Hume's dynamic system of the passions in the *Treatise*

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DPhil in philosophy

Trinity 2016

Abstract

This thesis is the first attempt to give an all-embracing survey of the second book of *A Treatise of Human Nature*. This masterpiece, published by David Hume in 1739-40, consists of three books, in which he discusses three operations of the mind, viz. the understanding, the passions, and morality, respectively. But unlike Books I and III, no book-length study of Book II has ever been produced in the secondary literature. This is unfortunate, because Hume's accounts of the particular topics of the passions are delivered in a jigsaw puzzle manner, strewn here and there in various different places and contexts. This thesis aims to uncover Hume's underlying intention, by providing a map or chart by which we can collect and connect the scattered pieces of his argument together, and thereby build them into a unified system. In pursuing this aim, I follow Hume's lead and examine all subjects as they appear in Book II with my focus on Hume's original distinction between the indirect and the direct passions. For, it is this indirect and direct division that functions as the key linkage that forms the whole system of the passions into a "new and extraordinary" structure by bridging between the other two systems. Here emerges a breathtakingly rich and profound system, filled with human warmth and a candidly expressed belief in human nature, clear of ostentation or dogmatism. No doubt Book II is the most fascinating and intriguing of the three books of the *Treatise*.

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Acknowledgments

I should like to express my deep gratitude to Professor Peter J. E. Kail for his patient and insightful supervision, to Dr Timothy Jarrold for his consistent support and ingenious comments on my work. I am grateful also to the two examiners of this thesis, Professor Alison Hills and Professor James Harris, for their elaborate and pinpoint suggestions. I have also fully appreciated the kind and warm encouragement of Hume Society members, which has been an invaluable source of power and energy to pursue this task.

Some parts of the thesis are adapted from my papers presented in the following journal and conferences:

"The origin of the indirect passions in the *Treatise*: An analogy between Books 1 and 2", *Hume Studies* 29 (2003) p 205-221.

"The different roles of the direct and the indirect passions in the *Treatise*", 33nd International Hume Society Conference. Toronto, Canada, 2006.

"Two roles of sympathy in Hume's theory of the passions in the *Treatise"*, 34th International Hume Society Conference, Boston, USA*,* 2007. Commented by Angela Maria Del Rosario Calvo De Saavedra

"How does Hume's division of calm and violent function in Hume's system of the Passions in the *Treatise*?", 35th International Hume Society Conference, Halifax, Canada, 2008. Commented by Andre Klaudat

"Is Hume's account on the subject of free-will and necessity really a 'lengthy digression'?", 36th International Hume Society Conference, Island, 2009. Commented by David Owen.

"The ambiguity in Hume's use of the calm and violent division in the *Treatise",* 39th International Hume Society Conference, Calgary, Canada, 2012. Commented by Catharina Paxman

"The two aspects of the will", 41st International Hume Society Conference, Portland, USA, 2014. Commented by Lorenzo Greco

"The compound passions", Oxford Hume Forum, 2015.

"Hume's Centaur passions: The motivational mechanism of the indirect passions", 42nd International Hume Society Conference, Stockholm, Sweden, 2015. Commented by Jacqueline Taylor

"The origin of respect and contempt: The interplay between sympathy and comparison", Humean Readings, Sapienza Universita Di Roma, 2016.

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Introduction

1 The aim and method of this thesis

This thesis is the first attempt to give an all-embracing survey of the second book of David Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature,* and to uncover what is intended there as the system of the passions. This masterpiece consists of three books, in which he discusses three operations of the mind, viz. the understanding, the passions, and morality, respectively.[1] It is unfortunate that unlike Books I and III, no book-length study of Book II has ever been produced in the secondary literature, because Hume's accounts of the particular topics of the passions are delivered in a jigsaw puzzle manner, strewn here and there in various different places and contexts.[2] The seemingly miscellaneous appearance of Book II is derived, probably, from the nature of the subject, viz. the passions. For Hume, the passions are so diverse and so easily changeable by the change of delicate and minute conditions or "situations of the object" that there occur plenty of seemingly contradictory or conflicting cases which need to be treated at once or referred back to on occasion. "'Tis difficult for the mind, when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation", as Hume observes, because "[h]uman nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity" (T2.1.4.3; SBN 283). But this observation does not imply that Hume left the task of unifying them in the hands of his readers. On the contrary: Hume had a clear idea of what he wanted to convey in Book II. This thesis aims to unveil Hume's underlying intention by providing a map or chart by which we can collect and connect the scattered pieces of his argument together, and thereby build them into a unified system.[3]

Given the place of Hume's system of the passions as the second book of the *Treatise*, the key linkages that hold the whole system together must be provided in Book II. It is not surprising

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[1] As Hume's *Advertisement* to Books I and II shows, his original plan was to include politics, and criticism also in the *Treatise*.

[2] In the editorial introduction to the *Enquiries,* Selby-Bigge cautions us: "Hume's philosophic writings are to be read with great caution. His pages, especially those of the *Treatise*, are so full of matter, he says so many different things in so many different ways, and different connexions, and with so much indifference to what he has said before, that it is very hard to say positively that he taught, or did not teach, this or that particular doctrine" (1992, p. vii).

[3] Passmore insists that "there is a unity in his work; it is dominated by a single over-riding intention" (1968, p. 2).

that Book II has a stable structure as a unified and organic mechanism by itself in order to play the crucial role of mediating between the other two accounts of the understanding and morality. A powerful weapon for this task is Hume's new division of direct and indirect passions: it is this division that provides his system with a peculiar dynamism by rendering it double-structured. In his later work, *A Dissertation on the Passions*, he convinces us of the centrality of this division by demonstrating how the virtual retraction of the division castrates the whole system: even though the *Dissertation* is a near echo of Book II, the retraction of the direct/indirect division castrates the work by causing the renunciation of the hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas which functions as the framework of his system.[4] This thesis is an attempt to give a full-length portrait of Book II, a portrait of a unitary system that is firmly and importantly founded on the distinction between the indirect and the direct passions.

Hume claims with considerable pride in his *Abstract* that his *Treatise* is a "bold" attempt to "alter from the foundation the greatest part of the sciences". Hume's *Treatise,* expressed with peerlessly deep and rich insight, and in remarkably forceful yet elegant prose, is no doubt the most important and influential work of philosophy ever written in English. But it is only in the early twentieth century that this masterpiece, published in 1739–1740, became the object of proper scholarly understanding and appreciation, but the readers' common consensus was still that "Book II is the least rewarding".[5]

This unfortunate state of the secondary literature regarding Book II has greatly improved in the last few decades, and many critics have come to treat Book II, albeit partially, as constituting an essential part of the *Treatise*. In writhing this thesis, I am immensely in debt to these books, written by e. g. John Laird, H. Price, Kemp Smith, Pall Árdal, Annette Baier, Nicholas Capaldi, and Terence Penelhum, as well as to recent articles which discuss particular topics of Book II, published by Jane McIntyre, Jacqueline Taylor, Rachel Cohon, Elizabeth Radcliffe, to name a few. Like most of Hume's students, I owe a debt to Kemp Smith's *The Philosophy of David Hume*,

[4] The direct/indirect distinction is mentioned here only in this very casual manner: the indirect passions are "of more complicated nature [than the direct passions], and imply more than one view or consideration" (DP 2.1; 7).

[5] Anthony Flew, 1986, p. 160. Nicholas Capaldi observes: "The general neglect of Hume's theory of the passions has always puzzled me, especially in view of the fact that without understanding that theory one cannot understand the structure and main theme of the *Treatise*" (1995 (2), p. 249).

from which derive much of my interpretation of the *Treatise*, and also my motivation. I was moved to work on Book II by Kemp Smith's following three complaints regarding what he calls "Unsatisfactory features of the argument and expression in Book II". He laments, first, that Hume's misplaced enthusiasm for associationist psychology led him to devote more than a third of Book II "to the treatment of four passions which have no very direct bearing upon Hume's ethical problems, and play indeed no really distinctive part in his system".[6] Secondly, he views Hume's account of free-will and necessity at T2.3.1-2 as a "lengthy digression" which ought to have been placed in Book I.[7] Thirdly, Kemp Smith claims that Hume "bewilders his readers by introducing two special laws of association (one of them between *impressions*!) additional to those mentioned in Book I, and by an over-ingenious elaboration of his argument."[8] In the course of my discussion, I try to show that these are all unfounded misgivings, derived from the failure to see the importance of Hume's original division between direct and indirect passions.[9] The importance of this division has somehow escaped critics' recognition, and critics' failure to see the significance of this division has mystified the whole structure of Book II.

It was Árdal who first demystified Hume's Book II of the *Treatise* in his *Passion and Value* by showing that Book II is philosophically interesting and of vital importance for the interpretation of Hume's view about the evaluation of human character. It is unfortunate, however, that Árdal's devotion to the connection between the second two books of the *Treatise* led him to disregard the connection between the first two books. Annette Baier's *A Progress of Sentiments* is a landmark in the comprehensive interpretation of the *Treatise,* which illustrates how the three books of the *Treatise* constitute "a developing unity", though Baier's work is not intended as a full survey of Book II. Capaldi's works are insightful, but his concern is eventually more with Hume's moral theory than with his treatment of the passions. Passmore's *Hume's intentions*, though an illuminating survey of the connection between the first two books of the *Treatise*, includes virtually no analysis of Hume's account of the passions. It is regrettable that Kydd, Stroud, and

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[6] 2005, p. 160.
[7] 2005, p. 161.
[8] 2005, p. 161.
[9] Kemp Smith observes that "the distinction between the direct and the indirect passions is not fundamental" (2005, p. 143).

many other critics are interested only in a very limited portion of Book II.[10]

What we need is the very point of view that enables us to see that Book II *by itself* constitutes a unified and organic mechanism.[11] I try to show that Book II is structured as a bridge between Book I and Book III, being founded on Book I, and providing the foundation to Book III.[12] On the one hand, the first two books of the *Treatise* are correlated with each other in such a crucial manner as to "*make a compleat chain of reasoning by themselves*", as Hume puts it in his *Advertisement*.[13] Hume's system of the mind operates on the two wheels of the understanding and the passions, and it is from this cooperation that the peculiar "statics and dynamics" of Hume's system of the mind, highlighted by Kemp Smith, is derived.[14] On the other hand, Books II and III are connected together by sharing the same hypothesis by which the indirect passions and the moral sentiments are produced. The most obvious connecting tie is sympathy, which "has a great influence on our sense of beauty, when we regard external objects, as well as when we judge of morals" (T3.3.6.1; SBN 618).

But how could Book II be actually adequate to the heavy task of mediating between Book I and Book III? Although we are equipped with fairly clear views regarding Books I and III, the entire picture of Book II is still hidden beneath a heap of unanswered questions. But in order to answer these questions, we need a general view, one that allows us to see how Hume's system of the passions is structured into a unity. We need an overall view because Hume stages his argument in Book II step by step, ensuring a progression within his system.[15] In the course of this thesis, I shall answer in full the following questions addressed in brief as below.

2 Key questions

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[10] As Ainslie points out in 1999 (p. 470), Hume's interpreters seem to agree with the extremely limited assessment of Book II, and with Loeb's opinion: "if one's familiarity with Book II were limited to II. i. 1, II. i. 11, and II. iii. 1-3, his understanding of Hume's moral theory as presented in Book II would not be significantly impaired" (1977, p. 403).

[11] Passmore points out that "there are organic connexions which we sever at the cost of misunderstanding between the different segments of Hume's theory" (1952, p. 2).

[12] The summarized account of these connections is given in the Conclusion.

[13] James Harris points out that the first two books "read as addressing the question of the relation between reason and passion" place "Hume's discussion in the context of a large early modern philosophical literature on the topic" (2009, p. 129.)

[14] 2005, pp. 71, 73, 75, 161.

[15] This feature of the *Treatise* is emphasizied by Baier (1994, p. vii) and Passmore (1980).

Why was it necessary for Hume to invent the new division of indirect and direct?

Hume wants to explain the delicate complexity and diversity of our emotional experience in terms of the interaction between the two kinds of passions, the indirect and the direct, which have different origins, properties and functions. He seems to think that we feel, think, and act differently not only from others, but also from ourselves in different times (T2.3.8.13; SBN 438), because two kinds of passions operate differently in our life, leading us to view ourselves not only in relation to others but also in relation to external objects. When we are affected by an indirect passion, our view is naturally directed to ourselves or to others, and we thereby become ethically concerned with the object of the passion, though this concern does not move us directly.[16] But when we are affected by a direct passion, we are concerned with an external object, and carried to act by this morally neutral concern. Hume's account of the passions is peerlessly rich and comprehensive, because his system of the passions is thus double-structured.

What different roles are assigned to the two kinds of passions in structuring Hume's system?

The indirect passions provide the foundation of Hume's system in terms of "four affections, plac'd, as it were, in a square" (T2.2.2.3; SBN 333). This square functions as the circumstance in which the idea of the self or another's self arises. The direct passions provide the circumstance in which we are carried to action, through their extension to the causes and the effects of the object of the passion.

What made Hume assert that the indirect passions are non-motivating affections while the direct passions are motives by themselves?

Hume finds it necessary to draw a distinction between the two motivating circumstances in which we are moved to act regarding person-related affairs and regarding non-person-related ones, because the former motivation is essentially an ethical matter, which necessarily involves sympathy, whereas the latter motivation is a morally neutral matter, basically dependent on the

[16] Although the compound passions, such as envy, pity, malice, generosity, are indirect passions, they are motivating because they contain the direct passions of benevolence and anger among their ingredients, as we see in Section 1 of Chapter 3.

relation between ourselves and the object of the passion. Hume establishes the motivational mechanism relevant to the indirect passions—which *per se* are pure emotions without any direction to action—in his account of the compound passions, and pairs it with another motivational mechanism which depends on "the force and violence" of a desire-based direct passion. Hence Hume's motivational system has two aspects, ethical and ethically neutral, or interpersonal and self-interested. What is autonomous with respect to the former is benevolence and anger whereas with respect to the latter is the prospect of our pleasure or pain.

What different strategies are adopted by Hume to account for motivation regarding the indirect passions and regarding the direct passions?

Our motivation regarding the person-related affairs is the subject relevant to the indirect passions, which depends entirely on an "original" tie between love and benevolence, or between hatred and anger (T2.2.6.3; SBN 367). Love and hatred move us because they are "always follow'd by, or rather conjoin'd with benevolence and anger" (T2.2.6.3; SBN 367), which are motivational direct passions. Although pride and humility are "unattended with any desire" (ibid.) and therefore lack this original tie, they move us by being mixed with love or hatred through the joint operation of sympathy and comparison. By contrast, our motivation regarding non-person-related objects is the subject relevant to the direct passions, which is partly a matter of "the *general* character or *present* disposition of the person" concerned (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418), and partly a matter of the "situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419). Hume explains the first circumstance in terms of "the combat of the calm and the violent passions" at T2.3.3, and the second one in terms of "the causes of the violent passions" at T2.3.4-8.

Why is sympathy not directly motivating?

Sympathy need *not* be directly motivating in order to play these two crucial roles in the production of the compound passions: to provide "the first foundation" of a compound passion, and to trigger the principle of a parallel direction by making a passion "run parallel" to benevolence.

How are the indirect and the direct passions connected to each other?

The connection between Hume's separate accounts of the indirect and the direct passions is explained in terms of the origin of the compound passions. The account of the compound passions provides the normative connection between the two kinds of passions by virtue of the peculiar nature of the compound passions as *centaur* affections — indirect passions with the function of the direct ones — being a mixture of the two kinds of passions. The account of the compound passions also contributes to the structural connection between the two kinds of passions, by being a prelude to his subsequent account of the direct passions: unlike other indirect passions, the origin of respect and contempt depends on the non-hedonic division of the "invigorating" and the "enfeebling" passions, the division that is central in his account of the direct passions.

Why are the indirect passions discussed before the direct ones?

Hume begins with the double-relation hypothesis from which the indirect passions arise—a hypothesis relevant only to the indirect passions, which have the self or another's self for their "original" object. For, in order to propound the theories of sympathy and motivation which depend on the idea of the self as the most vivacious present impression, he needs to establish in advance the circumstance in which the idea of the self arises—in terms of the double-relation of hypothesis.

Why is the double-relation hypothesis so important as to make Hume employ one half of Book II for its illustration?[17]

The hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas is central in Hume's system not only because it is a *schema* of his mechanical and naturalistic supposition, but also because the production of a new passion from the double relation is a *proof* of the veracity of his associative system. This hypothesis functions as a stable and reliable foundation of his system, and mediates between the other two systems relevant to the understanding and relevant to morality, in virtue of its being analogous to the two principles by which we make causal judgment on the one hand, and

[17] Hume's hypothesis of the double relation is eliminated from his later account of the passions in *A Dissertation on the Passions*, which begins with the direct passions. This is not surprising, because this hypothesis has no important bearing where the indirect passions are considered to be nothing essentially different from the direct ones.

by which we approve or disapprove the character or action of a person on the other.

Why does Hume, in accounting for the will, devote so many sections at T2.3.4-8 to "the causes of the violent passions" but only one section at T2.3.3 to "the combat of the calm and the violent passions"?

Hume distinguishes between the two aspects of the will, non-controllable and controllable, or ethical and non-ethical, and discusses them respectively in terms of "the combat of the calm and the violent passions" and in terms of "the causes of the violent passions". The first aspect of the will is discussed briefly, because his object in Book II is not to explain, like Hutcheson, "the Means of Good", but to establish this aspect of the will as the moral subject relevant to the character of a person for his later discussion in Book III. The second aspect is explained in detail because this is Hume's innovative account of the will, which directly belongs to Book II's main theme, viz. a close union of the imagination and affections.

Is personal identity regarding the passions discussed in Book II?

"Personal identity as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves" is discussed in Book II in terms of self-concern with the past in his treatment of the indirect passions, and in terms of self-concern with the future in his treatment of the direct passions. In the former treatment, Hume explains how the idea of the self as the bearer of sentiments, thoughts, and actions arises through the production of pride and humility. In the latter, he illustrates how the idea of the self as an agent arises through the process in which the emotion of desire or aversion extends itself to the causes and the effects of the object of the passion. On this view, Book II as a whole should be taken to be Hume's account of personal identity regarding the passions.

3 The indirect passions vs. the direct passions

The division of the passions into direct and indirect is Hume's invention.[18] Since no other philosophers have ever adapted this division, we need to make clear the differentia between the

[18] This is often pointed out by e.g. Cohon, 2007, p. 160.

direct and the indirect passions before entering into our discussion. Hume divides the passions into two kinds by their origin: the direct passions are those that arise immediately from pleasure or pain, whereas the indirect ones are those that arise from the same principle, though by the conjunction of other qualities (T2.1.1.4; SBN 276-7). The direct passions are "desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security"; the indirect ones are "pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their dependants" (ibid.). This generic definition of the two kinds of passions, however, is the source of scholarly controversy,[19] because Hume later introduces those "direct" passions that arise not from pleasure or pain, but "from a natural impulse or instinct", claiming: "These passions, properly speaking, produce good and evil, and proceed not from them, like the other affections" (T2.3.9.8; SBN 439).[20] Although Hume calls these "sheerly instinctive" passions "direct" passions, Kemp Smith treats them as neither the direct nor the indirect passions, and brackets them into an *ad hoc* category of "the primary" passions in order to place them outside the direct/indirect division.[21] But this re-classification of Hume's passions, suggested by Kemp Smith and supported by several critics, has difficulties in the following three respects. First, as Loeb insists, it is natural to take Hume's "Division of the subject" at T2.1.1.4 to be "canonical" and fundamental, and to imply that the direct/indirect division cuts through all the passions including Kemp Smith's "primary passions". Secondly, Hume explicitly states the sheerly instinctive passions as "the direct passions", and that "the direct passions frequently arise from a natural impulse or instinct" (ibid.). Thirdly, Hume has reason to include both instinctive and non-instinctive passions into the direct passions, because he wants to employ "desire" and "aversion"—the primary direct passions—to mean both an instinctive and a non-instinctive passion. For Hume, desire is a typically non-instinctive direct passion, which presupposes some antecedent perception of pleasure or pain, as he indicates: "DESIRE arises from good consider'd

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[19] This topic is discussed in detail by Loeb in his article (1977*)*.

[20] These instinctive direct passions include two kinds of "calm desires and tendencies": "either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such" (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417).

[21] Kemp Smith reclassifies Hume's list of passions, and introduces an *ad hoc* division, viz. the "primary" passions, for those instinctive passions that produce pleasure or pain rather than being produced by them. On his classification, the primary passions are left outside of the division of indirect and direct (2005, p. 164-9).

simply" (T2.3.9.7; SBN 439). However, when he observes that "[b]enevolence or the appetite… is a *desire* of the happiness of the person belov'd, and an aversion to his misery" (T2.2.9.3; SBN 382, my emphasis), "desire" is employed as an equivalent of benevolence, which does not presuppose any antecedent pleasure or pain: benevolence is a "calm passion", which is an instinct "originally implanted in our natures" (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417). Hume's use of desire as equivalent to benevolence is obviously at odds with Kemp Smith's re-classification, in which desire and benevolence are classified into different categories: desire is a "secondary" passion whereas benevolence is a "primary" one. It is evident that Kemp Smith's strict distinction between an instinctive and a non-instinctive passion is inconvenient for Hume in accounting for the origin of pity and malice by arguing that "pity and benevolence, malice, and anger, being the same desires arising from different principles, shou'd so totally mix together as to be undistinguishable" (T2.2.9.4; SBN 382). Given Hume's lenient notion of desire, which allows it to be both a non-instinctive and an instinctive passion, we need to take him at his word that, although some direct passions arise from pleasure or pain, others arise from a natural impulse or instinct. There is justification to disagree with Kemp Smith that "the distinction between the direct and the indirect passions is not fundamental",[22] and to suppose that this distinction is exhaustive and fundamental in Hume's system. It is not only exhaustive in the sense that all passions are subject to the direct/indirect distinction, but also absolute and fundamental in the sense that a direct passion can never be converted into an indirect, or vice versa.

But how does this direct/indirect division contribute to making Hume's system as it is? It is commonly insisted[23] that it is adapted by Hume in order to single out those passions that rely on Hume's associative operations of the mind for their production. Although this is no doubt an important contribution of this division to structuring his system, the following general and thematic contribution cannot be overlooked. It is the difference in the properties and functions of the indirect and the direct passions that enables Hume to explain the complexity and diversity of our emotional experience. We feel, think, and act differently not only from others, but also from ourselves in different times (T2.3.8.13; SBN 438) because two kinds of passions operate

[22] 2005, p. 143.
[23] Kemp Smith (2005) and Cohon (2007).

differently in our life, leading us to view ourselves not only in relation to others but also in relation to external objects. When we are affected by an indirect passion, our view is naturally directed to ourselves or to others, and we thereby become ethically concerned with the object of the passion, though this concern does not move us directly. But when we are affected by a direct passion, we are concerned with an external object, and carried to act by this morally neutral concern. Hume's system of the passions is rich and comprehensive because it is double-structured by the two kinds of passions that have strikingly different properties and functions.

The distinguishing feature of an indirect passion is that a passion, once excited, "always turns our view to ourselves" or to others (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287), because the indirect passions are determined by "a natural and original instinct" to have an object, viz. the self or another's self, distinct from their cause (T2.1.3.2; SBN 280). When I am proud of my beautiful house, my pride has "in a manner two objects", viz. my house and my self, since it redirects my attention from the house to my self.[24] It is this peculiar feature of the indirect passions that allows Hume to explain their genesis in terms of a double relation of impressions and ideas. But this double-relation is irrelevant to the direct passions, because, when I am affected by a direct passion, and desire a beautiful house, the cause and the object of my desire are identical, viz. the house. On the basis of this difference, Hume establishes two different mechanisms — one relevant to the indirect and one relevant to the direct passions — by resorting to different principles: the double relation of impressions and ideas for the former, and a parallel direction of impressions for the latter. The first mechanism concerns the circumstance in which the idea of my self or the idea of someone else arises, whereas the second one concerns the circumstance in which the idea of my self as an agent—a person who feels "an internal impression" of the will— arises. The connection between the two kinds of passions is explained in terms of the origin of the compound passions, viz. pity, malice, envy, respect, contempt, amorous passions, which are a mixture of the two kinds of passions.

[24] See Sections 4 and 9 of Chapter 1.

Chapter 1: The indirect passions - pride and humility

Hume employs more than a half of Book II for establishing the hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas from which pride and humility, love and hatred arise. For, this hypothesis is meant for him the foundation of his system, and provides the circumstance in which the idea of the self and another's self arise. He pursues this task through the illustration of the origin of pride and humility by the following four procedures. In T2.1.2-3 he builds the basic double-relation mechanism from which the passion arises; in T2.1.4-10 he gives an enhancement or adjustment to this basic model in terms of "limitations" in order to make it applicable to all causes of the passion, viz. beauty, virtue, riches; in T2.1.11 he introduces the "secondary" cause of pride, claiming that the "original" cause needs to be "seconded" by the opinions of others which are communicated by sympathy: in T2.1.12 he gives "a convincing proof" to the double-relation hypothesis through the demonstration that this hypothesis is so simple and basic as to applicable to the whole animal creation.

1 What is the double relation of impressions and ideas from which pride and humility arise?

What is the hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas from which pride and humility are derived? How does this productive mechanism operate? Why is it so important in Hume's system? The key to these questions is, I argue, that this double-relation hypothesis is nothing but the associational "schema" of Hume's empiricist and naturalist position, that the "concurrence" of the associations both of impressions and ideas renders the transition so much more easy and natural as to produce "a new passion" (T2.1.4.4; SBN 284). The production of a new passion from the double relation is therefore a proof of the validity of Hume's system.

Baier questions: Why Hume chooses pride and humility as the first subject of discussion?[25] Why does he begin with the indirect passions whose origin is more complicated than that of the

[25] 1994, p. 133. Baier answers the question that pride and humility are meant for the illustration of Hume's "philosophical priorities", that is, "reflexivity, indirectness, conflict—these are all themes that are of importance for understanding Hume's version of morality, as well as being themes that are carried over from Book One", or that Hume had a "philosophical reasons for the early concentration in Book Two on conflict and on emotional see-saws". But I find some difficulty to agree with her assertion of "philosophical priorities", or "reflexivity, indirectness, conflict" in Hume's account of the indirect passions.

indirect passions?[26] An obvious answer to these questions is that pride and humility are for Hume peculiar and special in that they have "self" for their object determined by "an original and natural instinct" (T2.1.5.3; SBN 284).[27] As we shall see, it is solely this property of pride and humility that allows Hume to establish the hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas from which the passions are derived, and to assert that "nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation, viz. of ideas to the object of the passion, and of sensation to the passions itself" (T2.2.2.3; SBN 333). But, what, exactly, is the double relation of impressions and ideas from which the passion arise? What makes Hume so concerned to establish that "'tis by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produc'd" (T2.2.2.28; SBN 347)?

Despite the centrality of the double-relation hypothesis to Hume's system, no direct answer is prepared to these questions in the secondary literature, nor are these questions asked properly as crucial subjects which need much discussion. Here lies the chief reason, I argue, why Hume's account of pride and humility is so frequently subject to scholarly misunderstandings or complaints for its defect. A typical example is Kemp Smith's misgiving that "more than a third of Book II is employed in the treatment of four passions which have no direct bearing upon Hume's ethical problem, and play indeed no really distinctive part in his system".[28] Penelhum's accusation of Hume is another example: "Hume is wrong when he say that the cause of pride has to give me pleasure" because "I can certainly be proud of very unenjoyable things, such as paying my tax bill under difficulties".[29] Or, the inadequacy of Davidson's famous reconstruction of Hume's account of pride originates from his failure to understand how Hume's double-relation

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[26] Hume's later work, *A Dissertations on the Passions* begins with the discussion of the direct passions.

[27] It must be noted that pride, humility, love, hatred are employed by Hume in a technical way, different from ordinary use, as he states: "by pride I understand that agreeable impression, which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or power makes us satisfy'd with ourselves: And by humility I mean the opposite impression" (T2.1.7.8; SBN 297). He deliberately employs "pride" and "humility" as a virtuous and a vicious self-evaluative passion, and attribute to them a flatly contrary ethical implication adapted by his contemporary writers: "There may, perhaps, be some, who being accustom'd to the style of the schools and pulpit, and having never consider'd human nature in any other light, than that in which they place it, may here be surpris'd to hear me talk of virtue as exciting pride, which they look upon as a vice; and of vice as producing humility, which they have been taught to consider as a virtue" (T2.1.7.8; SBN 297). Hume's technical use of pride is discussed in detail by Árdal in his 1966 (p. 17-33), and his use of love in Rachel Cohon in her 2007.

[28] 2005, p. 160.

[29] 2000, p. 69.

hypothesis operates.[30]

The reason why the above questions regarding Hume's double-relation hypothesis escape critics' attention is probably that it is too simple and unsophisticated to satisfy their curiosity. For, its basic model is the mechanical association between the two sets of ingredients constituting the cause and the passion, which depends on this supposition: since pride and humility are constituted of two components, viz. an impression (pleasure or uneasiness) and an idea (of the self), in order for the passion to arise, there must be some source of ingredients from which the components are derived. Hume's business is therefore to explain how the raw ingredients constituting the cause are converted into the components constituting the passion. His strategy is to explain the conversion in terms of "a double impulse" invoked by a *joint* transitions of ideas and impressions. He contrives with utmost care to make the whole mechanism mechanical and automatic in order not to involve any such intentional or rational elements as beliefs of the person affected. This contrivance allows Hume to take "a wholly external or objective view of the situation" and to ignore "completely…the relevant beliefs of the agent himself".[31] This is essential to his mechanical system, because his purpose in the *Treatise* is to show that "in the production and conduct of the passions, there is a certain regular mechanism, which is susceptible of as accurate a disquisition, as the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy" (DP 6. 19; 29).[32] "Such simple and natural principles, founded on such solid proofs, cannot fail to be receiv'd by philosophers" (T2.1.1; SBN 325), as Hume insists with considerable pride. The last section of Part 1 of Book II, in which Hume discusses "Of the pride and humility of animals", is meant to be the demonstration that it "is so simple, and supposes so little reflection and judgment, that 'tis applicable to every sensible creature" (T2.1.12.8; SBN 328), which is "a convincing proof" of the veracity of his hypothesis. In this chapter I examine what made Hume so concerned

[30] This is discussed in Section 3.

[31] G. Taylor is argues: "A crucial mistake in Hume's account is that he takes a wholly external or objective view of the situation; that is, he completely ignores the relevant beliefs of the agent himself. But reference to such beliefs is essential if we are to settle what is involved in pride but not in pleasure, and when pride can be said to be in some sense justified" (1980, p. 388). Taylor obviously misunderstands not only Hume's intention in his account of pride but also in the *Treatise* as a whole.

[32] Hume writes: "If, in examining several phaenomena, we find that they resolve themselves into one common principle, and can trace this principle into another, we shall at last arrive at those few simple principles, on which all the rest depend. And tho' we can never arrive at the ultimate principles, 'tis a satisfaction to go as far as our facilities will allow us" (T Abstract 1; SBN 646).

to show that the indirect passions of pride and humility, love and hatred, *must* arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas, and from the "mutual assistance" between the association of ideas and the association of impressions, in order to show that the double-relation hypothesis serves as a powerful weapon in his mechanical account of the passions, by mediating between the two systems of the understanding and of morality.

In order to understand what is meant by Hume as a double relation of impressions and ideas from which pride and humility, love and hated are derived, we need to reflect on Hume's declaration of his naturalistic position, that there is no *a priori* source of our knowledge, and that our experience begins with perceptions. As he states: "the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and … since the impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their appearance in the soul" (T2.1.1.2; SBN 275). When any object strikes upon our sensory organs, he argues at T1.1.2.1, we feel sensations such as heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure and pain, and these impressions, when reflected upon the mind, are copied in the mind as ideas, which remain after the impression ceases. These ideas of pleasure and pain, by returning again on the mind, produce "the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear", which Hume calls *the direct passions*. These again are copied by the memory and imagination, and become ideas, which in their turn give rise to other impressions, such as pride and humility, love and hatred—*the indirect passions* as he calls them. Thus, on Hume's view, the passions are the *reflection* of the sensory impressions, proceeding from the original sensations "either immediately or by the interposition of its idea" (T2.1.1.1; SBN 275). On this mechanical and naturalistic supposition, Hume argues on the one hand that in order for an indirect passion to arise, there must be some cause as the source of the ingredients from which the components of the passion are derived, and on the other that in order for these ingredients to be conveyed to compose the passion, there must be relations both of ideas and sensations established between the cause and the passion. This is the hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas from which a passion is derived.

In pursuing this mechanical strategy, Hume begins by distinguishing between the *quality* and the *subject* of the cause of the passion. When I am proud of my beautiful house, the cause of my

pride is the beautiful house, which is "sub-divided" into the quality and the subject: the former is the beauty, which operates upon the passion, and the latter is the house, which is both beautiful and mine. These two particulars, viz. the quality and the subject, should be considered "as component parts of the cause" insofar as the beauty and the house have "a necessity for their conjunction", though separable, in order to produce the passion (T2.1.2.6; SBN 279). Every beautiful object produces our pleasure, but pride arises only when it is related to us: "Beauty, consider'd merely as such, unless plac'd upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity" (ibid.).

After having specified the two properties of the cause of the passions, Hume's next business is to "find something in them correspondent to the suppos'd properties of their causes" (T2.1.5.3; SBN 286). He finds that pride has two original qualities: a pleasant sensation, which constitutes its "very being and essence" (T2.1.5.4; SBN 286), and the idea of the self, which nature has assigned to it as its object (T2.1.3.2; SBN 280). Hume explains this situation by appealing to an analogy with physiological phenomena, that pride is nothing but the combination of these two "contrivances of nature": the sensations of lust and hunger always excite the peculiar *idea* suitable to each appetite, and the nerves of the nose and palate are so disposed as to produce peculiar *sensations* in the mind (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287). This physiological assimilation allows Hume to suppose that the mind has "organs" which are "so dispos'd as to produce the passion;[33] and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea", viz. the idea of the self (T2.1.5.8; SBN 28).

Hume places these two qualities of pride, viz. a pleasant sensation, and the idea of the self, in relation with the two properties of its cause, viz. its tendency to excite a pleasant sensation, and its relation to the self, and argues: That cause, which excites the passion is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From this double relation of ideas and impressions, the

[33] Hume's metaphor of *organs* of the mind suggests, according to Lilli Alanen, "a distinction between the very act of operating of the mind (or its mental 'organ') and the object perceived or sensed, which, although these never occur (are experienced) separately, nevertheless can be thought of apart, as two different aspects of the same occurrence or phenomenon. Here again Hume may be seen as following his Cartesian predecessors in using the term 'perception' broadly enough to cover both the act and the content of a perception" (2005, p. 192-3).

passion is deriv'd" (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286-7). For,

> The one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it: With how much greater facility must this transition be made, where these movements mutually assist each other, and the mind receives a double impulse from the relation both of its impressions and ideas? (ibid.)

Wherever there is a double relation of impressions and ideas established between the two sets of component constituting the cause and the passion, viz. a pleasant sensation, and the idea of the self, the former set of the component is converted into the latter owing to the transition both of impressions and ideas, and thereby produces the passion. This conversion naturally takes place not only because there operates an attraction or association among resembling ideas and impressions, but also because these two kinds of association "very much assist and forward each other", and render the transition more easy and natural. Hume's point is that, when "a double impulse" is bestowed on the mind by the joint transitions of ideas and impressions, "[t]he new passion, therefore, *must* arise with so much greater violence" (T2.1.4.4; SBN 284, my emphasis). But, how does this *double impulse* contribute to the conversion of the components constituting the cause into the components constituting the passion?

In order to answer this question, let us take an example of my taking pride in my beautiful house, and see how the two components of the cause, viz. a pleasant sensation (CS), the idea of my self (CI), are converted into the two components constituting my pride, viz. a pleasant sensation (PS), the idea of my self (PI).[34] On Hume's mechanical account, my pride arises when CS+PI is converted into PS+PI by the following processes:[35]

(1) The two components of the cause (CS and CI) are related to the two components of my pride (PS and PI) forming a double relation of impressions and ideas.

(2) The association of ideas between CI and PI causes the connection of CI + PI, while the

[34] "The quality, which operates on the passion, produces separately an impression resembling it; the subject to which the quality adheres is related to self the object of the passion: No wonder the whole cause, consisting of a quality and of a subject, does so unavoidably give rise to the passion" (T2.1.5.10; SBN 289).
[35] The following interpretation is outlined in Haruko Inoue, 2003, p. 205-221

association of impressions between CS and PS causes the connection of CS + PS.

(3) The concurrence of the transition of ideas between CI + PI and the transition of impressions between CS + PS gives rise to "a double impulse".

(4) CI+CS is converted into PI+PS.

(5) Pride arises.

Hume's strategy, thus articulated, reveals two difficulties regarding (1) and (2). First, where I take pride in a house which is planned but not built yet, CS is not an impression, but an idea. Or, when a cook is proud of his dish, just prepared but not served yet, the pleasant sensation excited by this un-tasted meal is an idea, whereas the pleasant sensation constituting the very essence of pride is an impression. In these cases, there is a difficulty to assert the firs process of (1), because the association between CS with PS cannot take place insofar as the former is an idea whereas the latter an impression. Secondly, there is a difficulty to assert the second process of (2), because CI cannot be converted into PI insofar as ideas are "incapable of forming a compound by their mixture" (T2.2.6.1; SBN 366). CS may be converted into PS because impressions are like colours, and "susceptible of an entire union", whereas CI cannot be converted into PI because ideas are like "the extension and solidity of matter", and cannot be transfused into each other, according to Hume.

We may here learn that, despite its seeming simplicity, the conversion of CI+CS into PI+PS is not such a simple matter as a direct replacement of the former with latter, not like converting a barn into a garage without structural alternation. Hume makes this clear by insisting that "every cause of pride by its peculiar qualities, produces a *separate* pleasure, and of humility a *separate* uneasiness" (T2.1.5.1; SBN 285, my emphases). By stressing CS to be a *separate* pleasure distinct from PS, he indicates that CS is different from PS, though derived from it. This distinction between PS and CS is fundamental in his system, because CS is characteristically a non-evaluative pleasure, common to all pleasures we feel at the perception or contemplation of any object that strikes us pleasantly in some way or other. By contrast, PS as a component of pride is an evaluative pleasure, which is inherently related to ourselves. For PS, this connection with the self is so essential and integral that the beauty of the house, "consider'd merely as such,

unless plac'd upon something related to us, never produces any pride" (T2.1.2.6; SBN 279). On this view, although PS and CS are both a pleasant sensation, they are not, strictly speaking, the same: PS is something more than the pleasant sensation excited by the beauty. Likewise CI and PI, albeit both being the idea of the self, are distinct and different from each other, as Hume insists: "We must…make a distinction…betwixt that idea [CI], which excites them (the passions), and that [PI] to which they direct their view, when excited" (T2.1.2.4; SBN 278). As we shall see, these two ideas are different from each other, because the first is the idea of the limited and contingent aspect of ourselves whereas the latter is the idea of the general and intrinsic aspect of ourselves.[36] What then could be the ground for Hume to assert that, despite this difference between CS and PS, and between CI and PI, "[t]he one idea is easily converted into its correlative; and one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it" (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286-7)?

A clue to this question lies in the "great analogy" between this hypothesis of the double relation and the hypothesis regarding belief-formation in Book I. The two hypotheses relevant to the passions and relevant to the understanding are similar, Hume insists, in that the conversion in both cases depends on the transition of the vivacity from the present impression to the related idea. In both hypotheses, it is the present impression (CS), he indicates, that pulls the trigger of the conversion, and enables "an impression and idea…[to] transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their double relation" enabling the conversion (T2.1.5.11; SBN 290). Hume states: "When an idea produces an impression, related to an impression, which is connected with an idea, related to the first idea, these two impressions must be in a manner inseparable, nor will the one in any case be unattended with the other… Without the present impression, the attention is not fix'd, nor the spirits excited. Without the relation, this attention rests on its first object, and has no farther consequence" (T2.1.5.10-11; SBN 289-90). On the basis of the analogy of the present hypothesis regarding the passions with the hypothesis regarding the understanding, we can solve the above two difficulties involved in the conversion of CS into PS, and CI into PI in the following way.

[36] This is disussed in Section 3 of Chapter 1.

In an example in which a cook takes pride in his dish, just cooked but not tasted, CS is the idea of the pleasure produced by his imagining that it would produce a delightful sensation when he tastes it. But this idea of pleasure is converted into an impression when it is enlivened by the vivacity of the present impression of the dish, which is placed before his eye with a full appetizing look: for Hume, ideas and impressions are the same perception, differing only in their degrees of force and vivacity. So far as CS is so enlivened as to be a near impression, there is no difficulty for Hume to assert that CS is transfused itself into PS by the association of impressions. Now, the solution of the second difficulty is provided in Hume's assertion that "an impression and idea…transfuse themselves into another impression and idea by means of their *double relation*" (ibid. my emphasis). In this assertion he makes clear that the transfusions of CI into PI, and CS into PS, take place not independently but *jointly*, namely, as the unit-conversion of CS+CI into PS+PI. Hence his emphasis is on a *double relation* of impressions and ideas. Hume has two structural and systematic reasons to insist that this transfusion takes place jointly, but not separately. On the one hand, given the property of ideas which does not admit of a total union or mixture with each other, the transfusion of CI into PI, if possible at all, must happen *parasitically* on the transfusion of CS into PS. On the other hand, the two transfusions must happen together at once in order to bestow on the mind "a double impulse": "Those principles which forward the transition of ideas, here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one action, bestow on the mind a double impulse" (T2.1.4.4; SBN 284). Now we return to the above question, why, then, is *a double impulse* necessary for the conversion of CS+CI into PS+PI?

2 How could the sentiments of others enter into the double-relation mechanism?

The reason why the "original" cause has little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others (T2.1.11.1; SBN 316) is that the pleasant or painful sensation excited by the original cause requires the vivacity of the pleasant or painful sensation embedded in the secondary cause in order to be converted into the pleasant or painful sensation to constitute the passion.

The reason why a double impulse is necessary for this conversion of CS+CI into PS+PI to happen is, according to Hume, that this conversion is "a double task" (T2.1.6.2; SBN 291), which

requires “double force and energy” (ibid.)—it is a double task because not only the conversion of CS into PS but also the conversion of CI into PI must take place at once. A double impulse is required as the source of this double force and energy in order to convey the *double* vivacity to enliven both CS and CI at the same time. In order to understand this situation, we need to recall Hume’s assertion that, although we have organs which are so disposed to produce a passion, “there is requir’d some other emotion, which by a double relation of impressions and ideas may set these principles in action, and bestow on them their first impulse” (T2.2.11.6; SBN 396). When I am proud of my house, the emotion that triggers the organs is the pleasant sensation (CS) excited by the house, which is separate from the pleasant sensation (PS) constituting pride, as we noted above. But Hume’s problem is that this separate pleasant sensation (CS) is not vivacious enough to perform the double conversion both of CS into PS, and of CI into PI. There must be some *other* source of vivacity to assist CS to pursue this heavy task. The difficulty in this case is that the double relation of impressions and ideas established between the two sets of the components constituting the cause (CS and CI) and the passion (PS and PI) is too rigid to allow any other element to enter into the mechanism.

Hume solves this difficulty by claiming that, besides “the original cause” of pride, e.g. my beautiful house, “there is a secondary one in the opinions of others, which has an equal influence on the affections” (T2.1.11.1; SBN 316). He indicates that the source of additional vivacity lies not within the double relation established between the original cause and the passion, but *outside*, namely in *another* double relation established between the opinion of others (the secondary cause) and the passion. Hence he suggests that the production of the passion depends on the cooperation of the original and the secondary causes: “Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance; and even the other causes of pride; virtue, beauty and riches; have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others” (ibid.). But the question is, how could the secondary cause—which obviously has no place in the double relation constituted between the original cause and the passion—have any influence on the original cause?

In order to answer this question, we need to see that the production of pride from the

secondary cause is an instance in which the passion arises from a double relation of impressions and ideas. The good opinions of others are an immeasurable source of pleasure to us, and this pleasure inevitably pulls the trigger of the double-relation mechanism insofar as "*that all agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride*" (T2.1.6.1; SBN 290). Given that the original cause needs to be "seconded" by the secondary cause, we may well suppose that wherever pride is produced, there operate two parallel and similar double-relation mechanisms relevant to these two causes, and that the passion arises when these parallel double relation relevant to the two causes *agree* with each other. The question at stake is, how do these two double-relation mechanisms agree and cooperate with each other? Let us examine how the second mechanism relevant to the secondary cause could join and assist the first mechanism relevant to the original cause, by taking an example in which my neighbour's admiration of my house causes my pride.

On Hume's account, my neighbour's approval may be subdivided into two components, viz. an agreeable sensation (*CS*), and the idea of my neighbour (*CI*), and be placed in relation to the two components of pride, PS and PI, forming a double relation of impressions and ideas. But there are two special circumstances that may hinder Hume from asserting the double relation between the two sets of the components constituting the cause (*CS*+*CI*) and the passion (PS+PI). In the first place, since I can never have direct access to the mind of my neighbor,[37] *CS* is an idea and cannot therefore be related to PS by the similarity of impressions. Hume solves this difficulty by appealing to *sympathy*, by claiming that, although my neighbour's admiration appears in my mind as an idea, this pleasant idea is immediately converted into "a real impression" (T2.1.11.3; SBN 317). For, in sympathy, "the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and…the passions arise in conformity to the images we form of them" (T2.1.11.8; SBN 319). Hence *CS* is an impression, a proper ingredient to be transfused into PS. In the second place, it is difficult to assert the relation of ideas between *CI* and PI, because they are different ideas: the former is the idea of my neighbour whereas the latter the idea of my self. This difficulty is solved by him in terms of "a great resemblance among all human creatures"

[37] Hume writes: "No passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind" (T3.3.1.7; SBN 576).

(T2.1.11.5; SBN 318, T2.2.4.6; SBN 354), which is such a powerful principle as to operate even where we do not "remark" the resemblance between ourselves and others insofar as it happens "by the natural course of the disposition" (T2.2.4.6; SBN 354). With the two difficulties thus solved, Hume has good reason to assert a double relation of impressions and ideas between the secondary cause and the passion, and to hold that "nothing can produce any of these passions without bearing it a double relation, viz. of ideas to the objet of the passion, and of sensation to the passion itself" (T2.2.2.4; SBN 333).

Thus my pride is the result of the conversion of the admiration of my neighbour (*CS+CI)* into the passion (PS+PI) which takes place by the double relation of impressions and ideas. Again in this case the conversion is a matter of the enlivenment of *CS*, because *CS* alone is too weak to perform the conversion, so we need to ask, how this enlivenment of *CS* is possible at all. Here is the same difficulty that we found regarding the original cause of the passion. The key to this difficulty is found in the fact that the two double-relation mechanisms relevant to the original cause and relevant to the secondary cause are related to each other in following way:

(A) The original cause: The components of my beautiful house (CS+CI) are converted into the components of my pride (PS+PI)

CS (a pleasant sensation)	→	PS (a pleasant sensation)
+		+
CI (the idea of my self)	→	PI (the idea of my self)

(B) The secondary cause: The components of my neighbour's admiration (*CS+CI*) are converted into the components of pride (PS+PI)

CS (a pleasant sensation)	→	PS (a pleasant sensation)
+		+
CI (the idea of my neighbour)	→	PI (the idea of my self)

Since the two double-relation mechanisms triggered by *CS* and CS have not only the same structure but also similar components constituting them, there is reason to suppose that they are related so closely as to allow the interaction between the two mechanisms in the following way. On the one hand, *CS* [excited by my neighbour's admiration] and CS [excited by my house], both being present in the same mind, easily "mingle and unite", and transfuse into each other: "When two passions are already produc'd by their separate causes, and are both present in the mind, they readily mingle and unite, tho' they have but one relation, and sometimes without any" (T2.3.4.2; SBN 420). Hence CS is so increased as to be doubled by including *CS* as the result of this transfusion; and vice versa, *CS* increases its vivacity by being mixed with CS. On the other hand, the transition of the *impressions* between *CS* and CS caused by this mutual transfusion into each other is necessarily followed and accompanied by the transition of *ideas* between *CI* and CI not only in virtue of the resemblance between *CI* and CI, but also in virtue of the initial unity of *CI*+*CS*, and of CI+CS: owing to the initial tie between *CI*+*CS*, *CI* is led to be conjoined with CI according as *CS* is connected with CS; likewise CI is led to be conjoined with *CI* according as CS is connected with *CS*. Given this interaction between the two double-relation mechanisms relevant to the original and relevant to the secondary cause, we may well expect the conversion of CS+CI into PS+PI to take place by the following procedure:

(1) CS and *CS* are related with one another by the association of impressions.

(2) *CS* is transfused itself into CS, rendering CS so vivacious as to make the conversion possible: "The predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and converts into it itself" (T2.3.4.3; SBN 420). Note that this transfusion renders CS more than CS, viz. CS+*CS*.

(3) This association of impressions between *CS* and CS prompts the association of ideas between *CI* and CI, which are already related by resemblance, and reinforces the connection between *CI* and CI.

(4) Hence arises a double association of impressions and ideas, rendering the transition so easy and natural as to produce "a double impulse".

(5) Not only CS+CI but also *CS+CI* are converted *jointly* into PS+PI.

It must be noted that all this double association process hangs on the agreement of *CS* and CS, since it is the association of impressions between CS and *CS* that forwards the transition of ideas between CI and *CI*. When I find that my house does not excite any admiration in the mind of others, my pleasure (CS) excited by the house is not assisted by the additional vivacity derived from *CS*, and therefore cannot give rise to pride. We may learn that PS, though derived from CS, is something more than CS, because it includes *CS*, the pleasurable sensation constituting my neighbour's approval. This is why the original cause has little influence on the production of pride unless it is "seconded" by the sentiments of others. Similarly, although PI is derived from CI, PI is something more than CI, because it includes *CI*, viz. the idea of my neighbour. Hence pride as the product of the cooperation of the two mechanisms relevant to the original and relevant to the secondary cause entails these two facts about my pride. On the one hand, pride is essentially an evaluative passion, insofar as it is derived from CS+*CS*, including the evaluation of others into its component. This evaluative feature is essential for Hume's notion of pride, providing the basis of an intimate connection between the passion and morality. On the other hand, the idea of the self as a component of pride is the idea of the self as a social being, insofar as PI is derived from CI + *CI* rather than CI alone, including the idea of others. This is how a social perspective is built into the basic structure of Hume's theory of pride.

3 The idea of the self as the object of pride

Hume's assertion that pride is "plac'd betwixt two ideas, the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it" (T2.1.2.4; SBN 278) is the hotbed of scholarly disagreement for several reasons.[38] *This disagreement is solved, I argue, by seeing that these two ideas between which the passion is "plac'd" are for Hume different ideas— the first is the idea of the limited and contingent aspect of the self, whereas the second is the idea of its general and intrinsic aspect.*

[38] It has long been argued that Book II's assertion of the idea of the self as the most vivacious and intimate impression was at odd with Book I's denial of the idea of the substantial self. But there is no longer much support that Hume is inconsistent in his treatment of the self in the two Books. Instead, the point of critics' disagreement lies in the relation between the idea of the self and pride.

Hume's assertion should be taken to imply that this conversion or enlargement of the first idea into the second one is derived from the very nature of pride— that the production of the passion always involves the "redirection" of our attention.

Hume's account of pride and humility invites critics' puzzles and misgivings in several respects, but a most controversial one is this: "How can Hume assert that pride is caused by a present sensation related to the self, when he is claiming that it produces the idea of the self"?[39] For, Hume maintains on the one hand that the passion, after its production, "always turns our view to ourselves" and "naturally produces a certain idea", viz. the idea of the self (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287), and on the other that "[w]hen self enters not into the consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility" (T2.1.2.2; SBN 277). He also argues regarding pride and humility that we must make a distinction "betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea, which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited", implying both to be the idea of the self (T2.1.2.4; SBN 278). Different interpretations are propounded as the answers to this question, what made Hume speak of pride producing the idea of the self while holding that the idea of the self is presupposed for the production of the passion? James Baillie suggests that Hume "sometimes views the relationship between pride and humility and the self as causal and contingent rather than constitutive" by taking Hume to say that "pride and humility can exist distinctly and independently of any idea or impression of the self" as Book I's account of causality requests.[40] Rachel Cohon also argues that Hume "treats the passion's object (the idea of the self in this case) as something distinct from the passion and caused by it".[41] But this causal interpretation that the idea of the self is distinct and independent from the passion is often found to create a tension with Hume's denial of the substantial self in Book I, that there is no idea of the self distinct from a particular perception. Kemp Smith thus interprets Hume to assert that pride does not "*generate*" the idea of the self, since all that happens is that the attention is "turned upon it".[42] But if we take Hume to imply that "pride *itself* views the self, this will involve a complete

[39] Rorty, 1990, p. 257.
[40] 2000, p. 49.
[41] 2007, p. 181 fn.
[42] 2005, p. 179.

revision of Hume's epistemology", as Passmore worries,[43] because this again seems to require the idea of the self to be distinct and independent from the passion.

I argue that a clue to the solution of this muddle is found in Hume's assertion that we should "consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality" (T2.1.5.3; SBN 286). Pride, "being once rais'd, immediately turn[s] our attention to ourself" (T2.1.2.4; SBN 278), because this "peculiar direction of the thought" is the "original quality" of pride (T2.1.5.3; SBN 286). Insofar as this direction is "an original quality" of the passion and therefore inherent to, and inseparable from the passion, the relation of the idea of the self to the passion cannot be contingent or causal, but *functional*:[44] this idea of self as the result of the original direction must belong to the "very being and essence" of the passion—what makes pride as it is, just as the peculiar pleasant sensation does (T2.1.5.3; SBN 286). This point is strengthened by this insistence on this "contrivance of nature": "nature has give to the organs of the human mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call *pride*: To this emotion she has assign'd a certain idea, *viz.* that of *self,* which it never fails to produce" (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287). He further fortifies this original disposition of the passion by assimilating it to the disposition of lust and hunger: "The sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects, which are suitable to each appetite" (ibid.). Just like in the case of lust and hunger, he argues, "we never shou'd be possest of that passion, were there not a disposition of mind proper for it" (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287). Rachel Cohon plausibly suggests that Hume's assertion of the idea of self as the object of pride can be taken as "what today we would call the intentional object of the passions" — an object to which "a mental state is directed, or what mental state is about".[45] To take the idea of the self as an intentional object, contained within pride[46] — "the internal-representation view" as Cohon calls it — does not conflict with Hume's assertion that pride is a "simple and uniform" impression. This is particularly clear in the case of those instinctive direct passions, such as lust or hunger, which arise not from pain or pleasure, but from a natural impulse (T2.3.9.8; SBN 439). For, given the instinctiveness of the passion, there is

[43] 1980, p. 126.
[44] Cohon holds "the causal account of intentionality" (2007, p. 181fn).
[45] Cohon, 2007, p. 164.
[46] 2007, p. 181fn.

no room to argue that lust and hunger are simple impressions even though they contain within themselves intentional objects — representations of the things toward which they are directed.[47] The difference between the indirect and the direct passions, then, is that the intentional object of the indirect passions is the self [or another's self in the case of love and hatred] whereas the intentional object of the direct passions is an object relevant to each appetite: just as the appetite of hunger turns our view to something to eat, and gives rise to the idea of food, an indirect passion turns our view to ourselves [or to others], and thereby gives rise to the idea of ourselves [or of others]. In both cases, upon a removal of this peculiar direction, there is no room for either hunger or pride to arise.

But notwithstanding this similarity, the indirect passions are fundamentally different from the direct passions in that they involve the *redirection* of our attention. For Hume, pride is the result of the redirection of our attention, because, unlike the direct passions, "pride has in a manner two objects, to which it directs our view" (T2.1.6.5; SBN 292).[48] It is this distinguishing characteristic of the indirect passions that is highlighted by Hume when he mentions that the passion is "plac'd betwixt two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it" (T2.1.2.4; SBN 278). This redirection of our attention stems from the fact that the indirect passions arise from a double relation of impressions and ideas.

According to Hume's hypothesis of the double relation, when I take pride in my beautiful house, pride is produced from the double relation of impressions and ideas established between the cause, viz. my beautiful house, and the passion, both of which have a pleasant sensation and the idea of my self for their components (T2.1.5.5; SBN 286-7). On his mechanical account, the components constituting pride are derived from the components constituting my beautiful house: pride is the product of the conversion of the latter set of components into the former set. Hume's concern is to explain how the two conversions, of impressions and of ideas, take place jointly — they must happen jointly insofar as the production of the passion depends on "the double impulse" produced by the "concurrence" of the double association of impressions and ideas (T2.1.4.4; SBN

[47] Cohon agrees that the direct passions also have intentional objects (2007, p. 164).
[48] This is why pride is called an "indirect" passion, as Cohon points out (2007, p. 177).

284).[49] Let's begin by reflecting how the pleasant sensation excited by the house is converted into the pleasant sensation constituting my pride. It must be noted that these two sensations are different from each other in that the first is a pleasant sensation which I feel about the peculiar feature of the house, viz. beauty, whereas the second one is the pleasure which I feel about the peculiar feature of my self, viz. being the owner of the house. Although I was initially pleased with the beautiful quality of the house, I become pleased with the praiseworthy quality of my self as the owner of the house through feeling pride. We may here have good reason to suppose that when the first pleasure is converted into the second, my attention initially directed to the peculiar quality of the house, viz. the beauty, is *redirected* to the peculiar quality of my self, viz. the house owner. This redirection naturally happens owing to this nature of pride: "In order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate, *viz.* the *cause* or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passion" (T2.1.6.5; SBN 292). But, how does this shift of my focus take place?

The key to this question is that the first pleasure excited by the "original" cause, viz. my beautiful house, is converted into the second pleasure constituting pride only when the first pleasure is assisted by the "secondary" cause, which lies in the opinions and sentiments of others. The original causes "have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiments of others" (T2.1.11.1; SBN 316), Hume insists, because the initial pleasure evoked by the original cause is too weak to perform the conversion. Since the conversion is "a double task" which involves a double conversion of impressions and ideas (T2.1.6.2; SBN 291), the pleasant sensation embedded in the opinions and sentiments of others is required to assist the initial pleasure and to enliven it with its vivacity, as we have seen in the last section. It is this circumstance that redirects my attention. The redirection happens because the secondary cause of the passion is not the opinions about the quality of the house, viz. beauty, but the opinions about the quality of *myself*, viz. being the house owner. It is "*our* reputation, *our* character, *our* name" (ibid. my emphases) which I receive from others by sympathy, but not their opinions about the quality of the house, that have an influence on my pride, according to Hume. It is natural to

[49] See Section 1.

suppose that the opinions and sentiments of others, by highlighting the quality of my self rather than the quality of the house, prompt me to redirect my attention from the latter to the former, and thereby cause the shift of my focus from the house to my self. It is also natural to suppose that, as this shift of my focus takes place, my recognition that I am *contingently* related to the house is switched to the recognition that I am *intrinsically* related to the house in such an essential way as to define my self as who I am. Although the former recognition produces a mere factual idea of my self vis-à-vis the house, the latter produces a self-defining idea of my self as the house owner — precisely because the latter idea has gone through the filter of the approval of others. These two ideas are entitled to be *beliefs* insofar as they are enlivened by the vivacity of the passion. Donald Ainslie, by highlighting the situation that "pride converts a theoretical belief like 'I own a house' into the recognition that 'I am a homeowner'", indicates that "a *conception* of ourselves" is produced by this "belief about what is existentially connected to us".[50] A primary function of pride is thus to convert a mere factual belief into an "existential" or "person-defining" belief regarding ourselves, by allowing us to "parse" our experiences through the filter of the opinions and sentiments of others, and to pick out person-defining qualities to form the conception of ourselves. It is by feeling pride that we go through all these processes — to discover those qualities which have an "existential connection" to ourselves, and to "register" them as the essential features constituting ourselves — which is plainly beyond the capacity of causal or demonstrative reasoning, as Ainslie convincingly illustrates.[51] We enjoy the peculiar pleasure of pride not only because we feel ourselves specially qualified by the essential connection with the object of the passion, but also because this qualification has been endorsed by the approval of others. Once those properties which contingently belong to us are converted into relatively enduring properties intrinsic to us, we are naturally motivated to preserve and care for them in pursuit of that peculiarly pleasant feeling of pride, and thereby polish our character, as Rorty argues.[52] Given that the conception of my self as the house owner arises through feeling pride from the initial belief that the house belongs to me, Hume is justified to hold that pride *produces*

[50] 1999, p. 483.
[51] 1999.
[52] 1990, p. 263-4.

the idea of the self.

This circumstance sheds light on our initial problem, "how can Hume assert that pride is caused by a pleasant sensation related to the self, when he is claiming that it produces the idea of the self?"[53] This problem is solved by reflecting that the two ideas between which the passion is placed—that idea, which excites it, and that to which it direct its view, when excited — are not the same but different from each other (T2.1.2.4; SBN 278): the first is the idea of the factual and limited aspect of my self produced by the recognition that the house belongs to me, whereas the second is the idea of intrinsic and general aspect of my self produced by the recognition that I have such a praiseworthy quality as the owner of the house.[54] There is no difficulty to suppose that these two ideas are different from each other, being the ideas of different aspects of the self, insofar as for Hume the idea of the self is a compound idea, constituted of "that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T2.1.2.2; SBN 277). We may here learn that the two ideas of the self constitute the same notion of the self: the first is the idea of the property of my self whereas the second is the idea of my self as a whole "identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious" (T2.2.1.2; SBN 329). Given these two different ideas constituting the same notion of the self, we need to take the production of pride to be a matter which concerns the whole range of "a passion plac'd betwixt two ideas"—the entire process in which the first limited and factual idea of the self is so enlarged into the second general and intrinsic idea of it through the endorsement of the opinions and sentiments of others. The first idea represents a morally neutral aspect of a person whereas the second idea represents an aspect of a person who is sensitive to the evaluation of others. We may here learn that the social perspective is deeply built into the fundamental structure of the productive mechanism of the indirect passions.

The foregoing interpretation rescues Hume from Donald Davidson's charge, that Hume's "causal machinery does not assign an intelligible role to the relation of ideas".[55] Davidson's

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[53] Rorty, 1990, p. 257.
[54] Rorty takes the first idea of the self as "the idea of self embedded in the cause of pride is that which is left after Book I, the self as regards thought and the imagination" (1990, p. 257-8). I disagree with this interpretation. I shall discuss this subject in my later chapter on personal identity, Chapter 6.
[55] 1980, p. 283.

complaint is derived from the failure to notice that the redirection of my attention from the house to my self relies on the idea of the self which serves as their connection between the quality of the house, viz. beauty, and the quality of my self, viz. the house owner, and that the idea of the self is commonly involved in both recognitions that the house belongs to me, and that I am the owner of the house. This crucial role of the idea of the self escaped Davidson's notice because in reconstructing Hume's account of pride in terms of the causal and logical relations between pride and the beliefs on which it is based, Davidson overlooked the cardinal role of the initial pleasure excited by the house in the double-relation mechanism, by supposing that "Hume wants the 'transition along related ideas' to be part of the explanation of how generalized pleasure or approbation is 'transfused' into pride".[56] This supposition is plainly mistaken because it is not "generalized pleasure or approbation" that is transfused into pride, but is primarily the pleasure excited by the house, plus the pleasure embedded in the approval of others, house, as we have seen.

A similar failure led Penelhum to this unfounded claim: "Hume is wrong when he says that the cause of pride has to give me pleasure, and the cause of shame has to give me pain. At least, this is wrong if by 'pleasure' we mean 'enjoyment. I can certainly be proud of very unenjoyable things, such as paying my tax bill under difficulties…and my being proud does not entail that I find the contemplation of their doing these things enjoyable".[57] Penelhum is mistaken to accuse Hume for holding that the cause of pride has to give me pleasure,[58] because my pride in my taxpaying is derived from the "original delight" embedded in my approval of my virtuous character as the taxpayer. Penelhum overlooks that the original causes of pride are for Hume three kinds, viz. virtue, beauty, and riches or power (T2.1.11.1; SBN 316, T2.1.7.8; SBN 297), and that virtue, such as taxpaying, causes the passion only by involving a more sophisticated double-relation process than others. When I take pride in my taxpaying, the pleasant sensation constituting my pride is derived not from the pleasure or pain which my taxpaying *per se* excites, but from the pleasure embedded in "strength of mind" which enabled my taxpaying. For, my

[56] 1980, p. 283.
[57] 2000, p. 69.
[58] 2000, p. 73-4.

taxpaying is nothing but "a sign" of my virtuous quality or character, derived from durable principles of the mind that extend over my whole conduct. "If any action be either virtuous or vicious, 'tis only as a sign of some quality or character", Hume insists, since "[a]ctions themselves, not proceeding from any constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride or humility" (T3.3.1.4; SBN 575). It is this ethical pleasure that supplies a necessary ingredient to compose my pride and self-satisfaction.

4 Hume's limitations

Hume's "limitations" introduced at T2.1.6 are commonly understood as constraints on his "general system" that any agreeable object related to the self produces pride, and are intended to limit the range of the cause of the passion. But I try to show that these limitations are meant not to narrow the range of the causes, but to make the double-relation mechanism applicable to "all the causes" of pride, viz. beauty, virtue, and riches. Hume's object is to enhance and adjust his basic double-relation model through the illustration of its operational characteristics, and to explain why and how the double-relation mechanism is particularly sensitive to the causes of the passion in these five respects: closeness, publicity, durability, peculiarity, and "general rules".

Hume's section, "Limitations of this system", begins with the following remark:

> But before we proceed farther in this subject, and examine particularly all the causes of pride and humility, 'twill be proper to make some limitations to the general system, *that all agreeable objects, related to ourselves, by an association of ideas and of impressions, produce pride, and disagreeable ones, humility:* And these limitations are deriv'd from the very nature of the subject. (T2.1.6.1; SBN 290)

We might well suppose that Hume wants to introduce limitations as the constraints on his "general system", and to narrow the range of the cause of the passion. But Hume's intention in propounding the limitations is not to explore the conditions that must be met for the production of pride, I argue, but to enhance or refine the basic double-relation model that he has established in

his foregoing discussion, and to make it applicable to "all the causes of pride".[59] Whether they are meant as constraints or as enhancements might seem insignificant insofar as in either case it turns out that "not all objects that cause pleasure and are related to us are *actual* sources of pride".[60] But, as we shall see, it is the former interpretation that invites critics' misunderstanding, and leads them to assume that Hume wants to limit the conditions under which a man can justify his pride,[61] or to worry regarding the peculiarity requirement that "the stability of my pride will be threatened by the possibility that I could come to think that the cause of my pride is common".[62] I try to show that Hume's limitations are meant to explain the operative characteristics of the double-relation mechanism, and to examine why and how pride is particularly sensitive or "delicate" to the relation between ourselves and the object of the passion in these five respects, viz. closeness, publicity, peculiarity, durability, and "general rules". This sensitivity should not be taken as a sign of the limitedness of his double-relation hypothesis, but as the result of the prolificacy of pride—as a passion with many variables, each with different intensities and ethical values. This is how "these limitations are deriv'd from the very nature of the subject"—that pride is the product of these three entirely different kinds of cause, viz. beauty, virtue, riches or power.

5 The closeness, the publicity, the durability, and the peculiarity requirement

I argue that Hume's accounts of the closeness, durability, publicity, and peculiarity requirements are intended to explain what makes the relation of our self to the object of pride significant enough to produce the passion. We shall see that this requirement plays a crucial role as "a filter" to select those features that are essential to make us different from others, and to define us as who we are.[63]

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[59] Jerome Neu takes Hume's limitations as "more careful and precise specifications of the triggers to association" (1977, p. 11). Ainslie asserts Hume's limitations to be the refinement of his "initial constraints with some further qualifications" (1999, p. 484).

[60] Besser-Jones, 2010, p.177.

[61] G. Taylor thinks that Hume's limitations describe "a distinction between conditions which must obtain if a man is to be proud of something at all, and those which must obtain if he is to be in some sense justified in his pride" (1980, p. 400-1).

[62] Besser-Jones, 2010, p.176.

[63] See Rorty, 1990, Ainslie, 1999.

Hume's first limitation is that the cause of pride needs to be related closely to the person affected.[64] He begins his discussion with the famous example of a boastful guest: "men sometimes boast of a great entertainment, at which they have only been present; and by so small a relation as this convert their pleasure into pride" (T2.1.6.2; SBN 290). This remark is immediately followed by this comment: "But however, this must in general be own'd, that joy arises from a more inconsiderable relation than vanity, and that many things, which are too foreign to produce pride, are yet able to give us a delight and pleasure" (T2.1.6.2; SBN 290-1). Hume's treatment of the boastful guest leads Gabriele Taylor to complain that "there must be confusion in a story that allows us to accept both that some relation is not close enough for pride and that nevertheless pride can be based on it".[65] Indeed Hume might seem equivocal whether he suggests that even such an inconsiderable relation as the attendance of a feast is sufficient to produce pride, or that the shining feeling of the boastful guest should not be treated properly as pride. Taylor assumes the latter to be Hume's position, and takes his example to be "the suggestion that someone sufficiently determined to shine can somehow build his pride on a situation which is not really adequate", and observes that "Hume, it is clear, regards such people as uncommonly silly and so perhaps as not requiring serious attention".[66] Taylor concludes that Hume's account of pride contains "no more than half-truths that obscure rather than clarify the

[64] Hume alleges two reasons for this. Firstly, the relation needs to be close enough "in order to produce a transition form one passion to another, and convert the satisfaction into vanity", because the conversion is "a double task", which requires "double force and energy" (T2.1.6.2; SBN 291). Secondly, the feast should be related to us close enough in order to prevent it from relating to others, because where it is related to others, this relation to others "not only excels, but even diminishes, and sometimes destroys" its relation to ourselves" (ibid.). For the explanation of this situation, Hume refers to his later section in which he explains why the second marriage of a mother weakens the relation with her child. In this case, the relation of the child and his parent is not broken and sufficient to cause an easy transition of the imagination from the child, but "after the imagination is arriv'd at this point of view, it finds its object to be surrounded with so many other relations which challenges its regard, that it knows not which to prefer, and is at a loss what new object to pitch upon. The ties of interest and duty bind her to another family, and prevent that *return* of the fancy from her to myself, which is necessary to support the union. The thought has no longer the vibration, requisite to set it perfectly at ease, and indulge its inclination to change. It goes with facility, but *returns* with difficulty; and by that interruption finds the relation much weaken'd from what it wou'd be were the passage open and easy on both sides" (T2.2.4.11; SBN 356, my emphases). Hume makes clear that the imagination needs to "return" to the original object and the vibration of the imagination is essential for us to form a lively idea of the object of a passion.

[65] "Pride", p. 388.

[66] "Pride", p. 400.

structure of emotion".[67]

But Taylor's misgiving turns out unfounded when we take Hume's boastful guest in the former light, that even "so a small relation" as an attendance of a feast is sufficient for the boastful guest to cause the conversion of his satisfaction into his pride (T2.1.6.2; SBN 291). When we take a boastful guest to be an example to show that even such an "inconsiderable"—when seen objectively — relation can convert his satisfaction into pride, there is no tension between the guest's pride and the closeness requirement. For, on this view, this example turns out to be the demonstration that this sensitivity is a contingent matter relevant to the psychological or practical situation in which the guest is situated.[68] Given that whether the cause is close enough or not is a contingent matter dependent on the person affected, Hume's "stunning" vagueness regarding the limitation is no longer a puzzle,[69] nor is such a problem as to make Ainslie complain: "what makes these limitations problematic is that Hume gives no criteria for what makes a cause close enough or durable enough to cause an indirect passion".[70] Whether or not the attendance of a feast is close enough to produce pride is so delicate a psychological or practical matter of the person concerned that it cannot to be defined in terms of any objective criterion.[71] For, "it is not the actual relation between subject and object which is relevant, but rather what the object *thinks* is his relation to the subject", as Árdal rightly stresses.[72] The closeness requirement is thus meant to underscore the importance of a *relation*, and to insist that the guest's pride is a proof that the relation is *for him* sufficient enough to perform "the double task" of converting the satisfaction into vanity (ibid.), and that it is this conversion that distinguishes pride from joy. It is true that on accounting for the limitations, Hume draws our attention to the difference between pride and joy, but the limitations are not meant as the criteria for their distinction, but as the characteristic features of the double-relation mechanism: his aim is

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[67] "Pride", p. 386.
[68] This does not necessarily make Hume's pride something unstable, context-dependent, or contingent, because the cause needs to fall under "general rules", the fifth limitation, as we see later.
[69] Rorty, 1990, p. 260.
[70] 1999, p. 485.
[71] Rorty insightfully suggests, regarding the vaguness of Hume's limitations: "But in fact it is just this vagueness that serves: Whatever it is that, as a given original fact, causes pride, turns out as a matter of fact to be what a person takes as significant and particularly close to her. The condition is operational and conditional: it reveals the intentional description under which the cause produced the effect" (1990, p. 260).
[72] 1966, p. 28.

to explain why and when one and the same object produces joy, which does not presuppose the double relation, but not always pride, which is the product of the mechanism. Taylor is plainly mistaken to complain that "Hume has after all not kept his promise to offer points that will distinguish pride as such from joy or pleasure",[73] because Hume does not, and needs not, to offer "points that will distinguish pride" from joy insofar as he has already established their fundamental distinction in terms of their genesis in his forgoing discussion: unlike joy, which arise directly from pleasure without any significant relation, pride is the product of the complicated mechanism which depends on both *relations* of impressions and ideas.

Hume's limitations to the causes of pride, viz. closeness, publicity, durability, peculiarity, and susceptibility to "general rules", are all essential features that make the relation between ourselves and the object of the passion *significant* enough to convert joy into pride. The publicity requirement is that the pleasant or painful object related to us should be very discernible and obvious not only to ourselves but also to others. It is trivially true that any object needs to be discernible for us in order to take pleasure in it in the first place, or that the cause of pride must be observable and discernible to others because the cause of the passions needs to be "seconded" by the opinion of others (T2.1.11.1; SBN 316). But Hume's aim in the publicity requirement is not to insist on such a truism but to highlight the self-valuing feature of the passion as the product of sympathy, and to call our attention to this fact: "We fancy ourselves more happy, as well as more virtuous or beautiful, when we appear so to others; but are still more ostentatious of our virtues than of our pleasures" (T2.1.6.6; SBN 292). He wants to stress that our feeling ourselves happy, virtuous, or beautiful depends not merely on a pleasant sensation excited by an object, but heavily on the opinions and sentiments of others, because their pleasant sensation communicated by sympathy increases our pleasure. This is more remarkable in the case of virtue, because the pleasure derived from sympathy with the pleasure of others can be "a form of valuation" only by giving rise to our approval and thereby pride, as Árdal points out.[74] Obviously, Hume's point is not to limit the range of the agreeable object as the cause of the passion, but to show why pride is sensitive to the opinions and sentiments of others, and to prepare the connection of the indirect

[73] 1980, p. 386.
[74] 1966, p. 32.

passions with his subsequent account of Book III.

The durability requirement is that an object must be durable and constant to a certain degree in order to have any influence on pride. Hume has already made it obvious that the cause of pride must be durable and constant in order to be "seconded" by the opinions and sentiments of others. Hume's present aim is not to insist on such an obvious requirement, but to highlight the feature of pride as a form of self-valuation, by arguing: since pride, once excited, always turns our attention to ourselves, and naturally leads us to compare the cause of the passion to ourselves, whose existence is more durable, it needs to durable enough to make us "infer an excellency in ourselves" from it in order to sustain the passion, because it seems ridiculous to infer our own excellency from an object "which is of so much shorter duration, and attends us so small a part of our existence" (T2.1.6.7; SBN 293). Although Árdal is right to suggest that "Hume is insisting that one could not justify pride unless one could point out valuable qualities of a relatively constant kind",[75] he is mistaken to suppose that Hume "is concerned to state the conditions upon which pride arises, that is causal conditions".[76] Hume's concern is not with the criterion by which we judge the object to be valuable or constant, but to explain why pride is sensitive regarding the constancy and durability of the cause, and to show that this sensitivity is derived from the very nature of the passions — that is, it is self-evaluative passion.

The same point is stressed by Hume when he argues that the cause of pride must be "peculiar to ourselves, or at least common to us with a few persons", because everything that is too familiar to us by its frequent appearance loses its value in our eyes, and becomes neglected and despised (T2.1.6.4; SBN 291). But, why is an object which causes joy or pleasure unable to produce pride when it appears frequently, or why does an object of a real value produce joy, but not our vanity, when it is shared by many people? Hume answers these question by calling our attention to this quality of human nature, that we "judge of objects more from comparison than from their real and intrinsic merit", and by suggesting that "where we cannot by some contrast enhance their value, we are apt to overlook even what is essentially good in them" (ibid.). A passion becomes too weak to survive when we cannot "enhance" the idea of ourselves when pride turns our view to

[75] 1966, p. 32.
[76] Árdal, 1966, p. 32.

ourselves. The reason why pride "so much more delicate in this particular than joy" is that when I take pride in my house, for instance, the redirection of my attention from my house to my self is necessarily involved in the case of pride, because, unlike joy, "in order to excite pride, there are always two objects we must contemplate, viz. the cause, or that object which produces pleasure; and self, which is the real object of the passion" (T2.1.6.5; SBN 292), as Hume indicates. In other words, in order to prompt this redirection, the idea of my self needs to be enhanced so as to attract my attention: the passion is "entirely destroyed" where there is nothing enhanced with the idea of my self to capture my attention (ibid.). Granted that the sensitiveness of pride to the peculiarity of the cause is thus derived from the nature of the passion, that "pride has in a manner two objects" (ibid.), this peculiarity requirement is essential to pride, and cannot be "optional feature of pride" as Besser-Jones indicates.[77] The importance of pride as a powerful motive to virtue hangs heavily on this peculiarity requirement, because insofar as the usual way to enhance the idea of the self is for Hume to compare our own property with that of others, and to see its "proportion", we seek the peculiar pleasure of pride by trying to polish and develop such a praiseworthy quality of ourselves that could make us distinct from others and define us as what we are. Ainslie is plausible to suggest that Hume's peculiarity requirement is meant to be "part of his program to establish an adequate account of morality by undermining "any attempt to ground morality on some defining fact about us that we share with all other humans or rational creatures".[78]

6 General rules

I explore the important role assigned by Hume to "general principles", and see how they contribute to "the easy production of the passions" by guiding us to discover "the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another" (T2.1.6.9; SBN 294).

