Regional cooperation in Northeast Asia: an analysis of policy ideas across institutions and disciplines in Japanese higher education

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Abstract

This doctoral thesis is a qualitative study of policy ideas and programs in the higher education sector aimed at fostering regional cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea. The aims of the research were to understand the cognitive and normative ideas about regional cooperation in Northeast Asia from the perspectives of actors involved in government-initiated programs for higher education regional cooperation at Japanese universities. This takes in an investigation of how policy ideas at the government-level are adopted and adapted across different institutional and disciplinary contexts, and explores the conditions under which the ideas of actors at universities are implemented and any perceived barriers that impede their realization. To investigate these issues, two government-initiated programs for regional cooperation were selected, one representing higher education's societal role as a producer of research-based knowledge, and the other representing its social function as a site for teaching and learning. The program addressing the former role is the A3 Foresight program, a funding scheme for scientists to engage in regional research collaboration. The program addressing the latter role is CAMPUS Asia, a regional exchange program for students at top universities in the three countries.

The research design took the form of an interpretive study underpinned by a social constructivist epistemology. Nine participating universities were selected as cases, and the primary source of data were the transcripts of semi-structured interviews with 67 individuals involved in varying capacities in either A3 Foresight or CAMPUS Asia. 52 documents from five key governmental organizations involved in regional cooperation were also collected and analyzed, and these served as structuring elements with which to compare and illuminate the ideas of actors in the selected universities. Data analysis and interpretation involved a combination of methods, including the deductive application of an analytical framework from an International Relations theory known as discursive institutionalism along with inductive thematic analysis.

The constructed findings highlight a range of interconnected ideas about the current state and possible futures of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. Variation in ideas about higher education regional cooperation connected to the distinctive underlying philosophies of different academic disciplines, with STEM fields focused on 'borderless' knowledge production and competitiveness, the Arts on cultural connections and creative collaboration, and Social Sciences on communicative action for the resolution of regional problems. Each of these idealized visions intersected in practice with government-level ideas of regional cooperation for global competitiveness, resulting in various tensions and the frequent repurposing of government policy rhetoric to align with institutional and disciplinary orientations. Actors described a number of perceived ideational and institutional barriers impeding the realization of their visions for regional cooperation. Some lamented how neoliberal policies marked by competitive project-based funding schemes hindered both domestic cooperation within and across Japanese universities as well as efforts to implement effective strategies for internationalization. At the societal level, many reported that nationalistic worldviews espoused by politicians and the media, incommensurable historical memories, and frequent diplomatic tensions posed persistent barriers to regional stability, prosperity, and possibilities for educational exchange and research collaboration. However, many students who participated in one of the two programs reported broadened perspectives, an increased awareness of a shared humanity, and renewed hope for the future of the region. In the final chapter of the thesis these and other emergent themes are critically discussed in light of extant empirical and theoretical scholarship. I address the study's novel empirical, methodological and theoretical contributions to knowledge and present an argument on the importance of incorporating studies of the ideational dimension into research on higher education regional cooperation with examples and justifications from the case of Japan. I also consider limitations of the study and implications for further research.

A note on published work

This thesis draws in a number of places on work I have published as a single author in various journals. While I properly cite all of this work, in certain places in the thesis I reproduce verbatim or adapt and build upon somewhat lengthy excerpts from this published work. For readability, I refrain from placing these excerpts into block quotes. As such, to avoid any possibility of 'self-plagiarism' I state here the papers that have been utilized in this manner in the thesis:

Hammond, C. D. (2016). Internationalization, nationalism, and global competitiveness: a comparison of approaches to higher education in China and Japan. *Asia Pacific Education Review*, *17*(4), 555–566. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12564-016-9459-0

Hammond, C. D. (2018a). Dynamics of East Asia: Cultural Connections, Contested History, and the Rise of China. *The Journal of Rikkyo University Language Center*, *40*, 13–30.

Hammond, C. D. (2018b). Regional cooperation in Northeast Asia: Comparing Policy Ideas across Institutions and Disciplines at Japanese Universities. *Journal of Comparative and International Higher Eeducation*, *10*, 46–48. https://doi.org/10.32674/jcihe.v10iWinter.689

Hammond, C. D. (2019). Dynamics of higher education research collaboration and regional integration in Northeast Asia: a study of the A3 Foresight Program. *Higher Education*, *78*(4), 653–668. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10734-019-00363-x

Chapter 1: Introduction

This doctoral thesis is a qualitative study of policy ideas and programs in the higher education sector aimed at fostering regional cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea. The aims of the research were to understand the cognitive and normative ideas about regional cooperation in Northeast Asia from the perspectives of actors involved in government-initiated programs for higher education regional cooperation at Japanese universities, and to investigate how policy ideas at the government-level are adopted, adapted and repurposed across different institutional and disciplinary contexts. This takes in an exploration of the conditions under which the ideas of actors at universities are implemented and any perceived barriers that impede their realization. To investigate these issues, two government-initiated programs for regional cooperation were selected, one representing higher education's societal role as a producer of research-based knowledge, and the other representing its social function as a site for teaching and learning. The program addressing the former role is the A3 Foresight program, a funding scheme for scientists to engage in regional research collaboration. The program addressing the latter role is CAMPUS Asia, a regional exchange program for students at top universities in the three countries. The study aims to contribute new and valuable knowledge to the social science literature in fields such as Higher Education Studies, International Relations and the interdisciplinary field of Comparative Regionalism. It was hoped the knowledge generated would also have societal relevance by highlighting the potential value of higher education regional cooperation programs in fostering peaceful and collaborative relations between China, Japan, and South Korea. Acknowledging this normative bias, the research design took the form of an interpretive study underpinned by a social constructivist epistemology. Nine participating universities were selected as cases, and the primary source of data were the transcripts of semi-structured interviews with 67 individuals

involved in varying capacities in either A3 Foresight or CAMPUS Asia. 52 documents from five key governmental organizations involved in regional cooperation were also collected and analyzed, and these served as structuring elements with which to compare and illuminate the ideas of actors in the selected universities. Data analysis and interpretation involved a combination of methods including the deductive application of an analytical framework from an International Relations theory known as discursive institutionalism along with inductive thematic analysis. Utilizing these methods, an attempt was made to construct nuanced and informed answers to the following research questions:

Research questions

1. What policy ideas do actors involved in the CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight programs at Japanese universities have about regional cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea? How do these ideas compare across institutional and disciplinary contexts?
2. How do these ideas compare with policy ideas for higher education regionalism at the government level? How are government-level ideas adopted, adapted and resisted by actors at Japanese universities?
3. How do these actors' ideas about broader contextual dynamics in the region and beyond relate to and shape their policy ideas of higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia?
4. What do actors perceive are the barriers that impede regional cooperation at the higher education and broader levels?

Organization of the thesis

This thesis is structured in three parts, with a total of nine chapters. Part I is a Literature Review that provides a broad contextual picture of the research setting and a critical engagement with extant literature on the research topic. It does so first in Chapter 2 by sketching some of the important historical, cultural, economic and political forces that have shaped contemporary international relations in Northeast Asia. The chapter begins with a discussion of current trends, marked by growing economic interdependence and frequent political tensions fueled by nationalism and contested memories of modern history. The

chapter then zooms out to take a wider view of the vast pre-modern history of the region, highlighting the cultural, philosophical and linguistic legacies that have connected the region for millennia and continue to do so. The chapter then shifts to introduce global developments in the higher education sector, with particular reference to the ways massification, globalization, internationalization, neoliberalism and regional cooperation have shaped policy and programming worldwide and altered the higher education landscape. The final section of the chapter looks at how these developments in global higher education have impacted higher education in Northeast Asia, with particular emphasis placed on Japan. The three main sections of this chapter thus provide a contextual frame through which to conduct a deep qualitative investigation of the two programs for Northeast Asian regional cooperation selected for the study.

Chapter 3 makes up the second part of the Literature Review. It provides a survey of the empirical literature related to the two programs under study, and also considers theoretical contributions and relevant empirical studies of higher education regional cooperation more broadly. The chapter begins with a critical discussion of extant scholarship concerning CAMPUS Asia, A3 Foresight and regional cooperation in Northeast and broader East Asian higher education, and highlights methodological and empirical gaps that would benefit from further research. The chapter then shifts to a critical engagement with selected theories of higher education regionalization and regionalism, drawing primarily on scholarship from the fields of Higher Education Studies and International Relations. The chapter concludes by highlighting the most salient contributions from extant scholarship to date, and argues the current study will provide valuable empirical verification and qualitative exploration of these contributions. I also explain how this thesis will offer novel insights into the ongoing project of higher education region building in Northeast Asia, and

contribute to the larger research program of mapping, understanding and conceptualizing higher education regionalism. In these respects I argue that the research will contribute new and valuable knowledge to the social sciences literature.

Part II shifts to a discussion of the epistemological and theoretical framing and methodology adopted for the study. Chapter 4 begins with an introduction to methodological debates in the social sciences, and a rationale for the adoption of a social constructivist approach to the study of higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is presented. The discussion of social constructivism as an approach to social research includes key ontological concepts such as intersubjectivity, context, and power, and introduces the spectrum of possible epistemological orientations that fall under the social constructivist umbrella. This introduction enables for a honing in on the particular constructivist approach adopted for the study; a *naturalistic constructivism* informed by philosophical ideas from critical realism. A defense is ultimately made for a pragmatic approach that entails adopting a methodology that best allows for answering a given set of research questions, and as such the notion of *analytical eclecticism* is briefly introduced and justified. The chapter then shifts to a discussion of the analytical framework adopted to investigate the research topic. It introduces *discursive institutionalist* theory from International Relations which focuses analysis on the cognitive and normative ideas of actors and their agentive power to shape the institutions in which they operate. A justification is then made for the application of this analytical frame to study the ideas of actors involved in shaping higher education regional cooperation at Japanese universities. Finally, a brief discussion of the comparative methods that were adopted to compare and juxtapose the ideas of actors across institutions, programs, and disciplines, and with the ideas at the government level is presented.

Chapter 5 focuses on case selection and methods of data collection and analysis. It provides a detailed description of the two government-initiated programs selected for the study – CAMPUS Asia and the A3 Foresight program – as well as introducing the universities participating in one or both of these programs that were selected as cases. Acknowledging that while many forms of regional cooperation in the higher education sector are informal, it is argued that the selection of these top-down initiatives is valuable because it allows for a comparison of government-level policy ideas with those of individual actors, as well as a multi-layered picture of the ways these ideas are translated into practice from the governmental-level to the institutional and disciplinary levels. Also introduced is a description and justification of the approaches taken for data collection, transcription and translation. This includes methods for the collection and analysis of documents, and for the selection, categorization, and approach to interviewing program participants. Also included are theoretical and practical accounts of the limitations of the selected approaches as well as a number of reflexive considerations concerning my role as a researcher at the various stages of research design and data collection, analysis and interpretation. Finally, the combined approach comprising the deductive application of a discursive institutionalist analytical frame and inductive thematic analysis used for the construction of the findings and answering the research questions is introduced.

In Part III, Chapters 6 through 9 present and discuss the findings from this qualitative research project. Chapter 6 explores the main thematic ideas that emerged in selected government-level policy documents, and also presents the findings from two interviews with senior government officials involved with the CAMPUS Asia program. Five broad themes emerged as a result of the analysis of policy ideas at the government level. They

are (1) a discourse of '*mutual understanding*', (2) an emphasis on education and mobility with '*quality assurance*', (3) a recognition of the *economic interdependence* of the region and a commitment to use cooperation to enhance economic growth, (4) a focus on university students as future '*human resources*', and (5) a normative commitment to competition and '*competitiveness*'. Also evident from the analysis of documents spanning a 20-year period was the potential for developments in the economic and political arenas to influence policies for regional cooperation in science, technology and innovation (STI) and higher education. The analysis indicated that ideas at the government level during the conception and implementation of A3 Foresight and CAMPUS Asia have not been static, but have evolved over time in response to external forces and domestic political change. Other findings highlighted that the 'government' is not a monolithic entity with a clear consensus about its policy ideas and interests. Various organizations had their own ideas that at times conflicted with those of others. This fact became more apparent through interviewing two government officials from different agencies, and illuminated the importance of ideas of individual actors involved in shaping processes of regional cooperation. The government-level ideas presented in this chapter are intended to serve as structuring elements for the following core findings chapters, which engage with ideas of actors at the university-level.

The subsequent two chapters present the findings from semi-structured interviews with 65 actors at Japanese universities. Chapter 7 presents thematically the ideas actors had about regional cooperation through the lens of the discursive institutionalist analytical framework introduced in Chapter 4. The emergent themes highlight the ways in which the ideas at the government-level were adopted, adapted and contested by academics, administrators and students, and present the original ideas unique to various institutions, disciplines, and

individual actors. Both notable differences and commonalities regarding the cognitive and normative *policy ideas* about CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight emerged across institutions and across disciplines, and these are discussed in turn. I argue that variation in ideas about higher education regional cooperation connected to the distinctive underlying philosophies of different academic disciplines, with STEM fields focused on borderless knowledge production and competitiveness, the Arts on cultural connections and creative collaboration, and Social Sciences on communicative action for the resolution of regional problems. The next section of the chapter continues the exploration of the ideas of participants, but expands the contextual scope beyond the policy ideas concerning the specific programs for regional cooperation and attempts to engage with the *programmatic ideas* actors had about the broader sociological contexts in which the CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight Programs are enmeshed. Finally the chapter presents an interpretive engagement with the possible *underlying philosophies* that may be providing the cognitive foundations upon which the policy and programmatic ideas of participants find support. In addition to discussing the philosophies underpinning different academic disciplines mentioned above, I argue that actors generally adopted worldviews based on the unquestioned centrality of the nation-state, but these worldviews at times shifted through participation in the programs for regional cooperation toward a recognition of a shared humanity.

Chapter 8 presents the main barriers that were perceived by actors at Japanese universities that impede regional cooperation in Northeast Asia in various ways. As with chapters 6 and 7, the findings in this chapter are presented thematically, and are interpreted by a series of micro-arguments aiming to provide context and nuance to the emergent themes. The range of emergent barriers covered issues specific to the two programs like student recruitment, cultural and linguistic communication challenges, and funding constraints, and also broader

societal challenges such as a mistaken view of Japan as ‘ahead and above’ other Asian countries, xenophobic forms of nationalism, and biased portrayals of regional ‘others’ in the media. Instead of presenting themes under heading sections of policy, programmatic and philosophical ideas, these levels of ideas are grouped according to interconnected themes and organized into the broad categories of *ideational barriers* and *institutional barriers*. The term ‘ideational barriers’ implies obstacles connected to the various constructs of meaning actors in society have and are exposed to across the three countries, while ‘institutional barriers’ connotes impediments to regional cooperation that manifest from social structures and organizational practices external to actors, particularly those found at Japanese universities.

Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by utilizing the findings from the previous three chapters to engage with the extant empirical and theoretical scholarship presented in the Literature Review. I also discuss the novel empirical findings offered by this study that contribute new and valuable knowledge to the social sciences, which are particularly applicable to the research agenda for comparative higher education regionalism proposed by Chou and Ravinet (2015, 2016). Additionally, I address methodological and theoretical contributions, and posit my own argument about the importance of incorporating the ideational dimension into any study of higher education regional cooperation in order to gain a comprehensive, contextualized understanding about the multi-layered policy processes of higher education region building. The final section of this chapter presents a conclusion to the thesis, which addresses some of the limitations of the study and possibilities for further research. The chapter and thesis end with some concluding remarks about how the findings from this project could have relevance for higher education policy and practice in the region.

With the stage set, the remainder of this introductory chapter is dedicated to delineating the meanings of a number of key concepts and terminology used with frequency throughout the thesis, to help provide conceptual clarity and comprehensibility to readers from the outset.

Operationalizing key terms and concepts

In his work on social science methodology, John Gerring points out the central importance that concept formation plays in both the natural and social sciences, and the particular challenges faced by social scientists when naming and delineating social phenomena (Gerring, 1999, 2012). Challenges arise because unlike in the natural sciences where terms are frequently assigned and agreed upon by way of direct observation and replicable experimentation, key terms in the social sciences frequently lack clarity and uniformity. This is especially true for 'high-order' concepts that evade direct observation and are open for interpretation and debate (for example, terms such as 'ideology', 'justice', and 'democracy') (Gerring, 1999). Gerring points out that concepts are

> employed differently in different fields and sub-fields, and... even *within* single subfields or intellectual traditions there is a good deal of ambiguity surrounding such terms...Older concepts are redeployed, leaving etymological trails that confuse the unwitting reader. New words are created to refer to things that were perhaps poorly articulated through existing concepts, leaving a highly complex lexical terrain (for the old concepts continue to circulate) (Gerring, 1999, pp. 360-361).

In order to avoid ambiguity and possible confusion, this section clarifies a number of key terms and concepts that are used throughout the thesis; at the same time it avoids the creation of new terms that would contribute unnecessarily to the complexity of the extant 'lexical terrain' in the social sciences. In particular, an attempt is made to clearly delineate the intended meanings of terms found in the title and the research questions that could be interpreted in various ways. Some of these terms are defined rigidly for clarity and

analytical utility, while others are purposefully described as broad 'container' terms to allow for the inclusion of participant interpretations.

'Northeast Asia'

For the purposes of this study, the term 'Northeast Asia' will refer only to mainland China, Japan, and South Korea. I acknowledge this may be regarded as problematic due the absence of a number of countries and societies (e.g. North Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) that would by other accounts be included as members of a region labeled 'Northeast Asia'. North Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong were omitted from the study due to the fact that, to date, these societies were not officially included in the regional collaboration programs under investigation. However, the ramifications of the complex relationships between mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong and other regional players as well as issues related to North Korea affecting regional relations were given due consideration in the study.

'Region'

A further issue worth addressing at the outset is that in order to discuss the ideas driving higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia it is important to consider what it means to be a 'region'. Ideas about what constitutes a region vary by perspective and purpose. Understanding and explaining the 'region' as an object of study has sparked substantial debate in the social sciences, and led to the development of interdisciplinary fields such as 'old', 'new', and 'comparative' regionalism (Hettne, 2005; Robertson, Dale, Olds, & Dang, 2016). Conceptualizations of what constitutes a region vary considerably, with some interpretations focusing on degrees of regional cohesion or 'region-ness' (e.g. regional 'spaces', 'societies', 'institutionalised polities'), and others emphasizing processes of change involving interrelated dimensions (e.g. economic, political, security), 'actors' (e.g. state, market, civil society), and levels of society (see Hettne 2005).

While providing a concise definition of what constitutes a region is often the outcome of scholarly investigation rather than a starting point, for the purposes of this study I make the claim following Chou and Ravinet (2016, p. 275) that "a region, a regional area, a regional network, [or] a regional project is what the participating actors designate at the outset". A supranational[1] 'Northeast Asian region[2]' can thus be identified inductively, as a range of actors in China, Japan and South Korea have been involved in recent years in a variety of formal and informal processes of region building between the three countries, including the two policy initiatives for higher education regionalism selected for this study.

In addition to defining the meaning and scope of the Northeast Asian 'region' used in this study, it is necessary to present with clarity the variety of terms related to 'regional cooperation', including the term itself.

'Regionalization', 'regionalism', 'regional integration' and 'regional cooperation'

The terms in the above heading are often found in both the International Relations and Higher Education literature, and are at times defined in ambiguous and overlapping ways. While far from comprehensive, the brief discussion below provides an introduction to some of the main scholarly debates and includes definitions for these terms that will be utilized in the thesis.

[1] I include the term 'supranational' to highlight that my use of the term 'region' connotes spaces that contain multiple nation-states, rather than spaces within states that can also be termed 'regions'. Sub-national regions are also the subject of notable scholarship related to higher education, some of which has relevance for research of regions at the supranational level (see for example Audretsch, Lehmann, & Warning, 2004; Borell-Damian & Jorgenson, 2019; Jaffe, 1989).

[2] While referring to China, Japan and Korea as a 'region' may be problematic, I argue that it is the most suitable term for the purposes of this study. The term 'sub-region' may be more accurate but I feel this prefix is largely relative and unnecessary.

The terms ‘regionalization’ and ‘regionalism’ have at times been defined as distinct but frequently interdependent phenomena, and at other times the two terms have been deliberately blurred. Christopher Dent subsumes the two under the term ‘regionalism’ and provides the following definition:

> the ‘structures, processes and arrangements that are working towards greater coherence within a specific international regime in terms of economic, political, security, and socio-cultural and other kinds of linkages’ (Dent, 2008, cited in Dent, 2013, p. 964).

However, Dent also recognizes that there are two forms of regionalism that have distinct features and have been conceptually delineated by others. He writes:

> The first of these, comprising micro-level processes that stem from regional concentrations of interconnecting private or civil sector activities, may be specifically referred to as *regionalization*, as distinct from the second, which comprises public policy initiatives, such as a free trade agreement or other state-led projects of economic cooperation and integration that originate from intergovernmental dialogues and treaties, which may be specifically referred to as *regionalism*. According to this more strictly defined terminology, *regionalism* is a policy-driven, top-down process while *regionalization* is more of a business or societally driven, bottom-up process (Dent, 2013, p. 964, *italics added*).

For the purposes of this study, the terms ‘regionalization’ and ‘regionalism’ will be regarded as distinct but interconnected concepts, and align with the “more strictly defined” description provided in the above quote by Dent.

More specifically, following Robertson et al (2016), I will adhere to the definition of *regionalization* as the “tangible material and human flows that cross borders within a region and in doing so generate an evident and usually deepening intra-regional integration pattern when viewed from a global perspective” (Robertson et al., 2016, p. 4). I add to this the element suggested by Dent, in that regionalization refers to *de facto*, ‘bottom-up’ processes initiated autonomously by particular social actors which organically generate patterns of regional integration. By contrast, *regionalism* entails calculated, *de jure*, ‘top-down’

political processes aimed at the establishment of political, economic, security or social institutions at the regional level for the explicit purposes of region building. This aligns with many definitions from the International Relations literature. For example, International Relations scholar Amitav Acharya defines regionalism as "purposive interaction, formal or informal, among state and non-state actors of a given area in pursuit of shared external, domestic and transnational goals..." (Acharya, 2012, p. 3).

These two processes are frequently intertwined, in part because the growth of informal linkages creates a demand for the establishment of formal institutions to facilitate and enhance cross-border interactions (Robertson, et al., 2016).

Processes of regionalization and regionalism can also be observed in higher education. Extant frameworks and concepts regarding these phenomena in the higher education sector will be presented and interrogated in some detail in Chapter 3. In brief, and in line with the above definitions, *higher education regionalization* will refer to the increasing cross-border regional activities instigated primarily by actors at universities in a given region. *Higher education regionalism* entails government-led initiatives aimed at creating formalized programs, frameworks, higher education governance structures and other such institutions at the regional level. This aligns with an established definition by Chou and Ravinet who define higher education regionalism as "a political project of region creation involving at least some state authority (national, supranational, international), who in turn designates and delineates the world's geographical region to which such activities extend, in the higher education policy sector" (Chou & Ravinet, 2015, p. 368).

Regional integration will be defined as the broader, overarching processes of international relations between states and relevant non-state actors that move from independent action toward increasing levels of cooperation in various arenas. Regional integration can thus incorporate both regionalization and regionalism as defined above. In addition to these two mechanisms, Yamamoto (2013) introduces the concept of societal integration, describing it as a shift from "a phase in which fundamental values, norms and domestic institutions are inconsistent across a region to a phase in which values and norms are shared and a regional identity is formed" (p. 5). These shifts in values and norms and the development of a 'regional identity' are also encompassed in the definition of regional integration used in this study.

The ways by which regional integration occurs have been heavily studied and theorized, particularly in the field of International Relations, and with particular theoretical and empirical focus on processes of integration that have occurred in Europe. Some of the key theories from this field are useful to provide depth to the conceptualization of regional integration as it relates to higher education, and as such are briefly introduced below.

While much of International Relations focuses on the nation-state as the unit of analysis, some International Relations theorists of regional integration have recognized the relevance of non-state actors. One such theorist was Ernst B. Haas, who put forth a theory of regional integration known as neo-functionalism. Haas acknowledged the importance of states in integration processes, but posited that both supra- and sub-national non-state actors were capable of acting independently to reinforce, undermine, or circumvent national policies (Schmitter 2005). Haas argued that when states agree to assign some level of supranational responsibility to realize a limited task, there is the potential for a 'spill-over' of unintended

effects into other interdependent activities (ibid., p. 257). Thus, cooperation and "advancement toward the solution of concrete problems or production of collective goods in one arena is bound to affect performance and interests in other arenas" (ibid., p. 259). The theory posits that processes of economic integration will eventually 'spill-over' into forms of political integration. Yamamoto (2013) provides a useful figure to aid in visualizing the arenas in which spill-over can occur:

Figure 1.1 Sectors of integration



Source: Yamamoto (2013)

Other theories of regional integration also incorporate the notion of spill-over. Karl Deutsch's communication theory takes societal integration as its starting point, focusing on whether people in a given region share fundamental values and beliefs. From this perspective, a shared value system among either elites or the general populace in countries within a particular region can lead to a situation in which the use of force becomes improbable, thus leading to political rapprochement and the fostering of a security community (Deutsch et al 1957, cited in Yamamoto 2013, p. 11).

It's worth noting that in reality the process towards integration is rarely linear. States may move forward and backward along an axis of cooperation and may be at different stages of integration in *economic, political, security* and *societal* arenas at any given time. These four arenas are the typical focus of integration studies in the field of International Relations.

An arena that has yet to be adequately explored in the field of International Relations is the role of the higher education sector in influencing processes of regional integration in other arenas. As a unique and expansive sector with its own partly autonomous dynamics (Marginson 2017), higher education has the potential to shape society through both its institutionalized structures and its capacities for agency at local, national and global levels (Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). Depending on the system, universities can be classed as non-state actors, autonomous parts of the state, or in the case of East Asian nations with their strong state steering and control of higher education, as quasi-state actors. Higher education institutions serve both economic and societal functions through their roles as sub-national institutions and supra-nationally, through globalized collaborative networks. The public good aspects of higher education activities (such as the cross-border accessibility of research-based knowledge) could thus be conceptualized as having potential spill-over effects into other arenas of social life.

Critiques of neo-functionalism have pointed out that spill-over is not a given; societal demands do not automatically translate into policy (Caporaso, 1998), and in spite of progress in the economic arena, political leaders may operate according to a different set of guidelines. Some scholars have highlighted that because these traditional theories of regional integration have historically focused on the processes involved in the development, maintenance and expansion of the European Union, their suitability in non-

Western contexts may be problematic (Acharya 2012; Acharya & Buzan 2009; Hurrell 2016). Nevertheless, adding to the definition of regional integration the potential for spill-over is useful to conceptualize the possible far-reaching societal effects of higher education regional integration.

The various forms of integration discussed above represent one type of cooperative relationship possible between countries in a region, making the term *regional cooperation* the most general and all-encompassing of the four terms (Yamamoto, 2013). Regional cooperation can take many forms, and range from short-term arrangements to international regimes and supranational structures like the EU, and can conceivably culminate in the melding of originally distinct states into a new and unified sovereign state. International cooperation in the higher education arena can also manifest in a multitude of forms, including informal collaborative networks, project- and program-based cooperative arrangements, partnerships between departments or entire institutions for student and/or researcher mobility, the sharing of research equipment and other forms of capacity-building, consortia for research or exchange, 'triple-helix' collaborative relations between government, universities, and industry; frameworks for quality assurance and cross-border credit transfer, and more. As with cooperation between states, forms of higher education regional cooperation can vary in their levels of formality, modes of integration, duration and degrees of institutionalization.

The reason 'regional cooperation' was selected for inclusion in the title and in the research questions as opposed to regionalism, regionalization or regional integration is largely because of its capacity to serve as an expansive umbrella term, one which can be

interpreted with relative freedom by the actors whose ideas serve as the focal points of this study. This leads to a discussion of the intended meaning of the term 'actors'.

'Actors'

Unpacking the meaning of the term 'actor' inevitably leads into the fundamental debates in sociology concerning structure vs. agency, and notions of 'subjectivity' and 'the self' (Scott, 2014). A number of social theories and a vast literary cannon take up investigations of the characteristics of 'social actors', their capacities to be agentive and autonomous, and the nature of their relationships with social institutions (see for example Archer, 2000; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984). One noteworthy contribution to these debates has been actor-network theory (ANT), which posits that human actors are one of a plethora of agents that exist and operate within regenerative, evolving networks of relations (Latour, 2007). Actors, in this sense, can include humans, non-human animals and immaterial objects, all of which are capable of serving as 'mediators' which have transformative potential to alter forces that pass through their respective networks.

Actor-network theory has been taken up as research method in a variety of disciplines, including IR (Cudworth & Hobden, 2013). However, in the field of International Relations the term 'actor' generally refers to states, regarded as the principal agents of change in international relations. As was mentioned above, the field also recognizes 'non-state actors' as important players in international politics, a term which can encompass a wide array of individuals and groups such as business magnates, NGOs, media organizations, religious groups, and social movements. Universities could also be included in this group, but as was alluded to above the degrees by which universities operate autonomously from the state

vary considerably by context, and in East Asia universities are better understood as quasi-state actors.

I acknowledge that the term ‘actor’ could be used to refer to an organization like a university, or a nation-state, or a government policy document, and that the material and semiotic characteristics of these and other agents can have important influences on human actors enmeshed in networks with these other entities. However, in this study I am particularly interested in the human actors and their capacity to act as mediators to shape ideas of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. As such, for the purposes of this study, henceforth ‘actors’ will refer to *humans*, while the government policy documents that are analysed will be considered as structuring elements that help to frame and highlight the unique features of the ideas of the human actors interviewed for this project.

‘Institution’ and ‘institutional’

The terms ‘institution’ and ‘institutional’ are used with frequency and in different ways throughout the thesis, and warrant clarification. Often the terms refer conceptually to universities as organizations or social structures within which human actors operate and attempt to enact their agency. In these instances when the term is intended to refer to *higher education institutions*, I attempt to indicate this contextually[3]. There is frequent juxtaposition for example of policy ideas at the ‘national-level with the ‘institutional-level’. These expressions refer to comparisons between ideas emerging at the levels of the government and at universities, respectively.

[3] I have endeavoured in this thesis to avoid unnecessary abbreviations such as ‘HE’ for ‘higher education’, and ‘HEIs’ for ‘higher education institutions’. However, at times these and other abbreviations show up in quotes from referenced literature.

However, the term ‘institutional’ can also take on a broader, more abstract meaning when used in reference to the discursive institutionalist analytical framework used to explore the ideas of actors in this study. This more theoretical usage is taken up in some detail in Chapter 4, but in brief, ‘institutional context’ can refer to both the varied “structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents” and the “formal and informal institutions external to actors that may be seen to constrain (or empower) them” (Schmidt, 2017, p. 252). Therefore, in addition to internalized structures of meaning, institutions that are ‘external to actors’ are not limited to higher education institutions; they can refer to the vast range of institutionalized social facts that comprise the world of human relations. Again, I endeavor to make it clear which meaning I intend for these terms contextually, but where necessary further clarification is added in the text.

‘Policy’ and ‘policy ideas’

A final set of terms that will benefit from early clarification are ‘policy’ and ‘policy ideas’. The Cambridge Dictionary online defines ‘policy’ as “a set of ideas or a plan of what to do in particular situations that has been agreed to officially by a group of people, a business organization, a government, or a political party” (Cambridge Dictionary, n.d.). This definition implies that a given ‘set of ideas’ or ‘plan’, once conceived and agreed upon, exists in a static state. However, other definitions found in the academic literature describe policy as inherently processual in nature. Yeatman (1990, 1998, cited in Ozga & Lingard, 2007), for example,

> argues that policy should be conceived as a *process* that is negotiated and struggled over... This opens policy up to the appropriate participation of all those involved all the way through points of conception, operational formulation, implementation, delivery on the ground, consumption and evaluation, rather than separating policy from politics, which has the effect of protecting and sustaining bureaucratic logics of practice from democratic possibilities” (p. 67, italics in the original).

The notion of 'policy as process' is adopted in this study, with the particular points of scholarly interest being the 'operational formulation', 'implementation', and 'delivery on the ground', of top-down initiatives for Northeast Asian regionalism by academics and administrators at Japanese universities, as well as the 'consumption and evaluation' of these policies by participating students. I am particularly interested in the mediative capacities of these actors at Japanese universities to contribute to and shape the policy process, which will be explored through an investigation of their ideas of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, and the way these ideas compare with those at the government-level. It is in this sense that the term 'policy ideas' is generally employed, although this term also has a more specific meaning when discussed in relation to the discursive institutionalist analytical framework used for the analysis of the data collected in this study. A discussion of this more specific usage is taken up in some detail in the chapter on methodology (Chapter 4).

The terminology introduced above will be used consistently throughout the chapters that follow, and other terms will be introduced and defined as needed. The thesis now moves into Part I, which consists of two literature review chapters.

I. Literature Review

Chapter 2: Context

This first of two literature review chapters attempts to situate the research topic within a number of important and interconnected contexts. The first of these is the range of contemporary political and economic interactions that constitute international relations in Northeast Asia. An understanding of the key issues in this arena is essential to grasp the challenges and opportunities for regional cooperation in Northeast Asian higher education. I aim to provide an overview in the first section of the chapter, along with explanations for some of the current tensions and diplomatic impasses by drawing on examples from modern history. I also argue that any attempt to comprehend regional cooperation in this region benefits from an understanding of the cultural connections and patterns of exchange that have occurred between China, Japan and Korea over a much longer span of history. As such I address briefly in the second section this long historical legacy. A key element of this legacy is Confucianism, a philosophy of social organization that has influenced each of the three countries in deep and unique ways. An important and universally shared value of Confucianism is the value placed on education, and I focus in particular on the role of schooling and higher education in Confucian Northeast Asia in the final part of this section.

This leads to a point of transition in the chapter, where I shift focus to the context of global higher education. I introduce a number of interconnected phenomena that have shaped the sector worldwide in recent years, and then discuss the ways these developments have manifested in higher education in Northeast Asia. I also highlight how this part of the world has been rising dramatically on the global stage, particularly in areas such as knowledge production and innovation. Coinciding with this rise is an increase in both regional collaboration and competition, and the chapter closes by focusing on these key trends, with particular emphasis on Japan. In combination with the overview of the politics, cultural

connections and historical memories that shape Northeast Asian international relations, this chapter thus provides a detailed contextual frame through which to explore the programs for higher education regional cooperation selected for this study.

Northeast Asian international relations

Dynamics and tensions between China, Japan and South Korea

The countries that make up Northeast Asia are an important part of the more expansive and overlapping regions of East Asia (which includes ASEAN member countries[4]), and the Asia-Pacific, which incorporates powerful global players such as Russia, India and the United States. The Asia-Pacific region has been described as "a mosaic of divergent cultures and political regime types, historical estrangements, shifting power balances, and rapid economic change" (Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2003, p. 2). While in recent years economic power has been shifting in the region, the United States remains the dominant force in the security arena. Many nations, but not all, welcome the U.S. presence as a stabilizing force against volatile and unpredictable states like North Korea, and as a check against the rising global power of China. Nevertheless, He and Inoguchi state that "Asia is ripe for conflict, if not outright confrontation. The armed populations on the Korean Peninsula and on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are the two largest armed groups in the world" (2011, p. 174). Within this potentially volatile broader system, relations between Northeast Asian states have proven to be equally complex. While regional economic interdependence has been rapidly increasing, a range of geo-political issues and historical tensions between Japan, China and South Korea, as well as a rivalry leadership competition between China and Japan, present obstacles for regional cooperation (Byun and Um, 2014).

[4] Alternatively referred to as Southeast Asia.

Economic interdependence

Despite these challenges, many actors in the Asia-Pacific have in fact demonstrated "a growing predilection for highly hedged cooperation rather than overt hostility" by focusing primarily on economic development (Pempel, 2010, p. 468). In Northeast Asia, the rapid economic growth of China in the first decade of the 21st Century has led to dramatic increases in intra-regional trade volumes, with China now being both South Korea and Japan's most important trade partner in terms of imports and exports (Byun & Um, 2014, p. 125). Conversely, dependence on the U.S. in the economic sphere has declined. Inoguchi highlights the relative rapidity of this *de facto* economic regionalization with a European comparison:

> Whereas the European combined economy took more than 50 years to achieve an intra-regional trade figure of 60 percent, the East Asian[5] economy surpassed the 50 percent level in a mere 15 years (Inoguchi, 2009, p. 347).

As with the formation of the European Union (EU), increasing economic interdependence in Northeast Asia may be a precursor for political, cultural and other forms of integration. However, as was mentioned in the Introduction, critics of integration theories argue that economic integration does not inherently spill-over into other arenas, and developments in the political arena often evolve according to their own logics (Caporaso, 1998). Furthermore, the troubled political landscape of present-day Europe provides a salient example that regional integration is not an inherently linear, one-way process. During the writing of this thesis, waves of nativist populism have spread across many European states, exemplified by the decision and protracted process of the United Kingdom 'brexiting' from the EU.

[5] Inoguchi uses the term 'East Asia' here to refer to China, Japan and Korea.

While claims of causality and spill-over may be debatable, economic regionalization in Northeast Asia has nevertheless also been accompanied and supported by efforts towards regionalism. The same period of growing economic interdependence has seen the institutionalization of many forms of regional cooperation through the creation of institutions such as ASEAN Plus Three (APT), the East Asian Summit (EAS) and the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS). These various summits have often been spearheaded by ASEAN, which has played the role of 'convenor and facilitator', and enabled the otherwise reluctant parties of China, Japan and Korea to come together (Koh, 2010). For example,

> In 1997, the ASEAN plus Three (Japan, Korea, and China) was instituted. Japan, Korea, and China were major economic engines. Both ASEAN and the Three wanted to benefit from being closer [to] each other. No less important was the consideration to help the Three to talk to each other without too much fuss. The Three were at odds when they came together as a trio because of their insistence on face, rank and politics before they even reached the negotiation table. **For example, during negotiations it was necessary to use a room with three entrances and a desk of a triangular shape**" (Inoguchi and He, 2011, p. 167).

The requirements of a room with three entrances and triangular table paints a somewhat comical picture highlighting the fragility of the relationship between the three nations at the political level. Nevertheless, as a result of these frameworks discussions of an 'East Asian Community' have also emerged, albeit conceptions of what this community would entail have differed depending on the perspectives of the various stakeholder nations (Soeya, 2010).

While economic regionalization has served as a relatively stable foundation upon which to build regional institutions, like other forms of integration economic regionalization is not an inherently linear or unidirectional process; it is subject to fluctuations caused by domestic political developments, forces of globalization, and evolutions in the global

economy. Regarding the Northeast Asian region, the continued economic growth of China which has served until now to integrate the region may conversely evolve into a destabilizing force. It has been predicted that by 2050 the Chinese economy will be the largest in the world, nearly double the size of the US (Jacques, 2012). If this prediction begins to manifest in reality, it may be the case that the US sees its relationship with China as more important than that with Japan or Korea, which would likely serve to subvert the region's fragile stability. The future is, of course, uncertain. Claims about the past and present can arguably be made with more certainty, although when it comes to Northeast Asia these domains too are subjects of contestation and heated debate.

Contested histories

While economic interdependence has arguably contributed to regional stability and cohesion, a range of socio-political issues continue to cause tensions between the three countries. Many of these issues have connections to the contested history of Japan's imperialistic past, and a survey of the news will frequently reveal the latest iteration of these tensions. For example, throughout the process of writing this thesis, a number of events have sparked controversy and rekindled antagonisms between the three countries. In 2017 in Japan, the owner of a sizeable hotel chain placed a revisionist history book in hotel rooms that denied the Nanjing Massacre and the existence of "comfort women[6]", sparking protests and boycotts (The Japan Times, 2017b). In the same month, an ultranationalist school accused of bigotry against Chinese and Koreans was linked to Japan's First Lady, highlighting the growing prominence of a right-wing nationalist education movement in Japan (Soble, 2017). 2017 saw activities in South Korea generate tensions with both Japan and China in the diplomatic sphere as well. The placement of a

[6] 'Comfort women' is a term used to refer to the women and girls who were forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese Imperial Army during World War II (Argibay, 2003).

memorial to comfort women in front of the Japanese consulate in the city of Busan led Japan to recall its ambassador to South Korea, and Japan became further incensed by a proposal for erecting a similar memorial on the disputed island of Dokdo/Takeshima (The Japan Times, 2017a). In the security arena, South Korea's deployment of the U.S. Thaad missile defense system enraged China, which views it as a threatening exertion of American power that upsets the regional security balance. In response China banned Korean TV shows and pop stars, and the state-controlled media urged the public to boycott South Korean products and has even threatened possible military repercussions (Perlez & Choe, 2017).

In 2017-2018 the news cycle tended to shift towards issues pertaining to North Korea, and issues among the three countries were reported with significantly less frequency[7]. However, by the end of 2018 news stories once again began highlighting the persistent tensions between the three countries. In October of 2018, the Supreme Court of South Korea ordered Japan's Nippon Steel to pay $89,000 each to a former Korean slave laborer[8] and the families of three other plaintiffs — "a landmark decision clearing the way for former laborers and their descendants to claim the local assets of Japanese companies" (Choe & Rich, 2019). The implications of this ruling were especially significant because as many as 149,000 living and deceased victims of forced labor have been confirmed, and as many as

[7] English language news sources from the three countries were consulted, as were publications such as *The New York Times, BBC News, The Diplomat* and the *East Asia Forum.* For a list of news articles consulted see Appendix G

[8] Estimates suggest that as many as 7.8 million Koreans were coerced into forced labor during Japan's imperial expansion leading up and during World War II. Men had to work in mines and munitions factories or fight alongside Japanese soldiers while women were forced into sexual slavery in military brothels. After the war, the South Korean government sought compensation on behalf of these workers, and in 1965 Japan provided $300 million in aid and $200 million in loans. However, South Korea's ruling military dictatorship used the bulk of this money to jump-start the country's industrialization, and very few workers received payment. Only after the country's democratic elections in the late 80s did these workers begin to seek damages in both the Japanese and Korean courts (Choe & Rich, 2019).

"300 Japanese companies in operation can be traced to those that exploited such workers" (ibid.). Choe and Rich (2019) described the stark response from Japan:

> Japan has responded with outrage, pointing to wording in the 1965 treaty that describes all claims arising from the colonial era as "settled completely and finally." Prime Minister Shinzo Abe warned South Korea not to enforce what he called "impossible" judgments, hinting at economic retaliation if it does.

Korea did not balk at these statements, and economic retaliation soon followed, with Japan imposing trade restrictions and removing Korea from its 'whitelist' of preferred trade partners. Korea followed suit, revoking Japan's preferential trade status, and escalating a trade war that was compounded by mass boycotts of Japanese products in Korea. The row also spilled over into the security arena, with Korea calling an end to a bilateral agreement for sharing classified military intelligence, primarily with regard to potential threats from North Korea, China and Russia (Choe, Rich, & Wong, 2019). The row has thus marked a low point in the tumultuous relationship between the two countries. By contrast, in 2018 Japan and China reportedly reached a new level of cooperation, with Japan's Prime Minister Abe pledging to "forge deeper economic and political cooperation" and view China as its 'partner' going forward (Meyers & Rich, 2018). Japan's move was described as both an acknowledgement of the dominance of China's economy and a strategic response to the unpredictable 'America First' policies of President Trump, which have unwittingly served to push the "two historic rivals closer together" (ibid).

The above-mentioned events that have gained media attention in recent years are but an example of a wide range of issues that spark enmity among the three countries. Many of these tensions are aggravated by the actions of political leaders, a recurrent example of which is the visits of Japanese prime ministers to Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine – a memorial to Japan's war dead that includes Class-A war criminals convicted of atrocities in the region

during WWII. Others have to do with disputes over sovereignty of islands in the East China Sea (and the natural gas fields that lie beneath them) and issues related to regional security, particularly regarding security issues involving the United States.

Much of the tensions between the three countries relate to events that have taken place since Japan embarked on its project of modern-nation building at the start of the Meiji Era in the late 19th-century. Japan's activities since this time have generated reactions among elites and the general publics of neighboring East (and Southeast) Asian countries ranging from admiration to deep-seated resentment. Portrayals of Japan in these and other societies have varied widely, including images of the nation as a successful model of Asian modernization, a brutal colonizer and unrepentant military invader, an economic powerhouse, a pop-culture trendsetter, and an "obedient prop of American hegemony" (Morris, Shimazu, & Vickers, 2015, p. 4). Particular portrayals of Japan in East and Southeast Asia have been strategically emphasized in different societies at different times and played an instrumental role in the construction of national identities in a number of countries. Likewise, Japan itself has adopted various perspectives of its own role in relation to its Asian neighbors, and these are discussed in some detail in the following chapter. In the case of China and Korea, notions of collective victimhood at the hands of the Japanese have become a central tenet of each country's respective nationalist mythologies (ibid., p. 6).

Nationalism as a political tool

In the modern era, centralized state power found in each of the three nations has been exerted toward the inculcation of particular national identities for the purposes of legitimation, self-preservation, and the mobilization of each countries' citizenries for

economic development. At times this has involved the utilization of xenophobic discourses that have fueled both regional tensions and forms of ultra-nationalism (Hammond, 2016). Ruling elites have often been the instigators that spark popular resentment towards the other countries, often for the purpose of deflecting criticism away from themselves or unpopular domestic policies (Vickers, 2007). For example, the Communist Party of China has frequently invoked the image of Japan as an 'enemy Other' for the dual purpose of reinforcing national unity and deflecting popular anger away from domestic problems (Morris et al., 2015). This tendency for the centralized governments of each country to foster the development of strong nationalistic identities is a shared characteristic that serves to not only set China, Japan and Korea apart from one another, but frequently against one another.

While pervasive nationalist discourses and the lingering effects of Japanese imperialism may be pointed to as key factors that shape Northeast Asian relations more broadly, there are also an number of salient bilateral issues that are worthy of mention. Some of the specific historical and contemporary developments that have fostered tensions between particular countries are discussed below. The significance of the role of the USA in the region is also briefly considered.

Japan and China

Japan's history with China was relatively untroubled throughout much of recorded history. Japan played the role of an intermittent tributary state for much of this time, while borrowing a number of cultural, religious and philosophical traditions from China (described below). This all changed dramatically, however, with the Meiji Restoration in 1868. Looking up to the West as a model for modernization, Japan began to distance itself from its Asian neighbors. The Confucian emphasis on hierarchy that shaped Japanese

society internally through a rigid caste system expanded outward during this time, with the Western nations revered for their progress and deemed superior, and the 'backward' nations of Asia regarded as inferior to the modernizing West and to Japan (Jacques, 2012). In addition to scientific knowledge, innovative production techniques and new technologies, Japan also sought to emulate the Western powers in the practice of colonization.

The indemnity China was forced to pay Japan as a result of its defeat in the Sino-Japanese in 1894-5 war was a major driver in Japan's subsequent rapid industrialization (Holcombe, 2011, p. 205). Japan eventually launched a campaign of occupation and subjugation in neighboring China, Manchuria and Korea (expanding again dramatically in World War II) that is a major source of tension and resentment to this day. The Nanjing Massacre in particular, in which as many as 300,000 Chinese civilians were murdered over the course a few weeks, is regarded as a particularly traumatic event with lasting effects on the Chinese national consciousness; a fact that the government of Xi Jinping has been utilizing to its advantage. The historical memory of this tragedy has been exploited as a political tool in recent years by the CCP, which began state-led commemorations of the massacre (hosted by Xi Jinping) in 2014. The date commemorating the massacre is now one of three new public holidays that focus on the conflict between the two countries (BBC, 2014). The response from Japan has not helped the situation. The resistance of Japan to properly apologize for this atrocity has only fueled anti-Japanese sentiment in China. A connected issue that has sparked enmity has been the publication of revisionist history textbooks in Japan (with backing from many in government including PM Abe) that downplay Japan's crimes against China and other East Asian countries during the war (Selden & Nozaki, 2009).

Like many other countries in the East Asian region, there are disputes between China and Japan over islands that both countries claim as their own. China argues that international maps from the Ming Dynasty show the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were a part of China in that period, while the Japanese have claimed the islands since they were colonized after the Sino-Japanese War. Like the other contentious issues between the two countries, this serves as an ongoing source of tension and potential conflict.

Japan and Korea

Japan's history with Korea is complex. Tensions between the two countries began to emerge in the Meiji Restoration. The Koreans objected to the new Western-style approaches to trade (as well as the Western styles of dress) adopted by the Japanese, and refused to acknowledge the Japanese emperor (Holcombe, 2011). Doing so would put the Japanese emperor on equal footing with the emperor of China, to whom Korea served as a tributary state. It also meant that Japan's ruler would be ranked higher than that of the Korean king (ibid.). This refusal to recognize the emperor outraged Japan, and from 1875 they began to dispatch warships and soldiers to Korea. This pressure led Korea, under the advice of China, to sign a Western-style treaty that granted Korea independent status but also permitted port-style concessions to Japan.

During this period splits occurred within Korean leadership, with conservatives aligning with China and modernizers and reformers aligning with Meiji Japan (ibid.). Soon both countries became involved on Korean soil. An uneasy peace treaty was shattered by a popular religious uprising, which led both China and Japan to send troops to Korea (ibid.). The above-mentioned Sino-Japanese War was declared between China and Japan on 1 August 1894. Japan was victorious against China, taking territory in Manchuria and some

areas of coastal China. China was also forced to concede the island of Taiwan, and formally acknowledged Korea's independence. This led to expanding Japanese presence there.

Not all Koreans resisted Japanese occupation, with some pro-Japanese Korean officials instituting modernizing reforms and removing many of the Chinese influences from society such as the Chinese calendar and the civil service examinations (ibid.). During this period Korea was still nominally independent from Japan, and began to assert its own national identity. In 1897 the new *han'gul* alphabet was introduced, replacing Chinese characters. The Korean emperor (as he now called himself) was able to play Russian interests off of those of Japan, which helped to keep the rapidly industrializing country at bay (ibid.). Russia had interests in Manchuria and Japan's lay in Korea, and neither country was willing to reach an agreement. Great Britain aligned with the Japanese which gave confidence for Japan to confront Russia. This sparked the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. Once again two foreign powers battled on Korean soil. Japan was victorious against Russia as a result of strategic naval battles, and by 1905 Korea was reduced to the status of a Japanese protectorate. By 1910, Korea was a formal Japanese colony, a status it was to keep until the end of World War II (ibid.).

This period had mixed effects – while Koreans were subjected to inhumane oppression and racism under Japanese rule, the country also became thoroughly industrialized, second only to Japan itself by 1945 (ibid.). Holcombe writes: "Modernization in Korea thus followed a complicated trajectory, including simultaneous Japanese-ization, Westernization, and also the maturation of a new sense of Korean nationalism" (2011, p. 247).

With the outbreak of World War II in 1937, attempts to assimilate Korea into the Japanese Empire intensified. Koreans were forced to worship at *Shintō* shrines and take Japanese

names. The Korean language came to be banned in government, schools and the private press, even though it is estimated that in 1942 only about 20% of Koreans could understand Japanese (ibid.). In 1943, Koreans began to be drafted into the Imperial Army. So too were more than 100,000 Korean women forced into sexual slavery at the service of the Japanese military. These inappropriately named "comfort women" are still the subject of heated debate between Korea and Japan, with controversy frequently erupting over the Japanese government's approach to formal apologies and financial compensation for survivors.

Twenty years after World War II relations between Japan and Korea began to improve somewhat, albeit slowly. Holcombe writes:

> Korea re-established formal diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, moreover, Japan quickly became South Korea's largest trading partner. But if history explains Korea's close connections with Japan, it also explains deep Korean feelings of bitterness toward their formal colonial masters and an understandable desire to assert Korea's own independent national identity. Japanese cultural products were officially banned in South Korea until as late as 1998, and although generic modern Japanese appliances such as TVs might be acceptable, Japanese automobiles were totally excluded. Japanese-language education was also banned in Korea (and not reintroduced into Korean high schools until 1973) (ibid., p. 307).

While tensions continue to be played out in the political sphere, relations between Japan and Korea continue to evolve. Today South Korean cultural products are arguably the most popular in the region, with Korean TV dramas and K-pop music attracting die-hard fans. The so-called Korean Wave has had a dramatic soft power effect in the region and increasingly on a global scale. However, there have been anti-Korean protests about a Korean 'cultural invasion' by nationalists in China, Japan and Taiwan.

China and Korea

For hundreds of years the kingdoms that made up the Korean peninsula served as tributary states for the Chinese Empire. However, after World War II South Korea became an ally

of the United States, “a relationship that was cemented in the Korean War, with no small part of its subsequent economic success being due to its position as an American vassal state during the Cold War” (Jacques, 2012, p. 365). In the Korean War the Chinese sided with the North. In the conflict thirty-three thousand US lives were lost, and by comparison 800,000 Chinese (including Mao Zedong’s own son), and 3 million Korean people were killed (Holcombe, 2011). Today, China has far greater cultural and commercial interests in South Korea, though it still retains some diplomatic and trade relations with the North. Jacques outlines the complexity of the situation:

> Clearly, in the long run, China’s relationship with South Korea is far more important to it than that with North Korea: China’s trade with the South, for example, is 70 times greater than that with the North. On the other hand, the Chinese would probably prefer to see the Korean Peninsula remain divided for the foreseeable future because it does not want to share a border with South Korea given its military alliance with the United States and the continuing presence of the latter’s troops. The Chinese, as a consequence, are anxious to maintain a reasonably close relationship with North Korea while also seeking to ensure the country does not implode…There is no question, however, that China’s relationship with Pyongyang constantly puts Beijing in a difficult and defensive position both regionally and globally: ... these events served to strengthen the bonds between the US, South Korea and Japan, while also alienating South Korean public opinion (ibid., p. 366-367).

The US presence

It is impossible to study East Asian international relations without consideration of the influence of the United States, whose presence in the region Martin Jacques likens to an ‘elephant in the room’. He writes:

> with its military alliance with Japan, its military bases in South Korea, its long-term support for Taiwan, and various other bilateral alliances and arrangements, not to mention the Korean and Vietnamese wars, it has been the dominant military power in the region ever since it replaced Europe in the 1950s (Jacques, 2012, p. 401).

While the US still boasts the strongest military presence in the region, its political and economic clout is arguably waning. Military alliances with Japan and South Korea remain

strong, although these ties have become more tenuous during the era of the unpredictable Trump administration. The presence of US interests in the region has implications for any attempts for China, Korea and Japan to entertain ideas of regional integration, as the US tends not to condone alliances of which it is not a part (Jacques, 2012).

I have attempted thus far in this chapter to provide a reasonably thorough picture of contemporary international relations in Northeast Asia. While Japan has arguably played a central and controversial role in the development of region, I argue that it is a valuable exercise to zoom out and view the Northeast Asian region from a broader historical perspective. Doing so reveals that in addition to contemporary economic and political factors shaping Northeast Asian relations, the modern countries and cultures of China, Korea and Japan have in fact been formed over the course of a very long and richly interconnected history. Highlighting this historical context serves to further situate the topic of regional cooperation in cultural, linguistic and philosophical perspective.

Historical, cultural and linguistic connections

Prior to the Meiji Restoration and the advent of the modern age, the three Northeast Asian countries had been for centuries most directly influenced by the legacy of the Sinic, or Chinese, civilization (Holcombe, 2011). According to Holcombe:

> East Asia has an historical coherence as a civilization that is roughly equivalent to what we think of as Western civilization, with the Bronze Age prototype that first emerged in high antiquity in the region we now call China providing approximately the same sort of core historical legacy for the modern countries of China, Japan and Korea that ancient Greece and Rome left for modern Italy, France, Britain, Germany, and what we think of somewhat vaguely and imperfectly as "the West" (ibid., p. 3).

The three pillars of this historical legacy are the influences of Confucianism, Buddhism, and the Chinese writing system (ibid.). While the transmissions of Confucianism and

Buddhism inherently brought with them facets of Chinese culture and language, the universalist messages of these belief systems entailed Japan and Korea could adopt and adapt the teachings as their own.

The influence of Confucianism

The core teachings of Confucian philosophy came to be canonized in the five Confucian Classics which served as the heart of formal education in East Asia[9] for over two thousand years (from the late second century BCE to the early twentieth century CE) (Holcombe, 2011). Confucian teachings emphasize a humanistic and ethical philosophy that promotes filial piety, respect for order and authority, and the organizing social principle of hierarchy. In addition, leadership by virtue and scholarly merit are hallmarks of the teachings, the adoption of which led to the imperial examination system in China that flourished during the Tang and Song Dynasties. Today, screening by examination still serves a major function in East Asian education systems[10].

While evolving over time and arguably influenced by encounters with Western Enlightenment ideas, Confucian values have continued to impact Northeast Asian societies up to the present day. Scholars have debated whether (Neo-) Confucian values were influential in the rapid rise of both East Asian economies and higher education systems in the post-War period (Marginson, 2011a; Tu, 2008).

Social hierarchy and deference to those senior are observable in the three societies, as are high levels of respect paid to educators, academics and others with particular forms of

[9] In these sections on history the term 'East Asia' at times is used following from Holcombe (2011), and refers to China, Japan, Korea and at times Vietnam.

[10] Speak with any final-year high school student seeking to gain entrance to university in Japan, China or Korea and it becomes readily apparent how profound an effect the legacy of the examination system still has on the lives of individuals, their families, and broader society (Hammond, 2018).

expertise. While these hierarchies serve to stratify society, value placed on education and self-cultivation entail anyone can rise in society through studious hard work (Holcombe, 2011).

The Confucian Classics spread beyond China to Korea, Japan and Vietnam. While this transmission inherently brought with it facets of Chinese culture and language, the universalist message of Confucianism (and Buddhism as well) meant that other cultures could adopt and adapt the teachings as their own. In some instances, the adaptation entailed a removal of this very notion of universality. An example can be seen in Japan, with a shift in emphasis from universalism and meritocracy towards hierarchy, loyalty and the moral obligation to fulfil one's role (ibid.). The transmission of Confucianism to Korea also entailed localization, and even fostered a strengthening of Korean identity. With the fall of the Ming Dynasty and the reign of the Manchus during the succeeding Qing Dynasty, the Koreans came to see themselves as the sole exemplars of a true Confucian society (ibid). The influence of Confucianism is arguably a major unifying factor that connects Northeast Asian societies. However, each country has developed its own unique versions of Confucianism (Zhang, Lin, Nonaka, & Beom, 2005), and both Japan and Korea view their own versions as distinct and removed from that of China.

Traditional Chinese Confucianism is an ethical system that was developed in antiquity. Much like the revival of Greek philosophy and Roman law that occurred during the Renaissance period, subsequently shaping modern Western institutions, a movement known as *Neo-Confucianism* became a major influencing force in East Asia during the Tang Dynasty and continued until the twentieth century (Holcombe, 2011). While there are inherent tensions between traditional Confucianism with its emphasis on social harmony

and the public good, and Buddhism, which entails a self-centered rejection of an illusory world, Neo-Confucianism melded traditional Confucian ethics with Taoism and Buddhism. In addition to the influences Buddhism had on Confucian thought, the religion itself had a profound impact on the cultures and societies of Northeast Asia.

Buddhism in East Asia

Buddhism spread across East Asia during the Chinese 'Age of Division' after the fall of the Han Dynasty (220 to 589 CE) (Holcombe, 2011). This period coincides with the beginnings of recorded history for both Korea and Japan. Holcombe writes:

> A relatively common elite culture spread throughout East Asia in this period, extending to modern China, Korea, Japan, and northern Vietnam. The various local East Asian elites of this period in some ways even had more in common with each other than with the peasants in their own nearby villages. This was the age when East Asia was born. One of the key features of this new East Asian cultural community – and one that simultaneously also linked it, at another level, to a much larger world – was Buddhism (ibid., p. 70).

The primary form of East Asian Buddhism is Mahayana (Greater Vehicle) Buddhism, a tradition that "promises universal salvation, in which the Buddha and Bodhisattvas have come to be worshiped deities and rebirth in paradise is often seen as a more immediate goal than an end to reincarnation in *nirvana*" (ibid., p. 71). Another important form of Buddhism that developed in China was *Chan*, commonly known in the West by its Japanese name, *Zen.* This was a uniquely Chinese form of Buddhism that was influenced by Taoist thought. The emphasis was on meditation, with the idea that enlightenment can be attained instantly by removing the illusion of duality and awakening to the reality of the world (ibid, p. 101). Zen Buddhism had a major influence in Japan in particular, informing much of the cultural developments of the Kamakura and Muromachi periods (1185-1568) such as rock gardens, art and architecture, and the *chanoyu*, or tea ceremony (ibid., pp. 152-157).

The legacy of the Chinese written language

The third major unifying feature of Northeast Asia was the adoption of the Chinese writing system in both Korea and Japan. With the spread of the influence of the Confucian Classics so too did literacy in the Chinese written language become essential for cultural elites in these countries. This influence lasted for centuries up until the age of modernization, when attention was redirected towards the West:

> Despite the strengths of this [the Chinese writing] system, in the twentieth century, under the impact of modern Western influences, Chinese characters were largely abandoned in Korea, while in Japan they have been so thoroughly domesticated as to seem part of traditional Japanese culture. Even within China, sweeping language reforms were implemented, including the abandonment of the classical written language in favour of a modern vernacular in the early twentieth century and script simplification in the People's Republic. *It is still the case, however, that over one-third of the vocabulary items in each of the modern Japanese and Korean languages derive from Chinese, so the ghost of this once-shared premodern written language still hovers over East Asia* (ibid., p.24, italics added).

Unlike the written language, however, there are dramatic differences between the other linguistic features of the Korean, Japanese and Chinese languages. While Korean and Japanese are considered to be distant relatives of the same language family, the many variations of Chinese come from a completely different family. Thus, if linguistic competence in one of the three languages isn't shared between peoples of these three nations who wish to communicate, the default means of communication tends to be in the *lingua franca* of English (Graddol, 2000).

Summary

The above sections have attempted to present how the Northeast Asian region is shaped by:

a) interconnected historical, cultural and linguistic legacies spanning millennia;
b) contested modern histories that are co-opted by strong, nationalistic, centralized states for self-legitimating domestic purposes; and

c) multifaceted economic, political and socio-cultural relations that continue to evolve in response to global forces, including the rise of China and the ongoing regional presence of the United States.

I argue that an understanding of these varied social forces is an essential foundation for any attempt at understanding processes of higher education regional cooperation between China, Japan and Korea. It is also important to establish an understanding of the social functions of education in these societies, in order to better situate the roles of universities involved in programs for regional cooperation. In the following section I shift the discussion to education in a broad sense, before focusing on global and regional developments in the higher education sector.

The role of education

Within this complex historical, cultural, political and economic setting beset by ongoing tensions and potential flashpoints for conflict, educational institutions have often played central and formative roles. Schooling is especially pertinent in the region given the high status placed on education, self-cultivation and educators themselves in Confucian societies. Education in the region has historically been utilized for manpower planning in the service of developmental statism, which has included an emphasis on the cultivation of national identities for the purpose of mobilizing citizens to the common goal of modernization (Anderson, 2006; Green, 2013; Hammond, 2016). In particular, national identity formation has frequently been cultivated through state-mandated history, civic and moral education curricula (Hammond, 2016; McCullough, 2008).

In addition to developing understandings of their national selves, students are also often exposed to particular ideas and information about other countries, carefully selected by centralized education ministries. Indeed, it is often this information provided through school curricula that serves as a primary and formative source of knowledge for citizens of

a given country. For example, according to a 2009 survey conducted by Asia-Vision, 57% of Japanese university students described their main source of knowledge of other Asian countries as being 'school education' (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1: Sources of knowledge of other Asian countries for Japanese university students



Source: Asia-Vision Survey, 2009, cited in Kawaji, 2011 (Kawaji, 2011)

Considering this survey is now over a decade old, it is likely that if redone today the Internet would comprise a larger share of the pie as a source of information about neighboring Asian countries. If combined with 'newspapers, TV and radio' and 'books and magazines' into a category of 'online and offline media'(which would make sense given that many of these

forms of media are available both online and offline), it may even be the case that this source of information would parallel or surpass formal schooling. Nevertheless, it is valuable to recognize that education can have an important and formative role in the shaping of beliefs and opinions about one's own nation and one's neighbors, including attitudes about regional cooperation. Formal 'K-12' schooling in Northeast Asian societies has traditionally been top-down, teacher-centered and focused on rote learning and memorization. While consistently producing top scores on international assessments like the PISA test, education systems in the region have frequently been criticized for neglecting the development of critical thought among students (Hammond, 2013). In the Japanese context, ideas about Japan, Northeast Asia and the wider world are thus not necessarily open for discussion or debate in formal school settings.

In this context, universities may be in a unique position to open up spaces for more critical reflection on regional relations, including discussions of possibilities for regional cooperation. While students entering Japanese universities have traditionally matriculated into a specific department and focused on single academic specialisms, the provision of supplemental 'general education' classes has become increasingly commonplace in recent years (Huang, 2015). As such, in addition to those students majoring in International Studies/Relations or other fields in which they would critically engage with topics such as regional politics or history, general and liberal arts curricula could potentially provide opportunities accessible to all students for critical reflection on these and a wide range of other issues. In this respect, university education may facilitate the creation of a space for students to discuss and debate topics that were previously delivered in a rote and unquestionable manner through compulsory schooling.

While many universities in Northeast Asia are situated as extensions of the state and predominantly serve to further national interests, world-class research universities also operate in the global dimension, simultaneously competing and cooperating with other institutions worldwide (Marginson 2014). This global role of universities, coupled with government support aimed at creating globally competitive higher education systems, enables highly-ranked universities to act semi-autonomously. A recent example of this autonomy can be seen in top-ranked University of Tokyo and Kyoto Universities' defiance of a Ministry of Education request that Japan's national universities abolish social science and humanities programs in favor of those that "better meet society's needs" (Grove, 2015). While this level of autonomy does not extend to most universities in Northeast Asia, the activities of many universities nevertheless can have unanticipated effects beyond state borders in spite of the strong state control of higher education. For example, cooperation through processes of internationalization and research collaboration results in the private and public goods of higher education becoming accessible beyond state borders. The creation of research-based knowledge through cross-border cooperation, particularly that which is geared toward the understanding and solution of global problems, is perhaps the most notable of these 'global public', or 'global common' goods (Marginson, 2014, 2017).

Given these possibilities for higher education to serve as a public sphere for critical dialogue and its potential to create global public (or common) goods, I argue that universities have the capacity to make a lasting contribution to regional cooperation and the resolution of persistent tensions among the Northeast Asian countries. The chapter now turns to a discussion of higher education in more detail, including global developments and the impacts these are having on Northeast Asian systems.

Evolutions in global higher education

Higher education systems worldwide have undergone dramatic structural changes in recent decades. Some of the most salient developments are introduced below.

Massification

One of the most significant trends has been the massification of higher education. Growing demand for skilled workers to fuel knowledge economies coupled with ideas of equity and the shifting social belief that higher education is no longer solely the purview of the elite classes has led to a massive expansion of tertiary education enrolment worldwide. Figure 2.2 highlights this trend, and shows how tertiary enrolment has outpaced both population growth and economic development as evidenced by real GDP.

Figure 2.2: The Massification of Tertiary Education



Source: (Marginson, 2019b)

Massification has had a number of societal effects. One of these is credential inflation (also known as 'diploma disease' (Dore, 1997)), whereby the growing proportion of tertiary degree holders leads to an inverse reduction in the value of such degrees. As such, students must increasingly seek further opportunities to differentiate themselves from their peers

through additional qualifications, internships, study abroad, and other experiences that highlight their 'value' to potential employers. A striking example of this phenomenon appeared in a BBC News article in 2019, which highlighted that *post*graduate degrees are now needed in the UK to get significantly higher earnings compared to those without degrees (Coughlan, 2019). Another effect of massification is that while credential inflation arguably reduces the value of degrees (in terms of employability), those without degrees nevertheless become increasingly penalized. As massification reaches what Martin Trow termed 'universal' higher education – whereby approximately 50% of a societies' age appropriate population are attending higher education – families increasingly view sending their children to university as an obligation, even though it may be unaffordable for many of them (Trow, 1973). In some societies such as the US, large numbers of university students are required to take out substantial loans to pay for college, and end up graduating with significant and at times debilitating amounts of debt.

Expansion of the higher education sector through massification also leads to a vertical stratification of universities, with older institutions tending to retain prestige and positions of higher status over newer institutions. As the sector expands governments frequently become less able to cover costs of provision, so universities must actively seek additional sources of revenue to remain operational. This often entails higher tuition fees and other increasing costs, the burdens of which are passed on to students and their families.

