Working paper icon

Working paper

General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy.

Abstract:

Workers will not pay for general on-the-job training if contracts are not enforceable. Firms may if there are mobility frictions. Private information about worker productivities, however, prevents workers who quit receiving their marginal products elsewhere. Their new employers then receive external benefits from their training. In this paper, training firms increase profits by offering apprenticeships which commit firms to high wages for those trainees retained on completion. At these high w...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


Volume:
686 (4)
Series:
CESifo Working Papers
Publication date:
2002-04-05
URN:
uuid:0e788ba0-5faf-46fc-8d7d-dd9173282c3d
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13444
Language:
English

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP