ABSTRACT

Of the many groups of problems falling under the general heading "Intentionality" three will be discussed in this thesis - firstly, that nest of problems surrounding the various criteria for intentional sentences, and with the thesis that intentionality is the mark of psychological sentences; secondly, those views and queries surrounding the notion of an intentional object, and particularly the problems concerning the nature and definition of such objects; and thirdly the more traditional area, viz. problems concerning the account which is to be given of the relation between a mental event or activity and its object.

Part I takes up the first set of problems. For reasons which will emerge we need to give a clear sense to the idea of referential use of a name or description. After considering certain views, and in particular after rejecting a necessary connection between referential use and the ability of the speaker to identify what he is referring to, a detailed definition or criterion is proposed. The basic idea of this criterion (the G-criterion) is that the use of "the A" in "f(the A)" is referential if: f(the A) and a is the A implies that f(a), or vice versa (section 1 and 2). This covers very many cases, and prima facie objections can be overcome by

simple extensions (Sections 3 - 5). More difficult objections are discussed at appropriate places in the text (Sections 15 and 25), and appropriate simple extensions made.

Chisholm's first test for intentionality raises problems of formulation (Sections 6 and 7), but when these are overcome the objection may occur that the truth of a statement in which reference is made to something which is taken to exist requires that that thing exist. (Section 8). But as this is not generally valid the discussion proceeds by attempting to determine the limits of its validity. This requires various distinctions, in particular that between various ways of referentially using a name or definite description (attributive, essential and non-essential) and between what I mean and what I say (Sections 9 and 10). Now the principle of Section 8 breaks up into four distinct versions, two of which manifestly could not be used in criteria to pick out psychological sentences. A third version has more plausibility, but when explored it is seen to be not satisfied only by an interesting sub-class of psychological sentences, and the fourth version is finally seen to be of no help either for Chisholm's project, after further discussion of the mean/say distinction. Even after various relaxations are allowed and additional tests mooted, this first criteria does not pick out all psychological sentences among those to which it is applicable (Sections 11 - 14). Chisholm's second criterion is similarly unsuccessful (Section 15).

Chisholm's third criterion also faces problems of formulation, but when they are overcome it relates to the principle known as Liebniz' Law, and to Quine's notion of referential opacity, although Quine builds very different theses on his notion (Sections 17-19). Problems now arise about whether this test is to include a referential demand, and if so whether it would apply to sentences of the form "A f's an X"- such a demand is included, and separate criteria considered (unsuccessfully) for these sentences (Sections 19-21). Now psychological sentences are broken up into three rough groups, and it is shown for the two major groups that opacity occurs only for attributive or essential uses of such sentences, and does not occur at all for sentences which satisfy the principle of Section 12. (Section 21-24). So this third test again fails to pick out all psychological sentences, even when appropriately reformulated (Sections 24 and 30).

Applying these results to Quine's views, they show (together with further arguments) that failure of substitutivity cannot be taken as showing an ambiguity in the sentence concerned (Sections 26 and 27). But Quine needs this to make his rejection of intentional or opaque sentences plausible, and also to locate his restriction on quantification. We can now see that his restriction is misplaced, and should be that the variables can only be replaced by names or descriptions used non-essentially. This restriction also makes Liebniz's Law valid for all referential contexts. (Sections 27-29).

Turning in Part II to problems concerning intentional objects, Miss Anscombe's view that intentional objects are a sub-class of direct objects is expounded, but the arguments concerning the nature of direct objects are found to be inconclusive (Sections 1-3). Further there seem to be decisive objections to this thesis, arising from the fact that the sentence in question must be true and the phrase giving the intentional object must be used referentially. (Section 4). Even more important, though, is the fact that the sense of "object" used here seems obscure, and after a short attempt to clarify one case of it, viz. "object of thought", it emerges that there is a greater complexity of uses which need to be clarified (Section 6). So seven different uses of "to think of", none of which are cases in which the thought could be said to be embedded in an action, are distinguished and discussed in detail (Sections 7-13). In terms of these uses, and of some properties of "it occurred to me (him etc) ...." locutions, it is possible to (i) see the limitation of the simple definitions of object of thought considered earlier, (ii) see again the way in which Chisholm's criteria avoids the complexities of use in this area, (iii) define for a limited number of cases a notion of object of thought, and (iv) observe various features of objects of thought so defined and of these cases of thinking of.

Coming to the third area of intentionality, the type of concepts of intentionality as a property of mental events to be

discussed here, and indeed the very problems themselves, require that at least some cases of a concept like "thinking of" are mental events, and so two writings which might be regarded as attacks on this notion are considered. It is argued that P. F. Strawson's argument in 'Individuals' Chapter 3, is ambiguous in various ways, and that even when it is re-inforced in various ways it establishes nothing at all concerning thinking (Sections 1-6). A version of Wittgenstein's argument is set up in a relevant context, and it is argued that ... this is a valid argument provided that its restrictions are fully understood, that it is properly distinguished from other arguments and the inadequacy of various objections is recognized. However, the restrictions are such that it demonstrably does not apply to thinking (Sections 7-12). In further elaboration of this position, an attempt is made to sketch a plausible candidate for the view which this argument establishes (Section 13). But none of this shows that the notion "mental event" is a clear one, and an attempt to specify its sense clearly throws doubt on whether this can be done. The purposes of this thesis, however, can be achieved with more limited terms, and to this end a sense is defined for 'intellectual event'. (Section 15).

In Part IV it is argued that substantial and unresolved problems remain in the more traditional area of intentionality, that of the relation between a mental event and its object, at least

for the cases of thinking of above for which a sense of object of thought was defined, and for the more restricted notion of intellectual event, which these exemplify. For it can be shown that thinking of something does not consist in the having of images or symbols, or of using a word or symbol to mean the person or thing in question (Sections 1-3), and indeed that it does not consist in anything, in the sense of having mental constituents (Section 6). Further, none of the various views which might be or should be attributed to Aquinas seem to resolve the problem, either because they are themselves incoherent or because they fail to avoid the earlier arguments (Section 5). So the problems remain, and various attempts to dissolve them seem unacceptable (Section 6), even though they are in some sense not conceptual difficulties (Section 4).

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I wish to express my gratitude to Mr. J.C.B. Gosling for the many hours he spent in discussion and criticism of my work. I have not attempted to document his suggestions for this would have required an acknowledgement in almost every section.

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INTENTIONALITY AND MENTAL EVENTS

By

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ANALYTICAL TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I- INTENTIONALITY AND REFERENCE

Section

1 Some queries raised about the notion of reference, and of the referential use of a term, which will be fundamental to what follows. Some views discussed.

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3 Some advantages of this criterion are listed, by showing the range of cases which can handle satisfactorily.

4 Yet there are difficulties, most of which can be readily overcome. Problems concerning referentially opaque sentences discussed, but finally left till later.

5 But identity statements, whether simple ones or as occurring in the expression of a propositional attitude, need somewhat more detailed treatment. This criterion is accepted for the following discussion.

6 Chisholm's criteria for intentionality, and his thesis concerning intentionality as the mark of the psychological, expounded, and some points are made concerning their interpretation.

7 Preliminary problems regarding these formulations are discussed, particularly with respect to the first criterion, on which attention is now focussed.

8 But the main objection to the first test is likely to be that the truth of a statement in which reference is made to something which is taken to exist requires that that thing exist.

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10 This leads to a further distinction of importance, viz. that between what I mean and what I say. The conditions for this distinction to be a real one are explored.

11 Four versions of the principle of Section 8 can now be distinguished, and two are discussed and shown to pick out no particular class of sentences, and so could not be successfully used as a test for intentionality.

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13 The fourth version raises difficult questions about the mean/say distinction, and whether what I mean (propositional) can be true even though there is nothing that I mean.

14 Recapitulation of the discussion so far. It has been shown so far that no version of Chisholm's first test picks out all and only psychological sentences, at least when a referential demand is included and it is restricted to cases in which the speaker takes himself to be referring to something actual. Relaxation of these does not help.

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Section

18 So re-formulated, it relates to Liebniz' Law, as formulated by Russell and Higgins.

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22 Class (A) sentences are shown to exhibit opacity only in attributive or essential uses, if at all. This is conselidated by considering Russell's famous "George IV" example, and another difficult one.

23 A similar thesis is established for class (C) sentences by detailed consideration of "I intended to f the A".

24 And also by considering other class (C) sentences, but opacity only emerges at all for some such sentences, probably those pieced out by the version of Chisholm's first test given in Section 12.

25 A further simple amendment to the S-criterion allows it to handle cases of referential opacity.

26 These results seem to invalidate Quine's conclusion of a dual interpretation of sentences showing opacity.

27 This conclusion is more firmly established, by considering in detail various possible replies to it.

28 But if this goes, his rejection of opaque sentences from canonical notation becomes unacceptable, and his restriction on quantification misplaced. A more appropriate restriction is suggested, that variables can only be replaced by names or descriptions used non-essentially.

Section

29 This last suggestion is re-inforced by some general considerations about variables, and its impact on Liebnis' Law is discussed.

30 Summary of my results in respect of Chisholm.

31 Overall summary of the results of this part.

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5 Limited remarks on her tests for intentional sentences, one of which is incoherent as stated.

6 Preliminary discussion of the notion of "object" used here, and preliminary attempts to specify an object of thought. The latter show that a more detailed discussion of uses of "think of" and "think about" is necessary, and the features of each use which need to be investigated are listed.

7 The first ("hinting") type of use of "to think of" specified and analysed, and distinguished from other uses. Its features are clarified (e.g. it appears to be non-intentional by Chisholm's first test.)

Section

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9 Use III ("I was thinking of Ryle when you knocked") specified and discussed. The distinction here between "thinking of" and "thinking about" elaborated. The various uses of "trying to think of/about" are informative (and serve to isolate use IV)

10 Use IV ("I finally thought of something to say") investigated and distinguished from III. The truth-conditions for IV are special and important. Not all cases of thinking are cases of thinking of something. Various subdivisions in IV are discussed. The various available tenses are informative (appendix to section 10)

11 Various limitations in the sort of thing which can be thought of in use III discussed. Some use III cases are intentional actions, but some are not - no use IV cases, or cases describable by "it occurred to me (him etc.) that ..." are intentional actions.

12 Important contrast between I and III/IV cases in respect of the persons knowledge of what he thought of. The latter cases are also illuminated by comparison with pain or anger, and with some cases of thinking about.

13 Three other uses are discussed and explored a little.

14 These results demonstrated again the inadequacy of Chisholm's criteria for the psychological, and indeed threw doubt on his project. They also show the limitations of the obvious definitions of "object of thought" and of Miss Anscombe's implicit sense of intentional object, and render it unlikely that any general and useful definition could be given to that latter term. But we can now define a more limited notion of "object of thought". Four features relevant to that object given.

PART III - MENTAL EVENTS

Section

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2 Exposition of the views of P.F. Strawson shown in 'Individuals', Chapt. 3, and of the two arguments he presents in favour of them.

3 These arguments both rely on a common principle, the "ascription principle", which turns out to be ambiguous. And the ambiguities matter.

4 The ascription principle seems often to be founded on another, the "predicate principle". The latter is not argued for, but a possible argument is sketched.

5 But anyway there are two logical gaps between the predicate and the ascription principle. Quite new arguments would be needed to bridge them.

6 Further, the versions of the ascription principle are either highly implausible and question-begging, or plausible but such that they cannot be used to show anything about thinking. So 'Individuals' does not block our path.

7 A framework is set up in which Wittgenstein's "private language" argument would be relevant.

8 A sense is given to "identification statements", to which that argument will be applied.

9 A version of the private language argument is stated, which is taken as valid provided its restrictions are understood. Some objections to, and misunderstandings of, it are discussed.

10 It is distinguished from arguments employed by Malcolm in "Dreaming" and Shoemaker in "Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity" which arguments are held to be implausible and invalid respectively.

Section

11 Various objections discussed, and the private language argument is shown not to apply to thinking.

12 Further objections considered.

13 An attempt is made to sketch a plausible candidate for the conclusion of this argument.

14 So we can conclude that the private language argument is valid provided it is restricted in certain ways, but those restrictions are sufficient to show that it does not apply to thinking. So this argument does not stand in our way either.

15 But this does not show that the notion "mental event" is clear. Objections to any attempt to specify its sense in general. But our purposes can be achieved with more limited stipulation. A sense for "intellectual event" is defined.

PART IV - MENTAL EVENTS AS INTENTIONAL - A PARTICULAR CASE

Section

1 In terms of the earlier distinctions and definitions, questions are raised concerning the relation between thinking of something and the object of the thought, and hence concerning the account we are to give of thinking of. An argument produced against one likely view, that it consists in occurrence in the mind of images or symbols.

2 Some presuppositions of this argument are laid out, and various objections to it are considered and rejected.

3 Further arguments against various views of the "image" or "symbol" view of thinking of are considered - thinking of X is normally not an intentional action, and the thinker can rarely say what his thought of X consisted in. Two such arguments seem valid.

Section

4 The question to which these views are answers can be put as: "What does thinking of consist in?" Reasons are put forward for holding that in some sense this is not a conceptual question.

5 Perhaps St. Thomas Aquinas' view of thinking could solve our problem here, but the general views which would be helpful are not themselves acceptable, and a full understanding of Aquinas' position shows that it will not avoid the arguments above.

6 The arguments of Sections 1 and 4 above can be taken to show that thinking of has no mental constituents, but perplexities still remain concerning the relation of thought and object and the nature of thinking of. An attempt is made to specify these problems.

7 So this more traditional area of intentionality remains the most important, confusing and unresolved of the three mentioned in the introduction.

INTRODUCTION

Among that family of theses and problems which now fall under the general heading of "Intentionality" three important areas stand out, and with these this thesis will be concerned. Firstly, it has been held that intentionality, the directedness to an object, is characteristic of the psychological in the sense that only mental or psychological events, or in other formulations sentences, possess this feature. The fact that nothing but the psychological possesses this feature is supposed to show, or go towards showing, that the psychological cannot be reduced to the physical or the material, or alternatively that at least one new term is needed for the adequate description of the mental over and above the terms of physics. Some variant of these views is to be found in Brentano, probably in Husserl, and, most recently and most rigorously, in R.M. Chisholm. Part I of the thesis will be given to a discussion of these views, particularly in terms of the detailed criteria for intentionality given by Chisholm, and in terms of the theses he builds upon them. One independent source of interest of this discussion arises from the fact that Chisholm's criteria involve at many points interesting issues or notions of contemporary philosophy, e.g. Frege and Quine's notion of indirect reference or referential opacity, the doctrine about identity that has become

known as Liebnis's Law, the precise sense of "referential", and other questions about reference and definite descriptions. It is hoped that some light may be thrown on these areas also.

The second strand of the question of intentionality focuses on the notion of an intentional object. Intentional objects have been thought to have special properties which once seen solve certain traditional philosophical problems (e.g. how one can think of what does not exist, why philosophers tend to oscillate unsatisfactorily between sense-data and naive realist theories of perception, what distinguishes emotions from sensations) and also help towards the analysis of many psychological concepts. Thus intentional objects were thought by Brentano and Husserl, and recently Miss Anscombe, to solve the first problem mentioned, by Miss Anscombe to solve the second, by A. J. Kenny the third, and are held by Kenny and Anscombe and by many other writers to be helpful in conceptual analysis. Yet Miss Anscombe's view of the nature of intentional objects can be shown to be unacceptable, and both she and other writers operate with too simple a notion of "object". Part II of the thesis is concerned with these questions, and attempts to establish the truth of the two assertions made in the last sentence. It emerges that no general, clear notion of "intentional object" seems available, and that the sense of 'object' needs to be carefully defined for each area of its use. A detailed

investigation of different uses of "thinking of" and "thinking about" is made, to attempt to determine a precise sense for "object of thought". This material also re-inforces the conclusions of Part I, and provides a base for some of the discussion of Part IV.

The third strand of intentionality has been rarely discussed in recent philosophy, although it has been re-introduced by W. J. Gilmane. This is the scholastic notion of a thought or sensation being of or about its object in virtue of consisting not in anything related to that object but in that object itself, albeit in a different mode of existence, the intentional mode rather than the material. In as much as e.g. Brentano takes over a scholastic notion (as he claims to) he completely neglects this feature, for his "intentional inexistence" is quite different from this idea. Now this view manifestly has many problems, but there are also substantial, and often unexamined, pressures in the direction of it. For example, some arguments against Ayer's view of the relation between thought and its object seem to lead to it. But these arguments presuppose (i) that the notion of a "mental event" is both a clear one and one which can be used without any problems in respect of thinking, (ii) that a clear sense can be given to "object of thought", in terms of which the object is at least often something in the world, and (iii) that my knowledge of what is the object of my thought has a certain special character.

The second and third of these presuppositions are justified in the closing stages of Part II, and Part III is devoted to the discussion of the notion of a mental event, firstly by attempting to show that the writings of Stranson and Wittgenstein provide no object to talking of mental events in the case of thinking, and secondly by attempting to clarify what sense might be given to this term.

So by the time Part IV is reached the stage is set to attempt to evaluate the pressures towards a more traditional conception of intentionality, and to decide whether there are any substantial unresolved problems in this area. But this is a good way off, and we must begin by discussing the conception of intentionality introduced by Chisholm, following Brentano.

PART I

INTENTIONALITY AND REFERENCE

1.

Throughout this first part of the thesis in particular, but in the other parts as well, I will need to rely on notions of "reference" and "referential use of a name or definite description," so I will start by considering these ideas. "Reference" and "referential use" are tricky terms because they are used by philosophers basically as technical terms, and yet their cognates have some related uses in ordinary language. In what follows I will not consider the ordinary concept "refer", but look for a clear and useful sense to be given to the technical term which is consistent with its traditional philosophical use. Two obvious requirements for such a sense can be baldly stated: given that it is accepted that some uses of definite descriptions are referential, then our sense must be such that some uses of such descriptions, e.g. predicative ones, are non-referential; also, the required sense must include the cases of what Quine calls "referential opacity", and hence cannot be equivalent to his sense of "purely referential", as it would seem to be essential to these cases that, whatever else they are, they are cases in which a reference is made.

Let the following be my stock of examples, where "A" stands

for the phrase "the first man in space".

(1) A was Gagarin

(2) Glenn could have become A

(3) A was tall

(4) A might have been an American (as said in the following case: if only the men working on the U.S. space project had worked harder, then .....)

(5) A might have been an American (case: if Gagarin's father had been offered better immigration conditions).

(6) The name of A is as yet unknown (case: an announcement on Russian radio on the day of the feat).

(7) A might have been someone other than Gagarin.

(8) A will be tall (case: a prediction by a space doctor in 1953).

(9) A will receive the Lenin prize if he is a Russian (case: promise by Mr. Krushchev 1953).

(10) The second knight of the round table was highly intelligent (case: it is known that there was a person satisfying this description, but nothing is known about him, and this is the first scholarly hypothesis about him).

(11) Gagarin was A (case: in this conversation: "Gagarin is a fool". "No, don't treat him too lightly, Gagarin was A").

(12) Peter is unaware that A denounced Krushchev.

In his article on "Identity - Statements" Mr. D. Wiggins notes that it has been thought a sufficient condition for a

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[1] D. Wiggins, "Identity - Statements", in Analytical Philosophy, Second Series, ed. by R. J. Butler, p. 44.

definite description to be used referentially that 1) it is part of its sense that only one thing satisfies it, and 2) the speaker knows that only one thing does. Now this could not be a sufficient condition, for on it the use of 'A' in (2) and (11) is referential and in general there is no distinction between predicative and referential uses of a definite description. I am unable to see how any definition that allowed all predicative uses of A (as e.g. in (2)) could possibly characterise the traditional use in philosophy, and collapsing all predications of uniquely specifying definite descriptions into identity-statements, which might make the definition plausible, is not itself plausible - (2) cannot be read as "Glenn could have become the same man as the man who was A".

Wiggins feels obliged to argue (p. 45) that at least some predicative uses of A are not referential, but his argument seems fallacious. He argues that if A is referential in (11) "Gagarin was A" in a suitable case, then we may only be able to identify what is referred to by A in virtue of the truth of (11). But (11) having the meaning it does and cannot depend on its being true. I will suggest that the mistake here lies in necessarily connecting the notion of referring in this way with that of identifying.

Consider the following argument, used by Professor P.T. Geach in his book "Reference and Generality"[1], which he credits to Buridan: in "Jack loves a cat" the phrase "a cat" cannot be used to refer to a particular cat, as there would be such a cat only if the statement were true, and so if it is to be used referentially the statement could not be false. Now this argument seems clearly valid, but its principle, that a phrase in a given statement could not be used referringly if its having the reference it does depends on its being true, is in clear contrast with the principle of Wiggins' argument, in which the condition has the form "if our identifying the reference it has is dependent on the statements being true". Now we need to exercise a good deal of care here, for in his book Geach seems to give accounts of 'Buridan's Law' which might lead to a confusion of the two principles. In the preface it is stated as; "the reference of an expression E must be specifiable in some way which does not involve first determining whether the proposition in which E occurs is true".[2] Now this may have at least three interpretations, viz.

(i) E must have the reference it does, whether or not S is true, where S is the simplest proposition (as opposed to conjunctions etc.) in which E occurs.

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1 P.T. Geach, Reference and Generality, Cornell University Press, 1962. Ch. 3.

2 ibid, p(xi)

(ii) One must be able to specify what one is using E to refer to, or to identify the reference of E, independently of the truth of S, where S again is the simplest proposition in which E occurs.

(iii) Versions of (i) and (ii) for any proposition S, in which E occurs, i.e. without the restriction to the simplest proposition.

Now (i) seems to me clearly true, both versions of (iii) generally false, and (ii), which is also Wiggins' principle, false. The importance of (iii) is that Geach uses a version of it to show that it is absurd to regard relative pronouns which are not pronouns of laziness as referential.[1] Consider

(13) Just one man broke the bank at Monte Carlo, and he recently died a pauper.

The argument is that if the first half of (13) is false, 'he' will have no reference and so (13) as a whole will be false, and so 'he' will only have a specifiable reference if (13) is true, and this contradicts Buridan's Law. Yet if we interpret Buridan's Law as (i) and (13) as of th form 'p.q', then it will be satisfied, for 'he' in 'q' has a reference whether or not 'q' is true, but not whether or not 'p' or 'p.q' is true. The <u>reason</u> for taking Buridan's Law as (i) or (ii) and not as (iii) is that

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1 P.T. Geach, Reference and Generality, Cornell University Press, 1962, Ch. 3. p. 125-6.

for almost any referring expression, and certainly for most names, we could form a large enough conjunction (or perhaps disjunction) such that that expression has a referent only if the conjunction or disjunction is true. For example

(14) There was a man who did x or y or z, and that man was called 'Moses', and Moses led the Israelites.

Now given that the conditions in the first part of (14) are the conditions which must be fulfilled for 'Moses' to have a reference, (14) will be exactly parallel to (13) in that if the first two parts of (14) are both false, then "Moses" as it is used in the last part will have no reference, and (14) as a whole will be false. But this of course does not even look like a reason for saying that "Moses" is not here used referentially.

There also seem to be clear objection cases to (ii), the principle of Wiggins' argument. If someone tells me that the first man in space is in the next room, I may get excited and say this to someone even though I could not identify the first man in space except via the truth of this, and yet I certainly seem to use 'A' referentially here. Notice that what I said may be false if the wrong man is there, but that I would have no means of knowing that what I said were false. And there surely are a whole host of cases parallel to this.

Generally Wiggins seems to me to go wrong in claiming this sort of relation between referring and identifying - at least (3), (6) and (10) could fail to satisfy the identification condition, and yet it is difficult to see how any definition of "referential use" which captures the traditional intentions could exclude them. Because this is of some importance I will dwell a little on the parallel weakness in Wiggins' positive account of referentiality, which has three prongs. 'A' is used referentially if (i) the speaker is (and thinks he is) in a position to answer informatively 'What particular are you identifying by A?' (Because: to express the thought "A is P" I must know what the thought is, and so what particular I mean by 'A'), (ii) he can answer this question without making use of the truth of statement (Because statements must be capable of falsity) and (iii) a requirement, necessarily vague and flexible, about when this question has been adequately answered. Now, as suggested above, it is clearly false that it is a necessary condition for the falsity of e.g. (10) that I can say who I mean by the second knight' independently of the description already given or of the truth of the statement - if that description is indeed a uniquely specifying one, it will be false if the chap so specified was dumb, and true if he was highly intelligent, and his being intelligent may be the only clue we currently have for identifying

him. This will undoubtedly be a necessary condition for establishing its falsity, but not for its being false. And if this is accepted, it now becomes totally implausible that I only know what the thought is if I can give an answer to this question - if can be false without this, the thought must be already determined. So given that the arguments fail, and that (3) and (10) appear to be counter-cases, the only thing to do is to drop the criterion (and hence explanation of 'referential' in terms of 'identify') and accept examples like these three as falling under any acceptable definition.

2.

Having, I hope, succeeded in severing this necessary connection between reference and identification I will now attempt to offer a criterion for "referential use". The most plausible candidate that I know for an adequate and precise definition of this term is to be gleaned from Geach's "Reference and Generality" Ch. 3. It needs to be noted though that my purposes are at least in emphasis different from those of Geach, in that he introduced his criteria for "referring expression" to give that notion a precise sense for discussions of the referential character of phrases such as "some cat", "every cat"

"any cat", and so on. I shall not be concerned with any quantificational expressions here, but only withsingular statements, where the extent of "singular" is roughly indicated by examples (1) - (12).

The elucidation which I will call the G-criterion starts by drawing an absolute distinction between proper names and predicables - no proper name can occur in predicate position, and no predicable can be used as a proper name or occur as the logical subject of a sentence. The mark of a (proper) name is that it can be employed (and taught etc) in an act of naming, an utterance which consists just of the proper name and which is a complete utterance in itself, not equivalent in virtue of context or the intentions of the speaker to any proposition. For example "John!" when I see him walk in, or calling for him, as opposed to its use in answer to "Who did that?", when the reply is in fact equivalent to "John did it". Predicables on the other hand can never stand alone in this way. Another mark of the difference is that a predicable can always be negated to form another predicable, but not so a name. From this view it will follow that any two-name theory of predication is to be rejected, and that a sharp distinction is always to be drawn between the copula, or 'is' of predication, and the 'is' of identify - the mark of the distinction being that the latter, but not the former, 'is' is always

replaceable by "is the same X as", where X is the substantive term giving the aspect under which identity is being asserted. These are Geach's claims, and if some detail of them is objected to it is worth remembering that the minimum I need here is that there is an absolute distinction between names and predicables, so that a name simpliciter can never amount to a predicate, and that a sharp distinction is also to be drawn between the uses of 'is' in the making of a predication and of a statement of identity. These are at least widely accepted.

Now given all this, we can define a sense for "referential use of an expression" as follows: When the expression is a proper name, all uses except those in which the name is being mentioned rather than used i.e. except those in which just the name itself should occur in quotes.

When the expression is a definite description:

(i) Only those cases in which the descriptions consists in 'the' plus a substantive general term (where A is a substantive term if "the same A" makes sense and thus if we could use A as a principle for counting), or is formed from such a term by restriction. Thus, e.g. "the man", or "the first man in space".

(ii) Only those uses of such descriptions occurring where a proper name might also have stood without changing the sense of any of the words in the sentence or utterance, even if the substitution of a name for the description does alter the meaning or force

of the utterance. This will exclude straightforward predications, for if "He is the best philosopher" is such a predication, the substitution of his name will give a sentence which can only be interpreted as either "He is called 'John' " or "He is the same man as John".

(iii) Let A be a substantive term as in (i), and 'a' a proper name whose use can be understood only in terms of its being applied to the same A, and which in fact is the proper name of the A. Then a necessary condition for 'the A' to be referentially used will be that either the inference "f (the A) therefore f(a)" or "f(a) therefore f(the A)" is valid, where the context f( ) is the rest of the statement in which A is used.

Now let 'A that is P' be a further term formed from A in the required way, and 'a' a proper name as before. Then 'The A that is P' will only be referentially used if either the argument "a is P, f (the A that is P), therefore f(a)" or the argument "a is P, f(a) therefore f (the A that is P)" is valid, where f ( ) is the rest of the statement as above.

(iv) A further stipulation is needed for those cases in which it makes sense to suppose that there is, was, or will be, more than one A, or more than one A that is P. In these cases it is required that the inference is not dependent on the truth of any general proposition about all A's or A's that are P, whether such

general proposition be contained in one of the initial premises, or otherwise presupposed. To make this more precise, I will say that the inference is not so dependent when, in these cases, the supposition that it is false that all A's, or A's that are P or were P, have the property f (or generally, the supposition of the falsity of whatever general proposition about A's might be thought to be involved) does not invalidate the inference.

Thus, as it occurs in a book on constitutional theory,

(15) "the Prime Minister of U.K. is independent of his cabinet" does not contain "the Prime Minister" used referentially, for while the inference is valid with "Harold Wilson is the Prime Minister" and "Harold Wilson is independent of his cabinet", as second premise and conclusion respectively, but this validity depends on a general proposition about British Prime Ministers. For the supposition that it is true that not all British Prime Ministers have been so independent during the period involved invalidates the inference, as it conflicts with the first premise. Generally, this specification excludes cases in which the conclusion follows as one <u>instance</u> of the premise.

This will complete the basic criterion for the cases with which I am concerned. It will emerge that this basic idea will need to be extended in various ways to cover all cases.

3.

Whatever else we say, this criterion has several things to recommend it. Firstly, of course it provided a clear way of making the distinction between referential and predicative uses - to be referential it must be possible to substitute a name for the description saving the meanings of the other words, and this is held to be not possible with clear predicative uses. Secondly, it handles many of our examples nicely. The two senses of 'A might have been an American', exhibited in (4) and (5), seem intuitively to be such that 'A' is referential as used in (5) but not in (4), and this result comes out of the criterion. The inference "Gagarin was the first man in space ('A'), A might have been an American, therefore, Gagarin might have been an American" is valid for (5) but not for (4) and the reverse inference does not hold for (4) either. Further, examples (1), (3) and (10) come out referential as one would expect, or in these uses which one would expect, and (2) and (7) come out as straightforwardly non-referential, also as would be expected. Example (1) might be thought tricky: the inference for (iii) above, would become: Gagarin (or Nicholai) was the first man in space; The first man in space was Gagarin; therefore Gagarin (or Nicholai) was Gagarin. Now this may seem dubious when only the one proper name is employed, but if we introduce another proper name for

'a' (i.e. for the first man in space) e.g. Nicholai, then the argument is clearly valid. And as the test requires that when 'A' is so used that what is A in fact has no name we shall introduce one to fill the role of 'a', there is surely no reason why in testing (**i**) we may not introduce another name for 'A' than Gagarin. But we will need to return to this point later. For cases like (**ii**) we need to note that 'A' will occur referentially only in those uses which satisfy condition (ii) above, that A occurs where a proper name might also have occurred. Hence 'A' will not be referential as these are intended as predications.

Examples (8) and (9) might be thought to cause some problems. For here, where 'A' refers (if it does) to some future individual, it will be obscure what applying a proper name comes to. Considering (8) one might be inclined to say that the argument is valid as: Let 'a' be the name of the first man in space, then 'a is A, A will be tall therefore 'a' will be tall' is valid. Yet 'a' here is rather a fake proper name, as it is not yet the name of any particular man. And at this point it is evident that the obscurity about whether our test applies is matched by a parallel general obscurity about whether future cases like (8) and (9) are to be regarded as referential. On the one hand we might say: 'A' cannot be referential in (8) because for a definite description to be so used it must determine

now that a particular individual satisfies it (or is meant), because it could turn out that there never is any individual satisfying 'A', or that it is satisfied by a man 1,000 years hence, who surely was not referred to now, and because predictions like (8) cannot be held to be true now, and must wait upon the event. On the other hand; (8) may 'turn out' to be true, if the person who is 'A' is tall, and so 'A' must be referential, and further, in "The King of France is bald" it may on some occasions of its use turn out that there was no King of France, but this does not imply that our phrase was not used referringly, and so the central argument above fails. I will not go any further with this; all I want to say is that it will be an advantage, not a disadvantage, of our definition that it mirrors the obscurity that exists about these cases - when they are clarified, and a decision made, then the definition can be similarly interpreted.

Consider again, (15) "The Prime Minister of the U.K. is independent of his Cabinet". Now compare the use of this sentence in a book on twentieth-century British constitutional theory, and as said in 1967 in the context of a debate on the Rhodesia crisis by a person who knows nothing further at all about the Prime Minister. Now in both cases the phrase "whoever he is" could be inserted after the subject phrase, and yet I suggest

that it clearly refers to a particular person in the second use but not in the first. This result comes out of the criterion, once it is remembered that in the first case the inference of (iii) would be valid only because the conclusion would be an instance of the main premise and that this is excluded by requirement (iv).

4.

The criterion as it stands, however, poses a number of problems. Consider, firstly, phrases of the form 'the A' e.g. 'the bridegroom' as used in (16) 'the bridegroom is in the car', or (17) 'David will never get to be the bridegroom, is doomed to just being the best man'. Now the crucial inference for (16) will be 'the bridegroom is in the car, therefore Peter is in the car' which will of course be valid if Peter is in fact the name of the bridegroom I am referring to. The problem which this raises is one of circularity - it would seem that I can apply the test for referentiality only if I have decided that the phrase refers, and what it refers to, and can so decide whether the right name is being used. The parallel problem does not of course arise for uniquely specifying descriptions, because they specify or

fail to specify an individual whether or not they are used referentially. For definite descriptions which do not uniquely specify, this is a serious problem - the test can be non-circularly applied only if there were some way of deciding what individual is in question independently of the fact that "the bridegroom" is used to refer. Should we say: let 'Peter' be the name of the only bridegroom in the context, or the only bridegroom the speaker and hearers are interested in?

Now I think we can in fact dispose of this problem along the lines suggested in the last sentence. In respect of most, but not all, utterances using the phrase 'the bridegroom' it makes sense to inquire further about the identity of the bride-groom, via such questions as "Which bridegroom?" "Bridegroom in which wedding?", "Whose bridegroom?" and so on. Answers to these might be, for example, "The bridegroom of this wedding, of course", "Margaret's bridegroom - the only one we are interested in," "Didn't you know that Jill is getting married today?". Now such questions can be asked and answered without prejudice to the question whether "The bridegroom" is being used referringly (they could be asked if e.g. someone said "He is the bridegroom" (predicative) or "The bridegroom could easily have been a different chap") and the answer will be satisfactory only if it serves to specify a definite bridegroom in a way similar to the

specification given by e.g. "the first man in space." Once such specification is given, by e.g. "The bridegroom of this wedding" or "Margarets' bridegroom," we can attach a name as before by e.g. "Let Peter be the name of the bridegroom at this wedding" and proceed to apply the test for referentiality as before. Those cases in which questions such as "Which bridegroom?" "Whose bridegroom?" "Bridegroom at whose wedding?" cannot be asked (e.g. "In Indian marriage the bridegroom receives a dowry" or (17) above.) will be straight off excluded from referentiality. So the new stipulations will in general be: a necessary condition for a phrase of the form "the A" which is not uniquely specifying to be referentially used in an utterance S is that the question "Which A?" is appropriate and is answered by a specification determining a single A, and if 'a' is a proper name introduced to stand for this A, then a second necessary condition for referential use will be that expressed by (iii) earlier.

There are other problems, however, and two, one important and one trivial, are captured by examples (6) and (12). (6) consists in the utterance of "the name of A is as yet unknown," in a situation in which 'A' is fairly clearly referential. Now at first glance, there is a problem here if we interpret the inferences strictly as "Gagarin is the first man in space, the name of A is as yet unknown, therefore the name of Gagarin

is as yet unknown" and "Gagarin is A, the name of Gagarin is as yet unknown, therefore the name of A is as yet unknown," as these are hardly acceptable inferences. But this is a problem only for one reading of the letter of, and certainly not for the spirit of, the criterion. For we could proceed as follows: let us introduce for 'a' the name 'b', which is not his real name or perhaps not his only name, and then if b is A, and the (real) name of A is unknown, then the real name of b is unknown. The validity of this inference shows the use of A in (6) to be referential.

(12) poses a more serious problem, as it suggests that the G-criterion cannot handle cases of referential opacity in Quine's sense. For, given that Gagarin is A, it does not follow from "Peter is unaware that A denounced Krushchev" that "Peter is unaware that Gagarin denounced Krushchev," or vice-versa. And the device of letting 'a' range over not only actual names but any names we choose to invent for the individual will not help either, because Peter might not be aware of the person denouncing under that name either. These really are cases in which the truth-value depends not only on the reference but also on the meaning or content of the referring expression, but it surely cannot be denied that in at least some cases

falling under this description are referential.

Now this particular sentence, (12), is tricky in that a number of different contexts of its use can be envisaged. Probably the most normal context is that in which it is presumed that Peter does not know anything about the particular act of denouncing in question, or at least that he does not at all know that the person who, as we know, is A, denounced Krushchev. As far as he knows, e.g., Krushchev's relations with all Russians are amiable, and what (12) says is that he is unaware that a particular act of denouncing was done by this particular person. 'A' will be used only to pick out that person, and he will be equally unaware of the denunciation, under any other description of that person. On the other extreme, (12) may be uttered on the presumption that he knows that Gagarin denounced Krushchev, but that as he does not know that Gagarin was 'A' he is unaware that 'A' denounced Krushchev. For example, in a U.S.S.R. leadership faction fight Peter may know that Gagarin denounced Krushchev, but not that Gagarin is A , and the fact that A did the denouncing will be important in terms of influence etc. Now here (12) could be paraphrased as: Peter is unaware that the man who denounced Krushchev was A. Again we have two cases - if he did not know that anyone had been in space, 'A' here would be clearly predicative and non-referential, while if he had a

firm conception of A, the 'was' here would be equivalent to "was the same man as", and 'A' would be used referentially, at least in the sense in which the terms of an identity statement are referential. Roughly, in the first of these cases what is being said is that Peter is unaware that a particular person (the one who denounced Krushchev) has a certain property or attribute, viz. of being the first man in space, and in the second what is being said is that Peter does not know that this person is the same person as A. If this is acceptable, then taking the three cases here distinguished together, we can say: the occurrence of 'A' in the first is straightforwardly referential and satisfies the test; in the second case 'A' does not occur referentially at all, but predicatively; in the third case, 'A' occurs referentially in the same way as it does in any identity statement, and is shown to be referential by the expansion of the test used for identity statements previously.

Now it would seem that the question as to the acceptability of this attempt to rescue the G-criterion from its apparent failure to handle referentially opaque cases resolves itself into two queries. Firstly, whether the account is acceptable for this case, and even more important, whether referentially opaque sentences can in general be treated in this way. Secondly, whether the treatment of the referentiality of descriptions

used in identity statements already given is acceptable - this needs further discussion because that treatment introduced possible as well as actual names, and it has so far been assumed that this does not seriously alter the test. At this point we are getting into complicated waters, and into areas in which complete clarity can be attained only after further distinctions are drawn, and these distinctions will occupy much of the following discussions. So I will leave the first question here, after having, I hope, made it look reasonably likely that it can be answered along the lines of the G-criterion - I will return to it, and to another problem which will emerge, in Section 25.

5.

Let me turn then to the questions raised by statements of identity. It might be initially asked whether there is any reason for supposing that all uses of definite descriptions in place of the variables in 'a = b' are referential. Well, one answer might be, short of an explanation for "referential use" having <u>already</u> been given any answer to this will be uninformative, and so identity statements can provide no difficulty for the

criterion. Yet 1) I am strongly inclined to say that such descriptions are used referentially (but might not this be because e.g. we are inclined to oppose predicative to referential use, and think that any given use must be either one or the other), 2) it must not be the case that the test makes them non-referential on grounds which did not point to some account of them as non-referential i.e. not by some technical freak of the test, and 3) names as well as descriptions can be substituted into 'a = b' and a name can be substituted for a description in such statements while retaining the form of identity statement, so as there is no apparent asymmetry between the uses of these two sorts of terms and names are supposed to be always referential when used rather than mentioned, it looks as if descriptions must be regarded as referential here also. This last point is important because if a person wishes to deny that descriptions occur referentially in these statements he must now provide an explanation of this mutual substitutivity, saving the form of statement, and of the apparent symmetry of role. Short of such an explanation we seem justified in expecting these uses of definite descriptions to emerge from any criterion as referential.

Now the problem with identities for the G-criterion is two-fold - firstly, the inference "Gagarin is the first man in space,

The first man in space is Gagarin, therefore Gagarin is Gagarin" is a very odd inference as the conclusion follows from either of the premises if it follows from anything, and if it follows from these it follows from any statement about Gagarin. Or it would probably be better to say that "Gagarin is A" does not imply, but if anything presupposes that Gagarin is Gagarin. Secondly, if the use of 'A' in "He is A", is referential it would seem that its use in "I know that he is A" is also referential, at least in the case in which what I am claiming to know in the latter is what is expressed by the former. And anyway the use of 'A' in the latter does seem to be referential in the case in which this is a claim to know that an identity holds. But the test does not make this referential.

What marks the distinction between an utterance of "He is A" as a predication and as an identity statement? I have so far suggested that the difference is shown up by the possibility or otherwise of expanding the 'is' to 'is the same man as', or the appropriate variant with the relevant common noun. But what conditions must be fulfilled before this expansion can be made? The most important one, I suggest, is that the speaker has, and presumes that he audience also have, an idea of the man who is A prior to his utterance, and, therefore, independently of the identity which is being asserted. "Have an idea of" is admittedly

enormously vague, but at least includes (i) knowledge that there is someone man who is A, given that the description is a uniquely specifying one, (ii) if the description were not uniquely specifying knowledge of who is in question shown up in knowledge of some other facts about the person in question. That these two are not enough even for the interpretation of this condition is brought out by the consideration of cases such as: He is the 117th member on the seniority list in parliament, he is (the same man as) the 81st don of C.C.C., He is the man who lives in this house. In all these cases it might be true that we know that there was someone satisfying the description, but this would clearly not be sufficient for them to function as identity statements. So we might try a minimal statement of a third condition, viz. (iii) that my knowledge that there is someone who is A is not just a matter of knowing that there must be one A, or of having been told that there is one A, but rather of knowing that some person, whom I can further describe, is A. Thus utterances of "He is the 81st don of C.C.C." will change from predications to statements of identity as the situation of utterance changes from one in which I know only that there have been over 90 dons through the case in which I know that the 81st was quite remarkable but rather eccentric. to that in which I have

a fairly full picture of him. There is great difficulty, of course, in drawing any sort of sharp dividing line, but at least it seems clear that my knowing simply that there is an 'A' is not sufficient to enable the utterance to become an identity.[1]

The point of all this is that if conditions (i) - (iii) are fulfilled then it would be possible prior to the utterance to introduce a name for the person so described, and for this name the Q-test for referentiality would be satisfied. Thus if "Gagarin is A" is an identity-statement satisfying (i) - (iii), then prior to its utterance a name (e.g. Jim) could be introduced for the person who is A, and then "Gagarin is A, A is Jim, therefore Gagarin is (the same man as) Jim" is valid. Similarly for the other case mentioned - for these uses of "I know that Gagarin is A" for which the 'is' can be written as 'is the same man as' a similar procedure can be followed and the inference is valid. This sentence will of course have plenty of uses in which "A" is predicative, but for all identity uses this will hold.

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1 That other conditions altogether are needed is shown by the fact that one standard situation for predication is that in which we know Gagarin quite well, and that he is A, and are e.g. narrating the facts that we know about him. This points to some condition about the independence required of the two areas of knowledge.

So by this simple addition to the G-criterion the referentiality of descriptions occurring in identity statements can be adequately handled. One objection which might be made to this is that the cases of predicative use like that given in footnote (1) on the previous page, would emerge as referential. But these cases fail to satisfy the very first stipulation made, viz,. that the description occurs where a name might also have occurred without the meanings of the terms involved being at all altered, because if a name replaced the description the 'is' becomes one of identity, not predication. The extension of the G-test here elaborated depends on the fact that it is not crucial for that test that the actual name be usuable in the inference, if its not being so usuable arises from something other than the way the name or description in question is used. This may be further clarified by noting that the inference could be put as a conditional e.g. if f (the A that is p), and Jim is the A that is p, then f (Jim), and the test will be satisfied if this is true for any name for the A that is p. It may be thought that this merely transfers the uncertainty into the question of when a name can be used, for might I not replace any description by a name. But all I need to insist on here is one condition: that it is a necessary condition of the use of any name that any one of the

group of descriptions which back it could turn out to not apply without altering the application of the name. That is, that no single description of what it names is essential to its having the use it does. This is satisfied here because of the requirement for the statement to be one of identity. If this requirement is fulfilled, a name can be introduced satisfying our condition. But note that only for identity-statements can a name be safely introduced in this way, or rather only for utterances for which this condition is satisfied.

Right at the beginning of this query about statements of identity there is another course I could have taken, viz. to allow the form of inference given as acceptable, arguing that it is after all an instance of a valid inference pattern. But this would be less illuminating, and in particular would not show the referentiality of descriptions used in identities occurring within statements of preprositional attitudes.

In what follows, then, I will assume that the C-criterion as thus explained and extended supplies a satisfactory sense for "referential use". The objections which remain will be discussed in Section 25.

6.

In his article "Sentences about Believing" Professor Chisholm offers three criteria for the "intentional use of language", where the general idea behind "intentional" is that the activity described may be performed even though its object does not exist, and the aim is to define a use of language which is characteristic of the psychological and indispensible for its description but dispensible in any use it has in respect of the physical world. These criteria are:

1) A simple sentence (i.e. one containing no propositional connectives) is intentional if it uses a substantival expression or a proper name in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that there is or that there is not something to which the substantive expression truly applies, or which the name actually names.

2) A simple declarative sentence which has a subordinate verb in the object phrase of the principal verb is intentional if neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that the object phrase is true, or that it is false.

3) A simple declarative sentence is intentional if it uses a name or description in such a way that if it were replaced by some other name or description of what it names or describes then the truth-value of the new sentence could differ from that

of the first sentence.

Further a compound sentence will be intentional if any one of its component sentences is intentional by the above.

The thesis which is built upon these criteria is:

"1) That we do not need to use intentional language when we describe non-psychological, or "physical", phenomena; we can express all that we know, or believe, about such phenomena in language which is not intentional. And let us say 2) that, when we wish to describe certain psychological phenomena - in particular when we wish to describe thinking, believing, perceiving, seeing, knowing, wanting, hoping and the like - either (a) we must use language which is intentional or (b) we must use a vocabulary which we do not need to use when we describe non-psychological, or "physical phenomena"[1]

There are four points to be made concerning my interpretation of this thesis, before I commence a discussion of it. Firstly, concerning the use of "describe" in Chisholm's statement of this thesis. Certainly in what follows I will interpret this thesis as being primarily committed to its being true of many or all psychological sentences of ordinary language that they have this feature, and not as saying that only those sentences which in

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1 R. M. Chisholm, "Sentences about Believing", Reprinted in "Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science" Vol. II p. 511-2

some strict sense <u>describe</u> psychological phenomena are intentional, nor as relying on the word "describe" to claim just that, whatever may be the case about ordinary sentences, any adequate (scientific) description of psychological phenomena must use language possessing this feature. Secondly, this thesis will be further interpreted as claiming that all psychological sentences, or at least all central ones, are intentional. The formulation above seems obscure on this point, and could certainly be interpreted as claiming only that some intentional sentences are indispensible, although Chisholm re-states the thesis on p. 513 as applying "when we wish to describe anyone's believing, seeing, knowing, wanting and the like", which suggests that it is held that intentional sentences are indispensible to any adequate description of any case of believing etc. However, in the immediate discussion I will use the strict interpretation, but loosen it later on. (Section 30) Also, the alternative requirement about needing another vocabulary does not seem to be relevant here - it is introduced to block the simple introduction of a whole new terminology which is not intentional. Thirdly, concerning (1) in the statement above, Chisholm explicitly explains this as requiring that if any non-psychological sentence/is intentional then it can be translated either

into a sentence which is not intentional or into one which is explicitly psychological. When in what follows I introduce examples to dispute this aspect of the thesis, I do so on the presumption that those examples are susceptible to neither type of translation. Fourthly, Chisholm does not state directly whether his various criteria are intended to be individually or collectively necessary and/or sufficient for intentionality but I take it that his intention here is that a sentence is intentional if it satisfies one or more of the criteria, with the presumption that each sentence satisfies all the criteria applicable to it. That is that each test is sufficient, and that each is necessary for those sentences to which it applies. The possibility of conflict, that is that a sentence should be intentional by one but not by another, is not considered.[1]

So my discussion of Chisholm's views will take the form of first enquiring whether the criteria are coherent as stated above, then attempting to determine what sentences (or statements) in fact satisfy the various tests, with a view to determining the validity of the strict version of the intentionality thesis.

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[1] In his recent article in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Vol. 4 p. 204) Chisholm suggests the possibility that intentionality be regarded as a sufficient but not necessary condition of the psychological. Such weaker theses will be discussed in Section .

Finally, I will relax the requirements of the thesis, and try to decide whether some weaker version of the view could be acceptable.

There will be one general question which arises immediately, regarding the use of "sentence" in these criteria. They continually talk of the truth-value of a sentence, of a sentence using a name or description in a certain way, of what the description is used to describe, and so on. But of course different uses of the same sentence may have different truth-values, and may use a description in different ways (e.g. referentially or non-referentially)[1] or to describe different things. So if e.g. 3) were taken at its face value in respect of the sentence "He is my father" it could not be applied, because the sentence does not determine Who "he" describes, and and hence what alternative names or descriptions are relevant. If we want to hold to the view that intentionality as so defined is a property of sentences (rather than e.g. of statements) we

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1 And there are more complex distinctions here which will emerge later on.

will have to restate the criteria to avoid this problem.[1] Such a restatement for the third would be; a simple declarative sentence containing a name or description will be intentional if every statement made by the use of it uses the name or description in such a way that if it were replaced by some other name or description of what it names or describes, then the truth-value of the new statement could differ from that of the first statement. A similar restatements could be given for the other two. Even this does not catch the intention fully, as is shown by the following cases: "He has just become the Wayneflete

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It might be suggested that this is just a quibble, and could be readily avoided just by replacing "sentence" by "statement" in the original formulations. But this would then make intentionality a property of statements, and hence raise the possibility that some uses and not others of a given sentence are intentional. Yet Chisholm wants to isolate intentional, and thus psychological, language, and could hardly have done this if for a given sentence with a single sense one use and not another was intentional. So he would need a further use of "intentional" in which a sentence is intentional if all statements made with it are intentional. Thus it is clear that this procedure would arrive by a different route at the same place as the one I adopt, and my procedure harmonizes immediately with the claim that intentionality is a property of sentences.

Professor", may have a different truth-value from "He has just become Ryle", even though at the moment of speaking Ryle is truly described by the description; in a guide book (taken as true) "The Wynaflete Professor can never be a married man" has a different truth-value from "Ryle can never be a married man",. What this brings to light seems obvious enough, viz. that a restriction is intended to uses in which the description is used referringly, and the new description must be true of, and refer to, what was originally referred to. Now the criterion relies on the highly obscure notion of reference, but as I gave stipulations about its use in the earlier sections this causes no problem here. A similar stipulation in the case of criterion (1) avoids prima facie serious objection cases. He could be the tenth bridegroom this year, He could (might, should, ought to) be the first man in space/the John Looke winner for 1967. These are all such that neither the statement nor its contradictory implies either that there will, or that there will not, be a tenth bridegroom this year, or a first man in space, but restricting the test to uses of a given sentence in which the description is used referringly would exclude these uses as appropriate for testing for the intentionality of the sentences in question. This way of putting the matter will still allow

as to regard a sentence like "He could be the first man in space" as non-intentional by (1) because its uses in which the description is non-referential will not count for the test, and because it has other uses (e.g. when we are looking for the first man in space, see a figure, and think that he might be the one,) in which the condition of (1) is not satisfied. That is, its non-referential uses do not count for the test, and its referential uses do not satisfy the test, so it emerges as non-intentional. If I see a person in the distance, have heard about and seen pictures of the first man in space, and say "He could be the first man in space", this will imply that there is, or at least was, a first man in space. So one re-formulation of (1) will start as: a simple sentence which contains a substantive term is intentional if every statement made by the use of it in which the substantive term is used referringly so uses that term that .....

But this in its turn raises serious difficulties, for one whole paradigmatic class of "psychological" sentences will be non-intentional, viz. those like "I am looking for a four-leaf clover" or "I want a glass of water" in which the predicative description can often not be regarded as used to refer to a particular glass of water or clover. And coupled with this we

may have the following argument: if a person uses a term referringly, in most cases what he intends to refer to is something actual[1] (e.g. an actual man or horse), and in these cases one of the truth-conditions would seem to be that what he attempts to refer to does exist. If this is too strong, at least it would seem true that when the description used referringly does not uniquely specify anyway one thing simply by its meaning (e.g. "the professor" as opposed to "the Wayneflete Professor of Philosophy in Oxford), then we do not understand what is said until we know, e.g. which man is meant, and his statement could not be true if the man in question did not exist, given always that an actual man was meant.

These can seem very serious objections, yet Chisholm may succeed in side-stepping them. The most obvious move he could make would be to withdraw the referential demand, and say that the principle which he (and Brentano) wants can be stated as:

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[1] By this requirement I want to exclude all those cases in which the speaker does not take it that what he is referring to exists, such as fictional, pretence etc. uses. I also want to put to one side cases in which the utterance would naturally be taken as e.g. fictional, even if the speaker were not aware of this. That is, the question at issue here is quite separate from: Can I refer to something which does not exist? I tend to not re-iterate the requirement throughout what follows, but it is always relevant.

We do not need intentional language, other than those of the non-necessary modalities (and perhaps relations of comparison)[1] when we describe non-psychological phenomena. Of course he pays a considerable price for this, viz. that the thesis suddenly takes on a much greater look of arbitrariness, losing as it does the likelihood that it is some unique feature of the psychological which explains the fact of intentionality. So this as it may, this reply would obviate the first difficulty. A more satisfactory reply yet would be to retain the referential demand for this criterion, and give another one for sentences such as "I am looking for a job" where the object phrase can never be used referringly. I discuss later whether there are such sentences, what such a criterion could be, and whether it would be successful (Section 14.) But the argument for the second difficulty is worth expanding and attempting to evaluate, as it could be used to show that no psychological use of language which is referential in the required way could be intentional, and this would seem to be a serious objection even to the original version of the first criterion.

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1 cf. R.M. Chisholm, "Perceiving" Cornell University Press, 1958.

8.

A good starting-point for this would be to note that the claim implicit in this argument is to be distinguished from any explicitly expressed by either Russell or Strawson in their debate on reference and definite descriptions. In the respect we are interested in, Russell's position would be that if a phrase like "The King of France" is used to pick out a given individual and that individual does not exist, then a statement like the "The King of France is bald" will be false. Strawson, on the other hand, was committed to saying that this statement in this circumstance was neither true nor false. In contrast with both of these, the argument claims, with certain qualifications, that if a description is used referringly and what is referred to turns out not to exist, then that statement cannot be true. That is, the principle crudely is: referential use to refer to something taken to be actual and truth of statement in which this use is made entails existence of what is referred to. In the case they discuss, both Russell and Strawson implicitly accept something like this - neither wishes to suggest that the statementmight be true when there is no King of France, and neither restricts his thesis to a special class of proposition.