I may feel proud of the soccer team of my district, or I may feel myself elated when I am present at a great feast. In these cases, my pride is often too superficial and fleeting to make me aware of it, or to lead me to reflect whether I am justified to feel proud. Although the self-applause as such is much like joy, it is phenomenally different from joy in that whereas a joy

[77] Besser-Jones argues that "Hume treats peculiarity as an optional feature of pride" (2010, p. 179).
[78] 1999, p. 486.

or pleasure is apt to make us forget ourselves, pride or self-applause has a contrary tendency: it renders our self-consciousness so strong as to make us attentive to our own qualities and circumstances. Pride always turns our attention to "ourselves", and makes us "think of our own qualities and circumstances" (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287). This direction of the mind is essential for Hume's notion of pride, because it is derived from the very nature of pride, that pride is determined to have self for its object by a natural and original instinct (ibid.). It is a fundament distinction in Hume's system that pride is different from joy not only in its origin but also in its direction: the former is an indirect passion whereas the latter a direct one. Although the self-satisfaction I feel when present at a great feast may direct my attention to my self, it is often too superficial and transient to make me conscious of it, or to lead me to seek reasons for its justification, so that even when I come to realize that there is nothing to justify my pride, my shining feeling may linger with that peculiar excitement. But if I have no reason to justify my pride or any belief that I played any significant role in making the feast successful, does it follow that my pride is "inadequate", or unfounded, as Taylor thinks? Taylor argues that Hume's boastful guest, "unless foolish", needs to have a reason to justify his pride, whether mistaken or not,[79] because "it may be absurd for him to be proud of X being F if he really had no hand at all in bringing it about; his beliefs involve some self-deception".[80] She contends:

> A crucial mistake in Hume's account is that he takes a wholly external or objective view of the situation; that is, he completely ignores the relevant beliefs of the agent himself. But reference to such beliefs is essential if we are to settle what is involved in pride but not in pleasure, and when pride can be said to be in some sense justified.[81]

To this, Hume would retort in two ways. First, it is plainly unfounded to claim that he "completely ignores the relevant beliefs of the agent himself", because he maintains that "men sometimes boast of a great entertainment, at which they have only been present; and by so small a

[79] 1980, p. 389.
[80] 1980, p. 401.
[81] 1980, p. 388.

relation convert their pleasure into pride" (T2.1.6.2; SBN 290, my italics). Hume makes clear that a basic belief of the boastful guest is involved in the production of his pride insofar as the guest recognizes his "relation" to the feast. Thus Hume explicitly assigns to the guest's *belief* in the pleasant quality of the feast such a crucial role as to convert his satisfaction into pride.[82] But when Taylor complains that "if so he is not at all clear about the notion of 'reason' here in place", what she claims is not a basic belief as such but a stronger one, strong enough to be formulated into the guest's "belief that somehow he has contributed to the feast". To this, Hume would answer, secondly, that such a belief is not necessary for a certain kind of pride, and that even other kinds of pride do not presuppose such a cognitive belief as could be formulated into a reason to justify the passion. For, on Hume's view, it is not that a reason produces the passion, but that the passion makes us seek a reason for its justification. As Hume insists, "the idea of injury produces not the passion, but arises from it" (T2.2.3.9; SBN 351), because for Hume moral assessment which renders pride evaluative is derived not from a cognitive element as such, but from general rules, which teach us "the just value of every thing" (T2.1.6.9; SBN 294), as we see below.

In the case of a boastful guest present at the feast, the production of his pride depends on the double relation of ideas and impressions established between the feast and his pride, even though the relation of the gest to the feast is inconsiderable, as we noted above. But it is a mistake to assume that whether or not the relation between the guest and the feast is *significant* enough to cause an easy transition of ideas is, as Árdal assumes, a matter of whether "the person *thinks* that there is a special [or close] relation between the cause and the object of pride".[83] It is not a matter of his belief in the significance of the relation, but is chiefly a matter of "general establish'd maxims" acquired through custom and practice (ibid.), according to Hume. Such a cognitive element as the guest's belief or "thought" may be included as part of those factors constituting the significance of the relation, but the basic factors are these four practical and operational features of the cause of the passion, viz. the closeness, publicity, durability, peculiarity, as we have seen.

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[82] Taylor acknowledges this, claiming that "Hume thought one must have a reason for one's pride" (1980, p. 389).
[83] 1966, p. 28.

Yet those four features can trigger the double-relation mechanism to produce the passion when they are endorsed by those "general principles" or "general establish'd maxims" which teach us "the proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another" (ibid.).[84] On this view, the production of pride is the proof that this relation, however trivial and inconsiderable it might seem, is guaranteed by general rules to be sufficiently significant, significant enough to perform the "double task" of converting the pleasure into pride (T2.1.6.2; SBN 291).[85] Insofar as the guest's pride in his presence at the feast is the product of general rules, it is no surprise that his pride is so stable as to be immune to his recognition that he has no reason to justify his passion. It is true that, as Taylor points out, such a superficial pride as I take in the roses I grow in my garden does not entail that I think rose-growing to be an important part of my life, or as "anything about myself that is of particular significance", but it is not entirely correct to suppose that "what I am proud of may play a quite negligible part in my life":[86] my pride reflects at least "the just value" indicated by general rules which I acquired through custom and my experience.

For Hume, general rules are not the conditions under which the cause of the passion must fall, but, as he indicates, rather an "enlargement [which] contribute[s] to the easy production of the passions", serving "to obviate difficulties that may arise concerning some causes, which I shall hereafter ascribe to particular passions, and which may be esteem'd too refin'd to operate so universally and certainly, as they are found to do" (T2.1.6.9; SBN 294). General rules influence the passions as they do our causal reasoning, in virtue of custom which "readily carries us beyond the just bounds" (T2.1.6.8; SBN 293). When we find from our experience that such a passion is usually attended with such a circumstance, the imagination is affected by general rules, and makes us conceive a lively idea of the passion whether it is exceptional or not. Yet, the influence of general rules on the passions actually goes far beyond, Hume insists, as they not only amplify the "weakness" of a communicated passion, but also produce the transition even of "non-existent affections". When we find a person patiently bearing his great misfortune, our lamentation

[84] In Book III, Hume calls our attention to this crucial function of general rules by claiming that prudence, though being merely "tacit airs of superiority"", can regulate our actions, because they "have been establish'd and authoriz'd by custom" (T3.3.2.11; SBN 599).
[85] Rorty points out that "Hume is working backwards, analysing the cause from the character of the consequence" (1990, p. 260).
[86] Taylor, 1980, p. 400.

increases on account of his patience. For, "the communicated passion of sympathy sometimes acquires strength from the weakness of its original, and even arises by a transition from affections, which have no existence" (T2.2.7.5; SBN 370). Being accustomed to feel sorrow in such a circumstance, we extend the same sentiment to those who resemble them in their misfortune: even though they do not show any sign of sorrow, "the general rule still prevails, and by giving a bent to the imagination, draws along the passion in the same manner as if its proper object were real and existent" (T2.2.5.12; SBN 362). Or, when a person inherits a great fortune, we are "always *the more* rejoic'd for his prosperity, *the less* sense he seems to have of it" (T2.2.7.5; SBN 370, my emphases). All these phenomena are the effect of the "contrast" between his actual indifference and the affection produced by the general rule, according to Hume. Since we are acquainted with the happy situation of a person in a similar fortunate circumstance, the general rule gives us a lively idea of the pleasure that generally attends it, which becomes still more lively by a contrast with the indifference we observe in him (T2.2.7.6; SBN 371).

Hume indicates that the influence of general rules does not remain within our emotional experience, but has a significant effect on our moral life also. Regarding a person patiently bearing his misfortune, he writes: "we form a notion of his condition, and carrying our fancy from the cause to the usual effect, first conceive a lively idea of his sorrow, and then feel an impression of it, entirely overlooking that greatness of mind, which elevates him above such emotions, or only considering it so far as to increase our *admiration*, love and tenderness for him" (T2.2.7.5; SBN 370, my emphasis). The non-existent affection of his sorrow, thus transferred by sympathy, can eventually "increase our admiration", which is an evaluative passion. But, why do we feel pity or love, but not admiration when we find the same person not patient but dejected by the same misfortune?

We can construct Hume's answer in the following way. When we find the person patiently bearing his misfortune, we "contrast" his patience with his sorrow that our fancy carries from the cause to the usual effect of his condition, and take this contrast as a sign of the durable principle of his mind. In other words, the general principle allows us to register his conduct as his character trait in virtue of the admiration excited by the contrast between his sorrow (imagined) and his

patience (actual).[87] But this does not take place when the person is dejected, because no such contrast happens in this case. In Hume's example of the person who does not show any interest in his inheritance of a great fortune, his indifference makes so violent a contrast with the passion produced by general rules that we come to regard it as *peculiar* to that person, and take it to be derived from his character, as the effect of a certain distinguishing and durable quality of his mind. General rules thus contribute to the ascription of a character trait to a person that makes a difference to who he is. "A contrast of any kind never fails to affect the imagination, especially when presented by the subject" (T2.2.7.6; SBN 371), as Hume stresses. The influence of general rules thus extends all over our emotional, moral, and social life, he insists, as it contributes not only "to the easy production of the passions" but also to providing the foundation of our society by producing a notion of different ranks of people (T2.1.6.8; SBN 293).

We owe to general rules "a notion of different ranks of men, suitable to the power or riches they are possest of" (ibid.). The reason why we do not need to change this notion upon account of any particular circumstances or accidental conditions peculiar to each individual is that it is the product of these principles revealed by custom and practice, which "have settled the just value of everything" (T2.1.6.9; SBN 294). Suppose a full-grown person to have been suddenly transported into our world, Hume suggests, "he wou'd be very much embarrass'd with every object, and wou'd not readily find what degree of pride or humility, or any other passion he ought to attribute to it" (T2.1.6.9; SBN 293-4). It is because our emotional experience is not merely a matter of feeling pleasant or painful sensations, but rather is a matter of seeing the "proportions we ought to observe in preferring one object to another" (T2.1.6.9; SBN 294). We here learn that Hume's aim in propounding general rules as his fifth limitation is to show how it serves "to obviate difficulties that may arise concerning some causes" (ibid.), rather than to constrain the productive mechanism of the passion.

7 The pre-moral form of pride

[87] This situation is described by Ainslie that "passion-involving general rules not only summarize how we expect people to define themselves, they also serve to make them into those kinds of persons by leading us to interpret them in terms of our expectations." (1999, p. 490).

It is often pointed out that some of Hume's remarks on pride and humility seem conflicting with each other. This is because, I argue, pride and humility are for him a family notion constituted of a vast number of variables which arise from different situations of objects or different turns of thought (T2.3.9.31; SBN 447-8).

Pride may show itself in the shape of self-satisfaction, vanity, superiority, arrogance, self-respect, conceit, self-glory, which are for Hume at the bottom the same affections. When Hume observes that "men sometimes boast of a great entertainment at which they have only been present", his aim is to insist that even such a superficial kind of pride, which seems nothing essentially different from joy or satisfaction, is still the result of the conversion of their satisfaction into vanity, proceeded by the mechanism of the double relation (T2.1.6.2; SBN 290) as we have seen. We indeed enjoy a mere shining feeling of self-applause, or "tacit air of superiority" as such even where we are not aware of it, or even where we have no justifiable reason for it. We may call this superficial kind of pride "the emotional [form] of pride".[88] This should be contrasted with a different kind of pride, such a dominant and prevailing emotion occupying the forefront of our consciousness as to lead us to seek reasons for its justification. It is this dominant form of pride that is asserted by Hume as "the unavoidable attendant" of moral distinctions (T2.1.7.5; SBN 296), or as the effect of virtue. When I am proud of e.g. my muscle training, or making a lot of money, my pride may not be such a "well-founded" or "due degree of pride" (T3.3.2.8; SBN 596) as to be a powerful motive to virtue. Yet, it still contributes to polishing and cultivating my virtuous character trait by leading me to reflect on whether I am justified to take pride. We may call this kind of pride "the pre-moral [form of] pride", being "a pre-moral psychological reaction",[89] which needs to be "corrected" by the general point of view in order to become "a due degree of pride", or "real pride" (T3.3.2.11; SBN 599). The distinguishing feature of a pre-moral pride is that, while being so dominant as to be in the forefront of our consciousness, it is unstable and context dependent — dependent particularly on the opinions and sentiments of others. An emotional pride, in contrast, is relatively stable and

[88] I adapted the term, "the emotional pride", from Gabriel Taylor, though for different use (1980, p. 397)
[89] I borrowed this term from James Baillie, who points out that "the form of pride discussed in Book 2 is a pre-moral psychological reaction, which must be distinguished from pride the moral virtue, as discussed in Book 3" (2000, p. 47).

enduring: my feeling of self-glory may continue even when I fully realize that I have no reason to justify my being proud in the attendance at a feast. Given the vast difference between these two kinds of pride, it may be useful to suppose that there is an emotional spectrum extending between the emotional pride on the one side, and the pre-moral pride on the other. Those that sit towards the emotional pride are more like a joy or satisfaction, whereas those located towards the pre-moral pride are more like a moral sentiment.[90] Hume's treatment of pride in Book II covers the whole range of pride of this spectrum, because pride is for him the product of these three different causes: beauty, virtue, riches or power.

The common understanding of the secondary literature is that Hume's account of pride in Book II concerns primarily the pre-moral pride. It is this preconception that led G. Taylor to observe that Hume's boastful guest is meant as "the suggestion that someone sufficiently determined to shine can somehow build his pride on a situation which is not really adequate", and that "Hume, it is clear, regards such people as uncommonly silly and so perhaps as not requiring serious attention".[91] This is a mislaid interpretation, as we have seen, because Hume's example of the boastful guest should be taken not about someone who builds his pride on a situation which is not adequate, but about someone who is enjoying an emotional kind of pride—an example in which the conversion of joy into pride may take place even by such an inconsiderable relation as attending the feast. By contrast, the origin of the pre-moral pride is often more complicated. For, when we takes pride in such a painful experience as paying a tax bill under difficulties, or my survival of a shipwreck, the pleasurable sensation which provides the ingredient to compose the passion is not the sensation excited [separately from pride] by the taxpaying or survival by itself, but the pleasurable sensation caused by the approval of the praiseworthy quality of my self, regarding that object.[92] In this case, the "primary" cause of my pride is the praiseworthy quality of my mind, revealed by my present or past action such as taxpaying or survival, which may be called an "immediate" cause of the passion: the immediate cause has an influence on the passion only insofar as it is the sign of the primary cause. "Actions themselves, not proceeding from any

[90] This subject is discussed in Section 8 of Chapter 1.
[91] 1980, p. 400.
[92] See Section 3 of Chapter 1.

constant principle, have no influence on love or hatred, pride and humility" (T3.3.1.4; SBN 575) as Hume indicates. It is this situation that Hume details in terms of "limitations": the immediate cause needs to be close, peculiar, obvious, and durable in order to be a sign of the durable quality of mind that makes me what I am. On this view, his account of the limitations is a prelude to his subsequent discussion "Of vice and virtue" at T2.1.7.

The obvious difference between the pre-moral pride and the emotional pride is that the former type of pride, though so dominant as to be in the forefront of our consciousness, is unstable and more or less context dependent, and particularly subject to the opinions and sentiments of others. My pride I take in my survival of a shipwreck may decrease when I hear others having survived in more hazardous accidents, or my pride in my difficult taxpaying may diminish by another's indifferent comment on it. But, why is the pre-moral pride so unstable despite being founded on an inherent relation between our action and the self? The chief reason may be that the pre-moral pride is vulnerable to comparison, because this form of pride is essentially an evaluative passion, derived from the pleasant sentiment embedded in our own or others' moral approval of our action, e.g. taxpaying. As Baier points out, "pride will languish unless others confirm our pride by their esteem",[93] and therefore requires other affections and reasons to justify it for its survival. Since for Hume a passion, especially pride, is naturally tended for self-justification and for self-preservation, as Elenore Le Jalle indicates,[94] it needs continual nourishment for its survival, the chief source of which is another person's affection, such as envy, love, admiration, respect. Hume's view is not that, as Taylor indicates, we are proud of something because we have reasons for being proud, but the other way round: the peculiar pleasure of being proud makes us seek reasons to justify our pride for its self-preservation, as we noted above.

Hence comparison contributes greatly to the survival of pride by producing envy and contempt.[95] For, although envy is painful whereas pride is pleasant,[96] another's envy is

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[93] 1980, p. 418.

[94] Le Jalle points out that Hume follows Malebranche, who argues that all our passions tend to justify themselves (2012, p. 201-220).

[95] Baier argues: "This reinforcement of self-esteem from the envy of others, equally with that obtained from the esteem of others, is won at a cost in the self-sufficiency of pride—in both cases it is made dependent on the feelings of other people" (1980, p. 410).

[96] According to Hume, "envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison

converted into an opposite emotion by comparison, and becomes transfused into my pride to increase my affection. Or, when I feel contempt for a person because of his poor property, this contempt naturally conjoins with my pride, rendering my passion more forceful. For, nothing is more natural than contempt to be conjoined with pride insofar as contempt is for Hume a mixture of pride with hatred that takes place when we view the circumstances and qualities of others.[97] We here learn how pride, once excited, turns our view not only to our qualities and circumstances, but also to the qualities and circumstances of others.

That the pre-moral pride seeks own survival is not the whole story of Hume's notion of pride. For, as Baier details, pride needs to go through the process of "correction" or "negative feedback" in order to be a "real pride" (T2.2.8.12; SBN 377). It is true that for Hume virtue is "the most obvious cause" of pride, and that pride is the "unavoidable" accompaniment of virtue, but it is only through this process that pride becomes "a due degree of pride" (T3.3.2.8; SBN 596).[98] Pride, once produced from virtue, repeats its "reverberations" passing to and fro between our own mind and the mind of others, producing different passions attended by different but relevant ideas, as Hume illustrates in his later account of our esteem for the rich and powerful.[99] It is through this reverberating process in which pride naturally "swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself" (T2.3.4.2; SBN 420) that the pre-moral pride becomes "corrected" by the oppositions or contradictions of another's passions so as to allow us to attain "a due degree of pride" or "real pride", "which makes us sensible of our own merit, and gives us a confidence and assurance in all our projects and enterprizes" (T3.3.2.8; SBN 597). "When thus corrected, when no longer self-contained but sensitive to both the negative and the positive feedback from other persons' passions", Baier points out, "both pride and the moral sentiment are self-sustaining passions".[100] It is this correcting process that enables us to see "our own force" and "due degree" of pride so as to regulate our actions accordingly, he insists, and thereby allows us "to know our rank and

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diminishes our idea of our own" (T2.2.8.12; SBN 377).

[97] See Section 5 of Chapter 3.

[98] 1980, p. 416.

[99] Hume writes: "Thus the pleasure, which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem; which sentiments again, being perceiv'd and sympathiz's with, encrease the pleasure of the possessor; and being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder" (T2.2.5.21; SBN 365-6).

[100] 1980, p. 416.

situation in the world", and "to feel the sentiment and passion of pride in conformity to it" (T3.3.2.11; SBN 599). Although for Hume pride *per se* are not motivating by itself, being a "pure" emotion without any tendency to action, the real pride or due degree of pride as the result of the correction can regulate and "conform our actions to the general usage and custom" (ibid.). "Prudence" can regulate our actions, because "those tacit airs of superiority" are nothing but the corrected pride, and proceed from custom and practice, which inform us not only that men are "generally proud" but also that pride is "generally approv'd, when well-grounded" (ibid.). Baier insists that pride, after having gone through the correcting process, "is no longer a separate passion from the moral sentiments, but merges with it" insofar as "the discernment of virtue by the moral sentiment will occasion pride or love, so there will be a blending of these passions with the moral sentiment that introduces them".[101] This is how Hume's account of the indirect passions functions as the foundation of his system of morality.

8 The indirect passions and the moral sentiments

Hume insists on an intimate connection between the indirect passions and the moral sentiments both in Books II and III. But it is a mistake to take Hume to imply that, as Árdal thinks, the moral sentiments are species of the indirect passions.[102] For, what is insisted by Hume is not the similarity between the two kinds of sentiments, but the structural parallelism between the two productive mechanisms from which they are derived.[103]

It is remarkable how emphatic Hume is on the close relation between the moral sentiments

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[101] 1980, p. 416. Baier stresses this close relation: "The merger of corrected pride with the moral sentiment is seen not only by the fact that pride accompanies discernment of virtue but by the fact that pride may accompany virtue, so that one's own discerned pride in virtue will be a further proof of virtue and a further occasion for pride. Virtuous pride in virtue reinforces both pride and virtue, so that pride and the moral sense becomes lost in one another" (p. 417).

[102] Donald Ainslie argues that for Hume "the indirect passions will always accompany the moral sentiments, not that they are moral sentiments", and suggests that insofar as for Hume mental qualities can produce the indirect passions only if they cause an independent impressions of pleasure or pain, it is this immediate response to virtue and vice that Hume seems to identify with the moral sentiments" (1999, p. 474).

[103] There is disagreement regarding the status of Hume's notion of moral sentiments, some hold that moral sentiments are indirect passions, while others direct ones. There is an excellent illustration of this situation in Loeb (1977). Charlotte Brown finds the necessity to distinguish between the moral sentiments and motivational passions, by pointing out: "The original motive for any action or pattern of behaviour judged as morally right –natural or artificial— must be some non-moral feeling or tendency" (1988, p. 69-87).

and the indirect passions, claiming that the indirect passions are "the unavoidable attendants" of moral distinctions (T2.1.7.5; SBN 296), or that "[t]he pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any action or quality of the *mind*, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred" (T3.3.5.1; SBN 614). Árdal and many other critics take Hume to imply that the moral sentiments are species of the indirect passions, or that "approval and disapproval are love and hatred".[104] I shall argue that Hume's aim in insisting on the close connection between the moral sentiments and the indirect passions is not to equate the former with the latter, but to establish that the two productive mechanisms of the moral sentiments and of the passions "agree together".

The taxonomy of the moral sentiments is a hotbed of critical disagreement, producing three different opinions, that the moral sentiments are direct passions, indirect ones, and neither.[105] I support the third opinion, that the moral sentiments are not passions at all, and therefore not subject to the direct/indirect division. For, the other two opinions flatly contradict Hume's "Division of the subject" at T2.1.1.3. We need to place proper importance on this basic Division, since it is for Hume a "canonical" and "exhaustive" division, as Loeb plausibly insists,[106] which divides all impressions of reflection into two kinds, viz. the moral/aesthetic sentiments, and the passions. We need to pay more attention to the fact that, as Cohon points out, all through Books II and III, Hume never addresses the moral sentiments as "passions".[107] I try to show that Hume has no reason to modify or retract this initial division between the moral sentiments and the passions, because, as we see below, this distinction is perfectly compatible with his assertion of their close connection.

The distinction between the moral sentiments and the indirect passions does not conflict with their intimate connection, because for Hume it is not the resemblance of their properties but their *structural* parallelism that their intimate connection relies upon. Hume's concern is to explain both systems of the passions and of morality by the same associative mechanism, which is

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[104] Árdal, 1966, p. 116.
[105] The first position is stressed strongly by e.g. Árdal, Penelhum, Korsgaard, the second by Kemp Smith and Hearn, and the third by Loeb, Cohon, and Ainslie. See Loeb (1977). I discuss this subject in Section 2 of Chapter 4.
[106] 1977, p. 395.
[107] 2007, fn. p. 184.

founded on the same general principle. For, the structural analogy between the two productive mechanisms is important for him as a proof not only of the unity but also of the veracity of his system. As he states: "I go farther, and observe, that this moral hypothesis and my present system [regarding pride and humility] not only agree together, but also that, allowing the former to be just, 'tis an absolute and invincible proof of the latter" (T2.1.7.4; SBN 295). Yet, Hume's intention does not rest with this analogy, but to assert that this structural parallelism between Books II and III reaches Book I in virtue of "a great analogy" between Book II's hypothesis of the double relation and Book I's hypothesis of causal reasoning (T2.1.5.11; SBN 290). The hypothesis of the double relation from which the indirect passions arise thus functions as a linkage between the two hypotheses regarding the understanding and regarding morality, connecting the three books of the *Treatise* into a unity.

By taking an example in which I contemplate Hitler's character, let us see how the productive mechanisms from which my hatred and my disapproval are derived "agree together". Regarding the production of my hatred, we must first reflect that, in order for the passion to arise, there must be some source from which the ingredients, viz. an unpleasant sensation, and the idea of Hitler, to constitute the passion are derived. To put it the other way round, any unpleasant object related to Hitler gives rise to hatred (T2.1.5.8; SBN 288) in virtue of the double relation of impressions and ideas established between the two sets of components constituting the cause and constituting the passion, viz. an unpleasant sensation, and the idea of Hitler. On Hume's mechanical account, my hatred is the product of the conversion of the former set of components constituting the cause into the latter set constituting the passion. The difficulty is that the former unpleasant sensation excited by Hitler's character is not sufficiently vivacious to perform the conversion, and therefore requires some *additional* vivacity for its enlivenment. Hume solves this difficulty by claiming that Hitler's character as the "original" cause of the passion is assisted and reinforced by the "secondary" cause which lies in the sentiments and opinions of others. The unpleasant sensation excited by the original cause is converted into the sensation constituting my hatred when the former sensation is enlivened by the unpleasant sensation embedded in the secondary cause. As he indicates: the original cause has "little influence, when not seconded by

the opinions and sentiments of others" (T2.1.11.1; SBN 316).

Now, turning to the circumstance in which I disapprove Hitler's character, my disapproval also arises from the double relation of impressions and ideas: the unpleasant sensation constituting my disapproval is derived from the unpleasant sensation excited by my contemplation of his character. My disapproval is likewise the result of the conversion of the latter sensation into the former. "To approve of a character is to feel an original delight upon its appearance. To disapprove of it is to be sensible of an uneasiness" (T2.1.7.5; SBN 296), as Hume indicates. Again in this case, this conversion requires the assistance of the secondary cause, viz. the opinions and sentiments of others *in general*. The unpleasant sensation elicited by the original cause, viz. Hitler's character, is converted into the unpleasant sensation constituting my disapproval only when it is assisted by the opinions and sentiments of all relevant people *in general*. Not every sentiment of pleasure or pain, which arises from characters and actions is "of that *peculiar* kind, which makes us praise or condemn" (T3.1.2.4; SBN 472), Hume insists, because "'[t]is only when a character is consider'd *in general*, without reference to our particular interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or evil" (ibid. my emphasis). Every sentiment of pleasure or pain which arises from characters and actions causes the indirect passion of love or hatred, but not approval or disapproval: a moral sentiment arises only when the pleasant or painful sensation excited by my contemplation of the object agrees with, and is thereby reinforced by, the pleasant or painful sensation excited by that object viewed from the general point of view. We may learn that the structure of the moral hypothesis is nothing different from that of the double-relation hypothesis from which an indirect passion arises.

Yet given that both my hatred and my disapproval arise from the same double-relation mechanism, why does the same cause, viz. the contemplation of Hitler's character, give rise to the different sentiments, my hatred in some cases, and my disapproval in others? A clue is found in this difference: "we approve [or disapprove] of his character, and love [or hate] his person" (T3.3.3.2; SBN 602). When the contemplation of Hitler's character causes my hatred, the cause of the passion is his character, and the object is Hitler himself. The passion is here "plac'd betwixt

two ideas, of which the one produces it, and the other is produc'd by it" (T2.1.2.4; SBN 278): the first idea as the cause of the passion is Hitler's property whereas the second idea as the object of the passion is Hitler as a whole person, which includes his thoughts, actions, and sentiments (T2.2.1.2; SBN 329). By feeling pride, the redirection of my attention takes place from the former idea to the latter.[108] In contrast, when my contemplation of Hitler's character causes my disapproval, this sentiment also is "plac'd betwixt two ideas", but the ideas as the cause and the object of the sentiment are both Hitler's character. Yet, my disapproval is likewise the result of the redirection of my attention from the first idea (cause) to the second (object), because these two ideas are not the same insofar as they are the ideas of the different aspects of Hitler's character: the first is the idea of Hitler's character viewed from my point of view, whereas the second is the idea of Hitler's character viewed *from the general point of view*. To put it the other way round, the unpleasant sensation which I feel from the contemplation of Hitler's character is converted into the unpleasant sensation constituting my disapproval only when I feel the unpleasant sensation which is affected by people in general. It is this kind of "pain or pleasure, which arises from the general survey or view of any action or quality of the *mind*…[that] gives rise to our approbation or blame" (T3.3.5.1; SBN 614), according to Hume. When "the extensive sympathy" enables me to feel the unpleasant affection caused by Hitler's character in the minds of all those relevant people in general, my attention to Hitler's character viewed from my point of view is redirected to Hitler's character viewed from the general point of view. "The redirection occurs whenever we feel the moral sentiments", as Cohon points out.[109] The production of the moral sentiments is thus a matter of the involvement of the extensive sympathy, which allows us to go "so far out of ourselves" as to feel "the same pleasure or uneasiness in characters which are useful or pernicious to society, as if they had a tendency to our own advantage or loss" (T3.3.1.11; SBN 579). Given this fundamental difference in the genesis of the moral sentiments from the indirect passions, there is an obvious difficulty to agree with Árdal, that "approval and disapproval are love and hatred".[110]

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[108] See Section 3 of Chapter 1.
[109] 2007, p. 175.
[110] 1966, p. 116.

Chapter 2: The indirect passions - love and hatred

I examine the first half of Hume's treatment of love and hatred in Part 2 of Book II, leaving the second half for the discussion on the compound passions of the next chapter. After having established the double-relation mechanism from which pride and humility arise, Hume's aim is to build a parallel mechanism relevant to love and hatred on the basis of a great resemblance between the two sets of passions. Hume's hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas is complete when the first mechanism is superimposed over by the second one, and thereby provides a stable and reliable foundation of his system.

1 "Four passions, plac'd, as it were, in a square"

Hume calls our attention to the great resemblance between the two sets of the indirect passions, pride and humility, and love and hatred, and highlights their symmetrical relation in terms of the "four affections, plac'd, as it were, in a square" (T2.2.2.3; SBN 333). This "square" functions as a stable foundation of Hume's system by providing the "situation of the mind" in which the idea of the self or another's self arises according as the imagination wheels about along the four sides of the square.

Hume begins his discussion of love and hatred with his insistence on their "great resemblance" with pride and humility, and establishes a parallel double relation mechanism by claiming that all foregoing reasoning regarding pride and humility is "equally applicable to both set of passions" (T2.2.1.6; SBN 330). Hume's hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas is complete when he has shown that "'tis by means of a transition arising from a double relation of impressions and ideas, pride and humility, love and hatred are produc'd" (T2.2.2.28; SBN 347). But given that the double-relation mechanism relevant to love and hatred is nothing different from that relevant to pride and humility, why are two mechanisms necessary to complete Hume's hypothesis? Is the second mechanism meant as the confirmation of the first one? A clue to these puzzles is given in Hume remark: "As the immediate *object* of pride and humility is self, or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations, we are intimately conscious;

so the *object* of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations, we are not conscious" (T2.2.1.2; SBN 329). We here learn that for Hume the resemblance between the two sets of passions hangs not only on that they are both determined to have an original object, but also on that they are related *symmetrically* in virtue of the symmetrical resemblance between ourselves and others. This symmetrical correspondence between the two sets of passions is essential to Hume's system, because he takes this "situation of the mind" constituted by the two sets of passions to be the foundation of human relationship. It is this situation that enables "a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those they themselves have entertain'd", as he argues:

> Now 'tis evident, that the very same qualities and circumstances, which are the causes of pride or self-esteem, are also the causes of vanity or the desire of reputation; and that we always put to view those particulars with which in ourselves we are best satisfy'd. But if love and esteem were not produc'd by the same qualities as pride, according as these qualities are related to ourselves or others, this method of proceeding wou'd be very absurd, nor cou'd men expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those they themselves have entertain'd. (T2.2.1.9; SBN 332)

We are so desirous of our reputation, and seek the love and approbation of others because we are in general not satisfied with our own character, or genius, or fortune (T2.2.1.9; SBN 331) according to Hume. The very same qualities and circumstances which cause pride or self-esteem are also the causes of the desire of love or reputation: power and riches, when they belong to ourselves, produce pride; when they belong to others, love or esteem. In a similar manner, the same qualities that cause humility are also the causes of hatred. This symmetry entails that an object cannot count as the source of pride or humility unless it serves as the source of love or hatred. It is ensured by this symmetry that, when we are proud of, or humiliated by a certain property or quality of our mind, we approve or disapprove others who have the same property or quality. James King characterizes this symmetrical relation between the two sets of the passions

as the "principle of self-other parity", and observes that this principle merits our greater attention, since it is not only integral in Hume's account of pride, but also underlies Hume's account of virtues.[111] It serves "Hume's advocacy for the perspective of common life", King argues, because "the author of judgments to which the principle applies may not affirm her position solely on her own authority…but, by the reflexivity of the principle itself, must acknowledge the position of any other or others".[112] In virtue of this principle, we are not subject to many mistakes in this particular, as Hume insists, even though "few can form exact systems of the passions, or make reflexions on their general nature and resemblances" (T2.2.1.9; SBN 332).

Indeed Hume's ambition is to form such "an exact system of the passions" that enables us to "make reflexions on their general nature and resemblance", in terms of parallel double-relation mechanisms, one relevant to love and hatred, and the other relevant to pride and humility, and to explain why and how we are exempt from many mistakes in understanding what will operate on others by what we feel immediately in ourselves. Here is the reason, I argue, why Hume needs two mechanisms which are symmetrically parallel to each other. For, his strategy is to superimpose one mechanism over the other, and to render the whole system three-dimensional, and to assert that the two sets of passions, love and hatred, and pride and humility are "place'd, as it were, in a square": "pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by their objects or ideas: Pride with love, humility with hatred, by their sensations or impressions" (T2.2.2.3; SBN 333). This *square* constituted of double-fold ties of impressions and ideas connects together the two separate but parallel mechanisms relevant to the two sets of passions, and provides a stable and reliable situation in which, any object, once in this square, unavoidably produces one of the four affections, by causing the imagination to wheel about along the square according as the object's relation to ourselves or others varies. He conducts eight experiments on this situation in terms of the "general nature and resemblance" of the passions in order to give "a full and decisive proof" of his system (T2.2.1.9; SBN 331).

2 Hume's "experiments"

[111] 1999, p. 127.
[112] 1999, p. 134.

Hume makes eight experiments on the "square" constituted by the double-fold relation of impressions and ideas between the two sets of passions, pride and humility, love and hatred, and demonstrates how the passion "wheels about" around the square according to the change of the relation between ourselves and the object of the passion. Hume's aim in these experiments is to give an endorsement to "the parity principle", which enables us to "expect a correspondence in the sentiments of every other person, with those they themselves have entertain'd" (T2.2.1.9; SBN 332).

In the first three experiments, Hume proves that an object which has no relation, or only one relation, of either impressions and ideas to ourselves or to others can produce none of the four affections, pride, humility, love, hatred. In the first experiment, he shows that, when I am in company of a person towards whom I have no special feeling, any object, e.g. an ordinary stone, which belongs to neither of us, causes no emotion, because it has no relation either of impressions or of ideas to any of the four passions, and therefore is kept out of the mental "square". The second experiment illustrates that a relation of ideas alone cannot give rise to any of the affections, since the object belonging either to me or to my companion "bestows an equal impulse" towards the opposite passions of pride and humility, or love and hatred, according as the object belongs to ourselves or to others: this opposition of the passions "must destroy both, and leave the mind perfectly free from any affection or emotion" (T2.2.2.6; SBN 334). The third experiment demonstrates that where a transition of the sensations is not forwarded by a transition of ideas, an object belonging either to ourselves or to others can never give rise to any constant and established passion, only pleasure or uneasiness (T2.2.2.7; SBN 334-5).

In the fourth experiment, Hume chooses "vice and virtue" for the cause of the passion in order to prove that whatever has a double relation of impressions and ideas either with ourselves or with others must necessarily excite one of the four passions, pride, humility, love, hatred, and demonstrates how the affection wheels about according as the object changes its relation to myself or to others, or from pain to pleasure (T2.2.2.9; SBN 336). While the virtue, when belonging to me, produces pride by the double relation, the same virtue, when belonging to my companion, causes this affection to wheel about, leaving pride, and falling to the side of love, as it

is “attracted” by a double relation of impressions and ideas. The change of object from virtue to vice also makes the affections wheel about along the mental square, producing humility when the vice belongs to me, hatred when it belongs to my companion.

In the fifth experiment, Hume considers more complicated cases in which the cause of the passion is laid on a person who is closely related to ourselves, e.g. the vice or virtue of my son or brother. “The virtue or vice of a son or brother not only excites love or hatred, but by a new transition, from similar causes, gives rise to pride or humility” (T2.2.2.13; SBN 338), because the affections produced by the first double relation do not “rest there”, but “transfuse themselves” into other impressions.

In the sixth experiment, Hume examines the reverse case of this phenomenon, by placing the virtue or vice not in our son, but in ourselves. In this case, our own virtue may cause pride or humility, but the transition from pride or humility to love or hatred does not take place: we never love or hate our son for the virtue or vice we discern in ourselves. This might seem a counterexample to Hume’s hypothesis, because the relation between ourselves and our son should cause the transition of the affection insofar as pride/humility and love/hatred are connected with each other by the double-fold ties of impressions and ideas. However, the transfusion of pride or humility into love or hatred does not take place insofar as the relation between ourselves and our son does not here cause an easy transition of the imagination, and therefore the transition of the passion. This is because of this nature of the imagination: “The imagination passes easily from obscure to lively ideas, but with difficulty from lively to obscure” (T2.2.2.15; SBN 339). In other words, when the affections are at once directed to ourselves, the imagination has much difficulty passing from ourselves to any other person, because “ourself” is the most vivacious idea which engages our attention without any distraction. In this respect, the sixth experiment is for Hume the most important experiment, which proves that “the imagination and passions assist each other in their operation” (T2.2.2.16; SBN 339), while the rest are “variations” of this principle, intended to solve seeming contradictions or exceptions to his system. For, it shows “a clear proof” that “these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections” (T2.2.2.16; SBN 340).

In the seventh experiment, Hume explains why the transition from love or hatred to pride or humility is easier than from pride or humility to love or hatred. It might seem contrary to the natural propensity of the imagination, which passes with greater facility from the inferior to superior, and from remote to contiguous, that it is more natural for us to love the son upon account of his father, than the father upon account of his son. This phenomenon happens, according to Hume, when the natural propensity of the imagination is "overpowered" by the tendency of passions to descend with greater facility than to ascend. Where there any opposition between the two tendencies of the imagination and of the passions, "the affections are a more powerful principle than the imagination" (T2.2.2.26; SBN 345). Yet, the passion "prevails over" the imagination "by complying" with it, "by seeking another quality, which may counter-balance that principle, from whence the opposition arises" (T2.2.2.26; SBN 345). For example, when the tendency of the imagination of passing from inferior to superior leads us to think little of the children of the father, we could increase our affection to the children with the nearness and contiguity by having them in our presence (ibid.). Or, where there is a difficulty for the imagination to pass from greater to less, it may find an equal facility in passing from remote to contiguous, and thereby keep the way open from the one passion to the other (T2.2.2.26; SBN 346).

In the eighth experiment, Hume treats an exception to the preceding rule that the transition from love or hatred to pride or humility is easier than the other way round. This exception takes place when the very cause of pride and humility is placed in some other person, such as when we feel kindness and affection toward someone through his approbation of our conduct and character, or when stronger hatred is inspired by his blame or contempt regarding our conduct. We love our neighbours when they admire us, or we hate them when they despise us. What happens in this case is that the original passion, pride or humility, whose object is ourselves, is transfused into love or hatred, whose object is neighbours. Although this transition of the passions from pride and humility to love and hatred seems contrary to the rule that "*the imagination passes with difficulty from contingent to remote*" (T2.2.2.27; SBN 346), it is not a contradiction, but rather a confirmation of the rule, according to Hume. For, since this transition is caused not merely by the

relation between ourselves and neighbours, but by the fact that ourselves is the real cause of our first passion, viz. pride. Since pride contains neighbours' love and approbation as the secondary cause of the passion, it is no wonder that "the imagination returns back again attended with the related passions of love and hatred" (ibid.).