Globalization and the 'global dimension' of higher education

Another noteworthy development that has had dramatic effects on universities and higher education systems around the world is the complex and contested phenomenon known as globalization. The literature on globalization is vast, and definitions of what it entails vary

widely. One influential definition has defined globalization as "a process (or set of processes) that embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions, generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and power" (Held, McGrew, Goldblatt, & Perraton, 1999). The vast scope of this and other similar definitions have caused some scholars to lament that

> [g]lobalization has been linked to almost every purported social change in recent years, from an emergent knowledge economy, the declining authority of the state and the demise of traditional cultural practices to the spread of neo-liberal economic regimes and the advent of a postmodern consumer culture (Rizvi, 2007, p. 23).

Other more focused discussions of globalization view it as a force effecting particular arenas of social life. For example, much of the literature considers globalization in economic terms, whether evidenced through an increase in economic flows across borders (also termed 'internationalization'), or the removal of restrictions impeding these flows such as trade or investment barriers (also termed 'liberalization') (O'Brien & Williams, 2013, p. 27). Other definitions focus on communicative or cultural aspects of the phenomenon, such as the growing spread and acceptance of ideas and principles worldwide ('universalization'), or the tendency of these ideas (e.g. the discourse of human rights) to have origins in and flow uni-directionally from the US and Europe ('Westernization/Americanization') (ibid., Rizvi, 2007.). Arjun Appadurai, a prominent scholar of cultural globalization, disputes this view however, suggesting that

> Globalization is itself a deeply historical, uneven, and even *localizing* process. Globalization does not necessarily or even frequently imply homogenization or Americanization, and to the extent that different societies appropriate the materials of modernity differently, there is still ample room for the deep study of specific geographies, histories, and languages (Appadurai, 1996, p. 17).

Here Appadurai emphasizes the countervailing power of localities to adopt and adapt globalizing forces (a concept termed 'localization'). Other globalization scholarship points to a "shrinking of time and space" resulting from increased abilities to travel and

communicate rapidly across vast distances ('deterritorialization') (O'Brien & Williams, 2013, p. 27). Appadurai suggests this process has led to an acceleration of cultural exchanges, resulting in "both greater homogeneity and heterogeneity of culture, with more people than ever before becoming involved with more than one culture" (Appadurai, 1996; Rizvi, 2007, p. 24).

As with numerous other social institutions, the economic, communicative and cultural aspects of globalization have all spurred major changes in the higher education landscape. According to Simon Marginson, the impact of these developments has led to the formation of a 'global dimension' in higher education, consisting of "world or part-world systems of knowledge and information flow, networks, and people movement between institutions and systems" (Marginson, 2011, p. 12). A critical aspect of communicative globalization has been the advent of the Internet, which has had a dramatic impact on the nature of higher education research (Peters, Marginson, & Murphy, 2009). Marginson explains:

> The last two decades have seen considerable development of what can be called 'global science', organised in the form of a single accessible research system articulated by worldwide English language journals, collaborative networks and cross-border projects, the growing mobility of personnel, two large-scale data repositories focused on publication and citation metrics… and the research ranking of institutions and national systems (Marginson 2016b, p. 2).

The emergence of this global dimension has fostered the rapid expansion of cross-border research collaboration, evidenced by a dramatic rise in both the total number of internationally co-authored publications, and the proportion of these papers to all published science (Marginson, 2018). In addition to collaboration across borders, a number of other significant changes have occurred in the nature of knowledge production at universities.

Shifts in knowledge production

Connected to the influences of globalization (and neoliberalism, discussed below), the emergence of the concept of the 'knowledge economy' in government and policy circles has raised awareness of the socio-economic value of universities as key contributors to society through research-based knowledge production, innovation and the cultivation of human capital (Brown, Hesketh, & Williams, 2003; Kearny, 2009; Olssen & Peters, 2005). For the OECD, 'knowledge-based economies' are economies "directly based on the production, distribution and use of knowledge and information" and focused on "growth in high-technology investments, high-technology industries, more highly-skilled labour and associated productivity gains" (OECD, 1996, p. 7). As knowledge economies have become more prevalent around the world, so too have governments increasingly recognized the role of higher education as essential for economic development and global competitiveness.

A number of scholars argue that the processes by which knowledge itself is produced at universities have also undergone significant change. They suggest that the traditional mode of knowledge production which was characterized by an emphasis on basic research, clear distinctions and hierarchies between disciplinary sciences, and the autonomy of scientists ('Mode 1'), has been supplanted by a new mode ('Mode 2')[11], whereby knowledge production is "socially distributed, application oriented, trans-disciplinary and subject to multiple accountabilities" (Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2006, p. 39). Under this paradigm, the production of research has become increasingly shaped by commercialization, accountability, and the external steering of research priorities (ibid.). Research universities in particular are increasingly seen as a component of the 'triple helix', a model comprised

[11] Scholars have now theorized pluralistic 'Mode 3' systems of knowledge production, characterized by a "co-evolution, co-development and co-specialisation of different knowledge modes" (Carayannis & Campbell, 2009, p. 206).

of government-industry-university networks designed to foster innovation and economic growth (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000; Hawkins, 2015; Nabeshima & Tanaka, 2011). Some have also added the notion of 'society' to this model, emphasizing how the "media, publics and civil society actors" can also have an important influence on a national innovation system (Carayannis & Campbell, 2009; Leišytė & Fochler, 2018, p. 1).

The persistence of 'academic tribes'

While policies and practices for knowledge production are evolving and trans-disciplinary Mode 2 forms may be proliferating, there is an argument to be made that the academic disciplines still matter, and remain in fact a foundational aspect of higher education. Although much of Higher Education Studies research has taken a policy-perspective and focused on higher education institutions as units of analysis, a number of scholars have highlighted the significance and unique features of the various academic disciplines. Some have posited that the disciplines embody distinctive 'academic cultures' which are shaped by the varied epistemological orientations of particular fields of enquiry (Becher & Trowler, 2001), while others have demonstrated variation within disciplines (Trowler, 2014) resulting from social context (Trowler, 2008) and individual positioning (Fanghanel, 2009). Mary Henkel has highlighted the dynamic and evolving interactions between the individual and the communities of the discipline and the university as central to the constitution of academic identities (Henkel, 2005). Other research has focused on the influences various academic disciplines have on teaching and learning (Lindblom-Ylänne, Trigwell, Nevgi, & Ashwin, 2006), doctoral student socialization (Gardner, 2007), and attrition (Golde, 2005). Still others have explored the roles disciplines play in the ways internationalization strategies (discussed below) manifest at universities (Agnew, 2013), and their importance in the internationalization of higher education curricula (Leask, 2015). A current gap in this

literature is research into how the epistemological orientations of different academic disciplines might influence the ways actors conceptualize higher education regional cooperation. As such, a comparison of the ideas of regional cooperation across disciplinary contexts is one of the avenues of inquiry in this study.

Global Rankings

Another major development that has led to dramatic shifts in the policy priorities of governments and fueled the structural reform of higher education knowledge production is the growing prevalence of world and regional rankings of universities. Hazelkorn suggests that "rankings have induced governments and HEIs to adopt simplistic solutions and to skew research agendas/policies in order to increase research productivity and efficiency and to better the position of HEIs in the rankings" (2009, p. 11).While 'Mode 2' forms of trans-disciplinary knowledge production may be becoming the new reality, the metrics used by ranking organizations such as ARWU and QS remain focused primarily on discipline-specific research productivity and impact (Hazelkorn, 2009).

Marginson and van der Wende (2007) have argued that the system of global rankings tends to give preference to one particular model of university - that of the comprehensive research intensive university - and tends to favor institutions that are strong in science and located in the English-speaking world. In addition to research output and quality, some ranking systems also focus on the degree to which a university has a 'global outlook', measured by the percentage of international faculty and students (QS, n.d.). Many universities thus seek to improve their position in the rankings through strategies for internationalization, which has become in itself a critical component of many national and institutional policy agendas.

Internationalization of higher education

'Internationalization' in higher education is an umbrella terms that encompasses a range of policies, processes and activities undertaken at multiple levels. Arguably the most frequently used definition of the term is that posed by Jane Knight as "the process of integrating an international, intercultural, or global dimension into the purpose, functions, or delivery of post-secondary education" (Knight, 2004, p. 11). A revised definition of Knight's original explicitly adds a normative element of intentionality, as well as the notion that internationalization should "enhance the quality of education and research for all students and staff, and to make a meaningful contribution to society" (de Wit & Hunter, 2015, p. 3). Some have critiqued these definitions as being bound up with and inherently favouring Western models of higher education, arguing they are unsuitable for non-Western countries who must grapple with "longstanding knotty issues and tensions between Westernization and indigenization" (Yang, 2014, p. 153). Nevertheless, for those nations and universities who wish to compete in the global rankings game, internationalization has become a vital strategic priority. In practice, internationalization activities generally refer to policies and practices related to international student and scholar mobility (ISSM), international program and provider mobility (IPPM), internationalization 'at home', internationalization of curricula, international research networks and cross-border flows of knowledge.

Internationalization is not a new process, and has manifested in different forms throughout the long history of higher education. Nearly 3000 years ago the spread of the Asian world religions marked the first global movement of people, learning and scholarship (Marginson, 2011c). The Buddhist center of Nalanda in India at one time housed 10,000 students and a massive library that was visited by scholars from the Middle East and East Asia (ibid.). The

medieval European universities that later developed also had cosmopolitan DNA, with the first 2000 of their 2500-year history constituting a “wandering scholar model” characterized by autonomy and freedom from state control (Kerr, 1990).

Internationalization in the modern age stems originally from an ethos based on international peace, academic collaboration, and ‘mutual understanding’ (Kreber, 2009). In the early 20th century, it was seen as a means to foster international solidarity in the wake of World War I, and organizations such as the Institute of International Education (IIE) and the British Council were created to facilitate cooperation and peaceful relations between nations (Altbach & de Wit, 2015). This ethos continued to shape internationalization after World War II, with the idealism of the period leading to the creation of institutions such as UNESCO and programs like the Fulbright Act (ibid.). Things shifted during the Cold War, as internationalization became redefined by an ideological competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. When Europe finally recovered from the impact of World War II in the 1970s, a new form of international higher education began to emerge, one focused regionally on strengthening European cooperation and integration among countries within the emerging EU (ibid.). As such, internationalization in Europe originally began as a project in region building, particularly through mechanisms such as the ERASMUS program and the Bologna Process (de Wit & Hunter, 2015).

Arguably, contemporary forms of internationalization have shifted away from cosmopolitan ideals and political ideologies toward a competitive and nationally-bounded economic orientation (Engel & Siczek, 2018; Kreber, 2009; Qiang, 2003). Warner (1992) termed this the ‘market model’ of internationalization, whereby internationalization strategies are focused increasing the global positional advantage of universities, a

worldwide recruitment competition for students and their subsequent preparation for global careers (Hanson, 2015; Warner, 1992). While other competing models for internationalization that emphasize 'social transformation' and intercultural understanding exist and have their advocates, many scholars suggest that higher education and efforts toward internationalization have been dominated in recent decades by processes of commodification, marketization and corporatization (Mok, 2003; Olssen & Peters, 2005). In this respect, internationalization has arguably been subsumed by another force shaping the broader higher education landscape in recent decades: neoliberalism.

Higher education and the state in the neoliberal age

Many of the observed trends that have been shaping higher education worldwide are explained by scholars as being evidence of a far-reaching ideological project known as neoliberalism (Giroux, 2002; Lynch, 2006; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Slaughter & Leslie, 2001). Originating in the UK and the USA, the neoliberal project has spread worldwide through processes of globalization (Marginson, 2014). David Harvey defines neoliberalism as a theory of political economy that "proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade" (Harvey, 2005, p. 2). Furthermore, Harvey suggests the theory "holds that the social good will be maximized by maximizing the reach and frequency of market transactions, and it seeks to bring all human action into the domain of the market" (ibid., p. 3). Based on the inherent all-encompassing nature of this ideology, it is unsurprising that neoliberal ideas have also permeated the higher education sector. One distinctive outcome of the influence of neoliberalism on higher education has been the remodeling of many universities in the

image of private corporations. Universities are thus increasingly seen by governments as "self-interested firms in competition with other firms like them" (Marginson 2014, p. 19).

The influence of neoliberal policies has also had a knock-on effect on academic research. Rhoads and Szelényi (2011) suggest that many universities have become considerably more responsive to the research needs of private industry, and much more reliant on the funding accrued from doing so (a phenomenon which they describe as a form of 'academic capitalism') (see Slaughter & Leslie, 2001). As funding for research has increasingly come from for-profit organizations, some argue that this model is incentivizing some researchers to ignore important social problems in favor of projects that will generate the most revenue (Rhoads & Szelenyi, 2011). More broadly, it has been suggested that this trend is also leading universities to prioritize disciplines that are capable of generating substantial funding from private industry (such as the natural and applied sciences) and to deprioritize the social sciences and humanities disciplines. Beyond the effects of neoliberalism on research, Slaughter and Leslie (2001) suggest that an increase in "market and market-like behaviors on the part of universities and faculty" has led to a substantial 'restructuring of higher education' as a whole:

> By this we mean substantive organizational changes such as reduction or closure of departments, expansion or creation of other departments, establishment of interdisciplinary units; associated changes in internal resource allocations; substantive change in the division of academic labor with regard to research and teaching; the establishment of new organizational forms such as arms-length companies and research parks; and the organization of new administrative offices or the streamlining or redesign of old ones (Slaughter & Leslie, 2001, pp. 154-155).

The influence of neoliberalism has also had a notable impact on relationships between higher education and the state. This relationship has always been more complex than a mere bilateral interaction, and is based on the interplay of what Burton Clark called the 'triangle of coordination'; relations comprised of government/managerial, market forces, and

professional/collegial interactions within academia (Clark, 1983; Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). Under Clark's model, the market can take multitude forms, at times manifesting in different and competing markets impacting on various aspects of higher education. Furthermore, both government and universities can use markets to their own ends, with governments frequently utilizing them to develop systems of assessment and regulation in order to encourage competition, and universities using them to "assert their independence from state influence" (Taylor, 2013, p. 13). Neoliberalism has led in recent decades to an increased acceptance of the role of markets and competition in higher education, giving rise to what has been termed the New Public Management (NPM) approach to university management. NPM approaches typically involve target setting, performance management, reductions in public expenditures, and shifts to more demand-driven services reflecting 'consumer' rather than provider preferences (Taylor, 2013, p. 13).

Aligning with the expansion of the NPM approach, another development has been a rise in society of an audit culture, reflecting a shift in "traditional control structures of industrial society" and a growing awareness of the notion of 'risk' (Power, 1996, cited in Taylor, 2013, p. 14). This has resulted in an increasing value placed on "objective evidence or criteria upon which to make judgements and a preference for the judgements of external assessors" (Taylor, 2013, p. 14). As a result, the emergence of NPM and an audit culture has led to a growing formality in the relationship between higher education and the state marked by metrics, targets and other forms of measurement (ibid.).

This shift has led to a rise in the application of mechanisms of accountability by governments and institutions to measure the efficiency of public services (Murphy & Skillen, 2013). These mechanisms of accountability include "performance indicators, audit,

inspection and evaluation" which "are designed to increase formal levels of accountability to the state while also making the public sector more accountable to the public via marketization and the development of a consumer culture" (Murphy & Skillen, 2013, p. 84). In the higher education sector, these mechanisms often take the form of metrics measuring research output, quantifiable measures of internationalization, employability rates, and status competition through national and global rankings.

The various forms of higher education assessment have been accompanied by the rise in a discourse of 'quality assurance'. Once taken for granted as the remit of universities, expansion of student numbers and reductions in funding have raised concerns about quality, with universities themselves contributing to these concerns by highlighting the effects of cost-cutting on course delivery and support (Taylor, 2013, p. 22). Neoliberal marketization has contributed to this by providing information to potential 'customers' about universities' programs, standards and quality. Taylor writes:

> The ability to measure quality in teaching, in research and in institutional organization has become a preoccupation in many countries, and represents a key driver both for institutional behaviour and for the actions of teachers and researchers. Similarly, new frameworks for qualifications and codes of practice for course design, delivery and assessment now serve to shape and constrain course provision (Taylor, 2013, pp. 22-3).

The marketization of higher education has also caused renewed interest in the abilities for universities to contribute to economic growth and international competitiveness. In the context of the knowledge economy, governments are now increasingly looking to universities to produce "demonstrable products and innovation". Taylor argues,

> in these circumstances, the value attached to some other areas of higher education, including longstanding commitments to liberal education, has been eroded. It is possible to observe a shift in the position of government away from the support of a broad subject base to an emphasis on 'what is useful' (2013, p. 24).

While massification, globalization, internationalization and neoliberalism were introduced above as distinct phenomena, it is important to recognize that these forces are intricately intermeshed with one another. Peter Scott argues that the "universal and the local, the global and the national, 'market' and 'public service' models" of higher education cannot be readily distinguished due to their internal complexities and synergies between them (Scott, 2011, p. 74). For example, the dominant form of economic globalization has itself been equated with the neoliberal project (Marginson, 2014), and the elevated economic status of knowledge is inherently intertwined with communicative globalization. Emergent knowledge economies have contributed to the demand for and massification of higher education, and all of these forces work to inform higher education policies and practices for knowledge production and internationalization. Today, universities must compete in an expanding global marketplace for students, academics, knowledge and resources, and are increasingly accountable to metrics, audit culture, rankings, and quality assurance mechanisms characteristic of NPM governance practices and neoliberal reforms.

Regional cooperation of higher education systems

The final trend that has direct relevance to this study is the global emergence of a variety of higher education regional spaces, frameworks and institutions, pointing to growing patterns of regional cooperation. Various forms of regional cooperation in the higher education sector have often emerged in conjunction with or encompassed within broader region-building projects in political and economic spheres (Dale & Robertson, 2002). Through mutually reinforcing processes of regionalization and concerted top-down efforts toward regionalism, a number of higher education regional projects have emerged in regions such as Europe, ASEAN, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Northeast Asia, as well as various inter-regional spaces (such as EU-Africa) (Chou & Ravinet, 2017;

Hammond, 2019; Kyung, 2015; Robertson et al., 2016). Nevertheless, while massification, globalization, internationalization and neoliberalism have all received substantial attention in the academic literature, according to some scholars, broader social science scholarship has paid "insufficient attention to the role of higher education in regionalizing, whilst scholars of higher education have for their part given inadequate attention to the theoretical resources from different intellectual fields concerned with understanding regions and regionalizing" (Chou & Ravinet, 2016, 2017; Robertson et al., 2016, p. 15). Recognizing these lacunae in the literature was one of the impetuses for designing this research project, and a survey of the extant literature and noteworthy theoretical and empirical gaps will be addressed in detail in the following chapter. This chapter now turns to the final section, focusing on developments in higher education in the Northeast Asian region, with particular emphasis placed on Japan.

Developments in Northeast Asian and Japanese higher education

The broader global trends outlined above have affected the structures and policies shaping higher education systems[12] in Northeast Asia. For example, massification of higher education in the region has had dramatic effects, with an outstripping of supply leading to an expansive private higher education sector (Marginson, 2019b). Recent decades have also seen concerted efforts in the region to internationalize and build world-class universities and research hubs to better compete in the global higher education landscape. While efforts to internationalize have been met with mixed success, the Asian region has emerged as a dominant player in the realm of research-based knowledge production. A number of state-led policies have been initiated to augment this rise. In China, the '211', '985', and 'Double

[12] Appendix B provides a general overview of the three countries' higher education systems.

First-class University' programs have been implemented to raise the overall quality of selected universities to world-class status, with particular emphasis being placed on improving publication rates and fostering university-industry linkages in the STEM fields (Hawkins, 2015). In Korea, the Brain Korea 21 (BK21) project aims to augment global competitiveness by establishing 10 world class universities and make Korea one of the world's top 10 countries for research papers (Byun & Kim, 2011). Another project launched in 2008 is the World Class University project, which focuses on attracting prominent scholars from abroad to establish academic programs in key-growth fields like IT and biotechnology, and to conduct collaborative research with Korean professors (ibid). A number of similar policies have been implemented in Japan (Hawkins, 2015; Ota, 2018). As of this writing, some of the latest iterations include the 'World Premier International Research Center' (WPI), and 'Center of Excellence in the 21st Century (COE21) initiatives (Hawkins, 2015; Yonezawa, 2007), and the 'Top Global University' project (MEXT, n.d.).

Knowledge production and the 'tilt toward Asia'

For the past two centuries, the majority of the contributions to knowledge in science and technology (S&T) have come from the West, with the U.S. assuming the leadership role for much of the 20th century. The supremacy of Western research may be in decline, however, in part because Asia is fast emerging as a powerhouse of knowledge production and S&T innovation. Projections that describe the tilting of the research world toward Asia indicate that the region may surpass the U.S. within the next 15 years (Cummings, 2014). With substantial investment being provided to universities to improve both the quality and quantity of research-based knowledge outputs, universities in Northeast Asia are playing an important role in this global shift. A notable change in the past two decades has been the rapid rise in the quantity of China's research output. Figure 2.3 highlights this trend by

showing the growth of Web of Science publications in Japan, China, and South Korea from 1996 to 2016.

Figure 2.3: Web of Science Publications for Japan, China and South Korea, 1996 – 2016



Source: Web of Science InCites, (Hammond, 2019)

Over the past two decades, Japanese research showed moderate growth but remained relatively stable, indicative of a developed but arguably stagnating system. The emerging systems of South Korea and China showed more dramatic growth, with China in particular rocketing past Japan to become the top producer of research-based knowledge in Northeast Asia. By recent metrics, China has now surpassed the USA to become the world's largest producer of scientific papers (Tollefson, 2018). The substantial increase in the production of Chinese research has been attributed to the growth of the economy and focused investment in science, technology and innovation (STI) (Yang, 2004). For example, China's investment in R&D rose 18 per cent a year from 2000 to 2012, and is on track to surpass the US in the next decade (Marginson, 2016, p. 10). Investment in R&D in South

Korea is high as well; in 2017, the country invested 4.55 per cent of its GDP in R&D, the highest such proportion in the world among countries with well-developed research systems (UNESCO Institute of Statistics, 2019).

In addition to the rise in the outputs of scientific papers, Northeast Asia has also experienced an increase in innovation, as evidenced by the growth in the number of patents in the last two decades. Increased economic integration, driven in part by growing vertical specialization in the region, has led to a marked convergence in innovation and technology flows particularly in the field of electronics technology (Brahmbhatt & Hu, 2009; Nabeshima & Tanaka, 2011). Figure 2.4 highlights the emerging upward regional trend in innovation based on the growth in patent assignees from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)[13].

[13] USPTO data was used as a relatively objective reference point to avoid the bias that may be present in data from patent offices in any one of the three countries, and also because the US continues to be a major export market for all three.

Figure 2.4: Trends in Innovation for Japan, Korea and China: Number of USPTO Patent Assignees (1996-2017)



Source: USPTO PatentsView (n.d.) (Hammond, 2019)

Coinciding with this rise in innovation, there has also been a notable increase in intra-region patent citations, pointing to the development of a regional dimension of knowledge flows in Northeast Asia (Brahmbhatt & Hu, 2009).

While Japan was considered the leader in knowledge production in the East Asian region for much of the 20th century, recent decades have witnessed the country dropping in global rankings of research performance (Arimoto, 2015), while neighboring countries consistently improve their positions on the back of high levels of government investment in R&D and innovative strategies for systemic and institutional reform. In this context, Japan has been forced to reckon with its relative decline and make attempts to reignite its knowledge production systems, including those at research universities. According to Watanabe and Sato (2017), global rankings are now a major driver in the policymaking and

funding decisions of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (hereafter referred to as MEXT). However, a problematic reality facing the nation is the lack of available public funding to support R&D, resulting from decades of economic stagnation (Huang, 2018). Policymakers have thus sought alternative strategies to improve global competitiveness, such as granting top-tier research universities more autonomy to forge links with industry and develop innovative interdisciplinary research institutes to tackle globally relevant social challenges such as natural disasters (Yonezawa, Hammond, Brotherhood, Kitamura, & Kitagawa, 2019). Another approach that is widely recognized as essential to augmenting Japan's global competitiveness is internationalization, discussed below.

Import- and export-oriented internationalization

The types of internationalization activities a nation or institution are able to pursue are determined largely by its position in the global higher education landscape. According to Futao Huang (2007, p. 52), internationalization activities can be distinguished into three types: an import-oriented type, an import and export type, and an export-oriented type. Table 2.1 below outlines a framework for determining which type of higher education internationalization best applies to a given nation/institution.

Table 2.1: Three types of internationalization of higher education

	Import-oriented	**Import- and export-oriented**	**Export-oriented**
Country	Most developing countries, or countries with colonial experiences	Most non-English-speaking developed countries and some developing countries with their unique cultures or traditions	Especially English-speaking developed countries
Characteristics	Seeking competent professional personnel but having a weak modern higher education system	Importing English-language products to enhance the quality of learning and research, and exporting educational programmes with distinctive characteristics	Attracting foreign students from developing countries and non-English-speaking countries; and exporting transnational education services as trade
Issues and challenges	Brain drain and loss of national identity	Conflicts between foreign imports and national characteristics	Quality assurance and negative effects resulting from commercialism of higher education

Source: Huang (2007)

Countries that fall into the *export-oriented* category in Table 2.1 are typically those in the Anglosphere. At present, Anglosphere nations and their world-renowned research universities (particularly in the US and the UK) hold the top positions in the global higher education hierarchy (ARWU, n.d.; QS, n.d.-b; Times Higher Education, n.d.). As the English language has become the *lingua franca* for scientific research, international academic publications, and the world of global business, there is a strong worldwide draw to universities that can offer high-quality programs in English (Altbach, 2004). Thus, another factor that influences a nation's global position is whether or not English is used as a national or major language and incorporated into instruction at universities (Huang, 2007).

Today, many Northeast Asian universities fall into the *import- and export-oriented* category. In order to maintain, leverage, and improve upon their positions in the

global higher education landscape, many have implemented strategies to internationalize their campuses in a variety of ways. One approach has been has been the increasing provision of courses and degrees in the medium of English (Huang, 2007; Shimauchi, 2017). This has enabled increased inward mobility of students who would otherwise be unable to participate due to linguistic constraints. However, in some cases, the importation of English as a medium of instruction has brought with it a range of issues, including difficulties for domestic students and resistance from staff in adapting to this new medium of instruction (Tsuneyoshi, 2005).

A comprehensive survey of contemporary internationalization policies and practices in all three Northeast Asian countries is beyond the scope of this chapter. As such, the discussion on internationalization below will focus on relevant developments in Japan.

Internationalization of higher education in Japan

Japan has a history of trying to internationalize in one form or another since the 1970s (Takagi, 2009). In 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone implemented a policy with the intention of recruiting 100,000 international students to Japanese universities. At the time, the policy's objectives were to improve the relationship with neighboring Asian countries through exchange, demonstrate the nation's presence on the world stage, and "rehabilitate Japan's image of being a beneficiary, rather than a benefactor, of the world's intellectual currents" (Ishikawa, 2011, p. 209).

Today, the target number has increased to 300,000 but the motivations have shifted, reflecting the worldwide trend of higher education marketization and the adoption of an economic orientation towards internationalization (Kreber, 2009; Yonezawa & Yonezawa,

2016). Developments specific to Japan's economy and society have also played a key role in this shift:

> The policy initiatives for the internationalization of higher education were established in the 1980s as part of a broad policy rationale during a period of high confidence in Japan's success in the world economy. However, Japanese society's experience over the last three decades has been a long-term decline in terms of national positioning in the global economy. In this changed context, the slow responses of the education system and labor market to globalization have been considered a critical barrier to national development. In the end, government policy became focused on narrow economic considerations (Yonezawa & Yonezawa, 2016, p. 201).

Today top-tier research universities compete for project-based government funding which enables them to recruit high-quality foreign students and scholars to contribute to their research agendas and overall institutional competitiveness; meanwhile the majority of universities aggressively recruit international students to offset domestic population decline and meet enrolment capacities. The vast majority of the international students in Japanese higher education come from neighboring East Asian countries:

> From the beginning of the twenty-first century, the number of outgoing students from East Asian neighbors such as China and South Korea has grown sharply, and Japan has been one of their major destinations. According to official Japanese government data (JASSO, 2015), 92.7 percent of international students were from Asian countries in 2014; out of that, 51.3 percent were from China, 14.4 percent were from Vietnam, 8.6 percent were from South Korea, 5.7 percent were from Nepal, and 3.4 percent were from Taiwan. The OECD (2014) also pointed out that, among OECD member countries, Japan has the highest share of international students from countries that share land or maritime borders (81% in 2012) (Yonezawa & Yonezawa, 2016, p. 192).

In addition to the 300,000 Plan, a number of policies have been pushed by the government calling on Japan's youth to undertake study abroad and develop into 'global human resources' (Burgess, 2015; Yonezawa, 2014). However, in contrast to the dramatic rise in incoming international students at Japanese universities, the number of domestic students undertaking study abroad has been relatively low and decreasing in the last decade

(Yonezawa & Yonezawa, 2016). Table 2.2 highlights the various government initiatives for internationalization that have been implemented since 2008. The impetus for these initiatives has broadly been to re-establish Japan's competitiveness in the higher education sector (Ota, 2018; Watanabe & Sato, 2017).

Table 2.2: Higher education internationalization policies in Japan (2008-2023)

		2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
1	**300,000 International Students Plan (Inbound mobility)**	Inbound: 300,000 in total															
2	**Japan Revitalization Strategy (Doubling the number of study abroad students)**						Outbound: 120,000 in total										
3	**Global 30 (Inbound mobility)**		13 universities Inbound: 10,000														
4	**Inter-University Exchange Project (Two-way mobility)**																
	CAMPUS Asia and ASEAN				13 programs Outbound: 1,687; Inbound: 1,867												
	North America and EU				12 programs Outbound: 2,484; Inbound: 1,673												
	ASEAN					14 programs Outbound: 3,045; Inbound: 3,631											
	AIMS with ASEAN						7 programs Outbound: 746; Inbound: 759										
	ICI-ECP (EU)						5 programs Outbound: 69; Inbound: 61										
	Russia and India							9 programs Outbound: 1,086; Inbound: 1,130									
	Latin America &the Caribbean, and Turkey								11 programs Outbound: 1,159; Inbound: 1,295								
	CAMPUS Asia and ASEAN									25 programs Outbound: 3,279 Inbound: 3,789							
	Russia and India										9 programs Outbound: 1,157; Inbound: 1,084						
	USA (COIL)											10 programs					
5	**Go Global Japan (Outbound mobility)**					Type A (University-wide): 11 univs; Type B (Faculty-specific): 31 univs; Outbound: 58, 500											
6	**Top Global University Project (Comprehensive Internationalization)**							Type A (Top Type): 13 universities Type B (Global Traction Type): 24 universities									

Source: adapted from Ota (2018).
Note 1: AIMS stands for ASEAN International Mobility for Students program and is a government supported multilateral program in the ASEAN region, launched in 2010 by coordinated efforts of Malaysia-Indonesia-Thailand and the current members are Vietnam, the Philippines, Brunei and Japan.
Note 2: ICI-ECP (Industrialized Countries Instrument – Education Cooperation Programme) refers to EU cooperation with Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Korea in the field of higher education and vocational education training.
Note 3: COIL stands for Collaborative Online International Learning.

As of this writing, the most recent initiative to help augment this competitiveness is Prime Minister Abe's "Top Global University" project which was announced in 2013. Under this scheme universities were encouraged to devise their own programs and targets for internationalization and apply to the government for competitive funding to be awarded for a 10-year period up to 2023. MEXT has set forth 10 performance indicators by which to

measure the success of the 37 universities that were awarded 'Top Global' funding. They are:

1. Increase the number of full-time faculty and Japanese faculty who received their degrees from foreign universities
2. Increase the ratio of international students in the total student population
3. Increase the ratio of students who have earned credits at foreign universities in the total Japanese student population
4. Increase the number of students sent abroad under inter-university agreements
5. Increase the number of students taught in foreign languages
6. Increase the number of students enrolled in degree courses conducted in foreign languages only
7. Increase the number of students who meet the standards of proficiency in foreign languages
8. Develop English syllabi
9. Increase the number of Japanese students living in international dormitories
10. Adopt a flexible academic calendar (introduce a quarter system on a university-wide basis) (source: MEXT, n.d.)

These indicators point to an emphasis on language education (particularly English) and a view that internationalization can be measured in quantitative terms. This approach to internationalization has led to critiques by scholars such as Hiroshi Ota, who argues the overemphasis on quantitative metrics has led to the qualitative outcomes of internationalization being overlooked, instead making the achievement of numeric targets a top priority. He writes:

> Although policies of internationalization through quantitative expansion have been able to add a veneer of internationality or increase the outward-facing international image, it cannot be said that internationalization initiatives are being used as a means for qualitative reform of the university as a whole (Ota, 2018, p. 94).

In addition to being little more than a 'veneer of internationality', Japan's higher education internationalization policies have often garnered labels such as 'contradictory' and 'paradoxical' (Fitzpatrick, 2014; Ishikawa, 2011). The reason, it is argued, is because Japan's attempts at internationalization are infused with "a desire to protect and promote Japanese national identity" (Burgess, 2010). Japan's internationalization (*kokusaika*) has been described as form of 'modernist nationalism', with the ultimate aim being to

"reinforce the idea of Japanese as being different from all other people and for that difference to be properly understood outside Japan" (Goodman, 2007, p. 72). Furthermore, this monocultural nationalist approach to internationalization has been criticized for overlooking the already international nature of Japanese society (Horie, 2002). According to Tsuneyoshi (2011, p. 120), internationalization policies in Japan typically exclude recognition of the existing multiculturalism in the country, and instead focuses on "English, informational technology, and global competition". In addition to overlooking the Korean, Chinese, South American, and other minority populations within Japan, images of internationalization tend to ignore Japan's immediate neighbors with which the country's "past, present, and future are most intimately intertwined" in favor of an approach that is decidedly Western-facing:

> official discourse on 'internationalisation' posits interaction between a 'Japan' implicitly construed as linguistically and culturally homogenous, and a predominately Anglophone 'foreign' world whose denizens come to Japan only as temporary sojourners. It deliberately ignores or marginalizes the major resident minority groups whose presence challenges the illusion of Japanese homogeneity. And in doing so, it also reinforces stereotyped images of Japan as a society characterized by a cultural 'purity' that needs defending against the malign forces of Anglo-Saxon global hegemony (Vickers, 2018, p. 5).

The orientation towards the Anglosphere may be reflective of the positions universities in English-speaking countries hold in the global higher education landscape. In order to be competitive, Japanese institutions must seek to position themselves strategically in relation to the top-tier universities in the West. However, this reported marginalization of resident minorities is problematic, and arguably counterproductive to efforts toward regional cooperation in Northeast Asia and the broader non-Western world. The paramount form of internationalization that has evolved in Japan is thus one focused not on cosmopolitanism and regional cooperation, but on economic competitiveness and the strengthening of an ethnically Japanese national identity. Like many higher education systems worldwide, the

particular economic orientation adopted by the Japanese government to steer higher education is neoliberal in nature, discussed briefly below.

Neoliberalism and the incorporation of Japanese universities

The fact that Japan's universities are today required to compete for funding and must be assessed against quantifiable performance-based metrics point to the influence of the New Public Management (NPM) approach to university governance that has been adopted in many systems worldwide.

Incorporation of national universities (Hojinka)

The most notable NPM reform was enacted in 2004, when all national universities became 'corporate' entities. Universities were nominally granted more autonomy from state control, but this also entailed a reduction in baseline funds from the Ministry of Education. Instead, universities had to use their newfound 'autonomy' find innovative new ways to procure funds in competition with other national universities. Along with these changes came the measure stating that institutional performance would be periodically evaluated by a committee within the Ministry of Education (Murasawa, 2002). This signaled a new age of accountability and audit-culture, as until that time the government had seldom interfered with the activities of universities (ibid., p. 147). The rationale for this development in the Japanese context is provided succinctly by Motohisa Kaneko:

> ... as the drive toward knowledge society gain[s] momentum [sic], the expectation on universities increases both in their research and education function. Meanwhile, with the backdrop of intensifying global competition, higher levels of training of workforce and creation of excellence in science and technology assume strategic importance. On the other hand, the government faces serious fiscal stringency as the demography shifts to older age groups that demand greater social spending. At the same time, governments are pressed not to increase the tax burden which may induce negative effects on the economy under fierce global competition. This creates a serious gap between the financial needs of the institutions and the fiscal capacity of the government. Also, because of the competition for the funds, the need for accountability has grown substantially (Kaneko, 2009, p. 60).

This shift toward project-based funding schemes, audit culture, and quantifiable metrics of assessment, combined with economic recession and population decline have created an environment of intense competition within Japanese higher education. It has also created an environment in which many of the foreign and domestic faculty and staff at universities are recruited on fixed-term project-based contracts, leading to reported experiences of marginalization from the 'academic mainstream' at many universities (Brotherhood, Hammond, & Kim, 2019).

Regional cooperation in Northeast Asia

The final global development, regional cooperation of higher education systems, has also greatly impacted Northeast Asia and the broader Asian region. In addition to the trends of increasing global research collaboration, intra-regional innovation, and the tilt of the research world toward Asia, there has been a growth in inter-university linkages within Asia, pointing to a pattern of emerging higher education regionalization. Aligning with broader patterns of region building in the economic sphere, the higher education sector has witnessed a dramatic rise in both informal regionalization and government-initiated forms of regional cooperation. Examples of regionalism include the Association of East Asian Research Universities (AEARU), government-initiated programs for regional student exchanges like the AIMS and CAMPUS Asia programs, and collaborative research programs such as the A3 Foresight Program (discussed in more detail below and in the following chapters). Paradoxically, increased global competition in higher education has facilitated increases in cross-border cooperation at the region-level, as nations and universities form tactical alliances and consortia to enhance the global competitiveness of their national systems. While higher education region-building is a worldwide phenomenon, Asia stands out with respect to its rapid rate of regionalization (Kuroda, 2016).

Figure 2.5 Growing number of inter-university linkages within Asia



source: Kuroda (2016) – presentation at NAFSA 2016

In addition to the broader Asian region, research collaboration between Japan, China and South Korea has also increased dramatically in recent decades. Along with a rise in informal research collaborations in Northeast Asia there have also been efforts made by the governments of the three countries to establish formalized programs for collaborative regional research. A notable example, and one of the two programs selected for this study, is the A3 Foresight Program. The program is run jointly between the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF). The program aims "to create world-class research hubs within the Asian region, which by advancing world-class research will contribute to the solution of common regional problems, while fostering new generations of talented young researchers" (JSPS, 2015). Criteria for funding includes expectations that the collaboration between institutions will produce research of world-class academic value as well as "contribute to the continuous development of collaboration between the core

institutions in the future" (ibid.). The emphasis on network building between Japanese, Chinese and Korean institutions highlights the fact that, at least with respect to higher education and scientific research, the governments of the three countries are committed to fostering regional cooperation.

Efforts to improve collaborative research in the higher education sector have been couched within a broader political project to realize improved relations and increased cooperation between Japan, China and South Korea. In 2008, the three countries had their first trilateral summit independent of other regional gatherings such as ASEAN+3 or APEC. In 2010, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama proposed his vision of an "East Asian Community" with the intention of making Japan's diplomatic position more independent from the influence of the United States. This same year the first Japan-China-Korea Committee for Promoting Exchange and Cooperation convened and established the second program selected for this study, the CAMPUS Asia program (Yonezawa & Meerman, 2012). The goals of the program are to foster student and academic exchanges between the three nations, and establish a framework for quality assurance. According to Japan's Ministry of Education (MEXT), the program:

> aims to promote cooperation among universities and mutual understanding among students of the 3 countries through various forms of exchange programs between universities, and ultimately contribute to strengthening the competitiveness of universities and nurturing the next generation of outstanding talents of Asia (MEXT, 2011).

Both A3 Foresight and CAMPUS Asia provide examples of government-initiated policies aimed at fostering forms of higher education regionalism within Northeast Asia. It is important to point out, however, that these efforts are but two among an expanding array of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, both formal and informal, between China, Japan and South Korea; Japan and Southeast Asia; China and Southeast Asia, and so on (Byun &

Um, 2014, p. 140), with each Northeast Asian country working toward expanding its collaborative capacity at both the regional and global levels.

This chapter aimed to provide a comprehensive overview of the politics, cultural connections and historical memories that shape Northeast Asian international relations, as well as the global and regional developments in the higher education sector, in order to provide a detailed contextual frame through which to explore the programs for higher education regional cooperation selected for this study. Having set this stage, the following chapter continues the discussion of regional cooperation in Northeast Asian higher education with a critical engagement with the empirical literature related to CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight, as well as a survey of relevant theories and empirical studies related to higher education regional cooperation more broadly.

Chapter 3: Higher Education Regional Cooperation in Northeast Asia

This chapter presents a selective review of empirical and theoretical literature that is relevant to the research topic. The chapter begins with an introduction and critical analysis of empirical work that has been done on the specific programs under study to date. The intention is to provide a "coherent overall picture" of the extant empirical evidence relating to the research questions, highlight notable gaps and offer a justification for conducting this study (Punch & Oancea, 2014, p. 122). The chapter then expands in scope to cover work on higher education regional cooperation more broadly, including a consideration of empirical studies of the broader Asian region and theories that have been advanced on this topic.

A survey of the empirical literature on CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight

At the time of this writing, the number of high quality empirical studies of either CAMPUS Asia or the A3 Foresight program was relatively limited. By 'high quality' I mean research papers published in international peer-reviewed journals, as well as articles, monographs or book chapters that evidenced rigorous research designs and/or theoretically salient insights into either of the two programs. The majority of the extant English-language literature covering these programs was primarily descriptive, with some contributions venturing into unsubstantiated speculation and opinion. There were exceptions, however, and these studies are given particular attention in the following sections.

Research collaboration and 'epistemic communities'

Firstly, there was only one research paper that addressed the A3 Foresight Program: my own paper published in the journal *Higher Education* (Hammond, 2019). In an early stage

of this doctoral project I attempted to apply the concept of 'epistemic communities' (see Haas, 1992), to the analysis of A3 project reports and participant interviews. In brief, epistemic communities are networks of professionals with "recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas, 1993, p. 3). These professionals will also have shared sets of normative, principled, and causal beliefs, and a common "policy project" which guides professional practice and has the potential to influence policy and politics (ibid, p. 3; Hammond, 2019). My primary interest was to discern whether actors involved in regional scientific collaboration through A3 Foresight projects formed epistemic communities with a particular 'policy project', and whether their activities led to spillover effects in the broader economic and political arenas in the region. While the study did find that participants in A3 reported ongoing (post-project) knowledge production and regional collaboration and the 'shared policy project' of cultivating the next generation of regionally-networked young researchers, there was no evidence of groups of researchers advising on regional policy coordination (indicative of political spillover) or of the outputs of A3 projects having immediate spillovers into the economic arena.

While there were other novel insights uncovered through the study, a few limitations call into question the robustness of some of the findings. A major limitation was that only five A3 participants were able to be interviewed (this limitation is discussed further in Chapter 5 in relation to this thesis). Thus it is quite possible that A3 participants who were not interviewed may have satisfied the criteria of membership to epistemic communities and spillovers did in fact occur. However, this was not evidenced in the analysis of the 14 final-year project reports (see Appendix A), which included contributions from researchers I was not able to interview. Then again, as these documents were written for the purpose of

demonstrating to the funding body (JSPS) that project objectives were achieved, it may not have been imperative to include discussions of policy advising in the reports. As such the conclusions regarding political and economic spillover drawn from this study are tentative and warrant further research. Other findings from this paper are more robust, and as they are directly related to this doctoral study they are incorporated into the findings chapters.

Strangely, even though the A3 Foresight program has been ongoing since 2005, I could find no other published studies that investigated the program. There was, however, a range of literature on CAMPUS Asia, some of which I judged to be worthy of inclusion in this review. I omit from the following critical reflection a number of papers that were either purely descriptive (e.g. Sugimura, 2012; Yonezawa & Meerman, 2012), or lacking (for various reasons) in scholarly and/or methodological rigor (Hanada, n.d.; Horie, 2014[14]). Other publications addressing CAMPUS Asia deserve only cursory mention.

Regional student mobility and Asian identity

One of these is a study by Ja-hyun Chun published in the *Asia Europe Journal* (2016). Chun reports that a survey of CAMPUS Asia students funded by the Korean Ministry of Education demonstrated a

> positive change in terms of their Asian identity and affinity toward the country they have studied in. There is a significant difference between the changes experienced by these students compared to regular exchange students in particular (Chun, 2016, p. 290).

Chun then makes the following claim:

[14] Miki Horie's short piece on the CAMPUS Asia program at Ritsumeikan University offers some anecdotal insights but lacks any reference to research design, explicit findings or limitations. This is likely due to its publication in *International Higher Education*, a journal aimed at "insightful, informed, and high-quality commentary and analysis" as opposed to rigorous academic research.
See https://ejournals.bc.edu/index.php/ihe/about for details.

> This can serve as an important indicator to compare the effect of market-based bottom-up exchange versus government-led top-down exchange (Chun, 2016, p. 290).

While these findings appear noteworthy, there is no reference to the original government-funded study in Chun's paper. As such it is impossible to verify her claims that "the CAMPUS Asia program has had significant influence on forming an East Asian identity" (ibid., p. 292). However, the apparent finding that CAMPUS Asia was significantly different from "regular exchange" in this regard can be critically juxtaposed with a study by Yokota (2016, p. 5), which highlights how a "greater awareness of being Asian" rose dramatically (by 340%) among Japanese students who participated in study abroad in a range of (primarily 'Western') countries. While limited to Japanese students only, Yokota's findings call into question the degree by which CAMPUS Asia is truly unique among exchange programs in fostering East Asian identities. Another study of 709 Japanese university students found intra-Asian study abroad to contribute to notions of 'Asian citizenship', defined as "a willingness to further understand Asian people and contribute to the Asian region" (Mamiya, 2019, p. 205). While this finding appears to lend support to the survey findings referenced by Chun, I would argue that Mamiya's narrow definition of Asian citizenship is not equivalent to the idea of an 'East Asian identity'. However Mamiya's findings are, in themselves, noteworthy.

Furthermore, Chun's claim that this development is due to the fact that CAMPUS Asia is a 'top-down' exchange program as opposed to a 'market-based bottom-up exchange' is problematic and unsubstantiated. This claim connects to an oversimplified and inaccurate argument presented in the paper that higher education "bottom-up collaborations" are associated with an "economic rationale", while "top-down collaborations" are associated with a "political rationale" (Chun, 2016, p. 281). This oversimplification ignores the

economic motivations that undoubtedly shape top-down discussions at the political level as well as the strategic goals for competitiveness, collaboration, and the concerns of various discipline-specific ‘academic oligarchies’ (Clark, 1983) that influence higher education activities. As such, Chun’s binary analysis of top-down ‘political’ approaches versus bottom-up ‘economic’ or market driven approaches is flawed. The political is inherently bound up with economic concerns, and bottom-up approaches to regionalization are comprised of more than just adherence to market logic. Finally, in addition to the critiques of Chun’s oversimplified political/economic binary, many of the CAMPUS Asia exchanges were taking place among the participating universities prior to the time when government-initiated funding was implemented. As such, in many respects these exchanges are in fact ‘bottom up’.

Challenges and possibilities of regional cooperation

A major study worthy of discussion is the doctoral thesis by Eun Young Kyung (2015), entitled *Challenges and Possibilities of Regional Collaboration in East Asian Higher Education.* Kyung’s thesis explores the policies and practices of two major programs[15] for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, one of which is CAMPUS Asia. She conducts documentary analysis and 47 interviews with executive leadership, academics and administrators at 11 universities across the three participating countries. Kyung’s research questions are similar to my own, although there are noteworthy differences in scope and methodology that highlight how my own work contributes new knowledge to the field. These are discussed below. Kyung succinctly summarizes the main findings from the study in the concluding chapter of her thesis:

[15] In addition to CAMPUS Asia, Kyung analyses a collaborative program between the top universities in China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam called BESETOHA (which stands for *Be*ijing, *Se*oul, *To*kyo, and *Ha*noi).

> This study has found that while both programs display strong rationales towards regional collaboration, the ideological and material support provided by the governments contribute greatly to the policy internalisation of CAMPUS Asia. Challenges are located not only at the level of practice, such as coordinating systemic differences, but also in attitudes and deeply-rooted distrust of each other resulting from histories of distrust. Nonetheless, this the [sic] analysis of data suggests a growing recognition of the changing context and the importance of cooperation among East Asian higher education around the process of globalisation function [sic] as enabling factors for collaboration. As a consequence, the East Asian universities display distinctive patterns in their practices of collaboration, largely focused on mutual learning, small-scale projects, and an interest in creating regional standards of academic quality and relevance (Kyung, 2015, p. 237).

Kyung argues that 'the ideological and material support provided by the governments' for CAMPUS Asia contributed greatly to 'policy internalisation' at participating universities because of the generally positive view of "state intervention" held by actors in East Asian higher education systems (ibid., p. 193). However, Kyung also noted that strong state control has the potential to constrain university autonomy and agency, and that some participants lamented the funding constraints imposed by the project-based model to regional cooperation adopted at the government level. Nevertheless, a noteworthy finding was that interviewees displayed a "willingness to trade a lower level of autonomy at the university in order to garner greater financial support from the state in order to ensure the success of the programs in which they invest their energies" (ibid., p. 242). The emergence of this finding highlights a strength in Kyung's research design: the choice to juxtapose the government-led CAMPUS Asia program with BESETOHA, a "purely institution-driven program" that faced challenges due to lacking "a supportive and administrative umbrella" (ibid., p. 242). Juxtaposing these programs as cases enabled for a reflection by interviewees whose universities were involved with both to consider the positive aspects of state involvement.

Kyung identifies a number of 'enabling factors' that facilitate higher education regional cooperation such as the cost-saving aspects and time zone alignment that comes with geographical proximity, the growing economic interdependence of the region, and the growth of regional student mobility. Globalization and global status competition are reported to be another 'enabler', with "the creation of 'the region'" identified as being a necessary response to "intensifying global pressures" (ibid., p. 208). However, one of the stated limitations in Kyung's study was the focus on only the top-tier universities in each country, which may have skewed this emphasis on competition and global rankings.

With regard to 'challenges', Kyung suggests that a major obstacle to regional cooperation is the mistrust that persists among the three countries. She argues that this mistrust stems from "each country's relationship with the US", as well as "contemporary political issues between three countries" and "the legacy of historical conflicts" (Kyung, 2015, p. 186-7). Kyung claims that "all the three countries' higher education have close but rather complicated relationships with the US that prevent genuine understanding of each other and create distrust" (ibid., p. 187). For China, Japan and Korea's close alliance with the United States creates a barrier for effective regional cooperation. Conversely, Japan and Korea view China's emphasis on collaboration and mobility with the US as reason for its lack of enthusiasm for regional cooperation. Kyung writes, "[t]he unique position of the region in terms of relations with the US provides a double-sided challenge to promote collaboration among higher education institutions of China, Japan and Korea" (ibid., p. 189). While I agree with this statement, Kyung's claim that "the US's engagement in each East Asian country and its higher education certainly provides sources of distrust of each other", is unsubstantiated. For example, it does not follow that because China may be more focused on higher education collaboration with top-ranked US universities at the expense

of working with its neighbors this would lead counterparts in Japan and Korea to *distrust* the Chinese.

Kyung admits that "some of these challenges are common to the three study countries...while others are country-specific" (ibid., p. 193), however she does not elaborate on this, delineating which challenges where in fact country-specific. She does, however state that

> [t]he analysis of data suggests that the national dimension plays a critical role in policy translation and internalisation in East Asian higher education collaboration. The finding further indicates that the national dimension is highly related to the local dimension, which largely shapes socially accepted norms and standards, and demands. These differences across Chinese, Japanese and Korean local dimensions for systems of higher education are also historically constituted; thus, they are positioned differently in their capacities and interests in collaborating (ibid., p. 195).

Kyung draws on the 'glonacal agency heuristic' developed by Marginson and Rhoades (2002) in the statement above, and highlights how the national- and local-levels were found to be particularly salient in shaping 'socially accepted norms, standards and demands' and 'positioning capacities and interests' across the three countries. Despite this acknowledgement, these national differences go largely unexplored, as Kyung chooses to conflate her findings to the regional 'East Asian' level.

I argue this points to a limitation in Kyung's approach and highlights an important difference between Kyung's work and my own. Kyung attempts to thematically analyze the policy priorities, perceived barriers and future possibilities of regional cooperation in Northeast Asian higher education from the perspectives of actors at universities *across all three countries*, whereas I have focused my analysis on national/local perspectives from Japanese higher education. Kyung's approach enables for a focus on common themes that emerged across all three national higher education contexts, which provides useful data for

comparisons of regional cooperation across other world regional contexts. Her claims about convergent ideas emerging from the East Asian region warrant further study, and I argue that country-specific studies like this one will contribute further empirical and theoretical nuance that can serve to support or refute some of these claims.

Two final limitations are worthy of mention: first, Kyung does not interview any students. The omission of student voices arguably limits the discussion of 'challenges and possibilities' perceived by actors to the institutional level, and calls into question the claims about 'mistrust' that persist among the three nations. Was this mistrust perceived among CAMPUS Asia students? This is an important question worth exploring, as it is the students who are the primary beneficiaries of the programs for regional cooperation, and it is they who will mediate regional relations in the future. Second, a strength of Kyung's approach to case selection was its scope, including two distinct programs at elite universities across the three countries. However, this choice proved to be limiting as well, in the sense that different types of universities and programs situated in different academic disciplines were not given full consideration in the study. While limited to Japan, my study aims to address this gap by investigating the perceived 'challenges and possibilities' of actors at different types of universities, specializing in different fields.

'Asia as method' and Japanese higher education

One of the most comprehensive published studies of the CAMPUS Asia Program and Japanese universities' engagement with the Asian region more broadly is Jeremy Breaden's 2018 monograph entitled *Articulating Asia in Japanese Higher Education: Policy, Partnership and Mobility* (Breaden, 2018). In this work Breaden posits a useful analytical framework for conceptualizing Japan's evolving relationships with both the idea of 'Asia'

and the nations that comprise this ambiguous regional concept. He also has a chapter focused on CAMPUS Asia specifically, entitled 'Asia as campus: Enacting regionalism in student mobility'. I turn first to a brief discussion of Breaden's framework before considering his chapter on CAMPUS Asia.

Breaden succinctly introduces the contested concept of 'Asia' and its evolving discourse as it relates to Japan in the opening pages of his book. I include a number of passages here as they provide a useful lens through which to interrogate the contextual aspects of the research questions:

> Asia – originally a term used in ancient Mediterranean civilisations to refer to the lands to their east – has persisted to the present day as a fundamental component in Western views of the world, while also being adapted, claimed and/or rejected by those to whom it refers...
>
> Asia has also served as a particularly significant axis of Japanese cultural and political identity. In the late 1800s, Japan's modernisation was conceived by the new Meiji state as a twofold task of 'exiting Asia and joining Europe' (*datsu-a nyū-ō*). In the first half of the 20th century, on the other hand, Asia was re-appropriated in order to justify Japan's imperialist expansion as a struggle against Western hegemony, with Japan at the helm of a 'Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere' freed from the European colonial yoke (ibid., p. 3).
>
> The spectacular postwar recovery and economic boom of the 1960s and 1970s generated a new self-congratulatory discourse of Japan as Asia's first modern economic superpower and flag-bearer of a new Asian era. This discourse was often coloured, paradoxically, with an exceptionalist streak in which Japan was distinguished from the rest of Asia in its capacity to absorb and adapt Western ideas and institutions rather than clinging to its Asian-ness. Asia became a synonym for Japan's past, a baseline for measuring the country's success in modernisation through emulation of its Western Other. These ideas were fueled by popular Western characterisations of Japan's rise to superpower status as a the [sic] product of successful mediation of Eastern tradition and Western innovation, creating a highly (self-)Orientalist narrative of Japan as a country that was *in* but at the same time *above* and *ahead* of Asia. (ibid., p. 3-4)
>
> In the 21st century, economic changes such as the rise of China and Japanese industries' loss of ground to Asian competitors, combined with ongoing anxiety

> over domestic challenges such as depopulation, have generated new forms of discourse in which Japan's decline is indexed with Asia's rise, and in which increasing economic inter- dependence in the region coexists with mounting ethno-cultural nationalism. (ibid., p. 4).

Based on these evolutions in discourse, Breaden posits four 'articulations' of Asia that have emerged in the higher education context in modern Japanese history. He attempts this in what he describes is an adaptation of Chen Kuan-Hsing's 'Asia as method' methodology, whereby Asia serves as an "imaginary anchor point" and analytical "re-centring device" through which "non-Western societies and peoples" can reference one another and avoid "the persistent Western bias in traditional academic frameworks" (ibid., p. 5). In his descriptions of this region-centered approach Breaden raises an interesting point: just as some social science scholarship has come under criticism for the unquestioned usage of the nation-state as a primary unit of analysis (an orientation termed 'methodological nationalism' (see for example Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002)), so too must he reflexively consider the pitfalls of the selection of the Asian region as a unit of analysis as a possible contribution to 'methodological regionalism' (Breaden, 2018, p. 6). This is a noteworthy realization that is valuable to keep in mind for this study as well. I return to this point in my chapter on methods (Chapter 5).

The four articulations for Japanese higher education are Asia as "beneficiary, as market, as capability and as context" (ibid., p. 26). The idea of 'Asia-as-beneficiary' refers to Japan's approach to international education from the 1950s through the 1980s, which was characterized by a focus on regional international aid to help Asian economies industrialize. In the higher education context, this aid took the form of intake of Asian[16] students for purposes of human resource development, which culminated in the 100,000 international

[16] I follow here from Breaden with the term 'Asian' intended to mean non-Japanese international students from Asian countries.

students plan announced by Prime Minister Nakasone in 1983. Breaden describes how this approach was informed by an ethos shared across the emerging postwar international system which viewed former colonial powers as responsible for their former colonies, as well as the influence of the Cold War and U.S. interests in thwarting the spread of communism in Asia (ibid., p. 26-27). As many Asian economies rapidly developed in subsequent decades, Breaden suggests that Japan's engagement with Asia shifted in orientation from "aid to trade" (ibid., p. 30), pointing to the emergence of a discourse of 'Asia-as-market'. He tempers this claim however, by pointing out how many international students enrolled at Japanese universities pay discounted tuition fees and more than half receive some kind of scholarship. As such the international education 'market' in Japan is of a different sort than the models found in countries like the UK, Australia and the USA. Based on these admissions, in the Japanese higher education context, I would argue that the 'Asia-as-market' lens has limited analytical utility.

Breaden moves his discussion to point out that a noteworthy development in recent years has been a shift in rationale behind Japan's attempts to cultivate Asian human resources. It was previously expected that international graduates would return to their home countries with positive experiences of Japan and a willingness to forge ties with Japanese commercial interests abroad. Today, Asian graduates of Japanese universities are increasingly viewed as valuable human capital to be incorporated into Japan's domestic workforce. It is this shift that Breaden describes as a move from the orientation of 'Asia-as-market' to 'Asia-as-capability'. He writes:

> Asian students continue to function both as sponsored beneficiaries of and paying clientele for Japanese universities today, but these roles are increasingly overshadowed by their utility in the instrumentalist linking of university education with industry needs in Japan. Asia has emerged as a source of human capital, honed

> through university education in Japan, crucial to the success of Japanese industry in the Asian Century (ibid., p. 34).

The analytical lenses of Asia as 'beneficiary', 'market', and 'capability' view the region from the perspective of Japan and Japanese higher education in instrumental terms – as an "object of engagement" (ibid., p. 37). The final lens in Breaden's framework takes a different perspective, situating Japan and its higher education system in the *context* of an evolving Asian region. Doing so highlights the "complementarities and potentials for both collaboration and competition in a common regional playing field" (ibid., p, 37). Breaden argues that

> it is clear that Japanese universities have reached a point at which they must engage with Asia not just as counterpart but as joint component in the institutionalisation of regional cooperation...
>
> ...this demand, when juxtaposed with traditional modes of university engagement with Asia, produces conflicts between Asia as *them* and Asia as *us*, and between the goals of learning *about* Asia and learning *with* Asia (ibid., p. 38).

It is in this context that Breaden segues into a discussion of higher education regionalization and his chapter on the CAMPUS Asia program, which I address below. The four 'articulations' of Asia, while perhaps not equivalent in analytical applicability, provide a useful framework with which to interrogate the ideas about regional cooperation among actors at Japanese universities. The first three provide a means to conceptualize the evolving historical relationship of the nation of Japan and the idea of 'Asia', and the fourth frame enables for a focus on how ideas about this history interact with contemporary reality in this dynamic and interconnected region. These lenses will be incorporated where useful in the discussion of the findings from this study.

‘Enacting regionalism’ through CAMPUS Asia

I turn now to Breaden’s work on CAMPUS Asia. At the start of his chapter ‘Asia as campus: Enacting regionalism in student mobility’, Breaden utilizes the following definition of the CAMPUS Asia program upon which he builds his analysis:

> The CAMPUS Asia Program . . . aims to nurture future leaders of East Asia with global competence and thorough understandings of East Asian values. The CAMPUS Asia Program also seeks to establish an East Asian academic community and seeks to deepen the mutual understanding among Korea, China, and Japan, and to pave a new path for East Asian regional integration (SNU, n.d.) (ibid., p. 50).

For some reason Breaden chose a description of CAMPUS Asia provided on the website of Seoul National University in Korea, even though his focus of inquiry is Japan. He then uses this definition as a touchstone to build his analysis, problematizing the degrees by which CAMPUS Asia is helping to foster these aims in practice. However, the utilization of this definition as a jumping off point to analyze CAMPUS Asia from the perspective of Japan is itself problematic. While the description provided by SNU aligns with Breaden’s subsequent analysis, it is not consistent with the more commonly used definitions of CAMPUS Asia by the Japanese government. For instance, out of all of the Japanese government-level documents I collected and analyzed, there were no references to “East Asian values”, an “East Asian academic community”, or paving a path to “regional integration”.

There were however a number of references to “mutual understanding”, a term I address in some detail in the findings chapters. But Breaden errs in his analysis by conflating ‘mutual understanding’ with notions of “East Asianism” and “cultivating a shared identity”. I argue these concepts are distinct, and while a mutual understanding of nationally-bounded ‘others’ is indeed advocated, this does not equate to ideas of shared identities as East Asians.

Breaden addresses the significance of nationally-bounded others when considering the practicalities of establishing frameworks for regional mobility. He writes:

> The task at hand is not, of course, simply one of eliminating borders. Far more construction is required than demolition. Governments must work together to create a common framework for the sharing of governance structures, quality assurance mechanisms and other features of their respective national higher education systems; universities must engage pro-actively with this platform and collaborate systematically with international counterparts. These processes result paradoxically in an overt consciousness of borders, as it is the differences, not the similarities, which demand attention (ibid., p. 49).

Breaden's empirical research for this chapter involves an investigation into these practicalities. Like Eun Young Kyung and myself, Breaden sought to gain an understanding of the interaction of transnational, national and institutional level goals for regional cooperation that manifested in the policies and practices of CAMPUS Asia. He rightly points out that CAMPUS Asia projects are an "ongoing negotiation of diverse, multi-tiered interests" (ibid., p. 51), and suggests that his analysis "reveals a variety of tensions in this interaction and encompasses the possibility that CA[MPUS Asia] has provided a convenient framework through which to actualise agendas unconnected to its stated goals of regional integration" (ibid., p. 51). Again, I would suggest that his claims about 'stated goals of regional integration' are misleading, but operationalization of the CAMPUS Asia program as a framework through which various actors can actualize their own agendas is a notable finding worthy of further exploration.

With regard to methodology, Breaden's approach comprised a research design similar to Kyung's and my own, with a survey of documents available in the public domain and interviews with program participants at selected case universities. However, Breaden only conducted an examination of two universities involved in the pilot program of CAMPUS Asia; one a national university and the other a private institution. While his analysis

uncovers a number of insights, I argue that aspects of his case selection and methods skew his findings, aligning them with the ‘East Asianist’ narrative he puts forward which, I suggest, is overemphasized. For example, Breaden writes:

> Social science and humanities projects were chosen in favour of those in the natural sciences and engineering, in expectation that the former would have the deepest curricular engagement with the East Asianist ideals of the CA[MPUS Asia] program (ibid., p. 57).

This decision points to a weakness in his analysis. In addition to there not being any explicitly stated ‘East-Asianist ideals’ of the CAMPUS Asia program at the level of the Japanese government in the first place, the exclusion of natural sciences and engineering programs limits the possibility that ideas might emerge that would conflict with his pre-determined narrative.

Another limitation to Breaden’s approach is his decision to combine both academics and administrators involved in CAMPUS Asia into a category he terms ‘coordinators’ (ibid., p. 59). This move convolutes the ideas of various types of actors involved in the program. In the Japanese context in particular, academics and administrators have been described as being categorically distinct and frequently embodying opposing worldviews. For example, Poole (2016) writes:

> The first and most pronounced level of dichotomisation is that between administrators and academics. The assumption is that administrators represent ‘the university’ position, acting as a brake to change and a balance of power to the academic staff and faculties. The language used by administrators reinforces this position (Poole, 2016, p. 70).

Career administrators will arguably have different attitudes and motivations about regional cooperation and government-funded programs like CAMPUS Asia than academics, many of whom in this context would have been involved in the creation of cross-border links and

the applications for program funding. Conflating the perspectives of these two groups threatens to dilute the unique voices and experiences of each.

A final limitation, as with Kyung's study, was that Breaden did not interview students who participated in the program. The ramifications of this omission are mentioned above. Bearing these limitations in mind, Breaden's study did yield some noteworthy findings, one of which was the following:

> Coordinators appeared to have no qualms about separating their own roles from those of their university or Japanese government, preferring instead to find solidarity with Chinese and South Korean counterparts subjected to similar constraints. In this sense, such trilateral interaction can function to disassemble the balance of departmental, institutional and governmental interests already established, as coordinators de-couple their own roles from those of other Japanese stakeholders rather than endeavouring to represent the Japanese position as a whole (Breaden, 2018, p. 68).

This finding points to a significant and potentially unanticipated effect of implementing a program for regional cooperation. However, here the conflation of academics with administrators into the role of 'coordinators' weakens this claim. The above description sounds reasonable for academics who may identify more readily with cross-border epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) and unlikely for administrators who typically "represent 'the university' position" (Poole, 2016, p. 70). Nevertheless, this cross-national sense of solidarity will be explored in this study to see if the actors I interview lend support to Breaden's claim, and whether it tends to be academics or administrators (or both) who express these views.

In another passage, Breaden incorporates a 'coordinator' quote (reproduced below) that hints that this particular speaker may be an academic. In this instance the theme is the challenges posed by differences in communication styles. Breaden's interpretation follows:

> "Koreans and Japanese have very different ways of communicating. Koreans are much more up-front and try to drive the discussion forward quickly. This is difficult for Japanese professors who are used to a Japanese style of discussion and consensus-building. But I do feel there is some shared sensibility, shall we call it an Asian-style way of thinking, which helps us to trust each other and work through differences" ['coordinator' quote].

> There is nothing novel in this use of cultural difference as an explanation for communication problems, and no need to reiterate critiques of the worldview it represents, one constructed around static, stereotypical notions of 'national culture' and 'communication style'. Notable, however, is how it is offset by the subsequent statement concerning 'shared sensibility'; a sense of Asian identity (Breaden, 2018, p. 69).

Breaden once again makes a somewhat unfounded jump, this time from the 'shared sensibility' or 'Asian-style way of thinking' mentioned by the coordinator and the "sense of Asian identity" driving his narrative. However, what is noteworthy from this quote is the participant's mention of trust. Albeit the perspective of a sole individual, this statement appears to contradict the central claims about persistent distrust that impede regional cooperation among the three countries as purported by Kyung. I am not suggesting that one participant's claims can or should invalidate those of others, but that perhaps the argument about distrust put forward by Kyung is more complex than she suggests and warrants further investigation. (As was mentioned above, I think a good place to start is with students).

Some of the other claims made by Breaden are less credible and do not seem to be supported by evidence. For example, he writes:

> One of the greatest promises of CA[MPUS Asia] is that its Japanese graduates will be equipped with a greater capacity to empathise with colleagues in South Korea and China and transcend the petty nationalism which hampers Japan's relations with those countries (ibid., p. 70).

I see no reason to believe this statement. Transcending nationalism does not appear to be a 'promise' that anyone has made in CAMPUS Asia policy documents, and is inconsistent with the typical approaches to internationalization adopted by Japan which have been called out for their infusion of nationalistic elements. I think this statement may be another example of an interpretation of the 'mutual understanding' discourse that differs from my own. In the conclusion of his chapter, Breaden writes:

> ... the CA[MPUS Asia] initiative is designed to advance both regional integration of higher education systems and mutual understanding in East Asia. At first these dual purposes appear to be complementary, but they are actually quite dissimilar. One concerns the alignment of systems and structures, a purpose which is relatively easily programmatised at governmental level but too large-scale to be pursued purposefully by individual universities. The other, however, demands the cultivation of shared outlooks and identities (p. 77).

