Abstract

SOCIAL MOBILISATION AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS
IN 20th CENTURY UKRAINE

Thesis submitted for
the degree of D.Phil.,
Hilary Term, 1982.

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Oxford.

The thesis analyses social and political change in twentieth-century Ukraine and its impact on the development of the national consciousness of Ukrainians. In the pre-revolutionary era Ukrainians had a weak sense of national identity because the strategic sectors of society were dominated by non-Ukrainian minorities and because the infrastructures of national life were poorly developed. The 191 revolution saw the rise of a Ukrainian national movement which, while unable to achieve independence, proved strong enough to force major concessions, such as the creation of a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and acceptance of the principle of Ukrainization policies, from the Bolsheviks. The transformation of socio-economic relations in the course of the revolution facilitated the entry of Ukrainians into the socially-mobilized sectors of society, which, together with the development of the infrastructures of national life, brought Ukrainians to the threshold of nationhood by the end of the 1920s. During the first five-year plan Stalin's policies generated much opposition in Ukraine. The purges, the abandonment of Ukrainization, the great famine and the imposition of a totalitarian socio-political order in the 1930s, destroyed much of the fabric of Ukrainian national life. However, the rapid urbanization and industrialization saw Ukrainians emerge as a majority of the socially-mobilized population. Also, the fact that many republican institutions survived, at least in form, facilitated the resurgence of Ukrainian national assertiveness in the post-Second World War period. Ukraine's lagging economic development, large-scale Russian immigration and the Russification of Ukraine's educational system created a highly competitive environment in the republic which served as the social backdrop for a recrudescence of Ukrainian nationalism in the post-Stalin era. While the Ukrainian intelligentsia were the most vocal exponents of national claims, they were often backed by the new generation of Ukrainian political leaders who, having been trained for responsible positions, were anxious to assume them free from excessive interference from the centre. The Russian leadership's response to this new autonomism was to accelerate Russification and central control of the republic. These policies generated new national conflicts rather than resolve old ones.
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The thesis analyses social and political change in twentieth-century Ukraine and its impact on the development of the national consciousness of Ukrainians. The point of departure is Ukrainian society on the eve of the 1917 revolution. The results of the first (and only) general population census taken in the Tsarist Empire (1897) show that although Ukrainians were a majority of the population of their country, all crucial sectors in the social division of labour - the urban population, the nobility, the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the working class - were dominated by non-Ukrainian minorities. In explaining the peculiarities of Ukraine's social structure, the effects of the social and economic policies of foreign rulers are examined. The imbalance in the social structure produced by these policies meant that the social pressures which normally give rise to a strong sense of national consciousness operated weakly. Moreover, the human resources of the socially-mobilised population were largely denied to the emerging Ukrainian national movement. The leadership of that movement fell by default to a small layer of urban intelligentsia and rural semi-intelligentsia, whose ability to mobilise the Ukrainian people was greatly hampered by the relentless efforts
of the tsarist regime to block the emergence of the infrastructures of national life - schools, social and political organizations, book publishing and newspapers. Ukrainians were an overwhelmingly peasant people weighed down by illiteracy and poverty. Although the difficult agrarian conditions gave rise to major social unrest, that unrest had to be channeled and organized in order to be effective. While some progress towards the development of a Ukrainian national movement was apparent by the eve of the revolution, it was still inchoate when confronted by the challenge of the revolution.

During the revolution the development of the infrastructures of national life occurred very rapidly, especially in the countryside. The intelligentsia took the lead in this process. But in and of themselves, they would not have been able to accomplish this enormous task had they not been reinforced by tens of thousands of fresh cadres which the First World War and the army supplied. Hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainian peasants - the most dynamic element in the countryside - were placed in uniform where they learnt the effectiveness of organization. While serving the tsar they also experienced in a thousand different ways the social contrast which is the yeast of national self-awareness. When the soldiers returned (or deserted home), they greatly expanded the organizational forces of the Ukrainian movement. While this movement was unable to achieve Ukraine's independence, it proved strong enough to force major concessions from the Bolsheviks. The establishment of a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and acceptance of the principle of
Ukrainization were the most notable such concessions. The Bolsheviks found that while they could maintain control of the society from their urban fortresses, they could not bring about much-needed social, economic and cultural development, especially in the countryside, without involving their former opponents, the activists of the Ukrainian national movement - teachers, members of the cooperative movement and the like. Tasks which in Russia were purely economic, carried with them major national overtones in Ukraine. The recruitment of representatives of the social groups mentioned above to positions of responsibility resulted in the penetration of the national idea into Soviet Ukrainian institutions which had initially eschewed them. The activism and energy which these groups showed in organizing Ukrainian-language schools, newspapers and cultural groups ensured that Ukrainian culture deepened and broadened its influence in the society.

The revolution fundamentally altered economic relations in the country. Foreign capital, hitherto the motor force of Ukraine's industrialization, was expropriated, while the most important levers of economic policy and decision-making fell into the hands of central economic organs who defended the interests of the Russian economy to the detriment of the Ukrainian. Ukraine was subjected to discriminatory taxation and industrial location policies which hindered its economic development and depressed its population's standard of living. The leadership of the republic's institutions - the party, the state and trade unions - charged with the responsibility of managing the republic under these adverse conditions, reacted by attempting to broaden the republic's powers and consti-
tutional prerogatives as a way of ameliorating local conditions. The cultural movement led by the Ukrainian intelligentsia began to dovetail with the increasing autonomist assertiveness of the republic's new political and administrative elite.

The transformation of agrarian relations in the countryside, the mobilising effect of the revolution and the expansion of education altered fundamentally the migratory patterns of the Ukrainian population. The Ukrainian peasantry, especially village youth, began to stream into the towns to seek employment in industry and state administration, or admission to technical schools and universities. As Ukrainians increased their representation in the strategic sectors of society, the Ukrainization of these sectors gained momentum. Ukrainization "from below", when combined with the Ukrainization of the summit of society, brought Ukrainians to the threshold of nationhood by the end of the 1930s.

The centralistic drive initiated by Stalin in connection with the first five-year plan provoked much discontent in Ukraine. When the Ukrainian elite refused to become the willing tools in the extermination of their own people during the 1932-3 grain requisition campaign, Stalin launched his first mass purge of the republic. At the same time, Ukrainization policies which nurtured republican particularism were abandoned, and the republic's schools, mass media and intellectual life were remoulded and forced to propagate the virtues of extreme centralism. The decimation of Ukraine's population during the great famine of 1932-3 and the purges of 1933-4, when combined with the imposition of a totalitarian social and political order, destroyed much of the fabric of Ukrainian national
life. Yet even under these conditions Ukrainian particularism asserted itself. The new leadership after the 1933–4 purges made some efforts at national consolidation and played a leading role in offering resistance to Stalin's attempt to unleash a new wave of terror. They were mercilessly liquidated during the Ezhovshchina and the republic was reduced to a NKVD fiefdom. From 1938 onward, the infrastructures of Ukrainian national life were further weakened when their Russification was ordered.

In the era of the first five-year plan Ukraine saw much urban and industrial development. It was, however, a highly uneven growth, reflecting Russian economic priorities, not those of Ukraine. The socio-economic transformations which did occur during the 1930s, however, were sufficient for Ukrainians to emerge as a majority of the socially mobilised sectors of the population. This, combined with the fact that many republican institutions, at least in form, survived even Stalin's destructive hand, raised the possibility that perhaps the drive for national self-assertion could be resumed in the future.

In the post-Stalin period Ukraine fell further behind Russia in over-all levels of socio-economic development. The highly competitive environment created by the sizeable Russian immigration to Ukraine further restricted opportunities for social mobility, as did the Russification of Ukraine's educational system and the ossification of the social structure. As a consequence, Ukrainians did not improve their standing in the intelligentsia during the 1960s. Their representation among students attending vuzy even decline in that decade. These were some of the factors which served as the social backdrop for the resurgence
of Ukrainian national assertiveness. The most vocal exponents of Ukraine's national claims were the intelligentsia, supported by broad sectors of public opinion. Some of the intelligentsia's demands were backed by the new generation of Ukrainian political leaders, who, having been trained for responsible positions, were anxious to assume them free from excessive interference from the centre. That leadership made efforts to strengthen Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions, and to claim greater control over the economy.

The Russian leadership's response to this new autonomism was to accelerate Russification in the hopes that this would dry the well-springs that fed national ambitions. An examination of the relevant census data and other sources of information suggests that, despite the Russification drive, Ukrainians' sense of national identity during the 1960s was rather stable. It was found that among the urban and educated sectors of society a different structure of national consciousness existed, one which should not be mistaken with a weakening of that consciousness. Among the socially-mobilised sectors of society the source of national tensions was rooted in socio-economic rather than cultural factors. Russification and increased central control of the republic generated new national conflicts rather than resolve old ones. Evidence of this could be seen in the fact that in 1972, Petro Shelest, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, together with scores of leading state and party officials were dismissed from their posts on charges of nationalism.
SOCIAL MOBILISATION AND NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

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Bogdan A. Krawchenko

Preface

I should like above all to thank my supervisor, Archie Brown of St. Antony's College, for his patience and assistance. In Edmonton, Canada I benefited from many discussions with Dr. John-Paul Himka, Dr. I.L. Rudnytsky and Dr. A. Hornjatkevyc. Dr. M.R. Lupul, Director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta provided constant support and encouragement. Special thanks go to Anhelyna Szuch and Chrystia Chomiak who typed the thesis. My late "Ukrainized" mother, Antonina Zinov, and my father, Oleksandr Krawchenko, former residents of Donbas who lived through much of the period under study, were my constant sounding-boards. I could not have completed this work without the advice of Kim Fraser; but I am solely responsible for all the errors and omissions which remain.

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Technical note

A simplified Library of Congress system of transliteration, omitting all diacritics, will be used. Geographical names within the current boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR are transliterated from the Ukrainian following contemporary Soviet orthography: Kiev, the Crimea, Transcarpathia and Stalino are exceptions. Towns are identified in the various chapters by the name current in the period under study with their contemporary equivalents, where applicable, given in brackets the first time they are mentioned. Proper names of Ukrainians will be transliterated from the Ukrainian. Names of prominent figures (such as Trotsky) will be written in their customary English form. Dates, unless otherwise specified, refer to the new calendar. All measurements, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the metric system.
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Introduction

Throughout this thesis, we will use terms such as "people", "nation", "national consciousness", "national identity" and "nationhood". While there is little consensus in the literature on the national question as to how these concepts should be employed, we need working definitions in order to distinguish between the various stages in the development of a people. A people, then, is a collectivity distinguishable in terms of objective criteria (language, dress, rituals and the like) and one which is large enough to contain in theory, if not in practice, the elements for a complete division of labour. What differentiates a people from other ethnic categories is that its members attach little significance to cultural markers in pursuit of their social, economic and political demands.¹ The transition from a people to a nationality, or in other words the acquisition of a national consciousness or national identity, is a further step in the growth of a people's internal solidarity. This occurs when cultural distinctiveness becomes an important factor in a people's social, economic and political demands. At this stage of development a nationality must acquire a measure of "effective control over the behaviour of its members" in order to strengthen and elaborate the alignments that "make up the social fabric of nationality".² This control can be organized either through informal social arrangements or, more effectively, through formal social or political organization. Once a nationality has added this power to compel to its earlier cohesiveness and attachment to group symbols, it often considers itself a nation and is recognized as such by others, even though it may not yet control a state of
its own. If the nation acquires the right to govern itself in a separate sovereign unit, we may say that a nation-state has come into being.\(^3\)

The development of national identity is therefore a dynamic process. A preponderant factor determining the strength of national consciousness is the specific behaviour of elites. National identity is not a natural condition of humanity but a new alignment in society that occurs when "elites consciously choose to elect ethnic symbols as the basis for mobilisation in competition with other elites either for control over a local society or for equal or privileged access to the opportunities and resources that arise during the process of modernization.\(^4\) But not all elites choose to behave in this manner. Some may co-operate with external authorities and assimilate into an alien culture. Unless the elites demand the corporate recognition of the group as a whole, a people, while maintaining its cultural distinctiveness, cannot develop a strong sense of national identity.

Elite competition serves as the catalyst for the mobilisation of people around particularistic national demands. But this requires effective communication, and presupposes the existence of organizations that allow members of the group to engage in collective action, as well as a press and schools.\(^5\) The existence of these infrastructures of collective life, in turn, depends on the tolerance of dissent culture and political organization by the central state. Another precondition for group activity is a socially-mobilised population to whom the new message may be communicated and out of which a new political movement can be forged.

Social mobilisation is the name given to an "overall process of change which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries
which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life." It refers
to the growth of industry and trade, cities, the spread of literacy
and of education, processes which create a new way of life that pre-
disposes the population towards the new allegiances represented by na-
tionality and creates the community resources that allow for effective
organization in pursuit of new demands. Members of the mobilised public
are more likely to be urban rather than rural dwellers, literate rather
than illiterate, non-agricultural rather than peasant, and educated
rather than unschooled.

The active intervention of indigenous elites, the existence of
a mobilised population and of infrastructures of national life tolerated
by the central state are, in our view, among the most important elements
facilitating the emergence of a national consciousness. These are the
elements that will be highlighted in our analysis of society in Ukraine.
The period under study is from the turn of the twentieth century to
1972, the latter marking the fall of Shelest as First Secretary of the
Communist Party of Ukraine.
Notes


3. Ibid., 104-5.


6. Karl W. Deustch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," American Political Science Review, no.3, 1961, 493. It should be noted that for us the term "social mobilisation" refers to the processes of social change and social modernization. We do not necessarily accept the model of national development as presented by Karl Deustch and which is at times associated with the concept "social mobilisation".
Chapter One: Ukrainian Society on the Eve of the Revolution
Introduction

On the eve of the First World War and the revolution Ukrainians were a people who had not yet developed a crystallized national consciousness and whose emergence to the stature of nationhood seemed like a distant goal. The problems that Ukrainians encountered in their national development under the ancien régime could be grouped into two categories. The first derived from the imbalance of that nation's social structure. Ukrainians were poorly represented in the urban population, the working class, and among the elites of their society. The second involved the lack of infrastructures of national life - schools and the press - which could be used to communicate the national message and forge a national community. Both aspects will be analysed in this chapter and an attempt will also be made to provide an explanation as to how these problems came into being.

i. Territory and population

It is indicative of Ukraine's predicament under tsarism that one must begin a discussion of that society with some remarks about the territories that constituted Ukraine. Dankwart A. Rustow suggests that "a stable framework of geographical identity" is a precondition for a stable sense of nationality. The problem was that as a result of tsarist centralistic encroachments, Ukraine ceased to exist as a distinct
territorial, administrative entity by the late eighteenth century. Since 1782, with the introduction of the Russian gubernia or provincial system, Ukrainian provinces were governed directly from St. Petersburg like any other province of ethnic Russia. Because Ukraine did not exist in fact, the emerging national movement of the nineteenth century had to affirm it as an ideal. The question arose, what is Ukraine? The answer was not self-evident.

In the nineteenth century the Ukrainophile movement put forth two conceptions of Ukrainian territoriality. The first, advanced by sections of the Cossack gentry, was rooted in eighteenth-century notions of historical legitimism. In that political philosophy the nation was equated with statehood; the loss of statehood meant the death of the nation. Thus in the minds of the "Hetmanate Ukrainophiles", as an anonymous mid-nineteenth century writer labelled this current, the future of the Ukrainian nation was bound up with the restitution of the Hetman state. Flowing from this political conception, the territory of Ukraine consisted of lands which had once been under the administration of the Hetmanate. This was obviously a rather narrow definition of Ukrainian territoriality. It was only with the rise of populism and of the intelligentsia as the leading force within the Ukrainophile movement that the nation came to be defined as a cultural-linguistic community. Mykhailo Drahomanov in 1878 put the new ethnographic conception rather bluntly: "Ukrainian lands are those where live the same kind of moujiks as in former Cossack Ukraine along the Dnipro..." His conception of Ukrainian boundaries as stretching from Białystok to Armavir in the Kuban', from Presov to Novocherkassk, would have been
incomprehensible to Bantysh-Kamens'kyi, the epigone of early nineteenth century Cossack thought, who did not consider Volyn' Ukrainian territory since it had not been part of the Hetman state. Although subsequent demographic research improved Drahomanov's somewhat woolly boundaries, the ethnographic principle in the delineation of political boundaries which he enunciated took root in Ukrainian political thought. Thus the Central Rada in its Third Universal, proclaimed in November 1917, lay claim to nine provinces: Volyn', Podillia, Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson and Tavria (without the Crimea), and hoped a referendum would settle the inclusion in an autonomous Ukraine of the districts of surrounding Russian provinces where Ukrainians represented a majority. A broad spectrum of Russian political opinion reacted with hostility to this affirmation of territoriality. The right wing considered it to be "complete historical, ethnographical and geographical nonsense." Bolsheviks in Ukraine, at the opposite end of the spectrum, "wondered if there was any Ukraine at all.../and/ always thought they were living in South Russia." But the struggle of the Rada to give lands occupied by Ukrainians a territorial identity had left its imprint. When the Bolsheviks proclaimed a Ukrainian Peoples' Republic in December 1917, they too defined Ukraine in terms similar to those of the Central Rada. For our purposes, Ukraine will be defined as consisting of the above mentioned nine provinces plus the Crimea - since the latter was administratively part of Tavria province and was added to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954. (We will discuss Western Ukraine only after it was incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR.)

By the end of the eighteenth century, Russia's economic and
political domination of Ukraine had been firmly established. An im-
portant factor contributing to Russia's capacity to hold on to Ukraine
lay in the fact that colonization followed its political absorption.
Throughout the century, especially after the destruction of the Zaporiz'ka
Sich in 1775, massive tracts of land were handed out by the tsars to
reward their servitors. The Russian nobility brought with them their
families, in some cases their serfs, and numerous bands of bureaucrats
and merchants trailed in their wake. The preferential customs tariff
of 1775 sparked a boom by attracting thousands of merchants and specu-
lators from central Russia to the southern regions of Ukraine. To
the fertile and sparcely populated steppes came Russian peasant settlers,
as well as colonists from beyond the boundaries of the Russian Empire.
The development of industry in the Donets' basin in the post-reform
decades spurred further immigration. The extent of colonization can be
gauged by comparing demographic data of the late eighteenth century
with those of the late nineteenth. Throughout that period the rate of
increase of the Ukrainian population kept pace with the general popula-
tion boom. However, immigration was so extensive that it incontrover-
tibly altered the national composition of Ukraine. According to the
fifth revizia of 1795, 89 per cent of the (male) population of the nine
provinces was Ukrainian. A century later (1897) the Ukrainians' share
had dropped to 72 per cent of the total (male) population. Although the
steppe provinces were most affected by immigration, other regions did
not escape this process either. Ukrainians decreased from 95 per cent
of the (male) population of the left-bank provinces to 81 per cent,
88 to 77 per cent in the right-bank, and from 72 to 55 per cent in the
steppe.
National identity is not an innate characteristic of people but the result of social learning. Ethnically homogeneous populations are more likely to be susceptible to suggestions about their common nationality than populations which lack this characteristic. The numerical preponderance of Ukrainians was their biggest, perhaps only, asset. According to the first general population census of 1897 they formed 73 per cent of the population, and undoubtedly their numbers were higher than the census figures suggest. The numerical advantage of Ukrainians over the national minorities, however, was unevenly distributed among the various regions of Ukraine. (See table 1.1) The fact that regional variations in the pattern of nationality settlement overlapped with economic geography added to the social weight of the minorities. As a rule Ukrainians were concentrated in the provinces least affected by industrialization and urban growth. Half the Russian population of Ukraine, on the other hand, lived in the steppe region with its industries, ports and prosperous agriculture, giving them access to a disproportionate share of society's resources. Here Ukrainians formed 56 per cent of the population.

The steppe was least affected by the national and social movements developing in central Ukrainian territories. The integration of this region into Ukraine was an enormous problem for the Central Rada during the revolution. The Provisional Government in 1917 refused to cede the provinces to the jurisdiction of the Rada without the permission of the local authorities. The reaction of the Odesa duma to the suggestion that they join an autonomous Ukraine was typical for the region. The duma demanded that the city and surrounding districts be excluded
TABLE 1.1
National Composition of Ukraine by Province, 1897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Population Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,430,387</td>
<td>17,005,688</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>2,767,952</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>2,767,952</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1,447,770</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>1,447,770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volyn'</td>
<td>2,989,482</td>
<td>2,095,579</td>
<td>70.1</td>
<td>554,418</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>554,418</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>94,418</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>94,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podillia</td>
<td>3,018,299</td>
<td>2,442,819</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>322,537</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>322,537</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>53,512</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>53,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>3,559,229</td>
<td>2,819,145</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>575,375</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>575,375</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>114,714</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>114,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>2,297,854</td>
<td>1,526,072</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>495,963</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>495,963</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>374,820</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>374,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>2,778,151</td>
<td>2,583,133</td>
<td>93.0</td>
<td>72,941</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>72,941</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>110,352</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>110,352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>2,492,316</td>
<td>2,009,411</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>440,936</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>440,936</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>99,152</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>99,152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavria</td>
<td>2,113,674</td>
<td>1,456,369</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>364,974</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>364,974</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>322,537</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>322,537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>2,733,612</td>
<td>611,121</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>1,462,039</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>1,462,039</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>575,375</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>575,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
<td>Perepis 1897, tables XXI and XXII in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
from Ukraine "for ethnic reasons." Although the Central Rada complained that "this artificial and unhealthy division of the Ukrainian national body is a considerable additional obstacle to the planned and systematic work of the General Secretariat of Ukraine," it was too weak in the steppe region to enforce its writ. The incorporation of the region even into a Soviet Ukrainian republic did not pass without acrimonious debate. When in 1918 the first Bolshevik government was already established in Kharkiv, Bolshevik organizations of the steppe established three autonomous republics and attached them to Russia, refusing to recognize Kharkiv's authority. It was only under strong pressure from Moscow that the Bolsheviks of this region were reconciled to their inclusion within a Soviet Ukrainian republic. These regional discontinuities are a problem to this very day.

With the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian state prior to 1917, the development of the former was made to suit the interests of the latter. The task of redressing this relationship of domination was an important component of the "Ukrainian question" as it was posed at the turn of this century. However, as a result of large-scale colonization, Ukrainians were confronted with minorities in their own territory who could be called such only in the formal sense of the word. In terms of the social division of labour, the minorities dominated the strategic centres of social, economic, cultural and political life. Before Ukrainians could launch and sustain a national movement capable of altering the country's relationship with the Russian state, they would first have to establish a secure footing in the socially and politically active sectors of their own society. Thus the other component of the
"Ukrainian question" had to do with adjusting the unequal relationship between Ukrainians and the minorities in Ukraine. The nature of that relationship and the problems it posed for Ukrainians' efforts at national self-assertion are the focal points of the analysis that follows.

ii. The town

When writing about urban development in the tsarist empire it is customary to draw contrasts with Western Europe. The differences were enormous. In tsarist Russia only a fraction of the population was urban and the town never acted as the hothouse of a bourgeoisie, of representative democracy, of science and industrialization as it did in the West. Compared to Western Europe, the Russian city was politically and economically impotent. What was true of the city in Russia applied equally to the city in Ukraine.

But the emphasis on the backwardness of urban life in tsarist Russia should not obscure the fact that whatever development did occur in that society took place in the city. Cities were the administrative, cultural and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, economic focal points into which poured the talents, the ambitions, the greeds of the whole society. Compared to the village, "city air" was emancipating even in Russia. It was because the town represented relative progress that it occupied a contradictory position in Ukrainian society.

The characteristic feature of towns in Ukraine was that with few
exceptions they were Russian and Jewish in national composition and in their Weltanschauung. The fact that Ukrainians had such a weak urban presence stymied their national development in two important ways. To begin with, it meant that the very social processes which produce a national movement functioned very weakly. "The spread (if not the origins) of nationalism as a movement," writes A.D. Smith, "is a predominantly urban phenomenon, and its main supporters are not merely inhabitants of the city but are the products of the contrast between city and countryside, a contrast which has only played a large part in the social consciousness in modern times."²⁹ It was the city which provided for social mobility on a significant scale, and the competitive environment that it created for the middle classes, especially in the multi-ethnic towns of Eastern Europe, was "an important factor in the rise and more significantly the spread of nationalism."³⁰ Even in agrarian Eastern Europe, the city, not the "thatched-roof cottage," was the cradle of modern national movements.³¹ Miroslav Hroch, for example, noted that the "great majority" of Czech "patriots" between the years 1827-48 lived in towns, "certainly surprising in view of the agrarian character of the whole society."³² The same could be said of the Ukrainian national movement. It was from Kiev, Kharkiv and St. Petersburg that the Ukrainian "patriotic spirit" expanded, not from the countryside to the town.³³ "The town," wrote an activist of the Ukrainian movement in 1907, "having become the laboratory for the Russification of the Ukrainian people, has become at the same time the forge where the first elements of their national consciousness are fashioned."³⁴ At the heart of the weakness of the modern Ukrainian national consciousness lay the fact that there were too few Ukrainians in the towns subjected to the social pressures
that produced that consciousness. Secondly, because the town was non-Ukrainian it meant that the human and institutional resources of the city - the intelligentsia, schools, newspapers - were denied to the Ukrainian national movement, hampering its growth. The town creates both the social situation and the instruments that are essential in bringing about a realignment of loyalties and behaviour that a modern national movement represents. It is for these reasons that urbanization is such a significant indicator of national development.

A striking characteristic of urbanization in Ukraine was that there was less of it at the turn of the nineteenth century than in the second half of the seventeenth. P.V. Mykhailyna, a contemporary Soviet Ukrainian scholar, noted, "Some consider that the urban population /in the mid-seventeenth century/ represented almost half the total population of Ukraine, and according to O. Baranovych, only ten per cent. In our view the first figure is considerably inflated, the second somewhat too low." Baranovych estimated that there were 1.2 million urban inhabitants in that period; O.S. Kompan claimed that there were 1.4 million. Even taking the lowest estimate - Baranovych's - it is clear that throughout the eighteenth century a process of de-urbanization occurred, because by the turn of the nineteenth century the towns in Ukraine supported 375,000 inhabitants or five per cent of the total population. It was only with the abolition of serfdom and the development of trade and industry spurred by foreign investment that the urban population began to grow again, surpassing its achievement in the "feudal period". Between 1863 and 1897, the population of towns increased by 72 per cent. By 1897 Ukraine had 3 million urban inhabitants represent-
ing 13.2 per cent of the total population. (See table 1.2)

That Ukraine had fewer urban inhabitants in the early nineteenth century than in the mid-seventeenth is in part explained by changes in the character of the town. Medieval urban centres in Ukraine, as throughout much of Eastern Europe, were not as sharply differentiated from the village as towns were in the nineteenth century. In fact a sizeable proportion of the urban population of the medieval town engaged in agriculture. Changes in administrative designation, notably the reversion of scores of towns back to village status after Catherine II, contributed to the drop in urban numbers only in a minor way. A major factor in the de-urbanization of Ukraine was the disastrous socio-economic policies of Russian and Polish rulers during the eighteenth century. We will consider these policies in our discussion of changes in the national composition of Ukraine's towns.

Although urban development in Ukraine was adversely affected by foreign rulers, nevertheless on the eve of the twentieth century Ukraine as a whole was not under-developed in this respect when compared to other regions of the tsarist Empire. The very rapid development of southern Ukraine, an area which registered among the highest rates of urban growth in the Russian Empire in the latter part of the nineteenth century, was the main reason why in 1897 Ukraine's rate of urbanization - 13.2 per cent of the population total - was marginally higher than the average for European Russia - 12.9 per cent. Prior to the south's development Ukraine lagged behind European Russia in the rate of urbanization (5.8 per cent as compared with 6.6 per cent respectively in 1811.) It was not the comparative under-urbanization of Ukraine...
TABLE 1.2
Urban Population of Ukraine, 1897

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Total Urban Population</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volyn'</td>
<td>2,989,482</td>
<td>233,847</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podillia</td>
<td>3,018,299</td>
<td>221,870</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>3,559,229</td>
<td>459,253</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>2,297,854</td>
<td>209,453</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>2,778,151</td>
<td>274,294</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>2,492,316</td>
<td>367,343</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerynoslav</td>
<td>2,113,674</td>
<td>241,055</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>2,733,612</td>
<td>788,960</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavria</td>
<td>1,447,770</td>
<td>289,316</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,430,387</td>
<td>3,085,391</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tabulated from Table 1.1 and Perepis' 1897, table XXI in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.
which marked its position as a subordinate as much as the fact that the country's urban development would have been much greater had it not been for tsarist policies and above all the fact that the development which occurred produced both marked regional imbalances and serious distortions in the ethnic composition of Ukraine's towns.

In his thoughtful work, *Internal Colonialism*, Michael Hechter analyzes the predicament of nationally distinct peripheries that have been absorbed into a unified state by a metropolitan core composed of a different nationality. One of the features of an internal colony is the dependent nature of its urban development. Hechter writes:

> Since the colony's role is designed to be instrumental.../the/ colonial economy often specializes in the production of a narrow range of primary products or raw materials for export. Whereas cities arose to fulfill central place functions in societies having had endogenous development, the ecological distribution of cities looks very different in colonies, where they serve as way stations in the trade between colonial hinterlands and metropolitan ports...45

Urbanization in Ukraine was similar to that described in the internal colony model: exogenous forces concerned with the export of raw materials from Ukraine acted as the main stimulus of urbanization in the nineteenth century.

Ukraine's major urban centre in the pre-revolutionary period, Odesa, was the archetypal city whose main function was that of a "way station". Odesa grew from the first half of the nineteenth century because foreign capital turned it into the principal port and commercial centre for the export of Ukrainian cereals. Mercantile fortunes were
massed in Odesa, but these were repatriated beyond Ukrainian territory, making no contribution to the economic development of the immediate region, let alone the hinterland.\footnote{46} The second wave of foreign investment that spurred urbanization had little or no relationship to the first. That wave, in the form of British, French and Belgian capital, was attracted by the discovery of mineral deposits in the Donbas area. While the extraction of raw materials gave birth to a belt of industrial towns in that region, it did not generate urban growth based on manufacturing either here or elsewhere in Ukraine. The non-extractive industry in Ukraine remained in a primitive state because foreign capital was uninterested in creating a manufacturing base which could eventually compete with its domestic production and because Russian manufacturers jealously guarded their "colonial right to Ukraine as a massive consumer" of their wares.\footnote{47} The geographical distribution of towns in Ukraine reflected the country's economic predicament. The steppe witnessed urban development because it served the instrumental role allocated to Ukraine; elsewhere, it was a different story.

In the light of the 1897 census the steppe provinces with 27 per cent of the total population of Ukraine contained 43 per cent of the country's urban population. Here 21 per cent of the population lived in towns. The right and left-bank provinces were under-urbanized when compared to the steppe and the Russian Empire as a whole. Nine per cent of the population of the right bank lived in towns, and 11 per cent of the left bank. A quarter of the urban population of the right and left-bank provinces was accounted for by two cities, Kiev and Kharkiv, administrative centres and major railway junctions.\footnote{48} In reality, the regional disparities were more acute. Many villages in the steppe had
emerged as important industrial centres. "Few of these /villages/ became official cities, partially because St. Petersburg looked unfavourably on such requests (it opposed all forms of self-management no matter how limited), and partially because for entrepreneurs, existence in a legal city meant supplementary taxes with a paucity of added privileges." Thus a mining centre such as Iuzivka (Donets'k), with a population of 23,076, was considered a village in 1897. On the other hand, many towns in the right and left-bank provinces were little more than villages. This was particularly the case in right-bank Ukraine where the right of the nobility to establish towns (mestechka) under the Polish Commonwealth was reaffirmed under Russian rule in 1785. The majority of right-bank towns were of the mestechko type whose only distinguishing characteristic from the villages was that it was "a great village with an area of buildings in the middle which have a city-like character," and which contained a Jewish population. Urbanization in the steppe was quantitatively and qualitatively different from the process in other provinces. Only in the steppe did the growth of industry play a major role in urban development.

The urbanization of Ukraine which occurred in the nineteenth century proceeded largely without the participation of Ukrainians. As a consequence, with a little more than five per cent of their numbers living in towns, they were the least urbanized national group in their native land. In terms of this important measure of social and political mobilisation, the minorities had a decisive advantage: 38 per cent of Russians and 45 per cent of Jews living in Ukraine were urban dwellers. (See table 1.3) Ukrainians were a decided minority in the urban environment.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volyn'</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podillia</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerynoslav</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>63.1</td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>61.7</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavria</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>22.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>43.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tabulated from table 1.2 and table 1.4
According to the 1897 census they constituted less than one third of the urban population. (See table 1.4) The weak Ukrainian presence in towns, combined with discriminatory policies aimed at the Ukrainian language and culture meant that the cities provided a milieu for the Russification of the relatively few Ukrainians living there. Another important feature of the Ukrainian urban presence was that their representation declined in direct relationship to the degree of the industrialization of an area. Thus Ukrainians accounted for 18 per cent of the town population of the steppe provinces. It was only in the left-bank region, the former territory of the Hetman state, that Ukrainians claimed a majority of the urban population. But even here, Ukrainians were gathered into the small towns that dotted Poltava and Kharkiv provinces. In the major cities of this region, Kharkiv and Kremenchuk, they formed 26 and 30 per cent of the population respectively.

Not all urban residents were provided with the same mobilising environment. Larger cities differed from the smaller in the diversity of their economic, political and cultural functions. Examining the Ukrainian urban population by size of town a very marked trend emerges: the larger the town and the more removed from the village, the fewer the Ukrainian inhabitants. It was only in towns with a population under 10,000 that Ukrainians emerged as a majority, albeit a slim one, of the urban population. But these were by and large small county (povit) towns which served as centres of manorial consumption and markets for the peasantry. In the nine major cities that were the administrative, military and economic nerve centres of Ukraine, cities that were to play a decisive role in deciding the course of the revolutionary struggle in 1917, Ukrainians formed 18 per cent of the population. (See tables 1.5 and
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volyn</td>
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<td>19.7</td>
<td>44,351</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>118,727</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>118,727</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>33,353</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>103,431</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podillia</td>
<td>221,870</td>
<td>72,188</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>54,742</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>102,922</td>
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<td>102,922</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>22,030</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>68,862</td>
<td>30.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>459,253</td>
<td>129,540</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>152,190</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>142,222</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>142,222</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>64,951</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>228,291</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
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<td>101,554</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>48,527</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>54,401</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>54,401</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>54,401</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>274,294</td>
<td>156,752</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>31,246</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>118,591</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>118,591</td>
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<td>43.6</td>
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<td>Kharkiv</td>
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<td>145,504</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>62,602</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>62,602</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>62,602</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavria</td>
<td>241,055</td>
<td>65,166</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>98,047</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>86,802</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>86,802</td>
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<td>86,802</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>2,502</td>
<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
<td>142,062</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>341,959</td>
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<td>43.4</td>
<td>2,502</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerinoslav</td>
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<td>936,083</td>
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<td>3,085,391</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>3,085,391</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,085,391</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,085,391</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tabulated from Table I and Perepis 1897, table XXII in Vols. 8, 31, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.
How reliable are the 1897 census data? It must be remembered that the nationality category used in that census was mother tongue. Fortunately we can compare 1897 mother tongue data for Kiev with the returns of the 1917 Kiev city census which collected data on nationality (natsional'nist') by self-identification. In 1897, 22.2 per cent of the city's population gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue. In 1917, 16.4 per cent identified themselves as Ukrainians: 12.0 per cent giving Ukrainian as their nationality, 4.4 per cent "Little Russian". In view of this information there is room to think that the 1897 census returns provided a reasonably accurate record of Ukrainians' representation in the urban setting. In the period between 1897 and 1917 the Ukrainians' share of Kiev's population declined. This was a trend discernible earlier in the nineteenth century. An 1874 census of Kiev revealed that 30.3 per cent of Kiev's population gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue. It was not that Kiev's population stagnated. Quite the contrary. Between 1897 and 1917, for example, the city's population almost doubled. It appears that because of weak in-migration and assimilation, despite the opportunities provided by urban expansion, Ukrainians did not improve their relative standing in the future capital.

Why did Ukrainians show such little propensity for urban settlement? The weak Ukrainian urban presence is a phenomenon of such overwhelming social significance that it is surprising the question has not been studied. Of course, the fact that Ukrainians were a minority in the towns hardly escaped the notice of contemporaries. But all too often the situation was attributed to the psychological proclivities of the
### TABLE 1.5

**Distribution of Ukrainian Urban Population according to Size of Town, 1897**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Town</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>II. Ukrainians</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,000-10,000</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>378,000</td>
<td>201,000</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000-15,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>373,000</td>
<td>184,000</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000-20,000</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>324,000</td>
<td>124,000</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-50,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>570,000</td>
<td>172,000</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>502,000</td>
<td>99,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000 +</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>938,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Perepis, 1997, Table XIII, in vols. 8, 3, 16, 33, 41, 46, 47.

*Figures are rounded off to one thousand.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Odesa</td>
<td>403,800</td>
<td>39.9%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>247,700</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>61,400</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kremenchuk</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>49.1%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>61,400</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>247,700</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>47.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>65,000</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mykolaiv</td>
<td>63,000</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
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<td>Zhytomyr</td>
<td>61,400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>59,000</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kremenchuk</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perepis' 1897, table XIX in vols. 13, 16, 33, 41, 46, 47.

* Now known as Dnipropetrovsk.
** Now known as Dniprovets.
Ukrainian peasant masses, with Ukrainophiles stressing the positive virtues - love of nature and the desire to remain one's "own boss" - and Ukrainophobes the negative - mental sluggishness and lack of initiative. Neither explanation is particularly convincing.

The logical point of departure in an investigation of the issue is to pose the question: was there a time when Ukrainians formed a majority of the urban population? Indeed, prior to the 1648 revolution, when Ukraine was still under Polish rule, despite the many discriminatory measures instituted by Polish authorities against Ukrainian burghers, the "overwhelming majority" of town dwellers was Ukrainian. In right-bank Ukraine approximately 70 per cent of the urban population was Ukrainian. In left-bank Ukraine, the figure was even higher. During the 1648 revolution, the slaughter of the Jewish population of the right bank and the flight of Poles and others in the face of advancing Cossack armies left the urban population of the right bank more nationally homogeneous than it had been in the past. And yet, by the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian urban majority had been eclipsed and this situation persisted despite the growth of towns in the post-emancipation period.

Since the paths of development in the right and left banks differed in the post-1648 period, it is necessary to discuss these regions separately. The wars, invasions and civil strife that accompanied the return of Polish rule in the late seventeenth century in right-bank Ukraine saw the destruction of many cities and a virtual collapse of economic life. Since many Ukrainian urban residents (Cossacks and townsmen) were prominent in the various movements opposing Poland's advance into the region, they were the objects of brutal reprisals when Polish armies
gained control. To escape the wrath of Polish authorities many migrated to the left bank or Moldavia. What greatly accelerated the decline of the Ukrainian urban presence was the Sejm's decision in 1697 to exclude Cossacks from the ranks of the szlachta and in 1699 to abolish the Cossack army on the territory of the Polish commonwealth. Contrary to popular image, many Cossacks were hitherto engaged in such non-martial pursuits as trade, manufacturing and even artisan production. The abolition of Cossackdom on the right bank permanently undermined the juridical and economic position of these important urban representatives of the Ukrainian people. It also closed an avenue of social mobility and urban in-migration to peasants, who in the past could enter Cossack armies. In the wake of the Sejm's decision, the szlachta initiated a colonization drive, occupying positions vacated by the dispossessed Cossacks and relegating them to serve as agricultural labourers on the owners' estates.

By the first decades of the eighteenth century, the old feudal order was restored in right-bank Ukraine with a vengeance. Serfdom, in its most restrictive and exploitative form, corvée (panshchyna in Ukrainian or barshchina in Russian), was imposed on the Ukrainian peasant movement into towns. By placing heavy claims on the peasants' labour time it blocked the development of cottage industry, and hence, the emergence of a skilled or semi-skilled rural labour force. At the same time, unrestrained by central authority, the magnates engulfed the towns, absorbing them into their private ownership. Urban centres lost their former autonomy, and their populations, now the nobility's private citizens, were defenceless in the face of the gentry's fiscal greed.
Taxation was excessive: it was quite common for artisans and merchants to pay four sets of taxes on the same item. Controlling the Sejm, the nobility granted themselves monopolies in the production and sale of many commodities, as well as tax exemptions. Feudal duties were imposed on the urban population, blocking the development of commodity-money relationships, undermining the urban economy. These duties introduced an element of panic among artisans and craftsmen who in search of better masters started moving about from place to place, retarding the formation of stable urban populations. With religious intolerance at its height, particularly hard hit by this economic order were Orthodox Ukrainian townsmen, against whom discriminatory measures were intensified. Bankrupted townsmen merged with the peasantry, some escaped to the left bank, others joined the Zaporiz'ka sich, and those who could, Polonized themselves. The defeat of the haidamak movement, in which the pauperized Ukrainian urban masses played an important role, sealed any prospect of an improvement in the situation. By the time of the second and third partitions of Poland (1793 and 1795), when the right bank became part of the Russian state, Ukrainians formed but a fraction of the urban population. The dominant national group were the Jews, who, denied the right to ownership of land, maintained a miserable urban existence as small shopkeepers and artisans, rentiers of taverns from the nobility, and intermediaries between the peasants and landowners. In the early nineteenth century, towns in right-bank Ukraine experienced a new crisis as the development of factory production in central Polish and Russian lands ruined its fragile artisan industry. This is why at the turn of the nineteenth century the towns in this region supported a smaller proportion of the population - five per cent less - than in the eighteenth century.
Industrial development, which, by attracting impoverished Ukrainian peasants to the towns could have contributed to the reconstruction of a Ukrainian urban presence, played little or no role in the development of the cities in right-bank Ukraine. This region, even by Ukrainian standards, was an economic backwater. The only industry to speak of was sugar refining, operating mainly in rural areas on a seasonal basis. Ukrainians' lack of prior non-agricultural work experience, a consequence of the ruin of village crafts and the imposition of panshchyna, and their appallingly low level of culture, placed them at a decided disadvantage when it came to seeking employment. In an area where labour supply exceeded labour needs (in all industries) by a factor of three to one, competition for whatever urban jobs were created during the nineteenth century was intense. Tsarist anti-semitic policies contributed towards maintaining urban labour over-supply. The "Temporary Rules" of 1882 (reinforced by a 1887 law) expelled Jews from the villages of the Pale of Settlement (which encompassed most of the right bank) and cooped up "millions of human beings within the suffocating confines of the towns and townlets of the Western region...All/ the exits from the overcrowded cities to the villages within the Pale of Settlement /were/ tightly closed."

Central to the existence of the right-bank town was its role as the seat of tsarist administration and army garrison. But these positions tended to be filled by Russians who migrated to this region in large numbers following the partition of Poland and whose presence was reinforced following the Polish uprisings of the nineteenth century. In right-bank Ukraine, the Ukrainian urban presence collapsed in the late
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the nineteenth offered little opportunity for rebuilding it.

In the immediate post-Khmel'nyts'kyi era, the left-bank town fared better than its counterpart on the right bank of the Dnieper river. Although the town population diminished somewhat as a result of Cossack upheavals, the establishment of a new authority - the Hetmanate - under the watchful eye of the Russian suzerain spared this region the chaos that took place on the right bank. The towns of the left bank were small, tending to merge with the countryside, but evidence suggests they supported a significant artisan, craftsman and merchant population. The non-Ukrainian population was small before 1648, and after the revolution it became insignificant. And yet, in the space of a century or so, non-Ukrainians, Russians in particular, emerged hegemonous in the urban centres of this region, as well as in the south of Ukraine which opened up for colonization towards the end of the eighteenth century. How this came about is a complex matter. We will merely highlight the most significant developments.

In the period before the Poltava defeat (1708) the towns of Ukraine successfully fended off a dual challenge to their autonomy and prosperity. The first came from the Ukrainian Cossack officer class - the starshyna - who had emerged as the new landowning class replacing the old aristocracy that had been decimated by the 1648 revolution. Like the Polish szlachta, who served as a model for them, the starshyna attempted to encroach on the economic and juridical prerogatives of the town. But feudal relations had been undermined by the 1648 revolution, and the new gentry, lacking the strong traditions and social weight of the Polish aristocracy, did not get far in its efforts to subordinate the town. Two other factors limited
its freedom of action. The first was that the Hetmanate administration had to coexist with the centralized Russian state, which was too centralized to tolerate the existence of private feudal cities on the Polish scale. Many Ukrainian towns sought and obtained from the tsars confirmation of their autonomy, making them independent of the starshyna. The second factor was that the starshyna was opposed by an alliance of social groups in their own society: Ukrainian townsmen and urban Cossacks. The other challenge to the town's independent status came from what would prove to be a more formidable opponent, the Russian state. As early as the pre-Petrine period, Russian voevody manning garrisons had meddled in urban affairs, and under their protection Russian merchants had made efforts to gain control of the profitable Ukrainian trade. But the relationship of forces favoured the preservation of urban autonomy. Towns were under the dual administration of the Hetman and Russian authorities, leaving them room for manoeuvre. Russian authorities, in this period, trod relatively cautiously in their dealings with Ukraine and were anxious not to alienate townsmen. Some Hetmans, Samoilovych and Mazeppa, understood the significance of cities and, in part to forestall Russian influence, granted the burghers a role in their administration.

Economically, the end of the seventeenth century was a time of relative prosperity brought about by a fortuitous conjuncture. After the upheavals of the mid-seventeenth century, Western Europe was starved for Ukrainian raw materials and the Ukrainian market was starved for West European goods. As long as towns remained autonomous, they could set prices and regulate commerce and entry into guilds. By keeping out
outside competitors, they preserved their Ukrainian majorities. Serfdom, with its conditions limiting the free geographical and economic movement of peasants, had not yet been introduced, and towns contained many peasants, partly engaged in agriculture, partly as artisans. Guilds in this period accepted new membership quite readily which aided peasant mobility into urban occupations. This was facilitated by overall prosperity, resulting in a growth in the number of artisans and the founding of many new guilds. As concerns merchants, the revitalized economy and the penetration of money laid the basis for a vibrant Ukrainian merchant capitalism, large enough to compete quite successfully with Greek or Russian merchants, and capable of stimulating further economic development. Also, Russian merchants did not enjoy any special monopolies or privileged juridical positions at this time in Ukraine. But this entire economic process came to an abrupt halt with the tragedy of 1708.

Following the Mazeppist catastrophe, Ukraine found itself in a new situation. Just at the time when Russia was entering the path of an aggressive mercantilism, Ukrainian autonomy was reduced to a minimum which left the country economically defenceless. Although at the political level throughout the eighteenth century the emphasis was on integrating the Hetmanate into the Russian state, at the economic level Ukraine was treated as a foreign even hostile entity. In the early years of Petrine economic policy a concerted effort was made to capture Ukrainian trade and place it in the hands of Russian state-run commerce. By the mid-eighteenth century the policy was resoundingly successful. In the second period, when "manufacturing fever" gripped the Russian state, the axe fell on Ukrainian manufacturing in an effort to transform Ukraine
into a safe market for the new industries established in central Russia. This goal was also realized. The economic well-being of the country and of its towns was further undermined by the numerous new taxes (in money and in kind) that were imposed on the population. The effect of these policies on the urban population was profound.

Firstly, because important sectors of the urban economy were damaged, the town population registered a drop. Secondly, by undermining the economic position of Ukrainian urban classes, the policies initiated a change in the national composition of the cities. Merchants, the Ukrainian urban economic elite, were the first to be affected. As early as the first decades of the eighteenth century, the contractions of the Ukrainian market and competition from favoured Russian and other foreign merchants forced the indigenous commercial strata - Cossacks and burghers - to turn their attention to the only form of economic activity open to them - agriculture. Imperial policies restricting the trade and industrial activity of Cossacks contributed to this development. By the end of the eighteenth century foreign merchants had succeeded in their conquest of trade in central Ukrainian lands; in their march to the south of Ukraine, the question of competition was not even posed.

The emergence of Russians as a major component of the population of the lower social orders of the towns took longer to accomplish. The most numerous urban group in Ukraine at the turn of the nineteenth century were mishchany (townsmen) - artisans, shopkeepers, workers. Throughout the eighteenth century while Russian manufacturing was being nurtured in the womb of the Russian state, Ukrainian manufacturing was
severely damaged. But small artisan industries survived in towns because they could at least protect their internal markets by imposing their own tariffs on many goods brought in for sale. When in 1775 this right was abolished, Ukrainian townsmen received their first blow in the form of competition from their more developed Russian counterparts. The second came with Peter III's and Catherine's economic reforms (1762, 1775). Intended to foster a freer economic environment, their effect was to facilitate the entry of the gentry into industrial life. Although the votchinal (manorial) and kustar' industry never developed in Ukraine to the same extent that it did in Russia, the fact remained that many items of everyday use formerly purchased in the towns were now produced on the estate by serfs. This competition further weakened the Ukrainian urban economy. The coup de grace to the existence of Ukrainian townsmen was delivered by Catherine's Charter of Cities (1785). Urban centres were now made subject to new imperial regulations in the minutest detail, losing whatever economic prerogatives remained. They no longer controlled entry into guilds, and these institutions, formerly dominated by Ukrainians and used by them to keep out competition, were now integrated into an all-Russian order. Russian artisans began to migrate to Ukraine in large numbers. Although Ukrainian townsmen fought a rear-guard action to maintain their former positions, they lost the battle. The Charter of Cities meant that there could be no organized resistance to this new competition. Kiev put up the staunchest opposition, but by 1835, in the light of Nicholas' decision to grant a three-year tax exemption to any artisan and merchant in the empire who would settle in that city, its resistance was broken. Prior to the 1861 reforms, the towns of Ukraine had already assumed a Russian character and Russian had emerged as the
language of commerce. To survive in the towns, Ukrainians had to integrate themselves into that culture.

Thus occurred the death of a generation of Ukrainian townsmen, who had been nurtured by the conditions of the twilight years of the Hetmanate. But why were their numbers not replaced by new Ukrainian arrivals? The answer to this question is to be found in the nature of the agrarian order in Ukraine. The most significant barrier to urbanization in the nineteenth century was serfdom. In Ukraine, this institution with its conditions limiting the geographical and occupational mobility of peasants was imposed in the mid-eighteenth century. This occurred shortly before imperial policy opened the door, as already mentioned, to the gentry's economic activity. In connection with this new orientation, merchants were deprived of the right to own serfs and henceforth they could hire only wage labour. The ownership of serfs was restricted to dvoriane. In Russia, the beggardly agriculture of peasants could not provide the gentry with high revenues, so they turned to commuting the obligated labour service of the peasants into monetary rents or obrok. Serfs, in turn, were thus compelled to seek out new avenues of increasing their cash incomes, and one of the available means was to hire themselves out as wage labourers in industry, manufacture or service, often in the city, or to become artisans or petty traders. Landowners were only too happy to encourage their peasants in this direction. Experience had taught them that a peasant left to his own devices knew best how to raise revenues. The non-agricultural activity of Russian peasants had become so widespread that only a portion continued to till the land. The expansion of the availability of hired labour through the obrok system allowed urban industries to expand. Many more industries,
large and small, were founded in small towns and villages close to the source of labour supply, resulting in a diffusion of technical skills and know-how into the Russian countryside. \(^{114}\) In Ukraine developments took a different turn.

Though until the early eighteenth century obrok was practised, by the end of that century, with the growth of landlordism, panshchyna became universal in Ukraine. \(^{115}\) The high fertility of the Ukrainian black soil, the proximity of external markets and the lack of other sources of livelihood, made it most profitable for the gentry to exploit the labour of peasants on their manorial fields. \(^{116}\) The landowners' thirst for a labour force resulted in serfdom being much more widespread in Ukraine than in Russia. \(^{117}\) The consequences of this agrarian order cannot be stressed enough.

In the first place, peasants (as an estate) formed a substantially lower proportion of the urban population in Ukraine than in Russia. \(^{118}\) The shortage of available labour in the pre-emancipation era placed an additional obstacle to the development of Ukrainian industry in a situation where that industry was already burdened by discriminatory economic policies. \(^{119}\) It meant also that while Russian peasants were learning valuable industrial and entrepreneurial skills in urban factories and village industries, Ukrainians were not. Of course, some rural industries existed in Ukraine in the pre-emancipation era, but they were limited to regions where agriculture was less profitable (eg. Chernihiv). \(^{120}\) Moreover, an examination of the structure of these industries reveals that in contradistinction to the Russian, factory production was either non-existent or paltry, and focussed almost exclusively on the processing of food. \(^{121}\) In his Zapiski iuzhnoi Rossii written in the decade before emanci-
pation, Panteleimon Kulish observed that Russians were much more adaptable to industry and city life and were much more willing to travel to other regions to seek out work than Ukrainians. Indeed, the nature of economic and social relations in Russia nurtured these skills and attitudes. In Ukraine, they blocked their emergence.

When in the last decades of the nineteenth century the growth of industry in the steppe attracted intensive immigration, the Ukrainian peasantry was largely absent from this process. Ukrainians missed their only real opportunity prior to the revolution to change the national and cultural physiognomy of the cities. The extensive immigration of Russians into the towns of the steppe was attributed by Lenin, M. Porsh and others to the stormy development of capitalism in Ukraine. The contrary is more to the point. Such migration took place because of the lack of adequate skilled manpower in Ukraine due to the absence of capitalist development. The industries which sprang up on the Ukrainian steppe were not the product of indigenous development. Their emergence was not nurtured by a century of capitalist accumulation, nor by the penetration of capitalist relations into the pores of Ukrainian society. Industry grew because Western capital developed it. Almost overnight, new plants were established. Technicians and engineers arrived from Europe, and the bulk of the labour force was recruited from Russia since suitable labour was in short supply in Ukraine. The development of industry in Russia, nurtured by the state, and the nature of Russian agrarian relations had prepared an army of skilled labour. This point is graphically illustrated by a study comparing Ukrainian and Russian migrant labour in Ukraine: 93 per cent of the former were unskilled manual workers, whereas half of the latter were skilled. If the
Ukrainian peasant did not enter the mines and factories it was not because he "valued his human dignity," as Panas Fedenko claimed. That dignity stood a much better chance of being enhanced by urban wages, which were the highest in the Empire, than by agrarian incomes, which were among the lowest. It was the legacy of economic underdevelopment and the burden of a low level of culture that forced the uncompetitive Ukrainian peasant, even in Katerynoslav province, to migrate to Siberia in search of better circumstances rather than travel a dozen or so kilometers to the nearest factory gate.

Industrial development in Ukraine reinforced Russian influence in the towns. That influence had already been firmly established when Catherine's comprehensive administrative reforms made the city the focal point for state control. The town's role as an administrative centre contributed in a major way to its development in the Russian Empire. How were Ukrainians affected by this?

Although some Ukrainian towns (Kiev, Chernihiv, for example) became centres for various provincial and district administrative agencies, the country never developed a capital which could grow into a major city. Lacking a strong political centre of gravity its "urban network was fragmented." Kiev, despite its historic status as the "mother" city of Rus' was, until the mid-nineteenth century, a small provincial town with fewer than 45,000 inhabitants. The government's decision after the Polish uprising of 1863 to establish a strong military presence in this long-contested region did belatedly contribute towards a growth of Kiev's population in the second half of the nineteenth century. However, at the time of the 1897 census Ukraine did not have a burgeoning administrative centre. Kiev's population lagged considerably behind
Odesa's, a city whose fortunes were built on cereal trade with Europe.

With Catherine's reform, the bureaucracy in the towns was initially staffed by Ukrainians. The fact that the Ukrainian gentry had access to bureaucratic positions greatly facilitated their acceptance of the loss of Ukrainian autonomy. Because higher education in the earlier part of the eighteenth century was more advanced in Ukraine than in Russia, this offered the Ukrainian gentry better opportunities for higher education and hence easier access to bureaucratic positions than their Russian counterparts. But the situation changed in the nineteenth century. The development of higher education in Russia and government resistance to its further expansion in Ukraine meant that the educational advantage passed to Russians. The loss of autonomy meant that the allocation of bureaucratic positions was no longer in Ukrainian hands. Towards the end of the eighteenth century it was Russian policy to "increase the share of Russians in the population of the town, in particular by rotating military, administrative and leading personnel." After the Polish uprisings this tendency was accelerated, so that by the later decades of the nineteenth century Ukrainians lost their distinctive presence in the state apparatus.

There all exhales, diffuses Europe, all glitters with the South, and brindles with live variety. The tongue of golden Italy resounds along the gay street where walks the proud Slav, Frenchman, Spaniard, Armenian, and Greek, and the heavy Moldavian, and the son of Egyptian soil, the retired Corsair, Morali.
These verses from Pushkin's "Fragments of Onegin's Journey", which refer to the Ukrainian city of Odesa, illustrate the immense cultural chasm that existed between the non-Ukrainian town and the Ukrainian village. "People living in the cities of Ukraine," wrote a delegation of the Central Rada to the Provisional Government in May 1917, "see before them the Russified streets of these cities...and completely forget that these cities are only islets in the sea of the whole Ukrainian people." The Ukrainian village, on the other hand, viewed the town with the utmost suspicion and hostility. The Bolshevik V. Skorovstanskii/V. Shakhrai/ looking at the city through the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant wrote:

The city ruled the village, and "foreigners" the city. The city drew all the wealth to itself and gave almost nothing to the village in return. The city drew taxes, which almost never returned to the village, in Ukraine...In the city one had to pay bribes to officials to avoid mockery and red tape. In the city the landowner squandered all the wealth gathered in the village. In the city the merchant cheated you when he bought and sold. In the city there are lights, there are schools, theatres and music plays. The city is clean...dressed as for a holiday, it eats and drinks well, many people promenade. But in the village, apart from poverty, impenetrable darkness and hard work - there is almost nothing. The city is aristocratic, foreign, not ours, not Ukrainian. Russian, Jewish, Polish - only not ours, not Ukrainian.

The urban centres in Ukraine may have been foreign islets in a sea of Ukrainian peasants, but this did not diminish their strategic role in the society. Towns concentrated society's critical functions, as well as its most politically creative and active population. "The town always had some sort of programme: it had great capacities for political
organization. It had cadres for both active revolution and counterrevolution," wrote M. Shapoval. Towns were the focal points of the Ukrainian movement as well, but the merciless persecution of organized Ukrainian life and weak Ukrainian urban immigration denied the largest part of the human and institutional resources of the city to that movement. Trying to explain "out of what clay and with what difficulties one was forced to model a Ukrainian state" in 1917, an anonymous writer in 1924 gave the example of Chernihiv, once a great centre of Ukrainian cultural life. This town on the eve of the revolution had a population of 40,000 with three gymnasia, one Realschule, two seminaries. Yet it boasted a Ukrainian movement of forty people: ten from the older generation, thirty from the younger. In a similar vein a correspondent in Rada lamented: "My soul saddens when I think that Kremenchuk is considered a Ukrainian city." Kiev, by all accounts the centre of the national movement in the decades before the revolution, could recruit only 331 members to the Prosvita society (a popular enlightenment organization allowed to exist briefly after the 1905 revolution).

In the course of the revolution and civil war in Ukraine, the fate of the Ukrainian national movement was decided in the towns. In that period, the national movement struggled to achieve mastery over society, not with the aid of the city, but in the face of its indifference or active opposition. In the Constituent Assembly elections "Ukrainian nationalists were outvoted in every city by at least one group which was apathetic or antipathetic toward the Ukrainian cause." Elections to the city dumy produced an even poorer showing for Ukrainian parties. The cities of Ukraine, "even our Kiev," lamented I. Mazepa, "gave us no help whatsoever during the revolution." As a consequence,
the "policies of the Central Rada existed, to a large extent, in thin air." Without a base in the urban population, the national movement's principal strength would have to be sought in the politically disorganized, ineffective and unreliable village.

iii. The peasantry and the problem of national infrastructures

Before the revolution and for decades after, Ukrainian was synonymous with peasant. The term was a fitting description of the Ukrainian population: 93.1 per cent of all Ukrainians (in the light of the 1897 census) were listed as belonging to the peasant estate, 97 per cent of all Ukrainian peasants lived in rural areas, and 87 per cent of all Ukrainians earned their livelihood from agriculture. Of the total number of peasants living in Ukraine (81 per cent of the population), 83.4 per cent were Ukrainians. (See tables 1.7, 1.8)

The economic predicament of the village gave rise to a new set of synonyms: "Ukrainian and pauper". The situation of the peasant was familiar enough. The 1861 reform emancipated the peasant but neglected to provide him with the necessary means to establish himself as an independent farmer. The paltry allotments obtained at the time of the emancipation remained the main form of peasant landholding since the rapid increase in the price of purchase and rent of land prevented most from increasing the amount of land in their use. The fact that the rural population in Ukraine grew twice as rapidly as peasant land holdings compounded the problem of land shortage. Ukraine's large surplus rural population
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Peasant Population</th>
<th>Peasantry in the Population of Ukraine, 1897*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volyn</td>
<td>2,241,084</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podillia</td>
<td>2,437,686</td>
<td>80.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>2,768,542</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>1,953,119</td>
<td>85.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>2,459,742</td>
<td>88.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>2,263,887</td>
<td>90.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavria</td>
<td>1,886,232</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>1,846,456</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerynoslav</td>
<td>1,216,327</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18,980,225</td>
<td>81.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The term "peasantry" as used here as defined by the census, that is, all those belonging to the peasant estate.

Source: Tabulated from table I and Perepitsa 1897, table XXIV in voii. 8, 13, 16, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total no. Population</th>
<th>Total no. Ukrainians Employed in Agriculture</th>
<th>As % of Total no. Ukrainians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Volyn</td>
<td>1,227,474</td>
<td>1,275,851</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>2,767,826</td>
<td>2,726,392</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podillia</td>
<td>3,018,299</td>
<td>3,066,121</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>194,021</td>
<td>249,326</td>
<td>82.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>1,404,974</td>
<td>1,550,029</td>
<td>87.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>2,493,963</td>
<td>1,685,925</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chervonoi</td>
<td>3,429,823</td>
<td>2,567,152</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chortkiv</td>
<td>3,495,963</td>
<td>1,749,572</td>
<td>86.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khmelnitski</td>
<td>2,209,326</td>
<td>1,249,194</td>
<td>84.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podolitsev</td>
<td>2,794,864</td>
<td>1,557,169</td>
<td>87.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tabulated from Table I and Table III in and according to National Group, 1897.
had nowhere to go: the peasant was uncompetitive when it came to seeking urban employment, and migration to Siberia and Kazakhstan proved to be a disaster and many migrants returned home. The only form of economic activity open to the peasant, other than tilling his fields, was to hire himself out as an agricultural labourer. But the introduction of machinery on the large estates together with an over-supply of labour depressed agricultural wages. So for the average Ukrainian peasant the struggle for existence was a trying experience. The absence of draft animals and implements, primitive agricultural techniques and the peasants' own cultural backwardness made intensive agriculture impossible. The result was low yields. The lack of intelligent state policies promoting infrastructures in agriculture (credit facilities, grain elevators, agricultural schools, etc.) compounded the difficulties. Operating at a subsistence level, under Ukraine's climatic conditions, the peasant could expect to experience pangs of hunger every two to three years when the harvest was poor.

The countryside was not a homogeneous entity. A decade or so after the 1861 reform a contemporary observed that in the Ukrainian village society the polarities of "wealth and poverty", "misery and joy" were common. Rural stratification increased in the post-reform period. By 1917, of the four million rural households, 16 per cent had no land under cultivation at all, another 15 per cent cultivated up to one dessiatine (one dessiatine equals 1.1 hectares), 26 per cent between two and three dessiatines. These groups combined (57 per cent of the total number of households) were the poor peasants. (In 1881 Iu. Ianson claimed that not less than five dessiatines were needed to make ends meet.) The middle peasantry with 3 to 10 dessiatines accounted for 30 per cent of households,
while the rich, those with over 10 dessiatines, formed twelve per cent and their average land use was 32 dessiatines. The nobility and gentry representing 0.8 per cent of households owned 30 per cent of the land, and the average size of their estates was 360 dessiatines.\textsuperscript{160} The average peasant farm in Ukraine in 1917 was approximately 7 dessiatines (or 7.7 hectares). The landholding of the Ukrainian peasant was actually larger than that of his French, Danish or Belgian counterpart.\textsuperscript{161} But while the latter could earn a comfortable living on such a farm, the former could not.

There is no doubt that the landless, the poor and even the middle peasants wanted the upper classes' land - and they wanted it free. It is of course arguable whether an instant egalitarian redistribution of the arable land among four million peasant households would have improved the lot of the peasantry. Such a redistribution would have increased the size of the peasant holding by 1.6 hectares with an additional half a horse and half a cow. Under Ukrainian conditions this would still be merely a subsistence farm.\textsuperscript{162} But whatever economic calculations one could have produced to show the peasantry the economic inadvisability of land seizures as a solution to the agrarian question, "as early as March or April 1917, the Ukrainian peasantry started to solve the land problem on its own initiative," by dividing the big estates.\textsuperscript{163} This wave of agrarian discontent had the potential of being channelled into a national movement. The peasants' perceived economic antagonist was the nobility, and only a quarter of these were Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{164} Although the landholding of the nobility slowly decreased because many were incapable of adjusting to modern farming, in 1914 there were still 5,000 massive estates with about 1,600 dessiatines · (1,760 hectares) per estate.\textsuperscript{165} The large latifundia were almost entirely in Russian hands.\textsuperscript{166} Moreover, the Ukrainian peasant, fearful of sharing his newly acquired land
and moveable wealth with Russian peasants, could potentially endorse a national economic programme. 167

There was no shortage of grievances for the Ukrainian peasantry. But that in itself was no guarantee that they would identify with the articulation of these wrongs along national lines. Peasant responsiveness on this score would presuppose a certain self-awareness of belonging to a unique cultural community, and this awareness never arises spontaneously. It is the product of social learning which occurs over a long period of time. Neither was there any guarantee that peasant actions would follow an organized purposeful direction. Recent literature on social movements has shown that infrastructures of pre-existing voluntary associations and resources necessary to sustain organized activity are essential if movements are not to dissipate through lack of focus. 168

For the peasantry to serve as a base on which to build a national movement, it had to be organized. Out of an ethnic mass a self-conscious national community had to be forged. In that respect not much progress had been made prior to the revolution. The problem was two-fold: the national infrastructure, the channels transmitting the national message, were in their infancy, and the intended recipients of their message were at such a low cultural level that they could barely hear the voice of the national movement.

Mass illiteracy was one of the obstacles standing in the way of an effective propaganda effort of the Ukrainian national movement. It is true that in the post-reform period, thanks to the efforts of the zemstvo institutions and the intelligentsia's popular enlightenment campaigns, some rudimentary improvement in the level of literacy had been registered. 170
Indeed, the very fact that literacy had made some progress gave the fledgling Ukrainian press an audience, and the national movement a foothold in the village. But overall, prior to 1917, the mobilising potential of literacy was hardly developed. The social and national policies of tsarism had led to a situation, probably unique in European history, where Ukrainians had higher rates of literacy in the mid-eighteenth century than at the turn of the twentieth. In the light of the 1897 census eighteen per cent of Ukraine's population could read, five per cent less than the average for European Russia. Thirteen per cent of Ukrainians were literate. In the villages illiteracy predominated - 91 to 96 per cent depending on the province. Among Ukrainian women four per cent could read. Russians in Ukraine were twice as literate as Ukrainians, and Jews three times. The result was that Ukrainians formed half the literate population of their land. The contrast between urban and rural centres was marked. The large Russified cities of Ukraine had literacy rates higher than the cities of Russia. Kharkiv in 1912, for example, could boast a rate superior to that of Moscow and equal to that of St. Petersburg (66.6 per cent). (See table 1.9)

The literacy rate in Ukraine reflected the state of popular education in the country. Per capita expenditure on education was among the lowest in the world. The number of school establishments, especially in the villages, was woefully inadequate to the task and the majority of school buildings were in a state of dilapidation with basic educational materials in short supply. The pupil-teacher ratio could reach staggering proportions - 250 pupils per teacher in Podillia, for example. With no compulsory education, two-thirds of the children of school age in Ukraine (1915) had never set foot inside a classroom, and of those
TABLE 1.9

Literacy in Ukraine according to National Group, 1897 (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volyn</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Podillia</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>22.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poltava</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kherson</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tavria</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>30.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katerynoslav</td>
<td>30.7%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
<td>34.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Tabulated from Table I and Perepis' 1897, in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.
that did only ten per cent completed the two or three-year primary education programme. In the background of all of this was the poverty of the majority of peasants which impeded the educational achievement of their children. Most peasant families could afford neither the price of school materials, nor school fees, nor for that matter could they readily do without the labour of their children. The towns fared better than the village and the rich better than the poor when it came to education. Since the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians were both peasant and poor, it was not surprising that studies showed Ukrainian peasant children exhibited little interest in education: their rate of truancy was higher than that of Russian and Jewish children, they had the lowest rate of school attendance, and hence the lowest grades.

The school system throughout Russia was a travesty, but in Ukraine things were worse because national discrimination amplified the debilitating effects of general social and educational policies. From Alexander I's educational reform of 1804 until the time of the revolution, Ukrainian was banned from the schools both as a language of instruction and as a subject. All school activity, including explanations, had to be carried out in Russian. The 1804 law actually permitted the teaching of the non-Russian languages of the Empire. Ukrainian, however, was not considered a language but "a dialect, or half a dialect, or a mode of speech of the all-Russian language, in one word a patois, and being such, does not have the right to an independent existence...in schools." The school curriculum had no Ukrainian content: Ukrainian history, literature, culture were not taught and subjects such as geography and the natural sciences made only passing reference to "Little Russia". Until the revolution there did not exist a single state-supported Ukrainian language
school. There were some private Ukrainian Sunday schools around the
time of the emancipation, but they were closed in 1862. Although
Ukrainian patriots such as S. Iefremov called for the founding of
private Ukrainian institutions, the record of these (few) schools was
that they were shut down by provincial authorities after several
years' existence and they also had to confront the problem of the penury
of the Ukrainian masses.

Mountains of evidence were produced to show that the Russian
school in Ukraine deprived the few Ukrainian children who found their
way into a classroom of even the most rudimentary education. Since
instruction was carried out in a language they poorly understood, they
learnt little and quickly forgot what they had been taught. The con­
sequence was "a massive percentage of relapse into illiteracy among the
Ukrainian population" as Kharkiv zemstvo officials put it. A Poltava
teacher at the turn of this century observed, "...I have seen how almost
all, having completed school, in one to three years forgot how to write
and they read like the old guy who, trying to read.../the word/ photograph...
decided immediately - tobacco factory." In this teacher's village, one
school (a zemstvo one at that) had been in existence for twenty years and
37 per cent of the village population had attended it for at least one
winter (hence literate according to how statistics registered literacy),
but yet, only 14 per cent could read. Ukrainian pedagogues claimed the
Russian school induced boredom, "demoralized youth" and led to "hooliganism". These arguments fell on deaf ears. When in the aftermath of the 1905
revolution some teachers dared to give explanations in Ukrainian if the
Russian word was not understood, school inspectors gave stern warning
against such seditious behaviour.
The school question, as Otto Bauer noted, is one of the most important of all national questions, for a common national education is one of the strongest bonds of the nation. It is absolutely essential for the transmission of the great overarching traditions which give nations unity. The public school system in the Russian Empire, pitiful as it was, remained one of the most potent agencies of Russian socialization, a fact of which Russian reaction never lost sight. In Ukraine that instrument was dominated by obscurantist Russian clergy. It was an agency of denationalization and national disinformation, as one Rada correspondent put it. Since those with the means and talent were unable to learn in Ukrainian, they learned in Russian, and having done so, saw little need for the Ukrainian language. This is why N. Kostomarov in 1862 wrote, "our sense of nationality perishes with education." Because Ukrainian was not taught in schools, there were relatively few, even among the village intelligentsia, who knew the literary Ukrainian well or could read it without difficulty. This precluded the formation of an intelligentsia of any consequence and size writing in the Ukrainian language. Because the curriculum contained nothing about Ukrainian history or culture, school children emerged from the school with no knowledge of even the most basic elements of their heritage. Because the language was banned from the school, so much respected in village society, peasants held that language in very low esteem.

With so much at stake it was not surprising that the Ukrainian movement placed such great emphasis on the school question. S.N. Shchegolev, a perceptive opponent of "Little Russian separatism," commented that "...on this /school/ question are concentrated today all the efforts of Ukrainian parties as the single lever capable of becoming the fulcrum
for all the future efforts planned by the Ukrainianist movement.  

Nothing came of this agitation until the revolution of 1917. It is true, during the 1905 revolution some zemstvo institutions made unofficial efforts to introduce Ukrainian into the school system. They found there were no textbooks that could be used and that competent Ukrainian teachers were few and far between. (Many teachers actually opposed the introduction of Ukrainian, fearing loss of jobs.) The problem of educating the educators was not to be taken lightly. At the level of higher education, the sum total of Ukrainian instruction was represented by one course on "Little Russian literature" at Kiev university, and a philology and history course at Kharkiv.

In a situation where state institutions such as schools were denied as agencies of national integration and where peasant organizations were prohibited, the printed word was the only instrument which could facilitate the creation of a national social opinion (standardized by the nation's leadership and subject to its control) and impart a sense of obligation to the membership of the national group. It is for this reason that national movements under authoritarian regimes were fixated on the press and why the Ukrainian in particular spent so much energy on developing one. The tsarist regime was also acutely aware of the importance of the Ukrainian press and took numerous measures to block its emergence.

The first decree in the Russian Empire on publishing was Peter I's order of 5 October 1720 stipulating that all books in Ukraine should henceforth be examined by the Moscow church hierarchy for content and in order to ensure that they are free of all traces of the local "dialect". But censors in the eighteenth century were liberals in comparison with
their counterparts a hundred years later, and Peter's ukaz was largely overlooked with regard to language. It was really in 1847, following the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood affair, that censors started persecuting the printed word on the basis of language alone. Ukrainian books still made their appearance, but with great delays and much frustration. In 1863, following the Polish uprising and peasant unrest, the prospect that the nascent Ukrainian movement might ally itself with the peasantry acted as the catalyst for the first edict categorically banning Ukrainian-language books. Books with religious content or those intended for popular education were disallowed; only belles-lettres were permitted. In 1876, after Russian authorities became alarmed at the growth of the Ukrainian movement and of its attempts to influence peasant youth, the infamous Ems ukaz was promulgated adding many new restrictions to the 1863 measures. The ukaz, in the words of Iefremov, "sentenced to death the literature of one of the largest Slavic nations of Russia." Nothing was spared, neither the theatre nor even music, since libretti could not be written in Ukrainian without the express permission of the Main Administration for Publishing Matters. The Ems ukaz, like the 1863 measures, were exceptional events even by tsarist standards. The banning of books solely on the basis of language was unique even in Russia. Some of the rules were subsequently relaxed, but this thaw must be seen in relative terms. Between 1900-04, for example, 45 Ukrainian manuscripts were sent to the censors, but only 22 were allowed to be published. (Potebnia's ABC primer-Bukvar' was rejected). The 1905 revolution changed the situation de facto but not de jure. The revolution witnessed a flurry of Ukrainian publishing activity which the regime counter-
attacked with crippling fines and closures. In general in the post-1905 period administrative harassment was less intense when it came to books. Daily and weekly newspapers, especially those intended for peasant audiences were the first to fall victim.\(^{213}\) When reaction felt itself secure, the whole panoply of petty persecutions resumed. In Kiev in 1907 for example, the medical committee of the province refused to allow cholera epidemic notices to be published in Ukrainian.\(^{214}\) Ukrainian publishing activity languished until the revolution of 1917 cleared a path for its development. There was a unifying theme in all of the measures taken against the Ukrainian printed word. They were very consciously put into place to deny the leadership of the nascent Ukrainian movement an opportunity to influence the peasant masses.\(^{215}\)

If the Ukrainian language publishing enterprise suffered, it was not merely because of tsarist censorship policies. The social structure of Ukrainians was unpropitious for the support of a sustained publishing effort. Ukrainians were not numerous among the higher orders of society and those who were in privileged social positions were Russified and largely uninterested in supporting a Ukrainian press. Time and time again Ukrainian newspapers complained about the indifference of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the printed word in their own language.\(^{216}\) Thus publishing efforts, even when permitted, were constantly besieged by financial crises. *Rada*, a Ukrainian daily newspaper which appeared after 1905, could only muster 3,000 subscribers. The other daily newspaper, *Hromads'ka dumka*, had 1,509 subscribers in the second half of 1906. The magazine *Nova hromada*, 400.\(^{217}\) Finding typesetting equipment and training compositors were but a few of the technical headaches to be
resolved. The urban book trade was in the hands of distributors unsympathetic to the Ukrainian printed word and an alternative distribution system had to be developed. The Ukrainian press did beat a path to the village, there to confront the problem of mass illiteracy and an inferiority complex of such magnitude that it took much convincing to show that the book or periodical written in the "moujik" language was as good as that published in the "gentleman's" tongue.

The state of Ukrainian language publishing is graphically portrayed by statistics on the number of books and brochures that appeared between 1798 and 1916 (inclusive). In that 118-year period 3,214 titles saw publication, on the average 27 titles per year for a population of approximately 20 million! Almost two-thirds of that total was published after the 1905 revolution. Because of the watchful eye of colonial authorities, a significant proportion of Ukrainian book production had to be carried out elsewhere in the Empire, in the more tolerant atmosphere of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Only after 1905 did Kiev emerge as the major centre of Ukrainian publishing activity. Censorship laws ensured that Ukrainian language publications would not evolve beyond belles-lettres: 71 per cent of titles published prior to 1917 fell in that category. (See tables 1.10, 1.11) What should be borne in mind when examining the statistics is that much of what was published were popular brochures. The serial press in the Ukrainian language did not make its appearance until the second decade of the nineteenth century, over two hundred years after the founding of such a press in Western Europe, a hundred years after its establishment in Russia. Of the several hundred odd journals, newspapers and serial publications that appeared,
### TABLE 1.10

Ukrainian Language Books and Brochures Published in the Russian Empire 1798-1916 (inclusive)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Titles</th>
<th>Published in Ukraine</th>
<th>Published in Moscow</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1798-1840</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841-1904</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1916</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>1595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3214</td>
<td>2351</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: V. Ozerians'kyi "Persha vseukrains'ka vystavka drukovanoho slova v Kyivi" Chervonyi shliakh, nos.4-5, 1923, 229.

### TABLE 1.11

Ukrainian Language Books and Brochures Published in the Russian Empire 1798-1916 (inclusive) according to Subject Matter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belles-lettres</th>
<th>Ethnography</th>
<th>Philology</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Philosophy</th>
<th>History</th>
<th>Geography</th>
<th>Soc. stud. &amp; economics</th>
<th>Exact sciences</th>
<th>Applied sciences</th>
<th>Biography</th>
<th>Art</th>
<th>General (handbooks &amp; bibliography)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1748-1840</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1841-1904</td>
<td>1019</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1905-1916</td>
<td>1213</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2267</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

few survived for more than several years. The first daily newspaper in the Ukrainian language was not founded until 1905. Only one such newspaper, Rada, survived until 1914. With the outbreak of the First World War it was closed. Tatars, for the sake of comparison, had twelve newspapers on the eve of the war.

While the peasantry was a potential force in pressing the claims of the Ukrainian national movement, to be effective that force had to be harnessed and channelled. The state, the church, the school and the press were directed against that aim. Ukrainian life existed on the margins of society. Reading accounts of that period one gets the impression that amateur choirs and plays, the only open form of Ukrainian cultural life readily tolerated, were the main infrastructures of national life. It is undeniable that some progress was made as Ukraine inched towards the revolutionary conflagration of 1917. The Ukrainian printed word was more widely disseminated than in the past, every village had its nationally conscious peasants, and every other village its school teacher or zemstvo official who quietly propagated the national idea. Prosvita societies (when they existed), cooperatives, and some zemstvo institutions provided small but welcome havens for the efforts of the Ukrainian national movement. But overall, village society remained unorganized. National infrastructures had not been firmly planted in the Ukrainian soil and they did not create a strong sense of national solidarity that could be relied upon in the revolution.

The consequence of this situation was that the overwhelming mass of Ukrainian peasants had a very poorly developed sense of their national identity. "The 'sea' of the Ukrainian people, those tens of millions of people who generation after generation walked behind a plough..."
in such a cultural and educational state that...they couldn't care about any sort of national-political traditions," wrote Robitnycha hazeta in 1917. The village, of course, preserved its ethnos, but only because it was conservative. The small peasant "stubbornly looked at the world through his ancestors' eyeglasses; he wore his ancestors' clothes, spoke his ancestors' tongue." This was not the identity of a modern nation, but of a people left behind by the tide of modernization. S. Goldelman tells us that the national self-identification of the peasants was so low that they were "hardly aware that the language which they used in their daily life was 'Ukrainian'." Iefremov wrote in Rada, "It is well known...that on first hearing or reading a Ukrainian book, our peasant often looked at it as a gentleman's invention, and even as something intended to poke fun at the peasant." When during the 1905 revolution someone in the village suggested that Ukrainian should be taught in schools, peasants replied, "What is this? The moujik language to be studied in the school? They know it well from the home! What do we need schools for! We need them so we can know the Russian language, the gentleman's language. After all, all the books are written in that language." A Rada article entitled "A voice from the village" characterized the state of national consciousness as follows: "In our country peasants are only very little conscious when it comes to nationality. They know they are not Muscovites, but Little Russians as they call themselves. But what is a Little Russian? What are his needs and how does he differ from a Muscovite? This they cannot say." But the situation would not remain that way forever. The peasant may not have had much of a national instinct, but his sense of economic
grievance was acute. Pursuing his economic inclination he had little choice other than to reflect on the political order. He had to rise to the height of political being. "This political awakening of the peasantry," wrote Trotsky, "could not have taken place otherwise... than through their own native language - with all the consequences ensuing in regard to schools, courts, self-administration." 233 The close inter-relationship between the agrarian struggle and the national question was to be first observed during the 1905 revolution. The national factor began to play a role only towards the end of the agrarian revolt, after the peasantry had participated for months if not several years in the struggle for land, after the initial spontaneous outbursts gave way to more organized activity. Forced to consider and formulate their economic grievances, the peasantry became aware of political and national issues. The Poltava peasantry, which rebelled as early as 1902, began to incorporate in its petitions to authorities demands for the "Ukrainian language school, and the granting of political autonomy for Ukraine" only towards the end of 1905. 234 A study of peasant activity throughout the entire 1905 agrarian upheaval arrives at similar conclusions. 235 In his pessimistic assessment of peasant national consciousness cited above, Iefremov ended on an optimistic note: he was amazed at how quickly Ukrainian peasant representatives to the Second Duma came to understand the national question. The author of the equally despairing "A voice from the village" was also impressed that when forced to reflect, peasants would come to an appreciation of national demands. It was the agrarian revolt which roused the peasant masses from their age-old slumber.
The fact that the national awakening was inextricably bound up
with the agrarian struggle was a mixed blessing. The social dynamic in
the village was a fierce one: the richest peasants were evolving in the
direction of possessor-rentiers, the middle and the poor were headed
towards proletarianization. The most nationally conscious element in
the village was the rich peasantry. It was they who bought and read books,
supported cultural events, founded cooperatives. During the revolution
this "rural petty-bourgeoisie" was the first to organize and became a
powerful lobby against the introduction of revolutionary agrarian
reforms. The leadership of the Ukrainian national movement (intelli-
gentsia) was caught on the horns of a dilemma: radical agrarian measures
would alienate the most dependable element from the national point of
view; procrastination would discredit the national movement in the eyes
of the poor. The agrarian programme of the various Ukrainian govern-
ments revealed that they could ill afford to do without the backing of
the rural petty-bourgeoisie. The indecision on the agrarian front
developed in the masses a "conflict between the national and social
idea." It unleashed "a fury in the very heart of the Ukrainian com-
munity." The consequence was ruinous: political parties split,
jacquerie engulfed the countryside. Conversely, the relationship between
the national awakening and the agrarian question also posed a problem
for the Bolsheviks who took their stand only on the question of land
and were hostile to the other side of the equation. The fact of the
matter was that no one by 1919 really led the peasantry. A. Adams
summarized the situation very well: "One is tempted to suggest that
the nationalist intellectuals and Russian political leaders did not so
much teach the peasant as flee before him. At least the final years of the awakening of the Ukraine should be viewed as a history of a peasant jacquerie that crushed all lesser forces beneath its boots, until at last, peasants and the land were so exhausted that Bolshevism's patient workers were able to slip into power almost unchallenged."

Had the Ukrainian people evolved into a national community, a strong sense of national solidarity, the hegemony of the national idea, could have contained and channelled social antagonisms. The Galician peasantry was also impoverished and stratified when they came out in solid support of the Western Ukrainian national uprising in 1918. But there, unlike in tsarist Ukraine, the countryside was covered by a network of organizations which gave structures to the energies of that peasant people. If there had been strong non-peasant social groups in the social structure of the Ukrainian nation in tsarist Russia which could have served as an alternative rock on which to build a national movement, the social contradictions in the countryside would not have had such devastating effects. With the help of such groups rural contradictions would have had a much better chance of being resolved. But these groups did not exist.

iv. The dilemma of leadership

National identity does not exist in statu naturae. It is created, as we have argued in our introduction, by leading social groups who
elaborate and politicize objective cultural markers. In agrarian societies such as Ukraine, for the longest time, the only group capable of leading the people towards nationhood was the gentry. It was not the case, as populists argued, that Ukrainians were a "one-class people". They had an upper class. The origins of that class - V. Lypynskyi's point regarding the link with the old Ukrainian Orthodox aristocracy notwithstanding - lay in the social differentiation which occurred in the Cossack armies in the post-1648 period. In a society where land was the main source of wealth, the Cossack officer elite strove and succeeded in constituting itself as a landowning class. Since land without labour was useless, they also found it necessary to place increasingly onerous obligations on the peasantry, though they did not enserf them. The fact that both processes necessarily involved rapacity meant that between the elite and the mass of rank-and-file Cossacks and peasants there emerged sharp social contradictions. Well before the Charter of Nobility and serfdom a Ukrainian hereditary landowning class had come into being.  

Russian encroachments, culminating in the abolition of the Hetmanate in 1764, placed the Ukrainian starshyna-nobility in a discomfiting position. At issue was whether the new regime would recognize their privileges as an estate. Since the historical example of Poland was fresh in their minds, it was szlachta-like status that they demanded for themselves, often couching this request in patriotic discourse regarding their country's "ancient rights". Indeed when compared to the insecure status of Russia's nobility, the Polish aristocratic order had much to offer. But the starshyna's position was hardly feasible since hovering over them now was Russia and not Poland. When Catherine’s Charter of
Nobility of 1785 granted the dvoriane numerous economic and social privileges, the patriotic (even democratic) discourse subsided. The official sanctioning of serfdom sweetened the pill of integration into the Empire.\textsuperscript{249} There were of course problems in obtaining Russian nobility status. The Russian Table of Ranks did not correspond to the Hetmanate's hierarchy. Moreover, the Little Russian nobility demanded the inclusion into the ranks of dvoriane social groups, such as the clergy and the lower military ranks, which, however suited to the former Polish order, was unacceptable to the Russian dvoriane regime.\textsuperscript{250} But until Krechetnikov's arrival as Governor-General of Little Russia, imperial policy, prodded by Rumiantsev's intercessions, was downright liberal. The local assembly of the nobility adjudicated applications for ennoblement; the word of twelve nobles of indubitable status (easily purchased) was sufficient for a candidate to be accepted. The latter, one should add, was a uniquely Little Russian provision.\textsuperscript{251} Although many Cossacks showed remarkable ingenuity in producing utterly fantastic documents (forged by scribes in the Polish-held right bank) proving descent from foreign nobles, the majority based their claim on some ancestor having held a position of importance in the Hetman's administration.\textsuperscript{252} The results of the 1782 revizia showed that the Little Russian upper classes had been remarkably successful in securing patents of nobility. Dvoriane formed a higher proportion of the population of the left bank than of virtually any other part of the Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{253}

The security of the Ukrainian nobility was very much undermined by Krechetnikov, whose report to the Senate was a stinging indictment of irregularities in the ennoblement process. When the Senate endorsed
Krechetnikov's position, some 9,000 nobles had their status put into question. At issue was not only personal juridical status, but profound economic matters as well - estates, serfs, governmental careers, military service and education. This new development at the turn of the nineteenth century generated a fury of historical research intended to prove the claims of the injured Ukrainian gentry. It also gave rise to a new sense of Little Russian patriotism. The Napoleonic wars, Repin's intercessions and the sympathy of some high tsarist officials were the essential ingredients that resulted in the 1835 settlement when all Hetman civilian and military ranks, except for the lowest, were recognized as bestowing Russian dvorianstvo status. When this last outstanding issue was resolved, the gentry, having satisfied its estate demands, ceased to exist as a meaningful cohesive social force.