As we have seen, Hume's aim in the eight experiments lies in something more than a mere application of his "experimental method of reasoning" to the mental square constituted by pride and humility, love and hatred: they are meant for a proof of "the parity-principle". Hume shows that the "situation of the mind" formed by the four indirect passions functions as a safe and stable foundation of his system secured by the parity-principle.

3 The emotional cube


Given that the hypothesis of the double relation of impressions and ideas consists of two mechanisms relevant to pride and humility, relevant to love and hatred, what could be the purpose for Hume to involve the two similar mechanisms? I shall argue that this contrivance is essential to Hume's system, because his strategy is to superimpose one mechanism over the other, and to render the whole system three-dimensional, in order to allow the social perspective to be deeply embedded in the fundamental structure of his system.

We learn from Hume's experiments that the production of pride, humility, love, and hatred is not a simple matter which depends on a particular relation between ourselves and others, nor is a matter of a particular affection which takes place secretly in our own mind. For, these four passions are closely correlated with each other not only by the double-fold ties of impressions and ideas into a square, but also by the fact that insofar as the production of the passion depends on the agreement between the two mechanisms each relevant to pride/humility and love/hatred, nothing which affects the former can be entirely indifferent to the latter. These two mechanisms need to agree with each other, because any pleasant or painful object, even where it is related to ourselves, cannot produce pride or humility unless it is "seconded" by the opinions and sentiments of others. Given that the causes of pride or humility which excite a pleasure or pain must also be the causes of love or hatred, and excite the passion, the two mechanisms are situated

in a symmetrical relation by virtue of the fact that the two sets of passions, pride and humility, and love and hatred, "are plac'd, as it were, in a square". On this view, the mechanism relevant to love and hatred is superimposed over by that relevant to pride and humility, rendering the entire system *three-dimensional* — three-dimensional because these two mechanisms stand in a parallel with their basis upon the square constituted by pride and humility, love and hatred. So far as this this model is concerned, whether or not an agreeable or disagreeable object related to us can trigger the double-relation mechanism of pride or humility relies on the *shadow* operation of the other mechanism of love and hatred, and vice versa. This is why the production of the passion thus is a matter of the whole situation formed by the double-fold ties of impressions and ideas established between the two sets of passions. This square here functions as a sort of emotional network for the production of these passions, by allowing the imagination to wheel about along the passages prepared by these two sets of affections.

But, why does Hume want to make his system three-dimensional by superimposing the two mechanisms over each other? How does this three-dimensional double-relation model enhance Hume's system? In order to answer these questions, let us take an example in which I feel proud of my beautiful house when my neighbor admires it, and see how the two double-relation mechanisms which produce the two affections, my pride, and my neighbour's admiration, are related to each other. Let's begin by reflecting that my pride is derived from a double relation of impressions and ideas established between the two components constituting the cause and the passion: the two components constituting my pride, viz. a pleasant sensation (PS) and the idea of my self (PI), are derived from the components constituting my beautiful house, viz. a pleasant sensation (CS) excited by the beauty, and the idea of my self (CI). By the same procedure, the two components constituting my neighbour's love or admiration, viz. a pleasant sensation (*LS*) and the idea of my neighbour (*LI*), are derived from the components that constitute my beautiful house, viz. a pleasant sensation (*CS)*, and the idea of my neighbour (*CI*). The latter double-relation is a *shadow* mechanism insofar as "[n]o passion of another discovers itself immediately to the mind" (T3.3.1.7; SBN 576). This is a shadow mechanism in the sense that it represents an experience that is supposed to take place in my neighbour's mind, which never

allows my direct access, and is known only via sympathy. The relations of identity and resemblance built between the four sets of components may well lead us to assert an *emotional cube*, which has the following six aspects.



The first double-relation between CS-PS (both pleasant sensations constituting the house and pride) and CI-PI (both the idea of the self constituting the house and pride) constitute the *front* of the cube, while the second between *CS*-*LS* and *CI*-*LI* forms the *back*. The *top* is formed by the relation between CS-*CS* (both pleasant sensations constituting the house) and PS-*LS* (both pleasant sensations constituting pride and love). The *bottom* is built by the relation between CI-*CI* (both the ideas of my self embedded in the house) and PI-*LI* (the idea of my self constituting pride and the idea of my neighbour constituting his love). The *left-aspect* is formed between CS-*CS* (both pleasant sensations constituting the house) and CI-*CI* (both the idea of my self constituting the house), while the *right-aspect* is formed between PS-*LS* (both pleasant sensations constituting pride and love) and PI-*LI* (the idea of my self constituting pride and the idea of my neighbour constituting his love). It is the front that represents my actual experience of being proud of my house, the experience that I enjoy when I view my house from my perspective. The front entails the back, which is a shadow aspect, representing the experience my neighbour enjoys when he views my house from his perspective. The transition from CS to PS, accompanied by the transition from CI to PI, entails the shadow transition from *CS* to *LS*, in virtue of the connection between CS and *CS*, which involves in turn the transition from *CI* to *LI*. These two sets of transitions entail not only the left-aspect formed by the relations of CS-*CS* and CI-*CI*, as well as the right-aspect formed by PS-*LS* and PI-*LI*, but also the top formed by the relation of CS-PS and

CS-LS as well as the bottom formed by CI-PI and *CI-LI*. The significance of this emotional cube lies in that it endorses these amazing results: the top represents the transfusion of pride and love into one another while the bottom represents the transfusion or integration of my perspective into that of my neighbour. This emotional cube shows us clearly that the production of the passion is a matter which necessarily involves not only the transfusion of one passion into the other, but also the accommodation of our point of view to that of others. We here learn how the social perspective is inherently embedded into the very structure of Hume's double-relation hypothesis, and that the production of the passions is a matter which involves all of these eight elements constituting this cube.

4 "The love of relations"

In sections at T2.2.3-4, Hume solves two difficulties involved in his double-relation hypothesis, and establishes these two core issues: that an action of a person has an influence on the passions, only when it is a sign of his character, and that love or kindness may arise from "the force and liveliness of conception" even though there is only one relation and sometimes without any, in virtue of sympathy which arises implicitly and automatically "by the natural course of the disposition".

Hume's first difficulty is why "several actions that cause a real pleasure or uneasiness excite not any degree, or but a small one, of the passion of love or hatred, towards the actors" (T2.2.4.1; SBN 351). This phenomenon seems contradictory to Hume's system that anyone acquires our love or hatred in proportion to the pleasure or uneasiness we receive from that person. Hume's answer is that an action of a person has an influence on the passions only when it is a sign of some quality or character of that person. Hume established that an action causes our love or hatred toward the actor only when it is derived from such a quality that is "constant and inherent in his person and character (T2.2.3.4; SBN 348) — the absolute condition of an action to produce our approval or disapproval — and thereby strengthens the connection between the moral sentiments and the passions, which he has asserted in his preceding discussion of pride and humility (T2.1.7.5; SBN 296).

Another difficulty is this familiar phenomenon that love may be "excited by only one *relation* of a different kind, viz. betwixt ourselves and the object", such as the relation of consanguinity, or of countrymen, our neighbours, or those of the same profession (ibid.). But this phenomenon that whoever is united to us by any connection is always sure of a share of our love without inquiring his personal merit (T2.2.4.2; SBN 352) is obviously at odds with Hume's double-relation hypothesis that "there is always requir's a double relation of impressions and ideas betwixt the cause and effect, in order to produce either love or hatred" (ibid.). The difficulty is to show "wherein consists the pleasure or uneasiness of many objects which we find by experience to produce these passions" (T2.2.4.1; SBN 351). For instance, when I feel love, e.g. toward a baseball player of my district irrelevantly whether he has any valuable quality or not, what could be the source of the ingredient from which the pleasant sensation of compose the passion is derived? In order to solve this difficulty, Hume calls our attention to a parallel phenomenon, viz. the love of "acquaintance", that when we have contracted a habitude and intimacy with any person, we still prefer him to strangers of whose superior merit we are fully convinced, even though we find no valuable quality in him (T2.2.4.3; SBN 352). His strategy is to assume that these two phenomena, viz. the love of relation, and the love of acquaintance, will give a mutual light to each other, and to discover the principle common to both of them. Finding that the only particular common to both phenomena is "a lively and strong idea" of an object, he draws this conclusion: "it must be from the force and liveliness of conception" that love or kindness is derived: "Such a conception is agreeable, and makes us have an affectionate regard for every thing, that produces it, when the proper object of kindness and good-will" (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353). But, why could "the force and liveliness of conception" provide the pleasant sensation to compose love? Or, why is a forceful and vivacious conception so agreeable as to produce love or kindness?

The reason why the force and violence functions as the source of the pleasant sensation is that, Hume answers: "Every lively idea is agreeable, but especially that of a passion, because such an idea becomes a kind of passion, and gives a more sensible agitation to the mind, than any other image or conception" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352). This assertion that every lively idea — even the idea

of a painful passion such as grief or despair — is agreeable merits our special attention. For, this is entirely a new issue which claims that what decides the agreeableness of an idea is not the hedonic property but "the force and liveliness of conception". He derives this surprising claim from this method of thinking: since the mind is "insufficient, of itself, to its own entertainment, …it naturally seeks after foreign objects, which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352-3).[113] "On the appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with a new tide: The heart is elevated: And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments" (ibid.). Here is Hume's powerful picture which shows why every lively object is agreeable. Given that whatever produces a lively sensation and agitates the spirits is agreeable, "company is naturally so rejoicing" and agreeable because it presents "the liveliest of all objects, *viz.* a rational and thinking Being like ourselves" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 353). The idea of the resembling object to ourselves is most lively and rejoicing, Hume indicates, because it is converted into "a kind of passion" — it "communicates to us all the actions of his mind; makes us privy to his inmost sentiments and affections; and lets us see, *in the very instant of their production*, all the actions which are caus'd any object" (ibid. my emphasis). The idea of any object which is related to us is so "lively and strong" as to be converted into an impression, because it is enlivened by the vivacity of the most vivacious present impression of ourselves "by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object": "Whatever is related to us is conceiv'd in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object" (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353). "Custom also, or acquaintance facilitates the entrance, and strengthens the conception of any object" (ibid.) By virtue of this easy transition, the resemblance converts the idea into an impression instantly and automatically "by a certain sympathy which arises betwixt similar characters", in such a way as certain "materials take fire from the least spark" even where we do not remake the resemblance (ibid.). This is how "a sympathy with others is agreeable only by giving an emotion to the spirits" (T2.2.4.7; SBN 354),

[113] It is by the Epicurean tradition, according to James Moore, that Hume expresses his agreement with "those who take a pleasure in declaiming against human nature" in Book II, and owns the natural state of mankind to be a condition of scarcity, weakness and instability in Book III (1994, p. 30). However, in the last section of Book II, "Of curiosity, or the love of truth", Hume undermines his negative view regarding human nature, by claiming we have the love of truth which gives similar pleasure to hunting and gaming, according to my interpretation.

and serves the source of a pleasant impression, which "makes us have an affectionate regard for everything, that produces it, when the proper object of kindness and good-will" (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353).

This section, "Of the love of relations" is resourceful in many respects, as Hume establishes several central issues and maxims which are fundamental in forming his system. It is particularly important in that he provides a hint to a new non-hedonic criterion by suggesting that every lively idea is agreeable so that love or kindness may be derived from "the force and liveliness of conception". This assertion is the indication of the connection with his subsequent account of the direct passions, which depends on a non-hedonic division of the force and violence of a passion. This connection is also prepared in terms of this core maxim: "Whatever is related to us is conceiv'd in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object" (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353). He makes this connection clear by reiterating it in his account of the will and action to this effect: "Ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality" (T2.3.7.1; SBN 427). This section is important also in showing that sympathy arises in two ways: where we remark the resemblance between ourselves and others, the resemblance operates "by means of the relation, and by transfusing the original vivacity into the related idea" (T2.2.4.7; SBN 354), whereas where we do not remark it, it operates "by the natural course of the disposition, and by a certain sympathy which always arises betwixt similar characters" (T2.2.4.6; SBN 354). These two kinds of sympathy contribute greatly to the flexibility and richness of his system, as we can see in his account of the compound passions, whose origin depends on both kinds of sympathy.

5 The origin of esteem and contempt

Hume's aim in his account of the origin of our esteem or contempt for the rich is to establish that these passions arise "by means of a secondary sensation deriv'd from a sympathy" (T2.2.9.11; SBN 384). In this sense, our esteem and contempt are nothing but the modifications of "the original satisfaction" of the proprietor, which passes to and fro between his mind and ours, causing different passions through the conjunction with relevant ideas on its returns upon the

different minds.

In accounting for the genesis of our esteem for the rich, Hume specifies three causes of the passion: (1) our expectation of pleasures of having a share of the rich, (2) the rich possessions, e.g. beautiful houses, delicious food, (3) sympathy with the satisfaction of the proprietor. But the first cause has little influence on the passion, he insists, insofar as "[o]f a hundred men of credit and fortune I meet with, there is not, perhaps, one from whom I can expect advantage" (T2.2.5.13; SBN 362). Although the second cause has a great influence on the mind conveying an image of that satisfaction which the riches give by their real application to the bodily organs, this cause "resolves" itself into the third one, and "becomes a *sympathy* with the person we esteem or love" (T2.2.5.8; SBN 360), according to him. For, when the ideas of the pleasant wines, music, or gardens that the rich man enjoys become vivacious, "the fancy will not confine itself to them, but will carry its view to the related objects; and, in particular, to the person who possesses them" (T2.2.5.5; SBN 359). For, this pleasant idea naturally produces love toward the proprietor, and thereby makes him "enter into the original conception" as the object of the passion (ibid.). And once he enters into the original conception, and is "consider'd as enjoying these agreeable objects", sympathy takes place to produce our esteem (ibid.). Hence he concludes that "the chief and predominant" cause of esteem is sympathy. Hume's concern is to explain how sympathy enters into the double relation mechanism as the necessary factor to produce esteem and contempt, which are "species of love and hatred". He sketches the double-relation mechanism of the production of respect in the following way:

> Riches give satisfaction to their possessor; and this satisfaction is convey'd to the beholder by the imagination, which produces an idea resembling the original impression in force and vivacity. This agreeable idea or *impression* is connected with love, which is an agreeable passion. It proceeds from a thinking conscious being, which is the very object of love. From this relation of impressions, and identity of ideas, the passion arises, according to my hypothesis. (T2.2.5.14; SBN 362, my emphasis)

What triggers this mechanism is the pleasant sensation embedded in the satisfaction of the proprietor. The ingredients to compose our esteem are derived from the original satisfaction of the proprietor, which has two components, viz. the idea of the proprietor and a pleasant sensation. There seems nothing essentially different between the production of respect and the production of love except in the following respect. When we love a person for his good appearance, his valuable quality provides the pleasant sensation to compose our love, whereas when we respect a person for his possession, what provides the pleasant sensation to compose our respect is not the valuable quality of his possession, but the satisfaction of the proprietor which he takes in it. But since this satisfaction is not an impression, but an idea, it cannot serve directly as the ingredient to compose our respect. Sympathy is thus involved to convert this idea of the proprietor's satisfaction into the agreeable *impression*, "resembling the original satisfaction in force and vivacity"— an equivalent to "the original satisfaction in force and vivacity".

But why is it necessary for Hume to go further, and to assert that when we esteem a person for his possessions, we must "enter into the original conception", and to "consider him as enjoying these agreeable objects" (T2.2.5.5; SBN 359)? What made Hume make such a strong claim that "without such a sympathy the idea of the agreeable objects, which they give him the power to produce, wou'd have but a feeble influence upon us" (T2.2.5.7; SBN 360)? Hume wants to make clear that respect is essentially different from love in that the agreeableness which constitutes our respect for a rich man is derived from his satisfaction with his *power* of obtaining the possession rather than from his satisfaction with its valuable quality (T2.2.5.6; SBN 359). This is why we esteem an avaricious man even where there is no possibility that he will enjoy his property. Money is esteemed because it affords the power to acquire agreeable objects. Now given that the power is "nothing but a possibility or probability of existence, by which any object approaches to reality", this approach appears greater when the power belongs to us than to another (T2.2.5.7; SBN 360). This is why when we esteem a person upon account of his riches, "we must enter into the sentiment of the proprietor" and "partake of" his satisfaction (ibid.).[114]

[114] Significantly, Hume does not say that sympathy involves the identification of oneself with another, or, as Adam Smith holds, imagining what one would feel if one were in the other's situation. For Smith, sympathy involves imagining oneself in another's situation, and thereby experience the same feeling with

On this view, "'tis *sympathy,* which is properly the cause of the affection" (T2.2.5.5; SBN 359).

Sympathy is claimed by Hume to have an influence on a wide range of our experience, including our sense of beauty.[115] As he states: "tho' our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, 'tis seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures" (T2.2.5.16; SBN 363). When a beautiful house gives us pleasure even though our own interest is not in the least concerned, he argues, it delights us "merely by communication, and by our sympathizing" with the proprietor of the lodging (T2.2.5.16; SBN 364). What is essential to our emotional experience is the transition of the original sensation, which passes to and fro between our mind and the mind of spectators, making a different appearance as love or esteem, pride or vanity, and so on, as Hume argues:

> the pleasure, which a rich man receives from his possessions, being thrown upon the beholder, causes a pleasure and esteem; which sentiments again, being perceiv'd and sympathiz'd with, encrease the pleasure of the possessor; and being once more reflected, become a new foundation for pleasure and esteem in the beholder… But the possessor has also a secondary satisfaction in riches arising from the love and esteem he acquires by them, and this satisfaction is nothing but a second reflection of that original pleasure, which proceeded from himself. This secondary satisfaction or vanity becomes one of the principal recommendations of riches, and is the chief reason, why we either desire them for ourselves, or esteem them in others. Here then is a third rebound of the original pleasure…(T2.2.5.21; SBN 365)

It is this "easy communication of sentiments from one thinking being to another" that forms the very nature and essence of our whole affective experience (T2.2.5.15; SBN 363), as Hume

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that person: "When I condole with you for the loss of your only son, in order to enter into your grief I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession, should suffer, if I had a son, and if that son were unfortunately to die: but I consider wheat I should suffer, if I was really you, and I do not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters" (1964, p. 323). See Mercer (1972).

[115] In accounting for the compound passions of pity and malice, Hume extends the notion of sympathy further, and asserts that, when sympathy is "extended", we become "so interested in the concerns of the person, as to be sensible both of his good and bad fortune" (T2.2.5.14; SBN 362).

insists.[116] We owe our whole emotional experience as well as our ardent desire for society entirely to "the force of sympathy". "Whatever other passions we may be actuated by; pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge or lust; the soul or animating principle of them all is sympathy; nor wou'd they have any force, were we to abstract entirely from the thoughts and sentiments of others" (ibid.). Sympathy is further explored in the subsequent five sections, in which he illustrates the genesis of the compound passions.

6 The love and hatred of animals

Hume's aim in the final section of Part 2 of Book II is to show that his hypothesis of the double relation satisfies the criterion of the Science of Man—by being so simple, accurate, general, and universal as to be applicable to the account of the whole animal creation.

On leaving the account of the indirect passions, Hume demonstrates that his system of the double relation is of so simple and mechanical a nature as to require "no force of reflection or penetration" for its extension to the whole sensitive creation. He takes this to be a convincing proof of its being a simple, accurate, general, and universal mechanism as to be equivalent to "the laws of motion, optics, hydrostatics, or any part of natural philosophy" (DP 29). It is not surprising that even the love and hatred of animals are the product of the double relation, he insists, insofar as animals can judge of objects by the sensible good or evil, instead of the pleasure or pains produced by the imagination, and thereby regulate their conduct (T2.2.12.3; SBN 397). Although the thoughts of animals are not so active as to make relation to operate in the production of their love, "acquaintance" and "likeness"[117] play the same role as relation in producing the passion. Sympathy also operates as an animating principle of all animal affections: dogs are more animated when they hunt in a pack than alone. That animals most carefully avoid harming their companion, even though they have nothing to fear from his resentment, is "an evident proof of

[116] Hume famously illustrates this situation by employing the metaphor of mirror images: "the minds of men are mirrors to one another, not only because they reflect each other's emotions but also because those rays of passions, sentiments and opinions may be often reverberated and may decay away by insensible degrees" (T2.2.5.21; SBN 365). This metaphor was familiar in Hume's age, being used by e.g. Locke, Berkeley, as David Norton points out (2011, p. 848).

[117] It is interesting to note that in discussing the sympathy of animals, Hume employs "likeness", but not "resemblance" to signify the affinity among species.

the sense brutes have of each other's pain and pleasure" (T2.2.12.6; SBN 398). Such a primitive kind of sympathy as asserted above may properly be called an "emotional infection"— an emotional phenomenon which does not presuppose any cognitive operation of the mind. Hume's notion of sympathy includes such a primitive sympathy that arises between similar characters by "the natural course of the disposition" as well as a sophisticated sympathy that takes place by a manner of relation (T2.2.4.6; SBN 354), as we noted above.[118]

[118] See Section 4. It is observable that Hume's notion of sympathy, defined as the principle of communication of the sentiments and opinions of others, encompasses a wide range of affective experience, extending from a primitive or "limited" kind to an "extensive" one which makes us concerned with the interests of another person as he explains in his discussion of the origin of the compound passions at T2.2.7-11.

Chapter 3: The compound passions

Hume devotes the second half of his treatment of love and hatred at T2.2.6-8 to the account of the compound passions, and illustrates their origin in terms of a mixture of love and hatred with other passions. Hume's account of the compound passions is important and resourceful in many respects, but I shall highlight the significance of the compound passions in structuring his system as the connection between the indirect and the direct passions, and as the motivational indirect passions.

1 The connection between the indirect passions and the direct passions

Hume shows the conjunction between the separates accounts of the indirect and the direct passions through the illustration of the origin of the compound passions in terms of a mixture of the two kinds of affections in two ways: by showing that the passions are derived from the two different principles of association, viz. a double relation of impressions and ideas, a principle of a parallel direction, which are relevant to the indirect and the direct passions respectively; by showing that the production of respect and contempt involves the new non-hedonic division dependent on the force and violence of a passion—the division which is central to his analysis of the direct passions.

It is unfortunate that Hume's account of the compound passions has not received its proper attention in the secondary literature,[119] even though some particular passions, e.g. pity, respect, are treated by some critics in relation to Hume's moral philosophy.[120] For, we cannot grasp

[119] Penelhum takes Hume's account of the compound passions as a "theoretical addition", meant for "a leisurely examination of what Hume call the compound passions" (2015, p. 220). David Norton assumes that, while expressing his dissatisfaction with Hume's account of the compound passions, it is meant for the solution of the counterexamples, claiming that "we should be able to see why Hume on one occasion worries that his account may appear to be contradictory, and on another fears that he may appear to be arbitrarily appealing to a new principle to explain each new phenomenon he encounters" and that what he has to say in response to these potential criticisms is sometimes difficult to understand, nor are we likely to be satisfied with some of his explanations even when we understand them"(2002, I60). John Laird found Hume's account of the compound passions "puzzling", observing: though Hume is here "most resourceful", his account of the compound passions has "a puzzling reference to the distinction between passive emotion and active appetite and desires, and a slip in which benevolence was said to be only similar to *itself*" in *Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature* (1967, p. 200).

[120] Particular compound passions, such as pity, envy, resentment, are discussed as moral subjects

Hume's structure of the passions without understanding the crucial roles assigned to the compound passions as a mixture of the indirect and the direct passions. We cannot take Hume's account of the compound passions to mean for the taxonomy of the passions,[121] or for the solution of counter-examples to his "quasi-Newtonian theory of the 'double association of impressions and ideas'".[122] We should rather take it as the illustration of the conjunction between the indirect and the direct passions, because he introduces the following crucial issues and principles necessary for the connection of the two kinds of passions, which have different origin, properties, and functions.

1) Love and hatred are different from benevolence and anger
2) Love and hatred are different from pride and humility in this important respect: the former passions are conjoined by an original tie with benevolence and anger whereas the latter are pure emotions without any direction or tendency to action.
3) Sympathy is "extensive" or "complete" in some case, whereas in others, it is "limited", depending on the force of the impression with which another's affection strikes our mind.
4) Hume's system of the passions depends on two different principles or "causes, from which a transition of passion may arise", viz. a double relation of ideas and impressions, a conformity in the tendency and direction of any two desires—a principle of the parallel direction.

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illuminatingly by Jacqueline Taylor (2015), Baier (2010, 1980), and by others.

[121] A typology was fashionable in Hume's age, Hume draws particular passions and their relevant circumstances from a typology when writing Book II of the *Treatise*, employing terminologies such as "principal" passions, "variations", "the particular subdivisions of the other affections", "mixture", as Jane McIntyre illustrates (2006). But Hume's interest is not in the taxonomy of the passions, nor in a detailed account of the particular subdivisions or variations of the passions which arise from the mixture of different views and reflections. He rather criticises writers who were fascinated with the elaboration of a distinction between basic and derived, or primitive and mixed passions, and clearly kept a distance from typologists, by arguing: "I have here confin'd myself to the examination of hope and fear in their most simple and natural situation, without considering all the variations they may receive from the mixture of different views and reflections. *Terror, consternation, astonishment, anxiety,* and other passions of that kind, are nothing but different species and degrees of fear. 'Tis easy to imagine how a different situation of the object, or a different turn of thought, may change even the sensation of a passion; and this may in general account for all the particular subdivisions of the other affections, as well as of fear. Love may show itself in the shape of *tenderness, friendship, intimacy, esteem, good-will*, and in many other appearances; which at the bottom are the same affections, and arise from the same causes, tho' with a small variation, which it is not necessary to give any particular account of. 'Tis for this reason I have all along confin'd myself to the principal passion" (T2.3.9.31; SBN 447-8).

[122] Baillie argues: "Hume ends his discussion of the indirect passions just at the point at which his original quasi-Newtonian theory of the 'double association of impressions and ideas' is falling apart from the weight of counter-examples, shored up by auxiliary assumptions such as the 'parallel direction of interests' and the contrary effects of sympathy" (2000, p. 72).

5) Hume's accounts of the indirect and the direct passions presuppose different divisions of the passions—one dependent on the similarity of the sensation of a passion, and the other dependent on the force and violence of a passion.

Hume explains the connection between the two accounts of the indirect and the direct passions through the illustration of the origin of the compound passions in two ways, normatively and structurally. On the one hand, the compound passions are the *centaur* passions[123]—a mixture of the indirect and the direct passions not only in their property but also in their function. Although the compound passions are species of love and hatred, being a mixture of love and hatred with other affections, they are distinct from love and hatred in this: love and hatred are motivating *contingently* because of their "original" conjunction with benevolence and anger, whereas the compound passions are *intrinsically* motivating because they contain benevolence and anger among their components.[124] Wherever we feel love or hatred, we are moved to act for the happiness or misery of the person concerned in virtue of the original connection with benevolence or anger, but even where we do *not* initially feel love and hatred, we may be moved in a similar manner by producing a compound passion, according to Hume. When Hume indicates that pity and malice are motivating by including benevolence and anger, which are motivational direct passions, this strategy might be associated with that of Hutcheson, who argues that any affection, except joy and sorrow, becomes motivating by including "desire and aversion", which alone are for him the motivational affections. Yet, Hume's account is far richer and more flexible than Hutcheson's, because, on Hume's account this inclusion of the motivational passion takes place *via* sympathy. For Hume, sympathy has an essential role in rendering a passion motivational, not only by providing "the first foundations" of the compound passions with which other affections are mixed, but also by making them run parallel with benevolence, as we have seen. We can here learn why Hume found it necessary to define the indirect passions non-motivational pure emotions, and why the effects of sympathy need to be *not* directly motivating. The salient feature

[123] Although historically the term "centaur passions" was used to imply violence involved in the animal passion, it may be useful to call these passions "the centaur affections" in order to make clear that for Hume the compound passions are something more than a mere combination of the two kinds of passions, and to show that Hume's account of the compound passions is distinct from the traditional one.

[124] This situation is explained later in Section 3 of Chapter 3.

of Hume's motivational mechanism relevant to the compound passions is the involvement of sympathy, which enables him to adapt the communicated sentiment of another person as the foundation of our motivation. This explains why a social perspective is deeply embedded in the basic structure of Hume's motivational mechanism relevant to the indirect passions.

On the other hand, the connection between the separate accounts of the indirect and the direct passions is ensured by the fact that the compound passions share not only the same principle but also the same division of the passions as the direct passions: and the principle of a parallel direction, and the non-hedonic division of the force and violence of a passion.

2 Benevolence and anger

Pity and malice are indirect passions, whereas benevolence and anger are typical direct passions, being instincts listed among "the calm passions" (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417). But Hume asserts that pity and malice are "the same desires" as benevolence and anger (T2.2.9.3; SBN 382). This assertion leads critics to this fundamental mistake: to treat benevolence and anger as indirect passions, or as compound passions. I remove this fundamental mistake by exploring what is intended by Hume in the above assertion.

Before entering into the account of the origin of pity and malice which depends on benevolence and anger, Hume employs one section for the discusses of benevolence and anger in order to remove this popular and influential view: "love is nothing but the desire of happiness to another person, and hatred that of misery. The desire and aversion constitute the very nature of love and hatred. They are not only inseparable, but the same" (T2.2.6.4; SBN 367).[125] Hume needs to underline that benevolence/anger are different from love/hatred, because his account of the origin of pity and malice hangs entirely on benevolence and anger as *direct passions*, and on their role as a linkage between the effects of sympathy and love/hatred. Benevolence and anger can play this crucial role precisely because they are direct passions. In other words, the indirect passions can never function as the linkage, because they are "pure sensations, without any direction or tendency to action" (T2.2.9.2; SBN 382) and therefore unable to invoke "the

[125] Norton points out: "Hume may allude to Descartes, who supposed that the desire to benefit the object of love is an inseparable feature of love" (2011, p. 848).

principle of a parallel direction". In order to place this important role in the hand of benevolence/anger, Hume needs to emphasize that "benevolence and anger are passions different from love and hatred" and that "these desires are not the same with love and hatred, nor make any essential part of them" (T2.2.6.5-6; SBN 368).

Given Hume's fundamental division between the direct and the indirect passions, benevolence/anger cannot be the same affections as love/hatred: the former are indirect passions whereas the latter are direct ones. But it becomes a commonplace practice to ignore this basic difference as we see below:

David Norton: "Some passions are formed of a mixture of other, simpler passions; these Hume calls the compound passions. His account of them focuses principally on three pairs of contrary passions, benevolence and anger, respect and contempt, pity and malice, as well as on envy, and love between the sexes".[126]

James Fieser: "For the indirect passions, Hume argues that esteem and contempt arise from love and hate (respectively) plus sympathy; benevolence, anger, pity, malice, and envy arise from love or hate plus desire or aversion"[127]

James Baillie: "The indirect passions can be divided into basic and derivative states, the former being pride, humility, love and hatred. …The derivative passions, such as benevolence, pity or malice, result from one of these initial four under certain circumstances"[128]

Terence Penelhum: "His examples [of the compound affections] are benevolence and anger, compassion (or pity), malice, envy, respect, contempt, and sexual love"[129]

What leads commentators to take benevolence and anger as direct passions, or as compound passions is found in Hume's following remark:

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[126] 2002, p. I60.

[127] 1992, p.15. Sympathy cannot be the criterion for the distinction between the two kinds of the compound passions, because all compounds passions are the products of sympathy.

[128] 2000, p. 72.

[129] 2015, p. 220. It is inconsistent for Penelhum to enumerate benevolence as a compound passion while claiming it as a direct passion, because compound passions are the indirect passions according to Hume.

> What wonder, then, that pity and benevolence, malice and anger, being *the same desires* arising from different principles, shou'd so totally mix together as to be undistinguishable? (T2.2.9.4; SBN 382, my emphasis)

Although Hume says that pity and benevolence are the "same desires", he should not be taken to imply that benevolence and pity are the same *affections*. For, Hume's point is that they are the same *desires*—they have the same direction and tendency: "benevolence is a desire of the happiness of the person belov'd" while "pity is a desire of happiness of another" (ibid.). Pity and benevolence are apt to be confounded with each other in our ordinary use, because they have the same tendency and direction by making us concerned with the happiness of another person. It is this situation that Hume highlights when he defines pity and malice as *imitations* of benevolence and anger claiming: "tho' the desire of the happiness or misery of others, according to the love or hatred we bear them, be an arbitrary and original instinct implanted in our nature, we find it may be counterfeited on many occasions, and may arise from secondary principles" (T2.2.7.1; SBN 368-9). It must here be noted that what allows pity and malice to counterfeit or imitate benevolence and anger is the distinction between the "original" and the "secondary passions", and that this distinction of original and secondary is central to Hume's system.[130]

Hume is not arbitrary in defining pity and malice as counterfeited passions of benevolence and anger. For, this notion of imitation is adapted from Mandeville, who claims that pity "counterfeits" the benevolent desire or charitable virtue. Mandeville argues: "This Virtue [=charity] is often counterfeited by a Passion of ours, call'd *Pity* or *Compassion*, which consists in a Fellow-feeling and Condolence for the Misfortunes and Calamities of others".[131] Yet Hume employs the notion of imitation differently from Mandeville in an important respect. When

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[130] Benevolence is for Hume "an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain" (T2.2.9.15; SBN 387). On Hume's account, "original" is something like "innate, or a "contrivance of nature". After having asserted that pride and humility "are determin'd to have self for their *object*, not only by a natural but also by an original property" (T2.1.3.2; SBN 280), he comments, for instance: "That this proceeds from an *original* quality or primary impulse, will likewise appear evident, if we consider that 'tis the distinguishing characteristic of these passions. Unless nature had given some original qualities to the mind, it cou'd never have any secondary ones; because in that case it wou'd have no foundation for action, nor cou'd ever begin to exert itself" (T2.1.3.3; SBN 280).

[131] 1988, p. 287.

Mandeville argues that pity "mocks and resembles Charity"[132] "by assuming the Shape and by borrowing the very Name of it",[133] his point is that pity is not real, but a pseudo or fake virtue, though it resembles charity. In contrast, Hume's assertion that pity and malice are imitations of benevolence and anger has no ethical implications as such, because his point is that pity and malice are secondary affections arising from secondary principles, and that they therefore give us an uneasiness or joy in the suffering and miseries of others even where we have no friendship with them or injury caused by them (T2.2.8.1; SBN 372).[134] This allows Hume to keep himself aloof from the contemporary ethical debate concerning "pity", which took fire after Mandeville's publication of *The Fable of Bees,* and involved several eminent figures of his age, such as Rousseau, Adam Smith, Dr. Samuel Johnson.[135] It is this historical context that justifies Hume saying, "pity is a desire of happiness to another, and aversion to his misery", and that in this respect pity is the same desire as benevolence.[136]

But, how could Hume assert pity as a desire? Hume's assertion of pity as an equivalent *desire* to benevolence is obviously at odds with his fundamental distinction between the direct and the indirect passions, because for Hume pity is an indirect passion whereas desire is a direct one. This seeming inconsistency is solved by seeing that he employs "desire" in the Hutchesonian way. This is an *ad hoc* use, different from his ordinary use, because in the rest of places Hume employs desire or aversion as a hedonic emotion which arises from good or evil "consider'd simply" (T2.3.9.7; SBN 439),[137] and as a primary direct passion which has these two properties:

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[132] 1988, p. 285.
[133] 1988, p. 291.
[134] Hume insists that "*Pity* is a concern for, and *malice* a joy in, the misery of others, without any friendship or enmity to occasion this concern or joy" (T2.2.7.1; SBN 368).
[135] An excellent illustration of this situation is given by Gerald J. Postema (2005), and also Jane McIntyre (2006).
[136] By defining pity as "a desire of happiness of another, and aversion to his misery" derived from the communicated affection of others, Hume makes his position distinct from a rationalistic and self-interested account of pity given by Hobbes and Mandeville, that pity stems from reasoning.
[137] J.P. Day criticizes Hume's notion of "desire" as an emotion: "since a hope is identical with a desire plus a probability-estimate, and neither desire nor probability-estimate are emotions, Hope is not an emotion either" (1995, p. 353). Anthony Kenny also holds that "desire in its most general sense, is not an emotion because it is not sufficiently closely connected with feelings", while holding: "None the less, it has analogies with emotion, and we find the same philosophical positions maintained in its regard as we have seen exhibited in connection with the emotions. On the one hand desire is sometimes thought of as a particular indefinable sensation, which unanalyzable nature can be grasped by each of us only by a mental gaze upon our own experience. On the other hand, it may be regarded as a recognizable pattern of

a direction to seek a relevant pleasure, and a pleasant sensation. It is this hedonic property of desire that makes Hume mention desire and aversion as a set of opposite affections. This use of desire makes an obvious contrast to Hutcheson, who treats desire as "wholly distinct from all sort of Sensation"[138] observing that "We may call both [desire and aversion] *Desires* if we please".[139] Unlike Hume's desire, Hutcheson's desire is hedonically neutral, contains no sensation, pleasant or painful. It is this Hutchesonian use of desire that allows Hume to assimilate pity to benevolence, because for Hume benevolence is, just like Hutcheson's desire, a hedonically neutral "appetite", which can be *both* a pleasure and a pain, as he writes: "benevolence is an original *pleasure* arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a *pain* proceeding from his pain" (T2.2.9.15; SBN 387, my emphasis).[140] In this respect, there is a great analogy between Hume's notion of benevolence and Hutcheson's notion of desire. These two affections are also similar in that they serve as motivational modifiers of a non-motivational passion: on Hume's account, the indirect passions become motivating by including benevolence and anger into their components; on Hutcheson's account, the way passions, except joy and sorrow, become motivating is to contain desire and aversion among their components.[141] These two passions are parallel also in that they have a peculiar place in the taxonomy of the affections: for Hume benevolence is different from many other affections because it produces pleasure or pain rather than proceeding from them; for Hutcheson desire is a sort of master passion which is "obviously different from the other Modifications called Passions". It is not difficult to imagine that this parallelism between Hume's notion of benevolence and Hutcheson's notion of desire could have had a significant influence on Hume's assimilation of pity with benevolence. In any case, Hume's point in this assimilation is that pity has the same direction as benevolence and therefor subject to the principle of a parallel direction.

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behaviour, observed in the lives of men and animals around us, and useful as a basis for prediction of their future actions" (1963, p. 100-101).

[138] 2002, p. 49.

[139] 2002, p. 50-1.

[140] Laird, by characterizing benevolence and anger as "active tendencies" whereas love and hatred as "passive emotions", points out that benevolence and anger are not treated by Hume as emotions: Hume's general view was that "active tendencies were expressions of the emotions and were not the emotions themselves". (1967, p. 199)

[141] 2002, p. 49.

3 Pity and malice as motivational passions

Pity and malice are species of love and hatred, but different from love and hatred in this important respect: pity and malice "contain" benevolence or anger as a necessary constituent of the passion and are therefore "intrinsically" motivating, whereas love and hatred are only "conjoined" with benevolence and anger by "an original quality" and therefore "incidentally" motivating.

