

Establishing Rhythm as a Theological Category:
Experience, Metaphysics, Salvation

Alexandria Eikelboom

Submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Faculty of Theology and Religion
Regents Park College
Approximate word count: 99,000
Trinity Term, 2015

Short Abstract

Establishing Rhythm as a Theological Category: Experience, Metaphysics, Salvation
Alexandria Eikelboom, Regents Park College
Submitted for qualification for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Trinity Term, 2015

Rhythm is an important dimension of Christian liturgical practice as well as life in the world more generally. Given its significance, this study asks how theology ought to think about the nature and role of rhythm. It puts forward the argument that rhythm is a category of significance for Christian doctrine, particularly the doctrine of salvation, rather than one that pertains only to Christian religious expression (in liturgy for example) or aesthetics. This argument is made on the basis of three factors: (1) the pervasiveness of rhythm in dimensions of human experience that are salient to Christian soteriology, such as relationship and communication, (2) the fact that different conceptions of rhythm in various metaphysical accounts have different theological consequences, requiring theological discussion, and (3) the capacity of rhythm to illuminate certain dimensions of the Christian doctrine of salvation such as the nature of participation, the relation between immanent and transcendent, and the relationship between interruption and continuity, making it a category that adds to theological understanding.

The thesis proposes a definition of rhythm as an oscillation between synchronic form and diachronic experience based on theories of poetic rhythm and supported by theological analysis. The project finds that certain philosophical or theological approaches to metaphysics incorporate either a synchronic or diachronic perspective on rhythm but that both of these perspectives are theologically problematic on their own, the former tending to an illusory perspective on the whole from a God's-eye-view and the latter tending towards a strict division between creature and Creator such that the relationship between them is one of rupture and confrontation only and not salvific. The thesis therefore proposes an oscillation on the part of the theologian between these two perspectives after the metaphysics of Erich Przywara and demonstrates this approach to be appropriate to the Christian doctrine of salvation.

Long Abstract

Establishing Rhythm as a Theological Category: Experience, Metaphysics, Salvation
Alexandria Eikelboom, Regents Park College
Submitted for qualification for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Trinity Term, 2015

Rhythm is an important dimension of Christian liturgical practice as well as life in the world more generally. Given its significance, this study asks how theology ought to think about the nature and role of rhythm in its own discourse. It puts forward the argument that rhythm is a category of significance for Christian doctrine, particularly the doctrine of salvation, rather than one that pertains only to Christian religious expression (in liturgy for example) or aesthetics. While there are several philosophers and theologians who have used the category of rhythm, no study has yet been done to explicitly establish the theological significance of the category itself, its function in reality, or how and in what ways it may be appropriately used in theology. This is the gap that this thesis fills by offering a definition of rhythm, an analysis of the theological implications of the way in which the category is used in various approaches to metaphysics, and an account of how the category contributes to our understanding of salvation. All of this is offered with a view to making clear the significance of the category of rhythm for theology as well as providing clarity regarding what rhythm is and how theology ought to think about it.

(Chapter1)

The thesis begins by providing a working definition of rhythm based on the human interaction with rhythm in poetry. Poetry provides a context in which rhythm is foregrounded, allowing us to better understand its nature and function. An analysis of theories regarding poetic rhythm shows that our experience of rhythm in poetry involves two mutually-dependent but irreducible dimensions – a synchronic understanding of the pattern of a poem and the diachronic experience of moving through the poem. The former emphasizes harmony, the way in which various dimensions contribute to the whole, while the latter emphasizes the stops and starts, disjunctions and resolutions, which make up the experience of a particular rhythm. I then show that both of these perspectives are necessary not only for an accurate understanding of the rhythm of a poem, but also for approaching the ways in which rhythm operates in everyday communication and social structures. Rhythm functions in everyday life to hold in harmony large and small groups of people. However, such harmonization often includes or requires disruptions to established

rhythms, which set up counter-rhythms. Any account of rhythm in theology must likewise take both perspectives into account if it is to be faithful to the human experience of rhythm.

(Chapters 2 & 3)

Several contemporary continental philosophers, including Gilles Deleuze, Giorgio Agamben, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Julia Kristeva, have used rhythm in their attempts to make sense of reality, as have certain nineteenth and twentieth century philosophers and linguists such as Emile Benveniste, Henri Meschonnic, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Martin Heidegger. Interestingly, these thinkers use rhythm in ways that correspond either a primarily synchronic (Benveniste, Meschonnic, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze) or diachronic (Agamben, Lacoue-Labarthe, Kristeva) perspective on the role of rhythm in reality, much in the way that theorists approach the rhythm of a poem from either a primarily synchronic or diachronic perspective. The former use rhythm as a way of conceptualizing how it is that reality holds together as a fluctuating, improvised whole despite, or even through, conflicts between various dimensions, while the latter describes how it is that reality disrupts the systems that we create in our attempts to systematize and contain reality. Both of these perspectives have problematic theological consequences if either perspective is absolutized. If the idea of rhythm as a kind of metaphysical glue that holds things together is imported into theology without qualification, this risks giving the theologian a God's-eye perspective and reducing God to merely another element within a larger pattern that can be viewed at once and from a distance. On the other hand, if one only associates rhythm with divine interruptions from beyond the patterns of experience, then one risks losing any connection between the human experience of rhythm and a salvific relation to the divine or abstracting such interruptions from any vision of harmony according to which they could be incorporated into a meaningful pattern.

(Chapter 4)

Specifically theological uses of rhythm often take the form of a hierarchy, such as that of Augustine as interpreted and appropriated by certain proponents of Radical Orthodoxy. This is another synchronic approach, but rather than an immanent harmony generated from the bottom-up, rhythm is here conceptualized as a top-down structure. While this might appear to be the obvious Christian approach to rhythm, I argue that this approach is insufficient because it does not take into account the historical dimensions of the way in which salvation is experienced, and therefore requires the corrective of the interruptive rhythm of the diachronic perspective.

(Chapter 5)

The twentieth-century Jesuit theologian Erich Przywara uses rhythm in a way that maintains an oscillation between synchronic and diachronic thereby holding together the various movements of harmony and interruption necessary in Christian soteriology. Przywara calls this the *analogia entis*, which is not for him a static or mathematical correspondence, but an intersection of movements of intimacy and alterity. Przywara's *analogia entis* is rhythmic because its purpose is to show the dynamic relations and resonances between God and the human creature by bringing these into contact with the oscillations within the human creature itself. It has an "in-and-beyond" form that holds together the "vertical" theological movements between God and the creature with the "horizontal" movements of intra-creaturely experience. The intersection of intra-creaturely and theological analogies doubles the in-and-beyond relationship such that God is beyond the creature as both *telos* and as unknown, and within the creature as both propulsion and interruption. Thus, much like the rhythm of a poem, the *analogia entis* acknowledges that the relation between God and the human creature is a harmonious form, a unity of participation, while at the same time acknowledging that the way in which this shape is experienced and performed is based in the rhythms of the experience of the human creature itself, in which heightened points of rhythmic experience are encountered as interruptions to experience in general, especially when such intersections frustrate attempts at self-enclosed identity.

(Chapter 6)

Rhythm therefore points to the lived and experienced connections between the creature and the divine that make up salvation, and which occur in and through time. If the economy of salvation understood in terms of Przywara's *analogia entis* is rhythmic in nature, then this has important implications for the doctrine of soteriology. In particular, this conception of salvation as rhythmic puts it in conversation with the many other rhythms through which ordinary human life is lived. The rhythm of salvation is such that it does not overthrow the rhythms of everyday human life but reconfigures them through specific, eschatological disruptions that form the human movements through space and time. The rhythm of salvation is revealed in the relation between the cross and the resurrection, and in the tension between the temporal experience of these events as interruptive, and their glimpsed eschatological meaning. This is consistent with the nature of rhythm as foregrounded in poetry as including both the synchronic and the diachronic perspectives, the meeting of pattern and disruption.

Participation is a significant dimension of salvation in that it both indicates that Christianity understands health to be a matter of relationship and proposes that persons are

saved from the tight forces of nothingness, evil, sin, death through relationship. This is the more synchronic perspective on salvation in that it is an account of that which is accomplished in salvation and gives an indication of an eschatological reality for which the Church hopes. Rhythm is important at this point as a helpful way for understanding, from the creaturely side, what it means to participate in God. The human participates in relationships more generally through rhythm, and in alternative temporal realities such as poetry and dance, which are both continuous with and discontinuous from everyday time. Thus, rhythm provides a way of thinking about how it is that the activities of the Christian life such as prayer, Eucharist, liturgy, are means of participating in a certain rhythm analogous to the way in which repetition, bodily movement, and conversation are the rhythmic means by which one participates in temporal configurations not generated by the self.

The diachronic dimension of salvation nuances this depiction of salvation by describing the rhythmic implications of salvation's resistance to the hegemony of systems of sin. The suffering and evil still present in the world require that salvation not simply be described as persons transitioning seamlessly from the hold of tight sinful systems into the healthy rhythms of God's economy of relations. Rather, moving from sickness to health requires the disruption of self-enclosure and the opening of spaces for the performance and realization of new, participatory rhythms. Since salvation is ongoing in time, such disruption is not an event that happens all at once but is an ongoing part of the nature of the creature's salvific relation to Christ in time. This generates the rhythmic form of an ongoing oscillation between confrontation by and identification with Christ through which the Church and the creature begin to discern the pattern of salvation from within time.

In explicitly considering the theological significance of rhythm, we become aware of the importance of maintaining both the vision of a harmony or pattern into which we are being incorporated as well as of the theologian's position as always within the unfolding of this pattern in such a way that he or she can never simply view the whole from the outside. Harmony and interruption are thus not two movements opposed to one another such that theology affirms one to the exclusion of the other. They are, rather, two movements that conspire together towards the unfolding of a certain temporal shape.

This has consequences for how we think about the rhythmic dimensions of Christian expression, since such rhythm is not simply a separate aesthetic concern but inherently theological. Doctrine is thus not only discourse regarding a certain ontological situation, but also includes an account of the movements through which this situation is

encountered, experienced, and performed, not as a separate “liturgical studies,” but as inherent to understanding those “doctrines” themselves. As such, proposing that rhythm as an important theological category through which to understand the nature of salvation has implications for theological methodology. Rather than attempt to articulate a doctrine as a discreet circumscribable object, to approach doctrine rhythmically is to articulate doctrine as a process of moving between perspectives because one can never see the whole from a single position, much like the way in which one would analyze the rhythm of a poem.

This research opens up several dimensions of philosophical and theological thought. First, the thesis contributes a comparative analysis of rhythm in the work of several philosophers and theologians. In particular, it contributes a more extensive engagement with Przywara and Agamben on the topic. It illuminates the connections between the poetic analysis of rhythm and the way in which the category is conceptualized in continental philosophy, thereby contributing to an understanding of how and in what respect these metaphysical approaches are rooted in aesthetic perspectives. Second, considering rhythm also contributes to a theology that is neither solely a matter of metaphysics, nor based in personal experiences to the exclusion of metaphysical speculation. Rather, the category of rhythm demonstrates that the project of making sense of reality is part of the human encounter with reality and vice versa. Finally, the project opens up the possibility of future study on the significance of rhythm for theology as it might pertain to other doctrines such as creation and the Trinity, as well as Christian ethics as a matter of which personal and political rhythms one ought to inhabit.

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	viii
Acknowledgements	x
Introduction	1
Rhythm and Human Experience	7
Rhythm and Metaphysics	14
Rhythm and Salvation	21
Chapter 1 A Phenomenology of Rhythm	26
Rhythm in Poetry	28
<i>The Diachronic Perspective</i>	28
<i>The Synchronic Perspective</i>	35
<i>What is Poetic Rhythm?</i>	38
Rhythm and the Performance of Relation	41
<i>Rhythm and Language</i>	43
<i>Rhythm in Social Cohesion and Subversion</i>	49
Conclusion	57
Chapter 2 Synchronicity I: Rhythm as the Whole	60
Benvenistian Rhythm and Heraclitean (anti)Metaphysics	62
<i>Gilles Deleuze</i>	62
<i>Friedrich Nietzsche</i>	72
<i>Martin Heidegger</i>	80
Theological Responses to Benvenistian Rhythm	86
<i>Heraclitean (anti)Metaphysics as Univocal Logic and Equivocal Dialectic</i>	86
<i>Benvenistian Rhythm and Process Theology</i>	91
<i>Theological Critique</i>	93
Conclusion	95
Chapter 3 Diachronicity: Rhythm as Interruption	100
Interruptive Rhythm and the Experience of the Subject	102
<i>Rhythm in the Work of Giorgio Agamben</i>	102
<i>Rhythm as Politically Interruptive</i>	106
<i>Rhythm and the Interruption of the Subject</i>	113
Theological Interpretations	123
<i>Theological Critique</i>	124
<i>Agamben and the Possibility of an Immanent Transcendence</i>	130
<i>Przywara's Intra-Creaturely Analogy</i>	138
Conclusion	143

Chapter 4 Synchronicity II: Rhythm as Hierarchy	146
Przywara's Theological Analogy	147
Augustine	150
<i>De Musica: Rhythm and Theological Analogy</i>	152
<i>Interpretation and Criticism</i>	156
<i>Przywara's Augustine</i>	161
Contemporary Examples of Theological Analogy: Radical Orthodoxy	163
<i>John Milbank</i>	165
<i>Simon Oliver</i>	169
<i>Adrian Pabst</i>	172
<i>Criticisms</i>	175
Conclusion.....	179
Chapter 5 Rhythm as Analogy: Harmony and Interruption	182
The <i>Anlaogia Entis</i> as Rhythm	184
<i>Conceptions of the Analogia Entis</i>	185
<i>Przywara's Analogia Entis</i>	187
<i>Analogia Entis and Creation</i>	195
<i>Analogia Entis and Christology</i>	200
<i>Analogia Entis and the Trinity</i>	202
Thinking <i>Analogia Entis</i> as Rhythm Through Poetry.....	205
Conclusion.....	211
Chapter 6 The Rhythm of Christian Salvation.....	214
Beginning from Holy Saturday (In the Middle).....	218
Participation in the Rhythms of Salvation.....	226
<i>Participation in the Rhythms of Conversation</i>	230
<i>Participation in the Rhythms of Poetry</i>	233
<i>Participation in the Rhythms of Dance</i>	237
<i>Participation and the Church</i>	239
Salvation as Rhythmic Interruption.....	244
<i>Christ as Caesura</i>	247
<i>The Caesuric Rhythm of the Church</i>	252
Conclusion.....	258
Conclusion.....	262
Contributions.....	268
Future Directions.....	274
Bibliography	281

Acknowledgements

Institutions: I am grateful to the Faculty of Theology and Religion at the University of Oxford, which, in the form of financial support for presenting at conferences and by hosting seminars and events, provided the spaces in which I did the research for this project. In particular, I am grateful to Regents Park College, which supplied a much-valued desk from which to work, and financial support in the form of the Henman Scholarship. I would also like to express thanks to Scholarship and Christianity in Oxford for the position of Junior Dean during my study, a job which helped to cover living costs, research costs, and provided much of the community and conversation that has made my time at Oxford so pleasant.

People: I am of course indebted to my supervisor, Graham Ward, who, in addition to reading and commenting on my work and ensuring that I gained the necessary experience in various dimensions of academia at the proper times, filled that most important role of retaining the capacity to see where I was going even when I could not, so that I was never at a loss for my next step. I am grateful also for the comments, encouragement, opportunities, and feedback provided informally by other faculty members, in particular Johannes Zachhuber, Joel Rasmussen, Matthew Kirkpatrick, Louise Nelstrop, Paul Fiddes, and for feedback from Pamela Sue Anderson, and of fellow graduate students, particularly Emily Kempson, Taylor Knight, and Eleanor McLaughlin. Thank you also to the much-needed critical eye of my proof-readers Paul Eikelboom, Stephanie Redekop, and Lauren Bujaky. Finally, I would like to express ultimate gratitude to my parents, Kai and Elaine Grambart, for their continued emotional and financial support which have made the completion of this project a reality, and to my husband, Paul Eikelboom, for his unrelenting faith in me and for the sacrifices that he has made to make this project possible. Thank you.

Introduction

With intermittent shocks, sudden as the springs of a tiger, life emerges heaving its dark crest from the sea. It is to this we are attached; it is to this we are bound, as bodies to wild horses. And yet we have invented devices for filling up the crevices and disguising these fissures.

Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*, 40

Virginia Woolf's novel *The Waves* evokes the rhythms created by the interpenetrations of cosmic cycles and particular lives. Pieces of prose describing the landscape at particular times of the day, under certain heights of the sun, intersect with an account of six individuals' innermost orientations towards the world from childhood to old age. As the title suggests, both of these dimensions of reality are communicated through wave imagery. The character of each person is evoked and communicated through how he or she experiences and interacts with the rhythm of the waves of surrounding reality and of his or her own inner experience. Some feel themselves nearly seamlessly a part of the great, changing fluidity. Some feel themselves a rock against which the rhythms of life break. Another is fixed on order – the cut, the well-defined objects and persons that stand out against the surrounding chaos – while still another feels that the rhythms of daily life threaten and interrupt her as she precariously floats above them. While some experience

the waves as a liberating fluidity, another feels only the incessant repetitive beat of a prison. The waves are an ambiguous force of both wholeness and death.¹

Such characters are not only characters, but personifications of the diverse and variable meanings and experiences that surround rhythm, arising out of the intersection of large cosmic and social movements, with individual experience. What Woolf reveals is the difficulty involved in talking about rhythm in any direct way due to the multiplicity of its meanings and manifestations, and its inextricability from the roots of human perception. It is perhaps for this reason that Jacques Derrida notices that “rhythm has always haunted our tradition, without ever reaching the centre of its concerns.”² He says that this is to be expected, for rhythm is neither a visual nor a linguistic category. It does not adhere to the channels through which communication and philosophy operate, although it does make meaning and communication possible.

Derrida’s statement is true with respect to rhythm in Christian theology as well. No one would contest that rhythm is part of Christian religious expression, in the liturgy of services as the rhythms of sitting, standing, kneeling, speaking, singing, eating, not to mention musical rhythms, and in the organization of time according to the Sabbath and the church calendar. As a result of the connection of rhythm and Christian religious expression, some have attempted to intentionally perform theology from out of the rhythms of liturgy.³ Yet while this rhythm operates in the background as a scaffold to such theology, theology has not attempted to look directly at it, to consider how this dimension of life shapes Christian doctrine. Rhythm haunts the tradition without entering the centre of its concerns. Two recent thinkers who have come close to an investigation of rhythm are

¹ Paul Fiddes, *The Promised End: Eschatology in Theology and Literature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 200), 144.

² Jacques Derrida, “Introduction” in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography : Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, translated by Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 33.

³ For example, John E. Colwell, *The Rhythm of Doctrine: A Liturgical Sketch of Christian Faith and Faithfulness* (Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007); Stanley Hauerwas, “The Liturgical Shape of the Christian Life: Teaching Christian Ethics as Worship,” in *In Good Company: The Church as Polis* (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), pp 153-68.

Jeremy Begbie and Catherine Pickstock. Begbie analyzes various dimensions of music, including rhythm, in order to draw out theological insights concerning the nature of reality.⁴ Nevertheless, his primary concern is not with the significance of rhythm for Christian doctrine as a general feature of the human encounter with the world, but with the contribution of music to theology more specifically. As such, his work does not involve an analysis of the nature and function of rhythm as part of reality more generally. Catherine Pickstock argues that the liturgical form is the appropriate form of thought and metaphysics.⁵ She therefore points to dimensions and features of rhythm, which are part of the human experience of liturgy, as having metaphysical and philosophical significance. In her concern for grounding attempts to make sense of reality in the movements of human experience and performance, Pickstock's project is similar to my own. Nevertheless, her concern is ultimately with one particular rhythm, that of the liturgy of the church, and more specifically of The Roman Rite, while my interest is in the theological significance of the fact of rhythm as such, the fact that rhythm is part of human experience and is bound up with how we make sense of the world. While I am specifically concerned with the impact that this category has on Christian doctrine rather than on religion in general, I am interested in what we can learn from the breadth of its manifestations such that liturgy is contextualized in the diversity of rhythms that it extends, transforms, and interrupts.

This project brings rhythm into the centre of the concerns of Christian theology by addressing two mutually-dependent questions, namely: "What, from a theological perspective, is rhythm?" and "How should the fact of human embedded-ness in rhythm influence Christian doctrine?" As will become apparent, the first question implies that rhythm is not a homogenous category. The way in which it is understood and described differs based on a variety of metaphysical commitments, such that I must first establish a

⁴ Jeremy Begbie, *Theology, Music and Time* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁵ Catherine Pickstock, *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).

conception of rhythm that is faithful both to human experience and to the Christian understanding of reality. These two questions are inseparable because thinking about rhythm from the perspective of theology requires a consideration of how the particular Christian perspective on reality influences one's interpretation of rhythm.

More than simply an attempt to understand the nature of rhythm from the perspective of Christian theology, however, this project is an argument for including rhythm in the performance of Christian theology more generally. In other words, I do not set out here simply to develop a definition of rhythm based in Christian theology, but to establish the importance of rhythm for thinking about doctrine, and in particular the doctrine of salvation. I do this for reasons that are similar to the reasons of those who have argued that theology must always be done in the context of liturgy, worship, prayer, and the like. That is, if rhythm is a significant part of both human existence in the world, and the Christian's relation to and experience of God, then Christian doctrine has a responsibility to grow out of and reflect this dimension of reality. My original contribution is thus an argument that rhythm is a theological category and not only an aesthetic one. Certain theologians and philosophers of religion, including Paul Fiddes⁶ and Raimon Panikkar,⁷ have recently used the category in their work. I supply an argument for such usage by demonstrating that rhythm is a category that is important to the doctrine of salvation because: (a) it is a pervasive dimension of human relationship and is therefore affected by salvation if salvation concerns human relationship, (b) the way in which one conceptualizes and deploys the category has theological consequences, and (c) it is conceptually illuminating regarding the nature of Christian salvation.

Demonstrating the theological significance of rhythm would also show that the form of Christian religious expression is not accidental but part of human participation in

⁶ Most recently in Paul Fiddes, *Seeing the World and Knowing God: Hebrew Wisdom and Christian Doctrine in a Late-Modern Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁷ Raimon Panikkar, *The Rhythm of Being: The Unbroken Trinity* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010).

salvation and therefore worthy of doctrinal consideration. Another way of putting this is that my attempt to make rhythm more central to the concerns of theology is part of the larger project of acknowledging non-written and non-discursive dimensions of Christian practice and expression as significant for theology. This is a concern that I share with Pickstock, as the title of her book, *After Writing*, suggests. Kimerer LaMothe is another example of someone engaged in such a project by making dance a resource for generating theory about religion.⁸ Attention to rhythm is another way to resist the tendency to privilege writing in the study of religion and in theology.

My focus on rhythm is one example of the recent move to include aesthetic categories in theology. Another notable example is that of the sublime. Certain twentieth and twenty-first century philosophers and theologians have considered the philosophical, political, and theological significance of the sublime, to which I refer in chapter three. As with the sublime, there is a significant discussion to be had regarding the nature of rhythm and the ways in which it might be an appropriate category for theology. Demonstrating that rhythm is a theological category contributes to breaking down the boundaries between the aesthetic and the doctrinal in theology. This approach, however, is different from that generally taken by studies in theology and the arts, which tends to analyze the theological significance of particular artistic mediums or artefacts, as with Jeremy Begbie. This project, in contrast, is interested in drawing attention to where this aesthetic category is operative in everyday life and in philosophical thought in order to reveal its theological consequences.

Discussion surrounding rhythm is taking place in several disciplines. It is not a category that I am inventing. Rather, I am entering into a live conversation and bringing theology into that conversation. This project swings between many different disciplines

⁸ Kimerer L. LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing: The Practice of Religious Studies* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press), 3.

and perspectives precisely because rhythm is a category that holds together philosophical, theological, aesthetic, and sociological approaches to the world. Despite this wide scope, however, it will become apparent that there are certain movements around which the discussion of rhythm tends to cluster, even across disciplines. In particular, the relationship between the movements of harmony and interruption is the central locus around which the conversation turns. Much of what follows, therefore, surrounds how these two movements and their relationship to one another ought to be conceptualized in the rhythms of Christian theology.

LaMothe defines religion as an oscillation between knowledge and experience.⁹ As will become apparent, the movement of oscillation is an important dimension of the nature of rhythm itself, such that doctrine that is rhythmic is likewise an oscillation between knowledge and experience. Consequently, this project begins its approach to rhythm from the human experience of rhythm, then swings to consider the more formal and abstract uses of rhythm in the development of various metaphysical descriptions of the world, then swings back again to demonstrate the role of rhythm in the experience and performance of Christian salvation. In the terms of the two questions aforementioned, I answer the question of what rhythm is by setting up a description of rhythm based on a phenomenology of the experience of rhythm and by analyzing the ways in which it is used to describe the nature of reality. I then articulate the Christian doctrine of salvation through this experience of and theory about rhythm, thereby demonstrating its theological significance.

The diversity of perspectives on which I will be drawing to make my argument requires that I say something about methodology. In particular, the thesis begins with a phenomenology of rhythm through the perspectives of poetry and sociology regarding

⁹ LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 16.

language and group-cohesion, and these discussions self-consciously involve the human experience of rhythm, rather than an attempt to define rhythm in abstract, ontological terms. Nevertheless, once this definition has been established I then move to consider how rhythm has been conceptualized and how it has functioned in various philosophical and theological approaches to the nature of reality, which one might call metaphysical in a broad sense. These two approaches to reality have sometimes been considered antithetical to one another, and both have at times been thought inappropriate to theology. The remainder of this introduction is therefore an account of why both of these approaches are appropriate to and mutually-implicating in an attempt to bring rhythm into theological discourse.

Rhythm and Human Experience

If theological criteria were the only means by which I evaluated the various uses and depictions of rhythm, then the resulting description would risk infidelity to the experience of rhythm in human life. An evaluation of the various descriptions of rhythm based only in theology could lead to a conception of rhythm that is unrecognizable to us and is thus for all practical purposes some other kind of movement or form. As such, the first chapter of this thesis is a phenomenology, a “cartography of experience,”¹⁰ of rhythm in human life.

Rhythm is difficult to see due to its proximity to experience. As with categories like space, time, language, and consciousness, rhythm is one of those phenomena in which the human experience of reality is steeped. Almost everything we do and the ways in which we understand the world are bathed in rhythmic movements. For example, different languages

¹⁰ John Caputo, “The Experience of God and the Axiology of the Impossible” in Kevin Hart and Barbara Eileen Wall, *The Experience of God: A Postmodern Response* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 20.

have distinct rhythms, and these rhythms are significant enough that languages with very different rhythms can be identified even when all other cues are removed.¹¹ Newborns are immediately sensitive to the rhythms of language. They are capable of discriminating languages *only* if those languages are of different rhythmic types, suggesting that rhythm is central to language acquisition.¹² We also tend to think about many of the processes in the body as rhythmic, such as circadian rhythms or oscillations in the brain. The fact of rhythm's immediacy makes it important as an arguably irreducible and indispensable dimension of what it means to be human, but it also makes it difficult to obtain enough critical distance so as to be able to see what it is.

I am approaching a description of rhythm from within human experience precisely because of this inextricability. To assume that one could give an account of rhythm independent of how it functions in our everyday experience would be naïve. What I mean by experience here is not a Jamesian religious experience narrowly defined as individual, associated with feeling, and different from ordinary life.¹³ Nor do I mean, however, a thin understanding of experience as the perception of stimuli that can be used as an authority on which to make claims about a world understood to be outside the self.¹⁴ In fact, I think it is impossible to know whether the pervasiveness of rhythm in experience is due to its being a pattern of the natural world that humans, embedded in such patterns, perceive, exhibit, and imitate, or whether it is simply a feature of the human mind and body through which we

¹¹ Aniruddh D. Patel, *Music, Language, and the Brain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 136.

¹² Iain McGilchrist, *The Master and his Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World* (New Haven CN: Yale University Press, 2009), 103; Patel, *Music, Language and the Brain*, 137. Thierry Nazzi, Josiane Bertoncini, and Jacques Mehler "Language Discrimination by Newborns: Toward an Understanding of the Role of Rhythm," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 24 3 (1998): 756-766; Thierry Nazzi, Peter W. Juszyk, Elizabeth K. Johnson, "Language Discrimination by English-Learning 5-Month Olds: Effects of Rhythm and Familiarity," *Journal of Memory and Language* 43 1 (2000): 1-19; Jacques Mehler et al., "A Precursor of Language Acquisition in Young Infants," *Cognition* 29 (1988): 143-178.

¹³ William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature* (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1902), 6, 31, 334-5, 501. Charles Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 4-7.

¹⁴ Janack points out that this approach to experience as a scientific authority promoted by certain logical positivists is problematic in that it assumes experience to be free of interpretation or ideology. Marianne Janack, *What We Mean By Experience* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 4.

make sense of and interpret the world. There are arguments for both theories. In theories of language, for example, Peter Auer argues based on Gestalt-psychological research that the mind relies on rhythmic pattern-making, evidenced by the fact that series of stimuli are always rhythmically grouped in perception.¹⁵ Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen likewise suggests that rhythm in speech is only a perceptual and not an acoustic phenomenon.¹⁶ James Bunn, on the other hand, argues that rhythm is part of the fundamental physical pattern of the wave, which has replaced matter as the basis of physical reality. Speech is rhythmic not simply because the mind organizes perceptions through the lens of rhythm, but because it is performed in and through physical bodies and carrier-waves, all of which are based on the fundamental rhythmic pattern of the wave.¹⁷ Both of these theories are based in empirical research, and I do not think that we are required to decide between them. The advantage of understanding rhythm through human experience is precisely that it does not require us to artificially divide human perception from the world and allocate features to one or the other.

Thus, in locating rhythm in human experience, I am pointing to its embedded-ness in the encounter between self and world. The subject of experience knows the world not as a mirror but as a field of opportunities and barriers through active engagement, and objects and forces in the world are given meaning through this engagement.¹⁸ Human experience refers not primarily to what is experienced but to *how* humans experience the world, namely as possibilities, situations, and contexts for action, rather than as mere stimuli. Experience is thus an approach to reality that recognizes that the meaning the human person brings to a situation or environment and the influence of that situation or

¹⁵ Peter Auer, Frank Müller, and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, *Language in Time: The Rhythm and Tempo of Spoken Interaction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5.

¹⁶ Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen, *English Speech Rhythm: Form and Function in Everyday Verbal Interaction* (Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1993), 14.

¹⁷ James H. Bunn, *Wave Forms: A Natural Syntax for Rhythmic Language* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 1.

¹⁸ Janack, *What We Mean By Experience*, 154-8.

environment on the person are inextricable.¹⁹ In other words, I do not use experience to refer to a special kind of knowledge or event, but something more like ordinariness, and in particular the relational dimension of such ordinariness.

Jean Mouroux, a twentieth-century theologian, expresses something like what I mean in describing experience as “the act through which the person becomes aware of himself [or herself] in relation to the world, himself [herself], or God,”²⁰ rather than a thin, passively-received barrage of sensations, or a construct of the mind’s omnipotence. Experience is more like a structure generated by the relationships between different moments of activity and reception. He says:

Any attempt to describe the main lines of this structure, with all its subtle ramifications, would involve the whole problem of the communion between human beings; but we may say that any experience inevitably has some sort of structure; that it is a tissue of relations; that it is always inserted into the movement by which we achieve our own self-realization – if it is not the movement itself; and that on every level of reality one needs to make a detailed analysis of this structure, these relationships, this movement.²¹

Notice first that experience for Mouroux is not independent or self-referential, but an awareness of something prior, which Mouroux calls “life.” Second, this experience for Mouroux involves both structure and movement, which are rhythmic qualities.

This inextricability of self and world is appropriate for the way in which rhythm is bound up with self, environment, and the relation between the two, as in Woolf’s *The Waves*. In approaching rhythm from this perspective, I am indicating that the nature of rhythm cannot be known independently of a human’s interaction with it and its function in that human’s environment. Insofar as experience is this inextricable dialectic between self and environment, rhythm itself cannot be understood aside from this encounter. Rather

¹⁹ Janack, *What We Mean By Experience*, 162-175.

²⁰ Jean Mouroux, *The Christian Experience: An Introduction to a Theology* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 11.

²¹ Mouroux, *The Christian Experience*, 13.

than questioning what rhythm is, ontologically speaking, and whether or not and how it really exists, an approach to rhythm that considers its importance to be its role in human experience is more interested in how rhythm is encountered, and interpreted, and how it functions in various emotional, relational, religious, or other situations important for human existence in the world.

One might object that since this thesis is interested in making rhythm a part of Christian doctrine, it is inappropriate to base an understanding of this rhythm in human experience because doctrine itself cannot be based in experience. This would be the argument of someone like George Lindbeck who points out that there is no common core of human experience and it is thus not a stable ground for doctrine or a measure against which doctrine can be judged. Rather, since all experience is determined by one's language and is therefore both public and local, doctrine must function more like communally authoritative rules of discourse that guide the language through which religious experience is constructed and conceptualized.²² Such a position is in part a response to thinkers like Schleiermacher, who attempted to appeal precisely to common human experience as the basis of religion.²³

Lindbeck, however, objects to a very particular conception of experience, namely the individual and emotional kind of religious experience identified by James and Schleiermacher. While Lindbeck is right that there is no single universal experience to which one could appeal, he nevertheless sets up a universal form of the nature of experience, namely its determination by language. However, Lindbeck's understanding of this linguistic dependence is problematic because he unquestioningly accepts the division between inner experience and external religious and cultural factors. As a result, he simply

²² George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (London: SPCK, 1984), 32-41.

²³ Thomas M. Kelly, *Theology at the Void: The Retrieval of Experience* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 73.

reverses the situation,²⁴ making language the foundation of experience, and thereby failing to acknowledge that language is itself experiential, albeit in a communal way. This conclusion is based on his approach to language as a semiotic system, which reduces language to its semantic content.²⁵

Lindbeck's position is challenged by the research mentioned above, which shows that rhythm itself is a significant and indispensable dimension of language understood not in terms of a system of signs but in terms of how it functions in everyday life to make communication possible. Language is only learned in relationship and is therefore always already embedded in experience.²⁶ I will return to this point in chapter one, but for now I want to draw attention to the fact that if experience is understood not as a foundation of individual emotion on which to build knowledge but as the encounter between self and world, then languages and the rhythms that they involve are included within experience. Thus, while doctrine cannot be based in experience in any foundationalist way, it ought nevertheless to be faithful to the form of experience as the intertwining of self and world in which the divine is encountered. Such faithfulness requires an attentiveness to the means by which these encounters take place, such as language and, as this project endeavours to demonstrate, rhythm. So I am not arguing for rhythm as an experiential foundation for doctrine, but for an awareness on the part of doctrine about how the human participates in the reality in which God is encountered.

Another, I think legitimate, concern regarding the appeal to human experience is the risk of compromising God's transcendence or otherness by making him simply another feature of that experience. On this basis, Jean Yves-Lacoste suggests that the liturgy in

²⁴ Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, 33-34.

²⁵ This is how Lindbeck ends up with the problem of not being able to explain how the culturally-linguistically foreign texts of scripture are mediated and interpreted are mediated to present cultural-linguistic situations, as Kelly points out. Kelly, *Theology at the Void*, 88.

²⁶ Lindbeck himself admits this relational and communal dimension of language, Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine*, 37-38.

which the human relates to God is a transgression of the field of experience. There can be no equivocation between the way in which God is present to the human and the way in which other things are present. As such, knowledge of God cannot be based on experience.²⁷ However, notice that my objective here is not to derive an account of God himself from human experience. Rather, my objective is to give an account of rhythm in experience for the purpose of beginning a conversation about how this facet of experience is operative in the relationship between God and creature. In fact, I will argue that part of the way in which the rhythms of experience appear in the relation between God and creature is precisely in their own interruption.²⁸ Lacoste himself acknowledges that the interruption to experience that occurs in the liturgy happens precisely from within experience.²⁹ Experience is not overturned, but it is relativized.³⁰

Nicholas Lash warns against isolating doctrine about God from the world, saying that, “It only seems easy to speak about our experience and knowledge of God and his ways in the measure that we insulate our religious speech and theological imagination from the endlessly complex and disturbing world in which that speech finds reference.”³¹ Moreover, the point of the gospel is that God makes a difference to reality. God is thus a difference from the world that nevertheless appears within and has an effect on the world.

²⁷ Jean-Yves Lacoste, *Experience and the Absolute: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man*, trans. Mark Raftery-Skehan (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2004), 22, 43, 45, 47. Interestingly, the fact that God cannot be experienced is in part due to the difference between himself and all created being and this is sometimes articulated by saying that we experience God more intimately than we experience other things in the world as the very condition of experience itself (see, for example, David Bentley Hart, *The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss* (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press), 9-10, 15, 44). However, Lacoste points out that the inexperience of God is also due to the nature of Christian eschatology, such that this inexperience is also painful and provisional and thus points forward to the full presence of the *parousia* (145). As I will argue in the final chapter, rhythm captures this double-dimension of the relation between the God’s immanence to experience and God’s absence particularly well.

²⁸ This also applies to another criticism of the category of experience, namely its presupposition of the subject (Hart, “Introduction,” *The Experience of God*, 2). I have, I hope, in part allayed such fears by classifying human experience as a broader and more integrated category, rather than the possession of a lone subject. However, besides this, a later chapter will demonstrate how rhythm in particular is a facet of experience that cannot be grasped by the subject thereby interrupting it, providing a way of thinking about a particular kind of experience that does bring the subject into question.

²⁹ Lacoste, *Experience and the Absolute*, 22.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 143.

³¹ Nicholas Lash, *Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 217.

We know God to be making a difference in and through our human communities.³² My appeal to human experience in describing the nature of rhythm is part of the project of describing the world in which humans act and understand themselves and how God is both within and beyond this world of human experience, thereby making a difference to it. Thus, while an encounter with God may reset the nature of experience itself and may appear as a rupture or disturbance such that God himself is not had as an experience, such disturbance nevertheless always happens within the medium of experience insofar as it happens to the human creature.³³ An inquiry into how rhythm is operative in salvation asks about a particular dimension of the reality in which God is encountered and how its configuration by that encounter forms the experience of salvation.

Nevertheless, this position still leaves the question of how one can obtain enough distance from rhythm in order to be able to say anything about it. Rather than attempting to abstract myself from rhythm in order to analyze it from the outside, I approach the nature of rhythm through those artistic encounters in which it is foregrounded. Chapter one of this thesis begins by defining rhythm on the basis of the human experience of poetry and then widens to identify where and how this rhythm is operative in other everyday encounters.

Rhythm and Metaphysics

Chapters two through five of the thesis go on to consider how various approaches to metaphysics, theological and otherwise, have made use of rhythm in describing the nature of reality as a whole. My analysis of these various conceptions demonstrates that different approaches and uses of the category have different theological consequences, which lends support to my argument that rhythm is a significant category for Christian

³² Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 227-230.

³³ Hart, "The Experience of the Kingdom of God" in *The Experience of God*, 72-81.

doctrine. Moreover, as I will show, the ways in which rhythm is defined and deployed by various philosophers and theologians in their metaphysics can be classified and analyzed according to the same ways in which theorists approach the rhythm of poetry. This suggests that there is continuity between theory regarding rhythm in poetry and theory regarding rhythm as a part of reality more generally, which means that the same sorts of evaluations used with respect to poetic rhythm can also be applied to rhythm in philosophy.

Nevertheless, there are those who believe that a concern with human experience is incompatible with metaphysics. For example, Nietzsche objects to metaphysics by saying that, “One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole – there exists nothing which could judge, measure, compare, condemn our being for that would be to judge, measure, compare, condemn the whole ... But nothing exists apart from the whole.”³⁴ Nietzsche is pointing to the fact that the processes of judgement and comparison on which metaphysics depends are impossible because they presuppose a distance from the whole of immanent reality, or experience in other words, which we cannot attain. Metaphysics is objectionable insofar as it depends on a transcendence of such experience in order to give an account of the whole. Metaphysical systematizations are illusions that hide the vitality and chaos of life.³⁵ From the analytic tradition, Carnap objects to metaphysics on the basis that it entails propositions about the essence of things that are not predicated on either experience or a linguistic framework, the only two sources of knowledge. Statements about the nature and reality of the world as a whole cannot be

³⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale and Michael Tanner (London: Penguin, 2003), 65.

³⁵ Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, 35-46. See also A. W. Moore, *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 376-7. Interestingly, as I will argue in chapter two, despite this assertion Nietzsche sometimes makes grand claims about the nature of reality as if he were in a position from which to see the whole.

verified by experience.³⁶ Once experience becomes the basis of truth, metaphysics, defined as assertions about reality that are not verifiable by such experience, becomes impossible. These two thinkers, while very different, both consider experience and metaphysics to be at odds with one another because the latter makes reference to things that transcend experience. This leads to the question: does giving an account of rhythm based in the human experience of it in poetry, language, and relationship make such an account incompatible with a metaphysical approach, which is often considered an abstraction from such experience?

The validity of these objections is of course contingent upon definitions of both metaphysics and experience. Carnap's objection only stands if one accepts a verificationist understanding of experience, which I rejected in the previous section due to the fact that experience is not simply the confrontation of subject and object but includes a field of situations and forces – desires, aversions, expectations – that make up an environment. Experience thus always includes a particular, albeit sometimes unreflective, way of making sense of one's environment more generally, which is arguably a metaphysical enterprise.

With respect to the definition of metaphysics, A. W. Moore proposes that "Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things,"³⁷ which, he points out, assumes that while it is possible to debate how enquiry ought to or can be done, on what sorts of subject matter, and in relation to which other disciplines, it is not possible to argue that it cannot be pursued at all.³⁸ It might also be possible on this definition for a person to be engaged in metaphysics in a way that does not normally appear as metaphysics, or without thinking of his or her enterprise as metaphysics.³⁹ To make sense of things is simply to try to understand their meaning or purpose; to do so in the most general way is to

³⁶ Rudolf Carnap, *Philosophy and Logical Syntax* (Thoemes Press: Bristol, 1996), 15-3.

³⁷ A. W. Moore, *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 4.

include an account of what it means to make sense of something.⁴⁰ Nietzsche and Carnap are both engaged in projects of this sort. Nietzsche self-consciously attempts to give an account of how one can make sense of reality without transcendence. He argues that it is impossible to make sense of things from a point of disinterest. Rather, we do so in relation to our needs, values, interests, and the like, such that making sense of the world is simply part of acting out a particular life by negotiating the world's contingencies.⁴¹ In other words, making sense of things is heavily bound up with experience.

Thus, while some suggest that metaphysics is unrelated to experience, this is not necessarily the case. The previous discussion regarding human experience shows that questions regarding the role and nature of experience play a large part in debates surrounding how we can or ought to make sense of things. Rhythm is therefore included in one's attempts to make sense of things as part of human experience, rather than as an abstract category in an enterprise divorced from such experience. Several philosophers and theologians have already used rhythm in an attempt to make sense of reality. Some of these attempts include challenges to central tenets of traditional metaphysics or efforts to disrupt claims made about reality as a whole without setting up much of an alternative. However, such arguments are part of the larger discussion of what it means to make sense of things in general, and in new, creative, and better ways. The fact that various approaches to making sense of reality use rhythm for different purposes suggests that rhythm is not merely a passive dimension of reality to be made sense of, nor a transparent tool. Rather, it is involved in the most general level of the conversation regarding how one ought to approach the business of making sense of reality.

⁴⁰ Moore, *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics*, 5, 7.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 379-381. Moore makes similar arguments for other notorious critics of metaphysics including Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Derrida. All of these authors are attempting to give an account of how we can make sense of things. Moore believes Derrida presents the most formidable challenge to metaphysics by asking not whether it can be done but whether the enterprise is worthwhile or destructive. I argue something similar in chapter three by associating Derrida, Agamben, and Kristeva with a refusal to give an account of the whole and instead making sense of human experience, thought, and community only.

I have organized the various ways of using and making sense of rhythm into three broad categories: synchronic, diachronic, and oscillating. Chapters two and three examine the way in which rhythm functions in twentieth and twenty-first century continental philosophy, or what is sometimes broadly called “postmodernism.” I demonstrate that rhythm plays two different roles. For thinkers such as Henri Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Martin Heidegger, rhythm functions as a way of holding disparate dimensions of reality together in an improvised whole that is always in motion. This is what I describe as a synchronic approach to rhythm. Others – Giorgio Agamben, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Julia Kristeva – have little interest in the whole and are more concerned to locate gaps within constructed wholes. Rhythm is a way of indicating such gaps and their relation to the wholes that they disrupt. This is a more diachronic approach. My theological evaluation of these two approaches is in part based on the theology of the mid-twentieth-century Jesuit, Erich Przywara, who uses the category of rhythm regularly in putting forward his own metaphysics. I therefore turn to his oscillating approach in the fourth and fifth chapters, first by distinguishing it from rhythm as it is understood in an “Augustinian musical ontology,” and then by demonstrating how Przywara incorporates the best of the previously-considered approaches while avoiding their problems. The terms on which I evaluate the metaphysical role of rhythm are according to how well various descriptions accord with the experience of rhythm in poetic and relational encounters, and with how well they indicate the movement and encounter with transcendence within that immanent experience in a way consistent with the requirements of Christian theology, which I lay out in the next section.

The question of transcendence poses particular challenges for theology. Is it possible for theology to coherently maintain God’s transcendence? Moore points out the impossibility of distinguishing between immanent and transcendent without already

making sense of the transcendent in some way, thereby compromising its transcendence.⁴² He sees this happening paradigmatically in Kant who claims that the conditions of our knowledge are absolute, yet assumes a position outside those conditions in order to make this assertion about the nature of things in themselves (i.e. that we can only make sense of things by looking through certain “spectacles”).⁴³ Jean-Luc Marion makes a similar criticism of those metaphysical and phenomenological ways of speaking about God’s transcendence in which Being determines God to be an infinite being and therefore defines and determines God in God’s transcendence.⁴⁴

While some argue that God is better served by simply rejecting the concept of transcendence altogether, this is unsatisfactory if, for reasons that I lay out in chapter two, this means reducing God either to a character in history or to the whole itself. However, Marion identifies a different way of thinking about transcendence, one that is already contained within Moore’s problem. As Moore rightly identifies, insofar as God is transcendent, God is impossible. It is not possible for God to be in any way accessible by reason, concept, intuition, imagination, or experience, such that the very act of even positing a transcendent is an impossibility. Marion identifies that this means that we always already think about the transcendent in terms of its impossibility, and not that we do not think about transcendence at all. The transcendent remains as a question and a paradox, as the possibility of an impossibility, and that which is therefore beyond the limits of the impossible. God, understood as transcendent, is that for which the impossible is possible.⁴⁵ Marion thus contends that one can in this way make an assertion about the transcendent God without ever stepping outside the immanent because from the

⁴² Moore, *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics*, 10.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 139, 141.

⁴⁴ Jean-Luc Marion, “The Impossible for Man – God,” in Michael J. Scanlon and John D. Caputo, *Transcendence and Beyond: A Postmodern Inquiry* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007), 17-18.

⁴⁵ Marion, “The Impossible for Man – God,” 24-27.

perspective of the immanent, God remains the impossible. Impossibility itself is the mark of God's difference from the immanent.⁴⁶ As such, transcendence remains a metaphysical question because it is a question about how we can make sense of something impossible.

Przywara approaches the idea of God from the perspective of metaphysics similarly to Marion, under the phrase "similarity in ever-greater dissimilarity" from the Fourth Lateran Council. Marion too quotes the Fourth Lateran Council, saying "Despite its title, Erich Przywara's *Analogia Entis*... has indicated this in an exceptionally strong fashion," where "this" refers to the fact that the name of God only designates an absence in which we are inscribed.⁴⁷ What Marion here indicates is that the nature of Przywara's metaphysical approach to God is dynamic rather than conceptual. Thus, with respect to God, metaphysics is "an entry into the mystery of God in order more deeply 'to grasp his incomprehensibility as such'."⁴⁸ Przywara says that this dynamic cannot be reduced to a concept.⁴⁹ It is a moving habitation within the impossibility of a similarity in ever greater dissimilarity.

As will become evident, rhythm is very much caught up with the relation between immanence and transcendence, and it proves helpful for thinking about this relation beyond current, entrenched positions. In particular, rhythm makes clearer how one might encounter and participate in something without understanding it as object. One of its contributions to theology is a way of making the idea of transcendence viable by pointing to movements such as surprise and oscillation, rather than an object as such. Rhythm represents a dimension of human experience that is taken beyond itself into participation in the transcendent in a way that enables us not to see the transcendent as such, but to see the

⁴⁶ Marion, "The Impossible for Man – God," 28.

⁴⁷ Jean-Luc Marion, *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 17-18.

⁴⁸ Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm*, trans. John R. Betz and David Bentley Hart (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2015), 181E/87G. All German citations are from Erich Przywara, *Analogia Entis: Metaphysik in Schriften* vol 3 (Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1962).

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 183E/89G.

nature of the movement that participation in and encounter with the transcendent makes possible.⁵⁰

Rhythm and Salvation

If the first five chapters of the thesis work towards answering the question “What, from a theological perspective, is rhythm?” first by describing how rhythm functions in the human experience of encounter, and second in exploring its role in how we make sense of things, the final chapter begins to answer the question “How should the fact of human embedded-ness in rhythm influence Christian doctrine?” Nevertheless, I cannot exhaustively demonstrate the significance of rhythm for all Christian doctrine in a project of this length. While the discussion touches on many different doctrines, including the Trinity, christology, creation, ecclesiology, and eschatology, it does not explore the role of rhythm for these doctrines exhaustively. Instead, I have chosen to focus explicitly on the doctrine of Christian salvation.

My choice to emphasize salvation is based on two considerations related to human experience and metaphysics as described in this introduction. First, the doctrine of salvation is about the shape of the encounter between human and divine, not to the exclusion of other doctrines, but as that which influences how these other doctrines are constructed and interpreted. The incarnation, and the events of the crucifixion and resurrection, are the places in the Christian narrative at which the relationship between God and the human creature is focused to a point. If salvation is a matter of enabling the human, and creation more generally, to be what it is, then our understanding of what this looks like will influence how we think about creation, the church, and creation’s relationship to the

⁵⁰ Kevin Hector, *Theology Without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 129. Hector puts forward a similar approach, arguing that metaphysical concepts are not applied to God but taken up into God, thus referring to him only by participating in him.

Trinity. As Mouroux points out above, experience is secondary to life, and life, from the perspective of Christianity, is being in relation to God. To grasp one's self in relation to God, to have experience of that relation, is to place experience within the structure of that relation, which is determined by Christ.⁵¹ The doctrine of salvation describes this "structure" or "tissue of relations" that is life in Christ as an account of how creation, and in particular the human creature, is affected by its encounter with God in Jesus Christ. Since rhythm is a dimension of human life and experience, the theological significance of this rhythm is best seen at this point of encounter between human and divine that enables the human to be most fully itself. Unpacking the role of rhythm in this process and encounter involves understanding how rhythm is taken up, interrupted, and reconfigured in its encounter with the divine when Christ is at the centre of that human experience.

Second, as will become apparent, the conception of rhythm that one adopts has immediate implications for how salvation is understood. For example, and in anticipation of a later discussion, if rhythm is thought to be theologically significant but is understood only as a kind of metaphysical glue that holds things together, then its role will be limited to unifying God and creature, resulting in a simplistic unification that does not do justice to the doctrine of eschatology or to the ongoing human experience of suffering and oppression. In other words, the way in which rhythm is conceptualized as a part of making sense of things has implications for the resulting relation between immanent and transcendent in one's doctrine of salvation. The account of rhythm that theology adopts is therefore answerable to the depiction of salvation to which it leads. How one conceptualizes rhythm matters precisely because of the resulting understanding of salvation that this conception makes possible.

⁵¹ Mouroux, *The Christian Experience*, 363-365.

The idea of salvation has a very wide scope. It includes the idea of an authentic life for individuals and communities, the healing of broken relationships, both within and between social groups, the overcoming or restoration of corrupt systems, and the healing of and reconciliation with our bodies and creation at large. Christianity narrows this focus by insisting that these healings are dependent upon the restoration of the relationship between God and the human, and that this restoration is based in the specific events of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection.⁵² As Paul Fiddes says, "The Christian view of salvation thus moves, in what may seem a scandalous manner, away from general truths about the nature of existence to a very particular moment within it. Salvation, or the healing of life, issues from atonement, and this in turn has its basis in the cross of Christ."⁵³ The Christian approach to salvation therefore bases its description of what it means to be a healthy human being in Christ as the paragon of restored and healthy humanity and in the events of incarnation, cross and resurrection through which he makes this way of life available to all. I argue that if rhythm is part of human life, then doctrine about what salvation is ought to include a description of the sorts of rhythms appropriate to the human being that is in Christ.

This is not to say that there is a single monolithic doctrine of salvation, but that doctrines and conceptualizations are put forward as attempts to account for how certain dimensions of salvation hold together, which include the following: as mentioned above, a Christian account of salvation must centre around Jesus Christ, and in particular be based in the events of his incarnation, death, and resurrection, and give an account of how these events are effective across time. A Christian doctrine of salvation must affirm that the human creature is both brought into a relationship of intimacy with God, since the nature of salvation is such that its source lies beyond the creature, while also affirming that the

⁵² Paul S. Fiddes, *Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1989), 3-4.

⁵³ Fiddes, *Past Event and Present Salvation*, 4.

human creature is saved for its own proper nature and reality and is not simply absorbed as this would overturn the goodness of God's creation. Since the Christian God is Trinitarian, an account of the relationship between God and creature must include a recognition of the involvement of all three persons or movements of the Trinity. The idea of salvation assumes that there is something from which creation is saved, usually called sin, and that sin is powerful enough to require a salvation that originates from beyond creation; a simple self-improvement on the part of creation is insufficient. The idea of sin requires that the otherness or transcendence of God be recognized in some way if salvation from a force too strong for creation's own powers is to be effective. Finally, the ongoing experiences of suffering and oppression in the world require that a Christian doctrine of salvation is able to both acknowledge that the full presence, consummation, or experience of this salvation is not yet at hand, while also articulating how a relationship of intimacy with God makes a real difference to individual and corporate existence in the world.

Notice that plenty of room for disagreement regarding how these dimensions ought to be understood and held together remains. For example, there are many ways of thinking about God's transcendence and likewise, there are many ways of describing the nature of sin, the role of Christ, and the atonement.⁵⁴ As such, my evaluation of rhythm on the basis of the doctrine of salvation to which it leads is not based on a single denominational interpretation, but on how well various accounts hold the aforementioned elements together.

To inquire about the rhythm of salvation is to investigate how salvation forms the quality and nature of rhythm as a dimension of human experience, of the "tissue of relationship," it is to ask about how this dimension of experience is reconfigured through an encounter with God. However, it is also an attempt to make sense of the encounter

⁵⁴ For a good discussion of the various conceptualizations of both sin and the atonement, see Paul Fiddes, *Past Event and Present Salvation*, 10.

between God and the human creature at the most general level, to give a metaphysical account, in other words, through the category of rhythm. In answer to the question that the final chapter begins to address regarding how human embedded-ness in rhythm impacts doctrine, I argue that rhythm enables us to glimpse how the salvific encounter with God in Christ makes a difference to the fabric of experience without compromising God's otherness and transcendence by re-framing the doctrine as a description of intersecting movements. It is an approach to the doctrine that considers how salvation moves, rather than what salvation is. Rather than a position of distance or transcendence from which the nature of salvation can simply be circumscribed, approaching salvation through rhythm involves locating oneself within ongoing movements in order to articulate their intersections, necessitating the oscillations appropriate to a creaturely voice that is attempting to come to an awareness of the life made possible in relation to God. These three dimensions of rhythm as a theological category – its role in experience, its use in metaphysics, and its significance for salvation – form the structure of this thesis and, as I have endeavoured to show in this introduction, are all mutually-implicating.

Chapter 1 A Phenomenology of Rhythm

Am I not, as I walk, trembling with strange oscillations and vibrations of sympathy, which, unmoored as I am from a private being, bid me embrace these engrossed flocks...
Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*, 74

There are two factors that make the category of rhythm difficult to define. First, rhythm's immediacy to human experience makes it difficult to simply abstract ourselves from it and analyze it as an object of investigation. Second, rhythm is not a homogeneous category but contains many different definitions and perspectives, in part because it traverses many different practices, disciplines, and ways of speaking. A survey from 1986 catalogued 200 definitions and descriptions of rhythm in Western musical history alone.

¹ However, the term can also refer to such vastly different musical arrangements as Western tonal music, chant, and the polyrhythms of African or Indian music. There are likewise many theories regarding poetic rhythm, and this is to say nothing of dance, biology, ritual, and the like.

Nevertheless, these obstacles do not mean that it is impossible to say anything about rhythm. We may not be able to circumscribe the category absolutely, to define it as

¹¹ Haili You, "Defining Rhythm: Aspects of an Anthropology of Rhythm," *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry* 18, 3 (1994): 362.

such, but the fact that we nevertheless have some intuitive sense of what rhythm is suggests that we can at least say something meaningful about the human encounter with and experience of rhythm. My description will have to be both sufficiently broad to encompass the many ways in which rhythm is used and spoken about, while also sufficiently narrow to be able to distinguish rhythm from non-rhythmic instances of movement. One way to do this is to consider those human experiences in which rhythm is foregrounded. As such, this chapter provides a phenomenology of rhythm in human experience by considering the human encounter with poetry as a reference point within experience from which to identify certain characteristics that distinguish rhythm from other sorts of movement. Poetry is speech or text in which rhythm is foregrounded, and even if not everyone agrees about what poetic rhythm is, one would be hard-pressed to find someone who did not think that poetry is rhythmic in some sense. Thus, considering the various theories of what poetic rhythm is, we can start to get a handle on the sorts of occurrences around which discussions concerning rhythm centre and propose a description based on the sorts of considerations that theories regarding poetic rhythm must take into account. Understanding the nature of rhythm based on the phenomenological experience of it in poetry allows us to consider rhythm more directly while not artificially isolating it from human experience.

However, in order to provide a phenomenology of rhythm, a map of how it operates in human experience more widely, I then widen the lens to consider where such rhythm appears in experience more generally, how it functions, and what it makes possible. In keeping with the idea of experience as encounter, I focus on how rhythm operates in encounters between persons, both inter-personally and in and between larger social groups. There is a significant degree of coherence between how rhythm operates in poetry and how it operates in relationship through language, dance, and social action.

Rhythm in Poetry

Theorists are by no means agreed on what the rhythm of a poem is, especially since it is a term that is applied to many different kinds of poetry.² Nevertheless, these theories can be grouped into two broad categories: the diachronic approach and the synchronic approach. The diachronic approach to rhythm foregrounds the temporal experience of rhythm, while the synchronic describes rhythm from the outside as a pattern of interlocking shapes. I argue that rhythm involves both of these dimensions such that my description of rhythm involves an oscillation between these perspectives. While I begin with the synchronic perspective in describing its use in metaphysics in chapter two since it is the more common perspective in philosophy, I begin here with the diachronic because it brings out the dimensions of rhythm which are most familiar, such as its association with meter.

The Diachronic Perspective

One of the primary emphases of many diachronic theories of poetic rhythm is periodicity: an intermittent interruption to the flow of time and experience, such that time moves forward through an alternation between strong and weak beats, or between the beginning and ending of the lines. I call these theories diachronic because they draw attention to the way in which the reader or hearer experiences the movement of time as the poem is progressing.

Much of the discussion in theories that focus on periodicity centres on the relationship between metre and rhythm. Metre is almost as variable a category as rhythm.

While poetic metre is traditionally understood in terms of metric feet based on syllables

² See the introduction of Richard D. Cureton, *Rhythmic Phrasing in English Verse* (London: Longman, 1992), 7-70 for a good overview of the various theories of poetic rhythm. Schools of thought include the traditional Foot-substitution prosodists; Temporalists, who divide verse into measures; Slavic metrists, which apply analytical and statistical tools to metre conceptualized as a normative distribution; Intonationalists; and the generative metrists, which judge well-formed verse according to positions within the text's linguistic structure. 7-70.

and composed of alternations between *arsis* and *thesis*,³ as with Augustine, whom we will consider in a subsequent chapter, there are many ways of representing metre. Some argue that the traditional approach is so abstract that it bears almost no relation to metre as it is felt, namely as beat and accent.⁴ Nevertheless, whichever definition one adopts, metre is always based on the concept of periodicity: the alternation between strong and weak, whether of syllables or of beats. Derek Attridge, arguably the foremost theorist of periodic rhythm, says that in poetry, metre emerges from the nature of language itself, such that its definition varies based on the language of composition. In English, as in many other languages, there exists a tension between two kinds of energy pulses, or alternations between strong and weak – syllables on the one hand, and stress or accent on the other.⁵ In regular speech, syllables accommodate themselves to stress, while in a poem with a strong beat, the alternations of syllable and stress match up, such that the verbal accent falls on some of the strongest of these syllables. In between these two extremes are a variety of configurations of the interaction of these two alternations.⁶ The variable energy required to articulate syllables is accented according to factors such as the sound of individual words or the conceptual or emotional content of the words.⁷ Here, metre represents the periodic alternation of strong and weak beats, while rhythm is generated in the interplay of regularity and irregularity,⁸ and out of the interface between two movements, thereby

³ *Arsis* and *thesis* refer respectively to the longer, accented and the lighter, shorter syllables of a poetic foot (combination of two or more long and short syllables). Encyclopedia Britannica “arsis and thesis,” <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/36376/arsis-and-thesis> (accessed 29/04/2014).

⁴ See Derek Attridge, *Moving Words: Forms of English Poetry* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 111, and Philip Hobsbaum, *Metre, Rhythm and Verse Form* (London: Routledge, 1996), 5. Attridge’s approach to poetic rhythm is currently the most respected. His work is important because he is the first to base his analysis of poetic rhythm both on its relationship to the English language rather than on classical foot scansion, which originated from another language, and on its embedded-ness in bodily experience. In his later work, Attridge distances himself from the language of metre since it has been traditionally associated with foot scansion and elicits a dualistic opposition to rhythm that Attridge is eager to avoid. However, Cureton points out that Attridge’s concern with periodicity is essentially an interest in the metric dimensions of rhythm (which are not the only ones), *Rhythmic Phrasing in English Verse*, 95-98.

⁵ Attridge, *Moving Words*, 112.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 189.

⁷ Alfred Corn, *The Poem’s Heartbeat: A Manual of Prosody* (Brownsville, OR: Story Line Press, 1998), 3.

⁸ Corn, *The Poem’s Heartbeat*, 6.

creating “a continuous movement in time, given forward impetus by a series of alternations.”⁹ The emphasis here is on the way in which the time of the poem moves forward.

Some theorists consider rhythm and metre to be opposed to one another, the former representing organic movement and the latter a mechanistic grid.¹⁰ It is currently fashionable to throw off metre because it is perceived to be a sign of hegemony and colonialism.¹¹ Others argue that metre is not opposed to rhythm, but is itself a part of the organic process of rhythm,¹² which sometimes includes rejecting the language of metre while retaining its function (periodicity, regularity).¹³ Those who identify regularity and irregularity as two dimensions of one rhythm helpfully demonstrate that these are not two opposed movements but two dimensions that conspire together towards a certain effect. However, the reduction of metre to rhythm also obscures the fact of non-metrical rhythm, that it is possible for rhythm to be generated by movements other than periodicity. The question surrounding the relationship between rhythm and metre is not whether metric and non-metric verse are both rhythmic – all prosodists concede that both are – but which one is primary and which is merely a variation or a sub-set of the other.