The Ukrainian gentry was never a large social group when one considers the ensemble of Ukrainian territory. It evolved only on the left bank. The right bank did not give rise to a starshyna-nobility since Cossackdom had been destroyed there under the Polish regime. In the right bank Ukrainians represented 20 per cent of the nobility, Poles, 36 per cent, the rest were Russians. Russian right-bank dvoriane, insecure in their role as front-line colonizers, developed a particularly nauseous form of Russian chauvinism to justify their mission. In the south, only a handful of the officers of the Zaporis'ka sich were granted patents of nobility when the sich was liquidated in 1775. The left-bank gentry played no role in the settlement of the south; Russian nobles dominated the agricultural scene there. The Ukrainian gentry was concentrated in the left bank, in the provinces of Poltava and Chernihiv in particular,
where they formed a layer of petty land-holders whose estates did not exceed fifty dessiatines in most cases.  

The left-bank gentry forfeited their leadership of the national movement when they became Russified in the process of constituting themselves as a dvorianstvo within the all-Russian system. The Russification, in their case, was largely voluntary. The humble origins of most members of that gentry made Russification an attractive proposition. Like the nouveau riche who ape the manners of established families, the insecure Cossack starshyna took to aristocratic culture, first the Polish, then the Russian. They changed their names: the plebian Vasylenko became the noble-sounding Bazilevskii; Rozum, Rozumovskii. It would not do to beat the corridors of heraldic offices without French wigs, German waistcoats, and certainly correct Russian. Above all, the moujik's language was not to be spoken, much less written. The greater the cultural distance from the peasantry, the more convincing the argument for nobility status could be made.

Russian policies greatly facilitated the Russification process. As I.L. Rudnytsky has stressed, tsarist policy towards Ukraine differed markedly from its policies towards other nationalities. Tsarism may have oppressed the Poles, Finns and Georgians, but it did not challenge their claim to recognition as distinct and separate nations. In the case of Ukrainians, according to official dogma, they were the Little Russian offshoot of the triune Russian nation. This policy entailed two consequences. Firstly, individuals of Ukrainian origin of the appropriate estate, willing to renounce their identity and merge into an "all-Russian" one, were not discriminated against. Secondly, systematic repression was applied to all individuals who upheld a distinct Ukrainian identity.
"whether in the political or in the cultural sphere." Upward mobility could only be achieved by the acquisition of Russian language and culture. The fact that Russian culture in the latter part of the eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth was acquiring western ideas more rapidly than the Ukrainian, made the carrot all the more attractive. The stick of repression needed little elaboration for a gentry which remembered what happened to Mazeppa's followers. The combination of the carrot and the stick made for a very effective policy.

Ukraine's loss of its ruling class in the modern period was one of the many discontinuities in the history of this "non-historical" nation. "The Ukrainian people," wrote an editorialist in Robitnycha hazeta, "had the fortune or misfortune to lose their lordly-bourgeois classes without, obviously, being denied the pleasure of shouldering these classes. Therefore among Ukrainians there were no layers such as we see among the Poles, Georgians or Finns, which harboured national-political traditions." While this assessment is by and large correct, it must not obliterate the fact that whatever national consciousness survived into the nineteenth century was due to the gentry. The injured pride of many Little Russian nobleman transformed itself into a local patriotism. Beneath the Russian language and political subservience, in the crevices of an "all-Russian" (rossiiskoe not russkoe) identity there still existed a sense of cultural uniqueness in some. It was the gentry who funded journals, academic institutions and books which propagated the Ukrainian idea. These may have been very modest efforts, but without them, the Ukrainian intelligentsia would have been stillborn.

The task of modern nationalism is to mobilize the people and to integrate them into a new national body politic. This could only have been
achieved by the democratization of the social structure and the integration of the lower classes into the nation. This the gentry could never have achieved. Their image of the "ancient rights" of Little Russia never went beyond aristocratic corporatism. Every stirring of the peasantry drove the gentry deeper and deeper into the camp of political reaction. The Ukrainian national movement, wrote Iefremov, had to be "democratic and popular" or not at all. Thus it was not surprising that at the turn of the twentieth century those among the gentry who identified themselves with the national movement were so few that they stood out like "white ravens" in their own milieu. Ie. Chykalenko, himself a "feodal", commented that the gentry "with few exceptions, took a clearly hostile position" towards the Ukrainian movement. In the first decades of the nineteenth century the gentry bowed out of Ukrainian history, but not before it had planted a seed in another social group. Without that seed the modern Ukrainian national movement would have been inconceivable.

Describing the leadership dynamic of national movements, Karl Deutsch noted that if the main "interests and ties" of the established upper class of the moment "lie elsewhere, perhaps outside the country, or if it has accepted alien speech, habits or religion, or if, finally, it has come to care only for its own group interests in quite a narrow manner, then the national and social leadership may devolve upon the next class below it, or still further down to whichever class is sufficiently strong, respected and locally accessible to become in fact the 'leading group of the national movement'." In the case of the Ukrainians, one had to travel some distance down the social hierarchy to touch the leadership base of the national movement.
Though early Russian Marxists tried hard to find an indigenous capitalist class substantial enough to fulfill the requirements of the stages theory of revolution - feudalism, capitalism, socialism - even M. Pokrovskii, the most persistent detective, had to give up the search in the end. Notwithstanding the fact that to find a Ukrainian capitalist one would have had to walk Ukraine like the ancient Diogenes, lantern in hand in search of an honest man in Athens and come up with the same result, contemporary Soviet historiography persists in this shibboleth. If an indigenous Ukrainian capitalist class did not develop, this had little to do with the democratic national characteristics of that people, but rather entirely with economic under-development and unfavourable tsarist fiscal and investment policies which resulted in little indigenous capital formation. All the leading sectors of the economy were in West European hands: 80-90 per cent of the metallurgical industry; the mining and the farm implements industry were in similar straits. O.I. Luhova did a head count of capitalists in those regions of Ukraine where one would have expected to find some Ukrainian capitalists - Kiev and Kharkiv provinces, for example - and came up with six (all in Kiev province) who between them employed 316 workers. The closest one can get to a definition of "capitalist" in the 1897 census is the category referring to people deriving their income from capital or real estate. There were 111,626 individuals in this group, of whom 29 per cent were Ukrainians. The overwhelming majority of them derived income from property (estates) rather than factories or enterprises. This is evidenced by the fact that over half of those in the above category inhabited the left-bank provinces where there were few
factories to speak of. There was of course a small (mostly Russian) capitalist class, the most significant sectors of which participated in Western European ventures in Ukraine as minority share-holders. This group constituted a regional wing of the all-Russian bourgeoisie. They complained about the fact that central fiscal and tariff policies were hurting the growth of south Russian industries. Mykola Stasiuk, having demonstrated that national oppression in Ukraine was both "territorial" and "national-cultural," wondered if this may not lead to the mutual support of both currents, but quickly concluded that this was impossible. The bourgeoisie in Ukraine as in Russia was timid and conservative, politically impotent and incapable of independent action. The Russian bourgeoisie's contribution to the national question was to struggle against the slogan "national self-determination". The south Russian bourgeoisie's contribution was to constitute itself as the more intelligent wing of Russian reaction. The weakness and the national composition of the capitalists in Ukraine meant that the national movement could count on the material support only of the occasional Ukrainian "bourgeois who rose from the ranks of the people."

Many peoples in Eastern and Western Europe attained nationhood without having their own national big bourgeoisie. None, however, made it without a petty-bourgeoisie. This is the conclusion of Miroslav Hroch's study of the institutional development in a variety of national movements. Merchants and craftsmen, he concluded, are "the most important bearers of the nationalism of a fully developed nation...and a potential source for its ruling class." In our discussion of the city we have described the ruin of the indigenous merchant and trading classes. The 1897
census paid eloquent tribute to the results of that process. Nowhere were Ukrainians more weakly represented than in occupations involving trade and commerce: only 13 per cent were Ukrainian. (See table 1.12) To analyze the weight of Ukrainians among artisans is much more difficult since the 1897 census does not distinguish between self-supporting artisans and workers. In general, however, artisan production was extremely weak in Ukraine when compared to Russia. Evidence suggests that, except for the left bank, the majority of artisans in Ukraine were non-Ukrainian. In the left bank this petty bourgeoisie was small, but finding itself in a highly competitive environment—squeezed by Jewish artisans on the one hand and Russian factory and kustar' production on the other—it gravitated towards the national movement, forming, as in other countries of Eastern Europe, the chauvinist wing. Though the agrarian petty-bourgeoisie played a significant role in the national movement, the weakness of the non-agrarian sector was a factor of primary importance in accounting for the inordinate difficulties the Ukrainians had in crossing the threshold into nationhood.

The leadership of the Ukrainian national movement went by default to that amorphous group, the intelligentsia. The Ukrainian intelligentsia marked its political debut with the founding of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius. From the 1840s on, it was the "numerically small Ukrainian democratic intelligentsia" who took over from the gentry the role of incubator of national-political traditions. Not that in social terms there was a qualitative break between the two groups. The ranks of the first intelligentsia were filled by the sons of the small gentry who, finding no outlet in agriculture and commerce, sought admission into the civil service as petty officials and clerks, junior officers
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Right bank</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>122,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left bank</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>41.2</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>67,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steppe</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>122,419</td>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>62.0</td>
<td>330,615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include dependents.*

Source: 

Perepis', 1897, Table XXI in Vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 47, 48.
or as educators. Every modest step taken in tsarist Russia in the direction of modernity increased the size of the indigenous intelligentsia. The growth of the state apparatus, the founding of institutions of learning, the beginnings of a modicum of economic, medical and cultural infrastructures, all of this needed teachers, functionaries and medical personnel. The emancipation of the peasantry which hastened its differentiation provided an additional stimulus for the growth of Ukrainian intelligentsia cadres. The richer peasants, like their gentry predecessors, began in the 1870s to push their sons to acquire some education and "in this way, unconsciously, carried out the national task of training the national-cultural leadership of the people." I. Chopiv's'kyi remarked in 1918 that "to find a Ukrainian who was a second generation intelligent was rare. Most had just emerged from the village."

The preponderance of impoverished peasants in the social structure of the Ukrainian people and an educational system which was elitist and Russian-speaking meant that the Ukrainian intelligentsia represented a tiny layer of the population. There were only 27,000 students attending 19 institutions of higher learning and another 7,600 enrolled in 61 specialized secondary establishments in 1914 in Ukraine. That in itself was a vast improvement over what had existed in the preceding decades. In the light of the 1897 census there were only 24,329 individuals with some form of higher education and 17,000 with specialized secondary training in Ukraine. Although the census did not correlate educational achievement with nationality, it did so for estates. The dvoriane, chinovniki and urban estates claimed the lion's share of educated people. The census showed that Ukrainians formed a quarter of the membership of each of
these estates. The 1917 Kiev city census revealed that eleven per cent of the student population of the city gave Ukrainian as their nationality. Contemporaries observed that Ukrainians were virtually absent from the upper echelons of the intelligentsia, and were to be found mostly among the so-called "third element", that is, the rural intelligentsia and para-professionals. The census corroborates this. Almost a third of those with secondary education were from the village estates and, one can assume not unreasonably, belonged to the Ukrainian nationality. (See table 1.13)

The weakness of the Ukrainian intelligentsia is amply demonstrated by the census data giving their share of those occupations which commonly serve as the activist core of a national movement. It was only among those holding positions in zemstvo and other local institutions and among the clergy that Ukrainians emerged as a majority. (Unlike in Galicia, the clergy in tsarist Ukraine, organized as it was into a Russian Orthodox church, never played an important role in the national movement.) There are two other structural aspects of the Ukrainian intelligentsia that weakened their influence in society. The first was that most of them were located in rural areas: 75 per cent of the Ukrainians enumerated in the occupations given in table 1.14 (except for the army) lived in villages. Secondly, the intelligentsia was disproportionately concentrated in the left bank. For example, the left bank claimed 45 per cent of Ukrainians employed in central and local state institutions. While Poltava province had eight Ukrainian teachers per 1,000 Ukrainians inhabitants, Volyn' had five; while the former had 15 Ukrainians employed in state institutions per 1,000 Ukrainian people,
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>15</td>
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<td>Peasants</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cossacks</td>
<td>1182</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>1272</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>%</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
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<td>0.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Educational levels of population according to estate, 1997.

TABLE 1.13
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ukrainians (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>221,129</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>36,554</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>22,735</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature, art and science (nauka)</td>
<td>4,574</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teaching</td>
<td>22,294</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law practice</td>
<td>2,040</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public institutions</td>
<td>19,844</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zemstvo &amp; other local public institutions (administration, courts, central state apparatus)</td>
<td>34,273</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Labour, 1897*</td>
<td>34,273</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>221,129</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include dependents.

Source: Perepis', 1897, tables XIX, XXI in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.
the latter had eight. These facts largely accounted for the fact regional differences when it came to the national movement's influence.

The intelligentsia was a social category: those who were educated. Not easily fitted into the Procrustean bed of an estate society, they were the déclassé, the raznochintsy. But above all they represented a critical attitude. In a country with mass illiteracy and ignorance, the several thousand members of the intelligentsia were in a very real sense the "intelligence" of the people. Of course not all the members of the intelligentsia were revoltés; many were quite satisfied with their lot and, indeed, when compared to the misery around them they had much to be smug about. By no means all identified with the national idea. One need not search far for an explanation of this much dwelled-upon phenomenon. Everything that stood a step above the village - from the government office to schools and factories - in effect all the various manifestations of modern life in the country were powerful agents of Russification. For the educated too, Russian culture had lustre, while the struggling Ukrainian culture smacked of provincialism. Symon Petliura in a 1907 article complained that the theoretical debates and socio-economic analyses which excited students' minds were largely absent from the pages of the Ukrainian press which to the students seemed obsessed with linguistic and cultural concerns. Many with a proclivity to oppositional activity joined Russian organizations which operated in Ukraine, splitting the ranks of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Moreover in a society where secure employment was scarce, and where police persecuted Ukrainian activists, there were powerful material incentives to remain inactive. The very social origins of the intelligentsia were
a drawback. Hroch makes the point in relationship to the Czech movement that the village intelligentsia, insecure and bewildered, joined that movement only when it had acquired a certain prestige. All these factors induced inertia and indifference among large sectors of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the national task at hand. The Ukrainian intelligentsia, railed the press of the period, do not donate money to build a Shevchenko monument, they do not subscribe to Ukrainian periodicals, the fate of Ukrainian schools does not interest them, and the litany went on and on. But what was really remarkable in all of this was not so much that the intelligentsia was Russified and less than eager to throw themselves into the uncertain terrain of Ukrainian activity, as much as that so many of them did.

It was in the towns that the future intelligentsia activists were formed, but not out of long-standing urban residents. Most who had grown up in the city were permeated by Russian culture and rarely found their way into the Ukrainian movement. Their confrontation with the Ukrainian reality was through the occasional book, and, less frequently, the Ukrainian theatre - all of which had a certain curiosity value, little more. But for the young intelligent from the village, his confrontation with the Russian town was a wrenching experience. The Russian environment brutally reminded him of the fact that he was different, of peasant origin. The first reaction to this new reality was to blend in with the crowd - to shed as quickly as possible all the outward signs of the village. The internal transformation took a different route. City air allowed thought to flow more freely and broadly. At this point the intelligent either lost himself completely in Russian culture or, as often happened, he sought to understand the gnawing questions raised by
his ethnic origins. It was on him that the Ukrainian book and the Ukrainian theatre had such profound impact. If in the village the book and theatre were considered almost forms of condescension, in the town they became a "source of knowledge and genuine spiritual delight." It was, paradoxically, through the mechanisms of assimilation that the Ukrainian intelligentsia arrived at a national consciousness.

In this process of conscientization, the small circle of urban patriarchs of Ukrainian culture had an inordinate influence on the intelligent from the village, and through him on village society itself.

O. Shums'kyi describes the almost imperceptible, hushed chain of communication which linked the "quiet chambers of Kiev professors, doctors, chinovniki, lawyers, writers and plain petty gentry" with the village, mediated by the rural intelligent who visited their chambers. Returning to the village the intelligent organized amateur cultural circles. These in turn influenced the better-off peasantry, who secured funds from cooperatives they controlled to pay for further Ukrainian activities. If the Kiev professors gave the Ukrainian movement some status in the eyes of the village intelligentsia, the latter in turn planted the seed of national consciousness in the village. Find a nationally conscious peasant, wrote Chykalenko, and there you see the work of "the teacher" or "medic", or apothecary, clerk or priest's son.

The nascent Ukrainian intelligentsia also had material reasons for wanting to see their own national institutions. Ukrainian schools, newspapers and a Ukrainized civil service meant jobs, and would change the rules of the competitive environment in their favour. As the intelligentsia became exposed to modern ideas, expectations raced ahead of
material reality itself. They wanted schools, universities, newspapers, factories, parliaments, but they were unable to copy the West in too literal a sense for this would have entailed repeating all the painfully slow stages of growth. To achieve their aims they had to mobilize the forces at their disposal - the people, for people was all that they had.

"The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history."\(^{307}\)

The backwardness of their people placed the Ukrainian intelligentsia in a dilemma described by Ivan Franko in the Galician setting, but applicable to tsarist Ukraine as well:\(^{308}\)

.../Y/oung people frequently and vehemently argued the problem: what should we do in our national bad times, and what should we start from? Some said: "Education, book!" But others answered: "But our people are poor and hungry, who wants a book when he wants to eat, even a wise head raves when the body is faint". The first would retort: "Hungry and poor because uneducated, because they cannot stand up for themselves or get their due and anyone who wants can take advantage of them and oppress them." Still others reversed this answer: "Uneducated because unable to pay for an education, taken advantage of, because he is helpless in his poverty".

Socialism promised to circumvent this seemingly inexorable vicious circle. The Russian intelligentsia came to this conclusion as well, though there was little agreement on what kind of socialism it was to be. But at least their socialism had a touch-base in reality - the working class. In Ukraine, the nationally conscious intelligentsia could extend its "invitation" to the peasantry. This was not much even when compared to the Russian intelligentsia in Ukraine which could orient towards the
proletariat. The Russian intelligentsia in Ukraine jealously guarded their privileged contact with the working class and opposed any introduction of the national factor into the industrial milieu. A socialism without a working class, working class parties without workers, this made for political confusion, and gave rise to divisions within the nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia. Part of that intelligentsia turned to the peasantry, the other continued the search for a social base larger than themselves without ever really finding one.

v. The working class

If in the past peasant revolutions in Russia did not succeed, it was because there were no major urban classes interested in supporting the peasants' settlement of scores with feudalism. In the Russian revolution the working class, with its own accounts to take care of in the factories, provided that decisive lever. The coincidence of the two movements was responsible for the success of that revolution.

In Ukraine, by contrast, the two revolutions, the urban and the rural, never found common ground, and the revolution in that country proved to be a complex affair during which everything was tried at least once.

It was not that the working class in Ukraine had no history of activity. Paradoxically, Ukraine could boast an impressive series of "firsts" in Russian labour history: the first strike where political slogans were raised (1872), the first working class organization (1875),
the first revolutionary procession (1901), the first general strike (1903), and even the first Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party was called at the insistence of the Kiev League of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class. With the exception of the first organization, the Iuzhnorossiikii Workers' Union, whose membership was influenced by the Kiev Hromada, an organization regrouping the Ukrainian national intelligentsia, all other working class efforts went under the Iuzhnorussskii banner. The former is a territorial designation for the south of Russia; the latter refers to south Russians in the ethnic sense. While the Russian working class movement in Ukraine had proved its mettle in organizing in defence of its class interests, politically it never defined its role in terms of Ukraine. The proletariat, far from assuming responsibility for the Ukrainian revolution, spent most of its energies avoiding it. The root of the problem was not so much a matter of bad faith or wrong ideas, as in the social weight, location and national composition of that class.

We owe to Lenin a succinct summary of Ukraine's economic profile: "L'Ukraine...demeure à l'état de pays au niveau de l'économie naturelle. Ce que fut l'Irlande pour l'Angleterre, elle l'est devenue pour la Russie: exploitée à l'extrême limite, sans rien recevoir en retour." Capital investment was concentrated in central Russian lands while Ukraine was starved for its share. According to N. Iasnopolskii, in 1891-92 Ukraine received six per cent of European Russia's capital investment when its population represented 25 per cent. Lenin in his study of capitalism in Russia showed that in 1890 Ukraine accounted for only eight per cent of European Russia's workers employed in enterprises whose product exceeded 2,000 rubles.
In the second half of the 1890s, and especially in the decade preceding the revolution, huge strides were taken in the industrial development of Ukraine. This growth, however, centred largely in the coal-metallurgical industry in the Donbas and surrounding region. In 1912, for example, half the total industrial labour force of Ukraine was employed in that industrial enclave.\textsuperscript{314} It was foreign capital, attracted by fantastic profits and hardly concerned with the "centralistic great-power ambitions of Russian capitalism,"\textsuperscript{315} that opened up the region. Large enterprises with the latest Western machinery employing thousands of workers rose up on the Arcadian steppe.\textsuperscript{316} But one must avoid the pitfalls of Soviet-style panegyrics about the "stormy" development of the Donbas. On an otherwise bleak industrial map, Donbas was indeed impressive. But when compared to its potential, its growth was insignificant.

According to geological surveys carried out in the late 1860s, Donbas' coal reserves were 321 billion kilogrammes. This was sufficient to maintain British levels of coal production for two centuries.\textsuperscript{317} Donbas had the world's largest reserves of metallurgical coals (anthracite and semi-anthracite). But the geological surveys were hopelessly inadequate; larger reserves were to be found deeper in the ground. D.I. Mendeleev, the famous chemist who was also an ardent Russian economic nationalist, raved at the madness of tsarist policies which instead of building canals and railways to link southern coal deposits with northern industries, instead of locating industry close to the source of energy supply, preferred to spend tens of millions of rubles importing British and German coal through Baltic ports.\textsuperscript{318} Indeed, in 1889 Donbas produced as much coal as was imported from abroad, and the practice of
fuelling Moscow and Petersburg industries on imported coal continued right up until the revolution. Mendeleev argued (1892) that "the Donets'k region" with its coal reserves as an economic base could become "the new England with all kinds of industries being founded there," and unlike England it would not have to import wheat. But the precondition for this bright future was a change of economic policies regarding tariffs, industrial location practices and transportation infrastructures. As things worked out, the Donets' basin never evolved beyond the extraction and elementary processing of raw materials, and even that was in its rudimentary stage of development. The same story could be recounted for the Ukrainian iron-ore and metallurgical industries. Ukraine's rate of participation in the "industrial life of Russia is weak," wrote Stebnyts'kyi in 1918. "Its economic strengths are concentrated primarily in the harvesting and processing of food products." In Volobuiev's terms, this was a classical colonialism of a "European type".

The working class of Ukraine reflected the country's economic predicament. To begin with it was a small working class. Non-agricultural labourers numbered 425,413 in 1897 or sixteen per cent of the total for European Russia. (Recall that Ukraine's share of the population of the same geographical entity was 25 per cent.) Of course the figure 425,413 is not completely reliable. The gathering of labour statistics was still in its infancy in Europe, and in tsarist Russia errors due to dubious methodologies were amplified by the problems of counting a working class whose umbilical cord to the village economy had not yet been severed. The number, based on a re-working of the 1897 census
results under N.A. Troinitskii's direction, is, however, indicative of the proportion of the population that resembled a European working class. In the light of that study the working class represented seven per cent of the employed population of Ukraine. 326 Almost half the working class was concentrated in the steppe provinces where the might of the proletariat - the 65,100 industrial workers in mining and metallurgy - was located. 327 As Ukraine entered the twentieth century the working class grew, "although this growth did not have a very intensive character." In European Russia, workers per one thousand inhabitants increased from 15 to 20 between 1860 and 1900. In Ukraine the increase was from 12 to 13. 329 A 1913 study (taken when the sugar industry was operating at its height) revealed 642,308 workers, 45 per cent of whom were concentrated in the mining and metallurgical industry, that is, in the steppe. 330

The working class in the steppe reflected the very uneven development of Ukraine. European capital created factories in its own image. Enterprises in Katerynoslav province were relatively modern, and, utilizing much greater horse power per worker than industries in Russia, employed very large work forces. In 1902, for example, 69 per cent of all workers in Ukraine labouring in factories with over 1,000 employees were in that province. 331 As early as 1894 two-thirds of all enterprises in Katerynoslav province employed not less than 500 workers. 332 The highest paid workers in the Russian Empire (excluding Finland) were to be found in Katerynoslav province. 333 A coalface worker, for example, received the second highest wages in the Empire. 334 Wages in the right and left bank (except for the city of Kharkiv) were among the lowest in the Empire. 335 This does not mean that the standard of living and especially
the work environment of the Katerynoslav proletariat were anything but miserable by European standards. But misery is a relative concept. The peasant who found his way for several months of the year into the sugar refineries of Kiev also had to put up with poor ventilation, long hours and much abuse, but his material reward paled in comparison with the wages of the Donbas proletariat. Moreover, unlike the Donbas worker, he was inefficacious when it came to defending his rights. In labour history it has always been the case that the most highly paid sectors of the working class are also the best organized and the most capable of pursuing collective action. A Hromada correspondent observed this in 1879: "Certainly the most suitable element for propaganda and agitation appeared to be factory people. Firstly, because they have the most free time and the most common sense, and also because it is easiest to get to know them as opposed to other workers. Besides, they are for the most part literate people." The correspondent exaggerated somewhat the literacy of workers since in 1897, 52 per cent of Ukraine's proletariat was illiterate - 48 per cent in the steppe. But it is true that the most highly industrialized workers - metallurgists, for example - could in the main read (67 per cent). When newspapers or books came into their hands they could be understood and popular educational projects were avidly supported. Half the clientele of the Ielysavethrad (Kirovochrad) lending library were workers. How different from the situation in the villages.

Capitalism, we have argued, had not developed to the extent in Ukraine that it had mobilised large numbers of people for entry into the industrial environment. Census migration data give us some idea
of how much of industry's labour needs were met by Russian labour. According to M. Porsh's analysis of those data, 42 per cent of the 425,413 workers enumerated in the census were born beyond the borders of Ukraine. Two-thirds of these migrants settled in the industrial environment of the steppe and, more specifically, they gravitated to the large enterprises. In 1892, to give a concrete example, 80 per cent of the labour force in the mines and factories of one of Ukraine's bourgeoning industrial towns, Iuzivka, had arrived from the Moscow area. Evidence suggests that the rate of Ukrainians' industrial immigration showed a slight tendency to improve as the economy grew and as mechanized agriculture made them increasingly superfluous as an agricultural labour force. In 1871, 14 per cent of the Donbas miners originated from Ukrainian provinces; by 1900, 25 per cent. During the first world war Russian immigration substantially subsided and almost half the new recruits into the mines were Ukrainian. But all of this did not occur in time or on a large enough scale to alter the national composition of the working class. The revolution came too soon for the Ukrainian proletariat.

Unfortunately it is impossible to calculate the national composition of the working class (Troinitskii's study did not cover the mother-tongue variable.) What we have are data for economically self-supporting individuals earning an income as something other than self-supporting farmers. This includes both artisans and white-collar workers. Over a million and a half people were counted under that category, of whom 44 per cent were Ukrainians. If we examine the various categories, then Porsh's estimate that a third of the working class was Ukrainian seems reasonable. It was only among day labourers and servants and among
those employed in textiles that Ukrainians formed a majority. (The Ukrainian textile industry, unlike the Russian, had not evolved beyond the artisan stage.) In the industrial heartland of Ukraine, Katerynoslav province, Ukrainians represented a quarter of those employed in the mines, and a third of those in metallurgy. In the largest factory of the country, the Olexandrivs'kyi metallurgical plant, the national (ethnic, not linguistic) composition of workers was as follows: two-thirds were Russians; Ukrainians represented 30 per cent. (See table 1.15)

Other evidence points to the fact that Ukrainians never really developed deep roots in the urban industrial environment. Unlike the steppe, where the majority of workers even according to official statistics laboured in towns (and as we have noted there was much undeclared urbanization in that region), 15 per cent of workers in the left bank and 24 per cent in the right bank were located in towns. Since 80 per cent of Ukrainians employed outside of agriculture were located in the latter two regions, they were deprived of the richer mobilizing atmosphere that cities had to offer. V.I. Naulko makes the point that among railway workers, for example, Ukrainians dominated the rural stations, leaving the urban to Russians. Finally, Ukraine was characterized by an unusually high proportion of its factory proletariat classified as temporary workers. Studies of this work force in Donbas revealed that almost all were Ukrainian. Thus the size, structure and location of Ukrainian workers made it very difficult for them to be organized as a coherent force.

Denied a place among the urban petty-bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, the Ukrainian movement could not find a place for itself among the working class. The proletariat of the large urban factories was
# Table 1.15

Non-Agricultural Occupation Structure of Ukraine according to National Group, 1897*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total Ukrainians</th>
<th>% of As % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgy &amp; metal work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals &amp; mineral processing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodworking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation &amp; communications</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processing of animal products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Distilleries &amp; tobacco</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diverse manufacturing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodwork</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals &amp; mineral processing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Russian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebras</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include dependents.

Source: Perepis' 1897, table XXI in vols. 8, 13, 16, 18, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.
Russian. This was a working class very suited for political and trade union activity. For the small number of Ukrainians who found themselves among the ranks of industrial workers, "elementary cultural development... required for the most part acceptance of Russian culture." By and large, Ukrainian workers were organized by Russian trade unions and parties. There was a small nationally conscious sector of the working class that appeared on the scene late in the history of tsarism. Its importance was not always understood by the national movement. Under-development bred not only a lop-sided social structure, it also distorted intellectual development and political thought. As early as 1875, S. Podolynskyi suggested an organizational division of labour with Ukrainians orienting to the village and leaving the working class to "Russian radicals". A few individuals tried to change this. Lev Iurkevych, for example, campaigned for a Ukrainian workers' newspaper. The request of "several hundred" Katerynoslav workers which initiated his efforts met with indifference from the Ukrainian intelligentsia; moreover, the problem of material resources could not be surmounted. Prior to the founding of Robitnycha hazeta in 1917, there was no workers' newspaper published by the Ukrainian movement (Petliura's Slovo could hardly be called that). The workers' movement on the other hand published no Ukrainian language newspaper. What existed were two solitudes.

Conclusion

The revolution did not wait to present problems by stages, first the
national-democratic, then the social. All the contradictions which for centuries had accumulated under tsarism exploded simultaneously. Yet history had not provided Ukrainians with the wherewithal to tackle them. The cry of every General Secretary of the Central Rada, "For God's sake, we need people!" highlighted the dilemma of the Ukrainian movement during the revolution. 358

The ability of a people to rise to the stature of nationhood is uneven, and that unevenness lies essentially in the underlying social structures of the various nations. A comparison of the occupation structures of the three major national groups inhabiting Ukraine graphically bears out this point. 359 (See tables 1.16, 1.17) Perhaps if some of the mobilised minorities, Jews in particular, had come to the side of the Ukrainian movement, playing the same role in Ukraine as they did in the "young Germany" movement in the 1820s, the situation would have been different. This did not occur and Ukrainians were thrown on their own resources. The events of the revolution would have tested the strength of the most developed nation, while the Ukrainian as in the spring-time of its development. How could this nation build a state, resolve a complex agrarian question, establish new relationships in industry and commerce, found newspapers and universities, organize an army and fight on three fronts, when it had yet to open an elementary school in its native language? That Ukrainians did not succeed in their first attempt in modern times to control their society was hardly surprising under the circumstances. That so much was accomplished was the truly remarkable fact. Hundreds of thousands of people were drawn into the struggle for national self-assertion. Ukraine would never be the same again.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. State administration, courts, police, liberal professions</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>57.5</td>
<td>88.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Armed forces</td>
<td>85.2</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Trade and commerce</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Industry, manufacture, construction and transportation</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Day labourers</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>62.8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Agriculture</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>86.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include dependents

Source: Perepis 1897, table XXI in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.
TABLE 1.17

Occupational Structure of Major Nationalities, 1897 (in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Trade and commerce</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Armed forces</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Industry, manufacturing and transportation</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Agriculture and ser vices</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Day labourers</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>55.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Other</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Other</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include dependents

Source: Perepis' 1897, table XXI in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.
Notes


2. N.P. Eroshkin, Ocherki istorii gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii dorevoliutsionnoi Rossii (Moscow, 1960), 176-79 passim.


   "Hetmanate Ukainophiles" had some rather interesting ambitions. According to the author rumours were widespread throughout Ukrainian gentry circles that demands were being made to elevate a certain Poltavian noble "G" (probably H. Galagan,) to the post of Hetman, and M.I. Iuzefovych (!) author of the 1876 ukaz banning the Ukrainian language, to the post of pisar'. (This rumour appears to have circulated in the late 1850s.)


7. The publication of the results of the first general population census taken in 1897 played an important role in redefining the ethnic boundary of Ukraine. For a critique of Drahomanov's ethnic boundaries see: V. Ko-yi /V. Kosovy/, "Natsional'no-tertorial'ni mezhi Ukrainy i terytorii in'shykh oblastei Rosii," Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk, XXXIX, 1907, bk. VII-IX, 317.


13. In 1897, 36 per cent of the population of the Crimea was Tatar. After the revolution, the Crimea became an autonomous republic of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In 1944, Tatars were deported
en masse to Central Asia, charged with collaborating with the Nazis. The charges were formally withdrawn in 1967 by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Tatars, however, were not allowed to return to their ancestral homeland. See Aleksandr Nekrich, The Punished Peoples: The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War (New York, 1978), 13-35; 167-79.


15. Colonization was so widespread that it provoked considerable discontent among Cossack officers. In 1750 they sent a delegation to the tsar asking him to "send out of Ukraine all Great Russian chinovniki." Dmitrii Bantish-Kamenskii, Istoriia Maloi Rossii so vremen prisoedineniia onoi k Rossiiskomu gosudarstvu pri tsare Aleksee Mikhailoviche s kratkim obozreniem pervobytnogo sostojaniia sего kraia, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1822), II: 119.


17. This question has been studied extensively by V.M. Kabuzan, Zaselenie Novorossii v XVIII-pervoi polovine XIX veka (Moscow, 1970) and Donald Frances Lynch, "The Conquest, Settlement and Initial Development of New Russia (The Southern Third of the Ukraine): 1780-1837," Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1965.

18. The male Ukrainian population increased by 275 per cent between 1795 and 1897 as compared with a 280 per cent increase for the total population of the Russian Empire. V.M. Kabuzan and H.P. Makhnova, "Chislennost' i udel'nyi ves ukrainskogo naselenia na territorii SSSR v 1795-1959 gg.," Istoriia SSSR, no.1, 1965, 30.

19. Tabulated from ibid., 31-3. The figures are more connotative of the changes in the ethnic structure of the land than a precise statistical record. Nationality in the revizia was defined as political nationality whereas the 1897 census refers to mother tongue.

20. Data for 1897 is compiled from Pervaia vseobshchaia perepis' naseleniia Rossisskoi imperii 1897 goda, 89 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1897-1905). The following volumes were used extensively: 8 (Volyn'), 13 (Kiev), 16 (Katerynoslav), 32 (Podillia), 33 (Poltava), 41 (Tavria), 46 (Kharkiv), 47 (Kherson), 48 (Chernihiv). In our notes we will refer to table numbers, which are identical in all volumes, and not to pages, which vary. Hereafter cited as Perepis' 1897.

21. The 1897 census did not collect nationality data based on the self-identification of the respondents. Rather, individuals were asked to state their mother tongue. Throughout this chapter when reference
is made to the 1897 census nationality is defined by mother tongue.

Since many Ukrainians gave Russian as their mother tongue, there were more ethnic Ukrainians than the census reveals. The collection of mother tongue data itself was not without problems. Chairmen of local census committees and the enumerators were inadequately trained in census procedures and often, as contemporaries observed, their hostility towards expressions of "Little Russian" separatism was reflected in their interviews of respondents. The peasantry's poorly developed sense of national identity and the fact that many educated Ukrainians considered the Russian literary language as their mother tongue contain inaccuracies.


Given the state of national consciousness in Ukraine at that time, one wonders whether asking respondents to identify their nationality would have mirrored more accurately the national composition of Ukraine. In all fairness, it must also be noted that the gathering of statistics on nationality was in its early stages of development everywhere in Europe when the 1897 census was taken. See Stanyslav Dnistrians'kyi, "Natsional'na statystyka," Studii z polia suspil'nykh nauk i statystyky, no.1, 1909, 17-60. The student of tsarist Ukraine can at least take heart in the fact that compared with the enumeration of Ukrainians in Austro-Hungary the Russian census was a model of accuracy. See Myron Kordouba, Le territoire et la population de l'Ukraine (Berne, 1919), 6. In any case, data on native language identification are the only nationality category at our disposal for this period and they can serve as an approximate measures of the human resources of the Ukrainian nation.

22. Chernihiv is not an exception as would appear in table 1.1. That province included within its boundaries two ethnically Russian counties (povity) which were incorporated into the Russian SFSR after the revolution.

23. Ukraine is traditionally divided into three regions in the pre-revolutionary period. The right bank: Volyn', Podillia and Kiev. The left bank: Chernihiv, Poltava and Kharkiv. The southern region, the steppe consisted of Katerynoslav, Kherson and Tavria provinces.


25. Robitnycha hazeta, 29 November 1917.


28. Cities in tsarist Russia did not play an important role in the industrialization of the country until the turn of the twentieth century. The exception to this general trend were cities in southern Ukraine. See Roger L. Thiede, "Industry and Urbanization in New Russia from 1860 to 1910," in The City in Russian History, ed. Michael F. Hamm, (Lexington, 1976), 125-38.


30. Ibid., 71.


32. Ibid., 39-40.

33. Although historians of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national movement have not addressed themselves to this question directly, many references to the decisive role of these three cities are to be found. Following the creation of the University of Kharkiv in 1805, that city in the early part of the nineteenth century replaced Poltava as the centre of Ukrainian national life. See George Luciani, "Preface," in Le livre de la Genêse du peuple Ukrainien (Paris, 1956) 16. The role of the Kiev, Kharkiv and St. Peterburg circles in the development of the Ukrainian national movement is discussed in Anthony M. Ivancevich, "The Ukrainian National Movement and Russification," Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1976; Orest Pelech, "Towards a Historical Sociology of the Ukrainian Ideologues in the Russian Empire of the 1830's and 1840's," Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1976; Osyp Hermaize, "Z revoliutsiinoi mynuvshyny Kyiva," in Kyiv ta ioho okolytsia v istorii i pam"iatkakh, ed. M.Hrushevs'kyi, (Kiev, 1926), 394-429.


35. P.V. Mykhailyna, Vyzvol'na borot'ba trudovoho naselennia mist Ukrainy (1569-1654 rr.) (Kiev, 1975), 16.

36. A.I. Baranovich, Ukraina nakanune osvoboditel'noi voiny serediny XVII v. (Moscow, 1959), 139.

37. O.S. Kompan, Mista Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVII st. (Kiev, 1963), 72-3.
38. A.I. Dotsenko, "Heohrafichni osobyvosti protsesiv urbanizatsii na Ukraini (XIX-XX st.)," Ukrain's'kyi istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk, vypusk 2, 1972, 47.

By comparison, in the 1760s, 6.4 per cent of the population of the Hetman state lived in towns. See H.P. Makhnova, "Chysel'nist' i sklad urkains'koho naselennia Rosii v 60-kh rr. XVIII st.," Ukrain's'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, no.2, 1965, 116.

39. Tabulated from A.G. Rashin, Naselennie Rossii za 100 let (Moscow, 1956), table 19, 44-5.

40. I.O. Hurzhii, Zarodzhennia robitychnoho klasu Ukrainy (Kiev, 1958), 79.

41. The category of town in tsarist Russia was a juridical, not a functional one. After Catherine II it was necessary to strike from the list of towns scores of villages which had been elevated to town status under the uiezd reform; this is evidence of the arbitrary manner of designating towns. P. Miliukov, Ocherki po istorii Russkoi kul'tury (St. Petersburg, 1896), I:179.

42. Thomas Stanley Fedor, Patterns of Urban Growth in the Russian Empire during the Nineteenth Century (Chicago, 1975), 29.

43. Table 1.2 and A.G. Rashin, "Dinamika chislennosti i protsessy formirovaniia gorodskogo naseleniia Rossii v XIX-nachale XX vv.," Istoricheskie zapiski (Moscow, 1950), 43.

44. Rashin, "Dinamika chislennosti," 43.


47. M. Iavors'kyi, Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu. V superekakh imperializmu (Kharkiv, 1925), 18.

48. Perepis' 1897, table XIII in vols. 8, 13, 32, 33, 46, 58.


50. Istoriia mist i sil Ukrain's'koi RSR. Donets'ka oblast' (Kiev, 1970), 80.


54. We have not been able to find any literature addressing itself directly to this question.

55. Stephen Rudnitsky, Ukraine, 148-245 reproduces all of the "typical" national characteristics attributed to Ukrainians at the turn of this century.

56. Among the discriminatory measures were: restrictions on the purchase of buildings in towns, excessive taxation, exclusion from membership in many guilds and participation in municipal government. For an analysis of these measures see P.V. Mykhailyna, Mista Ukrainy v period feodalizmu. Do pytannia pro stanovyschhe mist v umovakh inozemnoho ponevolennia v kintsii XVI-pershii polovyni XVII st. (Chernivtsi, 1971) and Ia. P. Kis', Promyslovist' L'vova u period feodalizmu (L'viv, 1968), 212-6.

57. Baranovich, Ukraina, 139.


59. Kompan, Mista, 106.

60. Ibid., 94, 97-8.


62. The Sejm's measures were in violation of the terms of the "eternal peace treaty" of 1683 concluded between Russia and Poland. The treaty guaranteed the juridical position of Cossacks. The Sejm moved against the Cossacks because the threat from Turkey receded and Poland no longer needed the mettlesome Cossack armies. Władysław Serczyk, Hajdamacy (Krakow, 1972), 31-2.

63. Kompan, Mista, 88-92; V.A. Golobutskii, Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo (Kiev, 1957), 46 passim.

64. Cossacks were not a closed caste; peasants and townsmen could and did enter Cossack ranks. This process was greatly facilitated by the continuous campaigning against Turkey and the Tatars which required new recruits to maintain Cossack armies. V.A. Miakotin, Ocherki sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy v XVII-XVIII v. (Prague, 1924), 90.

65. Serczyk, Hajdamcy, 32.

66. V.A. Markina, Krest'iane pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy. Konets XVII-60e gody XVIII st. (Kiev, 1971), 99
67. As early as the end of the seventeenth century, 90 per cent of towns in the Kiev region, 88 per cent in Volyn' and 85 per cent in Podillia belonged to the gentry. Istoriia Ukraïns'koi RSR, 8 vols. (Kiev, 1977-79), II: 141-2.

68. M. Iavors'kyi, Istoriia Ukraïny v styslomu narysi (Kharkiv, 1928), 83.

69. Markina, Krest'iane, 99.

70. O.P. Lola, Haidamats'kyi rukh na Ukraïni 20-60 rr. XVIII st. (Kiev, 1965), 35-7; Kompan, Mista, 96-9.

71. See Ohloblyn, Het'man Ivan Mazepa, 200-1; Istoriia mist i sil Ukraïns'koi RSR. Cherkas'ka oblast'. (Kiev, 1972), 92; Kompan, Mista, 99, 186; Iavors'kyi, Istoriia, 83.

72. Lola, Haidamats'kyi rukh, 34.

73. Kompan, Mista, 101-4.

74. In Dobrovtsi, in 1772, Jews represented 27 per cent of the households; by 1760, 50 per cent. In Khmel'nyk, their representation increased from 17 per cent in 1739 to 69 per cent in 1763. Markina, Krest'iane, 93, 96.


75. Kompan, Mista, 92.

76. See A.P. Hrytsenko, "Rozmishchennia osnovnykh haluzei promyslovosti ta kontsentratsiia proletariatu Ukraïny v 1917 r.," Ukraïns'kyi istoryko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk, vypusk 2, 1972, 158-204.

77. This is the reason why the majority of non-seasonal workers in the sugar refineries were non-Ukrainians according to Mykola Baiier, Prychyny agrarnoi revoliutsii na Ukraïni i shliakhy do rozviazannia agrarnoi spravy (Kiev-Vienna, 1920), 11.

78. O. R-ain /pseud./, "Do statystyky pravobichnoi Ukraïny," Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk, XXXVIII, bk.IV, 1907, 95.


80. Viacheslav Prokopovych, Pid zolotoiu korohvoiu (Paris, 1943), 5-6, 70 for a discussion of Russian immigration. For an analysis of the occupational profile of Russians in right bank Ukraine see: L. Lichkov, "Iugo-zapadnyi krai po dannym perepisi 1897 g.," Kievkaia starina, no. 90, 1905, 362.

82. The 1666 census showed that approximately 20 per cent of the population of the left bank lived in towns. Artisans and craftsmen represented not less than 26 per cent of the urban population, merchants not less than 8. The census enumerated individuals according to membership in estate. Thus the figures should be taken only as a rough indication of the proportion of the urban population engaged in non-agricultural pursuits. B.B. Kafengauz, "Ekonomicheskie sviazii Ukrainy i Rossii v kontse XVII-nachale XVIII stoletii," in Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei 1654-1954. Sbornik statei (Moscow, 1954), 422.

In a number of towns, the overwhelming majority of residents were artisans, craftsmen or merchants - 73 per cent in the case of Pereiaslav. See V.A. Romanovskii, "Razvitie gorodov levoberezhnoi Ukrainy posle vossoedineniia s Rossiei (vo vtoroi polovine XVII veka)," ibid., 405.

83. Kompan, Mista, 99.


85. "Cossacks were permeated with the interests of the towns" which explains why "during the second half of the seventeenth century townsmen and Cossacks joined forces in the struggle against a common enemy: the nobility, the starshyna, and the Russian voevoda." The social background to this attitude was that the majority of Cossacks lived in towns and that there was a good deal of social movement between Cossacks and townsmen. Kompan, Mista, 89

86. Kompan, Mista, 144; Diadychenko, Narysy, 78, 311.

87. Diadychenko, Narysy, 103.

88. Ohloblyn, Het'man Ivan Mazepa, 100-12; Leo Okinshevich, Ukrainian Society and Government 1648-1781 (Munich, 1978), 61.


90. Diadychenko, Narysy, 237 for an account of the economic prerogatives of urban autonomy.

91. Ibid., 80; P.G. Liubomirov, Ocherki po istorii russkoi promyslenosti XVII, XVIII i nachalo XIX veka (Moscow, 1947), 191.

For an analysis of the origins and development of Petrine mercantilism see: P. Miliukov Gosudarstvennoe khoziaistvo Rossii v pervoi chetverti XVIII stoletiia i reforma Petra Velikogo (St. Petersburg, 1905), chapter eight. The general features of Russian policies towards Ukraine in the eighteenth century culminating in the abolition of all forms of autonomy have been most recently studied by Zenon Eugene Kohut, "The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy (1763-1786): A Case Study in the Integration of a non-Russian Area," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1975.

The best analysis of the means by which Ukrainian trade was captured is Ivan Dzhydzhora, Ukraina v pershii polovyni XVIII viku. Rozvidky i zamitky (Kiev, 1930), 1-95. See in particular page 27.

Ohloblyn, A History, I: 32 passim.

Brunswick's ambassador to Russia remarked that as a result of this taxation "L'Ukraine n'est plus maintenant que l'ombre de ce qu'elle était autrefois." Friedrich Christian Weber, Nouveaux memoires sur l'Etat Present de la Grande Russie ou Moscovie (Paris, 1725), I: 82.

Kiev, for example, in 1683 had 2,625 households, by 1727, 1,924. Poltava's households declined from 1,383 in 1654 to 600 by 1767. Slabchenko, Orhanizatsiia, 92.

Dzhyzhora, Ukraina, 1.

The author makes the point that the hot pursuit for the acquisition of land, accomplished at the expense of peasants and rank-and-file Cossacks, had fatal consequences for the national solidarity of Ukrainians. It introduced profound contradictions between the landowning elite and the dispossessed masses.

This policy was part and parcel of the tsarist attempt to restrict the development of Cossacks, an anomalous caste in the imperial system. See N. S/torozhenko/, "K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX veka," Kievskaiia starina, no.6, 1897, 472-483; Golobutskii, Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo, 420.

See Ohloblyn, A History, III: 45-52. On pages 47-9 data on the national composition of merchants show there were no Ukrainians in the upper guild, 15 per cent in the second, and 26 in the third. What is indicative of the thoroughness of the conquest of the
internal Ukrainian market is the fact that the third guild operated exclusively domestically. For an analysis of the economic prerogatives that went along with membership in the various guilds see: I.O. Hurzhii, Rozvytok tovarnoho vyrobnytstva i torhivli na Ukraini (Kiev, 1962), 134-5.

In southern Ukraine, at the turn of the nineteenth century less than a quarter of the region's merchants were Ukrainians. N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, Zaselennia pivdennoi Ukrainy v polovyni XVIII st. (1734-1775), 2 vols. (Munchen, 1960), II: 99. Jewish merchants from right-bank Ukraine emerged as an important commercial force in Ukraine at this time. See M.Ie. Slabchenko, Materiialy do ekonomichno-sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy XIX stolittia (Kiev, 1925), 192.

103. A.F. Shafonsky, Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie /edited by M. Sudienko/, (Kiev, 1851), 468-76.
106. Slabchenko, Materiialy, 199.
109. The imposition of serfdom with its Russian conditions restricting the personal freedom of peasants cannot be laid entirely at the doorstep of Russian authorities. Oleksandra Efimenko in her study of the Ukrainian nobility makes the point that the ukaz of 3 May 1783 on serfdom merely sanctioned an existing situation, one which came into being because of the Little Russian nobility. Aleksandra Efimenko, Iuzhnaia Rus'. Ocherki issledovaniia i zamecki, 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1905), I: 166. See also V.A. Diadychenko, Antyfeodal'ni povstannia v Rosii i na Ukraini v XII-XVIII st. (Kiev, 1954), 19-20.
111. Fedor, Patterns of Urban Growth, 146. In time the gentry also began to divest themselves of a direct entrepreneurial role since the obrok system provided them with higher monetary rents.


115. For a study of the nature of peasant obligations in the pre-1648 period see: D.I. Myskho, *Sotsial'no-ekonomichni umovy formuvannia Ukrains'koi narodnosti. Stanovyshche selian i antyfeodal'ni rukhy na Ukraini v XV-pershii polovyni XVI st.* (Kiev, 1963), 114-24


118. Hurzhii, *Rozvytok*, 135 shows that in 1816 townsmen were the dominant urban group. In Russia, on the other hand, data for 1803 show that the majority of the urban population belonged to the peasant estate. See S.I. Smetanin, "Razlozhenie soslovii i formirovanie klassovoi struktury gorodskogo naseleniia Rossii v 1800-1861 g.g.," *Istoricheskie zapiski*, no. 102, 1978, 173.


123. Between 1870 and 1914 the urban population of the steppe provinces increased more than threefold. Rashin, "Dinamika," 46. Migrants from Russia formed almost half the urban population of this region. See B.V. Tikhonov *Pereseleniia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow, 1978), table 5, 184.

124. In the light of the 1897 census 57 per cent of those belonging to the peasant estate residing in the towns of the steppe were Russian. *Perepis1 1897*, table XXIV, vols. 16, 41, 47.

   The abolition of serfdom did not mean that peasants were free to travel wherever they pleased. Administrative restrictions remained, which applied to Russian peasants as well. Only in right-bank Ukraine, where the regime was anxious not to weaken the "Russian element" there were special regulations in force making out-migration more difficult than in other regions of the Empire.


126. For a succinct analysis of the underdevelopment of capitalism in Ukraine see: Mykola Stasiuk, *Avtonomiia i rosvytok produktsiynykh syl na Ukraini* (St. Petersburg, 1908).


137. M.V. Kurman and I.V. Lebedinskii, *Naselenie bol'shogo sotsialisticheskogo goroda* (Moscow, 1968), 121.


140. V.Skorovstanskii /V.Shakhrai/, *Revolutsiia na Ukraine* (Saratov, 1919), 7-8.


143. Rada, 5 August 1907.

144. Rada, 31 October 1907.


146. Constituent Assembly election results for Kiev, for example, gave 25 per cent of the vote for Ukrainian parties; in duma elections, 21 per cent. Similarly the former in Katerynoslav gave 16 per cent to Ukrainian parties, the latter 3 per cent. See ibid., p. 42 for Constituent Assembly election results. Duma results in Robitnycha hazeta, 21 July 1917, 21 November 1917.


148. Fedenko, Ukrains'kyi rukh, 122.


150. When they heard of the terms of the Emancipation Act, the Ukrainian peasants considered it to be a fraud, a trick played on them by the landlords. They continued to wait for the "real emancipation" with fields and woods from the tsar. M. Drahomanov, Novi ukrains'ki pisni pro hromads'ki spravy (1764-1880) (Geneva, 1881), 66-7. The peasantry had good cause to be unhappy with the Act. The Ukrainian provisions of the Act expressed the landlords' desires to have an agricultural labour force at their disposal. Landlords agreed that the peasantry should receive enough land to be self-sufficient in their most basic requirements, but not sufficient to prevent their search for work on the estates. It is generally agreed that in left-bank Ukraine and in the steppe regions, peasants lost over 30 per cent of the land they previously used. In the right bank the drop was in the order of 14 per cent. M. Iavors'kyi, Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu. Na shliakhu kapitalistychnoi akumuliatsii (Kharkiv, 1925), 92-3. The redemption price for the allotments which the peasants were compelled to pay consumed 70 per cent of their incomes. Istoriia selianstva Ukrains'koi RSR, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1967), I: 387.

151. The 1905 land cadastre showed that 80 per cent of land owned by peasants consisted of allotments. M. Porsh, "Statystyka zemlevolo-dinnia v 1905 r. i mobilizatsiia zemel'noi vlastnosti na Ukraini vid 1877 r. po 1905 r.," Ukraina, no.4, 1907, 164, 176.
For a study of the price of the purchase and rent of land see:
M.H. Leshchenko, Klasova borot'ba v ukrains'komu seli v epokhu

152. Between 1870-1900 the peasant population of Ukraine increased 70
per cent (12.2 to 20.7 million). Istoriia selianstva, I: 394.
Peasant land holdings (1877-1905) of all types (allotment, purchased
and rented) increased by 30 per cent (17.5 to 22.7 million dessiat-

153. Hada, 28 October 1907; P.P. Telychuk, Ekonomichni osnovy ahrarnoi
revoliutsii na Ukraini (Kiev, 1973), 180-2; M. Hekhter, "Z ukrains'-
ko ho zhyttia. Pereselennie," Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk, L, bk.IV,
1910, 186-88.

154. M. Hekhter, "Zem's'ka statystyka pro zaribnu platniu v sil's'kim
hospodarstvi livoberezhnoi Ukrainy," Studii z polia suspil'nykh
nauk i statystyky, no.1, 1909, 203; O.I. Luhova, Sil's'kohospo-
dars'kyi proletariat pivndnia Ukrainy v period kapitalizmu (Kiev,
1965), 163.

The per acre yield of wheat in Ukraine was half that of Denmark,
Belgium or Germany. Isidor Shafarenko, The Natural Resources,

156. Republique Populaire de l'Ukraine, Mission Commerciale et Financiere,
L'Ukraine economique (Geneva, 1919), 9.


158. L. Kotelianskii, "Ocherki podvornoi Rossii," Otechestvenye zapiski,

159. Iu. Ianson, Opyt statisticheskogo issledovaniia o krest'ianskikh
nadelakh i platezhakh (St. Petersburg, 1881), 66.

160. Tabulated from Pobeda sovetskoi vlasti na Ukraine (Moscow, 1967),
47; Sotsialistichna perebudova i rozvytok sil's'koho hospodarstva
Ukrains'koi RSR, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1967-8), I: 14. The figures are
based on M. Rubach's research and show larger holdings than those
given by the émigré Konstantyn Kononenko, Ukraine and Russia:
A History of the Economic Relations Between Ukraine and Russia
(1654-1917) (Milwaukee, 1958), 100.


162. Tabulated from Sotsialistichna perebudova, I: 14.

163. Podgotovka velikoi oktiaber'skoi sotsialistichekoi revoliutsii na
The national composition of nobles (hereditary and non-hereditary) in the light of the 1897 census was as follows: Ukrainians: 26 per cent; Russians: 50 per cent; Poles: 20; others: 4 per cent. Tabulated from Perepis'1897, table XXIV in vols. 8, 3, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.

Podgotovka, 9.


For example, in 1880, 5 per cent of the population of Poltava province were literate, by 1897, 14 per cent, and by 1913, 23 per cent. A word of caution must be sounded. Pre-1917 literacy statistics should be considered as indicative, and not to be taken as an accurate reflection of the situation. Included as literate was a rather dubious category "half-literate" and all those who had attended school were automatically classified as literate. In Ukraine there was large-scale recidivism of illiteracy. Z.M. Svavitski and N.A. Svavitski, Zemskie podvornye perepisi 1880-1913. Pouezdnye itogi (Moscow, 1926), 237.

A. ia. Efimenko, Istoriia ukrainskogo naroda (St. Petersburg, 1906), 325.

Table 1.19 and A.G. Rashin, "Gramotnost' i narodnoe obrazovanie v Rossii v XIX i nachale XX v.," Istoricheskie zapiski, no.37, 1951, 48.

Perepis'1897, table 1.15 in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.

Kurman and Lebedinskii, Naselenie, 132-3.

It is true that state expenditure on national education in Russia increased markedly in the post-reform era: from 6.8 million rubles in 1866 to 26.5 million by 1897. P. Saburov, Materialy dlia istorii russkikh finansov 1866-1897 (St. Petersburg, 1899), 40. Still, in 1915, Russia's per capita expenditure on education, to give a comparison, was 30 per cent less than Bolivia's. N.V. Chekhov, ed. Narodnoe obrazovanie v Rossii s 60-kh godov XIX veka (Moscow, 1912), 220-1.

177. Rada, 17 September 1906. In Cherkassy, to give another example, the pupil-teacher ratio was 200 to 1. Rada, 29 September 1906.

178. I.N. Romanchenko, ed. Sil's'ke hospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR (Kiev, 1958), 408.


182. To say that Ukrainian was banned is not quite accurate. In the eighteenth century, the language of instruction in the schools was the Ukrainian variant of Church Slavonic and this is what was banned. Modern literary Ukrainian developed in the nineteenth century. The first grammar of living Ukrainian was published in 1818 /Oleksii Pavlovs'kyi/.

183. S.A. Kniaz'kov and N.I. Serbov, Ocherk istorii narodnogo obrazovaniia v Rossii do epokhi reform Aleksandra II (Moscow, 1910), 174.


186. Rada, 26 and 28 October 1907. See Borysenko, Borot'ba, 119-20 for an account of some of the private schools.

In the aftermath of the 1905 revolution the Ministry of Education allowed Ukrainian to be used in instruction in three private schools: two in Odesa, one in Kamianets'-Podil'sk. Hitherto Ukrainian was used in instruction only in the Lysenko musical-theatrical school in Kiev and in V. Rozvados'kyi's art school in Kamianets'. D. Doroshenko, "Ukraina v 1906 rotsi," Ukraina, no.1, pt.II, 1907, 23.

187. According to teachers attending a conference in Poltava in 1905 over fifty per cent of what went on in the classroom was incomprehensible to Ukrainian children. Budiak, "Zapysky," LIV, bk.V, 1911, 217.

188. Rada, 14 August 1911.

190. Ibid., 120. Here was what a "typical" educated peasant said about his reading ability. "Although I finished school, when I take to reading a Russian book, then perhaps I'll make out every twentieth word, but when I read in our language then perhaps every twentieth word is incomprehensible." "Z rozmovy iz selians'kymy inteligentamy na livoberezhnii Ukraini," Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk, XXVI, 1904, 69.


192. Rada, 11 October 1907.


194. For a reactionary's succinct statement on the question see P.I. Kovalevskii, Russkii natsionalizm i natsional'noe vospitanie (St. Petersburg, 1912).

195. At the turn of the twentieth century fifty per cent of schools in Russia were run by the Orthodox church. In Ukraine the figure was higher - 55 per cent, rising to 80 per cent on the right bank. V.I. Kizchenko, Kul'turno-osvitniii riven' robitnychoho klasu Ukrainy naparedodni revoliutsii 1905-1907 r.r. (Kiev, 1972), 12. Although peasants preferred the zemstvo schools, the clergy fought a rearguard action to maintain their grip on the educational system. H. Hekhter, "Z ukrains'koho zhyttia," 12. The clergy's influence was sufficiently great to ensure that in the zemstvo schools, like the parish schools, over a third of the school day was devoted to religious instruction. Borysenko, Borot'ba, 43-6. Of course not all priests were Black Hundredists. A "few" were concerned with popular education and even demanded that Ukrainian language instruction be introduced in seminaries and that Ukrainian-language religious literature should be produced. Rada, 23 September 1906. Half the clergy in Ukraine were Russian according to the 1897 census.

196. Rada, 17 December 1911.

197. Cited Ibid.

   Conversely, to find a person in the village who spoke literary Russian was as rare as a "nightingale in the autumn". Surzhyk, a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian, passed for Russian. (25).

199. S.N. Shchegolev, Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremennyi etap iuzhnorusskogo separatizma (Kiev, 1912), 349.

200. While many zemstvo institutions were favourably disposed towards the opening of Ukrainian schools, permission from central authorities was needed. Permission was not forthcoming. Rada, 15 September 1906.

   One should add to this list the course on Ukrainian history in
   St. Petersburg. See Symon Petliura, Statti. Lysty. Dokumeny

203. William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in

204. Ivan Krevets'kyi. "Ne bylo, net i byt' ne mozhet", Literaturno-
   naukovyi vistnyk, XXVI, bk.III, 1904, 132.

205. Ibid., 134.

206. Ibid., 137-40.

207. Ibid., 142-8.

208. Cited by Hryhorii Vas'kovych, Ems'kyi ukaz i borot'ba za ukrains'ku
   shkolu (Munich, 1976), 4.

209. Fedir Savchenko, Zaborona ukrains'va 1876 r. /reprint/, (Munich,
   1970), 381-3.


212. In 1905 the matter of the Ukrainian language was referred to the
   Petersburg Academy by tsarist officials and the Academy declared
   itself in favour of lifting all restrictions on Ukrainian language
   publications and in favour of introducing Ukrainian as a language
   of instruction in the schools. These recommendations were never
   implemented. M. Hrushevs'kyi, "Memorial Peterburz'koi akademii
   v spravi svobody ukrains'koj movy v Rosii," Literaturno-naukovyi

213. The first newspaper to make its appearance in 1905 was the weekly
   Khliborob (Farmer). It was closed after five issues. V. Ihnatiienko,
   Ukrain's'ka presa (1816-1923 rr.) (Kiev, 1926), 42-52.

214. Rada, 12 August 1907.

215. See Lev Mylovydov, "Nastup reaktsii na shkolu v 1860-kh rokakh,"
   Za sto lit. Materiialy z hromads'koho i literaturnoho zhyttya
   Ukraity XIX pochatkiv XX stolittia, bk.IV, 1929, 48-50; Basil
   Dmytryshyn "Introduction," in Savchenko, Zaborona ukrains'tva,
   XVI, for an analysis of Valuev's motivations.

216. Rada, 5 August 1907.

218. V. Domanyts'kyi, "Ukrains'ka presa v 1906 r.," Ukraina, I, bk.II, 1907, 49.

219. Rada, 3 and 5 August, 6 October 1907.

220. Rada, 26 October 1907.

221. V. Ozerians'kyi, "Persha vseukrails'ka vystavka drukovanoho slova v Kyivi," Chervonyi shliakh, nos.4-5, 1925, 231.

222. Ibid.

223. Ihnatienko, Ukrains'ka presa, 11.

224. Ibid., 42-52.

225. 20 let sovetskoi vlasti. Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1937), table 85, 104.

226. Shchegolev, Ukrainskoe dvizhenie, 272-332; 403-50.

227. Robitnycha hazeta, 10 June 1917.

228. V. St., "Ukrains'ka polityka," 239.


230. Rada, 26 October 1907.


234. Istoriia selianstva, I: 466.

235. N. Mirza-Avakians, Selians'ki rozrukhy na Ukraini 1905-1907 roku (Kharkiv, 1925), 41-8.


237. Ihnatienko, Ukrains'ka presa, 15-6; P. Khrystiuk, "Ukrains'ka drible
burzhuaziia v ukrains'kii revoliutsii," Boritesia-poborete!


"Our main support was in the peasantry, although not among the village poor, but in the wealthier peasants, as the more developed and nationally conscious." II:96.


243. M.M. Popov, Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1929), 162.


250. Ibid., LVI, no.1, no.2, 204.
Nobility status could only be granted by a monarch, hence outrageous genealogies tracing ancestors to Polish, Russian, Moldavian, Tatar, Hungarian, Serbian, German, even Ragusan (Dubrovnik) nobility.

V.M. Kabuzan and S.M. Troitski, "Izmeneniia v chislennosti, udel'nom vese i razmeschenii dvorianstva v Rossii v 1782-1858 gg.," Istoriiia SSSR, no.4, 1971, table I, 162-5.


Ibid., LVII, 4, 14, 40-7.


Robitnycha hazeta, 10 June 1917.

Omelian Pritsak, "U stolittia narody M. Hrushevs'koho," Lysty do priyateliiv, XIV, bk.5-6-7, 1966, 10-6.

Doroshenko, Narovy, II: 312.

Rada, 9 August 1907.

269. Ievhen Chykalenko, Shchodennyk (1907-1917) (L'viv, 1931), 289.


272. For the official point of view see: Narysy istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy (Kiev: 1971), 10.

273. Stasiuk, Avtonomia, 6-8.


278. V.V. Krutikov, "Hirnychopromyslova burzhuaziia Ukrainy ta mytna polityka tsaryzmu v ostannii chverti XIX st.," Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, no.5, 1978, 81-8.

279. Stasiuk, Avtonomia, 1, 3, 31.

280. E. Drabkina, Natsional'nyi i kolonial'nyi vopros v tsarskoii Rossii (Moscow, 1930), 44.


284. A. Finn-Enotaevskii, Sovremennoe khoziaistvo Rossii (St. Petersburg, 1911) 74.

285. Podolyns'kyi in 1880 wrote: "...The larger part of craftsmen in contemporary times in Ukraine are not Ukrainian." S. Podolyns'kyi, Remesla i khvabryky na Ukraini (Geneva, 1880), 66.

To arrive at an estimation of the national composition of craftsmen we have used lavors'kyi, Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu. V superekakh, 42-5 which provides information on the number and type of artisans for the various regions of Ukraine and we have compared this information with the 1897 census returns for occupations. In the main it appears that artisans in left-bank Ukraine were Ukrainian.


287. Robitnycha hazeta, 10 June 1917.


290. I. Chopiv's'kyi, Ekonomichni narysy. Pryrodni bahatstva ta velyka promyslovist' Ukrainy (Kiev, 1918), 93.

291. Narodna osvita, nauka i kul'tura v Ukraïns'kii RSR. Statystychnyi zbirnyk (Kiev, 1973), 149.

292. Perepis' 1897, table XXIV in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.


294. Chykalenko, Shchodennyk, 289.

295. Doroshenko, Narus', II: 312.

296. Perepis' 1897, table XII in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.


299. Only those with "connections" could get teaching posts, for example, Rada, 29 September 1906.


304. Chykalenko, Shchodennyk, 284


309. I. Mazepa, Bol'shevyzm i okupatsiia Ukrainy. Sotsial'no-ekonomichni prychyny nedozrilosti syl ukrains'koi revoliutsii (L'viv-Kiev, 1922) 3.


Metallurgical enterprises in southern Ukraine at the turn of the century showed 50 per cent net profits, and 100 per cent in the case of Hughes' factory. M. Hekhter, "Chy mozhlyva v nas intensyfikatsiia selyans'koho khliborobstva?" Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk, XLI, bk.II 1908, 364.

316. In the space of four years (1896-1900) the number of workers in coal mining increased from 32,212 to 85,437 and in metallurgy from 10,621 to 107,673. S.I. Potolov, Rabochie Donbassa v XIX veke (Moscow-Leningrad, 1963), table 6, 99.


320. Mendeleev, Problemy, 374.

321. Donbas, despite its massive reserves accounted for about 1.8 per cent of total world production. Feshchenko-Chopivs'kyi, "Problema," 3, 7.


323. Volobuiev in his article "Do problemy ukrains'koi ekonomiky," (137-68) anticipating M. Hechter's concept of 'internal colonialism', distinguished between the "European" and Asiatic" colonies. The 'European' type of colony is capitalist and more developed than the "Asiatic". Its productive forces, however, are developed for the benefit of the metropolis. The metropolis dominates the colony not so much because it represents a superior capitalist economic formation, but because it dominates the colony politically and, using political power, brings about a change in economic relations.

324. N.A. Troinitskii, ed. Chislennost' i sostav rabochikh v Rossii na osnovanii dannikh pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g. 2 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1906) I, table I.

325. The Troinitskii study omitted servants, agricultural labourers and day-labourers. We discuss these categories below. The study is, however, a much more accurate reflection of the reality than the general population census which grossly inflated the proletariat by failing to distinguish self-employed artisans from workers. In general there are numerous problems with the 1897 census as concerns labour statistics. The census was carried out in the winter time when industry relating to agriculture was at a lull. The census asked "what is your principal source of livelihood" which most peasants interpreted to mean what do you do most of the year. The
peasant, who worked eight months of the year in the fields and four months in industry answered 'agriculture' even though the non-agricultural income may have been very significant. Many more problems can be cited and by and large they amount to the fact that the census under-estimated the semi-proletarian element.


326. Tabulated from Troinitskii, Chislennost', table 1, and Perepis' 1897 table XXI in vols. 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.

327. The regional distribution of the working class was as follows: Right bank - 117,395 (28 per cent); Left bank - 106,217 (26 per cent), Steppe, - 201,801 (47 per cent). Troinitskii Chislennost', table 1.

328. V. Sadov's'kyi, Pratsia v USSR (Warsaw, 1932) 15.


334. Ibid., table 11, 104 and S.I. Potolov, Rabochie Donbassa, 153.


337. The conditions of various sectors of the working class are described in M. Hekhter, "Do istorii robochoho klasu na Ukraini rosiis'kyi," Studii z polia suspil'nykh nauk i statystyky. no.1, 1909, 161-94.

338. "Hrunt, knyzhka ta 'prepiatstviia'. Lysty i uvahy vporiadchyka pro novyny na Ukraini." Hromada. Ukrain's'ka zbirka. no.4,
1897, 4, 315.

339. Tabulated from Troinitskii, Chislennost', II, 42, 46, 82, 88, 100, 104, 223, 228. In the right bank 47 per cent of workers were literate; the left bank, 40 per cent.

340. Kizchenko, Kul'turno-osviti\'ni riven', 104 and passim for many more examples.


346. According to Troinitskii, Chislennost', there were 12,615 workers in the textile industry. The census lists 43,154 individuals earning their livelihood from textiles, meaning the majority were artisans.


349. Perepis' 1897, table XXI.

350. V.I. Naulko Etnichnyi sklad, 49.

351. Kruze, Polozhenie rabochego klassa, 137-8.

352. Naulko, Etnichnyi sklad, 49.

353. At the first all-Ukrainian Conference of Trade Unions (May 1918) out of 49 delegates, 19 belonged to Ukrainian parties. Ie.M. Skliarenko, Narusy istorii profspilkovoho rukhu na Ukraini 1917-20 (Kiev, 1974), 45.

354. Popov, Narusy istorii, 27.

355. V. St., "Ukra\'ns'ka polityka," 243


359. Data in tables 1.16 and 1.17 are for "economically independent" individuals. Women and children, who formed an important part of the labour force, especially in agriculture, tended to be excluded from the enumeration because of misinterpretations given to the concept "independent". See O. Rusov, "Pro zaniatia ukraintsiv po perepysu 1897 roku," Zapysky Ukrainskoho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyiv, bk.V, 1909, 100-1.

360. As early as 1907 Kosovyi expressed the hope that Jews would play this role. Kosovyi, op.cit., XL, bk.VII, 1907, 469-70. During the revolution the Ukrainian intelligentsia had hoped to attract Jews to their side. The pogroms, the work of brigand otamany, ruined all chances of such cooperation on a large scale. See M.G. Rafes, Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine. Evoliutsiia i raskol 'Bunda'. (Moscow, 1920), 8. For an analysis of the social origins of anti-semitism in Ukraine see Lavors'kyi, Istoriia, 88-9; M.Iu. Shapoval, "Narodnytsvo," 114.
Chapter Two: Ukrainian Society in the 1920s
Introduction

The defeat of the Ukrainian national movement in the course of the revolutionary struggle between 1917–20 was only partial. The movement proved strong enough to extract a number of major concessions, the most important of which was Ukrainization. This policy was a necessary response to the national mobilisation of Ukrainian society and concomitant social transformations brought about by the revolution. In the first four sections of this chapter (population, town, the village and the working class) we explore these social changes and their implications for the development of the national consciousness of Ukrainians.

The idea of Ukrainization was not, as is widely held, the conception of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). It had been common currency in the press and in resolutions of the national movement during the revolution and was prominent in the platforms of "national communist" parties such as the Borot'bists and the Ukrainian Communist Party-UKP. The national movement held that not only the infrastructures of public life, but fundamental political relationships as well must be Ukrainized. However, the policy proclaimed by the party in 1923 granted autonomy only in the cultural sphere. The press, schools and higher education were to be gradually converted to the Ukrainian language. This could not be accomplished without the rehabilitation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, whose cooperation was essential for the success of the policy. Thus the Ukrainized schools, higher education and press became readily accessible to the social group which was in the forefront of articulating a national ideology and vision – the intelligentsia. Inevitably the development led to a questioning of the
very political and economic centralization which the party hoped to preserve by its Ukrainization concession. In sections five and six this theme is developed.

In the last two sections we examine the Ukrainization of the summit of society: the party and the administration. The Ukrainization policy mandated the use of Ukrainian in conducting the business of the state and party. Linked to this was the promotion of Ukrainians to positions of authority. The degree to which Ukrainians thus penetrated the upper stratum of society and the nature of their identification with the national aspirations of Ukrainians will be our major concerns here.
1. **Territory and population**

The creation of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (the words were reversed in the 1930s) was a concession to the national movement and diplomatic protocol. Leaving aside for the moment what this meant in terms of real political sovereignty, the fact remains that the Ukrainian people obtained a territorial-administrative framework on which to build their national identity. The republic itself was 12.5 per cent smaller in size than the nine guberniia (provinces) defined as Ukraine in our preceding chapter. The Crimean peninsula was incorporated into Russia and the western part of Volyn' was ceded to Poland in the 1921 peace settlement which ended Soviet-Polish hostilities. Minor territorial adjustments between Ukraine and Russia were made throughout the 1920s. In August 1925 the old provinces were liquidated and forty-four okruhs (departments) took their place. These in turn were re-grouped (for planning purposes) into six major economic geographical regions. To ensure that the language and cultural rights of all national minorities were respected during Ukrainianization, "national minority districts" (of varying sizes, 1000 in all), as well as a Moldavian Autonomous Republic, were established on Ukrainian soil. In these minority territories the state administration had to be able to provide services in the minority languages. Russians in Ukraine had national minority status.

It is estimated that during the First World War and the civil war, much of which were fought on Ukrainian soil, one and a half million of Ukraine's people died - most of them men. These were direct deaths, as indirect mortality caused by shattered health is difficult to calculate. But
with hundreds of thousands suffering from tuberculosis, malaria and typhus in the Kharkiv region alone, the toll throughout the country must have been considerable.  

Ukraine's population had not recovered when famine struck in 1921 (it lingered until 1922). Hundreds of thousands of lives - a disproportionate number of which were children's - were claimed by this event, which in its general outlines proved to be a dress rehearsal for a more ominous famine a decade later. In an August 1922 speech, Kh. Rakovsky said, "to the great distress of the Ukrainian provinces which experienced famine, they were not officially declared famine zones until March 1921 and they did not receive international assistance." From another source we find that Soviet authorities withheld the proclamation of famine zones in Ukraine until they had collected prodnalog - tax in kind. When it became apparent that not a kilogramme more could be gathered, famine zones in Ukraine were announced. Rakovsky in the same speech reported that despite the catastrophic harvest and the famine, Ukraine delivered to Russia 369 million kilogrammes of grain out of the 541 million promised.  

In the pre-revolutionary period, the rate of natural increase of the population of Ukraine was the second highest in all of Europe, surpassed only by Bulgaria. Because of this, and despite emigration beyond the Urals, Ukraine's population grew by thirty-two per cent between 1897 and 1914, from 21.0 to 28.0 million (within the 1926 boundaries). S.V. Minaiev estimated that had it not been for the First World War, the civil war and the famine, Ukraine's population would have been 34 million by 1926. At the time of the 1926 general population census the country had 29 million people. The remarkable fact is that the population recovered its losses so rapidly. From 1923 on, the country continued to
enjoy an exceptionally high rate of natural increase, because of an improvement in the standard of living in the countryside and a decline in infant mortality as a result of the introduction of elementary medical and sanitary facilities.\textsuperscript{16} The fact that emigration beyond the Urals was reduced to a trickle also contributed to high population growth.

With the favourable climate created by Ukrainization policies, since the revolution, Russification came to a halt and many assimilated Ukrainians rediscovered their ethnicity.\textsuperscript{17} Since Ukrainians who had taken residence outside their republic were also supported in their drive to maintain their national culture, assimilation caused by residence beyond the borders of Ukraine diminished.\textsuperscript{18} "The more one studies the various sources," wrote A. Khomenko, "the more one is convinced that the change in the national consciousness of Ukrainians had a major influence on the indicators /of nationality/ in the 1926 census /results/." Attempting to gauge the scope of this process, Khomenko concluded that at the very minimum, 300,000 people who listed themselves as Russians in the 1897 census, counted themselves as Ukrainians in the 1926 enumeration.\textsuperscript{19}

The ethnic processes, combined with the post-1923 demographic optimum, resulted in a 40 per cent increase in the number of Ukrainians between 1897 and 1926, as compared with a 22 per cent increase in the case of Russians.\textsuperscript{20} By 1926, 80 per cent of Ukraine's population gave Ukrainian as their nationality, and 9.2 per cent gave Russian.\textsuperscript{21} What had not altered, however, was the geographical distribution of Ukraine's nationalities. Russians continued to be concentrated in the industrial south and south-east, posing a major problem in the efforts to Ukrainize the regions. (See table 2.1)
TABLE 2.1
National Composition of Ukraine, 1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Polissia*</th>
<th>Right Bank</th>
<th>Left Bank</th>
<th>Steppe</th>
<th>Dnipro</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Total  Pop.</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>86.0</td>
<td>87.8</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not included in the total population are 1,960 individuals from Polissia whose census sheets were lost.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1926, vol. XI, table VI, 8-17; 3-5; vol. XII, table VI, 9-12; vol. XIII, table VI, 8-9; 244-46,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>2,392,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total  Pop.</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1926, vol. XII, table VI, 8-9; 244</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1,983,403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total  Pop.</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1926, vol. XIII, table VI, 8-9; 244</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>1,464,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total  Pop.</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1926, vol. XII, table VI, 8-9; 244</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2,677,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total  Pop.</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1926, vol. XII, table VI, 8-9; 244</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>29,018,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total  Pop.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perepis'1926, vol. XI, table VI, 8-17; 3-5; vol. XII, table VI, 9-12; vol. XIII, table VI, 8-9; 244-46.
Every offensive and counter-offensive during the 1917-20 revolution plunged Ukraine's economy deeper and deeper into ruin until there was little left of it. By 1921 industrial production was one-tenth the pre-war (1912) figure. The country's heavy industry had for all intents and purposes ceased to exist. 22 The collapse of agricultural production and the break in exchange relationships with towns added an acute food shortage. By 1920 Ukraine's cities counted 4.2 million inhabitants, one and a half million less than the pre-war (1914) figure of 5.6 million. 23 Towns could barely support those that remained in them. Hunger, chronic shortages of fuel and water, rampant inflation and very low wages were the common predicament of the urban population. 24

Not all national groups inhabiting Ukraine's cities were affected by this chaos in the same way. The economic situation in the cities was so disastrous that most urban residents would have preferred to take temporary refuge in the villages close to food supplies. This option, however, was most easily pursued by Ukrainians for the obvious reason that they were better connected with village society. The hostile political climate in the towns was an added incentive for Ukrainians to leave. Both White and Red armies were antipathetic towards Ukrainians whom they suspected of nationalism. 25 When peace finally came to the land, the urban-dwelling Ukrainians had substantially decreased in number. The 1920 census showed that Ukrainians (according to nationality) represented a third of the urban population. Since according to the 1897 census one third of
urban dwellers had given Ukrainian as their mother-tongue, it is safe to say that by 1920 the weight of Ukrainians in towns was considerably less than what it had been a quarter century earlier.\textsuperscript{26}

The chaos in society had the opposite effect on the Jewish urban contingent. Escaping pogroms, they fled the villages and hamlets for the security of the larger cities.\textsuperscript{27} By 1920 they had emerged as the second largest group in Ukraine's towns, replacing Russians in this respect. Other national minorities, such as Germans and Poles, also increased their weight in the cities from 6.4 per cent of the total population in 1897 to 14.3 per cent by 1920. In the case of Russians, the initial surge in their urban contingent caused by the arrival of those connected with the manorial economy and of refugees from Russia, soon subsided as the upper classes fled to Western and Eastern Europe in the wake of Denikin's defeat. Russians also lost urban numbers through the departure of industrial workers in Donbas for their native villages in neighbouring Russian provinces during the economic collapse, as well as through the absorption of large numbers into the Red army.\textsuperscript{28} Those who arrived from Russia to constitute the backbone of the Soviet administration in Ukraine could not replenish the losses and by 1920 the weight of Russians in Ukraine's towns had diminished to 23.4 per cent of the urban total. The impact of war and revolution on towns can be seen in the case of Kiev, the only city in Ukraine to have carried out regular censuses throughout this period. (See table 2.2)

The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) saved the cities from complete collapse. Now that peasants had incentive to produce, they ensured the urban food supply, which enabled many urban dwellers who had sought refuge from hunger in the villages to return to the town. Light
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>247,723</td>
<td>55,064</td>
<td>134,278</td>
<td>29,937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>544,369</td>
<td>136,928</td>
<td>234,403</td>
<td>87,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>413,194</td>
<td>112,011</td>
<td>170,662</td>
<td>114,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>513,637</td>
<td>216,528</td>
<td>232,148</td>
<td>117,041</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 2.2.

Changes in the National Composition of Kiev, 1897-1926
industry began to rebuild itself to satiate the goods famine of the domestic market. Although heavy industry remained in crisis for several years to come, by 1924-5, as a result of a large-scale mobilisation of resources, it began to recoup lost production in earnest.\textsuperscript{29} By 1926, Ukrainian industry as a whole was producing 95 per cent of the value of pre-war production, and in 1927 it crossed the threshold of real economic growth when for the first time since the revolution, investment not only recovered the costs of amortization, but expanded production as well.\textsuperscript{30}

The impact of this reconstruction process can be seen from the fact that from 4.2 million inhabitants in 1920, cities grew to 5.3 million by 1926 and reached the pre-war total of 5.6 million by 1928.\textsuperscript{31}

During the 1920s cities were recouping their population losses; there was little real growth. In evaluating urban population growth it must be borne in mind that Ukrainian cities had a natural rate of increase of population considerably higher than that of their western European counterparts.\textsuperscript{32} Immigration played a major role in urban population growth only in the Mining (Donbas) and Dnipro regions, and a significant role in the case of administrative centres. The vast majority of towns, however, experienced little real growth between 1923 and 1926, and in fact, many decreased in population.\textsuperscript{33} According to Khomenko, in 1923-26, the towns absorbed approximately 200,000 migrants on an annual basis.\textsuperscript{34} This was indicative of the severe limitations of Ukrainian cities to attract large fresh contingents from the countryside.

The repopulation of Ukrainian cities during the 1920s did not affect the sharp regional disparities which characterized the republic's urban networks in the past. In fact, the urbanization process during the 1920s accentuated the inequalities.\textsuperscript{35} The weight of urban residents in the total
population of Polissia and the right and left banks remained virtually static between 1897 and 1926. Towns in these regions, as we argue in our discussion of the working class, were the victims of the role assigned Ukraine in the all-Union economic division of labour. Neither did it aid their development that urban centres, lacking any self-government, were powerless to stimulate local economic growth, and that resources, centrally allocated, were concentrated in four large cities. In the case of the steppe (in the 1926 meaning of the term), the rate of urbanization declined. (See table 2.3) The collapse of cereal trade with the West was the death knell of cities such as Odesa, whose population in 1926 was almost a quarter less than what it had been in 1904.

In view of the absence of opportunities for large-scale urban immigration and the stagnation of towns in regions of high concentration of the Ukrainian population, it was impossible to expect the age-old process which had given Ukraine Russian or Russified towns to be undone in less than a decade. When the 1926 general population census was taken it recorded Ukrainians as still the least urbanized national group in the republic (See table 2.4) and a minority of the urban population (See table 2.5) This situation limited the success of the Ukrainization campaign. However, when the 1926 census returns are compared with those of 1920 it is evident that Ukrainians registered a marked improvement in their urban representation in that short period of time. (See table 2.6) Moreover, they were gaining not only in small towns, but in the larger cities as well. (See table 2.7) The 1920s was a time of relatively slow economic and urban growth when compared to the late nineteenth century. Ukrainians did not participate in large numbers in the urbanization process in the latter period. Why, during the 1920s, as contemporaries observed, was "the urbani-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1897 Pop.</th>
<th>% of Total 1897</th>
<th>1923 Pop.</th>
<th>% of Total 1923</th>
<th>% of Total 1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polissia</td>
<td>3,475,723</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>4,297,305</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td><strong>18.5</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>212,951</td>
<td><strong>21.1</strong></td>
<td>503,197</td>
<td><strong>15.3</strong></td>
<td>493,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>851,645</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>839,329</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td><strong>44.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>1,080,653</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>1,254,351</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td><strong>16.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bank</td>
<td>663,366</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>992,317</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td><strong>16.4</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steppe</td>
<td>940,066</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>839,329</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td><strong>20.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>1,498,424</td>
<td><strong>16.1</strong></td>
<td>1,139,422</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td><strong>20.0</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>5,373,553</td>
<td><strong>19.0</strong></td>
<td>5,651,681</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td><strong>20.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Within the 1926 boundaries of Ukraine.

**The 1923 figures are based on the 1923 urban census, and information on the 1926 total population is not available.

Sources: 1897, 1923: Suchasna statystyka naselennia Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1929), table 2, 23, table 8, 29; 1926: Perepisi' 1926, vol. 1, table 2; 1929 (Kharkiv, 1929), table 2, 20.

Changes in the Urban Population of Ukraine, 1897-1928
### TABLE 2.4
Rate of Urbanization of Major National Groups, 1926 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polissia</td>
<td>77.4%</td>
<td>95.3%</td>
<td>71.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>76.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bank</td>
<td>44.0%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro Mining</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perepis' 1926, Table VI in Vol. XI, 73-75; Vol. XII, 9-12; Vol. XIII, 282-283; Vol. XVII, 9-10; Vol. XVIII, 244-245.
**TABLE 2.5**

National Composition of Urban Population, 1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Ukrainians %</th>
<th>Russians %</th>
<th>Jews %</th>
<th>Russians %</th>
<th>Ukrainians %</th>
<th>Others %</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polissia</td>
<td>428,982</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>5,373,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>851,645</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>1,343,689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bank</td>
<td>678,175</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>40.7</td>
<td>1,218,615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perepis', 1926, table VI, in vol. XI, 73-5, vol. XII, 9-12; vol. XIII, 9-10; 282-83; vol. XIV, 9-10; 244-45.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>43.2</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: 1897: Suchasna statistyka naselennia Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1929), table 2, 24.
1926: Perepis' 1926, table VI in vols. XI, 73-5; XII, 9-12; 28-3; XIII, 9-10.

TABLE 2.6: Changes in the National Composition of the Urban Population of Ukraine, 1897-1926 (within 1926 boundaries, in percent)
### TABLE 2.7

Changes in the National Composition of the Urban Population of Ukraine according to Size of Town, 1897-1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>56.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Within 1926 boundaries, in per cent

Changes in the National Composition of the Urban Population of Ukraine according to Size of Town, 1897-1926

**Source:** 1897, 1926: Suchasna starytskyia naselennia Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1929), table 2, 24.
zation of Ukrainians occurring rapidly".\(^{38}\)

Part of the increase in the number of Ukrainians in the towns during the 1920s was a consequence of a change in national self-awareness. There were two aspects to this process. The first was the re-absorption into a Ukrainian identity of assimilated Ukrainians. The second was that Russification, if not halted, was certainly reduced to a minimum. This meant that assimilation did not offset whatever gains Ukrainians made by urban immigration. How and in what proportions these factors combined to strengthen the urban presence of Ukrainians is impossible to establish. But the influence of these factors is the only plausible explanation for the absolute increase in the number of Ukrainians in the cities (1920-6) by almost 50 per cent, and for the decline in the number of Russians by 7 per cent. On the basis of natural increase alone, Russians ought to have registered (at the very minimum) a 5 per cent growth in their urban total.\(^{39}\)

A strengthening of Ukrainian national self-awareness was a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the Ukrainization of cities. Fresh contingents from the countryside were needed to alter the national physiognomy of the cities. In the past, because Ukrainians did not have the necessary social and economic skills, their surplus rural population migrated beyond the Urals or sought work on the estates of the steppe as an alternative to urban immigration. This situation, we argued, was the product of the nature of the agrarian relations that existed in Ukraine. New conditions in the countryside after 1917 led Ukrainians to consider a third option - settlement in the towns.