I argue that the concept of 'mutual understanding' does not, in fact, represent development of a shared identity, but instead represents a distinctive nationally-centered worldview that emphasizes difference. This discussion is taken up in more detail in Chapter 6.

In summary, while a number of empirical studies have been conducted on the CAMPUS Asia program, there is ample space for novel approaches including greater refinement and specificity of foci, and a need to verify the credibility of previous work with further research employing robust and rigorous methodologies. As was mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, there is a dearth of research on the A3 Foresight program. This thesis will address a number of these gaps. Focusing on Japan will enable for the development of a detailed and nuanced perspective from one of the three Northeast Asian higher education systems, which will complement and contrast with the 'East Asianist' perspectives offered in Kyung's study. While Breaden attempts to describe the view from Japan, the various limitations to his methodology warrant further research that incorporates views from more universities and a wider range of academic disciplines.

Another gap addressed is the absence of student voices from previous studies. While quantitative survey research has been conducted involving students (Chun, 2016; Mamiya, 2019), these studies have tended to focus on whether or not intra-Asian study abroad contributes to East Asian identities or notions of 'Asian citizenship'. Investigating complex concepts such as identity or citizenship using pre-determined definitions and quantitative approaches inherently constrains the possibilities for gaining an in-depth understanding of the meanings attributed to these concepts by participants. As such a qualitative engagement with actors involved in these programs will be beneficial in this regard. This study does not specifically aim to uncover whether or not students participating in CAMPUS Asia or A3 Foresight identify as 'East Asian', although I attempted to provide spaces for participants to address this topic during interviews. Instead, I endeavored to present participants with an even broader concept – that of 'regional cooperation in Northeast Asia' – and ask them what that idea means to them.

Broader theoretical literature on higher education regional cooperation

Having addressed the extant empirical studies of the two programs examined in this thesis, the chapter now moves to a discussion of some wider themes. According to Punch and Oancea, the second part of a literature review should be broader, aimed at critically assessing the overall state of knowledge on a given topic, including the theoretical and conceptual tools that can be used to aid in its exploration (Punch & Oancea, 2014, p. 122-123). This section of the chapter will attempt to accomplish this task.

Much of the extant literature that addresses higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia takes a descriptive, policy-focused perspective, with some scholars offering

additional speculative remarks about potential issues and challenges regarding regional integration in the higher education sector as well as other arenas. While some of this literature mentions CAMPUS Asia, the literature cited in this section does not include any empirical studies of the program. Instead, this section of the review discusses contributions to the literature that address the topic of regional cooperation in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific more broadly.

Scholars have debated the complex 'multi-layered' nature of the range of frameworks for regional cooperation in the East Asian and Asia-Pacific regions (Sugimura, 2012a, 2012b), with some lamenting the "fragmented landscape of HE regionalization, comprised of mutually exclusive and, in some instances, overlapping cross- and intraregional economic and political interdependencies" (Choi, 2017, p. 27), while others suggest the possibility of a "mosaic harmonization" that joins the diversity of higher education systems in the region (Kuroda, Sugimura, Kitamura, & Asada, 2019, p. 48). Whether the current state of affairs is best described as a 'mosaic' or a 'fragmented landscape', it has been argued that the complexity of the region demands effective political and policy coordination across multiple frameworks in order to maximize the latent benefits of higher education regional cooperation (ibid, 2019).

Two edited volumes relevant to the broader topic of higher education regional cooperation taken up in this study are *Higher Education Regionalization in Asia Pacific: Implications for Governance, Citizenship and University Transformation*, edited by John Hawkins, Ka Ho Mok, and Deane Neubauer (2012), and *Emerging International Dimensions in East Asian Higher Education,* edited by Akiyoshi Yonezawa, Yuto Kitamura, Arthur Meerman, and Kazuo Kuroda (2014). Selected contributions from these books are discussed below.

A noteworthy problem with the Hawkins *et al* edited volume worth mentioning at the outset is the editors' approach to conceptualizing *regionalism* and *regionalization*, which proves to be ambiguous, internally inconsistent and misaligned with broader literature. In the book's introduction Neubauer (2012) defines regionalism as a "normative and sometimes ideological articulation of how regional entities *should* be conceptualized or drawn together in presumptive common purposes" (p. 4, italics in the original), but he does not expand on which actors or 'entities' are involved in this process. He contrasts this with regionalization, which, he suggests, "can be supported more usefully by the identification and engagement of various empirical dimensions of interaction among the units presumed to constitute the regional focus" (2012, p. 4). Thus for Neubauer regionalism entails the ideals and ideologies that fuel a region-building project, while regionalization refers to the observable policies and practices. Hawkins in the same volume describes how "[r]egionalism may focus on political structures, security and international relations, economics, geography, literature, art and architecture, popular culture and sport, and education to name just a few" (2012, p. 179). What this 'focus' is supposed to mean is unclear, but Hawkins points to Knight's theoretical chapter in the same volume (discussed below) "for other ways of conceptualizing such distinctions" (ibid, p. 179). This is also a rather ambiguous statement, but it appears that the various authors of this volume did not come to an agreed upon definition of these terms.

As discussed in Chapter 1, I adopt a more substantive and empirically observable definition of regionalism, which aligns with established definitions by scholars of comparative regionalism in the field of International Relations (and some Higher Education scholars) (Acharya, 2012; Aggarwal et al., 2007; Börzel, 2016; Börzel & Risse, 2016; Dent, 2013; He & Inoguchi, 2011; Robertson, Dale, et al., 2016; Yeo, 2010). For example, Börzel and

Risse define regionalism as “a process of building and sustaining formal regional institutions and organizations” (Börzel & Risse, 2016, p. 3), while Acharya describes it as “purposive interaction, formal or informal, among state and non-state actors of a given area in pursuit of shared external, domestic and transnational goals (Acharya, 2012, p. 3). Chou and Ravinet offer a useful definition of *higher education regionalism* as “a political project of region creation involving at least some state authority (national, supranational, international), who in turn designates and delineates the world’s geographical region to which such activities extend, in the higher education policy sector” (Chou & Ravinet, 2015, p. 368).

The ambiguity of terminology in the Hawkins *et al* volume thus presents certain issues resulting from a disconnect with broader literature. However, a number of other concepts and insights into processes of regional cooperation in the East Asian region prove useful for this project. These are discussed below.

Centrifugal and centripetal forces: regional higher education’s opposing ‘laws of motion’

One such insight is the discussion by Hawkins concerning the set of concepts he terms *centrifugal* and *centripetal forces*. He explains that centrifugal forces pull nations away from processes of regional cooperation while centripetal forces pull towards a regionalist vision. He cites Hans de Witt (1995, cited in Hawkins, 2012) who argues that nationalism is a powerful centrifugal “counter force, placing boundaries that regionalization [sic] dare not cross” (Hawkins, 2012, p. 178). With regard to Northeast Asia, Hawkins writes:

> Given the economic and increasingly cultural interdependency of the region, there may well be a slow, tortuous path to a regional community, but if that is put up against the rise in nationalism on the part of all three of these core nations, it is not likely to be meaningfully successful (ibid., p. 182-183).

He also references Clark Kerr, who argued that the internationalization of learning and knowledge and the nationalization of the purposes of higher education are two opposing "laws of motion" which create inherent tensions within higher education (Kerr, 1990). These valuable ideas from Kerr and the concepts of centrifugal/centripetal forces will be incorporated into this study's analysis where relevant.

Hawkins ultimately argues that the nation-state itself serves as a centrifugal force that hinders regional cooperation, particularly in its contemporary iteration driven by influences such as neoliberalism and economic competition (ibid., p. 178). He also suggests that regional commonalities that contrast with other world regions can serve as a centripetal force. He argues that as "Asian nations have much more in common with each other than they do with the West...there is a basis for forging substantive regional affiliations (a centripetal force)" (ibid., p. 183). Neither of these claims are supported by evidence in Hawkins' chapter, and as such warrant verification through empirical research. In the analysis of participant ideas I will consider whether these claims hold water alongside the other centrifugal/centripetal forces that are uncovered.

A conceptual framework for higher education 'regionalization'

Another valuable contribution from the Hawkins *et al* volume is a conceptual framework developed by Jane Knight for what she terms higher education 'regionalization' (Knight, 2012, 2016) (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1: Knight's Conceptual Framework for Regionalization of Higher Education



Adapted from Knight, 2012; 2016.

Knight's contribution provides a useful toolkit to identify the various empirical dimensions of higher education region building and has now been utilized by a number of scholars (Chao, 2014; Chen & Shimizu, 2017; Chi Hou, Hill, Chen, Tsai, & Chen, 2017). However, I argue that aspects of the proposed framework are problematic. Firstly, Knight's chosen terminology is inconsistent with other scholarship on regional integration, including the terms delineated in the introduction of this thesis. For example, Chou and Ravinet argue there is a notable disconnect between Knight's framework and the broader debates ongoing

in the study field of Regionalism (Chou & Ravinet, 2016, p. 279). They note how terms such as 'characteristics' and 'approaches' are ambiguous and inconsistent with carefully defined 'variables', 'factors' and 'dimensions of comparison' that are commonly used in fields such as Political Science (ibid.). While the interpretive nature of this study does not entail the need to adhere to terms that imply causation such as 'variables', Knight's chosen terminology is problematic in other ways. In addition to the confusing break from established scholarship defining regionalization and regionalism as distinct but iterative processes for regional integration (see discussion above), Knight's 'continuum of intensity' also incorporates terminology inconsistent with extant literature. 'Cooperation' and 'integration' sit at opposite ends of a spectrum, whereas I have delineated integration to represent a range of possible processes (in line with International Relations scholarship) subsumed under the even broader umbrella term of cooperation (cf. Yamamoto, 2013). Likewise, 'informal, bottom up' characteristics would generally imply regionalization, while 'formal, top down' traits would typically be associated with regionalism.

Knight posits three 'approaches' to higher education 'regionalization' (referred to as the FOPA model). The *functional* approach relates to the "practical activities of HEIs and systems" (including "Collaborative Programs"); the *organizational* approach entails the "architecture that evolves to develop and guide the regionalization initiatives in a more systematic (although some might call bureaucratic) manner"; and the *political* approach refers to the "strategies that put higher education initiatives on the agenda of decision-making bodies" (Knight, 2016, p. 119-120). Knight suggests that the three 'approaches' to 'regionalization' are inter-related, ideally working in unison to complement and reinforce one another.

It is useful to conceptualize these varied elements of higher education regional cooperation and consider how they might influence processes of region building. However, Knight's choice to use a Venn diagram to indicate the distinct and overlapping relationships among these approaches is an inappropriate visualization. In a true Venn diagram, if an element was positioned in the intersecting space of two circles (sets), than that element should satisfy the criteria defining membership in both. It may not have been Knight's intention to employ a functional Venn diagram, but rather to show that the three approaches are merely inter-related.

Nevertheless, the visualization in the current FOPA model also appears to limit regional cooperation phenomena to seemingly static possibilities. Unlike the other elements of Knight's framework that make use of spectra, the FOPA diagram is not designed to consider the *degrees* by which the various approaches are established and intersect with one another. The idea of an 'approach' implies movement, perhaps flux, but this is not visualized. It also does not provide a space to consider the possible tensions and conflicting priorities between the approaches, or their degrees of sustainability, which are issues Knight herself mentions in her chapter (Knight, 2012, p. 29).

I suggest these 'approaches' might be better re-termed as the 'dimensions' mentioned by Chou and Ravinet (2016), which would enable for a recognition of the complexity and varied influences that constitute regional cooperation phenomena. Instead of a Venn diagram of intersecting 'approaches', I posit that a table that describes the various dimensions of regional cooperation, including the degrees by which these dimensions have become institutionalized[17] and potential barriers to sustainability, is more analytically

[17] 'Institutionalization' here entails the creation of "structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents" and the "formal and informal institutions external to actors that may be seen to constrain (or empower) them" (Schmidt, 2017, p. 252).

robust (see Table 3.1). I add a column indicating the degrees of institutionalization of the three dimensions using terminology borrowed from The World Bank's 'Systems Approach for Better Education Results' (SABER) methodology (The World Bank, n.d.). Institutionalization can thus be described as 'latent', 'emerging', 'established', or 'advanced'. I give a provisional example below with CAMPUS Asia.

Table 3.1: Dimensions of higher education regional cooperation: CAMPUS Asia Program

Dimension	Example	Degree of institutionalization	Barriers to sustainability
Functional dimension	Second (post-pilot) phase of short- and medium-term student mobility and double degree programs implemented by partner universities in China, Japan and Korea.	Established	Limited-term project-based government funding Challenges of credit and curricula alignment, quality assurance
Organizational dimension	Funding and support by Ministries of Education; Quality Assurance Monitoring by governmental agencies in the three countries	Established Established	Subject to changes in the political dimension
Political dimension	Part of the 'Inter-University Exchange Project' for global higher education competitiveness (Japan/national-level); the product of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) /Tri-lateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) efforts at region-building in the Education sector (tripartite level); Long-term strategic goal to expand program beyond Northeast Asia to include ASEAN countries	Established Advanced Emerging	Funding and support subject to shifts in domestic politics and the national economy (GDP) Tensions/conflicts in diplomatic relations Fragmented and overlapping existing frameworks; political, socio-cultural and linguistic differences; role of China; US influence

Knight describes the FOPA framework in a paper published in 2013 as "a work in progress" (Knight, 2013, p. 111). I have attempted to improve upon this framework here, and in a later chapter I argue that the 'ideational dimension' is an additional dimension that is essential to consider when trying to understand higher education regional cooperation.

In her application of the existing framework to the East Asian context, Knight locates the CAMPUS Asia program in the 'Functional Approaches' category, which highlights the fact that is indeed a 'collaborative program' involving regional student mobility (Knight, 2012, 2016). However, as noted in the amended framework above CAMPUS Asia has political and organizational dimensions, and therefore can also be situated in the Political and Organizational approaches categories (thereby falling in the center of Knight's Venn diagram). The program is the product of the political will and strategies for regionalism that emerged between China, Japan and Korea, and it is also steered through the bureaucratic monitoring of quality assurance agencies in the three countries. As such, while it is indeed a 'functional' collaborative mobility program, it is *constituted* by political strategizing and organizational control. This claim is supported by a 2017 study that applies Knight's framework to CAMPUS Asia and also suggests that the program embodies all three of the approaches (Hou, Hill, Chen, Tsai, & Chen, 2017). Many other of Knight's 'examples from the Asian region' also seem to fit best at the intersection of functional, organization and political approaches (see Knight, 2016, p. 122). In this sense, I argue that categorizing various policies, programs, organizations and practices into one of three approaches is unhelpful, as it encourages analysis of regional cooperation in a one-dimensional and oversimplified manner.

Of course, in some instances of regional cooperation any one or more of the above dimensions (or 'approaches') may be absent. While this is not the case for CAMPUS Asia, it may be true for the 'institution-driven' BESETOHA consortia studied by Kyung (mentioned briefly above), which reportedly lacked sufficient organizational and political capacities. In this respect, the absence, instability, or insufficient institutionalization of a

given dimension could highlight potential barriers to regional cooperation. In this sense, Knight is correct in stating that the three approaches would ideally work in unison to support one another.

Cross-border activities in broader East Asia

With regard to the edited volume *Emerging International Dimensions in East Asian Higher Education* (Yonezawa et al., 2014), a number of chapters discuss processes and prospects for higher education regional cooperation in East Asia. An empirically strong contribution is a chapter by Kazuo Kuroda, Takako Yuki and Kyuwon Kang, which reports on the results of a survey administered to 124 'leading' universities in North and Southeast Asian countries (including China, Japan and Korea). The objectives of the survey were to gain a better understanding of the types of cross-border activities being undertaken in the region and the significance attached to these activities, including their expected outcomes. The ultimate aim was to provide empirical evidence that could inform the construction of a "new East Asian collaborative higher education framework" (Kuroda, Yuki, & Kang, 2014, p. 60). Of particular interest for this study are the findings regarding the expected outcomes of cross-border activities. These are reproduced below.

Table 3.2: Significance of overall cross-border activities expected outcomes for East Asia

	Past		Present		Future	
Rank	**Expected outcome**	**Mean**	**Expected outcome**	**Mean**	**Expected outcome**	**Mean**
1	To improve quality of education (A-I)	2.59	To improve international visibility and reputation of your university (P-I)	3.23	To improve international visibility and reputation of your university (P-I)	3.78
2	To promote national values and culture (P-N)	2.54	To improve quality of education (A-I)	3.19	To improve quality of education (A-I)	3.78
3	To achieve research excellence (A-I)	2.39	To achieve research excellence (A-I)	3.17	To achieve research excellence (A-I)	3.78
4	To improve international visibility and reputation of your university (P-I)	2.39	To promote intercultural/international awareness and understanding (A-N)	3.13	To promote intercultural/international awareness and understanding (A-N)	3.75
5	To promote intercultural/international awareness and understanding (A-N)	2.38	To promote national values and culture (P-N)	3.09	To promote national values and culture (P-N)	3.68
6	To meet the demand of your national economy (E-N)	2.36	To meet the demand of your national economy (E-N)	3.01	To promote regional collaboration and identity of Asia (P-R)	3.63
7	To promote regional collaboration and identity of Asia (P-R)	2.24	To promote regional collaboration and identity of Asia (P-R)	2.93	To meet the demand of your national economy (E-N)	3.53
8	To generate revenue for your own institution (E-I)	1.94	To meet the demand of the global economy (E-G)	2.69	To generate revenue for your own institution (E-I)	3.39
9	To meet the demand of the Asian regional economy (E-R)	1.89	To generate revenue for your own institution (E-I)	2.68	To meet the demand of the Asian regional economy (E-R)	3.34
10	To meet the demand of the global economy (E-G)	1.87	To promote global citizenship (P-G)	2.63	To meet the demand of the global economy (E-G)	3.31
11	To promote global citizenship (P-G)	1.85	To meet the demand of the Asian regional economy (E-R)	2.62	To promote global citizenship (P-G)	3.29

Note – 4 Highly significant, 3 fairly significant, 2 moderately significant, 1 slightly significant, 0 not significant, (A) academic, (P) political, (E) economic, (G) global, (R) regional, (N) national, (I) institutional

Adapted from (Kuroda, Yuki, & Kang, 2014, p. 73).

Elements of the table and the underlying research design warrant explanation. The researchers developed 11 pre-determined indicators of 'expected outcomes' of cross-border

activities[18], and categorized these into thematic groups (academic, political, economic), and levels (global, regional, national, institutional). They asked participants to rate the 'significance' of these outcomes in relation to their institution's regional cross-border activities, reflecting on the past and present, and projecting their ideals towards the future. A number of the findings are relevant to this study.

The first is the perceived importance of improving the international visibility and reputation of universities. It is unclear why the researchers placed this outcome in the 'political' grouping, as it clearly seems bound up with the other highly ranked goals of enhancing education quality and achieving research excellence, both of which understandably fall into the 'academic' group. Nevertheless, what is noteworthy is how these goals were not only deemed important, but noticeably more important than the national, regional and global *economic* aspects that some suggest are the driving forces of de facto regionalization in the region (Byun & Um, 2014; Kuroda, 2016b). A second noteworthy finding is that promoting "intercultural/international awareness and understanding" and "national values and culture" are deemed the next most significant outcomes of cross-border activities. These goals are ranked higher than promoting "regional collaboration and identity of Asia" and "global citizenship". These findings thus point to a vision of regional cooperation that is informed primarily by nationally-oriented competitiveness; both with regard to the importance placed on improving universities' quality and international reputations, and with respect to emphasis on national cultural identity over regional and global identities.

[18] Cross-border activities were described as including outgoing mobility of students and faculty, acceptance of foreign students, cross-border research collaboration, institutional agreements, collaborative degree programs and distance education (Kuroda et al, 2014, p. 70).

The survey findings aggregate the results from 13 different East Asian countries[19], with Northeast Asian countries making up 33% of the surveyed sample, and Japan 14%. Considering the countries surveyed represent a wide range of cultures, levels of economic development and political regime-types, the degrees by which these results are reflective of individual countries is questionable. Other limitations include those inherent to any quantitative approach to research where survey items are selected *a priori* by the researchers, thereby limiting the range of possibilities from which respondents can deem an outcome 'significant'. Respondents may have other ideas about expected outcomes that were not available as options, and they may also have different interpretations of the meanings of selected terminology (e.g. 'global citizenship') than what was intended by the researchers. With regard to the outcomes in Table 3.2 above, another issue is that a number of them conflate multiple ideas into single metrics (e.g. intercultural *and* international awareness *and* understanding; national culture *and* values; regional collaboration *and* identity of Asia). This is problematic for obvious reasons: a respondent may feel one way about one element (e.g. regional collaboration) and differently about a conjoined element (e.g. identity of Asia). Nevertheless, the findings have relevance to this study and can be explored in more qualitative depth in the Japanese context if they emerge organically through interviews with participants.

Another important contribution from *Emerging International Dimensions in East Asian Higher Education* is Kiyong Byun and Sangheon Um's chapter entitled, 'The Regionalization of Higher Education in Northeast Asia' (Byun & Um, 2014). This chapter has been cited a number of times throughout this thesis as it provides a detailed description of the economic and political contexts related to higher education regional cooperation in

[19] Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Japan and Korea.

Northeast Asia and gives a thorough description of the CAMPUS Asia program. Byun and Um also present some arguments at the end of their chapter with regard to the issues and challenges that may serve to impede regional cooperation. Like Kyung, Byun and Um refer to geopolitical tensions involving the three countries and also the influences of nations such as the USA (and North Korea). They also point to organizational challenges such as quality assurance and alignment of diverse systems of institutional governance, as well as tensions between a regionalist program like CAMPUS Asia being operated among countries like Japan and Korea who are both in fierce competition as exporters of higher education, with China being a primary market for each. These arguments, while based on sound analysis, were inherently predictive as the chapter refers to CAMPUS Asia as a new program that "will be implemented...starting from 2012" (p. 136). This implies the chapter was written prior to this time and the above barriers were speculative. They do however, appear to align with subsequent empirical research (Breaden, 2018; Kyung, 2015), and this project will further serve to confirm or refute Byun and Um's arguments.

Higher education regionalism: a cross-disciplinary research agenda

A final important body of literature is the research on 'higher education regionalism' by Meng-Hsuan Chou and Pauline Ravinet. Chou and Ravinet posit through a number of papers the argument that there exists a problematic disconnect between scholarship on regional integration in the Higher Education Studies field and that in the broader social sciences, particularly in the disciplines of Political Science and International Relations (referred to by Chou and Ravinet as the study field of Regionalism). They point out that higher education scholarship has tended to give disproportionate attention to European developments in higher education regional cooperation at the expense of other regions, and has engaged insufficiently with the broader debates and substantial body of established

literature on regionalism in the abovementioned disciplines[20]. In turn, they highlight how the growth of regional political initiatives in the higher education sector has largely been ignored by Political Science and International Relations scholars of regional integration (Chou & Ravinet, 2015, 2016). To address these gaps they argue for a research program that takes a comparative policy-sectoral approach to the study of regionalism, and posit that cross-disciplinary empirical studies of the higher education policy sector[21] can contribute to a "new generation of comparative regional integration studies" and a better "understanding of statehood and globalization in the contemporary era" (Chou & Ravinet, 2016, p. 273).

To accomplish this task, Chou and Ravinet propose a research agenda that incorporates an "inclusive analytical framework for empirical analyses and assessment of findings" (ibid., p. 271). The framework is premised on a "political and inductive definition of regionalism, embraces the comparative method, and adopts a meso-micro policy-oriented perspective on comparative regionalism" (ibid., p. 276). They explain,

> Empirically, for our present purpose, this would mean looking at each regional case, taking as an entry point the different regional policy developments in one specific sector (e.g. higher education), and analyse the actors, the ideas, the institutions, and the mechanisms put into place to animate the cooperation (ibid., p. 276).

Chou and Ravinet describe a three-step approach to implement their research agenda. The first step involves a process of *mapping* the diversity of regional higher education initiatives

[20] A recent exception to this is the edited volume on higher education regionalism by Susan Robertson, Kris Olds, Roger Dale and Que Anh Dang entitled *Global Regionalisms and Higher Education: Projects, Processes, Politics,* published in 2016. In this volume a number of higher education regions are investigated, although the emphasis is indeed on Europe and there are no chapters that focus on Northeast Asia (Robertson, Olds, Dale, & Dang, 2016).

[21] In a similar vein, Robertson, Azevedo and Dale posit of theory of higher education regional cooperation they term a 'cultural political economy of regionalism' (Robertson, Azevedo, & Dale, 2016). The theory approaches the study of 'sectoral regions' (such as higher education regions) as "strategically selective socio-spatial projects" involving national, regional and global actors which can be understood through cultural, political and economic analytical lenses (ibid., p. 26).

in a particular area and time period, including the identification of the 'constellation of actors' involved in these processes (ibid., p. 280). In the second step, the identification of varieties of higher education regionalisms entails an investigation of the *institutional arrangements* adopted and the *ideas and principles* embedded in the regional initiatives (ibid., p. 282). The third step involves 'conceptualizing higher education regionalism', which essentially entails theory development based on the grounded, qualitative and comparative empirical work inherent in the previous steps that the two scholars argue "has yet to be undertaken" (ibid., p. 282).

This study aims to undertake some of this empirical work and adopts a research design that fits within Chou and Ravinet's second step, focusing on the 'ideas and principles' of actors involved in higher education regional cooperation in Japan. Following from the work of Vivian Schmidt (discussed in the following chapter), Chou and Ravinet explain that ideas and principles "refer to the paradigms, policy ideas, and programmatic ideas guiding that region's higher education initiatives", and that gaining an inductive understanding of these varied ideas can help "facilitate the distilling of regional models of higher education cooperation" (ibid., p. 282). They elaborate:

> We believe such an inductive approach is more likely to produce unexpected findings that may contribute to broader globalization debates. It is also less normative than one proposing to analyse regionalism along a developmental continuum. We thus depart clearly from the (more or less explicit) assumption that there is a 'better' regional model as indicated by the 'degree' of integration or level of 'region-ness' perspective (p. 282).

Adopting this approach, it is my hope that this inductive investigation of the cognitive and normative ideas shaping higher education regional cooperation in Japan will contribute to this larger project of mapping, understanding and conceptualizing 'higher education regionalism'.

Chou and Ravinet offer a valuable contribution to their research agenda in a paper that compares policy ideas for higher education regionalism in Europe and ASEAN. They conducted 53 interviews with policy actors in a range of governmental organizations involved in higher education region building in the two regions (Chou & Ravinet, 2017), and present in their paper a number of noteworthy findings. One of these is the identification of an approach to higher education regionalism in Southeast Asia that connects to a normative position called 'the ASEAN Way', a style of cooperation "characterized by informality, non-interference in national affairs, non-confrontational consultation and consensus building as the main mode of decision making" (ibid, p. 10). They point out how this approach differs considerably from that taken in Europe, which helps support their refutation of what they term the 'Bologna export thesis', which postulates that processes of higher education regionalism that have taken place in Europe have served as an exemplar for other regions, influencing them through diffusion and borrowing (ibid.). Another notable finding pointed to a commonality between the two regions. Chou and Ravinet term this phenomenon the 'knowledge discourse', which emphasizes "the role of knowledge in economic growth, international competition and social cohesion" (ibid., 11). As this 'knowledge discourse' has reportedly emerged in both ASEAN and European higher education regionalisms, it will be a worthwhile exercise to explore whether and to what degree these ideas of knowledge for economic growth, competitiveness and social cohesion emerge in the context of Japan in Northeast Asia.

However, I argue that, while valuable, Chou and Ravinet's methodological approach to uncover the ideas and principles driving higher education regionalism in their selected contexts is insufficient. As policy is a *process* that involves not only 'operational

formulation' and 'implementation' at the government-level, it also includes 'delivery on the ground' and 'consumption and evaluation' by actors at universities participating in regionalist projects (Yeatman, 1990, 1998, cited in Ozga & Lingard, 2007). As such, to gain a comprehensive picture it is necessary to include the voices of these actors.

While not exhaustive, I have attempted in this chapter to introduce and critically discuss the most relevant and robust scholarship related to the CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight programs and the research topic of higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia more generally. There are notable omissions. While policies and programs for higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia have been described as being modeled after Europe's ERASMUS Programme (Chun, 2016; Kuroda et al., 2014), I have not ventured into the vast literature that covers Europe, namely because the study is not designed to be comparative and the research questions are very much focused on the Northeast Asian context. Furthermore, as was alluded to above, scholars have increasingly begun to question the alleged influence of the European 'Bologna Process export model' in other regions, and the unquestioned assumptions that Europe should serve as an exemplar by which other regions should be compared (Cabanda, Tan, & Chou, 2019; Chou & Ravinet, 2016, 2017). This ties into the critique in the quote above by Chou and Ravinet suggesting that comparing various world region building projects against a particular 'model of success' limits the possibilities for comparative regionalism as a field: more can be gained from contextualized and nuanced studies that acknowledge the unique complexities that shape different regions and initiatives for regional cooperation.

In summary, notable empirical findings from extant research are suggestive of the following:

1) Geopolitical tensions and mistrust are perceived to be persistent barriers to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia (Byun & Um, 2014; Kyung, 2015);

2) Higher education regional cooperation in broader East Asia is driven primarily by rationales for national and institutional competitiveness, followed by the promotion of national cultures and values, as opposed to ideals of regional identity or global citizenship (Kuroda et al., 2014);
3) Actors involved in regionalist higher education programs may utilize them to realize their own agendas, and may develop a sense of 'cross-national solidarity' with program counterparts in other Northeast Asian countries (Breaden, 2018).

These findings from previous research merit further exploration. In addition to these empirical findings, previous scholarship has offered a number of valuable arguments, concepts and theoretical frameworks than can be assessed analytically in this study. They include:

1) The four 'articulations of Asia' as *beneficiary, market, capability* and *context* which may provide useful analytical lenses through which to interpret the ideas of actors at Japanese universities about regional cooperation;
2) The dual concepts of *centrifugal* and *centripetal* forces that pull towards or pull away from regionalist projects, which may be bound up with higher education's countervailing laws of motion: the drive for an internationalization of learning and the nationalization of the purposes of higher education (Hawkins, 2012; Kerr, 1990);
3) The argument that higher education regional cooperation can be best realized by a mutually supportive framework of functional, organizational and political dimensions ('approaches') (Knight, 2012, 2016);
4) The claim that there is a need for empirical research that explores higher education regionalism beyond the European case and without uncritical over-reliance on the 'Bologna Process export model'; and that this research can serve to bridge disciplinary gaps between Higher Education Studies and International Relations, and address the dearth of micro-level empirical research in the latter's study field of Regionalism.
5) To accomplish 4), a key step will be to uncover the ideas and principles embedded in regionalist higher education initiatives, along with other steps including mapping and conceptualizing higher education regionalisms.

I argue that the above are the most salient contributions of extant scholarship relevant to regional cooperation in Northeast Asian higher education to date, but all would benefit from further empirical verification and qualitative exploration. This thesis thus serves to address these needs and expand beyond them, ideally offering novel insights into the ongoing project of higher education region building in Northeast Asia.

II. Research Design

Chapter 4: Philosophical foundations, theory and methodology

Introduction

This chapter will describe and critically discuss the theories, approaches, and analytical frameworks selected to address the research questions. The contents of this chapter set the stage for the following chapter (Chapter 5) on case selection and methods for data collection, analysis and interpretation. While Chapter 5 describes and justifies the selection of cases and techniques for gathering and interpreting data connected to the research topic, this chapter engages with relevant ontological and epistemological debates that have developed in the social sciences and puts forth a rationale for the selected approaches used in this study. As mentioned in the Introduction in Chapter 1, this study addresses the topic of higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia from a particular social constructivist orientation and utilizes an analytical framework from an International Relations theory known as discursive institutionalism. These approaches are discussed in turn in the following sections. In addition to applying concepts and frames from these approaches, comparative methods of analysis were also utilized to inform the research design and enable a comparison of ideas of regional cooperation across a number of dimensions. As such, approaches to comparative social research are also discussed in the final section of the chapter.

Philosophies of social science

The development of the social sciences has been accompanied by philosophical deliberations among scholars about the nature of reality (ontology), the means by which we as humans can know this reality (epistemology), and the most appropriate tools and techniques for undertaking research on aspects of this reality (methodology). Recent decades have seen varying camps of positivists, interpretivists, rational-choice adherents,

post-structuralists and post-modernists (to name a few) engaging in heated debates over how one can understand and explain the social world (see Gerring, 2012). Some have lamented these debates have led social scientists astray from their primary task: solving problems of public concern (ibid., p. xx). While exhausting time (and space in scholarly journals) to defend one's position on the philosophy of social research does perhaps detract from the more pressing, pragmatic tasks of explaining and/or offering solutions to social problems, many argue that in order to foster a social science that is truly relevant and effective it is essential to critically engage with the philosophical foundations of different methodologies and cultivate a large toolkit of methods (ibid).

In his book *Social Science Methodology: A Unified Framework*, John Gerring (2012) argues that the majority of social scientists aspire to study human action and institutions in a "scientific" way; that is, in "a systematic, rigorous, evidence-based, falsifiable, replicable, generalizable, non-subjective, transparent, skeptical, rational, frequently causal, and cumulative fashion" (ibid., p. 2). This approach to the study of social phenomena is clearly influenced by and seeks to model the positivist methods found in the natural sciences. Proponents of this approach argue that social science research must indeed strive to be *objective,* otherwise it will lose its explanatory power and lack both rigor and credibility. Others would take issue with many aspects of this orientation, arguing that the ever-changing historical and cultural contexts within which human action takes place precludes universal generalization, and that all social phenomena must inherently be interpreted by researchers through the lenses of their own subjective and culturally-conditioned worldviews. Because of these shifting and varied contexts, and because of the unpredictable and at times irrational nature of human behavior, many believe that social research with

positivist objectives like replicability, falsifiability, causality, and non-subjectivity is both misguided and untenable.

This study adopts the latter of these perspectives. While certain aspects of social phenomena can arguably be known 'non-subjectively' (such as average life-expectancy in different countries), and correlations and even causal factors can be convincingly suggested (such as the connection of life-expectancy to nutrition or tobacco use), gaining an in-depth understanding of human experiences and the meanings people attribute to social phenomena can only occur in a subjective and interpretive manner. However, these understandings are not purely arbitrary, reflecting nothing beyond the sense perceptions imprinted on the mind of the subjective individual. An objective world outside the mind does exist, and will frequently push back against interpretations that stray too far from reality. The approach adopted for this project acknowledges this objective world, and the inherent subjectivity behind any attempts at understanding it.

A number of theoretical perspectives embrace this understanding of the intrinsic subjectivity and interpretation that constitutes social research and social life more broadly. One such perspective acknowledges that many of the understandings and meanings attributed to the world of human interaction are in fact *intersubjective;* they are negotiated and shaped through interactions with others and are situated in social and historical contexts. This ontological worldview and approach to research is known as social constructivism (in short, constructivism[22]). Constructivism is an umbrella term that encompasses a number of theoretical and methodological approaches to social research. Concepts central to

[22] Alternatively, the term 'social *constructionism*' has been used by some to refer to the ideas presented in this chapter that are termed 'constructivism' (see Scott, 2014). These ideas are not to be confused with theories of constructivism found in the field of psychology, which are generally associated with the work of Jean Piaget.

constructivist thought are presented in the next section, which is followed by an overview of the various types of constructivisms found in social research today. Presenting these typologies helps to situate the particular constructivist approach selected for this study, a form of *naturalistic constructivism*, which is presented and justified at the end of the first section.

Social constructivism

Constructivism can be regarded as a *social theory*, which is a "general theory about the social world, about social action, and about the relationship between structures and actors" (Jackson & Sørensen, 2016, p. 211). In this respect it has wide-ranging applicability across the social sciences. It can also take the form of any number of discipline-specific *substantive theories,* which seek to generate explanations of particular phenomena of disciplinary concern. International Relations scholar Alexander Wendt builds one such theory in his seminal work *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999), discussed in more detail below. Others have argued that constructivism is not technically a theory but is instead an *approach*, as it does not provide an explanation of social phenomena but instead offers a way of studying social relations (Onuf, 1998, p. 1, cited in Fierke, 2013, p. 194). Nevertheless, constructivists generally agree that social reality is inter-subjectively constructed and understand the objective of social research is to analyze the processes by which this occurs (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 13). Because the social world and the 'social facts' that comprise it are fundamentally different from the laws and 'brute facts' that govern the physical world, many concur the approaches to constructivist research must also inherently differ from those used in the natural sciences (Jackson & Sørensen, 2016; Ruggie, 1998). The ontological, epistemological and methodological ideas informing this approach to research are introduced below.

The scientific study of ideas

Social constructivism finds its roots in the sociology of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber. Durkheim's influence on constructivist thought comes in part from his development of the concept of "social facts", and from his recognition of the importance of ideas – or "ideational factors" - in shaping social action and social order (Ruggie, 1998, p. 858). For Durkheim, 'social facts' are collectively shared ideas about the world that arise through social interaction. They are facts which depend on collective agreement to ensure their existence and which are frequently supported by human institutions (ibid., p. 856, see also Searle, 1995). Whereas 'brute' observational facts such as palm trees, coconuts, and gravity exist whether or not there is agreement that they do, social facts such as marriage, money, doctoral degrees, and Christmas Day exist solely because of collective human agreement. While some social facts can manifest in physical form (e.g. a flag is a physical object that is also imbued with meaning and significance), other social facts are completely immaterial (such as the concepts of democracy or freedom of speech). Once these social facts come into existence, they then shape and constrain subsequent social action.

Another important contribution from Durkheim was his attempt to study ideas and their social influence in a scientific way. In this respect, his position on ideas was distinct from two other influential schools of 19th century thought. One was utilitarianism, which gave little credence to the role of ideas and instead focused on the utility-maximizing actions of individuals[23]. The other was transcendentalism, which saw mental life as otherworldly and "above the ordinary methods of science" (ibid, p. 858). By contrast, Durkheim understood

[23] Utilitarian schools of thought have re-emerged in the past half century in a number of social science disciplines, including International Relations. These 'neo-' versions retain their focus on the behaviors of the individual actor in society (see for example rational choice theory), and contemporary social constructivists have, like Durkheim, disputed this emphasis on the centrality of the actions of individual actors as being the primary agents of change and/or contestation.

ideas to be just as 'natural' and worldly as objects inhabiting the physical world, and centrally important to social research (ibid.) As such, for Durkheim ideas and their social expressions were capable of being subjected to scientific scrutiny. In an effort to help establish sociology as a credible scientific discipline, Durkheim attempted to study the forms of social expression (such as liturgical practices and legal codes) he believed to be representative of collectively shared ideas by applying the positivistic methods and 'objective' indicators found in the natural sciences (ibid.). While his methodology has been revealed to be problematic, Durkheim's positioning of ideas within the remit of the social sciences has been instrumental in the development of social constructivism.

Max Weber was also highly influential in the development of constructivist thought. Like Durkheim, Weber was an advocate for the scientific study of social life but argued for a different approach that steered clear of Durkheim's conventional positivist epistemology. Weber posited that the social world of human interaction is inherently different from the material reality of the natural world, and thus requires a different kind of 'interpretive understanding' to uncover the meanings people ascribe to social phenomena (Jackson & Sørensen, 2016). Weber argued that humans are "*cultural beings,* endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it *significance"* (Weber, 1949, p. 81, quoted in Ruggie, 1998, p. 856, emphases in original). This capacity for humans to focus on particular aspects of reality and lend them meaning leads to the collective production of the 'social facts' described above. In addition to social facts, Weber's emphasis on meaning and significance – both ideational phenomena – places the instrumental and normative roles of ideas in a central position to understanding social action and social order (ibid.). For Weber, social scientists investigating the meanings that

actors attribute to actions must consider both the "instrumental rationality[24] of the means actors select" and the "normative self-understanding of the ends held by the social groups in question" (ibid., p. 860).

Both Durkheim and Weber developed concepts and utilized novel methods to study the influence of ideas on social life in ways that were innovative for their time. However, according to Ruggie (1998) it is the theoretical objectives and dedication to rigorous scientific inquiry - rather than the particular methods - of both of these scholars that have influenced and most resemble the contemporary constructivist project. While indebted to the foundations laid by these early scholars, contemporary constructivists have since developed a range of ontological and epistemological concepts and a toolkit of methods that have helped to establish constructivism as a viable approach to social science research. A number of these developments are introduced below.

Social constructivist ontology

Ontology entails a set of assumptions about the world (or some discipline-specific domain of it), that provides an inventory of what kinds of things exist, the conditions that enable their existence, and the relationships between them (Scott, 2014, p. 531). Put quite simply, ontology refers to a set of beliefs that answers the question "what is the nature of things?" (Risse, 2009, p. 145). Constructivist research is grounded in particular ontological beliefs about the nature of society, the institutions and actors that comprise it, and the relationships between them.

[24] The concept of 'instrumental rationality' is central to Weber's thought. Weber argued that modernization fuelled the increasing 'rationalization' of society: processes which entailed actors utilizing knowledge to achieve control of the world around them. For Weber, these processes paradoxically inhibited the freedom and autonomy of individuals by 'making ends of means' and facilitating blind adherence to the rules of rationalized bureaucracies and other institutions (Scott, 2014, p. 628).

Perhaps the most important component of constructivist ontology is the belief that individuals and groups are both shaped by the established structures and institutions that maintain societies, *and* have the power to set in motion new norms and practices that lead to their transformation (Klotz & Lynch, 2007). In other words, "both structural continuities and processes of change are based on agency. Agency, in turn, is influenced by social, spatial, and historical context" (ibid., p. 3). Thus, for constructivists, structure and agency are not simply mutually codetermined, but are mutually *constitutive* (Risse, 2009). In addition to the mutually constitutive nature of structures and agents, Klotz and Lynch argue that the constructivist ontology is founded on three other key concepts: *intersubjectivity, context,* and *power* (2007, p. 7).

Intersubjectivity

As was briefly discussed above, *intersubjectivity* refers to the condition by which ideas evolve to become social facts through processes of human interaction and collective agreement. The general acceptance of these social facts is often accompanied by the creation of institutions (also called structures) that serve to reify them, subsequently defining and constraining social action. As institutions themselves likewise become collectively accepted, they too become reified. Klotz and Lynch provide a powerful example of this process and its far-reaching effects using the concept of money. Money, they write:

> requires shared acceptance that tokens can be exchanged for goods, which in turn requires general agreement among buyers and sellers on what coins, papers, or entries into a computer spreadsheet are worth. Corporations, in turn, would not exist without the concept of profit, defined in terms of money. Domestic and international laws, such as trade regimes, also depend on such a monetary system. Rules and norms establish the habitual practices and procedures that we know as capitalism. The world economy shapes how people see the world, the goals they wish to accomplish, and the actions they take (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 8).

Reified collective understandings (like those that societies generally accept about money) can thus lead to the development of a network of social structures that shape and give order to the social world. However, actors also have the power to deliberate and contest dominant understandings and effect social change. While social facts and social structures are produced through collective agreement, it does not follow that *all* individuals or groups will inherently agree with the collectively determined rules, norms and other established institutions by which their social identities and capacities for agency are externally defined. Many develop ideas which serve to question and critique dominant structures, and engage in actions to destabilize, re-appropriate and resist them.

While intersubjectivity is considered to be foundational to the constructivist ontology, the definition of the concept is itself contested. As in the paradigm wars that have been waged in the social sciences more broadly, constructivists with different epistemological orientations debate the appropriateness of terminologies used to designate key concepts, including those that describe intersubjective phenomena. For example, some constructivists use terms like “norms”, (which imply a sense of stability and broad societal acceptance), while others prefer “representations”, (which suggest impermanence and the potential for contestation) (ibid.). The spectrum of these varied perspectives is discussed in the section on constructivist epistemology below.

Context

Another concept that constructivists tend to broadly agree on is the importance of *context*. In addition to being subject to contestation, intersubjective understandings vary over time, across regions, and within differing social settings (ibid., p. 9). Recognizing this potential for variation and change over time, constructivist researchers resist making claims that

explain social phenomena in terms of static laws and try to avoid essentialized notions of culture (ibid.). Instead, it is these very processes of change and the contextual circumstances that facilitate them that are of particular academic interest. Because contextual factors vary across space and time, social change often occurs in a nonlinear and uneven fashion in different places at different times.

Another important aspect of the concept of context has to do with the subjective positioning of social researchers themselves. Constructivists recognize that contextual factors will also influence a researcher's interpretation of a given social phenomenon. To provide an example from this research project, my attempt to gain an understanding of the ideas shaping Northeast Asian regional cooperation at Japanese universities requires not only an in-depth understanding of the historical, geo-political and socio-cultural contextual factors that give rise to these ideas, but also an awareness of my own normative views, motivations and subjective understandings that will inherently lead to a particular interpretation of the data under investigation. These reflexive considerations are addressed in more detail in Chapter 5, however they warrant brief mention here.

The goal of the research project was to develop an understanding of the ideas about regional cooperation from the perspectives of actors at Japanese universities. Throughout the development of the project I have become aware of my own contextual positioning and central role as a subjective actor involved in the research design and collection and interpretation of the data. This positioning is constituted by a number of notable, externally-determined social facts: I am white, male, and an American/British dual citizen. I am not Japanese. I was also positioned as an outsider with respect to the universities and programs under study. The importance of these and other social facts that describe myself is debatable,

and these debates will be taken up in Chapter 5. However, it is worth stating here that these considerations were an important factor in the selection of a constructivist approach to the research topic. The constructivist emphasis on the importance of context (including the positioning of the researcher as a subjective constructor of knowledge as opposed to one who uncovers objective truths), provided an approach to study this topic that avoided the risks involved in making any claims to objective truth about Japan or essentialized notions about Japanese culture. Doing so might appear dangerously reminiscent of the long Western tradition of Orientalism (see Said, 1978). Instead, embracing the constructivist orientation allows for a recognition of the role of the researcher in constructing the findings of the study; findings which are presented as but one of a multitude of possible subjective interpretations.

Power

A final key concept that comprises the constructivist ontology is *power*. Multiple intersubjective meanings often coexist, at times in tension with one another (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 10). Typically, one form of collective meaning emerges in a dominant position, which establishes a relationship imbued with a power dynamic. These dominant positions are maintained and reinforced through habitual action ('practice') and language and techniques for communication ('discourse'). An important question for constructivists is why certain practices and discourses prevail over others in certain contexts (ibid.). In addition to the maintenance of dominant structures, power can be utilized to effect change. For Klotz and Lynch, the

> conception of the exercise of power as the ability to reconstruct discourses and shape practices offers researchers a framework for assessing how meanings condition identities and actions, why some dominate others, and when these patterns shift. It also broadens the scope of … analysis beyond behavior to include how people justify their actions (ibid., p. 11).

Dominant collective meanings can manifest in a variety of forms, including in the laws, policies, and practices of national governments. This study focuses on the policies and programs for higher education regional cooperation which were collectively agreed upon by the governments of Japan, China and Korea. The ideas and discourses found in government-level policy documents which outline the visions and functions of these programs are analyzed in a later chapter. The reason for this analysis is because the constructivist notion of power is of academic interest in this study, particularly the ways in which actors at universities involved in program implementation use their own power to adopt, adapt and repurpose government-level ideas and discourses for regional cooperation.

This emphasis on the exercise of power at the levels of universities and the individual actors within them offers a valuable contribution to the extant literature. Many constructivist International Relations scholars claim to study the role of ideas as mechanisms for institutional change, yet many focus their empirical analyses on the language found in policy documents (and in some cases the deliberations and discursive practices that were involved in producing them). While others do include memoirs and interviews in their empirical work, what tends to get overlooked in much of this scholarship is that processes of deliberation and institutional change do not cease at the point of *production* of a policy reform, but instead continue throughout the process of policy *implementation*; the ideas within a given policy are thus maintained or resisted and reshaped at various levels by various actors. This study explores the ideas of the actors involved in the actual implementation of policies for higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia at Japanese universities.

The study of power is central to the discipline of International Relations, and it also informs much of the social research influenced by the post-modernist tradition. Post-modernist approaches to social research are but one of a range of epistemological orientations adopted by International Relations and Higher Education scholars alike. The varied beliefs about how humans can understand social life which fall under the constructivist umbrella are introduced in the next section, including the particular orientation adopted for this study.

Social constructivist epistemology

Whereas ontologies offer a unified set of assumptions about the nature of reality (or some domain of it), epistemology is concerned with how humans can *know* this reality. This branch of philosophy has thus sought to find "secure foundations for knowledge" so that knowledge can be distinguished from "mere prejudice, belief, or opinion" (Scott, 2014, p. 218). Epistemology has traditionally been characterized by two competing schools of thought: rationalism and empiricism. Rationalists in the 17th-century favored the 'pure' reasoning and abstract conceptualizations utilized in subjects like logic and mathematics, and believed these tools could be applied to the totality of human knowledge (ibid.) Rationalism thus espoused the belief that knowledge could be theoretical and independent of experience. By contrast, the empiricists contended that knowledge could only be gained through the five senses, arguing that the human mind was a "blank sheet…until marked by the impressions of sensory experience" (ibid., p. 218). Modern iterations of these competing schools of thought can still be found informing debates about the respective merits of theory-driven versus data-driven research, but this simple dichotomy has been complicated by a number of more nuanced explanations. Immanuel Kant was perhaps the first to be credited with developing a conceptual framework that transcended these opposing perspectives: he argued that the human mind was indeed capable of devising universal concepts and categories *a priori*, but acknowledged that these ideas could only

be applied "to make objective judgements within the bounds of possible experience" (ibid., p. 218). Kant's ideas have inspired numerous successors, many of whom have revised his notion of universalizing concepts to account for the relativizing forces of historical and socio-cultural context. Other key developments emerged in the 19th-century, when neo-Kantians defended a radical distinction between the natural sciences and the "'human', 'cultural', or 'historical sciences''", which paved the way for Max Weber's theories of interpretive sociology described above (ibid., p. 510).

Constructivist epistemology emerges from this lineage of Kantian and Weberian thought, viewing human knowledge of the social domain as inherently subjective, contextual, and fundamentally different from that of the physical world of brute facts. However, constructivists themselves debate on exactly how this social reality can be known. In the field of International Relations, Klotz and Lynch suggest a spectrum from positivist to post-positivist [25] constructivist epistemologies. Positivists are generally concerned with processes of change and seek causal explanations for social phenomena, while post-positivists focus instead on discourse mapping, power relationships and contestations of dominant intersubjective meanings. Klotz and Lynch argue that while much attention has been given to epistemological battles pitting the extreme poles of these two perspectives against one another, in reality many constructivist International Relations scholars operate at different points along the spectrum between the two extremes. As such, attempts have been made to create typologies of various constructivist epistemologies.

[25] The use of the term 'post-positivist' is somewhat problematic. While Klotz and Lynch equate the term with more post-structuralist and post-modernist approaches, others have used the term to refer to a philosophy of science grounded in the positivist tradition. Karl Popper, in particular, is renowned for developing what has been called 'post-positivist' thought. He argued that instead of building theory from empirical observation, theory must *precede* empirical work. The goal of research should be to utilize data in an attempt to *falsify* a theory (or hypothesis) rather than verify it. While challenging some of the epistemological foundations of classical positivism, Popper's 'post-positivism' is still firmly rooted in a belief in the scientific method, and thus this use of the term is quite different in meaning from that of Klotz and Lynch (UCL Institute of Education, n.d.). In this thesis, the meaning of the term will align with that of Klotz and Lynch.

One such typology identifies three variants: *conventional, interpretive*, and *critical/radical* constructivisms (Checkel, 2006). According to Checkel, conventional constructivists (who comprise the dominant school in the US), are positivist in orientation. As such they seek to identify causal mechanisms that drive processes of change, and tend to utilize qualitative process-tracing case studies to uncover these mechanisms. In contrast to the conventional school, interpretive constructivism is informed more by post-positivist epistemologies and focuses on the role of language in "mediating and constructing social reality" (ibid., p. 2). Rather than seeking to explain how 'A causes B', interpretive constructivists seek answers to 'how possible?' questions (ibid., p. 2). Interpretive constructivists utilize an inductive research strategy to explore the "background conditions and linguistic constructions (discourses)" that make change possible (ibid., p. 2). With the critical/radical approach the linguistic focus of the interpretivists is maintained but a normative dimension is added, one that puts an emphasis on the notions of "power and domination inherent in language" (ibid., p, 3). The critical/radical camp also emphasizes the role of the researcher in the reproduction of the world they study, and posits a politicized view of the academy. In this view research itself is not a neutral activity, but one that has social consequences for which scholars must take responsibility.

Checkel delineates the three camps primarily by their positivist vs. post-positivist leanings, and groups the interpretivist and critical/radical constructivists together in juxtaposition with the conventional camp. He also highlights a third strand of post-postivist constructivism that aligns with the social theory of Jürgen Habermas. Habermasian constructivists also adopt a normative position to research, and focus on concepts such as

communicative action[26], *deliberation*, and *legitimacy* in the public sphere, as opposed to Foucauldian notions of power and domination (see for example Dryzek, 2001; Price & Reus-Smit, 1998; Risse, 2000).

Renowned International Relations scholar John Ruggie also delineates three main camps of constructivists, with some adopting more positivist leanings and others aligning more with post-modernist orientations (Ruggie, 1998; Sterling-Folker, 2000). The first is *neo-classical constructivism,* which closely resembles the conventional constructivism described by Checkel. The second variant is *postmodernist constructivism*. Following in the tradition of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida, this constructivist approach rejects the possibility of a social science and the identification of causal factors to explain social phenomena, focusing instead on the "linguistic construction of subjects" and the discursive practices utilized by hegemonic, disciplinary powers to impose a "regime of truth" (Keeley, 1990, cited in Ruggie, 1998, p. 881). This camp broadly aligns with Checkel's interpretive-critical/radical category. The third type of constructivism differs from those posited by Checkel however. It is situated in between the neo-classical and postmodernist camps and is labeled *naturalistic constructivism* by Ruggie. This approach is based on the doctrine of critical realism, a philosophical movement initiated by British philosopher Roy Bhaskar. As this type of constructivist approach aligns closely with the philosophical orientation adopted for this study, it will be discussed in some detail in the following section.

[26] The theory of communicative action was a major contribution to social theory from Habermas. Risse describes how communicative action manifests in the world of international politics as, "arguing and deliberating about the validity claims inherent in any statement about identities, interests, and the state of the world. Arguing and truth-seeking behavior presuppose that actors no longer hold fixed interests during their communicative interaction but are open to persuasion, challenges, and counterchallenges geared toward reaching a consensus" (Risse, 2000, p. 33). These ideas challenge the dominant rational choice and sociological institutionalist theories in International Relations that hold that actors behave according to either a "logic of consequentialism" whereby behaviors are fixed by predetermined interests, or a "logic of appropriateness", which entails that behaviors are guided by socially determined norms.

Naturalistic constructivism

> "It is not just that our experiences are *as if* there are cats, there are cats. It is not just that the observable world is *as if* there are atoms, there are atoms"[27]

The term 'critical realism' is an elision of two of Roy Bhaskar's philosophical ideas; the first is *transcendental realism*, which refers to an ontology derived from analysis of scientific practices broadly conceived, and the second is *critical naturalism*, which refers to the application of transcendental realist ideas specifically to the realm of the human sciences (Collier, 1994). A thorough introduction to Bhaskar's philosophy is beyond the scope of this chapter, but a number of principles relevant to this research project are described below.

In its application to the study of 'human sciences', critical realism emphasizes the importance of a social science that acknowledges both the subjective *and* objective sides of knowledge, and attempts to reconcile the divide between positivist and post-positivist approaches to social research. Furthermore, according to Collier, Bhaskar's work is committed both "to a belief that science can give us real insights into the nature of things, and to an interest in the potential of reason and science for human emancipation" (1994, p. ix.). This 'emancipation' can be achieved because critical realism adheres to four guiding principles:

1. It allows that "knowledge may be counter-phenomenal, it makes a place for our liberation from enslaving appearances" (ibid., p. 15). As such science can at times contradict, not merely explain, what appears to be reality.
2. "it calls for theories to be judged by objective criteria, it promotes theories that can transform, rather than merely rationalize, existing practices."
3. "it recognizes that states of affairs are brought about by the working of relatively enduring structures, it directs the attention of people who want to make the world a better place to the task of transforming those structures."

[27] (Devitt, 1991, p. 45, quoted in Wendt, 1999, p. 52)

4. "it recognizes that theories must make claims about what the world is like independently of those theories, it treats all theories as fallible, and open to transformation" (ibid., p. 16).

These guiding principles align well with the philosophical and normative views and conceptual frameworks adopted in this project. Critical realism resonates with constructivism with its recognition of the real-world effects of invisible, underlying social structures and the transformative roles of human agency. It is consistent with certain critical/radical perspectives in that it holds the normative position that actors, equipped with knowledge gained through scientific inquiry, can and should try to alter social structures so to realize the emancipation of humanity. It differs from certain post-modern constructivist ideas, however, in its acknowledgement of a *knowable* objective reality.

International Relations scholar Alexander Wendt adopts a critical realist orientation and attempts to reconcile the intractable epistemological debates among empiricist and postmodern International Relations scholars in his seminal work, *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999). For Wendt, naturalistic constructivist research, what he terms 'scientific realism', can successfully address both the causal and constitutive questions about the social world that have typically divided researchers adhering to strictly positivist and post-positivist epistemologies (ibid., p. 85). Doing so requires setting aside epistemological debates and focusing instead on ontology and question-oriented research.

Wendt embraces the critical realist ontology, which holds that "the world is independent of the mind and language of individual observers;" and "mature scientific theories typically refer to this world, even when it is not directly observable" (Wendt, 1999, p. 51). As such, he argues that constructivist research should recognize the subjective *and* objective aspects

of the social world. Wendt offers two important ideas from critical realism that are of particular use for this study, described below.

Theories of reference

According to Wendt, scientific realism aims to solve the epistemological problem of how mind and language connect to reality by offering a particular "theory of reference" (ibid., p. 53). Theories of reference address how the meanings of terms are assigned. Wendt explains that empiricists favor a theory of reference based on *description*, postmodernists advocate a *relational* theory, and scientific realists a *causal* theory (ibid., p. 53). The descriptive theory of reference is based on the use of empirical observation, or 'sense-data', to ascribe meaning to a term based on the properties we associate with it. The relational theory of reference by contrast posits that an object is not defined by what it appears to be *in itself*, but by its relationship within a broader discourse (ibid., p. 55). What both of these theories have in common is an epistemological rather than ontological orientation: meaning exists only in the mind through either sense perceptions or shared linguistic practices. For example, the meaning of the term 'cat' could be defined by a description of its experienced characteristics (e.g. a furry, four-legged feline that meows and claws the curtains), or relationally, in terms of a broader discourse (e.g. it is an animal that is neither a dog nor a tiger nor a human, etc.). However, explaining what a cat is purely by experienced descriptors or relational representations can lead to problems, according to Wendt. This is because neither theory "grounds meaning and truth in an external world that regulates their content" (ibid., p. 57). An external world will resist arbitrary, ungrounded descriptions and representations (e.g., reality will soon push back against a description of a cat as an immortal, omnipotent and benevolent god). Purely empirical descriptions and relational

representations of things can be incorrect, or change over time, while in reality a given object of reference remains unchanged.

By contrast, a scientific realist causal theory of reference suggests that meanings are determined by both discourse *and* nature. In other words, "mind and language help determine meaning, but meaning is also regulated by a *mind independent, extra-linguistic world*" (ibid., p. 57, emphasis added). Wendt describes how a causal theory of reference is most readily applicable to the natural world and the study of brute facts (what he terms 'natural kinds'), but can also be applied to the study of social facts (termed 'social kinds') and the inter-subjectively constructed social world. But how can a world that is socially constructed by human ideas exist independently from the human subjects that perceive and wish to study it? Wendt offers three arguments.

First, many social kinds have aspects which exist in the physical world. The example of the flag provided above is one such example. In such instances, the "extent to which material forces determine social kinds is a variable that can be examined empirically, and so the subject-object distinction varies when it comes to social kinds" (ibid., p. 73). It is important, says Wendt, to separate out the material forces from the ideas embedded within them to test their relative importance.

Second, many social kinds exhibit properties of 'self-organization'. That is, a thing is what it is by virtue of its internal structure. All *natural kinds* are self-organizing, says Wendt, in the sense that human descriptions and social relations have nothing to do with what constitutes them. Wendt argues that many social kinds have self-organizing capacities as well that "resist denials or misrepresentations of their existence" (ibid., p. 73). For example,

while a state is a social kind that is unobservable in physical form, it has self-organizing abilities (such as group control and administration of a territory) that serves to resist those who deny its existence. Successive resistance over time leads to an eventual recognition of its existence (in this case its status as a sovereign nation-state). However, self-organizing ability does not preclude a social kind from being constituted in part in a *relational* sense. Wendt offers the example of Luxemburg, pointing out that it "may be a self-organizing entity that resists denials of its existence, but it is clear that other states' recognition of its sovereignty enables it to survive" (ibid., p. 74).

The third of Wendt's arguments is that although social kinds "are not mind/discourse independent of the collectivity that constitutes them, they *are* usually independent of the minds and discourse of the *individuals* who want to explain them" (ibid., p. 75, emphasis in the original). This claim may sit uneasily with many constructivists, especially those who emphasize the context-dependent subjectivity of the researcher. However, Wendt argues that "[i]ndividuals do not constitute social kinds, collectivities do. And as such social kinds confront the individual as objective social facts" (ibid., p. 75). While individuals may be central in constructing a research design and the interpretive findings presented in a thesis, book or paper, they are rarely central to the constitution of the social kinds that are the focus of their research. This holds true for this research project.

Thus, because of the (at times) physical and (often) self-organizing properties of social phenomena, and because these phenomena are collectively rather than individually constituted, Wendt echoes Durkheim's view that social facts can be studied scientifically by social researchers. In this respect naturalistic constructivism offers a means by which social science research can maintain a sense of rigor, and make claims to relatively "secure

foundations for knowledge" as opposed to "mere prejudice, belief, or opinion" (Scott, 2014, p. 218).

Constitutive effects

A second important idea offered by Wendt is his argument that constructivist research can uncover phenomena that sit in-between causation and constitution; a concept he terms 'constitutive effects'. Constitutive effects move beyond mere description of phenomena but are not causal, because they "violate the requirements of independent existence and temporal asymmetry" used for explanations of causality (ibid., p. 88). He writes: "[i]deas or social structures have constitutive effects when they create phenomena – properties, powers, dispositions, meanings, etc. – that are conceptually or logically dependent on those ideas or structures, that exist only 'in virtue of' them" (ibid., p. 88). He provides the example of how terrorism (as opposed to state-sanctioned violence) would not exist without a national security discourse that defines 'terrorism', but it is not the case that this discourse is the *cause* of terrorism (ibid., p. 88). The concept of constitutive effects thus offers a bridge between camps of positivists seeking definitive causal explanations and post-positivists who deny outright the possibility of knowing the means by which social phenomena exist. This concept is valuable for this project, because it enables for an analysis of the ways structures, discourses and the identities of actors create the conditions by which particular ideas about regional cooperation in Northeast Asia might emerge.

Summary on constructivist ideas

To sum up, of the various perspectives on constructivist epistemology described above, this study adopts an orientation that best aligns with Checkel's interpretivist and Wendt's naturalistic (or critical realist) constructivisms. It thus takes an approach to the research

topic that is generally more post-positivist than positivist, and more question-focused than epistemologically anchored. It also embraces the notion of a mind-independent world, and places value in the notion that social research can be rigorous and scientific without resorting to a purely positivistic epistemology. Answers to research questions that address 'how possible?' lines of inquiry will be approached by attempting to uncover the constitutive effects and conditions upon which the ideas of actors depend, and while claims to objective truth will be avoided, any interpretations made will be framed in a way that acknowledges the intersubjective *and* objective nature of social reality.

Furthermore, I agree with the critical/radical notion that social research takes place in, and has effects on, the social world. As such, while recognizing the importance of thinking through one's philosophical orientation to social science, the primary focus of social research should be to address problems and issues of social concern. Thus while the epistemological orientation for this study is situated within a loosely demarcated framework of interpretivist/naturalistic constructivism, I also acknowledge value in the concept of 'problem-driven research'. In this respect, the research methodology embraces a form of what Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara termed 'analytical eclecticism' (Katzenstein, 2005; Katzenstein & Okawara, 2001).

Analytical eclecticism

In their analysis of Japanese and Asian-Pacific security affairs, Kaztenstein and Okawara argued that "the complex links between power, interest, and norms defy analytical capture by any one paradigm. They are made more intelligible by drawing selectively on different paradigms – that is by analytical eclecticism, not parsimony" (Katzenstein & Okawara, 2001, p. 154). These scholars suggest that reliance on a single analytical perspective is

often insufficient to fully understand the complexity of social and political processes (ibid., p. 167). Instead, Katzenstein suggests that new insights can be gained by drawing on the "intellectual tension between different approaches" (2005, p. xi.). The idea of analytical eclecticism is a valuable concept for researchers to consider when reflecting on their own epistemological orientations. While understanding the philosophical foundations of one's approach to research is indeed important, it is also valuable to remain flexible to the possibility of new insights from other perspectives.

Having presented the ontological and epistemological foundations underpinning the research design, the chapter now moves to introduce the particular analytical framework and methodological approaches selected to address the research questions. The first is an approach that emphasizes the role of ideas, discourse and agency in institutional context, and aligns well with the naturalistic constructivist ideas presented above.

Methodological approaches, theories and concepts

Discursive institutionalism: an agency-oriented ideational approach

Viewing the world of human action through a constructivist lens, researchers become interested in the nature and influence of ideas. There are a number of approaches to study the influence of ideas in the field of International Relations (see Beland & Cox, 2011; Blyth, 2016). An umbrella concept that describes many of these is 'discursive institutionalism'. Discursive institutionalism refers to approaches concerned with the "substantive content of ideas and the interactive processes of discourse in institutional context" (Schmidt, 2015, p. 171). Schmidt defines institutional context in two ways:

> First, it embodies the structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents whose 'background ideational abilities' enable them to create (and maintain) institutions (following Searle, Bourdieu, Foucault, and others) while their 'foreground

> discursive abilities' enable them to communicate critically about them so as to change (or maintain) them (following Habermas, Gramsci and others). Second, institutional context can also represent the formal and informal institutions external to actors that may be seen to constrain (or empower) them via the neo-institutionalist logics of rationalist incentive structures, historically established path dependent rules, or the frames of culturally imposed practices and identity (Schmidt, 2008, 2010, 2017, p. 252).

Discursive institutionalism is considered to be one of the 'newer' institutionalisms originating from a long line of 'institutionalist' scholarship. Each of these older institutionalisms embraces different ontological assumptions. Major variants include rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalisms (alluded to in the quote from Schmidt above), which respectively understand agency to be animated by "logics of calculus", "logics of appropriateness", or a combination of the two (Hay, 2011). A commonality among these views is the tendency to frame agency as both informed and limited by the constraining dynamics of structure. According to Hay, discursive institutionalism, which he terms 'constructivist institutionalism', differs dramatically from these former approaches in large part because of the emphasis placed on the transformative role of agency. Hay describes how actors'

> desires, preferences, and motivations are not a contextually given fact – a reflection of material or even social circumstance – but are irredeemably ideational, reflecting a normative (indeed, moral, ethical, and political) orientation toward the context in which they will have to be realized (ibid., p. 4).

Because of these varied normative orientations, actors are not considered "analytically substitutable" as they are in other institutionalisms (ibid., p. 5). Thus, in contrast to these other perspectives which emphasize the constraining nature of institutions, discursive institutionalism acknowledges a "dynamic, agent-centered approach to institutional change" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305). In addition to the importance placed on the unique characteristics of individual actors, discursive institutionalism also acknowledges the impermanent and changeable nature of institutions. Hay writes:

> ...institutions are understood less as functional means of reducing uncertainty, as in rational choice institutionalism, than as structures whose functionality or dysfunctionality is an open – empirical and historical – question. Indeed constructivist institutionalists place considerable emphasis on the potentially ineffective and inefficient nature of social institutions, on institutions as the subject and focus of political struggle, and on the contingent nature of such struggles, whose outcomes can in no sense be derived from the extant institutional context itself (Hay, 2011, p. 5).

Recognizing the nature of institutions as potential sites for contestation and political struggle, discursive institutionalism aligns with the critical realist view that structures can be transformed by actors for the purposes of human emancipation.

While acknowledging the relative malleability of institutions, discursive institutionalism also sides with historical institutionalism by conceding the significance of *path-dependence*, by which strategic choices or exogenous events may lead to the elimination of future possibilities and pose subsequent external constraints on agency. Furthermore, discursive institutionalists recognize that in addition to *institutional* path-dependence there can also be *ideational* path-dependence*,* whereby the ideas of actors themselves can serve to place limits on future possibilities (Hay, 2011). Hay writes:

> it is not just institutions but the very ideas on which they are predicated and which inform their design and development that exert constraints on political autonomy. Institutions are built on ideational foundations that exert an independent path-dependent effect on their subsequent development (ibid., p. 6).

The concept of 'ideational foundations' is similar to that of Thomas Kuhn's conception of 'paradigms', which are unified systems of belief shared by a given community which serves to govern their actions (Kuhn, 1996). As such, the *ideas* that actors have about their world are of key importance to discursive institutionalist researchers. Discursive institutionalists thus aim to:

> identify, detail and interrogate the extent to which – through processes of normalization and institutional embedding – established ideas become codified,

> serving as cognitive filters through which actors come to interpret environmental signals and, in so doing, to conceive of their own interests. Yet, crucially, they are also concerned with the conditions under which such established cognitive filters and paradigms are contested, challenged, and replaced (Hay, 2011, p. 6).

Schmidt (2008) posits that the ideas of actors differ in both levels of generality and type. Levels of ideas may represent specific '*policy solutions*'; encompass more general '*programs*' that define the problems, norms, ideals and goals that frame the more immediate policy ideas; or at the most basic level indicate underlying '*philosophies*': the rarely contested worldviews "that undergird the policies and programs with organizing ideas, values, and principles of knowledge and society" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306). The notion of underlying philosophies is arguably the most abstract of the three concepts. Schmidt writes:

> Whereas both policy ideas and programmatic ideas can be seen as foreground, since these tend to be discussed and debated on a regular basis, the philosophical ideas generally sit in the background as underlying assumptions that are rarely contested except in times of crisis (Schmidt, 2008, p. 306).

The three levels of ideas (policy, programmatic, and philosophical), can also be distinguished by type: they can be either *cognitive*, suggesting "what is and what to do", or *normative*, indicating "what is good or bad about what is" with respect to "what one ought to do" (ibid., p. 306). According to Schmidt, an important question for researchers studying ideas is why some ideas become policies, programs and philosophies while others do not. Table 4.1 below presents a framework for how these levels and types are organized. This framework provides a useful tool that can inform interview questions and approaches to analysis of ideational factors shaping higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Table 4.1: Levels and types of ideas

	Cognitive	Normative
Policy level	How policies are defined, and how they offer solutions to problems	How policies meet the aspirations and ideals of the actors involved
'Programmatic' level	How contexts are understood and how problems are defined, and how methods to solve them are identified	How the ideals and norms that frame the more immediate policy ideas are defined
Underlying philosophies	How policies and programs mesh with deeper principles and norms of relevant scientific disciplines or technical practices	How policies and programs resonate with the deeper core of principles and norms of public life, whether newly emerging values or the long-standing ones in the societal repertoire

Adapted from Schmidt (2008, pp. 306-7).

While this framework is useful for understanding and comparing the ideas of different actors, a potential downside is that parsing ideas into distinct categories threatens to reduce their complexity and nuance. Furthermore, the act of isolating ideas in practice can be difficult, especially at the deeper levels of the framework. Because underlying philosophies in particular are "left unarticulated as background knowledge", the actors in question may themselves be unaware of them (Schmidt, 2008, p. 308). As such, any attempt to uncover these underlying philosophies via interviewing may be a futile endeavor. Despite these concerns, the framework arguably offers a suitable means for identifying and categorizing the ideas shaping the institutions of regional cooperation at Japanese universities in a systematic way (particularly at the policy and programmatic levels), enabling for a rigorous interpretive analysis.

While the concepts of *ideas* and *institutions* have been considered, the other critical term adopted by the approach is 'discursive'. Schmidt defines *discourse* broadly, as a "generic

term that encompasses not only the substantive content of ideas but also the interactive processes by which ideas are conveyed" (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305). Analysis of discourse allows for a "way of considering the process by which such ideas go from thought to word to deed, that is, how ideas are conveyed, adopted, and adapted, let alone the actors who convey them to whom, how, where, and why" (ibid., p. 309). *Discursive* thus implies this process, "by which such ideas are constructed in a "coordinative" policy sphere by policy actors and deliberated in a "communicative" political sphere by political actors and the public" (Schmidt, 2010, p. 479). The reference to 'political actors' above points to the theory's disciplinary home of Political Science, but I argue that the concepts of coordinative and communicative spheres could be analytically applied to other contexts that involve collaboration, deliberation and communication of outcomes to broader society. However, these discursive interactions are not the focus of this study. Schmidt also writes:

> Discursive institutionalists tend to divide between those who concentrate on ideas and those who privilege discourse. The difference is primarily one of emphasis. Scholars concerned with ideas tend to focus on the substantive content of such ideas while leaving the interactive processes of discourse implicit. Scholars who prefer discourse themselves divide into those who also emphasize its substantive content as the representation or embodiment of ideas and those who are more concerned with the discursive interactions through which actors generate, argue about, and communicate ideas in given institutional contexts" (Schmidt, 2015, p. 2).

This study aligns with discursive institutionalist research that concentrates primarily on the 'substantive content of ideas', but it also engages with the ways the varying levels and types of ideas of individual actors may be representative of broader discourses shaping society, as well as the ways ideas are 'conveyed, adopted, and adapted' by actors at Japanese universities. I am less focused in this project on the 'coordinative' and 'communicative' 'discursive interactions' by which these ideas are communicated. As less emphasis is placed on the discursive processes involved in institutional change, it could be argued that adopting Hay's term of 'constructivist institutionalism' is more appropriate for this study.

However, it is Schmidt who posits the analytical framework of levels and types of ideas that I adopt for my investigation of the ideas of actors at Japanese universities, and as she terms this approach to social research 'discursive institutionalism' I have chosen to follow suit.

Discursive institutionalism is not without its critics, particularly in relation to the theory's explanatory potential regarding the nature of power (Blyth, 2016). While understanding power relations are a central concern of political scientists and international relations scholars, this is not the primary focus of this research. Another possible critique is that the theory is quite broad and diffuse, allowing for a multitude of potentially ambiguous interpretations and applications. While my own project may be contributing to this multitude, I do not intend to adopt discursive institutionalist theory wholesale; I am primarily interested in the theory's acknowledgement of the agentive capacities of actors to enact institutional change, and the analytical utility of the framework for cognitive and normative ideas as a means to identify and categorize the varied ideas of regional cooperation held by actors. In this respect I feel the theory provides a reasonable level of analytical precision.

With its origins in Political Science and International Relations, discursive institutionalist approaches have typically been applied to explain institutional change in the realms of policy and politics. Applications of discursive institutionalist theory to the field of Higher Education Studies are, as of this writing, relatively limited and have tended to focus on Europe (see for example Alexiadou & Lange, 2013; Capano & Piattoni, 2011; Degn, 2015; Handal et al., 2014; Komljenovic & Miklavic, 2013). A notable exception is the work of Chou and Ravinet (2016, 2017) (introduced in Chapter 3) who take an ideational and

comparative approach to the study of policy ideas for higher education regionalism in both Southeast Asia and Europe. To date, there have not been any analyses of the Northeast Asian higher education context from a discursive institutionalist perspective. Using a discursive institutionalist approach to understand the ideas of actors at universities involved in regional collaboration is particularly suitable in this context, because the tensions that exist between countries in the region are arguably based in large part on ideational factors such as varied historical memories and conflicting nationalist mythologies.

The particular methods for applying the discursive institutionalist framework (see Table 4.1 above) will be outlined in the following chapter. The chapter now concludes with a brief discussion about the rationale for adopting a comparative approach to the analysis of ideas across institutions and disciplines in Japanese higher education.

Comparative methods

In addition to the application of the discursive institutionalist framework, a comparative methodology was adopted to compare and contrast the selected cases and ideas of various actors. The study was designed so comparisons could be made across institutions, academic disciplines, programs, and roles of individuals (i.e. academics, administrators, and students). The options for comparison were kept intentionally broad so that through an inductive approach to data analysis there would be ample opportunities for themes to emerge and be explored at different levels and in different combinations.

Comparison is a common approach to social research that can be found in many disciplines. Some would argue that since any social phenomena is “invariably held in some way to be typical, representative, or unique”, all sociological inquiry inherently involves comparison

(Scott, 2014, p. 108). Durkheim thus suggested that "comparative sociology is not a particular branch of sociology; it is sociology itself…" (quoted in Scott, 2014, p. 108). Other scholars have argued that the comparative method does offer a particular set of tools for understanding and explaining the social world which delineates it as a distinct approach.

One such discipline is the field of Comparative Education. Like International Relations, Comparative Education has traditionally taken the nation-state as the unit of analysis. Comparisons and studies of policy-borrowing across countries were the primary focus of earlier comparative education research, and still comprises much scholarship today. However, straightforward comparisons across states have been complicated in recent decades by the forces of globalization, regionalization and localization. Furthermore, a number of comparativists have challenged the unquestioned focus on the state as the unit of analysis, suggesting any number of useful comparisons can be made at various levels of education. Bray and Thomas (1995) proposed a useful framework to envision the multitude levels at which comparative education analysis can be undertaken, although even this framework is not exhaustive:

Figure 4.1: A Framework for Comparative Education Analyses



Adapted from Bray & Thomas, 1995

Following Bray and Thomas, this project devises a number of levels, aspects and groups for comparison. They all reside within one nation-state – Japan – however, the ideational drivers shaping regional cooperation in Japanese higher education will be far from monolithic. While themes and commonalities may emerge, the various universities, scientific disciplines and individual actors at different levels will all have their own voices. The techniques for uncovering these themes and unique voices are described in more detail in the following chapter on case selection and methods.

Conclusion

In sum, this research project is designed on the foundations of the following beliefs. First, a physical world exists outside the realm of human consciousness, and this world can be known through both natural and social science research. However, study of the social world – of human institutions and human action – must be approached in a way that recognizes the distinct characteristics of social facts, and the centrality of the concepts of intersubjectivity, context and power that helps to constitute them. While the social world is created by collective understandings and evolving meanings, this world and its institutions *can* be studied scientifically, because collectively constituted social facts still present themselves as objective reality to the individuals who wish to study them. A naturalistic constructivist orientation which recognizes that both subjective and objective forces produce the constitutive effects that shape social reality is thus the best approach for this project.

With this ontological understanding, epistemological debates may be set aside and the focus placed on question-based research. Utilizing the most suitable, and at times eclectic, approaches to best answer the research questions at hand is preferable to blindly adhering to one epistemological orientation. However, this study and all social research is done by some*one* and for some purpose, and it is important to recognize these perspectives and motives and avoid claims to objective truth. This is especially important for a project like this one, considering the cultural and linguistic positionality of both myself and the research topic.

Utilizing a discursive institutionalist framework, this study places the cognitive and normative ideas of actors at the forefront, and recognizes the power of agency in fostering

institutional change and ultimately human emancipation. In addition to the application of this analytical framework, comparisons horizontally across cases and vertically, spanning from government policy rhetoric to the voices of students, are employed to uncover commonalities, differences, and emergent themes about regional cooperation in Japan. It is hoped that doing so will help to create a comprehensive picture of the ideas of actors in Japanese universities involved in programs for higher education regional cooperation, and the ways these ideas define the possibilities for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Based on the foundations of the philosophical and theoretical ideas set forth in this chapter, the following chapter introduces the cases selected and methods used to collect, analyze and interpret data for the purpose of answering the research questions.

Chapter 5: Case selection and methods of data collection and analysis

This chapter introduces the two government-initiated programs selected for the study, as well as the universities participating in one or both of these programs that were selected as cases. Also introduced is a description and justification of the approaches taken for data collection, transcription and analysis. This includes methods for the collection and analysis of documents, and for the selection, categorization, and approach to interviewing program participants. I also include an account of the limitations of the selected approaches as well as a number of reflexive considerations concerning my role as a researcher at the various stages of research design and data collection, analysis and interpretation.

Selected programs and universities

The two 'top-down' government-initiated programs for higher education regional cooperation selected for this study are the CAMPUS Asia program and the A3 Foresight Program. The selection of top-down programs as units of analysis requires some justification. While 'top-down' arrangements can be regarded as a type of *formal* collaboration, much of the regional collaboration taking place between higher education institutions and individual researchers is 'bottom-up', or *informal*. For example, according to Georghiou (1998, p. 613), the total scale of outputs of internationally co-authored research publications is generally far higher than what would be expected solely from formal arrangements – the remainder is the result of informal collaboration. Thus, it is worth recognizing that programs like A3 Foresight and CAMPUS Asia are but two formalized programs existing among a vast and growing array of informal arrangements in an increasingly networked and globalized higher education sector. The rationale for selecting these formal arrangements includes the considerations that a) the programs are

government-initiated, and thus provide an insight into the policy ideas shaping higher education regional cooperation at the national levels and a view to the ways these ideas are translated in practice at the institutional, disciplinary and individual levels; b) being government sponsored the connection of these programs to the political arena provides for a bridge linking to other debates in the field of International Relations; and c) they provide a substantial amount of documents available in the public domain that can be used for analysis. The two programs are introduced below.

The CAMPUS Asia program

The primary focus of this research project was on the ideas informing regional cooperation through what has been named the 'Collective Action for the Mobility Program of University Students in Asia', or in short, the CAMPUS Asia program. According to Japan's National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Evaluation (NIAD), the aim of CAMPUS Asia is to promote "exchange and cooperation with quality assurance among universities in Japan, China and Korea, in order to strengthen the competitiveness of universities and nurture the next generation of outstanding talent in Asia" (NAID, n.d.). In practice, the program aims to establish a foundation for the development of an East Asian higher education region through the creation of frameworks for student mobility, credit exchange, dual-degree programs, and quality assurance (Chun, 2016; Kyung, 2015).

The idea of CAMPUS Asia came about amidst a sea change in Japanese politics, when the longstanding Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, or *Jimintō*) was unseated from power and replaced by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ, or *Minshutō*). It was part of the DPJ's platform to shift Japan's foreign policy focus away from the USA and towards East Asia. Japan's Prime Minister at that time, Yukio Hatoyama, advocated for strengthening ties with

Japan's neighbors with the hopes of one day creating an 'East Asian Community' similar to that of the European Union (EU) (Nishikawa, 2009). The origins for the CAMPUS Asia program can be traced to the second Japan-China-Korea Trilateral Summit held during this period in October 2009. Hatoyama is credited with proposing the creation of an "inter-governmental expert committee in order to carry out high-quality exchange such as credit transfer and exchange programs among the universities of the three countries" (TCS, n.d.-a). The 2009 Trilateral Summit also led to the establishment in 2011 of the more permanent Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS). TCS describes itself as "an international organization established with a vision to promote peace and common prosperity" among the three countries. (TCS, n.d.-c).

The TCS is responsible for facilitating a range of trilateral cooperation mechanisms in arenas such as politics, international security, economic affairs, sustainable development and society and culture. It is under the 'Society and Culture' umbrella that programs for education and exchange among the three countries can be found, including the CAMPUS Asia program (TCS, n.d.-d).

The pilot version of CAMPUS Asia was launched in 2011. At the outset, ten Japanese universities were selected to participate in exchanges with counterparts in China and Korea. In 2015, at the 5th China-Japan-Korea Committee for Promoting Exchange and Cooperation among Universities, it was agreed to renew and increase the number of collaborative programs between the three countries and attempt to expand the framework of the program to ASEAN countries in the mid- to long-term (MEXT, 2016). This was followed by the First Japan-China-Korea Education Ministers' Meeting in January 2016, at which a commitment was made to expand financial support for the program, and in October of the

same year the program began its second phase with the inclusion of 17 participating Japanese universities.

On the Japan side, the CAMPUS Asia program is situated under the umbrella of a broader initiative called the “Inter-University Exchange Project” (also known as the “Re-inventing Japan Project”), which seeks to establish higher education networks with “strategically important countries and regions”, in order to “strengthen the global development capacity of Japanese universities while fostering excellent human resources who will play an active role on the global stage” (JSPS, 2017, p. 45). Included in this initiative is the vision of establishing an ‘Asian Higher Education Community’ among the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) countries (MEXT, 2017). Specifically, the aims are:

> to further increase the volume of student exchange within the region, to build common quality assurance rules, and to contribute to the formation of an Asian higher education community, while strengthening the capacity of Japanese universities to go global -- by strengthening the framework for exchange between universities in Japan and universities in other Asian countries (MEXT, 2017).

Under this umbrella project, CAMPUS Asia is designated as ‘Type A’, while new programs promoting exchanges with ASEAN universities are labeled ‘Type B’ (see Appendix C for the lists of programs and participating universities). Of the 17 selected ‘Type A’ programs, two universities - Waseda and Ritsumeikan - are private, while the remaining 15 are national universities. Eight universities have received funding for the second time (i.e. they were selected in 2011 and were part of the original ten) and nine universities launched their CAMPUS Asia programs for the first time in 2016. From within this group of 17, the following universities and their respective CAMPUS Asia programs were chosen as cases (see Table 5.1). The particular disciplines or interdisciplinary themes of the programs are highlighted in bold.

Table 5.1: Selected CAMPUS Asia Programs and Universities

No.	Japanese University	Sector	Project Title	Partner universities in China and Korea
1	University of Tokyo	National (former Imperial)	Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo (BESETO) Dual Degree Master's Program on **International and Public Policy Studies**	Peking University (China); Seoul National University (Korea)
2	Nagoya University	National (former Imperial)	Training Human Resources for the Development of an Epistemic Community in **Law and Political Science** to Promote the Formation of "jus commune" in East Asia	Renmin University of China, Tsinghua University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University (China); Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul National University (Korea)
3	Kyushu University	National (former Imperial)	Cooperative Educational Program for Fostering Human Resources to Lead Development of **Sustainable Urban and Architectural Environment** in Asia	Tongji University (China); Pusan National University (Korea)
4	Osaka University	National (former Imperial)	Program for nurturing **medical research** leaders to solve **global health** problems	Peking University, Tsinghua University, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine (China); Yonsei University (Korea)
5	Okayama University	National	Asiancrats: A Prime Professional Human Resource Development Program for the East Asian Higher Education Area (**Sustainable Development)**	Jilin University (China); Sungkyunkwan University (Korea)
6	Tokyo Gakugei University	National	International Graduate Program for **Teacher Education** in East Asia	Beijing Normal University (China); Seoul National University of Education (Korea)
7	Tokyo Institute of Technology	National	Advanced TKT CAMPUS Asia Consortium **(Science and Engineering)**	Tsinghua University (China); Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) (Korea)
8	Waseda University	Private	East Asian Global Leadership Program for Multi-layered **Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation**	Peking University (China); Korea University (Korea)
9	Tokyo University of the Arts	National	Japan-China-Korea International **Animation** Co-Work Curricula	Communication University of China (China); Korea National University of Arts (Korea)

Adapted from MEXT (2014).

The programs in Table 5.1 were selected for four reasons, with the general aim being to select cases in such a way as to have a sample of the variety of institutional and disciplinary types that were taking part in the program. First, an attempt was made to select some universities who had participated in the pilot phase of the program between 2011 and 2015 and some who would be participating for the first time. The rationale here was to potentially

get a balance between ideas and practices that were more established through experience and quality assurance monitoring and compare them with newer program ideas that had yet to be subjected to external evaluation. Second, while the majority of the CAMPUS Asia programs take place at national universities, it was deemed worthwhile to include a private institution as well, which is one reason Waseda is on the list. Also, from among the national universities, four are formal Imperial Universities, considered to be Japan's most prestigious research institutions.

The distinction between former Imperial universities and other national universities deserves some mention here. Japan recognizes seven of its national universities as 'former Imperial universities', most of which were founded at the turn of the 20th century and have since been responsible for producing many of Japan's political, civil service and private sector leaders (Watanabe & Sato, 2017). The majority of Japan's other national universities were established after World War II, when a major restructuring of the education system included the provision of one national university in each of Japan's 47 prefectures. Along with the status of prestige enjoyed by the former Imperial Universities also comes the most generous amounts of funding from the Ministry of Education. According to Watanabe and Sato (2017), "the former Imperial Universities and the top 10 universities receive 33.4 and 42.1 percent of the overall operating expense subsidies awarded by the MEXT respectively" (p. 143). Considering the status position and available resources of the former Imperial Universities, I chose to include four institutions that fit into this category, and juxtapose them with four other national universities that do not have this designation.

The third reason these particular programs were selected was because of the range of academic disciplines that are represented. The various CAMPUS Asia programs selected

include disciplines such as Medicine, Architecture, Law, Education, Policy Studies, Engineering, and New Media (Animation), as well as cross-disciplinary Social Science programs like Conflict Resolution and Sustainable Development. As such, the selected cases have a good balance of Natural/Physical Sciences, Social Sciences, and Humanities disciplines. Inspection of the list of titles of the selected CAMPUS Asia programs in Table 5.1 highlights the potential variety of ideas and practices of regional cooperation embedded within these programs.

Finally, two of the universities on the list are also involved in the A3 Foresight program, described in more detail below. In addition to comparing these ideas across institutions and disciplines, my initial plan was to juxtapose CAMPUS Asia, which is an initiative focused on higher education's role as a site for teaching and learning, with A3 Foresight, which focuses on the production of world-class research-based knowledge. This program and the selected cases are described in the next section.

The A3 Foresight program

Beginning in 2005, the A3 Foresight Program is a funding scheme run jointly between the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) and the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF). The program aims "to create world-class research hubs within the Asian region, which by advancing world-class research will contribute to the solution of common regional problems, while fostering new generations of talented young researchers" (JSPS, 2015). According to the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, the three agencies work as a consortium to support joint research, seminars and exchanges among researchers in the three countries (TCS, n.d.-b). Each year, targeted research areas are chosen to receive

funding from the three agencies, based on consultations that take place at meetings for 'Heads of Research Councils of Asian Countries' (A-HORCs) and corresponding to the annual theme of the Northeast Asian Symposium (JSPS, 2018). Since 2005, a number of projects have been funded for five-year intervals in a range of scientific fields. As of this writing, fourteen projects are considered to be completed, and 10 projects are currently underway. See Appendix D for a list of both.

From among these, the goal was to secure interviews and documents related to at least three projects, each of which involved a different Japanese university also involved in CAMPUS Asia. In the end participants from three projects from two different universities agreed to be interviewed. The projects and representative universities are presented in Table 5.2, and the scientific disciplines are noted in bold.

Table 5.2: Selected A3 Foresight Projects

University	No. of projects	Project Title(s)	Fiscal Year	Collaborating Universities in China and Korea
University of Tokyo	2	1. **Chemical & Synthetic Biology** of Natural Products through Streptomyces Genome Mining, Artificial Chromosome Engineering, and Synthetic Cell Factory Designing	2016	Shanghai Jiao Tong University (China); Inha University (Korea)
		2. sub-10nm wires; new **physics and chemistry**	2005	Tsinghua University (China); Seoul National University (Korea)
Waseda University	1	4. Synthesis and Structure Resolution of Novel Mesoporous Metals **(Chemistry)**	2005	Fudan University (China); Inha University (Korea)

Adapted from JSPS (n.d.)

There was considerably less literature available on A3 Foresight and based on my experience there also appeared to be a general lack of awareness of the program, including among staff in the international offices of universities where A3 projects were taking (or had taken) place. As was evidenced in Chapter 3, at the time of this writing, there was no

academic English language literature about the program besides my own study published in 2019 (see Hammond, 2019). This came as a surprising finding considering the projects have been ongoing since 2005; tended to involve large research teams comprising as many as 20 to 30 researchers, doctoral and/or master's students from universities in each of the three countries; and as a program rule required a component of annual mobility between the three countries. By contrast, the number of students involved in CAMPUS Asia exchanges in a given year rarely exceeded 10 from each university (with the exception of some short-term summer programs). The A3 Foresight program is listed on the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat's webpage, although unlike CAMPUS Asia it does not fall under the 'Education' heading or the 'Society and Culture' umbrella. Instead it can be found listed under 'Economy Affairs' in the 'Science and Technology' section (TCS, n.d.). These and other contrasts will be revisited in Chapter 6.

While I designed this study so that the CAMPUS Asia program was the primary focus of analysis, it was my hope to give more analytical weight to A3 Foresight than what ended up being possible. For reasons I can only speculate about, I had a significantly harder time securing interviews with A3 Foresight participants. The lack of both scholarship and policy documentation on A3 Foresight combined with these difficulties resulted in CAMPUS Asia becoming the dominant source of data in this study. This will be evidenced in Appendix F which provides interview participant profiles. In the end I was able to interview only 5 participants in A3 Foresight projects, while the remaining 62 represent CAMPUS Asia. However, in terms of the original intention to gain insights into both the education (teaching/learning) and research functions of higher education and their contributions to regional cooperation, I feel the interview sample strikes a relatively suitable balance. The selected Engineering and Medicine-focused CAMPUS Asia programs have a particular

research emphasis, and in effect served to blur the line between my original oversimplified distinctions. Nevertheless, it is regrettable that more research could not be conducted on A3 Foresight. I hope that my published paper mentioned above and any forthcoming outputs from this thesis will generate more scholarly interest in the program.

This chapter now turns to a presentation of the methods used to address the research questions, beginning with a description of the approaches taken for data collection.

Methods of data collection

Throughout the process of creating and implementing any research design, it is imperative to recognize the varied roles of the researcher and the implications of the researcher's involvement in the construction of scholarly knowledge. With regard to data collection and analysis, it is important to consider how the researcher evaluates and selects particular theoretical frameworks, methods, units of analysis, participants, and information through which data is identified, collected and interpreted. These reflexive and epistemological considerations will be addressed throughout the following sections along with concrete descriptions of the processes of data collection and analysis.

Data was collected primarily through conducting semi-structured interviews with program administrators, senior leadership, researchers and academics involved in program planning and implementation. I was also able to interview students at five universities (one former Imperial, three national, one private) who had either graduated from or, at the time of interview, were current participants in one of the two programs described above. Ethical clearance to conduct this research was approved in July, 2017, when I was a PhD student at the UCL Institute of Education (before my transfer to Oxford in October 2018). The

approved ethics application form, which addresses a number of the ethical considerations related to participant interviews, can be found in Appendix H. In addition to the data collected from these interviews, a range of documents were collected and analyzed. Many of these documents were available in the public domain and found online such as government-level policy documents, reports from external evaluating bodies and university program webpages, while others were provided by individuals at participating universities.

As the ideas of actors at universities participating in the two programs are the primary focus of the study, the data provided by the various documents collected was considered supplementary. The documents from the government, external evaluator, and institutional sources provided a set of texts that enabled a comparison and illumination of the ideas of participants, and an analysis of the degrees by which particular actors adhered to, resisted, or repurposed the official policy rhetoric of these 'top-down' programs for regional cooperation. The chapter proceeds by first outlining the approach taken toward document collection before leading into the longer section on interviews, transcription and analysis.

Documents

The meaning of 'document' was interpreted broadly to include speeches, posters, press releases, webpages, evaluation reports and promotional videos in addition to strategy documents and other 'official' policy texts. The rationale for collecting documents from the government-level was to help clarify the ideas and goals of the programs at the point where they were initially conceived, and to provide a structural frame by which to better understand the ways universities and individual actors within them reflected, repurposed or replaced these ideas based on their own ideas of regional cooperation.

There are a number of important precautions a researcher must consider when selecting documents for analysis. With regard to the documents themselves, Scott (1990) proposes four criteria for assessing the quality of documentary sources. They are authenticity, credibility, representativeness, and meaning (p.6). The following table provides some guiding questions for the ways documents were assessed against these criteria.

Table 5.3: Criteria for Assessing the Quality of Documentary Sources

Criteria	Key questions
Authenticity	Is the evidence genuine and of unquestionable origin?
Credibility	Is it free from error and distortion?
Representativeness	Is it typical of its kind, and, if not, is the extent of its un-typicality known?
Meaning	Is it clear and comprehensible?

Adapted from Scott, 1990.

According to May (2011), a researcher cannot read and analyze a document in a detached, objective way. Therefore, the researcher should recognize that meanings are received in particular ways which might differ from the intention of the author(s), as well as from other potential message recipients embodying different perspectives and experiences. Adopting this view, I acknowledge that I constructed meanings of the texts based on my own cultural understandings and individual perspectives. As such, it was imperative to adopt a reflexive approach when engaging with and analyzing documents.

Documents were saved as PDFs and organized in NVivo 12, and each document was categorized by a number of attributes including level (e.g. government level, university level), program (CAMPUS Asia, A3), and document type (e.g. international strategy document, program webpage, press release, etc.). To interrogate the various policy and programming documents using the discursive institutionalist framework, thematic analysis was utilized with the intention of uncovering the meanings and ideas embedded within the

texts. Steps in this analysis included identifying key themes and arguments that fit within the discursive institutionalist framework, and also being open to other details that might be relevant but not necessarily fit within the discursive institutionalist frame. These coded sections and themes were then later compared with responses from those of program participants. The processes of collecting, transcribing, analyzing and interpreting participant interview data is described below.

Semi-structured interviews

The main source of data and the primary focus of the study was the words and ideas of actors involved in one of the two government-initiated programs for Northeast Asian regional cooperation. These ideas were collected by conducting semi-structured interviews with 67 program participants.

Interviewing is a common approach utilized in qualitative research, and it is typically presented in a straightforward and unproblematic way in many texts dealing with qualitative research methods (Creswell, 2009; Rivas, 2012). However, the act of interviewing has been problematized by scholars in both the post-positivist (Mishler, 1986) and post-modernist (Scheurich, 1995) traditions. These critiques highlight that interviewing is far from straightforward and like other aspects of the research process must be reflexively considered.

The traditional positivist conception of interviewing generally involves the process of recording the responses of an interviewee to structured or unstructured questions, transcribing the text and then looking for themes, patterns, and underlying meanings through coding and analysis. This procedure can be viewed as two distinct parts:

conducting the interview and interpreting the interview. The positivist perspective of these processes sees the researcher as purposeful and knowledgeable, the meanings of the interview questions and responses as bounded and stable, and the specific context in which particular individuals take part in the interview as largely inconsequential (Mishler, 1986, cited in Scheurich, 1995, p. 240). Mishler problematizes this perspective by pointing out a number of issues regarding the asymmetrical power relationships between the researcher and the interviewee and the unstable relationship between language and meaning.

Regarding the former, it is argued that the positivist conception of interviewing overlooks the asymmetries of power inherent in the researcher-interviewee relationship. In the traditional approach, at each stage of the interview process it is the researcher who is in control, including wielding the power to define meaning from the interviewee's responses. According to Mishler, to counter this imbalance it is the responsibility of the researcher to find ways to "empower" the interviewee so they have more control over the processes by which 'meaning' is identified and presented (ibid.). Regarding the latter issue, Mishler argues that the relationship between language and meaning is not a stable one, but one that is "contextually grounded, unstable, ambiguous, and subject to endless reinterpretation" (Mishler, 1991, p. 260, quoted in Scheurich, 1995). Furthermore, what occurs at a particular interview is contingent on the specifics of the time, place, and individuals involved.

Taking a post-modernist perspective, Scheurich argues that the above critiques do not go far enough in pointing out the flaws of the positivist approach (ibid). Regarding power asymmetry, he agrees that an imbalance of power does indeed exist between the researcher and the interviewee but argues that the idea of 'empowering' the interviewee is in itself a paternalistic notion. Instead of seeing the interview context as one of total power

dominance by the researcher, Scheurich takes a view espoused by many critical theorists, seeing it as a space in which the interviewee has the power to resist researcher dominance in various ways. He also argues that the interview involves more than just a dominance-resistance binary; there also exists a space created in the interview that represents openness and freedom for both the interviewer and the interviewee (ibid., p. 248). Like other aspects of the interview process, however, the size and nature of this 'space' for self-determination on either party is not a constant.

Regarding language and meaning, Scheurich argues that while Mishler acknowledges the "fundamental indeterminateness of language, meaning, and communication", he falls back on the modernist assumptions that reality can still be 'known' through the identification of joint constructions of meaning as long as the researcher is careful, thorough and systematic in their approach to analysis (ibid, p. 244). From the postmodern perspective, this view remains constrained by a modernist, 'scientistic' view of interviewing.

Schuerich describes how interviewing is unpredictable and complex, with both the researcher and the interviewee embodying a range of intentions and desires, and the language used in the interview inherently "slippery, unstable, and ambiguous from person to person, from situation to situation, from time to time" (ibid, p. 240). Thus, a question or response may mean something different to the researcher than it does to the interviewee, and may change in meaning again to both parties over time. This coincides with Mishler's view, but Scheurich takes this further and argues that the 'joint construction of meaning' is not inevitable. He writes:

> Some of what occurs in an interview is verbal. Some is nonverbal. Some occurs only within the mind of each participant (interviewer or interviewee), but it may affect the entire interview. Sometimes the participants are jointly constructing meaning but, at other times, one of them may be resisting joint constructions.

> Sometimes the interviewee cannot find the right words to express herself or himself and, therefore, will compromise her or his meaning for the sake of expediency. There may be instances of dominance and resistance over large or small issues. There may be monologues. There may be times when one participant is talking about one thing but thinking about something else. A participant may be saying what she thinks she ought to say; in fact much of the interaction may be infused with a shift between performed or censured statements and unperformed and uncensured statements. Indeed, the "wild profusion" that occurs moment to moment in an interview is, I would argue, ultimately indeterminable and indescribable (Scheurich, 1995, p. 244).

Scheurich quotes Foucault when he refers to the "wild profusion" (ibid., p. 243), which references the post-structuralist critique of modernist attempts to categorize and tame the vast complexities of reality into logical structures and ordered taxonomies. Given the complexity and unknowable nature of the "wild profusion" that takes place during the reality of an interview, the postmodernist perspective highlights the futility in the idea of uncovering some sort of true or objective meaning from interview data. This futility is compounded by the fact that the second stage of the interview process - interpreting the interview – typically involves the quest to uncover some hidden meaning from interview transcripts which have been completely de-contextualized from the complexities and nuances of the original interview. Thus, while a modernist might view the coded themes and theoretical generalizations that emerge from interview data as representative of reality, the post-modernist would argue that there is no stable 'reality' or 'meaning' that can be represented. Scheurich writes: "When we think we 'interpret' what the meaning or meanings of an interview are, through various data reduction techniques, we are overlaying indeterminacy with the determinacies of our meaning-making, replacing ambiguities with findings or constructions" (Scheurich, 1995, p. 249). Adopting this view, and to return to May's point mentioned above, I have inevitably constructed my own meanings of the

transcripts based on particular cultural understandings and individual perspectives, and new constructions will occur once again by readers of this thesis[28].

Thus, instead of claiming to uncover some sort of hidden truth or meaning imbedded within the interview transcript data, the analysis and interpretations conducted during the course of this research project are understood to be but one of a multitude of possible constructions[29], and these constructed interpretations should be viewed in the context of my disciplinary training, social positionality, epistemological orientation, and individual idiosyncrasies (Scheurich, 1995). Also important is the fact that I have approached this topic and participants as a cultural outsider, and thus acknowledge the dangers of making any essentialist claims about Japan or the ideas of actors at Japanese universities. It is important to avoid making any claims that would align this research project with the Orientalist tradition (discussed more below), and thus adopting the above-described post-moderninst perspective when approaching data collection and analysis helps serve to circumvent this potential pitfall. While it is impossible to present an exhaustive description of all the conscious and unconscious baggage I brought to the research project, where possible the above and other relevant researcher traits are highlighted as potential influencing factors that shape the 'findings' presented in this thesis. Some of these traits are presented in the following section on reflexivity.

[28] This claim does not preclude the adoption of the naturalistic constructivist (critical realist) orientation I advocated for in Chapter 4. I maintain that an objective reality does indeed exist, but that interpretations of this reality will inherently be subjective. While 'truth' and 'accuracy' may be unachievable goals, the objective world will push back against subjective interpretations that stray too far from reality.

[29] While admittedly one of a multitude of 'possible constructions', I argue that as the interpretations I provide in this study are based on over four years of rigorous in-depth research and reflection, they are of value to social science scholarship.

Reflexivity and the role of the researcher

In the context of the semi-structured interviews, I was an ‘outsider’ in a number of respects; both in the sense of not being employed by any of the universities under study and also with respect to being from outside Japan, both linguistically and culturally. In addition to this outsider status, the fact that I am categorically a white, male, British-American studying the ‘Orient’ must be reflexively considered. According to Edward Said:

> For if it is true that no production of knowledge in the human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author’s involvement as a human subject in his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American studying the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of *his* actuality [sic]: that he comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second…
>
> [This actuality thus entails]… being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer (Said, 1978, p. 11).

While Said’s claim that the social categories of being American or European must *supersede* other more individual aspects of one’s personal identity can undoubtedly be contested, it should not be ignored or given cursory consideration. It was imperative to repeatedly challenge and self-reflect on assumptions I made regarding Japanese culture, the ideas defining the region of ‘Northeast Asia’ delineated for this study, my own normative beliefs about regional cooperation, and my role in the process of uncovering and analyzing the ideas of participants at Japanese universities. In addition, the fact that I am American appeared to have a noticeable influence on certain participants’ responses. As was described in Chapter 2, the USA has had and continues to play a critical role in the security arena in the region and has complicated relationships with each of the three countries involved in the programs under study. My being American at times appeared to cause

respondents to hesitate and temper their answers to questions, a reaction that was particularly evident from participants from China.

In addition to the 'outsider' status and identification as a 'Westerner', my social position was also a potentially influential factor. Many of the participants I encountered were accomplished researchers with doctorates and professorships, while I was a doctoral student. In the context of interviewing students this dynamic changed, as I was in every case older than the student participants. These differences in levels of perceived seniority due to age and authority arguably play an important role in social interactions in societies like Japan which are influenced by the Confucian tradition (Kyung, 2015; McCullough, 2008). According to Park (2011) researchers who do not share the same cultural background as those from Confucian cultures may struggle to draw out meanings from the 'low-context' forms of communication common in Confucian societies (cited in Kyung, 2015, p. 120). While this may be true in some cases, dividing the social world into Confucian 'insiders' and non-Confucian 'outsiders' is an unhelpful oversimplification. While I am undeniably a 'Westerner', I have also spent close to a third of my life living in Japan and have developed a reasonable understanding of communication styles in Japanese society. Nevertheless, it was useful to keep in mind these differences in cultural communication when conducting the interviews and interpreting the interview transcripts.

Another factor was language. The majority of participants in the study were capable of and appeared comfortable speaking in English, and chose to do so of their own volition. Both the CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight Programs operate at the trilateral and exchange program levels in English, and so participants generally had high levels of proficiency. However, it is likely that at times speaking in a second language entailed that interviewees

could not "find the right words" to express themselves and thus compromised meaning "for the sake of expediency" (Scheurich, 1995, p. 244). In other cases, participants chose to respond in Japanese. I am proficient in both languages but do not have native-level Japanese fluency. As such, translation of transcripts from Japanese to English presented another challenge and layer of researcher influence. For all of the sections of Japanese text that I deemed to be of particular importance to the study, I employed a translation service to provide a professional level of accuracy [30]. However, the professional translators did not have the benefit of attending the interviews and were not as familiar with the subject matter as I was. As such, I made a point to revisit the professional translations and confirm meanings aligned with the original Japanese transcripts with native Japanese speakers.

Additionally, some interview questions that touched on sensitive and contested topics were at times asked to participants (see Appendix E for the most recent version of the interview protocol). Care was taken to avoid causing undue anxiety or stress in respondents, and it was made clear that interviewees could 'pass' on answering any questions that made them feel uncomfortable. This did not end up being a noticeable problem. However, it may have been the case that interviewees felt unwilling to express their honest opinions for a variety of reasons. Thus, within the "wild profusion" of the interview and subsequent analysis of the transcripts I tried to also be aware of silences, omissions, nervous laughter and other 'tells' that the respondent may have been less than forthcoming to particular questions.

[30] At a conference presentation of this research project an audience member asked whether responses from participants in Japanese wouldn't be more nuanced and 'accurate', considering English was not the first language of the majority of the respondents and Japanese was. This is a valid question and points to a potential limitation in the study. However, it was arguably better, at least in some cases, for the respondents to translate their ideas into English themselves rather than have me or a professional translation service do it. Either way, the requirement for presenting the findings in English entails some potential loss of nuance and intended meanings embedded in the original Japanese. This is yet another example of the impossibility of making any claims to objective 'truth' uncovered from the data.

Finally, there was another assumption that I realized early on in the project needed to be reflexively considered: it was the notion I had that regional cooperation among the three countries was inherently 'a good thing'. The more I learned about regional and global politics throughout this project, the more I realized this assumption was coming from a place of particular subjective bias that tied in to my own ideas about Western and Japanese imperialism, continued Western/American hegemony, and other possible factors I had yet to reflect upon. Questions arose: regional cooperation among the Northeast Asian countries would surely be of benefit to many, but might it also have detrimental effects? Would increasing cooperation with mainland China, for example, lead to animosities or tensions between Japan and Taiwan, or those in Hong Kong SAR who identify more as Hongkongers? What would be the American reaction and subsequent outcomes if the nations of Northeast Asia eventually formed closer political ties? Could regional cooperation actually be destabilizing? The normative assumption that regional cooperation is most likely 'a good thing' and an appropriate frame for analysis of the ideas of actors in Japanese universities is potentially indicative of the 'methodological regionalism' discussed by Breaden (mentioned in Chapter 3) (Breaden, 2018). However, it is clear that a range of actors in the region hold the view that regional cooperation is a preferable (or possibly inevitable) state of affairs, and it is their views, not my own, that are of interest in this study.

Connected to this interest, I have also grappled with the wording of the research questions that have given this project its shape and direction. In order to avoid imposing my own normative assumptions onto the project, I have engaged in an iterative process of refining the research questions in light of the data and the dominant emergent themes. While I have

undoubtedly been instrumental in the construction of these themes, I have endeavored to represent the voices and ideas of participants as accurately as possible.

In sum, I attempted to assume a posture of ongoing reflexivity throughout this project. I aimed to be critically aware of the considerations mentioned above and open to the discovery of other potentially confounding factors throughout the process of interviewing, transcribing, analyzing data and writing this thesis. The chapter now moves on to introduce the scale and types of interviews conducted, as well as the approaches taken to interviewing, transcription and analysis.

Approach to interviewing participants

Appendix F sets out the scale, number of interviews and categories of the interviewees for each institution. The broad categories for participants are labelled as 'academics', 'administrators' and 'students'. In reality, these three categories represented a range of different types of actors. However, in order to protect the privacy and confidentiality of interviewees, names and identifying job titles were omitted. Instead, only categories, academic disciplines (where relevant), programs, and university names were used when presenting direct quotes from participants in the study. The types of roles that fit into these three broad categories are described below.

Academics are those actors who are involved in one of the two programs in some capacity, yet their primary functions at their university are that of a researcher and/or teacher. Academics at Japanese universities also take on a large amount of administrative responsibilities, and in some cases those duties equated in part to their involvement in the regional cooperation programs under study. With regard to the A3 projects, academics

typically performed the role of 'principal investigators', a term that entails a leadership position in a research team. Some others were junior or post-doc researchers involved in the A3 projects and employed by the universities at that time. Many of the academics involved in CAMPUS Asia programs situated in the hard sciences also assumed this type of role but tended to have more administrative and political functions in terms of driving the applications for program funding and shaping the goals of particular programs. This coincides with participating academics in the social sciences and humanities programs as well, although some of the academics interviewed had more cursory or figurehead type roles, such as deans of international offices and academics brought in for consultancy purposes.

Administrators were identified in part by the fact that they were not academics, which helped delineate the two groups because, as mentioned, many academics also have administrative functions. This group by contrast were those whose primary role at their university was to manage and administer the programs under study. Most of these actors were situated in university international offices, but some were located in particular faculties and departments.

Finally, *students* as a category, while seeming straightforward, also represents a rather diverse group. Some of the students were program alumni and had already graduated from their universities. Others were in the midst of their respective programs, and others still were yet to depart on their study abroad exchanges but had been involved in some program-related courses or activities on their home campuses.

Because of the diversity within these groupings it could be argued that they are not delineated parsimoniously enough to enable comparative analysis. However this does not pose a problem for two reasons. First, analytic comparisons were not made within each category (e.g. comparing students with other students). Instead comparisons were made vertically between categories[31], and there is justification for each participant to belong to the categories in which they are assigned. When comparisons where made horizontally, it was at the level of institutions or disciplines. Secondly, all of the participants are indeed actors that have been involved in one of the two programs for higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, and I argue that the ideas they hold contribute to the shaping of policies for regional cooperation and program outcomes. It is their role as 'actors' that is of primary importance to the study; further categorization serves mainly for coherence and organizational purposes when presenting the findings. However, I do feel that separating actors into these three groupings is preferable to the approach taken by Breaden (2018), in which he combined academics and administrators into the category of 'coordinators'. As was highlighted by Poole (2016) and discussed in chapter 3, academics and administrators at Japanese universities typically embody distinct and at times opposing identities with respect to their roles at university. As such it is useful to distinguish these groups in order to better isolate and identify their particular worldviews. Arguably students also have equivalently strong and distinct identities that warrants their own grouping.

In addition to the interviews with actors at Japanese universities, an attempt was made to interview a small number of participants from partner Chinese and Korean universities. I was able to travel to Seoul, Korea, to interview two professors involved with CAMPUS

[31] In the final analysis vertical comparisons did not yield many novel insights; the main differences in ideas emerged through comparisons of institutions and disciplines.

Asia at Korea University. Unfortunately, I was unable to organize a trip to conduct interviews in China. The reason for attempting to conduct these interviews was as follows: while the focus of the study is on perspectives from Japan, I believed gaining insights into the ideas about regional cooperation from the perspectives of actors at participating Chinese and Korean universities could help highlight any ideas that may be unique to the Japanese cases by way of contrast.

This point warrants clarification. By perspectives from Japan, I do not mean perspectives limited to ethnically-Japanese nationals. Gaining insights into the perspectives of individuals who fit the social categories of a particular ethnicity or nationality was not the purpose of the study. Instead, aside from the three role-types described above, I was interested solely in actors' academic disciplines, their programs for regional cooperation, and their Japanese universities, regardless of the other social categories (ethnicity, gender, age, nationality, etc.) that could otherwise distinguish them as individuals. This decision ties in to the discussion above about avoiding essentialized and Orientalist forms of 'research'. It also became quickly apparent that this approach would not have been feasible in practice, as the range of actors I was able to interview hailed from a variety of countries and cultural backgrounds. It could be argued that omitting these 'variables' does an injustice to the unique accounts of individual actors, and this is indeed a valid argument. However, it also presents the dilemma of where the cut-off point should be. How does one suitably categorize a Japanese student with an American parent and a Korean girlfriend in Seoul? Can this person be grouped into the category of 'Japanese' along with another student with Japanese nationality, trilingual Japanese-Mandarin-English ability, and a parent who is Chinese? Ideally the solution would be the creation of detailed personal profiles which could be woven into rich narratives that contextualize the ideas of individual

actors. However, to do so with 67 participants creates problems related to the word-count limitations of this thesis: the inclusion of such rich narrative descriptions would inherently entail the omission of other content I have deemed central to the aims of study.

Connected to this topic was the dilemma about whether or not to assign pseudonyms to participants. Doing so would entail social categories like gender, nationality and ethnicity would be inferable, even though they would not be explicitly stated. As such, for the reasons given above I decided not to give the participants pseudonyms. Participant quotations are thus followed only by a notation of their role (student, administrator, academic), program and related academic discipline, and university. Appendix F provides a table of the 67 participant profiles.

Access to participants was attempted primarily via email. Formal emails were composed in Japanese and English and were accompanied by a PDF synopsis of the research project on university letterhead. Where possible, snowballing techniques were used to gain access to additional participants. While snowballing could itself be a limitation due to the tendency to homogeneity as people will often recommend those who have similar outlooks to their own, I accepted all offers for additional interviews based on the rationale that expanding the sample size of participants as much as possible would lead to the widest range of ideas from which themes could be drawn. I continued to seek out opportunities to interview participants until I began detecting a significant amount of saturation in terms of the emergent thematic codes (discussed below). The practical realities of access, time and personal funding constraints also influenced my decision to stop recruiting further participants.

Often participants who were interviewed were able to recommend and introduce others. After gaining the trust of administrators and academics, I gained access to student participants at five different universities. All participants who agreed to interview were given consent forms in Japanese and English and offered the option to refuse to be recorded for part or all of the interview. Participants were made aware that they would be anonymized as individuals and could opt out of the study at any time. Throughout this project care was taken not to jeopardize anyone's personal or professional reputations or defame any institutions[32]. In one instance a participant did not wish to be recorded and so notes were taken, then drafted up in a report of the interview and sent to the participant for confirmation and editing.

Designing the interview protocol

Interview questions were informed by the constructivist and discursive institutionalist approaches described in Chapter 4 and sought to uncover the cognitive and normative ideas shaping higher education regional cooperation at the policy, programmatic, and philosophical levels (Schmidt, 2008). Following Galletta's approach to conducting semi-structured interviews, the interview protocol was designed in three sections, moving from open-ended questions focused on participants' concrete experiences to questions focused on pre-determined theoretical frameworks (Galletta, 2013, p. 46). The approach to interview design is presented in Table 5.4.

[32] In a few instances in the Findings chapters I redact University information to avoid the risk of institutional defamation.

Table 5.4: Stages and Aims of the Semi-Structured Interview

Stage of the Interview	Purpose of Interview Segment	Aims of the Segment
Opening segment	Creating a space for a Narrative Grounded in Participant Experience	• Establish levels of comfort and ensure understanding of participant rights • Create openings for participant to speak from experience • Support the flow of the narrative with probes that guide its direction as it relates to the research topic
Middle segment	Questions of Greater Specificity	• Attend to nuances in the narrative thus far • Shift into questions that specifically relate to research questions • Extend probes beyond clarification to meaning making
Concluding segment	Revisiting the Opening Narrative for Theoretical Connections	• Pose questions that reflect theoretical considerations – offer participant opportunity to explore opening narrative in relation to theory-driven questions • Look for opportunities to explore contradictions • Thank participant and emphasize his or her contribution to the research

Adapted from Galletta (2013).

In any type of interview, the setting and circumstances will undoubtedly have an impact on the data collected. It is important to reflect on the possible impacts these factors may have on the interview itself, but ultimately these impacts are unknowable (to the researcher, and potentially to the interviewees themselves). However, based on conducting over 60 interviews on this project, a few noteworthy potential influences were observed and deserve mention.

The original plan was to interview participants individually and in private locations. This was possible in the majority of cases but at times other configurations occurred. On one occasion administrators chose to interview in a pair, and on four occasions administrators who had arranged an interview with a senior academic sat in on the interview. In two of these interviews the academic dominated the interview and the administrators appeared reluctant to speak at all, let alone openly and honestly.

Student interviews were generally conducted individually, but on five occasions it was more feasible to conduct focus group-style interviews. At Tokyo Gakugei University, a mix of Japanese, Chinese and Korean students participated in a group discussion. At Okayama University, two groups of four Chinese students and two groups of four Korean students participated in focus groups. As was mentioned above, nationality/ethnicity was not given analytical weight when considering the ideas of actors at Japanese universities, however the make-up of nationalities of focus group members did appear to have an impact on the nature and content of the group interviews. When grouped into country-specific groups the participants appeared to speak more freely and more critically compared with the mixed grouping of Chinese, Japanese and Korean students.

The ideal setting was the individual interviews, where generally both I and the participant seemingly felt more comfortable having a lengthy and in-depth conversation about the various topics addressed in the interview protocol.

In all cases, I was cognizant that current events relevant to regional relations might have an impact on the interviews. In order to be aware of this possibility, news stories from media sources from a range of countries were monitored throughout the period when interviews were conducted. The media sources most frequently referenced were:

- The New York Times; BBC News; The Japan Times; Yonhap News (Korea); The Korean Herald; China Xinhua News; East Asia Forum; The Diplomat, Times Higher Education, University World News

News stories were followed on Twitter (as of this writing, China Xinghua is the only Chinese media outlet permitted on the platform by the CCP), and stories related to Northeast Asian international relations and higher education were recorded in an Excel file. See Appendix G for the complete list of recorded news stories. A noteworthy trend was

observed during the start of the project leading up to the time I started conducting interviews. In early 2017, there were many news stories that highlighted the tensions between two or all three of the Northeast Asian countries. Then when North Korea took the headlines with its nuclear weapons tests and verbal standoff with the Trump administration, stories about tensions between the three countries dropped significantly from the news cycle. During this time the first of the interviews were conducted. The majority of the interviews were finished by the time the 2018 Winter Olympics in PyeongChang, South Korea started, and during this time the media tended to focus on South Korea/North Korea talks and stories related to the Olympics. On occasion current events were discussed in the interviews, but the degree to which the news cycle impacted the content or tone of the interviews more broadly is unknown. Nevertheless paying attention to regional events at the time the interviews were conducted was a useful exercise that provided a contemporary frame of reference for the semi-structured discussions that ensued. Furthermore, tracking the relational ups and downs between the three countries over roughly a two-year period highlighted the fragility of Northeast Asian relations (some of these are noted in Chapter 2).

Approach to transcription

In addition to the epistemological considerations involved in interpreting and analyzing interview transcripts, it is important to recognize that the act of transcription itself is an activity that requires a number of subjective decisions on the part of the researcher. Approaches to transcription can range on a spectrum from *focused* to *unfocused*, with the former emphasizing particular features of speech and often employing transcription symbols to measure not only words but also pauses in a conversation, overlaps in speech and elongations of sound. Unfocused transcription by contrast aims to merely represent

‘what was said’, although this approach often involves the manipulation of data to make it easily understandable and representative of what the researcher thinks the participants ‘meant’ in their speech (Gibson, 2015, p. 7). Regardless of the approach to transcription that is taken up, it is crucial to recognize that:

> a transcript does not neutrally report, but displays a particular understanding and perspective of whatever it is that is being displayed. As such, transcripts are perhaps the epitome of an unequal relationship between the ‘researched’ and the ‘researcher’, where the latter defines, or at least delimits, a reader’s understandings of the former (Gibson, Webb, & vom Lehn, 2014, p. 781).
>
> The purpose of transcription is to draw attention to some aspect(s) of the data – to help the researcher to conceptualise an issue, to analytically work it through and, ultimately, to represent that problem to a reader (Gibson et al., 2014, p. 793).

In this respect, adopting a particular approach to transcription inherently enables some types of analysis while constraining and inhibiting others (ibid., p. 782). Gibson, Webb and vom Lehn argue that the goal of selecting a given approach to transcription is to enable a representation of the data so that it connects to and helps to address the research problem (ibid., p. 791). Thus, the notion of ‘accuracy’ when it comes to transcription is best understood in terms of the relationship between the transcription and the research questions, and the degree to which the approach adopted is suitable to providing an opportunity for the researcher to construct an answer to them.

The approach to transcription in this study was *unfocused*; there was no attempt made to utilize symbols representing the various nuances of speech other than to type up ‘what was said’. I initially used transcription software called F5 to do the transcriptions myself, and soon realized what a time-consuming process this was. While doing my own transcriptions was helpful in the sense it forced me to spend significant amounts of time with the data, I eventually decided to employ a professional service to do the transcriptions for me (in both English and Japanese). Once I received these documents, I listened to the audio recordings

and ‘cleaned up’ the transcripts where necessary. As was mentioned in the section on reflexivity, for those interview transcripts that were in Japanese, I did my own translations and identified sections that were important and relevant to the study. These sections, which amounted to approximately 21,241 characters in Japanese, were then sent to be professionally translated into English[33]. All translations were further cross-checked with bilingual native Japanese speakers for accuracy against the original transcripts. These professionally translated sections were also added to NVivo and coded accordingly.

Methods of data analysis and interpretation

Methods for data analysis and interpretation were selected that would best address the research questions, and as such a combination of the deductive application of the discursive institutionalist analytic framework and inductive thematic content analysis was utilized.

Deductive and inductive methods

Following Wolcott (1994), description, analysis and interpretation are recognized as distinct processes that complement one another in helping to address a research topic (cited in Gibson & Brown, 2009). Description entails presenting the data as closely as possible to its original form while still serving some purpose for the researcher. Analysis, by contrast, “involves going beyond…descriptive iterations and systematically producing an account of 'key factors and relationships among them' (Wolcott, 1994, p. 10, cited in Gibson & Brown, 2009). Finally, interpretation involves trying to give sense to the data by creatively producing insights about it (Gibson & Brown, 2009, p 5.). According to Gibson and Brown (2009):

[33] Any quotes presented in the thesis that were originally in Japanese were translated professionally.

> Wolcott describes the relationship between these three elements of qualitative work through the analogy of a see-saw. Description is the central part of the balance, and analysis and interpretation are the two opposite poles of the stem that balance on it. Researchers rest their analysis and interpretation…on their description, and can give more or less emphasis to one or the other by raising or lowering one or other side of the see-saw (p. 5).

Figure 5.1 depicts this dynamic.

Figure 5.1: Wolcott's 'see-saw' of qualitative data analysis



Adapted from Gibson and Brown, 2009.

Wolcott's see-saw is a useful tool for visualizing the components of qualitative data analysis, however it exhibits a weakness in the assumption that analysis and description do not contain within them their own interpretative elements. All steps of the data analysis process involve interpretation by the researcher. However, the see-saw does provide a means to conceptualize the two different methods employed for data analysis in this study. While the discursive institutionalist framework enabled for the analytic identification and deductive categorization of ideas into levels and types (see Table 4.1), thematic analysis provided a means to interpret and synthesize the raw data by inductively coding and constructing themes. Theme construction was an inherently interpretive task that entailed a consideration of not only the raw data, but also other emergent themes in both the actors' transcripts and government-level policy documents, and the broader contexts and issues covered in the literature review chapters. The goal was to identify commonalities,

relationships and differences across the various units of analysis in relation to the research questions (Gibson, 2016).

An initial *a priori* coding scheme was created based on the discursive institutionalist framework of policy-ideas, separated into levels (policy, programmatic, and underlying philosophies) and cognitive and normative types. Within the broader coding frames of the framework a number of emergent sub-codes were identified through a grounded, inductive interaction with the raw data. In addition to these three basic 'level' categories, a number of sub-categories were inductively defined (e.g. 'ideas about Japanese HE'; 'ideas about Northeast Asia'). Finally a category labelled 'Barriers' was created to address research question #4. Throughout the process I attempted to let the data 'speak for itself' and allow dominant themes to emerge organically, reading and coding the transcripts several times in NVivo and adding new codes and ideas as needed. Once I felt the coding frame was complete, I re-read the entirety of the transcripts and did a final pass of coding.

During the final coding process I copied important quotes into a Word document, and developed participant 'cameos' and case study descriptions of the universities and their respective programs which were indexed by headings and a navigable table of contents. This bridging document served as another helpful means to organize and explore the data. When coding was completed I ran a number of explorative queries with NVivo to detect emergent themes.

I maintained ongoing reflective research notes throughout the course of the project to bracket any assumptions and other ideas I had. Going in to the analysis/interpretation stage I was aware that I had some preconceived ideas of what to expect (e.g. administrators across

different universities might present similar ideas, in contrast to academics), and I made a point during coding to *not seek out* evidence that might prove my assumptions. Nevertheless, some of these assumptions did appear to be accurate, while in other instances I encountered a number of surprises. These surprises were often uncovered through the NVivo queries, which highlighted aspects of the data or the coding frame that were not at the forefront of my mind. In some instances, these surprises became the central lines of inquiry and resulted in the key thematic headings presented in the Findings chapters.

Some have argued that the creation of codes and categories to aid in identifying commonalities and differences across cases in a dataset threatens to distance the researcher from the 'lived experiences' and nuanced peculiarities to be found in the data (Gibson, 2016). Seeking to generate overarching codes and present common themes, while useful for studies such as this involving a relatively large amount of participants, does have limitations in that it decouples 'what was said' by individuals from the social contexts and social identities that embody them. This dilemma was discussed in the previous section on participant descriptions. As such, while many of the social characteristics of participants are obscured, the direct quotes from participants were preserved and presented 'as is' in the subsequent findings chapters in support of the constructed themes, and brief narratives are provided where possible when they help to illuminate an idea through contextualization. This approach further helps to present these disembodied quotes as coming from particular individuals.

The presentation of the findings for this project are organized into the following four chapters. The first three chapters present the constructed themes from the analysis and interpretation of the raw data in a logically ordered fashion. The presentation of these

themes are at times accompanied by micro-arguments that provide context and foreshadow the broader macro-arguments about regional cooperation in Northeast Asia that are made in the final chapter. The final chapter utilizes the findings to engage with the extant empirical and theoretical literature presented in Chapter 3, highlighting the ways this study confirms or refutes previous research and provides novel empirical, methodological and theoretical contributions to the literature. I also posit my own argument about the importance of incorporating the ideational dimension into any study of higher education regional cooperation in order to gain a comprehensive, contextualized understanding about the multi-layered policy processes of higher education region building. I conclude the thesis by addressing some of the limitations of the study and possibilities for further research.

III. Findings

Chapter 6: Government-level ideas

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to present the themes reflective of the cognitive and normative policy ideas for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia found at the 'government-level', which is represented by five governmental organizations involved in varying capacities in one or both of the programs under study. The ideas at this level are intended to serve as structuring elements against which to juxtapose the ideas of actors involved in the two programs at the various case universities presented in subsequent chapters. This chapter is organized into two parts. Part 1 proceeds by introducing the five key governmental organizations and presenting thematic findings from analyses of policy documents from each. Part 2 moves to a presentation of findings from two semi-structured interviews with government officials; one a senior administrator involved with CAMPUS Asia from Japan's Ministry of Education, and another an academic/senior evaluator of the CAMPUS Asia Program from an independent governmental monitoring agency.

The documents that were analyzed for this chapter include Trilateral Summit/Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) summaries, press releases and reports; Japanese government policy and strategy documents; program/project evaluation reports; and PR materials from the five organizations. Documents deemed relevant to this study were those that focused on CAMPUS Asia or A3 Foresight specifically or addressed the broader policy contexts of STI, higher education internationalization, or Northeast Asian regional cooperation in arenas directly related to higher education. Applying Scott's (1990) criteria for assessing the quality of documentary sources (see Chapter 5), a total of 52 documents produced at

the governmental-level totaling approximately 265,800 words were selected and analyzed[34]. In addition, 14 A3 Foresight project final-year reports which were produced by researchers and submitted to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) were also analyzed for insights. The rationale for selecting these reports is provided in the section on JSPS below. A consistent approach to coding both the documents and interview transcripts throughout this project enabled for a comparison of governmental policy rhetoric with the ideas of individuals at universities who were actually implementing the two programs under study. This provided an opportunity to track the continuities, adaptations and resistances that occurred as policy shifted into practice.

Five broad themes emerged as a result of the analysis of policy ideas at the government level. They are (1) a discourse of '*mutual understanding*', (2) an emphasis on education and mobility with '*quality assurance*', (3) a recognition of the *economic interdependence* of the region and a commitment to use cooperation to enhance economic growth, (4) a focus on university students as future '*human resources*', and (5) a normative commitment to competition and '*competitiveness*'. These overarching themes are elaborated upon and supported with direct quotes from documents and interview participants in the following sections. The different government agencies generally touched on all five themes with varying degrees of emphasis in relation to their particular remits. However, there were also notable differences, additional unique ideas, and potential points of tension among the different agencies involved. In addition, a range of perceived barriers to regional cooperation (often framed in the context of the above-mentioned policy ideas) were found in the data from some of the agencies and are presented accordingly below. Finally, the

[34] The range of documents consulted to serve this purpose are cited and a complete reference list can be found in Appendix A.

interviews with government officials further highlighted the fact that the 'government', both across agencies and within them, is far from monolithic, and actors at this level are involved in processes of compliance, adaptation, and resistance with regard to the officially-sanctioned policy rhetoric.

Part 1: Analysis of documents

The Trilateral Cooperation Summits/Secretariat

The first organization involved with both CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight whose policy ideas were analyzed was the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, or TCS. The TCS is an international governmental organization involving a range of stakeholders from China, Japan and South Korea, with a stated vision to "promote peace, stability and common prosperity of the East Asian Region" (TCS Y, 2017, p. 6). The TCS was officially inaugurated in 2011, but began its development in 1999 at the 3rd ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit held in Manila in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis. Trilateral Summit meetings occurred annually most years from that time in conjunction with APT summits, and meetings independent of APT began in 2008. However, in 2005 and 2006 the summits were suspended due to political tensions between the three countries (Kimura, 2014). At the third of the meetings held independent from ASEAN in May, 2010, a more permanent organization (the Secretariat) was agreed upon and officially established. To date, topics frequently addressed at the TCS summit meetings have included the regional and global economy, environmental issues, social and human exchange, national security and disaster prevention (Kimura, 2014). The TCS thus aims to promote trilateral cooperation among the three countries across a broad spectrum of sectors, which are subsumed under the categories of political, economic, and social/cultural affairs (TCS Y, 2017, p. 7). These areas are organized into relevant departments and supported by a fourth department for management

and coordination, displayed in Table 6.1. Those responsible for CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight are noted in bold.

Table 6.1: Departments and Sectors of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat

Department of Political Affairs	Department of Economic Affairs	Department of Social and Cultural Affairs	Department of Management and Coordination
• Foreign Affairs • Security • Regional Issues • International Issues • Disaster Prevention and Management • Think-Tank Networks	• Trade and Investment • Transport and Logistics • Customs • Intellectual Property Rights • ICT Industry • Finance • **Science and Technology (*A3 Foresight)** • Standardization • Energy • Consumer Policies • Environmental Protection • Agriculture • Water Resources • Forestry	• Culture • Youth Exchanges • Media • **Education (*CAMPUS Asia)** • Health and Welfare • Tourism • Local Government Exchanges • Personnel Administration • Sports • Public Diplomacy	• Planning and Coordination • Public Relations • Human Resources • Administrative and Legal Support • Budget and Accounting • Archives

Source: TCS FY2016 Annual Report (TCS Y, 2017).

The CAMPUS Asia program falls under the remit of the Department of Social and Cultural Affairs and the sector labelled ‘Education’. A3 Foresight by contrast is situated in the Science and Technology sector under the remit of the Department of Economic Affairs. While both programs are implemented almost completely by universities, their sectors (S&T; Education) and broader social functions (i.e. Economic; Social/Cultural) are, at this level, considered distinct and separately managed.

A comprehensive analysis of the ideas driving the TCS in each of the 30 sectors under its remit is beyond the scope and purpose of this project. Instead ideas specific to the sectors that house the two programs under study, namely Science and Technology (A3) and Education (CAMPUS Asia) were the focus of analysis. In addition, the broader, more general themes that capture the ethos of the organization and thus serve to frame and contextualize these two sectors were also investigated. A range of documents were

collected from the TCS website including the initial agreement establishing the TCS in 2010, reports summarizing APT and Trilateral Cooperation Summit meetings held since 1999 (called 'Mechanism Summaries'), progress reports and annual reports. Analyses focused primarily on documents that were produced just before and during the period when the programs under study were conceived and launched (A3 Foresight was the first of the two, being launched in 2005). In addition, there was one TCS report created in 2017 that focused specifically on CAMPUS Asia, which is discussed in some detail below. In total, 27 documents from the TCS were analyzed.

Economic cooperation

Having such a wide remit, the TCS documents contained a range of policy ideas about regional cooperation. Both at a broad level and in relation to STI, a dominant and recurrent theme was that of *regional economic cooperation*. This theme was present from the start of the Trilateral Summit meetings which began in 1999, and this early emphasis was arguably the result of the Asian Financial Crisis and the recognition that economic reform policy and cooperation were required for the economic stability of the region going forward. In documents describing subsequent annual meetings, new agenda topics were added such as the inclusion of the idea of 'people and youth exchange' (2nd Trilateral Summit Meeting at APT in 2000), and the notion of an 'East Asian Community' (6th Trilateral Summit Meeting at APT in 2006). However, recognition of the realities of economic interdependence and the importance of continued economic cooperation remained a constant:

> With geographical proximity, economic complementarity, growing economic cooperation and increasing people-to-people exchanges, the three countries have become important economic and trade partners to one another, and have continuously strengthened their coordination and cooperation in regional and international affairs (TCS F, 2003)

> On the basis of the common understanding that scientific progress and innovation have underpinned economic development and the three countries represent a great part of the world economy, the Three Ministers held, in the spirit of mutual respect and cooperation, practical talks concerning the trilateral cooperation in science and technology... (TCS K, 2007)

> We fully recognized the fact that, due to the uncertainty of the world economy, deepening of the debt crisis in developed economies, ongoing unrest in West Asia and North Africa and continued momentum of growth in East Asia, further enhancement of the trilateral cooperation has contributed to steady economic growth in the three countries and accelerated economic integration in Northeast Asia (TCS V, 2012)

The above and other statements in the documents highlight a cognitive understanding of the extant economic interdependence of the region and the external threats posed by the volatility of the global economy, which serves to reinforce the TCS's normative commitment to further regional economic cooperation. Notably, the documents recognized the importance of Science & Technology to augment economic development in the region, adding it as a 'priority area' along with youth exchanges and four other areas during the 7th Trilateral Summit Meeting at APT in 2007.

Socio-cultural exchange and cooperation despite political tensions

In addition to this emphasis on economic concerns, the TCS documents also frequently stated the importance of political cooperation and *cultural and people-to-people exchange* among the three countries. In the Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership issued as a result of the 1st independent Trilateral Summit in 2008, then Prime Minister Taro Aso of Japan, PRC Premier Wen Jiabao of China, and President Lee Myung-bak of the ROK co-authored the following statement:

> We are content with the achievements made so far in the tripartite cooperation in enhancing mutual political trust, increasing trade and economic contact, expanding social and cultural exchange and strengthening financial cooperation. We have

> committed ourselves to further promote our trilateral cooperation building on these achievements (TCS M, 2008, p. 1).

This joint statement was issued two years after the political tensions in the region became so pronounced that the Trilateral Summit meetings were suspended (in the years 2005-2006), highlighting the underlying political instability of the region. Nevertheless, despite the discord at the highest diplomatic levels during this period, a number of consultations in a range of areas continued, including those concerned with the economy, finance, IT, the environment, and education. In 2006, the First Directors-General's Meeting among the Education Ministries of China, Japan and Korea took place in Seoul, where the Directors-General agreed to expand existing bilateral exchange programs into a trilateral project (TCS H, 2007). It was at this meeting, while the top-level politicians weren't speaking to one another, that the seeds of the CAMPUS Asia program were planted.

In 2009, the year following the first Trilateral Summit independent of ASEAN, then Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama built upon the established ideas of social and cultural exchange and presented his ideas for what would soon after become CAMPUS Asia:

> [W]hat will be indispensable for trilateral cooperation is exchanges among the youth of the three countries, in particular those among university students. As one aspect of university student exchanges, we should for example actively consider permitting the interchangeability among universities of credits earned. This would naturally require a degree of consistency in the levels of the schools concerned. While I do not consider this something that is possible for all universities, we will be promoting cooperation as qualitative levels are standardised. **I proposed that through such cooperation, it would be possible for the various political and psychological hurdles still remaining among our three countries to be transformed and overcome** (Hatoyama, 2009).

These early ideas of credit transfer, consistency and standardization mentioned in the above quote tie in to theme of *quality assurance*, which appeared with regularity across the government policy documents describing CAMPUS Asia. Prime Minister Hatoyama also

clearly had an idea of the possibilities for higher education and international exchange to break down socially constructed barriers impeding regional stability and cooperation. These ideas connected to his broader vision for the region, that of creating an 'East Asian Community'.

CAMPUS Asia in an 'East Asian Community': an idea in flux

In addition to initiating talks about CAMPUS Asia, Prime Minister Hatoyama is widely recognized for advancing a particular vision of an 'East Asian Community' (EAC), a concept entailing the integration of the broader East Asian region that has been interpreted differently by various political actors. While former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi advocated in vague terms for an EAC in his policy speeches (Koizumi, 2002, 2005), describing a future East Asia as "an open community that shares economic prosperity while embracing diversity" (Koizumi, 2005), Hatoyama's vision was more sweeping – it entailed the forging in concrete terms of

> a community of life sustenance and culture in Asia that develops our history of cultural exchange spanning several millennia and intensifies our cooperation to ensure this sustenance of life...in parallel with the effort being made by the European Union" (Hatoyama, 2010).

Essential to his vision of regional integration was the notion of *yūai*, or 'fraternity', which entailed the necessity for Japan to adopt a more humble posture and reconcile its differences with the countries it occupied during World War II. According to Koh (2010), Hatoyama "was inspired by the post-war experience of Europe, where, following two world wars, historic enemies reconciled and a union of 27 countries was established". It was thus in this broader context of a potential East Asian Community based on *yūai* that CAMPUS Asia was conceived and launched, with a vision of the program modelled on the concept of the EU's ERASMUS Program.

Hatoyama's tenure as Prime Minister was short lived, as was the control of the government by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). By 2012, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had returned to power, along with the reinstitution of right-wing nationalist Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister. In a policy speech in early 2013, Abe laid out his plan for foreign policy, which de-emphasized regional relations, firmly repositioned Japan as an ally of the USA, and effectively thwarted the DPJ's hopes of an East Asian Community:

> There is also a pressing need for us to undertake a drastic reshaping in the areas of diplomacy and security. Above all, we must further reinforce the Japan-U.S. alliance, which is the cornerstone of Japanese diplomacy and security, and fully restore the bonds of friendship between Japan and the U.S. At the Japan-U.S. summit meeting scheduled for the third week of February, I am determined to demonstrate to both the people of Japan and people around the world that the close ties of the Japan-U.S. alliance have been restored…
>
> Fundamental to our diplomacy will be for us to develop a strategic diplomacy based on the fundamental values of freedom, democracy, basic human rights, and the rule of law, **and we view the world as a whole, as if looking at a globe, rather than look only at bilateral relations with neighboring countries** (Abe, 2013).

The reinstitution of the LDP in Japan and its adoption of a more 'global' approach to foreign policy coincided with the gradual expansion of a higher education initiative called the 'Re-inventing Japan Project' (eventually rebranded the 'Inter-University Exchange Project'). In 2011, the Re-inventing Japan Project offered support for the CAMPUS Asia pilot program and also for exchange partnerships with universities in the USA and ASEAN countries. This was followed by an annual expansion of the project to include new exchanges with India, Russia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Turkey, CAMPUS Asia once again in 2016, and the USA (JSPS, n.d.-a). This expansion of programs for exchange between Japanese universities, international partners and consortia in a wider range of regions around the world – while perhaps a logical and strategic move to enhance Japan's higher education global competitiveness – arguably served to de-emphasize the focus on higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia, aligning with Prime Minister

Abe's foreign policy agenda. However, despite these shifts in the political and policy realms in Japan, statements highlighting the value of the CAMPUS Asia program and regional educational cooperation remained a constant at the international level as evidenced in the TCS documents.

The pilot program of CAMPUS Asia came to an end in 2015, and the 'full-fledged' program was launched the following year. This coincided with another effort to foster higher education regionalization by the TCS, called the 'Trilateral Rectors Forum'. This forum aimed

> to strengthen the networks between higher education institutions and to further cooperation, convening university presidents from China, ROK and Japan on a rotational basis. The 1st TRF was held on December 13, 2016 in Seoul, ROK, hosted by the Korean Ministry of Education and Korean Council for University Education. As a side event, a ceremony celebrating the launching of the full-fledged CAMPUS Asia Program was organized. **Over 170 university presidents, vice presidents, professors, and staff members including representatives from the 17 original and new CAMPUS Asia consortia participated.** The TCS delegation, headed by Secretary-General YANG Houlan, participated in the event as an observer and delivered congratulatory remarks…He particularly emphasized the significance of the CAMPUS Asia, and expressed his congratulations on its continuation as a regular program as well as the successful organization of the 1st TRF (TCS Annual Report 2016, p. 34).

While discussions of an East Asian Community may have disappeared from the policy dialogue amidst fluctuating approaches to foreign policy between the three countries, the above quote highlights that ongoing regional cooperation of higher education in Northeast Asia remained strong. CAMPUS Asia was continually noted in the documents as an exemplar of this cooperation.

A3 Foresight, STI and the EAC

In contrast to CAMPUS Asia, A3 Foresight was rarely mentioned in the TCS documents. One of the few instances where it was mentioned was in 2010, in the TCS's 'Vision 2020' Statement:

> We share the view to enhance the cooperation in science and innovation to improve our research capacity, strengthen the competitiveness of the industrial technology of the three countries, address the common regional and global issues and explore ways of contributing to the long-term goal of developing an East Asia community. For this purpose, we will continue to provide financial support, including the Joint Research Collaboration Program and the A3 Foresight Program (TCS Q 2010 Vision 2020).

Published in May 2010, TCS's Vision 2020 document still contained the hope of an East Asian Community, one that would be strengthened by concerted regional cooperation in STI. However, the following month Prime Minister Hatoyama was set to announce his resignation from office in the wake of accusations of broken campaign promises regarding relocation of the US military base in Okinawa (The Associated Press, 2010). References to this idea ceased to appear after this point in the TCS documents, until 2016 when the term "East Asian *Economic* Community" [italics added] re-emerged in an annual report.

Mutual understanding

A key document from the TCS that was analyzed was entitled 'TCS Seminar on Regional Education Cooperation: CAMPUS Asia in CJK – Outcome Report' (TCS Z, 2017). The report presents the outcomes of the first TCS Seminar focused specifically on the CAMPUS Asia program which took place in Seoul on May 11-12, 2017. The seminar brought CAMPUS Asia representatives from the three countries together to discuss best practices and common concerns regarding the program. A notable inclusion in the seminar was a briefing by representatives from the EU's ERASMUS program. Interestingly, the

ERASMUS program was highlighted in the Forward of the report for its ability of instilling in participants a sense of common European identity:

> International cooperation is possible only under the premise that there is mutual understanding between the people of different backgrounds. One of the best ways to foster mutual understanding among groups is people-to-people exchange, especially for the youth. The CAMPUS Asia program is an exemplary case of an effort to build trust among the future leaders of a region, in ways similar to how Europe's Erasmus program led to the development of the European identity. (TCS CAMPUS Asia report, 2017 p. 6).

What is noteworthy in the above quote is the emphasis placed on the cultivation of *mutual understanding*. The discourse of 'mutual understanding' frequently appeared in the documents of nearly all the government agencies, and also emerged in the interviews with government officials. Somewhat confusingly, the above quote attempts to align (but does not equate) the idea of 'mutual understanding' and building "trust among future leaders of a region" to the ERASMUS Program's stated goal of fostering a European identity. As was noted in Chapter 3, this conflation of 'mutual understanding' with the notion of a 'shared East Asian identity' was also suggested by a number of scholars writing about CAMPUS Asia (for example Breaden 2018). However, based on my analysis of both the government-level documents and the participant interviews, I argue that the concept of 'mutual understanding' does not, in fact, represent development of a shared identity, but instead represents a distinctive nationally-centered worldview that emphasizes difference. With regard to the term 'mutual', I suggest that the confusion may arise because of the different possible meanings of the word. According to the New Oxford American Dictionary (2015), 'mutual' is an adjective that can mean either

1) "(of a feeling or action) experienced or done by each of two or more parties toward the other or others: *a partnership based on mutual respect and understanding"*; or

2) "held in common by two or more parties: *we were introduced by a mutual friend"*.

Based on these definitions the meaning of 'mutual understanding' can differ dramatically depending on how the term 'mutual' is interpreted. In the first meaning, 'mutual' implies distinction, with two or more parties each having their own understanding of a separate and distinct 'other' or 'others' (note that '*mutual understanding*' is one of the examples in the first definition). Put simply, it means "I understand you, and you understand me". In the second, it implies that the 'understanding' experienced by the parties is shared as a common and unifying characteristic, in the same way having a mutual friend might be. Just as the 'friend' is a singular entity, so too is the common 'understanding'. While a valid interpretation, the second meaning begs the question as to what the *object* of this shared understanding is. It is here that some scholars make the leap to suggest that the object of shared understanding among the Northeast Asian countries is an experienced 'East Asian identity'. I suggest that this claim is not borne out empirically. Instead of this second definition, I argue based on my analysis that mutual understanding, at least in the Japanese context, in fact signifies the former definition[35].

The idea of mutual understanding thus entails a recognition of *difference*, and an effort to understand and respect members of another group despite these differences. This is markedly dissimilar to the idea of fostering a shared sense of regional identity. While a shared East Asian identity could arguably be encouraged based on the long-standing cultural connections and emerging interdependence of the region (an idea aligning with PM Hatoyama's vision of an East Asian Community), I argue that the mutual understanding

[35] Apparently I am siding with the 'traditionalists' with regards to my interpretation. The Dictionary definition goes on to explain: Some traditionalists consider using mutual to mean 'common to two or more people' (a mutual friend; a mutual interest) to be incorrect, holding that a sense of reciprocity is necessary (mutual respect; mutual need). The use they object to has a long and respectable history, however, being first recorded in Shakespeare and appearing in the writing of Sir Walter Scott, George Eliot, and, most famously, as the title of Dickens's novel Our Mutual Friend. It is now generally accepted as part of standard English (2015).

discourse firmly establishes the idea of *cultural difference* based on national boundaries and national identities. This interpretation will be elaborated with other examples below.

In addition to ideas of economic cooperation, mutual understanding, and social/cultural exchange, the majority of TCS documents expressed hopeful statements about the potential and necessity for peace, stability and security among the three countries, and a commitment for regional cooperation to serve as a platform for addressing regional and global challenges.

Barriers to regional cooperation as perceived by TCS

The TCS documents were generally written in a positive, future-oriented tone, and discussions of the tensions and barriers facing the three countries that might impede regional cooperation were infrequent. Of the 27 documents analyzed, there were only a handful of occurrences where statements were coded to 'barriers' categories in the coding scheme. However, in a 2014 presentation given by then Secretary-General of the TCS, Shigeo Iwatani, a concrete list of perceived 'political conflicts' between the countries was stated, namely:

- Difference of opinion on basic values (Democracy, Fundamental Human Rights vs. Social stability, etc.)
- Shifting balance of power and lack of solid conflict management mechanism
- Discrepancy and fluctuation of top leaders' views on regional integration
- Reconciliation process after WWII still incomplete
- Historical and territorial disputes in bilateral relations
- Rising nationalism and xenophobia (TCS BB, 2014)

Of the barriers mentioned above, the "fluctuation of top leaders' views on regional integration", while not explicitly stated, was detectable in the TCS documents. The abrupt shift in discussions about the EAC is the most notable in this regard.

The TCS is an international organization made up of foreign ministry officials, academics, representatives from industry, and other stakeholders from China, Japan and South Korea, and its *raison d'être* is to foster regional cooperation between the three countries. The following government agencies are, by contrast, domestic to Japan, and each is concerned with policies and projects that include but also extend beyond Northeast Asia.

The Council for Science, Technology and Innovation

In recent years the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister has become more directly involved in affairs related to higher education and STI in Japan. In 2001, the Council for Science and Technology Policy (CSTP) was created during a broader reorganization of government ministries. In 2014, this council was once again reorganized and renamed to incorporate an emphasis on the importance of innovation (CSTI A, 2015). According to CSTI's brochure:

> Under the leadership of the Prime Minister and the Minister of State for Science and Technology Policy, the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation serves as the headquarters for the promotion of STI policy; *it overlooks all of the nation's Science and Technology*, formulates comprehensive and basic policies, and conducts their overall coordination. (CSTI A 2015 ,p1). [italics added]

In this capacity, the Council is involved in devising STI strategy and setting budgets, as well as assessment activities in key areas of Japan's research and development. Furthermore, this 'overlooking' of all the nation's science and technology entails it has established itself in an authoritative position over the higher education sector, which has traditionally been the sole responsibility of the Ministry of Education. Perhaps unsurprisingly, tensions between these two agencies were reported in a number of participant interviews.

From CSTP/CSTI, a total of 5 key documents were selected for analysis. These included an 18-page promotional brochure outlining the functions and aims of CSTI, and the 2nd, 3rd,

4th and 5th 'Science and Technology Basic Plans', which are strategy documents that set the agenda for STI policy for five-year periods. The analysis began with the 2nd Plan because it covered the years from 2001-2005, which was the time period just before the launch of the A3 Foresight Program. These documents averaged 56 pages in length and set out comprehensive plans for STI strategy including summaries of previous accomplishments, visions for the future, core principles as to what STI should accomplish for Japan, and specific STI issue areas and fields to which investment would be directed.

While these documents contained a wealth of information, analysis focused on topics and themes related to the research questions. Each report had a section on international cooperation/collaboration, with varying degrees of emphasis on East Asia. As the Basic Plans for Science and Technology were all generally formatted in the same way, a keyword analysis that highlighted the emphases and shifts in trends of terms relevant to this study over an 18-year period was possible. Table 6.2 presents this keyword analysis along with some brief interpretations of these trends.

Table 6.2: CSTP/CSTI Basic Plans analysis of selected keywords (and collocations): instances, frequencies and trends

*** means top 10 high frequency words; * means top 25 high frequency words*

Keyword	2nd Basic Plan (2001-2005)	3rd Basic Plan (2006-2010)	4th Basic Plan (2011-2015)	5th Basic Plan (2016~)	Interpretation of trends
Universities	68* (0.61%)	223** (1.44%) ↑	146** (1.03%) ↓	165** (0.84%) ↓	Universities are generally in the top 10 of all words by frequency, and are considered crucial for achieving STI goals
Government	73* (0.65%)	203** (1.32%) ↑	392** (2.78%) ↑	152** (0.77%) ↓	Government also often in the top 10, and a key stakeholder in steering STI policy
Industry/ Company	113* (1.01%)	80* (0.52%)	84 (0.59%)	223** (1.13%) ↑	References to industry are on the rise, notably in the 5th Basic Plan
"industry + university (+government)" (triple-helix)	14 (0.13%)	30 (0.19%)	22 (0.16%)	37 (0.19%)	A relatively stable pattern of references to the triple-helix
Competition	67* (0.60%)	153** (0.99%) ↑	37 (0.26%) ↓	62 (0.31%)	Early emphasis on (international) competition declines somewhat in later plans (however it is still a key concept)
Innovation	33 (0.30%)	55 (0.36%) ↑	86* (0.61%) ↑	138* (0.70%) ↑	Steady rise in references to innovation, coinciding with repurposing of CSTP to CSTI and the importance of STI to contribute to the 'usefulness' of scientific research
Cooperation/ Collaboration	40 (0.36%)	81* (0.53%) ↑	86* (0.61%) ↑	120* (0.61%) ↑	Steady rise in references to cooperation/collaboration, primarily regarding triple-helix collaboration,(with some refs. to international cooperation)
Human resources	22 (0.2%)	78 (0.51%) ↑	43 (0.3%)	44 (0.22%)	Stable level of importance placed on the cultivation of human resources
China, Korea, or Asia	2 (0.02%)	9 (0.06%) ↑	17 (0.12%) ↑	3 (0.02%) ↓	A recognition of the rising power and competitiveness of East Asian countries (de-emphasized in the 5th Basic Plan)

Based on the frequencies and trends of the above key terms, it is clear that CSTI views higher education institutions, along with government and industry, as essential actors in

achieving the STI goals for the nation. Knowledge production is increasingly framed in terms of its applicability and potential to contribute to innovation. These trends align with developments in higher education worldwide; with massification, funding constraints, and marketization creating an environment where governments and universities must demonstrate their value, relevance and competitiveness in globalizing knowledge economies. The trends apparent in the above keyword frequency search were further supported by thematic analysis of the CSTI documents. The most dominant themes are discussed below.

Global competitiveness

The most prevalent theme that emerged from the CSTI documents was the importance of STI to contribute to Japan's *global competitiveness*. This idea of competition was applied both to the higher education sector and to the nation as a whole. As a 'resource poor' nation, STI was portrayed as an investment essential to Japan's survival, and universities were seen as key actors in the achievement of this important mission. Universities were not to act in isolation, however, and were encouraged to work in collaboration with industry and government to further the advancement of applicable knowledge. They were also called out for their inadequacies in this regard:

> Universities, the main proponent in STI activity, are lagging behind in terms of management and human resource management systems, and other organizational reform. Furthermore, there are barriers between organizations, between industry and academia, between ministries, between research fields, and more. These points must be swiftly improved (CSTI E 5th Basic Plan, p. 6).

Competition was also framed in international terms. The documents recognized an atmosphere of competition both with the West and with a rising Asia, and framed cross-border collaboration as a means to augment Japan's global competitiveness.

> STI activity has recently been expanded past national borders. In this context, questions related to how well an international research network can be established and whether a framework that will promptly and effectively utilize intellectual resources across the globe can be built will have a great impact on Japan's international competitiveness. Amidst the great ongoing changes in the international environment, Japan needs to raise its international profile by utilizing its ability in STI and by demonstrating leadership in the pursuit of common interests shared by Japan and the world (CSTI E 5th Basic Plan, p. 6).

This goal to foster the competitiveness of the nation through improvements in international research networks highlights the strategic and arguably realist approach (in the International Relations sense) to regional STI collaboration. Connected to this, the CSTI documents also quite plainly stated their perception of STI cross-border collaboration as a tool for enhancing Japan's economic and political power.

STI as soft power

CSTI made clear that it viewed STI not only as a means of producing knowledge, augmenting growth and solving global problems, but also as a form of science diplomacy:

> the international competitiveness of science and technology systems is improved by using science and technology for diplomacy and using diplomacy for science and technology promotion to contribute to solving common global issues to all mankind and at the same time **to increase the wealth and power of the nation**…
>
> While each country is promoting STI policies as their national strategies and globally competing for "knowledge," Japan, too, must strategically implement international activities related to STI. (CSTI A, Brochure).

Jane Knight suggests that knowledge diplomacy (which includes science diplomacy) is inherently different from soft power[36] (Knight, 2019a, 2019b; Nye, 2017). However, the above quotes from the CSTI document highlight how efforts toward science diplomacy can indeed contain soft power elements. Perhaps it is because these approaches become blurred

[36] Joseph Nye defines soft power as "the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by attraction rather than coercion or payment" (Nye, 2017, p. 1).

in the context of global competition, but whatever the reason, CSTI is clearly interested in contributing to the solution of global problems while at the same time increasing both the wealth *and power* of the nation. This strategic approach to the steering of STI priorities highlights another, more political orientation to the notion of competitiveness. Not only is Japan concerned with advancing knowledge and innovation to enhance economic competitiveness, but it sees STI cross-border research as a political tool for achieving its goals in the international relations arena. This strategic and political approach to the support of research has implications for academic freedom and institutional autonomy, as projects that do not align with the diplomatic goals of the government may be deemed ineligible for funding opportunities.

Perceived barriers to global competitiveness in STI

The Basic Plans often addressed Japan's position in an increasingly competitive global environment and focused on areas of weakness that impeded the achievement of the goals of previous plans. Weak areas that were identified included the overly traditional 'inward-looking' domestic nature of Japanese research culture in an increasingly networked global research environment; the lack of women, foreign researchers, and youth interest in STI fields; the social disconnect and distrust of STI in the wake of the Fukushima nuclear disaster and ethics violations by researchers; and broader challenges facing Japan such as population decline and an ageing society. Also noted was the inefficient utilization of industry-university-government collaboration, with one document highlighting the threat that if Japanese academia was unable to compete and attract industry for collaborative opportunities, Japanese companies would end up collaborating with foreign universities instead. The seriousness of this trend is evidenced in a somewhat dated slide from a presentation by the Ministry of Education on University-Industry Collaboration:

Figure 6.1: Investment for research and development goes overseas – payment recipient of research and development cost



Source: (MEXT, 2011).

The above figure shows that over a 19-year period, investment in research by Japanese firms that went to domestic universities rose by 151% with a compound annual growth rate of 4.88%. However, this same period saw Japanese firms increasingly investing in research laboratories overseas, with an overall rise of 615% (and an annual growth rate of 10.91%) over the same period. Clearly, the global marketplace for STI research is itself highly competitive. In this context, CSTI views it as essential that Japanese universities learn to overcome their outdated approaches, adapt and succeed in the areas of innovation, collaboration with industry, and global competitiveness for the benefit of the nation. As such, the CSTI documents encouraged Japanese universities to adopt new models of knowledge creation that were open, flexible, competitive, cooperative and cross-disciplinary, aligning with emergent models of Mode 2 knowledge production found in other developed countries (and discussed in Chapter 2).

CSTI is a relatively new governmental stakeholder in Japan involved in STI and higher education, with direct ties to the political ambitions of the Prime Minister. Two other long-established key players at the governmental level in Japan are the funding bodies of the two programs under study in this project. CAMPUS Asia has been funded and managed by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport, Science and Technology (MEXT), whereas A3 Foresight has been supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS). JSPS has also played an evaluative role for CAMPUS Asia. The ideas driving regional cooperation at these two agencies are described in turn below.

The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (alternatively known as the Ministry of Education, MEXT, or *Monkasho*) is the primary organization responsible for governing education in Japan, including approving curricula for public schools across the country[37], and providing funding and steering to its national, public, and private universities. Among other bureaus dedicated to areas such as Sports and Cultural Affairs, MEXT has three bureaus focused on Science and Technology (S&T Policy, Research Promotion, and R&D) and three focused on Education (Lifelong Learning Policy, Elementary and Secondary Education, and Higher Education). With regard to higher education,

> MEXT grants permission for the establishment of universities, junior colleges, and colleges of technology; assures the quality of education through teacher

[37] Textbook screening and censorship by MEXT, particularly regarding school history textbooks that have purportedly whitewashed Japan's role in WWII, have sparked domestic and international controversies over the years. In 2002, the right-wing nationalist 'Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform', or *Tsukurukai,* published the *New History Textbook,* which cut back or removed completely many references to Japan's wartime atrocities (Selden & Nozaki, 2009). Despite public protests in Japan, China and Korea, MEXT approved the textbook for use in schools (although very few schools actually adopted the book). This right-wing group has purportedly developed strong ties with the LDP and nationalist politicians like Prime Minister Abe, who have placed pressure on MEXT to permit history textbook revisions that omit 'masochistic' views of Japanese history and promote in youth 'a sense of pride in Japan's past' (Koide, 2014).

> evaluations; supports university education reform; and fosters the development of high-level professionals. At the same time, MEXT performs administration for the selection of student admission, student support, internationalization of universities and foreign student exchanges, and the invigoration of incorporated national universities. In addition, it promotes private schools through tax incentives, subsidies and administrative guidance and advice (MEXT, 2019).

MEXT manages and funds a range of programs for Japan's higher education sector, including CAMPUS Asia and a variety of other initiatives for internationalization. 14 different policy documents were analyzed from MEXT. Most were directly related to CAMPUS Asia or trilateral education cooperation in Northeast Asia, while a few focused on broader strategies for education policy in Japan. The dominant ideas that emerged from these documents are presented below.

(Global) human resources: a contested idea

The discourse of '*mutual understanding*' was once again evident in the documents, as was the emphasis on '*quality assurance'* for Japan's domestic and international education programs. However, the dominant theme that emerged from MEXT was an emphasis placed on the importance of *human resources*, a term that was often prefaced by the word 'global'. The term 'global human resources' (or *gurōbaru jinzai* in Japanese), has become frequently used in recent years in government policies and the discourse of the higher education sector, the business community, and Japanese society at large (Yonezawa, 2014; Yoshida, 2017). In a 2010 report published jointly by MEXT and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Investment (METI), 'global human resources' are defined as possessing:

- Communication ability in foreign languages (particularly English)
- Ability to understand and take advantage of different cultures, including:
    - An awareness of different values and communication methods
    - A non-judgmental perspective and an interest in other cultures
    - Abilities to utilize the strengths found in cultural difference to create value through synergy
- 'Fundamental Competencies for Working Persons', including:

- Ability to be proactive and persistent
- Ability to plan, solve problems, and think creatively
- Ability to work well with others (adapted from Yonezawa, 2014, p. 38)

In 2011, the Cabinet Office of the Prime Minister established a cross-ministerial 'Council on Promotion of Human Resource for Globalization Development', and in 2012, the Council released a report with a more simplified definition of *gurōbaru jinzai.* They would now possess:

- Linguistic and communication skills
- Self-direction and positiveness, a spirit for challenge, cooperativeness and flexibility, a sense of responsibility and mission
- Understanding of other cultures and **a sense of identity as a Japanese** (Yonezawa, 2014, p. 39)

A notable inclusion in this second definition is the notion of having a 'Japanese identity'. Yonezawa suggests that this concept was stressed in the Cabinet's Council report, and the discourse of *gurōbaru jinzai* has been framed by the government as being bound up with the national, economic, and social development of Japan (ibid). The infusion of nationalist ideas into the government's internationalization policies is not new, and has been criticized by a number of scholars. As was discussed in Chapter 2, some argue that the traditional aim of Japan's internationalization strategy has been to "reinforce the idea of Japanese as being different from all other people and for that difference to be properly understood outside Japan" (Goodman, 2007, p. 72), while others point out that the monocultural emphasis on 'Japanese identity' in Japan's attempts to internationalize overlooks the multi-cultural nature Japanese society (Horie, 2002). The above definition of global human resources appears consistent with these critiques.

However, in contrast to the Cabinet's ideas, in a 2010 document published by MEXT entitled, 'The Concept of Global Human Resource Development Focusing on the East Asian Region', the importance of national identity is downplayed in favor of a normative

idea of economic and social integration in the East Asian region. For universities in particular, the notion of nationality may become 'meaningless' in the near future:

> Japan, and other countries in the East Asian region have a long history of exchanges in diverse fields such as academics and culture. In recent years, the integration between the Japanese economy and other economies in the East Asian region is increasingly strengthened...Thanks to these movements, it is considered that closer relationships will be built in relation to education and training systems, certification of learning knowledge and skills, recruitment and treatment in corporations, and so on, and that the future social system within the East Asian region will develop in closer coordination...Under these circumstances, from the viewpoint of concerned parties in corporations, etc., **it is expected that the barrier between internal demand and external demand will be significantly lowered and that recruitment and training of human resources, which are free from nationality, will be promoted**.
>
> These rapid developments will bring significant changes into university education. **For universities, the distinction by nationality of students may be relatively meaningless, thanks to the increased mobility of students within the entire East Asian region.** As a result, the fostering of human resources that have both world-class specialized knowledge and global communication skills will be emphasized, and the focus will be on mastering systematic knowledge and skills, which are expected of an academic degree and for what one becomes capable of (MEXT A, 2010).

The above paragraphs conceptualize Japan's *gurōbaru jinzai* as mobile, 'East Asian' students with expert specialized knowledge and global communication skills capable of fulfilling the demands of an increasingly integrated regional economy. However, it may be the case that this document (as evidenced by the date of publication in 2010) may simply mirror the political ambitions of the DPJ government at that time. Also noteworthy is that while the above paragraphs describe a future for Japan and its universities that is unconcerned with cultivating Japanese national identities, another statement from the same document highlights the urgency for the nation to develop *gurōbaru jinzai* in the context of international regional competition:

> Students will be able to enjoy broader courses of career opportunities in the East Asian region, where economic activities are rapidly integrated, by acquiring

> knowledge and skills such as abilities to understand diversity as his/her own issues, abilities to comprehend events from a diversified point of view, and communication abilities,... **Especially, as young students of the same generation in this region, including China and South Korea, are actively gaining overseas experience and improving their abilities, it becomes increasingly important and valuable to gain experience and abilities that can be the basis for competition and cooperation with these young foreign students** (MEXT A, 2010).

Here the idea of Japan's human resources is framed in national terms (although not necessarily *ethnic-nationality*) in the context of competition with neighboring China and Korea. Also evident in the above quote is the connected concept of *employability*, which presented itself frequently in the MEXT documents in conjunction with the global human resources discourse. However, the use of the term *human resources* was not always used solely in economic terms. In a number of instances, the idea of creating *gurōbaru jinzai* was for the purposes of contributing to "global peace and prosperity in the shared spirit of community as close neighbors" (MEXT H, 2015), or to "human resources that can proactively contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world" (MEXT G, 2014). The idea of *gurōbaru jinzai* for peace has also been adopted by The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who fund a program run jointly by the Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center (HPC) and the United Nations Volunteers (UNV) program called 'The Program for Global Human Resource Development for Peacebuilding and Development'. This program is focused on developing "experts who will confront and tackle the global challenges that plague the world today", including "conflict, poverty, refugees, and diseases, in addition to many other political, economic, and social issues" (Hiroshima Peacebuilders Center, 2016).

Based on these varied interpretations of the term, the notion of 'global human resources' is clearly an umbrella concept that can be repurposed in different ways by different actors. This repurposing became clear in a number of the participant interviews as well, who felt

obliged to use the term to refer to students in their applications for CAMPUS Asia funding but had very different ideas about the goals of their respective programs.

Exchange and cooperation with quality assurance

Another idea that emerged was the cognitive understanding that the government was an essential actor needed to mobilize universities and help them achieve their goals:

> This working group expects that universities in Japan proactively develop interuniversity exchanges within the East Asian region. On the other hand, owing to the globalization of university education, every country is competing with others and taking actions to strategically accept competent foreign students and to promote active dispatching of its own students overseas. Therefore, the national government and related organizations, industries, etc. are required to provide support with a sense of speed and the mind of collaboration. (MEXT A, 2010).

In addition to funding, this 'support' from the national government and related organizations was often framed in the context of *quality assurance*. This theme was especially dominant in the documents of the external monitoring organization NIAD-QE (or simply NIAD), who were in charge of assessing the quality assurance of the CAMPUS Asia program. As such, the implications of this idea will be discussed in more detail in the section on NIAD. However, a few insights into the concept were also provided by analysis of the MEXT documents. One interview question that I asked participants about the two programs was *"Why do you think China, Japan, and South Korea were selected as countries for CA/A3? Why these three countries in particular, and not others?"* This question would often elicit varied and interesting responses. Here MEXT gives a very practical answer involving quality assurance:

> While it is ultimately desirable that some kind of quality assurance framework will be developed for the entire East Asian region from the standpoint of continued integration of the East Asian economy and society, it is conceived that Japan, China, and South Korea, which are neighboring countries and have relatively high commonality with each other in terms of the university system and university quality assurance system, will first examine at a certain level the framework of interuniversity exchanges with quality assurance, such as credit transfer and grading

> policy, and that the results of such examination will be shared through dialogue with ASEAN, etc., taking into account the accomplishments of interuniversity exchanges such as the ASEAN University Network （AUN and Southeast Asia Engineering Education Development Network (SEED-Net) (MEXT A, 2010).

At the time of publication of the above document, the vision of an East Asian Community was still intact. While ideas of CAMPUS Asia expanding to incorporate ASEAN member countries persists, the feasibility of this endeavour has become a disputed topic. Nevertheless, above it is clear that one of the rationales for starting with China, Japan and Korea was the perceived consistency in their higher education systems and policies. Participant interviews have revealed that this consistency is more perception than reality, but the ideal of quality assurance through credit transfer, grading policy and the establishment of dual and joint degrees remains a persistent goal for a variety of stakeholders.

The Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

Another organization that works in conjunction with MEXT is the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS or *Gakushin*). JSPS "is an independent administrative institution, established … for the purpose of contributing to the advancement of science in all fields of the natural and social sciences and the humanities" (JSPS, n.d.). Funded by annual subsidies from the Japanese government, JSPS's main functions include awarding competitive grants for scientific research, fostering the development of young researchers, promoting international research collaboration, supporting links between academia and industry, and information dissemination (JSPS, n.d.-c).

JSPS is well known in academic circles in Japan because of the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (or *KAKENHI)* system, which accounts for over 50% of competitive research

funding in Japan (JSPS A, 2017, p. 4) Universities and departments frequently encourage (and sometimes require, according to one interview participant) researchers to apply each year for KAKENHI grants.

The organization is also responsible for funding the A3 Foresight Program (JSPS A, 2017). JSPS was contacted but denied a request for interviews, and the documents available from this organization were relatively limited to brief descriptions and FAQs about the program for potential funding applications on the organization's website. One comprehensive 68-page brochure detailing JSPS's functions was included in the analysis, however, and it proved to offer some valuable insights into the ideas driving the organization. Also available on the JSPS website (in Japanese) were annual and summative reports submitted by researchers participating in A3 projects *to* JSPS. While the content of these reports reflects the perspectives of the actors involved in the A3 projects at various universities, the formatting of the report templates provides a window into the ideas and expectations JSPS has for A3 project outcomes. The reports were formatted so that researchers could document both published and unpublished academic achievements, the training and development of junior researchers, the construction of a cooperative research system among the three countries, contributions to society, and unexpected achievements. Another section for issues/challenges associated with the project and prospects for further research allowed for reflection on barriers that impeded the attainment of project objectives as well as opportunities for the future[38].

[38] These 14 annual reports were analysed in depth for another inter-related project. For a more detailed analysis of A3 project outcomes, see Hammond (2019) (discussed also in Chapter 3).

The JSPS brochure described the mission of JSPS as being defined by four pillars. They are :

> (1) Creating Diverse World Level Knowledge;
> (2) Building Robust International Cooperative Networks;
> (3) Fostering the Next Generation while Enhancing the Education and Research Functions of Universities; and
> (4) Building Evidence-Based Science-Promotion Systems and Strengthening Linkage with Society (JSPS A, 2017, p. 1).

The JSPS document that was analyzed pointed to a notably different ethos compared to the other governmental organizations that were investigated. The unique themes that emerged are discussed below.

Cultivating young researchers in a spirit of cooperation

Throughout the 68-page booklet repeated references were made to the development of 'young researchers' (71 instances) and fostering the 'next generation' (21 instances). The term 'human resources', by contrast, only appeared once. While a future generation of scientists could arguably be categorized as human resources essential for Japan's future economic development (as indeed it was in the CSTI Basic Plans), or repurposed for social and global causes as it has been by MEXT and MOFA, emphasis on a human resources discourse was not evident in the JSPS document. Surprisingly, the term 'economy' (and its collocations) was completely absent from the document. The term 'cooperation' and its stemmed words appeared 77 times, while 'competition', by contrast, appeared only 15 times. Unlike CSTI with its emphasis on competitiveness and MEXT with its focus on human resources, JSPS appears to have quite different ideas about the social functions of knowledge creation.

International cooperative research

The idea of cooperation was often framed in international context, emphasizing the importance of international cooperative research networks. JSPS thus supports a diverse array of international joint research projects and seminars, researcher exchanges, research collaborations with scientists in developing countries, and cooperation with similar research councils in a range of countries. One such collaboration among Japan, China and Korea, called the 'Heads of Research Councils in Asia (A-HORCs), is responsible for the establishment of the A3 Foresight Program. The brochure describes the role of the A-HORCs as follows:

> To promote high-level research activities in Asia with Japan, China and Korea at their core, the heads of leading science-promotion agencies in the three countries meet annually to discuss face-to-face S&T policy trends and the state of international collaboration in their respective countries. Initially proposed by JSPS, these meetings have been held each year from 2003. Discussions in them have yielded various tangible outcomes including the establishment of the "A3 Foresight Program" and "Northeastern Asian Symposiums," jointly implemented by JSPS and its partner agencies in China and Korea. (JSPS A, 2017, p. 24)

The A3 Foresight Program was introduced in the section of the brochure concerning "Building Robust International Cooperative Networks" with the following description, which varies slightly from the description on the JSPS website:

> JSPS, the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) work as a consortium in supporting trilateral research projects that advance research on both a global level and on common regional issues while working to foster talented young researchers. Ultimately, the program aims to build world-standard research and education hubs with Japan, China and Korea at their core in the Asian region (JSPS A, 2017, p. 24).

The ideas of regional cooperation in Northeast Asia from the perspective of JSPS appear to resonate with its broader normative position regarding the value of international cooperative research and knowledge creation. In this instance, the knowledge created should contribute to solving problems facing the region, and also have global applicability.

In the one instance where the term ‘human resources’ did appear in the document it was actually in reference to the Inter-University Exchange Project, which houses the CAMPUS Asia Program. JSPS has also had a role in evaluating applications for CAMPUS Asia under the umbrella of the Inter-University Exchange Project. The quote describing the Project has a familiar tone that repeats itself in documents across agencies at the governmental level:

> This program gives focused funding to projects that form higher-education networks and linkages with strategically important countries and regions. In doing so, it seeks to strengthen the global development capacity of Japanese universities while fostering excellent human resources who will play an active role on the global stage. While building an internationally recognized system of high-quality university education in Japan, the program supports projects that advance the international exchange of excellent Japanese students and the strategic acceptance of overseas students. A program committee established within JSPS screens applications and evaluates projects (JSPS A, 2017, p. 45).

JSPS has a stated commitment to not only advancement in the natural sciences but also in the social sciences and humanities. As the organization has been involved in screening applications for CAMPUS Asia funding, this may connect to the fact that the various CAMPUS programs span a wide range of disciplines, including those in the humanities and social sciences. JSPS has also been involved in providing graded mid-term evaluations of the CAMPUS Asia programs, the results of which are made public (Breaden, 2018). In this respect JSPS has a powerful role in determining the perceived ‘success’ of the various CAMPUS Asia programs in Japan.

The National Institution for Academic Degrees and Quality Enhancement of Higher Education

The final organization whose documents were analyzed was another agency with an evaluative role in ‘monitoring’ the CAMPUS Asia program, called the National Institution for Academic Degrees and Quality Enhancement of Higher Education (NIAD-QE, also referred to simply as NIAD). Key themes from six documents are presented below.

According to the NIAD website, the organization is "an incorporated administrative agency created in 2016... [that] supports efforts to improve the quality of higher education in Japan with the goal of contributing to the development of Japanese higher education through the following roles:

1. Evaluation and accreditation of higher education institutions
2. Awarding of Academic Degrees
3. Cooperation in Quality Assurance
4. Research Activities
5. Loans and Grants for Facility Construction" (NIAD-QE, n.d.)

Measuring 'quality'

In its capacity regarding the CAMPUS Asia program, NIAD has the following role in 'monitoring' for quality assurance by identifying 'good practices', rather than evaluation:

> 'CAMPUS Asia' monitoring looks at the 'CAMPUS Asia' pilot programs as case studies... Monitoring is being conducted not as an evaluation to confirm that a program has the minimum quality but rather to ascertain the current state of transnational programs and their quality enhancement initiatives with the aim of identifying good practices from the standpoint of educational quality and promoting those good practices throughout the higher education community (NIAD C, 2014).

To measure (or 'monitor') quality, NIAD recruited the expertise of a range of academics to assess quality across seven different criteria, and also collected the input from program administrators and participating students on two occasions during the pilot phase of CAMPUS Asia. The seven criteria that were monitored were:

- Criterion 1: Goals of Academic Program
- Criterion 2: Teaching and Learning
  - Criterion 2-1 ： Organization and Staff
  - Criterion 2-2: Contents of Academic Program
  - Criterion 2-3: Support for Learning and Living
  - Criterion 2-4: Credit Transfer and Grading System
- Criterion 3: Learning Outcomes
- Criterion 4: Internal Quality Assurance System (NIAD B, 2013).

While the stated aims of CAMPUS Asia often contain the normative ideas of cultivating mutual understanding, global human resources and addressing global problems, these lofty and somewhat ambiguous goals are absent in NIAD's criteria for assessment of program success. Instead, more measurable, practical concerns related to organization, governance and student satisfaction were utilized to assess program 'quality'. Interestingly, NIAD itself took a notably economic orientation when describing CAMPUS Asia, noting that the aim of the program

> is not only to encourage exchange among universities but also to translate that into stimulation of economic activity and to create a platform for personnel exchanges. The designation 'CAMPUS Asia' symbolizes the concept of making all of Asia into a campus and denotes the expectation of developing human resources with a region-wide outlook in the three countries and the hope of contributing to the creation of an Asian community (NIAD C, 2014).

What this 'Asian community' would entail was not evident from the documents, but the contextualized rhetoric of stimulating economic activity in the region pointed to the common themes of economic interdependence and human resource development evident in many of the government-level documents. The idea that these human resources would have a *region-wide outlook* rather than being *gurōbaru jinzai* is perhaps noteworthy, although this was not a claim that was made with any frequency in the NIAD documents. One area in which NIAD's economic orientation may have had particular impact was in the 'Examples of Good Practices' guidance documents provided to participating universities to conduct their own self-assessment reports based on the seven criteria. For Criterion 1: 'Goals of Academic Program', for which the sub-heading states "Are the goals for the transnational collaborative program clearly articulated and shared among participating institutions in the three countries?", NIAD provides the following examples of what it defines as 'good practices':

a) Societal and academic needs for **fostering excellent human resources** (e.g., the need for **global talent within East Asia**) are articulated in the program goals

b) The educational contents are configured in line with expected learning outcomes (e.g., student knowledge, skills, attitudes) - such as a need for **global talent within East Asia**, and have been systematically analyzed by the institution.
c) It is clear that through international collaboration, the program adds value to education in the participating institutions and enhances their **international competitiveness**. (NIAD C, 2014).

As the above was provided as 'guidance' to universities participating in the CAMPUS Asia pilot program, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Self-Analysis Reports[39] made by university administrators also made frequent reference to promoting human resources and augmenting international competitiveness.

Summary

To summarize the above analysis, the five government organizations all generally espoused the common themes of *mutual understanding, human resource development, economic interdependence, quality assurance* and *competitiveness* when making references to the goals of higher education and/or STI in the context of the Northeast Asian region. These terms were interpreted differently and emphasized at varying degrees however, and frequently evidence emerged that the different organizations embodied different philosophies. The TCS, by its very nature, is focused on achieving economic, political and social cooperation among the three countries, although the underlying motives for achieving this cooperation are arguably as varied as the diverse stakeholders that comprise the organization. CSTI, by contrast, is primarily focused on Japan's competitiveness in the STI fields, and sees cross-border cooperation and STI diplomacy as tools to augment this competitiveness, not only in economic but also in political terms. Human resources must also be developed to achieve this end. The remit of CSTI in 'overlooking' all STI policy in

[39] The Self-Analysis Reports provided by participating universities to NIAD were included as appendices in the document NIAD C 2014, entitled *'CAMPUS Asia' Monitoring on Quality Assurance – Collaboration among Japan, China and Korea-Overview of the First Monitoring in Japan.* See Appendix A for the reference.

Japan has placed it in a powerful position with regard to the steering of higher education, a role that entails inherent tensions with MEXT. MEXT, too, sees education and regional cooperation as mechanisms to produce global human resources, although the organization adopts a more flexible and arguably less nationalistic definition of the term than that posed by the Council of the Prime Minister. However, the date of publication of the document that was analyzed that suggests this precedes the current LDP administration, and thus this may be a relatively weak claim. MEXT has certainly bowed to pressures from the Cabinet office in other matters such as school textbook revisions, and may be in a weakened position to influence policy now that it shares responsibilities for higher education with CSTI. JSPS appears to have the most unique view of government agencies surveyed, valuing knowledge creation and collaboration for its potential to advance human societies and solve global and regional problems with little reference to the 'economy' or notions of competitiveness. However, it may be unwise to make such claims with authority considering the comparatively small number of documents from JSPS that were analyzed. As the agency responsible for determining 'quality' in educational cooperation, the NIAD documents further reinforced the dominance of the five themes. While advocating for the lofty goals of mutual understanding, the agency appeared to judge the quality of the CAMPUS Asia programs in practice from an economic perspective by the degree to which they successfully produced 'global talent'.

Also evident from the analysis of documents spanning a 20-year period was the potential for developments in the economic and political arenas to influence policies for regional cooperation in STI and higher education. Most notable was the de-emphasis on creating an East Asian Community which aligned with changes in power and political orientation in Japan. There were also subtle shifts in the discourse of Science and Technology, as growing

global competition (including increasing collaboration of industry with universities overseas) coincided with increased calls for the practical application of knowledge and for Japanese universities to contribute to innovation. While tracking these changes over time was not the main purpose of the analysis, it was a valuable finding to realize that the ideas at the government level during the conception and implementation of A3 and CAMPUS Asia have not been static, but have evolved over time in response to external forces and domestic political change. In addition to change over time, the 'government' is clearly not a monolithic entity with a clear consensus about its policy ideas and interests. Various organizations will have their own ideas that at times conflict with those of others. This fact became more apparent through interviewing two government officials from different agencies, and highlighted the importance of ideas of individual actors involved in shaping processes of regional cooperation. The ideas of these actors are presented in the second part of this chapter, below.

Part 2: Analysis of government interviews

Two interviews were conducted with government officials. The first was with a senior administrator from the MEXT's Higher Education Bureau who was closely involved with the CAMPUS Asia Program. The second was with a senior administrator and academic who was involved with CAMPUS Asia monitoring at NIAD-QE. The circumstances under which the two interviews were conducted differed greatly, as did the resultant content. As both are relevant to the cognitive and normative ideas presented by the participants, they are described below.

The MEXT interview

The interview with the MEXT official took place at the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Building in the bustling Chiyoda ward of downtown Tokyo. MEXT is situated amidst other government ministries, the National Diet, the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister's official residence, and the Imperial Palace of the Emperor. I arrived early and was asked to complete an entry form describing the purpose of my visit and with whom I would be meeting. After submitting this document I received a security pass and took the elevator to the 14th floor, where I encountered a hallway with identical, non-descript doors. I eventually found the correct office and met my interview participant, who offered me a beverage. We returned to the hallway and walked down the corridor to a vending machine adjacent to a large window that overlooked the government district. The administrator pointed out the Ministry of Finance building across the street and a number of other government agencies within view. We then returned to his communal work area to begin the interview.

The participant was hesitant to be recorded, and requested that I not use an interview transcript for my research but instead write up a 'case note' report that summarized our discussion. I offered to record the interview just for the purpose of accurately writing up the report, then deleting the audio recording afterward. The administrator agreed to this. The interview proceeded smoothly. The administrator had requested I send my interview questions in advance of our meeting, and he had prepared typed responses to these questions. As with all of the interviews I conducted, I often asked additional probing questions when interesting topics or opinions were mentioned by participants. The administrator understood English well, but answered all questions I asked (in both languages) in Japanese. The interview lasted about an hour.

Afterwards I used the audio recording this to write up the case note report. I sent this report back to the administrator for approval, and asked him to make any changes or additions he saw necessary. I received no reply from him, and began to worry that I may not be able to use the data from this very informative interview. After sending a few follow up emails over the course of several weeks, he replied and asked me to come to the MEXT building again in person.

We met in the same office, and I noticed the case note report on the meeting room table with a number of comments written on it. The administrator explained that the report was very good, but wondered if I might make a few changes to various sentences. By the end of the meeting, the report had been edited so that virtually all of the opinions offered by the administrator that differed from MEXT's official policy discourse had been removed. Below are some excerpts from the approved case note report.

> CAMPUS Asia (CA) was described as a program in the field of Higher Education, whereby students from China, Japan and South Korea can participate in exchanges for the purpose of developing mutual understanding and the capacity for being active in the global society. The hope is that by participating in these exchanges while still young, program participants can help contribute to continued friendship, peace and stability in the wider Asian region in the future. Through gaining an understanding of the region and an understanding of one another, combined with the aim of developing CA participants as 'global human resources', the program can contribute to improving regional cooperation, which will in turn help to strengthen the region's global competitiveness. The notion of competitiveness is that of improving the competitiveness of the East Asian region among other regions in the world. (MEXT interview case note report)

In line with the dominant themes from the government documents, ideas of *mutual understanding, global human resources,* and *competitiveness* are evident in the above statement. Interestingly, this version of competitiveness is not one of Japan as a globally

competitive nation but instead has a regional orientation; one of a competitive East Asia capable of competing with other world regions. The administrator also spoke about the political tensions between the three countries, and how these generally did not impede the progress of regional educational cooperation. The challenges that did arise were related more to administrative matters such as communication challenges between the three countries:

> Although tensions at the diplomatic/political level persist, these did not seem to have a noticeable effect on program development and implementation. Although the Hatoyama government has now been replaced by the LDP, and the idea of an East Asian Community is less feasible today than in 2010 when the CAMPUS Asia program was launched, those responsible for implementing and evaluating the program (e.g. universities, quality assurance institutions, industries and so on) are still committed to continuing and expanding the program.
>
> With regard to any challenges with respect to the development, implementation, or evaluation of the program, the only challenge experienced thus far was that of occasional administrative difficulties between the three countries because of language barriers. Cooperation between the three countries for student exchanges also requires cooperation among program administrators. As the languages of each country are different, the common mode of communication is English, often via e-mail or the internet, which has at times led to some communication challenges. The participant recognized the value and importance of face-to-face communication and interaction, which is one of the important aspects of the conferences of experts. (MEXT interview case note report).

Considering the fact that the approved report differed very little from the official policy rhetoric of MEXT, there is little that can be said about the personal views of this particular actor. While they were indeed shared in the initial interview, due to ethical considerations and the request of the participant, these views cannot be included in the thesis.

If any message can be gleaned from this, it may be that the Ministry of Education, as a political entity and governmental organization, is quite different in nature from the universities over which they exercise control. Whereas academics at universities in Japan

(at least those who have tenure) in principle have the right to academic freedom and can speak critically about any given topic, administrators at MEXT (at least the one I interviewed) did not appear comfortable doing so.

The NIAD-QE interview

The interview with the official from NIAD was quite different from the experience of interviewing the administrator from MEXT. As a social sciences academic and former faculty member of a Japanese national university, the participant was keen to candidly discuss global and regional politics, history and issues pertaining to Japanese higher education. The NIAD offices were located in a suburb about an hour outside of downtown Tokyo, situated in a modern building in the middle of a branch campus of Hitotsubashi University. Aside from the NIAD offices and some international student dormitories, the campus was no longer in use. At the time of my visit the campus was completely vacant of people, which gave it the surreal feeling of being abandoned.

Excerpts from the interview are provided below. The professor had exceptional English abilities and was a very adept speaker, modulating his voice at key moments to emphasize points and express his opinions. These rhythms and emphases are difficult to reproduce in disembodied quotes, but where helpful, certain words are italicized to highlight important points of emphasis. Where useful for comprehension, the questions I asked precede the professor's comments (and are also in italics).

The professor and I discussed some of the key policy ideas that both NIAD and the other government agencies consistently espoused about the CAMPUS Asia program. In

particular, he shared his views on the meaning and value of ‘quality assurance’, as well as his interpretation of ‘mutual understanding’:

Can you tell me what quality assurance means and why it's so important?

> Generally, cooperation, educational cooperation without quality assurance is quite meaningless...Not just the cooperation but education *itself* without quality assurance is quite meaningless. So it's quite natural to think of the quality assurance also about international collaborative projects…
>
> ...In judging quality we're focusing on individual projects or engagements, not so much a level or standard of the quality itself, because it's hard to grasp. And particularly this project is an international one so cooperation with Chinese and Koreans and each country has its own understanding of the quality of standards, something like that, right? So to breach the differences among these countries, it's a reasonable way to focus on the individual engagements or indeed, the individual project, individual activities. So not quality of standards per se, but rather focusing on … good practices.

The notion that quality assurance and monitoring of education by external organizations are essential to education, and education is ‘meaningless’ without it highlights the degree to which the normative ideas of the ‘audit society’ have become reified in this participant’s worldview. The professor’s description of quality assurance aligns with the NIAD documents, but it still left me wondering what ‘quality’ actually meant. While there may have been no agreed upon standard or benchmark of quality, those monitoring the CAMPUS Asia programs still made judgements based on their own, perhaps unarticulated, criteria of what ‘good quality’ or ‘good practices’ means. The professor went on to explain that when assessing the quality of programs an important component is the feedback and ‘self-reporting’ of program administrators and participating students. In this sense, ‘quality’ is determined by the perceptions of participants of ‘what worked well’ in their respective programs, which are then shared as ‘good practices’ with other participating universities. As was pointed out above, the NIAD guidance notes had within them strong connotations that good practices were tied in with the production of human resources and ‘global talent’,

and these terms were often repeated in the self-reporting assessments by universities (NIAD C, 2014). This made me wonder to what degree the self-reporting by universities involved simply telling NIAD what they wanted to hear, and highlighted how NIAD may be involved in shaping the ideas of what 'successful' regional education cooperation looks like. The professor did not expound further on this topic, however.

With regard to the mutual understanding discourse, the professor mentioned the term before I had the chance to bring it up. It emerged when I began to ask the following question:

What in your mind, are the issues in the region that CAMPUS Asia is supposed to address? What should CAMPUS Asia graduates be able to…

> Mutual understanding, in a sense. Of course, it's quite valuable to have some results in cooperation in research and teaching too - of course, but now generally, or more *profoundly* I would say, mutual understanding between three nations, that was the target I think, the agreement, and this… generally I don't agree with the Democrats but in this I agree with them completely. And despite the political confrontations and sometimes physical confrontations too, we badly need mutual understanding for the sake of peace and stability in this region, and it is the basis surely... and in the coming generation, *if* the coming generation in each of the three nations have a deeper understanding about the others, then the situation in this region will be okay.

I asked you what 'quality' is. What is 'mutual understanding'? What does that mean exactly?

[In response to this prompt the professor did not offer a definition of the term, but instead told an impactful personal story]:

> For example I've been in Europe, in Germany many times. I know a lot about the Germans and Europeans, their history, their culture, their everyday life. But, *to my shame*, I have so little idea about Chinese and Koreans and I must confess, it was, my first time in Korea was about 15 years ago and in Seoul I have to admit what I didn't know, what I had known about Korea was *so little*. It's really a big shame for me. And more or less the same is true of the Japanese people. And the Koreans and the Chinese are a bit better because now for example in the realm of pop culture Japanese things are very popular among them in the East Asian countries so they know more about Japan but the other way around?...[exasperated shrug].

Here the professor touched on an issue that I argue has important ramifications for the CAMPUS Asia program and the possibilities for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia more broadly. Many administrators described the challenges of marketing the CAMPUS Asia program on their campuses, and recruiting their assigned quotas of Japanese students. It was generally less difficult to attract Chinese and Korean students to participate in the various CAMPUS Asia programs. Japanese students, when they do study abroad, tend to choose to study in Anglo-sphere countries such as the USA, UK, Australia and New Zealand. Despite a primary barrier to choosing to study abroad being the prohibitive costs (which could be partially mitigated by choosing to study in a neighboring country with a lower cost of living like Korea or China), Japanese students overwhelmingly choose to study in the West. The professor may have touched on an underlying cause with the above statement; Japanese students, and the general public at large, generally to not have an understanding or interest in their immediate neighbors in East Asia. This theme is revisited in later chapters.

Without first having a basic understanding of one's neighbors, it would arguably be impossible to recognize similarities and differences in culture, language and ways of thinking. In this sense perhaps it is reasonable that cultivating mutual understanding is a preferred aim to developing a common regional identity, which might not be considered feasible. Levels of interest, at least with certain pockets of the Japanese population, may be changing however. Korea, with its recent global tsunami of pop-cultural soft power known as Hallyu (or the Korean Wave), is arguably creating major shifts in this traditional lack of interest, especially among Japanese youth. Nevertheless, why it has taken a profusion of K-pop stars to spark this interest in Japan's neighbor (China still has yet to ignite a similar level of interest) is an important question.

A related element of the professor's comment above was his referral to the group of people he termed 'Europeans'. While the professor expressed confidence in knowing a lot about 'Europeans', at no point in our conversation did he allude an equivalent group of 'East Asians' in reference to the peoples from the three countries. In fact, at another point in the conversation he explained why East Asia could never become like Europe:

> When you think of regionalism then you surely automatically think of Europe as a model. And the big difference between Europe and East Asia is Europe was an entity in a sense in the post-War time, because now between the Soviet Union and America, Europe had a strong sense of crisis. They are now declining. But now this consciousness and awareness of the crisis, we don't have it in East Asia, I think. Rather, China is now rising, and Japan is now declining a bit and in the East, the hegemon of the United States is there. So such a geographical or geopolitical entity as 'East Asia', it doesn't exist.

For the professor, the lack of recognition of 'East Asia' as an 'entity' and source of identity stems from the different geographical, political and economic circumstances driving the development and international relations of the three countries with one another, and with other key regional players. Importantly, it is the lack of a sense of 'crisis' that translates to a disinterest in working towards integration. This lack of a sense of crisis is arguably felt at different degrees by the three different countries. China, in particular, has seen unparalleled economic growth in the past few decades, and may see no reason to form an integrated regional entity with its neighbors. Korea may be more motivated, as are other small and medium-sized countries, who by forming a larger regional bloc may be able to counter-balance the destabilizing rise of China (ASEAN is one example of this). As indicated by the professor, the presence of the United States also plays a critical role in the regional balance of power. Both Japan and Korea have a strong ally in the USA, which has made concerted efforts in the past to block attempts at forming East Asian agreements and alliances that exclude it (or include China) (Jacques, 2012).

This varied level of interest in broader regional cooperation among the three countries was evident at the micro-level in the professor's comments about the differing levels 'eagerness' to participate in the CAMPUS Asia program:

> if I may add the eagerness of the three parties, if I may say so are a bit different from country to country. And some are quite eager, positive and active, but the others are … OK.

Confirming what I had heard from other interviewees, the professor explained that China was the partner that tended to show less commitment and eagerness to the vision of CAMPUS Asia. I asked his opinion on other issues related to China that had emerged in the news around that time, such as the crackdowns on academic freedom and whether this increasingly constrained environment might have an impact on the program. Connecting the two topics of lack of eagerness/willingness to compromise and a growing 'assertiveness' in CCP rule, the professor responded:

> I personally think it will be a bit harder to find agreement in how to harmonize our different institutions, among the countries.... Everyone should make an attempt because there must be a compromise... But if the Chinese remain assertive, they will not make a compromise, they will only say that is our way of doing things and if you like it then you can adapt yourself to it...

[with regard to the crackdowns on academic freedom, he mentioned]:

> so far I haven't seen any signs of this future possible problem but I personally guess that it might become a bit difficult... and so far, yeah. Koreans are quite eager, Japanese more eager, but Chinese are quite complacent in doing the business in CAMPUS Asia, already now we have a bit of difficulties with them. So the difficulties will not will not be eased with this policy in Beijing.

In addition to the difficulties with China, the professor mentioned a range of perceived barriers to program success and regional cooperation more broadly. Regarding CAMPUS Asia, he noted that practical realities, such as the different academic calendars in the three countries, posed a challenge to effective harmonization of the curricula. These and other

administrative challenges, coupled with cultural differences led to program outcomes that for the professor failed to measure up to the stated goals of the program. In addition to these practical challenges, I was interested in learning how the professor perceived the shifting political and diplomatic contexts and their impacts on the program:

Now, I know that it was the Hatoyama government that initiated Campus Asia. One thing that surprised me, especially while I was designing my research proposal to do this PhD in, I think, 2015, and I was unsure if the pilot project was going to be renewed and continue because the government had changed and perhaps the diplomatic goals of the Japanese government and the other governments have also changed. Yet it has continued and expanded at least in terms of the universities involved. So any thought about why Campus Asia has…?

> Yeah it's a bit surprising for me too because most of the political agenda set up by the Democratic government back then and Hatoyama and his successors were overturned by the succeeding Cabinet by the LDP. And CAMPUS Asia is really [one of] a few exceptions which have not been overturned. And I think, sure, I personally guess because regardless who is in power in Tokyo the relationships between Chinese and Koreans are *so vital* for Japanese foreign policy, or for our Japanese economic interest or for Japan-at-large. So it is, for me thinking like this, it's quite natural the succeeding governments' carried on this CAMPUS Asia policy.

This comment led me to ask why the program was so small in scale and focused only at the elite-level of Japanese higher education. If mutual understanding and production of human resources was indeed so vital to Japanese society, why focus only on a small group of elites at the top? This led into a discussion of the challenges posed by funding constraints:

> For the financial reasons it is hardly imaginable to expand CAMPUS Asia so widely so as to include a great number of students in each country. Already now CAMPUS Asia is in a tight situation in financial terms, and so I don't think it is feasible to include so many people. But if you think about it from the another angle a so-called trickle-down effect can be imagined. If CAMPUS Asia is restricted to a small number of elites they will, you know, take on a leading role in each nation and later influence on the ordinary people, vast majority of the country…

Funding constraints on higher education are a global trend experienced in many countries, including Japan. However, investment in education and R&D in China and Korea is

relatively high. For the professor, the reason that CAMPUS Asia could not attract the vast amount of funding needed to produce an East Asian equivalent to the ERASMUS Programme stemmed from the fact that there is no coordinating political entity such as the EU in the region. On the ERASMUS programme he mentioned:

> It's a gigantic project and compared with this, CAMPUS Asia is really nothing. But unfortunately I cannot see that for CAMPUS Asia we could spend so large an amount as the ERASMUS project because for one thing we have no such thing as the EU. And the EU, not the individual governments of the member states, but the EU itself plays a big role in the ERASUMUS project. But in East Asia we have no such thing and in the foreseeable future we will not have any similar thing in East Asia. So lack of this umbrella entity covering the individual member states it is really a big, big difference between Europe and East Asia.

I suggested that perhaps another factor might be the temporary nature of the CAMPUS Asia funding scheme that also poses difficulties both to program expansion and assurance of quality educational outcomes. The professor agreed this may be the perspective held by many universities:

> Of course MEXT thinks in quite a different way and not only about CAMPUS Asia programs. Every subsidy program issued by the Ministry is always like this. The Ministry gives money for a certain period of time, say five years or seven years but it’s just the period of setting up and after this period of subsidy has passed the university must incorporate the mobility program in itself. That means it must finance on its own but in most cases the Japanese universities always say without money when five years is over, then the project itself must be over.

This discussion tied in to another theme that emerged from a number of participant interviews. A number of actors at Japanese universities had a perception of *passivity* and lack of initiative on the part of many administrators and institution-level policy makers. In Japanese, the term *zenrei ga nai* (which translates to ‘there is no precedent’) emerged as a means to code this passivity. Typically career administrators at Japanese universities rotate every few years through the different administrative departments, ideally gaining promotions as they do so. For example, I met an administrator who went from managing a university library, to directing the International Office, to head of the General Affairs

Division. In higher education systems in other countries, each of these jobs would most likely go to specialists (often with degrees in their specialism and work experience in a particular area of higher education administration). The Japanese approach to higher education models the Japanese business sector in this respect. While globalization and pressures to internationalize have called on both companies and universities to re-evaluate this traditional organizational model, many have been slow to change. This resistance to change at the organizational level is one example of the *zenrei ga nai* phenomenon, but it can be witnessed at the micro-level as well. When it comes to internationalization activities, often career administrators (who aren't international education specialists) are hesitant to put forward new ideas or take on new projects, choosing instead to not rock the boat. CAMPUS Asia provides one such example:

> It's quite difficult for CAMPUS Asia to survive when it comes to an end when no money is there. Yes, this mindset among the among the Japanese University people is quite strong – without the precedent, they would not embark on something new and CAMPUS Asia is only possible because the extra money is coming from the government. And for them, it's quite unimaginable for the people in Japanese, particularly National Universities to think of CAMPUS Asia or something similar on their own.
>
> ...private universities are more proactive because it's about their survival. This year the demographic crisis of Japanese society is quite acute for them. And so far, the number of the 18-year-olds remain a bit stable, but from this year, 2018 on the curve is now declining forever. And then for them, they can't help but be active. But in the National Universities the atmosphere is quite complacent. And they are still dependent on the Ministry in the management. And I'm quite sure all of them don't think that they can be abolished or done away with because they are national, if the crisis comes, the Ministry will jump in, that's the way they think without the sense of crisis, there's no need of being proactive.

From the professor's perspective, the lack of funding coupled with the lack of proactivity at Japanese national universities entails that innovative programs like CAMPUS Asia require government initiative and support to be sustainable (currently, of the 17 CAMPUS Asia programs all but two of them are housed at national universities). These comments

made me question whether he thought the program might come to an end after the second funding cycle was completed in 2020. This brought us back to the discussion of the broader context of regional relations:

> They are so dependent on the external money from government. But apart from other international mobility programs, CAMPUS Asia has good prospects to survive the political change because as I said, China and Korea are always our neighbors, and it's quite crucial for us to maintain a good relationship. And then this is a good reason to carry on the CAMPUS Asia program. Okay, so then in five years, this cycle of the funding will come to an end, but it's quite imaginable for the government to begin the third cycle.

While critical of the lack of inertia and initiative of many Japanese universities, the professor also highlighted that MEXT itself lacks the vision to establish path-breaking projects, in part because it faces pressures and constraints by various other government agencies. His statements cast some light on the tensions playing out at the government-level:

> I have the impression that the people in the MEXT have no habit of thinking in the longer term. It's partly because of the politics inside the Japanese political or bureaucratic circles. For example, in terms of the share of the national budget, Education has a good part I think. Following Defense, Education is the fourth largest share of the governmental budget every year but now apart from that the clout of the Ministry is quite weak. In recent years the Ministry is a bit on the defensive against the Office on the Prime Minister and there's not a few people who say today that higher education policy is not determined in the MEXT but in the Office of the Premiership.
>
> CSTI is one of the most prominent meetings under the office of the Prime Minister, and they are now quite assertive today, pushing for university reform and for the Ministry to invent some KPIs (key performance indicators), yes, indeed, something to measure the performance of every university. And in the face of this offensive from the Prime Minister’s office, the Ministry is, according to my personal impression, is a bit defensive. Yeah, they are now exposed to pressure from the Finance Ministry too and the people in the MEXT are quite eager to defend the position in financial terms against this offensive from the Minister of Finance.

Clearly funding constraints are not only a challenge for universities in Japan, but the Ministry of Education itself is experiencing its own challenges and pressures from other ministries in the context of a stagnating Japanese economy.