Those who emphasize periodicity would argue that even in poetry which does not involve metre (narrowly-defined), there is always some form of periodicity. For example, in French and Japanese, languages in which there is no second kind of stress-accent, rhythm is based only on the alternation between the language’s strong and weak syllables.¹⁴ Another example, of course, is free-verse which, though it is not structured

⁹ Attridge, *Moving Words*, 150.

¹⁰ Hobsbaum, *Metre, Rhythm and Verse Form*, 5.

¹¹ Aviram Amittai, “The Meaning of Rhythm” in *Between Philosophy and Poetry: Writing, Rhythm, History*, ed. Massimo Verdicchio and Robert Burch (London: Continuum, 2002), 164-65.

¹² Christopher Francis Hasty, *Meter as Rhythm* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

¹³ As do Aviram and Attridge.

¹⁴ Corn, *The Poem’s Heartbeat*, 17. This is also the case for some English poetry written by those for whom English was a learned language, as with much contemporary Anglo-Indian poetry. See, for example, Peter

according to syllable stress or accent, the periodists argue is regulated by the experience of periodic, visual segmentation.¹⁵ In free verse, lines are read as units of rhythmic pattern by their visual segmentation. These units are played off other modes of unification, such as syntax or meaning.¹⁶ The resulting tension creates a movement of oscillation, from the end of a line to the beginning of the next and so on, such that there exists the same movement of alternation that drives the time of the poem in metric periodicity,¹⁷ but the difference being that this alternation is primarily visual.

From the perspective of periodicity, poetic rhythm is produced through a combination of natural factors and cultural or conventional factors. Since language is produced by muscles in the body, which are themselves regulated by the periodicities of breath and heartbeat, it tends towards temporal regularity. The identification of a rhythm as “metric” is based in the body through “muscular empathy,” the impulse to move one’s body to a beat.¹⁸ This also extends to other, non-vocal ways in which rhythm is generated. Whether in the movements of the body in dance or typing, these rhythms are dependent on the physicality of the medium through which movement is made.¹⁹ However, while the fact of the periodicity of language according to its emergence from the body is natural, culture determines how exactly such periodicity is arranged.²⁰ Some languages and cultures tend to arrange such periodicity through metre, others do not. The periodists’ conclusions regarding the experience of rhythm are that rhythm is based in the configuration of the body according to periodic movement and is therefore universal, but that it is also culturally-linguistically configured and interpreted such that there is no pure, universal rhythm available to experience.

Groves, “Subversive Rhythms,” in *Off Beat: Pluralizing Rhythm*, ed. Jan Hein Hoogstad and Birgitte Stougaard Pederson (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013), 123-134.

¹⁵ Attridge, *Moving Words*, 209; Harding, *Words into Rhythm*, 111.

¹⁶ Harding, *Words into Rhythm*, 70-71, 154.

¹⁷ The term verse from *versus* means “turning back.” Corn, *The Poem’s Heartbeat*, 7.

¹⁸ Attridge, *Moving Words*, 111, 123.

¹⁹ Harding, *Words into Rhythm*, 7.

²⁰ Attridge, *Moving Words*, 112.

This association of rhythm with the body leads to a theory regarding the purpose of the foregrounding of rhythm in poetry: namely, that rhythm functions to connect the semantic content of the poem to the emotion of the reader or hearer through the body. The capacity of rhythm to evoke emotion is located in its expression and representation of bodily motion and therewith the states of mind and affects that such bodily movements accompany. Rhythm reflects the levels of energy and the way in which they are deployed in the expression of emotion,²¹ thereby evoking these emotions in the reader or hearer through contagion. This is the same process by which a listener experiences emotions in response to music. We interpret the rhythms of music through the lens of physical gait and movement, which are expressive of certain emotional states. By imperceptibly repeating these movements in our bodies, we come to experience those emotions that we extrapolate from the movements suggested to us by the music.²²

Periodicity, however, is not the only possible diachronic approach to rhythm. For example, the field of cognitive poetics developed by Reuven Tsur, studies how the reader or hearer experiences a poem by analysing the reader's performative strategies, and by applying cognitive theories regarding various mental processes to a reader's interactions with the poem. One of the most relevant theories of cognition is that of working memory and the way in which it is involved in one's reading and hearing of poetry. The resources of working memory must be allocated differently in poetry than in regular speech. Very few of the contextual cues that make understanding everyday speech easier are present in poetry, and the precise order of words cannot be amended into simpler structures for deeper encoding, while in everyday listening, the brain can reorganize words into more

²¹ Prose acts this out on a larger scale in which much of it may represent the continuous flow of everyday life and speech, punctuated by expressive eruptions. Harding, *Words into Rhythm*, 150.

²² Stephen Davies, "Infectious Music: Music-Listener Emotional Contagion," in *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives*, ed. Amy Coplan and Peter Goldie (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 147.

efficient units of information.²³ In poetry, however, not only the meaning but also the musicality of the words is important, such that words must be held in memory in the order in which they are presented. As such, many of working memory's processing capabilities are taken up in poetry by trying to hold together two different patterns: that of meaning, and that of musical patterns, such as stress, accent, and phonetics. The limited energy of working memory is expended in poetry on the simultaneous perception of the conflicting patterns of stress and syntax.²⁴ Rhythm is the way in which the reader holds these two patterns together. Accommodating the stress and pronunciation of words to fit into a stress-pattern allows for enough space in working memory to retain the meaning of the line. In particular, words are articulated more prominently and the whole is grouped into smaller line-units. These structures provide clues for the reader regarding how he or she should rhythmically proceed. The reader uses rhythm to mediate the two factors. This allocation of cognitive energy and space is what leads to a different experience of poetry than of everyday speech.

The rhythmic pattern is made up of the tensions of discontinuities created between movements such as metre, pause, pitch, or segment (such as when parts of speech that would overlap in regular speech are articulated as distinct), and the intrinsic continuities of everyday speech.²⁵ The poem is shaped precisely in such a way to make it possible, albeit sometimes challenging, for the reader to hold prosody and semantics together. In particular, the length and division of the lines of a poem divide up the words and patterns into chunks that can be held in working memory long enough for the reader to understand what is being said and long enough to perform the following line in a way that is

²³ Reuven Tsur, *Poetic rhythm: Structure and Performance: An Empirical Study in Cognitive Poetics* (Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2012), 66.

²⁴ Tsur, *Poetic Rhythm*, 76.

²⁵ Tsur, *Poetic Rhythm*, 8. Study cited from Gerry Knowles, "Prosodic Labelling: The Problem of Tone Group Boundaries," in *English Computer Corpora: Selected Papers and Research Guide*, ed. Bernd Kortman (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991), 149-163.

rhythmically congruous with the previous. This chunking is accomplished in part by caesurae, mid-line pauses indicated by punctuation marks. These caesurae organize the whole into perceptible parts in order to facilitate the perception of the complex whole, while also intruding upon the momentum towards completion.²⁶ A caesura is therefore often felt as an intruding event that “forces the line to reassert itself in the listener’s perception.”²⁷ The caesura is experienced diachronically as an interruption to the flow of the poem, but in fact, this interruption helps the reader to perform the rhythmic mediation of the two patterns by breaking up the semantic content into two, more manageable chunks, thereby making each chunk more accessible to the reader or hearer. The various rhythmic features of the poem are thus given meaning in cognitive poetics by their relation to, impact upon, and facilitation of the rhythmic performance of the reader.

Thus, rather than conceptualize rhythm in terms of the objective features of the poem, Tsur locates rhythm in the reader’s interaction with the poem and his or her capacity to hold the various parts of the poem together in terms of both meaning and a consistent temporal pattern. This is a process of negotiation between reader and text that takes place over the course of the poem, with the reader testing out various rhythmic configurations between syntax, accent, meaning, phonetics, alliteration, etc. Metre and other forms of periodicity are only one indicator of a pattern among several, and may have a greater or lesser impact on the rhythm adopted by the reader depending on the other factors involved in the poem. The regular recurrence of a beat may draw attention to a pattern, but pattern can exist independently of this recurrence. Even when metre is present, it can sometimes be unclear which rhythm the reader is supposed to adopt. This is why it is possible for two poems with the same metre to have completely different rhythms. For example, strong and regular meter can have two opposite effects. It can lead to a sense of order, structure and

²⁶ Tsur, *Poetic Rhythm*, 113.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 15.

control, as in nursery rhymes. Alternatively, it can also be experienced as inducing trance, dissolution, and loss of control, as with chants and incantations. The particular subjective experience depends on the other components including semantic content and the psychological atmosphere that this content evokes.²⁸ Rhythm emerges out of the interactions of these various dimensions of speech, with each other and with the reader or hearer.²⁹

While periodic theories of rhythm are more aware of how the whole body is involved with the experience of rhythm rather than only the mind, cognitive poetics supplies the important idea that the subject is not the passive recipient of the experience of rhythm in poetry but an active contributor to how that rhythm is performed. This suggests that the emotional connection between the semantic content of the poem and the experience of the reader or hearer that is affected by rhythm is affected not simply by a representation of the bodily motions that accompany various emotions but through a cognitive participation in the construction of those motions on the part of the reader or hearer. Tsur draws attention to the difference between poetic rhythm and other forms of cognition, and these cognitive differences suggests why poetry can be experienced as different from or even interruptive to everyday experience.

The Synchronic Perspective

Like cognitive poetics, another group of prosodists, which I here call synchronic, argue that even if there are elements of periodicity in all poetry, these are not sufficient to describe rhythm because in some cases the periodic elements are so qualified and relativized by other factors that their contribution to rhythm could not be said to be the dominant factor. While a rhythmic shape may involve metre, this is not necessary since

²⁸ Reuven Tsur, *On the Shore of Nothingness: Space, Rhythm, and Semantic Structure in Religious Poetry and its Mystic-Secular Counterpart: A Study in Cognitive Poetics* (Thorverton: Imrpint Academic, 2003), 179.

²⁹ Harding, *Words into Rhythm*, 28.

rhythm is based on shape rather than repetition. Metre and other forms of periodicity are only one factor in a larger pattern. The synchronic theorists also defines rhythm as a cognitive-perceptual function rather than emerging primarily out of the bodily dimensions of language, as the periodists do. In this way, this approach to rhythm is similar to that of cognitive poetics.

Unlike cognitive prosodists, however, these theorists do not focus on the subjective processes of the listener or hearer, but turn instead to the objective structures of a poem as a whole that cause a reader or hearer to perceive the text as rhythmic. The synchronic approach considers the various levels of movement operating in a poem, how these are related to one another, and the shapes that these relations produce. In considering these objective structures, these theorists tend to analyze the poem much like a visual work of art in which the rhythm is understood by seeing the relations within the whole, rather than according to the temporal experience of the reader. To think about rhythm synchronically is to think of it as a shape rather than a progression, as a whole with one or more salient events or features around which others are organized.³⁰ This approach depicts rhythm as a kind of unification, the creation of a pattern of sensory experiences that includes the possibility of isolating various components within the larger shape or pattern.³¹

While synchronic theorists would acknowledge the oscillation put in play by metre, visual segmentation, or other kinds of periodicity, they emphasize that this oscillation comes into contact with other factors, producing a vertical shape as well as a forward momentum. Rhythm is composed of a hierarchy of types of movement that interact with one another to form shapes. Metre is an example of the lowest level of the hierarchy: a simple oscillation between weak and strong. In poetry without metrical beat, the lowest

³⁰ Harding, *Words into Rhythm*, 15.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

level of the hierarchy is based in syntax instead.³² However, this movement may be operative in the background, but not perceived or felt because it is covered over by other, higher-level movements. The highest level is a teleological movement, set towards a definite ending by the hermeneutical content of the poem. Rather than a repetitive back-and-forth movement, the teleological movement tends in a single direction. As such, the highest and lowest levels are two different kinds of movement, alternation and forward momentum, and are thus in tension with one another. These two layers are brought into relationship with one another through intermediate groupings, which provide segmentation and structure to both movements, thereby creating the intermediate levels of the rhythm.³³ These groupings are created by the various ways in which unaccented beats are grouped around accented ones.³⁴ It is these groups, rather than the metre or syntactic oscillation itself, which are most salient. As such, a “levelled hierarchy of culminating phrases or goal-oriented regions,”³⁵ such as those which exist in free verse, can also be perceived as rhythmic.

The difference between the diachronic and synchronic perspectives on rhythm is particularly evident in their approach to free verse. While the periodists emphasize the alternation produced by the visual segmentation of the lines, the synchronic prosodists emphasize the visual shapes created by the poem as a whole. Consider, for example, Eva Lilja’s analysis of Sylvia Plath’s free-verse poem “Poppies in October.” Rather than attending to how the reader experiences the poem in time, Lilja analyzes the poem much like one would a painting. Looking at the poem as a whole, she identifies patterns in both the visual organization of lines and the semantic content, such as references to colour. She argues that the poem is rhythmic on the basis of a harmony that is captured in the moment.

³² Cureton, *Rhythmic Phrasing in English Verse*, 170.

³³ *Ibid.*, 125.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 172.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 425.

The verses are arranged as two intersecting, mirrored triangles, with the longest lines at the top and bottom and the shortest in the middle, although the top line remains slightly longer. Moreover, the colour red, associated with blood, poppies, and rushing emotions is evoked throughout, until the last word, which is a suggestion of blue – a moment of stillness and calm amongst the running reds. At the end of her analysis, we could very well replace the poem with a painting.³⁶

Attending to these various levels of rhythm allows for greater flexibility and complexity. Rather than only thinking about the tensions and resolutions of rhythm as they are set up and experienced diachronically through memory and expectation, synchronic theories recognize the tensions and resolutions that are operative outside conscious awareness, and not only along a single trajectory, but between levels of movement. In other words, in synchronic theories, rhythm takes on a kind of vertical extension. This enables a greater variety of temporal shapes that are not necessarily regular or periodic, but are nevertheless rhythmic because of a “coherent asymmetry” in which various shapes intersect with one another in a way that is patterned, even if not symmetrical.³⁷

What is Poetic Rhythm?

The difference between the synchronic and diachronic theories of rhythm is one of emphasis and perspective. The two theories are not mutually exclusive. The synchronic theorists would acknowledge that the reader’s experience of the rhythm of a poem, at least the first time through, does not include all the levels of movement and their interacting shapes. However, they would argue that whether the reader knows it or not, his or her experience of the poem as rhythmic is made possible by the shapes created by the

³⁶ This is not a coincidence since the purpose of the essay is to compare the rhythm of this poem with the rhythm of a sculpture. The rhythm must be presented synchronically in order for this comparison to take place. Lena Hopsch and Eva Lilja, “Rhythm and Balance in Sculpture and poetry,” in *Off Beat: Pluralizing Rhythm*, 114-7.

³⁷ Cureton, *Rhythmic Phrasing in English Verse*, 141, 145.

interactions of various layers of movement. Likewise, the diachronic theorists recognize that these various layers of movement are operative in the background, but they nevertheless argue that the category of rhythm is one that is primarily concerned with the reader or hearer's experience of a poem, such that only those factors that are present in that experience should be foregrounded, whether they be a feeling of periodicity or cognitive negotiations between reader or hearer and text. Other dimensions may be part of the poem, but they are not necessarily a part of its rhythm.

Poetically, then, the category of rhythm includes these two perspectives on rhythm: one that unearths the objective structures that generate the experience of rhythm, and another that identifies what it is about an experience that leads one to perceive it as rhythmic. The synchronic is concerned with the harmony of the whole of the poetic artefact, while the diachronic involves surprise, interruption, and a concern with the relationship and disjunction between the poem and the everyday. If we accept both of these positions as true depictions of rhythm, and yet irreducible to one another, then we have a description of rhythm that includes both diachronic experience and synchronic form. Both of these perspectives are necessary. The diachronic perspective is necessary because it describes the experience of rhythm as the subject encounters it in time. The reader or hearer does not experience the rhythm of the poem as a depiction of interacting shapes laid out, objectively and spatially, which he or she could take in all at once. It is impossible for the human mind to experience the entirety of the poem's structure diachronically. Working memory can only accommodate the verse-line and its parts.³⁸ The result is that the reader or hearer experiences rhythm by holding various rhythmic structures lightly and amending them as new patterns emerge, which may adjust the reader's performance.³⁹ However, though it cannot be grasped from the inside, the synchronic pattern of the whole is the

³⁸ Tsur, *Poetic Rhythm*, 17.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 55.

source of one's diachronic experience. Oscillation at the lowest levels would not be experienced as rhythm without a structure or pattern of some kind, such that the experience of something like periodicity is insufficient for describing *why* we experience such periodicity as rhythmic rather than as merely repetitive. Rhythm therefore requires not only alternation, but structure of some kind. However, the rhythmic pattern only manifests itself as rhythmic through its interaction with the performative subject who seeks to hold the various patterns together in tension as he or she experiences the poem diachronically. Without a subject to experience and perform the rhythm, it is not clear how simple shapes on a page could be called rhythmic in their own right.

Another way of putting this is in terms of an intersection between objective and subjective dimensions of rhythm. Objectively, rhythm as shape is composed of a hierarchy of waves in which the polarity between the lowest and highest level waves creates groupings of shapes. Not all of the elements of the pattern, however, are within the listener's subjective experience. For example, in some non-metric poetry, the syntactical oscillation at the lowest level might not be perceived at all. Likewise, the groupings that extend beyond a line are imperfectly perceived because they exceed the capacity of working memory. Only when one has come to the end of the piece can one step back and survey how the various parts work together to form the whole, or perhaps one oscillates one's perspective back and forth between the diachronic experience of the rhythm and a stepping back to understand how such rhythm is being generated and why certain movements are evoked. Thus, despite their mutual dependence, these two perspectives cannot be amalgamated into a single perspective. The subject cannot simultaneously experience the poem diachronically and see the whole of its structure. While both perspectives are necessary, they nevertheless cannot be inhabited simultaneously. They must instead be related by oscillation. Therefore, *rhythm is an oscillation between diachronic experience and synchronic form.*

This description allows us to make theoretical distinctions between rhythm and movement which is not rhythmic. For example, the pure repetition as of a metronome does not qualify as rhythm according to this definition because it has no extension into a shape. It is purely diachronic. However, it is impossible to identify such a pure repetition in practice. As suggested by the evidence of the mental grouping of repetitive stimuli mentioned in the introduction, the mind always supplies a shape to such pure repetitions. As soon as the human comes into contact with alternation, he or she brings rhythm to it through the interaction. Thus, while in theory it may be possible to distinguish rhythm from non-rhythm, in practice rhythm is more like a spectrum on which certain movements can be classified as less rhythmic than others but not absolutely a-rhythmic. Less rhythmic movements are lacking a significant degree of either the diachronic or the synchronic, but it cannot be proved that any movement is absolutely without rhythm because the human encounter with the world often supplies such rhythm. As such, my evaluation of the various philosophical uses of rhythm in the following chapters will not be an evaluation according to assertions that certain approaches are or are not treatments of rhythm. Rather, it will consider the degree to which such approaches include a sufficient acknowledgement of both the synchronic and the diachronic.

Rhythm and the Performance of Relation

An idea of rhythm as an oscillation between synchronic and diachronic is appropriate to an analysis of rhythm in poetry. However, this is of little use if it cannot be extended to how that rhythm is a part of experience more generally. Since this project is concerned with understanding how rhythm, as a dimension of human experience, is significant for how we understand salvation, the rhythm that I have identified must be a part of human life more generally if it is to be salvifically significant and not merely an illuminating aesthetic metaphor. However, the difference between artistic practices such as

poetry and life more generally is by no means an absolute division, particularly because poetry is constructed from language, which is an important feature of experience more broadly. Poetry foregrounds the musical dimensions of language, including rhythm, amplifying its connective effect. However, rhythm exists in everyday language as well, and since language, broadly-understood, is the context in which relationship and social interaction are bathed, both at the inter-personal and the larger social levels, rhythm is a part of the functioning of such relationships and societies as well. The following section is devoted to describing how rhythm functions more broadly through language and social structure, and to pointing out the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of this rhythm thereby relating it to the nature of rhythm as it is foregrounded in poetry.

In the mid-twentieth century, Henri Lefebvre explored the possibility of studying sociological and geographical patterns in terms of their rhythms, which he describes as the motions of repetition and difference produced by the intersection of place, time, and energy. When seen in this way, the everyday is a “polyrhythmia” of cyclical and linear, natural and machinic rhythms.⁴⁰ The analysis of these rhythms is an analysis of a multiplicity of meanings, and in particular of the interface between the linear rhythms of everyday life and chance, and more prolonged cosmic cycles.⁴¹ Fundamentally, according to Lefebvre, our theories of rhythms are founded in our experience of the body, a bundle of interacting biological, physiological, sociological, and psychological rhythms.⁴² What these rhythms make possible is the synchronicities on which societies are based – between people, people and machines, people and nature, and people and power – just as rhythm connects layers of different kinds of movement in the poem. Lefebvre’s work draws attention to the extent to which we function in and through rhythms – that they are so much

⁴⁰ Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time, and Everyday Life*, trans. Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 25.

⁴¹ Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis*, 37, 41.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 77, 90.

a part of everyday experience that we do not even notice them until these everyday rhythms are disrupted and foregrounded, as in poetry. The way in which rhythm facilitates a connection between language and emotion in poetry is therefore a microcosm of the connections that rhythm makes possible in everyday life, both at the inter-personal and the larger sociological level.

Rhythm and Language

At the inter-personal level such connection and synchronicity emerge in and through language. Only recently have linguistic theories begun to consider language from the perspective of its use, rather than only as a tool or “system of semiotic relationships,” and only with this change has rhythm become part of such theories.⁴³ These linguists argue that rhythm serves to construct interactional meaning. Rather than merely an accessory to information, rhythm serves to contextualize what is said. Rhythm is “the process by which conversationalists enable each other to bridge the gap between what is meant and what is said.”⁴⁴ It connects information to the context in which that information is being communicated by indexing interpretive frames that enable those in conversation to answer questions about what they are trying to achieve in a particular conversation and where they are in the process.⁴⁵ In other words, rhythm is bound up with the relational and connective dimensions of language.

According to Iain McGilchrist’s summary of the neurological research, this association between rhythm and connection is reflected in the way in which rhythm is understood, created, and communicated by the brain. Each hemisphere of the brain has certain proclivities in approaching the world. For the left hemisphere, these include abstraction, making explicit, a desire to control and manage the environment in accordance

⁴³ Auer, Couper-Kuhlen, Müller, *Language in Time*, 6.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 57.

with pre-determined patterns, and a tendency to understand the world in mechanistic terms. The right hemisphere is the location of those cognitive propensities towards making connections, locating details in context, and attention to the unexpected. This makes it more attentive to the organic, emotive, and bodily dimensions of reality, rather than the abstract and mechanistic dimensions.⁴⁶ The left hemisphere thus approaches language from the perspective of the information that it communicates, while the right hemisphere approaches language from the perspective of the connections that it makes.

The right hemisphere is also highly involved in music and dance. Many aspects of language are mediated by the same areas of the right hemisphere that mediate the performance and experience of music.⁴⁷ Discriminating rhythm patterns is one such example, in that this process uses large portions of the brain, activating networks of neurons in the temporal, inferior parietal, and prefrontal cortex, primarily in the right hemisphere, especially for more complex rhythms that include syncopation. These same networks are activated in language-processing.⁴⁸ Rhythm connects both music and the body to linguistic meaning through syntax, which is based on musical and gestural patterns. Moreover, the bodily response to rhythm occurs first in the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system, which is also involved with all emotional responses. These responses then move through the right hemisphere of the brain and only then are processed by the left hemisphere.⁴⁹ As mentioned above, the reason that rhythm is perceived as having an emotive quality is due to its imitation of the bodily expressions that

⁴⁶ There are various approaches to studies of the brain; some prefer to approach brain functions from the perspective of the local regions in which they take place, while those considering the differences between hemispheres are more interested in how the brain operates as a whole. These approaches are not necessarily incompatible and while there are certain myths surrounding individual persons being left- or right-brained, there is a substantial amount of research to suggest that the left and right hemispheres approach the world in different ways, both of which are important for normal brain function. See Iain McGilchrist, *The Master and His Emissary*, 32-93 for a summary of this research.

⁴⁷ McGilchrist, *The Master and His Emissary*, 102.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 74-75. The left hemisphere is used for simpler, more familiar rhythms, that we might call beat.

⁴⁹ William Hardy McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time: Dance and Drill in Human History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 6.

accompany such emotion. The verbal, musical, and gestural rhythms emerge from the body as part of the emotional expression in which the body has been trained.⁵⁰ As a representation of the bodily and musical dimension of language, rhythm serves the more right-hemisphere purpose of making connections and expressing emotion. As Raimon Panikkar says, “Rhythm is the reconciliation between physical processes and human feelings.”⁵¹ Thus, while the left hemisphere’s purpose in language is to convey information, the right hemisphere seeks to connect with an interlocutor. Conveying and receiving emotion is an important part of such connection.

Of course, in most situations, rhythm is only one factor among several dimensions of music that are used in expressing and evoking emotion through language. However, rhythm is sufficiently effective at creating communicative connection on its own. Rowan Williams has recently cited the research of Phoebe Caldwell on interaction with those with Autism Spectrum Disorder, drawing conclusions about what it might teach us about the nature of language more broadly.⁵² According to Caldwell, those with ASD will often create repetitive patterns in order to focus their attention, thereby protecting an over-stimulated brain. This is essentially talking to one's self through repetitive rhythms of speech or gesture. Communication is only possible by entering into this self-talk by repetition of the individual's rhythms. For example, responding to the rhythm of finger-tapping with a similar pattern sets up a communication within a safe sensory space.⁵³ Repeating a rhythm opens a way out of the distressed person's world because it feeds information back that is familiar rather than threatening. Once this connection has been

⁵⁰ McGilchrist, *The Master and His Emissary*, 103.

⁵¹ Panikkar, *The Rhythm of Being*, 48.

⁵² Rowan Williams, *The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 95-103.

⁵³ Phoebe Caldwell, *Finding You, Finding Me: Using Intensive Interaction to Get in Touch with People with Severe Learning Disabilities Combined with Autistic Spectrum Disorder* (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2006), 105.

established, rhythms can then be subtly altered.⁵⁴ This is a highly controlled form of communication in which the communicator must learn a new language by entering into the world of the autistic individual, and in this case the connection is created through the imitation of rhythm alone, by doing the work of figuring out the rhythm that has been devised to protect an overstimulated brain.⁵⁵

Imitative repetitions, and variation on such repetitions, are part of how rhythmic connection works. Communication in the case of ASD is literally only possible through the synchronizations of rhythms because it is this imitation that communicates empathy, that one is entering into the experience of the other. Through this repetition, one says, “I am here with you in this rhythm, in this language.” It is through this empathy that the ASD patient is then able to transcend his or her rhythmic-loop into new rhythmic variations. McGilchrist says about the importance of imitation that

Imitation is a human characteristic, and is arguably the ultimately most important human skill, a critical development in the evolution of the human brain. ...The enormous strength of the human capacity for *mimesis* is that our brains let us escape from the confines of our own experience and enter directly into the experience of another being: this is the way in which, through human consciousness, we bridge the gap, share in what another feels and does, in what it is like to be that person. This comes about through our ability to transform what we perceive into something we directly experience. It is founded on empathy and grounded in the body. In fact imitation is a marker of empathy.⁵⁶

In empathy, we not only acknowledge the experience of another but we enter into the other’s experiential space ourselves precisely through rhythmic repetition and imitation.

Rhythm makes this possible because its emotive associations are based in the imitation of the bodily movements that accompany affect.

This is not only true of communication with non-verbal individuals, but of communication more widely, in both formal and informal contexts. More formally, in the

⁵⁴ Williams, *The Edge of Words*, 95-96.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 98.

⁵⁶ McGilchrist, *The Master and His Emissary*, 248.

traditional African-American sermon rhythms of repetitive and imitative call-and-response lead to an almost trance-like rhythmic intensity, creating synchrony between participants.⁵⁷ Informally, two or more individuals in conversation undertake and undergo an adaptive process by which they synchronize the timings of their verbal and non-verbal behaviour.⁵⁸ Rhythmic patterns in conversation are set up and carried across speakers in order to signal mutual endeavour.⁵⁹ When such rhythmic integration is interrupted, which happens not infrequently, repair must be made through meaning explanation in order to ensure that everyone is at the same place in the conversation.⁶⁰ Moreover, one of the first stages in an infant's acquisition of language is imitation of the musical dimensions of the parent's speech.⁶¹

Rhythm, based on patterns of repetition and imitation, serves to create synchronicity between participants in a linguistic event as well as between the information communicated and its context. In other words, it functions to hold disparate things together, in particular the physical with the psychical or emotional. Bodily participation in certain rhythms in speech or gesture is a way of entering into a shared psychological space that allows for intimacy. Empathy in communication is in part based in emotional contagion, which is the taking on of the emotion of one's interlocutor through mimicry (automatic or intentional) of the physical gestures and movements of the other in one's own body. Jean Decety, a researcher in empathy, states that "Motor imitation is foundational to emotion sharing, which is the building block of empathy which in turn

⁵⁷ John J. Gumperz, "Dialect and Conversational Inference," *Language in Society* 7, no. 3 (1978): 396-402.

⁵⁸ Auer, Couper-Kuhlen and Müller, *Language in Time*, 14-5.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 57-58.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 70-71. This is especially important during the openings and closings of conversations because these are the times at which mutuality is first being tested and established, or mutually brought to a close.

⁶¹ Caldwell, *From Isolation to Intimacy*, 54. Attachment between mothers and their infants at 12 months is directly related to the patterns of vocal rhythms between them. Attachment is hampered if there is either not enough or too much rhythmic synchronization (75).

affects the projected mental state content during perspective-taking.”⁶² This suggests that the poetic function of rhythm, of bringing the reader or hearer into emotional connection with the semantic content of the poem, is an intensified instance of rhythm’s function in everyday communication.

James Bunn has pointed out that the creation of synchronicity is an extension of the way in which rhythmic waves function in the physical world. The wave-form is consistent across matter as a recurring form that oscillates particles. He says that “the carrier vehicle is the wave-form that oscillates from two apparently discontinuous media,”⁶³ and that the “wave is a crossover format between two different media.”⁶⁴ An example of this is a fish moving through water in which the wave form oscillates between the body of the fish and the water. The fish’s movement is generated by the interaction of the two waves. The two different media are connected when one interrupts the other and establishes another pattern of waves, carrying energy between the different substances. Rhythm is a pattern of such waves, which break in upon and influence each other’s directions. Bunn’s argument is that this same process is at work in language, in that syntax is a rhythmic sculpting of the audible carrier wave. Speech is a transformation of vocal sound through syntax, which orients it within the natural orders of waves.⁶⁵ This suggests that rhythm not only connects individual persons to one another, but that it connects individuals to their environment more widely. Speech is just one example of an oriented wave-form that carries energy between the physical, psychological, and relational dimensions of reality. Synchronically, there is a resonance or empathy between different dimensions of reality.

However, notice that this synchronicity requires and is dependent on an interruption to the subject’s own personal rhythms. In Bunn’s description, in order for a transfer of

⁶² Jean Decety and Andrew N. Meltzoff, “Empathy, Imitation, and the Social Brain,” in *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives*, 81.

⁶³ Bunn, *Wave Forms*, 16.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 184.

energy to take place, one wave must disrupt another. Likewise, empathetic synchronicity requires the subject to suspend his or her own rhythms of thought and routine in order to enter into the experience of the other, which is often difficult. The process of empathy creates a shared flow in which the noise of internal conversation between brain and body, and the sense of time itself, is interrupted and suspended.⁶⁶ This interruption is very important for someone with ASD who may have retreated into the safety of his or her own bodily rhythms for protection from over-stimulation. Interrupting this self-enclosure, by using these rhythms to build a bridge re-establishes attention to the outside world through connection and intimacy.⁶⁷ This is simply a more concentrated example of the processes at work in all conversation. Just as rhythm functions in all conversation to create synchronicity between speakers, entering into this shared conversational space requires the individual's own rhythms to be interrupted, suspended, or re-directed. While most people are perhaps not attending primarily to the internal rhythms of their own bodies, we are nevertheless usually attending to our own patterns or rhythms of thought and work. Thus, while synchronicity is the objective state that is created through the matching of rhythms, it is diachronically experienced as an oscillation between one's own rhythms and the suspension and re-direction of one's rhythms for the purpose of entering the rhythms of others.

Rhythm in Social Cohesion and Subversion

I mentioned that, according to Lefebvre, rhythm not only affects inter-personal connection, but also the formation of larger-level social groups. I have already noted that the rhythms of call-and-response in African-American church services create an

⁶⁶ Caldwell and Horwood, *From Isolation to Intimacy*, 26, 42.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 58-61.

atmosphere of synchronicity at a larger level than merely between two or three persons. Another, larger-scale example of this sort of synchronicity is dance, in which synchronicity is or can be experienced by large groups of people, and in this case altogether without the verbal component of language. In both cases the rhythmic production of synchronicity comes about through the body. Kimerer LaMothe, in her writing on dance based on the work of Gerardus van der Leeuw, says that dance is a display of the medium of human life, namely the body. However, such a display is double-edged. In displaying the body, dance displays a connection of all humans in their bodiliness, while also being a singular articulation, an individual expression. The meaning of a dance can never be translated into a general, universal meaning.⁶⁸ However, in dance, the body is connected to the larger social context in which it is situated. A dance is an enactment of the web of communal relations in which the body is embedded, revealing the unity of life even as it conceals it within a particular expression.⁶⁹ There is a connection between subjective sensations inscribed in the brain and body and a socially or culturally-shared pattern.⁷⁰ The larger social context is embodied as a culture, understood as a process of generating meaning through organized and stylized movement, or rhythms, in response to nature.⁷¹ Dance displays these rhythms of responsive meaning-making. Van der Leeuw says that a human senses the rhythms of a culture, senses her own similar rhythms, and then uses these to respond to the rhythms of that culture.⁷² In so doing, the individual simultaneously associates herself with the culture as well as expressing the uniqueness of her own bodily identity. I believe that this dialectic is what Virginia Woolf attempts to express in *The Waves*. Interestingly, van der Leeuw says that the process of dance is a process of

⁶⁸ LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 182.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 180.

⁷⁰ Hoogstad and Pedersen, "Introduction," *Off Beat*, 13.

⁷¹ Gerardus van der Leeuw, *Sacred and Profane Beauty: The Holy in Art*, trans. David Green (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963), 15. LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 185-86.

⁷² Van der Leeuw, *Sacred and Profane Beauty*, 14. LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 186-87.

organization, of a dancer placing his own movements and those of the world around him into an ordered whole.⁷³ The purpose of the performance is the creation of a synchronic pattern, albeit one that is expressed through time, as with poetry.

Van der Leeuw identifies two ways in which a dancer interacts with rhythm in dance, which correspond to the two dimensions of rhythm as unification and disruption. Mimetic dance is an attempt to secure for one's self the power of something or someone else by mastering their rhythms. It is a process of empathy, of inhabiting the rhythms of the other through a dialogical movement. One submits to the rhythms of another in order to master them, and one individuates oneself as a unique expression through expressing a desire for relationship with the other. LaMothe says that as the dancer "loses his sense of subjectivity to the rhythms he seeks to master, he expresses more strongly and more precisely his self in relation to the god as master of its movements."⁷⁴ This is an exhibition of the cultural rhythms of discovery and response in which the individual seeks to exist more fully within the world as both individual and part of the whole. This approach to rhythm in dance is a taking of one's place through the imitation of surrounding rhythms.

The other encounter with rhythm in dance that van der Leeuw identifies is ecstatic. This is not a locating of oneself within the world through submission and mastery, but a being caught up in and suspended by powers that are larger than oneself, represented by the rhythms that hold and suspend the dancer.⁷⁵ The whirling dervish is here an important example. In this sort of dance, the self is lost, its boundaries dissolved.⁷⁶ This is a kind of self-transcendence, in which, as with empathy, the individual's own will, rhythms of work and projects that make up his or her identity, are surrendered. The feeling of freedom that comes with dance is paradoxically based on participation in a pre-determined pattern that

⁷³ Van der Leeuw, *Sacred and Profane Beauty*, 14.

⁷⁴ LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 191.

⁷⁵ Van der Leeuw, *Sacred and Profane Beauty*, 24-29.

⁷⁶ LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 194. Van der Leeuw, *Sacred and Profane Beauty*, 73.

is not subject to one's own will. Dance is freeing precisely because it is freedom from one's will, a free surrender.⁷⁷ LaMothe suggests that these two responses to rhythm in dance are really two directions of a double-movement, one from unity to individuation, the other from individuation to dissolution. Dance both holds and lets go of life.⁷⁸ The nature of dance thus indicates the double-edged nature of rhythm as both connective and interruptive, as with rhythm in conversation.

If we think about the social and political consequences of dance, participation in a certain kind of rhythm furnishes one with a particular cultural identity, the most immediate examples of which might be rap, hip-hop, or rave cultures.⁷⁹ Historically, “the human majority, living on the land, accommodated itself to powerful outsiders who demanded rents and taxes from them. Such intrusions, however, did not prevent village communities from maintaining their own integrity and cultural traditions, despite subordination to distant masters.”⁸⁰ The primary way in which this was accomplished was through rhythmic practices such as dance and music, which hold groups of people together in time through muscular expression. Even today, in participating in these rhythmic practices, a sense of identity is strengthened within a relational context that is brought into existence in music and dance. Even Plato believed dance to be part of moral education, and therefore important for the ordering of society.⁸¹ It is a powerful form of social identity construction and even social control. Linguist Peter Auer says, “The ‘process of civilization’ (N. Eiliias) is in essential ways a process of imposing socio-cultural rhythm on our lives,”⁸² and Lefebvre too has noticed that the determination of one's rhythm is a kind of internal control such that for there to be social change, an intervention must be made that imprints a

⁷⁷ Aviram: “The Meaning of Rhythm,” 169.

⁷⁸ LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 196. Van der Leeuw, *Sacred and Profane Beauty*, 27.

⁷⁹ See for example Birgitte Stougaard Pedersen, “Aesthetic Potentials of Rhythm in Hip-Hop Music and Culture: Rhythmic Conventions, Skills, and Everyday Life,” in *Off Beat: Pluralizing Rhythm*.

⁸⁰ McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time*, 154.

⁸¹ Plato, *Laws* 657d.

⁸² Auer, Couper-Kuhlen, and Müller, *Language in Time*, 4.

new rhythm on persons.⁸³ Rhythm's capacity for unification is therefore not unequivocally positive, but is capable of slipping into hegemony – whoever controls the rhythm, controls society.

A powerful illustration of what such a hegemonic rhythm looks like comes from Madeleine L'Engle's novel *A Wrinkle in Time*, in which adventuring children visit another world where everything is exactly the same and everyone looks and behaves in exactly the same way. The children all bounce balls and jump rope at exactly the same time, to a beat.⁸⁴ Eventually we find that the reason for this is that a malevolent force controls everyone and everything by imposing a pulse on them. This malevolent force attempts to bring the protagonists under its control by reciting the multiplication table to this same pulse. Tellingly, one of the children shouts nursery rhymes, a different rhythm in other words, in an attempt to counteract the malevolent rhythm attempting to control them.⁸⁵ Notice that this is not a rhythm experienced through empathetic imitation, but through imposition, something like mechanical reproduction. McGilchrist describes the difference well: "Imitation gives rise, paradoxically as it may seem, to individuality. That is precisely because the process is not mechanical reproduction, but an imaginative inhabiting of the other, which is always different because of its intersubjective between-ness."⁸⁶ Likewise, Caldwell emphasizes that communication with non-verbal persons is not a matter of imitation for its own sake, but of introducing variations on repetitive patterns that create a space of mutual discovery.⁸⁷ This "intersubjective between-ness" which makes individual identity possible, is precisely what the malevolent, pulsing force does not allow. In the end, the child succumbs to the malevolent pulse and the only thing that is capable of freeing him is love – a rival kind of connection that is not based on control, but on empathy.

⁸³ Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis*, 24, 49.

⁸⁴ Madeleine L'Engle, *A Wrinkle in Time* (London: Puffin, 1995), 89.

⁸⁵ L'Engle, *A Wrinkle in Time*, p 104-05.

⁸⁶ McGilchrist, *The Master and His Emissary*, 249.

⁸⁷ Caldwell and Horwood, *From Isolation to Intimacy*, 61-62.

An historical example of the operation of hegemonic rhythms is the case of African-American slavery. This situation is perhaps unique in the history of slavery due to the extensive mechanistic rhythms that it involved. Martin Munro points out that the slaves were taken from their familiar rhythmic contexts and were subjugated by the alienating rhythms of rigorous schedules. The natural rhythms of the slaves were suppressed by the rhythms of the machine because the slaves themselves were understood largely as parts of a machine.⁸⁸ This is very much like the example above from L'Engle, in which control is exerted through the imposition of a machine-like pulse.

What is interesting about this situation is how African American communities were nevertheless able to rhythmically subvert the imposed rhythms by expressing their own rhythms that emerged out of both their African heritages and the new situation in which the slaves found themselves. The rhythms of slavery were contested by the assertion of an alternative identity based in the democratic collective expression of the group.⁸⁹ Theorists of black aesthetics such as Fred Moten have pointed to the importance of the break, cut, or disruption in the music growing out of African-American slave culture. He says that the slave is a speaking commodity that disrupts the subjectivity generated by systems of capital and consumption through the materiality of his or her speech.⁹⁰ The music that comes out of this tradition lingers in the cut or disruption to such systems. Moten says that this is the space between meaning and expression. The shrieks and yells, the ways in which “musical abundance” cuts off words, are examples of these caesurae and interruptions

⁸⁸ Martin Munro, *Different Drummers: Rhythm and Race in the Americas* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 19-20.

⁸⁹ Munro, *Different Drummers*, 20.

⁹⁰ Fred Moten, *In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 12.

generated by the materiality of speech.⁹¹ Moten calls this “an expressive procreativity improvising through opposition and relation of cut and suture.”⁹²

Rhythm is complex and double-edged. On the one hand, the association of race and rhythm can be essentialist and racist, yet it also indicates a kind of resistance and impenetrable subjectivity for the African-American.⁹³ Especially since these rhythms have grown out of the African-American’s experience of slavery, they both signal a loss of identity as well as assert a new identity. Part of what Moten is here gesturing at is the unique historical situation of African-American music, which opens up spaces for negotiation both between African and European rhythms, as well as between the African-American identity as a whole and the diversity and singularities of which that always-incomplete whole is composed. While African-American rhythms are not the same as African rhythms, the African attitude towards rhythm in general, which approaches rhythm as a complex pattern of gaps in which one can improvise new rhythms, was preserved.⁹⁴ This understanding of rhythm is perhaps what enabled the slaves to use rhythm as a channel for the interruption of hegemony and the negotiation of identity. It is an example of an approach to rhythm in which it is used to break up an overly-tight, oppressive synchrony. In contrast to the mechanistic rhythms that were imposed on the slaves,

⁹¹ Moten, *In the Break*, 89, 91-92, 105.

⁹² *Ibid.*, 122.

⁹³ Martin Munro, *Different Drummers*, 4, 16. This is the difference between Munro and Moten on the one hand, and Amiri Baraka on the other. The latter approaches rhythm as an essentialist category that describes the African-American community as a whole (much like Heidegger, according to Moten, *In the Break*, 87). As an essentialist category, black music is for Baraka fundamentally different than, opposed to, and destructive of white forms, an “unmediated performance of essential blackness” (Moten, *Different Drummers*, 145). Moten says “That thinking is manifest precisely where Baraka establishes an ethos of violent differentiation by way of essentializing differences...that replicates the [oscillational form of the] ethos and thinking he would abjure” (125). Rhythm, for Baraka, is a racial differentiator, a valorized black pure process of improvisation is opposed to the white system (Amiri Baraka, *Digging: The Afro-American Soul of American Classical Music* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010), 25-37; Moten, *Different Drummers*, 130), while for Munro it is an ambiguous force that can be used for good or ill, as unifying and interruptive. Likewise for Moten, described here, black music is not an opposition of one totality to another, but a process of cutting and disruption which opens spaces in which the relation between totality and singularity can be negotiated. Munro, *Different Drummers*, 98-207.

⁹⁴ Christopher Small, *Music of the Common Tongue: Survival and Celebration in Afro-American Music* (London: Calder, 1987), 295. Small argues that this is particularly the case for musical styles such as ragtime.

African-American rhythm grew up as distinctively diachronic. It was opportunistic, improvisational, and evolving, seizing and creating available gaps in order to affect transitory communities. It was expressed and performed from out of the inside of an oppressive rhythm as its suspension, rather than imposed as a pattern from the outside.

This example suggests that while rhythm can be manipulated and used for problematic, hegemonic purposes, the disruptive dimension of rhythm means that it can only ever be controlled imperfectly because variations and improvisations serve to challenge, disrupt, and break up the oppressive uses to which it is put.⁹⁵ These possibilities for disruption are latent within the nature of rhythm itself. At the same time that rhythmic practices establish and maintain particular social configurations and identities, they also manifest social divisions.⁹⁶ Unity is only ever local. A particular rhythm does not unite everyone, but only a particular community. Moreover, there are often significant differences and divisions within a community or culture. Rhythm is therefore not a universal pattern. On the contrary, rhythms are plural, and as such they simultaneously unite persons in a community and divide that community from those who do not participate in its rhythm.⁹⁷ What all of this demonstrates is that rhythm is politically significant. Insofar as questions of identity are based on to what or with whom we belong, rhythm plays a part in constructing that identity. However, it does so in a way that is double-edged. The solidarity aroused by participation in large rhythmic patterns is not in and of itself a good thing. It can be used for many different ends.⁹⁸ Where such rhythms are problematic, they are not simply ground to a halt, but interrupted and transected by rhythmic cuts and breaks that open up spaces for new rhythmic variations and improvisations. There is no

⁹⁵ Munro, *Different Drummers*, 216.

⁹⁶ Small, *Music of the Common Tongue*, 67-74.

⁹⁷ Hoogstad and Stougaard, "Introduction," *Off Beat*, 23.

⁹⁸ Other examples are described in McNeill, *Keeping Together in Time*, 155-56.

single rhythm, but nor can one escape rhythm altogether. The only escape from one rhythm is its disruption by another rhythmic counterpoint.

Conclusion

Rhythm in poetry, at the most general level, is the intersection of synchronic form and diachronic experience, which is experienced by the reader or hearer through a movement of oscillation. In arriving at this description, I have made several observations about the way in which rhythm functions. From the synchronic perspective, rhythm is involved in holding things together. It is the connections and interactions of the various layers of movement at work in a poem that make up that movement's structure. Moreover, in terms of the relation between the reader or hearer and the poem, rhythm plays a large part in bringing the emotional experience of the reader or hearer into synchronicity with the semantic content of the poem. This is confirmed by the way in which rhythm functions in everyday language as that which connects semantic content to its context and builds a bridge of emotional connection between persons in conversation thereby creating a sense of shared-endeavour or intimacy.

From the diachronic perspective, while the result of rhythm might be greater synchronicity, rhythm itself involves disjunctions and periodic suspensions. For example, it is the disjunction between the semantic content and the musical form that leads the reader or hearer to use rhythm to attempt to bring these two dimensions of the poem into harmony. The caesura, likewise, disrupts forward momentum but this disruption in turn introduces more complex relations between segments. Events such as these structure the time of the poem as rhythmic rather than as a simple unconscious flow. The particular combinations and configurations of these disjunctions and suspensions create a particular, rhythmic way of moving forward in time. Since the synchronicity made possible by rhythm is not given all at once but experienced as taking place in time, it necessarily requires

interruptions, suspensions, and adjustments on the part of the subject. This is the case in interpersonal communication, as well as within and between larger social groups in which some rhythms must be interrupted in order for intimacy with an individual or identity with a group to take place.

Such disjunctions and suspensions, however, do not only work to create unity and harmony. Sometimes a rhythmic system must be disrupted and re-directed because it is too tight and manifests hegemony rather than synchronicity. Just as the caesura functions to interrupt a forward-momentum that would otherwise be too dominating, rhythm can involve an interruption of tight political rhythms as well. The eventual objective of such interruption is, of course, improved relationship and harmony, as in the case of the caesura, but this can sometimes require a significant break from a previous rhythm and those who perpetuate it.

As such, rhythm has a double-edged quality. As LaMothe says of rhythm in dance, it both holds and lets go of life. It both gives unity and suspends it. It includes the movements taking place in an “intersubjective between-ness,” and thus can encompass a variety of movements and relations between connection and interruption. This is why there is no single rhythm, no rhythm as such, or as universal pattern, but different rhythms that intersect and overlap and influence one another. Moreover, not all rhythms are good. Rhythm can function as a space for intimacy or as a means of alienation and hegemony. The reason that rhythm is important is not because it is a self-referentially positive dynamic, but because it is influential. The value of any particular rhythm depends on the pattern and effects of that particular instance. Furthermore, its value is not static. Since all rhythms are diachronic, they must continue to move and respond to the events that are encountered in time, attempting to hold them together in a way that is harmonious and respectful. What the discussion of this chapter reveals is that there are different kinds of connection and synchronicity, not all of which are equally beneficial. It is therefore

possible to place too much value on synchronicity in its own right. The interruptive dimension of rhythm is a corrective to this temptation.

Rhythm is thus theologically important precisely because of this ambiguity. If understanding the nature of Christian salvation is in part about understanding what it means for the human creature to be at the peak of human flourishing by being in Christ, then theology is responsible to identify and perform the best manifestation of rhythm possible as one performs the rhythm of a poem, namely from within the flow, always amending this rhythm in response to encountered events and their rhythmic implications. With this goal in view, the following chapters consider particular rhythms put forward as attempts to hold together the various dimensions of reality, and evaluate how successful they are in doing justice to the synchronic and diachronic dimensions of rhythm and their appropriateness to the requirements of Christian theology.

Chapter 2 Synchronicity I: Rhythm as the Whole

Rippling small, rippling grey, innumerable waves spread beneath us. I touch nothing. I see nothing. We may sink and settle on the waves. The sea will drum in my ears. The white petals will be darkened with sea water. They will float for a moment and then sink. Rolling me over the waves will shoulder me under. Everything falls in a tremendous shower, dissolving me.

Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*, 137

The category of rhythm has enjoyed a recent upsurge in French and Italian postmodern philosophy, as exhibited in the work of thinkers such as Gilles Deleuze, Julia Kristeva, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy, Giorgio Agamben, Henri Lefebvre, Henri Meschonnic, and Emile Benveniste. The roots of this upsurge can be traced back to certain thinkers in previous generations of philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson. However, perhaps with the exception of Benveniste, Meschonnic, and one essay by Lacoue-Labarthe, rhythm has been harnessed as a way for these thinkers to express their ideas and has not itself been a category of analysis. Even Lefebvre's book *Rhythmanalysis* is not an analysis of rhythm itself, but a text that uses rhythm to analyze daily life. Meschonnic's analysis demonstrates the various ways in which the concept has been used incorrectly but does not offer much by way of demonstration for how it ought to be used.

I argue that the recent upsurge in the use of the concept of rhythm actually involves two competing depictions of the nature of rhythm and that these are bound up with two

different kinds of descriptions of reality. Some philosophers use the concept of rhythm as it is described by Benveniste and Meschonnic, including Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, and Friedrich Nietzsche. For them, rhythm is a fluid form and is often associated with what I call a Heraclitean metaphysic in which harmony is immanently and seamlessly generated from chaos or opposition. As such, it emphasizes the synchronic element described in the previous chapter. The second concept of rhythm includes a significant dimension of interruption and is used by thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Julia Kristeva.

This approach is both similar to and different from that of Amittai Aviram, who has performed a similar analysis of rhythm in continental philosophy. Aviram argues that rhythm can be understood in two ways: as form of expression, or as a regular beat. The former is associated with the expression of the subject, while the latter is an interruption of the subject.¹ The relationship of rhythm to the subject is important in my analysis as well. While I agree with Aviram that rhythm can be classified according to whether it functions as form or as interruption, I argue that whether a thinker ultimately articulates one or the other depends on his or her perspective on rhythm as either synchronic or diachronic. Most of the thinkers that I analyze in this and the following chapter include elements of both expression and interruption such that it is difficult to simply classify them according to the one or the other. Doing so ultimately results in an over-simplification of their thought, as I will particularly point out with respect to Nietzsche in this chapter. The differences between them are ultimately more a matter of whether interruption is described as a dimension of the whole viewed from the outside, or whether it is felt to be an interruption to the subject from within the rhythm. This perspective results in my classifying thinkers differently than Aviram does. Although Nietzsche acknowledges interruption, such

¹ Aviram, "The Meaning of Rhythm," 162.

interruption is a function of the form of reality as a whole and I therefore consider him to ultimately approach rhythm as Benvenistian synchronic form, contra Aviram. Likewise, while Aviram argues that Lacoue-Labarthe and Kristeva put forward rhythm as an expression to the subject, I will demonstrate in the next chapter that this is only a secondary dimension of rhythm. Its primary nature is disruptive, and this is a disruption that cannot simply be reduced to the movements of reality as a whole.

This chapter is an analysis and theological evaluation of rhythm as form. It considers the philosophy of Deleuze, Nietzsche, and Heidegger as different manifestations of this Benvenistian rhythm, which operate as variations on the Heraclitean (anti)metaphysic. The descriptions in this chapter and the following are not exhaustive treatments of these thinkers. Instead, I have sought to indicate the connections between a certain understanding of rhythm in their work and its role in their descriptions of reality. For the same reason, I also draw a somewhat strong demarcation between the philosophers of this chapter and those in the following chapter. The reader will notice that this creates some unusual categorizations. This is only intended to be a comment upon the various ways in which these thinkers approach the concept of rhythm specifically, and I am foregrounding certain differences in an attempt to demonstrate the significance of the differing conceptions of rhythm. Nevertheless, what I hope this will demonstrate is that “postmodern” philosophy is not homogeneous and cannot be treated as such by theology. Rhythm throws light on this diversity.

Benvenistian Rhythm and Heraclitean (anti)Metaphysics

Gilles Deleuze

Gilles Deleuze is known as one of the most radical and direct proponents of a pure logic of immanence, out of which he develops a metaphysic or anti-metaphysic, depending

on how one defines “metaphysics,” as I discussed in the introduction. Deleuze uses rhythm as one of many perspectives from which to describe his complex system. Others include “the fold,” “the plane of immanence,” and the One-All that absorbs everything.² These images describe the nature of both thought and reality. In terms of thought, the plane of immanence holds concepts together, and is the space from which they unfold. It is not itself a concept, but nor is it other than those concepts which it holds. The “concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling, but the plane of immanence is the single wave that rolls them up and unrolls them.”³ In terms of ontology, modalities, like concepts, are expressions of the single, univocal substance that produces them. The “fold” denotes both the myriad of folds beneath the surface and the larger folds of the monads which they generate. Each monad contains the same universe as all the others in different expressions and sequences of folds. Each of these differentiations are folds in a single fabric and there are no gaps between them. The fold is a “coextensive movement of veiling and unveiling.”⁴ Thus, while the plane of immanence is an ontological univocity, it is also the principle of differentiation. It is an infinite movement of differentiation and dissolution, veiling and unveiling. However, such movements and differentiations are all of the same order. Reality is not tiered, but is a single, infinite movement of becoming. Transcendence is merely an illusion that emerges when the movement of the One-All is perceived to be interrupted.⁵ The plane of immanence is the whole of reality. Moreover, this plane of immanence takes on divine significance for Deleuze. He describes the unity of the folds as a “spiritual presence.”⁶ God is the process of folding and unfolding, perhaps even the Fold

² Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?* Trans., Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 44.

³ Deleuze and Guattari. *What Is Philosophy?* 36.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 47.

⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*, trans. Tom Conley (London: Athlone, 1993), 125.

itself, which is everywhere, animating from the inside.⁷ Monads are themselves the passage of God, because each coincides with the point of view of the divine.⁸ God is thus the whole of the system, which cannot be separated from the folding and unfolding process.

The movement of the plane of immanence is generated by the interpenetration of opposites. Immanence is “the irruption of impossibilities on the same stage,” where the principle of non-contradiction is overcome, and contradiction exists in unity.⁹ The plane of immanence has two sides, or poles. These two sides are described as the virtual and the actual (or sometimes as matter and soul). The virtual is a horizontal field of originary, chaotic forces or intensities, which generate the actual: that which we perceive as stable identities. These identities are really only vibrations, “imperceptible rhythms” in the virtual field of forces.¹⁰ The virtual involves two movements in opposite directions between flux and identity – movements of both organization and dissolution. Deleuze's contradiction in unity is a unity of the two poles. These two poles are: “Everything is always the same thing...and; everything is distinguished by degree.”¹¹ These two facets of immanence are not two realities, but two perspectives, two expressions of the one world, such that we cannot really distinguish where one ends and the other begins.¹² The plane of immanence is a to-and-fro movement between virtual and actual, organization and dissolution.

⁷ Deleuze, *The Fold*, 13. 73.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 73.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 82.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 77, 86. Deleuze's thought is very close to that of Henri Bergson at several points. Bergson thought about reality in terms of duration, as constant motion and flux, such that what we perceive as stable identities are in fact illusions. Duration is a current that flows continuously and animates objects during the interval of their existence, not as something that provides continuity, but is the impetus of absolute change (Henri Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. Arthur Mitchell (London: Macmillan, 1911), 1-2). Nevertheless, we do not perceive reality this way because action in the world requires fixedness, such that thought must adopt the rhythm of action (Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, 324).

¹¹ Deleuze, *The Fold*, 58.

¹² *Ibid.*, 119.

Another pair of terms Deleuze uses to designate these movements are “difference” and “repetition.” Difference and repetition are here not properties of already-existing identities such that they would represent either the repetition of an identity or differences between identities. The fixity of actualities is due to the repetitions of the underlying movements of the difference and dissymmetry of the virtual. The repetition and synthesis of prior repetitions within this flux creates the illusion of a stable identity. So, the relationship between virtual and actual, and difference and repetition is complex. There are three sorts of repetition corresponding to three syntheses, the first two of which tend towards stability. The first is that of habit or contraction by which repetition is contracted into actualities, and past and future are contracted into a present.¹³ The second synthesis is the passing of the present, or more simply, the past. Memory is the corresponding repetition.¹⁴ The past is a contraction as well, in which there are “an infinity of diverse degrees of relaxation and contraction at an infinity of levels.”¹⁵ The present is the choice of such a level. Thus, each of these two repetitions corresponds to the actual (present, habit, individuation) and the virtual (past, memory, flux). Likewise, we might say that each of these repetitions corresponds to each of the levels of the plane of immanence. Habits are the concepts, actualities, or monads that are infinitely differentiated from one another, while memory is the plane of immanence, or the lower folds – the originary chaos of the virtual.

There is, however, a third synthesis or repetition that enables the relation of the two syntheses. The third synthesis is the unfolding of time itself, rather than of contents in time, and it has the character of being “out of joint.” It is a static caesura between past and future.¹⁶ The third synthesis prevents time from becoming circular and orienting itself only

¹³ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (London: Athlone, 1994), 74-6.

¹⁴ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 79.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 84. Deleuze is here relying on Bergson.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 88-89.

towards the past and the same. The future is open and in no way resembles the past, such that we have absolute cyclicity on one side of the cut and absolute newness and linearity on the other side. While the caesura divides these two, it also holds them together in coming to represent the whole of time – all of the events in the future, and all of the events in the past. It is thus a way to hold together both linear time and cyclical time. The repetition of identities is consigned to the past and cannot be repeated in the future, because the future is constructed of difference. However, the difference or movement between identities *is* repeated in the future.¹⁷ One side of the caesura represents repetition (past) and the other side is the newness of difference (future), but the caesura between them is the repetition of difference itself. The third synthesis operates in the “between” and in so doing comes to stand in for the whole of the system.¹⁸

Deleuze associates rhythm with the third synthesis. Rhythm is the relationship between the two different sorts of time: “presents that pass” and “pasts that are preserved.”¹⁹ He juxtaposes this rhythm with the symmetrical repetition of cadence, which is merely the “envelope” for a more significant rhythmic repetition which is based on unequal accents that create inequalities and rhythmic “events.”²⁰ Deleuze’s most thorough treatment of rhythm is found in his essay “1837: Of the Refrain” in *A Thousand Plateaus*, in which rhythm is bound up in the relationship between chaos and milieu. A milieu is a “block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component,”²¹ a vibration. This is the cadence-repetition that Deleuze juxtaposes to rhythm. The milieu is open to the chaos out of which it emerges, but it counteracts that chaos through rhythm. He

¹⁷ James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition : A Critical Introduction and Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 102-3.

¹⁸ Deleuze also describes the third synthesis as the Fold or THE plane of immanence. See Deleuze, *The Fold*, 10 and Deleuze, *What is Philosophy*, 59 for examples of how the third synthesis comes to represent the all by standing between.

¹⁹ Gilles Deleuze, *The Time Image: Cinema 2*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 106.

²⁰ Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 21.

²¹ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (London: Athlone Press, 1988), 313.

writes that milieus and rhythm are both born out of chaos as its ecstasies. Both chaos and rhythm exist between milieus. Rhythm and chaos are not opposites, but chaos becomes rhythm when two milieus, two “heterogeneous space-times,” communicate with one another through transcoding. Each milieu has particular patterns of repetition, which are like metre. These are transcoded when one code receives fragments of a different code without ceasing to become what it is. The piece of code from another milieu does not make the two homogenous, but it manifests in a new and unique way in the milieu into which it has been transcoded such that an interaction between the two takes place. Rhythm is the difference between repetitions that ties them together as “heterogeneous blocks.” It binds them together without overcoming their heterogeneity,²² and is therefore that which makes communication between them possible. Rhythm both divides milieus, distinguishing them from one another, and holds them together, allowing for communication. Rhythm is the between of milieus, but also between chaos and the milieu. It operates between repetitions, but also between difference and repetition, as with the third synthesis.

Furthermore, a particular assemblage of pieces of milieus and the rhythms between them can be territorialized. This too is an act of rhythm, but of a rhythm that has become “expressive.”²³ An expressive rhythm is one that is the expression of the relationship of a territory to its external circumstances and internal impulses. Such territorialization means that the weather, environment, dangers, longings, emotions, all become rhythmic (as well as melodic).²⁴ Chaos and the territory are two movements – movements of territorialization and deterritorialization, harmony and opposition, which traverse all rhythms and milieus. This rhizomatic system is a “superposition of disparate rhythms, an articulation from within of an interrhythmicity, with no imposition of metre or cadence.” Territorialization “produces consolidation aggregates, of succession as well as of coexistence,” in which

²² Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 314.

²³ *Ibid.*, 315.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 318-19.

heterogeneous components are held together by “intercalary oscillations.”²⁵ In other words, rhythm is not a transcendent structure, but a harmony that emerges immanently from chaos, the relationships between the milieus that emerge from and exist in chaos. Out of these relationships, a rhythm emerges, generating a harmony and expression that territorializes groups of milieus without overcoming their difference.

Rhythm is thus for Deleuze a principle of harmony that operates between difference and repetition, or between heterogeneous milieus. It is differentiated from cadence repetition or vibration that individuates actualities and is associated instead with the configuration of the flux or chaos of the virtual that allows communication between such actualities. This understanding of rhythm as associated with form as fluid configuration rather than simple repetition or cadence is common to almost all of the aforementioned thinkers.²⁶ The origin of this definition lies with Emile Benveniste,²⁷ who argued that the Greek *rhythmos* did not originally indicate a regular beat or ebb and flow of waves, a form of regularity imposed on disorder. Rather, it was derived from *rhusmos*, which was first used to denote a change in alphabetical characters.²⁸ He argued that while rhythm is a sort of form, it is not the static, regular, schematic form that he believed Aristotle suggested it to be. It is, rather, the configuration of something that is fluid or in motion. It does not hold

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 329.