Before entering into the examination of Hume's account of the origin of the compound passions, it may be useful to make clear that pity and malice, even though they are species of love and hatred, are different from love and hatred in this important respect: although love and hatred are motivating *incidentally,* pity and malice are *intrinsically* motivating by virtue of the inclusion of benevolence and anger—motivational direct passions—into their components. Although love and hatred *per se* are not motivating, they move us because they are "always followed by, or rather conjoin'd with benevolence and anger", according to Hume. Love and hatred are thus incidentally motivating by virtue of this original *conjunction* with benevolence and anger. By contrast, pity and malice are intrinsically motivating, because they *contain* benevolence or anger among their components as a necessary ingredient composing the passion. This is a salient feature of the compound passions as the *centaur* affections. Before discussing the origin of pity and malice, I shall sketch why and how pity and malice require benevolence and anger for their composition.

It must first be noted that Hume's account of the origin of pity and malice depends on two associative principles, viz. a double relation of impressions and ideas, and a parallel direction of desires, and that the first principle is involved by sympathy whereas the second by benevolence and anger.[142] The production of the passion is therefore a matter of the interaction of these two principles, or of how the effect of the former principle, viz. another's affection communicated by sympathy, could invoke the latter principle. On Hume's account, when I pity a person for his misery, what provides the source or "foundation" of my pity is his pain communicated by

[142] This is discussed in Section 3 of Chapter 2.

sympathy. Hume's chief business is to explain how this communicated pain is connected with love and produces their mixture. The difficulty with this connection is that these two affections are hedonically different from each other: the sympathized affection is painful whereas love is pleasant. Hume solves this difficulty by introducing "the principle of a parallel direction", claiming: "One impression may be related to another, not only when their sensations are resembling… but also when their impulses or directions are similar and correspondent" (T2.2.9.2; SBN 381). Hume's solution is to hold that the communicated affection is connected with love by the similarity of their directions. But, how and when is the principle of a parallel direction invoked by another's affection communicated by sympathy?

Hume answers: the principle of a parallel direction takes place when another's communicated affection "run[s] parallel to benevolence" (T2.2.9.15; SBN 387). That is, when another's affection engages benevolence by running parallel to benevolence, benevolence triggers the principle of a parallel direction. For, benevolence is "an original pleasure arising from the pleasure of the person belov'd, and a pain proceeding from his pain", from this "correspondence of impressions there arises a subsequent desire of his pleasure, and aversion to his pain" (ibid.) according to him. The principle of a parallel direction is engaged whenever another's communicated affection, whether pleasant or painful, runs parallel to benevolence, because this correspondence of impressions produces "subsequent desire" regarding that person. The question then is, how does the sympathised passion run parallel to benevolence? "In order…to make a passion run parallel with benevolence", he answers, "'tis requisite we shou'd feel these double impressions, correspondent to those of the person, whom we consider; nor is any one of them alone sufficient for that purpose" (ibid.). Hume's point is that the sympathized passion runs parallel to benevolence only when sympathy is so "compleat" and "forceful" as to make us feel these "double impressions": another's affection and his concern of his own future pleasure and pain. It is "the force of the impression [of the first sympathy that] generally produces pity and benevolence" by rendering the sympathy "compleat", because "[u]pon its acquiring greater force, we become so interested in the concerns of the person, as to be sensible of both of his good and bad fortune" (T2.2.9.18; SBN 388). Hence, "from that compleat sympathy there arises pity and

benevolence" (ibid.), according to Hume. When sympathy is "strong" and "extensive", it invokes benevolence and the principle of a parallel direction, whereas when "weak" and "limited", it cannot engage benevolence, and ends up producing anger and hatred by their hedonic resemblance. We may here learn that benevolence is an essential component of pity, not merely conjoined with the passion as in the case of love, and renders pity intrinsically motivating.

4 The origin of pity and malice

The significant of Hume's account of the origin of pity and malice lies particularly in that Hume explains how the two principles of association, viz. the double relation of impressions and ideas, and the principle of a parallel direction, cooperate together in producing the passion through sympathy.

Pity and malice arise from a mixture of love and hatred with other affections through these two processes: the affections of others communicated by sympathy or by comparison provide "the first foundation" of pity or malice, and this first foundation is conjoined with love and hatred via the mediation of benevolence or anger. Pity or malice is produced only when the first process is successfully followed by the second. Since the first process depends on a double relation of impressions and ideas, whereas the second on a parallel direction of desires, Hume's chief business in accounting for the origin of pity and malice is to explain how the former principle relevant to the indirect passions involves the latter principle relevant to the direct passions. For Hume, pity and malice are products of the interaction of the double-relation principle and the principle of a parallel direction. Let us examine how pity arises from a mixture of love with other affections.

Hume explicitly indicates that what provides "the first foundation of pity" (T2.2.9.1; SBN 381) is sympathy. The first foundation of pity is provided by sympathy in the sense that what supplies the ingredients to compose my pity is another's passion communicated by sympathy. On Hume's mechanical account, when I feel pity on seeing a person grieving over his failure, for instance, my pity is derived from his grief communicated by sympathy, in the sense the ingredients to constitute my pity are derived from the components of his communicated grief. For,

Hume's hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas is nothing but the supposition that in order for a passion to arise, there must be the source of the ingredients to compose the passion, viz. a pleasant or a painful sensation, and the idea of the self or of another's self. Anything pleasant or painful, and related to ourselves or some other person, produces a passion by the double relation of impressions and ideas established between the object and the passion: both of which have a pleasant or a painful sensation, and the idea of the self or of another's self. On this view, the production of a passion is nothing but the result of the conversion of the former set of components into the latter. Hence Hume observes that it is "'easy to explain the passion of *pity*, from the precedent reasoning concerning *sympathy*" (T2.2.7.2; SBN 369).

But pity is a mixture of love with other affections. Hume's difficulty is how another's communicated grief as the foundation of pity is connected with love, despite their hedonic difference: his communicated grief is painful whereas love is pleasant.[143] Hume solves this difficulty by calling our attention that "'tis not the present sensation alone or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the character of any passion, but the whole bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the end" (T2.2.9.2; SBN 381). A new principle of association is here introduced: "One impression may be related to another, not only when their impulse or directions are similar and correspondent" (ibid.). This principle is relevant not to the indirect passions, because it is only the direct passions that have any direction or tendency to action. We here learn that the production of pity depends on two different principles or "causes, from which a transition of passion may arise": a double relation of impressions and ideas, and "a conformity in the tendency and direction of any tow desires" (T2.2.9.12; SBN 385). Now, Hume's question is, when and how can the effect of sympathy invoke the principle of a parallel direction in order to be conjoined with love?

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[143] I may feel pity for a street kid who is delighted to find a coin in the street. I am grateful to Don Baxter for his indication that I feel pity and uneasiness even though the communicated affection is not a pain but pleasure. This case is not ad hoc to Hume, as his account of pity covers even such complex situations as require "the extended" notion of sympathy which makes us concerned with the real good or bad of the person concerned. As Herdt plausibly points out, Hume's notion of extensive sympathy in Book 2 allows us to make sense of such a complex situation in which we saw a man give a delicious but deadly poison to a child, though in his discussion of the natural virtue, "Hume highlights the simpler situations in which virtuous characters contribute to present sense of well-being and vicious characters to present misery" (1997, pp. 50, 244)


The principle of a parallel direction is triggered when the sympathized affections "run parallel with benevolence" (T2.2.9.15; SBN 387), according to Hume. And the way to make the effect of sympathy run parallel with benevolence is to "feel these double impressions, correspondent to those of the person, whom we consider; nor is any one of them alone sufficient for that purpose" (ibid.), as we have seen. The sympathized pain, when strong, renders the sympathy so "extended" as to make us feel "the double impression", viz. not only his uneasiness but also his desire of his own happiness and aversion to his own misery (T2.2.9.15; SBN 387). The communicated impression needs to be strong and forceful in order to make us "so interested in the concerns of the person, as to be sensible both of his good and bad fortune" (T2.2.9.18; SBN 388). All this depends on the force and strength of the first sympathy, because "[i]f I diminish the vivacity of the first conception, I diminish that of the related ideas; as pipes can convey no more water than what arises at the fountain" (T2.2.9.14; SBN 386). Sympathy is "extensive" when the impression communicated by the first sympathy is forceful enough to invoke the principle of a parallel direction: sympathy is "limited" when the impression is too weak to involve the principle of a parallel direction, and invites instead the double association of impressions and ideas (T2.2.9.15; SBN 387). And once benevolence is thus invoked, benevolence is connected with love by virtue of "a natural and original quality" established between love and benevolence (T2.2.9.3; SBN 382) as we noted above. Benevolence here plays the role of mediation between the communicated pain and love, producing a chain of the passions: the communicated pain + benevolence + love.

To summarize, pity arises from the following five processes:

1) The "first sympathy": the communicated affection of a person provides the first foundation of pity.
2) The "second sympathy": another person's affection communicated by the first sympathy invokes a "double sympathy", and makes us interested in his concern both with his bad and good fortune.
3) Benevolence is invoked when the second sympathy leads the sympathized affection to run parallel to benevolence, and thereby summons up the principle of a parallel direction.

4) Benevolence, once awakened, invokes love by the original connection established between benevolence/anger and love/hatred, and bridges between the sympathized affection and love.
5) Benevolence invokes pity by a parallel direction of desires, as pity is the desire for the happiness of another person, and aversion to his misery, and therefore is "the same desire" as benevolence.

This productive mechanism of pity can be illustrated in the following diagram.


The origin of pity
(1)
sympathy with the pain of my friend
a double relation of impressions and ideas
the force of the impression
(2)
sympathy
with his concern and interest
(their desire) - the double sympathy
a parallel direction
(3)
benevolence
(a desire of his happiness,
and aversion to his misery)
original
connection
(4)
love
a parallel direction
(5)
pity
(a desire of happiness to another,
and aversion to his misery)

When the two principles of the double association and a parallel desire cooperate with each other, there arises this remarkable effect, viz. the production of the motivational indirect passions. We may call them the *centaur* passions—affections of a mixed nature of the indirect and the direct passions—because they are unique and peculiar in Hume's system, in which a passion is either indirect or direct but can never be both. Like the indirect passions of love and hatred, the compound passions arise from the idea of the pleasurable or painful property of another person, rather than from the prospect of our own pleasure or pain; like the direct passions of benevolence and anger, they are desire-oriented, and make us desire the happiness of the person beloved and avoid his misery, or desire the misery of the person hated and avoid his happiness. Although the compound passions imitate the effects of love and hatred, being person-directed, and basically person-evaluative passions, this assessment of another person as good or bad has no ethical implication that the person is morally good or bad. This peculiarity of the centaur passions originates from the fact that the production of the passion, despite being another person-directed, does not presuppose any intimate relation between ourselves and that person: the person who is the object of our pity or malice could be a perfect "stranger", and no "friendship or enmity" is required to occasion our painful or pleasurable sensation (T2.2.7.1; SBN 369). Although this thin relation may be too weak to trigger the double-relation mechanism to produce love or hatred, it still plays a similar role by triggering sympathy by virtue of "a great resemblance among all human creatures", and thereby invokes benevolence or anger by means of the principle of a parallel direction.

From this it follows that even where we do *not* initially feel love or hatred, or any friendship or enmity, we may be motivated when sympathy operates, because sympathy triggers this original tie between love and benevolence, and thereby produces pity and malice (T2.2.7.1; SBN 369). This does not imply, however, that the sympathized pains or pleasures are directly motivating. On the contrary: the effect of sympathy is for Hume not directly motivating. Although Hume's notion of sympathy is often criticized for the lack of "practical concern",[144] such criticism is unfounded,

[144] Philip Mercer, 1972, p. 21. Mercer complains that "Hume sees sympathy as a kind of emotional infection and that in consequence of this he fails to leave room for the practical concern for the other which…was...an essential part of the meaning of 'sympathy' understood in its strongest sense".

not only because the effects of Hume's sympathy can eventually move us by producing the compound passion, but also because sympathy can play an important role in the production of the compound passions precisely because the effect of sympathy is not directly motivating as we have seen. Hume's system is so flexible as to allow a sympathy with one and the same pain or pleasure to produce different effects according to the different circumstances and conditions in which the sympathy takes place: a strong painful impression, when communicated, gives rise to benevolence and love, whereas a weak painful impression gives rise to anger and hatred. What greatly contributes to the flexibility and comprehensiveness of Hume's system of the passions is the fact that person-directed passions can move us only through the complicated and sophisticated process which involves an extended sympathy.

Another factor which contributes to the flexibility of Hume's sympathy is that, although it is generally the case that strong sympathy produces pity and love whereas weak sympathy produces malice and hatred, the force and strength of sympathy is not merely a matter of the actual perception of the person's affections: "general rules" have a considerable influence on sympathy, by making us conceive a lively idea of the passion, or even feel the passion itself as if the person were really actuated by it when they are not (T2.2.7.5; SBN 371). This is why "the communicated passion of sympathy sometimes acquires strength from the weakness of its original, and even arises by a transition from affections, which have no existence" (T2.2.7.5; SBN 370). In his example of an infant prince, who is a captive in the hands of his enemies, Hume insists that our concern and sense of his misfortune becomes greater by his insensibility with his own misery, because we generalize from experience what we would feel in the same situation.[145] It is also by the same principle, he says, that we blush for those who behave themselves foolishly before us even where they show no sense of shame, nor seem in the least conscious of their folly. All these examples of general rules should be taken to strengthen his foregoing argument that pity is derived from sympathy, because they all owe the passion to sympathy, which makes us enter into a person's suffering with so vivid a conception as to make it our own concern, and thereby become sensible of his pains and pleasures, whether he actually feels them or not.

[145] This is discussed in Section 7 of Chapter 1.

Let's turn to malice, which is an imitation of the effects of hatred derived from the secondary principle, just as pity is an imitation of the effects of love. For Hume, malice is "a joy in the sufferings and miseries of others" (T2.2.8.1; SBN 372), and a desire of the misery of another, and aversion to his happiness (T2.2.9.3; SBN 382). The only circumstance in which the origin of malice differs from the origin of pity is that in the former case, the sensation we receive from another is "reversed" (T2.2.8.9; SBN 376), and makes us feel a contrary sensation from that of another, according to Hume.[146] This reversion happens, because our sentiments and opinions are so little governed by reason and make us judge always more of objects by comparison than from their intrinsic worth and value, according to Hume. As such, we make an estimate of our own condition and feel a consequent pain or pleasure according as we observe a greater or less share of happiness or misery in others (T2.2.8.8; SBN 375).[147] The misery or happiness of another produces delight or uneasiness because it gives us a more lively idea of our happiness or misery through the contrast of the latter with the former (ibid.). Where my observation of another person grieving over his failure makes me feel joy, which is the sensation contrary to the original affection, malice arises from a mixture of this pleasurable sensation with hatred by the same procedure by which pity arises from a mixture of the communicated affection with love. The same reasoning is applicable both to malice and envy, according to Hume.[148]

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[146] When Hume maintains that "[t]he direct survey of another's pleasure naturally gives us pleasure, and therefore produces pain when compar'd with our own" (T2.2.8.9; SBN 376), we should not take sympathy and comparison to be different principles related in a mutual exclusion. For, sympathy and comparison often operate together as we see in his account of the origin of respect and contempt. Baier is plausible to argue that "'comparison' is seen to presuppose our capacity for sympathy" (1994, p. 150), because comparison presupposes the same propensity of human nature as sympathy, viz. the propensity to receive by communication the inclinations and sentiments of others. Baillie is tenable to insist: "Hume's account suggests that the principle of comparison does not operate *instead of* sympathy, but *after* it, diverting or overruling it. In order to suffer through seeing oneself in comparison to someone else, one has to enter into their self-esteem, and compare it to one's own, in a way that requires sympathy. The idea seems to be that we actually become aware of someone's inner state through sympathy, which results, via the intervention of comparison, in these negative derivative passions" (2000, p. 67).

[147] According to Hume, this principle is derived from an "*original* quality" of the mind, "similar to what we have every day experience of in our bodies", such as an experience of feeling the same water at the same time both hot and cold when we have previously heated one hand and cooled the other (T2.2.8.2; SBN 372). He gives a detailed explanation of this situation, and concludes to this effect: the principle that "objects appear greater or less by a comparison with others" is derived from this general maxim that "[e]very object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it; a great object with a great emotion, a small object with a small emotion" (T2.2.8.6; SBN 374).

[148] The only difference between envy and malice lies in that, according to Hume, "envy is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own: Whereas malice is the

5 The origin of respect and contempt

Hume's account of the origin of respect and contempt in terms of a mixture of love with humility, and hatred with pride, respectively, is important particularly in these two respects. First, he shows how sympathy and comparison interact with each other in producing the mixture of passions. Secondly, this account serves as a prelude to his subsequent account of the direct passions by introducing the non-hedonic division dependent on the force and violence of a passion.

In the preceding sections, we have seen that the motivational mechanism of the indirect passions depends entirely on this "original" tie between love/hatred and benevolence/anger: love and hatred are "always followed by, or rather conjoin'd with benevolence and anger" (T2.2.6.3; SBN 367). How then could pride and humility move us without the original tie with desires, given that pride and humility are "pure emotions in the soul, unattended with any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action" (ibid.)? Hume answers this question in his account of the origin of respect and contempt to this effect: pride and humility move us by being mixed with love and hatred, and thereby producing the compound passions of contempt and respect.

Hume begins by making clear that he is adapting the same strategy which he employed for the analysis of pity and malice, and explaining the genesis of respect and contempt in terms of a mixture of love with humility, and a mixture of hatred with pride, respectively (T2.2.10.3; SBN 390). However, this strategy involves this serious difficulty in explaining the connection of the affections: Hume's two principles of association, viz. the double relation of impressions and ideas, the principle of a parallel direction, are both useless for the connection of love with humility, or for the connection of hatred with pride. For, love and humility, or hatred and pride are different form each other not only in their sensation but also in their object: pride and love are agreeable

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unprovok'd desire of producing evil to another in order to reap a pleasure from the comparison" (T2.2.8.12; SBN 377). He assumes that the same explanation is applicable to the origin of envy and malice, as they are both the effects of comparison (T2.2.8.7; SBN 375). Baillie argues that the difference between "envy" and "malice" is that "envy concerns events which have already occurred, whereas malice is future-directed and connected with action. Envy consists in a negative state of wishing for what someone else has, or resenting him for having it, whereas malice is actively wishing for some misfortune to befall him on that account. In both cases, these negative passions arise from the 'pain' of humility caused by comparing oneself to someone else and not liking what one sees"(2000, p. 68).

whereas hatred and humility disagreeable; the object of pride and humility is ourselves whereas the object of love and hatred is some other person. Hume finds a clue to their connection in the fact that, when we consider the qualities and circumstances of others, different passions arise alternately as we change our point of view regarding them: we may view them as they really are in themselves, make a comparison of them with our own qualities and circumstances, or join these two methods of consideration (T2.2.10.2; SBN 389-90). In contemplating the good quality of a person, we feel love from the first point of view, humility from the second, and respect from the third (T2.2.10.2; SBN 390). When the quality is undesirable, we feel hatred, pride, and respect, according as we change our point of view. We here learn that Hume's strategy is to explain the origin of respect and contempt in terms of the circumstance in which we view the qualities of others from the third point of view—the circumstance in which the considerations from the first and the second points of view join together. His chief task is therefore to answer these questions: why the different passions arise according to the change of the point of view even though the object remains the same, and how these two considerations which arise from different point of view join together.

Hume answers: the different passions arise from different points of view because we observe "the proportion" (T2.2.10.3; SBN 390). "The same man may cause either respect, love, or contempt by his condition and talents, according as the person, who considers him, from his inferior becomes his equal or superior" (ibid.), because the cause of these passions is the *proportion* that we observe regarding the quality of ourselves as contrasted with the very quality of the man. "These passions, therefore, arise from our observing the proportion; that is, from a comparison" (ibid.), according to Hume. But, how do we observe the proportion? Since our observing the proportion is nothing but our observing the contrast between the two ideas produced from the two different points of view, the idea of this proportion must be derived from the relation between the two considerations produced from the different points of view. The question therefore is, how are these two considerations connected to be compared with each other?

In order to answer this question, we need to see that the different principles operate when we

view an object from different points of view. The direct survey of the good quality of others excites love, because sympathy operates and communicates the satisfaction they enjoy: this satisfaction serves as the ingredient to compose love, which is a pleasant emotion. In contrast, the second point of view, viz. comparison, excites humility, because the observation of the proportion of our own quality through the contrast with the good quality of others produces a painful sensation in our mind, which is "contrary" to the satisfaction they take in their own quality: this painful sensation serves as the ingredient to compose humility, which is unpleasant emotion. The third point of view gives rise to respect, by allowing the interaction between sympathy and comparison and thereby causing the mixture of love and humility which are the products of sympathy and comparison. Hume argues that "this mixture arises from *a tacit comparison* of the person contemned or respected with ourselves" (ibid. my emphasis)— that is, the first point of view is still *alive* even when it is taken over by the second point of view.[149] The "mixture arises from a tacit comparison" insofar as love [the product of sympathy] remains to mix with humility [the product of comparison] thereby enabling sympathy to interact with comparison. To put it the other way round, the production of respect is a proof of the interaction between sympathy and comparison, operating together, rather than excluding each other—not in a manner of seeing a duck-rabbit figure in which we see either a duck or a rabbit, but never both at once. But, how does sympathy allow "a tacit comparison"?

Although Hume does not answer this question directly, he indicates that this interaction between sympathy and comparison is invited by the connections of passions, because of this different properties of the imagination and affections: "The imagination is extreme quick and agile; but the passions are slow and restive" (T2.3.9.12; SBN 441). This situation is illustrated in his later account of the origin of hope and fear in terms of the mixture of affections to this effect: the passions resemble a string-instrument, "where after each stroke the vibrations still retain some sound, which gradually and insensibly decays", whereas the imagination is more like a

[149] "Upon the whole, contrary passions succeed each other alternately, when they arise from different objects: They mutually destroy each other, when they proceed from different parts of the same; And they subside both of them, and mingle together, when they are deriv'd from the contrary and incompatible chances or possibilities, on which any one object depends" (T2.3.9.17; SBN 443). It is in the third case that respect and contempt arise from a mixture of the passions.


wind-instrument "which in running over all the notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases" (T2.3.9.12; SBN 440-1).[150] It naturally happens that, while the imagination changes the point of view regarding an object with great celerity, an affection produced from the first point of view decays away only by degrees allowing the affection produced from the second point of view to intermingle with each other (T2.3.9.16; SBN 442-3). This situation is adequately applied to the circumstance in which respect arises from a mixture of love and humility produced from the first and the second points of view regarding the good quality of others. When I change my point of view from the first to the second, the idea relevant to the first point of view changes quickly to the one relevant to the second point of view following the imagination, while an affection produced from the first point of view decays away only by degrees causing a mixture with the new affection produced from the second point of view. On this view, the first point of view is still alive while it is taken over by the second point of view –here operates "a tacit comparison". Here we may well suppose that this mixture of affections prompts the connection of the two ideas produced from the different points of view, because, when two passions are both present in the mind, "they readily mingle and unite, tho' they have but one relation, and sometimes without any" (T2.3.4.2; SBN 420).

Hume's worry is that this method of reasoning involves this difficulty: if the contemplation of the good quality of others produces respect from a mixture of affections, why does this mixture take place in some cases, but not always? (T2.2.10.8; SBN 392) The grandeur of a person, for instance, may cause a mixture of love with humility, and produce respect, but good-nature seldom produces respect, only love (T2.2.10.5; SBN 391).[151] Why does "any object ever excite pure love or hatred, and does not always produces respect or contempt, by a mixture of humility or pride" (T2.2.10.8; SBN 392)? The good-nature of a person does not produce the mixture of love and

[150] "'Tis impossible by one steady view to survey the opposite chances, and the events dependent on them; but 'tis necessary, that the imagination shou'd run alternately from the one to the other. Each view of the imagination produces its peculiar passion, which decays away by degrees, and is follow'd by a sensible vibration after the stroke. The incompatibility of the views keeps the passions from shocking in a direct line, if that expression may be allow'd; and yet their relation is sufficient to mingle their fainter emotions. 'Tis after this manner that hope and fear arise from the different mixture of these opposite passions of grief and joy, and from their imperfect union and conjunction" (T2.3.9.16; SBN 442-3).

[151] These good qualities, good-nature, good-humour, facility, generosity, beauty, are apt to produce "pure love" without involving this mixture (T2.2.10.8; SBN 392).

humility, Hume reasons, because when we compare the good-nature of the person with our own quality, we scarcely feel humility. Why then does the good-nature of a person have a less tendency to produce humility by comparison? It is because it has a less tendency to produce pride when we have that quality for ourselves. Hume argues: "No quality in another gives rise to humility by comparison, unless it wou'd have produc'd pride by being plac'd in ourselves; and *vice versa* no object excites pride by comparison, unless it wou'd have produc'd humility by the direct survey" (T2.2.10.8; SBN 392). It is evident, he observes, that the good qualities of a person make us feel humiliated only when we would feel proud of it when they belong to us, and vice versa. The following diagram may be useful to make this situation clear.



(1) is the relation established between love and pride, which have similar sensations.

(2) is the relation established between pride and humility, which have identical ideas, viz. the idea of the self.

Hume's task in accounting for the origin of respect in terms of the mixture of love and humility is to explain how the diagonal relation could be established between love and humility, which are different not only in their sensations but also in their ideas. Now, when Hume argues that, unless the good-nature of a person causes pride [when it belongs to us] and therefore humility [when it belongs to others], this quality does not produce respect, we can take him to imply that love cannot reach humility by taking the direct route of (3): it needs to take a circuitous route via pride, passing along (1) and (2) in order to join humility. The relation of (3) thus presupposes the relay relation both of (1) and (2): love – pride – humility.[152] The same situation is found in the

[152] Jacqueline Taylor gives an illuminating analysis of this situation from the viewpoint of "social power"

production of the opposite passion, viz. contempt: the relation between pride with hatred presupposes the relay connection between hatred and humility, and between humility and pride.[153] This explains why good-nature of a person has less tendency to produce respect: in order to reach humility, love needs to take a circuitous way by passing along (1) and (2), but this circuitous is not prepared for good-nature because this quality has a less tendency to produce pride when we compare it with our own quality.

Hume's difficulty, "why any objects ever cause pure love or hatred, and produce not always the mixt passions of respect and contempt" (T2.2.10.5; SBN 391), is thus solved by the fact that the connection between love and humility cannot be direct but oblique, only *via* pride, depending on the relay connections between love and pride, and between pride and humility. Though pride is not a component of respect, it functions as the mediation between the two remote passions, viz. love and humility, by virtue of the resemblance of its sensation with love on the one hand, and by virtue of the identity of its object with humility on the other. We may here learn that, although respect is a species of love, it is something more than a mere evaluation of another's quality: it includes both the negative and positive evaluation of our own quality, insofar as it contains not only humility, but also a *shadow* pride, which is not the actual ingredient of the passion. This circumstance is derived from the fact that respect is the product of the interaction of sympathy and comparison: humility is the result of comparison whereas pride is the result of sympathy. The same situation is applicable to contempt.

The good nature of a person excites pure love, but not respect, because this quality would not produce pride [when it belongs to ourselves] and therefore cannot produce humility [when it belongs to others] to compose respect, as we have seen. But, why do some qualities of a person have such a peculiar aptitude to produce love in others, but not so great a tendency to excite pride in ourselves? Hume solves this puzzle by claiming that some passions are "enfeebling" by their nature, and therefore produce more love [when it belongs to others], but less pride [when it belongs to ourselves]. From this, it follows that, although "tho' the same object always produces

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in (2015, p. 71-83).

[153] In other words, only those qualities which make us *envy* others produce respect by triggering the principle of comparison, because envy is a negative passion based on humility, which "is excited by some present enjoyment of another, which by comparison diminishes our idea of our own" (T2.2.8.12; SBN 377).

love and pride, humility and hatred, according to its different situations, yet it seldom produces either the two former or the two latter passions in the same proportion" (T2.2.10.7; SBN 392). Hume here introduces a new non-hedonic division of the passions between the enfeebling and the invigorating passions:

> Nothing invigorates and exalts the mind equally with pride and vanity; tho' at the same time love or tenderness is rather found to weaken and enfeeble it. The same difference is observable betwixt the uneasy passions. Anger and hatred bestow a new force on all our thoughts and actions; while humility and shame deject and discourage us. (T2.2.10.6; SBN 391)

A new criterion for distinguishing the passions is here introduced in terms of the force and violence of a passion, and a new non-hedonic connection is asserted between pride and hatred, and between humility and love. This connection makes an obvious contrast with his former hedonic connection between pride and love, and between humility and hatred, on which his foregoing account was entirely founded. By appealing to the new division, Hume explains why some good qualities of a person, e.g. genius, produce a great degree of pride, while producing only a small degree of love, in terms of the double relation of impressions and forcefulness. Genius causes a great degree of pride [when it belongs to ourselves], because genius is a "*pleasant* and *magnificent*" passion, and therefore connected with pride, which is pleasant and invigorating, by *a double relation* of impressions and forcefulness (T2.2.10.7; SBN 391). But genius produces only a small degree of love [when it belongs to others], because genius is related to love only by *one relation*, viz. a pleasant sensation, because love is pleasant but not invigorating (T2.2.10.7; SBN 392). Or, ignorance produces a great degree of humility [when it belongs to ourselves], but only a small degree of hatred [when it belongs to others]. For, ignorance is a "*disagreeable* and *mean*" passion, and therefore related to humility, which is unpleasant and enfeebling, by a double relation of impressions and enfeebling-properties, but it is related to hatred only by the relation of unpleasant sensations alone (ibid.). But what could the

bearing of this new division in Hume's system?

This non-hedonic division of the passions has a crucial role in structuring Hume's system. For, it contributes to the reinforcement of the situation of the mind constituted by the four affections "plac'd, as it were, in a square" (T2.2.2.3; SBN 333): pride is connected with humility, love with hatred, by the identity of their objects; pride with love, humility with hatred, by the identity of their sensations or impressions. For, the new non-hedonic division attributes to this square constituted by the double-fold relations of impressions and ideas a *diagonal* connection between pride and hatred, and between humility and love. These diagonal relations increases the stability of this situation of the mind as the foundation of Hume's system by providing a new dimension which does not depend on the hedonic connection of the passions.

In Hume's account of the indirect passions, our emotional experience is explained in terms of *given* properties of an individual passion, either agreeable or disagreeable, directed to ourselves or to others. When I am affected by pride or love, I am emotionally and physiologically determined to enjoy a pleasing view of the qualities and circumstances of myself or of others, while when I feel humility or hatred, I am determined to experience the contrary sensation and view. This hedonic division of the passions has enabled Hume to establish the foundation of his system in terms of a double relation of impressions and ideas, because this double-relation hypothesis functions as a stable and reliable mechanism of the production of a passion insofar as it depends on the original and fixed properties of a passion. But this hypothesis is irrelevant to the direct passions, because unlike the indirect passions, the direct passions have no original object, such as the self or the other self, assigned by a natural and primary instinct. What governs the direct passions is therefore not the double-relation of impressions and ideas, but "a close union of the imagination and affections" which has a direct influence on "the force and violence" of a passion. This is why Hume's account of the direct passions and the determination of will requires a division dependent on the force and violence of a passion. By introducing this new division in his account of respect and contempt, Hume anticipates the motivational mechanism relevant to the direct passions.

6 The origin of "the amorous passion, or love betwixt the sexes"

Hume's aim in his discussion of "the amorous passion" is to show that "the love betwixt the sexes" is an indirect passion, distinct from lust, derived from a double relation of impressions and ideas. By thus accommodating the amorous passion among the moral subjects, he provides the basis of Book III's discussion of sexual virtues and vices.

We might expect that "the love betwixt sexes" is a direct passion, insofar as it is very much like kindness to children, lust, or other bodily appetite. But the amorous passion is for Hume an evaluative compound passion, and therefore should be accommodated properly among the moral subjects of Book III. Hume's account of the amorous love is meant to be the final confirmation of his account of the indirect passions, and to provide "a sensible proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas" (T2.2.11.5; SBN 396).

The amorous passion is a mixture of these three affections: the pleasing sensation arising from beauty, the bodily appetite for generation, and a generous kindness or good-will. In illustrating the origin of this passion in terms of the mixture of these three different affections, Hume begins by holding that the first foundation of the amorous passion is provided by the sense of beauty, which is derived from sympathy. This is exactly the same method of reasoning as is employed for other compound passions insofar as the first foundation of the passions is provided by sympathy. On the one hand, the sense of beauty as the first foundation is easily connected with love or kindness not only by the resemblance of their sensation but also by the identity of their object. On the other hand, the sense of beauty, when thus conjoined with love and kindness, is connected with benevolence by virtue of the original connection between love and benevolence. Here three passions are connected together by a double relation of impressions and ideas into this "chain of passions": the sense of beauty + love + benevolence. Hume's only difficulty is to explain how the bodily appetite is connected with the sense of beauty.

Hume solves this difficulty by appealing to these two principles, viz. a double relation of impressions and ideas, and a parallel direction of desires. Since the appetite of generation, when confined to a certain degree, is a pleasant sensation, it is connected with the sense of beauty by virtue of the similarity both of their sensations and their ideas, that is, by a double relation of

impressions and ideas. The appetite of generation is connected with the sense of beauty also by the principle of a parallel direction, because any "principal" desire is attended with "subordinate" ones, which are related to it by a parallel direction, according to Hume. For example, hunger is "the primary inclination of the soul" whereas the desire of approaching the meat is the "secondary" one, a means to satisfy that appetite (T2.2.11.3; SBN 394-5). And if any other desire is parallel to the secondary ones, it is related to the principal one by means of its connection with them. Now in the case of the amorous passion, since the desire of generation is the "principal" desire whereas the desire for beauty is a "secondary" one, any object which inclines us to approach the beauty by any separate qualities naturally increases our desire for generation by the parallel direction established between these two desires: just as an object which inclines us to approach meat naturally increases our principal appetite, viz. hunger. This is how the sense of beauty is connected with the bodily appetite in two ways, and thereby functions as a linkage between the bodily appetite and love or kindness, and thereby produces their mixture.

The production of the amorous passion from the mixture of these affections provides "a sensible proof of the double relation of impressions and ideas" (T2.2.11.5; SBN 396). For, we can here see clearly that the double-relation mechanism established between the bodily appetite and the amorous love needs the trigger of "some new impulse", which arises from "the *beauty* of the *person*",[154] because the appetite for generation loses its force unless it is not "quicken'd by some impulse", viz. beauty (T2.2.11.6; SBN 396). This section merits more scholarly attention, because it is this account of the passion that provides the basis of Book III's discussion of sexual virtues and vices.

[154] As we have seen, "the sense of beauty" is for Hume the product of sympathy: "Most kinds of beauty are deriv'd from this origin; and tho' our first object be some senseless inanimate piece of matter, 'tis seldom we rest there, and carry not our view to its influence on sensible and rational creatures" (T2.2.6.16; SBN 363).

Chapter 4: The will and the instinctive-direct passions

I argue that Hume's treatment of the will is divided into three parts, in which he discusses three different but related subjects: "all actions of the will have particular causes" at T2.3.1-2, "what these causes are" at T2.3.3, and "how they operate" at T2.3.4-8 (T2.3.2.8; SBN 412). I also argue that Hume illustrates the different determinations of the will from two different perspectives, ethical and non-ethical, and discusses them separately. The first aspect of the will is discussed at T2.3.3 in terms of "the combat of the calm and the violent passions". The second aspect is discussed at T2.3.4-8 in terms of "the causes of the violent passions". The former account is brief because it is the ethical subject to be discussed in Book III, whereas the latter in detail because it is Hume's innovative treatment of the will.

The whole arrangement and exposition of Hume's discussion of "Of the will and direct passions" in Part 3 of Book II might be found puzzling for the following three reasons. In the first place, against his opening remark that "we come now to explain the direct passions", Hume directly enters upon the subject of the will, which is not, "properly speaking…comprehended among the passions" (T2.3.1.2; SBN 399). In the second place, the first two sections "Of liberty and necessity" seem like a "lengthy digression", because they are "mainly epistemological in character and therefore…ought properly to have followed immediately after the discussion of the ideas of necessary connection in Book I", as Kemp Smith points out.[155] In the third place, it is difficult to understand Hume's aim at T2.3.4-8 in which he gives a detailed illustration of "those circumstances and situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent", because it seems like a mixed bag constituted of unrelated subjects,[156] viz. the association of the passions, the effects of custom, the influence of the imagination on the passions, contiguity in space and time.

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[155] Kemp Smith famously complains: "The arrangement of Book II is yet further complicated by Hume's lengthy digression, in Part iii, on the subject of free-will and necessity, which, as he there treats it, is mainly epistemological in character and therefore, as he came to recognize in preparing the *Enquiries*, ought properly to have followed immediately upon the discussion of the idea of necessary connexion in Book I" (2005, p. 161).

[156] Laird observes that "the remainder of Hume's examination of the passions [=T2.3.4-10] was rather desultory" (1967, p. 205).

These puzzles are solved by Hume's remark delivered at the end of his discussion of "liberty and necessity": "Upon a review of these reasonings, I cannot doubt of an entire victory; and therefore, having proved that all actions of the will have particular causes, I proceed to explain what these causes are, and how they operate" (T2.3.2.8; SBN 412). This remark makes clear that the first two sections are employed to prove that "all actions of the will have particular causes" while the rest are employed to show "what these causes are", and "how they operate". We then have reason to assume that Hume's object at T2.3.1-2 is to provide the foundation of his mechanical account of the will through the demonstration of the necessity of the actions of the mind. On this foundation, he explains at T2.3.3 what the causes of our voluntary actions are in terms of these two causes: "the combat of the calm and the violent passions", and the force and "impulse of passion". And lastly at T2.3.4-8, he examines the second cause through the illustration of "the causes of the violent passions" in terms of the "circumstances and situations of objects, which renders a passion either calm or violent". I shall discuss Hume's account of the origin of the direct passions delivered at T2.3.9-10 separately in the next chapter, because it is intended for the different purpose from the preceding eight sections. This understanding of Hume's project in his last part, "Of the will and direct passions", sheds light on the controversy regarding his treatment of the will and direct passions, as we shall see below.

1 "All actions of the will have particular causes"

I argue that T2.3.1-2 in which Hume discusses free-will and necessity should be taken not as a "lengthy digression", but as an essential part of his account of the will. For, his object in these two sections is to prove the analogy between the actions of the mind and the actions of matter, and thereby provide the foundation of his subsequent account of the influencing motives of the will in terms of the "cement between natural and moral evidence".

There are three issues that Hume needs to establish in order to pursue his first task, and to prove that "all actions of the mind have a particular cause". First, the cause of all voluntary actions are motives: secondly, it is nothing but the observation of the constant union between motives and actions, and its consequent inference from actions to motives, that makes us form the

idea of the necessity of action, whether of matter or of the mind: thirdly, natural and voluntary evidence form one connected chain of argument between them. Regarding the first issue that the cause of all voluntary actions are motives, Hume insists that no one, even a libertarian, would disagree that motives are the causes of human actions. The point of dispute hangs therefore only on "the nature of the causes of voluntary actions",[157] and on the question of whether or not the idea of the necessity of voluntary actions is merely a matter of our observation of a constant union between the actions of the mind, or of the discovery of any power through introspection. This question is easily solved by reflecting that we cannot form an idea of any power or necessary connection between the motion of a body and its cause not only because all that we can observe is their constant union, but also because we can form an idea only of those perceptions which have appeared first as impressions. Now, in order to establish the second issue that the idea of the necessity of action is derived from the observation of the constant union between motives and actions, he argues, all that we need to do is to observe "the common course of human affairs", and see that "[n]o union can be more constant and certain than that of some actions with some motives and characters" (T2.3.1.12; SBN 404). The third issue, that natural and voluntary evidence form only one chain of argument, naturally follows form the second issue: insofar as "the *union* betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy as that in any natural operations, …its influence on the understanding is also the same in *determining* us to infer the existence of one from that of another" (T2.3.1.14; SBN 404). All these three issues are agreed by us as matters of fact (T2.3.1.18; SBN 407), upon which human society is founded. Hence Hume concludes that the dispute of "liberty and necessity" is essentially a matter of words (ibid.).[158]

The first two sections, "Of liberty and necessity", treats the subject of a heated debate which divided Hume's contemporary philosophers into two positions, viz. the libertarian and the necessitarian, regarding the question, in what sense our actions are said to be free or necessitated? The necessitarian insists that voluntary actions are caused by motives, whereas the libertarian holds that the cause of the actions of the mind is the will or power, which allows us to choose and act, even against our motives. It is this early modern controversy that provided the context in

[157] James Harris, 2003, p. 453.
[158] Hume writes: "the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words" (EHU 81).

which Hume mentions "that long-disputed question concerning liberty and necessity, which occurs so naturally in treating of the will" (T2.3.1.2; SBN 399) and "the prevalence of the doctrine of liberty" (T2.3.2.1; SBN 407). Hume is said to belong to compatibilism, a position traditionally held by mechanists and materialists such as Hobbes and Locke, who claim that there is no logical inconsistency to suppose that human actions are caused, while they are sometimes free.

I do not treat this controversial issue, which has already been discussed in several illuminating works, because my present aim is to establish that Hume's account of "liberty and necessity" is meant to provide the foundation of his theory of the will and direct passions.[159] I begin by asking: Is Hume's account of free-will and necessity, which is buried in the discussion of the passions, really a "lengthy digression" as Kemp Smith thinks? Kemp Smith suggests that since Hume found himself to have misplaced his account of liberty and necessity in the *Treatise*, he placed it in the first *Enquiry* immediately after his account of necessary connection.[160] But I would rather suggest that if the *Enquiries* had included the treatment of the passions, Hume would have placed it in the same order as it is in the *Treatise*. For, his account of liberty and necessity has an essential role in his treatment of the passions in the *Treatise*: to assert "a connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions" (T2.3.1.17; SBN 406) and thereby to provide the foundation of his theory of the will and action. Although Hume's account of the will is almost parallel in the *Treatise* and in the *Enquiries*, we cannot overlook the following difference derived from the different contexts in which it occurs.[161] In the *Enquires* his account of the will is not assigned the role to provide the foundation of the discussion of the passions, because the passions are not treated there. By contrast, his account of liberty and necessity in the *Treatise* has this vital task as a linkage between the epistemological issues of Book I and the issues of passions in Book II: to explain free-will and necessity from an epistemological

[159] This is an aspect that makes the *Treatise* account differ from the *Enquiry* account. Hume discusses "liberty and necessity" in the three places: the *Treatise* at T2.3.1-2, the first *Enquiry* at Section 8, *Abstract*.
[160] 2005, p. 161.
[161] Hume's approach to the subject of liberty and necessity is different in the *Treatise* and the *Enquiries*, according to James Harris, in that Hume's "concern in the later treatment of the question is not to argue against liberty by arguing for necessity, but rather 'to make it appear, that all men have ever agreed in the doctrines both of necessity and of liberty, according to any reasonable sense, which can be put on these terms; and that the whole controversy has hitherto turned merely upon words'" (2002, p. 67).

perspective on the one hand, and to prove the *cement* between the physical and moral necessity in terms of the analogy between actions of matter and actions of the mind on the other. Hume pursues the first task, and establish the necessity of the actions of the mind through the demonstration that "[t]he actions of matter are…to be regarded as instances of necessary actions; and whatever is in this respect on the same footing with matter, must be acknowledg'd to be necessary" (T2.3.1.3; SBN 400).[162] On the basis of this issue, he establishes the second issue that "all actions of the will have a particular cause", through the illustration of the determination of the will in the subsequent discussion by the same method of reasoning by which he has explained the actions of physical objects in Book I.

Let us now examine Hume's first subject, "all actions of the will have particular causes", which begins with the following remark on "the will":

> Of all the immediate effects of pain and pleasure, there is none more remarkable than the WILL; and tho', properly speaking, it be not comprehended among the passions, yet as the full understanding of its nature and properties, is necessary to the explanation of them, we shall here make it the subject of our enquiry. I desire it may be observ'd, that, by the *will*, I mean nothing but *the internal impression we feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind.* (T2.3.1.2; SBN 399)

This definition of the will as "an internal impression" might seem rather abrupt, and puzzling. For, when Hume highlights the will as the feeling that we are conscious of when we "knowingly" move our body, he might be taken to imply that the will is "the power or force" which actuates the bodily mechanism. On the contrary, his reason for giving this definition is to restrain such a view, and to establish that the cause of a voluntary action is not such a power or the agent's will

[162] So far as the epistemological issue relevant to liberty and necessity is concerned, Hume's aim in the first two sections of the *Treatise* is to show that his "reconciling project" (EHU 95) settles the heated debate between necessitarians and libertarians by means of a "new definition of necessity", and by seeing that "necessity", whether physical or mental, consists in both the constant union and the inference of the mind and by recognizing that "wherever we discover these, we must acknowledge a necessity" (T2.3.1.4; SBN 400).

or faculty as is revealed by introspection.[163] In order to enter into the discussion of the cause of our action, Hume found it necessary to make clear that, since we can never, in a single instance of the actions of matter, discover any power or necessary connection which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other, it is not by any insight into the essence of bodies that we discover their connection: we only find that the one does actually follow the other (EHU 63). For, his project is to establish by this analogy that insofar as we can never perceive the connection between an act of volition and a motion of the body, the cause of our voluntary actions cannot be the will, nor such a "power or energy" as we may feel within ourselves when we give rise to the motions of our body.[164] The definition of the will as an internal impression which we feel when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, may well be taken to be a warning that we should not expect to find the cause of our action through introspection.

It is remarkable how Hume assimilates the will to a passion despite his remark that the will is not a passion. Hume is emphatic about the close relation between the will and the passions, insisting that the full understanding of the nature and properties of the will is necessary to the explanation of the passions. Since the will is not only like a direct passion in being the immediate effect of pleasure and pain, he even counts "volition" in the list of the direct passions in his later discussion (T2.3.9.2; SBN 438). By assimilating the will to a passion, Hume makes plain that the will is not a faculty or power which has command over our bodily movements, but rather a

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[163] Hume gives a detailed account of this view by mentioning "power" along with "necessary connexion" (EHU 64). Hume indicates power and necessary connection to be synonymous, following Locke who defines power in terms of its effects.

[164] This issue is not included in the main text of the *Treatise*, but only in its Appendix (T SBG 632-33) as an insertion to be placed between the two paragraphs of his account of necessary connection at T1.3.14.11-12. In the first *Enquiry*, Hume discusses it in detail as an essential part of the account of necessary connection. In the first *Enquiry*, Hume examines and refutes the view held by several philosophers that "the true and direct principle of every effect is not any power or force in nature, but a volition of the Supreme Being, who wills that such particular object should for ever be conjoined with each other" (EHU 70). In the *Enquiries*, but not in the *Treatise*, he employs the considerable part of his discussion for the refutation of this view which goes so far as to hold that "the Deity is the immediate cause of the union between soul and body; and that they are not the organs of sense, which, being agitated by external objects, produce sensations in the mind, but that it is a particular volition of our omnipotent Maker" or that "[our mental vision or conception of ideas is nothing but a revelation made to us by our Maker" (EHU 70-1).

feeling that can be known only through the feeling of it together with the passion.[165] He wants to establish that we can know the act of volition only when we feel the motion of our body *together with* the passion of desire or aversion. When we are suddenly struck with palsy in the leg or arm, for example, where "the authority of the will" is of no service, he insists, we may plainly see that "this command of the will gives us no real idea of force and energy" (EHU 67). The will thus defined directs Hume's investigation away from the Lockean question of the freedom of human choices,[166] and allows him to concentrate on the question of the influencing motives on the will.

After having established that the will is not the causes of voluntary action, Hume's next business is to establish the constant union with regard to our voluntary actions through the demonstration: "Like causes still produce like effects; in the same manner, as in the mutual action of the elements and powers of nature" (T2.3.1.5; SBN 401). All that is needed for this purpose is to have a general survey of "the common course of human affairs", and to see that "there is a general course of nature in human actions, as well as in the operations of the sun and the climate" (T2.3.1.10; SBN 402-3). For, it is this "uniformity of human actions" that "forms the very essence of necessity" (T2.3.1.10; SBN 403) and makes the inference of one from another possible. Insofar as no union can be more constant and certain than that of some actions with some motives and characters, he argues, "in judging of the actions of men we must proceed upon the same maxims, as when we reason concerning external objects" (T2.3.1.12; SBN 403). Although there are many inferior degrees of evidence and probability in the supposition of this union, we can assert "the necessity of the actions of the mind", and we do not thereby remove the notion of causes and necessity, nor take any single contrariety to entirely destroy all our reasoning. For, we either balance the case with the contrary experiments, or regard it to be the result of our imperfect knowledge rather than the result of something inherent to it, reflecting that this uncertainty of the union is common to the actions of bodies (ibid). Hume states: "the *union* betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy, as that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding is also the same in *determining* us to infer the existence of one from that of another"

[165] I shall discuss this topic in relation to personal identity in Section 3 of Chapter 6.

[166] James Harris observes, that by defining the will as "a sort of epiphenomenal accompaniment of intentional action", he sucessfully directs Hume's investigation away from the Lockean question of the freedom of human choices (2002, p. 66).

(T2.3.1.14; SBN 404).

On the basis of this "connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions" (T2.3.1.17; SBN 406), Hume proceeds and discusses the second subject, "what the causes of the actions of the will are", in terms of this circumstance: "when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction" (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414). Although the impulse of these passions arises not from reason, we can happily trust the impulse which carries us to avoid or embrace what will cause our uneasiness or satisfaction (ibid.), because we know by experience that "*natural* and moral *evidence*" form only one chain of argument (T2.3.1.17; SBN 406). As Hume indicates, the emotions of aversion and propensity "extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as *they are pointed out by reason and experience*" (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414, my emphasis). For example, I may give up persuading my husband to abandon his practice of smoking, because, reflecting on his nature, I find it no more easy to make him quit the practice than to prevent him from lung cancer when he goes on smoking. My desire of protecting my husband from lung cancer extends itself so long as it makes me cast my view on every side, and comprehend whatever objects are connected with the original one by the relation of cause and effect (ibid.) as Hume indicates. My desire fails when this emotion loses the way prepared by the causes and the object of my object. All this depends on the connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions, which enables the mind to pass from one link to another without feeling any difference betwixt natural causes and voluntary actions, or any less certainty "of the future event than if it were connected with the present impressions of the memory and senses by a train of causes cemented together by what we are pleas'd to call a *physical necessity"* (T2.3.1.17; SBN 406).

It is this connected chain of natural causes and voluntary actions that allows Hume to explain in his later sections (T2.3.4-8) "how the causes of the actions of the will operate" in terms of "those circumstances and situations of objects" which render a passion either calm or violent. For, his strategy is to explain the influencing motives of the will in terms of the force and impulse of a passion, by taking advantage of our common sense opinion that "the violent passions have a more

powerful influence on the will" than calm ones (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437). Through the illustration of how the impulse of a passion varies according to the practical, psychological, or physical relation between ourselves and the object of a passion, e.g. custom, the contiguity and distance in space and time, he endeavours to show that motivation is a matter of the easy passage of the imagination prepared by the relation of cause and effect.

2 The two uses of the calm/violent division

Hume's section, "Of the influencing motives of the will", is the source of widespread controversies. I argue that these controversies are solved by seeing that Hume employs the division in two different ways, as a type distinction and as a token distinction, and that the combat of the calm and the violent passions is discussed by means of the former use whereas "the causes of the violent passions" by means of the latter use. But, what made Hume use the calm/violent division in two ways? Why was it necessary for him to employ it differently? How does it contribute to the reinforcement of Hume's theory of the will?

Hume's section "Of the influencing motives of the will" at T2.3.3 is central to Book II, since it is here that Hume makes his anti-rationalist position clear by rejecting the popular view of "the combat of passion and reason", and propounds instead "the combat of the calm and the violent passions" as a determination of the will. But this section is known as a hotbed of critics' disagreement in their interpretations, chiefly because the calm/violent division, which Hume employs as the powerful weapon of his analysis of the will, is extremely ambiguous. Rachel Cohon remarks that "Hume seems rather equivocal as to whether the distinction between calm and violent affections is to be taken seriously".[167] Elizabeth Radcliffe also observes: "How Hume makes the distinction between calm and violent passions is not entirely clear. Sometimes he names the calm and violent passions, and at other times he suggests that any passion can be calm and violent, depending on whether it is a resolute disposition of one's character or an episodic occurrence".[168] But if this ambiguity is so serious as to make "certain of his remarks about the nature of the distinction between the calm and violent passions seem to conflict with each other"

[167] 2008. p. 33.
[168] 2004, fn. p. 639.

as Kydd indicates,[169] we cannot simply suppose that "this ambiguity does not infect what follows",[170] and leave it unexamined. In this section, I answer these questions: What made Hume use the calm/violent division in two ways: Why it was necessary for him to employ it differently: How it contributes to the reinforcement of Hume's theory of the will.

Several commentators have suggested that the calm/violent division is employed by Hume for different uses.[171] Immerwahr points out that when Hume mentions a "calm" passion, "it can mean a passion that is usually calm (like the love of beauty) even if it is being experienced violently, or it can mean a passion that is usually violent (such as anger) that is being experienced at a low level of emotional intensity; the same holds *mutatis mutandis* for term 'violent passion'".[172] Or, Baillie remarks that "a *token* passion is calm if it has a low felt intensity; a *type* of passion is calm if its tokens are typically like this", though "a passion that is typically calm can, on occasion, be violent".[173] Let us suppose, following Baillie, that Hume employs the division in two ways, as a *type* distinction and as a *token* distinction,[174] and see how this sheds light on the

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[169] Rachael Kydd observes that "the 'calm passions' doctrine is exceedingly difficult to understand. It is neither as coherently stated or so carefully elaborated as most of Hume's other arguments. Certain of his remarks about the nature of the distinction between the calm and violent passions seem to conflict with others"(1946, p. 141).

[170] Immerwahr, 1992, p. 295.

[171] Kydd points out that "our passions are *materially* calm without being *formally* so", and implies that these two descriptions respectively represent their being materially calm, and their being calm in terms of feeling quality (1946, p. 144). Tito Magri remarks that "calm and violent passions are differentiated by Hume not only in causal, but also in normative terms" (2008, p. 196-7). Mercer observes that "[t]he calmness or violence of a passion refers to the *intensity* with which the passion is felt rather than to its mode of origin"(1972, p. 23). John Wright argues that the calm passions seem paradoxical "because the very concept of a passion seems to imply high emotional intensity, as well as a receptive or passive state of mind" (2009, p. 231-2)

[172] 1992, p. 295. Árdal also insists on the necessity of this distinction, arguing: "we must distinguish between 'calm passions' as a particular occasion, and as the characterization of a passion occurring on a particular occasion"…If we take the first interpretation, the class includes more than approval and disapproval. If we take the second interpretation, many passions, even those that are commonly the most violent, may be calm on particular occasions, although they do not arise from a 'distant view and reflection'". Árdal even warns us not to confuse "'calm and violent' which refers to "refer to emotional intensity on particular occasions" with "the sense of 'calm' in which moral approval is a calm passion" (1996, p. 104).

[173] 2000, p. 100.

[174] The token distinction may serve as the scale of some other feature of an impression, such as Loeb's "volatility" or "stability" (2002). If the interpretive key is the stability of the perception as Loeb's suggests, we can take Hume to employ the calm/violent division in reference to the contrast between the calm stable passions and the more violent transitory volatile passions, that is, as the stability-token distinction. This token distinction may be applicable to both the calm and the violent impressions of reflection insofar as "stability is crucial to Hume's theory of justified belief, as well as to his accounts of the calm emotions, artificial justice, and moral judgment", as Loeb indicates.

ambiguity of Hume's treatment of the will. On this supposition, Hume employs the calm/violent division in the following way:

(1) At T2.1.1.3, Hume uses calm and violent to distinguish kinds of impressions of reflection: there are the violent impressions of reflection, called *passions*, which are the subject of Book II, and there are the calm impressions of reflection, moral and aesthetic sentiments, which are the subject of Book III. This is a type distinction.

(2) At T2.3.3, the violent type of impressions of reflection are further divided into two sub-types: so-called "calm passions", which lead us to act with the view of the greatest possible good, and the "violent emotions of the same kind", which lead us to act regardless of our real interest. It is this sub-type distinction of the passions that allows Hume to explain the determination of the will in terms of "the combat of the calm and the violent passion".

(3) Within the violent type of impressions of reflection, viz. passions, Hume also distinguishes between the two ways in which the same type of passion can occur: one token of a certain type of passion can occur violently whereas another token calmly. This is a token distinction, which operates as the scale of the emotional *intensity* of an impression. It is this distinction that allows Hume to explain the determination of the will in terms of "the causes of the violent passions" at T2.3.4-8.

Let us begin with Hume's following definition of the calm and the violent impressions of reflection propounded in the opening section of Book II:

> "The reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, *viz*. the *calm* and the *violent*. Of the first kind is the sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call'd *passions*, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been commonly distinguish'd from each other. (T2.1.1.3; SBN 276)

The distinction between the calm and the violent impressions of reflection asserted above is a *type* distinction. This assertion, taken literally, accommodates these two standpoints: 1) The impressions of reflection are divided into two kinds: the moral/aesthetic sentiments as the calm type, the passions as the violent type. 2) The subject of Book II is the violent type of impressions of reflection, which he calls the *passions*. It follows from these two standpoints that the calm type of impressions of reflection, viz. the moral/aesthetic sentiments, is excluded from the study of Book II. This is a "canonical" division, as Loeb points out, insofar as it is the only "exhaustive" division of the impressions of refection that we can find in the *Treatise*.[175]

This distinction between the two types of impressions of reflection is stable enough to be the foundation of his system, because it does not depend on the intensity with which they appear in the mind: although the rapture of poetry and music, which are typically calm, may rise to the greatest height, they are still the calm type of impression. The status of the aesthetic/moral sentiments as the type-determined calm impressions is intact however drastic they may change their emotional intensity. The same is true with the passions as the type-determined violent reflections: even when a passion decays into so soft an emotion as to become "imperceptible", it is still a type-determined violent impression, never converted into a calm type (ibid.). We should bear in mind that "the calm passions" introduced later at T2.3.3.8 are type-determined violent impressions, distinct from the moral sentiment, which is a type-determined calm impression of reflection even though they "produce little emotion in the mind".[176] When Hume comments that the calm/violent division is "far from being exact",[177] he can be taken to imply that it does not

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[175] 1977, p. 395.

[176] Árdal and many other critics take Hume to imply that the moral sentiments are species of the indirect passions, or even that "approval and disapproval are love and hatred" (Árdal, 1966, p. 116), and thereby create the widespread controversy.

[177] Loeb observes that "the distinction need be considered vulgar and specious, however, only insofar as it is "far from being exact", that is, applicable to types rather than to individual emotions (1977, p. 403). Immerwahr argues: "The calm/violent distinction, according to Hume, has little to do with the strength of a passion or its power in influencing the will" (1992, p. 294). Árdal argues that "Hume calls the distinction vulgar and specious, and indicates that he uses it is as a methodological device merely. The distinction can, indeed, be called 'vulgar and specious', in the sense that there is nothing very sophisticated about it as stated here, and a similar distinction might well occur to common sense. Hume probably also wants to emphasize the fact that this is a rough and ready distinction, since any passion may become violent, and the calm ones are those which are so on most occasions" (1996, p. 94-95).

function as an exact scale to judge the actual feeling intensity of an impression, but not that it is "a rough and ready distinction" as Árdal suggests.[178] Although Hume also remarks that the calm/violent division is "a vulgar and specious division", we should take him to mean not that "there is nothing very sophisticated about it"[179], but that it is a reliable division so firmly founded on our common ordinary experience as to be accepted even by a vulgar person. Hume's implication is that this initial distinction between the aesthetic/moral sentiments and the passions is nothing special or sophisticated, but rather so stable and undisputable as to be the foundation of his system.

However, this initial distinction between the calm and the violent impressions is the subject of scholarly dispute regarding whether or not we should take this initial definition seriously, because Hume's later assertion of "the calm passions" seems conflicting with the distinction. Hume maintains:

> Now 'tis certain, there are certain calm desires and tendencies, which, tho' they be *real passions*, produce little emotion in the mind, and are more known by their effects than by the immediate feeling or sensation. These desires are of two kinds; either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such. (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417, my emphasis)

Some critics doubt if Hume really adheres to his initial distinction between the calm and the violent impressions of reflection, because his definition of the passions as violent impressions of reflection at T2.1.1.3 seems at odd with his above assertion of "the calm passions" which influence our action by operating with the same calmness and tranquillity as to be confounded with reason (ibid.). Their suspicion seems to be confirmed by Hume's indication in Book III that moral approval and disapproval are "nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred" (T3.3.5.1; SBN 614). Critics' common solution to this seeming conflict is to assume that "Hume

[178] 1996, p. 94-95.
[179] Árdal, 1996, p. 94-95.

does not always restrict the term 'passions' to violent reflective impressions".[180] Árdal insists that Hume's initial "distinction, as such, appears not of any very great importance", and suggests the "guesswork" that Hume's initial definition at T2.1.1 is meant to be the announcement of "the main distinguishing characteristic of a calm passion", and that his later assertion of the calm passions at T2.3.3 is "a fuller, or complete account" of the calm passions.[181] Similarly, Baillie argues: "At the start of Book 2, Hume takes calm passions to include 'the sense of beauty and deformity in action,…' Now, in this later section, he describes them as 'either certain instincts originally implanted in our natures…'. The latter discussion makes it clear that calm passions are to be regarded as general tendencies of character".[182] Árdal s guesswork is so influential as to receive a strong support from many commentators.

But for two reasons, Árdal is mistaken in taking Hume's assertion at T2.3.3 to be the restatement of his assertion at T2.1.1, and in supposing Hume to imply that "the calm passions", such as benevolence and resentment, are equivalent to moral sentiments. In the first place, for Hume the moral sentiments are distinct from "the calm passions" because the former are type-determined calm impressions of reflection, and not passions at all—which are type-determined violent impressions of reflection.[183] Within the class of the violent type of impressions of reflection, he wants to distinguish between the calm type and the violent type of passions. Given "the calm passions" to be type-determined calm passions, Árdal is wrong to take "the *fundamentum divisionis* to be emotional intensity, 'the disturbance in the soul'",[184] because the actual felt intensity of a passion is only symptomatic, and cannot function as the criterion of distinction of the calm passions from the rest of passions. In the second place, there is a difficulty in taking Hume to imply that the moral sentiments are species of the passions, as we have seen in the foregoing section.[185]

Yet in order to prove that the calm/violent division is employed as the sub-division to

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[180] Cohon, 2008, p. 33.
[181] 1996, p. 95.
[182] 2000, p. 100. The same interpretation is propounded by many critics, e.g. John Stewart, 1994, p. 76.
[183] Hume never mentions the moral sentiments as passions in the Treatise, as Cohon points out (2007, fn. p. 184).
[184] 1996, p. 94.
[185] Section 9 of Chapter 1.

distinguish between the type-determined calm and the type-determined violent passions, we still need to overcome another hurdle by solving the apparent conflict involved in Hume's following remark:

> 'Tis evident passions influence not the will in proportion to their violence, or the disorder they occasion in the temper; but on the contrary, that when a passion has once become a settled principle of action, and is the predominant inclination of the soul, it commonly produces no longer any sensible agitation... We must, therefore, distinguish betwixt a calm and a weak passion; betwixt a violent and a strong one. But notwithstanding this, 'tis certain, that when we wou'd govern a man, and push him to any action, 'twill commonly be better policy to work upon the violent than the calm passions ... We ought to place the object in such particular situations as are proper to encrease the violence of the passion... Both these kinds of passions pursue good, and avoid evil; and both of them are encreas'd or diminish'd by the encrease or diminution of the good or evil. (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418-9)

This passage seems to give reasons to Rachael Kydd to complain that "certain of his remarks about the nature of the distinction between the calm and violent passions seem to conflict with others".[186] For, Hume seems inconsistent to argue that the influence of a passion on the will is not in proportion to its violence on the one hand, and on the other that we should appeal to a violence passion in order to push a person to action since the force and the violence of a passion go together. More seriously, Hume's assertion that the calm and the violent passions both "pursue good, and avoid evil" seems to be in tension with his foregoing account of the determination of the will in terms of the combat of the calm and the violent passions, which depends entirely on their opposite directions: a calm passion leads us to act with a view of "the greatest possible good" whereas a violent with a view of a present short-term interest. But we can solve these seeming conflicts by supposing that Hume explains the determination of the will in two ways by employing the calm/violent division as a type distinction and as a token distinction, and by taking

[186] Kydd, 1946, p. 141.

Hume's remark that the calm and the violent passions both "pursue good, and avoid evil" to be a signal that he is now adapting a new strategy, and explaining the determination of the will by employing the division as a token distinction.

So far as the type-determined calm and violent passions are concerned, a passion does not influence the will in proportion to its actual intensity: when a passion becomes the predominant inclination of the mind, for instance, it may overpower a violent passion even though it no longer produces any sensible agitation, according to Hume. This is why we need to distinguish between the force and the violence, or the weakness and the calmness of a passion. By contrast, where the calm and the violent passions have the same direction, both seeking the same good or evil, we have fairly good reasons to suppose that "the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will" (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437). Given that the force and the strength of a passion is in proportion to its violence in determining the will, Hume's task is to explain the impulse of a passion in terms of "the causes of the violent passions". It is this token-determined use of the calm/violent division that allows Hume to explain the morally neutral aspect of the will, which is more or less subject to our control, insofar as we can motivate ourselves or others by placing "the object in such particular situations as are proper to encrease the violence of the passion" (ibid.).

But, what made Hume use the calm/violent division in two ways? Why was it necessary for him to employ it differently? How does it contribute to the reinforcement of Hume's theory of the will? Hume uses the calm/violent division in two ways, I argue, in order to explain the will from two different perspectives, viz. uncontrollable and controllable, or moral and morally neutral. For, he finds that our motivation takes place in two different circumstances, in which we decide or choose an action regarding ethical matters, e.g. whether I should stop smoking, on the one hand, and on the other in which we are carried to act by those implicit and momentary propensities or aversions toward the objects involved in our non-ethical everyday action, e.g. walking, cooking, or shopping. He explains the first circumstance in terms of the combat of the calm and the violent passions by employing the calm/violent division as a type distinction, whereas the second circumstance in terms of "the causes of the violent passions" by employing the division as a token-distinction. So far as the first circumstance is concerned, there is a great difficulty in

deciding our action, because it is largely a matter of "the *general* character or *present* disposition" of the person concerned (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418), according to him. But so far as the second circumstance is concerned, we may well expect to control our action by placing "the object in such particular situations as are proper to encrease [or decrease] the violence of the passion" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419). Hume's strategy for the first circumstance is to adapt the Hutchesonian ethical dichotomy of the calm and the violent passions, and to explain the determination of the will in terms of the combat between the calm and the violent passions—where there is any conflict of motivation, these two kinds of passions oppose to each other because they have opposite directions: the calm passions lead us to act with "the view of the greatest possible good" whereas the violent ones move us "independent of all consideration of pleasure and advantage to myself". By contrast, his strategy for the second circumstance is to assume that both the calm and violent passions "pursue good, and avoid evil" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419), so the determination of the will is a matter of the impulse of a passion. We have reasons to expect that the calm/violent division thus employed in two ways contributes greatly to rending his theory of the will flexible and comprehensible. In the succeeding section, I shall examine how Hume explains the determination of the will from two perspectives by employing the calm/violent division as a type and as a token distinction.

3 The combat of the calm and the violent passions

In his section "Of the influencing motives of the will" at T2.3.3, Hume explains the determination of the will in terms of the combat of the calm and the violent passions. But what makes Hume take the trouble of adapting the notion of "the calm passions" when he could have argued simply that, following Hutcheson, a calm passion pursues good whereas a violent one pursues evil? It is his notion of the calm passions, I argue, that allows him to divert from Hutcheson, and to deny Hutcheson's view that whether we act virtuously or perniciously is essentially a matter of our free employment of reason.

In accounting for the will, Hume follows Hutcheson in arguing that what motivates us to act is not reason but passion, and rejects the rationalists' view, that we should give a preference to

reason insofar as we are virtuous only when we conform ourselves to its dictates. Reason alone can neither prevent nor produce volition, because the understanding exerts itself only in two ways, viz. as it judges from demonstration or probability, and as it regards the abstract relations of our ideas (T2.3.3.1-4; SBN 413-5).[187] In asserting "the combat of the calm and the violent passions" by rejecting "the combat of passion and reason" as the determination of the will, Hume adapts Hutcheson's ethical dichotomy between the calm and the violent passions. Although Hutcheson does not mention "violence", but instead he refers to "a confused sensation" involved in a passion, and asserts an ethical dichotomy between "the calm desires" and "the particular passions" as a type distinction. For Hutcheson, "*Passions*" are different from "*Affections*" in that they include "a *confused Sensation* either of Pleasure or Pain, occasioned or attended by some violent bodily Motions".[188] When "our Desires become *passionate*", Hutcheson argues, it therefore "keeps the Mind much employed upon the present Affair, to the exclusion of every thing else, and prolongs or strengthens the Affection sometimes to such a degree, as to prevent all *deliberate Reasoning* about our Conduct".[189] Hence Hutcheson's concern is with the question of how to "obtain *Command* over the *Particular Passions*, principally by strengthening the *general Desires* thro frequent Reflection, and making them *habitual*, so to obtain Strength superior to the *particular Passions*".[190] In his account of the combat of the calm and the violent passions, Hume inherits Hutcheson's ethical distinction that the calm passions lead us to act with the view of the greatest possible good whereas the violent ones with a present short-term interest.

However, Hume diverges from Hutcheson by introducing the notion of "the calm passions", and by claiming that what is vulgarly called "reason" in the talk of "the combat of passion and reason" is nothing but "the calm passions", which producing so little emotion in the mind as to be confounded with reason (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417). When I am threatened by a violent desire to smoke,

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[187] We should never overlook that Hume undermines his dictum "Reason is, and ought to be, the slave of the passions" (T3.3.4; SBN 415) by adding "alone" in his preceding assertion "reason alone can never produce any action" (T2.3.3.4; SBN 414), because he asserts the crucial role of reason in the determination of the will by claiming: "the impulse [of a passion] arises not from reason, but is only directed by it" T2.3.3.2; SBN 414). Nuyen plausibly insists that "Hume is only concerned with dismissing the claim that reason could be a sufficient condition, not that it is a necessary one" (1995).

[188] In the footnote, Hutcheson makes clear that he follows Malebranche in accounting for the distinction between passions and affections (2002, p. 31 fn.).

[189] 2002, p. 30-1.

[190] 2002, p. 32.

for instance, what makes me resist this momentary desire is not reason but the calm passion, viz. "love of life". Whether I stop or continue smoking is therefore a matter of how my calm desire of love of life can counteract my violent desire of smoking. This method of reasoning is different from Hutcheson's view in two respects. First, although for Hutcheson "Affections" are calm because they do not contain confused sensations, for Hume whether a passion is actually felt calm or violent has nothing essential to make the calm passions as they are, because the calmness of the calm passions is merely their symptomatic feature, and cannot be the criterion to distinguish them from the rest of passions. The calm passions are "either certain instincts, originally implanted in our natures, such as benevolence and resentment, the love of life, and kindness to children; or the general appetite to good, and aversion to evil, consider'd merely as such" (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417). Secondly, Hutcheson assigns an important role to reason in the determination of the will by claiming that Affections direct us to virtuous action because they allow us free employment of reason. By contrast, Hume admits no room for reason to enter in directing us to virtuous conduct by claiming that the calm passions are "arbitrary and original instinct[s] implanted in our nature" (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417)—just like hanger or lust, they are instincts which carry us to attain peculiarly virtuous objects which are suitable to each appetite.

Given the calm passions as the principle which leads us to act virtuously, we may naturally expect that there must be also be the principle, the type-determined violent passions, to be paired with the type-determined calm passions, which leads us to an opposite direction, insofar as Hume argues: "both principles operate on the will, and that where they are contrary, either of them prevail (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418). Hence is Hume's assertion of "certain violent emotions of the same kind":

> Beside these calm passions, which often determine the will, there are certain violent emotions of the same kind, which have likewise a great influence on that faculty. When I receive any injury from another, I often feel a violent passion of resentment, which makes me desire his evil and punishment, independent of all considerations of pleasure and advantage to myself. (T2.3.3.9; SBN 417-8)

The resentment of the calm-type is thus paired with the resentment of the violent type, which leads me to act regardless of our real profit,[191] just like benevolence is paired with anger, which is the "violent emotion of the same kind" as benevolence.

But this interpretation of the above passage does not agree with the standard interpretation of the secondary literature. John Wright argues: not only that "the same instinctive passion operates in both cases… while I naturally and instinctively feel kindness to the young children of strangers whom I meet, my feelings of kindness for my own children are full of emotional intensity. *The same instinctive passion* operates in both cases, but it is only calm when considering children who are not closely related to me" (my emphasis).[192] Baier also insists that the calm desires "may be calm in good conditions, but as Hume goes on to note, they certainly have their violent moments---resentment can *turn* to disorderly anger, when, as it often is, it is in conflict with other desires" (my emphasis).[193] Both Wright and Baier commonly take Hume's assertion of "the violent emotion of the same kind" to imply that the calm passions, though virtuous in general, become pernicious when they increase their emotional intensity at the presence of some impeding object, and that whether they are virtuous or pernicious is a matter of the emotional disturbance.

But I argue that their interpretation fails to grasp Hume's point in propounding the notion of "the calm passions". If this interpretation were correct, Hume could have simply asserted like Hutcheson that whether we are moved to act virtuously or perniciously is a matter of the violence of a passion without asserting "the calm passions". Why was it necessary for Hume to take the trouble of introducing "the calm passions" as type-determined evaluative affections, which lead us to act virtuously? Hume's aim in introducing the notion of the calm passions is to make his divergence from Hutcheson clear, and to show that whether we act virtuously or perniciously is *not* a matter of the violence of a passion which prevents our free employment of reason, but is a

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[191] The calm/violent distinction indicated by Tito Magri may be taken to as the type distinction, when he argues: a direct passion of the calm sort "consists in the mind's responding with pursuit, or avoidance, to certain kinds of object (that is, to their impressions or ideas), because of the mind's instinctual, original dispositions, and is therefore calm *in general*, but becomes violent at the presence of *particular* objects appropriate for the different motivational dispositions" (2008, p. 192).

[192] 2009, p. 231-2.

[193] 1994, p. 167.

matter of a *type* to which a passion in question belongs: benevolence, for instance, is a type-determined calm passion, and therefore can never be pernicious even when it increases its violence: the same is true with anger, which is the "violent emotion of the same kind" as benevolence.

Hutcheson holds that "the very best of our particular Affections or Desires, when they are grown violent and *passionate*, thro' the *confused Sensations* and *Propensities* which attend them, do make us incapable of considering calmly the whole *Tendency* of our Actions, and lead us often into what is *absolutely pernicious*".[194] For Hutcheson, since whether we act virtuously or perniciously is a matter of our free employment of reason, we need to reduce "the confused sensations" which hinders it in order to attain "the best management of our Desire" or "the proper and effectual means".[195] Hume criticizes Hutcheson's view claiming: "Men often act *knowingly* against their interest: For which reason, the view of the greatest possible good does not always influence them. Men often counteract a violent passion in prosecution of their interests and designs: 'Tis not, therefore, the present uneasiness alone which determines them" (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418, my emphasis). Hume makes clear that whether we act virtuously or perniciously is not essentially a matter of our free employment of reason, because we may act "knowingly" against our real profit even when we employ our reason freely, or even where we are fully aware what action would bring us the greatest good. He insists that the direction of the will is neither a matter of the current emotional intensity or "the present uneasiness alone", nor is it entirely a matter of our capacity of employing reason freely. Even if we are not disturbed by the emotional disorder of the passion, and freely appeal to our deliberate reasoning, we might still fail to override the calm passion above the violent, and be led to act against our interest, because strength of mind is a matter of "the *general* character or *present* disposition of the person" (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418). It is important to see that, as James Moore points out, although both Hutcheson and Hume oppose the rationalists', "the aims or objectives of the two philosophers [in their account of the will] were far from identical or even entirely compatible: this incapability of reason is for Hutcheson that "virtuous conduct can only be prompted by virtuous motives", whereas for Hume that "reason,

[194] 2002, p. 175.
[195] 2002, p. 39.

strictly speaking, does not prompt us to act at all", which is a locution Hutcheson never employed.[196] Hume leaves the discussion without exploring how to maintain the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent, observing that "there is no man so constantly possess'd of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire" (ibid.). But this final remark does not imply that he is "self-consciously refusing to tell his readers how to manage their emotions",[197] but rather that he takes the matter of "the best management of our Desire" to be such an important subject as to involve the whole system of morality. Hume's aim in his account of the will in Book II is not to explain how to win the combat of the calm and the violent passions, but to establish the will as the subject of morals, which is properly discussed in relation to the character of a person in Book III.

Given this difference between Hutcheson and Hume, we need to detect that in Hume's assertion of "certain violent emotions of the same kind", the emotional quality here mentioned is only symptomatic of some more fundamental difference, and that the calmness and the violence of a passions indicate only a feature of a passion, and do not function as a real criterion to distinguish between the two types of passions. The fundamental differentia between the type-determined calm passion and the type-determined violent passion is that the former involves "extensive" sympathy which enables us to view an object from the general point of view whereas the latter not. "The *general* appetite to good, and aversion to evil, *consider'd merely as such*" (T2.3.3.8; SBN 417, my emphases) is a calm type, leading us to act with the view of the greatest possible good, because the object is viewed from the general point of view. "Love of life" is a type-determined calm passion which involves "the general appetite to good… consider'd merely as such", but when "I am immediately threaten'd with any grievous ill", I become affected by the type-determined violent emotion of the same kind which involves the limited or particular

[196] 1994, p. 40.

[197] 2009, p. 145. On my interpretation, there is no mystery of Hume's "startling silence" on how to attain strength of mind". James Harris takes this silence as a sign of Hume's "sense of the ultimate inscrutability of the ways in which the passions succeed and alter each other", observing: "What Hume calls 'strength of mind' implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent', but it appears that there is nothing to be said about how one might ensure such a prevalence, given that, as Hume says himself, 'there is no man so constantly possess'd of this virtue, as never on any occasion to yield to the solicitations of passion and desire'—which is to say, more properly, the solicitations of *violent* passions and desires. At the end of his account of the calm and violent passions, Hume admits that there is a certain mysteriousness to the whole business…" (p. 142-3).

appetite to good (T2.3.3.9; SBN 418).

Given that the actual felt intensity is irrelevant to the type-determined calm and the violent passions, which have opposite directions to each other, there is no need to worry about Baier's paradox involved in Hume's assertion of the combat of the calm and the violent passions: "the moment there is any conflict of motivation, then there will be the danger that all parties in the soul will become violent" insofar as, on Hume's view, an opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits, and produces more disorder.[198] For, the status as a type-determined calm and violent passion is stable, not subject to change even when their intensity changes during the combat, as we noted above. It is this situation founded on Hume's use of the calm/violent division as the type distinction[199] that allows him to contend that the influence of a passion on the will is not in proportion to its violence, and that we should distinguish between a calm and a weak passion, and between a violent and a strong one (T2.3.4.1; SBN 418-9).

