Knowing and Owning a Body

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Introduction

The body is central to much philosophical discussion of the self and the person. Philosophers have argued variously for the claims that: (i) the self or person is identical with the body or the human being; (ii) the self or person is conceived of or experienced by itself as a body; (iii) a necessary condition of self-consciousness is the conception or experience of oneself as a body; and relatedly that (iv) the possibility of self-reference depends on discriminating knowledge of oneself as one among others, which is only possible if one conceives of or experiences oneself as a body. ¹ Clearly the body has not been ignored by those who argue for these claims. But the interest in it has depended on its relevance to questions about the self or person. The aim of this thesis, in contrast, is to present a sustained discussion of the body in its own right. To adopt this aim is not to deny that the body is relevant to questions about the self or person, nor to deny that this is part of its interest. And I shall consider some of these questions. But I hope to show that the body is of interest beyond its relevance to the self or person, and even more, that we are better placed to discuss this once we have a more considered and neutral account of the body in hand.

To introduce the body, however, I do want to consider how it is presented, very schematically, in discussions of the self and the person. For there is an oddity to the body as presented in these discussions. This oddity provides a place to begin.

Of the above claims, (i) is the most robustly metaphysical: it alone takes a stand on what the self or person is. Claims (ii) to (iv) are all broadly speaking epistemological or semantic in character. They concern the conception or experience one has of oneself as a body; and of course, in (iii) and (iv), the role of this in self-consciousness and the capacity for self-reference. But one might naively expect a link between the metaphysical claim made in (i) and the claims made in (ii) to (iv). One might expect one's conception or experience of oneself to reflect what one in fact is: a human being. In this way, claims (ii) to (iv) should be influenced by claim (i).

This might seem overly naïve. There is in general no guarantee of a match between how things seem to one and how they in fact are: it is perfectly possible one's

¹ In support of claim (i) see e.g. E. Olson (1997); P. Snowdon (1990) and (1995); P.F. Strawson (1959); D. Wiggins (1980) and (1987); B. Williams (1973a), (1973c) and (1973d). Against claim (i) see e.g. D. Parfit (1987); L. Rudder Baker (2000); S. Shoemaker and R. Swinburne (1984). In support of claim (ii) see e.g. M. Ayers (1991); D. Bell (1990); B. Brewer (1995); Q. Cassam (1997); G. Evans (1982); M. Merleau-Ponty (1962). Against claim (ii) see e.g. M. Martin (1995) and (1997); S. Shoemaker (1984c). In support of claim (iii) and/or (iv) see e.g. Q. Cassam (1997); G. Evans (1982); P.F. Strawson (1959) and (1966). Against claims (iii) and/or (iv) see e.g. G.E.M. Anscombe (1994); L. O'Brien (1995); and possibly J. Campbell (1994) (on the question of how Campbell's view relates to (iii) and (iv) see Q. Cassam (1997a)).
conception or experience of oneself is misleading or in error. At the end of the day, this conception or experience may have to answer to the hard facts of one's nature, but it need not reflect them. Even more, from a philosophical point of view (i) is controversial: any prominence it has gained is relatively recent. Many philosophers (and perhaps non-philosophers, too) have thought the self or person to be nothing more than a single if unified stream of consciousness. Or an illusion. Or, if it exists at all, to exist in some sense outside of the spatio-temporal world – a systematically elusive and mysterious entity. According to none of these views is the self or person identical to a body or a human being. So even if we allow that it is fair to expect one's conception or experience of oneself to reflect what one in fact is, that is only reason to expect one's conception or experience of oneself to reflect the fact that one is a body or a human being if indeed one is a body or a human being.

But that said, from a pre-theoretical or common-sense point of view, (i) is little more than a platitude. In ordinary life, all the selves or persons we know do seem to be, and to conceive of and experience themselves and each other as, human beings. Claim (i) simply expresses a philosophical endorsement of this. This being so, one might hold on to one's naive expectation to the following extent. Perhaps the true and ultimate nature of the self or person has little if anything to do with bodies or human beings: (i) may be rejected as wrong or simplistic. Nonetheless in so far as one does, from a pre-theoretical or common-sense point of view, have a conception and experience of oneself as a body, this should reflect the fact that one at least seems to oneself to be a human being. That is, the conception or experience one has of oneself as a body, to which claims (ii) to (iv) appeal, should be a conception or experience of oneself as a human body, even if, at the end of the day, we discover that selves or persons are not human beings, and this conception or experience is thus in error. But on the whole, this expectation has not been fulfilled. The conception or experience one has of oneself as a body, to which philosophers interested in the self or person have appealed, has little which is recognisably human about it.

What would it be to conceive of or experience oneself as a recognisably human body? One question is what it is for a body to be 'recognisably' human. No doubt there are different levels of knowledge about human beings and their bodies that one might have. Some philosophers who have claimed that the self or person is identical with the human being seem to be conceiving of human beings as a biological species: Homo

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Sapiens. In keeping with this, we might suggest that a human body is simply a member of this species: a Homo Sapiens. So for instance, it will have a quite specific evolutionary history, genetic structure, physiology and brain. In Western society, most people have at least some scientific knowledge of this sort about human beings and their bodies, however incomplete or shaky. One way, then, of explaining what it would be to conceive of or experience oneself as a recognisably human body draws on this scientific knowledge. To conceive of or experience oneself as a recognisably human body is to conceive of or experience oneself as a Homo Sapiens, and so as possessing a quite specific evolutionary history, genetic structure, physiology and brain. We can leave open exactly how much scientific knowledge is actually required for a self or person to possess such a conception or experience. Indeed we could even suggest that basically ‘human being’ functions like a natural kind concept. We are all familiar with the basic sample to which the term refers. That sample is us. But what exactly these human beings are we leave in the hands of the scientists. It is up to them to fill out this conception or experience which each of us possesses in crude.

Another way of explaining what it would be to conceive of or experience oneself as a recognisably human body refuses to abandon a more pre-theoretical or common-sense point of view. We may not know where to draw the line between this level and a more scientific level. We may not even be sure that there is a firm line to be drawn. But we still have some sense of what a human being is without recourse to science. This is the concept I shall be concerned with in this thesis. It is not the idea of species membership, although it does invoke a more general idea of membership. It is the idea of being one of us.

Let us imagine, for instance, that having delivered our concept of a human being into the hands of the scientists, they return the information that, as it happens and despite appearances, half of the sample belong to one biological species, and half to another. We were wrong that our sample was of a single evolutionary kind. I think it is unlikely that we should therefore strip half the population of their status as human beings. Or at least, one idea of what it is to be human would survive this discovery. It would be what united these two different species together.

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4 See e.g. E. Olson (1997).
6 As Tom Baldwin says: ‘There is no clear boundary between, say, an imprecise and unsystematic understanding of how to grow vegetables and systematic scientific knowledge of the biological processes involved . . . ’ (1988) p. 38.
This concept of a human being is perhaps akin to Locke's idea of 'man', or as we should now say 'men and women'. One does not need to believe in evolution or know anything at all about the biological sciences to possess it. It is a concept which can be shared by a scientist, a theologian who believes we are all made in the image of God, and a member of a culture which has not developed a body of knowledge anything like modern science or Western religion. They can all conceive of and indeed experience themselves and each other as human beings in this sense. Note, however, that this concept of a human being is not simply the concept of a person. It is quite possible that our concept of a person covers beings who are decidedly not human beings should they nonetheless possess traits like reason, intelligence, and self-consciousness. Perhaps extra-terrestrials or even members of a terrestrial species of cetaceans might count as persons. But extra-terrestrials and cetaceans cannot count as humans. So although human beings are persons and no doubt in matter of fact do belong to a single species, we have a concept of a human being which is neither the concept of a person nor the concept of a member of this species. This concept embodies a pre-theoretical or common-sense view of ourselves.

Can we be more specific about the nature of this concept? What exactly do we think we are? The answer to this question is bound to be complex. Perhaps we could never manage to answer it in full. But it is relatively easy to give at least a partial answer which can be applied to the question with which we are concerned, viz. what it would be for a body to be a recognisably human body. And certainly the idea of such a body is a part, indeed a good part, of this concept of a human being.

Among the other objects with which we share the world, both animate and inanimate, human beings have a characteristic perceptual appearance and exhibit characteristic behaviour. On the one hand, a human body has a standard shape and structure: a torso of a certain girth, four limbs, hands and feet, a head and, perhaps most importantly, a human face. Once mature, is has a relatively stable size. Its skin, eyes, and hair are coloured. It has a certain density, and feel to the touch. It has a smell. This perceptual appearance carries a very real social significance. For instance, a human being will appear to be of a certain sex and race depending on its body's shape and colour, although no doubt there is more to the ideas of sex and race than merely shape.

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7 J. Locke (1975).
8 A person is 'a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places' (J. Locke (1975) p. 335).
9 For discussion of the importance of the face see V. Bruce and A. Young (1998); J. Cole (1998).
and colour. On the other hand, a human being is capable of mobility, and its behaviour will exhibit typical patterns of motion, both natural and intentional. It walks upright, and is relatively dexterous. It has a wide range of natural expressions. It is capable of intentional action. It is capable of speech.

No doubt this description is rough-and-ready. But I think the basic idea should be evident. What it is for a body to be recognisably human is for it to possess a characteristic set of features allowing it to be immediately distinguished in perception from non-human bodies. The force of ‘recognisable’ here is to do in large part with bodily features which make up bodily appearance – to oneself and to others. It is these features that make a body one of us, make a body belong with or among us, in virtue of making that body appear like us. So part of what it would be to conceive of or experience oneself as a recognisably human body would be to conceive of or experience oneself as a body possessing such a characteristic set of features. Indeed, if we turn to developmental psychology, we find that the idea that we conceive of and experience ourselves and others as recognisably human bodies in this sense is thought to be of real import. Alison Gopnik and Andrew Meltzoff, for instance, have suggested that ‘infants are launched on their career of interpersonal relations with the primary perception judgement: “Here is something like me”’ Their basic idea is that infants grasp themselves and others as perceptibly similar in body. This grasp acts as a sort of bedrock which enables infants to develop an appreciation of others as selves or persons, similar now to the infants themselves not only in body, but in mind or psychology. In this way, a conception or experience of oneself as a recognisably human body, akin to other perceptible bodies in one’s company, is crucial to normal human development.

I shall return to Gopnik and Meltzoff’s suggestion again at the end of this thesis. The point for now, however, is that surprisingly few of these rough-and-ready bodily features have played any role at all in the conception and experience philosophers have supposed one to have of oneself as a body. Thus the oddity about the

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10 For discussion of the social significance of perceptual bodily appearance see E. Goffman (1959) and (1963). On the relation between race and colour, see e.g. F. Fanon (1967).

11 There is a question about whether this concept of a recognisably human body is purely nominal, or is committed, however tacitly or minimally, to the idea that the characteristic bodily appearance of human beings is to be explained by appeal to some or other sort of underlying common cause. If so, then an object which was indiscernible from us at a pre-theoretical or common-sense level, but which did not share this underlying commonality, would not actually be one of us, appearances notwithstanding. Note however that a positive answer to this question is not the same as the claim that our concept of a recognisably human body is a natural kind concept, albeit of a weak sort. The underlying commonality need not obviously be biological or scientific. For instance, perhaps the explanation could be that all human beings are made by, and in the image of, God.

body as it is presented in philosophical discussions of the self or person: it is strikingly spare of human detail.

Why is this so? Perhaps one reason is a general philosophical tendency towards abstraction. But here is a different explanation. Some philosophers are interested in the self or person's conception or experience of itself as a body simply for its own sake. But many are interested in it because of its potential relevance to questions about self-consciousness and the capacity for self-reference. When this is the motivation, philosophers are led towards consideration of the body by way of consideration of what is required for thought or reference in general, and thought of or reference to oneself in particular. Suppose now that there proves reason to claim that thought of or reference to oneself is only possible if one conceives of or experiences oneself as a body. Perhaps such thought or reference displays a sort of objectivity which we think only possible if the object of the thought or reference is taken by the subject to be a material body, broadly speaking. The details of such a claim do not matter here, but no doubt, in motivating it, some sort of account of what a body is will be forthcoming. A variety of such accounts in fact exist. One might think that a body is simply something that exists in the spatio-temporal world: a body is anything that has an empirical place. On this rather thin account, a hologram or a dispersing cloud of gas is a body. Or one might think that this is too thin: that our pre-theoretical or common-sense idea of a body distinguishes (and rightly) holograms and clouds from tables, horses, and rocks. One might think that not just spatio-temporal location but shape and something like resistance, solidity or impenetrability is required if something is to count as a body. Crucially, a body must fill space, in a way as to exclude other bodies. Or one might think that the idea of a body essentially involves the idea of it as internally causally connected and capable of causal interaction with other objects. Or one might think that the idea of a body essentially involves the idea of it as exerting and responding to mechanical force. Or one might think some combination of these was the right account. For it is not as if they are unconnected.

It may not be immediately obvious how or why these various accounts of what a material body is bear on general issues to do with the possibility of thought and reference. But what matters is only that the overall structure of the thinking be clear.

13 See G. Evans (1982), although Evans' account is far from clear.
14 See Q. Cassam (1997); I. Kant (1970); J. Locke (1975); C. Peacocke (1993); D. Wiggins (1968).
Again, suppose that the kind of objectivity displayed in self-consciousness or the capacity for self-reference is only possible if the object of the thought or reference is taken by the subject to be a body. Then in thinking self-conscious thoughts, or referring to oneself, one must be conceiving of or experiencing oneself as a body. What this amounts to will depend on which account of the nature of material bodies is adopted. One might be conceiving of or experiencing oneself as spatio-temporally located. Or as a shaped, solid, space-filler. Or as internally causally connected and capable of causal interaction with other objects. Or as capable of exerting and responding to mechanical force.

Of course, human bodies are spatio-temporally located, shaped and solid, space-filling, internally causally connected, and capable of causally interacting with other objects and exerting and responding to mechanical force. But so too are non-human bodies. So far, there is nothing recognisably human in conceiving of and experiencing oneself as such a body, even if, needless to say, there is something recognisably bodily in such a conception or experience.

Perhaps this seems of little philosophical matter. Why do we need to pay attention to the details of the conception and experience we have of our bodies and to the precise nature of these bodies themselves? Certainly it does not seem intuitively obvious why this would be of any relevance whatsoever to questions about self-consciousness and the capacity for self-reference. For instance, it seems absurd to think that a necessary condition of self-consciousness or self-reference is the conception or experience of oneself as a recognisably human body. Surely it is both logically and empirically possible that beings other than human beings might be self-conscious and capable of self-reference. And surely they would not need to be under the illusion that they were humans to be so capable.

For the time being let us grant this is so. But the paucity of human detail matters if one has other philosophical aims. For instance, it matters if one has any interest for its own sake in how we conceive of or experience ourselves as bodies. Perhaps this is less an interest of analytic philosophy than of continental philosophy and psychology. Perhaps analytic philosophy has been more interested in the idea that we do not conceive of and experience ourselves as bodies, than in the idea that we do. But still, if one has an interest in this latter idea at all, then such an account is at best incomplete, at worst misleading or flawed. The reason for this is simple. Any conception or experience one has of oneself as a body should answer to one's conception and experience of one's own body. And there is more to our conception and experience of our own bodies than
has so far been recognised, viz. the fact that this conception and experience appears to be as of a recognisably human body. But now a question has emerged which is just about the body. It seems we each of us have a conception and experience of our own body which has not been adequately reckoned with. For each of us there is one body which is special, different from all other bodies: the body which is one's own, and which one conceives of and experiences as such. Prescinding now from the issue of whether this conception and experience of one's own body amounts to a conception and experience of one's self, we can nonetheless ask: What does this conception or experience of one's own body amount to? What is its significance for us? What role does it play in our lives? These are the basic questions I shall address in this thesis.

Part I is about body awareness and body ownership. We each of us have a sort of sensory and spatial body awareness 'from the inside' I examine the nature of this awareness and argue that what it is to conceive of and experience a body as one's own body just is to enjoy this awareness of it. I then examine the nature of the awareness of our own bodies we have 'from the outside', through the outer senses. And I propose one way in which the body conceived of and experienced as one's own is conceived of and experienced as a recognisably human body: one's own body can be presented to one as one's own through the outer senses as well as through body awareness.

Part II is about the knowledge of the location of objects which we take perception, especially visual perception, to afford. There is a question of whether and if so why there is a connection between the subject's body, and her spatial perception of and thinking about objects and places in her immediate environment. I argue that we need to reconsider how we think about the places we perceive if we are to do justice to this knowledge. The subject's awareness of her body is not incidental to the alternative account I propose: her awareness of her body from the inside is what provides her with knowledge of being within a spatial world, together with the objects which she perceives.

Part III is about the conceptual problem of other minds. I argue that a solution to it demands that we treat psychological concepts as observational: psychological states are states which can be either experienced, or observed. In other words, psychological states can be bodily states, for it is bodily states which can be observed. The problem then is to see how this solution is itself possible in face of strong intuitions that it is incredible. To this end I examine in some detail our concepts of the basic emotions and the importance of naturally expressive behaviour. This leads me to propose a second
way in which the body conceived of and experienced as one's own is conceived of and experienced as recognisably human: it is subject to the basic human emotions.

Only briefly, in conclusion, do I return to the question of whether the conception and experience of one's own body which I develop in this thesis amounts to a conception and experience of one's self. For it is, quite clearly, not a priori or prima facie evident that we conceive of and experience ourselves as bodies. Even if, at the end of the day, we reject all those views which claim that the self or person is not identical with the body or the human being, one can at least sensibly wonder whether one is one's body, or even has a body.\(^{18}\) What I shall suggest is that there is one very intuitive reason to think that we do conceive of and experience our bodies as our selves which emerges from this thesis. This, in turn, provides an extremely simple model for understanding self-consciousness and self-reference. So despite initial intuitions to the contrary, I shall end by suggesting, if tentatively, that the precise nature of the body one conceives of and experiences as one's own is after all of relevance to questions about self-consciousness and the capacity for self-reference. How robust these suggestions prove to be in face of other considerations, such as those which have motivated philosophers (and perhaps non-philosophers, too) to claim that the self or person is a stream of consciousness, or an illusion, or exists outside of the spatio-temporal world, or that self-consciousness and the capacity for self-reference is possible in absence of any conception or experience of oneself as a body at all, is a further question. But I hope that, at the very least, it will be apparent why a more considered and neutral account of the body is of interest and of use.

Knowing and Owning a Body

Part I
1.1 The Body as Subject and as Object

In the *Blue Book*, Wittgenstein draws a distinction between two uses of 'I' or 'my' which he labels the use 'as object' and the use 'as subject'. For instance, 'I' is used 'as object' when one judges 'My arm is broken' based on how it looks, or on an x-ray; or 'I have grown six inches' based on measuring one's height against a wall. 'I' is used 'as subject' when for instance one judges 'I see so-and-so' or 'I hear so-and-so' or 'I think it will rain' based on introspection.\(^1\) Related to this distinction is another distinction, famously drawn by P.F. Strawson. Strawson distinguishes two rough classes of predicate which one can ascribe to oneself and to others, 'M-predicates' and 'P-predicates'. M-predicates are predicates which one ascribes to material bodies of all sorts, like 'weighs 10 stone' or 'is in the drawing-room'. P-predicates are predicates which one ascribes only to persons (although perhaps too to some animals), like 'is going for a walk' or 'is in pain' or 'is thinking hard'. P-predicates ascribe states of consciousness or imply the possession of consciousness by that to which they are ascribed. M-predicates do not.\(^2\)

The two distinctions are related in that paradigmatically, when 'I' is used as object the sort of predicate ascribed will be an M-predicate, while when 'I' is used as subject the sort of predicate ascribed will be a P-predicate.\(^3\) This relation is crude, in part because the division of predicates into M-predicates and P-predicates is crude: many, perhaps even most, predicates we ascribe to ourselves do not fit neatly into either category, like for instance 'is turning red' or 'has not moved' or 'is capable of great resilience'.\(^4\) But still, there are M-predicates and there are P-predicates. There are predicates which ascribe properties which are merely physical properties. And there are predicates which ascribe states of consciousness.

When predicates ascribing states of consciousness are ascribed on the basis of introspection — when, to use Wittgenstein's label, 'I' is used as subject — these judgements are immune to errors of misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. This means that it is not possible that the judgement is mistaken only in which object it picks out as instantiating the property ascribed by the predicate. For instance, if one judges on the basis of introspection 'I am in pain' it is impossible that one is correct that someone is in pain, but wrong that it is oneself. Contrast this with a judgement like

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\(^{1}\) L. Wittgenstein (1958) p. 66.

\(^{2}\) P.F. Strawson (1959) ch. 3, esp. p. 103 ff.

\(^{3}\) Cf. S. Shoemaker (1984c).

\(^{4}\) See B. Williams (1973a).
'I have a broken arm' based on studying an x-ray. If there has been a mistake and the x-ray taken of one's own arm has been confused with the x-ray taken of another's arm, then by studying that x-ray one certainly can know that someone has a broken arm. One only makes a mistake in thinking that the person in question is oneself. The reason why one makes this mistake is that nothing about the x-ray can guarantee that the arm it is of is one's own. One believes or supposes the x-ray to be of one's own arm, but that belief or supposition is both additional to the information the x-ray itself contains, and fallible. And so, if one makes a judgement about oneself by studying the x-ray, there is a possibility, however remote, that one will make a mistake. In the case of a judgement like 'I am in pain' made on the basis of introspection, no such possibility exists. If one knows that pain is instantiated on the basis of introspection that just is knowing that one is oneself in pain. One's grounds for judgement give one knowledge that one is oneself in pain if they give one knowledge that anyone is in pain at all.⁵

So, again crudely, there are on the one hand judgements which ascribe states of consciousness to oneself and which are immune to errors of misidentification, and there are on the other hand judgements which ascribe physical properties to oneself and which allow for errors of misidentification: 'I' as subject, and 'I' as object.

However, some judgements seem at odds with this dichotomy. We each of us have a sort of awareness of our own bodies 'from the inside' One is aware of the overall affective condition of one's body, of whether it is lethargic or energetic, say, or hungry or satiated, and also of any particular sensations located at discrete places within or on it, such as pains, tickles, scratches, feelings of warmth, cold, pressure, and so on. One is also aware of certain purely spatial properties of one's body, for instance its current shape or configuration. Based on this latter awareness, one might come to judge, for instance, 'I am sitting cross-legged'. This judgement appears to be made in such a way that it is immune to errors of misidentification. At least in the normal course of affairs, it seems one cannot know in this way that someone's legs are crossed, but be wrong that the legs in question are one's own. But the property ascribed, sitting cross-legged, belongs basically with the class of M-predicates, not P-predicates: it is a physical property, in that it attributes a shape or spatial configuration. Judgements about oneself made on the basis of awareness of one's body from the inside seem to be immune to errors of misidentification, and in this way indicate a use of 'I' as subject.

⁵ I am neglecting here the possibility of a 'no-ownership' account of experiences. For discussion see A.J. Ayer (1964); G. Evans (1982); D. Parfit (1987); C. Peacocke (1999); P.F. Strawson (1959).
But the properties they ascribe can be physical properties, and in this way these judgements indicate a use of ‘I’ as object.

In the next Section, I shall discuss this awareness one has of one’s body from the inside, and I shall return later in this Part to the question of whether and if so why judgements made on this basis are immune to errors of misidentification. In the rest of this Section, I want to say a little more about the intuitive interest of this awareness and the judgements it grounds.

Philosophers keen to argue that we conceive of or experience ourselves as bodies have been much impressed by these judgements. For instance, Gareth Evans has claimed that these judgements ‘tell against the common idea that our conception of ourselves “from the first-person perspective” ... is not necessarily of a physical thing located in space’, and that they provide ‘the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self’. Certainly these judgements point to the fact that our pre-theoretical or common-sense conception of the self is not Cartesian in that it attributes to the self physical and spatial properties, in a ‘first-person way’. But Descartes at least has no illusions on this score: he is fully aware that his account of the self is not at one with the pre-theoretical or common-sense view. That is the point of his famous claim that I am not in my body as a pilot is in his ship. Pointing out the existence of these judgements does not tell against the Cartesian conception of the self on the reasonable assumption that the Cartesian conception of the self is in some sense revisionist: it does not claim for itself phenomenological accuracy.

Moreover, the judgements in question can be expressed using ‘my’ as opposed to ‘I’: if on the basis of awareness of my body from the inside I judge that ‘I am sitting cross-legged’ or even that ‘I am aching all over’ or that ‘I have a pain in this hand’ I could just as well have judged that ‘My legs are crossed’ or that ‘My body is aching all over’ or that ‘My hand hurts’. That is, the very same grounds license either a judgement using the first-person pronoun, or a judgement using the possessive ‘my’ in conjunction with ‘body’ or instead the term for one or more body parts like ‘legs’ or ‘hand’ or ‘nose’, etc. Sometimes one formulation sounds better to the ear, sometimes the other, but both will do and both will be immune to errors of misidentification if either is. But it is not obvious that ‘I’ simply means ‘my body’ or ‘this body’ even if it turns out that these terms have the same referent and are, in the context of these judgements, interchangeable. Once again, if I can even wonder whether I am my body it is not a

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priori or prima facie evident that I am. So we can either enquire into such judgements in
the hope of elucidating some aspect of our use of 'I' and our conception and experience
of ourselves, or we can enquire into such judgements in the hope of elucidating some
aspect of our use of 'my' when applied to our bodies, and so too of our conception and
experience of our bodies. It is this latter path that I shall pursue. The aim of this Part is
to provide an account of one's conception and experience of one's body as one's own:
in what does grasp of 'my' or 'mine' when used in conjunction with 'body' consist? I
shall leave open the question of whether or not this amounts to a conception and
experience of oneself.

To opt for this path is not entirely to abandon all the issues surrounding the self.
Or at least, analogous issues do arise for the body. Consider for instance Thomas
Nagel's claim that the thought that I am a particular person, in my case HP, in his case
TN, is a source of great wonder and mystery. Nagel's idea is that for each of us, from
our own first-person perspective, it can seem incomprehensible that one is simply a
particular person, one among others, all equally part of the world as it is conceived from
a third-person or more objective point of view: 'I may occupy TN or see the world
through the eyes of TN, but I can't be TN. I can't be a mere person' 8 This is an attempt
to express the idea that the self is in some sense elusive or mysterious. How can I bring
my conception or experience of myself in line with my conception or experience of a
mere human being, one among others in the world? How can I identify the world as
experienced from my own first-person perspective, and that perspective itself, with the
world as conceived from a third-person or objective point of view?

A parallel issues arises about the body. As Merleau-Ponty famously puts it:

if I can, with my left hand, feel my right hand as it touches an object, the right
hand as an object is not the right hand as it touches. In so far as it sees or
touches the world, my body can therefore be neither seen nor touched.9

It may seem as if Merleau-Ponty is here writing as if there are two objects – my right
hand as it touches an object, and my right hand as an object of touch – and so is making
a rather questionable ontological claim. But it is plausible that the objects of which he

heart, that only I see, I was also inclined to say that by "I" I didn't really mean L.W, although for the
benefit of my fellow men I might say "It's now L.W. who really sees" though this is not what I really mean.
I could almost say that by "I" I mean something which just now inhabits L.W., something which others
can't see.'
9 M. Merleau-Ponty (1962) p. 92. Note that I am neglecting the relationship between this quotation and
Merleau-Ponty's view of the self as a 'body-subject'
writes should be taken as intentional objects.\textsuperscript{10} And certainly we can see his point without committing ourselves to an unparsimonious ontology. The point is that there are two sorts of awareness which I have of my body, which stand in some sort of complicated or problematic relation. There is on the one hand the awareness of my body I have from the inside, awareness which grounds judgements which are immune to errors of misidentification and which indicates what we might call a use of 'my' as subject. I have this sort of awareness of only one body and no one else has this sort of awareness of this body. This awareness seems deeply first-personal in flavour. Then there is on the other hand the awareness of my body I have through the outer senses: vision, touch, hearing, taste, smell. I can have outer sensory awareness of my body just as I can have outer sensory awareness of any body I come across in the world. And others too can be aware of my body in these ways. This awareness seems deeply third-personal in flavour. And indeed, judgements based on awareness of one's body through the outer senses have not been thought immune to errors of misidentification. It has seemed to many perfectly possible that if, say, one was jumbled up with other people's bodies, perhaps in a car accident, or when nearing the climax of a game of Twister, one might very well mistake a visually perceived hand or foot for one's own when really it belonged to another.\textsuperscript{11} Judgements based on awareness of one's body through the outer senses employ what we might call a use of 'my' as object.

The issue Merleau-Ponty raises is how these two sorts of awareness of one's body, from the inside and through the outer senses, can be brought in line with one another. From the inside I am aware of my body in a special way. I am aware of only one body in this way and no one else is aware of this body in this way. Through the outer senses I am aware of my body as just another object in the world. Other people are aware of it too. There is nothing special about it or my awareness of it at all. So how can this special body, my body, be just another body in the world, an object as much of my awareness as of the awareness of others? As David Bell puts it: 'The knowledge and understanding that I have of my own body are of two categorially distinguishable sorts'.\textsuperscript{12} There is a tension between the first-person and the third-person or objective perspectives on one's body one can have, just as there is a tension between the first-person and the third-person or objective perspectives on one's self one can have.

\textsuperscript{11} See J. Campbell (1994); Q. Cassam (1997); G. Evans (1982); M. Martin (1997); S. Shoemaker (1984c).
\textsuperscript{12} D. Bell (1990) p. 211.
It matters that this tension about the body be resolved. Or at least, without a resolution, it seems there is no prospect whatsoever of explaining how one’s conception and experience of one’s body as one’s own is also, in the first instance, a conception and experience as of a recognisably human body. Our typical conception or experience of human bodies stems in large part from encountering them through the outer senses. From the inside alone, I do have awareness of the general shape and current configuration of my body, and its affective or sensory condition. But I do not have awareness of most of the human details of my body: its colour and look, sounds, smells, feel to the touch, and more. It is almost as if the body the awareness is of might as well be an artist’s lay figure or manikin. Unless my conception and experience of my body attributes to it properties which are accessible to the outer senses, there will be very little about this conception and experience which presents my body as recognisably human.

By the end of this Part, I hope to show how this can be so: the first-person and the third-person or objective perspectives one can have on one’s body can be reconciled. What I shall turn to first, as promised, is the sort of awareness of one’s body one has from the inside. For one prominent philosopher may even have denied that there is any such awareness. In order to be in a position to discuss the use of ‘my’ as subject and the issue of what it is to conceive of and experience a body as one’s own, I need to ensure that the awareness which allegedly grounds such uses of ‘my’ does exist.
1.2 Body Awareness

G.E.M. Anscombe is notorious for claiming that one has ‘knowledge without observation’ of the position of one’s limbs.\(^\text{13}\) It is far from clear what Anscombe means by this. But sometimes she seems to mean – and certainly sometimes she seems to have been taken to mean – that even if we do experience body sensations, like pains, tickles, scratches, feelings of warmth, cold, pressure, and so on, we do not have any awareness of the spatial properties of our bodies, like shape or configuration.\(^\text{14}\) There is immediately something inconsistent in such a claim, for we experience body sensations, like pains, as located in or on our bodies: it seems to be at least a partly spatial property of one’s body that, for instance, there is a pain in its hand. But let us focus for the moment, with Anscombe, on what we might think of as purely spatial properties, like limb position. Could Anscombe possibly be denying that one is aware from the inside of the position of one’s limbs? Could ‘knowledge without observation’ mean ‘knowledge without awareness’? On the one hand, it is natural to think that a moment’s reflection on and attention to one’s body should secure the falsity of this claim. And Anscombe seems to acknowledge as much when she agrees, with her critics, that she denies what they think is ‘a plain fact of common experience’\(^\text{15}\) On the other hand, one may sometimes, if rarely, make a mistake with regard to the position (or existence) of one’s limbs. One can suffer a momentary illusion, or a more prolonged hallucination, as the phenomena of phantom and alien limbs make apparent.\(^\text{16}\) It is natural to think that illusion and hallucination are marks of, or of a piece with, sensory awareness and perception. Again Anscombe acknowledges as much.\(^\text{17}\) But nonetheless, having made both acknowledgements, she proceeds to comment:

‘I thought my leg was bent’, ‘To me it was as if my leg was bent’, ‘I should have said my leg was bent’, ‘I had the feeling of my leg’s being bent’: in a certain context all these come to the same thing. If only my leg had been bent, there would very likely just have been that fact and my knowledge of it, i.e. my capacity to describe my position straight off: no question of any appearance of the position to me, of any sensations which give me the position. The difference between the two situations [the situation in which I am right about my limb position and the situation in which I am wrong] may

\(^{13}\) G.E.M. Anscombe (1957), esp. sections 8 and 28, and (1962).
\(^{14}\) See D. Braybooke and Others (1962); C.B. Martin (1971).
\(^{16}\) People who suffer from phantom limb are amputees and those born without limbs: they have the illusion of enjoying awareness from the inside of the amputated or missing limb. People who suffer from alien limb lack any awareness from the inside of a limb which is in perfectly good physiological order, and disown it. See V.S. Ramachandran and S. Blakeslee (1998); O. Sacks (1991).
\(^{17}\) See G.E.M. Anscombe (1962) p. 57.
lie only in this, that in the one case my leg is bent and I know it, and in the
other it is not bent but – off my own bat – I believe that it is.\textsuperscript{18}

In face of the claim that one has a capacity to describe one’s position straight off
without ‘any appearance’, or that one forms a belief as to one’s position just ‘off one’s
own bat’, it would be foolhardy to claim outright that Anscombe does not intend
‘knowledge without observation’ to mean ‘knowledge without awareness’. What I shall
suggest is rather that she does not actually argue for such a claim. One possibility, then,
is that she has not expressed herself felicitously. Another, perhaps, is that she has not
quite seen what she has, and what she has not, argued for. But fine points of
interpretation aside, Anscombe provides us with no reason for denying that we have
awareness of the spatial properties of our bodies from the inside.

Before I begin on this task, I want to forestall one objection. Perhaps it might
not seem a plain fact of common experience that we have awareness not only of body
sensations, but of the spatial properties of our bodies from the inside. After all, any
awareness of these spatial properties seems dull and faded in comparison to body
sensations and outer sensory awareness. Unless one is suffering from the agony of pain
or the annoyance of a persistent itch, or is in the throes of sexual pleasure, one’s
awareness of one’s body from the inside is not likely to rival the lushness of vision, or
the beauty of sound. Whatever awareness one has may seem so pale, spartan, and
recalcitrant in comparison with body sensations and the outer senses as not to amount to
much awareness at all.

To say that awareness from the inside of the spatial properties of one’s body is
often minimal is not to say that no such awareness exists. And we can explain in part
why it is so often minimal if we make a simple distinction between awareness of one’s
body from the inside, and the internal information systems in one’s body together with
the information about one’s body they deliver for processing in the brain.\textsuperscript{19}

Many different internal systems provide information about one’s body, employing receptors in skin, muscles, organs, joints, bones, and the inner ear. Some of
these systems also provide information about other objects: skin receptors, for instance,
can provide information both about the shape of one’s hand, and about the shape of an
object one is holding in one’s hand. Equally, the vestibular system of the inner ear does
not provide information purely about the body, but also provides information about the

\textsuperscript{18} G.E.M. Anscombe (1962) p. 58.
\textsuperscript{19} The editors’ Introduction to J.L. Bermudez, N. Eilan, and T. Marcel (1995) stresses the importance of this
distinction.
body in relation to the gravitational field. There are also information systems which provide information about the body, albeit of a tacit sort, while providing information about other objects. The visual system, for instance, provides information about the orientation and movement of the head through the visual array and flow. So neither is all information about the body derived from internal information systems alone, nor do the internal information systems all provide information about the body alone. The sub-personal situation is complicated. But still, there is a basic distinction to be drawn between what is going on at the sub-personal level, and what is going on at the personal level. Although information about one's body must be reaching one's brain if, for instance, one is to be able to act successfully in the world, one's body need not come to awareness: the monitoring and directing of the body in action can be largely a task for sub-personal processes. This can explain why one is so often not aware of the spatial properties of one's body. One has no need to be. But still, the spatial properties of one's body can be, and frequently enough are, the object of one's awareness. Perhaps this is most palpable when one is trying to learn some new skill, like how to dance, or how to play an instrument, or alternatively when one realises that one's body is the object of another's gaze. All that is required is that for some reason or other one attends to one's body. Then the information which has been exploited at the sub-personal level gets exploited at the personal level: one attends to one's body from the inside, and in so doing becomes aware of its spatial properties.

Consider, for instance, the experience of closing one's eyes and stretching one's arms out in front of one's body. As Michael Martin has insisted, when one does this one is aware of the span of one's arms across and within a larger space: one is aware of one's body as bounded and limited within a space which it does not fill. One feels the shape of one's arms, positioned in space in relation to each other and the rest of one's body. There are these tube-like appendages attached to a torso and stretched in front of it, at a perpendicular angle. There is space between one's arms, and also between one's arms and one's torso, where one's body is not currently positioned. Yet one has some awareness of this space, in that one is aware that one's body is precisely not there, but configured in or around it. From the inside, then, one is aware of one's body as

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20 This complication has caused some psychologists to deny that there is anything like a 'body sense'. See e.g. J.J. Gibson (1966) esp. p. 32 ff. And perhaps some philosophers would object to the idea that there is a 'body sense' because of the paucity of objects this 'sense' would provide one with information about. See e.g. S. Shoemaker (1994). But one can perhaps deny that there is a bona fide body 'sense' without denying that the body is an object of a peculiar sort of awareness: it depends on what is required for something to count as a 'sense'. Cf. M. Martin (1993) and (1997).

generally shaped and currently configured in a certain way, within a space which is larger than it and which it does not fill.\(^{22}\) No doubt if one took up this position in order to catch a ball, one might not be aware of one's body in this way: one might only be aware of the ball. But that does not mean that one can never enjoy such awareness.

In what follows, I shall take it that this is the basic deliverance of the spatial awareness of one's body one enjoys from the inside: one is aware of one's body as shaped and configured in a certain way, within a space which is larger than it. This is how one can know the position of one's limbs: for instance, one can be aware of one's legs as crossed. I shall return below to the question of what more, apart from shape and configuration, awareness of one's body from the inside might deliver. But for now, the point is that Anscombe does really seem to be denying a plain fact of common experience if indeed she is denying that one can be aware of these spatial properties of one's body from the inside. But is she really denying this?

Perhaps the key point Anscombe tries to press is that our sensations of limb position are not 'separable' or 'separately describable'. What does this mean? She elucidates this notion in a number of ways. Sometimes she claims that there is no description of the content of the sensation which is 'internal'. Consider for instance going down in a lift. We can describe this sensation by reference to what occasions it: going down in a lift. We can call it: 'that familiar sensation of going down in the lift'. Or we can describe this sensation as: 'of sudden lightness and as it were of one's stomach lurching upwards'.\(^{23}\) This last description Anscombe supposes to be internal. It is what we allegedly lack with respect to limb position. So one way to interpret Anscombe's point is that we have no descriptions of our sensations of limb position which are internal, in that they prescind from what occasions them.

Ancombe has hold of a real point here, but it is not well put. As Anscombe herself seems to acknowledge, whether or not we are capable of providing an internal description of a sensation seems largely a matter of the conventions of our language. To describe a smell as the smell 'of onions' seems not to be an internal description because it describes the smell by what occasions it. But should onions stop having that smell, but other objects come to possess it, then 'of onions' might become an internal description, like 'bitter' is.\(^{24}\) So Anscombe's point is not obviously well-made by reference to

\(^{22}\) M. Martin (1993) and also (1995) and (1997).
\(^{24}\) Ibid.
whether or not a sensation can be internally described. The point seems rather to do with the sort of content which a sensation may or may not have.

Matters are not helped by another of Anscombe's attempts at elucidation. Sometimes she claims that our sensations of limb position are not 'separable' because if one is asked what it is like to give a reflex kick, say, one imagines giving a kick, not having a set of sensations. And even more, she seems to think, one would not even know prior to investigation what sensations would accompany giving a kick. To know this one would need to give the kick, while attending to any sensations of sharpness, tickles, strain, etc., that occur. Anscombe seems to take this to show the kick itself has some sort of priority over the sensations: again, a point perhaps with some merit. But once more, this point is not obviously well-made by this example. For it seems a matter of happenstance that one needs to investigate in order to know what sensations accompany a reflex kick. Surely there is no logical impossibility in the idea that a person could be exceedingly knowledgeable about such matters – perhaps she simply visited the doctor the day before, or is a yogi.\(^\text{25}\) If so, then surely too there is no logical impossibility in the idea that a person could straight away imagine having such sensations if asked what it is like to give a reflex kick, as opposed to imagining giving the kick.

In both these attempts at elucidation, Anscombe seems to be hovering near a point she is unsure how best to make: it is something to do with the sort of content which a sensation may or may not have, something to do with the priority of the limb position itself over a sensation of it. In the following quotation, however, she presents an argument which is both simple and correct:

> if one ever did have to use the feelings of resistance in the upper leg, and of weight and pressure in the lower leg as clues going by which one judged that one's legs were crossed, one would also need assurance that the sensations of pressure, weight, and resistance were produced in one leg by the other and not by some quite different bodies.\(^\text{26}\)

Suppose that one's legs are in matter of fact crossed. So in the lower leg, one would be aware of certain located sensations, of weight on it, and of contact with the front of its thigh. In the upper leg, one would be aware of certain other located sensations, of support, for instance, and of contact with the back of the thigh. But unless one already knows where one's legs are, that is, how they are configured with respect to one

\(^{22}\) Cf. C.B. Martin (1971).

\(^{26}\) G.E.M. Anscombe (1962) p. 55. She repeats the point on p. 56.
another, these sensations provide one with no evidence whatsoever that one’s legs are crossed. One leg could have a different object resting on it, the other could be resting on a different object again. So one cannot know in virtue of having located sensations of support and resistance, etc., in one’s legs that they are crossed, since unless one already knows that they are crossed one does not know that the support and resistance, etc., is offered to each leg by the other.

What this shows is that one cannot know the position of one’s limbs on the basis of particular, located sensations in or on one’s limbs. It does not show that one cannot know the position of one’s limbs on the basis of awareness as of the position of one’s limbs. Nor does it show that no such awareness exists. But I think it does help to explain what Anscombe means by saying that sensations of limb position are not ‘separable’

Recall the sensation of sudden lightness and of one’s stomach lurching upwards typically caused by going down in a lift. If one knows that this sensation is typically present on these occasions, then one can use its presence, together with this piece of general, empirical knowledge, to judge or infer that one is going down in a lift if one does not know this already. For Anscombe, this is to know ‘by observation’ of one’s sensations that one is going down in a lift. For our purposes, the basic point is that the content of the sensation on its own cannot ground the belief that one is going down in a lift. The reason is simple. The content of the sensation is not as of going down in a lift. There is no such match between the content of the sensation, and the content of the knowledge it helps to ground. Possessing the piece of general, empirical knowledge linking stomach sensations and lifts is therefore indispensable. Contrast this now with limb position. Anscombe thinks that one cannot know ‘by observation’ of one’s sensations that one’s limbs are crossed. Why? On the one hand, attention to particular, located sensations of support and resistance, etc., in one’s legs is no basis on its own for knowing that they are crossed. For like the sensation of sudden lightness and of one’s stomach lurching upwards, the content of these sensations, considered in themselves, has nothing to do with limb position. The content is only as of support and resistance, etc. But on the other hand, and unlike the case of stomach sensations and lifts, there is no general, empirical knowledge available which would link particular sets of these located sensations to particular types of limb position. For as the above argument suggests, the same set of particular, located sensations can be caused by different positions. So it is not possible for the basis of one’s knowledge of the position of one’s limbs to consist in the presence of particular, located sensations of support and
resistance, etc., together with some general, empirical knowledge. Therefore one cannot know the position of one's limbs 'by observation'.

If this is right, then what it means for a sensation to be 'separable' is for its content not to match the content of a particular piece of knowledge which it is being used to ground. A 'separable' sensation makes a contribution to knowledge only in conjunction with some general, empirical knowledge linking the type of sensation to something else. Knowledge formed on this basis is 'by observation'. A 'non-separable' sensation, in contrast then, is a sensation whose content does match the content of a particular piece of knowledge which it is being used to ground. So no general, empirical knowledge is needed in addition. Knowledge formed on this basis is not 'by observation'. Indeed at one point, Anscombe appears to say exactly this:

When I say: 'the sensation is not separable' I mean that the internal description of the 'sensation' -- the description of the sensation-content -- is the very same as the description of the fact known; when that is so, I should deny that we can speak of observing that fact by means of the alleged sensation.\(^7\)

Note that this way of elucidating the notion of 'separability' is relative to a particular piece of knowledge which a sensation is being used to ground. It does not apply to sensations as a type or class. For instance, the sensation of sudden lightness and of one's stomach lurching upwards typically caused by going down in a lift is 'separable' when it helps to ground the judgement that one is going down in a lift. But this same sensation would be 'non-separable' if used to ground the judgement that one is experiencing a sensation of sudden lightness and of one's stomach lurching upwards.\(^8\) 'Separability' is more a kind of evidence a sensation can provide than a kind of sensation itself. Part of why Anscombe's discussion is unclear is that either she simply fails to recognise this point, or she does not make it sufficiently explicit.

If this is indeed what Anscombe in the end intends by 'separability' and 'knowledge by observation', then her claim that we do not know the position of our limbs 'by observation' is simply a negative claim. The basis of knowledge of limb position is not a set of so-called 'separable' sensations like particular, located feelings of support and resistance, etc., together with some general empirical knowledge. And this negative claim is wholly compatible with the thought that the basis of knowledge of limb position is a 'non-separable' sensation, that is, a sensation or awareness as of limb

\(^7\) G.E.M. Anscombe (1962) p. 56.