²⁶ This is also similar to Bergson’s theory that the differing manifestations of life are characterized by different rhythms, which emerge through the restraining effect of matter on life. Matter splits life into various rhythms, which we perceive as individuals (Bergson, *Creative evolution*, 265; Henri Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2004), 207). Reality is given to us through the opposition of matter and duration. Pure matter is described as pure repetition or rapid pulsation (Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Carol Publishing, 1992), 109). Eternity, in contrast, is described as the “concentration of all duration,” which suggests both difference as well as an association with the whole of the system (Henri Bergson, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. John Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 37). We can see the influence on Deleuze here, for whom objects are likewise associated with repetition, while rhythm is associated with the whole of the system. The whole of reality for Bergson is a series of interpenetrating rhythms, represented as a whole in eternity as the concentration of duration. Moreover, we can therefore classify Bergson as also adhering to Benveniste’s definition of rhythm in that rhythms for him represent the particular relationship between motion and form that make up various dimensions of reality.

²⁷ As well as with Henri Meschonnic who similarly argues for a rhythm beyond metrics and regularity, and indeed that the definition of rhythm itself is always in flux. Henri Meschonnic, *Critique du Rythme: Anthropologie Historique du Langage* (Lagrasse: Verdier, 1982).

²⁸ Émile Benveniste, *Problèmes De Linguistique Générale*, 2 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 332.

something, thereby preventing motion, but “designates the form in the instant that it is assumed by what is moving, mobile and fluid, the form of that which does not have organic consistency... it is the form as improvised, momentary, changeable.”²⁹

This approach to rhythm has all the marks of the synchronic perspective. It eschews the periodicity associated with a diachronic approach and is instead interested in the configuration of the whole. While Benveniste and Deleuze recognize that this whole is in motion, that it includes movements of territorialization and deterritorialization, the perspective on those movements is nevertheless a perspective from the outside that considers the configuration of the whole, the relation of dimensions. It is an assessment of the form of things in general, rather than of the temporal experience of encountering the rhythm. For example, while Deleuze invokes the caesura or the cut, suggesting an interruption of some sort, this is not an interruption experienced in time, but a feature of reality that stands in for the nature of the whole itself.

Benvenistian rhythm functions metaphysically for Deleuze. In associating it with the third synthesis, the nature of rhythm’s unifying function is one that is caesuric, creating an absolute difference between past and future, repetition and difference, while also holding them together. However, because the caesura between the two syntheses is not simply a division, but represents the whole of the plane of immanence, a whole that is not other than the system but emerges from between its components, rhythm is associated with this whole as well. It is a whole that is traversed by the movements of territorialisation and de-territorialisation, organization and dissolution. Thus, Deleuze applies Benveniste’s definition of rhythm as fluid configuration to the whole of reality. Moreover, this is a reality that is generated from the confrontation of opposites, the absolute difference between the two syntheses that the caesura of the third synthesis represents. In making this

²⁹ Benveniste, *Problèmes De Linguistique Générale*, 333.

caesura stand in for the whole of the plane of immanence, the whole is constituted by the confrontation of these opposites. The principle of non-contradiction is overcome and contradictions exist in unity.

Deleuze's approach to reality rejects the Aristotelian metaphysical principles of non-contradiction, stability, and eternity in favour of movement and flux. Nietzsche's doctrine of the eternal return is often closely associated with this overcoming of Aristotelian metaphysics as an attempt to associate the whole of reality with the ebb and flow of the forces of "a *physis* that carries and dominates everything, generates and destroys."³⁰ Deleuze carries this forward in suggesting that the identity of something is not dependent upon a stable presence, but on the possibility of its appearing repeatedly, eternally recurring at different times. Thus, changing objects are not dependent on a changeless Platonic Form, but receive their identity from their recurrence,³¹ even as that identity is called into question by the process of recurrence. For this reason, Deleuze appropriates Nietzsche's eternal return as an example of his own immanent metaphysics, and in doing so, he argues that chaos and harmony are not opposites but mutually-dependent facets of the same process of reality. This shift is associated with the philosophy of Heraclitus, and several of the thinkers that reject Aristotelian metaphysics, including Hegel,³² Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Deleuze tie their anti-metaphysics to the philosophy of

³⁰ Karl Löwith, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, trans. Harvey Lomax (Berkeley ; London: University of California Press, 1997), 189.

³¹ David Wood, *The Deconstruction of Time* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 31.

³² Similar to the other thinkers described in this chapter, Hegel also used rhythm to describe the whole, saying, "It is in this nature of what is to be in its being its own Notion, that *logical necessity* in general consists. This alone is the rational element and the rhythm of the organic whole.... The self-moving concrete shape makes itself into a simple determinateness; in so doing it raises itself to logical form, and exists in its essentiality; its concrete existence is just this movement" (G. F. W. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 36). Similarly to Nietzsche below, he argues that the opposition between the form of a proposition and the unity of the Notion is like the opposition between metre and accent (G. W. F. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, 39). Hegel considered Heraclitus to be the first thinker to put forward dialectics, stating "Heraclitus at least understands the absolute as just this process of the dialectic," and even that "there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic" (G. W. F. Hegel, "Heraclitus" in *Lectures on the History of Philosophy vol 1*, trans. E. S. Haldane (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 278; 279. <http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2165/cgi/t/text/text->

Heraclitus. Heraclitus believed in two mutually-implicating dimensions – that of flux and that of unity of harmony. He says that “all things are one.”³³ However, tension and change are necessary to preserve the unity, and so the surface of things appears as a strife between opposite extremes.³⁴ He says, “One must know that war is common and right is strife and that all things are happening by strife and necessity.”³⁵ Just as war is governed by unseen harmony, so too is the strife of the universe.³⁶ Justice is the strife of opposites, such that good and evil are both necessary in order for this strife to play out and result in harmony.³⁷ Strife and harmony are not opposed. The organization of opposites determines unity, and this unity is in turn determined by the *Logos*, a divine law of order described as the fire of harmony.³⁸ Thus, the process of harmony that comes about through strife is itself divinized.³⁹

Deleuze echoes this by suggesting that the oppositions of the two syntheses are really a manifestation of a larger harmony of differences in the plane of immanence. In fact, Deleuze says that “Heraclitus foresaw that there is no kind of opposition between chaos and cycle,”⁴⁰ and both Heraclitus and Deleuze divinize this process. However, Heraclitus upholds the principle of strife to a greater degree than Deleuze, who only speaks of a gap or opposition, but not a productive strife. Each of the philosophers discussed in this chapter appropriate Heraclitus in slightly different ways, some emphasizing strife more than others.

idx?c=acls;cc=acls;idno=heb30754.0001.001;node=heb30754.0001.001%3A1;view=toc (accessed 26-06-2015)).

³³ Heraclitus, *The Cosmic Fragments*, ed. G.S. Kirk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1954), 65.

³⁴ Heraclitus, *The Cosmic Fragments*, 167-68.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 238.

³⁶ Adam Drozdek, *Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 28, 30.

³⁷ Heraclitus, *The Cosmic Fragments*, 180. Drozdek, *Greek Philosophers as Theologian*, 37.

³⁸ Drozdek, *Greek Philosophers as Theologians*, 33.

³⁹ Heraclitus, *The Cosmic Fragments*, 166, 184.

⁴⁰ Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (London: Continuum, 2006), 27.

Deleuze's statement regarding Heraclitus comes from his book on Nietzsche, who he credits as one of the influences on his thought. Deleuze associates his own system of the three syntheses with Nietzsche's eternal return, saying that the eternal return is not a return of being, but a return of difference and becoming.⁴¹ According to Deleuze, Nietzsche portrays time in a way that is beyond the opposition between linear and circular time. The eternal return is the return of the one, and is thus circular. However, it is a decentered circle because the one which returns, which repeats itself, is the difference between singularities. The content of the eternal return is this system of difference, in which there is "...no prior identity, no internal resemblance. It is all a matter of difference in the series, and of differences of difference in the communication between series."⁴² Repetition, the eternal return, is not anathema to this difference, but is the natural product of it because each difference implicates the others and thus, secondarily, implicates and repeats itself as well, since it is itself implicated in the others.⁴³ If we associate difference with opposition and repetition with harmony, then we might say that Deleuze is not interested in the opposition between identities, but in opposition itself, which is a harmony – the harmony of opposition itself. Contradiction is a negative difference, the negation of the essence of something. For Deleuze, however, identities do not violently come into contradiction with one another because they are too indeterminate to come into contradiction at all. Deleuze is interested in affirmative difference, the infinite generation of differentiation (the philosophy of "the and...", as in *A Thousand Plateaus*). The eternal return is the return of this affirmative difference.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, 43-44.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 299.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 300.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 179.

However, while the thought of Deleuze and Nietzsche are similar in some respects, Nietzsche is more comfortable with the dimension of struggle in Heraclitus' philosophy than is Deleuze, and the concept of rhythm is likewise caught up in the question of the degree to which struggle is a foundational principle of the cosmos. Nietzsche too associates his doctrine of the eternal return with Heraclitus. In *Ecce Homo*, Nietzsche explains that his doctrine of the "Eternal Return of the Same" is something that could have been taught by Heraclitus, and that he feels that the thoughts of Heraclitus are closest to his own because of the "Affirmation of transience and destruction, the decisive feature of any Dionysian philosophy, saying 'yes' to opposition and war, becoming, with a radical rejection of even the concept of being."⁴⁵ This association of Heraclitus with Dionysian philosophy is significant because it suggests a link in Nietzsche's thought between Heraclitus and the kind of rhythm that Nietzsche associates with the Dionysian, which is of the same kind as that exemplified by Deleuze.

The Dionysian is the abyss of artistic chaos and disorganization which interrupts and overcomes the individual. It is those forces of death and chaos that are more primal than the individual and are therefore threatening to it. However, Dionysus also represents *eros* and affirmation of life. It is the play of simultaneously creative and destructive forces, a dangerous, "abominable mixture of sensuality and cruelty."⁴⁶ The Apollonian, on the other hand, represents those images that create a veil over this Dionysian reality, leading us to believe in discrete objects with their own individual integrity. Apollo is only the appearance of things and not their reality; individuation is an illusion. However, while the

⁴⁵Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are*, trans. Duncan Large (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 47-48. It has been suggested that Nietzsche's philosophy did not actually concur with that of Heraclitus, but only with his own interpretation of Heraclitus in *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. Artur Przybyslawski, "Nietzsche Contra Heraclitus," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 23 (20: 88-95. This is evident in the quote above in that Nietzsche suggests that Heraclitus rejected being, while we know that this is not the case. However, as will become apparent, Nietzsche adopted Heraclitus' metaphysics in so far as it included elements of both strife and harmony.

⁴⁶ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, trans. Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25.

Apollonian is an illusion, it is necessary because it makes possible the objects, concepts, and selves through which we can grasp the world.⁴⁷ Both the Apollonian and Dionysian forces⁴⁸ are manifested in various art-forms: the Apollonian in those static and harmonious artistic practices such as sculpture, and the Dionysian in music and dance. Nietzsche associates both of these forces with two different kinds of rhythm. For Nietzsche, music is the paradigmatic form of Dionysian art. However, he says that music is sometimes associated with the Apollonian, with respect to “the wave-like beat of rhythm.” On the same page, however, he notes that the Dionysian is the symbolic expression of the world of nature in the symbols of “the full gestures of dance, the rhythmic movement of all the limbs.”⁴⁹ Apollonian rhythm represents the static and predictable beat, whereas Dionysian rhythm is the flux of difference upon which the predictable beat depends. Here we have the same opposition between rhythm as beat and rhythm as flux evident in both Benveniste and Deleuze.

Nietzsche explicitly differentiates between these two sorts of rhythm in certain early notes and lectures: the time-rhythmic, or quantitative rhythm, of ancient Greece on the one hand, and a more recognizable rhythm, in which quantitative rhythm takes account of Dionysian forces, on the other. In time-measured rhythmic, “the essence of rhythm is seen as the succession of even, often diverse, intervals of time... *Ictus* and *percussio* then are intervals of time which the timekeeper set; we have no suggestion that these at the same time marked the rhythmical accents also.”⁵⁰ Time-rhythmic is purely a keeping of

⁴⁷ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 21.

⁴⁸There is some discussion as to whether these forces are metaphysical or psychological in nature. At the beginning of the *Birth of Tragedy*, the Dionysian is referred to as a “ground” that underlies experience, and therefore appears to have a metaphysical status. However, Nietzsche was suspicious of such grounds because he accepted Schopenhauer's critique that such a metaphysical ground would escape experience. Thus, if these forces are in some sense “metaphysical,” they are so as parts of the physical universe, and not as a ground behind it. See David B. Allison, *Reading the New Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy, the Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and On the Genealogy of Morals* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 63-64 for this discussion.

⁴⁹Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 26.

⁵⁰ James W. Halporn, “Nietzsche: On the Theory of Quantitative Rhythm,” *Arion* 6, no. 2 (1967): 238.

time through division rather than accentuation, and is the rhythm of post-Socratic Greece, particularly of the philosopher Aristoxenus.⁵¹ When this marking of time comes into contact with Dionysian forces, through the *Ictus* or stress, it produces a more visceral rhythm. He says that “A very different rhythmic is that of the balance of power. Here also, the unending diversity of nature is bound by certain basic forms (the regular oscillation of 'strong' and 'weak'). Within these stabilizing basic forms, the largest dynamic diversity is experienced.”⁵²

We can therefore never straightforwardly associate rhythm in Nietzsche with the Dionysian or the Apollonian, as Amittai Aviram does when he associates rhythm with Dionysus and then accuses Nietzsche of being inconsistent in associating it with Apollo.⁵³ Different types and dimensions of rhythm are associated with each figure. The regular time-keeping dimension of rhythm is associated with Apollo, while the primal, corporeal experience of the movement and interaction of forces as in dance is associated with Dionysus. Nietzsche’s description of rhythm to this point is notably similar to that of Deleuze. Both associate the repetitive vibrations or wave-like beat of actualities with illusion, while true rhythm is associated with the flux of difference on which such regularity depends. Moreover, Nietzsche describes the rhythm of the “balance of power,” like Benveniste, in terms of a form based in dynamism and diversity.

There are several different kinds of possible relationship between these two rhythms. In his lecture “Rhythmic Investigations,” Nietzsche says:

⁵¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, “*Rhythmische Untersuchungen*,” (KGW II/3, S. 312). Elaine P Miller, “Harnessing Dionysos: Nietzsche on Rhythm, Time, and Restraint,” *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 17 (1999): 2.

⁵² Nietzsche, “*Rhythmische Untersuchungen*,” S. 324. Own translation.

⁵³ Amittai F. Aviram, *Telling Rhythm: Body and Meaning in Poetry* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 115. Aviram argues that in associating rhythm with the Dionysian, which interrupts the individual, Nietzsche supports a definition of rhythm opposed to that of Benveniste, who associates it with form. We have seen, however, that while Dionysian rhythm is associated with the interruption of the individual, this is not the only definition of rhythm in Nietzsche. Without its association with Apollonian form, Dionysian rhythm is arguably not perceived as rhythm at all. Nietzsche never speaks about a pure Dionysian rhythm in his lectures, he only juxtaposes Takt and that rhythm which is influenced by the Dionysian.

I suspect that the sensuous power of rhythm lies in the fact that the two rhythms that work effects on each other determine [*bestimmen*] each other in such a way that the broader one divides the narrower one. The rhythmic movements of the pulse etc. (the pace) are apparently re-organized as the step accommodates itself to the beat... And since the entire body [*Leib*] contains an infinite number of rhythms in it, every rhythm will make a direct attack upon the body. Everything suddenly moves according to a new law: not, indeed, as if the old ones no longer dominate, but rather in that they are fixed [or attuned, *bestimmt*].⁵⁴

In this passage, the relationship between the body's infinite number of rhythms (the Dionysian) and the beat (the Apollonian) is harmonious. The beat acts as a new law that orders and directs the rhythms of the body without subjugating or diminishing them. This is similar to the way in which Nietzsche describes tragedy, namely as the collusion of the Dionysian chorus and the Apollonian image. According to Nietzsche's definition, "drama is the concrete Apollonian representation of Dionysian insights and effects."⁵⁵ The Dionysian cannot represent itself, so in tragedy the Apollonian represents the Dionysian while also maintaining it as Dionysian in the same way that the beat in Nietzsche's "Rhythmic Investigations" fixes the infinite rhythms of the body while still allowing them to dominate. The Apollonian does not capture the Dionysian, but induces it to linger briefly in representation. It is the Benvenistian form of that which is fluid and changeable. Tragedy achieves this through the phenomenon of "the Dionysian chorus which again and again discharges itself in an Apollonian world of images. So those chorus parts which are interwoven through tragedy are to a certain extent the maternal womb of the whole so-called dialogue."⁵⁶ The chorus is the reality which produces the Apollonian vision from out

⁵⁴ Nietzsche, "Rhythmische Untersuchungen," 332. Translation from Miller, "Harnessing Dionysos: Nietzsche on Rhythm, Time, and Restraint," 4.

⁵⁵ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 51.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

of itself and the Apollonian image depends on the Dionysian flux as a womb,⁵⁷ even as this flux continually interrupts the vision it has created.

Nevertheless, this is not the most common relationship between Apollo and Dionysus. Nietzsche opens *The Birth of Tragedy* by saying that

To both of their artistic deities, Apollo and Dionysus, is linked our knowledge that in the Greek world there existed a tremendous opposition, in terms of origin and goals, between the Apollonian art of the sculptor and the imageless Dionysian art of music: these two very different drives run in parallel with one another, for the most part diverging openly with one another and continually stimulating each other to ever new and more powerful births, in order to perpetuate in themselves the struggle of that opposition only apparently bridged by the shared name of 'art'.⁵⁸

The two forces finally gave birth to Attic tragedy, which is perfectly Dionysian and Apollonian, but this soon unravelled in what Nietzsche calls the Socratic tendencies of Euripides. Thus, the more common relationship is not the harmonious relationship of tragedy, but struggle. The Apollonian seeks to cover the terror of the Dionysian reality, and the Dionysian threatens the Apollonian individuation that makes society possible. Even in "Rhythmic Investigations," Nietzsche refers to "the age-old struggle between the life of time and the life of sound."⁵⁹ Moreover, it was only through the struggle between these two forces that the harmony of tragedy emerged. Nietzsche thus suggests a Heraclitean situation in which the strife of opposites is their harmonious unity.

Now consider Nietzsche's depiction of the world:

...a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself; as a whole, of unalterable size, ...not something blurry or wasted, not something endlessly extended, but set in a definite space as a definite force, and not a space that might be 'empty' here or there, but rather as force

⁵⁷ Note that the Dionysian chorus to which Nietzsche refers acts as a sort of "maternal womb" which nourishes the Apollonian drama. This is not unlike the Platonic *chora* in the work of Julia Kristeva, which is a sort of semiotic, maternal matrix that interrupts symbolic reality.

⁵⁸ Nietzsche, *The Birth of Tragedy*, 19.

⁵⁹ Nietzsche, "Rhythmische Untersuchungen," 323. Own translation.

throughout, as a play of forces and waves of forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and at the same time decreasing there; a sea of forces flowing and rushing together, eternally changing, eternally flooding back, with tremendous years of recurrence, with an ebb and a flood of its forms.⁶⁰

This is a depiction of the eternal return, the whole as eternally changing and eternally flooding back. There are two dimensions to this description. On the one hand, there is the repetition or recurrence of the same forces at every moment. Nothing is added or taken away and so there is no change, although there is movement. It is a closed system that is absolutely immanent. Yet, Nietzsche says that this sea of forces is “eternally changing.” The eternal return includes both flux or chaos, as well as a certain stability, just as in Heraclitus all is movement, change, and flux, but there is nevertheless a hint of rhythm or order to this flux due to the underlying principle of harmony. By suggesting that in affirming opposition, transience, and becoming, Heraclitus is affirming a Dionysian philosophy, Nietzsche suggests that a Heraclitean depiction of reality (as he understands it) like the one here described includes the Dionysian understanding of rhythm as a play of forces given form in its struggle with the Apollonian. Reality is a diversity and dynamism of balances of power or forces mediated to human experience through forms.

The eternal return is here described in terms that are relatively harmonious, much like Deleuze’s description. However, it has been argued by Karl Löwith, the most well-regarded interpreter of the eternal return, that the reason the relationship between form and force is experienced as strife is due to the presence of the human within the system of the eternal return. In *The Gay Science*, Nietzsche gives the problem of the eternal return an existential flavour when he asks the reader ““Do you want this again and innumerable times again?””⁶¹ This struggle emerges because of the conflict in the eternal return between

⁶⁰ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Arnold Kaufmann, and R. J. Hollingdale (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 550.

⁶¹ Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche and others, *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 194. According to Karl Löwith, this

the lack of meaning in this doctrine of reality, and the human desire for meaning and purpose. The eternal return described only as a metaphysical principle is insufficient because it negates this struggle in not being concerned with the human's inability to will a meaningless reality.⁶² Löwith says that “The cosmic meaning clashes with the anthropological meaning, so that the one contradicts the other.”⁶³ The eternal return is thus the unity of a conflict, and it is this struggle between the will and the forces of life that produces reality as we know it.⁶⁴ From this perspective, any unity between the two forces is a unity of struggle because they are naturally opposed to one another. The ebb and flow of the forces of *physis* dominate reality, but when the individual human will emerges in this ebb and flow and comes into contact and conflict with the meaningless *physis*, the Apollonian-willed desire for individuation imposes form on its movement. Thus, Nietzsche's understanding of rhythm differs from that of Deleuze insofar as it includes an element of the psychological or existential. It is this dimension that leads him to highlight the element of struggle in reality.

This corresponds to another dimension of the synchronic perspective on rhythm, namely that from the synchronic perspective the rhythmic harmony and structure of the poem emerge from the tension or conflict between the top and bottom layers of movement. The bottom layer, like Nietzsche's Apollo or Deleuze's vibrations, is the oscillation of periodicity, while the top layer is the movement of the whole at its most general, the Dionysian. The difference is that while this top layer for poetic rhythm is generally considered to be teleological, for Nietzsche and Deleuze, it is circular. However, Nietzsche

existential dimension also appears in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, in which the snake represents the eternal return and the vision in which the shepherd must bite off its head represents the struggle and decision that must be made with respect to the nature of reality as eternal return (Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One*, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969), 179-80). This is also suggested in the conversation between Zarathustra and the Dwarf regarding the moment (178) and the conversation between Zarathustra and his animals (234). See also Löwith, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, 69.

⁶² Löwith, *Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*, 69.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 191.

has arguably introduced something of the diachronic in his concern with the individual mind and will and its confrontation. Thus, while I am not suggesting that Nietzsche's rhythm is wholly devoid of the diachronic, this perspective remains marginal because it remains an element within the whole of which he gives an account.

Martin Heidegger

One of the thinkers on whom Nietzsche had great influence was Martin Heidegger, and Deleuze adopts certain concerns of Heidegger as well, albeit to a lesser extent.⁶⁵ Like both Nietzsche and Deleuze, Heidegger betrays a certain preoccupation with the whole. Moreover, at one time in his career, Heidegger strongly emphasized the importance of Heraclitus, in particular, the idea of struggle in Heraclitus' thought. Heidegger's only reference to rhythm is related to Heraclitus. While the emphasis on struggle between earth and world settles in his later work into the more harmonious relation of the "fourfold," Heidegger's preoccupation with the Heraclitean flux of the whole remains.

According to Heidegger, the Greeks called the emerging of all things *physis* which is that by which entities assume their distinctive shapes and become what they are. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger calls this "earth," and says that it is the ground of human dwelling.⁶⁶ He says that

Physis as emergence can be observed everywhere, e.g. in celestial phenomena (the rising of the sun), in the rolling of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the coming forth of man and animal from the womb. But *physis*, the realm of that which arises, is not synonymous with these phenomena...*Physis* is being itself, by virtue of which essents become and remain observable. ...This power of emerging and

⁶⁵ For example, Daniel Barber points out that the convergence of difference and immanence that Deleuze takes up is first present in Heidegger. Daniel Barber, *Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-Secularism and the Future of Immanence* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014), 17-25.

⁶⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings: From "Being and Time" (1927) to "the Task of Thinking" (1964)*, trans. David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 2011), 168.

enduring includes 'becoming' as well as 'being'.⁶⁷

Physis represents a whole in flux. More particularly, according to Heidegger's interpretation of Heraclitus, *physis* is an oscillation: a hurling back and forth between oppositions.⁶⁸ *Physis* as emergence always implies its other side of death and decay, such that entities oscillate because they are held out into the possibility of non-being.⁶⁹ *Physis* is the one principle of all, the univocal law that includes the oscillation between the entity and the abyss of its non-being.⁷⁰ However, Heidegger states this even more strongly, saying that for Heraclitus. "The true essence is time itself. ...The oppositional *is*, conflict; the dialectical itself in the Hegelian sense. The movement of constant opposition and sublation is the principle."⁷¹ The term Heidegger uses for this sort of conflict is Heraclitus' word *polemos*, which he often translates as *Auseinandersetzung*, literally "setting apart from one another." Since *polemos* is the character of *physis*, it is the nature of the whole, and it is out of this conflict that identities emerge, including the divine and the human. Moreover, "Conflict does not split, much less destroy unity. It constitutes unity, it is a binding together, *logos*. *Polemos* and *logos* are the same."⁷² Conflict both divides and individuates, and makes intimacy possible. In other words, it is the principle of creation. *Physis* understood as *polemos* is therefore the 1936 Heidegger's more radical equivalent of Deleuze's opposition of the two syntheses or Nietzsche's Dionysian force as both creative and destructive.

⁶⁷ Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1959), 14.

⁶⁸ Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, 134. This is how Heidegger describes the adage attributed to Heraclitus that "everything flows." It is not pure impermanence, but a tossing back and forth between opposites, as on a wave.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 28.

⁷⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Heraclitus Seminar*, trans. Eugen Fink (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 44-46.

⁷¹ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2008), 50. Italics original. For Heraclitus, strife is a principle of the oppositions of apparent reality. However, Heidegger interprets Heraclitus according to his own purposes. For Heraclitus, strife is relativized by the underlying harmony, while for Heidegger strife is reality itself.

⁷² Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, 62.

The human's encounter with *physis* is one of participation in this *polemos*, and is expressed primarily in art. Heidegger bases his description of art on his interpretation of Greek ideas about beauty. The function of art in Greek culture, Heidegger claims, is to open a space or world within *physis*. He states that "What the Greeks meant by 'beauty' was restraint," involving struggle rather than repose.⁷³ The struggle of artistic activity "is not a function of faculties that man has, but a [binding/*bändig*en] of powers by virtue of which the essent opens up as such when man moves into it."⁷⁴ In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger adopts this Greek description, saying that the truth of art is the establishing of a clearing which takes a stand in being and attains constancy. This truth uses *physis* through art "in the fixing in place of truth in the figure."⁷⁵ Heidegger is here concerned to encourage a way of being that that avoids the domination and control of the artist by presupposing that we are already in the middle of things, which requires us to be open to their happening.⁷⁶ This requires the artist to establish a world in and through *physis*, as a passageway for the natural unity in conflict between the forces of earth and world to establish itself.⁷⁷ In the artwork, the world grounds itself on the earth, attempting to transcend it, while the earth juts through the world. Insofar as art is the happening of truth, it must manifest this strife because strife is the essence of the truth of being.

Compare this description of art to Heidegger's definition of rhythm, given in a lecture on Heraclitus:

In connection with what has been said concerning language, I would like to refer to the lecture '*Sprache als Rhythmus*' [Language as

⁷³ Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, 131.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 157.

⁷⁵ Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 189.

⁷⁶ Karsten Harries, *Art Matters: A Critical Commentary on Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art"* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 60.

⁷⁷ Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art" in *Basic Writings*, 174. George Pattison suggests that the struggle between world and earth is only a relationship within human experience (George Pattison, *Routledge Philosophy Handbook to the Later Heidegger* (London: Routledge, 2000), 101). However, this explanation does not account for the striking similarities between Heidegger's description of the work of art and his description of ontology in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*.

Rhythm] by Thrasybulos Georgiades... as well as his book *Musik und Rhythmus bei den Griechen*. In both works, he has spoken excellently about language. Among other things, he asks about rhythm and shows that *rhythmos* has nothing to do with *rheo* (flow), but is to be understood as imprint. In recourse to Werner Jaeger, he appeals to a verse of Archilochos Fr. 67A, where *rhythmos* has this meaning. The verse reads... 'Recognize which rhythm holds men.' Moreover, he cites a passage from Aeschylus' *Prometheus*, to which Jaeger likewise has referred and in which the *rhythmos* or *rhythmiso* [bring into a measure of time or proportion] has the same meaning as in the Archilochos fragment...Here Prometheus says of himself '... in this rhythm I am bound.' He, who is held immobile in the iron chains of his confinement, is 'rhythmed,' that is joined. Georgiades points out that humans do not make rhythm; rather for the Greeks, the *rhythmos* [measure] is the substrate of language namely the language that approaches us.⁷⁸

First, notice that the definition to which Heidegger is here referring by Georgiades is that of Benveniste – not flow, but form. However, rather than describing this as a fluid, improvised form, Heidegger's definition of rhythm, like his definition of beauty, is associated with restraint. While *physis* represents the chaotic, moving forces that give rise to beings, rhythm and beauty are that which restrain them, much like Nietzsche's Apollo. Rhythm as a restraining force is not under the control of humans, but is something more primordial that they encounter in language, just as for Nietzsche the forces of the human body are given form by their encounter with Apollonian *Takt*.⁷⁹ Rhythm plays an analogous role to art in that just as art struggles against and binds the forces of *physis*, rhythm binds the human in language. In binding the human in language, rhythm, like art, opens up the world within which human dwelling is possible. As such, art is rhythmic according to Heidegger's definition. However, a restraint of *physis* can never be absolute. The rhythmic form is only ever momentary and conflicted. It is not rigid and immovable but emerges in and of the flux of *physis*, suggesting that it is more like Benveniste's definition than might first appear to be the case. Harmony emerges immanently from strife,

⁷⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Heraclitus Seminar*, 55. See also Pattison, *Routledge Guidebook to the Later Heidegger*, 135.

⁷⁹ Again, Julia Kristeva also associates rhythm with the primordial and pre-linguistic, but for her it does not hold the subject in a kind of shape, but interrupts the subject.

through the process of the struggle to restrain. As with Nietzsche, rhythm represents the encounter between a form, such as that of art or language, and the struggling, chaotic forces of nature.

Nevertheless, Heidegger's later work drops the concept of *polemos* and instead uses the categories of earth and world as two principles in his more peaceful description of reality in terms of the "fourfold."⁸⁰ In his later work the idea of truth as *Ereignis*, a term that suggests, among other things, a more passive or serene "happening" rather than a battle, comes to replace truth as strife.⁸¹ However, this only makes Heidegger's work more similar to that of Deleuze and Nietzsche. The happening of truth in Heidegger's later thought emerges out of the fourfold – two sets of polarities between earth and sky, and mortals and divinities. He describes the fourfold by saying that "Preceding everything that is present, they are enfolded into a single fourfold. In the gift of the outpouring dwells the simple singlefoldness of the four"⁸² and that "None of the four insists on its own separate particularity."⁸³ Rather, each is expropriated to the others in a kind of mirror-play or round-dance. Being is, for Heidegger, described in terms of opposites, the rhythmic cycle of the opposites of day and night and of the seasons, and this is what the poles of the fourfold represent, as well as the nature of truth as a movement of revealing and concealing. Thus, like Nietzsche and Deleuze, Heidegger here describes the nature of reality as a whole that emerges out of movements between opposites, albeit no longer through struggle. In particular, the imagery of round-dance and cyclicity suggests its association with

⁸⁰ Pattison, *Routledge Guidebook to the Later Heidegger*, 98, 101.

⁸¹ Julian Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 64.

⁸² Martin Heidegger, "The Thing," in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 2001), 171.

⁸³ Heidegger, "The Thing," 177.

Nietzsche's eternal return.⁸⁴ In this way, Heidegger's later fourfold is based on the same principle as his earlier description of reality as the oscillation of *physis*.

There are ways in which Heidegger suggests that truth happens as an interruption of the flow of the everyday,⁸⁵ and this is the dimension of Heidegger that Agamben takes up as rhythm, which we will explore in the next chapter. In particular, rhythm is more primordial than human control and is thus confrontational. However, the difference is that for Heidegger, these interruptions are not something other to the fourfold, but emerge within it, whether they are the product of mortals (art) or divinities (holy days), since both of these are factors and dimensions included within the fourfold. For example, the Other of beings is Nothing, but the Nothing is coincident with Being as a whole, because it is that which is beyond the standards of intelligibility.⁸⁶ Just as Deleuze says that opposition itself is a harmony because it is not between determinate identities that could contradict each other, the Nothing is not the opposite of Being for Heidegger because Being is not a determinate thing that can be circumscribed. As such, when the later Heidegger praises that art which presences the Other of beings, or the It that gives Being,⁸⁷ he is really praising that which reveals Being as a whole in its mysteriousness and holiness. While this whole contains an element of mystery or concealment, what Heidegger calls earth, Being as a whole is nevertheless the totality of possible truths, horizons, and perspectives, though many of these are indeterminate.⁸⁸ It is a whole in flux, a whole that is composed of the poles of the outer limits of possibility and the unknowability of these possibilities, much like Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian. The fourfold as a whole is still primary, still

⁸⁴ This despite Heidegger's description of Nietzsche's eternal return as the last metaphysics. See Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, 116-19.

⁸⁵ For example, even in "The Origin," Heidegger suggests that the world becomes conspicuous only when the flow of the everyday is disrupted and that this is the function of art (*Poetry, Language, Thought*, 66). See Pattison, *Routledge Guidebook to the Later Heidegger*, 177, 179, 180.

⁸⁶ Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" in *Basic Writings*, 99-108; Heidegger.

⁸⁷ A description of the It that gives the world can be found in Martin Heidegger, "Letter on 'Humanism,'" trans. Frank A. Capuzzi in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 254-5.

⁸⁸ Young, *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*, 39.

precedes everything. The patterns that are established by the poet and the festival, emerge from within the relationships of the fourfold. Heidegger says that “Each thing stays the fourfold into a happening of the simple oneness of world,”⁸⁹ suggesting that particular identities, like those of Deleuze, are monads or repetitions, each of which is a recapitulation of the whole. Finally, as with Deleuze, the fourfold constitutes Heidegger’s most positive claims concerning the nature of the divine,⁹⁰ suggesting the divinization of the whole.

Thus, while the element of struggle as the essence of truth has been replaced by the fourfold, the depiction of Being as a whole in terms of a flux or oscillation between revealing and concealing, or presence and mystery, remains consistent. Indeed, it is heightened and becomes more totalizing. Moreover, it is particularly rhythmic events within the fourfold, such as poetry and the festival, that give order and pattern to the human world. Thus, Heidegger’s association of rhythm with Greek ideas of a binding that makes possible the emergence of a world for human dwelling from within the flux arguably remains the same across his move from strife to event.

Theological Responses to Benvenistian Rhythm

Heraclitean (anti)Metaphysics as Univocal Logic and Equivocal Dialectic

One of the differences between the various Heraclitean thinkers here described is the role of conflict in their work. Deleuze demonstrates the least amount of conflict, likely because the notion of conflict presupposes identities that are sufficiently individuated that they can come into contact with one another, and Deleuze prefers to see such identities as repetitions of the underlying system of chaos in which nothing is distinct enough to

⁸⁹ Heidegger, “The Thing,” 179.

⁹⁰ S. J. McGrath, *Heidegger: A (Very) Critical Introduction* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2008), 120.

contradict anything else. The other extreme is Heidegger who, at the time of writing the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, saw strife as the principle of harmony. Nietzsche stands between the two, suggesting that strife is not an inherent principle of reality but a particular way of understanding reality from the perspective of the human subject, albeit an inevitable perspective due to the subject's need for meaning which it experiences as inherently at war with the forces of the cosmos.

Nevertheless, these differences are simply various manifestations of the same Heraclitean whole. Theologians Erich Przywara and William Desmond are interested in, among other things, how various philosophers deal with the "between," or how various systems hold together identity and contradiction. Both identify two opposite approaches that nevertheless collapse into one another of which the work of the philosophers described in this chapter are examples. Przywara designates these methods pure logic and pure dialectic,⁹¹ and Desmond calls them the univocal and the equivocal. These two approaches, the one emphasizing harmony and the other conflict, are both problematic for these two theologians because of their shared attempt to hold the whole of reality together within a single, immanent system, regardless of the degree of conflict that this attempt includes.

Univocal logic negotiates the between by reducing opposite terms to an immediate law. According to Przywara, in univocal logic the principle of non-contradiction is equated

⁹¹ Przywara categorizes the ways in which philosophy negotiates the "between" differently in *Polarity* and in *Analogia Entis*. In *Polarity*, there are three pure types – immanent, transcendent, and transcendental, which is an eternal striving for a unity of completeness, which never is, but is only a goal or unfolding. There are then nine fluctuating middles between different combinations of two types at a time (Erich Przywara, *Polarity: A German Catholic's Interpretation of Religion*, trans. A. C. Bouquet (London: Oxford University Press, 1935), 12). In all of these systems, "God" is the name given to an absolutized version of union, distance, or striving. Analogy is something different than all of these, in that God is the union between immanent and transcendent (rather than the other way around) (Przywara, *Polarity*, 38). In *Analogia Entis*, on the other hand, Przywara says that one can negotiate the between either according to an immanent law such as "all is movement" or "all is rest," or according to dialectic, which is simply a third immanent law "identity is contradiction." These can be loosely mapped onto immanent (flow), transcendent (rest), and transcendental (dialectic). However, in *Analogia Entis*, Przywara also identifies an immanent analogy that is nevertheless not the same as the Catholic *analogia entis*. This can cause some confusion because the way in which Przywara describes the pure logic of the immanentist religious position in *Polarity* can sometimes appear very similar to Aristotle's immanent analogy, rather than Heraclitus' flux.

with the principle of identity,⁹² as with Deleuze. Essence and existence are the same, and form a single principle which governs the whole of reality, such as in Heraclitus' "all is motion." For Heraclitus, "real creaturely [*geschöpfliche*] consciousness and being are characterized by a constantly surging flux [*Wandel*] of oppositions... a real rhythmic measure of opposites within the living fire."⁹³ This is the absolutization of pure becoming. The effect of this absolutization of becoming and change is the dissolution of all opposition, in which being turns into non-being and truth into falsity and vice versa without inhibition.⁹⁴ Things are too indeterminate to be able to say of them that a property and its opposite could not apply to it. True opposition is obliterated.⁹⁵ Przywara points out that this is acceptable with respect to potentiality because at the level of potentiality, everything is indeterminate; potentiality is an identity of opposites in which there is a possibility towards everything. However, actualization is the realization of one possibility over others such that its contraries are excluded and the principle of non-contradiction must apply.⁹⁶

Equivocal dialectic, on the other hand, is the antithesis of univocal logic in that it takes opposites seriously. In the Heideggerian variation of equivocal dialectic, antitheses are not resolved (as in Hegel), but are held together as an ideal way of knowing that can be described as "knowing that I do not know."⁹⁷ Two absolute opposites are pitted against one another in order to arrive at the truth of identity – the unity of essence and existence. The

⁹² Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 199E/106G.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, E203-4/110G.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 206E/112G.

⁹⁵ Przywara's description of Parmenides is here more akin to those systems that make all of reality an extension of the transcendent, in which everything participates in its rest. I will make this argument in chapter three with respect to Radical Orthodoxy and its Augustinian musical ontology. Interestingly, this system also conceptualizes rhythm as a form, such that it is associated with the whole, although this form is more like a structure rather than fluid.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, E206-7/113G. Przywara's interpretation of both Parmenides and Heraclitus is arguably reductionist, since both thinkers do admit of some sort of relationship between flux and stability. The difference between them lies in how they conceive of the relationship between these two things, with Parmenides understanding flux as a veil that hides the true reality of stability, and Heraclitus purporting a tighter relationship between a stable *Logos* and the strife of opposites that emerges as a flux.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 194-5E/101-2G.

principle of non-contradiction is thus violently overcome, not because things are too indeterminate for the principle to apply, but because truth is arrived at through the identity of contradiction. Przywara interprets Heidegger as suggesting that the flux of opposites is held up in its own right, rather than as a means to identity, such that identity as a determinate reality is eliminated, and reality is only ever its own possibility. So, the Heideggerian Nothing becomes the principle of identity itself, that which produces and undergirds all becoming, in which essence and existence coincide and as such the dialectic collapses into the univocal logic of identity. God (in the sense of the coinherence of essence and existence, of identity) is everything as Nothing.⁹⁸

Thus, Przywara argues that “identity of contradiction” is simply a more complex version of univocal logic. These two approaches to identity and difference simply collapse into one another. Regardless of the differences in the degree of struggle exhibited in the thought of the philosophers described above, they end up in the same place with respect to the nature of reality as a whole, its relation to the divine, and the role of rhythm within the whole. In Desmond's language, the absolutization of univocity breeds equivocity and nihilism because no indubitable, univocal reason can be given for an insistence on univocity, such that in the end, an underlying doubt undermines absolute univocity into nothing.⁹⁹ Equally, however, an absolutized equivocity beyond mediation is a new univocal law. Thus, while the above thinkers espouse equivocity beyond mediation as a way to counteract Cartesian univocity, such a wholesale dismissal of univocity simply sets up another closed, immanent system in its place, under the sign of difference. So, whereas the rhythm of univocal logic is the immanent creaturely rhythm that has been imbued with divine significance or equated with God, equivocal dialectical rhythm is the rhythm of the divine itself, the identity of essence and existence in which opposites are held together, that

⁹⁸ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 202E/108-9G.

⁹⁹ William Desmond, *Being and the Between*, (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 82.

has been usurped by the world. In both approaches, rhythm represents the immanent movement of the divine whole.

Insofar as rhythm as fluid form lends itself to descriptions of reality as an immanent whole, it suggests a relationship to a God who is not other than the system, but is the inner form of the system – the absolutization of the system.¹⁰⁰ God is the law of the whole itself, worked out in its process. For Heraclitus, God is the immanent law of “all is movement,” because it is the highest absolutization of the principle of movement. God represents the internal unity of completeness and infinity of the rhythmic ebb and flow of the “in-and-beyond.”¹⁰¹ Even if such a system recognizes a sort of self-transcendence – a reaching to the beyond of infinity – the unity and harmony of this immanence and self-transcendence is located within the process rather than in an active otherness that could come to and interrupt the immanent from beyond itself. Przywara says that

as the ‘cause of unification’... within the rhythmic interpenetration of contraries, the divine is diametrically opposed to any ‘cause of division...; its sovereign inner rhythm of ‘beginning, middle, and end in one’ betrays itself as a correlate of the attempt of knowledge to grasp the beginning and end of what is ‘posited... and thus do away with the creatureliness of man, who ‘staggers towards nothingness’ because he ‘cannot join beginning to end.’¹⁰²

In such a system, unity is not an arrived-at static completeness but an ever-unfolding process. However, because infinity is here associated with the process of striving or unfolding, it belongs to the movement of the One-All.¹⁰³ It is the absolutization and deification of process, movement, and struggle itself. “[God] is, as ‘Rhythm,’ the unifying Force of the movement, but not beyond the movement.”¹⁰⁴ The measured movement of the world as “beautiful harmony” or unifying force of ebb and flow is here a creaturely rhythm

¹⁰⁰ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 201E/107G; 204E/110G.

¹⁰¹ Przywara, *Polarity*, 15.

¹⁰² Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 243E/146G. Przywara is in this instance making this criticism of Plato.

¹⁰³ Przywara, *Polarity*, 4.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 7. Morrison argues that Nietzsche replaces the concept of God with a “dynamic theory of matter,” that this dynamic matter plays the same divine role in Nietzsche’s system that God might do for a theologian. Robert G. Morrison, *Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 223-25.

that is imbued with divine significance. Rhythm is characterized as the movement of the whole, and is consequently equated with the divine.

Benvenistian Rhythm and Process Theology

The religious expression corresponding to such an absolutization or deification is union with the God of this process. This may take the form of the accommodation of one's self to the whole, a kind of pantheistic renunciation of the self and one's own projects. We can see this in Nietzsche, for whom the ethical injunction in *The Gay Science* and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* is for the human to come to terms with, give her or himself over to, the difficult truth of the eternal return. Alternatively, it may also be a matter of moving forward, of realizing new possibilities latent within the system. For (earlier) Heidegger, the subject must enter into the cosmic struggle in order to open worlds for human dwelling, while for Deleuze the implication of a system that generates ever new possibilities is that we participate in this generation rather than attempt to solidify that which is fluid. In all cases, however, this is a matter of participation in the rhythm of the whole.

There are, within Christian theology, mixed responses to this approach to the divine. Catherine Keller is among those who adopt an approach to Christian theology similar to and based on the thinkers and principles described here. In putting forward a theology of creation based on the image of the Spirit of God hovering over the face of the deep, Keller argues for a theology that understands God as a becoming-in-relation that folds in and out of chaos.¹⁰⁵ Keller insists that she does not worship chaos.¹⁰⁶ It is not equal to God. However, the chaos precedes any ontological difference between creator and creation.¹⁰⁷ She appeals to Deleuze in describing this chaos as depth that is without transcendence or verticality, but is a virtual matrix of difference itself. She even appeals to

¹⁰⁵ Catherine Keller, *The Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming* (London: Routledge), 40.

¹⁰⁶ Keller, *The Face of the Deep*, 7.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 163.

Deleuze's use of rhythm, suggesting that rhythm and chaos are synonymous.¹⁰⁸ Creation is not an outside order imposed upon this Deleuzian matrix but is generated from within the matrix through oscillations that produce positive feedback, amplified into layers of oscillation in and out of chaos. God is the first oscillation between attraction and reception, invitation and Sabbath. Order and creation emerge in response to this oscillation.¹⁰⁹ God is therefore described not as a personal will that creates, but as a physical force of oscillating attraction within the process of the world's becoming in relation to chaos. With this change in the nature of God, there is also a change in the nature of rhythm. The "metric regularity of the whole order has been perturbed – from the beginning – by another rhythm."¹¹⁰ Notice here the relativization of a particular kind of rhythm as regular and periodic in favour of a more chaotic rhythm.

Keller readily identifies her approach with panentheism, or what she calls "creation as incarnation." She says,

If the godhead, or rather the godness, 'in' whom *unfolds* the universe can be theologized as Tehom, the ocean of divinity, the divinity *who unfolds* 'in' the all is called by such biblical names as Elohim, Sophia, Logos, Christ. The all in the divine, the divine in the all: this rhythm of appellations does not name two Gods, or even two Persons. Yet it does echo the Trinitarian intuition of complex relationality *immanent* to an impersonal Godhead and personalized in the *oikonomia* of the creation. Their relation to each other...can be resignified only through the icon of the oscillating Spirit. So the names Tehom and Elohim may henceforth designate, if not 'persons,' two *capacities* of an infinite becoming.¹¹¹

God is both of the opposed realities: impersonal matrix and personal God within the matrix, as well as the relation between them. In other words, God designates the whole of the system. God unfolds in the all, such that chaos and God are two capacities of an infinite becoming held together by an oscillating Spirit. Thus, while God is not equal to chaos, he

¹⁰⁸ Keller, *The Face of the Deep*, 168-9.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 198.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 115-6.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 219.

is the divinizing and creating impulse of it and in it, and it is included within his self-relations. God exceeds chaos, but does not exceed the whole.

Theological Critique

There are dimensions of this kind of Heraclitean theology that are important. Keller's rehabilitation of the dimension of chaos in the biblical creation narrative, and with it the possibility that God did not create out of nothing, but invited and attracted potentiality into various actualizations, is both a good, biblically-grounded argument as well as theologically and socially significant. Furthermore, her non-personalist description of the Trinity as a matrix of "rhythmic interrelations"¹¹² is imaginatively compelling and there are ways that I will take up this idea in a later chapter. Nevertheless, Keller's extension of these elements into a system in which God is identified so closely with the movements of the becoming of creation itself means that her theology is in the end an account of a unified whole in which gaps or ruptures are relativized and swallowed up in the grand movement of becoming. The possibility of any real rupture, interruption, or the coming of something utterly new or other to the system is foreclosed. While newness and difference may be generated from within the system, according to its own internal logic,¹¹³ everything is already prematurely understood from within the whole. The new is therefore not an encounter with the other, but new beginnings, things that begin from within, grow through nascent stages, and develop and die. The sort of confrontation that is based on historical encounter is not considered theologically significant. The absence of such

¹¹² Keller, *The Face of the Deep*, 18.

¹¹³ Daniel Barber argues, from an analysis of Deleuze that transcendence is not necessary for the breaking in of the new, suggesting that Deleuze's entire system is predicated on differentiation, gaps and interruptions between things, such that the new is generated immanently because it is generated out of a system of difference rather than sameness (Barber, *Deleuze and the Naming of God*). Nevertheless, as Keller points out, there exist two kinds of difference: ontological differentiation between Creator and creation, or the differential of the matrix (Keller, *The Face of the Deep*, 163). The differential of the matrix does not necessarily ensure the breaking in of the new.

historical encounter is particularly evident in Keller's interpretation of incarnation. For Keller, the incarnation is not an historical event, a happening or an interruption, but an inclusive possibility, a way of thinking of the unfolding of reality in which God is within that reality. It becomes a symbol and is swallowed into the repetitions of the process.¹¹⁴ If this is the case, however, then the incarnation is not an actual, historical event that can confront us as actual, historical persons. As with Deleuze, it is so indeterminate that it makes confrontation impossible. Its significance is limited to the symbolic and unconscious ways in which the incarnation forms us through our milieu. Incarnation is simply part of all of us, and can therefore not confront us in any meaningful sense.

Therefore, whether or not one believes this approach to reality to be amenable to Christianity depends upon whether one believes it is necessary that God be an Other to creation, and whether the possibility of confrontation from something beyond the system ought to be maintained. My primary concern in this thesis is not to argue that Christian theology must *necessarily* keep such a possibility open but to demonstrate the various theological systems that accompany concepts of rhythm, and identify a conception that takes as many dimensions of Christian theology into account as possible. There are two reasons why I believe that the process theology description of reality to which Heraclitean rhythm lends itself does not do so satisfactorily, and that it is necessary for Christian theology to therefore maintain the tradition of God as other in some way. First, the experience of people in the world is historical in the sense that it is one in which persons are encountered by events. Regardless of the ontological reality or underpinnings of such events, we experience reality, at least in part, as encounters with events and identities that influence us not only through waves of generation and destruction, but through our confrontation with them and the interruption of the flow of our thoughts and experience by

¹¹⁴ Keller, *The Face of the Deep*, 220-1.

them. Keller does not account for this dimension of reality and her theology is therefore insufficient to human experience as temporal, and to the salvific encounters that the human experience of salvation involves. The biblical narrative describes the human relation to God largely in terms of such surprising and interruptive encounters. Faithfulness to that dimension of Christian religious experience and to the form of relation represented in scripture therefore requires an account not only of God as part of a whole or the whole itself, but God encountered as event. Keller does not supply such an account. Her perspective is only synchronic.

Second is the problem of sin. While there is by no means consensus regarding what sin is, the fact that corruption and suffering have resulted from that which has been generated from within the system of creation suggests that a concept of redemption or salvation cannot be reduced to yet one more process generated by the system. It is not clear how such a process within the system could sufficiently challenge the others, or how it could of itself resist the traps of evil and corruption that have overcome so many others. While I do not hereby suggest that such redemption must be wholly transcendent in a voluntaristic way, a total opposition to and overcoming of the world, I do think that an element of otherness to the system that generates pain and injustice is necessary. These objections show that while there may be dimensions of this Heraclitean account of reality and the rhythm that it involves that are appropriate to Christian theology, they cannot be the whole of its doctrine.

Conclusion

The Benvenistian definition of rhythm, when applied to the nature of reality, is a form in the Heraclitean sense of a harmony that emerges immanently out of chaos, and that changes with the relationships of oppositions that constitute the world. All of the above examples describe rhythm in terms of a fluid form that comes to stand for the whole of

reality. For Deleuze, this is expressed as a kind of grouping, the emergence of links and territories through the communication of heterogeneous actualities. By implication this extends to the pattern of the whole of reality through the association of rhythm with the third synthesis. For Nietzsche, the Dionysian is experienced as rhythm when it is given form by its encounter with the Apollonian, which induces it to linger, whether in a relationship of harmony, as in tragedy, or in the natural strife between these opposites that nevertheless makes such harmony possible. This relation between force and form, which creates a fluid form, is extended from art to the description of reality as a whole in the eternal return. For Heidegger, rhythmic form is achieved through the primordial principle of struggle against the realm of *physis*. However, such form can only ever be partial and tendentious and is therefore also fluid in nature because of the forces of *physis* that assault and interrupt it from the outside. The dialectic between these two movements constitutes the whole, particularly evident in the fourfold.

All the approaches described above exhibit an almost seamless relationship between harmony and opposition, chaos, or struggle, with rhythm mediating this relationship. In Deleuze, rhythm inhabits the between that maintains the ultimate separation between past and future, but this separation is likewise their unification in that, as the repetition of difference itself, it is and contains the whole of difference and repetition which is the whole of reality. The principle of opposition is the principle of unity. For Nietzsche, opposition and harmony are simply two perspectives on the same relationship between force and form, the former an existential perspective and the latter a cosmological perspective. Heidegger states that *logos* and *polemos* are one and the same, indicating that rhythm's participation in a struggle against the forces of *physis* is a participation in the harmony and unity of the cosmos as well.¹¹⁵ In making conflict or opposition the basis of

¹¹⁵ Notice that all of these thinkers admit of a kind of interruption in some way. Deleuze sees a gap or a caesura between repetition and difference. Nietzsche envisions the Dionysian constantly interrupting the

unity and form, that unity and form is made universal because any opposition is already included within it. Opposition is not a confrontation to unity, but is included within it and rhythm designates this universality.

In terms of rhythm in poetry, these thinkers approach rhythm from a synchronic perspective. It is a form that, while recognized as temporal, as in flux, is nevertheless not described in terms of how it is experienced in time but in terms of how it functions to hold together the whole of the system. The unity and harmony of the whole is ultimate, but is based on an opposition and an oscillation between two elements. The difference is that while synchronic theories often describe this polarity in terms of hierarchies and acknowledge a teleological element at the highest level, these elements are lacking in Benvenistian rhythm. Chapter four describes an alternative synchronic approach based on elements of the work of Augustine on rhythm, in which these elements are present. For the moment, however, given this synchronic perspective, it is unsurprising that ideas such as the event, the encounter, and history, are absent from a theology based on flux, since this would require a diachronic perspective, which is lacking in this approach.

This (anti)metaphysics that Benvenistian rhythm lends itself to is theologically problematic because God is reduced to an element within the rhythmic and improvised form of the whole, foreclosing the possibility of an encounter of the system with something that is not the system. This in turn does not provide a sufficiently robust salvation narrative for a Christian theology that takes the concept of sin seriously, nor does it sufficiently represent the experience of the historic person's encounter with God as an interruption to experience rather than as exclusively the emergence of a possibility within that experience.

Apollonian in tragedy. Likewise, Heidegger's earth and world jut through each other, interrupt each other. Nevertheless, in each case these interruptions are merely movements within a larger system, or manifestations of the strife through which the whole system works itself out. My opposition of rhythm as form to rhythm as interruption is therefore not a matter of whether a particular understanding includes the idea of interruption so much as whether this is the defining feature of the experience of rhythm itself, rather than simply one movement within the larger rhythmic form of the whole.

The assumed human capacity to give an account of reality as a whole assumes a transcendent perspective from which the whole is identifiable to human experience. Moreover, as I indicated in the previous chapter, there is, socially speaking, from within the creaturely perspective, no universal rhythm but a collection of overlapping and interacting local rhythms that only ever unite provisionally, such that it is disingenuous to human embedded-ness in rhythm to identify a single universal rhythm as the structure of reality in general, with no possibility of interruption from beyond that rhythm. While Benvenistian synchronic rhythm would affirm this based on the emphasis on difference, it nevertheless assumes a perspective from which the totality of these rhythms and their character can be known, thereby giving up the creaturely perspective. The synchronic perspective assumes a God's-eye-view on the part of the thinker and also risks creating a metaphysics that is, for all its internal diversity, at the most general level closed to change and interruption and therefore at risk of hegemony.¹¹⁶

I have here demonstrated that Benvenistian rhythm characteristically accompanies these sorts of immanent systems of process, helping to describe the immanent generation of harmony from chaos. Nevertheless, the question still remains whether this is the necessary outcome of the Benvenistian definition of rhythm as fluid form. The answer depends on the degree of absolutization of this definition. If rhythm is only defined in Benvenistian terms and then used in describing the nature of reality as a whole, reality will appear as fluid and improvised form in which all movement is simply incorporated into that form. However, while I have here argued that this understanding of rhythm is not sufficient to Christian theology, it is helpful and even necessary, when taken alongside

¹¹⁶ Alain Badiou, *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*, trans. Louise Burchill (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 25, 97, 91-2. Interestingly, Badiou makes the connection between Deleuze's univocity and a Neoplatonic emanation despite Deleuze's avowed anti-platonism. This is similar to my association between Deleuze's synchrony and that of Neoplatonism in chapter four. Badiou suggests that for all its internal diversity, Deleuze's system is not able to provide political confrontation since everything is valued equally. It therefore ends up simply affirming the status quo.

other perspectives, as a way to describe certain dimensions of theology, salvation, creation, etc. (I have already mentioned the Trinity as an example). The way in which these various dimensions of rhythm interact within theology will emerge in chapter five and beyond, while the next two chapters consider two other perspectives on rhythm: one diachronic and the other synchronic.

Chapter 3 Diachronicity: Rhythm as Interruption

For one day as I leant over a gate that led into a field, the rhythm stopped; the rhymes and the hummings, the nonsense and the poetry. A space was cleared in my mind. I saw through the thick leaves of habit.

Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*, 190.

The previous chapter describes rhythm as it appears in the work of Gilles Deleuze based on the definition given by Emile Benveniste and its function in earlier philosophies such as those of Nietzsche and Heidegger. For these thinkers, rhythm is the form of that which is indeterminate and in flux. It acts as an intermediary between chaos and the identities that such chaos generates out of itself. As such, rhythm understood in this way plays the Heraclitean role of holding together the conflict of opposites in the harmony of the absolute, immanent One. This is a synchronic perspective on rhythm because it does not take into account the perspective of the thinker as embedded in time and the experiences of encounter that this entails. Rather, it assumes a position outside the whole from which it is possible to indicate what rhythm is, where it occurs, and how it functions.

However, this is not the only description of rhythm in recent philosophy. In contrast with attempts to use rhythm as a way of describing how various dimensions of reality are held together as a whole, other philosophers such as Julia Kristeva, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Giorgio Agamben emphasize the interruptive nature of rhythm, based on the way in which the subject experiences it. Theological responses to these

thinkers has been mixed. I argue here that while this perspective on rhythm is insufficient to theology, it is nevertheless an important and irreducible dimension of a description of rhythm appropriate to Christian theology.

I focus particularly on the way in which rhythm is used by Giorgio Agamben because of what I take to be the relevance of his thought for theology. While commentators are not in agreement regarding the compatibility of Agamben's work with Christian theology, he is nevertheless highly engaged with material from the Christian tradition. These engagements are connected to the way in which he conceptualizes and utilizes rhythm, and both rhythm and Agamben's engagement with Christianity play an important role in his work more generally. Agamben's perspective on rhythm is theologically significant because although it does not acknowledge a transcendent God revealed in Jesus Christ, it is nevertheless an attempt to make sense of the diachronic perspective of the creature in terms of poetry, language, and the political, all of which I identified in chapter one as areas of human experience in which rhythm operates. Agamben provides a way to make sense of the significance of these operations of rhythm. Unlike the thinkers of the previous chapter, Agamben's perspective is therefore a creaturely one, a perspective from inside the rhythms of human structures that nevertheless strains beyond them. From his intra-creaturely perspective, Agamben identifies openings or caesurae within the rhythms of human structures and experiences. These caesurae are not God *per se* but ambiguous spaces from which to interrupt a hegemonic system, and they are thus spaces in which it is possible to encounter something beyond such human systems. Such caesurae are often experienced as interruptive, and I include Lacoue-Labarthe and Kristeva here in order to describe more clearly the relationship between such interruptions, the rhythm in which they occur, the subject¹ that experiences them, and possible theological resonances.

¹ I use the term "subject" here because it is the term that Lacoue-Labarthe uses. While there is contention surrounding the term, much of Lacoue-Labarthe's work on rhythm and the subject is precisely an attempt to

While the philosophers discussed in this chapter would likely not think of themselves of metaphysicians, in the most general sense they are providing an argument for how one ought to make sense of the world, namely from the perspective of the socially-constructed structures and systems that govern everyday life. These thinkers are important for establishing the theological significance of rhythm because their attempts to make sense of reality are based in the movements and rhythms of the relationship between the person and surrounding reality, particularly the structures that have been constructed by human community. Since I am arguing that rhythm is significant, because it provides a way of conceptualizing movements in and between self, Church, God, and world that constitute salvation, thereby configuring the rhythms of human experience in particular ways, these thinkers affirm that the way in which we make sense of reality cannot be abstracted from the rhythms in which the human creature is embedded. Salvation is always a salvation of this world and these rhythms.

Interruptive Rhythm and the Experience of the Subject

Rhythm in the Work of Giorgio Agamben

Agamben describes the interruptive nature of rhythm in his book *The Man Without Content*, in the chapter entitled “The Original Structure of the Work of Art,” a reference to Heidegger's essay “The Origin of the Work of Art.” Heidegger states that his interest in the origin of the work of art is a question about the way in which art is an origin of our historical existence,² and Agamben too is interested in how it is that we describe this originary nature or quality of the work of art. Like Heidegger, Agamben rejects the aesthetic interpretation of art in favour of understanding art as a more “essential”

unsettle the subject that is often conceived of as discreet and autonomous, showing its dependence upon rhythms that threaten and interrupt such independence.

² Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, 75.

[*essenziale*] dimension of our experience in the world. He identifies two sides to the problem of aesthetics: that of the passive spectator/critic and that of the creative genius. Much of the book traces how these two constructs have reinforced each other, and how they have together obscured the originary structure of the work of art. Contrary to aesthetics, he says that to look at art is to be “hurled out into a more original time.”³ The work of art is the site of the origin of dwelling on earth and of truth.⁴ Both Heidegger and Agamben understand *poiesis* as that which opens a world for common human dwelling.

However, differences emerge in the respective descriptions of this originary space. For the later Heidegger, the original status of humanity’s dwelling on earth is located in the encounter with the fourfold – reality as a whole. The role of the poet is to bring the various poles of reality into contact with one another. The poet or artist retains the privileged position of making dwelling possible. For Agamben, the emphasis is on the work of art itself, in which “artists and spectators recover their essential solidarity and their common ground.”⁵ Engagement with the work of art keeps humanity in the truth and gives its dwelling an “original status” because it is the rhythmicization of such dwelling. As with Heidegger, rhythm is something more original than human will, beyond human control. Hence, the chapter on the originary status of the work of art is an exploration of the meaning of Hölderlin’s phrase “Everything is rhythm.”⁶ Based on his interest in this phrase, one might think that Agamben sets out to demonstrate how rhythm is a symbol for the Heraclitean whole as in the previous chapter. His conclusion about Hölderlin’s phrase, however, is somewhat paradoxical. Agamben explores, and rejects as merely aesthetic, definitions of rhythm as measure or number that holds things in place, and as flow. Rather,

³ Giorgio Agamben, *The Man Without Content*, trans. Georgia Albert (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 101.