So what we need to decide is in which conditions this principle is valid, and in what conditions it is not. More fully

stated, the principle is: if a person uses a definite description to refer to something that he takes to be actual, and his statement in which the referential use is made is true, then it follows that what is referred to by the description exists. (I) . The question concerns the limits of acceptability of this principle because it is clear on the one hand that there are cases (e.g. (18) I hit the person I think is my brother, I was run over by Professor Ryle's car) for which it holds, and on the other cases (e.g. (19) I was trying to find my brother, I was looking for my brother) for which it does not. For if there is no person whom I think is my brother, it follows that I did not hit him, while it clearly does not follow that I was not trying to find him. Or, to put it in the right order, if all these statements are true, then it follows from (18) that there is someone whom I think is my brother, but it does not follow from (19) that I have a brother. Chisholm's first criterion amounts to a claim that all cases for which one version of this principle does not hold are psychological sentences.[1]

I say "one version of this principle" because the exact criterion enunciated by Chisholm is rather different from this principle.

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1 Or rather, the restatement of Chisholm's first criterion that I gave with the explicit requirement that the test be applicable only to utterances in which the description is used referentially, amounts to this, with the further qualification which follows.

Chisholm says that a sentence is intentional if neither the sentence nor its contradictory entails either the existence or non-existence of something satisfying the description, and this would lead to a version involving the principle (II): all sentences for which "(II) referential use of the description and truth of the statement entails existence of something satisfying the description" does not hold are psychological sentences. This principle, different from (I), is the one strictly relevant to the first criterion as stated, but if this proved unacceptable that criterion could easily be restated in terms deriving from (I).

One set of limits to these principles is implicitly drawn by Keith S. Donnellan in 'Philosophical Review', July, 1966. He introduces a distinction between "referential" and "attributive" uses of referring expressions, where the idea in the first type is the use of description as a (dispensible) means of picking out a given individual, and in the second to talk about whoever or whatever it is that satisfies the particular description. If we consider a sentence "The B is F", (where "The B" is a definite description) in the first use it may be true even if there were no B, as the reference may succeed even though the person concerned is not B. In the second use, however, if there

is nothing which is B then nothing has been said to be F, and the speaker will not have succeeded in saying anything true. So on this view, principle II will be true only for attributive uses, and the truth of principle I is assumed throughout. Now, even assuming that this distinction is thoroughly clarified, it is clear that these results will not do. The case (19) above, "I was trying to find my brother", certainly does not satisfy either I or II if the last phrase is used attributively, and perhaps not I if used referentially (in Donnellan's sense). So it is an objection to both these results, and there are plenty of examples similar to it in this respect.

9.

To attempt to get clearer about this, we need to keep in mind and clarify a number of distinctions, all pertaining to definite descriptions and their use. These are:

(1) Obviously definite descriptions can be divided into those such that only one thing does or could satisfy the meaning of the description at the same time, and those for which more than

one thing does or could so satisfy. For example, only one man could satisfy the description "the first man in space", if any does, but there could be many satisfying "the man in space". For example, in their own laberatories and concerned with their own experiments, American, Russian and British scientists might each use "the man in space" at the same time to refer to <u>their</u> man. Or again, after the re-possession van has been down the street, all the householders may say "the table is missing" about <u>their own</u> table. The test for this will be whether or not it is possible that the description could be correctly used to refer to more than one individual at the same time. There will of course be intermediate cases. It will be no objection to this to say that surely a definite description, i.e. one involving the definite article "the" and thus implying uniqueness, cannot be correctly used of several different things at the same time. For what is being distinguished here is in fact those cases in which it is implied that there is only one thing and those in which the implication is just there is only one thing being referred to, and the uniqueness of definite descriptions can be of either type. I will call descriptions of the first type "uniquely specifying".

(2) Secondly, we can distinguish between two ways in which

reference to an individual is achieved, or in which an individual is picked out by the use of expression. The individual referred to may be the one which satisfies the description used ('satisfying'), or it may be the one which the speaker means or intends ('intending'). For example, 'the cat' used referentially will normally have both these aspects - what is referred to is picked out as being a cat, and also as being the cat I mean. The marks of satisfying rather than intending will be: that the content is unnecessary for understanding who is being referred to in the first type but not the second; that the question "Which A do you mean?" is not appropriate with a pure case of satisfying; and that if a description refers in the first way, and changes its referent, this will necessarily be a matter of a change in the world (very widely understood) and not just of the intentions of the speaker. Again, there will be many intermediate cases, and indeed it could be argued that we never get a completely pure case of either satisfying or intending.

(3) Next, two simple if not always clear distinctions need to be kept in mind, viz. that between referring to something which is present to the speaker and to something which is not, and that between referring to what one is acquainted with and to what one is not.

(4) Finally, Donnellan's distinction between attributive and referential$_D$ uses of referring expressions (as he uses "referential" for the second arm of his distinction I will use subscript D for his use, and the unsubscripted term in the way specified earlier). There seem to be four main features of this distinction, the first two being primarily intended to define the distinction and the last two having more the character of theses about it. Firstly, then, when a speaker uses a description attributively he uses it to say something about whoever or whatever satisfies the description, but when he uses it referentially he uses it just to pick out (and to enable his hearers to pick out) the particular person or thing he is talking about. Donnellan insists that my thinking , or not thinking, that I know what particular I am talking about independently of the description used is not what is essential for this point. For even if I know that Jones was Smith's murderer, I may say "Smith's murderer was insane" in a context in which this is clearly to be taken as: whoever murdered Smith is insane. (This suggests a possible refinement of this test, viz. use is attributive if description "the B" can be replaced by "whoever or whatever is B" without altering the meaning of his utterance. Secondly, in a referential use a description will be used only as

a tool for picking out a given person or thing, and any other description which also did this would do as well, while in the attributive use this particular description is essential. This we might interpret as; non-essential if the same statement could be made, in the same situation, using another (any other) name or description with the same reference. And this would give two senses of essential/non-essential, depending on whether we insist on the substitutitivy of any other description with the same reference, or just of some other description.

These two points alone raise problems, which reflect back on the clarity and exhaustiveness of the distinction, and it matters for our problem, viz. the determining of the limits of the two principles, whether or not it is exhaustive.

So I will first attempt to get the distinction completely clear and then inquire whether or not it covers all cases. To start with, in Donnellan's article the second mark of the distinction is unclear, for while he stresses that in an attributive use a particular description is "essential" or "all-important", he does not say what it is essential to or all important for. In expounding the mark above I filled this out as: essential for making the same statement in the same situation, and on this interpretation a description will occur essentially in a given utterance if there is no other description which could stand in its place and the new sentence be used to make the

same statement in the same situation. Now there can seem to be some problem here about what will constitute the same situation - if John's wife says "John is dumb" but does not know that John is the tallest man in his office, is "the tallest man in the office" substitutable for "John" so that is can be used to make the same statement in the same situation? Surely, whether or not she knows some obscure and trivial facts about him is immaterial to the situation of utterance, yet in other cases e.g. the utterance of

(20) the police have the car used by Christine Darby's murderer, as part of the investigation, it seems essential to the situation of utterance that they know little about him. Now this doubt can be made largely irrelevant by stipulating only that if the original situation of utterance were one in which the speaker knew nothing at all about the person or thing he refers to by "the B", then we have an irrevocably different situation if he comes to learn something about the person or thing who is the B. So on this stipulation all referential uses of definite descriptions in which the speaker knows nothing about what he refers to by the B will use the description in a way "essential" to the statement. We are now in a position to give the corresponding criterion for attributive use:

a definite description is used attributively in a given utter-

ance if a) it is used referentially and b) there is no other description which could replace it and be such that it could, in the same situation, be used to make the same statement.[1]

It may be doubted whether there are any uses which are attributive in this sense, combining as it does the requirement of strict non-substitutivity and that of referentiality. But consider: (20) above, in an appropriate case; (21) "my brother is to receive all my chattels" as occurring in the will of a man who knew virtually nothing about his brother; (22) "Smith's murderer was insane" as used by the judge in court in his summing up, when his intention is not to prejudge who the murderer was; (23) "The patient who has been in here longest will have to go" as said by the President of the Hospital Board in reaching his decision, and so on. All these cases of

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[1] In the article mentioned Donnellan seems to me less than fully clear about the need both for an independent criterion for referentiality and for the inclusion of the requirement of referential use to be included in this criterion. Or, perhaps, whether he wants this last requirement in his criterion for referential use. For he uses his distinction to object to Strawson's views about reference, and there is no reason for thinking that Strawson thinks that all uses of definite descriptions are referential (indeed, reasons to the contrary). Yet he often seems to suppose that attributive uses are not referential in e.g. Strawson's sense (cf. p. 295, middle paragraph). Whatever may be the case about Donnellan, I trust that my position on this is quite clear.

(20) - (23) will use the underlined descriptions referentially, for they will all satisfy inferences of the form "f (the A), a is the A, therefore f(a)" where "a" is some proper name, and they will also satisfy the other aspect of the criterion, for no other description could be substituted and be used to make the same statement in the same situation.

The special feature of these cases which seems to cast doubt on their being referential uses is that the knowledge of the speaker is irrelevant in the sense that if the person I think I refer to is not the A then I do not refer to him but to whoever is the A. And thus I can be mistaken about who I am referring. Now this feature certainly suggests that they must be unusual cases, but yet it remains that they do seem to be referential and do satisfy the G-test. Take one more case: the M.C. at a party, reading from instructions, says: "The man nearest the wall is the winner". Now by the G-test he does seem to refer to a given man, even though he might mistakenly believe that his friend is the man nearest the wall.

So this is what I will accept as a statement of a criterion for attributive use, but it needs to be pointed out that there is another possible interpretation of Donnellan's remarks here. Consider a case in which, on just hearing that my brother has received my father's inheritance, I tell someone (24) "My brother has just become wealthy" in a case in which I know my brother well. Or I say "My mother had twins and a long labour, and (25) my brother was born 10 minutes before me". Now here there seems to be some sense in which the phrase "my brother" is essential to the statement made, as opposed to an ordinary case in which e.g. I see the person I believe to be my brother come out of an hotel and say (26) "My brother is drunk". Whatever this sense of "essential" is, it is not that defined above, because if I said (24) to someone in a case in which we both knew that John was my brother, and this was understood, my statement made with (24) would be equivalent to "John has just become wealthy". Even this though suggests one aspect of the special sense, for it is essential to any translation of (24) or (25), but not of (26), that it is understood that the description used refers to my brother. If a person heard me say "John is drunk" in the situation of (26) above, he would understand the same statement as that made with (26) even if he did not

know that John is my brother, provided only that he did know John. Or take another case: "I can always get money out of any male member of the family, and (24) my brother has just become wealthy". Now if a person was not aware (so that it is not understood) that John is my brother, (24) is not here equivalent to "John has just become wealthy". So we might mark out the new sense of "essential" as: a given description (B) is essential to a particular statement if any other utterance using another description (C) referring to the same as B is the same statement only if what is referred to by C is understood to be B. This principle needs to be distinguished from a similar one for "recognizing the new statement as the same statement", as for this the necessary condition given would be trivial.

I take it that cases of this use of descriptions will abound, and will indeed be more plentiful than cases of pure attributive use, for they are cases in which a particular description is essential to what I say, but in which it is sufficient that this description be understood to apply. And so there will be no great difference in principle between these and attributive uses, but more a difference in strictness. In what follows I will use the following terminology: "attributive" uses as defined by the first criterion, "essential" uses those defined by

this last criterion, and "non-essential" uses those which are referential but neither attributive nor essential. So/non-essential uses are those for which some description is substitutable and the new sentence be used to make the same statement.

But something more needs to be said about the sense of "same statement" being presumed here. Now it seems clear that when in respect of the same person Smith and the same murder, the Judge says (22) in court in the case given, and a close friend of Jones says it is Jones' defence, that there is some sense in which these utterances constitute different statements, but the sense of "same statement" in which these utterances are not the same statement is very difficult to define. A central part of the problem here is that this sense could only be fully clarified as part of a whole theory of speech-acts, sentences and statements; for example, we would need to be a good deal clearer about relation between sentences and statements, statements and truth-conditions, and so on. To the extent to which this is the problem, it obviously cannot be tackled here, and I will have to leave the relevant sense of "same statement" as primitive and unanalysed in my account. Yet something partial can be done to make this clearer, for the sense of "same statement" can be

given in this way: two utterances (assertions) make the same statement if, given only what is required to determine in that situation what statement was made, there still remains the logical possibility of a difference in truth-value between the two utterances. Thus we can understand what statement the judge makes by the use of (22) without deciding who is Smith's murderer, and we can grasp what statement Jones' friend makes without assuming that Jones is Smith's murderer, and so there is the possibility that the first statement be true and the second false, viz. the situation that Smith's murderer is insane, but Jones is not and he is quite normal. Now it is crucial to notice that this elucidation is quite different from a parallel one, which will be of importance later, viz. that there is no contradiction in the two utterances having different truth-values, given only that it is presumed that the two names or descriptions in question refer to the same thing. The distinction is important because this latter criterion will be central in the later discussion of Chisholm's third test for intentionality and of Quine's test for opacity. Also, it needs to be noticed that this first test has nothing to do with the relation between sentence-forms. For example, we might[1] say that two sentence forms

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[1] Might, but in virtue of the above, should not.

are the same sentence if there is no situation in which they could be used to make statements with different truth-values. My elucidation is concerned with statements as made by particular utterances in particular situations. Even so, it may be objected that surely any two assertions made with different sentences (e.g. with "Jones was insane" and "Smith's murderer was insane") could fail this test for "same statement", as there would always be the logical possibility of a difference of truth-value. No, at least if they are used non-essentially, for we do in fact use descriptions just to pick out a given individual, and such that the description used is not essential to what is said; in such a use, determining what statement is made involves determining what individual is said to be P, and if the same individual is in question, then there is no possibility of a difference in truth-value. But this should become clearer when we introduce another distinction in the next section, section 10.

Before turning to this distinction, the application of all this to names needs to be discussed. I have so far drawn the distinctions only in terms of definite descriptions - do proper names also show these three types of referential use? New names seem to be normally used in situations in which both speaker and hearer are familiar with a given person or thing,

and to pick out that person or thing, and so are normally used non-essentially. But there can be cases of essential or perhaps even attributive use. Consider: a teacher rebuking pupils who are supposed to be lining up in alphabetical order, by saying (27) "Sheehan should be before Tehan"; a person who has just come to Oxford and only heard of Ryle suggesting (28) "Ryle is probably the same man as Strawson"; an adaptation of an example of Quine's, (29) "Giorgione was called what he was because of his size", in a case in which we have just been introduced to Giorgione for the first time. Now these all seem to be both referential by the C-criterion and either essential or attributive - arguably, (27) and (28) might be held to be attributive, and (29) essential. But, the objection might come, the name in the subject-position in each case might be replaced by "the man called "Ryle" " etc. in which the name is mentioned rather than used, and the C-criterion makes the occurrence of names referential only if they are used rather than mentioned. The reply to this is that almost any use of a name can be replaced by something of the form "the B called 'a' ", but this description is itself referential, and the whole description replaces the name - the name is shown to be mentioned only if just the name in quotation marks replaces the name in its

original use.

One final remark, concerning non-essential uses of descriptions, which have been defined as: the use of "the B" in "the B is P" is non-essential if some other description of what is referred to could replace "the B" and the new sentence be used to make the same statement, in the sense that once it is determined what statement is made there is no possibility of a difference of truth-value between the two. Now consider three statements (i) an attributive or essential use of "the B is P", where 'P' is not an intentional context by any possible criterion, (ii) a non-essential use of "the B is P" in the same situation as (i), (iii) a non-essential use of "the C is P" which makes the same statement in the required sense as (ii). From these stipulations and our earlier definitions, it follows that (i) and (iii) do not make the same statement, and therefore, as (ii) and (iii) do, that (i) and (ii) do not amount to the same statement. Thus there must be the possibility of situations in which (i) is true and (ii) false, or vice-versa. Now (i) can only be true if what is in fact the B is P, and if this is so and (ii) is false, this must be a matter of what is referred to by "the B" in (ii) not in fact being the B. In reverse, if (ii)

is true and (i) is false, i.e. the B is not F, then the truth of (ii) must again be a matter of what is referred to by "the B" not in fact being the B. So in this way we are forced to accept a very basic feature on non-essential use, the possibility that what is referred to by the name or description does not in fact have that name, or satisfy that description. When this does occur, it clearly must be a matter of what the speaker means by the B not in fact being the B. To a distinction concerned with this we must now turn.

10.

Consider two situations in which, after hitting a chap whom I know well and falsely believe to be my brother, I am questioned about it in court. The first situation is a court case about this man's damages, and every one in court knows both that I believe he is my brother and that in fact he is not. Here, when I say (30) "I hit my brother" and mean that chap, it is most likely that my utterance will be accepted as true. The second situation is a court case in which my real brother's

damages are in question, and apart from this the conditions of utterance of (30) are the same as before. Here it is most likely that my utterance will be regarded as false, even though every one knows that I did hit the chap I mean. If this is right it can appear puzzling, because both my utterance and the facts are unchanged in the two situations, and yet the truth-value that we assign to it has changed. The explanation, however, is obvious enough, if difficult to put clearly - in some cases we evaluate what I say for truth or falsity, and in others what I mean, and which we are interested in is shown by the context. Thus in the second case someone might say "It is of course false that he hit his brother, yet true that he hit the person he meant by 'my brother'." It is worth recalling here the second distinction I drew earlier in the last section between two ways in which reference to an individual is achieved - by that individual being what satisfies the description I use ("satisfying"), and by its being the individual I mean or intend ("intending"). Both these are present in most normal acts of referring. For example, when I use 'the cat' to refer to a particular cat, which individual I refer to is determined partly by its satisfying 'the cat' and partly by which one I mean.

But if what I mean turns out to be different from what satisfies the description (e.g. if I refer to a particular person as the Wayneflete Professor of Philosophy, and he no longer is, but someone else is) the distinction between what I mean and what I say becom s a very real, and not just a logical, one.

Now such a distinction will not always exist, and we need to explore the conditions in which it will do so. For example, if I say "the cat is on the mat" but mean by "my cat" my kangaroo, and I have no cat yet mistakenly believe that kangaroos are members of the cat family, then here because there is no cat which is picked out by my description there is no clear sense that can be given to what I meant as opposed to what I said. Or in at least one way this is true, for saying that the distinction "exists" above is ambiguous, and three things need to be kept separate; the conditions for being able to draw the distinction at all, the conditions for it to be possible that there is something that satisfies my description as distinguished from something that I mean (whether or not they are the same thing), and the conditions for being able to distinguish a further, propositional, sense of what I say as distinct from what I mean. The last is fairly simple, for if I use a description in a statement and the second set of conditions are fulfilled, then

I can distinguish at the propositional level what I said and what I meant. As I am interested in this latter, I need to clarify the second set, the conditions for it to be possible that there is something that satisfies my description as distinguished from something that I meant.

I will just give three necessary conditions here. Firstly, it will be a necessary condition for this that the description ("the B") is used in a uniquely specifying fashion, for otherwise it will not succeed in picking out a particular B independently of which B the speaker means to refer to. A second necessary condition will be that the description is not used attributively, for the truth of a statement using a description attributively depends on the object referred to satisfying the description. That is to say, even if in an attributive use we were to allow some sense to the speaker meaning by the use of that description something which did not satisfy it, then that could never amount to part of a proposition which could have a truth-value different to what he said. The third necessary condition is even more difficult to decide, but if I know only that I have a brother and say "My brother is probably tall," then there will be no possibility of there being someone that I mean by "my brother" but who is not actually my brother. The best I can do here is

to say that the third necessary condition is that the speaker has a coherent idea of what he means, so that he could identify that person or thing independently of the description.

All this needs more discussion, but the time is long overdue at which these various distinctions were made to do some work. But I will return again to this last distinction in Section 13.

11.

We are now in a position to draw together a few threads. In starting to evaluate the objection about reference and the existence of what is referred to which was raised to Chisholm's first test for intentionality, I distinguished two different principles, designated I and II, the limits of whose applicability I set out to determine. Now it is clear that we must distinguish four rather than two related principles, only the first of which I will state in full, viz.

I(a) If a person uses a definite description in a statement to refer to what he takes to be an actual person or thing, and if what he says (in the sense above) in making that statement is true, then it follows (logically i.e. this is an entailment)

that what he meant by the use of the description exists or has existed.

I(b) referential use + truth of what he meant entails existence of what he meant.

II(a) referential use + truth of what he said entails that something exists which satisfies the description.

II(b) referential use + truth of what he meant entails that something exists which satisfies the description.

The other main point, which emerged from the discussion of Donnellan's article, was that we need to distingtish three ways in which a description can occur referentially in an utterance, which I designated as attributive, essential and non-essential uses. What needs to be done now is to consider what the limits of applicability and validity of the various principles are, with the help of the distinction of uses. Of somewhat more incidental interest is the question as to what becomes of the other features of Donnellan's distinction, given our new complications.

First, then, the limits of applicability and validity, and here I will leave I(b) till last, as it is the most tricky. I(a) will not be applicable at all to utterances which use the particular description attributively, as for these uses we can

make no sense of what he meant by the use of the description as opposed to what satisfies it, and hence of I(a) as opposed to Ii(a). A similar remark applies to essential uses for which the person knows only (or virtually only) that there is someone or something satisfying the description - here again no sense for what he meant as opposed to what he said. I(a) will also not apply to those cases ruled out by the first necessary condition for the mean/say distinction, viz. those for which the description is a not uniquely specifying one, or not at least uniquely specifying in the given situation of utterance. It needs to be noticed here that "uniquely specifying in the situation" does not reduce to "as used in that context, in fact picks out one", for the situation of utterance may be important either for clarifying what the description itself means, or for clarifying what particular A (or something misdescribed as A) it is used to pick out. Thus, if a person in the dark in strange surroundings hears someone say "my house ....." or "the cat in the drawing room ....." before he fully understands the description as used he needs to know who is the speaker, or what house is in question. This is to be opposed to knowing which cat or which house he means, if he says e.g. "the cat ....." or "the house .....", which may also be obvious from the situation. So I am

including the first and not the second type of knowledge drawn from the context as acceptable for "uniquely specifying in the situation", but the distinction should not be regarded as wholly sharp-edged, as it will often be a matter of a presumption about the facts (e.g. that I have only one house) which makes a description uniquely specifying. And of course in "the cat in the drawing-room ....", "the drawing-room" picks out the one he means or intends, and so a given description can be used, in that context, in a uniquely specifying way even if on of its referential terms is not so used. We might put it this way: "the B" is used in a uniquely specifying way if there is, and the user believes there is, only one B, where the sense and reference (if any) of all the terms in 'B' is taken as fixed.

Thus, I(a) will be applicable to all uniquely specifying essential or non-essential uses, except those where the speaker has no coherent idea of the individual he is referring To, independent of the given description. Further it would seem that for all those uses it is an <u>invalid</u> principle or inference because, given that the distinction can be drawn in all these cases between what I said and what I meant (and what I meant by A) and the conditions for what I said to be possibly true are satisfied, there would seem to be no logical reason why what I said could not

be true even though what I meant by A did not exist. (Given of course that the supposition that what I meant did not exist makes sense - see later, Section 13). So it looks as if for all these cases for which it is applicable this principle is invalid. And if this is so, its contradictory is not all that plausible as a criterion for picking out the intentional use of language in Chisholm's sense, as by it any utterance using a description in these ways would be intentional, and there is no reason at all to restrict the class of such utterances to anything like those using psychological sentences. That is, as a criterion it would fail by being far too inclusive. As the initial considerations for II(a) and II(b) are rather similar to this case, I will deal with them rather shortly.

II(a) Applicability: to all uniquely specifying uses of descriptions and so all attributive uses, most (all?) essential uses, and some non-essential uses. Validity : prima facie valid for all these uses, as it would seem that a statement which purported to assert something of an actual individual could be true only if that individual exists, and the only way an utterance of this type viewed in this aspect, determines an individual is via the description being satisfied, so/if the description is satisfied.

If this validity claim were right, then the principle would be

useless as mark of intentionality as it would exclude most psychological utterances. But this validity claim is doubtful precisely for some psychological utterances e.g. the essential use of "my brother" in "I am looking for my brother" - here is one point at which we cannot avoid looking in detail at particular psychological utterances. To this I will devote the next section.

II(b) Applicability: the only conditions seems to be that the speaker has a coherent idea of what individual he is referring to independently of the description used, and that the description is a uniquely specifying one, and hence it applies only to non-essential and essential uses which satisfy this last condition. Validity : invalid for all its uses, by the same argument for I(a), viz. that it requires that the mean/say distinction applies, and if it does there is no logical reason why what he meant could not be true even though nothing satisfies the description. As a criterion for intentionality interpreted as a mark of the psychological, the contradictory of II(b) would fail in the same way as I(a), by including too many sentences or utterances[1] as it would include nearly all sentences capable

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[1] This equivocation derives, of course, from a slight over-simplification adoptedfor purposes of exposition. The current

Cont. p. 67

of being used in utterances using descriptions essentially or non-essentially.

12.

So it does not look as if either 1(a) or 11(b) could possibly help us to a criterion for singling out the psychological uses of language, at least when considered alone. 11(a) left some hope, the hope that psychological utterances may turn out to fail to satisfy the principle, thus distinguishing them from most other utterances, which do satisfy it. This hope is doomed to disappointment, as I think we can see if we take seven more or less random and prima facie psychological sentences, viz.

(31) I asked for my brother.

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test is that a given sentence is intentional in every statement made with it does not entail the existence or non-existence of what is described or referred to. The last condition breaks down into the four distinguished, and if every statement made with a given sentence satisfies any version of the condition, then that sentence will be intentional under that interpretation of the test. The argument here is that every sentence for uses of which the test applies will be intentional, and so no particular sentences, much less only psychological sentences, would be picked out at intentional if this interpretation were used.

(32) I am looking for my brother

(33) I love my brother

(34) I trust my brother

(35) I intend to kill my brother

(36) I was listening to my brother

(37) I admire my brother

and two fully clearly non-psychological sentences, viz.

(38) My brother was run over last night

(39) John hit my brother

Here again we will have the three-way distinction of uses, considering throughout only uses in which the description is used referentially, in case there are any in which it is not. Some unease may be felt about whether (33) and (34) could be used other than non-essentially, but sufficiently unusual examples could surely be produced. In what follows I will call attributive, essential and non-essential uses u, v, and w respectively, and use S and M for what I say and what I mean, in the propositional sense, respectively. So S(w) will stand for what I say in a non-essential use of the sentence in question. Attributive uses, as we have seen, do not admit of the distinction between what I say and mean at the propositional level, and so the symbols S and M are not relevant to them.

Further, we can distinguish cases of utterance of (31) - (39) in which: (X) the speaker has no brother but there is some person that he means by his use of "my brother", (Y) He has a brother but he is not the person who is meant, even though that person does exist, (Z) He has no brother and is mistaken in believing that the person he means does exist. The letters given will be used to designate these cases. Finally, in the table which follows I will use "T" to mean: this sentence so used, and as satisfying these conditions could be true if the other presumptions of the use (e.g. that I did ask some appropriate question, or that I do have some appropriate feelings of love) are satisfied. And "F" to mean: so used the sentence will always be false or at least not true, given that the only asking, loving etc in question is that about which the statement is made. Thus if I say I love my brother about someone who is not my brother, the fact that independently of this I may love a person who is my brother will not be held to be relevant to the ascription of T or F to this use of the sentence. Also, I say "at least not true" here to avoid entangling my discussion with the controversy associated with Russell and Strawson about the possibility of there being a truth-value gap, when what is referred to does not exist. Consider a statement made with a sentence of the form

"the A is P". Now with Chisholm in mind what we are interested in is statements whose truth does not entail the existence of the A, or of what is referred to by "the A", i.e. statements which can be true even though there is no A or what is referred to turns out not to exist. This will show up independently of the existence of truth-value gaps - if Strawson is right, most utterances will be neither true nor false in the situations considered, but this will not affect the existence of utterances which can be true in these conditions. So I use "F" to cover both not being true in this way, if there are any such, as well as straight-out falsity. One final comment: it needs to be recalled that in all of this discussion I am concerned with cases in which the speaker takes himself to be referring to something actual.

With these stipulations then, I can summarize the relevant behaviour of the nine sentences above in the form of a table:

	(31)[1]			(32)			(33)			(34)			(35)		
	X	Y	Z	X	Y	Z	X	Y	Z	X	Y	Z	X	Y	Z
(u)	T	-	-	T	-	-	F	-	-	F	-	-	T	-	-
S(v)	T	T	T	T	T	T	F	F	F	F	F	F	T	T	T
M(v)	F	F	F(?)	T	T	T	T	T	F(?)	T	T	F(?)	T	T	T
S(w)	F	F	F(?)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
M(w)	T	T	T(?)	T	T	T(?)	T	T	F(?)	T	T	F(?)	T	T	T

	(36)			(37)			(38)			(39)		
	X	Y	Z	X	Y	Z	X	Y	Z	X	Y	Z
(u)	F	-	-	F	-	-	F	-	-	F	-	-
S(v)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
M(v)	T	T	F	T	T	T(?)	T	T	F	T	T	F
S(w)	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
M(w)	T	T	F	T	T	F(?)	T	T	F	T	T	F

[1]

(31) is an obscure example in that, in addition to the distinction already introduced, complications will arise from the fact that I could use different descriptions, or use them in different ways, in the act of asking which (31) is used to report. (And this generally arises with this sort of report.) For the purposes of this table, I will restrict to use of (31) to those cases in which the phrase "my brother" was used in the act of asking reported, and in the same way as it is used in the particular use of (31) being considered. If my purposes here were different (31) would provide a fruitful field for investigation, illustrating at least the point that simple tests like those given by Chisholm and Quine underestimate the actual complexity of the use of language to a very large extent.

Now I am not wanting to claim that every entry in this table is entirely indisputable, but to say just that they are sufficiently reliable to show that there are three general patterns exhibited here, as shown below, generally speaking satisfied by the sentences shown.

^{3}3,4,6,7,8,9	^{3}2,5	1
F - -	T - -	T - -
F F F	T T T	T T T
T T F	T T T	F F F(?)
F F F	F F F	F F F(?)
T T F	T T T	T T T(?)

There will of course be plenty more examples satisfying these, e.g. "I hate my brother" or "I recognized my brother" falls probably under the first, "I meant my brother (by what I said)" or "I pretended to be my brother" under the second, and "I insulted my brother" or "I abused my brother" under the third.

One thing at least emerges very clearly from the table, and that is that the negation of II(a) has no plausibility as a criterion for the psychological. II(a) was roughly put as: referential use + truth of what he said entails existence of something satisfying the description. Now the version of

Chisholm's first criterion which is parallel to this is that this entailment does not hold, and if the entailment does not hold in some or all of cases X, Y and Z this will be shown up in the occurrence of T in the table, as this will mean that the utterance can be true even though e.g. I have no brother. The only cases which concern II(a) will be those concerned with the truth of what I said, viz. (u), S(v), and S(w). The latter we can put out of the way immediately, as it follows from the character of the non-essential use that for all statements so using a description what I said will be F if e.g. I have no brother but there is someone I mean, or if I have a brother but he is not the meant one, and, for most uses, if there is neither a brother nor someone I mean. So the fact that F's occur throughout the S(w) column can be discounted from the test for intentionality, although of course, this seriously restricts the applicability of the test.

Taking the (u) and S(v) uses, it is clear that the four psychological cases exhibiting the first pattern above come out as non-intentional. The variable middle value of S(v) is not relevant to this, as this is the case of the supposition that I have a brother but the one I mean is not he, and hence is not relevant. But trusting, loving, admiring and listening to are surely paradigms

of the psychological, and hence the supposed criterion fails by being far too exclusive. Perhaps, though, it defines a class of utterances with independent interest, and some attempt should be made to find the rationale of the difference in behaviour shown here.

One interesting fact is that the first pattern is that of many sentences which no one would be inclined to say were intentional, for example38 and39 above, which would seem to be fairly typical non-psychological sentences. So we can conclude that in these respects these psychological sentences show no variations at all from non-psychological ones. The other two patterns, however, would seem to be quite distinctive. The characteristic mark of the second is that in an essential use, it can be true both that I was looking for or intending to kill my brother, and also someone who is not my brother, in respect of the one act of intending to kill or looking for some person. Hence T's occur in both S(v) and M(v) lines. In both these examples this feature arises from the fact that in (divergent) essential uses "I am looking for X" can be true because of what I set out to find, of what I regard myself as looking for, and yet also because of what I am in fact looking for, of the particular person I have set my mind on and towards which my

actions may be directed. The first pattern differs from this primarily in that for sentences exhibiting it, in their essential uses, what particular person my love, hate, admiration etc. is directed towards is crucial to determining the truth-value of the statement, but what I regard that person as being (e.g. my brother) is not. Thus if I love a particular person only because he is my brother, and would not love him if I found out that he was not my brother, and use "I love my brother" essentially to describe this, nevertheless what I say is false and what I mean is true. The coherence of this example may be challenged, on the ground that "I love my brother" could not have the <u>essential</u> use described. If this were accepted, other examples could be found e.g. "I admire my brother" said in the right conditions in a certain sort of society. The third pattern differs from the second in the opposite way - here at least often the descriptions I use (e.g. I say "My brother is a coward" essentially), and not which person I meant, alone determine the truth-value of e.g. "I abused my brother", or "I asked for my brother". There are obvious complexities in this third pattern which I will, however, ignore, basing this on the argument that these cases, essentially reports of actions of a special type, are not necessarily psychological. A full

account of this area would of course need to treat these complications. All I wish to suggest for the present is that the second pattern, covering patently psychological sentences, does serve to define a distinct and interesting class of sentences, even though there seems to be no criterion here that could pick out all and only psychological sentences.

13.

I can now turn to the fourth of the principles distinguished earlier, I(b), viz. referential use + truth of what he meant entails the existence of what he meant, to give it its schematic formulation. Now following the preceding procedure, the entailment will not hold if we have T in the M(v) or M(w) row when what I mean does not exist, i.e. in case Z (as the use of its contradictory as a criterion of intentionality would require). But the M(v) and M(w) rows in the Z column are the very rows in which uncertainty abounds, as shown by the abundance of question-marks. And this of course points to the question as to whether we can evaluate what I mean for truth or

falsity even though what I mean does not exist, or more precisely, whether it makes sense to suppose that what I mean does not exist. This also arises because it might seem that the distinction between what I say and what I mean is that between what person (e.g.) satisfies the description I use, and what actual person I mean, and hence that it is necessary that what I mean exists, if the distinction is to be drawn. Now at least this query is a justified request for more clarification of this crucial distinction, and such clarification is anyway needed independently of this query.

A start on this can be made by putting on one side two possibly distracting uses of "what I mean", viz. in cases akin to slips of the tongue, and in cases in which what I mean is given by what I point to or otherwise physically indicate. The first, in which e.g. I say "the cat" and yet mean to say "the dog", and hence mean the dog all along, need to be kept aside because of the complications which arise out of not saying what I mean or intend to say. The second class consists of cases in which I say e.g. "my brother is drunk" and indicate a person (or what I take to be a person) whom I believe is my brother. Now one might say that the person he indicates is the one he means, but this is not the sense I wish to isolate in the "what

he meant"/"what he said" distinction. For it is essential to that distinction that the terms be what I meant or said <u>by the use of the given description</u>, or what I meant to refer to by that or in saying that, but in cases like pointing, who or what I mean by the gesture can be grasped independently of the description used, and only relates to that utterance by being made at the same time. But this is too slick, and needs to be discussed in more detail.

We can distinguish a number of types of case in which pointing or some other gesture is made to indicate that some individual present to speaker and hearer is in question. Consider these cases, like e.g. "This man is P" where the speaker somehow indicates which man he is talking about and which are those where some demonstrative element (normally "this" or "that") is part of the description used to refer, and hence in which the indication of the particular individual is essential for the reference of that description to be achieved. Now by the criterion of the last paragraph we do not have a separate instance of "what I mean" given by what I indicate here, for I cannot interpret the gesture or other form of indication as giving what I meant as contrasted with what I said because that gesture is essential to understanding what it is that I said. What I said was that <u>this</u> man was P, so the one I indicate cannot be what I

mean in the current sense of that phrase. These cases will, however, be included in another way, or at least some of them will. For while we will not get the required distinction such that what I mean is given by what I gesture towards, yet simply because the demonstrative element is an essential part of the description we can often get it in another way. For example, if I say to someone "This man has just become wealthy" thinking that he is my brother, who has just got the inheritance and whom I know well, then we might distinguish "what I said" (viz. the man who is this man, and the corresponding proposition) from "what I meant" (viz. my brother etc.)[1]. Contrast this with the case in which I say "This man is well-dressed" about a person

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1 This is still too vague a specification of the case, for the two following could both fall under it. a) I have for many years had a false belief about which man is my brother, and I say this of the man I falsely believe to be him, and b) I know my brother alright, but mistakenly believe that this man is he. Now in the first case it will be false that I mean my brother when I say "This man" even though I take myself to be talking about my brother. There will also be many other cases intermediate between these two (e.g. I keep confusing my brother with this chap) but something approximate to the situation of (b) will be necessary if what I mean is to be my brother. This is not to deny of course that a related distinction arises in (a) in quite another way, viz. what I say is the man I actually point to, and what I mean is the man I meant to point to.

I have never seen before, in a fashion parade. Here there is no other way I can specify which man I mean other than by observable properties of this man, and it would make no sense to suppose that it was not this man that I had meant. A better case still for the contrast might be: at a fish market I see a nice fish and point to it saying, "That one will do," or any case in which nothing particularly hangs upon which I indicate. These last two cases allow only two of the three possible notions hinted at here, as for them we might distinguish what I indicated or pointed to (generally what I said) from what I meant to point to or indicate (generally, what I meant to say), but not again what I meant in saying that or in producing these words and gestures in this situation.

Let me try to put in summary form what I am trying to distinguish here.

1) Considering situations in which I point to something, there are those cases in which the act of pointing is part of what I say ("this man"), those in which it is simply illustrative of what I say ("my brother" in a family gathering, accompanied by gesture), and those in which the gesture gives what I mean and the description used is more or less illustrative (concerning my

brother I say "that drunken fool in the armchair" and point).

Now in the third case only can the gesture be taken to give what I mean in my sense, but this is not to imply that the mean/say distinction will not be applicable to these cases in another way.

2) Different again is what I meant to point to, which does not give what I mean in this sense and is to be assimilated in the first of the above cases to what I meant to say.

The separating out of these cases serves to re-inforce the point made earlier (see Section 10) that one necessary condition for the mean/say distinction to exist is that the speaker has a coherent and reasonably full idea of what it is he means, as shown up by the fact that he could describe in further detail what it is that he means to refer to by his use of "the B". Does this imply only, or more than, that he must be able to supply more than one description of what it is that he means? The answer to this, I think, is that this distinction exists primarily in the situation in which the speaker has a firm body of knowledge concerning a particular person or thing, and in which he uses one name or description to pick out that person or thing. If he has only two or three descriptions which he knows or believes to apply, or if the descriptions which he believes to hold of that person or thing in fact break down into those which hold of one

thing and those which hold of another, then the distinction will be obscured. One very minimal necessary condition on the coherence side can be stated though: the distinction could only exist if his false beliefs about what he meant were in the minority among his beliefs concerning it.

We can now return to the question with which this section opened, viz. whether it is possible that what I mean could turn out not to exist, and yet the distinction still remain. The importance of this question is that if we decide that it is not possible, then it will follow that all statements to which the principle I(b) applies will satisfy it. Consider an example which will be of importance in Part II, viz.

(4) I was thinking of that camp-site in Lucerne

The argument for a negative answer to this question must be: if I intend to refer to something actual (e.g. an actual camping-site), and there is nothing that I mean then I have not succeeded in saying that I thought of anything. Of course I could have said that I was thinking of the camping-site I dreamt about, but I did not, and <u>that</u> could not in any sense be what I meant by what I <u>did</u> say. So my original utterance will certainly not be true, whether we choose to say that it is false or that it does not have a truth-value.

But if this is the argument we are landed back with general

considerations, for it does not turn at all on any special feature of "thinking of". Recall the two conditions for our distinction to exist - firstly, that the speaker believes that what he means satisfies the description used (or at least, in very special cases, that he believes that his listeners do so believe) and secondly, that one that I expressed vaguely by saying that he must have a fairly full coherent idea of that which he means, but which at least seems to imply that any false beliefs that he has about it are necessarily in the minority. Now these in turn seem to imply a third, that what I mean or refer to is something of the right type for it to be asserted, whether truly or falsely, to satisfy the description. For how could I have a "fairly full idea" of what I refer to and yet be mistaken about the type of thing it is? But, it might be objected, how about this case: I shot at random, but hit a tree that I believe to be my father, and say "I hit my father", using "my father" non-essentially and meaning "that tree". The reply will be to point out that I use this description non-essentially to refer to a certain person that I know well, and only secondarily, because I believe that this (tree) is he, to mean that tree. So taken just as using the description non-essentially my statement is false, and what I mean by the description is that person, even

though in the context it may serve to correctly indicate to people around what I hit.

Now if this third condition is accepted, it will be a necessary condition of successfully[1] using a description non-essentially that what I mean falls within the category of things of which the description is significantly predicable, or to put all of this in reverse form, that a description can be used to mean only what satisfies this condition. The question now is whether, in the case above, in which I think that I am referring to an actual camp-site, the camp-site I dreamt of or had developed this idea of will satisfy this condition. In general form the question is whether what I mean has to be an actual thing within the required category, or, more generally still, whether it has to exist in the way that the speaker supposes it does. Thus, with the imagined or dreamt of camp-site do, will a real man do if I think I am referring to a fictional character, and so on?

Three considerations favour a negative answer to this question as put in the very last sentence. Firstly, this third condition was deduced from two others, one of which was that the speaker

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1. "Success" here will consist in the description having been so used that a proposition susceptible of truth or falsity has been uttered, or would have been if other factors had not intervened.

believed that what he meant satisfied the description. Now if we so interpret the third condition that the camp he dreamt of or imagined was what he meant, then it becomes false that he thought that <u>that</u> was e.g. "that camp-site in Lucarno", for we are not to suppose that the distinction between dreams and reality has collapsed for him. That is, while we may well describe the case by saying that he is confused as between what he dreamt and what was real, yet it is still false that he believes that the camp-site he dreamt of was in Lucarno. But, an objection may come, "he believes that what he dreamt of was in Lucarno" can serve to indicate two quite different statements, in the way discussed earlier and depending on how the phrase "what he dreamt of" is used. What is true in this case could be put by saying that he believes that what he dreamt of existed in Lucarno, but of course does not at the same time recognise that he dreamt of it. What is false is that he believes that what he dreamt of existed in Lucarno (which he may believe in another case). And the first of these could not satisfy the condition of the mean/say distinction, for it is only incidentally true that it is what he dreamt of that he believes exists in Lucarno. That is, in the case described it is not in any way essential to the statement he made that he dreamt it, rather than got the idea of it from a film or just imagined it.

This leads on to the second point, for it is surely not possible that I not know what I mean to refer to by a given description, or that I should find out later on, or perhaps never find out, but it *is* possible that these hold in the case given. As above, it might only dawn on him later that he dreamt of it, or he might believe that he dreamt of it when in fact he saw it in a film. So the camp-site I dreamt of, or imagined, or saw in a film, cannot *in the case described* be what I meant by the use of the description (although they could be in other cases). The third point, which re-inforces this, is that when I say that I was thinking of, enjoyed, loved, recalled or intend to return to that site in Lucarno, I take myself to be expressing either a relation between myself and something in the world or my reaction to or intentions towards something in the world. What I mean cannot be taken to be *simply* an object of my dreams, imagination or delusions,[1] in the sort of case given.

All this is intended to support the view that when I make a statement using a description to mean a particular thing in the current sense then that statement can only be true if there exists

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1. Compare: "I can see Uncle Joe", non-essentially concerning a mirage in the desert.

something of that logical type of which the description is significantly predicable and of the existential status[1] intended by the speaker. This last clause is intended to cover cases in which I actually did mean what I dreamt of or imagined, or a fictional character or camp-site. Here, by parity of reasoning, it would seem that what I meant could not turn out to be an actual person or camp-site.

We must exercise care at this point, however, for at least the last step in this argument may be invalid. For even if it is granted that what I mean must be of the logical type and existential status I intend, yet the conclusion that what I mean (in the propositional sense) can be true only if there is something satisfying these conditions follows only if it is also granted that what I mean (proposition) can be true only if there is something which is what I mean to refer to. The arguments of the first part had the form: if I take myself to mean an actual X, and there is no actual X that I mean, then it follows that there was nothing that I mean. Filling out the last step of the argument, it is: if there is nothing that I mean, then

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[1] Use of this phrase is not to be taken as committing me to there being modes or degrees of existence, but simply to their being different sorts of thing, which may or may not exist.

then because what I said is ruled out as far as concerns determining what proposition I expressed, there seems to be no way of interpreting what I mean as a proposition which may be true or false. Of course, it should be added, the utterance I make may be intelligible in the circumstances and may be readily interpreted in a way which would make it true, but this does not mean that the utterance itself could be true.

Consider this sequence, as uttered by an old man and his daughter: (33) "I love my brother" "But you do not have any brother" "Well, perhaps not, but anyway you know who I mean - the chap who is x,y, and z" "But no one is x,y and z. You have dreamt it all". Now I take it as clear that at this point the original utterance collapses, and that we can make no sense of it as a case in which what he meant was true. Yet of course she may make a true statement by saying "He loves his brother" with a knowing nod, or by saying that her father thinks that there is someone who did x, y and z, and that he loves him. But the particular utterance of (33) cannot be interpreted as a case in which what he means is true.

But is it in general true that If I mean to refer to a particular actual X, and there is nothing that I mean, then there can be no proposition which gives what I mean and is true?

reason for answering "No" to this might be that philosophers thought that a parallel generalisation was true until they noted the existence of "intentional" sentences - isn't a parallel situation likely to prevail here? Yet, it will be urged in favour of a positive answer, this last consideration considerably over-simplifies the case. True, there are statements which can be true when what the speaker takes himself to be referring to does not exist, yet the only non-controversial such cases are those in which we evaluate what he said for truth or falsity, or in which there is some person or thing that I mean (see the table of the last section). So this cannot give any relief in the present case. Further, if neither the description I use nor what I mean can be used in the determination of what proposition I expressed, how can this be determined at all?

This is, indeed, an issue which I am unable to finally decide in this thesis, for we need a good deal more clarity about the particular controversial cases, and about the tools to be used in the discussion of them. Fortunately, this is not a major impediment to my programme, for the controversial cases are clearly of limited number, being primarily those satisfying the criterion deriving from version II(a), and as isolated in the last section. So whatever position we take on this issue, the contradictory of I(b) will be of no use to Chisholm as a criterion of

the psychological, including as it does very many basic psychological sentences.

Let me conclude this section, then, by posing the issue in terms of one of the controversial cases. Consider an utterance of (35) "I intend to kill my brother" in the same old man and daughter situation as above, or another in which an elderly couple jointly plan a murder. Now it emerges that the speaker had no brother, and that there is no one that they mean; it is clear that in some sense they had intentions to kill, and that these might be made intelligible to others via (35) if they knew the situation sufficiently well. Given all this, could we say that what he means by the original use of (35) is true, given the sense of "what he means" that I have tried to develop? No, I am inclined to say, but without feeling at all sure that this is the correct answer.

14.

At this point of the discussion there is a danger of losing the wood for the trees, and some recapitulation is necessary.

This section opened by clarifying some points about Chisholm's first test, and then confronted the problem about whether the test should include a referential demand or not. Some advantages of both leaving this demand or withdrawing it were canvassed, but on either view the difficulty arose that if the description was used to refer to what the speaker took to be an actual person or thing then the truth of the statement mode might be thought to entail that that person or thing exists. In examining this, the test with the referential demand included was seen to break down into four distinct tests, none of which succeeded as criteria for psychological sentences, but one, or perhaps two, of which served to isolate two distinct classes of sentences, one of these classes being highly interesting. Now all of this discussion has in fact taken Chisholm's test with the referential demand built in, and a special sort of referential demand at that, viz. that the person concerned takes himself to be referring to an actual person or thing. So something now must be said about the two classes of uses excluded from this - that of non-referential use and that of utterances in which the person takes himself to be referring to a non-actual person or thing.

Concerning non-referential uses, we need to treat of two classes of sentences or statements, those which contain a definite description not used referentially, and those which contain non-

definite descriptions, particularly those of the form "A f'ed an X" Now the referential demand was mainly introduced because many non-referential uses failed the test e.g. "He could have become the first man in space", "He is the first man in space". Now short of a quite new test being introduced, these cases will not upset our tentative conclusion that Chisholm's first test fails to pick out all, and only, psychological sentences. I am not aware of any plausible candidate for such a new test.

One objectionto introducing the referential demand was that it excluded one complete important class of psychological sentences which are never referential, viz. those of the form "A f'ed an X"[1] The possibility was raised that a new test could be introduced for such sentences, and there are in fact several related possibilities. We might say that a sentence of the form "A f'ed an X" is intentional if every statement made with it is such that neither it nor its contradictory implies (i) that there exists any X, or (ii) that there exists an X that A f'ed, or (iii) that A f'ed some particular X. There are three criteria here, and another three would be obtained by making the requirement that some statement made with it is such that .....

Now I think we can safely say that none of these six

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[1] For discussion of the claim that in uses of sentences of this form "an X" is never referential, see Section 20 of this part.

criteria serve to advance Chisholm's purposes. For if Jane loves, admires, hates, trusts or was listening to a man, it would seem to follow from all of these that there exists (or existed) at least one man, that there exists (or existed) a man that Jane loves, admires etc., and that Jane loves, admires, hates etc. some particular man. So there seems little plausibility in the first three options, those which require that <u>every</u> statement have the property in question. But perhaps those which require it to hold only of <u>some</u> statement will be more successful - after all Jane could easily enough love, admire or hate Macbeth, Mr. Pickwick or Sherlock Holmes. Now even in these cases the third requirement is satisfied, for Jane still loves some particular man - the case is not at all like looking for a friend, where there really is no particular person that is being looked for. The ~~the~~ versions with the existence requirements remain, and this leads us on to cases in which a person takes himself to be referring to a non-actual person or thing.

Indeed, these versions of the test for "A f'ed an X" sentences which include the existence requirement and need only some statement to possess the property can be subsumed under a wide test which emerges here: a sentence is intentional if some (serious) statement made with it expresses a relation between a real subject and a fictional object. Leaving aside the imprecision of "serious" this test arises from the fact that Jane can love, admire or hate a

man who exists only in fiction, but that she cannot kiss, hit or kill him. But now this fails in another way, for she certainly cannot listen to, know, observe, look at, or watch him, and she could only look for, ask for or intend to kill him if she were under the delusion that he is real.

In fact, we find ourselves here in what I take to be the constant plight of the intentionality thesis, at least in respect of the first test or group of tests, that when the various criteria are clarified, they serve to isolate various interesting classes of sentences, often of some importance for e.g. future philosophical analyses, but which are not co-extensive with the class of psychological sentences. And given the enormous importance of that latter class in human life, and the remarkable complexity of language which is being continually revealed, this is surely to be expected.

15.

Before turning to Chisholm's other tests, we must consider one objection of some importance to the G-test for referentiality,

one which was hinted at but could not be stated earlier. The objection is that non-essential uses of description, which are surely absolute paradigms of referential uses, do not in fact satisfy that criterion. The reason for this is that in this use my description may in fact successfully refer to something which is not correctly described by it, and this means that neither of the inferences "f(the A that is p), a is the A that is p, therefore f(a)" or "f(a), a is the A that is p therefore f(the A that is p)" are valid if "the A that is p" is used non-essentially. Or rather either not valid, or valid only if the presupposition is made that the same thing is referred to by the name and the description. But the latter course clearly introduces circularity. One form of reply to this would be to argue that at least the speaker must believe that the inference holds, and hence make the G-criterion become: referential use if either the inference is valid or the speaker believes it to be valid. Yet we surely can, as Donnellan points out, use a description to refer to a person or thing that we know not to satisfy it, if we know that our hearer believes that that person or thing does satisfy it (e.g. a child and its "father"). So the amended criterion will not do.

Now undoubtedly this line of reply could be further qualified, and objected to, and so on, but I think we can get more directly to

the heart of the matter. The most obvious way in which the criterion can be expanded to cover these cases is by stipulating that all non-essential uses of descriptions are to be considered as referential, as well as those which satisfy the G-test. But if this is not to be just ad hoc stipulation which introduces a second sense for "referential" some rationale underlying both this and the G-test will need to be made explicit. Fortunately such is to hand. For if a description is used non-essentially then this implies that other names or descriptions which name or describe the same thing as the given description can be used to make the same statement as was originally made. So in such a use a description can be replaced by a name of the thing described, and the same statement still to be made. Now I take it that what the G-test in fact does is to explain reference in terms of the way proper names introduce particulars into statements - a description is used referentially if the statement made implies a parallel statement with description replaced by appropriate name. So this use of a proper name is taken as the primitive notion for the definition, and if part of what the description does is to introduce a particular in the way a proper name does (as shown by the holding of the implication) then the use is referential. Now in the case of non-essential uses, the same point is shown in an even more straight-forward way - for in

Such a case the description can be replaced by a proper name, and the same statement made in a very strict sense. If precisely the same statement can be made with a proper name replacing the description, this would seem to be as good a case as any for concluding that part of what the description does is to introduce a particular in the way a proper name does. Thus we can bracket the two requirements for referentiality without diverging at all from the basic rationale of the criterion.

This discussion brings to the fore two problems which might cause confusion. Firstly, it might be thought that this account makes all uses of proper names referential. Now this of course is what I am claiming, with the stress laid on "uses", and hence explicitly on the distinction between the use and mention of a proper name. This distinction is presupposed throughout the discussion on reference, and while I do not believe that it has yet been adequately clarified, I cannot discuss it in this thesis. Secondly, it will be objected that the stipulation that all non-essential uses are referential makes my whole account circular, for non-essential uses are defined as those which are neither essential nor attributive, and the definitions of both of these latter notions explicitly use the notion of reference. So only if we have a separate test of referentiality can we isolate non-

essential uses at all, but these uses do not satisfy the recommended C-criterion. Now this is not quite accurate, for a sufficient[1] definition of non-essential uses is that other names or descriptions, which are not analytically related to the one used but which name or describe the same thing, can be used to make the same statement in the strict sense. Now "name" or "describe" do not presuppose "refer" in my account, and there is no explicit referential demand so there is no circularity.

There remains only one problem yet to be discussed concerning the C-criterion. This involves the conditions of its applicability with referentially opaque sentences, and will be delayed until such sentences have been treated (See section 25).

16.

Chisholm's second test for intentionality concerns sentences which contain a subordinate verb in the phrase which is the object of the principle verb. A simple declarative sentence of such a type is intentional "if neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies either that the phrase following the principle verb is

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[1] i.e. Sufficient in the relevant respects.

true or that it is false".[1] Now for a number of reasons I will not engage in an at all prolonged discussion of this criterion in this thesis - because there are fairly obvious, and substantial, counter-examples to regarding it as either a necessary or a sufficient condition for a sentence of this type to be a psychological one, because many of the points which would arise in such a discussion are similar to those which arise with the first and third criteria, and because this test leads, as far as I know, to no other interesting and relevent philosophical issues. I will confine myself then to making three points.