\(^8\) Note, however, that Ansombe does not think judgements about one's particular, located sensations constitute knowledge. I discuss this further below.
position. It is perhaps worth pointing out that, according to this interpretation, a sensation or awareness as of limb position can be 'separable'. It is only that it is not 'separable' when it is used to ground knowledge of limb position. Suppose, for instance, that one knows a piece of general, empirical knowledge to the effect that when one is nervous, one tends to absent-mindedly twist one's hands about. All of a sudden, in the middle of an interview, say, one becomes aware from the inside of one's hands as twisted about. One might thereby come to know one is nervous. In this case, one's awareness of one's hands as twisted is 'separable' in that it helps ground a judgement whose content is not simply that one's hands are twisted about, but that one is nervous. But in any event, the main point is simply this: Anscombe has given us no reason to deny the plain fact of common experience that we are aware of the shape and configuration of our bodies from the inside, and that this is the basis of our knowledge of body shape and configuration. Indeed, she actually has given us reason to think that this awareness is fundamentally spatial. Knowledge of body shape and configuration cannot be grounded in awareness of particular, located sensations: the awareness grounding it must be as of spatial properties.

The question that remains is why Anscombe would then say that we know the position of our limbs without any 'appearance' and 'off our own bat'. One reason might be that she, like the rest of us, takes it for granted that we do enjoy awareness of the spatial properties of our bodies, but thinks that the nature of this awareness is not such as to qualify it for the title of 'a sensation'. For instance, she remarks: 'The idea that it is by sensation that I judge my bodily position is usually the idea that it is by other sensations, not just the 'sensation' of sitting cross-legged, say, that I judge that I am sitting cross-legged.' Indeed, she then goes on to speak easily of 'the sensation of having one's arms stretched out in front of one . . where the 'of' phrase gives an internal description'. This suggests that notwithstanding her other comments, she does accept that we enjoy awareness of the position of our limbs.

Another reason might be that Anscombe compares her view of knowledge of limb position to a view Wittgenstein suggests in the Blue Book about the locations of pains. Wittgenstein claims that 'the act of pointing determines a place of pain'. This is a crude expression of what we might better think of as a dispositional view. The view would then be that what makes it the case that a pain is felt in one place and not another

30 Ibid.
32 L. Wittgenstein (1958) p. 50 (emphasis in original).
is that the subject is disposed to tend to that place, and also perhaps to say that it is where the pain feels to be. This view does not deny that we have awareness of located pains. But it presents an account of what this awareness consists in that would deny it a rational or justifying role in knowledge of the locations of pains. Although I do not think anything in Anscombe’s arguments and attempts at elucidation suggest that she holds a parallel view about limb position, it is possible that her sympathy for the dispositional view of the locations of pains has infected her thinking about limb position. If so, then Anscombe claims that we know of our limb position without any ‘appearance’ and ‘off our own bat’ not because there is no body awareness of limb position, but because it plays no rational or justifying role in knowledge of limb position. Note that we should not think of this as the claim that body awareness is not belief-independent. For the existence and persistence of illusions, like that of phantom limb, would appear to show that it is. We must rather think of it as the claim that body awareness itself in some sense consists in our dispositions to behaviour and verbal report, as opposed to grounding them.

Whether or not this view of knowledge of limb position is Anscombe’s, how plausible is it? Let us first consider the model for it: the dispositional view of the locations of pains. This view certainly does not capture how we intuitively conceive of the locations of pains. Intuitively what makes it the case that the subject is disposed to tend to a place and report that a pain is located there is that the subject feels pain there. The pain’s felt location is the reason why she is behaviourally and verbally disposed as she is. If the dispositional view of the locations of pains has any plausibility at all, I think it can only be because there is nothing more to the location of a pain than where it feels to the subject to be. She is, in this sense, infallible: where it seems is where it is. (Certainly there is a fact of the matter as to whether the subject’s body is damaged at the place the pain feels to be — but these are not the same.) Given this, the only way we observers have of telling where a subject feels a pain to be located is by her behaviour and her verbal reports. The dispositional view treats these public ways of telling of location as constitutive of location. It is perhaps not surprising that this view can be traced to Wittgenstein. But it is at least intelligible that someone might hold this view. For these dispositions are (public) manifestations of where the pain seems to the subject to be. And where it seems to her to be is where it is. But this is precisely not the case with respect to limb position. We are not infallible about the position of our limbs:

where they seem to be need not be where they are. There is, as Anscombe herself points out repeatedly, an objective fact of the matter about limb position. So it is patently false if not outright absurd to claim that what makes it the case that a subject’s limbs are positioned one way and not another is that she is disposed to behave as if they are so positioned and report that they are so positioned. There is no possible parallel here with the locations of pains. But given this, we have as yet no reason whatsoever to think that what makes it the case that the subject’s limbs seem or appear to her to be positioned one way and not another is her dispositions to behaviour and verbal report. Why, once we have allowed that awareness of the spatial properties of one’s body exists, should we abandon the idea that it is a form of awareness which provides the subject with knowledge of her body and so plays a rational or justifying role in her behaviour, reports and judgements? Certainly Anscombe does not provide us with a good reason for doing so. Nor does a purported parallel to the dispositional view of the locations of pains.

In Section 1.4, I shall briefly return to the nature of our awareness of particular, located sensations. In the rest of this Section I want to pursue further the phenomenology of our awareness of the spatial properties of our bodies, together with the question of whether this awareness of our bodies can count as awareness as of a material body. I take it as now established that this awareness of the spatial properties of our bodies exists, and can be a ground for judgements about the body the awareness is of.

As I said above, one is aware of one’s body from the inside as generally shaped and currently configured in a certain way, within a space which is larger than it. By ‘general shape’ I mean simply that one is aware of one’s body, at a time and over time, as relatively determinately shaped and structured. One is aware that one’s body is fashioned by a torso, limbs, hands and feet, and a head, which are jointed or hinged together such as to allow for certain possibilities of movement, and not others. By ‘current configuration’ I mean simply how one’s body, so fashioned and hinged, is currently configured: the position of its various parts relative to one another. But how precise is this awareness of shape and configuration?

This question is basically phenomenological, and the answer may well vary between individuals, and within changes of circumstance within one individual’s life.

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35 This idea is akin to Brian O’Shaughnessy’s idea of a ‘long-term’ body image. See his (1980) vol. 1 and his (1995).
36 This idea is akin to Brian O’Shaughnessy’s idea of a ‘short-term’ body image: ibid.
Certainly we all seem to have a basic awareness of how we are put together and currently configured. But the exact contours and curves, line and angles, and relative position of one’s body may be less than apparent. For instance, one might well be aware that one has a torso, but not aware at all of the exact shape of one’s waist. However, this is precisely the sort of detail which a fashion model, say, or a practitioner of the Alexander Technique, might have an awareness of. In similar vein, an actor might have a very precise awareness of the expression of her face, or a tight-rope walker the position of his toes. And the rest of us may become more aware of our bodies as and when they change. For instance, one might be all too aware of a change of general shape when one feels bloated, or puts on unwanted weight, or becomes pregnant; one might be all too aware of the torture of a current configuration when attempting a complicated yoga posture. So, we all have some basic awareness of shape and configuration, which can potentially become more exact and refined.

Together with this awareness of shape and configuration comes some awareness of size. On the one hand, one has some awareness of the relative size of one’s body parts: it seems clear, from the inside, that one’s hands are smaller than one’s head, which is smaller than one’s torso. On the other hand, one has some awareness of the size of one’s body as a whole, relative to other sizes it can have. If one feels bloated or is aware of having put on unwanted weight, one feels one’s body to have changed in size as much as in shape. If one is curled up or crouching down, one is aware of one’s body, thus configured, as taking up less space overall, and in this sense as smaller, than if one were standing tall. But does one have awareness of one’s overall size in a more absolute way? It is unclear what absolute size is, but there is at least a further awareness of relative size one might have: the size of one’s body relative to other bodies. For instance, as Brian O’Shaughnessy says: ‘a man will insert his hand into a cupboard but will not attempt to insert it into a thimble.’ Every time one slides into a seat, or wraps one’s hand around a cup, or holds up an item of clothing and thinks it will never fit, one displays knowledge, tacit or more explicit, of the size of one’s body, relative to these other things. But what is hard to see is how this awareness of one’s body size could be made available from the inside alone, and not in conjunction with one’s awareness, through the outer senses, of the sizes of these other things. Whatever this awareness of one’s size amounts to, it seems to require an external measure.

So I shall take it that awareness of one's body from the inside provides one with relatively determinate knowledge of the general shape and current configuration of one's body, and with some knowledge of its size. Does the fact that one has awareness of these spatial properties of one's body—shape, configuration, and to some extent size—suffice to make one aware of one's body as a body?

It will of course depend on what one considers a material body to be. In the Introduction, I briefly canvassed a number of such accounts. Certainly an awareness of the shape, configuration, and to some extent size of one's body, as within a world which is larger than it, will suffice to make this awareness as of a body according to the most minimal and thin of the accounts on offer. Although there is only one body one is aware of in this way, it is still the case that, if one experiences this body as within a space which is larger than it, one is experiencing it as within the spatial world, which can in principle contain other bodies. But this so far fails to capture the idea that for something to be a body, it must not just occupy or exist in space, but fill it, in a way such as to exclude other bodies, or that it must offer resistance, or be solid or impenetrable or capable of causal interactions or exerting and responding to force.

One certainly can be aware of one's body as possessing at least some of these various properties. The difficulty is that it is not clear that one can be aware of one's body as possessing these properties from the inside alone. When one touches an object, or when an object touches one's body, one can be aware of one's body as solid, as offering resistance. One is perhaps not aware of one's body as impenetrable, at least as common sense, if not atomistic science, conceives of it: one's body can be cut with a knife, for instance, and it has a number of orifices which allow for entry and exit. But certainly one can be aware of one's body as capable of causal interaction with objects, of exerting and responding to force, when one acts in the world. Quite often such awareness, be it of solidity, or of force, is tacit: one is not directly aware of one's own body as solid, but rather of the object one is holding; one is not directly aware of one's body as exerting force, but rather of the task at hand. Sometimes, of course, one is more directly aware of one's own body as such. For instance, when one bumps one's knee hard against a desk, or when one is trying to carry an armchair up a flight of stairs, and

38 Cf. M. Martin (1993) and also (1995) and (1997). However Martin does not sharply distinguish the question of what it is to experience one's own body as a body from the question of what it is to experience a body as one's own. See the next Section and onwards for discussion of this latter question.
39 See B. O'Shaughnessy (1989); M. Martin (1992) and (1993).
40 See W.I. Miller (1997) for a discussion of the emotional and social significance of the fact that our bodies have orifices. A. Dworkin (1987), esp. ch. 7, is a discussion of the significance of sexual penetration to women's inequality and relative lack of freedom.
realises with despair that one is just not strong enough to do it. But whether the awareness of one's body as solid, forceful, and so on, is tacit or more explicit, it does not seem available simply through the awareness one has of one's body from the inside. It seems to depend rather on this awareness in conjunction with the awareness one has of one's actions on and contact with other objects.

So although I shall take it that one can be aware of one's body as a body, according to most of the more robust accounts of what a body is, I shall not assume that this awareness can be had wholly from the inside. From the inside, once again, one can be aware of the shape and configuration and to some extent size of one's body, as within a space larger than it. This does not obviously suffice for awareness of one's body as a body. Perhaps this is why some have worried that the awareness one has of one's body from the inside is of a sort of 'luminous will-o'-the-wisp' entity: the sort of entity revealed in its full glory in cases of phantom limb. But that is just a mistake: the entity one is aware of is a material body. The point is only that one is not obviously aware of it as a body, in the sense that one is not aware of it, solely now from the inside, as solid, forceful, and so on.

In what follows, I focus predominantly on the awareness of one's body that can be had wholly from the inside. It is enough to give one awareness of one's body as a body in a minimal sense, even if the more robust awareness of our bodies as bodies which we do have is yet lacking. It is a form of spatial perception, in that the properties it reveals are spatial. And it is also, I shall now try to argue, what grounds one's conception of a body as one's own.

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41 I think it is possible that one's awareness of the force of gravity on one's body might provide a minimal sense of one's body as a body only from the inside: one seems to be aware from the inside of one's body as having weight. But the relation between weight and these other properties is not obvious, and I should not want to hang much, let alone an argument, on this possibility.

42 B. O'Shaughnessy (1980) vol. 1 p. 177; see also ibid., p. 214 ff.
1.3 Body Ownership

What is it to conceive of a body as one's own body? As we saw in Section 1.1, there are two sorts of judgement about one's body one can make. When one makes a judgement about a body based on awareness of it from the inside, one can use the possessive 'my' in conjunction with 'body' or the term for one or more body parts. I called this a use of 'my' as subject. Such judgements seem to be immune to errors of misidentification. When one makes a judgement about a body based on other grounds, like seeing an x-ray, one may also judge that body to be one's own: the body in question can again be called 'my body' or 'mine'. I called this a use of 'my' as object. Such judgements are not immune to errors of misidentification. The x-ray provides one with knowledge of some or other body: whichever body, that is, that the x-ray is of. In making a judgement about one's own body based on seeing an x-ray, one bases one's judgement not only on the x-ray itself, but also on the belief that the body the x-ray is of is one's own body. So there are differences between these two sorts of judgement. Judgements where 'my' is used as subject seem more directly linked to one's conception of a body as one's own, while judgements where 'my' is used as object are linked to this conception indirectly: they depend on a prior conception of a body as one's own. Still, in both cases, the same question arises. What is this conception? What is it to conceive of a body as one's own body?

A natural response to this question is to produce a list of all the various features which make one's body special to one, different from all other bodies in the world. For instance, Husserl lists four features which are intended to define the 'living body' or the 'body subject'. Husserl's question is to this extent different: he is concerned with the conception (and also experience) of a body as oneself, not with the conception of a body as one's own. Nonetheless, his list is potentially as relevant to our question as to his, for it is simply a list of the features which make one's own body different for one from all other bodies in the world. They are: (i) my body is expressive of my character and occurent psychological states; (ii) my body is sensitive, for instance, I feel pain in it; (iii) my body is immediately and directly responsive to my will; and (iv) my body is at the centre of the world which I perceive. There are of course other features which make one's own body special. For instance, one's brain is in it, one's heart is in it, and if either stops functioning one is likely to die. But these features are more to do with the

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4) This account of Husserl is taken from D. Bell (1990) ch. 9.
scientific level of knowledge than the pre-theoretical or common-sense point of view. Husserl, like this thesis, is concerned with the latter.

It may be natural to respond to the question of what it is to conceive of a body as one's own body by producing such a list, but it is not satisfying. The reasons are two. First, this answer is not simple, but a complicated rag-bag of components. Second, and more importantly, although the body which is one's own body may indeed exhibit all these features, we have not yet been given any explanation of how or why these features make one conceive of it as one's own, let alone if they all do so equally. There is a prima facie difference between a feature being unique or special to one's body, and a feature being part of what makes one conceive of that body as one's own. So simply listing all the features distinctive of one's body will not do.

In this Section, I shall discuss two competing answers to our question, both of which are certainly simple enough: idealism and realism about body ownership. I shall suggest a reason why realism about body ownership is wanting, and try to argue for idealism, in part by trying to show how or why it is explanatory. But first, I need to distinguish the question I have asked from a number of other, related questions.

The question I have asked is:

(1) What is it to conceive of a body as one's own body?

But we might also ask:

(2) What makes a body one's own body?

These two questions are different: (1) asks after our conception of body ownership, while (2) asks after what we might call the fact of body ownership itself. And these two questions need to be distinguished because it is in principle possible that our conception of body ownership is incorrect: we are in some way or other misguided, and what makes one conceive of a body as one's own is not in matter of fact what makes a body one's own. But these questions are nonetheless clearly related, and easily confused. The reason is that asking after our conception of body ownership just is asking after body ownership, albeit from within our pre-theoretical or common-sense point of view. Only a cautious if worthy scepticism about this point of view calls for this distinction to be

44 The label 'idealism about body ownership' is suggested by Q. Cassam in his (1995) and (1997).
made. So I shall, in what follows, treat (1) and (2) as identical, on the assumption that it
is understood that (2) is posed from this pre-theoretical or common-sense point of view.

We are interested in descriptive, not revisionist, metaphysics.\(^{45}\)

This is important. For (2) is also related to, and easily confused with, another
question, namely:

\( (3) \) What is the relation between selves or persons and their bodies?

– where we are to understand this question as asking after an account of what a self or
person is. For instance, we might consider whether the relation between selves or
persons and their bodies was one of identity or non-identity. Now suppose one decides
that the relation is one of non-identity. Then an account is due of what this non-identity
relation is: how then are selves or persons related to their bodies? Many possibilities
arise at this point, but whichever one opts for, it seems natural to describe this relation,
holding between selves or persons and their bodies, as what makes a body the body of a
self or a person, and so, given that one is oneself a self or a person, as what makes a
body one’s own. That is, once one has decided that whatever the relation between selves
or persons and their bodies is, that relation is not one of identity, it seems natural to treat
(2) and (3) as identical questions, differing only in that (2) uses the pronoun ‘one’ and
(3) uses instead the nouns ‘self’ and ‘person’

So (2) is in effect torn in two directions, towards (1) and towards (3). But (1)
and (3) are not at all the same question. To see this, consider for instance the claim that
the self or person is really just a brain. Then the relation between a self or person and
her body might be this: her body houses the brain which she is. I do not at all mean to
endorse this view. The point is simply to elucidate the sort of answer to (3) which is in
principle feasible: the self or person is identical to one rather special part of her body,
which is sustained by the rest of it. For this sort of answer is not in principle a feasible
answer to (1). It is surely possible to have a conception of a body as one’s own without
even knowing what brains are or that one is oneself such a thing. An answer to (3) is
part of an account of what a self or a person is. It need not be part of an account of what
it is for a self or person to conceive of a body as her own body.

Note that this does not mean that an answer to (1) is no part at all of an account
of what a self or a person is. It has long been argued that a self or person need be

\(^{45}\) See P.F. Strawson (1959) pp. 9-12.
capable of conceiving of her experiences as her own in order to be a self or a person. It is at least open to argument that a self or person need also be capable of conceiving of a body as her own: that is also part of what it is to be a self or a person. But to acknowledge this is only to acknowledge that the answer to (1) will play some role in a complete account of what a self or person is. We do not thereby acknowledge that the answer to (1) can be imported as an answer to (3), let alone that an answer to (3) can be imported as an answer to (1).

So despite the fact that both (1) and (3) seem able to appropriate (2), (1) and (3) are not the same. When (2) is appropriated by (1), it asks after an account of body ownership, from our point of view. As I said, this is what I shall mean by (2). When (2) is appropriated by (3), it asks after the relation between selves or persons and their bodies, within the context of providing an account of what the self or the person is. I shall return to the distinction between (1) and (3). But having, I hope, clarified somewhat what question I am asking, I want now to turn to the two competing answers to it on offer.

Idealism about body ownership claims that what makes a body 'my body' or 'mine' is that I am aware of that body from the inside. In so far as idealism makes any appearance at all on Husserl's list, it is comparable to: (ii) my body is sensitive. But some support for idealism can be found if we turn to the empirical evidence. People who suffer from alien limb reject as their own a limb which is in fact a part of their body and in perfect physiological order. Whatever the neurological basis for this disorder, it seems clear that the explanation of this rejection, from the point of view of the sufferer, is that they no longer have any awareness of the limb from the inside. Oliver Sacks describes his experience of alien limb thus:

I had no feeling whatever of where the leg lay — no feeling that it was 'here' as opposed to 'there', no feeling that it was anywhere — no feeling at all. I gazed at it, and felt I don't know you, you're not part of me.

The leg had vanished, taking its 'place' with it.

Interestingly, no amount of searching about with the outer senses to find the limb, as it were, makes one bit of difference to people with alien limb. Presented with the

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46 See e.g. L. Rudder Baker (2000).
47 See M. Kinsbourne (1995) for a discussion of possible neurological explanations of this phenomenon.
hypothesis that the limb attached to their body, which they can both touch and see, is their own limb, these patients demur.

But regardless of the empirical support for idealism, it has found philosophical endorsement. Idealism is basically the position Descartes adopts in the 6th Meditation:

> As for the body which by some special right I called 'mine', my belief that this body, more than any other, belonged to me had some justification. For I could never be separated from it, as I could from other bodies; and I felt all my appetites and emotions in, and on account of, this body; and finally, I was aware of pain and pleasurable ticklings in parts of this body, but not in other bodies external to it.

What is noteworthy about this answer is that apart from the claim that his appetites and emotions are felt 'on account of' this body, Descartes' explanation of his belief that a certain body belongs to him is phenomenological: my body is the only body in the world which I cannot be separate from, and which I have feeling of various sorts in. 'Separate' here has to be understood phenomenologically, since by the 6th Meditation Descartes claims to have proved he is not identical to his body: he certainly is 'separate' from it in this sense. This shows that Descartes must take himself to be answering question (1) and not question (3), on pain of self-contradiction. I shall return to what this notion of 'separate' could amount to. But for now, the point is that what, according to Descartes, 'somewhat justifies' my belief that a particular body is 'mine' is basically that I am aware of it from the inside.

Idealism about body ownership is to be distinguished from what we might call idealism about body existence. The point is not that my body does not exist apart from my awareness of it. Idealism about body ownership is not pure idealism in this sense. And it is equally to be distinguished from what we might call idealism about body identity. As Michael Martin says: 'In general, we think that we can have genuine sensory awareness of an entity, where the identity of that entity is fixed independently of whether and how we are aware of it.' It is one thing to say that awareness of a body from the inside is what makes a body mine, another to say that such awareness is what carves a body, my body, out of the larger world: that such awareness is what individuates and so confers identity on a body. As things normally are, I do not have

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51 This distinction has not always been appreciated, in part because the question of body ownership is often raised within discussions of personal identity: that is, within discussions of question (3) above. See e.g. E. Olson (1997) ch. 6.
awareness from the inside of my hair, my nails, and, at least most times, my liver as such; and I can quite easily imagine losing such awareness, perhaps due to a sort of permanent anaesthesia, of larger parts of my body, like my limbs. But idealism can allow that these body parts are still mine in virtue of being part of the body which is mine: the body I have awareness of, if of an incomplete sort, from the inside. A whole body can be mine without that which makes it mine obtaining for the whole of it. Perhaps in a similar vein, I can see, say, a sofa without seeing all of it, for its back may be hidden from view by its front. The point of idealism about body ownership is to do with body ownership, not with body existence or identity: the point is that it is my awareness of a body from the inside – a body which exists independently of this awareness, which has an identity as a body in its own right – that makes this body mine. So idealism about body ownership is not the only, nor even the strongest, version of idealism about the body we can envisage. But it is nonetheless idealistic, for it makes ownership a question of awareness, and no more.

In contrast to idealism about body ownership, realism about body ownership claims that what makes a body ‘my body’ or ‘mine’ is that it is causally connected in the appropriate way to my psychological life. In so far as realism makes any appearance at all on Husserl’s list, it is comparable to an austere or mechanistic amalgam of: (i) my body is expressive of my character and occurrent psychological states; (iii) my body is immediately and directly responsive to my will; and (iv) my body is at the centre of the world which I perceive. But realism about body ownership is really a far cry from Husserl’s account of the matter. It is the account of body ownership put forward by Sidney Shoemaker.52

Shoemaker claims that what it means to say that a particular person is embodied, or that a body is the body of a particular person, is for there to exist certain causal connections between that person’s psychological states and her bodily behaviour and situation. Shoemaker does not think that all of the existing causal connections in normal human beings matter in this regard. For instance, he holds that it is perfectly imaginable that a change in our physiology could make it the case that our expressions of emotion were radically altered: we no longer blushed when ashamed and trembled when frightened, but trembled when ashamed and blushed when frightened, and so on throughout the gamut of emotions and their expressions.53 But we should not be any less embodied for that; and so, Shoemaker thinks, it cannot be part of what it is or what it

52 This account is most fully developed in S. Shoemaker (1984b), but see also his (1984a) and (1984c).
53 This claim is made in S. Shoemaker (1984b) and also in his (1984a).
means to be embodied that the experience of emotion on the part of the person whose body it is results in the expression of emotion on that person’s body. Contrast this with the case of perception and action. According to Shoemaker, part of what it is to be embodied is for a person’s perceptions of her environment to be due to the situation and functioning of a body, and for a person’s volitions to issue in actions in that same body. So what it is for a body to be the body of a particular person is for it to have a quite specific causal role in her perceptions, and for her volitions to have a quite specific causal effect in it. Now these causal connections are not something Shoemaker thinks we can imagine radically altered. On the one hand, we cannot rationally explain a person’s behaviour unless we suppose that she intends the actions she performs in response to perceptions of her surrounding environment. On the other, it makes no sense to suppose that the link between volitions and the actions they result in could be systematically and radically altered. For imagine for a moment that, as with the case of the physiology of emotional expression, the physiology of action were radically to alter so that a volition to raise an arm resulted in a moving of a leg. This supposition cannot in the end make sense. For when the agent is fully appraised of this fact, she can no longer try to raise an arm. Doing that has simply become trying to move a leg. And so Shoemaker holds that the causal connections between a person’s bodily situation and her perceptions, and a person’s volitions and her bodily behaviour, could not be, broadly speaking, other than what they are. And it is the existence of these connections between the body of a person and her psychological life that makes that body her body.

One question for Shoemaker’s account, simply now on its own terms, is whether the purported impossibility of a radical alteration to the connection between a sort of psychological state and a sort of bodily behaviour is indeed an adequate criterion for that connection to be constitutive of embodiment. Let us grant, what seems at least partly correct, that we can imagine a change in our emotional physiology with much greater ease than we can imagine a change in our volitional physiology. It is still the case that, whatever the physiological rig-up in the end is, if there is such a rig-up then if a person is embodied her emotional state will cause the correlated expression in whichever body her body is. In which other body might the effect be? Now perhaps we can imagine an even more radical change, whereby we ceased having emotions in any sense similar to our actual emotions. Perhaps there could be no physiological expression at all, but rather, as William James phrases it: ‘a cold and neutral state of intellectual

54 Note that Shoemaker is not explicit that the body connected to a person’s perceptions and the body connected to her volitions are or must be the same. This is tacitly assumed in his discussion.
perception'. In such an eventuality, our embodiment would be different – it would not be emotional embodiment – but embodied we should yet be. But equally, perhaps we can imagine losing much of our perceptual or active abilities, or perhaps we can imagine a species which evolved to be much less attentive to the environment, much more sluggish, than we are. And certainly, as Shoemaker concedes, there are indeed people who suffer severe extero-sensory dysfunction and paralysis. But again, such people, real or imagined, seem no less embodied for their predicament, even if the precise nature of their embodiment is different from our own. So it is not yet clear why it matters, with regard to a person’s embodiment, which actual causal connections exist between certain sorts of her psychological states and certain sorts of her bodily behaviour and situation. As things stand for us, our psychological life is causally connected to our bodies in a wealth of perceptual, active, and expressive ways. We can imagine many changes to the nature of these connections, and we can imagine the outright loss of many of these connections, without imagining our embodiment to have been in the end compromised. Hence for all Shoemaker has said, what matters should be this: if a person is such as to have psychological states, of whatever sort, which typically cause a certain sort of bodily behaviour or are caused by a certain sort of bodily situation, then the body so connected to her psychological states will be her body in virtue of being so connected.

Another question for Shoemaker’s account, less now on its own terms than on ours, is whether he adequately distinguishes between question (1) and question (3), and if so, which question he means to be addressing. I have formulated Shoemaker’s account as he himself does. Shoemaker explicitly claims to be providing us with an account of ‘embodiment’: of what it is for a body to be, or what it means to say that a body is, or what it is that makes a body, the body of a particular person. That is, Shoemaker seems to be addressing question (2), although he speaks in the main although not exclusively of ‘a particular person’s body’ instead of ‘one’s own body’ or ‘my body’ As we saw above, (2) can be appropriated by (1) or by (3). Some of what Shoemaker says lends credence to the thought that the question he means really to be addressing is (1), while some of what he says lends credence to the thought that the question he means really to be addressing is (3).

55 W. James (1884) p. 193.
56 Philip Gerrans (1999) has made the intriguing suggestion that the reason why patients suffering from the Cotard delusion claim to be dead is that they lack emotional embodiment: and without emotional embodiment one has no sense of being embodied at all. If death is disembodiment, this is a reason to think one is dead. I discuss the relationship between the body and emotion in Part III, and its relevance to the self in the Conclusion.
The reasons for thinking Shoemaker is addressing question (1) are three. First, he appeals to the judgements we make about our bodies to elucidate what his account is supposed to be an account of. He claims that his account explains the sense of referring to a body as ‘my body’ or a body part as ‘mine’ in judgement. Second, he insists that his account is a ‘conceptual truth’, which, at least on one sensible interpretation of this phrase, is just to insist that it is a truth about our concepts. Third, Shoemaker rejects the possibility that what makes a body the body of a particular person is that that body houses her brain: he thinks this fact is no doubt part of what causally underpins embodiment, but not what embodiment could plausibly be. It is just the wrong sort of answer to his question. But as we saw, this is at least in principle the right sort of to answer (3). Together, these points seem to indicate that Shoemaker is addressing (1).

The reasons for thinking Shoemaker is addressing question (3) are also three. First, Shoemaker’s account of what makes a body the body of a particular person is part of a larger discussion of whether or not persons can exist disembodied. That is, it is part of a larger discussion of what a person is. Second, in a footnote, he explains that at least part of why some sort of account such as the one he offers is required is that persons are not identical with their bodies, and so we need to understand what their relation to their bodies is. Third, Shoemaker’s account seems of a piece with his own view about the nature of persons and the nature of psychological states. Not only does Shoemaker hold that persons are not identical with their bodies, and that a person is, in some sense to be explained, a psychological life. He also holds that essential to what a psychological state is is its causal role: in relation to the environment, other psychological states, and behaviour. Given both these views, it is perhaps immediately appealing, although not required, to claim that what makes a body the body of a particular person is that her psychological states cause that body’s behaviour, and are caused by that body’s situation and functioning. This makes Shoemaker’s account look less like a ‘conceptual truth’ about what makes a body the body of a particular person, and more like a piece of philosophy driven by his preferred larger picture. In any event, together these points seems to indicate that Shoemaker is addressing (3).

Perhaps the truth of the matter is that Shoemaker did not adequately distinguish question (1) from question (3). But I shall take Shoemaker’s account to be an account of

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59 Ibid. p. 118 ff.
60 Ibid. p. 117 n. 7.
body ownership: that is, an answer to question (1). It certainly is possible Shoemaker
would not wish it to be so taken. But he says enough in favour of doing so to make it
not utterly unreasonable, and meanwhile his account is intuitively feasible as an answer
to (1); at the very least, it resonates to some extent with some of the features on
Husserl’s list. So, I shall treat it as such, and see how it contrasts with idealism about
body ownership.63

Recall that idealism about body ownership claims that what makes a body ‘my
body’ or ‘mine’ is that I am aware of that body from the inside. Realism about body
ownership, in contrast, claims that what makes a body ‘my body’ or ‘mine’ is that it is
causally connected in the appropriate way to my psychological life: it has a quite
specific causal role in my perceptions, and my volitions have a quite specific causal
effect on it. The question we face is whether there is any reason to prefer one to the
other.

I think there is a reason to find realism wanting. It is no doubt right that the
body I take to be mine is causally connected to my perceptions and volitions; and
indeed, it being so connected is part of what I recognise as unique or special about my
body, in contrast to all other bodies. But, and here I put the point intuitively, realism
makes it seem as if I could be in the position of needing to search around to find the
body in fact causally connected to my psychological life. Noticing that a body was
loaﬁng about and that I was bored and aimless, I might think: ‘Ah hah! That sad
specimen of a body must be mine.’ Put more precisely now, realism leaves my
knowledge of which body my body is entirely open. All I am so far in a position to
know is that the body which is ‘my body’ or ‘mine’ is whichever body it is which is
connected up in the right way to my psychological life. I know what condition a body
must meet to be my body, but not which body, out of all the bodies in the world, meets
this condition.

Realism about body ownership is of course a view about what our conception of
body ownership is: it did not set out to explain the epistemological relation which we
have to our bodies. The objection is not simply that realism about body ownership
seems to throw up a somewhat spurious epistemological question. This does mean that
the realist, perhaps like any sort of realist, will face a sceptical challenge. We can ask
the realist: how then do I know which body my body is? But there is no reason to think

63 Shoemaker’s account has recently been endorsed, at least in part, by Lynn Rudder Baker. See her (2000)
esp. ch. 4. However Rudder Baker seems also to fail to distinguish between (1) and (3), and her account is
very confused, if not self-contradictory.
the realist cannot meet this challenge. I shall return to this briefly. The objection is
rather this: there is a sort of alienation between me and my body if I do not know which
body my body is, simply in virtue of owning it. The ‘in virtue of’ is important here.
Realism about body ownership can perfectly well hold that, if I own a body, then, all
things being equal, I also know which body my body is. That is: it can allow that I do in
fact know which body my body is. What it fails to establish is that I know which body
my body is because that is part of what owning a body amounts to. And that, I claim, is
not adequate: part of what it is to own a body is to know it. That is: to be acquainted
with it.

This objection does not immediately or conclusively refute realism, for it is
driven by an intuition which realism might try to soften or reinterpret. For instance,
realism might fairly complain of the intuitive way in which the objection was initially
put: that realism makes it seem as if I could be in the position of needing to search
around to find my body. The image here is that I am at one place, my body at another,
and meanwhile I do not know where my body’s place is: that is why I need to search for
it. In other words, I seem to be ‘separate’ from my body, in just the way Descartes
claims I am not. Realism about body ownership can insist that it has in no way claimed
that I could be separate from my body. indeed, it denies it. I am no out-of-body
onlooker: I and my body are at one and the same place. However, realism has not yet
provided for any awareness of where this place – the place where I and my body are –
is. This is why realism flouts the intuition that part of what it is to own a body is to
know it, and it is here that the crucial difference between realism and idealism lies.

Intuitively, idealism about body ownership can simply accept this intuition. If I
am aware of a body from the inside, I am acquainted with it in a most intimate manner.
There is none of the alienation between me and my body which realism creates. But
why is this so? In general, awareness of location is not incidental to the awareness I
have of any body through any sense: usually, although not always, and certainly not
always correctly, we perceive bodies as located. And, in perceiving where a body is, we
can to that extent know which body it is: we can use its perceived place to identify it, to
discriminate it from all other bodies. So it might seem obvious why idealism provides
me with knowledge of which body my body is. If what makes a body mine is that I have
a special sort of sensory awareness of it, then in all likelihood this awareness, as sensory
awareness is wont to be, is an awareness of the body in question as among other things
located. And if I am aware of a body as located, then I am able to identify it or
discriminate it from all other bodies. Knowledge of which body my body is is thus
secured: awareness of a body from the inside at one and the same time makes a body mine and provides me with awareness of its place. Saying this is perhaps not saying quite enough: we need somehow to account for Descartes' point that my body is never 'separate' from me. But we might note that as modes of sensory awareness go, awareness of a body from the inside appears to be fairly permanently operative. Although I sometimes, perhaps often, fail to attend to my body, I cannot block the operation of the awareness I have of it from the inside, the way I can block my eyes or my ears or my nose or my mouth. And even if I could block the operation of this awareness, it seems my body would always be there, ready and waiting if or when it resumed, unlike the other bodies I am aware of through the outer senses: there is no guarantee that they will be in sensory vicinity.

These remarks do not suffice to account for the point that my body is never 'separate' from me. For we can imagine a scenario in which I am constantly aware or able to be aware of some other body. My dog, for instance, faithful friend that he is, may never leave my side: he is always to be found just next to me on the left, say, and I could, if I wished, keep an eye trained on him at all times. He is never 'separate' from me in this sense. Clearly there is a difference we need to mark between my body and my faithful dog if we are adequately to understand what it is for my body never to be 'separate' from me. What I want to suggest is that the difference is to be found in the kind of awareness of my body's location I have from the inside alone.

When philosophers consider the question of one's awareness of one's body location, they tend to focus on the awareness of location one has in relation to other objects in the world: through 'egocentric' spatial perception. If I see my dog at my side, I see him just down there and to the left: that is, just down there and to the left of my body, which is at the origin of my visual field. There are questions about the nature of such spatial perception, and there are questions about the placing of one's body at the origin of the visual field. These are some of the topics I shall address in Part II. But for now, assuming my body is somehow placed at the origin of the visual field, then just as I can be visually aware of where my dog is in relation to my body, so too I can be visually aware of where my body is in relation to my dog. The awareness I have of the location of my body and the location of what I perceive seems to be equally relational. But the awareness I have from the inside of my body's location seems not to be relational at all.

Consider waking up after some accident, without any memory of events and heavily bandaged. One cannot see or hear or even smell the surrounding world. So one
cannot use one's memory, or one's perception of one's surroundings, to locate one's body. For all one knows, one's body could be absolutely anywhere. But there is yet a sense in which one knows perfectly well where one's body is: it is here, as one might say in frustration. One might, for instance, wake up from the accident acutely aware that every bit of one's body is aching. One has all too vivid a sense of one's body: its configuration and its sensory state. So one knows where one's body is. What one does not know is what or where this place – the place where one's body is – is.

In the previous Section, I argued that one is aware from the inside of the shape and configuration and to some extent size of one's body, as within a space larger than it. Part of the focus in that Section was on whether this awareness of one's body should count as awareness of one's body as a body, and I suggested that according to any robust account of what a body is, it should not. In being aware of one's body as bounded, as limited, as occupying a certain volume of space within a region of space, one is not thereby obviously aware of one's body as filling space in such a way as to be solid, forceful, and so on. The point here is that one is thereby aware of one's body as located. To be aware of a body as occupying a certain volume of space within a region of space just is to be aware of a body as located in space: it seems a simple matter of the definition of 'location'. So awareness of one's body from the inside is one way, a quite primitive way, in which one can be aware of one's body as located. Now so far, this does not distinguish awareness of a body from the inside from awareness of a body through another sense, like vision. In vision, one is aware of a body one sees as bounded, as limited, as occupying a certain volume of space within a region of space. But the location of a body one sees is relative: either to the origin of the visual field, or to other objects and places. In contrast, the location of a body one is aware of from the inside is not given in relation to anything else at all. Its relative location is left entirely open, yet one is still aware of it as located: as occupying a limited place in a space larger than it, the place which we call 'here'.

I shall return to this sort of awareness of location in Part II. The point for now is that it can explain the depth of Descartes' claim that one is never 'separate' from one's body. It is not just that oneself and one's body are, as realism about body ownership is free to insist, at the same place. This could be so, and yet one might lack all awareness of where this place was. Nor is it simply that awareness of a body from the inside appears fairly permanently operative as modes of sensory awareness go, and manages to keep its object close to hand. It is rather that one is never 'separate' from the body one is aware of from the inside in that it is the only body one is fundamentally aware of as
located but not as located in relation to any other body. One's awareness of its location is in this sense absolute: as we might say more metaphorically, one is aware of it from the inside out, and one is not aware of what is outside of it at all.

Here then is how idealism does justice to the intuition that part of what it is to own a body is to know it. On the one hand, if what it is to own a body is to be aware of it from the inside, then I am guaranteed to know which body my body is. I am guaranteed to know this, because that which makes a body mine presents that body to me as located. My body is presented to me from the inside as at this location here. This is how I can refer to it demonstratively, as Descartes does in the above quotation, as 'this body': my awareness of it from the inside gives me discriminating knowledge of it, as one object within a larger spatial region, which can ground a demonstrative reference.\(^{64}\) On the other hand, the acquaintance I have with a body when I am aware of it from the inside is extremely intimate in nature. For it is presented to me as located in an absolute as opposed to a relational way: I am never 'separate' from it.

I suggested at the start of this Section that it is incumbent upon an account of body ownership to explain why it is a sensible account. I want now to suggest a possible way for idealism to meet this demand. It makes sense that a body which one has awareness of not in relation to any other body - from the inside out - would be a body one conceives of as one's own. The reason why depends on the idea that to conceive of a body as one's own is really at bottom to conceive of oneself as existing in the spatio-temporal world: as having a place in, or being a piece of, empirical reality. This idea is no doubt related to another: that to conceive of a body as oneself is really at bottom to conceive of oneself as in the world.\(^{65}\) But once again, I am not claiming that to conceive of a body as one's own amounts to conceiving of a body as oneself. The idea is more minimal: to conceive of a body as one's own is enough. So, if the link between a conception of a body as one's own, and the conception of oneself as having a place in, or being a piece of, empirical reality, in virtue of owning a body, is accepted, then it is possible idealism can explain why its account of body ownership makes sense. One's conception of oneself as in the world is just that: a conception of oneself as 'in' it, as having a place in it, as being a piece of it. And that is what awareness of a body from the inside out, and so as located, not in relation to any other body but absolutely in itself, is: awareness of being 'in' a body. If one imagines losing, bit by bit, the awareness one has of one's body from the inside, one in effect imagines that one is

\(^{64}\) See e.g. G. Evans (1982); J. McDowell (1990); C. Peacocke (1991); P.F. Strawson (1959).

shrinking to a point without extension: in so far as one still has any awareness of being ‘in’ the world, it is only because one identifies oneself as ‘at’ the origin of the visual field, say.\textsuperscript{66} One has lost one’s awareness of having a self-standing place in the world at all, and, to this extent, one has lost one’s conception of oneself as in the world. It is of course possible that one might yet have a more theoretical conception of oneself as in the world; what one has lost is one’s conception of this insofar as it is grounded in awareness. The point is only that if this link is accepted, then idealism about body ownership, as well as securing the intuitive link between knowing and owning a body, has a certain explanatory appeal.

As I said, I shall address some of these topics further in Part II. But where does this leave the dispute between realism and idealism about body ownership? Even if realism fails to establish that I know which body my body is merely in virtue of owning it, it can appropriate for itself some of the virtues of idealism. Recall that realism about body ownership faces a sceptical challenge. We can ask the realist: how do I know which body my body is? The tactics in general available to a realist in face of a sceptical challenge are available here. What realism must do is import idealism’s emphasis on awareness of a body from the inside, with all that that involves, to explain the epistemology of body ownership, and then link that epistemology adequately with its own account of what body ownership is. So for instance, realism could claim that how I know which body my body is depends on body awareness, and then point out that there is a reliable connection between the body I am aware of from the inside and the body which is causally connected to my psychological life and so meets realism’s condition of body ownership: they are reliably one and the same.

Realism will then need to explain what recommends it: why is the fact of a causal connection between a body and the perceptual-volitional life of a subject a sensible account of body ownership? It is perfectly possible realism can meet this demand – certainly our capacity to perceive and act on the world is monumentally important to us – although Shoemaker himself does not take up this task. It is however important to note two things.

The first is that what realism needs to explain is why it is a sensible account of body ownership, not a sensible part of an account of what a self or a person is. It seems compelling that we do not understand what selves or persons (such as we know them) are unless we take account of the inter-dependency of their perceptual-volitional life and

\textsuperscript{66} Cf. L. Wittgenstein (1922) 5.63 to 5.641.
their bodies. This inter-dependency seems essential to being an animal of any sort. But that is not to say it is essential to an account of body ownership.

The second is that it is the fact of a causal connection between a body and a psychological life which realism claims to be constitutive of body ownership, not any awareness of the obtaining of this fact that a self or person might have. Recall Husserl's third feature defining the 'living body' or 'body subject': my body is immediately and directly responsive to my will. When we act, we have what we might call a sense of our own agency: there can be an awareness of one's body from the inside as under the control of one's will. Perhaps it is intuitively plausible that this sense of agency could play a role in an account of body ownership. Equally, some have thought that one is tacitly aware of one's body in outer sensory awareness. Recall Husserl's fourth and final defining feature: my body is at the centre of the world which I perceive. In similar vein. Michael Ayers, for instance, claims that 'our experience of ourselves as being a material object among others essentially permeates our sensory experience of things in general'. Perhaps a case could be made that this fact too plays a role in our conception of body ownership. Be this as it may, the point here is that it is neither an awareness of agency in a body, nor an awareness of a body as colouring or imbuing one's outer sensory perceptions, which realism posits as constitutive of body ownership. What realism posits as constitutive of body ownership is the fact of a causal connection between one's perceptions and volitions and a body – not any awareness of this fact one might have.

So at this stage in the debate between realism and idealism, the onus of proof is on realism. It may not have been conclusively refuted, but it does have its work cut out for it. I shall return briefly to this debate in the Conclusion. To anticipate, I shall there suggest that we should accept a view which is in a sense akin to realism, in conjunction with idealism. For certainly there is something deeply intuitive about the general idea that body ownership is to do with the connection between a subject's body and her psychological life, even if the realism we have so far considered fails adequately to account for this intuition. But the aim of the rest of this Part is to further develop idealism.

Before taking up this task, there is an objection to the whole approach I have adopted which needs to be considered. The objection points out that, just as people can suffer from severe extero-sensory dysfunction and paralysis, perhaps too they could

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suffer from an utter lack of awareness of their bodies from the inside: certainly there have been people who have lost almost all body awareness below the shoulders or neck. But all such people – those who fail to meet the realist criteria, and those who fail to meet in full the idealist criteria – own bodies. Indeed, people in long-term comas, who seem destined to fail to meet any criterion we could even possibly consider which does not make body ownership thoroughly dispositional, own bodies. Or at least, there seems to be nothing odd or indeterminate in the thought that there is a body which is the body of any such self or person. Given this, the objection claims that our concept of body ownership really is a rag-bag concept. We have multiple criteria of body ownership, any of which will do in a pinch.

I think the right response to this objection is two-tiered. The first tier borrows from Shoemaker’s account of realism. Shoemaker insists that realism about body ownership is an account of ‘paradigmatic embodiment’. So too is any account of body ownership. When we imagine a non-paradigmatic situation, it is far from clear what this reveals about the concepts we employ in paradigmatic situations. Perhaps those concepts are stretched or some new facet of them revealed. Or perhaps we imagine new, if comparable, concepts in their stead.