⁴ As with Heidegger, Agamben’s understanding of the “origin” is not a remote past but a “cultural and conceptual space that we might all share.” Leland de la Durantaye, *Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 35-6.

⁵ Agamben, *The Man Without Content*, 102.

⁶ Hölderlin, quoted in Bettina von Arnim, *Die Gündertode*, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Insel, 1914), p. 331.

these things are themselves products of rhythm; flow and measure are themselves made possible by a more “essential” rhythm.⁷ Agamben describes this more “essential” rhythm in the following terms:

Yet rhythm – as we commonly understand it – appears to introduce into this eternal flow a split and a stop. Thus in a musical piece, although it is somehow in time, we perceive rhythm as something that escapes the incessant flight of instants and appears almost as the presence of an atemporal dimension in time. In the same way, when we are before a work of art or a landscape bathed in the light of its own presence, we perceive a stop in time, as though we were suddenly thrown into a more original time. ... We are as though held, arrested before something, but this being arrested is also a being-outside, an *ek-stasis* in a more original dimension.⁸

Rhythm is not here described primarily from the perspective of ontology, as something that holds reality together as a whole, but experientially, as that which splits and takes us outside the eternal flow. Agamben begins from how it is that we experience rhythm rather than from its function in a description of reality as a whole. Based on this experience of rhythm as a stop, he associates it with the idea of *epoche*, which he says has the double meaning of both suspending and offering, giving and holding⁹:

If we consider what we have just said about rhythm, that it reveals a more original dimension of time and at the same time conceals it in the one-dimensional flight of instants, we can perhaps, with only apparent violence, translate *epoche* as rhythm, and say: rhythm is *epoche*, gift and reserve. ... Rhythm grants men both the ecstatic dwelling in a more original dimension and the fall into the flight of measurable time. ... It is the original ecstasy that opens for man the space of his world, and only

⁷ Agamben, *The Man Without Content*, 96-99.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁹ *Epoche* is literally translated as suspension. It was used in Greek philosophy to denote the suspension of judgement regarding the outside world and therewith action in that world (and was later taken up by Edmund Husserl to mean the suspension, but not obliteration, of belief (see “Epoche”, Encyclopaedia Britannica Online, <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/190459/epoche>. (accessed October 29, 2012))). However, it also refers to the instant of time that is the origin of a particular era, thereby acting as a reference point for the measuring of time Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon, Abridged: The Little Liddell* (London: Simon Wallenberg Press, 2007), 677). This is the sense from which we derive our word “epoc” (Oxford Companion to the Year, 880). Interestingly, a third sense of the word which Agamben does not mention is its use in music to denote a period of vibration (Liddell and Scott, *Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon, Abridged*, 677).

by starting from it can he experience freedom and alienation, historical consciousness and loss in time, truth and error.¹⁰

Agamben thus interprets Hölderlin's phrase not by describing how it is that rhythm is the whole, but by suggesting that rhythm is something other than the whole, something more primordial that makes the whole possible, as well as interrupting it.¹¹ Rhythm is a double-movement of revealing and concealing, or giving and suspending. This corresponds to LaMothe's description of the rhythms of dance in chapter one as both holding and letting go of life.

While for the thinkers considered in the previous chapter, reality involves a fundamental division that rhythm needs to hold together, Agamben describes rhythm as "something that could be found only by abandoning the terrain of division ad infinitum to enter a more essential dimension."¹² Rather than holding reality together as a whole, rhythm is something more essential that encounters the terrain of division as an interruption. In his later work, Agamben describes this as the division of division. In *The Time that Remains*, his commentary on Paul's epistle to the Romans, Agamben calls the messianic remnant the division of division. Secular time is governed by the law, which creates divisions between groups such as between Jew and Gentile. The remnant is not the fusion of these divisions into the "all," since that is the domain of the eschaton. Rather, the remnant is intimately bound up with the division while nevertheless subverting it by dividing it. The remnant thereby prevents "divisions from being exhaustive and excludes the parts and the all from the possibility of coinciding with themselves."¹³ Agamben calls

¹⁰ Agamben, *The Man Without Content*, 100.

¹¹ This is similar to Blanchot's description of rhythm. Blanchot also considers Holderlin's phrase "all is rhythm," saying "How is this sentence to be understood? 'All' does not mean the cosmic in an already ordered totality which it would be rhythm's job to maintain.... Rhythm, while it disengages the multiple from its missing unity, and while it appears regular and seems to govern according to a rule, threatens the rule. For always it exceeds the rule through a reversal whereby, being in play or in operation within measure, it is not measured thereby." (Maurice Blanchot, *The Writing of the Disaster* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 112).

¹² Agamben, *The Man Without Content*, 96-97.

¹³ Agamben, *The Man Without Content*, 56

this a “messianic division” or “messianic vocation.” The messianic renders divisions inoperative, incapable of generating an ontology or politics. It also does not set up some alternative final ground,¹⁴ whole, or alternative world. It simply opens up a space within the world in which these divisions are meaningless. The messianic is “a zone of absolute indiscernability between immanence and transcendence, between this world and the future world.”¹⁵ As such, Agamben characterizes the gospel as power that is actualized in weakness (2 Cor. 12:9).¹⁶ It does not establish something new, but interrupts and frustrates the established.¹⁷

Rhythm as Politically Interruptive

In Agamben’s discussion of the remnant we begin to see the associations between the political and the ontological, and their relationship to rhythm. This is the nexus in which Agamben’s thought operates, most well-known in his *Homo Sacer* series on politics. These books attempt to trace the divisions on which the power of the state depends. In *Homo Sacer* Agamben points out that the exclusion of an excess (in this case bare life) is the way in which the state creates its space of power such that it retains power over what is excluded by this act of exclusion. The excluded remains in relation to the rule as its suspension.¹⁸ “The exception is what cannot be included in the whole of which it is a member and cannot be a member of the whole in which it is always already included.”¹⁹ Thus, in distinction from Deleuze and those who attempt to articulate ontology as a whole, Agamben points out that the concept of the whole is always problematic because it is a

¹⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *The Time that Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*, trans. Patricia Dailey (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 52.

¹⁵ Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, 25.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹⁸ Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998), 17-18.

¹⁹ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 25.

political concept based on a relation to that which is its exception. This, what he calls the “state of exception”, is a “topological zone of indistinction,” as with the indiscernability between immanence and transcendence in the remnant. Agamben therefore thinks about political and ontological structures in similar ways, as human-made machines that operate by holding together divisions in the way that Heraclitus does. In fact, Agamben traces back to Heraclitus the indiscernability in ontology between being and division, the one and the many, as represented in the previous chapter.²⁰ His conclusion is that this relationship is misunderstood if it is thought to be the nature of being as such but is rather the social *praxis* that becomes transparent to itself.²¹ In other words, ontology is the self-reflection of social movements, of politics. Ontology is based on division because politics is based in division.

Agamben’s objective is to unmask the machine that generates Western politics and its ontology. This involves separating what the machine claims to unite. Much of Agamben’s philosophy is an attempt to open various caesurae within the binary categories that we take for granted in experience. Ontology operates according to oppositions, such as between actual and potential, human and animal, universal and particular, or immanent and transcendent. The caesurae are described as zones of “indifference,” “indiscernability,” or “indistinction” between these terms, and are variously described as “the coming community,” “(im)potentiality,” “states of exception,” “infancy,” “the remnant,” etc. The zone of indistinction, as might be expected, is ambiguous and double-faceted in that it manifests most clearly the underlying problematic ontological and political divisions, but it also represents the sites of possible interruption to such binaries. At times Agamben speaks of the zone of indistinction or state of exception as threatening. For example, it is

²⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 118; Watkin, *Agamben and Indifference*, 58-59.

²¹ Agamben, *Potentialities*, 137.

associated with Auschwitz, which is “the extreme that has become ordinary”²² and the reality of the impossible.²³ Limits, such as between human and non-human, life and norm, lose their meaning in this zone, thereby revealing how they otherwise collude to uphold the state. Nevertheless, Agamben seeks out these states precisely because these are the points from which the machines that generated such states of exception in the first place might be rendered inoperative. As such, they are also spaces of hope for something other than the conditions of current social practice. This is why such spaces are associated with the messianic remnant: “In the end, the remnant appears as a redemptive machine allowing for the salvation of the very whole whose division and loss it had signified.”²⁴

This is why Agamben is more interested in rhythm’s interruptive qualities than its harmonizing qualities. He understands his philosophical and political responsibility to be the disclosure of the split on which politics and ontology are based in opposition to those forces that attempt to cover it over.²⁵ He does not appeal to rhythm as an attempt to show the unification of ontological division, as in the previous chapter, but points to its capacity to open a space or stop in the midst of the flow of the machine, in which the divisions on which it is based become visible and the function to which they are put is disrupted.²⁶

Notice that this is much like the way in which African American rhythm functioned as a means of disrupting the machinic rhythms of slavery through music, dance, poetry, and religious practice. The disruption to the machine based in the social *praxis* of something other occurred from within a zone of indistinction generated by a machine that it is not far-fetched to say is comparable to that which generated Auschwitz. Similar to the way in which Agamben says that the “*musselman*” disrupts the boundary between the

²² Giorgio Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone, 1999), 50.

²³ Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, 148.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 163.

²⁵ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 180.

²⁶ Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevill Attell (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 88.

human and non-human, Fred Moten points out that the slave disrupts the boundary between subject and object as a “speaking commodity.” Like the *Homo Sacer*, the slave is included within the sphere of power as an exclusion or suspension from both the protection of the law and white Christianity, and yet by virtue of that exclusion is tightly captured and enslaved within those systems *as* excluded. Interaction with a slave is a human action (what would otherwise be called violence) that is not categorized according to either sphere.²⁷ From within this zone of indistinction between inclusion and exclusion, however, the power of these spheres is challenged by alternative rhythms performed in the gaps.

The rhythmic term that Agamben uses to describe these spaces is the caesura. His understanding of rhythm is caesuric – its function is to open spaces. In poetics the caesura is the device whereby the steady, rhythmic progress of a poem is interrupted mid-line by a punctuation mark, such that a gap emerges in the reader or hearer’s experience of the forward momentum of the poem.²⁸ In *The Idea of Prose*, Agamben describes it as follows: the poet rides asleep on the horse of the sound and vocal element of language, carried along by the regular movement of the “rhythmic succession of representations.” The poet is thus unaware of that which carries him, he is merely swept along. However, when the horse stops suddenly, the poet awakes and is forced to consider that which carries him, namely his own voice. This sudden stop of the horse, which engenders thought, is the caesura.²⁹ Like rhythm in general, the voice is here described as that which both makes poetry possible as well as that which interrupts the process and progress of language, opening a space in which the possibility of representation itself is thought.

Agamben takes this image from Hölderlin:

²⁷ Agamben, *Homo Sacer*, 82.

²⁸ William Watkin, *The Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis* (London: Continuum, 2010), 168.

²⁹ Giorgio Agamben, *Idea of Prose*, trans. Michael Sullivan, and Sam Whitsitt (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 44.

In the rhythmic sequence of representations, in which the tragic transport exhibits itself, that which one calls the caesura in poetic metre, the pure word, the counter-rhythmic interruption, is necessary; precisely in order to counter the raging change of representations at its summit so that it is no longer the change of representations but the representation itself which appears.³⁰

The caesura introduces an interruption into the incessant sequence of representations, the run-away train of progress. Hölderlin's understanding of rhythm therefore always includes this necessary counter-rhythmic caesura. The gap, the interruption to rhythm, is itself part of this rhythm and reveals the more "essential" rhythm which makes it possible. This is the place from which the voice, the possibility of poetry, can be contemplated and alternative rhythmic possibilities envisioned.

The relationship between the poetic and the political takes on theological inflections where Agamben discusses time through the idea of the messianic. The effect of the messianic on time echoes his description of caesuric rhythm. The Messiah introduces a temporal dimension into chronological time, which acts as a scission between the messianic event (the crucifixion and resurrection) and its *parousia*, its full presence.³¹ The image of this in the Judeo-Christian tradition is the Sabbath, which represents "that innermost disjointedness within time through which one may... grasp time and accomplish it."³² Messianic time is within *chronos* but exceeds it, and is also part of eternity but exceeds it. It is both immanent to *chronos*, as well as transcendent in that it enables one to transcend *chronos*. In other words, messianic time divides the division between time and eternity. The purpose of this scission is to make the *parousia* graspable by recapitulating each instant, making it contemporary with the Messiah in a constellation between the two

³⁰J. M. Bernstein et al., *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 195.

³¹ Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, 71.

³² *Ibid.*, 72.

times.³³ This is Agamben's description of the *kairos*. The division between the messianic, salvific event and its full presence that divides the division of time and eternity thereby opens a more original dimension in which moments are freed from the flow and made present to that messianic event. As with rhythm, the messianic is not something other than time, but a process within time itself that disrupts it, opening a space in which new meaning is possible.

Agamben describes messianic time as poetic. A poem is an eschatological machine because it is always straining towards its end.³⁴ For its duration, it has a kind of time that is specific to it, involving rhythm and rhyme.³⁵ The rhyming of end words is a recapitulation of the ending that is foreshadowed therein. This rhyme is "the articulation of a difference between semiotic series and semantic series" that works as follows:

Through this complicated to-and-fro directed both forward and backward, the chronological sequence of linear homogeneous time is completely transformed into rhythmic constellations themselves in movement. ...What we have is the same time that organizes itself through its own somewhat hidden internal pulsation, in order to make place for the time of the poem.³⁶

A pulsation that is immanent within time opens up the process of poetic time. Time that has been reconfigured by the messianic, like the poem, is a rhythmic movement that is directed towards its *parousia* in the eschaton, and that end is that which generates the particular configuration of time. This leads to an interesting relationship in Agamben's thought between space and time, arguably the two ingredients of rhythm. The *kairos* or caesura for Agamben is a space opened up within time, and is this spatial interruption to the temporal flow that creates rhythm. The space is beyond time in the sense that it is

³³ Agamben, *The Time that Remains*, 76-7.

³⁴ The end of the poem plays an interesting role for Agamben's poetics. He suggests that the distinguishing feature of poetry is the possibility of enjambment – the articulation of a difference between the semiotic and the semantic. At the end of the poem, however, enjambment is no longer possible and poetry passes over into prose. The poem is therefore a temporal engine that is always moving towards its own end.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 79.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 82.

associated with the end of time, the eschaton, and it refutes sequence. However, this is not something other than time, just as the poem is not other than time, but a grasped and contracted time. The opportune time is not exactly a time at all but a space, but in this spaciousness it is the opportune time. Likewise, just as the opportune time is time-becoming-space, the space of the beyond, the threshold, is a space becoming time, it is the movement or taking-place of being inside the outside.³⁷ The nature of the messianic caesura is therefore always described in relation to poetic experiences – the experience of a spacious time, and of the time that it takes to move into a space.

Agamben is not prescribing zones of indistinction as new wholes or a new system that ought to be followed or set up. He is only interested in disrupting already-existing categories. He prefers to speak in terms of deactivation and hollowing-out rather than destruction or overcoming because he is not intent upon overthrowing the world as we know it. However, if it is true that the messianic for Agamben represents the division of division and thus the positive space in which an alternative politics, which he calls the Coming Community, could be realized, his association of the messianic with poetry suggests that this space has an elementary character and is not a simple void. It has no ontological status, but there are inklings of the kinds of movements and experiences that it involves.

The particular character of the caesura or the zone of indistinction is affirmed by his book *The Coming Community*, the one work that describes Agamben's vision of human life in the spaces that carry one beyond the realm of infinite division. Here Agamben identifies two oscillations: the vertical between the common and the proper, and the horizontal oscillation between potentiality and act that characterizes such singularities. William Watkin, a commentator on Agamben, says:

³⁷ William Watkin, *Agamben and Indifference*, 79-86.

The motion of indifference is both a rising up and a shuttling across. It is a point of ecstasy, and an ongoing oscillation. It combines, in other words, meta- and para- spatial positioning ... in my earlier work in relation to this interactive spatial dynamism in poetic rhythm, I have called it the tabular-planar. ... Take a point and extend it horizontally and vertically, and you have the two-dimensional space-arena that captures the double-modality of indifferent singularization.

He calls this “a space-movement across the heterogeneity of the horizontal and vertical temporal-spatial coordinates.”³⁸ The tabular-planar movement to which Watkin here refers is that of the movement of enjambment in poetry, which opens up the line of text into a plane that includes the surrounding space, which is both exterior and threshold.³⁹ When we come to discussing the rhythm of Erich Przywara, we will find that Przywara uses precisely this model of an oscillation between vertical and horizontal oscillations as a way of describing the *analogia entis*. The rhythmic movement of this zone of indifference is strikingly similar to the relationship between God and creature in the *analogia entis*.

Agamben does not identify the zone of indifference as a transcendence in a theological sense, but the zone is a threshold, and therefore suggests something beyond itself, albeit in more of the sense of a future beyond that is not yet realized rather than a given ontological beyond that can be spatially represented. What Agamben calls the “outside” is here the passage, the act of moving over a threshold, “the experience of the limit itself, the experience of being-within an outside.”⁴⁰ He therefore acknowledges something like transcendence from a radically intra-creaturely perspective which allows one to only describe the experience of moving to beyond, rather than the outside itself.

³⁸ Watkin, *Agamben and Indifference*, 73.

³⁹ Watkin, *The Literary Agamben*, 144.

⁴⁰ Giorgio Agamben, *The Coming Community*, trans. Michael Hardt (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 68.

Rhythm and the Interruption of the Subject

Hölderlin extends the idea of the caesura to consciousness as well. He describes the unity of human faculties as a rhythm, while the caesura is the “counter-rhythmic rupture” that disrupts this unity.⁴¹ These moments are a kind of Dionysian chorus in the midst of dialogue, which are composed of nothing but space and time and in which “man forgets himself because he exists entirely for the moment.”⁴² Agamben too makes a connection between the caesura as a poetic device in its associations with rhythm and the disruption of experience.⁴³ In particular, the caesura as an element of poetry is bound up with the operation of language in the nature of the subject. Agamben draws attention to the communicability of language rather than to its nature as an abstract system of signs. The caesura introduces a stop precisely for the contemplation of the possibility of language itself, its communicability. He is thus interested in the operation of language, just as those linguists who study the rhythm of language are interested in how language functions and to what end. Agamben is here turning away from language as logical operation and focusing instead on the “the practical activity, that is, the assumption of language by one or more

⁴¹Friedrich Hölderlin, *Friedrich Hölderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory*, trans. Thomas Pfau (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988), 109.

⁴² Hölderlin, *Friedrich Hölderlin*, 107-08.

⁴³ Of course Agamben is not the only one to do this. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, for example, believes that Hölderlin’s work sought to capture the “double bind” of *mimesis* that causes an oscillation between self and other. However, the impossibility of capturing *mimesis* causes a disruption of the mimetic schema from the inside, which “distends and suspends it. Something that constantly prevents it from completing itself and never ceases, by doubling it, to divert it from itself, to dig into it in such a way as to create a spiral, and to bring about its collapse. Or that interrupts it, from place to place, and provokes its 'spasm.’” (Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*, trans. Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 227). In the caesura, binaries are dissolved. The suspension does not eliminate oscillation, “It simply brings it to a halt, re-establishes its equilibrium; prevents it, as Hölderlin says, from carrying along its representations exclusively in one sense or another.” (Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, 235). Lacoue-Labarthe’s description of the rhythmic caesura is thus similar to that of Agamben in that it is an opening of a more original lack, space, or zone of undecidability within the play of binary categories yet beyond their binary logic. Rhythm both makes possible the building of schemas through differentiation, and produces a residue or caesura that threatens that same schema. As with Agamben, it supports the system of representation while also suspending and interrupting it.

speaking subjects,”⁴⁴ just as he focuses on the function of ontology as a product of political *praxis*.

Agamben is particularly interested in the pronoun “I,” which does not designate anything because its referent is different depending on who is speaking. Instead, the I designates the act of speaking itself, that one is communicating and the implied trust in the possibility of communication.⁴⁵ The I is not a thing but is language taking place. As such, Agamben says that the subject is not the master of language because the I is always something other than the speaking subject, even as it is the grounding of one’s subjectivity by making such subjectivity communicable. This grounding of the subject is therefore also a desubjectification, a distancing of the subject from itself. He says that “To speak, to bear witness, is thus to enter into a vertiginous movement in which something sinks to the bottom, wholly desubjectified and silenced, and something subjectified speaks without truly having anything to say of its own”⁴⁶ In speech the self is disrupted. A caesura opens up between the human subject and the inhuman desubjectified, and between two movements: the flow of vital functions, and the flow of language and consciousness. The I is this caesura. Agamben is here contemplating the voice from within the caesura. He is thinking the communicability of language itself, the split in the subject by which communication is made possible. In thinking of the communicability of language as the I of the caesura, Agamben points to its rhythmic nature. The I introduces a stop into the flow of language, making it rhythmic and graspable. In chapter one, I pointed out that in order for communication to take place, the rhythms of the self’s thought must be interrupted and re-directed. Agamben here makes the I the focus for this interruption in the self that makes communication possible. The unconscious flow is interrupted in order to enter into conversation. The stop in the flow sets up a new rhythm.

⁴⁴ Agamben, *State of Exception*, 39.

⁴⁵ Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, 116.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 120.

Another dimension of communication with rhythmic significance that I mentioned is that of imitation or *mimesis*, in that the imitation of the rhythms of another is a significant factor in both the acquisition of language and in carrying emotional and contextual meaning across speakers, thereby creating a place of intimacy or mutual endeavour. Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe makes observations about this relationship between rhythm, *mimesis*, and the subject, and is in this respect an interesting supplement to Agamben. Lacoue-Labarthe says that the subject generates itself through *mimesis* in speech and writing,⁴⁷ and is thus not a given foundation but an ongoing process. This process is the creation of the self by differentiating familiar and strange, real and fantastic, based on the imitation of previous examples. Subjectivity is generated through the imitation of the movements of patterns provided for us. Below the surface of overt social interactions, social life is a matter of the confluence and divergence of these rhythms. Likewise, each subject, beneath the figure that he or she projects, is rhythm because it is rhythm that enables the development of this figure.⁴⁸ However, since this rhythm is a sort of Derridean *archi-écriture*, something more primordial that acts as a ground which is nevertheless unstable and cannot be grasped, it must be covered over because it is a threat to the subject. This is attained through a domestication of rhythm, in which it is re-constituted in the service of the subject, as for example in Plato's *Republic* in which the rhythmic dimension of music is called upon to "imitate the life (the style) of an ordered (*kosmos*) and virile man (courageous, *andrios*), and 'measure and melody' are obliged to submit themselves to the words of such a man."⁴⁹ Rhythm is expected to be imitative of already-established orders and patterns so as to protect against the dissolution of the subject.

As such, there are two sorts of mimetic rhythm at work. One is the creation of order through the imitation of other identities. The other is the more primordial rhythm that is

⁴⁷ Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, 179.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 198-99.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 202.

simply *mimesis* itself, the imitation of imitation. Lacoue-Labarthe describes *mimesis* as ek-static – outside of and prior to the subject, a “*différance* [which] is inherent in the subject, forever preventing it from being subject.”⁵⁰ *Mimesis* is here not imitation of an original such that we can dispense with the copy in order to access or unveil the original. Rather, it is a movement of original supplementarity, a recognition that origin is fiction and that the only origin is one of dependence on *mimesis* itself.⁵¹ Insofar as rhythm is associated with this latter understanding of *mimesis*, rhythm determines the subject as a pre-inscription of chaos that makes us inaccessible to ourselves.⁵² ⁵³ While the subject is constituted by rhythm, that rhythm cannot be grasped and therefore functions as an interruption of the subject.

Like Deleuze’s repetition, *mimesis* can either represent the repetition of identities or the repetition of chaos, of repetition itself.⁵⁴ The difference, however, between Deleuze and Lacoue-Labarthe is that while Deleuze describes rhythm and the reality of which it is a part as if he has direct access to and knowledge of it, Lacoue-Labarthe is more aware of the elusive nature of rhythm, the knowing subject’s relationship to it, and consequently its interruptive quality. Rhythm grounds everything, but one can only encounter this grounding rhythm as a problematizing of the patterns, systems, and wholes that we generate. As such, his understanding of rhythm is more like that of Agamben because

⁵⁰ Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, 202.

⁵¹ Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*, trans. Chris Turner (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 83.

⁵² Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, 202.

⁵³ Jacques Derrida says in the introduction to this volume of Lacoue-Labarthe’s work that the character that rhythm “imprints or prescribes is not the attribute of the being we are, not an attribute of our existence,” but “before the stance of our being-present, before its consistency, its existence, and its essence, there is rhythmic desistance” (Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, 31). Derrida therefore here seems to describe rhythm in a way that is similar to the way that he thinks about *différance*, as an originary spatial-temporal movement that cannot be represented but both gives and disrupts representation. If this is the case, then Derridean *différance* is comparable to the rhythm of Agamben, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Kristeva, although he is less clear than Agamben about its political significance and potential.

⁵⁴ Lacoue-Labarthe even references Benveniste’s definition of rhythm as *rhusmos*, which originally indicated the form of a letter or a character. He thus associates this definition with the idea of subjective character as rhythm, while also pointing out that Benveniste was aware that this form or character is nevertheless fluid, rather than stable. Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, 3, 200.

while rhythm is a more original dimension of reality, prior to and generative of the categories of difference and division through which we experience reality, it is only known through the experience of it as an interruption, rather than directly as a movement that holds everything together. Also, like Agamben, the subject is not for Lacoue-Labarthe an established thing, but a site of movements of subjectification and interruption.

What Lacoue-Labarthe shows is that the mimetic rhythms of language that hold us together in intimacy and mutual endeavour have a double-character. While holding persons together and through this process establishing subjects, mimetic rhythm simultaneously threatens that subjectivity, revealing that the subject is not self-grounded but always only in process through interaction with others. The rhythms of the self that are generated in this process are therefore always in danger of being interrupted by continued interaction. This is the same nexus of forces that Agamben identifies in language through the I. However, in associating these forces with chaos, Lacoue-Labarthe minimizes the inter-personal nature of the rhythms that generate and interrupt the subject. Agamben more appropriately identifies it with communicability.

Julia Kristeva likewise emphasizes the inter-personal dimension of the rhythmic interruption to language and subjectivity and also reveals its possible theological significance. She draws attention to the relation between language, socio-biology, and how it is that both of these dimensions form and question the subject, particularly through poetry and other forms of art. Regular, what she calls “symbolic,” language assumes a neutral, transparent speaker whose subjectivity is independent of what is spoken. However, a more feminine dimension of language that takes account of the subjectivity of the speaker, known as the semiotic, remains tethered to language. This semiotic meaning, which cannot be reduced to the relationship between signifier and signified, is made up of the interaction of the various social and biological drives that shape language. The semiotic encompasses “the drives of the psychic-social body, involving the materiality,

emotionality, and interdependence associated in much of the Western philosophical tradition with the realm of the ‘feminine.’”⁵⁵ The semiotic also recalls the biological connection between mother and child and the relational, and often mimetic, space in which language is first acquired.^{56 57}

The image that Kristeva uses for this space of semiotic meaning is the *chora*, the platonic, primeval maternal space or matrix of nourishment, prior to any sort of god or metaphysics.⁵⁸ It is the kind of meaning that precedes language and is “analogous only to vocal or kinetic rhythm.”⁵⁹ Language is dependent on the *chora* as the process by which significance is constituted. The *chora* is semiotic in that it is the necessary kinetic processes through which language and social relations are acquired. In other words, the *chora* refers to the rhythmic dimensions of language, which are based in the body and the maternal space out of which we first acquire language. However, this semiotic *chora* remains within language, both sustaining and threatening it.⁶⁰

Significantly, Kristeva uses christological language to describe the *chora*. The movements of the *chora* are kenotic – self-emptying or self-effacing. These movements

⁵⁵ Jennifer-Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, “Feminine Figures in Heidegger’s Theory of Poetic Language” in *Feminist Interpretations of Martin Heidegger*, ed. Nancy J. Holland and Patricia Huntington (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press), 207-08.

⁵⁶ Some critics such as Judith Butler object to Kristeva’s association of the feminine with nature and the maternal body, over-against culture. This leads to a kind of gender essentialism that subjects the semiotic rendering it less powerful than it might otherwise be (Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (London: Routledge, 1999), 102-03). However, if we read Kristeva as doing something similar to Agamben, we can read her as not making an argument that the feminine is necessarily and essentially associated with biology and maternity but as recognizing that this is the role that has been assigned to it by the symbolic. Much in the way that Agamben uncovers the political and ontological oppositions that emerge not because they are necessary but because they make possible a particular system, Kristeva uncovers an opposition upon which patriarchal culture is built and finds the zones of their indistinction in which to open alternative spaces. Her approach is therefore a different kind of subversion than that of Butler in that it is less an overthrowing, and more an attempt to hollow out, render inoperative, and move beyond. The semiotic is a space or machine of change and subversion, not the ideal itself.

⁵⁷ Lacoue-Labarthe makes a similar point, saying that the maternal echo imprinted on us when “from the period preceding birth... the infant discovers nothing from his own impressions but the regular rhythm of the mother’s heart and his own.” The subject is “rhythmed” through the mother (Lacoue-Labarthe, *Typography*, 206).

⁵⁸ Julia Kristeva, *The Kristeva Reader*, trans. Toril Moi (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), 191.

⁵⁹ Julia Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 26.

⁶⁰ Kristeva, *Revolution in Poetic Language*, 68.

give us reality as we know it but simultaneously obscure the *chora* itself. In reference to Christ, she says, “He who provides food is the one who sacrifices himself and disappears so that others might live. His death is neither murder nor evacuation but a life-giving discontinuity, closer to nutrition than to the simple destruction of value or the abandonment of a fallen object.”⁶¹ The *chora* is likewise such a life-giving discontinuity.⁶² The result of such *kenosis* is that insofar as we are alive we encounter the *chora* only as an interruptive space and not as a thing in itself. However, this interruption is at the heart of intimacy and here Kristeva refers to the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar, saying that in the crucifixion, a split or “hiatus” enters the relationship between Father and Son in the Trinity,⁶³ which is also the point at which we see the intimacy between them most clearly.⁶⁴ As a result, sacrifice itself is “destroyed and superseded,”⁶⁵ an event represented by the resurrection. One might say here that the division is divided.

The same relationship between the interruptive sacrifice of the kenotic *chora* and the *aufhebung* of such sacrifice is at play in the construction of the subject. She says:

The break, brief as it might have been, in the bond linking Christ to his Father and to life introduces into the mythical representation of

⁶¹ Julia Kristeva, *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia*, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 130.

⁶² There is a large debate surrounding the appropriateness of the *chora* for Christian theology, particularly in describing the nature of the Trinity, as part of the larger discussion surrounding the extent to which such disruptive and excessive movements and spaces are nihilistic versus important, but historically neglected, dimensions of the transcendent. Richard Kearney and John Caputo tend to distance the idea from God. Simon Oliver likewise says that “Violent motions are in a sense the lowest form of motion, reminiscent of those in Plato’s *khora* before the ordering work of the Demiurge begins: these are akin to ‘wandering’ or an imperfect stasis by the intimation of conflict rather than co-operation between the mover and the moved. Such motions prevent rather than provide fulfilment in a *telos*” (Simon Oliver, *Philosophy, God and Motion* (London: Routledge, 2005), 40). These thinkers largely restrict their observations to a description of the *chora* as it is influenced by Derrida and do not explore the theological possibilities of Kristeva’s *chora* of nurturing rhythms. Paul Fiddes, in contrast, has made connections between the *chora* and the Trinity, influenced by the passages from Kristeva mentioned above.

⁶³ See Kristeva, *Black Sun*, 132, n.28. Paul Fiddes is the first to give attention to Kristeva’s reference to Balthasar in discussing the hiatus: Paul Fiddes, *Seeing the World and Knowing God: Hebrew Wisdom and Modern Doctrine in Late Modern Context* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 259. It is important, I think, that the interruptive is here not an interruption of a thing or a concept, which could very easily become a violent penetration, but the interruption only of a space. It is a pure interruption, an interruption of representation that does not have an agenda, does not push anything else in particular, but simply makes a space for the new.

⁶⁴ Kristeva, *Black Sun*, 135.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 131.

the Subject a fundamental and psychically necessary discontinuity. Such a caesura, which some have called a ‘hiatus,’ provides an image, at the same time as a narrative, for many separations that build up the psychic life of individuals. It provides image and narrative for some psychic cataclysms that more or less frequently threaten the assumed balance of individuals. Thus, psychoanalysis identifies and relates as an indispensable condition for autonomy a series of splittings... Real, imaginary, or symbolic, those processes necessarily structure our individuation. ... Because Christianity set that rupture at the very heart of the absolute subject – Christ; because it represented it as a Passion that was the solidary lining of his Resurrection, his glory, and his eternity, it brought to consciousness the essential dramas that are internal to the becoming of each and every subject. It thus endows itself with a tremendous cathartic power. In addition to displaying a dramatic diachrony, the death of Christ offers imaginary support to the nonrepresentable catastrophic anguish distinctive of melancholy persons.⁶⁶

In particular, the interruptions of the *chora* are evident in depression and melancholia in a way that is similar to the rupture of the death of Christ. One of the marks of depression is the uncoupling of symbolic speech from semiotic processes. While language and symbolic constructs usually manage and mediate the rhythms of our primary, semiotic processes, for the depressed person these biological rhythms instead control symbolic discourse even to the point of muting it. Where language does emerge, it replaces linguistic sequentiality with rhythmic “supra-segmental operations,”⁶⁷ requiring the analyst to interpret the voice rather than the signifying sequence in which its fragments are hidden. What this uncoupling reveals is a “presubject” that is capable of expressing intense levels of meaning through semiotic rhythms,⁶⁸ revealing that language involves three elements: “symbolic processes (the grammar and logic of discourse), and semiotic processes (displacement, condensation, alliterations, vocal and gestural rhythms, etc.), and the supports constituted by bio-physiological rhythms of transmission and stimulation.”⁶⁹ In depression, meaning shifts to the rhythmic dimensions of speech and the biological rhythms undergirding them.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 132-3.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 38.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 65.

Depression therefore functions for Kristeva much in the way that zones of exception or indifference function for Agamben, as an ambivalent space that is not only terrible but also a source of the hope of moving beyond the depression in which the split that is usually covered over becomes exposed. In particular, what is exposed here is the disjunction between the same flow of vital functions and flow of consciousness that Agamben points to. Kristeva identifies this hope with Christian faith, which is an antidote to depression which nevertheless also starts from such depression,⁷⁰ as well as in an artistic activity that is summoned by melancholy and retains its trace. Poetry and creativity may be effective “counterdepressants.” Poetry is the site of the struggle between the semiotic and signification. In poetry, the speaker does not possess an unequivocal meaning and truth, but is opened up to alterity.⁷¹ Poetic language “introduces through the symbolic that which works on, moves, and threatens it.”⁷² The semiotic acts as a break that splits up the symbolic, injecting it with empty spaces.⁷³ Thus, poetically, language is capable of “shatter[ing] conceptual unity into rhythms.”⁷⁴

The disruption of the subject as double-movement of both threat and hope is therefore analogous for Kristeva to the crucifixion in which Father and Son are divided, just as the subject is divided from itself in depression. Insofar as Christ is the ultimate subject, the firstborn, and undergoes such a fundamental rupture, every subject is likewise constituted in discontinuity. Notice also that Kristeva associates the passion narrative with diachrony: the experience of a discontinuity that happens within time leading to its own resolution in passing through the hiatus, as in the resurrection. The two are not given all at once. The hope must rather be realized, worked out, in time. In this way the *chora* is analogous to Christ in whom discontinuity is the site of greater intimacy of the subject with

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 134.

⁷¹ Gosetti, “Feminine Figures in Heidegger’s Theory of Poetic Language,” 197.

⁷² Kristeva, *Black Sun*, 81.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 69.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 186.

itself, of the semiotic and the symbolic. Faith and poetry are thus both counter-depressants (rather than anti-depressants) precisely because they are hopeful responses that emerge diachronically from within the depression. Agamben's movements of the messianic are diachronic in the same way. This is not to say that either thinker is theological per se, but these resonances give an indication of how an interruptive rhythm could have theological significance.

Agamben's description of the nature of rhythm is therefore not simply a fringe moment in his thought, but is key to his thought as a whole⁷⁵ as the diachronic form through which the various movements of his thought are performed. Agamben is primarily interested in means, rather than in the end. The concepts in his thought are not a-historical prescriptions but operations performed kairologically, only at the right historical moment. The form that guides this discernment is what Watkin calls "logo-poetic," an interchange between enjambment and caesura, flow and arrest,⁷⁶ which is to say that it corresponds to Agamben's own initial definition of rhythm. Rhythm works to make new kinds of relationships possible by opening up spaces within time and experience in which the usual categories determined by political machines can be transcended and re-imagined. According to Kristeva, the crucifixion is at least illustrative of such a space.

Theological Interpretations

The rhythm described by thinkers like Agamben, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Kristeva includes an interruptive dimension because they explore the relationship of rhythm to subjective experience. As with cognitive poetics, these thinkers talk about rhythm as an alternative configuration of space-time that encounters and interrupts language and cognition. Likewise, as with the periodists, these interruptions set up rhythm as an

⁷⁵ Watkin, *The Literary Agamben*, 189. Watkin argues that we can see in "The Original Structure of the Work of Art" the basis of all of Agamben's subsequent philosophy.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 197.

oscillation of stop and flow between everyday movements and their suspension in a caesura. They also draw out the political and interpersonal consequences of this situation. The result is that rhythm is not an ontological process, the functions of which we can observe at a remove. Instead, in beginning from our experiences as subjects that encounter rhythm, these thinkers include the quality of this encounter in their observations about its nature. This is a description that is attempting to make sense of an encounter with rhythm and the social and political uses to which it is put, rather than of rhythm simply as an abstract category. The consensus is that this experience always includes an element of interruption to or confrontation with the everyday flow of language, time, and experience that is composed of structures and processes of division, exclusion, and imitation.

Agamben's thought has generated a variety of interpretations and reactions, including various theological appraisals. I have hinted at some of the theological themes in his work and how they might be theologically extended as Kristeva does, but what is yet required is a theological engagement with Agamben's work. The focus of my theological interrogation of Agamben's depiction of rhythm is the nature of the interruption. If the theological criticism of Benvenistian rhythm is that it represents a closed, immanent system in which the divine is reduced to the whole of the system such that confrontation to that system is made impossible, then surely a rhythm that includes an interruption to the whole, the flow, and the self, would be welcome. Nevertheless, the character of these interruptions is not straightforward, and some have suggested that such disruptions are less a matter of redemptive confrontation and more movements of nihilistic destruction.

Theological Critique

Conor Cunningham makes the most direct theological critique of Agamben, arguing that Agamben attempts to set up a world of undifferentiated potential in which there is no distinction between good and evil. He argues that Agamben inverts actuality

and potentiality, such that what is potential is the real and what is actual is only mirage. Any actuality is simply the inhibition of potentialities, an “ontological pretence” that prohibits the existence of what could be otherwise. Cunningham's conclusion is that Agamben would like to bring the world as we know it to an end, and he does not offer us a new one in its place.⁷⁷ Likewise, John Milbank interprets Agamben apocalyptically, arguing that because Agamben envisions a space that is entirely free of laws and ends, it is a space that is necessarily free and independent of all language, culture, and human history. In attempting to abstract beings from Being, Milbank argues that Agamben is making extreme a “lack of mediation,” such that the only option open to him is the negative one of “apocalyptic refusal.” Everything must be overthrown and nothing positive can be done.⁷⁸ Colby Dickinson, while generally supportive of Agamben, says that there exists in Agamben's thought a Spinozan-Deleuzian affiliation⁷⁹ and admits that there is a constant risk in Agamben's work that his “philosophy suggestively 'undoes' theology, at least as we historically have known it, or that it perhaps threatens to remove its content while preserving its empty shell alone.”⁸⁰

However, Agamben's philosophy is not so straightforward to categorize. There is a strong thread of theological engagement in Agamben's work that at least requires evaluation and dialogue. We have already mentioned his work on messianism in his book on Paul's letter to the Romans. Other examples include his thoughts on Franciscan monasticism, sacrifice, judgement day, and salvation. Dickinson too draws several other theological parallels which Agamben does not explicate, but which are nevertheless

⁷⁷ Conor Cunningham, “Nihilism and Theology: Who Stands at the Door?” in *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought*, ed. Nicholas Adams, George Pattison, and Graham Ward (Oxford: Oxford University, 2013), 337-39.

⁷⁸ John Milbank, Slavoj Zizek, Creston Davis and Catherine Pickstock, *Paul's New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2010), 34-35. Milbank asks if there is a Levinasian echo here in Agamben.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁸⁰ Dickinson, *Agamben and Theology*, 8.

convincing.⁸¹ These examples demonstrate at the very least that Agamben is attracted to religious, and particularly Christian, concepts in explicating his thought. Agamben is not unique among contemporary philosophers in this respect. For example, Žižek and Badiou also engage with the thought of Paul, however, while these thinkers self-identify as atheists or make explicit that their interest in Paul is not an interest in the message that Paul himself proclaims,⁸² Agamben does not identify with any particular group, religious or atheist, nor does he distance himself from Paul's message but tries to re-capture what he believes to be its essence.⁸³ So, whatever else his interests and alliances might be, he at least perceives himself as faithful to Paul's intentions. Similarly, in *The Kingdom and the Glory*, Agamben exposes the twists that the Christian concept *oikonomia* underwent soon after Paul's use of it, which brought it into the service of managerial government.⁸⁴ His methodology with regard to Christian concepts and thinkers is thus less a simple looting of the tradition, as in the case of Badiou, and more an attempt to re-affirm what he believes to be the real, more originary, messianism that has been bent out of shape through its complicity with various anthropological and political agendas. Moreover, he seems happy to associate certain examples of messianic caesurae with certain strands of Christianity, such as the Franciscans.⁸⁵ This is not to say that Agamben is a Christian thinker, but his objections to

⁸¹ For example, "Parabasis," the notion that a transcendent actor is transposed into the spectating audience in order to transform them into participants, is a possible way to think about the incarnation of Christ. See *Ibid.*, 33.

⁸² Alain Badiou, for example, says, "I care nothing for the Good News [Paul] declares, or the cult dedicated to him. ... Basically, I have never really connected Paul with religion" (Alain Badiou, *Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism*, trans. Ray Brassier (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 1). Note also that Badiou attributes to Paul a message of universality, while Agamben does not.

⁸³ Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, 1.

⁸⁴ Giorgio Agamben, *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa, and Matteo Mandarini (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 65.

⁸⁵ Agamben suggests that the Franciscan rule-of-life aims at a threshold of indifference between rule/liturgy and life (although it ultimately fails). The terms lose their original meaning and allow a third thing, "use," to appear (Giorgio Agamben, *The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form of Life*, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 71). The concept of use is important for the Franciscans in conceptualizing life itself as something that cannot be owned or appropriated. Moreover, it is particularly important that this is a common form-of-life, in that use is the way of life that is most common to all, and is

Christianity lie with what he considers to be certain highly specific and heretofore un-analyzed perversions of the Christian religion and not with Christ himself. He is therefore a thinker that cannot be so easily dismissed.

Nevertheless, what I think the above critiques represent is a larger concern surrounding those postmodern movements that include something like Christian transcendence on the surface but upon closer inspection are mere irruptions of an excess from within the system that has destructive, rather than redemptive, consequences. One example of this concern is the category of the “sublime.” John Betz, for instance, says that Heidegger exhibits

an underlying aesthetic prejudice for the sublime against the beautiful, which translates into an ontological prioritization of potentiality over actuality, of the indeterminate over the determinate, and thus, ultimately, of the *potentia pura* of the creature (which is hypostatized as Being) over the actual, determinate plenitude of God himself – in a sudden reversal of two-thousand years of metaphysics since Plato.⁸⁶

By “sublime,” Betz here means the absence of form and representation. The sublime is a sort of transcendence, but because thinkers like Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the French immanentists reject the beautiful form in favour of the sublime absence of form, there is no longer a relationship between these two aesthetic moments. Instead, the sublime itself becomes so absolutely other that it collapses into nothingness, leaving us in immanence.⁸⁷

thus most originary (Agamben, *The Highest Poverty*, xiii, 132). Thus, we see here again connections between a zone of indifference that disrupts dichotomies and communities of commonality.

⁸⁶ John R. Betz, "Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part two)," *Modern Theology* 22, no. 1 (2006): 16.

⁸⁷ John R. Betz, "Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part One)," *Modern Theology* 21, no. 3 (2005): 375. The sublime has made an appearance in the work of contemporary French philosophers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard, Julia Kristeva, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Jacques Derrida, and the American Fredric Jameson. As a result, certain theologians, such as David Bentley Hart and John Betz, have noted this category and its metaphysical implications as a point of contention, in which this aesthetic category comes to stand as a sort of summary for the above thinkers' systems of thought as a whole. These theologians argue for the metaphysical primacy of the beautiful as opposed to the sublime. However, this is not the only theological approach to the sublime. Paul Fiddes has been exploring the significance of the sublime in critical theory and theology in more appreciative ways. See for example Paul Fiddes, "The Sublime, the Conflicted Self and Attention to the Other: Towards a Theopoetics with Iris Murdoch and Julia Kristeva," in Roland Faber (ed.), *Theopoetic Folds: Philosophizing Multifariousness* (New York: Fordham

If transcendence becomes something about which we cannot speak and with which we can have no relationship, then any transcendence that supposedly remains, such as the sublime that Betz identifies, is a counterfeit transcendence – merely a rupture of nothingness within immanence.⁸⁸

Milbank makes a similar argument with respect to the French immanentists. He argues that the re-conceptualization of transcendence as sublimity has made Heraclitean, immanentist philosophy possible, because it allows for difference and otherness within immanence that is nevertheless not something other than immanence. Among other things, this re-conceptualization is bound up with the Cartesian “turn to the subject.” The sublime is conceived as the unrepresentable ground of the subject, which both gives rise to it as a ground, but also threatens and undoes it in its unrepresentability.⁸⁹ This is true of rhythm as a ground of the subject as it has been described by all the thinkers considered in this chapter. Re-casting transcendence as the unrepresentable ground of the subject reduces it to merely self-transcendence which, since there is nowhere to transcend to, is the mere dissolution of the subject into nothing.⁹⁰

Milbank is not suggesting that transcendence ought not include an account of self-transcendence. Without an account of self-transcendence one would end up with the same problem of a divinity that is so utterly outside representation that it has no draw on us, encouraging self-absorption and naturalism. His argument is rather that self-transcendence must take place within a larger system of movement and representation, rather than as an

University Press, 2013), 159-78; Paul Fiddes, “The Sublime and the Beautiful: Intersections Between Theology and Literature,” in Heather Walton (ed.), *Literature and Theology: New Interdisciplinary Spaces* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 127-51.

⁸⁸ The first step towards this nihilism is the hardening of immanence and transcendence into a dualism. William Desmond, *God and the Between* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 62.

⁸⁹ John Milbank, “Sublimity: The Postmodern Transcendent,” in *Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the Beyond*, ed. Regina M. Schwartz (New York ; London: Routledge, 2004).

⁹⁰ William Desmond makes this same point in *God and the Between*, in which he argues that while there are three sorts of transcendence: the otherness of beings, human self-transcendence, and originary transcendence itself, the turn to the subject has meant that self-transcendence has become an “overreaching into emptiness,” rather than a movement towards transcendence as other. Desmond, *God and the Between*, 22-3.

eschewal of representation. Sublimity, according to Milbank, was previously associated with the movement of the soul and included wounding and rupture, but such rupture occurred within a framework that guided movement through ordered forms towards the unlimited excess of that order.⁹¹ Self-transcendence, properly situated, is a movement that is the result of being pulled forward by the Other through ordered structure. A transcendence that makes God unavailable becomes an empty transcendence that is merely the sublime overthrow of representation. It becomes reduced entirely to the movement of the subject beyond its own individual identity into nothingness.

I consider this association between transcendence and ordered structure in the following chapter. For the moment, however, I simply want to point out that Cunningham likely has these sorts of concerns in mind when critiquing Agamben. As with Betz and Milbank's concerns regarding the sublime, Cunningham critiques Agamben's alleged liquidation of form, representation, boundary, and structure. For Cunningham, the caesura is only a rupture of nothingness within the immanent rather than something other to it. The implication for the subject is that any interruption by which he or she is capable of transcending the everyday flow of experience or structures of subjectivity is only an empty space that enables a self-transcendence to nowhere. Self-transcendence is therefore no longer a matter of relationship, of union with the transcendent, but is a disruption of the categories of representation for its own sake. Any relationship between everyday reality and a "transcendence" of this kind is purely a relationship of opposition, threat, and destruction.

The reason that all of this is theologically problematic is that if the only space for the divine in a thinker's work is as the interruption and dissolution of form and of the subject, the divine becomes a threat to the world and to established reality because that

⁹¹ Milbank, "Sublimity: The Modern Transcendent," 213.

interruption is not for the sake of any redemptive end. This “transcendent” has no content or character. No relationship to this “divine,” other than one of confrontation, is possible. While none of the above thinkers would directly associate rhythm with the divine or transcendence, it nevertheless has similar qualities to the above-described “sublime transcendence” in that it is a groundless ground and an otherness that is powerful enough to disrupt established systems. So, while these thinkers would not associate such disruptive spaces and movements with God in any straightforward sense, they carry divine resonances nonetheless. These divine resonances are considered threatening to Christianity insofar as they replace the Christian God with a divinized empty space of disruption and dissolution that can offer no hope and no relationship.

Agamben and the Possibility of an Immanent Transcendence

However, these concerns overlook other, more theologically promising, dimensions of the interruptive rhythm of Agamben and others like him. First, these critiques do not do justice to the nuance and complexity of Agamben’s work. Milbank and Cunningham’s critiques fail to take into account Agamben’s refusal to participate in attempts to give an account of the whole. In fact, Agamben believes that this enterprise leads to violence. For Agamben, neither Deleuze nor Heidegger go far enough in their deactivations because they continue to attempt to give an account of the whole, and ultimately propose an ontology that is based on strife, as in Heidegger,⁹² or in the immanent movement of self-preservation, as with Deleuze.⁹³ Agamben is precisely not trying to set up a world at all,

⁹² Besides Agamben’s alternative account of the originary nature of art, Agamben also departs from the way in which he believes Heidegger to maintain the opposition between human and non-human (Giorgio Agamben, *The Open: Man and Animal*, trans. Kevin Attell (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 69; Tracy Colony, “Before the Abyss: Agamben on Heidegger and the Living,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 40, (2007): 6).

⁹³ Agamben, *Potentialities*, 237; Erinn Cunniff Gilson, “Zones of Indiscernability: The Life of a Concept from Deleuze to Agamben,” *Philosophy Today*, 51 (2007): 102. Claire Colebrook notes that Deleuze’s program of creating a philosophy of “higher deterritorialisation” and a post-organic future goes far beyond Agamben’s less prescriptive attempts to “describe the genesis of humanity, polity and lived worlds from the

whether of undifferentiated potential or of any other kind.⁹⁴ William Watkin affirms that Agamben suspends the differentiation between general and particular, for example, not by negating them but by applying these categories across their own logic.⁹⁵ The same is true of potentiality and actuality. The suspension between potential and actual is not a static situation but their coexistence through that which governs potential, namely *dynamis* or the movement of change.⁹⁶ Watkin points out that this is how Agamben is different than Deleuze. While Deleuze flattens reality, making of every event its own potential counteractualisation, for Agamben events are historically determined moments, the meanings of which are located in their relation to other events in a constellation.⁹⁷ Watkin says that, “Put simply, for Agamben, radical change comes from impotential suspension of difference and for Deleuze counteractual destruction of the same. Agamben’s is the revolution of the weak, while Deleuze’s is the counterinsurgency of the strong, suggesting of course a very different political makeup.”⁹⁸ Agamben’s purpose is not to describe an ontology. Rather it is more like a movement of strategy. He is not primarily interested in ends, in describing an outcome, but in means, the operation by which one seizes upon a *kairos* in order to open up a space. This is why the idea of a diachronic perspective on rhythm is particularly appropriate to Agamben since his approach to thought and politics in general is much like moving through a poem in that certain ideas are only accessible at

prior domain of potentiality” (Alex Murray and Jessica Whyte, *The Agamben Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), 57). Likewise, William Watkin, while he believes the thought of Agamben and Deleuze to be similar, nevertheless admits that Agamben rejects the ubiquity of life and permanent equilibrium of Deleuze in favour of a complex process based in history, aware of certain kairological moments, and directed towards a future (Watkin, *Agamben and Indifference*, 153, 172-75). In other words, his approach is diachronic. The political result is that while Deleuze has the “strong” solution of the destruction of the same, Agamben opts for a weak suspension of difference into a static suspension that nevertheless makes “evental change” possible (Watkin, *Agamben and Indifference*, 148).

⁹⁴ Both Colby Dickinson (Dickinson, *Agamben and Theology*, 87), a theological commentator, and William Watkin (Watkin, *Agamben and Indifference*, 137-8), who is by no means favourable to a theological interpretation of Agamben, affirm that Agamben does not seek to reduce the world to potentiality as if it were a new ontological prescription of how the world is or ought to be.

⁹⁵ Watkin, *Agamben and Indifference*, 86.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 147.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 174-75.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 148.

certain points in time depending on one's location in the constellation.⁹⁹ It is also what makes Agamben's thought particularly amenable to theology in that there is no competing vision of the eschaton but primarily an interest in how one interacts with the current historical situation with a view to that which is beyond.

These criticisms also fail to account for the difference between obliteration and suspension. Agamben is not seeking to obliterate all opposition, but is creating a zone of suspension in which the relations between these oppositions can be re-thought. For example, Milbank suggests that Agamben's vision, following Benjamin, is apocalyptic. He takes as an example Agamben's definition of *kairos*, interpreting it as an alternative time that is removed from any social and historical context.¹⁰⁰ As we have seen, however, the *kairos* for Agamben is not something that is other than time and is not intended to replace time and its social-historical context. It is rather a certain operation performed on time that is nevertheless part of time itself, configuring it as a poem, rather than a simple flow. This is precisely why Agamben designates this operation as messianic, in explicit distinction from apocalypse.¹⁰¹ Agamben is not attempting to abolish history and difference in order that the world should become an immanent soup of indifference. Seeking to open spaces of indifference is not necessarily a threat to all order, but an opportunity to re-think orders and relationships so that they can be altered and replaced by new kinds of order and relationship. If we bear this in mind, Agamben's work looks more like Betz's relation between form and its sublime disruption, rather than the sublime overcoming of form.

Moreover, the caesuric spaces opened up by primordial rhythm, both for Agamben and Kristeva, are not completely without character, not pure dissolution, and thus also do not present a nihilistic vision simply by virtue of not saying anything at all. Kristeva's *chora* is explicitly described as a matrix of the rhythmic movements of maternal love.

⁹⁹ Watkin, *Agamben and Indifference*, 174.

¹⁰⁰ Milbank, "Paul against Biopolitics" in *Paul's New Moment*, 51, n. 60.

¹⁰¹ Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, 62-64.

While it is a space that is pre-symbolic and pre-linguistic, it is composed of the rhythmic movements of the body and of original sociality. Kristeva intentionally puts forward this original place of love as an alternative to originary violence. Thus, the space in fact has a very particular kind of character, albeit one that is pre-symbolic. Likewise, Agamben envisions the more originary dimension that rhythm opens up as one in which persons can recover their solidarity. In *The Coming Community*, Agamben's reasons for overcoming division are to enable a kind of belonging that is not based on any category other than being together. As with Kristeva, then, this space of dissolution is not entirely characterless but is intentionally aimed at particular kinds of relationship. While it is true that this does not include a direct relationship with the "transcendent" itself, this focus on relationality indicates that the space has a certain kind of character beyond mere interruption and dissolution.

Based on this more theologically promising interpretation, rhythm can be read in a way that is different than the nihilistic sublime described above, namely as an "immanent transcendence." This is not an idea or a term proposed by Agamben, but there is resonance between this idea and Agamben's interruptive caesura. Maurice Blondel refers to the idea of immanent transcendence in his 1896 *Letter on Apologetics*. He argues that the field of knowledge proper to philosophy is the immanent, but that philosophy must nevertheless "find in itself that which goes beyond it, an immanent transcendence."¹⁰² The method of immanence proper to philosophy proceeds from an examination of that which we will, think, and do. However, we quickly find that "even the complete knowledge of thought and of life does not supply or suffice for the activity of thinking or of living; that on the one hand what is immanent in us, action and living thought, is yet transcendent ... in regard

¹⁰²Maurice Blondel, *The Letter on Apologetics; & History and Dogma*, trans. Alexander Dru, Illyd Trethowan, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 181.

to that which it represents.”¹⁰³ Philosophy cannot itself investigate that which is beyond the limits of immanence, namely the nature of the transcendent. However, it nevertheless affirms the existence of that transcendent within itself.¹⁰⁴ The transcendent is here associated with a positive content, that which immanent thought and action represents, rather than nothingness, even if this is not something that can be thought or known.

Notice that Blondel too begins with the life of the subject – its thought and action. The immanent transcendent is encountered precisely within the subject’s experience. Through his or her analysis of this experience, it becomes apparent that knowledge is not sufficient to thinking and living. There is a dimension of living in the world that escapes comprehension and is not reducible to analysis. Within the reality that is most immediate to the subject is buried something ineffable. In contrast to the immanent sublime in which immanent and transcendent are absolutely divorced and the only possibility for otherness that remains within the immanent is its rupture by sublime nothingness, immanent transcendence is a transcendence viewed without theological presuppositions, from the perspective of immanence. Rather than making claims about the ontological character of the rupture, an immanent transcendence is an articulation of the immanent experience of such a rupture. Immanent transcendence remains open, rather than resolving into a larger harmony of either immanence or nothingness, and has a nature that is at least not incompatible with Christian ideas regarding the divine, even if the thinker propounding it does not him or herself make these associations.

¹⁰³ Blondel, *The Letter on Apologetics*, 180.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 157. Interestingly, Blondel was one of those French Catholic philosophers who was influenced by Bergson and was later taken up by Chevalier in articulating a new Catholic philosophy of intuition and the individual based in French thinkers such as Bergson. In particular, Blondel took from Bergson the idea that the individual has within him or herself the possibility and structures for self-transcendence to a spiritual life. John Hellman, "Jacques Chevalier, Bergsonism, and Modern French Catholic Intellectuals," *Biography* 4, no. 2 (1981): 139, 141. Nevertheless, Blondel arguably was not influenced by Bergson himself, but by his own interpretation of Bergson, which tended to overlook his pantheistic tendencies. Bergson himself declared that he was not a philosopher of intuition, but of duration. Pierre Lachieze-Rey, "Blondel Et Bergson," *Les Etudes philosophiques* 7, no. 4 (1952):383-86.

One might object that Blondel says that thought and life are transcendent by virtue of that which they represent, while for Agamben the more original dimension is other precisely because it does not represent anything, but suspends representation. This is similar to the problem of transcendence identified by philosophers like A. W. Moore, as I mentioned in the introduction: Is the nature of the transcendent really transcendent if we can designate it at all by virtue of designating the limit between immanent and transcendent? In this case, the limit proposed by Blondel is simply the limit between consciousness and the world. How can Blondel know this limit? This is what Jean-Luc Marion calls phenomenological transcendence – that which is transcendent simply by virtue of being outside consciousness. It is therefore inadequate to God’s transcendence,¹⁰⁵ not really transcendent as such but only transcendent to consciousness. This is an important criticism if we want to maintain the interruptive nature of transcendence as that which interrupts from beyond the system, from beyond life and being and not merely from beyond a certain perspective. Otherwise, transcendence would once again simply be the whole. While this criticism may apply to Blondel, I believe that it is possible to think about the idea of immanent transcendence slightly differently, and in particular that Agamben escapes this problem.

I mentioned in the introduction that Jean-Luc Marion is an example of a thinker who manages to speak about the transcendent while also not compromising its transcendence by speaking about it in the language of impossible possibility. This is an approach to transcendence that maintains the transcendence of the transcendent because it is beyond the conditions of the possibility of experience, yet is experienced nonetheless. Thus, rather than that which is simply beyond consciousness, the transcendent is beyond everything that makes consciousness possible, beyond the possible. Yet it is experienced

¹⁰⁵ Jean-Luc Marion, “The Impossible for Man – God,” in *Transcendence and Beyond: A Postmodern Inquiry*, ed. John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), 17-18.

nonetheless as an event that comes without preconditions of possibility, concept, or causation.¹⁰⁶ This is an event that gives itself without making itself comprehensible. In approaching the transcendent in terms of possibility, Marion escapes the temptation of making the transcendent a passive realm of non-knowledge that is subsequently penetrated and instead gives it a freedom that encounters the subject as surprise.¹⁰⁷

Agamben approaches the caesura or the zone of indistinction in similar terms. He suggests in his discussion of the caesura that the caesura is an interruption to representation precisely because it represents the possibility of representation itself, which is unrepresentable. He therefore uses the language of a possibility that escapes thought and representation, much like Marion. Moreover, Agamben says that it is important that one maintain “oneself in the right relationship with ignorance. ... The art of living is, in this sense, the capacity to keep ourselves in harmonious relationship with that which escapes us.”¹⁰⁸ He calls this the zone of non-knowledge and contrasts it with knowledge which separates out what is unknown only so as to conquer and attain it. Instead, the zone of non-knowledge is a matter of gestures and our relationship to it is a dance. It is a matter of movement. In protecting the creaturely perspective, Agamben makes possible the intersection of this diachronic movement by a different kind of movement in a dance. The transcendent is not conceptualized here in terms of epistemology, but encounter. In this way, Agamben’s zone of non-knowledge or indistinction resonates with Marion’s account of transcendence.

¹⁰⁶ Marion, “The Impossible for Man – God,” 33. I owe my understanding of Marion to Taylor Knight.

¹⁰⁷ Marion says that surprise “challenges self-constituting polarity in [their *interloque*], and finally comprehends it starting from and in an event that the *interloque* itself does not in any way comprehend” (Jean-Luc Marion, *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998), 201). This is similar to the way in which Przywara’s theological analogy intersects and disrupts the temptation of the intra-creaturely polarity towards self-enclosedness.

¹⁰⁸ Giorgio Agamben, *Nudities*, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Padatella (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 114.

In particular, the idea does not unambiguously designate the divine. For Marion, the saturated phenomenon, or the event, is always impossible in the sense that it brings about something new without being a logical continuation of that which was before. Any number of events could be classified in this way. Agamben goes so far as to describe Auschwitz in these terms.¹⁰⁹ Marion would not himself describe an evil event such as Auschwitz in terms of the event or the saturated phenomena precisely because this would suggest that no one could be held responsible.¹¹⁰ Instead, evil is the result of a particular and very tight logic and is thus the opposite of the impossible.¹¹¹ Marion would be more likely to designate forgiveness as a saturated phenomenon, since it is an interruption to the blame-shifting logic on which evil depends. Nevertheless, I think that Agamben would agree with this in that Auschwitz for him is the revelation of the logic of the machine according to which the state operates, taken to its extreme and is thus an outworking of that same logic. The difference is that Marion designates such atrocities as tight outworkings of a particular logic while Agamben, although not denying this, considers them both outworkings of a logic *and* gaps from within which such logic can be challenged and rendered inoperative. Nevertheless, the event which Marion designates as the most extreme outworking of the logic of evil is the crucifixion of Christ,¹¹² such that, given the resurrection, this event also becomes the place from which the tight logic of revenge and retaliation is rendered inoperative and overcome. Thus, despite what might appear as differences between Marion and Agamben, both thinkers in fact approach the transcendent, or zone of non-knowledge, in a similar way, as an interruption to the logic of the current situation, which is therefore designated impossible.