The interview with the professor provided a variety of insights into the policy ideas, practical realities, and tensions playing out in both the international and domestic arenas which were shaping the possibilities for the CAMPUS Asia program and regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. While he echoed some of the ideas present in the government-level documents such as the aims for quality assurance and mutual understanding, he also highlighted a number of challenges facing Japan and its higher education sector that could impede successful regional education cooperation. Japanese socio-cultural tendencies such as a general lack of awareness of Japan's closest neighbors and the workplace phenomenon of *zenrei ga nai* may be deeply entrenched and resistant to change via 'top-down' policies for regionalism and higher education internationalization. Funding constraints are also an obvious challenge, as are the broader political and economic realities of the three countries (and the lack of a coordinating supra-national governance structure) that influence levels of eagerness for the possibilities of regional integration.

Conclusion

The ideas from the 'government-level' presented in this chapter were intended to serve as structuring elements by which to juxtapose the ideas of actors at Japanese universities involved in CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight projects. Government-level ideas clearly vary by organization, but the dominant and unifying themes that emerged from all of them were a discourse of '*mutual understanding*', an emphasis on '*quality assurance*', a recognition of the *economic interdependence* of the region, a conceptualization of university graduates

as '*human resources*', and a normative commitment to '*competitiveness*'. The importance of these themes was generally reinforced by the opinions offered by the interview participants from MEXT and NIAD.

The following chapters will present thematically the ideas of actors involved in CAMPUS Asia or A3 Foresight at nine participating Japanese universities. In addition to juxtaposing these cases with one another, the ideas from the government-level will be utilized to frame the ways that actors adopt, adapt and contest the officially sanctioned ideas of higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia.

Chapter 7: Ideas of actors at universities

Like in Part 1 of the previous chapter on the ideas at the government-level, the following chapter is presented thematically, with headings representing themes that emerged across a number of cases. In line with the conceptual framework from discursive institutionalism, the themes are presented first at the *policy* level, as cognitive and normative ideas about the purposes and functions of CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight specifically. *Programmatic* ideas are framed in two contextual levels; the first comprises ideas concerning Japanese higher education which house and operate the CAMPUS Asia/A3 projects, as well as the broader ideas regarding STI and the positionality and future goals for knowledge production in Japan in an increasingly competitive region. The second concerns the social, political and diplomatic relations between Japan, China and Korea in regional and global perspective. This is followed by a section that discusses the potential *underlying philosophies* that may be giving a foundational shape to participants' ideas. Throughout the chapter there is a comparative engagement with the government-level ideas presented in Chapter 6. By addressing the above topics, this core findings chapter addresses research questions 1, 2, and 3. Research question 4 is addressed in Chapter 8 on barriers. The themes presented in all three of the findings chapters are revisited and critically discussed in Chapter 9.

Policy ideas about regional cooperation through CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight

Different ideas across academic disciplines

It was expected there would be notable differences in ideas between the categories of academics, administrators and students - and across different universities - and in many instances there were indications these categorical distinctions did provide a means for delineating certain ideas of regional cooperation. Furthermore, the identities, experiences

and distinguishing characteristics that make participants individuals undoubtedly had an influence on the ideas they presented. However, what was most apparent were the strong differences in ideas of regional cooperation across academic disciplines. The quote below from a graduate from the University of Tokyo's Masters in Public Policy-CAMPUS Asia program highlights her own experience with this stark distinction:

> I still remember the time when I talked about the CAMPUS Asia program with the students from Hitotsubashi University[40]; they're focusing on the business side of the three countries. Before meeting them I thought people participating in CAMPUS Asia have the same kinds of ideas as me: promoting peace, having seen the issues in three countries. But when I talked about the CAMPUS Asia program with Hitotsubashi students, they were very different. I wanted to do some activities to promote peace in the three countries, but they asked me one simple question saying, "Why do we need to do that?"... And they told me, "Because we are studying Economics and Business, we are doing very good. If you see the business sectors of the three countries even though there were tensions we were not affected. So when you say you want to do something to promote the peace, it sounds like 'Oh, the situation is really bad so we need to do something', but from the first place we do not think it's bad, we are here to make a good thing even better. So your start is seeing something as bad, but we are not like that".
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

The above quote highlights that some CAMPUS Asia participants viewed the program as an opportunity to make "a good thing even better", capitalizing on the growing economic interdependence of the region (Byun & Um, 2014). However, a theme that emerged more frequently among actors at a few case universities was one that echoed this student's ideas, that the program was a platform for addressing regional tensions.

Discussing and diffusing political tensions

The CAMPUS Asia program at UTokyo was developed as a trilateral dual-degree master's program in International Relations and Public Policy Studies with Peking University in

[40] Hitotsubashi University's CAMPUS Asia program is entitled the "Asia Business Leaders Program".

Beijing, China, and Seoul National University in Korea. Its stated aim is to "nurture next-generation world leaders who can deepen understanding of the region and confront complex global issues" (University of Tokyo, n.d.). As such, program participants were encouraged to discuss and debate controversial topics and points of diplomatic tension between the three countries, and seek suitable solutions. While a similar approach was taken in Waseda University's CAMPUS Asia program, the quote above highlights that this focus on regional tensions was not ubiquitous. By contrast, there seemed to be a sharp distinction between programs and actors that envisioned regional cooperation as involving facing head-on, and discussing, the historical and political issues that continue to impede peaceful diplomatic relations between the three countries, and those that felt it was better not to speak about these sensitive topics. In both cases these groups aligned their ideas of regional cooperation closely with their subject areas: actors in Humanities and STEM fields generally felt discussing political issues to be unhelpful in achieving successful cooperation, focusing instead on points of positive cultural connection and collaborative opportunities within their specialisms; while those involved in Social Science-oriented programs saw addressing sensitive historical and political issues as essential for future peace and regional stability. A salient example is provided by Waseda's CAMPUS Asia program[41] which, while open to students of all academic disciplines, takes an approach grounded in the Social Sciences focused on Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation:

> we had very intensive, active discussions during our summer program. The theme was history in East Asia and we asked students to group up, then write up one page of a fictitious common history book on the page of the 9th, August 1945[42]. So it was totally up to the students to decide what they're going to write. It was quite dynamic, because ... views of historical events among the mainland Chinese people

[41] CAMPUS Asia at Waseda is entitled the 'East Asian Global Leadership Program for Multi-layered Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation' and is run jointly between the Faculty of Political Science and Economics and the Center for International Education.
[42] The date of the US atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Japan.

> and the Taiwanese students[43] were totally different and initially they were not talking to each other, you could sense it was very... kind of uncomfortable, yeah? But then we deliberately mixed students of those backgrounds and put some of them in the same group and eventually they did their own conflict resolution. Like a Taiwanese student came up with tears saying that "My group members coming from China and Korea and elsewhere were open to listen to my perspective and actually asked me to give my perspective which would never have happened in a regular setting". And it was very emotional. But that means it had a catalyst effect.
>
> Academic, Conflict Resolution, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

Encouraging discussion of sensitive issues and making attempts to understand the different perspectives of students from the three countries (and beyond, in some cases) was an approach to regional cooperation found in the UTokyo, Waseda and Okayama University cases. In the majority of the programs studied, however, this was not common practice. Instead of focusing on regional points of conflict, students were encouraged to work within the bounds of their academic disciplines, finding common points of collaboration, and in some cases celebrate the shared elements of the cultures of the three countries.

Celebrating cultural connections; recognizing cultural diversity

One group that appeared to avoid confronting difficult political issues head-on was the Artists. The CAMPUS Asia program at Tokyo University of the Arts (also known as *Tokyo Geidai*) is an exchange (and aspiring double-degree program) for graduate students studying animation at Tokyo Geidai, the Communication University of China, and Korea National University of Arts. After an informative interview, one participant (a program administrator) agreed to share the products of the University's "Japan-China-Korea Students' Co-Work of Animation" projects which, in addition to a range of useful

[43] Waseda's program also makes a point to include students from Taiwan (and was the only program to do so), although they are not allowed to study abroad in mainland China.

documents, included a DVD containing 6 years' worth of short animation pieces created collaboratively by students from the three countries. Forty-three animation pieces in total, each ranging from approximately 1 to 2 minutes in duration, became available for analysis[44]. While these films are not formally incorporated into the analysis for this study, I was also able to interview a student alumnus of Tokyo Geidai's 'Co-Work' program, and he agreed to let me include some stills from his short film in the thesis. In both his film and interview it became clear that his ideas and those from the artists he collaborated with had a lot to do with the cultural connections between the three countries. This theme is introduced in the description of the short animation film below.

'East Wind'

The 2017 Co-Work short film entitled 'East Wind' opens with overhead view of a modern city, then leads to a scene where four animation students from the three countries sit at a table, looking exhausted and bored. Soon, one student drifts off into a dream, and begins to be carried away into a dream-world. The others notice and try to catch him, but they too get swept up in the wind of the dream. The background begins to evolve into scenery from ink paintings depicting the East Asian region, including castles, mountains, and the Great Wall of China, while music utilizing traditional Chinese instruments plays. The students struggle in the wind to catch each other. Eventually all four students connect to one another other, at which point they begin to morph into a dragon. The dragon flies through the landscape in the other direction, eventually fading away to reveal the four students back in the room with the table. They rouse from the dream, and laugh together.

[44] As a result of this unexpected opportunity, I considered incorporating additional methods for analysing these films into the study for the particular case of Tokyo Geidai, however it soon became apparent this would result in an overload of data and stretch the methodology of the doctoral thesis too thin. It is my hope to analyse these 43 films in-depth in a future study using multimodal or film analysis methods (having gained appropriate participant consent and ethical clearance).

[East Wind]







The student who was involved in this project had some interesting reflections about it. He explained how the cityscape at the beginning of the film represents the urban development that has taken place in the three countries. The students and their generation have grown up in this already-developed environment and are feeling boxed in and lethargic as a result. Instead of feeling a desire to strive for money or a luxurious lifestyle, the group long for an opportunity 'live well' – to find a life with meaning. This is represented by the dream taking them into an environment of natural landscapes and buildings from the past. The student explained how the dragon is a symbol common to the three cultures that has a meaning of good fortune, or a prosperous future.

In the dream sequence (and the film in general) there is no speaking. According to the student the group find they can communicate and understand one another without dialogue through the common connections among their cultures (represented by the 'East Wind' that carries them away).

The student explained how he made the film before he had studied abroad in Korea, and realized after his study abroad experience that the ideas of the film were too naively

idealistic. Through study abroad he realized the importance of language as a means to communicate. This experience clarified for him that while there are indeed cultural connections between the countries that are communicated non-verbally and can be experienced through the Arts, in order for the peoples of the three countries to truly communicate, language ability is essential. This awareness of the importance of language and communicative abilities was mentioned by many participants across different CAMPUS Asia programs, the lack of which presented as a notable barrier for many. As such this theme is discussed in some detail in the following chapter on barriers.

Another program that emphasized the cultural connections between the three programs, at least on paper, was Nagoya University's CAMPUS Asia program in Law[45]. The University's program website describes the history and vision of utilizing the shared usage of the Chinese writing system (*kanji,* in Japanese) as an opportunity to achieve a form of regional integration of the East Asian legal community:

> one should not overlook the important fact that China, Japan and Korea constitute a unique East Asian cultural zone in which ideograms of Chinese origin (*kanji*) are used. In adopting the Western legal system following the Meiji Restoration, Japan developed a legal terminology using *kanji*, which later greatly influenced similar enterprises by China and Korea. Naturally, there are many legal terms that are represented by identical ideograms but have different meanings in each of the three countries today, as a result of their respective historical background or subsequent development. Nevertheless, it is possible to envisage harmonization of the legal terminology of the three countries with the aid of a common legal database that can be built with the most advanced information technology, which in turn can accelerate the formation of a *jus commune* in East Asia. (Nagoya University Faculty of Law, n.d.)

[45] Nagoya University's CAMPUS Asia program is entitled: 'Training Human Resources for the Development of an Epistemic Community in Law and Political Science to Promote the Formation of "jus commune" in East Asia'

The Law professor involved with Nagoya's CAMPUS Asia program had his own interpretations of the above text and other public-facing rhetoric used to describe the program in the University's PR materials, some of which he had a hand in writing himself:

> the idea of creating a common research platform for jurisprudence based on the premise of a cultural sphere with *kanji* characters as the commonality has been around for a long time... Until around the point where the EU had such massive power, a similar discussion took place in Japan as well... whether we would decide to create a community involving the three Asian countries.
>
> If we had some sort of commonality – whether that's the kanji cultural sphere or Confucian cultural sphere – and we decided to create a common legal community, we could develop people who are able to acknowledge and understand one another, and have knowledge for discussing the creation of common law, rather than simply saying things like, "laws in our country are like this".
>
> This would be my *official* answer.
>
> Whether this could actually exist for real or not is another issue. I think it's possible that after discussing it, we might end up with the conclusion that it was a strange idea after all... Japan, China and South Korea are the opposite. They want to talk earnestly about only the commonalities. This applies to the kanji characters and to Confucianism I mentioned earlier. They like to find common ground, to say that "we're this similar to one another", but I don't think a common law will ever be possible. Yep. I think we need to start by admitting we're different.
>
> Academic, Law, CAMPUS Asia, Nagoya University

On the public-facing webpages and in the 'official' answer of the Law professor above, the cultural connections between the three countries are described as providing the foundations to develop a harmonized East Asian legal community. However, the actual views of the professor were more nuanced and skeptical about this possibility. While he acknowledged cultural connections between the three countries, he described these as tenuous, and secondary to the inherent *cultural and societal differences* between them. This excerpt highlights one of a number of instances where the official policy rhetoric espoused by an institution often differed from the ideas of actors and the realities of the programs in practice. It also provides an example of the idea of *nationally-bounded cultural difference*,

a theme which emerged with some frequency. By using this term I mean that notions of particular cultures are presented in a way that binds them to the nation-state, often in the sense that one country is representative of an essentialized mono-culture rather than an amalgamation of diverse and evolving cultures.

'Borderless' science, but regional cooperation for global competitiveness

Those from the STEM disciplines had their own unique ideas about regional cooperation. In some instances, discussion of controversial issues between the three countries was expressly forbidden by senior professors, and young researchers where encouraged to instead focus on their "mutual love of science". This idea of mutual love often entailed a transcendence of national boundaries, as many academics and students used the term *borderless* to describe the nature of their disciplines and their ideas of scientific collaboration. From this perspective, researchers passionate about scientific discovery could cooperate and contribute to the creation of new knowledge regardless of cultural or national background. Nevertheless, with regard to Northeast Asia, some participants did admit that in addition to believing in borderless science they were also aware of political tensions, and were hopeful they could contribute to their resolution:

> I think there is no boundary for science, so if you are a scientist there is nothing important about which country you are from... But I am from China and some people from the old generation, they don't think we have a good relationship with Japan or Korea. So they have that thought in their mind, and I want to influence them because I am studying in Japan, and I got the chance to talk with people from all over the world, so I want to change their ideas. So, during the A3 meeting, I talked with the professor from Korea and he also had similar thoughts so that makes me feel that I am not the only one that wants to make everyone be friendly.
>
> Student, Biology, A3 Foresight Program, UTokyo

In response to follow up questions during interviews the somewhat idealistic notion of 'borderless science' often gave way to reveal an understanding that political and economic

relations *do* matter between countries, even for those in scientific communities. Furthermore, when the discussion shifted to the perceived purpose of top-down programs for regional cooperation like A3 Foresight and CAMPUS Asia, the existence and importance of borders became more tangible. A common theme that emerged echoed the ideas found in many government-level documents: the idea of *regional collaboration for the purpose of augmenting global competitiveness*, notably with regard to improving East Asia's standing against that of the West. For example, the Engineering CAMPUS Asia program at Tokyo Tech was described in terms of competition with the USA and Europe:

> if we know each other, then probably we can optimize all of the situations [sic] together to make a big promotion among the three countries. I mean against the US and Europe. US group and Europe group.
>
> Academic, Engineering, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Similarly, A3 Foresight was described in part as

> a research program started with the idea that it is important to work hard in Asia so that the countries are more powerful and do not lose to Europe or America.
>
> Academic, Biology, A3 Foresight Program, UTokyo

The idea of competition with the 'West', while seemingly contradictory to the notion of a truly borderless, global science, may provide the cognitive conditions that serve as an impetus for scientists in Northeast Asia to engage in regional cross-border collaboration. However, in a few cases it became apparent that competition could also become a hinderance to regional cooperation, particularly when the areas of expertise among scientists from different countries had significant overlap:

> after I started the project I noticed that the Chinese team and the Japanese team are so similar. I mean, ... the Chinese team and the Japanese team has the same direction or the same interest in the synthesis or preparation of [redacted for anonymity]. So this means, it is not a sort of collaboration, but also it is sort of a rival. You see?
>
> Academic, A3 Foresight[46]

[46] Identifying information redacted for anonymity.

The idea that competition may hinder cooperation was touched on by a number of actors in different contexts, enough to warrant a discussion in the chapter on barriers.

The stark distinctions in the policy ideas of regional cooperation across academic disciplines is suggestive of deeper, foundational beliefs that are shared by particular academic communities. As such, the discussion of these differences across disciplines is revisited later in this chapter in the section on underlying philosophies.

Differences across institutions

While differences across academic disciplines emerged as a distinguishing feature of the varied policy-level ideas of regional cooperation, institution-level characteristics also appeared to shape strategies for internationalization and, by extension, actors' cognitive and normative ideas about the two programs in particular. An institutional characteristic that was often discussed was geographical location, particularly whether the respective university was located in the global city of Tokyo or in more rural and remote areas of Japan.

Strategies of urban and rural universities

Both proximity to urban centers and international visibility appeared to be influential factors that shaped institutional identities, which subsequently impacted internationalization strategies and policy ideas for regional cooperation. The University of Tokyo served as the exemplar of a globally visible and prestigious urban research university, which helped to highlight the unique features and strategies of the other case universities. As the premier flagship national university in Japan, UTokyo's international strategy includes partnerships with other world-class universities and cross-border

collaborations for the pursuit of path-breaking research and knowledge production. In this capacity, UTokyo naturally partnered with its flagship counterparts in China and Korea (Peking University and Seoul National University, respectively) for its CAMPUS Asia program, and a number of top-tier research universities for its A3 Foresight projects.

By contrast, actors at universities with lower levels of global brand recognition, generally positioned in less well-known cities and more rural parts of Japan, reported challenges with regard to pressures from the government to 'globalize', attract more international students and effectively market their mobility programs. Without this global brand status, these universities had to devise innovative approaches to attract both funding and international actors to their campuses. One such institution was Okayama University (located 675 km from Tokyo), which devised its CAMPUS Asia program to focus on sustainable development grounded in the idea of addressing regional and global issues from a local perspective:

> Okayama University cannot compete with Tokyo University or Kyoto University. We have to take advantage of the features of the university related to the local community and local development.... And one of the features is that this city itself is sustainable development-conscious and also has strong, I would say, infrastructure, [in its] community-based learning centers... [students] can contribute to the local community, and that can be linked with national and also regional as well as global issues.
>
> Academic, Sustainable Development, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University

In addition to geographic location, an institution's vision (or lack thereof) also appeared to have an effect in shaping actors' views toward regional cooperation. Tokyo's Waseda University stood out as an example of how an institution's ethos can have a strong influence in shaping its international activities. A number of actors interviewed at Waseda mentioned the vision of the University's founder (and former Prime Minister of Japan), Shigenobu Okuma, and how his legacy continues to shape Waseda's strategy. The University's

approach to CAMPUS Asia in particular connected to this vision, which embodies the long tradition of the University's acceptance of international students from East Asia. Unlike Japan's national universities which were founded in the late 19th century for the purpose of helping the Japanese nation to modernize and catch up with the West, during the same period Waseda's founding mission was to foster a "harmony of the civilizations of the West and the East", and "to contribute to global society". This mission to serve as a bridge between East and West was described as being influential in the University's willingness to host international students, and its continued proactive recruitment of a diverse student body. An academic involved in the development of the CAMPUS Asia program offered the following insights into how the ideas of the program were bound up with this international vision of the University:

> so as for the ideas of CAMPUS Asia... at Waseda we have a lot of students from mainland China and also from Taiwan. And I think it's quite a rare opportunity for Taiwanese students to talk directly to students from mainland China and vis-a-versa. And also the Korean students can meet students from Japan, Taiwan and mainland China...I think it has a very good educational effect for the Japanese students who are usually not so interested in politics.... So having Asian students on campus is not only simply educating Korean or Taiwanese students, we are also educating Japanese students by offering them the opportunity to interact directly with the students from different nations.
>
> I think this is a basic idea for CAMPUS Asia. If it is successful, maybe the students from America or students from Europe may be interested in coming to Waseda, they can meet not only Japanese students but also they can meet Chinese, Taiwanese, and Korean students. And if they can come, if many American and European students come to Waseda, we can attract more students from Peking, from Taiwan, from Korea, because they know that if they go to Waseda they can meet not only the Japanese but they can meet American students or European students like that... So this is actually the words of [Waseda's] founder, 'unification', 'harmony', "*tozai bunmei no chou wa*[47]" so I think CAMPUS Asia is a very important step that direction.
>
> Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

[47] "Harmony of Eastern and Western civilizations"

This idea that Japanese universities can serve as a *contact zone for East Asia* was not limited to actors at Waseda, and was identified as a broader contextual theme related to the social functions of higher education perceived by actors across a number of cases. As such it is discussed in more detail in a later section of the chapter.

Commonalities across cases

Although disciplinary and institutional characteristics emerged as factors that served to distinguish some ideas of regional cooperation from others, a number of themes emerged that were common across most if not all of the cases.

While not an idea in itself per se, one finding that is worth mentioning is that in nearly all of the cases studied there was evidence of pre-existing positive relations between university actors from the three countries which enabled the development of the formal programs. While in some cases there were pre-existing institutional arrangements, in most cases the links were between individual academics and researchers who were instrumental in applying for program funding. In this respect, there was notable evidence that bottom-up forms of higher education regionalization served as pre-conditions for the success of formal, top-down policies for higher education regionalism. This connects to the first common theme, that of the importance of developing relationships through face-to-face communication.

Broadening perspectives through face-to-face experience

A prevalent policy-level idea that emerged, particularly among the current and former students that were interviewed, was that undertaking study abroad or research collaboration in Northeast Asia would serve to 'broaden perspectives'. For these individuals, *face-to-face international communication* was perceived as key to gaining alternative understandings

of the varied issues confronting the three countries. This idea of face-to-face interaction was often juxtaposed with the notion of exposure to information presented through the media, which was generally considered to be lacking and biased. Inaccurate portrayals of 'others' in the media (and also through formal schooling) emerged as a significant barrier that was perceived to be hindering regional cooperation and peaceful relations amongst the broader populations of the three countries. As such this issue is addressed in the chapter on barriers. Here the below quotes are intended to highlight the perceived and actual power of educational exchange and the benefits of gaining personal experience in other countries:

> I started learning Chinese and I chose this department because it's the best for Journalism and Political Science. But as I continued studying, I felt like it's not enough unless I see the real situation in China. So I wanted to go there maybe for one year or longer just to grasp what people are thinking and how it is there because it's very limited what we can know about China from here, from the mass media, it's very biased.
>
> Student, Conflict Resolution, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda

> I went to the Palace [in Korea] and other historical sites and I saw how many historical artworks had been destroyed by Japan. When I was in Japan seeing how Korea was portrayed in the media it was things like Korea asking for money and compensation for wartime atrocities and I had this kind of negative image, but then when I was actually in Korea I saw with my own eyes what Japan had done.
>
> Student, Animation, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo University of the Arts

> I mean I was… I *did* understand the point of view of Chinese people and to some extent Korean people as well but I didn't know how actually *strongly* they felt about history issues…it astonished me a little the fact that they would be so passionate, like even people in the street, like not even like academics or students studying about history or IR, but like random students who've never really studied history professionally or something they would have a really strong opinion on history and what Japan did to them…totally understandable. It's not really like that in Japan, like people don't really care but I can totally understand now that there is this saying that goes 'bullies always forget what they've done but those who were bullied would never forget', so I am more compassionate about what they feel… it's kind of enriched me in my … approach to my neighbors in China and Korea maybe… Also I can see Japan more critically from like a third person's point of view.

Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

> so usually in ordinary life, we - many Japanese, have no or little experience to communicate with non-Japanese people, so -- and for China and Korea, we usually hear things just from the news. But after communicating, directly communicating with Korean and Chinese guys, my impression has totally changed. Yes, of course they have some attitudes about the country of China or Korea, but as individuals they are very nice guys [sic] and not so different from we Japanese. So, in a sense, yes it was very good. Yes, they are very good friends now.

Academic, Physics, A3 Foresight Program, UTokyo

> Meeting others in person is, I think is the best way to solve all the conflicts.

Student, Sustainable Development, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University

The ideas of face-to-face, experiential learning to help shift perspectives and deepen understanding evident in the above quotes connects to another concept that was described by one of the academics at Waseda. The Japanese idea of *koryu* is literally translated to mean 'exchange' in English. However the interviewee conveyed that the term means more than what the English equivalent connotes. Whereas 'exchange' can be understood in quantitative terms, (e.g. as in 'the number of exchange students or programs have increased'), 'Koryu' can imply a transformative relationship, one that can be cultivated and deepened:

> what I sense from the exchange with various people involved in this program and also faculty members from other countries is that they really aim at enhancing the… *koryu*, I don't know how to term that in English… So the students are very much aware of the opportunity, so more than half the students who attended my courses really decided to attend because they wanted to have alternative views on East Asian relations.

Academic, Conflict Resolution, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The discourse of *broadening perspectives* through 'koryu' aligns in some ways with the ideas of *mutual understanding* found in the government-level policy documents. Indeed,

gaining an insight into other perspectives on regional or global issues would help individuals to better understand those who held viewpoints alternative to their own. However, the notion of mutual understanding does not imply an inherent internal change of perspective on the part of the individual, nor does it imply an integration of others' viewpoints into one's own view of the world. Instead, it suggests tolerance and possibly even a strategic knowledge of the other. *Broadening perspectives*, by contrast, implies growth, an increase in cognitive flexibility and an expansion of one's own understanding of the world. I argue that this is an important distinction indicative of the differences between the stated goals of the government and those of many actors at the higher education level. Having said that, many of the same actors also described the perceived benefits of participation in the programs in instrumental terms, viewing the skills and experiences gained as 'added value' that could be utilized to enhance employability.

Employability and regional cooperation for a 'prosperous future'

Whether academics, administrators or students, many actors discussing their role in either CAMPUS Asia or A3 Foresight framed their narratives from normative, future-oriented perspectives. While some emphasized an envisioned future in which the three countries achieved improved levels of peace and stability, many focused on these as the ideal end-product of their own more personal-level goals, which frequently connected to ideas of employability for CAMPUS Asia and A3 graduates. In a sense, the notion of *future prosperity* allowed for a normative idea of regional cooperation that pushed in both the directions of regional peace and economic competitiveness simultaneously. Like other ideas mentioned above, the employability narratives were often discipline-specific.

This was true for fields such as Architecture;

> As an architect, you can do a lot of work, [a lot of] jobs in China... so if they were to recruit well-educated, well-exposed people from Japan in their working environment, they need someone who has some prior experience while in the University, so that is an added value. Probably in that sense, students may have a better opportunity of working in Chinese companies and vice versa... So for us it is an opportunity to give some exposure to our students among professionals and professors, so in future they will have better connections regarding professional life and even if they become researchers they will have more opportunities. That is the idea.
>
> Academic, Architecture, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

and also Medicine;

> My aim is to nurture research investigators in the field of public health and medicine... the most important thing is the number of students who will become researchers and administrative workers should be increased and working to have some sense of collaboration with Asian countries. So such students or personnel is getting appropriate position [sic], so they can communicate with each other and work together to solve serious common problems in public health and also in medicine.
>
> Academic, Public Health and Medicine, CAMPUS Asia, Osaka University

and in Education;

> I believe that Tokyo Gakugei University's program undertakes the most fundamental task of examining how to teach students and what content to teach to connect it to the future...[and] the ripple effect is extremely large... the professors educate people and they later become the top teaching staff members in their respective countries. This means that they will spend ten to twenty years teaching in their country and that their influence is extremely strong.
>
> Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo Gakugei University

Many students in particular had hopes that participation in their programs would connect in some capacity to future careers.

> my major is public diplomacy, and my career goal is to work for some international organization such as United Nations, or UNICEF, so the program is really... I think it will help for my dreams, my career goals.
>
> Student, Sustainable Development, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University

Many also envisioned these careers as having some significant impact on the future of the region:

> I think that the relationship between China and Japan and Korea will not suddenly change, but it can be changed progressively, because students who participate in CAMPUS Asia will become officers in each government and scholars in each university, so after participating in this program they will influence each country.
>
> Student, Sustainable Development, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University

To use the government's keyword term, a significant number of actors were interested in the capacities of their programs for regional cooperation to produce *(global) human resources*. Administrators in particular often repeated the rhetoric of the government-level policy documents, discussing 'producing global leaders', or 'next generation leaders of East Asia'.

However, the nature and social function of these 'resources' varied considerably in the views of participants, and as such the discourse of human resources was one that was adapted considerably on the part of actors at universities. While generally shaped by discipline, nuanced differences in the employability narratives emerged at times because of particular institutional identities. This was especially evident at Tokyo University of the Arts (referred to below as '*Geidai'*):

> Animation is an industry, you know, it's a money making, commercial..., and you know Japan is like '*Anime!*' with a capital 'A'. In that sense, Japan definitely sees itself as a leader, and Korea, China are interested in Japan in that regard. However, Geidai is an *Arts* university, and is not aiming to create or educate for anime careers. It's about creating, nurturing people to use animation for artistic personal expression, which could go towards industry, of course, but we're not the place where you come to become the next Anime Expo superstar. We're very, you could say, marginalized, or you could say carving out a very a specific area of the world of animation.
>
> Administrator, Animation, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo University of the Arts

In the CAMPUS Asia program at Tokyo Geidai, the production of 'global human resources' (*global jinzai*) in the field of animation was not informed by economic and employability motives. Indeed, according to the administrator interviewed the use of the *global jinzai* concept was adopted simply because the CAMPUS Asia program presented as a funding opportunity, and use of the term was perceived to improve the chances of being awarded funding. Tokyo Geidai already had a pre-existing exchange program established with its partners in China and Korea informed by its own motives for collaboration and co-creation, and producing *global jinzai* was not part of this original vision. It turned out that adopting particular terminology for the purposes of securing funding was a common practice across many case universities.

Repurposing of government policy rhetoric

The government-level idea of 'global human resources' was one of a number of concepts that were adopted but then re-interpreted by actors at Japanese universities. As was mentioned above, participants at times admitted to using certain terms simply because they felt it was a necessary step to be awarded program funding from the Ministry of Education:

> Well 'human resources', personally I don't like the [term] human resources, the manager's view - it's one of the resources; financial resources, natural resources, human resources....but I have to use it because it's in the application (laughs). But anyway, the idea is that human resources that can lead not only in terms of employability in the private companies or government but also in the community, who can lead the sustainable development in the community...
>
> Academic, Sustainable Development, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University

A re-purposing of the government-level policy rhetoric as a form of resistance was also evident in the case of Waseda. An academic understood the government-level emphasis on *human resources*, *competitiveness* and *quality assurance* as an infusion of an economic

orientation into the notion of regional cooperation, a view he described differed from Waseda's vision:

> I think it really depends on how we can define the term *quality*, or maybe *competitiveness*. If the government used that term only from the perspective of efficiency, or kind of the economic benefit or something like that, this is not our goal. We really want to interpret the term 'quality' or 'competitiveness' in a much broader sense. So if we are very successful in producing human-oriented practitioners who contribute to world peace, maybe social innovation all over the world, I think it might be a different quality that the government wants but this is a kind of quality and competitiveness from our point of view that we really want to pursue.

Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The capacities of university actors to adapt and repurpose government-level ideas is illustrative of their agentic power. However, one of the oft-cited reasons for using the government-level policy rhetoric in the first place was because of the reported need to acquire financial support to operate the respective programs. Funding constraints were identified as a significant obstacle at Japanese universities and so this topic is addressed in more detail in the chapter on barriers. Interestingly, while the ideas and opinions about what regional cooperation is and should be varied considerably across cases, the perceived barriers that impeded these different forms of cooperation showed relative consistency regardless of discipline or institution.

The finding of the resistance to and repurposing of certain government-level ideas echoes claims made by Jeremey Breaden, who described how CAMPUS Asia projects represent an "ongoing negotiation of diverse, multi-tiered interests" and provide a "convenient framework through which to actualise agendas unconnected to its stated goals of regional integration" (Breaden, 2018, p. 51). While I disagreed with Breaden's argument about CAMPUS Asia's 'stated goals', this study supports his claims about the 'multi-tiered interests' and varied agendas that shape the CAMPUS Asia program on the ground.

Programmatic ideas

This section of the chapter continues the exploration of the ideas of participants, but expands the contextual scope beyond the cognitive and normative ideas of the specific programs for regional cooperation and attempts to engage with the programmatic ideas actors had about the broader sociological contexts in which the CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight Programs are enmeshed. The section first deals with ideas about the social functions of higher education in Japan, which help frame and contextualize the reasons actors gave for the creation of mobility programs for regional cooperation. This is followed by an exploration of ideas about universities as tools for knowledge production, STI and global competitiveness as well as a discussion of perceptions about Northeast Asian international relations. This section is followed by an attempt to discern some of the underlying philosophies that may be providing the foundation for actors' ideas at the policy and programmatic levels. Programmatic and philosophical ideas are presented thematically, and as above low inference micro-arguments are provided which set the stage for a more macro-level synthesis of themes in Chapter 9.

Ideas about Japanese higher education

A two-part question that was posed to participants was "How would you describe higher education's primary social functions, and how might these connect to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia?" The answers provided typically aligned with the primary roles and responsibilities of the interviewees: those with research-intensive jobs often highlighted higher education's function in producing knowledge, while those with student-facing roles (and many students themselves) emphasized the importance of teaching and learning, and cultivating graduates with particular characteristics. These functions were then typically connected to ideas about regional cooperation in terms of cross-border research

collaboration and the development of knowledge and skills that would enhance 'prosperity' (i.e. regional peace, or global competitiveness) in various arenas. While some respondents interpreted the meaning of higher education in the question in a general way, others interpreted it to mean Japanese universities in particular. A few respondents who discussed Japanese higher education described its social role in evolutionary terms. Some noted that in the past Japanese universities performed very few social functions other than to serve as a period of respite for students who had studied hard to pass their entrance examinations and needed a break before dedicating the rest of their working lives to a single Japanese company:

> Traditionally speaking, in the Japanese case, higher education gave the students the opportunity of a moratorium, so in a traditional Japanese university, education actually meant nothing. The all-important thing was the entrance examination. So each university recruited the good students through the entrance examinations, and students had a really good time for four years. And after the graduation, they entered the company and it's also a very hard-working kind of life, so the four university years are kind of the very relaxing, and also the very precious time. So I don't think it's necessarily bad because some students really study very hard by themselves. So this is a university function. When I was an undergraduate student, Japanese university was like that.

Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

However, it was also mentioned that times had changed. Lifetime employment is no longer guaranteed at many Japanese companies, and there has been a dramatic increase in precarious forms of work since the 1990s (Osawa, Kim, & Kingston, 2013). Fewer companies are now willing to invest in training newly-recruited graduates, and so the responsibility has shifted to universities to equip students with the knowledge and skills needed to succeed in the world of work in an increasingly globalizing Japan (Yonezawa, 2014; Yonezawa & Meerman, 2012b). One professor interviewed described how this shift in the role of the university had brought with it new forms of discipline and control over students, a notion he was resistant to:

> Students now have become much more interested in attending class and more serious about listening to lectures and professors are more interested in teaching; this is a good thing. But also I'm kind of afraid that higher education is not a place for educating the students but more focused on disciplining, how to discipline the students...
>
> But we are not so interested in disciplining students, not so interested in producing a so-called 'elite salaryman'[48] for example. So I think [at university] I want to give students an opportunity to encounter a different environment, different culture, different people, and to reflect on themselves, their own culture, their own history...
>
> Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

Instead of producing 'elite salarymen', a notion that implies a human capital conception of higher education, the participant interviewed above echoed a number of others with the view that higher education in Japan should be about creating a space for young people to explore and exchange ideas, and reflect deeply about topics that at other times in their life they may not have time or inclination to consider. This appeared to be a consistent belief among the various actors interviewed at Waseda University in particular. In this sense the idea that emerged was of higher education as a 'Habermasian' public sphere for "discussion, criticism, debate, and opinion formation" (Marginson, 2014, p. 27).

Japanese higher education as a public sphere

Recognition of the university as a *space for debate and discovery* connected with many participants' ideas about the purpose of the CAMPUS Asia program:

> I'm not sure but young people don't have concrete ideas about the three countries and also the circumstance around Asia. So for the youngsters, governments think that it's better to start the program at the university because once they get a job and go to the society, they don't have that kind of idea or time to think about three countries but for university students, they have time, and also they have opportunities.
>
> Administrator, Political Science, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

[48] A 'salaryman' is the term generally used in Japan to refer to a white-collar worker (traditionally male).

> I've noticed that perhaps it might be characteristic of Waseda as an environment but it's very free to speak up and it's a very open space for the students to exchange their views and also the faculty members. So higher education provides an alternative way of forming opinions based on original information and also based on the direct exchange among the students and faculty members. So I think this place is really… it's like an incubator to create an alternative society in a way but a very powerful one. To counter the confrontational political collisions.
>
> Academic, Conflict Resolution, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The ideas of the role of Japanese higher education to serve as a 'free' space for exploration, discussion and reflection, connects to a broader and important topic that has relevance for regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. It is the idea that Japan as a nation values the rights of *academic freedom* which can be exercised in its universities. This normative idea is of critical importance in part because, at the time of writing, crackdowns on academic freedom have been increasing in various forms around the world, including in China. These trends have implications for Japanese higher education and the nation at large, and were mentioned by a number of actors that were interviewed.

Academic freedom: an opportunity for Japan

The idea that students were free to discuss and debate ideas was at times framed in the context of freedom from government censorship and control:

> through this CAMPUS Asia program I think some of the pressing issues are really discussed in many occasions and that is I think a good thing. And this is an educational program so we don't have any political preference, I mean in terms of education we can be free from those political … what would you say, we don't have to be with the government. We can be different. So we can create some new value.
>
> Administrator, IR and Public Policy, CAMPUS Asia, UTokyo

The commitment to academic freedom was connected to tradition, which one participant attributed to the influences of Western values on Japanese higher education. This contrasted to ideas about the emerging trends in China, where censorship and crackdowns

on dissenting views were seen as posing a growing threat to academic freedom there. These trends in China are the focus of a 2019 report published by NYU-based Scholars at Risk, who detail the situation in stark terms:

> In mainland China, state and university authorities have employed a range of tactics to intimidate, silence, and punish academics and students. They include limits on internet access, libraries, and publication imports that impair research and learning; orders to ban discussion and research on topics the Party-state deems controversial; surveillance and monitoring of academic activity that result in loss of position and self-censorship; travel restrictions that disrupt the flow of ideas across borders; and the use of detentions, prosecutions, and other coercive tactics to retaliate against and constrain critical inquiry and expression (Scholars at Risk, 2019, p. 4).

Some participants described their own personal experiences encountering limits on academic freedom in China:

> the freedom of research in *Beida* (Peking University) is not guaranteed for one hundred percent I would say. For me I wasn't affected because I chose a topic of comfort women right, they *want* me to say something about it. I didn't like insult the Japanese government or anything but they liked my topic so it was OK. But the students who chose like Taiwan issues or like freedom of speech, they were forced to change their topic.
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

> It's been two years now since there was this directive that went out to universities [in China] that said you should avoid teaching Western thought too much. And I visited a University shortly afterwards, and at the time I thought. 'What is this? Are universities, especially elite ones, are they really going to take this seriously?' And Chinese academics were sort of joking about it saying 'Well I guess that puts an end to Marxism right?' (laughing) But I wonder what they're saying now because you've got universities falling over each other to set up centers for Xi Jinping Thought, since the 'Great Leader' became the 'Great Thinker', and had his ideas written into the constitution...
>
> And also Chinese colleagues if they want to travel overseas for research and they want to use university money, they have to apply within the university for the use of, effectively a diplomatic passport. They cannot travel on their own passport. And so every time they go overseas for research purposes on university funding, there's this kind of exit visa application process they have to go through.

> So that is another, I mean it's billed as a kind of measure for controlling corruption, but what it really is is another tool of control. So China, yeah, [for the] Humanities and Social Sciences I would say it's not looking that good. And this should be seen for Japan as an opportunity.

Academic, Education[49], CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

These developments in China pose threats to academic freedom not only for scholars and students residing there, they also raise challenges for universities, researchers and students worldwide who adhere to the principles of academic freedom but wish to collaborate with Chinese partners. These conflicting norms have obvious implications for regional cooperation between actors and institutions in Northeast Asia, and as such could manifest as a considerable barrier in the near future. Participants generally did not voice this as an immediate concern, however. Instead, like the academic above, some participants regarded this unfavorable development in an otherwise burgeoning Chinese higher education system as an 'opportunity for Japan'. A number of participants highlighted how unique features of Japanese higher education (or certain institutions in particular) such as a commitment to academic freedom could be utilized to respond to restrictive developments taking place in other countries such as China. For example, the opportunity for Japan was described above with respect to Waseda University's long-standing tradition as being a bridge between Western and Eastern civilizations. This notion that Japanese higher education can serve as a contact zone for East Asia thus emerged as an important theme that informed some actors' ideas of regional cooperation.

[49] This particular academic was involved in the application process for a CAMPUS Asia program at Kyushu University that was ultimately unsuccessful (the funding was awarded to the Architecture program). However, this individual is also an expert in East Asia and Comparative Education and as such provided valuable insights into many lines of inquiry in this research project.

Japanese universities as a contact zone for East Asia

Japanese universities were described by some as a 'cross-roads for all nations' and a 'gateway to Asia':

> I think Japan has a very high potential for attracting students from all over the world as a field in which students can study Asia very deeply... So I think the Japanese universities, especially Waseda, should develop as a cross-roads of all nations...
>
> Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The idea of Waseda serving as a 'cross-roads' aligns with its institutional legacy, but it was also mentioned that this role was especially relevant in the contemporary period in relation to China:

> Because in the past, like 7 or 8 years ago we thought now all these American and European students want to go to China because of the very booming economy. And so there was a kind of shift of student mobility from Japan to China that we faced. But in recent years because of the two issues [in China] of the environment and academic freedom, at least for the exchange-based students from American universities, demand has become really strong to come to Japan.
>
> So we sell Japanese education not only to know about Japan but if they want to know about Asia, Japan is a good gateway, that is also what we are trying to sell. I mean because there are many Chinese students studying here and then also some academic expertise also exists in Japan about Asia.
>
> Academic, Center for International Education, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

While Waseda had a coherent institutional mission that emphasized its long tradition of serving as a global gateway to East Asia, actors at some other universities described how their institutions lacked vision and focus regarding internationalization, but they personally thought that an orientation towards Asia was an obvious choice for their university's internationalization strategy. Geographic location once again arose as a factor, this time at Kyushu University (*Kyudai*):

> Kyushu is the part of Japan that is closest to the rest of the world!... I mean after Tokyo, Kyoto; Fukuoka is one of the biggest destinations in Japan. The city has branded itself as a sort of gateway to Asia. It has an Asia month, every

> September...There's the Fukuoka Asia Prize, which is quite prestigious, I think there are two - there's one for artists and one for scholars. So Ezra Vogel got it a few years ago, Ramchandra Guha, a famous Indian historian got it a couple of years ago. It's a big thing! *Kyudai* has no involvement...We have these Asia links, we have a city that's up for it, and yet when it comes to internationalization, there's no coherent vision. But it's kind of staring us right in the face. It's Asia.
>
> Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

Founded in 1911, Kyushu University is one of Japan's former Imperial Universities and remains one of its top national research universities. As such, actors from Kyudai discussed another critical role that Japanese universities heavily engaged in research and knowledge production had to play: that of adhering to the long tradition of serving as a tool of the state in achieving its goals for scientific, technological and economic development.

The legacy of Japanese universities as tools for scientific and industrial modernization

While traditionally many Japanese universities served as a moratorium for students and may have contributed little in the arena of teaching and learning, research-intensive national universities were tasked from their creation with a very important national mission. A professor from Kyudai specializing in East Asian history and education had a number of insights regarding this mission as well as the factors influencing other East Asian higher education systems:

> Japan's whole model of modernization has been described as 'catch up modernization'. There's been, largely because of that, a kind of fetishization of science and technology that goes back quite a long way. From the Meiji period onwards...universities here were always seen primarily as tools for driving forward technological and industrial modernization. Whereas in Europe, you also have catch up modernization - everyone's catching up with Britain basically, once upon a time - but you also have a university system that's built on the foundations of a system that was entirely really to do with Humanities. And so the vestiges of that tradition remain. I mean the Imperial universities in Japan did have humanities and social sciences and indeed some quite eminent scholars in those fields, but the bias was always very heavily skewed toward the hard sciences, and has remained so.

> And then you have the sort of Leninist, Soviet tradition of higher education in East Asia, in China, North Korea, Vietnam, particularly in China of course, some extent also in Taiwan, where the KMT was a Leninist party, and that is another form of intensely science and technology-focused industrialization and modernization.
>
> And so in East Asia you put those two traditions together, the Meiji legacy and Japan's wider influence in the region of developmental statism, and the Soviet version of that, and you have basically a very strong and deeply ingrained assumption that this is what higher education is for.
>
> Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

Both the historical and contemporary emphases on the role of higher education as a tool for the production of science, technology and subsequent national industrial development seem, at first glance, to be disconnected from the role universities can play as a public sphere for discussion, debate and international exchange introduced above. However, these two seemingly disparate ideas appeared to converge in the CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight programs. This point of convergence points once again to the discourse of *regional cooperation as a mechanism to enhance global competitiveness* that emerged at the government-level and in the ideas of actors from STEM disciplines:

> ...Also competitiveness is another dimension. Because not really Japan but the Korean and Chinese universities have become really top universities in the world now. So of course, the CAMPUS Asia or some other regional collaboration project was proposed for international understanding or making peace and that element was very important, but the other emerging recognition is how collaborations of higher education institutions in intraregional frameworks strengthen the higher education of that region as a whole.
>
> Like Europe, what Europe experienced with the Erasmus program... I mean it was of course [about] contributing to international understanding, inter-regional understanding - to nurture the people who understand other countries - but at the same time it was proposed in the 1980's when the Soviet Union and the US/North America became giants of higher education, and European higher education was relatively weak at that time. So through the inter-regional collaborations they wanted to reestablish European higher education and create a competitive higher education capacity in Europe. That is what I understand and also some writers of the Erasmus program actually wrote about. So that kind of thinking actually came in when we established the programs in East Asia.

> Now, of course, we had to focus on peace and collaborations of the three countries as a symbolic meaning but when there was more discussions on East Asian integration and governance, there were considerations of ... competitiveness through intra-regional collaborations. So that actually came in in this program too I think.
>
> Academic, Center for International Education, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The same professor went on to explain that the rapid rise of China in the realm of science and technology had made this notion of cooperation to enhance competitiveness particularly salient for Japan. In this context he also discussed idea of *science diplomacy* which was found in a number of government-level documents and discussed in Chapter 6:

The need for science diplomacy

> I'm also on an international strategy committee at the Ministry of Education. And I heard one very interesting and impactful presentation from the president of the JST [Japan Science and Technology Agency] which illustrated how advanced the science and engineering fields are in China. If you saw the top 10% impact journal articles 10, 15 years ago – among 50 fields probably 40 are from the United States. The top is the United States and then the rest of them are all from Japan. But now it has completely changed with China. So China is really a growing giant of science and engineering technology now. So for this international strategy committee meeting we had to discuss the science diplomacy of Japan. In terms of political diplomacy maybe China-Japan relations is not very good... But for science diplomacy we don't have options to just only compete with China, but we have to collaborate otherwise we won't be able to keep our competence and competitiveness.
>
> Academic, Center for International Education, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

Ideas about cooperation for competitiveness once again emerge. For the professor, science diplomacy does not have the same aggressive soft power connotations found in the CSTI documents which describe it as a tool to enhance the 'wealth and power' of the nation (see Chapter 6). Instead, science diplomacy is a necessity for Japan to simply maintain the status quo in an increasingly competitive region. The connection of the idea of science diplomacy

to the political arena sets the stage for a transition to the final level of programmatic ideas explored through the participant interviews, that of the ideas about the perceived realities and possibilities for international relations between the three countries.

Ideas about Northeast Asian international relations

A set of questions asked of all participants intended to uncover their ideas about the connections between programs for higher education regional cooperation and Northeast Asian international relations was, "Why do you think the governments of the three countries got together and decided to make this program? Why *only* those three, and why now at this time in history?"

A return to Asianism?

Some actors involved in STEM fields were quick to plead ignorance, stating that they were unsure about the political rationales and motivations driving policymakers at the government level. Others with more expertise in social and political science had a lot of valuable insights to contribute. One such insight framed the current policy agenda for regional cooperation in the broader historical context of debates between Western and 'Asianist' schools of thought that have existed in Japan for many years:

> I think there are two ways to explain the situation. The first answer to this question is Japan had always been looking to the United States or Western nations so maybe as a reaction to this the government started to emphasize a focus on East Asia. So this is a very historical reason. In this country there is always two schools coexisting and arguing with each other: Japan should follow a Western model or we should have a more close relationship with Asian nations. So it's a modernist kind of Western school and also an Asianist school. So I think there is always a tension co-existing, not only in this program but every policy in Japan. So this is a manifestation of a very long tradition of Asianism. So this is one thing.
>
> Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The idea of a return to Asianism as a reaction to the long-standing Westernist approach aligns with the historical unseating of Japan's LDP from power by the DPJ. Then Prime Minister Hatoyama and his party perhaps recognized the chance to take a radically different approach to East Asian relations, and it was during this time that CAMPUS Asia was conceived. This period was discussed by other participants, one of whom thought that DPJ's (retrospectively short) rise to power was also welcomed by China and Korea, who saw this political shift in Japan as an opportunity for an era of improved relations. This view was supported by one of the supplementary interviews I conducted with a professor in Korea as well:

> As you know education is the soft area, compared to the economic and military cooperation. So, at the time in 2009 the then Prime Minister Hatoyama in Japan, I think he was very open and flexible to make this kind of soft idea of making an East Asian Community, and [led] the political momentum where Japan, Korea and China try to make some kind of trilateral summit where the leaders of three countries get together to discuss, to provide some attraction [sic] in the future for collaboration of these three important countries in Northeast Asia.
>
> Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Korea University

The US influence

The short-lived nature of the DPJ in Japanese politics was described by some as being connected to another key element of East Asian international relations, the influence of the United States in the region:

> I'm not by any means an expert on East Asian diplomacy but from what I've read the Hatoyama government in particular was very keen to build a more positive relationship with China, and Korea. I think you may remember when Hatoyama was prime minister his buddy, what's his name, Ozawa, took a delegation of Japanese parliamentarians over to Beijing and of course what brought Hatoyama down was the spat over the (US) airbase off Okinawa. And you put two things together and what Hatoyama was trying to do was become less reliant on America and build a more constructive relationship, which personally seems to me to be the obvious strategy for Japan to pursue. There is no alternative, in the long term. And yet, Hatoyama was very badly undermined by some of his own officials but also by American diplomats, you know many of them, the key advisors in Washington...who were being told by their conservative contacts here in Japan that

> Hatoyama was a disaster ... and you need to do something to get him out. And he ended up being very publicly snubbed by Obama at a key meeting. Obama treated him in a way for example an American president until Trump would never have treated the leader of a key ally...
>
> Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

The influence of the United States on East Asian relations was mentioned by a few participants generally with reference to the complex rivalry between the USA and China. Some interviewees expressed mild trepidation raising the issue because I am an American, but I did my best to reassure them that any opinions they shared wouldn't upset me, and it was my hope they would speak freely. Nevertheless, it may have been difficult for some to share their true thoughts about the USA because of who was interviewing them. The complex relationship between Japan and the USA also arose in discussions on the controversial visits of Japanese politicians to Yasukuni Shrine, perceived as a major barrier to East Asian international relations. This topic is revisited in the following chapter.

Politics and the economy are intertwined

The other point mentioned by the Political Science professor at Waseda points back to the very first quote introduced at the beginning of this chapter, where the Business students from Hitotsubashi University refer to the positive economic developments in East Asia. He differs with their reported view about disregarding political tensions, however, suggesting the three governments recognize the importance of maintaining stable political relations for the purpose of continued economic growth:

> And also, another aspect is related to the economic situation. Now there is mutual interdependence between Japan, China and Korea that became very salient. But still once some kind of political conflict occurs, business and commercial interactions might be very threatened by such kind of things, unstable in this kind of political relationship. So I think this is one reason why the three governments know very well that conflict does very serious damage to economic development and economic prosperity in this region. So I think this is one reason. In order to keep the area

> economically prosperous, I think all three governments agreed we really need this kind of thing for the future of East Asia.

Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

These comments from 2018 foreshadowed the spillover of diplomatic tensions between Japan and Korea over war-time forced labor into the economic arena the following year. The row between the two countries led to trade restrictions, boycotts on Japanese products in Korea and reduced levels of tourism. Critically the tensions also spilled over into the security arena, with the two nations deciding to cease the sharing of intelligence regarding North Korea with one another, much to the dismay of their mutual American ally.

An academic from Okayama University also highlighted the growing forms of economic regionalization taking place in East Asia, and suggested the governments came to the realization that these should be strengthened by establishing regionalist institutions:

> ... you mentioned about regionalism. But actually East Asia, particularly these three countries have, somebody called it, 'regionalization without regionalism'. So we have strong ties in terms of economy and exchange of people, tourists and so on, but we don't have regionalism. We don't think about that we East Asians get together [sic], like ASEAN has. Europe used to have, now it's not so sure but they – in these regions and before Trump we also had a kind of North American-- the NAFTA...
>
> So regionalization like it or not, it's growing more and more and in terms of the population and trade and exchange of people, East Asia is very big, next to the EU, next to NAFTA, much bigger than ASEAN. So looking at this regionalization, I understand these three countries' governments thought, we have to do something to develop the regionalism. So they selected different areas like the environment, economy and this, education. I think that's the motivation...
>
> So officially these three countries, they do for the politics [sic], they cannot be so friendly but inside they feel that the politicians, the government thinks that we need to develop regionalism at this stage. So that is the only hidden agenda but we cannot show that we forgive Japan, something like this, territorial issues. Japanese government cannot say this –

> It's difficult to compromise at this moment by the present governance. Instead – you cannot make black and white under the current situation but we can invest to the next generations so that is the logic as far as I understood.
>
> Academic, Sustainable Development, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University

The above are some of the main programmatic themes that emerged from the data, which provide some context and a better explanation for the reasons behind the policy ideas discussed in the first section of the chapter. Commitment to academic freedom and the idea of universities in Japan as a public sphere create the conditions for discussing political tensions and celebrating cultural connections. As the CCP tightens its grip on freedoms of expression in China, Japanese higher education has the chance to assert itself as a space for open dialogue and as a contact zone for the critical study of the region. As China also rises as a major global player in STI, STEM students at Japanese universities benefit from learning science diplomacy, focusing on collaborative projects without attending to differences or diplomatic tensions, and helping Japan to maintain competitiveness through cooperation. Programmatic ideas about international relations in the region point to a recognition of the importance of existing economic interdependence and the need for regionalist institutions to ensure their continued development, which aligns with many of the policy ideas of higher education regional cooperation for employability and a 'prosperous 'future.

The final section of this chapter shifts now to a brief discussion of third level of the discursive institutionalist framework, with an interpretive consideration of some of the potential underlying philosophies that may be informing these policy and programmatic ideas.

Underlying Philosophies

The ideational category of 'underlying philosophies' is perhaps the most abstract and unknowable of the three levels in the discursive institutionalist framework. This level thus poses the biggest challenges for the social researcher, as by nature these foundational beliefs about the world are often unconscious to the individuals in question and rarely spoken of directly. As such any claims about actors' underlying philosophies are bound to be deeply subjective and interpretative. With this disclaimer, I offer a few thoughts, some based on participant quotes (and others on silences), that may point in the direction of particular foundational beliefs about the world upon which the policy and programmatic ideas of regional cooperation find support.

Schmidt's definition of cognitive philosophical ideas is "how policies and programs mesh with deeper principles and norms of relevant scientific disciplines or technical practices" (Schmidt, 2008, pp. 306-7). As was introduced in the first section of this chapter on policy ideas for the two programs, notable differences in ideas about higher education regional cooperation were evident across academic disciplines. These distinctions arguably point to fundamental differences in the underlying philosophies of these disciplines, with STEM fields focused on 'borderless' knowledge production, the Arts on culture and creative collaboration, and certain Social Sciences on communicative action for the resolution of social problems. The more professional disciplines like Law, Medicine, Architecture and Teacher Education frequently conceived of their programs for regional cooperation in employability terms.

In practice, each of these disciplinary cognitive philosophies intersected with the ideas of regional cooperation for global competitiveness found at the government level, resulting in the adoption and adaptation of government policy rhetoric to align with disciplinary

orientations. These adaptations were not without inherent tensions, however. For example, an A3 Foresight participant lamented how the A3 project funding application contained a requirement to demonstrate the applicability of the proposed research, indicative of a growing trend that favors Mode 2 applied science to the detriment of basic science. This points to a potential conflict in the government's goals of knowledge production for innovation and national competitiveness with that of certain scientific communities, whose epistemic beliefs include a commitment to the furthering of all scientific knowledge at the global level. However, many in the science disciplines themselves prescribed to the notion of cooperation to enhance competitiveness, highlighting that variation also exists within disciplines. In both the Arts and Social Science programs, administrators and academics grappled with incorporating terms like 'global human resources', but felt compelled to do so in order to receive program funding. Many appeared successful in repurposing these terms however, with the reinterpretations enabling for the development of programs that aligned with their disciplinary worldviews.

While the tensions inherent in ideas of cooperation for the sake of competition created challenges for some actors at the policy level, I suggest they also connect to another underlying philosophical idea that appeared ubiquitous across the dataset; that of the unquestioned centrality of the nation-state.

The nation as an unquestioned, central reality

One way to attempt to understand underlying philosophies is to notice what is *not* spoken of - absences or silences in the discussion. This is of course a hugely subjective endeavor, but framed within a given topic and context it can also be a telling exercise. Broadly speaking, actors who were interviewed did not bring up certain topics, such as capitalism

(or its often ill-spoken of variant ‘neoliberalism’), or the existing international order of Westphalian nation-states. These were perhaps assumed to be unchangeable givens. The established national sovereignty of the three countries also went unquestioned, and no mention was made about the possible eventual outcome of regional cooperation ideally manifesting itself in some sort of new, unified sovereign political entity. There was no talk of hopes for an EU equivalent in Northeast or broader East Asia, in the sense that one might someday be able to carry an East Asian passport.

Beyond these speculations, there were a few ideas alluded to by participants that were indicative of possible underlying worldviews, many of which were tied to notions of nationhood. One of these was the idea of cultural diversity as a concept that was nationally-bounded. This in itself did not appear to be a negative thing, but did at times appear to connect to the ideas of nationalism that arose in many discussions about barriers, discussed in the following chapter. The theme of nationally-bounded cultural diversity was evident across documents at all levels, and in the comments of many different actors. Little mention was made of the extensive Chinese and Korean diaspora populations living in Japan, for example. I noticed it as a theme because I was often looking for evidence of cultural connections that spanned the three nations[50], which also emerged on occasion, but I found numerous instances where cultural differences between the countries were highlighted instead. This was noted in the earlier section of this chapter in the quote from the Law professor at Nagoya University.

[50] I have recognized this to be a bias of my own, illuminated by the general lack of participant comments on these ‘cultural connections’.

Notions of banal forms of nationalism could also be traced beneath documents and discussions of global competitiveness, and the rationales for cooperating with neighboring Northeast Asian nations for purposes of its augmentation. For example, normative ideas about 'mutual understanding', 'prosperity', the social roles of higher education, and the goals of science diplomacy, all contained inherent assumptions about the interminable future of 'the nation'.

Recognition of a shared humanity

However, another theme that appeared to emerge organically in discussions was a recognition, at times realized through the process of study abroad, of a shared humanity that unified the peoples of the region:

> after living in China and South Korea, I had both pros and cons about each society and each situation, but one of the big findings I found in two countries throughout the program is that we are same, after all. We are human, right? And we have empathy and we have understanding toward each other if we tried to understand.
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

> Well, to begin with, I wanted to go to South Korea, and I also heard from my family a rumor about my roots; that perhaps there was someone of Korean origin, though I don't know about this for certain. However, my father, who is part of these roots, really dislikes South Korea. He detests it. Moreover, he hates it despite not having been there. The question I had was, "how can you say you hate South Korea so much?", despite the fact that if we traced our ancestry back quite a bit, our ancestry might actually be mixed. For this reason, I felt that I actually wanted to see the country for real and said that I wanted to go there. So the first impression I had before studying abroad was, "Is South Korea really that bad as he says it is"? That was my mindset.
>
> So when I actually went there, I did feel a little that there were some problems, ones that had been mentioned several times in Japan. However, my rough impression was that "it is not a country which one could hate that much", because we are all the same humans .... So something which I had at first questioned changed, something that was negative changed into something positive. This is what had changed as a result of visiting South Korea.

Student, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo Gakugei University

The descriptions of the experiences of students encountering their shared humanity with peoples from other nations seemed to resonate with some of the ideals for education mentioned by academics:

> Education should be about enabling people to explore their humanity, to live more fulfilling lives, to expand their capabilities not just as workers but as citizens and as human beings.

Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

> I think that we are more interested in how we can educate the students as a human being, so I think the CAMPUS Asia should be one of the methods for the students to develop their own humanity through the encountering with many different cultures.

Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

Through discussions with a number of students participating in the two programs, it appeared that this ideal for education was in many cases being realized. The ideas of a shared humanity and the role of education for its cultivation points, I argue, to an underlying philosophy about the social world that frames many of the programmatic normative ideas about Northeast Asian international relations, the social roles of higher education, and the policy ideas related to the intended outcomes of the two programs under study. This underlying worldview exists perhaps in tension with cognitive beliefs about the centrality of the nation-state and nationally-bounded cultural identities.

To conclude, this chapter has presented a range of policy, programmatic and philosophical ideas of actors at Japanese universities. Major emergent themes included dramatic differences in ideas for regional cooperation across academic disciplines and the repurposing and alignment of government-level policy ideas with institutional strategies,

disciplinary worldviews and individual values. There was a widely held normative commitment to broadening perspectives through transformational exchange, coupled with an orientation to study abroad infused with an employability agenda. These policy level ideas were couched in the broader programmatic perspectives of Japanese higher education as a public sphere for debate, collaboration and academic freedom, and as a gateway to connect East Asia to the wider world. Japanese universities were also bound by their legacy as mechanisms for national advancement through scientific knowledge production, and were seen by many as tools to enact science diplomacy and augment Japan's global competitiveness. Government steering of Japanese universities with regard to regional cooperation was viewed as an evolving political project influenced by shifts in domestic politics, China's rise, regional economic interdependence, competition with the West and the complex relationship between Japan and the USA. I suggest above that many of these ideas and discourses are shaped by underlying worldviews that hold national identity as foundational, although transformative experiences of study abroad have the potential to shift (or add on to) these worldviews toward a shared identity with the wider world. As was alluded to in a number of sections in this chapter, virtually all actors interviewed had ideas about a number of ideological and practical barriers that impeded the realization of many of their ideals of regional cooperation. These barriers are presented and discussed in the following chapter.

Chapter 8: Barriers to regional cooperation

While there was substantial variation in the range of policy and programmatic ideas about what regional cooperation in Northeast Asia is and should be, there was relative consistency across cases regarding the perceived barriers that impede the realization of these ideas in practice. These perceived barriers (which are ideas in themselves), were again analysed by level and type in line with the discursive institutionalist framework. As in the previous chapter, policy level ideas focus on CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight program-specific barriers, while the programmatic-level addresses the broader contexts of Japanese higher education, national strategies, and China-Japan-Korea relations. Ideas at these various levels are presented below in a manner that highlights the interconnections between them and are organized into the broad categories of *ideational barriers* and *institutional barriers*. Adapting the discursive institutionalist approach from Schmidt (2017), I posit that 'ideational barriers' are obstacles connected to the "structures and constructs of meaning internal to agents" which perpetuate social relations that impede regional cooperation, while 'institutional barriers' connote impediments that manifest from "the formal and informal institutions external to actors that may be seen to constrain (or empower) them" (Schmidt, 2017, p. 252). Put another way, ideational barriers refer to the various ideas actors in society have and are exposed to across the three countries, while institutional barriers connote obstacles that emerge from social structures and organizational practices external to actors, particularly those found at Japanese universities. The two categories are not mutually exclusive; there is some overlap where particular ideas could be categorized either way. But I argue that this approach to the categorization of themes allows for an effective means to present both the various policy- and programmatic-level ideas and show the possible relationships between them.

Ideational barriers

Difficulty recruiting Japanese students

A nearly ubiquitous policy-level barrier described across all cases and by academics, administrators and students alike was the trouble recruiting Japanese students to take part in study abroad in East Asia. While this issue is arguably a practical, 'institutional' barrier, I argue that the reasons behind this challenge are fundamentally ideational in nature, and connect to broader, underlying programmatic ideas about Japan and its relationship to the Asian region. I develop this argument below.

The number of Japanese students interested in study abroad in general was described as being low, with those that do go abroad typically choosing to study in English-speaking Western countries like the USA, UK, or Australia. While slightly dated, the following two slides from a presentation on CAMPUS Asia delivered by an official at MEXT highlights this trend, and shows that a number of factors influence Japanese students' choices to not study abroad including financial constraints, concerns about language abilities, and domestic pressures to take part in job-hunting during their time at university. These particular issues are not new, however, and so they do not adequately explain the decline in students choosing to go abroad.

Figure. 8.1: Trends in the number of Japanese students studying abroad



Figure 8.2: Obstacles for Japanese students to study abroad



Worry to stay in university one more year after back to Japan	68%
Financial problems as main reasons	48%
Difficulty to recognition of credit after back to Japan	37%
Shortage of faculty staffs who can advise on studying abroad	26%
University structure for suport of students on studying abroad	24%
Lack of information of foreign universities in which Japanese students can study	10%
Understanding of family	8%
Understanding of academic supervisor	3%
Others	31%

While the MEXT slides point to job-hunting, financial factors, and lack of support from universities as the main obstacles, another common argument attempting to explain the decline in study abroad participation that has been offered in the Japanese media is that Japan's youth have become increasingly 'inward-looking' (*uchimuki*) in recent years (Burgess, 2015). According to this argument, the comforts of Japan as a peaceful, technologically-advanced society coupled with growing uncertainty about safety in other countries (including fears of terrorism) has led many young Japanese to forego opportunities to study, work and volunteer abroad (ibid.). Burgess is critical of this argument, however, suggesting that it is not the youth who are themselves *uchimuki;* it is instead the broader institutions in society that remain insular and resistant to adapt to the encroaching forces of globalization. The MEXT slide above highlights concerns from students that study abroad will lengthen their overall time spent at university, implying that going abroad entails missing out on opportunities to take part in the time-consuming process of job-hunting that often occupies students during their final years at university. However, Burgess argues that the real issue is that the "rigid job-hunting system" and a "conservative corporate culture" are institutions that actually devalue those with international experience, paying little more than lip-service to the government's goals of seeking 'global human resources' (ibid., p. 503).

Whatever the causes, and while these broader trends of declining participation in study abroad overall are arguably a barrier in itself, participants interviewed emphasized that it was *particularly* difficult to market and attract Japanese students to a study abroad program in East Asia:

> Student exchange within East Asia is a minor interest of the students themselves, so they are more interested in the UK or you know US, Europe, but it's something about East Asia, it's not so popular.

Administrator, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

> Creating a study abroad program and setting subjects in itself isn't technically that difficult. However, finding out how to send Japanese students to China and South Korea is extremely difficult. In contrast, there has been an abundance of Chinese and Korean students coming to Japan and quite a lot of them keep coming even when there's no scholarship. However, I think the hardest, and the only, challenge is to also make Japanese students interested in this.

Administrator, Center for International Education, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

> Japanese graduate students are maybe not really interested in going abroad, generally undergrad and graduate school. So actually we have been experiencing this problem. When we received students from Kobe (Japan), they were not necessarily Japanese students. They were in many cases Chinese who went to Kobe University and they are taking this opportunity to experience Korea.

Academic, CAMPUS Asia, Korea University

With regard to East Asian exchange programs, difficulties encouraging Japanese students to study abroad in general appeared to be compounded by the fact that those that did choose to go abroad preferred to study in Anglosphere countries. One administrator described this preference as being connected to a 'fixed idea' among the Japanese about studying the English language:

> Well, I think language is the biggest problem... Obviously, students who study English are the largest in number. Well, this is probably a fixed idea that Japanese people have, but there is a certain bias that one cannot learn clearly-spoken English without going to the US or the UK, or Oceania. So people who study abroad for the first time are very likely to study in the West. This relates exactly to how it is extremely common for students to look toward Asia as their second study abroad destination. Students who had studied abroad during high school (in the West) frequently have an interest in East Asia.