1) Firstly, there are clear objections to treating it as giving, for sentences of this type, a necessary conditions for their being psychological ones. Consider, for example, "I know that p", "I recognise that p," "I have discovered that p", "I am aware that p", "I realise that p", "I understand that p", "I remember that p", "I observed that p" and "I noticed that p". Now all these would at least have interpretations which were such that any use of the sentence would imply that "p" were true - if the cat was not on the mat last night, I cannot know, discover be aware, realise, remember or notice that he was on the mat. And in any normal sense of "psychological" these would surely have to count as psychological sentences. There are other sorts

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[1] op. cit. p. 510.

of counter-cases, but the point here could be roughly said to be that many mental acts have a central cognitive element, and that because of this the sentences expressing them have this feature.

2) Secondly, there are objections to treating this as a sufficient condition of the psychological, and while these are perhaps a little less clear than the ones above, they still seem decisive. Consider: "You ought to do what he asks of you," "You might do what he asks", "You are obliged by law to do what he asks", "You must do what he asks", "You might yet become the man who won", "It is important/urgent/good/the best thing/the most advantageous to all/necessary for your health that you should resign". These sentences would all have quite straightforward uses in which neither the statement made nor its contradictory implies that the phrase containing the subordinate verb is true. Note the importance of the inclusion of the contradictory - this aspect rules out cases like "He is able to win the race" or "It is possible that he should come". It would hardly be plausible, either, for Chisholm to reply that my objection cases could be analysed in explicitly psychological - in general there is surely no reason to believe this.

3) Finally, it may be urged that all statements made with sentences of this type in which the subordinate verb occurs in a

description used non-essentially will satisfy the test, for the statement could be true without the descriptive-phrase being true, in the case in which what is meant is not in fact picked out by the description. For example, if "the man who won the race" is used non-essentially then "He hit the man who won the race" can be true even if no-one won the race. Now as it stands this seems true, but various replies or ammendments to the test could be made, but I will not enter into a discussion of this complexities to which this point leads. For those complexities are parallel to the ones discussed in respect of the third test, and here seem to have no further, independent, interest.

17.

Chisholm's third criterion, though, will require much more detailed treatment. As already stated, it is that a sentence is intentional if it uses a name or definite description of a given thing in such a way that if it is replaced by another name or description of that thing then the new sentence may have a different truth-value from the original one. As before, there

are certain immediate difficulties in making this test precise. Firstly, we surely cannot in general accept talk about sentences having truth-values and using names or descriptions in respect of particular things. Secondly, when we speak of a name or description "of that thing", is it presumed that the test only applies to referential uses of names or descriptions? Thirdly, what exact interpretation are we to give to the phrase "may have a different truth-value?".

The following formulation should overcome the first two difficulties, while retaining the criterion as one picking out sentences. A simple declarative sentence containing a name or definite description will be intentional if every statement made by the use of it uses the name or description in such a way that if it were replaced by some other name or description of what it names or describes, then the truth-value of the new statement could differ from that of the first statement. Further, when we introduce statements as opposed to sentences into this criterion, we readily get in all four versions parallel to and including the one given, viz. (i) intentional if ... every statement .... replaced by any name or description, (ii) some statement ... any name or description, (iii) every statement ... some description (iv) some statement ... some description. Now since it would seem that almost any sentence could have a use in

which the description was used non-essentially (as defined earlier), almost any sentence could be used to make one statement possessing the feature common to all versions of the test, for in any non-essential use it is possible that another name or description of what has been already named or described could be used in the making of a statement with a different truth-value. So (ii) and (iv) must be excluded if the test is to be plausible. Further it seems likely, although this might need to be investigated, that for any sentence there would be some statement for which there was some alternative description which does not raise the possibility of a different truth-value, and hence (i) would seem to be far too strong. So I give (iii) in the statement above.[1] The other point about this statement of the test is that is explicitly does not require referential use of the description - whether this is in fact required for a plausible test will be discussed later.

On the third point, Chisholm's "sentence whose truth-value may differ from that of the original sentence" could most naturally be interpreted as: a sentence which could be used to make a statement with a different truth-value from that of (the statement made by) the original sentence. The general concern here of course

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[1] (iii) also is closer to the version needed for Quine's test for referential opacity.

is that the criterion not fail to catch those sentences which could otherwise avoid the test simply as a result of some sort of contingent fact - e.g. if I intend to kill a man it may happen that I know all the descriptions true of him, and intend to kill him under all of them (whatever that meant), but this clearly need not have been the case. This could have been ensured by the interpretation of Chisholm's remark given, i.e. by letting the possibility range over all statements which the sentence could possibly be used to make, but once we recognise the test as above in terms of the behaviour of each statement made by the use of the sentence this method is obviously no longer open. So the problem now becomes that of the interpretation of the relevant phrase of my formulation; "then the truth-value of the two statements could differ from that of the first statement" (for an obvious candidate suggests itself - if there is no logical contradiction in these statements having different truth-values, and their having the same, if they do, is just a matter of the extra-linguistic facts. However, as usual the obvious candidate did not do, as for almost any two statements so formed it will be logically coherent to suppose that they have different truth-values, and so this interpretation will be far too permissive. The only contrary cases now will be those in which the descriptions have exactly the same sense (taking that as clear for the present)

B.1. this can be readily avoided, by stressing the requirement that the two descriptions are used to name or describe (or perhaps refer - see later) to the same thing. So the interpretation will be; if there is no contradiction in these two statements having different truth-values in cases in which the two names or descriptions name or describe the same thing (that is that there is the logical possibility of their having different truth-values apart from the excluded possibility that different things might be named or described).

45.

Before I attempt to assess the limits of applicability of the test as so interpreted, it is worthwhile contrasting the discussion with certain other views and problems of other philosophers. For the criterion here outlined is intimately related to the principle which has become known as Liebniz's Law, and also to the criterion which is used to determine referential opacity. Nagins[1] states Liebniz's Law as; "if a = b then whatever is truly

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[1] "Identity - statements" in Analytical Philosophy Vol. II Ed. Butler, p. 40.

ascribable to a is truly ascribable to b, and vice-versa".
Russell[1] gives a parallel law; "if a is identical with b,
whatever is true of the one is true of the other and either may
be substituted for the other in any proposition without altering
the truth or falsehood of that proposition". Russell's inter-
pretation, and subsequent use, of this principle makes it clear
that it is for him equivalent to a denial that there are any
sentences satisfying Chisholm's test, as elucidated in the last
section. Consider also the following argument given by Diggins[2].
Liebniz's Law can be written as

$$(1)\quad (x)(y)\ (\ (x=y) \supset (P)\ (Px \equiv Py)\ )$$

Now viewing identity statements as ascriptions or predications,
the predicate variable in (1) can range over properties such as
that expressed by (=a), and so we get

$$(2)\quad (x)(y)\ (\ (x=y) \supset (x = x .\supset. y = x)\ )$$

If there are dere modalities, and if (= a) expresses a
property, then $\Box$(= a) will also express a property, and we can
get from (1)

$$(3)\quad (x)(y)\quad (\ (x=y) \supset \big(\Box(\ x = x) .\supset. \Box(y = x)\ )$$

Reversing the antecedents,

$$(4)\quad (x)(y)\quad (\ \Box(x = x) .\supset. (x = y) \supset \Box(x = y)\ )$$

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1 "On Denoting" p. 47 of "Logic and Knowledge" ed. R.C.Marsh
2 op. cit. pp.40-1

But $\wedge\Box(x = x)$ is a necessary truth, so

(5) $(x)(y)\ (\ (x = y) \supset \Box(x = y)\ )$ follows. But there certainly are contingent identity statements, and (5) would amount to a denial that there are any such. So it is apparently false.

I do not want to try and examine this argument in detail here, but just consider what it might be taken to show about Liebniz's Law. Consider (1) and (5) together, i.e.

$$(x)(y)\ (\ (x = y) \supset (P)(Px \equiv Py)\ )$$

and $$(x)(y)\ (\ (x = y) \supset \Box(x = y)\ )$$

Now couldn't one argue about (5), as one is inclined to argue about (1), that as any object is necessarily identical with itself, then if x and y really do introduce the same object it is a necessary truth that the identity holds? This form of argument is not persuasive because we are fully familiar with the significance of the descriptions or mode of reference used in identity statements, but if we could think of the terms which replace the variables as doing nothing but simply introducing the objects, then (5) would be valid. Similarly we want to argue about (1) that if 'x' and 'y' really do introduce one object then whatever is ascribable truly to that object under (say) 'a' must also be truly ascribable under 'b'. So here again there

in the idea of a term purely introducing an object, and in fact it seems to me that (1) and (5) are true and false in precisely analogous ways, and that seeing this provides one explanation for the supposedly paradoxical derivation of (5) from (1). When the manner of reference to the object differs (e.g. "The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star") then there immediately arises the possibility that a person should not, wonder, inquire about, etc. a fact about the object under one mode of reference and not under another. At the same time the identity statement at least may become contingent. If one takes this strong line then (1) will be generally valid only for substitution for x and y of the same name or description, and perhaps analytically related descriptions, and it is similarly for those cases that one most characteristically gets identity-statements satisfying (5). Now it may be replied to this that at least (1) is true for a certain class of statements or sentences, extensional statements, while such a class of sentences has no bearing on (5). There is a circularity problem with this - that the whole question is involved with the criteria for intentional/extensional[1] and

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[1] I purposely jumble up "s" and "t" because, leaving aside on the one hand both questions concerning the principle "$p \equiv q \supset (f(p) \equiv f(q)$" and questions concerning meanings or intensions, and on the other questions concerning intentional action, there seems to me to be no further relevant distinction between "intentionality" with an 's' and a 't'.

it is difficult to see an independent and useful criterion emerging. Short of such an independent criterion, we can only assign this role to (1), in which case we admit that (1) fails as a law for those descriptions as above for which (5) also fails. Now while I will want to retain the parallelism between (1) and (5) I hope after the detailed discussion of Chisholm's criterion, to give an interpretation of all this which is a good deal more enlightening than that sketched above.

Much the same applies to Russell, in the part of "On denoting" already quoted, with the addition that Russell seems a good deal more certain of the law-like status of the principle than is Wiggins. He uses it to establish his famous puzzle about George IV: he wanted to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley, but not whether Scott was Scott, even though Scott was the author of Waverley. And the puzzle was in turn used as one argument against Frege's distinction of sense and reference, and finally as one in favour of the view that definite descriptions do not refer. His procedure in respect of the latter is to give an analysis of definite descriptions which saves the law by denying that "the author of Waverley" occurs in this form in the final analysis of George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverley", and hence denying that it is

appropriate to be substituted for 'a' or 'b' in the law. That is, the law is saved from this apparently contrary case by being shown to be inapplicable to it. Now if we are to deny the law as the whole intentionality debate suggests, then we could at least make the minimal point against Russell that his analysis receives no confirmation at all from this quarter.

Before saying something about the relation between Chisholm's test and some of Quine's views, it is illuminating to attempt to formulate Liebniz's Law as it is here employed without the aid of variables. Two formulations seem to suggest themselves; (i) if two descriptions refer to the same thing, then whatever is true of that thing as referred to by the first description is also true of that thing as referred to by the second description, and (ii) at first glance it would seem that there should be some formulation which just makes use of the fact that we have one and the same thing, and does not speak of two different descriptions, but such is not available. Now if (i) is the only acceptable formulation the principle loses its initial plausibility, as it raises immediately the possibility that some feature of one of the descriptions will affect the truth-value. Compare this with Higgins's formulation (1) $(x)(y)\ (\ (x = y) \supset (F)(Fx \equiv Fy)\ )$. As

we normally think of variables as ranging over objects or individuals, or perhaps names, but never descriptions, this can be read as: for all entities x, and for all entities y, if entity x is the same as entity y then everything which is true of x is also true of y. Now this formulation, making no reference at all to different names or descriptions, is highly plausible, but it derives its plausibility from the illusion which the variables create of a way of introducing particulars or individuals which is not dependent on any particular mode of introduction. (Quine e.g. even though he admits exceptions to the version of this formulated in ordinary language, regards the variable formulation (1) as a law)[1] In the argument given by Wiggins and previously quoted, the paradox arises because when terms like "The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star" are substituted for the variables a falsehood arises. But (1) gives no hint of different names or descriptions, and in the case of these two, and with no restrictions on what can be substituted for P, is manifestly false. My conclusion is that in this area the variable is a tricky tool, whose use needs to be closely scrutinised.

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1 Word and Object, p. 167.

19.

One key notion of Quine's book "Word and Object" is that of referential opacity, the criterion for which is failure of substitutivity of identity, which is defined in this passage: "When a singular term is used in a sentence purely to specify its object, and when the sentence is true of the object, then certainly the sentence will stay true when any other singular term is substituted that designates the same object"[1] Quine regards referential opacity, herein implicitly defined, and its converse, purely referential position, as a feature of positions for expressions in sentences, and for expressions in other expressions. For example, the position of a singular term under predication in any sentence is purely referential because any singular term in this position in any sentence is supposed to satisfy this condition. As Quine in fact applies this to ordinary sentences, and not just to his eternal sentences (sentences independant of time and circumstance of utterance), it seems to contain the same difficulties for understanding as noted before for Chisholm. Firstly, does "specify its object" restrict the test to referential uses of descriptions - if not, cases like the use of "the first man in space" in its true predicative use

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1 Word and Object, p. 142.

in "He is the first man in space" would be purely referential, which is paradoxical at least on the normal view that the predicative use of a definite description is not a referential one at all. Secondly, given the concern for ordinary and not just eternal sentences, then generally speaking sentences are not either true or false, and descriptions in sentences often do not specify objects, and so the test needs to be restated in terms of the behaviour of statements,[1] or at least in terms of some minimal notion like the uses of sentences. Thirdly, is it

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1 Quine of course deprecates statements, both generally and as truth-bearers, in favour of eternal sentences. I could not discuss this here, but if I say "the door is open", how could it be that in this case it is the eternal sentence which is true? Speaker and hearer may both know that what is said is true without even being able to construct the relevant eternal sentence (they may be children or not know the time) Luo, bringing in eternal sentences will not help him to apply his test to ordinary sentences. More importantly still, Quine can hardly reject talk of statements on the ground that no precise criterion has been given for "same statement" (this is his main ground for rejecting propositions), as an exactly parallel problem arises, and remains, for him in respect of the relation between any non-eternal sentence and the corresponding eternal one. All he can offer is: "the (corresponding) eternal sentence will be the one that the original speaker could have uttered in the place of his original utterance in those original circumstances without detriment, so far as he could foresee, to the project he was bent on" (Word and Object, p. 208). This is at least as obscure as the remarks I offered earlier for the strict sense of "same statement".

sufficient to capture the idea of refer ntial purity that the sentences or statements in fact remain true under substitution, or it is required that in some sense they must remain true? Consider cases like "Gagarin knows that his wife was the first woman in space" or "Jim knows that Venus is the Morning Star", in the case in which Jim is a learned astronomer. Now it seems at least possible that Gagarin should know every individuating fact about his wife, or that Jim knows (or perhaps 'can derive' may be enough) every individuating fact about Venus, in which circumstances these positions will become purely referential. Or take clear cases: "Jim is unaware that Venus is the Morning Star", "Jim has never heard of the Morning Star", "Jim did not learn that Venus is the Morning Star", will be purely referential in respect of the position of "Venus" if Jim knows nothing at all about Venus or the Morning Star, but opague if Jim knows a few facts about them. I take these examples to show that Quine's criterion runs into problems if it relies just on the fact that for all alternative substitutions the truth-value remains unaltered, or the fact that it changes for some substitution, and that it needs instead Chisholm's requirement that the truth-value <u>could</u> change for some new description. If these three points are accepted, the ammended version of Quine's criterion for a

position in a sentence to be referentially opaque will be almost identical with the revised version of Chisholm's third criterion for an intentional sentence - the relation between them will be: a sentence is intentional if the position of some description in that sentence is referentially opaque.

Quine differs a good deal from Chisholm, however, in the theses that he builds upon his notion, and a brief resume of those theses and their differences may set the stage for an evaluation of the criterion. Very briefly stated, the main relevant theses of "Word and Object" would seem to be:

1) Sentences containing most of the verbs philosophers have worried about in this respect ("believe", "look for", "hunt" "want", "wish" and so on) can be interpreted in two ways, one containing a referentially opaque position and one not. See "Word and Object" Sections 30, 31 and 32. Chisholm, on the other hand, is inclined to classify all these sentences as intentional.

2) Partly as a result of this, Quine takes the irreducibility of intentional idioms to non-intentional ones as showing the baselessness of them and the need to purge them from canonical and logical notation. Chisholm, to the contrary, takes this to show that they cannot be disposed of in an adequate description of the world.

3) Quine holds that referential opacity is not restricted

to psychological sentences (in particular modal sentences are opaque), not includes all psychological sentences, as intend follows from 2).

4) Quine holds that in spite of all this, if properly interpreted $(x)(y)\ ((\ (x = y)\ .\ (\ \ldots x \ldots)\ ) \supset (\ldots y \ldots))$ is a law.

20.

With these connections made, I can now return to the discussion of Chisholm's third test for intentional/psychological uses of language. One query which I specifically withheld in the formulation given is whether the test requires restriction to referential uses of descriptions only. The case for this is the apparent existence of many examples which are manifestly non-psychological, and yet satisfy the test, e.g. "He has just become the leader/ the king/the Bayeaflete professor", "He might have become the first man in space", "The first man in space might have been someone other than Gagarin", "The first man in space might have been an American", and so on. All of these would be excluded if the requirement was added to the test for intentionality that

only those uses of descriptions referential by the G-criterion (see sections on reference) were relevant. The case against this amendment is that, prima facie, many centrally psychological sentences have no referential uses, and thus would emerge as non-intentional, e.g. I am looking for a man/for someone/some intelligent man, I want a banana, I hate a man, and so on. In particular it might look as if this stipulation ruled out all sentences of the form "A f's an X", and this would be fairly serious, as psychological sentences of that form are common and important. However, this problem need not arise if sentences of this form have <u>any</u> referential uses, so the test would then apply only to them, and could therefore be settled. So the question is: do sentences of this form have any uses in which the description is referential?

Here we encounter again what Geach has christened Burleigh's law, viz. if E is an expression forming part of a sentence which is used to make a statement S, where S is the simplest statement in which E occurs, then if E is referential it must have the reference it does whether or not S is true, and a frequently heard argument based on this law. Now the controversial cases will be those uses of sentences of the form "A f's an X" in which I have, and it is clear that I have, a particular X in mind, e.g. a suitable case of "He is looking for a friend" or "I intend to

kill a man". The argument in the general case will be: if "A f's an X" is false there will be no X which A f's, and hence no X which is referred to, and so in this case we cannot regard 'an X' as referential; but by Buridan's Law, it is incoherent to suppose that an expression is referential when the statement is true and not when it is false, and so the supposition that it is referential in S must be given up. The controversial step in this argument will of course be that from the falsity of "A f's an X" to the non-referentiality of "an X" as here used. Granted that when it is false there will be no XwhichA f's, but it does not seem to necessarily follow from this that no X is refered to. Indeed, prima facie, the falsity of statements of this form could be of several different types, in some of which only would this follow. Consider different utterances of "He is looking for a friend". There will of course be a general distinction between cases in which what this says is that he is looking for some particular person, who is his friend, and those in which there is no particular person that he is looking for (e.g. when what is meant is that he is looking for any one of his friends, or when he is looking for someone to be his friend). Only the former cases will be relevant, and here the falsity of "He is looking for a friend" could be a matter of 1) He is not looking for anyone, nor at all concerned about any friend, or

2) the person he is looking for is not at all a friend but an enemy, or 3) He was not looking for, but rather trying to shoot, a friend. Now in none of these, with the possible exception of 2) is any problem raised for the supposition that "a friend" is used referringly by the falsity of the statement, and so the argument does not get going for these cases. So the controversial cases still remain controversial.

The obvious way to try to settle the matter is to apply the G-test developed earlier. The second class of cases distinguished earlier come out non-referential, but the former are a little unclear. Consider: "He is looking for a friend of his, Jim is a friend of his, therefore he is looking for Jim" which would appear to be the relevant inference, and is clearly invalid. The reason for this of course is that Jim may not be the friend he is looking for. If we were to conclude that this shows non-referentiality it will be objected that in the rather parallel case of non-uniquely specifying descriptions (e.g. The bridegroom is fat) we earlier allowed questions like "Which bridegroom?" "Whose bridegroom" whose answers were to specify which bridegroom was in question, and which name was relevant. Should not we allow the question "Which friend?" to perform a similar function here? But the point of the former questions was to draw out which bridegroom he meant, which one he was talking about, but

such a question in the present case could only be glossed as "Which friend is he looking for?" The distinction that we need here is perhaps a fine one, but nevertheless it is important - the distinction between questions which are asked about, or in order to elucidate, the particular utterance or speech-act, and questions which raise a further query about the topic. Thus if I say "He is looking for a friend" in the sort of case being discussed, "Which friend do you mean?" or "Which friend did you say he is looking for?" will not make sense, because these are cases in which, even though I may have a particular person in mind, I do not say (in any sense) which particular I mean (and this will involve not relying on the context to make it clear either). Of course, "Which friend is he looking for?" "Who is this friend?", and so on, are quite acceptable, but these are questions of a quite different type. So, not allowing such further questions, such uses of these sentences fail the test for referentiality. Short of a further substantial reason to alter the C-test, we should conclude that no normal[1] use of the sentences of the form "A f's an X" uses 'an X' referentially.

Where does this leave Chisholm's third test? His most satisfactory response to all this would be to accept the addition

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1 Of course, in very special cases "a friend" may be referential

that the third test applies only to descriptions used referentially and hence that it does not apply to any uses of 'an X' in uses of sentences of the form "A f's an X". This also has the virtue for our discussion, of applying the test more closely to Quine's referential opacity, for Quine glosses the "designates" used in his test (p. 142) as "referring to" on p. 151 of "Word and Object". Now to save the plausibility of his criterion of the psychological Chisholm needs another criterion, this one applying to sentences of the form "A f's an X". There may be other suggestions, but the best candidate I know of would be: a sentence of this form is intentional if it can be used to make some statement in the present tense such that from the fact that A f's an X it does not follow that there is some particular X which A f's,[1] with the qualifications that the sentence is not a modal one, and the verb 'f' is not to be the "is" of predication. But even with these last qualifications added to exclude obvious problem cases this test could not isolate psychological "a f's an X" sentences. In fact such a test will be seen to be very closely related to Chisholm's first test as discussed earlier, and its limits of will be parallel to those defined in the tables of Section 12, earlier. If I love, admire, trust or listen to a man

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1 This is almost the exact form of the "possible non-existence of the object" criterion, given by Miss Anscombe at a recent lecture.

then it follows that I do these things in respect of some particular man, but I may ask for, look for or intend to kill a man but not thereby any particular man. So, roughly speaking, those verbs falling in the first pattern of that section do not satisfy this test, while those of the second and third patterns do, and thus this test picks out an interesting class of sentences, but not the class of psychological ones. Perhaps a better test could be produced, but I am unaware of it.

Another point relevant here is the by now familiar behaviour on non-essential uses of descriptions, viz. that what in fact satisfies the description may not be what that description was used to refer to (or alternatively, that what I mean may not be the same as what I say). Now as this is regarded as a basic feature of this use, and hence that for any non-essential use this possibility exists, it will be argued that any statement made with such use will have the property required by the test, that the new statement logically could have a different truth-value, given even the fact that the same thing is named or described. In the face of this, two lines of response are possible. Firstly the fact urged could be admitted, and it be thus admitted that for every sentence those statements made with a description used non-essentially will have the property

specified, and hence the important statements to which the test should be applied will be those containing attributive or essential uses. For the test so far has been given as: sentence is intentional if *every* statement made by it so uses a name or description that if it were replaced by *some* other expression ....., the new statement could have a different truth-value (see Section 17). Nor the fact that for every sentence *some* statements have this property does not go to show that every sentence is intentional. But, a further objection will now argue, attributive and essential uses are defined as those for which the same statement could not be made by any (non-analytically related) description, i.e. attributive, or could not except under certain special circumstances i.e. essential. But as no special circumstances are mentioned, any statements made with such uses could have the property required by the test, and so every sentence will still come out as intentional. This objection in fact brings us back to the queries concerning the exact sense of "same statement" which is taken as primitive in the first part. However, it was made clear there that one thing was not meant, that two statements are the same statement in this sense if they have the same truth-value in all conditions, presuming only that the same thing is referred to. For example, the *statements* "Smith's murderer is dead" and "Jones is dead" would be true or false in the same conditions if Jones was

Smith's murderer (one could not possibly be true and the other false if this presumption were correct) but in the terms of that part could be quite different statements. So it is clearly possible that two statements formed by the requisite substitution not make the same statement in this sense (i.e. certain attributive or essential uses if this generally holds) but have no possibility of different truth-value given the "same thing" condition. So, to return to the original point, there is no reason why we should not rely on the applicability or otherwise of the test to statements containing attributive or essential uses to show up intentional and non-intentional sentences.

But there is a second, probably simpler, reply to the original problem. That problem arose because non-essential uses are used in which there is the possibility of a gap opening up between what I said and what I meant, as these terms were defined earlier, and also because the test focuses for purposes of substitution on what I said (i.e. what I in fact named or described) while in these uses what I meant determined the truth-value. So two relatively simple stipulations will protect the underlying intention of the test from this problem: that what is substituted is another name or description which in fact names or describes what I meant in the first statement, and that if

this new name or description is used non-essentially in the second statement then it be so used that what the speaker means to refer to by use of it in the second statement be the same as what is meant in the first.

We are now in a position to see the two responses to the original problem in some sort of perspective, for the first neutralizes the troublesome possibility, that of a gap between what I said and what I meant, by cutting off all those cases in which such a possibility can arise, while the second achieves its purpose by altering the test so that this possibility no longer affects it. We may expect that these two moves would have the same result, but this could possibly not be so.[1] Anyway, for reasons of simplicity and because it leaves us with a criterion operating on all classes of statements, I will use the second in future discussion. The amended and reinforced third criterion will then be:

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1 It is worth noting that the "some statement .... any description" and "some statement .... some description" versions of Chisholm's third criterion, put aside at the very beginning of the discussion, (section 7) could be saved from the objection there taken as decisive by stipulations parallel to those used in the first of these. The latter, at least, would then come out equivalent to the first version here.

A simple declarative sentence containing a name or definite description will be intentional if every statement made by the use of it which uses the name or description referentially also uses it in such a way that if it were replaced by some other name or description of what it was meant to refer to, then given even this the new statement still could differ in truth-value, with the proviso only that if the description is used non-essentially in the second statement it is meant to refer to the same as was meant in the original statement. It now remains to determine what sentences are, and what sentences are not, intentional by this criterion. In discussing this, we must remember to keep in mind the objection to the S-criterion for referential use which is left in abeyance, viz. that referentially opaque uses do not satisfy that criterion. Determining which sentences do, and which do not, satisfy the test should put us in a position to evaluate that objection.

21.

Let me start this by introducing symbols N-E$_1$ and N-E$_2$, for the two senses of "non-essential use of a definite description"

which have been forcing themselves through the ambiguity with which I have so far been using that phrase. A use of a description is N-E| if *some* other name or description of what is described can replace the first description and the same statement still be made, and N-E2 if *any* other name or description of what is described can so replace the first with the proviso that the sense of "same statement" here is that strict sense used previously. For the question of the relation between N-E| and N-E2 arises, and here I am inclined to argue as follows. If a number of descriptions can be so substituted in a given statement, then it would seem that none of these is essential to the statement made, and, given that they are referentially used, that their function must be purely and simply to introduce an object. So (a) it would seem to be possible that a description A be used to introduce an object which is not, but which is believed by speaker and hearers to be A, (this possibility has of course been already established, see section 10) and (b) that given that some descriptions behaved this way, there seems to be no reason why any description true of the object in question could not be substituted. The first point, (a) which I have taken throughout as an important feature of non-essential use, is true of both kinds of non-essential use. The second point, (b) which claims

that N-E1 usage entails N-E2 use, is more dubious, as there seem to be cases (e.g. "I intend to kill the man in the corner") for which some descriptions but not others are substitutable. This brings out what the quick formulation above glosses over, viz. that the supposition that <u>any</u> description is substituted involves also supposing (what may be contrary-to-fact) that the speaker knows that any description given is true of the object concerned. And now this may cause troubles, for the supposition that the speaker knows that what he describes as X is also Z may radically disturb the situation of utterance. For example if a man who dearly loves all members of his family, says (N-E) "I intend to kill the man in the corner" then the supposition that he knew that that man was his father would alter the case to one in which, by the data already given, the person might be expected to not have this intention at all. Here, it will be obscure what it will mean to say that in the same situation the description "his father" could be substituted and used to make the same statement, for the supposition radically alters the case. This effect, which I will call the N-effect, serves to make the notion of N-E2 use devoid of clear meaning in these cases, and we will need to watch for it in what follows.

Now I wish to distinguish very crudely three different classes of sentences, all falling within the general, problematical

class we are concerned with. Firstly, (A), those psychological sentences which express an attitude to a proposition, and which show that they have this feature by being of, or being transformable into, the form "A f's that p". Secondly, (B) those which can be regarded as a reaction to an object explicitly under a specific description or sort of descriptions and which illustrate this by being of the form "A f's B as X", or by being transformable into this form. Thirdly, (C) those psychological sentences which one is inclined to say involve some sort of direction to the thing itself, and for which the description used is always more or less marginal. The mark of this I take to be that for any sentence here, of the form "A f's the X", there are normally some uses which remain true after the substitution of any description of what A did. It will be obvious that sentences falling in these different classes are likely to have very different properties, and I introduce them just to break down the material, and do not at all suppose that these classes are either exhaustive of psychological sentences or precisely defined.

22.

Consider then sentences of class (A), which will include those like "A knows/believes/understands/has heard/does not know that p". Now if we assume that the sense of "proposition" in which these sentences express attitudes to propositions (in which propositions are the "objects" of these attitudes) is one closely correlated with my strict sense of "same statement", so that only if two utterances make the same statement in this sense can they be said to express the same proposition, then it would seem that these sentences (or at least the third person ones amongst them) would behave in respect of the re-formulated Chisholm test in the same way as the contained statement reacts to the essential/non-essential test. For the latter test turned upon substitutivity or non-substitutivity of different descriptions while still making the same statement, and two statements made with any related pair of class (A) sentences (e.g. 'I know that p_1', and 'I know that p2') will exclude the possibility of a difference in truth-value only if their objects are precisely the same proposition in this sense, i.e. if p_1 is the same as p2. For example, consider a statement "John believes that the king is coming" in which the description "the king" is used in a N-R2 fashion. So any description which is

true of the person meant by "the king" can be used to make the same statement, and for some sense of "same statement" or "same proposition", if it is true that James believes that the king is coming then any other statement which asserts that he believes the same proposition as this must also be true.

But what reason is there for assuming that my strict sense of "same statement" yields the sense of "same proposition" in which e.g. "He knows that p1", and "He knows that p2" could not have different truth-values if p1 is the same proposition as p2?[1] This query might be directed either from the fact that statements, carrying the force of assertion, could not be objects of belief, or from the fact that I have admitted that the sense of "same statement" I am using has not been made very clear. The first problem is easily overcome: in as much as propositions are required, the connection is that if two utterances make the same statement in this sense then they express the same proposition. The query from the other direction is more substantial. Considering only factual beliefs (in case there is some other kind) I am

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[1] It is worth repeating here that Quine's main objection in "Word and Object" to taking statements or propositions as the objects of such attitudes ("propositional attitudes" as he calls them) is that no satisfactory criterion for "same proposition" can be given. My procedure here amounts to a denial of this position. See "Word and Object", Sections 42-44.

inclined to reply as follows. Beliefs are characteristically expressible in speech-acts, and the relevant sense of "same statement" was crudely given as: two speech-acts make the same statement if there is no discernible difference between them when they are considered solely as attempts to convey information. Now if two beliefs b_1 and b_2 were different beliefs[1] in the sense that a person A might have a belief b_1 but not b_2 then we would expect that difference should be shown in some relevant difference in the expressions of those beliefs, i.e. by the making of different statements in the current sense. Conversely, if two speech acts make different statements in this sense, it should be possible for a person to believe what is expressed by the one but not what is expressed by the other.

If it is then accepted that statements roughly falling in class (A) behave in the same way concerning the feature given in the modified Chisholm test as their component statements or propositions do in respect of this sense of "same statement", we will get the following general pattern. If the statement or

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1. That is, different beliefs in respect of their content, of what is hereby believed, and not just made somehow different beliefs by his possessing or not certain other beliefs.

proposition "p" in "A Q's that p" contains a description used attributively, then substitution of any other description of the same thing will leave open the possibility of a different truth-value for the compound utterance; if "p" contains a description used essentially, unconditional substitution of any other description will leave the possibility of a different truth-value; if "p" contains a description S_1 used non-essentially, then for the substitution of any description S2 also used non-essentially of the same thing as S1, the possibility of a different truth-value will be excluded, for the two descriptions will be used to make the same proposition p. But this last assertion seems to need qualification, for if the use of S_1 is N-E_1 it will follow that there may be other descriptions S3, S4, etc. for which the statement is not made, and hence such that "A Q's that p_2" etc. could have a different truth-value from "A Q's that p_1". So the conclusion I gave follows only if the use is N-E2. But it was noted above that the notion of an N-E2 use was barely coherent in certain cases, viz. those in which the K-effect arises. So the conclusion here needs to be more precisely explored.

Now the K-effect was: in considering whether a use of a description in a given case was N-E2 we had to evaluate the

the possibility that any description equivalent in reference to the first might be substituted, but that for some descriptions this supposition may radically, and relevantly, alter the case. Thus if I say "I intend to kill that man in the corner", and he is my father, then the supposition that I know this may radically alter the case, for it may be a necessary condition for my having this intention that I am not aware that he is my father. Whatever the general importance of this, however, I feel sure that we can put it aside for at least most class (A) sentences. For if I believe that the A is f, and "the A" really is used N-E so that no description is essential to the content of the belief "the A is f", then my believing that of that person or thing at that time could not be affected by what further beliefs I have or lack about it. So at best "I believed that the B is f" and "I believed that the C is f" must equally truly capture my belief at the original time, if the use of "the A" was really N-E, if "the B" and "the C" are also used in an N-E fashion, and if the A, the B, and the C are the same person or thing. Similarly for "He believed that the A is F" and for parallel uses of "know", "does not know", "is aware of", "understands", "thinks", and so on. The only statements for which problems remain are those using "I believe that the A is f", for I cannot use "the B", even

non-essentially, to pick out what I do not know or believe is the B. But this now seems fairly trivial, for it is true that I believe that the B (N-E) is Q, even though I am not in a position to assert it in this form.

To consolidate this point, let me consider two fairly similar if obscure examples. Firstly, Russell's famous example, (41) "George IV wanted to know whether Scott was the author of "Waverley" ", calling the phrase 'the author of "Waverley"' phrase 'A'. Now we will have to start by separating off uses of (41) in which 'A' is functioning predicatively - in terms of the discussion earlier, 'A' will not be predicative if the "was" is expendable into "was the same man as", and George IV is bothered about an identity proposition. Even within these uses there will be many different cases, in not all of which will it make sense to suppose that the use of 'A' is N-E, or N-E2. For example, the case in which George IV knows Scott well and has just read an article on the author of "Waverley"; or the reverse, in which he knows very well the chap who wrote "Waverley" but not as Scott, and has just read a little about Scott; or one in which he has just knighted Scott, and can distinctly remember meeting the author of "Waverley" at a book-launching party, but is uncertain about whether they are the same person. Of these, only

the second seems a plausible case of an N-E, use of 'A' being the only one in which it is clear that 'A' is not essential to the statement, but is used just to pick out a certain person. Now this seems to be exactly the case in which any versions of (41) produced with other names or descriptions of the author of "Waverley" (e.g. the author of "Ivanhoe", the most senior knight, Sir Walter) both make the same statement as, and hence necessarily have the same truth-value as (41) even if George IV did not know that they applied to the author of "Waverley". But, it might be replied to this, Russell was at least right when he asserted that George IV did not want to know whether Scott was Scott. In one way this is of course right, but in another it is not nearly so clear. Certainly (41) would usually be so used that the content of 'A' mattered, when George is really wondering about the author of "Waverley" rather than of "Ivanhoe", or rather than the most senior knight, and thus in cases in which the use of 'A' is not N-E2. Thought of in this way, Russell is clearly right. But in <u>our</u> case, (41) would certainly be equivalent to 'George IV wondered whether (the person he read about as) Scott was Scott", and the problem with the unqualified version of this is just that this does not make clear that the first "Scott" is being used differently from the second. Or consider another case of N-E use of 'A' in an utterance of (41): George is trying to

to remember names, knows Scott and his writings very well, and wants to know whether Scott is (the name of) the author of "Waverley". Here, if the conditions and the N-E use are kept firmly in mind, (41) can be seen to be equivalent to "George IV wanted to know whether Scott was (the name of) Scott".[1] Generally, any case in which the use of 'A' in N-E2 is one in which any other name or description of the person meant could be substituted without the possibility arising of the new statement having a different truth-value from (41). So this provides no objection to my earlier doctrine.

Secondly, consider utterances of (42) "I was wondering whether the Wayneflete Professor of Philosophy at Oxford wrote "The Concept of Mind" ", in the following four cases:

I Someone who knows Ryle well and uses the description non-essentially.

II By the chairman of the Wayneflete trust, at a meeting to assess the productivity of their professors, but in a case in which he knows Ryle well.

III As for II, but the chairman knows nothing at all about Ryle except a couple of minor things he has heard by report.

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1 cf. "John has so lost his memory that he wanted to know whether Peter was (the name of) Peter".

IV The chairman thinks: "Did Waynefleete Professor of Philosophy at Oxford write that book? I don't know. Well, who is he? Ryle? Yes, that is right, the tall man. Yes, he showed me a copy of "The Concept of Mind","and reports this as "at the start, (42) but then I remembered ....".

Now concerning I, much of the same argument as in the discussion of the first example applies, and any description true of Ryle could be substituted, if used non-essentially. How about the author of "The Concept of Mind"? Again there seems to be no problem, if the requirements of a non-essential use are kept firmly in mind. In case II, where the description is used essentially, some or perhaps even all other descriptions true of Ryle could be substituted in the required way, subject only to the condition that it is always understood that person concerned is the Wayneflete Professor of Philosophy at Oxford. Case III, which lies uneasily between features of an essential and an attributive use, might allow substitution of the few descriptions which the chairman knew but certainly not unrestricted substitution. Case IV, a pure attributive use, would allow no substitution, except of descriptions analytically related to "the Waynefleete Professor of Philosophy at Oxford".

Now if this is right, both these examples serve to confirm

my earlier generalization, which was that statements made with class ( ) sentences (those of the form 'A ('s that p') satisfy the relevant feature of the revised third test for intentionality if 'p' contains a description used attributively, probably do if the description is used essentially,[1] and clearly do not if the description in question is used non-essentially. Before assessing the effect this has on the criterion as a whole, I turn to considering statements made with class (C) sentences, and then with class (B) sentences.

23.

Turning then to class (C) sentences, we have a ready and familiar fund of examples in the list already discussed in detail in Section 12, in connection with the first of Chisholm's tests. Altering the order a little and hence introducing new numbering they were: (43) I intend to kill my brother, (44) I am looking for my brother (45) I love my brother (46) I trust my brother

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1 For this to be firmly decided we need more consideration of these cases, and also a stipulation about whether the requirement that ' ' be understood to be 'the B' bars these uses under the test.

(47) I asked for my brother (48) I was listening to my brother, and (49) I admire my brother. Now the first of these immediately raises the topic of intention, which in this area can become very complicated. In the hope that the tools we have developed can throw some light, I turn now to the discussion of the behaviour of sentences like (43) under the re-formulated third test. To provide some material for this discussion, I will discuss various uses of two sentences in some detail.

Firstly, consider an example that Miss Anscombe gives[1] viz. "Do you mean to be using that pen? Why, what about this pen? It is Smith's pen. Oh, no, I did not intend (mean) to use his pen." In cases falling under this general heading, we are interested (50) in the use of "I intended to use this pen" and the substitutability or otherwise of "Smith's pen" as a description of what I intended to use. Some cases might be the following:

(1) I have been forbidden to use Smith's pen, and I would know it when I saw it. Yet (a) I just do not think of this, but see a pen on the table and intend to use it, (b) I intend to obey, but see Smith's pen on the table, and cannot be bothered looking for another one (c) I see mine on the table, and meant to pick it up, but picked up Smith's by mistake.

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1 "The Intentionality of Sensation : A Grammatical Feature" in R. J. Butler, "Analytical Philosophy" Vol. II, p.159

Now for (a), when I saw the pen in one way I intended to use Smith's pen and in another not, but anyway I intended to use <u>this</u> pen, yet at an earlier time it may have been true that I did not intend to use Smith's pen. Also, in a parallel fashion it is in one way true and another false that I intentionally used Smith's pen (for I intentionally used <u>this</u> pen). For a suitable case of (b), there may be no time at which it was true that I intended to use Smith's pen (I just weaken and use it) yet of course I use it intentionally. For (c) whether or not at some earlier time I intended to use Smith's pen, I here use it unintentionally, for I used this pen unintentionally. Here, "I did not intend to use Smith's pen" implies that I did not intend to use the pen I am now using.

(2) I did not know Smith had a pen, thought all the pens in the house were mine, and strictly believe in only using my own things. Here, if I see a pen on the table, intend to use, and report this later by (50), it is the case that I would not have intended to use it if I had known it was Smith's. Again it is in one way true and in another false that I intended to use Smith's pen, for often "I intended to use Smith's pen" would mislead by implying my knowledge that it was Smith's pen (and my full responsibility for using it).

From even these few examples we can see a number of points.

Firstly, that doing Y intentionally and intending to do Y need to be kept separate here, for in a particular case they may behave differently under substitution. Secondly, that we need to put aside as irrelevant to our present purposes cases in which finding out that this is X (is Smith's pen) means that I did not intend to Y this at all; these do not allow substitution at all in the appropriate way. That is, the fact that if I had known that what I Y'ed was X I would not have Y'ed it is not relevant. Thirdly, and relevantly, we have this phenomenon of its being in one way true and another false that I intended to use Smith's pen. The other point we need to keep in mind is that our concerns here are rather different from the question of the substitutivity of different descriptions of the action which is the core normal topic in connection with intention. Now while the two concerns may co-incide, as for example in the case of using this pen and using Smith's pen, they do not in general co-incide. Thus consider Miss Anscombe's case in "Intention",[1] pumping water may also be pumping poison, and hence poisoning the inhabitants, and it is manifest that a person may be intending to pump water without intending, in any way at all, to poison the inhabitants. In this area also we would have to face the question of what constitutes the same action, but this does not arise for the present

1 G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, Basil Blackwell, 1957, Sec. 23

discussion. Generally, even if it is true that other descriptions of the same action are not substitutable in any use of "I intend to do Y", it does not follow from this that this sentence satisfies Chisholm's third test.

Reverting to the third point above, I wish to suggest that this behaviour is to be also understood in terms of the different referential uses of a definite description. For it in case (2) given, for example, I say "I intended to use Smith's pen", using "Smith's pen" non-essentially[1], that is in such a way that the same statement (in the strict sense) could be made without the use of this description, then this will clearly be true. But if the description 'Smith's pen' is essential to what I say, i.e. if it is used either attributively or essentially, then the statement so made will be false. Looking at it from the other angle, if in a case (2) situation I say "I intended to use this pen" (perhaps to the police investigating the loss of Smith's pen), then substitutivity will be saved in respect of 'Smith's pen' used non-essentially, but not in respect of this phrase used essentially. Thus on learning that that pen was in fact Smith's pen I may say to the police either "Yes, I intended to use Smith's pen, but I did not know it was his at the time", or "I certainly did not intend to use Smith's pen - I did not even know he had one."

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1 As one may well do in a case in which nothing hangs on whose pen it is.

To generalize: a statement made with a sentence "I intended to f the A" saves substitutivity[1] if the A is the same as the B, and 'the B' is used non-essentially in the new statement ("I intended to f the B"), irrespective of how 'the B' is used in the first statement.

A number of queries will be made about this generalization. Firstly, anxiety may be felt about the sense of "non-essential" here, and about an air of circularity which this assertion possesses. The circularity seems to arise from the fact that a use of a description is N-E2 if any other description of the same thing can be substituted and still make the same statement, and to inquire whether this is so of a particular use is very close to inquiring whether the statement in question can sustain substitutivity without the possibility of a change in truth-value. But it will be sufficient for current purposes to use the N-E1 sense, that a description is used non-essentially if some other descriptions can be used to make exactly the same statement, and this removes the air of circularity. In fact it seems to me that her N-E1 use implies N-E2 use, but this is not strictly required by the generalization. How about the K-effect then - won't that

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1 This is a shorthand way of expressing the reverse of the condition given in full in the final re-formulation of the third Chisholm criterion. See p.126

occur, and be significant here? No, at least not for cases in the past tense, for if "I intended to use Smith's pen" is used non-essentially, the fact that if I had known that the pen in question was Smith's I would not have intended to use it does not destroy the truth of statements about the past. It could arise though with "I intend to use Smith's pen" in a case (2) situation, for here there is a clash between the description of the case and the requirement of substitution, viz. that I use the phrase 'Smith's pen' to refer to this pen. How this of course arises from the necessity that if I use a phrase to refer to a particular thing then I know, or at least believe, that what I refer to satisfies that description, yet as before it is difficult to place any importance on it, in view of the fact that the parallel "I intended ...." and "He intends ...." sentences behave in the way I have suggested.

A second query may run like this: surely it is a feature of intentions that in some cases certain descriptions of what my intention is directed toward cannot be substituted, and not just a matter of a manner of using descriptions. Thus I do not intend to kill the Prime Minister even if I intend to kill the man who is the Prime Minister unless I know that he is the Prime Minister, and so knowledge is the relevant necessary feature of intention.

Now this is basically a misunderstanding of what I am trying to say, for I am trying to specify in what cases non-substitutivity occurs, and not trying to explain why it does occur. My thesis is that non-substitutivity occurs only when the substituted description is used attributively or essentially, and not that it occurs only because the description is so used.

To fully consolidate these points about (43) and (50) a good number of further examples should be discussed in detail in the manner of 'I intended to use Smith's pen', but for reasons of space I will consider only one more. In a pub a chap comes up to me and hits me, and I get very irate and say truthfully "I intend to kill him". Now in fact he is (all in the one case) (i) the man in the corner, (ii) the man who has just moved into a house in the street, (iii) the man with a scar on his left hand (iv) my father (v) the Prime Minister, although I am not aware of any of these. There seems to be no reason for denying that I intended to kill the man in the corner, or (ii) or (iii), yet the last two descriptions bring pause, and we feel some reluctance to say that I intended to kill my father, or the Prime Minister. Why is this? The reason, I suggest, is that as there is nothing special about the first three descriptions they naturally bring to mind a non-essential use, but the last two naturally suggest an essential use. We would rarely say, after all, that he intended

to kill the Prime Minister in such a way that the description "the Prime Minister" was not essential to what was said, but one could in a sufficient case e.g. if you were his son . In fact, all the descriptions could have essential and non-essential uses in appropriate circumstances, with substitution behaviour as outlined above.

24.

So far I have been concerned with only one class (C) sentence, albeit a controversial one, and I must turn to consider some others. Let us briefly take then (45) "I love my brother" and (46) "I trust my brother", or rather, the past tense versions of these sentences. Consider for example the case of the spy Philby, his sister and the editor of the "Observer", who we will suppose is Philby's brother, and the last two utter (45) and (46) respectively (and truthfully) after he has been revealed as a master Russian spy, but concerning the period before this last fact was known. Now I can see no situation here in which, after the revelation, Philby's sister could deny that she had loved the leading Russian spy, or the editor of the "Observer" that he had trusted the

the leading Russian spy. That is, however these descriptions are used, their mutual substitutivity must be admitted. Now of course both the deceived persons might hasten to add that they did not of course know that he was a Russian spy, or that they did not love or trust him as a Russian spy, or that they would not have trusted him if they had known what he was, but they could not deny that they had loved or trusted the master Russian spy. Of course, also, to say the past-tense version of (45) is quite different from (i.e. amounts to a different statement from) saying that (51) "I loved the master Russian spy", but this again does not deny the substitutivity saving the possibility of a difference in truth-value given the assumption that the two descriptions refer to the same person, which is what is in question here. And a description like "the leading Russian spy" would seem to be as good a candidate as any for one showing non-substitutivity.

One other problem which arises again here with present-tense uses can be quickly dispatched. If someone says (45) then the K-effect problem may arise, for the supposition that he can say the present-tense version of (51) in the appropriate way implies that he knows that his brother is a Russian spy, and this may radically affect the case. But this, as I have argued earlier, is trivial. For if at 11.00 p.m. he says (45) and is immediately told the news, at 11.01 p.m. he may not hold the present-tense

version of (51) true, but must hold that it was true at 11.00 p.m. if (45) was true then. And he must admit that at 11.01 p.m. (45) is no longer true, if he denies the present-tense version of (51). The final conclusive reason for holding this K-effect to be irrelevant is that can occur with any appropriate non-psychological sentence, e.g. (52) "I am throttling my brother". If I am told the news, and am a member of the Party, I might do my utmost to make (52) false a minute later. Now while this K-effect is thus trivial, I believe that it has not always been recognized as such and has been one cause of confusion in this area.

Let us turn to another example, e.g. (44) "I am looking for my brother". Here we return to the earlier pattern, for (considering the past-tense version of (44) which I will call (44′)) if I say that (44′) using "my brother" attributively or essential (e.g. I do not know my brother but am trying to implement my father's will, then we have again the possibility of non-substitutivity arises. For if I say (44′) and the person I am talking to is my brother, then it does not follow that I was looking for the person I was talking to. If I use "my brother" non-essentially, however, substitutivity will be assured. The K-effect will intrude again with (44), indeed with particular force in this case, but it should hardly need further discussion in this particular utterance.

Interesting and valuable as a further discussion of class (C) sentences would be, a halt must be drawn at this point, for my purpose here is not to clarify in detail the relevant properties of all such sentences, but just to bring them under a sufficiently powerful hypothesis to enable me to evaluate the views of Chisholm and Quine. With regard to class (A) sentences this generalization was: that non-substitutivity in the sense defined occurs with uses of most such sentences, but that it is a feature only of some classes of uses (attributive, essential) but not of the other class distinguished. With regard to class (B) sentences we seem in a position to make a parallel claim: for at least some such sentences non-substitutivity in our sense occurs, but when it does it is again a property of attributive or essential but not non-essential uses, and further that it seems to occur only in those uses which also satisfied the revised, referential, version of Chisholm's first test. As the form of these generalizations makes clear, they are not offered as claims concerning every sentence falling in these (anyway roughly defined) classes, but just that even with their limited scope they are sufficient for the purposes of this thesis.

I will put forward no such generalization concerning class (C) sentences, those of the form "A f's X as Y", for this is a

class with both a fairly restricted and various membership. For many such sentences the description replacing "I" is normally not referential, in uses of e.g. "I imagined him as the prince", "I saw him as my superior" or "I regarded him as my superior". Other sentences can be tricky, e.g. (53) "I recognized him as the Prince", where Prince Charles is the one in question. Now uses of this seem to be referential and to probably show non-substitutivity, yet questions about whether they have non-essential uses and what the precise importance of the A-effect is here are obscure. But they cannot be discussed here, and in what follows I will be limiting myself to class ( ) and (C) sentences, and making use of the generalizations above.

25.

But before making use of these generalizations to clarify some views of Quine, I must return to a problem for the C-criterion for referential uses of a name or description, one which was posed in section 4. For it was noted in that section that descriptions used in sentences showing referential opacity did

not in general satisfy this test, and that this was an objection to it. Taking again the sentence used there, (12) "Peter is unaware that the first man in space (x) denounced Hruschchev", then it does not follow from the truth of this and the fact that Gagarin is the first man in space that Peter is unaware that Gagarin denounced Kruschchev. And this would seem to apply to all sentences which have uses for which substitutivity in the sense above does not hold.

In Section 4 I attempted to resolve the problem as posed for (12) by arguing that this sentence had three types of use: (i) those in which the occurrence of ' ' is straightforwardly referential and satisfies the test (we can now identify these as non-essential uses), (ii) those in which 'x' does not occur referentially at all, but predicatively, and (iii) those in which what Peter is unaware of can be written as an identity statement and hence in which the use of 'x' satisfies the version of the C-criterion finally given for identity statements. In the terms we have since developed, this amounts to claiming that all the attributive and essential uses of 'x' in (12) are either predicative uses or uses in which 'x' functions as one term of an identity statement.

Now this takes us a good deal, but not all, of the way to

solving the problem, for while these sorts of use can be distinguished, both for (12) and for other class (') sentences, there remain other attributive or essential uses which cannot be accommodated in this way. For example, if Peter is presumed to be unaware that Kruschev has been denounced, but for some reason we are interested only in asserting that he does not know that the first man in space did this. Or take some clearer examples; if I know nothing about my brother and am concerned with the implementation of my father's will, and say "I believe that my brother is dead", "my brother" is likely to be used at least essentially but clearly is neither predicative nor one of the terms in an identity statement. Or, in the same situation, utterances of "I know that my brother is evil" or "I understand that my brother lives in Oxford for a time". Now the existence of these cases, intractable along the present line of approach, points to the need of a different treatment of uses of class (A) sentences. But to say this is not to deny the validity of the approach of section 4 as far as it goes - indeed I take the fact that the unamended G-criterion can handle so many of these cases to show that it is at least on the right track.

Such a different treatment is fortunately to hand. Class (') sentences, i.e. those of the form "A f'ed that p", would

seem to have one striking feature, viz. that the existence of those sentences in the language would seem to be logically dependent on the existence in the language of sentences which can be used to express the proposition that p. This is true in this sense at least: that a language could not have a sentence of the form "A f'ed that p" without having one of the form "p", but could of course have the latter without the form. And parallel to this, one could not be in a position to make the statement that A f'ed that p without being in a position to state that p (where "being in a position to state" means "have the linguistic resources to state" and not "being justified in stating"). Here also we can locate two other important points, firstly that if a person believes that p it is always possible for him to express his belief by an assertion that p, and without also asserting that he believes this, and secondly it would be paradoxical if, given this possibility and concerning the same belief, a description came out as non-referential in his expression of his belief by "p" but not in his expression of exactly the same belief by "I believe that p".

That this suggests, of course, is that we should stipulate that a statement or proposition of the form "A f'ed that p" uses a definite description contained in "p" referentially if that description is referential in the statement or proposition that p,

as shown by the use of the G-criterion already developed. This seems to resolve the difficulty, and amounts to taking referential occurrence in the statement or proposition that p as the basic case in terms of which the sense of "referential use" of descriptions involved in uses of class (A) sentences in to be explicated. In view of the points above this is surely reasonable, and it succeeds both in avoiding the possibility of the paradox mentioned and in accommodating the approach of section 4, for non-essential, predicative and identity uses of the description will occur, if they do, in the statement or proposition that p.