¹⁰⁹ Agamben, *Remnants of Auschwitz*, 148.

¹¹⁰ These points about Marion were made by Taylor Knight in correspondence from May 4th, 2015.

¹¹¹ Jean-Luc Marion, "Evil in Person," in *Prolegomena to Charity*, trans. Stephen E. Lewis (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 1.

¹¹² Marion, "Evil in Person," 10.

For Agamben, it is, at the most, possible to find points from which something beyond the system could be realized. However, the nature of such an immanent transcendence is a matter of social *praxis*, an imaginative possibility to be realized, rather than speculation regarding something given. Agamben might therefore be thought of as espousing an immanence that is more radical than that of Deleuze, not because he reduces everything to a soup of indifference but because he refuses at any point to compromise the immanent, diachronic perspective of the subject. The interesting thing about this approach is that it is this radical immanence that opens up the possibility of a beyond, albeit a beyond that is as yet without content. This is, of course, why Agamben's project is not sufficient for theology. However, my contention is that it is a necessary perspective for theology in differentiating the movements of the world from those of the transcendent, as well as distinguishing movements that are particular to creation from the divine, thereby allowing for the interruptive encounter. Agamben traces the kind of world that theology encounters and in which it is articulated, which is in part the world of the experience of human structures and machines that require such interruption and encounter. In other words, Agamben at no point compromises his intra-creaturely perspective in an attempt to give an account of the whole. The theological is a different movement and not approachable from within the movements of the intra-creaturely. It is instead a movement initiated by non-knowledge itself, with enough independence from human knowledge and movement to interrupt and intersect it.

Przywara's Intra-Creaturely Analogy

Based on this association between Agamben's interruptive rhythm and a certain kind of immanent transcendence, I propose that interruptive rhythm is a manifestation of what Erich Przywara calls "intra-creaturely analogy." In contrast to a closed-in (anti)metaphysic in which the oscillation between essence and existence, form and chaos,

etc., is absolutized into an immanent harmony, Przywara argues for the alternative of thinking about this intra-creaturely oscillation as an analogy. This involves a refusal to close the system in on itself, instead recognizing a beyond in which essence and existence are unified in tension, but are not fused into a whole.¹¹³ An analogy is a relationship between two poles, such as between essence and existence, in which difference and unity are maintained in tension. The tension is maintained by keeping the oscillation open to something beyond itself. Rather than two opposite sides of reality that are fused into a whole, the oscillation between the two poles in analogy is preserved by virtue of their being united in something beyond their division. Interruptive rhythm and immanent transcendence are examples of ways in which something beyond the poles of experience is recognized.

Przywara identifies two basic approaches to analogy, based in either the creature's essence or existence. Each emphasizes a different aspect of the relationship between God and the creature, between immanent and transcendent. The theological analogy, which we will discuss in the following chapter, is the relationship between God and creature based on essence, while the intra-creaturely analogy is an analogy from the perspective within the creature's life. The former is generally articulated by theology, and the latter by philosophy. Neither analogy is sufficient to the relationship between God and creature on its own. Each is problematic if absolutized, and neither one can reduce the other to its own approach. On its own, intra-creaturely analogy falls into the sorts of traps of which the theological critics of Agamben are wary, but theological analogy is equally problematic without the humble perspective of the intra-creaturely that experiences the divine as confrontation and interruption, as will become evident in the following chapter.

¹¹³ Przywara, *Polarity*, 85.

Przywara associates the intra-creaturely analogy with “transcending immanence,”¹¹⁴ described, in language similar to that of Agamben, as theology hollowing out philosophy.¹¹⁵ Rather than simply extending, supplementing, or replacing philosophy, theology opens a space. In particular, “Analogy appears here as an *immanent transcending between movement and number*,” by which Przywara means that number and movement both transcend themselves toward the other, creating the back-and-forth dynamic of analogy.¹¹⁶ This is significant because Agamben defines rhythm through considering its association with both number or measure, and flow. In the end, he says that rhythm is beyond, something other than, both number and flow, as that which gives both measure, number, or *arhythmos*, and the flow of time. Agamben suggests that the beyond, the more original dimension, is a rhythm, but refuses to associate this rhythm with the concepts of flow or measure that would make it comprehensible.¹¹⁷ My identification of Agamben’s rhythm with immanent transcendence is therefore consistent with Przywara’s own association of the transcending immanence with the rhythm of intra-creaturely analogy, as a rhythm that transcends both number and flow, nevertheless manifesting as an oscillation between them. Przywara’s intra-creaturely analogy is thus more comparable to the way in which Agamben uses rhythm than to either the flux of the rhythm of the previous chapter or rhythm as measure in the following chapter.

¹¹⁴ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 239E/143G.

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 177E/83G. At several points, Przywara also describes theological concepts and thinking as crossing themselves out through the analogical “ever greater dissimilarity,” thereby disrupting uniform sense (184E/90G; 369E/268G; 433E/338G). Jean-Luc Marion makes a similar reference to the Christian God being a concept that is always crossed out because the Christian God reveals himself as the one who is crucified (Jean-Luc Marion, *God Without Being: Hors-texte*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 2012), 71). This is a device used by Heidegger and several philosophers after him, including Derrida. Przywara and Marion both appear to apply a Christian interpretation to this movement.

¹¹⁶ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 211E/117G. Italics original. The explanation comes from the translator’s footnote. An alternative interpretation might be that the oscillation between movement and number itself transcends both, pointing to a beyond. The point is simply that the rhythm of intra-creaturely analogy is described in similar terms to Agamben’s description of rhythm and that it is designated an immanent transcending.

¹¹⁷ For more on the similarities between rhythm in Agamben and Przywara’s intra-creaturely analogy see Lexi Eikelboom, “Erich Przywara and Giorgio Agamben: Rhythm as a Space for Dialogue Between Catholic Metaphysics and Postmodernism,” *Heythrop Journal* 56, no. 3 (2014): 10.1111/heyj.12149.

The rhythm of the intra-creaturely analogy in Przywara involves both an “upward” and a “downward” movement. In one sense, intra-creaturely analogy is an analogy from below to above because it begins with the particulars of creaturely experience and recognizes the presence of a beyond from within this immanent reality. However, Przywara also describes it as a regressive rhythm, or “philosophy of the pure image,” a top-down movement that attempts to reduce all abstraction of *logos* to the contradictoriness of experience.¹¹⁸ When it is not absolutized into a whole, Przywara is very positive about Heraclitus’s recognition of “an inner contradictoriness in the real itself.”¹¹⁹ This is appropriate to creaturely reality, and more honest than what Przywara calls idealisms or essentialisms, which express perfect harmony or coinherence,¹²⁰ so long as it is not absolutized. The two perspectives on rhythm, the Benvenistian and that of Agamben, are both attempts to describe the same creaturely rhythm, but they do so from two different perspectives, the former from without and the latter from within. Agamben recognizes a beyond from within immanence and makes no attempt to harmonize the contradictoriness of experience into a whole, preferring instead to draw attention to and open up such contradictions.

William Desmond contrasts this to Hegel’s dialectic, in which the end is simply the immanent wholeness of the whole, such that the mediation between determinate and indeterminate is one of self-mediation, rather than of openness to transcendence.¹²¹ The

¹¹⁸ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 430E/335G, 436-7E/342G.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 473E/384G.

¹²⁰ Note that Przywara is not always consistent about which thinkers he places in which category. In this essay, he associates Hegel, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and Plato with idealism, while elsewhere he associates Kierkegaard and Heidegger both with existentialism or realism. This difference can be explained by Przywara’s assertion that when absolutized, both alternatives collapse into one another.

¹²¹ William Desmond, *Beyond Hegel and Dialectic: Speculation, Cult, and Comedy* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). This is not the only theological interpretation of Hegel. Rowan Williams, for example, is more sympathetic, arguing that Hegel’s association of thinking with love problematizes arguments that Hegel privileges identity or sameness. Rowan Williams, “Logic and Spirit in Hegel,” in *Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology* (London: SCM, 2007), 48-9). Graham Ward, likewise, interprets Hegel’s eschatology not as immanent, but as including a divine interruption into time. See for example Graham Ward, “Hegel’s Messianic Reasoning and its Theological Politics,” in *Politics to Come: Power, Modernity, and the Messianic*, ed. Aurthur Bradley and Paul Fletcher (London: Continuum,

dialectic that Desmond wants to affirm is one in which double-ness is kept open, in which one is pulled in two directions through the process of self-transcendence in the between. This as an open whole – a finite that is nevertheless open to the infinite – rather than an immanent whole closed in on itself.¹²² The difference between the intra-creaturely analogy and the relationship between struggle and harmony in a Heraclitean metaphysic is admittedly subtle. John Betz, points out that Przywara’s analogy and the metaphysics of Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the post-structuralists have the same rhythmic form.¹²³ The difference lies in the openness of these two rhythms. Intra-creaturely analogy is an immanent metaphysic that is not absolutized and closed in on itself. It is open to something beyond itself such that the harmony between actuality and potentiality is not one that is dependent upon immanent process, but on something beyond the system that is capable of mediating the two poles as well as disrupting unhelpful relations between them. Intra-creaturely metaphysics is therefore humble. In refusing to divinize itself, it remains open to a beyond.

What is theologically important is that this undoing not be for its own sake but for the purpose of ever new and redemptive actualizations. What the discussion of this chapter shows is that this is Agamben’s intention. Doubt remains, however, regarding whether Agamben is able to achieve such new and redemptive situations without a positive vision of harmony such as that which theology supplies. This is the difference between the rhythm of the immanent transcendence of Przywara and that of Agamben: the movement of the intra-creaturely analogy has an “inner end-directedness” such that the oscillation between actuality and potentiality is directed by something that is beyond it and within

2010), 78-97. I am less interested here in the correct interpretation of Hegel, and more interested in distancing interruptive rhythm from the kinds of criticisms theology levels at Hegel.

¹²² Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 158-59.

¹²³ Betz, "Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part Two)," 16.

it.¹²⁴ In other words, the beyond is efficacious, while Agamben must remain mute on this point given his immanent perspective.

Conclusion

The rhythm proposed by Agamben is based in the subject's experience. Rather than a form as seen from the outside, rhythm names a mysterious dimension of existence by which the subject is encountered but does not control. This dimension is described as rhythmic because it is represented in the sorts of movements in which this encounter takes place and is given form. In this way, Agamben's rhythm can be thought of as diachronic. From a diachronic perspective, the rhythm of a poem is conceptualized in terms of the encounter of the subject with the movements of the poem as they are encountered and negotiated within time through structures such as oscillation, periodicity, enjambment, and caesura.

The movements of rhythm precede subjectivity. Since these are the movements in which the self is first fashioned prior to its will, control, and symbolic understanding, they represent a confrontation to the more controlled and willed selves and worlds that the subject fashions for itself through symbolic language and systems of binary categories. Thus, these movements are not only that out of which the subject is fashioned, but they are also interruptions to the language, categories, and experiences that are familiar to it. This is in large part what makes the pre-subjective and pre-symbolic space of movements rhythmic, namely its double character of both giving reality and identity, as well as suspending and disrupting them.

The double-nature of this rhythm gives it an ambiguous quality, which makes theology suspicious of it. These interruptions might be positive, even intimations of divine

¹²⁴ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 209E/115G.

transcendence, but they might also be nihilistic, oppositional, destructive forces. Since it escapes the categories in which we are used to thinking, it is fair to say that intra-creaturely rhythm is not an ethical or theological category. It is disruptive to all such systems and ideas, indifferent to ideas like good or evil. Thus, theology cannot simply adopt this understanding of rhythm without qualification or interrogation. Rhythm understood as the form of the relationship between God and creature, according to Christian theology, must be interpreted through the lens of that relationship, must be in service to its ends – the ends of redemption and salvation.

Nevertheless, this is not to dismiss this conception out of hand either. The Christian tradition requires that a degree of otherness, transcendence, or mystery be attributed to God. Theology must retain a degree of apophaticism such that God is never fully circumscribed in doctrine. For example, while theology makes definite assertions about the goodness and love of God, it can never exhaustively explain what this means. So, there is always the possibility that our categories of good and evil will be confronted and interrupted, though not completely overturned. Acknowledging this dimension of the relation between God and creature is therefore necessary, and diachronic rhythm provides one possible way for articulating the nature of this divine interruption and the apophatic dimension of that relationship in a way that is helpfully descriptive of the experience. Indeed, as I demonstrate in the next chapter, even a self-consciously theological conception of rhythm that does not retain the possibility of interruption leads to theological problems.

If this space breaks through and threatens symbolic structures in forms like depression, it is because those structures are too tight. The rhythms are revealed in such ruptures, and from there make new kinds of healing and “counter-depressants” possible. In other, more theological words, the rhythmic rupture is not absolute but one in which movements of love carry on and make new social and subjective realities possible. Thus, these disruptions are not annihilations. They periodically suspend the flow of regularity

only to send us back in again in new ways. For these reasons, I have shown in this chapter that Agamben's interruptive rhythm is not antithetical to theology but is appropriately understood as a kind of immanent transcendence or an intra-creaturely analogy – a description of the beyond from within experience, a space in which the divine might be met. This perspective on creaturely rhythm is thus more amenable to Christian theology than the perspectives of the previous chapter

Chapter 4 Synchronicity II: Rhythm as Hierarchy

Where then is the break in this continuity? What the fissure through which one sees disaster? The circle is unbroken; the harmony complete. Here is the central rhythm; here the common mainspring. I watch it expand, contract; and then expand again. Yet I am not included.

Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*

We have thus far considered two perspectives on creaturely rhythm. The first is rhythm as that which holds together two opposites in harmony while the second is rhythm as the interruption of a beyond. The former corresponds to a reality that is closed in on itself, while the latter corresponds to a system that recognizes something beyond itself. The nature of the beyond within the intra-creaturely analogy is undetermined. It is represented within the immanent as an excess, the sublime, or an interruption. Critics of this approach argue that such a content-less transcendent is inaccessible. It is impossible to have a relationship with such a transcendent because of its absolute otherness. The result of this non-communication is that the dualism between immanent and transcendent hardens and the immanent is only all the more closed in on itself. These critics, most of whom are proponents of the movement known as Radical Orthodoxy, prefer a metaphysics in which immanent and transcendent interact with one another according to an ontological hierarchy of participation, appealing to Neoplatonic and medieval theology. This hierarchical metaphysics entails a third approach to rhythm articulated by Augustine.

This chapter argues that such a hierarchical description of reality adheres to what Przywara calls the theological analogy, and that it is a synchronic perspective, albeit one of

a different kind than that of Benvenistian rhythm. As with intra-creaturely analogy, theological analogy cannot stand on its own, but requires the intervention of the intra-creaturely rhythm of the previous chapter if it is to avoid tipping over into “essentialism.” The rhythm of the theological analogy is by itself insufficient to Christian soteriology.

Przywara’s Theological Analogy

While the intra-creaturely analogy refers to the relationship between the creature's essence and existence held together in a beyond, the theological analogy concerns an analogical relationship between philosophy and theology, which has the form theology-in-and-beyond-philosophy. The philosophical perspective on metaphysics approaches God as a limit-concept (as in the previous chapter) and attains its *telos* through theology, which is concerned with God in himself. However, the theological is realized only in and through the philosophical, or the creaturely.¹

As with intra-creaturely analogy, theological analogy involves both a bottom-up and a top-down movement. It tends towards a “progressive rhythm” that seeks to move from the immanent, sensory world of images to the true, abstract, and eternal *Logos*.² “Through the theological, as its ‘inner *telos*’ (*entelecheia*), the ‘ascending movement’ (*dunamis*) of metaphysics arrives at its ‘definitive actualization (*energeia*).”³ However, this ascent is based on a top-down ontological movement from the “freely independent giving”⁴ of the transcendence of God himself to the creature.⁵ In this “*a priori*” approach to metaphysics, the grounded, directed, and determined is deduced from its ground, end, and definition, which is absolute truth. The relationship between God and creature that results

¹ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 174E/80G.

² *Ibid.*, 434E/339G.

³ *Ibid.*, 174E/180G.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 217E/122G.

⁵ James V. Zeitz, "Przywara and Von Balthasar on Analogy," *Thomist Press* (2006): 484.

from this top-down movement is “a oneness with a God of the ‘Ideas’ and of ‘Truth,’ to the point of reproducing [*Mitvollzug*] the groundedness, directedness, and determinateness of all reality from this God.”⁶ This is the relationship between God and creature based on essence, while the intra-creaturely analogy is the relationship between God and creature based on the creature’s existence. The former is generally articulated by theology, and the latter by philosophy.

Since each of these analogies have both a top-down and a bottom-up movement, each has a different way of conceptualizing the way in which God is both in and beyond the creature. From the perspective of the intra-creaturely God is within the creaturely as its (active) potency towards God, however, since God is not here known “in himself,” God is experienced as an interruption. God is only known as “above-and-beyond” and is therefore treated apophatically. The primary domain of enquiry for the theological analogy, on the other hand, is the beyond, namely God himself and “the creaturely comes into question only as (and ‘insofar’ as it is) the site and way and mode of the self-declaration of the divine.”⁷ The “in” of the theological analogy is such that the creature is a manifestation of God’s own standpoint. The creature is simply God’s knowledge of what God has made.⁸

The risk to which an absolutized theological analogy tends as with the synchrony of Heraclitean metaphysics is that of a God’s-eye-view. The progressive rhythm of the theological analogy is the analogical form of the “philosophy of the pure concept” (which Przywara associates with the philosophical tradition that runs from Descartes to Hegel). Abstracted from its analogical relationship with the regressive rhythm of the intra-creaturely analogy, theological analogy rationalizes the sensible world.⁹ It becomes a purely *a priori* metaphysic that seeks an absolute unity. Przywara names this danger

⁶ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 156E/61G.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 163E/68G.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 158E/64G.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 430E/335G.

“theopanism,” in that “proceeding fundamentally [*grundlegender Richtung*] ‘from above to below,’ God becomes the all. This is the form of ‘devolution’ that ultimately is immanently implicit in a purely *a priori* metaphysics.”¹⁰

The difference between theopanism and the *analogia entis* is the difference between a “speculative theology” of *a priori* metaphysics, and a properly ecclesial theology, which Przywara describes as a theology of the divine made visible in the church, as it unfolds over the course of time. In other words, this is the difference between a theology that emerges out of the soteriological narrative of God’s engagement with history, as opposed to an independent, and eternal structure. Przywara criticizes various thinkers for falling into this kind of theopanism, primarily Hegel. His criticism is that Hegel “directly [*unmittelbar*] grasps the super-conceptual rhythm of the intra-Trinitarian life as the thought form governing the creature’s intellectual life [*Geisteslebens*],”¹¹ rather than allowing this to be relativized by mystery. The problem with this is that

it would imply a standpoint not only outside the tradition’s current, but one situated already at the end, at the very mouth of the stream. But this standpoint is God’s alone. For the creature, only something similar (though precisely for this reason essentially dissimilar) is possible: firstly, moving ‘with’ the current, which is to say, maximally, giving oneself up to it [*Selbstaufhörens*]; secondly, moving ‘in’ the current, which is to say moving in the conscious awareness that even the most vigorous attempt to move ‘with’ the current never grasps the whole of it (because both its past as well as its coming possibilities always look out of the reach of any attempt, concomitantly, to grasp it), but is instead ever more deeply grasped by it.¹²

My argument in this chapter is that those who (rightly) critique an absolutized intra-creaturely rhythm described in the previous chapter are themselves in danger of theopanism should they reject intra-creaturely rhythm entirely. At times, these theologians assume a position outside the flow that presumes to be capable of grasping the whole. The

¹⁰ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 165E/70G.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 185E/91G.

¹² *Ibid.*, 151E/56-57G.

particular understanding of the nature of rhythm that accompanies this risk is exhibited most clearly in Augustine's *De Musica*.

Augustine

Augustine is a thinker whom Przywara mostly lauds and draws upon in explicating his own thought. In the first part of *Analogia Entis*, Augustine is repeatedly referenced as one of the central theologians who understands and expresses the importance of analogy. Several of Przywara's primary phrases in describing analogy come from Augustine: for example, God "within everything because all things are in him, and outside everything because beyond all things."¹³ However, Przywara draws a distinction between the early Augustine and the later Augustine. The early Augustine expresses an idealism or an essentialism, in which he postulates a divine absolute, which Przywara attributes to Augustine's radical turning away from Manicheism and its dialectical deity.¹⁴ True existence is associated with the ideal world of universal forms.¹⁵ Thus, the early Augustine tends to emphasize "revelation in spirit and truth," perfect and immutable, and the human ascent into this ideal from out of the sensible. In contrast, Augustine's later theology gives greater recognition to the realism of flesh and blood, and the ascent of salvation is one that occurs within and through the real. Real truth is given only within this downward, humbling movement. This leads to a cosmic Christology: a coincidence of all antitheses in Christ.¹⁶ Przywara argues:

If the idealism of the early Augustine represented the negative overcoming of his original Manicheism and its doctrine of primordial intra-divine antitheses (between a God of light and God of darkness), and if, for precisely this reason, his own idealism was in danger of degenerating into an integralism of pure 'truth in the spirit'..., then

¹³ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 215E/120G.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 509E/425-26G.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 442E/349G.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 514E/431-32G.

Augustine's realism of antitheses can be seen, by contrast, as a positive overcoming of his original Manicheism, redeeming the positive core that Manicheism had turned into an absolute.¹⁷

Whether one can divide up Augustine's Christian thought into an early and late period is contentious.¹⁸ In fact, even Przywara himself is not consistent in this division. While he distinguishes between the idealism of the early Augustine and the realism of the later Augustine in the above quote, in the main body of *Analogia Entis*, he draws on Augustine's works indiscriminately, often referring to the *Soliloquia*, for example - one of Augustine's earliest writings as a Christian. Moreover, Przywara is not always consistent in associating various thinkers with one movement or another.¹⁹ The various typologies (*a priori* and *a posteriori*, essentialist and existentialist, theopanism and pantheism) are formal categories, which no one fits perfectly. Theopanism represents a particular kind of danger to which some thinkers are more prone than others. In the case of Augustine in particular, Przywara is not primarily interested in the historical Augustine's intellectual trajectory, but in distinguishing his own use of Augustine from certain other uses and interpretations, particularly those that emphasize the unity of the transcendent and spiritual world as opposed to the disparate temporal world, which leads to theopanism, and relies on

¹⁷ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 516E/433G.

¹⁸ See, for example, Carol Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). Harrison notes the extent of the debate (5-6) and the important scholars (e.g. Brown) who identify a significant difference between Augustine's early and late theology dating from the 390s (14-17) while herself arguing that there is no such turn but that both his Neoplatonism and his emphasis on sin and grace, and the insufficiency of reason for soteriological ascent are present in his thought from his conversion to Christianity in 386. However, she does acknowledge that Augustine becomes "increasingly aware of the irreconcilability of certain specific Platonic doctrines with the Christian faith," including the doctrine of emanation (37). She states that "Neoplatonic ascents are juxtaposed with Christian faith in the authority of the incarnate Christ." However, "he never actually leaves behind the ascensional schemes" (47).

¹⁹ For example, Przywara admits that Hegel is, from one perspective an existentialist in that the Idea is only grasped through the antitheses of concrete existence, but from another perspective, interprets the sphere of existence according to "the dialectic of ideal being," so that even concrete existence itself is essentialized (319E/215G).

a Neoplatonic reading of Augustine, which he attributes to the Jansenists and the Reformation²⁰

De Musica: Rhythm and Theological Analogy

Przywara does not explicitly consider Augustine's writing on rhythm (or number, the association of which is probably based on the etymologically dubious association between *rhythmus* and *arithmos*²¹) in *De Musica*. Nevertheless, *De Musica* is an example of rational and moral ascent according to a hierarchy of the unity and harmony of the eternal over-against the disparity of the temporal. As such, Augustine's description of rhythm is an example of the progressive rhythm characteristic of the theological analogy, which, if it is not balanced with an intra-creaturely analogy, leads to essentialism. Understanding the nature of this rhythm will help us to know the character of this progressive "rhythmicization" in Przywara's rhythm of the *analogia entis*.

The first five books of *De Musica* are a lesson in the division of sentences according to feet – ratios of *arsis* and *thesis* which must be kept constant.²² Augustine appears to subscribe to a distinction between rhythm and metre. He says that rhythm or number is a rolling forward in fixed feet but this is not yet metre because there is no rational decision made as to how to measure out these intervals.²³ Augustine's rhythm is thus a simple alternation between two syllables at equal intervals, with no beginning, end, or differentiation.²⁴ The objective of metre is to measure intervals so that things move well or rationally,²⁵ and rational movement occurs according to these measurable intervals or

²⁰ Thomas F. O'Meara, *Erich Przywara, S. J.: His Theology and His World* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 78.

²¹ Panikkar, *The Rhythm of Being*, 40.

²² All quotes from *De Musica* come from *Writings of Saint Augustine, The Fathers of the Church, a New Translation* (New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc, 1947).

²³ Augustine, *De Musica*, 3.1.2.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 3.4.7.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.3.4.

ratios.²⁶ Thus, while rhythm is undifferentiated and repetitive motion, metre holds and divides this oscillation according to rationality, so that it moves well. In one respect this is similar to the Heraclitean rhythm that we looked at in the first chapter in that rhythm is a natural flow differentiated from metre as the application of human reason and division. However, this natural rhythm has the shape of a repetitive alteration, which makes the order applied through reason possible. This is precisely the sort of rhythm that followers of Benveniste's definition reject.

Augustine applies this understanding of rhythm to metaphysics in Book VI. He turns his attention to the rhythms of the body in breathing, heartbeat etc., arguing that these numbers are created in the soul for the ordering of the body according to equilibrium.²⁷ The soul moves the body and mediates between bodies, through numbers.²⁸ For example, sense is described as "an instrument of the body directed by the soul for its ordering so that the soul may be more prepared to act on the passions of the body with attention to the end of joining like things to like."²⁹ Rhythm, or number, is that through which the soul is joined to and interacts with things outside itself. Numerical rhythm brings things together through the influence of the order enacted by the soul. The ordering of things correctly and according to rationality is determined by a metaphysical hierarchy in which the higher layers of rhythm exert influence on the layers below. In particular, the soul must order the body through its numbers, but the soul itself should not be influenced by the numbers of the body but by "the divine numbers of wisdom."³⁰ This is what is proper to the soul because the soul seeks constancy and eternity rather than the temporal.³¹ In this way, the

²⁶ Augustine, *De Musica*, 1.9.15.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.3.4.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 6.11.31.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.5.10.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.4.7.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 6.13.40. See Robert Catesby Taliaferro's footnote 22 on page 378: "Augustine seems to be saying that the root of all dispersion is the temporal and that the spatial dispersion depends upon it. He then proceeds to enumerate the hierarchy of numbers. As Svoboda has pointed out, we can consider this as a hierarchy of rhythms since *numerus* is an ambiguous word."

heavenly numbers are impressed upon the body by the soul. Thus, Augustine says, “to each thing in its proper kind and in its proportion with the universe is given a sense of places and times, so that even as its body is so much in proportion to the body of the universe whose part it is..., so its sensing complies with the action it pursues in proportion to the movement of the universe whose part it is.”³² The numbers of everything in the cosmos form a matrix of layers (rhythm) which make their ordering according to ratio and proportion (metre) possible. The soul is responsible for harmonizing the lower rhythms of the body with the higher through the application of reason experienced as metre.

This rhythmic cosmology is derived from Neoplatonism and the Pythagoreans. At the end of his earlier work on the arts, *De Ordine*, Augustine references his dependence on the Pythagoreans,³³ who affirm a cosmic musical harmony based on number.³⁴ According to Henry Chadwick, “the Platonists hold that the physical universe is constructed on the model of musical concords in harmonic ratios which are part of the fabric of the world-soul.”³⁵ Number is the principle of everything because while nothing can exist or be known without numbers, numbers are not dependent upon the existence of anything else.³⁶ Further, Neoplatonism holds a distinction between intellectual and sensible music. Music-making was considered a disreputable occupation undertaken by the lower orders of society. Plato nevertheless believed that music could be studied as an abstract science, and later Pythagoreans likewise believed that the study of music was only acceptable if it was divorced from audible music. The music of the spheres, according to the Neoplatonist

³² Augustine, *De Musica*, 6.7.19.

³³ In particular, the Pythagoreans venerate the number 10, and Augustine too describes the act of counting as progression, the perfect progression being 1-2-3-4 (i.e. to 10) (Augustine, *De Musica*, 1.12.26).

³⁴ Robert J. O’Connell, *Art and the Christian Intelligence in St Augustine* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 16. Since the text is not-widely accessible, O’Connell refers to Tscholl’s pagination of the series of articles in *Augustiniana*.

³⁵ Chadwick, *Boethius*, 81.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 82.

Simplicius, could not be heard through vibrations in the air, but only by “intellectual discernment of the harmonic ratios governing all cosmic order.”³⁷

Augustine likewise sets out to convince us at the beginning of *De Musica* that music is a science, in the sense of the knowledge of numerical relations accessible only by reason,³⁸ and that this is superior to musical practice.³⁹ He aligns musical performance with nature, rather than art, in *De Ordine*.⁴⁰ Augustine makes this distinction even more strongly in his commentary on Psalm 42, which expresses a similar theory to that of Simplicius, when a man comes to the very point of death, the mind becomes detached from this world and hears an intellectual music: “A sound from above so strikes in silence, not on the ears but on the mind, that whoever hears that melody is filled with loathing of corporeal sounds, and all human life becomes in comparison a din interrupting the incomparable, ineffable song from heaven.”⁴¹ Through Augustine, this theory of numbers was the most influential theory of music throughout the middle ages and the Renaissance, including for Boethius’ treatise on music.⁴² Medieval theories retained the Neoplatonic and Pythagorean idea that numbers are eternal and divine, while sensible numbers are merely their shadow, and the belief that this theory of numbers supports the elevation of reason over the senses.⁴³

³⁷ Chadwick, *Boethius*, 80.

³⁸ Augustine, *De Musica*, 1.2.2. Likewise “For Boethius the true *musicus* is not the executant but the one who understands the theory, as superior to practice as soul is to body (*Mus.* I, 34).” Chadwick, *Boethius*, 87.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

⁴⁰ Robert J. O’Connell, *Art and the Christian Intelligence in St Augustine* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 16.

⁴¹ Augustine, *Exposition of Psalm 42*, 7.

⁴² William Bowen, “St Augustine in Medieval and Renaissance Musical Science,” in *Augustine on Music: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays, Studies in the History and Interpretation of Music*, ed. Richard R. La Croix (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988).

⁴³ “Boethius’ introduction to musical theory is much more Pythagorean than Aristoxenian, and is accordingly a remove distant from the actual art on which he is not utterly clear, and of whose practice he is surely ignorant. Like Augustine he sets out to describe the science, not the art. The Pythagorean doctrine of cosmic harmony lies at its heart, and this came to him with the high authority of Plato’s *Timaeus*. It is not surprising that *De institutione musica* anticipates many themes which are restated in the *Consolation of Philosophy*: the harmony of the heavens and the seasons, the ‘love’ that produces concord out of the warring elements in the world, the binding of the elements by numbers, and the ‘consonant members’ of the world-soul. Arithmetic directs the mind towards immutable truths unaffected by the contingencies of time and space” (Chadwick, *Boethius*, 101).

Interpretation and Criticism

Unsurprisingly, Augustine's description of rhythm has generated rather different interpretations. All recognize the necessity of the temporal world's participation in the eternal if it is to be harmonious. However, they diverge with respect to the degree that this requires an ascent from, or a devaluation, of the temporal order. In the end, however, most interpreters, with the exception of Catherine Pickstock, agree that the goodness of created time and number is at best provisional as a secondary remedy for the fall, and that their function is to facilitate ascent.

Jeremy Begbie, based on Chadwick's interpretation of Augustine's association with Neoplatonism, argues that Augustine's positive regard for music is not related to music's nature as a temporal art, but to how it is able to move us away from the temporal and to the eternal. Thus, while audible music is good insofar as it makes metric proportions available to the senses, the function of rightly-ordered audible rhythm is to train the mind to grasp immaterial reality and thereby ascend to the eternal.⁴⁴ Music is unique in its ability to enable ascension because it is independent of most of the senses and heavily dependent upon mathematics. It is therefore capable of moving us from the realm of sensible numbers to rational numbers, although Begbie admits that to what extent this involves leaving the sensible behind is unclear.⁴⁵ Such ascension is necessary because our immersion in temporal reality has made us unable to perceive the harmony of the cosmos.⁴⁶ The application of rational ordering to dispersed time and number is analogous to a feeble apprehension of the unity of eternity from which we have fallen. Thus, the goodness of

⁴⁴ Begbie, *Theology, Music, and Time*, 81; O'Connell, *Art and the Christian Intelligence in St Augustine*, 65.

⁴⁵ Begbie, *Theology, Music, and Time*, 82.

⁴⁶ Augustine, *De Musica*, 6. 11. 30-33.

music does not lie in its embodiment of a good temporal order, but in its ability to carry the soul beyond this order.⁴⁷

In contrast to this interpretation, Catherine Pickstock reads *De Musica* more magnanimously, down-playing the Neoplatonic creation-denying implications. She argues that Augustine's objective is to “achieve the best possible representation of (and offering to) eternity,”⁴⁸ and that temporality is not associated with fallenness but is, in fact, particularly well-suited to the task of representing eternity because it acknowledges the nothingness and infinity in which creation is suspended.⁴⁹ Pickstock interprets Book VI not as a call for creatures to ascend beyond the created to the eternal but as an attempt, through the eternal, to occupy their proper place in space and time by moving towards a greater exactitude of their creaturely measure. Thus, the striving of every creature for its ultimate unity is not a striving beyond itself for the eternal, but a striving for its own proper place and time.⁵⁰ When we sense sound, it evokes the memory of divine transcendence in the soul. However, Pickstock argues that assuming this to be an ascent from the sensible through reason forgets Augustine's association of reason with desire and of number with depth, meaning and mystery, in contrast to our modern conception of number as cold and scientific rationality.⁵¹

Robert O'Connell's interpretation is a middle way between those of Begbie and Pickstock. O'Connell reads *De Musica* as expressing a more amicable relationship between sense and reason than in Augustine's earlier work, in which the sensible is a “herald” of

⁴⁷ Begbie, *Theology, Music, and Time*, 84.

⁴⁸ Catherine Pickstock, “Music: Soul, City, and Cosmos after Augustine,” in *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*, ed. John Milbank, Graham Ward, and Catherine Pickstock (London: Routledge, 1999), 247.

⁴⁹ Pickstock, “Music,” 248.

⁵⁰ Augustine, *De Musica*, 6.17.56; Pickstock, “Music,” 249. Pickstock contrasts Augustine's rhythm to that of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, for whom, she argues, rhythm as absolute time is abstracted from public space such that it becomes a private movement of self-constitution which is nevertheless static because it is entirely elusive. Rather than the finding of one's place within time, as with her interpretation of Augustine, rhythm for Lacoue-Labarthe is the ever elusive origin of nothingness that is internal to the self, disconnected from the world (254).

⁵¹ Pickstock, “Music,” 255-56.

the truth to which reason points.⁵² In *De Musica*, the two work together more harmoniously. As Pickstock has pointed out, one moves to the incorporeal through the corporeal, rather than away from it. This is exhibited in Augustine's pedagogical method in which he asks his student to listen to a verse in order to determine whether it sounds right before searching for the rational principle behind it, though reason is still the ultimate judge of beauty.⁵³ Even so, it remains true that “the soul's involvement in the world of words and authority, of time and its measures, is the result of a fall. The point of the *De Musica*, from start to finish, is to bring the soul to a recognition of its fallen state and thereby promote its return.”⁵⁴ Inferior numbers are good, but only as a secondary providence which is made necessary by our punitive immersion in time.⁵⁵ Thus, O’Connell here agrees with Pickstock that time is part of the natural order and not itself evil, but disagrees with her that this implies that our position within time is good. Rather, he believes that the whole temporal, human domain is a secondary concession by which we may purify our souls, rather than part of an original, good design.⁵⁶

Carol Harrison supports this assessment when, on the one hand, she argues that in Augustine’s doctrine of creation, the necessary ontological difference between God as Being itself and creation as coming from nothing implies creation’s temporality and mutability.⁵⁷ Time is thus proper to creation, and is not a result of the fall. On the other hand, however, she also acknowledges that God’s providence must happen within time

⁵² O’Connell argues that in Augustine’s early work on the liberal arts, *De Ordine*, true art is practiced by “knowing the numerical relationships responsible for such harmonious activity” (*Art and the Christian Intelligence in St Augustine*, 15). The arts train the mind in mathematical thought, which purifies the soul (16). However, Harrison argues that we must interpret this alongside Augustine’s other works of the same period, in which ascent to the truth is through faith in authority through the sacraments. Thus, while Harrison calls this an “odd tension” between reason and faith, she says that they are not mutually exclusive (*Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology*, 45). This reinforces Przywara’s dialectical interpretation of Augustine as including two movements.

⁵³ O’Connell, *Art and The Christian Intelligence in St Augustine*, 68-69.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 71.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 84.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 76, 88.

⁵⁷ Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology*, 78.

because “human beings have fallen ‘from paradise into the present world, that is, from eternal things to temporal,’” and providence must lead us back to the eternal.⁵⁸ Time is good, but our relation to time is not. Providence is the way in which God is a hidden presence within creation, and Augustine describes this as “order” and “form.”⁵⁹ As such, Harrison describes Augustine’s approach to the arts as such: “[T]he liberal arts are useful in effecting this inward turn and ascent, as they facilitate the movement from multiplicity to unity, from temporal fragmentation to eternal simplicity and truth.”⁶⁰ Even in *On True Religion*, one of Augustine’s later works, he states that “because we have come down to the things of time and are being restrained by love of them from reaching the things of eternity, a certain time-bound method of healing, which is calling believers, not knowers, to salvation, comes first in the order of time, though not in natural excellence.”⁶¹ This leads Harrison to conclude that divine providence as temporal leads humans to believe in an authority of unity, as opposed to multiplicity and disagreement.⁶²

All of this scholarship reveals an interesting tension in this Neoplatonic Augustine in that he affirms both the radical ontological divide between God and the created order such that the temporal is pitted against the eternal to the extent that it is questionable whether this is the appropriate sphere of human action. Yet, the created order itself is beautifully ordered through its participation in God and through God’s sustaining it as its form. God, as providence, is himself the hierarchy according to which we can ascend to God. Harrison notes that due to God’s presence within and intimacy to the created realm as its order, the beauty of the created universe is not affected by sin. Instead, “it is as if *everything*, formed, ordered, and governed by divine Providence, serves to admonish human beings towards God. The whole of creation, from the lowliest worm to the highest

⁵⁸ Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology*, 244. Quote from Augustine, *On True Religion*, 38.

⁵⁹ Augustine, *On Free Will*, 2. 17. 45; Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology*, 241.

⁶⁰ Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology*, 43.

⁶¹ Augustine, *On True Religion*, 45.

⁶² Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology*, 246-47.

rational angelic creature, is a 'nod' (*nutus*) in the direction of its Creator."⁶³ Thus, on the one hand, there is very little affirmation of the created order on its own terms, since the means by which we ascend is not the created order as it is in itself, but God's providence within it as form. Yet, this providence at times suggests an already-perfected world-order which calls us to take our proper place in it. Sin and fallen-ness would be no more if only we followed the hierarchy provided. Thus, Augustine, from this perspective, values the created order at once too much and too little. The sensory is only valuable as the location of the revelation of God as form and not in itself. Yet, because God is within creation as form, it is perfect and beautiful, such that there is little recognition of the possibility of sin or tragedy. As we will see, this same tension re-appears in contemporary theology that builds itself on Augustine's "musical ontology."

Augustine's description of rhythm as the matrix of layers of number organized according to a metaphysical hierarchy, which makes order possible through measure gives us a picture of rhythm as ontological form. On the one hand, there is something attractive about this depiction of rhythm, particularly in its association with a kind of cosmic empathy. Rhythm is that which holds the various layers of reality together through resonance, which is reminiscent of James Bunn's wave-form. The numbers at the top of the hierarchy come to bear upon the lower levels through metric ratios, holding them all together and thereby making ascent possible. On the other hand, however, Augustine's rhythm is bound up with the above-named tension in that his perspective does not admit of any rhythmic response from nature itself because rhythmic form is associated only with God's providence. It does not admit of novelty or interruption. Rhythm is reduced to a structure imposed from the top. Thus, Augustine's description of rhythm exhibits his tendency towards a unity that is perceived from outside the flow. Such an account is

⁶³ Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology*, 244.

problematic if taken by itself both because intra-temporal relationship to the divine is not always experienced in terms of such unity and because it may tend to support tight, hierarchical systems of harmony and unity as good and interruptions to such premature harmony as sinful, which is dangerous for the social-historical reasons described in chapter one.

Przywara's Augustine

The above interpretations of Augustine only look at one aspect of Augustine while there is in fact a dialectical element to his thought. In contrast to the Augustine described above, Przywara uses Augustine to put forward “the dynamic ‘in-between’ of the (Platonic) progressive and (Aristotelian) regressive analogies.”⁶⁴ He argues from Augustine,

The most creaturely aspect of the creature (in view of which its ‘analogy’ to God would appear to be the severest conflict with God: intrinsic opposition versus unity, no versus yes, nothing versus Is) – precisely this is the site of the profoundest disclosure [Enthülltseins] of God (the site, that is, of an ‘analogy to God’ not merely in the sense of ‘exemplarity,’ but almost in the sense of revelation’ [Offenbarung]).⁶⁵

So, Przywara is emphasizing here not the ascent, but the way in which God is within creation, and this not only as form but as confrontation. For Augustine, God is within creation as the hidden, inward presence of natural order, within history through prophets, Spirit, Scripture, Church, and ultimately Christ, and finally within human memory as the turning of the soul to himself.⁶⁶ As described above, the created realm is presented as a perfectly-ordered hierarchy by which we can ascend to the creator. Even Christ is

⁶⁴ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 264E/166G.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 266E/168.

⁶⁶ Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology*, 241-43; *On True Religion*, 51; *The Soliloquies*, 1. 1. 3.

sometimes presented as measure, number, and order, especially in Augustine's early works.⁶⁷

Przywara goes beyond this, however, in saying that the revelation of God is within that which is the most opposed to God. There is no sense here that God overcomes the creaturely, but only the worst tear of the contradiction between good and evil.⁶⁸ Przywara appeals to the extreme ontological difference recognized by Augustine between God as Being and unity, and creation as mutable and temporal and passing into nothingness. Nevertheless, the latter is not something subsumed into order according to Przywara's interpretation, but is the site of the revelation of God as *other* than this reality. God is here revealed not as providence, but as Other.

The word that best captures the essence of Augustinianism is therefore 'night.' ... It is, to be more precise: the Easter vigil. The night following upon Good Friday: immersion in the absurdity – the 'non-sense' – of a God put to death by his creation. The night in anticipation of Easter morning: rapture into the 'supersense' of a creation redeemed by God and into God by the killing of God. It is thus the 'vigilant night'...Vigilance in the negative sense: of the acutest consciousness of the abysses that have been torn open. And vigilance in the positive sense: of the night that is already day. It is the night in which the abyss of the creature (*quid est profundius hoc abyssio?*) and the groundlessness of God (*ut inventus quaeratur, immensus est*) are unfathomably [*unergründlich*] one. The word 'night' thus indicates that the Augustinian analogy breaks through in both a downward and an upward direction: downward into the abyss of the creaturely, which – beyond an 'ever greater dissimilarity' – is almost a 'contradiction'; and upward into the immeasurability of God's incomprehensibility, into which the creature is enraptured, such that – beyond even the 'so great a similarity' of 'exemplarity' – one must almost speak of a 'cessation into God.'⁶⁹

Notice that the side of Augustine's theology expressed in *De Musica* is not negated.

Przywara acknowledges that creation is redeemed, and we are enraptured into a

⁶⁷ Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology*, 256. See Marc Lods, "La personne du Christ dans la 'conversion' de saint Augustin" *Recherche Augustinienne* 11 (1976): 33.

⁶⁸ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 265E/167G. Augustine, *Soliloquies* 1. 1. 2.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 268-9E/170G. The citations are from Augustine, *In Ps. KLI*, xiii and Augustine, *In Jo. Tract. LXIII*, 1, respectively.

“supersense.” However, he puts this upward movement beside a downward movement, which he describes as the non-sense of the historical event of Christ's death. Przywara associates both of these with Augustine. This perspective corresponds to those places in Augustine's corpus in which grace figures as interruptive, and in which conversion involves pain and discomfort.⁷⁰ Thus, Przywara argues that “The first trait distinctive to the Augustinian analogy, then, is the *emphatic notion of its ‘back-and-forth’*” between the spiritual and sensible.⁷¹ This interpretation points to the possibility that the rhythm of the ontological structure in Augustine is capable of recognizing an historical counter-rhythm in which creaturely reality is not subsumed under a larger ontological hierarchy but is confronted and interrupted in an encounter with God as its other from within the flow of intra-creaturely reality.

Contemporary Examples of Theological Analogy: Radical Orthodoxy

Despite the agreement between the above commentators that Neoplatonic, temporality-denying tendencies are problematic, there remain examples of thinkers at risk of this absolutized theological analogy, most notably several of the proponents of the school of thought known as Radical Orthodoxy, whose critiques I considered in the previous chapter. The proponents of Radical Orthodoxy appeal to Augustine as one of the primary sources of their theology. In particular, they adopt his “musical ontology,” in which peace, described as “a hierarchy of harmonious differences,” is ontologically basic.⁷² John Milbank calls this “Postmodern Critical Augustinianism” and describes it as an attempt on the part of Christianity to embrace the creative flux and openness of

⁷⁰ Harrison, *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology*, 249-51.

⁷¹ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 262E/164G. Italics original.

⁷² Simon Oliver, “Introduction” and John Milbank “Postmodern Critical Augustinianism: A Summa in 42 Responses to Unasked Questions” in *The Radical Orthodoxy Reader*, ed. Simon Oliver and John Milbank (London: Routledge, 2009), 7, 52.

postmodernism without the violence and the conflict that it usually implies.⁷³ I argue that this dependence on Augustine's *De Musica* opens certain thinkers within Radical Orthodoxy to the sort of critiques that Przywara makes of an absolutized theological analogy as essentialist. This is not to say that any of the proponents want to eschew the created order in favour of a transcendent, atemporal one. Rather, they argue that participation in the transcendent establishes the immanent as valuable in itself; hence Catherine Pickstock's desire to remove associations of world denial from Augustine's *De Musica*.⁷⁴ However, there is a striking similarity between Augustine and Milbank in the setting up of a total order of reality according to a hierarchical relationship between immanent and transcendent that allays the need for any kind of confrontational interruption. In fact, this tendency is even stronger in certain thinkers within Radical Orthodoxy than it was for Augustine, since Augustine preserves the possibility of an intimate confrontation, which is a possibility that thinkers like Milbank tend to foreclose.

Radical Orthodoxy has become such a large movement that it is difficult to say very much about it as a whole. There are some significant disagreements within it, and certain thinkers may be more or less guilty of exhibiting the sorts of tendencies for which the movement as a whole is sometimes criticized. I therefore restrict my analysis to certain thinkers who most fall prey to charges of the kind of Augustinian essentialism described in

⁷³ Milbank, "Postmodern Critical Augustinianism," 51.

⁷⁴ Catherine Pickstock, since she is more attentive to the diversity of movements at work in a Christian account of reality, avoids some of the problems of which I am critical in this chapter. Her desire to avoid spatialization leads her to an awareness of the more diachronic perspective, which describes liturgical time as a stuttering, as involving segmentation and intervals and pauses as opposed to a simple unconscious, seamless flow (Pickstock, *After Writing*, 190, 234). This form is based in the division and dissemination of Christ's body (225) and the non-identical repetition of the Resurrection (265-6), which I will discuss in chapter six. Nevertheless, she at times maligns movements of disjunction, pauses, and interruption saying that these are neutralized in the Trinity (206-7). Specifically, the character of the liturgical gift of being is that it is "uninterrupted," a guarantee of peace. "Since any interruption here at any point – a moment before, beyond or without gift – would cancel gift altogether, to give or to be within the gift is to inhabit an harmonic flow and interchange which knows no interruption and which would have to experience a 'stopping' of the gift as violence" (250). She does not account for how these two positions are compatible. My proposal in this thesis is that while an uninterrupted gift is the sort of thing that one may want to affirm from a synchronic or metaphysical perspective, it is not true to the temporal human experience of salvation. Ultimately, it denies that God is beyond a system of exchange, albeit one of absolute love and peace, and therefore assumes a perspective on reality outside time, thereby spatializing it again in a new way.

this chapter. I begin by describing the thought of John Milbank, the founder of the movement and the name with whom it is most often associated, and then go on to describe two of the metaphysical depictions that have grown out of the movement: that of Simon Oliver and of Adrian Pabst. While each thinker has different aims and distinctive emphases I argue that an underlying Augustinian hierarchical totality is evident in all three.

John Milbank

The major work associated with Radical Orthodoxy is John Milbank's *Theology and Social Theory*. The book argues that theology must not capitulate to other disciplines in constructing reality because the “secular” descriptions of reality that these disciplines assume are fundamentally opposed to theology. The “secular” gives ontological priority to violence, and the theological to peace.⁷⁵ If theology does not articulate its own depiction of reality, it will imbibe the assumptions of the disciplines whose methodologies it uses. This opposition turns on the secular's rejection of transcendence, since without it there is only anarchy or a violent imposition of order. Milbank argues that the postmodern celebration of immanent difference is a situation of ontological violence in which differences are “equivocally at variance,” and infinity is described in terms of the anarchy of their relations.⁷⁶ The modern alternative against which this postmodern approach sets itself up is a “substantialist” metaphysics in which God is outside being, leading to a gulf, a dualism, between God as One, immutable, and immovable, and created being as many, differentiated, and temporal, thereby cutting off the possibility of participation and relationship. Such dualism requires that one side of the dualism subordinates the other side

⁷⁵ John Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990), 409.

⁷⁶ Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 281.

by force.⁷⁷ This was precisely the crux of the criticisms made by Milbank and others of the thinkers I considered in the previous chapter. Because God is outside of being itself, the division between immanent and transcendent is total such that the relationship between them cannot but be one of violent opposition.

In contrast, Milbank says that “the Christian social ontology, linked to the idea of an emanative procession of all reality from a single divine source, abolishes this duality which supports the idea of an ineradicable ontological violence.” Reality is an analogical participation in the transcendent that positions all things within a proper order, “which still involves hierarchical subordination, yet no longer coercive suppression.”⁷⁸ Milbank appeals to Augustine's *De Musica* in describing this hierarchy. Each thing in the world is positioned in a harmonious, flowing series, which progresses towards God.⁷⁹ This series is the mediation between immanent and transcendent and is identified with Christ, who conveys his mediation “as an endless series of new mediations.”⁸⁰ Thus, Christ as mediation between part and whole is not a once-for-all event but is creatively extended in time.⁸¹ Milbank argues from Augustine that there are no discreet things, only “tensional ratios” which participate in divine creation. Creation is not static, but continues to be creatively generated in time, unfolding out of itself through this participation.⁸² The relational sequence “which endlessly threatens to break out of any totality” is given predominance over the part/whole ratio. This fluidity means that the part/whole or immanent/transcendent duality is subservient to the larger movement of unity in difference. Difference is contained within God as the Trinity because God as the One is without limits

⁷⁷ Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 410. Milbank attributes this attitude to Augustine in his rejection of heroic ideals as a virtue that is dependent upon evil and disorder for its manifestation and therefore presumes an ontology of forceful overcoming.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 410.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 404-05.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 405.

⁸¹ This musical mediation is also described as an economy of salvation or the “suspended middle,” a term which Przywara also uses.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 424-25, 428. Milbank does not attribute this part of his thought to Augustine, but to John Scotus Eriugena.

and beyond difference. He is thus himself the mediation between unity and difference, even as this is a mediation that is not a static structure but is continually remade through creation. Unity is a dynamic movement of difference and order is a matter of relation rather than identity.⁸³ Appealing to Dionysus, Milbank calls this “Baroque Hierarchy,” and describes it as

the appearance of the divine self-realization in finitude, and therefore as a vertical sequence up which each individual can contemplatively and actively rise. At its summit lies not a static completion, but a full participation in the suspension downwards of hierarchies (the aiding of others by charity) and a greater participation in the suspension forwards of the thearchy, God's infinite self-realization.⁸⁴

For Milbank, the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* therefore means that there is no dualistic opposition, whether between spiritual and material, the One and the Many, actuality and potentiality because there is no other that God must violently impose form onto. Instead, creation is merely the finite expression of God’s self-realization and, as such, creation is peaceful. It is generated out of nothing but is an expression of God's own being. Milbank therefore associates it with emanation. At times Milbank speaks of Christianity and Neoplatonism as though they were virtually synonymous.⁸⁵ Milbank therefore fits Przywara’s description of theological analogy: that perspective in which the creaturely is only thought about as the site and self-declaration of the divine, that the creature is a manifestation of God’s own standpoint.⁸⁶

Milbank’s hierarchy of emanation includes the complementary movement of anagogy, which Przywara also identifies as part of theological analogy. The fact that creation is the self-realization of the infinite in the finite leads to the soteriological result of an unproblematic ontological ascent, since participation in divine self-realization is the

⁸³ Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 428.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 429.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 295. Milbank distinguishes this Christian Neoplatonism from the Platonic understanding of the Good as an “untainted original,” but does not eschew its associations with emanation.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 163, 158.

mode of the creature's ontology as a tensional ratio within the unified movement of difference. Milbank says that "the initial hierarchy involved is self-cancelling in the sense that the aim of a downwards transmission is to raise up the one beneath," much like Przywara's progressive rhythm. Milbank calls this a "pedagogic rhythm."⁸⁷ This lends a democratic quality to Milbank's hierarchy in which, although the cosmos is hierarchical, the temporal cycles of *kenosis* and exaltation create reversals of position, calling every static hierarchy into question.⁸⁸

The epistemological and political implication of this ontological rejection of dualism is the rejection of dialectics. Just as God is everything as the unity of the dynamic movement of difference, God's salvation is total. Milbank asserts that

Justice that is content with less than absolute social consensus and harmony is therefore less than justice, not because justice is only founded in conventional agreement, but because one has faith in an infinite justice, in the idea that there is a temporally 'proper' (even if changing) position for everything, without any chaotic remainder.⁸⁹

In accordance with this conviction, the objective of Radical Orthodoxy is to "reclaim the world."⁹⁰ As I will discuss later in the chapter, this tendency to an almost one-for-one correlation between ontology and politics is problematic, particularly in the moments when justice is located exclusively in the church. Milbank acknowledges at the beginning of *Theology and Social* theory that "The *saeculum*, in the medieval era, was not a space, a domain, but a time – the interval between fall and *eschaton* where coercive justice, private property and impaired natural reason must make shift to cope with the unredeemed effects

⁸⁷ John Milbank, *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon* (London: Routledge), 182.

⁸⁸ Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 183.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 410.

⁹⁰ Milbank, Ward, and Pickstock, ed., *Radical Orthodoxy*, 1.

of sinful humanity.”⁹¹ However, very little is subsequently said about this historical dimension that is not reduced to ontology.

Simon Oliver

Some thinkers within Radical Orthodoxy acknowledge the significance of an historical element more than others. Simon Oliver expresses a variation of ontological hierarchy in his book *Philosophy, God and Motion* that includes very little recognition of an historical counter-rhythm. Oliver’s particular project makes a claim for a cosmology in which motion is ontologically primary and is not opposed to a divine stasis, but is an expression of divine movement as that through which participation in the divine is made possible. Oliver posits this cosmology in contrast to that implied by Newtonian physics in which motion is identified solely as resulting from the exertion of force of one object on another in an otherwise static universe. In this sense, Oliver’s concerns are similar to those of Przywara and myself in seeking to understand the relationship between God and creation dynamically, in terms of motion, rather than according to static schemas.

Oliver appeals to Plato's concept of the world-soul in the *Timeaus* to describe the participation of movement in being as hierarchical. As described above by Chadwick, the world-soul is the fabric of harmonic ratios of numbers, which order the numbers of the world. For Oliver, the world-soul is the movement of the whole in which all other discreet

⁹¹ Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory*, 9. Milbank occasionally acknowledges a supplementary historical and eschatological side to his theology, which may go some way to relativizing the hints of political triumphalism. For example, in *Being Reconciled*, he acknowledges that while Christians believe peace to be ontologically primary, it is also the name for the eschaton. Thus, “Once there is violence, we are all inevitably violent. And violence can only be eradicated collectively, by a strange apocalyptic counter-violence, which is in the end a divine prerogative, yet is also obscurely anticipated within time.” (John Milbank, *Being Reconciled*, 42). He calls this a tragic deploying of the enemy's means (43). However, while this admits that eschatological peace may have an interruptive quality, there remains the concern that this apocalyptic action is associated too closely with the Church, such that it flows in a uni-directional movement from Church to world. As such, Milbank may still not sufficiently recognize the difference between the now and the Eschaton as it regards the church (See Graham Ward, “Milbank’s *Divina Commedia*,” *New Blackfriars* 73 (2007): 311-18).

movements participate. The movement of the world-soul is circular and creation participates in eternity through the perfect circular motion of the spheres, which mediate eternity to the lower orders of motion, thereby lending permanence and stability to the cosmos.⁹² Circular motion is primary because it is always related to the central point of rest or eternity whereas other motions are like “irrational wanderings” that are only related to relative points of rest. Circular motion thus unifies all other motions.⁹³ Natural motion proceeds in relation to a well-defined hierarchy, in which the undetermined wanderings of the *khora* are located at the bottom, and the top motion is the circular movement of the spheres.

Moreover, Oliver argues that in the Christian conception God is not un-moved mover since this would introduce too much of a gulf between moving creation and immutable transcendence, making participation difficult.⁹⁴ Rather, as dynamic Trinity, a “motionless motion,”⁹⁵ God is intimate to and interior to creation as the motion that touches all things.⁹⁶ We therefore have here the same concern as in Milbank to avoid a dualism, in this case between God as simple unmoved mover and moving creation. In suggesting that created movement grows out of God’s own movement, Oliver identifies an exclusive participation in God that is similar to that put forward by Milbank. It is therefore not surprising that while Oliver’s study does not directly appeal to Augustine, Oliver is very concerned to demonstrate the Neoplatonic influences that Aquinas adopts as a corrective to Aristotle, particularly with respect to the concept of an unmoved mover. Thus, the Neoplatonic world-soul that orders the numbers that govern movement, and which is a part of Augustine’s rhythmic cosmology as demonstrated above, is also the

⁹² Oliver, *Philosophy, God and Motion*, 96.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 115.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 104.

guiding image for Oliver's Thomistic hierarchical system of motion. God is the dynamic form of creation.

These concerns lead Oliver to the same system of emanation and return as that of Milbank,⁹⁷ such that Oliver's depiction of motion is another description of a hierarchical cosmos in which all motion exists within and toward the motion of God. However, this hierarchy is arguably even more rigid than that of Milbank who describes the hierarchy in terms of creative extensions of difference. Oliver's emphasis on the containment effected by circular motion, however, implies a more strictly organized order of reality that pre-emptively contains motion rather than enabling its overflow into new creative expressions. This is particularly the case when we consider the *khora*. Oliver says that

Violent motions are in a sense the lowest form of motion, reminiscent of those in Plato's *khora* before the ordering work of the Demiurge begins: these are akin to 'wandering' or an imperfect stasis by the intimation of conflict rather than co-operation between the mover and the moved. Such motions prevent rather than provide fulfilment in a *telos*.⁹⁸

Oliver is here describing unnatural motion that does not adhere to the eternal, circular movement of the spheres. These wandering motions of the *khora*, chaotic and unformed, are described as violent. Oliver here betrays the totality and rigidity of the ontological hierarchy that he promotes. All movements that are wandering or oppositional are considered violent until they are tamed by eternal circular motion. Motion is a top-down structure that determines in advance the legitimate possibilities at lower levels of the hierarchy much like Augustinian rhythm. There is no creative movement of response from creation as other. Everything is subsumed. As with Milbank, justice cannot allow for a chaotic remainder. However, while Milbank tempers this by envisioning a hierarchy that is temporally self-cancelling in that it creates reversals of position, Oliver's hierarchy is a

⁹⁷ Oliver, *Philosophy, God and Motion*, 118.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 40.

more static structure within which everything takes its place despite his emphasis on motion. Another way to say this is to point out that Oliver's account fails to acknowledge historical motion in that he does not give an account of how the movements of wandering and opposition that arguably constitute history are themselves made sites of healing and salvation. Przywara designates such Aristotelian philosophies of cyclical revolution as a philosophical striving for an *absolutum*, marked by the desire of original sin to "unfold the coherence and meaning of being and history."⁹⁹ Oliver's system is not capable of accounting for the fact that movements of wandering, opposition, and interruption might themselves be salvific disruptions to those circular and repetitive motions of corrupt, historical systems.

Adrian Pabst

While Oliver's project is a specific attempt to articulate the ontological significance of movement, Adrian Pabst sets out to describe a comprehensive hierarchical metaphysic. Oliver's rejection of movements of opposition and confrontation is even more pronounced in Pabst's work, which likewise speaks in terms of Neoplatonic emanation and hierarchy.¹⁰⁰ Pabst's objective is to understand the nature of things not in terms of their substance but in terms of their "metaphysical positioning in relation to other things."¹⁰¹ Again, this objective is similar to Przywara's use of rhythm as way of describing analogical relationships both within the creaturely as well as between the creaturely and God. However, the way in which Pabst describes these relationships is more limited than Przywara's description. Pabst, like Milbank, asserts that the opposition of principles such as the one and the many or immanence and transcendence produces a conflict based on the

⁹⁹ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 405E/308-9G.

¹⁰⁰ Adrian Pabst, *Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy* (Grand Rapids: William B Eerdmans, 2012), xxviii.

¹⁰¹ Pabst, *Metaphysics*, xxvii.

assumption that substance is prior to relationship.¹⁰² Instead, the individuation of the many is made possible through relational participation in and elevation to union with God, which Pabst calls “the fusion of the divine with the human elevating the entire cosmos to union with God, as revealed and renewed by the unique event of the Incarnation of the relational *Logos* (John 1:1).”¹⁰³

Among the many thinkers Pabst considers he appeals specifically to Augustine’s *De Musica*, arguing that Augustine’s articulation of everything in terms of numbers and ratios enables the co-originality of relationality and individuation, one and many¹⁰⁴: “Individual things are beautiful and harmonious insofar as they reflect the unity of oneness. The hierarchy of numbers and ratios is coextensive with the equality of all things compared with the perfection of the One.”¹⁰⁵ Individual forms and their relations are determined by these ratios such that individuation is subordinate to the larger matrix of ratios according to which individuals are simultaneously individual and in relation. Neither is prior to the other because both are simultaneously engendered in the prior matrix of ratios, otherwise known as Being. This is similar to the way in which Augustine’s cosmological layers of rhythm enable a fundamental relationality that holds the various layers of the cosmos together, both material and immaterial. Pabst, like Milbank, argues that hierarchy is compatible with a democratic equality within creation since the unity of the three-in-oneness of the divine is analogically reflected in the democracy of creation. Pabst argues from Augustine’s statement in *On True Religion* that everything possesses three qualities: “it is a particular thing; it is distinguished from other things by its own proper form; and it does not transgress the order of nature.”¹⁰⁶ Measure, form, and order (elsewhere described as singularity, relationality, and overarching order) constitute the metaphysical structure of

¹⁰² Pabst, *Metaphysics*, xxx.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, xxxv.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 88.