The second tier of the response points out that it is possible that the reason why there seems nothing odd or indeterminate in the thought that a person in a coma, say, owns a body, is to do with how we answer the question of what a self or a person is, not with how we answer the question of what body ownership is. In effect, the suggestion is that our intuitions about these non-paradigmatic cases stem from confusing question (1) with question (3). So, we are happy to claim that there is a body which is the body of a person in a coma, because, say, there is a body which houses her brain, or, perhaps better, there is a body which she simply is. Indeed, it seems evident that if we imagine that persons were paradigmatically in comas, then we imagine that there is nothing it is to conceive of (or experience) a body as one’s own at all, precisely because there is no conceiving (or experiencing) at all. Still though, there are people, who stand in some sort of relation to their bodies, no matter what state they are in so long as they are alive.

Perhaps in the end, the viability of the approach I have taken is to be judged by the account it produces. By the end of this Part, I hope to have shown one way in which idealism can explain how one’s conception and experience of a body as one’s own is as

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71 S. Shoemaker (1984b) p. 120 ff.
of a recognisably human body, as promised. But there is one final feature of idealism
which needs first to be addressed, a feature which might be either one of its ultimate
virtues, or its ultimate downfall. The feature is the simplicity with which it can explain
why judgements about our bodies based on awareness from the inside are immune to
errors of misidentification. I shall take up this issue in Section 1.5. But first, I want to
look very briefly at our awareness of our body sensations. In the quotation from
Descartes I cited when introducing idealism, he claims that feeling sensations in a body,
like appetites and emotions, and pains and pleasurable ticklings, is part of what makes
one conceive of that body as one's own. But so far, I have focused exclusively on one's
awareness of the spatial properties of one's body from the inside. I want now to justify
this focus.
1.4 Body Sensations

Do body sensations contribute to one's conception of a body as one's own? Intuitively, it seems that Descartes must be right that they do: after all, it is one's own body and no other in which one has these sensations, and they are so vivid a part of one's bodily experience.

The awareness one has of the spatial properties of one's body, like shape and configuration, and location, is not unrelated to the awareness one has of its feelings. For these feelings are felt to be located in or on the body. When a bodily feeling seems to encompass the body as a whole, the way lethargy or an emotional condition like depression can, we can still make sense of the idea that the feeling is located. The feeling is located simply in that it fills or suffuses the body; and the body is itself experienced as having a location: as occupying a certain volume of space, and no more, within a region of space larger than it. When a bodily feeling is more precisely located, at a particular place in or on the body, the connection between that location and the spatial properties of the body is even more concrete. One is aware of sensations, like pains, tickles, scratches, warmth, cold, pressure, and so on, to be at places given in relation to the space of the body as a whole. A pain, for instance, might be in one's ankle: that is, wherever one's ankle is felt to be, whether one is sitting with it crossed over a knee, or stretched out in front of one, that is where the pain is experienced to be.

But we can imagine a creature who experiences located sensations in a very different way. Imagine, for instance, a perfectly spherical creature who is quite unable to move and lives in liquid. This sphere could experience its sensations as located if it had a simple, primitive, frame of reference centred on its body. It might have a mechanism which gave it a sensitivity to gravity, together with a mechanism which gave it a sensitivity to the nearest magnetic pole. Such sensitivities could provide it with axes along which it could plot its body sensations.

This way of locating sensations makes no reference to any awareness the sphere has of the spatial properties of its body like shape, configuration, and size. If the sphere happens never to have experienced sensations outside of a certain spherical area, that, to

72 I discuss the relationship between body awareness and emotion further in Section 3.3.
73 For a debate about how the idea of a location of a sensation should be analysed, see K. Baier (1964); L. C. Holborow (1966); D. M. Taylor (1965) and (1966); G.N.A. Vesey (1965). See also the discussion between G.E.M. Anscombe (1957) and (1962), and D. Braybrooke and Others (1962). For a more recent account, see M. Martin (1993) and also B. O'Shaughnessy (1980) vol. 1.
it, is mere happenstance. The frame of reference it is using to locate its sensations would be just as capable of specifying sensations at places outside of the sphere’s body, as within it. And so it does not seem that the sphere’s capacity to locate its sensations at places in fact internal to its body provides it with any conception of its body as such. The reason is that the fact that these sensations are at places internal to its body plays no part in how the sphere is specifying those places. Its way of locating its sensations gives it no awareness of a body at all, and so certainly no conception of a body as its own.

Our feelings matter to us a great deal. Pains, sensations, and emotions can demand one’s attention; one can want nothing more than for one’s experience of them to cease, or, in the case of more pleasurable feelings, to continue. As we saw in Section 1.2, in this they contrast palpably with the rather more ethereal and recalcitrant awareness of the purely spatial properties of one’s body that one has. Nevertheless, without this more spartan, spatial awareness of one’s body from the inside, in which sensations can then be housed, those sensations would not provide one with any conception of a body as one’s own. Unlocated sensations certainly could not provide one with any such conception; and sensations which are located but not in relation to one’s awareness of the purely spatial properties of one’s body do nothing to make up the difference, witness the sphere. So it is only because one experiences sensations in or on what is already given to one as one’s own body that they are able to make any contribution to one’s conception of a body as one’s own. And so the contribution they make is not basic, but more affective: they make one care for one’s own body all the more.
1.5 Immunity to Errors of Misidentification: Body Awareness

In Section 1.1, I first introduced the notion of immunity to errors of misidentification, and suggested that judgements about one's body based on awareness of it from the inside seem indeed to be immune. Whenever a particular sort of judgement is immune to errors of misidentification, we need to look for an explanation of why. Consider, for instance, what is perhaps the paradigm of immunity: first-person judgements which ascribe present states of conscious experience based on introspection. Why are these judgements immune to errors relative to the first-person pronoun? John Campbell has proposed that the simplest explanation is this: what makes an experience an experience of a certain self or person is the possibility of her self-ascribing it. This guarantees that no mistake is possible: for if someone self-ascribes an experience, she thereby makes that experience her own. I think that when one first encounters this proposal, one feels a strong intuitive resistance to it. The reason is that it seems to reverse the correct order of explanation: what makes self-ascription possible is that the experience in question is the ascriber's own, not vice versa. If one insists on this intuitive order of explanation, the problem now is to produce a different explanation of the immunity of these judgements, and to produce a different explanation of the ownership of experiences. Immediately one might think to appeal to the way in which the ascription of an experience is made. One might say: what makes an experience the experience of a particular self or person is that it is available to her in introspection; and that is why judgements ascribing experiences which are made on that basis are immune to errors of misidentification. But this will not work. For 'is available to her in introspection' seems simply to mean 'which she experiences'. And it is patently circular to try to explain the ownership of experiences by claiming that what makes an experience the experience of a particular self or person is that she experiences it. We do better, at least as yet, to keep with Campbell's simple proposal, however counter-intuitive it may at first seem.

The feature of idealism about body ownership which may be one of its ultimate virtues is that it can explain the immunity to errors of misidentification of judgements about one's body, based on awareness from the inside, in a simple yet intuitive way. The explanation runs parallel to the failed alternative to Campbell's simple proposal.

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74 J. Campbell (1999a).
75 Campbell himself does not offer this argument, so it may not be his reason for opting for the simple proposal. Note too that Campbell does not claim that this simple proposal is a complete account of the ownership of experiences. See also his (1999b).
According to idealism, what makes a body one's own body is that one is aware of it from the inside. This guarantees that no mistake of identification is possible: for if someone makes a judgement about a body based on awareness of it from the inside, her awareness of that body makes it her own. But there is no circularity here. For a body is not like an experience: claiming that what makes a body one's own is that one experiences it (in a certain way from the inside) is not like claiming that what makes an experience one's own is that one experiences it (through introspection).

However, this virtue will instead be the downfall of idealism if it is possible to be aware from the inside of a body which we should resolutely and sensibly deny to be one's own. Idealism will then have secured the immunity of the relevant judgements by creating property where there is no legal entitlement. For, according to idealism, such a body, despite our conviction that it is not one's own, is made into one's own, in virtue of the fact that one is aware of it from the inside.

It seems a reasonable conjecture that in the history of the human race this has never happened. No one has ever been aware of a body from the inside which we should not consider her own body. However, it may seem easy enough to imagine just such a situation. All we need imagine is a change in the causal ground of body awareness. As things are, the brain receives information from the internal information systems in only one body: the body housing the brain. Sensory fibres carry afferent signals from the body to a 'body map' just behind the central sulcus, as well as to other areas of the brain: this is the physiological basis for a person's awareness of her body from the inside. But we can easily imagine two alternatives to this ordinary situation.

The first alternative is suggested by Wittgenstein in the Blue Book: one person, call her A, comes to have awareness not only of her own body, but also of a part of another's body, call him B. To make this seem feasible what we need imagine is that the appropriate causal connection has been secured between A's brain and B's body. Perhaps a sort of radio transmitter has been implanted in B's legs, for instance, which duplicates the signals which continue onwards and upwards to B's brain, and sends them across the airwaves to A. A's brain, in turn, might be fitted with a receiver for these signals, as well as an extra area for mapping B's legs, in addition to the map A already has of her own body. There is some empirical evidence that afferent signals can only be interpreted by the brain in conjunction with corollary discharges from the motor centres; but I shall disregard this complication. Planting A's will into B's body,
especially if B's own will resides there still, would confuse matters greatly. So I shall assume that we are imagining that A receives information from B's legs but cannot put that information to any active use. She is in the physiological position with respect to B's legs that most of us are in with respect to our ears: we cannot move them, but we can feel them, for instance, when they are cold, or pinched under a hat. Wittgenstein's claim, then, is simply that so long as we have secured the appropriate causal-physiological rig-up between A and B, A can be aware of B's legs from the inside. And so, Wittgenstein suggests, it is easy to imagine that, should B have a pain in his legs, A would spontaneously reach out to tend to the place of the pain, and in so doing would feel and see her hand reaching out to B. Once the appropriate physiological rig-up between A and B has been secured, we do still need to imagine 'a correlation between visual, tactual, and kinaesthetic, etc., experiences different from the ordinary correlation': that is the upshot of A being aware of B's legs. But this, he thinks, is none too hard to imagine.

It is important to make plain just what Wittgenstein's suggestion amounts to. It is not the case that we are to imagine that A comes to have a fully different body, the body which used to be B's. A continues to have her own body. Nor is it the case that A feels pain in her own leg, but not because she has damaged it but because B has damaged his. This would be to imagine that A's pain was due to an unusual cause, damage not to her own leg but to B's, but not to imagine that A's pain was felt by her to be in an unusual place, B's leg. Nor, finally, are we to imagine that A suddenly feels her own body to extend to a place which happens to coincide with B's legs. If a person who suffers from a phantom limb feels pain in a phantom foot, say, and as it happens at that moment another person's foot is where the phantom foot seems to her to be, that does not amount to the sufferer feeling pain in another's foot. For instance, should the other person move his foot away, the sufferer continues to feel pain in the same place: the place where her phantom foot feels to be. So, again, we are not being asked to imagine that A has a rather long and funny phantom extension to her body which as it happens ends up coinciding with B's legs. Rather, A is supposed to have awareness of B's legs, and so to be able to feel pain in them: the place her awareness is of, the place of the pain she feels, is wherever B and his legs are. So simply put: A's body is more or less as it normally is, but to boot, she is now capable of awareness from the inside of another bit of the world as well: B's legs.

The second alternative we can imagine is in a sense simpler. Imagine that we stop A's brain from receiving any information from (or sending any signals to) her own
body, and instead send her brain all and only information from B’s. Again, we must imagine that A has no motor control over B’s body: she is and she knows herself to be paralysed with respect to the body she is receiving information from. So in this situation A has no awareness from the inside of her own body, but full awareness from the inside of B’s. 78

Both of these imagined alternatives challenge the plausibility of idealism about body ownership, on the assumption that we should not wish to claim in the first case that A has a new body part, and in the second that she has a new body. What should idealism say about these imagined alternatives to the ordinary situation? I shall take the alternatives in order, although in the end the discussions will need to be linked.

Both Quassim Cassam and Michael Martin have recently argued that the first alternative situation is not possible: A could not be aware of B’s legs. 79 The basic thought to which both appeal is that body awareness primarily provides one with awareness of an object, that is, of a body as a whole, and so of awareness of body parts only in so far as they are parts of that whole. I want briefly to look at these arguments. It seems to me that neither will do as a response for idealism.

Martin begins by pointing out that there are good reasons for thinking that a causal connection between an object and a perceiving subject may be necessary but is not sufficient for that subject to perceive the object: witness the notorious problem of deviant causal chains. A better way of conceiving of perception in general is to ask what a mode of perception is for; when we ask this about body awareness, we see that what it is for is providing a subject with awareness of a body as a whole, and with body parts only in as much as they are parts of that whole. The reason Martin says that the whole has priority over the parts is that otherwise the subject would have no way of tracking which body the parts belonged to: if given the right physiological rig-up, any body part could come to be perceived from the inside, then the subject would have no way of knowing "whether the body part belongs to one body or another." 80 So Martin concludes that there can only be awareness of a body part from the inside if:

that body part really is part of the subject’s body . . where it is clear that B’s [legs are] not a part of A’s body, the set-up will amount to no more than a means of causing damage to one person’s body [B’s] and pain to another [A], without thereby giving the second awareness of the former’s body. 81

81 Ibid.
This is why Martin suggests Wittgenstein's scenario should be rejected: A cannot have awareness from the inside of B's legs.

But I think that Martin's conclusion is not warranted by his argument. Grant both that we must ask what a mode of perception is for, and that what body awareness is for is providing a subject with awareness of a body as a whole, and body parts only in as much as they are parts of that whole. It is nonetheless perfectly possible that a subject could have awareness of two distinct bodies, as wholes, from the inside. To say that one can only have awareness from the inside of a body as a whole is not to say that one can only have awareness from the inside of one whole body. Now as Wittgenstein's imagined alternative has so far been described, it is true that A has been physiologically connected only to B's legs, and not to the rest of him. So if we have granted that Martin is correct in claiming that a subject can only have awareness of a body part in as much as she can have awareness of the body it is part of as a whole, then we are forced to say that A cannot have awareness of B's legs. But no reason has yet been given why we could not imagine extending the physiological connection between A and B so that A came to have awareness of all of B's body. In which case, for all that has been said, she would have awareness from the inside of two whole bodies; and so it seems she could know, from the inside, which body a body part she was aware of belonged to: this one, or that one. And so Martin's demand would be met: she would have awareness from the inside of bodies as wholes in the first instance, of their parts only derivatively, precisely in that she was perfectly able to say which body a part she was perceiving was a part of. But this is not the conclusion which was hoped for: for once again, it seems to be a mere physiological contingency that we are each of us aware of only one body from the inside.

Cassam, on the other hand, seems to be recommending one of two possible arguments, both of which depend on the fact that our common-sense concept of an object would disbar B's legs from being part of A's body, for B's legs are materially united not with A's body but with B's. Sometimes Cassam seems to suggest that we can use this thought to motivate a position analogous to Martin's: one cannot have awareness from the inside of a body part not materially united with one's whole body, for nothing can count as such awareness unless it is awareness of a body part materially united with one's whole body.82 The problem is to see why this would be so. Certainly as things ordinarily are no one has any awareness from the inside of a body part not

materially united to her body, but the status of the ordinary is precisely what is in question. Sometimes however Cassam seems to suggest that since B’s legs are not materially united with A’s body, they would not seem to A to be her legs. This seems correct, in that if all of a sudden, without warning or explanation, one became aware of what felt like a second pair of legs at some distance from one’s body, one would hardly immediately conceive of those legs as one’s own second set.\textsuperscript{83} One would not immediately judge on the basis of this awareness ‘My legs are hurting’ but rather something more like ‘There seem to be some legs over there I am aware of as hurting’ or perhaps ‘These other legs are hurting’ Correct as this thought may be, it will unfortunately not help idealism. For so far, according to idealism, these second legs are one’s own legs, regardless of what one would be inclined to judge, simply in virtue of one’s new-found if bizarre awareness of them.

I shall return to this suggestion of Cassam’s below. For now, I want to question Wittgenstein’s alternative situation in a slightly different way.

What Wittgenstein claims is that, given the physiological rig-up we have orchestrated between B’s legs and A’s brain, A can have feeling in, or awareness of, B’s legs: so for instance, the place where the pain feels to her to be is the place where B’s legs are. Now as Wittgenstein describes the situation, B is in the very near vicinity of A: she can spontaneously reach out and tend to his legs when she feels pain; she can see his legs, right there in front of her. So as the situation is described, A surely knows where B and his legs are. Her visual and tactual experience provide her with this knowledge. But A’s visual and tactual experience is additional to her awareness of B’s legs from the inside. If she truly has such awareness, then she should have knowledge of the spatial and sensory properties of B’s legs, including knowledge of where they are, without needing to rely on her visual and tactual experience. Her awareness of B’s legs should be like her awareness of her own body from the inside: she is aware of the shape and configuration and to some extent size of B’s legs, and in this way, she is aware of them as located at a place here. If she spontaneously reaches out to the place of the pain and in so doing touches B’s legs, this is because she already, prior to reaching, feels the pain at that place. She does not feel an unlocated pain, and then comes to know where it is by noting where she is spontaneously inclined to reach. But how then does A know where B’s legs are? How does the mere existence of a causal-physiological rig-up between B’s legs and A’s brain provide A with the right sort of awareness of B’s legs?

The difficulty is to see how the kind of awareness we each have of only one body could be extended to two distinct bodies at once. Awareness of a body from the inside provides one with knowledge of where the body is located: here. So, for A to have awareness of B’s legs, it seems she must be aware of them as located here. But of course, B’s body is not here, where A’s body is, but over there, where her body is not. How can A be aware of two bodies, spatially distinct and randomly related, both at the same time as located here? This seems of dubious coherence. But perhaps the difficulty is not rightly put. It is not that A must be aware of two bodies at the same time as located here, but rather that she is aware of a single but spatially gappy body as located here. Just as one can be aware of one’s left hand as over here and one’s right foot as over there, relative to the whole body which one is aware of as here, A is aware of her body as over here and B’s legs as over there, relative to the whole body, spatially disjoint, including her body and B’s legs, which she is aware of as stretching over a space the whole of which is here.

If this is the right way to put the difficulty, then the problem is not obviously that it is of dubious coherence. The problem is rather that the causal-physiological rig-up as it stands does not seem to suffice to give A this awareness of where B’s legs are in relation to her own body. She is aware of the relative location of her own body parts because they are part of a single whole of which she is already aware. This awareness is utterly impotent when it comes to providing her with awareness of any other objects, outside the boundaries of her body and at a certain distance and direction from it. How does sending her information from B’s legs and providing her with a new map for them in her brain remedy this? As yet there is no provision for any awareness of the relation between B’s legs and her own body. For all A can know, B’s legs could be anywhere. This is why Wittgenstein’s claim, as it stands, can be rejected: if we try to grant that A has awareness from the inside, of B’s legs, we must yet admit that she has no way, from the inside, of knowing where the volume of space his legs are taking up is in relation to the volume of space her body is taking up. And this is simply to say that she is not really aware of B’s legs from the inside at all. Or at least: if she is not aware of where the legs she is receiving information from are, she cannot know which legs they are in virtue of this awareness. (Although of course, A might come by other means to know

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84 Of course, if there is no distance between one’s body and another body, one is touching that other body, and one can have knowledge of its location, in relation to one’s body, in this way. For a discussion of the relationship between awareness of one’s body from the inside and touch see B. O’Shaughnessy (1989); M. Martin (1992) and (1993).
with which legs she is newly linked, e.g., testimony from the scientists involved, or from B himself.)

One might object that this line of reasoning cannot be right because something at least similar to Wittgenstein's alternative scenario is in fact empirically possible. Oliver Sacks reports that much to his surprise, when he suffered from an alien leg, his toes were unaffected, still 'pink and lively, twiddling away'. There was, in effect, a spatial gap in the body which he had awareness of from the inside: he lacked all awareness of his leg from thigh to foot, but he had awareness of his toes. And it might seem as if this is just how it is with A and B.

There is a real difference between the imagined case of A and B, and the real case of Sacks and his toes. Sacks may have lacked any awareness of his leg, but there is yet a sense in which it played a role in his awareness of the place of his toes. Sacks, like all of us, started with a body which he sensed as a whole, and one chunk of that body was then dropped from his awareness. But the spatial relation between the two areas of his body he was still able to sense, the spatial relation between the bulk of his body excluding his leg, and then his leftover toes, was nonetheless determined by his alien leg: the place of his toes was defined in relation to the rest of his body, as the place at a certain distance and direction from his thigh, at the end of the place which his actual, if alien, leg was. So the place of Sacks' toes was fixed in relation to Sacks: wherever Sacks's body goes, that place, and his toes at that place, follow. But this is not how it is with A and B. B's legs could be absolutely anywhere in the world in relation to A's body, for they go where B goes, not where A goes.

However, perhaps we have no reason in principle to deny that technology might be developed which could overcome this difference between A and B, and Sacks and his toes. Sacks' case shows that it is empirically possible that the awareness one has of a body from the inside can be to some extent gappy. Why not see the case of A and B as simply gappy to the extreme, and so requiring a very new and innovative technology to sustain it? Grant that the causal-physiological rig-up as described above will not suffice to provide A with any awareness of where B's legs are. All this means is that it is not enough to implant the transmitter and the receiver and create the new brain map. We must also add a sophisticated tracking device of some sort or other, so that A could be aware of where B's legs were in relation to her own body, just as Sacks is aware of his.

toes in relation to his body, and we are all of us aware of the relative position of our body’s parts.

It would be foolhardy to deny that such a technological advance is impossible. But the suggested alternative now depends on the possibility of scientific technology which has not yet been envisaged in any detail at all. It is not just a question of a new causal underpinning: there is a real problem which will require a creative solution. In the meantime, the conceptual and phenomenological difficulties attending the possibility that A could be aware of B’s legs from the inside remain.

Where does this leave idealism about body ownership? What the above discussion brings to the fore is that it may be a mere contingent, physiological fact that there is only one body to which each of us is causally connected in such a way as to provide us with awareness of it from the inside, but that this fact is nonetheless somewhat remarkable. Tampering with it amounts to a serious intervention with the natural world. But idealism about body ownership is supposed to be an account of our conception of body ownership. Tamper with the natural facts too much, and of course that conception will seem wanting: for our conception of body ownership emerges from or answers to the world as it is. So idealism about body ownership can perhaps accept that in a radically different world, a world in which we did not have separate, integrated, nervous systems, awareness of a body from the inside would not suffice to make that body one’s own body. The immunity to errors of misidentification of judgements about one’s body based on body awareness is to this extent ‘de facto’.

I shall return to this first alternative to the ordinary situation shortly. But I want now to turn briefly to the second alternative. Recall that in it, we are to imagine that A has no awareness from the inside of her own body, but full awareness from the inside of B’s. So none of the difficulties to do with her awareness of the spatial relation between B’s body and her own arises.

What should idealism say about this situation? It may depend on what we imagine the surrounding circumstances to be. Imagine that A is in a general sensory deprivation tank for all of ten minutes, except that we allow her to receive information from B’s body. A might be able to make all sorts of judgements about B’s body on this

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86 Similarly, David Pears has suggested that Wittgenstein may have thought that the immunity to errors of misidentification of the first-person pronoun in judgements which ascribe present states of consciousness based on introspection is also ‘de facto’. It would not exist in a world in which we did not live with separate, integrated nervous systems. For instance, there is at least some room for questioning whether, if A has awareness of B’s legs from the inside and, feeling a pain in them, judges ‘I have a pain’, her judgement is immune to error relative to the first-person pronoun. If this suggestion is credited, then it is possible that all judgements which are immune to errors of misidentification are so only in a ‘de facto’ sense. See D. Pears (1998) and also his (1987) ch. 7.
basis. She might say, for instance, that it seems less healthy than her body does, or that it is walking along, or sitting cross-legged. After the ten minutes, A emerges from the tank intact, and we thank her for her participation in the experiment. Here there is no inclination at all to think that, for those ten minutes, B's body became A's.

But imagine instead that A is in a sensory deprivation tank for the whole of her life, except that we allow her to receive information from B's body. B's body is the only body A knows; and from the inside, she knows it as thoroughly as does B. Here there is more sense in thinking that both A and B own this body: they share it, the way Siamese twins can sometimes share body parts. Indeed, if we imagine now that we also allow A to receive some information from B's outer senses, then she seems to share his body even more. And if we even further imagine that B all the while is in a coma, then the body we are calling B's may even seem to belong more to A than to B, even if it is still not hers exclusively.

Return now to our first alternative situation, and imagine that, having solved the technological difficulties, A is able to be aware of B's legs. But imagine too that, this technological solution being no trifling matter, the alternations we need to make to A and to B are permanent. A does not just find herself with this new-found awareness for a short burst of time. She and B undergo surgery, and A is aware of B's legs from then on. Here again it seems there is more sense in thinking that B's legs, as well as being B's, are A's. Cassam may be right that, if all of a sudden, without warning or explanation, one became aware of what felt like a second pair of legs at some distance from one's body, one would hardly immediately conceive of those legs as one's own second set. But in this lifelong situation, it seems A might well conceive of B's legs as her own, even if she also concedes they are B's too. And she would be right to do so. For instance, imagine that B, to A's dismay, is an eccentric sado-masochist, and enjoys pains in his legs. A might insist that she had a valid claim that B not indulge in his sado-masochistic ways, or at the very least, that he inform her in advance so that she could take a general analgesic in preparation.

Part of what makes the difference between the cases where neither we nor A would dream of claiming that the body she has awareness of is her own body, and the cases where both we and A would countenance such a claim, is the length of time A enjoys the awareness. Why does this matter? The reason is that the longer the time, the more the situation in general resembles the ordinary. For in the ordinary situation, a body is something one has to live with.
I think it is worth pausing briefly here to examine the notion of living with a body. For it is important to see that this is something idealism about body ownership basically takes for granted. When I first introduced idealism about body ownership, I distinguished it from idealism about body identity. Idealism does not provide identity conditions for a body over time. According to idealism, there is a body, otherwise individuated, which is 'mine' in virtue of my awareness of it from the inside. The point I have been labouring in this Section is that it is an important fact that as things stand, there is only one body which possesses this property, both at a time and, we have now noted, over time. But one might yet wonder whether this fact of living with a body itself plays some role in one's conception of a body as one's own. One might wonder, for instance, whether one's memory of one's body from an earlier time in one's life contributes to making that body one's own.

To this end, let us consider the classic Prince and the Cobbler switching scenario, familiar from discussions of personal identity. All of a sudden, whatever the reason, we find that the Cobbler's body seems to house the Prince's memories, knowledge, skills and character traits, and the Prince's body seems to house the Cobbler's memories, knowledge, skills and character traits. This scenario certainly points, among other things, to a role for personal memory in personal identity. Does it point to a role for body memory in body ownership?

The first point to make is that which body memories these men have depends on which theory of personal identity is adopted. If we take the view that the self or person is identical to the body or the human being, then neither man actually has memories of a different body from the inside. Both men are under the illusion that they have these memories. So here the question we might ask is whether their current lack of memories of the bodies to which they are identical makes these bodies less their own. On the other hand, if we take the view that the self or person is something like a single, unified stream of consciousness, then both men do have memories of a body from the inside which is a different body from the body they are currently aware of from the inside. Here the question we might ask is again whether their current lack of memories of the body they are currently aware of from the inside makes these bodies less their own (although the cause of this lack is different in this case). But we might also ask whether the fact that they have memories of a body they are no longer aware of from the inside makes that body their own.

87 J. Locke (1975).
It seems straightforward that the answer to this last question, at least, is no. Memory of a body from the inside at some earlier time does not make that body now one’s own. But nor does it seem to make it the case that the body in question was one’s own. For one could only have such a memory if one was in fact aware of it from the inside then. That is, if it was one’s own. So there is no basic, constitutive role for memory of a body from the inside to play in an idealist account of body ownership. There is, however, a more affective role for it to play. Like body sensations, memory of a body can contribute to one’s conception of it as one’s own by contributing to one’s familiarity with and feelings for it.

As we live with a body we come to know it. One might once again encounter that old familiar back pain, which returns with every rainy season. Or one might realise that over the years one’s body has lost the pulse of youth. This knowledge of and familiarity with a body over time can deepen and enrich one’s feelings about it. One may love it despite its failures. One may feel it has let one down. We can acknowledge that living with a body makes an affective contribution to one’s conception of a body as one’s own in that it can shape one’s feelings about and concern with the body which is one’s own. This is the sense in which a body which is one’s own, but which one has no memories of, is ‘less’ one’s own than a body one knows all too well. But this is not a basic or constitutive role for body memory in body ownership.

So although we do live with our bodies over time, and this no doubt matters to us a great deal, idealism about body ownership takes this for granted. It neither explains it, nor does it include it in its basic account of body ownership. Nonetheless, the fact we do live with our bodies is of help to idealism. The two imagined alternatives to the ordinary situation which we considered present a challenge to idealism about body ownership only on the assumption that we should not wish to claim in the first case that A has a new body part, and in the second that she has a new body. This assumption is deeply questionable. When the body or part is something that A must live with, as we ordinarily live with our bodies, we seem to be happy to make such a claim, even if, when her awareness is short-lived, we should not. This, together with the degree of intervention with the natural facts that these imagined alternatives demand, does much to counter the charge that idealism is too profligate an account of body ownership. So long as idealism recognises that the truth of its account is not independent of the contingent, natural facts of life, viz. that in the normal course of affairs there is only one human body one has awareness of at a time and over time, it need not concern itself duly with the worry that it might be possible, in extremely rare situations, for extremely
short periods of time, to be aware of a body from the inside which we should deny to be one’s own. And so judgements about one’s own body based on awareness of it from the inside are indeed immune to errors of misidentification – if in a somewhat ‘de facto’ sense. Immune to errors of misidentification, and, if idealism is accepted, understandably so.
1.6 Immunity to Errors of Misidentification: The Outer Senses

The claim that judgements about one's body based on awareness from the inside are immune to errors of misidentification is relatively common. In contrast, the claim that judgements about one's body based on awareness of it through the outer senses even might be immune to errors of misidentification is commonly rejected out of hand, if indeed it is considered at all. As mentioned in Section 1.1, it has seemed to many perfectly possible that if, say, one was jumbled up with other people's bodies, perhaps in a car accident, or when nearing the climax of a game of Twister, one might very well mistake a visually perceived hand or foot for one's own when really it belonged to another. In this Section, I shall argue that this sweeping denial is wrong: judgements about one's body based on awareness of it through the outer senses can indeed be immune to errors of misidentification.  

To say that a judgement is immune to errors of misidentification is not to say it is infallible. This point can be overlooked, since the paradigm of judgements exhibiting immunity - first-person present-tense judgements ascribing states of consciousness on the basis of introspection - are also infallible. For instance, if one judges 'I am in pain' in this way, it seems it is not just that one cannot be mistaken that it is oneself who is experiencing pain. One cannot be mistaken that it is pain one is experiencing. But not all judgements exhibiting immunity are infallible: these are simply two different properties judgements can have. Consider a visually-based demonstrative judgement ascribing a perceived object's location: say that one has occasion to judge, of a visually perceived object, 'That object is over there' As John Campbell has pointed out, when one makes such a judgement, it is of course possible that one is hallucinating, or that unbeknownst to one various prisms or mirrors are making an object appear where it is not. But in such a case, one could not at least know on this basis that some object is there at the place in question, only not the object that one's judgement is about. The reason one cannot know this is that the basis upon which one has identified the object of the visual-demonstrative judgement seems precisely to be its perceived location: it is the

88 To my knowledge, the only suggestion that judgements about one's body based on the outer senses might be immune to errors of misidentification is to be found in a footnote of Evans's: 'I do not include in this list (of ways of perceiving our bodies which give rise to judgements which are immune to errors of misidentification) perceptual knowledge of the physical self based upon executing certain characteristic movements, e.g., looking down, or feeling one's body with the sort of motions one uses in washing oneself. But actually I am not at all persuaded that judgements so based ought not to appear on the list, because I am not at all persuaded that they depend upon an identification component' (1982) p. 220.
perceived location which determines which object is in question. So if one judges, based on a visual experience of an object, 'That object is over there', the meaning of the referring term 'that object' depends on the fact that one has singled an object out as over there. One cannot visually perceive some object over there, but just not that object. Yet one may not be perceiving any object at all.

Consider now a judgement based on awareness of a body from the inside. Body awareness gives one discriminating knowledge of a body and its parts, as one object within a larger spatial region. Like a visual experience, this can ground a demonstrative reference: one can refer to the body one is presented with from the inside as 'this body' or its foot, say, as 'this foot'. The meaning of these referring terms depends on the fact that one has singled a body or a body part out in body awareness. But if we are idealists about body ownership, what it is for a body or a foot to be 'my body' or 'my foot' just is for it to be presented to me through body awareness. I am equally entitled to make a judgement using a possessive like 'my'. So a judgement about 'this body' or 'this foot' made on the basis of awareness from the inside just is a judgement about 'my body' or 'my foot' for one who has the concept of body ownership. In this sense, it is a priori that 'this body' I am aware of from the inside is 'my body'.

Contrast this with a judgement about one's body based on the outer senses. Say that when in a car accident, or when playing Twister, one glances down and, on the basis of one's visual experience, judges 'My foot is twisted all around'. Why should we think this judgement is prone to an error of misidentification? The reason seems to be this. The basis of this judgement is one's visual experience, which presents a particular object, a foot, to one as twisted all around. So one is fully entitled to make the demonstrative judgement 'That foot is twisted all around' where which foot that foot is depends on its perceived location. So far, this judgement is akin to a judgement based on body awareness: both awareness of a body from the inside, and awareness of a body through the outer senses, can ground a demonstrative judgement about the body the awareness is of. But at this stage these two sorts of judgements part ways. It is a priori that the body presented to one from the inside is one's own. But there is nothing in the presentation of a body to one through the outer senses to inform one of whose body it is: all bodies and their parts perceived through the outer senses are on a par in this regard. So it is a further claim that the foot one sees is one's own: a claim not warranted simply by the content of the visual experience in its own right, and a claim about which one

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89 J. Campbell (1999a).
might be wrong. In this way, making a judgement about one's body based on a visual experience of it is like making a judgement about one's body based on an x-ray. There is a possibility, however remote, that one will make a mistake about the owner. For both sorts of judgement depend not only on the content of an experience, but on a belief that the object presented in the experience is one's own body.

Perhaps mistakes about whose body is presented to one through the outer senses are sometimes possible. But that such mistakes are sometimes possible does not entail that such mistakes are always possible. And if such mistakes are not always possible there may be some interest in this fact. So consider the judgement: 'My feet look big' formed on the basis of one's visual experience, as one looks down at one's feet, while walking along. It could be that one is hallucinating the whole experience: one is not infallible about this judgement. But if one is not hallucinating, that is, if one is indeed walking along, looking down at the ground, and musing about the feet one sees there, then one cannot make a mistake about those feet being one's own feet. If anyone else's feet were there, one would no longer be walking along, for one would have tripped. Or consider the judgement: 'My hand feels sticky' while touching one's right hand with one's left. Again, the whole experience could be an illusion of some sort or a hallucination. But if one is not suffering from illusion or hallucination, that is, if one is indeed touching one's right hand with one's left, then it seems one cannot be making a mistake about the hand touched being one's own hand. Again, no one else's hand could be there. So unlike the situation of being in a car accident, or nearing the climax of a game of Twister, one's outer sensory experience in these situations does seem to provide one with grounds for a judgement about one's body which is immune to errors of misidentification.

What is the explanation of this alleged immunity? At this stage, I need to draw attention to a point which has so far been in the background. The most intuitive way of saying what immunity is is this: one simply cannot make a mistake about which object it is that instantiates whatever property is ascribed by the predicate given the grounds at one's disposal. One cannot be wrong about this. And the explanation of this immunity which I have so far offered depends on its contrast to judgements which are not immune: judgements which are formed on the basis of an experience, together with a further, fallible belief about the identity of the object presented in the experience. This can make it seem as if judgements which are immune to errors of misidentification cannot be formed on the basis of an experience together with any further belief at all. But that is too quick.
When one makes a judgement about one’s body based on awareness of it from the inside, there is a sense in which it is open for us to hold that the basis of one’s judgement is one’s experience of a body, together with a further belief about this body. Say one’s experience presents a body to one from the inside as cross-legged. One is immediately licensed to judge ‘This body is cross-legged’. Now it is a priori that ‘this body’ one is aware of from the inside is ‘my body’ One is also immediately licensed to judge ‘This body is my body’. So we can see the basis of the judgement ‘My body is cross-legged’ in one of two ways. Either the basis is the immediate presentation of a body to one in experience as one’s own. Given that one has the concept of body ownership, one simply judges: ‘My body is cross-legged’. Or the basis is the presentation of a body to one in experience together with the a priori belief that the body so presented is one’s own. This belief is not fallible. Once again, if we are idealists about body ownership, what it is for a body to be one’s own just is for it to be presented to one through body awareness. So one can judge ‘My body is cross-legged’ on this more complicated basis. Given the topic we are pursuing here, not much rests on which of these descriptions one prefers. Certainly the immunity of the judgement is secured in either case. One cannot know on the basis of body awareness that some body is cross-legged but be wrong that the body in question is one’s own. The point is that it is not obviously the mere existence of a further belief about the identity of the object presented in an experience which makes a judgement made on this basis liable to an error of misidentification. This liability rather depends on the fallibility of the further belief.90

So consider again walking along and looking at one’s feet. If one is indeed walking along, then no one else’s feet could be at that place where the feet one sees are. If one refers to the feet one sees as ‘my feet’ one cannot be wrong. But the immunity of such a judgement is consistent with the claim that its basis is a visual experience, together with a further belief identifying those perceived feet with one one’s own. What the immunity of such a judgement is not consistent with is the fallibility of this further belief.

I think there is a reason to think that such a belief is infallible. The identification of ‘these feet’ with ‘my feet’ is a priori in just the way the identification of ‘this body’ presented to one from the inside with ‘my body’ is a priori. If this is so,

90 Here I disagree with J. Pryor (1999). Pryor holds that if a judgement is immune to errors of misidentification, then it cannot be based on any further belief. Note that he denies the converse: if a judgement is not based on any further belief, that does not entail that it is immune to errors of misidentification.
then we can equally put this point by denying the claim that there is nothing about these perceived feet which presents them to one as one's own. They are presented to one as one's own: not all bodies presented in the outer senses are on a par in this regard. The reason depends on the integration of the outer senses with body awareness in one's overall experience. The feet one sees walking along right there in full view are presented to one as one's own feet because they are presented to one as at the place one already knows one's own feet to be.

From the inside one is aware of a body as having a certain shape and configuration and to some extent size, within a region of space which is larger than it, and so as located, here, in the world. The body one is aware of in this way is presented to one as one's own body: it is a priori that this body is one's own. But the body one is aware of in this way is also presented as the same body as the body one can be aware of through the outer senses: it is presented as the same body quite simply because it is presented as taking up the same space, as at the same place. From a phenomenological point of view, we should not describe such a situation thus: one is aware of a body from the inside as at one place; one is aware of a body through the outer senses as at another place; and one then comes to realise that these two differently identified places are really one and the same. In fact there is no such realisation, no such identification. From a phenomenological point of view, we should rather describe the situation thus: one is aware of a body from the inside and through the outer senses as at the same place and so as one and the same. As Michael Ayers puts it:

Thus it is not normally as a result of inference, habitual association or the like that I judge the object I feel with my hand to be the object I see. Quite simply, I perceive it as the same: the identity enters into the intentional content of sensation. We need to understand that I can have immediate perceptual knowledge that the foot the shape and the size of which I feel with my hand, the foot which I see, the foot the coldness of which I feel both directly and with my hand, and the foot which is the object of other direct bodily sensations including pain, are one and the same foot.\(^1\)

The suggestion I am making is that the way to understand how this can be is simply to recognise that an object which one has experience of through different sensory modalities is experienced as located at one and the same place, and so as one and the same. So if one is indeed walking along, looking down at one's feet, then one knows the feet one sees, right there beneath one's eyes, are the same feet as the feet one is also aware of from the inside. And if one touches one's right hand with one's left, one

knows that the hand one is touching is the same hand as the hand one is aware of from the inside. One knows they are the same feet and the same hand because the different senses, inner and outer, present them as at the same place. But of course, the feet and the hand and indeed the body as a whole one is aware of from the inside are one’s own and are presented to one as such: that this is so is a priori. And so the body one is aware of through the outer senses not only is in matter of fact one’s own. It can also be presented to one as one’s own body: this is also a priori. The reason, once again for emphasis, is simply that the body one is aware of through the outer senses is presented to one as the same body as the body one is aware of from the inside because it is presented as at the same place. And it is a priori that this body at this place is one’s own.

It is, however, important not to overlook how dependent judgements based on the outer senses really are on body awareness, if they are to be immune to errors of misidentification. If body awareness is illusory, a judgement based on the outer senses will not be immune. Suppose that one wakes up after an accident lying prone on a hospital bed. One feels alright, except that one’s left leg seems to be hurting. So one looks down at it, and, relieved, based on one’s visual experience one judges: ‘My left leg is unscarred.’ Now unbeknownst to one, one’s left leg has in fact been amputated; one is feeling pain in a phantom limb; but the hospital orderly has put someone else’s amputated leg where one’s phantom leg feels to be. In such a situation, one is indeed licensed to judge, on the basis of one’s visual experience: ‘That leg is unscarred’. Hence one does indeed know that some leg is unscarred. But one is mistaken that that leg is one’s own leg. So the possibility of judgements about one’s body based on the outer senses being immune to errors of misidentification depends on the very real assumption that one is in a position to have knowledge of one’s body from the inside: that one is not suffering from an illusion or a hallucination of body awareness.

It also depends on there being a kind of determinacy in the content of the awareness one has of one’s body from the inside, and on one’s attention to that content. Consider again the possibility of making a mistake about whose foot is twisted when in a car accident or when playing Twister. Why does it seem intuitive that in such a situation one could make a mistake? One possibility is that one does not imagine attending to one’s body from the inside. Were one to do so, one would immediately see that the twisted foot was not one’s own foot: integration of the inner and outer modalities is dependent on attention. Another possibility is that the content of one’s

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awareness of the configuration of one's body from the inside is not determinate enough to guarantee precise knowledge of the exact place of one's foot, especially in a situation where there are lots of feet all jumbled up. Body awareness is notoriously prone to illusions, and can be easily misled by the outer senses: this is, no doubt, a corollary of their integration. So perhaps we need to allow that there is some indeterminacy in one's awareness from the inside of one's body, enough indeterminacy that one cannot always draw upon this awareness in a fully satisfactory way.

Hence there are quite a number of fairly contingent conditions which must be met if judgements about one's body based on the outer senses are to be immune to errors of misidentification. One's senses must be functioning normally, and they must be functioning relatively well. The philosophical interest of these judgements is thus perhaps not as deep as it is with other sorts of judgements exhibiting immunity. Nonetheless, these conditions are more often met than not. It takes the construction of somewhat irregular if not tortured examples for the immunity to errors of misidentification of judgements about one's body based on the outer senses to come into question. It does not take any construction of irregular or tortured examples to find a situation in which such judgements are immune: the grounds are ordinarily available.

And there is some philosophical interest in these everyday judgements. The interest is that when one makes a judgement based on the outer senses about one's body, and that judgement is immune to errors of misidentification, it is a priori that that body is one's own: one's experience presents the object of one's judgement to one as one's body. One is as entitled to make a judgement using the expression 'my body' as one is entitled to make a judgement using the expression 'that body.' So not only through body awareness, but through the outer senses, too, a body is presented to one, fundamentally, as one's own: 'my' can be used as subject.

Why has this not seemed obvious? Perhaps one reason is that relatively little philosophical attention has been paid to the question of what makes a body one's own body, and the possibility of an idealistic answer to it. Another reason might be that relatively little credit or even simply importance has been given to the claim that from a phenomenological point of view, the senses are integrated. And a final reason might be this. In Section 1.2, I suggested that some philosophers have confused the fact that, from the inside alone, one is not obviously aware of one's body as solid, forceful, and

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93 For anecdotal reports of, and experimental evidence for, the ways in which body awareness is prone to illusion or easily misled by the outer senses, see V.S. Gurfinkel and Y.S. Levick (1991); J.R. Lackner (1988); V.S. Ramachandran and S. Blakeslee (1998); J.P. Roll, R. Roll, and J.P. Velay (1991); P. Schilder (1950).
so on, with the fact that the body which one is aware of from the inside is not a solid, forceful, and so on, body. They may have thought of the body one is aware of from the inside as a ghostly, ethereal, entity which inhabits a real, physical body: as Descartes says, 'something tenuous, like a wind or fire or ether, which permeated my more solid parts'. This, again, is a mistake: the body one is aware of from the inside is a material body, even if one is not aware from the inside of all its material properties. But this mistake may have precluded the realisation that it is one and the same body one is aware of through the various inner and outer modalities. And so too that one could ever be aware of this body through the various inner and outer modalities as one and the same. But diagnosis aside, judgements about one's body based on the outer senses are, when integrated with awareness of one's body from the inside, immune to errors of misidentification. One's conception and experience of a body as one's own is not confined to the awareness one has of it from the inside. One can equally conceive and experience a body as one's own through the outer senses. So there is no unresolvable tension between awareness of a body from the inside and from the outside. There is no deep schism between the body 'as subject' and the body 'as object'.

I want to propose that this is one explanation of how one's conception and experience of one's body is as of a recognisably human body. The explanation is simply that one experiences a body as one's own body through the outer senses as well as from the inside. So the body which one experiences as one's own is experienced as possessing a set of characteristic human features and details. It will have a certain colour, shape and look; it will produce certain sounds and smells; it will feel a particular way to the touch, etc. The point is that one's conception of one's body as recognisably human is, according to this explanation, immediate or basic in the sense that it is grounded simply in experiencing what is a human body, inside and outside, as one's own. Obviously it was always open to those philosophers interested in the idea that one conceives of or experiences oneself as a body to hold that in matter of fact one does know that the body so conceived and experienced is a human body. Equally it was open to them to hold that in matter of fact one is apprised of quite a number of its human features and details. What was not apparent was how these features and details were any part of one's immediate or basic conception or experience of a body as oneself. And that was what seemed so unlikely. Now I have not claimed that this conception of a body as one's own which is grounded in one's experience of a body through the different senses

amounts to a conception and experience of oneself. But at the very least, if we do end up convinced that it does, then one will be conceiving of and experiencing oneself as a recognisably human body, as a human being.