But what about class (C) sentences, for as we have already seen some uses of some of these sentences manifest non-substitutivity, and could therefore fail the test. For example, in appropriate uses "I intended to kill my brother" and "I was looking for my brother" may not entail that I intended to kill John and was looking for John respectively, even when it is granted that John is my brother. The treatment of Section 4 is manifestly not appropriate here. Now the reason why substitutitity of the name does not hold in these cases is that the speaker may know John but be unaware that he is his brother, and so not intend to kill or not have looked for John - just not knowing his brother's name will not be sufficient to destroy substitutivity. If this

is accepted, three points can be made. Firstly, in as much as these special conditions are required it would be highly plausible to regard these as a non-central cases of the referential use of descriptions. Secondly, and supporting this, they are cases in which, given that the description is used to refer, it is nevertheless not the case that a clear and unequivocal reference is made. And thirdly, that they come out as referential uses if we allow the test to take this form: referential if the speaker is committed to accept the inference "If 'Jim' is the name of my brother, and I am looking for my brother, then I am looking for Jim," and similarly for second and third person sentences. Certainly when these three points are seen, there seems to be no substantial objection arising for the G-criterion from our class (C) sentences.

Finally let me reply to the objection which will be made that my procedure concerning this criterion is simply to introduce ad hoc extensions to cover every objection raised. Now in a way this is correct, yet to the extent that extensions have been introduced I believe (and have tried to show) that they are faithful to the character of the individual cases and consonant with the basic idea of the G-criterion, that a description is used referentially if what it does in part at least is to introduce

a particular in the way a proper name does, as shown by the holding of the inference given. But the crucial point concerns the character of the problem, for the C-criterion is not offered in an attempt to analyse a concept, the meaning of which is determined by its uses being prescribed in ordinary language, but as an attempt to give a precise sense to a technical term which already occupies an obscure yet important place in philosophical investigations.

26.

As has been already noted, one central theme of Professor Quine's book "Word and Object" is relevant to the current discussion, and the argument in question goes as follows. Firstly, the notion of referential opacity is introduced as a property of the position of a name or description in a sentence (and by extension in an expression) and as defined by the substitutitity of identity criterion (section 30). Then it is noted that positions in certain sentences appear in one way opaque and yet in another transparent, and as opacity is a function of sentence position, this means that such sentences must in fact be interpreted

in two quite different ways (Sections 30 and 31), which need to be marked by introducing certain conventions (section 32), and thus believing, intending, looking for, wanting, and so on are to be regarded as having two distinct interpretations. Next it is argued that cross-reference into an opaque construction cannot be allowed (Section 31) and hence that as quantification is in fact basically a form of cross-reference one cannot quantify into an opaque construction (Section 35), and hence that any interpretation of a formula such as (x) (y) (x = y. ....x...⊃....y..) which allowed opaque consructions to take the place of the blanks would be a distortion (section 35). So this formula can be considered both as a statement of the substitutivity of identity in variable form, which allows us to employ the notion of referential opacity even after we have eliminated singular terms, and a law (Section 35). One applicationof all of this is to modality in the sense of logical necessity - such modal sentences are argued to be opaque, and hence not appropriate for quantification (section 41). Finally, from our point of view, Quine takes all of this, and the irreducability of intentional idioms, to show not their indispensibility (cf. Brentano and Chisholm) but their ultimate baselessness, and dispensibility in any canonical notation or attempt to discover the ultimate categories for the description of reality (Section 45, see also section 33).

Now I have already argued (see Section 19) that the formulation Quine gives of his criterion for referential opacity faces the same immediate problems as Chisholm's third test for intentionality, and that when it is re-formulated to avoid these problems it becomes a very close relative of that third test. The relation in fact seems to be that a sentence is intentional if the position of some description in it is referentially opaque. So we should be able to apply for foregoing discussion of Chisholm's third criterion to Quine's notion. But as soon as we do this difficulties arise. For I have just attempted to show (Sections 22-24) that the feature on which this criterion is based is true of some uses of sentences and not others, and hence that that criterion as it stands is incoherent as one acting on sentences, and it will therefore follow that Quine's test, as thus reformulated, is incoherent as a criterion for distinguishing some sentence positions from others. Thus, given the position of the description "the dean" in the sentence "the commissioner is looking for the dean", in some uses of the sentence and not others this description is substitutable by other names or descriptions of the same thing saving the possibility of a difference in truth-value. So any test for referential opacity running "a position in a sentence is opaque if every statement ....." will be incoherent in this way. The feature which these tests reach towards one of

course be used to define a class of sentence positions: the position of a description in a sentence is opaque if the use of that description essentially or attributively in that position ruises the possibility of a difference of truth-value on substitution But the important point in relation to Quine's doctrines is this: for any sentence, if uses of that sentence show failure of substitutivity, then certain classes of uses only will, and others will not, and these classes, and this difference of behaviour between different uses, is to be understood in terms of uses of names or descriptions which can occur in respect of any sentence, intentional or otherwise. That is, the different classes of uses here can be completely described (but not of course explained) in terms of notions which we need anyway to understand the behaviour of any sentence. And so it will be completely wrong-headed to regard sentences in which referential opacity can occur as having two senses or interpretations, in one of which substitutivity is allowable and in the other of which substitutivity fails. Sentences like "I intend to use Smith's pen", "The commissioner is looking for the dean" or "Tom believes that the first man in space denounced Krushchev", like any sentence containing such definite descriptions can be so uttered that the description in question is used essentially or non-essentially, and that they behave unusually in the first set of uses is evidence that they

constitute a special class of sentences, but not at all that the sense of the sentence used in the first way must be quite different from the sense of the sentence used in the second way. On the contrary, for what characterises the single sense of such a sentence is how it behaves in all the uses of which it is capable. So I conclude that Quine is wrong in thinking that sentences involving "intending", "looking for", "believing" "wanting" andso on are capable of two quite different interpretations in this way.[1]

This conclusion is of some importance, not only because the position denied is a central thesis of Quine's book but also because he needs this thesis to make other positions that he advocates at all plausible. In particular, he can only assert, in the way he does, the fundamental irrelevance or baselessness of intentional or opaque language because he regards all sentences which are intentional as also having another, non-intentional or transparent, interpretation. Only if one has some intention, belief, desire etc. sentences which are non-intentional can one downgrade the importance of those which are intentional. Now if my conclusion above is accepted, and Quine is denied his dual interpretation, his dismissal of intentional sentences becomes

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1 It may of course be true that they are ambiguous in other ways but no dual interpretation is to be detected from the current direction.

highly implausible, being a straight-out dismissal of all these sentences. Almost all the sentences we use to describe believing, intending, wanting, looking, and so on are dispensed with. Of course, further arguments might be advanced to show that all the linguistic functions which such sentences now performed could equally well be performed by sentences which are not intentional, but this seems prima facie implausible. Above all, these arguments now need to be produced.

27.

But it will undoubtedly be thought that I am proceeding too quickly here, and that more discussion is needed. Indeed, Quine is not altogether devoid of replies at this point, and there seem to me to be three alternatives before him which might appear to save the plausibility of his position. My argument so far has been that if it is accepted that for any sentence non-substitutivity only occurs, if it does at all, for some uses of the sentence and not others, that it follows from this that failure of substitutivity does not mark out a different sense of a given

e.g. belief sentence, and that any sentence of the form "F(the A)" where the A is a definite description can be uttered using "the A" either essentially or non-essentially if this phrase can be used referentially at all[1], then it follows that if Quine wants to exclude all non-substitutivity from his canonical notation "he can only do this by excluding all sentences showing opacity, i.e. all sentences involving verbs such as "to believe" "to want" and "to intend". And this, I have taken it, is too big a price even for Quine to pay, for his canonical notation must have at least two features, viz. that it is in principle possible that it should stand on its own, and stand on its own as a notation in terms of which we can achieve all the basic purposes of ordinary language. A notation which had no resources at all for describing, believing, intending, desiring etc. situations could hardly satisfy this last requirement.

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1 This assumption is made fully explicit here for the first time. Now while I can see no reason for doubting its truth, it is difficult to produce a watertight argument in support of it. Consider this though: if "the A" is true of any given individual then it is surely possible either that I should wish to refer to the individual who is A, whoever he is and especially as the A, or that I should know him well and refer to him via the description but the reference to that person and not th the A be the important thing. That is, that if the sentence is one in which it is possible that "the A" could be used referentially then there could be no logical restriction on its being used essentially or non-essentially Thus the fact that "the secretary" in "The dean has just declared him the secretary" could not be used non-essentially does not

deny my point, for it could not be used referentially either. It might be said that the content of the rest of the sentence could affect the possible uses of the description - consider "the secretary is to read the minutes" or "my brother is the oldest male member of the family". Now the first of these illustrates the point that some sentences are specially designed with essential or attributive uses in mind, and the second that some are such that in any use they will be true only if what is referred to as the A satisfies certain conditions which may be implied by "the A" but neither is a case in which the possibility of non-essential use is excluded.

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s noted above, I am leaving aside the possibility that a completely new language might be introduced to describe these situations.

The three alternatives which Quine seems to have are; firstly, he could continue to assert that failure of substitutivity in any uses shows that a sentence of a different sense is being employed, in his sense of "different sense"; secondly, more drastically, he could attempt to undercut my argument at an earlier point by asserting that for any sentence, and particularly for the ones we are interested in, the applicability of the distinction between essential and non-essential uses shows that sentences of different senses are being employed, again in his sense of these terms; thirdly, on a quite different tack, he might maintain his basic thesis by altering his requirement to this; that canonical notation only includes non-essential uses of sentences in my sense.

Consider the claim that in some sense of "sentence", the very

existence of the distinction which I express as between essential and non-essential uses of a description show that sentences with different senses are being employed. Now I have already argued that whenever we have a definite description true of a given individual we have already the possibility of that description being used to refer to whoever it is that satisfies it, or to a given individual who it just happens is held to have that property. So, given that descriptions are used in more complex speech-acts, and independently of any other considerations, there must be some distinction betwe n the language-whole of which the description is part, and uses of it which differ only in the mode of usage of the description. Now whatever else it is used for, one thing that the distinction between sentences and uses of sentences marks is <u>this</u> distinction. And notice that this must exist independently of the position that is taken up in respect of the following query: which <u>other</u> uses of language do, and which do not, show that we have a different sense of the sentence rather than just another use of the sentence in the same sense. Now if Quine wished to deny even this point of his use of "sentence" and "sense of a sentence" I could only conclude that he is introducing a completely different sense for these terms, and my objection, in my terms, would still stand. Such a sense for these

terms would be fundamentally different from their normal sense, and until it was produced and shown to be coherent we could not start to evaluate its helpfulness to Quine's programme of dismissing opaque uses. If we stick to anything like the traditional sense of our terms, my objection will stand, at least if the other two alternatives can be shown to be unacceptable.

What about the first alternatives, thus, that when we get non-substitutivity occurring in attributive or essential uses, this shows that the sense of the sentence is different from that involved when substitutivity is allowed? This remains possible, it will be said, even if my point above about the necessity of the basic sentence/use of sentence distinction is accepted. In the opaque uses, after all, implications do not hold which do hold in the non-essential uses and isn't this as good a reason as any for detecting a difference of sense? So this suggestion is not that the essential/non-essential distinction shows a difference of sense, but that the occurrence of opacity in the essential uses does.

Now if I am granted that for any sentence of the form "f (the A)" can be used referringly there is the possibility of both essential and non-essential uses, and also that whenever we speak of a given form of words having two different senses it is in principle always possible that the different senses be expressed

in different sentences,[1] then I think it can be shown that that alternative is not satisfactory. Let "f, (the A)" be a sentence (my sense) which shows opacity in its essential, but not in its non-essential, uses. Now on the view offered, this will show that there are two senses here, presumably expressible by sentences 'f2(the A)' and 'f3(the A)'. But by my first presumption, both of these could have essential and non-essential uses. Consider firstly then 'f2(the A)'. Now the non-essential uses of 'f2(the A)' will not manifest opacity, as established earlier, and the essential uses presumably will, so if this is sufficient evidence for duality of sense, we must distinguish also two senses of 'f2 (the A)'. And this obviously leads to a vicious infinite regress. Consider then 'f3 (the A)', the sentence expressing the sense involved in non-essential, transparent, uses of 'f1 (the A)'. Again, non-essential uses of 'f3 (the A)' will be transparent, but it is obscure how essential uses will stand. If we allow them to come out opaque, the regress will ensue. Yet if not, it will surely be very paradoxical that a sense of e.g. a **belief** sentence will always save substitutivity even in essential uses. Be this last point as it may, the

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1 It will be required, of course, that the sentences have different senses, but this raises no problem of circularity as it is not offered as any sort of analysis. All I want is that if someone says that one form of words have two senses then he is committed to the possibility of expressing those two senses in two forms of words which he holds in turn to have different senses.

the generation of the regress in the essential "sense" is surely enough to show that the principle involved, viz. that we can infer from opacity in essential uses and transparency in non-essential uses to a duality of sense of the original sentence, is unacceptable.

There is one further glaring assumption that this argument makes, viz. that the sentence capturing the two new senses will also contain the description "the A" in such a way that it could be used referentially. Now although I have stated it in terms of this assumption, it actually required only a weaker one, that the new sentences contain <u>some</u> description in such a way that it could be used to refer to the same as does "the A". But this seems acceptable, for given that 'the A' in 'f1 (the A)' can be used referringly in both senses (for the tests for both opacity and transparency or suppose referentiality) then if 'f2 (the A)' and 'f3(the A)' correctly capture these two senses they must at least contain a description capable of the same use as 'the A'. That is, the new essential 'sense' can be expressed either by some uses of 'f1 (the A)' in which 'the A' is used referringly, or by the sentence 'f2 (the A)' or 'f2 (the B)', and of course, one of the new sentences may contain 'the A' only as mentioned, not used, but this provides no problem. For any name or description 'the A' can be replaced by 'the man (car etc.) who (which) is the A' and the latter phrase still be used to refer to the same as

'the A', and so the last sentence must contain a description capable of being used to refer to whatever 'the A' can be used to refer to. But it may be objected that on a Russellian interpretation of ϕ (the ψ), viz as equivalent to $(\exists x)\ (x \text{ is } \psi .\ (y)\ (y \text{ is } \psi \supset y = x).\ x \text{ is } \phi)$, this is analysed as containing no definite description used referentially. Now the procedure of this thesis has been to define referentiality as a feature that certain uses of sentences have as they stand, i.e. unanalysed, and if it is claimed that a correct analysis shows that they are not referential, this only shows that a different sense is being attached to "referential".

So I conclude that this second alternative of Quine's leads to a regress, and that he is forced to recognize that however the other problems concerning 'sense' and 'sentence' are resolved we have in the present respect one sentence, one sense, and different uses, some of which show opacity and some of which do not, rather than several senses. It needs to be noticed here that it is not being said that the utterances or statements which contain the different uses do not have a different meaning - certainly, if different implications hold in different occasions something must possess a difference of meaning, in some sense of that last term. The question only concerns where that difference of meaning or sense can be coherently located.

What then of the third alternative I suggested lay open for Quine, that he should accept my characterisation of these cases completely and then argue that only non-essential uses of such sentences are to be included in his canonical notation? But now the problem is that a crucial requirement for Quine's canonical notation is that it is in principle possible that it stand alone and independently of our ordinary language, y t it is manifest that we could only talk of non-essential uses of this sentence if we already had this sentence operative in ordinary language. So taken literally this alternative implies that the canonical notation presupposes the ordinary language concerning e.g. belief, only a part of which is subsumed into that notation. Here we find the need for duality of sense, for if belief-sentences could be broken up into two independent senses, then one could be included in the notation without depending on the other. But, it will be said, why cannot Quine rule that his canonical notation includes a sentence which only has used equivalent to the non-essential uses of belief-sentences? This would be a new, constructed, sentence and part of the enterprise of constructing a new language which contains no opacity and yet which can handle most of the requirements which we have for a language. Such a language would need to be constructed in detail, and the discussion of its acceptability would involve different

considerations[1] from those I have so far advanced. The whole topic is one I certainly cannot handle in this thesis. The point I have tried to establish is that the sort of canonical notation that Quine actually sets up, and the form of rejection of opaque language which he actually advocates, are not acceptable.

2.

Parallel with another aspect of Quine's book which requires the "dual interpretation" thesis are his doctrines concerning the role of variables and quantification in "canonical notation" For quantification is at once asserted to be only possible into referentially transparent contexts and yet the very basis of an adequate and complete canonical notation. But if the duality of sense of such sentences is denied, then a whole host of important sentences cannot be handled by this notation, which in turn cannot be still asserted to be in principle complete. But the connection between quantification and referential opacity needs to be looked at a little more closely.

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1 such as how words and sentences get their meaning, to what extent they are necessarily grounded in complex language-using situations, and so on.

This connection is supposedly established by the argument of Section 31, particularly pp. 146-8. Consider either "The commissioner is looking for someone" or "Someone is such that Tom believes that he denounced Catiline". Now who is this person the commissioner is looking for? The chairman of the hospital board i.e. the dean. And who is this person whom Tom believes to have denounced Catiline? Tully, i.e. Cicero. It is clear, suggests Quine, that these locutions can be truly used only if the alternative descriptions are also appropriate. That person who is such that Tom believes him to have denounced Catiline could not be description-relative, i.e. could not be given by 'Tully' but not 'Cicero'. So these locutions can only be truly used in respect of the transparent sense of sentences involving verbs like 'to believe', 'to intent', 'to want' etc. To put it another way pronominal cross-reference is only allowable into a transparent context, and thus not allowable into an opaque context. Now as quantification is basically a type of cross-reference, this becomes when applies to variables; an indefinite singular term outside an opaque construction does not bind a variable inside the construction. In other terms again, quantification is not possible into an opaque context.

Now while there is surely something persuasive about this argument, the fact that it relies for its conclusion on the

the distinction between transparent and opaque uses of sentences suggests that the presumption cannot have been misinterpreted, and in terms of the material of the last few sections the point of mis-interpretation is fairly obvious. For the appeal 'who is the person whom Tom believes to have denounced Catiline? Tully i.e. Cicero' is persuasive only if the names used in answering the question are used essentially or attributively used, for what is being suggested is that the location given in the question is permissible only if the person concerned can be specified as the person about whom Tom believes by means of either description. But the person concerned could also be specified in such a way that no description was essential to the specification, and in that case nothing would follow about the required sense of the sentence expressing Tom's belief. In other words, this argument of Kripke's misplaces, in a way parallel to his discussion of identity itself, the problem about quantification from certain kinds of descriptions to a special sense of belief, intention etc sentences. For if I say "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" using 'Cicero' essentially (e.g. I am replying to a person who has claimed that Tom has a mental block about any person with the name 'Cicero') this may be true without it being true that he also believes this of Tully, and hence the sense of

rguing from this to "someone is such that Tom believ s that he denounced Catiline" is doubtful, for it may emerge that Tom believes that there are two completely distinct persons, Tully and Cicero, one who did, and the other who did not denounce Catiline. In this last case,"Someone is such that Tom believes that he denounced Catiline" will robably be false, or at least seriously misrepresent the situation, but "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline" will be true if 'Cicero' is used essentially or attributively, but false, or at least misrepresenting, if 'Cicero' is used non-essentially. So where pronominal cross-reference, and quantification, raise problems is in the case of intentional sentences containing the relevant name(s) or description(s) used attributively or essentially; the move which is not allowable is "Tom believes that Cicero denounced Catiline", with 'Cicero' used in either of these ways, to "Someone is such that Tom believes that he denounced Catiline".

Another way of putting this is to make clear that the possibility of quantification depends not on the characteristics of the case of belief about which we are talking, but upon the use of the relevant description in the statement made, even though the type of use made of that description depends at least in part on the purposes of the speaker, independently of the characteristics of the given case of belief. For I may say "Tom believ s that Cicero (used essentially) denounced Catiline" in an appropriate situation,

even if Tom has the two-person view of Tully and Cicero, or if he knows a good deal about Cicero but has never heard of the name 'Tully', or even if he knows everything about Tully and Cicero. And the statement using 'Cicero' essentially will be true in all of these cases, but from what I have thereby asserted it does not follow that he believes Tully to also be the denouncer, for this statement may be true even though he does not (as e.g. in the first two cases given in the last sentence). And this remains true even for the third case, in which he does believe that Tully also was the denouncer - "Tully" was in fact substitutable, but the statement that I made left open the possibility that it was not.

What emerges from all of this, then, is that quantification (i.e. the inference from "Pa" to $(\exists x)(Fx)$) is allowable only for uses of intentional sentences in which the description quantified over is used non-essentially, providing only that the description is the one, or one of the ones, with respect to which the sentence is intentional.[1] Now an alternative way of putting

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[1] For the immediate purposes of discussion, I use "intentional" as a term defined by the test that emerges from the discussion of Chisholm's third criterion; a sentence is intentional with respect to a given description if it reflects the difference in uses of that description in the emergence of a possibility of a change in truth-value for some uses. This specification lapses however, at the end of section 29.

this would be; in the formula $(\exists x)(Px)$, and all other formulae associated with it, when 'P' is an intentional context in this sense, the variables are to be regarded as substitutable only by names or descriptions used non-essentially. This becomes the correct restriction on quantification, then, which replaces Quine's one that quantification is only allowable in respect of transparent contexts.

29.

To re-inforce this conclusion, I will first consider one application of it, and then make some general remarks about variables. In section 18, following Wiggin's, "Liebniz's Law" was written as (1) $(x)(y)\ (\ (x = y) \supset (P)\ (Px \equiv Py)\ )$, and this seemed to be held to be valid by Russell and Wiggins, while I was inclined to question it, and to assert that it was valid only for a certain class of sentences ("extensional" sentences). We are now in a position to get a clear view of this matter. The problem earlier was that this seemed to be a universal law while we thought just in terms of variables, (if x is the very same as y, then whatever is true of x must also be true of y), but this amounted to treating

variables as a way of introducing particulars into propositions independently of any names or descriptions, yet in fact only names or descriptions can be substituted for them. How our conclusion above clarifies this problem, since we have seen that for intentional sentences at least, variables can only be substituted for by names or descriptions used non-essentially, and non-essential use amounts to a way of introducing particulars into propositions which is not description-relative. So we can say that this formula is valid for all contexts P, provided only that it is understood that, for intentional sentences at least, the variables can only be replaced by names or descriptions used non-essentially. Lest this form of restriction seem too unusual or of an inappropriate sort, it is worth noting that the usual statement, that variables are to be substituted by names or definite descriptions, requires the addition that the descriptions be used referentially, and that the names or descriptions be used to refer to the same thing in each substitution for a given variable. For no one thinks that a substitution instance of $(x)(y)\ (\ (x = y) \supset (\ ) (\ x = y\ )\ )$ is "If the Wayneflete Professor is the Editor of 'Mind'"(taken as stating a constitutional truth), then "Strawson will become the Wayneflete Professor"

is equivalent[1] to "Strawson will become the Editor of Mind" for Ryle may well get the rules changed.

Similar remarks apply to the conclusion Piggin' reaches by his chain of argument, and which he takes to be manifestly false, viz. (5) $(x)(y)\ (\ (x = y) \supset \Box(x = y)\ )$, where the sense of '$\Box$' is that introduced with '$\Box\ (a = a)$'. But in the sense in which something is necessarily the same as itself, surely every thing is necessarily the same as itself, and (5) can be construed as a perhaps unnecessarily complicated way of asserting this. For it is most naturally read as: for any value of x and any value of y, if that value of x is the same as that value of y then that value of x is necessarily the same as that value of y, given that it is understood that the necessity does not arise from their being the particular values of x and y they are, but from the two values being the same thing. Compare this with: let x = 3 and y = 2, then that value of x is necessarily greater than that value of y, where the necessity arises simply from the fact that the values are 3 and 2 respectively. So the reason for thinking that (5) is wrong is that there are contingent

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1. In whatever sense of "equivalent" we choose to interpret " ="

identity statements, e.g. "The Morning Star is the Evening Star".[1] This is supposed to be an objection to (5) because if we let the Morning Star be x, and the Evening star be y, then if the Morning Star is the Evening Star then the Morning Star is necessarily the Evening Star. But if we concentrate only on the fact that the two values are the same planet, and not on what distinguishes them as values of x and y respectively then this seems to raise no problems.

This point may be clearer after some more general remarks. Consider the formula discussed earlier, viz. $(x)(y)\ ((x = y) \supset (\phi x \equiv \phi y))$. Now it is a familiar point that 'x' is being used in a different way in its first use from the way it is in its second and third, as is brought out by the long-winded reading: For any value of x and any value of y, if that value of x is the same as that value of y then for all ϕ, the statement that that value of x is ϕ is equivalent to the statement that that value of y is ϕ. Now how is the phrase "that value of x" being used here?

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[1] But compare (5) restricted only to the domain of numbers. Here surely for all values of x and y$((x = y) \supset \Box(x = y))$ is true and it is not thought to be any objection to this that in one sense the number of the planets is not necessarily the same as the number children X has (given that he has 9). For while the first asserts that very number is necessarily the same as itself, the second is most naturally taken to assert, not that 9 is the same as itself, but that it is not possible that there could have been more or less planets than children of X.

In introducing variables, Frege says "each letter represents either an indeterminate number or an indeterminate function", and variables are among the class of symbols "that can be taken to mean various things"[1] which makes them look like some sort of referring expression, albeit an unusual one. But compare the following: "To any Corpus man going out tonight I give the following warning: if he is not in by midnight he will be sent down". One might well say that "he" here is used to refer indeterminately to any Corpus man going out - i.e. not to refer to all the men, or the group of men, going out, but to a representative one, so to speak. And this seems to be how our phrase is used - "that value of x" has referential form, but refers only indefinitely, indeterminately. The key difference between the two cases is that "he" "refers" to any Corpus man satisfying a certain condition, while "that value of x" "refers" to just any value of x, and thus is subject only to the conditions implicit in that phrase. If this is accepted, then the process of substitution will involve finding a person, thing etc. satisfying the conditions, and applying the statement to <u>that</u> i.e. to what is already in a way referred to in the original statement. Let me put it this way: if it is accepted that a variable under quantification is in this extended

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[1] Both quotations from Begriffsschrift Sec. 1. Geach and Black "Translations from Philosophical Writings of Frege" p. 1.

Sense a conditional referring expression, then substituting values for the variable will involve letting the variable take as values the entities etc. which have already been in any way referred to, and hence in the proposition resulting from substitution, that thing must be purely introduced and the manner of referring to it here cannot be relevant. These remarks are intended, then, to make more plausible the claim that in general variables can be coherently substituted/only by names or descriptions used non-essentially.

Quine's attitude to his version of this supposed principle $(x)(y)\,(((x = y)\,(\ldots x\ldots))\supset(\ldots y\ldots)$ is of course rather different from the above. He holds that it is a law, valid for all appropriate interpretations of " ....x...." and "....y....", for the requirement that there is no quantifying into an opaque construction excludes all the interpretations of the blanks for which the formula breaks down. That is, properly interpreted, this principle is valid for all contexts. Now this is a conclusion which I have also reached, and the differences flow into what is intended by "properly interpreted". These differences would, I feel sure, have quite far-reaching consequences - in particular my results can be used to throw light on the controversy about modality and quantification - but these consequences, and that particular topic, cannot be taken up here. For I have strayed too

far already from the problems of Chisholm and Brentano with which this part is mainly concerned, and I must return and summarize my results in respect of those questions.

30.

We should now be in a position to make an assessment of the Chisholm and Brentano intentionality thesis, which was given by Chisholm in "Sentences about Believing"[1] as;

"(1) that we do not need to use intentional language when we describe non-psychological, or "physical" phenomena; we can express all that we know or believe about such phenomena in language which is not intentional. And let us say (2) that, when we wish to describe certain psychological phenomena - in particular when we wish to describe thinking, believing, seeing, knowing, wanting, hoping and the like - either (a) we must use language which is intentional or (b) we must use a vocabulary which we do not need to use when we describe non-psychological, or "physical" phenomena".

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1 op. cit. p. 511-2.

Now there are three theses here, at least by implication. Firstly, the view that the criteria for intentionality pick out only psychological sentences i.e. that satisfying the criteria is a sufficient condition for a sentence being a psychological one. Secondly, the view that satisfying these criteria is a necessary condition for psychological language, and hence that intentionality is the characteristic mark of the psychological. Thirdly, and this comes out more strongly in Chisholm's letters in the Chisholm/Sellars correspondence on intentionality[1], the indispensibility thesis, that intentional language cannot be avoided in any adequate description of the psychological, or at least can only be so avoided if some new vocabulary is introduced.

The first view has not been a central concern of this part, but we have seen that all the criteria as stated would appear liable to counter-example, but that at least the first and third can be restated in ways which make this thesis at least plausible. The second view I take to have been shown to have been manifestly false, at least for the criteria offered and possible alternative criteria which have been offered. Even after detailed discussion, and restatement in a manner designed to capture the basic idea behind the criterion, whole groups of essentially psychological sentences remain excluded.

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1 See Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II ed.by Feigl , Scriven and Maxwell, Minneapolis, 1958. p. 521-537.

The third view received substantial discussion here only in respect of the third criterion, and again only concerning one way of putting forward the dispensibility of intentional sentences. For I argued that Quine's attempt to assert dispensability by arguing that failure of substitutivity showed a difference of senses in the sentence used was unacceptable. But, it may be said, surely that leaves open the possibility that intentional sentences, by the revised criteria, are to be analysed in terms of non-intentional sentences. After all, this commentator may continue, Chisholm's thesis is plausible as long as it is accepted that intentional sentences are all, and only, psychological sentences, for the possibility that a whole area of language as basic as psychological language could be analysed in other terms is surely minimal, but once it is understood that some psychological sentences, and not others, are intentional this possibility arises. Yet considered in detail, this possibility does not appear significant. For the restated third criterion, most class (A) and some class (B) sentences, among others, become intentional, and this may also be true for the first test, if we accept as a restatement of it a version based on principle II(b) as given in section 12. But now it is difficult to see how most sentences of the form "A f's that p" could be analysed in terms of other sentences lacking their distinctive properties, or even how class

(3) sentences such as "I intend to kill my brother" or "I am looking for my brother" could be analysed in terms of other appropriate. But I cannot offer any proof here that this could not be done, and if any such analysis were offered it would have to be considered in detail.

One reason why such a proof cannot be given might be simply that the many and varied complexities which arose in the discussion of the tests have not been fully understood and classified. And this leads to what is surely the most important point, viz. that the simple way in which the tests are normally given glosses over an enormous complexity of uses of the various sentences, and that if such tests, and their corresponding thesis, are to be meaningfully given and discussed, this complexity must be far more fully understood. To take one more example: in the next part I have cause to discuss in some detail six or seven quite different uses of the verb "to think of", some of which satisfy some or all of these tests, and others of which do not. So it will be much too early to talk simply of "intentional sentences" as if one clear and coherent notion picking out various sentences had been specified, much less to speak, as both Chisholm and Sellers do in the correspondence mentioned above, about thinking, desiring, believing etc. as intentional. Yet even with this said I think

We have seen enough in the preceding discussion to see the falsity of the thesis that criteria can be produced along these lines as necessary marks of psychological sentences, and on the other hand the plausibility of the view that some such criteria could mark out intentional uses of language which are indispensible for a complete description of "psychological" reality but not for "physical" reality.

31.

Finally, I will summarize the main results of this part in the form of eight brief points.

1) A precise criterion for "referential use of a name or definite description" has been given, which covers, or can naturally be extended to cover, all the clear cases of such use.

2) We can distinguish at least three types of referential use of a name or definite description. The distinguishing mark concerns the various conditions of substitutivity of descriptions making the same statement, in a sense partly clarified in terms of there being no possibility of a difference in truth-value,

given only what is necessary to determine what statement is made in a given case.

3) Chisholm's first criterion for intentionality breaks up into at least four different versions, none of which specify all and only psychological sentences, but one of which (II(b)) can be used to define a highly interesting class of sentences.

4) Chisholm's third test (which finally becomes virtually equivalent to Quine's test for referential opacity) picks out at best only some uses of descriptions and not others, but a related criterion can be formulated which picks out another (and perhaps the same) interesting class of sentences.

5) Quine is mistaken in thinking that non-substitutivity can be interpreted as showing two senses of the sentence concerned, and in thinking that on this basis opaque sentences can be dispensed with.

6) Liebniz's Law is always valid if substitution for the variables is restricted to names or descriptions used non-essentially.

7) Generally, quantification is valid into all referential contexts if this restriction on substitution is accepted.

8) Although the discussion brings to light many unclarified complexities, it is clear that the Chisholm/Brentano thesis that intentionality is a necessary condition for the psychological

is false, yet it seems likely that criteria could be given to mark out intentional uses of language which are both psychological and non-eliminable.

PART II

INTENTIONAL OBJECTS

1.

So far I have been discussing what might be called the thesis of intentionality, given as the view that criteria can be produced which mark off psychological from non-psychological sentences. But this thesis is quite often put in another way: that psychological events, states or phenomena are characterised by, or have the peculiar character of, the possession of objects with certain properties, ie. intentional objects. Brentano put his statement of the view in these terms rather than in terms of the properties of sentences,[1] and more recently Kenny has stated the thesis in these terms.[2] And intentional objects are not only introduced in respect of this thesis, for their special features are thought to be germane to many of the problems encountered in/philosophical psychology.[3] Thus one view deriving from

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1 See "Psychologie von Empirischen Standpunkt", Book II, Chapter 1, Section 5, translated in A. Kenny, "Action, Emotion and Will" Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963. Ch. 9.

2 Kenny, ibid.

3 It needs to be stressed again here that I am not concerned with intensional objects of psychological operations or attitudes, in e.g. Quine's sense. Thus the sense in which the proposition that p is the object of my thought or belief, being what I thought or believed, is not in question here.

Meinong and Brentano[4] used the notion of intentional object to explain how it is that our thinking, desiring, and other such mental operations, can be directed towards objects that do not exist. More recently, Miss G. E. M. Anscombe has argued that a proper understanding of the nature of intentional objects helps us to get clear about such questions as the possible non-existence of the object of thought, and in particular to understand why philosophers of perception tend to oscillate unsatisfactorily between sense-data and naive realist theories of perception.[5] Intentional objects are a sub-class of direct objects, and while the naive realists fall into error by not taking account of intentionality at all, the sense-data theorists err by mistakenly arguing from a true grammatical point about the existence of intentional objects to an ontological claim about the existence of ideas or impressions which are directly seen. Again, Anthony Kenny has argued that the possession of (intentional) objects is the most important distinguishing mark

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4 I say "deriving from" to avoid questions concerning differences between these two writers on this point, and indeed also between different doctrines that they both advocated at different periods.

5 G. E. M. Anscombe "The Intentionality of Sensation: A Grammatical Feature" in R. J. Butler "Analytical Philosophy" Oxford, 1965.

of emotions as opposed to sensations,[1] and, more generally, that sentences containing intentional objects stand in need of special analysis.[2]

These questions and views, and in particular the presuppositions underlying them, form one element of the concerns of this part. The other element is the need to be clear about objects of thought, their definition and properties, for the purposes of the later parts of this thesis. I start by considering Miss Anscombe's doctrine about the nature of intentional objects, and arrive via this and a short discussion of some of her tests for distinguishing intentional from non-intentional objects, at the crucial question, viz. how the sense of "object" being used here is to be precisely specified. As a general specification of this sense seems impossible in any way which will be useful, I turn to one particular (and problematical) notion, that of an object of thought, and the detailed discussion of the different uses of "thinking of", "thinking about" etc. which soon emerges as necessary. This discussion throws light on the discussion of Part I and on Miss Anscombe's tests, helps us to another definition of "object of thought", shows

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1 op. cit. Ch. 3.

2 op. cit., pp. 200-1, and also Chapters X and XI.

clearly some of the limitations there are involved in any notion of "object" and in any general theses about, or analyses of, intentional objects, and clears the path for the discussion of Parts III and IV.

2.

So to start all this I will first look at one recent doctrine about intentional objects, that of Miss Anscombe in her article "The Intentionality of Sensation - a Grammatical Feature." Intentional objects, of which the objects of thought are one class, are asserted by Miss Anscombe to be the sub-class of direct objects characterized by the three related features of possible non-existence of the object, non-substitutability of different true descriptions of the object if it does exist, and indeterminacy. Verbs which take such objects, i.e. intentional verbs, also take material objects, where the material object of a given verb is given by the description giving the intentional object, if what is thus described exists, and by any other equivalent true description. Direct objects, and hence intentional objects, are, as the terms are used here, neither phrases nor that phrases are used to refer to, but pertain to grammatical understanding. The position of material objects in this respect is unclear to me: on the one hand they are given by certain

descriptions, if what is described exists, which seems to imply that they are that which is described and exists, yet on the other hand some material objects seem to be members of the class of intentional objects, and to be explicable in terms of verbs and their objects.

This puzzle I will discuss again shortly. What I wish to do in what immediately follows is to inquire whether the framework contained in this article is helpful in elucidating the notion of intentional object, and hence in elucidating my question.

In philosophy, and to some extent in ordinary discourse, we operate with some notion of object, connected particularly with mental operations and radically different from that used in e.g. "I hit a solid object". We speak of the object of my fear and of what I am afraid of, the object of my desire and what I desire, the object of my thought and what I am thinking of, and so on. It is a notion which is connected particularly closely, as Miss Anscombe notes, with the question "what?", and again with the preposition "of". It is this notion which we are trying to get at, and of which (or some classes of which) Miss Anscombe's definition is offered. Her argument for the view above is roughly as follows: consider first the nature of direct objects, because for the view to be plausible it must be shown that direct objects

are not just phrases, as the intentional object of thought (say) is given in answer to "What are you thinking of?", and it is not in general true that you are thinking of a phrase. The concept of a direct object is in fact taught in a situation such as this: A teacher writes on the board a sentence, say "John sent Mary a book", and asks "What does this sentence say John sent Mary?", and on receiving the answer "A book" says "That gives (or is) the direct object". Now in this procedure it is clear that the phrase "a book" is not being used to refer to any particular book, as questions like "Which book?" or "How thick is it?" are clearly out of order, and yet it does not seem either to be mentioned, to be used as equivalent to "The phrase "A book"," as what John sent Mary was not a phrase. Yet these are the only obvious alternatives - the answer to the impending puzzle here is that to insist on saying "If the direct object is neither what the phrase is used to refer to nor the phrase itself, then what is it?" is to make the mistake of assuming that an answer of the form "A direct object is a such and such" is always possible and requisite. In fact this teaching situation shows the role of the concept "direct object", which is really grasped from question and answer examples like the above, whose interest is thus its special relation to the obtaining of

grammatical understanding. Now the parallel between intentional and direct objects is apparent, as e.g. in "The direct object is what John sent "and" The intentional object is what John is thinking of". Intentional objects are in fact the sub-class of direct objects, being the direct objects of those verbs which show the three features mentioned earlier.

Two further points in exposition. Firstly, it needs to be noticed that this account relieves us of one vexing problem about e.g. objects of thought. If we say that the phrase giving the intentional object of thought is used referringly and thus that the object often either is or has an internal relation to something in the world, a serious problem arises from the fact that what the thought is of may not exist, viz. the problem as to how the one notion of "object" can have as instances sometimes objects in the world and on other occasions what does not exist or is purely imaginary. Now this problem, which needs to be distinguished from the question as to how thought can be of what does not exist, is relieved by Miss Anscombe's account: if we explicate "intentional object" in terms of the grammatical notion of direct object, the former category confusion does not arise. True, corresponding to some intentional objects and not others, there will be material objects, but this need cause no further problem.

Secondly: A key move in the above argument is that the direct object, as given by the answer to "What did John send Mary?", cannot be a phrase, as one cannot say "What John is said to have sent Mary is a phrase?" To this it may be objected that one cannot either say "What John is said to have sent Mary is a direct object?" Now the reply that will be made to this is that there is a clear and non-eliminable difference between the two uses of the clause "What John is said to have sent Mary" in these two sentences. One might roughly clarify the two uses by comparing an inverted pair of sentences - "A book is what John is said to have sent Mary" and "A direct object is what John is said to have sent Mary". Very roughly speaking, the use of our clause in the first sentence is to be assimilated to a predicative use, to asserting something about a book, while its use in the second sentence is to be assimilated rather to a referring use, and it is to be taken as picking out the direct object rather than asserting something about it. This clause has a parallel duality of use in our first two sentences, and so the objection fails.

3.

This provides a good point at which to commence an evaluation of the offered definition, which I do by giving an at least plausible reconstruction of the teaching situation discussed for 'direct objects'. This situation is set up by the teacher writing the sentence "John sent Mary a book" on the board and asking questions about what it says or asserts. Already one is inclined to object that such sentences exist in the language for their use in making claims, assertions, hypotheses, suggestions and so on and only say, claim, assert, suggest etc. anything in their use by language-speakers. Thus in one context this sentence may be used to assert that he sent her a book, in another to cast scorn on that suggestion, in another to raise the question as to whether it was a book he gave her. In the scorning or querying use, e.g., one cannot ask "What did he say John sent Mary?" and in most uses in which this question is acceptable the answer will refer to a particular book. Following this line of thought then, one will interpret the asking of the question "What does the sentence say John sent Mary?" as treating the sentence as having a special use, in which it is treated as if it had been used to make an assertion, with it being clear nevertheless that no particular persons or books are in question. Rather as when a child asks his father to make up a story, and

he starts "John sent Mary a Book", and the child, not hearing properly, asks "What did John send Mary?". So this interpretation of the teaching situation will be to treat the sentence "John sent Mary a book" as having a special or mock use, as if it had been used to make an assertion, but with the negative qualifications. And on this view the natural interpretation of the point of this special game with language will be to elicit from the learner the utterance of a phrase, which phrase is then asserted to be the direct object. Also it will be clear that when the answer comes "a book" this phrase is neither being used to refer to a particular book nor to mention a phrase - it has an unusual use, to which the use/mention dichotomy is not applicable.

It may seem that much of this is compatible with Miss Anscombe's view but at least one important thing follows from it. Her argument on direct objects as I understand it turns upon the supposed fact that in the described teaching situation, the question "What is the direct object of the verb in this sentence?" is the same as "What does the sentence say John sent Mary?", and hence that as one cannot answer "A phrase" to the latter question one cannot answer it to the former, and hence that the direct object is not a phrase. Now in the above reconstruction

it will be evident that these two questions have a different role, as the second and not the first are part of the special language-game being played with the sentence. That is to say, an essential part of the reconstruction would be to distinguish between the teacher's question and the pupils answer "A book" on the one hand and the teacher's statement "That's the direct object" on the other which is not nor a part of the game but a comment on what emerges from it. So it will be a mistake to equate them and the error in replying "A phrase" or "The phrase "A book" " to the teacher's question "What did John send Mary?" will be the error of refusing to play the game, and insisting on talking about sentences or phrases when a different use of them is in question. On this view also, there need be no error in replying "The phrase "A book" " to the question "What is the direct object of the verb in this sentence?".

We can now return to the objection that led up to this. It was argued that the use of the clause "What John is said to have sent Mary" is different in "What John is said to have sent Mary is a book" from its use in "What John is said to have sent Mary is a direct object". This difference becomes a little clearer in our reconstruction. Considered as a sentence within the special language-game, the latter is totally unacceptable as that game says nothing about sending direct objects. But

considered primarily as a comment on that game, parallel to "That is the direct object", the clause in question can be seen to have a quasi-referential use quite different from its use in the game itself. It serves basically to pick out what is asserted to be the direct object, and might be paraphrased as "in the special use given to this sentence, what is given in answer to the question "What is John said to have sent Mary?" is the direct object". Now "What John is said to have sent Mary is a phrase?" is similarly explicable, as something like "in the special use, what is used in answering to the question "What is John said to have sent Mary?" is a phrase", and so both can be seen to be quite different from the simple question and answer contained in "What John is said to have sent Mary is a book." So on this view the original objection is in a way right, or rather points to the valid objection.

I am not wanting to argue here that the account I have offered of the teaching situation and the possible objection is the correct one, but just to suggest that it is highly plausible, and that as it accounts for all the pressures Miss Anscombe brings against saying simply that direct objects are phrases, its possibility shows that her arguments have not yet established the contrary conclusion. In other words, in respect of the offered

definition that "intentional objects are the sub-class of direct objects characterised by these three connected features",[1] I have been arguing so far that the arguments offered on the nature of direct objects, needed to make this plausible, are not convincing. I will now attempt to give some reasons for believing that the assimilation of intentional objects to direct objects is mistaken, and then consider some other aspects of the definition.

4.

It would seem to be essential to the notion of a direct object that it is correlated with that of a sentence, in this sense: that the criteria for same direct object are correlative with the criteria for same sentence, and thus that for one sentence one could not have more than one direct object, or have what the direct object is depending on the use to which the sentence is put. Now it is also accepted in the article that the intentional object is given in answer to the question "what?" Consider then ten true uses, all in different

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1 op. cit. p. 162.

circumstances, of "He aimed at his father" (e.g. different persons uttering the sentence.). Now prima facie there is no sense to the question "What did he aim at?" such that what he aimed at is the same in all ten cases. In such cases, the answer to this question would normally be taken to be "His father" taken as referring to a particular person, and hence to different persons in the different uses. If one were to consider the point of talking about intentional objects to be to capture the content, so to speak, of the act of aiming, or as being related to what he intends, then we would still get different intentional objects in the different cases. Yet on the direct object definition it seems necessary that the intentional object be given once the sentence is given. Further, in each particular case the utterance of our sentence will be replaceable by utterances of the form "He aimed at Jim Smith", "He aimed at Joe Blow" etc. which will all be straightforwardly true on the assumption that all the sons know what their father's name is. Now, on the direct object account, we have different intentional objects of the same aiming, as the direct objects of the verb "to aim" in the sentences "He aimed at his father" and "He aimed at John Smith" certainly seem different. So we are now in the position of saying that two different aimings, by different persons at different persons, have the same intentional object, and the same aiming

has two different intentional objects. The connexion with the question "What?" certainly now seems obscure.

Let us try another difficulty. Consider three utterances of "He aimed at his father" in respect of the same person, (i) When it is completely false that he is aiming at his father or anything he takes to be his father, (ii) When he is aiming at what he takes to be his father but in fact is a stag. (iii) When he is straight out aiming at his father. Now on the strict direct object account as so far developed, these three aimings have the same intentional object, which is impossible on any relevant rendering of that term.[1] One is inclined to say that what this brings out is that the sentence must be true before it can be taken as giving the object, and that (as Miss Anscombe says) it must give a description under which what is in question is aimed at, worshipped or thought of. But if so the puzzle arises as to how anything can be a grammatical feature (which in this case I take to imply being a feature in some broad sense of a sentence) if its being a feature of that sentence is dependent on the truth of the sentence, or on the

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1 Or, at least, any rendering which is tied to what is given by any truthful answer to the question "What?" See later, the last paragraph of this Section.

use of the sentence satisfying certain other conditions. Surely the grammatical features of any sentence must be among those that hold irrespective of its truth or falsity, and independently of the conditions in which it is used. Yet to this it might be replied that what is intended is this; that the intentional object is given by the direct object of any sentence containing an intentional verb correctly used to describe a particular case and which gives a description under which, and in this way the assimilation of intentional to direct objects is maintained. Now this will still be heir to the problems above (that one aiming may have many intentional objects, and two quite distinct aimings the same object),[1] but the important point is that its acceptability in the current context will depend on the status it is given and on the exact sense of the original definition. That definition seemed to subsume intentional objects under the class of direct objects, to define them as a certain type of direct object, and this presupposes that a set

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1 Or another one along the same lines. Concerning the same aiming, if the sentence "He aimed at our cat" is uttered by two different people, and he hated one of their cats and tried to kill it in the shot in question, then in one use it gives the intentional object of his aiming, and in another not (as it gives what he aimed at, and a description under which, even if he were mistaken in thinking the cat was anywhere near). So the same direct object of the same sentence, in respect of the same aiming, at once gives and does not give the intentional object.

of criteria can be produced which differentiate non-intentional from intentional objects (i.e. criteria acting on direct objects, and finally on sentences). Now in the current account some uses of a given direct object and not others give intentional objects, and therefore the latter cannot be defined as a sub-class of the former. Once one has introduced criteria operating on the uses of direct objects into the definition, one can no longer claim intentional objects to be a sub-class of direct objects. It is rather as if one were to claim that referring expressions are a sub-class of nouns, while including in the definition the fact that some uses, and not others, of a given noun amounted to a referring expression.

But perhaps, to hesitate again, the current account ('the intentional object is given by the direct object of any sentence containing an intentional verb correctly used to describe a particular case and which gives a description under which') contains enough to constitute a weaker version of the assimilation of intentional to direct objects. Above I have interpreted this as implying straight off that some uses of a given direct object and not others give intentional objects. But might not one, prodded by the awkwardness of talking of uses of direct objects, interpret this account as firstly giving criteria to pick out in a particular case a particular sentence, and secondly defining

the intentional object as the direct object of <u>that</u> sentence, thus still maintaining the former as a sub-class of the latter. Now in her article Miss Anscombe never denies that once we are given a sentence we are given thereby one and only one direct object (given that the sentence contains a direct object) and thus that a direct object is a feature of a sentence, rather than the use of a sentence etc. This is implicit both in the teaching case of the notion of direct object given, or in statements like the following, on the actual use of the term "direct object"; "Given a sentence in which a verb takes an object, one procedure for replying to the question "What is the object in this sentence?" is to recite the object phrase (p.164)." Now one might put this presumption crudely as saying that once one has a sentence with a verb taking one object, and thus (if at all) a direct object phrase, then one has a direct object, and hence to differentiate between some uses of a sentence and others involves differentiating between uses of a direct object phrase, and hence between something like uses of a direct object. (What force one gives to the "something like" will depend on how one regards direct object phrases as <u>giving</u> direct objects). My point simply is that even this interpretation of the thesis requires that a given direct object give an given intentional objects only in some conditions and not others, and hence

cannot support a "sub-class" definition.

I mentioned right at the beginning of Section 2 that I had some problem with the status of material objects in Miss Anscombe's account, and in fact it seems to me that the general problem underlying all the above emerges here in a new way. Consider the paragraph in which material objects are introduced. "Thus, the given intentional object (the stag) being non-existent in the situation, we looked for another intentional object until we found one that did exist. Then the phrase giving that intentional object, and any other true description of the existent thing in question, gives the material object of "He aimed at ....." (p. 167). There are two sets of difficulties which arise out of this. Firstly, the talk of the intentional object existing or not existing, and the implication that the phrase giving the intentional object can give a true description of some existent thing. This is puzzling because the phrase giving the direct object of the sentence "He aimed at his father" viz. "his father" is not used to refer to a particular man, or referringly at all - this has been a key point of the argument. Yet one can only talk of what this phrase gives as existing or not, or of the phrase being (or not being) a true description of anything existent in the situation, if it is used in an attempt to refer to a particular man, if a particular referent is given to "his".

So this sort of talk about intentional objects seems to exclude the possibility of their being assimilated to direct objects. The second worry, concerning the status of material objects, arises out of this. On the one hand they seem to be given by certain descriptions, if what is described exists, while seems to imply that they are what is described and exists, yet on the other hand some material objects appear to be members of the class of intentional objects, and to be explicable in terms of verbs and their direct objects. I take this to show that the above equivocation between phrases giving direct objects and phrases used referingly runs right through the very characterization of material objects themselves.

Let me dwell on the first of these two points a little. Now it is clear from the quotation given above, and from other parts of the article in question, that the two conditions necessary for a phrase P1 to give a material object (of a verb or an activity)[1] are that there be some phrase P2 which gives an intentional object (and P1 might = P2) and that P1 and P2 are true descriptions of the same existing thing. But one could not possibly determine whether the phrases "his pet" and "the cat"

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1 Which it is I find obscure, and this seems to me a central part of the equivocation. As before, if intentional and material objects were objects of verbs the sentence alone and not the facts should determine whether or not a given phrase gave an object.

were true of the same things unless one knew who "he" was and which ost was meant in the utterance concerning which our questions arise. So we are driven back again to a particular utterance, and to the phrase giving the intentional object being used referringly. This last is not meant to imply, though, that that phrase must always be used referringly.

Now in reply to this line of attack the reply might be as follows[1]: Two peoples, A and B, worship a fox. Do they worship the same? What the sentences (a) "People A worship a fox" and (b) "People B worship a fox" say they worship is the same. So these two peoples worship the same, viz. a fox. Now if the sentences are true, we might ask a further question about whether they worship the same fox, and if they worship existing foxes this will be a query about the identity of material objects. But the identity question can be asked even if there is no material object.

This serves to focus my problem, into two strands. Firstly, in what sense can you argue from the fact that the two sentences (a) and (b) have the same direct object that what they worship is the same? Only in this case, as far as I can see, that they worship something of the same kind (and this of course requires the truth of the sentences concerned). But this is hardly a sense of what they worship being the same and, anyway, surely

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[1] Miss Anscombe so argued to me, if I have correctly interpreted her.

has no connection with intentional objects and just derives from a particular example. For from "People A worship him" and "People B worship him" you can infer only that they worship beings of the same sex, from "People A worship Jim" and "People B worship Jim" that that they respectively worship has a common name. So there seems to be no sense of "worship the same" (or "think of the same", or "be afraid of the same") which one can introduce prior to the normal use concerning statements as opposed to sentences.

Secondly, and crucially, all this refutation is valid only if Miss Anscombe's article is interpreted as proposing a thesis about intentional objects, which are defined prior to that thesis as what is given in answer to the questions "What are you thinking of?" "What are you aiming at/afraid of?" and so on. My argument has in fact been that it is incoherent to construe intentional objects, as defined, as a sub-class of direct objects. Now there seem to me to be strong reasons for so interpreting the article - e.g. passages like "If I am thinking of Winston Churchill then he is the object of my thought" (p. 160), the fact that it is objected to the suggestion that ideas are the objects of thought that this makes it seem as if the idea was what someone was thinking of, and the fact that the argument turns

around the parallelism between "The direct object is what John sent" and "The intentional object is what I was thinking of". Yet perhaps this is a mis-reading, perhaps intentional objects are simply defined as a certain sub-class of direct objects. But if this is the intention, my arguments serve to demonstrate the irrelevance of this new notion to traditional problems about objects conceived in the earlier way. The interest of the new grammatical notion would be highly obscure.

5.

I turn now to a short consideration of the tests Miss Anscombe offers us to pick out the class of intentional verbs. The discussion will be short because two of Miss Anscombe's are close to those offered by Chisholm, and also because she does not, unlike Chisholm, maintain any general thesis about intentional verbs. In particular, she does not assert that all, and only psychological verbs are intentional ones - indeed, she admits that on her account "to believe" and "to intend" do not come out at intentional. So we do not have to inquire whether those tests succeed in picking out some claimed class, but only

whether the tests themselves are clear and coherent.

The three tests which Miss Anscombe offers for intentionality, which derive by analogy from three important features of the concept "intention", and which purport to pick out a special class of verbs, are:

(i) The possible non-existence of the object, by analogy with the fact that the intended action may not get done. More fully stated, I take it to be: A verb "to φ" is intentional if for some utterance of that verb in a sentence of an appropriate form the proposition so expressed can be true even though what is φ'd does not exist.

(ii) The possible non-substitutability of different descriptions of the object, where it does exist. That is, a verb "to φ" is intentional if there is some use of this verb, such that if p1 is a description used in a statement S1 to truly give that I φed or an φing, and p2 is a true description of the same thing as p1, and S2 is formed by replacing p1 by p2, then it is still possible that S1 be true and S2 false.