Administrator, Center for International Education, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

Among the students I interviewed who chose to take part in CAMPUS Asia, there were a few for whom the program was their second study abroad experience; the first being in the

United States. It was during their time abroad in the USA that they met Chinese and Korean students who were also studying abroad, and these encounters challenged their preconceived notions and sparked their interest in East Asian relations. In this respect, students choosing to study abroad in the West instead of East Asia is not inherently a barrier to East Asian regional cooperation in itself. In fact, a 2016 study abroad survey of approximately 4,500 Japanese students - 88% of whom studied abroad in Western countries - revealed that 62% of students reported their sense of regional, Asian identity increased as a result of their experience (Kuroda, 2018; Yokota et al., 2016).

Some students in Japan have opportunities to study abroad during high school, and here too students tend to select Western countries as destinations (Yokota et al., 2016). However, one student I interviewed was rare in the sense that they had chosen to undertake two periods of study abroad during their time at university, which would end up delaying their graduation by one year. As this possible delay was a reported deterrent for many students, the draw to the West for those undertaking study abroad for the first time could serve to impede participation in East Asian programs. However, the findings indicated that it is not solely this draw to Western countries that results in Japanese students forgoing chances to study abroad in East Asia. Another critical barrier was the presence of a set of persistent programmatic ideas that appear to be widespread in Japan.

Ignorance and lack of awareness of China and Korea in Japan

The lack of interest in study abroad in China or Korea was recognized by some as indicative of a larger and more serious issue. When asked what the main barriers were to achieving regional cooperation, a student from UTokyo mentioned that the big problem was a lack of

awareness and interest in the neighboring countries of China and Korea on the part of the Japanese, which she attributed to *muchi* (ignorance):

> Because I am Japanese and because I was ignorant as well, as a high school student and university student, I could say the issue is that. For instance, the big difference...this could be explained by the speed of development of each society but... I still say that whenever you go to the university library in South Korea and China they have so many books about Japan. From the novels to you know, essays,… many things. Both written in Japanese and English, so they try to understand from many perspectives. I'd always go to the library in the two countries, and I always found my favorite authors of Japanese books, and so that was very good for me as well. But when I think about Japan how many authors, like Korean authors and Chinese authors can I name? And how many books in Chinese and Korean language do I have access to in the Tokyo University library? So I think this is a 'one-way love' from China and South Korea to the Japanese society.
>
> South Koreans and Chinese are sometimes too much [sic] about promoting anti-Japanese [sic] and I hate that as well. But I could see that they are making efforts to understand from many perspectives... But because we developed first, and we think that we are the first Asian country to attain the successful life, I have a feeling that we have failed to learn about our neighbors in a deep sense. We know their political leaders but it's hard for us to name the other kind of leaders, we know K-Pop, … but that's it!
>
> So I feel like Japanese people including myself should have more interest in many kinds of things in South Korea and China and I think that's the same for political issues as well; South Korean and Chinese people they know so much… but for Japanese people we don't know anything. Right? Comfort women, who are they? Nanjing Massacre, when is it? So like, this gap between Japanese and Chinese and Korean people is very huge and I feel like the Japanese side is '*muchi*' (ignorance), including myself. That's what I think.
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

When considering this excerpt from my interview with the UTokyo student, I was reminded of my discussion with the government official from NIAD-QE:

> I know a lot about the Germans and Europeans, their history, their culture, their everyday life. But, to my shame, I have so little idea about Chinese and Koreans and I must confess, it was, my first time in Korea was about 15 years ago and in Seoul I have to admit what I didn't know, what I had known about Korea was *so*

> *little*. It's really a big shame for me. And more or less the same is true of the Japanese people.
>
> Official, CAMPUS Asia Monitoring, NIAD-QE, Japanese Government

According to some, this lack of awareness of China and Korea on the part of Japan was a key factor contributing to political tensions between the three countries. An academic at Waseda provided a poignant example with his take on the repeated visits of Japanese politicians to Yasukini Shrine, an issue that outrages many Chinese and Koreans:

> From the point of view of Japanese conservatives the Yasukuni issue is the issue of the relationship between Japan and the United States, not Japan and China, not Japan and Korea. So basically they believe that these people died in the war against the United States. And also America occupied Japan and actually America saved the Emperor and put the Emperor as a symbol of the entire nation, so somehow they believed that America actually…, we Japanese and the Americans fought each other, but now somehow the reconciliation was made…So Japan has very special and very strong emotions against America…so Yasukuni is a symbol of that kind of love/hate, strong emotions against the United States. They don't care at all about the Chinese feelings, Korean feelings at all. So I don't think they intentionally are trying to irritate China and Korea, they simply ignore the existence of Korea and China.
>
> Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The above quote highlights how ignorance and lack of awareness can have political ramifications and impede regional cooperation. When I tried to uncover why there was this perceived 'one-way love' from China and Korea to Japan that went unreciprocated, a number of actors discussed how perceptions of Japan's national self and its relationships to other nations in the region were bound up with the country's leading role in modernizing and its subsequent economic development during the 20th century. This coincided with the development of a national identity imbued with a sense of superiority toward its East Asian neighbors, reflective of Breaden's descriptions of Japan's self-perception as being 'ahead and above' Asia (Breaden, 2018).

Mistaken view that Japan is No. 1

While the 21st century has witnessed Japan experiencing prolonged economic stagnation and a range of societal challenges that pose obstacles for recovery, according to a number of actors the (now mistaken) view that Japan is 'Number 1' in Asia has persisted, posing a number of challenges in itself:

> I feel that maybe not in our generation, but my parents' generation, they're very used to treating East Asian people as inferior. I don't want to sound like a racist, but it's very hard to change their mind. Like economically, China and Korea are growing so rapidly, and they're almost like… Japan's economy, but they cannot accept that emotionally. So, like, they want to put this bias that they're...they want to make sure that they're not like superior to us.
>
> Student, Conflict Resolution, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

In addition to the persistent idea that Japan remains a superior nation, particularly among older generations, an academic at Tokyo Tech explained how this idea also persists in the realm of STI and knowledge production:

> The reason why we'd like to promote CAMPUS Asia, one of the biggest reasons, is we say that China or Korea has a very big dynamism [sic], and I should say that Japan, or Japanese universities - this is my own opinion - but we have to catch up with their activities in many cases. Once Japanese or Tokyo Tech students visit KAIST or Tsinghua or Korea or China, they will be so surprised. Because we or students believe that Japan is the best, the highest, and the most international situation or something… the answer is no. Once they go over there, they are so surprised to see it.
>
> Academic, Engineering, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo Institute of Technology

Lack of awareness, ignorance, and a misplaced sense of superiority on the part of Japanese people were described by a number of actors as reasons both for the lack of popularity of East Asian study abroad opportunities and for difficulties in attaining successful regional cooperation. I argue that these characteristics are bound up with another factor that impedes cooperation at both the higher education and broader socio-political levels. Unlike the idea of *muchi* (ignorance), this is not a characteristic that was perceived to be unique to Japan,

but was described rather as a strong influence shaping worldviews in all three countries. A number of interview participants offered personal accounts of their experiences with this phenomenon, described below.

Nationalism

Nationalism was often invoked as an ideational barrier that impeded regional cooperation. Nationalism is a complex high-order concept that has received substantial scholarly attention in its own right (see for example Anderson, 2006; Hobsbawm, 2012; Smith, 2010), and it has also been discussed in relation to its purported infusion into Japan's agenda for internationalization (*kokusaika*) (Goodman, 2007). One possible way of interpreting the term is offered by Anthony D. Smith, who defines it as

> an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential "nation" (Smith, 2010, p. 9).

Smith's definition is quite general and abstract, and serves as an umbrella concept that can include a wide range of nationalist ideologies. Smith goes on to describe how nationalism can manifest in civic/voluntarist or ethnic/organicist varieties[51], as well as span a spectrum from relatively banal to more extreme, xenophobic and violent forms (ibid.). Grosby (2005), by contrast, posits a narrower definition, highlighting the detrimental nature of these extreme forms of nationalism:

> Nationalism refers to a set of beliefs about the nation...that often leads to the belief that the nation demands unquestioned and uncompromising loyalty...[and] often asserts that other nations are implacable enemies to one's own nation; it injects hatred of what is perceived to be foreign, whether another nation, an immigrant, or a person that may practice another religion or speak a different language" (ibid., p. 5).

[51] In brief, the difference here entails whether one can choose to be a member of a nation through voluntary civic participation or is deemed a member by birth or ethnicity.

The narrower definition provided by Grosby appears to align with many of the ideas of actors who expressed how nationalism impeded the attainment of goals for regional cooperation in various ways.

Nationalism was described by one participant as a socio-political force that exerted pressure on actors at Japanese universities to justify the purposes and value of their programs, particularly in the social sciences and humanities:

> At the political level, the strong nationalism always gives us challenges. For example, recently the government always asks, or *orders*, universities to practice some kind of, somehow 'useful thing' - for example some kind of collaboration in the field of engineering. People easily understand that, how it is actually useful... but in our program, an undergraduate program and the issue is conflict resolution - very sort of society or kind of policy-oriented issues... so I think the nationalistic feeling always casts doubt on the mission of these kind of programs. As in 'Why should we Japanese pay tax for educating Korean students or Chinese students?" or something like that. This kind of nationalism is always a challenge for us to deal with. So this is kind of the political level.

Academic, Political Science and Economics, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The above quote highlights how perceptions of nationalism at the 'political level' can pose challenges for the internationalization agendas of particular programs at Japanese universities. In this respect it points to the possibility that while nationalism and internationalization may in many ways be intertwined in the government's *kokusaika* agenda, these two forces can conflict at times at the university-level.

Descriptions of nationalistic attitudes were by no means limited to Japan. A number of CAMPUS Asia students described challenging encounters with nationalism in China, including those who were proficient Chinese speakers. One student who is a Japanese national fluent in Chinese discussed her experiences of encountering xenophobic or anti-

Japanese attitudes while in Beijing, as well as her courageous and pro-active approach to addressing these attitudes:

> When I was in China, I actually faced a lot of nationalism and outright, you know, not like discrimination but when I was talking in Japanese with my friends, for example in a tourist area like Tiananmen, people would shout at me like, "Oh you're not welcome here!" or something like that ... so, every time that happened I'd talk to them in Chinese, because I might be their first Japanese person to meet, so I wanted to give them a good first impression...
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

This student's trilingual language abilities and self-confidence enabled her to engage directly with Chinese locals who expressed anti-Japanese sentiment. She also made this the focus of her master's degree research, describing her interest in the subject in the following way:

> So I was really interested in how nationalism really drives people, even though we're the same people from the same region it puzzled me how just because you're born in one country you can be so hostile to another person, and that seemed to be really strong in East Asia, more than in other countries and other regions.
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

This strong sense of nationalism was often discussed by participants in the context of national politics and the controversial actions of politicians in the three countries as attempts to shore up support among domestic constituencies. This theme also arose with discussions of portrayals of China, Japan and Korea in the mass media, and the stereotypes and biases that become spread throughout society by way of television, newspapers and the internet.

Portrayals of 'Others' in the media

As was mentioned in a number of quotations highlighting the value of face-to-face interactions through exchange in the previous chapter, the commonly perceived flipside to

gaining personal experiences with those from other countries was receiving information about them through the media. Actors generally recognized the inherent bias in the presentations of 'Others' through these media channels, and some described this as a serious barrier impeding regional cooperation:

> I think it's the media in each country. Each country's media is making stereotypes against other countries' people. In Korea, many people have wrong thoughts [sic] against Japan and China. Also Chinese and Japanese people have wrong stereotypes toward Koreans. When media speaks about something, people believe it...They think, "Koreans do that and every Korean has the same traits like that." So I think media makes the biggest barriers.
>
> Student, Sustainable Development, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University

> ...most of Korea really hates Japan because of our history and recently President Moon said Japan is not our alliance [sic]. Even though our, we have a strong alliance with the US and Japan's alliance [with the US] is very strong we are not… Japan is not our alliance. And many public people said 'oh that's very good comments' [sic]. So Korea and Japan need to trust each other but I think that's hardly possible for the moment.
>
> Interviewer:
> Why not?
>
> Student:
> I think there are some kind of media or political problems because they want to manipulate anti-Japan sentiment for their, for strengthening their political power sometimes in Korean politics because that unites Korean people.
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

In these and the quotes in Chapter 7 highlighting the value of face-to-face communication, actors point out how depictions of neighboring East Asian countries in the media serve to perpetuate stereotypes among the peoples of the three countries. Interestingly, it was often students who made these observations. Whether or not these comments are reflective of a broader generational shift towards an increased cognizance of media bias is an interesting topic for future research.

The comment by the UTokyo student above about government and media purposively working to foment anti-Japanese sentiment is suggestive of another interconnected issue, that of the degrees by which media channels in the three countries are able to produce content and undertake journalistic pursuits free from government control.

While academic freedom remains relatively protected in Japanese society, press freedom has witnessed a significant decline in recent years. In 2013, the LDP pushed through the Act on Protection of Specified Secrets, also known as the 'Secrecy Law'. The Law sparked controversy among the Japanese public because of its ambiguity and potential severity. It effectively grants

> ministries and agencies, including the Defense Ministry and the Nuclear Regulation Authority, the power to classify information in areas such as diplomacy and counterterrorism as "state secrets." The law subjects leakers to up to 10 years in prison and those who try to obtain secrets, including journalists, to five years behind bars (Osaki, 2014).

The passage of the Secrecy law led to a wave of grassroots protests and a dramatic drop of 31 places in Japan's RSF World Press Freedom ranking from 22 to 53. The ranking as of this writing in 2019 is even lower, at 67 out of 180 countries (Reporters Without Borders, 2019). According to the Reporters without Borders website:

> Journalists have been complaining of a climate of mistrust toward them ever since Shinzo Abe became prime minister again in 2012. The system of "kisha clubs" (reporters' clubs) continues to discriminate against freelancers and foreign reporters. On social networks, nationalist groups harass journalists who are critical of the government or cover "antipatriotic" subjects such as the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster or the US military presence in Okinawa. The government continues to refuse any debate about a law protecting "Specially Designated Secrets," under which whistleblowers, journalists and bloggers face up to ten years in prison if convicted of publishing information obtained "illegally." (Reporters Without Borders, 2019)

In 2019, South Korea's ranking was 41st, 26 places higher than Japan. According to the same site:

> The election of Moon Jae-in, a human rights activist and former political prisoner, as president has been a breath of fresh air after a bad decade in which South Korea fell more than 30 places in RSF's World Press Freedom Index. The South Korean media showed their grit in the course of the battle they waged with President Park Geun-hye from 2014 and 2016, and finally won when she was impeached for corruption and removed... Nonetheless, structural problems remain. The system of appointing managers at the public broadcasters needs to be revised in order to guarantee their independence. Defamation is still punishable by seven years in prison and must be decriminalized. South Korea also needs to repeal laws that, on national security grounds, provide for extremely severe penalties for the dissemination of sensitive information, especially if it involves North Korea. (Reporters Without Borders, 2019).

Clearly, freedom of the press in Japan and Korea is far from guaranteed, and there are persistent socio-cultural, systemic and legal practices that hinder 'objective' reporting, alternative perspectives and criticism of the government. However, these issues pale in comparison to the situation in China. Ranked 177th out of 180, its country profile is as follows:

> By relying on the massive use of new technology, President Xi Jinping has succeeded in imposing a social model in China based on control of news and information and online surveillance of its citizens. At the same time, he has been trying to export this oppressive model by promoting a "new world media order" under China's influence. China's state and privately-owned media are now under the Communist Party's close control while foreign reporters trying to work in China are encountering more and more obstacles in the field. More than 60 journalists and bloggers are currently detained in conditions that pose a threat to their lives. ...Under tougher Internet regulations, members of the public can now be jailed for the comments on a news item that they post on a social network or messaging service or even just for sharing content (Reporters Without Borders, 2019).

Levels of constraint and outright oppression of press freedoms (and freedom of speech) vary considerably among the three countries but are present in all of them. In these settings, criticism of ones' own national government is discouraged, blocked or completely silenced. In addition to restrictions on self-critique, ruling elites have often utilized media channels to fuel popular resentment towards neighboring East Asian (and other) countries, which serves to deflect criticism away from themselves or unpopular domestic policies (Vickers,

2007). Adopting this strategy entails portraying 'Enemy Others' who can be blamed for domestic troubles instead of the ruling politicians or their parties (Morris et al., 2015). In this context, the value of face-to-face exchange becomes more clear.

> Before ... I had no foreign friends, Chinese friends, Korean friends, I didn't have any, and I had to imagine and understand about the two countries through the TV programs or the internet. But now I have friends, now I have the real voice, yes [sic]. And I think we have to remove our bias. I think the most easy way, the most useful way of removing bias is talking with friends. Not in TV or like that.
>
> Student, Animation, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo University of the Arts

While interactions with 'friends' from neighboring countries is an ideal that could help break down biases and other barriers to regional cooperation, the lack of awareness, interest and opportunity for most people in Japan to gain these experiences means that the media will continue to shape the views of many in society.

The above barriers represent policy and programmatic ideas that arguably exist in the minds of many in Japanese society (and in the case of nationalism, in the other societies as well). The chapter now turns to a discussion of more practical, organizational barriers that were perceived to block actors from achieving their goals for regional cooperation.

Institutional barriers

Cultural and linguistic communication challenges

While getting to know others was described as key for breaking down biases, another barrier that impeded this process that emerged across many of the cases was the *challenge of communication.* This included impasses due to cultural differences but the issue primarily mentioned was linguistic barriers.

Many participants described how challenges with communication often impeded the achievement of various personal goals, whether in terms of attaining administrative objectives to effectively facilitate the mobility programs, or for students to gain deep understandings through exchanging ideas with 'locals' from their host cultures. Most often these barriers were related to language, including challenges posed by a lack of understanding of the local languages in host countries (i.e. Mandarin Chinese, Korean or Japanese), or by the use of English, the common language selected to facilitate both CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight in all of the cases studied. Frequently the linguistic barriers were those of a lack of abilities on the part of actors, but at times they were related to cultural differences in communication styles.

A student provided some memorable examples of a cultural impasse. While deference to seniority is a common feature of Confucian cultures and is present in all three societies to some degree, when this student was in Korea she struggled with the expectation that she should refrain from speaking when a senior professor openly disagreed with her:

> One thing which I do not accept is the behavior of some of the professors in [...] University[52] ... because of the traditions of *johei kankei*[53] in South Korea, between the students and professors...because in South Korea, when a teacher asks a question to students with an angry face you are not supposed to answer it....
>
> ...so we decided to do this skit presenting the issues, so we tried to behave as we are very nationalistic people, but we explained everything before the presentation, we made sure that this is just a skit and we were going to continue with professional information after that. But because of the presentation we did, one of the very top professors...was soo angry toward us. He said "why did you do that?", and because I thought maybe he did not understand why we did it, I was trying to explain, in front of everyone, because he asked the question!... But while I was speaking he was trying to... *kabuseru* (meaning: to cover, interrupt or stop) and he wasn't willing to listen to me so I was like "why is this guy not listening to me?". But I kept trying to explain the situation because he kept asking me right? But at the end he was like

[52] Redacted to avoid institutional defamation.
[53] Hierarchical relations between 'seniors' and 'juniors'.

> “oh this is stupid. This is the worst presentation I've ever heard and you are ruining the Campus Asia program” and we were like Oh my god right? And we had the dinner session after that but he canceled everything with the other professors. He didn't show up and he asked the other professors to not show up as well.
>
> And other Korean students were like “Yeah, you shouldn't have done that”,... because students are under the professor. But I could not accept that because it's a university; you should exchange your opinions. But almost all Korean students were agreeing ... you should not be answering the questions.

She encountered similar challenges in Korea during her internship:

> I was working for the Korean National Commission for UNESCO, where they are supposed to be very international...but, this kind of Korean culture came into the meeting as well, like whenever a senior said something I was not supposed to speak, I mean I was supposed to say yes, but I didn't know the culture so I always expressed my opinion but my colleagues told me “Oh, maybe you should be more, you know, nice”. (laughs)
>
> Student, National University

A combination of cultural differences and linguistic challenges at times impeded cooperation for program administrators as well:

> Actually I think the way of thinking is a little different from us, and also English is not a native language for us... So, even to send an email in English is a little stressful because we can’t communicate well sometimes. And also for me, they don’t think so much about deadline, so I often will send email but sometimes they just ignore…

Administrator, Center for International Exchange, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The delay in responding or perceived ignoring of emails and other correspondence was mentioned by a few administrators, some of whom connected this with a difference in the levels of ‘eagerness’ among the three countries to be involved with the programs for regional mobility. Administrators in China in particular were highlighted as being somewhat challenging to deal with. These differences in levels of ‘eagerness’ were often discussed in relation to correlating imbalances in funding allocated to the programs in the three countries. Both of these additional challenges are discussed below.

Linguistic difficulties were reported by administrators, students, and academics alike. In Japan, the requirement to provide CAMPUS Asia courses in English was described as an additional burden for academics:

> Interviewer: Has there been any resistance from Japanese lecturers or professors that do not want to deliver lectures in English?
>
> Interviewee: Quite resistant in the sense that they are not... it is just, the workload, it is all about workload.
>
> Academic, Architecture, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

While administrators and academics worked to establish a common linguistic platform in English for students from the three countries to communicate, a common problem that arose was the tendency for students to remain in their own-country groups and revert to speaking their home languages:

> Interviewee: Our role is to break down those misunderstandings and misconceptions, and during this program, I tried to break into the Korean circle and Japanese circle but I find it pretty hard.
>
> Interviewer: Really?
>
> Interviewee: Yes because when I get in the group, they speak Korean...
>
> Student, Sustainable Development, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University

While some students reported difficulties in getting to know other CAMPUS Asia students because of language issues, many described that interacting with CAMPUS Asia students was not a problem, but interacting with other 'local people' in their host countries was. Participants frequently reported challenges in getting to know the local students and communities that were not directly connected to their programs. Those locals who *were* connected to CAMPUS Asia were described as having more cosmopolitan, rather than national, identities. As such there was a perceived barrier to gaining 'truly local' and cross-cultural experiences:

> I felt like it was a challenge to really get to know the *Korean* Korean students. It sounds weird but the Korean students that I was studying with were kind of similar to me, like they had a foreign background or they lived abroad for a long time or they weren't really mainstream like *really Korean* students. So that's why I actually searched for other opportunities to meet 'really Korean' students, and I joined the swimming club in Seoul National University and there I met the undergrad SNU students who are really the elite of the Korean society. So that was a very interesting experience for me but you have to really go out of your comfort zone and make a conscious effort to mingle with the Korean people, that's what I felt was a challenge in SNU.
>
> And in Beijing University I wanted to take classes given in Chinese but since I had so many classes that I had to take to finish this course which were all in English I didn't really have time to take classes in Chinese - um so it was the same thing and it was actually worse in China because all the classes given in English you kind of end up with the internationals; like Beijing U also has double degree students coming in from everywhere so I would end up always hanging out with the LSE students (UK) or the Sciences Po (France) students...
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

The tendency for international students to have limited interactions with host country students has been documented in the literature (Olaniran, 1996; Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2013; Trice, 2004). While some self-segregate and interact primarily with 'co-nationals' from their home countries, others tend to be 'exclusive global mixers' who interact primarily with co-nationals and international students from other countries, but not with host country students. (Rose-Redwood & Rose-Redwood, 2013). The student above fits the description of an 'inclusive global mixer', one who makes a concerted effort to interact with international *and* host country students (ibid.). Nevertheless, in spite of a willingness to go out of her comfort zone and engage with local communities, in some respects the curricular demands of the CAMPUS Asia program acted as a constraint for gaining local (in this instance, Chinese) experiences.

In addition to program specific barriers described above, a number of actors discussed broader challenges facing Japanese universities that impeded regional cooperation, often framed in the context of rising global competition in higher education and the economic and social challenges facing the nation.

Funding constraints

A major practical challenge facing Japanese universities that has implications for the East Asian mobility programs studied is constraints on funding. The incorporation of national universities that took place in 2004 (*hojinka*) established a situation by which universities were nominally granted more autonomy as 'national university corporations' but were faced with gradual reductions in government funding for operational budgets. This coincided with a proliferation of competitive project based funding schemes offered by the Ministry which universities (and faculties within them) were compelled to apply for. This new atmosphere of enhanced competition was perceived by some to be exacerbated by the tendency for Japanese universities to view funding for research as a closed, domestic system:

> I think a misconception, and many Japanese academics will tell you this, you know *hojinka*, in theory gives universities autonomy, ... but one basic fact that you need to understand about *hojinka* is that it gives universities responsibility without power. It's a very sort of new public management style reform. So right, here you are, now you've got to find ways of basically resourcing yourselves and to incentivize you, every year we are going to automatically reduce your core funding by 1 percent. So every year the universities therefore become more desperate to compete with each other for funding. Where is the funding coming from? *Monkasho*.
>
> And because this is Japan it's very much a world unto itself in higher education terms, the prospects for securing funding outside the system are lower than ... in the case of Britain for example, at least until recently, there's been European funding, there's been, you know, big foundations, internationally that you could apply to especially for scientific research. In Japan, most people are very focused on sources of funding within Japan and in the humanities and social sciences almost entirely. And this gives *Monkasho* huge power.

> But another feature of that scheme which I think is typical of Japanese grants generally is they advertise a grant up to so much, and so institutions have to apply on the basis of a grant at this level and they have to produce budgets accordingly, and then you get it, congratulations, and six months or twelve months in *Monkasho* gets the calculator out, 'Oh actually, no our budget's changed so sorry guys we're cutting you down by…30%? let's say 35%. And so… what the (expletive)?
>
> That's exactly what they've done with Top Global. And then you know people wonder why Japanese academics are cynical about internationalization. I mean, why bother?
>
> I don't think it's calculated, I think it is just poor planning, stupidity at a certain level. But it contributes to this atmosphere of acute insecurity, chronic insecurity, that there is within this University and I think many others when it comes to funding applications, when it comes to, doing anything new. Can we plan? Do we know where the money's going to be coming from in a year's time? two years' time?
>
> Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

This atmosphere of chronic insecurity regarding funding amounts is compounded in many instances by the limited nature of the government's funding schemes. Both CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight projects are funded at five-year intervals, and many of the broader policies for internationalization have similar limits. In a number of interviews, concerns about the long-term viability of programs for regional cooperation were connected to this uncertainty about future funding. In some of the A3 cases the end of funding essentially meant the end of collaboration:

> Interviewer: Has there been any continuation of collaboration with the partner universities or the researchers that you worked with in the three countries?
>
> Interviewee: Honestly speaking there has not. After the end of the project we stopped the seminar and of course no funding about sending the students and so we stopped.
>
> Academic, Chemistry, A3 Foresight, Waseda University

As of this writing, CAMPUS Asia has been funded twice at five-year intervals, and informal discussions with administrators suggest that the scheme is set to be renewed for

another five-year period. Nevertheless, even with a steady stream of funding to enable program operation, some actors discussed the challenges of adhering to the strict rules set by the government concerning the ways funding can be allocated:

> Interviewee 1: This is the government driven program so in a way it's not very flexible, in terms of use of funds.
>
> Interviewee 2: Not flexible at all.
>
> Interviewee 1: For example we are short of funds for supporting student-related activities but we have a lot of unspent money and funds for other purposes, but we are not allowed to move because 30%--
>
> Interviewee 2: It's the 30% cap. So in order to do something, in order to receive a certain number of students, the cost for the dormitory and other things like sending students, it's much more than 30% in our case. So we want to use that money from the budget that's going to be returned.
>
> Interviewee 1: But there is no flexibility.
>
> Interviewer: Why do you think so? I'm sure that they understand that there's a problem.
>
> Interviewee 1: Well according to their explanation, this program is to develop the kind of system framework or models, not just giving funds to students.
>
> Academic, CAMPUS Asia, Okayama University and Administrator, CAMPUS Asia, UTokyo

Lack of flexibility on the use of funds was also reported in the A3 Foresight projects:

> JSPS has a very strict rule to use some money for us, Japanese side. Half of the budget should be used for communication or internationalization; accepting students, sending students to the seminars; so another half can be used for the experiments. So in this size we can use say a small – because the budget size is not so large, so we do not introduce any big machine or measurement instruments, but some small chemicals and so on.
>
> Yes, but very strict. Half the money should be used for communication. But airfare between China-Japan, China-Korea is very cheap, so even we send or we accept many people, expenditure is not so much. But this criteria is so strict, so not every year, but in the second year I could not use all the money, so I had to return it back.

Academic, Chemistry, A3 Foresight, Waseda University

While a number of actors at Japanese universities lamented the challenges and limits imposed by funding constraints, it was interesting to learn that, with regard to CAMPUS Asia, Japan was from the outset the most well-endowed of the three participating countries in terms of resources. The fact that the other countries were also experiencing budget constraints had implications for those in Japan:

> ...actually for the Chinese side and Korean side they also prepare a significantly smaller budget for CAMPUS Asia so there are not many incentives for the Chinese and Korean universities to apply for it, that is what I heard. So that is why somehow the Japanese contributions, I mean Ministry of Education actually commit much more funding compared to the Chinese and the Korean government. So to run this project now actually we have to subsidize the Korean and Chinese partners.

Director, Center for International Education, CAMPUS Asia, Waseda University

The funding situations at the partner universities appeared to be uncertain, and was perceived in a few cases to be evolving:

> there was a time when Peking University didn't receive any budget for operating the program, just for the scholarship for the students. At that time there was some difficulty because they didn't have any, you know, sort of incentive…the professors really wanted to do something but their hands were tied and so there was a time where it was difficult, but now it's pretty good.

Administrator, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

> The Chinese side was initially rather reluctant toward this project...However, I heard that the Chinese government has recently also allotted special budgets for this program.

Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo Gakugei University

The apparent differences and uncertainties regarding the amount of financial resources available to each of the participating countries perhaps connected to another challenge discussed by a number of Japanese administrators, and was also alluded to in the interview with the government official from NIAD. This was the notion that there was a notable

imbalance of ‘eagerness’ towards the CAMPUS Asia program on the part of actors in the three countries.

An imbalance of ‘eagerness’ for regional cooperation

Differing levels of perceived commitment and eagerness toward the CAMPUS Asia program was reported by a few actors that were interviewed. For some, these levels of eagerness appeared to be in a state of flux as a result of engagement and commitment to the program at the government levels in the three countries. This perceived imbalance was generally one whereby Japan and Korea were the ‘eager’ and proactive partners and China was less so. China’s relative lack of enthusiasm was at times attributed to funding constraints, but it was also mentioned that China’s emergent position as a major economy and a world-leader in higher education had contributed to a newfound complacence regarding it neighbors:

> ...on the Korean side I think the universities are very eager to exchange students. Well at the first stage, I visited Chinese counterpart and Japanese counterpart, but usually Japanese and Korean university are very eager to do something, but Chinese government is not very interested in, maybe because they already have a lot of international students who want to come to Chinese universities.
>
> Academic, CAMPUS Asia, Korea University

The perceived re-establishment of China at the center of global affairs and the subsequent disinterest in neighboring countries was also mentioned by students:

> Every time we have a conference or you know cooperation among three countries, most of the cases Japan and Korea are eager to work on these kind of issues but from the Chinese perspective, I think Japan is not an important country in a sense, there's the United States, there's another countries, in you know, Southeast Asia... So back in the 1980s or 90s, Japan was the first country to you know...China *had* to cooperate in many cases, but not now. So I can see this kind of passive posture of the Chinese government on cooperation with Japan, it’s a kind of hindrance...
>
> Student, IR and Public Policy Studies, CAMPUS Asia, University of Tokyo

The perceived imbalance of eagerness at times tilted the other direction, however:

> For some reason, President Moon (Korea), he must have [said something] and so again Korea is very gung-ho and for some reason China suddenly said that their Ministry of Education has really come behind CAMPUS Asia this year and they were telling us we have access to all this money now that we didn't have before and so then they're considering these double degrees with Korea next year... they're like full speed ahead and we're like well Abe would never say anything about CAMPUS Asia and we're getting no impact from MEXT about their intentions or their excitement about CAMPUS Asia so the temperature level is very different in terms that kind of political or ministerial support within our little consortium.

Administrator, Animation, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo University of the Arts

At times the imbalance was not attributed to politics or perceptions of global economic positioning, but discussed in terms of socio-cultural communication styles and approaches to university management:

> this is my own original sentence, but for example Korea: governments, professors, students, and also the administrative staff, they say they start running before sinking. But in Japan, we discuss *a lot*, before starting. So they start very quickly, and during running, they will discuss, to modify the directions. But in Japan, we do not start quickly, but we discuss a lot. And these days we are very late against the Korean dynamism. And then China, China is a big country, they see Japanese attitude and Korean attitude [sic]. So they see all of the conditions together. And then they will do by themselves.

Academic, Engineering, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo Institution of Technology

This final example offers a segue into the next few sections about barriers to regional cooperation that stem from particular approaches to management of Japanese universities.

An organizational culture of uncertainty avoidance

One of the main institutional barriers appeared to be organizational. As was discussed in Chapter 6, at many Japanese universities (and this also appeared to be the case elsewhere in East Asia), university administrators are typically hired as generalists and are rotated through the various administrative sections of their institutions every few years. Thus there are no human resources specialists, for example, nor are there specialists in

internationalization. The fact that administrators in charge of many programs for internationalization often lack specialized knowledge and skills (such as foreign language abilities), coupled with their frequent rotation to various departments around their universities was described as a chronic barrier that impeded the achievement of many institutional goals. A professor at Kyushu University described the situation in the following way:

> If you want to have a coherent vision for internationalization for a university, it would help if you had a functioning international office that has bought into this and is seeking to promote it in some sort of coherent way. But the administrators who staff university international offices are…people who don't necessarily know anything about internationalization or have any expertise, ... they've taken the exam to be a university administrator at *Kyudai*, and then they're posted round offices within the University. And so you have, ...I think the permanent administrative staff, to a man or woman, are ALL Japanese, I don't think there's a single foreigner who's on the permanent Admin payroll, because the exam is all in Japanese right? When the international office itself is not internationalized, what you have is career administrators who are desperately looking to avoid taking on extra work, avoid dealing with stuff they don't know about. Which is understandable. And what you always find is they want to avoid setting any new precedent...you can't blame these guys for being terrified of internationalization.
>
> Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

As was discussed in Chapter 6 in the section covering the interview with the professor at NIAD, the Japanese expression '*zenrei ga nai,* meaning 'there is no precedent', was frequently evoked as a representation of the bureaucratic impasses encountered by many who wished to push forward new or innovative approaches to internationalization. This expression was reportedly used by administrators to explain why the ideas for new initiatives, programs and partnerships were not feasible, simply because they had not been done before. Coupled with the abovementioned tendency for decision-makers to 'discuss a lot' before starting (often characterized by multiple meetings), this hesitancy to try new things was mentioned by a number of actors as being an impediment to internationalization and to university reform in general.

These descriptions of organizational culture at Japanese universities align with the work of Geert Hofstede, who worked to develop models for understanding national and organizational cultures in different countries. One of Hofstede's six key dimensions of national culture is 'Uncertainty Avoidance', which is defined as

> the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by ambiguous or unknown situations and have created beliefs and institutions that try to avoid these ...
>
> (Hofstede Insights, n.d.)

The website www.hofstede-insights.com provides a tool for country comparison that presents a breakdown of the scores each country gets in each of the six dimensions. The description of Uncertainty Avoidance for Japan is telling:

> At (a score of) 92 Japan is one of the most uncertainty avoiding countries on earth. This is often attributed to the fact that Japan is constantly threatened by natural disasters from earthquakes, tsunamis (this is a Japanese word used internationally), typhoons to volcano eruptions. Under these circumstances Japanese learned to prepare themselves for any uncertain situation. This goes not only for the emergency plan and precautions for sudden natural disasters but also for every other aspect of society. You could say that in Japan anything you do is prescribed for maximum predictability. From cradle to grave, life is highly ritualized and you have a lot of ceremonies. For example, there is [sic] opening and closing ceremonies of every school year which are conducted almost exactly the same way everywhere in Japan. At weddings, funerals and other important social events, what people wear and how people should behave are prescribed in great detail in etiquette books. School teachers and public servants are reluctant to do things without precedence.
>
> (Hofstede Insights, n.d.)

While adopting new practices may prove challenging for some at Japanese organizations, in some instances particular universities did hire internationalization specialists to help manage their CAMPUS Asia programs. These positions were generally funded as part of the government internationalization initiatives, and as such, like the projects themselves, were limited-term contracts. An academic at Tokyo Tech had this to say:

> when the Tokyo Tech proposal for the Super Global University Project[54] was approved, I was a member of the preparatory committee for the Super Global, then CAMPUS Asia started in the second phase, then I suggested please hire the specialist. The native speaker for international… negotiation. Actually there's no specialists who can speak English very fluently and enough to discuss deeply in Japanese universities. Like the University of Tokyo for example or Kyoto… or Waseda or Keio, some universities already introduced a new structure or organization with the specialists. So for example I said that within one or two years it's OK, then he or she will introduce how to organize or, we say 'attitude', make a kind of international attitude to the universities in US and Europe [sic]. But frankly speaking, unfortunately, the Japanese administrative staff and also the headquarters, say they do not know how to make such kind of relations.
>
> Academic, Engineering, CAMPUS Asia, Tokyo Institute of Technology

This reported lack of knowledge regarding how to forge international relationships with universities in other countries could be another example of the 'zenrei ga nai' phenomenon, with career administrators wishing to avoid the uncertainty of trying new things. This lack of knowledge was also referenced in relation to the capacities of some actors at Japanese universities to imagine the possibilities for internationalization more broadly.

Lack of vision for internationalization

It was also mentioned that while some institutions did make attempts to reform their universities through internationalization, they lacked a clear vision for what internationalization actually entailed. Instead, the attempts were viewed simply as a means to acquire much needed funding for the university:

> Pitched up in this room, with about, oh God there must have been about 70 or 80 academics plus two or three dozen administrators. Big meeting. Looked around, well there may have been one or two Chinese or Korean colleagues in the room, but as far as I could see I was the only non-Japanese, or the only non-Asian face in the room, in a meeting to discuss internationalization. And basically, [our University] had no vision. No vision, for internationalization, apart from itself being nominated

[54] The 'Super Global University Project' is a literal translation of the Japanese language version of the Top Global University Project.

> as one of these 'Super Global Universities', and getting that status, getting its hands on that funding.
>
> Academic, National University[55]

The challenges imposed by funding constraints were discussed above as barrier in itself that impeded autonomy and the realization of long-term goals for regional cooperation. However the environment in which universities are pressured to continually seek funding opportunities was also perceived to create another barrier, one whereby opportunities for collegial cooperation are overshadowed by competition.

Competition hinders cooperation

The experience of "chronic insecurity" as a result of insufficient funding combined with the competitive project-based funding schemes offered by the Ministry have reportedly led to an atmosphere of intense competition both between universities in Japan and within them.

> When the architecture guys who you were talking to this morning applied for their CAMPUS Asia, we in the Education Department were also invited to apply at the same time. But the deal was that the university could only select one program to put forward. So it was basically us up against the architects.
>
> CAMPUS Asia is one of these schemes, I mean one way of looking at it is it's one of these schemes set up since *hojinka* to stimulate competition. And this is actually not just happening amongst universities it's happening within universities. And this is one of the reasons why there's so little collaboration across faculties at a university like this. It's that the University is set up, ... to stimulate competition amongst faculties.
>
> It's very much the sort of war of all against all, survival of the fittest approach to internal management of universities as well as the management of the sector overall.
>
> Academic, Education, CAMPUS Asia, Kyushu University

[55] Redacted to avoid institutional defamation.

The idea of competition in one form or another was pervasive throughout the documents at the government-level and the ideas of many of the actors who were interviewed for the study. Whether the competition was between faculties within a university to get funding, or among research teams from the three countries with overlapping expertise, or across world regions in areas such as knowledge production or economic development, competition was described as both a goal of and a barrier to regional cooperation.

To conclude, this chapter has presented the various barriers, both ideational and institutional, that actors perceived were significant hindrances to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. The range of emergent barriers covered issues specific to the two programs like cultural and linguistic communication challenges and difficulties recruiting Japanese students to study abroad in East Asia. I attempted to connect this latter challenge to broader societal barriers such as ignorance of neighboring countries' cultures and societies on the part of many in Japanese society, persistent and unquestioning attitudes that Japan is No. 1 in Asia, xenophobic forms of nationalism, and the ubiquity of biased portrayals of regional 'others' in the media. Institutional barriers included the perceived insecurity imposed by funding constraints, the organizational culture of risk avoidance in Japanese higher education administration, a lack of vision for internationalization and the dominance of an atmosphere of competition that hinders cooperation. The following chapter revisits these themes along with those presented in previous chapters, discussing them in light of the research questions and the empirical and theoretical contributions discussed in the literature review.

Chapter 9: Discussion and Conclusion

In the previous three chapters the emergent themes from the data analysis and a number of interpretive micro-arguments were presented in a manner that addressed the four research questions. In this final chapter, I utilize these findings to engage with the extant scholarship on CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight to date, as well as the empirical studies that have investigated regional cooperation in East Asian higher education more broadly. I also address the novel empirical findings offered by this study that contribute new and valuable knowledge to the social sciences, and which are particularly applicable to the research agenda for comparative higher education regionalism proposed by Chou and Ravinet (2015, 2016). In the second section of the chapter I consider the findings in light of some of the theoretical concepts and frameworks discussed in Chapter 3. I also posit my own argument about the importance of incorporating the ideational dimension into any study of higher education regional cooperation in order to gain a comprehensive, contextualized understanding about the multi-layered policy processes of higher education region building. The final section of this chapter presents a conclusion to the thesis, which addresses some of the limitations of the study and possibilities for further research.

Empirical contributions

Elaborations on extant literature

Insights from the research design

This study's research design, which involved the qualitative engagement with a variety of actors – including students – provided a number of insights which both support extant research and highlight discrepancies. One of Eun Young Kyung's key findings from her doctoral work was that a major challenge to regional cooperation in Northeast Asia was the "deeply-rooted distrust" shared among the three countries (Kyung, 2015, p. 237). I

suggested that Kyung's proposed rationales for explaining this distrust were questionable, and that omitting student voices was a limiting factor of her study. Analysis of documents and transcripts in my own study revealed the word 'trust' appeared 96 times, and 74 of these were in the government-level documents and research reports. The topic of trust/mistrust also emerged in five of the interviews. These were primarily the voices of students who were discussing the broader contextual barriers that hindered cooperation between the three nations. As such, the topic of trust is indeed an important issue, but this appears to be primarily with regard to government-level relations and policy coordination. Trust issues were not raised in the context of the face-to-face interactions that took place through participation in the programs. By contrast, the notion of broadening perspectives and establishing networks and friendships through *koryu* (transformative exchange) was emphasized.

It proved valuable exploring this topic with students in particular. Trust issues were generally referred to in the context of contemporary politics and broader society, and it appeared that the younger generation (at least those who were involved in the two programs) did not suffer from the malady of mistrust of Northeast Asian 'others'. I argue that this orientation of openness and exchange adopted by many students, coupled with the reported development of shared regional and global identities through study abroad, offers a ray of hope for the future of the Northeast Asian region. It appears the long-standing 'deep distrust' between the three countries may be slowly becoming uprooted with passing generations. A shift in the normative ideas of those in Japan in particular – which many viewed as being mired in an archaic worldview of being 'No. 1' in Asia – would represent a significant change that could have demonstrable impacts on regional cooperation. Many CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight graduates will go on to become scientists, business and

civil society leaders, diplomats and politicians, and those who have in fact cultivated trust with regional neighbors will be positioned to contribute to a wide range of collaborative regional projects.

Another notable finding from Kyung was that interviewees in her study displayed a "willingness to trade a lower level of autonomy at the university in order to garner greater financial support from the state in order to ensure the success of the programs in which they invest their energies" (ibid., p. 242). This sense of willingness was not evidenced in this study. It may be the case that since Kyung's research design provided a means to compare two programs, one with government guidance and financial support (CAMPUS Asia) and one without (BESETOHA), it enabled participants in her study to reflect on the positive aspects of government intervention; and this space was not sufficiently provided or encouraged in my own study. It may also be the case that Kyung's finding may not be appropriately representative of experiences in Japan, considering her thematic findings were based on the conflation of interview data from all three countries. In this study, as was evident in the section in Chapter 8 on institutional barriers, actors in Japan generally expressed feelings of frustration about the lack of autonomy and chronic insecurity regarding the limited-term nature of the government's funding schemes.

Concerning Jeremy Breaden's claim that CAMPUS Asia 'coordinators' evidenced a 'cross-national sense of solidarity' (Breaden, 2018), the findings from my own study supported my assumptions that this would hold true more for academics than for administrators. While the term 'solidarity' did not emerge in the participant transcripts, academics who had the commonality of a shared academic discipline with counterparts across borders generally referred to their collegial relations, their networks, and the global dimensions of

their fields more frequently and more favorably than administrators, who by-and-large seemed to prioritize commitments to their universities above other considerations.

With regard to the Kuroda *et al* survey that measured the expected outcomes of regional cross-border activities in broader Asia (see Table 3.2 for reference), in my investigation of Japan there was indeed evidence of a strong emphasis on competitiveness and nationally-oriented cooperation, with less emphasis placed on regional identity and virtually no mention of global citizenship. However, this evidence was mainly present in the government-level documents, and in some instances in the normative ideas of scientists and engineers concerned about their university's global rankings and competitiveness in their disciplines. Also, many administrators prioritized the importance of ensuring the educational quality of their programs, which aligned with the findings from the survey. However, the majority of participants did not prioritize the particular outcomes measured by Kuroda *et al*, and in fact often presented a range of ideal outcomes of the two programs that were not available options on the survey. Instead, normative policy ideas about what particular versions of CAMPUS Asia or A3 Foresight *should* accomplish included:

> co-creating Art; making international friends; collaborating to advance basic science; developing a common legal language; sharing pedagogical best practices; confronting historical impasses; advancing regional public health solutions; connecting the local and regional to the global through the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); developing networked future leaders and scientists; *koryu* (transformative exchange); and more.

The range of these qualitative findings and their distinctiveness from the *a priori* outcomes measured in the Kuroda *et al* study highlight the limitations of quantitative survey research. While the findings from their study are indeed insightful and to some degree were confirmed in the Japan case through this project, the varied ideas of actors that emerged from this qualitative study demonstrate the value of a methodologically eclectic approach

to social research. The findings from this and similar qualitative studies in other Asian countries would thus serve to support but also temper the claims made from quantitative surveys such as those carried out by Kuroda and colleagues.

Agentive power

A final consideration that has been addressed in previous literature is the notion of the agentive power of actors involved in regional cooperation in Japanese higher education. The discursive institutionalist approach acknowledges the agentive capacities of actors to enact institutional change. As such, I was interested in this study in exploring the ways government-level ideas were adopted, adapted and repurposed by actors at Japanese universities. Breaden described CAMPUS Asia as a framework comprised of "diverse, multi-tiered interests...through which to actualise agendas unconnected to its stated goals of regional integration" (Breaden, 2018, p. 51). While I disputed Breaden's argument about the purported 'stated goals' of CAMPUS Asia, this study supports his claim about the 'multi-tiered interests' involved in actualizing their own agendas for regional cooperation. The dominant and unifying themes that emerged at the government-level pointed to discourses of '*mutual understanding*', '*quality assurance*', '*regional economic interdependence'*, '*human resources*', and '*competitiveness*'. While a number of these themes were reflected in the funding applications and public-facing documents describing the various programs for regional cooperation at the case universities, it became clear through speaking to actors involved in these programs that many of these policy ideas were adapted and repurposed in practice to align with the institutional, disciplinary and individual values of actors driving these programs on the ground. In this respect actors at Japanese universities demonstrated their capacities to be agentive and resist policy ideas imposed upon them which did not align with their own ideas and principles. On reflection,

while this study was successful in identifying examples of this agentive power, I felt that more space should have been made in the research design to investigate these resistances in greater depth. I expand further on this reflection in the section on limitations below.

Novel empirical contributions

Disciplinary variation

With regard to novel empirical findings from this study, the emergence of dramatically different ideas of Northeast Asian regional cooperation across academic disciplines provides a noteworthy contribution to extant scholarship. Previous studies of CAMPUS Asia have tended to focus on Social Sciences and Humanities disciplines, omitting important and substantial ideas from groups representing the Sciences, who in themselves are representative of growing patterns of cross-border research collaboration in Northeast Asia and beyond. This study incorporated the study of the A3 Foresight program and science-based CAMPUS Asia projects, and included the views of biologists, public health experts, engineers, chemists and physicists, many of whom expressed the normative view that is was unhelpful to dwell on political tensions and conflicting historical memories. The focus should instead be on the productive force of the 'borderless' and mutually-shared passion for the scientific enterprise, urgently needed to maintain the capacity to compete with the innovative and productive 'West'. In these respects those in the natural and physical sciences were arguably both the most globally-oriented and the most conforming to the government-level policy rhetoric of cooperation for the purposes of competition.

This study also engaged with the ideas of the Artists, who drew on their creative capacities to envision the ideals of regional cooperation through the visual medium of animated film. These ideas had little to do with competition, employability, politics, or modern history.

Instead a number of them highlighted the common cultural legacies that extend back in time for millennia, and persist in the contemporary period through art, architecture and music.

Those from particular social science disciplines and interdisciplinary programs were focused on the acknowledgement, analysis, and collaborative resolution of social problems of regional concern, and ideas of regional cooperation aligned closely with disciplinary worldviews. Other programs such as Medicine, Architecture and Law placed an additional emphasis on regional employability, aligning with the professional orientation of these disciplines.

I argue that this capacity for disciplinary variation to shape attitudes and values is a critical empirical finding that opens new possibilities for research into higher education regional cooperation. Having emerged with a policy, leadership and management orientation, the field of Higher Education Studies has tended to take the institution (i.e. the University) as its primary unit of analysis. Thus, while much of the research on regionalism and regionalization in the field has focused on policy and the interactions of governments and universities, the ways that various academic cultures and disciplinary communities can and do shape processes of regional cooperation in the higher education sector has to date been overlooked. This is an important gap that warrants further exploration. An avenue for further inquiry would be to explore the ways the identities of academics, administrators and students are constituted through their varied levels of involvement with their disciplinary and university communities (Henkel, 2005); consider the individual positionality of these actors within these communities (Fanghanel, 2009); and then attempt draw connections to the ways these contextualized identities shape ideas and practices for regional cooperation.

Transformative exchange at the 'cross-roads for all nations'

Another critical finding was the programmatic notion that Japanese universities can serve as a gateway to East Asia, in part through the broadly accepted commitment to academic freedom in Japanese higher education. This is a unique and significant finding that highlights the importance of context in understanding higher education regional cooperation. With crackdowns on academic freedom in neighboring China, Japan has an opportunity to utilize its universities to serve as a public sphere for discussion, debate, and critical engagement with important issues facing broader East Asia and the wider world. The capacity for Japanese universities to provide spaces for students from mainland China to interact with students from Taiwan and Hong Kong, for Japanese students to gain insights into the perspectives of East Asian neighbors, and for students from further abroad to encounter and exchange ideas with this diversity of perspectives points to the possibilities of *koryu,* and the potential for Japanese universities to serve as a 'cross-roads for all nations'. That universities in Japan will actually serve this role is far from guaranteed, however, in part because of the range of reported barriers that thwart efforts for regional cooperation and internationalization more broadly.

A range of other noteworthy empirical findings emerged from the data. The key qualitative insights specific to the Japan case of higher education regional cooperation (e.g. programmatic ideas about the social roles of Japanese higher education, the challenges and underlying socio-cultural rationales of recruiting Japanese students to East Asian exchange programs, ideational barriers such as nationalism, and institutional barriers such as the organizational culture of risk avoidance at Japanese universities) all provide novel empirical data that can serve to contextualize this particular case of higher education regionalism and contribute to the broader research agenda of comparative regionalism

(Chou & Ravinet, 2015, 2016). The discursive institutionalist focus on ideas in this study makes the findings particularly relevant to the identification of ideas and principles necessary to distil regional models of higher education cooperation (Chou & Ravinet, 2016 p. 282).

I move now to a consideration of methodological contributions of this study, as well as the way these findings relate to the extant concepts and theories of higher education regional cooperation presented in Chapter 3. I then posit my own argument about the importance of conceptualizing the ideational dimension of regional higher education.

Methodological contributions

This study has contributed to the adaptation and expansion of the methodological toolkit available to higher education researchers studying regional cooperation in a number of ways. Firstly, I have adapted and employed an analytical framework from discursive institutionalism which has enabled for the categorization of cognitive and normative policy, programmatic and philosophical ideas of regional cooperation. With its home in the field of Political Science/International Relations, discursive institutionalist theory is not perfectly suitable in all respects to the study of higher education institutions and sectoral institutional change, but the framework of types and levels of ideas proved to be a valuable analytical approach to delineate and analyze the ideas of actors at universities involved in regional cooperation. I suggest that this particular approach from discursive institutionalism can thus be employed in other higher education research contexts and offer novel insights into ideas, processes and phenomena shaping the sector.

Returning to Jane Knight's 'FOPA model' of higher education 'regionalization', in Chapter 3 I proposed a number of modifications to the model to better reflect the degrees by which

the various functional, organizational and political *dimensions* of regional cooperation were institutionalized and sustainable, and I gave a provisional example of the CAMPUS Asia program. Here I employ the same modified framework to the A3 Foresight Program:

Table 9.1: Dimensions of higher education regional cooperation: A3 Foresight Program

Dimension	Example	Degree of institutionalization	Barriers to sustainability
Functional dimension	Collaborative 5-year research projects designed and managed by scientists (principal investigators)	Established	Limited-term project-based government funding
Organizational dimension	Funding and support by scientific research funding agencies (JSPS in Japan); Project evaluation through annual and final year project reports submitted to JSPS Little awareness and institutional support from participant universities	Established Established Latent	Subject to changes in the political dimension and shifts in agency funding priorities Shifts in institutional funding priorities
Political dimension	Projects supported by Heads of Research Councils of Asian Countries' (A-HORCs); corresponding to the annual theme of the Northeast Asian Symposium Support from Tri-lateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) Department of Economic Affairs (Science and Technology division) – but considerably less public profile than CAMPUS Asia	Advanced Established	Tensions/conflicts in diplomatic relations

Adapted from Knight, 2012, 2016.

Considering the functional, organizational and political dimensions of higher education regional cooperation is a useful analytical exercise to gain a better understanding of programs like CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight. Shifting Knight's terminology from 'approaches' to 'dimensions' also helps align Higher Education Studies research with

methodologies found in other social science disciplines such as Political Science and International Relations. Along with the application of a discursive institutionalist approach, these methodological practices enable for cross-disciplinary insights and bridge building within the social sciences.

However, while I suggest that the FOPA model is improved, simply investigating these three dimensions is insufficient. In order to gain a deep understanding of the policy processes of higher education regionalism and regionalization in various contexts, it is necessary to uncover the ideas and principles driving the range of actors involved in these processes. This is the *ideational dimension*, and I have endeavored in this thesis to present a detailed interpretive description of how this dimension is driving actors in the context of Japan.

Theoretical Contributions

The ideational dimension of higher education regional cooperation: the view from Japan

Japan presents an interesting and important case that can contribute to the research agenda of conceptualizing the variety of higher education regionalisms worldwide (Chou & Ravinet, 2015, 2016). Higher education regional cooperation in Northeast Asia from the perspective of Japan is a multifaceted endeavour that is bound up with the nation's political, economic, and socio-cultural engagement with the region spanning millennia, with modern historical developments in particular contributing to a complex range of challenges, tensions, and opportunities. This thesis has highlighted many of the ideas giving shape to this ongoing and dynamic process.

Japan has experienced an evolving relationship with surrounding Asia that has shifted rapidly from aid to trade, to seeing the region as both a valuable resource for human capital and economic development and a collection of burgeoning economic rivals (Breaden, 2018). Today, Japan and Japanese universities must reckon with interconnected developments in the global higher education landscape dominated in many respects by the neoliberal project, as well as their new roles in a rising Asia; persistently held worldviews of Japan as above and ahead of the region are increasingly met with the undeniable reality that Japan is no longer 'Number 1'.

Many in Japan have grasped this emerging reality and have become active participants in shaping a new vision for the country and its engagement with the region. Actors in government have recognized that endless disputes with important neighbouring economies are unsustainable, and have worked in recent years to regionally integrate activities across a wide range of sectors. Education and scientific knowledge production are two of these important arenas, as policymakers have committed to cultivate the next generation of leaders and innovators who have developed positive networked relationships with counterparts in neighbouring countries. In this respect the case of Japan aligns with the ASEAN and European forms of regionalism which emphasize the 'knowledge discourse' (Chou & Ravinet, 2017). The emergent ideas at the government-level of *mutual understanding*, *quality assurance*, *cooperation to enhance economic growth*, developing '*human resources*', and a normative commitment to *competitiveness* all align with Chou and Ravinet's description of the knowledge discourse, which focuses on "the role of knowledge in economic growth, international competition and social cohesion" (ibid., p. 11).

However, as I pointed out in Chapter 3, it is not enough to limit the exploration of ideational drivers for higher education regionalism to actors at the government level. Actors at Japanese universities involved in policy implementation on the ground had a range of their own ideas of regional cooperation, and frequently adapted the government-level 'knowledge discourse' to align with their own institutional, disciplinary and individual agendas. In this respect I argue that in order to study regionalism in the higher education policy sector it is essential to engage with actors operating in various academic disciplines at universities. I argue further that a recognition of the importance of higher education in international relations is warranted, and that inclusion of studies of ideas and international activities *at the university- and disciplinary-levels* would be a beneficial addition to the study field of Comparative Regionalism and the discipline of International Relations more broadly.

While a number of the ideas of actors at Japanese universities varied across institutions, disciplines, and role-types, many were commonly shared. One such idea was that through higher education regional cooperation young people can discover the means to solve the problems that current leaders cannot, and can work together towards the achievement of collective regional goals. Many at universities in Japan – academics, administrators, and students – expressed this ideational vision, and are committed to realizing concrete changes in Japan's relations with its neighbours in their lifetimes.

However, at present CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight are relatively small programs that cater to elite-level students at elite universities. In this respect the graduates of these programs are reminiscent of the elite culture that formed and served to unify East Asia during the spread of Buddhism in the region over 1400 years ago. Some have expressed

the notion that since these students will most likely go on to lead the country in various sectors there will be the potential for a trickle-down effect of the ideas of regional cooperation to the broader society. Whether this will in fact materialize into societal forms of integration across Northeast Asia remains to be seen.

Ideational and institutional barriers abound. Even students at the nation's elite universities tend to forego study abroad opportunities in Northeast Asia in favor of study in the Anglosphere. The dominance of the English language as a *lingua franca* and the status positions of top universities in the US and the UK act as centrifugal forces which continue to pull students away from the region. Additionally, the persistent notion that Japan is 'number one in Asia', while misaligned with reality, presents a real and significant obstacle to regional cooperation. Education at the level of formal schooling, the media, and the behaviors of politicians further exacerbate this idea of Japan as a nation apart, above and ahead of its Asian neighbors. Coupled with a predominant form of largely benign but deeply entrenched ethnic nationalism, these forces manifest as ideational barriers that impede the possibilities for broadened perspectives and the cultivation of regional identities. These barriers were largely absent in the face-to-face interactions of the students participating in the two programs, but it is not possible to extrapolate from the worldviews of a small group of elite young people with an expressed interest in Northeast Asia that this applies to the vast majority of the younger generation in Japan. The perception of Japan as a nation above and apart from Asia is also tied to a reported widespread ignorance (*muchi*) on the part of Japanese people with regard to the nation's role in Asia's history as well as its contemporary positionality in the emerging 'Asian Century' (Breaden, 2018).

Ideational barriers are slow to change but can dissolve over time. But in addition to these, Japanese universities themselves are faced with a number of obstacles that impede regional cooperation which are institutional in nature. The organizational structure of Japanese universities was described as inherently resistant to change and unconducive to comprehensive internationalization. The policy priorities of the government also impose constraints, as many academics who were interviewed in this study expressed frustration not only with their own institutions for creating an atmosphere of competition rather than collaboration, but also for the overarching national ethos of global competitiveness at the expense of all other pursuits. A major challenge that emerged in many case interviews was the idea of insecurity, connected to the limited-term funding and external evaluative pressures placed on universities and their programs by the government. These pressures are not unique to Japan, and are indicative of the neoliberal reforms affecting higher education across much of the world.

In spite of these challenges, many actors at Japanese universities are actively pursuing goals for internationalization and regional cooperation. The above ideas and the many others shared by participants in this study point to the nuanced complexity of the ideational dimension of regional cooperation in Japanese higher education, and highlight how merely investigating the functional, organizational and political dimensions of regional cooperation is insufficient. To reiterate, based on the empirical findings from this study I argue that to gain a comprehensive understanding of regional cooperation in any higher education context, an exploration of the ideational dimension at the various levels of the policy process is essential.

Limitations of the study and considerations for further research

While it was possible in varying degrees to subjectively identify the differing levels of ideas of actors involved in regional cooperation, it was difficult to demonstrate how these ideas manifested in practice, and what the concrete impact of these ideas might be in terms of affecting institutional change and processes of regional integration. In retrospect an incorporation of studies of the formal and informal curriculum[56] in the various cases – including content, intended learning outcomes and assessment – may have provided valuable insights into the practical manifestations of the varied ideas of regional cooperation. This is a potentially fruitful line of further inquiry.

Another approach to gain insights into the potential, practical effects of the various ideas of regional cooperation would be a long-term longitudinal study that followed graduates of the two programs. In this respect follow-up interviews with program graduates at different points in their lives and careers would provide valuable insights into the ways these actors perceived participation in their programs to have affected their life courses and personal and professional activities related to the region. Connections could then conceivably be drawn between the participants' ideas, program outcomes and processes of regional integration in the various arenas in which program graduates operate.

It was also challenging to determine the limitations and differentiation of individual actors' agentive power in this study, and the particular roles they play in shaping regional cooperation policy and practice. These are arguably limitations of the discursive institutionalist approach emphasizing the substantive content of ideas rather than the

[56] The 'formal curriculum' refers to the coursework and planned activities required of students as part of their programs, and the 'informal curriculum' refers to the "various support services and additional activities and options ... that are not assessed and don't form part of the formal curriculum, although they may support learning within it" (Leask, 2015, p. 8).

discursive interactions whereby actors "generate, argue about, and communicate ideas in given institutional contexts" (Schmidt, 2015, p. 2). To gain insights into these discursive interactions it may be beneficial to conduct further interviews and observations with government officials, academics, university administrators and other stakeholders involved in processes of policy coordination and program evaluation at government-level organizations such as TCS, MEXT CSTI, JSPS and NIAD. At the university-level, classroom observations of 'public sphere' interactions among academics and students could provide valuable insights, but gaining access at both of these levels as a researcher would most likely be challenging.

Other limitations are worthy of mention. It is worthwhile noting that while I was lucky enough to interview 67 participants involved in the two programs, as of 2017, 2122 students from Japan participated in CAMPUS Asia[57]. The numbers from A3 Foresight were not readily available, but considering I was only able to secure 5 interviews with A3 participants, it is safe to say I have only heard the voices of a fraction of the total number of participants in these two programs. By 2020, a further 1,491 students from Japan are predicted to have participated in CAMPUS Asia. In this study I have utilized the ideas of 67 individuals and constructed thematic arguments about the disciplinary, institutional and role-type ideas shaping regional cooperation in Japanese higher education. While I feel I reached a point of saturation and level of consistency with respect to the ideas I encountered, conflating the ideas of individual actors in this manner effectively eliminates many of the nuanced characteristics that make these actors individuals. While commonalities did indeed emerge, it is also not possible to make generalizing claims to the broader population of program participants. I therefore suggest that the findings in this thesis would benefit from

[57] These numbers were provided to me from my contact at MEXT, who asked me to help with an English translation of a summary of the CAMPUS Asia program. As of this writing, the summary has yet to be published.

further research, perhaps through an even more in-depth ethnographic study that follows a select few individuals over time, as well as a quantitative research design that builds on the emergent themes from this study to create a survey to be provided to a large sample of former and current program participants. The former approach could entail a nuanced investigation of the individual positionality and levels of agentive power of actors involved in regional cooperation in their particular disciplinary and institutional contexts, while the latter could provide readily comparable statistical data that would inform regional comparisons. With funding and a team of interested collaborators these could be promising next steps for this research project.

Concluding remarks

While it is my hope that this research can contribute to academic scholarship in various fields, it is my belief that this work, if disseminated appropriately, can also have relevant, practical policy implications. Government-level policymakers would benefit from an awareness of the varied ideas and perceived barriers regarding regional cooperation to be found at the institutional- and disciplinary-levels at Japanese universities, and can utilize these ideas to expand and improve upon their region-building projects.

Today, China is a major economic and political player on the world stage, and while as of this writing it has been beset by a trade war and other challenges in its complex relationship with the American hegemon, its power is expected to grow in the coming decades (Jacques, 2012). China's unwillingness to date to fully embrace the ideals of liberal democracy and human rights, coupled with its dramatic advancements in surveillance and censorship technologies, have raised legitimate concerns about the future of democratic institutions and humanity's ongoing struggle to be free from authoritarian rule. China's recent

encroachment into Hong Kong and the dramatic resistance by Hongkongers provides a window into a possible future for other interconnected societies dependent on mainland China. The Western world has likewise seen a shift in many states toward xenophobic nationalism, with similar developments emerging in India, Russia and elsewhere. In the United States, the growing stigmatization of Chinese faculty and students at US universities as potential 'spies' poses further threats on academic freedom under the guise of a Western security agenda (Marginson, 2019a). In this increasingly volatile world context, I argue that higher education institutions and the actors within them have an opportunity to mount a resistance. The global dimension of higher education allows many universities to operate in a semi-autonomous manner, provided the states in which they physically reside are permissive of the ideals of academic freedom and mobility of knowledge and people across borders. Particularly in China, these ideals are under threat, and the possibilities for these constraints to spill into the global dimension of higher education through pressures on many in the sector to collaborate with a rising China are today realer than ever (Scholars at Risk, 2019).

In the Northeast Asian context, Japan and Japanese universities have a unique opportunity should they wish to seize it. However, as this study has shown, many in Japanese society are themselves blinded by nationalistic worldviews and a connected aloofness toward their East Asian neighbours. This was not the case for the individuals I was lucky enough to interview through this doctoral research project however, and it was their awareness and commitment to building a peaceful and productive future through regional cooperation that gives me hope. With the right leadership, Japan's universities and its government have the capacity to stay true to the ideals of democracy, press and academic freedom, as well as resist detrimental forms of nationalism that will only exacerbate long-standing regional

tensions. If Japan's future leaders and scientists are comprised of graduates of the CAMPUS Asia and A3 Foresight programs, then it is my feeling that regional stability and collaborative prosperity can be achieved. Northeast Asia has the opportunity to show the world what is still possible for regional cooperation. Japan will play a key role in this process, and with luck, the publications and other outcomes of this research project will also make some contribution.