Only acute land hunger could force the Ukrainian peasantry to make the thousand-mile trek to Siberia in search of land. Land redistribution
during the revolution which gave rise to the middle peasant as the norm in the Ukrainian countryside put an end to migration beyond the Urals. In 1924-6 for example, 20,000 people from Ukraine migrated every year, whereas the annual average for the 1910-14 period was 165,276. Despite the state's efforts to revive resettlement, the peasantry refused to budge. The small number who did migrate beyond the Urals during the 1920s left farms with less than one hectare of land. But even in the most congested region of Ukraine, the Kiev okruh, only seven per cent of households possessed less than one hectare of land.

For the landless and land-hungry peasants there was a much more attractive location for putting down new roots - the steppe. The break-up of the estates and the departure of many foreign colonists had left some land in need of settlement in that region. The existing peasant population in the steppe had neither the implements nor draught animals to farm the free land. From the congested north, many peasants migrated southwards, putting them within commuting range of Ukraine's industrial heartland. In general, however, throughout the 1920s the tempo of resettlement was paltry, involving no more than a quarter million peasants.

The abolition of estates ended the demand for agricultural labour and there were very few state or collective farms to offer alternative employment. "Unemployment in the village," wrote L. Kaganovich, "is colossal." The land use law introduced following NEP abolished land purchase and restricted land rental, thus preventing the emergence on a large scale of alternatives for supplementary employment in the farming sector. Yet the average Ukrainian peasant, the middle peasant, was in dire need of cash. He had obtained land, but the severe shortage of
draught animals and of agricultural implements (aggravated by the
devastation during the civil war) prevented him from making effective use
of his newly acquired fields. The fact that the rural population was
increasing more rapidly than the availability of land made the need for
additional income all the more urgent. State credit for agricultural
improvement was inadequate when compared to the requirements of the
countryside. Passport regulations restricting freedom of movement were
gone. Under the market conditions of NEP, the peasant, as an independent
producer, was faced with the choice of either becoming more efficient or
moving into new branches of the economy. The growing differentiation
among the peasantry "encouraged the separation /from the village/ of surplus
labour."

The breaking of a peasant's bond with his land has always been a
difficult process. This was particularly true in Ukraine because, in the
words of S. Pylypenko, "unlike in Russia...our peasants knew nothing apart
from farming." The new agrarian conditions forced the Ukrainian peasantry
to learn. The goods famine aided the process. Brought on by the disorganiza-
tion of the economy during the civil war and the "scissors crisis" (low
agricultural prices and expensive industrial goods) it stimulated the
rapid development of artisan production in the Ukrainian village. New
skills were being acquired. Since artisan production was still insufficient
to satisfy the peasants' need for cash, seasonal work in industry being
reconstructed in the towns became widespread. Light industry, especially
that connected with food processing, experienced the fastest growth and
facilitated the peasants' search for additional sources of income. As
early as in 1923-4, a survey of peasant households revealed that throughout
Ukraine 13 per cent of all middle peasants worked for part of the year in industry. The size of the outflow from the village for seasonal employment in industry depended on the proximity of an industrial centre as a point of attraction and on the availability of rail transport. Since both were most developed in the south-east, in 1923 almost half the peasants in the country leaving the village for urban employment were from Donets'k and Katerynoslav provinces. Peasants clung to their land, but whenever possible either the male head or someone in the family entered at least partially into the industrial milieu. In the mid-1920s in the Kozel' district of the left-bank, for example, 85 per cent of rural households had a member of their family in industrial employ for at least half the year. In Donbas, in 1923, half the labour force had economic ties with agriculture. In a major factory in Dnipropetrovs'k (formerly Katerynoslav) almost 40 per cent of the proletariat lived in villages and considered their labour in the factory a supplementary activity. "Only for a horse, or that cow, just to live a little better....Only for a little of that money - and then quickly, back to the village, to the wife, to parents, to wide cheerful open spaces, to the fields and woods." This is how Borys Antonenko-Davydovych described the thoughts of peasants who were reluctantly trudging off to the mines in Donbas. These were sentiments peasants around the world expressed on the road to their proletarianization. In time, the Ukrainian peasant too would find that he could not live in both worlds. With wages in industry much higher than agrarian incomes and carrying the added advantage of social security and a shorter working day, there was little doubt as to which world the majority of peasants would eventually choose. Towards the second half of the 1920s there was a marked tendency for the proportion of workers with ties to the
village to decline and this paralleled an increase of Ukrainians in the working class and in the urban population. Khomenko already noted in 1923 that the Ukrainian populations in a number of towns in Kiev and Poltava districts increased in direct proportion to the growth of industry. The same could be observed in Donbas in 1923-6. "We can note a very marked migration from the Ukrainian village to the Ukrainian town," was a common judgement made during the 1920s.

Jobs in industry were not the only urban employment opportunity available to Ukrainians. The state apparatus was a major employer and despite all efforts to limit its growth, the number of white-collar staff kept growing. In the old tsarist apparatus there were relatively few Ukrainians. The situation after 1923, however, markedly shifted the structure of opportunities in bureaucratic employment in Ukrainians' favour. Firstly, Ukrainization, at a time of high white-collar unemployment offered unheard-of opportunities for Ukrainian speakers in the course of the implementation of the Ukrainization of office routine. Secondly, the administrative reform which abolished the old provinces and located the new regional centres much closer to the village offered new possibilities for the geographic and occupational social mobility of the Ukrainian rural intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. The impact of new job opportunities in the growing administrative sector on Ukrainians is well illustrated by data on migrants to the city of Kiev in 1923-6, when Ukrainians increased their weight in the city's population from 27 to 42 per cent. White-collar staff accounted for 41 per cent of all Ukrainians entering the city for the first time and over half of all incoming white-collar staff were Ukrainian.

But perhaps the most important new element in increasing Ukrainian
urban immigration rise was the dramatic rise in the expectations of village youth. They had been most affected by the mobilisations during the revolution and the promise of the new ideology of progress. The letter from an Uman' peasant in 1922 expressing amazement at the extent of "enthusiasm and eagerness" of rural youth for education and better jobs was characteristic of attitudes throughout the republic's countryside. The Ukrainizing educational system also opened new horizons for them. Like Stefan Radchenko, the hero of V. Pidmohyl'nyi's novel Misto (The City), village youth wondered, "Can it be that the village is eternally fated to be a dull and visionless slave...?" Probably like Radchenko they had been guerrillas in 1919 and had once carried "the flag of the autumn steppe and sky" (the yellow and blue national Ukrainian standard). In thousands they came "to conquer the city."  

The fact that the economy was still experiencing difficulties and that the demand for labour inputs was modest put limits on the size of urban immigration from the countryside. The social dynamic of the 1920s, however, had swung in favour of urban settlement by Ukrainians and it was simply a matter of time before that group emerged as a majority in the city. The 1926 census data on migration showed that almost 60 per cent of urban immigrants had been born in Ukraine. Since the census registered those who had migrated before the revolution as well as those who did so after, it is possible that figures isolating urban immigration only for the 1920s would show a higher percentage for those born in Ukraine. For example, a study of migration into the cities of Kiev, Odesa and Dnipropetrovs'k found that three out of four new residents in the third quarter of 1927 were from Ukraine and of these 77 per cent were from the countryside. According to a State Planning Committee (Gosplan) report, influx from
the Ukrainian countryside was the motor force of urban growth in 1924-6. 77

Migratory trends during the 1920s had not yet had time to ensure the Ukrainization of the republic's cities. In small towns, to be sure, as early as 1923 observers commented how Russian was less and less spoken on the streets, but the Ukrainian countryside had just begun its march on the large cities. 78 The rural areas as always spoke Ukrainian. In the towns, however, as a result of the legacy of linguistic assimilation under tsarism, only three out of four Ukrainians gave Ukrainian as their mother-tongue (1926). (See table 2.8) Since Ukrainians were a minority of the urban population, the Ukrainian language was used only by a third of urban dwellers. (See table 2.9) Analysing mother tongue retention among urban Ukrainians according to age-groups however, a "rebirth" of the language could be observed among youth. Between the ages of 20-24, for example, 79 per cent gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue (1926 census), as compared to 73 per cent for those between 35-64 years of age. In the larger cities the age-group differences were particularly great. In Odesa, the most Russified of Ukraine's large cities, 51 per cent of males aged 35-64 gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue in 1926; in the 20-24 age group the figure was 73 per cent. 79

The Ukrainization of the people of the republic's cities was facilitated by policies aimed at Ukrainizing the town's physical appearance. Summarizing the state's intentions in this respect V. Zatons'kyi said, "We will not forcibly Ukrainize the Russian proletariat in Ukraine, but we will ensure that the Ukrainian...when he goes to the city will not be Russified... and yes, we will repaint the signs in towns." 80 Signs were changed from Russian to Ukrainian (though the lack of urban Ukrainian cultural traditions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total no.</td>
<td>3,604,526</td>
<td>8,782,916</td>
<td>13,964,286</td>
<td>18,287,096</td>
<td>22,769,436</td>
<td>27,425,768</td>
<td>32,308,192</td>
<td>35,607,480</td>
<td>37,823,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Ukrainian</td>
<td>83.6</td>
<td>98.3</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>95.1</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% which</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>2,536</td>
<td>5,601</td>
<td>8,583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Perepisi, 1926, Table VI, in vol. XI, 7-5; Vol. XII, 9-12, 282-6; Vol. XIII, 8-10, 243-6; 336-9.

*Mother-tongue was defined as the language which the individual usually spoke or spoke best.*
### TABLE 2.9

**Mother-Tongue Identification of Urban Population of Ukraine, 1926***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population 1,932,019</th>
<th>Ukrainian 5,373,553</th>
<th>Russian 1,932,019</th>
<th>Other 1,932,019</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polissia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>607,034</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>238,969</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>331,789</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>402,368</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>372,483</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>140,402</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Mother-tongue was defined as the language the individual usually spoke or spoke best.

meant cities could not agree on what the proper Ukrainian word for restaurant, barber shop or hotel should be). Street names were Ukrainized in form and content since, despite several years of "Soviet power," main streets still bore the names of "Peter the Great" and of other luminaries of the Russian imperial past. Though "Soviet gentlewomen" protested this capitulation to moujik culture the Ukrainian communities of the cities were pleased to see that finally cities in the republic were acknowledging the fact of their location on Ukrainian soil. Ukrainians could now recognize something of their own in the city: signs and posters, Ukrainian theatres, concerts, schools and institutions where their language was spoken and even urban Ukrainized churches.

iii. The village

The extent of the self-organization of village society in 1917 took even seasoned political observers by surprise. By the end of that year, the Ukrainian Peasants' Union (Selians'ka spilka) had branches in the villages of most provinces and a membership which ran into the millions. The Spilka's newspaper, Narodnia volia, by May 1917 reached an astonishing circulation of 200,000. Scores of new cooperatives were founded. The development of these infrastructures of national life in turn permitted the national idea to penetrate the masses. The speed with which this happened was to be measured not in months, but in weeks and days. In peasant conferences and meetings the outlines of a national consensus were emerging: land to the peasants, a Ukrainization of the army, schools and administration, self-government for Ukraine in a loose federation with
When the Ukrainian peasant masses gave Ukrainian parties an impressive victory in the Russian Constituent Assembly elections (two months after the October revolution) there could be no doubt that the national movement had secured a popular base. What is remarkable is that this was achieved in a nation whose unfettered development was all of nine months old.

The rise of national consciousness in the countryside occurred not because the human mind is maleable, but because it is conservative. The masses had always spoken the "simple language" and sung "the simple songs." Only during the revolution, these age-old facts of their existence became politicized. The rural intelligentsia took the lead in this process. But in and of themselves, they would not have been able to accomplish this enormous task had they not been reinforced by tens of thousands of fresh cadres which the war and the army supplied.

Hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainian peasants - the most dynamic element in the countryside - were placed in uniform where they learnt the effectiveness of organization. While serving the tsar they also experienced in a thousand different ways - from the taunts and insults of reactionary Russian officers to encounters with nationalistic Poles - the social contrast which is the yeast of national self-awareness. There too they met the heart and soul of the Ukrainian national movement, the village teachers, thousands of whom had been drafted as subalterns, and who became instrumental in transforming the young peasant recruits' new experiences and awareness into a national ideology. The national movement in 1917 as a mass phenomenon began in the barracks, often in urban garrisons, with discussions, concerts, clubs and congresses. The movement developed to such an extent that the
2,500 delegates attending the Second Military Congress in Kiev (July 1917) held mandates from over a million and a half troops. When the soldiers returned (or deserted) home, they greatly expanded the existing organizational forces of the Ukrainian movement in the village. Soldiers had an immense authority in the eyes of the peasant masses. They had toppled the tsar and they would ensure that the moujik received his fair share of land. "Nobody in the village," wrote Vynnychenko, "was trusted as much, had as much authority as the...plain, simple rank-and-file soldier." With these reinforcements, the organization of the village proceeded very rapidly.

The "rebirth of the nation" in 1917, or more correctly its birth, can only be understood if it is viewed as the handiwork of millions, led by thousands of nameless individuals who came forward to constitute the natural leadership of the movement at its base. The exuberant and inexperienced youth gathered in the three small rooms of the Pedagogical Museum in Kiev with "no officials, no clerks, not even a janitor" - the Central Rada - only mirrored the larger drama. Of course, a major weakness of the national movement lay precisely in the fact that its hands and feet were disproportionately larger than its head. In an economically underdeveloped country whose social structure was dominated by millions of small independent producers, strong central authority was needed for anything to be accomplished. Capable leadership, massive resources, control of the city, as well as time and peace were needed to consolidate the gains. Bolshevik armies invaded Ukraine just as the nation-building process had begun in earnest. But what had transpired in the village during 1917 had sufficiently transformed the countryside to ensure that it would generate
difficulties for those who opposed its will in the years to come. If before the revolution most commentators agreed that the peasantry had a weak sense of national identity, after the revolution this evaluation changed. Speaking of the Ukrainian peasantry, Trotsky in 1923 noted, "National ideology for the peasantry is a factor of great significance. National psychology...is an explosive force of immense proportions."  

The national awakening of the Ukrainian peasantry was tied to the agrarian question. It could not have been otherwise. If the peasantry en masse supported the idea of Ukrainian autonomy in 1917, which they understood to mean full equality with Russia, it was because experience had taught them not to trust any agrarian reforms originating from the north. They were convinced that only a Ukrainian government "run by 'our people'...who know what 'our people' in Ukraine need" would give them the agrarian order they desired. When the peasantry cornered members of the Central Rada and "pounded" them with the demand to "take power" immediately, this was an expression of their socio-economic realism. In the spring of 1917 seizures of land had already begun. Peasants needed a guarantee that this land and, more importantly, all future land that they would take would be backed up by the power of a state, a state from which they could expect a sympathetic hearing. It is not surprising that peasants were in the forefront of criticism of the Central Rada for its lack of resolve in obtaining autonomy from the Provisional Government. Delegates to the First All-Ukrainian Peasants' Congress (10-15 June 1917) could not understand why the Rada "requested" autonomy and did not "demand it." Many felt that the negotiations should stop and Ukraine be proclaimed independent. In the words of a soldier-peasant representing Cherkasy,
"The moment is great and our children and our grandchildren will not forgive us if we waste this opportunity. There is no need to kneel before anybody: let us take what belongs to us!"\textsuperscript{100}

When the national leadership could have taken power with the force of the people behind it, it did not. The fact that for months on end the Rada was locked in inconclusive negotiations with Kerensky cost the Rada as much by way of peasant support as its hesitancy on the agrarian front. From the peasants' point of view, both were part of the same problem.

In matters concerning land distribution, the Rada tail-ended the peasant movement by a mile.\textsuperscript{101} Until its Third Universal of 20 November 1917 it urged peasants to await the resolution of the agrarian question by the Russian Constituent Assembly.\textsuperscript{102} In short, it asked the peasants to have faith in the same central all-Russian institutions which they had grown to suspect. When the Third Universal abolished the private ownership of land by "non-toiling" elements, the peasantry, organized into local committees (hromady), had already seized control of almost a third of all non-peasant lands.\textsuperscript{103} As troops returned from the front to claim their share of the estates, the agrarian movement intensified.\textsuperscript{104} But the move towards a more radical solution of the agrarian question did not mean an abandonment of a national platform by the peasantry. Throughout the entire revolutionary era (1917-20) not a single significant political formation or movement based on the peasantry dropped its national demands.\textsuperscript{105} The Rada's agrarian programme and its indecisiveness in organizing a national government weakened the national movement not because the peasantry turned against the national idea, rather because it accelerated the natural tendency of village society where capitalism had not developed to retreat
into its own shell and rely on its own resources. Unable to count on "their" state, each Ukrainian village transformed itself into an isolated fortress. This isolation was perfectly compatible with the newly acquired national consciousness: both blended to produce an acute xenophobia.

Mass movements develop so long as the swing of the movement does not run into objective obstacles. When it does, there begins a reaction, a fragmentation and retreat. The path of the national movement after 1917 was strewn with many such obstacles. Whatever suspicions the peasantry had of the ineffectiveness of Ukrainian national governments to protect and guarantee their interests were greatly reinforced by their experiences of the Pavlo Skoropads'kyi regime. After the peasants under the leadership of the Directory toppled that regime, the Directory's failure to formulate an adequate agrarian programme cost it much support. But this is only part of the story. Agrarian programmes have an impact on peasants only when they see that there is an agency of some substance to back them up. With Ukrainian political parties in disarray and armies invading on all sides, it is not surprising that the peasantry, unable to see a clear goal which could only be posited by some kind of regular, centralized hierarchy of control, chose to wait out events in their villages. When threatened, these villages would combine to fight their opponents according to the guerrilla methods of their forefathers. Having defeated their enemies, they would return to their homes. "Even under the most favourable conditions the peasant is unable to convert his overwhelming quantity into a political quality," observed Trotsky. What this method of peasant struggle indicated was that Ukrainian society, without a town, resources or foreign assistance, simply did not have the wherewithal to support any other kind of resistance.
In this fashion the village resisted until 1920, and even later. The village began to emerge from its shell on a significant scale only after 1923, when it was more or less safe to do so. In the language of the Soviet newspapers of the time this phenomenon was called "the unbelievably brisk tempo of the growth of village activism." L. Kaganovich in 1925 warned that this "activism" was "turning away from us," and only accelerated Ukrainization could channel this movement from below into the desired direction. To understand why this "activism" would "turn away" from the Bolsheviks, it is necessary to outline the history of the peasantry's encounters with the Bolshevik regime prior to NEP.

To begin with, Bolshevik influence on the Ukrainian peasantry during 1917 was virtually non-existent. The publication of Lenin's Decree on Land did not alter that. The little support the Bolsheviks enjoyed in the village soon evaporated when the Red Army installed the first Soviet government of Ukraine. From the very start the overriding concern of the Bolsheviks was to secure grain for the hungry Russian cities and armies, without having any goods to offer in return. Armed detachments were sent to forage the countryside. Preoccupied with this form of plunder, the Bolsheviks had neither the inclination nor the manpower to establish local Soviet organs of power outside the main industrial centres. The only form of local rule the peasantry encountered was the "bayonet" of the all-powerful commissars who had arrived from Russia with the army, and who, according to V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko, were often "unworthy drunkards and stupid ruffians." All of this would have been more tolerable in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasantry had it been tempered with energetic measures aimed at redistributing land. The opposite occurred. During the period of the Rada the peasantry had seized many estates. The first Soviet regime
however opposed the parcelling of estates on the grounds that this lowered production. Consequently, where they could enforce their writ, peasants had to return sequestered real estate and movable property to Bolshevik-appointed land committees. These bodies then either "sold" the returned property back to the peasants, or allocated them in smaller proportions. At the same time, wherever possible agricultural "artels" were established. To enlarge peasant holdings, Bolsheviks turned to expropriating surplus land from the richer peasantry. These policies turned the richer peasantry into implacable enemies of the Soviet government. The practice of restricting the redistribution of estates and especially of reselling them to the peasantry turned the village poor against the Bolsheviks. Collective farms were abhorred by all sectors of the countryside. 120

Peasant reaction to the first Soviet government in Ukraine is illustrated by the first (Bolshevik-sponsored) Peasants' Conference (January 1918). It was called when the Bolsheviks discovered that in a peasant country, peasants were not represented in Bolshevik legislative organs. Hundreds of delegates were expected, but only 78 showed up. 121 Significantly, that conference provided the only known resolution on the national question emanating from the Bolshevik camp during this entire period (1917 to mid 1918). The conference demanded that the language rights of the republic's citizens be guaranteed. 122 Even in retreat before German and Ukrainian troops Bolsheviks alienated the village since the Red Army was ordered to destroy all food-stuffs that could not be evacuated. 123

The second Soviet government of Ukraine merely amplified the mistakes of the first and failed to assimilate anything of the experience with the peasantry in Russia. 124 When Committees of Poor Peasants (kombedy) in
in Russia were being dissolved because practice had shown they were driving the middle peasantry into opposition, in Ukraine these committees (komnezamy in Ukrainian) were developed. In Ukraine, few genuinely poor peasants were to be found in the komnezamy. They were composed largely of "Lumpenproletariat" elements from the city, charged with performing police functions in a fashion reminiscent of the commissars of the previous period. While in Russia the wave of enthusiasm for collective farms waned because Bolsheviks discovered this was provoking peasant uprisings, in Ukraine, where the traditions of individual peasant ownership were much stronger, the thrust of the government's land-use regulations was to keep "almost all" of the estates as state farms. Those who suffered most from this policy were poor and landless peasants since this greatly diminished the amount of land available for redistribution. State farms were so poorly managed that most of the land in their possession lay fallow. Poor peasants fought the regime for these fields. Moreover, private trade in foodstuffs was abolished and in February 1919 all grain (above a minimal consumption quota) was seized by armed detachments without pay. With every month, peasant uprisings increased.

Since the regime was one of occupation, there was little question of offering concessions to the socio-economic and political interests of the peasantry. Concessions would have made it difficult to expropriate the countryside with impunity. But the same time their absence meant that every kilogramme of grain extracted entailed hard struggle with an enraged peasantry. From a purely economic point of view, the whole enterprise was catastrophic. With the magnificent harvest of 1919, Ukraine ought to have been able to deliver 820 million kilogrammes of grain. Because of peasant resistance, only 139 million were requisitioned with each kilogramme "coloured with
drops of workers' blood". Only 33 million were sent to Russia, the rest remaining to feed hungry Donbas. To appreciate what a paltry sum that was, it should be pointed out that in 1919 a single district (uezd) of Tula province delivered 38 million kilogrammes of grain to the state. A single train load of textile goods would have generated more grain for Russia than the entire requisition campaign.

The third Soviet government of Ukraine began its existence under strict orders from the Russian leadership to distribute estates to the peasantry and with the warning that "severe punishment" would be meted out to party members coercing the peasants into joining collective farms. Granting the peasantry the land they had fought and longed for since 1917 appears as the positive side of the Bolshevik agrarian programme only by comparison with their other policies for the countryside, which were much worse. The peasantry obtained some twelve million hectares of land. However, the manner in which the land was distributed generated much peasant discontent. The process was not organized under the democratic control of the peasant masses, but rested entirely in the hands of notorious local komnezamy chiefs; bribes, nepotism and other forms of corruption were common practices. In the summer of 1925 it was revealed that komnezamy members profited from their unlimited power in the village during this period to obtain the choicest land for themselves and their families. But the main source of peasant opposition was the requisition policy known as prodrazverstka which entailed a state monopoly of trade, with most agricultural commodities to be delivered by individual households to the state according to norms established by the local komnezamy. Komnezamy members in turn became tax farmers keeping 10-25 per cent of all collected foodstuffs for their personal consumption. Mass peasant uprisings broke out in Ukraine during 1920. As a result, instead of the expected 2,624
The breach between the peasantry and the regime continued to widen. "For peasants," said D. Manuil's'kyi in 1920, "we have remained a new caste which desires to govern and exploit peasants, as they used to be exploited by the privileged classes." During the 4th CPU conference (March 1920) many voices demanded an immediate change in agricultural procurement policies, advocating NEP a year before it was introduced. But powerless to change policies without permission from the Russian leadership, the party in Ukraine watched the disaster in the countryside continue until March 1921 when Lenin, at the 10th CPSU congress, proclaimed NEP.

NEP did not restore peace to the Ukrainian countryside. It is true that peasants could now sell their surplus on the free market, but because of prodnalog (tax in kind) most households had little to spare. Prodnalog was a complex tax consisting of thirteen types of payments so onerous as to consume almost half the peasants' harvest. "Revolutionary tribunals" were established throughout the countryside to dispense summary justice to peasants who did not pay. As with most aspects of Bolshevik agrarian policies, prodnalog fell heaviest on the poor peasantry since the tax was regressive. The richer, more socially skilled peasantry found ingenious ways of circumventing the tax, the most common of which was the establishment of tax-exempt "model state farms" or agricultural "artels". They would relinquish only part of their fields for this purpose but gain control of land held by the state. They used the produce for their own personal consumption. The poor viewed collective farms with the utmost hostility, as yet another attempt to cheat them out of land and their harvest. Prodnalog was collected with such zeal that, as we pointed out earlier, it contributed to the outbreak of the famine of 1921. Through-
out Ukraine peasant hostility increased, with "banditry" becoming widespread and every harvest season marked by uprisings. M. Frunze, who as head of the military in Ukraine had the task of suppressing peasant unrest, vehemently opposed any further grain requisitions. The troops, he argued, could no longer be relied upon to pacify the countryside. Indeed, in 1922, it was discovered that the 145th Red Army division stationed in right-bank Ukraine was on the verge of mutiny. Soldiers from Russia had to be sent into Ukraine to collect taxes. The village complained that although it was heavily taxed, it was given nothing in return: schools were in ruin, roads in disrepair. The press countered with the argument that prodnalog was needed "to feed the Red Army and the cities". For the peasantry, this translated into feeding their Russian masters. A newspaper reporting from a village in 1922 wrote: "There are no newspapers, and finding a book is like looking for a needle in the haystack, but every conceivable counter-revolutionary rumour or fabrication is widespread." The rumour in question was that Symon Petliura was returning to Ukraine to throw out the Bolsheviks and the hope was expressed that "the Soviet regime will not last the year." The fact that this sentiment was expressed by poor peasants, the group which might have been considered most likely to support the Bolshevik regime, is indicative of the deep antagonism that had developed between the Bolsheviks and the village.

The raising of the national consciousness of the peasantry, which began in 1917, was completed by the peasants' experience of the various Soviet regimes. Having obtained arms from demoralized White and Red Army troops during Denikin's occupation of Ukraine in 1919, the village was capable of offering resistance to the third Soviet government, installed in December 1919. Soviet policies, even the third time around, boxed all
of village society into a corner out of which some form of resistance seemed the only solution. Even extraordinary measures, such as Rakovsky's draconian command of 12 September 1920 ordering the "complete annihilation" of villages (voluntarily or involuntarily) supplying guerrillas, did not end the turmoil. The national policies of the regime guaranteed that the rural intelligentsia would seize all opportunities to oppose the Bolsheviks. Bolshevik agrarian policies ensured that the intelligentsia would find many supporters among the peasantry rich and poor; between 1920-1 poor peasants formed a very sizeable proportion of partisan detachments. Whatever break had developed between the rural intelligentsia and the rank-and-file peasantry during the preceding years was healed in the process. The third Bolshevik government confronted a village characterized by a high degree of internal solidarity. In the course of the resistance - truly remarkable in its breadth and scope - the national movement gained adherents in regions where it had been traditionally weak. From late 1919 on, peasant resistance in the south and south-east corner of Ukraine became pronouncedly "chauvinist" in character, writes the Soviet historian O.O. Kucher. This was the situation in 1923 when the Bolsheviks announced a "detente" with the countryside.

For the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, control of the village seemed to be an insurmountable problem. Unable to win the village from within, they attempted to control it from above, destroying in the process more than they could create. All of the expressions of progress in rural areas - from cooperatives to Prosvita societies - were ordered to be shut in 1920. They resurfaced in 1922 as pale shadows of their former selves under the control of komnezamy. Similarly, the rural intelligentsia (agronomists, veterinarians, medical assistants, teachers and cooperative activists) was
as a group suspected of "Petliurism" and its activities curtailed. 162 This policy was carried one step further and applied to the peasantry itself. In 1920 it was decided that the focal point of Soviet power in the countryside would not be the Soviets (rady) but the komnezamy because the party had the forces to control the latter but not the former. The peasant masses were disenfranchised. 163 The economic price of this disorganization of the village was considerable. But it did preserve political control.

E.H. Carr could not have been further from the truth when he asserted that the komnezamy in Ukraine survived "long after they had become a memory elsewhere in the Soviet Union" because of the acute differentiation of the peasantry in Ukraine. Nor for that matter did the komnezamy "keep alive the traditions of class struggle", unless of course, one gives an entirely new meaning to the term. 164 The longevity of the komnezamy was rooted in the weakness of the Soviet regime in the countryside. Unable to police the village themselves, the party recruited people to serve as their local agents by offering a wide and enticing range of privileges. 165 The result was the emergence of the "komnezamy /as/ a caste organization". 166 "People join the komnezamy simply to obtain privileges...Komnezamy avoid communist work like the devil avoids incense," wrote a peasant. 167 Another summarized the work of this organization as follows:

Swindling and drunkenness were held in high esteem. An exceptional level of productivity of samohon /home-brew/ was maintained...The komnezam destroyed the village, it disorganized the school, the cooperative, the reading house, everywhere its work had catastrophic results...Our local theatre premises, the former house of the landlord, was divided up among komnezam members...The head of the komnezam was "elected "without a general
Butsenko observed that the organization of "poor peasants" was detested by the village poor. One official was so incensed by the political and economic damage the organization had done in his district that he insisted "komnezamy have to be dispersed and their administration burnt to the ground." As for the membership of the group, H. Petrovs'kyi wrote in 1923 that the reason why two-thirds of the delegates to the organization's third congress did not speak Ukrainian, and fewer could read it, was because most komnezam members were not peasants in the usual meaning of the term. Most had lived and worked in cities and had lost their ties with the village and with Ukrainian culture.

The village was left to cope as best it could while officialdom "simply folded its arms in the face of the economic and cultural tasks." The succession of economic crises between 1921 and 1923 dictated that something had to be done to raise agricultural productivity. The lack of economic incentive had forced the village to exist at the level of a natural economy. Agricultural stagnation was hampering the recovery of industry. In the spring of 1923 new measures were taken to raise peasant production. Prodnalog was abolished, a single tax was introduced, taxes were lightened and peasants were encouraged to enrich themselves. It was not merely a question of giving peasants an incentive to produce according to their age-old methods. Their productivity had to be raised. Inspired by Lenin's article "On Cooperation," the party in Ukraine now saw the cooperative movement and education as the way to improve the living standards of the masses. What was purely an economic task in
Russia had a decisive national dimension in Ukraine. The new mood of "cooperation" implied coming to terms with the forces of the national movement in the countryside and, above all, the rural intelligentsia and the former cooperative movement activists. The party organ in Uman' went even one step further. It argued that since experience had shown the party simply could not lead cultural-economic work in the village, it should relinquish its claims on this front to the rural intelligentsia and its satellite forces. It was clear the party needed the national forces in the village for its programme of economic recovery, but it did not necessarily want their national ideology. Try though it did, it could not have the one without the other.

The post-1923 period saw the rapid reconstitution of national forces in the countryside. Cooperatives, resurrected as one of the main pillars of NEP, played a leading role in this respect. Cooperatives in Ukraine had a distinctive feature not to be found in Russia, "the principal one being that the Ukrainian cooperative has a strong national-chauvinist character," according to a 1922 report. The Ukrainian cooperative leader, it was written, "will organize the wide mass of peasants around the cooperative in order to turn them against Soviet power at a later date." But having no alternative, the party decided to let the cooperatives do their work in developing the economy. By the second half of the 1920s cooperatives had managed to organize three-quarters of the peasantry. Their contribution to the economic well-being of the republic was considerable. As a force strengthening the national consciousness of the Ukrainian masses the cooperatives equalled the school. It was not just a question of their wide-ranging cultural work. As one of the few institutions in the country whose leadership was almost entirely in Ukrainian hands, they
were in the forefront of voicing the village's complaints before state and party officialdom which reinforced their prestige in the eyes of the peasantry. As a force promoting the self-organization of peasants, they raised the peasants' self-confidence as a group.\textsuperscript{185}

The rehabilitation of the rural intelligentsia was the other important factor in the consolidation of the villages' national forces. For many party leaders in Ukraine, the fact that they could now reach a \textit{modus vivendi} with indigenous forces came as a relief. There were those, of course, who complained that this intelligentsia was almost entirely "Petliurite" and was not to be trusted.\textsuperscript{186} Petrovs'kyi pointed out that that was the only intelligentsia available in the countryside and without it the village would be condemned to backwardness and illiteracy. The rural intelligentsia seized the opportunities made available to them. A 1925 survey, for example, found that over half the rural intelligentsia were highly active in cultural-political work and their "authority was enormous."\textsuperscript{187} The institutions which came under their control - the village school, the reading-rooms, literacy courses, veterinary and agricultural stations - all became outposts for the articulation of a national ideology. The party was very much concerned that the "increased political activity of the intelligentsia - an undeniable fact - does not lead to a \textit{smychka}.../which/ will threaten us with a new peasant party."\textsuperscript{188} To prevent this from happening, the material conditions of the rural intelligentsia were improved and they were given more responsibility in the hope that this would bind them closer to the regime.\textsuperscript{189} The result was not what the party had hoped for. "The ideological influence of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the majority of whom have nationalist deviations, on the toiling masses and in particular on the peasantry is more and more widespread...The sharp
break of the wide mass of the peasantry and of a certain layer of the proletariat from our party leadership is now an eminent danger unless the party follows the path indicated by the decisions of the 12th Congress on the national question. The rural intelligentsia, this seemingly awesome group, represented a mere 0.3 per cent of the population in the countryside. This tiny group could influence millions because the concrete experience of the latter had confirmed in practice what the intelligentsia affirmed in theory.

When draconian measures in dealing with the village were replaced by market relationships, and the village was allowed to breathe and express itself more freely, the party press now saw the rise of a new "kul'turnist" (culturedness) instead of peasant "banditism". The Ukrainization of the rural apparatus, the rise in educational opportunities, the expansion of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church, the enfranchisement of the peasantry through the development of local Soviets in 1924, when komnezamy were downplayed, were some of the factors which contributed to the "unbelievable tempo in the growth of the political maturity and activity of the village."

In this situation party officialdom found that it was "easier to march against an armed force" than to "face the village". A peasant from the Donets'k region offered what was a common opinion about the average party worker in the village, "They bring him from the city, like a cat in the bag, and let him loose, and he will stay for about five months and then run away carrying off with him to the city either five cows or a pocketful of money." The Dymivka affair revealed that in Ukraine, rural party cells were guilty of corruption and abuse of power. A commission sent to investigate these organizations found widespread drunkenness, rape and brawling as the common norms of party members' behaviour, all of which
was combined with an ethereal infatuation with "high politics". The kinds of questions which made up 70 per cent of the party discussions were: "the economic situation in Europe', 'the tactics of French socialists', 'the role of the individual in history.'" Rural organizations, it turned out, were totally unfamiliar with economic questions and policies in general, and their local application in particular. Nonsensical resolutions filled entire books. The following were offered by the commission as examples of the party's "political illiteracy": "'On the national question - to learn it by heart', 'On Shevchenko - to carry out his commandments!' Or 'to request that the Comintern hurry up with the revolution in the West.'" It was observed that "the non-party activists in the village had a higher cultural level than the average communist in the countryside." Here the legacy of the Ukrainian revolution played an enormous role. "In every village in our district," wrote a correspondent, "we have a politically developed and active leadership comprised of peasants who have lived through much, and who during the war and revolution spent some time in various lands, heard and read much, and now read newspapers. These leading elements make observations, criticize and... put us in our place." The crisis in authority experienced by the party in this period formed the backdrop to the decision to open its doors to those whom it had kept out. Thus the national current within the party was reinforced.

There was a growing impatience reflected in the renewed activism of the village. Demands for books, newspapers and schools seemed to increase exponentially. A Ukrainization of the central apparatus was demanded so that "our time isn't wasted when dealing with officials." Central offices received many complaints about the fact that peasants were angry
with state and party officials for using the gentry's vocabulary in addressing peasants as "muzhyk", "diad'ko" or "khokhol". When a troupe of Russian performers came to one village and spoke about the glories of the "Russian Empire" they found that they had lost their audience. The village wanted medical facilities and agronomists. It was, in short, demanding the right of entry into the twentieth century. Peasants were not convinced by the party's argument that socio-cultural development could not proceed as quickly in the village as in the town because of the lack of funds. In the city people "live well," wrote a peasant from Podillia, "they smoke cigarettes and visit theatres, wear boots...But the entire burden falls on the peasantry. And they stuff the 'smychka' under our noses." Lebed', the Ukrainophobe Central Committee secretary (until 1925), called these peasant demands "expressions of their petty-bourgeois nature." These grievances which combined with the new kul'turnist' produced "a national chauvinism /that/ has eaten its way deep into the peasant masses," wrote Petrovs'kyi in 1924. But as a peasant delegate to the second session of the Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (V.Ts.V.K.) explained, "Give us equal opportunity and then there won't be any chauvinism in Ukraine." The peasantry was merely giving notice that they were no longer content with being the pack animals of history.

Peasant activism expressed itself with considerable force on economic questions with demands for more credit, better state support for the development of cooperatives and more investment in agriculture. The Soviet regime had certainly inherited a formidable legacy of economic backwardness. The basic problem in Ukraine was the existence of many small uneconomical households lacking farm implements and livestock and which could not develop the intensive forms of production needed to raise their incomes.
During NEP the social differentiation which this produced occurred not so much through changes in the size of land holdings, but rather, those who had economically viable farms increased their wealth through the purchase of livestock and the marketing of grain. What this pointed to was the absence of energetic measures to improve the infrastructure in the countryside. The marketing of grain was a case in point. The higher grain prices, a subject of so much discussion during the 1920s, brought little benefit to the majority of peasants since most of the profits went to middle-men (Nepmen) who were reselling the grain bought from the peasantry at from two to four times the initial purchase price. The peasantry saw a "new bourgeoisie being born" at their expense and wondered why the state failed to give more energetic support to the development of cooperatives. Similarly, because of the lack of state support, cooperatives found it difficult to service all of the consumer needs of the peasantry, which meant that peasants had to turn to private traders from whom they bought almost 40 per cent of their manufactured needs, more often than not at inflated prices. When peasants demanded backing for cooperatives, this was not, as Carr asserts, the voice of the kulak speaking. In 1927, 53 per cent of the members of agricultural cooperatives were poor peasants, 41.5 per cent middle peasants and a mere 2.4 per cent kulaks. The government, of course, claimed inadequate resources as the reason why it did not come to the aid of the countryside. But as Odynets', a Ukrainian government official, pointed out at the second session of the V.Ts.V.K., the problem was that Ukraine did not have its own budget and the sum of money it received for agricultural purposes was inadequate. For the Ukrainian peasantry the argument of "lack of funds" was hardly convincing since they were taxed more heavily than their Russian counterparts: taxes in Russia were lowered for households with
less livestock, but in Ukraine this was not taken into account; in
Russia taxes were based on the actual harvest result in any given
region, but in Ukraine taxes were levied on the basis of estimated
yields, which generally erred on the side of optimism. Any improvement in agricultural productivity would have necessitated
at least three measures: a) a consolidation of land usage to avoid
wasteful thin-strip fields; b) the supply of machinery, tractors in parti-
cular, and c) agricultural credit. However, policies designed to con-
solidate land usage were not instituted until 1924 and then not very ener-
getically pursued. The production of machinery was totally inadequate,
and this was especially serious because of the severe shortage of horses
in Ukraine. Existing heavy industry in the republic, locked into all-
Union commissariats, was not geared to supply the village with the products
it needed and these had to be imported from factories in the Urals. Agricultural credit, the cornerstone of all agricultural development
policies, presented a bleak picture. As of 1 March 1925, Ukraine, with over
5 million rural households, had seen 50 million rubles lent to peasants,
over half of which was raised by cooperatives. Ukraine's budget, allo-
cated in Moscow, hardly paid attention to agriculture. The 1926-7 budget,
for example, assigned 18 million out of a total of 245 million rubles for
agricultural development. Expenditures on administration, by contrast,
consumed 52 million rubles, almost three times that given agriculture.
Yet, agriculture provided 91 per cent of all tax revenues. By 1924 the
Ukrainian peasantry had delivered almost 16.5 milliard kilogrammes of
grain (91 per cent of the 1916 figure). With necessary infrastructures,
a profitable export trade could have developed, which in turn would have
facilitated the development of industry. Because of inadequate grain
handling facilities and other infrastructures, the state was "killing the goose that laid the golden eggs." \(^{224}\)

For the poorest element in the countryside, some form of collective effort was clearly needed since as individual producers they did not have the wherewithal to increase substantially their output. The poor peasantry had identified which of the several possible forms of collective enterprise it preferred. By far the most popular, because it combined socialized and private activity, was the form of cooperation known as TSOZ (Tovarystvo po suspil'nomu obrobitku zemli (Association for the Common Cultivation of Land)). \(^{225}\) Absence of credit facilities and party dogma which favoured "collective farms" or "artels" (with full or almost total socialization of production), prevented the TSOZy from growing as fast as they could have. \(^{226}\) Not having supported initiatives which came from peasants themselves, the regime in 1928 decided to organize a major push for the establishment of collective farms, violating the basic proprietary instincts of peasants. Peasants were also appalled that those organizing collective farms had no practical experience in agriculture, and that these farms were being established without tractors. \(^{227}\) As late as 1929 Fesenko of the komnezamy Central Committee insisted that peasants had to be convinced that tractors were not needed, and that a few horses were sufficient for collective farms to flourish! \(^{228}\) Since collective farms did not offer the promise of superior agricultural techniques and did not have the advantage of the old entrepreneurial stimulus, peasants merely looked at these initiatives as yet another hairbrained scheme of urban origin.

The economic dilemma of the Ukrainian village cannot be abstracted from broader political questions. Pavlo Khrystiuk, anticipating the
arguments of latter-day economic reformers, argued in his analysis of NEP that without "freedom of socio-political life for the toiling masses" the economic development of the country would be blocked. \(^{229}\) Had attention been paid to many of the suggestions offered by the peasants themselves, the problems experienced during the fateful harvest of 1927-8 would not have existed. \(^{230}\) It was not the peasants' fault that grain purchases that year were dominated by private merchants because cooperatives had not developed, or that existing goods were poorly distributed, with mountains of unsold stocks to be found in some regions, and none to be offered in exchange for grain in others. \(^{231}\) An analysis of grain procurement problems written in early 1929 showed that chaos in the state's financial organs was responsible for most of the difficulties - kulaks were not even mentioned once in the analysis. \(^{232}\) As things worked out, however, the Ukrainian peasantry was forced to pay a high price for a problem it had no hand in creating.

Neither can the economic problems of the Ukrainian countryside be separated from the republic's predicament within the unequal union. When reference is made to the Ukrainian village in most standard Western works, the favourite theme is the existence of acute social differentiation. \(^{233}\) If Ukraine had a larger share of poor households in its countryside than Russia, it was not because its kulaks were more rapacious than elsewhere, but because its industry, which could have absorbed the rural poor, was underdeveloped by comparison with Russia's and because funds needed for agricultural development were denied the republic.

The economic improvements which took place in the village during the 1920s were the product of the unlocking of the creative energies of village society under NEP. With appropriate policies, the improvements could have been much greater. \(^{234}\) The 1920s also demonstrated that the peasantry,
having begun its self-emancipation on the economic front, would not be content until its cultural and political institutions were subjected to the same process. The mobilisation of village society and its rise in expectations also meant that whenever opportunities for social mobility presented themselves, they would be seized. It was out of the human material shaped by the Ukrainian village that the new working class was being forged. To this aspect of Ukrainian society we now turn.

iv. The working class

It was with great difficulty that Ukrainian political parties challenged the monopoly enjoyed by Russian political groups in their access to the working class. However, where Ukrainian workers solved the problem of lack of propaganda materials and a shortage of "educated and politically experienced workers" the national movement made progress. Outside the Donbas-Dnipro region, "a sizeable portion of the proletariat in large and small cities, and in the provinces, followed the yellow and blue flag of Ukrainian nationalism." Towards the end of 1917, the national movement was beginning to gain a foothold in the industrial heartland. In Luhans'k (Voroshilovhrad), for example, a "Ukrainian workers' club" was formed. In that proletarian bastion, complained the Bolshevik K.E. Voroshilov, there were bitter disputes with Ukrainians who were set on Ukrainizing the city, recognizing only the Central Rada, and viewing Bolsheviks as "a foreign element". A mass meeting of workers in a Dnipropetrovs'k metallurgical plant, to give another example, voted "All Power to the Central Rada". Most workers in the southern regions of Ukraine first
heard of Ukrainian political parties during the mass campaign around the elections to the Constituent Assembly. If the majority of workers in those regions remained indifferent to the national-cultural demands of the Ukrainian people, it was not because there was something inherent in workers which made them resistant to these claims. Rather, as L. Chykalenko found in his discussions with pro-Bolshevik workers in Mykolaiv, nobody had confronted the proletariat with these issues. The revolution did just that.

The non-Ukrainian sectors of the working class were by no means a homogeneous entity. Workers with longer records of employment, those with some skill, the better educated, the factory proletariat (especially in the large foreign firms where, unlike in Russia, collective bargaining was practised), and finally artisans were largely Menshevik in orientation. Mazepa maintains that this sector of the working class was also the most politically conscious and expressed the greatest hostility to the "nanny" services of the Bolshevik intelligentsia. The workers we have described were the backbone of the trade union movement in Ukraine. The younger, less literate, unskilled workers, generally of peasant stock, who had recently arrived from Russia to work in the mines, were the group which furnished the bulk of the Bolsheviks' recruits. These structural divisions within the working class played a very significant role in forming its orientation towards the national movement. Menshevik workers, the most rooted in Ukrainian soil, were at the same time the most inclined to reach an agreement with the national movement. Throughout 1917 they formed a "loyal opposition" to the Central Rada. Here, however, one should add that many Bolshevik workers were also inclined to some form of accommodation with the Ukrainian movement: the war with the Rada was not their
The first Bolshevik regime in Ukraine received "far less" support than its counterpart in Russia had received from workers there. For many workers in Ukraine, their experiences with the first Soviet government proved to be negative. In Dnipropetrovs'k and Kharkiv, for example, Russian workers were shocked by the wave of terror unleashed by the Red Army against the Bolsheviks' political opponents. When the Bolshevik government began to organize a massive evacuation of equipment and machinery, many workers resisted this removal of their means of livelihood. It was against the backdrop of these events that the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers met in May 1918. Attended by over 300 delegates representing over half a million workers in 311 trade unions, the Congress (which was not boycotted by the Bolsheviks) gave the Mensheviks a solid majority. Delegates, the overwhelming majority of whom were non-Ukrainian, voted for far-reaching changes in labour legislation, the nationalization of industry, as well as proclaiming themselves in favour of an independent Ukrainian People's Republic.

The congress created the first trade union centre for Ukraine - Utsentroprof - and it was independent of Russian trade union organizations. Soon afterwards, metallurgists, miners, chemical workers and others also established their own all-Ukrainian territorial organizations independent of their Russian counterparts. During the Hetmanate an intensive organizational drive saw the trade unions greatly expand their membership. This invigorated trade union movement could have been won to the side of the national movement. When the Directory took power, representatives of Utsentroprof, especially its far left, were enthusiastic about Vynnychenko's proposed radical course. But the Directory's turn to the right, "otamania", doing.
especially P. Bolbochan's repression of workers in the left-bank Ukraine, and new military incursions foreclosed such collaboration. The fact, however, that independent trade unions existed and were in Menshevik hands posed a major problem for the second Bolshevik government when it was installed in December 1919.

The reactionary social policies of the Hetmanate and disenchantment with the Directory led most workers to view the arrival of the second Bolshevik government with sympathy. But this was the period of war communism; in Russia the Second Congress of trade unions (January 1919) proclaimed the "etatisation" (ogosudarstvenie) of the trade unions and stripped them of their independence. These decisions were soon implemented in Ukraine. But there, because Mensheviks had dominated the trade union movement for years, the execution of these policies was much more difficult. In Ukraine, moreover, the struggle against the independence of trade unions had a double thrust: subordination to the state and absorption into all-Russian bodies. Having purged the trade unions, the Bolsheviks convoked their First All-Ukrainian Trade Union congress in April 1919 which implemented both policies. Advocating the merger of Ukrainian trade unions into the all-Russian organizations, a Bolshevik party leader used arguments strongly marked by Russian chauvinism:

The boundaries of an independent Ukrainian state... have left their mark among wide strata of the Ukrainian population...The communist proletariat with its iron fist has begun to eradicate these boundaries...This decision is characteristic of the clear understanding of the proletariat of Ukraine that Great Russia and Ukraine, the north and south of Russia, in and of themselves represent a single economic whole...We must fight against the petty-bourgeois illusions of the toiling masses of south Russia and bring about this unity...
The liquidation of independent (in the double sense) trade unions, combined with the introduction of military discipline within the working class and other aspects of the Bolsheviks' economic policies, resulted in a situation where "the attitudes of the working class markedly changed during the second Soviet government...Among workers there occurred a well-known recidivism towards a Menshevik frame of mind, and the proletariat, in the final analysis, did not give the Soviet government in the last weeks and months of its existence the support which it ought to have expected." 260

With the collapse of the second Bolshevik government, the working class under the difficult conditions of White army occupation once again rebuilt an all-Ukrainian organization. A congress was held with delegates holding mandates from over a quarter million workers. Metallurgists, miners and others soon followed in the re-establishment of an all-Ukrainian centre. Once again Mensheviks were in the leadership of the trade unions. 261 When the third and final Bolshevik government was installed these independent territorial trade unions were liquidated and the organizations were once again merged into all-Russian ones. 262

The re-establishment of Bolshevik control over the trade unions took several years to accomplish. The economic collapse, the introduction of one-man management, the complete subordination of trade unions to the party and the state, and the militarization of labour generated a high degree of discontent within the working class. Where free elections were held, Mensheviks obtained majorities because their "slogans were more concrete, more tangible, more understandable.../by/ the broad working class" than Bolshevik propaganda. 263 In the face of this situation Bolsheviks unleashed a wave of repression against their opponents within the working class:
over 200,000 people were expelled from the trade unions. It was only after the economic circumstances of the country had improved and control over the trade unions had been firmly established that a territorial trade union organization was established in Ukraine. This occurred in 1924, the same year that trade unions were handed the Ukrainization decree for consideration. Not surprisingly it was found that among "trade union cadres there is a deviation in the direction of Great Russian chauvinism." The basis of this chauvinism, it was explained, lay in the "fear that Ukrainization will destroy the existing trade union apparatus." This is important to bear in mind when analysing the movement for Ukrainization within the working class during the 1920s: the voice of the bureaucracy must not be mistaken for that of the working class. The point was well illustrated in a play written about Ukrainization. In it the trade union official Petrov opposes Ukrainization, arguing that the working class orients towards Russian culture and is indifferent or even hostile to the Ukrainian culture. He is answered by Bystrov: "And I say as a worker...that you are lying. All sorts of vileness is spewed in the name of workers. Only Russian jingoists (rusotiap), trade union bureaucrats like you, can say these things, those who have occupied for seven years the post of head of the cultural department /of the trade union/ and still haven't learnt a single Ukrainian word."  

The Bolsheviks established control over a working class that was rapidly changing. In the early 1920s, the economic chaos brought about by the civil war and war communism resulted in a massive de-proletarianization of the population. Compulsory mobilisations of workers and the general militarization of labour did not stop the flight from the factories.
By 1921, Ukraine had only 260,000 factory workers, a little more than one per cent of the total population, half the size of the pre-revolutionary figure. With NEP and economic recovery the working class began to reconstitute itself, and increased to 360,000 factory workers by 1924, rising to 675,000 by 1927. The total work force (industry, manufacturing, transport and communication) virtually doubled between 1924 and 1927, from 1.2 to 2.7 million. What was significant about the new working class that was being formed was that for the first time in the history of the country, the majority of the new recruits were Ukrainian.

A detailed study of the national composition of the working class during the 1920s is hampered by the absence of comprehensive data. Our only sources of information before and after the 1926 census are statistics on the national composition of the trade union membership, statistics which included white-collar staff. However since the overwhelming majority of trade unionists were industrial workers, it is safe to assume that changes in the national composition of trade union membership reflected nationality changes in the proletariat. Trade union membership data show that Ukrainians increased from 41 per cent of the total membership in 1923, to 57 per cent by the autumn of 1929. The most complete record of the working class according to nationality is provided by the 1926 general population census. (See table 2.10) It revealed that Ukrainians were a majority of the working class. They were however a minority among workers in industry and manufacturing. With the upsurge in the economy in the second half of the 1920s this was changing. Between the winter of 1926 and the autumn of 1929, Ukrainians in industry increased from 41 to 48 per cent; among miners, an occupation Ukrainians traditionally eschewed, the increase was from 36 to 40 per cent. In the younger age groups,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry &amp; Manufacturing</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Transportation</th>
<th>Petty Manufacturing</th>
<th>Trade &amp; Commerce</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>41.5%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>54.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>47.1%</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>18.4%</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total (100%) 8.0% 1.1% 9.6% 38.1% 159,379

Source: Перепись 1926, vol. 28, table 1, 3-5.

Economically active population only.
Ukrainians predominated. Among apprentices being trained for industry, Ukrainians formed 62 per cent of the total. In the large labour-intensive projects such as Dnirel'stan, the hydro-electric dam, two-thirds of the work force was Ukrainian. What was most indicative of the new abilities of Ukrainians to seek industrial employment was their recruitment into the most skilled sector of the working class as metal workers, that is, those who worked in the machine-building industry with precision tools. Traditionally, this sector of the working class was dominated by non-Ukrainians. A 1929 survey (which included the southern regions of Ukraine) showed that 52 per cent of new cadres in this demanding profession belonged to the Ukrainian nationality. Indicative of the new situation was the fact that in 1927, 44 per cent of the republic's skilled manpower originated in the Ukrainian village.

In the pre-revolutionary era workers, never having attended a Ukrainian language school or having read a Ukrainian-language newspaper or book, had to acquire their elementary exposure to culture in the Russian language. The result was a working class that was Russified. Mykola Skrypnyk, Commissar of Education in the second half of the 1920s, like many others, was confident that this legacy of tsarism would gradually be overcome as new working class cadres who had graduated from Ukrainian-language schools arrived on the scene and older workers seized the opportunity to Ukrainize themselves during the 1920s. Comparing the 1926 and 1929 trade union census it is clear that the de-Russification of the working class was proceeding briskly. When comparing the two sets of figures on language identification it must be borne in mind that in 1929 trade unionists were asked "which language do you speak at home?", a more stringent test of language
identity than the question on mother-tongue posed in 1926. The 1929 question was deliberately phrased in that way in order to obtain a more accurate assessment of Ukrainian language usage among workers. It is interesting to note when comparing the 1926 and 1929 figures that the rate of increase in the number of workers using Ukrainian at home was several percentage points higher than the increase in the number of Ukrainians according to nationality - 11 and 8 per cent respectively in the case of workers in transport and communication, 10 and 7 per cent in the case of members of industrial trade unions. The rate of acquisition of literacy in Ukrainian was particularly impressive in that short three-year span. (See table 2.11) The 1929 trade union census also revealed that among workers giving Ukrainian as their nationality native language usage at home ranged from 94 per cent in the case of workers in agriculture, to 68 per cent among those in transport and communication and 66 per cent among those in industry. Russification was very much a regional phenomenon. Outside of the mining (Donbas) and steppe regions, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian workers spoke their native language at home. Significant here are the figures for the Dnipro region, where much new economic development was underway and where almost 80 per cent of Ukrainian workers spoke their native language at home. (See table 2.12)

Language data, while very enlightening, nevertheless do not capture the nuances of the real situation. Language usage data for Donbas are particularly misleading in this respect. A 1925 study of the "language problem in Donbas" found that among Russian youth the "articulation base" of the Russian spoken was Ukrainian and their speech was replete with Ukrainian words. Among Russified Ukrainian workers, what passed for Russian was a language whose pronunciation, sentence construction and vocabulary
| Type of Union | Membership | Total
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>50,820</td>
<td>166,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial</td>
<td>205,241</td>
<td>226,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communication</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artcultural</td>
<td>138,394</td>
<td>1929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>119,921</td>
<td>222,969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Read (as % of Total)</th>
<th>Write (as % of Total)</th>
<th>Speak (as % of Total)</th>
<th>Enumerated by Nationality (as % of Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2.12

Nationality Data on Ukrainians in the Trade Unions according to Region, 1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Weight of Ukrainians in Trade Unions in the Trade Unions (in per cent)</th>
<th>Speaking Ukrainian at Home (in per cent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polissia</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steppe</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bank</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Natsional'nyi perepys-robitnykiv ta služvoborshchuk ukrayiny (Shovotent, Kharkiv, 1930), 96-101.
of everyday life was Ukrainian while Russian was used for work-related discussions. What the researcher found, in effect, was that in urban industrial centres a new language existed, a "Ukraino-Russian dialect" and teachers of Russian noted that they had "great difficulties teaching children correct Russian". Because of this, it was argued that with little instruction many Russian speakers could easily transfer into the Ukrainian language. As for the culture of workers, P. Solodub wrote, "Is it true that the proletariat in Ukraine is oriented towards Russian culture? Obviously not." The proletariat he argued, had little of any culture and was only awakening to the possibilities of enlightenment. What culture it had was an amalgam of various elements, with Ukrainian "motifs of peasant-proletarian existence" occupying a prominent role.

In examining the Ukrainization of the proletariat in more detail it is necessary to make a distinction between two elements in the process. The first is the linguistic Ukrainization of official trade union business and the promotion of Ukrainian culture within the working class - these we call Ukrainization policies. The second is the development of an identification with the territory and institutions of the Ukrainian republic. We will consider each in turn.

Ukrainization as a policy within the trade unions had an immediate impact on the working class in two ways. The first was an attempt to introduce Ukrainian as the language in which the business of the trade unions was conducted. The second was an effort to promote and popularize Ukrainian culture and language among workers through courses, the distribution of Ukrainian books, newspapers, and the organization of concerts and films. Neither of these activities was made subject to statutory provisions.
Only state institutions were obligated by legislation to make a knowledge of Ukrainian compulsory for their employees. Trade unions, like other social organizations, were allowed to develop their own Ukrainization programmes. This independence in turn was used by the trade union bureaucracies as an excuse for them to do very little about either aspect of Ukrainization.

When Ukrainization was announced in 1923, the political conjuncture in the republic was unfavourable for the campaign to be carried into the trade unions. The head of the party was Kviring, who made it quite clear that Ukrainization was not to be extended to the proletariat. It did not help that the republic was without its own territorial trade union structure. When the trade unions were reorganized in 1924, the new bureau of the All-Ukrainian Council of the Trade Unions was handed the Ukrainization decree for consideration by representatives of the Commissariat of Education (Narkomos). The trade union leadership decided to pursue Ukrainization by increasing the output of brochures in the language, organizing language courses for those in the apparatus wishing to take them, and by promoting Ukrainian culture in the workers' clubs. Reports delivered at that time made it clear that there were no central directives, but that the policy was left up to the regional organizations to implement as they saw fit.

The reluctance of the trade union apparatus to promote Ukrainization was challenged from two sources. The first came from rank-and-file workers themselves among whom Ukrainization was very popular. A 1929 survey of almost a hundred metallurgical workers in Donbas found that only 6 opposed Ukrainization. Of these 5 were older workers; 59 wanted more Ukrainian culture courses, and 14 argued for cheaper books in the Ukrainian language.
There were numerous examples cited in the press of rank-and-file initiatives being frustrated by the trade union apparatus. The experience of railway workers in one region was quite typical in this respect: when these workers decided to organize evening courses on Ukrainian language and culture, instead of the Ukrainian books they requested, the central cultural-educational department of the trade union sent them Russian books with the following note: "trade unions do not need to stock Ukrainian language materials." Such incidents provided ammunition for the second group which challenged the trade union bureaucracy on the Ukrainization front, namely the Ukrainian intelligentsia and national communists within the party and state. Leading this opposition was Narkomos, a unique institution - both a ministry of education and a super-ministry charged with overseeing the republic's cultural affairs and Ukrainization in all areas of life. It was also the major institutional power base of national communists.

Officials of Narkomos first confronted the trade unions on the question of Ukrainization in 1924, the year Oleksandr Shums'kyi took over as head of that institution. With statistics on the national composition of the working class in hand, they argued that all those employed in the trade union apparatus had to know both Ukrainian and Russian. In unions where Ukrainians formed a majority, the trade unions' business should be conducted in Ukrainian, where Russians enjoyed numerical superiority, their language should be employed. A Ukrainian trade union newspaper should be published and all unions should actively promote and popularize Ukrainian culture. The trade union apparatus balked at these suggestions. The newspaper, for example, although endorsed by the second trade union congress in 1924, did not come into existence until November 1926. Because of the
difficulties in implementing Ukrainization policies, when Kviring was removed from office and Kaganovich took his place, Narkomos made a move to assume responsibility for Ukrainization within the trade unions, by-passing the trade union apparatus. It was this attempt which gave rise to the false charge levied against Shums'kyi that he attempted to forcibly Ukrainize non-Ukrainian workers. "Only an idiot would propose this," said Shumsk'kyi, "and I do not consider myself to be one." Faced with the threat of having Ukrainization within the trade unions taken up as an objective by national communists outside the trade union apparatus, the apparatus decided to take control of the policy themselves. This was the essence of the compromise reached in the spring of 1925.

The Ukrainization of the administrative language of trade unions did not begin until 1925 in the industrial branches. In the forefront here were railway workers, who in January 1925 at the second congress decided to Ukrainize the language of business first at the local level, and then at the centre as the next step. Ukrainization in other industrial sectors - metallurgy, mining, and the chemical industry did not begin until late 1926, when Ukrainization commissions were formed and began to make concrete plans. By 1927 the Ukrainization of the business of trade unions was complete in metallurgical union branches in the right-bank, in most regions of the left-bank and in the Dnipro region. Even in Donbas among miners, by the autumn of 1927, 10 local branches were completely Ukrainized. By the autumn of 1929, about half the industrial trade unions were now conducting their business in the Ukrainian language. The least Ukrainized in this respect were the unions in Donbas. With the sizable influx of new workers in the last years of the 1920s the demand for Ukrainization increased. A. Khvylia provides us with many graphic accounts of this. He
quotes D. Leikin, a worker from Stalino (Donets'k), for example, who
made the following observation (1929):

In the past few years we have listened to hundreds of
lecturers on different themes. All of them spoke in
Russian. However, one heard many shouts "speak in
Ukrainian". There exists a solid basis for these cries.
Out of a thousand workers in our factory...half are
either Ukrainians or those who speak the Ukrainian
language. Therefore the pull towards Ukrainian culture
is widespread. 299

Perhaps the most fascinating development during the 1920s was the
impact of Ukrainian culture on the working class and the movement "from
below" for Ukrainization. Here the role of the press - books and newspapers -
was decisive. Workers who did not know Ukrainian, wrote a miner from Donbas,
were simply too tired to attend evening lectures to learn it. What they
needed and wanted for their Ukrainization was newspapers and books to read
at home. 300 The industrial proletariat in large factories, observed another
worker (in 1925) comprised two types: the Russified worker who functioned
mostly in Russian because he had never had an opportunity to study Ukrai­
nian, and the less numerous group who functioned entirely in Ukrainian.
The former group, contrary "to what Russifiers say, is an element extremely
interested in Ukrainian culture and literature. Often when we see a Ukrai­
nian book appear in the factory a mass of these workers gravitate to the
book and pass it around from hand to hand. The majority of factory workers
are in this category." 301 Because the printed word was so central for the
workers' self-Ukrainization, demands for it escalated to campaign propor­
tions within the working class. 302 Many in the trade union apparatus seemed
to do everything in their power to sabotage this interest. Workers in
Horlivka (Donbas), for example, who ordered one hundred Ukrainian titles, were sent Russian titles instead because "Donbas does not need Ukrainian books". Workers in a railway yard in Donbas were not allowed to subscribe to the Ukrainian magazine Vsesvit because their union office had not sanctioned the publication. As far as libraries are concerned, the situation was no better. The Ukrainian holdings of trade union libraries were meagre. The Rykov factory library was typical in this respect: Ukrainian books accounted for three per cent of the total number of volumes held, yet twice as many Ukrainian books were taken out as Russian titles and there was a long waiting list for Ukrainian works. When questioned on why more books were not ordered, the trade union official answered that "nobody understands Ukrainian." A worker who wrote a letter complaining about this argued that the real reasons "were pests who either consciously or unconsciously were blocking the Ukrainization process." What was interesting about the demand for Ukrainian books was that it focussed on works of high literary merit. In the trade union library in Stalino, the largest industrial centre in Ukraine, the most widely read authors were Vynnychenko, Kotsiubyn's'kyi, Vovchok and Shevchenko, 65 copies of whose works were "always on loan and circulated from hand to hand." Pidmohyl'nyi's Misto was among the most popular contemporary Soviet works.

Concerts, amateur choirs and literary evenings were an important component of the movement for Ukrainian culture within the working class. In 1928, for example, almost half a million workers participated in cultural circles. Visits by professional troupes organized by trade unions played an important role in popularizing Ukrainian culture. For many workers this was their first encounter with Ukrainian cultural production and
the enthusiasm with which these troupes were received, especially in Donbas, astounded observers.309

The movement for Ukrainian culture in the working class developed because for the first time in the history of the country the indigenous intelligentsia had wide access to the proletariat. The implementation of Ukrainization policies within the trade unions, as Rabichev reported in 1927, necessitated the involvement of Ukrainian cultural organizations and the local Ukrainian intelligentsia.310 The decision of the 1924 trade union congress breaking the monopoly of cultural work enjoyed by full-time trade union staff and allowing workers' initiatives in this area, enabled rank-and-file activists to approach the Ukrainian intelligentsia for help in organizing lectures and cultural events.311 As the ties between the working class and the intelligentsia multiplied, the cultural movement within the working class strengthened.312 Where the intelligentsia was weak, as in the case of Donbas, that movement took a longer time to develop.313 In Donbas, it was only in the late 1920s that the cultural movement assumed mass proportions. Visiting Donbas in 1929 Antonenko-Davydovych was moved to write:

How beautiful is the rebirth of the country! Donbas is on the move. From below, from the mines, from the factory it draws towards Ukrainian books, towards the Ukrainian theatre, towards newspapers. Management goes to meet this locomotive of Ukrainization from below under orders.../and/ instructions.314

The second element in the Ukrainization process we mentioned was the development of an identification with the territory and institutions of the Ukrainian republic. Of all the possible ways of approaching this question,
perhaps the most indicative trend was the evolution of the trade union leadership from an arch-centralist position to being the defender of the republic's prerogatives. Their arrival at this position was tied to the economic policies pursued by the Moscow centre. Before one can appreciate the trade union leaderships' response, these policies must be briefly described.

If Ukraine industrialized during the second half of the nineteenth century it was entirely the work of foreign capital which did not share the prejudices and concerns of Russia's dominant economic interests. The revolution swept foreign capital out of Ukraine, but the Russian state remained. From the very start of Soviet rule all the levers of economic policy and decision-making were assumed by the central government in Moscow. After 1927, the republic was further stripped of its economic prerogatives. But as S. Iavors'kyi complained during the second session of the V.Ts.V.K. (1925), the traditional Russian view of Ukraine as only a source of raw materials for Russian industry became established orthodoxy in the economic thought and policies of the Moscow centre. Only in the post-revolutionary situation, the resurrected ambitions of Russian bureaucrats could be pursued with vigour.

Ukraine's economy suffered in numerous ways from this arrangement; we will mention three points in this respect. The first was a drain on its capital resources. V. Dobrohaiev showed that between 1923-27 around 20–30 per cent of Ukraine's budgetary receipts left the country for reinvestment in Russia, a capital drain of the same proportions as under the ancien régime. What this meant was that the country's industry was being starved for lack of new investment.
The second aspect had to do with Moscow's industrial location policy. Russia needed Ukraine's raw materials and it did not develop the republic's manufacturing capacity. The reason for this, as economists such as Volobuiev argued, had little to do with economic rationality and efficiency, but was caused by Russian economic nationalism. 319 What began to develop in the 1920s was an economic insanity which in subsequent decades was to flourish. A few examples will demonstrate the point. At a session of the Ukrainian Ts.V.K., Peizak, representing Polissia, argued that the region could sustain a prosperous forest products industry, but as things stood logs from Volyn' were being shipped to Russia only to be re-imported as timber. 320 P. Liubchenko at the 10th CPU Congress (1927) complained that new refineries and distilleries were being built in Russia to process sugar beet supplied by the right-bank, whereas the right-bank, the historic centre of this activity, was witnessing a sharp decline in investment in its processing industry. 321 Ukrainian scientists were outraged when they learnt that the new sugar research institute was to be located in the city of Moscow whereas the crop was grown largely in their republic. 322 With Ukraine as a major producer of flax, economists argued that it made economic sense to have some of the new textile capacity located in the republic. 323 Russian experts on the other hand maintained that Ukraine had not had a textile industry in the past and did not need one in the future. M. Shrah answered that Ukraine once had had a flourishing textile industry which had been deliberately ruined by the Russian state. 324 The right bank suffered most from the decision to avoid investment in Ukraine's manufacturing capacity. The "serious, large-scale industry..." demanded for the right bank by Ukraine's leadership was not considered. 325 As things stood in the 1920s, what managed to save the right bank from dramatic economic decline was the existence of small-scale industry run by private capital. 326 When NEP
was liquidated and this economic activity fell into the hands of the Moscow centre, the right bank slid deeper into the status of an economic backwater.

The third aspect had to do with the development of Ukraine's industrial heartland - the Dnipro-Donbas region. There were two contested issues here. The first was the fact that investment in coal and iron ore extraction was inadequate in view of the massive damage to equipment which had occurred during the war. The lack of capital caused enormous hardships for workers in these industries which were using labour-intensive methods to produce output. The second issue was whether the "all-rounded development" of the Dnipro-Donbas region would occur. From the standpoint of the Moscow centre, Ukraine's coal and iron ore resources were to be exploited since these raw materials were essential for the survival of Russian industry. Coal in particular was of central concern since after the revolution plants in the Leningrad-Moscow region were cut off from their traditional Western supply. Shrah, expressing a point of view shared by most other economists in Ukraine, accused central authorities of discrimination in their support of only the extraction of coal and iron ore and the primary processing of metals and of refusing to permit the development of the machine-building capacities of the region. The close proximity of coal (coke) and high grade ores (ferrous metals) could have laid the basis for a powerful machine-building sector. During the 1920s, however, not only were new machine-building plants not established, but also, as Chubar complained, Moscow's economic organs were "disorganizing" the existing capacity. When the construction of the Donbas-Moscow railway line and the Volga-Don canal were announced, the government of Ukraine vehemently opposed these projects, fearing that this would merely facilitate the export of raw materials and semi-finished products without the establishment of a manu-
facturing base in the republic. \textsuperscript{333} When the centre decided to expand the metallurgical, coal and machine-building industries in the Urals and the Kuzbas, Ukrainians engaged in an acrimonious debate with the centre for its neglect of the Dnipro-Donbas region. \textsuperscript{334} But with metals and coal directly administered by all-Union commissariats, there was little they could do to prevent the implementation of these plans. \textsuperscript{335}

The low standard of living and the difficulties in economic reconstruction which these policies produced in Ukraine generated much bitterness among workers in the republic. \textsuperscript{336} Probably for the first time proletarian discontent was beginning to flow in a substantial way along the lines of a defence of Ukraine's rights as a state. \textsuperscript{337} Here the trade union bureaucracy itself played an important role. It was composed largely of Russians or Russified Ukrainians, who were reluctant about cultural Ukrainianization lest this threaten their own positions. But when it came to demanding greater economic and administrative rights for Ukraine, they were quite adamant. The apparatus had the ungratifying task of managing and representing a disgruntled work force. A source of many of the problems was the excessively centralized Soviet state which was holding back the republic's economic growth. There was little alternative other than to articulate grievances in the form of more rights for Ukraine. During trade union congresses and plenums this sentiment was expressed time and time again. A sample of the interventions made during the fourth all-Ukrainian trade union congress (1928) will illustrate the point.

Zuiev, representing Dniprol'stan, argued that "our VRNH /Supreme Council for the National Economy/ knows local conditions better" and must be given control over the mega-project. Limar'ov, the head of the miners'
union, demanded that the coal industry be transferred from its status as an all-Union commissariat and placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the "VRNH of Ukraine, which stands close to this industry and knows its daily problems. We often end up in a catastrophic situation...because the Ukrainian VRNH cannot interfere...in what is 'Moscow's business'." Iefremov representing metal workers could not understand why the Ukrainian VRNH was so timid in its dealings with Moscow. They could "force" the question of new factories for Ukraine and better manpower training programmes. Serdiukov from Kharkiv criticized all-Union economic organs for building new plants in Russia when those in Ukraine were starved for investment. Sdobnikov from the tobacco industry demanded that "our VRNH must be more aggressive with officials in the USSR." Antontsev from Stalino, Alekseev from Kiev, Cherenov from Artemivs'k, Israileva representing tailors, Veselov from the woodworkers and many others raised identical demands. What is interesting is that there is hardly a Ukrainian name to be found in this list.

A working class whose Ukrainian contingent was rapidly increasing, a movement for the national culture within the proletariat and a trade union leadership now defending the institutional prerogatives of the republic were three new elements that emerged during the 1920s, bringing the Ukrainian people to the threshold of nationhood by the end of that decade.

v. Education

The Soviet regime inherited an unenviable legacy of cultural backwardness. The first step in tackling this legacy was the liquidation of illiteracy. In
1923 it was announced that illiteracy was to be abolished by 1927. \(^{339}\) But the particular national and social structure of Ukraine posed an immediate problem. In what language was literacy to be acquired? Prior to 1923, when the CPU's national policy was characterized by the "struggle between two cultures" theory in which the "superior", "proletarian" Russian culture was to be promoted at the expense of the "inferior", "peasant" culture of Ukrainians, Russian was the language in which literacy had been taught. \(^{340}\) After 1923, however, literacy schools (likpunkty) became part of the Ukrainization campaign. By the autumn of 1925, 81 per cent of likpunkty had been Ukrainized. The process was slower in the towns where, since citizens had a choice in the matter, the national composition of cities ensured that Russian literacy schools dominated. \(^{341}\)

The campaign against illiteracy suffered from the unequal distribution of resources in the republic. It was largely organized and financed by social organizations, enterprises and local authorities. \(^{342}\) This meant that the village must lag behind. A chronic shortage of funds hampered the literacy campaign in rural areas. (The situation improved somewhat after 1925). \(^{343}\) A village teacher from the Dnipropetrovs'k (formerly Katerynoslav) region wrote that some likpunkty were without instructors because their minimal salaries could not be paid. The staff-student ratio in the likpunkty of his district was 1 to 70. \(^{344}\) Because so much rested on local initiative, in Donbas, where factory managements were bitter opponents of Ukrainization, Chubar's promise that all Ukrainian workers would be given the opportunity to acquire literacy in their language was often impossible to implement. \(^{345}\) A worker in the large Stalins'kyi factory in 1925 complained that while illiteracy was liquidated among the 80 Chinese and 120 Tatar workers emp-
loyed in the plant, no effort had been made to teach basic reading skills to Ukrainians in their native language, with the consequence that almost a third of the Ukrainian workers were illiterate. If much was accomplished in the acquisition of literacy among Ukrainians it was because of the ceaseless efforts of Ukrainian teachers "on whose shoulders the entire literacy campaign rested." For minimal renumeration they spent 6-15 additional hours after work to bring elementary enlightenment to the population.

By 1926 considerable progress had been achieved. The literate population between the ages of 9-49 had more than doubled when compared to the 1897 figures: 28 per cent in 1897, 64 per cent in 1926. In rural areas the percentages for the respective years were 24 and 59. The gains made by Ukrainians in this respect were impressive. According to the 1920 census 24 per cent of the total Ukrainian population was literate (little change from the 1897 figures). Six years later this increased to 42 per cent.

The 1926 census form asked respondents in Ukraine whether they were literate in their native language. The results showed that two out of three literate Ukrainians had native language reading ability. In urban areas this declined to 57 per cent. In the Donbas little more than a third of Ukrainians claimed native language literacy. As educational facilities grew and the Ukrainized school turned out its school leavers this changed. By 1929 two out of three literate Ukrainians working in the Donbas basin could read Ukrainian. For the republic as a whole the 1929 study showed that 76 per cent of literate Ukrainians now read Ukrainian and 74 per cent could read Russian. An obstacle to Ukrainization was that the bilingualism of Ukrainians was not matched by Russians. In 1929 less than a quarter of Russians employed in the republic could read Ukrainian, while about 60 per cent of Jews and Poles could do so.
Often frustrated by adults, Ukrainizers placed their hope in the future generation. A study of schools shows that their optimism in this respect was not misplaced. During the revolution a mass movement in favour of Ukrainian schools developed. Hundreds of new schools came into being, over two million textbooks were produced and pedagogical courses for the training of new staff were established. In 1917 "The village," wrote E. Hrytsak, who taught in rural schools during the revolution, "spontaneously surged towards the Ukrainian school." This activity was based on the clear recognition that the sine qua non of the entry of the Ukrainian people into the ranks of modern nations was the Ukrainian language school. This reasoning the Futurists of the literary journal Nova generatsiia mockingly outlined as follows:

.../T/he music begins with the Ukrainian nation having obtained the right to have its own school... Children go to school. Slowly teaching cadres develop... Children grow up, they start stealing - the native language goes into the courts! And so it goes year after year until those who have completed school feel hemmed in by the village...and they go to take their place in the middle class and the working class and they speak only Ukrainian with everyone...Since many will creep into the town...they will thus mechanically Ukrainize the city. This is the basis of our confidence.../for the future/.

When the first and second Bolshevik governments were installed in Ukraine, the country already had a modest network of Ukrainian language schools. The Bolsheviks, however, did not trust these establishments, charging them with Ukrainian nationalism and chauvinism and converting many Ukrainized schools back into Russian ones. It was only in the spring of 1919 that the regime recognized the rights of non-Russian peoples to
instruction in their native language. This change in policy vis-à-vis Ukraine was not a gratuitous gesture. Lenin in a resolution written for the party's Central Committee, stated that if Bolsheviks wanted to overcome the hostility of the Ukrainian peasants, the Ukrainian language could not be pushed into the background of educational life.

Although party members were warned by Stalin that they must stop thinking that "Ukrainian...is an empty invention," the implementation of native language education was a different matter. Irrespective of the fact that in 1921 the equality of Ukrainian and Russian in the republic was proclaimed, the local plenipotentiary "when he saw a teacher or a pupil with a certificate written in Ukrainian would froth with anger, often rip it up and stomp on it." This chauvinism received its theoretical justification in the formulation "the struggle between two cultures". This theory, which held sway in the CPU until 1923, heralded the "merging of the Ukrainian language into the Russian language" and condemned the Ukrainian school as reactionary.

The root of Bolshevik hostility towards the Ukrainian language school lay in their inability to lead the Ukrainization process. Were they to implement such a policy they would have to share power and influence with their former bitter opponents, the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Lebed', the CPU's organizational secretary and theorist of the "struggle between two cultures", expressed this concern very clearly at a party conference: "We know that the national intelligentsia exhibits chauvinism most deeply. Of this we have convinced outselves in the course of four years of bitter struggle in Ukraine." Since the cultural development of the peasantry entailed the use of the Ukrainian language, he warned that the party must
proceed slowly and with caution to ensure that "this matter does not pass into the hands of our enemies." But with 72 per cent of the republic's teachers belonging to the Ukrainian nationality, sooner or later the regime would have to reach a modus vivendi with this group.

Party opposition to the Ukrainian language school was clearly leading the country into a blind alley. Without such a school there could be no socio-economic progress, let alone peace. With Ukrainization in 1923 the party held out an olive branch to the Ukrainian teachers. Zatons'kyi explained away the "sins" of those teachers: "The Ukrainian teacher by and large hated the Bolsheviks not because the teacher stood on the side of capital, but because it seemed to him that Bolsheviks had robbed him of an opportunity to work calmly and peacefully 'for the good of our dear motherland, the peasant-democratic Ukraine'. Teachers were now invited to continue their efforts on behalf of a Soviet Ukrainian "motherland". As a group they were now reclassified, from "Petliurites" to "the toiling intelligentsia". The detente was successful, and "by the end of 1924, the participation of teachers in cultural-educational work assumed a mass character." The Ukrainizing school became a formidable tool of cultural and national awakening.

The objective conditions for the development of a network of schools could not have been worse. The devastation of physical plant during the civil war was immense. The situation in Kiev province in 1924 was typical of most parts of the country: out of 2098 elementary schools, only 500 were in suitable premises, the rest were housed in small old parish buildings which had not been repaired in the last 7-8 years. The famine of 1921 decimated the school population: almost half the two million children enrolled in elementary schools were forced to drop out. To this
must be added the one million children left homeless by the fighting that had taken place on Ukraine's soil. In 1924 the number of children attending classes 1-4 as a proportion of the school-age population was 45 per cent, barely surpassing the 1915 mark of 40 per cent. The recovery was hampered by the penury of the country. Educational costs until 1923 were borne almost entirely by local authorities. The consequence of this was that the urban, industrial regions with greater local resources at their disposal, witnessed a more rapid development of the school network than rural areas.

According to the education laws that were passed in 1923-4, instruction of all children was to be conducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated; where national minorities formed a compact group, they were to be guaranteed education in their native language. Both Ukrainian and Russian were made compulsory subjects in all schools, irrespective of the language of instruction. The implementation of Ukrainization varied throughout the republic. Lists of teachers who knew Ukrainian had to be compiled; wherever possible, these teachers were regrouped to form complete schools. Elsewhere Ukrainian-Russian instruction was offered as a stop-gap measure. In the south and south-east Ukrainization first began with the earliest classes, and gradually worked its way through all levels of the school ladder: the elementary or four-year schools (ages 8-12), the incomplete secondary or seven-year schools and finally the complete secondary or ten-year schools. Although Ukrainization began in 1923, it was only in 1925 that a major campaign was launched to establish the supremacy of the Ukrainian-language school system.

The success of Ukrainization of the schools can best be appreciated
when placed in the context of the difficulties that had to be surmounted along the way. Among the most important was the shortage of teachers. While it was estimated that 100,000 teachers were needed (in 1923) to meet basic educational requirements, only 45,000 teachers were to be found in the educational system. The growth in the number of schools and of the pupil population was increasing faster than the supply of teachers. The result was that in most regions the teacher/pupil ratio in 1925 was worse than it had been in 1911. The quality of teaching staff was also a problem. In 1927, 56 per cent of teachers had no special pedagogical training and of course the overwhelming majority had not received formal training in the Ukrainian language. The shortage of teachers, especially in the sciences and technical subjects, meant that those who did not know Ukrainian considered themselves so indispensable that they resisted learning the language. Eventually compulsion had to be used against those refusing to learn Ukrainian. Since in the pre-revolutionary period the meagre intellectual resources of the Ukrainian people had been concentrated in the left and right banks, the dire shortage of Ukrainian teachers in the Donbas was cited as the major obstacle to the growth of Ukrainian language schools in that region. Teachers from the right and left banks had to be imported to staff schools in Donbas. This in itself was an extremely significant development, since it provided that region with its first cadres of the national movement.

The material conditions of the population which the Ukrainian school served weighed heavily on the schools' development. The penury of the rural population meant that as late as 1927, 40 per cent of village children between the ages of 8-11 were still not attending schools (the figure was 15 per cent in urban areas), despite compulsory education laws.
These figures however represented a vast improvement over the pre-war situation when two-thirds of the children in the above-mentioned age bracket were not in school. Finances were also part of the problem with teacher supply. The average monthly wage of teachers was 22 rubles as compared with the 6 rubles a day earned by the average industrial worker. Thus many teachers preferred to seek alternative employment. The schools themselves were in a shameful condition - poorly heated, without elementary libraries or equipment. Most of these problems could have been resolved with more money from the state budget. The demand for funds was the *leit-motiv* of every intervention made by Narkomos officials at state and party gatherings. The educational budget, however, was controlled by the central government and Ukraine's pleas for an increase in the republic's share fell on deaf ears. In 1923 Ukraine received 15 per cent of the all-Union educational budget, and in 1925 it obtained 16 per cent, several percentage points lower than it would have been entitled to on the basis of population (i.e. 20 per cent).

A chronic shortage of textbooks also undermined efforts at Ukrainizing the schools. In Donbas it led parents to take their children out of Ukrainian language schools and place them in Russian schools instead. According to Ia. Riappo, the assistant head of Narkomos, in 1924 half the Ukrainian language schools were without textbooks. Chauvinist policies during the era of the "struggle between two cultures" were at fault here. The development of textbooks did not really begin until 1924. In 1923, for example, out of 2513 school texts published in Ukraine, only 459 were Ukrainian language titles. Although the State Publishing House (DVU) greatly increased its output of books intended for schools after 1924, a
teacher from the Dnipropetrovsk region claimed that government reports that "90 per cent of school textbook needs were being met" was sheer nonsense. "Take away the last zero and you have the real situation," he wrote. In 1929 reports indicated that "schools were being Ukrainized in the Donbas without textbooks." 

Despite the difficulties, the Ukrainization of schools proceeded rapidly as can be shown by comparing school statistics for 1922-3 with those for 1925-7. (See tables 2.13 and 2.14) By 1927, 49 per cent of urban schools had been Ukrainized and Ukrainian-language schools accounted for 42 per cent of urban enrolments. These figures do not include the mixed schools, where Ukrainian and Russian were used in instruction. Over a quarter of the pupils in the Mining region, for example, attended mixed schools in 1927. By 1929-30 the Ukrainization of the incomplete secondary schools, those offering classes 1-7, achieved considerable success in the towns as well as the countryside. (See table 2.15) Particularly significant in this respect was the Ukrainization of schools in Donbas. Whereas in 1923 there was only one Ukrainian-language school in the urban areas of that region, by 1929, over a third of the schools had been Ukrainized and half the children were enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools.

The dream of nineteenth century pedagogues such as Borys Hrinchenko that all Ukrainian children should study in their native language was largely realized by 1927 with 94 per cent of all Ukrainian pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools. In 1929 this increased to 97.2 per cent. The effect of legislation making knowledge of Ukrainian a precondition for state employment can be seen in the fact that almost a quarter of Russian and Jewish children in the republic were being sent to Ukrainian-language
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<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>1922</td>
<td>1923</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>74.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* "Trudshkoly" only, i.e. classes 1-7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th></th>
<th>1927</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ukrl.-Lang. Schools as % of Total no.</td>
<td>Pupils in Ukrl.-Lang. Schools as % of Total no.</td>
<td>Weight of Ukrl. in Total Population</td>
<td>Ukrl.-Lang. Schools as % of Total no.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polissia</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>85.1</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>89.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bank</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>86.3</td>
<td>92.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steppe</td>
<td>69.1</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>72.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>53.4</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>76.2</td>
<td>81.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* "Trudshkoly" only, i.e. classes 1-7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927-8</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>67.5%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>67.0%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>16.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Rural</th>
<th>Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927-8</td>
<td>60.6%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929-30</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>51.6%</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

classrooms by their parents (1927). In the city of Kiev, for example, every third Russian child was studying in a Ukrainian school. With Ukrainian a compulsory language in all of the republic's schools as well as the language of state it had broken out of its confines as the vernacular of the Ukrainian village to emerge as the medium of all of society. What a change this was in comparison to the 1890s when Hrinchenko taught Ukrainian illegally to peasant children using hand-written sheets for a textbook. In the "march of millions on their way to the Ukrainian school," wrote Antonenko-Davydovych, could be seen "the fire of a great revival".