(iii) Possible Indeterminacy of the object. That is, a verb "to φ" is intentional if it has some use such that its being true that "A φed a Y does not imply that there is some particular Y that A φed.

Let us first point up the crucial difference between these

criteria and the ones Chisholm offers, viz. that being criteria for verbs rather than sentences, and the recognition being explicit that not all uses of these verb have the given feature, it requires only one use of one (simple) sentence containing this verb to possess this feature for the intentionality of the verb to be established. So producing examples of sentences using the given verb which never satisfy any of the criteria does not go to show that the verb is not intentional. Nor Miss Anscombe's procedure in this respect could, but need not, lead to confusion. For while she in fact makes a much smaller claim than Chisholm, or even than Quine does concerning "referential opacity", we can be tempted to think that if the intentionality of the verb in this sense is established then something has been established about all uses of the verb (something, for example, relevant to the analysis of all sentences involving central uses of that verb). When stated this is obviously inadmissable, and I mention it only so that the temptation will be avoided.

About these tests I will have little to say, contenting myself to observing that the first and third tests pick out a quite restricted class of sentences, and that the second one seems to be incoherent as a test designed to pick out a special class of sentences or verbs. On the first test , if we leave

abide possible quibbles about formulation and assume that for each statement made with any relevant sentence complications arising from the distinction between what I mean and what I say can be ignored, it seems that we will succeed in picking out a class roughly similar to that picked out by Chisholm's first test. The qualification about the mean/say distinction is necessary because at first glance it may seem that for Miss Lecombe the object does not exist if there is nothing satisfying the description, yet we have already seen that this type of condition can be satisfied in any use of a sentence using a description non-essentially. So we need an amendment that the object is given by what I meant, for the uses for which this stipulation is relevant. With this amendment, the seven cases considered earlier will divide in the same way as they did with Chisholm's first test. For all uses of "I loved the A", or of "I listened to the A" or "I trust the A" or "I am looking at the A", the statement made will be true only if the person or thing I referred to by "the A" exists, while this does not seem to be true of "I intended to kill the A" or "I am looking for the A", as we saw in that earlier disoussion. Similarly for the third test - If I say that I loved, hated, trusted, looked at, admired or listened to a man, this would seem to imply that there was some particular man whom I loved, hated etc. I can however, look

for or intend to kill a man without its being the case that there is any particular man that I am looking for or intending to kill. So, generally speaking, these two tests of Miss Anscombe's seem to isolate the same class of sentences which were finally picked out in the discussion of Chisholm's third test.

I will not attempt to justify these last remarks in detail, for their interest lies only in showing the scope of Miss Anscombe's tests and not in the evaluation of some particular thesis. More important, though, is my remark about the second test, viz. that it is incoherent as a test purporting to pick out a special class of sentences. Now as it stands this test is satisfied by all sentences, or at least all sentences containing a description which could be used non-essentially. This might be taken simply as showing that some minor amendment is needed, but no simple amendment seems to be possible, as the source of the problem here is that our criterion is essentially a matter of the substitution of descriptions, while for non-essential uses the truth-value of the statement depends on the what is referred to and not upon what description is used. It is thus not a trivial objection, one which is formally correct but which does not really count against the main thrust of the criterion. In a serious way, this test mis-describes the feature of some verbs

or sentences which really is unusual in this area.[1] I do not wish to deny, however, that there is such a feature, and I attempted to isolate it in the later parts of the discussion of Chisholm's third criterion. But in Miss Anscombe's terminology it is: a verb is an intentional if some sentences in which it is the main verb reflects the difference between attributive, essential, and non-essential uses of some name or description in it by the fact that there is the possibility of a difference in truth-value between the statements involving these uses, even when the same thing is referred to and when the statements are made in the same circumstances,[2] Note that this served the analogy Miss Anscombe wanted with "to intend", for although this verb satisfies the test, the analogy was supposed to be with the non-substitutivity of different descriptions of the action intended. Now assuming that that feature of intention was

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1 It is worth relating this problem to the deficiencies in Miss Anscombe's "grammatical account of intentional objects". For on this latter view to say that the object of my love or fear does not exist can only be interpreted in terms of there being nothing satisfying some name or description, for only names or descriptions can be direct objects of verbs. But it was a key point of my earlier objection that a phrase gives an object of love or fear only if it is used referentially, and now the question of what I referred to as opposed to what satisfies the description arises. This cannot be handled at all by the strict "grammatical" view.

2 See Part I, Section .

correctly described, it is; some descriptions but not others of the action Y can be substituted in "I intended to do Y" saving the truth-value, and it is just the test derived by analogy with this that is not acceptable.

Three final points. Firstly, as I have already noted, Miss Anscombe uses her work on intentional, material and direct objects to state her views about perception - naive realists overlook the intentionality of sensation, and sense-data theorists mistakenly construe what are grammatical truths about intentional objects materially. It is surely clear that the latter point in particular depends essentially on the view about intentional objects being a sub-class of direct objects, and if I am right in claiming that his view is unacceptable, then this point can no longer be made. Secondly, lest anyone think that the Chisholm/Brentano thesis about psychological language is more plausible when expressed in terms of verbs and their objects, we need to note, as above, that basically the same points apply when that thesis is expressed in this way as when it is expressed in terms of the behaviour of sentences and statements. Thirdly, we need to be on our guard against thinking that the sense of "intentional" here defined is immediately relevant to questions of analysis - compare, for example, Kenny[1] who explicitly sets himself the task

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1 op. cit. pp. 202-3.

of producing an analysis of intentional sentences. With regard to Miss Anscombe's second criterion the objection to this will be obvious enough, for that criterion does not pick out a class of sentences but only a set of uses of sentences. More generally it will surely be dangerous to assume that criteria which are satisfied by a few uses of a given sentence serve to isolate feature(s) of the meaning of that sentence relevant to analysis. Before any such assumption could be made we would need a much firmer grasp of why some uses, and not others, possess the property given in any criterion. The force of this cautionery remark will become more obvious when we discuss in detail various uses of sentences involving "think of" in the latter sections of this part.

6.

All the foregoing discussion presupposes, at least when interpreted as concerned with theses asserted about previously specified intentional objects, that a clear notion of "object" has been, or can be, given. Now when one thinks about activities

or states like fear, desire, thought and worship, the notion of the object of the fear, desire, thought or worship readily comes to mind, and we are inclined to take it that we have a fairly clear intuitive idea of what such a notion of "object" is and of what would or would not be an object of these operations or states. This notion is connected with the question "What?" and often with that question as involving a particular preposition - the object of desire is what is desired, the object of fear is what I am afraid <u>of</u>, the object of thought is what I am thinking <u>of</u>, and so on. Interpreted in the way I have throughout, Miss Anscombe relies in her article/seems to rely, on this general notion. Now as the term "object" is in general not nearly as firmly embedded in the language as the term like "cause", we could, and ought to, ask whether this intuitive idea is a clear and coherent one, and whether the features mentioned provide sufficiently sharp criteria for deciding what is and what is not an object of such various states or activities.

In a case like "fear" this may not seem to be a very taxing question, because our intuitive notion of the object of fear does not hang solely on the answers given to "What are you afraid of?" but also on considerations of what I avoid, endeavour to escape from, regard as a danger etc. Indeed, all these questions seem very closely woven together - when I am afraid,

what I am afraid of is shown by my actions (what I cringe from, take steps to avoid, am hypnotised by) and by my words and thoughts (what I regard as a danger, as likely to cause harm). If I claim to be very much afraid of some particular thing, and yet my behaviour shows no bias at all towards that thing and I act with complete indifference towards it, then the validity of the claim to be afraid will be seriously called into question. And similarly if I deny that I see that thing as in any way threatening or dangerous, or that I can see any connection at all between it and possible harm to myself of someone else, then my claim will also be in question. Again, it could not be the case that, in respect of the same fear, one regarded one thing as what one was afraid of, another quite different thing as likely to cause harm, and avoided something different again. In other words, we have here a web of questions and considerations which together seem to fix fairly clearly the place of the term "object of fear". It is perhaps worth noting that when we have such a situation, it is highly plausible to say that the notion of "object" is to be understood primarily in terms of cases in which all considerations both operate and agree, i.e. here in terms of the uses in which what I say I am afraid of, what I take steps to avoid and what I connect with possible harm all agree. And if this is the case, then the old questions about possible non-

existence of the object, or of the object as described, seem far less intractable. When the adder that I think I am afraid of just does not exist in the situation, or in fact is a twig, it will be clearly the case that the different considerations determining the notion of object break apart and we will not feel obliged to go searching for <u>the</u> object.

But even this rough clarity is not immediately available with the term "object of thought". If we try and tie the notion of object to what is given in answer to the question "What are you thinking of?" then we will have objects of thought given by such descriptions as "the possibility that he might come," "what might happen this afternoon," and by full statements like "Britain will use force in Rhodesia" in contexts like; "One thing is certain, I believe." "What are you thinking of?" "Britain will use force in Rhodesia." And such cases as these seem to conflict sharply with that vague intuitive notion that we have. So there are two alternatives - either we can forget about the intuitive notion altogether, and take the "What are you thinking of?" criterion as giving the object of thought whatever it gives, or we can attempt to refine this last criterion to give a result more in line with the received notion. I will first do something towards the latter, to try and evaluate

what clarity can be achieved by this route.

The first thing I am inclined to say about "object" of thought is that it must contrast in one way with the "topic" of one's thought or one's thinking, and in another way with the "content" of the thought of which it is the object, and that these two distinctions are roughly marked out by the difference between "What are you thinking of?" / "What are you thinking?" and "I was thinking of"/ "I was thinking that" on the one hand (object/content,) and between "What are you thinking of?" /"What are you thinking about?" and "I was thinking of" / "I was thinking about" on the other (object/topic.) When it occurs to me that Peter might drop in and that his manners are terrible, I would say in response to appropriate queries that I was thinking of Peter and that what I thought was that he might drop in and that he has bad manners. Similarly, I spent the afternoon thinking about the problem of evil, rather than of it. It may be instructive to see what these very rough distinctions achieve when formed into a criterion for "object of thought", viz. the object of thought is given by the answer to the question "What are you thinking of?" as opposed to the other two questions, and when the answer is not translatable into either a "thinking about" or a "thinking that" locution.

When we consider some cases, we can discover several strands which do not seem to be relevant to the notion of object.

1) In cases like the following: Someone says "I have certain measures in mind," or "There are several possibilities," and in answer to our question "What are you thinking of?" states what these measures are, or what possibilities he envisages, perhaps by saying something like "I was thinking of the possibility that a, and that b". Now on the account we are trying, these cases will be excluded on the ground that they give the content rather than the object, which shows up in the fact that the answer could always be paraphrased as "I was thinking <u>that</u> a is a possibility and also b."

2) Rather similar to these will be those cases, which constitute a fairly important section of the use of "What (Who) are you thinking of?" and "I am thinking of ...", in which something is hinted at or otherwise indirectly given in some initial statement, and is only specified directly in response to this question. For example: "An earlier Labour leader would not have done this." "Who are you thinking of?" "Gaitskill" or, "The best move would end the game in 3 minutes" "What are you thinking of?" "Knight to there." One reason why the question in this use seems unacceptable as part of the test to determine the object of thought is that it can only be asked if a certain sort of formulation is

given to the thought. Thus for example, if it had been put as "Caitskill would not have done this" the question what are you thinking of in this sense would not have arisen. But perhaps a sufficient explanation for this is the fact that if this formulation is not given the question has no point. Further, to the extent to which the cases here are not equivalent to those of 1) above in that the answer to the question is not rephrasable with a that-clause, there would seem to be no other problem about allowing what is so picked out as objects of thought. So we might accept the reply and leave these cases stand.

3) Another set of uses apparently irrelevant to the notion of an object will be those of "What did you think of?" / "What have you thought of?" in cases like "What did you think of to say?", "What have you thought of for us to do?", and in which answers like "I thought of this possibility, that objections, of saying that I was held up" or "I cannot think of anything further" are appropriate. If these remained in, we would have to say that the object of my thought was e.g. the possibility that he might come, when the thought of which it is the object is expressible as "He might come." Now again, on the criteria we are trying they will be excluded, as the statement giving what I thought of ("I thought of the possibility that he might come") is equivalent to one involving a 'that' - clause only, viz. "I

thought that it is a possibility that he might come," which in turn seems equivalent to "I thought that he might come".

4) Similarly to this, cases like "What are you thinking of doing?"-"I am thinking of going away" and like "What were you thinking of in doing that?" seem to be excludable both on the ground that a quite new question has been formed from our old one, and because the answers can be given in terms of that clauses.

Problems of a different sort crowd in when we consider the application of the rough object/topic (thinking of/thinking about) distinction to the use of "What are you thinking of?". Consider someone who has just thought that Peter might drop in today and is asked "What are you thinking of or about?" he might reply that he was thinking of or about Peter, or that he was thinking of or about what might happen this afternoon. Now the point is that the supposed cleavage between "thinking of" and "thinking about" has not yet emerged, yet there seems to be some cleavage by the time we get to "thinking about the problem of evil," "thinking of the problem of evil". So we might try saying that the object is given by those uses of "thinking of" in which "thinking about" is also available.

I will not continue this discussion in this way, for it is by now clear that there is a considerable complexity of use

underlying these rough distinctions, which the assumption that the object of thought can be defined in terms of what is given in answer to the question "What are you thinking of?" does not even recognise. And it should further be clear that we will not be able to move safely in this field until we have a much firmer grasp of that complexity, and so I now turn to discuss it.

This is the time, also, to broaden the concerns of this part of the thesis. For I am interested in the notion of an object of thought not simply as an example of an intentional object from the foregoing discussion, but also with an eye on the discussion scheduled for Part III and particularly Part IV, concerning the explanation we are to give of the relation between the thought and its object. For <u>that</u> discussion we need not only a clear notion of object of thought, but also to be clear about the character of a person's knowledge of the object of his own thought, about what relevant cases of thinking involve the occurrence of mental events, and about the ontological status of the object of thought. So when in the next five sections I distinguish various uses of sentences involving "think of" or "thinking of" I will also ask the following questions:

(1) Firstly, whether there are any parallel "thinking that" locutions which could replace the ones considered without significant change of meaning.

(2) Secondly, what connection there is in each use, if any, with any "occurrent" thoughts or acts of thinking.

(3) Thirdly, what limitations there are, if any, on the "kinds of thing" which are given by the phrase or clause following the "thinking of", and in particular whether there is in any of these locutions a commitment to the existence of what I am thinking of.

(4) Fourthly, what the character of my knowledge of what I am thinking of is, whether I am always the final authority, whether my utterance is incorrigible, and so on.

7.

There appear to be at least six or perhaps seven discernibly different uses of sentences involving various parts of the verb "to think of", each of which I will attempt to clarify a little and discuss in terms of the questions listed above. I will attempt to avoid disputes about whether we have seven different uses of the one sentence with a single sense, or several different senses of the basic sentence. For the situation is that one can find groups of applications of the given sentence which possess

various distinctive features not possessed by other groups of applications of that sentence, and these differences may be more or less striking, more or less important in each pair of cases. The criteria on which one could determine the precise point at which such differences amounted to a difference of sense are obscure to me, and fortunately the question is of no importance here. All I wish to claim here is that the uses of the various parts of the very "to think of" group themselves around these six or seven paradigms, each of which is quite different from the others, but I am not claiming either that they amount to different senses or that each use can be fitted precisely into one or another.

One important class of uses, which one might call "hinting" or "suggestion" uses, consists of those in which it is essential that some description or specification of what A is thinking of have already been given by A, and given in such a way that it leaves it to some extent open what it was that A is thinking of. Consider for example: "An earlier leader of the Labour Party would not have done that", "Who are you thinking of?" (1) "I am (was) thinking of Gaitskill" or "A number of good suggestions have been made" "What are you thinking of?" (2) "I am thinking of Jim's idea that p, and that q" These cases I will take as examples of use I, which can be given a

preliminary specification as: those uses of the continuous tenses of "to think of" for which such prior description is necessary. But they need to be distinguished from cases like: "I have certain measures in mind." "What are you thinking of (doing)?" (3) "I am thinking of doing X, Y and Z". These exhibit continuous tenses and the necessity of the prior description, but can be seen to be different from the above by the presence of "doing" in question and answer, and also because (3) expresses a sense of hesitancy or indecision which is quite absent from (1) or (2). Case like (3) will be clarified when we come to discuss use II in the next section, and further definition of I will emerge as we discuss its features.

Consider two more examples of I: "There are certain possibilities as yet unexplored". "What are you thinking of?" (4) "I am thinking of the possibility that a, that b, or that c". or "Some of Johnson's actions are difficulty to justify". "What are you thinking of?" (5) "I am thinking or X, Y, and Z"[1] Now immediately we can assert two conditions which the prior specification must satisfy - it must be presumed that the speaker knows what particulars he had in mind at the time of utterance (which does not imply that he need be thinking of them at that time)

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1 In what follows I will use(3) for the question "What are you thinking of?"

and yet it must not be deducible from the description or from the use of the description that they were. These are still obscure requirements, yet there must on the one hand be a distinction between these cases and those in which I use the description without any particulars in mind, and on the other between these and cases in which I use a description to refer to one or more particulars.

Turning now to the questions listed at the end of the last section, and asking these in relation to I, we can clearly see that there could in general be no equivalent use of a sentence, involving "thinking that". This may appear to be false if we consider only cases like example (4) viz. the example using "There are certain possibilities as yet unexplored". If a policeman were to say that to his colleagues in the search for Roberts who were convinced he had left the country, and was asked (B) he may well reply "I was thinking that he might be in the cave, or hiding in Dorset wood", and it is difficult to see how this would differ from "I was thinking of the possibility that ...." in reply to (B). This seems to warrant no general conclusion, however, as it is the special case in which the possibilities that I am thinking of are necessarily such that they can also be given in terms of what I think. Compare: "There are certain objections to Goldwater's thesis."

"What are you thinking of?" "I was thinking that (or of the objection that) China is peace-loving and, therefore, will never attack". Thinking of an objection, in a context in which it is made clear that I think (or thought at the relevant time) that it is or was an objection, essentially involves thinking that such-and-such is the case. Of course if "objection" is used to mean just "what someone has put up as an objection" this would not be the case. That is, "I was thinking of the objection that p" normally entails "I was thinking that p", whereas "I was thinking of X's objection that p" does not entail "I was thinking that p". The point of all this is that only for these special cases of I is there an equivalent "thinking that" locution; if this special condition is not fulfilled, as in (1), (2), or (5) such an equivalence is not possible. It will be no objection either to say that if someone says "A number of suggestions have been made" and is asked "What do you think they are?", he might reply "I think that they are a, b and c" - indeed, to the extent to which this reply is possible a reply of the form "I was thinking of a, b and c" will not be possible. If I only think that they were the suggestions made, then it can hardly be the case that I was thinking of them when I asserted that a number had been made. Or, to put this more exactly, if I utter (2) and in reply to someone's

question (.) say "I was thinking of a, b, and c" it will follow that my belief that a, b and c, are suggestions which have been made is stronger than is expressed by "I think that they are."

It also seems to me that no locution involving "thinking about" would be at home in I. If I say (6) "One of his remarks was obscene" and am asked by a person who heard his remarks "What were you thinking about?", this would at least be very strained, even though what he was getting at would probably be understood. If I had said though "I have just been musing about part of his lecture: one of his remarks was obscene but highly moving and very penetrating" the question "what (part) were you thinking about?" would be quite natural, every bit as natural as (.). I am inclined to say, and this will come out later, that "thinking about" differs from "thinking of" in that it implies that something was thought about what one was thinking about, and hence that it is tied to there being some period of time in which this thinking is taking place. The above example seems to illustrate these two. Anyway there seems to be no undoubted case of I to which "what are you thinking about?" is applicable in a way plausibly equivalent to (.) and a similar conclusion applies to the appropriate answers to these questions.

Little needs to be said about the second question, viz. what

connection is there in I with any "occurrent" thoughts? The answer is simply none, or at least none apart from the utterance which brought forth the question. In all the cases of I given, if there is any time at which I am thinking of what I give in answer to (B) it is when I make that original utterance, and at that time I need not be having thoughts of particular suggestions, possibilities, or remarks. My mind might be taken up with something quite different, e.g. with wondering how they will react to this bold claim. On the third, whether there are any limitations on the "kinds of thing" which can be thought of in this use, the only two requirements seem to be that I cannot think of my own future intentional actions, and that what follows the "think of" must at least be phrasable as a substantive. Consider: "Certain things need to be said". "What are you thinking of?" Now the answer to this will either be of the form "I was thinkin of doing A (e.g. saying P)" which is not a case of I (see earlier and discussion of II), or it must be of the form "I was thinking of the fact that, the point that, the possibility that etc." and a future action of mine might come in under such a substantive.

Am I in any way, or always, committed to the existence of what I am thinking of in this use? If, in response to (A) and (B) I say (7) "I was thinking of his remark that Wilson is a

Communist" I am at least committed to the belief that this is one of the remarks he made. And similarly with the other examples, with the possibilities, suggestions and his actions. And isn't it the case that, to use the reverse wording to one of Chisholm's criteria for intentionality, if I say (7) in the given context then I imply not just that I believe that he said this but also that he said it.

But, as usual, this is too simple. Consider the following case: I have just returned home from the Continent and say seriously to friends "The best camping ground in Europe is the cheapest", and when asked what (or which one) I was thinking of, I reply with (a) "I was thinking of the camping ground right on the main street of Locarno". Now here it might be the case that

(a) there is no such ground in Locarno, but there is in Lugano, and this is the one I meant.

(b) I stayed at a camping ground on the main street in Norway, and this is the one I was thinking of.

(c) there are camping grounds on the main streets of both Lugano and Locarno, which I confuse, and I was thinking of the one which in fact is in Lugano.

(d) there is no such in Locarno, and when I am pressed my ideas about various camping grounds collapse into confusion.

(e) I dreamt of just such a site, but there are none in Locarno.

Now for (a), what I mean by (3) will be true but what I say (1) will be false, in the sense of those terms given in Part I. For (b) what I say would be clearly false, but unless a very unusual case was considered there is no obvious sense in which what I mean is true. Similarly for (c) except that we may be prepared to allow that I meant the one in Lugano in a sense which does not reduce to "meant to say" - if so, what I meant would be true. For (d) it would seem that (2) is not true[1] whichever way it is taken and this would seem to be a case in which no statement of the form "I was thinking of ..." (in use I) is true. In (e) (1) will again be false however it is taken, and yet something like this might be true: "I dreamt of this camp-site that was supposed to be in Lugano, and I was thinking of that."

For a second case, consider again our first example, viz. an utterance of (1) "I am thinking of Gaitskill" in reply to query (2) and after having said "An earlier leader of the Liberal Party would not have done that." Now (1) will clearly be true even though Gaitskill was always a Labour man, given only that I believe that he was a Liberal leader. On the other hand, what I said by (3) would be false and what I meant true if I think that Grimond's name was "Gaitskill", and was thinking of him. Further, if I am confused and there existed no-one called Gaitskill and no-one

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1 i.e. I do not attempt to decide between "false" or "neither true nor false".

that I mean, then (1) will simply be false.

These two examples suggest what I believe is the general pattern with use I cases. Assuming that the description giving the prior specification is of the form "the A which is B", where "A" is the simplest relevant category term (e.g. "man", "standing-ground", "remark") and the reply was the form "I was thinking of the C", then at least one interpretation of the reply is true only if there exists an A which is B or which I believe to be B, and which I either mean or describe by my use of "the C". Spelling this out a little more, what I say in the reply will be true if I correctly describe the A whom I believe to be B, and false if I do not correctly describe him, and but I mean will be true if he is in fact the one I mean by the use of "the C". Generally speaking, if there is no A which satisfies these conditions, the reply will certainly be not true but some other use I locution of the form "I was thinking of ...", perhaps with preliminary qualifications, may be true.

I cannot devote the space here to a detailed attempt to justify this by considering many cases, but this is at least a good deal more plausible than the simple condition given above that such sentences can be true only if there is something satisfying the prior specification, the A which is B. Two points deserve mention though - firstly, that if this is correct use I

sentences are non-intentional by the revised (IIb) version of Chisholm's first test, for this is almost precisely the behaviour climed in that discussion for sentences like "I love my brother" or "I am listening to my brother". Secondly, it must be noted though that the two discussions are quite different in scope, for in the discussion of Chisholm's test I only considered descriptions, referring in a narrow sense to persons or things, but the above discussion includes reference to suggestions, remarks, actions and possibilities as well.

One of the two remaining questions concerns whether it makes sense to regard my thinking of X, as described by this use as an intentional action[1]. If I say (1) "I was thinking of Gaitskill" in the case previously given and am asked "Why were you thinking of him (in saying that)?" the point of the question will seem completely obscure. One could not, for this use of "to think of", give a reason for thinking of Gaitskill in saying "an earlier Labour leader" which was not primarily a reason for the whole linguistic performance. That is, given the case as described, one could not have one reason for saying "an earlier Labour leader" and another for thinking of Gaitskill in saying that. If this were to be possible, the case would have to be one in which I said "an earlier Labour leader" and also thought of Gaitskill

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1 In, of course, the familiar sense of intentional and purposive action, and not of any notion of intentionality given by the various criteria discussed in Part I.

i.e. not one in which our group I use would be appropriate. Thinking of I as described by case I is not by itself sufficient to be a candidate for the intentional/non-intentional distinction. Compare meaning Jim Smith by a use of "Jim" in a particular utterance. It makes sense to ask "Why did you say 'Jim'?" and "Why did you refer to Jim Smith?" but not "Why did you mean Jim Smith by 'Jim' in that utterance." In such a case, meaning Jim Smith, like thinking of Gaitskill, does not amount to an action such that it makes sense to describe it as either intentional or non-intentional.

The final question concerns the character of my knowledge of what I am thinking of. Three related, if apparently opposed, points need to be made immediately. Firstly that it is necessary that I know who or what I am thinking of, in this sense; that if it turns out that I cannot say who or what it was I was thinking of, and this inability cannot be ascribed to my having forgotten, then that shows that I was not thinking of anyone or anything. Secondly, unless it is supposed that I have forgotten or may have forgotten, then I am the authority about what it is I was thinking of, and there can be no appeal beyond what I sincerely assert. Nevertheless, thirdly, it may be the case that I feel sure that I was thinking of someone when I said something, yet when pressed

not be able to say who, and it thus turn out that I was not thinking of anyone at all. For example, in the heat of an argument I may say "An earlier Labour leader would not have done that" and feel confident that I have a particular one in mind, but then never be able to specify him. In other words, our current cases of "thinking of X" cannot be limited to those in which I think of (in another, "occurrent" sense) a particular one, as I speak.

Consider such a case of a different sense, one in which I am sitting in my arm-chair and am thinking of Kyle.[1] Now in what precise way does my knowledge of what I am thinking of in these cases differ from that in the above? In the new case, if I think I am thinking of a real man I could turn out to be mistaken in thinking that he existed, but not in thinking that I was thinking of a man. Yet in the former cases, it could turn out that I was not thinking of anyone or anything at all. This connects with the fact that, assuming that one can locate the time of thinking of in the group I cases as the time of utterance, there is a sense in which for these I do not know at the time of thinking of who or what I am thinking of. What happens at the moment of utterance in no way determines which person I am thinking of.

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[1] In which cases will, of course, receive more detailed specification later, see section 10.

This contrast is obviously of some importance, and needs to be discussed in more detail. But that discussion will be more fruitful when I have clarified the new uses a little and so I will leave it till Section 10.

3.

Right at the beginning of the discussion of use I I noted a use of "What are you thinking of?" and "I am thinking of ..." apparently similar to, but in some ways quite different from I. This is the use illustrated by: "I have certain measures in mind" "What are you think of?" "I am thinking of doing A, Y and Z" or by Witch]: "There are many ways of getting rid of him" Witch 2 "What are you thinking of" Witch 1: "I am thinking of casting a spell, or running him over, or hiring murderers". Now it is difficult to get clear about whether cases like these are significantly different from i, or whether the differences that do exist are to be regarded as arising simply from the fact that th basic use described in I is applied to a particular type, viz. the actions of the speaker. This difficulty is shown up by the fact that the "witch" example given above is ambiguous, and if this

sequence we'll uttered in a context in which it was understood that Wilson wanted to get rid of Smith, and that this was what was being discussed, we would appear to have a pure example of I. But when this is not the case, or with the first case, as at least seem to have the new feature of hesitation, uncertainty, indecision, which certainly suggests that a quite new aspect has crept into our use. Could not one reply to this, though, that it follows from the meaning of "think of" as used e.g. in I that when it is used in respect of my own future actions, which are up for decision, there should be a contrast between thinking of doing a given action and having decided to do it, and thus that in virtue of this contrast "think of doing" rather than "will do" suggests hesitancy, indecision, and so on. So this reply would suggest that these cases are to be assimilated to I after all.

The truth about all this seems to be that these puzzling uses in fact are half-way houses between I and a clearly distinct type of use, which will be II. Examples of II will be: "I heard about your problem - what are you thinking of doing?" "I am thinking of going out to work, or of suing for divorce." or "What are you going to do?" "I am thinking of staying in Oxford/I was thinking of staying here till yesterday, but he pointed out the difficulties in that so now I am thinking of leaving." That is, it consists of such uses of "What are you thinking of doing?" or

"I am (was) thinking of doing A," and without any restriction to cases in which what is thought of is already given, if incompletely by some form of description. Note that it seems essential to this use that both the question and the statement can occur independently of one another, i.e. each can occur in contexts in which the other would not be appropriate.

The key difference between I and II, apart from the lack of a necessary prior specification in the latter, is a difference in the way temporal predicates attach to them. In I, if someone asks "When were you thinking of that?", then if any answer is appropriate, it will be "When I said what I did." If I say "An earlier leader of the Labour party would not have done that" and reply to question ( ) with "I was the king of Gaitskill", I can only say that I was thinking of Gaitskill when, or in, making that statement. From which it does not follow of course that any further thinking of Gaitskill was going on over and above the making of the statement. II is quite different however. Firstly, we have a possibility of different tenses actually being used in respect of different times - e.g. "I was thinking of doing X on Monday," or "I am now thinking of doing X". Between certain times which may be specifiable on Monday, I was thinking of doing X. Secondly, these utterances contain some sort of

reference, but not a very direct kind, to some "occurent" thinking about doing X. I cannot say "I have not been able to give any thought to it (or my mind has been fully engaged on other matters) but I was thinking of doing X" - this would only become plausible if I said "I am thinking of doing X", and if this were interpreted as equivalent to "I think I will do X" i.e. some sort of expression of a decision or an opinion about what I will do. However, to say "I was thinking of doing X" in a type II case is not either to report on particular acts of thinking, as shown by the fact that all day Monday I was thinking of doing X, but of course I was not having thoughts of X all day. So we have a contrast between II and "I think I will do X" in one way, and II/ and "I was thinking of Y at 12 noon yesterday" in another.

The first of these needs following up a little, and for this purpose I will call "I think I will do X" II(b). Now II(b) has the interesting features, not shared by II itself, of having all its apparently the same sense as the present one, in respect of events independent of the speaker e.g. natural events or the actions of others, and following from this, uses in which the third person can be used in the clause following "I think". Thus while I can well say "I think he will do X" or "I think the mountain will fall" and this seems completely parallel to "I think I will

do X", I cannot say "I am thinking of him doing X" or 'of the mountain falling" at all in a way parallel to "I am thinking of doing X." Saying "I am thinking of him (his) doing X" is not to suggest either that there is some chance that he will do it or that he is uncertain whether or not to do it, and also during the period in which I am thinking of this I must be having the appropriate thoughts. The point is then simply that the characteristic features of II are tied to its being a particular action of mind that is in question, but not so with the features of II(b). The restrictions on II are even finer than this, for the case has to be one in which whatever question or difficulty there is about doing the action is primarily a matter of my deciding to do it, and not of my putting my choice or decision into effect. Thus, "I am thinking of living till I am 80/of winning the championship/playing brilliantly tomorrow/solving the problems of philosophy next year" are all quite inappropriate, whereas one could say "I think I will live till I am 80/win/play brilliantly tomorrow/solve the problems of philosophy next year" without showing anything other than conceit. This last also brings out the strong predictive element in II(b), the presence of which is also shown by the fact that one could not say: "I think I will go but I am fairly sure that I will decide not to" but could well say "I am thinking of going but I am fairly sure I will decide not to."

II is presumably restricted in this way to my own actions as up for decision because the point of the use is to suggest that the given action is being held in thought, or considered, as a possible alternative without actually having been decided upon. And this serves to distinguish II not only from II(b) but also again from I. Now with these distinguished, it is easier to get clear about the cases that caused trouble earlier, e.g. Witch1: "There are many ways of getting rid of him" Witch 2: "What were you thinking of (doing)?" Witch 1 "I was thinking of casting a spell, or running him over, or hiring murderers". The problem about this case obviously arises because it is unclear whether the ways of getting rid of him are presented as courses of action which the witch is considering implementing, or just possibilities she is thinking of. As the case veers towards the first, it will be an instance of II, and as towards the second, it will be an instance of I, which it is will be shown up critically by the answer given to "When were you thinking of (doing) these?"

The interest of the other questions is not very great here. There seems to be no equivalent "about" locution, for "I am thinking about doing X" is quite different, as it does not imply any commitment at all to doing X. But our sentence could sometimes be replaced by a "that" locution such as "I am thinking that I might do X". Concerning a person's knowledge of what he is thinking

of for these cases, I will remark only that while the subject remains the authority on what he is thinking of, nevertheless he can misreport it or even know that he is thinking of doing something but have forgotten for the minute what it is.

3.

The third type of use which I want to discuss is the one which might be thought to have the greatest philosophical significance. It is shown in examples such as "I was thinking of the things I have to do today," "I just keep thinking of the last thing he said/of the look on his face," "All the time I was talking to her I was thinking of Martha," and the parallel ones "We think of you every now and again" and "I still think of my stretch on the Kokoda trail often." As the latter are included only because they are roughly equivalent to something like /Every now and again we are thinking of you," and "There are still many periods during which I am thinking of my stretch on the Kokoda trail," I will can be given a preliminary specification as consisting of those uses of "was thinking of" "am thinking of"

and "will be thinking of" which are not examples either of I or II. That is, as those uses of "am thinking of" and the other continuous tenses which are not either tied to some previously given specification of what was being thought of or to the objec of the thought being a future intentional action of the speaker. One important specifying feature of this use will obviously be that all cases will show a direct relation to a "thinking event," by which I mean that a time can be at least in principle specified at which the person concerned does some thinking of i.e. that we can specify a time at which a statement made with a continuous tense is true of him, and at which he is actually engaged in that thinking. Whether they also require that there be a period during which the thinking is going on will be considered later.

To get to some important features of this use, consider the case in which I enter a room and find a person sitting in a chair obviously engrossed in thought. Now I will often say either "What are you thinking?" or "What are you thinking about?", but it would be at least odd to ask "What are you thinking of?" unless there were some special circumstances which suggested that he was thinking of something or someone. For example, if the chap was girl-mad and had a love-struck look, I might ask "Who are you thinking of today." or again, if he was sitting at the breakfast

table apparently enumerating things in thought and counting them on his fingers, I might ask what he is thinking of. But generally if it is clear only that he is thinking, then this does not seem a sufficient reason for asking "What are you thinking of?", but is for asking "What are you thinking about?" and the oddity of asking it would seem to be rather like the oddity of asking "What are you planning?" or "What are you memorizing?" in the same case, viz. that we have no sufficient reason for suspecting that any thinking of, memorizing or planning is going on. Now this suggests that there is a significant difference between "thinking of" and "thinking about", at least in the type of cases under discussion, and that not all cases of thinking can actually be regarded as cases of thinking of something. As both of these seem to me largely true and perhaps of some importance, I will discuss each in turn. Of course, to say "was thinking of" is not always to imply that I thought nothing at all about e.g. her, any more than to say "thought of" rather than "thought about" is to assimilate the case to one model rather than another.

Starting with the distinction between "thinking about" and "thinking of" I will firstly state that the crux of this seems to be, roughly, that in the use of a sentence like "I was thinking of X" the description X which gives what I was thinking of is

presumed to cover everything relevant to the thought, and the sentence does not imply that there were other thoughts not included under the description. On the other hand, the use of a sentence like "I was thinking about I" implies that I had, or at least was attempting to have, some thoughts about which one would not learn just from finding out that I was thinking about I. To clarify this with examples: if I say "I was thinking of Jane, or of how Ryle acted while I was there, or of that last look on his face, or of what I have to do today" the important contrast between this and saying that I was thinking about any of these seems to be that the implication in the latter case, but not the former, would be that I had some further thought such as "Jane is evil" or "Ryle acted very decently for a professor", or at least that I was puzzling about e.g. how to fit everything in today and so at least attempting to have some further thoughts. "Thinking of" something in this use is a matter of holding it before my mind rather than "entertaining propositions about it," or of recalling just what each phase or proposed action was rather than pondering or puzzling about each phase or action.

There seem to be a number of reasons for accepting some such account as this. Firstly, the fact that one can always ask what I was thinking about what I was thinking about, but there is nothing parallel with "thinking of." This essential dual use of

"about" is important because it shows a clear difference between "I was thinking about Y," and "I was thinking that p" and "I was thinking of X." The first only picks out I as the centre of some process its being the centre of which is essential to its being something which is thought about. The other two contrast with this - with them both it is taken that the content of the thinking is given (i.e. "that p" or "of X"), and the questioning has to follow a different tack (e.g. "Why were you thinking of X?") But "content" can be tricky here, because one of the contrasts between the first two and the third lies in the fact that for the former it is always appropriate to expect the "content" (i.e. what I thought about X, what I was thinking) to be expressible in a proposition or in some sort of speech-act, e.g. statement, question, hypothesis, whereas/with the latter any such demand might be wholly inappropriate. If I was thinking of Jane, or of how Ryle looked, it will at least often be completely confusing to ask what further I was thinking in relation to this, and we certainly have no linguistic forms for such a question at hand.

Secondly, the behaviour of these locutions with "trying" is illuminating - indeed not only does it reinforce the distinction I have drawn between "I was thinking of X" (III) and "I was thinking about X" but it also enables us to distinguish clearly cases which may be falsely thought to fall under III. If I am

trying to think about X this will normally mean that I am distracted, or cannot concentrate, or for some other reason cannot get myself, or am having difficulty getting myself, into a position to "have any thoughts about X." Yet if I am trying to think of X this will mean that I cannot bring it to mind, think what it was or how he acted. And, generally speaking, if I could not think <u>of</u> what he said then I could not even be trying to think <u>about</u> what he said. The difficulty in thinking of X might be one of memory or imagination, but the focus is on having X before the mind rather than having any further thoughts.

Note, however, that for the use in which I could not think of X but then did succeed in thinking of it there does not seem to be any clear sense to be attached to "For how long did you think of X?" or "For how long were you thinking of X?" other than that of "How long did it take you to think of X?" Yet for the cases that we gave in introducing use III (e.g. "I was thinking of the look on his face, or of Jane") these questions have a straight-forward sense, and may havequite clear answers (e.g. "I must have stood there for a full minute just thinking of the look on his face"). Here can see other differences, for the verb "to think of" as used in saying that for a long time I could not think of his name, or of what the number of his house is, or of

a word that goes with "jungle", but then I did succeed in thinking of it could be replaced without change of meaning by the appropriate part of some verb like "to recall", "to remember" or "to think up," but this is not possible with our use III cases. And following on from the point about the temporal questions above, our new uses include no continuous present or past (i.e. no uses of "is thinking of" or "was thinking of") in terms of which use III was partly defined. So it is clear that these uses are quite different from the ones we have been investigating in this section, and will in fact turn out to form use IV - I will put them aside and not discuss them until the next section. Finally note that it is for these uses, and not our use III ones, that "I am trying to think of X" means that I cannot bring it to mind, or recall what it was or how he acted, and so the point about "trying" above misses its original target.

Even after IV has been put aside, however, the behaviour of the two locutions with "trying" is informative. As I have said, "I am trying to think about X" suggests that I am having difficulty getting myself into the position to have any thoughts about X (e.g. in concentrating), and it is certainly a familiar use. Now in respect of III, as opposed to IV, it is difficult to discover a clear case of "trying to think of." If I am trying

to think of the final look on his face, this could only seem to mean trying to think of (recall) what it was, or what it was like. "I am trying to think of Ryle," in a case in which I know him quite well, would only seem to make sense if I had completely forgotten him, and was trying to think of which one he was, or of what he looked like. Of course, I might try to think of something in this use under certain conditions - e.g. in a test I might be asked to think of Ryle for 2 minutes, and fail because my mind wanders, or I might be advised to try and think of the horror of nuclear war more often. But these cases are like trying to breathe ten times in a minute, or to walk across the room with dignity; neither goes to show that in a normal case I can try to breathe or try to walk across the room. And this last case suggests the reason for the non-applicability of "try" to "think of" in use III - if I can think of X in use IV there could be no further difficulty in thinking III of X. If this is right, this difference between "thinking about" and "thinking of" will be explicable in terms of a general account; if one has thought of (recalled) how he looked, it will be a further activity and act of mind to think <u>about</u> this normally involving the having of further thoughts, which may or may not be difficult; on the other hand, if one has thought of this there could in general be no

difficulty in dwelling on it, at least for a few moments. Connected with this is a further point of contrast between the two, viz. that "thinking about" is characteristically purposive or directed towards some further end in a way in which "thinking III of" is not. That is, while one may think about something for no particular reason, or just because one enjoys doing it or wants to, very often it is because one needs or is interested in the solution of the problem, or because one needs to act on what one decides in the case about something. In other words, very often one is thinking about X because one is interested in what is the case about X in some respect. In contrast to this, it is unusual for any intellectual or practical purpose to be advanced by thinking III of X, given that one can think (or (has) thought) III of X, for no further thoughts will thereby produced. Presumably for this reason the cases of III that spring most readily to mind are those akin to day-dreaming, infatuation, or drifting idly off in thought.

10.

I will now leave this discussion of the differences between "thinking of" and "thinking about" for the present, and turn to elucidate the differences between group III cases of "to think of", and those falling under group IV, which I will divide into IV(a) and IV(b).

The cases falling under IV(a) are primarily those uses of "can/cannot think of" and "thought of" in which it is assumed that what I cannot think of, or did succeed in thinking of, is something that I have previously known or been aware of, and under in which the verb can be generally replaced by some part of "recall," and in which, as noted earlier, it will not be appropriate to ask how long the "thinking of" took, or for how long I was thinking of it. This last feature is highlighted in the pages at the end of this section on the available tense structure of these verbs - IV(a) has no continuous tenses which can be descriptive of a single act of "thinking of", as opposed to uses like "I was thinking of what to say" which can be continuous cases of IV(a) only by covering over many particular acts of "thinking of".

Cases of IV(b) differ from IV(a) only in that the first are directed at non-propositions - they are cases whereby I can or cannot think of x, is, not something of which I am presumed to have some sort of previous knowledge. For example, "I am trying to think of

a way out/of what to say." It may be doubted though whether the distinction between (a) and (b) is of any significance - but more of this later.

One important aspect of the distinction between III and IV(a) is brought out by the fact that a proper name simpliciter can be used to specify what I think of in the case of all but not of IV(a). If I say "I thought of Ryle", this could only be a case of IV if it is understood that it is uttered in a context in which e.g. people had been trying to think of some unmarried professors of philosophy, and it will depend on what the background description is whether or not it will be true to say, in that context, and this use, "I thought of Ryle." The difficulty in accepting this last point arises, I think, from the fact that the sentence "I thought of Ryle" in IV(a) use suggests a case in which some true description is in fact, or in which the person's real problem is e.g. to think of any professors of philosophy. Generally, I am inclined to say that two of the truth-conditions for a use/utterance of the form of IV(a) are that (i) there exists, really or in the context, some such description which the speaker takes it that that was thought of satisfies, and (ii) what is referred as that is thought of actually does satisfy it. There will be truth-conditions in somewhat different senses. If

the final is not entirely d, ... if someone says "I thought of Kyle" and sends to i most mis-hits it's IT(a) use you cannot have an any further information like "I have been trying to think of this name for a bachelor person of philosophy", we will be unable to understand at all what could be meant by the sentence that this is a IT(a) use. If the second is not satisfied, i.e. if we says "I thought of his name - Kyle" when the name of the person in question is in fact "Norman", then his utterance will be really intelligible as a IT(e) use, but false. We have used an any true IT(a) proposition. Here - there is more pressure to say in this last case that at least he thought of the name "Kyle" yet this is not true in the if as we have been, and the reason why just used to him, in this case it will not be true in the initial circle, i.e. that I have been trying to think of the name of x, the person I just met, and say "I thought of his name - Kyle" and he was in fact wrong, there seems to be no true "thinking of" proposition. In other cases e.g. trying to think of the name of a bachelor professor of philosophy but am thought of the name of a person or of philosophy but no, an unmarried one, but this need not be generally the case. but if a name occurs to me, is not it therefore true in some sense that I thought of it? I think the answer to this is 'No', but this

point will be discussed in more detail later.

Leaving aside this last unresolved question, it will anyway be clear that the existence of these truth conditions for IV(a) provides a sharp point of contrast with III, as for these latter there need be no such description which what I thought of satisfies, and the truth of such a use of "I thought of A" will not be dependent on the satisfying of any such description. Further, if someone sincerely reports "I thought of X for a while yesterday" and has not misremembered, then even if this statement is not true it would seem that there must be some description such that "the thought of Y for a while yesterday" is true and this will be a III case. One correct way of forming such a description will be to replace "I believed" in the original description. Thus if it is not true that I thought of the girl next door, or of Kyle, or of the third professor of philosophy at Melbourne, it may be true that I was thinking of the girl I believed lived next door, or of the person whose name I thought was Kyle etc. Something like this would always work - if, e.g. I am received by my friends about the existence of a blonde girl who lives next door, my presumably false report that I was thinking of the girl who lives next door (there is one, Mark, Mary etc) can be replaced by the true one that I was thinking of the fictional

Jane, whom I believed lived next door. It will in these III cases, as contrasted with similar IV(a) cases always remain true that I did think of something.

If I have been right so far in my division and discussion of group III uses, then one point of interest starts to emerge. Namely, that it does not follow from the fact that I was having, or had, "thoughts" that I was thinking of, or thought of, anything in the sense of III or IV(a) or (b). And as the other types of use of "think of","thought of" etc. seem to have even more special applicability conditions, this may be a conclusion true for all uses, but I will consider only the first, restricted, neither. One of the points which emerges from the discussion of the different tenses at the end of this section is that "It occurred to me that ...." is opposed to "I was thinking bout" and the III use of "I was thinking of" in not having any acceptable continuous or true present tenses. There is of course a "timeless" present tense, "it occurs to me" etc. used primarily in complex statements like conditionals "if it occurs to me I will come", and in certain sorts of descriptions_"it rushes at me. I foil him. Then it occurs to me that p." Compare here uses of "if I will," and of "he wins". This will not destroy the contrast, but suggests that it needs to be more tightly expressed. Parallel to

this, descriptions like "it occurred to me that p for for five minutes" are unacceptable if taken literally as stating the time for which it was occurring to me, or which it took to occur, but such descriptions are quite in order with the other two locutions. Now these points are sufficient to show that it does not follow from that fact that some description of the form "It occurred to me that p" is true of me that some description of the form "I was thinking about X"[1] or III "I was thinking of Y" is also true. For if at 12 noon it occurs to me that P, nothing follows yet about the period surrounding or following 12 noon, which period would be described by the latter sentences. On the other hand we have also seen that one condition for the truth of a IV(a) or (b) locution is that there exist some description which what I offer as what I thought of is supposed to satisfy. Now clearly it can occur to me that p without there being any such description as e.g. if it just occurs to me that he might come, and in these cases it will then follow that there is no true statement of the III(b) or (c) form. So not all cases in which a thought occurs to me need be cases in which I am thinking III or IV of something

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1 The conclusion is true for "thinking about" only if this has only one type of use parallel to the III(a) use of "thinking of", and whether this is the case needs investigation.

or thinking about something. If this line of argument is generally acceptable, what follows is that, contrary to what some philosophers appear to have thought, to define a sense of "object of thought" in terms of what I am thinking of or about is not to define a notion such that every thinking which is an identifiable mental event has an object, and similarly that to give criteria for "intentionality" in terms of properties of sentences involving "thinking of" or "thinking about" is not to define a notion according to which all "event" thinking is intentional, or indeed either intentional or non-intentional.[1]

One loose end which must be mentioned is the supposed difference between IV(a) and (b) cases. So far all I have said in respect of this difference is that IV(a) cases are those uses of "can/cannot think of" and "thought of" in which what follows the "of" is a description which is assumed to be true of something which I had previously known or been aware of, while IV(b) are those uses for which this restriction does not hold. Thus "I cannot think of his name" contrasts with "I cannot think of anything to say/of how to escape." Now this difference does not seem to be a trivial one which I have erected arbitarily into the specification for a major difference of use, but a fairly substantial one. For while

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1 The precise sense which is to be given to "mental event" in such claims will be discussed in Part III.

the basic structure of IV(a) and (b) uses remains the same (e.g. both possess the truth conditions discussed above, and the same tenses and temporal reference) they differ markedly in the pare-phrases which would be acceptable, and in the sort of phrases characteristically used to give the "object". Thus, while a sentence "I thought of Y" in an (a) use can be normally paraphrased as "I recalled or remembered X" or "It came back to me that X" in a (b) use it would typically be paraphraseable by one or all of "I discovered/invented/created/thought up X". This I take to show both that we have two rather different uses of our sentence "I thought of X", and that the alternative terms here, 'recall' 'discovers' etc. are all intimately related to the concept of thinking. Also in an (a) case the phrase following the 'of' can be, and often is, used referentially, while this can never be the case with (b). The general reason for this presumably is that if what I am trying to think of is something which is not regarded as previously known by me, and yet I can expect to think of it, it seems to follow that it cannot be anything already existent (wide sense) such that I can use an expression to refer to it. So the 'object-expression' in a IV(b) case is rarely a substantive one, and when it is that expression is not used referringly, and this is in contrast with many cases of IV(a).

This last point, however, can be misleading if it is taken too far, as it gives the impression of greater clarity than is possible. There are many cases which lie between (a) and (b), e.g. "I was trying to think of someone nice to ask (of a satisfactory name for the child) and finally I thought of Ryle ('Ick')". Now while this is clearly of the same general type, it is a clear case of neither (a) nor (b), with features of both. In particular the phrase "someone nice to ask" is not used referentially while the name "Ryle" of course is, and this divorce is explicable in terms of the ambiguity of the term "something" in the last paragraph - what I am thinking of is in one way something I know etc. (Ryle) yet in another (someone nice to ask today) is not, and in the latter way is parallel to something to say. Here again it needs to be kept in mind that my divisions such as (a) and (b) are only general poles which can be used to show up the salient features of the usages, and are not intended as rigid and exclusive dichotomies.

One final remark worth making before I leave these group III and IV uses concerns Chisholm's first criterion for intentionality. This was: a simple declarative sentence is intentional if it uses a substantive term or a name in such a way that neither the sentence nor its contradictory implies that there is or that there

is not something to which the term or name truly apply. Now at least many clear IV(a) cases will not be intentional, as the implication will hold - "I thought of his name - Ryle" implies surely that he has a name, and that it is Ryle, or in Chisholm's terminology, that there is a name of the person concerned/which to "his name" truly applies. Or take some cases which are clearer still: if I say "I have finally thought of a living unmarried professor of philosophy - Ryle" or "I have thought of someone who can help you in your dilemma - Ryle", these could only be true if there is a person called Ryle, who is a living unmarried professor of Philosophy or able to help, respectively. The same applies to at least many intermediate and (b) cases, although as we move into/(b) the sense of the implication of existence in the text becomes more in need of interpretation. Thus "I thought of someone nice to ask" implies that there is someone nice to ask, and "I just thought of something suitable to say" implies that there is something suitable to say, at least if that last clause is interpreted in a way parallel to "there were many suitable things he could have said, but he was too dumb to think of them" or "In that dreadful situation, there was just nothing suitable to say at all". So it looks as if the bulk of these IV(a) and IV(b) uses will fail this test for intentionality, and there is no reason to

believe that this conclusion would be controverted even after we introduce here all the complications of Part I.

Appendix to Section 10

It would seem that some of the things we have learnt about the uses of the verbs under discussion could be consolidated and summarised by a consideration of the structure of the available tenses. In the following "I am thinking of" is considered only as falling in the broad class of uses III and IV, and the uses signified as III, IV(a) and IV(b), are those so designated and explained in the text (e.g. III I was thinking (for a few minutes) of Ryle, IV(a) For days I could not think of what he said, but I have just now thought of it, IV(b), I cannot think of (have just thought of) something to say).

Continuous Present tense

1) I was thinking about	1) here clearly has many acceptable uses, and 3) as far as I can see none.
2) I am thinking of	2) interpreted as III, would seem to have many second and third person uses, but generally not to be used in the first person.
3) It is occurring to me ...	

Although there may be queries, it would seem that I cannot say "I am thinking of Ryle" in this use because if I am thinking of

of him I cannot be reporting that fact. 2) Has no uses in IV. a utterance like "I am thinking of what to say" may be either equivalent to "I am trying to think of something to say" and thus a case of IV(b) but not a true use of (2), or be equivalent to "I am thinking of what I am to say" (i.e. in a case in which I know and am just running over it)". In the latter event the utterance would be disputable either a case of III, or an extended case of IV(a) in which the continuous present arises because a number of things are being thought of in succession. Perhaps though, "I am thinking of what to say" could have a reporting use when e.g. I am in the midst of composing my speech? cf. I am thinking of lots of things I could say first, and will assess them later. This continuous present is rather like "I am winning three races a week," or "I am winning lots of money this week", and thus would seem to fall between III and IV(b). Certainly neither goes to show that there could be a continuous present in the normal case of IV.

Non-continuous present

1) I think about .....
2) I think of .....
3) It occurs to me ...

All three seem to have an habitual present (e.g. 1) "I think about it often" 2) "I think of you regularly" 3) "That reply always occurs to me after the discussion"), and only an habitual non-continuous

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present,3) has an unusual stylistic variant of "It has just occurred to me that ...." viz. "It occurs to me that ..." which is hardly an objection to this. The main difference between the different cases of 2) probably is that both III and IV(a) can be concluded with an expression referring to a particular (e.g. 'Ryle' or 'your name'), but IV(b) cannot. That is, the IV(b) habitual present always is like "In a tight spot I normally think of something to say."

Continuous past

1) I was thinking about .....
2) I was thinking of .....
3) It was occurring to me ...

The same points seem to apply here as in the continuous present, with the exception of difficulty about first person use of 2) viz. that 1) is, and 3) is not, acceptable, and that 2) in use III is generally acceptable and in IV uses generally not. The obvious and parallel objections, e.g. "I was thinking of the different things he said" would need to be treated as before, by saying that this is either a case of I.1, or an extended case of IV(a) such that the existence of continuous tenses is explicable without giving up the point that basic IV(a) uses do not have such continuous tenses. Similarly with "I was thinking all afternoon of what to say", plausible case for IV(b) - this could mean either that I was thinking all afternoon about what to say, or of

various things that I could say (which makes it like the case of the last sentence), or that I was trying all afternoon to think of what to say, a case of (b) but no longer with a continuous tense of "think of".

Non-Continuous Past.

1) I thought about .....
2) I thought of .....
3) It occurred to me ...