Idealism about body ownership is what makes this explanation of how one’s conception and experience of one’s body is as of a recognisably human body possible. The explanation depends on the idea that it is a priori that ‘this body’ singled out on the basis of body awareness is ‘my body’ Certainly it does not depend on this alone. The senses must be integrated, and they must functioning normally and regularly well. But the explanation would not be possible in absence of idealism. It would not, for instance, be possible if we accepted the sort of realism we considered at the end of Section 1.3. There I suggested that realism about body ownership might claim that there is a reliable connection between the body which one is aware of from the inside, and the body which is causally connected to one’s perceptions and volitions: they are reliably one and the same. But then they are not a priori one and the same. And so it is not a priori that ‘this body’ singled out on the basis of body awareness is ‘my body’ Now it may be that, some way or other, realism can secure this claim for itself without simply embracing the idealist condition of body ownership alongside its own realist condition. But quite clearly an embrace of idealism would be by far the simplest way of doing so. So this is perhaps the ultimate virtue of idealism: in securing the connection between knowing and owning a body, it makes it possible to see one way in which one’s conception and experience of a body as one’s own is as of a recognisably human body.
2.1 Perception

In *Individuals*, P.F. Strawson’s initial concern is with the ‘identification of particulars’.\(^1\) Sometimes a speaker refers to a particular, and a hearer knows what or which particular is in question. Then the hearer is able to identify the particular referred to. There are many ways in which this identification can be secured. But Strawson thinks that one way is both sufficient and, if not necessary, then fundamental. This is when ‘the hearer can pick out by sight or hearing or touch, or can otherwise sensibly discriminate, the particular being referred to, knowing that it is that particular’.\(^2\) When this condition is met, Strawson claims that ‘the hearer is able directly to locate the particular referred to’.\(^3\) She knows where the particular in question is, and so too knows which particular it is.

It is surely too strong to claim that whenever a hearer can sensibly discriminate a particular out of a range of sensible particulars – whenever Strawson’s condition is met – she is able directly to locate it. Perhaps one might discriminate a sound or a smell from other sounds or smells without any awareness at all of where the sounds or smells are, or are coming from: one uses qualitative or temporal differences to make the discrimination, even though one is still thinking of the sounds or smells as particular sounds or smells. Or one might discriminate a particular based on an illusion as to its location: one might visually identify it via its reflection in a fairground mirror, or one might simply misperceive its location due to a sensory malfunction. But still, in paradigmatic cases of perception, especially visual perception, these two things do seem to go hand in hand: we are not only able sensibly to discriminate a particular but directly to locate it. Indeed in paradigmatic cases of visual perception, the explanation of this is simple: the basis upon which a particular is discriminated just is its perceived location.

What is it to be able ‘directly’ to locate a particular? The intuitive idea seems to be just this: very often, in perceiving an object one perceives it as located, and thereby comes to know where the object is. One might see one’s dog at one’s side and, on this basis, come to know that she is to one’s left. One might judge ‘My dog is to my left’. So if one is trying to help a hearer understand which dog, out of a range of sensibly present dogs, the dog in question is, one might say: ‘I mean the dog to my left’. The knowledge

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\(^1\) P.F. Strawson (1959) p. 15 ff.
\(^2\) Ibid. p. 18.
\(^3\) Ibid. p. 19 (emphasis in original).
which perception affords and which matters in a referential context is propositional. We are able to make and express judgements, which may or may not be correct, about the locations of objects we perceive.

This knowledge of location which perception affords is basic. It cannot be analysed as consisting in other capacities. On the one hand, it does not consist in the capacity to refer demonstratively to or think about a perceived object. Certainly one could not make judgements about the locations of perceived objects if one did not have the capacity to refer demonstratively to or think about those objects. Propositional knowledge requires such conceptual capacities. And certainly it seems correct that in order to refer demonstratively to or think about a perceived object, one must be discriminating it from other sensible objects: one must know which object it is. But as it seems one can sensibly discriminate an object from others, and so have the required basis for demonstrative reference or thought, without knowing where it is, knowledge of where a perceived object is is only a sufficient basis, and not a necessary condition, to refer demonstratively to or think about an object. On the other hand, this knowledge does not consist in the capacity to act intentionally on perceived objects either: it is not merely practical knowledge.

The ability to act on a perceived object does not seem to be a necessary condition for perceptual knowledge of its location: it seems perfectly possible that an animal incapable of action may yet perceive its environment, and come to know where the objects it perceives are. I shall return to this later in this Part. But nor does the ability to act on a perceived object seem to be a sufficient condition for perceptual knowledge of its location. There are two reasons. The first is that just as it is possible to sensibly discriminate an object from others without knowing where it is, so too it seems possible to act on an object without knowing where it is. Gareth Evans has imagined a subject who is watching a live film of a remote seabed, taken from a submarine which is equipped with limbs, excavators, etc. The subject can control the submarine from her remote location, acting on the places she sees on the screen. Evans imagines that the subject is extremely skilled and efficient at operating the controls – she can do it ‘on automatic pilot’ – and that she throws herself into the task, identifying with the point of view of the submarine and forgetting that she is actually far away. ‘What’s that there?’ she might say, moving an excavator to pull a piece of debris from the muck. What is interesting about this example is that it combines two features. On the one hand, the

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subject's actions seem to be spatial in that she intends to act on particular objects and places. Not all actions are spatial in this sense. Consider for instance a sound engineer as familiar with his controls as our subject is with hers. This engineer might act, for instance, so as to mute the bass, or increase the vocals. Certainly he does this by moving the controls, but his actions are not intentional under a spatial description: what he intends to do is mute the bass, or increase the vocals. On the other hand, despite the fact that our subject's actions are both spatial and successful, she has no direct knowledge of where the sector of the seabed she is watching and acting on is. The most she knows is that it is wherever the submarine is. And of that she may have no further idea. Yet it is arguable that our concept of perception covers her 'perception' of the seabed via the film, and that our concept of action covers her 'actions' on it.

But even if one is inclined to discount this example – certainly it is not a paradigm case of perception and action – there is a second way that the ability to act on a perceived object is not a sufficient condition for perceptual knowledge of its location. This is simply that many animals are able to act on the objects they perceive without knowing where these objects are, that is, without being able to judge or say where these objects are. Even if one thinks that one could not have propositional knowledge of the location of perceived objects without practical knowledge of their location, this propositional knowledge is still something different in kind, thus requiring a different, if now related, explanation.

So how does perception afford us with such knowledge of where objects are? Strawson says little about this question. His interest is rather in what, taking for granted that we have such perceptually acquired knowledge, it itself affords. But there is a simple and intuitive way of responding to this question which is, more or less, the received view.

Reflecting on the character of visual experience, it seems immediately apparent that, in the normal course of affairs, it presents objects as standing in spatial relations to each other and to the subject of experience: it is what has come to be called 'egocentric'. One can see one's dog at one's side, right there, at a particular place, which stands in a certain spatial relation to oneself and also to any other objects which one might also perceive. So one can judge 'My dog is to my left' on the basis of the primitive, spatial content of visual experience. One makes the judgement simply by taking this content at face value and endorsing it.

There is a well-known complication to this view which needs to be acknowledged. Actually visual experience does not, considered wholly in itself, present
objects as standing in spatial relations to the subject of experience. Visual experience is perspectival, in that there is a point of view or origin of the experience. To use a term of John Campbell's, we can characterise this as 'monadic': visual experience presents objects not as 'to the left of me' but as 'to the left' or 'left' For I am not presented in that experience as a relatum. The self, whether incorporeal or bodily, is not presented to itself as itself as an object among others within the visual field. So in so far as it is correct to say that the content of visual experience presents objects as standing in spatial relations not only to each other but also to the subject of experience, that is for reasons additional to the primitive, spatial content of the experience considered in itself. On the one hand, it is because we consider the point of view or origin of the experience - this disappearing focal point - as a sort of tacit relatum: my dog is 'to the left or left (of the focal point of the visual field)' On the other hand, it is because in the normal course of affairs the subject herself - her body - is in matter of fact at the place where the point of view or origin of the visual experience is, and she is no doubt apprised of this fact. Strictly speaking then, one does not see one’s dog as standing in a certain spatial relation to oneself, but as standing in a certain place, which is, in matter of fact, spatially related to oneself. So there are complications.

But it is still the case that, complications to do with the subject aside, visual experience is perspectival, and presents its objects as spatially distributed in the perceived world. This is simply a primitive fact about the character of the experience, depending on little more than the nature of the visual system. Given this, a subject in general capable of spatial thinking can make judgements about the locations of perceived objects simply by taking at face value and endorsing the content of her experience. So we might put this received response to our question thus. Visual experience directly locates its objects egocentrically for the subject. And so there is no difficulty at all in the subject herself being able directly to locate the particulars she perceives: to know where what she perceives is. The knowledge of location which this response would attribute to us is nothing more than the primitive deliverances of the visual system put into propositional form. It is the primitive, monadic content of visual experience itself which is doing most of the explanatory work.

6 Wittgenstein makes this point in his discussion of the self and solipsism in the Tractatus: ‘Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found? / You will say that this is exactly like the case of the eye and the visual field. / But really you do not see the eye. / And nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an eye’ (1922) 5.633.
Note too that once the complications have been addressed, and the subject is in a position to know not only that ‘my dog is to the left’ but ‘my dog is to my left’, her visual experience not only allows her to locate the objects she perceives, but also to locate herself in relation to those objects. In general, if one knows where one object or place is in relation to another, then it is relatively simple to determine where that second object or place is in relation to the first. If the subject has the concepts ‘left’ and ‘right’ and knows that her dog is to her left, then she can, either on the immediate basis of her experience itself, or by means of an inference, come to know that she is to the right of her dog.7

The aim of this Part is to question whether this received view does in the end suffice to explain our ability directly to locate the objects we perceive. There are two basic reasons for thinking it may not.

The first is both common and intuitive. The received view takes a negligent attitude towards the subject’s body, and there are reasons for thinking this suspect. On the one hand, in the normal course of affairs, the truth of any judgement the subject makes about a perceived object’s location rests on whether, in fact, the object is spatially related to her – that is, to her body – as she judges it to be. As Bill Brewer puts it: ‘It is the actual spatial relations between the things [s]he perceives and h[er]self which determine whether or not [s]he perceives them as being where they actually are’: that is, whether her perception provides her with knowledge.8 So although the subject’s body has little to do with the basis upon which the judgement is made, it has everything to do with its truth. On the other hand, it is the subject’s body that does the perceiving, and it has seemed to some that this not only does, but must, have an effect on the nature of perceptual experience itself: it colours or imbues it.9 This negligence towards the subject’s body is a reason for questioning the sufficiency of the received view, not its necessity: the question raised is whether it is in fact correct that the received view can explain our ability directly to locate the objects we perceive without making any appeal of any sort to the subject’s body.

The second reason for questioning the received view is neither common nor intuitive. Perhaps as many as one-third of all human languages do not contain the terms required to express the purportedly primitive monadic content which it posits.10 Such

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9 As I mentioned in Section 1.3. See e.g. M. Ayers (1991); Q. Cassam (1997); S. Gallagher (1995); M. Merleau-Ponty (1962).
languages do not have the resources to express the thought 'My dog is to the left' for they do not employ notions like 'left' and 'right', 'up' and 'down', 'front' and 'back'. They do however have the resources to state where the dog in question is, using an alternative system of spatial notation. Stephen Levinson, a linguistic anthropologist who has studied such languages, puts the point thus: 'Although, from a perceptual point of view, a relative frame of reference seems entirely fundamental, from a linguistic point of view, it is not. In fact it is entirely dispensable.' So a speaker of such a language who wishes to help a hearer identify which particular dog she is referring to cannot say, for instance, 'I mean the dog to the (or my) left'. She will need to locate the relevant particular otherwise. In essence, the spatial notions employed by these languages are akin to our notions of North, South, East and West. Imagine, for instance, standing with another person and a team of dogs in the Arctic, with a compass that shows which bearing is North. In order to help the other person understand which dog is in question, one might say, 'I mean the dog just North of the sled' This is a reason, albeit an empirical one, for questioning not merely the sufficiency but the necessity of the received view: the question is not whether the received view should only be accepted if supplemented by some sort of appeal to the subject's body, but whether it should be accepted at all.

To anticipate, I shall argue that on its own the received view does not suffice to account for the knowledge of location we take perception to afford, and I shall then develop an alternative view which can account for this knowledge. On this alternative view, the subject's awareness of her body from the inside is part of the basis of her judgements about the locations of the objects she perceives. The fundamental way she thinks about these objects is as together with her body in a surrounding space. But if this is accepted, then it does not appear that a judgement such as 'The dog is to the (or my) left' does any more justice to the primitive content of visual experience than a judgement such as 'The dog is to the North'. Both are equally adequate systems of spatial notation: ways of individuating particular places within a space shared by speaker, hearer, and dog. So although I begin by attempting to find a role for the body within the received view, I end by suggesting that the received view has misled.

This anticipated alternative may be met, at the outset, with utter disbelief. And certainly it cannot be denied that the primitive content of visual experience is perspectival, in that there is a focal point to it: the spatial relations between it and the

11Ibid. p. 144.
objects perceived are manifest. But note that it is a further claim that the correct characterisation of this content is monadic, in so far as that entails the use of notions like 'right' and 'left', 'up' and 'down', and 'front' and 'back' to individuate the places where objects are perceived to be. And it is an even further claim that knowledge of where the objects we perceive are is knowledge of their locations specified using these notions. The primitive content of visual experience – however that content should be characterised – need not be doing so much explanatory work.
2.2 Egocentric Thinking

Philosophers and psychologists have drawn a distinction between two contrasting ways of thinking of space: egocentric thinking and objective thinking. To think of space egocentrically is to think of space as one does when one is immersed in it, fully engaged with one's practical dealings with the world immediately out there. It is space as conceived of from one's own, local point of view. It is space as presented in perception and action. Thinking about space objectively, on the other hand, seems to require the capacity to understand that the world is there anyway, independently of oneself and one's practical dealings. It seems to require the capacity to prescind from one's own, local point of view, and take up a more detached and impersonal view of the world, a view which includes oneself and one's point of view as an item, like others, within it. 12

The classic philosophical formulation of this distinction is due to Gareth Evans. Evans wants to explain our ability perceptually to 'locate [an] object in space' 13 He thinks this ability rests on a dual capacity to think about places egocentrically and objectively. We individuate the places we perceive in egocentric terms:

The subject conceives himself to be in the centre of a space (at its point of origin) with its co-ordinates given by the concepts 'up' and 'down', 'left' and 'right', and 'in front' and 'behind'. We may call this 'egocentric space', and we may call thinking about spatial positions in this framework centring on the subject's body 'thinking egocentrically about space'. Egocentric spatial terms are the terms in which the content of our spatial experiences would be formulated, and those in which our immediate behavioural plans would be expressed. 14

Note that according to Evans, egocentric thinking about objects and places is essentially linked to the capacity to act on those objects and places. We want to be able to distinguish an animal capable of responding differentially to what may in fact be spatially differentiated stimuli, from an animal that conceives of the stimuli to which it is responding as spatial. On the one hand, Evans claims that 'having spatially significant perceptual information consists at least partly in being disposed to do various things': without the capacity for spatial action, an animal cannot have the capacity for egocentric thinking. 15 This is a claim about when it is correct to ascribe spatial content to an animal.

12 See N. Eilan, R. McCarthy, and B. Brewer, eds. (1993) for a collection of papers on spatial representation. The editors' introduction contains a characterisation of the contrast between egocentric and detached ways of thinking about space.
15 Ibid. p. 155.
at all. On the other hand, Evans also claims that the spatial content of perception must be specified in terms whose meanings derive in part from being connected with spatial action. This is a different claim: a claim about the precise nature of the content being ascribed. Both purported links between egocentric thinking and action are questionable. An animal incapable of action may not be incapable of thinking egocentrically about objects and places. I shall return to this in the following Section. For now, the point is only to note that the capacity for action is one of the constraints that Evans puts on the capacity for egocentric thinking. The capacity for objective thinking about space is another.

Evans's characterisation of objective thinking about space is not altogether clear. But he appears to think that it consists in two components. First, the possession of a 'model' or a 'cognitive map' which simultaneously represents the relations between a number of objects and places, every object or place being represented 'in the same way' as every other. We can imagine here a sort of aerial photograph of a sector of the world, or an ordnance-survey map. Second, the ability to include oneself and one's location in this map-like representation, and so to think about oneself and one's place 'in the same way' as one thinks about all objects or places. One aspect of Evans's characterisation of egocentric thinking about space is that the subject conceives of herself as at 'the centre' or 'point of origin' of a space. This is not to think of herself and her place as on a par with, or in the same way as, other objects and places. So Evans's idea seems to be that there is a sort of mutual dependence between egocentric and objective thinking. Unless the subject is able to think about the place where she is, this centre or point of origin of her 'egocentric space', as she would think about any place, she cannot be credited with the capacity for objective thinking about space. But only if she can be credited with the capacity for objective thinking about space is she capable of egocentric thinking: only then is the content of her perceptions spatial, or is her 'egocentric space' a 'space' at all.

This characterisation of objective thinking about space is also questionable. The idea that the subject must not privilege herself and her location, but treat herself and it on a par with all other objects and locations, does intuitively seem to be crucial to objective thinking about space. But even if this is accepted, it does not seem it can be explained or secured by the possession of a cognitive map or model. As John Campbell

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16 Ibid. pp. 154-7.
17 Ibid. see pp. 99, 151-2, 162-3.
18 Ibid. pp. 99 n. 13, 163.
has pointed out, many animals possess such maps or models of their environment which they use for the purposes of navigation: they are capable of representing their own location in their environment by means of this map or model. 19 But what we are trying to capture by our characterisation of objective thinking about space is the sort of thinking about space that distinguishes us from simpler animals. So the mere possession of such a map or model cannot suffice to explain objective thinking about space: it must consist in something more. I shall return later in this Part to the intuition that Evans is trying to capture about objective spatial thinking, and its connection to egocentric thinking. But for now, having sketched Evans's overall picture, I want to look in more detail at his characterisation of egocentric thinking about space.

Evans does not argue for the characterisation I have quoted above. He seems simply to take it as self-evident. But it is a fairly complex characterisation, and actually contains four distinct ideas: (i) the idea that the subject's body is the object upon which the framework for individuating places egocentrically is centred; (ii) the idea that this framework itself consists in or makes use of a certain sort of co-ordinate system or set of axes employing the notions 'up' and 'down', 'front' and 'back', and 'left' and 'right'; (iii) the idea, mentioned above, that the subject conceives of her body, upon which this framework is centred, as the 'centre' or 'point of origin' of a space; (iv) the idea that the content of perceptual experiences or behavioural intentions makes use of this way of thinking about space: the content is given in the terms of this co-ordinate system or set of axes, centred on the subject's body. These four ideas are, to varying degrees, independent of each other. But there is a natural and intuitive way of weaving them together, which may contribute to Evans's assumption that his characterisation is self-evidently correct.

In so far as egocentric thinking about space gains its sense from its contrast with objective thinking about space, Evans's fourth idea is little more than definitional. What we are trying to characterise is space as thought about from one's own, local point of view on, and practical dealings with, the world. It is hard to see what else this sort of spatial thinking could be but space as thought about in perception and action. What we need to do is say more about this sort of spatial thinking. Now it is certainly true that in the normal course of affairs, the objects and places one perceives and upon which one acts surround one's body. And it is also true that speakers of English can specify the locations of these objects and places using the standard triad of axes Evans mentions.

up/down, front/back, and left/right. One might see, for instance, an appetising snack at a
place just in front of one and to the right, and so reach for it there. Used in this way, the
axes up/down, front/back, and left/right specify places in relation to one’s body. One’s
body is the object relative to which places are specified precisely because it is the object
on which these axes are, as a matter of fact, centred: in this way, it defines the origin of
the axes. Now in order to specify where a place is in three-dimensional space, we do
need to have available three axes, one for each dimension. We do not however need
these three axes to intersect at a single point. So long as there is a way of specifying
where in each dimension the place is, that will do. But there is a simplicity about a
single point of intersection of the axes – acting as a point of origin perhaps reminiscent
of the focal point of the visual field – which may explain why we so naturally think of
them thus. And of course, it is also the case that we think of our bodies as themselves
objects which have ups and downs, fronts and backs, lefts and rights. It seems that one’s
body is at one with these axes. It aligns easily with them. And so if we set about trying
to characterise egocentric thinking about space, it is natural to characterise it as Evans
does: one perceives and acts on places specified using the standard triad of axes, when
these axes are centred on one’s body. This makes perfect sense. For it is one’s body
which does the perceiving and the acting: the body is the instrument of perception and
action. So for Evans, egocentric thinking is body-centred: the connection between the
standard egocentric axes and their use in perception and action goes via the connection
each has to the body.

I said above that the triad of axes up/down, front/back, and left/right is
’s standard’ for speakers of English. One way, then, that this triad is standard is that it
seems to capture the way places are specified for the subject in perceiving and acting on
the world. Another way it is standard is that it can be used when we communicate with
one another about places in our shared environment. This should be evident from the
last Section. If one wishes to direct another’s attention to an object, one may do so by
directing her attention to where in relation either to her, or to another, more salient,
object, that object is. One might say, for instance, that the object in question is just
behind her; or that it has rolled underneath the sofa on the right. Not only one’s own
body, but other people’s bodies, and indeed material objects quite generally, seem at
one with the standard triad of axes. We think of many objects, like sofas, buildings,
tables, computers, animals, and more, as having ups and downs, fronts and backs, lefts

20 At least the instrument: some have thought it is the subject of perception and action. See M. Ayers
and rights. We may not think of all objects thus. A house plant, for instance, may lack a
front and back and left and right, even if it is obvious enough which part of the plant
grows up and which grows down. But it is nonetheless easy enough to impose the
standard axes upon it. One might notice that a book is behind a plant and to the left.
This is probably to say that the book is on the far side of the plant from where one is
oneself, and on the side of the plant aligned with one’s left. Interestingly, this is not the
plant’s ‘left’, were one to take up the plant’s own point of view, as it were, once its
‘front’ and ‘back’ have been decided. Indeed, this same sort of flexibility can be found
when we consider an object like a desk, which we more naturally think of as having an
intrinsic front and back, and left and right. Which side is ‘left’ and which ‘right’ may
depend on what one is doing with the desk: if one is writing on it, its left is one’s left,
never mind that its front faces one’s front. So the imposition of the standard axes on an
object, so that places can be specified in relation to that object, may be somewhat
arbitrary. Another may have difficulty interpreting one’s specifications. But still, this is
something we do all the time: select an object and specify places in relation to it, using
the standard triad of axes.

In the psycho-linguistic literature, three ways of specifying perceptible places,
using the standard triad of axes, are distinguished. The first is to use a ‘basic system’
Basic systems specify places in relation to the subject’s body. Basic systems do not
specify places in relation to each other. If two objects are perceived as located using a
basic system, the information is available to compute where in relation to each other
those objects are. But this is a further computational step, and it is at least logically
possible that a subject might employ a basic system for specifying places and not have
the ability to compute where each of the perceived locations are in relation to one
another. The second is to use a ‘deictic system’. Deictic systems specify places in
relation to a selected object, but they simply project the standard axes from the subject
onto that object. A deictic system takes no account of whether the selected object itself
has an up and down, front and back, left and right. It maintains the subject’s point of
view, as it were, but shifts the origin of the frame away from the subject’s body: another
object is now the object relative to which places are specified. The third is to use an
‘intrinsic system’. Intrinsic systems exploit the internal structure of an object to derive a
set of axes. Not only is the origin of the frame shifted away from the subject’s body
onto another object, but the subject’s point of view is not maintained: new axes, labelled

collection of articles in this tradition.
in the standard way, are derived from the structure of that object itself. Only an object which has a natural up and down, front and back, and left and right, can intrinsically support all three of the standard axes. As I mentioned, a house plant may have an intrinsic up and down, but not a front and back, or left and right. This is perhaps why there is a certain amount of flexibility or arbitrariness as to which side of the plant is ‘left’: the axes being used to specify places in relation to the plant seem to combine a deictic and an intrinsic system.

At first glance, it may seem there is no flexibility or arbitrariness when we use the standard axes in relation to our own bodies: despite the malleability of these axes when used in conjunction with other, selected objects, they are fixed when the system being used is basic. But actually this is a mistake. When we think of our bodies as aligning easily with the standard triad of axes, we are in all likelihood thinking of our bodies in the classic standing pose: feet shoulder-width apart, arms at one’s sides, face forward, ready and waiting for any action that might come one’s way. The vertical axis of the body is aligned with gravity, providing a match between body and environment with respect to up and down; the face and torso are properly aligned with the coronal plane, providing a strong sense of a direction as forward; the body is symmetrical around the sagittal plane, providing a nice, neat, left and right. One is trisected by the up/down, front/back, left/right axes. Yet as Brian O’Shaughnessy points out: ‘whereas there is such a thing as the shape of a vegetable, there is in a certain sense nothing that is the shape of an animal (inasmuch as no posture, whether in sleep or during sentry duty, is standard)’. When we are not in the classic standing pose, we do not align well with these axes.

Consider first the up/down axis. Whether one is lying down, leaning nonchalantly to the side, or actually standing on one’s head, the up/down axis does not always coincide with the up/down direction of the body. It has long been acknowledged that the up/down axis is normally defined by the direction of gravity. Given the pervasive influence of gravity on the surface of the Earth and the fact that we have a vestibular system designed to monitor our gravitational alignment, it is perhaps unsurprising that we make use of this axis. The point is only that, when one’s body is not aligned with it, there is a certain flexibility and arbitrariness as to which way is ‘up’.

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23 See A. Garnham (1989). Garnham points out that our intuitions about what is ‘up’ and what is ‘down’ fail us when we consider animals such as flies and lizards that can ‘escape’ the constraints of gravity by climbing walls and ceilings. This suggests that up/down is not simply due to the direction of gravity, but gravity together with a canonically human way of coping with it.

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and which is 'down': we need to choose between defining this axis in line with the gravitational field, or defining it in line with the body. Consider next the front/back axis. This axis does seem to be more fundamentally linked to the body: if we want to speak of a direction as forward, it is hard to see how it could be anything other than the direction of one's front. 24 But then, sometimes no direction is really 'forward'. Imagine sitting on the floor in a forward bend, with one's face resting on one's knees. One's body is folded together, along its front, like a jack-knife. It is not clear that, in this position, any direction is forward at all. We might call an object placed at a short distance from one's feet, in line with one's body, 'in front of one's feet'. But we could equally say it was 'below one's feet'. Finally, even the left/right axis need not align with what is conventionally the left and right of the body. If one has swivelled one's head around to look over one's shoulder, or is simply listening attentively to what is going on behind one, one is likely to specify places as if one had rotated the left/right axis around: 'left' is on the right side of one's body, and 'right' is on the left. One has rotated one's orientation or sense of attentional focus, and with it the left/right axis. So once again, we can use this axis, relative to the body, without the body itself aligning naturally with this axis.

Just as our use of the standard triad of axes to specify locations in relation to other objects is not always self-evident or rigidly fixed, so too our use of these axes to specify locations in relation to our own bodies, in perceiving and acting on the surrounding world, is not always self-evident or rigidly fixed. We use these axes on-the-fly, as we might say: their relation to the natural structure of our bodies shifts and changes as we ourselves move about the world, changing location, posture, and practical intent.

Moreover, perhaps we can even imagine animals whose primitive perceptual experience entirely evades description in terms of these axes, used on-the-fly or otherwise. Perhaps there just is no use for the up/down axis for animals who live deep under the sea, or in outer space. Or perhaps an animal fully double-jointed and symmetrical around the coronal plane would have no use for the front/back axis. If so, then alternative axes would need to be employed in their stead. And there seems nothing problematic about this at all.

24 There is some debate about whether the front of the body is defined by the direction of the face or the most natural direction of movement. For instance, the fact that crabs walk 'sideways' is often claimed to show that the forward direction is defined by the direction of the face (A. Garnham (1989)). But crabs do not have necks. If one turns one's neck, and thereby one's face, to one side while walking easily along, one has not thereby started walking sideways. Normally, for us, the natural resting place of the head relative to the body causes the direction of the face to coincide with the direction in which we most naturally move.
Realising that the standard triad of axes is used quite generally, to specify places not only in relation to oneself or one's own body, but in relation to any object one might choose, and realising further that there is real arbitrariness and flexibility attending their use, irrespective of the object upon which they are centred, can weaken the sense that there is something special about these axes. We may be able to describe the primitive content of our visual experience using these axes, but that is simply because they are in general suitable for describing the spatial relations between objects (at least asymmetrical objects on the surface of the Earth), and the human visual system presents objects as spatially related. We thus seem able to dispense with the second of Evans's ideas: we cannot define egocentric thinking by appeal to the standard triad of axes. They are neither necessary nor sufficient for this thinking. So Evans's first idea takes on a certain prominence. What comes to matter is rather where the axes are centred. Egocentric thinking about space is distinctive because it uses axes centred on the subject's body: it uses a basic system.

This means that there now seems to be a prospect of defining egocentric thinking about space as body-centred. Quite generally, there is a way of thinking about places which selects an object as the origin of a frame of reference, and, one way or another, uses a co-ordinate system or set of axes to define places relative to that origin. Egocentric thinking about places could then be defined as employing a frame of reference of this general kind, but one which is distinctive in that it uses the subject's body as the origin of the frame.

This definition of egocentric thinking, as fundamentally body-centred, has been sharply criticised by John Campbell. I want now to look at his argument against it.

Campbell begins by focusing on intrinsic systems: he points out that one can specify places in relation to a selected object by exploiting its internal structure, perhaps together with some facts about the environment it is in, to derive a set of axes. Consider for instance a mailbox. It can be seen to have an axis running from top to bottom, in line with the gravitational field, together with a directional vector defined as the direction in which the slot opens: the mailbox's 'front', as it were. Given this, we can impose a left/right axis upon the mailbox. These intrinsic axes suffice to provide one with a way of specifying places in relation to the mailbox.

But what one can do with a mailbox, one can do with many other objects: a sofa, a building, a table, a computer, an animal, a human being. One could, if one

wished, do this with the object which is one’s own body (most simply, when in the
classic standing pose, but equally in a different, more complicated position). Then one
would have a way of specifying places in relation to one’s own body. The axes one
would be using would be centred on one’s body. Indeed they would be derived from its
structure: in a very real way, they would owe their character to it. (Here is one way,
perhaps, in which the subject’s body might colour or imbue her perceptual experience.)
They would be the up/down, front/back, left/right axes, and they could be used to
specify places which one perceives and upon which one acts. But this is clearly not an
adequate characterisation of egocentric thinking about space. It does not seem right that
egocentric thinking simply specifies places in relation to an object which, as it happens,
is one’s body. Saying only that egocentric thinking uses a basic system of spatial
relations is not enough. It may be true, but it does not illuminate the significance of this
system for the subject: it is her own egocentric thinking about space which we are trying
to characterise.

Campbell acknowledges that what seems wrong with this proposal is precisely
that it treats one’s body on a par with all other objects: there is something about it being
one’s own body which the egocentric axes should reflect. So he suggests, on behalf of
the view that egocentric thinking makes use, by definition, of a body-centred frame of
reference, that perhaps the egocentric axes are derived from one’s awareness of one’s
body from the inside. If one is aware from the inside of the general shape and current
configuration of one’s body, one can plot the relations between its various parts and
construct a body-centred set of axes in this way. There is a question as to why this
should help: why should it matter that one derives the axes from a body perceived ‘from
the inside’ as opposed to ‘from the outside’? One is still just constructing axes in line
with the structure of a body one perceives. The difference, Campbell suggests, might be
found in the link between awareness of a body from the inside and action. We think
there is a connection between egocentric space and action. If we also now think there is
a connection between body awareness and action, we can potentially use the latter to
explain the former: the connection between egocentric space and action can be
explained by a prior connection between body awareness and action. But then we must
ask what explains the connection between body awareness and action. And now a
dilemma arises. For either one’s awareness of one’s body from the inside, its shape,
configuration, and the relation of its parts, is already given egocentrically, or it is not. If
it is – that is, if one knows some parts of one’s body to be above, some below, some to
the left of, some to the right of, other parts – then one’s awareness of one’s body from
the inside presupposes a grasp of the egocentric axes, and so cannot be used to explain them, via a connection to action or otherwise. One cannot construct a set of egocentric axes out of one's more primitive knowledge of the relations of one's body parts if these relations are already specified egocentrically. But if it is not the case that these relations are already specified egocentrically, then it is unclear how an appeal to awareness of a body from the inside in order to construct the egocentric axes is an improvement on the construction of these axes out of any selected object: if these relations are not already specified egocentrically, then it is utterly mysterious how body awareness could have any direct connection to action and the egocentric axes. And so Campbell concludes that egocentric axes must be taken as primitive, relative to awareness of a body from the inside:

The capacity to use the egocentric axes is more fundamental than the capacity to think in terms of a body image [i.e. to have body awareness]. The egocentric identification of places does not depend on a prior identification of a body. The notion of an egocentric frame is more fundamental than the relevant notion of body-centredness.26

We cannot define egocentric thinking about space as essentially employing the standard triad of axes. These axes are neither necessary nor sufficient for egocentric thinking. But nor can we define egocentric thinking about space as essentially body-centred. The egocentric axes, whether standard or not, are given prior to any awareness of her body the subject may have. Both the first and second of Evans's ideas seem to have failed.

Campbell concludes by suggesting that the notion of an egocentric frame of reference is the frame 'immediately used by the subject in the direction of action'.27 This notion of immediate use is 'rough and intuitive'. But the basic idea is evident: egocentric thinking about space is whatever thinking about space it is that directly enables an animal to navigate through and act within the space in which it finds itself. The immediate frame animals use to navigate is usually if not always a perceptual frame. So egocentric thinking about space is the thinking about space used in perception and action. But this is little more than an initial definition of the sort of spatial thinking we were hoping to characterise further.

I shall return to this point later in this Part. But for now, I want to turn briefly to the possible connection between egocentric thinking about space, action, and body

26 Ibid. p. 13.
awareness, to which Campbell alludes on behalf of the view that egocentric thinking makes use of a body-centred frame of reference. For a proponent of this view might yet be tempted by the thought that, even if we cannot derive the egocentric axes from the structure of the body, nonetheless there may be a different sort of connection between the two. If we can show that a necessary condition of egocentric thinking is the capacity for action (as Evans, for instance, seems to hold), and we can show that a necessary condition of the capacity for action is awareness of a body from the inside, then we can conclude that there is a necessary connection between egocentric thinking and awareness of a body from the inside. Even though the connection is not direct, it is yet the case that one could not think egocentrically about places if one were not aware of one's body from the inside.
2.3 Action

The basic ideas to consider in this Section are whether the capacity for action is a necessary condition of egocentric thinking, and whether body awareness is a necessary condition of the capacity for action. I shall suggest that we lack a reason to believe that the first of these claims is true, and that we have a reason to believe the second is false.

I mentioned above that although an animal’s actions can be guided by its egocentric thinking about objects and places, an animal incapable of action might yet think egocentrically about objects and places. Certainly Evans is right that we want to be able to distinguish animals capable only of differential responses to spatial stimuli from animals capable of conceiving of these stimuli as spatial. So what reason does he give for thinking that having or lacking a capacity for directed spatial action is what marks this distinction?

Evans’s argument seems to be this. We humans, who do have spatially significant perceptual information at our disposal, do not need to think or calculate which way to turn our heads, say, in order to turn our heads in the direction of a sound. Otherwise two people might hear a sound as coming from the same direction, but due to a difference in calculation, be disposed to turn in different ways. But Evans thinks this does not make sense.

The fact that this does not make sense does not show that a necessary condition of spatial perception is the capacity for spatial action. What it shows is that the same frame of reference is used in both perception and action: the subject does not individuate a place using some or other perceptual frame, and then need to translate that frame into a different frame, individuating places in a different way, in order then to direct actions to that place. 28 Her motor system and her perceptual system apparently individuate places in the same way.

So Evans’s claim is under-argued. Even worse, Christopher Peacocke has suggested a simple counter-example to it. 29 Peacocke asks us to imagine a sphere who lives in liquid and is incapable of locomotion, but is capable of perception: the sphere is basically like a big eye-ball, with an appropriate internal neural structure. Peacocke suggests that this sphere could think about places in its environment and form intentions on this basis. Imagine the sphere is able intentionally to control its acidity level. It might then perceive a predator at a certain distance from it, and decide defensively to vary its

acidity rate in response to the velocity of the predator's approach. It might even be able
to distinguish between two qualitatively indistinguishable regions into which it
regularly floats, but in only one of which lurks a predator. It could then again decide to
vary its acidity rate should it float into that region. Given the possibility of such a
sphere, Peacocke proposes we need to distinguish between an action which is spatial, in
the sense of being a bodily movement, and an action which is intentional under a spatial
description, like the sphere's variation of its acidity. Only the latter is required for the
attribution of spatial thinking. (Indeed, perhaps even less is required: could a sphere that
could do nothing about an approaching predator but hope that it swim in another
direction be credited with spatial thinking? Why not? Here the significance of the
spatial content is manifested in the animal's wishes but not its intentions.) Peacocke's
sphere presents a challenge: a proponent of the view that a necessary condition of
spatial thinking is the capacity for spatial action must explain why the sphere cannot in
matter of fact think egocentrically about space. It is hard to see how this challenge could
be met.

The second claim is that a necessary condition of the capacity for action is
awareness of a body from the inside. There are two different ways someone might try to
argue for this.

Campbell seems to be envisaging a proponent of this claim appealing to the
idea that body awareness can provide one with a grasp of the ways in which it is
possible to act. Recall that in Section 1.2, I claimed that one is aware of one's body
from the inside as generally shaped and currently configured a certain way, within a
space which is larger than it. 'General shape' simply means that one is aware of one's
body, at a time and over time, as relatively determinately shaped and structured. One is
aware that one's body is fashioned by a torso, limbs, hands and feet, a head, and so on,
which are jointed and hinged together so as to allow for certain possibilities of
movement, and not others. 'Current configuration' simply means how one's body, so
fashioned and hinged, is currently configured: the position of its various parts relative to
one another. Brian O'Shaughnessy has claimed that the conjunction of these is such as
to provide one with knowledge not only of how one's body is currently configured but
how it could come to be configured: the possibilities of movement open to it, given its
current configuration.30 In this way, body awareness is supposed to provide one with a
practical grasp of the ways in which it is possible to act. Assuming that one can only act

if one has a grasp of how in principle it is possible to act, this is one way, then, that a connection between the capacity for action and body awareness might be forged.

It is no doubt true that, if one knows the way an object is in general shaped and hinged, and one knows the way it is currently configured, then in principle one can compute the possibilities of movement open to that object. The problem is that this does not seem very relevant to a practical grasp of how one can act. Given an object as complex as the human body, the possibilities of movement open to that body from any starting configuration are virtually endless -- never mind the difficulties of how to know what counts as one movement and what counts as another. Just think what one could do from a normal standing position: one could move an index finger, or move both index fingers, or roll one's eyes, or walk forward, or wiggle, or do a back-flip, and so on. The choice is stultifying. So many possibilities of movement might as well be no possibilities of movement, from the practical perspective of trying to get on in the world.

Now perhaps it is the case that, given any particular practical task, there is a more manageable set of movements which would satisfactorily execute it. Consider for instance having decided to act so as to 'pick up that appetising snack'. There is then a limited number of ways one might go about doing so. For instance, there is a choice of two hands, and after that choice is made, there is a choice between some number of possible trajectories. So perhaps once there is a practical task at hand, one has some awareness, from the inside, of the ways one might move to go about it.31 But once there is a practical task at hand, there is already a place, egocentrically specified, to which one is oriented in action: a place upon which one intends to act, prior to any awareness one has of how one might actually move to do so. So it may well be that one can only act if one has in principle a grasp of how it is possible to act. The point is that this grasp seems to be prior to any awareness one might have of how then to go about moving one's body in order to perform a previously selected action.

But still, it might be thought that at the very least, one could not actually perform a previously selected action if one were not able to have some awareness, however latent, of how one might go about doing so. This brings us to the second way one might try to interpret and motivate the claim that a necessary condition of the capacity for action is awareness of a body from the inside. It is much simpler. Body awareness is a necessary condition of action because only with the knowledge of one’s

body which body awareness affords can one in fact act, deliberately and selectively, never mind successfully, upon places and objects. Our concept of action, it is claimed, is not the concept of random, thrashing movements, but the concept of controlled and monitored movement. As Bernard Williams puts it, 'it is a notable feature of our experience that our control over our limbs is not ballistic: we do not, unless partially paralysed, throw our arm at something on a desired trajectory, but rather reach for the thing.'

The difficulty with this claim is that it is a commonplace that one is often enough not aware of one’s body when acting. A moment’s reflection should make that plain: walking home from work, one navigates the potholes, swings a briefcase, hurries along, with no awareness of one’s body whatsoever – one may be mulling over the day’s events or the night’s plans, or perhaps just noticing the scenery. It might be claimed that one is always at least sublimmally aware of one’s body when acting, that its various doings form a sort of backdrop. But there is no reason to think this so. Compare the way pain can recede from awareness when one is otherwise occupied: even though one has a bad muscle strain, the concert is so marvellous that one feels nothing for its duration. Of course the strain did not miraculously mend itself and one’s brain did not stop receiving information from the muscle. One’s attention was simply otherwise occupied. Here there is limited if any inclination to say the pain was subliminally there all along. But once we distinguish, as I did in Section 1.2, the awareness one can have of one’s body from the inside, from the information about one’s body which one’s brain receives, there is equally no obvious reason why we should be inclined to think one is subliminally aware of one’s body all along. Certainly human actions are willed, controlled and monitored movements, and perhaps too they must be: perhaps we cannot make sense of the idea of an animal capable of action, but entirely unable to control or monitor its actions. The point is only that one’s brain can take care of the execution of the relevant bodily movements on one’s behalf, leaving one free to occupy oneself with other tasks. The execution of the action need not be brought to awareness.

Now if the execution of the action goes awry – one stumbles, perhaps – one may well become aware of one’s body from the inside, and focus in this way on righting

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34 It is not even the case that one’s brain needs to receive information from the body’s internal systems in order for one to act: Ian Waterman, who suffered a severe neuropathy damaging his sensory fibres below the neck, managed to learn how to act using the information about his body which he received through vision (J. Cole (1991)). I discuss Waterman’s case in more detail in the following Section.
oneself. And perhaps certain types of action require attention to one’s body from the inside. One might want to act with one body part on another: one might, for instance, decide to scratch an itch. One will need to know where the itch is to do so, and one knows this through body awareness. Still other actions may simply have as their aim a body movement or state itself, as when one tries to learn a new dance-step, or get one’s body into some or other posture or pose. One will then need to use body awareness to guide the action and monitor its success. But none of these facts establishes that body awareness is a necessary condition of action quite generally. What they establish is only that body awareness may be needed or at least useful when one’s action goes awry, or aims at a purely bodily end.

Finally, it is not even the case that one’s brain necessarily uses a single, integrated, sub-personal, representation of one’s body in order to execute actions. The co-ordination and direction of action may be hierarchically distributed. All the brain need do is send out basic command signals to what are called co-ordinative structures: units of motor control which govern groups of muscles and joints.35

So we do not have a reason to think it true that the capacity for spatial action is a necessary condition of egocentric thinking, and we do have a reason to think it false that body awareness is a necessary condition of the capacity for spatial action. This is not to deny that much of our egocentric thinking about objects and places is in the service of our intentional actions, and that we are aware of performing many of these actions from the inside, and much aided in these actions by this awareness. It is only to deny that a necessary connection between egocentric thinking and the body can be forged via the connection each has with action. The prospects for characterising egocentric thinking as body-centred remain dim.

2.4 Body and Space: A First Attempt

We cannot characterise egocentric thinking about space as essentially employing the standard triad of axes. Nor can we characterise egocentric thinking about space as essentially body-centred. The conclusion Campbell draws is that egocentric thinking is whatever thinking about space it is that immediately enables an animal to navigate through and act in the space in which it finds itself. But if we are now to register the possibility broached in the previous Section, viz. that egocentric thinking may be possible in absence of the capacity for spatial action, or indeed perhaps any sort of action which is not merely the forming of a hope or a thought, then even this nearly definitional characterisation cannot be unequivocally accepted. We must rather say that an egocentric frame of reference can be used by the subject in the immediate direction of action, or in specifying the content of an intention or hope or thought about a perceived place. In either case, we return to the idea that the basis for egocentric thinking is a subject's perception of her surrounding world. For, at least in the normal course of affairs, it is her perceptions which immediately guide her actions. And it is her perceptions which are the basis for the formation of judgements or propositional attitudes more generally about perceived places.

Despite all these complications, one might still be tempted to try to characterise egocentric thinking as body-centred in the following way. If we focus for a moment solely on the claim that egocentric thinking is whatever thinking about space it is that immediately enables an animal to navigate through and act in the space in which it finds itself, it may seem that any such thinking about perceived places must employ a frame which is, in matter of fact, body-centred: the system used to individuate places must be basic. For once again, it is the body which is the instrument of perception and action. How could a frame of reference guide action which did not display in an immediate way the spatial relation between the location of the acting body and the object to be acted on? Here, at least, there must be a connection, however tenuous, thin, and extensional, between the body and egocentric thinking. But as Campbell has suggested, it appears that even the frame immediately used to guide action need not actually be body-centred. To see why, consider the case of Ian Waterman.36

Aged nineteen, Waterman suffered a unique form of neuropathy: there was damage to some of the sensory fibres, but none of the motor nerves. He lost all feeling

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of touch below the neck and all immediate awareness of the position of his body and limbs; he retained the capacity to feel only heat, cold, and pain, together with a much reduced awareness of muscle fatigue. His neuropathy made him effectively ‘body-blind’: he suffered from an ‘almost unimaginable total absence of feeling’.\(^37\) Since there was no damage to the motor nerves, Waterman retained the capacity for movement. But with neither information about, nor awareness of, body position, he could not control his body when he moved. Astoundingly, Waterman regained this control by learning to use information about his body available in vision. If he keeps an eye constantly on his body, he can guide his movements in this way.

When Waterman wants to pick up an object, like a cup, say, he cannot just espy the thing and reach for it. Instead, he usually focuses on a third object, like a teapot next to the cup, and then determines both where in relation to the teapot the cup is, and where in relation to the teapot his hand is. He is then able to move his hand towards the cup by varying the distance and angle between hand and teapot to match that between teapot and cup. In effect, Waterman guides his action using a diectic or intrinsic system of spatial representation: the frame of reference he employs is constructed so as to specify places not in relation to his body but in relation to some other object, like the teapot. There is, of course, nothing unusual about imposing such a system on a perceptual array: this is something we all do. What is unusual is only that Waterman’s actions are guided by this non-body-centred frame. So it appears that even the frame immediately used by the subject in the direction of action need not actually be a body-centred or basic frame, even if, for most of us most of the time, it is.\(^38\)

There are more commonplace examples of non-body-centred frames being used in action. If one is exploring an object through active touch alone, it is feasible that one’s hand is guided by the structure of, or a frame of reference centred on, the object being explored itself.\(^39\) But touch is different from vision in that it is a ‘contact’ sense. If one is touching an object, the surface of one’s body is right up against the surface of that object: they are spatially contiguous. Touch displays in an immediate way the relation between the acting body, and the body to be acted on. So there is no question of how to move in order to act on the object. But actually even in visual perception we


\(^{38}\) One might wonder why Waterman uses the teapot at all: why not just fix on the cup, determine where in relation to the cup his hand is, and move his hand to the cup directly? The reason is that it costs Waterman tremendous effort simply to keep upright. If he keeps focused on a stable place in his environment, it helps him to keep his balance. As he is hoping to pick up the cup, the cup cannot provide him with a stable place on which to fix.

\(^{39}\) E. Foulke and W. Schiff, eds. (1982); L.E. Kreuger (1982).
often employ deictic and intrinsic frames to immediately guide our actions. Consider any sort of action where instead of trying to pick up an object, what one is trying to do is put down an object at a certain relation to another: planting tulip bulbs in a row, or constructing a model boat, or arranging items in a cupboard, say. Any such action is likely to be guided by a frame centred on the object relative to which the intended place of the object in hand is specified. What is so striking about Waterman is not really that he is using a non-body-centred visual frame in acting. It is that he does not locate his own body at the focal point of the visual field, but as an object like any other within it. It is as if, without adequate awareness of his body from the inside, the perspectival character of visual experience and the fact that Waterman's body itself is at the focal point of the visual field are irrelevant to his capacity for action.

But still, one might make one final attempt to characterise egocentric thinking as body-centred. Perhaps the perceptual frame used to immediately guide action need not be, in matter of fact, body-centred or basic. It might yet be that the perceptual frame which is the basis for the formation of judgements or propositional attitudes more generally about perceived places must be, in matter of fact, body-centred or basic. For if we reflect on how we are able to construct deictic or intrinsic systems of spatial representation, it appears that we depend on the fact that we have a body-centred or basic system already at our disposal. That is how we know where the object we have selected as the origin of such a frame is in the first place. For instance, Waterman can use the teapot as the origin of a spatial framework he then uses to guide his actions, relative to which he can perceive the locations of the cup and his hand, because he sees the teapot and so knows where it is. And so even if a body-centred or basic system is not used to immediately guide his actions, it seems it is yet being used. For we all of us perceive the world fundamentally from a point of view.

The idea is simple. If one is able to perceive where one object is in relation to another object, as we do when we construct deictic or intrinsic systems, one must be able to perceive where that first, orienting object is. One has perceptual knowledge of its location, and so too the relative location of others objects. Now sometimes one might have knowledge of where an object or a place is in relation to another object or place without having any idea whatsoever of where that orienting object or place is. One might know, for instance, that the Empire State Building is in Manhattan, but have no idea where Manhattan is located in America: one's knowledge of American geography is just not good. Or one might study a map of a city and commit to memory the lay-out of the streets and the locations of the main public buildings, without knowing which city
or even which country the map was of. This is nonetheless a genuine kind of knowledge of location, and it could be practically useful. If one decides to travel to see the Empire State Building, for instance, one knows one needs to travel to Manhattan; or if one is parachuted down to this unknown city, one can find one’s way about. But this is not the kind of knowledge of location one has when one perceives where one object is in relation to another object using a deictic or intrinsic system. In such a case, one has an ability directly to locate both objects because one can perceive both objects. That is, both locations are known because both locations are perceived: one perceives where the orienting object is as well as where the object located in relation to it is. Waterman, as I said, can use the teapot as a frame of reference, relative to which he can perceive the locations of the cup and his hand, because he can see the teapot and so knows where it is.

Now one might suggest that Waterman’s perception of the teapot’s location is also deictic or intrinsic: he sees it as relative to the table it is on, say. But then, we shall need to know how he is locating the table. Relative to what is the table perceived to be located? Again, one might suggest that Waterman’s perception of the table’s location is also relative to some other selected object: the chair, perhaps. But then, we shall need to know how he is locating the chair. Relative to what is the chair perceived to be located? And so the possibility of an infinite regress emerges, where each object is perceived only relative to the perceived location of some other, selected object.

This possibility generates a sceptical question about how visual perception affords knowledge of location. For if each object is perceived relative to the location of some other, selected object, then it seems the subject does not know where any of these objects and locations are. It is rather as if she has a photographic map of objects and locations and their relations, as seen from above. She knows the relations between all the objects and locations seen, but has no idea where they are: she cannot begin to get a grip on how to place what this perceptual map depicts in the world. The key problem here is that if all the knowledge perception affords of the location of perceived objects is knowledge of their locations relative to each other, then perception becomes little more than a phenomenologically vivid way of presenting the very same knowledge which one could glean from a map or a model. It may be that perception, thus conceived, can suffice to guide a subject’s actions, witness Waterman. But we seem to have lost the ability directly to locate the objects we perceive. The subject is in a position akin to Evans’s subject who is watching a live film of a remote seabed: she knows of all the
relations among the objects perceived, wherever it is they are, but she does not know where those objects, thus related, are.

So the sceptical question which the possibility of such a regress generates is: How can perception be more than a phenomenologically vivid way to present the very same knowledge available from a map or a model? How can we have the knowledge of location we take perception to afford? A body-centred or basic system of spatial thinking might be thought to quiet this question. One can know where what one perceives is because at a fundamental level, objects are perceived from a point of view: relative to the focal point of the visual field.

In essence, this is an appeal to the received view. At long last, it might seem, we can finally see what the force of this view is. Grant that there is a certain flexibility and arbitrariness as to how the standard axes are to be used to describe the primitive monadic content of visual experience; indeed, grant even that axes other than the standard axes might be suitable to describe this content. Grant too that there is no possibility of deriving these axes from the structure of the subject’s body. It is still the case that the content of visual experience is perspectival. It presents its objects as spatially distributed in the perceived world. And there is a focal point or point of origin to this experience. So even if we are unsure how to label the various directions in which objects appear to be located around this point, and even if the perception of these objects as located is prior to any awareness of her body that the subject has, it is still the case that these objects are perceived as located, at a fundamental level, in relation to this point. This is what allows these objects to be perceived as located relative to each other. But this point is not itself perceived. It is not an object like the others within the visual field. It is only tacitly represented: the point or place where the visual field originates, where the experience is had from. Recall Evans’s claim that a cognitive map or model represents the relations between a number of objects and places, every object and place being represented ‘in the same way’ as every other. The idea is that what makes perception and the knowledge it affords different in kind from a cognitive map is that there is one item not represented ‘in the same way’ as the others: the focal point of the visual field, the place where the experience is had from. So what halts the regress is an appeal to the primitive, perspectival character of visual experience.

However intuitive it is, I think this appeal to the received view will not solve the problem. Certainly it is true that the focal point of the visual field is not represented as located ‘in the same way’ as the objects perceived. For it is not represented at all. It is a feature of the character of visual experience, a feature of the way the visual field is
structured. In so far as it is an object at all, it is an abstraction. But how can the character of an experience, or the manner in which spatial relations are presented, make such a fundamental difference to the sort of knowledge which it affords? Cognitive maps or models do not provide one with the ability directly to locate objects. Perception does. How can that difference in knowledge consist in a feature of the character or manner of the different representations? What matters is what information is available, not how it is presented. And if we consider what information an appeal to the perspectival character of visual experience makes available, there does not appear to be anything to help distinguish the knowledge perception affords from knowledge afforded by a cognitive map or model. It is true that there is the following difference. When two material objects are perceived as spatially related, they are both explicitly displayed: this is no different from a map or a model. When an object is perceived as spatially related to the focal point or point of origin of the visual field, the object is explicitly displayed and the focal point only tacitly: this is different from a map or model. But the additional information which we have secured is only one more specification of the relative location of two objects (one explicitly displayed, and one tacitly displayed). One comes by one more piece of knowledge of the same sort. One does not come by a different sort of knowledge.

It might be objected that I have missed the point of the appeal to the perspectival character of visual experience. The point is the idea that the focal point or origin of the visual field is ‘the place the experience is had from’ But if this idea is to be anything more than pure metaphor, then it is the idea which we are trying to explain. If the subject knows where her experience is had from, then she can know where places specified in relation to that place are. The point I have been urging is that an appeal to the perspectival character of visual experience does nothing to provide the subject with any such knowledge.

If this is right, then the received view cannot quiet the sceptical question: it does not suffice to explain how perception affords knowledge of the location of its objects. The problem is to see how the knowledge afforded by perception is different in kind from the knowledge afforded by a map or model of a region. The primitive monadic content of visual experience, in which objects are displayed within a visual field which has a focal point, and so can be specified as located relative to that point, is an insufficient basis for this knowledge. It cannot explain how we know not only what the spatial relations between perceived objects are, but where those objects, thus related, are. Something else is required.
This suggests an alternative way to try to halt the regress. For there is one object whose location is known not relative to other objects: the subject's own body, of which she has awareness from the inside.

In Part I, I argued that one is aware of one's body from the inside as bounded, as limited, as occupying a certain volume of space within a region of space, and thereby as located at this place, here, in the world. One's awareness of one's body as in this way located is absolute. Its relative location is left entirely open, but one is nonetheless aware of one's body as located: as occupying a particular place in a space larger than it. In that Part, the nub of the point I wanted to make is that such awareness is fundamental to one's conception of a body as one's own. In this Part, the point is that such awareness seems to promise help with the above regress: there is indeed one object which is perceived as located, but absolutely, not in relation to other objects or places. The idea is that one's body and one's awareness of it act as a sort of anchor. Centring whatever axes are being used in perception, or centring the focal point of the visual field itself, on one's body is what anchors the objects and places one perceives in vision to a place in the world which can be specified independently of vision: the place where one's body is and where one knows it to be from the inside, right here. Perhaps this is what Husserl has in mind in speaking of how 'a firm zero of orientation persists, so to speak, as an absolute Here' 40 In any event, the proposal is that we can only have direct knowledge of where what we perceive is if the basis of this knowledge is not purely visual, but includes the subject's awareness of her body from the inside, as right here at the origin of the visual field.

I think there is something intuitively correct about the idea of one's body and one's awareness of it acting as a sort of anchor. One's spatial awareness of one's body from the inside is what gives one an awareness of being within a larger space – a space one is in together with the objects one perceives. But there is a puzzle about the knowledge of location which awareness of a body from the inside affords which makes it unable to quiet the sceptical question in quite this way. The intuition may be correct, but it has not yet been adequately understood.

On the one hand, the awareness one has of one's body from the inside does seem to be awareness of one's body as at a particular place: it is awareness of one's body as taking up a certain, determinate volume of space, in a space which is larger than it. It would not be correct to say that the knowledge afforded by such awareness is only

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knowledge that one's body is somewhere in the world. That would not do justice to the content of body awareness which grounds this knowledge. The knowledge one has of one's body as located based on awareness of it from the inside is knowledge of it as at this place here within a larger space, and so not, for instance, at the place one step forward, or the place just over there – one's body is not at these other places, places which are also within the same sector of space one's body is in. So we do seem to need to characterise this knowledge as knowledge of one's body as at a particular place. On the other hand, the awareness one has of one's body from the inside seems insufficient to warrant this knowledge. For although one's body can, in matter of fact, be at any one of an infinite number of places in space, every such place is presented through body awareness in the same way as every other. Were one in fact at the place one step forward, or the place just over there, it would be presented to one from the inside in the same way as the place one currently is is presented. What sense can be made of the notion of a particular place if every such place one could possibly be is individuated in the same way as every other place one could possibly be?

Given this, it is wholly unclear how the prior and independent knowledge available from the inside alone, that one's body is located at a place just here in the world, could ever anchor one's perception of the world to one particular place and not another. How can knowing that a spatially related array of perceived objects and places is related to a particular place here, independently specified in an absolute way, suffice to provide one with knowledge of where this spatially related array is, if every independently specified place is presented in the same way as every other? So the simple addition of the information that one is aware of one's body as here at the focal point of the visual field seems as incapable of quieting the sceptical question as the addition of the information that the focal point of the visual field bears a certain relation to the objects in that field.

The search for a role for the body in egocentric spatial thinking has so far done little more than raise a sceptical question. How does perception afford knowledge of where what one perceives is? How can perception be anything more than a phenomenologically vivid way of presenting the very same knowledge that one could gain from a map or a model? Neither the received view of the content of visual experience alone, nor the received view of the content of visual experience in conjunction with the subject's body and her awareness of it from the inside, seems capable of answering this question. One's ability directly to locate the objects one
perceives has not yet been accounted for. So we need an alternative approach. We need to reconsider the received view.
2.5 Body and Space: The Alternative View

The aim of this Section is to develop an alternative to the received view: an alternative to the idea that the fundamental way we think about places we perceive is as relative to our point of view – whether defined quite strictly, as the focal point of the visual field, or more loosely, as the body. I shall begin by describing a spatial system which has been studied by Stephen Levinson: the environmental system employed by the Tenejepan people in Mexico. One reason why this system is of interest is that it seems to show that egocentric thinking is dispensable. I shall then return to Evans's formulation of the distinction between objective and egocentric thinking, and suggest a reason why it has misled us. This leads me to suggest an alternative to the received view which quiets the sceptical question. This alternative makes it possible to understand how we can directly locate the objects we perceive: how we know where what we perceive is. Egocentric thinking as classically conceived then becomes one way, out of many ways, of individuating particular places. No doubt this view is counter-intuitive. But I shall conclude this Section by suggesting that it is actually an illusion that even we always employ an egocentric system. In fact we often think about perceived places in a manner similar to the Tenejepans.

There is a dialect of Tzeltal, spoken by the Tenejepan people, which does not make use of the standard triad of axes for communicating about places. 41 How is this possible? The Tenejepans live in a large, mountainous area, which nonetheless exhibits an overall tendency to fall in altitude. They use this decline to mark a direction: 'downhill' A second, notional direction is defined simply as cutting across 'downhill': 'across'. The third, vertical dimension is defined by the gravitational field. Tenejepans individuate places in their environment, including those currently perceived, by using this system. So for instance, if asking another to pass an object which is to their left, they might ask for the object which is 'uphill' Or if telling another where a child is hiding, they might say that the child is 'downhill' and 'across' of the tree. Tenejepans even use this system when they are outside of the mountainous area and so can no longer perceive the slope of the land: they have an extremely well-developed ability (for humans) to keep track of direction. There is no doubt that to us, this environmental system seems at first bizarre, if not outright incredible. But note that it is extremely practical. On the one hand, it facilitates inferential reasoning about locations: both

converseness and transitivity hold. On the other hand, it facilitates communication. It is neutral with respect to the subjects situated within the environment, so there is no need to keep track of another's location and point of view in order to communicate about places.

Part of what is striking about the Tenejepans is how deep this system of spatial thinking goes. I think that when one first encounters it, it is hard to resist a sceptical stance. Really this can be nothing more than a linguistic peculiarity: perhaps this dialect lacks the resources to express egocentric thinking about perceived places, but the Tenejepans themselves must nonetheless think egocentrically. But empirical study has shown this sceptical stance to be in large measure incorrect. Tenejepans will judge two spatial arrays to be similar if the objects displayed have the same relative locations with respect to the environment. They will not judge two spatial arrays to be similar if they have the same relative locations with respect to their own point of view. Tenejepans remember locations of objects with respect to the environment. They do not remember locations of objects with respect to their own point of view. Finally, their unconscious gestures accompanying verbal reports of spatial arrays also reflect this environmental system. Tenejepans do not appear to think about places as specified relative to themselves at all: neither consciously, nor unconsciously. The environmental system encoded in their language appears to permeate all their spatial thinking.

As I said, what this suggests is that egocentric thinking about perceived places is dispensable. We cannot deny that, for the Tenejepans as much as for us, the primitive content of vision is perspectival in that there is a focal point to it: the spatial relations between it and the objects perceived are manifest. But this does not appear to necessitate that the places perceived are thought about as relative to that point of view. Can we explain how this can be?

In his discussion of objective spatial thinking, Evans writes: 'We say that the subject thinks of himself as located in space (in an objective world that exists independently of him, and through which he moves'). We have a way of thinking about the space surrounding us as something we are in together with the objects we perceive: we and they move through it. Places within this space are stationary. We are not the 'centre' or 'point of origin' of this space relative to which the locations of these perceived objects are individuated. We are simply all in it together. As we saw, Evans

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43 John O'Keefe expresses this idea thus: 'the notion of absolute, unitary space is a non-centred, stationary framework through which the organism and its egocentric spaces move' (quoted in J. Campbell (1994) p. 19).
thinks this way of thinking about space consists in the possession of a cognitive map or model, together with the ability to locate oneself using this map or model. But the crucial point here is that Evans contrasts this objective way of thinking about space with the way we think about the space we perceive. We think about the space we perceive egocentrically: relative to us. This is why we are at the 'centre' or 'point of origin' of 'egocentric space'. Now, according to Evans, we can think of egocentrically individuated perceived places objectively. That is, we can understand that a perceived place egocentrically individuated is the very same place as a place specified using a cognitive map or model: we can make judgements identifying egocentrically individuated places with places on maps and models. I shall return to this below. But it is still the case that the subject and her position is privileged in her thinking about the places in her environment: perceived locations are individuated relative to her point of view.

This is what allows the sceptical question to arise. For if perceived locations are individuated in relation to the subject's point of view, we can then ask: Where is that point of view? And visual perception seems incapable of providing any answer to this question which does not simply appeal to the locations of those perceived places themselves, of course, individuated in relation to the subject's point of view.

But why must the subject think about perceived places in her environment as individuated relative to her? There really is something very strange, if not solipsistic, in thinking that the subject conceives of herself as the 'centre' or 'point of origin' of space. I think the intuition driving this picture is this. The subject perceives objects to be located at places which are spatially related to her, in the sense that the spatial relations between those objects and the point of view of the visual experience is manifest. And so, we might continue, just as the subject perceives objects as located in relation to her, so too she thinks about those locations in relation to her. Hence the idea that we think about perceived places egocentrically: relative to us and our point of view.

But it does not follow from the fact that objects are perceived to be located at places spatially related to the subject's point of view that the subject must be thinking about those places as individuated relative to her point of view. To see this, it can help to consider the difference between our common-sense conception of objects as opposed to places. We think that the objects we perceive exist independently of us. They come pre-packaged or pre-individuated. We may use the perceived location of an object to discriminate it from others in perception. And once this discrimination is made, we can think about or refer to that object. But we nonetheless think that the object is there...
anyway, at that location, apart from any sensible discrimination of it by us. Now we also think of the space in which objects, including our own bodies, are located as existing independently of us. It too is there anyway. But we do not think that places within this space come pre-packaged or pre-individuated: space may exist independently of us, but particular places do not. 44 There is no way to carve space at its own joints: it really is up to us how to slice it. If we are to discriminate and so think about or refer to places we perceive – whether these places are occupied by objects or appear to be empty – we must have a way of individuating them. We must impose a system for distinguishing one place from another upon the space we perceive. But we can do this in any number of ways, using any number of systems: egocentric, deictic, intrinsic, or environmental – no one more true to space itself than another.

When we sensibly discriminate one object out of a range of objects we may well do so by its perceived location: that is how we identify particulars, and so too come to think about them, or direct a hearer’s attention to them. And the perceived location of an object bears a manifest relation to the subject’s point of view: to the focal point of the visual field, and indeed to her body itself which is at the origin of this field. But this does not entail that when the subject discriminates one perceived location out of a range of locations, and so too becomes able to think about that location, or direct a hearer’s attention to it, she must do so by appeal to the spatial relation in which it stands to her own point of view. Basically, the received view mistakes one way which English speakers individuate places they perceive for the fundamental or basic way in which all perceived places must be individuated.

So what then is the alternative view? As Evans remarks, we have a way of thinking about the space surrounding us, and which we perceive, which is objective: we are in it together with other objects. What I want to propose is that just as we have a way of thinking about space as something we are in together with other objects, so too we have an awareness of space as something we are in: through body awareness. 45 This is how we can make use of the intuition that the subject’s body and her awareness of it act as a sort of anchor. A subject’s awareness of her body from the inside gives her awareness of her own body as taking up a certain volume of space within a larger space: as being within a surrounding spatial world. As we saw, this awareness does not provide

45 Given that body awareness has a constitutive role to play in touch, then we also have an awareness of space as something we are in, together with other objects, through body awareness in conjunction with touch. For discussion of this constitutive connection see M. Martin (1993), B. O’Shaughnessy (1989).
her with knowledge of which place out of a range of particular, individuated places she is currently occupying: her body is always presented as just here, no matter where precisely in the world here is. But it does nonetheless provide her with an awareness of being at some particular place within a larger space: of being here within the spatial world, which can in principle contain other objects.

In his discussion of the identification of particulars, Strawson remarks: 'There can be no question as to which scene we are talking about, though there may be question enough as to which part of it, which element in which part of it, and so on.' In the normal course of affairs, no sceptical question arises as to where the objects we perceive are: we are able directly to locate them. The alternative view I am proposing explains this simply as the ability to know that the objects perceived are within the same space as the subject is aware her own body is in. This is how visual experience can be more than a phenomenologically vivid way of presenting the very same information which could be gained from a map or a model. When integrated with body awareness, one does not fundamentally think of the objects one sees as located relative to one's point of view – wherever that then is. One rather thinks about the objects one sees as located together with one's body within space: the sector of space surrounding one's body, which one is aware of it as being within. If this is right, then the direct knowledge of location we take perception to afford is fundamentally knowledge that the objects perceived are in this space together with one's body.

But where more precisely are the objects perceived? This will depend on which system of spatial representation the subject employs to individuate places within this space. She could think about the locations of the objects she perceives egocentrically, or she could think about these locations deictically, intrinsically, or environmentally. None of these systems is more fundamental than the others. They are all simply ways of individuating particular locations within a space already identified: of carving up this space, and so making thought about or reference to particular places within it possible.

Note that this alternative view does not guarantee that the subject in fact has knowledge of where what she perceives is. What it does is quiet the sceptical question: it makes it possible to see how she ever could. Consider once again Evans's subject who is watching a film of a remote seabed and identifies with the point of view of the camera, wholly forgetting that her body is not deep beneath the sea. If the subject is thinking of the objects she sees as together with her body within a sector of space, then

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any judgements about their locations she makes will not constitute knowledge. For this subject is wrong that the objects she perceives are in the same sector of space as she is aware of her body as being within: she is taken in by phenomenological similarity between viewing the film and seeing the world.

How might this alternative view be questioned? There are at least three ways. The first simply rejects it entirely. It is possible for a proponent of the received view to see the sceptical question I raised in the last Section as nothing more than a challenge to be met: either the question can be deflated, or the received view on its own has the resources to meet it. The second accepts that the received view on its own cannot explain our knowledge of where what we perceive is. But rather than appeal to the subject's awareness of her body, it claims that a subject's grasp of the token-reflexive 'here' will suffice to anchor her perceptions to one sector of the world: to ensure 'which scene' is in question is not in question. In essence, this view claims that grasp of a token-reflexive 'here' can itself explain how the subject has discriminating knowledge of where in space she and the objects perceived are located: the awareness she has of her body from the inside is not required. The third way of resisting the alternative view accepts the need to appeal to the subject's awareness of her body. For after all, given that we have such awareness, why should it not have a use in grounding our knowledge of where what we perceive is? But this view resists the claim that egocentric, deictic, intrinsic, and environmental frames are all on a par. Egocentric thinking about perceived places is prior. The capacity to construct a deictic or intrinsic frame, or to employ an environmental system, is dependent upon a prior egocentric system: the fundamental way we individuate places we perceive is as relative to us and our point of view, empirical study of the Tenejepans notwithstanding. In support of this, it might be claimed that the primitive content of visual experience just is perspectival. One perceives objects as located relative to the focal point of the visual field. And so one must think about the locations of these perceived objects as relative to the focal point of the visual field – at least in the first instance.

I am not claiming to have conclusively argued for the alternative view. I hope only to have made a plausible proposal. But I think the inclination to resist it is likely to stem from the intuition just expressed: that the perspectival character of visual experience simply demands an egocentric individuation of places. I shall conclude this Section by trying to make this less obvious to intuition. I think there are three basic points to be made.
The first point is that there is a question about the status and scope of the claim that an egocentric system of individuating places in visual perception is prior to all other systems. Is it more than an empirical claim? Are all visual systems perspectival in this way, or only the human visual system? For instance, would an egocentric system also be fundamental to a horse or a fish or any creature with eyes on both sides of its head, as opposed to the front of its face? At what level of visual processing does visual content become perspectival?

The second point to make is that we are due an explanation of why exactly the perspectival nature of vision entails that thought about perceived locations must in the first instance be thought about locations individuated relative to the subject. For the alternative view does not deny the fact that vision is perspectival. Consider for instance a Tenejepan who has left her mountainous area in search of a stream. As I said, she will be able to keep track of the direction ‘downhill’ despite the fact that she can no longer perceive the slope of the land. This is a very basic navigational skill many animals also possess. Imagine now that she glimpses the stream through some trees and realises that for a while now it has actually been ‘downhill’. Let us say that in similar circumstances, an Englishman would judge the stream to be ‘left’. In both cases, the spatial relation between the subject and the stream is manifest: it is ‘downhill’ from the Tenejepan, ‘left’ from the Englishman. Note, for emphasis, that these judgements are not therefore the same. These subjects are not thinking of the location of the stream in the same way. For instance, were the Tenejepan to come to the stream on the opposite bank, walking from the opposite direction, she would judge it to be ‘uphill’ while our Englishman would again judge it to be ‘left’. Now it is certainly true that the Tenejepan must be keeping track of ‘downhill’ to make such a judgement. The question is why this entails that she is at a more fundamental level thinking of the stream as at a place individuated in relation to her, as opposed to thinking of its place, no doubt seen in relation to her, as individuated environmentally.

The third and final point to make is that it is not obvious on reflection that even we think about the places we perceive as in the first instance individuated relative to us. Certainly we do not have an environmental system encoded in our language. But just as one might suggest that really the Tenejepans think egocentrically, so too one might suggest that really we think environmentally. To see why this is so, I want to return one final time to the distinction Evans draws between objective and egocentric thinking.

47 See J. Gibson (1979).
Recall Evans’s claim that only a subject capable of objective thinking about space is capable of egocentric thinking about space. Why does Evans make this claim? I think part of the answer is found in the following footnote:

Notice that spatial positions are not identified, in the egocentric mode of thought we are considering, by descriptions like ‘the position three feet in front of my nose’. For something that occupies a position so identified, after one has rotated, is not thought of as occupying the same position as something that was three feet in front of one’s nose before one rotated. One would have to think in terms of such descriptions if one were free-floating in space; but it is not our usual mode of egocentric thinking. 49

Individuating places in relation to the subject means that the places so individuated are carried through the world as the subject moves. They are not stationary. Currently I see a computer screen ‘at the place so far in front of my nose’. If I stand and turn, I see a window ‘at the place so far in front of my nose’. If we allow that the fundamental way we think of the places we perceive is as individuated relative to the subject, then the fundamental way I am thinking about the place of the computer screen and that of the window is the same: both are ‘the place so far in front of my nose’. This is nothing more than a statement of what the received view is. But intuitively it is not how we think about perceived places.

The reason why Evans claims that only a subject capable of objective thinking about places is capable of egocentric thinking about places is that, having characterised egocentric thinking as relative to the subject, he must now supplement it. He needs to explain how I can know that the computer screen and the window are not in matter of fact at the same perceived place despite the fact that that given his characterisation of egocentric thinking, the way I am thinking of them is indeed as at the same perceived place. How can the subject keep track of perceived places individuated relative to her as she moves through space? The simplest proposal we might make is that the subject keeps track of her own movements. Certainly animals, including humans, do have an ability to keep track of their movements. But as we saw, Evans’s proposal is more complex: the subject identifies places egocentrically individuated with places represented by a map or model. I can know that the computer screen and the window are not in matter of fact at the same place by identifying each with different places using a map or model of my study. So according to Evans, part of why only a subject capable of objective thinking is capable of egocentric thinking is that the subject must use a

cognitive map or model to keep track of perceived places, re-identifying them over time.

The key point about this explanation of how the subject keeps track of or re-identifies places is that it turns on her ability to identify a place individuated in one way, with a place individuated in another way. Any re-identification of a place – if the subject has moved at all – will be based on an identity judgement. But this seems neither necessary nor credible.

Consider for instance busying oneself preparing dinner in the kitchen, while keeping an eye on one's toddler who has so far sat contentedly and quietly at a place on the floor. If we think of perceived places as individuated relative to the subject, then each time one turns to check that the toddler is still at that place, from different positions and orientations in the room, one’s knowledge that she has not moved will be based on an identity judgement. Let us say that the place one first perceives her to be is ‘a few metres straight in front of me’ (when leaning against the dishwasher). The next place one sees her to be is ‘just over my shoulder and to the right’ (when at the sink). One’s knowledge that she has not toddled off is based on one’s knowledge that these two places, thus individuated, are in fact one and the same.

It is relatively simple to make this judgement. All one need do is determine the relation between the two locations of the two different sightings, determine how the standard axes were used on each sighting, and compute whether or not the two locations of the toddler, individuated in different ways from different places, match. We are extremely good at this sort of spatial reasoning. Indeed the computation may be performed at the sub-personal level. The point is that we are trying to characterise how perceived places are thought about: we are interested in our thinking about perceived places. And we do have a way of individuating the location of the toddler which would make it transparent that she is at the same place on each sighting. One can see that she has not moved because one perceives her on each occasion as located at the same place on the floor, say ‘the middle of the floor’. To acknowledge this all we need do is resist the claim that the fundamental way perceived places are individuated in thought is relative to the subject, and explain the alternative.

I shall describe this alternative in a moment. But perhaps a champion of the received view might accept that all re-identifications of places are based on judgements of identity. Perhaps it is cumbersome and unnecessary, but if there are independent reasons for being committed to the received view, whatever they are, so be it. I want
now to consider one more example, which I hope will show that there is more than simplicity at stake.

So consider a situation akin to the one Strawson has in mind when he initially introduces the notion of ‘identification of particulars’: jointly attending to a place and discussing it with another. Adults jointly attend to objects and places regularly. But joint attention is also extremely important for children’s language learning and cognitive development. Now it is not easy to know how to analyse joint attention. We are all familiar with the phenomenon. We want to say: we are attending to the same object or place together. The force of this use of ‘together’ is that there is an ‘openness’ or mutual understanding between us about what we are doing. But it is hard to analyse this notion of ‘togetherness’ or ‘openness’. For as soon as we try to characterise it we seem forced to say that it requires an infinite amount of knowledge. I know that you are attending to the same place as I am. And I know that you know that you are attending to the same place as I am. And I know that you know that I know that you know that you are attending to the same place as I am. The ‘togetherness’ or ‘openness’ evades us in analysis. Meanwhile it is not credible that a nine-month old child is capable of anything approaching such thinking. But however we are to analyse joint attention, we are all familiar with it: this attending to a place together and possibly discussing it, and this openness or mutual understanding about this being what we are doing.

If one is committed to the idea that perceived places are individuated relative to the subject, then one is committed to the following view of joint attention. I am attending to a place which I am thinking about as individuated relative to me. You are attending to a place which you are thinking about as individuated relative to you. Our knowledge that we are attending to the same place is thus based on an identity judgement. We can form this judgement in either of two ways. We can take up the point of view of the other, and imagine ourselves looking at the world from where she is. Or we can simply locate the other’s eyes and then follow her gaze. Either way, all we need do is determine whether these two differently individuated places are one and the same. Once again, it may be relatively easy for us to do this. The point is only that the place to which we are jointly attending is not individuated in the same way for each of us. It is not transparent to us that we are jointly attending to the same place. And this puts the sort of togetherness and openness which is characteristic of joint attention at an even further remove. What we want to be able to say is that the basic phenomenon is that we

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are attending to the same place together. This is not the basic phenomenon if our knowledge of this depends on identifying as the same two differently individuated places, to which each of us are separately, as it were, attending: I to one, you to the other.

What this example brings to the fore is that in claiming that perceived places are individuated relative to the subject, the received view loses sight of the idea of the space perceived as shared or in common between subjects. It loses sight of the conception of space as something we are all in together. This idea is secured by an environmental system for individuating perceived places: for places are individuated in a way which is neutral between subjects in the environment.

How could we use such a system? For unlike the dialect of Tzeltal used by the Tenejepans, we do not have a stable environmental system encoded in our language. What this means is that we need to construct such systems on-the-fly, as it were. I said earlier than in order to specify where a place is in three-dimensional space, we do not need to employ three axes intersecting at a single point. All we need to be able to do is mark places in each dimension. So the first and simplest dimension to mark is the vertical: we can use gravity to mark an up/down axis. Indeed, if we stop and think for a moment about the up/down axis, it does not really seem correct that it is an axis we ever think of as ‘centred’ on objects. We think of it as everywhere at once. So that is one dimension accounted for. What now of the other two? All that is required is a way of marking one of them. The other can then be notionally defined as cutting across it. But often we have obvious ways of marking both. Within an enclosed or semi-enclosed space, like a room or a city park, we can use the parameters of the enclosure: the walls or the streets. These provide us with ways of marking locations in the other two dimensions. That is how, for instance, one can individuate the place where one’s toddler is sitting as ‘the middle of the floor’. With respect to the vertical dimension she is on the ground. With respect to the horizontal dimensions she is in the middle section of an area defined by the kitchen walls, roughly equidistant from all four of them. Outside of an enclosed or semi-enclosed space we shall need to use an environmental feature. Large, stable features are for obvious reasons most practical, but theoretically all that is required is a feature of some sort or other.\footnote{Levinson mentions a linguistic community that uses the direction from which the monsoons arrive (S.C. Levinson (1996) p. 146).} In an entirely featureless environment with not a single object in sight (we might imagine being alone on a perfectly flat Arctic plain) one could not manage it. But much of our time is spent in houses and cities and
countryside with plenty of obvious features. Given this, an environmental system is easy to construct. Unlike the Tenejepans we shall need to construct such a system on-the-fly: there is a certain amount of arbitrariness and flexibility, and we shall need tacitly to agree to construct it one way, and not another, if we are to use it to communicate. But as we saw, that is equally so when we are specifying places using the standard triad of axes. In any event, once constructed, we can think of an environmental system as specifying places by means of a sort of three-dimensional grid. There is a way of individuating places in each dimension. But there is no single object upon which all three axes, one for each dimension, are centred.

So I think it is not intuitively obvious that even we think about the particular places we perceive as, in the first instance, individuated relative to us. On its own, this received view faces a sceptical challenge: it cannot explain how we know where what we perceive is. But if the alternative view I have proposed is accepted, then egocentric thinking appears to be little more than one system out of many which we use to individuate particular places within the sector of space we are aware of our own bodies and other objects as together in – and not a particularly practical one at that.

Once again, I do not claim to have argued conclusively for this alternative view. I hope only to have made the view plausible. But its plausibility will be increased if we explain why the received view has seemed so self-evident. No doubt part of the explanation is that visual experience is perspectival, and that the English language makes use of the standard triad of axes for specifying places. But I think there is a background philosophical picture which is also partly explanatory. I want to conclude this Section by briefly discussing this picture.

It is sometimes claimed that the deep interest of egocentric perception and thinking is that it ‘places’ the subject in the world. Bill Brewer, for instance, remarks: ‘By displaying the spatial relations between its objects and us, the perceivers, perception places us in the perceived world: our world and the perceived world are one’. 52 But there is an ambiguity in this use of ‘place’ What in matter of fact makes it the case that the subject is ‘placed’ in the world – in the sense of having a place in it, or being a piece of it – is not that she perceives herself as standing in spatial relations to other objects. What makes it the case that she is placed in the world in this sense is that she has a body. Her perception of the surrounding world, as standing in spatial relations to her, is an upshot of the fact that she has a body and that this body is equipped to

perceive its surrounding environment. So the sense in which her perception of the world 'places' her in it is this: it can provide her with knowledge of where, in relation to other objects, her body is already placed. When seen in comparison with this picture, the appeal of the alternative view is to make it possible for the subject to know she is placed in the world, in the first sense of 'place', in virtue of her awareness of what in matter of fact places her in the world – in virtue of her awareness of her body.

So why has egocentric perception and thinking been accorded this 'placing' role? The reasons are complicated, but one might be this. There is a view, perhaps originating in Wittgenstein's discussion of the self and solipsism in the *Tractatus*, which makes use of the idea of a visual point of view, with its disappearing focal point, to get a fix on the idea of a subjective point of view: that is, a subject of conscious experience. Very crudely then, with this view in mind, in order to place the subject in the world in either sense of 'place' one must place the focal point of visual experience in the world. I am inclined to think that it may be a mistake to use the idea of a visual point of view to get a fix on the idea of a subjective point of view. But be that as it may, it is possible that one reason why it has seemed evident that we think about the places we perceive as individuated relative to the subject is an underlying assumption that it is the perception of these relations, between these places and the subject, that places her, again in both senses, in the world.

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53 See e.g. N. Eilan (1995); T. Nagel (1986); D. Pears (1987) and (1988); L. Wittgenstein (1922).
2.6 The Film Subject

I want to end this Part by considering the predicament of the subject who has become known as 'the film subject'. The film subject treats her visual perception of her environment akin to the manner in which we might treat a documentary film. We can come to know all about a particular time and place by watching a film. But we do not think that what we are watching has anything to do with us. The film subject treats her perceptions in this way: she does not think of what she perceives as having anything to do with her. The question this raises is in what the difference between us and the film subject consists. For the film subject might act on the objects she perceives. She might be totally immersed in and interested by what she perceives. She certainly seems to have knowledge of it. But she does not treat what she perceives as relating to her at all.

I think that when one first encounters the film subject, the intuitive response one is inclined to make is that if the film subject treats her visual perception like a documentary film, then although she may come to know a great deal about the objects she perceives, there is one thing she does not know: where they are. For she is precisely not treating her visual perception as informing her about the sector of space she is aware of her own body as being in. She is not thinking of these objects as in a space together with her and in this way as related to her, viz. as spatially related to her. But one might now suggest that just as the film subject can visually perceive objects and act on them, so too she can perceive a body from the inside and think of the objects she visually perceives as being in the same space as this body. The point is that she does not think that this body, any more than the objects she perceives, has anything to do with her. So she does know where what she perceives is: her visual perception is informing her about the sector of space she is aware of this body as being in. But she still does not think of herself as in this space together with this body and these perceived objects.

But it is not obvious that the film subject can distance herself from the body she is aware of from the inside in the same way as she can distance herself from the objects she perceives. In the last Part, I discussed how one feels pains, for instance, to be located at places within or on the body one is aware of from the inside. To anticipate, in the next Section I shall argue that the basic emotions just are bodily states which one has awareness of from the inside. What it is to be in a state of fear, for instance, or anger or happiness, is in part to feel or experience one's body as in such a state. If it is correct

that not only pains but emotions are bodily, then in order to distance herself from the body she is aware of from the inside, the film subject must also distance herself from the pains and emotions she feels. So for instance, when a sharp object in the perceived environment causes damage to the body she is aware of from the inside, the film subject cannot think that the pain felt in this body has anything to do with her. It is not her pain. And when the film subject witnesses some flagrant injustice in the environment and feels anger coursing through this body's veins, she cannot think of this anger as having anything to do with her. It is not her anger. The film subject's emotions are not even as real as the emotions we experience when watching a film. To use a term of Kendall Walton's, we think of these as 'quasi-emotions' in so far as we know that what they are about is either fictional or, if real, then at a remove from us.\textsuperscript{55} One cannot immediately lash out and act on one's anger at an injustice portrayed in a film. But we yet think of our 'quasi-emotions' as our own. This the film subject cannot do.

I do not want to claim that it is inconceivable for a subject to feel distanced from or alienated by the pains and emotions she feels. Apparently analgesics like morphine do not diminish pain, but make the sufferer not mind it so much.\textsuperscript{56} Perhaps that is a sort of distance from one's pains. And one can sometimes feel an alienation from one's emotions. Overcome with jealousy or upset, one might think, for instance: 'What is all this? This is not me. These feelings are not mine.' Indeed such emotional alienation is one of the diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia: some patients experience emotions they attribute to an external source.\textsuperscript{57} However, there are two points to make about these cases. First, they seem derivative upon more ordinary cases. Even if it is conceivable that this sense of distance or alienation sometimes occurs, it is not necessarily conceivable that it could always occur. Second, if the film subject distances and alienates herself from the pains and emotions she feels, then there is a strong sense in which she is distancing himself from being a subject at all. That is, I think we now have a right to ask: in what sense is the film subject a subject? For it is now not only the objects she perceives, nor the body she perceives to be in a space together with the objects she perceives, but the pains and emotions felt in this body in response to those objects, that she purports to think have nothing to do with her.

\textsuperscript{56} D. Dennett (1981) p. 208.
\textsuperscript{57} One patient reports: 'I cry, tears roll down my cheeks and I look unhappy, but I have a cold anger because they are using me in this way, and it is not me who is unhappy, but they are projecting unhappiness onto my brain. They project upon me laughter, for no reason, and you have no idea how terrible it is to laugh and look happy and know it is not you, but their emotions' (C.S. Mellor (1970) p. 17).
Hence I think there is some hope of defending the intuitive response one is inclined to make upon first encountering the film subject. Unless the film subject treats the objects she perceives as in a space together with the body she is aware of from the inside, she does not know where what she perceives is. But it is not obvious that the film subject can distance or alienate herself from this body and yet retain her status as a subject. If she is not willing to concede that the pains and emotions she feels are hers, in what sense is she a subject at all?
Emotions and Other Minds

Part III
3.1 The Conceptual Problem of Other Minds

There are two classic problems of other minds: one epistemological, one conceptual. The epistemological problem asks how one can know, or how one can be justified in believing, that another person has a mind at all: that there exist other subjects of conscious experience. The conceptual problem asks how one can so much as understand that there could exist other minds or subjects of conscious experience – never mind how one could come to know it. Although the problem most discussed throughout the history of philosophy is epistemological, modern philosophy has focused instead on the conceptual problem. And it is the conceptual problem with which I shall on the whole be concerned here. But both problems have their source, at bottom, in the same idea. This is the idea that there is an ontological distinction between conscious experience and behaviour: that they are not at all the same type of thing. Hence in so far as some of our psychological concepts are concepts of types of conscious experience, they are concepts of a type of thing distinct from behaviour.

The idea that there is an ontological distinction between conscious experience and behaviour is extremely intuitive. Consider first the epistemological problem and the fact that has played a key role in generating it: the possibility of pretence. As philosophers are notoriously wont to emphasise, one can be intentionally misled as to the nature of another person’s experience. For instance, a person may be carrying on as if hurt, writhing and moaning and crying out for aid, but not be hurt at all: she is engaged in a deception, or perhaps is acting a part in a play. Yet one could be completely taken in by such a performance. One could come to believe that she is in pain. Now when philosophers advert to the possibility of pretence in discussions of other minds, I think there is an inclination to think that too much is being made of a small thing. Pretence is not, nor could it be, the norm. But really all that matters here is the existence of a possible discrepancy between what a person’s behaviour seems to reveal about her psychological state, and what her state in fact is. And the actual existence of such a discrepancy is widespread. Consider, for instance, putting a stern look on one’s fact in order to discipline a young child, even though it is all one can do not to laugh at her high jinks. Or smiling in supposedly friendly greeting when one sees an acquaintance, although the last thing one feels is pleasure in the encounter. ‘Keeping up appearances’, as we say, is part and parcel of living with others, in a shared culture.

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1 See A. Avramides (2000).
and community. Most adults often behave in ways which are not ‘true to the facts’ of their occurent psychological state. They are not liars or actors for that. So although the possibility of pretence is a vivid way of presenting the idea that there is discrepancy between what a person’s behaviour seems to reveal about her psychological state, and what that state in fact is, and I shall continue to speak of pretence in this Section, this discrepancy is in fact much less pernicious, and much more widespread, than a focus on pretence makes it seem.

Pretence can be successful. Not only can one come to form a false belief as to another’s state of mind, but it may be that her performance was exemplary: there may be nothing in a person’s behaviour which could have put one on to the fact that she is pretending. Her behaviour may appear to be just like behaviour which results not from a performance, but from real and genuine experience. There is no discernible difference. And so, for all that another’s behaviour seems to reveal about what her psychological state is, it seems that all one can know for sure is what her behaviour seems to reveal: her experience itself is in this sense out of reach. Hence the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour: since it seems one can know how she is behaving and not know what her experience is, it seems that what one observes cannot be her experience, but something else, something less – her behaviour.