4 "The causes of the violent passions"

I focus on T2.3.4 and examine Hume's account of "the causes of the violent passions" in order to understand why and how he employs the calm/violent division as a token distinction in accounting for the will.

Hume's assertion that both calm and violent passions "pursue good, and avoid evil; and both of them are encreas'd or diminish'd by the encrease or diminution of the good or evil" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419) releases him from the Hutchesonian ethical bond that calm passion pursue good whereas violent ones evil. This enables Hume to leaves his former technical position that we must distinguish between a violent and a strong passion, or between a calm and a weak one (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419), and to adopt the common-sense view that "the violent passions have a more powerful influence on the will" (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437). Here the determination of the will does not depend on the combat of the calm and the violent passions, but on the "situations of objects, which render

[198] 1994, p. 168.
[199] Baier suggests that "the best way to save Hume's thesis is to suppose that 'calm passion' usually means 'typically calm', not 'necessarily calm, even when it meets opposition" (1994, p. 168).

a passion either calm or violent" (ibid.), because the violence of a passion here entails the force and strength of the passion. For Hume, the subject which belongs to the question concerning the will is this question: "why the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" (ibid.). In the rest of his discussion he is entirely occupied with the questions of how and why a passion is rendered calm or violent, and thereby decreases or increases its impulse. This indeed is a strategy which has never been employed by other philosophers. But, why is it necessary for Hume to adapt this strategy?

There may be a combat between the calm and the violent passions when there is some difficulty in deciding concerning our actions and resolutions, but we spend the rest of our everyday life without going through such a laborious process as to make a decision. For, we are naturally carried by a passion to avoid or embrace what will give us an uneasiness or satisfaction, as Hume observes:" 'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction" (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414). Given that a considerable part of our life is spent wantonly according to our involuntary response to immediate pleasures and pains, does it follow that our life is nothing but hedonic projection by which we pursue the present pleasure and avoid pains regardless of our real interest? Hume's answer is in the negative, that, although the impulse of the passion does not arise from reason, this impulse is "directed" by it (ibid.). For, the emotion of desire or aversion "rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect", and "according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation (ibid.). Even when we are cooking, walking along the street, or waiting in a queue for payment, or cycling, our action is the result of choices and decisions. When I go shopping, and find an ice-cream shop, and buy an ice-cream to eat on the way, even such an immediate response to my immediate good is the consequence of my implicit filtering which almost unconsciously takes place: whether the cost is reasonable, it is embarrassing to walk eating an ice-cream, and so on. Our wanton response to immediate pleasures or pains is regulated by, or

"filtered" through[200], the social, practical, mental, and physical screens established between ourselves and the object of a passion—what Hume calls the "situations of objects". Hume's reason for employing the calm/violent division as a token distinction is to explain the circumstance in which we are carried to act through such minor and unconscious choices or resolutions regarding our action, in terms of the impulse of a passion, as he maintains:

> when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. 'Tis also obvious, that this emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason but is only directed by it. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414)

This motivational circumstance is constituted by the following three processes, which depend respectively on these three operations of the mind, viz. the imagination, the passions, and reason. When I am moved to get a beautiful dress which I saw in a showcase, for example, I first form the prospect of the pleasure which I receive from the dress when I own it: secondly this idea gives rise to my propensity for the dress: thirdly, the emotion of this propensity extends itself to the causes and effects of the object. Hume has explained the first process in Book I, "Of the influence of belief" at T1.3.10.3, and established that any perception of pain and pleasure has an influence on our action only when it produces a belief — "a lively idea related to a present impression". In other words, the emotion excited by the pleasure must pass by an easy transition to the

[200] Rorty, 1990. p. 263.

imagination, and by "diffusing itself over our idea of the affecting object", make us "form that idea with greater force and vivacity, and consequently assent to it" (T1.3.10.4; SBN 120). Hume insists that "belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions" (T1.3.10.4; SBN 120), because the "vivacity [of the belief] is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions" (T2.3.9.7; SBN 439). The idea of the pleasure, when enlivened by the vivacity of the belief, gives rise to my desire, in the second process.[201] Now, this desire invokes reason by "making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect". My desire extends itself in the third process "to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience". My desire for the dress moves me when the passion goes through the filter of demonstrative and abstract reasoning, and reaches the object. My motivation is thus a matter of the extension of the passion, and therefore cannot move me whenever there is any obstacle in the way. Hence Hume remarks: "DESIRE arises from good consider'd simply. The WILL exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind or body (T2.3.9.7; SBN 439).

This definition of the will and desire is a near echo of Hutcheson's: "The Apprehension of Good, either to ourselves or others, as attainable, raises *Desire*: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises *Aversion*, or Desire of removing or preventing it.[202] It must have been useful for Hume to adapt Hutcheson's remark in order to attract readers' attention to the fact that his standpoint is common to Hutcheson, who was an established philosopher in Hume's age. This adaptation must also have been useful for Hume to make clear in what respect he differs from Hutcheson: for Hutcheson desire arises merely at the presence of good even when it is not

[201] The so-called Humean theory of motivation is a position to hold that motivation is a matter of a belief-desire pair, which assumes that neither a desire nor a belief by itself is sufficient to provide a motive, because our action always originates with a desire, which furnishes us with a goal; and that desire, when paired with a belief, which tells us how to pursue the goal, comprise a motive. This position, thus understood, is basically on the right track. The chief reason why this interpretation invites various disagreements seems to be that motivation as a belief-desire pair is often understood in the light only of the second process in which the prospect of pain and pleasure gives rise to aversion and desire. But we need to understand Hume's account of the will in light of all three processes mentioned above, and not to overlook that the determination of the will is explained by means of his general principle, viz. the communication of vivacity, which depends not on the imagination alone, but on the joint operation of the imagination and affections.

[202] 2002, p. 50.

attainable, whereas for Hume it is not "desire" but "the will or volition" that arises when good is attainable. In Hutcheson's system, motivation is merely a matter of the inclusion of desire and aversion, which are the only motivational master affections. For Hutcheson, any affection, except joy and sorrow, can be motivating by including either of these two affections, and the inclusion of desire and aversion is in proportion to "the apprehended Excess of Good or Evil" contained in the object of an affection.[203] Hutcheson's object is thus to explain how to establish "the best management of our Desire" or "the proper and effectual means" in order to obtain the greatest good for ourselves or others. By contrast, Hume's concern in Book II is not to explain how to attain strength of mind, which is for him a matter of "the *general* character or *present* disposition of the person" (T2.3.3.10; SBN T418), because it is a moral subject which involves the entire system of morality to be discussed in Book III. Yet Hume's point is that motivation is not merely a matter of the inclusion of a particular motivating passion, and that the force and violence of a passion is not a matter of "the quantity or ratio of good or pleasure contained in objects" as Hutcheson thinks. For, motivation is a matter of the impulse of a passion, which depends on the physical, mental, practical, and social relations between ourselves and the object of the passion. Hume's strategy is to illustrate this circumstance by appealing to the "close union of the imagination and affections", and to explain our motivation by the general principle, viz. the communication of vivacity, as we shall see in the next section.

5 The "situations of objects, which render a passion either calm or violent"

In the second half of his treatment of the will at T2.3.4-8, Hume explains the motivational circumstance in which the impulse of a passion changes according to change of the relation of ourselves and the object of the passion. His aim is to show that the same method of reasoning is applicable for the account of the will, and to prove the veracity of his system founded on the general principle, viz. the communication of vivacity.

Laird observes that the second half of Hume's discussion of the will is "desultory",[204] not worth our study. Apparently, the five sections which discuss "the causes of the violent passions"

[203] 2002, p. 37.
[204] Laird, 1967, p. 205.

look like a mixed bag which is constituted by seemingly unrelated subjects, such as custom, the influence of the imagination, the contiguity in space and time. These sections might seem like a miscellaneous collection of different subjects when we overlook that Hume's strategy is to explain the determination of the will by employing the calm/violent division as a token distinction, as opposed to a type distinction. There are several reasons that may make critics suspicious as to Hume's employment of the division as a token distinction, but the most fundamental reason is that the violence of a passion cannot serve as any reliable criterion, because emotional intensity is "volatile, likely to be momentary".[205] Yet, the violence qua volatility of a passion cannot be a problem for Hume to explain the impulse of a passion in terms of the force and violence of a passion, because this strategy is not concerned with any ethical aspect of our motivation. Critics commonly assume that "distinction in terms of feeling quality is not supposed to be the fundamental one".[206] Kydd takes Hume's account of the causes of the violent passions to be meant for the illustration of those undesirable circumstances which we should avoid in order to act virtuously, or of "unfortunate cases in which we are led by a distorted view or inadequate ideas".[207] For, they agree with Loeb that "Hume takes volatility to be a defect that sustains a normative or evaluative distinction between the calm and the violent emotions".[208]

Critics' belief or preconception that the violence of a passion is a defect which disturbs the mind is a relic of Hutcheson's view that "a confused sensation" prevents us from our free employment of reason. They are naturally guided by this Hutchesonian view, because in his former discussion of the combat of the calm and the violent passions, Hume adapted Hutcheson's ethical dichotomy, and indicated that the violence of passion is a negative factor, or a "momentary gust of passion" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419), which directs us to pernicious action. However, in his discussion of "the causes of the violent passions" at T2.3.4-8, the "force and violence" is regarding by Hume as a desirable factor to make a passion not only forceful but also agreeable. We need to "excite the spirits and enliven the passion" (T2.3.4.6; SBN 421), he insists, because we are naturally so insufficient to support ourselves that we need to "be "sustain'd by

[205] Loeb, 2002, p. 4.
[206] Árdal, 1966, p. 94.
[207] 1946, p. 131-5, 144.
[208] 2002, p. 4.

some brisk and lively emotion" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352):[209] the "ferment of the spirits" entails pleasure (T2.3.5.3; SBN 423). It is evident that Hume regards the "force and violence" as necessary to excite the spirits, and enliven the passion (T2.3.4.6; SBN 421), and that what is intended in his inquiry into "the causes of the violent passions" is those deisrable circumstances in which "the passion commonly acquires new force and violence" and thereby increases its impulse (T2.3.4.6; SBN 421).

Given that both the calm and the violent passions "pursue good, and avoid evil; and both of them are encreas'd or diminish'd by the encrease or diminution of the good or evil", why is it that "the same good, when near, will cause a violent passion, which, when remote, produces only a calm one" (T2.3.4.1; SBN 419)? It is this question, Hume indicates, that is central to the account of motivation. Given that my friend's visit tomorrow is more exciting than her visit planned for five years time because the idea of her near visit is more vivacious and forceful than the remote one, Hume's chief task is to explain the violence-inducing factors of a passion in terms of the technical, practical, psychological, and physical relation established between ourselves and the object of the passion.[210]

We cannot overlook that Hume's account of this seemingly haphazard assortment of different subjects is founded on the *cement* between "*natural* and *moral* evidence" which he has established in T2.3.1. Given that Hume's object in Book II of the *Treatise* is to demonstrate that "the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of reasoning", it is no surprise that his foregoing discussion of the passions converges on this key issue, a close union of the imagination and affections, in his treatment of this last subject of Book II. Let's see how Hume strengthens this master issue through the illustration of these four violence-inducing factors, viz. the association of passions, the effects of custom, the influence of the imagination on the passions, contiguity and distance in space and time.

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[209] Throughout his discussion of the causes of the violent passions, Hume highlights the violence of a passion as a desirable factor which gives a passion "new force and violence" (T2.3.9.5; SBN 421), "rouses the spirits, and gives an additional force to the passion" (T2.3.4.9; SBN 422), or "encreases the passion, and gives it new force and violence" (T2.3.4.10; SBN 422).

[210] Tito Magri plausibly argues that Hume's discussion of "the situations of the object which render a passion either calm or violent" is an inquiry into the causal principle of the violence of a passion, but he erroneously takes it as the subject belonging to Hume's discussion of the combat of reason and passion. (2008, p. 197).

"The association of passions" takes place whenever two passions are present in the same mind, even where they have no relation, or are produced by different principles, and are "transfused" into each other, causing an increase in their force and violence (T2.3.4.4; SBN 421). This is how a passion becomes more violent and motivational "by the borrowing of force from any attendant passion" (T2.3.8.13; SBN 438). When a pleasure produced by a beautiful dress produces my desire, this desire becomes increased by "swallowing up" my pride, which I may feel when I consider the dress as owned by me, and thereby converting the pride into the desire (T2.3.4.2; SBN 420).[211] The indirect passion of pride gives "additional force" to the direct passion of desire, and increases my desire for the object, because "when good or evil is plac'd in such a situation as to cause any particular emotion beside its direct passion of desire or aversion, that latter passion must acquire new force and violence" (T2.3.4.4; SBN 421). The increase of the force of a passion also happens, he indicates, whenever "any object excites contrary passions". For, the "opposition of passions commonly causes a new emotion in the spirits", and this new passion is converted into the predominant passion, thereby producing more disorder than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force (T2.3.4.5; SBN 421), according to him. This is how, for example, the love of Romeo for Juliet is strengthened by their families' opposition to their love.

"Custom" is mentioned by Hume as another remarkable cause of the increase or decrease of a passion: it even converts pleasure into pain, and pain into pleasure, by giving a "*facility* in the performance of any action or the conception of any object; and afterwards a *tendency* or *inclination* towards it" (T2.3.5.1; SBN 422). Although cooking is a troublesome task for an apprentice, it becomes the source of pleasure as it grows easier through repeated practice. Although there is a certain "unpliableness" in the conception of any object to which we are not accustomed, Hume points out, as the repetition produces facility, the "orderly motion" of the spirits produces a pleasure by giving "a relish in time for what at first was most harsh and

[211] This paragraph merits our attention, because this is the only place in which Hume explains the connection between a direct and an indirect passion: "Thus, a suit of fine clothes produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces the direct passions, or the impressions of volition and desire. Again, when these clothes are consider'd as belonging to ourself, the double relation conveys to us the sentiment of pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure, which attends that passion, returns back to the direct affections, and gives a new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope" (T2.3.9.4; SBN 439).

disagreeable" (T2.3.5.3; SBN 423). But, what is this "relish"? A hint is found in the analogy between custom and causal reasoning.[212] Custom is "parallel to our reasonings from cause and effect" (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353),[213] since both rely on the easy transition of the vivacity of the present impression, and on its consequent enlivenment of the conception of the relevant object, according to Hume. Our causal reasoning depends entirely on the *orderly* or customary motion of the imagination from cause and effect, which produces the feeling of "necessity" (T2.3.1.16; SBN 406). Similarly, the pleasure of facility produced by custom consists in the *orderly* motion of the spirits, which gives rise to a peculiar feeling or "relish" through the acceleration of the association of the passions. It is this relish, according to Hume, that contributes to the conversion of my former pain of cooking into a present pleasure, just as the feeling of necessity converts the simple conception of an object into a belief.

In his section, "Of the influence of the imagination on the passions" at T2.3.6, Hume underlines that "the imagination and affections have a close union together, and that nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter" (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424).[214] This close union of the imagination and affections is not a new issue, as he has already established it in his previous section, "Of the influence of belief" in Book I.[215] The significance of the connection between these two sections of Book I and Book II is emphasized by Annette Baier in terms of their thematic continuity, viz. "the factors determining patterns of attention, and the relative

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[212] In his discussion of love, Hume maintained: "Whatever is related to us is conceiv'd in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object. Custom also, or acquaintance, facilitates the entrance, and strengthens the conception of any object. The first case is parallel to our reasonings from cause and effect; the second education. And as reasoning and education concur only in producing a lively and strong idea of any object; so is this the only particular, which is common to relation and acquaintance…it must be from the force and liveliness of conception, that the passion is deriv'd" (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353).

[213] Hume observes: "'Tis sufficient for my present purpose, that we have may instances to confirm this influence of the imagination upon the passions" (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424). For, Hume has already established the close union of the imagination and affections in his section , "Of the influence of belief", in Book I. So Hume's discussion of the third situation of the object, "The influence of the imagination on the passions", is nothing more than the reiteration of this union.

[214] Hume's aim in his discussion of the origin of the direct passions of hope and fear is the demonstration of this key theme.

[215] Annette Baier points out that Hume's section, "Of the influence of the imagination on the passions" at T2.3.6 is founded on his discussion delivered in his former section in Book 1, "Of the influence of belief", and emphasizes the importance of this union of the imagination and the passions (1994, pp. 171, 310 fn).

salience of different evaluative judgments".[216] But what merits our attention is their structural continuity, viz. the close union of the imagination and affections, that serves as the basic structure of Hume's entire system. Also in his discussion of the indirect passions, Hume highlighted their close union in terms of the double relation of impressions and ideas from which the passion arises, insisting that "the relation of ideas must forward the transition of impressions" (T2.2.8.20; SBN 380), or that "these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections" (T2.2.2.16; SBN 340). What is new in the present account of the direct passions is that, unlike his foregoing discussion of the indirect passions, Hume's emphasis is laid on the dependence of the imagination upon the affections, rather than on the other way around. By referring back to his former maxim that "every object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it" (T2.2.8.6; SBN 374), he affirms that the passions forward the progression of the imagination by connecting those ideas which attend the relevant affections wherever the affections are transfused into each other (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424). Wherever the association of passions takes place producing their transfusion into each other, this transfusion necessarily forwards the association of ideas even where "they have but one relation, and sometimes without any" (T2.3.4.2; SBN 419). "A mutual implication between the passions and the association of ideas" is thus insisted by Hume: "the modes of association give the ideas possible reciprocal relations, while the qualities of the passions give the relations a direction and a sense" as Deleuze points out.[217]

The last violence-inducing factor is "the contiguity and distance in space and time", illustrated in the last two sections of the treatment of the will. Since the passions "keep pace with the imagination in all its variations" (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424), Hume has good reason to suppose that whatever has an influence on the imagination has "a proportionable effect on the will and passions" (T2.3.7.3; SBN 428). Hence Hume's only task is to explain why and how "distance both in space and time has a considerable effect on the imagination" (T2.3.7.4; SBN 429). Hume

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[216] 1994, pp. 171, 310 fn.

[217] Deleuze observes that "the passions need somehow the association of ideas, and conversely … the association presupposes the passions", claiming that "association links ideas in the imagination; the passions give a sense to these relations, and thus they provide the imagination with tendency", because it is "in virtue of a goal, an intention or a purpose" that ideas get associated, and it is only the passions that can confer motives upon human activity (1991, p. 62-3).

begins by reiterating his former assertion: "Ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality" (T2.3.7.1; SBN 427). Hume's assertion that "everything contiguous to us, either in space or time…be conceiv'd with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object, in its influence on the imagination" (T2.3.7.1; SBN 427) is nothing but the repetition of his former maxim: "Whatever is related to us is conceiv'd in a lively manner by the easy transition from ourselves to the related object" (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353). This is why "everything contiguous to us, either in space or time, shou'd be conceiv'd with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object, in its influence on the imagination" (T2.3.7.1; SBN 427). A promise of my tomorrow's present gives my son more pleasure than my promise of the same present in the next year. A withered maple tree in my garden gives me more concern than the one in a remote garden. For, the idea of a nearby object, by means of its relation to myself, approaches an impression in force and vivacity, whereas the idea of a remote object, by reason of the interruption involved in my conceiving it, appears in a weaker and more imperfect light (T2.3.7.3; SBN 428).

Hume's strategy is thus to explain why the same object, when near, has a more powerful influence on the will than when remote, in terms of the easy transition of the imagination, and to assume that the vivacity of the idea of the self is conveyed by the imagination to the object, and enlivens it. The imagination can perform this crucial task, because

> the imagination can never totally forget the points of space and time, in which we are existent; but receives such frequent advertisements of them from the passions and senses, that however it may turn its attention to foreign and remote objects, it is necessitated every moment to reflect on the present. (T2.3.7.2; SBN 427-8)

By assuming that "the present situation of the person is always that of the imagination", Hume takes "ourself" as the location of the imagination to be a sort of spatiotemporal axis "from thence we proceed to the conception of any distant object" (T2.3.7.8; SBN 430). On this view, "ourself" is thus the most vivacious present impression insofar as it receives frequent advertisements of

external objects from the passions and senses. This present situation of the person, as identified with the present location of the imagination, cannot be a physical or objective pivot from which space and time are expanded, but is a subjective one, being entirely dependent on the imagination which carries the present impression of ourselves to the object of the passion. This notion of space and time is subjective because it depends not only on the operation of the imagination which situates and relates objects in relation to ourselves, but also on the most intimate and vivacious impressions of ourselves, which make the object of the passion differently felt as its relation to ourselves varies. To put it the other way around, the present situation of ourselves as the axis of the subjective idea of space and time is announced by the imagination when the vivacity of the present impression of ourselves that has been carried to the object *returns* back to ourselves.[218] We can see how far the object is situated in relation to ourselves only when the impression of "ourself" carried by the imagination, having once reached the object, comes back to *reflect* upon us. As Hume indicates: "When we reflect, therefore, on any object distant from ourselves, we are oblig'd not only to reach it at first by passing thro' all the intermediate space betwixt ourselves and the object, but also to renew our progress every moment; being every moment *recall'd* to the consideration of ourselves and our present situation" (T2.3.7.2; SBN 428, my emphasis). "The *fewer* steps we make to arrive at the object, and the *smoother* the road is, this diminution of vivacity is less sensibly felt", and so is "more or less in proportion to the degrees of distance and difficulty" (ibid.). This is how the distance in space and time thus weakens the idea, and consequently the impulse of a passions, causing an interruption in the thought, according to Hume.

After having explained the transition of the imagination along the passage between ourselves and the object of the passion, Hume proceeds to argue that the easy transition of the imagination is not merely a matter of the spatiotemporal distance in which the object of a passion is related to us: the easy or difficult passage of the imagination depends on the *order* by which ideas are situated in reference to ourselves. When the object belongs to our past, the progression of our

[218] In his discussion of love, Hume argues that the second marriage of a mother weakens the relation with her child, because her new ties with another family prevent that *return* of the imagination from her to the child, so that the thought has no longer the vibration, requisite to set it perfectly at ease (T2.2.4.11; SBN 356).

thought in passing from the present situation of ourselves to the past object is "contrary to nature", so that the imagination has to proceed "in opposition to the natural course of the succession" of ideas (T2.3.7.8; SBN 430). By contrast, when we turn our thought to a future object, "our fancy flows along the stream of time … passing always from one point of time to that which is immediately posterior to it" (T2.3.7.8; SBN 430-1). All this is because

> in the conception of those objects, which we regard as real and existent, we take them in their proper order and situation, and never leap from one object to another, which is distant from it, without running over, at least in a cursory manner, all those objects, which are interpos'd betwixt them. (T2.3.7.2; SBN 428)

Hume thus accommodates the subjective notion of space and time with this qualitatively different feeling about past and future, front and behind, or at rest and in motion. This notion of space and time here shows a clear contrast with Book I's notion in this respect. In Book I, Hume's concern is with the "objective point" dependent on the objective spatiotemporal situations and relations of objects,[219] whereas in Book II, his concern is with what Livingston calls "tensed space and time"[220] or what Waxman describes as the "subjective" notion of space and time,[221] dependent

[219] Hume's theory of space and time should properly be taken to have two aspects, which are treated separately in Book I and Book II as the subject relevant to the understanding and relevant to the passions. Hume's concern in Book I is to explain space and time in terms of the properties of extension and duration as exhibited in our perceptions, whereas in Book II his concern is to explain space and time in terms of the influence of the relations of spatial and temporal contiguity on the imagination, and hence on the will and passions. In Book I, Hume maintains that "the idea of extension is nothing but a copy of the impressions of colour'd points, and of the manner of their appearance"(T1.2.3.4; SBN 34), and that "indivisible moments of time must be fill'd with some real object or existence, whose succession forms the duration, and makes it be conceivable by the mind" (T1.2.3.17; SBN 39). Hume's position is to hold that space and time consist of physical points, and to assume that some impressions and ideas have spatial or temporal qualities, not merely representional ones, and compose compound perceptions that have shape and size, which are constituted by simple perceptions occurring successively in that specific order. Book I's account is thus employed for the illustration of the properties of extension and duration as exhibited in our perceptions, and for establishing that the idea of space and time is not the idea of a separate or distinct existence but is merely the idea of "the manner or order" of the arrangement of simple impressions, which are not infinitely divisible.

[220] Livingston claims that "a new conception of [space and] time is being forged" in Book II (1984, p. 112). Waxman indicates a similar point, and rephrases Livingston's "tensed space and time" as "the subjective point of view". It is this point of view, according to Waxman, that enables imagination to situate and relate objects "not according to their own objective situation and relations in space and time but according to their spatial and temporal orientation relative to ourself" (2008, p. 83-4).

on the spatiotemporal orientation of objects relative to ourselves. Critics often find Hume's treatment of space and time defective, because they fail to take Book II's account into consideration, and thereby overlook that Hume's theory of space and time comprises two accounts, viewed from the subjective and objective points of view. [222] Livingston is plausible to observe that "some of their negative comments are due, perhaps, to the fact that Hume's two discussions of time have not been read as a piece", as "there is yet no commentary on the account in Book II".[223]

Hume leaves his account of the will by observing that there is a definite uncertainty concerning the determination of the will, not only because "the *causes* and *effects* of these violent and calm passions are pretty variable", but also because they "depend, in a great measure, on the peculiar temper and disposition of every individual" (T2.3.8.13; SBN 437), that is, "the *general* character and *present* disposition of a person" (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418). Yet Hume is not pessimistic about it, remarking: "Upon the whole, this struggle of passion and of reason, as it is call'd, diversifies human life, and makes men so different not only from each other, but also from themselves in different times. Philosophy can only account for a few of the greater and more sensible events of this war; but must leave all the smaller and more delicate revolutions, as dependent on principles too fine and minute for her comprehension" (T2.3.8.13; SBN 438).[224] We may well suppose that Hume is fairly satisfied with the result of his foregoing discussion of the passions.

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[221] 2008, p. 83-4.

[222] It is plain that is in Kemp Smith's consideration is only Book I's account of space and time, when he observes that "Hume's own positive teaching, that space and time consist of physical points is…one of the least satisfactory parts of the *Treatise*"(2005, p. 287).

[223] 1984, p. 112.

[224] We may take this to be Hume's explicit declaration of "mitigated scepticism". James Harris points out that "this sense of the ultimate inscrutability of the ways in which the passions succeed and alter each other is another respect in which Hume's text displays the influence of Malebranche and the Augustinian tradition" (2009, p. 143).

Chapter 5: The non-instinctive-direct passions

In the last two sections of Book II, T2.3.9-10, Hume illustrates the origin of hope and fear, and the love of truth, which are non-instinctive direct passions, derived from a mixture of different affections.[225] Hume's concern in his account of hope and fear is to demonstrate the influence of the relations of ideas on the affections (T2.3.9.7; SBN 443) through the illustration of their origin in terms of a mixture of joy and sorrow which varies according to the probability of good or evil. The love of truth is also a mixed affection, derived from the combination of different associative principles. Although unlike the other two books, Book II has no conclusion, this final section of Book II can be taken as the conclusion, or rather afterthought of his treatment of the passions, that human beings are not, after all, so entirely passive or dependent on external objects for the excitement of the mind, because we have such a peculiarly human passion, "the love of truth".

1 The origin of hope and fear

I examine how hope and fear arise from a sophisticated process in which joy and sorrow are intermingled according to the probability of good or evil which we expect from the object of the passion, and argue that Hume's aim is to give a final confirmation to his key theme of Book II, viz. a close union of the imagination and the passions.

Hume's discussion of the direct passions begins with the rehearsal of his former distinction between the indirect and the direct passions in terms of their genesis, and with his assertion that these two kinds of passion, "by concurring with certain dormant principles of the human mind", give additional force to each other. He here alleges seven direct passions, viz. desire and aversion, grief and joy, hope and fear, along with volition" (T2.3.9.2; SBN 438), and gives a brief sketch over the circumstances in which they arise:

> When good is certain or probable, it produces JOY. When evil is in the same situation, there

[225] I have argued that the direct passions are two kinds, non-instinctive and instinctive: those which arise directly from pain and pleasure, and thos which arise "from a natural impulse or instinct", which produce good and evil, and proceed not from then, unlike the other affections" (T2.3.9.8; SBN 439). See Section 3 of Introduction.

arises GRIEF or SORROW. (T2.3.9.5; SBN 439)

When either good or evil is uncertain, it gives rise to FEAR or HOPE, according to the degrees of uncertainty on the one side or the other. (T2.3.9.6; SBN 439)

DESIRE arises from good consider'd simply, and aversion is deriv'd from evil. The WILL exerts itself, when either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind or body. (T2.3.9.7; SBN 439)

There seems reason to suspect that in accounting for these passions, Hume adapted the particular passions and their surrounding circumstances from Hutcheson's following account:

> The Reflection upon the Presence or certain Futurity of any Good, raises the Sensation of Joy… The *Reflection* upon the Presence of Evil, or the certain Prospect of it, or of the Loss of Good, is the Occasion of the Sensation of *Sorrow*…[226]
>
> Fear … is "a Mixture of *Sorrow and Aversion*, when we apprehend the Probability of Evil, or the Loss of Good befalling our selves, or those we love:" There is more or less of Sorrow, according to the apprehended Degrees of Probability. Hope … is 'a Mixture of *Desire* and *Joy*, upon the probability of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil.'[227]
>
> The Apprehension of Good, either to ourselves or others, as attainable, raises *Desire*: The like Apprehension of Evil, or of the Loss of Good, raises *Aversion*, or Desire of removing or preventing it.[228]

Obviously Hume assimilates much from Hutcheson, and mold his account upon that of Hutcheson. This strategy is quite useful for Hume to make clear in what respects he is different from Hutcheson.[229] Hume's accounts are different from Hutcheson's chiefly in the following three points. First, for Hutcheson, hope is a mixture of joy with desire, and fear is a mixture of

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[226] 2002, p. 51.
[227] 2002, p. 53.
[228] 2002, p. 50.
[229] See Jane McIntyre, who details how "although Hume assimilates quite a lot from previous accounts of the passions, his intention is to subvert them, not to reform them" (2006, p. 209).

sorrow with aversion, whereas for Hume hope and fear are a mixture both of joy with sorrow, differing only in the ratio of their composition. Secondly, Hutcheson's account of hope and fear as a mixture of joy and sorrow is meant chiefly for the illustration of how to render joy and sorrow motivating, whereas Hume's same account is intended for the illustration of a close union of the imagination and affections. Thirdly, for Hutcheson, desire and aversion arise when they are attainable and therefore "directly lead to Action", whereas for Hume, desire and aversion are motivational passion which arise merely at the presence of good and evil, though "the will or volition" arises only when good and evil is attainable.[230]

On Hutcheson's account, motivational affections which "directly lead to Action" are desire and aversion. An affection, except joy and sorrow, become motivating by including desire or aversion. Hutcheson argues: "MIXED *Objects* are pursued or shunned with Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the apprehended Excess of Good or Evil…A COMPOUND *good or evil Object* is prosecuted or shunned with a Degree of Desire or Aversion, proportioned to the Sum of Good, or of Evil".[231] Hutcheson's concern is therefore with "the best management of our Desire", how the affections are influenced by the quantity, degree, or ratio of good and evil contained in the objects, and to establish this "general law", that "the Strength of publick Desire is in a Compound Ratio of the Quantity of the Good itself, and the Number, Attachment, and Dignity of the Persons".[232] Hence Hutcheson's object in *Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections* is to explain how to establish "the best management of our Desire" or "the proper and effectual means" in order to obtain the greatest good for ourselves or others. What makes this motivational system of Hutcheson's complicated is that joy and sorrow are "spiritual or pure Affections",[233] which cannot, be motivational by including desire or aversion. Joy and sorrow become motivating

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[230] I shall not here be concerned with the third difference because I discussed it in Section 4 of Chapter 4.

[231] 2002, p. 37. Although these two expressions, "compound" and "mix", were commonly used interchangeably by Hume's contemporaries, Hutcheson seems to employ them differently: by the former he means those of a mixed nature, which contain something adverse and something prosperous in their different circumstances, whereas by the latter, those which contain varieties of the same kind, viz. several Goods, at once. This different use of Hutcheson's might have influenced Hume, though Hume diverges from Hutcheson.

[232] Hutcheson, ibid. p. 39.

[233] 2002, p. 50-1. Following Malebranche, Hutcheson calls these four "original Affections", viz. Desire, Aversion, Joy and Sorrow, "spiritual or pure Affections", and distinguishes them from Passions, which are "violent confused Sensations, connected, with bodily Motions" (2002, p. 50-1).

only when they are converted into hope and fear by being conjoined with desire and aversion.[234] Hope is a mixture of joy with desire whereas fear a mixture of sorrow with aversion. This mixture takes place according to "the probability of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil" respectively. In contrast, for Hume hope and fear are a mixture *both* of joy and sorrow, differing only in the ratio of their composition: "hope and fear arise from the different mixture of these opposite passions of grief and joy, and from their imperfect union and conjunction" (T2.3.9.16; SBN 443). Hence Hume's concern is with these questions: why "the very same event, which, by its certainty, would produce grief or joy, gives always rise to fear or hope, when only probable and uncertain" (T2.3.9.9; SBN 439-440), and "why this circumstance makes such a considerable difference" (ibid.). Obviously Hume's concern is not with Hutcheson's "best management of our Desire", but to give the final confirmation to the influence of the relations of ideas on the passions, and to reinforce the key theme of Book II, viz. a close union of the imagination and the passions. Let's examine how Hume's account of the origin of hope and fear, and see how he subverts Hutcheson's account for his own purpose.

In accounting for the origin of hope and fear, Hume's chief task is to explain how the connection between the contrary affections, viz. joy with sorrow, takes place. Hume employs the same strategy by which he has explained the origin of respect and contempt, and examines the circumstance in which different affections arise as we change the points of view regarding the object of a passion.[235] He argues: "An object, whose existence we desire, gives satisfaction, when we reflect on those causes, which produce it; and for the same reason excites grief or uneasiness from the opposite consideration: So that as the understanding, in all probable questions, is divided betwixt the contrary points of view, the affections must in the same manner be divided betwixt opposite emotions" (T2.3.9.11; SBN 440). In this case, according as the imagination turns itself either to the one side or the other, and fluctuates between the opposite views of the object either

[234] This strategy is adapted by Hume when he argues that pride and humility can move us by producing the compound passions of respect and contempt. See Section 5 of Chapter 3.

[235] Hume argues: "In considering the qualites and circumstances of others, we may either regard them as they really are in themselves; or may make a comparison betwixt them and our own qualities and circusmtances; or may join these two methods of consideration. The good qualiteis of others, from the first point of view, produce love; from the second, humility, and for the third, respect; which is a mixture of these two passions" (T2.2.10.2; SBN 390).

of desire or aversion, "it must feel a momentary impression of joy or sorrow" (ibid.). "According as the probability inclines to good or evil, the passion of joy or sorrow predominates in the composition: Because the nature of probability is to cast a superior number of views or chances on one side; or, which is the same thing, a superior number of returns of one passion; or since the disper'd passions are collected into one, a superior degree of that passion" (T2.3.9.11; SBN 440). This is how "the grief and joy being intermingled with each other, by means of the contrary views of the imagination, produce by their union the passions of hope and fear (ibid.), according to Hume. This mixture of the contrary passions takes place in virtue of the different properties of the imagination and the passions: the imagination is "extreme quite and agile" since it is "of the nature of wind-instrument of music, which in running over all the notes immediately loses the sound after the breath ceases, whereas the passions are "slow and restive" since they "resemble a string-instrument, where after each stroke the variations still retain some sound, which gradually and insensibly decays" (T2.3.9.12; SBN 440-1). For this reason, where the imagination changes its view with great celerity, a passion produced from the first view still remains only to decay by degrees and allows the second passion produced from the second view to be mixed and confounded with each other. Thus far, this situation is nothing essentially different from his forgoing method of reasoning by which he explained the compound passions of respect and contempt as a mixture of love with humility, and of pride with hatred.

Yet, unlike the foregoing case, the present one is special because it is the case of the mixture of "contrariety of passions". For, where the objects of contrary passions are presented at once, the following three phenomena happen: "contrary passions succeed each other alternately, when they arise from different objects: They mutually destroy each other, when they proceed from different parts of the same: And they subsist both of them, and mingle together, when they are deriv'd from the contrary and incompatible chances or possibilities, on which any one object depends" (T2.3.9.17; SBN 443).[236] To explain these variations in terms of "the general principle", viz. a close union of the imagination and affections, is Hume's real aim in his account of the origin of

[236] Hume here mentions that contrary passions produce the increase of the predominant passon "at the shock of rencounter", as Hume has asserted in his former section: "wherever any object excites a contrary passions…an opposition of passions commonly cause a new emotion in the spirits, and produces more disorder, than the concurrence of any two affections of equal force" (T2.3.4.5; SBN 421).

hope and fear (T2.3.9.13; SBN 441).

The production of hope and fear is the third phenomena that when the object is not a compound of good or evil, but is considered as probable or improbable in any degree, "the contrary passions will both of them be present at once in the soul, and instead of destroying and tempering each other, will subsist together, and produce a third impression of affection by their union" (T2.3.9.16; SBN 442). For, contrary passions are capable of destroying each other not only when they are opposite in their directions as well as in the sensation they produce, but also when their contrary movements exactly rencounter,[237] which depends on the relations of those ideas from which they are derived (ibid.). But in the case of probability, in determining concerning the existence or non-existence of the same object, their relation cannot be perfect because these two objects are altogether incompatible. Although it is impossible for the imagination to survey the opposite chances by one steady view, it still needs to run alternately from the one to another, producing its peculiar passion, which decays away by degrees. This incompatibility of the views allows the two passions produced from different views to intermingle together by keeping the passions "from shocking in a direct line" (ibid.).[238] This is how hope and fear arise from the different mixture of the opposite passions of grief and joy, and "from their imperfect union and conjunction" (T2.3.9.16; SBN 443), according to Hume. He observes with considerable pride: "The influence of the relations of ideas is plainly seen in this whole affair" (T2.3.9.17; SBN 443). This "close union" of the imagination and affections is Hume's master issue which enables him to assert that whatever has an effect on "the imagination…have a proportionable effect on the will and passions" (T2.3.7.3; SBN 428).[239] Even in his discussion of

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[237] Hutcheson makes a similar reasoning: "EQUAL *Mixtures* of Good and Evil stop all Desire or Aversion"(2002, p. 37).

[238] Hume famously explains the mixture of contrary passions by the analogy of two opposite liquors in the following way. "If the objects of the contrary passions be totally different, the passions are like two opposite liquors in different bottles, which have no influence on each other. If the objects be intimately connected, the passions are like an alkali and acid, which, being mingled, destroy each other. If the relation be more imperfect, and consists in the contradictory views of the same object, the passions are like oil and vinegar, which, however mingled, never perfectly unite and incorporate" (T2.3.9.17; SBN 443). This assimilation of the passions to liquor or fluid makes a vivid contrast to his treatment of ideas, which are assimilated to particles or the extension and solidity of matter.

[239] Hume's account of the will and actions depends on their close union, that "nothing which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter: "Whatever our ideas of good or evil acquires a new vivacity, the passions become more violent; and keeps pace with the imagiantion in all its variations" (T2.3.6.1; SBN

the indirect passions, Hume's exclusive concern is to provide "a clear proof, that these two faculties of the passions and imagination are connected together, and that the relations of ideas have an influence upon the affections" through the demonstration that the "easy or difficult transition of the imagination operates upon the passions, and facilitates or retard their transition" (T2.2.2.16; SBN 340).[240] Hume insists that his "hypothesis concerning hope and fear carries its own evidence along with it" (T2.3.9.18; SBN 443), because that the production of hope and fear from "a probable good or evil" is a proof that "probability, being a wavering and unconstant method of surveying an object, causes naturally a like mixture and uncertainty of passion" (T2.3.9.21; SBN 444). In order to be "more concise in our proof", he examines some counterexamples, that wherever this mixture is produced from other causes, hope and fear arise even though there is no probability (ibid.). He examines these cases in which an evil conceived barely as *possible*, *impossible*, or even *certain*, does sometimes produce fear, or in which "surprise is apt to change into fear" (T2.3.9.22-8; SBN 444-7), and shows that they are all nothing but variation of the foregoing hypothesis, which "must be allow'd to be a convincing proof of the present hypothesis" regarding the origin of hope and fear (T2.3.9.21; SBN 444).

2 The origin of "curiosity, or the love of truth"

I argue that Hume's aim in his account of "the love of truth" in the last section of Book II is to undermine his Epicurean position[241] expressed in his former section that since the mind of man is insufficient to support itself, it naturally seeks after external objects to agitate the spirits (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352), by asserting that we have "an insatiable desire" for truth implanted in human nature, which affords us a pleasure similar to the pleasure of hunting and gaming.

There is something strange in the way how Hume completes his treatment of the passions in

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424), as we have seen in Section 4 of Chapter 5.

[240] Hume's famous "experiments", especially the sixth one, conducted on the "square" constituted pride and humility, love and hatred, is intended for the demonstration of this close union of the imagination and the passions.

[241] Hume thinks that the mind is "insufficient, of itself, to its own entertainment" so that "it naturally seeks after foreign objects, which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 352-3). It is by the Epicurean tradition, according to James Moore, that Hume expresses his agreement with "those who take a pleasure in declaiming against human nature" in Book II, and owns the natural state of mankind to be a condition of scarcity, weakness and instability in Book III (1994, p. 30).

Book II of the *Treatise*. For, unlike Books I and III, Book II is completed with the discussion of the origin of a direct passion with no conclusion nor concluding remarks. Furthermore, unlike the treatment of the indirect passions in Parts 1 and 2 of Book II, the treatment of the direct passions in Part 3 is completed without the account of the animal passions.[242] Part 3 of Book II shows a striking contrast with Part 1 and 2 in that its preceding two parts are completed with the demonstration that these person-directed passions, pride and humility, love and hatred, are nothing peculiar to human creatures, but shared by the whole sensitive creation, whereas Part 3 ends with the emphasis on a peculiarly human affection, viz. the love of truth. Granted that the last sections of Parts 1 and 2 are meant to confirm that Hume's system is so simple, accurate, general, and universal as to equal the theory of natural philosophy, what is Hume's aim in treating the love of truth in the final section of Book II?

Hume begins his discussion of the love of truth with the distinction between two kinds of truth, relevant to the abstract relations of ideas, and relevant to their real connections and existence, and discusses the first kind, assuming that the same theory is applicable to both kinds of truth (T2.3.10.11; SBN 453). What makes the love of truth distinct from other desires is that the truth "is not desir'd merely as truth", and that "'tis not the justness of our conclusions that alone gives the pleasure" (T2.3.10.2; SBN 448-9). But if the satisfaction which we sometimes receive from the discovery of truth does not proceeds "from truth, merely as such", what makes truth agreeable? Hume answers this question in terms of the following various factors which operate to render truth agreeable.

"The genius and capacity" which we employ in its invention and discovery is "the first and most considerable circumstance" to make truth agreeable (T2.3.10.3; SBN 449). For, the actions of the mind by themselves are always agreeable, because they produce the excitement of the soul.[243] But in order to enjoy "any stretch of thought or judgment", and to enjoy exercising our genius, there must be not only some "end" to "fix our attention", but also the importance and

[242] The reason for this is to "avoid prolixity", as Hume writes: "the reason why I waive the examination of the will and direct passions, as they appear in animals; since nothing is more evident, than that they are of the same nature, and excited by the same causes as in human creatures. I leave this to the reader's own observation; desiring him at the same time to consier the additional force this bestows on the present system" (T2.3.9.32; SBN 448).

[243] "Every lively idea is agreeable" (T2.2.4.5; SBN 353) by exciting the spirits.

utility of the truth in question (T2.3.10.4; SBN 449-450). For, the satisfaction which we receive in proportion to the fitness of an object to the end is derived not from the object by itself, but from its utility and importance to which the truth is directed. Given that, it is by sympathy with those who are supposed to enjoy the utility and importance of the object that they operate on the mind (T2.3.10.5; SBN 450). 5). We might wonder how such "a remote sympathy" could be the foundation of so great a passion as make philosophers apply themselves to the truth with so much industry and application, but this remote sympathy is sufficient for the purpose: its role is not to increase our pleasure with the communicated affections of others, but only to enable us to "fix our attention" on them (T2.3.10.6; SBN 451). In other words, the importance of sympathy is not to increases our pleasure by adding a new affection communicated from others, but to provide the "end" or target for the action of the mind. Although "that passion is not deriv'd originally from the end", but merely from "the action and pursuit", the end or target of our attention is essential to render the pursuit enjoyable and to make the attainment of the end, or the discovery of that truth, successful (T2.3.10.7; SBN 451). This success produces "a concern" for the end, which in turn gives rise to pleasure and disappointment by "the relation and parallel direction" of the passions (ibid.). Philosophy thus is parallel to hunting in these three respects: the pleasure consists in the actions of the mind [and body]; the utility or importance of the object is requisite, not to cause any real passion, but to support the imagination; the end of the action produces a concern with success, and thereby a pleasure and an uneasiness. (T2.3.10.8; SBN 451-2). Philosophy is also parallel to gaming in that the pleasure arises not from interest nor the game alone, but "from both these causes united, tho' separately they have no effect" (T2.3.10.9; SBN 452).

There is another "insatiable desire of knowing" implanted in human nature, viz. "curiosity". Despite its similarity to the love of truth, curiosity is derived from "a quite different principle" from the love of knowledge, because it is the desire which entirely depends on others for their information, allowing no room for study or application (T2.3.10.11; SBN 453). It is different from the love of truth, especially in that curiosity is basically a *pain* derived from a doubt, which causes a variation in the thought, and transports the mind suddenly from one idea to another. It is a quality of human nature that "too sudden and violent a change is unpleasant to us, and that

however any objects may in themselves be indifferent, yet their alteration gives uneasiness" (T2.3.10.12; SBN 453). The pleasure of curiosity is thus derived from the idea which strikes on us with such force, and concerns us so nearly, as to give an uneasiness in its instability and inconstancy" (ibid.). Hume treated "curiosity" together with "the love of truth" in order to make clear that despite their resemblance, they are fundamentally different from each other: the former is nothing sophisticated, being an uneasiness derived from the instability and inconstancy of ideas, whereas the latter peculiarly human, "the first source of all our enquiries" and human knowledge.

Now, given that the principal source of pleasure that the love of truth consists in is the action of the mind, we may ask, returning to our initial question, what could be the bearing of Hume's account of the love of truth on his system of the passions? Annette Baier suggests that this final section of Book II is intended to undermine his former dictum that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions", observing: "finally, Hume does concede the real motivating force of 'reason alone'—we enjoy reasoning".[244] But this reading of Baier's is not convincing, because Hume's point is not that reasoning is pleasing, but rather that what motivates us to seek "truth" is a passion founded on pleasures which are nothing essentially different from the pleasure of hunting and gaming. What Hume intends to undermine is not this slavery metaphor, but this former assertion: "Human life is so tiresome a scene, and men generally are of such indolent disposition" (T2.3.10.10; SBN 452) that we need to support ourselves by seeking "after foreign objects, which may produce a lively sensation, and agitate the spirits" (T2.2.4.3; SBN 352-3). Hume's object in highlighting the love of truth as the peculiarly human passion is to assert that the "continual search after amusement in gaming, in hunting, in business" is not necessary to make us "forget ourselves, and excite our spirits from the languid state", because we have an insatiable desire for truth implanted in human nature, and can enjoy such a peculiarly human pleasure as the love of truth. We may take Hume's discussion of the passions in Book II to be concluded with this *afterthought* that our affective experience is not so passive, nor entirely dependent on the "appearance" of a foreign object as he has deplored before, because we can keep ourselves vigorous and cheerful by eliciting such a peculiar pleasure as the love of truth.

[244] Baier, 1994, p. 170.

Chapter 6: Personal identity as it regards the passions

Hume distinguishes between two aspects of personal identity, "as it regards our thought or imagination", and "as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves", and discusses the first aspect in Book I. Although not a word is mentioned about the second aspect of our identity in Book II, he illustrates it in terms of self-concern with the past and self-concern with the future in his treatments of the indirect and the direct passions respectively.[245] On this view, his discussion of the passions as a whole can be taken as the illustration of personal identity regarding the passions.

1 How does the idea of the self arise?

Hume's account of the idea of the self as the product of pride and humility meets with this fundamental question regarding the impression-source of the idea of selfhood: Where does the idea of the self come from? What, exactly, is it an idea of?

Hume maintains on the one hand that "[a]ny thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride" (T2.1.5.8; SBN 288), and on the other that "the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea", viz. the idea of the self (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287). Hume thus indicates not only that the idea of the self is presupposed by pride, but also that pride produces the idea of the self. Here arises Penelhum's question, "how could we need to 'contemplate' the self in order to feel pride if the idea of the self is something the pride produces?"[246] Or, Donald Ainslie asks: "Since Hume can only explain conception of ourselves in terms of the indirect passions, how can he account for the idea of self that plays a role in producing the indirect passions?"[247] Ainslie suggests that Hume avoids this question by "supposing that the pre-existing idea of self is itself the product of our previous experiences with

[245] Jane McIntyre argues that "Hume's account of the indirect passions provides the framework for explaining concern with the past", whereas "the identification with a self in the future finds its fullest expression in a certain kind of motivation for action" (1989, pp. 551, 553).
[246] 1992, p. 285.
[247] 1999, p. 485 fn.

the indirect passions".[248] But this suggestion does not solve Penelhum's question: "although the idea of the self is 'produced' by pride in the sense that it is *called up* by it, it has in every instance to be an idea that we have and use already"—how could the idea of the self be "*in our repertoire*" in the first place?[249] Penelhum laments that Hume's account shows no way in which the associative mechanism of pride could be the origin of the idea of the self. I argue that, although Hume does not directly address Penelhum's question, his answer can be constructed not to the effect that "the pre-existing idea of self as the cause of the indirect passions is itself the product of our previous experiences with the indirect passions" as Ainslie suggests, but to the effect that it is the product of our previous experiences with the *direct* passions — the basic and primitive idea of the self "*revealed… in the activity of a living embodied individual*".[250]

In order to understand why this is so, we must begin by reiterating that for Hume the idea of the self is not anything like a substantial self which he denied in Book I. The idea of the self is not a simple idea but a complex one— "that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T2.1.2.2; SBN 277), as he explicitly indicates. But how are those ideas and impressions related to each other to constitute the idea of the self? Many answers have been given to the first question, but Capaldi's answer, taken in the following way, seems most convincing. Capaldi argues that the idea of ourselves emerges originally in action, and is revealed "in unfolding action" in two ways. On the one hand, the conception of ourselves arises from the images which others form of ourselves: "I can come to know myself through others".[251] "I can come to view myself from a social perspective" insofar as "*the self can respond to its own activity just as others respond to its activity*".[252] On the other hand, ourselves as a unity of consciousness is "*revealed to us only in the activity of a living embodied individual*" insofar as "it is only in action (with reference to the passion) that the unity of consciousness is most vivid".[253] Capaldi's view, thus understood, can be developed in the following way.

On the one hand, the importance of the aspect of the self as "a social construction" in

[248] 1999, p. 484.
[249] 1992, p. 286.
[250] Capaldi, 1995 (1), p. 636.
[251] 1995 (1), p. 635.
[252] 1995 (1), p. 635.
[253] 1995 (1), p. 636.

Hume's system should be emphasized. For, what makes a salient feature of Hume's accounts of the passions and of morality is his recurrent emphasis on the social aspect of our identity, and on the fact that our self-concern is fed by our awareness of others, and by their sentiments and opinions communicated to us by sympathy. "Our reputation, our character, our name are considerations of vast weight and importance" in the production of pride and humility (T2.1.11.1; SBN 316), as Hume insists, and these passions, once excited, *always* produce the idea of ourselves. Hume makes it explicit that this social aspect of self-awareness is the necessary condition for the production of pride and humility, by claiming that the original causes, such as a beautiful house, "have little influence, when not seconded by the opinions and sentiment of others" (ibid.). Although he calls the opinions of others the "secondary" cause of the passion, the role of the secondary cause in the production of a passion is as important as that of the original ones.[254] But, isn't Hume inconsistent to assert that the opinions and sentiments of others cause pride and humility, despite that they do not contain the idea of the self among their components? Since it is not the idea of ourselves, but the idea of others, that is embedded in the opinions and sentiments of others, Hume's assertion of the secondary cause of the passion seems at odds with his system that anything agreeable and related to us gives rise to pride by the double relation of impressions and ideas.

This seeming conflict is solved by Hume in terms of sympathy. Although the opinions and sentiments of others by themselves do not contain the idea of ourselves among their components, they always invoke the idea of ourselves by triggering sympathy—a powerful principle which raises "the idea, or rather impression of ourselves" by means of "a great resemblance among all human creatures" (T2.1.11.4-5; SBN 317-8). Wherever there is an object resembling ourselves, sympathy happens instinctively and automatically just as certain "materials take fire from the least spark" (T2.2.4.7; SBN 354), because this resemblance triggers sympathy "by the natural course of the disposition" even where we do not remark the resemblance (T2.2.4.6; SBN 354). And sympathy, thus triggered, engages the idea of ourselves, which is so intimate and vivacious as to be called an impression (T2.1.11.4; SBN 317). We here learn that the secondary cause of the

[254] See Section 2 of Chapter 1.

passion perfectly satisfies the condition of the double-relation hypothesis, and functions as the source of the ingredients to compose the passion. Importantly in this case, the opinions and sentiments of others communicated by sympathy are something more than mere ideas: "the ideas of the affections of others are converted into the very impressions they represent, and… the passions arise *in conformity to* the images we form of them" (T2.1.11.8; SBN 319, my emphasis). The reason why and how the image of ourselves entertained by others has a strong influence on the formation of our self-image is that in sympathy our own self-image or self-conception arises *in conformity to* the images that others form of ourselves. What here happens is that the opinions and sentiments of others trigger sympathy, while sympathy summons up the vivid impression of the self, and enables us to form a conception of ourselves.

On the other hand, ourselves as a unity of consciousness emerges most vividly through our action, or in "*bodily activity",* as Capaldi insists. It is this unity of consciousness involved in our bodily activity that gives rise to the idea of the self as an agent—a person who feels "the internal impression" called the will.[255] For Hume, the will is "*the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind*" (T2.3.1.2; SBN 399). Hume's point in defining the will as "an internal impression" is that we can never feel this impression separately from direct passions. He even defines "volition" as a direct passion (T2.3.9.2; SBN 438) despite his former assertion that the will is not "properly speaking … comprehended among the passions" (T2.3.1.2; SBN 399). By defining volition as a direct passion, he wants to make plain that we can have access to volition only by feeling a direct passion. Hume remarks that we feel the internal impression of the will when we give rise to a new motion of our body "knowingly". The internal impression of the will is discernible only through the direct passions, because it is, like the impression of necessary connection, not rationally discernible, and also because we find the motion of our body taking place *"*knowingly" *only insofar as* the sensation of the motion of our body is accommodated in our *on-going* feeling of the direct passions of desire or aversion. We "know" or perceive that the motion of our body is taking place "knowingly", not by means of causal or demonstrative reasoning, but by feeling the

[255] I explain this situation later in Section 2 of Chapter 6.

sensation of our moving body *together* with, or *accompanied* by, the feeling of the direct passions. The internal impression of the will does not arise, for instance, when I feel a new motion of my arm even though I do not desire it, or, conversely, when I cannot move my arm despite my wish because of my being palsy in the arm (EHU 67). It is by feeling this internal impression that we discover the unity of our existence both as the mind and the body, insofar as it is the product of the intimate connection between the bodily sensations and the passion. Granted that it is thus in action that the unity of consciousness is most vivid, as Capaldi points out, we may have reason to expect that the idea of ourselves arises through the feeling of the connection between the passion and the sensations of bodily movement. This is how the idea of the self is "*revealed to us only in the activity of a living embodied individual*".[256]

This inseparable connection between desire and bodily sensations guarantees that this idea of ourselves, once registered in the mind, is called up whenever a pleasant or painful object related to us appears in the mind, and thereby functions as the cause of pride and humility. For, anything pleasant or painful, and related to ourselves, summons up this original idea of the self, and thereby produces pride and humility, *because* this idea stocked in the repertoire of the mind is the product of the intimate connection between the direct passion of desire or aversion, which is pleasant or painful, and bodily sensations, which is closely related to us. We here have reason to suppose that this basic and primitive idea of the self produced by the direct passions—the idea of the self as an agent—functions as part of the "original" cause that produces pride and humility, insofar as for Hume the direct passions appear in the mind before the indirect passions according to the order of perceptions described in "Division of the subject" at T1.1.2. And an indirect passion, once aroused, converts this basic and primitive idea of the self embedded in the "original" cause into the general and intrinsic idea of the self constituting the passion—by turning our attention to ourselves, and making us think of our own qualities and circumstances (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287).[257] On this view, Hume is justified to assert that pride and humility *produce* the idea of the self, while they *presuppose* the [basic] idea of the self.

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[256] Capaldi, 1995 (1), p. 636.
[257] See Section 4 of Chapter 1.

2 The two aspects of personal identity

In this section, I try to answer these questions: Why does Hume divide his account of personal identity into two parts regarding the imagination and regarding the passions, and discusses them separately? What could be the merits of the distinction between the two aspects of our identity?[258]

Hume distinguishes between two aspects of personal identity, "as it regards our thought or imagination", and "as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves", and claims that the second aspect "corroborates" the first aspect, "by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T1.4.6.19; SBN 261). As Jane McIntyre argues, this distinction is a sign of Hume's divergence from Butler and Hutcheson, who hold that self-concern necessitates the existence of a substantial self, and also from Locke's view that an account of personal identity must justify concern with our past and future actions.[259] There was a strong worry prevalent among Hume's contemporaries that, unless we had something substantial existing through time, such as a substantial self or Locke's "consciousness", we could not justify our being as a bearer of moral responsibility nor make the concern with the consequences of our actions legitimate. Hume's strategy is to keep himself aloof from this worry by separating the questions concerning personal identity from the questions concerning morality, and by discussing the idea of the self as the subject relevant to self-concern—the subject distinct from the nature of the self relevant to beliefs we form concerning it, as McIntyre illustrates.[260] Book I is employed to prove the fallacy of our belief in a genuine idea of the self as substance, and to show how the fictitious idea of the self as a unity arises through the imagination's response to different perceptions linked together by the relation of cause and effect. Book II is employed for the account of a richer notion of the self as an embodied agent—a person who acts and is responsible for his actions—which arises from "a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures". The separation of the issue of self-concern from that of moral responsibility allows Hume to treat the idea of the self as a genuine subject of the passions to be discussed in terms of a unity of consciousness that emerges in two ways, through our feelings of the indirect passions and of the direct passions. The first

[258] This issue is illuminatingly illustrated by Jane McIntyre (1989) and Donald Livingston (1984).
[259] 1989, p. 549.
[260] 1989, p. 549.

circumstance is discussed in terms of self-concern with the past involved in the production of pride and humility,[261] whereas the second is illustrated in terms of self-concern with the future involved in a voluntary action. In the former discussion, Hume explains how the idea of the self as a bearer of sentiments, thoughts, and actions arises as the object of pride and humility, whereas in the latter discussion, he shows how the idea of the self as an agent arises while desire and aversion extend themselves to the causes and effects of the object of the passion.

It is true that not a word is mentioned by Hume in Book II regarding personal identity. But we find instead his assertion of the self as "that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and consciousness" (T2.1.2.2; SBN 277), and his recurrent emphasis on the idea of the self as the most vivacious and intimate present impression. It is indeed the "peculiar force and vivacity" of the idea of the self that enables Hume to hold that "whatever is related to self must partake of that quality" (T2.3.7.1; SBN 427), and to establish his core theories regarding the double relation of impressions and ideas, sympathy, and the will or volition. It may not be fanciful to suppose that Hume's reason why he does not directly address personal identity regarding the passions in Book II is that this aspect of our identity is so deeply embedded in his whole emotional system that it cannot be treated independently or separately from the general account of the passions. As we shall see, our identity regarding the passions pervades the entire treatment of the passions, because it is from a unity of consciousness which emerges through "a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" that the idea of ourselves existent through time arises. On this view, Book II as a whole should be taken properly as the illustration of personal identity regarding the passions.[262]

Hume's strategy for the analysis of our identity is strikingly different in Book I and Book II. Hume strictly narrows his focus upon a particular issue in order to prove the fallacy of "the strict and proper identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being" (Appendix 10; SBN 633), and to explain our identity in terms of the unity of the mind constituted of different perceptions. Hume

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[261] Jane McIntyre points out that "Hume's account of the indirect passions provides the framework for explaining concern with the past", whereas "the identification with a self in the future finds its fullest expression in a certain kind of motivation for action" (1989, pp. 551, 553).

[262] Livingston (1984, p. 119) and Capaldi (1992, 1995 (1)) argue that Book II is a study of the self through an examination of its passions.

needed only one section to show that, since the minds of men is nothing but a bundle of perceptions, our identity is a "fiction" produced by the natural propensity to confound identity with a related succession of perceptions. It is this negative task in Book I of demolishing the influential notion of a substantial self that allows Hume to address the idea of the self as the salient and most intimate present impression in Book II, and to enter into the discussion of the second aspect of personal identity, the one relevant to the passions. Personal identity regarding the imagination corroborates personal identity regarding the passions by providing its foundation in terms of a unitary mind, while the latter identity corroborates the former "by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T2.4.6.19; SBN 261). Jane McIntyre modestly points out that "Book 2 of the *Treatise,* in its account of the passions, provides the resources for supplementing our understanding of Hume's discussion of personal identity".[263] We must go further and insist that Hume's theory of personal identity depends on the *mutual* corroboration of two aspects of our identity.[264]

3 Self-concern with the past and with the future

In the discussion of the indirect passions, Hume explains how the idea of the self arises in the circumstance in which the present concern with ourselves, engaged by pride and humility, extends itself encompassing our past thoughts, sentiments, and actions, and produces a unity of causally linked different perceptions in a form of personal history. The present self is here viewed from the "diachronic" perspective[265] *as the pivot from which the causal chain of our past perceptions is extended in the form of a "narrative" along the subjective or personal time. In his discussion of the direct passions, Hume illustrates how the idea of the self arises in the circumstance in which the direct passions give rise to the present concern with the future pains and pleasures, and thereby give unity to those different perceptions constituting the relation*

[263] 1989, p. 545.
[264] The relation between the two aspects of our identity is controversial. Critics' opinions are divided roughly into two: Suzan M. Purviance holds that Hume recanted Book I's account of personal identity, and replaced with Book II's (1997), whereas Annette Baier, Jane McIntyre, Peter Kail argue that there is a continuation between Book I's and Book II's account, and that the latter supplements and reinforces the former.
[265] Peter Kail highlights the "diachronic and synchronic" aspects of the identity of a person (Unpublished).

between ourselves and to the object of the passion. The self is here viewed from the "synchronic" perspective in terms of a time-sliced person, in which the spatiotemporal "present situation of the person" (T2.3.7.8; SBN 430) plays the role of its locus providing "the location of the imagination" (ibid.).

Hume argues that pride, once produced, "always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities and circumstances" (T2.1.5.6; SBN 287). It is this self-concern engaged by the passion that provides the foundation of personal identity regarding the passions. For, the idea of my self as a temporally enduring existence arises through the process in which this self-concern extends itself by encompassing all those sentiments, thoughts, and actions related to the house, and thereby connect them into a unity constituting my personal history. But, isn't this causally linked chain of perceptions nothing different from Book I's "system of different perceptions or different existence, which are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect" (T1.4.6.19; SBN 261)?

The causally linked chain of perceptions produced by pride is different from Book I's "true idea of the human mind" in this important respect. The former unity of perceptions is the product both of the associations of impressions and of ideas, whereas the latter is the product of the association of ideas alone, as Hume states: "identity depends on the relation of ideas; and these relations produce identity, by means of that easy transition they occasion" (T1.4.6.21; SBN 262). The association of ideas cannot produce "a total union", because ideas are *discrete* existences, which are capable of forming a compound "only by their conjunction, not by their mixture" (T2.2.6.1; SBN 366). In order to render the union entire, the association of ideas needs to be corroborated by the association of impressions, because impressions or passions are, like colours, susceptible of an entire union by their mixture (ibid.). Where the two associations join together, those perceptions constituting the mind are connected into such a firm unity as to produce an idea of the self which is more like an "impression of ourselves" rather than a mere idea (T2.1.11.3; SBN 317), because they are cemented together by the mutual *transfusion* of the impressions into a mixture, not merely by a conjunction.

But, how could the association of ideas invoke the association of passions? Hume answers:

"no object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it" (T2.2.8.4; SBN 373). That is, in virtue of this "general maxim", that "every object is attended by some emotion proportion'd to it" (T2.2.8.6; SBN 374), those emotions attending the different perceptions which constitute the mind are transfused into each other, and produce a mixture in the form of entire unity, by playing the role of the *cement* of their connection. And it is this cement that enables the extension of our present concern. When I take pride in my house, my present concern engaged by pride encompasses or "swallows" those emotions attending all those related past sentiments, thoughts, and actions, by transfusing them into each other. Nothing is then more natural for us than to suppose that this extension of concern by means of the transfusion of the emotions produces a unity of all those ideas which are attended by them, insofar as for Hume "every idea is attended by some emotion proportion'd to it" (T2.2.8.6; SBN 374).[266] The conception of my self as the house owner invoked by pride here functions as the pivot from which a causal chain of the relevant perceptions extends diachronically in a "narrative" manner,[267] giving rise to the idea of my self as a temporary enduring existence.

It is evident, however, that this important function of pride and humility required to produce the idea of the self as the bearer of thoughts, sentiments, and perceptions, is irrelevant to the direct passions. When I reflect on my past generous donation, the pleasant emotion excited by the reflection of this past action may trigger the double-relation mechanism of pride, because the idea of the pleasure caused by my donation is so enlivened by memory as to pull the trigger of the productive mechanism. By contrast, my future action cannot trigger the productive mechanism of pride and humility, because when I think of my future donation, the idea of the pleasure which I expect from this action is nothing but a faint image, a mere projection of my past experience, which is too weak to perform the task.[268] Besides, the direct passions cannot turn our view to ourselves, because, unlike pride and humility, they do not have the idea of the self for their object.

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[266] Hume writes: "no object is presented to the senses, nor image formed in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spirits proportion'd to it" (T2.2.8.4; SBN 373).
[267] Hume's account of personal identity is often discussed in terms of narrative conception of the self: e.g. Livingston (1984), A. E. Pitson (2002), Lorenzo Greco (2015).
[268] See Section 2 of Chapter 1.

Nonetheless, however, the contribution of the direct passions to the production of our identity is no less significant than that of the indirect passions: we owe the idea of the self as an agent to the direct passions. For, unlike the indirect passions, the direct passions are for Hume motivational passions—a passion, which cannot rest as it is, "but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and effect" (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414). The direct passions do not involve the "redirection" of our attention, but directly engage the present concern for our future pleasures and pains, and allow the concern to extend itself to the causes and effects of the object of the passion (ibid.).[269] When we are affected by a direct passion, the passion not only turns our view to the pleasure or pain that we expect from an object, but also carries us to embrace or avoid that object (ibid.). It is through this extending process that we discover whether "either the good or the absence of the evil may be attain'd by any action of the mind or body" (T2.3.9.7; SBN 439). And it is only when either good or the absence of evil is attainable "by any action of the mind or body" that "[t]he WILL exerts itself" (ibid.) according to Hume. Hume's chief concern in his account of the direct passions is to explain the circumstance in which the idea of the self as an agent—a person who feels the "internal impression" of the will— through the illustration of how we discover whether good or the absence of evil is attainable by any action of the mind or body.[270]

We owe this discovery chiefly to the imagination which conveys the present impression of the self to the object of the passion through the transition along related ideas prepared between "the present situation of the person" and the object of the passion (T2.3.7.8; SBN 430-1), as we

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[269] Jane McIntyre argues that "our concern with ourselves in the future results from the operation of sympathy": "The identification of *my* interest with the interest of a future person—the identification of *myself* with that person—is the result of this extended operation of sympathy. When I think of myself in the future I think of the actions that follow from my present intentions, motives and character: I think of the consequences of those actions, and the circumstances in which they take place. This causal connection between something central to my present self—that is, my intentions motives and character—and the actions and circumstances of a future person facilitates the operation of sympathy. The 'possible or probable condition' of that future person becomes my own present concern"(p. 556). But this view that self-concern with the future is derived from sympathy is at odds with her basic assertion that self-concern with the past is discussed in Hume's treatment of the indirect passions whereas self-concern with the future in his treatment of the direct passions, that "the identification with a self in the future finds its fullest expression in a certain kind of motivation for action" (p. 553), because sympathy is for Hume the subject relevant to the indirect passions, whereas the will and action relevant to the direct passions.

[270] Five sections of T2.3.4-8 detail this situation. See Section 5 Chapter 4.

have seen.[271] The task of the imagination is to produce "the conception of any distant object" (T2.3.7.8; SBN 430), and thereby situates ourselves in relation to the object as one of the items constituting the external world (T2.3.7.2; SBN 427-8): the task of the passion is to engage our concern by enlivening the ideas of pains or pleasures which we expect from that object. This concern extends itself according to the progression of the imagination, by encompassing different perceptions constituting the circumstance in which our self is related to the object. This extension of the present concern produces the connection of different perceptions into a synchronic unity—a unity that extends itself with an axis of "the present situation of" ourselves, "from thence we proceed to the conception of any distant object" (T2.3.7.8; SBN 430). It is this unity, which the product of the corroboration of the two associations of ideas and impressions, or of the imagination and passions, that invokes the internal impression called the will, and gives rise to the idea of the self as an agent, a flesh-and-blood person who acts for his pleasures and interests.

[271] See Section 5 of Chapter 4.

Conclusion

Hume's aim in the *Treatise* is to establish "the science of MAN" as "the only solid foundation to other sciences" by "anatomizing human nature" in terms of these activities of the mind: logic, that explains "*the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas*"; morals and criticisms, that "*regard our tastes and sentiments"*; and politics, that considers *"men as united in society, and dependent on each other*" (Abs. 3; SBN 646). Hume observes that he "has finished what regards logic, and has laid the foundation of the other parts in his account of the passions" (ibid.), and indicates that the key linkages to hold the whole system together are found in the discussion of the passions propounded in Book II.

The connection between the two systems of the understanding and the passions is asserted by Hume in various places in Book II particularly in terms of their common associationist methodology. "What in particular distinguishes them as a single topic is the fact that in both cases association is the source of order and complexity", as Passmore rightly argues. A salient feature of Book II is the analogy between the double-relation hypothesis of the production of the indirect passions and Book I's hypothesis of our making causal judgment (T2.1.5.11; SBN 289-90). Given this analogy, it is no wonder that sympathy, which is a typical instance of the double relation, is "exactly correspondent to the operations of our understanding" (T2.1.11.8; SBN 320), and functions as a secure tie to connect Book II's account of the passions with Book I's theory of knowledge. This analogy leads Kemps Smith even to argue that Hume's doctrine of belief is modeled on the doctrine of sympathy.[272] Yet, Hume's intention is not to establish a mere analogy between two methodologies, but to assert the "concurrence" of both associations of ideas and impressions, and to claim that a new passion *must* arise when both transitions of ideas and impressions are united "in one action", bestowing on the mind "a double impulse" (T2.1.4.4; SBN 284). For Hume, the production of a passion is not only a proof of the cooperation between the two systems of the understanding and the passions: it is "no despicable proof" of the veracity of his system (T2.1.5.11; SBN 290).

[272] 2005, p. 48.

But as regards the direct passions, it is not the double-relation hypothesis, but the "close union of the imagination and affections" that serves as the connection between Books I and II. The theme of Book II's discussion, "Of the influence of the imagination on the passions" at T2.3.6, is directly carried over from Book I's section, "Of the influence of belief". He makes this clear by referring back: "I have already observ'd that belief is nothing but a lively idea related to a present impression. This vivacity is a requisite circumstance to the exciting all our passions" (T2.3.6.10; SBN 427).[273] It is on the basis of this intimate connection between belief and the passions that he establishes "a close union" between the imagination and affections, and that "nothing, which affects the former, can be entirely indifferent to the latter" (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424). "Whenever our ideas of good or evil acquire a new vivacity, the passions become more violent; and keep pace with the imagination in all its variations" (ibid.), because, he reasons: "Every object is attended with some emotion proportion'd to it" (T2.2.8.6; SBN 374) and this "*attendant emotion is easily converted into the predominant*" (T2.3.6.1; SBN 424).[274] This close union of the imagination and affections allows Hume to suppose that whatever has an "effect on the imagination… must have a proportionable effect on the will and passions" (T2.3.7.3; SBN 428), and to explain the impulse of a passion in terms of the process in which the emotions of desire and aversion extend themselves to the causes and effects of the object of the passion, "as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience" (T2.3.3.3; SBN 414). The impulse of a passion for extension is here a matter of the easy transition of the imagination that carries the impression of the self to the object of the passion, and enlivens it (T2.3.7-8; SBN 427-438). This close union of the imagination and affections is strengthened and confirmed in his account of the origin of hope and fear through the demonstration of how the passion arises from a different mixture of joy and sorrow which takes place according as good or evil is probable or improbable (T2.3.9.9-32; SBN 439-448).

A further important connection between the first two books of the *Treatise* is the mutual

[273] This is a reiteration that "belief is almost absolutely requisite to the exciting our passions" (T1.3.10.4; SBN 120).

[274] This is derived from his former "general maxims": "no object is presented to the senses, nor image form'd in the fancy, but what is accompany'd with some emotion or movement of spririts proportion'd to it" (T2.2.8.4; SBN 373); "The predominant passion swallows up the inferior, and converts it into itself" (T2.3.4.2; SBN 420).

corroboration between the two aspects of our identity, as it regards the imagination, and as it regards the passions, discussed in Books I and II respectively. Personal identity regarding the passions is founded on "the fictitious idea" of unitary mind produced by personal identity regarding the imagination, while the former identity supplements and reinforces the latter by rendering it to be the identity of a flesh-and-blood person, not just of mind.[275]

Now, turning to the second connection between Books II and III, Árdal has good reason to emphasise their "peculiar unity"; that they are both meant "to discover those psychological laws that explain human emotions (including moral emotions) and the behaviour of people in society".[276] Given Hume's assertion that Book II provides the foundation of Book III (Abs. 3; SBN 646), nothing is more natural for us than to agree with Árdal, that "Book III is to be understood in the light of the arguments in the earlier books", or that "certain features of Hume's constructive moral theory in the *Treatise* can be understood only if the second and third books of the *Treatise* are studied together".[277] A most important connection is asserted by Hume in terms of the intimate relation between the indirect passions and the moral sentiments: "our approbation or blame…is nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred" (T3.3.5.1; SBN 614). It is essential for Hume that the two productive mechanisms of the indirect passions and the moral sentiments "agree together" (T2.1.7.4; SBN 295) in order that "the moral sentiments register approval or disapproval of a character trait; the indirect passions connect the trait to the person who bears it", as Ainslie puts it.[278] The "justness" of the former hypothesis relevant to the passions is "an absolute and invincible proof" of the latter relevant to morality (ibid.) insofar as they agree with each other. The intimate connection between Books II and III is further insisted on in his account of the will and direct passions. By claiming that strength of mind implies the prevalence of the calm passions above the violent ones, which depends on "the *general* character or *present* disposition of the person" (T2.3.3.10; SBN 418), he makes clear that the determination of the will is, to a certain extent, an ethical matter relevant to the character of the person affected. The most obvious tie between Books II and III is sympathy, which "has a great influence on our

[275] Baier, 1994, p. 136.
[276] 1966, p. 2.
[277] 1966, p. 4.
[278] 1999, p. 491.

sense of beauty, when we regard external objects, as well as when we judge of morals" (T3.3.6.1; SBN 618). Sympathy as "the chief source of moral distinctions" is first introduced in his discussion of the indirect passions as the most remarkable quality of human nature, which enables us to receive the opinions and affections of others (T2.1.11.1-2; SBN 316). It is evident that the *Treatise* as "a complete system of the sciences" (T Intro. 6; SBN xvi) hangs on Book II, which makes the heart of the whole system by building vital bridges between the epistemological theories of Book I and the moral ones of Book III.

The importance of Book II is not merely as linkages that render the whole system into a unity, but as the *heart* of the science of MAN: Hume's system of the passions *by itself* is so autonomous and active as to be comparable to the living organism of *man*. Fanciful as it might seem, it is tempting to highlight the efficiency of this system by assimilating it to our physical constitution: pride and humility function as the *head*; love and hatred as the *body*; the compound passions as *hands*; the direct passions as *legs and feet*; personal identity regarding the passions as *blood*. Pride and humility play the role of the "head" of Book II's system, in the sense that the hypothesis of a double relation of impressions and ideas dominates and supervises the whole system through the production of pride and humility, thereby giving rise to the idea of the self as their object. The influence of the double-relation mechanism extends even to the systems of the understanding and morality in virtue its being analogous to the mechanisms in which beliefs arise from causal judgments on the one hand, and in which the moral sentiments arise from the extended sympathy on the other. The production of love and hatred provides the "body" to the system, by ensuring a great resemblance of all human creatures, and situates us in relation to others as a member of society. The compound passions serves as the "hands" of his system, which enable us to get in touch with other people by taking care of all the complicated relations between ourselves and others through sympathy. The direct passions function as the "legs and feet" of the system, as they have a full command all over our action, and bring us into contact with external objects. Finally, in his account of personal identity, Hume shows how the peculiar force and vivacity of "ourself" circulates like "blood" all over the system, and enlivens those ideas constituting both of the mind and the body. Here arises the organism of human mind,

comparable to the organism of living body.[279] The whole mechanism of Hume's system is ready at any moment to be triggered by the appearance of an external object, "a rational thinking Being like ourselves", in particular. As Hume states: "On the appearance of such an object it awakes, as it were, from a dream: The blood flows with a new tide; The heart is elevated; And the whole man acquires a vigour, which he cannot command in his solitary and calm moments" (T2.2.4.4; SBN 353). It is indeed the "statics and dynamics of the mind" modeled on the pattern of natural science, as Kemp Smith points out,[280] that characterizes Hume's naturalistic and mechanistic account of the human constitution. But, from whence is this "statics and dynamics" derived? We have now one obvious answer to this question: it is Hume's division of the passions into indirect and direct that accommodates all these dynamic factors to his system by virtue of the different or even contrary qualities of these two kinds of passions. Our affective experience is so delicate and complicated because it is the product of the integration of these two different kinds of passions. Book II of the *Treatise* is "new and extraordinary", insofar as no one had ever succeeded in propounding such a dynamic yet consistent system of the passions as could be paralleled to natural sciences.

[279] Tamás Demeter highlights the mental and medical analogy as the basic feature of Hume's account of the mind, especially of Book II, and indicates that Hume's theory of the mind, and his treatment of the passions in particular, was modeled on the theories of physiology, anatomy, and medicine popular in his age, rather than on the Newtonian science as is commonly acknowledged (2016).
[280] 2005, p. 71.

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