The same factors which stymied Ukrainization of the elementary level were present in the secondary schools (profshkoly) as well, but in greater proportion. The Ukrainization of these institutions had to begin from nil: in 1922, 0.3 per cent of the profshkoly in general and only 2 per cent of agricultural establishments were Ukrainized. As those who had completed elementary school made their way through the educational system, and as the economic situation in the village improved, both the social and national composition of the pupil population changed in the Ukrainians' favour. By 1929 the majority of such schools were Ukrainian-language institutions. (See table 2.16)

During the 1920s considerable attention was given to Ukrainizing the summit of the educational ladder; the institutes, the technical colleges (tekhnikumy, which were considered institutions of tertiary learning in Ukraine), and workers' faculties, (a kind of preparatory school for workers and peasants attached to institutes). Three problems had to be resolved: higher education had to be democratized in both the social and national senses, since for centuries higher education had been dominated by the scions of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Prof. School</th>
<th>Ukrainian-Language Schools as % of Total Number of Schools</th>
<th>Ukrainian-Russian Schools as % of Total Number of Schools</th>
<th>Pupil Enrolment, 1929</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>85.5</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industrial-tech.</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc.-economic</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ukrainian-Russian schools means most of the instruction was given in Ukrainian, as opposed to Russian-Ukrainian schools were the reverse was the case.

non-Ukrainian elite; these institutions had to be Ukrainized both in form and content; the imperial hyper-centralization of educational facilities in Moscow and Leningrad had to be redressed and a network of higher educational establishments had to be created in Ukraine. Let us consider briefly what was achieved with respect to each of these tasks.

Despite the revolution the selection of students into higher education remained remarkably elitist. In Odesa in 1920, for example, 82 per cent of students attending institutions of higher learning - vuzy - originated from families of either white-collar staff or merchants and artisans. A system of higher education which recruited largely from the upper and middle strata of society ensured that the representation of Ukrainians in the vuzy student population would be limited: in 1922, 19 per cent of the student population of institutes and 16 per cent in the case of tekhnikumy was Ukrainian. To democratize the selection process normal admission requirements were suspended in the case of workers and poor peasants seeking tertiary education in 1922-3 following the pattern established in Russia. The desire to democratize, however, was tempered by the state's needs for specialists. Moreover higher education demanded a relatively solid academic background, difficult to achieve for the offspring of peasants and workers. Still, the liberalization of admissions policies, combined with the mobilization of rural youth, meant that a larger proportion of young peasants were entering higher educational establishments. This was particularly the case after 1923 when the economic recovery of the village allowed peasants to subsidize their children attending vuzy, an important factor since few students could survive on the pitiful state stipends. The demand for teachers generated by a Ukrainizing public school system as well as the
drive to improve the qualifications of existing teaching staff were other factors promoting the entry of Ukrainians into higher education. (See table 2.17 and 2.18) As a new generation was completing elementary and secondary schools, Ukrainian youth started to enrol in faculties other than agriculture and pedagogy which had traditionally attracted them. (See table 2.19) In the technical and industrial institutes Ukrainians in 1928 were still poorly represented in the student population. But if one examines the national composition of those being admitted, it is clear that the national composition of students would change in the Ukrainians' favour within the next few years. At the prestigious Kharkiv Technological Institute, for example, half the students admitted in the 1927 academic year were Ukrainians. 404 (See table 2.20) If a fundamental weakness of the social structure of the Ukrainian nation in the past had been the absence of a substantial intelligentsia, the 35,000 Ukrainians attending institutes and tekhnikumy by 1928 represented a major gain.

The first step in the Ukrainization of higher education was the introduction of courses with Ukrainian content. The study of the history, language, literature and economic geography of Ukraine became compulsory for all students. 405 Beginning in 1925, many regions made a knowledge of the Ukrainian language a precondition for admission to higher education and of graduation from these institutions. By 1927 these provisions were extended to cover all higher educational establishments in Ukraine. 406 The second step, the introduction of Ukrainian as the language of instruction in vuzy, was much more difficult one to make.

The Achilles' heel of the Ukrainization of higher education was the national composition of the academic staff. Ukrainians had always been
TABLE 2.17
Social Origins of Students in Higher Education, 1924-5, 1928-9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Working Peasants</th>
<th>White-collar Staff</th>
<th>Artisans and Merchants</th>
<th>Source:</th>
<th>Narodnaya osvita Ukrainy, Ustannya profesiinoi osvity na I i Vtoriðta 1928 ta 1929 r.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924-5</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>55.1%</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928-9</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers, Faculties, Institutes</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
<td>22.0%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *Mainly artisans and merchants.

Source: "Narodnaya osvita Ukrainy, Ustannya profesiinoi osvity na I i Vtoriðta 1928 ta 1929 r."
TABLE 2.18

Social Origins of Students according to Nationality,

Kiev University, 1926-7

(in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Working class</th>
<th>Peasants</th>
<th>Teachers</th>
<th>White-collar staff</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Then called Institute of People's Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Institute</th>
<th>1922-3</th>
<th>1928</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical-industrial</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc.-econ.</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogical</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 2.20

National Composition of Students 1925, 1928

(in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutes</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th>1928</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tekhnikumy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>61.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers' Faculties</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>54.4</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Narodnia osvita Ukrainy. Ustanovy profesiinoi ta politychnoi osvity na 1 hrudnia 1925 r.," Statystyka Ukrainy, VI, no.110, 1927, table V, 22; M. Avdienko, Zahal'ne navchannia na Ukraini. Stan i perspektyvy (Kharkiv, 1930), table 12, 80.
poorly represented among the academic staff of the country's universities and technical schools. With a significant proportion of those Ukrainians who had occupied university positions emigrating in the wake of the defeat of the national movement during the revolution, the republic's resources of Ukrainian-speaking academics were even more depleted. In 1925, a third of the teaching staff in institutes and 43 per cent in tekhnikumy were Ukrainian. Among researchers (in all types of institutions) a mere 6 per cent gave Ukrainian as their nationality in 1925. Resistance to Ukrainization among the Russian academic staff, whose attitudes were shaped under tsarism, was intense. Professor Tolstoi's declaration at a meeting of the Odesa Institute of the Economy was not atypical: "I consider the laws governing the national question as a violation of civil rights and all comrades who have switched to lecturing in the Ukrainian language as renegades." While three-quarters of Ukrainian academic personnel lectured in the Ukrainian language, very few non-Ukrainian staff did so. Various measures were proposed to hasten Ukrainization, among them the large-scale recruitment of lecturers from Galicia and the Ukrainian diaspora, but these were rejected on political grounds. Ukrainization had to be enforced through regulations making a knowledge of Ukrainian equivalent to that demanded of government officials a precondition for academic employment. These regulations, however, could rarely be enforced and the implementation of Ukrainization at the vuz level was postponed, first to 1924, then 1925, until finally it was hoped the process could be completed by 1930. While much progress had been made by 1928 (see table 2.21 and 2.22), the hope was that the new generation of graduates would have the required language skills and be free of the "Russificatory superstitions" about the unsuitability of
TABLE 2.21
Ukrainian Language in Higher Education, 1925, 1928

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutes</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Schools</td>
<td>Number of Students</td>
<td>As %</td>
<td>Number of Schools</td>
<td>Number of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian lang.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,512</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukr.-Russian lang.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16,054</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>22,675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>27,205</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33,406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tekhnikumy</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Schools</td>
<td>Number of Students</td>
<td>As %</td>
<td>Number of Schools</td>
<td>Number of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian lang.</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6,438</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>10,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukr.-Russian lang.</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>12,598</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>8,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>25,613</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>26,896</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers' faculties</th>
<th>1925</th>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Schools</td>
<td>Number of Students</td>
<td>As %</td>
<td>Number of Schools</td>
<td>Number of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian lang.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukr.-Russian lang.</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>4,767</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7,429</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>9,803</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institutes</th>
<th>Ukrainian Language Est.</th>
<th>Ukr.-Russian Language Est.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total no. of Schools</td>
<td>Total no. of Students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indust.-Tech.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soc.-Econ.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogical</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Tekhnikumy       |                         |                             |                        |                          |              |                         |                             |              |
| Agricultural     | 17                      | 3095                        | 4                    | 484 (23)                | 12           | 2493 (81)             |
| Indust.-Tech.    | 46                      | 9518                        | 2                    | 560 (6)                 | 10           | 2298 (24)             |
| Soc.-Econ.       | 2                       | 850                         | 0                    | 0 (0)                   | 2            | 850 (100)             |
| Medical          | 4                       | 1289                        | 1                    | 262 (20)                | 2            | 728 (57)              |
| Pedagogical      | 52                      | 11009                       | 37                   | 8394 (76)               | 5            | 1035 (9)              |
| Art              | 4                       | 2279                        | 2                    | 400 (16)                | 3            | 735 (65)              |

Ukrainian for use in higher education. With almost 60 per cent of all post-graduate students in the republic in 1928 giving Ukrainian as their nationality, these were not pipe dreams.

After the revolution, Russia inherited the facilities and resources in higher education which tsarism, with funds gathered from all of the nations of the Empire, had concentrated in Leningrad and Moscow. Ukraine, on the other hand, was left a legacy of a very weakly developed higher educational system and a chronic shortage of scholarly and scientific personnel. In redressing the imbalance, the republic had to confront the resurgent claims of Russian centralism which stymied the development of higher education in Ukraine. Only institutions in Russia, for example, received the designation "institution of all-Union significance" and were thus entitled for funding from the all-Union budget. Ukrainian academics protested the fact that four agricultural institutes in Moscow, three in Leningrad and one in Saratov were given that classification when not a single agricultural institute in Ukraine was given this honour. The republic received a mere 5 per cent of the all-Union budget for agricultural research. The same discriminatory practice was to be seen in the case of sugar and coal research establishments. Overall, in 1924, Russian higher educational institutions received 10 times more funds for research than those in Ukraine and this figure did not include establishments in Russia already subsidized because of their "All-Union" status. To these budgetary constraints must be added a myriad of petty restrictions imposed on Ukrainian academics but not applied to their counterparts in Russia. For example, parcels of books from abroad could be received by scholars in the RSFSR without special restrictions, whereas in Ukraine all such materials had to
be registered with state officials before they could be released.\textsuperscript{418}

The expansion of higher education in the face of budgetary restrictions simply meant that Ukrainian \textit{vuzy} had to do more with much less money. There were twice as many post-graduate students per staff member in Ukraine as in the RSFSR, academic salaries were much lower in Ukraine, institute libraries were so poor that they could not afford to order \textit{belles lettres} since all available funds had to be mobilised for specialist literature and laboratories were poorly equipped.\textsuperscript{419} The academic community in the republic, irrespective of nationality, was very vocal in its protests over this blatant discrimination.\textsuperscript{420}

Despite these impediments, the achievements in higher education during the 1920s in Ukraine were impressive. The education gap between Ukraine and Russia was rapidly being closed. By the autumn of 1929, the per capita student population in Ukraine was higher than in Russia, the number of students attending \textit{vuzy} was growing faster than in Russia, and the social composition of the student population was also a good deal more egalitarian.\textsuperscript{421}

The Ukrainizing higher educational system was bringing about profound changes in the life of the republic. Osyp Hermaize summarized them well. Hrushevs'kyi, with money raised from a few private sponsors, once organized a Ukrainian scientific society, which, hounded by tsarist authorities, managed to produce a few collections a year. "Today we see how that same society under the leadership of the same old chief has 14 scholarly institutions researching history...and publishes every year scores of serious scholarly publications." A new generation of intelligentsia was being produced in an atmosphere where they never "had to suffer the national schizophrenia that the older generation had experienced." This younger generation, "organically tied to the Ukrainian language," had a much deeper understanding of their
society and history and a much stronger sense of national identity than those who had preceded them. The research carried out in the 1920s in history, economics, demography and geography added much to the Ukrainian people's knowledge about themselves, a crucial element in the development of a national identity. There was a new generation emerging, capable of articulating and popularising that store of information. This prospect did not escape the notice of central authorities.

Because education is so central in the socialization process, Moscow organs steadily encroached on this republican jurisdiction during the 1920s. By the end of that decade the administrative basis for a complete centralization of education was laid. It began with the creation of an all-Union Commissariat of Education charged with standardizing education throughout the Union - a move which was strongly opposed in Ukraine. It continued with the transformation of the Russian Academy of Sciences into an all-Union institution with responsibility for overseeing the scholarly life of the entire USSR. This move was fought by the academic community in Ukraine and by CPU party leaders as unpardonable chauvinism. By 1929, when the all-Union Supreme Council of the Economy ordered Ukraine's education system to be reorganized along Russian lines from top to bottom, the first phase of centralization was completed. With it came a witch-hunt of "nationalist deviation" in the republic's social sciences and humanities departments as the second phase of the centralization process. The third would be accomplished in 1933.
vi. The press

The national mobilisation of 1917 generated a voracious appetite in the population for Ukrainian books. To meet it, over a hundred new publishing houses sprang into being and they issued virtually everything they could get their hands on—re-editions, new manuscripts and brochures on every conceivable theme. This activity continued under the Skoropads'kyi regime. The years 1917-18 generated 1931 Ukrainian-language titles published in 16.2 million copies, or 70 per cent of the total book production in Ukraine. The "enemies of the Ukrainian nation," as a Soviet writer described those who carried out the renaissance of the printed word, published more Ukrainian books in those two years than were produced in the first four years of the third Soviet Ukrainian republic (1920-24). As for Ukrainian language books as a proportion of the total number of books published on the territory of Ukraine, the Soviet regime would not surpass the achievement of the revolution until 1930.

There were many factors underlying the poor record of the Soviet regime in Ukraine in the field of Ukrainian language book publishing. Among the most obvious was the economic collapse of the country under war communism, the dislocation of the distribution system and the penury of an exhausted population. The chaos in the school system, a major consumer of books, was more acute in rural areas than in urban and this too affected the recovery of Ukrainian language publishing. With high rates of illiteracy among Ukrainians, and their low representation among the urban and educated groups of society, Ukrainian-language publishing suffered from the underdeveloped social structure of the population it was intended to serve. But these objective factors played a minor role by comparison with considerations of
### TABLE 2.23

**Books Published in Ukraine, 1913-1928**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Number of Titles Published</th>
<th>Ukrainian-Language Titles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>5,465</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917*</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918*</td>
<td>1,526</td>
<td>1,084</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>860</td>
<td>457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-4</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924-5</td>
<td>4,508</td>
<td>1,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925-6</td>
<td>4,726</td>
<td>2,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926-7</td>
<td>5,028</td>
<td>2,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927-8</td>
<td>5,413</td>
<td>2,920</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include all Ukrainian books.

**Source:** V. Ozernians'kyi, "Persha vseukrains'ka vystavka drukованого slova v Kyivi," Chervonyi shliakh, no.4-5, 1923, table 5, 233; S. Siropolko, Narodniia osvita na Sovetskii Ukraini (Warsaw, 1931), 184.
a political, subjective nature. Throughout the 1920s the demand for
Ukrainian books always exceeded the supply.

Those who ran Ukrainian publishing concerns in 1917-18 were ordered
to cease their activity and their presses were confiscated. With the
"theory of the struggle between two cultures" dominating party policy, sup­
port was withdrawn from Ukrainian publishing, and it was pushed steadily
into oblivion until rescued by Ukrainization. The Ukrainization of publishing
did not begin as a concerted policy until the spring of 1925, when the
younger Ukrainian intelligentsia were permitted to become involved in pub­
lishing under the protectorship of Shums'kyi.

Among the most important factors stymying the development of the
Ukrainian book publishing industry was the budgetary chicanery of all-
Union organs. This first began during the allocation of capital when accoun­
tability (khozraschet) and the "self-financing of books" was introduced in
1922. The decision on how capital was to be divided was made in Moscow
and it was carried out in such a way as to leave Ukraine's largest publishing
house - Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy (DVU) - without a printing press
and with stocks of useless, faded paper. Any adjustments or requests for
additional funds had to be processed in Moscow and DVU delegations more
often than not returned empty-handed. It was only in the spring of 1925
that DVU obtained assistance from the government. But here DVU and others
encountered the problem of a centralized budget. Ukraine, with a fifth of
the USSR's population, received no more than one tenth of all-Union funds
allocated for publishing activity. Ukrainians, approximately 20 per cent
of the USSR's population, had only seven per cent of the USSR's total book
output in their language. The financial crisis of DVU was so severe that
in 1925 it stopped paying royalties to authors. In addition to money, the
fact that the paper supply was allocated by all-Union organs and that the republic's share was less than it deserved contributed to the emergence of a chronic book shortage. That shortage could be seen in the contraction of textbooks available per pupil from 3.1 in 1926-7 to 2.3 by 1928-9. The financial predicament of Ukrainian publishers also meant that Ukrainian books on the average cost 10 per cent more than Russian publications. Good editions were considerably more expensive. The high cost of Ukrainian books was a constant theme of readers' complaints during that decade.

The Ukrainian book market presented an enormous potential which was only beginning to be exploited. The village, because of a chaotic distribution network, received less than 20 per cent of the total output of Ukrainian books. The books that arrived in villages became the subject of many feuilletons: physical instruction manuals rather than brochures on agriculture, Levitan's "Rules of Football" instead of the ever popular Ostap Vyshnia. When a reader proposed the creation of a society of "Supporters of the Book" to help solve distribution anomalies, this was opposed lest the society become a breeding ground for nationalism. Marketing was further complicated by the fact that some establishments, under all-Union jurisdiction, enjoyed a monopoly of book distribution in some localities and refused to stock Ukrainian materials. The situation improved somewhat after 1926, but it was still necessary for the Central Committee of the CPU to order the establishment of book warehouses and shops in all major cities in 1929 in response to the public's complaints. What cannot be overlooked, however, is the fact that a network of Ukrainian bookstores covering all the major centres was established, bringing Ukrainian literature to cities which had never seen such works in the past. The town of Artemivs'k
in Donbas, for example, had the unlikely reputation of having one of the finest Ukrainian bookstores in the republic. 444

The frustration of Ukrainian publishers was understandable in view of the demands that were placed on them. Educational texts had to be produced, communities outside Ukraine had to be supplied, and the cultural needs of non-Ukrainian minorities in the republic had to be met, in addition to satisfying the needs of the mature Ukrainian-language reading public. Ukrainian government officials such as Odynets' wondered why DVU and other publishers were so conscientious in meeting their obligations to the Russian readership in Ukraine, when the Russian government did not release a single book in Ukrainian for the millions of that nationality inhabiting its territory. 445 With school texts accounting for over 80 percent of DVU's production it is not difficult to see why the wider public's demand for Ukrainian books was never satiated. 446 Taking belles lettres as an example, these books normally took one to one and a half years to sell out in the USSR. Most Ukrainian novels, however, sold their press runs in half that time. 447

A weakness of the Ukrainian book-publishing profile was the "overproduction of agitational and socio-historical literature and a shortage of scientific works." 448 Until the spring of 1924 not a single textbook for higher education was produced in Ukrainian. 449 An improvement in the output of scientific literature occurred in the latter years of the 1920s as the need for technical literature grew under the impact of industrial growth. 450 By then much had been accomplished in the standardization of the Ukrainian language and the development of terminology, which in itself represented an important cultural achievement of that decade. 451
The small quantity of books published in the 1920s was compensated by their quality. (Journals deserve a special mention in this respect.) \(^{452}\) Written in a relatively unfettered intellectual environment, the published works of that period tower above the hack-work of later years. The fact that these books were purchased not out of patriotic duty, but because of their artistic merit or originality of research, gave Ukrainian culture the prestige which made it increasingly attractive for the urban, sophisticated reader. \(^{453}\)

Newspaper publishing followed an evolution similar to that of books. The revolution gave birth to 84 Ukrainian language newspapers. \(^{454}\) Although the total circulation of these publications is not known, information available for individual titles (1917) such as _Narodnia volia_ (200,000), or _Robitnycha hazeta_ (30,000) in the first months of its existence, demonstrated the tremendous vitality of the Ukrainian press. \(^{455}\) Because newspapers were the most powerful means of mass communication at that time, they were the first to feel the effects of political repression. By 1920 all non-Bolshevik newspapers were ordered to be closed down, including _Chervonyi prapor_, the organ of the still legal Ukrainian Communist Party. \(^{456}\) A Bolshevik press in the Ukrainian language did not exist until 1918 and the policies which prevailed until 1923 prevented its development. \(^{457}\) In 1920-1 there were between 7 and 10 Ukrainian-language newspapers for the entire country, and most of them had half their pages printed in Russian. \(^{458}\) In the period of the "struggle between two cultures" most of the newspapers that survived were suspended and only _Visti_ was allowed to exist, publishing 2,000 copies in 1922. \(^{459}\) This blindly chauvinist policy was criticized in 1923 when it was pointed out that not a single Ukrainian newspaper was pub-
lished for the millions of peasants whose sympathy the regime was allegedly soliciting.\textsuperscript{460}

The Ukrainization of newspapers began in 1923, but little was achieved until 1925.\textsuperscript{461} In 1925 a mere 27 per cent of newspapers were Ukrainian-language titles, 21 per cent of the total circulation.\textsuperscript{462} During that year 21 local (okruh) and 3 central Ukrainian newspapers were founded. The push to bring the Ukrainian printed word to the working class started in 1926 with the launching of \textit{Proletar}.\textsuperscript{463} With Skrypnyk at the helm of \textit{Narkomos}, the Ukrainization of newspapers reached campaign proportions. By 1929, 64 per cent of newspaper titles and 65 per cent of the circulation was represented by Ukrainian language titles.\textsuperscript{464} By the winter of 1929, newspapers in the Ukrainian language which aimed at workers outnumbered similar Russian editions 12 to 9 and in circulation they reached parity. As for the central republican press, the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian newspapers was 17 to 2.\textsuperscript{465}

In the development of national identity the effective communication of those elements which "make up the social fabric of nationality" is essential.\textsuperscript{466} Newspapers were the most important medium available in pursuing that end. When radio appeared it too became a "front of Ukrainization".\textsuperscript{467} In 1927 Ukrainian language newspapers were read by 1.5 - 2.0 million people.\textsuperscript{468} The Ukrainian intelligentsia used the press very consciously to strengthen their people's sense of nationality, to hasten the "rebirth of the Ukrainian people", as a \textit{Visti} editorial described its goals.\textsuperscript{469} Newspapers were also the tool used by the intelligentsia to mobilise public opinion in pursuit of national demands. \textit{Visti} was in this respect deservedly called by Zatons'kyi "the pioneer of Ukrainization".\textsuperscript{470} Ukrainization was not just
a question of form, but of content as well. On the latter, the concern was to ensure that Ukrainian newspapers did not become second-rate versions of Moscow editions, but, on the contrary, to allow a "unique Ukrainian newspaper style" to emerge. There was also the effort to make Ukrainian culture contemporary through its presentation in newspapers. The task of the press, argued Ravich-Cherkas'kyi at the first congress of journalist (1925), was to ensure that "Ukrainization is not peasantization". What was at stake in the development of the Ukrainian press was also whether Ukrainian or Russian newspapers would be the major source of opinion formation. By the end of the 1920s, papers such as Visti sold far more copies in the republic than Pravda. This represented a considerable achievement.

vii. The party

The revolution found the Bolsheviks without a territorial organization in Ukraine and with a Luxemburgist leadership resisting the creation of such a body lest this imply a legitimation of the national idea. The exigencies of the national revolution however demanded a different approach. In November 1917, the same Luxemburgist element asked the party centre in Russia for permission to create a separate organization to be called "Social Democracy of Ukraine" to "counter the growing influence of Ukrainian socialist parties." The answer received from Ia. Sverdlov, organizational secretary of the Russian party, was unequivocal, "The creation of a separate Ukrainian party, no matter what its name, no matter what programme it adopts, is considered undesirable." None the less, several
attempts were made to establish a territorial organization in Ukraine because it was recognized that without one the party was doomed. When Ukraine was cut off from Russia during the German advance, and party members in Ukraine were more or less on their own, Bolsheviks meeting in Taganrog in April 1918 proclaimed an independent Communist Party of Ukraine, tied to the Russian party only through the Third International. This decision was overturned under pressure from the Moscow Central Committee when the Ukrainian party met in Moscow in July 1918. The CPU was at that time established as an integral, though autonomous, part of the CPSU, subject to the discipline of the latter's Central Committee, without its own budget, autonomous only in local matters.

On the eve of the October revolution the Bolshevik organization in Ukraine was characterized by "trifling party branches and membership". Although party statistics for 1917 are not entirely reliable in view of the fluid situation, the figure of 22,569 members released by the mandate commission of the 6th CPSU Congress (August 1917) probably comes closest to mirroring the reality. Two thirds of the membership was in Donbas. There were entire regions of the country which for all intents and purposes did not have a party organization, namely the right and left banks outside the cities of Kiev and Kharkiv. With a mere 209 rural party cells and 16 percent of the total membership listed as peasants, in terms of their social origin, Bolsheviks were very weak in the countryside. The majority of party members were Russians, and most of the leadership at the local level "were only temporarily on the territory of Ukraine." The "absence of permanent party forces" in Ukraine was major factor in the organization's political and organizational weakness. In this respect the party in Ukraine
was quite different from the Latvian, Polish, Caucasian and even Siberian organizations. 485

The record of the local Bolsheviks in Ukraine during the revolution was characterized by helplessness. During the events of 1918, for example, the party simply collapsed, leaving in July of that year a membership total of 4,364. 486 By the end of 1918 party strength had not increased much: total membership stood at 5,014. 487 Prior to 1920, "it is a well-known fact," wrote Bil'shovyk, "that the Borot'bisty had more members than the CPU." 488 If party fortunes improved after 1920, at which time total membership was 37,958, it was because new blood was infused from two sources. 489 By far the most important was the arrival of cadres from Russia with the Red army to bolster what by Lenin's admission was a pathetically weak Soviet apparatus. 490 Approximately half the CPU membership in 1920 was composed of "comrades who had arrived with and are stationed in military units." 491 The second source of new members was the absorption of other parties into the CPU. The most important of these were the Borot'bisty, who had proven their mettle during the Austro-German occupation. According to Skrypnyk, 4,000 Borot'bisty entered CPU ranks, providing the party with much needed influence among the peasantry and cadres "who spoke Ukrainian." 492 By late 1920 almost 20 per cent of party members were former members of other organizations. 493

The first available data on the social and national composition of the party are for the year 1920. The re-registration of party members which occurred in that year revealed that Ukrainians represented less than a quarter of the CPU membership. In terms of social origin almost 60 per cent of the membership was proletarian (there are no statistics on the actual
occupation). The intelligentsia and white-collar workers represented almost 30 per cent of the total. (See table 2.24) As for the leadership, the first secretaries throughout this period were non-Ukrainian and in 1920 six out of seventeen Central Committee members were Ukrainian. 494

Whatever weight Ukrainians may have gained inside the CPU as a result of the entry of Borot'bisty was soon to be undermined. On the surface, the resolutions of the 10th CPSU Congress, which contained a condemnation of Great Russian chauvinism and a call to draw into the party more members of the indigenous nationalities to strengthen party influence in the countryside in connection with NEP, ought to have favoured the entry of Ukrainians. The same Congress, however, announced a purge of "petty bourgeois" elements "not trained in the Communist spirit." 495 While the scope of the purge in Ukraine is a matter of some controversy, some give a figure of 22 per cent of the membership purged, others "almost 40 per cent". 496 On the question of who was purged, the issue is clearer: it was the Ukrainian membership that was largely expelled. 497 This is not surprising since Lebed', the arch-opponent of concessions to Ukrainians' national aspirations, was the CPU organizational secretary responsible for carrying out the purge. 498 With the party in Ukraine having as its main preoccupations the struggle against "banditism" and the collection of taxes from the peasantry, there was little sympathy for Ukrainians. 499 The purge served as an excellent pretext for expelling the Borot'bisty: out of the 4,000 who had joined the CPU in 1920, only 118 remained. 500

The 1922 party census illustrates well the crisis confronting the CPU. The party (56,000 strong) had become an urban military-bureaucratic apparatus. Almost half the membership (48 per cent) was in the Red Army. Only 14 per cent
TABLE 2.24

Changes in the National and Social Composition of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 1920-7

(in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Nationality</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1927</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2. Social origin</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-coll</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Full and candidate members.

Source: A. Gilinskii, "Sostoianie KP(b)U k piatiletiiu Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii," in Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiiia.Pervoe piatiletie (Kharkiv,1922), 167; N.N.Popov, Natsional'naia politika Sovetskoi vlasti (Moscow,1927),98; Vserossiiskaia perepis' 1922 goda chlenov R.K.P. Itogi partperpisí 1922 goda na Ukraine (Kharkiv,1922),viii,xii; Ukraina. Statystichnyi shchorichnyk na 1928 rik (Kharkiv,1928),17; Vsесoiuznaia partiinaia perepis' 1927 goda. Vypusk II: I. Sotsial'nyi sostav VKP(b). II. Kommunisticheskaia prosloika v promyshlennykh predpriiatiiakh (Moscow,1927), 6-7.
of this wing of the organization was Ukrainian. Almost 80 per cent of the CPU membership lived in towns (44 per cent in provincial capitals). The party weakness in rural areas is graphically illustrated by Kiev province, where there were 1,000 members living in rural regions, of whom 300 were actually peasants. The rural population of this province was over 3 million. While 51 per cent of the membership claimed to be proletarian, almost 90 per cent of all workers in the party were employed as functionaries in the state, party, trade union or economic administrations. All in all 92 per cent of CPU members were functionaries by occupation. The toiling element in the party was represented by seven per cent of the membership who still worked in factories, and one per cent employed in agriculture. In terms of nationality, Ukrainians represented 23 per cent of the total membership. (See table 2.24) Linguistically, the party was worlds apart from the population: 99 per cent of CPU members spoke Russian fluently, 82 per cent claimed it as their language of everyday use. Ukrainian was spoken by eleven per cent of the membership. Even this figure exaggerates the point, since party members interpreted the question "language of conversation" to mean "mother-tongue". In a 1921 report, Kh. Rakovsky admitted that only 2.4 per cent of party members "maintained a tie with the Ukrainian language." The party was thus alienated not only from the millions of Ukrainians whom it ruled, but also from the proletariat in whose name it claimed to exercise a dictatorship. Within the party, Frunze, Popov and many others argued that a radical change in policy was needed. On the eve of the 7th CPU Congress (April 1923) Popov wrote, "we have been unable at the present time, in the sixth year of the revolution, in spite of the strengthening
of Soviet rule, to suppress political banditism about which the Moscow provinces have forgotten a long time ago." Those party members who thought that they could conquer the Ukrainian nation by Russifying it were mistaken. The only alternative, Popov concluded, was "to conquer the Ukrainian masses" by transacting "party and cultural work in the Ukrainian language." With Ukrainization a new era in the party began.

From 1923 on a number of developments within the party and society favoured the growth of Ukrainian membership. Influential party spokesmen pressed for a more systematic recruitment of Ukrainians. The rehabilitation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia after 1923 facilitated this. The Ukrainization of the educational system saw a new generation of Ukrainian specialists and cultural workers appear and these sought a place for themselves in the party. The economic recovery saw Ukrainian youth leave the village to join the working class, resulting in "the entry of new, young cadres" into the CPU. (In 1927, the average length of membership was 2 to 3 years, attesting to massive recent recruitment). Finally, the removal of Kviring and Lebed' from the levers of power played an important role. Although Shumsk'kyi's demand for a Ukrainian to head the CPU was not granted by Stalin, Kaganovich, who replaced Kviring, was the most Ukrainized head of the party to date. Unlike Kviring, who was born and raised in Russia, Kaganovich's roots were in the Kiev region. Knowing Ukrainian, he used it in making all official pronouncements and under his leadership it was announced that by 1 January 1927 "all party business was to be conducted in the Ukrainian language." The 1927 party census showed the results of the new policies and social developments. The party had greatly expanded its membership - 182,396 full and candidate members by 1927. Of the 168,087 members
who completed their questionnaires, 52 per cent were Ukrainian, virtually
double the 1922 figure, and almost 70 per cent of the Ukrainian membership
gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue (as compared to 46 per cent in 1922).
In the party as a whole, one third of the membership now claimed Ukrainian
as their native language. Although in terms of class designation 62 per cent
of the CPU were workers, only 34 per cent were proletarians in their present
occupation, and 9 per cent were peasants. Half the membership was con­
centrated in the industrial regions of Ukraine. The change in the nature of
the ethnically Ukrainian membership of the party reflected the ever­
growing penetration of that group into the urban and industrial environment.
While in 1922 20 per cent of the Ukrainian CPU was considered to be working
class, by 1927 this rose to 56 per cent. (See table 2.24)
"The younger the generation, the more our culture and economy develops,
the more Ukrainian will emerge as the main medium of cultural and economic
growth. In several years this process will be completed." This is how
Khvylia characterized the significance of the major changes that were
occurring in the membership of the party "reserve", the Komsomol. In
November 1925, when 40 per cent of the CPU membership was Ukrainian, the
comparable figure for the Komsomol was 58 per cent. At the second
plenum of the Komsomol's Central Committee (1926) it was announced that the
"majority of our members are now Ukrainian peasant youth, so Ukrainization
is now essential." Among these Komsomol members, V. Dubovs'kyi recounts,
"Ukrainian patriotism" was the dominant mood. Officials reported that "the
base of the Komsomol is for Ukrainization" and that there was great enthusiasm
for Ukrainian literature and lectures on history and "Ukrainian statehood".
By 1 January 1929, 64 per cent of the Komsomol membership was Ukrainian
by nationality. Even in Donbas, the "forge" of Russian cadres in Ukraine, by the end of the decade 49.2 per cent of the Komsomol membership gave Ukrainian as their nationality. \(^{522}\) (See table 2.25)

In the party as in other spheres of the country's life, the absence of democracy meant that the Ukrainization of the heights of power proceeded more slowly than the process at the base. In the Komsomol, for example, Ukrainians represented two-thirds of the membership, but only one third of the Central Committee. \(^{523}\) The disporportions were similar in the CPU. Kaganovich reported that Ukrainians in the Central Committee increased from 16 per cent in 1923 to 25 per cent in 1925. \(^{524}\) At the local party leadership level Ukrainians were better represented. Among the secretaries of okruh committees, 55 per cent gave Ukrainian as their nationality in 1927, and 56 per cent of raion committee secretaries. \(^{525}\) By 1926 over half (52 per cent) of the "leading cadres" in the CPU were Ukrainian, a considerable increase over the 24 per cent of 1923. \(^{526}\) Ten per cent of the central party press was published in the Ukrainian language in 1925. This reached 100 per cent by 1929. \(^{527}\) In 1925, half the business of the central apparatus was conducted in the Ukrainian language. \(^{528}\)

The CPU came to power in Ukraine with the opprobrium of an alien force. But the longer the party existed on Ukrainian soil, the more it came to identify with the particularistic demands of the republic. Ukrainization hastened this development by committing the party to a Ukrainian cultural form as the medium of its daily work, by facilitating the recruitment of Ukrainians into its ranks and by legitimizing national demands within the bosom of the party. The most visible and most studied manifestation
TABLE 2.25

National Composition of the Komsomol according to Region, 1929

(in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polissia</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right Bank</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bank</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steppe</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full and candidate members. Data are for 1 January 1929.

of this Ukrainization in substance was the emergence of national communist currents within the CPU who were particularly bold in their formulation of political, economic and cultural programmes. However, Ukrainian particularism was not limited to the national communist current. Other deviations - the workers' opposition, the left or right oppositions - also had a national specificity about which little has been written. Zatons'kyi made an interesting point in this regard at the Kharkiv party conference in 1928 when he said that "any deviation in Ukraine is serious, because each deviation in Ukrainian conditions can be tied to the national question." In the republic one also found mestnichestvo (localism) as a widespread "deviation", especially in the southern regions of the republic.  

It is unfortunate that the scholarly literature on national communism, the clearest expression of identification with the republic, tends to view these currents as personifications of individuals who were declared "deviationists" - Shums'kyi, Volobuiev and Khvyl'ovyi. This individualization obscures the fact that the views espoused by these individuals were widely held in Ukraine's political circles. Volobuievism is a case in point. The views he expressed in his famous article published in the CPU theoretical organ - Bil'shovyk Ukrainy - were rather typical of sentiments expressed by many leading figures in the republic. The theoretical elaboration of Ukraine's predicament as a colony was advanced with equal clarity in 1925 by S. Iavors'kyi, the head of Holovnauka, the government's higher education branch. The need of an "economic base" for real statehood was expressed with considerable vigour by P. Solodub, a major party and state figure from right-bank Ukraine. The concrete tasks of economic de-
colonization outlined by Volobuiev were also posed in the autumn of 1928 during the plenary session of the Ukrainian Ts.V.K.'s budgetary commission by Slyn'ko, representing the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and Katel', from Ukraine's State Planning Agency. When Shums'kyi, to take another example, posed the problem of the Ukrainization of the working class, this aspect of "Shums'kyism" was endorsed by all CPU Central Committee members with only one dissenting vote.

Without access to party archives, it is impossible to determine the specific weight of national communist sentiments within the party. Judging from the press, however, it was considerable. Only the same archives will reveal who took the lead in pronouncing these sentiments as "deviations". Since most of these "deviations" were first published as articles on the pages of the Ukrainian state and party press, there is reason to suspect the initiative was largely Moscow's. It seems that the major difference between the national communists and many of the more centrist members of the CPU leadership was one of tone, formulation, strategy and tactics, rather than one of principle. When A. Richyts'kyi answered Volobuiev's article on behalf of the party leadership, one of his more telling arguments was that to pose contentious issues in a sharp way at a time when Ukraine was in the throes of great national development was simply bad politics. (Richyts'kyi's reply was itself labelled "the reverse side of the Volobuiev coin", a charge denied by Richyts'kyi's mentor, Skrypnyk.)

As the party became rooted in the reality of Ukraine, a wide range of differences emerged between those making policies in Moscow and those charged with implementing unpalatable decisions in Ukraine. Many communists from Russia sent to Ukraine as plenipotentiaries came to identify with
the victims of unbridled centralization. The evolution of some was extreme. Georgii Lapchinskii, a Russian communist, became one of the principal figures of the independent Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP). Rakovsky's conversion was more typical: he began his career in Ukraine in 1919 questioning the very existence of a Ukrainian national identity, only to emerge later as a defender of its culture and constitutional prerogatives. The national aspirations of Ukrainians found an unlikely defendant in Frunze, the head of the military in Ukraine and one of the proponents of Ukrainization and decentralization. Even Russian jingoists (rusotiap) slowly began to reckon with the specificity of conditions of work in Ukraine, and ended by arguing "for the creation of a complete Ukrainian national-economic entity in a Soviet federation". In 1921 Iakovlev, formerly a leading opponent of Ukrainian aspirations, was removed from office for "tending towards Ukrainian independence". Lobanov, the left-oppositionist who dismissed Ukrainization with disdain in 1925, by 1927 attacked Odynets', the party spokesman on Ukrainization for his narrow conception of Ukrainian nationality. To be a Ukrainian, argued Lobanov, was not "determined by blood", but through one's identification with Ukrainian culture, and many Russians in the republic were increasingly finding themselves in that position. When Hrushevs'kyi delivered an embittered denunciation of great Russian chaunivism and centralism, his speech was endorsed by none other than the future hang man of Ukraine, Pavel Postyshev. When the party and state leadership at the closing session of the 9th Congress of Soviets sang Shevchenko's Zapovit, the hymn of the national revival in 1917, this gesture symbolized a much more profound change of heart among the republic's leader-
If, as an official party policy, the Ukrainian version of indigenization (korenizatsiia) went further than elsewhere, it was not merely because of mounting pressure from the depths of Ukrainian society. One feels that after the ravages of the long civil war in Ukraine, the leadership was relieved by Ukrainization policies which allowed them to pursue the goal of national consolidation and reconciliation. Also, the republic's institutions had begun to foster the emergence of a new political elite. This elite, whose power and prestige were rooted in these institutions, defended them out of self-preservation. They supported the development of a distinct national identity, if only to reinforce their claims to power and authority.

There were, of course, many within the party who did not so much oppose Ukrainization as ignore it, claiming that age and heavy responsibilities made it "too difficult to learn Ukrainian because it is so similar to Russian." This "petty-bourgeois or bureaucratic element" was quite "capable of loving Little Russia with its charming gardens and white houses", so long as they did not have to learn the language of its people.

Manuil's'kyi said that "Ukrainization was a new revolution, which will overturn existing conditions" but to break the spine of "chauvinist" inertia "was not a matter of weeks or months, but a matter of years."

An important current within the party opposed concessions to Ukrainian national aspirations and favoured political and economic centralization. The centre of this opposition were the "bosses" (nachal'stvo) in Donbas, especially those recently arrived from Russia to manage industry directly administered by all-Union commissariats. But in and of themselves, this current was too weak to reverse the very autonomist course charted by the
majority of the party's leading cadres. It would take a massive interven-
tion from outside and two large-scale purges before the party in Ukraine
could be brought to heel. During the 1920s this opposition was steadily
losing influence in the party. At a 1924 CPU Central Committee plenum party
leaders expressed the hope that "new social groups...for whom the Ukrai-
nian language and culture are native" would carry forward the national
policies initiated in 1923.\textsuperscript{552} Our discussion of changes in the CPU
membership shows that this was in fact the case.

viii. The \textit{bureaucracy}

The revolution brought basic transformations in the nature of elites. The old ruling classes were expropriated and in their place a new ruling
elite comprised of those in authority in the various apparatuses of the
party, state and social organizations was crystallizing. The social weight
of these administrators was due not only to their numbers, but also to the
technical superiority and monopoly of culture that they enjoyed. "You can
throw out the tsar, throw out the landowners, throw out the capitalists...
But you cannot 'throw out' bureaucracy in a peasant country," said Lenin
in 1921, "you can only reduce it by slow and stubborn effort."\textsuperscript{553}

Yet, "the apparatus and the bureaucracy are growing despite all our
attempts to limit this," complained a delegate to the 8th CPU Conference
in 1924. He showed how the 1924 reform designed to reduce the size of the
bureaucracy merely produced the contrary effect. The Workers' and Peasants'
Inspectorate (RSI) was pared down to 148 employees after the reform, only
to have the tasks of financial control now performed by the CPU Central Committee, whose staff had mushroomed to 1,200.\textsuperscript{554} Indeed, prior to the July 1924 reform the bureaucracy in Ukraine numbered 335,700; seven months later, 360,000.

Before the idea became fashionable, Vynnychenko in 1920 warned that a new "bureaucratic caste", a new "Soviet bourgeoisie" had come into being. What made this bureaucracy worse in Ukraine was that it had inherited from tsarism "300 years of imperialist dogma".\textsuperscript{556} This was the apparatus that was to have been Ukrainized during the 1920s. After the military defeats of the national movement, if the national aspirations of Ukrainians were to be pursued and articulated, it would have to be through this bureaucracy or not at all. The major task facing the programme of national consolidation was to Ukrainize that bureaucracy in the fullest sense of the term. As we have already discussed the party, our task here will be to examine other groups involved in the organization of society: white-collar staff and others who laboured with their minds.

Many laws, decrees and regulations were promulgated during the effort to Ukrainize the administration. The first significant announcement was a 1921 party resolution on the need to take measures to "ensure that sufficient Ukrainian speakers are to be found in the state apparatus."\textsuperscript{557} Only in 1923, however, was the Ukrainian language introduced as a language of work together with Russian in most branches of administration, both centrally and at the local level.\textsuperscript{558} White-collar staff could no longer be hired without special authorization unless they knew Ukrainian or would undertake to learn the language in six months. In 1925 several laws were passed hastening the Ukrainization of administration - all signs, forms, as well as the
language of business were to change into Ukrainian. In 1927 further measures were taken ordering the Ukrainization of cooperatives and voluntary associations. In addition to these general regulations, each locality and each administrative branch and enterprise had its own schedule of Ukrainization worked out. During this period many deadlines for Ukrainization were set and employees were threatened with losing their jobs if they did not comply with regulations by 1 January 1924, then 1 January 1925, 1 January 1926, 1 January 1927 and finally 1 July 1929. These dates alone are indicative of the problems which existed in this regard.

"Ukrainization," said Chubar in 1924, "cannot be merely understood as the introduction of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainization consists of involving in the work of the state the maximum number of representatives of the Ukrainian milieu." The starting point in both respects was extremely low. The only force that could carry out Ukrainization, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, was outside the corridors of power. The struggle against the national movement had produced a situation where in 1921 "great power chauvinism" was rife in the state apparatus which was comprised of "urban petty-bourgeois elements" and where less than one in ten employees spoke the indigenous language. On the eve of Ukrainization, 35 per cent of state employees were Ukrainian, and the state apparatus "from top to bottom functioned in the Russian language, with few exceptions" (the primary exception was Narkomos). It was in 1923 that the party leadership extended an invitation to the Ukrainian intelligentsia to participate in the state administration. The intelligentsia responded enthusiastically, hoping to influence the Soviet Ukrainian regime. By 1925, 50 per cent of state employees were Ukrainian; by 1926, 54 per cent.
The entry of Ukrainians into white-collar occupations, even when more propitious recruitment policies were adopted, was hindered by the historic inequalities in the social structure of the country. The mobilisation of Ukrainian society had only begun when the 1926 census was taken. The census of 1926 recorded Ukrainians as the least mobilised national group, and consequently they were poorly represented among white-collar employees and in the liberal professions. (See table 2.27) The situation in this respect was better than it had been prior to the revolution, but it improved vastly only in the final years of the 1920s.

The most comprehensive source of information on white-collar staff and mental labour in general after 1926 is the 1929 census of the labour force. When compared with the 1926 general population census returns, it enables us to gauge the impact of Ukrainization policies on this strategic sector of society. In that three year period, Ukrainians among white-collar groups increased from 52 to 57 per cent; among those involved in all forms of mental labour (medicine, law, culture, education, in addition to state and industry) the increase was from 52 to 58 per cent. The Ukrainian-language identification of this group strengthened in greater proportion than the increase on the basis of nationality. In 1926, 43 per cent of white-collar staff gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue. In 1929, according to the more stringent test, Ukrainian as the language in the home, the figure was 50 per cent. For those involved in all forms of mental labour the corresponding increase was from 44 to 51 per cent. The national composition of the various age groups provides insight into future trends. Among those engaged in mental labour under the age of 35 (1929), Ukrainians represented 64 per cent of the total, whereas in the 51-55 age group they
<table>
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<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
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*Economically active population only

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<tr>
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<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Others</th>
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*Economically active population only.

Source:  *Perepis' 1926*, vol. 28, table 1, 1-9.
accounted for 49 per cent. When the results are analysed for Ukrainians alone, one can say that the cultural Russification of this stratum (mental labour), which weakened the social basis of Ukrainian national consciousness in the past, came to an end following the revolution: 83 per cent of Ukrainians engaged in mental labour spoke Ukrainian at home and the younger the age group the stronger the identification with the language. Moreover, 95 per cent of Ukrainians read and 85 per cent wrote in their native language, representing a large market (150,000) for the consumption of Ukrainian culture. The 1929 census returns also enable us to measure the success of Ukrainization policies among all white-collar staff and those employed in all forms of mental labour: in 1926, 68 per cent of the white-collar group could read and 64 per cent could write in Ukrainian. Three years later the figures for the respective skills were 79 and 74 per cent. For the mental labour group the returns showed that those having a reading and writing ability in Ukrainian increased from 67 to 79 per cent and 62 and 76 per cent respectively between 1926 and 1929.\(^{570}\)

If one examines the state administration more closely, an interesting pattern emerges. At the summit of state administration, that is among those who headed the various commissariats, 13 out of 20 (or 65 per cent) were Ukrainian. The same was the case with the Central Executive Committee - V.Ts.V.K.\(^ {571}\) This group was the motor force of Ukrainization from "the top". The data on white-collar employees in general shows that the base was Ukrainizing as well. The major weakness in this respect was the regional level of management, as well as the managing cadres in the economy. Here there were two important groups, the managers themselves and the technical specialists (spetsy). Fifty per cent of managers as whole and 48 per cent
of spetsy were Ukrainian in 1926. In industry, however, the percentages were lower: 34 and 37 respectively. The strongest representation of Russians among white-collar staff was among the spetsy. In 1926 Russians in this category formed the largest single national group - 34 per cent of all specialists in all branches of the administration, 43 per cent in the case of industry and manufacturing. Among the specialists in turn, the most important group was the engineers, whose role in the order being constructed under Stalin was to grow so large. This was a very self-assured group with all of the characteristics of a "closed caste", wrote Antonenko-Davydovych. They were also the backbone of resistance to Ukrainization and as "highly qualified people" they were in fact exempt from Ukrainization decrees. Among engineers in 1926 Ukrainians represented a mere 14 per cent of the total. Of great interest therefore are the changes which occurred among this most highly skilled stratum to whom the future belonged.

Most of our evidence, unfortunately, is for the 1924-7 period only. In that interval, Ukrainians among "leading cadres" in economic administration increased from 20 to 38 per cent; in the state administration as a whole the increase was from 24 to 51 per cent; and in the case of professional organizations, from 14 to 48 per cent. Probably the most revealing figure of the extent of social mobilisation of Ukrainians in the second half of the 1920s is for the national composition of mining engineers, the aristocracy among the specialists. By 1929, half were Ukrainian.

The linguistic Ukrainization of the state and economic administration is another aspect of the policy to consider. To introduce Ukrainian as the language of business in administration was a radical measure. It meant the penetration of the national fact into a bureaucratic machine that for
centuries had been the bulwark of Russification and colonization. Modes of behaviour and attitudes that had become ingrained over the centuries had to be shattered. This mammoth task had to be carried out in a difficult context. Not the least of the difficulties was the absence of popular democracy in the face of edinonachalie (one-man management). Workers were always a good deal more enthusiastic about Ukrainization than the management. The press of that period provides many examples of this. In a Kharkiv paper factory, to take once instance, the personnel had a positive attitude towards Ukrainization and had carried it forward. But when a new director arrived, he ordered Russian to be used instead of Ukrainian. When workers in Kremenchuk submitted order sheets written in Ukrainian, the factory management refused to accept them unless they were written in Russian and asked workers not to "force on them the khokhol tongue". In the case of the administration of the southern railways, the entire staff functioned in Ukrainian, except for the top managers who stubbornly refused to make this move.

Ukrainization had to contend with the fact that most white-collar employees had been born and raised in the pre-revolutionary period and had never studied Ukrainian. To learn it, they had to attend Ukrainization courses after work for several hours a week and had to pay for much of this education out of their own pockets. Having completed the first phase of Ukrainization, namely the acquisition of "literacy in Ukraine", they were tested and placed in a category according to their language skills. The second stage consisted of courses to familiarize them with Ukrainian culture and history. Ukrainization courses were taxing in time and energy and it is not surprising that many complained about this additional burden. Release time from work would have undoubtedly helped, but the country was
too poor to afford this luxury.

To supervise the Ukrainization of administration the state had a central commission, and similar bodies were created at every level of administration, down to the individual factory level. While this provided much employment for the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the shortage of competent "Ukrainization lecturers" remained a major problem in the south-eastern regions of Ukraine. Much of the success or failure of Ukrainization rested on the abilities of these lecturers. By far the best were teachers and university students who had studied the language. Their impact on tens of thousands of white-collar workers was considerable. By 1926 the shortage of lecturers in Ukrainian language courses had been more or less overcome; specialists in culture and history remained at a premium. The dire shortage of technical literature was also a stumbling block in the Ukrainization process. Insurance companies, for example, as early as 1925 had been effectively Ukrainized and the only obstacle to complete Ukrainization was the absence of a terminological dictionary for actuarial terms. To understand the scope of the problem one has but to look at one branch of the economy, railway transport, where 5,000 different terms had to be translated into Ukrainian.

Ukrainization was particularly difficult in all-Union enterprises, which according to the 1923 law, were exempt from the process. After a good deal of pressure, all-Union enterprises were made subject to Ukrainization norms. While their communication with the centre in Russia could take place in Russian, they had to use Ukrainian when dealing with local or republican institutions, and their staffs had to learn the language or face the threat of dismissal. It is not hard to imagine the reception
given to these policies by the managerial strata at the centre. The reactions of a Moscow journalist writing for Novyi mir were not atypical in this respect. Visiting Donbas in 1929 he was shocked to find specialists grappling with Ukrainian grammar books and telephone operators who spoke only the Ukrainian language. 589

The battle for Ukrainization in the republic had to be waged in the face of growing hostility to this policy from the all-Union centre. The first major attack on Ukrainization was made in 1926 when a high level Ukrainian delegation arrived in Moscow to give a report at a session of the all-Union Ts.I.K. Led by Iu. Larin, Bukharin's protégé, Russian spokesmen confronted the Ukrainian delegation with a litany of complaints about the violations of the rights of Russians in the republic. The reaction of the Ukrainian leadership revealed much about the dominant mood in that milieu. Larin was attacked for "offering a protectorate for Russian bureaucrats /chinovniki/ in the national republics." 590 Chubar claimed Larin's intervention was an attempt to distract attention from the more pressing question, a fairer share of the allocation of resources for Ukraine's economic development. 591 Skrypnyk sensed that this was a move of a more fundamental nature: "Larin says because of our initiative 'we founded' many national republics. Congratulations, comrade Larin, you have forgotten that the idea of the USSR was Ukraine's initiative. Larin was opposed to the USSR and wanted to incorporate Ukraine into the RSFSR." Zatons'kyi claimed, "Larin used to be in the Spilka /Ukrainian Social Democratic Union/. I worked with him there, so he knows perfectly well why we need the Ukrainian language. This is a manoeuvre on his part." It was very revealing to learn who in Ukraine had helped Larin prepare his case. Petrovs'kyi said, "Larin bases his facts on materials published in
Russian by Russian comrades prepared by the NKVD. Only in the last 4-5 months did the NKVD hire its first Ukrainian.\textsuperscript{592}

To what extent did Ukrainization succeed in converting the administration to use of Ukrainian as its business medium? Overall, the proportion of state business conducted in the Ukrainian language grew from 20 per cent in early 1925 to 70 per cent by the spring of 1927.\textsuperscript{593} The rural apparatus was virtually completely Ukrainized,\textsuperscript{594} and in major urban centres it made impressive inroads. In the city of Dnipropetrov'sk, for example, three-quarters of all paper work was Ukrainized.\textsuperscript{595} The Ukrainization of the military, aided by the gradual formation of a republican army, was initiated. Where Ukrainians predominated, regimental schools and business were completely Ukrainized.\textsuperscript{596} Ukrainization in the right and left banks was very successful, but less so, for obvious historic reasons, in the country's industrial heartland. The slowest to Ukrainize were economic and trade organizations where Ukrainization did not begin until 1925. That year, a little more than a third of the business had been Ukrainized, although this varied from enterprise to enterprise.\textsuperscript{597} Perhaps the most significant indicator of progress of the Ukrainization of factory and trade enterprises was the proportion of functionaries examined and certified as knowing Ukrainian. Their weight increased from 46 per cent of the total in 1924 to 52 per cent in 1929.\textsuperscript{598} The progress was slow, but S. Iavors'kyi, reporting on Ukrainization in the economic sphere, was optimistic that with further economic growth, the process would proceed full steam ahead.\textsuperscript{599}
Conclusion

For Ukrainians, a people with such a tortuous history, the indigenization policies opened an avenue for their emergence into the ranks of nationhood. The Georgian Menshevik N. Iordania assessed these policies as follows: "From the standpoint of national relationships, Bolsheviks have pushed ahead unhistorical nations and have brought them onto the path of rebirth. For instance, before our very eyes Ukraine has been created." This assessment, not uncommon at that time, is only partially correct. It overlooks the fact that through protracted struggle, the Ukrainian nation paid a heavy price in extracting the "Ukrainization" concession from its new rulers. Also overlooked are the social transformations after 1917 which made Ukrainization a "natural process" in which the party had scarcely any choice but to participate if it was to contain the forces unleashed by the changes.

Ukrainization's successes were not so much the product of regulations, laws, rules and threats of dismissal, although these played a role. The policy achieved much because it legitimized the outpouring of the energy and zeal of thousands of local activists. Every town and village, every government department and factory, had its individuals such as Piven' in Nikopol', described by Antonenko-Davydovych as the "pillar of Ukrainization in that city", or "comrade Karpenko" and his friends who in "seemingly Russified Stalino...stubbornly everwhere, even when welcoming writers from Moscow, spoke only in Ukrainian - these are the pillars of Ukrainization...." These initiatives were possible also because the regime, although authoritarian, was not yet totalitarian. The social trends
during the 1920s constantly added fresh cadres to the existing corps of activists.

Stalin's dictum at the 12th CPSU Congress, "You won't get far with Ukrainizing the schools only...You must introduce industrialization to succeed", was well taken, although this was not the whole story. The background to Ukrainization was NEP, a period of steady, but relatively slow economic growth. If one examines the Ukrainization process over the entire span of the 1920s, the process scored its most important successes towards the end of the decade, when economic expansion facilitated the absorption of young people into the labour force. Of course, the Ukrainized school had prepared them for their working life. But Ukrainization was not merely a question of form, it was one of substance as well. What was at stake was whether the new social weight of the Ukrainian fact would be able to place on the agenda further measures for the self-emancipation of the Ukrainian nation. As Ukraine approached the end of its "golden era", the republic, with the introduction of the first five year plan, witnessed an accretion by the Moscow centre of its authority in every field. The first major blow at the content of Ukrainization came in the wake of the trial of "bourgeois specialists" in the Shakhty region in March 1928 with an attack on the Ukrainian intelligentsia. When in 1929 the new General Secretary of the CPU S. Kosior, praised the form of Ukrainization, but attacked the "elite" of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and insisted that the content must be given a new "class character", he announced in effect the beginning of the end of Ukrainization. In less than five years' time, the form itself would be declared too subversive to tolerate.
Notes

   The names of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the
Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) have changed several times. The CPSU
was known as the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) -
RSDLP(B) - until 1918, when the name changed to the Russian Communist
Party (Bolsheviks). "Russian" here is rossiiskaia not russkaia and
denotes the entire territory of the Russian state, rather than ethnic
Russia. In 1925 the party name was changed to the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) - CPSU(B) - and in 1952 the word
"Bolshevik" was dropped. The Communist Party of Ukraine founded in
1918 was the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, until 1952, when
the adjective "Bolshevik" was dropped. Hereafter the abbreviations
CPSU and CPU will be used to note these organizations, except in
direct quotes or when reference is made to the CPSU in the pre-1917
period.

2. See for example the programme of the Ukrainian Communist Party
(Borot'biists) K razresheniiu natsional'nogo voprosa (Kiev, 1920),
in particular the draft decree on the development of Ukrainian culture,

3. In the words of a delegate to a 1917 Kharkiv Peasants' Congress,
Ukrainian must "become the nation's tongue" and "Ukraine ought to
govern itself." Robitnycha hazeta, 11 May 1917.

4. Vasyl Markus, L'Ukraine sovietique dans les relations internationales
et son statut en droit international 1918-1923 (Paris, 1959), 271.

5. For an account and map detailing boundary changes see Naulko,
Etnichnyi sklad, 56-8.

6. The old provinces paid little heed to principles of economic geography,
let alone nationality. The new okruh system, while leaving much to be
desired on both counts, was a vast improvement nonetheless. See Stefan
Rudnyts'kyi, "Dekil'ka zamitok do spravy raionizatsii Ukrainy,

7. The most comprehensive account of the status of Ukraine's national
minorities is Itogi raboty sredi natsional'nykh men'shinstv na Ukraine.
K 10-i godovshchine oktiabr'skoj revoliutsii (Kharkhiv, 1927)

8. S.V. Minaiev, Naslidky vseliudnoho perepysu 1926 r. na Ukraini
(Kharkiv, 1928), 13.


10. "There are provinces where there are virtually no children left
under six or seven years of age," wrote V.A. Arnautov, Golod i deti na Ukraine (Kharkiv, 1922), 5.

11. Bil'shovyk, 17 August 1922.


16. See Statystychna khronika Tsentral'noho statystychnoho upravlinnia, no.100, 1928, 1; A. Khomenko, R. Kol'ner, Suchasna smertnist' nemovliat v USRR (Kharkiv, n.d.) 10. Infant mortality was still high, 155 per 1000 live births (1927), but substantially lower than it had been in 1913, 210 deaths per 1000 live births.

17. See A. Khomenko's analysis of the 1923 urban census returns in Kul'tura i pobut (supplement to Visti /Visty until 1929/ Vseukrainskoho vykonavchoho komitetu), 20 March 1925. (Hereafter referred to as Visti.)

18. This aspect of Ukrainization policies during the 1920s has not yet been studied fully. In general, the policies could be divided into two categories. In those areas which could be considered ethnic Ukrainian lands or where Ukrainians formed compact communities, Ukrainization policies extended to the school system and the local state and party apparatus. Kuban' had the most developed Ukrainization programme. By 1925-6, 205 out of a total of 650 schools in the region had been Ukrainized. The Ukrainian-language Pedagogical tekhnikum established in Kuban' emerged as a major regional centre of Ukrainian cultural life. Local state and party institutions in that area were also Ukrainized. See Visti, 29 August 1925, 25 December 1926, 4 July 1928. To a lesser degree, the Ukrainization of schools and the state apparatus occurred in the northern Caucasus, Voronezh and Siberia. See Visti, 11 and 13 November 1926, 8 February, 1 April, 23 June 1927. Ukrainians living in the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republics (RSFSR) had their own national organization, which convened conferences and provided a much needed vehicle for the articulation of their collective demands. See Visti, 15 November 1928. Outside these compact areas of settlement, Ukrainians were organized in cultural associations and clubs. Among the most active were those in Samarkand, Tver', and Orenburg. See Visti, 27 January, 8 and 10 February, 23 June 1927. In Leningrad and Moscow, where there was a significant Ukrainian student population, there were very active cultural and student organizations. Moscow had the Shevchenko Ukrainian Club which served as a centre for the local
Ukrainian community. The students' organization in Moscow, Zemliatstvo proletars'koho studentstva Ukrainy v Moskvi had over one thousand members, of which, interestingly, 20 per cent were Jewish. The club encouraged students to focus on the Ukrainian problematic in their chosen field of specialization. See Visti, 26 July 1927. The party leadership in Ukraine during this period was very critical of the Russian government for not providing more assistance to the six million Ukrainians living on its territory and urged that government to emulate the Ukrainian in their treatment of national minorities. See A. Butsenko's speech in Visti, 16 May 1929.

19. A. Khomenko, Natsional'nyi sklad liudnosti USSR (Kharkiv, 1931) 50. The impact on the ethno-demography of Ukraine of the change in Ukrainians' national consciousness is analysed on pages 44-57. While it is not necessary to reproduce Khomenko's argument here, it should be mentioned that he does take the obvious factors into account in his calculations: the emigration of Russian supporters of the White armies, lower birth-rates among Russians in Ukraine, the immigration of Russian workers and state employees during the 1920s as well as the peculiarities of the 1897 census.

20. Naulko, Etnichnyi sklad, 69. Here and below data for 1897 are given within the 1926 boundaries. It may be objected that the proper comparison between the 1897 and the 1926 census should be with respect to mother-tongue data. The problem here is that "mother-tongue" in 1926 meant the language which the respondent spoke best, that is, it tested the respondent's language skill (rozhovirna mova), unlike the 1897 census which measured the respondent's psychological identification with his "mother" tongue (ridna mova). We concur with M. Ptukha's argument that the mother-tongue data of 1897 are best compared with nationality data of 1926. See M. Ptukha, Smertnist' u Rosii i Ukraini (Kharkiv-Kiev, 1928), 64.

21. A comparison of the 1897 and 1926 census returns shows as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>21,680,200</td>
<td>29,018,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>80.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Naulko, Etnichnyi sklad, 69. See also Khomenko, Natsional'nyi sklad for a detailed analysis of population changes in each of Ukraine's major national group in the 1897-1926 period.

22. Industrial production is measured here in pre-war rubles. One should note that the damage in Russia was considerably less than it had been in Ukraine. In 1921, for example, for the USSR as a whole, industrial production was one-fifth the pre-war figure. Visti, 27 March 1926. In
1920, coal production in Ukraine was 17 per cent the 1913 figure. The output of metallurgy in 1920 was one per cent the 1913 figure. See S. Zhilkin, ed., Ukraina v tsifrakh 1913-1920 gg. (Kharkiv, 1922), 34-7; M.I. Beliakov, "Rozvit sotsialistynoi ekonomiki: yvirishal'na umova zrostannia material'noho dobrobutu," in Pidvyshchennia dobrobutu trudispyshkh Ukrainy za p'iatdesiat rokiv radians'koi vlady (L'viv, 1967), 26.

23. The 1920 census figure is from Ukraina. Statystychnyi spravochnyk (Kharkiv, 1925), table 6, 13. The 1914 figure is from SSSR v tsifrakh 1933 (Moscow, 1934), table 1, 92.

24. See Dilo, 25 October 1922, for an account of conditions in industrial cities in Ukraine which produced widespread rioting that year.

25. See for example "The Situation in Ukrainia" (sic), Eastern Europe, no.4, 1919, 116-7.

26. See table 2.6 below.


28. See N. Movchin, Komplektovanie Krasnoi armii. Istoricheskii ocherk (Moscow, 1926), 85.

29. By 1923, light industry was producing 50 per cent of the value of pre-war production, whereas metallurgy was still at 3 per cent of the pre-war figure. By 1925, light industry had more than recovered its pre-war position. See Bil'shovyk, 11 April 1923, and Visti, 24 September 1925. For measures aimed at reconstructing heavy industry see Partiine kerivnytstvo rozvytkom promyslovosti Ukrainy (1917-1975) (Kiev, 1976), 78-9.


31. Ukraina. Statystychnyi spravochnyk, table 6, 14; Statystychnyi shchorichnyk 1929 (Kharkiv, 1929), table 2, 20. These figures should be taken as indicative of the changes in the urban population and not as a precise statistical record. Throughout the 1920s, between the 1920 and 1923 census and again between the 1923 and 1926 census, the definition of what constituted a town changed. See A. Khomenko, "Sproba karaktershky klasovoi struktury naselennia ukrains'kykh miz," Chervonyi shliakh, no.6, 1924, 158-73; Pervyi vseukrainskii statisticheskii s"ezd 16-23 noiabria 1925 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Kharkiv, 1925).


33. The natural rate of increase of the urban population (in absolute
Changes in the population of all towns in Ukraine, 1897-1926 as well as information on the natural rate of increase of each of the republic's okruh centres is given in Mis'ki selyshcha USSR. Zbirnyk stat-ekonomichnykh vidomostei (Kharkiv, 1929), 4-23.

34. Khomenko, Naselennia Ukrainy, 35.

35. Changes in the regional distribution of Ukraine's urban population are as follows (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1897</th>
<th>1926</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polissia</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Right bank</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left bank</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steppe</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tabulated from table 2.3.

36. Ukraine's four largest cities with 28 per cent of the total urban population received 80 per cent of funds allocated for urban economic development. O. Pytel', "Ohliad mis'koho hospodarstva i polityka v USRR," Ukrain's'kyi ekonomist, no.2, 1929, 79.

37. Mis'ki selyshcha, table 2-a, 6.


40. Seventy per cent of peasant households possessed between 2.3 and 6.6 hectares of land. Z.P. Shul'ha, Pidhotovka sutsil'noi kolektyvizatsii na Ukraini (Kiev, 1960), 43.


42. In 1927-8 only 35,000 people (7,000 households) migrated to the east whereas the plan called for many times that number. Visti, 15 February 1928. For the state's unsuccessful campaign to encourage re-settlement, see Visti, 11 August 1927, 17 March 1928 and 20 October 1928.

43. M. Krasil'nikov, "Pereselenie v 1925 i 1926 godakh," Statisticheskoe
44. **Hospodarštvo Kyivshchyny** (Kiev, 1926), 146.
45. The steppe had enough free land for 60,000 households or 300,000 people. See M. Siabro, "Planovi zakhody Narkomzemu Ukrainy na 1925-26 rik," **Znannia**, no.47-8, 1925, 11-15.
47. See O.H. Shlikhter, **Vybrani tvory** (Kiev, 1959), 380; P.M. Pershin, **Ahrarni peretvorennia Velykoi Zhovtnevoi sotsialistychnoi revoliutsii** (Kiev, 1962), 497.
49. For an analysis of the land use law, see **Bil'shovyk**, 12, 14 and 17 December 1922.
50. As late as 1928, 40 per cent of peasant households were still without farm implements. **Visti**, 11 July 1928. In 1924 the area of land under cultivation was still 10 per cent less than in 1916 because of these difficulties. **Visti**, 16 May 1925.
51. In 1916-25 the number of households increased by 30.2 per cent, land under cultivation by 16.7 per cent. P.I. Fomin, "Promyshlennost' Ukrainy. Tip i perspektivy razvitija ukrainskoj promyshlennosti" in **Voprosy ekonomiki** (Kharkiv, 1927), 14.
52. As of 1 March 1925, the Bank of Ukraine had given a mere 24 million rubles in agricultural credit. There were 5 million peasant households in Ukraine. **Visti**, 6 May 1925.
54. E.O. Shatan, **Problema rabochei sily v osnovnykh promyshlennykh raionakh SSSR** (Kharkiv, 1927), 73.
55. **Bil'shovyk**, 14 September 1922.
56. See Dobrokhotov's speech in **Biuleten' II-oi sesii Vseukrains'koho tsentral'nogo vykonavchoho komitetu VIII sklykannia**, no.3 (14 April), 1924, 159.
59. A. Hirshfel'd, **Migratsiini protsesy na Ukraini (v svitli perepysu 1926 r.)**
(Kharkiv, 1930), 23.

60. Shatan, Problema rabochei sily, 73.


64. In 1924-5 the average household in Ukraine made a clear annual profit of 226 rubles. See "Selians'ki biudzheti Ukrainy. Monohrafichne obsli-duvannia selians'kykh biudzhetiv za 1924-5 hospodarchyi rik," Statystyka Ukrainy, VI, no.115, 1927, 191. In 1925 the average real monthly wage of workers was 43.4 rubles a month. See "Dyferentsiatsiia zarobitnoi platy v 1925 i 1926 rr.," Statystyka Ukrainy, I, no.101, 1927, 2. For social security and other benefits attached to industrial employment see Visti, 24 October 1926.


67. The following illustrates the point: the percentage of Ukrainians in Artemivs'k between 1923 and 1926 increased from 22 to 55, in Stalino (Donets'k), from 7 to 26, Luhans'k (Voroshlyovhrad), from 21 to 44; these were the three largest cities in Donbas. Mis'ki selyshcha, 4-7, 10.


70. A. Butsenko, "Nova system uriaduvannia USRR," Znannia, no.11, 1928, 4.


72. Bil'shovyk, 14 September 1922.

73. V. Pidmohyl'nyi, Misto. Roman (Kiev, 1929), 37, 95.


75. A. Hirshfel'd, Migratsiini protsesy, 30.

77. Kontrol'nye tsifry narodnogo khoziaistva SSR na 1927-28 goda (Moscow, 1928), 214-5.

78. Dilo, 26 October 1923 reports a visitor's impressions of Ukraine.


80. Visti, 20 April 1926.

81. See Antonenko-Davydovych, Zemleiu, 87.

82. See Torgovo-promyshlennyi kalendar'-spravochnik Ukrainy na 1923 god (Kiev, 1923).

83. See Visti, 15 October, 9 December 1925.

84. See Khrystiuk, Ukrains'ka revoliutsiia, I: 24-5, 45-6; I.V. Khmil', Trudiashche selianstvo Ukrainy v borot'bi za vladu rad (Kiev, 1977), 23-5.

85. For an account of the development of the Ukrainian press during the revolution see Guthier, "The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917," 32.

86. I. Ivasiuk, Kredytova kooperatsiia na Ukraini (Warsaw, 1933), 6-7.

87. I. Kulik, the Bolsheviks' specialist on Ukrainian affairs, in a very revealing article, lamented this development. He wrote, "The development of national culture... among wide layers of the population... unfortunately occurred along the path of complete isolation from the culture and values common to the whole state /obshchegosudarstvennoi/." I. Kulik, "Revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie na Ukraine za 1917-18 gg.," Zhizn' natsional'nostei. Organ Narodnogo komissariata po delam natsional'nosteii. 9 November 1918, 2.

88. For example, see Robitnycha hazeta, 12 April, 11 May, 10 June, 24 August, 31 August 1917.

89. In the Constituent Assembly elections Ukrainian parties received a little less than two-thirds of the total number of votes cast. Tabulated from O.H. Radkey, The Elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917 (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), 78-9.

90. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, I: 176.


92. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, I: 176.
93. Ibid., 259.


96. For the lessons of the 1905 revolution in this respect see H.R. Weinstein, "Land Hunger and Nationalism in the Ukraine, 1905-1917," Journal of Economic History, 2, no.1, 1942, 35.

97. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, I: 177.


101. Some of the reasons for this we gave in our chapter one.

102. The First Universal (June 1917) called on peasants to wait for the Constituent Assembly. The Second Universal (July 1917) did not even mention the agrarian programme. The texts of the various "universals" can be found in Iakiv Zozulia, ed., Velyka ukraïns'ka revoliutsiia. Materiialy do istorii vidnovelennia ukraïns'koï derzhavnosty. Kalendär istorichnykh podii za liutyi 1917 roku - berezen' 1918 roku (New York, 1967), 65-70.


104. S.M. Hrytsai, Razvitie ekonomicheskoi mysli po agrarnomu voprosu na Ukraine v perekhodnyi period ot kapitalizma k sotsializmu (Kharkiv, 1970), 25.


106. We are referring to the isolation characteristic of the semi-Asiatic nature of the former Russian Empire. This natural atomization of village communities was broken only by a hyper-centralized state which arose for the purposes of defence and which existed through the extraction of surpluses from the countryside. For the presentation of the

107. Nova doba, no.6, 1920, 6. When citing articles from this magazine we will provide complete references only in the case of signed references.

108. A fascinating glimpse into the national attitudes prevailing in the village is provided by Sen'ko, *Narodni prypovidky-chastivky*.


114. For the problems involved in converting peasant guerrilla units into a regular army, see Leon Trotsky, *Problems of Civil War* (New York, 1976), 9, 22-3.


117. I.V. Khmil', who tried hard to prove the impact of Bolsheviks on the Ukrainian peasantry in the post-Decree period, came up with fewer than two score of instances of peasant actions which were attributed to Bolshevik influence. I.V. Khmil', "Borot'ba selian Ukrainy za zdiisnennia dekretu pro zemliu (zhovten'-hruden' 1917 r.)," *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no.5, 1971, 46-53. For a thorough discussion of the influence of various political parties on the peasantry see Holubnychy, "The Agrarian Revolution in the Ukraine."


122. Bol'shevistskie organizatsii Ukrainy v period ustanovleniia Sovetskoi vlasti (noiabr' 1917-aprel' 1918 gg.). Sbornik dokumentov i materialov (Kiev, 1962), 49.

Other sources examined for resolutions on the national question are: Velikaia oktiabr'skaia sotsialisticheskaia revoliutsiia na Ukraine (fevral' 1917- aprel' 1918; Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukrains'kii RSR. Vazhlyvishii rishennia Komunistychnoi partii i Radians'koho uriadu 1917-1959, 2 vols. (Kiev, 1959); Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukrains'kii RSR 1917-1927. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv (Kiev, 1979)


126. Mazepa, Bol'shevyzm i okupatsiia Ukrainy, 90. For the functions of komnezamy see A. Shlikhter, "Bor'ba za khleb na Ukraiene v 1919 g.," Litopys revoliutsii, no.2, 1928, 105.


129. Shlikhter, "Bor'ba," 106; Popov, Narys istorii, 194-5. Prior to the requisition without pay, Soviet agents in the countryside could only offer the peasantry ten per cent of the value of their grain in whatever goods the government had in stock.


131. Ibid., 100.

132. In 1917 A. Iakubov claimed that to "squeeze" 820-980 million kilogrammes of grain out of the Ukrainian peasantry a railway car of textile goods and 200 million rubles in money were needed. Cited by V. Holubnychy, "The 1917 Agrarian Revolution."

133. See the CPSU Central Committee resolution "O sovetskoi vlasti na Ukraiene," in
Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia partiia (bol'shevikov) v rezoliutsiiakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts.K., 2 vols. (Moscow, 1935) I: 324-6. See also the report of the IVth all-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in Nova doba, no.23, 1920, 2-3.


135. See peasant complaints about corrupt heads of land commissions, surveyors, etc. in Bil'shovyk, 10 August, 14 September 1922.

136. Visti, 14 August 1925.


140. Cited ibid., 293.


143. Non-payment meant the immediate confiscation of the harvest plus a minimum eight-month prison sentence. "Interference" in tax collection resulted in summary execution. "Many errors," it appears, were committed by the tribunals according to Bil'shovyk, 6, 22 August 1922.

144. Bil'shovyk, 3 August 1922.

145. Bil'shovyk, 14 September, 10 August 1922. Collective farms in this period, one should point out, did not have socialized production, but were more consumer cooperatives.

146. See Bil'shovyk, 12 September 1922.

147. Bil'shovyk, 24 August 1922.

148. See the report of Frunze's growing dissagreements with the Moscow centre in Dilo, 22 October 1922.

149. Bil'shovyk, 31 August 1922; Dilo 6 September 1922.

150. Dilo, 22 October 1922.

151. See Bil'shovyk, 10 August, 14 September 1922; Visti, 17 November 1923.

153. *Bil'shovyk*, 10 August 1922.

154. Foreign intervention as well as Denikin's occupation of Ukraine also contributed to this process. See Adams, "The Awakening of the Ukraine," 233.

155. See *Nova doba*, no.43, 1920, 4. The *Nova doba* report remarked that the command "outdoes anything the Cheka or Dzerzhinsky ever ordered."


158. At the 4th all-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets the UKP argued that the village needed class struggle, only Bolshevik policies were generating inter-class solidarity, rather than class antagonisms. See *Nova doba*, no.24, 1920, 3.

159. A scholarly analysis of peasant resistance during this period had yet to be written. The best Soviet work is by Kucher, *Rozhrom zbroinoi vnutral'noi kontrrevolutsii na Ukraïni v 1921-1923 rr*. See also Iurii Hai, *Z kym i proty koho. Hanebnyi shliakh petliurivshchyny ta ii spad-kolem'stiv* (Kiev, 1980) and sections of D.I. Golinkov, *Krushenie antisoetskogo podpol'ia v SSSR*, 2 vols. (Moscow, 1978). Popov, *Narys*, 247 provides interesting examples of the size of partisan units that were active in 1920. For instance, 15,000 partisans in the Oleksandriv'ski district, 7,000 near Kaniv, 3,000 in the Zolotonosha region, etc. The press is the best source of information. For examples of partisan activity during 1922, see: *Bil'shovyk*, 3, 5 and 10 September, 8 October 1922. See also the Lviv newspaper *Dilo*, 2, 27 September, 21 October 1922. For reports of partisan activity during 1923 see *Bil'shovyk*, 7 and 9 February, 5 and 24 March and 24 July 1923 and *Dilo*, 8 September, 26 June, 10 October, 17 September 1923.

160. Kucher, *Rozhrom*, 24. See 19-24 for a characterization of the national views of peasant movements in this region. As for the powerful Makhnovist movement, from 1920 on it moved towards a decidedly national, even chauvinist, position. The newspaper of that movement, for example, called for "the liberation of our native Ukraine from Russians." This development is well documented in an early study. See M. Kubanin, *Makhnovshchina. Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v stepnoi Ukraïne v gody grazhdanskoi voiny* (Leningrad, 1927), 165-66. For an analysis of the villages' attitudes on the national question see Myk. Shapoval, "Svitova revoliutsiia, Rosiia i Ukraïina," *Boritesia-poborete!* no.3, 1920, 21 and passim.

162. See Bil'shovyk, 21 March, 19 April 1923.

163. Ravich-Cherkasskii, Istoriia, 158. Local Soviets existed but komnezamy members were instructed to ensure that non-members did not participate in elections to Soviets and their executive committees and that non-members were not present during elections. See Mazepa, Bol'shevyzm, 89. Elections to the republic's Congress of Soviets were weighted in such a way as to ensure that peasants would never gain a majority: one deputy was elected per 1,000 Red army soldiers, one deputy per 10,000 workers and one per 50,000 peasants. See Myk. Shapoval, "Svitova," 19.


165. Among the duties of komnezam members was to keep a register and a close watch over all those whom the komnezam statutes excluded from membership in the organization. The material incentives were formidable: exemption from taxation, a share of taxes collected in addition to a share of stocks of grain and seeds from state warehouses, first priority on all manufactured goods arriving in the village, free medical, veterinary, agronomical and surveying services, free use of state-owned agricultural machines, priority in admission and tuition-free education (at all levels), priority in obtaining employment in the state apparatus and, free use of forests, implements, buildings, livestock and lands of estates not distributed to the peasants. See Komitety nezamozhnykh, 12-4, 119-20, 157-8, 177; Iu. Ozers'kyi, "Chotyry z'izdy komnezamiv," Znannia, no.27, 1924, 3.

166. Kommunist, 15 July 1923.


168. Ibid. P. Postyshev described the manner in which komnezamy exercised their authority in one village thus: "For four years the head of the komnezam hit peasants across the face, four years!...For four years this individual imprisoned a whole number of citizens, for four years he provoked the village..." Bil'shovyk, 7 April 1925.

169. Visti, 20 August 1925.


171. Bil'shovyk, 17 June 1923.

172. Bil'shovyk, 5 December 1923.

173. The land under cultivation contracted in the following manner: if 1916=100, 1921, 88.8, 1922, 74.7."Narodnie hospodarstvo Ukrainy 1924 roku," Chervonyi shliakh, no.11-2, 1924, 245.

174. This aspect is analysed in some depth by L. Frei, "Predisloviie," in
Eksportnye resursy Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1923), iii, xviii.

175. Bil'shovyk, 13 and 23 April 1923.


177. See V. Arnautiv, "Inteligentsiia i radians'ka vlada," Znannia, no.21-2, 1924, 7.

178. Robitnycho-selians'ka pravda, cited in Bil'shovyk, 22 January 1924. The editors of the latter denounced the former as publishing "anti-party propaganda in the pages of the party press."

179. See cautions to that effect in Bil'shovyk, 5 December 1923.

180. For the history of the cooperative movement during 1917 see A. Serbinenko, Les sociétés coopératives en Ukraine (Vienna, 1919) and Dniprovs'kyi soiuz spozhyvychykho soiuziv. Vseukraïns'kyi tsentr spozhyvchoi kooperatsii (Kiev, 1918). In 1917 consumer cooperatives alone had 15,000 branches with over 3 million members.

181. Bil'shovyk, 12 September 1922.

182. See M.V. Melikhova, "Z istorii rozvytku spozhyvchoi kooperatsii v Ukraïns'kii RSR (1921-1925 rr.)," Istoriia narodnoho hospodarstva ta ekonomichnoi dumky Ukraïns'koi RSR, vypusk 9 (Kiev, 1975), 84-8.


185. Vytanovych, Istoriia ukraïns'koho kooperatyvnoho rukhu, 295; Bil'shovyk, 28 September 1922.

186. Bil'shovyk, 7 February and 19 April 1923. They were led by D. Lebed' and other supporters of the "struggle between the two cultures" school. See discussion below.


189. Ibid., 49-50.
190. Kommunist, 17 April 1925. See Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the 
Ukraine, 90-6 for a discussion of the 12th CPUS Congress.

191. V. Arnautiv, "Intelihentsiia i radians'ka vlada," 7.

192. Kommunist, 28 May 1925. For an account of the growth of the 
church see Dilo, 19 October 1922, 27 October 1923, Bil'shovyk, 
6 and 17 August 1922. For an analysis of the growth of local 
soviet see: B.M. Babii, Ukrains'ka radians'ka derzhava v period 
vidbudovy narodnoho hospodarstva (1921-1925 rr.) (Kiev, 1961), 233-57. 
For a discussion of increased Ukrainian participation in local govern­ 
ment see: Basil Dmytryshyn, The Ukraine 1918-1953: A Study of Russian 
Bolshevik Nationality Policy (New York, 1956), 82-3.

193. Pravda, 14 March 1925.

194. Pravda, 13 January 1925.

195. Dymivka was a village in the Mykolaiv okruh were local party 
officials were exposed after they had murdered a peasant named 
Malynov's'kyi. It was cited as an example of what was wrong with many 
rural organizations. See Ie.I. Kvirinh, "Pro Dymivku," in Partiia i 
selo, 85-7.

196. Kommunist, 24 March 1925.

197. Kommunist, 24 October 1925.

198. Pravda, 29 January 1925.

199. Bil'shovyk, 15 April 1925. Examples of demands for books, newspapers 
and schools as reflected in the press are so numerous that it would 
be impossible to cite even a fraction of them. Among the more inter­ 
esting are those found in Visti, 4 December 1927 (on the village's 
"famine for Ukrainian literature"), Visti, 9 October 1926 (on educa­
tion, especially for a curriculum that "will teach our children 
arithmetic and not about the life of Lenin").

200. Visti, 30 April 1926. "Diad'ko", in this context, means "old man".

201. Bil'shovyk, 6 May 1925.

202. See for example Bil'shovyk, 10 August 1924.

203. Bil'shovyk, 7 April 1925.

204. Pravda, 4 September 1925.

205. D. Lebed', "Partiia i selo," in Partiia i selo, 42.

207. Visti, 22 October 1925.

208. Forty per cent of Ukraine's households were without implements and there was one plough for every 11.3 hectares of land. Visti, 11 July 1928. In right-bank Ukraine, 57 per cent of households were without livestock. Visti, 2 September 1927.

209. See data on changes in the size of peasant holdings in Shul'ha, Pidhotovka sutsil'noi kolektyvizatsii, 43; on the causes of differentiation among the peasantry see M. Volobuiev, "Suchasne selo (pro klasove rozsharuvannia)," Znannya, no.21-2, 1924.


211. Iv. Lebedyns'kyi, Selians'kyi indeks na Ukraini. Metodolohichni osnovy ioho vyrakhovuvannia (Kharkiv, 1928), 12.

212. Carr, Socialism in One Country, I: 239.


214. Visti, 22 October 1925. Agricultural policies together with land-use legislation was not in the hands of the republic's government, an arrangement against which the republic's leadership protested. See S. Pidhainyi, Ukrains'ka intelihentsiia na Solovkakh (n.p., 1947), 51-2 for reminiscences of Poloz, the republic's Commissar of Finance and his complaints on this score.

215. M.B. Gurevich, Priamoe oblozhenie sel'skogo khoziaistva Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1923), 64. See also Kommunist, 9 December 1924.

216. Visti, 3 September 1927.


218. A. Il'nyts'kyi, Traktor i motorovyi pluh ta zastosuvannia ikh u sil's'kому hospodarstvi (Kamianets'-Odesa, 1922), 7-8.

219. See complaints on this score by Radchenko, the head of Ukraine's trade unions, in Visti, 6 November 1924.

220. Visti, 6 May 1925.

221. Finansy Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1927), 45-7.

To give an example of how profitable that trade could be one has but to compare commodity prices on the Moscow and London exchanges. Oats, for instance, sold for 42 (gold) kopecks per 16.4 kilogrammes in Moscow, 118 in London. See Bil'shovyk, 21 March 1923.

Because of the absence of facilities to handle export "we burnt ourselves on exports," admitted Chubar. Visti, 6 May 1925.

The number of TSOZy grew from 90 in 1922 to 3009 in 1927 whereas collective farms increased from 141 to 258 and artels declined from 2782 to 2299. "Kolektyvni hospodarstva na Ukraini," Statystyka Ukrainy, no.163, 1929, vi-vii. The share of collective farms and artels continued to fall throughout 1927-8. See Visti, 29 March 1929.

Visti, 29 March 1929.

Visti, 1 July 1928 and 29 March 1929.

Visti, 29 March 1929.

P. Khrystiuk, "Novyi kurs komunistychnoi polityky i nasha partiia," Boritesia-poborete!, no.10, 1921, 22.


See Visti, 19 January and 20 February 1929.

Visti, 8 January 1929.


An analysis of these improvements can be found in Mykhailo Trykhrest, NEP na Ukraini (n.p., 1947).

Whether the working class were as quiescent on national and cultural issues as is generally assumed remains an open question, given the virtually complete lack of research on this topic.

This was a point made by Ukrainian workers attending the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Railwaymen. Robitnycha hazeta, 15 July 1917.

M. Skrypnyk, "Donbas i Ukraina," Statti i promovy z natsional'noho pytannia (Munich, 1974), 12.

Robitnycha hazeta, 8 December 1917.

Robitnycha hazeta, 9 December 1917. Many more examples could be provided. See Oksen Lola's interesting report in Robitnycha hazeta, 23 December 1917.
241. Robitnycha hazeta, 22 December 1917. This account of the spread of the national movement in the south mentions "slow steady progress" in this respect beginning in December 1917.


244. Mazepa, Bol'shevyzm, 31.


246. Lane, The Roots of Russian Communism, 50-1, 175; V. Modestov, Rabochee i professionalnoe dvizhenie v Donbasse do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoj sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii (Moscow, 1957), 21.