Now pretence would not be possible in absence of a general connection between types of behaviour and types of experience. If another is to succeed in making one think she is in pain, she must appear as if she is in pain. But still, once the ontological distinction is felt to be real, the epistemological problem of other minds looms large. For as Bertrand Russell has pointed out: ‘we have no grounds for believing in [other people’s] minds except such as are derived from observing their bodies’. It is not as if one could get inside another’s head and into her mind, and so by-pass the bodily shell and behavioural proxy. For what one would experience would still and always be one’s own experience, never another’s. The hope that one might somehow finagle access of the sort she has to her experience makes no sense: any experience one has is one’s own. So one’s epistemological predicament is this. Another has a kind of access to her experience which one lacks: she has it. All one has access to is something different in kind: her observable behaviour. Hence there is a question of why and how one is justified in attributing experience to another at all, given the grounds for

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attribution at one's disposal. How can one possibly know that she has a mind? How can one know that anyone does?

I have presented the epistemological problem partly to distinguish it from the conceptual problem, and partly to make the idea palpable that there is an ontological distinction between conscious experience and behaviour. For as I said, the conceptual problem too arises from this idea. The conceptual problem of other minds asks how one can so much as understand that there could exist other minds or subjects of conscious experience - never mind how one could come to know it. The problem is to see how concepts of psychological states, when the state in question is a type of conscious experience or, more generally, experience itself, are so much as possible.

To quote Peter Strawson: 'The idea of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, applied.' For many of our concepts there is nothing problematic about this. It is easy to understand judgements ascribing these concepts: to understand what it would be for such a judgement to be true. Consider for instance a colour concept, say 'red'. In order to understand a judgement that some object is red, one needs to know which object is in question, and one needs to know what redness is. Only so can one know what it would be for the judgement to be true. Now it seems evident that one's fundamental conception of what redness is derives from one's experience of seeing red objects: it is just a certain shade of colour, which one regularly sees. Once one knows in this way what redness is, one can understand the proposition that any number of objects might be red: a stone, a truck, a horse, the sky, another or oneself. It is simply for that object to be that colour. But of course, to understand what it would be for such a judgement to be true is not to know whether or not it is true. For that, one would need to have the capacity to verify the judgement, to ascertain whether or not it is the case. One might do this by asking someone. Or more fundamentally, one might do it by finding the object in question and looking at it in good light.

Consider now a concept of a type of psychological state, for instance 'pain'. In order to understand a judgement that some object is in pain, one needs to know which object is in question, and one needs to know what pain is. Only so can one know what it would be for the judgement to be true. Now it seems evident that one's fundamental conception of what pain is derives from one's own experience of it. One knows what pain is from one's own case: it is that wretched experience, with which one is

unfortunately all too familiar. So, according to the model set out above, once one understands this, one can understand the proposition that any number of objects might be in pain: a stone, a truck, a horse, the sky, another or oneself. It is simply for that object to have that experience, which one knows and understands so well from one’s own experience. Of course, with some of these objects, one might have no idea how to verify or ascertain whether or not they are in pain: how could one tell that about a stone or the sky? Or again, how could an object without a certain sort of neuro-physiological constitution feel pain at all? But waiving questions of method of verification and empirical constraint, one should still understand at least in principle what it would be for such an object to be in pain. With other objects there are thankfully fewer questions to do with method of verification and empirical constraint. Most animals, including humans, have the empirically appropriate neuro-physiological constitution, and also naturally express their pain in their behaviour. Humans, to boot, can tell one how they are feeling, even if, unlike other animals, they may also have the wherewithal and desire to hide it. But, as Wittgenstein says: ‘Pain is pain – whether he has it, or I have it; and however I come to know whether he has a pain or not.’5 One gleans one’s fundamental conception of what pain is from one’s own experience of it. One’s understanding of what it is for another object to be in pain just is for that object to have the very same sort of experience which one has oneself. One’s understanding of what pain is is one thing. One’s capacity to verify whether an object is in pain is another.

This picture is intuitively compelling. But if one gleans one’s conception of what pain is from one’s own case in this way, then it is actually utterly mysterious how one is able to understand that any object other than oneself could be in pain at all. This conception of pain cannot be significantly applied to a range of objects. For it is entirely due to one’s own experience of it: pain is just that wretched experience one knows so well oneself. But when any object other than oneself is in pain, there is none of that wretched experience around for one to experience. The most one could hope to have experience of is that object’s behaviour. So how is one able to understand the proposition that an object other than oneself is in pain, when there is nothing resembling pain in one’s experience of any other object at all? If one’s understanding of pain is entirely due to one’s own experience of it, how can one understand that there is pain when there is no pain for one to experience? It is as if one said: what it is for another to be in pain is for there to be pain, but for there not to be. To quote Wittgenstein once

5 L. Wittgenstein (1953) ¶ 351 (emphasis in original).
again: 'If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of pain which I do feel.' The understanding sticks at the point where one is trying to extrapolate from felt to unfelt pain.

Not all of our psychological concepts present this problem. Consider those concepts like 'going for a walk' or 'coiling a rope' or 'writing a letter' or 'waiting patiently for someone' which, as Strawson says, 'involve doing something.' Prima facie it seems there is no difficulty understanding what it would be for any number of objects to be doing these things. One's fundamental conception of what 'going for a walk' or 'coiling a rope' or 'writing a letter' or 'waiting patiently for someone' consists in is a certain characteristic pattern of bodily movement and behaviour, which one can easily understand any number of objects performing. Some of these patterns of movement do require the performing object to have certain causal capacities. As a stone lacks legs it could not go for a walk even if it was capable of wanting to, although it might be able to wait patiently. It is also characteristic, although perhaps not always necessary, that these patterns of movement are performed for certain sorts of reasons, or are accompanied by certain sorts of experience. Perhaps only objects capable of having reasons and experience can go for walks or wait patiently – although a machine, despite its lack of psychological capacities, could certainly coil a rope, and possibly a computer program could write a letter. In any event, there are some constraints on which kinds of objects one can sensibly ascribe these concepts to, even if it is unclear just what these constraints are. These concepts are not as easy to generalise as a concept like 'red'. Still, there seems little problem in ascribing them to other people: they are beyond doubt the right kind of object. But insofar as it is easy to understand that other people can go for walks or coil ropes or write a letter or wait patiently, that ease seems to depend on the fact that one is conceiving of these activities as fundamentally consisting in characteristic patterns of bodily movement and behaviour. If one focuses instead on the having of a reason or the accompanying experience, the ease of understanding rapidly fades. It is just as hard to understand how another could have the experience of waiting patiently (as opposed to how another could wait patiently) as it is to understand how another could have the experience of pain (as opposed to crying out and displaying behaviour indicative of pain). So the fact that some of our psychological concepts seem

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6 Ibid. ¶ 302 (emphasis in original).
7 P.F. Strawson (1959) p. 111.
8 See B. Williams (1973a) and (1973c) for a discussion of this issue.
to be relatively easy to ascribe to a range of objects is of little help when it comes to making sense of those which are not: the problematic concepts are untouched by the promiscuity of the rest.

The conceptual problem of other minds is the problem of how concepts of psychological states, when the state in question is a type of experience or, more generally, experience itself, are so much as possible. These concepts must be significantly ascribable to a range of objects. Any ascription made must ascribe the very same thing. But it seems that one’s fundamental conception of types of experience or experience in general is gleaned from one’s own case. One understands what experience in all its varieties is simply because one has it. And all the experience one has is one’s own: it is logically impossible that one might have another’s experience. But then this conception is impotent when it comes to making ascriptions of psychological states to other objects. It is not a conception which provides one with any understanding of another’s experience in all its varieties. If one’s conception of experience is a conception tailored to one’s own experience, how can one so much as understand the possibility that there is experience other than one’s own experience? How can one so much as understand the possibility that there exist other minds or subjects of experience?

Faced with this problem, the obvious way to begin to answer it is to reject the intuition that one’s fundamental conception of experience in all its varieties is gleaned only from one’s own case in this way. What the conceptual problem of other minds shows is that if one’s psychological concepts are derived only from one’s own encounter with one’s own experience, then one cannot have any such concepts. But clearly one does. Hence these concepts cannot be derived only from one’s own experience. They must be gleaned in some other way as well. And the obvious way to continue this answer is to suggest that one gleans one’s conception of experience in all its varieties from the experience of others too.

Of course, another’s experience is not something one has access to in the same way one has access to one’s own experience: one cannot have another’s experience. What one has access to is rather what one can observe of others: their bodily behaviour. So the suggestion is that behaviour is as much a part of one’s concepts of psychological states as is experience itself. One does not glean one’s conception of what a psychological state is from one’s own case, and then treat another’s behaviour simply as

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a way of telling what sort of state another is enjoying. Rather, one’s concepts of psychological states are gleaned as much from observing the psychological life of others as from enjoying a psychological life oneself. So what one observes, another’s behaviour, is in some sense a part of what one’s conception of a conscious psychological state, like pain, is.

So far, this is no more than a sketch of the way an answer to the conceptual problem of other minds might go. The first question to address if we are to make this answer more robust is: in what sense is behaviour a part of one’s conception of a conscious psychological state? In the rest of this Section, I shall look at three quite general, but contrasting, answers we might give to this question, and suggest that only the first of them will in fact help to resolve the problem. The aim of the following Sections is to develop this answer in more detail: to show how it, and so too psychological concepts, are so much as possible.

The first answer is the simplest answer we could give: the way in which behaviour is part of one’s conception of a conscious psychological state is that the behaviour in others which one observes, like the experience which one has, just is such a state. So when one observes behaviour displaying pain, what one observes is pain. I shall call this answer ‘the observational model’ For the basic idea is that psychological states are as easily observed as experienced. Both P.F Strawson and John McDowell have, in some of their writing, advocated what appears to be the observational model. Thus McDowell writes in ‘On “The Reality of the Past”’: ‘one can literally perceive, in another’s facial expression or his behaviour, that he is in pain, and not just infer that he is in pain from what one perceives’.

In effect, the observational model rejects outright the existence of an ontological distinction between the experience which one has and the behaviour which one observes: both are instances of psychological states, and in this, ontologically on a par. They are indeed the same type of thing. Given this, observing another’s behaviour can give one as much access to pain itself as does having it. One’s conception of what pain is encompasses the behaviour which one can observe. So it is not the case that some of our psychological concepts are concepts of types of conscious experience as distinct from behaviour. Our psychological concepts are concepts of states which can be equally and unambiguously instantiated in one’s own experience and another’s behaviour.

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In this way, the observational model looks set to resolve the conceptual problem of other minds — if only we agree to reject the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour. But this is none too easy a thing to do. Not only is the distinction intuitively compelling. But even should we agree to abandon this intuition in the face of philosophical need, we are still left with the problem of understanding how experience and behaviour can be the very same type of thing. Having schematically shown how concepts of psychological states are so much as possible, we are left with the question of how that which makes such concepts possible is itself so much as possible.

Possibly for this reason, both Strawson and McDowell have also, in other places, shied away from an outright embrace of the observational model. Rather than claim that behaviour can be what a psychological state is, they have claimed that behaviour can constitute 'logically adequate criteria' for the ascription of psychological states to others.12 This is the second answer we might give. I shall call it 'the criterial model'.

In schematic form, the criterial model is much less simple than the observational model. For we need to understand what exactly logically adequate criteria are. Strawson elucidates the notion mainly be saying what they are not. He begins with the thought that behaviour is a way of telling or verifying what another is experiencing. He then insists that if we do not conceive of behaviour as logically adequate criteria, we should need to conceive of behaviour as 'signs of the presence, in the individual concerned, of this different thing, viz. the state of consciousness.'13 But this latter conception of the relation would offer us no escape from the conceptual problem. For once again, one will only be in a position to glean one's conception of what a psychological state is from one's own case: one's own psychological life will be the only such life one encounters. So Strawson concludes that we must conceive of behaviour as logically adequate criteria.

Apart from a tacit acceptance that behaviour is a way of telling what another is experiencing, this does not tell us what behaviour qua logically adequate criteria is, but only what it is not: a sign of an experience, distinct from it. For all that Strawson says, what it is for behaviour to be logically adequate criteria could simply be for behaviour to be a psychological state. That is, he says too little about what logically adequate

criteria are to resist the collapse of the criterial model into the observational model. Indeed, at the end of his discussion, when Strawson feels forced to put his point 'with a certain unavoidable crudity', he does seem to advocate the observational model:

To put the point ... in terms of one particular concept in this class, say, that of depression. We speak of behaving in a depressed way (of depressed behaviour) and we also speak of feeling depressed (of a feeling of depression). One is inclined to argue that feelings can be felt but not observed, and behaviour can be observed but not felt, and that therefore there must be room here to drive in a logical wedge. But the concept of depression spans the place where one wants to drive it in. We might say: in order for there to be such a concept as that of X's depression, the depression which X has, the concept must cover both what is felt, but not observed, by X, and what may be observed, but not felt, by others than X (for all values of X). But it is perhaps better to say: X's depression is something, one and the same thing, which is felt, but not observed, by X, and observed, but not felt, by others than X.14

Note that Strawson chooses depression as an example: an affective state, for which there is something like a natural form of bodily expression. I shall return to this below. The point for now is that if Strawson means to endorse a model of psychological concepts other than the observational model, he has not said enough to explain what that model is.

McDowell, by contrast, is explicit in his rejection of the observational model. Although he admits to having embraced it in 'On "The Reality of the Past"' (quoted above), his later paper 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge' chastises it for its 'difficulties'.15 The model McDowell advocates in its place is supposed to steer between the claim that another's behaviour is nothing more than a sign of a distinct experience, and the claim that another’s behaviour is a psychological state.16

McDowell’s position can best be introduced by comparison with a position he is famous for: the disjunctive conception of perceptual experience.17 McDowell has proposed that we need not, indeed we must not, treat the possibility of perceptual illusion as showing that there is, ontologically speaking, something in common between veridical perceptual experience and perceptual illusion. Even though we may not be able to tell whether we are veridically perceiving the world or suffering from illusion, that is no reason to think that what a perceptual experience is is what is in common

15 J. McDowell (1998a) p. 370 n. 5, and also Section 3. McDowell does admit, in a footnote, that the observational model is intuitively plausible for some of our psychological concepts, like the emotions. But he does not see any need for it. See p. 387 n. 34.
16 Interestingly, McDowell claims to be doing justice to Strawson's discussion in both these papers, despite the fact that they are to some extent at loggerheads.
17 J. McDowell (1998a) and (1998c).
between the two: how things seem to the subject. Rather, we must understand that perceptual experience comes in two ontologically distinct varieties: veridical perception, and illusion.

Just so, McDowell thinks, behaviour itself comes in two ontologically distinct varieties: veridical behaviour, and pretence and the like. We need not, indeed we must not, treat the possibility of pretence, of a discrepancy between behaviour and experience, as showing that there is, ontologically speaking, something in common between veridical behaviour and pretence: i.e. how it appears to another. Even though we may not be able to tell whether someone is deceiving us or not, that is no reason to think that what behaviour is is what is in common between the two cases, no matter whether the behaviour is real or feigned. Rather, we must understand that behaviour comes in two ontologically distinct varieties: veridical behaviour, and pretence and the like.

Now to propose a disjunctive conception of behaviour is not in itself to reject the observational model. Indeed, a proponent of the observational model will need to accept a version of sorts of the disjunctive conception. For if one holds that behaviour can be a psychological state, one will yet need to distinguish between behaviour which is pain, say, and behaviour which is only the appearance of pain. Despite the fact that there may be no discernible difference to the observer, there are in fact two distinct sorts of state here: pain, and pretending to be in pain. I shall return to this issue later in this Part. The point here is rather that McDowell rejects the observational model because he believes the disjunctive conception allows him to dispense with it. That is, he holds that a proponent of the disjunctive conception does not need to accept a version of the observational model. We need not conceive of a person’s behaviour as a psychological state, so that when we observe her behaviour what we observe is her psychological state. Instead, we can conceive of her behaviour ‘in some such terms as “h[er] giving expression to h[er] being in that “inner” state”; this is something that, while not itself actually being the “inner” state of affairs in question, nevertheless does not fall short of it in the sense I explained.’

What does McDowell mean by this? The way in which her giving expression to her experience, while not being her experience, nevertheless does not ‘fall short’ of her experience is just this: that when we observe her behaviour, the fact that she is having the experience in question is supposed to be made manifest to us. What this means in

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turn is 'purely negative': it rejects the thought that when we are observing her giving
expression to her experience, our experience of her is consistent with her not having
such an experience.19 This then is the sense in which her experience is manifest to us by
her behaviour: given the nature of her behaviour, she could not not be having the
experience to which she is giving expression. And this then gives some explanation of
what the criterial model is. Her giving expression to her experience amounts to logically
adequate criteria for the ascription of the experience in that her having the experience is
logically entailed by her giving expression to it. And her giving expression to her
experience is something we can observe.

Now McDowell puts forward this proposal in a context where his concern is
more epistemological than conceptual. And certainly, if it is accepted, it seems to
promise some help with the epistemological problem of other minds. For consider
accepting, as McDowell would have us do, both the disjunctive conception of
perceptual experience and the disjunctive conception of behaviour. Then, when one is
veridically perceiving another's veridical behaviour, her experience is manifest to one in
the sense explained. That is, one's own experience is of a fact which is not consistent
with her failing to have the experience in question. Otherwise one could not be
observing what ex hypothesis one is observing: one's experience of her could not have
the content it does were it not the case that she was having that experience. Whether or
not, in the end, this helps with the epistemological problem of other minds will depend
on whether or not we think this account of the content of perceptual experience suffices
for knowledge. A sceptic about knowledge might yet insist that unless we are able to
tell to which side of the disjunct our own perceptual experience, or another's behaviour,
falls, these ontological distinctions count for nought from an epistemological point of
view.20 But whether or not the criterial model promises help with the epistemological
problem of other minds, it is of no help with the conceptual problem of other minds: for
all that has been said, we do not yet understand what we apparently now can know.

The criterial model as propounded by McDowell leaves untouched the
ontological distinction between experience and behaviour. Behaviour is still a way of
telling what another's experience is. What it then claims is that there is a previously
unrecognised ontological distinction within the category of behaviour: veridical and
pretend. Until we recognise this, we have not adequately understood what behaviour
qua way of telling is. Now it is true that this ontological distinction within the category

19 Ibid.
20 On this question, see M. Martin (1997b).
of behaviour cannot be drawn without an appeal to experience. What makes it the case that a particular piece of behaviour counts as veridical as opposed to pretend is the nature of the experience of the person whose behaviour it is. In this way, the nature of a person’s experience makes a constitutive difference to the nature of her behaviour. Because of this, behaviour can be not just a way of telling but a logically adequate way of telling what another is experiencing. If another’s behaviour is the expression of pain as opposed to a pretence, then she is in pain – no doubt about it. But according to the criterial model, psychological states themselves are still ‘inner’ experiences as distinct from behaviour. And so once again, it seems that one can glean one’s conception of what a psychological state like pain is only from one’s own encounter with one’s own experience. What one encounters of another is still just her behaviour. This is not changed by the fact that some of this behaviour could not be the behaviour it is unless there is an ‘inner’ state to back it up, as it were. So the criterial model does not solve the conceptual problem of other minds. Our concepts of psychological states are as problematic as ever.

The key to this objection is really that the criterial model leaves the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour intact. Accepting this distinction means that all behaviour can ever be is a way of telling, however logically adequate, what another is experiencing. And this in turn means that the only psychological states one can ever encounter are one’s own. Contrast this now with the observational model. According to the observational model, we are wrong that behaviour is a way of telling that another is in a psychological state. Observing another is a way of telling that she is in a psychological state. Her behaviour just is her being in that state. And so one can encounter the psychological states of others as well as one’s own.

McDowell’s presentation of his view is somewhat unclear. I believe I have represented it accurately, but it may be that he would nonetheless respond to this objection in the following way. I shall call the view to emerge from this response ‘the behavioural-constraint model’. McDowell might concede that unlike the observational model, the criterial model leaves the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour intact. And he might also concede that to resolve the conceptual problem of other minds we need to understand how our conception of psychological states is gleaned not only from our own case, but from our experience of others too: we need to understand how the behaviour which we observe in others can be a part of our concepts of psychological states. But it is possible for the behaviour which we observe in others to be a part of our concepts of psychological states, and in this sense, more than just a
way of telling what another is experiencing, without thinking that this behaviour just is a psychological state. We can build behaviour into these concepts in other ways. For instance, it is possible that in order to possess the concept of a psychological state one must appreciate that behaviour can constitute a logically adequate way of telling what another is experiencing. The two are still distinct. But an appreciation of the fact that veridical behaviour ‘gives expression to the inner state’ is a constraint on one’s possession of the concept of such an inner state.

This response is in ways akin to a proposal Christopher Peacocke has made. Peacocke does not propose a disjunctive model of behaviour. But he does suggest that our concept of a psychological state like an experience of red is ‘the concept of a state which, in suitable circumstances, enables someone knowledgeable to discriminate or to act intentionally on the red objects, under that description’. One conceives of experiences of red, one’s own experiences or another’s, as making possible such discrimination and intentional action. So an appreciation of the link between experience and behaviour is again a constraint on one’s possession of concepts of types of experience. Peacocke’s proposal diverges from the suggestion I have made on McDowell’s behalf in the nature of the link he posits. For Peacocke it is part of our conception of experience that it enables behaviour, while for the reconstructed McDowell it is part of our conception of experience that behaviour expresses it. But the positions are in essence similar. Both leave the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour intact. But both nonetheless claim that behaviour is a part of our concepts of psychological states, in the sense that an appreciation of a link between experience and behaviour is a constraint upon possession of these concepts. In this sense, then, our concepts of psychological states might be thought to ‘span the divide’ between experience and behaviour, while maintaining their distinctiveness.

I think placing this behavioural constraint on the possession of psychological concepts does not solve the conceptual problem of other minds any more than the criterial model does. The question we need to ask is why the psychological concepts resulting from placing this constraint would be equally and unambiguously applicable to oneself and to others. For it is still the case that the only experience one encounters is one’s own. One’s understanding of what a psychological state itself is is still going to be tailored to one’s own experience. So why should the demand that one appreciate a link, of whatever nature, between experience and something different in kind, behaviour, if

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22 Anita Avramides also sometimes appears to endorse a view like this. See her (2000) p. 268 ff.
one is to possess a concept of experience, make the resulting concept any more generally applicable? I think the intuition driving the constraint is the following. If one can only possess the concept of experience if one appreciates that experience has a link to behaviour, then one is only capable of thinking about one’s own ‘inner’ experiences if one is also capable of appreciating that the behaviour of others can be linked to their own ‘inner’ experiences. So there is no thinking about one’s own experiences in absence of the capacity to think about the experiences of others. The problem however is to make intelligible how one gleans a conception of these ‘inner’ experiences of others. With what right do we suppose our concepts of psychological states to be generally applicable? This constraint does not explain this, but takes it for granted.

The observational model can explain our right to suppose our concepts of psychological states generally applicable. If psychological states can be experienced by oneself or observed in another, then it is perfectly intelligible how one gleans a conception of the psychological life of others. One encounters the psychological life of others when one encounters them, just as one encounters one’s own psychological life by having it. Certainly there are two different methods of verification for the ascription of psychological states, depending on whether the owner of the state is oneself or another. But what is ascribed in each case is one and the same thing.

Schematically, the observational model of psychological concepts is not just the simplest, but quite possibly the only, way of resolving the conceptual problem of other minds. We must deal directly with the underlying ontological assumption of a distinction between experience and behaviour. But to acknowledge that we must do so is one thing. To understand how to is another. Once again, if we deny the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour then we may indeed have schematically shown how concepts of psychological states are so much as possible, but we are left with the question of how that which makes such concepts possible is itself so much as possible. There really is a very hard dilemma: either we embrace the conceptual problem of other minds, or we embrace the observational model of psychological concepts.

To see why this dilemma is so hard, consider an analogy suggested by Colin McGinn: that we compare our concepts of psychological states to our shape concepts, like ‘square’. The judgement that a certain object is square can in principle be verified in any number of ways. For instance, one could look at the object, or one could explore

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it through touch. The possibility of using either method to make this judgement depends
on the fact that one’s understanding of what it is for an object to be square is not simply
an understanding of what it is for an object to look square on the one hand, or feel
square on the other. One has an understanding of what squareness is which is objective:
it is independent of these methods of judging that an object is square, and neutral in this
way. One can for instance say what squareness is using geometrical concepts. But even
without geometry, there is something deeply intuitive in the idea that both vision and
touch both give one access to the very same thing, the shape of the object itself. The
fundamental problem in the case of concepts of psychological states is that one does not
seem to have a conception of what it is to be in such a state which is objective in this
way. There seems no possibility of saying what a psychological state is independent of
one’s methods of judging that someone is in that state. Either one experiences the state,
or one observes it in others. But what is experienced and what is observed appear utterly
different in kind: pure, raw, felt experience on the one hand, and a sequence of bodily
movements, sounds, happenings, on the other. How could these two things be one and
the same kind of thing? Where is the unity in our concepts of psychological states to
come from?

We must answer these questions if the observational model is to be freely and
not forcibly embraced. For the cost of a forced embrace is real. The appeal of the claim
that one’s fundamental conception of pain is derived from one’s own case is that it
seems what matters about pain is not how it is expressed in behaviour, but how it feels:
the experience of being in pain is what is significant to the person in pain. Of course
how another is behaving matters from the point of view of someone trying to ascertain
whether or not she is in pain. The point is that it does not seem to matter much to her.
More generally, from the point of view of the subject enjoying a psychological life, it
seems that what is significant about that life is not what is observable to another, but
what it is like to enjoy it oneself. Without an adequate account of how experience and
behaviour can be one and the same type of thing, it seems that an embrace of the
observational model denies to others what matters, what is important, about life.

When philosophers consider the observational model, they almost invariably
gravitate, with Strawson, towards examples of psychological states which we think of as
having a natural bodily expression: depression, pain, emotions quite generally.24 The

24 See e.g. : J.L. Austin (1961a); N. Malcolm (1966); J. McDowell (1998a) and (1998b); P.F. Strawson
(1959); J. Wisdom (1965). Many of these authors are influenced by Wittgenstein, who famously
emphasises the importance of natural expression: ' how does a human being learn the meaning of the
names of sensations? – of the word “pain” for example. Here is one possibility: words are connected with
reason for this is intuitively obvious: we feel and speak as if these are states which one can indeed observe. One can simply see the joy in another's face, feel the anger and tension gripping her body, hear the weariness in her voice. It is as if one can perceive these psychological states in face, body, and voice, as easily as one can perceive the shape of an object: the locutions we use are indeed observational. As Wittgenstein writes:

Consciousness in another's face. Look into someone else's face, and see the consciousness in it, and a particular shade of consciousness. You can see on it, in it, joy, indifference, interest, excitement, torpor and so on. The light in other people's faces.

Do you look into yourself in order to recognise the fury in his face? It is there as clearly as in your own breast.25

In this way, emotions are, at least prima facie, distinctive: we speak as if the direct object of our perception just is another's emotion. For this reason, if we want to try to understand how an observational model of psychological concepts is so much as possible, our concepts of emotions seem the place to begin. In the rest of this Part, I shall delve in some detail into our concepts of emotions, and then suggest that they do indeed offer a solution to the conceptual problem of other minds.

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3.2 Expressing Emotions

The behaviour which we intuitively think of as displaying or manifesting an emotion is 'naturally expressive' behaviour. But by no means all of the behaviour which besets us when emotional is of this sort. In this Section, I shall address a somewhat preliminary question: what is it for a state to be expressed in behaviour? That is, what makes a piece of behaviour naturally expressive?

Consider, for instance, being confronted by a wild animal while hiking in the countryside: a primitive and paradigmatic occasion for a very basic, animal experience of fear. One's behaviour on such an occasion is likely to be varied. One might freeze up, and start to tremble and perspire. Not wanting to be attacked, one might deliberately and cautiously retreat, taking care not to make any quick or startling movements. Perhaps one whispers aloud that one is scared to death - a sort of plea for survival. All of this behaviour is connected to one's experience of fear in that it can all be explained by it. But intuitively, not all of this behaviour is naturally expressive of one's fear, in the sense of displaying or manifesting it: only one's freezing and trembling seem expressive in this sense. Certainly one's whispered utterance is an expression in a different sense of the term: a linguistic expression. Voicing it is an expression of one's fear in the sense that it states it to be the case. But it is not the sort of expression we are looking for. It is not an expression in which one's fear itself need be audible (although it might be). Nor do one's perspiration or deliberate retreat seem really to be, in this sense, expressions of fear. One's perspiration is less an expression of one's fear than an involuntary sign or indication of it, while one's deliberate retreat is less an expression of one's fear than an action undertaken because one is afraid, and wants to escape from harm. So what are the properties which freezing and trembling possess, which the rest of this behaviour lacks? What, that is, makes freezing and trembling expressive? To address this question, I want to look at a proposal made by Rosalind Hursthouse.

Hursthouse is famous for arguing that actions which express emotions are 'arational'. Examples of arational actions can include: rumpling the hair of a loved one out of affection; violently destroying or damaging an object somehow connected with or representing someone one is jealous of or angry with; rolling in the clothes of dead spouse out of grief; throwing or kicking an inanimate object like a tin opener out of frustration; covering one's face in the dark out of shame; jumping up and down and

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clapping out of excitement; and other actions in similar vein. Hursthouse does not insist that each token action falling under such a description is arational. Rather, she uses these examples to give a feel for the class of actions she has in mind, and then defines the criteria for arational actions thus: (i) the agent acts voluntarily and with awareness; (ii) the agent would not have so acted had she not been in the grip of an emotion, and the fact that she was in the grip of emotion is what explains her action; and (iii) the agent did not act for a reason, in that she has no belief which can ‘reveal the favourable light in which she saw what she did’ 27. Hence Hursthouse claims that arational actions prove recalcitrant to the standard account of action. It is this recalcitrance, she suggests, which makes them bona fide expressions of emotion.

The standard account of action draws a single, sharp distinction between two sorts of behaviour: actions and mere bodily happenings. 28. What makes a piece of behaviour a mere happening is that it is not something one does, but something that simply happens to one’s body. One has no direct control over it: one cannot will it to happen and one cannot will it to stop. It is just not up to one in this way. Perspiring out of fear is a mere happening, as is much of our behaviour: if hungry one’s mouth waters at the smell or sight of food; if startled one’s heart races; if angry blood pumps to one’s fists; if chopping onions one cries. In each case there is a bodily change which can be explained in a very simple way: being in some or other physical or psychological state causes the bodily change to occur. It is a simple function of how one’s body is made.

If one knows how one’s body is made, then one can act with the intention of causing a bodily change to occur. For instance, if for some reason one wants to perspire and one knows that one perspires when scared, one can put oneself in a scary situation, or perhaps simply imagine being in a scary situation: one does what it takes to make oneself scared, which in turn causes one to perspire. Of course, one could also cause oneself to perspire in other ways: one could take a sauna, or go for a jog. The point is that what one cannot do is simply perspire. Mere happenings are in this sense involuntary: they are brute bodily effects over which one has no direct control.

In contrast, what makes a piece of behaviour an action is that it is something one does for a reason: it is at once voluntary and intentional. One has a particular goal or aim or desire or intention or pro-attitude, and one behaves in a manner which one believes stands to satisfy it. One’s behaviour is a means to an independent end: its being

such a means is one's reason for doing it.\textsuperscript{30} Cautiously retreating from a wild animal is such an action. One wants not to be attacked, and believes that a cautious retreat is the best means to this end. Of course, one may or may not be attacked despite this cautious retreat. It may have been wiser to stand one's ground. Because an action is a means to an end, it can go better or worse. One may make a mistake about how best to achieve one's end. One may make a mess of the whole thing. One may not achieve one's end no matter what one does. But however incompetent one's reasoning about, and one's execution of, the action is, and however unsuccessful the action is itself, it is still an action if it is done for a reason: it is a piece of voluntary behaviour aimed at an independent end.

Note that one's reason serves not only to make a piece of behaviour an action. It also serves to explain it.\textsuperscript{30} On the one hand, this explanation is causal, in that one only acts as one does because of one's reason. The mere occurrence of the action is causally explained by one's reason. On the other hand, this explanation is rational, in that citing one's reason for acting is what makes it intelligible that one did what one did. One's reason is what makes the action make sense. One slowly and carefully backs away from an animal because one wants not to be attacked, and believes that slowly and carefully backing away will achieve this: having this reason is both what makes one act in this way at all, and what makes so acting intelligible.

Arational actions are not mere bodily happenings in that they are things we do: they are not purely involuntary effects of being in the grip of emotion. This is why it seems compelling to think of them as actions. But if Hursthouse is correct that they are not done for a reason, then despite being voluntary they are not actions according to the standard account. So either Hursthouse is wrong that arational actions are not done for reasons. Or it seems the standard account has succeeded only in articulating the nature of a certain class of actions, those done for reasons, and not the nature of actions per se.

To prove her case, Hurthouse uses the example of Jane's gouging the eyes out of a photo of Joan, her hated rival. She canvasses and discards a number of reasoned explanations which would purportedly fit the standard account. For instance, she imagines someone claiming that Jane wants to hurt Joan, and believes that she is gouging out the eyes of a photo of Joan. But this will not do, for it does not explain the action unless we also attribute to Jane an absurd belief – for instance, a belief that the photo of Joan is Joan, or a belief in the effectiveness of voodoo. Next, Hurthouse

\textsuperscript{30} Cf. D. Davidson (1980a).

\textsuperscript{30} See T.W. Child (1994); D. Davidson (1980a) and (1980b).
imagines someone claiming that Jane gouges out the eyes of the photo in order to express her emotion: she has this desire, and believes that her action satisfies it. But as Hursthouse points out, to claim that an action is done in order to express an emotion is not the same as claiming an action just is an expression of emotion. Certainly there are actions which are performed in order to express emotion. One might, for instance, wish to communicate one's emotions to another, and act in a way conducive to doing so. Or one might wish to express one's emotion because one's psychiatrist suggested one is overly repressed. In either case, it is intelligible that one would have a desire to express one's emotion, and so might then act on this desire. But it does not seem right that every time one expresses emotion one has a desire to express emotion and behaves as one does in order to satisfy it. Were that so, we should be open to correction with respect to our expressive behaviour in a way it seems we are not. For instance, we are not obviously entitled to correct Jane if we think she did not express her emotion very well— as if, say, she had failed to gouge with sufficient determination and zeal. Hence Hursthouse concludes that there is no suitable belief and desire which can explain our intuitive understanding of Jane's action. Jane gouged Joan's photo simply because she 'wanted to' or 'felt she had to', while in the grip of emotion.31

Yet as Michael Smith has pointed out, there is a perfectly suitable belief and desire to which a proponent of the standard account can appeal: Jane desires to gouge out the eyes of Joan's photo, and believes that that is what she is doing.32 Attributing such a reason to Jane will leave her open to correction. The independence of means from ends means that she may make a mistake: if the photo is after all not a photo of Joan, or if she manages to make a mess of the whole thing (perhaps the scissors are blunt) she will not have managed to satisfy her desire. But that is as we should expect, if Jane really does desire to gouge out the eyes of a photo of Joan.

Now Smith concedes that if all we are told about Jane's behaviour is that she desires to gouge the eyes out of a photo of Joan and believes that that is what she is doing, her behaviour will not have been adequately explained. To say that an action is done for a reason is not thereby to say that the reason is itself reasonable: our reasons for acting may be foolhardy, impulsive, weak-willed, simply crazy, irrational, unintelligible, and more. And when our reasons are not reasonable, they are themselves in need of explanation. Having the desire to gouge the eyes out of a photo is not a transparently intelligible desire to have. But it becomes intelligible once we are further

told of Jane's hatred and jealousy. In this way, an appeal to emotion can be a required supplement to a reasoned explanation. The action is only intelligible once the emotion is cited. But the standard account's claim, that what makes a piece of behaviour an action is that it is done for a reason, appears secure. For wanting to act a certain way or feeling as if one must act a certain way is still a reason so to act: one would then act however one does because one believes that so acting stands to satisfy one's desire or feeling.

So it seems the reason why Hursthouse claims that arational actions are not done for reasons is that she fails to distinguish acting for a reason from acting reasonably. When one acts arationally one acts for a reason: there is something one is trying to do or achieve. But the reason why one acts – the very fact that one possesses such a desire – is not exactly reasonable. One is, as we say, emotional, and so too is one's reason for acting.

Not all desires one has when gripped by emotion are unreasonable. Consider the desire not to be attacked by a wild animal. As soon as this desire is cited in explanation of one's retreat, it is fully intelligible: nothing more needs to be said. Being in the grip of emotion plays little if any explanatory role in making sense of it. Of course, in all likelihood one wants not to be attacked because one is afraid: it is one's fear which causes a vivid and palpable desire to get to safety, or, alternatively, this vivid and palpable desire is a part of what one's fear is. But a fearless person could just as easily have a desire to be safe. A veteran game-warden might be inured to fear of wild animals. She might still want not to be attacked, and so take requisite action when confronted. So in contrast to the game-warden, the explanation of why an ordinary person has this desire might indeed appeal to the fact that she is afraid. But the intelligibility of having this desire need not depend upon its connection to fear. It is wholly intelligible that someone might have a similar desire, and behave in a similar way, without feeling fear at all.

This is not so with arational actions: unlike a desire not to be attacked, arational desires are not intelligible if left to stand on their own. The reason for this is that only being in the grip of emotion explains why one would ever have such a desire in the first place: the existence of the desire can only be explained by appeal to emotion. So whatever intelligibility arational desires have depends on knowing that the subject of the desire is emotional. We are all familiar with the fact that when in the grip of emotion people have arational desires (and also often enough arational beliefs), and so behave in arational ways. It is by no means easy to understand why this is so. But to some extent, at least, the intelligibility of arationality can be explained by its
ordinariness if nothing else. The point that matters here is simply that we may not be able to dispense with the causal history of an emotional or arational desire if we are to find it intelligible: it may only be only an intelligible desire to have if it occurs in the grip of emotion. For this reason, explaining arational actions depends upon an appeal to the emotional state of the agent, in a way that explaining rational actions does not.

So Hursthouse may be wrong that an arational action like Jane’s gouging of Joan’s photo is not done for a reason, but she is right that the intelligibility of arational actions depends on an appeal to emotion. Does this essential explanatory appeal to emotion show why arational actions, in contrast to rational actions, strike us as paradigmatic expressions of emotion? For it was the difference between arational actions and more standard actions which was supposed to account for their expressiveness.

It seems that this essential explanatory appeal to emotion cannot explain why arational actions strike us as expressive. For insofar as there is an intuition that more standard, rational actions are not expressive, it seems to be this: if an action is done for a reason it cannot just be an expression of emotion, for expressive behaviour is precisely not behaviour which aims at an independent end. But arational actions are done for reasons: they do aim at independent ends. Meanwhile, mere happenings are sometimes also only intelligible by appeal to emotion: since someone is healthy, and sitting comfortably in a temperate room, we only understand why he is perspiring when we realise he is frightened and anxious. But his perspiration is not expressive of his fear merely in virtue of being causally explained by it and nothing else.

So why then do arational actions strike us as expressive? One aspect of arational actions yet to be mentioned is the manner in which we tend to imagine them performed. If one gouges the eyes out of a hated rival’s photo, one does indeed probably act with a sort of determination and zeal. If one rumples the head of a loved one out of affection, there is in all likelihood a certain gentleness to one’s touch. It is as if the emotion is there in the manner of the gesture. And this may be equally true of a cautious retreat from a wild animal. Although in this case one does manage to back away slowly and carefully so as not to threaten the animal, the style of one’s retreat is nonetheless not one of casual nonchalance. One is terrified. It shows. One might tremble the whole time, finding it hard not to freeze up, or to break into a panicked run. In this, one’s

P. Goldie (2000a) attempts to explain further the link between arational desires and emotion.
action may be unlike that of the veteran game-warden. What can make an otherwise ordinary, rational action expressive is the manner in which it is performed. 34

The key question then is what the source of this manner is: why does one gouge with zeal, rumple gently, or retreat trembling? And the obvious thought is that simply being in the grip of emotion makes one behave in a zealous or gentle or trembling manner. It is not just that a wave of anger or affection or fear causes one to want to gouge or rumple or retreat. It is that the same wave causes one to gouge or rumple or retreat in a certain way. There is something about what it is like to be emotional which makes for the manner of one's behaviour. There is a sort of palpable phenomenology at stake here.

Some of Hursthouse's examples of arational actions do seem less like actions, and more like having a gentle touch or a trembling body, than the arational actions we have considered so far. Consider jumping up and down or clapping one's hands with excitement, or covering one's face in the dark in shame. It might be that one really does have a desire to jump or to clap or to cover one's face, and so jumps or claps or covers one's face in order to satisfy one's desire. 35 If so, there is indeed an aim to the action. It is just that the aim is simply the performance of a body movement: there is what we might think of as a coincidence of means and ends. One does not move one's body in order to do anything else, but only to move it. One does not have any beliefs about this being the way or the means to jump up and down or cover one's face. But still, one might not succeed: one might in the excitement fall over when trying to jump, or one might accidentally poke oneself in the eye. The coincidence of means and ends limits the possible ways one might fail, but does not on its own guarantee success. If we feel reluctant to concede this, it is probably because it seems one might equally jump or clap or cover one's face not because one has any such desire, but simply out of emotion. One might just find oneself doing these things, spontaneously, without really having any desire to do so. One might not mind if one fell over, for instance. That might not thwart any aim one has. Some things it seems we simply do. We do not really do them because we want to do them.

This sort of behaviour does genuinely lie between actions on the one hand, and mere happenings on the other. Consider once again trembling. One might just find oneself trembling when scared. One certainly does not tremble because one has a desire to. But trembling is still something one does. Unlike perspiring, it is voluntary in that it

is not wholly involuntary: one might, for instance, manage to stop. A whole range of
behaviour lies between reasoned actions and mere bodily happenings in this way. Not
only trembling, jumping, clapping, and face-covering, but smiling, frowning, twitching,
crying, laughing, staring, gaping, slumping, rocking, fist-clenching, and much more to
boot. On the one hand, there is something compulsive about much of this behaviour. It
besets us. In this it is akin to a mere causal effect of a physical or psychological state.
On the other hand, it is somewhat under our control. It is, to some extent at least, up to
us. In this it is akin to an action. One might, for instance, find oneself smiling and then
either choose to continue or choose to stop, especially if given a reason: ‘Wipe that
smirk off your face!’ But equally, one might not be able to stop: perhaps it is a nervous
smile, plastered to one’s face despite one’s best efforts. Even so, one at least knows how
to try to stop smiling, unlike perspiring. And indeed, the struggle to control such
behaviour can itself be perceptible: we can sometimes see a person, lips quivering and
eyes watering, doing everything possible not to cry. Alternatively, for one reason or
another, there may be no attempt to control the behaviour at all. Indeed, we are often not
even aware of behaving in these ways. So there is a range of behaviour which seems to
exhibit a blend, as I shall put it, of compulsion and control. This behaviour is what can
make for the manner of the action, or the manner of the body.

Whether or not Hursthouse has succeeded in showing that the standard account
of action is wanting will depend on whether or not we think this behaviour, on the one
hand voluntary, but on the other not done for a reason, counts as an action. But
regardless of this, we can now say what it is that makes a piece of behaviour expressive:
a piece of behaviour is expressive if it is of a type which paradigmatically exhibits a
blend of compulsion and control, and so lies between purely reasoned actions, and mere
bodily happenings. Of course, on any particular occasion, a token piece of expressive
behaviour may not be controlled at all. But it still counts as expressive because it is of a
type which can be controlled, even though, on this occasion, no such effort is made. So
in this, Hursthouse is right: expressive behaviour is neither something one does for a
reason, be that reason itself rational or not, nor something that merely happens to one, a
brute effect of one’s physical or psychological state.

I said at the start of this Section that it addressed a somewhat preliminary
question. The reason is simple. To say that expressive behaviour paradigmatically
exhibits a blend of compulsion and control is only to say which of the many types of
behaviour connected to states like emotions we think of as expressive. We still need to
understand why we think of this behaviour as expressive. Why do we intuitively feel

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expressive behaviour displays the emotion itself? That is the question which ultimately needs to be answered if emotions are to prove of any help to the conceptual problem of other minds. But some direction can perhaps be found if we reflect on what being ‘gripped by’ an emotion or an emotion ‘taking hold of’ one’s body might be. As I said, there is a sort of palpable phenomenology at stake here: something it is like to experience emotion which is essentially connected to bodily behaviour. That is, the experience of emotion seems to be, in part, a bodily experience. This may be what philosophers have in mind when they speak of ‘outward criteria’ capturing or being appropriate to ‘intrinsic character’ or ‘inner experience’. For instance, J.L. Austin has pointed out:

it is to be noted that the feeling is related in a unique sort of way to the display. When we are angry, we have an impulse, felt and/or acted on, to do actions of particular kinds, and, unless we suppress the anger, we do actually proceed to do them. There is a peculiar and intimate relationship between the emotion and the natural manner of venting it, with which, having been ourselves angry, we are acquainted. The ways in which anger is normally manifested are natural to anger just as there are tones naturally expressive of various emotions (indignation, &c.).

Rather little understanding is gained by using words like ‘unique’, ‘peculiar’, and ‘intimate’, or by italicising ‘natural’. To try to gain a little more, I want to examine, and indeed in large part defend, Williams James’s account of the emotions. For James is the philosopher who has taken the bodily nature of emotion most seriously.

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3.3 William James and the Body

The aim of this Section is to begin to try to understand whether or in what sense we conceive of emotions as bodily. For if we can understand this, it may be we can find our way towards accepting the observational model of psychological concepts, and so resolve the conceptual problem of other minds. But clearly, to try to understand whether or in what sense we conceive of emotions as bodily is to try to understand, at least to some extent, the nature of emotions. The extent to which I shall be attempting this is really very minimal. Let me begin by explaining why.