Appendices

Appendix A: List of documentary data sources (government-level)

Data collected between April 16, 2016 and February 28, 2019

TCS Documents

Accessed at the following webpages:
http://www.tcs-asia.org/?doc_id=trilateral_consultation&bo_table=summits
http://www.tcs-asia.org/bbs/board.php?bo_table=publication

A. 1st Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit (1999)

B. 2nd Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit (2000)

C. 3rd Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit (2001)

D. 4th Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit (2002)

E. 5th Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit (2003)

F. Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation (2003)

G. 6th Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit (2004)

H. 7th Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit Mechanism Summary (2007)

I. 8th Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit Mechanism Summary (2007)

J. 2005-2006 Progress Report of the Trilateral Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (2007)

K. Joint Statement of the First Trilateral Korea-Japan-China Ministerial Meeting on Science and Technology Cooperation (2007)

L. 2007 Progress Report of the Trilateral Cooperation among the People's Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea

M. 1st Trilateral Summit Report (apart from ASEAN): Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership (2008)

N. 1st (TCS) Trilateral Summit Report (apart from ASEAN): Japan-China-ROK Trilateral Summit Joint Statement on the International Finance and Economy (2008)

O. 2nd Trilateral Summit Report: Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation 2009 – October (2009)

P. 9th Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit Mechanism Summary (2009)

Q. 3rd Trilateral Summit Report: Establishment of Secretariat, Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020 - May (2010)

R. 3rd Trilateral Summit Report, May (2010) (TCS): Joint Statement on Strengthening Science and Innovation Cooperation among the Republic of Korea, Japan, and the People's Republic of China

S. 10th Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit Mechanism Summary (2010)

T. 11th Trilateral Summit Meeting on the occasion of ASEAN + 3 Summit Mechanism Summary (2011)

U. 4th Trilateral Summit (TCS), May (2011)

V. 5th Trilateral Summit Report, Joint Declaration on the Enhancement of Trilateral Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership, May (2012)

W. 6th Trilateral Summit Report (TCS), November 2015 - Joint Declaration for Peace and Cooperation in Northeast Asia

X. 6th Trilateral Summit Report (TCS), November 2015 - Joint Statement for Education Cooperation

Y. Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat Annual Report FY2016 (2017)

Z. 2017 TCS Seminar of Regional Education Cooperation: CAMPUS Asia in China, Japan and ROK

AA. 7th Trilateral Summit Report, May 2018 (TCS): Korean Unification, and Protecting Free Trade

BB. Trilateral Cooperation – Cultivating Multilateralism in East Asia, Presentation by Iwatani Shigeo

CSTI Documents

A. About the Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (Brochure) 2015. Accessed at https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/panhu/index.html

B. 2nd Basic Plan for Science and Technology, 2001 – 2005. Accessed at https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/basic/

C. 3rd Basic Plan for Science and Technology, 2006 – 2010. Accessed at https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/basic/

D. 4th Basic Plan for Science and Technology, 2011 – 2015. Accessed at https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/basic/4th-BasicPolicy.pdf

E. 5th Basic Plan for Science and Technology, 2016 – 2020. Accessed at https://www8.cao.go.jp/cstp/english/basic/5thbasicplan.pdf

MEXT Documents

A. The Concept of Global Human Resource Development Focusing on the East Asian Region 2010. http://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/highered/title02/detail02/sdetail02/1373900.htm

B. (2010) Japan-China-Korea Committee for Promoting Exchange and Cooperation among Universities: Working Group Outcomes. http://www.mext.go.jp/en/news/press/detail/1372506.htm

C. (2010) Details of Agreement from the Second Japan-China-Korea Committee for Promoting Exchange and Cooperation among Universities (Beijing) http://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/highered/title02/detail02/sdetail02/1373899.htm

D. (2010) "CAMPUS Asia" launched: the first Japan-China-Korea Committee for Promoting Exchange and Cooperation among Universities. http://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/highered/title02/detail02/sdetail02/sdetail02/1374098.htm

E. (2011) Guidelines for Exchange and Cooperation among Universities in China, Japan and Korea with Quality Assurance. http://www.mext.go.jp/en/policy/education/highered/title02/detail02/sdetail02/1373899.htm

F. (2012) CAMPUS Asia Challenge to Quality Assurance to Develop Inter-University Exchange among Japan-China-Korea. https://www.niad.ac.jp/n_kenkyukai/no13_intlsmnr_prs5(aruga).pdf

G. (2014) Guidelines for Building International Joint Diploma Programs Including Double and Joint Degree Programs. http://www.mext.go.jp/component/b_menu/shingi/toushin/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2015/04/17/1356863_1.pdf

H. 2015 Seoul Declaration for Trilateral Education Cooperation

I. 2017 Grand Design for Higher Education toward 2040. http://www.mext.go.jp/component/b_menu/shingi/toushin/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2018/12/17/1411360_7_2.pdf

J. 2017 CAMPUS Asia Program overview

K. 2017 Agreement of the 6th Meeting of the Korea-China-Japan Committee for Promoting Exchange and Cooperation among Universities. (not found online – was given copy by official at MEXT)

L. 2018 Second Trilateral Education Ministers' Joint Communique http://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/kokusai/senryaku/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2018/04/10/1403250_1.pdf

M. Overview of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology. http://www.mext.go.jp/en/about/pablication/index.htm

JSPS Documents

A. JSPS 2017-2018 Brochure

A3 Foresight Final Annual Reports to JSPS. Accessed at https://www.jsps.go.jp/j-foresight/k_shuryo.html; and https://www.jsps.go.jp/j-foresight/k_jisshi.html

B. Synthesis and Structure Resolution of Novel Mesoporous Materials, Waseda University, 2010

C. sub-10nm wires ; new physics and chemistry, University of Tokyo, 2010

D. Novel cell-specific and pH-sensitive non-viral gene carrier system, Kyushu University, 2011

E. Quantifying and predicting terrestrial carbon sinks in East Asia : toward a network of climate change research, Gifu University, 2012

F. CarboEastAsia: Capacity building among ChinaFLUX, JapanFlux and KoFlux to cope with climate change protocols by synthesizing measurement, theory and modeling in quantifying and understanding of carbon fluxes and storages in East Asia, Hokkaido University, 2012

G. Exploring of New Functions and Application Potentials of Multifunctional Ceramics, Nagaoka University of Technology, 2013
H. Joint research on novel properties of complex oxides, University of Tokyo, 2013
I. The microRNA mediated mechanisms underlying the pathological behavior of breast cancer initiating cells, Sapporo Medical University, 2014
J. Epigenetic Signatures in Gastric Carcinogenesis, Tokyo Medical and Dental University, 2014
K. Composite Photocatalytic Systems for Efficient Overall Water Splitting, University of Tokyo Graduate School of Engineering, 2015
L. Research on Next Generation Internet and Network Security, Tohoku University Graduate School of Information Science, 2016
M. Ultra-realistic acoustic interactive communication on next-generation Internet, Tohoku University Electrical Communication Laboratory, 2016
N. Innovative Tokamak Plasma Startup and Current Drive in Spherical Torus, University of Tokyo, 2017
O. Study on critical physics issues specific to steady state sustainment of high-performance Institute for Natural Sciences Nuclear Fusion Science Institute, 2017

NIAD-QE
Accessed at the following webpages
https://www.niad.ac.jp/english/campusasia/concept.html

A. NIAD (About) https://www.niad.ac.jp/english/en-about/role.html

B. 2013 Outline of CAMPUS Asia Monitoring

C. (2014 1st Report)'CAMPUS Asia' Monitoring on Quality Assurance – Collaboration among Japan, China and Korea-Overview of the First Monitoring in Japan

D. (2014) 'CAMPUS Asia' Programs in Light of Quality Assurance: A Collection of Good Practices

E. (2016) Useful Tips on How to Design an International Cooperative Academic Program 'CAMPUS Asia' Pilot Program Joint Monitoring Report – Collaboration among Japan, China and Korea

F. (2017) Joint Guidelines for Monitoring International Cooperative Academic Programs in CAMPUS Asia

Appendix B. Comparisons of tertiary education in China, Japan and Korea

		China	Japan	Korea
Enrolment	Total enrolment ***	44,127, 509 (2017)	3,846,927 (2016)	3,204, 348 (2016)
	% Female	50	46	40
	% Private	44 (approx.) *	79	81
	Ratio of undergraduate to graduate enrolment (2011 or most recent year available)	8:1	10:1	7:1
Research and Academic disciplines	Main disciplinary Foci (2008-2012)	Engineering, Physics and Computer Science	Engineering, Physics and Medicine	Engineering, Medicine, Physics and Astronomy
	R&D expenditure as as % of GDP***	2.13	3.2	4.55
	Compound annual growth rate of publications	17.8%	1.7%	…
	Main international collaboration partners	USA, Japan, China (Hong Kong)	USA, China, Germany	USA, Japan, China
International Mobility	Students from abroad studying in given country***	178, 271	164,338 (79,375 from China) (13,121 from Korea)	70, 796 (44,163 from China) (1,455 from Japan)
	Mobile students from East Asia and the Pacific studying in given country	…	134,142	52,825
	Top five destinations (host countries) for outbound mobile students***	USA (321,625) Australia (128,498) UK (96,543) Japan (79,375) Canada (66,161)	USA (14,787) UK (2,846) Australia (2,244) Germany (1,816) Canada (1,655)	USA (56,186) Japan (13,121) Australia (8,316) Canada (5,277) UK (5,157)

Note: Data compiled from UNESCO (2014) ; * data calculated independently; ***data collected from uis.unesco.org in 2019

Appendix C: Selected Projects for Re-Inventing Japan (CAMPUS Asia) Project FY2016

Number of Applications and Selections
FY2016 Re-Inventing Japan Project

Categories		TypeA CAMPUS Asia			TypeB ASEAN	Total
		A-①	A-②	Total		
Applied	National	7	16	23	30	53(39)※
	Public	0	0	0	3	3
	Private	1	6	7	19	26(24)※
	Total	8	22	30	52	82(66)※
Selected	National	7	8	15	6	21(17)※
	Public	0	0	0	0	0
	Private	1	1	2	2	4
	Total	8	9	17	8	25(21)※

※The numbers in parentheses are the number of universities.
The total number of "projects" and "universities" do not correspond because there are Japanese universities that applied for or were selected for two or three projects with both types in "CAMPUS Asia (Type A)" and "ASEAN (Type B)".

List of Selected Projects FY2016 Re-Inventing Japan Project

※ Marked ○: Representative university

※ The names of the overseas counterpartners are those stated in the application documents submitted by each university.

【Type A－①】

No.	Name of University	Sector	Project Title of the Application	Name of Overseas Counterpart University	
1	The University of Tokyo	National	Beijing-Seoul-Tokyo (BESETO) Dual Degree Master' s Program on International and Public Policy Studies	2	Peking University(China),Seoul National University (Korea)
2	Tokyo Institute of Technology	National	Advanced TKT CAMPUS Asia Consortium	2	Tsinghua University(China),Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology(Korea)
3	Hitotsubashi University	National	Asia Business Leaders Program Ⅱ (Advanced)	2	Peking University(China),Seoul National University (Korea)
4	Nagoya University	National	Training Human Resources for the Development of an Epistemic Community in Law and Political Science to Promote the Formation of "jus commune" in East Asia	5	Renmin University of China(China),Tsinghua University(China),Shanghai Jiao Tong University (China),Sungkyunkwan University(Korea),Seoul National University(Korea)
5	Kobe University	National	Program for Careers on Risk Management Experts in East Asia	2	Fudan University(China),Korea University(Korea)
6	Okayama University	National	Asiancrats: A Prime Professional Human Resource Development Program for the East Asian Higher Education Area	2	Jilin University(China),Sungkyunkwan University (Korea)
7	Kyushu University	National	Cooperational Graduate Education Program for the Development of Global Human Resources in Energy and Environmental Science and Technology - A New Challenge -	2	Shanghai Jiao Tong University(China),Pusan National University(Korea)
8	Ritsumeikan University	Private	Plan for a Joint Campus representing Korea, China and Japan which will foster leaders in East Asian humanities.	2	Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (China),Dongseo University(Korea)

【Type A－②】

No.	Name of University	Sector	Project Title of the Application	Name of Overseas Counterpart University	
1	Chiba University	National	Plant & Environment Innovation Program	3	Tsinghua University(China), Zhejiang University (China), Yonsei University(Korea)
2	The University of Tokyo	National	East Asia Liberal Arts Alliance for Enhancement of Liberal Arts Education and Training of "Co-Creative" Leaders (Asian regional experts education projects)	2	Peking University(China), Seoul National University (Korea)
3	Tokyo Gakugei University	National	International Graduate Program for Teacher Education in East Asia	2	Beijing Normal University(China), Seoul National University of Education(Korea)
4	Tokyo University of the Arts	National	Japan-China-Korea International Animation Co-work Curriculum	2	Communication University of China(China), Korea National University of Arts(Korea)
5	Tokyo University of Marine Science and Technology	National	Collaborative Education Program in Marine Science and Technology, Based on "China-Japan-Korea Version" of ERASMUS	2	Shanghai Ocean University(China), Korea Maritime and Ocean University(Korea)
6	Osaka University	National	Program for naturing medical research leaders to solve global health problems	5	Peking University(China), Tsinghua University (China), Shanghai Jiao Tong University(China), Tianjin University of Traditional Chinese Medicine (China), Yonsei University(Korea)
7	Kyushu University	National	Cooperative Educational Program for Fostering Human Resources to Lead Development of Sustainable Urban and Architectural Environment in Asia	2	Tongji University(China), Pusan National University (Korea)
8	Nagasaki University	National	China-Japan-Korea intercollegiate Cooperative Project for Nurturing Leading Infrastructure Engineers	2	Shandong University(China), Sungkyunkwan University(Korea)
9	Waseda University	Private	East Asian Global Leadership Program for Multi-layered Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation	2	Peking University(China), Korea University(Korea)

【Type B】

No.	Name of University	Sector	Project Title of the Application	Name of Overseas Counterpart University	
1	Tokyo University of Foreign Studies	National	TUFS Japan Specialist Program for the Enhancement of Japanese Language and Cultural Outreach in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia	3	University of Yangon(Myanmar),National University of Laos(Laos),Royal University of Phnom Penh (Cambodia)
2	Tokyo University of the Arts	National	Multifaceted promotions led by art and culture exchanges with the ASEAN members: Building "soft" infrastructure and a quality assurance system through social practices	8	The Royal University of Fine Arts (Cambodia),National Institute of Fine Art (Laos),National University of Arts and Culture (Myanmar),Lacquerware Technology College (Myanmar),Vietnam University of Fine Arts (Vietnam),Vietnam Natioanl Academy of Music (Vietnam),Ho Chi Minh City University of Fine Arts (Vietnam),Silpakorn University(Thailand)
3	Niigata University	National	Co-creative Dormitory-type Group-work for Science and Technological Students in Japan and Mekong Countries with Regional Collaboration	4	Royal University of Phnom Penh(Cambodia),National University of Laos(Laos),Hanoi University of Science and Technology(Vietnam),Chulalongkorn University(Thailand)
4	Nagoya University	National	Fostering Human Resources for Global Soft-Infrastructure connecting between ASEAN and Japan	6	Foreign Trade University(Vietnam),University of Yangon(Myanmar),National University of Laos (Laos),Royal University of Agriculture (Cambodia),Royal University of Phnom Penh (Cambodia),National University of Singapore (Singapore)
5	○Kyoto University, Kansai University	National	International Program on Resilient Society Development under Changing Climate	12	Vietnam National University, Hanoi (Vietnam)、Hue University(Vietnam),Hanoi University of Science and Technology(Vietnam),The University of Da Nang (Vietnam),Yangon Technological University (Myanmar),Mandalay Technological University (Myanmar),Royal University of Agriculture (Cambodia),Champasak University(Laos),Asian Institute of Technology(Thailand),Chulalongkorn University(Thailand),Kasetsart University (Thailand),Mahidol University(Thailand)
6	○Hiroshima University, Hiroshima University of Economics	National	Project of Effective Action with CLMV's Education (PEACE) to promote the Capacity of Research and Social Planning for Peaceful, Inclusive and Sustainable Development	12	Royal University of Phnom Penh (Cambodia),University of Health Sciences (Cambodia),Royal University of Phnom Penh (Laos),University of Yangon(Myanmar),University of Dental Medicine Yangon(Myanmar),Myeik University (Myanmar),Vietnam National University-Hanoi (Vietnam),Vietnam National University-Ho Chi Minh City(Vietnam),University of Medicine and Pharmacy Ho Chi Minh City(Vietnam),University of Transport and Communications(Vietnam),Foreign Trade University(Vietnam),Kasetsart University(Thailand)
7	Keio University	Private	Human Resource Development Program through LL.M. for Asian Global Legal Professions (PAGLEP) in Collaboration with Universities in Mekong Countries	6	Pannasastra University(Cambodia),National University of Laos(Laos),University of Yangon (Myanmar)Viet Nam National University:University of Economics and Law(Vietnam),Hanoi Law University(Vietnam),Thammasat University (Thailand)
8	Meiji University	Private	Creation of Innovative Educational System for Sustainable Society and Urban Growth	15	Royal University of Fine Arts(Cambodia),Institute of Technology of Cambodia(Cambodia),National University of Laos(Laos),Yangon Technological University(Myanmar),Foreign Trade University (Vietnam),Hanoi University(Vietnam),University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University-Ho Chi Minh City(Vietnam),University of languages and International Studies, Vietnam National University-Hanoi(Vietnam)University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University-Hanoi(Vietnam),Ho Chi Minh City University of Architecture(Vietnam),Chulalongkorn University(Thailand),Srinakharinwirot University (Thailand)King Monqkut's Institute of Technology Ladkrabang(Thailand),Thammasat University (Thailand),National University of Singapore (Singapore)

Appendix D: List of A3 Foresight Projects, underway and completed



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foresight@jsps.go.jp



Projects underway

FY2018

(1 Aug. 2018 - 31 July. 2023)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Joint Research on Novel Physical Properties and Functionalities of Emerging 2D Materials and van der Waals Heterostructures	School of Engineering The University of Tokyo **IWASA Yoshihiro** Professor	CHINA	Nanjin University	YUAN Hongtao Professor
			KOREA	Sogang University	CHEONG Hyeonsik Professor
2	Functionalization and Flexible Device Application of Atomic Scale Organic and Inorganic Material	Tokyo Institute of Technology **KIGUCHI Manabu** Professor	CHINA	Donghua University	SHI Xiangyang Professor
			KOREA	KAIST	BAE Byeoung-Soo Professor

FY2017

(1 Aug. 2017 - 31 Jul. 2022)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Molecular Imaging-Based Precision Cell Therapy	RIKEN **WATANABE Yasuyoshi** Team Reader	CHINA	Zhejiang University School of Medicine	TIAN Mei Professor and Vice President
			KOREA	Seoul National University College of Medicine	KANG Keon Wook Professor and Chairman
2	Organic/Inorganic Nanohybrid Platforms for Precision Tumor Imaging and Therapy	Osaka University **SUGANUMA Katsuaki** Professor	CHINA	Donghua University	SHI Xiangyang Professor
			KOREA	Ewha Womans University	CHOY Jin-Ho Professor

FY2016

(1 Aug. 2016 - 31 Jul. 2021)

		Core Institute	Partner	Core	Principal

No.	Project Title	(Japan) Coordinator	Countries	Institute (Partner)	Investigator (Partner)
1	Asian Chemical Probe Research Hub	Graduate School of Science Tohoku University **UEDA Minoru** Professor	CHINA	Zhejiang University	QI Jianhua Professor
			KOREA	Seoul National University	PARK Seung Bum Professor
2	Chemical & Synthetic Biology of Natural Products through Streptomyces Genome Mining, Artificial Chromosome Engineering, and Synthetic Cell Factory Designing	Graduate School of Agricultural and Life Sciences, The University of Tokyo **OHNISHI Yasuo** Professor	CHINA	Shanghai Jiao Tong University	DENG Zixin Professor
			KOREA	Inha University	KIM Eung-Soo Professor

FY2015

(1 Aug. 2015 - 31 Jul. 2020)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Autophagy, metabolism and neurodegeneration	Niigata University **KOMATSU Masaaki** Professor	CHINA	Chinese Academy of Sciences	ZHANG Hong Investigator
			KOREA	Yonsei University College of Medicine	LEE Myung-Shik Professor
2	The molecular mechanism of Xenophagy and Endophagy	Osaka University **YOSHIMORI Tamotsu** Professor	CHINA	Tsinghua University	YU Li Professor
			KOREA	Chungnam National University	JO Eun-Kyeong Professor

FY2014

(1 Aug. 2014 - 31 Jul. 2019)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Modeling and Simulation of Hierarchical and Heterogeneous Flow Systems with Applications to Materials Science	Tohoku University **NISHIURA Yasumasa** Professor	CHINA	Peking University	ZHANG Pingwen Professor
			KOREA	Inha University	KANG Hyeonbae Professor
2	Modeling and Computation of Applied Inverse Problems	Graduate School of Mathematical Sciences, The University of Tokyo **YAMAMOTO Masahiro** Professor	CHINA	Zhejiang University	BAO Gang Professor
			KOREA	Yonsei University	SEO Jin-Keun Professor

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A3 FORESIGHT PROGRAM

Projects completed

FY2013

(1 Aug. 2013 - 31 Jul. 2018)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Nano-Biomaterials and Delivery Strategies in Regenerative Medicine for Intractable Diseases	Tokyo Women's Medical University **YAMATO Masayuki** Professor	CHINA	Tianjin Medical University	YANG C Victor Professor
			KOREA	Ewha Womans University	LEE Seung Jin Professor
2	Nanoscale imaging and tracing of key molecular events in cancer biology using nanobiomaterials	Graduate School of Medicine Tohoku University **GONDA Kosuke** Professor	CHINA	Chinese Academy of Sciences	JIANG Xingyu Professor
			KOREA	Yonsei University	YOON Tae-Young Professor

FY2012

(1 Aug. 2012 - 31 Jul. 2017)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Study on critical physics issues specific to steady state sustainment of high-performance plasmas	National Institutes of Natural Sciences **MORITA Shigeru** Professor	CHINA	Institute of Plasma Physics , Chinese Academy of Sciences	HU Liqun Professor
			KOREA	National Fusion Research Institute	OH Yeong-kook Principal Researcher
2	Innovative tokamak plasma startup and current drive in Spherical Torus	Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, The University of Tokyo **INOMOTO Michiaki** Associate Professor	CHINA	Tsinghua University	GAO Zhe Professor
			KOREA	Seoul National University	HWANG Yong-Seok Professor

FY2011

(1 Aug. 2011 - 31 Jul. 2016)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Ultra-realistic acoustic interactive communication on next-generation Internet	Tohoku University **SUZUKI Yôiti** Professor	CHINA	Chinese Academy of Sciences	YAN Yonghong Professor
			KOREA	Seoul National University	KIM Nam Soo Professor
2	Research on Next Generation Internet and Network Security	Tohoku University **KATO Nei** Professor	CHINA	Shanghai Jiao Tong University	CAO Zhenfu Professor
			KOREA	Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology	SUNG Dan Keun Professor

FY2010

(1 Aug. 2010 - 31 Jul. 2015)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Composite Photocatalytic Systems for Efficient Overall Water Splitting	School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo **DOMEN Kazunari** Associate Professor	CHINA	Dalian Institute of Chemical Physics, Chinese Academy of Sciences	LI Can Professor and Vice-Director
			KOREA	Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology	JAE Sung Lee Professor

FY2009

(1 Aug. 2009 - 31 Jul. 2014)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Epigenetic Signatures in Gastric Carcinogenesis	Tokyo Medical and Dental University **AKIYAMA Yoshimitsu** Junior Associate Professor	CHINA	Peking University	DENG Dajun Professor and Director
			KOREA	Seoul National University	KIM Woo Ho Professor
2	The microRNA mediated mechanisms underlying the pathological behavior of breast cancer initiating cells	Sapporo Medical University **SUZUKI Hiromu** Professor	CHINA	Sun Yat-sen University	SONG Erwei Professor, Vice president of the hospital
			KOREA	Sookmyung Women's University	PARK Jong Hoon Professor

FY2008

(1 Aug. 2008 - 31 Jul. 2013)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
		The University		Fudan	FENG Donglai

1	Joint research on novel properties of complex oxides	of Tokyo **FUJIMORI Atsushi** Professor	CHINA	University	Professor
			KOREA	Seoul National University	PARK Je-Geun Professor
2	Exploring of New Functions and Application Potentials of Multifunctional Ceramics	Nagaoka University of Technology **NIIHARA Koichi** Professor	CHINA	Wuhan University of Technology	FU Zhengyi Professor
			KOREA	Sun Moon University	LEE Soo Wohn Professor

FY2007

(1 Aug. 2007 - 31 Jul. 2012)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	CarboEastAsia: Capacity building among ChinaFlux, JapanFlux and KoFlux to cope with climate change protocols by synthesizing measurement, theory and modeling in quantifying and understanding of carbon fluxes and storages in East Asia	Hokkaido University **HIRANO Takashi** Professor	CHINA	Institute of Geographical Science and Natural Resources Research, Chinese Academy of Sciences	YU Guirui Vice-Director
			KOREA	Seoul National University	KIM Joon Professor
2	Quantifying and predicting terrestrial carbon sinks in East Asia : toward a network of climate change research	Gifu University **OHTSUKA Toshiyuki** Professor	CHINA	Peking University	FANG Jingyun Professor and Chair
			KOREA	Korea University	SON Yowhan Professor

FY2006

(1 Aug. 2006 - 31 Jul. 2011)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	Novel cell-specific and pH-sensitive non-viral gene carrier system	Kyushu University **MARUYAMA Atsushi** Professor	CHINA	Changchun Institute of Applied Chemistry, Chinese Academy of Sciences	CHEN Xuesi Professor
			KOREA	Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology	PARK Tae Gwan Professor

FY2005

(1 Aug.2005- 31 Jul.2010)

No.	Project Title	Core Institute (Japan) Coordinator	Partner Countries	Core Institute (Partner)	Principal Investigator (Partner)
1	sub-10nm wires ; new physics and chemistry	The University of Tokyo **HASEGAWA**	CHINA	Tsing-Hua University	XUE Qikun Professor
				Seoul National	KUK Young

		Shuji Professor	KOREA	University	Professor
2	Synthesis and Structure Resolution of Novel Mesoporous Materials	Waseda University **KURODA Kazuyuki** Professor	CHINA	Fudan University	ZHAO Dongyuan Professor
			KOREA	Inha University	PARK Sang-Eon Professor

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Appendix E: Semi-structured interview protocol

Semi-structured Interview Stages and Questions
Part 1: Creating a space for a Narrative Grounded in Participant Experience
Explain the aims of the research and participant rights. Have participant sign consent form. Begin recording if allowed to do so.
1. Can you tell me about your role with regard to the program? 2. How would you briefly introduce the general CAMPUS Asia/A3 Foresight program to someone who didn't know what CA/A3 was? 3. And how would you introduce the specific program at your university? What makes it different from other CA/A3 programs (at other universities)? 4. How were the links formed with the partner universities in China and Korea? 5. What are your impressions about (the outcomes of) the program so far? 6. Have you had the chance to collaborate personally with academics, administrative staff, or students from your partner universities in China and Korea? If so, can you tell me about your experiences? 7. Have you experienced any challenges with respect to the development, implementation, or evaluation of the program so far at your institution? 8. How do you envision CA/A3 graduates will use their experiences on the program in the future? 9. Other probing questions as needed.
Part 2: Questions of Greater Specificity
10. How would you describe the goals (or philosophy) of your university's strategy for internationalization? 11. Why do you think your institution/department applied for CA/A3 funding? 12. What do you think are the goals of the CA/A3 program from the strategic perspective of your institution? 13. What policy ideas does your university have about cooperation between Japan, China and Korea in the higher education sector? 14. More broadly, how would you describe higher education's primary social functions? 15. And how might these connect to fostering regional cooperation in the Northeast Asia?
Part 3: Revisiting the Opening Narrative for Theoretical Connections
16. Your institution/department's particular version of the CA/A3 program is titled _________ and is based in the Faculty of ____________. Can you tell me about the process by which this Faculty became involved in the program and how the title came about?
17. What do you think the ideas about regional cooperation are from the perspective of the Faculty of ___________ (participating faculty/faculties)? 18. NIADs description of CA is an *"exchange and cooperation with quality assurance among universities in Japan, China and Korea, in order to strengthen the competitiveness of*

universities and nurture the next generation of outstanding talent in Asia". What are your thoughts about this description?

19. Do you think CA will 'strengthen the competitiveness of universities'? How?
20. The three governments have used the idea of 'developing mutual understanding' a lot in policy documents. What does this term mean to you?

21. What are your thoughts about the challenges that Japan faces in cooperating with China? With Korea?
22. Why do you think the governments of Japan, China and Korea decided to create CAMPUS Asia/A3 Foresight?
23. (optional) What do you think the goals of the CAMPUS Asia program are for the Japanese government specifically?
24. What would you say are some of the important regional issues that the CAMPUS Asia/A3 Foresight program is supposed to address?

25. Why do you think these three particular countries are involved (and not other countries)?
26. Why do you think this program was created at this particular time in history?

27. Other probing questions as needed to explore contradictions, and connections of narrative to theoretically driven questions

Appendix F: Interview participant profiles

Participant	Category	Program	Discipline/Administrative Department	University
1	Administrator	CA	International and Public Policy Studies	University of Tokyo
2	Administrator	CA	International and Public Policy Studies	University of Tokyo
3	Student	CA	International and Public Policy Studies	University of Tokyo
4	Student	CA	International and Public Policy Studies	University of Tokyo
5	Student	CA	International and Public Policy Studies	University of Tokyo
6	Student	CA	International and Public Policy Studies	University of Tokyo
7	Student	CA	International and Public Policy Studies	University of Tokyo
8	Academic	A3	Physics	University of Tokyo
9	Student	A3	Physics	University of Tokyo
10	Academic	A3	Biology	University of Tokyo
11	Student	A3	Biology	University of Tokyo
12	Academic	CA	Medicine and Public Health	Osaka University
13	Academic	CA	Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation	Waseda University
14	Academic	CA	Political Science and Economics	Waseda University
15	Academic	CA	Center for International Education	Waseda University
16	Administrator	CA	Political Science and Economics	Waseda University
17	Administrator	CA	Center for International Education	Waseda University
18	Administrator	CA	Center for International Education	Waseda University
19	Administrator	CA	Center for International Education	Waseda University
20	Academic	A3	Chemistry	Waseda University

21	Student	CA	Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation	Waseda University
22	Student	CA	Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation	Waseda University
23	Student	CA	Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation	Waseda University
24	Student	CA	Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation	Waseda University
25	Student	CA	Conflict Resolution and Social Innovation	Waseda University
26	Academic	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
27	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
28	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
29	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
30	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
31	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
32	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
33	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
34	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
35	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
36	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
37	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
38	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University

39	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
40	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
41	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
42	Student	CA	Sustainable Development	Okayama University
43	Academic	CA	Architecture	Kyushu University
44	Academic	CA	Architecture	Kyushu University
45	Academic	CA	Architecture	Kyushu University
46	Academic	CA	Education*	Kyushu University
47	Administrator	CA	Architecture	Kyushu University
48	Academic	CA	Law	Nagoya University
49	Administrator	CA	Law	Nagoya University
50	Academic	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
51	Academic	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
52	Administrator	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
53	Student	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
54	Student	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
55	Student	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
56	Student	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
57	Student	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
58	Student	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University

59	Student	CA	Teacher Education	Tokyo Gakugei University
60	Academic	CA	Engineering	Tokyo Institute of Technology
61	Administrator	CA	Engineering	Tokyo Institute of Technology
62	Administrator	CA	Animation	Tokyo University of the Arts
63	Student	CA	Animation	Tokyo University of the Arts
64	Academic	CA	Risk Management	Korea University
65	Academic	CA	Higher Education Policy and Administration**	Korea University
66	Government Official	CA	Higher Education	Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT)
67	Government official	CA	CAMPUS Asia Monitoring	National Institution for Academic Degrees and University Evaluation (NIAD-QE)

Appendix G: News stories relevant to the region (Jan 2017 – Aug 2019)

Article (or Tweet) Title	Publication	Date of Publication	URL
South Korea Says It Will End Intelligence Sharing Deal With Japan, Adding to Tensions	The New York Times	2019-08-22	https://nyti.ms/2poJYXd
Finance Minister Taro Aso ponders tariffs in spat with South Korea over wartime labor	The Japan Times	2019-03-14	https://bit.ly/2XYzryD
The $89,000 Verdict Tearing Japan and South Korea Apart	The New York Times	2019-02-13	https://nyti.ms/2Sv0wdt
Alarm as Peking head replaced with Communist Party secretary Academics claim Chinese government 'has taken significantly more control' over universities	Times Higher Education	2018-11-14	https://bit.ly/2K1sJ40
Barring Chinese from research projects 'should not be taboo'	Times Higher Education	2018-11-12	https://bit.ly/2PqKQqh
FBI warns US universities of 'threat' from Chinese nationals	Times Higher Education	2018-11-13	https://bit.ly/2QDA9gw
China's universities on 'front line' of drive to promote 'Xi Thought'	Times Higher Education	2018-06-26	https://bit.ly/2K0woz5
Japan and China, Asian Rivals, Are Trying to Get Along	The New York Times	2018-10-24	https://nyti.ms/2O6PeVP
How the world is grappling with China's rising power	BBC News	2018-10-26	https://bbc.in/2EM8jgn
Shinzo Abe Says Japan Is China's 'Partner,' and No Longer Its Aid Donor	The New York Times	2018-10-26	https://nyti.ms/2AtPBpK
Moon skeptical over trilateral military alliance with U.S., Japan	Yonhap News Agency	2017-11-03	http://bit.ly/2hEED7a
Can business sell a likeable Japan to China?	East Asia Forum	2017-11-02	http://bit.ly/2zfVHrP
S. Korea's top diplomat to visit China to discuss cooperation	Yonhap News Agency	2017-11-02	http://bit.ly/2ze65mk
China, South Korea agree to mend ties after THAAD standoff	Reuters	2017-10-31	http://reut.rs/2ityeuU
China Blinks on South Korea, Making Nice After a Year of Hostilities	The New York Times	2017-11-01	http://nyti.ms/2lPTK27
Osaka threatens San Francisco ties over sister city's 'comfort women' memorial	The Japan Times	2017-10-29	http://bit.ly/2zeaaqk
North Korea Rouses Neighbors to Reconsider Nuclear Weapons	The New York Times	2017-10-28	http://nyti.ms/2j0NV0I
Japanese interest in Senkaku and Takeshima disputes waning, surveys show	The Japan Times	2017-10-28	http://bit.ly/2yuidjp
Moon says Korea-U.S. alliance 'effectively' preventing N. Korean provocations	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-27	http://bit.ly/2zk5UFx
As Jim Mattis visits Seoul, North Korea says it will release South Korean fishing boat, crew held for six days	The Japan Times	2017-10-27	http://bit.ly/2lOARMO
Korea to keep working on UNESCO listing of documents on comfort women	The Korea Herald	2017-10-24	http://bit.ly/2h4SJho

S. Korea, U.S., Japan carry out missile warning exercise on sea	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-24	http://bit.ly/2A76seV
Xi tightens grip on China as name added to Communist Party constitution	The Japan Times	2017-10-24	http://bit.ly/2AiWdFi
China's Communist Party enshrines President Xi Jinping as its most powerful ruler since founder Mao Zedong.	BBC News	2017-10-24	http://bbc.in/2zdssrJ
In era of celebrity culture, Chinese authorities struggle to get propaganda message across	The Japan Times	2017-10-23	http://bit.ly/2yuxGjh
Japan's elusive dream of 'contestable party politics'	East Asia Forum	2017-10-23	http://bit.ly/2j0ZZyS
Abe emerges stronger with win, but faces nation still divided over constitutional revision	The Japan Times	2017-10-22	http://bit.ly/2hFQIJ7
Abe's gamble pays off as ruling bloc bags two-thirds majority in Lower House	The Japan Times	2017-10-22	http://bit.ly/2zwWKq3
The Pride And (Anti-Korean) Prejudice Of Tokyo Governor Yuriko Koike Is A Big Problem	Forbes.com	2017-10-20	http://bit.ly/2lUE51F
China's Party Congress Brings Crackdown on Critics, Nightclubs and Airbnb	The New York Times	2017-10-20	http://nyti.ms/2zdHH1E
Seoul stocks hit fresh record high on tech gains	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-20	http://bit.ly/2j0DgD2
Prime Minister Abe's decision to call a snap election may pay off with Japan's opposition parties in disarray.	East Asia Forum	2017-10-19	http://bit.ly/2zx2dNJ
CIA chief: N. Korea 'months' from ability to nuke U.S.	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-20	http://bit.ly/2gvaSIn
Favorable feelings toward US in Jpn dropped 15% from last year to 57%-lowest in 8 years.	Asahi.com	2017-10-17	http://bit.ly/2AkqKTs
The Asian century is gaining momentum: universities must prepare	The Guardian	2017-10-18	http://bit.ly/2hEUWRh
Xi Jinping: 'Time for China to take centre stage'	BBC News	2017-10-18	http://bbc.in/2gNLivq
Ex-sex slave hopes to install memorial statue at US university	The Korea Herald	2017-10-18	http://bit.ly/2il9Qzl
Senior diplomats of S. Korea, U.S., Japan meet in Seoul to discuss N.K. nuclear issue	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-18	http://bit.ly/2zdRd4N
Japan needs to open up to international faculty	University World News	2017-10-06	http://bit.ly/2lOaAya
S. Korea voices concern over Abe's sending of ritual offering to war-linked shrine	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-17	http://bit.ly/2zcDZHT
Pyongyang envoy tells U.N. 'a nuclear war may break out any moment'	The Japan Times	2017-10-17	http://bit.ly/2lPolwL
(URGENT) EU endorses new sanctions on N. Korea	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-16	http://bit.ly/2ze8smm
'Comfort women' statue to be unveiled in New York	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-13	http://bit.ly/2A7eN2o
U.S. flies powerful bombers over Korean Peninsula as Trump discusses 'range of options'	The Japan Times	2017-10-10	http://bit.ly/2h1kese

Korea close to developing 'blackout bomb'	The Korea Herald	2017-10-08	http://bit.ly/2y0PPB4
White House again rules out talks as North Korea threatens Japan with 'nuclear clouds'	The Japan Times	2017-10-02	http://bit.ly/2ytez9r
U.S. rules out nuclear talks with N. Korea	Yonhap News Agency	2017-10-03	http://bit.ly/2zcnBHz
A Chinese society where ideas and power are freely contested is further out of reach than it has been for decades.	East Asia Forum	2017-10-02	http://bit.ly/2yuG16M
How are China's universities going to be world class when propaganda is credited as research?	University World News	2017-09-26	http://bit.ly/2hc5wlG
Abe Makes a Surprise Appearance, Hails 45 Years of Japan-China Relations	The Diplomat	2017-09-29	http://bit.ly/2y155hg
Tillerson says U.S. in contact with N. Korea over possible nuclear talks	Yonhap News Agency	2017-09-30	http://bit.ly/2xGstUF
Weakening press freedoms in Japan may be part of broader shifts in Japan's domestic political scene.	East Asia Forum	2017-09-29	http://bit.ly/2hanXY3
Former prime minister Yukio Hatoyama joins Henoko protests. The Okinawa base issue led to his resignation in 2010.	William Andrews Twitter	2017-09-29	http://bit.ly/2yuR005
Japan expresses concern over South Korea's 'comfort women' monument plan	The Japan Times	2017-09-26	http://bit.ly/2yumnIc
North Korea accuses US of declaring war	BBC News	2017-09-25	http://bbc.in/2wOWeTt
A nationalist approach to internationalisation of HE	University World News	2017-09-22	http://bit.ly/2hanLrN
Trump and North Korea war of words escalates	BBC News	2017-09-24	http://bbc.in/2lQiI19
North Korea foreign minister warns of 'pre-emptive action' as U.S. bombers fly off Korean Peninsula	The Japan Times	2017-09-24	http://bit.ly/2j0eoeU
US bombers stage North Korea show of force	BBC News	2017-09-24	http://bbc.in/2wcPYAr
Decoding Kim's speech and the Pacific threat	BBC News	2017-09-22	http://bbc.in/2zdzRY8
The new nationalism and internationalisation of HE [Altbach]	University World News	2017-09-15	http://bit.ly/2j1HXgd
North Korea will reach its nuclear force goal - Kim Jong-un	BBC News	2017-09-16	http://bbc.in/2xpSEhy
Latest North Korea missile test renews US talk of military option	CNN	2017-09-16	http://cnn.it/2xq5gFk
North Korea missile test splits world powers	BBC News	2017-09-15	http://bbc.in/2foGDiT
$8 Million to Aid Poor North Koreans? South Korea and Japan Disagree	The New York Times	2017-09-15	http://nyti.ms/2xGUQCp
One year after China's THAAD warning, South Korean business suffer	The Japan Times	2017-09-14	http://bit.ly/2h8nkxZ
Japan seeks oil embargo on North Korea but China will resist cutting lifeline	The Japan Times	2017-09-05	http://bit.ly/2f2ixJQ
North Korea nuclear test: Hydrogen bomb 'missile-ready'	BBC News	2017-09-03	http://bbc.in/2ez7j3c
North Korea 'has missile-ready nuclear weapon'	BBC News	2017-09-03	http://bbc.in/2vBvwNt

Chinese students taught to ‘snitch’ on politically incorrect lecturers	The Australian	2017-09-01	http://bit.ly/2xaBKTF
Japan, South Korea, China agree to jointly promote Asian culture during next three Olympic events	The Japan Times	2017-08-26	http://bit.ly/2wiSl8Z
Cambridge Press Changes Course on Chinese Censorship Request	Inside Higher Ed	2017-08-22	http://bit.ly/2fqgYGi
How do university leaders view internationalisation?	University World News	2017-09-16	http://bit.ly/2jxQOWG
Japan’s new security agenda	East Asia Forum	2017-08-19	http://bit.ly/2fbXmZC
U.S., Japan vow unity against North in ‘two-plus-two’ talks	The Japan Times	2017-08-18	http://bit.ly/2x9NPs7
Korean statue symbolizing wartime forced labor victims erected in Seoul	The Japan Times	2017-08-13	http://bit.ly/2f2jO3T
Guam, Japan prepare defense against threat from North Korea	The Japan Times	2017-08-12	http://bit.ly/2wwLjsq
A Timely Guide to the North Korea Crisis	The New York Times	2017-08-10	http://nyti.ms/2wiXnm6
Trump’s Tough Talk on North Korea Puts Japan’s Leader in Delicate Spot	The New York Times	2017-08-11	http://nyti.ms/2yemN1y
Asia’s Exceptional Neoliberalism: Asian countries are not truly embracing neoliberalism, just selectively adopting elements that best suit their needs.	The Diplomat	2017-08-07	http://bit.ly/2wwzmDd
Has China's Rise Topped Out?	Bloomberg Opinion	2017-08-07	https://bloom.bg/2wydBzLV
China bets U.S. won’t carry out strike against North Korea	The Japan Times	2017-07-30	http://bit.ly/2wi5EGR
Fewer in Japan, South Korea support ‘comfort women’ deal	The Japan Times	2017-07-22	http://bit.ly/2xFnKmn
Chinese ships making surprise appearances in other parts of Japan	The Japan Times	2017-07-22	http://bit.ly/2xGsSXd
‘Annoying’ Bieber barred from China over 2014 Yasukuni visit	The Japan Times	2017-07-22	http://bit.ly/2fbgKWD
South Korea’s Brain Drain: Why so many young South Koreans think of their country as “hell.”	The Diplomat	2017-07-06	http://bit.ly/2fc5WYs
Can ‘one Country, two Systems’ continue to weather Hong Kong’s political storms?	IPI Global Observatory	2017-07-12	http://bit.ly/2w0IHnc
Rare video footage of ‘comfort women’ released by South Korea	The Japan Times	2017-07-08	http://bit.ly/2w0IHnc
South Korea, Japan unlikely to let ‘comfort women’ row undermine security ties	The Japan Times	2017-07-08	http://bit.ly/2h7nqWC
Japan, China start talks to prevent accidental clashes in East China Sea, disputed isles	The Japan Times	2017-06-29	http://bit.ly/2ye3Trm
South Korea urges Japan to be cautious when commenting on ‘comfort women’ issue	The Japan Times	2017-06-12	http://bit.ly/2y4yvuI
Japan carmakers benefit as South Korean auto sales plunge in China: report	The Japan Times	2017-06-11	http://bit.ly/2x6AOhy

[Abe Speech] "Asia's Dream: Linking the Pacific and Eurasia" - Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the 23rd International Conference on The Future of Asia	Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet	2017-06-05	http://bit.ly/2s5QwJV
Japan's strategic hedging under Trump	East Asia Forum	2017-06-06	http://bit.ly/2f1Uyuo
South Korea halts Thaad anti-missile system rollout	BBC News	2017-06-07	http://bbc.in/2x3JgRd
Shinzo Abe and the arrogance of power	The Japan Times	2017-06-01	http://bit.ly/2h5WOVU
The Global Rightist Turn, Nationalism and Japan	The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus	2017-05-15	http://apjjf.org/2017/10/Postel-Vinay.html
Japan's growing concern over China's naval might	BBC News	2017-05-28	http://bbc.in/2fqzyy9
High expectations for Moon amid mounting challenges	East Asia Forum	2017-05-23	http://bit.ly/2y5fmIU
***Restructuring at National Universities: Implications for the Future of Higher Learning	Nippon.com	2017-05-12	http://bit.ly/2xoUXlh
Is the sun setting on the U.S. imperium? China is on the march to a dominant military footprint while American policy lacks strategic intent	The Japan Times	2017-05-12	http://bit.ly/2vZtW47
China presses South Korea on Thaad missile system	BBC News	2017-05-11	http://bbc.in/2f1dcTk
Amid soaring tensions, South Korea's new leader to navigate fine line between Beijing, Washington	The Japan Times	2017-05-10	http://bit.ly/2x9RHtu
Japan, China to boost financial ties amid protectionist, North Korean tensions	Reuters	2017-05-06	http://reut.rs/2fplFQC
Anti-Japanese rhetoric of South Korean presidential campaign won't survive geopolitical reality, experts say	The Japan Times	2017-05-05	http://bit.ly/2xpfnKQ
Squeezed by global powers, South Koreans seek 'Korea first' in new leader	Reuters	2017-05-04	http://reut.rs/2fbPibt
Japan's Abe hopes for reform of pacifist charter by 2020	Reuters	2017-05-03	http://reut.rs/2jwKKO5
US anti-missile system operational in South Korea	BBC News	2017-05-02	http://bbc.in/2xprXd8
Abe says no to resuming six-party denuclearization talks with North Korea	The Japan Times	2017-4-29	http://bit.ly/2fpTdhI
North Korea tensions: US installs missile defence system in S Korea	BBC News	2017-04-26	http://bbc.in/2xpKKEO
How Our Foreign-Policy Elites Manufactured the Korea Crisis	The Nation	2017-04-20	http://bit.ly/2x49RNW
N Korea missile launch fails day after military parade	BBC News	2017-04-16	http://bbc.in/2pEkWh4
Test or No Test, the List of Options in North Korea Is Quickly Narrowing	The Diplomat	2017-04-15	http://bit.ly/2x6v8E0
China fears North Korea-US conflict 'at any moment'	BBC News	2017-04-14	http://bbc.in/2y5le4R

Japan scrambles jet fighters at record pace as Chinese military activity rises	Reuters	2017-04-13	http://reut.rs/2jxqpID
Japan plans joint show of force with U.S. carrier headed to Korean peninsula: sources	Reuters	2017-04-11	http://reut.rs/2h8lwVw
Imperial Rescript on Education making slow, contentious comeback	The Japan Times	2017-04-11	http://bit.ly/2xGsWWW
Chinese premier positive on improving relations with Japan	The Japan Times	2017-04-10	http://bit.ly/2wx9o2n
Japanese envoy meets senior South Korean official amid 'comfort women' row	The Japan Times	2017-04-10	http://bit.ly/2f1ZLT4
Move of U.S. Warships Shows Trump Has Few Options on North Korea	The New York Times	2017-04-10	http://nyti.ms/2xaH5KR
Diplomatic dialogue paves way for Abe-Xi talks	The Japan Times	2017-04-04	http://bit.ly/2jzcp0K
Japanese ambassador to return to South Korea	The Japan Times	2017-04-03	http://bit.ly/2wwB73c
Day after new pro-Beijing chief is chosen, Hong Kong police move to arrest activists	The Washington Post	2017-03-27	http://wapo.st/2xab05L
China upset after Japanese minister visits Taiwan	Japan Today	2017-03-27	http://bit.ly/2wiEJdU
China overtakes Japan on S Koreans' worst countries list	Japan Today	2017-03-21	http://bit.ly/2x3T39K
US, South Korea, Japan start drills off North Korea	CNN	2017-03-14	http://cnn.it/2xpEGwe
South Korea Removes President Park Geun-hye	The New York Times	2017-03-09	http://nyti.ms/2x46RB5
US deploys THAAD Missile defense to South Korea, China opposes this as a threat that could compromise its military capabilities.	The New York Times	2017-03-06	http://nyti.ms/2h7nWnn
North Korea fires four missiles into sea near Japan	The Guardian	2017 -03-06	https://bit.ly/2K0ppaE
Abe moves to distance himself from Osaka school (Tsukamoto) after praising principal's ideology	The Japan Times	2017-02-27	http://bit.ly/2f1rXW9
Bigotry and fraud scandal at Kindergarten liked to Japan's first lady	The New York Times	2017-02-24	https://nyti.ms/2WULX1V
Protesters march in Tokyo against Apa hotel chief's Nanking Massacre denial books	The Japan Times	2017-02-06	https://bit.ly/2NXIrj2
Japan protests S. Korean politicians' plan to erect comfort women memorial on disputed islets	The Japan Times	2017-01-17	https://bit.ly/34HB1XX

Appendix H: Ethics Application Form: Student Research (UCL Institute of Education)

Anyone conducting research under the auspices of the Institute (staff, students or visitors) where the research involves human participants or the use of data collected from human participants, is required to gain ethical approval before starting. This includes preliminary and pilot studies. Please answer all relevant questions in terms that can be understood by a lay person and note that your form may be returned if incomplete.

For further support and guidance please see accompanying guidelines and the Ethics Review Procedures for Student Research http://www.ucl.ac.uk/srs/research-ethics-committee/ioe or contact your supervisor or IOE.researchethics@ucl.ac.uk.

Before completing this form you will need to discuss your proposal fully with your supervisor(s).
Please attach all supporting documents and letters.

Section 1 Project details				
a.	Project title	Regional cooperation in Northeast Asia: comparing policy across institutions and disciplines in the higher education sector in Japan		
b.	Student name	Christopher D. Hammond		
c.	Supervisor/Personal Tutor	Professor Simon Marginson		
d.	Department	Education, Practice and Society		
e.	Course category (Tick one)	PhD/MPhil ☒	EdD ☐	
f.	Course/module title	MPhil/PhD in Education		
g.	**If applicable,** state who the funder is and if funding has been confirmed.	N/A		
h.	Intended research start date	September 2017		
i.	Intended research end date	June 2018		
j.	Country fieldwork will be conducted in *If research to be conducted abroad please ensure travel insurance is obtained through UCL* *http://www.ucl.ac.uk/finance/insurance/travel*	Japan		
k.	Has this project been considered by another (external) Research Ethics Committee?			
	Yes ☐	External Committee Name:		

	No ☒ ⇨ *go to Section 2*	Date of Approval:

If yes:
- Submit a copy of the approval letter with this application.
- Proceed to Section 10 Attachments**.**

Note: Ensure that you check the guidelines carefully as research with some participants will require ethical approval from a different ethics committee such as the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) or Social Care Research Ethics Committee (SCREC). In addition, if your research is based in another institution then you may be required to apply to their research ethics committee.

Section 2 Project summary

Research methods (tick all that apply)

Please attach questionnaires, visual methods and schedules for interviews (even in draft form).

☒ Interviews ☐ Focus groups ☐ Questionnaires ☐ Action research ☐ Observation ☒ Literature review	☐ Controlled trial/other intervention study ☐ Use of personal records ☐ Systematic review ⇨ ***if only method used go to Section 5.*** ☐ Secondary data analysis ⇨ ***if secondary analysis used go to Section 6.*** ☐ Advisory/consultation/collaborative groups ☒ Other, give details: Document analysis (e.g. University and government webpages, evaluation reports, physical documents like brochures, etc – all documents will be in the public domain or received by permission from owners, and all personal data will be kept confidential and anonymized)

Please provide an overview of your research. This should include some or all of the following: purpose of the research, aims, main research questions, research design, participants, sampling, your method of data collection (e.g., observations, interviews, questionnaires, etc.) and kind of questions that will be asked, reporting and dissemination (typically 300-500 words).

This research is a qualitative study of policy ideas and programs aimed at fostering regional cooperation between China, Japan and South Korea in the higher education sector. The aims of the research are to understand the ideational drivers shaping Northeast Asian higher education (HE) regionalism from the perspective of Japan, and to investigate the ways policy ideas are translated into practice across different institutional and disciplinary contexts in Japanese universities. This takes in an investigation of the conditions under which those ideational drivers are implemented and any limits, blockages and resistances to them. Adopting a discursive institutionalist

approach, the study will investigate the ways certain ideas about higher education regionalism (and not others) emerge and become institutionalized, as well as how they are contested, re-appropriated and translated by actors into practice. The research will focus on the ways ideas and practices compare across universities and across disciplines, and will seek to determine the degrees by which regionalism extends into different aspects of higher education in Japan. To investigate these issues, two government-initiated regional collaboration programs have been selected, one representing higher education's societal role as a producer of research-based knowledge, and the other representing its social function as a site for teaching and learning. The program addressing the former role is the A3 Foresight program, a funding scheme for scientists to engage in regional research collaboration. The program addressing the latter role is CAMPUS Asia, a regional exchange program for students at top universities in the three countries. Through contextualized case studies involving semi-structured interviews with program participants, supplemented by discourse analysis of documents, an attempt will be made to construct nuanced and informed answers to the following research questions:

1. What are the ideas driving Northeast Asian regionalism in the higher education sector at Japanese universities?
2. What factors can account for the emergence of these ideas of regional cooperation (as opposed to others)?
3. Under what conditions and how are these ideas translated into practice across different institutions and disciplines? What facilitates the translation into practices and are there limits, blockages or resistances?

Participants will include researchers, administrators and academics (and potentially alumni) involved in the two programmes from ten selected Japanese universities. The goal will be to conduct approximately 63 interviews. Interview questions will be structured around the research questions, a framework for categorizing types and levels of ideas put forth by Vivien Schmidt (Schmidt, 2008, 2010), and an approach to interviewing that aims to put participants at ease by inviting them to share their stories in a relaxed manner before moving on to more theoretically focused questions (Galletta, 2013). Interviews will be recorded but participants will have the option to opt out of this, in which case notes will be taken followed by a report that will be confirmed for accuracy with the participants. Reporting and dissemination will take the form of a doctoral thesis, journal articles and conference presentations. All participants' personal information will be kept confidential and anonymized.

Section 3 Participants

Please answer the following questions giving full details where necessary. Text boxes will expand for your responses.

a.	Will your research involve human participants?	Yes ☒	No ☐ ⇨ *go to Section 4*

b.	Who are the participants (i.e. what sorts of people will be involved)? Tick all that apply. Academics, researchers, programme administrators and possibly alumni from the selected programmes at Japanese universities.
	☐ Early years/pre-school ☐ Ages 5-11 ☐ Ages 12-16 ☐ Young people aged 17-18 ☐ Unknown – specify below ☒ Adults *please specify below* ☐ Other – specify below
	NB: Ensure that you check the **guidelines** (Section 1) carefully as research with some participants will require ethical approval from a different ethics committee such as the National Research Ethics Service (NRES). NA
c.	If participants are under the responsibility of others (such as parents, teachers or medical staff) how do you intend to obtain permission to approach the participants to take part in the study? **(Please attach approach letters or details of permission procedures – see Section 9 Attachments.)** NA
d.	How will participants be recruited (identified and approached)? Participants will be identified via university and government webpages and documents, and through snowballing techniques. They will be approached via email (which will include an attached official letter on UCL letterhead explaining the project – see attached), or at events at which I will have the opportunity to speak with potential participants.
e.	Describe the process you will use to inform participants about what you are doing. Participants will be given a verbal explanation of the project, supplemented with an information sheet written in both English and Japanese.
f.	How will you obtain the consent of participants? Will this be written? How will it be made clear to participants that they may withdraw consent to participate at any time? *See the guidelines for information on opt-in and opt-out procedures. Please note that the method of consent should be appropriate to the research and fully explained.* Written informed consent forms will be obtained from all participants (see attached). This form will also be translated into Japanese. The form explains that participants may with draw at any time.

g.	**Studies involving questionnaires:** Will participants be given the option of omitting questions they do not wish to answer? NA
	If **NO** please explain why below and ensure that you cover any ethical issues arising from this in section 8. NA
h.	**Studies involving observation:** Confirm whether participants will be asked for their informed consent to be observed. NA
	If **NO** read the guidelines (Ethical Issues section) and explain why below and ensure that you cover any ethical issues arising from this in section 8. NA
i.	Might participants experience anxiety, discomfort or embarrassment as a result of your study? Yes ☒ No ☐
	If **yes** what steps will you take to explain and minimise this? Participants will be reassured of their anonymity and the confidentiality with which their information and data will be kept. They will be reminded that they do not need to answer any questions they do not feel comfortable answering, and may opt out of the study at any time. The researcher will also aim to be reflexive and sensitive to the fact that respondents may feel some discomfort addressing certain issues (e.g. issues related to tensions or contested history between China, Japan and South Korea). If any perceived anxiety or discomfort is caused the researcher will immediately cease that particular line of questioning. If **not**, explain how you can be sure that no discomfort or embarrassment will arise? NA
j.	Will your project involve deliberately misleading participants (deception) in any way? Yes ☐ No ☒
	If **YES** please provide further details below and ensure that you cover any ethical issues arising from this in section 8. NA
k.	Will you debrief participants at the end of their participation (i.e. give them a brief explanation of the study)? Yes ☒ No ☐
	If **NO** please explain why below and ensure that you cover any ethical issues arising from this in section 8. NA

l.	Will participants be given information about the findings of your study? (This could be a brief summary of your findings in general; it is not the same as an individual debriefing.) Yes ☒ No ☐
	If **no**, why not? NA

Section 4 Security-sensitive material

Only complete if applicable

Security sensitive research includes: commissioned by the military; commissioned under an EU security call; involves the acquisition of security clearances; concerns terrorist or extreme groups.

a.	Will your project consider or encounter security-sensitive material?	Yes ☐ *	No ☒
b.	Will you be visiting websites associated with extreme or terrorist organisations?	Yes ☐ *	No ☒
c.	Will you be storing or transmitting any materials that could be interpreted as promoting or endorsing terrorist acts?	Yes ☐ *	No ☒

* *Give further details in **Section 8 Ethical Issues***

Section 5 Systematic review of research

Only complete if applicable

a.	Will you be collecting any new data from participants? -	Yes ☒ *	No ☐
b.	Will you be analysing any secondary data? - NA	Yes ☐ *	No ☒

* *Give further details in **Section 8 Ethical Issues***

*If your methods do not involve engagement with participants (e.g. systematic review, literature review) **and** if you have answered **No** to both questions, please go to **Section 10 Attachments.***

Section 6 Secondary data analysis Complete for all secondary analysis

a.	Name of dataset/s	NA	
b.	Owner of dataset/s	NA	
c.	Are the data in the public domain?	Yes ☐	No ☐
			***If no,** do you have the owner's permission/license?* Yes ☐ No* ☐

d.	Are the data anonymised?	Yes ☐	No ☐
		Do you plan to anonymise the data? Yes ☐ No* ☐	
		Do you plan to use individual level data? Yes* ☐ No ☐	
		Will you be linking data to individuals? Yes* ☐ No ☐	
e.	Are the data sensitive (DPA 1998 definition)?	Yes* ☐	No ☐
f.	Will you be conducting analysis within the remit it was originally collected for?	Yes ☐	No* ☐
g.	**If no,** was consent gained from participants for subsequent/future analysis?	Yes ☐	No* ☐
h.	**If no,** was data collected prior to ethics approval process?	Yes ☐	No* ☐

* *Give further details in **Section 8 Ethical Issues***

*If secondary analysis is only method used **and** no answers with asterisks are ticked, go to **Section 9 Attachments.***

Section 7 Data Storage and Security

Please ensure that you include all hard and electronic data when completing this section.

a.	Confirm that all personal data will be stored and processed in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA 1998). *(See the Guidelines and the Institute's Data Protection & Records Management Policy for more detail.)*	Yes ☒	
b.	Will personal data be processed or be sent outside the European Economic Area?	Yes ☒ *	No ☐

*** If yes,** please confirm that there are adequate levels of protections in compliance with the DPA 1998 and state what these arrangements are below.

The research will be conducted in Japan, and all personal data will remain in Japan and be protected in accordance with Japan's Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI 2003/2017)

c.	Who will have access to the data and personal information, including advisory/consultation groups and during transcription? The researcher only
During the research	
d.	Where will the data be stored? On the researcher's personal computers, USB storage devices, and temporarily on an IC recorder (for recording interviews). Once interviews are transferred to the researcher's computer they will be deleted from the IC recorder.

e.	Will mobile devices such as USB storage and laptops be used? Yes ☒ * No ☐ * **If yes,** state what mobile devices: laptop computers, USB drives , IC recorder * **If yes,** will they be encrypted?: Yes (all but IC recorder)
After the research	
f.	Where will the data be stored? On encrypted personal computers and USB drives
g.	How long will the data and records be kept for and in what format? The data will be stored for the duration of the doctoral thesis and until the time when all data has been exhausted for purposes of publication and dissemination (approximately 4 years)
h.	Will data be archived for use by other researchers? Yes ☐ * No ☒ * **If yes,** please provide details. NA

Section 8 Ethical issues

Are there particular features of the proposed work which may raise ethical concerns or add to the complexity of ethical decision making? If so, please outline how you will deal with these.

It is important that you demonstrate your awareness of potential risks or harm that may arise as a result of your research. You should then demonstrate that you have considered ways to minimise the likelihood and impact of each potential harm that you have identified. Please be as specific as possible in describing the ethical issues you will have to address. Please consider / address ALL issues that may apply.
Ethical concerns may include, but not be limited to, the following areas:

- Methods
- Recruitment
- Gatekeepers
- Informed consent
- Potentially vulnerable participants
- Safeguarding/child protection
- Sensitive topics
- International research
- Risks to participants and/or researchers
- Confidentiality/Anonymity
- Disclosures/limits to confidentiality
- Data storage and security both during and after the research (including transfer, sharing, encryption, protection)
- Reporting
- Dissemination and use of findings

Ethical risk	Action to mitigate risk
Methods – interviews will entail collecting personal information and individual stories and opinions from participants Documents analysis	A large number of interviews will be conducted and all data will be anonymized at the individual level. However the names of the participating institutions will at times be referenced. This is inevitable in part because the institutions under study will be chosen from a limited number of total institutions participating in the two programs. However, care will be taken not to jeopardize anyone's personal or professional reputations or defame any institutions. While comparison between institutions will take place, comparisons will be undertaken with the primary aim of detecting common emergent themes driving Japanese regionalism in the HE sector. Any findings that might reflect negatively on a given institution or individual will be completely anonymized to avoid defamation. Documents will be those found in the public domain or obtained by permission.
Sampling – sampling will be undertaken using snowballing techniques	All participants will be informed of the aims of the research and sign consent forms indicated their willingness to participate.
Gatekeepers – some participants may be recruited via introduction from colleagues or coworkers	It will be important to be aware of the interpersonal relationships among gatekeepers or other individuals who provide introductions to potential participants, in order to protect their professional reputations. Utmost care must be taken by the researcher to not damage or unsettle these relationships. This will be mitigated by ensuring all potential participants are informed and consenting throughout the research process, and gatekeepers are appropriately acknowledged, thanked and given the continued option to terminate their role in the research process. It is also possible that a gatekeeper may be in a position of power over potential participants, and hence the potential interviewee may feel obliged to participate in the study (perhaps against their will). Where possible, it will be made clear to

	all participants that they have the option to refrain from or cancel their participation at any time and this too will be kept completely confidential.
Informed consent	All participants will be given informed consent forms and have the option to opt out of the research at any time (see attached).
Potentially vulnerable participants	While no children, young adults or other 'potentially vulnerable' participants will be involved in the study, there is the potential for participants to feel concerned that the information they disclose may have a negative impact on them professionally. Confidentiality and anonymity will be assured to mitigate these concerns.
Sensitive topics	Sensitive topics such as the tensions and contested history between China, Japan and Korea will be discussed in the interviews. Anonymity and confidentiality will help to mitigate concerns in part, but participants may feel discomfort discussing these topics in general (especially if they are being recorded). Participants will be given the option to refrain from answering any questions, stop recording, and end the interview at any time if they feel discomfort.
International research	The research will be conducted in Japan. The researcher has undergone the CITI Japan Research Ethics Training Course (certificate attached), and will abide by the Japan's Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI 2003/2017). Research will be disseminated internationally through papers and conferences, and participant anonymity will be maintained throughout.
Risks to participants and/or researchers	Risks to participants include discomfort/anxiety and concern for professional reputation. These concerns and anxieties will be mitigated as much as possible by the researcher through the procedures described above (informed consent, confidentiality, etc). The researcher will "desist immediately from any actions, ensuing from the research process, that cause emotional or other harm " (BERA, 2011).
Confidentiality/Anonymity and disclosures and limits to	Individual confidentiality will be guaranteed to participants, but the institutions that will be

confidentiality	selected will be evident in the disseminated research. Thus it is possible the participants may feel as though they could be identified if there is a small number of interviewees from a given institution. This will be given consideration in the writing up stages of the research, and care will be taken not to damage any institution's reputation or implicate any individuals while still maintaining the integrity of the research. This will be an iterative process and may involve corresponding with participants to confirm they are satisfied with the researcher's interpretations and narratives.
Data storage and security both during and after the research (including transfer, sharing, encryption, protection)	Data will be stored on encrypted devices and rarely moved from the researcher's home. All interview transcriptions will be anonymized. Personal information will be destroyed after completion of the research project.
Reporting and dissemination and use of findings	Reporting of the research findings will primarily take the form of a doctoral thesis, but may also appear in the form of journal articles and conference presentations. Care will be taken to maintain the integrity of the research while avoiding making any claims that may implicate individuals or damage the reputations of particular institutions

Section 9 Further information

Outline any other information you feel relevant to this submission, using a separate sheet or attachments if necessary.

Please find attached the following documentation:

Information Sheet
Interview questions
Consent form
Email letter template
Schedule for interviews (included in timeline for completion of thesis)
CITI Japan Research Ethics Training Completion certificate

Section 10	**Attachments** Please attach the following items to this form, or explain if not attached		
a.	Information sheets and other materials to be used to inform potential participants about the research, including approach letters	Yes ☒	No ☐
b.	Consent form	Yes ☒	No ☐
	If applicable:		
c.	The proposal for the project - NA	Yes ☐	No ☐
d.	Approval letter from external Research Ethics Committee - NA	Yes ☐	No ☐
e.	Full risk assessment - NA	Yes ☐	No ☐

Section 11 Declaration

Yes **No**

I have read, understood and will abide by the following set of guidelines.

☒ ☐

BPS ☐	BERA ☒	BSA ☐ Other (please state) ☒ Japan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI 2003/2017)

I have discussed the ethical issues relating to my research with my supervisor.

☒ ☐

I have attended the appropriate ethics training provided by my institution in Japan (see attached CITI certificate) .

☒ ☐

I confirm that to the best of my knowledge:

The above information is correct and that this is a full description of the ethics issues that may arise in the course of this project.

Name	Christopher D. Hammond
Date	July 23, 2017

Notes and references

Professional code of ethics
You should read and understand relevant ethics guidelines, for example:
British Psychological Society (2009) *Code of Ethics and Conduct*, and (2014) *Code of Human Research Ethics*
or
British Educational Research Association (2011) *Ethical Guidelines*
or
British Sociological Association (2002) *Statement of Ethical Practice*

Disclosure and Barring Service checks
If you are planning to carry out research in regulated Education environments such as Schools, or if your research will bring you into contact with children and young people (under the age of 18), you will need to have a Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) CHECK, before you start. The DBS was previously known as the Criminal Records Bureau (CRB)). If you do not already hold a current DBS check, and have not registered with the DBS update service, you will need to obtain one through UCL.

Ensure that you apply for the DBS check in plenty of time as will take around 4 weeks, though can take longer depending on the circumstances.

Further references
The www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk website is very useful for assisting you to think through the ethical issues arising from your project.

Robson, Colin (2011). *Real world research: a resource for social scientists and practitioner researchers* (3rd edition). Oxford: Blackwell.
This text has a helpful section on ethical considerations.

Alderson, P. and Morrow, V. (2011) *The Ethics of Research with Children and Young People: A Practical Handbook.* London: Sage.
This text has useful suggestions if you are conducting research with children and young people.

Wiles, R. (2013) What are Qualitative Research Ethics? Bloomsbury.
A useful and short text covering areas including informed consent, approaches to research ethics including examples of ethical dilemmas.

Departmental use

If a project raises particularly challenging ethics issues, or a more detailed review would be appropriate, you may refer the application to the Research Ethics and Governance Administrator (via IOE.researchethics@ucl.ac.uk) so that it can be submitted to the Research Ethics Committee for consideration. A Research Ethics Committee Chair, ethics representatives in your department and the research ethics coordinator can advise you, either to support your review process, or help decide whether an application should be referred to the Research Ethics Committee.

Reviewer 1		
Supervisor name	Simon W. Marginson	
Supervisor comments	I am satisfied that Chris has considered and addressed all necessary procedures to ensure the ethical conduct of this research.	
Supervisor signature		
Reviewer 2		
Advisory committee/course team member name	Claire Callender	
Advisory committee/course team member comments		
Advisory committee/course team member signature		
Decision		
Date decision was made	27/07/2017	
Decision	Approved	X☐
	Referred back to applicant and supervisor	☐
	Referred to REC for review	☐
Recording	Recorded in the student information system	☐

Once completed and approved, please send this form and associated documents to the relevant programme administrator to record on the student information system and to securely store.

Further guidance on ethical issues can be found on the IOE website at http://www.ucl.ac.uk/srs/research-ethics-committee/ioe and www.ethicsguidebook.ac.uk

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