¹⁰⁶ Augustine, *On True Religion*, VIII. 13.

the world, blending diversity and unity and thereby reflecting Trinitarian relationality.¹⁰⁷

Pabst's conclusion is that "Christianity outwits the oscillation between the One and the many."¹⁰⁸

Nevertheless, while Pabst asserts equality and democracy within creation, as does Milbank, he never describes the way in which things relate to one another on this plane of equality. The result is that the privileging of relationality over substance is actually the privileging of a single kind of relationality, namely that of vertical participation. No intra-creaturely movement or relationality is identified. Relations are described purely in terms of relation to the Creator. For Przywara, in contrast, the form of oscillation such as between the one and the many, which Pabst claims Christianity overcomes, is in fact appropriate to the creaturely. In making the duality between immanent and transcendent, the One and the many inherently problematic, Pabst likewise makes the oscillating movement of the intra-creaturely relation problematic. Thus, as per Przywara's criticism of the early Augustine, this is an essentialism that becomes an "integralism of pure truth in the spirit." It is the flow of creaturely reality seen from the outside, rather than from one's movement with it. This is particularly evident in Pabst's analogical extension of the Trinity into a creaturely structure, albeit one that is a pale reflection. He begins from the Trinity and sees this structure emanating downward, such that the difference between God and creation is here more one of degree rather than one of difference encountered in relational confrontation. This is the criticism that Przywara makes of Hegel, namely that he directly grasps the rhythm of the intra-Trinitarian life as the thought form governing the creature's life. For Przywara, the intra-Trinitarian is ultimately the divine mystery of God as beyond, and not a rhythm that can be ontologically extended to the creaturely, although as we will

¹⁰⁷ Pabst, 90-91.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 450.

see in the next chapter, this does not mean that there is no relation between Trinity and cosmos.

Each of these thinkers that we have here considered are doing something different in their work. Nevertheless, there are certain themes that recur in each of them, particularly the reliance on an Augustinian-Neoplatonic element that pulls towards the creation of a hierarchical system of ontological totality. The result is the same tension between an Augustinian denigration of the temporal on the one hand and a premature eschatology on the other. While the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy claim that participation in transcendence is the only way to affirm the immanent as immanent, what is in fact here being affirmed is the ordering form of the presence of the divine within the creaturely, the “divine self-realization” as Milbank says, and not the creaturely in itself as other than transcendence. This leads to an ontological totality that does not deal in any significant way with historical, pre-eschatological tragedy, and thereby eschews alternative forms of relations and movements which such a history might make necessary. Emanation, or exclusive participation makes any kind of confrontation between divine and created almost impossible and this is a possibility that we may want to leave open for reasons that the following critiques explain.

Criticisms

Radical Orthodoxy has received almost as many criticisms as it has produced thinkers. I here only deal with those that are directly related to my criticism of an absolutized theological analogy in general. I have already alluded that there is perhaps a problematic dimension to Milbank's association of the church with a necessary counter-violence, however this is part of the much larger problem of dualisms in Milbank's work. Milbank wants to remove all dualisms from ontology. However, doing so has two effects. On the one hand, Milbank has been critiqued for setting up a kind of monism in which

exclusive participation leads to a lack of difference between God and creation.¹⁰⁹ Reality is a single system of unfolding movements. We see this absolutization of a system in Pabst and Oliver also. Politically and historically, this manifests as a problematically close relationship between Christ and Church. Steven Shakespeare says “The way some of [Radical Orthodoxy’s] authors virtually identify the Church or the Eucharist with Christ risks abolishing the otherness of God and ignoring the Church’s own failings and blind spots,”¹¹⁰ resulting in a mediation that is so close that there is no possibility of interruption. Mediation itself becomes a closed and totalized structure. Shakespeare suggests that this undermines the otherness which makes any sort of real forgiveness or relationship, which are arguably interruptive events, possible.¹¹¹ Milbank wants difference, but he wants a sanitized difference that does not include *ontological* otherness.¹¹² Thus, paradoxically, while these thinkers affirm the non-negotiable significance of transcendence, they end up with the same product as those who reject transcendence: namely, a divinized whole. This is what Przywara designates theopanism, and it is significant that Przywara argues that theopanism and pantheism are two manifestations of the same problem: God is equated with the whole of the system.

This totalization is based on a system of dichotomies: Church or nihilism; theology or philosophy/social-theory; peace or violence. Since there is only one reality, the other in the dichotomy is rejected as non-existent or nihilistic. Thus, while the idea of participation overcomes dualism and violence within the Christian story, violence and dualism are simply re-instated at the edges of the story between Christianity/Church/theology and

¹⁰⁹ Steven Shakespeare, *Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction* (London: SPCK, 2007), 170-71.

¹¹⁰ Shakespeare, *Radical Orthodoxy*, 116.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 166.

¹¹² Graham Ward hints at this critique when he asks “does Milbank’s theology of analogy think difference radically enough?” and “what enables him to write this Christian metanarrative from God’s perspective?” (Ward, “Milbank’s *Divina Commedia*, 317). He also recognizes the absence of interruption when he asks “Is there no violence in the Christian story that is ontological? Could not the incarnation, the resurrection, and Christ’s miracles be described as violences? How is violence to be understood?” (317) and says that in Milbank, “there is no moment of revelation, no epiphany, no epistemological rupture. There is only mediation and mythologies...” (312).

whatever is outside them, dubbed nihilism.¹¹³ There is thus a contradiction between Milbank's declared objective and the mode of his exposition. Two thinkers who have made this criticism of *Theology and Social Theory* in particular are Rowan Williams and Gillian Rose. Both critique Milbank for not recognizing the historical process of negotiation with culture and contingency in which the Church and its self-understanding has emerged.¹¹⁴ If the Church is constructed in the midst of violence and conflict, what Rose calls the “broken middle,” then the character of its peace should not be one of perfect harmony, but of “healed history.” Rose criticizes Milbank's ecclesial middle for its unequivocal lack of boundaries, belying the fact that it is not really a middle at all since it is un-locatable in the particularities of history and institution. It is an ideal, a mended or holy middle, but the reality is that this mended middle arises out of and is configured in the broken middle.¹¹⁵ By ignoring this historical configuration in brokenness the middle becomes corrupt as a system of total domination without boundaries.¹¹⁶ Similarly, according to Williams, Milbank has made the mistake of assuming that theology's rejection of an ontological primary violence must require a rejection of historical violence. Williams suggests instead that “It ought to be possible to say that a contingent world is one in which contestation is inevitable, given that not all goods are 'compossible', without saying that there can be no healing or mending eschatologically, or that conflict and exclusion have either a sacred or a necessarily liberating character.”¹¹⁷

Todd Breyfogle traces these criticisms to Milbank's interpretation of Augustine, arguing that his interpretation of Augustine is one-sided and does not hold in tension the

¹¹³ Gavin Hyman, *The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist Textualism?* (Louisville, KY: John Knox, 2007), 77.

¹¹⁴ Rowan Williams, “Saving Time: Thoughts on Practice, Patience and Vision” in *New Blackfriars* 73 (1992): 320. Notice also that in his appeal to *Nouvelle Théologie*, Milbank focuses almost exclusively on de Lubac rather than his student Daniélou, who was far more aware of the significance of the historical in analogy.

¹¹⁵ Gillian Rose, *The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 285.

¹¹⁶ Rose, *The Broken Middle*, 287.

¹¹⁷ Williams, “Saving Time,” 322.

two natures: created and historical. Breyfogle says that for Augustine there is a tension between these two perspectives, but no synthesis. History interposes itself between ontology and eschatology such that there can be no project of simple, progressive, earthly transformation. Milbank, contrary to Augustine, collapses history and ontology leading to an immanent eschaton.¹¹⁸ While Augustine maintains a dialectic between church and state, or eschatology and history (as do Rose and Williams), Milbank's privileging of Augustine's musical ontology rejects this dialectic, leading to premature consensus between them.¹¹⁹

Finally, notice the difference between Milbank and Agamben. Both Milbank and Agamben are suspicious of the totalizing political system and its reliance on boundaries between inside and outside. The difference, however, is that while Milbank opposes the church to this system, Agamben sees the way in which the church has been complicit with the system. He would likely characterize Milbank's attempt to overthrow the secular and replace it with the church as a mistake of the same kind in that he, like the political machine, attempts to impose a total order on reality. Agamben sees true messianism as an attempt to undo and challenge such orders and thus opposes theological economies just as much as political economies. This suggests that Agamben's interruptive messianism is an important corrective to the totalizing tendencies in ontological hierarchies of participation.¹²⁰ This is not to say that the theological idea of participation itself is problematic or that interruptive messianism ought to negate or replace such participation. As I describe in the following chapter, the idea of participation is an important dimension of understanding the role of rhythm in soteriology. The problem is rather with a particular

¹¹⁸ Todd Breyfogle, "Is There Room for Political Philosophy in Postmodern Critical Augustinianism?" in *Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric, and Truth*, ed. W. J. Hankey and Douglas Hedley (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 36.

¹¹⁹ Breyfogle, "Is There Room for Political Philosophy in Postmodern Critical Augustinianism?" 37.

¹²⁰ See Adam Kotsko, "Dismantling the Theo-Political Machine: On Agamben's Messianic Nihilism" in *After the*

Postsecular and the Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion, ed. Anthony Paul Smith and Daniel Whistler (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 215, 221.

kind of participation as exclusive ontological form that does not recognize an intersection with other kinds of movement.

Conclusion

Beside the two descriptions of rhythm as the immanent harmony of oppositions, and as interruption and flow, we now have a definition of rhythm in theological analogy as the harmony of ontological hierarchy. Rhythm in this case is associated with number and order and is the means by which the hierarchy holds together, thereby making movement and interaction between levels possible. Reality is here seen from the outside such that rhythm appears as a holistic, harmonizing, and transcendent structure. Augustinian rhythm is the closest to the synchronic perspective on poetic rhythm. The interactions of the various movements are laid out and visible to the theologian, and theology thus attempts to describe the contours of the whole. In particular, Augustinian musical ontology recognizes the hierarchical form of rhythm including both the cyclical movements of ontology and the teleological movement of anagogy. The connection of these two movements generates the rhythms of Christian salvation. This perspective has the benefit of allowing for communication and intimate relationship between immanent and transcendent.

Yet, the absolutization of this rhythm has an interesting and problematic result. The structure tends towards a total system that does not recognize anything besides itself. Most notably, such a system does not tend to engage with created reality as other and in its historical particulars, but instead subsumes it through participation. Interestingly then, this rhythm comes to have a similar character to that of Heraclitean pantheism. Although Benvenistian rhythm is an improvised shape, while Augustinian rhythm is a hierarchy of layers, both rhythms are approached synchronically as intersections of movements that are laid out spatially. In both cases, rhythm is that which holds things together in harmony, although hierarchical metaphysics does so through number and ratio while Heraclitean

rhythm is an improvised flux. Moreover, in both cases this totality is dependent upon opposing dualities. The difference is that while the proponents of Heraclitean rhythm acknowledge this opposition, it tends to go underground and re-emerge as a performative opposition in Radical Orthodoxy.

The consequence in both cases is that the whole is divinized, and there is no room for interruption. God becomes equated with the whole rhythm or structure. In terms of religious expression as well, the injunction of thinkers such as Deleuze, Nietzsche, and Heidegger is participation in the logic of the whole – whether through multiplying identities, accepting the eternal return, or being a conduit for the strife of the cosmos. The religious injunction of Radical Orthodoxy is also participation in the whole, albeit a participation of peaceful acceptance of one’s proper place in the hierarchy. This is due to the fact that God comes to stand in for the whole of the system such that participation in the order of things is tantamount to participation in God. In the final chapter, I propose an alternative understanding of participation, in which participation in God includes the disruption of order, which is more akin to Agamben’s active participation in the caesura by which political and ontological systems are challenged.

The above description of Przywara's use of Augustine demonstrates that although Przywara makes use of the concept of analogy this is not Milbank's theological analogy of exclusive participation. Likewise, when Przywara appeals to Augustine, he is not using him the same way that Radical Orthodoxy makes use of Augustine's “musical ontology.” The difference between the two is that while Milbank, Oliver, and Pabst subsume the movements of the historical within the movements of ontological participation, Przywara and Augustine both maintain the tension between these two movements. This is what it means for him to recognize an *analogia entis* between the (historical) intra-creaturely analogy and the (ontological) theological analogy. Thus, the interruptive “dissimilarity” between God and creation, of which Agamben is an expression, provides an important

corrective to the “similarity” that makes ontological participation and intimacy possible. I now turn to what this rhythm of the *analogia entis* looks like and how it is the form most appropriate to Christian soteriology.

Chapter 5 Rhythm as Analogy: Harmony and Interruption

And the little fierce beat – tick-tack, tick-tack – the pulse of one’s mind took on a more majestic rhythm.

Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*, 173

Rhythm is a theologically significant category because, as the past three chapters have demonstrated, different understandings of the role of rhythm have various theological consequences. Each of the conceptions of rhythm that we have considered thus far, if adopted as *the* definition of rhythm, exhibit problems from the perspective of Christian theology. For both the structural rhythm of theological analogy and the improvised rhythm of Heraclitean (anti)metaphysics, the divine is so closely equated with the goodness, structure, or processes of creation that the difference between God and creation threatens to become annihilated. This is exhibited in different ways in the process theology of Catherine Keller in chapter two and by John Milbank, Simon Oliver, and Adrian Pabst as described in chapter four. While Keller reduces God to part of the process of an unfolding world, the above proponents of Radical Orthodoxy reify reality into a hierarchy that suggests a completed whole and therefore a premature eschatology. This is problematic because it precludes the possibility of divine confrontation with sinful systems that result from attempts to secure a premature peace. Both of these accounts of rhythm as form, whether fluid or structured, lead to such fusion because they use the category of rhythm to account for the totality of relations, such that God, described as the rhythm of the whole, is also reduced to this totality. My objections to these approaches, however, do not mean that

I recommend the alternative of an arbitrary and voluntaristic deity. The rhythm that is arbitrarily interruptive on its own lends itself to the opposite theological problem of a kind of total opposition between immanent and transcendent, characteristic of Barth's *Römerbrief*, which severely limits the possibility of genuinely transformative relationship. Agamben's radical, intra-creaturely silence regarding the beyond, if left to itself, could tend in this direction. The solution to these theological dangers that beset the category of rhythm is not to carve out another middle way between these rhythms, but to hold together the two extremes of rhythm as totality of relation and rhythm as interruption. This is consistent with rhythm in poetry as including both perspectives.

This is the approach of Erich Przywara. I do not here offer a comprehensive interpretation of Przywara himself, though I would hope that my use of his thought on rhythm would not be unrecognizable to him. Przywara was ultimately not concerned with rhythm itself, but simply used the idea as a way of describing the *analogia entis* as an oscillation between the intra-creaturely and the theological. However, it plays a large descriptive role, and I hope that focussing on the role of rhythm in Przywara's thought also helps to make his rather dense work and its significance more clear.

In Przywara's thought, the two movements – intra-creaturely and theological – are not dissolved into a *tertium quid* but are mediated only by the movement that the creature must make in Christ between them, such that each account of rhythm is maintained as a unique perspective that is nevertheless qualified by its other. This guards against the temptation for the theologian to use rhythm as a way of circumscribing the whole of reality under a single, univocal category, recognizing instead that the best accounts of the relationship between God and creation involve a multiplicity of perspectives that the theologian must move between. This is a way of describing what it means that Przywara's *analogia entis* is the analogical relationship between intra-creaturely and theological rhythms. The rhythm of the relationship between God and creature is both related to but

different from the rhythms of human life. This oscillating perspective suggested by Przywara is faithful to the nature of rhythm itself, understood as an oscillation between synchronic form and diachronic experience, as described in chapter one. This chapter is therefore intended to set up how and why the category of rhythm should be included in a doctrine of salvation despite the fact that previous uses of rhythm have been insufficient to Christian theology. This chapter defends and lays out the rhythm I believe is appropriate to Christian theology, while the next shows what it adds to the doctrine of salvation.

The *Analogia Entis* as Rhythm

I have mentioned in previous chapters that Przywara describes ascending (theological) and descending (intra-creaturely) rhythm as two distinct “rhythmicizations” [*Rhythmisierungen*] of the one rhythm of the *analogia entis*. Each of these movements is itself described as an analogy. The intra-creaturely analogy from below and the theological analogy from above are both themselves oscillations, the former between actuality and potentiality or essence and existence, and the latter between emanation and analogy. Przywara comes to the conclusion that neither movement is sufficient on its own for describing the relation between God and the creaturely and thus concludes that there is a relationship between these two analogies which is itself analogical. The *analogia entis* is this oscillating tension between these two dynamic analogies.¹ It is this understanding of the *analogia entis* that is theologically central for Przywara and thus determines the way in which he uses rhythm.

¹ Betz, “Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part Two),” 22.

Conceptions of the Analogia Entis

The doctrine of analogy refers to several different issues in Christian theology.² We are here interested in the metaphysical question regarding the relationship between human being and that of God. However, even within the category of metaphysical analogy, there are various ways in which the term “analogy” is understood. These include the analogy of attribution, the analogy of proportion, and, according to Steven Long, the analogy of proper proportionality. The analogy of attribution is a way of speaking in which we extend a concept from a central case to its effects, causes, and signs. Health is Aristotle’s oft-used example of this analogy, in which health is primarily found in a person, but we also designate medicine, wholesome food, and exercise as healthy because they contribute to and represent the person’s health. The analogy of proportion indicates a determined relation, such as between numbers or currency. Finally, the analogy of proper proportionality is not a determined relation, but a mathematical term that indicates that a predicate applies to two cases proportionately.³ It has the form A is to B as C is to D,⁴ and an example might include that the wings of a butterfly are to the butterfly as the wings of a gull are to the gull.

All of these forms of analogy can be said to apply to the relationship between God and creatures in various ways. For example, the creature has a determinate relationship to God as in the analogy of proportion, but God does not have a determinate relationship to

² It includes the epistemological question of how it is that we know God, the linguistic question of how it is that we speak about God, and the metaphysical question about the way in which the being of God and the being of creation correspond to one another. Of course, these questions are not entirely distinct from one another, since the way in which we are capable of thinking about the metaphysical analogy between God and creation is determined by the way in which analogy works in our language, and the question of how it is that we can actually have such knowledge in the first place. Nevertheless, the failure to distinguish between these different ways of using analogy has led to much misunderstanding and lack of clarity surrounding the term. White attributes much of the debate between Barth and Przywara on analogy to lack of clarity on both sides surround the use of analogy: Roger M. White, *Talking About God: The Concept of Analogy and the Problem of Religious Language* (Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate, 2010), 7.

³ Steven A. Long, *Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011), 2-3.

⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics IX 6*, 1048a35-1048b9 in *Aristotle: The Complete Works. Electronic Edition, Past Masters: Humanities Full Text Works* (accessed 10-07-2013).

the creature, because he infinitely transcends the creature.⁵ Likewise, the analogy of attribution designates God as the primary model and cause of such things as love and justice, and we indicate examples of love and justice in the world by way of an attributive analogy to such things in God. Long argues that in the case of being itself, however, the only appropriate analogy is that of the analogy of proper proportionality. Our relationship to God is only made possible by the creature's receiving its own being from God, such that the creature's being is distinct from that of God. Thus, the being of God is to God as the being of the creature is to creature.⁶

The difference between God's being and that of the creature is located in the relationship between act and potency. Potency defines the being of the creature as that which makes change and movement possible,⁷ but does not exist in God since potency accounts for the possibility of limitation, change, and multiplicity, all of which are impossible for God.⁸ God is identical to pure being, and infinitely exceeds the being of the creature as its origin.⁹ This is the difference between created being and uncreated, self-sustaining being. The result is that God "exceeds all proportion."¹⁰ Thus, although God and creature are both said to have being, this does not imply that being is a third category of which God and creatures are two types. Rather,

as the creature is to its act, so is God to His act. For while what is affirmed is perfection in each case, the meaning and being of the perfection differ and differ infinitely; the meaning and being of perfection of God is without any limit of potentiality, while the meaning and being of perfection in the creature involves limit of potentiality.¹¹

⁵ Long, *Analogia Entis*, 3.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics XI*, 9, 1065b15-16.

⁸ Long, *Analogia Entis*, 24, 28.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 31.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 30.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 33.

Thus, while there can be an analogy of proper proportionality between God and creatures with respect to their acts, God himself transcends and contains proportionate being, rather than vice versa, such that the creature is related to and depends upon God, but God is transcendent to and independent of the creature.¹² Long says that “The middle term is not a third thing under which both God and creature fall, but rather the proportionate identity of perfection limited by potency in creatures, with perfection in its utter fullness in God without limit of potency and as identified with the divine substance and first cause.”¹³ This is similarity within ever greater dissimilarity.¹⁴ Thus, according to Long, the analogy of the *analogia entis* is the analogy of proper proportionality.

Przywara's Analogia Entis

I describe Long's account of the *analogia entis* by way of contrast with that of Przywara. While Przywara does not use the language of proper proportionality, this idea is included in his *analogia entis*, though it is ultimately insufficient for it. The being of the creature is not self-sufficient and at rest, like that of God, but is an oscillation between essence and existence. More specifically, essence and existence have the relation to each other of in-and-beyond,¹⁵ with essence-in-existence corresponding to actuality, and essence-beyond-existence as corresponding to potency or potentiality. The oscillation between these two is what Przywara calls intra-creaturely analogy. God, on the other hand, is unity and wholeness because God's essence equals his existence such that there is no distinction between actuality and potentiality.¹⁶ In traditional Thomistic language, Przywara says he is the “necessarily actual.”¹⁷ Thus Przywara implies a kind of proper

¹² Long, *Analogia Enti.*, 91.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 103.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 95,

¹⁵ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 141E/46G.

¹⁶ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 160E/66G.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 222E/127G.

proportionality in which the mode of being proper to the creature is wholly dissimilar from the mode of being that is proper to God. Przywara is always very careful to emphasize the pole of ever greater dissimilarity over similarity, stating that “every last ‘attributive’ [zumessende] analogy (*analogia attributionis*) reduces to an incomprehensible ‘suspended’ [schwebende] analogy (*analogia proportionis*). To be sure, there is such a thing as a positive statement concerning God, but it is merely the basis of a negative statement concerning his absolute otherness.”¹⁸

Przywara would object, however, to equating proper proportionality understood as a mathematical principle with the *analogia entis* itself. Such a mathematical construction does not take us very far. It tells us how it is that God and creatures are dissimilar while each having a mode of being proper to them, but it gives little account of how God and creation are in relationship with one another. Similarity cannot simply be proportionately balanced with dissimilarity, as this makes a mathematical principle, rather than God himself, decisive for the relation between God and creature.¹⁹ William Desmond likewise criticizes the way in which analogy is often thought of in quasi-mathematical terms, as in Long’s work, because this “easily freezes into a two-tiered system of otherwise unrelated terms, and hence risks the dualistic opposition between ‘here’ and ‘beyond,’ between immanence and transcendence as other that it is the great power of analogy to circumvent.”²⁰ Instead, Przywara believes that alterity can only be understood within the problem of relation.²¹ The aim of analogy ought to be to express the nature of the dynamic relations between God and the creaturely.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 231E/135G.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 232E/137G.

²⁰ Desmond, *God and the Between*, 124. See also Desmond, *Being and the Between*, 211, and Thomas A. F. Kelly, *Between System and Poetics: William Desmond and Philosophy after Dialectic* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 107, 229.

²¹ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 287E/187G.

In contrast to proper proportionality, Przywara describes his understanding of *analogia entis* as

a relation of mutual alterity. It is a 'relation' (of God to the creaturely, in that the creaturely is related to God as to its innermost and abiding *principium et finis*), and it is a 'genuine' relation (i.e., to God as genuinely God) insofar as it expresses the fundamental 'alterity' of God with respect to the creaturely. At its peak, the *positivum* of 'relation' reveals itself as the *negativum* of 'alterity.' But precisely as such the *negativum* of 'alterity' is the sign of the fulfillment of the *positivum* of 'relation.'²²

Both relation and otherness are here affirmed. Even at the highest level of participative unity of the creature with God, there remains an absolute difference between God and creature. There is no third principle that regulates the relation between God and the creature,²³ no principle or mathematical structure that can act as a middle-vantage point from which these extremes can both be viewed. The two extremes of absolute intimacy and absolute alterity are simply both asserted. The genuine-ness of the relation is predicated upon the alterity between God and creature. The immanence of intimacy is dependent on the otherness of transcendence. They are held together only in God.²⁴

Przywara believes that rhythm is more helpful than mathematics in describing the dynamics of this relation in alterity. As stated above, for Przywara, the intra-creaturely analogy has the form of an oscillation. The theological analogy, the relation between God and creature, cannot be thought independently of this oscillating creaturely perspective and therefore also has the form of an oscillation between intimacy and alterity, or what Przywara calls the God in-and-beyond the creature. Remember that Przywara describes these as two rhythmicizations of the one rhythm. Thus, Przywara says of the *analogia*

²² Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 231-2E/136G.

²³ *Ibid.*, 234E/138G.

²⁴ Teran Dutari and Thomas F. O'Meara argue that Przywara's analogy is an attempt to cover all the various types of analogy by developing the concept as a theology of incarnation (O'Meara, *Erich Przywara, S.J.*, 76-77). Przywara's analogy is not "a way of thinking or a form of logic but ... both kinds of analogy, attribution and proportionality, point to something deeper, an exposition of the structure of created being as diverse but also as participative in God" (80).

entis, “This primordial oscillation [*Ur-Schwingung*] between structures that are (themselves) oscillating [*Schwingungs-Gebilden*] is itself the primordial rhythm [*Ur-Rhythmus*] within the rhythm between metaphysics and religion.”²⁵ The relationship between the intra-creaturely (metaphysics) and theological (religion) is a rhythm, or indeed *the* primordial rhythm that constitutes reality, because it is a relationship between two dimensions of reality that are themselves oscillating: the creaturely, and the relation of God to the creaturely. The two are not held together in a principle that could be observed at a remove, but through movements in which the human creature is always already a participant.

The nature of this rhythm can best be thought of as a doubling of the theological analogy. All three analogies are an oscillation of the in-and-beyond. The theological analogy is “God-in-and-beyond-the-creature,” while the intra-creaturely analogy is “essence-in-and-beyond-existence.” In the *analogia entis*, the two rhythmicizations intersect as similarity contained within an ever greater dissimilarity in the form of an in-and-beyond.²⁶ Thus, God is in-and-beyond the creaturely as essence-in-existence and God is in-and-beyond the creaturely as essence-beyond-existence. Since the principle of analogy is “similarity in ever greater dissimilarity,” the way in which God is in the creaturely as its *telos* (essence-in-existence) is relativized, but not overcome, by the greater way in which God is beyond the creature as he is, in himself, unknowable to us (essence-beyond-existence).²⁷ Likewise, the way in which God is within the creaturely as its intimate movement towards its *telos* (essence-in-existence) is relativized, but not overcome, by God’s otherness within the creaturely, experienced as interruption and confrontation (essence-beyond-existence).²⁸ A certain primacy is thus given to the intra-

²⁵ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 418E/323G.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 434E/339G.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 214E/119G.

²⁸ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 216E/121G; 287E/187G.

creaturely, diachronic perspective and with it to the transcendence of God, by virtue of the ever greater dissimilarity. Thus, Przywara talks about the “in-and-beyond” form, but he also talks about the “above-and-beyond” form, which is the result of this doubling.

Przywara’s solution to the theological question of the nature of God’s relation to the world is thus to assert both poles, the in and the beyond, intimacy and alterity, in their extremes, and to then identify the various movements of relation that the intersection of these poles produce. This approach is not necessarily unique; there are many theologians who would agree with all of these points, or adopt the similar approach of maintaining two poles in tension.²⁹ What is unique in Przywara’s thought is his identification of rhythm as the means by which the various elements of the economy of salvation are related to one another, which emphasizes their relation as experienced and performed, rather than conceptualized. Przywara says that each of these dimensions is, objectively, first a principle of being but “temporally speaking, however, each is first of all a *practical* principle of orientation ... and only subsequently by abstraction a theoretical principle of method.”³⁰ In other words, Przywara here acknowledges the difference between a synchronic and a diachronic perspective, the second of which understands that theology is first a matter of practical orientation. The form of in-and-beyond is not a position from which to manage the whole, but an intra-temporal position that requires movement and oscillation on the part of the creature. The result is that *analogia entis* is not a static, logical form, but a dynamic, lived rhythm.³¹

This perspective avoids the theological problems identified in previous chapters. The emphasis on alterity, on ever greater dissimilarity, prevents the fusion of creation and

²⁹ Another example is Hans Urs von Balthasar’s emphasis on polarities (for example in Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theological Dramatic Theory*, vol. 4 of *Theo-drama*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1988), 116). Balthasar may have been influenced by Przywara in this. However, others such as Søren Kierkegaard and Karl Barth articulate a similar oscillation between poles, often in language of dialectic.

³⁰ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 365E/264G. Italics mine.

³¹ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 308E/204G.

the divine into a single system, which both compromises the integrity of creation and forecloses the possibility of a divine interruption from beyond created reality. However, this beyond is not a kind of pure otherness that can only act as a limit to the immanent, and to which the immanent cannot relate other than in opposition. The relationship is one of intimacy, but this is an intimacy based on dissimilarity and alterity, and it therefore does not preclude the possibility of interruption and confrontation.³² In Przywara's words,

The rhythm of the first (ascending) 'above-and-beyond' serves to overcome the excessive [*Übermaßes*] enclosedness of a totality. The rhythm of the second (descending) 'above-and-beyond' tempers the excess [*Übermaß*] of a divine agency, which alone is efficacious, into the proportion [*Gleichmaß*] of a relative all-unity between Divine omnificence and the creature's own proper agency.³³

Notice that there are here two "above-and-beyonds," two forms of transcendence as it were. This is the result of the doubling of the *analogia entis*. The one refers to the transcendence that unifies the synchronic form, and the other to the diachronic experience of transcendence disrupting enclosed forms resulting from the unknowability of the divine. In associating both proportion and interruption with rhythm, Przywara avoids identifying a single rhythmic form or structure in relation to which all disruption becomes extrinsic, arbitrary, or nihilistic. Instead, interruption is also a rhythmic movement, which allows him to acknowledge the disruption of balance and order without this being destructive. Thus, while Przywara wants to avoid a transcendence that is an excessive divine agency, he is also wary of simply tempering divine otherness via order and balance. He says,

Because it is synonymous with order ..., relation seems to aim at balance and, in the final analysis, at a formula for such balance. And yet, it is characteristic of the relation in our *perfectio universi* that every closed system of mutual relatedness is exploded by an 'above-

³² As we will see, Przywara does use the language of opposition in describing God's relation to the creature's original sin. Thus, while opposition is not the sole category of relation it is also not precluded, but given its proper place in the economy of salvation.

³³ *Ibid.*, 295E/193-4G.

and-beyond.’ This, then, is what characterizes the universe as oriented ‘towards God.’³⁴

This explosion of balance as part of the rhythm of God’s relation to the world is what makes Przywara’s *analogia entis* different from the synchronic harmony of the previous chapter’s theological analogy. The *analogia entis* is a form that points beyond itself, ending always in a negative declaration, and is therefore a form that surpasses itself.³⁵ This requires Przywara to assert two realities in tension. The rhythm of the *analogia entis* is both an ultimate structure, a bridge that holds together the abyss within the creature and the abyss between the creature and God, and an ever greater dissimilarity that is always opening to something beyond that structure.³⁶ Built into the very form of the *analogia entis* is a recognition that, as a representation of the relation between God and creature, it is only ever a creaturely construction and is therefore always open to that which is beyond itself. This is what makes it a rhythm, rather than a mathematical construction. Participation is like moving through a poem in that the “full concreteness” of participation is not a given reality, but achieved only at the eschaton.³⁷

Notice also that the *analogia entis* is not, for Przywara, a relation between the movements of God and the movements of the creature, but a relation between the movements of the intra-creaturely and the movements of the relationship between God and the creaturely. This is what gives the *analogia entis* its dynamic character, in that it is the relation between two motions, rather than two static realities. Przywara grounds his perspective in the movements of God’s relation with creation rather than attempting to

³⁴ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 287E/187G.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 190-1E/95-6G. Notice that my interpretation of the *analogia entis* here differs from that of John Betz who argues that for Przywara proportion and harmony are primary, while sublimity is folded into this harmony. However, in order to take the ever greater dissimilarity seriously, anything that we can recognize as harmony must always be relativized. This is not to say that there is not beauty, harmony, or structure, but only that God and our experience of God is not equated with our ability to identify these, though it includes them.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 235-6E/140G.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 367E/206G.

directly grasp the internal life of God. He does not begin with two things, the nature of which is known in advance, and then bring these into relation but determines the nature of things only from the movements and relations through which they appear. I will say more about this in a later section, but it is worth noting here that Przywara's focus on the movements in and through which God is known allows room for acknowledging the transcendent God as he is in himself, as "above-and-beyond," but it preserves this transcendence precisely by referring to it only obliquely.

This is related to the fact that, for Przywara, the *analogia entis* is only a creaturely construct. Its rhythmic nature is an attempt to reflect the primordial rhythm, but always only in a way that is faithful to its creaturely perspective. Przywara says that the history of the articulation of analogy shows,

the range of oscillation [*Schwingungsbreite*] proper to its varying emphases – but one that passes over ... into a structure of differentiations, to the point of the unsystematizable surd [*Restliche*] left behind by the plenitude of historical configurations. In this respect, the *analogia entis* shows itself to be – in the strongest sense – a 'creaturely principle' and, thus, as consisting in the illimitable openness of the movement of becoming. ...It is not a principle that makes the creaturely comprehensible and thus manipulable, but one in which the creaturely oscillates [*schwingt*] unhindered in its utter [*restlose*] potentiality.³⁸

As a creaturely principle, the function of *analogia entis* is soteriological – to set the creature free for movement appropriate to it. It is not an attempt to grasp the nature of God directly, though the transcendence of God is acknowledged by the "unsystematizable surd." As a result, commenters say about Przywara that "His attention to the dynamic, living creaturely dimension of life has remained his primary concern."³⁹

³⁸ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 310E/206G.

³⁹ Zeitz, "Przywara and von Balthasar on Analogy," 484.

Analogia Entis and Creation

In the *analogia entis*, relation at its peak reveals the alterity between God and creature and vice versa. The rhythm of the *analogia entis* refers to the movements by which we describe and participate in this paradox, including movements of harmony, propulsion, oscillation, and interruption. The nature of creation and its relationship to God is included in this “primordial rhythm.” This is important because the *analogia entis* or the economy of salvation might otherwise be construed as imposing something alien or arbitrary onto creation, particularly with respect to the idea that interruption is appropriate to the rhythm of the *analogia entis*. While I do not have space here to explore Przywara’s doctrine of creation extensively, I want to point out that, for Przywara, the form of creation is responsive to interruptions from beyond itself. Such interruptions are not threatening to its form because its form is a temporal unfolding in response to such events.

The following is Przywara’s clearest and most poignant description of the intersection of God with creation in intimacy and alterity:

Since for the ‘*Ichts*’ of the ‘infinite greatness’ of space and time, the critical point of intersection [*Schnitt- und Brennpunkt*] is the ‘infinite smallness’ of the here and now qua ‘*Nichts*,’ it is precisely here, in this focal point, that we see the ultimate and decisive ‘*topos theios*’: in God’s appearing as the ‘ever greater’ within the ever smaller’ of his ‘Now and Here’ within the ‘now and here’ of space and time, and so of his ‘*Ichts*’ within the ‘*Nichts*’ ... Thus the human being who would wish to ascend into the eternity of the ‘ever greater’ of the ‘*Ichts*’ – in an attempt to overcome space and time – must descend into the ‘*Nichts*’ of his ‘now and here’; for it is only in such a ‘nothing’ of the ‘now and here’ that he becomes conscious of this eternity – just as, in Christian theological terms, the ‘eternity’ (of God in Christ), as a genuinely creaturely eternity, is in space and time as ‘now and here’: from the ‘now and here’ of a birth in a manger and a death on a cross to the ‘now and here’ of a real historical church under the sign of ever new ‘nihilations,’ until the complete ‘nothingness’ of the destruction [*Untergangs*] of ‘the old heaven and the old earth’ reveals the unveiled eternity of the ‘*Ichts*,’ certainly as something ‘new,’ but whose newness is that of a ‘heaven and earth’ that is the ‘tabernacling of God with men.’⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 592E/519G.

Notice that the “now and here” is a “Nichts” or a “nothing.” This is a reference to creation as being *ex nihilo*. The now and here is nothing because creation is a movement of becoming “between the ‘infinitem of possibilities’ in the ‘nothing’,” of which each instantiation is simply a limited actuality of potential.⁴¹ Creation *ex nihilo* is thus an ongoing situation in which creation is “suspended” or “hanging” in God.⁴² Creation is only a matrix of “provisional halting points”⁴³ and is thus “related as ‘nothing’ to the ‘Creator out of nothing.’”⁴⁴ It is a movement of becoming directed by God.

Nevertheless, this approach is different to the emanationist interpretation of creation *ex nihilo* of the previous chapter. While God sustains creation, he does so by direct intersection with the point of nothingness, namely with that which is most different from God, rather than through a pattern of the whole. Although this point is a nothing, its intersection does not mean that the here and now is ontologically subsumed into God. Rather, God preserves the movement of the here and now through God’s presence to it. The otherness of God as eternal, his absolute difference from creation, is what makes possible God’s radical intimacy to the nothingness of each here and now in a way that is not possible for anything within creation.⁴⁵ Thus, God’s absolute alterity and radical intimacy are interconnected. The intimacy of God to creation is also what frees it for its independence, its most free and natural self-movement, which includes its ability to say “No” to God.⁴⁶ The creaturely nothingness, its insufficiency and incapacity to anything in itself is therefore paradoxically its positive capacity for a relation to the divine that is beyond itself precisely *as* something other than the divine.⁴⁷

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 217E/122G.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 427-29E/332-34G.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 223E/128G.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 237E/141G.

⁴⁵ Janet Soskice, “Creatio *ex nihilo*: Its Jewish and Christian Foundations” in *Creation and the God of Abraham*, ed. David B. Burrell et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 37.

⁴⁶ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 230E/135G.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 228E/141G.

Rather than talking about the relation between God and creation in terms of God relating to the whole, Przywara describes God as relating to the smallest point of particularity, due, no doubt, to his incarnational approach. In Christ, eternity enters time and space, which implies a particular point in time and space. This reveals that God is not encountered in a general harmony, but through the process of moving through particular here-and-nows. This already carries with it suggestions of surprise, encounter, and re-direction. Part of the nature of creation is therefore that it is ongoing, and that this creativity includes a dialectical element, a response on the part of creation to the eternity encountered at each here-and-now. This points to the fact that the world is not a mechanistic process governed by laws, but the result of a free agency, and therefore spontaneous. Certain events are experienced by us as surprises because God is alive and in motion and we cannot anticipate what God will do. This is what we call the hiddenness of God.⁴⁸

The relation between God and creation is much like the relation between the reader and the poem. Structures of the poem determine the movement of the rhythm, but the reader performs the given rhythm creatively. There are a multitude of possible performances. Creative performance is provisional, continually interrupted and confronted by new demands from the text that must be creatively negotiated in order to move forward in harmony with the rhythm. Creative participation is therefore not a simple conformity to a pattern, but requires a creative response to a pattern only partially and provisionally given. The interruption of expectations, patterns, and trajectories is part of this process, and part of what makes poetry enjoyable. In a similar way, there is a general responsiveness to interruption that is a part of the rhythms of creation.

⁴⁸ Robert Jenson, *The Triune God, Systematic Theology Vol. 1* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 233.

However, this discussion is so far somewhat speculative since we never have access to creation in its pure form, but always through the economy of salvation. Part of Przywara's concern is precisely to demonstrate the continuity between the form of the economy of salvation and the form of metaphysics in the *analogia entis* more generally. When expressed in the terms of the economy of salvation, the intra-creaturely is dubbed "nature" and the theological, "the supernatural." The latter is the oscillation between original sin and redemption. The relationship between essence-existence is the nature of the creature and this is intersected by the supernatural relation between original sin and redemption. As such, nature only ever exists in the context of the supernatural relation,⁴⁹ just as the intra-creaturely is intersected by the theological. The intersection of the supernatural with the natural reveals that the universal "natural" form is in fact original sin's attempt to be like God in identity, "a seizing of the God who has shared himself beyond all measure."⁵⁰ The natural takes the form of the attempt to fuse the poles of being, essence and existence, into a unity, as in God. This is the reason that the intersection of the theological is experienced as interruptive despite its redemptive effects. It is a challenge to the self-enclosure of nature in the form of original sin. The *analogia entis* therefore determines for Przywara how we ought to think about the nature of creation as it is caught up in a supernatural opposition between original sin (nature as identity with God) and redemption (nature as related to God through its own ordinariness). Salvation is only experienced and encountered from within the movements of creation, and likewise creation itself is only understood through the movements of the economy of salvation.

Thus, in the context of the *analogia entis*, we once again have a kind of doubling of creation in that insofar as original sin is the attempt on the part of creation to create systems of self-enclosure and identity with God, the responsive, dialogical process in

⁴⁹ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 339E/237G.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 343E/241G; See also *Ibid.*, 337E/234-5G.

which creation is forged becomes unwelcome. The redemptive interruptions that might otherwise be understood as formations of the natural are instead felt as painful interruptions to the natural. This is why Przywara, in the above quote, talks about the Church as under the sign of “ever new nihilations” and refers to the final obliteration of nothingness in which eternity nevertheless emerges. The forward-movement of the creature towards ever new actualizations is experienced through “ever new nihilations” precisely because its attempts towards self-enclosure mean that the new movements of the beyond are experienced as threats. Salvation is the freeing of the creature for its own proper movement, in resistance to its attempts at self-reification.

As such Przywara makes it possible to maintain an experience of interruption and confrontation as part of creation without suggesting that this is the result of an absolute ontological rift between God and creation. However, due to the fact that nature is always experienced through the supernatural oscillation between original sin and redemption, these interruptions are also not mere expressions of harmony but sometimes real “nihilations” that nevertheless make a redemptive encounter with the eternal possible again. That interruption is sometimes experienced as rupture is not due to a static, ontological situation of separation, but due to the original sin that seeks to escape such intersection and set up a life sufficient to itself.

The social and political significance of rhythm pointed out in chapter one is evident here. The otherness of creation from God as a matrix of provisional halting points both enables it to reject God and to move towards God through a series of such halting points and their suspension. This double-edged quality is part of the nature of rhythm as that which creates harmony and is also therefore tempted to premature self-enclosure. Yet its double-character also enables it to disrupt such self-enclosures. The double-edged nature of the nothingness of creation is therefore expressed in and through this category of rhythm. This rhythm emerges in social and political configurations as both the original sin of self-

enclosed hegemonies as well as the potential for the redemptive disruption to such hegemonies through the creation of spaces (nothings or nihilations) that are opened for intimacy with God.

Analogia Entis and Christology

The incarnation is the primary example of such a redemptive interruption to the established order from within the contingencies of the here and now. It could not have been anticipated in advance and in this way is interruptive, but it is nevertheless consistent with the form of creation as responsive to such disruptions. Przywara describes the incarnation as “The patience of resting in the ordinary” in which creaturely limitation comes to serve the redemptive purposes of God. This patience of resting in the ordinary is the proper and salvific form of “genuine creaturely becoming.”⁵¹ In the incarnation, the supernatural *telos* of humanity is incorporated into the ordinary, into the “relational edifice of the natural.”⁵²

From the perspective of the economy of salvation, however, it is also a movement of contradiction between original sin’s attempts at identity with God and God’s kenotic taking on of the creature’s sinful form, and in this way it is interruptive in the most oppositional sense. Przywara defines redemption as: “the preservation [*Wahrung*] of what is distinctive [*unterscheidend*] to the creaturely, which God assumes in the incarnation, in order that we, in the form of the creature that God assumed, might again have a share in his divinity.”⁵³ The very act of preserving the creaturely is felt to be an opposition to the creature in its attempts to be like God. This is why Przywara refers to Augustine’s cross as night in all its ambiguity, involving both the absurdity of the putting to death of God by creation and the anticipation of the Easter morning of the redemption of that creation, in

⁵¹ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 347E/246G.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 227E/132G.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 345E/243.

which “the abyss [*Abgründige*] of the creature ... and the groundlessness [*Grundlose*] of God ... are unfathomably [*unergründlich*] one.”⁵⁴

The cross is neither an absolute rupture nor an absolute harmony but a double-movement. It therefore bears similarities to one of Agamben’s caesurae or zones of indistinction, in that it is simultaneously the revelation of sin at the extreme of its logic as well as the threshold of its overcoming and therefore a kairological moment of hope. The caesura is counter-rhythmic and yet, by its very contradiction, it defines the rhythm of which it is a part. In the same way, the incarnation, and the cross to which it leads, are a counter-rhythm to the hegemonic rhythms of original sin, but they thereby come to define the rhythm of the natural in its opposition to original sin.

I will say more about Christ as caesura in the following chapter, but one immediate resonance between Przywara’s Christology and the research on rhythm laid out in chapter one that is worth mentioning here is the implications for what it means to think about the second person of the Trinity as *Logos* and what it means for this *Logos* to take on flesh. Often this is described in terms of God’s self-revelation; the *Logos* represents God’s knowledge of himself and provisionally enables the human to know him as well. This tends to associate the idea of Jesus as the Word with the more left-hemisphere concerns of concept and information. However, rhythm reveals that to think about the second person of the Trinity as Word has other dimensions as well, which are heightened when we talk about this Word becoming flesh. In particular, language has a relational and connective dimension that seeks to establish intimacy. Thinking of the *Logos* not as mere informational content but as communication suggests that when John’s prologue asserts that all things came into being through God’s Word, it suggests that this act of creation is an act of communication, which is always based on a shared space of intimacy. In

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 268-9E/170G.

communication, rhythm is a large part of how such a shared space is set up, such that it is conceivable that one of the roles of rhythm in creation is to facilitate intimacy between Creator and creature. Since Christ is the Word in which creation happens, Christ is this rhythmic space of intimacy. The rhythms that we encounter in creation are adopted as empathetic responses from and to the rhythm of God's creative communication in Christ. Moreover, the fact is that this space of intimacy always already involves interruption to any self-enclosed rhythms again suggesting that interruption is part of, rather than extrinsic to, creation.

True to its nature as the Word, the incarnation is itself an act of communication because it is likewise an act that establishes a shared space in which intimacy is possible. In taking on human flesh, the second person of the Trinity takes up the movements of human flesh, bringing them into contact with the movements of the Trinity. Incarnation is a variation on the rhythms set up in the communication of creation, in order to make these rhythms once again a space for intimacy. Furthermore, just as genuine communication requires a certain suspension of one's assumptions and agendas in order to enter into the experience of the other, the Christ hymn in Philippians 2 suggests a similar suspension on Christ's part that he undertook in order to participate in human experience. The incarnation is, when viewed this way, the supreme example of a movement that is communicated across irreducibly dissimilar spheres, a wave-form that carries movement from the intra-divine to the intra-creaturely, and back again, making communion between them possible.

Analogia Entis and the Trinity

Przywara says that analogy is not something added onto the relationship between nature, supernatural redemption, and supernatural participation in God, but "concerns the

rhythm that obtains among these three theologies.”⁵⁵ Rather than a principle, Przywara says that *analogia entis* is a primordial dynamic.⁵⁶ The implication here for analogy is that Przywara accepts no third principle that mediates between God and creation. Since the economy of salvation is initiated by God, the relation between theological and intra-creaturely is located only in God himself.⁵⁷ Insofar as Christ himself is the *analogia entis*, Christ is the primordial rhythm, which manifests in redemption as the counter-rhythmic caesura in which a new rhythm is established.

However, the nature of rhythm is such that it always takes place through relations between things. Thus, Christ is not simply rhythm in himself but through his relations in the Trinity and with the human. The significance of analogy is to simultaneously assert that salvation is both divine and creaturely-performed in Christ and through the Spirit. Another way of saying this is that the primordial rhythm, which is the economy of salvation, is also the economic Trinity itself.⁵⁸ Redemption through Christ’s assumption of human nature is participation in the second divine person of the Trinity.⁵⁹ The ongoing rhythms of the relation between God and creature are made possible in Christ and by the Spirit. Thus, Przywara says that God, “as the ‘economic Trinity’ (that is, the Trinity in the economy of salvation) is the fundamental real structure [*Grund-Real-Struktur*] of the real cosmos.”⁶⁰ In other words, the *analogia entis*, the rhythmic relation between the intra-creaturely and the theological, is not an independent metaphysical order or structure but is the movements of

⁵⁵ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 375E/275G. Italics mine.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 314E/210G.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 181E/87G.

⁵⁸ I understand that the term “economic Trinity” has a fraught history, and can sometimes suggest that there are two trinities such that the human is not really brought into relationship with God through Christ, but with some shadow of God. I do not want to suggest this, but I use the term because it helpfully points to the particular movements of the Trinity involved with Christ’s incarnation. While I do think these movements are those of God God’s self and not of a shadow deity, I nevertheless want to maintain an apophaticism with respect to how such movements appear from anywhere other than a creaturely and temporal perspective.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 365-6E/264G.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 416E/321G.

the Trinity in the economy of salvation. While the *analogia entis* is itself a creaturely construction, the rhythms that it imperfectly intimates are divine.

So far this sounds much like the Augustinian musical ontology of the previous chapter in which the rhythms of the divine are that of creation as well such that participation in God is participation in the structure by which these divine rhythms are mediated. The difference, however, is that this is not Przywara's only perspective. As per the ever greater dissimilarity, such a synchronic perspective is always made relative by the intra-Trinitarian life. While Przywara does not systematically explain his understanding of the relation between the economy of salvation and the intra-Trinitarian life, he nevertheless briefly indicates how these two dimensions of the Trinity are related to one another. By analogy, Przywara extends the movements of the economy of salvation to the mystery of intra-Trinitarian rhythm as well.⁶¹ However, because it is by analogy, the intra-Trinitarian rhythm is an "ever-greater-dissimilarity" to the rhythm of the economy of salvation as it is perceptible from the diachronic perspective of the human creature.

Przywara compares this to the way in which the rhythms of music, as in a Bach fugue, pass beyond themselves into silence, which Przywara calls a "silent analogy."⁶² As with Agamben's poetic example, the end of the poem or of a piece of music is both absolutely other than the economy of movements internal to that temporal artwork while also that which fulfills and completes it as a whole. Similarly, the intra-Trinitarian relations are beyond what is comprehensible from within the creaturely economy of movements, from within the poem. Nevertheless, these impenetrable intra-Trinitarian relations are that

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 479E/392G. Simon Oliver has pointed out that this is the position of Aquinas as well, who analogically attributes motion to intra-Trinitarian relations such that motion is the means by which creatures participate in the divine (Simon Oliver, "Trinity, Motion, and Creation *ex nihilo*," 135). Przywara here says something similar when he describes the *analogia entis*, the means by which the creature participates in the divine, as a rhythm, which suggests that this idea is a variation on Thomistic theology. In this I agree with Oliver. My objection is that he conceptualizes this motion as a fairly rigid hierarchy of emanation and return, which does not leave room for other kinds of motion or the interruption of motion, due to the fact that the motion of creation is too close to intra-Trinitarian motion, precluding the possibility that God's motion might be an interruption to the motion of creation.

⁶² Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 314E/210G.

make the movements of the economy of salvation efficacious and meaningful. Moreover, Agamben argues that the silence of the end of the poem interjects into and influences the movements of the poem through the caesura and the motions of enjambment by which the poem moves forward towards its end. This is an illuminating description of how it is possible for the intra-Trinitarian relations to both be impenetrable to the human mind yet truly present to creaturely reality in the movements of the economy of salvation. The intra-Trinitarian relations shape the rhythms of salvation through their presence to creaturely rhythms precisely as silences, as spaces that are other than and so cannot be subsumed into the semantic meaning of the poem.

Przywara preserves the intimacy of the creature to the Trinity in the movements of the *analogia entis*, while also allowing the intra-Trinitarian rhythms to remain an impenetrable beyond that appears to this economy only as silence. These are not two different trinities, but an indication of the necessary oscillation between two perspectives on the Trinity, which is the appropriate creaturely noetic stance. As with Agamben, transcendence remains silent and Przywara maintains his creaturely perspective, describing the movements of relation to the transcendent, rather than the nature of transcendent.

Thinking *Analogia Entis* as Rhythm Through Poetry

The next chapter will propose what a soteriology understood in terms of rhythm, as Przywara describes it, looks like. However, before moving on to such a description it is worth considering more closely what it means for the *analogia entis* to be thought of in terms of rhythm in accordance with the description of poetic rhythm given in chapter one. The *analogia entis* is rhythmic in a similar way to poetry because it includes a recognition of both synchronic form and diachronic experience. In chapter one I defined rhythm as an oscillation between a synchronic perspective on a pattern, shape, or form, and a diachronic perspective on the experience of that pattern, shape, or form. A diachronic perspective is

one in which the subject does not see the whole of the pattern, but is encountered in time by the disruptions, surprises, confrontations, and resolutions of which the pattern is composed. These two perspectives on rhythm resonate with one or another of the philosophical deployments of the category that we have been exploring.

The diachronic perspective describes an intra-creaturely perspective on rhythm such as that given by Agamben in which the creature is experiencing rhythm from the inside, as a flow that is given momentum and form through its interruption. As with Agamben, diachronic theories describe rhythm from inside experience, with attention to the relation of rhythm to the subject. This results in an emphasis on the experience of the caesura and on the poetic tension between sound and sense, which are similar to those described in Tsur's cognitive poetics. Rhythm is also described by Agamben as a stop-and-flow rather than as a shape, just as theories of periodicity emphasize the significance of alternation as the way in which the forward-momentum of the poem is configured.

Similarly, there are intimations of both Augustinian hierarchical rhythm as well as Heraclitean rhythm in the synchronic perspective. What they have in common is the attempt to consider reality as a whole, thereby assuming a position outside that whole. The synchronic theories of rhythm in poetry describe rhythm as a pattern or shape that emerges from the tensions between moving phrases. However, this shape is described as a hierarchy of levels of movements that are not random but patterned. The Augustinian account of rhythm focuses on this ordered and hierarchical dimension of rhythm, while the Heraclitean account describes the movement of the whole as a variable, improvised shape. Both of these dimensions are included in the synchronic perspective on rhythm.

Przywara's *analogia entis* is rhythmic because, as with rhythm in poetry, it is the oscillation between a diachronic, intra-creaturely perspective, and a synchronic, theological perspective on this primordial movement. The synchronic theological shape is the form of reality as determined by God's relation to creation, while the diachronic experience of

rhythm is the creaturely participation in the economy of salvation, and the interruptions that this entails. These two perspectives are mutually dependent, but are nevertheless irreducible to one another. For example, Przywara says that the economy of salvation is an all-unity that shapes everything.⁶³ However, it does so from the end, which suggests that it is not a static unity, but one that takes place in time, as things pass away.⁶⁴ In calling the relation between the intra-creaturely and the theological rhythmic, I seek to take account of both of these dimensions of rhythm in theology: the experience of diachronic movement in time through tension and oscillation, as well as the overall shape created by the relations of these movements as they are sustained by God.

Another way of describing this relation is in terms of the interface between the subjective and objective dimensions of rhythm.⁶⁵ The poem is objectively structured in a particular way, but that pattern is experienced as rhythm only through its interface with subjective experience. The subjective dimension is not merely the ability to cognitively perceive rhythm, but is part of what makes rhythm possible and gives it significance by enabling the expressive capacity of rhythm to evoke and form emotion, attitude, and mood within the hearer.⁶⁶ Moreover, as suggested by cognitive poetics, the tensions between various levels of organization in a rhythm are only mediated as rhythm through the integrative performance of the reader or hearer, such that the limit of rhythm is based on the performer's ability to resolve the incompatibility of the tensions by a rhythmical performance.⁶⁷ In rhythm, the objective shape of the poem and the tensions of which it is composed are held together through the creature's diachronic experience and performance. One might say that this is a Kierkegaardian way to think about rhythm in that while the

⁶³ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 274E/175G.

⁶⁴ Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 265E/167G.

⁶⁵ Panikkar, *The Rhythm of Being*, 44.

⁶⁶ Harding, *Words into Rhythm*, 98. Admittedly, rhythm can only do this in a general sense, while the semantic content of a poem, for example, lends specificity to this emotion, in the same way that general physiological responses are given specificity through cognitive labelling.

⁶⁷ Tsur, *Poetic Rhythm*, 8, 18.

poles of possibility and actuality, infinite and finite are objective dimensions of reality, the dialectic between them by which they are held together takes place only through the self's experience and performance of that dialectic.

Thus, another way to think about the difference between this perspective on metaphysical rhythm and that of the previous chapter is that accounts based on an Augustinian musical ontology tend to think of reality in terms of the poem itself. Every part of reality has its proper place in the larger structure of the whole, while God is the top layer of the rhythm that holds everything together and with which the other layers must be brought into harmony. The trouble with this is that all elements of reality exist on the same plane. My account of rhythm, and I believe this is faithful to that of Przywara as well, incorporates a more subjective dimension. The creaturely is not the poem itself but the reader, while the poem is more akin to the economy of salvation, which includes counter-rhythmic interruptions and invites responses from the reader as he or she moves forward in time. The pattern is not reality as a whole, such that we could step outside it and describe our own place with it. The proper place of the creature is in dialogical responsiveness to the pattern as it is given in time.

This perspective is also analogous to the relation between the poem and surrounding, everyday experience. Agamben says that time itself is not rhythmic, but is made rhythmic by the stop that suspends us before a work of art.⁶⁸ As we have seen, Agamben, following Hölderlin, describes the caesura as the suspension that causes us to contemplate the fact of language itself.⁶⁹ According to this definition, the caesura is a metaphor for the artistic work as a whole, which interrupts time, thereby making it rhythmic. For example, the poem draws attention to the medium, form, and movement of language itself, including its rhythm, by hollowing out the everyday uses to which

⁶⁸ Agamben, *The Man Without Content*, 99.

⁶⁹ Agamben, *Idea of Prose*, 44.

language is generally put.⁷⁰ It de-familiarizes the subject's regular use of speech, removing him or her from the everyday context in order to experience something other. Yet, because it is grounded in language itself, this otherness is not a violent overthrow of language, but an otherness that manifests within language itself, surpassing its everyday boundaries. Redemption is likewise the suspensions and counter-rhythmic caesurae that interrupt the self-enclosed tendencies of creation under original sin by manifesting the primordial rhythm in and through the movements of creation itself. The economy of salvation interrupts the movements of creation, and in so doing, it draws attention to those movements themselves, thereby making time rhythmic, and freeing it from any hegemonic uses to which it is put.

Reuven Tsur argues that the disruption of the regular use of language, and therewith of regular cognitive processes and states, is how poets are able to evoke religious experiences in poetry.⁷¹ The poetic interruption to what is usually the smooth functioning of cognitive processes evokes a sense of other-worldliness.⁷² For example, there are certain background assumptions always at work in perception, of which we are unaware, which Tsur calls "appresentation." We only become aware of this background when something peculiar happens to draw attention to it. When this occurs, an awareness of appresentation implicitly suggests an unseen reality beyond our perceptual boundaries, making us aware of the limits of our experience.⁷³ Tsur's primary example of this is the disruption of the appresentation of the smooth interplay between semantic and acoustic, which in everyday language works to move from the beginning to the end of a sentence as quickly and clearly as possible. This process is disrupted by typographic patterning, caesurae, enjambment and other devices that require the reader or hearer to linger over and doubt the meaning of

⁷⁰ Attridge, *The Rhythms of English Poetry*, 310.

⁷¹ Tsur, *On the Shore of Nothingness*, 55.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 59.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 60, 73.

normally familiar words, causing a sense of epistemic insecurity.⁷⁴ Rather than choosing a single meaning based on context, the reader or hearer can see all meanings at once; boundaries dissolve, and uncertainty is created.⁷⁵ Thus, not only is the poem a disruptive space, this disruption serves to suggest transcendence and religious experience. As with the immanent transcendent, however, these poetic devices themselves do not have theological content. Many of them are double-edged; they can evoke either the heavenly or the hellish.⁷⁶ Their character as one or the other is dependent on the larger pattern of structural and semantic movements of the poem as a whole.⁷⁷

This is why the synchronic perspective nevertheless remains important for theology. The poem is patterned and harmonious. Without this, one would not be able to judge interruptions to be redemptive or harmful. While the synchronic perspective is not accessible to the creature in its entirety, its existence in the intra-Trinitarian relations and its partial communication through the economy of salvation ensures that the redemptive interruptions that the creature experiences are part of the primordial rhythm between God and creation. Nevertheless, the *analogia entis*, which is an attempt to describe this rhythm of the primordial poem, is a creaturely description from within time. It is the provisional account of the rhythm that has thus far been encountered, which guides the rhythmic, forward motion of the creaturely. This provisionality is owing to the fact that the poem is interruptive to the smooth functioning of the movements of everyday life, not for their obliteration, but to free them for their own proper movement.

The function of the poetic interruption to everyday experience is precisely to connect the semantic content of the poem to the emotion of the reader. Rhythm creates resonances between the poetic artefact and the subject that are nevertheless the result of an

⁷⁴ Tsur, *On the Shore of Nothingness*, 211.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 238.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 169.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 179.

interruption to the information-conveying flow of language. Rhythm holds conversationalists together, induces emotion in encounters with art, and plays a role in activities of social bonding, such as dance. The connective capacity of rhythm is one of its primary functions. This was picked up both in Benvenistean rhythm in which rhythm allows for communication between entities and in Augustine, in which the resonances of rhythm bring various metaphysical tiers into harmony. The interruptive quality of rhythm is therefore not a quality or value unto itself but is executed for the purpose of improved connection and harmony. The *analogia entis* is therefore rhythmic in a second sense as well. Not only is it the relation and distinction of two perspectives – the diachronic intra-creaturely and the synchronic theological – but its function is connective and relational. It serves to connect the experience of the creature to something beyond that experience, making intimacy in alterity, possible. In associating the *analogia entis* with rhythm, Przywara indicates both its connective purpose and its dynamic, caesuric form. Thus, this primordial, theological rhythm is not something different than rhythm as it is generally understood, as in art and anthropology, but is a particular conception of the nature and significance of those rhythmic movements in which humans are always already embedded as capable of making connection to God possible. Yet, this very form points to how it is that the encounter with God can be thought of as a productive interruption to those everyday rhythms, rather than as simply their extension.

Conclusion

This chapter has put the pieces in place for a description of how Christian salvation is conceptualized when rhythm is taken into account by offering a theological interpretation of rhythm based on Przywara's *analogia entis*. I have argued that this interpretation is appropriate to Christian theology and that it corresponds to poetic rhythm. This comparison is evidence that Przywara's *analogia entis* is rhythmic in a non-trivial

way. The two perspectives on rhythm in poetry correspond to the various perspectives on rhythm in philosophy and theology that we have considered, and therefore also to Przywara's two analogies. Przywara's *analogia entis* is a dynamic tension (analogy) between the theological analogy (harmonious structure) and the creaturely analogy (diachronic experience of becoming). The intersection of intra-creaturely and theological analogies doubles the in-and-beyond relationship such that God is beyond the creature as both *telos* and as unknown, and within the creature as both propulsion and interruption. Przywara makes the *analogia entis* the site of otherness and intimacy, which are both true at the same time, but are nevertheless only experienced as a rhythm.