All have acceptable uses, and as is by now expected, these divide in respect of the question "For how long were you thinking of/about etc?" For 1) and use III in 2) only is this applicable. On the other hand, "How long did it take you to think of X?" is applicable only to IV uses of 2). It is interesting that the case which I have regarded as a border case between III and IV(a) (viz. "I thought of what I have to do today during breakfast" when I know and just ran over it rather than decided) is such that both these questions apply to it.

What this points to is a radical difference between 1) and 2) - III on the one hand, and 2) - IV and 3) on the other, and a difference between 2) - IV and 3) starts to emerge at the end.

11.

Let us now turn to the questions which we are to ask of every use, and which were given at the end of Section 6. Firstly, it should be clear from the foregoing discussion that no use of "I was thinking of X" falling in groups III or IV could be replaced without change of meaning by any "thinking about" or "thinking that" locution, and except in very special cases, and relatedly that "What are you thinking of?" in this use asks a quite different question from that asked by either "What are you thinking about?" or just "What are you thinking". Secondly, I have also argued that one of the characterising features of this group of uses is that a time can always be isolated at which a statement made with a continuous present or past tense of "to think of" is true of[1] the person concerned, and we can now see that his requirement should be extended to there being a period of time, in the case of use III. So the answer to the second question is that in this sense of "occurrent" thoughts, group III and IV uses essentially report occurrent thoughts, whatever else they also do.

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1 This needs more precise statement, for what we want is that there is a time (or period of time) at (during) which a present continuous tense is true, or alternatively, a period in respect of which a past continuous tense is true. That is, a period during which a past continuous tense is true certainly not is all we need. For other considerations here, see the final section of Part III.

The third question concerned possible limitation on the kinds of thing that could be thought of in use III, and possible committments to the existence or non-existence of what is thought of. Now this is both difficult to get clear about and anyway of limited importance, so I will first make a number of very general assertions, and then give some objections to them. Particularly when one thinks of certain sorts of cases, one is inclined to give four rough limiting conditions on the kinds of thing that can be thought of in use III, viz (i) That what is thought of must at least be phrasable as a substantive, (ii) That it must be a particular, (iii) that it must to some extent be simple, such as to be encompassed in a single thought, and (iv) that the thinker must be acquainted with it, or very well informed about it, or have imagined it in some detail. The first is suggested by the apparent fact that if the sentence is completed by other than a substantive then the use must be other then group III. The second arises from the fact that "I was thinking of war (of horror/of colour etc)" would have to mean that I was thinking of various incidents in wars, or perhaps that I was thinking of the concept of war or horror, if it were to fall within the class. Thirdly, it could hardly be the case that I was thinking III of the history of man, or of the last war, or of the last Presidential elections - this suggests the requirement that

what I am thinking of have a certain simplicity. (How about the case in which I am running through the sequence of main events in man's history, the last war or the elections? These cases are like the ones mentioned but hardly considered earlier, e.g. I was thinking of the things I have to do today", and have the peculiarities that while I am clearly not thinking <u>about</u> man's history or the things I have to do today yet the description which follows the "thinking of" gives some sort of general specification satisfied by the different parts of the thinking. In this respect they are analogous to group IV cases, in which, as we shall see, there must be in the context a description which what is thought of satisfies. Indeed, I think they are best understood as standing between I-I and IV). Fourthly, it would hardly make sense to say that I was thinking III of the tallest man in Oxford, or of my mother's Irish cousin, if I had no idea who the tallest man was or know nothing at all about this cousin of my mother, unless some context is presupposed in which I have imagined what he or she would be or must be like. Even in this last situation, it may be doubted whether it is really true that I thought III of either of them. Further, even if I know that the tallest man in Oxford lives in Headington, works at Cowley and is married with three children, this will not help. So leaving aside cases of fiction or imagination, some fairly strong condition seems to be

needed, and I put it above by claiming that the thinker must either be acquainted with, or very well informed about, what it is he is thinking of.

Consider now cases like "I was thinking of how remarkable he was/of how calm Michael was throughout/of what a remarkable chap he is", which certainly seem to be objections to the first two conditions. These I take to simply show that those first two conditions must be relaxed somewhat, but I will not delay to attempt to clarify exactly what form that relaxation should take, as that would involve a prior detailed investigation to make the points themselves much less vague.

A question which has more importance in relation to the later parts of this thesis is this; does thinking of something in such cases amount to an intentional action? which we might gloss as; does it make sense to predicate either "intentional" or "unintentional" of thinking of something in these cases? Now I will take it that a minimum sufficient condition for this predication to a potential action X to make sense will be that <u>either</u> it makes sense to plan to do X, to decide or hesitate to do X, or to intend to do X at some time in the future, <u>or</u> that the question "Why did you do X?" is applicable in a sense in which the answer gives a reason for

acting, as opposed to a cause or a reason for believing something.[1] Be the failure of both of these will be a necessary condition for the predication not making sense, and if this necessary condition is fulfilled I will take it that we have something which cannot be said to be either intentional or unintentional.

Consider this case; I am listening to a lecture by Strawson but start thinking of Ryle; after a very short time though, I notice that my mind has wandered and get back to the lecture. Now someone asks why I was thinking of Ryle, and this will be a group I.i use. I may say that I have no idea why I did, and this would be to treat the question as a request for a type of cause, such that an answer might be "Because he mentioned the name "Gilbert"". Or I may say that I did not have any reason at all, indeed I wanted to concentrate on the lecture, but it just happened, and this looks very much like a rejection of the question as one asking for a reason for acting. But there could be no sense in this case in any answer which purports to give my reason for thinking of Ryle at that particular time. And there could here

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1 For this last condition, and particularly elucidation of the sense of "reason for acting", and also for the distinction between intention with which and intentional action implicit in the first condition, see G. E. M. Anscombe, "Intention", Basil Blackwell, Oxford 1957. Sec.

be no sense in planning, deciding or intending to think of Ryle at that time. Yet there can be cases in which I intend to think of X (use III) at a particular time, and in which I have a good reason for doing so: I was thinking of my dead brother then because that is what the service requires, or because that is the whole point of the one minute silence. So among use III cases we seem to have both those which are intentional and those which are not intentional. Yet a difficult question remains - are the cases which are not intentional unintentional, or such that it does not make sense to apply the distinction intentional/unintentional at all? I gave the two conditions above as conditions for the latter, and it could be argued that I can only assert that I unintentionally knocked the vase over/because knocking the vase over in this situation is the sort of thing that I could do intentionally, that I could plan or intend to do and that I could have very good reasons for doing. On the other hand, it might be replied that thinking of Ryle is the sort of thing I can intend to and have reasons for, that it is thus only the special features of this case which make them not possible, and that in a particular case of knocking over the vase they may not be possible either. Now I cannot attempt to resolve this dispute, and fortunately my purposes do not require it - I will claim only that some Use III

cases are intentional actions and some are not.

Turning to case IV, we encounter complications of a somewhat different type. For while I may quite deliberately set out to think of an unmarried professor of philosophy, and have good reasons for trying to do so (e.g. I want to invite one to a party), yet when I succeed and think of Ryle, it does not make sense to question whether or not I intended to think of Ryle, or why I thought of Ryle rather than, say Wittgenstein (assuming he were alive). And generally in these uses the requirement that I cannot at present think of what I am trying to think of seems to rule out my planning or intending to think of that, or my having reasons for thinking of that. So I think we should say that while I intentionally try to think of an unmarried professor, and in a way intentionally do think of one, yet I cannot in these cases be said to think of Ryle either intentionally or unintentionally. "I finally thought of an unmarried professor of philosophy - Ryle" is not the expression of an intentional action, nor clearly of a unintentional one. To take a very rough parallel.- I intentionally threw the discus, and perhaps intentionally threw it a long way, but I did not either intentionally or unintentionally throw it 156 ft. 10 ins.

The other type of case mentioned in the last section, those correctly described by an "it occurred to me that ..." locution,

would seem to be manifestly not intentional, and probably neither intentional nor unintentional. For if it occurs to me that Ryle might drop in, there is no sense in the question "Why did this occur to you?" if this is construed as a reason for acting. It is true that this might be construed as a quasi-causal question, to which I might speculate that perhaps it occured to me because I would like to see him, or it might be asked as a form of moral rebuff, roughly equivalent to "Why are you that sort of person?" cf. "Why do such nasty thoughts occur to you?" But neither of these are the appropriate interpretation of the question.

Similarly, while I may take steps to bring it about that something occurs to me at a given time, I do not intend, plan or decide, to have something occur to me. Now a problem may arise here parallel to the one that arose for use I.1 - on the one hand it may be argued that this shows that such cases are just not of the right logical type to be either intentional or unintentional, yet on the other that it is only particular cases such that a description of the form "it occurred to me that ...." is appropriate that are not intentional, and hence that we do not have a special type of neither intentional nor non-intentional cases. Again, however, such disputes do not need to be resolved here.

12.

The final, and probably most important, question which we must put to these various uses concerns the character of my knowledge of what I am thinking of. Here I will be mainly concerned with use III, but will consider the other uses at the end of this section. To keep the complications to a minimum I will introduce two restrictions on the cases I will discuss - only those of the III use of "I was thinking of X" which use a name or description non-essentially, and only as occurring in those cases in which the thinker is correct in his beliefs about what exists in the world and what does not. The second of these will, however, be relaxed at the end of this section. The first serves to put aside cases (if there are any) in which I am thinking of the Magdalen Professor of Philosophy, whoever he is, and to make irrelevant the question concerning whether I have used the right name or description to refer to the person I mean. I will proceed by drawing three comparisons - between my knowledge in use III and use I cases, in use III cases and cases of pain, anger, fear etc., and between cases of "thinking of" in this use and some cases of "thinking about."

I have considered the contrast between uses I and III in this respect already in Section 10. We saw there that these two classes

of cases have at least two features in common. Firstly, I am the final authority concerning what I was thinking of in both types of case - if the person concerned sincerely asserts that he was thinking of A, and there is nothing unusual about the case, then there is no way in which his claim can be challenged. Secondly, in both cases if it turns out that he does not know, and he never did know, what he was thinking of, then this is sufficient to establish that he did not think of anything. This we might express by saying that for both cases knowing (at some time) what I was thinking of is a necessary condition for its being true that I was thinking of anything. Thus if I say "an earlier Labour leader ....." and when questioned about whom I was thinking of cannot say at all, and cannot sincerely claim to have known but forgotten, then this shows, and I would have to accept, that I was not in fact thinking of anyone when I said that. Similarly if I claim to have just been thinking of someone in a III use, but I cannot say anything about whom nor sincerely ascribe this to forgetting, then the only conclusion could be that I was not thinking of anyone after all.

But there is a crucial point of contrast. For in case I it may be the case that I believe I am thinking of someone when I say "an earlier Labour leader ..." but when questioned not be able

to say, and accept this (because the possibility that I forgot is for some reason ruled out) as showing that I was not thinking of anyone when I said that. But, and we are leaving aside the possibility that I am thinking of a person whom I falsely believe to exist or have existed, this is not possible for a group I.I use - I cannot sincerely think that I am thinking of someone and it turn out that I was mistaken. Perhaps it will be suggested that I may, e.g. think that I am thinking of someone but actually be musing about a problem, if I am extremely bad at classifying my mental states or do not have a sound grasp of the meanings of the relevant words. Yet even if this were accepted it would be irrelevant to the contrast I wish to draw - it makes sense to suppose that an intelligent and proficient language-user found out that he was not thinking of anyone or anything at all, when he thought he was, as a result of it emerging that he could not say who or what, in the one case and not in the other. Now the reason why this is not possible with such group III cases I take to be connected with the fact that these cases of thinking of are mental events, and with the apparent fact that I am inclined to express by saying that I must be aware at the time who or what I am thinking of. So I will say that in these group III cases I must know at the time who or what I am thinking of - if this is challenged, it can be cashed simply in terms of the fact that the

above possibility does not exist for these cases.

For the second contrast, consider an utterance of "I have a dull, thudding pain". It is possible here that, for example, because I am excited or in a very over-wrought state after an accident, that I should mis-describe my pain, and that it is a rather sharp, searing pain. That this is the case may be shown by the fact that as soon as I say this I recognise that it is wrong (but the case is not one of not saying what I meant to say). My error here might be ascribable to my failure to recognize a sharp, searing pain for what it was, or to my failure to observe my pain sufficiently closely, or attend to it enough. Or take anger - I may claim to be angry with someone and then realize that my emotion was one of fear rather than anger. I failed to recognize my fear for what it was. Or, more disputably perhaps, I may conclude from this emotional turbulence that I feel that I love someone, and yet more mature reflection convince me that it was not love after all. Now whether these cases are correctly characterized does not matter very much; the important point is that none of these possibilities exist for our use III cases of "thinking of". It makes no sense to attribute any error in my report of who or what I was thinking of to any failure of observation or recognition, however over-wrought or excited I happened to be, and much less so to attribute such an error to a faulty inference

or deduction. This point I will express by saying that my knowledge of who or what I am thinking of is not in these cases a matter of any observation, recognition or inference.

Thirdly, consider a case in which I am thinking about certain problems in philosophy, and say "I am thinking about the problem of evil", or one in which I am thinking about a country that I have heard a lot about and seen pictures of, and say "I am thinking about Zambia". Now it could at least be argued here that if I informed others of what I had thought, they would be as good a judge as I concerning what I was thinking about, which in fact would be what it was that all, or the majority, of my thoughts were true of.

So on this suggestion deciding what I am thinking about amounts to making a judgement concerning what my thoughts are true of, and so this is a judgement that could equally well be made by others, given only that they knew what my thoughts were, and thus my knowledge of what it is I am thinking about can have no special character. I cannot get involved in a full discussion of "thinking about" here, but it is clear that there can be two different points here - whether what I offer is an appropriate or judicious statement of what I am thinking about, and whether it is the case that I am thinking about e.g. the problems of Burma rather than

of Vietnam. Taking the latter, it is clear that the above account can only hold for those cases for which my thoughts can be fully understood without deciding whether Vietnam or Burma is in question. If one of my thoughts had been "It is a very attractive place, and I hope to go back there, but its problems are enormous", then one would only grasp this if one knew whether he meant Vietnam or Burma, and if one did not know this one could not decide what it was true of. Now I have already argued that in the group III use "I am thinking of X" does not imply that I had any further thoughts concerning X, and often I in fact do not; further it is surely clear that even if in these cases I do have further thoughts, then they will not in general be intelligible independently of deciding what it was I was thinking of. The clear cases in which this is possible will be equally clearly not be cases of thinking of something. So this account could not in general be true of these uses of "thinking of" - what I am thinking of is not what my thoughts are true of, and so knowing what I am thinking of is not knos what it is that my thoughts are true of.

The three points established by these considerations for such use III cases of "thinking of"I will express by saying that I must know at the time what I am thinking of, that my knowledge of what

it is I am thinking of is not a matter of any observation, inference or recognition, and that what I am thinking of is not in general given by what the thoughts I have are true of. Now it should be recalled that these have been restricted so far to cases which can be correctly by a group III use of "I am thinking of X" which use the name or description "X" non-essentially, and also in cases in which the thinker's beliefs about the world are correct. I will keep the first restriction, but it may be suggested that the second restriction is what makes these conclusions plausible at all, and thus that they are not generally valid. Now it is clear that a person may take himself to be thinking of a real person, Mary, but yet in fact have been totally fooled about the existence of any such person. Here, it may be the case that he thought he was thinking of a real person Mary when in fact Mary did not exist, but this is irrelevant to the first contrast for it is still true here that he was thinking of a person Mary, albeit not one who existed. That is, it is still senseless here to suppose that he thought that he was thinking of a person but he was not, although this works if we put "a real person", for it is still true that he was thinking of Mary, even though he is deluded about her existence. But this does not license us either to conclude that in the other cases he is thinking really of his idea of the person, or that all he means is that he is standing in a line or concept of a person.

To conclude this discussion I will inquire whether these contrasts can be drawn also with group IV uses, and also with uses of "it occurred to me that A was p". Let us confine our attention again to group IV uses in which a name or description is used non-essentially, and to cases which can be correctly described by such a use. Consider our old example - "I just thought of an unmarried professor of philosophy - Ryle". Now it will be argued that here Strawson may have occurred to me, and hence I thought that I had thought of an unmarried professor, but be mistaken,. And so, it will be concluded, IV contrasts with II in a way parallel to I, rather than contrasting with I. To a certain extent this is right, but yet there is also a relevant contrast between IV and I, for if we leave aside in both cases whether what I believe satisfies the description in fact does so, then for I but not IV it still makes sense to suppose that A believed that I thought (or was thinking of), someone who in fact I was not. The necessity in use IV that a description be satisfied is a further point, additional to the point which I expressed earlier by saying that I must know at the time or what I am thinking of. In use I may not being able to say who I was thinking of when questioned arises not from the fact that the description was not satisfied but from the fact

that I was not thinking of anyone or anything. So the basic contrast holds for IV as against I. I will take it as obvious that the second and third contrasts hold with the group IV uses.

Finally, if we consider uses of "it occurred to me that X was p" which use a name or description "X" non-essentially, it is clear that all three contrasts hold. That the cases correctly described by these uses have these features will be of importance in Part IV.

13.

There remain a number of uses of "think of" and cognates which have not been included in the four basic types which I have given, and these must be briefly discussed.

V. The fifth type will be those uses like "What do (did) you think of Wilson/of his address to the party/of the Aberfan disaster?" and "I think highly/poorly of him". One characteristic of these uses will be that the tense of "to think" is only the habitual present or past, and there will be no continuous present or past tenses. In this respect, and in its temporal specification, this use is like the 'opinion' use of "to think" as in "I think that he will

come/that it is more than two sounds." Perhaps the most important feature is that the question "What do you think of Wilson?" is not asked in respect of a prior thinking of Wilson, as "What were you thinking about X?" would normally be asked about a known or suspected thinking about X. In other words, it is not a question designed to elucidate the content of some thinking which was of Wilson, and so it is not a part of any pattern of "thinking of" locutions. The importance of this is that it shows that we do not have here any objection to my earlier remarks on the difference between "thinking of" and "thinking about", in parallel locutions. The main point of that difference was that when it is true that I was thinking (III(a)) of X, it is not in general appropriate to ask "What are you thinking of/about X?" whereas this is always in with "thinking about." Now here it is the essence of the use to ask "What do you think of X?", and be always answered, so this looks like an objection to any general thesis. But the central point here is the above one, that this question is not asked about any thinking of X, (and need not even presuppose that the person concerned has thought anything of X), and so cannot be any objection to the earlier claim. Indeed what we have here is one corner of the whole "opinion" use of "to think", as I called it, in which 'of' and 'about' serve, in rather different ways, as topic-introducing devices. All this needs to be explored, but I have assumed in this

thesis that the problems about intentionality can be adequately discussed without detailed treatment of either the 'opinion' uses of 'to think' or those in which the thought is embedded in action.

One final feature which shows the divergence of V from the earlier uses is exhibited in the following: "I do not know what I think of him yet, or of his action, but I am considering it", "I am unable to make up my mind, decide what I think of him", "I do not know what I think of Wilson/what to think of him". In the earlier cases the suggestions that I did not know what I was thinking of, or that finding out was a matter of decision or further consideration, could find no applications at all in straight-forward cases.

VI. The last significant set of uses is illustrated by these cases: in a shoe shop, after trying on three pairs - "I was thinking of something a little more elaborate"; when looking at houses - "I was thinking of a larger house than that". Briefly, the defining features of this use would seem to be that there is no time at which I was thinking of this, and that the "object" phrase is rarely if ever referential, but that they are quite different from I and II uses in that no prior specification is required and that what I was thinking of is not my own intentional action. Also very

important is the point that what I was thinking of is not some actual thing, and the use is neutral to the existence of anything satisfying the description. It can be true that I was thinking of something more elaborate without thinking of some particular thing, or even without feeling sure that anything more elaborate exists. Yet of course I am still not thinking of a description.

VII. Finally, a seventh set of uses should be even more briefly noted. They are cases like "Think of a man 8 ft. tall, and with two heads", "I was thinking of David as Prime Minister", "Think of the chaos that measure would cause", "I was thinking of Jane in that suit", which have the crucial feature that the relevant part of "to think of" can be replaced by some part of "to imagine". Other important features are: a time can be specified at which I was thinking of whatever it is, that I can very often think of what I am sure does not exist and perhaps even cannot think of some thing which I know very well, and that what I think of is often someone or something under a given aspect rather than just that person or thing.

I should re-iterate that I am not claiming that all uses of sentences containing "to think of" as the main verb fit neatly into one or another of these category, or indeed that there are not other significantly distinct uses, but just that these are the

most obvious distinctions of different types of use.

14.

This fairly detailed study of the various uses of sentences involving the verb "to think of" has had two main purposes - to throw light on the sense or senses that might be given to "intentional object" in general and "object of thought" in particular, and to get clear about the features of the various uses for the purposes of later discussion - and one minor one, to demonstrate again the complexity of language on which criteria for intentionality are based, and how they ignore it.

To take the last point first, application of these results in a short space to the various criteria for intentionality is made difficult by the necessity, demonstrated in Part I, to take account of many distinctions and further issues before those criteria themselves become fully clear. Yet ignoring these factors here, and speaking just on an intuitive basis, the following conclusions seem likely: concerning Chisholm's first test, uses (i) and (iv) probably come out as non-intentional, uses (iii), (v) and (vi) intentional, with either the applicability of the test or its results

uncertain with at least many (ii) and (vii) uses. The range of applicability of the second test will be obscure, but to the extent which it applies to I these uses will be intentional ("I am thinking of going out" does not entail that I do go out) and yet in so far as it applies to IV these will be non-intentional (if I thought of a professor of philosophy who has not married this entails that some professor of philosophy, the one I thought of, has not married). Concerning the third test, obscurity still reigns, but it is at least likely that I and III could be non-intentional (if I was thinking of Ryle and Ryle is the man who did X, then is not it true that I was thinking of the man who did X?) and yet IV could have to be accepted as intentional in an unusual way in contrast to the results of both the first and second tests (if I think of the unmarried Oxford professor, it is not in the same use true that I have thought of Magdalen's senior don, even if both descriptions are true of the person in question). Now many of these remarks could be questioned, but they strongly re-inforce one of the conclusions of part I, that both the criteria for intentionality and the corresponding thesis of intentionality are formulated in ways much overlook the complexity of psychological language, and further that recognition of that complexity renders the belief that criteria could be produced to pick out all and only psychological

sentences highly implausible.

Turning to the major concerns of this part of the thesis, we are in a position to make some evaluation of the usefulness of the type of definition of "object" suggested by Miss Anscombe's article particularly in relation to "object of thought". In general, this definition would be: the object is what is given by the appropriate answer to "What are you thinking of?", "What are you afraid of?" "What are you aiming at?" and so on, where this is taken to indicate whatever question, and whatever proposition, is appropriate[1]; refining it a little in the case of thinking, the object of thought is what is given in answer to the question "What are you thinking of?", where this is distinguished from "What are you thinking?" and "What are you thinking about?", and where the answer also employs some part of "to think of" as the main verb of the sentence. Now, given that the term "object of thought" is being treated not as a common concept to be elucidated but as a technical term to be defined, the usefulness and appropriateness of any definition will depend on the purposes for which the term is introduced. But concerning this definition of "object of thought" we need to notice that there are four very serious restrictions on its usefulness, viz.

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1 For a consideration of such a view as applied to the emotions, see "Emotion and Object" by J.C. Gosling, in the "Philosophical Review".

a) That it will be applicable to a relatively small class of cases of thinking, for as argued earlier not all cases in which it is true that I am thinking is it true that I am thinking of something, in the normal sense in which I am thinking of anything.

b) That if it is taken as thinking something which stands in a relation to my thought, then many different such relations will be picked out. The relation between my thinking of going out and my going out (use ...) is clearly quite different from that between my thinking of Ryle and Ryle (III or IV) between my thinking highly of Wilson and Wilson (V), between my thinking of something elaborate and something elaborate (VI, and so on.

c) That, relatedly, many enormously different sorts of things (?) would be objects of my thought. Compare what is given by "Ryle" as what is given by "... something elaborate", or my possible relation given by "... going out" with what is given by "... David as Prime Minister". In some cases the description is used to refer to a particular person or thing, in others it specifies but of course does not refer to a possible action of the speaker's, in others again it just puts forward an idea and is not at all the sort of description which could be referential.

d) That what is held to possess the object would also differ widely. In use III and IV cases, the thinking in question always

airaya is a mental event, in use II mental events are somehow involved but e.g. my thinking of going out is not such, and in use i and VI cases my thinking is clearly not in any sense a mental event.

Now I am not wanting to argue that the presence of these restrictions shows that no use could be given to a notion so defined, but its usefulness must surely be very minimal. And if this is true of "object of thought" so defined it must be even more so in respect of such a general definition of "intentional object". For if this is the definition it will not be possible to assert that all mental events or states have such objects, and surely not possible to maintain any general theses about intentional objects. And in particular it will be impossible to offer any general characterization of intentional objects - it will be equally implausible to assert that all intentional objects are just direct objects, that they are all subsistent entities, that they are all either within or without consciousness, and so on. So it is unlikely that such a notion will be of any use in philosophical analysis.

If this is correct, it follows that for our current purposes we need to lower our sights a good deal and attempt to specify a much more limited and specific notion of "object of thought". Bearing in mind the many similarities between uses III and IV, the

most obvious candidate is: an object of thought is what is given by the answer to the question "What are you thinking of?" when this question is correctly answered by the use of a sentence falling within either group III and group IV of the uses distinguished above. Now the main problem with this is its restrictiveness, and so, taking note of the fact that most group III uses and many group IV ones use a description non-essentially, I will give a slightly wider one, which reduces to this for most of the common cases, viz.

An object of thought is what is given by a name or description used non-essentially (which entails referentially) in the object-phrase or sentence in a group III or IV use of "I was thinking of X", "He was thinking of X", or in a use of a sentence of the form "it occured to me (him, etc) that p".

This will be the sense of "object of thought" that I will use in the discussions that follow. Notice that, if the work of this part is accepted, these uses and their objects of thought as so defined will have four key features. Firstly, that the three contrasts of section 12 will apply to a person's knowledge of the object of his thought - he must know at the time what it is, he knows the object of his thought other than via some process of observation, inference or recognition, and the object of my thought

is not given by what my thoughts are true of. Secondly, the objects will all be objects of mental events. Thirdly, that as detailed in section ii, the thought in question will not normally be an intentional action. Fourthly, the object of thought will very often be something in the world, an actual person or thing referred to by the description.

Now this last claim may be challenged, for there is considerable resistance to the idea that the object of my thought can be something in the world. Surely, it will be argued, it may in many cases turn out that the object of my thinking does not exist, and yet the thought of course remains unaltered, and so existence must be at best irrelevant to the idea of an object of thought. Also, another objection may come, it is a logically necessary truth that a given thought has the object that it does have, and yet the existence of anything in the world is not logically necessary, and so it cannot be the case that the object of my thought is something in the world. No this last argument can age or dwindling, but it is in fact clearly fallacious - compare; it is logically necessary that this sort of nothing has the object it has, but not that any person exist, so I never hit an actual person. In general, it is necessary that anything have that aspect (or those aspects) which define it, but it is of course not logically necessary that it exists at all - it is the conflation of these two points that leads to the fallacy.

The striking thing about the first argument, and to some extent the second, is that it takes the notion of an object of thought as clear and given, and further such that objects of thought can be only of one type. For only if it is assumed that they must be of one type or ontological status, or alternatively if it is assumed that the answer must always be right about the ontological status of what he is thinking of, does anything follow. But there is no reason for either of these assumptions, and indeed detailed investigation and definition shows them to be mistaken.

PART III

MENTAL EVENTS

1.

In a recent book H. N. Chapman has argued that Husserl bases the highly doubtful assumption that if "intentionality" signifies a special sort of relation between a mental act or event and its object such that this relation is essential to that act or event, then the other term of that relation, the object, must also be within consciousness. It is essential to Husserl's teaching that there is a sharp distinction between act and object, between the act as immanent in the stream of consciousness and the object as transcendent to it, between the two terms of the intentional relation, but also essential that both terms of that relation, and so both act and object, are elements within consciousness.

Chapman attempts to clarify the character of the assumption that Husserl is thereby making by first outlining another, "common-sense", view of intentionality, which he accepts. All consciousness is consciousness of something, and this special "of" relation to its object is essential to any act of consciousness; in most cases, but not all, what a mental event or act is of,

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1 Sensations and Phenomenology, Indiana Univ. Press, 1966. Chaps. VI and VII.

what it intends towards in a rather special sense of "intends", is an existing public object, but even when this is not so there remains always a clear distinction between act and object; on the side of the awareness, this relation is essential to the existence of the act, for the act is awareness of this object, and intentionally shares in the being of its object, but on the side of the object the relation is quite external; so what is the object could and does exist independently of this awareness of it, but not so for the act of awareness, and so, e.g. scoptical problems can not be held to arise in the normal way. Further, on this view there will be a crucial distinction between an idea or sensation and such an act of awareness, for we can ask whether and how an idea or sensation is related to its object but not so for the act of awareness, for that act is or amounts to the intending of the object and contains the object intentionally within itself. So the object exists in the mind with intentional being, and there cannot be an act of awareness of that object without there having been that object (whereas the object can but need not be a physical object). On the basis of this alternative view, Cinamon argues that Husserl is not justified in assuming that if "intentionality" signifies a relation between a mental act or event and its object, and this relation is essential to the act or event, then the other term of the relation must be of

the same kind, i.e. within consciousness. Husserl ignores the very special character of the intentional "of" relation.

Now I am not in a position to evaluate this as an objection against Husserl, but the view put forward by Chapman serves to point up one area of the intentionality problem which is often ignored. The main features of this view are that intending a given object is of the essence of the act of awareness, that such an act is to be sharply distinguished from an idea or sensation in respect of its relation to its object, and that the object is contained intentionally, or with intentional being, in the act of awareness. It will be clear from the argument of the first two parts of this thesis that I could not accept this view as it stands. For I have argued there that the standard criteria for intentionality fail to pick out all psychological sentences, or even all sentences using "to think of" for example, and so no clear sense has been given to a notion of intentionality applying to "consciousness"; further, that the preposition "of" cannot be so relied on to define a relation which either applies to all cases of "consciousness" or which when it does apply is sufficiently univocal to allow of such simple and general theses; and finally, that the notion of "object" used in such contexts cannot be taken as intuitively given, that it needs to be defined variously and in detail for different mental activities, and that when this is

done there is no reason for believing that theses of such generality would apply to the various types of object.

Yet Chapman's remarks here grope towards a view which, if it were put with much less generality and far more detailed specification, could perhaps be acceptable. That is, a view which claims that one or more mental events or activities are such that they essentially involve a direction toward something outside themselves, and involve this by containing the object in a special way, or perhaps with a special sort of being, within the event or activity. Something like this (where the object may be a reality) haunts many discussions of intentionality, and is particularly reminiscent of many medieval writers, from whom the concept "intentionality" is normally said to derive. In the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, the dictum that whenever something is known what is known exists in a way in the knower constantly recurs, and in conjunction with the idea of "esse intentionale", the mode of being of e.g. redness or a chair in the mind as thought of or understood. Given its most minimal characterization, this view is one which makes intentionality a property of some mental events, and a property which explains both the nature of those mental events and their relation to their objects.

The last two parts of this thesis will be devoted to an

attempt to examine both the pressures towards adopting such a view and the possibility of making it coherent, with very special reference to cases of thinking of something. How of course, what such a view would precisely come to has not been explained here, but this cannot be attempted until Part IV. With these questions in mind I have devoted much of Part II to the clarification of the various uses of the verb "to think of", of the status of the various cases described by these uses, vis-a-vis mental events and intentional action, and of the various types of knowledge of what is thought of. But before I can turn to consider the view itself, one other important inquiry must be carried out, viz. some investigation of the validity and applicability of the concept of a mental event.

For in contemporary philosophical discussion the notion of a mental event or process has been attacked from many quarters - it has been asserted that there are no mental events, that this concept cannot exist as a primitive one, that it can only lead to confusion and that it is obscure in various ways, and so on. One requirement which would seem to apply to any concept of "mental event" which was to be used in respect of the above view would be that there are to be no logical relations between statements about the mental event and statements about the behaviour of the

subject. If mental events are to be asserted to have the unique feature or property of being intentional, then it must be possible to logically isolate these events from the ~~event~~ behaviour of the subject, which could not be said to be intentional. For this reason, and for convenience of exposition, I will discuss the attacks on the notion of a mental event in terms of consideration in favour of the view that some relations between statements about mental events or activities and statements about behaviour are logical, and not just contingent. To this end I will consider in the sections that follow arguments of Strawson and Wittgenstein. In the concluding section of this part I will return to the question of whether a clear sense can be given to this concept "mental event."

2.

Turning then to views which appear to make the notion of "mental event" or "mental process" here presupposed either problematical or inapplicable to the case we are concerned with, we come immediately to the views advocated by P. F. Strawson in his book "Individuals"[1] particularly Chapter 3. For it is there argued

1 "Individuals" P. F. Strawson, Methuen, London, 1959.

that the concept of a person is primitive in our conceptual scheme, and that this concept is logically prior to that of an individual consciousness. Further, and following from this, the concepts of states of consciousness, of experiences (and, we might add, mental events or mental processes in the sense we need) are logically secondary to the concepts of the various states of a person. Thus a normal 'mental' predicate, such as "is in pain" or "is depressed", will give rise to secondary predicates, such as "feels pain" and "is exhibiting pain behaviour", whose applicability will be derivative from that of the original predicate. Now it will follow from this that one cannot think of what is ascribed by such a secondary predicate as existing in its own right as one of the components of the world, so to speak, as standing in a certain relation to what is ascribed by another such predicate so that the complex amounts to e.g. pain or depression. Certainly it will be prohibited to inquire about the relations between the sensation of pain or the feeling of depression and their cause and object, if these are considered as queries about the relations of two entities in the world and not as oblique ways of inquiring about the relations of the complete state. There are, as will emerge, uncertainties about whether Strawson would regard this view as applying to a predicate like "is thinking of X", yet, given that it is held to apply, it is

clear that it would raise the most serious doubts about the correctness of asking the questions raised in the last section, at least in the sort of formulation given. So we need to look in more detail at the view, and consider the arguments offered in support of it.

It follows, according to Strawson, from a consideration of the conditions necessary for any ascription of states of consciousness to anything that we must acknowledge the primitiveness of the concept of a person, and with it the unique character of many of predicates (predicates applicable only to beings capable of consciousness). A person here is held to be an entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and those ascribing corporeal characteristics are equally applicable to it and as this concept is primitive the applicability of these will not be a matter of what they ascribe being in any way a constitutive element of the subject, but rather of their being derived by abstraction or some such process from the single state. It will be a basic mistake to suppose that a person is any sort of compound of states of consciousness and bodily aspects, and so the questions "Why are states of consciousness ascribed to anything" and "Why are they ascribed to the same thing as certain corporeal characteristics?" are shown to be based on a misconception. Robotedly, and from the general type of argument, there follows

the position about P-predicates; at least some P-predicates have the character that what they ascribe is the one thing, prior to and not to be analysed in terms of, a mental state and a bodily or behavioural manifestation; that the behavioural features on the basis of which one ascribes these p-predicates to others constitute logically adequate criteria for the ascription of that predicate, rather as the markings on a playing card constitute a logically adequate criterion for calling it the Queen of Hearts; that exactly the same is ascribed when I ascribe a P-predicate to myself on the basis of observation of his behaviour, and he affirms it of himself otherwise than as a result of observing his own behaviour. Not all these statements are, of course, as clear as one might wish, and I will attempt to determine a little more precisely what the view is in section 4 following - first, we must look at the arguments lying behind it.

There are two basic strands of argument offered, one directed primarily to establishing the primitiveness of the concept "person" and the other to establishing the unique character of P-predicates. Both succeed by demonstrating the inadequacy of a Cartesian position, an alternative, "no-ownership", view having already been argued to be incoherent. The first is: it is a necessary condition of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself that

one should also be prepared to ascribe them to others; the condition of this is that one can identify other subjects of state of consciousness predicates than oneself, and indeed without having recourse to any information or correlation, such as entails ascription of the predicate to oneself, gained from observing one's own case; and the condition in turn of this is that there be an entity, or at least that we have the concept of an entity, such that both states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics are predicable of it, and which is such that our knowledge of the ascribability of ψ-predicates to that one not is not an inductive but a logical matter; and this is possible only if we have the concept of such an entity (i.e. person) as prior both to states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics.[1] I will call this the "person" argument in what follows.

The second argument, the "ψ-predicate" argument, runs: if we think of the behaviour on the basis of which we ascribe a ψ-predicate to another as only a sign of what is ascribed, then we can only know that it is a (reliable) sign by observing a correlation between the sign and that it is a sign of; this can only happen in one's own case, and requires that one can identify one's own pain (for example); but it is a necessary condition of ascribing states of consciousness to oneself that one should also be prepared to ascribe them to others; so one cannot ascribe pain

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1 This statement of the argument is assembled from the versions given on p. 100 and p. 104.

to oneself unless one is also in a position to ascribe it to others; so one could not observe the correlation between (potential) sign and signified, and so one cannot think of behaviour only as a sign of the appearance of the ψ-characteristic; thus behaviour must at best sometimes constitute a "logically adequate criterion" for the ascription of the ψ-predicate.[1]

5.

The most striking thing about these arguments is that they both rely on a single principle, which I will call the "ascription principle" and which is first stated on p. 99 as: "it is a necessary condition of one's ascribing states of consciousness to oneself, in the way one does, that one should also ascribe them, or be prepared to ascribe them, to others who are not oneself." Unfortunately, this crucial principle seems to be ambiguous between a number of alternative renderings. The first one, given explicitly in the above statement and forth mentioning only to put it out of the way, is whether the necessary condition is that one actually ascribe states of consciousness to others, or just that one be prepared to so ascribe them. As Strawson notes in the footnote to page 99,

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1 See p. 105-6

it might be objected to the unmodified version of the principle that the idea of a uniquely applicable predicate (i.e. one which is only truly applicable to one subject), is not absurd and such a predicate might well be only ascribed to one individual, so only the more minimal necessary condition could be claimed. He is prepared to admit this, however, as his argument requires only the weak version, and with the caveat that as we are dealing with an enormous class of ordinary predicates the distinction on which the objection is based is rather dubious.

The other ambiguities are more important, and far more likely to affect the content of the argument. Four rather different versions of the principle can be discerned, variously supported by the four statements of it given in the text. They are:

(i) That it is a necessary condition of ascribing any state of consciousness predicate to oneself that one should also be prepared to ascribe that predicate to others. This, the strictest version, is certainly one possible interpretation of the statements given on pages 99, 100 and 104.

(ii) That for most such predicates, necessary condition (i) holds and I can ascribe to myself those predicates for which it does not hold only if I can already ascribe to myself some (state of consciousness) predicates for which it does hold. That is, (i) generally holds for these predicates, and the ascribability of the

remaining minority of predicates is dependant on the prior ascribability of some of the other ones. This version might be urged because it accounts for Strawson's desire to talk in general terms about "predicates ascribing states of consciousness" and yet also for his willingness at times (e.g. p. 106) to accept a weaker principle than (i).

(iii) That there is no sense in the idea of ascribing any state of consciousness to on self, or at all, unless the ascriber already knows how to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others. This is certainly a possible interpretation, and in the formulation of p. 106 with only the "any" added.

(iv) That the necessary condition (i) holds for most state of consciousness predicates, and the exceptions to it are necessarily a typical and infrequent. A weaker version on the lines of (ii).

As regards the first argument, the "person" argument, the different possible senses of the principle are not as greatly important as for the second, at least if we regard the concept of a person which is shown to be primitive as that of an entity such that <u>some</u> states of consciousness predicates are as equally applicable to it as any behavioural or corporeal predicate. For on all of the first three versions, the condition of ascribing even one such predicate to myself will be that I can already ascribe

some such to another, which requires that I can recognise another as a subject of some (particular) predicate, and this will only be possible if we have the concept of an entity such that some consciousness and some corporeal predicates are applicable to it, and so on. The fourth version will not, as it stands, support this argument; also this argument will not establish that we must have the concept of an entity such that all of, or some particular class of, state of consciousness predicates and corporeal predicates are equally applicable to it. Only an argument based on the first version could establish that more general conclusion. Thus, if we use (ii) or (iii) we will not exclude, for example, the possibility that we have the concept of an entity such that sensation predicates and corporeal predicates are equally applicable to it, and yet think of thought and emotion predicates as ascribable to another, albeit related, subject, perhaps a Cartesian ego. This is because once we can ascribe any (group of) state of consciousness predicate(s) to another subject, those two versions of the principle are satisfied for any further such predicate.

The impact of the different versions is even sharper on the second argument, the "logically adequate criterion" argument. For only if we use version (i) could the argument possibly establish the claim that, for <u>all</u> P-predicates, the behaviour on which the P-predicate is ascribed constitutes a logically adequate criterion

for that conclusion. And a formula often does seem to sum this strong conclusion. The use of premises (ii) and (iv) could only establish a conclusion limited to a special, yet central, class of a class of consciousness predicates, viz. those for which version (i) holds. Version (iii) is in fact the most plausible interpretation of Nelson's intentions in respect of this argument, for two reasons. The argument I gave is refuted by: "... in the case of at least some C-predicates, two ways of telling must constitute in some sense logically adequate criteria .... For as yet in no case did these ways of telling constitute logically adequate criteria. Then ....." and this is strongly suggestive, in spite of the fact that the restriction seems to be tacitly dropped later. Also, version (iii) is the most natural interpretation of the formulation of the principle given in the Postscript (p. 106). Yet there are still problems. Not only will the conclusion be restricted in this way, it will be much more limited again unless (iii) is augmented, for as it stands it could support only the conclusion that each person must think of so C-predicates as having the required type of criteria. No need was reason for believing that every person, or at least most people, would regard any class of C-predicates as having these criteria if we were to take the argument as establishing anything at all about our actual conceptual scheme.

The upshot of all this is that the once clear curves become highly blurred, and we are offered no guidance in the text of this book about how to decide exactly which conception of a person is regarded, which version of the ascription principle is to be involved, or what scope is intended for the point about logically adequate criteria. As I have already suggested, the various sorts of evidence that one can glean point in contrary directions, rather than dotsy mappling over the evidence, however, I will now turn to look at the reasons that have been, or might be, offered for the general ascription principle, in the hope that the reasons might define for us which version, if any, we are forced to accept.

Unfortunately, in the main body of the text the ascription principle is just asserted without any supporting argument, but in a footnote to that first such passage the main point is said to be that "the logic of a predicate is correlative with that of a range of distinguishable individuals of which the predicate can be significantly, though not necessarily truly, affirmed" (p. 99). So we might approach the reasons for the ascription principle in two ways. Firstly by considering this latter principle which I will call the "predicate principle", the reasons for it, and the connection between it and the ascription principle; secondly by inquiring whether any reasons can be offered for the ascription principle in

its own right. The former of these are taken up in the next sections, and the latter after that.

4.

As above, the point behind the ascription principle is said to be that the idea of the predicate is correlative with that of a number of individuals of which that predicate could be significantly ascribed. This can presumably be put as; 'X is a predicate' entails that it would make sense to suppose more than one individual such that it would give a significant proposition to predicate X of it. Two things immediately spring to mind - that on the one hand this must be true, for if it only made sense to suppose that a predicate applied in only one case, then we could never learn the sense of that predicate and it could only function as a name, and on the other hand that this could not be right, as predicates like "my only son ", and "the natural whole number between 3 and 5" are logically only applicable to one instance. But both of these would be mis-understandings - the first because it confuses instances of a predicate with subjects, and a person who wanted to

to maintain that e.g. "in pain" was logically applicable only to the user would of course admit that even here there would be many instances of pain. The second fails to take sufficient account of "significant". "My only son", or to take a better example, "The only son of the King of England at noon on the 10th October, 1939" could be significantly ascribed to many subjects (male humans) but truly only to one. The same applies to, "The only whole natural number between 3 and 5", although here the ambiguity of the term "significant" is more to the fore. There could be at least four senses of "not significant utterance", a) where the utterance does not even form into words, or lacks the grammar to even form a sentence - 'the cat mat in on', b) where the utterance involves the making of a radical category error, c) cases of logical contradiction where a form of words is excluded from the language, and d) cases in which we could not get any grip at all on what a man could mean by saying that in those circumstances. a) is presumably not in question here, not d). Our last example shows that (c) could not be what is meant, and there could be presumably be other examples such that any other ascription that to a given individual would either be a logical contradiction or a category mistake. That is, this example shows that if (c) is what is meant, the principle is either false (because there are counter cases) or

relies on (b), because it could only operate at all if an assumed that we were dealing with ascriptions in the right category.

So we have to take the sense of 'significant' as that parallel to (b) and this is re-inforced by the several references Strawson makes to "individuals of the same logical type or category"[1]. The principle then becomes: "X is a predicate" entails that it makes sense to suppose that there is more than one entity in the category of which X is predicable. This is hardly very clear, but at least makes it obvious that 'the number between 3 and 5' is not a counter example, as '2 is the number between 3 and 5', could be significant in the required sense. Given this limited clarification we might now ask about the reasons for accepting this principle. One negative remark is worth making, viz. that any such argument cannot depend on any inductive generalisations about predicates, partly because it can always be denied that that generalisation applies to this case, and more importantly because Strawson is keen to stress that he is concerned with a very large class of predicates in natural language, and the force of any supposed generalisation is reduced by the size of the problematical class.[2] What we need is an argument which shows that this follows somehow from what it is to be a predicate.

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1 See, e.g. the 1b note to p. 99. 2. Assuming, that is, that it is intended to be true of all predicates.

One line of argument might be as follows. The principle can be rephrased as: it is a contradiction to claim that X is a predicate and to claim that there is a contradiction involved in supposing that there is more than one individual in the category of which X is predicable i.e. Contradiction (X is predicate. Contradiction (more than on a in Cx)). This could be shown to be true if (i) it is shown that there is a contradiction involved in "contradiction (more than one a in Cx)", or (ii) that the two terms of the conjunction stand in contradiction. Now the possibility of (i) will depend on what criterion we have for a category, and how we regard a predicate as determining a category, because there is no problem here if we consider just classes. There can readily be a class such that it is a contradiction to assert that it has more than one member. So everything will depend on how we draw the distinction between a class and a category, and what we take to be the relation between a predicate and a category.

I am inclined to argue at this point that the idea of a category relates primarily to the idea of there being different types of entity in the world, and that the perception of those different types lies at the basis of every area of language, while a class is, or can be, dependent on language, being the group of those entities which satisfy a given description, or fall under a given

or dicta etc. That is to say that every area of language (or "language-game") is based on, and does not define or describe, the idea of certain types of entity being appropriate for that language-game, and others not. This implies that there cannot be any non-circular linguistic criteria for picking out different types, but that this should show up in the whole complex of acceptable and not-acceptable locutions. Take for example the language-game of ascribing colour predicates to things. To learn that language-game is to learn that individuals in the general category of material things, and of certain other types, are coloured, and sounds, ideas and particulars are not, and that there seems to be no non-circular way of giving a criteria for distinguishing all those sorts of things that can be coloured from those that cannot. Compared with this a class is at least often defined by giving a more or less complex description, e.g. "The sons of ....." It needs to be noted here that once we have formed classes in this way we can presumably also introduce predicates which can only apply to individuals of that class. So the argument requires the assumption that we are dealing with 'simple' predicates in the sense of complexity of this type being excluded. (I use the simple/complex distinction for this is what follows - probably secondary or derivative would have been more appropriate.) The point of all

this is that if it is accepted then one can argue as follows; once one is given a predicate, and hence the category to which it is applicable, then it must remain a matter of how the world is (in the widest sense) how many individuals there are of that type, and cannot be a matter of the meaning of any criterion or description determining the category, and hence not a matter of logic. And so it cannot be the case that it is logically excluded that there be more than one individual in a given category. To clarify this, consider that area of language concerned with the ascription of states of consciousness to oneself and others. The only way in which it could be maintained that these predicates logically only applied to one individual would be by claiming that they applied only to my own experience, (or my own pain etc.), and other cases are logically excluded from this class by the very meaning of this expression. But this class can only be so determined if the person has already got the relevant concepts (e.g. of a person's pain, or experience, etc.), i.e. if the language-game is already largely learnt, and hence if the category of individuals to which these predicates are ascribable has already been grasped. And so the possibility here of forming a class which logically excludes more than one individual is dependant on the idea already having been grasped of the relevant category, the number of whose

numbers cannot be logically confined in this way.

If all the above argument is accepted, it shows that there cannot be a contradiction in there being more than one individual in a given category. The exact nature of the principle so supposedly established depends on the character of the last "cannot", - depending on whether we take it to be a logical 'cannot' or something weaker (conceptual), the principle is that there is either an entailment or a "conceptual connexion", between X being a predicate and between there being no contradiction in supposing that there is more than one individual of which X is predicable.

This argument seems to me at least plausible, even though many queries could of course be directed at it. It serves to found the predicate principle on a general claim about the nature of categories, and about how they enter into language. While this seems a promising line of attack, at least one other possible strand of argument needs to be mentioned. Strawson insists that this principle is a purely logical one, and he might fill this out by arguing (in the spirit of part II of "Individuals") that the logical distinction between subject and predicate is to be drawn on lines which entail the predicate principle. Thus the second, or "categorial", criterion offered in the book for the subject/predicate distinction bases this distinction on a prior distinction of terms into particular

and universal, and indeed in such a way that it follows that particulars can never be (simply) predicated, and this is a logical role reserved for universals alone (see. p. 172). From this the predicate principle might naturally be thought to follow immediately.

For reasons which will emerge in the next section, I am not concerned to evaluate these lines of argument. My basic point here is two-fold: firstly that if Strawson's general argument is to be founded upon the predicate principle, then it needs to be recognized that that principle is not at all self-evident and stands in need of some justification; secondly, that while such justification has not been produced, either in Strawson's book or this section, the arguments sketched make it at least a possibility that it could be so justified. The predicate principle has not been established but its establishment looks plausible.

5.

Having noted this shortcoming in the argument, but at the same time the possibility of its being remedied along the lines suggested, let us grant the predicate principle as established along one or

sum of them can consider what follows from it.

The first version of the ascription principle was that it was a necessary condition for the ascription of any state of consciousness predicable to oneself that one should also be prepared to ascribe that predicate to others. Now this might be thought to follow from the predicate principle, for both concern the behaviour of each individual predicate. Yet the "argument from categories" introduced a distinction of simple and complex predicates, for the first of which only was the predicate principle established, and so for these only does the other principle follow.

But now a further problem arises, for the ascription principle is used in the P-predicate argument in the following way. If one thinks of the correlation behaviour/event on the model of sign/signified, then one can only learn the reliability of an sign by observing the correlation in one's own case, but one can ascribe a predicate to oneself only if one can also ascribe it to others, and so one can be able to identify other subjects of the predicate. Briefly, the principle needed here is: one can ascribe a predicate to oneself only if one is actually able to ascribe it to others. Within it this may expose another ambiguity in the ascription principle: "must be prepared to ascribe to others" might mean either "must ascribe the logical possibility that it be ascribed to

others" or "must actually be capable h re and ow of ascribing it to others". The importance of this is that only on the second interpr tation does it follo that he must be able to identify other subjects of the predicate - I could accept the logical possibility that something could be ascribed to another without being in a position to so ascribe it. Further, only the first follows from the predicate principle, for I might surely accept that this being a predicate implies that it must be logically possible that it could be ascribed to others but myself without being in a position to actually ascribe it to another.

But surely, it may be objected, this last possibility is vacuous, for "others" here means "other subjects of the predicate" and if I could not pick out any such subject of the predicate what could my admitting that there could be other subjects come to? Yet given that the person is familiar with predicates, and subjects of predicates, surely it needs a further argument to establish that a vacuous assertion is made if I say that I accept that this predicate could have other subjects but I cannot identify any such other subjects.

Further, this is not the only point. Assume that the predicate principle is valid, and can be written as: "X is a predicate" entails that there exists or can exist more than one individual in

the category of which X is predicable. Assume also that the person concerned in the P-predicate argument believes that the term he applies to himself, "X", is a predicate. Now it does not follow from this belief and the predicate principle that he believes that there exists or can exist more than one individual in the given - this must surely be accepted as the principle is manifestly not self-evident, and as I have argued earlier still stands in need of complete justification. Further, and this is the point above, even if he does have this belief it does not seem to follow that he must be able to identify other subjects of the given predicate.

So there are two logical gaps to be filled between the predicate principle and any version of the ascription principle, that from the entailment to the person's concerned believing that the entailment holds, and that from this belief to the requirement that he be actually able to identify other subjects of the predicate. And these exist for any version of the ascription principle, for the logical gaps in question have nothing to do with whether the ascription principle is taken to apply to some, most, or all such predicates, but are on a quite different plane. As far as I can see they could be bridged only by some argument of a quite new type, and this would need to be produced.

6.

But perhaps we should ignore the predicate principle, and enquire whether some or all versions of the ascription principle are obviously true, or can readily be established. And it is worth remembering here that our main concern here is to decide whether the arguments of this book establish anything concerning thinking (and particularly thinking of something) which would vitiate talk of mental events here, and particularly whether they establish any view to the effect that the relation between thoughts and behaviour is somehow a logical one. To this end it might be worth keeping in mind a modified Cartesian view of thinking, that the thinking subject is quite distinct from the subject of physical, sensation and movement predicates, and is a type of Cartesian ego. I am not of course suggesting that talk of mental events is committed to this, but it will be instructive to see in what way the argument excludes this possibility.

The first version of the ascription principle is that it is a necessary condition of ascribing <u>any</u> state of consciousness predicate to oneself that one should also be prepared (which I will interpret here as "be actually able to" as both arguments require) to ascribe <u>that</u> predicate to others. Now this principle, as noted earlier, fully satisfies the requirements of both the "person" argument

and the "I-predicate" argument. But the trouble is that so interpreted it is far from obvious, and in particular the modified Cartesian view given above would fail to satisfy it, for a person could ascribe the predicate "is thinking" to himself without yet being in a position to ascribe it to others. In general, until further arguments are produced, it is not obvious why there should not be some concepts falling within the traditional dualist mould - I learn what X is in my own case, then observe what behaviour etc. is correlated with this, and hence come later to ascribe it to others.[1] And if there could be such concepts or predicates, "thinking" could be one of them.

Versions (ii) and (iv) can be quickly excluded, for whatever their plausibility they do not in fact establish anything interesting about any particular predicate, such as "is thinking". For on version (ii), that (i) holds for most predicates and the ascribability of those for which it does not is necessarily dependent on the prior ascribability of some for which it does, both arguments are valid only for certain classes of predicates. On this version, the "I-person" argument does not exclude the modified Cartesian view above, and the "I-predicate" argument is valid only for predicates for which (i) holds, which need not include "is thinking". Similar

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1 I am not of course wanting to endorse this argument, but just to point out that Strawson's argument interpreted along the current lines does not give reasons for excluding it.

results apply to version (iv) - for it the "person" argument is simply invalid, and the P-predicate argument applies only to that majority of predicates for which (i) holds, which again need not include "is thinking".