249. Popov, Narys istorii, 122.


In some sources this Congress is referred to as the "Second All-Ukrainian..." The First All-Ukrainian Workers' Congress met in Kiev in July 1917 under the leadership of Ukrainian Social Democrats. It was not representative of the entire working class in Ukraine. The "Second" was really the "First" representative congress. The Congress that met under the leadership of Ukrainian Social Democrats hardly dealt with industrial issues, but focused on autonomy and the agrarian question. See its resolutions in S.M. Dimanshtein, ed. Revoliutsiia i natsional'nyi vopros. Dokumenty i materialy po istorii natsional'nego voprosa v Rossii i SSSR v XX veke (Moscow, 1930), 171-3.


254. For an account of the organizational structure of trade unions prior to the congress see V. Grinevich, Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh...
v Rossii (Moscow, 1923) 186-207. For the post-congress period, see B. Kolos, "Profesiinyi rukh na Ukraini," 197-8.

255. Kolos, "Profesiinyi rukh na Ukraini," 199 and Volin, "Men'sheviki," 82-3, 90-4. "Otamaniia" refers to the various insurgent groups which operated more or less independently of the leadership of the Ukrainian national movement.


258. Skliarenko, Narysy istorii profspilkovoho rukhu, 90-1


263. Tretii vserossiiskii s"ezd professional'nykh soiuzov 6-13 aprelia 1920. Stenograficheskii otchet. Chast' 1. Plenumy (Moscow, 1921), 43.


265. Znannia, no.43-4, 1924, 22.

266. Ibid., and Visti, 7 November 1924.


270. P. Solodub complained in 1923 that nobody studied the national composition of the working class although everyone seemed to have an opinion about it. Bil'shovyk, 3 August 1923.

271. The weight of industrial workers in the trade unions increased from
65 per cent in 1922 to 83 per cent in 1925. Almost 90 per cent of the work force was unionized by 1926. Istoriia robitynoho klasu Ukrains'koi RSR, II: 107; Visti, 24 October 1926.

272. In 1926, 50 per cent of the membership of trade unions was Ukrainian. Visti, 29 May 1929; Trud i profsoiuzy na Ukraine. Statisticheki spravochnik za 1921-1928 gg. (Kharkiv, 1928), 110; Natsional'nyi perepys robitynykh ta službovtsiv Ukrainy (zhovten' -lystopad 1929), (Kharkiv, 1930), xvi.

273. For a discussion of the concepts and categories employed by the census in defining the working class see Masiutin, "Profesiina statystyka v Rosii ta na Ukraini," 77-83.

274. Natsional'nyi perepys, xvi.

275. Ibid., 72-4.

276. Sadov's'kyi, Pratsia v USSR, 130.


278. Statystichna khronika viddilu statystyky pratsi Tsentral'noho statystichnoho upravlinnia, no.26, 1928, 10.

279. See M. Skrypnyk, "Zblyzhennia i zlyttia natsii za doby sotsializmu," Statti i promovy, 260-1.


281. Ibid., xxiii.

282. K. Kimchynaz, "Do iazykovoi problemy v Donbasi," Kul'tura i pobut, 15 November 1925. (Supplement to Visti).


284. See the law governing Ukrainization in Natsional'nyi sostav Sovetskoi Ukrainy. Ob"iasnitel'naia zapiska k etnograficheskoj karte Ukrainskoi sotsialisticheskoi sovetskoi respubliki (Kharkiv, 1925), 126-30.


286. Visti, 14 October 1924.

287. Visti, 9 January 1929.

288. Visti, 28 May 1924. For other examples see Visti, 20 March 1924; Bil'shovyk, 2 July, 23 August 1924.

290. **Visti**, 7 and 11 November 1924.

291. **Visti**, 24 October 1926.

292. **Visti**, 4 December 1927. This is the substance of Rabichev's attack on Shums'kyi. Rabichev was the trade union functionary responsible for cultural work in the trade unions.


294. **Visti**, 17 January 1925. The Ukrainization of unions of agriculture and forestry and sugar refinery workers was completed by 1924.


296. **Visti**, 7 April 1927.

297. **Visti**, 29 October 1927.


300. **Visti**, 20 October 1925.

301. **Visti**, 2 August 1925.

302. For examples see **Visti**, 22 September 1928, especially the report of the State Publishing House's first exhibition of Ukrainian books in Donbas in **Visti**, 17 April 1925.


304. Ibid.


307. **Visti**, 3 October 1928. The views of one Donbas worker on contemporary "socialist realist" literature were interesting. He was tired of the tedious output of novels dealing with "the social differentiation in the village" and suggested that perhaps publishing houses should concentrate on translating the classics of world literature instead. **Visti**, 22 September 1928. Workers in Smila sent a letter to their trade union's cultural department asking it not to send them "erunda" (rubbish). **Visti**, 29 April 1925.

308. *IV Vseukrains'kyi z'izd profspilok 1-8 hrudnia 1928 r. Stenohra-
These groups did not always meet the approval of local trade union officials. The case of number 6 Petrovs'kyi factory in Odesa was not isolated. Workers included such activities as readings of the ever-popular Ostap Vyshnia. Their group was ordered to be disbanded by the trade union when it went 20 rubles over the budget. Visti, 8 April 1928. In Kremenchuk, to cite another example, the trade union official Poliakov systematically blocked workers' attempts to introduce Ukrainian theatre to the town by demanding 50 per cent of the gross revenue of all performances for union coffers. Visti, 20 November 1924.

309. See Visti, 21 December 1928 and Literatura, nauka i mystetstvo, 1 June 1924 (supplement to Visti).


311. Horlach, Virna opora, 33. For examples of how this worked in an individual factory see Visti, 21 February 1925.

312. The visit of writers to factories is a case in point. In a Stalino trade union library, prior to the arrival of Ukrainian writers, 68 individuals took out Ukrainian books on a monthly basis. After the visit this increased to 750. Visti, 3 October 1928.

313. See a discussion of this point in Visti, 3 October 1928.

314. Antonenko-Davydovych, Zemleiu, 149.

315. Pricing, budgets, finances, investment, trade and operational control of industry - all were in the hands of central authorities. The leading sectors of the Ukrainian economy were under all-Union jurisdiction. The function of the Ukrainian Supreme Council for the National Economy was "to ensure that the direction given to the economy centrally will be implemented." Promyshlennost' Ukrainy. Itogi 1921-22 g. i promplan na 1922-23 g. (Kharkiv, 1923), 516.


319. Ibid. It should be mentioned here that Volobuiev, whose article "Do problemy ukrains'koi ekonomiky" is considered to be the most far-reaching elaboration of the economic platform of national communism, was not an "obscure" economist, as is generally believed. See Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 154. He was the head of Holovpolitosvita, a large branch of Narkomos responsible
for all adult education, literacy schools, etc. In this capacity Volobuiev delivered a number of important reports to various conferences. See Visti, 30 October, 1925. Volobuiev was also a widely published author whose articles appeared in Znannia, Radians'ka osvita and other publications. Articles such as his "Orhanizatsiia pratsi," Radians'ka osvita, no.1, 1923, 20-4 show that he was in fact an economist and not as Holubnychy maintains in "The Views of M. Volobuyev", merely a pedagogue. We make these points in order to show that Volobuiev's positions undoubtedly reflected the views of a significant section of the republic's leadership.

320. Visti, 22 May 1927.

321. Visti, 1 December 1927. Dudnyk at the same congress demonstrated that the left bank was suffering from the same location policy.

322. Visti, 18 May 1927. Over a quarter century later N. Khrushchev observed, "sugar is mainly grown in Ukraine," so "is it necessary for the Institute /of sugar/ to be near Moscow?" Pravda, 21 March 1954.

323. The Ukrainian VRNH argued that a textile industry was essential since the republic was constantly experiencing a dire shortage of textile goods and was paying a much higher price for the goods it obtained than was being charged in Russia. Visti, 16 September 1927. In 1925, for example, only 45 per cent of Ukraine's needs for textiles were being met. Visti, 13 September, 1925.

324. Visti, 14 February 1928.

325. Ibid. See also the statement by Poloz, the republic's Commissar of Finance in Visti, 2 March 1924.

326. B.V. Sihal, Do pytannia pro pryvatnyi kapital na Ukraini (Kharkiv, 1929), 146-7.

In Kiev province (1924) for example, one third of all industrial manufacturing enterprises were in private hands, a further 12 per cent were run by local cooperatives. Mykola Zhornikov, Promyslovist' Kyivshchyny v 1923-24 r. Porivnial'na kharakterystyka do peredvoiennoho i voiennoho chasu (Kiev, 1926), 21.

327. See Kaganovich's report to the 15th CPSU Congress. XV s"ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b) 2-19 dekabria 1927 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1928), 887-92.

328. Visti, 16 May 1928.

329. See the presentation to the all-Union Central Executive Committee (Ts.I.K.) by the Ukrainian delegation led by D. Rapoport-Darin, Visti, 25 March 1926, and Znannia, no.17-18, 1924, 19-20.

330. Visti, 14 February 1928.
331. For a detailed analysis of this question see V. Ivakys, "Donbas i uralo-kuznets'kyi basein za chasiv pershoi i druhoi piatylityky," Suchasni problemy ekonomiky Ukrainy, III, 1936, 66-75.

332. Visti, 2 March 1929.

333. Visti, 9 March 1929.

334. N.I. Fomin, "Promyshlenost' Ukrainy," Voprosy ekonomiki (Kharkiv, 1927), 5-40. "Ukraine or the Urals?" was a question intensely debated from 1927-9 on the pages of the Ukrainian press. See Visti, 6 July 1927, 13 and 15 May 1928 in particular.

335. The demand that these industries be turned over to republican jurisdiction was raised but turned down. Visti, 7 December 1925.

336. For example workers in communication in 1926 received fifty per cent of the pre-war wage and "in comparison with other workers communications workers were far from occupying last place." Kommunist, 3 April 1926.

337. Chubar clearly recognized this when at a Kharkiv party conference he made the point that at a time of economic difficulties the slogan of national economic development was leading to the popularization of "dangerous ideas", meaning Ukrainian nationalism. Visti, 13 June 1926.

338. IV Vseukrains'kyi z'izd profspilok, 195, 185, 196-7, 203, 179, 175, 203, 207. The pages refer respectively to each of the speakers cited.

339. Znannia, no.41-2, 1924, 15.

340. This statement is based on the Russian textbooks recommended for the literacy campaign. See Bil'shovyk, 4 January 1923.

341. Visti, 25 September 1925. In 1924, 10 per cent of Kiev's likpunkty were Ukrainian. Visti, 4 March 1924. In 1925 this increased to 30 per cent. H.M. Shevchuk, Kul'turne budivnytstvo na Ukraini u 1921-1925 rokakh (Kiev, 1963), 60.


343. H.M. Shevchuk, Kul'turne budivnytstvo, 68-70.

344. Visti, 7 April 1925.

345. Visti, 7 May 1925.

346. Visti, 26 March 1925.
347. Bil'shovyk, 11 September 1924.

348. Nauka, osvita i kul'tura 16.


351. Natsional'nyi perepys, table 28, 102, 106, 109, XXIX.


358. I. Stalin, Stat'i i rechi ob Ukraine. Sbornik (Kiev, 1936), 112.


360. M. Skrypnyk, Do teorii borot'by dvokh kul'tur (Kharkiv, 1926), 10.

361. Bil'shovyk, 6 June 1923.


363. V. Zatons'kyi, "Do radians'koho uchytel'ia,"Radians'ka osvita, no.1, 1923, 7.
364. Compare Bil'shovyk, 19 April 1923 and 1 January 1924.


366. Bil'shovyk, 4 September 1924.

367. Bil'shovyk, 23 April 1923.

368. Bil'shovyk, 15 April 1923.

369. Visti, 6 February 1924.


372. Bil'shovyk, 11 August 1923.

373. For examples of this Ukrainization by stages, see Dilo, 23 August 1923.


375. Bil'shovyk, 7 February 1923 and Visti, 20 November 1926.

376. See a survey of 42 raions in Visti, 21 October 1925.

377. Visti, 4 December 1927.

378. Visti, 24 June 1924.

379. In 1925 it was announced that teachers refusing to Ukrainize themselves would be dismissed. Visti, 11 November 1925.

380. Visti, 20 November 1926.


382. Visti, 2 September 1924 and IV Vseukrains'kyi izd profspilok, 31. Village teachers in the Chernihiv region were paid 10 rubles a month.

383. These conditions are graphically portrayed by V. Koriak, "Uchytel's'kyi pobut," Radians'ka osvita, no.1, 1923, 70-7.

384. Bil'shovyk, 23 March 1923; Znannia, no.25, 22.
385. Visti, 1 April 1926.
386. Visti, 9 August 1924.
388. Visti, 7 April 1925.
389. Visti, 6 January 1929.
396. In the 1920s Ukraine's educational system was unique in the Soviet Union. Its secondary schools, geared to meet a shortage of skilled labour, were called professional schools (profshkoly) and offered a wide range of vocational training programmes. This aspect of the Ukrainian educational system is discussed in depth by S. Siropolko, Narodnia osvita na Soviets'kii Ukraini (Warsaw, 1934) and Ia.P. Riappo, Narodnia osvita na Ukraini za desiat' rokov revoliutsii (Kharkiv, 1927).
398. In 1925 students of peasant origin accounted for 27 per cent of those attending profshkoly, almost 40 per cent were from white-collar staff background. By 1927 students of peasant origin had increased to one third. "Narodnia osvita Ukrainy. Ustanovy profesiinoi ta politychnoi osvity na 1 hrudnia 1925 r.," Statystyka
In 1923 for example the student body was purged of "non toiling elements". Visti, 19 May 1923 and Bil'shovyk, 24 May 1923. For other aspects such as liberalized admissions, see Andrew J. Popovecz, "Higher Education in the Soviet Union: A Descriptive Study," Ph.D. dissertation, Wayne State University, 1976, 56-61.

In institutes the proportion of students of peasant origin increased from 19 per cent in 1923-4 to 42 per cent by 1926-7; in tekhnikumy from 30 to 48 per cent. Riappo, Narodnia osvita na Ukraini, 73.

On the material conditions of students see "Lysty z Ukrainy. Sered studentiv," Nova Ukraina, no.2-3, 1925, 10-1.

A 1928 survey showed the impact of these policies on the student population. About half the vu_z_students knew the Ukrainian language quite well. Most were familiar with Ukrainian literature and were avid followers of Ukrainian theatre. Their knowledge of Ukrainian history, however, left much to be desired. Rural youth were the best informed on this subject, as were students of working class origin. The least informed were students who came from the families of white-collar staff. Surprisingly, students knew more about nineteenth century Ukrainian history than the events of the contemporary period. Visti, 16 June 1928.


M. Skrypnyk, Neprymyrennym shliakhom. Dopovid' na okrpartkons-
ferentsii v Odesi 12-ho hrudnia 1928 roku. (Kharkiv, 1929), 82.

"Vsesoiuznyi shkil'nyi perepys 15-XII 1927 roku. Ustanovy...," table 11a, 133.
412. Visti, 6 August 1925.

413. Ibid.

414. L.V. Ivanova, Formirovanie sovetskoi nauchnoi intelligentsii (1917-1927 gg.) (Moscow, 1980), 309.

415. In 1914-15 out of 105 vuzy only 21 were located outside of Russia. Ukraine had 17 vuzy. By 1927-8 Ukraine had 37 such institutions out of a total for the USSR of 131. Ivanova, Formirovanie, 293.


417. Visti, 22 October 1925.


419. Vseobshchee obuchenie, 121; Ivanova, Formirovanie, 296; Hrushevs'kyi, "Perspektyvy," 7-8; Visti, 16 June 1928; Komunist /formerly Kommunist/, 1 July 1929.

420. See Visti, 12 March 1927, 22 October 1925.

421. The number of vuzy students per 10,000 population was 13.1 in Ukraine, 11.6 in Russia. Between 1924 and 1929 the number of students in vuzy in Ukraine grew by 50 per cent (27,224 to 40,844) as compared with a 6 per cent increase for Russia (117,485 to 124,124). In 1929 students of peasant origin accounted for 26 per cent of vuzy students in Ukraine, 21 per cent in Russia. Similarly the figures for workers was 36 and 35 per cent respectively and in the case of white-collar staff 32 and 40 per cent. See Vseobshchee obuchenie, 114, 117, 129.

Ukraine's unique educational system, which focused on producing as quickly as possible a basic complement of intelligentsia through the tekhnikumy facilitated the expansion of higher education. Ukraine's institutes had 17 per cent of the all-Union institute student population, 3 percentage points less than its populations' weight in the union. Ukraina, Statystichnyi shchorichnyk na 1928 rik, XVIII. See also D.S. Spryrydonova, "Z istorii rozvytku seredn'oi spetsial'noi ta vyshchoi osvity v Donbasi (1921-1929 rr.)," Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal, no.8, 1974, 51-6.

422. Osyp Hermaize, "Desiatylittia zhovtneoi revoliutsii i ukrains'ka nauka," Ukraina, bk.6, 1927, iv.

423. See Visti, 11 November 1924 for Riappo's attack on Lunacharsky.
for his proposed all-Union Commissariat of Education. See 
Nauka i osvita, 17 March 1929 and 24 March 1929 (Supplement
to Visti) for the unification of Ukraine's educational system
with Russia's.

424. Hrushevskyi "Perspektyvy," 13. For other examples of Ukraine 's
opposition to the measure see: Visti, 8 September 1925 and
15 March 1927.

425. Visti, 8 March 1929.

426. See the campaign for a "clear class line" in literature, history,
etc. in Visti, 8 January, 8 March 1929.

427. S. Pylypenko, "10 rokiv ukrains'koi radians'koi knyhy,
Biuleten' Derzhavnoho vydavnytstva Ukrainy, no.4-5, 1929, 6.

428. For an analysis of book consumption according to social group
see: I. Doroshev, "Tsifry i fakty kul'turnogo stroitel'stva,"
Kommunisticheskaya revoliutsiia no.9, 1928, 31, 39; E. Popovkin,
"Kul'turnaia revoliutsiiia na sele, 'melochi' byta, krest'ianstvo
'zavtra'," Kommunisticheskaya revoliutsiia, no.11-12, 1928, 97-
102.


430. V.A. Ruban, Formuvannia lenins'kykh tradytsii ukrains'koi

431. M. Khliebnikov, "Finansy Derzhavnoho vydavnytstva Ukrainy za 10
rokiv (1920-1929)," Biuleten' Derzhavnoho vydavnytstva Ukrainy,
no.4-5, 1929, 25.

432. D. Isaievych, "Moderni iezuity abo perenoha ukrains'koi stykhii.
Z nahody vystavky knyh SSSR v Prazi," Nova Ukraina, no.2-3, 1925,
139.

433. M. Shapoval, Sotsiografiia Ukrainy. Sotsial'na struktura Ukrainy
(Prague, 1933), 67.


435. Visti, 7 February 1929.


437. Kul'tura i pobut, 8 October 1927 (Supplement to Visti).

438. See Radians'ke budivnytstvo, 26 February 1929 (Supplement to Visti).

439. Kul'tura i pobut, 8 October 1927.

441. Bil'shovyk, 16 May 1924.

442. Railway kiosks for example. Visti, 20 March 1924.


446. Visti, 3 September 1926.

447. Literatura, nauka, mystetstvo, 1 June 1924.


449. Bil'shovyk, 20 March 1924.

450. The Ukrainian language share of technical literature jumped from 25 per cent of the total (332 titles) to 50 per cent (785) between 1927 and 1929. "Presa," Chervonyi shliakh, no.5-6, 1932, 148.


452. Because of their high cost there were no mass circulation journals in the republic and few individual subscribers. Journals were received by institutions and libraries, and appear to have had a large readership. The Ukrainization of journals was considerable. In 1928 there were 232 Ukrainian language titles or 77 per cent of the total, 74 per cent of the total number of copies of journals published. They covered a wide range of themes. Pylypenko, "10 rokiv," 8.

453. In the summer of 1927, 83 per cent of all Ukrainian language books purchased were bought in towns. Visti, 27 August 1926.

454. Ihnatiienko, Ukraïns'ka presa, 71.

455. Guthier, "Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism," 38; Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia, 1:78.

457. Ihnatiienko, Ukrainsk'i presa, 73.

458. A. Khyvilia, Natsional'nyi vopros na Ukrain'e (Kharkiv, 1926), 41.

459. N.N. Popov, "Ocherednye zadachi parti i v natsional'nom voprosse," Kommunisticheskaiia revoliutsiia, no.12, 1923, 21; Visti, 28 May 1925. In 1921 the circulation of Visti was as low as 400 copies.


461. Ratau, the republic's press agency was Ukrainized in the summer of 1924. Visti, 29 August 1924.


463. M. Avdiienko, Zahal'ne vanchannia na Ukraini. Stan i perspektyvy (Kharkiv, 1930), table 2, 100-3. (This table gives the date of the founding of each newspaper in Ukraine.)

464. Numerically this represented 54 Ukrainian, 20 Russian and 11 newspapers for other national minorities. The figures do not include village and factory newspapers. Data refer to 1 January 1929. Khyvilia, Do rozv'iazannia, 64.

465. Avdiienko, Zahalne navchannia, 100-3.

466. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, 104.

467. Visti, 6 March 1927. Radio was under the jurisdiction of the all-Union commissariat of posts and telegraph. Narkomos under Skrypnyk demanded exclusive jurisdiction over radio. See Visti, 8 May 1927.

468. Visti, 6 May 1927. The only information that has come to our attention regarding the social composition of the readership of the Ukrainian press is for Proletars'ka pravda, the Kiev newspaper. In 1928, 63 per cent of its readers were white-collar staff, 28 per cent workers, and 3 per cent were peasants. Proletars'ka pravda, 15 February 1928. The following data give some idea of Ukrainian language newspaper subscriptions in Donbas. In 1929 in Horlivka, a mining town, there were 10,000 subscribers to Komunist and another 10,000 to Proletar'. In the space of one year the number of workers subscribing to a Ukrainian language edition in one factory increased from 12 to 500. See O.P. /O. Poltorats'kyi/, "Donbas slu'khai," Nova gene- ratsiia, no.4, 1929, 71.
292

469. Visti, 28 May 1925. For a contemporary account of the role played by the two major dailies - Visti and Bil'shovyk - see Ruban, Formuvannia, 178-9.

470. Visti, 28 May 1925.

471. Visti, 5 May 1926. One should add that in connection with this Ukrainian leaders demanded the establishment of a school of journalism in the republic since the only existing training establishment was in Moscow. See Visti, 17 January, 28 May 1925. Although such a school was not established, special short-term courses in journalism were introduced. See N.F. Ostapenko, "Zakhody Komunistychnoi partii po zmitsenniu partiino-radians'-koi presy na Ukraini u period rekonstruktsii narodnoho hospodarstva (1926-1929)," Zhurnalist. Presa, telebachennia, radio. Pytannia istorii, teorii i praktyky no.5, 1978, 86.

472. Visti, 17 January 1925. Ravich-Cherkas'kyi was the head of the press department of the CPU Central Committee.

473. In 1929 for example, Pravda sold 48,000 copies in Ukraine, Visti sold 70,000 and Komunist 79,000. Zhurnalist, no.5, 1929 cited in Dilo, 20 March 1929 and Avdiienko, Zahal'ne navchannia, table 2, 100. A major impediment to the development of Ukrainian language newspapers was that distribution of newspapers in the republic was in the hands of Soiuzpechat' whose representatives, complained Ravich-Cherkas'kyi, wreaked havoc with the Ukrainian press. See Visti, 17 January 1925. Soiuzpechat' remains the bête noire of cultural activists in Ukraine today.

474. See Borys, Sovietization, 143-5.


476. Ibid., 419. See Ie.M. Skliarenko, Utvorennia Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy ta ii kerivnytstvo borot'boiu trudianshchykh proty avstro-nimets'kykh okupantiv u 1918 r. (Kiev, 1958), 28 for earlier attempts to form a unified Ukrainian organization which were also foiled by the Russian Central Committee.

477. See P.L. Varhatiuk, "Pro prychyny vidsutnosti vseukrains'koho ob'iednannia bil'shovykiv u 1917 r.," in Komunistychna partiiia Ukrainy - boiovyi zahin v borot'bi za pobudovu sotsializmu i komunizmu (Dniproprotshev'sk', 1968), 19 passim.

"It was one of the ironies of history," wrote Skrypnyk, that the Bolsheviks of the south-western region, who had been such bitter opponents of "all manner of national revival" were now suspected by the Bolsheviks of the Donbas-Kryvyi-Rih region "on the same score" for their attempts to create a Ukrainian party. See M.O. Skrypnyk, "Nacherk istorii proletars'koi revoliutsii na Ukraini," Chervonyi shliakh, no.1, 1923, 105.
See M. Ravich-Cherkas'kyi, Korotka istoriia Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1925), 17-21.


See Iu.Iu. Kondufor, "Stvorennia KP(b)U - skladovoi i nevid'nomoi chastyny lenins'koi partii komunistiv," Ukrains'kyi istorichnyj zhurnal, no.4, 1976, 42-52. On the point of the centralized budget see Visti, 15 May 1924. The party budget assigned from Moscow for that year was 137 million rubles.

Skrypnyk, "Nacherk istorii," 100.


The organization in Volyn' province had 150 members whereas the population of the province was over 3 million. In the right-bank, outside the city of Kiev there were 865 members. In Poltava province (total population over 3 million), outside the city of Kremenchuk, there were 1,800 members. S. Shreiber, "K protokolam pervogo vseukrainskogo soveshchania bol'shevikov," Letopis' revoliutsii, no.5, 1925, 65-6.

S. Kikhtiev, Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia i pervye sotsialisticheskie preobrazovaniiia v Donetsko-Krivorozhskom basseine, (Kiev, 1969), 118.

Skrypnyk, "Nacherk istorii," 99-100.


M. Iavorskii, "K istorii KP(b)U," in Oktiabr'skaia revoliutsiia. Pervoe piatiletie (Kharkiv, 1927), 106.

Bil'shovyk, 8 March 1923. See Majstrenko, Borot'bism, 206-8 for an analysis of Borot'bist membership. The numerical advantage of Ukrainian national communist parties over the Bolsheviks would be that much greater if the membership of the UKP were added. According to Bil'shovyk, 15 March 1923 UKP had 150 active members and this figure has gained currency in Western scholarship. The figure of 150 however represents only those who remained in the party by 1923 after three years of persecution. We do not know of any source that gives the membership of UKP. However, at the 2nd UKP Congress in Kharkiv it was reported that the organization had 30 branches and its congress was attended by 87 delegates, all of which indicates that the membership in 1920 was considerably higher than 150. See Nova doba, no.41, 1920, 3.
A. Gilinskii, "Sostoianie KP(b)U k piatiletiiu oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii," in Oktiabr'skaia REVOLIUTSIIA, 167.

490. Lenin, Collected Works, 29:50-1. Much evidence on this point is also contained in The Trotsky Papers, 2 vols. (The Hague, 1964), I: 625, 631, 637, 653; II: 149, 351; M. Donii, Shosta konferentsiia KP(b)U (Kiev, 1963), 40. During April-September 1920 alone, "about a thousand cadres with long party and Soviet experience" were sent to Ukraine from Russia. See Desiatyi s"ezd RKP(b). Protokoly. (Moscow, 1933), 54n.


492. Dvenadtsatyi s"ezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1968), 572; Popov, Narys istorii, 219.


494. The first secretaries were Piatakov, Kviring, Kosior and Molotov. The nationality of various Central Committee members was established here (and below when reference is made to this point) by examining encyclopaedias as well as other secondary sources. Among the most important in the latter category are: B. Levytsky, The Soviet Political Elite (Stanford, 1970); J.Y. Borys, "Who Ruled the Soviet Ukraine In Stalin's Time?(1917-1939)," Canadian Slavonic Papers, XIV, no.2, 1972, 212-33. The names of Central Committee members (Bureau members in the case of April 1918) were obtained from Iavorskii, "K istorii KP(b)U," 93-103; Narysy istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy (1971); V. Holub/nychyi/, "Konspektynyi narys istorii KP(b)U," Ukraints'kyi zbirnyk, no.9, 1957, 31-137.

495. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts K, 4 vols. (Moscow, 1954), 553-6, 250.

496. Odinnadtsatyi s"ezd RKP(b). Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow, 1961), 743; M. Skrypnyk, Neprymyrennym shliakhom, 40.


498. Bil'shovyk, 12 April 1923.


500. Dvenadtsatyi s"ezd RKP(b), 572.

501. Vserossiiskaia perepis' 1922 goda chlenov R.K.P. Itogi partpe-repisi 1922 goda na Ukrainе (Kharkiv, 1922), VII, XII. (Hereafter

503. Itogi 1922, vii, ix, xii, 178-9. Among workers and white-collar staff in the party Ukrainians accounted for 20 and 22 per cent respectively; among peasants, 38 per cent. Geographically, the highest representation of Ukrainians was in Poltava province (56 per cent) followed by Chernihiv (51 per cent). The lowest was in Zaporizhzhia and Donbas (17 per cent).


507. See Chubary's appeal in Bil'shovyk, 15 June 1924 to increase the representation of the Ukrainian-speaking intelligentsia in the party.

508. F. Sherstiuk, Partiine budivnytstvo na Ukraini v 1926-1929 rr. (Kiev, 1960), 61. See also Proletars'ka pravda, 8 July 1928.

509. L. Kahanovych, Natsional'na polityka bil'shovykiv Ukrainy. Dopovid' vyholoshena na X. z"izdi Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy (New York, 1928), 82.


512. See Sherstiuk, Partiine budivnytstvo, 60-1.

513. For a more detailed analysis of the 1927 census see Dmytryshyn, "National and Social Composition," 253-55.

514. Sotsial'nyi i natsional'nyi sostav VKP(b). Itogi vsesoiuznoi partiinoi perepisi 1927 goda (Moscow, 1928), 20. The CPU represented 16 per cent of the total CPSU membership.

VKP(b). II. Kommunisticheskaia prosloika v promyshlennykh predpriiatiiakh (Moscow, 1927), 6-7; Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia perepis' 1927 goda. Vypusk VII; I. Narodnost' i rodnoi iazyk chlenov VKP(b) i kandidatov v chleny. II. Sostav kommunistov korennoi narodnosti v natsional'nykh republikakh i oblastiakh SSR (Moscow, 1927), 51-2; Sotsial'nyi i natsional'nyi, 149-50.

516. Vsesoiuznaia partiinaia perepis' 1927 goda. Vypusk III: Rod zаниятий членов VKP(b) i kandidatov v члены (Moscow, 1927), 154-61.

517. Itogi 1922 and Sotsial'nyi i natsional'nyi, 126.

518. Khvylia, Natsional'nyi vopros, 54-5.

519. Visti, 11 June 1926. In 1926 there were 353,000 members of the Komsomol. L K S M Ukrainy v tsyfrakh i faktakh. Dovidnyk (Kiev, 1978), 24.

520. V. Dubovs'kyi, "Mykola Skrypnyk, iak ia ioho bachyv. (Fragment spohadiv)," Ucrains'kyi zbirnyk, no.10, 1957, 149.
   Bil'shovyk, 12 September 1922 reported that "a Petliurist branch of the Komsomol" had to be closed down in Volyn'.

521. Visti, 12 June 1926.


524. Pravda, 10 December 1925.

525. Sherstiuk, Partiine budivnytstvo, 60.

526. Kahanovych, Natsional'na polityka, 32.


528. Pravda, 10 December 1925.

529. Visti, 2 December 1928.

530. Gilmenskii, "Sostoianie KP(b)U," 175.


532. Visti, 21 October 1925.
Visti, 17 October 1928.

Visti, 10 April 1925 and Bil'shovyk, 10 April 1925. At the 10th CPU Congress, following Shums'kyi's removal from Ukraine for his "deviation" it is noteworthy that the deviation was hardly mentioned in the speeches delivered by the party leadership on that occasion. The Presidium of the Congress, however, did receive two questions regarding Shums'kyi. The first asked, "Shums'kyi has been sent out of Ukraine, but I am still not clear what is the nature of his deviation?" The second, more poignantly, "What kind of Ukrainian statehood and independence is this, when the best workers who have defended Ukrainian statehood have been sent out of Ukraine?" That the press reported these questions is in itself highly indicative of the mood of many within the CPU. Visti, 29 November 1927.

V. Holubnychy, "The Views of M. Volobuyev," 8, 10.


See Izvestiia, 3 January 1919 for Rakovsky's infamous article questioning the existence of a Ukrainian language. His speech to the 12th CPSU Congress is the best testament to his change of mind. See Christian Rakovsky, Selected Writings on Opposition in the USSR 1923-30 (London, 1980), 77-87.

Bil'shovyk, 13 April 1923. Nova doba, (no.10, 1921, 1) wrote the following about Frunze, "the name is absolutely unknown in Ukrainian party circles, obviously appointed...from Moscow."

Ravich-Cherkasskii, Istoriiia, 160.

Nova doba, no.10, 1921, 1.

For a critique of Lobanov's earlier positions see Solodub's intervention at the 9th CPU Congress, Visti, 7 December 1925. For his later position see Visti, 11 January 1927.


Visti, 12 May 1924.

One could justifiably fault these leaders for their illusions about the possibility of carrying out this consolidation within the context of an increasingly totalitarian regime. Butsenko, the Ukrainian "Danton," was later to admit that their greatest mistake was that "we were unable to guarantee our security and that of our nation" and we accepted "the fiction of statehood as a reality". Hryhorii Kostiuk, Okaiani roki. Vid Luk"ianiv'skoj tiurmy do Vorkuts'koj trahedii (1935-40 rr.) (Toronto, 1978), 105.

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552. *Bil'shovyk*, 30 March 1924.
556. V. Vynnychenko, "Revolutsiia v nebezpetsi!" Nova doba, no.37, 1920, 1-2; no.38, 1920, 2-3.
557. Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukrain's'kii RSR, 1:120.
558. Ibid., 244-6.
560. Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukrain's'kii RSR, 1: 346-56.
562. Cited by B.M. Babii, Ukrain's'ka radians'ka derzhava, 284.
564. B.M. Kuritsyn, Gosudarstvennoe sotrudnichestvo mezhdu Ukrainskoi SSR i RSFSR v 1917-1922 gg. (Moscow, 1957), 140.


566. Kommunist, 19 July 1923. See also the appeal to the Ukrainian intelligentsia at the 8th CPU Conference, Visti, 18 May 1924.

567. Dilo, 10 July 1923.

568. Babii, Ukrains'ka radians'ka derzhava, 288 and XV s"ezd VKP(b), 443.

569. See table 1.16, chapter 1.

570. Calculated from Natsional'nyi perepys, XVI, XXV, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXIX, XXX, XLII, table 3, 24, table 4.38. This source compares the 1929 census with the results of the 1926 general population census. The figure giving the nationality of those involved in mental labour according to age is for males only; males occupied more important positions in the administration than females.

571. Kahanovych, Natsional'na polityka, 21. The overwhelming majority of elected local officials belonged to the Ukrainian nationality. This includes the executive committees at the various regional levels of government. See Ukraina. Statystychnyi shchorichnyk na 1928 r., 14-5 for comprehensive statistics on this question.


574. Bil'shovyk, 5 August 1923.

575. S.V. Kosior, Vybrani statti i promovy (Kiev, 1968), 497.

576. The 1924 figures are from M. Shapoval, "Khto keruie Ukrainoiu?" Nova Ukraina, no.2-3, 1925, 3; the 1927 data are from Khvylya, Do rozv"iazannia, 72. Among leading cadres in agriculture in 1927, not surprisingly, two-thirds were Ukrainians.

577. Khvylya, Do rozv"iazannia, 72. By 1929 only 21 per cent of engineers in Ukraine had some pre-1917 work experience. Visti, 10 February 1929.

578. Visti, 16 November 1926.

580. Visti, 14 October 1926.
582. Visti, 8 April 1926.
583. Visti, 6 October 1926.
584. Visti, 24 November 1925.
585. Visti, 21 November 1925.
586. Visti, 5 April 1925.
587. Visti, 5 March 1926.
588. Visti, 20 October 1925.
590. Visti, 20 April 1926.
591. Visti, 21 April 1926.
592. Visti, 19 April 1926.
593. The 1925 figure is from "Tezy Ts.K. KP(b)U pro pidsumky Ukrainizatsii," Visti, 15 June 1926. The 1927 figure is taken from Chubar's report to the 10th Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, Visti, 7 April 1927.
594. Bil'shovyk, 31 July 1924.
595. Visti, 22 March 1927.
596. Visti, 31 December 1925.
598. The 1924 figure is from V. Chubar, "Voprosy khoziaistvennogo stroitel'stva na Ukraine," 3; the 1929 figure from Radians'ke budivnytstvo, 26 February 1929 (supplement to Visti).
599. Radians'ke budivnytstvo, 26 February 1929.
600. Cited by Kahanovych, Natsional'na polityka, 22.
601. Visti, 11 January 1927. Khvilia phrased the problem in somewhat sharper terms. Without Ukrainization, he reported to the 10th CPU Congress in 1927, "we would have a civil war in Ukraine.
under nationalist slogans." Visti, 29 November 1927.

602. Antonenko-Davydovych, Zemleiu ukrains'koiu, 9, 149-50.

603. See Mace, "Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation," 378 passim.

604. Cited by S.V. Kosior, "Pidsumky i naiblyzhchi zavdannia natsional'noi polityky na Ukraini," Chervonyi shliakh, no.8-9, 1933, 206.


606. Visti, 8 January 1929.
Chapter Three: Ukrainian Society in the 1930s
Introduction

Far-reaching changes in Ukrainian society occurred during the 1930s. Urbanization, industrialization, and the expansion of education transformed the social structure of the Ukrainian nation. With Ukrainians emerging as a majority in all the categories indicating social mobilisation, it seemed that the social preconditions for national consolidation had been laid. But the entry of the Ukrainian nation into modernity was accompanied by the unleashing of terror on a mass scale during which millions died and the nation's cultural and political elite was eliminated. Ukrainization was abandoned and Russian supremacy was imposed. A totalitarian regime was established under which the state and its apparatus of repression destroyed all semblance of civil society. The most appropriate question we can ask concerning the 1930s is: what of the Ukrainian nation survived that decade?

In studying those years we are severely handicapped by a lack of data. As the regime rose to its full totalitarian posture it suppressed information to cover up its deeds. The 1937 census, for example, was declared "counter-revolutionary" and its results were not released. To this day the Soviet regime has not provided a full breakdown of the population of Ukraine according to nationality in the light of the following census, that of 1939. Throughout the entire 1930s less than a dozen statistical handbooks were published. But this period is a watershed in Ukrainian history; piecing together fragmentary evidence one can reconstruct social developments during those eventful years. This chapter will attempt to do so by examining five aspects of Soviet Ukrainian reality. The first section, dealing with population, attempts to evaluate the scope of the demographic catastrophe
caused by the famine, the purges and the changes that occurred in the ethno-demographic structure of the republic. Sections two and three, on urbanization and class structure, examine the major social structural transformations and discuss their impact on the national consciousness of Ukrainians. The fourth section, concerned with education and the press, analyses the erosion of the infrastructures of national life. The fifth and final section documents changes in the national and social composition of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and the destruction of an entire generation of cadres.
1. Population

The favourable demographic trends during the 1920s ought to have produced a sizeable increase in the population of Ukraine in the next decade. This did not occur because collectivization, the artificial famine of 1932-3 and the purges decimated the population of the republic. These events will be discussed below: here our concern is to analyse the demographic impact of these tragedies.

How many died during the famine? Harry Lang, editor of the left-wing Jewish daily Forward, published in New York, visited Kharkiv in 1933 and was told by a high-ranking state official: "'Six million people perished from the famine in our country..." The official paused, and repeated, 'six million!'" Adam Tawdul, a Russian-born American citizen who had access to ruling circles in Ukraine thanks to a pre-revolutionary acquaintance with Skrypnyk, was told by Skrypnyk before his death that eight million had perished in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. At that time, the famine had not yet run its course. Another important functionary in Ukraine gave him the figure of eight to nine million dead in Ukraine alone. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung, on the basis of discussions with officials in Moscow, concluded that at least six million perished in Ukraine.

Official statistics published during the first half of the 1930s were notorious for their falsifications, yet even they confirm the major decrease in population. In the autumn of 1932, Petrovs'kyi claimed that the population of Ukraine was 32.1 million and also stated that the increase in the population for 1933 would probably amount to 622,000. In 1934, according to
P.P. Liubchenko's report to the Seventh Congress of Soviets in Moscow, Ukraine had thirty million people. Thus in 1933 alone, almost three million people disappeared. These figures understated the population loss, as can be seen by examining regional statistics. For example, in 1931 the population of Kiev oblast was 8,018,066, according to a handbook published on the eve of the famine. On 1 January 1933 the oblast's population had diminished to 6,130,113, or by almost two million. Similarly, the population of Vinnytsia oblast, according to a newspaper report, was 5,109,000 on 1 January 1932 and only 4,801,124 on 1 January 1933.

The effects of the famine and the purges can also be noted by comparing the results of the 17 January 1939 general population census with earlier data. In 1939, Ukraine's population (within the 1926 boundaries) was 30.9 million. In 1932, the population was 32.1 million. Under normal conditions, according to M. Ptukha's 1931 projections, Ukraine (within the 1926 boundaries) ought to have had 36 million people. Over five million people were missing. The actual loss was even greater, since there was substantial immigration to Ukraine during the 1930s.

"Ukrainians," as the Polish scholar J. Radziejowski pointed out, "were not the only ones to suffer during this period. But if we speak of collectivization in particular, they surely have the sad distinction of being its greatest victims." In 1926, there were 31.2 million Ukrainians in the USSR, but in 1939, 28.1 million: over a thirteen year period the number of Ukrainians diminished by 3.1 million, or 11 per cent. The population of the USSR, on the other hand, increased by 16 per cent, and the number of Russians by 27 per cent. The drop in the absolute number of Ukrainians in the Soviet Union must be evaluated in light of the fact that Ukrainians had among the highest rates of natural increase of any nation in Europe during the second half of the 1920s. According to Radziejowski's calculations, there ought to have
been 33.7 million Ukrainians in the Soviet Union in 1939. Instead, there were only 28.1 million, which meant a demographic loss of 9.3 million people. Most specialists, including those among dissident circles in the Soviet Union, such as M. Maksudov, believe that approximately six million perished during the famine of 1932-3.

Until recently, it was impossible to evaluate the effects of the events of the 1930s on the ethno-demographic structure of Ukraine. V.I. Kozlov's study published in 1975 was the first to make public the number of Ukrainians and Russians in the Ukrainian SSR in the light of the 1939 census. His figures include the Crimea. Comparing the 1939 census with those of 1929 (including the Crimea), we find that the Ukrainians' share of the republic's population dropped by five per cent, whereas the number of Russians increased by three per cent. (See table 3.1) This development reflected the impact of collectivization, the famine and the purges on the Ukrainian population. It was also brought about by the sizeable Russian immigration that occurred during the 1930s, especially the influx of many Russian functionaries who arrived to take control of the republic's institutions. In 1938, for example, almost a quarter of those migrated to urban centres in Ukraine came from outside the boundaries of the republic.

Khrushchev was right when he wrote, "Perhaps we'll never know how many people perished directly as a result of collectivization, or indirectly as a result of Stalin's eagerness to blame his failure on others." What we do know is that Ukrainians were not merely incidental victims of the Stalinist terror that gripped the entire Soviet Union. There were, as we discuss below, a Ukrainian specificity to the terror, a perverse recognition of Ukrainians' claims to separate development.
### TABLE 3.1

**National Composition of the Population of Ukraine, 1926-39***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>29,733,000</td>
<td>23,296,000</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>2,977,000</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>3,460,000</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>31,785,000</td>
<td>23,362,000</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>4,100,000</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>4,323,000</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes the Crimea

Source: Table 2.1; V. Sadov's'kyi, "Ukraintsi poza mezhany USSR na osnovi perepysu 1926 r.,” Ukrains'ka liudnist' S.S.S.R. (Warsaw, 1931), 139; V.I. Kozlov, Natsional'nosti SSSR (Moscow, 1975), table 13, 108-9.
ii. Urbanization

Stalin, in a 1931 speech to Soviet industrial administrators, explained the need to maintain high levels of industrial growth in the following way:

The tempo must not be reduced! ...
To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind.
And those who fall behind get beaten! One feature of the history of old Russian was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her—because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, political backwardness, cultural backwardness, agricultural backwardness, industrial backwardness...You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: "You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia."

...This is why we must no longer lag behind.

This panegyric to Russian nationalism made it clear whose interests were foremost in the industrialization drive. To understand how Ukraine's urban growth suffered from the instrumental role assigned to Ukraine, it is first necessary to trace the main features of the republic's economic development during the 1930s.

To begin with, during the 1930s, Moscow assumed control over the entire economy of Ukraine. In 1935, for example, 84 per cent of the republic's industrial capital was in the hands of all-Union enterprises. Ukraine was obliged to subsidize economic development in other parts of the Soviet Union. During the first five-year plan, a third of all capital created in the republic was exported. The sum involved represented 53.3 per cent of all capital
investments in the Ukrainian economy during the first five-year plan.  

Industrial growth in Ukraine focused primarily on the Donbas-Dnipro coal-metallurgical complex, since the region, as Stalin pointed out in 1931, "supplied metal to our industrial regions...[and] coal to the principal enterprises in the Soviet Union." The intensive economic development of these regions, however, was seen as a stop-gap measure until a coal-metallurgical complex could be established in Russia, in the Moscow region, in the Urals and to the east of the mountain range.  

In the second five-year plan, Donbas' and Dnipro's share of investment dropped.  

The branches of industry producing finished-goods were sorely neglected in Ukraine. Ukrainian economists as late as May 1932 still had the audacity to pass a resolution at one of their congresses demanding that the five-year plan should be oriented towards consumer goods and that the "irrational practice" of exporting raw materials to Russia and importing finished products be abandoned. Ukrainian light industry, they argued, should receive five times more capital investment than was allocated in the first five-year plan, and the new productive capacity should be located in the right-bank Ukraine.  

Following the purges of 1933, no one dared make the same point again, at least not in public. In 1928, the consumer goods industry (sector B) represented 47 per cent of Ukraine's gross industrial production; by 1937 its share declined to 38 per cent. In the Soviet Union, sector B represented 42 per cent of gross industrial production in 1937. I.S. Koropeckyj, who studied industrial locations politics in Ukraine during the 1930s, concluded that as a result of these policies, "some branches of the heavy industry in which Ukraine was already well developed expanded rapidly, while there was very little progress in light industry...[T]he imbalance between producer-and-consumer goods branches widened further."
The imbalance existed not only between producer-goods and consumer-goods branches but also between individual branches of heavy industry. This was particularly the case in machine-building and ferrous metallurgy, which specialized in "branches requiring less processing." In 1932, for example, while Ukraine supplied 70 per cent of the Soviet Union's coal, iron ore and pig iron, and 63 per cent of its steel, it provided only 23 per cent of the USSR's finished metal products, and by 1937 this declined to 21 per cent.

Of course, in the climacteric industrialization era of the 1930s Ukraine's economy expanded rapidly: by 1940, industrial production had increased 7.3 times as compared with the 1913 figure. However, the increase for the USSR as a whole was 7.6, and for Russia 8.9. The growth rate differential must be seen against the background of Ukraine's industrial potential. Capital productivity, for example, was much higher there than in other regions of the USSR. The argument that Ukraine's development had to be held back in order to facilitate the location of industry, for strategic reasons, east of the Urals does not explain the economic anomaly. It was the traditional centres of the European parts of Russia that experienced the most rapid growth in final-goods industries. Leningrad's industry, for example, expanded eleven-fold between 1928 and 1940. The eastern regions, like Ukraine, supplied raw materials for Russian industry. Defence considerations would have required the development of all stages of production in the east. Ukraine's economic predicament reflected the rise of an aggressive Russian nationalism during the 1930s. Fedir Butenko, a Soviet diplomat serving in Romania who defected in 1938, told an Italian newspaper, "All chemical, aeronautic and military industry, machine-building and electro-technical industry" has been concentrated in Russia. "From the point of view of industrial
development, Ukraine now resembles a colony of Moscow."  

The economic policies entailed two major consequences for Ukraine's urbanization during the 1930s. Firstly, while the increase in the urban population was the highest in Ukraine's history - from 5.4 to 11.2 million between 1926 and 1939 - on a comparative basis, Ukraine ranked seventh among the eleven republics in the rate of urban population growth.  

(Approximately 20 per cent of Ukraine's urban population growth was due to the reclassification of villages and rural settlements into towns.) In the intercensal period the proportion of urban residents increased from 18.5 to 36.2 per cent of the population total.  

Secondly, since only cities tied to coal and iron ore experienced substantial growth during the 1930s, the regional imbalances in the distribution of the republic's urban population were greatly accentuated. Three-quarters of the increase in Ukraine's urban population between 1926 and 1939 was claimed by the Donbas and Dnipro regions. By 1939, 48 per cent of the republic's total urban population was centred in those areas, as compared with 26 per cent in 1926. In 1939, 74 per cent of Donbas' population lived in towns.  

The urban population of the right bank, on the other hand, stagnated. In 1926, 16.1 per cent of the population of the right bank lived in towns; by 1939, 20.5 per cent. That increase was almost entirely due to the transfer of Ukraine's capital from Kharkiv to Kiev in 1934: the city of Kiev was responsible for two-thirds of the urban population growth in right-bank Ukraine between 1926 and 1939. In the case of Polissia, the rate of urbanization actually dropped by five per cent between 1926 and 1939.  

In the course of industrialization, the rural population of Ukraine declined from 24 to 20 million between 1926 and 1939. The new circumstances of peasant life which collectivization brought about accelerated the migration
of peasants to the city. Peasants escaped to cities to feed themselves and their families. According to M. Kulischer, most of the two million new urban residents of the Donbas, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovs'k and Kharkiv regions were Ukrainian peasants. This migration changed the national composition of Ukraine's urban population.

Between 1926 and 1939 the number of Ukrainians in towns increased from 2.5 to 6.8 million and the rate of urbanization among Ukrainians rose to 29 per cent by 1939, almost triple the 1926 figure. By 1939, Ukrainians had emerged as a majority of the urban population - 58.1 per cent. Attacking those who suggested that the policy of Ukrainization had been abandoned, S.V. Kosior, Secretary of the CPU in 1933, pointed out that on the contrary, because of industrialization, this policy was finally being realized. The increase of Ukrainians in the urban population, according to Kosior, was "a natural process" that "will continue at an increasing rate." He presented data on the national composition of Ukraine's major industrial centres which showed that the Ukrainian contingent has strengthened between 1926 and 1933. The increase, however, was much less impressive than Kosior would have had his audience believe. In most of the industrial centres Ukrainians had improved their representation in the urban population at a faster rate between 1923 and 1926 than between 1926 and 1933. (See table 3.2) Overall, between 1920 and 1926, Ukrainians improved their standing in the republic's urban population by 14 per cent, as compared with an 11 per cent increase between 1926 and 1939.

There is no doubt that the opportunities created for urban immigration during the 1930s were seized by Ukrainians. In those areas where collectivization was most intense, the flow of people from the country to urban areas was greatest. The increase in the Ukrainian urban representation would have
### TABLE 3.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>1923</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stalino (Donets'k)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voroshilovgrad (Luhans'k)</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaporizhzhia</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovs'k</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Pravda, 2 December 1933 and for Kharkiv, 1939, M.V. Kurman and I.V. Lebedinski, Naselenie bol'shogo sotsialisticheskogo goroda (Moscow, 1968), table 73, 22.
been much higher had urbanization during the 1930s indeed remained "a natural process" as Kosior asserted. The demographic catastrophe of 1932-3 diminished the number of Ukrainians available for urbanization. Moreover, to combat the spontaneous process of immigration, which created problems in "labour discipline", a series of laws regulating migration was passed in 1931 and 1932. Organized methods of labour recruitment based on contracts concluded between collective farms and recruiting agencies were introduced. Even this was insufficient to stem large-scale migration, and on the 27 December 1932 a passport was introduced for the urban population which was also to register their place of residence. By making the peasant apply for a passport in his village and report his destination, migration to towns was artificially controlled.

Urbanization during the 1930s was accompanied by intense social strain. There was a chronic shortage of housing in industrial centres. G. Lapchinskii reported in 1932 that almost sixty per cent of the 1931 housing plan was unfulfilled. Hundreds of thousands of people lived in wretched make-shift shacks, nakhalovky as they were called in Donbas, constructed from cardboard, or whatever other materials came into hand. Food supply was in perpetual crisis and in 1932-3 famine struck the industrial centres. The social tensions were responsible for a rise in nationalism among Ukrainians in the industrial south-east. For example, discussing the 1930 CPU Central Committee resolution "On Ukrainization in Industrial Regions", a Visti article noted that "national enmity is greatly increasing in Donbas." It stated that newly arrived Ukrainian workers were mocked and taunted by officials who refused to recognize the workers' national and social rights. In some cities of Donbas, Ukrainians rioted. The article called for accelerated Ukrainization to prevent further outbreaks of violence. By 1933, the combination of the new influx of
Ukrainian-speaking peasants and Ukrainization resulted in a situation where all schools in Makiivka, a major mining centre in Donbas, were Ukrainized. But the Ukrainization solution to some of the tensions bred by urbanization was abandoned in 1933 at the very time when Ukrainization bordered on the verge of success.
iii. Class structure

In 1930 there began what Lev Kopelev called "the destruction of the peasantry, that is, pulling out the living roots of national historical existence." The immediate background was the difficulties experienced in realizing the highly improvised and dilettantish first five-year plan. Because too many projects had been started simultaneously, and too many resources had been wasted through bureaucratic incompetence, by 1930 an acute shortage of capital suddenly made itself felt. The international economic conjuncture - a drop in the grain prices and a rise in the price of manufactured goods - compounded the effects of economic mismanagement. More grain had to be squeezed out of the peasantry and the quickest method of doing this was, in the words of Stalin, "to establish a system whereby the collective farmers will deliver to the state and cooperative organizations the whole of their marketable grain under penalty..." Ukraine, as the Soviet Union's major grain producing area, was singled out for accelerated collectivization.

The scope of collectivization that was proclaimed caught everyone, including CPU and state officials, by surprise. In the autumn of 1929, several months before "total collectivization" was ordered, collective farms (of all kinds) represented a mere 3.7 per cent of Ukraine's arable land and 5.6 per cent of the total number of rural households. This was the result of almost two years of intensive campaigning for the voluntary formation of collective farms. The original version of the first five-year plan called for collectivization of approximately ten per cent of Ukraine's arable land by the end
of 1932 with rudimentary forms of collective labour as the dominant organizational form, not collective farms.\(^59\) In November 1929, however, the CPSU Politburo ordered collectivization in Ukraine to be speeded up in order to "intensify export and the production of raw materials for industry."\(^60\) Initially, peasants were to have been allowed to keep livestock for their personal consumption. The revised plan called for the establishment of collective farms on 20 per cent of the republic's arable land involving 30 per cent of peasant households by the end of 1932.\(^61\) In February 1930 the policy was again changed. All peasant households were ordered to be collectivized by the autumn of 1930 and the "complete socialization" of all peasant livestock was decreed.\(^62\) War was declared on the Ukrainian peasant.

An essential component of forced collectivization, according to Stalin, was the "elimination of kulaks as a class" in order to "replace their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms."\(^63\) In reality, the destruction of kulaks had little to do with economic considerations. By Stalin's own admission, kulaks supplied only a fifth of the Soviet Union's marketable grain surplus (that is, grain not consumed in the countryside). The middle and poor peasants furnished three-quarters.\(^64\) The procurement campaigns of 1928 and 1929 had already crippled the kulaks as producers.\(^65\) In 1929 in particular the heavy fines imposed on kulaks, including the confiscation of the property of 33,000 households for the non-delivery of grain quotas, undermined the economic power of the kulaks.\(^66\) De-kulakization was primarily intended to rid the countryside of peasants most likely to organize and lead resistance. As V. Gsovski noted, "it was not so much the prosperity of a peasant as his attitude towards collectivization which determined his class character."\(^67\)

The liquidation of kulaks as a class began in January 1930 and continued until 1932. According to official sources, 200,000 kulak households were
"liquidated", that is, approximately one million people. Other sources place the number of "liquidated" kulak households at 500,000 or two million people. Kulaks had their property confiscated and were forbidden to join collective farms. The kulaks were divided into three groups. The first group, called "counter-revolutionary kulak activists", was composed of peasants who actively resisted collectivization; they were either executed or sent to prison camps and their families were deported. The "wealthiest kulaks", who made up the second group, were deported with their families to remote regions of the Soviet Union. The rest were ordered to leave their districts. These were the general rules established by the CPSU Politburo in January 1930. Their implementation varied greatly from region to region.

In Ukraine, the dekulakization campaign took on especially brutal forms:

Barefooted and underclothed peasants were jammed into railroad cars and transported to the regions of Murmansk, Vologda, Kotlas and the like. This kurkulization [kurkul' is the Ukrainian for kulak] was carried on in the Russian districts, but here it took on a more human form, if one may apply that term here. Those Russian kurkuls whose property was taken away were often allowed to remain in their villages and if they were deported they were generally deported to the western districts of Siberia or the region of Sadosn. The death rate amongst the expropriated Russian peasants was disproportionately lower...

Forced collectivization unleashed wide and spontaneous resistance among all strata of village society. Peasant revolts broke out in most regions of Ukraine. In Chernihiv, the 21st Red Army regiment joined the peasant rebellion. Everywhere peasants slaughtered their livestock, burnt their crops, and as many as could fled to the cities. Komnezamy, hitherto the mainstay of the party in rural areas, became "hostile to the Soviet regime". Rural state and party officials opposed collectivization. In 1930 a fifth of all rural state and party functionaries were dismissed on charges of "right opportunism". The army, the GPU, the militia and armed brigades of
reliable urban party members were sent into the villages to implement collectivization. Just as in earlier revolts against the Soviet regime, during forced collectivization the village poor were in the forefront of unrest. According to a newspaper report, the slaughter of animals was carried out mostly by poor and middle peasants. V.A. Iakovtsevskii, a Soviet historian, pointed out that resistance to collectivization was greatest among the poor peasants who had recently obtained land and among the middle peasantry who had recently risen from the ranks of the poor.

The publication of Stalin's article "Dizzy with Success" was evidence that the Soviet leadership had become nervous about rural unrest. Stalin admitted that "excesses" had occurred during collectivization and pinned the entire blame on the local officials. The Ukrainian press, during the momentary thaw which followed the publication of Stalin's article, published several accounts which gave some indication of how collectivization had been carried out. The homes of poor and middle peasants, according to one report were raided in the middle of the night and the peasants forced at gunpoint to enter collective farms. Confiscated property was often stolen by urban brigades. The militia roamed village streets arresting anyone in sight. Communalization of property in many villages extended even to clothes and footwear. Collectivization throughout the Soviet Union was accompanied by brutality. In Ukraine, however, it was worse because this was a grain-growing region which was slated for intensive collectivization. On 1 March 1930, 69 per cent of the arable land and 63 per cent of peasant households had been collectivized. In the steppe region of the republic, almost 80 per cent of arable land was held by collective farms. In the Soviet Union as a whole, only 30 per cent of the arable land and 24 per cent of households had been collectivized.
The emphasis on the "voluntary" nature of collective farms following Stalin's article was prompted by the fear that growing peasant resistance would severely damage spring sowing. Peasants were allowed to leave collective farms and in Ukraine a mass exodus occurred. By May 1930, the percentage of collectivized households dropped to 41 per cent and the collective farms' share of arable land declined to 50 per cent. This permitted the regime to get the situation in the countryside under control and it also facilitated work on the fields which resulted in a good harvest in 1930. That year 7.7 million tons of grain were taken from Ukraine or a third of the harvest. "That Ukraine was being exploited," wrote V. Holubnychy, "can be seen from the fact that while the total grain harvest in Ukraine amounted to 27 per cent of the all-Union harvest in 1930, the consignment of grain in Ukraine accounted for 38 per cent of the grain consigned in the entire Soviet Union in 1930." The amount of grain taken out of Ukraine in 1930 was 2.3 times what it had been in 1926. Three factors made this possible. Climatic conditions were optimal that year, the private sector and voluntary collective farms boosted production and, finally, the requisition campaign was so intense that seed grain needed for the following year was confiscated. Reassured by this success, forced collectivization was renewed, and by 1931, 65 per cent of rural households and 67 per cent of arable land had been collectivized. By 1933, the figures were 73 and 86 per cent respectively. The 1931 quota for grain delivery to the state was set at the level achieved in 1930 - 7.7 million tons. Very early in 1932 famine appeared in Ukraine and it ravaged the countryside until the end of 1933.

In explaining why the famine occurred, two factors must be mentioned by way of providing background information. The first was the collapse of agricultural production brought about by collectivization. Rather than
surrender their animals to the collectives, many peasants slaughtered them: in 1928 there were 7.0 million pigs in Ukraine, in 1933, 2.1 million; cattle declined in the same period from 8.6 to 4.4 million and the number of horses from 5.4 to 2.6 million. This not only meant that meat delivery quotas could not be fulfilled, it also accentuated what was always a major problem in Ukrainian agriculture - the shortage of draught animals. The production of tractors was in its infancy and could not replace animal power. In 1932, for example, Ukraine had on the average one tractor per collective farm. Moreover, tractors were under a separate jurisdiction from the collective farms; they belonged to the Machine Tractor Stations, an arrangement which was opposed by the Ukrainian leadership on the grounds that it made an effective integration of agricultural production impossible. The tractors themselves were of extremely low quality and were constantly breaking down. During the fateful harvest of 1932, to give an example, 70 per cent of the tractors in Dnipropetrovs'k oblast were inoperative in August, and by September this had increased to 90 per cent. The peasantry was given no incentive to produce. By the end of 1930, 78 per cent of collective farms had failed to pay peasants their "labour days" worked. Moreover, the "labour day" payment in Ukraine (in kilogrammes of food produce) was half what it was in Russia. Collective farms were excessively large, reflecting the mania for gargantuan projects that dominated Stalinist economic thinking; the Ukrainian leadership had called for small "cooperative collectives". Highly bureaucratized in their decision-making structure, collective farms left no room for individual or group initiatives. In 1932 some collective farm chairmen wished to sow rye instead of wheat, arguing that rye was a more suitable crop for their region. "These bearers of anti-wheat sentiments must be severely punished," was the reply that came from Moscow.
The combination of all these factors resulted in unbelievable chaos in production. Between 1931 and 1932 the total sowing area in Ukraine contracted by one fifth; in 1931, almost 30 per cent of the grain yield was lost during the harvest.

To add to the difficulties a drought affected Ukraine. It began in late 1931 and was most severe in the steppe. By the autumn of 1932, in many regions of the republic, the land was too dry to sow. In 1934 another far more serious drought developed. The disruption in agricultural production together with climatic conditions caused relatively poor yields in 1931, 1932 and especially in 1934. The 1931 harvest, according to official figures, gave 18.3 million tons of grain, considerably less than the 23.1 million ton figure of 1930. In 1932, 14.6 million tons were harvested, in 1933, 22.3 and in 1934, 12.3 million tons.

The factors we have mentioned, chaos in agricultural production and the drought, contributed to the famine, but they were not its main cause. In 1934, the year of the poorest harvest, there was no famine in Ukraine. Responsibility for the famine rested with the Stalinist leadership and the draconian grain requisition quotas that were imposed on Ukraine in order to maintain the heady industrialization pace. In 1931, 7.7 million tons were ordered to be requisitioned from Ukraine, the same as in 1930, even though the harvest was 20 per cent less than in 1930. Moscow ordered that the grain be obtained at any cost and applied enormous pressure to that end. Seven million tons were obtained, leaving the average peasant household in Ukraine with only 132 kilogrammes of grain. Before the revolution a peasant household which consumed three times that amount was considered impoverished by tsarist statisticians. The amount of grain
requisitioned was so great that the republic was short of seed grain by 45 per cent. Anxious about the impending catastrophe, the Ukrainian leadership argued with Moscow for a major downward revision of its agricultural obligations for the year 1932. The amount was lowered to 6.2 million tons, but this was still far above the capacities of the republic in view of the poor harvest - 14.6 million tons of grain, of which 40 per cent was lost during the harvest because of the breakdown of machinery and the chaotic transportation system. To ensure that the Ukrainian party obeyed orders, a special mission headed by Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Kharkiv. Every conceivable method was used to extract 6.2 million tons. The state and party apparatus was purged in those regions that lagged behind in grain requisition; newspapers that failed to campaign aggressively for the collection of grain had their staffs dismissed; troops and armed brigades were sent into the villages to carry out the mass repression of peasants charged with sabotaging the grain campaign; and every third and fourth person holding a responsible position in the collective farms was purged. It was during the 1932 harvest, in August, that the infamous law was passed stipulating a minimum sentence of five years in labour camp and a maximum of the death penalty for "theft of socialist property." "Visiting assizes of the regional court" in Dnipropetrovs'k oblast sentenced peasants to the firing squad for the theft of a sack of wheat. In Vinnytsia oblast, peasants were sentenced to five years in labour camps for taking an unripened ear of corn from the field. Ukrainian farmers became "the most numerous" among "political offenders" in the Soviet Gulag. According to the last available information, in early January 1933, 75 per cent of the grain
quota was fulfilled, that is, 4.7 million tons. This left the average peasant with 83 kilogrammes of grain with which to feed himself.

The famine, which began in January 1932, finally subsided when the 1933 harvest was brought in. This was because Ukraine, lacking 55 percent of its seed, was lent seed grain by Moscow and, more significantly, Moscow reduced the quality of grain to be delivered to the state to 5.0 million tons, even though the 1933 harvest resulted in 22.3 million tons of grain. 1934 could have been a famine year as well since the grain harvest was a mere 12.3 million tons. It was not, however, because the amount of grain requisitioned was reduced further and Stalin even released grain from existing stocks to feed the population. He could have done something similar in 1932, but he did not, and one of the worst famines in human history raged in Ukraine.

Many eyewitness accounts of the famine have been published and we need not describe the ghastly scenes which were to be observed in Ukraine in 1932 and 1933. The main victims of the famine were not even the imagined enemies of the Soviet regime, the kulaks, since they had been eliminated by 1932 when the famine began. It was the poor and middle peasantry who died agonizing deaths in the millions and whose orphaned children foraged the countryside in search of food and who were ultimately eliminated by means of mass executions. As for the effects of the experience of collectivization and the famine on the attitudes of the peasantry, this is best summarized by the findings of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System which interviewed Soviet refugees after the Second World War. When asked "whether or not it would be a good idea to drop an atom bomb on Moscow", half the Ukrainian collective farmers answered yes, twice the proportion of the Russian collective farmers.
But though the Ukrainian peasantry seethed with hatred for Moscow, Moscow's agrarian policies had destroyed them as a social force. The Ukrainian village was silenced and never again rose in opposition to the Soviet regime.

The tragedy of the Ukrainian peasantry was a national tragedy. It was, after all, Stalin who wrote, "the peasantry represents the main army of a national movement...Without the peasantry there cannot be a strong national movement." The history of Ukrainians' encounter with the Soviet regime confirmed Stalin's point. If in the early 1920s, the Soviet regime adopted Ukrainization policies, it was because it feared peasant unrest. When the Ukrainian peasantry was under attack in 1932-3, the Ukrainian elite, whose existence was nurtured by Ukrainization, sprang to their defence. Ewald Ammende, who analysed this question, wrote:

...[T]he widest circles of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had entered the struggle; teachers, students, Soviet officials, all thought it was their duty to protest against a further sucking dry of the country. Future historians will have to admit that in the campaign against the Ukrainians, during the spring and summer of 1933, the Soviet regime was faced by a united people, a solid front, including everyone, from the highest Soviet officials down to the poorest peasant. National solidarity, which threatened Stalin's plans for Ukraine's exploitation, was fostered by Ukrainization policies. In 1933 Stalin ordered that these policies be abandoned. Ukrainization, born with the peasantry, died with it too.

It was out of the dispossessed peasantry that the working class was forged during the 1930s. Escaping collectivization and attracted by the higher standard of living and opportunities for social mobility offered by industrial employment, hundreds of thousands of peasants flocked to industry whose labour needs were growing rapidly. Between 1930 and 1932
heavy industry alone absorbed almost 300,000 workers annually.\textsuperscript{129} The majority of these workers came from the village. In 1930, for example, 79 per cent of the new recruits to Donbas mines were peasants.\textsuperscript{130} In the machine-building industry in 1933, 56 per cent of new working class cadres were peasants.\textsuperscript{131} The workers entering industry were also very young, almost half were under 22 years of age.\textsuperscript{132} By 1933, 40 per cent of the republic's working class was less than 23 years old.\textsuperscript{133} When Stalin declared in November 1936 that the Soviet working class was "a completely new working class" he was not exaggerating.\textsuperscript{134}

The rapid expansion of the working class was a phenomenon confined to the period of the first five-year plan, and was focused on the Donbas and Dnipro regions. The number of workers in heavy industry expanded from 607,000 on 1 January 1929 to 1.1 million by 1 January 1933.\textsuperscript{135} In 1939 the same industry had 1.4 million workers.\textsuperscript{136} This was a process not unique to Ukraine. It occurred throughout the Soviet Union as increasing labour productivity and the mastery of new technology was emphasized rather than extensive growth. The contraction of growth, however, was sharper in Ukraine than in Russia because of the economic policies we have already described.\textsuperscript{137} As a result of the economic division of labour imposed on Ukraine, the coal and metallurgical industry by 1935 claimed 57 per cent of the total number of the total number of workers employed in heavy and light industry.\textsuperscript{138} This resulted in a marked regional imbalance in the geographical distribution of the republic's working class. In 1935, two out of three workers employed in heavy industry in the republic lived either in the Donbas or Dnipro region. If one counts the total working class (heavy and light industry), the above mentioned regions claimed every
second worker in Ukraine. During the 1930s the working class increased its social weight in the republic's total population. (See table 3.3) By 1939, 29 per cent of Ukrainians belonged to the working class, 55 per cent were listed as collective farmers and 13 per cent as white-collar staff. More indicative of the level of Ukrainians' social mobilisation were the changes that occurred in the national composition of the industrial working class. Here Ukrainians increased their representation from 52 per cent of the total in 1930, to 58 per cent in 1931, 62 per cent in 1935 and by 1939 the figure increased to 66 per cent. By 1932, Ukrainians had established a majority among coal miners - 50 per cent, and their weight among metallurgists increased from 53 per cent in 1932 to 70 per cent by 1936. They represented 77 per cent of workers in the iron ore industry in 1932, 77 per cent among railwaymen, and in the chemical industry their share of the working class rose from 58 per cent in 1932 to 75 per cent by 1936.

The working class which came into existence during the early years of industrialization was formed when Ukrainization was still in force. The new influx of Ukrainian workers gave fresh impetus to the Ukrainization of trade unions. (See table 3.4) In Donbas, by 1932, 56 per cent of trade unionists were Ukrainian. The new cadres coming from the village and the Ukrainized school could only be influenced through the Ukrainian language. By 1933, 88 per cent of all factory newspapers were published in the Ukrainian language, double the figure for 1928. In 1932, almost 60 per cent of cultural work in the republic's trade unions was completely Ukrainized. By the summer of 1930, 70 per cent of books in workers' clubs in Donbas were Ukrainian language titles. Ukrainian culture, wrote a correspondent from Donbas, "has now become the culture of factories, plants, mines and workshops."
## TABLE 3.3

### Changes in the Class Structure of the Population of Ukraine, 1926-1939

*(in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>36.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar staff</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants/Collective Farmers</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Economically active population only. The 1939 data include the Crimea.

Source: *Perepis' 1926*, vol. 28, table 1, 1-9; *Perepis' 1959*, vol. 2, table 47, 144-50.
TABLE 3.4

National Composition of Trade Union Membership in Industry and Construction in Ukraine, 1929-34 (in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes white-collar staff.

Source: Narodne hospodarstvo USRR. Statystychnyi dovidnyk (Kiev, 1935), 386.
The Soviet leadership was forced to consider the unsettling fact that the working class was moving towards a more distinctly national posture. The growing dominance of the indigenous nation and its culture within the working class was not the only reason for this development. Industrialization was accompanied by extreme social strain, and one of the responses was a growth of nationalism within the working class.

A newspaper article referred to this and cited the example of the Krasnoluts'k region in Donbas where fights had broken out between Ukrainian and Russian miners. In that region, almost 60 per cent of miners were now Ukrainian and tensions existed because "officialdom refused to recognize this fact and blocked Ukrainization." Contributing to the growth of nationalism within the proletariat was the fact that a high proportion of the peasants arriving in Donbas were the most nationally conscious rural element, namely, "kulak youth".

Ukrainization, in the words of Skrypnyk, "raised the consciousness of millions of toilers." It deepened their awareness of their cultural heritage and their claims to separate national and socio-economic development. As a speaker at the July 1933 Komsomol plenum expressed it, Ukrainization as led by Skrypnyk and others, by stressing the "national specificity of Ukraine", challenged the notion that there was only one path of socialist development, namely the one "charted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern." According to Postyshev, the emphasis on "national specificity" in culture and public life was simply "a refusal to submit to all-Union interests." Thus the first step in enforcing that submission was to end the movement fostering the national-cultural individuality of Ukraine since this led "only to separatism and counter-revolution." When Postyshev announced that "even such a little matter
as the letters "r" and "R" is symptomatic of a much deeper counter-revolution", it was a signal that the campaign against Ukrainian culture would attend to the most minute details.  

The Ukrainization policies hitherto pursued within the working class were attacked in 1933 as "cultural counter-revolution" aimed at "fanning national enmity among the proletariat" and isolating the Ukrainian proletariat from the positive influence of Russian culture. "Nationalist counter-revolution" was discovered in the trade unions' cultural work: there were far too many Ukrainian-language books in trade union libraries and not enough Russian titles. New books were ordered and old titles confiscated. Among amateur cultural groups, "nationalist counter-revolution" consisted of the performance of too many Ukrainian plays and songs. The programmes of these groups were revamped.  

The struggle against Ukrainian culture in the trade unions was a prelude to further centralization. Between 1934 and 1937 the trade unions in Ukraine were purged. In 1937, the republican trade union council was abolished and trade unions were merged into organizations directly controlled by Moscow. It was only in 1945 that the republic regained a territorial trade union structure.  

The end of Ukrainization and the purge of trade unions coincided with the introduction of a totalitarian factory regime. The changes in the condition of the working class had profound repercussions on its national consciousness. In the second half of the 1920s, the workers' close ties to the village, Ukrainization policies, and workers' relationship with the Ukrainian intelligentsia reinforced their national consciousness. Throughout most of the 1930s workers had to establish roots and affirm an identity in a new and unfamiliar environment without the support of
their national collectivity. Certainly, as the results of the Harvard Project suggest, the experiences of the 1930s made Ukrainian workers far more hostile to the Soviet regime than their Russian counterparts. Moreover, it was found that national symbols still had substantial "drawing power." But the elaboration of the national idea is above all a collective undertaking. By atomizing the working class and forcing workers to concentrate on survival as individuals, open, unfettered social interaction essential for the existence of a national community was undermined. Although a Ukrainian working class survived the 1930s as an objective cultural category, the working class as part of a Ukrainian national community was undermined.

Turning to white-collar staff, between 1929 and 1940 their number grew from 500,000 to two million. Since the economy experienced an acute shortage of technical personnel, there was a particularly rapid growth in the number of engineering and technical staff. They increased from 25,000 in 1926 to 123,000 by 1936. The majority of the new specialists were the so-called vydvizhentsy, former workers and peasants who were given an education and promoted to positions of responsibility. Sixty per cent of engineering and technical staff that graduated in 1933 were composed of vydvizhentsy.

Very little information on changes in the national composition of white-collar staff during the 1930s has come to light. What data are available suggest that although in absolute terms Ukrainians registered as increase, their share of white-collar positions declined. Kosior in 1935 boasted that approximately 50 per cent of engineers in industry were Ukrainians. But since, as early as 1929, 50 per cent of engineers in
the coal mining industry were Ukrainian, it is doubtful whether there was much improvement during the 1930s. The only relatively comprehensive data for the white-collar group are derived from the trade union censuses, and they include all those involved in mental labour. Comparing 1929 and 1934, we find that the Ukrainians' share of mental work occupations declined from 58 to 56 per cent during a period of unprecedented expansion in mental work occupations. (See table 3.5) The 1939 census revealed that 56 per cent of those engaged in predominately mental work gave Ukrainian as their nationality. (See table 3.6)

The various purges of the 1930s were the principal reason for the seeming inability of Ukrainians to improve their share of white-collar positions. The first purge, during 1929-30, saw 12 per cent of all white-collar employees dismissed. The second in 1932-3 resulted in a quarter of all employees of central state and economic institutions being removed from their posts. These measures were motivated ostensibly by the "struggle against bureaucratism and violations of labour discipline." However, the 1929-30 purge occurred at a time when the propaganda apparatus had whipped up a hysterical campaign against "Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution." In that climate, Ukrainians were probably disproportionately victimized. There can be little doubt that the 1932-3 dismissals, occurring at the height of the famine, affected Ukrainians primarily.

The 1933-4 purge, under Postyshev's guidance, had the express aim of removing Ukrainians suspected of nationalism. In the central state institutions of Kharkiv alone, 2,500 Ukrainians were dismissed. The Commissariat of Education, the centre of Ukrainization was so thoroughly
### TABLE 3.5

**National Composition of those Engaged in Mental Work in Ukraine, 1926-34 (in per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Jews</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Natsional'nyi perepys robitynikiv ta slubzhbovtsiv Ukrainy (zhovtten' -lystopada 1929)* (Kharkiv, 1930), xvi; *Narodne hospodarstvo USRR. Statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kiev, 1935), 386.
### TABLE 3.6

**Class Structure of Ukraine according to Nationality, 1939**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Ukrainians as % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>10,363,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar staff</td>
<td>5,467,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers</td>
<td>15,956,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes dependents.

purged that the entire staff of the apparatus at the oblast level had been dismissed and 90 per cent at the raion level. Over 4,000 Ukrainian teachers were fired, as were 210 lecturers at pedagogical institutions. In the case of the latter, they were replaced with 185 "cadres from the fraternal republics".\textsuperscript{170} The proportion of Ukrainians among the staff of research institutions dropped from 50 per cent of the total in 1929 to 31 per cent in 1934, whereas the share of Russians increased from 30 to 50 per cent of the total in the same period.\textsuperscript{171} During the "great terror" the victims were legion. "The purge swept through every sort of establishment in the Republic...state industrial enterprises, the municipal councils, the educational and scientific bodies..."\textsuperscript{172}

During the 1930s, according to Iu. Lavrynenko, 80 per cent of Ukraine's writers and creative intelligentsia were eliminated.\textsuperscript{173} Among Ukrainian historians, clergymen, national communists and many other groups an equal, if not higher, proportion were sent to their deaths.\textsuperscript{174} The desire to stamp out the agents of the Ukrainian national idea was so extreme that, according to D. Shostakovich, several hundred blind bandurysty - itinerant folk singers - were executed.\textsuperscript{175} The purges dealt a devastating blow to the existence of Ukrainians as a nation. They decimated that nation's leadership, the intelligentsia that had been forged during the 1920s and that had been awakened to the possibilities of nationhood. The assault on the Ukrainian school, newspapers and books during the 1930s was carried out to ensure that the legacy of the intelligentsia of the 1920s would not be communicated to the new intelligentsia that was coming into being.
iv. Education and the press

Industrialization demanded a literate work force. As part of the first five-year plan it was decided that each year two million illiterates and semi-literates had to be taught how to read and write. A special "Literacy Commission" was established within the CPU Politburo to coordinate the campaign. Statistics released during the 1930s pointed to impressive results. By 1930, 70 per cent of those between the ages of 5 and 50 were literate, and 96 per cent by 1933. Among industrial workers in 1936, a mere 1.5 per cent were illiterate and only 2.3 per cent were classified as semi-literate. On 1 January 1938 it was triumphantly announced that 98 per cent of the total population of Ukraine was now considered literate. Most of these figures were probably fabricated, since in the light of the 1939 census data released after Stalin's death only 85 per cent of the republic's population was literate. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the course of the 1930s illiteracy was largely eliminated.

An important question for our purposes is the language in which literacy was acquired. In 1927, 78 per cent of all literacy schools were conducted in the Ukrainian language. Between 1927 and 1933, officials of the Commissariat of Education made a concerted effort to have Ukrainian adopted universally in the republic as the language in which illiterates would learn to read and write, irrespective of nationality. At the second Donets'k party conference in January 1934, complaints were voiced that "activity in the schools of literacy was conducted only in the Ukrainian language, and this retarded the acquisition
of reading skills by citizens of non-Ukrainian nationality." In Kiev, for example, the number of Russian literacy schools had declined form 131 in 1925 to 7 by 1932. After 1933 it was charged that throughout Ukraine "evidence of forcible Ukrainization was to be found in the fact that only Ukrainian literature and Ukrainian cadres were assigned to literacy schools." In 1934 these "shortcomings" were corrected. But inasmuch as between 1930 and 1934 almost 5.5 million citizens of the republic had acquired literacy during the period of "forced Ukrainization", even assuming a decline in Ukrainian literacy schools after that date (something which V. Kysil' claims did not occur), the literacy campaign of the 1930s added millions of new Ukrainian readers.

Industrialization also brought major changes to the school system. In July 1930 the CPSU Central Committee ordered compulsory elementary education (four classes) to be implemented in the countryside and incomplete secondary education (seven classes) in urban areas beginning with the 1930-1 school year. The resources of the state were mobilized for the task. Capital investment in schools in 1930 was increased by 30 per cent over the previous year. Between 1929 and 1932, two thousand new schools were built (of these three quarters were in rural areas). The seven-year schools were expanded by 180 per cent between 1929-30 and 1932-3. The number of children of school age enrolled in the elementary and incomplete secondary school system increased from 2.8 million in 1929-30 to 4.6 million by 1932-3. The main beneficiaries of the crash programme to expand the educational system were Ukrainian children who had been previously denied access to either elementary or secondary education.
The period between 1930 and 1933 marked the high point of achievement in the Ukrainization of schools. In the 1929-30 school year, 83.2 per cent of general education schools had Ukrainian as their language of instruction. By 1932, this rose to 87 per cent. In 1929, 81 per cent of the total number of pupils enrolled were receiving instruction in the Ukrainian language. By the 1932-3 school year, the figure had reached the 88 per cent mark. Pupils of Ukrainian nationality represented 85 per cent of school enrolment in 1933. The process of Ukrainization was particularly successful in the urban areas of Ukraine's industrial heartland. In 1933, all elementary schools in Makiivka (Donbas) and Kherson had been converted into Ukrainian-language establishments. In Dnipropetrovs'k, to give another example, some Ukrainian-language schools had 4,847 pupils, of which only 2,700 were pupils giving Ukrainian as their mother tongue. The Ukrainian-language school system had broken out of its narrow ethnic confines to become not merely an institution for Ukrainians, but for the entire population of Ukraine. As those who had completed their education at these schools entered post-secondary education or the labour force, they would accelerate the Ukrainization of their milieux. Ukrainian language and culture would emerge hegemonic in its own territory and the process of national consolidation would have been completed. The attack on Ukrainization in 1933 was designed to prevent this from happening.

In the spring of 1933 Postyshev arrived in Kharkiv with a mandate from Moscow to radically alter Ukrainization policies. His attack was focused on Skrypnyk and the Commissariat of Education which he headed, who were accused of having "delivered the policy of Ukrainization into the hands of Petliurites, Makhnovites and other national elements." On 7 July 1933 Skrypnyk committed suicide. The November 1933 CPU Central Committee plenum signalled the turning point. Prior to that time in all its major pronouncements on the national problem,
the party considered Great Russian chauvinism as the fundamental danger. Local nationalism had always been viewed as the secondary threat. In keeping with Stalin's dictum, a new interpretation was given at the November plenum - the positions of the two were reversed. At the Kharkiv city party conference in July 1933, "nationalist counter-revolution" was defined in six points which served as a guideline for the changes that were to be made in the educational, media and cultural spheres. "Nationalist counter-revolution" consisted of: 1) exaggerating the importance of the national question and refusing to submit to all-Union interests; 2) negating Lenin and Stalin as theorists of the national question, that is, searching for legitimacy in Ukrainian political thought; 3) advocating the theory of "national Bolshevism", meaning that each nation should choose its own path to socialism; 4) considering the "cultural development of Ukraine as limitless", that is, advocating that Ukrainian culture should permeate all aspects of the republic's life; 5) "forced Ukrainization"; 6) artificially separating Ukrainian from Russian culture.

The school system was affected in five ways by the 1933-4 purge. Firstly, as already mentioned, thousands of teachers, educational administrators and instructors in pedagogical institutes were dismissed. Secondly, the last remnants of Ukraine's unique educational system were liquidated and the Russian model was imposed. Thirdly, the school curriculum was purged of textbooks and programmes inspired by Skrypnyk's "fascist theory of national emotions". At the kindergarten level, for example, the fact that only Ukrainian fairy tales were read to children was offered as proof that the "fascist theory" guided school programmes. Russian fairy tales were ordered to be introduced as a corrective measure.
Fourthly, the school system serving Ukraine's non-Russian minorities was attacked. It was claimed that "Ukrainian nationalists formed a block with Jewish nationalists to push through forced Judaization in order to prevent the normal assimilation of Jewish children."\textsuperscript{207} Jewish teachers were accused of crimes such as "teaching Jewish children that Jews are a nation", and teaching Yiddish to Jewish children whose mother-tongue was Russian.\textsuperscript{208} Many Polish and German schools were ordered to be closed because they contained "too many fascist elements".\textsuperscript{209} Finally, children who were either Russian according to nationality or who gave Russian as their mother tongue were removed from Ukrainian-language schools and placed in the reinvigorated Russian school system.\textsuperscript{210} In short, the role of the school as an agent communicating national values other than authorized Soviet and Russian patriotism was undermined and the Ukrainian-language school was driven back to being a school only for Ukrainians.

School statistics for the 1933-4 academic year showed that no time was wasted in implementing the new course. The number of pupils enrolled in the Ukrainian-language school system dropped from 88 per cent of the total enrolment in 1932-3 to 84 per cent by 1933-4. Registration in the Russian school network increased from 6 to 10 per cent.\textsuperscript{211} By 1937, 83 per cent of total pupil enrolment was accounted for by the Ukrainian language network.\textsuperscript{212} Urban schools were the focus of the new policies. In Kharkiv, for example, the percentage of pupils enrolled in Russian-language schools increased from 20 for 1932-3 school year to 39 by 1933-4. In Kherson in the same period registration in Russian schools grew from zero to 30 per cent.\textsuperscript{213}

With Khrushchev's arrival to the post of First Secretary of the
CPU following the "great terror", a new assault was made on the republic's Ukrainian-language school system. The focus of the new measures was not to reduce enrolment in the Ukrainian language school system. In 1938-9 that school system accounted for 82 per cent of the total number of registrations. Rather, the emphasis was on Russifying the programme of Ukrainian-language schools. It was charged that "national-fascists, Trotskyites and spies...had attempted to push out the Russian language from the curriculum of schools in order to prevent the Ukrainian people from mastering the rich treasures of Russian culture." In 1938 Russian was introduced as a compulsory subject from the second class onward, the number of hours devoted to the study of Russian was greatly increased, and Russian culture and literature courses were introduced. Since "many harmful elements" had survived the 1933-4 purge, the Ukrainian history and literature courses received major revisions.

With industrialization, the regime's need to provide itself with its own intelligentsia was met at a break-neck pace. Post-secondary educational facilities were greatly expanded. The number of vuzy increased from 39 in 1928 to 173 by 1940 and the number of students in them grew from 29,141 to 196,775 in the same period. Similarly, tekhnikumy and institutions offering a specialized secondary education grew from 158 in 1928 to 693 by 1940 and student enrolment from 31,176 to 196,200. Between 1928 and 1936, with almost 300,000 students having graduated from vuzy and tekhnikumy, an entirely new intelligentsia had come into being.

In the course of the 1930s Ukraine's post-secondary educational system was completely reorganized along the lines of what existed in the RSFSR. At the same time notions about the prior claim of the
working class to educational facilities were gradually abandoned as
the quality of graduates was stressed. As A.L. Unger expressed it,
"At a time when the supreme slogan was 'cadres decide everything', the
regime became increasingly reluctant to forego the vital contribution
of the culturally most advanced sectors of the community. Merit rather
than social origin now opened the door to education and career." The peasantry were most affected by these measures. In 1929 they
represented 26 per cent of the vuzy student population; by 1936
their share had dropped by six or more per cent depending on the type
of higher educational establishment. (See table 3.7)

The new nationalities policy proclaimed in 1933 affected post-
secondary education in a way similar to its impact on the school system.
The only difference was that the purge of Ukrainians accused of nationalism
was much more thorough. As mentioned, Ukrainians among the research
staff declined from 49 to 31 per cent of the total between 1929 and
1934, whereas the proportion of Russians increased from 30 to 50
per cent in the same period. Students were purged as well – between
20 and 30 per cent in the case of pedagogical institutions. The
social sciences and humanities were most affected by the witch-hunt.
Both the Hrushevs'kyi and Ivors'kyi schools of history were liquidated,
as were numerous others in linguistics, literature, economics, etc. In 1938, a concerted effort was made to introduce Russian-language instruc-
tion in higher education. There was no overt government decree order-
ing the de-Ukrainization of higher education because none was needed.
Given the prevailing hysteria against "nationalist counter-revolution"
and "linguistics wrecking", many lecturers undoubtedly followed the
example of the Luhans'k pedagogical staff, who interpreted the new policies
introduced in 1933-4 to mean that Russian was to be used as the medium
### TABLE 3.7

**Social Origin of Students Attending Institutions of Higher Learning in Ukraine, 1936 (in per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Universities*</th>
<th>Vuzy and Vtuzy*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White-collar staff</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*University is a particular type of vuz including faculties of science, mathematics and the humanities. Vuzy include all other higher educational institutions and vtuzy are higher technical educational institutions.

Source: *Sotsialistychna Ukraina. Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1937), 222.
of instruction. The impact of the new national and social policies in higher education on Ukrainians' representation in the student population is difficult to evaluate on the basis of existing information. Data for the years 1928 to 1935 indicate that Ukrainians improved their share of student enrolment in tekhnikumy, that is, institutions producing the semi-intelligentsia, or para-professionals. At the vuzy level, however, institutions which served as the pool of manpower for the new elite, the representation of Ukrainians in the student population showed a tendency to decline after 1933. (See table 3.8) More importantly, the educational experience of Ukrainian students had drastically altered. The most brilliant representatives of Ukrainian scholarship were physically eliminated, and with them an entire intellectual tradition perished. Their books were removed from libraries in order to banish the memory of the national revival of the 1920s.

In publishing, industrialization accelerated the Ukrainization of newspapers and book production at an unprecedented rate. In part this was due to the success of Ukrainization policies. Industrialization itself, however, greatly contributed to this development. A large number of Ukrainians were entering industrial employment. To deny them the right to learn in their own language how best to use modern equipment connected with industrialization would have meant slowing the tempo of industrialization. To make every participant in industrialization conscious of the tasks which the party set, it was necessary to make him technically, and of course politically literate. The output of scientific and technical literature was particularly affected by these processes. If in 1927, 25 per cent of such works were Ukrainian-language titles, by 1931 the figure rose to 61 per cent. In 1930, to give another example,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vuzy</th>
<th>Tekhnikumy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>1933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>53.5</td>
<td>54.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>23.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes vuzy, vtuzy and universities.

Source: Narodne hospodarstvo USRR. Statystychnyi dovidnyk (Kiev, 1935), 584.
80 per cent of titles intended for use as textbooks in technical schools were in Ukrainian. 231 Overall, the share of Ukrainian-language titles in the republic's total book production increased from 54 per cent in 1928 to 79 per cent by 1930. 232

The high point of Ukrainian book production was in 1930. Towards the end of the summer of that year Ukrainian-language publications were affected by encroachment on the autonomy of Ukraine's cultural and literary associations. The publishing houses which these associations operated were eliminated in a drive to centralize the book trade in the hands of a few major establishments. 223 In 1931, in the aftermath of the show trial of members of the alleged Union for the Liberation of Ukraine, the "quality" of books produced between 1928 and 1930 was verified and it was noted that: many books contained major ideological errors". 234 Since it was claimed that the Ukrainian publishing industry "had been in the hands of the Iefremovs" to quote M. Gorky, 235 a purge of Ukrainians on the editorial staffs of publishing houses was ordered. 236 The statistics on book production in Ukraine for that year showed the consequences of this campaign: Ukrainian-language titles dropped to 72.2 per cent of the total number of titles published. 237

The biggest blow to Ukrainian-language publishing was delivered by the change in nationalities policies initiated in 1933-4. The "forced Ukrainization" of the book trade was attacked and "internationalist education" was stressed. 238 The following was offered as a concrete example of the new orientation: in 1934 the republic's publishing houses issued thirteen titles of Russian classical literature, as compared with three titles in the case of Ukrainian classical literature. 239

By 1936, Ukrainian-language titles represented 56 per cent of the total
number of titles published in Ukraine. In 1940, this declined to 42 per cent. A full circle was completed and the share of Ukrainian-language titles in 1940 was the same as it has been in 1924, on the eve of Ukrainization. At the same time the number of books published in Ukraine declined during the 1930s when compared with the second half of the 1920s. Thus in 1934, 4,711 titles were published, of which 2,750 were in the Ukrainian language. In 1928, the figures had been 5,413 and 2,920 respectively. The Ukrainian-language book ceased to develop at a pace necessary to meet the requirements of a modernizing society.

The effect of the year 1933 on Ukrainian language newspapers was best expressed by N.N. Popov in his speech to the November 1933 CPU Central Committee plenum:

For some individual comrades it seems that the liquidation of excessive Ukrainization means the liquidation of Ukrainization as such. In the past, Ukrainization went too far. The entire press, which serviced the working class, was mechanically transferred into the Ukrainian language, and Russian workers in many instances were not being served... Recently, we accepted the proposition to establish two new Russian newspapers in Kharkiv and in Dnipropetrovs'k. But in several localities we now notice a marked tendency to transfer all newspapers which service workers into Russian-language publications. Some people think that they are doing their duty by the nationalities policy when, as in the case of the Luhans'k newspaper, Zhovtnevyi hudok, the name remains Ukrainian, but the entire text is in Russian...This mechanical transfer is a capitulation to Great Russian chauvinism.

In 1932, 85 per cent of the republic's newspapers (excluding the collective farm and factory press) were Ukrainian-language titles. In 1934, this had declined to 80 per cent. If collective farm and factory
newspapers are included, the drop was from 89 per cent in 1931 to 77 per cent by 1934. The decline of the Ukrainian-language press continued until 1940, when Ukrainian-language newspapers represented 69 per cent of the total number of titles published in the republic (including collective farm and factory newspapers). As concerns journals, in 1930 there were 261 Ukrainian-language titles or 85 per cent of the total output in the republic. This declined to 153 titles, 67 per cent of total output in 1934, and by 1940, there were 144 Ukrainian-language journals, or 45 per cent of the total number of journals published in Ukraine.

The decline of the Ukrainian-language press during the 1930s meant that the Ukrainian language could not serve as a vehicle of modernization. Those wanting access to knowledge and current opinion had to acquire it, increasingly, through the Russian language. The content of publications was drastically changed. Newspapers and journals, which in the past had articulated national values and served as vehicles of national mobilisation, now focussed their attention on combating the slightest manifestation of Ukrainian individuality. The monotonous exhortations to overfulfill the plan and paeans in praise of Stalin's genius filled the pages of the Russian press as well. But in Ukraine things were worse. The central focus of commentary on the national question was to drive home the point that Ukraine's development, be it cultural or economic, could only be achieved through the intermediary of Russia. Denied an independent existence, Ukrainian culture and thought was reduced to narrow provincialism, even by the standards of the Stalinist USSR. At the same time, Russian cultural influence in the republic was accelerated. Over 200 Ukrainian plays were banned and scores of Ukrainian theatres closed, while the number of Russian theatres increased from 9
In music, in 1934, over 5,000 "new songs" were printed, especially "the best works of Russian composers", while the finest representatives of the Ukrainian musical tradition had their works removed from circulation. Museums were ordered to stop "idealizing Cossack history", while figures from the Russian imperial past were rehabilitated. In 1937, the republic was accused of having failed to celebrate Peter the Great's victory at Poltava. Not a single stone was left unturned in the struggle against what Na fronti kul'tury called "the nationalist theory of the specificity of Ukraine".
v. The party

"Nowhere did restrictions, purges, repressions, and in general all forms of bureaucratic hooliganism assume such a murderous sweep as they did in Ukraine in the struggle against the powerful, deeply rooted longings of the Ukrainian masses for greater freedom and independence." Thus Trotsky summarized Stalinist policies in the republic during the 1930s. As Postyshev explained in 1936, the purges had to be more sweeping in Ukraine than elsewhere because the "Ukrainian specificity" kept producing "more enemies" than elsewhere. Throughout the 1930s the CPU was bled three times, until finally, by 1938, the republic had "become little more than an N.K.V.D. fief, where even the formalities of Party and State activities were barely gone through." The purge which began in the spring of 1929 had as its objective the expulsion of "right deviationists...who have a foreign class position." Ostensibly this meant Bukharin's supporters in Ukraine, notably the so-called "bourgeois specialists", but in reality, it included all those who publically opposed the disruption of civil peace that the abolition of NEP represented. In the case of Ukrainians within the CPU, judging by the press reports of the time, those expelled were individuals tied to the peasant movement during the revolution: former members of Ukrainian socialist parties, cooperatives, and of course the peasant membership of the CPU itself. In urban areas, between April 1929 and January 1930, 10 per cent of the CPU ranks were expelled; in rural areas,
however, 16 per cent of the membership was thrown out of the party. In the towns, under the impact of industrialization, the party registered an impressive growth of its membership. By January 1933, the CPU numbered over half a million.\textsuperscript{260} In the villages, the CPU membership declined.

Prior to collectivization, the party was extremely weakly implanted in the countryside. As a result of the 1929-30 purge, its membership in the villages was cut by half: from 40,000 on January 1929 to 21,000 by January 1930.\textsuperscript{261} A verification of rural party cells carried out in 1930 found that many had to be dissolved for lack of membership.\textsuperscript{262} As resistance to collectivization grew, the purge initiated in April 1929 became a permanent feature of rural party life. The mobilisation of 11,000 industrial workers between January and February 1930 for continuous work in agriculture did not solve the problem of lack of cadres.\textsuperscript{263} The situation in the Dykans'ka raion in Poltava oblast typified "the instability of cadres in the villages." It was reported in November 1932 that during the last year and a half, all three raion secretaries had been changed three times. The same was the case with the chairman of the raion executive committee. "The rest of the party aktiv changed even more frequently." In the villages, the secretaries of party cells had been replaced four and five times.\textsuperscript{264} Throughout Ukraine, 80 per cent of raion committee party secretaries had been removed between January 1930 and July 1932. The turnover rate among secretaries of village party cells in the same period was 156 per cent.\textsuperscript{265} In November 1932, another purge of rural organizations was announced since it was found that the existing membership was unwilling to enforce the party's agricultural policies.\textsuperscript{266} Although data on the number of people expelled were never published, we do know that the indigenous rural cadres were
so depleted that, according to Postyshev, "workers of Russian nationality"
had to be brought in to implement the grain requisition campaign.267

Emphasizing Ukraine's inordinately long experience with Stalinist
terror, Lev Kopelev wrote, "the year '37 began in Ukraine with '33."268
The immediate cause of the 1933 purge was the Ukrainian leadership's
refusal to become willing tools in the extermination of their people. This
hastened what would have been an inevitable development, given the nature
of Stalinist rule. The national current within the CPU, which defended
a vision of Ukraine's autonomous socio-economic and cultural develop­
ment, had become an anomaly. "To the totalitarian bureaucracy," wrote
Trotsky, "Soviet Ukraine became an administrative division of an economic
unit and a military base of the USSR."269 That bureaucracy could not
tolerate national communists such as Skrypnyk for whom "among the highest
goals of Soviet society was the free development of each separate people."270
The national communists' resistance on the grain front was for Stalin
symptomatic of a more general problem. In 1930 he had condemned those
stressing separate national development. Not wishing, however, to move
against the Ukrainian national current on all fronts at the same time,
he had allowed Ukraine a large measure of cultural autonomy between
1930 and 1933, while thoroughly centralizing economic and political
activities. But inasmuch as cultural autonomy, Ukrainization in particular,
was a node for the crystallization of political opposition, keeping alive
the Ukrainian people's hopes and ambitions for separate development,
the Stalinist leadership had to bring culture under its control.271
With that end in mind, the CPU was ordered to be purged in January 1933.272
Postyshev was appointed Second Secretary of the organization and was
given the assignment to rid the CPU of "Skrypnykite counter-revolution
in cultural development" as well as provide "Bolshevik leadership in agriculture."\textsuperscript{273}

The mass expulsions began in the spring of 1933.\textsuperscript{274} That year the word "purge" took on a new meaning. As Postyshev explained during the November 1933 CPU Central Committee plenum, "...almost all the people removed were arrested and put before the firing squad or exiled,"\textsuperscript{275} meaning sent to prison camps. During the purge, 237 out of a total of 390 heads of raion party organizations were found "seized by the Petliurite disease" and dismissed, as were 249 chairmen of raion Control Commissions, and 130 members of the raion Komsomol leadership.\textsuperscript{276} Throughout Ukraine close to 15,000 people holding "responsible positions" in the party were expelled for nationalism.\textsuperscript{277} At the rank-and-file level, it was officially stated in November 1933 that 27,400 members had been expelled from the CPU.\textsuperscript{278} After November the terror gained impetus as Shums'kyi, Iavors'kyi, Solodub and many other well-known figures were accused of belonging to groups such as the "Ukrainian Military Organization", the "All-Ukrainian Social- Revolutionary Centre", and the "All-Ukrainian Borot'bishist Centre".\textsuperscript{279} These organizations were invented to justify the size and scope of the purge as well as an indictment on a charge of high treason.\textsuperscript{280} Kosior reported to the Twelfth CPU Congress held in January 1934 that 14 per cent of the CPU members and 23 per cent of candidate members had been expelled, that is, approximately 80,000 people.\textsuperscript{281} Between January 1933 and January 1934 the CPU lost close to 97,000 members. (See table 3.9) The delegate to the Twelfth Congress who said, "It feels as though Stalin were here among us" had expressed a bitter truth.\textsuperscript{282}

The elimination of the national communists during 1933 began a period in the history of the CPU appropriately labelled by Jurij Borys "the return
TABLE 3.9

Changes in the National Composition of the Communist Party of Ukraine,
1930-40*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Membership</th>
<th>Ukrainians (%)</th>
<th>Russians (%)</th>
<th>Others (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 1930</td>
<td>270,098</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1932</td>
<td>496,320</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1933</td>
<td>550,433</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 1933</td>
<td>468,793</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 1934</td>
<td>453,526</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1937</td>
<td>296,643</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1938</td>
<td>285,818</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1940</td>
<td>521,078</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full and candidate members.

of the Russians". In 1933, "thousands of members of political sections" from Russia were sent to Ukraine, in addition to "3,000 leading cadres" assigned to the republic by the CPSU Central Committee, as well as several thousand others directed to "leading posts" in the raions. Postyshev in 1936 pointed out that the purges represented not an attack on "Ukrainians but on national deviationists". Judging by the statistics on the national composition of the CPU the Ukrainians' share of the total party membership did not decline in major proportions. (See table 3.9) The losses, however, were heaviest where they mattered most. Individuals with a measure of independent thought, those who had experienced relatively unfettered national and cultural development, were removed. The new raw recruits were now led by a largely Russian leadership. The twelve-member Politburo that emerged from the January 1934 Congress contained only four Ukrainians. Of the four Central Committee secretaries only one, the Fourth Secretary, was a Ukrainian.

Postyshev and his clique, having sent hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to their doom in the struggle against "Ukrainian specificity", in time became captives of that same "specificity". During the brief relative calm that prevailed in the republic between 1935 and 1936, the new power holders attempted to consolidate their positions in the republic by promoting Ukraine's uniqueness. John Reshetar wrote:

Postyshev wore Ukrainian embroidered shirts and had an impressive monument erected to Ukraine's greatest port, Shevchenko. He had the capital returned to Kiev from Kharkiv...Ukrainian cultural development continued, although at a sharply reduced tempo... All of this was apparently calculated to have a stabilizing and calming effect on the Ukrainians following the first mass purges...In the last analysis, it seems likely that Postyshev perished because he was probably alleged to have been building his own machine in Ukraine and had become a kind of Soviet Ukrainian "Hetman" - an unpardonable sin in the eyes of the Chief and his coterie in the Kremlin.
Hryhory Kostiuk noted that Postyshev "began to show a lively interest in Ukrainian history and culture, and in the preservation of Ukrainian cadres in the CPU." An example of this was his 1935 article admonishing party members for de-Ukrainizing themselves:

We have many members of the CPU who are already pretty well Ukrainized, and others who are perfectly fluent in the language. But recently members have begun to de-Ukrainize themselves and even to stop speaking the Ukrainian language. We must say that these people are pouring water on the mills of our enemies. This is a very serious development and we must pay considerable attention to it...We have many fine Ukrainian cadres now: our workers, our collective farmers, our Ukrainian intelligentsia. We have far too few of them - Soviet Ukrainian cadres - in our party. We have to recruit these cadres...In Kiev, only 35 per cent of the system of party education is Ukrainized. We need more Ukrainization of party education and not only in terms of language, but also our members must learn about Ukrainian history, culture, the economy.

This discourse was a new development in the period after the 1933 purge. Equally novel was Postyshev's admission that there was hunger on collective farms and that "comrades" in the centre should stop demanding "help from the regions" because grain reserves had been exhausted. Ukraine's "historical, cultural, social and economic peculiarities" had an uncanny way of asserting themselves.

The Ukrainian leadership became embroiled in a new struggle with Moscow in an effort to preserve the cadres in the republic. According to Roy Medvedev, at the Seventeenth CPSU Congress held early in 1934, the so-called "Congress of Victors", "a considerable number of leading party members formed an illegal bloc", hoping to remove Stalin from office. This bloc consisted "basically of secretaries of oblast committees and secretaries of the non-Russian central committees, people who knew the shortcomings of Stalin's policies better than anyone else."
Among those who approached S.M. Kirov to replace Stalin as Secretary General was Petrovs'kyi, representing the CPU. Dissatisfaction with Stalin was also expressed in the election of the CPSU Central Committee. "Only three votes were cast against Kirov, while 270 delegates voted against Stalin, who was elected only because there were exactly as many candidates as there were members to be elected. Stalin was well aware of the efforts to remove him. On 1 December 1934 Kirov was assassinated on Stalin's orders as a prelude to Stalin's renewed attempt to destroy all remaining opposition.

In the wake of Kirov's assassination the remaining national communists, Trotskyists and Bukharinists were expelled from the CPU and charged with belonging to groups such as the "Nationalist Terrorist Bloc", the "Trotskyite Nationalist Terrorist Bloc", and other equally absurd concoctions; then they were executed. It was, however, the CPSU Central Committee letter dated 13 April 1935, ordering a general verification of party documents, that began the mass expulsions which culminated in the Ezhovshchina, the largest purge yet. The CPU leadership resisted this new bloodletting. For the first few months the purge made little headway in Ukraine, and the CPU Central Committee was criticized for its lack of enthusiasm in the verification process. In February 1936 the purge began in earnest. Having decimated the party ranks, Stalin appointed Khrushchev in January 1938 to the post of First Secretary of the CPU with orders to rebuild the organization.

Examining party membership data between January 1934 and May 1938 it is possible to arrive at an estimate of the number of victims of the Ezhovshchina, especially since during that period recruitment into the CPU was at a virtual standstill. In January 1934 the party numbered
453,526 individuals; by May 1938, 285,818. The party had lost approximately 167,708 members, or 37 per cent of its total membership. (See table 3.9) Available evidence suggests that the highest proportion of members expelled was in Odesa oblast, closely followed by Donets'k oblast. The national and social composition of the party members was substantially altered as a result of the purge. We do not have data which allows us to gauge the impact of the entire purge period; our figures are for 1 April 1937. On that day Ukrainians represented 57 per cent of the total membership of the CPU, a drop of three percentage points when compared to October 1933. This means that approximately 40 per cent of the Ukrainians in the party in 1933 were purged by April 1937. In terms of the occupational structure of the CPU ranks, workers represented 51 per cent of the total in 1932 and a mere 25 per cent by 1937. Collective farmers declined from 15 to 5 per cent of the total membership in the same period, while the proportion of white-collar staff increased from 32 to 70 per cent. (See table 3.10) The overwhelming majority of party members were now "functionaries in the party, state and economic organizations".

A.L. Unger summarized the effects of the purge as follows:

[The party]...was rapidly becoming an association of "better people" - better not because they were enlightened, class-conscious workers actually engaged in material production...but because they had succeeded in making their mark in the kind of society which the Soviet Union had become under the iron rule of Stalinist totalitarianism. It was a society in which education, ability, ambition and blind loyalty to the cause of the party and the commands of its leader alone paved the way to the top. The criterion of social origin, still powerful in the early years of industrialization, had lost all relevance...It was inevitable that the "profiteers" of the revolution should join the Jacobin Club, and that the character of the latter should be irrevocably transformed in the process...
TABLE 3.10

Changes in the Occupational Structure of the Membership of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 1930-7 (in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Workers</th>
<th>White-collar staff</th>
<th>Collective farmers</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full and candidate members.

Source: Pravda, 8 June 1930; "Kolichestvennyi i kachestvennyi sostav partii," Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, no.9, 1932, 50; Iu. V. Babko, Partiinoe budivnystvo na Ukraini u 1933-1937 rr. (L'viv, 1971), 14-5, 124-5.
One of the most important reasons why, in Khrushchev's words, the CPU "had been purged spotless" was because the CPU leadership had offered the greatest resistance to Stalin's apparatus of terror. During the February-March 1937 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, a number of Committee members agreed to oppose the attempt to bring Bukharin to trial, making it a test case to try to limit the N.K.V.D.'s powers. The dissenters were lead by Postyshev. Although Stalin's victory over the CPSU was assured when he crushed his opposition at the February-March plenum, "there was to be one last flicker of resistance - in the Ukraine." Despite Postyshev's removal from his CPU office and his banishment to Kuibyshev, those that remained in power in Ukraine continued to oppose the extension of the purge. As Robert Conquest notes:

This was action on a local scale, an attempt to defend a last outpost of comparative sanity. There was no longer any prospect of victory in the Union as a whole, and the struggle which now went on in Kiev might be compared to that of the garrison of an isolated fort which continues with a gallant but hopeless defence, after its main armies have been in the field.

A CPSU Politburo commission consisting of V. Molotov, Khrushchev and N. Ezhov arrived in Kiev in August 1937 with a large force of "special troops" of the N.K.V.D. At a session of the CPU Central Committee Molotov proposed the dismissal of Kosior, Petrovs'kyi, Liubchenko and others from their posts and from the Central Committee, suggesting the election of Khrushchev as head of the CPU. "The Ukrainians refused to vote as instructed, in spite of Molotov ringing Moscow for Stalin's instructions." Finally, Molotov suggested that the Ukrainian Politburo should go to Moscow for a combined session of the CPSU Politburo. Liubchenko, the head of the Ukrainian government, shot himself and his wife rather than walk into the trap. The others went to Moscow since they could hardly avoid doing so
without an open breach of party discipline. They were either arrested at once or on their return to Ukraine.

Stalin took revenge for the attempt to block him during the February-March plenum and especially for the temporarily successful resistance offered by the CPU leadership on their home ground. What unfolded was an orgy of terror even by the standards of the day. Every sort of establishment — industrial enterprises, municipal councils, educational and scientific bodies, creative associations — lost their leaders by the hundreds.

At the Fourteenth CPU Congress in June 1938 it was announced that almost two-thirds of the party’s leadership at the city, oblast, raion and village levels had been purged. The 59 member Central Committee elected at that congress had only one individual — S. Tymoshenko, later Marshall of the Soviet Union — who survived from the previous Central Committee. The entire Politburo and Central Committee secretariat perished, with the exception of Petrovs'kyi who was arrested and later released. The purge was so quick and thorough that it was impossible to hold a Central Committee meeting or Politburo meeting, and the CPU as an organization ceased to function. Between May and June 1938, the entire government of Ukraine was executed. Alex Weissberg, a CPU member arrested during the purge, wrote that "one premier after another had been arrested", to the point where nobody seemed to know who was technically in charge of the government. The continuity of rule had for the first time been completely destroyed. Khrushchev noted, "it seemed as though not one regional or executive Committee secretary, not one secretary of the Council of People's Commissars, not even a single deputy was left. We had to start rebuilding from scratch."

The Communist Party of Ukraine was rebuilt very quickly. Spurred by various resolutions urging an all-out campaign to gain new members, the
CPU grew from 285,818 members at the time of the Fourteenth CPU Congress (June 1938), to 521,078 by the Fifteenth CPU Congress (May 1940). (See table 3.9) The rapid intake of new members improved the representation of Ukrainians in the party. In May 1940 they accounted for 63 per cent of the total membership. (See table 3.9) The increase was certainly not the result of the addition of new members through the annexation of Western Ukraine in 1939. When Western Ukraine was annexed, the Communist forces there were in a state of disarray. Stalin had dissolved the Communist Party of Poland and its subordinate organization, the Communist Party of Western Ukraine in the summer of 1938. In 1940, there were only 11,280 party members in Western Ukraine. Ukrainians improved their representation because of the insecurity that Khrushchev felt when assuming the leadership of the CPU. He had told Stalin that he was "afraid the Ukrainians, and particularly the intelligentsia, might be very cool to me"; that "it hardly makes sense to send me, a Russian to the Ukraine." At the Fifteenth Congress Khrushchev sought to reassure the Ukrainian cadres that they would have a place in the new regime. "The new Ukrainian intelligentsia, a people's socialist intelligentsia," he said, had assumed "its proper role in all branches of the economy and was rapidly entering the ranks of the party." Nevertheless, the fact remained that although the rank-and-file was largely Ukrainian, within the Politburo, out of eight full and candidate members, only three belonged to the indigenous nationality. Yugoslav Communists visiting Kiev, according to Milovan Djilas, were surprised that "...among the Ukrainians, a nation as numerous as the French and in some ways more cultured than the Russians, there was not a single person capable of being premier of the Government." (Khrushchev headed the government as well as the party).
Inasmuch as Stalin told Roosevelt at Yalta that his "position in the Ukraine was difficult and insecure", one can assume that Ukrainians, despite the nightmare they had lived through, continued to be restive about the state of affairs in their republic.
S. Dimanshtein in 1929 argued that the influx of the indigenous population into the towns under industrialization in the context of a policy not only tolerating but also promoting indigenous cultural development, gave Ukrainian culture an historically unprecedented opportunity for development. Having an urban base denied it in the past, with resources of the state backing Ukrainian culture, and a wider public than ever before as a result of the liquidation of illiteracy and progress in education, this culture and language would not only flourish, but would "also increasingly differentiate itself" from the culture of other nations, in particular the Russian. Dimanshtein noted that the language of the "contemporary Ukrainian writers" had evolved to such a stage as to be incomprehensible for "those of us who know the Ukrainian language only on the basis of Russian." He predicted that this development would unleash centrifugal forces.

Stalin retorted in 1931 that Dimenshtein was wrong, not because of faculty logic, but rather because the content of culture would be controlled to ensure that a national self-emancipatory message would not be communicated. As things developed, the controls that Stalin put into place were so thorough that, as Butenko, the Soviet diplomat, noted, every sign of Ukrainian national consciousness, "even when it did not venture beyond the established norm of Soviet life, was rooted out and destroyed." The Ukrainian elite which could serve as a focal point of national discontent was liquidated. The school system and the press which could rein-
force national consciousness were emasculated and subjected to Russification.
The tsarist imperial past was rehabilitated in order to undermine the
Ukrainians' shared collective experience. According to Khrushchev, the
only reason why Ukrainians escaped the fate of deportation suffered
by much smaller nationalities as the Chechen, Ingush and Balkars was that
"there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport
them." 327

There were, however, major aspects of Ukrainian national life which
survived even Stalin's destructive hand. Many republican institutions
remained, at least in form. Moreover, to meet the needs of industrializa-
tion, a new intelligentsia had come into being, replacing the one that had
been destroyed. The fact that these and other aspects remained raised
the possibility that perhaps, at some time in the future, the drive for
national self-assertion could be resumed. In suming up the 1930s, it is
no exaggeration to say that Ukrainians' greatest achievement during that
decade was that they outlasted it.
Notes


5. Visti, 7 November 1932.


7. Korotkyi statystychno-ekonomichnyi dovidnyk Kyivs'koi oblasti 1932 r. (Kiev, 1932), 150. It should be noted that in 1932 the oblast system was introduced in Ukraine, replacing the okruhy as the basic regional administrative unit. See Visti, 10 February 1932.

8. Raiony USRR. Statystychnyi dovidnyk (Kiev, 1936), table 4, x.


10. Visti, 7 November 1932 and Iu. A. Korchak-Chepurkovskii, Izbrannye demograficheskie issledovaniia (Moscow, 1970), 305. The 1959 census, which gives the population of Ukraine for 1939, includes in the 1939 figure the Crimea, added to the republic after 1954. In 1939, the Crimea had over one million people. M. Ptukha, cited by Korchak-Chepurkovskii, gives the population of Ukraine in 1939 within the 1926 boundaries.

11. Ptukha's projections are discussed by Korchak-Chepurkovskii, Izbrannye demograficheskie issledovaniia, 303.


16. V.A. Shpyliuk, Sotsializm i internatsionalizatsiia suspil'noho zhyttia (L'viv, 1971), table 20, 156.


22. N.S. Popov, ed., *Perspektivy Donbassa na vtoroe piatiletie. Po materialam vseukrainski konferentsii po Donbassu 5-9 sentiabria 1931 g.* (Kharkiv, 1932), 16.

23. See Ivakys, "Donbas i uralo-kuznets'kyi basein," 90; *Printsipy geograficheskogo razmeshcheniia tiazheili promyshlennosti vo vtoroi piatiletke* (Moscow, 1932), 7.


27. Ibid., 87.


31. Ibid., 84.


35. I.Iu. Pisarev, *Narodonaselenie SSSR. (Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskii ocherk)* (Moscow, 1962), table 26, 96. The figures are for Ukraine within the 1926 boundaries.


38. This is discussed by Ie. Ia. Shhypovych, "Zrushennia, rozvytok i roz-
mishchennia mis'kyh poselen' Ukrains'koi RSR za roky radians'koi vlady,"
Ekonomicnha heohrafiia, vypusk 7, 1974, 27.

244-5' Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1959 goda, 16 vols. (Moscow,

40. Ibid., and I.M. Shutov, Goroda, v kotorykh my zhivem. (Tsifry i fakty)
(Moscow, 1967), 33; Dotsenko, "Heohrafichni osoblyvosti protsesiv
urbanizatsii," 63, 65.

41. Perepis' 1959, table 1, 11. All data based on the 1959 published census
returns includes the Crimea unless otherwise indicated.

42. See The Black Deeds of the Kremlin: A White Book, 2 vols., (Detroit,
1953-5), II: 611.

43. Eugene M. Kulischer, Europe on the Move: War and Population Changes

44. V.I. Kozlov, Natsional'nosti SSSR (Moscow, 1975), 84, 109, 245; V. Bur-
lin and A.L. Perkhovs'kyi, "Zminy v sotsial'no-ekonomichnii strukturi
naselenia Ukrains'koi RSR (1959-1970 rr.)," Demohrafichni doslidzhennia,

45. S.V. Kosior, "Results and Immediate Tasks of the National Policy in the
Ukraine: Report to the Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the
Central Control Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, November
1933," in P.P. Postyshev and S.V. Kosior, Soviet Ukraine Today (Moscow-
Leningrad, 1934), 44-5.

46. Ibid., 43-5.

47. Table 2.6 and Burlin and Perkhovs'kyi, "Zminy v sotsial'no-ekonomichnii
strukturi," 25.

48. R.P. Dadykin, "O chislennosti i istochnikakh popolneniia rabochego klassa
SSSR (1928-1937 gg.)," Istoricheiskie zapiski, no. 87, 1971, 36.

49. Ibid., 38-41, 47.

50. Visti, 21 February 1932.

51. Visti, 1 and 15 January 1930; The Black Deeds, II: 562, 569, 616.

52. Visti, 3 January 1930.

53. Visti, 23 August 1933.

54. Kopelev, I sotvoril, 140.

55. See Khrystian Rakovsky, "The Five Year Plan in Crisis," Critique, no. 13,
371


58. Romanchenko, Sil's'ke hospodarstvo, 56.


60. Istoriia kolektyvizatsii, II: 219.


62. Istoriia kolektyvizatsii, II: 245.


64. Ibid., 11: 89.

65. See B.A. Abramov, "Kollektivizatsiia sel'skogo khoziaistva v RSFSR," in V.P. Danilov, ed., Ocherki istorii kolektyvizatsii sel'skogo khoziaistva v soiuznykh respublikakh (Moscow, 1963), 90.

66. Istoriia selians'tva Ukraïns'koi RSR, II: 146; Visti, 14 July 1929.


68. Istoriia selians'tva Ukraïns'koi RSR, II: 150.


71. Ibid., 29-31.


75. Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule, 6.
76. The Black Deeds, II: 416. See also 416-29, ibid.
77. Visti, 19 June 1930.
78. Visti, 5 April 1930.
79. V.N. Iakovtsevskii, Agrarnye otnosheniia v SSSR v period stroitel' stva sotsializma (Moscow, 1964), 326-7n.
81. Visti, 22 March 1930.
82. See Jules Koslow, The Despised and the Damned: The Russian Peasant through the Ages (London, 1972), 135-8; Markoosha Fischer, My Lives in Russia (New York, 1944), 49-51.
83. Visti, 5 March 1930.
85. Ibid., 18.
86. Sotsialisticheskoe sel'skoe khoziaistvo Sovetskoi Ukrainy (Kiev, 1939), 251.
88. Ibid.
89. Mykola Velychkivs'kyi, Sil's'ke hospodarstvo Ukrainy i koloniial'na polityka Rosii (New York, 1957), 36.
90. See P. Liubchenko's speech in 16-taia konferentsiia VKP(b). Stenotchet (Moscow, 1962), 182.

100. Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo (Moscow, 1934), 180.


102. Visti, 1 February 1932.

103. Visti, 6 October 1932.


106. Vasyly Hryshko, Moskva sl'ozam ne viryt*. Trahedia Ukrainy 1933 roku z perspektyvy 30-richchia (1933-1963) (New York, 1963), 27.


109. See Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule, 18-21.

110. Komunistychna partiiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiiakh, I: 750.

111. Visti, 17 November 1932.


113. See Visti, 23 November, 2 December, 4 December 1932; Radziejowski, "Collectivization in Ukraine," 13.


115. Visti, 30 November 1932.

116. Visti, 11 June 1933.


118. Visti, 4 January 1933.

119. Hryshko, Moskva, 34.

120. Visti, 15 February and 10 March 1933.

122. Ibid.
129. Sotszialistychna Ukraina, 112.
131. A.B. Slutskii, Rabochii klass Ukrainy v bor'be za sozdanie fundamenta sotsialisticheskoi ekonomiki (1926-1932 gg.) (Kiev, 1963), 391.
132. Ibid., 393.
133. USRR v tsyfrakh, table 5, 396.
134. I.V. Stalin, Voprosy leninizma (Moscow, 1945), 511.
135. USRR v tsyfrakh, table 8, 400.
139. Sotszialistychna Ukraina, 186.
141. Visti, 21 June 1930; L. Zinge"r, Natsional'nyi sostav proletariata v SSSR (Moscow, 1934), 11; Istoriiia robitnychoho klasu Ukrains'koi RSR, II: 206; S.L. Seniavs'kii and V.B. Tel'pukhovskii, Rabochii klass SSSR (1938-1965 gg.) (Moscow, 1971), table 24, 335.
142. Slutskii, Rabochii klass Ukrainy, 399-70 and Kosior, Vybrani stati, 497.

143. Horlach, Virna opora, 185.

144. Kosior, "Pidsumky i naiblyzhchi zavdannia," 216.

145. Visti, 10 April 1932.

146. Visti, 24 July 1930.


148. Visti, 3 January 1930.


150. Visti, 22 June 1930.

151. Visti, 6 July 1933.

152. Visti, 11 July 1933.

153. Ammende, Human Life in Russia, 118.

154. Visti, 22 June 1933."T" was dropped in the standard Soviet Ukrainian orthography in the early 1930s. The existence of "r" and "r" was an element differentiating the Ukrainian alphabet from the Russian.


156. Na fronti kul'tury (Kiev, 1935), 170, 195.


159. Inkeles and Bauer, The Soviet Citizen, 353, 357.


161. Sotsialistichna Ukraina, 22.

163. Kosior, Vybrani statti, 497.

164. Khvylia, Do rozv'iazannia, 72.


167. Ibid.

168. See Visti, 27 February 1930.

169. Nykyfor Hryhoryiv, Pidstavy ukrains'koi nezalezhnoi polityky (Detroit, 1939), 13.

170. Na fronti kul'tury, 15, 30, 98.

171. Ibid., 128.


177. S. Chugunov, "Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo Ukrainy," Revoliutsiia i natsional'nosti, no. 4, 1934, 68.


179. Shliakh do znannia, no. 25, 1938, 2.

180. P.G. Pod'iachikh, Vsesciuзнаia perepis naseleniia 1939 goda (Moscow, 1957), 34.


185. Kul'turne budivnytstvo Ukrains'koi RSR. Statystychnyi dovidnyk (Kiev, 1940), 38.


188. L.P. Tenderes, "Budivnytstvo radians'koi shkoly i rozvytok narodnoi osvity na Ukraini v 1926-1932 rr.," Naukovyi pratsi z istorii KPRS, vypus 5, 85.

189. Narodna osvita, nauka i kul'tura, 305.


191. I.I. Kolomiichenko, "Kerivnytstvo KP(b)U rozv'ytkom narodnoi osvity v period pidhotovky nastupu sotsializmu po vs'omu frontu (1926-1929 rr.)," Naukovyi pratsi z istorii KPRS, vypus 5, 81.


193. Skrypnyk, Statti i promovy, 210-11.


196. Visti, 23 August 1933.


198. See Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule, 31-74 for the political history of this period.


200. See Visti, 8 July 1933 for Skrypnyk's obituary.


202. The text of the resolution adopted by the November 1933 Central Committee plenum is reproduced in Pravda, 24 November 1933.

203. Visti, 11 July 1933.
204. *Na fronti kul'tury*, 16.
205. Ibid., 13.
206. Ibid., 212.
209. Ibid., 30.
211. Ibid., 28.
213. *Na fronti kul'tury*, 16.
219. V. Riabichko, "Rozvytok narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrainy u druhili p"iatyrichtsi," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, no. 5, 1938, 42.
222. See table 2.17.
224. See Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule*, 142-3.
225. See "Boiova prohrama dii bil'shovykiv Ukrainy," *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*, no. 7, 1938, 32.
227. Na fronti kul'tury, 98.

228. For the removal of works by "nationalist counter-revolutionaries" from Ukraine's libraries see ibid., 10.

229. Dmytryshyn, Moscow and the Ukraine, 128.

230. "Presa", Chervonyi shliakh, no. 5-6, 1932, 148.

231. Skrypnyk, Statti i promovy, 212.

232. Table 2.23 and SSSR v tsifrakh, (Moscow, 1933), table 16, 542-3.


234. A.I. Nazarov, Ocherki istorii sovetskogo knigoizdatel' stva (Moscow, 1952), 161.

235. M. Gorkii, O literature (Moscow, 1934), 81.

236. P. Samoilovich, "Bol'she bditel'nosti na ideologicheskom fronte," Partiinoe stroitel' stvo, no. 1-2, 1932, 21, 32.


   It should be noted that comprehensive statistics on the publishing industry in Ukraine were not released during the 1930s.

238. Na fronti kul'tury, 252.

239. Ibid.

240. 20 let sovetskoi vlasti, table 84, 103.


242. See table 2.23.

243. Ibid., and Narodne hospodarstvo (1935), 575.

244. M.M. Popov, "Peretvoryty Ukrainu na zrazkovu respubliku. Promova na lystopadovomu plenumi TsK TsKK KP(b)U," Chervynyi shliakh, no.10, 1933, 183.


247. Skrypnyk, Statti i promovy, 212.


250. Na fronti kul'tury, 142 and Sotsialistychna Ukraina, 223.

251. Na fronti kul'tury, 143, 146.

252. Ibid., 10.

253. Pravda, 4 October 1937.

254. Na fronti kul'tury, 89.


258. Visti, 7 April 1929.

259. Visti, 9 January 1929.


261. Natsional'naia politika VKP(b) v tsifrakh (Moscow, 1930), 144-5.


263. Holubnychy, "Outline History," 92.


266. Visti, 23 November 1932.


268. Kopelev, I sotvoril sebe kumira, 297.

269. Trotsky, Writings, 72.

270. Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 201.
271. Ibid., 178-9, 202-4.
272. Pravda, 27 November 1933.
274. "O chistke parti. Postanovlenie TsK i TsKK VKP(b)," Partiinoe stroitel'stvo, no. 9, 1933.
276. Ibid.
277. Pravda, 22 November 1933.
279. Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule, 85, 93.
280. Ibid.
284. Pravda, 27 November 1933; Postshev and Kosior, Soviet Ukraine Today, 11-12.
288. Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule, 117. In June 1936, for example the CPU Central Committee passed a resolution encouraging the study of Ukrainian folklore. Visti, 1 June 1936.
290. Cited by Kopelev, I sotvoril sebe kumira, 298.
291. Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule, 117.
293. Ibid., 156.
294. Ibid., 166.


297. Visti, 1 February 1936.


300. Regional party membership data are available for seven out of twelve oblasts and for the years 1933 and 1937.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1937 membership as % of 1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donets'k</td>
<td>169,358</td>
<td>78,632</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipropetrovs'k</td>
<td>91,333</td>
<td>49,560</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kharkiv</td>
<td>98,525</td>
<td>56,935</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odesa</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>22,015</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev</td>
<td>58,000</td>
<td>33,358</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chernihiv</td>
<td>20,244</td>
<td>11,173</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldavia</td>
<td>5,768</td>
<td>3,538</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: M. Klymko, Chotyrnadtsiatyi z"izd KP(b)U (Kiev, 1964), 50-1; Iz istorii Odesskoi partiinoi organizatsii. Ocherki (Odesa, 1964), 340; Narysy istorii Kyivs'koi oblasnoi partiinoi orhanizatsii (Kiev, 1967), 368; Babko, Partiine budivnytstvo, 126.

301. Babko, Partiine budivnytstvo, 125.


303. N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 108.


305. Ibid., 343.

306. Ie. Rivosh, Pavlo Petrovych Postyshev. (Biohrafichnyi narys) (Kiev, 1964), 123. There seemed to be some confusion as to how Postyshev died. See Kostiuk, Stalinist Rule, 116. Rivosh, 124, supplies the answer: Postyshev was executed in December 1940.


308. Ibid., 349.

309. Ibid., 350.

310. Ibid.


316. See *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiiaakh*, I: 895-6, 931.


319. Visti, 18 May 1940.


324. Ibid., 119, 121-46.


Chapter Four: Ukrainian Society After the Second World War
Introduction

It seemed to some that Ukrainians were crushed as a nation, perhaps irreparably, during the 1930s. There was no time to recover before they were confronted with another cataclysmic event - the Second World War. Neither was the post-war period propitious for Ukrainians' national development. The number of Russians in the republic increased substantially, creating an environment promoting the assimilation of Ukrainians. The social structure of Ukraine was modernized, but this occurred at a time when the Russian leadership unleashed a concerted assimilatory and integrationist drive. As Evgenii Tiazhel'nikov, the former head of the all-Union Komsomol, said, "You can play the independence game with the Kirghiz or the Moldavians, but this is impossible with the Ukrainians. They are too numerous. They must be ruled with an iron hand." There was the danger that the "iron hand" of assimilation could wipe out whatever gains Ukrainians' may have made as a result of their social mobilisation.

Yet in the post-war period, despite the seemingly insurmountable obstacles, Ukrainians resumed their drive for national self-assertion. The form that this took and its underlying social causes are the two basic themes of this chapter.
i. **Population**

During the Second World War, when all of Ukraine served as a theatre of war, the republic experienced its third demographic catastrophe of this century. According to V.V. Shcherbyts'kyi, the CPU's First Secretary, 6,750,000 people were killed during the war. Of these, five million were civilian casualties. Adding indirect deaths to the total, it is calculated that eleven million people were lost to the republic. Included in this figure were over two million Jews.

The end of the war did not bring respite to the republic. In 1946-7 a drought, more acute than the one which had occurred in 1921-2, affected the steppe. History repeated itself: "train after train" loaded with foodstuffs from the non-famine regions of Ukraine departed for Russia, while the population of the steppe was left to starve. The western regions of Ukraine, added to the republic during the war, also lost many people as a result of mass deportations to Siberia and the Far East between 1947 and 1951 in the course of the Soviet regime's campaign to stamp out the nationalist resistance movement.

Ukraine's population losses during the war and post-war period were so extreme that, despite the addition of two million citizens with the incorporation of Transcarpathia (1944) and the Crimea (1954), it was only in 1960 that the republic recovered its 1 January 1941 population total of 42.1 million. (The 1941 figure included all of Western Ukraine except for Transcarpathia.) When the casualties of the civil war, collectivization, the purges and World War II are combined, more than half the male and a quarter of the female population of Ukraine did not fulfill their natural
Such a "mountain of skulls" was unprecedented in human history. Along with people, the traditions and ideas, the achievements and hopes that one generation communicates to another were destroyed. In the face of such monumental losses, it was remarkable that Ukrainian society had any strength left for national self-assertion in the post-war period.

Society in Ukraine began its recovery in the 1950s with a changed ethno-demographic structure. As a result of Nazi extermination policies, Jews diminished to a mere two per cent of Ukraine's population by 1959. Many Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and other East European minorities living in Ukraine were resettled in the aftermath of WWII in the newly established peoples' democracies. The incorporation of Western Ukraine added approximately seven million Ukrainians to the population of the republic. The diminution of the population of Ukraine's non-Russian minorities and the addition of Ukrainians from the western regions were the two factors responsible for an increase in the Ukrainians' representation in the total population of the republic between 1930 and 1959. Ukrainians had not augmented their share of the population at the expense of the Russian minority. On the contrary, in the post-war period the growth of the Russian population in Ukraine was unprecedented. By 1970 there were over nine million Russians in Ukraine, almost twenty per cent of the population. Ukrainians during the 1960s saw their plurality eroded by two per cent. [See table 4.1] Many Ukrainians viewed this ethno-demographic trend with alarm.

Because (as we discuss below) the large increase in the number of Russians in Ukraine posed such a major challenge for Ukrainians both in terms of the preservation of their national identity and in establishing a dominant position in the republic's social structure, the causes of the
### TABLE 4.1

National Composition of the Population of Ukraine, 1795-1970

| Year   | Population | Ukrainians | % of Total Ukrainians | Russians | % of Total Russians | Jews | % of Total Jews | Others | % of Total Others | Year of Population
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1795</td>
<td>3,974,000</td>
<td>3,522,000</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>440,000</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>23,430,000</td>
<td>17,004,000</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>6,377,000</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>29,019,000</td>
<td>23,219,000</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>5,740,000</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>38,569,000</td>
<td>28,626,000</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>9,143,000</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>1,908,000</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>31,785,000</td>
<td>23,362,000</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>8,423,000</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>41,869,000</td>
<td>32,158,000</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>9,711,000</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>47,127,000</td>
<td>35,284,000</td>
<td>74.9</td>
<td>11,843,000</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*a. Male population only, nine provinces of tsarist Russia.
b. Nine provinces of tsarist Russia. Nationality is denoted by mother-tongue.
c. Territories of the Ukrainian SSR (e.g., post 1954).
d. This figure includes all of the territories within the present boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR.

increase deserve to be examined in some detail. Four factors were at play: the rate of natural increase of the population of Ukraine, the immigration of Russians, the assimilation of Ukrainians to a Russian identity and, finally, the out-migration of Ukrainians. We will examine each of these factors in turn.

In 1969 participants at a special conference held in Kharkiv to discuss Ukraine's demographic trends noted, "Society cannot ignore the statistical fact that our country's birth rate is declining rapidly. Should this trend continue, by the beginning of the 1970s, our population will have ceased to increase itself naturally and will begin to decline: economically, socially and otherwise, the consequences will be extremely unfavourable." Indeed, in 1974-6 the gross coefficient of reproduction reached 1.00, meaning the population had stopped growing naturally. During the 1960s Ukraine had the third lowest birth rate among the fifteen republics of the USSR. The traditional source of population renewal, the village, had exhausted its capacities as a result of war losses, the flight of young people to the cities and changes in rural life styles. By 1966, the fertility rate in the countryside was lower than in the cities and soon cities had larger families than the villages. A portent of demographic trends in urban centres could be seen in the industrial cities of the republic's south-eastern oblasts, where by 1964 the net reproduction ratio, that is the rate at which women of one maternal generation are completely replaced by the women of the succeeding maternal generation, was less than unity. An absolute decline in the population had begun. Parallelling the declining birth rate, the death rate increased during the 1960s. Ukraine moved from fourth to third place among the fifteen republics between 1960 and 1970 in this respect. The
causes of this looming demographic crisis were only in part attributable to the processes of modernization. The regime's inability to improve or even to keep stable the quality of life played a large role.24

Ukrainians in the republic had higher birth rates than Russians living there. Ukrainians' higher death rates, however, meant that their tempo of natural increase was roughly the same as that of the Russian population of the Ukrainian SRR.25 In this situation of demographic parity, migratory patterns and ethnic processes played the determining role in altering the ethnic structure of the republic's population.26

It is estimated that between 1959 and 1970 one million Russians migrated to Ukraine.27 The great size of this migration has led some to claim that it represented a conscious policy to Russify the republic.28 Because migration is a complex process and existing Soviet literature on the subject leaves many questions unanswered, it is difficult either to disprove or to substantiate such a claim. Officially, the Administration for Organized Recruitment of Labour (O.N.R.) of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR in coordination with the all-Union Gosplan was charged with ensuring that Ukraine's labour needs were met.29 The O.N.R., however, had no jurisdiction over institutions and enterprises in Ukraine under all-Union control. These establishments recruited largely from outside the republic despite instructions stating that local labour reserves had to be used.30 Only a tenth of Ukraine's immigrants were brought through the aegis of the republic's labour recruitment agencies.31 Soviet researchers claimed that in the overwhelming majority of cases, immigrants were moving to Ukraine on their own personal initiative.32 They were attracted by the climate, the developed economy offering job possibilities for a wide variety of skills and qualifi-
cations, as well as by the developed social infrastructures (schools, hospitals) of Ukraine's southern regions. The existence of a Russian "old boys" network in the enterprises located in the republic meant that many Russian immigrants had little difficulty in securing good employment. A Soviet Academy of Sciences study of labour resources pointed out that the large scale movement of Russians into Ukraine was technically illegal since it was not part of the plan for balancing labour resources. Although Ukrainian party leaders attempted to stem the tide of Russian immigration, their efforts in this direction were not successful.

Because Russian migration was concentrated in certain regions, it "altered the existing ethnic structure" of these areas. Our only source of information for the regional pattern of immigrant settlement is the 1970 census, the first since 1926 to collect information on migration. The census gathered this data by asking residents who had lived less than two years at their current address to indicate their previous place of residence. The results showed that 13.8 million people in Ukraine changed their place of residence between 1968 and 1970. A little fewer than 600,000 had arrived from outside the republic; of these 428,000 came from the RSFSR. The majority of migrants from Russia settled in the Donbas and Southern regions. Although the census did not provide demographic information about the new arrivals, some of these data can be gleaned from surveys. A 1968 study of 4,500 migrants, for example, found that two-thirds were males, 84 per cent were under the age of 40 and almost a third had higher or specialized secondary education. This profile indicated that immigrants were equipped to play a dynamic role in the socio-economic life of the republic.

Apart from in-migration, the Russian population of Ukraine increased
## TABLE 4.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of Regions of Total In-Migration to Ukraine, 1968-70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To Donbas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSFSR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other regions of Ukraine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

as a result of the assimilation of other minorities living in the republic (Belorussians, Bulgarians, Greeks, etc.) to a Russian identity. As regards Ukrainians, Bruk noted, "It is quite likely that fewer Russians moved to Ukraine than emerges from the calculations. After all, as early as 1959 over 2 million Ukrainians on the territory of Ukraine gave Russian as their native language, and a proportion of them (or their children) might in the intervening period have changed their national self-identity as well." In the process of assimilation, the "level of multinationality" plays a decisive role. In some regions this level is much higher than in others. (In Western Ukraine it has actually declined.) In view of the statutory regulations governing individuals' declaration of nationality, the most significant avenue of influence of a high index of multinationality on national assimilation is through inter-marriage between Ukrainians and Russians. The number of mixed marriages in Ukraine increased from 15 percent of the total number of families in 1959 to 20 percent in 1970. The majority of such marriages are between Ukrainians and Russians. In areas with substantial Russian populations, the rate of inter-marriage is high. In the southern and south-eastern regions of Ukraine a significant majority of the offspring of mixed marriages were registered as Russians by their parents. In the case of the city of Kiev, however, a 1968 survey found that half the children raised in families where one of the parents was a Ukrainian claimed Ukrainian as their nationality on reaching the age of 16. Based on calculations using the residual method, it appears that the Ukrainian nation in the Ukrainian SSR lost approximately 225,000 individuals between 1959 and 1970 through assimilation. The bulk of those assimilating, as will be shown below, resided in Donbas and the southern regions.
TABLE 4.3
National Composition of Ukraine according to Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Others</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1926-70*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2,982,059</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>6,714,220</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>7,642,545</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>4,315,232</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>5,386,561</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,377,109</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>6,368,755</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>5,665,553</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,037,299</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>12,606,774</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>11,237,522</td>
<td>88.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>11,934,679</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>8,502,400</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>7,802,058</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>8,754,522</td>
<td>88.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>6.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>3,735,568</td>
<td>52.5</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>26.8</td>
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<td>1959</td>
<td>5,066,132</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>6,380,614</td>
<td>55.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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</table>

* Data for 1926 were obtained from index cards supplied by Lew Shankovsky and reproduced with his permission. Mr. Shankovsky translated pre-war administrative divisions into post-war oblasts.

In the post-war period, under-employment and even unemployment in the Western and Central-Western regions created pressure for out-migration. In the immediate post-war period, the main form of out-migration was to other areas within the republic, with a large number of families resettled from the West to the South. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, as a result of Khrushchev's decision to open up the virgin lands in Kazakhstan, several hundred thousand Ukrainians were directed by labour recruitment agencies to move to Central Asia. In addition, as a consequence of the state's right to transfer graduates of specialized secondary schools and higher educational institutions to work for not less than three years anywhere in the country, some Ukrainians migrated beyond the borders of their republic. In 1964, for example, 21 per cent of the graduating class of Ukraine's technical institutions of higher education were assigned to jobs outside Ukraine.

In the second half of the 1960s the out-migration of Ukrainians beyond the borders of the republic declined. Moreover, many of those who had migrated to Central Asia, dissatisfied with living conditions there, returned to Ukraine. Speaking at the Fourth Congress of the Geographical Society of the USSR, a group of prominent Soviet geographers made the following observation about Ukraine's contribution to the total migration into Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East:

...The contribution of Ukraine is unexpectedly small. Although Ukraine is well supplied with manpower, and even has a surplus in the western part, out-migration from Ukraine was lower than for Belorussia, whose population is five times smaller.

Information for the two main forms of resettlement, O.N.R. and the planned resettlement of families, as well as data on the migratory patterns of Ukraine's rural population, confirm the above observation.
An important factor in stemming out-migration was a shift in the geographical pattern of capital investment, which V.K. Vrublevs'kyi analysed as follows:

Escalating scientific and technical progress is... having a noticeable impact on the geographical distribution of productive forces. In the Soviet Union there is a noticeable shift to the east, the object of which is the exploitation of the vast fuel and raw material resources of Siberia, the Far East and Central Asia. In our republic the shift has been toward the western oblasts in order to achieve a more comprehensive utilization of labour resources.61

The dispersement of investment funds to the less developed regions of Ukraine where the majority of Ukrainians lived was a long-standing demand of Ukrainian economic nationalism.62 This demand was tied to the development of Ukraine's light and manufacturing industries. In the post-war period, it was only in the mid-1960s, when autonomist currents within the CPU gained the upper hand under the leadership of P.Iu. Shelest, that an attempt was made to implement this policy.63 The share of total capital investment allocated to the Central West and West increased from 1965 onwards.64 The emphasis that was placed on consumer industry by the Brezhnev leadership after Khrushchev's fall aided the industrialization of this region.65 The development of Western Ukraine was also "motivated by a desire for greater integration with the adjoining Comecon countries."66 Finally, the disinclination of the local population in Western Ukraine to migrate to the eastern region experiencing labour shortages provided Ukrainian officials with an additional argument to shift capital investment to that region.67 Since the Western and Central-Western regions were also those where the national self-identification of Ukrainians was strongest, the economic trends of the 1960s had the effect of strengthening the social basis of nationalism in the republic.68
Studies of internal Ukrainian migration have shown that the desire for a higher standard of living, more satisfying employment and better cultural facilities are the decisive motivating factors. This is what one would expect to find among those changing residence in a modern society. Migration everywhere involves rivalry, as people vie for well paid, interesting employment. Not everywhere, however, does this rivalry entail tensions between nations and ethnic groups. In Ukraine, because of substantial Russian immigration, it did. The focal point of the tensions was the cities.

ii. Urbanization

During the Second World War Ukraine's cities bore the brunt of military confrontations. Over 700 cities and towns were either completely or partially destroyed. This represented 42 per cent of all urban centres devastated by the war in the entire USSR. Over 16,000 industrial enterprises were demolished or burnt down which accounted for 31 per cent of the USSR's enterprises thus affected by the war. All in all it is estimated that the material damage in Ukraine amounted to 285 milliard rubles (in 1941 prices), or 42 per cent of the USSR's losses. These figures do not include the damage incurred through the evacuation of machinery and plants from Ukraine to the interior of the USSR, nor the consequences of the Soviet government's scorched-earth policy. The scope of Ukraine's loss of industrial capacity from this evacuation policy can be seen from the fact that by the end of
1942 over 50,000 plants and factories had been relocated from Ukraine to Kazakhstan alone. By 1946, despite two years of reconstruction, Ukrainian industry was still operating at one third its 1941 capacity. As for human losses, over three and a half million urban civilians died during the war. Most of Ukraine's large cities lost half their population. Millions of Ukrainians were taken by Germans to work in labour camps or were evacuated to the eastern regions of the USSR in the face of the German advance.

In view of the extent of war damage, one would have thought Ukraine more than qualified for a massive infusion of investment to rebuild the war-torn country. After the war, however, the republic's portion of the USSR's investment capital was below Ukraine's share of the USSR's total population, and well below Ukraine's economic capacity and contribution to the all-Union state treasury. Between 1946 and 1951, for example, only 15 per cent of Soviet construction funds were spent in Ukraine, where 40 per cent of the Soviet population left homeless by the war resided. Had it not been for the savings of Ukraine's impoverished population, there would have been little reconstruction at all. The central government's neglect of investment in Ukrainian urban reconstruction meant that as late as 1950, Ukrainian towns had 12.8 million people, well below the 1940 mark of 13.8 million, and two thirds of the republic's population lived in the countryside, just as in 1940. The urban economy offered little opportunity for migration from the village. In 1956, over ten years after the end of the war, the urban population of the Central West had increased a mere 10 per cent when compared to 1939; the West's growth in the same period was 2 per cent. The little urban expansion that occurred in Ukraine between 1939 and 1956 was centred in Donbas and Dnipro.
The war had a profound effect on the national composition of Ukraine's cities. In the Central West, as a result of the destruction of the Jewish population, the most significant non-Ukrainian group inhabiting the area, as well as through the evacuation of Russian officialdom, towns became more homogenously Ukrainian during the war. In 1942, for example, 80 per cent of Kiev's population was Ukrainian. After the war, Russian officialdom returned, but since the Central West's economy stagnated until the 1960s, there was little opportunity for a sizeable Russian in-migration. In Western Ukraine, in the wake of resettlements, Ukrainians experienced a dramatic rise in their urban representation: from an estimated 25 per cent in 1933 to 71 per cent of the urban total by 1959.

As a result of the war Ukrainians increased their representation in the eastern industrial regions as well, although there were important differences between the Dnipro and Donbas regions in this respect. The population loss of the urban centres of Dnipro and Donbas were particularly acute, and the working class had dwindled in size. To reconstitute the work force, fresh contingents of young people were brought in from the countryside. They were needed most in the Dnipro region for the labour-intensive metallurgical industry. Between 1946 and 1948, for example, Ukraine's Komsomol directed over half a million young people to factories in Dnipropetrovs'k and Zaporizhzhia. Many also entered the work force in Donbas, but in fewer numbers. Donbas' industry demanded a more skilled labour force. To meet the need, tens of thousands of experienced workers, engineers, technicians and white-collar staff were imported from Russia to fill posts in the Donbas economy. Whether the fact that the region's industry was under all-Union jurisdiction influenced recruitment patterns is impossible to prove one way or the other.
However, the fact that Ukraine could not meet its own demands for a skilled labour force was indicative of a serious crisis in the republic's educational system.

During the 1950s, the urban population of Ukraine was recovering its losses. If one takes into account the relatively high rate of natural increase of the urban population, as well as the fact that in 1956 all "villages of an urban type" were reclassified as towns, artificially inflating the size of the urban population, there was a good deal less real urban growth than the statistical manuals suggest. Unfortunately, sociological studies on urban trends in Ukraine during that decade only began to be published with de-Stalinization, after 1956. The 1959 census data record the results of a process, but tell us nothing about the process itself. Rather than examine the 1959 census returns separately, we shall consider them in concert with the 1970 census data in analysing the urbanization of the republic during the 1960s.

During the 1960s the urban population of Ukraine increased from 19 million in 1959 to 26 million by 1970. By 1966 Ukraine (but not Ukrainians) had emerged as a mobilised society, the criterion of which, according to Deutsch, is an urban population which exceeds half the total population. The fact that Ukraine reached modernity so late, a full decade behind the Russian republic, pointed to major problems in the republic's urbanization. A comparison of Ukraine's urban development since the revolution with that of Russia's clearly demonstrates this. In 1913, for example, 19 per cent of Ukraine's urban population lived in towns, while Russia's rate of urbanization was 17 per cent. By 1959 the weight of urban dwellers in Russia's population represented 52 per cent of the total population. In the case of Ukraine the
figure was 48 per cent. During the 1960s the urban gap between the republics widened. Russia's urban population in 1970 was 62 per cent of the total population, Ukraine's was 55 per cent. The qualitative differences between the cities of the two republics must also be stressed. Russian cities in aggregate terms were 38 per cent larger than their Ukrainian counterparts, and Ukraine's urban network was disproportionately dominated by small and middle-size centres of 20,000-50,000 people.

Urbanization is related to industrial development, a point well documented by B.S. Khorev. Ukraine's slow pace of urban growth was a reflection of the republic's economic predicament within the USSR. Since major industrial investment decisions are the monopoly of the all-Union government, this meant Ukraine suffered from discriminatory practices in the location of new plants and factories. At the same time the republic's economic development was affected by a substantial drain of capital. Z.L. Melnyk has calculated that 34 per cent of the total receipts of the budgetary system in Ukraine between 1959 and 1970 were lost to the republic. This net capital outflow represented 20 per cent of Ukraine's reported national income. Melnyk's conclusions have been corroborated by Soviet Ukrainian economists who demonstrated that between 1959 and 1961 the all-Union government expropriated almost a third of all budgetary revenues in Ukraine. Because Ukraine did not receive a fair share of industrial development, the republic's urban growth was held back.

During the 1960s Ukraine's share of all-Union capital investment funds declined, and the drop in the republic's economic growth rate was sharper than for the USSR as a whole. The economic and urban growth that did occur, however, had a distinctive regional pattern not experienced in pre-
vious decades. Under the impact of renewed trade with capitalist countries and build-up of the USSR's Mediterranean fleet, the southern port cities expanded rapidly.\textsuperscript{92} The Central-Western and Western areas, for reasons we have already mentioned, saw new investment. At the same time, the shift of the USSR's energy and raw material development to Siberia and the Soviet north, combined with urban saturation in Donbas, resulted in a downplaying of investment in the Dnipro-Donbas coal-metallurgical complex which affected the region's overall urban expansion.\textsuperscript{93}

To evaluate the impact of these economic trends on the republic's urban network it is first necessary to isolate the three different sources that bring about urban population growth. The first, changes in the administrative boundaries of cities, represented 14 per cent of Ukraine's urban population increase between 1959 and 1970. The second, natural increase of the population, accounted for 38 per cent of the growth and, finally, in-migration or mechanical increase was responsible for 48 per cent.\textsuperscript{94} Mechanical increase is the indicator which points to an expansion of urban employment opportunities and other processes associated with social mobilisation.\textsuperscript{95} Prior to 1960, Donbas and Dnipro were the regions experiencing the highest rates of mechanical increase. After 1960 the focal points in this respect were the South, the Central West and some oblasts of the Western region - L'viv, Chernivtsi and Volyn' in particular. Thus while in-migration accounted for less than 10 per cent of Donets'k oblast's urban population increase, in the case of Cherkasy oblast in the Central-Western region, over 40 per cent of its urban population growth was due to in-migration.\textsuperscript{96} As a consequence of these trends, between 1959 and 1970 the South, the Central West and the West had above average rates of urban population growth and a shift towards a more
even regional distribution of Ukraine's urban population could be discerned. [See tables 4.4 and 4.5] The trends of the 1960s, however, were too recent a development to alter the stark regional contrasts in the rate of urbanization. 97 [See table 4.6]

When the 1959 census was taken, Ukrainians were far from a fully mobilised nation since their rate of urbanization was only 36 per cent. 98 Although they were a majority of the urban population in 1959, 62 per cent of the total, that in itself does not give us the whole picture. The modernization of the social structure of a people consists not only of their movement from rural to urban centres, but also of a strengthening of their presence in large cities. The major metropolitan centres with their wide range of services, employment opportunities and cultural facilities represent a much richer urban experience than small towns. In the light of 1959 data we find that 53 per cent of the 12 million urban residents claiming Ukrainian as their nationality inhabited towns with a population under 50,000. 99 By contrast, 63 per cent of the Russian urban population in Ukraine lived in towns with populations greater than 50,000. [See table 4.7] The weight of Ukrainians in the urban population also decreased in direct proportion to the size of town. In urban centres with a population of less than 20,000, Ukrainians enjoyed a decisive majority - 72 per cent of the population total. But in the crucial urban centres, the five major cities of the republic with a population of over half a million, the Ukrainian share diminished to 53 per cent. [See table 4.8] Not surprisingly, there were pronounced regional variations in the pattern of Ukrainian urban settlement according to size of town. The weak points in this respect were the southern oblasts of Odesa and, of course, the Crimea, an oblast which became a destination for Ukrainian migra-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total urban population</th>
<th>As % of total population</th>
<th>Total urban population</th>
<th>As % of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>5,601,000</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>6,546,000</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>3,108,000</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>4,268,000</td>
<td>66.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>2,539,000</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>3,293,000</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>3,327,000</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>4,932,000</td>
<td>41.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>2,107,000</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>3,009,000</td>
<td>34.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>2,465,000</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>3,641,000</td>
<td>57.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>19,147,000</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>25,689,000</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 4.5

Rate of Increase of Urban Population according to Region, 1939-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1939-1959</th>
<th>1959-1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 4.6

Changes in the Regional Distribution of Ukraine's Urban Population, 1959-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4.7

National Composition of Urban Settlements in Ukraine according to Size of Town, 1959 (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Urban Population:</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>500,000 +</td>
<td>11,781,750</td>
<td>5,726,476</td>
<td>1,639,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,000-500,000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000-300,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-50,000</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000 and under</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE 4.8

**Distribution of the Urban Population of the Major National Groups in Ukraine according to Size of Town, 1959 (in per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Town</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20,000</td>
<td>936</td>
<td>6,045,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-50,000</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2,844,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1,898,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000-300,000</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2,703,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,000-500,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1,590,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 and over</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,064,948</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Town</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 20,000</td>
<td>71.6%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000-50,000</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50,000-100,000</td>
<td>57.9%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000-300,000</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300,000-500,000</td>
<td>59.2%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500,000 and over</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>33.4%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source:
- Calculated from Karta shuchasnoho etnichnoho skladu naselennia Ukrains'koi RSR (Moscow, 1966);
- Pgrepis' 1959T vol.2, table 6, 17-21, table 7, 22, table 8, 23-4; Istoriia mist i sil Ukrains'koi RSR
tion only after 1954. The rather strong Ukrainian urban presence in cities of all sizes in Dnipropetrovs'k oblast, one of the most economically developed in the republic, is important to note. Also, although in Donets'k oblast Ukrainians were a minority of the population of the capital of the region (Donets'k city), in the smaller mining centres they were a majority. [See table 4.9] Unfortunately no data giving the national composition of the urban population according to size of town were released after 1959 so the qualitative aspect of the Ukrainians' urbanization process during the 1960s cannot be studied directly; it has to be inferred.

Between 1959 and 1970 the rate of Ukrainians' urbanization improved by a little more than nine per cent, although by 1970 Ukrainians could still not be considered a fully modernized nation. [See table 4.10] Because the number of Russians in Ukraine's cities increased in roughly the same proportion as the number of Ukrainians - 34 and 37 per cent respectively - the Ukrainians' majority of the republic's urban population grew by a mere 1.4 per cent in the intercensal period. In a number of regions the Russian increase was larger than that of Ukrainians and as a result Ukrainians experienced a decline in their urban pluralities. [See table 4.11]

Three factors affected the proportional representation of Ukrainians in the urban population. The first was assimilation. There can be no doubt that in the republic's eastern cities this process played a role in reducing the size of the Ukrainian urban population. It is in cities, for example, that most intermarriages between Ukrainians and Russians take place, and the rate of intermarriage between partners of different nationality increased from 26 to 30 per cent of all urban marriages between 1959 and 1970 in Ukraine. The eastern industrial cities lacked a strong infrastructure of Ukrainian
### TABLE 4.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Ukrainian</th>
<th>Russian</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oblast</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1000-2000</td>
<td>2000-3000</td>
<td>3000-7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70-100</td>
<td>100-300</td>
<td>300-1000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>100-300</td>
<td>300-700</td>
<td>700-2000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>300-700</td>
<td>700-2000</td>
<td>2000-4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>700-2000</td>
<td>2000-4000</td>
<td>4000-6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2000-4000</td>
<td>4000-6000</td>
<td>6000-10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4000-6000</td>
<td>6000-10000</td>
<td>10000-20000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6000-10000</td>
<td>10000-20000</td>
<td>20000-30000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4.10

Weight of Urban Contingent Within the Ukrainian and Russian Population of Ukraine, according to Region, 1959-70

(in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Urban pop. as % of total Ukr. population</th>
<th>Urban pop. as % of total Rus. population</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>Urban pop. as % of total Ukr. population</th>
<th>Urban pop. as % of total Rus. population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Urban pop. as % of total Ukr. population</td>
<td>Urban pop. as % of total Rus. population</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Urban pop. as % of total Ukr. population</td>
<td>Urban pop. as % of total Rus. population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>92.1</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>69.6</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>77.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>88.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>86.4</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>92.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>45.8</td>
<td>84.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE 4.11

National Composition of the Urban Population of Ukraine according to Region, 1959-70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>5,600,873</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>3,103,499</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>68.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>2,542,375</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>3,328,307</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>74.4</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>2,107,144</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>2,465,221</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>19,147,419</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

cultural life which could support a national identity. The city of Donets'k, for example, did not have a single Ukrainian-language school left by 1964.102

Secondly, during the first half of the 1960s migration from Ukraine's villages into the towns was slowed down because of the large-scale recruitment of the Ukrainian rural population to work the virgin lands in Central Asia, and to settle on collective and state farms in the republic's south in order to meet their labour shortages. Khrushchev's fall and the end of the virgin lands campaign in the form in which he had developed it, as well as the satiation of the south's manpower needs, saw rural-urban migration in the republic resume its normal course. This development is well illustrated by the following data: taking 1958 as the index year (1958=100), the number of people leaving a Ukrainian village for a Ukrainian city dropped to 76 by 1964. Immediately after 1964, however, the number climbed steadily to reach 120 by 1968.103 Internal migration accounted for 66.5 per cent of all those settling in a Ukrainian city between 1959 and 1963.104 In 1964 it rose to 75 per cent of all newcomers to Ukraine's cities and remained at that level throughout the second half of the decade.105

Finally, the large Russian immigration during the 1960s played a decisive role in bringing about changes in the national structure of Ukraine's urban population. Approximately three-quarters of the estimated one million Russians who immigrated to Ukraine during the 1960s settled in cities.106 The ethno-demographic impact of this immigration was accentuated because of the settlement pattern of the newcomers. In the light of the 1970 census data on migration, between 1968 and 1970 half of the 326,000 individuals from Russia who settled in a Ukrainian city moved to Donbas and the South.
Relatively few migrants from Russia moved either to the cities of the Central West (47,000) or the West (22,000).\textsuperscript{107} [See tables 4.12 and 4.13] The 1970 census did not provide information on the nationality of immigrants, but some monographs did. Available data on the nationality of immigrants to Ukraine's cities can be summarized as follows:\textsuperscript{108}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality of Immigrants to Urban Centres of Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev city (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev oblast (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L'viv oblast (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcarpathian oblast (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Odesa oblast (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donets'k oblast (1968)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can only speculate about the qualitative aspects of the urbanization of Ukrainians during the 1960s. Since two-thirds of migrants in the republic settled in towns with populations over 100,000, internal migration changed the national composition of Ukraine's larger cities in Ukrainians' favour during that decade.\textsuperscript{109} In the case of the republic's capital, Kiev, census data showed that between 1959 and 1970 Ukrainians increased from 60 to 65 per cent of the population.\textsuperscript{110} This was an important development since one of the problems confronting Ukrainians in the efforts for national self-assertion in the past, was the absence of a capital city whose concentration of the nation's intellectual and cultural resources could act as a hot-house for the development of new cadres of a national movement. In the post-war years, Kiev emerged as such a centre. With 1.6 million people in 1970, Kiev was Ukraine's largest metropolis, and it is expected to reach the 2.5
TABLE 4.12

Weight of In-Migration to Cities of Ukraine according to Place of Origin, according to Region, 1968-70

(in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>From RSFSR</th>
<th>From other rep.</th>
<th>From Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>28.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>63.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>70.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>69.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>78.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>64.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>72.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Calculated from Perepis' 1970, vol.7, table 4, 79-101

TABLE 4.13

Distribution of In-Migration to Cities of Ukraine according to Region, 1968-70 (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>From RSFSR</th>
<th>From Ukraine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

million mark by the end of this century. As Mark Jefferson noted, "Once a city is large than any other in its country, this mere fact gives it an impetus to grow that cannot affect any other city, and it draws away from all of them in character as well as in size...It is the best market for all exceptional products."

The urbanization of Ukraine, as a process of geographical and hence social mobility, was accompanied by a competition between Ukrainians and Russians. At stake in this rivalry were higher status and better paying jobs, political and economic power and influence. In this competitive process, Russians enjoyed considerable advantages. They were a highly mobilised immigration: the majority of them came from towns (72 per cent), and had more skills and more education than most Ukrainian migrants. Judging by the complaints which appeared in unofficial literature, Russian immigrants obtained better positions and housing. They arrived with the confidence that the superior standing of Russians throughout the USSR gave them. They migrated into Ukrainian cities, where the institutional infrastructures had been transformed since the 1930s to meet their needs. There they found Russian theatres and cinemas, Russian books, newspapers and schools, and Russian as the language of administration. These were not the immigrants that one found in most other countries in the world—newcomers moving into subordinate positions in the host society. Rather, this immigration resembled the movement of population which occurs from an imperial core to a colonized periphery.

This situation would have led to national tensions in most countries; all the more so in Ukraine because the republic was not a colony in the traditional sense of the word. It was a colony of the European type; that is, one with a relatively highly advanced economy whose development was distorted
by having to meet the priorities established by the Russian state. Ukraine's predicament was that its indigenous people competed for the same positions as those migrating from the dominating nation, something not common in the classical colonial model. Comparative statistics on migration demonstrate this point. In numerical terms, in-migration from beyond the borders of Ukraine to its cities was the largest among the 14 non-Russian republics. However, as a percentage of total in-migration to Ukraine's cities, external immigration was the twelfth smallest (1967). This indicated a high degree of mobility of Ukraine's population in the second half of the 1960s. Indeed, between 1968 and 1970, 1.2 million of the republic's citizens moved into a Ukrainian town from another location in the republic.

The most mobile elements of Ukraine's population were those living in small towns, who, having gained urban experience and skills, migrated in large numbers into the same centres as the majority of in-coming Russians - Donbas, the South and Dnipro. Almost 20 per cent of migrants originating in a Ukrainian town settled in Ukraine's five largest centres in 1969. Based on evidence from Donbas, many Ukrainians when confronted with a large Russian immigration experienced career disappointment and had to move to another location. The mobilisation of Ukrainian rural youth reached an exceptionally high tempo in the second half of the 1960s, and as a result Ukraine's rural population between 1959 and 1970 declined by 1.3 million. The improvement in the level of education, notably the acquisition of secondary education, resulted in new job aspirations and an intense desire to leave the confines of the village. According to one study, few young people with more than incomplete secondary education remained in the village. Increased mechanisation of the countryside and a rise of rural standards of living, far from
keeping youth on the farms, merely increased the tempo of out-migration. This was particularly the case in the Dnipro region where, because of a relatively highly developed agriculture, the rate of out-migration of rural youth was the highest in the republic.\textsuperscript{123} As the economy of the Central West and West expanded, and new industrial centres arose within close proximity to the large rural concentrations, the pull effect of the city was enhanced.\textsuperscript{124} The statutory regulations restricting the movement of population, namely the withholding of internal passports from the collective farm population, meant that for hundreds of thousands of rural young people, urban in-migration was a stressful process.\textsuperscript{125} The rise of expectations that social transformations brought about, when combined with the highly competitive climate that was created in the republic's cities as a result of Russian immigration, were some of the principal factors underlying the recrudescence of Ukrainian nationalism during the 1960s.

iii. Problems of national identity

In the post-Stalin era, official Soviet discourse on national relations in the USSR centred on four themes: \textit{rastsvet}, the flowering or development of nations; \textit{sblizenie}, the drawing together or rapprochement of nations as a result of the building of a Union-wide economic, political and cultural unit; \textit{sliianie}, the fusion of nations into a single nationality; and the emergence of a new historical community of people, the Soviet people - \textit{Sovetskii narod}. At various times, depending on the political conjuncture, one or the other
element in the arsenal of official theory was stressed. Sliianie, for example, was a dominant theme under Khrushchev between the 22nd and 23rd CPSU Congresses. When Brezhnev came to power, the notion of a Soviet people was emphasized. The independent variable in this ideological discourse was the qualifications which were added whenever rastsvet was mentioned. Under Khrushchev, nations flowered and simultaneously drew closer together. Under Brezhnev, they developed in order to more vigourously affirm their unshakable unity.

Ideology, as Marx and Engels pointed out, is a smoke-screen which hides the interests of dominant socio-political groups. Official formulations of national relationships in the Soviet Union are no exception. The centralization of power in the hands of the Russian leadership is the fundamental reality of the USSR. To justify it, common interests, common psychological and cultural characteristics between the rulers and the ruled are posited as a way of legitimizing domination by a single group. As with most ideologies, however, the hidden agenda is not well camouflaged. In the case of official Soviet pronouncements on the national question, that agenda is Russification. This was most evident in the notion of sliianie. The suggestion that Georgians, with their Ibero-Caucasian language would somehow merge with the Finno-Ugric Estonians or the Turkic Uzbeks into a new nation with a common language was obviously absurd. Operationally, sliianie meant the assimilation of these disparate groups into Russian culture. The undertones of sblizhenie were also those of Russification. For example, I.Kravtsev in the first half of the 1960s explained sblizhenie as follows:
The drawing together of nations is a natural and objective process... The national form must not be imagined as the unalterable mould into which we pour our new socialist content. In the drawing together of national forms, Russian culture holds a place of great importance... The Russian language also plays an enormous role in this... 129

The same theme lurked beneath the surface of the seemingly less assimilatory notion, the Soviet people. P. Rogachev and M. Sverdlin, for example, defined the Soviet people as "resembling a nation in many essential features: community of economy, territory, culture, psychology, consciousness.../and/ the presence of an all-Union language of international communication," meaning Russian. 130

Ukrainians (and Belorussians), because of their linguistic and cultural proximity to Russians, were singled out for a vanguard role in the processes of either merging, rapprochement or the rise of a new Soviet people. Ukrainians, according to John Armstrong, were elevated to the status of "younger brother" and slated for immediate and complete Russification. 131 The principal obstacle in this respect, argued Armstrong, was the peasantry, who still nurtured a separate Ukrainian identity. Urban Ukrainians, it appeared, had been successfully assimilated. 132

Armstrong's pessimistic prognosis of the future of a Ukrainian national identity was shared by some Soviet writers. According to them, the village tended to preserve distinctive ethnic features, while cities with their standardized material culture and a mixing of ethnic components weakened separate national identity. 133 S.S. Savoskul wrote,

New, urbanized forms of culture are being disseminated among broad strata of the population, and this also furthers the establishment
of an overall common culture of the peoples of the USSR. The spheres of traditional culture, which have a more vividly ethnic coloration, are steadily narrowing. The ideological content of the culture of the peoples of our country is becoming increasingly more unified.134

The widespread use of Russian in the cities, according to Bruk, "is having the effect that the national awareness of certain groups of the population is becoming less pronounced. Many members of these groups often have trouble in determining their nationality."135

Invariably, when measurement of the strength or weakness of national identity among the various nations of the USSR is attempted, language data drawn from the censuses are used. In part, this is dictated by necessity, since the data base for the study of national identity in the USSR contains relatively few attitudinal studies. The focus on the measurement of language retention in Western scholarship, however, was also inspired by Deutsch's work which stressed the importance of similarity of communication habits in the process of assimilation.136 Unfortunately, Western studies have focussed on mother tongue retention,137 even though language data, those of the 1970 census in particular, can be used in a more refined way. The information contained in the 1970 census can be disaggregated to provide an evaluation of what proportion of the population of a given nation is at what stage of the linguistic assimilation process. Assimilation, it is true, is not a purely linguistic process, but a change in national self-identification. Moreover, statistics on language retention explain neither the roots of inter-ethnic conflict nor the sources of maintenance of national identity, and therefore must be supplemented by an analysis of social developments. Yet, as a first step in understanding the processes involved in national identity, language data can illuminate the
strength or weakness of one of the more important objective cultural traits that distinguish one nation from another.

The first linguistic group we can identify in the 1970 census are those whom we call the unadapted. These are Ukrainians who gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue and did not know Russian. Those who have learnt Russian but have retained Ukrainian as their mother tongue we call the adapted. There has been no comprehensive survey of the unadapted Ukrainians, but one was conducted among the Tatars in the Tatar ASSR. It found that unilingual members of that nation tended to come from the lower rungs of society (unskilled physical labour), were more often rural than urban, and their national identity, unlike that of the more mobilised sectors, was not "intellectual or rooted in a set of socioeconomic causes" but "sociocultural". The latter was rather pejoratively described as stemming from a "national-cultural narrow-mindedness due to cultural isolation and backwardness, and the retention of obsolete forms of the traditional culture." L.M. Drobizheva's report of an attitudinal study of Ukrainians (1965-66) showed that those who rarely read Russian newspapers and books had a considerably higher frequency of opposition to both "working in the same place with members of other nationalities" and "mixed marriages" than those who did. This unilingual group also tended to be more religious, as a survey of Western Ukrainian villages noted. Naulko's study of some Kirovohrad districts found that the majority of those working as unskilled labourers (54.4 per cent) spoke only Ukrainian, whereas skilled workers and those employed in mental labour were bilingual Ukrainian-Russian speakers. Unilingual Ukrainians, more than any other segment of the indigenous population, preserved the old traditions and prejudices. They were, in short, the carriers of the "old...nationalism of the Ukraine of the past."
If speaking only Ukrainian is indicative of a mental set favourably disposed to the appeals of traditional Ukrainian nationalism, then the majority of Ukrainians in 1970 were in that camp. This group numbered 19.6 million, or 56 per cent of Ukrainians in the republic. Unilingual Ukrainians formed the highest proportion of the Ukrainian population in the Central West, which had been part of the USSR since its inception. Not surprisingly, the oblasts with the lowest proportion of unilingual Ukrainian speakers were to be found in the southern and south-eastern regions of the republic. In rural areas, only one in four Ukrainians knew Russian. In urban areas, unilingualism declined to one in three (See table, 4.14)

There is reason to believe that unilingualism was more widespread than the census figures suggest. During the 1979 enumeration, for example, census takers in Lithuania were ordered to include all children over the age of seven, all graduates of Soviet secondary and higher educational establishments, all who spoke but a few words of Russian, and all who indicated knowing a second language other than Russian as "knowing Russian well." The 1970 census results on unilingualism among Ukrainians revealed a number of anomalies that can best be explained by falsification analogous to that in Lithuania. The contrast between Ternopil' oblast, in the heart of traditionally nationalist Western Ukraine, and Kirovohrad, in the Dnipro, is a case in point. In Ternopil' oblast, which in 1970 ranked 24th out of the republic's 25 oblasts in its economic development and whose rural population was over 98 per cent Ukrainian, only 72 per cent of the Ukrainian rural population was unilingual. The Ukrainian rural population of Kirovohrad oblast, however, had a higher rate of unilingualism - 76 per cent, even though only 82 per cent of the oblast's rural population gave Ukrainian as their nationality and the oblast was more economically
TABLE 4.14

Ukrainians - National Identity Data according to Region, 1970 (in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Total Ukrainian population</th>
<th>unadapted</th>
<th>adapted</th>
<th>acculturated</th>
<th>Russified</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>4,103,479</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>3,296,030</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>807,449</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>4,686,924</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>2,819,871</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>1,847,107</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>4,739,075</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>2,268,462</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>2,470,613</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West 1</td>
<td>9,388,645</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>2,611,860</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>6,776,785</td>
<td>78.1</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev city</td>
<td>1,056,905</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West 2</td>
<td>7,271,989</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>2,329,530</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>5,392,458</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South 3</td>
<td>3,026,198</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>1,446,096</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>1,580,102</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>480,733</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>29.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>235,734</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>244,999</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>33.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>35,283,857</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>16,164,254</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>19,119,603</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Does not include the city of Kiev.
2. Percentages do not add up to 100 because 0.2 per cent of urban population indicated a mother tongue other than Ukrainian or Russian.
3. Does not include the Crimea.

* Unadapted = unilingual Ukrainian speakers; adapted = Ukrainians who gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue and knew Russian; acculturated = Ukrainians who gave Russian as their mother tongue but knew Ukrainian; Russified = Ukrainians who gave Russian as their mother tongue and did not know Ukrainian.

Source: Calculated from Perepis' 1970, vol.4, tables 7 and 8, 152-91.
developed than Ternopil' (ranking 11 of 25).\textsuperscript{144}

Desirable though unilingualism may be from the point of view of the preservation of the traditional Ukrainian ethnos, its prevalence in the Soviet context indicates a low level of social mobilisation. Given the dominant role of Russian in the USSR, a knowledge of that language, as many studies have shown, is indispensable for both social and geographical mobility.\textsuperscript{145} The adapted, having acquired a second language, have broadened their field of vision. But having become bilingual, as M.N. Guboglo noted in his empirical sociological study of verbal behaviour, "does not as a general rule, lead to a change in the language the individual considers native, nor does it automatically imply a change in ethnic self-identity in other ethnic determinants, by means of which the individual retains firm connections with his ethnic community."\textsuperscript{146} Although knowing Russian, the adapted have also indicated that they retain a close psychological identification with their nation by declaring Ukrainian as their mother tongue. The adapted, more than any other group, closely resemble the paradigm of a modern nationalist public. Naulko, for example, found that bilingualism was the norm among skilled workers and qualified mental workers in Kirovohrad districts. Only an insignificant percentage (3 per cent) did not know Ukrainian well.\textsuperscript{147} (Knowledge of language in Naulko's (1960) study involved speaking, reading and writing.) These are the groups that are the bearers of "the modern ideological nationalism of an industrialized, urbanized and literate society."\textsuperscript{148}

Within the total Ukrainian population the adapted numbered 12.6 million, or 36 per cent of the population total. Almost half the Ukrainians living in urban areas belonged to this category, and a quarter of those inhabiting rural regions. The representation of this group within the urban population was
highest in Western Ukraine. In the city of Kiev, 57 per cent of Ukrainians could be considered adapted.

The third group belong to the category we call the acculturated Ukrainians. These are individuals who have lost their mother tongue identification but have preserved a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The fact that Russian is their mother tongue signifies a "change in the elements of the material and spiritual culture." The change is brought about largely through living and working in an ethnically mixed environment. For example, in Naulko's survey, Ukrainian was given as the mother tongue of over 90 per cent of Ukrainians in all occupational categories in the Kirovohrad sample: 97.2 per cent in the case of qualified mental labour, 93.3 per cent of skilled workers, 97.1 per cent of unskilled workers. In regions bordering on the Sea of Azov (districts of Donets'k and Zaporizhzhia oblasts) which contain a large Russian minority, the comparable figures for the above mentioned groups were: 72.2, 91.1 and 89.7 per cent. The change to Russian as a native language may also be motivated by the desire for social advancement, especially by groups who are less secure in their status. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that in the Sea of Azov and Kirovohrad districts studied by Naulko, unqualified mental workers had the lowest rate of native language identification: 69.2 and 91.6 per cent for the respective regions. The change in mother tongue identification, according to Guboglo, "does not in itself tell us about the state of the ethnic indices and the stability of the ethnos...The paradox lies in the fact that among some Gagauz professional people, for example, the acquisition of the Russian language [as mother tongue] has gone hand in hand with a rise in ethnic self-awareness." But "the non-coincidence of the two ethnic determinants [language and nationality] may be
regarded as evidence...[that] less attention [is] being paid to the question of ethnic affiliation relative to those who firmly retain both determinants."

The acculturated Ukrainian group numbered 1.6 million in 1970, or 4 per cent of the total Ukrainian population. In the villages, they were insignificant. It was the urban milieu that was conducive to changing mother tongue identification. In Kiev, the republic's largest city, 15 per cent of Ukrainians could be counted as acculturated. Throughout Ukraine, half the acculturated group lived in the oblasts of the Donbas and the South (including the Crimea).

Russified Ukrainians, the final group, are those individuals who gave Ukrainian as their nationality, but neither gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue, nor indicated a knowledge of the language. They were unilingual Russian speakers. Language identification and language knowledge provides an important shield against changes in national self-identity. In the case of this contingent, such protection is gone, and either they, or their children, are more likely to assimilate to a Russian national identity than any other group of Ukrainians. Unqualified mental workers were the most unilingual Russian group among all occupational categories in the Kirovohrad districts studied by Naulko. Thus while 3 per cent of skilled workers and qualified mental workers spoke only Russian, 16 per cent of unqualified mental workers spoke only Russian. Whether this was the case because unqualified mental workers are subject to transfers from place to place more than other groups, or because psychological motives are at play, is impossible to establish.

The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians who could be defined as Russified were urban residents - 89 per cent of the total 1.5 million in the group. Those who lived in rural areas inhabited either the Crimean peninsula or the ethnically mixed districts of North-Eastern Ukraine. Two-thirds of the
total number of Russified Ukrainians inhabited the Donbas and the South (including the Crimea), where less than a third of the total Ukrainian population lived.

The data presented indicate that the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian ethnos were a good deal more stable than the theorists of the merging of nations suggested. In 1970, 96 per cent of all Ukrainians in the republic knew their native language. In the villages the figure was 99 per cent, in urban centres, 92 per cent. Over three-quarters of the population knew Ukrainian while approximately half knew Russian. In urban centres, 68 per cent of the total population knew Ukrainian as compared with 62 per cent who knew Russian. [See table 4.15] What these figures largely reflected was the fact that only one quarter of the Russian urban population in the republic indicated a knowledge of Ukrainian. Other minorities were much more familiar with the language; 41 per cent of urban Jews, for example, knew Ukrainian.157

The 1959 census supplied information only on mother tongue, so we can evaluate trends during the 1960s only in terms of this index. Mother tongue, for the purposes of the 1959 and 1970 census, was established by asking respondents "the name of that language which the subject himself regards as his native language."158 Thus, unlike 1926 when the subject was asked what language he or she knew best, in the later censuses, as Guboglo points out,"the definition of the concept has shifted in the direction of the psychological attitudes of the subject toward the language which he himself chooses as native."159

In the intercensal period the proportion of the Ukrainian population that gave Ukrainian as their native language declined from 93.5 to 91.4
TABLE 4.15
Language Knowledge of Total Population (All Nationalities) 1970
(in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population knowing Ukrainian</th>
<th>Population knowing Russian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>68.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>79.2</td>
<td>52.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>73.6</td>
<td>60.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West $^i$</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>84.0</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>96.9</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiev City</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>91.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South $^{ii}$</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>70.8</td>
<td>50.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crimea</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>77.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>47.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>urban</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>62.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rural</td>
<td>90.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$i$. Does not include the city of Kiev.
$^{ii}$. Does not include the Crimean oblast.

per cent. In rural areas, mother tongue identification remained stable (98.6 per cent of the total Ukrainian population in 1959 and 98.7 per cent in 1970). It was in urban areas that the tendency towards a weakening of native language identity was to be observed. The most serious decline was in Donbas, where the drop was not only proportional but numerical as well—47,000 between 1959 and 1970. [See table 4.16] In 1970, 942,000 more Ukrainians gave Russian as their native language when compared with 1959. Two-thirds of that increase was accounted for by Donbas (43 per cent) and the South (19 per cent).

Data for the city of Kiev, the only information available for an individual urban centre, shows that in the intercensal period the proportion of Ukrainians giving Ukrainian as their mother tongue increased from 71.9 to 77.4 per cent. Ukrainians between 1959 and 1970 increased by 59 per cent according to nationality, but the growth of Ukrainian mother tongue identification was 71 per cent. In a number of oblasts the same process could be observed in the Ukrainian urban population (Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Poltava and the Crimea). Referring to Kiev, V.V. Pokshishevskii remarked that the very concentration of the cultural, scientific and administrative talent of Ukrainians there was creating an environment strengthening national awareness. The high increase in the number of Ukrainians in the capital during the 1960s was attributed by him in part to the fact that "some Kievans, after some hesitation whether to consider themselves Ukrainians, later did so with absolute conviction; more children of mixed marriages have also declared themselves Ukrainians."163

What the data for Kiev and the urban populations of other oblasts point to is that mother-tongue identity, like national identity, is a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
<th>% Change in Total</th>
<th>% Change in Total</th>
<th>Ukrainian Population</th>
<th>Ukrainian Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,109,400</td>
<td>3,057,777</td>
<td>-1.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td>82.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>3,439,975</td>
<td>3,336,179</td>
<td>-3.2%</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>4,287,975</td>
<td>4,322,541</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>9,551,603</td>
<td>9,749,257</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>99.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South West</td>
<td>6,226,710</td>
<td>6,699,257</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td></td>
<td>97.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>2,493,731</td>
<td>2,904,146</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>96.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>30,072,360</td>
<td>33,257,360</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>93.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

dynamic process influenced by both social and political developments.

Insights from some Soviet authors themselves serve as a warning against hasty generalizations about the relationship between urbanization, modernization and assimilation. Referring to cities, Pokshishevskii wrote:

This ethnically-oriented state structure combined with rapid economic development of so-called non-Russian area...gave rise to rapidly growing urban foci in these areas. They became the centres of national culture and ethnic consciousness with educational institutions...and with other institutions and agencies which fostered ethnic culture...

These cities, in view of the need for ethnic personnel, thus began to attract ethnic contingents...This suggests that in the USSR it is now the city, perhaps more than the countryside, that has become the "carrier of the ethnos"... Similar processes by which the centre of gravity of the ethnos is transferred from the countryside to town are evident in the developing countries...Cities, despite their ethnic diversity, are also beginning to play a key role in ethnic consolidation.164

V.Iu. Krupianskaia and M.G. Rabinovich argued in a similar vein. For them, "The city represents not only an economic and political centre, but also a centre for the development of the country's cultural life. Here are concentrated its most advanced cultural forces, cultural institutions and values. This leaves its specific mark on all aspects of life of the urban population."165

Ending his major attitudinal study of some non-Russian nations, A.L. Kholmogorov questioned every shibboleth of party propagandists:

The appearance of international traits in Soviet nations does not mean that national features have lost their significance. The Soviet nations and nationalities still have great potential for development along national lines. Under these conditions, the notions sometimes encountered in our press to the effect that nations
are "becoming extinguished", undergoing "mutual assimilation"; declarations to the effect that the development of the country's economy with due consideration of the ethnic factor is a "non-existent problem"; pronouncements that administrative entities organized along lines of ethnic affiliations are becoming "denationalized", that "complete merger of nations in terms of public law" is a near prospect; ratiocinations to the effect that a "federal language" of the Soviet people has become established, that the identification signs of nationhood have been seriously "modified" and are gradually dying out - all these are premature and represent an attempt to accelerate by artificial means the course of the process of internationalization of the social life of the Soviet nations and peoples.\textsuperscript{166}

Summing up at a major conference on ethnic relations held in Moscow, Ukraine's foremost ethnographer, Naulko commented, "It has been pointed out that there is a need for a deeper understanding of the problem of the growth of socialist nations and their drawing together. The essence of these processes has not been studied sufficiently, and scientific categories are sometimes brought to bear without justification and a wrong meaning is attributed to them."\textsuperscript{167} The stress "on the concept of the proximity" of the national cultures of the USSR was also labelled "mechanistic, thoroughly tentative, and not founded on sufficient proof" by L. Novychenko, a leading Soviet Ukrainian cultural figure.\textsuperscript{168}

At a Conference on the Problems of the Drawing Together of Socialist Nations held in Luhans'k (Vorosylovhrad) in 1966, M.S. Dzhunusov stressed that the psychological aspect of nationality "more than any other subject" needed study.\textsuperscript{169} National self-identification is by far the most important element in ethnicity; it is distinct from and more enduring than language. Walker Connor pointed out that the Ukrainian identity, "that is, a popular
consciousness of being Ukrainian," would likely persist even if the language were totally replaced by Russian, just as the Irish national identity has outlived the Gaelic language."¹⁷⁰ (George Bernard Shaw wrote that the Irish and the English were "separated from each other by the same language.")¹⁷¹ The non-linguistic component has been stressed by the Soviet scholar V.I. Kozlov:

> Having achieved a definite stage of development, ethnic self-consciousness, like other ideological forms, can acquire a certain independent existence.... Having achieved a definite stage of development, it is capable of reciprocal influence on the factors that gave rise to it. (Emphasis added)¹⁷²

For Kozlov, the bond of territorial attachment is a much neglected aspect of Soviet research on national identity. He wrote, "Finding themselves in the course of many centuries on the same territory, 'enlivening' this territory, a people began to consider it 'native' and link themselves with its historical fate."¹⁷³

If a nation is defined as a group "who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others,"¹⁷⁴ it may be argued that Ukrainian national identity is stronger today than ever in the past. With the annexation of Western Ukraine during the Second World War, virtually all Ukrainian ethnic territories were unified for the first time since the mid-seventeenth century under a single political authority. Through historical circumstances, Western Ukrainians had developed a strong sense of national consciousness. "Considering how fervently nationalist very many West Ukrainians are," noted Armstrong, "one can hardly doubt...that given protracted and extensive contacts...many will manage to convey their ideas to East Ukrainians."¹⁷⁵
(In 1970, almost a quarter of the Ukrainian population lived in the Western oblasts.) In other respects too, the Ukrainian nation has experienced a consolidation in the past several decades. Regional subdivisions of the Ukrainian people with their own dialects - the Boykos, Lemkos and Hutsuls of Western Ukraine for whom until recently the concept of "Ukrainian" was foreign - have completed their evolution to a Ukrainian national awareness since their lands were incorporated into Soviet Ukraine. A similar development of national consciousness occurred in eastern Ukraine. L. Chizhikova observed during her expedition to a number of Ukrainian villages in the Kharkiv region near the Russian border in the 1960s that people who had formerly identified themselves as "khokhly" by the end of the decade called themselves Ukrainians.

A distinctive Ukrainian national identity, even without the Ukrainian language, exists in the most Russified regions of the republic. Because it remained largely unresearched, some Western scholars, looking at mother tongue retention alone, have wondered whether such an identity exists and have even suggested the separation of the eastern industrial regions from the rest of Ukraine as a way of preserving national self-awareness in the republic. But in fact, the distinctive Ukrainian identity in those regions was maintained at many levels. Territorial identity was strong and was reinforced by Moscow's discriminatory economic policies. The unique Ukrainian manner of speaking Russian clearly distinguished Ukrainians from others. At the level of daily life (pobut), the material and spiritual culture has been remarkably well preserved. Among Donbas miners, for example, wedding traditions, while having lost their "religious element, have preserved the national specificity and dazzling originality of the traditions of the Ukrainian wedding."
Iu.V. Bromlei notes that "at present certain cultural elements (primarily those associated with religion) are disappearing, but a number of other traditions...which had died out are being reborn." His observation that "in the cities of the national republics this is reflected by a new deep interest in the cultural traditions of the past" applies to many industrial centres in Donbas. A survey of Donets'k and Luhans'k workers, for example, found that Ukrainians more than any other nationality in these very Russified centres preferred national-cultural objects for the interior of their homes. Among miners, interest in Ukrainian song, theatre and opera was widespread.

The existence of this national self-consciousness is important for understanding the relationship between modernization and national consciousness in post-Stalin Ukraine. The "independent existence" of national self-consciousness, as Kozlov wrote, means that it can have a "reciprocal influence" on other elements of national identity, language being one of them. It is this which explains the seeming anomaly that occurred time and time again during the 1960s, when Ukrainians who had been Russified, that is, who had lost their native language facility, learned and sprang to the defence of the same Ukrainian language as a way of re-affirming their bond with their own national group, and as a way of seeking legitimacy in their own unique cultural heritage.

Ukrainian unrest during the 1960s is often reported as an attempt to preserve the Ukrainian language against Russian inroads. This propensity to equate the national unrest with the more tangible features is often supported by the statements and actions of those involved. Thus, Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, waged their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to speak Ukrainian, rather
than Russian. The language question is of course important for a nation in its struggle for continued viability. But the language issue also plays the role of a symbol in the important conflict between competing social groups, in particular, elites.

Urbanization, education and social mobility lead not simply to a change in the statistical structure of the population, but also alter the very nature of that population. Because of their greater mobilisation the urban, the educated, the mobile groups experience "a sharpening of ethnic awareness that arises from the possibility of constantly comparing one's own culture with other ethnic cultures in the urban community" and "such an increase in ethnic awareness tends to stimulate...competition between ethnic groups in a particular city." The question of competition is crucial in explaining the rise of national consciousness. With mobilised individuals, expectations race ahead of the real possibilities. These were the same people who had to compete with Russians for employment, and the rivalry led to an exacerbation of ethnic tensions. M.I. Kulichenko referred to this development somewhat obliquely when he wrote, "...[A]t the present time we are currently witnessing some activization of national life - a growth of national consciousness, and national feeling..." Iu.V. Arutiunian related this consciousness directly to "conditions for mobility of non-Russian personnel." As will be clear from our discussion of occupations below, the "conditions for mobility" of Ukrainians took a turn for the worse during the 1960s, and the exacerbated social tensions that resulted from this situation tended to flow along national lines.

The language data that were presented pointed to a slow erosion of native language identity during the 1960s. This development was of course
linked to the steady downgrading of the Ukrainian language in public life, and of the Ukrainian language school system and the press. Language usage, like national identity, however, is a dynamic process. A preponderant factor in determining its strength and future direction is the specific behaviour of elites. National identity is an alignment in society brought about when elites consciously choose to select ethnic symbols either for control over a local society or for equal or privileged access to opportunities and resources. Elite competition serves as the catalyst for the mobilisation of people around particularistic national demands, which in turn can shore up the "objective" cultural markers of a people, among them language. It was in this context that the language issue emerged as a subject in the political arena, having been banned from public debate for decades.

Soon after Stalin's death a movement in defence of the Ukrainian language developed in the republic. The intelligentsia was in the forefront of demands to enhance the social role of Ukrainian. What was probably more significant, however, was that the Ukrainian party leadership took up the issue. The articulation of the Ukrainian leadership's position on the language issue surfaced on the pages of the republican press following the 20th Congress of the CPSU, with the sovnarkhoz reform. For the republic's political authorities, an expansion of their autonomy was not to be limited to the economic sphere. What the new broadening of rights for the republic implied in the sphere of language was spelled out in Komunist Ukrainy, the theoretical organ of the CPU. The importance of the article was underscored by the fact that it appeared under the heading of "Lessons and Consultations," a section reserved for the propaganda apparatus' instructions to the population:
...[N]ot all Soviet and Party functionaries understand the nature of our Party's language policy. Alas, we often encounter among them people, even from the national cadres, who, although they are working in their own nations, often do not know their people's language and history. It is the duty of the communist working in a national republic to support with every means the development of his people's national language and culture. Every functionary must, of course, speak this people's language and know its cultural history and national traditions, for otherwise there can be no real political and organizational work among the masses. In his Draft Decree of the CPSU CC on Soviet Power in Ukraine, V.I. Lenin wrote that the Party and Soviet organs should display great care for the national traditions and must grant the working masses the practical right to learn their mother tongue and speak it in all Soviet institutions, resist all Russification attempts aimed at pushing Ukrainian into second place, and make it a means for the communist education of the working masses.

The development of the national language, its introduction into all spheres of the republic's state, Party and economic structure were questions of principle in Lenin's nationality policy.190

The efforts of the Ukrainian Party leadership to enhance the role of the Ukrainian language in the republic ran afoul of the policies being made in Moscow. The first point of contention was that, with the abolition of the central ministries under the sovnarkhoz reform, tens of thousands of officials from Moscow were dispatched to the republics to work in the regional economic organs. This personnel policy was resisted by Ukrainian party officials who saw it as an encroachment on their newly gained rights. This insistence on the need for all officials in Ukraine to be trained in the indigenous language was part of their programme of opposition. Kravtsev expressed the contentions very clearly in his book published in 1960:

Relics of nationalism also reveal themselves in the practice of juxtaposing the cadres of the basic nation to the cadres of other nations living in a given republic by an attempt to select
cadres solely on the basis of nationality or in accordance with knowledge of the national language. The rights of persons who do not belong to the indigenous nation are often infringed in the process of rotating cadres.

Despite several similar strictures, a surreptitious campaign against incoming Russian officials continued to be waged by Ukrainian officialdom.

The language question surfaced in many forms during the 1950s and 1960s. The highest demand that could be raised as regards the language (we discuss education and the press below) was to make Ukrainian the official state language, a status it never enjoyed. This demand was raised at the "Conference on the Ukrainian Language" held in Kiev, 10-15 February 1963, which was attended by over a thousand members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The conference passed a resolution appealing to the party leadership to proclaim Ukrainian as the official language in state and public institutions and in all places of work. Although the party leadership did not endorse the formal recognition of Ukrainian as the official language, numerous veiled references to this were made throughout the 1960s. In a 1967 interview, for example, P. Shelest, the First Secretary of the CPU, noted that in the period after the October Revolution, "Ukraine's language has been enriched immeasurably and its social role has vastly increased." By saying "Ukraine's language" rather than "the Ukrainian language," Shelest implied official status for the language. He also told a delegation of Ukrainian-Canadian communists in 1967 that "only a fool could imagine that there is any possibility of Russian taking over in Ukraine." His sentiments were echoed by the head of the Ukrainian Gosplan who told the same delegation, "I believe that here in Ukraine we should speak Ukrainian." Throughout his tenure of office,
Shelest helped create a climate where demands concerning the language could be raised with greater frequency. At the Fifth Congress of Writers of Ukraine (1966) Shelest said, "We must treat our beautiful Ukrainian language with great care and respect. It is our treasure, our great heritage, which all of us, but in the first place you, our writers, must preserve and develop...Your efforts in this direction always have been and will be supported by the Communist Party." 199

In the press of the 1960s it is possible to find wide-ranging demands for an improvement in the status of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of the republic's life. 200 Russians were taken to task in the press for refusing to learn the indigenous language of the republic. To this end, an attempt was also made to rally the support of Russians sympathetic to Ukrainian national aspirations. Thus a Russian resident of Donbas chastized other Russians for failing to learn Ukrainian. She wrote, "I am Russian and have been living in Donets'k for only four years, but during this time I have grown to love the Ukrainian language and understand it." 201 The literary organ in Ukraine pointed out to Russians that "if one has the good fortune of living within a certain linguistic community, then one should know the language of the nation in whose land one lives and works." 202 Some, such as, Vysheslavskii, the Russian writing living in Ukraine, intimated that statutory provisions like those enforced during the 1920s ought to be used. "I am convinced," he wrote, "that a situation has to be created where a Russian living in Ukraine will know the Ukrainian language." 203

The language data presented point to a slow erosion of native language fluency during the 1960s. This development itself was linked to the steady downgrading, since 1933, of Ukrainian as the medium of public administration.
Ukrainians, according to several surveys, used their language much more frequently at home than at the place of work. The impact of the work place and of the educational system on language is very clearly shown by language data according to age group. This information, provided only for Ukrainians in the entire USSR, showed that three-quarters of Ukrainian children under the age of nine were unilingual Ukrainian speakers in 1970, substantially higher than the average for the population as a whole. The deterioration of the objective indices of language retention and usage, therefore, cannot be abstracted from the wider political context. The spread of the Russian language occurred not because urbanization and the modernization of the social structure were taking their inexorable toll. Quite the contrary. These social processes gave the Ukrainian nation the social strength and capacity to pose the demand for an upgrading of the status of the language in the republic. What the "objective" facts reflected was the political defeat of the Ukrainian party leadership, the intelligentsia and the broad sectors of the public who supported the first effort to elevate the status of Ukrainian in the post-Stalin period.

iv. Class structure

There exists a large body of literature showing that the Soviet Union is a stratified society marked by profound social inequalities. The connection between social and national differentiation in Soviet Ukraine is particularly relevant to understanding the relationship between social mobilisation and national consciousness. At the theoretical level, there are two competing schools of thought. The first includes both Western
modernization theorists inspired by structural-functionalism as well as official Soviet theory which, notwithstanding its denunciations of "bourgeois sociology", shares many of its assumptions. Both agree that with industrialization, the social structure of the core region (in our case Russia) diffuses into the periphery (Ukraine and other republics), causing a multi-faceted interaction that produces commonality. In time, wealth becomes equally distributed among the various regions, and cultural differences cease to be socially significant. These global changes in the socio-economic base of the regions produce a thoroughgoing convergence in the performance of individual roles. Industrialization brings about structural differentiation: status is achieved rather than ascribed, and social relations become largely impersonal. 207 As a consequence of industrialization, to cite two Soviet writers, "the division of labour has everywhere come to be based on professional, and not on [the] national identity of population groups." 208

Another model, which is far less optimistic about the possibility of industrialization causing national-cultural convergence in multinational states, is that of "internal colonialism". A leading writer of this school of thought is M. Hechter, who has outlined an alternative vision in the following way:

Far from maintaining that increased core-periphery contact results in social structural convergence, the internal colonial model posits an altogether different relationship between these regions... The spatially uneven wave of modernization over state territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups. As a consequence of this initial fortuitous advantage, there is crystallization of unequal distribution of resources and power between the two groups. The superordinate group, or core, seeks to stabilize and monopolize its advantages through policies aimed at the institutionalization of the existing stratification system. It attempts to regulate the allocation of social roles such that those roles commonly defined as having high prestige
are reserved for its members. Conversely, individuals from the less advanced group are denied access to these roles. This stratification system, which may be termed a cultural division of labour, contributes to the development of distinctive ethnic identification in the two groups. Actors come to categorize themselves and others according to the range of roles each may be expected to play. They are aided in this categorization by the presence of visible signs, or cultural markers, which are seen to characterize both groups...

To the extent that social stratification in the periphery is based on observable cultural differences, there exists the probability that the disadvantaged group will, in time, reactively assert its own culture as equal or superior to that of the relatively advantaged core. This may help it conceive of itself as a separate "nation" and seek independence.209

An inquiry into cultural-national stratification is severely hampered by a lack of data. The last census to publish correlations between nationality and occupations was in 1926. While the rebirth of sociology in the Soviet Union in the 1960s generated much new and interesting information on many aspects of social stratification, information on ethnic variables was not so forthcoming.210 In Ukraine, moreover, sociology as a discipline languished, and not a single scholarly journal was devoted to it.211 The data at our disposal are fragmentary; major lacunae exist, and available statistics require extensive re-calculation to be meaningful. An additional problem is that much of our information is for large social categories which obscure finer, but crucial, differences. The category "white-collar staff", for example, which includes both secretaries and managers, is far too broad for a precise analysis of Ukrainians' share of high status positions. But given such a paucity of information, we must make use of the nationality data for the class structure of the republic and, wherever possible, supplement it with other information.

The industrial growth that Ukraine experienced after the Second World
War significantly altered the class structure of the republic. By 1970 the working class represented half the population of Ukraine, white-collar staff one fifth, and collective farmers less than one third of the population. [See table 4.17] As a result of the movement of industrial investment to the Central-West and Western regions, the class structure of the more underdeveloped areas of Ukraine had also undergone transformation. [See table 4.18]

Social change, however, is a relative concept; and when development is highly uneven it produces tensions. If the evolution of Ukraine's class structure is compared with that of Russia's or of the USSR's as a whole, the consequences of the discriminatory economic policies described earlier are very much apparent. Whereas in 1939 Ukraine's social structure was roughly as modernized as that of the USSR's, and only slightly less so than Russia's, by 1970 major social structural inequalities had developed. For example, the working class' representation in Russia's social structure in 1939 was only 2.4 per cent larger than the figure for Ukraine. In 1970, the gap had widened to 9.8 per cent within the 1939 boundaries, and 11.5 per cent in all of Ukraine's territory. [See table 4.19] The social structural convergence between the core and periphery, which ought to have accompanied industrialization according to Soviet and tradition Western social theory, had not materialized.

The social structure of the Ukrainian nation within the Ukrainian SSR underwent considerable change during the 1960s. In 1959 the majority of Ukrainians were still collective farmers. By 1970, however, the working class had emerged as the dominant group in Ukrainian society. [See table 4.20] Here again, on a comparative basis, Ukrainians lagged behind the Russians, who could build on their initial advantage. The social structure of the Russian nation in the RSFSR had been modernized much more quickly than was the
### TABLE 4.17

**Class Structure of the Population of Ukraine, 1939-70**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1939</th>
<th></th>
<th>1959</th>
<th></th>
<th>1970</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total no.</td>
<td>in%</td>
<td>Total no.</td>
<td>in%</td>
<td>Total no.</td>
<td>in%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>10,362,000</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>17,123,000</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>23,430,000</td>
<td>49.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar staff</td>
<td>5,467,000</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>7,253,000</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>9,281,000</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers**</td>
<td>15,956,000</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>17,472,000</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>14,230,000</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes dependents; 1939 figure for Ukraine without the western oblasts.
** The 1939 figure includes 1.5 of the population listed as craftsmen and non-collectivized farmers; the 1959 figure includes 0.5 per cent of the same group.


### TABLE 4.18

**Changes in the Class Structure of Regions, 1959-70**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Working class</th>
<th></th>
<th>White-collar staff</th>
<th></th>
<th>Collective farmers</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Donbas</td>
<td>70 72</td>
<td>19 21</td>
<td></td>
<td>11 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dnipro</td>
<td>48 55</td>
<td>18 21</td>
<td></td>
<td>34 24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North East</td>
<td>39 48</td>
<td>19 21</td>
<td></td>
<td>42 31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central West</td>
<td>28 38</td>
<td>16 19</td>
<td></td>
<td>56 43</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>30 41</td>
<td>14 18</td>
<td></td>
<td>56 41</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>43 52</td>
<td>21 24</td>
<td></td>
<td>36 23</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>41 50</td>
<td>17 20</td>
<td></td>
<td>42 30</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes dependents.

Table 4.19

A Comparison of Changes in the Class Structure of Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, 1939 and 1970

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1970**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>White-collar staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes dependents
** 1970 data exclude territories acquired after 1939.


Table 4.20

Class Structure of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR, 1939-70 (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1939*</th>
<th>1959*</th>
<th>1970**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar staff</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes dependents; ** Economically active population only.

case with Ukrainians. In 1939, the working class within the Russian population in the RSFSR was 8.9 per cent larger than the working class within the Ukrainian population in the Ukrainian SSR. This difference increased to 13 per cent by 1959 and stood at 16 per cent by 1970. Similarly, in 1939 the weight of white-collar staff within the class structure of Russians (in the RSFSR) was five per cent greater than for Ukrainians. By 1970, however, the gap had widened to nine per cent. The least mobilised class, the collective farmers, was overrepresented among Ukrainians, whose class structure contained 25 per cent more collective farmers in 1970 than that of the Russians. In 1939 the difference between the two titular nations had been only 4.8 per cent. 212

The changes in the class structure of Ukraine pointed to a crisis in the social mobility of Ukrainians in their own republic. One must distinguish between structural and individual social mobility, or between real and perceived mobility. Ukrainians registered substantial increases within the working class: from 66 per cent of the total in 1939 to 74 per cent by 1970. By 1970 Ukrainians were no longer under-represented within that class. Moreover, the working class of Ukraine occupied third place among the republics of the USSR in terms of its national homogeneity. 213 What did not change between 1939 and 1970 was the under-representation of Ukrainians among white-collar staff. Russians, it appeared, had moved out of the working class in Ukraine in large numbers, and Ukrainians had taken their place. The class pyramid and the position of the various nations within it had remained virtually the same. [See table 4.21] In Hechter's terms, Ukraine still had a "cultural division of labour".

All studies of social stratification in the USSR have placed manual
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working class*</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>69.5</td>
<td>73.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar staff</td>
<td>56.2**</td>
<td>58.7**</td>
<td>59.9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers</td>
<td>85.3**</td>
<td>95.5**</td>
<td>93.3*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes economically active population only within the given social class; **Includes dependents within the given social class.

labourers in agriculture at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy in terms of prestige and income. The status of Ukrainians in their own republic was exemplified by the fact that in 1959, 48 per cent of all Ukrainians were employed in predominantly physical labour in agriculture. In the inter-census period (1959-1970), the total number involved in manual labour in agriculture declined from 8.7 to 5.5 million, a drop of 33 per cent. The flight from the countryside that these figures represented was a well documented phenomenon. In Ukraine, as elsewhere, the young accounted for most of those who left the village. Thus the proportion of young workers (under the age of 29) employed in agriculture dropped from 36 to 20 per cent between 1959 and 1970. Agriculture, however, remained a very significant economic activity in the republic. In 1970 every third worker (defined as someone engaged in predominantly physical labour) was employed in agriculture. In 1970, 37 per cent of all Ukrainians were collective farmers. Agriculture also provided 29 per cent of Ukraine's national income (1965).

In the past, highly discriminatory economic policies nurtured a reactive nationalism among the peasantry. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that if the same policies remained, so did the objective basis for that nationalism. The socio-economic plight and the disaffection of the Soviet Union's collective farm population has been the subject of considerable scholarly analysis. Ukraine's collective farm population was at the bottom of this sector of the work force. The earned income (from all sources) of collective farmers in Ukraine in 1970 was the lowest among the 15 republics of the USSR. Yet in 1965, Ukraine contributed over 25 per cent of the USSR's agricultural income.
Ukraine's agriculture was the object of discriminatory policies in pricing and crop specialization. One of the more blatant forms of discrimination, and among the most significant in determining the socio-economic standing of the rural work force, was the reluctance of state authorities to convert collective farms into state farms. Collective farms, as they developed under Stalin, became finely tuned instruments for the exploitation of their working populations. Wages were a residual charge after all operating expenditures were met. Since agricultural prices which determined the collective farm's income, were set by the state, the maintenance of collective farms allowed the state to depress agricultural wages. State farmers, on the other hand, were paid a minimum wage, in addition to piece-work tariffs similar to those in industry. Thus state farmers, on the average, earned more than twice the monthly wage of collective farmers, and enjoyed other important advantages such as higher pensions, more comprehensive social security, and possession of the internal passport. (Both state and collective farmers had private plots.) Indicative of the predicament of Ukraine's rural population was the exceptionally small number of state farms in the republic. In Russia in 1970, 46 per cent of the agricultural work force was employed on state farms, in Ukraine 18 per cent.

Collective farms in Ukraine, unlike those in Russia, had to bear a disproportionate share of investment in schools, hospitals and housing. In 1970, 27.9 per cent of such investment in Ukraine's collective farm villages came from state funds. Russia's collective farms, on the other hand, obtained 49 per cent of their investment from the state treasury. The level of educational achievement of Ukraine's rural population also revealed glaring inequalities. In considering these data it must be remembered that Ukrainians
historically enjoyed a substantial educational advantage over other titular nationalities. In 1926, for example, Ukrainians ranked second among 11 titular nationalities (pre-1939 boundaries) in literacy.\textsuperscript{230} By 1970, the rural population of Ukraine ranked last among the 15 titular nationalities in the proportion of young people (ages 20-29) with some higher education.\textsuperscript{231} If rural youth in the republic had such a poor showing in obtaining higher education, it was not because of a lack of motivation on their part. Petrenko's study of Ukraine's collective farm population revealed that secondary school finishers had an almost universal desire to continue their education.\textsuperscript{232} Indeed, considering the proportion of young people between the ages of 16 to 19 with complete secondary education, Ukraine's rural youth was the second best educated among the 15 titular nations of the USSR in 1970.\textsuperscript{233} During the 1960s, unable to pursue social mobility through higher education, Ukraine's rural youth flocked to industrial occupations. But the disappointments that they must have felt when they were unable to realize their ambitions was undoubtedly a major source of social and national tensions. At the same time, the high educational level of rural youth meant that industry was receiving fresh cadres with high expectations.

When a distinction is made between "workers" and "peasants" in the Soviet context, a methodological error is frequently committed: location of employment (urban/rural, agriculture/industry) is confused with class. Forty years after collectivization, the Soviet collective farmers were no longer peasants, but rural proletarians with a corresponding consciousness.\textsuperscript{234} Their demands - higher wages, a shorter work week, mechanization of manual tasks, better social, cultural and educational amenities - were no different from those of industrial workers.\textsuperscript{235} Significantly, when the discontent of collective farmers assumed an organized, public character, the method of
collective farmers assumed an organized, public character, the method of protest used was that of strikes. In Ukraine this transformation of the rural population had a particular significance. If historically the petty commodity producer in the village was an uncertain ally of the urban proletariat, this was no longer the case. The objective basis of the age-old antagonism between town and country was removed with the abolition of private property and the emergence of Ukrainians as the hegemonic nation within their republic's proletariat.

In the early years of the Soviet regime in Ukraine, the weakest link was the peasantry. A combination of brutal repression and the creation of a safety valve for the rural population in the form of opportunities for social mobility into the growing industrial sector helped defuse rural discontent. In the post-Second World War period, however, it became apparent that the working class was emerging as the Achilles heel of the regime. De-stalinization in 1956 brought a noticeable increase in industrial conflict in Ukraine. "Protests against low wages and bad working conditions mounted; workers, especially in the industrial centres, displayed a lack of trust in the regime." In the city of Kharkiv in 1956, V. Titov, the oblast first secretary, admitted that workers wanted to abolish one-man management and introduce workers' control. In 1962, Donbas was the scene of large-scale rioting that produced a semi-insurrectionary situation. Throughout the 1960s many strikes occurred in Ukraine as the republic's working class took its first hesitant steps towards self-assertion. (In the 1970s, some embryonic free trade unions emerged.) Ukraine was a prominent centre of worker unrest in the Soviet Union. This was not merely the result of conjunctural economic difficulties, nor of the suppression of workers' rights,
which is common throughout the Soviet Union. There were some reasons entirely specific to Ukraine.

Among the most significant was the strengthening of the working class as a "class in itself". Numerically, the working class in Ukraine (as defined by statistical handbooks) grew from 4.6 million in 1940, to 7.9 million in 1959 and stood at 11.6 million in 1970. In reality, the working class was larger and Ukrainian society was a good deal more proletarianized than these figures suggest. The branches of industry that accounted for most of that growth were machine-building and metal work. [See table 4.22] Ukraine’s proletariat was highly concentrated, with two-thirds employed in factories containing over 1,000 workers. Indicative of larger economic problems was the fact that the rapid growth of Ukraine’s working class was to a significant degree brought about by a level of labour productivity much below the all-Union norm. What this pointed to was inadequate industrial investment and poor mechanization, which in turn produced a conflictual factory regime. In Donbas, for example, because mining was starved for new investment, workers’ safety deteriorated and became a major cause of unrest. These problems existed because between 1959 and 1970, half the total capital formed in Ukraine was reinvested outside the republic.

The drain of capital from Ukraine during the 1960s affected the working class in many other ways. The earned income of workers in the republic in 1960 ranked sixth out of the 15 republics and slipped to ninth place by 1970. Consumption of consumer durables, as well as the development of the infrastructure of social welfare (hospitals and the like), were below the Soviet norm. A similar situation prevailed in food consumption. This was particularly irritating to the population because of Ukraine’s role as an agricul-
### TABLE 4.22

**Changes in the Structure of the Working Class Employed**

**Outside of Agriculture, 1959 and 1970***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959 total number</th>
<th>1970 total number</th>
<th>Change in percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>457,000</td>
<td>389,000</td>
<td>-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallurgy</td>
<td>107,000</td>
<td>121,000</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power installations</td>
<td>203,000</td>
<td>233,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine-building and</td>
<td>1,569,000</td>
<td>2,817,000</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metal work</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical indust.</td>
<td>57,000</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light indust.</td>
<td>796,000</td>
<td>959,000</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food indust.</td>
<td>165,000</td>
<td>185,000</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>948,000</td>
<td>1,031,000</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and</td>
<td>1,795,000</td>
<td>2,178,000</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade and service</td>
<td>2,326,000</td>
<td>2,977,000</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8,423,000</td>
<td>10,995,000</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Defined as those involved in predominantly physical labour.

tural producer. The main cause of food shortages was obvious. In the case of Poltava oblast, for instance, 98 per cent of its sunflower oil production was exported beyond the borders of the republic.

The material predicament and the nature of the factory regime were major sources of working class discontent in the republic. The published results of a survey of young workers' attitudes in Voroshyllovhrad confirmed the observations made by individual observers. In 1968, 54 per cent of those questioned said that pay was poor, and this figure increased to 66 per cent by 1973. In both years 71 per cent were unhappy with their equipment; 65 per cent in 1968 and 70 per cent in 1973 were dissatisfied with sanitary and hygienic conditions; two thirds in 1973 (no information was provided for 1968) were critical of the level of productivity in general and labour productivity in particular.

It is when difficult material circumstances clash with rising expectations that conflict and tensions increase. In Ukraine the rise in expectations came about as a result of two developments. The first was the influx of youth into the working class. In 1970 every third worker was under the age of 29, and among machine-building and metal workers - 46 per cent. The second and perhaps more significant factor was the improvement in the educational level. When Soviet sociologists spoke of the educational revolution in the working class, they meant that a much higher proportion of workers had completed secondary education. The working class of Ukraine presented a paradox in this respect. It was on the one hand, among the best educated in the USSR, as can be seen by comparing the working class of the RSFSR with that of Ukraine. In Russia 12.0 per cent of all workers had completed secondary education and 3.0 per cent had either incomplete higher or
specialized secondary education (1970). In Ukraine the corresponding figures were 18.0 and 3.2 per cent. Ukrainian youth in particular had an exceptionally high rate of educational achievement. Calculations by V.S. Nemchenko of the Labour Resources Laboratory of Moscow State University showed that in 1970, 55 per cent of young people entering the blue-collar labour force for the first time in the city of Moscow had completed secondary education. In Ukraine as a whole, the figure was 63 per cent. The paradox was that while the proportion of Ukrainian youth with qualifications necessary for higher education (that is, complete secondary education) was among the highest in the USSR, their rate of entry into higher educational establishments was among the lowest in the USSR. (See discussion below.) What this pointed to is that Ukrainian youth were denied their aspirations to acquire higher education, and therefore joined the working class. The growth of a substantial layer of workers who only became workers because their hopes for social mobility were dashed created fertile conditions for discontent. At the same time, as studies showed, with education, workers became more socially aware, more demanding of their work environment, greater consumers of culture, and more prone to take initiative. It was for this reason that management actually preferred "workers with as little as five or six years of schooling."

After de-Stalinization, the reactivization of the republic's working class was in its infancy as society slowly emerged out of a state of immobility and fear. Given the mechanisms of social control, working class self-assertion represented as yet an unrealized potential. However, in the post-1956 period it was clear that this self-assertion could flow along national lines. One could read in the pages of the main party organ for Ukraine's workers, Robitnycha hazeta, numerous demands for a broadening of the republic's economic
prerogatives as well as protests against the economic division of labour imposed on Ukraine. 267 On the cultural front, workers' letters from all regions of Ukraine, including Donbas, Odesa, Kherson, and Kiev complained about the shortages of Ukrainian-language literature, films, theatres and other cultural facilities. A group of Donbas workers, for example, wrote, "We...love our land, our skies, our people and their wonderful melodious language and we want to hear and sing Ukrainian songs. Give them to us, comrade composers and poets! Give us songs such as were written by the immortal bard Taras Shevchenko...We are waiting." 268 It is significant that in 1972, when Ukraine's institutions were massively purged in connection with Shelest's dismissal, "a chauvinistic pogrom was carried out at Robitnycha hazeta." 269

Workers also participated in national protest outside official institutions in the post-1956 period. In Western Ukraine, virtually the entire membership of the two major clandestine nationalist groups formed in the latter half of the 1950s were workers. 270 In Kiev, workers were arrested for distributing leaflets opposing Russification. 271 In Donbas, young miners in an open letter questioned party authorities about their policies regarding the development of the Ukrainian language. 272 In 1964 in Darnytsia, the working class district of Kiev, a flag was hoisted on May Day and flew over a factory for several days before officials noticed the slogan (written in Russian): "Long Live a Free Ukraine!" 273 As Dziuba wrote in 1965, "It is no secret that during recent years a growing number of people in the Ukraine, especially among the younger generation (not only students, scientists and creative writers, and artists, but also now, quite often, workers) have been coming to the conclusion that there is something amiss with the nationalities
policy in the Ukraine, and that the actual national and political position of the Ukraine does not correspond to its formal constitutional position as a state..."274

There were several important social structural factors reinforcing the appeal of the national message within the working class. The industrial development of the Central-West and Western regions of Ukraine was among them. By 1970, every third worker in the republic lived in these regions where national identification was traditionally very strong275 and the overwhelming majority of workers were Ukrainian.276 The growth of commuter workers also contributed to the maintenance of national identity within the working class. By 1968 one million workers, or 17 per cent of the industrial work force, lived in the culturally Ukrainian environment of the village and commuted to the city to work.277

The most significant factor, however, was the growing national homogeneity within the working class. In 1959, 70 per cent of the working class was Ukrainian. By 1970 their share had increased to 74 per cent. Russians within the republic's working class represented 23 per cent of the total in 1959 and their share may well have decreased to below the 20 per cent mark in the intercensus period.278 This meant that the traditional determinants of national identity were more likely to be preserved. Inter-ethnic marriages among workers, for example, were considerably lower than among white-collar staff.279 Unlike in the past, the strategic sectors of the proletariat, the qualified and educated sectors, were also Ukrainian.280 By the mid-1960s, for example, 70 per cent of industrial workers in the republic were Ukrainian. Ukrainian representation in other occupations ranged from 78 per cent among railway workers (circa 1950) and 72 per cent of workers in the chemical industry,
to almost 70 per cent among machine-building and metal workers (circa 1965). Moreover, as a result of the crisis of Ukrainians' social mobility, an increasingly ossified cultural division of labour emerged.

As early as 1959, every second Russian who worked in Ukraine was a white-collar employee. In this situation, as Dziuba wrote:

...[T]he national question again develops into a social one: we see that in city life the Ukrainian language is in a certain sense opposed as the language of the "lower" strata of the population (caretakers, maids, unskilled labourers, newly hired workers..., rank and file workers, especially in the suburbs) to the Russian language as the language of the "higher", "more educated" strata of society "captains of industry", clerks and the intelligentsia). And it is not possible to "brush aside" this social rift. The language barrier aggravates and exacerbates social divisions.

This is why when workers in Ukraine first began asserting their claims as a class, they inevitably raised national demands as well.

Leading social groups play a preponderant role in the development of national consciousness. In the Soviet context the intelligentsia, who provide "high-level specialists for all branches of human endeavour, including government and administration," was such a group. The intelligentsia is not the same as white-collar staff. White-collar staff include clerks, secretaries and other low grade personnel. Rutkevich defined the intelligentsia as those with higher or specialized secondary education. But as L.G. Churchward pointed out, "there is in most professions an important distinction between jobs requiring tertiary training and those requiring secondary specialist qualifications." The former one could regard as constituting...
the occupations of the intelligentsia, the latter as those of the semi-intelligentsia.

The demands of scientific and technological development necessitated the rapid numerical growth of the intelligentsia. In Ukraine, between 1960 and 1970, the intelligentsia employed in the national economy expanded from 0.7 to 1.4 million. While the size and structure of the intelligentsia has been extensively researched by Soviet writers, they have largely avoided a discussion of the intelligentsia's national composition. It is possible to ascertain the Ukrainians' share of the intelligentsia as a whole (those gainfully employed, students and pensioners) for 1970: the 1.1 million Ukrainians who belonged to the intelligentsia represented 54.7 per cent of the total group in the republic. In the case of the semi-intelligentsia (as a whole) 63.1 per cent or 2.6 million were Ukrainian. Based on estimates for 1959, it appears that in the intercensal period Ukrainians did not increase their proportional representation in either the intelligentsia or the semi-intelligentsia.

An analysis of the structure of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia shows that the artistic and academic component represented only 3 per cent of the total in 1959. The largest group - 42.8 per cent - was employed in the economy, followed by the so-called mass intelligentsia (teachers, nurses and the like) who formed 38.8 per cent, while those engaged in administration represented 15.4 per cent of the total. Very little information has surfaced on Ukrainians' share of the various occupational groups within the intelligentsia. The data that have been published point to a very serious underrepresentation of Ukrainians among academics and researchers. In 1947, 41 per cent of a total of 20,000 gave Ukrainian as their nationality.
In 1960 this improved to 48 per cent of the 48,000 academics and researchers in the republic. Within the national economy (agriculture and industry) the Ukrainian intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia represented 58.3 per cent of the total in 1960 and increased to 63.7 per cent by 1962.

The 3.6 million members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia were potentially a major force in promoting the Ukrainian national cause. However, forming a slim majority of the intelligentsia, they were exposed to the impact of Russian culture and were, more than any other layer of society, subjected to the pressures of Russification. The Soviet state conducted a concerted campaign to elevate Russian culture and to make it synonymous with all that was modern and progressive. The message contained in a book devoted to an analysis of the influence of culture on personality development in the USSR was typical:

The Russian language is unusually supple and brimming with bright colours. The Russian language is the greatest achievement of all human communication; it has gathered all of the finest elements of world culture and science... Without it, a cultural revolution and the formation of a new man is impossible...

The author explained it was for these reasons that Russians had such a "boundless sense of responsibility" to develop and propagate their language.

Colonial powers have always masked their rapacity as a mission to civilize the world. That civilizing drive was itself an important component of colonial policy. The metropolitan culture was propagated as superior for the realization of universal ends. The denigration of indigenous culture was intended to "undermine the native's will to resist the colonial regime."
The underlying assumption of colonial cultural policy was that by changing individuals' cultural preferences, the psychological attitude of people towards those who dominate them would change as well. In essence, the strategy of Russification is no different. By teaching non-Russians Russian culture and language, the authorities hope that the new cultural orientation will produce indifference to particularistic claims based on national distinctiveness and that Russian domination in society will not be found objectionable as more come to identify with Russian culture. If there are those who persist in advancing the claims of their nation, their attitudes are labelled relics of a mental set inherited from the past, which a protracted exposure to Russian culture will wipe out.

The intelligentsia more than any other group in Ukrainian society was exposed to and participated in Russian culture. Yet, on the pages of the Soviet Ukrainian press one could read comments such as: "in recent years our intelligentsia has begun to display moods alien to our way of life," "nationalist prejudices are alive and strong and one way or another they make themselves felt even under our circumstances," and "nationalist manifestations among our student youth are still far too dangerous to be underestimated." A correspondent to Politicheskii dnevnik, a samizdat journal, whose circle of contributors and readers is thought to have included members of the Soviet establishment offered the following comment: "In the opinion of many comrades, a strengthening of nationalist tendencies in Ukraine is being witnessed... Nationalist moods...have gained wide currency within a sector of the Ukrainian intelligentsia." What accounted for the revival of nationalism among the intelligentsia? What were the flaws, if any, in the strategy of the Soviet regime to dry, by protracted exposure to Russian culture, the well-springs
which fed a separate Ukrainian national identity?

The attitudes towards national identity and inter-ethnic relationships of the contemporary Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia are not a single-valued phenomenon, rather they follow a highly complex pattern. Simply because archaic and in many respects residual forms of traditional culture (some rituals, for example) display a tendency to disappear or atrophy among the educated sectors of society, this does not signify growing indifference to the national culture. An exhaustive survey of Georgia, for example, found that "the contemporary living forms of national culture are preserved rather stably in all groups of the population, including the intelligentsia..." It is true, as many empirical Soviet sociological investigations have confirmed, that the urban and especially the educated are much more international in their cultural preferences (music, literature, art, dance, food) than the rural and less educated members of their nation. On the two continua of cultural orientation - traditional to contemporary, narrowly national to international - the preferences of the intelligentsia cluster around the latter in far greater proportions than those of any other sector of the population. This does not, however, imply anorexia for the national. What occurs in the intelligentsia is an expansion of their cultural fund such that the international does not replace the national in their cultural orientation, but is added to it. Thus:

Irrespective of all the differences between the scientific intelligentsia and other strata of the population on the level of their cultural requirements, they are united in their love of national forms. This suggests a very important conclusion: the scientific intelligentsia, the more educated and highly qualified, reflecting the
tendency of general development sharply expands the range of its cultural-aesthetic tastes, but at the same time seeks to preserve its national cultural heritage.\textsuperscript{303}

On the question of attitudes towards national identity, Soviet researchers have shown that the traditional explicit determinants of national self-identification (appearance, language, etc.), although particularly important in the national self-image of the lower strata of society, play a lesser role in the case of the intelligentsia. But this does not imply a weakening of national consciousness among the intelligentsia. T.V. Starovoitova in her study of Tatars noted that:

Individuals with specialized secondary and higher education...direct more attention to the non-explicit, but significant features of ethnic similarity and difference (character traits, distinctions in behaviour, etc.). The selection of these markers requires both a higher cultural level, and a different structure of ethnic identity, one no longer based on commonplace notions. \textsuperscript{304}

E.I. Klement'ev came to an analogous conclusion when analysing the national self-awareness of Karelians:

In groups with low qualifications, the evaluation of their ties to their ethnic community...is associated with the existence of readily discernable national features, while in groups of persons performing mental labour and having a high level of education, perception of intraethnic ties is balanced by general theoretical concepts with respect to the significance of criteria shaping national self-awareness. \textsuperscript{305}
In the realm of national identity the orientations of the intelligentsia are complex and diverse. They make unquestionably broader use of integrated culture and inter-ethnic families and friendships are more prevalent in this milieu. But their level of culture, their capacity to engage in abstract thought, and their interest in intellectual values "make the intelligentsia precisely the most active voice of national self-awareness. They are the most sensitive to the historical past of the nation and its culture." For the intelligentsia, an awareness and appreciation of shared, collective experience is a much more important component of their national identity than for other strata of society. For workers and collective farmers, the "we-they" dichotomy is the basic determinant of national self-identification. Thus Soviet investigators found that responses to the question "what does your national group have in common?" were relatively infrequent among these groups - it was their differences with other national groups that were stressed. The Soviet psychologist L.S. Vygotskii explained this phenomenon in the following way: "awareness of similarity requires a much more highly developed capacity for generalization and conceptualization than awareness of differences; awareness of similarity presumes a generalization or concept embracing a number of similar things, while awareness of difference is possible even on the sensory level." In the recognition of national similarity, historical consciousness plays a determining role. The results of a survey of reader preferences among engineering-technical staff employed in a number of industrial enterprises in Ukraine found that novels exploring historical themes (such as Mykola Rudenko's Ostannia shablia, Ivan Le's Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi) were ranked as the most widely read pieces of literature. Amazed, the newspaper commented, "this
explosion of interest in historical subjects requires a special study.  

In major industrial towns the intelligentsia also led campaigns to rename streets in honour of Ukrainian historical figures. The intelligentsia did not have a weak national identity, only one that was structurally different.

What impact did the intelligentsia's differently structured national self-awareness have on their attitudes towards relations between nations? Soviet sociologists conducted studies of the non-Russian intelligentsia, investigating specifically the correlation between national-cultural orientations (judged by responses to questions such as knowledge of languages, cultural figures, literature, etc.) and national-psychological orientation (identified from the combination of answers about attitudes towards work in a nationally mixed work force and whether the nationality of the enterprise's manager made any difference). The most succinct and revealing summary of the findings on the intelligentsia's attitudes was provided by Arutunian. He wrote:

There exists a somewhat simplified understanding of the mechanics of interaction between cultural change and cross-national relationships. At times it is regarded as self-evident that an internationalization of culture and a mutual exchange of cultural values leads almost automatically to optimizing mutual understanding among nations. On the basis of concrete sociological research, we have repeatedly had occasion to refute this simplistic point of view. The results of our present study once again confirm that there is no direct and single-valued relationship between cultural and national-psychological orientations. Thus the scientific intelligentsia, which exhibits a great interest in international culture, does not by any means reach the same statistical "ratio" in expressing positive attitudes in national relationships. This permits the assumption that we are dealing with two independent systems of orientations. To verify this hypothesis a latent-structural analysis of national-
cultural and national-psychological sets was carried out. Special ordered scales were constructed on the basis of the combination of answers to questions indicating cultural and then psychological orientation. The coefficient of rank correlation between the two systems expressed by these scales proved to be insignificant, which again confirms the hypothesis.312

The findings of concrete Soviet sociological investigations have shown that the system of attitudes on inter-national relationships depends not so much on cultural orientation and the degree of the internationalization of an individual's cultural pattern as on a complex combination of social and occupational interests. Thus, despite the fact that the intelligentsia is the best educated and the most cosmopolitan social stratum, it does not have a higher degree of positive attitudes in cross-national relationships. On the contrary, a study of the Tatar ASSR revealed that it was the intelligentsia, especially "top executives," "middle-level management," "professionals with higher education" and "paraprofessionals", who had a much higher rate of negative responses to the question "the nationality of the superior makes no difference" than manual workers.313 Similarly it was the intelligentsia who, in an exhaustive survey of the Baltic republics, of the rural population of Tatar ASSR, and of a Georgian factory, opposed cross-national contact at the work place more often than workers.314 The explanation given was that unlike for manual labourers, whose negative attitude towards inter-national relationships stemmed primarily from cultural differences, the critical attitude of the intelligentsia was rooted in "the competitive strivings that exist as a result of [nationally] mixed environments."315

The gap between the social expectations which come with a higher level of education and the possibility of their realization was one of the principal
factors behind the growth of nationalism within the intelligentsia in Ukraine, as in other union republics. "When social expectations are not wholly realized," wrote Arutiunian, "a dissatisfaction appears that is projected on national relations." The most forthright study establishing the causal relationship between the growth of the Russian intelligentsia in the union republics and the growth of national consciousness in the indigenous intelligentsia was done by A.A. Susokolov. His data base included Ukraine. He concluded, "where a rapid increase in the number of the indigenous and of the Russian intelligentsia is taking place, there appears a more intense rise in national consciousness." He added, if "there occurs a rapid growth of the intelligentsia of the indigenous nationality under conditions of a relatively stable number of jobs requiring mental labour...this may intensify national consolidation..."  

In Ukraine the socially competitive milieu in which the intelligentsia found itself was created above all by the large influx of Russian specialists into the republic. One study acknowledged the dissatisfaction of many Ukrainian students who, having graduated from Kiev's higher educational establishments, were unable to obtain positions in the city and were forced to resettle in far less attractive locations. Dziuba's point that the in-migration of Russian specialists was forcing the Ukrainian intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia to seek employment elsewhere (Central Asia and Siberia primarily), was confirmed by statistics provided by V.A. Shpyliuk. Ukrainians had the second highest percentage of their intelligentsia employed outside the republic among the fifteen titular nations of the USSR. The fact that every fourth member of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was working outside Ukraine explains to some extent the low representation of Ukrainians within
the intelligentsia at home.  

The in-migration of Russians was also forcing the native Ukrainian populace into low paid jobs while the better positions, jobs and professions within the intelligentsia went to the newcomers. This occurred at a time when the material position of the rank-and-file intelligentsia was steadily worsening. Workers could maintain and even improve their wages because they were in a much better position to manipulate wage norms, wage grades and piece rates. The rank-and-file intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia did not have this option open to them. The movement of real wages throughout the 1960s was against the rank-and-file intelligentsia. The upper strata of the intelligentsia, on the other hand, continued to evolve into a highly privileged group. National divisions in Ukraine exacerbated the tensions that were produced by these "scissors" in the standard of living.

In explaining the process of the rapprochement of nations in the USSR official Soviet theory placed great emphasis on social structural convergence. While all republics in the Soviet Union experienced economic development and a modernization of their social structure, what was important for national relations was the great unevenness of development. Moreover, as Arutiunian pointed out, economic development itself "does not always lead to a growing solidarity between nations". The key to inter-nation solidarity was a high rate of social mobility for the indigenous population. "The more favourable the conditions for the mobility of non-Russian personnel," he wrote, "the more successfully it is possible to eliminate tensions in national relations." Eradicating national animosities among the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia required socio-economic measures directly touching on their socio-occupational interests. Simply to accelerate "cultural
influence" that is, to Russify—would not bring about a "change in nationality attitudes". On the contrary, a low rate of social mobility accompanied by an assault on the national culture would force the intelligentsia to assert its own national culture as a way of forging a link with other members of its threatened national group.

At the turn of the 1960s, Ukrainians were seriously under-represented in the intelligentsia of their republic. They made little significant progress during the course of the decade in increasing their representation in the upper echelons of society. The unfavourable conditions for the social mobility of Ukrainians were part of an overall social trend in the Soviet Union. As Soviet society stabilized following the end of the rapid growth demanded by early industrialization, the opportunities to secure higher positions stabilized as well. Soviet sociologists themselves came to realize that during the 1960s, with the end of major social and economic change, the structural sources of a high rate of mobility had been exhausted. L.A. Gordon and E.V. Klopow, for example, stressed the emergence of hereditary occupational patterns with the setting-in of "social stabilization". To Ukraine, however, this social stability conserved a cultural division of labour. The re-emergence of a national movement can be seen as one of the consequences of this.

v. Education and the press

Throughout the Soviet Union higher education is the principal avenue of social mobility. By the end of industrialization, Ukrainians, when compared to most nations of the Soviet Union, were in a favourable position to develop
a strong intelligentsia. In 1939, 7.7 per cent of Ukrainians had complete secondary or higher education. They ranked fourth among the eleven titular nations of the USSR in this respect - very close to Russians (8.0 per cent).\textsuperscript{335} By 1959, out of the original eleven titular nations, Ukrainians ranked sixth in the ratio of their population with higher or incomplete higher education, or ninth if all fifteen titular nations in 1959 are counted. During the 1960s their relative standing further declined so that by 1970 Ukrainians ranked eleventh out of the fifteen.\textsuperscript{336}

It is true that with the incorporation of Western Ukraine, the republic received a population which, as a result of Polish and Romanian domination and extreme poverty, had been deprived of opportunities for higher studies. Under the Polish regime, for example, a mere three per cent of L'viv university students were Ukrainian during the 1930s.\textsuperscript{337} Similarly, in Bukovyna, part of Romania, only 3.7 per cent of the student population of Chernivtsi university in 1938-9 were Ukrainians.\textsuperscript{338} But the population of Western Ukraine rapidly overcame its initial educational disadvantage relative to other regions of Ukraine. By 1970 Western Ukrainians acquired higher education at the same rate as the inhabitants of most other regions of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{339} The incorporation of Western Ukraine therefore cannot account for the continuing decline of the relative standing of Ukrainians in higher education.

If in comparison with other nations a much smaller proportion of the Ukrainian population had higher education, it was not because the youth of that nation had inadequately prepared itself for admission to vuzy. Available evidence suggests the contrary. In 1959, 80.3 per cent of Ukrainian 16-19 year-olds had some higher or complete and incomplete secondary education, making them the best educated young people in the Soviet Union among the fifteen titular
nations. Among Russian and Armenian 16-19 year-olds, for example, the percentage of those with higher or complete and incomplete secondary education was 73.6 and 78.2 respectively. By 1970 Ukrainian youth held fourth place among the fifteen titular nations in the proportion of 16-19 year olds with incomplete higher or complete secondary education. But rank obscures what were in reality marginal differences between the highly educated Armenians, who ranked second with 40.5 per cent, and Ukrainians with 39.4 per cent. By examining the next age group we can get some idea of where Ukrainians stood in terms of the proportion of youth going on to attend institutions of higher learning. The 1970 census provided data on those in the 20-9 year-old group with complete higher education. Here the Ukrainians' relative standing plummeted to fourteenth place out of the fifteen titular nations. Since access to higher education is predicated on secondary education, the contrast between Ukrainian youth's achievements in the one and the other is anomalous, and socially significant.

In Ukraine, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, a revolution in the social expectations of young people had occurred. The Kiev Komsomol asked 5,000 school children what they wanted to be when they grew up, and an article summarizing the results illustrated the point well:

Let us transport ourselves magically to a desert island where each of the pupils has become what he wanted to be. We find many designers, but only seven construction workers and one work superintendent. Every tenth person is a doctor, but there are only five nurses. Manufacturing is hopelessly bad, with only 80 factory workers. There are nearly 300 teachers and state security officials. There are hundreds of journalists and writers, but no printers to publish their work. We find one restaurant director, 23 cooks and no waiter - but with only seven livestock specialists, one tractor driver and
one fisherman, it is hard to feed all the scientists, actors and coaches at work on the island.\textsuperscript{342}

The high social expectations, as one newspaper article noted, applied to rural as well as urban youth.\textsuperscript{343} As a consequence, a high proportion of young people in Ukraine, completed their secondary education, making themselves eligible for university entrance. The overwhelming majority of pupils who had completed secondary school desired to continue their studies. As P.P. Udovychenko, Minister of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, reported (1969):

During the last three years the number of pupils who have gone on to attain a general or special secondary education after completing the eighth grade has increased from 76 to 82 per cent. Most of them want to go on to higher education. As a result, the professional aspirations of those who have completed secondary school do not coincide with the needs of society. The majority of these school leavers see their future only in continuing their studies in higher or specialized secondary educational institutions.\textsuperscript{344}

Or, as one official complained:

Not enough young people go into industry...! Schools do an inadequate job of popularizing blue-collar professions. This is the source of the existing disparity between the aspirations (often pretentious) of secondary school finishers and the real needs of society.\textsuperscript{345}

Gaining entry into institutions of higher education was a highly competitive process in Ukraine, as throughout the Soviet Union, because the numbers seeking admission to higher education grew much more rapidly than places available therein. The increase in the pressure can be seen in the admission statistics reported for the year 1972-3 for the USSR. Only 22 per cent of secondary school finishers could enter day-time higher education. This could be contrasted with 25 per cent in 1960, 50 per cent in 1950, and
80 per cent in 1940. In Ukraine the ratio between the number of applicants for full-time study in post-secondary educational establishments and the number accepted indicated an intense rivalry for the available places. In Donets'k oblast in 1966, for example, only 10,000 of the 56,000 secondary school finishers seeking admission to higher education were accepted. Throughout Ukraine in all post-secondary institutions in 1965 there were three times more applicants than places available, and this increased to 3.7 times by 1972. In some faculties at some universities and polytechnics, the competition reached exceptionally high proportions. In 1972, for example, there were seventeen applicants for every student place in the law faculty of L'viv university.

As the ratio of failures to successful candidates increased steadily, the chances of students of Ukrainian nationality inevitably decreased. Ukrainians suffered from three disadvantages. The first was their social origin. M.N. Rutkevich and F.R. Filippov have emphasized that the greater competition for vuz places resulted in a steady increase in the proportion of students from intelligentsia backgrounds, and a decrease in those from working class and collective farm origins:

It is quite obvious that, given equal abilities of youngsters, those families in which the parents have higher educational attainment provide greater opportunities for preparing young people for competitive examinations....In ignoring the conditions under which applicants are trained, and in making judgements based solely on the applicants' knowledge, admissions committees in effect sanction inequality of opportunity.

The advantages held by the offspring of the intelligentsia in securing admittance to higher education were not simply a consequence of their cultural advantages and more affluent home environments which enabled them to
achieve better scores in examination results. In addition, their families could provide special tutoring, and they could use various kinds of pressure, even bribery of university officials to gain admission. As Khrushchev pointed out in 1958:

> In some cases, the higher educational institution accepts not the candidate who is well qualified but the one with an influential papa and mama who can help in getting son or daughter into the higher education institution. Often it is not the deserving who gain admission but those who have an inside track to the people in charge of determining who is to be accepted at the higher educational institution and who is not. This is a shameful phenomenon. 351

The bias of the Soviet educational system of higher education in favour of the upper strata of society was well documented in a series of Soviet sociological investigations. L.I. Senikova noted that trends pointed to "a decline in the proportion of workers and collective farmers among the students." Characterizing this development, she wrote that it "does not by any means signify that Soviet higher schools have lost in the slightest degree their distinguishing characteristics— their genuinely public character. White-collar staff and the intelligentsia are also part of the people, the working class." Leaving aside her convoluted argument, what was characteristic about white-collar staff and especially the intelligentsia in Ukraine was the pronounced under-representation of Ukrainians.

Few data are available on the highly sensitive, but important question of the class composition of the student population of Ukraine. Those which were published are quite revealing. In 1965, 70 per cent of the first-year students in Kharkiv university were the offspring of white-collar staff, 23 per cent of workers and 7 per cent of collective farmers. Among first-year
students attending L'viv University (circa 1965), 55 per cent were either working class or collective farmers by social origin. By contrast, 82 per cent of the population of Western Ukraine belonged to these social groups. Iu. O. Kurnosov wrote that in 1970-1, 13.8 per cent of first year students attending the republic's vuzy were of collective farm origin. Among students attending specialized secondary institutions, the weight of collective farmers improved to 26.4 per cent. Although Kurnosov did not give any further figures, he did note that "the relative weight of white-collar staff among students in higher education has remained substantially higher than their weight in the population as a whole." (In 1970, collective farmers represented 30.3 per cent of Ukraine's population, 37.0 per cent of Ukrainians.) The social bias in higher education was weighted most heavily against the indigenous nationality in Ukraine.

The second factor impeding Ukrainian access to universities was the Russification of higher education. As Nicholas De Witt noted, "the policy of cultural Russification which is particularly evident in higher education...is reflected in the low representation of local nationalities in student enrollments." The impact of Russification on the recruitment of Ukrainians into institutions of higher education was most forcefully stated by the dissident S. Karavans'kyi:

"People of Ukrainian nationality whose native tongue is Ukrainian do not enjoy the same rights in entering the vuzy as do those whose native tongue is Russian. Russian language and literature are a compulsory part of the vuzy entrance examinations, and so the graduates from Russian schools are more successful in passing this examination with higher marks than the graduates from Ukrainian schools. Furthermore, entrance examinations for special disciplines are also
conducted in Russian, and this too, makes it difficult for graduates from Ukrainian schools to pass special subjects. And so Ukrainian-speaking applicants get lower marks in competitive examinations. Because those with higher marks in the competitive examinations are accepted by the institutions, the majority of students entering the *vyzy* in Ukraine are graduates from Russian secondary and incomplete secondary schools. Most of the institutes on the territory of the Ukr. SSR demand from their entrants an examination in the Russian language and literature...As a result...among those who entered the Odesa Polytechnical Institute in the 1964-1965 school year, Ukrainians amounted to 43 per cent. Of 1,126 Ukrainians who applied for admission, 453 were accepted, i.e. 40 per cent. But of 1,042 Russians who forwarded documents to the Institute, 477 were accepted, i.e. 46 per cent. This is the result of the system of admission, which makes it difficult for Ukrainians to enter institutions of learning.360

Arguing in a similar vein, V. Chornovil pointed out that of the graduates of Ukrainian-language secondary schools who have studied their subjects in Ukrainian, only very few succeed in passing entrance examinations "which are entirely in Russian in subjects which they have studied in Ukrainian."361 A former student at Kharkiv University had the following to say about the role of the Ukrainian language in admission procedures at the university:

Students seeking entry to the university had to fill out some twenty-odd questionnaires, the questions rubrics and headings being phrased in Russian only, and woe to the applicant who wrote his answers in the Ukrainian language. His application would be tossed into the wastebasket by contemptuous officials. At best, he would have to write out new formulas, and go through extra tough examinations in the Russian language to prove he knew it well enough for academic studies.362

Finally, the disadvantaged position of Ukrainians contemplating entry into higher education also derived from the excessive centralization of higher education in the hands of Moscow authorities.363 The power of these
authorities was greatly enhanced when in 1959 a Union-Republic Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education was established. In 1965 only 50 out of Ukraine's 132 vuzy were under the jurisdiction of Ukraine's Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. Postgraduate programmes could only be established with Moscow's permission. In Ukraine, for example, it was not possible to obtain a doctorate in pedagogy; of the seven institutions endowed with this power, all were located in the RSFSR. Ukraine's budgetary allocation for post-secondary education was decided upon centrally and the republic received less than it was entitled to on a per capita basis. This meant that higher education expanded at a slower tempo than the local population and authorities would have wished. Ukraine also did not have control over vuzy admissions policies. From 1954 on, Ukrainian was dropped as a compulsory entrance requirement; Russian remained. This, when combined with the overall Russification of Ukraine's vuzy, facilitated the admission of students from Russia. Since in Russia competition for entrance to vuzy had also intensified, a greater proportion of Russian students considered Ukraine for their higher education. With most entrance examinations conducted in Russian, the candidates from the RSFSR stood a much better chance of gaining entry than the students whose native language was Ukrainian.

The statistics on the national composition of the student body of Ukraine confirmed the effects of social and national discrimination. In 1928, when Ukrainians were a largely rural and peasant people, they represented 62 per cent of the student population of specialized secondary establishments and 54 per cent of vuzy. After the Second World War, in 1946, 52 per cent of the vuzy student population were Ukrainians, 29 per cent were Russians and 19 per cent others. By the 1953-4 academic year Ukrainians had improved
their standing to represent 63 per cent of the *vuzy* student population;  
Russians and others had declined to 28 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. In the 1955-6 academic year Ukrainians were 63.8 per cent of the students attending the republic's *vuzy*. During the 1960s, however, their rate of entry into higher education fell dramatically. By 1970-1 Ukrainians dropped almost four percentage points in their share of Ukraine's *vuzy* students. Russians, on the other hand, improved their representation among the republic's *vuzy* student population between 1955-6 and 1970-1 by almost six per cent.  

/See table 4.23/ The declining share of Ukrainians in the student population of the republic was certainly not because a greater proportion of them were studying in other regions of the USSR. Quite the contrary: in 1960-1, 24.4 per cent of the total number of Ukrainian *vuzy* students in the USSR studied in republics other than Ukraine, and this declined to 20 per cent by 1970-1.  

At the level of specialized secondary training, which prepared the republic's semi-intelligentsia, Ukrainians represented 68.7 per cent of the student population in 1955-6 and this rose to 70.3 per cent by 1970-1. Russians maintained their share of the student population. Ukrainian gains were made possible by a decline of "others", primarily Jews.  

/See table 4.24/ As a result of the under-representation of Ukrainians in post-secondary institutions, the education gap between Ukrainians and Russians in the republic increased between 1959 and 1970.  

/See table 4.25/  

The deteriorating position of Ukrainians in higher education emerged as a source of considerable tension in the republic during the 1960s. The results of L.M. Drobizheva's study of Tatar youth could be applied equally to Ukrainian young people. She found that youth under the age of 18 had the most "favourable nationality sets" (positive attitudes towards work in a
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Student Pop.</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Total Student Pop.</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Total Student Pop.</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>Total Student Pop.</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>325,900</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>417,748</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>687,739</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>813,306</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>207,000</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>260,945</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>421,447</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>487,292</td>
<td>59.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>125,464</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>218,237</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>267,309</td>
<td>32.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>30,339</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>48,114</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>58,425</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: * Pravda Ukrainy, 25 December 1956 and Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrains'koї RSR, Statystychnyi zbirnyk (Kiev, 1957), table 20, 449. Calculated from data on the number of female students by nationality.
### TABLE 4.24
National Composition of Students Attending Specialized Secondary Establishments, 1955-71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Student Pop.</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>374,642</td>
<td>257,379</td>
<td>87,292</td>
<td>29,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>399,677</td>
<td>272,137</td>
<td>100,045</td>
<td>27,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-66</td>
<td>648,996</td>
<td>441,461</td>
<td>167,241</td>
<td>40,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>792,862</td>
<td>557,723</td>
<td>204,137</td>
<td>31,002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Student Pop.</th>
<th>Ukrainians</th>
<th>Russians</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955-56</td>
<td>374,642</td>
<td>257,379</td>
<td>87,292</td>
<td>29,971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-61</td>
<td>399,677</td>
<td>272,137</td>
<td>100,045</td>
<td>27,495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>648,996</td>
<td>441,461</td>
<td>167,241</td>
<td>40,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>792,862</td>
<td>557,723</td>
<td>204,137</td>
<td>31,002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Pravda Ukrainy, 25 December 1956 and Narodne Hospodarstvo Ukraini, RSR. Statystychnyi sbirnyk (Kiev, 1957). Table 20, 449. Calculated from Narodnoe Obrazovanie, nauka i kultura v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbirnyk (Moscow, 1971), Table 30, 449.
TABLE 4.25
Changes in Educational Levels of Population of Ukraine, 1959-70
(in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1970</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine urban</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine urban</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
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<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine urban</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine urban</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine urban</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine urban</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>13.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incomplete</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine urban</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>16.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As a percentage of the total population over the age of 10.

nationally mixed collective, etc.). "However, as early as in the very next age group (18 to 22) these sets became noticeably worse." Explaining why this ought to have been the case, she wrote, "It is especially at 18 or a little later that boys and girls choose their path in work. They often continue their studies, but now it is under conditions of competitive examinations. Because their plans are not always realized, dissatisfaction may arise, which in some people becomes a critical attitude towards certain phenomena of life," namely, national relationships.

The status of the Ukrainian language in higher education became one of the central focuses of the new national movement that emerged during the 1960s. Undoubtedly under pressure from the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the issue was also taken up by the Ukrainian political elite. In a bold move at national self-assertion, the Ukrainian party leadership under Shelest issued far-reaching instructions regarding higher education in the republic. The instructions, unknown in the West until their publication in a Ukrainian samvydad journal, were delivered by Iu. M. Dadenkov, the republic's Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, first in the form of a lecture (August 1965) to an assembly of the rectors of higher educational institutions. This lecture then became the basis for a circular memorandum which contained the following points:

A) Priority in admission should be given to those students who are either in full command of the Ukrainian language, are in the process of learning it, or are willing to study it. The opportunity to set Candidate's examinations in all disciplines in Ukrainian should be provided.

B) All the social sciences should be taught in the Ukrainian language in all higher educational institutes.

C) All instructors who have a good knowledge of the Ukrainian language should be requested to use this language in their lectures; courses
in the Ukrainian language should be provided for those who have an inadequate knowledge of the language.

D) The entire educational process should be gradually converted to the Ukrainian language.

E) Administrative work in the institutions of higher learning should be conducted in the Ukrainian language.

F) Scholarly journals, textbooks, instructional manuals intended for use in higher education should be published primarily in Ukrainian.

G) Teaching programmes should reflect special preparation of students for future professional work in Ukraine.

H) Mass political, cultural and educational instruction in the higher educational institutes should be conducted primarily in Ukrainian.

That such measures were needed could be clearly seen from information supplied by Dadenkov. In the fifty educational institutes of the republic under his ministry's jurisdiction, Ukrainians formed a mere 55 per cent of students and 49 per cent of teaching staff. (The latter figure was roughly equivalent to what it had been in 1926!) Of the 75,027 students attending the eight universities of the republic, 61 per cent were Ukrainian; 56 per cent of the staff was also Ukrainian, but only 34 per cent lectured in Ukrainian. Of the thirty-six technical educational institutions under the republic's jurisdiction, lectures in Ukrainian and Russian were given in only six of them. In the rest, Russian reigned supreme. Almost 70 per cent of the total number of subjects in the curricula of all eight universities were not supplied with Ukrainian-language textbooks.

The importance of the measures Dadenkov proposed cannot be emphasized enough. Higher education is the key to social mobility in the Soviet Union. The recommendation on the priority admission of Ukrainian speakers would have had the effect of reinforcing the Ukrainian contingent within the intelligentsia of the republic. Also, the measures would have sent reverberations throughout
the educational system. For example, since Ukrainian parents, solicitous of their children's occupational future, prefer for that reason to send their children to Russian language schools in the republic, the elevation of the role of Ukrainian in higher education would have also begun to reverse the Russification trend in primary and secondary education. Thus, even without a specific statute ordering the Ukrainization of the lower levels of education, the very fact that priority admission was to be given to students "who know, are studying, or are willing to learn Ukrainian" would have had a major impact on parental choice of schools. Making Ukrainian the medium of instruction in higher education would have enhanced the prestige of the language and would have broadened its social function. The measures were not as far-reaching as the Ukrainization proposals of the 1920s, but they were the most significant step in that direction since the abandonment of Ukrainization in 1933.

The advancement of such measures by the republic's leadership meant that decades of centralization and repression had not stamped out the autonomist drive in the republic. The timing of Dadenkov's proposals was significant. Khrushchev had been removed from power in 1964 and in 1965 his various educational reforms were dismantled. The Moscow leadership was not yet secure and it included M. Pidhornyî, (N. Podgorny), the former CPU First Secretary who, with L. Brezhnev and A. Kosygin, formed a triumvirate. Undoubtedly Ukrainian party leaders thought that the time was opportune for a change in the nationalities policy. Dadenkov's instructions were also a response to the national revival of the 1960s, to the growing boldness of Ukrainian public opinion as evidenced by the 1963 conference which demanded that Ukrainian be made the official language of the republic. Moreover, the very future of the
Ukrainian political elite, its strength as a social group, lay in the development of a power base within the indigenous intelligentsia. The Ukrainization proposals would have greatly reinforced that base. Shelest and other political leaders were surely also aware that higher education, offering Ukrainian youth social mobility, would act as an important safety valve for their discontent. Dadenkov's measures were timely ones from the point of view of tension management. While we have to speculate on the motives underlying Dadenkov's proposed reform, it is not necessary to speculate about why it was never introduced. The reform was quashed by "a directive from Moscow".  

The failure of the 1965 attempt to reform the republic's higher educational system did not end the controversy. Less radical demands, such as the introduction of Ukrainian as a language of university entrance examinations in all subjects, were raised after that date, indicating that within Ukrainian officialdom the issue was still smouldering. A major impediment in the efforts of the republic's leadership to bring about a change in the system of higher education was that only a small percentage of the total number of vuzy and specialized secondary establishments fell under the direct authority of the union-republic Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education. Little influence could be exerted by the Ukrainian leadership on the important decisions to be made, such as the appointment of professors, the development of new programmes or the method of admission of new applicants. In the latter half of the 1960s, some measures aimed at expanding the republic's authority over higher education had already been taken with the creation of a Rectors' Council, which was established to coordinate the majority of the republic's higher educational establishments, including those under the jurisdiction of all-Union ministries. The initiative for the council appears to
have come from Dadenkov, with Shelest's backing. In 1971, however, the Shelest leadership pressed its claims further. That year, Dadenkov, in a bold article, wrote that transferring all institutions of higher learning on the territory of the republic to the direct authority of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the Ukrainian SSR" was an urgent issue. "In our view," he concluded, "the quality of the education of specialists will only profit from this." Shortly thereafter, Shelest was removed from office as was Dadenkov.

Although Ukrainian as a language of instruction in the republic's school system was much more widespread than in higher education, there too, the situation had been steadily deteriorating since the Second World War. In 1948-9, 90 per cent of general education schools had Ukrainian as their language of instruction. By 1968-9 this had declined to 79 per cent. The number of pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools fell from 81 per cent of the total in 1950-1 to 60 per cent by 1974. An exception to the overall decline was school enrolment for 1964, when Ukrainian-language schools increased their enrolment by six per cent over 1961-2. /See table 4.26/ It is difficult to say what stimulated this upturn, perhaps some measures Shelest took when coming to power. In any case, the increase proved that there was nothing inevitable about the atrophy of the Ukrainian-language school system. Rather, the future of instruction in the native language was tied to the capacity of the local elite to assert its political claims.

The real predicament of Ukrainian-language schools was even worse than the global figures imply. Firstly, in urban centres, the overwhelming majority of pupils received instruction in Russian. In 1966, in Kiev, for example, only 23 per cent of the total number of pupils were enrolled in Ukrainian-
# TABLE 4.26

General Education Schools in Ukraine according to Language of Instruction, 1948-74

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ukr.</th>
<th>Rus.</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ukr.</th>
<th>Rus.</th>
<th>Other*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) 1948-49</td>
<td>29,087</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(2) 1950-51</td>
<td>31,055</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,841,900</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) 1953-54</td>
<td>29,551</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6,421,900</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) 1955-56</td>
<td>30,063</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,524,764</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5) 1958-59</td>
<td>30,077</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(6) 1961-62</td>
<td>31,098</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6,473,000</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(7) 1963-64</td>
<td>29,918</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(8) 1964</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,529,900</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(9) 1966-67</td>
<td>29,363</td>
<td>82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(10) 1968-69</td>
<td>29,267</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(11) 1971-72</td>
<td>28,024</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(12) 1974</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8,356,300</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Mixed schools are included in this column.

** The source stated that "almost forty per cent" were in Russian-language schools. Enrolment in mixed schools was not given.

Source: Total number of schools and pupil enrolment derived from Narodna osvita, nauka i kul'tura v Ukrains'kii RSR. Statystychnyi zbirnyk (Kiev, 1973), 23; Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR u 1974 rotsi. Statystychnyi zbirnyk (Kiev, 1975), 498. Other data obtained from:

1. L.A. Shevchenko, Druzhba bratnikh kul'tur (Kiev, 1971), 82.
2. O.K. Zuban', Borot'ba Komunistichnoi partii Ukrainy za rozvytok osvity i pidhotovky kadriv dlia narodnoho hospodarstva (L'viv, 1967), 90.
5. Radians'ka osvita, 1 February 1958.
11. B.Stanchuk, What I. Dzyuba Stands For, And How He Does It: (Once More about the Book "Internationalism or Russification") (Kiev,1972), 37.
language schools. Moreover, the Ukrainian schools that remained open in the cities tended to be located in working-class neighbourhoods, while the elite districts were served by Russian schools. Secondly, there were marked regional variations in the distribution of Ukrainian-language schools. In Western Ukraine (and probably in the Central West as well), the Ukrainian-language network dominated. Thus, in L'viv oblast in 1968, 95 per cent of schools were offering Ukrainian-language instruction. In Odesa oblast, on the other hand, 65 per cent of schools in 1965 were Ukrainian-language institutions. Thirdly, Ukrainian-language schools tended to be elementary (classes 1-3) or incomplete secondary schools (classes 1-8), whereas the majority of Russian schools were complete secondary educational establishments (classes 1-10). In urban areas, only 21 per cent of the children attending complete secondary urban schools were registered in Ukrainian-language establishments. Russian schools were also larger, having twice as many pupils on the average as Ukrainian language schools (1961-2); larger schools were better equipped since they received priority in budgetary allocations, offered a wider range of science subjects, and had better qualified teachers. In short, the Russian-language school system offered a superior education. With higher education Russified, it was not surprising that many Ukrainian parents, with an eye to their children's future, preferred to send their offspring to Russian-language schools.

Because schools are one of the most important instruments of socialization, and because native language instruction is a major factor enhancing national consciousness, Russian authorities made a concerted effort in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s to Russify the educational systems of union and autonomous republics. As one Russian educational official expressed it in
1963, "The conversion of elementary school children to Russian as the language of instruction is an important phenomenon in the sphere of education in our country and has enormous progressive significance. At present the process is at the beginning stage of its development..." Central authorities justified this measure as one dictated by objective laws of socio-economic development, and claimed that the atrophy of the non-Russian school system was a purely voluntary process. The former claim contained a grain of truth. A uniform school system conducted only in Russian would greatly facilitate economic centralization and control, especially as it would enhance the geographical mobility of Russian cadres. This point was made rather clearly in 1961 during the 22nd CPSU Congress which formally sanctioned the theory of the merging of nations. In Ukraine, Kravtsev, reiterating the conclusions of the Congress, called native-language development "attempts to isolate one nation from another by a language barrier" and this "nationalist prejudice" was linked to yet another, namely, "attempts to establish a nationally-closed economy." Russian, which "internationalizes" and makes "uniform the content of the cultures of the peoples of the USSR", was proposed as the antidote. As for the claim that Russification was a voluntary process, a writer in Ukrains'kyi visnyk refused to agree to this, saying, "This is not a spontaneous process, as the authorities attempt to explain it. It is consciously directed and stimulated..." The most ambitious "consciously directed" assault on the non-Russian language school system occurred under Khrushchev. It is worthwhile considering these policies and their reception in Ukraine as a small case-study of the impact of Moscow's directives on the Ukrainian-language school system.

In the autumn of 1958 Khrushchev unveiled his new "Seven-Year Plan", 
which promised to overtake America in numerous areas of economic performance and was heralded as a giant step in building the material prerequisites of communism. To meet such ambitious goals secondary education was to be reformed to make it more attuned to the requirements of the economy. The "production education" reform, as it was called, also proposed a dramatic reversal of policy on indigenous language instruction in the union republics. The nineteenth article of Khrushchev's education reform proposal affirmed the right of parents to choose whether their children ought to attend the Russian or the indigenous-language schools in the republic and that second-language instruction (in Russian schools Ukrainian, and in Ukrainian schools Russian) was to be made an optional subject. Only the second part of the thesis was new, since parents had always had the right to send their children to the school of their choice. In the course of the debate, and in authoritative articles following the passage of the school reform, it was made absolutely clear that Russian would remain a compulsory subject in Ukrainian-language schools. The real intent of the reform, therefore, was to drop Ukrainian-language instruction from the Russian school network. The problem was phrased as the unnecessary "overburdening" of pupils with subjects of no great importance. In view of the volume of propaganda unleashed at the time in favour of the Russian language as the only language opening the way for better educational opportunities and access to the treasury of technology and science, it was apparent that the development of the Russian school system in the republic was to be stressed. With parents encouraged to send their children to Russian-language schools, and Ukrainian disappearing as a compulsory subject in that school curriculum, the indigenous language was gradually to be relegated to the status of a historical relic. As an attack on Ukrainian-
language instruction, Khrushchev's proposal was without precedent in Soviet history.

In keeping with his demagogic style of leadership, Khrushchev allowed an "all-people" debate on his education reform to occur first. The position of the CPU as expressed publically (unofficial views are discussed below) was not to question the right of parents to choose in which language their children should receive instruction. Nor was there any question of downgrading the Russian-language network. The CPU leadership, however, was firm on two points: that Ukrainian must remain a compulsory subject in Russian-language schools in the republic and that the republic's jurisdiction over the public education system must be expanded. The CPU position was first expressed by P. Tron'ko, then a secretary of the Kiev obkom when Shelest was First Secretary of the oblast. Writing in the authoritative Komunist Ukrainy, Tron'ko insisted that concern "for the general educational and cultural level of young people in the conditions of our republic" demanded that "the learning of Russian, Ukrainian and one foreign language must remain compulsory in all schools." (Emphasis in original.) He also argued that the educational system must take into account the republic's specificity and that programmes should be developed in that light. When after six weeks of discussion the education reform was brought to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for ratification, the Ukrainian delegation clearly expressed its opposition to thesis 19. The strongest condemnation came from S. Chervonenko, a teacher by profession, candidate member of the CPU Presidium and secretary of the C.C. CPU's "department of culture and education." Speaking in the Council of Nationalities, Chervonenko claimed that the question of the study of languages in the schools of Ukraine had "attracted great attention during the public
discussion." The compulsory study of Ukrainian and Russian had to remain, he argued, and "any other formulation of the question, it seems to us, would be a retrograde step." Similar remarks were made by M.S. Hrechukha, full member of the CPU Presidium and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. Hrechukha also used the occasion to plead for a greater allocation of funds for the republic's public school system.

The reaction to thesis 19 was similarly reflected in the Soviet Ukrainian press. It is significant that not a single letter or comment in the twenty publications (including five central republican dailies) examined supported thesis 19. The opposition was spearheaded by teachers and pedagogues. The resolution of the Board of the Poltava Pedagogical Institute was typical of the sentiments expressed at the time:

> The Institute Board believes that on no account should the learning of the mother tongue be displaced in the national and autonomous republics. On the contrary, the role of the native language and literature should be expanded throughout the whole education system.

Prominent cultural figures and members of the Supreme Soviet of the republic also criticized thesis 19, as did many members of the general public. An effort was even made to stress the negative international implications of an adoption of the thesis; testimonials in defence of the Ukrainian language from East European authors were translated and published in the Soviet Ukrainian newspapers in the course of the discussion. The education debate was, in effect, the first mass public mobilisation of Ukrainian opinion since the Stalin period. There was little doubt that that opinion wished more to be done to enhance the Ukrainian language in the republic's schools, not less.

It appears that in various meetings and encounters not reported in the
official press, Ukrainian public opinion posed the question of native language in a much sharper manner. Kravtsev, writing shortly after the debate, admonished people for proposing that "their native language be written in their constitution as the official language". He also noted an "erroneous trend...to develop education according to nationality: children of Russians should allegedly study in Russian schools, Ukrainians in Ukrainian schools." He criticized those who wished to "force people who are not members of the indigenous nation to acquire a knowledge of the local language within a prescribed period while they are living in the republic." Lenin, when writing on Ukraine, pointed out "that all officials should know how to speak Ukrainian.../he did not/ say that all officials working in Ukraine have a duty to speak only Ukrainian," he concluded. (Italics in original.)

Opposition to thesis 19 was so widespread in Ukraine, and in all other union republics, that it had to be dropped from the education reform law which was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 24 December 1958. At the Supreme Soviet session both I.A. Kairov, former Minister of Education of the RSFSR and then President of its Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, and I. Ignatov, Presidium member of the CC CPSU, announced a compromise. The implementation of thesis 19 was to be left to each republic to resolve for itself. Moscow's tactic was to fight for the implementation of thesis 19 republic by republic. Republican leaderships that made the mistake of not including the equivalent of thesis 19 in their legislation suffered severe consequences. In Azerbaijan and Latvia, top party and state officials were purged.

Between the passing of the education reform minus thesis 19 by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the convocation of the Ukrainian body in April 1959, opposition to thesis 19 in Ukraine persisted. On 13 October
1959, a high-level conference of the republic's leading educational authorities, party officials and representatives from the CPSU was held in Kiev. No information on what transpired at the conference is available. The next day, however, a teachers' conference opened in the capital and all who attended the earlier conference arrived to inform the teachers what the policy would be. A highly edited stenographic report of the teachers' conference, which was later published in book form, made it clear that major opposition to the inclusion of thesis 19 in Ukraine's educational legislation was articulated on that occasion.

The teachers' conference was attended by M.P. Kuzin, head of the C.C. CPSU Department of Education and Science. In an authoritative explanation of what was expected of Ukrainian party leaders in the realm of language of education, he stressed the following points:

a) "Strict adherence" to the question of parental discretion in the choice of the school system to which to send their children;

b) The learning of Ukrainian in the Russian school system must "be offered on a strictly voluntary basis";

c) "If the second language is studied voluntarily then a poor mark obtained in this language must not be considered an impediment in passing the pupil to a higher grade." This point was reiterated twice by Kuzin, the second time with regard to admission into higher education.

The instructions that came from the C.C. CPSU were very clear in their intent: Ukrainian was to be considered an unimportant subject in the school curriculum.

In view of Kuzin's instructions, it was all the more significant that in a long address to the conference, I. Bilodid, Minister of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, gave no hint whatsoever that Ukrainian would be dropped as a compulsory subject from the Russian-language school system. In fact, most of his speech dealing with languages focussed on the need to improve instruction
in both Ukrainian and Russian. Moreover, the assembled delegates, in the presence of high-level officials from Moscow, also offered resistance. M. Ryl's'kyi, a well-known Ukrainian poet invited to speak to the conference, delivered a spirited defence of the Ukrainian language. It was reported that the conference delegates "spoke out very sharply on the question of the number of hours to be devoted to the study of the native language." The curriculum plans that were approved did not diminish the number of hours to be devoted to the study of Ukrainian in Russian-language schools. Demands were raised not only that additional hours should be given to the study of Ukrainian, but also an expanded number of hours should be allotted to programmes dealing with Ukrainian history, literature and geography.

When the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR met in April 1959, the question of language was not debated. The only speaker to address himself to the issue was Bilodid. He introduced a variant of thesis 19 which was adopted. The variant was noteworthy in that it stressed an improvement in the teaching of both Russian and Ukrainian. However, public and party opinion in Ukraine suffered a defeat in that the education law which was passed stated explicitly that in the Russian-language schools instruction in the Ukrainian language was to be an optional subject, to be taught only if there was sufficient student demand. In the Ukrainian-language network, Russian was to be a compulsory subject.

The passage of the law did not end the controversy, or resistance to the measure. A letter of seven pupils attending a secondary school in Uman' argued that although the Ukrainian language was taught in their school, they were unable to learn it properly, and called for "love and cultivation of the mother tongue". The letter caused something of a sensation in the republic.
when it was published in Рadians'ka osvita, the official organ of the Ministry of Education. Also in 1963 the All-Ukrainian Scientific Conference on the Cultivation of the Ukrainian Language, to which we have already referred, developed into an impressive demonstration on behalf of the Ukrainian language. Several speakers issued a strong condemnation of the Russification of schools, and former captain V.F. Lobko, whose address was repeatedly interrupted by applause said:

It looks as if these successors of Stalin and Kaganovich have some kind of special power, for even the resistance of the Ukrainian people has been unable so far to achieve a repeal of these criminals' interdictions; has been unable to obtain the simplest, most natural, yet dearest and most hallowed thing possessed by all the peoples of the world — the right to teach its children in their mother tongue in nurseries, kindergartens and schools.

As a concession to the intelligentsia, the problems confronting the Ukrainian language were allowed to be debated in the press. The debate opened on 21 March 1963 with an article by Bilodid in which a commitment was made to expand the special role of the spoken language. The educational system per se was not a topic in the debate. But concern for the purity of the language, voiced then and on subsequent occasions, invariably touched upon the educational system. Thus Oleksandr Il'chenko, a writer, suggested that teachers who spoke "a mixture of broken Russian with broken Ukrainian" ought to be dismissed. The teachers of Poltava city, for example, took a collective pledge to defend the purity of the language.

It was only with Shelest's arrival in power that direct reference to the language of instruction in the schools was made. Prior to then, the press silence on the question allowed for the assumption that Ukrainian had in
fact disappeared as a compulsory subject in the Russian-language school system. But subsequently it was made clear that de facto Ukrainian was a compulsory subject in Russian schools. This was admitted in an article by Alla Bondar, Shelest's Minister of Education who succeeded Bilodid. It appears as though all permanent residents of Ukraine with children in the Russian-language school system were obliged to study Ukrainian. Bondar also pointed out, "it is also noteworthy that children whose parents due to the nature of their occupation, are often compelled to change their place of residence and who come to Ukraine from other republics (military personnel, geologists, construction workers, etc), in a great majority of cases express a wish to study the Ukrainian language and successfully realize that wish. That is why in schools with Russian as the language of instruction there are practically no classes which would not study Ukrainian." A correspondent from the Crimea writing in 1965 claimed that Ukrainian, in an oblast where Russians were a majority of the population, was a compulsory subject.

Another issue which caused contention between the Ukrainian and central Party leaders was the rights of the republic in the field of education. With education left entirely in the hands of the republic (the Ministry of Education was a republican ministry), it appeared on the surface that republics had wide autonomy in this area. Their autonomy, however, was severely curtailed by the existence of the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. The Academy was a deceptive institution. As a research centre, it was certainly without parallel in the Soviet Union and internationally. Staffed by over 700 researchers, the institution was rightly called the "formulator of Soviet education plans." The Academy was, as the name implied, not organized on an All-Union basis, but was limited to the RSFSR.
It enjoyed, however, a quasi-official status in the Soviet governmental framework. It was the Academy that worked out, approved and published curriculum plans and textbooks for all the schools of the Soviet Union. Through its directorate dealing with nationalities, it in fact regulated the school system in the non-Russian republics. In Ukraine, curricula and textbooks were developed by local authorities only in the fields of Ukrainian language and literature, Ukrainian history and geography. All other subjects were centrally controlled through the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. In the course of the debate, the Ukrainian party leadership through the person of Chervonenko, speaking at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1958, let it be known that it was unhappy with this arrangement. Chervonenko sharply criticized the state of pedagogical sciences in the Soviet Union, attacking the statements of the members of the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences as "without foundation and unscientific," and demanded that the Academy be transformed into a Union-Republic institution. He claimed that branches of this Academy ought to be located in the Union republics so that the curricula of the republics could be developed according to "their specific needs." Given the crucial role of the Academy in the centralization of education, this demand in fact called for the decentralization of curriculum development. It should also be noted that the Ukrainian party leadership was among the strongest articulators of this demand in the educational debate.

The RSFSR Academy, called "the prime agency of Russification of the schools in Ukraine" by one Western author, remained as an RSFSR Academy until 1966. Ukrainian leaders failed in their efforts to expand their jurisdiction in the field of education. In 1966, however, the Academy was transformed into a Union-Republic institution. As a decentralizing measure this proved
very illusory, since at the same time education was taken out of a solely republican jurisdiction, and a Union-Republic ministry was created. The "centre" reinforced its grip over the curricula of the schools in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian party leadership and public opinion lost the struggle over education in the Ukrainian language at the post-secondary and at the elementary and secondary levels. The deteriorating position of the Ukrainian language in education was certainly not the result of some inner logic of social mobilisation. It reflected the dominance of the Russian apparatus. An analysis of Ukrainian-language books, newspapers and journals shows that their fate was also determined by political considerations.

In the post-war period the share of Ukrainian-language titles in the total number of books and brochures produced in Ukraine slipped from 61 per cent in 1945 to 45 per cent in 1950. After Stalin's death the situation improved. During the first two years of the sovnarkhoz reform (1958-9), when most of the enterprises located in Ukraine were under the jurisdiction of the republic's Council of Ministers, the share of Ukrainian language titles climbed to 60 per cent of the total. With the change in nationalities policy initiated by Khrushchev shortly before the 21st CPSU Congress – a change epitomized by his school reform – Ukrainian-language books plummeted to 49 per cent of the global output in 1960. With the fall of Shelest in 1972, the share of Ukrainian books in the total number of titles produced in the republic dropped a full nine per cent: from 39 in 1971 to a mere 30 per cent by 1975. The decline in the relative position of Ukrainian books was particularly accelerated in the case of scholarly titles. Looking at individual disciplines, it was only in the case of belles-lettres, agriculture, political and the social sciences that Ukrainian-language titles were a majority of the
### TABLE 4.27

**Share of Ukrainian Titles in the Total Number of Books and Brochures Published in Ukraine, 1946-75 (in per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ukrainian Language (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>2151</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>4136</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>4021</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>6618</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>8313</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>7486</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>8068</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>8731</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 4.28

**Share of Ukrainian Titles in Total Number of Scholarly Books Published in Ukraine, 1946-75 (in per cent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ukrainian Language (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1421</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>2373</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This was in keeping with the CPSU's policy to constantly minimize the role of non-Russian languages in scientific and technical literature.

Decision-making in and the financing of the publishing industry in the Soviet Union were highly centralized in the hands of the Moscow bureaucracy. Thus the deteriorating position of Ukrainian language titles was not a spontaneous process, but was the result of central initiatives. Shelest tried to change this. He upbraided V.V. Shcherbyts'kyi, then Chairman of Ukraine's Council of Ministers and Brezhnev's protégé, for not "allocating enough funds for various kinds of publishing activities and for the printing of books." Shcherbyts'kyi answered that "the allocation of funds here is centralized" [that is, came from Moscow]. Shelest called Shcherbyts'kyi an "ignoramous" who "just didn't want to work" harder to increase Ukraine's allocation.

Shelest himself made such an effort. In 1968, in a speech before a Kiev university student audience he said:

We must look more fearlessly into the future...
Work on perfecting educational plans, programmes and lecturing methods. It is necessary to take into consideration the requirements of the national economy, not just today, but five, ten years from now! The time has come to compile new textbooks which measure up to the contemporary scientific and technical levels. And most important of all, these must be published in the Ukrainian language. (Italics ours.)

Shelest appeared to have succeeded in increasing the output of textbooks in the Ukrainian language at the post-secondary level. In the year he gave his speech, 1968, only 17 per cent of such textbooks were published in the Ukrainian language. By 1969 this figure had almost doubled (30 per cent), and continued to increase steadily, reaching 40 per cent in 1972, the year of his ouster from office. His initiative was abandoned by the succeeding leadership,
and textbooks intended for higher education dropped to 19 per cent of total output by 1975.  

The sorry state of the Ukrainian-language book was a clear violation of the rights and preferences of the reading public in Ukraine. For example, in Melitopol', Zaporizhzhia oblast, local officials claimed that they were not ordering Ukrainian-language books because "readers were unenthusiastic" about them. Employees of the Ministry of Culture of the Ukrainian SSR who visited the Central City library to verify this allegation found that Ukrainian books "enjoy a great demand" and that some titles, such as novels by Petro Panch, "literally passed from hand to hand." A large survey of workers and engineering and technical employees in Donbas and loaders and chemical workers in Vinnytsia conducted in 1970 found that out of 743 who answered the questionnaire, 732 read books constantly. Of this total 474 were manual workers, 219 were specialists, and the rest represented diverse professions. The "best books of the year", according to the survey, and the most widely read were all Ukrainian-language titles. Moreover, "readers demonstrated good taste and exacting criteria in their selection...works of little artistic merit were ignored."  

Within the limits of censorship, a vigorous campaign was fought by the Ukrainian reading public on behalf of Ukrainian books during the latter half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s. In countless newspaper articles they attacked officials of the distribution system who were unwilling to fill orders for Ukrainian-language titles. The case of Vera Bondar, Director of the Kharkiv oblast book trade centre, provides an interesting insight into the politics of book distribution.
she decided to wage a relentless battle against the republic's publishing houses, and to close the door to the finest examples of Ukrainian literature to hundreds of thousands of readers....

At the Kharkiv oblast book trade centre...for example, 50 copies of a book are ordered by a bookstore. Comrade Bondar says her magic word, and the order drops to 20 copies....If a book comes out in Ukrainian and Russian, she makes a categorical statement, "We will take this book only in Russian". Discussion turned to O. Diachenko's monograph, "The National Character and Its Evolution". Comrade Bondar...shouted, "What heroes' character is this about? Ukrainians? Then this is nationalism...."

As part of the campaign for Ukrainian-language titles, a concerted effort was made to popularize them in the Russified cities of Donbas and Odesa, with considerable success. Restrictions on the allocation of funds for scientific titles in Ukrainian were also assailed. An effort was made to prove that "Ukrainian is quite adequate for conveying the most complicated scientific concepts." Proof came in the form of two pathbreaking works on cybernetics published in the Ukrainian language: O. Ivakhnenko's *Kibernetichni systemy z kombinovanum keruvanniam* (1963) (Cybernetic Systems in Automated Management) and the two-volume *Entsyklopediia kibernetiky* (1973) (Encyclopaedia of Cybernetics). These works, unique in the Soviet Union, could rightly be considered a major breakthrough in Ukrainian cultural and scientific life. The supply of books to Ukrainians living outside their republic was also undertaken. If this campaign did not succeed in achieving its goals, it was not because the Ukrainian reading public had not clearly demonstrated its preferences. In 1966 the mail order book service was receiving requests for not less than 20,000 copies of Ukrainian-language titles a day! But the CPSU had decided that in Ukraine:

The publication of books and brochures, newspapers and journals in the Russian language is growing too slowly and far from completely satisfying the growing demands of the population. And, of course, this means that the less readers are offered Russian-language literature,
the less they will be capable of mastering the Russian language.\textsuperscript{456}

The predicament of Ukrainian-language newspapers was somewhat more favourable than that of Ukrainian-language books.\textsuperscript{457} In 1971, for example, 70 per cent of all titles (excluding collective farm newspapers) and 68 per cent of total circulation was claimed by Ukrainian-language editions. \textit{\textsuperscript{458}}

Under Shelest a number of important developments occurred in Ukrainian-language newspaper publishing. The most notable was the establishment in 1972 of mass-circulation evening daily newspapers in the Ukrainian language in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovs'k. That the evening newspapers were published only in Ukrainian in those cities demonstrated the viability of the Ukrainian-language press in the seemingly Russified urban milieu.

The position of the Ukrainian-language press in the republic was far from satisfactory. Readers constantly complained about the unavailability of Ukrainian-language newspapers.\textsuperscript{459} Much of the discontent was focussed on Soiuzpechat', the all-Union agency which monopolized the distribution of periodical literature in the republic. This agency was accused of systematically discriminating against Ukrainian-language newspapers.\textsuperscript{460} Demands were raised for the republic to establish its own distribution network.\textsuperscript{461} Ukrainian newspaper editors, in particular at \textit{Robitnycha hazeta} (Workers' Newspaper), had to wage a battle with Russian officialdom for the right of access to their reading public. Workers in a Kiev shoe factory and in mine number 8 in Donets'k protested when factory management told them not to subscribe to \textit{Robitnycha hazeta},\textsuperscript{462} perhaps the most interesting newspaper published during the 1960s. In the Kherson Cellulose plant, to give another example, "Comrade Filippov, head of the plant party committee" refused to allow representatives of...
### TABLE 4.29

Share of Ukrainian-Language Newspapers in Total Number of Newspapers Published in Ukraine, 1946-75 (in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Titles</th>
<th>Ukr.Lang. (%)</th>
<th>Copies Per Issue (thousands)</th>
<th>Ukr.Lang. (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>3804</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>1192</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>4627</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>1020</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>5467</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>1319</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>7006</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>934</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>10034</td>
<td>68</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1114</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13802</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1231</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>20504</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1266</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>23747</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Does not include collective farm newspapers.


### TABLE 4.30

Share of Ukrainian Titles in Total Number of Journals Published in Ukraine, 1950-75 (in per cent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Ukrainian Language (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Robitnycha hazeta into the plant to discuss their newspaper with workers. Only a public outcry, from the workers themselves among others, overturned Filippov's decision. As concerns journals, during the period of the sovnarkhoz reform many new titles were established. But here again, judging from readers' complaints, demand far exceeded supply. /See table 4.30/

Throughout the 1960s Ukrainian public opinion waged a battle not only to increase the output of Ukrainian-language publications (and of Ukrainian-language radio and television programmes), but also for an improvement of their content and style. Some editors made an effort to make Ukrainian-language editions particularly interesting. Authors such as Hemingway, for example, were published in Vsesvit, the Ukrainian-language journal of world literature in translation, before being published in Russian: Vsesvit had to demand that its press run be increased to satisfy requests pouring in from Russia. The magazine Ukraina was another that partially succeeded in freeing itself from the constraints of bureaucratized journalism to become a very popular magazine in all regions of Ukraine, especially Dnipropetrovs'k and Donets'k oblasts. To understand its success it is helpful to quote from a 1971 newspaper article that attacked the magazine as part of a broader campaign to improve the ideological purity of the republic's press. Ukraina was accused of excessive concern for the purity of the Ukrainian language ("the language is littered with archaisms and far-fetched expressions"), of failure to "expose modern bourgeois nationalism," of carrying "ideologically dubious apolitical poems by Drach." "Seldom printing criticism of decadent bourgeois art," of writing "articles based on private impressions which lack the necessary socio-political interpretations," etc. Because of these "deviations" Ukraina managed to increase its circulation from 100,000 in
1966 to 300,000 by 1969.470

Ukrainians lost the struggle over Ukrainian-language education at the post-secondary, secondary and elementary levels. They were also defeated in their efforts to improve the status of the Ukrainian-language press. The deteriorating position of both was not the result of the inner logic of social mobilisation. Rather, it reflected the integrationist drive of the ruling Russian bureaucracy. The bureaucracy's policies generated tension in Ukrainian society, especially since they clashed with the claims and ambitions of a new political force - the Ukrainian party elite, whose emergence is our next theme.

vi. The party

The dismissal of Petro Shelest from his post as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine in May 1972 was a notable event in the history of the party. He was charged not merely with having failed to perform his job, but with having intentionally promoted a heretical tendency - Ukrainian nationalism - within the bosom of the party.471 An attitude of greater national self-assertiveness had penetrated the upper levels of the party leadership. One of the reasons for this development was the change that had occurred in the national composition of the CPU.

The Second World War was a watershed in the history of the CPU. During the war, in an effort to rally Ukrainians' support, strong appeals were made to their sense of national identity.472 The constitutional rights of the republic were also expanded, at least on paper.473 This concessionary policy reinforced a mood of self-confidence within the republic's leadership. Evidence
of this could be seen at the 1946 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet where Ukrainian leaders were vocal in demanding more funds for their war-torn country. Shortly thereafter, however, with the coming of Zhdanovshchina, sterner methods in dealing with the republic were introduced. Russian nationalism reached new heights and a campaign against Ukrainian cultural figures was launched. The bitterness and resentment that these new policies evoked within the Ukrainian leadership hovered beneath the surface. They emerged into the open when Stalin died.

During the Second World War, a new leadership within the CPU was being forged, the so-called "partisan clan". The background of this development was the evacuation of most CPU members to the east in the face of the rapid German advance. Only 15,000 members and candidate members remained in the territory of Ukraine. In October 1942, the Politburo decided to develop underground resistance to the German occupation and ordered the establishment of a clandestine party network. Between 1942 and 1944, illegal party committees had developed to such an extent that they included over 100,000 communists and Komsomol members. Since these people were described as those accustomed to local conditions, and since heavy recruitment took place in oblasts with small Russian populations (Central West, Poltava, Chernihiv), it seems that the majority of the membership was Ukrainian. Many future Ukrainian party leaders rose to prominence in this period: A.P. Kyrylenko, L.R. Korniiets', M.S. Hrechukha and others.

After the war, the party was in a perilous condition. Its membership had dropped from 680,000 in 1940 to less than 200,000 by July 1945. There were entire districts, especially in rural areas, without primary organizations. The 1943–4 purge of some of the members who had joined the party during the
underground period in what was an unsupervised recruitment merely added to the crisis. Between 1945 and 1949 the party increased its membership to 684,000. This rapid growth offered a major opportunity for Ukrainians' recruitment into the party.

The war had also left a major vacuum at the local leadership level. With the economy in ruin, the lack of competent cadres hampered its recovery. The demands for such personnel were so great that the transfer of cadres from Russia to Ukraine could not resolve the problem. Neither did periodic purges of local leaderships accused of incompetence offer much of a solution to the management problem. After these methods were tried and failed in 1947-8, a concerted effort was made to establish special party economic management training schools with the aim of dispatching graduates to posts in local party organizations. Since most of the students were locally recruited, this training programme played an important role in facilitating the promotion of Ukrainians to responsible positions within the apparatus.

The first post-war congress (the 16th in the history of the CPU) which met in January 1949 reflected the changes that had taken place in the organization since 1940. A third of the members had entered the party during the war; almost two-thirds had joined after 1945. White-collar staff (using the criterion of social origin) formed the largest contingent in the party - 43 per cent. Over a third of the membership had completed higher or secondary education. The only indication of the representation of Ukrainians within the CPU was data on the national composition of congress delegates: 61 per cent were Ukrainians, 36 per cent were Russian and 3.5 per cent belonged to other nationalities. Of the 119 members and candidate members elected to the Central Committee at the pre-war congress in 1940, only 21 were re-
Sixty per cent of the CC members were Ukrainian, a marked improvement over the estimated 40 per cent in 1940. At the summit of power, however, control was vested in the hands of Russians. Both the First Secretary (Khrushchev) and the Second (L.G. Mel'nikov) were Russians. Of the 13 full Politburo and Orgburo members, only 6 were Ukrainian. The contrast between the top leadership and those holding responsible positions beneath them was all the more marked in the light of data supplied by an unpublished Soviet dissertation. In 1951, according to that source, 71.4 per cent of "leading cadres" in the party (at all levels) were Ukrainian.

Stalin's death in March 1953 was timely — it saved the CPU cadres from a major purge being prepared in connection with the Jewish "doctors' plot". After Stalin's death, developments in the Ukrainian party leadership took a somewhat different course than those in the central Moscow leadership. Whereas uncertainty and an intense struggle for succession prevailed in Moscow, the party leadership in Ukraine was characterized by a process of consolidation. The most important event along that road was the June 1953 CC CPU plenum which dismissed Mel'nikov as head of the party on charges of having failed to provide leadership, allowing grave errors in the selection of cadres and in the implementation of the party's nationalities policy. Kyrychenko was appointed First Secretary, the first Ukrainian in the history of the CPU to occupy the post. The position of indigenous cadres in the top leadership was enhanced with Pidhornyi's promotion to the strategic post of Second Secretary in August 1953. Shortly after Khrushchev's appointment as First Secretary of the CPSU, the advance of Ukrainians to leading posts in the state apparatus was also accelerated. The 18th CPU Congress, held in March 1954, revealed the extent to which Ukrainians had penetrated into positions of leadership.
The turnover of Central Committee members was high: 40 per cent of those elected to the Central Committee at the 18th Congress were new to their posts. Among those who found their way into the Central Committee for the first time as candidate members were Shelest and Shcherbyts'kyi. The representation of Ukrainians in that body registered an impressive leap: from 62 to 72 per cent. In a major reversal of past practices, all eight full members of the Politburo were Ukrainian. Of the three candidate members, one was a Ukrainian. Not only were the first and second secretaries Ukrainian (Kyrychenko and Pidhoryi), but the other two Central Committee secretaries as well.

The 18th Congress saw the emergence of a new Ukrainian political elite, the first such elite to hold a decided majority of key posts in the republic. They were different from the preceding one not only by nationality, but also in their lack of political experience in the Donbas. It is not true, as Sullivant claims, that the nine full Politburo members and Secretaries of the Central Committee were "as far removed from the Ukrainians of the countryside as Communists sent from Russia". With one exception, all were born in the Ukrainian countryside, and six held their first positions of responsibility in a field of work connected with agriculture. Most (seven) were born in the oblasts of the Central West and North East in the first decade of this century, entered the party during the first five-year plan were trained as engineers or technicians, held minor appointments in the second half of the 1930s, and were promoted to positions of rank after the Second World War. The change in the geographical pattern of elite recruitment meant that the new elite was far more influenced by the Ukrainian fact than its predecessors from Donbas.
That Ukrainians achieved a monopoly of top positions in the party was a reflection of the transformations which had occurred in the social structure of the Ukrainian nation. It was also the result of new attitudes of the Moscow leadership towards the Ukrainian party. In Khrushchev's leadership bid, the Ukrainian party's support proved decisive. The support he obtained was a result of the fact that he, perhaps more than any other major figure in the CPSU Politburo at that time, recognized that the new national cadres in the republic had to be given a greater role in running their affairs. His attitude was epitomized by the theme that was developed in 1954 during the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty. For the first time, a note of partnership between Ukrainians and Russians was sounded. Ukrainians, it was claimed, along with Russians, "were the two great Slav peoples" of the Soviet Union. The partnership was not to be an equal one - Russians were described as the "leading nation" - but Ukrainians were singled out from among the other national groups for the role of associates in the building of the USSR. The new Ukrainian leadership was of course grateful for the trust shown them, but it also began, hesitantly at first, to demand a greater voice in managing the republic. The Ukrainian leadership, of course, did not question or challenge the unity of the Soviet Union. But it was increasingly caught in the cross-fire between the demands of the party centre for conformity and obedience, on the one hand, and its own political ambitions and the growing voice of the Ukrainian public for more autonomy on the other. Following the 18th Congress, the tension between the two poles characterized politics in the republic.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU initiated a new period for Ukraine and for Soviet nationalities policy in general. In the section of Khrushchev's
local bodies. Although global figures on the numbers transferred to Ukraine were never published, reports from the various economic regions indicate that the number was substantial. Moreover, the cadres from Moscow occupied many of the top positions in the sovnarkhozy. The transfers provoked opposition in Ukraine and the party in Ukraine had to be reminded that "In the selection and placement of personnel, remnants of nationalism show up in opposing personnel of the native nationality to personnel of another nationality, in the desire to select personnel according to nationality only." 511

In 1958 the first data on the national and social composition of the CPU were released, showing that the party counted 1.1 million full and candidate members. Half the total membership was the offspring of white-collar staff, 20 per cent came from working-class backgrounds and only 14 per cent from collective farm families. By occupation, two-thirds were employed as white-collar workers, 20 per cent as blue-collar workers and 14 per cent as collective farmers. Three-quarters of the CPU ranks had joined either during or after the Second World War. Ukrainians represented 60 per cent of the CPU membership, a three per cent drop when compared with the 1940 figure. This change was undoubtedly brought about by the addition to the republic, in 1954, of the Crimean oblast, where Ukrainians were a minority of the population, as well as by the influx of Russian officials in the wake of the sovnarkhoz reform. 512 Both factors were only a temporary setback in the Ukrainians' share of the total CPU membership, since in 1960, for example, 73 per cent of those accepted into candidate status were Ukrainians. 513

From the time of Mel'nikov's ouster in 1953 to the 19th Congress in 1956, the leadership of the CPU was a model of stability. After 1956, however, it witnessed changes in personnel and a shifting of forces under
the impact of various all-Union events. The CPU, one of the largest territorial organizations of the CPSU, played an important role in the factional struggles which characterized politics in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. Both Kyrychenko (in 1957) and his successor as First Secretary of the CPU, Pidhoryni (in 1963), were promoted to important positions in the CPSU Central Committee for their role in these conflicts. Pidhoryni's replacement was Shelest, who headed the Ukrainian party from 1963 to 1972.

The hegemony enjoyed by Ukrainians in the top leadership of the CPU under Kyrychenko and Pidhoryni continued under Shelest. In 1966, for example, 9 out of 11 full members and 4 out of 5 candidate members of the Politburo were Ukrainians. In 1971, 9 out of 10 full Politburo members and all five candidate members belonged to the indigenous nationality. According to a C.I.A. study, in 1964 out of 33 "top party officials" in the republic, 30 were Ukrainian. Grey Hodnett's comprehensive study of the leadership in both state and party sectors showed that over 75 per cent of "all leading jobs" between 1955 and 1972 were held by Ukrainians.

In examining the changes that occurred in party membership between 1958 and 1971, the first fact which should be noted is the exceptionally high rate of growth in the total numbers: from 1.1 million in 1958 to 2.5 million by 1971. In terms of the geographical distribution of the party ranks, Donbas and Dnipro were far from being the pre-eminent regions that they used to be. In 1971, every third member of the party resided in those regions. The Central West, because it contained the capital city, accounted for every fourth CPU member. Western Ukraine claimed over 13 per cent of the CPU total. Data on the social origins of the membership showed that the CPU became somewhat more proletarian between 1958 and 1971. Party members giving white-coll...
staff as their social origin declined from 49 to 42 per cent of the total between 1958 and 1971. /See table 4.31/ These figures, however, are misleading since they are not based on the occupation of individuals but on their origins. In 1971, over 43 per cent of the CPU ranks were specialists with higher or specialized secondary education. "Ukrainians by 1968 represented 65 per cent of the CPU membership /See table 4.32/ This was less than their share of the total population, but it approximated their position within the urban and educated sectors of society from which the CPU recruited most of its members.

After Stalin's death, national aspirations within the CPU took a qualitatively new form. The precondition for this development was the emergence of Ukrainians as the dominant group within the leadership and membership of the party. The central government's economic policies, which discriminated against Ukraine, intensified national feelings by adding socio-economic grievances to national antagonisms based on culture.

In the post-war period, Ukraine was the victim of what D. Solovei called the "scissors of colonialism". In every significant sector of industry, Ukraine's share of all-Union production declined, whereas Russia's share increased. Opposing discrimination in development policies, the CPU made efforts to gain control of Ukraine's economy. Even Khrushchev's sovnarkhoz reform, which gave Ukrainian leaders operational control of enterprises located on their soil, did not satisfy them. In 1957, for example, the CPU Central Committee passed a resolution demanding that the Ukrainian Gosplan, not the all-Union one, have responsibility for both "current and long-term plans" as well as control over the entire economic life of the republic. This was the strongest statement of republican economic autonomism ever made
### TABLE 4.31
Social Origins of the Membership of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 1958-71 (in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1971</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective farmers</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>17.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar staff</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>41.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full members only


### TABLE 4.32
National Composition of the Communist Party of Ukraine, 1958-68 (in per cent)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1958</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1968</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainians</td>
<td>60.3</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>65.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russians</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Full and candidate members.

by a CPU Central Committee. An irritated Ukrainian official in an article called the extensive re-centralization of economic power under Brezhnev "a very grave mistake.../that/should not have been allowed in a socialist economy." A good example of the mood of Ukrainian economic officials was provided by a Moscow samizdat report commenting on the recrudescence of Ukrainian nationalism. The employees of the Gosplan and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR kept insisting that their share of funds allocated for capital investment increased. They based their arguments on statistics showing Ukraine's high contribution to all-Union funds. "They declared bluntly that they were being robbed." I.S. Koropeckyj noted that "according to the statements of recent emigrants from the USSR, nationalism is particularly strong among the Ukrainian planners and managers who have an intimate knowledge of the economic discrimination against their republic." The "increasingly bitter criticism of the economic exploitation of Ukraine" which Shelest tolerated played a major role in bringing about his downfall.

A new Ukrainian political elite comprised of individuals with modern skills had come into being and found itself frustrated politically and economically by a hyper-centralized system which refused to recognize it as a force, or share power with it. Shelest, for example, could not even sanction the construction of a pedestrian underpass in Kiev without first having obtained permission from Moscow. The nationalism that this situation produced was new, the "result of the superimposition of new conflicts on top of old ethnic differences". The new elite attempted to consolidate its position. Under Shelest, for example, an attempt was made to "re-Ukrainize" the political apparatus by opposing the influx of non-Ukrainian cadres into the republic. The new elite sought its own ideology to justify its claims
and found sources of legitimacy in its own unique national heritage.\textsuperscript{533}

In May 1972 Shelest was purged. The charges brought against him, published eleven months later, were very revealing. He was accused of misinterpreting the Soviet federal system, promoting "elements of economic autarkism", failing to acknowledge nationalist deviations in the CPU and Ukrainian cultural circles during the 1920s, idealizing Ukrainian cossacks, ignoring the positive influence of Russian culture on Ukrainian culture and education and of other similar sins.\textsuperscript{534} In a clear reference to Shelest, the new party leader Shcherbyts'kyi admonished those standing "on the side of reactionary nationalist philistinism"; speaking of economic integration he said that "anyone who would attempt to hold this back, to take the path of national seclusion, would inflict grave damage to the goal of communist construction."\textsuperscript{535} At the April 1975 plenum of the CPU Central Committee Shcherbyts'kyi criticized "the unprincipled tolerant attitude on the part of individual leading cadres toward manifestations of national limitedness and localism."\textsuperscript{536}

Shelest's removal was engineered by the Brezhnev leadership and occurred at a time when the Moscow centre introduced new centralist initiatives.\textsuperscript{537} What is significant is that Shelest's position was supported by virtually the entire Ukrainian apparatus. His ouster was backed by only three of the twenty-five oblast first chairmen. The purge that followed Shelest's fall was the most thorough since Stalin's time. At the regional, city and district levels a quarter of the secretaries responsible for ideology were replaced.\textsuperscript{538} Every major institution in Ukraine was affected by the purge.\textsuperscript{539} With the fall of Shelest, autonomism as a movement within the CPU suffered a major setback. But since the conditions that gave rise to it have not changed, its re-
emergence within the CPU remains part of the historical agenda.

vii. **Dissidents: A summary profile**

In Ukraine there emerged during the 1960s a "spontaneous, multiform, widespread, self-originating" movement of "national self-defence." This movement articulated its own democratic vision of society which included broad cultural, political and economic rights for the republic. When the regime attempted to intimidate and silence this new voice, the movement offered resistance, and a new phenomenon surfaced: dissent and dissidents.

A socio-economic profile of individuals involved in dissent can contribute towards an understanding of the relationship between social mobilisation and national consciousness. If dissidents were drawn from sectors of society closely identified with modernity, then this would be evidence that social mobilisation far from weakening a separate identity, may have played a role in enhancing it.

A dissident is here defined as any individual who expressed disapproval of the existing regime or of one of its policies or actions in a public way, be it by signing a petition, authoring or circulating *samizdat*, writing a letter of protest or complaint, participating in unofficial gatherings such as discussion groups or demonstrations, writing slogans in public places or similar actions. The chief characteristic of the form of public activity was that it went beyond official forums and was perceived by authorities as breaking their norms of permissible behaviour. Our investigation was limited to the territory of Ukraine; former residents of the republic involved in dissident activity outside the boundaries of Ukraine were not included. By limiting our sources to
the major documents of the Ukrainian dissident movement and the Moscow Khronika tekushchikh sobytii (Chronicle of Current Events), ours is not a comprehensive analysis of individuals involved in dissent activity in the republic. Religious movements, for example, were inadequately covered by these sources. The analysis does, however, provide fairly complete information on the Ukrainian national current, as well as the human rights movement. Our sources covered the period from 1960 to 1972. However, since the bulk of our information was contained in issues of the samizdat journals Ukrains'kyi visnyk and the Khronika, and since these publications were initiated only in 1970 and 1968 respectively, the study can be said to focus on individuals active in the dissident movement from 1969 to 1972. All in all we collected information on 975 individuals, which is a large sample.542

By nationality, 77.2 per cent of dissidents were Ukrainian, 0.5 per cent were Russians, 9.9 per cent belonged to other nationalities (mostly Jews and Crimean Tatars) and the nationality of 12.4 per cent of our total sample of 975 was impossible to determine. Bearing in mind that almost 20 per cent of the total population in the republic was Russian, and their representation in the urban population was higher, Russians were clearly under-represented among dissidents. Since the Moscow Khronika was also used as a source of information, Russians participating in the movement for human rights in Ukraine ought to have appeared in the sample. It is therefore unlikely that the source base biased the results. We can only conclude that as a relatively privileged group in the republic, Russians were less likely to engage in protest activity.

The place of residence of the individuals allows an insight into the geographical distribution of dissidents in the republic. Information on this
question was available for 774 cases. The single largest contingent came from the city of Kiev - 283 or 38 per cent. All of the oblasts of Western Ukraine taken together contributed 38.4 per cent of the total. The South contributed 86 individuals, Dnipro 42 and Donbas only 7. Dissent in Ukraine was very much an urban phenomenon. It was possible to identify the type of residence (city or village) in the case of 626 individuals. Of this total, 89 per cent lived in urban centres and 11 per cent in the countryside. The lion's share of dissidents was claimed by two cities: Kiev, 293 and L'viv, 190. In the 1960s these cities emerged as the focal points of the Ukrainian national revival. Other urban centres that figured in dissent activity were: Dnipro, 34; Kharkiv, 24; and Odesa, 21.

Examining dissidents from the point of view of the official Soviet characterizations of social class, it is evident that the opposition in Ukraine came from the socially mobilised sectors of society. Our sample here includes 656 individuals identifiable by class: 86 per cent were white-collar staff, 13 per cent were workers, and only 1 per cent were collective farmers. As for occupation, the largest single contingent was formed by the scientific and technical intelligentsia - 146; in fact there were as many research scientists involved in protest activity (55), and almost as many engineers (52), as there were writers and poets (55). The sample of 675 identifiable by occupation was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>scientists and technicians</td>
<td>146 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>creative intelligentsia (writers, poets, literary critics, visual and performing artists)</td>
<td>112 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elementary and secondary school teachers</td>
<td>98 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social scientists</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>workers</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lawyers</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clergy</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>managers (of enterprises or institutions)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>journalists</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>military</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted that the largest contingent among the workers was formed by skilled workers (78 per cent).

Detailed data on the level of educational achievement of dissidents were available for 220 individuals. The results showed that this was a highly educated group: 97 per cent had some post-secondary education. Of this total, 37 had reached the rank of candidate of sciences, 12 held the title of doctor of sciences.

Many issues were raised by dissidents. These, however, could be grouped into two general categories: national and human rights. Of the total sample of 975, 641 individuals protested limitations of the cultural, political and economic rights of Ukraine. Human rights were raised by 464 individuals. In a significant number of cases (400), the two overlapped.

**Conclusion**

Developments in Ukrainian society in the post-war period were highly contradictory. The Russian population of the republic increased substantially, creating an environment promoting the assimilation of Ukrainians. That increase was also instrumental in bringing about a crisis in the social
mobility of Ukrainians. A hierarchical cultural division of labour crystallized, contributing to the rise of a reactive Ukrainian nationalism. The integrationist and assimilationist policies of the Russian leadership succeeded in eroding the sense of national identity of some. But because this integration was on unequal terms, Ukraine's exploitation provoked national outrage in many more. Centralization was designed to unify the Soviet Union under Russian hegemony; but by trampling on the ambitions of the new Ukrainian elite it succeeded in making that elite "more Ukrainian than Soviet", in the words of Hélène Carrère d'Encausse. Every thesis, in time, produces its antithesis, as every Soviet citizen who has studied dialectical materialism knows. The Soviet leadership appeared to have forgotten that basic law.

The Soviet leadership chose repression as a means to resolve the tensions that their policies produced in Ukraine. Far from demonstrating the strength and stability of the existing regime, their move revealed a fundamental weakness. Repression can only succeed temporarily. There are historical factors stronger than the will of the most resolute First Secretary of the CPSU. Valentyn Moroz, standing defiant at his 1970 trial, made reference to them when he said: "You close your eyes and pretend there is no problem...What them? The new processes in Ukraine (and in the entire USSR) are just beginning. The Ukrainian renaissance has not yet become a mass movement. But do not expect that it will always be so. In the epoch of universal literacy, when in Ukraine there are 800,000 students and everyone has a radio, every socially significant phenomenon takes on mass proportions. Are you really not able to understand that soon you will be dealing with a mass social movement?"
Notes


8. Ibid., 106.

9. Maksym Sahaydak, comp., The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8: Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR (Baltimore, 1976), 62. This is a translation of the Ukrainian samvydav (samizdat) journal Ukrain's'kyi visnyk.


15. The average annual rate of growth of Russians in Ukraine was: 16,800 between 1897 and 1926; 110,000 between 1926 and 1939; 150,000 between 1939 and 1959; 185,000 between 1959 and 1970. Table 4.1. The addition of the Crimea in 1954 to Ukraine played an important role in increasing the Russian population of the republic. In 1959 there were 860,000 Russians in the Crimea. Perepis' 1959, vol.2, table 54, 178.


19. Birth rates in Ukraine were 20.9 births per 1,000 people in 1959 and 14.7 per 1,000 in 1969. Naselenie SSSR. (Chislennost', sostav i dvizhenie naseleniia.) 1973. Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1975), 71.


23. Ukraine's death rate increased from 7.5 per 1,000 people in 1959 to 8.6 per 1,000 in 1969. The natural rate of increase of the population dropped from 13.4 per 1,000 people in 1959 to 6.1 in 1969. Naselenie SSSR, 71.


   In the Ukrainian SSR mortality among those between the ages of 35 and 44 increased between 1959 and 1969. Infant mortality was declining throughout most of the 1960s, but from 1969 on it began to climb, increasing 16 per cent between 1970 and 1974. Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrain's'koi RSR 1974, 20-1. Later issues of Narodne hospodarstvo, as indeed all Soviet statistical handbooks, stopped publishing statistics on the above questions. Abortions in Ukraine increased 300 per cent between 1956 and 1966, seriously damaging the health of many women. See Steshenko and Piskunov, "Pro suchasne vidtvorenna naselennia," 151 for a rare discussion of this question.

25. See Naulko, Etnichnyi sklad, table 14,85; Belova, Skol'ko detei, table 13,45; G.A. Bondarskaia, Rozhdaemost' v SSSR. (Etnodemograficheskii aspekt) (Moscow, 1977), 28.

   Presumably Ukrainians had higher death rates because of the effects of collectivization and World War II. Soviet scholarship registers the fact of Ukrainians' higher death rates without discussing its causes.
26. In terms of the rate of increase of its Russian population Ukraine ranked eighth among the other 14 republics. Other titular nationalities, especially in Central Asia, despite a major influx of Russians, managed to maintain and even increase their representation in their republic's population because of their uncommonly high birth rates.


32. On the debate whether migration is planned by authorities or results from spontaneous decisions of individuals see: V.I. Perevedentsev, Metody izuchenia migratsii naseleniia (Moscow, 1975), 101-2.


35. Osnovnye problemy ratsional'nogo ispol'zovaniia trudovykh resursov v SSSR (Moscow, 1971), 317.


37. Onikienko and Popovkin, Kompleksnoe issledovanie, 14.


40. We have regrouped Ukraine's twenty-five oblasts into six major regions following the system used by Roman Szporluk, "Russians in Ukraine and Problems of Ukrainian Identity in the USSR," in Ukraine in the Seventies, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj, (Oakville, Ont., 1975), 202. Donbas consists of two oblasts: Donets'k and Voroshylovhrad; Dnipro:Dniproprovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kirovohrad; North East: Kharkiv, Poltava and Sumy; Central West: Kiev, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia and Khmel'nyts'kyi; West: L'viv, Rovno,
Ternopil', Ivano-Frankivs'k, Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi; South: Odesa, the Crimea, Kherson and Mykolaiv oblasts.

41. Onikienko and Popovkin, Kompleksnoe issledovanie, 36.

42. See also Naselenie i trudovye resursy Donbassa (Kiev, 1977), 71; A.F. Zahrobs'ka, "Mizhrepublikans'kyi balans mihratsii naselennia Ukrain's'koi RSR. (Metodyka skladannia ta osnovni resul'taty)," Demohrafichni doslidzhennia, vypusk 2, 1971, 185-6.

43. See Naulko, Ethnichnyi sklad, 85-6; Raisa Moroz, "Z zhyttia natsional'nykh menshostei Ukrainy: hreky," Suchasnist', no.12, 1980, 75-9. One should note that not all of Ukraine's non-Russian minorities exhibit the same tendency regarding assimilation into a Russian identity. Poles, for example, tend to assimilate to a Ukrainian identity.


46. These are discussed by Stephen Rapawy, "Linguistic Shift among Ukrainians in the Ukraine since Stalin," Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1977, 47-8.


48. V.A. Shpiliuk, Mezhrespublikanskaia migratsiia i sblizhenie natsii v SSSR (Lviv, 1975), 150.

49. L.V. Chuiko, Braki i razvody. (Demograficheskoe issledovanie na primere Ukrainskoi SSR) (Moscow, 1975), 75.

50. In 1959, 26 per cent of all urban marriages in Ukraine were mixed. In the city of Kharkiv, where Russians form a higher percentage of the population than in most other cities of Ukraine, 48 per cent of all marriages were between members of different national groups. Shpiliuk, Mezhrespublikanskaia migratsiia, 150 and Z. Sokolyns'kyi, "Demohrafichni doslidzhennia sotsialistychnoho mista," Ekonomika Radians'koi Ukrainy, no.2, 1969, 89.


52. Since immigration beyond the borders of the Soviet Union plays an insignificant role in the demographic processes of Ukrainians, it is possible to estimate the size of Ukrainians' assimilation in the USSR. Comparing the results of the 1959 and 1970 censuses with the figure that would have resulted from the rate of natural increase we arrive at a
deficit of 445,000 Ukrainians. Approximately 86.5 per cent of all Ukrainians between 1959 and 1970 resided in the Ukrainian SSR. Assuming that Ukrainians assimilated in equal proportions both in and out of their republic we arrive at a figure of 385,000. Studies, however, have shown that Ukrainians found outside the borders of their republic assimilate at a much faster rate than those who remain at home. It is therefore unreasonable to assume that approximately half of the total deficit of 445,000 was accounted for by Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR.


53. The under-employment of the population is discussed by: P.V. Voloboi and V.A. Popovkin, Problemy terytorial'noi spetsializatsii i kompleksnoho rozvytku narodnogo hospodarstva Ukrains'koi SSR (Kiev, 1972), 86-8; A.F. Zahrobs'ka, "Dynamika ta sklad naselennia Kyiv's'koho ekonomichnoho raionu," in Pytannia sotsialistichnoyi ekonomiky ta istorii narodnoho hospodarstva, ed. M.V. Drahana (Kiev, 1963), 182. On the question of unemployment see Radians'ka Ukraina, 7 June 1966; M.O. Kovtoniuk, "Mihratsii naselenia ta ikh vplyv na liudnist' sil's'kykh naselenykh punktiv Rovens'koi oblasti," Ekonomichna heohrafiia, vypuske 3, 1968, 15. A study of three towns in Rovno oblast found that 13 per cent of the able-bodied population was unemployed.


55. V. Malanchuk, "Dvi kontseptsii mynuloho i suchasnoho Ukrainy," Zhovten', no.5, 1972, 117 mentions that half the labour force sent to develop the virgin lands between 1960 and 1964 were Ukrainians. Alec Nove, An Economic History of the USSR (London, 1970), 331 estimates that as many as 300,000 people migrated to the virgin lands. According to P. Kovalenkov,"Pro polippshennia vykorystannia trudovykh resursiv," Ekonomika Radians'koi Ukrainy, no.6, 1963, 83, between 1946 and 1962, 88,000 families from Ukraine were resettled beyond the boundaries of their republic and 810,000 individuals were sent to other republics by organized labour recruitment agencies.


57. Data collected for Cherkasy oblast in 1968 showed that for every person leaving the oblast for Kazakhstan, two former residents of Cherkasy were returning home from the republic. O.T. Dibrova, ed. "Cherkas'ka oblast'," Ekonomichna heohrafiia, vypuske 11, 1971, 12. It was in 1966 that a large movement of people returning to Ukraine from Kazakhstan began. See Zahrobs'ka, "Mizhrepublikans'kyi balans," 190.

58. V.V. Pokshishevskyi, V.V. Vorobyev, Ye.N. Gladysheva, V.I. Perevedentsev,

59. The number of people migrating beyond the republic under the auspices of O.N.R. declined from 40 per cent of the total of migrants sponsored by O.N.R. between 1959 and 1962 to 16 per cent between 1967 and 1970. In the case of the planned resettlement of families the decline was from 54 to 19 per cent for the respective dates. A.F. Zahrobs'ka, "Deiaki aspekty doslidzhenia vplyvu migratsii na vidtvorennia naselelnia URSR," *Demohrafichni doslidzhennia*, vypusk 3, 1975, table 4, 67.


62. In 1970, 52 per cent of Ukrainians in the republic inhabited the Central-West and Western regions.

63. See S.O. Volos and S.I. Ishchuk, "Problemy terytorial'noho planuvannia narodnoho hospodarstva v Ukrains'kii RSR," *Ekonomichna heohrafiia*, vypusk 17, 1971, 3-4 for the period when a major effort was made in regional economic development. One should add that the economists around the journal *Ekonomichna heohrafiia* waged a concerted campaign on the pages of that publication for the development of the Central-West and Western regions.

64. The regional distribution of capital investment in all branches of the economy (except for collective farms) between 1965 and 1970 was as follows (in per cent):

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>1965</th>
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<td>Donbas</td>
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<td>Dnipro</td>
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<td>North East</td>
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<td>Central West</td>
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<td>West</td>
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<td>South</td>
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68. The most significant industrial development in the Central West and Western regions was the location of machine-building and metal-work plants. This sector of industry by 1972 employed 35 per cent of the industrial work force. Almost 20 per cent were employed in light industry, and 14 per cent in the food industry. M.M. Palamarchuk, V.I. Pila and D.N. Steshenko, Problemy razvitiia i razmeshcheniia proizvoditel'nykh sil lugo-zapadnogo raiona (Moscow, 1976), 23. For a comprehensive ranking of Ukraine's oblasts according to level of economic development see: M.M. Palamarchuk, Ekonomichna heohrafiia Ukrain's'koi RSR (Kiev, 1975), table 26, 250; B.F. Kudina, "O vzaimosviaziakh urovnei lokalizatsii promyshlennosti i gorodskogo naseleniia," Ekonomicheskaia geografiia, vypusk 30, 1981, 45.


75. Narodne hospodarstvo 1964, 9; Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrain's'koi RSR. Statystychnyi zbirnyk (Kiev, 1957), 7.

76. Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrain's'koi RSR (1957) and Perepis' 1959, vol.2,
table 5, 16.

77. Leontii Forostivs'kyi, Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy (Buenos Aires, 1952), 43.

78. Ukrains'kyi statystychnyi richnyk na rik 1934 (Warsaw, 1934), 26-7; Perepis' 1959, vol.2, table 54, 18-5.

79. Between 1933 and 1959, in the city of Luhans'k (Voroshylovhrad), one of the largest centres in the Donbas, Ukrainians dropped from 60 to 48 per cent of the population. In the city of Kharkiv between 1939 and 1959 the representation of Ukrainians remained stable – 48 per cent. In the Dnipro region, however, in the two major industrial cities of Dnipropetrovs'k and Zaporizhzhia, the proportion of Ukrainians between 1933 and 1959 rose from 48 to 69 and 56 to 61 per cent respectively. Tabulated from S.V. Kosior, "Results and Immediate Tasks," 43-5; The USSR in Figures 1935 (Moscow, 1935), table 3, 221-3; Kurman and Lebedinskiii, Naselenie, table 73, 122; Karta suchasnogo etnichnoho skladu naselennia Ukrains'koi RSR (Moscow, 1966).


81. Partiine kerivnytstvo rozvytkom promyslovosti, 189; Ekonomika Sovetskoi Ukrainy, 146-8; 323-6; Kudlai, Robitnychyi klas, 62.

82. Kudlai, Robitnychyi klas, 61; V.I. Kiselev, "Vsenarodniaia pomoshch' v vosstanovlenii Donbassa v 1943-1945 gg.,” in Rabochii klass i industrial'noe razvitie SSR (Moscow, 1975), 379-87.

83. Iu.I. Pitiurenko, Rozvytok mist i mis'ke rozselennia v Ukrains'kii RSR (Kiev, 1972), 50.


85. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let. Iubileinyi statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow, 1977), 41-4.


90. Natsional'nyi dokhod Ukrains'koi RSR v period rozhornutoho bud'vnytstva komunizmu (Kiev, 1963), table 33, 151. This was the first study of a union republic's national income to be carried out in the USSR. The study was the result of the cooperative efforts of a large team of economists from Ukraine's Academy of Sciences, Derzhplan (Gosplan) and the Ministry of Finances.

91. Ukraine's share of the USSR's capital investment during the 1950s was 15.8 per cent whereas during the 1960s it was 14.6 per cent. Between 1965 and 1970 Ukraine's net material/social/ product, the most aggregate official economic indicator grew by 38 per cent, the figure for the USSR as a whole was 43 per cent. Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1974, 53,520; Narodne hospodarstvo 1974, 29,375.


94. Pravda Ukrainy, 30 April, 1970.

95. The most comprehensive discussion of this question is by A.G. Vishnevskii and V.S. Steshenko, "K voprosu o prognozirovanii migratsii," Demograficheskie tetradi, vypusk 1, 1969, 69-86.


98. Among the 15 titular nations of the USSR Ukrainians ranked fifth in the rate of urbanization in both 1959 and 1970.

The calculation of the national composition of the individual towns in Ukraine poses major difficulties for the researcher. The only readily available data are for the cities of Kiev, Sevastopol and Kharkiv in 1959, and Kiev in 1970. The only published source giving the ethnic composition of individual urban settlements in Ukraine is a map based on the 1959 census returns prepared by V.I. Naulko. (Karta suchasnoho etnichnoho skladu naselennia Ukrains'koi RSR). This map denotes the national composition of urban settlements by using grid squares coloured to represent the different nationalities inhabiting the settlement in percentage terms. Using the map we identified almost 800 individual towns. Using other sources it was possible to assign numerical weights to the percentages. We were able to obtain precise nationality data for all towns in Ukraine with a population over 20,000. Towns under 20,000 presented some difficulty. The problem here lay in that the map identified 649 out of 936 towns with a population under 20,000. In some cases one grid square covered several towns. Thus the data we give for towns under 20,000 represents an average based on a 70 per cent sample. An additional difficulty lay in that the map, although using data obtained from the 1959 census, was based on administrative divisions as they stood in 1966. Various oblast maps, volumes of Istoriia mist i sil, and Ukrains'ka RSR. Administratyvno-terytorial'nyi podil had to be used to identify towns that had either changed their names or had amalgamated with other centres. Finally, the map did not use the same system of town classification (according to size) as the census. To facilitate the collection of data we used a modified version of the census categories for the purposes of the tables.

Tabulated from Perepis' 1959, vol.II, table 54, 174-91; Perepis' 1970, vol.IV, table 8, 170-91. One should note that it is impossible to establish the sources of urban population growth according to nationality.

Shpiliuk, Mezhrespublikanskaia migratsiia, 150.


Demograficheskoi razvitie, diagram 22, 175.


Demograficheskoi razvitie, table 85, 168.

Onikiienko and Popovkin, "Heohrafiia mihratsii naselennia," 33.


Onikiienko and Popovkin, Kompleksnoe issledovanie migratsionnykh protsessov, 39-43; Naulko, Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei, table 8, 78.


111. Kyiv (Kiev, 1975), 23.


113. This idea is developed by Wsevolod Isajiw, "Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Ukraine," Canadian Slavonic Papers, no.1, 1980, 58-66.


115. See for example The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8, 66-8, 95.


117. Shpiliuk, Mezhrespublikanskaia migratsiia, table 6, 107.


119. Demograficheskoe razvitie, 169-70.

120. Onikienko and Popovkin, Kompleksnoe issledovanie, 43.


123. Iakuba, "Masshtaby ta osnovni napriamy mihratsii," 32.


132. Ibid., 14-5, 18, 32.


137. Ibid.


141. Naulko, Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei, table 22, 146. The survey results that we cite here and below were gathered during ethnographic expeditions during the 1960s.


147. Naulko, Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei, table 22, 146.


149. V.I. Kozlov, "Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR. (K metodologii issledovaniia)," Sovetskaia etnografiia, no.2, 1969, 64.

150. Naulko, Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei, table 21, 142-4.


152. Naulko, Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei, table 22, 146.


154. Sotsial'noe i natsional'noe (Moscow, 1977), 29.


162. Ibid. In the case of the Crimea, there was an 8.2 per cent difference between the two indices.


164. Ibid., 116. See also V.V. Poshishevskii, "Etnicheskie protsessy v gorodakh SSSR i nekotorye problemy ikh izucheniiia," *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4, 1969, 5.


166. A.I. Kholmogorov, "International Traits of Soviet Nations (Based on Data of Concrete Sociological Research in the Baltic Area)," *Soviet Sociology*, no. 2, 1973, 52.


173. Ibid.


180. V.V. Mironov, *Kul'tura i pobut hirnykov Radians'koi Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1965), 95.


182. A.P. Ponomar'ov, *Suchasna sim'ia i simeinyi pobut robitnykov Donbasu* (Kiev, 1978), 138. See also Kul'turno-bytovye protsessy na iuge Ukrainy (Moscow, 1979); *Material'naia kul'tura kompaknykh etnicheskikh grupp na Ukraine*. Zhilishche (Moscow, 1979)


184. Alla Hors'ka, who emerged as one of Ukraine's leading activists in the national-cultural revival of the 1960s, did not know Ukrainian until 1964. She and several others who participated in the national revival took private Ukrainian language lessons. See "Interv'iu z Nadiieiu Svitlychnoiu. Alla Hors'ka i shistdesiati roky v Ukraini," *Dialoh*, no.5-6, 1981, 3-27.


188. Arutunian, "Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie natsional'nykh otnoshenii," 137.

189. This question is explored by Borys Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953-1979 (Edmonton, forthcoming)


191. I. Kravtsev, Sbližhenie sotsialisticheskikh natsii v protsessse perekhoda k kommunizmu (Kiev, 1960), 81. See discussion below on personnel transfers during the sovnarkhoz reform.


193. The old and new constitutions of the Ukrainian SSR mention the right of its citizens to use their "native language and the language of other nations of the USSR." Radians'ka Ukraina, 21 April 1978.

194. Nasha kul'tura, no.3, 1965, 5. The conference, it was reported, "created an interest among the public of the capital city. The main hall of the university could not hold all the persons seeking admission. During the discussions there were lively exchanges of ideas...The participants expressed the need to hold such conferences on a regular basis." Literaturna Ukraina, 26 February 1963.


198. Ibid., 11.


201. Radians'ka kul'tura, 29 February 1963.


204. See Naulko, Razvitie mezhnicheskikh sviazei, table 21, 142-3; Guboglo, "Ethnolinguistic Processes," table 1, 46.
205. **Perepis' 1970**, vol.4, table 32, 360. Half the total Ukrainian population of the USSR was unilingual.


207. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, 7-8. See Hechter, 15-43 for a review of Western literature. The impact of industrialization on international integration in the USSR is described by Soviet theorists in virtually the same terms, often using the same vocabulary as Western structural-functionalists. See examples of this in: Stanovlenie sovetskogo naroda i razvitie sotsialisticheskikh natsii (Kiev, 1978), 53-131; M. Kulichenko, Ukreplenie internatsional'nogo edinstva sovetskogo obshchestva (Kiev, 1976), 59-83.


211. Throughout the 1960s only one volume on sociology appeared in Ukraine: Sotsiolohiia na Ukraini (Kiev, 1968). See Sotsiolohichni doslidzhennia, vypusk 2, 1971, 2. The former title is considered the first issue of the latter series.


213. S.L. Seniavskii, *Rost rabochego klassa SSSR (1951-1964 g.g.)* (Moscow, 1966), table 16, 223.


219. Ibid., table 4, 34,38.


221. See James R. Millar, ed., The Soviet Rural Community: A Symposium (Chicago, 1971)


223. I. Gordiev, "The Ukrainian Economy," unpublished manuscript. (Deposited at the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Canada.)


225. In 1966 it was announced that the trudoden' system of remuneration in collective farms was to be abolished and collective farms were to change to a system of wage payment similar to that which existed in state farms. Since it took some time before the new system was implemented, for the purposes of this study, which deals with Ukrainian society until 1970, we will omit a discussion of the new wage system. For an analysis of remuneration on collective farms prior to 1966 see: F.G. Kysil', "Dosvid perekhodu na hroshovu oplatu pratsi kolhospnykiv," in Pytannia sotsialistichnoi ekonomiky ta istorii narodnoho hospodarstva (Kiev, 1963), 156-61. The post-1966 period is discussed in Ekonomika sel'skogo khoziaistva, no.1, 1969, 7.

226. Gordiev, "The Ukrainian Economy."

227. See Iu. V. Arutiunian, Opyt sotsiologicheskogo izucheniia sela (Moscow, 1968), table 7, 95.


229. Gordiev, "The Ukrainian Economy."

230. Vseobshchee obuchenie, 11.

231. Perepis' 1970, vol. 3, table 1, 54-77. Whereas Ukraine had 19 per 1,000 people between the ages of 20-9 with higher education, Russia had 31 per 1,000.


236. See veiled accounts of work stoppages in agriculture in Pravda, 10 July 1978; Komsomol'skaia pravda, 5 September 1972.


238. Lewytzkyj, Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine.

239. Ibid. and Pravda, 2 September 1956.


241. Some of these are analysed by M. Holubenko, "The Soviet Working Class," Critique, no. 4, 1975, 10-18.


245. Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR 1973, 376. Included in the working class are junior service personnel. The number of workers as presented in the census volumes is larger than the figure given in the statistical manuals.

246. The practice of excluding collective farmers from membership in the working class makes no sense from a methodological or theoretical point of view. Their exclusion is justified by Soviet statisticians on the basis that collective farmers formally own their means of production. This ownership criterion, which does not apply to the land itself, is fictitious. The administration of collective farms is in no way different from that of any other Soviet enterprise, that is, neither have economic autonomy. Moreover, a significant number of collective farmers, one in nine in 1970, were employed not in agriculture, but in industrial concerns located in rural areas. Perepis' 1970, vol. 5, table 14, 214. For other anomalies in the statistics on the working class see:

247. V.O. Romantsov, "Kil'kisni zminy v robint'nychu klii promyslovosti Ukra"

248. Narodne hospodarstvo Ukra


250. See O. Reshetnyk, V. Khyzniak and A. Tuzman. "Efektyvnist' vykorystannia Donets'koho vuhillia v teploenergety",


254. See Budka, "Natsional'nyi aspekt robint'nychoho pytannia," 125.

255. Diialoh, no.4, 1980, 16.


263. This point is made by H. Proshcharuk, Vidtvoreniia robchooi syly na suchasnomu etapi komunistychnoho budivnytsva (Kiev, 1973), 130.

265. Ianov, "Rabochaia tema," 256.


269. Sahaydak, The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-9, 143.


275. In 1970, 21 per cent of the republic's working class inhabited the Central-West region, 15 per cent in the Western. The Dnipro, South, North-East and Donbas accounted for 15, 13, 15 and 21 per cent of the working class respectively. Perepis1 1970, vol.5, table 5, 38-41.

276. In Western Ukraine in the mid-1960s, 90 per cent of the working class was Ukrainian. In L'viv oblast as early as the mid-1950s, 70 per cent of the working class was Ukrainian, and this in a region where less than a decade before Ukrainians were a decided minority of the working class. The largest industrial concern in Western Ukraine was the L'viv-Volyn' coal basin. Of the 30,000 miners employed here, three-quarters were Ukrainians. In the city of Kiev, the most important industrial centre of the Central West, the overwhelming majority of the working class were Ukrainian by nationality. See S.A. Makarchuk, "Rabochaia sem'ia v ukrainskom Prikarpate," in Etnograficheskoe izuchenie vyta rabochikh. (Po materialam otdel'nykh promyshlennykh raionov SSSR) (Moscow,1968), 80; H.I. Koval'chak, Rozvytok promyslovosti v zakhidnynkh oblastiakh Ukrainy za 20 rokiv radians'koi vlady (1939-1958 rr.) Istoryko ekonomichnyi narys (Kiev,1965), 46; Stanislav Uvatorov, "Shakhtari L'viv's'ko-Volyn's'koho vuhih'noho baseinu," Narodna tvorchist' ta etnohrafiia, no.1, 1970, 59-60; V.T. Zinych, "Suchasnyi robitynychyi shliub i vesillia," Narodna tvorchist' ta etnohrafiia, no.2, 1957, 62.

278. Seniavskii and Tel'pukhovskii, Rabochii klass SSSR, table 24, 335.


281. Istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR, 2 vols. (Kiev,1967), II:550; Rabochii klass razvitogo sotsialisticheskogo obschestva (Moscow,1974), 68.

282. Using the data at our disposal it was possible to calculate the minimal figure. It is probable that white-collar staff within the economically active Russian population of Ukraine represented more than half the total Russian population. Calculated from: Seniavskii and Tel'pukhovskii, Rabochii klass SSSR, table 24, 335; Naulko, Etnichnyi sklad, 95 (this source gives the age structure of the Russian population in Ukraine.); Perepis' 1970, vol. 6, table 4, 34.


284. Workers in Kiev, for example, according to a recent émigré were by far the least Russified sector of the city's population. See Serhii Pirohov, "Do pytannia pro 'ukrainizatsiiu' Kyieva," Suchasnist', no.6, 1980, 64.


290. The 1970 census provided educational achievement data for the population over the age of ten. The census only provided information on the age structure of the titular nations, thus it was not possible to obtain data on Russians' share of the intelligentsia in Ukraine. Calculations based on: Perepis' 1970, vol.2, table 3, 20-1; vol. 3, table 3, 280; vol. 4, table 33, 377, table 40, 475.

291. In 1959, it would appear that Ukrainians represented 52 per cent of the intelligentsia and 63 per cent of the semi-intelligentsia. Estimates are based on ibid. and Naulko, Etnichnyi sklad, diagram 8, 94; Perepis' 1959, vol.2, tables 55 and 56, 192-3.


293. Shpyliuk, Sotsializm, table 29, 206.


295. See Partiia i intelligentsiia v usloviakh rozvitogo sotsializma. Iz opyta raboty partiinykh organizatsii (Moscow,1977), 195-238.


297. Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 64.


300. We do not have attitudinal data specifically for the Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia, although studies exist on the intelligentsia of other nations. The general conclusions arrived at by these studies should be applicable to the Ukrainian intelligentsia as well.


304. T.V. Starovoitova, "K issledovaniu etnopsikhologii gorodskikh
zhitelei (po materialam oprosa naseleniia trekh gorodov Tatarskoi ASSR)," Sovetskaia etnografiia, no.3, 1976, 48.


308. Starovoitova, "K issledovaniu etnopsikhologii," 49.

309. Cited ibid.


316. Ibid., 137.


319. Ibid., 51-6.


322. Vyacheslav Chornovil, comp., The Chornovil Papers (Toronto, 1968), 204.


325. For example, the average salary of engineers and technicians employed in industry in 1940 was 115 per cent higher than the average industrial worker's wage; by 1970 it was only 34 per cent higher. In 1966 those employed in cultural and educational institutions (the rank-and-file intelligentsia) earned 16 per cent less than the average industrial worker's wage. By 1970 they were earning 27 per cent less. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922-72 (Moscow, 1972), 350; Narodnoe hospodarstvo 1973, 383.


328. Iu.V. Arutiunian, "Sotsial'no-kul'turnye aspekty razvitiia i sblizheniia natsii v SSSR. (Programma, metodika i perspektivy issledovaniia)," Sovetskaia etnografiia, no.3, 1972, 7.


336. Perepis' 1970, vol.4, table 37, 405; table 40, 475; table 41, 480; table 42, 484; table 43, 490; table 44, 494; table 45, 504; table 46, 509; table 47, 513; table 48, 518; table 49, 524; table 50, 530; table 51, 536; table 52, 539; table 53, 545.

337. B. Koval', "Vyshcha i serednia spetsial'na osvita na Ukrains'ke:" in Priroda i razvitie natury (Kiev, 1957), 88.


352. See Murray Yanovich and Wesley A Fischer, eds., *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR* (New York, 1973)


354. V.I. Astakhova, "Osnovnye tendentsii izmeneniia sotsial'noi struktury studenchestva," in *Effektivnost' podgotovki spesialistov* (Kaunas, 1969), 10. In part, the high proportion of white-collar staff among students could be the result of the impact of Khrushchev's higher education reform. See Popovecz, "Higher Education in the Soviet Union," 70-2.


358. For a fuller discussion of the question see Kolasky, Education in Soviet Ukraine, 112-59.


360. The Chornovil Papers, 170-1.


365. Chornovil, "What Bohdan Stenchuk Defends," 33 and Narodna osvita, nauka i kul'tura, 149.


369. The rules of admission to vuzy and institutions offering specialized secondary education stipulate that the student must pass an examination in the language in which instruction is given. Since as we note below Russian is the medium of instruction in most institutions of higher learning, Ukrainian students had to pass their examinations in Russian. See Dovidnyk dlia vstupnykiv vyshchych uchbovych zakladiv URSR 1976 (Kiev,1976), 6-9; Dovidnyk dlia vstupnykiv do serednikh spetsial'nykh navchal'nykh zakladiv Ukrain'skoi RSR na 1976 rik (Kiev,1976), 11-12.

370. See chapter two, table 2.20.

371. L.A. Shevchenko, Druzhba bratnikh kul'tur (Kiev,1971), 68.

372. K.Z. Litvin, Rastsvet kul'tury Sovetskoi Ukrainy (Kiev,1954), 36,38. In 1947 Ukrainians formed 53.5 per cent of the vuzy student population; in 1948 - 53.8 per cent; 1949 - 55.6 per cent; 1950 - 57.9 per cent; 1951 - 59.1 per cent; 1952 - 59.9 per cent.
Calculated from Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1961), table 26, 106; table 29, 128-57; Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik (Moscow, 1971), 196.

That a quota system exists is known; its workings and impact, however, remain a mystery. See De Witt, Education and Professional Employment, 357.


Ibid., 33-6. For additional data on the Russification of higher education see Rapawy, "Linguistic Shift among Ukrainians," 256-7. Among academics of the vuzy (1966-7) who held the title of professor or doctor, 59 per cent were born in Ukraine (including Western Ukraine in the inter-war period.) It is interesting to note that of those born in Ukraine, the largest proportion (25 per cent) came from Left-Bank Ukraine. Calculated from Ucheni vuziv Ukrains'koi RSR (Kiev, 1968), 29-496.

See Pravda Ukrainy, 2 July 1965 for an account of the reform of higher education after Khrushchev's fall.


See the editorial in Radians'ka osvita, 17 July 1969. The paper is the organ of the Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education of the Ukrainian SSR.


Ibid., 15.

The general education school network refers to elementary, incomplete secondary and complete secondary schools. The system had undergone several reforms. The structure of elementary and secondary education in the Soviet Union as a whole and the union-republics in particular is discussed by: Jan Pennar and Ivan I. Bakalo, Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education: With Special Reference to Nationality Groups (New York, 1971).

In 1958-9, in Kharkiv, 4.1 per cent of the total number of pupils in general education were registered in Ukrainian-language establishments; in Odesa, 8.1 per cent; Dnipropetrovs'k, 17.4; Donets'k, 1.2; Vinnytsia, 33.0; Ivano-Frankivs'k, 39.4; Sumy, 41.7; Khmel'nyts'kyi, 43.1; Luhans'k, 6.5; Zaporizhzhia, 26.6 per cent. Kolasky, Education in Soviet Ukraine, 57.

The Ukrainian Herald Issue 6, 66.
386. Ibid., 75-6.


388. The Chornovil Papers, 176 and Narodna osvita, nauka i kul'tura, 83.


392. See The Ukrainian Herald Issue 6, 69-76.

393. For a discussion of some aspects of these policies see: Yaroslav Bilinsky, "Education of the Non-Russian Peoples in the Soviet Union," Comparative Education Review, no.1, 1964, 78-89.


397. The Ukrainian Herald Issue 6, 76.


Shortly before thesis 19 was put forward, B.G. Gafurov wrote an article in the authoritative central party journal announcing "the fusion of nations presupposes the emergence of a single language for all the peoples." B.G. Gafurov, "Uspekhii natsional'noi politiki KPSS i nekotorye voprosy internatsional'nogo vospitaniiia." Kommunist, no.11, 1958, 16-17.

403. Radians'ka Ukraina, 18 November 1959.


408. Zasedaniia Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, 296.

409. The daily newspapers examined were: Radians'ka Ukraina, Pravda Ukrainy, Molod' Ukrainy, Kolhospne selo and Robitnycha hazeta. In addition three semi-weeklies and twelve journals were read.


412. See examples in Radians'ka Ukraina, 30 November, 3 December 1958; Pravda, 22 December 1938. In Radians'ka Ukraina, 4 December 1958, M. Skal'nyi, Director of the Communications Department of Chernihiv oblast, in addition to opposing thesis 19, also argued that Ukraine ought to develop its own unique 12-year educational system, instead of the 10-year one that Khrushchev proposed.

413. The most notable was a translation from Rudé Pravo of an article by the Czech writer Bohumil Říha who had just returned from a visit to Transcarpathia. "Battles were fought for Ukraine from all sides, different languages were imposed on it, different cultures....I talked to a labourer...'What school do the children attend? Ukrainian, of course. The children will grow up to be real Ukrainians.' ... Yes, this people has finally found itself, and no one can take advantage of them." Radians'ka Ukraina, 28 November 1958.


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419. See for example Pravda, 3 January 1959; Radians'ka Ukraina, 22 January 1959. The editorial in Ukrains'ka mova v shkoli, no.4, 1959, 5 even suggested that measures should be taken to influence parent choice in the selection of schools.


421. Z"izd uchyteliv Ukrains'koi RSR 14-16 zhovtnia (Kiev,1960), 147.

422. Ibid., 32.

423. Ibid., 181.

424. Ibid., 182, 195, 208.


437. Zasedaniiia Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR, 355. See the criticism of the Pedagogical Academy published in Radians'ka Ukraina, 4 September 1959.

438. Vpered, July 1959. Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? 179 criticizes the Academy's publications which he claims advocated the Russification of non-Russian schools.


440. Radians'ka Ukraina, 4 September 1966.

441. See Hechter, Internal Colonialism, 191-207 for a refutation of theories that suggest that there is something in the urban, industrial environment that would weaken the ties of recently urbanized groups to their customary language.

442. The share of Ukrainian-language titles in the total number of books published in Ukraine according to subject was as follows:

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<td>1946</td>
<td>567 68</td>
<td>249 90</td>
<td>405 23</td>
<td>225 67</td>
<td>127 47</td>
<td>29 72</td>
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<td>1958</td>
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<td>1966</td>
<td>941 62</td>
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<td>2470 10</td>
<td>693 67</td>
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<td>1972</td>
<td>1193 55</td>
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<td>1204 47</td>
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Pres. Ukrains'koi RSR, 1918-1975, table 18, 41-2; tables 22-3, 48-9, 50-1; tables 26-7, 55-7; tables 30-1, 61-3; table 33, 66; table 35, 69; table 37, 72; table 39, 75; table 41, 77; table 43, 81; table 45, 84; table 51, 93; table 52, 94-7.


444. See Ibid., 109-17.

445. The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8, 130.
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446. Radians'ska Ukraina, 4 September 1968.

447. Presa Ukrains'koi RSR, 1918-1975, table 51, 93.


452. Literaturna Ukraina, 5 April 1968.

453. Ibid.


455. In the 1960s a mail order service was established called "Books by Mail". See Radians'ska Ukraina, 29 January 1966.


457. For a more detailed discussion of statistics on Ukrainian-language newspaper publishing see: Rapawy, "Linguistic Shift among Ukrainians," 143-54.


459. See examples in Robitnycha hazeta, 22 October 1965 and 22 October 1966.

460. See complaints in Literaturna Ukraina, 2, 22 October 1964; Molod' Ukrainy, 6 November 1963; Radians'ska kul'tura, 27 December 1964; Radians'ska Ukraina, 17 January 1967.


463. Robitnycha hazeta, 10 September 1965.


465. See Radians'ska kul'tura, 27 December 1964 for complaints from Donets'k oblast, and Literaturna Ukraina, 15 November 1963 for a letter from a worker in the synthetic fibre combine in Darnytsia (a Kiev suburb) about problems in obtaining Ukrainian literary journals.


It is interesting to note that Dnipropetrovs'k oblast had 26 per cent more subscribers than L'viv, and Donets'k's subscription base was larger than any of the Western Ukrainian oblasts with the exception of L'viv. Ukraina, no.2, 1969, 3.


At first, Shelest's dismissal was erroneously interpreted by many Western journalists as having to do with his alleged opposition to detente. See Christian Science Monitor, 27 May 1972; The Times, 15 June 1972; Le Monde, 23 May 1972. Lewtytzkyj claims that this assessment was based on misinformation fed by CPSU authorities to Western journalists. See his Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine. Hodnett in his very comprehensive discussion of the foreign policy factor in Shelest's purge showed that Shelest did accent themes somewhat different from those to be found in Brezhnev's speeches. However, Shelest's positions on international questions were well in keeping with his overall national policy. For example, he showed a tendency to favour rapprochement with the Chinese leadership, probably, as Hodnett argues, in order to forestall the need for a more rapid development of Siberia and the Far East, which would release funds for economic growth in Ukraine. A year after Shelest's purge, most Western journalists changed their evaluation of the underlying reasons for his dismissal and agreed that a nationalist "deviation" was at the heart of it. See The Times, 23 April 1973; New York Times, 23 April 1973; Le Monde, 26-7 May 1974.

See Lystivky partiinoho pidpillia i partyzans'kykh zahoniv Ukrainy u roky velikoï vit'chyznianoi viiny (Kiev, 1969).

Pravda, 27 May 1944.


It was during the campaign against the "anti-Party group", which included Kaganovich, who headed the CPU in 1946, that many Ukrainian party leaders expressed their views on this period, laying the entire blame on Kaganovich. Thus Pidhornyi at the 22nd CPSU Congress said, "Like a true sadist Kaganovich found gratification in mocking the /party/ activists and intelligentsia...threatening them with arrest and imprisonment. It is not by chance that to this very day, many party and state officials...call Kaganovich's tenure the black days of Soviet Ukraine." XXII s"ezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1962), I:272.

The standard work dealing with this question is by John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York, 1959)

N.F. Kuzmin, Kommunisticheskaia partiia - vdochnovitel' i organizator bor'by ukrainskogo naroda za sozdanie i ukreplenie ukrainskogo sovetskogo gosudarstva (Moscow, 1954), 34.

Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiiakh, II:35-6.

Ukrainskaia SSR v velikoi otechestvennoi voine, I:34.

G.T. Gorobets, Partiinoe podpol'e na Ukrainе 1941-1944 g.g. (Moscow, 1969), 72-89.


See Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiiakh, II:36-7.

Narysy istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy (1971), 556.


Pravda, 23 August 1946; Radians'ka Ukraina, 25 December 1949.

Radians'ka Ukraina, 25 September 1952.


Radians'ka Ukraina, 29 January 1949. The nationality of Politburo and Orgburo members was established by consulting biographical entries in various encyclopaedias and the biographical data contained in Borys Lewytzkyj, Die Sowjetukraine 1944-1963 (Cologne-Berlin, 1964), 301-71.

Cited by Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite, 16.

In Ukraine the attack was centred on the Kiev party organization. The 27 February 1953 CC CPU plenum passed a lengthy resolution criticizing the oblast organization for negligence in the ideological arena; tolerating "manifestations of bourgeois nationalism and Zionism" in the capital's institutions of higher learning and the schools. This campaign, which reached hysterical proportions reminiscent of the 1930s, suddenly came to a halt when notices of Stalin's illness appeared in the press on 4 March 1953. The next day Stalin died. See Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiiakh, II: 427-37; Radians'ka Ukraina, 29 February, 1 and 2 March, 1953.

Radians'ka Ukraina, 13 June 1953.

Radians'ka Ukraina, 19 August 1953.

See Radians'ka Ukraina, 13 and 16 September 1953.

Tabulated from Radians'ka Ukraina, 26 March 1952 and 27 March 1954.

Levyts'kyi, "Komunistychna partiia," 111.

Radians'ka Ukraina, 27 March 1954.

Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine, 289.

Radians'ka Ukraina, 24 March 1954. Biographical data obtained from various encyclopaedias.


Pravda, 30 May 1954.

Pravda, 15 February 1956.


508. See the editorial in Radians'ka Ukraina, 8 June 1957.

509. See the article by S. Stefanyk, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR ibid.

510. The situation was typified by the following report of how the staff of the Zaporizhzhia sovnarkhoz was recruited: "A large number of cadres for the sovnarkhoz were sent to us by Moscow. Among them the First Deputy Chairman, comrade Bakuma, who headed a department in the USSR Ministry of Construction of Enterprises in the Metallurgical and Chemical Industry, and Deputy Chairman Korolev, formerly head of this ministry's Main Administration for Procurement," Radians'ka Ukraina, 11 June 1958.


514. For an account of the politics of this period and the CPU's role see: Lewytzkyj, Die Sowjetukraine, 85-174; Bilinski, The Second Soviet Republic, 226-63.


522. Dmytro Solovei, Polityka TsK KPSS u plianuvanni rozvytku promyslovosti ta promyslovikh kadriv na Ukraini (New York, 1960), 82.
523. Ibid., 64-102.

524. Pravda, 28 April 1957. See also Radians'ka osvita, 14 July 1956.


526. Politicheskii dnevnik, 91.


532. Carrère d’Encausse, Decline of an Empire, 214.


538. The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8, 127.

539. Ibid., 125-51 and Iurii Badz'o, Vidkrytyi lyst do Prezydii Verkhovnoi rady Soluzu RSR ta Tsentral'noho komitetu KPRS (New York, 1980), 50-5.

540. Dzyuba, Internationalism or Russification? 204.

542. The following sources were used: Ukrains'kyi visnyk, vypusk I-II, IV; Ukrains'kyi visnyk, vypusk VI (Paris, 1972); Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-9; The Chornovil Papers; Browne, Ferment in the Ukraine; A Chronicle of Current Events, issues 1-33. Issues 13-33 were published by Amnesty International, London. The earlier issues were obtained in typescript from Carleton University. The SPSS computer programme was used in coding the information obtained.


545. Valentyn Moroz, Report From the Beria Reserve (Toronto, 1974), 120.
Conclusion

In the decades preceding the revolution, formidable obstacles blocked the development of the Ukrainian national movement. Autonomous Ukrainian institutions had been destroyed by the end of the 18th century and the administration of the country was firmly in the hands of the Russian bureaucracy. The old Ukrainian ruling class, the Cossack officer class, had ceased to exist as a cohesive national elite, and tsarist statist economic policies prevented the emergence of an alternative elite based on the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. The leadership of the national movement went by default to the not too numerous intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, whose ability to mobilise the Ukrainian people was greatly hampered by the relentless efforts of the tsarist regime to block the emergence of the infrastructures of national life - schools, social and political organizations, book publishing and newspapers.

Of course, some progress towards the development of a Ukrainian national movement was apparent by the eve of the revolution. An inchoate rural cooperative movement provided a rudimentary organizational structure. Modest improvements in education enlarged the Ukrainian intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. Moreover, as the experience of the 1905 revolution showed, the agrarian movement in Ukraine could flow along national channels. Thus in 1917 the Ukrainian national movement was far from having reached its full potential: it was only beginning in earnest.

During the revolution millions of Ukrainians were drawn into the struggle for social and national emancipation. While this movement was
unable to achieve Ukraine's independence, it proved strong enough to force major concessions from the Bolsheviks. The establishment of a Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, of a Communist Party of Ukraine, and acceptance of the principle of Ukrainianization were the most notable such concessions. The Bolsheviks found that while they could maintain control of the society from their urban fortresses, they could not bring about much-needed social, economic and cultural development, especially in the countryside, without involving their former opponents - the activists of the Ukrainian national movement: teachers, members of the cooperative movement and the like. Tasks which were purely economic in nature in Russia, carried with them major national overtones in Ukraine. The recruitment of representatives of the social groups mentioned above to positions of responsibility resulted in the penetration of the national idea into Soviet Ukrainian institutions which had initially eschewed them. The activism and energy which these groups showed in organizing Ukrainian-language schools, newspapers and cultural groups ensured that Ukrainian culture deepened and broadened its influence in the society.

The revolution fundamentally altered economic relations in the country. Foreign capital, hitherto the motor force of Ukraine's industrialization, was expropriated, while the most important levers of economic policy and decision-making fell into the hands of central economic organs who defended the interests of the Russian economy to the detriment of the Ukrainian. Ukraine was subjected to discriminatory taxation and industrial location policies which hindered its economic development and depressed its population's standard of living. The leadership
of the republic's institutions - the party, state, and trade unions - charged with the responsibility of managing the republic under these adverse conditions, reacted by attempting to broaden the republic's powers and prerogatives as a way of ameliorating local conditions. The cultural movement led by the Ukrainian intelligentsia began to dovetail with the increasing autonomist assertiveness of the republic's new political and administrative elite.

The transformation of agrarian relations in the country, the mobilizing effect of the revolution and the expansion of education altered fundamentally the migratory patterns of the Ukrainian population. The Ukrainian peasantry, especially village youth, began to stream into the towns to seek employment in industry and state administration or admission to technical schools and universities. As Ukrainians increased their representation in the strategic sectors of society, the Ukrainization of these sectors gained momentum. Ukrainization "from below", when combined with the Ukrainization of the summit of society, brought Ukrainians to the threshold of nationhood by the end of the 1920s.

The centralistic drive initiated by Stalin in connection with the first five-year plan provoked much discontent in Ukraine. When the Ukrainian elite refused to become willing tools in the extermination of their own people during the 1932-3 grain requisition campaigns, Stalin launched his first mass purge of the republic. At the same time, Ukrainization which nurtured republican particularism was abandoned, and the republic's schools, mass media and intellectual life were remoulded and forced to propagate the virtues of extreme centralism. The decimation of Ukraine's population during the great famine of 1932-3 and the purges
of 1933-4, combined with the imposition of a totalitarian social order, destroyed much of the fabric of Ukrainian national life. Even so, Ukrainian particularism had an uncanny way of asserting itself. The new leadership after the 1933-4 purges made some efforts at national consolidation and played a leading role in opposing Stalin's plans for a new purge. They were mercilessly liquidated during the Ezhovshchina and the republic was reduced to a NKVD fiefdom. From 1938 onward, the infrastructures of Ukrainian national life were further weakened when their Russification was ordered.

In the era of the first five-year plan Ukraine saw much urban and industrial development. It was, however, a highly uneven growth, reflecting all-Union economic priorities, not those of Ukraine. The large-scale transfers of capital from Ukraine to the USSR exchequer accentuated a trend discernible early in the 1920s when, in contrast to the pre-revolutionary period, Ukraine's level of socio-economic development lagged substantially behind that of Russia. The socio-economic transformations which did occur during the 1930s in Ukraine, however, were sufficient for Ukrainians to emerge as a majority of the socially-mobilised sectors of the population. This, combined with the fact that many republican institutions, at least in form, survived even Stalin's destructive hand, raised the possibility that perhaps the drive for national self-assertion could be resumed in the future.

In the post-Second World War period, the "scissors of colonialism" continued to widen as Ukraine fell further behind Russia in over-all levels of socio-economic development. The highly competitive social en-
vironment created by the sizeable Russian immigration to Ukraine further restricted opportunities for the social mobility of Ukrainians, as did the Russification of Ukraine's educational system, post-secondary education in particular. These were some of the factors which served as the social backdrop for the resurgence of Ukrainian national assertiveness in the post-Stalin era. The most vocal exponents of Ukraine's national claims were the intelligentsia, supported by broad sectors of public opinion. Many of the intelligentsia's demands were backed by the new generation of Ukrainian political leaders who, having been trained for responsible positions, were anxious to assume them free from excessive interference from the centre. Taking advantage of momentary relaxations of central control, that leadership made efforts to strengthen Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions, promote the indigenous language, and exert greater control over the economy.

The Russian leadership's response to this new autonomism was to accelerate Russification. This policy failed because it did not address itself to the principle source of nationalism which was socio-economic in nature. Indeed, the attempted Russification hastened the crisis in social mobility and soon had to be backed up by repression - Shelest's dismissal and the purge of the state and party apparatus. None of the pressing social, economic, political and cultural questions confronting Ukraine were tackled, and the deteriorating economic situation left the Soviet regime with less capacity to deal with them. Given current conditions and policies, there is reason to anticipate a continued growth in national tensions and these are unlikely to be appeased without major concessions.
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