The problems confronting any attempt to produce an overarching philosophical account of the emotions are many. One is the lack of heterogeneity among the various emotions. Is it really credible that fear, an emotion we share with quite primitive animals, is the same type of psychological phenomenon as nostalgia, or contempt, say? If so, why? Another is a lack of heterogeneity even within a single type of emotion. If one encounters a wild animal on a hike, it is perfectly likely that, during the encounter and for some amount of time after the fact, one will be afraid. This is what we might call an occurrent, episodic state of fear. It begins and comes to an end in a discrete amount of time. For the duration of that time one’s psychological state is one of being afraid. Contrast this with the sort of fear a parent might experience during the course of the year in which leukemia is discovered and treated in her child. Many of the parent’s moods, decisions, thoughts, actions, and feelings will be explained by the fact that she is afraid for her child’s life. But this fear is nothing like an occurrent, episodic state of fear (although of course, the parent may also undergo many such episodes during the course of the year). She is certainly not in a state of being afraid throughout the year. Is it really credible that one’s experience when on a hike and the experience of such a parent are the same type of psychological phenomenon, i.e. fear? If so, why? Any philosophical account attempting to understand the nature of the emotions will need to address these problems of emotional diversity and complexity.37

William James hardly seems to recognise these problems, let alone to address them. For this reason, his account of the emotions, if treated quite generally, simply will not succeed. But the reason why he does not address these problems is quite obvious. James conceives of emotions only as occurrent, episodic states. His account is really an account of these states. Like James, I shall be concerned only with such states. For it is

37 See P. Goldie (2000) for a discussion of the emotions which is sensitive to these issues.
on such occasions that we express emotion: that we feel 'gripped' or 'taken hold of' by it. But I make no claim even to address all the issues arising about such states, let alone to address all the issues arising from the diversity and complexity of the emotions.

James also intends his account to cover occurent episodes of absolutely all types of emotions. Not only states of fear, nostalgia, and contempt, but religious, aesthetic, and in general any type of episodic state we might countenance as affective, however highly civilised or indeed however crude and basic, is supposed to fall within its purview. But I shall limit my concern. I shall discuss only those types of emotions which are, relatively speaking, crude and basic. These can be taken to include at least fear, anger, disgust or aversion, joy or happiness, upset or sadness or grief, and possibly too contempt, lust, shame or embarrassment, and jealousy or envy. There are problems enough in understanding episodes of these basic emotions, before we even begin to address the problems of emotional diversity and complexity. Indeed there is one problem which is really quite fundamental.

On the one hand, like beliefs and other propositional attitudes, basic emotions can be, although I think are not necessarily, intentional: they are about or directed towards an object. For instance, one is scared of the wild animal, or that it will attack. On the other hand, like pains and sensations in general, emotions are affective or felt. Believing that the wild animal is dangerous and will attack is not the same as fearing that it will. There is a phenomenology to one's fear that is not incidental to it being fear. Fear is in some paradigmatic sense affective – a feeling. But characteristically, propositional attitudes are intentional but not felt, while feelings, like pains and sensations in general, are felt but not intentional. The fundamental problem is how there can be a state which possesses both features. How can these features be reconciled or integrated with one another so that they make up a single state: being afraid of an animal?

I think it is fair to say that the standard philosophical response to this problem is avoidance. Some philosophers simply claim that emotions do indeed have these different features: emotions are both felt and intentional. Their thought is that it is in some sense primitively intelligible that there are 'hot cognitions' or 'feelings towards' or 'psychic affect'. Other philosophers claim that emotions consist in both cognitive

38 Or at least, if they are intentional, then what they are about is the condition of the body, nothing outside of it. For a discussion of the intentionality of body sensations see T. Crane (1998).
39 See e.g. P. Goldie (2000); M. Stocker (1983) and (1996).
and sensory states. No attempt is made to reconcile or integrate the two, or to explain why we should so much as have concepts of psychological states which consist of such disparate, independent components: emotions are conceded to be rag-bags. Other philosophers choose instead to identify an emotion with one or other of its features, leaving the other to the side. By far the most common of this sort of view is cognitive. The claim is that an emotion just is a cognitive state of sorts: a belief, judgement, perception or apprehension of an object, real or imagined, as in some way significant—threatening, insulting, disgusting, delightful, a loss, a boon, and so on. There is no doubt that many of our emotions are responsive to such properties of objects. The reason why one is afraid of the wild animal is that at some level, whether conscious or unconscious, rational or instinctive, one considers it dangerous. If this were in no way so, we should not know what to make of the idea that one was afraid of it. The cognitive view focuses on this aspect of emotion alone: a cognitive appreciation of the object as possessing such a property is itself the emotion. In what follows, I shall refer to this cognitive aspect of emotion as a ‘cognition’.

To some extent, James is no exception to the general rule of avoidance. He stands out simply because he is the sole philosopher who insists that an emotion be identified not with a cognition, but with a bodily feeling:

Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the PERCEPTION of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. Without the bodily states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colourless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might see the bear and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem it right to strike, but we could not actually feel angry and afraid.

James claims that what an emotion is is the feeling of ‘bodily changes’ and ‘bodily expression’ as these changes and expression occur. His argument for this claim is extremely simple:

If we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we

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40 See e.g. J. Oakley (1992); G. Pitcher (1965). Such theorists often claim that emotions consist of desires as well.
41 See R. Gordon (1974) and (1987); R. Solomon (1980). Such theorists often claim that an emotion is, more specifically, a belief or a judgement. This makes our emotional responses to imagination, fiction, fantasy and so forth problematic: not ‘real’ emotions. See K. Walton (1990).
42 See C. Taylor (1985b) for a discussion of this point.
43 W. James (1884) pp. 190-1 (emphasis in original). See also his (1890).
find we have nothing left behind, no "mind-stuff" out of which the emotion can be constituted, and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception is all that remains.\textsuperscript{44}

There are two points contained in this brief thought experiment. One point is that without the feeling of bodily symptoms, there is nothing emotional about a state at all: what makes a state count as an episode of emotion, as opposed to a simple cognition, is the presence of this feeling. Once again, it is perfectly possible to perceive a wild animal as threatening, or believe that it is dangerous, without feeling fear at all: witness the veteran game-warden. This point is correct and absolutely fundamental. It is why, for instance, any account that identifies an emotion with a pure cognition alone will not do: purely cognitive accounts of emotion simply are not accounts of emotion, for paradigmatically, in order for a state to be an emotion it must be felt or affective.

The second point is that the nature of this feeling or affect is bodily: emotions are 'fruits of the same soil with the grossest bodily sensations of pleasure and pain'.\textsuperscript{45} James claims that the body, not the mind, is the right sort of domain or medium for feeling: an emotion cannot be constituted out of 'mind-stuff'. James appears to view the idea that there might be 'mental affect' of some sort not as primitively intelligible, but rather as primitively unintelligible. Or at the very least, he views it as unintelligible with respect to us:

A purely disembodied human emotion is a nonentity. I do not say that it is a contradiction in the nature of things, or that pure spirits are necessarily condemned to cold intellectual life; but I say that for us, emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable.\textsuperscript{46}

James has been an object of much criticism if not derision because of his identification of emotions with bodily feelings. It has seemed clear to many philosophers that emotions cannot be bodily because they are psychological. How could a particular, located body sensation be an emotion?\textsuperscript{47} The intuition behind this rhetorical challenge seems to be that such a sensation cannot be intentional in the relevant way: it cannot be about an object. For instance, how could a sensation of dryness in the mouth which occurs when one is afraid itself be about the wild animal? No doubt this is one of

\textsuperscript{44} W. James (1884) p. 193.
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid. p. 201.
\textsuperscript{46} Ibid. p. 194 (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{47} See C. Armon-Jones (1991); R. de Souza (1987); R. Gordon (1987); K. Oakley (1992); G. Pitcher (1965). Michael Stocker for instance writes of emotions that: 'we feel as though they were in the soul itself', in contrast to bodily feelings, which 'we relate to our body or some of its parts' ((1996) p. 19). Stocker says nothing about the question as to where the soul 'in' which these feelings are felt is – if not in the body.
the motivations for positing the existence of mental feeling or affect: if the feeling or
affect in question is mental, then its intentionality, at least, is less problematic.

It is unquestionable that the intentionality of the basic emotions will be difficult
to account for if an emotion is nothing more than a particular, located sensation, or even
a set of such sensations. But it seems highly questionable that this is what James has in
mind. James describes the phenomenology of bodily feeling thus:

Our whole cubic capacity is sensibly alive; and each morsel of it contributes
its pulsations of feeling, dim or sharp, pleasant, painful, or dubious, to that
sense of personality that every one of us unfailingly carries with him.48

The feeling here is of one’s ‘whole cubic capacity’, that is, one’s body as a whole.
There is a distinction to be drawn between a particular, located sensation or a set of such
sensations, and an awareness of the way one’s body, as a whole, feels. Whether or not
James himself was perfectly clear about this distinction, we can nonetheless use it to
give a plausible account of the nature of emotional affect or feeling. Waiving for the
moment the problem of intentionality, this is one very strong theoretical reason to prefer
the Jamesian claim that emotional feeling is bodily to the claim that emotional feeling is
mental. Philosophers who posit the existence of mental affect rarely if ever provide any
account of what this might be. It is to be taken as primitively intelligible.49 In contrast,
we can use the understanding of body awareness I have developed in this thesis to
provide a plausible account of what bodily feeling or affect is. And this account has
both phenomenological and empirical support.

I have argued that one is aware of one’s body from the inside as generally
shaped and currently configured one way and not another, and so as occupying a certain
amount of space within a space larger than it. In this way, one is aware of one’s body as
located within space. Now, if we reflect on what the experience of being in the grip of
emotion is like, it is certainly intuitive that it is bodily. One immediately imagines
sensations like a pounding heart, a lump in the throat, a sinking feeling in the pit of the
stomach, a pang in the chest. These are indeed sensations which have particular
locations within one’s body: one’s heart, throat, stomach, chest. And no doubt often
enough it is such located sensations which are most prominent and palpable if one
attends to one’s body while emotional. But these sensations do not exhaust the sensory

48 W. James (1884) p. 192.
49 To my knowledge, the one exception is the adverbial account put forward in C. Armon-Jones (1991)
which is based on I. Thalberg (1980). I explain why this account does not succeed in H. Pickard (1997) ch.
4.
awareness of one's body one has. On the one hand, one's body as a whole may have an overall affective state. Feelings of the body when hungry, nauseous, energetic, fatigued, depressed, and so on, seem to encompass it: they fill or suffuse it, as opposed to being located at discrete places in or on it. Nonetheless, we can still make sense of the idea that these feelings are felt to be located. They are felt to be located in that they encompass a body which is itself felt to be located. On the other hand, there is also an awareness of the shape and configuration and movement of the body itself. This is not incidental to affective experience. Consider, for instance, the relevance of posture to an overall feeling of depression on the one hand, or buoyancy and energy on the other.\(^{50}\) Or the feeling of tension resulting from clenching the fists. Or the feeling of one's frame heaving with sobs. In these and similar cases, what is felt is quite literally a bodily configuration or type of movement. I shall return to this characterisation of bodily feeling below. The point for now is that the Jamesian claim that emotional feeling or affect is bodily is both theoretically and phenomenologically plausible. Emotional feeling or affect consists in an awareness of one's body as a whole from the inside: both its particular and more diffuse sensory happenings, together with its more physical or spatial configuration and movement of parts relative to each other. Importantly however, this claim is also empirically plausible: there is overwhelming empirical evidence that one's body undergoes such changes when emotional.

Thanks to the work of Charles Darwin and Paul Ekman, it is widely accepted that there is a phylogenetically given set of basic, pancultural human emotions, each with a distinctive physiology and physical expression: fear, anger, disgust or aversion, joy or happiness, upset or sadness or grief, surprise, and possibly too contempt, shame, guilt, embarrassment, and jealousy. Their distinctive bodily mode is called an 'affect programme': an automatic, co-ordinated response to an elicitor, involving distinctive facial and bodily expression and movement patterns, changes in voice tone and loudness, changes in hormone balance and level, and changes in the autonomic nervous system.\(^{51}\) Herein lies a very simple explanation of the manner of our bodies and actions when emotional. The reason why our bodies are gripped and taken hold of by the basic emotions is that we are phylogenetically endowed this way.

Now James himself never claims that each type of emotion is a type of bodily feeling. He claims only that a token episode of emotion is a token bodily feeling.

\(^{50}\) For a discussion of posture and affect see P. Bull (1987).

\(^{51}\) See C. Darwin (1998), edited by and including a Foreword and Afterword by P. Ekman. See also P. Ekman (1992) for a summary of his research; and P. Griffiths (1997) for a philosophical discussion of evolution and the emotions.
Indeed, he appears to think that individual differences in bodily changes and expression, together with the merging and blending together of the bodily changes and expression typically associated with different types of emotion, precludes any identification of types of emotions with types of bodily feeling. The type of emotion is determined by the type of its object:

every one of us, almost, has some personal idiosyncrasy of expression, laughing or sobbing differently from his neighbour, or reddening or growing pale where others do not. . . . The internal shadings of emotional feeling, moreover, merge endlessly into each other. Language has discriminated some of them, as hatred, antipathy, vengefulness, abhorrence, etc., etc.; but in the dictionaries of synonyms we find these feelings are distinguished more by their severally appropriate objective stimuli than by their conscious or subjective tone.

In short, any classification of the emotions is seen to be as true and as 'natural' as any other, if only it serves some purpose; and such a question as "What is the 'real' or 'typical' expression of anger, or fear?" is seen to have no objective meaning at all. 52

So James's own account is importantly different from the claim that each type of emotion is a type of bodily feeling. Part of why this matters is that, as I said, James intends his theory to cover not only tokens of basic emotion but tokens of all types of emotion. It seems somewhat implausible to think that there is one type of bodily feeling for religious awe, and another for devotion. But still, the existence of phylogenetic affect programmes does lend support to the basic Jamesian approach to emotional feeling and affect which I am endorsing. For it provides the sort of empirical underpinning which we should expect if basic emotions are on the one hand necessarily affective, and on other necessarily bodily in affect. For each type of basic emotion, there is, as a matter of empirical fact, a distinctive physiology and physical expression, which will correspond to a distinctive type of feeling. Of course, there are substantial differences between the elicitors of emotion, not only amongst individuals but across cultures too. Equally, there are substantial individual and cultural differences in the kind and degree of emotional expression, and action out of emotion, deemed appropriate. And the concepts people have of the basic emotions surely differ across cultures and history too. What remains the same is that for each type of basic emotion, there is a very schematic sort of elicitor of the emotion, and physiological and physical expression.

As I mentioned in Part I, Sidney Shoemaker claims that we might easily imagine that our natural, bodily expressions of emotion were radically altered: that we

52 W. James (1890) pp. 448, 454 (emphasis in original).
no longer blushed when ashamed and trembled when frightened, but trembled when ashamed and blushed when frightened, and so on throughout the gamut of emotions and their expressions. Shoemaker's claim needs qualification. We cannot so easily imagine altering all of the bodily changes associated with each type of basic emotion while leaving the emotion itself unchanged. How, for instance, could the adrenalin levels corresponding to fear and joy be switched? How could anger make us heave with sobs? It is no easier to imagine these switches than it is to imagine switching the sensations of pleasure and pain while holding their causes and effects constant. But certainly if we focus on some of the facial expressions of emotion it seems he must be right. Consider the difference between the shape of the mouth associated with pleasure, and the shape of the mouth associated with displeasure: it consists in little more than the direction in which the crescent points. How can a mouth pointing up be especially suitable for expressing pleasure, and a mouth pointing down especially suitable for expressing displeasure? It cannot be anything more than evolutionary happenstance which has made this so. This is in fact borne out if we look at our closest evolutionary cousins: humans often mistake the toothy grin of other primates for friendly pleasure, when really it expresses an angry threat. So it is a contingent empirical fact, and nothing more, that some of our natural and automatic types of expression correspond to the types of emotion they do. For this reason, Shoemaker has claimed that there cannot be a 'logical' or 'conceptual' connection between the emotions and their expressions.

It is not altogether clear what a logical or conceptual connection is supposed to be, and so not altogether clear whether this amounts to a denial of a Jamesian approach. But it can be conceded that there is no necessity to the pairing of some of our types of expression with types of emotion, and yet maintained that the bodily changes which are, as a matter of empirical fact, correlated with each type of basic emotion, have a constitutive role to play in those emotions. To be sure, if we had had a slightly different evolutionary history, we might be more like the other primates. Yet some such pairing can still be necessary if there are to be emotions at all. This, indeed, is all that James's argument, when applied to types of emotions as opposed to tokens of emotion, could possibly establish. A constitutive role for the body is part of our – no doubt human – concept of emotion.

The problem, however, is that the precise nature of this constitutive bodily involvement is ambiguous. James takes his argument to show that without any feeling

53 S. Shoemaker (1984a) and (1984b). See above Section 1.3.
of the bodily changes and expression as they occur, a state cannot count as an emotion: our concepts of the basic emotions are concepts not of cognitive, but of felt or affective states. And I have proposed that the way to account for this bodily feeling is to treat it as an awareness of one’s whole body from the inside. This proposal finds empirical support in the fact that our bodies are phylogenetically endowed with affect programmes: for each type of basic emotion, there is a type of physiological and physically expressive state which is associated with it. But it is entirely possible that such a bodily state can occur without the subject feeling anything much at all. One might be very poor at attending to one’s body and one’s feelings. Or one’s attention might be wholly occupied by the object of one’s emotion. Safe from the wild animal, one might breathe a sigh of relief, and realise that one had been too scared to feel scared: the whole conscious focus of one’s experience had been on getting to safety. James’s claim that an emotion is ‘the feeling of bodily changes as they occur’ seems an attempt to cement together two distinct things: the actual bodily changes and expression, and the awareness of them one may have from the inside. And indeed, he often drops any mention of feeling from his discussion of the role of the body in emotion: it is only ‘without the bodily changes following on the perception’, not without the feeling of the bodily changes following on the perception, that the perception would be devoid of emotional warmth.55

Now in one sense, it is perfectly correct to cement together the feeling of the bodily changes with the bodily changes themselves. The reason for this, as I have said, is that we need to appeal to many of these changes in order to properly characterise what the feeling in question is like. Consider for instance the feeling of a pounding heart, or the feeling of trembling all over, or the feeling of beaming a broad smile at a friend. Here it seems right that the feeling cannot be properly characterised without saying what it is of: a pounding heart, a trembling body, or a big smile. What one is aware of is literally an organ thumping in one’s chest, or the shaking of one’s entire body, or the broad curve of one’s mouth. And indeed, one might be aware of these changes otherwise than through body awareness. One might be aware of them through the outer senses: one might hear the thumping in one’s chest or feel it if one placed one’s hand over one’s heart, or see the shaking of one’s body by glancing down, or

55 W. James (1884) p. 191 and see the first quotation, p. 149 above. Indeed, James’s descriptions of the nature of the different emotions are often descriptions of the body itself, not of a bodily feeling: ‘Can one fancy the state of rage and picture no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dilation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse to vigorous action but in their stead limp muscles, calm breathing, and a placid face?’ ((1890) p. 452).
come to touch one’s mouth with one’s hand. This is not so for all of the bodily changes connected with emotion. Changes in hormone balance and level, and in the autonomic nervous system, will make for a phenomenological difference in how one feels, but they are not exactly what is felt. But with this caveat, it is correct that if one is aware of one’s body when emotional, that awareness will need to be characterised by appeal to the changes actually occurring in and to one’s body. The feeling is quite simply an awareness of one’s body from the inside as in the bodily state in question. This is important. For the bodily state which the subject herself is aware of from the inside, is the very same that others can be aware of through their outer senses. I shall return to this in the next Section. But the point for now is that this is not to say that one is necessarily aware of the bodily state in question each and every time it occurs. That the awareness must be characterised by appeal to the state of the body does not entail that this bodily state must be an object of awareness.

For this reason, the constitutive role for the body in emotion must be, at bottom, a role for the actual bodily state. What James’s thought experiment shows is that without any actual bodily changes and expression, a state cannot count as an emotion. James is correct that the feeling or experience of an emotion is a bodily feeling or experience. But one can sometimes be in a bodily state constituting an emotion without being aware of it. I think this is actually intuitively correct: it does not jar with our common-sense understanding of the basic emotions. I want to end this Section by explaining why, and also explaining why I think this account can adequately contend with the intentionality of emotions. In the following Section, I shall apply this account to the conceptual problem of other minds, and try to quiet any qualms about it that might remain.

Why does this account not jar with our common-sense understanding? The first point to make is that we should not exaggerate what we are required to concede. The account does not claim that emotions are not on the whole felt or experienced. It claims only that on occasion they may not be. No doubt as it happens one is aware of one’s body more often than not when emotional. The bodily state calls out for one’s attention. And even more, there is something right in the idea that it at least sets a sort of conscious tone, or forms a sort of backdrop, for one’s various other states and doings. Even if one is not oneself overtly aware of one’s body, it almost seems as if there is an unconscious consciousness of the body, which cannot simply be explained by the fact that one’s brain is continuously monitoring it. I do not want to insist that, in the end, we can make sense of such an idea. The point is only that to say we may not be aware of
our bodies when emotional, and so too of our emotions, is not to say that, on the whole, we are not.

The second point is that what the claim that emotions are at bottom bodily states does require us to concede seems to be perfectly intuitive. This is that one can have an emotion and yet lack awareness of it. This seems right. It is a common enough experience not to realise that one is emotional until it is pointed out by another. One is not aware of being angry or upset, say, until another asks one why one is feeling that way.\(^{56}\) The claim that a basic emotion is at bottom a bodily state can help to explain how this is possible. Sometimes one is simply not attending to one’s body – often, no doubt, because one is too focused on the cause or object of the emotion.

This brings us at last to the problem of intentionality. I said above that one of the reasons why James’s account has met with criticism is that it has seemed to many that a body sensation cannot be intentional. I hope that the force of this objection is diminished by the account of bodily feeling I have offered. It is not so implausible that the way one’s body as a whole feels might be, in some sense, intentional. But it is still the case that the basic elements available to account for whatever intentionality this feeling can have are the same. James himself says very little about this issue. We are told that the connection between ‘the perception of the exciting fact’, and ‘the feeling of the bodily changes as they occur’, is that the latter ‘follows directly’ the former. I think it is fair to read ‘follows directly’ as ‘is caused by’. So James’s overall picture is of an antecedent cognition causing a certain bodily state of which the subject herself is then aware. According to him, this awareness is the emotion itself. According to the account I have offered here, the bodily state which this awareness is of is at bottom the emotion itself. But how could either ever be thought to be intentional? How can the cognitive and the bodily components be adequately reconciled or integrated? I want to conclude this Section by suggesting two ways we might account for the intentionality of emotion. I hope this will be enough to establish that there at least no deep implausibility in the idea that a bodily feeling or state can be intentional.

One reason why James says so little about the intentionality of emotion is that he does not think that basic emotions are necessarily intentional. Note that James’s thought experiment does not actually establish his claim that an emotion is a bodily feeling. The most it establishes is that a bodily feeling is necessary if a state is to be an

\(^{56}\) Indeed even after one’s emotional state is pointed out, one may, on occasion and in the grip of what is undeniably an emotion, genuinely deny being in any such state. For discussion of this see J. Lambie and T. Marcel (draft).
emotion: the argument does not establish that it is also sufficient. But James does think it is sufficient. His basic reasons are two. First, he thinks the line between moods and emotions is sketchy at best, and moods clearly do not need to be intentional. Something might make one angry, and one might then stay in an angry or at least a disgruntled state, although one is no longer angry about anything in particular. Alternatively, the fact that one is in a happy mood might cause one to feel great joy over some small event which would normally warrant nothing more than a smile. Note that this blending of emotions and moods can be explained at least in part by the bodily nature of both these states. But be that as it may, the second reason why James thinks that a bodily feeling is sufficient for a state to be a basic emotion is that he thinks the cause or object of the bodily feeling can be unconscious or unknown, and so we often enough do not know why we are feeling what we are feeling.

It is this last point which is important. At least some of the time, we do not know why we are feeling what we are feeling. Certainly if one is confronted by a wild animal on a hike there is little difficulty. The animal is quite obviously both what has caused one to feel afraid, and what one is afraid of. But we are sometimes at a loss to know either what the precise cause or object of an emotion is. One might leave an encounter with a good friend knowing that one is feeling sad about the state of the friendship, but having not yet determined what in the conversation caused this feeling. Alternatively, one might run into an old flame after many years, but find to one’s surprise that one feels saddened as opposed to pleased by the chance encounter. Here one is sure that the cause of this feeling is the encounter, but it may take some time and thought to determine the reason why this has caused one to feel sad, and, in this way, to determine what the sadness is about. One might run through a number of different explanations, believing each true until the next one occurs. Meanwhile one feels sad. That much is certain.

What this shows is that the intentionality of emotion can be open. Understanding the reason why one is feeling as one is may require thought and interpretation. One might never quite be sure. Or one might be sure but mistaken. So just as we are not always aware of our emotions, so too we are not always aware of what our emotions are about. But if this is right, then the intentionality of emotion is fundamentally different from the intentionality of a cognitive state like a judgement, or

57 W. James (1890) p. 456 ff.
59 See C. Taylor (1985a) and (1985b) for a discussion of this process of articulation of emotion.
a belief. Certainly one can be unsure as to what to judge or believe. But if one has made a judgement, or simply has a belief, then one has authoritative knowledge about the content of that judgement or belief. There may be philosophical questions about how this is possible. But there is no question here for the subject. This is not so with respect to the emotions. There may be no question about how one is feeling, but there can be plenty of questions about why one is feeling this way or what this feeling is about.

Given that the intentionality of emotion can be open, I think a Jamesian approach can account for it perfectly well. So the first way that the antecedent cognition can be adequately reconciled or integrated with the bodily features of an emotion is this. Often enough it is perfectly evident to one that the reason why one is feeling a certain way is that the object of the cognition has caused one to feel this way. It is obvious that the reason why one is frightened is that there is wild animal on the path. Or perhaps it is actually obvious that the reason why seeing one’s old flame makes one sad is that one misses him. We can use this to explain the intentionality of emotions. One’s bodily feeling is intentional in so far as one understands perfectly well the reason why one is feeling as one is. The intentionality of emotion goes via the subject’s own understanding of her own emotions. This is the simplest way of explaining its openness: what makes an emotion intentional is that the subject who has it herself understands the reason why, and so an emotion will not be intentional if the subject herself lacks all understanding of the reason why. Certainly if this explanation is accepted, then emotions are not intentional in the same way that a belief, judgement, perception or apprehension of an object, real or imagined, is intentional. But then emotions are not beliefs, judgements or perceptions.

Note that this explanation does not require us to deny that a subject’s understanding of the reason why she is feeling as she is can be better or worse, right or wrong. The claim is not that the subject’s own understanding of this reason is constitutive of the actual reason why she is feeling as she is. The claim is only that the subject’s own understanding of this reason is constitutive of the intentionality of her emotion. If her understanding of this reason is in some way deluded, or even just incomplete, then her emotion has in a sense a false or partial intentionality. All we must deny is a certain explanation of this false or partial intentionality: we cannot say that in

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60 This is a worry which has concerned Charles Taylor: ‘The peculiarity of these emotions is that it is at one and the same time the case that our formulations are constitutive of the emotion, and that these formulations can be right or wrong. They do in a sense offer representations, but not of an independent object’ ((1985a) p. 101, emphasis in original). See also R. Moran (1988).
actual fact her emotion already was intentional, but that the subject then failed correctly to discern its intentional content.

However, I think that even if one is inclined to accept that this account of the intentionality of emotion is sometimes correct, one might not accept that it is always correct. For some emotions seem already to be intentional, prior to any reflection or understanding on the part of the subject. Perhaps this account is an acceptable explanation of one’s sadness upon seeing one’s old flame, but is it really feasible that, confronted by a wild animal on a hike, the intentionality of one’s state of fear depends on one’s own understanding of the reason why one is afraid? This seems a bit much. For instance, were one to claim, after a mad and panicked flight from the animal, that it was not really the animal one was afraid of but rather something deep from one’s childhood which it symbolised, we might think this false not simply because one has over-analysed the reason why one was afraid, but because what one was afraid of was the animal. No matter how one understands one’s fear or what one claims upon reflection, the truth of the matter is that one’s emotion was already intentional: about the animal. So how can a Jamesian approach account for what we might call the ‘evident’ intentionality of some emotions?

When the object of the emotion is actually present, then and there in the subject’s vicinity and an object of her thought or perception, I think it is possible that the bodily state constitutive of the emotion itself possesses all the ‘evident’ intentionality which is required. This is the second way we might account for the intentionality of emotion: the bodily or behavioural state itself is spatially oriented in relation to the object of the emotion. Most basically, the body may be withdrawing or approaching: directed towards or away from the object. But within these two basic modes, there is of course a variety of kinds of bodily engagement. So we can make sense of the evident intentionality of emotion extremely simply: by direct appeal to the evident orientation of the body itself. Of course, this is not a possible explanation of the intentionality of an emotion for which the object is only imagined, or exists in the distant past or far future. But in such cases, it is much more plausible that the explanation of the emotion’s intentionality can proceed via the subject’s own understanding of it.

No doubt these suggestions need to be discussed in more detail. What I hope to have shown is that it is not implausible that a Jamesian approach to the basic emotions

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can account for their intentionality: the charge that it plainly cannot is unwarranted. Given this, I conclude that our concepts of the basic emotions are concepts of bodily states which one can, although on occasion may not, have awareness of from the inside: this is what an emotion is. This may not be all that an emotion is. It may also be typical of episodes of emotion that certain sorts of beliefs and desires are entertained about the emotion's cause or object (perhaps especially of an arational sort), and certain sorts of actions undertaken. Indeed, I think it is quite clear that we need to understand more about the relationship between these various elements for our account to be satisfying and complete. I do however want to insist that the claim that our concepts of basic emotions are concepts of bodily states is fundamental. Without the bodily state which one can have awareness of from the inside, a state cannot count as an emotion.
Recall what is required to solve the conceptual problem of other minds. The problem arises because of a commitment to an ontological distinction between experience and behaviour: they are not at all the same type of thing. Hence in so far as some of our psychological concepts are concepts of types of conscious experience, they are concepts of a type of thing distinct from behaviour. To resolve this problem the ontological distinction must be rejected. One’s concepts of psychological states must be gleaned as much from one’s encounter with the psychological life of others as from one’s encounter with one’s own experience. That is to say that the behaviour of another which one observes must be as much an instance of a psychological state as the experience which one has oneself. The difficulty is then to understand how this could be possible. How can the experience which one has, and the behaviour of another which one observes, be ontologically on a par, in so far as both are equally and unambiguously instances of a psychological state? Where is the unity in our concepts of psychological states to come from?

Consider now the claim that our concepts of the basic emotions are concepts of bodily states. When the body instantiating such a state is one’s own, one can be aware of it from the inside and so have a feeling or experience of an emotion. When the body instantiating such a state is another’s, one can observe that state from the outside: one can observe another in an emotional state. There seems nothing problematic about this at all. The feeling or experience of an emotion which one has, and the behaviour of another which one observes, are instances of the very same type of thing: an emotion. We can explain the unity in our concepts of emotions by appeal to the fact that the very same thing which one can be aware of from the inside one can also observe in others: a bodily state. There is something in common between what one experiences and what one observes. Hence it seems perfectly intelligible that our concepts of the basic emotions are observational. These concepts are set to resolve the conceptual problem of other minds in a very simple way.

I think, however, that there may yet be intuitive qualms about this resolution. There are two different ways of objecting to this account of the basic emotions and the resolution it offers, although they are ultimately related. The first targets the claim that the basic emotions are bodily states. The basic intuition behind this objection is that what matters about the basic emotions, from the point of view of the subject, is not her bodily state but her feeling or experience of it. That on its own is what the emotion is.
Someone moved by this intuition could concede that the bodily state is itself necessary for there to be a state which is an emotion: for the bodily state is what the feeling or experience which is the emotion is of. What is being denied is that that bodily state itself could ever be the emotion. It is just a bodily state. In essence, this objection pushes the psychological aspect of emotion back inside of the body. For this reason the emotions of others will not be observable.

Note that this objection entails that one will always be aware of one’s emotions. For they are nothing more than one’s feelings or experiences: states of awareness. What one may not on occasion be aware of is only one’s bodily state. As I said, I think that this is not how we intuitively conceive of emotions. We are not always aware of our emotions. Re-iterating this point, however, will not on its own suffice to answer this objection.

The second objection does not deny the claim that the basic emotions are themselves bodily states. It concedes that this is so, and so too that we are sometimes not aware of our emotions. It rather objects to the way this claim is supposedly used to resolve the conceptual problem of other minds. Granting that our concepts of emotions are concepts of bodily states means that we can indeed understand what it would for another to be in an emotional state. What we still cannot understand is what it would be for another to be enjoying or suffering a feeling or experience of an emotional state. In essence, this objection claims that there is now all the difference in the world between an emotion, and a feeling or experience of an emotion. Even if emotions are bodily, feelings or experiences of emotions are not. So there will always be something of another’s psychological life which one cannot observe or have access to. The feeling or experience itself of an emotion remains inner and private, no matter how publicly observable the emotions themselves have become. Given this, we are just as unable to explain our right to possess our concepts of emotional feelings or experience, as opposed now to our concepts of emotions, as we ever were.

Both these objections try to drive a wedge between the feeling or experience of a bodily state, and the bodily state itself. They disagree only about what is and what is not an emotion. According to the first objection, only the feeling or experience itself is the emotion. According to the second objection, there are two distinct categories of emotions: feelings or experiences, and bodily states. If our concepts of emotions are to resolve the conceptual problem of other minds, we need to resist the driving of this wedge. Otherwise the feeling or experience of an emotion which one has, and the behaviour of another which one observes, will not be instances of the very same type of
thing: an emotion. They will rather be instances of two different kinds of thing: a feeling or experience, and a bodily state.

These objections are intuitive. But I think it is possible they can be met. To do so I shall take them in reverse order. The first thing to note is that there is something slightly duplicitous about the second objection. This objection grants that basic emotions are bodily states. So let us now grant that there is a difference between an emotion, thus understood, which is felt or experienced by the subject, and one which is not. In itself this is to grant no more than this: the former emotion is felt or experienced, and the latter emotion is not. The objection now wishes to press the point that this means there is all the difference in the world between them. We are supposed now to have two fundamentally different categories of emotions: emotions which are feelings and experiences, and emotions which are bodily states. But as it has been granted that a bodily state is an emotion, it is unclear why we should accept this. For whatever this difference is, it is nothing like the ontological distinction purported to exist between experience and behaviour. This difference lies within the category of psychological states. Indeed it lies within the category of emotions. If the second objection is to carry any weight, we need a reason to think that the concession that one may not be aware of some bodily states which are emotions results in the existence of two fundamentally different categories of emotions: feelings and experiences, and bodily states. But we have not as yet been given any such reason. Moreover, the fact that we are intuitively prepared to allow that the very same emotion which is not at present felt or experienced can come to be felt or experienced, in virtue of nothing more miraculous than a shift of attention, is a reason against treating this objection as credible. How could this be so if there are two fundamentally different categories of emotions: feelings and experiences, and bodily states?

But still, it might be thought there is something tight in the second objection. For it certainly is true that one will not be able to have access to another’s emotions in the same way she has. That is: one cannot oneself have her emotions. One cannot finagle one’s way into her head (and, perhaps we should now add, body) in order to have direct awareness of her awareness. So there is yet something to which one lacks access.

But in itself this is no objection to the resolution I have suggested to the conceptual problem of other minds. A resolution to the conceptual problem of other minds cannot demand an explanation of how one can have another’s psychological state. We cannot ask to be shown how to finagle one’s way into another’s head and
body, so that one somehow, despite the logical difficulties, has direct awareness of her awareness. The most we can ask to be shown is how one can have access to another’s psychological states without demanding the impossible: without oneself having those states. And if it is conceded that emotions are bodily states, that is indeed what the observational model achieves.

If this response to the second objection is apt, then it seems that the objection went wrong right at the start. It should have contested the claim that our concepts of basic emotions are concepts of bodily states. It should not have allowed that bodily states are psychological states. So we are left with the first objection. This objection claims that an emotion itself is only a feeling or experience, albeit of a bodily state. For how could a bodily state be a psychological state? This objection once again blocks the resolution to the conceptual problem of other minds which I have suggested. Certainly one can observe another’s bodily state. But that, it is now claimed, is not her emotion. Her emotion is the feeling or experience of that state, which is itself once again hidden from view.

I think the first response to make to this objection is that, at this stage, it cannot simply be stated as an obvious truth. On the one hand, the point of the last Section’s discussion of James was to try to establish whether or in what sense we conceive of emotions as bodily. And I concluded that our concepts of emotions are concepts of bodily states which can, although need not be, felt or experienced. So we now have some reason to think that whether or not a token bodily state in matter of fact is or is not felt or experienced is irrelevant to its status as an emotion. On the other hand, there are independent stakes in the truth of this claim: the help it promises with the conceptual problem of other minds. This gives us reason to try to find our way towards accepting it, even though this acceptance must not be forced. Moreover, I have now offered an explanation of how it could be that the very same thing which one feels or experiences oneself, one can also observe in others. What is in common between what is felt and experienced and what is observed is a bodily state: this can explain the unity of our concepts. So the rhetorical challenge – how could a bodily state be a psychological state? – does not on its own carry weight at this stage. If the claim that our concepts of emotions are concepts of bodily states is being contested, we are owed an explanation of the grounds of complaint.

Now as I said, I think the basic intuition behind this first objection is that what matters about the basic emotions, from the point of view of the subject, is not her bodily state itself but her feeling or experience of it. This is in effect a way of articulating a
commitment to the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour. Behaviour is just not what matters to the subject of conscious experience. It lies outside of that experience, in another, less significant, domain. If this is right, then one way to deflate the objection is to try to understand why the bodily state itself, and not just the subject's feeling or experience, matters to her. Only then will the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour loosen its grip.

In the rest of this Section, I shall try to put this final qualm to rest. I shall suggest two related reasons why the bodily states themselves matter to the subject. But it is important to see that these reasons are not themselves arguments for the truth of the claim that our concepts of emotions are concepts of bodily states. That, I hope, we have already. They are rather designed to help us accept without qualm what we already have reason to believe.

The first reason is both simple and obvious. The reason why the bodily state itself matters to the subject is that it is what she is feeling: it is itself the object of her feeling or experience. How could the bodily state itself not matter to her, given that the feeling or experience she is having is of the bodily state? We can allow that the first objection is correct that the subject's feeling or experience will itself matter to her. The point is that the nature of this feeling or experience is constituted by the nature of the bodily state it is of. And so it too matters. We can make this point side-ways on: from the point of view of philosophical theory. But we should not lose sight of the fact that it is also perfectly apparent to the subject.

Some emotions, like happiness, are a pleasure to be in. Some, like grief and upset, are not. Some emotions, like anger, can be either pleasurable or wretched: it depends on what one is angry about. In this, emotions are similar to sensations like pleasure and pain. And just as it is apparent to the subject that whether she has received a loving caress or a blow to the head is not incidental to the pleasurable or painful nature of her sensations, so too it is apparent to the subject that the bodily state she is in is not incidental to her emotional feeling or experience: that the pleasure of happiness, or the wretchedness of upset, is constituted by her bodily state. This is why, for instance, one might try to 'keep smiling' in order to stay happy, or one might try to control one's shakes and sobs, and calm one's breathing, in order to diminish one's upset. Of course, part of what is so nice when one is happy, and so awful when one is upset, is whatever it is one is happy or upset about. We need not deny this. But the nature of the feeling or experience of one's body when emotional is also of subjective
significance. And the nature of this feeling or experience is constituted by the nature of the bodily state felt or experienced.

The second reason is also simple, but perhaps slightly less obvious. The reason why the bodily state itself matters to the subject is that it allows her to communicate what she is feeling to others. To develop this idea, I want to look briefly at a proposal made by the developmental psychologist Esther Thelen. 62

Recall that our paradigm of expressive behaviour exhibits a blend of compulsion and control. This is the feature which marks out the behaviour which we intuitively find expressive. But control over compulsive emotional behaviour is not something we are born with. We come by it as we mature and develop. Some of the bodily changes which are part of our emotional endowment remain resolutely outside the scope of our will. Most of us cannot learn to control changes in hormone balance and level and the autonomic nervous system, nor any felt or visible effects which result. But most of us can learn to control, at least to some extent, some of the time, changes in facial and bodily configuration and movement, and also in voice tone and loudness. There is a developmental question as to how and why this happens. What good is gaining control over compulsive behaviour?

Thelen conducted a series of experiments designed to test how voluntary control of spontaneous motor behaviour is achieved in infants. Her proposal develops out of the solution to the degrees-of-freedom problem: the problem of how control of complex movements, like catching a ball, or even simply walking, is achieved so that the movement is a smooth success, and the different body parts do not get in the way of or inhibit each other's performance. The solution to this problem is that control is hierarchically distributed: it is not the case that every aspect of the movement is orchestrated by the brain. Instead, the brain sends out command functions to initiate and co-ordinate interactions between what are called co-ordinative structures: 'a unit of motor control which governs a group of muscles as it operates over one or more body joints'. 63 A co-ordinative structure is a single unit of movement, a sort of building block out of which larger, integrated movements can be built. In this way, co-ordinative structures serve to constrain the degrees of freedom of the movement. So for instance, if an obstacle is placed in the path of one arm but not the other, so that each has a task of

different difficulty, the behaviour of both limbs is affected: the limbs are designed to work in tandem, as a unit.

Infants not only have various primitive reflexes to specific stimuli, such as sucking or rooting. They also have such co-ordinative structures. Spontaneous leg kicks in infants are not random or thrashing, but consist of simultaneous, rapid flexions at hip, knee, and ankle. Furthermore, most kicking alternates evenly between legs, at a set, non-random, pace. This spontaneous movement is in fact highly structured. Thelen labels it rhythmical behaviour.

In the first six months, the most potent elicitor of rhythmical behaviour is general arousal or excitement – most often due to interaction with a person or an object. But as infants mature, they gain control of this behaviour and begin to use it, among other things, to communicate how they feel or what they want. Kicking caused by the pleasure of feeding comes to be used as a sign to continue or to stop the feeding: infants come to exploit available motor patterns to useful ends.

Thelen is interested in how the control over the motor pattern which such exploitation demands is achieved. To test this, she performed what she called the mobile conjugate-reinforcement experiment. Three-month-old infants were placed on their backs with a moving mobile above them. One group of infants had a ribbon tied to their leg and attached to the mobile. The other group had no such ribbon, but a hidden adult had a ribbon attached to the mobile which she tugged, causing the mobile to jiggle at about the rate it would if tied to a kicking infant’s leg. The infants’ kicking behaviour was then examined. In both groups, the kick itself remained stable and unchanged: the timing and structure of a particular kick and the co-ordination between legs was constant. What varied was the kick rate and force. As infants grew excited, they kicked more frequently. But the infants whose kicking controlled the mobile also kicked with slightly more amplitude. Thelen concludes that what can vary in this kicking is not the kick itself – the co-ordinative structure – but the frequency of the kicks and the force with which they are executed. Hence what the infant can learn to bring under its control is when to kick, and with how much intensity.

Thelen’s proposal is that a similar developmental route governs infant control of emotional expression. Ekman, Friesen and Oster have identified about 50 anatomically based, discrete action units, which make up the minimally distinguishable actions of the facial muscles.64 Most human facial expressions of emotion use a

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64 P. Ekman and W.V. Friesen (1976); P. Ekman and H. Oster (1977).
combination of these movements, but by no means all possible combinations are put to use. Infants possess all these action units, and use them in appropriate expressive combinations. Consider, for instance, the development of the smile. Early smiles occur in sleep and non-alert states following feeding. The first visually-elicited smiles are caused by simply patterned stimuli, and only later become more specifically associated with social stimuli. But whatever the stimuli of early smiles, they are reinforced by carers, and so provide infants with positive feedback, like the movement of the mobile in response to their kicks. Infants have something to gain in learning to control their smiles: to initiate or intensify them in response to persons, objects, and events they like, and to keep them off their faces in response to persons, objects, and events they don’t. So although the form of the smile, as a piece of behaviour, is present from an early stage onwards, infants come to gain control over the initiation and intensity of their smiles, just as over their kicks. And once this control is gained, they can use smiles to communicate.

Hence the good of gaining control over the natural and automatic behaviour which besets us is just this: it makes that behaviour into a communicative resource. Expressive behaviour is the most basic language we have.

Recall the fact that helps to generate the epistemological problem of other minds: the possible discrepancy between what a person’s behaviour seems to reveal about her experience, and what her experience in fact is. When the revealing behaviour appears to be of the natural and automatic type, the existence of a discrepancy is only possible because this is a type of behaviour over which we have some control. For instance, one might initiate an expression: put a stern or angry look on one’s face in order to discipline a child. Or again, one might completely stifle an expression: suppress any glimmer of pain in order that she not see one suffer. Now when one uses one’s body in these ways, one’s observable behaviour is not expressive. It is not expressive because there is nothing compulsive about it. It is fully intentional: one behaves as one does wholly in order to cause one’s child to form a certain belief about one’s occurent psychological state. It is almost as if one said ‘I am seriously angry with you now’ or ‘I am feeling fine, not to worry’. One exploits the fact that normally, when one is feeling

Note that it is not the discrepancy between behaviour and the facts of a person’s experience that makes her behaviour not expressive, but the intentional nature of it. Consider the case of Ian Waterman, whom I discussed in Part II. One of the results of Waterman’s neuropathy is that his body no longer naturally and automatically moves at all. Although his hormone level and autonomic nervous system are still affected by his emotions, his body (although not his face) is utterly lacking in expression. But he has developed a limited repertoire of set gestures which he uses to try to make his communication with others more normal: any action costs him great effort, but he thinks it is worthwhile purposefully to add gestures to his speech to complement what he is saying. These gestures are true to his experience. They are in no way intended to be
angry or feeling fine one's body naturally and automatically behaves in a certain way, by wilfully making one's body behave as it would were one feeling angry or feeling fine in order to appear that way to another. The point is that this simply would not be possible unless the natural and automatic behaviour in question was subject to our control. The use of this behaviour to communicate, whether in deception or in truth, depends on the ability to stifle, initiate, soften and intensify it. In this, we are all just like the infant who has managed to gain control over its kicks and smiles. 66

So consider now behaviour that, unlike fully intentional behaviour, is genuinely expressive: behaviour which is compulsive, but of a type under our control. And consider it occurring within a potentially communicative context: in the presence of others. So imagine, for instance, feeling delighted when a child presents one with a gift of a scribbled drawing. One naturally and automatically smiles, exclaims, and shows one's joy, but one might exaggerate one's behaviour somewhat, to be sure that the child appreciates it. Or imagine finding oneself getting worked up into that all too familiar state of anger or contempt. One's body stiffens and a haughty, surly look begins to form, but one quickly softens it somewhat: he shouldn't get away with the remark entirely, but neither will anything be gained by allowing oneself to make too big a deal of it. Or imagine finding oneself overcome with upset in the company of another, and simply resigning oneself to the fact that she is to see one's emotional state. One does nothing about it but let the bodily behaviour run its course. Perhaps it serves her right: her act of betrayal is after all its cause. In such contexts, one uses one's natural and automatic bodily behaviour to communicate with others. But what one communicates in this way is twofold. On the one hand, this communication is to do with the object in question: what caused one to feel as one does or what one's feeling is about. What one uses one's bodily behaviour to mean is 'That is a nice drawing and a nice thing to do' or 'That remark is unacceptable' or 'That action is a betrayal'. So part of what one can communicate with one's natural and automatic bodily behaviour is that an object has a certain property. But this is not all. One can also communicate how one is feeling. So on the other hand, this communication is to do with oneself: one's occurrent emotional state. What one uses one's bodily behaviour to mean is 'I am delighted' or 'I am angry'

deceptive or misleading. But they are not expressive of his meaning. For they are wholly intentional: there is nothing compulsive about them at all. See J. Cole and J. Paillard (1995) pp. 259-60.

Note that we can now give a definition of what naturally expressive behaviour is in Gricean terms: a piece of behaviour is naturally expressive if it is of a type which can be used by the subject to non-naturally mean something even though on this occasion it naturally means something. See P. Grice (1989a) and (1989b).
or 'I am overwrought with grief'. It is as if one can quite literally say with one’s body: ‘This is what I’m feeling’.

But in communicating about one’s emotions in this way, it does not seem that one conceives of one’s own expressive behaviour as a mere bodily state, something other and ontologically distinct from the psychological states which are one’s emotions. It rather seems as if one conceives of one’s own emotions as wholly manifest or displayed in one’s expressive behaviour. They are right there in full view of another. This is how one communicates them. One shows another how one is feeling by quite literally showing her what one is feeling: one’s bodily state. Any intuition that one’s emotional state itself is really something other than the bodily state, something hidden behind it, simply disappears when one considers oneself within a communicative context.

This can explain why we find behaviour which exhibits a blend of compulsion and control to be most expressive of emotion. For one might have wondered why, if it is conceded that a basic emotion can just be a bodily state, it should matter whether or not that state is subject to our control. Why do we not intuitively think that the emotion itself is as perceptible in perspiration as in trembling? The explanation we can now give is this. What helps us to understand why we conceive of emotions as bodily states is to understand why these bodily states matter to the subject herself. And one reason why they matter is that she can put them to communicative use. It is not only that her body, like it or not, shows how she is feeling. She shows how she is feeling by using her body. But that is only possible if the subject has some control, however minimal, over the type of bodily state in question: it cannot be purely involuntary. So in a sense, the very same fact that makes for a possible discrepancy between experience and behaviour and so grounds the intuition that there is an ontological distinction also grounds the opposite intuition: that there is no distinction between them at all.

The bodily states themselves, and not only the subject’s feeling or experience of them, matter to her for two reasons. On the one hand, they are what is felt or experienced and so constitutive of the nature of her feeling or experience: her feeling or experience would not be what it is were it not for her bodily state. On the other hand, because they are what is felt or experienced they can be used by the subject to communicate to another the nature of her feeling or experience: to show what is felt or experienced. So the bodily states matter because they are what is felt and what is observed. In this way, they point in two directions at once: towards the subject herself and towards the others in whose presence she is.
I hope that this has put to rest all remaining qualms. We do not conceive of our own emotions as hidden behind the bodily states which we feel or experience. We conceive of our own emotions as bodily states which we feel or experience. So the concession that some bodily states may not be felt or experienced neither does nor needs to drive a wedge between the feeling and experience of other bodily states, and those states themselves.

I want to conclude this Section by returning once more to the conceptual problem of other minds, and clarifying what exactly the solution to it that I am proposing entails. Recall that to resolve the problem we need to understand how our psychological concepts can be observational. How can the behaviour of another which one observes be as much an instance of a psychological state as the experience which one has? But now it appears that one conceives of one’s own emotions as bodily states which are felt or experienced by oneself, and observable by others. From one’s own point of view, there is no ontological distinction between one’s experience and one’s behaviour with respect to the basic emotions: no wedge has been driven. We can explain this unity by appeal to the fact that the very same thing which one can be aware of from the inside can also be observed by others: a bodily state. And given this, there is no difficulty at all in the idea that the feeling or experience of an emotion which one has, and the behaviour of another which one observes, are instances of the very same type of thing: an emotion. When one observes the expressive behaviour of others, what one observes is their emotions, just as when others observe one’s own expressive behaviour, what they observe is one’s own emotions. An observational model of our concepts of basic emotions is perfectly intelligible.

Of course, not all token emotions are observable. Sometimes one can manage to suppress and control all observable aspects of one’s bodily state. Now if there is to be a suppressed or controlled emotion, there must be a bodily state to be suppressed or controlled. But with this caveat in mind, it is of course perfectly possible to hide one’s feelings from another. One’s emotion can be kept wholly inside. Yet this is not a difficulty for the observational model of psychological concepts. The model must claim only that our concepts of psychological states are concepts of states which can be either experienced or observed. It need not claim that every token psychological state is both experienced and observable (let alone observed). It is enough that psychological states are in principle observable. So the very same type of thing which one can manage to keep to oneself on one occasion can be perfectly observable on another: one can
suppress an emotion or one can let it all hang out, as we say. Indeed any particular token of emotion may be either, neither, or both experienced and observed.

This affects how the observational model should treat the so-called disjunctive conception of behaviour. An observational model, as I said, will need to adopt a version of sorts of the disjunctive conception. For it will need to distinguish between real, pretend, and suppressed anger, say. The way it can do this is relatively simple. Real anger just is a bodily state and so itself observable. The point here is that in contrast to McDowell’s version of the disjunctive conception of behaviour, what is observable is a psychological state, not a piece of behaviour which falls into the veridical category because of its relationship to an inner or private psychological state. Pretend anger, on the other hand, can simply be a type of bodily state which is not a psychological state: a type of bodily state which is intended physically to appear like the psychological state of anger. The observational model need not claim that all observable types of bodily states are types of psychological states, any more than it need claim that all tokens of bodily states which are types of psychological states are observable. A bodily state which is pretending to be anger is therefore not an instance of the psychological state of anger, even though it does appear to be. Meanwhile a bodily state which is suppressed anger is an instance of the psychological state of anger, even though it does not appear to be.

This, in turn, affects the relevance of an observational model of psychological concepts to the epistemological problem of other minds. Recall that the epistemological problem asks how one can know, or how one can be justified in believing that, another has a mind at all. I think it is natural to want to answer this question simply by saying: one can know, or be justified in believing, that another has a mind because one can observe that she does. The observational model in a sense allows us this answer: one can observe the psychological states of others. But the worth of this answer will yet depend on how one can know, or be justified in believing, anything about the external world on the grounds of perception at all. That is, adopting the observational model means that there is no particular epistemological problem about other minds, but there is still an epistemological problem. To see this, let us compare what one can encounter of the life of another to what one can encounter of barns. One can perceive real barns, and just so one can perceive real states of anger. One can perceive barn facades, and just so one can perceive a bodily state intended to look like anger: pretend anger. One can perceive something which is a barn but which one would never take to be a barn if going by appearances, and just so one can perceive suppressed anger. And finally one
can have an illusion of perceiving a barn, and so one can have an illusion of perceiving another in anger. One may not be able to tell, on any particular occasion, which of these options obtains with respect to barns or anger. As I said when discussing the criterial model, there is a general question about the relevance of this point to one’s ability to know or be justified in believing that something is a barn or an angry person. Any observational solution to the epistemological problem of other minds will depend on the answer to this question.

I want finally to address what may seem like a curious, although not necessarily pernicious, feature of the proposal I have made. I have suggested throughout this discussion that one’s concepts of psychological states must be gleaned as much from one’s encounter with the psychological life of others as from one’s encounter with one’s own experience. But the proposal I have made may seem at odds with this thought. For it depends on the idea that it is both intuitive and intelligible that in one’s own case, one conceives of one’s own bodily states as simply being one’s emotion. With this understanding in hand, it seems one can then turn to the case of others and ascribe emotions to them based on the similarity between their bodily states and one’s own. So how does this count as gleaning one’s concepts of emotions from one’s encounters with the psychological life of others?

At this stage, I think it is important to distinguish the question of how one acquires concepts of emotion, from what those concepts are concepts of. What was needed was to understand how there could be no ontological distinction between what one experiences oneself and what one observes in others: how both can be equally and unambiguously instances of the very same type of psychological state, and in this sense ontologically on a par. In a sense the proposal I have made depends in part on a turning of the tables: it depends in part on conceiving of oneself as the other who is observed. So from a philosophical point of view, the idea that one gleans one’s concepts of emotions from one’s encounters with the psychological life of others has not wholly been flouted. One is oneself an other to others. That is what a communicative context brings to the fore. But this is compatible with the thought that, from a developmental point of view, it is perfectly possible – in fact, it is overwhelmingly probable – that one’s actual acquisition of emotion concepts as a child depends as much on one’s attunement to real others and their bodily states as it does on one’s attunement to oneself and one’s own bodily states.

Consider for instance the phenomenon known as social referencing, which normally begins when the infant reaches nine months. At this stage, when confronted
with a novel object, infants begin to scrutinise the expressions of their carers. They want to know whether an object they perceive is dangerous or fun, for instance: as they move towards it they look to see whether their carers show encouragement or alarm. In effect, infants use the knowledge they have of their carers' emotional expressions to learn about the world. But the structure of this capacity suggests it could just as easily be turned around: if infants know that an object is dangerous or fun, they can turn to their carers to learn about what emotional expressions the object provokes. Of course, they can also learn this by monitoring their own natural and automatic reactions. But they will learn more by observing their carers. After all, their carers have already learned to express their emotions according to the norms of the culture, and the infants are only beginning this learning process.

This suggestion is mere speculative psychology, nothing more. It is relevant only in that it serves to bring out that how one acquires a concept is just a different question from what the concept is a concept of. I have tried to argue that our concepts of emotions are concepts of bodily states which can be felt or experienced. For this reason, our concepts of emotions are concepts of states which can also be observed. There is nothing problematic in conceiving of the bodily feeling or experience one has oneself, and the bodily state one observes in others, as the very same thing: an emotion. There is nothing problematic about this, as soon as it is made apparent that, and intelligible why, one conceives of others as observing the emotions one has. So the observational model, at least with respect to the basic emotions, is not forced upon us only out of philosophical need.

67 See e.g. P.M. Cole (1985) for a discussion of social referencing. G. Zivin, ed. (1985) is a collection of articles containing information about the developmental issues raised in this Section.
3.5 Extending the Solution

The solution I have proposed to the conceptual problem of other minds stems from considering the basic emotions and trying to make a convincing case for the claim that our concepts of them are observational. There is a question as to how this can be extended to cover other psychological concepts and the concept of a psychological life or experience in general: how far can the observational model of basic emotions and the solution it offers be pushed?

One way to extend the solution is to point out that expressive behaviour can be what we might call 'top-down' as opposed to 'bottom-up'. The expressive behaviour I have so far considered results from the fact that human beings are phylogenetically endowed with a set of basic affect programmes over which they can come to have some control. But human beings also grow up to learn forms of expressive behaviour which are cultural, or indeed individual, in origin. And once learned, this behaviour can be as compulsory, and in this sense as automatic, as the behaviour with which we are phylogenetically endowed. Consider, for instance, the use of the eyebrows to convey cognitive states in Western cultures: fully raised expresses disbelief, and half lowered expresses puzzlement. Or consider a footballer’s punch in the air and run through the field after scoring a goal. Or a woman’s nervous and attractive flick of the hair. Or the swagger of the adolescent. A type of behaviour or gesture which was perhaps once a deliberate, stylised manner of communicating or behaving can become second nature, as we say. With time and habit, it grows to be as spontaneous as an infant’s smile of pleasure. So just as growing up in a culture, and coming to have a sense of oneself as an individual, is part of what teaches one when, and how much, to express one’s phylogenetically given emotional behaviour, so too it is part of what provides one with a more expanded, nuanced, repertoire of expressive behaviour.

Linguistic utterances can also on occasion be expressive. Consider the way a child who has been looking forward to a day’s outing at the beach might wake and greet the sunny weather with a joyous exclamation: ‘Sun!’ Such a linguistic utterance is in a sense compulsive: it is wrung from her lips. Adults often use expletives in this way.

69 ‘All human activities are to a greater or lesser degree performed in a certain style or manner, which is always taken to be a partly natural and partly conventional expression of the thought and impulses which accompany them’ (S. Hampshire (1959) p. 78). Growing up in a culture is also part of what teaches one what and how much it is appropriate to feel, not only when and how to express what one feels. See M. Burnyeat (1980); J. McDowell (1994).
So one way in which the observational model and the solution it offers can be extended is via an extension of the behaviour which is expressive: which exhibits a blend of cultural or individual, if not phylogenetic, compulsion and control.

Another way to extend the solution is this. When we come to consider psychological states which we do not think of as naturally expressed in behaviour, we should yet consider them within a communicative context. When I first introduced the conceptual problem of other minds I used the concept of pain as an example. The reason why pain is such a compelling example is that it seems what is significant about pain from the point of view of the person having the experience is not how it is expressed in behaviour, but how it feels. Pain does have a natural and automatic behavioural expression, over which we can indeed gain some control. But that seems somewhat beside the point when one imagines being in pain: what matters is really just how awful and wretched the sensation is. Of course when in pain attention and sympathy is always nice to have. But if the pain is real one would gladly trade it all for relief.

One of the reasons why the basic emotions are more amenable to an observational model of psychological concepts is that sometimes what matters most from the point of view of the person having an emotion is communicating it. Sometimes only telling another how one is feeling will make one feel better. Or again, sometimes one can want nothing more than to hide one’s feeling from another: some people always manage to make things worse. Or sometimes one might just want to share one’s feelings with another in order that they share in one’s pleasure or suffering. Sharing emotions is in itself a human desire, and sometimes a good. And of course, from an evolutionary point of view communicating emotions is beneficial: a way to learn about the threats and boons of the environment from conspecifics. But the general point is just that communicating our emotions matters to us a great deal: the emotions are inherently and deeply social.

But we can construct contexts where the communication of other sorts of psychological states matters just as much. And in such contexts, the intuition that the psychological state to be communicated is something other than what is observable may disappear.

Consider for instance our concept of visual experience: imagine a situation in which one is trying to get someone to look at something without telling her where to look – perhaps one is at a lecture and so cannot easily speak aloud. To get her to look at the right place, one is likely first to get her attention, and then oneself to look at that place: looking there is what one does in order to communicate to her where one wishes
her to look. Now it is certainly the case that human beings naturally follow each other's gaze – it is possible that someone else just will follow one's gaze no matter what one does or intends. But this fact does not suffice to explain why one looks at a place in order to get her to look at the place. One looks at the place oneself in order to show her where one wishes her to look. It is almost as if one said to her: 'Look where I'm looking'. But if this is right, it seems that one conceives of one's own experience of looking at the place as itself observable: she can see that one is looking over there, and in this way she can come to know where to look. Similarly, if one's partner asks what one is thinking, and one not only reports what one was thinking but helpfully continues one's train of thought aloud, he hears what one is thinking: one was thinking to oneself, but one is now thinking aloud. Or if it really matters to communicate one's pain to another – perhaps he is standing on one's foot and so the cause of it – one may well conceive of one's behaviour as manifesting or displaying one's pain. One expects him just to see that one is in pain and so to stop standing on one's foot.

So another way in which the solution I have proposed can be extended is by considering our concepts of psychological states within communicative contexts. In such contexts, it seems intuitive that we conceive of many of our own psychological states as observable. It is true that we still need an explanation of how what one experiences oneself, and what is observable to another, could be the very same type of thing. Where is the unity in our concepts to come from? For unlike the basic emotions, these psychological states are not feelings or experiences of bodily states. But perhaps we can see in outline how these explanations might go. What we need is to find something neutral or in common between what is experienced and what is observed. With respect to our concept of visual experience, we might focus on making intelligible the idea that one conceives of the visual experience one has not as the upshot, but as itself a part, of the process of directing and orienting one's eyes. With respect to our concept of thinking, we might suggest that fundamentally thinking is something like 'intelligent manipulation of symbols'. This may then occur in one's head, aloud, or even with pen and paper. But in any event, perhaps at this stage it is enough to point out that there is nothing counter-intuitive about the claim that, within communicative contexts, we seem to conceive of many of our psychological concepts as conforming to the observational model, even if we cannot further explain why.

70 There is an anecdote of E.E. Maccoby’s about a four-year-old child who injured himself but afterwards told his mother he didn’t cry because ‘I didn’t know you were home!’ ((1980) p. 178). M. Lewis and L. Michalson (1985) report evidence that children as young as 18 months wait to cry in pain until in the presence of adults. See also P. M Cole (1985).
But once again, an inclination to protest may be mounting. For one might concede that we can observe another looking at an object, but yet claim that there is something we cannot observe: her visual experience itself. This is true: one cannot have or oneself directly experience her visual experience itself. But nor is this logically possible or indeed required for the resolution of the problem.

Still, the protest might continue. Perhaps one can observe another looking at an object. But one cannot observe her looking at an object and seeing it as red, say. The most one can observe is her looking at an object which is red, and which one sees as red oneself. And so there are some concepts of visual states which the observational model cannot cover: concepts like ‘seeing an object as red’.

I think that this must be conceded. But it is not obviously such a troubling concession. For it seems perfectly reasonable that, once one has a general concept of visual experience which one can significantly ascribe to oneself and to others, one is entitled to use one’s own experience as a way of further demarcating quite specific kinds of visual experience. At this stage, one can glean one’s concepts of colours from one’s own experience of colours. We might think something similar is the case with pain. Once one has a general concept of pain which one can significantly ascribe to oneself and to others, one is entitled to use one’s own experience as a way of further demarcating quite specific kinds of pain: bad pain, for instance, or pain which is stabbing or dull. So once one has a range of observational psychological concepts, it is credible that one could make more refined divisions of type based on one’s own case alone.

We might further suggest that once one has a range of observational psychological concepts, together with the concept of a subject of psychological states, one can fashion psychological concepts which are generally applicable but non-observational, based on one’s own case alone. The reason is that one has already gained one’s right to the concept of a subject of psychological states. One question about this suggestion is what this conception of a subject might be. I shall return to this briefly in the Conclusion.

Finally, I think it is also credible that, using this range of observational psychological concepts, one can imaginatively abstract a quite general concept of a psychological life or experience, which is in principle applicable to objects radically

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different from us. Not everyone has agreed with this. I want to end this Section by explaining why I think it is so.

Thomas Nagel is famous for claiming that, using our powers of imagination and abstraction, we can come by a very general concept of a psychological life or experience.\(^{72}\) We can apply this concept to creatures as unlike us as bats, in that we can understand, minimally, that there is something it is like to be a bat even if we cannot begin to fathom what this something is. And we can even apply this concept to creatures more unlike us than bats. We can imagine the existence of a species so unlike us that we cannot recognise them as having a psychological life or experience at all, and yet we can understand the proposition that they might: we understand, in some minimal sense, what it would be for them to have experience, even if we cannot tell whether or not they do. To us, they are no different from stones or the sky.

Now I think it is possible to believe that a commitment to the observational model of psychological concepts or something similar in kind is incompatible with Nagel’s claim. Anita Avramides, for instance, claims that if we have solved the conceptual problem of other minds, then our concept of mind: ‘reaches its limits . . . at the point where behaviour is [no] longer comprehensible to us. Rocks . . . do not have experience’.\(^{73}\) Now Avramides does not explicitly embrace the observational model. Indeed she appears to embrace something more like the behavioural-constraint model which I discussed above.\(^{74}\) Nonetheless her concern may be thought to apply to the observational model as well. If our concepts of psychological states are concepts of states which can be bodily, or which are some way or other linked to behaviour, how can these concepts apply to creatures if we acknowledge that their bodies and behaviour are unintelligible to us? In order for our concepts of psychological states to have any purchase, we need some way or other to be able to recognise a creature as having a psychological life or experience via its behaviour. Certainly we can do that in creatures like us: other humans and higher mammals. And perhaps we can even understand that there is something it is like to be a bat. But if we cannot make head or tail of a creature’s body, we cannot so much as understand what it would be for that creature to have a psychological life or experience. We cannot apply our general concept to a stone or to the sky.

\(^{72}\) See T. Nagel (1979) and (1986).
\(^{74}\) Ibid. p. 268 ff.
What is right about this thought is that any general concept of a psychological life or experience which we come by will be imaginatively abstracted from our own, parochial concepts of types of psychological states. These concepts, together with the nature of our capacity for imaginative abstraction, will limit what this general concept can ever be: they are prior to it. But that is not to say that we cannot understand such a general concept applying to creatures radically unlike us in body and behaviour. Our understanding is not so limited by what we can and cannot verify.

To claim that our concepts of psychological states are observational is to claim that these concepts are of types of states which can be either experienced or observed. But as I have insisted, a token psychological state may not be observable. The point is that such a token is of a type of state that can be observed: the very same type of state not observed on this occasion can be observed on another. That is all that is required to resolve the conceptual problem of other minds.

Now if we imagine a species of creature whose psychological states are never observable – neither to us, nor let us say to its conspecifics – then we cannot tell which if any of our concepts of psychological states apply to it, and perhaps these creatures could never themselves come by psychological concepts of their own at all. But we can still understand what it would be for these creatures to have a psychological life or experience. Insofar as we can fashion a general concept of a psychological life or experience from our own parochial concepts of our own psychological states, we can understand the proposition that these creatures fall under this concept. We may be right or we may be wrong: that will depend on what this general concept of ours actually amounts to, and what their psychological life or experience in fact is like, if indeed it exists. And it may well be we could never know either way. But given that our general concept will be of a general state which can be either experienced or observed, we can understand what it would be for this concept to apply to these creatures. This is not so different from understanding what it would be for a human paralysed from head to foot to have a psychological life or experience: what the rest of us both keep inside and express in behaviour, these creatures and this human are doomed forever to keep to themselves.

So for all these reasons, I think the solution I have proposed to the conceptual problem of other minds can be adequately extended. Our basic understanding of ourselves and others as subjects of conscious experience is as subjects of emotions. But once this understanding is gleaned, the whole range of human psychological concepts,
together with a more abstract conception of a psychological life or experience in
general, come ready enough to hand.
3.6 Body Awareness and Emotions

I wish to conclude this Part by making explicit the three related roles for body awareness that emerge from my discussion of emotions and other minds.

The first is to be found in the feeling or experience of emotions. Body awareness allows us to provide a plausible account of emotional affect. The feeling or experience of an emotion just is the awareness one has of one's body as a whole from the inside. And this, of course, is part of why it is intelligible that we conceive of emotions as observable: what one is aware of from the inside another can perfectly well observe.

The second is to be found in the capacity to communicate with others using body language: without body awareness, one could not communicate in this way at all.

It is possible for an animal to learn to suppress or initiate an instinctive bodily reaction if it is given enough motivation. For instance, an animal might learn to stifle a cry of pain if this had the effect of shortening a beating. Certainly such an animal has control over its instinctive behaviour. It manages not to cry out in pain. But the control which we have over our bodies is of a different order. Consider again trying to suppress any glimmer of pain in front of one's child: what one is trying to do is compose one's face into a look of placid repose in order to hide one's suffering from her. One controls one's facial expression because one wants one's face to be configured a certain way so as to appear a certain way. That is not necessarily so for the animal. It may manage to control its instinctive bodily reaction without any conception that that is what it is doing. It is not that it wants its body to be a certain way and so too to appear a certain way to another. All it wants is not to be beaten.

Of course, sometimes we may be no different from such an animal. One might just happen to carry oneself a certain way upon entering a room, and something one considers a boon might happen in that room: perhaps one receives a lot of sexual attention. One might then carry oneself in a similar way on the next suitable occasion, without having any awareness of what one was doing or why. The point is simply that the possibility of using one's body to communicate intentionally, by gaining control over, and in this way exploiting, its natural and automatic reactions, is more complex than this. One must be conceiving of one's psychological states as manifest or displayed in one's body. One must be conceiving of one's body as something which others can perceive. And finally, one must have current knowledge of the state of this body. This is what body awareness provides. So one way in which body awareness is of real
significance to us is that it provides us with knowledge of how we appear, physically and psychologically, to others. And in so doing, body awareness makes possible body language.

But if body awareness provides us with knowledge of how our bodies physically and psychologically appear to others, that is because it provides us with knowledge of how our bodies physically and psychologically are. Body awareness provides one with current knowledge of the state of one's own body, including one's emotional state. This is the third role for body awareness. And it is what brings to the fore yet another way in which one's conception and experience of a body as one's own is as of a recognisably human body.

I have argued that the body one is aware of from the inside is presented to one as one's own body. But now consider this in conjunction with the claim that our concepts of emotions are concepts of bodily states which one can be aware of from the inside. Together these claims establish that the body presented to one from the inside can be presented at once as one's own and as subject to the emotions. So not only is the body presented to one as one's own presented as physically human: it is also presented as psychologically human. One's conception and experience of a body as one's own can be a conception and experience as of a recognisably human body, in that one conceives and experiences this body, like the bodies of others one observes, as subject to the basic emotions.
Conclusion

John McDowell has suggested that philosophy goes wrong if it replaces the concept of a human being with the concept of a mere human body which, more or less mysteriously, then proves to be a point of occupancy for psychological states. We ought not to lose sight of the 'seamless whole' and 'unity' of the human being in the first place. ¹ The difficulty with McDowell's counsel as it stands is that it is far from apparent what this seamless and unified being is. We know, perhaps, what he thinks it is not. Despite the fact that human bodies are material bodies, we are not to think of them as merely material bodies, i.e. as on a par with inanimate objects like rocks and tables. Equally we are not to conceive of psychological states as 'private' and 'inner' experiences, accessible to no one but the subject whose states they are. I want to conclude by suggesting that this thesis has provided the resources for us to understand what the concept of a human being is. Notwithstanding McDowell's professed disdain for the concept of a human body, it is really the concept of a recognisably human body which must be kept in view.

Recall Gopnik and Meltzoff's claim that 'infants are launched on their career of interpersonal relations with the primary perceptual judgement: "Here is something like me"'. ² Some of the empirical evidence for this claim stems from work on infant imitation. From birth onwards, and so prior to any possibility of associative learning, infants are able to imitate the facial expressions of adults they see, and to recognise when adults are imitating their own facial expressions. ³ For instance, an infant will respond to an adult protruding her tongue with a tongue protrusion of its own, or to an adult protruding her lips with a lip protrusion of its own. This imitative behaviour is not simply an automatic response to visual stimuli. The behaviour occurs because infants are capable of representing the facial expressions of others, and of trying to copy that behaviour. The evidence for this is threefold. First, infants do not always imitate the behaviour they attentively observe. Second, they may imitate the behaviour some time after the adult has ceased making the facial expression: they appear able to remember the expression. Third, some infants seem to come up with creative solutions in the face of imitative difficulties. For instance, an infant who was finding it difficult to imitate a

tongue protrusion to the side of the mouth eventually executed a normal tongue protrusion and meanwhile turned her head to the side.

Gopnik and Meltzoff, together with Keith Moore, have argued that this innate ability intentionally to imitate adult behaviour is possible because infants possess a 'supramodal representation system'. The basic idea is that they are able to represent the behaviour of others, which they see, and the behaviour of their own bodies, which they are aware of from the inside, in the very same way despite the difference in mode of awareness. The representation of facial expression is in a sense neutral between vision and body awareness: there is an innate cross-modal connection. This is what allows an infant to try to match its behaviour to that of others, and also to recognise when others are matching their behaviour to the infant's own.

Quite generally, imitation is important for infant and child development. For older children, it may be crucial for cultural and linguistic learning and communication. For infants, it may provide a general sense of attunement and rapport with others. But Gopnik and Meltzoff have proposed that it is also part of what enables infants to come to grasp a basic, folk psychology. The fact that infants are born able to imitate others and so with something like a supramodal representation system means that they are able to perceive 'equivalences' between their own bodies and the bodies of others. Infants are able to use this grasp of others as similar in body to come by a grasp of others as similar in mind or psychology. Gopnik and Meltzoff have suggested two ways this could occur. The first depends on the idea that body awareness and action are in some sense 'half-way stations' between behaviour on the one hand, and psychological states on the other. Presumably the thought here is simply that body awareness is a form of awareness and so psychological, but meanwhile it is of a body; while actions consist in body movements, but of an intentional, and so psychologically motivated, kind. In this way, both might be thought to lie between behaviour and bodies, conceived purely physically, and psychological states, conceived purely non-physically. Since imitation is a form of action which requires body awareness, imitation allows infants to get a foothold into folk psychology. The second depends on the notion of emotional 'contagion'. Imitating an emotional expression can have the effect of producing some, although by no means all, of the associated physiological changes. The suggestion is

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4 See e.g. A. Meltzoff and K. Moore (1997).
that if infants imitate the emotional expressions of others, they will come themselves to feel that emotion. In this way, they can know what the other is feeling: the other who is behaving 'like me' is also having an emotional experience 'like me'. By contagion, they learn to pair types of inner, felt experience with types of outer, observable behaviour. In essence, then, the proposal is that infants are born with an ability to grasp that others are 'like me' in body, which allows them to develop an ability to grasp that others are also 'like me' in mind.

From the point of view of this thesis, this proposal is striking because of the dual nature of its commitments. On the one hand, real importance is given to the idea that we have a primitive grasp of our bodies as like the bodies of others: as recognisably human. On the other hand, the idea that there is an ontological distinction between experience and behaviour quite generally, but also with regard to the basic emotions, is pervasive. Indeed Gopnik and Meltzoff are quite explicit on this point: 'Although we directly observe other people's behaviour, we think of them as having internal mental states that are analogous to our own.' That is why there is an issue as to how the infant moves from a grasp that others are physically similar to a grasp that others are psychologically similar. The picture of the infant's predicament which these psychologists paint is quite like the picture McDowell counsels us to reject. The idea of a physically recognisably human body 'like me' is unproblematic. The only problem is then to understand how this body can be a point of occupancy of inner and private psychological states.

The observational model of psychological concepts offers an alternative. If there is no ontological distinction between experience and behaviour, at least with regard to the basic emotions, then there is no chasm between physical behaviour and psychology which infants need to learn to cross. Infants would not only be able to represent the behaviour of others, which they see, and the behaviour of their own bodies, which they are aware of from the inside, in the very same way in so far as both are similar with respect to facial expression, considered physically. Infants would also be able to represent the behaviour of others and their own behaviour in the very same way in so far as both are instances of the very same emotion. Another can be 'like me' not only in that the infant perceives the physical state of her face to be 'like me' but

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10 Ibid. p. 335.
because the infant perceives her emotional state to be 'like me'. 11 Whether or not this proves true of infants, I do want to suggest it is true of adults. This is what allows us to understand how a human being can be a seamless whole or unity.

Consider again the claim that there is an innate cross-modal connection. Why does this seem a priori plausible? One reason is that the examples of types of behaviour represented by infants - like tongue protrusions and lip protrusions - are facial expressions which consist of a certain spatial configuration of the parts of the face. As I suggested in Section 3.1, it is both intuitive and intelligible that our concepts of shape properties are neutral between sensory modes of presentation of shapes, and objective in this way. Tongue and lip protrusion are basically ways a face can be shaped. So just as one can judge that an object is square either on the basis of vision or on the basis of touch, so too one can judge that a tongue is protruding either on the basis of vision or on the basis of body awareness.

Many of the bodily states constitutive of the basic emotions do consist, at least partly, of spatial configurations of the body and face. Consider for instance a smile. One can be conceiving of one’s own smile, which one is aware of from the inside, and another’s smile, which one sees, in the very same way in so far as both smiles are nothing more than a certain configuration of the mouth relative to the face: it is shaped as a crescent which points up. This is the proposal Gopnik and Meltzoff have made. One is conceiving of both smiles as instances of the very same physical behaviour. But one can also be conceiving of both smiles in the very same way in that both are instances of the very same psychological behaviour. Both are constitutive of the same emotion: happiness. This is the alternative proposal I am making. It is important to see just how different it is.

In the case of a smile, another’s body behaviour can be conceived to be ‘like me’ twice over: physically, and psychologically. But another can be ‘like me’ psychologically without matching the spatial configuration of my body and face. There are two ways this can be so. The first is that the bodily states constitutive of the basic emotions may not involve spatial configuration. Consider blushing. The physiological basis for blushing is an increase of blood to the face. But an increased blood flow is not what is perceived when a person blushes. When the person in question is oneself, one is aware of one’s upper torso and face getting hot. When the person in question is another,

one is aware of her upper torso and face getting red. So the judgements about physical behaviour one is entitled to make are not the same in the two cases. The immediate judgements one is entitled to make are ‘My face is getting hot’ and ‘Her face is getting red’ respectively. Of course one is likely to know an empirical generalisation to the effect that hot faces look red and red faces feel hot. The point is that the purely physical properties one is aware of are different in the two cases. The properties of temperature and colour seem to be in essence modality specific. There is no possibility of supramodal representation here. But one might yet be conceiving of these two bodily states as psychologically the same: both are instances of embarrassment. Based on awareness of one’s upper torso and face getting hot one might judge ‘I am embarrassed’. Based on awareness of her upper torso and face getting red one might judge ‘She is embarrassed’.

Blushing is of course quite distinctive and unusual. Most of the bodily states constitutive of the basic emotions do involve spatial configuration. But the second way that another can be ‘like me’ psychologically without being physically ‘like me’ or matching my spatial configuration is that the very same psychological state can consist in a different spatial configuration or physical state. Consider greeting a dear friend after a long absence. One might be so overjoyed that one can do nothing but sit quietly smiling. She, on the other hand, might be so overjoyed that she cannot sit still and jumps up and down, clapping in excitement and throwing up her hands. Both bodily states can be constitutive of happiness. Based on awareness of one’s persistent smile and quiet joy one might judge: ‘I am so happy’. Based on awareness of her persistent exuberance one might judge: ‘She is so happy’. But despite the fact that both bodily states constitute happiness they quite clearly do not constitute the same spatial configuration of body parts.

Over the course of this thesis, I have suggested two ways in which the body conceived and experienced as one’s own is conceived and experienced as a recognisably human body. The first is that one’s own body as much as the bodies of others can be presented as having a characteristic shape and structure, colour and look, smell, density and feel to the touch, and so on. These features carry a very real social significance, and they can of course be perceived, by oneself and by others. So human bodies, including one’s own, physically are and appear a certain way. The second is that one’s own body as much as the bodies of others can be presented as subject to the basic emotions. Some

12 Despite popular accounts of the phenomenon, synaesthesia does not appear to offer a counter-example to this claim. For discussion see J. Harrison (2001).
human bodily states are emotional states. These states can also be perceived, by oneself and by others. So human bodies, including one’s own, psychologically are and appear a certain way. Thus there are, in a sense, two aspects to being recognisably human: the physical aspect, and the psychological aspect. But these two aspects are both equally bodily and equally perceptible. Given this, the question does not arise of how mere human bodies become points of occupancy for psychological states. For at least with regard to those psychological states which are emotions, they just are bodily states. They could not be instantiated other than in a human body. In this way, the observational model of the emotions allows us to give a simple account of what the seamless whole and unity of a human being is: a human being is physically and psychologically human in body.

With this picture in mind, I want to return now, as promised, to realism and idealism about body ownership. Recall that one of the virtues of idealism is that in securing the connection between knowing and owning a body, it makes it possible to see how one’s conception and experience of a body as one’s own is as of a recognisably human body in the physical sense. A body can be presented to one through the outer senses as one’s own. But recall too that there is something deeply intuitive about the basic realist idea that body ownership is to do with the connection between a subject’s body and her psychological life. Now the realism which we considered in Part I claimed that this connection is causal. According to Shoemaker, what makes a body mine is that my perceptions are due to the situation and functioning of that body and my volitions issue in actions of that same body. Shoemaker’s picture is one of an inner or private psychological life which is causally connected to a body conceived of purely physically. As we saw, this version of realism is wanting in so far as it alienates the subject from her body: it makes it the case that one does not know which body one’s own body is in virtue of owning it. But the claim that the basic emotions are bodily states suggests an alternative way of developing the basic realist idea. We must not abandon idealism. However, in conjunction with the claim that what makes a body mine is that I am aware of it from the inside, we can suggest that what makes a body mine is that its bodily states are my psychological states. My emotional life quite literally takes place in the body which is my body. As Descartes claims when he proposes a version of idealism: I have a special right to call the body ‘mine’ which I feel my ‘emotions in and on account of’.13 So a connection between a subject’s body and her psychological life can be, after

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all, constitutive of body ownership. What makes a body mine is that I am aware of it from the inside and that some of its bodily states are my psychological states.

I want to end this thesis by suggesting that this combined view of body ownership makes it possible to see why one’s conception and experience of a body as one’s own might amount to a conception and experience of oneself as a body. The reason is very simple. It is both traditional and plausible to think that self-awareness and self-knowledge consist in awareness and knowledge of one’s psychological states. I have argued that the basic human emotions are bodily states. The basic awareness and knowledge of one’s emotions one has depends on one’s awareness and knowledge of one’s own body. So how could it be that one does not conceive of and experience oneself as a body, given that one conceives of and experiences some of one’s psychological states, the emotions, as bodily states? How could one not conceive of and experience oneself as a body, given that one enjoys awareness and knowledge of one’s psychological states in virtue of enjoying awareness and knowledge of one’s body?

In essence, this suggestion agrees with the traditional view in holding that self-awareness and self-knowledge consist in awareness and knowledge of one’s psychological states. But it rejects the details which usually accompany this view. On the one hand, this view tends to treat as private or inner the psychological states of which one has awareness or knowledge. The ontological distinction between experience and behaviour is upheld. On the other hand, this view tends to deny that one is presented to oneself as an object which is the subject of these psychological states. As Shoemaker puts it: ‘when one is introspectively aware of one’s thoughts, feelings, beliefs and desires, one is not presented to oneself as a flesh and blood person, and does not seem to be presented to oneself as an object at all’. 14 What I am suggesting is that we have reason to reject these details at least with regard to the basic emotions. On the one hand, emotions are not private and inner, but bodily. They are there for all to see. On the other hand, when one is aware of one’s emotions, one is presented to oneself as an object to this extent: one is aware of a body, viz. one’s own, as the object instantiating the emotions. So on the basis of awareness of a body from the inside one is entitled knowledgeably to ascribe not only spatial properties and located sensations to one’s body, but also psychological states. One is entitled to judge not only ‘My body is cross-legged’ but also ‘My body is happy’ or ‘My body is sad’. This is why it is correct.

to think that one conceives of and experiences oneself as a body. For, once again, one conceives of and experiences one’s own body as instantiating psychological states.

Now it is evident that the use of ‘my body’ as a referring term is substantially more strained when the property ascribed is a psychological state than it is when the property ascribed is purely physical or spatial. No doubt circumstances can be envisaged in which one might judge on the basis of awareness of one’s own body ‘My body is happy’ or ‘My body is sad’. But it is far more natural to judge on the very same basis that ‘I am happy’ or ‘I am sad’. This suggests that we might use these basic cases of ascriptions of emotions to give an account of the meaning of ‘I’. We might use these cases to provide a model for self-consciousness and self-reference.

The most obvious suggestion would be that ‘I’ means ‘my body’. But this fails to take account of the way in which these ascriptions are made. We are interested in the use of ‘I’ and ‘my’ as the subject of psychological states. We must not lose sight of the fact that even though the subject of these states is conceiving of herself as a body, in making these ascriptions she is aware of a body as her own, that is, fundamentally from the inside. That is what makes a body ‘mine’ and, the suggestion now is, also part of what makes it ‘me’. So we might suggest that ‘I’ means ‘this body’ with the proviso that the fundamental basis of this demonstrative reference is body awareness. There is a sense in which this suggestion is apt. But it does not reflect the fact that the body presented to the subject in body awareness is presented as a recognisably human body, both physically and, especially when what is being ascribed is an emotion, psychologically. So finally we might suggest that ‘I’ really means ‘this human’. We must still accompany this suggestion with the proviso that the fundamental basis of this demonstrative is body awareness, although we have now in a sense made explicit that the body in question can be demonstratively presented to the subject, as herself, through the outer senses too. Note, however, in keeping with a point made in the Introduction, that the suggestion that ‘I’ means ‘this human’ is not the same as the suggestion that ‘I’ means ‘this person’. Our concept of a person is not the same as our concept of a human being from the pre-theoretical or common-sense point of view. So the suggestion I am making, albeit tentatively, is that in these basic cases of ascriptions of emotions what we understand ‘I’ to mean is ‘this human’.

This suggestion is really very simple. One has a conception and experience of a body as one’s own and yet as recognisably human, physically and psychologically. The reason why such a conception and experience of a body as one’s own amounts to a conception and experience of oneself is that one conceives of and experiences this body
as instantiating psychological states, viz. the basic emotions. This in turn provides a model for understanding self-consciousness and the capacity for self-reference. The model is a perceptual-demonstrative model. Indeed the model makes for a perfect symmetry between self-ascriptions of emotions and other-ascriptions. In both cases, one ascribes the emotion on the basis of perception of a human body as instantiating the emotion. In one’s own case, fundamentally from the inside. In the case of others, through the outer senses.

Even if it is conceded that, in these basic emotional cases, one conceives and experiences oneself as a body, there is still room to reject this model for understanding self-consciousness and self-reference. One objection might point out that we can wonder whether I am ‘my body’ or ‘this body’ or ‘this human’. It makes sense to ask such a question. So how could ‘I’ mean any of these? Another objection might point out that this model will not serve to explain the self-ascriptions of psychological states which are not bodily states. For if they are not bodily states, they are not perceptible based on awareness of a body from the inside. And so a perceptual-demonstrative model will not do. These objections are real. But it may be that this model is nonetheless basic. I want to conclude this thesis by suggesting a reason why the possibility of self-ascriptions of psychological states which are not bodily states depends on the possibility of self-ascriptions of psychological states which are bodily states. Hence one’s conception and experience of oneself as a body – indeed, as I shall try to suggest, as a recognisably human body – is basic to one’s conception and experience of oneself. For this reason, there may yet be a sense in which the meaning of ‘I’ is ‘this human’.

I have suggested that one can only ascribe psychological states to oneself if one can ascribe them to others. Our concepts of psychological states must be generally applicable. I have also argued that this is only possible if the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour is rejected. Psychological states can be either experienced, or observed. So psychological states can be bodily states. It is bodies which are observed. Now let us allow that once we have secured possession of a general concept of a psychological life and a subject of that life, we can loosen these constraints on the nature of concepts of psychological states. Not all of one’s psychological concepts must be observational. But if so, it is still the case that in order to have concepts of psychological states which are non-bodily, one must have concepts of psychological states which are bodily. And in order to self-ascribe a psychological state which is non-bodily, one must have the capacity to self-ascribe psychological states
which are bodily. That is, the possibility of having psychological concepts which one can self-ascribe at all depends on the fact that some of those concepts which one self-ascribes are concepts of bodily states. But a bodily state must be ascribed to a body. This means that the possibility of self-ascription of psychological states at all depends on a certain conception of some psychological states, viz. as bodily, which in turn constrains the range of objects to which they can sensibly be ascribed, viz. to bodies.

But the psychological states which seem most intuitively and intelligibly to be either experienced or observed are the basic emotions. If we can see our way to meeting this constraint on psychological states at all, it is by appeal to them. The explanation of how it is possible to reject the ontological distinction between experience and behaviour depends on the fact that we are naturally endowed with a basic set of emotions which we feel and experience and put to communicative use. It is these basic emotions which we conceive of as bodily. But a bodily state such as a basic human emotion cannot be sensibly ascribed to just any material body. The body must be a human body. And so meeting a general constraint on the nature of psychological concepts if self-ascription is to be possible may indeed depend, in the end, and in our case, on a conception and experience of one’s own body as recognisably human: physically and psychologically.
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For each of us there is one body which is special, different from all other bodies: the body one conceives of and experiences as one’s own. The principal aim of this thesis is to understand what this conception and experience amounts to, and why it matters.

I address three main topics: (1) body awareness, body ownership, and the immunity to errors of misidentification of judgements which refer to a body as ‘my body’ or ‘mine’; (2) spatial perception and the knowledge of location we take it to afford; (3) the conceptual problem of other minds and the nature of the basic emotions. Through consideration of these topics, I propose that the conception and experience one has of a body as one’s own is as of a recognisably human body. This is so in two ways.

I argue that what makes a body one’s own is that one is aware of it ‘from the inside’. Given this, one can also experience a body as one’s own through the outer senses. So the first way that the conception and experience one has of a body as one’s own is as of a recognisably human body is that it is human in physical appearance, like the bodies of others.

I also argue that the basic emotions are bodily states that one can be aware of from the inside, and in this sense feel or experience. This solves the conceptual problem of other minds. For it makes it possible to understand how the very same type of psychological state one can feel or experience oneself, one can also observe in others. It also provides the second way that the conception and experience one has of a body as one’s own is as of a recognisably human body: one experiences one’s own body, as much as the bodies of others, as subject to the basic emotions, and so as human in psychology.

I conclude by suggesting that this account of one’s conception and experience of a body as one’s own and as recognisably human points to a perceptual-demonstrative model of self-consciousness and self-reference: in basic cases, ‘I’ means ‘this human’.