Version (iii) is perhaps the most obviously plausible of the four, and is that there is no sense in the idea of ascribing <u>any</u> state of consciousness predicate to oneself unless one can already ascribe <u>some</u> such predicate to another. Only if one has the idea of oneself, we may roughly argue, can one ascribe such a predicate to oneself, and one can have this idea only if one has the idea of another, and this latter is possible only if one can ascribe some state of consciousness predicate to that other. Let however, this may be, this version will not do the job either. For the "person" argument will now show only that we must have the idea of an entity to which <u>some</u> states of consciousness predicates as well as material predicates are applicable, and this clearly does not exclude the Cartesian view given. With the "P-predicate" argument the condition is even worse, for not only would the conclusion be restricted to some state of consciousness predicates, but also a further argument would be needed to show that each person regarded (or had to regard) the same set of predicates in the appropriate way.

So the position seems to be that while the predicate principle could perhaps be established, no version of the ascription

rinoiple nas b:en shown, or could easily be shown, to follo. from it; and that independently of this argument the various versions of the ascription principle oscillate between begging the controversial question about "thinking" and establishing, in the contexts of the arguments, conclusions which do not apply to this concept.

In such a situation it seems reasonable to conclude that no objections have yet been successfully raised along these lines against our speaking of mental events in respect of thinking. I will now turn to enquire whether a similar conclusion can be reached in respect of Wittgenstein's famous."private language" argument.

7.

In respect of the meanings of terms which, prima facie, refer to mental events (e.g. 'pain', 'thought', 'fear'; we might say: "X" (such a term) means in all or part, "experiences of a certain type or sort," or stands for experiences of a certain type. Now as further specification of the type we may either give an account in terms of common public concepts (e.g. thoughts are experiences

having the following properties; locatable at a particular time, having content, reference and sense like overt utterances, such that it is not possible to divide one thought, rather than a train of thoughts, into temporally ordered parts and expressible in statements etc.) and hence give a complete specification of the type involved, or we may say that the type is at least partly given as: all experiences sufficiently similar to a certain class of experiences which I have. The first account will cover all concepts susceptible of behaviouristic analysis, and all those which can be construed as analogical developments out of non-mental concepts. These alternatives seem to be the only ones, if we assume (vaguely) that we are dealing with a genuine and independent mental event concept, in the sense that the type cannot be helpfully given either in terms of a concept derived from a completely different area or in terms of another mental event concept. Following up the second alternative the question clearly becomes that of characterizing the class of my experiences, for which there might seem to be the three following alternatives:

1) the relevant class is that class of experiences which I have in certain specifiable contexts, the contexts thus being the defining factor of the class.

2) the account might be: in certain contexts I find that I have similar experiences, and hence showing someone the contexts serves to illustrate what experiences are meant, given the presumption (anyway built into our language) that people all have recognisably similar experiences in such contexts, although it remains that the only logical requirement is that the experiences have a certain recognisable character.

3) simply, the only requirement is that the experiences have this certain character, which I can recognise and to which I apply words like 'pain'. Yet this third alternative seems clearly unacceptable - unless it is expanded to become (2), it has the consequence that the meaning of the word in question could never be taught, as there would be no means of conveying that it was this, rather than some other, character that was meant. This is not a change of very great moment, but now the choice must be between the first two.

Consider now the view that all correlations between statements about mental events and statements about behaviour are contingent. For those terms for which the class of experiences is given as similar to a class of experiences which I have (i.e. for those not susceptible of behaviouristic analysis or an analogical account) this view is committed to the second of the above alternatives, as

for it the only logical requirement can be that operating on the behaviour itself. So in such cases the "contingent" view is committed to the possibility of recognising a class of experiences as similar, prior to there being any (public language or analogical) description of their common features available, and completely independently of any considerations of context, stimulus or response. And also to the possibility of using a word to refer to experiences of this type, in such circumstances. It is against such a possibility that Wittgenstein's 'private language argument' is directed. I will discuss a version of that argument, and if it is successful the conclusion will be that for certain cases this contingent view is false.

3.

Firstly, a distinction must be drawn between what one might call statements proper (e.g. "the cat is on the mat" uttered in a certain context) and identification statements (e.g. "This is an X") The distinction, crude as it is, that I want these to exemplify is that statements proper assert that such and such is the case,

offer a representation of the way the world (in part) is (i.e. are those for which 'the" corr s onds with the facts" account of their truth is most plausible), while identifications assert only that this particular thing or entity falls under this classificatory term. If one is unaware of what a statement proper asserts, then it follows that what one is ignorant of is either a fact about the world, considered as distinct from language, from classification or the meanings of words etc, whereas if one is unaware of what an identification asserts one is thereby ignorant only of a particular use of a word or a particular classification, and not necessarily any substantial fact. Thus I am using "identification statement" in such a way that as a result of its being uttered the hearer is not any further aware of any of the properties, states, relations etc. of whatever it is that the statement is about, but simply of what it is called or how it is classified. This makes clear that not everything of the form "This is an x" qualifies as an identification, for many utterances of this form can be r placed equivalently by statements proper. For example, in a given context "This stone is diamond" is equivalent to "This stone has such and such a molecular structure", and its utterance could be intended as nothing but the stating of a very important and unexpected fact about the stone. Similarly, "this is red" in certain contexts (notably when

the reference to the thing in question can succeed without its colour being presently observed, and when the hearer does not know that colour) asserts such a fact. To cover these cases we need to restrict "identification statements" in two ways: firstly, to those utterances of a form like "This is (an) X" where what is referred to by the "this" is the very same as what is being claimed to be 'X' rather than being what is asserted to have or possess X (e.g. when it is "This is red", what is referred to is this sample of colour rather than this object). Secondly, to utterances employing predicates which cannot be given complete verbal definitions (i.e. for which "This is X" is not replaceable by "This is abc" where abc operates as a definition of the predicate "X" and not just as a description picking out the same class). This last restriction excludes utterances like "This diamond" above.

This last condition still needs a little clarification. An utterance of the form "This is X" might entail "this is abc" where "abc" is some more or less complex description giving the sense of the term "X" or might imply in a looser sense "This is abc" where the connection is not a logical one e.g. "This is X, X is in fact abc so this is abc". The case with diamond exhibits both of these - "This is a diamond" probably now entails "This has a

certain structure" but only implies that it is a precious metal, as it may one day not be such. Now the first, entailment, case is the one I wish to exclude. (Even in Wittgenstein's S case, "This is S" might in certain cases imply "This is the accompaniment of my high blood pressure"). Nothing special is intended over and above what has been said by the use of the term "identification" and in particular my use of this term does not choose between the speech acts distinguished by Austin in his model So in "How to Talk"[1] - neither direction of fit nor case of match affect the issue.

The present importance of this distinction is that it seems to me that the prior to language argument only claims to apply to the latter, i.e. to identifications. Consider what the minimum logical conditions must be for the predicates 'true'/'false' to be applicable to an utterance of the statement prior form. The most obvious basic minimum seems to be that the utterance succeeds in representing a state of the world, by characterising a situation or state of affairs which it asserts to hold. I will not inquire here into what the conditions in turn of this might be, but just want to make a contrast between this condition and another one

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1 See J. L. Austin "How to Talk", reprinted in Philosophical Essays ed. by J. O. Urmson Oxford, 1961 pp. 181-192
G. J. Warnock

which might be suggested viz. that it must be in principle possible to decide whether the utterance is true or false. It is tempting to say that if either of these predications is to be significantly applied to a given utterance it must at least make sense to speak of deciding which of them is correctly applied. But consider this case: A certain tribe firmly believe in the existence of a class of beings, rather similar to fairies, about which they have full legends, etc. but such that the existence of each "fairy" is dependent on the existence of the mind of a certain person, and also that at certain times a person has direct awareness of "his fairy". Now when one of them says "I just had an intuition of my fairy" and it is the right time etc. other members of the tribe may accept this as true, and yet we may be inclined to say that all such statements are false. And yet there is in principle here no way of checking or finally deciding that this utterance is true or false. Or consider one's closer to the problem: "I was thinking of just 10 o'clock when I was alone in my flat", "I dreamt of last night, and no-one observed my sleep" if uttered in a situation in which the conditions of the sort are known to be true, are from the moment of utterance, in principle uncheckable in respect of truth or falsity. If someone should dispute my memory claim here, there is in principle nothing which can be done further to check the claim.

It is it difficult to see what reason there could be here for denying even to my dear that these are true, or to his reply that perhaps they are false.

Now of course all this is highly controversial, and I do not want to hang anything on its being true. All I want to suggest is that any argument that turns upon the supposed meaninglessness of, or failure of intelligible presentation of 'true' or 'false' to, statements proper which cannot be checked or decisively verified would be a highly dubious argument, and further that such a claim is not at all involved in the 'private language' argument. I will now set out a version of that argument in several steps.

2.

1) A term 't' is supposed to be used by someone to stand solely for a private experience of his own e.g. a sensation.

2) The case has to be one in which the connection between term and sensation is set up independently of any public criterion or response, or independently of the knowledge of any convert of the common language (e.g. he has none of our concepts "pain", "sensation" "tingling" etc, and so cannot use 't' with any description like

"tingling sensation") And so our describing 'S' as the name for a sensation will be misleading.

3) Now if the person tries an "internal ostensive definition", uttering 'S' and attending to his sensation (or whatever he has), this will be a fake definition because nothing will be excluded by it from falling under 'S' in the future. For example, describing the case from our point of view, if he has a dull intense long pain when he 'defines' 'S', and on the next occasion he has a light sharp pain like a pin prick, or a dull intense moderate pain, or a unpleasant stirring falling in the stomach (like in fear), it has not yet been determined which of these is a right or wrong use. Whatever he does will be right, if anything is. And if, after 10 'S' attributions, he writes 'S' when he has a mild sensation of warmth beside the fire, what reason has he or anyone else of regarding this as wrong. Generally, anything he were inclined to say would be right, so there is in fact no sense to the right or wrong use of 'S' here.

4) So the suggestion that he used a term to refer to his sensation, to name the same sensation, or to signify his recognition of this sensation. All the sen will be mistaken, and will have been shown to be impossible in such a situation.

5) So the view that all relations between statements about

behaviour are contingent, which was described earlier and which was shown to be committed to such a possibility for certain cases, must be false.

I will make a few comments on this argument. Firstly, it will be important to notice that when we describe the case as one in which he gives a name to his sensation or his pain, this can be very misleading both because we will have no way of knowing whether he has names his pain or something else, and ex hypothesis he cannot think of himself as naming his sensation or pain. Really, any description we give will tend to be misleading as importing concepts and distinctions which he does not possess. Yes, one might say, ex hypothese he cannot possess any of the words or concepts of our language, yet that provides no reason why he should not have his own concepts parallel to our ones of experiences, sensations, and different types of sensation. And so he might have some idea of what he is naming, parallel e.g. to "intense sharp pain". But this only postpones the moment of truth, for his idea of 'intense' or 'pain' is either backed up by further such bits or descriptions, or either is equivalent to 'what these experiences have in common'. In our case as given, every such supposed private idea or description must finally rest upon the recognition of a class of experiences as similar, independently of the teaching of any description. But

this is exactly what is involved in the 'S' case, and so the independent viability of this remains the key point.

Secondly, if this point is taken, the suggestion that he has named anything will start to appear suspect. Normally two conditions have to be satisfied for naming something - one must think of what one is naming as a persistent, or recurrent, and identifiable entity, and one must have some idea of what a further use of the name could be like, and an intention or at least readiness to so use it. Faced with a complete flux of experience I could not do any naming, unless I named the flux, and if I pick up grains of sand on the beach, gave them names, and tossed them over my back, this would be a complete mockery. Now in our current case both these are doubtful - how is it determined that he has named, and what does he think of as recurrent and identifiable.

"This" one might say, but yet how is his performance different from a chap who walks into a room and says "I name this P" and can give no further specification of what he has named P. And should we say that he envisages further correct uses for 'S' even though he could not say what such a correct use would be like. But he will say: I will use 'S' again whenever I have the same as this. The problem here is that it is in no way determined what "the same" will be. Compare a chap who points in the direction of a chair and

says "I call anything the same as this 'S' ". Now if we put aside our natural presumption that he is naming the chair, and if he can give no further specification of what "the same" will be (e.g. the same colour, shape, period, the same in being a material object) then it will start to look as if he has failed to do any naming.

Thirdly, it will be objected that he can at least remember what the same is, and why should we be so reluctant to rely on memory here, seeing that it is normally quite reliable? Yet, the reply will be, to remember something surely requires that there be some distinction between remembering right and wrong, and that distinction does not exist here. I think it is important to notice that the thesis is not at all one about the fallibility or otherwise of memory, but of what it means to say that he did or did not misremember. In this connection a famous paragraph of the "Philosophical Investigations", p. 265, seems to me often misread. This is the paragraph in which it is suggested that perhaps he looks up a table in the imagination, and this justifies him in saying 'S' again - like looking up a timetable in the imagination. But, says Wittgenstein, this could only serve as a justification if it were <u>correct</u> and known to be correct. "If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it confir th correctness of the first memory? (As if someone

...are to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what is said here true." The argument here seems to me to be that when we are in doubt, not about the correctness of a first memory but about what "correct" means as applied to it, a second memory will be in the same boat and cannot help unless we could give some sense to "establishing that it is correct." This certainly does not commit Wittgenstein to the view that any checkable statement is somehow meaningless or senseless, nor to the view that any memory claim which cannot in fact be checked cannot be regarded as either true or false, nor even, I suspect, to the view that any memory claim that could not in principle (whatever that means) be tested or checked cannot sensibly be said to possess a truth-value. The claim is that an identification can only be regarded as having a truth-value if something could at least possibly establish it as true or false; what I imagine or remember could do the latter only if it in turn could be tested, and the cases of "having a table in imagination" or "remembering it as this" could not be so tested. This seems to me right, while I would regard the three principles above as at least dubious.

10.

In what I have been just saying I have already been moving into the second area of this discussion which involves distinguishing this argument from others which may be confused with it. In particular, it may have emerged why I delayed over the attempted distinction between statements proper and identifications. Once one has a statement proper, a representation of the world, as opposed to an identification, there is at least the possibility of meaningfully speculating that something is true or false even though which it is (logically) cannot be decided. Wittgenstein, as far as I can see, never commits himself to any verification criterion of meaning - after all "asking <u>whether</u> and <u>how</u> a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking "How do you mean?" (Phil. 353) ", and any such criterion would be foreign to his theory of meaning.

So it will be clear that I will want to distinguish the argument here from a type of argument employed by Norman Malcolm in his book "Dreaming". Malcolm argues that because one could never conclusively establish that one judged, or had an image or sensation, while asleep, because the truth or falsity of any such claims could never be established, these claims are themselves senseless, unintelligible (e.g. in Chapters 9 and 10). There are

admittedly two rather different arguments employed in these chapters; 1) that I have a judgement in sleep is unverifiable; that I dream is verifiable, therefore dreaming is not having judgements in sleep, and 2) that it follows from the first of these (i.e. that I have judgements in sleep is unverifiable) that the notion of judgements in sleep is unintelligible, therefore dreaming is not having judgements in sleep. This second pattern of argument is the one I am concerned with, and is quite distinct from the private language argument. Indeed it seems to me a pattern of argument a good deal removed from the spirit of the "Investigations".

For a little further clarification, it may be of interest to examine the relation Wittgenstein's argument has to two fairly similar arguments employed by Sydney Shoemaker in his book "Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity."[1] These arguments are intended to establish or go towards establishing, the thesis that not all relations between statements about behaviour and statements about psychological states are contingent, which for Shoemaker means that some are logical. The first argument is as follows: (p. 167-8):

"We only know that another person has a mental state B on the basis of observation of some of his behaviour A; now if the relation between A and B is contingent, we can only know that A is evidence

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1 "Self-knowledge and Self-Identity" Sydney Shoemaker, Cornell Univ. Press, 1965.

for B on the basis of the observation of some correlation between A and B; but this is only possible if we can know B independently of A, and finally of anything contingently related to it, and so if we are to attribute any mental states to another, some such relations must be logical. Now, as Shoemaker recognises, the standard response to this will be that I learn the correlation between pain and behaviour from my own case, and so when I see others acting similarly, conclude, or form the hypothesis, that they are also in pain. But this will be possible only if it is possible for a person to recognize a class of experiences as similar independently of the possession of any of the relevant concepts, and of his behaviour. In other words, this form of argument is ultimately dependent for its success on the viability of some argument like the version of the private language argument given.

Shoemaker offers such an argument (p. 189-90), directed to show that I cannot regard all such relations as contingent in my own case, because it makes no sense to suppose that it is now regularly the case that I am e.g. in pain, and yet have a completely different set of behaviour to normal pain and responses. That is, that it makes no sense to suppose that the normal psychophysical relations have ceased to hold. The argument runs: let S be such a state of affairs, i.e. one in which I have a set of experiences not related in the normal way to facts about my body. Now it makes

sense to suppose that 'S' occurs now, and that a chap observes that S occurs to him at t1 But it does not follow that he could know that it occurred to him at t1 and t2 and t3 etc. i.e. regularly over a period of time, for to make this claim would be equivalent to claiming that it could be established that it occurred, and how could it be established? At t3 e.g. I can only say that S occurred at t1 and t2 of the basis of what I remember, or seem to remember. But nothing could decide between my seeming to remember that S occurred, and my actually remembering it, and so there is no way of establishing rather than seeming to establish that 'S' regularly occurred. So I have not, and cannot, describe a case in which S regularly occurred, as opposed to its seeming to me that it occurred.

I find this pattern of argument most implausible, for two reasons. Firstly, if it is allowed that he can know that S has occurred at t1 surely he can inform people (by utterance or writing) that S is now the case. If this is possible then does not he have here a quite straight-forward way of establishing that S had regularly occurred over a period? But perhaps Shoemaker will say that this will involve saying "I am in pain" which is normal pain behaviour, which we are supposing not to hold. This certainly would illustrate some of the ambiguity in notions like "pain-behaviour"

e.g. that some pain-behaviour is intentional and some is not. Surely the supposition that he has pain without any normal behaviour, and without any of the normal bodily facts holding, cannot include the supposition that he cannot intentionally assert that he is in pain. If that were included, what could it mean to say that he knew he was in pain? If we allow that S can occur at tl, and that he can know it, then there are ways of establishing that S occurs regularly over a period. The only way Shoemaker could proceed would be to find incoherence in the notion of S ever occurring - this is like, but not the same as, what Wittgenstein does.

The other problem with this argument lies in its principle - that it is meaningless or otherwise senseless to hold that p is the case unless one can establish that p is the case, over and above seeming to remember, or believing, that p is the case. This is a principle of the type I have all along held to be dubious, as the claim is supposed to be able to give a description of S, and not just identify what happens. Apart from our lack of a reason for accepting the principle, there seem to be, as I suggested earlier, counter-cases - e.g. "my last unexpressed thought yesterday was that q" the truth of which is unestablishable in the required way, but which would seem to be quite intelligible and either true or

false. Again, I would suggest that Wittgenstein showed a sounder insight in avoiding this type of argument.

11.

Turning then to the third area of this discussion, I will take up a number of objections that have been or might be made to all this, starting with ones which are directed against the "private language" argument itself, and moving on to objections to the view which it is supposed to establish.

As a start then it will probably be, and often is, objected that his argument must be fallacious because thinking and dreaming are both clearly mental events, referred to by our talk of them, and only contingently connected with any behaviour. That one may report one's thoughts or dreams is surely undeniable, it will be said, as is the contention that they are identifiable mental events, so any argument which presumes to show that all the connections between mental events and behaviour are not contingent must be invalid. Now, ignoring confusions probably implicit in this formulation, the line of reply to this will be that the argument applies to neither thoughts nor dreams, for the same basic reasons.

Right at the beginning of this discussion of the "private language" argument I drew a distinction between two types of "mental event" concepts which might be held to stand for a certain class of experiences, viz. those for which the class of experiences could be completelyspecified in terms of common, public, concepts, and those for which the type seemed to come down to; similar to a certain class of experiences which I have. And as a possible example of the first type of concept I offered "thinking", suggesting that here the experiences might be specifiable as; locatable at a particular time, having content, sense and reference like overt utterances, such that it is not possible to divide one thought into temporally ordered parts, expressible in statements, and so on. Now this is one sense that might be given to saying that thinking is an analogical concept, and if it were correct the argument as I have formulated it would not apply to "thinking". I will not attempt to decide here whether or not it is correct, but will just offer two relevent considerations. Firstly, the familiar point I can only describe my thinking something in terms of what I thought, and with metaphors concerning the speed with which the thought occurred to me ("it flashed across my mind that ...") or concerning the conditions in which I had the thought ("slowly and painfully it came to me that p"). There is here no such thing as describing

the experience of having a thought parallel to describing a pain or sensation as intense, dull, sharp or nagging. Secondly, but relatedly, the only concept we have of "same thought" is that it has the same content - there is no other criterion of sameness in terms of the experience being the same.

The points support, but hardly establish, the view above, but there is a further and more immediate reason for believing that the argument does not apply to "thinking", and this dispenses me from a detail discussion of the above view. For when we consider the argument above with any case of thinking, its principle reduces to a form of the verification principle, which we have through-out regarded as at least doubtful. Consider a person in the situation provided by the argument, who says to himself "This is S" in respect of a thought of his that p. Now if he thinks that p he must know that he thought that p (even if it is supposed that he cannot express it in language), and, as above, the only sense we can give to the expression "the same thought" is "has the same content as". So his supposed identification statement "This is S" is for him at least equivalent to e.g. "This (i.e. the cat is on the mat) is S", and on a second occasion when he says "This also is S" the new utterance will be equivalent to e.g. "This (i.e. the cat is on the bed) is S". If this really is the private language situation then

it may be that he has no way of checking the truth of second utterance,yet it could be written as "This (i.e. the cat is on the bed is S (i.e. is the same as "the cat is on the mat")". Now he may only have his memory to rely on concerning what S in fact was, but nevertheless there seems to be a clear sense to "true" or "false" concerning his new utterance - it is true if this, i.e. "the cat is on the bed" is the same as S, i.e. "the cat is on the mat", and false if these are not the same. And the sense of 'the same' is also clear - they are the same if they have the same content.

So it seems that the only point here is the verification point, that there is no way of checking whether his new utterance is right or wrong, and not the point which I claimed as central to the private language argument, that no sense could be given to "right" or "wrong" here, because nothing was excluded from qualifying as "right". Another way of putting the same point is that for thoughts there can be no such thing as a simple identification statement in my sense, i.e. independent of any description of what is identified, for having a thought essentially involves being provided with such a description.[1]

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1 I will not take up the question of dreaming here, except to suggest that to say that one dreams is not to say that one had a particular sort of experience, but rather to say that one had any sort of experience while asleep, and that for this reason the argument does not apply to dreaming.

So certainly for this second reason, and possibly for the first, the private language argument does not apply to thinking, and so does not block our attempt to talk of thinking in terms of mental events. But now, both because this argument might be thought to be relevant in other ways to the discussion of Part IV and because my defence against the argument has been to suggest that it is valid but not applicable, I will continue by discussing certain other objections to it, and then consider what it might be taken to establish.

12.

I must now say something about A. J. Ayer's renowned objection in his article "Can there be a private language?" [1] His main objection is that all processes of checking an identification must themselves end in one which is not checked, and every series of checking either ends in such an unchecked identification or goes on ad infinitum, and so we must at some stage take some identifications as valid in themselves. To the extent to which this is simply an

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1 A. J. Ayer, "Can there be a Private Language", reprinted in "Philosophical Essays".

argument from "not every identification would in fact be checked" to "not every identification need to checkable" it is clearly fallacious, as Miss Anscombe has pointed out in her book on the "Tractatus"[1] Even if we regard the argument as of the form; "every process of checking ends in an unchecked recognition, and so we have to take some acts of recognition as valid in themselves, therefore private sensations can be "corroborated" (Ayer's word) by acts of recognition", the same general fallacy will be present. Recognition of private sensations could in fact be corroborated by further (private) recognitions and rememberings, if we already had a sense for right or wrong here. The question is not simply one of what is, and what is not, acceptable evidence for the correctness of a recognition, but the prior question of what correct/incorrect means here, and how they get a sense.

A third objection, and in many ways the most interesting one, is one which can be constructed out of the writings of Sellars (especially "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind")[2] and is fairly explicit in the Fodor and Chihara's article "Operationalism and Ordinary Language".[3] This will attempt to by-pass any such argument by suggesting another way in which we may come to possess the

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1 G.E.M. Anscombe, "An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus" Hutchinson, 1959.

2 Sellars, W. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind", in H. Feigl and S. Scriven(eds) Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Vol. 1. 1956.

3 Fodor and Chihara "Operationalism and Ordinary Language" American Philosophical Quarterly, 1965.

concept of e.g. the mental state "pain" which nevertheless retains the contingent view of all relations between behaviour statements and mental event statements. Using 'pain' for terms of exposition, this view will construe the relation behaviour/mental state or event 'pain' on the model of evidence/theoretical entity in a highly verified scientific theory. The notion of "being in pain" as opposed to acting in a certain way is introduced as a theoretical postulate to explain certain sorts of behaviour, and "our success in accounting for the behaviour on the basis of which mental predicates are applied might properly be thought of as supplying evidence for the existence of the mental processes we postulate." (Fodor and Chihara, p. 293) Presumably it is at a later stage that the notions so introduced come to have the use they did for self-description.

I have stated the view fairly crudely, and no doubt it could be dressed up to look more attractive, yet the fatal difficulty would, I think remain. It is perhaps plausible for some mental concepts (e.g. thought) but in the cases like "pain" the crucial problem seems to me to centre around what could count as evidence for the newly postulated theoretical entities. Presumably one requirement for a scientific theory to be explanatory is that the basic particles, or whatever else is the basic postulate, are postulated to have properties which are either plausible given

that they are e.g. particles, or at least sufficiently far removed from the facts to be explained to be independent of them. The theoretical entities could not just have the properties of being such as to cause a), b) and c), if these are the data to be explained. They must have properties from which the facts to be explained could be non-trivially deduced. So either the postulated "pain-events" have properties which follow from their nature, from their being pain-events, or they are introduced having properties from which pain-behaviour can be deduced by some substantial chain of reasoning. But the last alternative cannot be correct because there just are no properties of our pain-states from which pain-behaviour can be so deduced. There is no logical gap between feeling a pain when one puts one's hand on a hot stove and pulling it away. So the first alternative must be right - but what the natural properties of pain-states are we can only learn, on the current account, from our own case i.e. from knowing in our own case at least what pain is prior to a knowledge of pain-behaviour. Hence the possibility of this view depends on the failure of Wittgenstein's argument, and cannot be any objection to it.

13.

I come now to the fourth section of this discussion, the one of which I feel most uncertain and in which I am largely groping about. The question, of course, is: what exactly does this supposedly valid argument establish? The conclusion reached in the earlier statement of it was simply that the view that all relations between statements about behaviour and statements about mental states were contingent is false, as it makes the character of the experience the crucial logical test for 'pain' and this in turn required that one could use a term to refer to the same experience completely independently of any public language concepts, stimuli or responses. Now before I attack the current position it is worth mentioning another argument that Wittgenstein directs against this view, the famous "beetle" argument of P.I. sec 293. This is directed against the view that one knows only from one's own case what 'pain' means, which is another statement of what the "contingent" view is committed to. The 'only' is important, because it excludes learning even partly through understanding e.g. descriptions of the experiences which other people offer. The argument, by analogy, is simply: if everyone had a box, such that everybody could only look into their own box, and could only find what was in the boxes from their own box, and the term "beetle" is generally used for what

is in the box, then the character of what such person has is irrelevant for the meaning of the term "beetle", as everyone might have something different, or changing, or nothing. And so it would be for pain on the contingent view. I cannot fault this argument, provided it is understood that the restriction here is the same as that in the private language argument, viz. that it does not apply to any concept for which a description can be given and understood prior to possession of the concept which characterizes the class of experiences. But I have assumed all along that "pain" is a concept for which these restrictions are fulfilled. Indeed, the basic ideas behind the two arguments are very much the same, provided the restrictions are properly understood,. And for exactly this reason this argument will also not apply to "thinking" for this concept does not stand for a certain type of experience which can be grouped independently of any description which characterizes the experience.

So what does all this establish? The first problem here lies in the notorious ambiguity of this term "contingent", so I will proceed again by discussing various alternatives.

(1) What some people have taken all this to establish is some sort of behaviouristic view, that being in pain is nothing over and above behaving in a certain way or that sensation-talk is translatable

without remainder into pain-behaviour talk. I will assume that this is not a serious candidate, either in itself or as an account of Wittgenstein's views.

(2) Another alternative might be that the decisive logical test for being in pain lies in the behaviour, in that 'pain' basically means "the sensation a person has when he behaves, or is inclined to behave, in ways x,y,z, etc." On this view what makes a group of sensations ones of pain is not their innate similarity which is recognized, but their common relation to a certain sort of behaviour, pain behaviour. And this becomes plausible when one tries to think of the similarity of the sensations involved in having a pin stuck into one, burning your finger on the stove, having a very bad headache, and having very bad indigestion. But the crucial difficulty seems to be to be that on this view we should actually be able to give a complete, neutral characterisation of pain-behaviour, which distinguishes it from e.g. face-behaviour, and which does not presume that it is <u>pain</u>-behaviour. Yet this does not seem to be possible - how exactly does screwing up one's face in pain differ from screwing it up in anguish, fear, hatred or distast. We could certainly recognize each as such in suitable circumstances, but could not describe it is neutral terms. Might not one set one's face and body in the same way when one is trying to suppress an

expression of pain, fear or anger? And how exactly must a cry of pain differ from one of hatred or displeasure? Now it must be remembered that for the current thesis to work, it must be the case that there is a set of behavioural responses characteristic of each distinct basic mental state, and such that we actually can recognize such a set independently of any view about what he feels. The first seems highly unlikely, and the cases given suggest that we at least often take it that he is screwing up his face in pain rather than fear because we believe, in the circumstances, that he is in pain.

(3) We might derive a third possible conclusion simply by giving "contingent" as it occurred earlier one of its most common meaning viz. "not logical", and so if this is the sense used throughout, it will have been established that these such relations are logical. Two points about this. Firstly, our argument only established the falsity of the view that in these cases the inclusive logical test is on the character of the experience. Now it does not follow from this that it is false that all relations are not logical, unless one denies the possibility of any other necessary relation than pure entailment. Secondly it is very difficult to see that the view that some such relations are logical could come to, other than as versions of behaviourism or the second alternative about, and neither of these are acceptable. So we are still looking.

(4) The only nearly plausible candidate I can offer as an interpretation of the conclusion of our argument is an adaption of the view Strawson maintains in "Individuals", Chap. 3. In the context of arguing that the notion of a person is logically primitive in respect of the notion of consciousness, he says of depression:

"X's depression is something,/and the same thing which is felt but not observed by X, and observed, but not felt, by others than X." (p. 109). The view is that the idea of the state of the person, depression, is logically prior to the idea of depressed behaviour and feeling depressed, and the logical priority is a matter of these two being the one thing, not in the sense of combination or composition, but in the sense that to speak of individually of depressed behaviour or feelings of depression is to abstract from the single state. So applied to pain, the suggestion would be that pain is a single state, prior to both pain behaviour and pain-sensations.

Now it is interesting to note that such a suggestion satisfies the requirements of our argument, as well as the point made above about pain behaviour. To learn what pain is will not be to learn that character is common to certain class of sensations or experiences, and so this view will not be committed to the species of recognition attacked by the private language argument. Learning the meaning of "pain" will indeed involve learning to recognize its

presence in another person (but not by inference), and learning to use the word correctly in my own case, yet neither of these need involve the recognition of private sensations. Also, on this view the fact that we cannot in general give a non-circular description of pain-behaviour will be explicable - pain-behaviour (not just behaviour though) will be a notion which is derivative from that of the single state, so we should not expect to be able to describe or recognize such behaviour independently of the state which is logically prior to it.

There are two of its advantages, but by now the two key problems with this view have started to emerge - firstly to understand it, and to give some more precise account of it, and secondly, to give some account of my knowledge that I am in pain which is faithful to it and to the apparent fact I know that I am in pain independently of any observation of my behaviour. To understand it we will need to have some clearer idea of what could be meant by "primitive", and what by "the one thing".

Consider, by way of analogy, the notions of matter and shape. Now one could have this matter and some other shape, or this shape with some other matter, but not this matter without any shape, and perhaps not this (3-D) shape without any matter. So here there is some sense in which we have the one thing, which has different sorts of properties, viz. those appropriate to matter

and to shape, but is not to be regarded as composed or made up of these two things. The notion of a material thing (like chair, table, rock etc.) is logically prior to that of matter and perhaps of shape, but what is the exact sense of "logically prior"? Is it that the concept "matter" can only be explained in terms of some "material thing" concepts? Probably something like this, and yet it is not clear that the notion of matter without shape is logically contradictory (c.f. infinitely large matter). Perhaps what we ought to say here is that we have two concepts which can in fact only be introduced in terms of the notion of material thing, and yet such that it may not be logically contradictory for one to occur without the other. This will parallel what Strawson says when he suggests that the possibility of disembodied existence is not logically excluded.

But if "primitive" is to be taken to mean "can only be explained in terms of", more will need to be said to give us our thesis. For in this sense e.g. "mother" is primitive in that not of "sibling" and "daughter" and yet there is no temptation to talk of a mother as the one thing prior to .... etc. What this suggests is that the notions which are primitive cannot be just any such group, but related so that in some sense, as yet undetermined, B and C (the secondary terms) make up one thing denoted by A.

This is illustrated also by the example of sound as primitive to pitch and volume. Here what the B and C terms denote are properties of A, and could never be thought of as making any sort of unity alone (i.e. just pitch and volume). And the sense of one thing we want will be crudely: that we could not have either a B or a C without an A, from which it will follow that there could not be a B without some C, or vice versa. So, applying this to pain, I will tentatively offer the following as a sense of "pain is the one thing, logically prior both to pain-behaviour and the feeling of pain";

1) both "the feeling or experience of pain" and "pain-behaviour" can only be explained in terms of "being in pain".

2) it makes sense to suppose that these two on their own form an existing unity.

3) there could not be either a case of "pain behaviour" or "feeling pain" without the state of being in pain, and hence one of "pain-behaviour" without one of "feeling pain" (although the status of this "could" may be a problem). All this is to be understood by analogy to matter and shape, or matter and surface.

One feature of such a view will be that it will exhibit a different approach to "pain behaviour" than any contingent view. Pain behaviour will be explained as behaviour of a person in pain,

not of no feeling ain, and so if I think that a person is manifesting pain behaviour and he is not in pain I will have been wrong in ascribing pain-behaviour to him. By contrast, any 'contingent' view has to say that pain behaviour is a certain class of behaviour, such that we can in principle classify any piece of behaviour as, or as not, pain behaviour independently of deciding e.g. on whether it is caused by a feeling of pain. The first attitude is more in line with the facts as I suggested earlier.

How could this view handle the two hoary old objections, pretending to be in pain and suppressing one's pain behaviour? Pretending causes no problem here - there is no reason why I should not imitate or mock pain-behaviour, but because of what I have just said this will not actually be pain behaviour. Suppressing is more difficult, and raises problems of clarification. In thinking about these problems under the influence of the 'contingent' picture, and with the problem of other minds always in the background, one is inclined to think of "pain-behaviour" as behaviour which shows, or communicates, that he is in pain. But the view in question is, crudely, that pain is a state which can be analysed into feelings or sensations on the one hand, and behaviour or responses on the other, but which is prior to both. Now for this view it will be quite possible for a child who responds in the

normal way to be taught a new form of behaviour, to learn to hold himself in check, to force himself not to show any sign of pain. This will not be "pain-behaviour" in the 'showing' sense, but could be in the sense we required. "Pain-behaviour" is after all an open-ended notion, and a child can progress from crying to the more conventional expressive "Ow" to "it hurts", so why should we not include suppressing as a special sort of pain-response? But perhaps this is too slick.

Probably the most important objection, however, will be of this form: I know when I am in pain with complete certainty, and yet not at all as a result of observation of my behaviour, so I must know this by identifying the sensation which I am having. Now the short reply to this will be: why assume that identifying a sensation or observing one's own behaviour are the only ways of coming to know one's own mental states, particularly as e.g. I often know what I am doing, or what the position of a limb is, but not by identifying any experiences or observing my actions or limbs. This short answer, like all such, is of course unsatisfactory, but a fully sustained answer would require a general treatment of such first person utterances, of the sense in which I <u>know</u> that I am in pain, of what "identifying" and "observing" mean here, and so on, and I could not attempt it. All I can do is to make a few suggestions,

derived from Wittgenstein, or the direction in which we might go.

Consider the pain expressive "Ow". Now when a doctor jabs a very blunt needle in me and I pull back and yell "Ow", the exclamation is surely pain-behaviour in the same way as the drawing-back or the grimace, and is related to the pain in the same way as these. Yet it has certain interesting features - e.g. it is in some sense a learned, conventional linguistic response, and it could be listed in the dictionary among standard exclamations. And although one could mislead someone else by saying "Ow" when it did not hurt, yet in a real case (e.g. the needle is above) it does not make sense to doubt whether he is justified or correct to use "Ow", or to ask how he knows that this is a situation in which "Ow" is appropriate. His natural expression of pain has just been channelled into the linguistic area, and it makes as little sense to ask these as it does to ask "How does he know to grimace?" or "is he justified in grimacing?" (c.f. Wittgenstein, sec. 290 "What I do is not, of course, to identify my sensation by criteria but to recognize an expression".) Now arising out of this use of "Ow" a community might invent sentences: (1) "I am in ow-state" (2) "He is in ow-state". (1), the first person sentence, will sometimes at least still be a cry of pain equivalent to "Ow", and in which use those questions will still be inappropriate, and such that it will be highly implausible to say that he identifies

any sensations. And it will come to have many other uses - as a cry of complaint, an expression of self-pity, an appeal for help, and finally as a description of my state. (c.f. P. I. II Sec. iv). And if in none of the other cases can we say that my utterance is justified because I have identified a sensation, why must we say it when this sentence served as a description? Further, could not we argue in a similar way regarding the sentence "I am in pain," as far as I can see Wittgenstein did?

14.

It may well seem that I have followed up this discussion well beyond the point of relevance to this thesis, but this is not altogether so. For there are a number of reasons in our context for attempting to get clear about the private language argument all of which concern ways in which this argument might be introduced into the discussion of part IV. One of these was mentioned in the beginning, viz. that it might be introduced to show that the concept of a mental event cannot be employed as I wish to do so,

via showing that no relations between statements about mental events and statements about behaviour are contingent. My reply to this was that while this argument, properly interpreted, is valid, yet it does not when so interpreted apply to "thinking". Yet, it may be said, perhaps this only shows that you have misinterpreted that argument. Now I obviously cannot establish that no argument could ever be produced to block this use of "mental event", but I have attempted to side track this last objection by arguing that not only is the argument on my interpretation valid, but it also seems to lead to intelligible conclusions which also manifestly do not apply to thinking (as the "one thing" view clearly does not). The last point has not been firmly established, but I hope that it has been rendered plausible. Other ways in which the private language might intrude into Part IV is by being taken to show that any mental state must be so tied to a report of it that there is no room for other than trivial mistakes, or that if any "content" is involved in that mental state, this can only be taken as definitively given by the utterance of the person concerned. I have tried to side-track any such intrusion by exploring what in fact the argument should be taken to show.

But one final question remains.

If the account I have been considering becomes at all plausible

the question arises whether or not this is what Wittgenstein took his argument to establish. For a change, the answer to this is clear - no. Wittgenstein would certainly have regarded the "one thing" account as another picture, which may or may not lead us to the correct use of the word "pain", and which is only of value to the extent to which it does this. His main purpose in the section on "pain" is to free us from the grip of the "contingent" picture, not so that he can substitute another one, but so that we may see the use of the relevant words clearly. Thus his aim is to "show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" and thus theses can never be advanced in philosophy, and philosophy is a form of therapy. This view follows from his theory of meaning as one point of the "meaning equals use" doctrine is to deny that any thought, statement, picture or rule contains its meaning in itself, independently of how it is used in given contexts. So the meaning of any concept of philosophical interest will lie only in its having a certain use - and once we understand that use, any general statement will be at best superfluous, and at worst highly misleading. It seems to me that the challenge of that view to traditional philosophical practise has not yet been adequately confronted, but I certainly was not concerned to confront it in this thesis. Notice, however, that the fact that the conclusion I suggest is not acceptable to

Wittgenstein should not be taken to show that I have mis-interpreted his argument - the unacceptability of it can be adequately explained in terms of his theory of meaning and view of philosophy.

b.

Even if the argument of this part is accepted to this stage, and it is granted that the principles involved in the works of Wittgenstein and Strawson here discussed provide no objection to talking of mental events, at least in the case of thinking, yet this does not of course show that such talk would be clear, or that any precise sense can be or has been given to "mental event" in this context. Indeed, when the question is raised in this form, substantial queries soon arise. These queries arise from at least two sources - firstly, from the reduction of cases in which it seems obscure whether or not we should say that we had the recurrence of a mental event, or indeed what it would mean to say that, and secondly, from attempting to say exactly what "mental events" as so used means, either by trying to give necessary and sufficient conditions for its application or by otherwise explaining

how it gets its meaning.

As an example of the first, consider cases of understanding what someone says. I says "John has gone to do the shopping in Oxford", and I understand, or believe I understand, what he says. Nor if someone asks me ten minutes later what he said, I should be able to tell him, but I may have forgotten. At the time at which I understand, though, I must know what it is that I understand him to be saying, and in a way different from my knowledge of ten minutes later. For the later knowledge looks back to the former as to part of its source, and involves remembering, and so has to contend with the possibility of forgetting. But if at the time of understanding (or misunderstanding) what he says I must know in some non-dispositional way at least what I take him to be saying (e.g. that p) then surely at that time there must occur some mental event which involves the entertaining, or awareness or something such, of the proposition that p. Yet the case may be one in which my mother shouts this to me as I rush through the room looking for my coat - there is no obvious room for a special mental event involved in the understanding here.[1] But if you understood that

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1 I am here not concerned with the question whether understanding what he said can be in any sense said to be a mental process or event, but rather to raise queries about what it would mean to say even that it involved such a process or event.

She said that ., then you must have ..... The questions now clearly are: What does it mean to say that I did or did not have a mental event here? and then, how is the question about its occurrence to be settled? In those other cases in which parallel queries could arise could be (a) listening for a sound (b) trying to think of something to say (c) reading without understanding and (d) reading with understanding.

A number of answers will be made to these questions, and they in turn serve to raise the second area of query. At least, it will be said, the paradigm cases are clear. For example, if you are walking down the street and it suddenly occurs to you that ., then that is clearly and unambiguously a mental event. This tends to compel our assent alright, but exactly what is this case said to exemplify? It might of course just mean; thinking in this case at least cannot be reduced to a form of behaviour, even verbal behaviour. And that is certainly true, and explains the compelled assent, but does not offer any positive account of our notion, and such an account is what we need, or it might be offered as part

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1 The remarks of the last paragraph are not to be taken to imply that the current queries are completely out of spirit with the spirit of Wittgenstein. Compare for example Sec. 154 of "Philosophical Investigations", viz; "Try not to think of understanding as a mental process at all - for that is the expression which confuses you"

of an ostensive definition. How could "mental event" be ostensively defined? Well, by moving certain cases like the one above into the centre of the picture, and explaining a mental event as what is given paradigmatically by these cases. Thus I might produce cases of a thought occurring to one, of thinking about a problem, of remembering something, and of suddenly feeling afraid, and assert that these cases, and any sufficiently like them, exemplify the occurrence of a mental event. But if this is all the definition we are offered, what determines e.g. whether the above case of understanding what he said involves a mental event? How does one go about comparing this case with the others given, and in what respect must there be similarity? To put it another way, how does this statement go beyond a definition by enumeration to become an ostensive definition? Well it might be replied, in whatever way the ostensive definition of the term "red" goes beyond the particular cases pointed out. But there are at least two differences between the supposed ostensive definition of "mental event" and that of "red" - firstly, for any such definition of "red" that we now give there are standard ways of deciding whether the person goes on correctly beyond the given cases, in particular whether he agrees with judgements of other users of the word; secondly, the person giving the definition, at least, can specify the respect in which

the similarity of the examples is relevant, viz. their colour. Neither of these seem to be possible with the new definition, and short of them (and they are of course connected) it is difficult to see what such an attempt at ostensive definition could accomplish.

Let us try to find, then, some way of giving a statement of the meaning, perhaps in terms of tests, or necessary and sufficient conditions, for the correct application of the term. One procedure,[1] would be to argue that e.g. 'it occured to me that p' is at least an event[2] in that it can be clocked as occurring at a particular time T, and in a sense (via the position of the person to whom it occurs) at a particular place. And as it does not involve any movements of the body, deserves the designation "mental event." This needs further refinement, for on the obvious interpretation of it even "believing that p" would be a mental event, as it could be true that from 9 p.m. to 11 p.m. only did I believe that p. If we avoid restricting mental events to only instantaneous occurrences, the refinement is likely to be that we have a mental event only if

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1 See e.g. N. J. Ginnane, "Thoughts", Mind 1960.

2 I use this rather inaccurate way of speaking (i.e."'it occurred to me that p' is an event") as a short way of saying: that would be correctly described by 'it occurred to me that p', or that this is taken to report, is an event.

the continuous present tense of a 'mental' verb is truely applicable at a given time, or over a given period of time. This will hardly do, however, for it has very paradoxical consequences. For example, if for 10 seconds I was trying to think of something to say, this will be a mental event even if I do not think anything at all during that time, while our earlier paradigm case of a thought suddenly occurring to me will not be a mental event as there is no continuous present tense with which such a case can be described. Dropping the 'continuous' part of the continuous present tense requirement will not help either, and nor will forming the requirement in terms of the applicability of continuous past tense. The first will bring relief back in, and the second will still exclude the case of a thought occurring to one. One stipulation which avoids these troubles is: a person is having a mental event if either the continuous past tense of some verb "to f" is true of him between T1 and T2 or some other part is true of him at T1 and the/condition that no continuous part is true of him is that there is no continuing activity from T1, and that is true of him is not so at all because of any movements of his body, or of his relations to anything other than himself. Now, leaving aside the ambiguities, this might operate as some sort of criterion for mental events, but its consequences need to be made clear. For most of the philosophically

later still, sees, like understanding what he said, recognising someone, listening for a sound, and trying to think of something to say, all count as mental events on on' or another of this kind, and one might be swayed from thinking that the notion had now lost its interest. And there will be paradoxical cases - e.g. 'I was thinking of going to the beach all day' and 'I was thinking of Wilson when I said "the old fool is gone", i.e. at T1' would probably qualify as cases of mental events.

But this sort of discussion could go on interminably, and the overriding issue has not yet been raised. For what the foregoing discussion does is to make clear that there is no single, clear and obvious sense attaching to the idea like "mental event", and hence that sense we give this term will depend on our purposes in specifying it. Admittedly, the vague general idea lying behind the use often in the particular case, or between times T1 and T2, something is actually going on in one's mind, but I can see no way of making this idea at all precise. But it is presumably this sort idea like this in mind that we reject any ordinary for 'mental event' which makes belief a mental event. But if we had other purposes in mind than the capturing of this idea, we might be prepared to accept as satisfactory one of the above

criterion, or introduce some further one. But what we accept and what we do not, what we find helpful or unhelpful, above all depends on what aims and purposes we have in constructing and introducing this concept.

If this is right, then the crucial question here becomes: why, in the context of the questions raised in this thesis, do we need a notion of mental event? What functions does this concept fulfil, that no other, clearer notion could equally well fulfill? Now in relation to the problem proposed at the beginning of this part, viz. what is the relation between the mental event which is the thought and the object of that thought? , and the answer whose possibility we are to explore, viz. that the thought is a thought of that object in virtue of being, or consisting in, the occurrence of that object in the mind in the intentional mode, the notion "mental event" has a two-fold function. The first arises from the fact that if that answer is to be a possible one, then at least some cases of thinking, or more exactly of thinking of, must have a certain character, which one is inclined to say is that they must be mental events. Minimally, the point is that some cases of thinking of must be such that it is possible that they consist in the occurrence in the mind of the form of the object[1] of the thought

1 Or, to take another possible answer to our question, that they consist in the occurrence in the mind of an image of, or symbol for what is thought of.

in the intentional rather than the material mode. Now, given that this seems to be the case, we may be able to satisfy ourselves on this point without involking the notion of "mental event" if we can show that any arguments which might lead us to deny this are either invalid or able to be shown not to apply to the relevant cases of thinking of something. That is, given that our answer is a prima facie possible one even before the term "mental event" is introduced, then if the arguments which tend to destroy this possibility can be shown to be invalid or inapplicable we can accept the prima facie possibility, and our doing so not be at all vitiated by our inability to give a clear sense to "mental event." But I have already argued (i) that radical behaviorism is not plausible, (ii) that Strawson's argument is not valid, or at least not proven and apparently not likely to be proven, and (iii) that in as much as Wittgenstein's argument is valid it is not applicable to these cases. So it looks as if our inability to clarify the term "mental event", which is the term that most naturally comes to mind here, need not hold us up on the main point.

But the second function might appear more difficult to fulfill. For in defining the various classes of uses of the verb "to think of", and thus the use with which I am particularly concerned, I have used to rely on the notion of a mental event. Thus one distinguishing

mark of use III (as opposed, for example, to use I) was that thinking of something in these cases necessarily involved a mental event, and did not for use I cases. Fortunately, I think we can avoid allowing this account to be vitiated by our inability to give a precise sense to "mental event" by giving specifications which perform the limited role that is needed here. So for this verb I will say that we have a mental event if a continuous present tense is true of a given subject over a period of time, or another tense is true of him at a given time, and if it is necessary that during the period, or at the time, for which these are true he be concentrating on what he is thinking of, that he be caught up in that thought, that his mind be occupied with it, and so on. Now of course, this last requirement is enormously vague, but it serves the very limited purposes which we have here. For whatever it means, if I say that I was thinking of Gaitskill when I said "an earlier Labour leader ....." (and it really is use I) then it does not follow that I was caught up with thoughts of Gaitskill at the time of utterance, or that I was concentrating on the thought of Gaitskill when I said that. If I were thinking of Gaitskill in case III, or thought of him in a suitable case for use IV, then it follows that at some time I was caught up in this thought, and that my mind was not completely concentrating

on something quite different. This ad hoc specification at least makes the idea sufficiently explicit and workable that we can accept our crucial distinctions, and proceed on that basis.

Now even if these remarks serve to fulfill the two functions already given for which a notion of mental event is required, that of allowing the viability of a "form of X" or "image of/symbol for X" account of certain cases of thinking of x and that of being one of the distinguishing features of these as opposed to other cases of thinking of x, another problem remains. For in Part IV I will have cause to argue that neither of these accounts are correct, and yet will want to assert that the arguments that show this do not also show that no cases of thinking of x are mental events or occurrences, and also to suggest that if no such account can be given then we will be forced to postulate a unique relation between the event or occurrence which is the thought (in e.g. a use III case) and the object of the thought, at least when that is an actual person or thing. So we are still left with the problem of specifying the sense of "event" or "occurrence" in which e.g. a use III case of thinking of can be said to have (real) relations to other events, and cannot be explained away.

The problem here can be given in part by saying that it concerns how we are to mark the difference between thinking of X

(III or IV use) and firstly, believing, knowing or expecting that p, secondly, trying to think of something, listening for a sound or trying to solve a problem, and thirdly, thinking about, pondering over or considering, the problem of evil. The first three cases ("dispositions") might be said to be not events at all even though they are correctly ascribable over a period of time; the second set to be not occurrences (or not necessarily occurrences) even when they are ascribable over a period or time and when it is necessary that I be concentrating on or attending to what I am doing; the third to be too complex to be held to be a single event over the whole time for which they are truly ascribable.

To allay this difficulty sufficiently for the purposes of this thesis, I will give specifications for a notion of "intellectual event" as follows. An utterance of the form "I was (am) y-ing P" or, "I y-ed P" (where 'P' stands for any object phrase or clause) reports an intellectual event if and only if:

(i) it is true that at a certain time t1 I was y-ing P or I y-ed P.

(ii) a necessary condition for this to be true is that at t1 I was attending to the y-ing or what was y-ed, i.e. this could not be true and it still be the case that I was attending to or concentrating on something completely different.

(iii) neither "I thought at t1 that I y-ed or was y-ing something then but was mistaken "nor "I was not sure at t1 whether or not I was y-ing or y-ed P then" make sense.

(iv) the case reported is not complex in the sense that it could be broken down into y1-ing P1, then y2-ing P2 and then y3-ing P3 etc.

(v) "I was y-ing P" or "I y-ed P" is not of the form, or reducible to the form "I was trying/tried to x p1".

The first point of this specification is obviously necessary, and the second serves to exclude cases like "I believed all day that he was correct", "I have been expecting you to come for a long while" and "I intend to do it today" (i.e. the "dispositional" cases). The third avoids cases like the group I uses of "to think of" or like enjoying the music or taking pleasure in the complexity of his argument, for which attending might be held to be a necessary condition but which allow sense to one or both of the locutions of (iii). Among those cases satisfying these three points, there are some extraneous ones which are either too complex to be completely classified as intellectual events or satisfy the points by being attempts to do something which itself involves the having of such events. So (iv) and (v) are designed to exclude these - (iv) excludes

cases like "I was thinking about/wondering about/pondering over the problem of evil" or "I was composing a poem in my head", and (v) such cases as "I was trying to think of something to say/of the solution to the problem" or "I was listening for a sound" (which is equivalent to "I was trying to hear a sound" or "I was trying to hear if there is a sound"). I must add a sixth specification also, that the notion taking as basic here, attending to, does not itself stand for an intellectual event.

An interesting feature of this criterion is its treatment of "success" verbs such as "to understand". If someone says something to me, and I claim to understand what he said, then this claim will not report an intellectual event because (iii) will not be satisfied, yet there will be a closely related notion, free of the same success claim, which will report such an event viz. "I understood (took) him to say that p". So understanding involves, but is not simply, an intellectual event.

Of course many "mental events", particularly those involved in emotions or sensations, will not satisfy this test because it will be possible to be in pain, or feel angry or afraid, and still be attending to something quite different altogether, and also because for many of these (iii) will not be satisfied. But this is no objection to the criterion - I can see at present no way of specifying

a general notion of mental event, and indeed no reason for believing that such a general specification must be possible. This more limited notion, though, will be of use in Part IV.

PART IV

MENTAL EVENTS & INTENTIONAL - A PARTICULAR CASE

1. In the closing stages of Part II I isolated a certain set of uses of sentences, viz. those group III and IV uses of sentences with "to think of" as the principal verb, and those uses of sentences of the form "it occurred to me (him etc) that p", which use a name or description non-essentially in the object phrase or clause. And for cases correctly described by such uses I defined a sense for "object of thought", viz. that in such cases the object of thought is what is given by the name or description used non-essentially. Then in what follows I use the terms "thinking of" and "thought of" I use them in the rather special sense of the activities specified by these sets of uses, and "object of thought" will have the sense here specified.

Now cases of thinking of something, in this special sense, and the objects of this thinking as so defined, were seen to have four interesting features. Firstly, certain informative contrasts could be drawn, the results of which I expressed by saying that I must know at the time what I am thinking of, that my knowledge of what I am thinking of is not a matter of any observation, inference

or recognition, and that the object of my thought is not to be held to be what the thoughts I have are true of. Secondly, in the minimal and obscure sense defined, these cases of thinking of something are all examples of mental events. Thirdly, that most such cases of thinking of cannot be held to be intentional actions. Fourthly, that atleast very often the object of such thinking is something in the world, e.g. a person or other material thing.

Before we proceed, I must make a few further comments on the above, to make a little clearer exactly what I have in mind. The cases in which I think of X in our sense might be roughly divided into those in which I am (or take myself to be) well acquainted with X, or those in which I am not acquainted with X but believe that many descriptions hold of it, or those in which there are very few descriptions which I believe X satisfies or in which X is just whatever satisfies one given description. Now in cases of the third type it may be doubted whether I can think III or perhaps even IV of X, and special problems will arise when one name or description is essential to the specification of what I am thinking of. So to avoid both of these, I specify the cases of thinking of I am concerned with as only those which could be correctly described by a name or description used non-essentially, and only for these cases have I defined "object of thought". But this is only a restriction of convenience, and the object of thought could be defined in the other cases in terms of what is referred to by any

name or description used referentially and not just non-essentially. However, in what follows I will consider only the more restricted class of cases.

Further, it needs to be noticed that the object of the thought is given only by a sentence which is <u>correctly</u> used to describe the case. Apart from the obvious instances in which my report is a lie or deliberately seriously misleading, there is at least one other type of situation in which this qualification is important viz. those in which I am mistaken about the existence or non-existence of what I take myself to be thinking of. If I believe that there is a person Ryle whom I am acquainted with and know a lot about, and say "I was thinking of Ryle", but in fact it is all a gigantic hoax, then in a way my utterance will not correctly describe my thought, for it says that I was thinking of a real person Ryle but I was not. To put it another way, my utterance "I was thinking of Ryle" uses "Ryle" to refer to an actual person, and so that name is used referentially but does not succeed in making a reference. Of course, if I am informed about the hoax I will say "I was sure there was a person Ryle who did x, y, and z, and I was thinking of him", and here "him" or in another utterance "Ryle" are used to refer to, and succeed in referring to, an imaginary or fictional person. If I am in fact thinking of an imaginary or fictional

character but believe myself to be thinking of a real one (or vice-versa), then my report which uses a name or description to refer to an actual person or thing will not be a correct description in the appropriate sense, and the object of my thought will only be given by my report after I have been informed of the facts (or by the statement of someone else who is not deceived).

This leads on to the most important comment. I have throughout allowed that a person may be mistaken about the existence or non-existence of what he is thinking of, but have also wished to claim that he must know at the time what he is thinking of. Lest these be thought to stand in contradiction, we must remember how the last claim is to be cashed, viz. that it does not make sense to claim in our cases that "I thought at ti that I was thinking of someone (something) but I was not," leaving aside questions of existential status, and taken in contrast with use I. For in use I just this is possible - I may be convinced that when I said "an earlier Labour leader ...." I was thinking of someone, but be mistaken i.e. have nothing at all to say when I am queried. So this last claim is not to be construed simply as asserting that I must know at the time what the object of my thought is, for there is not a complete correlation between what I must know and the object. In one way I must know at the time what the object of my thought is, but this must be taken together with the point that I can be mistaken about the existential status of that object.

Questions now arise of this form: What account are we to give here of the relation between the mental event which is the thought and the object of the thought, particularly in the cases in which the object of the thought is some material thing other than the thinker? And relatedly: what account are we to give of thinking of something to explain satisfactorily the relation between the thought and its object? With such questions we will be concerned in this part, but I must stress that my aims here are strictly limited, and that I cannot attempt to offer answers to these questions. All I hope to show is that there are real problems in this area, i.e. concerning the relation between thought and its object (and generally between some mental events and their objects), and that the problems which remain unresolved in this traditional area of intentionality are at least as important and as difficult as those which more frequently fall under this heading in contemporary discussion.

If the above four claims about thinking of are correct, they seem to raise objections to some of the most obvious accounts of what the thought of X consists in, and thus to some obvious answers to these questions. Consider the following, which I offer as a general argument directed against any view which maintains that the thought of X consists in the mental occurrence of any entity or

experience ('A') which bears some relation (natural, conventional or otherwise, 'R') to the object of the thought X. It is thus directed against the view that the thought of X is a matter of the occurrence in the mind of the word 'X' (or other appropriate words), the image, picture etc. of X, or the idea of X, where this is given some further relational account. With the premise that one knows at the time, and not through any observation, recognition or inference, what is the object of one's thought, the argument is: On such an account, for the thought to be of X, A must occur and the person concerned must believe that A stands in the given relation to X (ARX). But the belief that ARX must actually be entertained at that time, for he knows immediately at the time what it is that he is thinking of. If the belief were not actually entertained, but were still what makes my thought of X, then it must be possible that I am unable to recall it, or uncertain as to what A is related to. This situation would then be one in which I thought of something, or thought that I had thought of something, and yet never know what it was that I was thinking of, a situation clearly excluded by the above. But to entertain the belief that ARX requires that it be possible to think of X other than through the occurrence of A. Now applying the account consistently we might say that this thought of X consisted of the occurrence of some B, and the entertaining of

the belief that ARX. It is clear at this point, however, that this line of argument leads to a vicious regress and hence that it must be possible to think of x other than through the mental occurrence of something related to X. And not just in some cases - in all our cases of thinking of X, there must be a thought of X other than via some relation.

There are several remarks to be made in further exposition of this argument. Firstly, it may be worth pointing out that the above argument turns essentially on the supposed necessity of the entertaining of the belief that ARX, although it might seem that it could be counted just from the fact that this belief must be held if the thought is to be of X and known to be of A. But this is false as one can say that holding the belief ARX commits one only to at some stage entertaining (or being in a position entertain) ARX in the form of A, R, and some uniquely specifying description (e.g. the cow in the corner) of X. That is, holding the belief that ARX requires that one is able to think of X apart from the occurrence of A, but it at least needs another argument to show that this may not be through the occurrence, at some other time, of a uniquely specifying description of X. In other words, if only the possession of the belief were required, then the regress as described would not be set up, for the condition that the person concerned can

think of A independently of the occurrence of A is not required at the time, to make sense of the original act of thinking of. But if the earlier argument that to explain the peculiar knowledge we have of the object of our thought we must at that time entertain (on the account under discussion, the belief ARX holds, the whole argument remains.

Let us consider some more specific cases of the mental occurrence A and the relation R. For example, it might be said that thinking of A is having a picture or image of X, or of something one associates immediately with X, occur to one. That is, A here is a picture or image, and the relation R is the relation "being a picture of" or "being an image of". Now apart from the likely objection that one can think of X without any given picture occurring to one (and perhaps without any at all), the above objection comes to the fact that here knowing what one is thinking of would be a matter of recognizing or realising or being aware of what the picture was a picture of, and that this involves both the possibility of misrecognition and the difficulty that to be able to recognize A as a picture of X at a given time (i.e. in a way which excludes the possibility that it may turn out that I did not know that it was a picture of) seems to involve thinking of X other than through the occurrence of A, and so on. And the same

applies if we were to say that what occurred was the word 'Peter', and the relation was "standing for" or "being the name of" (i.e. if we endeavour to give an account of this aspect of thought in terms of naming or standing for, linguistic relations). One would need to be aware that 'Peter' was the name of <u>that</u> person, and this would seem to involve one again in the difficulties above. Thus consider Ayer's claim: "Thus we may define an object of thought as follows: 'x' is thinking of I if and only if either (1) 'x' is using certain symbols of which at least one designates X, or (2) there is a y such that 'x' is using certain symbols of which at least one designates y and it is a fact that x is y....(& further conditions)."[1] This clearly gives an account of thinking of something in terms of the use of a given expression to refer to that thing. Now the claim of the argument will be that if this account were correct it would follow that it could turn out that the person could not say, and did not know, who it was that the symbol designated, in which case it would have been true that he thought he was thinking of someone or something but was mistaken. But that this did not make sense is exactly one of the features distinguishing our cases of "thinking of" from e.g. group I cases. Further, this could be avoided only by requiring that he know at the time who it

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1 A. J. Ayer, "Thinking and Meaning", Inaugural Lecture, University College, London, 1947. p. 13.

designated, but this implies thinking of X other than via the symbol, and on the current account leads to a regress.

Two points are worth noting here. Firstly, to repeat the point made earlier, the possibility that this argument claims exists (i.e. that he should turn out not to know what the symbol designated) is to be sharply distinguished from another possibility, that it should turn out that he was mistaken in believing that what he was thinking of exists. The latter causes no problem. Secondly, two different versions of the Ayer position need to be distinguished, depending on the interpretation that is given to the claim that A is using certain symbols, in the passage noted. On the one hand thinking of X may be just a matter of having the appropriate image or symbol occur in one's mind, or of on the other, actually using that symbol to mean X. The first version manifestly falls under the argument, but the second may appear doubtful. Now I feel sure that there are other decisive objections to this second version, and they will be discussed in Section 3, but it is important to consider whether it falls under the argument.

Let me return to the contrast between group I and group III uses of sentences involving "think of", which formed one of the bases of this argument. Now for both group I uses (e.g. "an earlier Labour leader ....." "Who are you thinking of?" "I was thinking of

Caitskell") and group III uses (e.g. "What were you doing?" "I was just thinking of Ryle") it was true that if the person concerned could not say what he was thinking of, and could not honestly ascribe this to failure to his having forgotten, then this shows that he was not thinking of anything. But they differed in that for group I but not group III uses this also showed that at the time in question he did not think or believe that he was thinking of anything, as for III uses it does not make sense to suppose that one thought or believed at the time that he was thinking of something and yet it be the case that he was not. How does meaning X by the use of a certain symbol fare on this contrast? Again, if he cannot say whom or what he meant, and cannot ascribe this to his having forgotten, this shows that he did not mean anyone or anything. But does it also show that he could not have thought, at the time of using the word, that he meant someone? Or again, does it make sense to suppose that he thought, at the time of the use of the word, that he meant someone but that he in fact did not?

In general, and although the case is not as clear as group I uses, this does seem to make sense - e.g. in the heat of argument I say "Ryle would not have done that", confident that I mean someone quite definite by Ryle, but when questioned be able to say

nothing at all other than that I thought I meant someone. Yet, it might be objected, the sense in which this makes sense is only a weak sense of "mean"; there are many senses of this word, and if I believe that I really meant someone when I said "Ryle", in a strong sense of this term, then it is not possible that I did not mean anyone after all. This objection is at least plausible, but now requires that the "strong" senses be distinguished from the "weak" ones, and in a way which does not assimilate ~~to~~ such "strong" cases of meaning something to cases of, or involving, thinking of something. For if the latter concept is re-introduced, or if the cases of meaning something appear as similar to our cases of thinking of something, then exactly the same questions arise again.

How I cannot enquire here whether such a distinction can be drawn, but I should admit to scepticism on the point. Its relevance for the argument of course is that if this possibility is accepted, and that therefore it is not necessary that I know at the time who or what I mean, the argument applies, and shows that thinking of something cannot consist in using a symbol to mean that thing. The reason I do not attempt to decide the question here is that there seem to me to be other objections, independent and decisive, to that view. These will be discussed in section 3, but first I must consider in more detail the assumptions of this current argument, and some objections to it.

2. Let us try and state precisely the main things which this argument presupposes, and consider some objections that may be made to these presuppositions.

(a) Firstly, it presupposes (at least in the way its conclusions are formulated) that a sense can be given to "object of thought" (or alternatively perhaps, to "what I was thinking of") which is both clear and such that in at least some cases the object of my thought is something in the world. Against this presumption there may be made the familiar objection: there are certainly cases in which the object of my thought is something which does not exist, e.g. when I think of Mr. Pickwick. But now surely in a doubtful case, one in which I am thinking of something about whose existence I am uncertain or one in which I think it exists but it does not (e.g. thinking of King Arthur or the Holy Grail), it makes no difference to my thinking whether or not what I think of turns out to exist. So existence cannot be essential to the notion of object, and this must be specifiable independently of the existence of what is thought of.

I have already suggested at the end of Part II that this objection involves a mistake, viz. the assumption that a sense of "object of thought" is already clear, and furthermore such that anything which qualifies as such an object must be of one certain ontological status. It is at base still the illusion that objects of thought

must be a certain sort of thing, albeit a queer sort, which stands in the way of accepting that a sense can be given to our phrase in which persons and ordinary material things can be objects. I hope my investigations in Part II finally dispel this illusion - according to either of the criteria suggested there, and the one finally adopted persons and material things could often qualify. This is not to overlook, however, the separate point that any account of what thinking of consists in or amounts to must be able to handle the fact that the object of my thought may often be something which does not exist.

(b) Secondly, it presupposes that it makes sense to speak of, and that there is no further objection in these cases to speaking of, mental events, such as entertaining the belief that p at a certain time, thinking of X at a certain time, or an image or picture of X occurring to one at that time. I have argued in Part III that some notion of a mental event is appropriate in respect of "thinking" and "thinking of" even if it is not a clear notion. My definition of such a notion, under the label "intellectual event", concluded that part, and will be taken as satisfying this requirement of the argument.

(c) Thirdly, and this is where difficulties are most likely to arise, the argument makes certain presuppositions about the character of my knowledge of the object of my thought. The main

one of course concerns the point that I must know at the time what I am thinking of, in the sense that it does not make sense to suppose either that I thought of something but did not know at the time that I did nor that I thought at the time that I had thought of something at that time but was mistaken. Further, it is assumed that if an account is offered (e.g. a symbol 'A' occurs) which leaves open the possibility that I mistakenly thought that I knew what A is a symbol of, then the second condition above can be fulfilled only by supposing that I entertain at the time my belief about what it symbolizes, and thus think of this. Most of the objections to the argument will centre around these assumptions, but as I have discussed the knowledge claim a good deal already I will consider only two such objections.

It may be objected then that at least sometimes thinking something may be a matter of saying something to oneself (even if it could not be in any of the cases we are concerned with), and in such cases it remains true that I could not have thought I thought of something and have been mistaken, so the argument would seem to apply, and establish, contrary to the hypothesis, that thinking did not here consist in these symbols occurring to the person concerned. For example, I may say to myself as part of a train of thought "Wittgenstein was incredibly good", and this is surely a case of

thinking that, but the argument would seem to show that thinking in of Wittgenstein could never consist/just saying "Wittgenstein", and so it looks as if the argument must be fallacious. And it will not matter to this objection that these cases in which I say something to myself do not fall within the class of cases isolated for discussion.

The first point to be noticed in reply to this is that not all cases in which such words occur to me will be classed as cases of thinking, nor even all cases in which I say these words to myself. From another angle, not all cases of saying these words to myself and meaning someone by "Wittgenstein" will be such that it will not make sense to suppose that I think that I thought of someone but am mistaken. We saw at the end of Section I that for at least many cases of meaning something by the use of an expression, it makes sense to suppose that I thought I meant someone or something but was mistaken - to these cases our argument will not apply. And now the position is parallel to that arrived at at the end of that last Section, for in as much as a case of saying "Wittgenstein" and meaning some particular person by the use of it satisfies our condition for "knowing at the time", then to that extent the meaning a particular person which accompanies the occurrence of "Wittgenstein" becomes so akin to a case of thinking of as to be of no value in explanation.

So the general form of my reply to the objection will be that the case of saying "Wittgenstein" to myself may or may not be a case of thinking of the type to which the argument applies (i.e. one satisfying the "knowing at a time" condition), and in those cases in which it is the conclusion of the argument is not implausible.

A second objection may have this form. Consider cases of understanding what someone says, in respect of which it may be argued that there is a process common to both understanding and mis-understanding what he said, viz. taking him to have said that p, and that understanding what he said is just correctly taking him to have said that p. So on this line of argument being correct is a necessary feature of the cases falling under "understanding what he said" in the sense that only if I am correct is it called "understanding" rather than "misunderstanding" but not in the sense of being a necessary feature of these cases independently of how they are described. And, the objector may continue, the same is true of thinking of and knowing at times what I am thinking of - for only if a particular case has this feature do we call it thinking of, but possession of this feature is not some sort of necessary property of the cases independently of how they are described. But the argument presumes that the latter is the case, for only if this is presumed does it exclude the possibility that thinking of consists in the occurrences of images or symbols but only

in those cases in which I know at the time what it is an image of or symbol for.

Now whatever is to be said of the general validity of this line of argument, it is clearly not acceptable here. The basic reason is that the suggestion would be incoherent, because a case in which I had an image but did not know who it was an image of (even though I thought I did) would be a case in which I thought I thought of something or someone but did not, and so would have the possibility that I mistakenly think that I thought of something. That is, on the account suggested whether a case in which I think I know what it is an image of is really a case of thinking of depends on whether I do in fact know, and hence unless more is added it remains true that I could mistakenly think that I thought of something at a given time. So the argument remains intact.

5.

Let me put forward now some other objections to some of the views we are considering. Four need to be discussed, all relatively simple in formulation.

(i) Recall the results arrived at in Part II concerning whether

our various cases could or could not be construed as intentional actions. It was decided that many use III cases, and all use IV, and "it occurred to me (him etc) ...." cases, were not intentional, although the question was shelved whether this was a matter of these cases being e.g. unintentional or of their not being at all the type of case to which the intentional/unintentional vocabulary could be attributed. Now this gives rise to a simple objection to the sort of view expressed by Ayer's "A is using certain symbols of which at best one designates X",[1] at least when this is interpreted as A using a certain symbol to mean X, and generally to any view which explains what I am thinking of, and my knowledge of what I am thinking of in terms of what I mean or intend by the use of a given symbol. Namely: using a certain symbol and meaning or intending X by the use of it is essentially an intentional action (e.g. it would make sense to ask why I meant X rather than Y by the use of it, or to plan to, or decide to, use it to mean X on a given occasion), but most of our cases of thinking of something are not intentional actions, and so this could not be a correct account of these cases. Now one clearly could not unintentionally use a symbol and mean or intend X by the use of it - to establish that a given action was unintentional is sufficient to establish that nothing was meant or intended either in

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[1] "Thinking and Meaning" p. 13.

it or by it, in any relevant sense of "meant"[1] And it also seems clear that if something could not be said to be either intentional or unintentional, then one could not be said to mean or intend something either in it or by it. So, given that the argument of Part II is also accepted, both premises of this argument seem to be sound, and thus the conclusion to follow.

A number of replies may, however, be made at this point. For example, concerning cases correctly described by an "it occurred to me that ..." locution, it may be urged that the non-intentional point arises only because of the fact that this description is inappropriate, and is not an intrinsic feature of these cases. Thus, if someone says truly that three things happened today - Mr. Wilson went to see the Queen, the pound fell, and Mr. Heath resigned, it does not follow from the fact that these are all describable as "things that happened" that Mr. Wilson's visit and Mr. Heath's resignation were neither intentional nor unintentional. But this reply would largely miss the point, which is not just that a description like "it occurred to me that ..." is applicable but that for the cases so described no sense can be given to having reasons for doing this, or to planning, deciding or intending to do it. To put it another

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[1] This last phrase is intended to exclude e.g. the sense in which a Freudian may claim that I meant something by unintentionally knocking over the vase.

way: what distinguishes these cases as non-intentional is that no description can be given under which giving reasons, planning or intending make sense.

Another reply might be made, again in respect of "it occurred to me" cases, by pointing out that what has been shown to be non-intentional here is the occurrence of the whole thought, but my argument concerns only that aspect of the thought which can be reported by use of a name or definite description, and so the possibility remains that the thought might be non-intentional but that aspect of it intentional. And this could be supported by producing cases in which e.g. I am trying to think of what I know about Peter, and it suddenly occurs to me that he will be in Oxford by now. Here, it will be urged, my thinking something concerning Peter is intentional alright, it is what I am trying to do, but my thinking that is not of course intentional.

Now whatever may be the truth about these cases, and it is not at all clear that the account suggested is correct, there are many other cases in which it will clearly not do - e.g. if I am walking along not thinking of anything, or trying to think about who might be in Oxford, and it occurs to me that Peter will be there, then my thinking of Peter could not be regarded as intentional. So if necessary I can rest my argument on these examples.

(ii) Another argument against the "relation" view of thinking of something can be mounted by considering the fact that at least very often, a person is unable to say what it was that he thought of X consisted in or even what, if anything, occurred in his mind when he thought of X. If I am trying to think of an unmarried professor of philosophy and suddenly think of Ryle and am then asked "Did thinking of Ryle involve the having of an image of him, did the word "Ryle" occur, or something else?", I will very often not be able to answer this question. And this is a general fact - very often the mind flounders on such a question, and it cannot be certainly answered. In claiming this as a fact, I am not claiming that it is a fact that we can think of something without having any images of or symbols for that thing occur in the mind, for this latter claim could at least be disputed, and it be asserted e.g. that people could be trained so that they could always report what images or symbols they had. Be that as it may, it cannot be denied that <u>now</u> many people are often unable to say with certainty whether or not they had an image or a symbol, but those people still know perfectly well who or what they are thinking of. And from these juxtaposed facts it follows that knowing what one is thinking of cannot be, in these cases at least, a matter of knowing or recognising what the image is an image of, or the symbol a symbol for, or of knowing who or what you are using that symbol to mean. But if

thinking of something consists in the occurrence of an image or of symbol for that thing in the mind, or if using a symbol to mean that thing, then this must be what knowing what one is thinking of amounts to. So it follows that those doctrines are false.

Now it must be noted concerning this argument that it presumes that a person's not being able to say what his thought of X consisted in is not to be ascribed in general to his having forgotten, but this seems reasonable. Although there could of course be cases in which I have forgotten, if I just think of Ryle and am immediately asked what that thought consisted in, word or image, the supposition that I knew but have forgotten is surely highly implausible, and this would apply to very many such cases. Not only would this supposition be implausible, but it would get very close to being vacuous. For if someone were to claim in this case that I have always forgotten, he has to provide some reason for believing that I ever knew, and such a reason could only be forthcoming from me, but I have explicably disavowed knowing. But, it may be objected, consider reading - people can often say what they read, or what a certain passage said, and yet have no chance of repeating what the exact words were, but reading certainly involves recognising the words on the page. So could not this be an analogy for thinking of something? That is, to the extent to which this argument is that

the fact that in general a person cannot say what his thought consisted in shows that he could not know what his thought was of by recognizing what it consisted in, then the case of reading seems to provide a counter-example.

The reply to this must be twofold. Firstly, reading a passage is surely a case in which forgetting is plausible, simply because of the number of words involved, and a person would normally know, unless he had forgotten, the words of a single sentence which he had just read. So the case is not quite as clear as the example might suggest. Secondly, it may be queried whether it is completely certain that we read byrecognising individual words. Indeed, if it were established that even after reading a simple sentence a person could say what it meant but not repeat the words, then would not this be exactly what would show that he does not read by recognizing the various words? For surely recognizing this as a word for "cat" or a name for my mother (or as an image of my mother) entails being aware of some word, name or image.

(iii) A third and fairly common argument might be derived from at least the spirit of Wittgenstein's "Philosophical Investigations". An image or symbol is capable of use in many contexts with a different meaning or reference, and could occur in many cases of thinking of someone which in fact had different

objects. Thus "the images are quite equivocal in a way in which the thought is quite definite",[1] and the same word or name could occur in many cases of thinking of which differ in objects. So thinking of something cannot just be a matter of a word or symbol occurring to one.

Now I will not rely on this argument at all, partly because any convinced adherent of the view it opposes could deny it simply by postulating, and fairly plausibly, a sufficiently complicated image or a combination of word and image for which uniqueness held, but more importantly because it suggests that the view needs to be supplemented by his meaning or intending something, and then that suggestion needs to be evaluated. So we return very quickly to the earlier arguments.

(iv) The fourth argument which needs to be mentioned is also one on which I will not rely. It is that, irrespective of the truth of the empirical or quasi-empirical claim that we always have symbols or images when we thinking of something, nevertheless there is no contradiction in supposing that I thought of someone or something but had no symbol or image occur to me. This is the main argument which Ginnane uses in a recent article on these topics.[2] I will

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1 R. J. Ginnane, "Thoughts", Mind, July, 1960 p. 387. It needs to be noticed that Ginnane's concern here is with complete thoughts, and not just cases of thinking like the ones I have isolated, and in this context the point is quite likely a stronger one.

2 Ibid.

not rely on it, however, because it presupposes a certain view of the question we are trying to answer here, and of the sort of answer which would be appropriate to it, viz. that the question can be answered, and only answered, in terms which are analytically related to the terms of the question. This view of the problem I must now consider, but first I will conclude this section by summarizing the arguments I am accepting against the various variants of the image or symbol view.

"Image or symbol" views of thinking of break up into two types, one claiming that thinking of consists in just the occurrence of the image or symbol, the other claiming that it consists in the image or symbol being used to mean or intend a given thing. Against the first there is the argument of section I, the argument from "knowing at the time", and the second argument of this section, from the fact that a person can very often not say what occurred when he thought of f. Against the second there is this latter argument, as well as the one from thinking of most often not being an intentional action, and perhaps also the "knowing at the time" argument. So it seems clear that no such view could be acceptable.

4.

The question to which these views are offered as answers is: what does thinking of X, in the sort of cases isolated, consist in? Ginnane asks implicitly a more general question than this, but what he says should be applicable to the narrower one also.

This question is one in which it is presumed that we are clear about what we mean by "thinking of X" and that we can decide which cases do, and which do not, fall under this description. So the question is still to be asked when we know exactly what cases we are talking about, and when we know exactly what we mean in saying that it is a case of "thinking of X". That is, I am inclined to say that this is not a conceptual question, not one concerning the meaning or explication of the concepts involved.

Now the problems are: why say this, and what does it mean to say either that a question is, or that it is not, a conceptual one. Well, as Miss Anscombe said in a slightly different context,[1] one does not learn anything about the answer to <u>this</u> when one learns the meaning of "thinking of", or indeed when one learns the whole area of language in which this concept is embedded. Further, most people seem to know perfectly well what "thinking of" means, as shown for example by the fact that they can use this term adequately in all its normal contexts, yet they could not answer our question.

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1 Viz. in discussing very closely related problems in a recent lecture in Oxford.

To take a particular case: on hearing that someone just thought of Peter, I ask him whether or not his thought of Peter consisted in the occurrence in his mind of the image of the word "Peter". One very likely reaction to this will have three features - he will treat it as a more or less empirical question, and try to look and see, in the form of trying to remember what went on in his mind; he will find this process indecisive, and will not know what to say in answer to our question; finally, even if he does decide that there was an image there, he will feel uncertain about whether or not to say that this is what the thought of Peter <u>consisted</u> in. Again, St. Thomas believed that thinking of X consisted in the occurrence in the mind of X in the intentional mode of being,[1] many modern philosophers and psychologists considered that it consisted in the occurrence of images of or symbols for X, and some presumably believe that it consists in certain brain-processes (I am not wishing to suggest necessarily that these are all answers of the same type). Now whichever one of these we adopt will not seem to alter the meaning of "thinking of" - the concept will have its same role in ordinary discourse whichever one of these we accept, and its meaning will not change if we change our minds about these, or introduce another alternative.

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1 What exactly his view might have been is taken up in Section 5.

Yet, it will be replied to all this, philosophers have for a long time argued over the precise meaning of the term "cause", and whether it is to be analysed in terms of necessary connection or constant conjunction, or not to be analysed at all but taken as primitive. And, it will be said, no one doubts that this problem concerns the meaning of the term "cause", or the explication of the concept "cause", and yet all three of my points above will apply to it. We do not learn to decide for or against constant conjunction when we learn the meaning of the word "cause"; normal language-speakers know what this word means but have no opinions at all on the question of constant conjunction; and the meaning of the word does not change when one, or even all, philosophers change their positions. Similarly with the dispute about whether "seeing" is to be analysed in terms of the having of visual experiences, and indeed with the generality of philosophical analyses. I would have two partial replies to this reply. Whatever else we say, we must preserve a distinction somewhere between those inquiries which concern the concept and those which concern the thing, at least in the case of those concepts which are concerned with a reality in some strong sense of that term. We distinguish between what the word "lightning" means and what lighting consists in, between what "table" or "sun" mean and what tables or suns are made of. Further

the considerations I advanced are surely at least related to the reasons why Wittgenstein eschewed such analyses, and insisted that words like "seeing" or "cause" should be elucidated by being shown in their contexts of normal employment and not by being given a complicated, quasi-technical, analysis. So perhaps we should not feel too certain that we have in the debates about causality or vision, clear attempts to give the meaning of a term by analysis, which nevertheless satisfy my three points.

At this stage it is evident that we are landed in a general question of the greatest difficulty, viz. in what precise sense such philosophical problems can be said to be conceptual problems, and in what sense the solutions offered can be said to be analyses. Now I cannot consider the question at this level of generality, but will attempt to give some sense to the claim that my question concerning "thinking of" is not a conceptual one by considering some theses that such a claim might deny. Ginnane says (p. 377):

"At this point, however, I might mention in passing that I see no relevant distinction to be drawn here between the questions "What is the nature of thought?" and "What is the meaning of "thought" ?" Indeed I fail to see how there could be. At the level of philosophical enquiry, investigations into the articulations of 'Reality' and into the articulations of language emerge as one and the same project. I

cannot set my language aside and pry into Nature in a conceptually neutral way, because I should have no means of prying, let alone of registering my results."

Now the last sentence suggests a number of clearly acceptable points about our cases. I cannot inquire into the nature of thinking of something independently of its being the case that some cases and not others fall under this concept - I cannot even say clearly what I am investigating independently of the actual concept we have of "thinking"of", and Part II of this thesis was largely devoted to this point. Further, it may well be argued that I can only register my results, can only make sense of any answer I might give to the question concerning what thinking of something consists in, only in terms of concepts that we already have in the language or could explain in terms of concepts of the common language. Note though that even if these two points are granted it does not obviously follow that there can be no relevant distinction between "What is the nature of thinking of something". (or "What does thinking of something consist in:") and "What is the meaning of "thinking of" ?". This would only follow if, for example, the second point also involved the claim that the concepts used for registering the results had to be somehow analytically related to the concepts in terms of which the question is phrased. But this new claim most certainly needs to be

argued for, and a denial of it would constitute one way of saying that our question is not a conceptual one; it is not conceptual if it can be answered solely in terms of concepts not analytically related to the concepts in which it is phrased. This is of course not at all clear, and just loads all the problems into the phrase "analytically related to", but it may help us to see Ginnane's article a little more clearly. For his argument against saying that thinking of X consists in the occurrence of images of X is that there is no contradiction in saying that A thought of X but did not have any image of X. Now, stressing as it does the lack of <u>contradiction</u>, this argument clearly relies on the passage quoted earlier, and hence on the claim that our question can only be answered in terms of concepts analytically related to the concepts in terms of which it is phrased. But one may equally well say, in view of the fact that the "image" answer <u>seems</u> to be a plausible one and in view of my three points earlier, that the lack of contradiction shows that the question is not, or at least need not be construed as, a conceptual one. At best, then, this argument of Ginnane's is inconclusive. He may have chosen, but did not, to rest his case on the empirical fact that thinking of something can occur without the occurrence of any images. Wisely, I believe, for it is, or was, a question much disputed among psychologists whether there can be any imageless thinking, and also

because all the occurrence of imageless thinking need show, when divorced from the contradiction point, is that not all cases of thinking of are alike in this respect.

Let me turn to the positive theses of Ginnane's article. He reaches the stage of posing the dilemma; a thought could not both occur as a mental event and yet be composed of <u>nothing</u>.[1] Philosophical behaviourists are mistaken in trying to deny the first horn of the dilemma, by asserting that thoughts are never mental events; equally, materialists or imagists are mistaken in trying to deny the second horn, by asserting that the stuff of thinking is brain processes or images. The only way out is to accept that thoughts are <u>sui generis</u>, that they cannot be explained by equating them with something else of a more familiar type. We do not have any way of describing our thoughts except by saying what they are of or about, and we cannot describe them or their morphology or structure in any other way. Whenever we do try to so describe them, we end up with something quite irrelevant like our imagery or body chemistry.

Now the problem arises as to why the fact, if it is a fact, that thoughts form a class of their own so that they cannot be

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1 See p. 388. One of the paths which lead to the latter side of this dilemma is an attempt to say in a non-trivial fashion what changes when a thought occurs to me. Our inability to specify anything which changes might tempt us to say that thought is composed of nothing.

described in any other terms, resolves or allows us to live with or in any way relates to the original dilemma. For the dilemma that it seems to impinge upon would be this; that a thought could not both occur as an event and yet what that event involved not be describable in any other terms. Even if we accepted the sui generis point the original dilemma would re-appear in this way: as a thought could not both occur and yet be composed of nothing, the thesis that thought is sui generis implies that thought consists in a stuff of its own unique kind, which cannot be explained in terms of any other kinds. Rather as for at least some medieval philosophers it seems to have been the case that thinking of X consisted in the occurrence of X in the mind in a special mode of being, the intentional mode, which mode was essentially a matter of being thought of and which could not be explained in any other terms.

It is clear why this sort of problem does not arise for Ginnane. For if "What does thought consist in?" or "What is the nature of thought?" comes to nothing more than "What is the meaning of "thought"?", then it will follow from the claim that thoughts cannot be described in any other terms than what they are of or about, (i.e. that the meaning of "thought" can only be explained in such terms; that there are no other relevant questions to be asked or answered. And so accepting thought as sui generis does not

involve accepting a sui generis stuff or substance. But there does seem to be a residual question, and a question (e.g. "What does thinking consist in?") which, if it is appropriate, is shown by the applicability to it of our three features to be in some sense not a conceptual one. So I willlook at one further attempt that might be made to answer a version of this question in our context, that of the attempt to clarify the relation between thinking of something and the object of that thinking, but returning, in section 6, to look in more detail at the character of the problems being posed here.

5.

Faced then with this seemingly intelligible and appropriate question, but also with apparently sound reasons for rejecting the only obvious forms of answer, we might turn for illumination to some medieval doctrines, seeing that medieval writers are so often said to have first introduced the term "intentionality" and that some such doctrine has been hinted at continually during this thesis. If the arguments so far are accepted literally as showing the falsity of any view which maintains that the thought of A consists in the

occurrence in the mind of anything related to X, or the use of any word or symbol to mean X, then it might seem to follow that the thought must somehow involve the occurrence of X itself. But of course when I think of my cat, it does not occur in my mind simpliciter, so we might suppose that it occurs in my mind in another mode of being, a mode of being which is nothing other than a thing's being thought of. Such a mode of being would entail that what so existed was being thought of, and so the problem about our knowledge of what we are thinking of would not arise - to have my cat occur to me in that way is to think of my cat, and to think of my cat involves knowing that I am thinking of my cat, so having my cat occur in this way also essentially involves knowing that I was thinking of my cat. That is, this mode of being is, in a way, essentially conscious of itself. Further, we might add, the mind is nothing apart from the possibility of reception of such thoughts, and so there is no question of a knowing subject being aware of the occurrence of my cat in this mode in the mind, no question of a subject recognising or observing that occurrence.

Now this type of view, which is sometimes offered as Aquinas' position, would certainly resolve our problem, but at a very substantial cost. For to say that anything is my cat seems to entail that what is so described is material, possesses some matter - to say that

this is a cat but is not material is surely a clear contradiction. But the doctrine sketched above seems committed to a non-material mode of being of my cat, and it now seems completely obscure what could be meant by saying that this, in any sense, is my cat. (Or, for even clearer examples, take my car or my chair). Other objections might arise too (e.g. primia facie circularity, problems with the idea of modes of being or existence) and so if this is the view of Aquinas it seems to be in great difficulties.

But of course this is a far too simplified, and essentially misleading, statement of any view which could be represented as being that of Aquinas on this topic, and we need to go into the matter more carefully. In his article on Aquinas in "Three Philosophers,"[1] P. T. Geach expounds Aquinas' doctrine by saying:

"What makes a sensation or thought of an X to be of an X is that it is an individual occurrence of that very form or nature which occurs in an X - it is thus that our mind 'reaches right up to the reality'; What makes it to be a sensation or thought of an X rather than an actual X or an actual X-ness is that X-ness here occurs in the special way called esse intentionale and not in the 'ordinary' way called esse naturale. This solution resolves the difficulty. It shows how being of an X is not a relation in which

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1 "Three Philosophers", G.E.M. Anscombe and P.T. Geach, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1961, p. 95.

the thought or sensation stands, but is simply what the thought or sensation <u>is</u> .....".

Let us try to see if this view could be understood as a solution to the problems of this part. In stating it, Geach seems to use the terms "form" and "nature" interchangeably, as they are often used in such discussions, but as they can also be used in somewhat different senses, I will treat them in their different interpretations.

Consider then the view that the thought of an X (i.e. a particular known X) consists in the occurrence of the nature of that X with esse intentionale. Now for Aquinas the nature of a thing is what is given by its definition, and is <u>this</u> form plus matter, but not <u>this</u> matter, for it is essential to what this thing (e.g. my chair) is only that it should have some matter, not that it should have this matter. But now if one were to allow sense to speaking of the nature of a thing in this sense occurring at all, then 1) surely to suppose that this form and matter (i.e. the nature of this chair or cat) occurred immaterially, with non-material *esse*, is to suppose a contradiction, and 2) it would be completely obscure how such a thought would of <u>this</u> cat or chair rather than any other cat or chair, for all cats (or all chairs) presumably have the same nature, and what is held to individuate this cat from among other beings with this same nature is the

possession of this matter.

So perhaps the sense in which "nature" is different from "form" is not relevant, and the suggestion becomes just that the thought of X consists in the occurrence in the mind of the (individualized) form of X. Now why it is asserted that two modes of esse are involved is obscure, for we are surely not to suppose that there are two modes of being of the <u>form</u> of X. But, it might be suggested, the basic distinction here between esse naturale and intentionale is that between the occurrence of a form together with matter and its occurrence without matter. But at this point the problem above arises - what individuates <u>this</u> cat or chair among other cats or chairs is the occurrence of the form together with a particular parcel of matter, and so a form free of relation to any matter could not be regarded as the form of this cat rather than of any other cat. Further, even if this were somehow solved, there would still arise a problem concerning how I knew what my thought was of, parallel to the ones raised earlier - this individualized form is the form of this cat rather than that one by bearing some relation to the former, and so one could only know what particular cat one was thinking of by knowing that this relation held, and so on.

Some remarks need to be made concerning these possible inter-relations and the arguments given. Firstly, concerning whether "intentionale" and "naturale" could be taken as denoting

modes of esse of the form in question, it might be urged that there is evidence (e.g. in Q. 56 art. 2 ad. 3) for believing that Aquinas was prepared to allow forms to have two such modes of esse. This passage concerns the knowledge which one angel (a pure subsisting form) has of another, and Aquinas has to confront the difficulty that if angel A knows angel B by the occurrence of the form of angel B in his intellect, this will imply that angel B himself is in A's intellect, as B is simply a subsisting form. His solution of this problem is to invoke the distinction between esse naturale and intentionale of B, and he goes on to draw a parallel with the form of colour on the wall, which exists with esse naturale, but in the mind of someone knowing it has esse intentionale. But this seems to apply only when the form is of something without matter, such as an angel or a colour; I can find no reason for believing that Aquinas would have allowed that the form of a material thing could have two such esses.

Secondly, I have followed Gilson in the above by allowing a distinction between individualised and non-individualised forms in Aquinas, and if it is further allowed that individualised forms could differ from case to case within the limits laid down by the definition of the species, it may be objected that such differences

could enable the "form" doctrine to handle our problem. Be this last point as it may, the characteristic direct textual evidence for the presence of this distinction in Aquinas (e.g. 1a q75 art 5 ad 1) also shows clearly that it is not individualized forms which occur in the mind in thought or knowledge. In the passage just quoted, for example, a distinction between "individual" and "absolute"[1] forms is used to explain the difference between the way primary matter receives forms and the way the intellect receives forms, and how the intellect can be moved from potentiality to act by the occurrence of a form without itself being composed of matter and form. Compare also "For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual"[2] so it will clearly be mistaken to think of individualized forms as what occurs in the mind in thought - but now it is becoming obscure how St. Thomas' doctrine could be interpreted as a solution to the problems of this part.

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1 These are the terms used in the English Dominican translation, as given in "The Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas", ed. by A. C. Pegis, Random House, 1945. p. 695. All quotations and references will be to this translation and edition, unless otherwise stated.

2 1a q75 art 5

Thirdly, it seems a characteristic doctrine of Aquinas that for a form of A to exist it is simply for there to be something which is A^1 - only the form of the human body, the soul, is held to be capable of existing independently of its matter. How then can he say that the form occurs immaterially in the mind when something is thought of?[2] This can probably be resolved by the distinction between individual and absolute forms. The doctrine of 1a Q75 art5 is that as matter is the principle of individuation of forms, if the intellect was composed of matter and form then forms would be received into it as individuals, but in fact the form of a stone absolutely is in the intellectual soul. So he would seem to be prepared to allow that absolute forms can exist independently of their matter.[3]

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1 cf. 1a Q84 art4

2 Compare e.g. "A thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower" S.T. 1a. Q75 art 5.

3 But this still leaves the problem as to why St. Thomas speaks of intentional or mental esse here, as e.g. at 1a 2ae Q50 art4 ad 2, and the comment on this passage in A.Kenny (ed. and translation) Summa Theologica, Dispositions for Human Acts. Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964, p. 40-1.

This suggests the fourth point, which in turn leads on to the most important considerations. For we must notice that the main objection raised above to construing the doctrine of the occurrence of the form in the mind as a solution to the current problems (that the same form is common to, e.g. many different cats, and what individuates of them is their different matter) was known to Aquinas, and its consequences were accepted by him. At 1a Q86 art 1 the question is raised whether the intellect knows singulars, and Aquinas argues that only universals are directly known, for matter is the principle of individuation of singulars and the mind understands by abstracting the intelligible species from such matter. Yet singulars are indirectly known, via the phantasms in which the intellect understands the species. This is consistent with the many passages in the Summa which stress that the mind's knowledge is primarily through the universal, and makes clear that if the remarks of Geach quoted earlier are interpreted as an answer to our problems (as they may but need not be)[1] then they over-simplify and mis-construe Aquinas' doctrine. So we need to attempt to understand the role of the phantasms in this "indirect" knowledge or thought of singulars.

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[1] If one takes "thought of an X" as Geach does it in the passage given as e.g. "thought of a dog" rather than "thought of some particular dog" then Geach's remarks do not relate directly to my problem. This may well be his intention, but it is not altogether clear to me.

Aquinas stresses that phantasms are necessary for thought or understanding in two ways, that the mind can only understand through intelligible species abstracted from the phantasms and that it can only understand its proper object, actual existing things, through the phantasms. "Our intellect both abstracts the intelligible species <u>from</u> the phantasms in as much as it considers the natures of things universally, and yet understands these natures <u>in</u> the phantasms, since it cannot understand the things of which it abstracts the species, without turning to phantasms ....." (1a Q85 art 1 ad5) The point which concerns us here is that on this view what makes a thought or judgement of a particular X is that it is an act of judgement or a thought turned towards a particular set of phantasms. Now this relation to phantasms which introduces particularity into the judgement is mentioned by Aquinas very often (e.g. 1a Q85 a 7, 2a 2ae q175 a4; "and it is in considering these phantasms that the intellect judges of and co-ordinates sensible objects",[1] 3a, Q11, ad2 ad 1) but as far as I can see is never clarified beyond the use of the metaphors already given.

But this hardly matters for our purposes, for it has become clear that if Aquinas' doctrine is applied to our problem, then what makes my thought one of this X rather than some other X

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1 Translated in P. Hoenen S.J. Reality and Judgement according to St. Thomas, Scriber, New York, p. 28.

(of this man or horse rather than some other man or horse) is the fact that certain phantasms or images are somehow involved. This account, however it is more fully filled out, would seem to be susceptible to the arguments already brought forward against the image or symbol view. For if its the character of the phantasms or images which determines, in the sort of cases we are considering, what particular man my thought is of, then both the "knowing at the time" argument and the argument from not knowing what occurs are applicable and decisive. As far as our problem is concerned, the principle involved here is no different from that of the views already discussed.

The fact of the matter seems to be that the current problem was not one which greatly occupied Aquinas' attention, and unless quite drastic revisions are made his doctrine could not provide a solution to it. And it may be doubted in view of the discussion of this section whether even drastic revisions would be successful.

6.

Let me recapitulate on the discussion of this part of the thesis. In attempt to understand, in certain specified cases, the relation between the mental event which was the thought and its object, this question was inevitably raised: in these cases, what does thinking of something consist in? If the answer to this last question was, e.g. that thinking of X consisted in the occurrence in the mind of an image of or symbol for X, we might conclude that the relation between thought and object was a familiar one of being similar to or standing for; if the answer were that thinking of X consisted in the occurrence of X in the intentional mode, the relation (?) between thought and object would be that of being the same thing, albeit in a different mode. But we have seen reasons for believing that thinking of X does not consist in the occurrence of anything (image, symbol etc) other than but related to X, and for being at least sceptical about whether a Thomistic, esse intentionale, doctrine could be made coherent in a way which would avoid our objections. Further, one attempt to reject the question as one having no answer, that of Ginnane, has been shown to be ambiguous and apparently unacceptable. Now we may start to suspect that our question itself is somehow bogus, or perhaps that the presumption that thinking of something is a mental event is

mistaken or incoherent. So these two anxieties must now be taken up.

Our worries on the first score may be increased by a number of reflections. Firstly, might not the arguments used against the image or symbol view be taken rather as establishing that there could be no answer to the question, for anything which could be offered as what thinking of something consists in would seem to be susceptible to them. Not only can I often not say whether I had an image, but also I cannot say what else I had (i.e. supposing that thinking of were held to consist in something else) other than the thought of X. And whatever my thought consisted in, would not the question about how I know what I am thinking of lead to the reductio given in Section 1? So perhaps we should conclude that these arguments show that the question "What does thinking of something consist in?" is not one which can have any answer.

Secondly, assuming that 'pain' names a special kind of sensation, what would the question "What does pain consist in?" come to? What is being asked when such a question is pressed in such a case and such conditions, or with the case of hearing a loud noise, or feeling overwhelming in love? Thirdly, are not "the occurrence of an image of X" and "the occurrence of the form of X" somehow answers of a quite different sort, even though they both could not be true together? That is, the form of X or X occurring in the immaterial

mode are not more basic elements into which cases of thinking of something can be broken down, but are offered as accounts of a rather different type.

One thing that emerges from all of this is that there are here two somewhat different queries, or at least two different senses of the question: "What does thinking of consist in?" For if this is construed as: "What are the constituents of thinking of—into what simpler and more familiar elements can it be broken down?", then our arguments would seem to show that there are no such constituents or simpler elements, and thus to show that the question interpreted is in this way not appropriate.[1], With any such constituents , there would arise the problem of how I know what I am thinking of, leading to a regress or an inadequate account, and also the problem that I do not know that such constituents in fact occur. In other cases of thinking, or with other experiences, we can make quite good use of the notion of the elements or constituents of the thinking or the experience. If I were thinking about the problem of evil for ten minutes, someone might well ask what my thoughts consisted in, and I could give him the various thoughts that passed through my head; if I have a very odd experience one evening, I might attempt to convey to someone what thoughts and feelings that experience consisted in. But our arguments show

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1 i.e. not appropriate in the sense of not having any answer, but not of being altogether senseless.

no
that/such elements or constituents are acceptable with thinking of something. Yet even if this is accepted, perplexities remain, which may find their expression by means of "But what is it to think of something?" or even "What does thinking of something consist in?" We must attempt to make these more explicit.

The basic concern of this part of the thesis has been to confront the question: what account can we give of the relation between the mental event which is the thought and the object of that thought, for certain specified cases? And this question is raised in the hope of getting a more informative answer than that the relation in question is one of being thought of. How this immediately involved us in considering what thinking of something consists in, for if it consists, e.g. in the occurrence of images, then the relation between thought and object is fairly clear. We have seen that thinking of cannot be said to have any constituents or to consist of certain more basic elements, but this does not dissolve the original problem, for it is not clear that accepting this conclusion blocks any attempt to understand further the relation between thought and object. It is no objection to this either to claim that my arguments show that thinking of X cannot be a matter of the occurrence of <u>anything</u> related to X, for the reply will be that what they show is that thinking of X cannot be a matter of the occurrence of anything

more familiar and tangible than a thought, related to X in a more familiar and non-unique way. Thinking of X cannot be reduced to anything more tangible,[1] and the relation between thought and object cannot be thus elucidated in terms of any more familiar relation, but this does not resolve or eliminate the original problem. Perhaps it shows, though, that nothing can be done in answer to it. other than accepting the utter uniqueness of thinking? But we would need another argument to show that nothing more could be said, as can be seen by considering firstly some related questions which arise here, and secondly by considering other cases in which it does not make sense to ask what something consists in.

At least three such questions arise:

(1) "The occurrence of an event entails that something has changed"[2] This seems to be a necessary truth, and in the case of thinking of implies that something changes when I think of X. Now I cannot just say that the person or his mind changes, unless these are taken as denoting Cartesian second substances, for in general a person changes only if some part or aspect of him changes, and "mind" involves all the problems that "thinking" does and more. So can we give any further account of what changes when a thought occurs to me or I think of something at a given time?

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1 i.e. cannot be reduced to a more tangible and more readily understood constituents, in the sense that has been given to this last term.

2 Ginnane op. cit. p. 384.

(2) Various accounts are, or have been, offered of thinking, and by implication of thinking of - thinking is sometimes asserted to be nothing other than a certain brain process, to be a certain type of occurrence in the life history of a spiritual substance, to be nothing more than a propensity or disposition to behave in a certain way, or to be the occurrence of what is thought of in the mind with esse intentionale. These seems to be attempts to say what thinking of consists in/a sense (or senses) other than that in which images or symbols are offered, i.e. they do not pretend to offer mental constituents of thinking of which are such that we know what we are thinking of by knowing what such constituents is related to. But for any of these accounts to be acceptable they must imply answers to the questions concerning the relation thought/ object and one's knowledge of the object of one's thought which avoid the arguments of this part.[1] If we were to claim that all these either did not make sense or were false, would not the drive behind them viz. to understand more fully what sort of event thinking of is, still remain?

(3) If we deny that thinking of has constituents of the sort in question, does it follow that we should postulate an absolutely uni ue relation between thought and object, describable only as

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1 It is worth noting in passing that it seems completely baffling how the brain process account could so handle these questions,

that of being thought of? This relation would presumably be such that it was essential to the thought but not to the object, and such that it was somehow the being of the thought to be so related to the object. (Note that this would be a particular application of Chapman's view of intentionality outlined at the beginning of Part III). Are we forced to postulate such a relation?

Such questions seem to arise even if it is admitted that thinking of has no more familiar mental constituents. Further, consider another case in which we might be inclined to say that the question "What does it consist in?" is not appropriate, or at least has no answer, viz. that of a basic particle. Suppose that the physicists conclude that, in the manner of the Kinetic Theory of Gases, matter consists finally of ultimate particles which could never be broken down or split, and which had no further structure. Here our question (construed as a request for constituents) is not appropriate, and to pursue it would only be to show that you have not grasped what "basic particle" means here. Yet much can be said about the basic particles. Firstly, of course, that they are <u>particles</u> (assuming that they are, and do not have, e.g. the status which electrons currently possess) tells us a vast amount - that they are independent material substances, discrete but interacting in certain ways. And the various properties of these particles could

be discovered - mass, size, charge, speed of motion, elasticity etc. so it does not follow from the fact that there is something which cannot be said to have any constituents that one can say nothing about that thing. In the case of thinking of, then, it would need a further argument to show that nothing further can be significantly asked or observed. Short of such an argument,[1] significant questions would seem to be the ones above: What changes when I think of X? In the contexts of the various alternatives put up, can we understand more fully what sort of event thinking of is? Are we forced to postulate this unique "thinking of" relation?

It needs to be noted that such queries, assuming that they are significant, are not conceptual queries, at least in the sense in which it was suggested earlier that the "constituent" question was not a conceptual one. For any answer would seem to have the three features given in section 4, that a person does not learn that answer when learning language, that ordinary language-speakers would normally have no idea whether or not it was a correct answer, and that the meaning of "think of" does not change even if all philosophers change their position in respect of this answer. Now although the grounds of "conceptual" here involve great problems, these seem to be at least sufficient to allow the conclusion that

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1 I am not wanting to deny that such an argument might be forthcoming, but I cannot go into the question here. For example, Wittgenstein's treatment of meaning and philosophical Investigations" would, if accepted, amount to such an argument.

these are not conceptual enquiries in that a possible answer cannot be excluded simply because its denial does not involve a contradiction.

I will conclude by returning to the central question, that of the relation between the event which is the thought of X and the object of the thought X, particular in the cases in which X is an actual person or thing. Now if it is accepted that at least often the thought of X can be a genuine intellectual event, in the sense of Part III (and surely no reason has yet emerged to cast doubt on this), that the object is often something in the world and that thinking of X cannot be said to have constituents in the sense given, then four positions seem possible vis-a-vis our question, viz.

(1) That there is no such relation and no reason to suppose that there is one.

(2) That whether or not there is such a relation, there is nothing to be said other than that these are cases of "thinking of".

(3) That we are forced to postulate an absolutely unique relation or group of relations, which could only occur in cases of "thinking of", and which specifies the very special character of these cases

(4) That when we come to understand more fully what thinking of is, we will come to understand what this relation is.

One way of supporting (1) (and perhaps (2)) might be to insist that as there is no logical gap between thought and its expression, the only real problem here is that of the relation between the utterance which expresses my thought and the object of the thought. But I may never express my thought, and yet it is clearly "of" its object, and known to be at the time of the thinking; further, the fact that the expression of my thought refers to Ryle is certainly not what makes my thought one of Ryle. So a problem seems to remain. And unless position (1) (or some versions of (2)) could be established, this problem seems likely to remain.

7.

My aims in this concluding part of the thesis have been very limited ones, viz. to show that serious and apparently genuine problems remain in this traditional area of intentionality, that of the relation between a mental event and its object, and to attempt to delineate some features of these problems in the case of thinking of something. In conclusion I can only suggest a number of further areas, a deeper understanding of which might provide some

solutions to these problems. Firstly, the relation between the thought and the thinking subject needs to be probed, for the models of this which the "occurrence of an image" view and the "meaning X by use of some symbol" view provide have been shown to be unacceptable, the former because it distorts my knowledge of the object of my thought and the latter because it makes thinking of X always intentional. Secondly, a clearer sense must be provided for the terms "mental event" and (or) "intellectual event", if this is possible. Thirdly, a deeper understanding is required of questions concerning, meaning and intending, both to clarify the nature of the questions involved and to elucidate the way they (i.e. meaning and intending) involve mental events and relate to thinking. Fourthly, more fully understood the concepts involved in the Aristotelian and Scholastic traditions might yet provide the answer to these puzzles. But at least we can conclude that here there are very important and unresolved problems remaining.

So the conclusions of this thesis can be summed up in the most general way as follows. Of the three areas falling under the heading "intentionality" which were outlined in the introduction, the first, the view that criteria can be given which mark out all and only psychological sentences, is demonstrably false, even

though the criteria offered do mark out an interesting group or groups of largely psychological sentences; the second, involving the use of the notion of an "intentional object", uses a notion to which it appears likely that no clear and useful sense can be given, even though particular instances of this notion (e.g. "object of thought") can be precisely defined and are of some importance; the third; involving the idea of some mental events as purely intentional or of intentionality as a mode of being, points to problems in the case of "thinking of" which have not yet been solved but to which such ideas would provide a solution, even though any solution along these lines has itself to face many difficulties.

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