The various doctrines involved in the economy of salvation are all implicated in such rhythm through their role in Przywara's *analogia entis*. Creation itself has a rhythmic quality in that it is a movement of becoming in which actualities are always only ever provisional and are thus displaced as new potentialities are actualized. Interruption to the actual is thus not an extrinsic form imposed on and in opposition to creation, but is part of the rhythmic form of creation itself. Likewise, the incarnation and crucifixion, are the central example of such an interruption that is both confrontational and redemptive, disrupting the movements of intra-creaturely hegemonies in order to enable participation in the movements of redemption. However, Christ is not this rhythm as a discreet object or identity but as a part of the movements of the Trinity in the economy of salvation, a pattern of movements that points beyond itself to its own intra-Trinitarian rhythms, which are only the rhythms of silence. All of these come together in a rhythmic doctrine of salvation, which I will describe in the following chapter.

Unlike *analogia entis* as proper proportionality, Przywara's *analogia entis* is rhythmic because its purpose is to show the dynamic relations and resonances between God and the human creature by bringing these into contact with the oscillations within the human creature itself. Thus, much like the rhythm of a poem, the *analogia entis*

acknowledges that the relation between God and the human creature is a harmonious form, a unity of participation, while at the same time acknowledging that the way in which this shape is experienced and performed is based in the rhythms of the experience of the human creature itself, in which heightened points of rhythmic experience are encountered as interruptions to experience in general, especially when such intersections frustrate attempts at self-enclosed identity.

Chapter 6 The Rhythm of Christian Salvation

I remarked with what magnificent vitality the atoms of my attention dispersed, swarmed round the interruption, ... adapted themselves to a new state of affairs and had created, ...a richer, a stronger, a more complicated world in which I was called upon to act my part...

Virginia Woolf, *The Waves*, 175

Now that we have a description of rhythm that is faithful to the nature of rhythm as it is foregrounded in poetry, faithful to the requirement of Christian theology to reflect both the real intimacy as well as the absolute difference between God and creation, and demonstrably part of the functioning of human relationship, the question that this final chapter addresses is what difference this rhythm makes to theology, in particular for how we might conceptualize the relationship between God and the human creature in the economy of salvation.

If the economy of salvation, understood in terms of Przywara's *analogia entis*, is rhythmic in nature, then this has important implications for the doctrine of soteriology. In particular, this conception of salvation as rhythmic puts it in conversation with the many other rhythms through which ordinary human life is lived and constituted. Rhythm plays a significant role in dimensions of life that are important to human identity and flourishing, such as communication, relationship, and politics in a general sense. Human identity and flourishing are, in part, determined by what and whom one identifies with or against, and such identification takes place through channels such as communication, dance, music, and protest. Rhythm is a significant means through which all of these activities operate and

thus plays an important role in identity and relationship construction, delineating lines of identification with or against groups and intimacy with or distance from other individuals. The pervasive operation of rhythm in identity and relationship suggests that conceptualizing salvation in terms of rhythm brings the doctrine of salvation into close relation to ordinary human life.

In other words, salvation is not a rhythm that is simply brought down from heaven in opposition to and purified of the rhythms of physical, social, psychological creation but is a particular configuration of created rhythms. This is a variation on Kathryn Tanner's more general argument that Christian culture, identity, and tradition are not discreet and independent of surrounding cultures. The experience of salvation is not a discreet whole that is discovered and unpacked,¹ but an experience of God configuring and confronting the rhythms of culture and relationship, sometimes in unpredictable ways. God makes a difference, but makes this difference in and through patterns of human community.² This is consistent with Przywara's position that the supernatural economy of salvation is not something alien to the natural, but the configuration of the natural as the opposition between original sin and redemption. Just as the poetic is a particular configuration of the rhythms of language itself even if for the purpose of disrupting the everyday uses to which that language is put, the salvific relationship is a particular configuration and performance of the rhythms of relationship itself even though it disrupts some of the uses to which those rhythms are put. This means that the rhythmic form of salvation is not accidental, but corresponds to the nature of human experience.

Such an approach is necessary for avoiding idolatry. If one could identify the rhythm of salvation as a discreet pattern, this pattern would threaten to replace God as the agent of salvation, compromising God's freedom to reverse and re-direct human rhythms

¹ Tanner, *Theories of Culture*, 76, 99.

² Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 230.

in unpredictable and surprising ways.³ Instead, we experience the effects of salvation on the rhythms that make up relationship. Redemption, as a counter-rhythmic caesura, cannot be grasped and identified. However, such a caesura has very real effects on rhythms that follow it. This is simply another way of affirming the incarnation. God enters the world while also not being directly identifiable with it or with a discreet object within it.⁴ Furthermore, this position is appropriate to a theology that asserts that salvation is about the redemption of this world rather than some other. Thus, the way in which rhythm functions in human relations is a way into understanding how humans experience their relation to God, both in and beyond the rhythms of human community.

An emphasis on rhythm in salvation inevitably leads to a focus on salvation as a matter of *salus* – good health. The salvific configuration of human rhythms is the configuration that contributes to human flourishing. Thus, I am not here primarily concerned with how it is that salvation is achieved by God and obtained by humanity, through justification by faith, for example. This is not because I believe such concerns to be wrong or unimportant, although such an investigation is of limited value because the means of salvation are to a degree impenetrable. Rather, an emphasis on rhythm naturally shifts the focus of enquiry to what salvation *is*, how it unfolds in time and experience. What are the movements through which the relationships and experiences in which we are embedded are transfigured and made healthy? How does the relationship between God and humanity in the cross and resurrection change the configurations of one's rhythms and what do such healthy rhythms look like?

Nevertheless, while salvation is a matter of the health of human rhythms and not a discreet and alternative rhythm, this health is only known in and through the events on

³ Tanner, *Theories of Culture*, 136.

⁴ As we will see, this even applies to the person of Jesus Christ who, through the Spirit and cannot be pinned down, particularly after the resurrection. This is part of what the doctrine of the Trinity indicates. While Jesus is considered divine, he nevertheless prays to his Father and refers to the Spirit, directing attention away from himself.

which Christian salvation is based, namely Jesus' incarnation, death, and resurrection. I say this in an attempt to take seriously the legitimate concern that describing salvation in terms of human health and flourishing risks basing our understanding of salvation on human needs identified through human experience, rather than on the basis of what God gives. Basing an account of salvation on human experience alone is problematic if one believes that sin has sufficiently compromised human understanding of the good. Even if this is not one's position, basing one's view of what salvation accomplishes on human experience alone risks allowing a limited human perspective to take precedence over an unlimited divine perspective. These two perspectives, of course, need not be in conflict, but doctrine would fall into precisely this mistake if it made human experience the sole determinant of *salus*. Again, considering that Christian salvation is based on the incarnation, the human experience on which my understanding of *salus* is based is that which is made possible by Jesus Christ.

As such, this chapter begins with a description of the rhythm that emerges between Jesus' death and resurrection before moving on to a description of how this rhythm unfolds through and in confrontation with the rhythms of human relationship described in previous chapters. While we know the nature of creaturely rhythms from experience, an assessment of the health of such rhythms is carried out under the events through which Christians understand the nature of salvation. This is consistent with Przywara's own assertion that Christ is the middle of creation as "constituted by God in the God-man, and this is not merely as a human middle, but rather (in the 'scandal of the cross') as a human middle within the all-too-human, as such – in this way – a middle that brings all things to perfection."⁵ While we will never have absolute knowledge of what happened in these events, the cross and resurrection themselves must nevertheless, as the middle around

⁵Przywara, *Analogia Entis*, 305E/201-02G. See also *Ibid.*, 275-76E/177G.

which creation turns, form our understanding of redeemed rhythms. The meaning of these events determines the nature of the salvation for which Christians hope and how health is conceived of.

One chapter is not enough to describe the economy of salvation exhaustively. This chapter is intended instead as an identification of the theological *loci* from which we can see the significance of rhythm for salvation, and an attempt to show that rhythm connects these various *loci* to one another, holding them together, not in a circumscribable whole, but through particular kinds of movements. Rhythm thus offers a way of thinking theologically, of approaching salvation by moving between doctrines in a way that is appropriate to the salvation in which the Christian participates. Thus, besides affecting how the theologian conceives of certain dimensions of salvation, such as participation and formation, rhythm also points towards a particular methodological approach to the doctrine that focuses on the movements at work and how participation in these movements holds dimensions of the doctrine together, sometimes despite apparent paradox.

Beginning from Holy Saturday (In the Middle)

Among other things, the cross and the resurrection raise questions about the continuity and interruption between time and eternity, between God and creation, and within God himself. If we begin by conceptually standing on Holy Saturday we can see movements of both continuity and interruption by interpreting the events of Easter weekend as they would appear from synchronic and diachronic perspectives.⁶

If we imagine ourselves standing on Holy Saturday turned towards the cross, we see how the disciples might have experienced it, namely in time and without knowledge of the resurrection. From this perspective, the cross is a rupture in time. Holy Saturday is an

⁶ This idea comes from Alan E. Lewis, *Between Cross and Resurrection: A Theology of Holy Saturday* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B Eerdmans, 2001).

absolute suspension of God's activity. There is a rupture between the Father and the Son expressed in Jesus' cry "My God my God why have you forsaken me?" As a result, the resurrection is absolutely unexpected. It does not follow as a matter of course from the cross as a historical event.

This perspective is historical and diachronic. The cross is an event in history and there is no means of interpreting its significance other than as rupture. The events are experienced as historical; their ultimate and eschatological meaning is inaccessible. We might be able to see that something took place within the Trinity, but there is no means of knowing what that was from within time. The creature has only observed Jesus' cry to the Father and his death, suggesting a rupture in relationship. Placing oneself in the apostles' diachronic perspective on Holy Saturday makes clear that the resurrection does not follow out of death as a natural or historical process. The hiatus of Holy Saturday is a genuine interruption, a break between historical process and the inauguration of a new and unexpected eschatological reality.⁷

However, this perspective is not quite faithful to the events. The Christian no longer stands completely in the place of the apostles on Holy Saturday with no knowledge of the resurrection, although she may attempt to imaginatively adopt this perspective at

⁷ This is the perspective of someone like Jürgen Moltmann. For Moltmann, if Christ's death passed over immediately into life the motion might be attributable to a larger cosmic principle of re-birth or the necessary opposition of good and evil. In that case salvation would not be a matter of the new but of a return to an original paradise (Jürgen Moltmann, *Religion, Revolution, and the Future*, trans. M. Douglas Meeks (New York: Scribner, 1969), 21). Holy Saturday preserves the discontinuity between the old order of sin and death and the new life in God. New creation is really new because it is out of nothing, and is therefore preceded by a deconstruction (Moltmann, *Religion, Revolution, and the Future*, 9). The crucifixion is an historic event, the natural and inevitable outcome of the confrontation of sin and *kenosis*, while the resurrection is an eschatological event based only in the faithfulness of God (Jürgen Moltmann, *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology*, trans. Dick Wilson and John Bowden (London: SCM Press, 1976), 204). The disruptive quality of this story cannot be ameliorated into a larger principle of unity, but is preserved in its particularity as an ugly, historical death. It is a real, historical interval that forces a diachronic experience in which death and resurrection are not experienced as interconnected, but severed. The two poles do not flow into one another in a simple harmony. Moltmann emphasizes an element of disruption on both ends. Creaturely reality is characterized by opposition and strife. God's soteriological response to this strife, however, is not to simply unify the whole of creaturely reality. Instead, the wholly Other interrupts the oppositions of sinful society (Moltmann, *Religion, Revolution, and the Future*, 199). In this way, Moltmann's interpretation of the crucifixion is similar to Agamben's messianism.

certain times of the year, such as during Advent or on Good Friday. If this was the Christian perspective, then that for which the Church hopes would be unknown and it would be impossible to form a concept of how salvation and health ought to look. Without the resurrection, Holy Saturday would be a nihilistic abyss without promise. Even from a diachronic perspective, the caesura between the cross and the resurrection is arguably not an absolute rupture since acts of love, such as the giving of the tomb by Joseph of Arimathea, the adoption of Mary by John, and the preparations that the women made for Jesus' body, were acts of love that prefigured the Church and carried across the hiatus. An oscillation towards Easter Sunday is required in order to understand the meaning of this. If one turns towards Easter Sunday, the cross is interpreted in light of the resurrection and the nature of the continuity between the events becomes visible. One sees not only the historical events but a measure of their eschatological meaning. Holy Saturday is no longer an absolute rupture because the resurrection shows that the Trinitarian relations in which God's life-giving power is manifested are carried through Holy Saturday. Jesus' cry "my God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" becomes problematized. It does not, from this perspective, appear as a simple rupture between Father and Son, but as an identification and unity with those who suffer and experience loss. When looking at the resurrection, the point of most extreme distance between Father and Son reveals the depth of their Trinitarian unity.⁸ Holy Saturday is a caesura instead of a rupture, a space that makes it possible for a new word to be spoken. The cross becomes more than mere historical event

⁸ This is more the perspective of someone like Hans Urs von Balthasar. The hiatus of Holy Saturday is important for both Moltmann and Balthasar, however their emphases are different. While it is primarily a break for Moltmann, Balthasar emphasizes this as the point at which we can see the unity of Father and Son most clearly, precisely because it is the point at which they are furthest from one another. The unity between Father and Son that enables the resurrection of Easter Sunday is preserved only in the freedom of God himself (Hans Urs von Balthasar: *Theological Dramatic Theory*, vol. 3 of *Theo-drama*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1988), 228). For Moltmann too there is a continuity between the pre- and post-resurrection Christ that cannot be accounted for except by the faithfulness of God to the person of Christ within the Trinity (Moltmann, *Revolution, and the Future*, 12). However, Jesus' death and resurrection remain antitheses for Moltmann. Moltmann envisions continuity only in the sense of an interpenetration of two radically different, even opposed realities, which are at no point dissolved into one another, while for Balthasar, *kenosis* and *plerosis* are more tightly tied together.

because we see that God is in Christ, evidenced by the fact that he overcomes it. The various theories of atonement, metaphors regarding what took place on the cross between Father and Son and its salvific import are developed from the perspective of the resurrection. These are all synchronic perspectives, focused less on how the events are experienced in time and more on how they weave a pattern of eschatological meaning,⁹ concerned with describing what was accomplished.

Kenotic interpretations of the incarnation based on the Philippians 2 Christ hymn, in which Christ is said to empty himself, are an example of this synchrony. A large number of scholars now argue that the Greek word for “although” in the Christ hymn can also be translated “because” such that the text can be read “who, because, he was in the form of God did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited” (Phil. 2:6, NRSV). The argument goes that the passage contrasts divinity as it is revealed in Christ and understood by the early Christians with divinity as it was generally understood by the Hellenistic world. Thus, although Christ is in the form of God, this is not a divinity as we commonly imagine it, but is the kind of divinity of which *kenosis* is the proper manifestation.¹⁰ Likewise the exaltation that Christ undergoes from verse 9 is not so much a reward for Christ’s emptying himself of his divinity, but a vindication and demonstration of *kenosis* as the proper display of divinity.¹¹ In other words, *plerosis* and *kenosis* must be

⁹ In Balthasar this is particularly demonstrated by the way in which the division between Father and Son on Holy Saturday becomes that which swallows all other divisions of sin and suffering, such that this division is a principle of unification, a point from which one can stand and see the unification of reality. God contains the divisions of history within the greater division of Holy Saturday. As the only continuous factor that spans the opposition between death and resurrection, Christ takes their opposition into himself (Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter*, trans. Aidan Nichols (Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1990), 91-97).

¹⁰ For examples of this argument, see N. T. Wright, *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 62- 90; Gerald F. Hawthorne, *Philippians* (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1983), 90- 95; Stephen E. Fowl, *Philippians* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B Eerdmans, 2005), 100-105.

¹¹ Michael J. Gorman, *Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul’s Narrative Soteriology* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B Eerdmans), 30.

seen as two perspectives on the same divinity.¹² Although from the perspective of history we experience *kenosis* and *plerosis* diachronically as the cross and resurrection, Christ does not give up his divinity in order to get it back again as a reward. Rather, the resurrection simply shows that Christ's self-emptying is appropriate to what it means to be God.¹³ It is a vindication of this kind of divinity. This interpretation of *kenosis* suggests a synchronic perspective because *kenosis* and *plerosis* are merely two dimensions of the same divinity and are thus affirmed simultaneously and in harmony. It also suggests that *kenosis/plerosis* is not merely an act of Christ in history, but is the representation of Trinitarian love itself,¹⁴ and is thus a harmony that is eternally true in the same way that a

¹² Interestingly, Richard Nanian ties the idea of *plerosis* and *kenosis* to experiences of the sublime in literature arguing that both experiences of positive (all) and negative (nothing) are routes to the same sublime experiences. *Plerosis* is the attempt to provide a sense of the infinite with language, while *kenosis* signifies the clearing away of language so that such an experience of the infinite can be obtained (Richard A. Nanian, *Plerosis/Kenosis: Poetic Language and its Energies* (New York: Peter Lang, 2012), 109). This fits with the way in which *plerosis/kenosis* is used in theology in that both poles are part of the divine movement, and arguably, therefore, sublime.

¹³ Lewis, *Between Cross and Resurrection*, 174-75.

¹⁴ This is a claim made explicitly by Balthasar as well as Bulgakov. Balthasar envisions a two-way relationship in Christ between the world and the Trinity. It is through Christ that the Trinity and the nature of its divinity as kenotic is made known, but it is likewise in and through the Trinity that Christ's relation to the world takes place as unification. The nature of the Trinity as self-differentiation and self out-pouring, as able to stand outside itself without losing its unity is demonstrated by Christ's *kenosis*. The differences within the Trinity are greater than the tensions within the human creature and are therefore able to hold them together in unity (Balthasar, *Theological Dramatic Theory*, 530). Thus, *kenosis* is not only an historical event but is possible precisely because it is part of the Trinity and its intra-Trinitarian character is what makes the break between Father and Son on Holy Saturday so fundamental that it is able to hold the tensions and divisions of creation within itself. Through Holy Saturday, creation is brought into participation in intra-Trinitarian *kenosis* (Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theological Logical Theory*, vol. 1 of *Theo-Logic*, trans. Adrian J. Walker (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2001), 105, 150, 251). This extreme synchrony even accounts for the possibilities of sin, suffering, pain, and death within the relations of the Trinity (Balthasar, *Theological Dramatic Theory*, 325). In associating Christ's *kenosis* so closely with an intra-Trinitarian *kenosis*, Balthasar sometimes gives the impression that *kenosis* in the Godhead includes a kind of suffering or abandonment. He does this because while he wants the event of the cross to tell us something real about God as he is in himself, he does not believe that this can include a change in God. In order for the Father's separation from the Son on the cross to be real, but not the introduction of a new experience into the Trinity, something of the abandonment that Christ experiences on the cross must be present in the intra-Trinitarian *kenosis* (Balthasar, *Theological Dramatic Theory*, 323-8).

Balthasar says that he is at this point basing his thought on Sergi Bulgakov. Bulgakov's emphasis on Sophia as a mediator between divine and created (Sergi Bulgakov, *The Lamb of God*, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B Eerdmans, 2008), 220) makes his theology a particularly strong example of an attempt to account for the harmony of the whole, the totality of relations. The concept of *Sophia* plays precisely this role as mediator and as 'the pan-organism of ideas, the organism of the ideas of all about all and in all' (Bulgakov, *The Lamb of God*, 112). Divine *Sophia* as this unifying whole is herself the principle of *kenosis* in the Godhead, emptying herself into creaturely *Sophia*. She is the principle of humanity within God in the second person of the Trinity as "the Lamb sacrificed before the creation of the world" (*Ibid.*, 113). Through the concept of *Sophia*, Bulgakov thus gives us a synchronic depiction of the eternal relations

synchronic pattern transcends the temporal vicissitudes of the rhythm of the poem as it is felt through time.

Notice, however, that the synchronic perspective does not account for everything. In attempting to hold reality together in a larger pattern, the synchronic, if taken on its own, threatens to obfuscate the diachronic, creaturely experience of the events. The danger in this is that the theologian quickly comes to occupy a God-like perspective that presumes to see the whole of the pattern. Rather than simply affirming that the Trinity is involved in the cross and the resurrection thereby making salvation possible, the temptation is to nail down precisely how this is the case, such as in postulating an intra-Trinitarian *kenosis*. On its own, such a synchronic perspective professes to know the intra-Trinitarian rhythms that Przywara says only appear to us as silence.¹⁵ This is a conflation of the economy of salvation, in which we can speculate about how the movements of the Trinity are manifested in the movements of the historical events that make salvation possible, with God as he is in himself, thereby forgetting the way in which God exceeds the limitations of human experience. Certainly, that the Trinity is related to the economy of salvation is necessary. If salvation is based on participation in the movements of God, then such participation is only possible because God has entered into human rhythms in order to take them up. Thus, the events of Jesus' death and resurrection are not merely historical. The

between God and creation with the result that all Christological events in history are only realizations of divine principles: "in the cross of the earthly path is realized the cross of the heavenly *kenosis*" (*Ibid.*, 217).

¹⁵ This is Karen Kilby's criticism of Balthasar. She notices his tendency towards totalization in his tendency to pull everything into a single system, while positioning himself outside the system, giving an objective account of the totality of the relations within God and between God and creation (Karen Kilby, *Balthasar: A (Very) Critical Introduction* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B Eerdmans, 2012), 13, 44). Moreover, Kilby argues that Balthasar sometimes makes the seeing of this whole an all-or-nothing affair in which a person either sees the whole or nothing at all (Kilby, *Balthasar*, 55-6). This is an extreme example of the privileging of synchrony – the assumption that one can see the whole of the rhythmic pattern without the mediation of time or perspective. This is particularly problematic with respect to the intra-Trinitarian. Balthasar at points (for example, Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Love Alone: The Way of Revelation*, trans. Alexander Dru (London: Sheed and Ward, 1970), 71) presumes too speculative a view into the intra-Trinitarian relationships based on the movements of the Trinity in the economy of salvation. However, this is too speculative, not because there is a division between the economic and immanent Trinity but because we cannot penetrate the internal relations between the Trinity even within the economy of salvation. In the end, we do not really know what took place between Father and Son on the cross, for example.

divine is involved. However, to speculate that we can from our creaturely, historical perspective, see how these movements operate all the way down into the intra-Trinitarian relations negates that historical, creaturely perspective. Since such a perspective is limited by its own time-bound experience, basing a doctrine of God as he is in himself entirely on his manifestation in this experience reduces God to the level of the creature as a character that acts in history to be comprehended and articulated through the categories of experience.¹⁶

An eschatological perspective on the events of the passion is possible because the Christian is no longer in the position of the apostle on Holy Saturday. However, this perspective remains limited because the Christian does not see the economy of salvation from the perspective of the eschaton itself, but from within time. In this way, the Church's perspective remains very similar to that of the apostles in that it still finds itself in *media res*. While the resurrection casts eschatological meaning back onto the cross, this does not mean that an absolute harmony was at that moment brought into effect. Interruption did not end after the resurrection. Instead, the resurrection itself manifests as a series of interruptions within the disciples' experience between intervals of ordinary time, as the gospel narratives make clear. Thus, while the post-resurrection experience makes an interpretation of Holy Saturday as absolute division between Father and Son impossible, it

¹⁶ Moltmann's doctrine of God's mutability may also be guilty of this in a different way than Balthasar, in that it imports a diachronic perspective into God himself undermining the very otherness that the diachronic perspective of creation guards against. God and creation are here again unified into mutually-constituting poles. There are ways around this, for example, by asserting that God's creative capacity makes the relationship between the poles unequal and gives God greater control over the relationship, but it is difficult to see how anything of the synchronic perspective is preserved since it is not even God's perspective. On what basis do we then have confidence in an eschatological unity based in participation in God if not even God himself is unifying? This is not to suggest that it is altogether inappropriate to use diachronic language when speaking about the Trinity. I would not want to say, for example, that God is entirely unaffected by history as this would put into question any genuine relationship between God and creation. Moreover, such a diachronic element is consistent with Trinitarian language regarding procession and begetting. Nevertheless, my point is that such language must always be understood as reflections on the Trinity from within temporal, intra-creaturely experience, such that speculation can therefore not be extended to intra-Trinitarian speculation about the nature of God in himself independent of our creaturely perspective. God is only ever revealed to us in relation to us and our temporal, creaturely natures. An analogical silence must therefore be preserved with respect to the nature of God independent of that Creator-creature relationship.

also does not set up a situation of absolute harmony or continuity. The resurrection is represented and experienced precisely through a creaturely, temporal perspective, which includes interruption. This suggests that salvation is not an absolute and immediate healing or transport to another realm, but a rhythmic event – an event that is given its meaning through the way in which it is encountered in time.

The image of conceptually standing on Holy Saturday is helpful for bringing the creature's limited perspective to the fore. From here, the theologian glimpses both the interruption of the cross experienced diachronically and the synchrony of the events understood in light of the resurrection. The salvific events of cross and resurrection cannot be schematized according to a neat or absolute interruption, nor a neat or absolute continuity. However, the theologian cannot inhabit both of these perspectives at the same time because it is not possible for the creature to simultaneously stand outside time to survey the meaning of the whole and engage in action and encounter within time, learning to wait for and respond to what is next because one does not know. The most one can do is oscillate between liturgical and symbolic visions of the whole, and action in time. Each perspective influences the other, but they can only be experienced diachronically, through oscillation. As with the reader or hearer's experience of the poem, diachronic and synchronic cannot be experienced at the same time, despite the fact that both are simultaneously true. The economy of salvation likewise cannot be neatly circumscribed, but is only glimpsed through movement between perspectives, from a position within that economy. This is to conceptualize salvation rhythmically. Such an oscillation between perspectives is what is sometimes referred to in Christianity as a paradox. However, in drawing attention to the fact that such a paradox is rhythmic, I am suggesting that paradox is not simply a static tension, but that the expression of truth requires movement on the part of the human creature. The apparent contradiction of the paradox is made compelling through a movement between perspectives.

Participation in the Rhythms of Salvation

I have suggested that a Christian account of salvation includes participation. This is one of the primary ways in which Christians think about both the means and goal of salvation.¹⁷ Such participation in God is made possible by God's participation in creation, especially in the incarnation. Przywara says that the incarnation preserves the distinctive creaturely form, what he calls the "ordinary," in opposition to sinful attempts at identity with God. The divine participates in the ordinary and is thereby incorporated into the relational structures of the natural world, configuring its rhythms. The consequence of this divine participation is that the human creature is likewise invited into participation in the divine as it is manifested in the ordinary. Redemption is experienced and performed by being in Christ, who is the divine participation in the creaturely (2 Cor. 5:17; Eph. 1:13; Heb. 3:14). Since Christ is the second person of the Trinity, being in Christ initiates one into the movements of the Trinity as well (2 Pet. 1:3-4), which Przywara says is the true shape of the cosmos (see chapter five). The idea of participation is thus a way of articulating, in relation terms, what the creature is saved for, what health is.

However, part of the reason that salvation is described in this way is related to what it is that one is saved from. As I mentioned in chapter three, one of ways in which evil is described is as a very tight system of logic from which it is impossible to escape using the regular tools of logic and improvement, which are themselves caught in this tight system. Redemption from such forces can therefore not be reduced to a simple removal of guilt.

¹⁷ The idea of participation is common to most theologians as various as the proponents of Radical Orthodoxy, Paul Fiddes, Eastern Orthodox theologians (John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 2004), 94), Hans Urs von Balthasar as mentioned above, and Protestant theologians such as Karl Barth (See Adam Neder, *Participation in Christ: An Entry into Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009), 19-20). The difference lies in how such participation is believed to take place and what it is that the believer participates in. The various images that I present in this section resonate with several of these perspectives, but in the end I emphasize an account of participation that maintains an element of encounter with God as other.

The notion of justification addresses sin from the perspective of personal responsibility and this is appropriate as far as it goes, but it does not address the problem of evil as a captivating force. If salvation were only a matter of forgiving the human creature and then leaving it alone, that creature would remain vulnerable to sin and death. Salvation is therefore not simply a matter of justification. Rather, salvation from evil, and the sin and death in which it manifests, is only possible through participation in something other, a more originary time, as Agamben would say. Salvation must therefore include participation in God if it is to be an efficacious redemption. That for which creation is saved, that for which it hopes, is participation in the movements of God himself and therewith freedom from the distorted movements of sin and evil.

Nevertheless, what it means to be in Christ or to participate in God is not immediately apparent. If we think about how we commonly conceptualize participation, one is said to participate in a project, ritual, production, or community of some kind, and not in a person. How can one participate in Christ, a person, let alone from a time and place removed from that person? More specifically, Christians are baptized into Christ's death, they participate in his death and thereby in hope in his resurrection as well (Rom. 6:5). How is participation in this remote person's death and resurrection possible? While Christianity does sometimes manifest as participation in ongoing projects, communities, visions, and practices, it is not immediately clear how these activities constitute a participation in the life and death of Christ or with him in the movements of the Trinity in any real way. How could one judge such activities as participating or not participating in Christ and the economy of the Trinity?¹⁸ In other words, it is a nice thing to say, but what does it mean in the context of time?

¹⁸ Similar questions are raised by Paul Fiddes in *Past Event and Present Salvation*, particularly with respect to how it is that a particular historic event could have ongoing redemptive significance. As well as several other perspectives, Fiddes points to participation as a particularly helpful way of making sense of this, particularly in that the nature of Christ's being is communal all the way down, such that he is a new kind of

The category of rhythm is particularly helpful for focusing this question. If participation in God is participation in God's movements in the economy of salvation, as opened to creation in Christ, then the question of what it means to be in Christ becomes a question of how the rhythms of everyday human life, relationship, and community that I described in chapter one are adapted and adopted by Christ for God's redemptive purposes in these movements of salvation. In other words, Christ is not only a historical person, but a space for the possibility of creaturely life in intimacy with the Creator in the rhythms of the creaturely.

Christian scripture points to the Holy Spirit as the way these rhythms are communicated beyond the historical person of Jesus. Jesus said that it was better for him to ascend so that the Spirit could come and guide the disciples into truth. The Spirit does not speak on his own authority, but Jesus says he will "glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you. All the Father has is mine; therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you" (John 16:13-15). This suggests that the Spirit makes the presence of Christ more immediate and widespread than was possible for the historical Jesus. The Spirit is described in terms of movements and changes, images of blowing wind or moving breath, trickling oil, tongues of fire, flowing water, beating wings,¹⁹ but the Spirit has no content of its own but only Christ. This makes it analogous to the wave-form identified by James Bunn. The wave-form designates a recurrent form in nature that functions to transfer movement between different bodies and materials. The carrier-waves of speech, shaped by syntax, are one such example, transferring meaning from one person to another. The Spirit is likewise a form that communicates the life of God in Christ across

human being that only exists in relation to us and that this now takes the form of the Church (151-64). Participation in the person of Christ is participation in a particular vision and performance of being a creature, which is fundamentally relational and is thus enacted in community. This position is also similar to that of John Zizioulas.

¹⁹ This list comes from Paul S. Fiddes, *The Promised End: Eschatology in Theology and Literature* (Oxford: Blackwells, 2000), 270. The passages of Scripture for these images include: Ez. 37:9; Is. 40:7; Gen. 2:7; Is. 61:6; 4:4; 44:3; 1 Cor. 12:13; Acts 2:2-3; Luke 1:35; Gen. 1:2; Luke 3:22.

media, through what is not biologically Christ's body.²⁰ The life of God moves through the body and voice of the historical Christ into the Eucharistic elements, into the Church, and then out to the world through the Church, just as the affect and perspective of one person can transmit to another by a carrier wave that is shaped according to a particular rhythm. The Spirit is the rhythm by which Christ is made available for participation in the salvific economy of God.²¹

Notice that this is a different understanding of participation than that suggested by Milbank, Oliver, and Pabst according to an Augustinian musical ontology. My description of participation is not a matter of taking one's proper place within a hierarchy. It is less a participation in a certain ontological structure or proper order of things, and more a participation in a relational space and the rhythms that make this space possible. One of the differences that this involves is that a rhythmic approach to participation begins from the way in which the rhythms available for participation are encountered and experienced from within. I am not concerned with the overall structure created in the relation between God and creation. In fact, I think it is impossible to see this harmonious structure from within time. Instead, I am interested in the points of lived and experienced connections between the creature and the divine, how it is that these constitute participation, and the channels through which such participation is enacted.

The following sections describe the nature of this participation through a variety of images. These images are not intended to be descriptions in the mode of a one-to-one correspondence between the image and an ontological reality. Nor, however, are they "mere" metaphors that simply aid understanding. Rather, these images work together to convey how participation is experienced in the flesh, through rhythm. They say something

²⁰ Rowan Williams, *Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1982), 111.

²¹ John Zizioulas articulates this well in describing the Church as instituted by Christ and constituted by the Spirit such that Christ is not simply an historical individual. Instead, his being is constituted by the communion of the Church through the Spirit (Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 130).

meaningful about a real rhythm by contextualizing it within the rhythms of everyday life that I described in chapter one.

Participation in the Rhythms of Conversation

There are three helpful ways of thinking about the rhythm of participation. First, I argued in the previous chapter that the idea of Christ as Word become flesh suggests not only information but also the function of rhythm in language, which is the setting up of a space that makes communication possible. Christ is not only a revelation of certain information regarding God, but the space of intimacy, communication, and mutual endeavour in which the rhythms of the Trinity in the economy of salvation are carried across to humanity. Oliver Davies has argued that God addresses the human creature from within the world, such that the world becomes the voice-bearing body of God. If nothing else, this idea at least points to the fact that in the incarnation, God speaks to the human from within the material. Davies' emphasis on the voice is an emphasis on the musical and bodily dimensions of speech, which are those dimensions that create connection. Rather than making God an object of knowledge, this perspective on Christ as Word presents a God known in and through the movements of relation.²² Davies says that if this relation is the Christian's ultimate reality, then ultimate reality is "an excess, a wave, a momentum of embrace, which comes to meet us at the root of our perceptions."²³ This description again suggests an association between the Spirit and the wave-form, which depicts participation as the bathing and configuring of human perception in the rhythms of Trinitarian relationship, such that all human action emerges from these rhythms.

The idea of the Word, therefore, suggests that the question of what it means to be in Christ is a question about the kinds of synchronization and harmonization that make

²² Oliver Davies, *The Creativity of God: World, Eucharist, Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 146.

²³ Davies, *The Creativity of God*, 153.

participation in a conversation possible. To participate in Christ is to enter into the space of mutual endeavour in which communication, intimacy, and the kind of being that is based in this relationship take place. Just as conversation requires the suspension and re-direction of personal rhythms into the rhythms of the conversation, salvation is a matter of the suspension and re-direction of everyday rhythms into the rhythm offered in God's self-communication. A preoccupation with one's self is interrupted by the kenotic movements of Christ, which are not characterized by the same preoccupations with self-survival that enclose the sinful creature.²⁴ The result is the opening of a shared space of relational being, the economy of the Trinity, in which God and creature participate. Rather than constituting a distinct "spiritual" activity, participation is a particular way of responding to God and others within the rhythms of human creatureliness as configured in Christ and the Holy Spirit. One responds to the world out of the rhythms of this conversation.

Notice that this image of participation as engagement in the shared rhythms of conversation, which shape one's responses and perceptions, retains difference. In the shared space of conversation, the whole person is engaged and turned towards the other and yet is not absorbed to that shared space. In the same way, this is not a participation of the creature in God in such a way that it loses its distinctive creatureliness, nor does the creature penetrate the intra-Trinitarian relations apart from the economy of salvation, just as in conversation one does not have access to the inner life of another beyond what is part of that shared space. Instead, the result of participation in conversation is that one becomes one's self through the other. At this point, of course, the analogy is asymmetrical, and this is a limitation of the image of conversation. The creature is known through such participation in a way that the Creator is not and the creature becomes itself in relation to God because of its proper creaturely motion, while God is not dependent on the creature in

²⁴ Fiddes, *Past Event and Present Salvation*, 148.

the same way. Notice also that this means that one does not participate in God himself in a simple or direct way, but in the space that he opens, which makes intimacy possible. One does not see the intra-Trinitarian rhythms themselves but their manifestation through and for the rhythms of creaturely life. This is not to say that participation in the space of intimacy is participation in something other than God. The economy of salvation is the rhythms of the Trinity in Christ and through the Spirit, just as the rhythms of conversation are not something other than one's conversation partner. Rather, it is the space that a person makes in his or her rhythms for the other such that encounter with this other is made possible. Participation in God's economy is for the purpose of encounter with God. God communicates his true self to the creature, but communication is not absorption.

One might object that the image of the rhythms of conversation leaves too much distance between God and creature, that it is not intimate enough, but I hope my description demonstrates that this is more a problem with our understanding of conversation as superficial and cerebral rather than with the intimate, bodily experience of conversation that reaches down into a person and affects him or her to the degree that it constitutes a distinctive space of experience. Remember from chapter one that rhythm functions through bodily patterns of repetition and imitation, which are experienced through the nervous system, thereby emotionally connecting persons together in communication. In human experience, intimacy comes about through bodily participation in a shared rhythmic space, even across the gap between persons that remains in conversation. The image of conversation therefore helpfully indicates how it is possible for participation to involve both transformative intimacy between God and creature as well as irreducible difference.

Moreover, this image is particularly appropriate given the role of prayer in the salvific configuration of rhythms through participation, as noted by Jean-Yves Lacoste. Just as the rhythms of one's own mind are suspended and re-directed in conversation,

prayer includes a bracketing of the world that frees one from the usual forces shaping one's responses. One is suspended into a new space in which different responses are made possible.²⁵ Prayer, like conversation, is the interval between action that takes leave of the everyday world of action precisely in order to discover those responsibilities and possibilities.²⁶ One's responsibilities are known only when the other is known, and prayer assumes precisely that God is the kind of God that can make himself known to the creature and thereby shape its responsibilities and possibilities.²⁷

However, conversation remains an image, which means that while it says something real about the human experience of participation, it is limited and requires supplementation. An example of its weakness might lie in the fact that human conversation occurs between two creatures of the same kind with equal and mutual influence on one another, while God and the human creature are not of the same order. While I have addressed this, to a degree, by associating God with the space and rhythms of intimacy itself, and not only with a conversation partner, a second image is helpful in bringing this dimension to the fore.

Participation in the Rhythms of Poetry

A second way of conceptualizing rhythmic participation is through poetry. Both this and the previous image refer to types of discourse. I demonstrated previously that poetry is a more focused example of the rhythms that are operative in general conversation. As with conversation, the reader or hearer of poetry enters into the rhythmic space of the poem and this includes a similar back-and-forth element as the reader adjusts his or her reading to the rhythmic changes encountered. During this process, one entirely suspends and re-directs one's use of time and rhythm toward the experience of the particular and

²⁵ Lacoste, *Experience and the Absolute*, 95.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 73, 94.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 142.

unique rhythm and time of the poem. Likewise, participating in Christ is much like entering a particular rhythmic space. This is not a space that is entirely distinct from everyday space and time. After all, it has an effect on everyday space and time, but Christ as rhythmic space is a particular configuration that may appear as an interruption to the self-enclosed and self-referential patterns in which time is often caught. The rhythm of the redeemed creature is realized through the participant's subjective rhythmic responses to the rhythmic events of the poem. Participation in a poem is not only a matter of imitation, but is a genuine inhabiting of an alternative rhythmic configuration insofar as one's body and mind become habituated to and carry forward the rhythm of the poem.

Repetition is one of the means by which the specific rhythm of the poem is set up. Giorgio Agamben has noticed how the theme of repetition is significant for unification with Christ in the letters of Paul. He points to Ephesians 1:10 in which Paul says "as for the economy of the *pleroma* of times, all things are recapitulated in him" suggesting that the fullness of time, when God is all in all, is mediated through a recapitulation that takes place in Christ. In this recapitulation, each instant is related to Christ and thereby saved, because it is related to its end in the eschaton.²⁸ Agamben compares this to the poetic structure of the sestina in which the end word of each stanza is repeated as the first end word of the next stanza and moves down the lines in each successive stanza (six in all) until it would begin back at the beginning if the poem went on. Instead of beginning again, however, a coda repeats each of the end words in a new sequence. "Through this complicated to-and-fro directed both forward and backward, the chronological sequence of linear homogeneous time is completely transformed into rhythmic constellations themselves in movement."²⁹ In the poem, time organizes itself according to the pulses emerging out of this process of recapitulation. Agamben associates this pattern with the

²⁸ Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, 77.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 82.

week of six days, with the seventh day recapitulating the previous days in a unique way.³⁰ Through the repetition of the seventh day, the whole of life and of time is brought into relation with Christ, and therewith into the harmonious relations of the Trinity.

Notice that recapitulation here is not a simple repetition but involves the opening of new possibilities. Cyclicity and repetition demonstrate how every moment is transformed by being brought into a larger pattern that holds together the fabric of time. While we often think of repetition as opposed to surprise, however, in poetry recurrence and allusion can create a saturation that deepens surprise by making it an experience of recognizing what was in fact always there to be seen.³¹ Likewise, while incarnation and resurrection are genuinely new possibilities for human experience, and do not follow from the human experience of the progression of things, they are also possibilities that are in part based in human life in the sense that they are meaningful to human life. This deepens surprise in the sense that these events are not simply shocks, but momentary (diachronic) illuminations of the synchronic pattern of eschatological meaning.

In his book *The Promised End*, Paul Fiddes refers to T. S. Eliot's thoughts about poetry. Eliot suggested that the transience of words could be preserved in a pattern, through their relation to other words and that in the unification of words, time itself is held together. Moreover, Fiddes suggests that this is a symbol of how Eliot thought that such preservation is possible for events in time more generally, made possible by Christ the Word. He argues that from within the pattern, the shape of the whole can be grasped synchronically at one particular moment or event. Fiddes takes this as an image of the healing of time that is made possible by God's concurrent participation in the time of all things in which all moments are made open to redemption.³² The idea of synchronicity is

³⁰ Agamben, *The Time That Remains*, 83.

³¹ Jane Hirshfield, *Hiddenness, Uncertainty, Surprise: Three Generative Energies of Poetry* (Tarsset: Bloodaxe, 2008), 55.

³² Fiddes, *The Promised End*, 130.

brought to the fore through Eliot's use of the image of poetry because here, while time is not without duration, it is woven into a pattern and thereby healed because it is given meaning and harmony. Participation in this pattern enables one to intuit that harmony.

Interestingly and relatedly, the book of Genesis portrays natural and liturgical time as inextricable. God institutes the Sabbath within the natural world. Thus, while natural cyclicity is often used to suggest a tight system of eternal recurrence of birth and death, that same cyclicity can be configured as a liturgical recapitulation that draws the natural into participation through the interweaving movements of the time that God has for the world. This refers to the double-nature of rhythm, with its capacity for both self-referentiality, and interruption to self-referentiality. A dimension of rhythm such as repetition or recapitulation can signify both a tight system of hegemony, and the deepening of surprise.

In the case of this image, the influence of the one upon the other (poem and reader/hearer) is qualitatively different. While there is room for variation in the rhythm of the poem, its pattern is at a certain level fixed, which means that it is not influenced in the same way as the reader or hearer is. The rhythm of the poem may change in time, as the reader moves through it and these changes operate like responses to the reader's performance, but these are all dimensions of the same, harmonious rhythm. If the reader strays too far from this rhythm the performance will simply become antagonistic to that rhythm. Thus, while this metaphor more effectively communicates participation as the inhabiting of a rhythmic world over which both parties do not have equal influence, some might argue that this suggests an inflexible God. I again suspect that this has more to do with a misunderstanding of poetic rhythm which, according to Tsur, does include a degree of responsiveness to the reader in that a rhythm is set up precisely in such a way to encourage the reader or hearer to respond and behave in certain ways. Nevertheless, I agree that taken on its own this metaphor could suggest a participation that is rather

impersonal, and cannot therefore simply replace the image of participation in the rhythms of conversation.

Participation in the Rhythms of Dance

Finally, a third way of conceptualizing rhythmic participation is through dance. I will not add much on this image since this has already been described by van der Leeuw, LaMothe, and Fiddes. Interestingly, van der Leeuw describes the imitation of Christ as a mimetic dance in which the disciples submit themselves to Christ's rhythmic forms so that the disciple is empowered to express his or her own agency in mastering these rhythms of love. In a dance, one's body is very clearly immersed in and shaped by rhythms that are larger than one's self. The same is true of the rhythms of both poetry and conversation in that one allows one's self to be configured by rhythms that are not produced by one's own will. However, LaMothe says that dance is also a metaphor for coming to know God through the exercise of individual embodiment.³³ The individual rhythms are not simply absorbed but must be performed through the rhythms of one's own body. LaMothe and van der Leeuw's description of dance resonates with the way in which Przywara describes the rhythm of creaturely life as an oscillation between essence in- and beyond-existence in that in dance, the creature's becoming takes place both in its own movements and through the participation of those movements in something beyond them.

Paul Fiddes also frequently appeals to the metaphor of a dance in describing the Trinity, and creaturely participation in the movements of the Trinity.³⁴ However, while I think this image is helpful for highlighting the indispensability of rhythm in participation, I also do not think that this perspective ought to eclipse the others. In particular, it is

³³ LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 199. See also Van der Leeuw, *Sacred and Profane Beauty*, 29.

³⁴ For example, Paul S. Fiddes, *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2000).

arguably a less personal metaphor than that of conversation in that it is based more on the adoption of a rhythm rather than encounter through rhythm. In conversation, the rhythm of the relationship is determined precisely in and through the back-and-forth between speakers, it emerges in an ongoing way through their relationship. As mentioned above, this risks reducing God to the level of the creature, but it is also helpful in demonstrating that the purpose of participation is communion and encounter, which is something that the metaphor of participation in the movements of the dance might tend to obscure. One would not say that participation in the movements of a dance leads to an encounter with those movements that is personal. Such movements could be construed as an impersonal, albeit somewhat responsive, force.

These images have been intended to show how the idea of rhythm is helpful to the doctrine of salvation in illuminating how participation in God through Christ takes place within time. By thinking of rhythm as the form of such participation, it is possible to see how the human person can participate in movements that lead to intimacy and encounter, and which transform human action and movement in the world. These rhythms are made of the same dimensions of everyday rhythms, such as the ways in which the rhythms of conversation are taken up in prayer, or the cyclicity of nature is re-oriented towards a salvific recapitulation in liturgy. These configurations thus suggest the presence of a counter-rhythm in time, which makes use of and re-directs human rhythms towards communion with God. Although there are resonances of the diachronic particularly with respect to conversation, participation tends to be associated with a synchronic perspective on rhythm. Rhythm functions to hold God and the intra-creaturely together in participation. Before turning to a more diachronic perspective on the rhythm of salvation, I first think through how such rhythmic participation forms the movements of the Church.

Participation and the Church

Given the somatic nature of rhythm, it is not accidental that those who participate in Christ are designated the body of Christ. If Christ embodies the rhythmic configurations of creation that make intimacy with God possible, then the body of Christ is the very point of participation in this intimacy. Understood in terms of rhythms, Christ's body is less a discreet object than a particular harmonization of flows of movement and energy, which is a Christology conditioned by the Holy Spirit. The configuration of Christ's body as flows of movement and energy in which it is possible for the Church to participate is the work of the Holy Spirit, which makes Christ present across space and time. If Christ preserves and embodies the creature's proper form in opposition to the creature's sinful attempt at identity with God, then creation's embodiment of this form requires participation in the form of Christ. This is only possible if we think of this form, not as a circumscribable and indivisible object, but as the rhythms of the ordinary that Christ configures by his embodiment of them. Scripture identifies Christ's body with his historical body, the body of believers, the communion bread, and insofar as Christ is the proper creaturely form, his body is all of redeemed creation. These various manifestations are all the body of Christ insofar as they take on the rhythms in which communication with God is possible.³⁵ Participation in the rhythms of Christ's body enacts and manifests that body more widely and in new variations.

The Eucharistic bread makes the human body the point of unity between the historical body of Christ and the world.³⁶ This is an act of communication in that it is the metaphorical taking in of the experience of Christ into one's own flesh. Participating in the movements of the body of Christ and taking his body into one's own is a way of patterning one's body according to the life of the historical body of Christ despite the fact that this

³⁵ Fiddes, *Seeing the World and Knowing God* 391-2.

³⁶ Davies, *The Creativity of God*, 156.

body is no longer present in history. Rhythm therefore offers a particular approach to the idea that salvation is formation by and conformity to Christ. It suggests that participation is bodily, that the making healthy of one's rhythms, one's patterns of life, includes the transformation of bodily rhythms through communication with the rhythms of Christ's body. This leaves us with the question: what are the rhythms of the intimacy with God in which Christ's body participates? Can the rhythms of Christ's body be identified?

The bodily nature of the rhythms of participation are most vividly evident in liturgy. Just as the poem is the foregrounding of the rhythms present in everyday language, liturgy foregrounds this configuration of the rhythms of the relationships of the Christian community. Liturgy uses patterns of bodily repetition to both recapitulate all of life in relation to God, and to create synchrony between persons through their participation in the same rhythms of call, response, sitting, kneeling, rising, singing, eating and drinking, thereby establishing a shared identity.³⁷ The practices, rituals, communities, and missions of the Church carry the wave-form of the particular rhythm of communication set up and sustained by the Father in Christ and through the Spirit.

Lacoste has developed a phenomenology of liturgy in which he argues that the perspective on the whole that is impossible from within time is nevertheless possible symbolically.³⁸ In this space, one has a view of totality because one is symbolically in the presence of the absolute, albeit pre-eschatologically. In other words, one has a glimpse of synchronic harmony. Lacoste says that such liturgy is a gap in experience, since this glimpse is a knowledge without experience.³⁹ Liturgy does not silence inexperience. Rather, it is a caesura that interrupts the closed circle of experience by introducing a symbolic absence from the world from which one can nevertheless see the world. For

³⁷ This is a dimension of the liturgical form particularly important to Pickstock. See Pickstock, *After Writing*, 221-23; Catherine Pickstock, *Repetition and Identity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

³⁸ Lacoste, *Experience and the Absolute*, 24.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 47.

Lacoste, while liturgy in one sense gives the creature a synchronic perspective, this is always on the condition of a greater separation from the *parousia* and the pain of our provisionality that the inexperience of God points to.⁴⁰ I will say more about this in the next section, but it is worth noting here that the temporal conditions of an encounter with the absolute includes a liturgical disorientation of consciousness,⁴¹ an interruption or caesura, in other words.

In identifying liturgy with the rhythms of Christ's body, or the carrying-through of the wave form, I do not mean to suggest that salvation is absolutely dependent on participation in the liturgy or that the rhythms of the Church are always and in every way equal to the rhythms of Christ's body. To assert this would be to adopt an absolutely synchronic perspective in which one has identified the location of harmony, separated from the cacophony of the world. If the synchronic is an eschatological reality, then the Church is only ever a partial reception of the wave form, a partial embodiment of the rhythms of the Son's communication with the Father. Other manifestations of those rhythms may be enacted elsewhere and the Church may be confronted with these from outside itself and may be required to change its rhythms in response. The synchrony of the Church is only ever a synchrony that is asserted on hope and faith, and thus only identified and experienced through time, in fragments. I will say more about this in the next section.

One quality of the rhythms of the body of Christ that we can identify is that they are kenotic. Insofar as Christ makes himself a space of intimacy between God and humanity and the Spirit is a wave-form shaped by the form of Christ, participation in the rhythms of Trinity that constitute that space of intimacy must involve the kenotic space-making function that characterizes the rhythm of Christ. In scriptural terms, this is expressed in sayings about participating in Christ's death in order that he live in the self

⁴⁰ Lacoste, *Experience and the Absolute*, 143-45.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 152-56.

(Romans 6:6; 2 Cor 4:11; Gal 2:20; 2 Tim 2:11; John 12:24). Just as Christ gave himself up in order to become a space for the confrontation of sin and redemption, the effect of taking on the rhythms of Christ is to make oneself spacious as well. The rhythms of Christ's own life were always directed at being for others. To carry through the rhythms of Christ's body is to carry the rhythms of a broken body, poured out for others.⁴² In other words, the Church's performance of its liturgical rhythms is not for the purpose of creating an independent identity, but for the purpose of opening a space in the world for others.

This idea of the rhythms of the body of Christ as kenotic is not a triumphalistic attempt to pull everything into a single rhythm. This is precisely what the language of *kenosis* attempts to guard against. The intimacy with God to which the Church invites the world is not an established and pre-identified pattern that simply subsumes all other movements. It is, rather, a space in which the nature of this rhythm is discerned through time, as it comes into contact with other movements, just as one discerns the rhythm of a poem through temporal encounter. Nor do I want to suggest that the language of dying with Christ requires that those suffering under oppression ought to suffer or that such suffering is itself somehow salvific. This is the opposite of health. Rather, recasting participation in kenotic rhythms as a space for intimacy suggests not required self-harm, but rather an openness to receiving oneself by re-directing one's self-enclosed rhythms into

⁴² Liberation theology does this in an interesting way. Gustavo Gutierrez says that salvation is an intra-historical reality as simultaneously new creation and liberation from sin, and it occurs wherever there is a politically liberating event, wherever the struggle for justice take place. As such, for Gutierrez the Church does not perfectly correlate with churches, as if it were a group of people who could be delineated from the rest of the world. Rather, his definition of Church is an active definition based in certain kinds of movement over against others. Church happens wherever liberation happens, and this sometimes involves unmasking the use of the gospel in supporting injustice (Gustavo Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation*, trans. Caridad Inga and John Eagleson (London: SCM, 1974), 18). Eschatology for Gutierrez is thus a matter of social practice. "The political is grafted into the eternal" (Gutiérrez, *A Theology of Liberation*, 232). Whatever one thinks about the particularly Marxist understanding of this political eschaton that proponents of Liberation Theology tend to appeal to, Liberation Theology helpfully points to the dynamic nature of salvation not only in terms of the movements within the Church through liturgy but also in terms of the political movements that move outward, disrupting certain structures. Since this is a matter of participation in the eschaton, such political movement is not something extrinsic to salvation, but is part of its manifestation. As such, Liberation Theology is a manifestation of a diachronic perspective on the rhythms of salvation that moves forward towards the eschaton in a way that is responsive to movements that are encountered in the world.

a communion or conversation that exceeds the self. That excess is certainly confrontational, and such confrontation may provoke responses of violence and oppression, but that is a consequence rather than the objective of the rhythms of the body of Christ. The objective is communion.

Following this discussion, what does participation in rhythm tell us about health as it is understood by Christian salvation? First, this health is eccentric. Its source lies in something beyond the self to which the self must adhere, an idea evident in all three of the images that I discussed. Self-enclosedness and self-referentiality are the opposite of health, while intimacy is inherent to it. Part of the reason that Jesus is central to human salvation is that he makes this intimacy possible. We can think of this in terms of ASD as described in the previous chapter. Someone with Autism Spectrum Disorder is considered to be in poor mental health if he or she is not able to escape his or her own internal rhythms. In order to escape these self-referential patterns, someone else must connect to these patterns, be with the individual in these rhythms, and then bring him or her out into a shared space through variations on those rhythms. It is the shared rhythms that generate this space. Similarly, Christ breaks through human self-referentiality precisely by entering into human rhythms and drawing the creature outside itself through his variations on these rhythms. The creature inhabits Jesus' rhythms by recapitulating them in the liturgy. The rhythms of everyday life are made healthy when the creature attends to the variations on life that the body of Christ introduces, and these rhythms then form the shared space of communion with God. Since these variations are happening in time, as in conversation, we never have a grasp of the whole pattern synchronically. Rather, harmony and intimacy occur precisely through responding in real time to such variations. Thus, participation in synchronic pattern only ever happens as a result of diachronic relationship, through attention to that which comes to the self from outside the self and through a response to it from out of the space of intimacy with God.

Salvation as Rhythmic Interruption

The idea of participation provides a synchronic perspective on salvation, a description of the harmony that Christ's death and resurrection make possible, and for which Christians hope. The idea of synchronicity is necessary for understanding what it means to be in Christ and participate in God. If one believes sin and evil to be more systemic and threatening to flourishing than mere human failing, then such an account of participation is necessary in order to explain how redemption from such patterns is possible, albeit only in a way that is partial and indicative of the full participation for which Christians hope. However, it becomes apparent in my description of this participation as rhythmic that the experience of the synchronicity of participation in time is not straightforward, but necessarily includes an element of the diachronic, and with it, of confrontation.

This is due, in part, to the way in which relationship is possible for the human. In describing salvific health as analogous to communication in ASD, I point out that something other breaks into the subject's experience, making resonance and connection beyond itself possible. Relationship is made possible by *ek-stasis*. The connection between God and the human creature thus requires something analogous to empathy, by which I mean that it is a connection that requires the subject to step outside his or her own experience and adjust his or her movements in resonance with those of God. In doing so, the subject does not lose identity, but identity is momentarily disrupted in order to make space for another, and in consequence that identity is challenged and amended. This disruptive dimension of connection must also be considered.

There are other reasons for why an account of participation as facile harmonization does not sufficiently depict temporal reality. First, the movements of sin and evil, and the suffering that they engender, remain part of human experience even after Christ, as

demonstrated by our discussion of the mechanistic rhythms of slavery in the first chapter. A synchronic depiction of the harmony of participation is therefore insufficient to the human experience of sin and suffering in time. As Levinas says, “To proclaim the universality of God in consciousness, to think that everything is consummated while the peoples that tear one another to pieces belie this universality in fact, is not only to prepare the irreligion of a Voltaire, but is to shock reason itself.”⁴³ Reducing salvation to such a depiction would suggest that God simply draws reality into his own movements, straightening out any distorted movements. However, the character of these forces is precisely such that they do not respond to gentle wooing and invitation. One of the hallmarks of a sinful system is that it is too intransigent, self-enclosed, and unresponsive to the movements of God for gentle re-direction. Moreover, history has demonstrated that the forces and movements of sin are not slowly weeded out and straightened out over time. Salvation history is not a simple continuous process of incorporation into God.

Second, a synchronic description of Christian communal practice as harmonious whole is not true to how the Christian community is experienced from the inside. There is little consensus regarding the forms or meaning of Church and liturgical practices, nor do participants consistently participate in healthy rhythms of communion. In fact, an insistent pursuit of consensus may be an attempt to nail down the difference between Church and world and is therefore antithetical to the openness to God required for Christian discipleship.⁴⁴ To set up an enclosed frame of reference in which there is peace is not only disingenuous, it is also a participation in the very moves of power and competition that give rise to hegemonic systems in the first place because it suggests that our peace is more important than being present to the other.⁴⁵ Rowan Williams points out that our desire to

⁴³ Emmanuel Lévinas, *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (London: Kluwer Academic, 1991), 241.

⁴⁴ Tanner, *Theories of Culture*, 171.

⁴⁵ Rowan Williams, *Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement* (London: T&T Clark, 2003), 105-06.

be at peace with ourselves is constantly frustrated by the reality of dispossession and dispersal, the experience of limits and conflicts.⁴⁶ Thus, whatever encourages us to seek out or think we have achieved an environment without friction is a denial of the nature of reality and encourages language about the other that is easy and uninterrupted.⁴⁷ Some attempts at harmony are in fact violent self-enclosures of this sort.

In order to be true to both the ongoing experience of sin and suffering and to the Christian responsibility to eschew a premature unity, a doctrine of salvation cannot only include the synchrony of participation but must also speak about God interrupting and confronting movements of sin, hegemony, and oppression inside as well as outside the Church. This is an important reason that God cannot be conceptualized as a part or even the whole of a system, but must be beyond such systems. The ability to confront and break up systems of oppression requires an otherness from them to the extent that God himself does not become simply another oppressive system. While there have been problematic ways of conceptualizing such otherness,⁴⁸ some conception of God as beyond human experience is necessary to allow for the creative possibilities beyond current reality that the hope for salvation must include.⁴⁹ God is transcendent in that he is free and able to do new things and open new possibilities in the world.⁵⁰

However, this is not to say that these interruptions are alien to the true movements of the world. Such interruptions are not arbitrary but are in the service of the world's *telos*, namely participation in the movements of God. As I explained in the previous chapter, interruption is not itself antithetical to the nature of creation. Creation is not a mechanism,

⁴⁶ Williams, *Lost Icons*, 146.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 113.

⁴⁸ A competitive duality between immanent and transcendent like that of Barth's *Römerbrief*, for example.

⁴⁹ Moltmann and Gutiérrez both recognize this in various ways. For Moltmann, resurrection hope is precisely not optimism because it is based on the creative power of God rather than historical process. Likewise, while Gutiérrez in one way has a specific vision of salvation in that it is a socio-economic reality that is free from oppression, he nevertheless does not equate such a utopia (no-place) with any particular political system that has been manifested in history. The kingdom of God therefore remains a challenge to all political systems.

⁵⁰ Fiddes, *Past Event and Present Salvation*, 31.

but the creation of, and in relationship to, a free God such that the idea that creation includes surprise is consistent with a creation that experiences this free God in and through time. The confrontational character of these surprises and interruptions comes not from the interruptions themselves but from the sinful self-enclosure that resists such newness. In other words, creation's own rhythms are the channel through which distorted rhythms are challenged. Again, if we refer to the example of African-American slavery, the suspension of the alienating mechanistic rhythms occurred through the interpolation of rhythms of alternative identities manifested in African-American music and religion. A new identity was not created by simply grinding the alienating rhythms to a halt from the outside, but through participation in the alternative rhythms of spaces within the alienating repetitions. I propose that such rhythmic gaps in which alternative identities are performed are divine interruptions such that to participate in these counter-oppressive spaces is to participate in God.⁵¹ The interruptions of the beyond are thus creative spaces for improvisation rather than alternative and competitive realities.

Christ as Caesura

The idea of God as an interruptive space is exhibited in the gospels. Jesus' opposition to the religious leaders who maintained a tight system of entitlement and hierarchy was not violent. He did not set up an alternative system. For example, Jesus hid his power by refusing to give a sign (Luke 11:29), and by warning his disciples not tell anyone about his transfiguration (Matt. 17:9). He did not reject and overthrow the whole system outright. Jesus says that he did not come to abolish the law but to fulfill it (Matt. 5:17-19). Rather, if Jesus fulfills the law, then he is the new space in which the law is

⁵¹ My association of God with gaps or spaces here has nothing to do with the idea of the "God of the gaps," which suggests that God simply fills any gaps in our knowledge. I am proposing the opposite – that God opens gaps within those systems that are too tight. We find God here not as an explanatory device but as the source of new creative possibilities.

interpreted and performed. He opens up space in the interpretation of the law. Questions such as “Who is my neighbour?” become “Who can you be a neighbour to?” (Luke 10). The poor, oppressed, and sinful people become the space in which blessing and healing are found (Matt. 5: 1-11; Matt. 9:12; Mark 2: 17; Luke 5:31). Matthew 5 in particular suggests a breaking up of traditional social categories and channels. Not only is it the poor and oppressed who are blessed, but the social channels of respect and retribution are challenged and broken up. The people are told that the formula for determining who to love, loving those who love you, is too tight, too exclusive. The formula is broken open to the extent that love includes even enemies. The principle of vengeance – an eye for an eye – is likewise suspended. Jesus even interrupts the system of the oath, that according to which the validity of language was determined. An oath was a system by which one ensured the power of one’s words by tying them to something powerful. Jesus interrupts this association. God and his world are not the fabric of attempts to secure power. Language is cut off from this system and is redeemed to be itself according to its own proper power *as* language.⁵² Even the transfiguration can be thought of as the transformation of Christ’s body into a space beyond appropriation for the manifestation of the glory of God.⁵³ In Christ, the flow of things is made more spacious.

⁵² In his book *The Sacrament of Language*, Giorgio Agamben considers what the oath is and how it functions in defining humanity. He points out that according to Lycurgus and Hierocles the oath keeps united what the law has brought into being (Giorgio Agamben, *The Sacrament of Language: An Archeology of the Oath*, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), 3) and is therefore the guarantee of the efficacy of language (Agamben, *The Sacrament of Language*, 4). The Greek word for oath, *horkos* is arguably derived from *herkos*, which means a tie, bond, or enclosure. The oath is intended as a way of binding oneself through speech to the sacred (*Ibid.*, 11-12, 31). Far from being a tangential issue then, Agamben suggests that language is hereby indicated as the space in which humanity puts its own nature at stake via a bond or enclosure (*Ibid.*, 68). By suspending or interrupting such a bond, Jesus questions the nature of human identity as bound to the sacred by language. Rather than a system that secures power, language hereby becomes a (rhythmic) space that the speaker must inhabit and make his or her own (Agamben suggests that this is the true nature of language but does not interpret Jesus’ prohibition against oaths in this way, 71). Such an approach to language would therefore correlate with my description above of Jesus himself as *logos* – a space that can be inhabited.

⁵³ Graham Ward, *Cities of God* (London: Routledge, 2000), 99-101. This is also consonant with the way in which Giorgio Agamben thinks about the resurrected body as displaying its functions (movement, digestion, etc.) beyond any usefulness (Agamben, “The Glorious Body,” in *Nudities*, 91-103).

As indicated in chapter two, conceptualizing salvation in terms of the opening of spaces and the disruption that this involves is suggested by Agamben in his reading of Paul. For example, the “as not” in I Cor. 7:29-31, in which those who weep are as not weeping and those who rejoice as not rejoicing and those who buy as not possessing and so on, puts forward a messianic vocation without content. The messianic vocation is rather a space that hollows out all conditions.⁵⁴ Agamben believes that this form of life is performed especially by Franciscan monasticism, which is “life as that which is never given as property but only as a common use.”⁵⁵ This way of life is an interruption to the systems of property ethics, which base law on ownership as that which everyone has in common. Interrupting the systems of law and ethics suggests that use, and therewith a form of existence based on temporality, are what is common rather than the stability and security of ownership. This approach makes space in the law for time. Agamben says that it is this interruption of the legal system based on ownership that makes the life of Christ present to the world.⁵⁶ Likewise, the division between Jew and Gentile, on which the law was based, is interrupted by Paul in the division “flesh/breath,” which creates a remnant (*resto*): the messianic non-non-Jew.⁵⁷ This remnant is an interruptive space that does not provide an alternative identity but disrupts the categories on which identity is based.⁵⁸ What Agamben here describes is the interruptive dimension of salvation that does not set up a new world order but opens spaces for new variations of creaturely rhythms.

Christ’s salvific encounter with death ought to be thought of in similar terms. God does not simply overthrow the whole from the outside. He instead goes inside it, submits to it as a creature, and himself becomes the space of the suspension of death so that even the

⁵⁴ Agamben, *The Time that Remains*, 23-24.

⁵⁵ Agamben, *The Highest Poverty*, xiii.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 142-43.

⁵⁷ Agamben, *The Time that Remains*, 51.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 55.

totality of death is overcome by participation in his death.⁵⁹ It is difficult to understand how it is that Christ suspends death, since death clearly remains a part of human experience. However, thinking of God's work in history as the opening of spaces gives us a clue. Christ's resurrection is more like a space, rather than a triumphalistic inauguration of an immediate, absolute and harmonious kingdom in which all things are immediately brought under Christ's judgement and rule. Its first sign is the empty tomb or the space between the angels on the tabernacle.⁶⁰ This interruption to death inaugurates a new rhythm. While the resurrection demonstrates that the disjunction of Holy Saturday is not absolute, the nature of the resurrection is also not absolute harmony or continuity. Christ's post-resurrection presence to the disciples is one of flickering. He comes and goes, oscillates between being recognizable and unrecognizable. The resurrection cannot be grasped, controlled, or comprehended.⁶¹ The resurrection as space is confirmed by the ascension, in which Jesus' presence becomes the gap that the Church is responsible to inhabit.⁶² This flickering rhythm of the resurrection is the interruption of death due to its effect on time. Time is no longer shaped by a simple being-towards-death, as with Heidegger, but by a being towards the eschaton. The eschaton evades the control of present experience, including the experience of death, and thus remains a protest to it.⁶³ The finality that usually accompanies death is delayed and is instead opened to new possibilities. God opens up a space in death, or perhaps even makes of death a space within

⁵⁹ There are varying positions on the degree to which death itself is problematic or is a natural part of God's good creation. Nevertheless, while there may be some positive dimensions of death in the abstract, such as the wholeness that it brings to a life, much like the end of a poem, the actual experience of death is more often than not tragic and destructive, partly because of its tight hegemony, the fact that it controls all of life. Christ's resurrection addresses this dimension of death by opening spaces within its tragedy rather than overcoming death as a whole (see Fiddes, *The Promised End*, 68).

⁶⁰ Ward, *Cities of God*, 108.

⁶¹ Graham Ward makes this point with respect to the body of Christ (*Ibid.*, 111), however since the body of Christ is the location of the resurrection, the point extends more broadly to the nature of resurrected life and the overcoming of death, in general.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 112-13. Significantly, Ward compares the ascension to a womb in Christ, which resonates with Kristeva's rhythmic *chora*.

⁶³ Fiddes, *Past Event and Present Salvation*, 31.

which a new creation can be recognized and anticipated. This is the quintessential example of Agamben's remnant or zone of indifference. That which is most horrific becomes the kairological moment of hope by which the system as a whole is challenged.

In other words, Jesus' resurrection appears in time and to human experience as an oscillation of stop and flow in which moments of eschatological presence interrupt and suspend everyday experience before releasing the disciples back into that flow, as per Agamben's description. Agamben calls this time after the resurrection and before the eschaton "messianic time," which has the character of a disjunction or caesura that divides chronological time from its end in the eschaton. The experience of this time is what Agamben calls "operational," the time that one uses in representing time itself. It is therefore a time which is used but itself escapes possession, just as rhythm itself for Agamben cannot be grasped. The experience of messianic time is an experience of being out of joint, of not coinciding perfectly with or possessing one's own experience, and it is this non-coincidence that makes it possible to participate in the eschaton from within time.⁶⁴ It is habitation in a more original time. The time in which the eschaton comes, in which time comes to an end, does not have the shape of an arrow, but of a rhythm – the repetition of a shape, which sets up and then re-directs expectations through surprise.

This is a rhythmic understanding of God's intervention in history. As a space inserted into a particular movement that thereby suspends it, the caesura re-frames and re-directs that movement in a way that is different than its previous motion, yet not completely discontinuous with it. Caesuric interruptions are a frustration of a particular movement's direction, in particular of the desire to reach the end rest as quickly as possible, but in so doing caesuras contribute to the proper shape and form of the poem. In the same way, God disrupts those attempts at premature peace, security, and closure that

⁶⁴ Agamben, *The Time that Remains*, 71.

are made at the cost of others. God's difference is a break, cut, or caesura in the rhythms of experience that points beyond the boundaries of this or that particular situation.⁶⁵ However, rhythmic interruptions are consistent with the proper movement of creation similar to the way in which the caesura contributes to the movement of the poem. As a space, God is hidden. One can participate in the movements of this space, but cannot grasp it as an object. This conception prevents the transcendent from becoming something that simply validates existing structures or inhibits change, and instead recognizes its character as the ever-greater-dissimilarity that ruptures representations and makes space for an encounter with others.⁶⁶

The Caesuric Rhythm of the Church

Conceptualizing the interruption of God as a space preserves the character of God as beyond; it preserves the ever-greater dissimilarity. As a space, God is an eruption in time that can be participated in but not conceptualized or objectified. God is thereby differentiated from any other identifiable object or rhythm in the world, including those of the Church, and therefore cannot be identified with any particular rhythm as a seal of approval, or confined within a rhythm and thereby domesticated. He remains free to confront all rhythms, including those of the Church. While the events of Christ's life and post-resurrection appearances have a rhythmic quality, the encoding of those rhythms into the foundation of an ecclesial system is no guarantee of its participation in the rhythms of

⁶⁵ Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 244. This is similar to the way in which Kimerer LaMothe describes the divine, namely as a kind of power that disrupts the horizon but does not appear or does not produce something new or different. It is an eruption within the horizontal movements of life (LaMothe, *Between Dancing and Writing*, 163). This power has a double character in that it is both agential and dislocating, revelation and concealment. LaMothe says that "Humans express and acquire power over the ends of life by naming (and thereby relating themselves to) a realm of disruptive, uncanny, enabling power that recedes beyond their farthest reach with every claim to master it." (*Ibid.*, 165). She cites the book of Revelation as an example in the way that it continually delays the end with multiple turning points that repeat the crisis-judgement-vindication shape (156).

⁶⁶ Thus, Fiddes describes the transcendent as a hidden, intimate space in and for the world: Fiddes, *The Promised End*, 254-58.

God, as is evidenced by the many ecclesial injustices over the centuries. Imitation of the rhythms of Christ and thereby participation in God is less a matter of conforming to a pre-established pattern and more a matter of discerning the intersection of the rhythms of Church, relationship, and society as they move forward in time, as one would in a poem. Christ's resurrection is rhythmic, but the precise manifestation of that rhythm in any given place and time cannot be known in advance, but is discerned in and through that place in time. Such ongoing discernment inevitably includes caesuric interruptions that re-direct one's movements.

The community in which God's saving grace is active is not a place of peace and harmony over-against a culture of division, but is one that retains the ability to interrupt such self-enclosed and prematurely peaceful systems, to deepen conflict constructively, to incite self-questioning, and to participate in conversation and communion across such gaps anyway, just as God's love extends across the caesura of Holy Saturday, rather than overthrowing it to bring about immediate peace. Such a community is made possible by the disjunction introduced in the resurrection that makes the Church aware of the contingency of its reality and experience due to the fact that at any moment Christ may appear and call that experience into question. Lacoste, mentioned previously, points out that liturgy is not a "theophanic space," but a topological subversion, breaking through the enclosure of experience. While it offers the synchronic perspective of a symbolic situation in which nothing interposes itself between God and the creature, this is only for the purpose of allowing the eschaton to disrupt the present. He says that the proximity between God and creature at such moments "shelters a still greater distance,"⁶⁷ a phrase that is reminiscent of Przywara's similiarity in ever greater dissimilarity.

⁶⁷ Lacoste, *Experience and the Absolute*, 84.

Rowan Williams likewise points out how the practices of the Church, and the Eucharist in particular, act as sites that encourage self-questioning and interruption by facilitating the necessary openness to the free grace of God that may always reverse our assumptions. He suggests that the Eucharist requires an oscillation between the two poles of the participant's identity as both betrayer and restored penitent.⁶⁸ This is an identity that is based in the belief that a recognition of failure, betrayal and collusion with violence is the basis of hope, that salvation is based on a disruptive confrontation with Christ.⁶⁹ In the Eucharist, we meet Christ as a stranger. The caesura of the tomb questions our identity and status, questions what we thought we knew. It silences us and causes disorientation and it is this dislocation that is the basis of restored relations.⁷⁰ Participation is not a simple process of imitation and identification with Christ because we are not the crucified innocents, but the betrayers. As such, Williams says that prayer, liturgy, and Eucharist operate between two contradictory poles: a recognition of the formlessness that surrounds Christ, which results in our lost-ness, and an association with Jesus.⁷¹ The Eucharist oscillates between Gethsemane and Emmaus, betrayal and forgiveness, connection and confrontation, oppressor and penitent.⁷² We might add that it operates through an oscillation between diachronic and synchronic perspectives. The body that the Church meets in the Eucharist is broken, and this is not only a sign of Christ's pain but that "behind and beneath the smooth wheels of the socially constructed world are two abiding facts: unreconciled pain and unexhausted compassion."⁷³ The Eucharist here is thus pictured not only in terms of participation but as a disruption to the smooth totalizations of

⁶⁸ Williams, *Resurrection*, 58.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 62.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 85-86.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁷² Julie Gittoes, *Anamnesis and the Eucharist: Contemporary Anglican Approaches* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), 112. Gittoes argues that Williams provides what Catherine Pickstock's theology of the eucharist lacks, namely specific social and political effects. This is arguably because the eucharist functions, for Pickstock, as a premature eschatology.

⁷³ Rowan Williams, *Open to Judgement: Sermons and Addresses* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2014), 55.

social construction and its power-relations.⁷⁴ This perspective locates the rhythms of the Church in the rhythms of the larger social and political world in which the Church performs these rhythms, and according to Williams this includes a recognition of the Church's own collusion with violence. Salvation effects an empathetic connection between God and human persons but this involves the necessary disruptions, dislocations, and caesurae to subjectivity. Finally, in the Eucharist the Church celebrates the interruption to the most totalizing and isolating system of all – death itself.⁷⁵

Another way of expressing this is to say that the pattern of the Christian community's experience of God is not one of pure peace and participation, but is cruciform.⁷⁶ If Christian salvation is performed in the symbol of the Eucharist, then salvation is an oscillation between an ongoing interruption to identity through confrontation with pain and failure, and an affirmation of unity with God in Christ in the movement of his life. The intra-creaturely oscillation between two things that cannot be unified – a desire for peace and the friction of the presence of the other as other – are brought together in the beyond of the theological oscillation between God in-and-beyond the world. This is the cruciform shape of the rhythm of salvation, which is the same shape as Przywara's *analogia entis*.

Thus, salvation is not a simple ascent into participation according to a given pattern. The rhythms through which the relationships of the Church are forged and enacted are not a given pattern, but are themselves worked out through the social life of the Church in time.⁷⁷ The fact that we are often tempted to easy peace and pattern means that God's presence sometimes appears as reversals of human expectations and in breaking up the

⁷⁴ Gittoes, *Anamnesis and the Eucharist*, 126, 131.

⁷⁵ Williams, *Resurrection*, 60; David Ford, *Self and Salvation: Being Transformed* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 62-63.

⁷⁶ Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 284.

⁷⁷ This observation is again a more specific example of Kathryn Tanner's argument that the relations of cultural elements are not given but emerge from within social life (Tanner, *Theories of Culture*, 44).

various ways in which cultures, including the Church itself, set up networks of connections in an attempt to construct a whole.⁷⁸ There is an analogy, then, between the Christian community at its best and the way in which the African-American slave community responded to the dominant culture. Kathryn Tanner says that “Rather than generate cultural artifacts that are all their own, Christian social practices, like those of socially subordinated subcultures, have to make do with materials that they do not themselves produce.”⁷⁹ The social and political performance of salvation in and through the Church is not an alternative culture of participation, but opens up gaps within enclosed frameworks, allowing for the improvisation of new kinds of relationships. This does not deny that there have been many times in which the Church itself has been part of a too-tight system or culture that has required interruption. The point is that there is no sharp division between a world that experiences God’s grace as interruptive and a Church that experiences it as harmonizing. The difference lies in the disjunction that Christ inaugurates that allows for the non-coincidence with the flow of social time that enables the Church to see this grace.

As such, Agamben’s description of the remnant is a helpful description for the political identity of the Church:

The people is neither the all nor the part, neither the majority nor the minority. Instead, it is that which can never coincide with itself, as all or as part, that which infinitely remains or resists in each division This remnant is the figure, or the substantiality assumed by a people in a decisive moment, as such is the only real political subject.⁸⁰

In the same way that salvation is not one rhythm in competition with others, but a configuration of all rhythms of relationship according to the oscillation between identification and formlessness, and unity and strangeness, the Church is not another

⁷⁸ Lash, *Easter in Ordinary*, 227. Lash is here arguing that God always poses a threat to total attempt at explaining reality because he does not fit in any system. There are biblical examples of God’s disrupting too-tight societies – the scattering of the builders of the tower of Babel, for example, or Jesus’ disruption of the family and of Jewish nationalistic impulses.

⁷⁹ Tanner, *Theories of Culture*, 111.

⁸⁰ Agamben, *The Time that Remains*, 57.

community in competition with others. It is neither a universal whole, but nor is it one part at the exclusion of others. Its identity cannot coincide with itself because it is an oscillation between identification with the world and confrontation to it, and between identification with Christ and being confronted by Christ. It is not a circumscribable identity, but a particular kind of movement. Notice that this allows for a positive interpretation of the multiplicity of Christian Church denominations as varieties of rhythms, sometimes in harmony and sometimes in tension with one another that are nevertheless part of the same poem of participation in various ways and to various degrees. Each Church is itself an oscillation between participation and confrontation. No one Church can claim to participate wholly in God to the exclusion of others. Rather, this is the sort of hubris that might require disruption.

Of course, all of this is simply to state in the abstract, but it raises the difficult question of how it is that the Church differentiates healthy rhythms from hegemonic rhythms. Madeleine L'Engle's *A Wrinkle in Time* offers one clue in differentiating the kind of synchrony that emerges from a mechanistic and repetitive alienation in which personal identity is dissolved, from the loving connection in which individuality is preserved. One could argue that a mechanistic pattern of repetition does not even qualify as a rhythm precisely because it lacks a significant element of the diachronic. It is a pattern that is identifiable at the outset and to which everything simply submits. It does not unfold through time, but is simply repeated in time. This suggests that patterns that do not rely on the kind of call-and-response that allows them to unfold in time, but simply pulls everything under their already-established forms, thereby reducing particulars to cogs in a machine, are likely to require disruption. On the other hand, those patterns that unfold in time through a dialogical process that generates a shared space are healthy rhythms. These rhythms are healthy precisely because they include and are capable of making use of spaces, disjunctions, and interruptions as part of their unfolding.

Nevertheless, while one can make these sorts of generalizations, the process of discerning particular patterns as healthy rhythms or unhealthy hegemonies is itself only a temporal discernment and not a pre-given pattern. As with Przywara's analogy, the unification of the Church's oscillating identity is located in a beyond and is thus not a pattern that can be simply identified. The Church retains its responsibility for moving well with and against the world. While it is true, synchronically-speaking, that we empathetically participate in the body of Christ, this is always relativized by the "ever-greater-dissimilarity," which means that social unity is by its nature a diachronic performance always in formation through encounter.

Conclusion

Just as the rhythm of the poem is a performed and experienced rhythm, I have here described the rhythm of salvation as performed in the Church. The rhythmic form of the Church – its calendars and feasts, its repetitive liturgies – is not incidental or decorative, but is the form and context through which we conceptualize the nature of salvation. While no one would contest that rhythm is a part of Christian ecclesial expression, I have endeavoured to show that this rhythmic expression is central to how we understand the nature of salvation itself, not in terms of a precise pattern but the meaning of the rhythmic form in general.

What, then, is the rhythm of salvation and what, through the lens of rhythm, is salvation? The rhythm of salvation is revealed in the relation between the cross and the resurrection and in the tension between the temporal experience of these events as interruptive, and the eschatological meaning that is offered and glimpsed in their halting temporality. This is consistent with the nature of rhythm as foregrounded in poetry as including both the synchronic and the diachronic perspectives, the meeting of pattern and disruption. The rhythm of salvation is such that it does not overthrow the rhythms of

everyday human life but reconfigures them through specific, eschatological disruptions that form the movements through space and time in which such disruptions appear. Notice that this rhythm must hold several different conceptions of time together: a diachronic movement forward through time in which the creature does not know the future and can thus be surprised, a repetitive time appropriate to both nature and liturgy that provides a pattern out of which eschatological harmony can be intuited, and a reverse-arrow in which the eschaton comes to the creature, interrupts its time, and shapes its actions from the future.⁸¹ The rhythm of salvation is the particular intersections of these temporal shapes.

From the perspective of rhythm, salvation is the experience and performance of this oscillating tension between participation in the eschatological reality made possible in the resurrection and the confrontations and disruptions through which this eschatological reality is manifest in time. Both of these dimensions of salvation are rhythmic, and both imply each other. Participation is a significant dimension of salvation in that it both indicates that Christianity understands health to be a matter of relationship and in that it proposes that persons are saved from the tight forces of nothingness, evil, sin, death through relationship. This is the more synchronic perspective on salvation in that it is an account of that which is accomplished in salvation and gives an indication of an eschatological reality for which the Church hopes. Rhythm is important at this point as a helpful way for understanding, from the creaturely side, what it means to participate in God. The human participates in relationships more generally through rhythm, and in alternative temporal realities such as poetry and dance, which are both continuous with and discontinuous from everyday time. Thus, rhythm provides a way of thinking how it is that the activities of the Christian life such as prayer, Eucharist, liturgy, etc. are means of participating in a certain rhythm analogous to the way in which repetition, bodily

⁸¹ Fiddes, *The Promised End*, 190.

movement, and conversation are the rhythmic means by which one participates in what is not generated by the self.

The diachronic dimension of salvation tempers this depiction of salvation as an accommodation of the creature to the movements of God in the economy of salvation by describing the rhythmic implications of salvation's resistance to the hegemony of systems of sin. The suffering and evil still present in the world require that salvation not simply be described as persons transitioning seamlessly from the hold of tight sinful systems into the healthy rhythms of God's economy of relations. Rather, moving from sickness to health requires the disruption of self-enclosure and the opening of spaces for the performance and realization of new, participatory rhythms. Since salvation is ongoing in time, such disruption was not an event that happened once for all but, as demonstrated by the character of the resurrection, is part of the very nature of the creature's salvific relation to Christ in time. In fact, it is this temporal form that lends salvation its rhythmic character as an ongoing oscillation between stop and flow, and between confrontation by and identification with Christ through which the Church and the creature begin to discern the eschatological pattern from within time.

Notice, then, what the rhythm of salvation is not. It is not the simple unfolding of a shape without friction, as with Benveniste's rhythm. The rhythm of salvation is more faithful to the actual lived experience and performance of time as including confrontations from a beyond that are necessary for salvation from sinful systems that manifest as personal and political realities. Nor is the rhythm of salvation a simple, harmonious resounding of the order of creation with God, for the same reason. These understandings of rhythm do not consider its personal and relational element, reducing it to metaphysical structure. As I explained in the introduction, it is impossible for us to know whether rhythm in general is an ontological reality independent of human experience. If we carry this through to the rhythm of salvation, then salvation as rhythmic is based first in the

nature of human experience and the fact that salvation for the human creature is appropriate to its life. As a pattern that emerges through relationship and makes such relationship possible, the rhythm of salvation is a social reality. The rhythmic consequences for being as a whole are then determined only secondarily and provisionally, as the creature moves through time. This is the only means we have by which to represent that metaphysics to ourselves. Even for Przywara, who is concerned with metaphysics, this metaphysics is always described from the perspective of the intra-creaturely in relation to the theological such that the *analogia entis* is always first a practical principle because it is impossible to see the whole of the harmonious structure from within time. What rhythm instead points to are the lived and experienced connections between the creature and the divine.

Finally, however, the rhythm of Christian salvation is not reducible to diachronic disruption alone. The nature of the spaces that God enacts in history, which give salvation through time its rhythmic quality, are of a particular sort. They are not caesurae that are so indefinite so as to be either divine or demonic, nor are they simple lacks within the psyche of the subject that drag the person down into an endless attempt to fill them. Rather, as divine, such spaces are the possibility of creation and newness. I accept that there is a degree of ambiguity surrounding them insofar as the structures that humans enact in the spaces that are offered are less than perfect and sometimes downright hegemonic as with the crimes committed by the Church in the space of “the body of Christ”, as mentioned previously. However, spaces are precisely the manifestation of God’s grace and forgiveness. God opens spaces within systems that would otherwise be self-enclosed and too tight, thereby demonstrating that hegemony is never absolute. New spaces are always offered. Attempts at self-enclosure are suspended by the caesura such that one is again invited to participate in the complexities of the rhythm appropriate to the creature.

Conclusion

“I am writing to a rhythm and not to a plot. ... All writing is nothing but putting words on the backs of rhythm.”

Virginia Woolf, written about *The Waves* (D3: 316)

The research of this project contributes to the argument that the category of rhythm ought to be taken into account when articulating the Christian doctrine of salvation since salvation is in part understood through the sorts of movements it involves. This demonstrates that rhythm is a theological category. Considering the category of rhythm helpfully illuminates and grounds the doctrine of salvation in the human experience of everyday life, and bases doctrine not only in the semantic content of the liturgy, but also in its rhythmic form. This has consequences for how we think about the rhythmic dimensions of Christian expression, since this is no longer simply a separate aesthetic concern but inherently theological. It is also important for our concept of the nature and responsibilities of doctrine because it suggests that doctrine is not only discourse regarding a certain ontological situation, but also includes an account of the movements through which this situation is encountered, experienced, and performed, not as a separate “liturgical studies,” but as inherent to understanding those “doctrines” themselves. Such theology assumes

itself to be shaped in particular ways by the movements of the creature who is articulating theology.

The conclusion that rhythm is in fact important in the articulation of theological doctrine is based on three inter-related arguments. First, research regarding the degree to which rhythm pervades human experience supports my claim that rhythm is an important part of life and consequently an important part of salvation as well, if salvation is the health (*salus*) of this human life. In particular, rhythm plays a part in communication by connecting the semantic content of language to the emotions of the speaker and hearer and to the context of the conversation, thereby creating a space of mutual endeavour in which participants feel themselves to be engaged in the same meaning. This is the case with larger groups as well. Rhythm facilitates group cohesion in and through activities such as dance, religious services, and political protest. However, in some of these cases, rhythm is simultaneously used by these groups as a way to resist other rhythms and identities imposed on them. Such research is important in establishing rhythm as a category of theological import because it shows how rhythm is a ubiquitous dimension of life, particularly in the formation and negotiation of relationship and relational identity. Thus, insofar as salvation includes the redemption of human-human and human-divine relationships, rhythm will play a part in how such redemption is enacted.

Second, the various ways in which rhythm has been used in philosophical and theological attempts to make sense of reality demonstrates the usefulness of the category of rhythm for making sense of metaphysical questions such as the nature of the relationship between God and creation. The variety of theological consequences of these approaches shows that the discussion regarding the theologically-appropriate role of rhythm in descriptions of reality is important because there is a genuine discussion that can and ought to be had regarding the role of rhythm in theology. One cannot simply affirm that salvation is rhythmic. The ambiguous nature of rhythm and the theological effects of various

articulations of it require dialogue regarding its nature and its role in theology. Rhythm is therefore a category that is of significance in theological discourse. This debate regarding its role and nature suggests that theology ought to intentionally and self-consciously articulate a position on the role and nature of rhythm that is congruent with theology's aims and commitments. I have made an argument for one such position in chapter five based on the theology of Erich Przywara.

Third, rhythm sheds light on the events in which Christian salvation is based, namely the events of Easter weekend, and on how the rhythm of these events forms the Christian experience of salvation. Rhythm is a significant dimension of the Church's experience and performance of salvation in liturgy and the church calendar. Since rhythm is already part of how the Church performs its identity and participates in salvation, doctrine regarding the nature of salvation ought to work to understand the contribution of this dimension if it is to be faithful to the theology of the Church, not only in its explicit verbal expression, but also the theology expressed in its practice. The nature of participation is made clearer through the concept of rhythm in that rhythm functions as that which enables persons to participate in a group identity, a space of mutual endeavour, or the emotional tenor of a poem or piece of music. As such, focusing on rhythm makes it clearer how we might think about participation in God and how this is something that is co-extensive with, and therefore formative for, life and experience more generally. In particular, the human mode of participation in the rhythms of the Trinity as temporal means that the relationship between the rhythms of salvation cannot be known all at once but are only discerned in and through time, as in a poem. The invitation to participation is thus sometimes experienced not as harmony, but as confrontation to and interruption of the rhythms in which one is habituated, much in the way that a caesura might interrupt and re-direct the rhythm of a poem.

Since rhythm is not a monolithic category, but one that includes multiple definitions and functions with various theological consequences, one must think intentionally about its nature. I proposed the following definition of rhythm: an oscillation between synchronic form and diachronic experience. This definition is supported by poetic theory, is illuminating for understanding both alternative philosophical uses of rhythm as well as the doctrine of salvation, and avoids the theological problems of other approaches. Other philosophical approaches that I considered in this thesis can be classified as either primarily synchronic or diachronic. The synchronic approaches, when applied to metaphysics, use rhythm as a way of describing how various dimensions of reality, be they metaphysical layers, opposing forces, or diverse singularities, are held together as a whole. These approaches, whether they acknowledge the transcendent or not, are at risk of becoming God's-eye perspectives on reality in which the knower is abstracted from experience and is able to give an account of the whole. This is theologically problematic because it spatializes reality in a way that does not take sufficient account of the difference in perspective between our current intra-temporal position and the coming eschaton, and because it does not acknowledge how it is that the pattern of reality is something that we only know in part as we move through it, involving surprises and confrontations from beyond the human perception of the pattern. Thus, in addition to these theological problems, this account is also not faithful to the nature of rhythm itself as something experienced from within time. The diachronic account maintains precisely such an intra-temporal and intra-creaturely perspective by using rhythm as a way of describing human engagement with time and reality as an interaction between the patterns and structures that govern the flow of time, and the moments from which the flow and its structures can be momentarily or indefinitely suspended into something as yet unknown. While this approach is amenable to theology as an intra-creaturely perspective on the transcendent, it is insufficient in that it tells us very little about the character of the beyond.

I propose an oscillation between these two perspectives because such an oscillation 1) allows the strengths of each perspective to correct the short-comings of the other, 2) is faithful to the limited and intra-creaturely perspective of the theologian in refusing to define a position from which both perspectives could be grasped at once and 3) corresponds to the way in which the human encounters rhythm in artistic practices such as poetry. My analysis of Erich Przywara's *Analogia Entis* is a demonstration of what such an oscillation looks like in metaphysics and theology. A consideration of the rhythm of Christian salvation also supports this definition by showing that the events of Easter weekend must be viewed from both a synchronic and a diachronic perspective, which reveals that the events constitute neither an absolute continuity nor an absolute rupture, but a complex interplay of flow and interruption appropriate to the nature of rhythm. While this definition is based in theories regarding the nature and operation of rhythm in poetry, it is also a theologically appropriate and helpful definition. It takes account of the intra-creaturely and intra-temporal perspective of the human, while also admitting its intersection by another movement, which gives us synchronic glimpses of the nature of the unity and harmony of these movements for which the creature hopes at the conclusion of the poem, as it were.

However, the two poles – synchronic shape and diachronic experience are not entirely equal. In arguing that the appropriate form of movement with respect to these poles is one of oscillation I have given privilege to diachronic experience, since the movement of oscillation is itself a mode of diachronic experience. I believe this is appropriate to rhythm conceived as something inevitably bound up with time, at least as it is known and experienced by the human creature. Rather than approach rhythm as an ontological category, I have been ultimately interested in rhythm as a fundamental and irreducible dimension of human experience and the way in which this is taken up into the human creature's relation to God. There is no other way we could speak about it honestly,

for I do not think we could muster enough distance between ourselves and our experience of rhythm in order to delineate a more “objective” approach, a more synchronic approach, in other words.

Moreover, the reader will have noticed that the form of this thesis is itself one of oscillation back and forth between these two perspectives. This privileging of the diachronic is reflective of the process of reading and writing, themselves movements that take place in and through time. In presenting rhythm through language, an emphasis is bound to fall on the diachronic side. What I hope all of this amounts to is an approach to soteriological rhythm that is appropriately creaturely, which is to say humble, that it does not try to say too much, but limits itself to what can reasonably be said from the human perspective, embedded as it is in the human experience of rhythm. Thus, in proposing rhythm as an important theological category through which to understand the nature of salvation, I am also proposing a particular theological methodology. Rather than attempt to articulate a doctrine as a discreet circumscribable object, to approach doctrine rhythmically, through the rhythms of salvation performed by the Church in particular, is to articulate doctrine as a process of moving between perspectives because one can never see the whole from a single position. Likewise, since rhythm functions to connect things, to approach doctrine rhythmically is also to approach particular doctrines through their connections with other doctrines. This is not to say that there are not already many good theologians who do in fact do this. However, thinking about rhythm nevertheless gives voice and theological significance to this approach. It is an attempt to acknowledge for theology what Virginia Woolf knew and embodied about writing in general, namely that a piece of writing is a manifestation of the rhythm of a particular human creature as it moves between ideas. Thus, a final reason that rhythm ought to be taken into account when articulating theological doctrine is that it is a fundamental part of the act of articulation itself.

Contributions

I have already mentioned two of the methodological contributions that this investigation into the theological significance of rhythm makes. The first is its contribution to the grounding of doctrine in church practice, a concern that is becoming increasingly recognized by theology. This helps to ensure that theological discourse is articulated in response to church doctrine and practice, and the contemporary challenges that the Church might be facing, and that such discourse, in turn, forms how it is that the Church thinks about its practices, doctrines, and challenges. Rhythm contributes to this objective by leading theology to consider the kinds of movements that liturgy requires and that its doctrines reflect and promote.

Second, I have also said that the project makes a contribution to how it is that we think about and perform the articulation of doctrine, not as the circumscription of a particular object that can be seen all at once, but as an articulation that happens in and through a movement between various perspectives, based in the recognition of the theologian as creature and the rhythm that this entails. This is a contribution to what is often described as the theology of language, the question of how it is that we can and ought to speak about God. Emphasizing rhythm draws attention to the embodied and temporal dimensions of language as communication rather than as a system of signs that problematically captures God. My approach is consistent with that of Rowan Williams in his recently-published Gifford Lectures *The End of Words*, which is likewise concerned to point out the mobile materiality of all language. A focus on rhythm sharpens our understanding of the nature of the connections between communication and materiality through movement.

Besides such methodological considerations, this thesis also makes several other contributions to the fields of both theology and philosophy. The first is related to

aesthetics. Aesthetics has often been a sub-discipline sequestered from other areas of philosophy with its own questions pertaining to the nature of beauty, its relation to objective and subjective, to value, to the sublime, to taste, to the artist and the spectator, and the like.¹ While there has been much work done recently on the relationship between theology and the arts,² and some historical investigation into the relationship between the field of aesthetics and philosophy and politics more generally,³ this project takes a category that has historically been the concern of aesthetics alone and demonstrates its wider significance to both philosophy and theology. For philosophy, this research illuminates the connections between the poetic analysis of rhythm and the way in which the category is conceptualized in continental philosophy, thereby grounding an analysis of the philosophical concept in poetics, which contributes to understanding how and in what respect these metaphysical approaches are rooted in aesthetic perspectives. This demonstrates that an aesthetic category can have significance beyond the arts for thought more generally.

Likewise theologically, rather than merely performing theological reflection on the contribution of the arts to theology, this thesis demonstrates the theological significance of an aesthetic category in revealing how it is already implicitly part of the Christian doctrine of salvation. Theology need not be artificially applied to the arts as an analytical tool, or vice versa. Aesthetics and artistic considerations are already a part of theology itself. Rhythm is not simply an illuminating artistic parallel but is implicitly part of the structure of salvation itself by virtue of its being a structure of the movements and processes of human relationship.

¹ Indeed this is the argument of Agamben's book *The Man Without Content*, which articulates a criticism of aesthetics already begun by Heidegger.

² Examples include the work of Jeremy Begbie, George Pattison, Richard Harries, and those involved with St Andrews Center for Theology, Imagination, and the Arts.

³ Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

This contribution is related to the larger methodological contribution of calling into question the barrier between “experience” and “metaphysics.” As I outlined in the introduction, the two have often been thought to be incompatible and both have been considered by some to be problematic for theology. However, the category of rhythm is largely ignorant of these sorts of divisions. It is a part of human experience, by which I mean the human encounter with the everyday, yet it is also invoked by those attempting to give an account of how one ought make sense of reality. Thus, here as well, rhythm is a connector, in this case between disciplines or methodologies. Considering rhythm therefore contributes to a theology that is neither solely a matter of metaphysics, nor based in particular personal experiences in rejection of metaphysical speculation, but that considers the project of making sense of reality to be a part of the human encounter with reality and vice versa.

One of the most prominent dividers between metaphysics and experience is that the attempts of the former to make sense of that which transcends experience, of that which experience, immanent to the human creature, cannot know. Following rhythm across experience and metaphysics has therefore also led to a particular way of approaching the nature of transcendence and its relation to immanence. Rhythm is related to this debate in all of the philosophical and theological positions that I consider. Those who approach rhythm synchronically tend to articulate the nature of transcendence in spatial terms, whether they accept or reject it, while Giorgio Agamben, in maintaining a radically creaturely perspective, in some ways much like that of Jean-Luc Marion, thinks of the beyond as that which is not yet come and maintains a radical apophaticism regarding it. The absolute affirmation or absolute rejection of transcendence assumes a synchronic perspective because it assumes that one can know what the transcendent is and then accept or reject its existence accordingly. Agamben, however, neither accepts nor rejects the transcendent. Instead, he simply points to the threshold that indicates a beyond about

which we cannot know anything. If one is truly speaking about the transcendent, one must at that moment inhabit such a diachronic position. This is not to say that one cannot say anything about God, since the Christian believes that it is possible see the relationship between God and the world synchronically or “symbolically,” as Jean-Yves Lacoste says, and there are many other dimensions of God’s relation to the world that can be spoken about and affirmed from this position. However, if one also wants to propose that this God is transcendent, then the analogy must pass over into silence. Introducing the category of rhythm into this debate therefore contributes the question of how it is that time and perspective determine one’s understanding of a beyond or a transcendent. In order to really affirm and really encounter transcendence, one must be sure one is standing in the right place. As with the rhythm of a poem, this means that these two things cannot be inhabited at the same time. One cannot say something about God and also indicate that this is the nature of his transcendence, since it would then cease to be transcendence. It does not mean that those things are untrue, only that they cannot be said from the same perspective as God’s transcendence is affirmed. To be a creature is to move, to be unable to know God at once, from a single position, and it is transcendence that safeguards this creaturely movement. Rhythm thus contributes to the debate regarding transcendence and its relationship to immanence by articulating transcendence through movements such as surprise and oscillation, rather than pointing to an object as such.

Theologically, this project also makes a contribution to scholarship on Erich Przywara, of which there is currently very little in the English-speaking world. This is timely, as John Betz and David Bentley Hart have recently translated Przywara’s *Analogia Entis*, which hopefully means that he will begin to receive more scholarly attention in the English-speaking world. However, even with respect to scholarship on Przywara more widely, while Przywara frequently uses rhythm in his description of metaphysics and the *analogia entis*, he nowhere defines what he means by this, nor do any other scholars

attempt an analysis of his use of the concept. This project therefore adds to scholarship on the thought of Przywara by contributing an explication of his understanding of rhythm in dialogue with and in comparison to various other philosophical and theological uses of the term and to poetic theories on rhythm, thereby making Przywara's use of the category more clear as well as giving credence to it by demonstrating its correspondence to poetic approaches to rhythm.

I make a similar contribution with respect to Giorgio Agamben. There have been many commentaries on Agamben's political work, some theological notice, especially of his book on Paul's letter to the Romans, and William Watkin has published an important and helpful book on Agamben's poetics, highlighting his treatment of rhythm as of particular importance. However, despite Watkin's assertion that rhythm is the ground on which all future work about Agamben's "logopoetic" mode of thought must be done,⁴ no one has yet considered the significance of Agamben's work on rhythm and poetics for interpreting his approach to political philosophy, and how it is that this aesthetic category has significance for Agamben's wider thought. In chapter three, I made the argument that Agamben's approach to political theory is one of diachronic rhythm in that he locates himself within patterns, structures, and systems, waiting for and identifying caesurae within those systems from which those patterns can be suspended, similar to the way in which he describes rhythm in *The Man Without Content* as stops in the flow, in which artist and spectator can regain their common humanity. Thus, rather than a marginal part of Agamben's corpus, or simply important for understanding his poetics, rhythm is significant in understanding Agamben's philosophical and political project more generally. Furthermore, I have also particularly contributed to theological engagement with Agamben. Beyond simply making connections between certain themes in Agamben's work

⁴ William Watkin, *The Literary Agamben*, 197.

and Christian theology as Colby Dickinson does, I have made a defense of Agamben against some of his theological critics, made comparisons between his work and that of Jean-Luc Marion and Erich Przywara, and put forward a theory regarding what Agamben's appropriate theological role or relationship to theology might be.

Finally, philosophically, the contrast between diachronic and synchronic perspectives provides an alternative way of thinking about and classifying various continental philosophers. In particular, commentary on Agamben has often allied him with Gilles Deleuze, while marginalizing the difference between them.⁵ Bringing out the way in which these thinkers use rhythm, however, re-organizes them along different lines. Regardless of the apparent similarities in concepts or language between Agamben and Deleuze, emphasizing rhythm reveals that these two thinkers begin from fundamentally different perspectives and with very different aims, such that they cannot be categorized together in any straightforward way. This is helpful because it breaks up what is sometimes approached as a monolithic group of "postmodern" philosophers, revealing that the perspectives and objectives of various thinkers classified as "postmodern" may in fact be different in important ways.

My emphasis on rhythm however also led to the peculiar association between Deleuze's immanence and Augustine's musical ontology. I would like to avoid over-emphasizing this connection. The two thinkers are clearly in many ways remote from one another, and even their understanding of rhythm is very different. Augustine associates rhythm with number and metrics, while Deleuze's rhythm is based on a Benvenistian rejection of metre. Nevertheless, I do not think that the similarity of Deleuze's perspective

⁵ For example, Colby Dickinson. William Watkin does this as well, allying Agamben more closely with Deleuze than with Derrida, although he is more explicit about the differences between them than is Dickinson. I have done the opposite, suggesting that Derrida and Agamben both take a more diachronic approach than Deleuze. While it is possible that Watkin is correct to say that Agamben and Derrida have different prescriptions regarding how one ought to move forward responsibly in time, the point from which they both begin is one of being within the movement of time and negotiating reality from that position. This is less true of Deleuze. My contention is that this beginning point of perspective is in fact a more fundamental difference because it signals a difference in aims.

to those members of Radical Orthodoxy who appeal to Augustine in constructing an ontology is contrived. The similarity lies in the fact that both use rhythm to construct an ontology, which, as the comparison with Agamben shows, is not the only way in which one can think about the role of rhythm in reality. This is not simply a curiosity but may be important in suggesting that thinkers such as Milbank, Oliver, and Pabst end up with similar problems to those they reject. Moreover, while proponents of Radical Orthodoxy have been particularly enthusiastic about Erich Przywara's metaphysics, this thesis shows that the metaphysics of Przywara may present challenges to some of the ways in which he is appropriated by members of Radical Orthodoxy such as John Betz and David Bentley Hart. Thus, while I do not want to overstate the function of rhythm in classifying thinkers as a whole, it nevertheless provides an alternative perspective from which to consider various thinkers' assumptions and projects, illuminating similarities and differences which have heretofore gone unnoticed.

Future Directions

Nevertheless, this work on rhythm is only a beginning. I have been limited in this thesis largely to defining the category and establishing its import for Christian theology. I have chosen to focus primarily on the doctrine of salvation since this is the doctrine that considers most directly the transformation of human experience and therewith the theological manifestation of the rhythms of that experience. The role of rhythm in salvation is in some ways the most straightforward bridge between rhythm in other disciplines and theology since it is the point of most focused attention on the relationship between God and creature, and therewith the various dimensions of the creature's experience.

However, this doctrine cannot be articulated in abstraction from the others that it necessarily and immediately invokes and presupposes. Further research would therefore involve a more detailed account of the nature and role of rhythm in doctrines beyond

soteriology. In particular, articulating a doctrine of salvation raises questions about the nature of creation and the Trinity. While I have touched upon and referred to these, particularly in the chapter on Przywara's use of rhythm, I have not here been able to explore the relation of rhythm to these doctrines in detail. Nevertheless, some of the discussions in current contemporary theology are implicitly, at least in part, questions about the rhythms involved in God, creation, and the relation between them. For example, I have already pointed out in this project how debates about the relation between immanence and transcendence, and the nature of participation are partly questions about the nature of rhythm. Considering contemporary theological questions pertaining to doctrines of creation and Trinity in the light of rhythm would strengthen my argument that rhythm is a category of theological significance.

With respect to creation, the first and most obvious question is how we ought to think about cosmological rhythms. I have already alluded to Catherine Keller and other process theologians who emphasize the rhythmic dimension of creation as ongoing movements of call and response between God and chaos, as well as visions such as those of Simon Oliver of a circular motion in which everything participates. For a third perspective, Dietrich Bonhoeffer points to the significance of rhythm in the Genesis account of creation, emphasizing oscillation: The day "is the great rhythm, the natural dialectic of creation."⁶ He says that "The rhythm – repose and movement in one – which gives and takes and gives again and takes again, which thus eternally points towards God's giving and taking, to God's freedom on the other side of repose and movement – that rhythm is the day."⁷ What is the relationship between these various movements?

However, beyond simply the question of what the rhythms of creation are, rhythm may be able to bring a new perspective to debates surrounding the relationship between

⁶ Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall* (London, Camelot Press, 1966), 26.

⁷ Bonhoeffer, *Creation and Fall*, 27.

natural theology and revelation, or nature and grace, by asking questions like: can we distinguish the rhythms of creation from the ways in which they have been bent out of shape? Does redemption bend such rhythms back into shape or does it introduce new rhythms? Are the rhythms of nature and grace different, and what is their relationship to one another? The synchronic and diachronic as two perspectives on the same rhythm which nevertheless cannot be inhabited simultaneously may be helpful here for thinking about nature and grace as two perspectives on the one rhythm of relationship between God and creation, much in the way that the relation between immanence and transcendence can be approached in this way.

Furthermore, the relationship between rhythm and the Christian doctrine of creation is related to salvation because thinking about creation in terms of rhythm raises questions regarding the nature of the human participation in the act of creation, sometimes called co-creation or sub-creation. Does sub-creation have a particular rhythm that is itself a redemptive or sanctifying participation? Answering this question might help to identify one of the healthy rhythms of salvation more specifically.

The role of rhythm in conceptualizing the Trinity has already been considered by Paul Fiddes. Nevertheless, there is room here for expansion, particularly in thinking about more specific debates and conceptualizations regarding the Trinity. For example, Karen Kilby's question with respect to Balthasar concerning whether or not there is an eternal separation of some sort between Father and Son, or whether the separation on the cross was an unprecedented event within the Trinity, or indeed whether there was any such separation at all is in part a question about rhythm, about the kinds of continuity and disjunction at play in the Trinity. These are questions pertaining to the relationship between what are often called the immanent and economic Trinity. Since rhythm includes ideas of both synchronicity and harmony, as well as temporality, the category may be

helpful for conceptualizing how the eternal is related to time in a way that allows it to be really present, yet without compromising its eternity.

Likewise, the diachronic and synchronic perspectives on rhythm may be helpful in understanding the simultaneous eternal equality of the persons of the Trinity and their eternal relations of begetting and procession as two perspectives on the rhythm of the Trinity that are nevertheless not simultaneously inhabitable, suggesting that a certain, modified diachronic approach to articulating the rhythm of the Trinity might also be appropriate.⁸

The second direction in which this research on the role of rhythm in theology ought to be expanded is in considering the possible ways in which rhythm might be illuminating for political and social theory. This is a direction in which Agamben invites this research in articulating political theory in ways that are consistent with his ideas about rhythm. Making these kinds of connections explicit, not only with respect to Agamben, but more generally, would contribute to demonstrating the relevance of categories and ideas usually associated with aesthetics for ethics and politics, as well as illuminating rarely-considered dimensions of social and political situations. For example, in chapter one I pointed to research in black aesthetics, which has analyzed American slavery terms of the rhythms involved. The slave-trade removed Africans from the rhythms of their home country and subjected them to the rhythm of the machine. Part of the African-American response to the subjection of the machine was to improvise new and alternative rhythms through music, dance, and church services within gaps in the rhythms of the machine. Thus, rhythm was involved in the formation of African-American identity both in that a certain identity of the “cog in the machine” was imposed by slave-owners through rigidly-scheduled rhythms, and also in that part of how slaves took back the power to determine their own identities in

⁸ This question was posed to me by Emily Kempson on 04-11-2014.

different, more human, ways was through participation in alternative rhythms. Rhythm was a medium both of oppression and resistance and was therefore bound up with the exercise of power.

Such research raises questions about the rhythms of today's social situations and the ways in which these rhythms are a medium for the exercise or contestation of power. Some of the thinkers from the various fields that I have discussed in this project have expressed thoughts concerning the rhythms of the contemporary West. Henri Lefebvre has pointed out that the rhythm of our age is "banality become commodity," through the rhythms of the media which replace the other with a product or simulacrum.⁹ Amittai Aviram has suggested that one reason for our culture's disparagement of regular rhythm is that the character of most work is unpredictable rather than regular, such that our general, everyday experience of rhythm is an experience of irregularity.¹⁰ This raises the question of whether this makes one more or less politically active and empowered.

One particular avenue through which I think the rhythms of contemporary Western society could be helpfully understood is by the ways in which recent technological advances have changed the ways in which people move through time. If the factory machine of American slavery determined the kinds of rhythms imposed on the slaves, what kinds of rhythms, and the kinds of power and influence they enable, are made possible and impossible by portable electronic devices? Do these developments extend the rhythms of Victorian machines, for example, or are they different? In either case, what are the rhythms that such structures encourage and inhibit? How are they problematic and what are their potentials?

Rowan Williams has suggested that Western culture is becoming increasingly arrhythmic, and that perhaps the most significant and overlooked difference between the

⁹ Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis*, 58-59.

¹⁰ Aviram, "The Meaning of Rhythm," 167.

church and surrounding consumer-culture is the Church's approach to time as a gift that must be rhythmically appropriated.¹¹ This raises the question of how the rhythms of the Church intersect with the rhythms that surround it in the contemporary West and beyond, which is to historically locate the rhythms of salvation: What is the rhythm of salvation at this time and in this place? The situation is complex, but beginning to answer questions about the intersection of rhythm and power would help to identify possible totalizing and isolating rhythms that may require disruption for the purpose of renewed empathetic relationship, thereby making concrete what a soteriological configuration of the rhythms of contemporary Western society would entail.

This is also related to the question of the pedagogical role of rhythm, in terms of Christian formation. I have laid out a basic vision for how rhythm functions in soteriology, but what are the particular ways in which it might practically assist in sanctification? The seeds of such a description are already present in this project. For example, if rhythm brings us into harmony with persons, groups, movements and the like, and if sanctification includes such harmony, then identifying the rhythms that enable harmony with God in Christ is an enterprise that serves Christian formation. Likewise, identifying the rhythms in which we are held that hinder discipleship may help to envision how such rhythms can be creatively disrupted and their captives liberated. These sorts of investigations, moreover, tell us something about the nature of theology itself, namely that theology need not be only second-order discourse on the practices of the Church. While the present project is such an attempt to doctrinally make sense of the role of rhythm in the Christian life, if theology asks questions about the patterns of life and seeks to identify where these are helpful or problematic to Christian formation, theology itself thereby participates in pedagogy, sanctification, and liberation.

¹¹ Rowan Williams, "Faith and Human Flourishing," Humanitas Lecture, University of Oxford, 31-01-2014.

Finally, this thesis has, among other things, traced the use of the category of rhythm in recent philosophical and theological accounts of metaphysics. The dialogue between theology and recent continental philosophy has begun to consider the significance of aesthetic concepts in understanding metaphysical positions and commitments, and this thesis might be classified as part of that project. However, this opens up the larger historical question of how metaphysics, politics, and aesthetics have been related to one another and, more prescriptively, whether theology envisions a particular way in which they ought to be related to one another. The former question has been addressed in part by Terry Eagleton in his book *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, which traces the history of the relationship between political and aesthetic theory since the inception of the latter with Baumgarten.¹² However, what of the theological question of the role of aesthetics in theological discourse?

What the research and analysis in this thesis makes explicit is that certain basic metaphysical assumptions and projects, such as whether one approaches making sense of reality as a spectator or from within a flow, are helpfully understood in aesthetic terms. Such aesthetic positions in metaphysics have political and theological consequences, requiring that these aesthetic presuppositions be examined and theologically justified. It might therefore be time for theology to consider not only how it thinks about the role and significance of art, but also how it understands aesthetic and artistic categories to be related to how theology itself is articulated and what it seeks to perform.

¹² Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

Bibliography

- Agamben, Giorgio. *The Coming Community*. Translated by Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
- . *The Church and the Kingdom*. Translated by Deland de la Durantaye. London: Seagull Books, 2012.
- . *The End of the Poem: Studies in Poetics*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- . *The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life*. Translated by Adam Kotsko. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013.
- . *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- . *Idea of Prose*. Translated by Michael Sullivan and Sam Whitsitt. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- . *Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience*. Translated by Liz Heron. London: Verso, 1993.
- . *The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government*. Translated by Lorenzo Chiesa and Matteo Mandarini. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- . *Language and Death: The Place of Negativity*. Translated by Karen E. Pinkus and Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.
- . *L'uomo Senza Contenuto*. Macerata: Quodlibet, 1994.
- . *The Man without Content*. Translated by Georgia Albert. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- . *Nudities*. Translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- . *The Open: Man and Animal*. Translated by Kevin Attell. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
- . *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- . *Profanations*. Translated by Jeff Fort. New York: Zone Books, 2007.
- . *Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive*. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen. New York: Zone, 1999.

- . *The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath*. Translated by Adam Kotsko. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.
- . *Stanzas: Word and Phantasm in Western Culture*. Translated by Ronald L. Martinez. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
- . *State of Exception*. Translated by Kevin Attell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005.
- . *The Signature of All Things: On Method*. Translated by Luca D'Isanto and Kevin Attell. New York: Zone Books, 2009.
- . *The Time That Remains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans*. Translated by Patricia Dailey. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005.
- . *"What Is an Apparatus?" And Other Essays*. Translated by David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella. Stanford, CA: Stanford General, 2009.
- Allison, David B. *Reading the New Nietzsche: The Birth of Tragedy, The Gay Science, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and On the Genealogy of Morals*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001.
- Aristotle. *Metaphysics*. Vol. 2 of *Aristotle: The Complete Works*, Edited by Jonathan Barnes. *Past Masters: Humanities Full Text Works*. Clayton, GA: Intelix, 1992.
<http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2159/xtf/view?docId=aristotle/aristotle.02.xml;chunk.id=div.aristotle.v2.56;toc.depth=1;toc.id=div.aristotle.v2.56;brand=default> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Arnim, Bettina von, and Karoline von Arnim. *Die G nderode*. Frankfurt am Main: Insel, 1982.
- Attridge, Derek. *Moving Words: Forms of English Poetry*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- . *The Rhythms of English Poetry*. London: Longman, 1982.
- Auer, J. C. P., Frank M ller, and Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen. *Language in Time: The Rhythm and Tempo of Spoken Interaction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Augustine. *Writings of Saint Augustine. The Fathers of the Church, a New Translation*. Edited and translated by Ludwig Schopp. New York: Fathers of the Church, Inc, 1947.
- Aviram, Amittai F. *Telling Rhythm: Body and Meaning in Poetry*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994.
- Badiou, Alain. *Deleuze: The Clamor of Being*. Translated by Ray Brassier. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000.
- Balthasar, Hans Urs von. *Cosmic Liturgy: The Universe According to Maximus the Confessor*. Translated by Brian E. Daley. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2003.

- . *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics*. Translated by Joseph Fessio and John Kenneth Riches. 7 vols. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1983.
- . *Love Alone: The Way of Revelation*. Translated by Alexander Dru. London: Sheed and Ward, 1970.
- . *Man in History: A Theological Study*. Translated by W. G. Doepel. London: Catholic Book Club, 1972.
- . *Mysterium Paschale: The Mystery of Easter*. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2000.
- . *Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory*. Translated by Graham Harrison. 5 vols. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1988.
- . *The Theology of Karl Barth: Exposition and Interpretation*. Translated by John Baltharpe and Edward T. Oakes. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1992.
- . *The Truth of the World*. Vol. 1 of *Theo-Logic: The Theological Logical Theory*. Translated by Adrian J. Walker. San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2000.
- Baraka, Amiri. *Digging: The Afro-American Soul of American Classical Music*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10675688> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Barber, Daniel. *Deleuze and the Naming of God: Post-Secularism and the Future of Immanence*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014.
- Barth, Karl. *Church Dogmatics*. 2nd ed. Translated by Geoffrey William Bromiley and Thomas F. Torrance. 14 vols. London: T. & T. Clark International, 2004.
- Beare, Francis Wright. *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians*. London: Black, 1959.
- Begbie, Jeremy. *Theology, Music and Time*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- Beistegui, Miguel de. *Immanence: Deleuze and Philosophy*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.
- Benjamin, Walter. *Illuminations*. Edited by Hannah Arendt. Translated by Harry Zohn. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968.
- . *The Origin of German Tragic Drama*. 1998. Translated by John Osborne. London: Verso, 2003.
- Benveniste, Émile. *Problèmes De Linguistique Générale*. Vol 1. Paris: Gallimard, 1966.
- Bergson, Henri. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Translated by John Mullarkey and Michael Kolkman. 1913. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- . *Creative Evolution*. Translated by Arthur Mitchell. London: Macmillan, 1911.

- . *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Translated by Mabelle L. Andison. New York: Carol Publishing, 1992.
- . *Matter and Memory*. Translated by Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer. 1912. New York: Dover Publications, 2004.
- . *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*. Translated by Frank Lubecki Pogson. 1910. London: Allen & Unwin, 1950.
- Bernstein, J. M., Friedrich Schiller, Johann Georg Hamann, and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing. *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Betz, John R. "Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part Two)." *Modern Theology* 22, no. 1 (2006): 2-50.
- . "Beyond the Sublime: The Aesthetics of the Analogy of Being (Part One)." *Modern Theology* 21, no. 3 (2005): 367-411.
- Bigger, Charles P. *Participation: a Platonic Inquiry*. Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1968.
- Blanchot, Maurice. *The Writing of the Disaster*. Translated by Ann Smock. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1986.
- Bloch, Ernst. *Essays on the Philosophy of Music*. Translated by Peter Palmer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Blondel, Maurice. *The Letter on Apologetics: History and Dogma*. 1964. Translated by Alexander Dru and Illtyd Trethowan. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995.
- Bonhoeffer, Dietrich. *Creation and Temptation*. 1959, 1955. London: SCM Press, 1966.
- Brown, David. *God and Grace of Body: Sacrament in Ordinary*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Brown, David and Ann Loades. *The Sense of the Sacramental: Movement and Measure in Art and Music, Place and Time*. London: SPCK, 1995.
- Bryden, Mary. *Deleuze and Religion*. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Bulgakov, Sergi. *The Lamb of God*. Translated by Boris Jakim. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2008.
- Bullimore, Matthew. "The Politics of Resurrection: Responding to Carl Schmitt on Law and Sovereignty." *Theology* 112, no. 4 (2009): 425-34.
- Bunn, James H. *Wave Forms: A Natural Syntax for Rhythmic Language*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
- Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. 1990. London: Routledge, 2002.

<http://ezproxyprd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2091/ehost/detail/detail?sid=b565162d-7bf4-41c7-9256-1a93f51efa15%40sessionmgr4005&crlhashurl=login.aspx%253fdirect%253dtrue%2526scope%253dsite%2526db%253dnlebk%2526db%253dnlabk%2526AN%253d70541&hid=4104&vid=0&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=nlebk&AN=70541> (accessed 16-06-2015).

Calarco, Matthew, and Steven DeCaroli, eds. *Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.

Caldwell, Phoebe. *Finding You, Finding Me: Using Intensive Interaction to Get in Touch with People with Severe Learning Disabilities Combined with Autistic Spectrum Disorder*. London: Jessica Kingsley, 2005.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10130566> (accessed 12-06-2015).

Caldwell, Phoebe, and Jane Horwood. *From Isolation to Intimacy: Making Friends without Words*. London: Jessica Kingsley, 2007.
<http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip075/2006038060.html> (accessed 12-06-2015).

Carlisle, Clare. *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Becoming: Movements and Positions*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005.

Carnap, Rudolf. *Philosophy and Logical Syntax*. 1935. Bristol: Thoemmes, 1996.

Carper, Thomas, and Derek Attridge. *Meter and Meaning: An Introduction to Rhythm in Poetry*. London: Routledge, 2003.

Cerbone, David R. *Heidegger: A Guide for the Perplexed*. London: Continuum, 2008.

Chadwick, Henry. *Boethius the Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1981.

Chernyakov, A. G. *The Ontology of Time: Being and Time in the Philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger*. London: Kluwer Academic, 2002.

Chiesa, Lorenzo, and Alberto Toscano, ed. *The Italian Difference: Between Nihilism and Biopolitics*. Melbourne: re.press, 2009.

Clarke, Anthony. *A Cry in the Darkness: The Forsakenness of Jesus in Scripture, Theology, and Experience*. Oxford: Regent's Park College, 2002.

Clemens, Justin, Nicholas Heron, and Alex Murray. *The Work of Giorgio Agamben: Law, Literature, Life*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011.

Colony, Tracy. "Before the Abyss: Agamben on Heidegger and the Living." *Continental Philosophy Review* 40 (2007): 1-16.

Colwell, John. *The Rhythm of Doctrine: A Liturgical Sketch of Christian Faith and Faithfulness*. Milton Keynes: Paternoster, 2007.

- Coplan, Amy, and Peter Goldie, eds. *Empathy: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
- Corn, Alfred. *The Poem's Heartbeat: A Manual of Prosody*. Brownsville, OR: Story Line Press, 1998.
- Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth. *English Speech Rhythm: Form and Function in Everyday Verbal Interaction*. Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1993.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10463004> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Cunningham, Conor. "Nihilism and Theology: Who Stands at the Door?" In *The Oxford Handbook of Theology and Modern European Thought*, edited by Nicholas Adams, George Pattison, and Graham Ward, 325-344. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Cureton, Richard D. *Rhythmic Phrasing in English Verse*. London: Longman, 1992.
- Dahlke, Benjamin. *Karl Barth, Catholic Renewal and Vatican II*. London: T&T Clark, 2012.
- Davies, Oliver. *The Creativity of God: World, Eucharist, Reason*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- De la Durantaye, Leland. *Giorgio Agamben: A Critical Introduction*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.
- Deleuze, Gilles. *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: Continuum, 2005.
<http://www.oxford.ebib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=310174&g=N&echo=1&userid=55oKjn7d%2fmAdl8bbhs6fTOajaWA%3d&tstamp=1434109292&id=d7209644cc969d1ad00ed4282d2da81636ffe02f&extsrc=shib-pid&patrontype=member%40ox.ac.uk> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- . *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson, and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1989.
- . *Difference and Repetition*. Translated by Paul Patton London: Athlone, 1994.
- . *The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque*. Translated by Tom Conley. London: Athlone, 1993.
- . *Pure Immanence: Essays on a Life*. Translated by Anne Boyman. New York: Zone Books, 2001.
- . *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson. London: Continuum, 2006.
- Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*. Translated by Brian Massumi. London: Athlone Press, 1988.
- . *What Is Philosophy?* Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994.
- Depoortere, Frederiek. *Badiou and Theology*. London: T&T Clark, 2009.

- Derrida, Jacques. *The Gift of Death*. Translated by David Wills. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
- . *Margins of Philosophy*. Translated by Alan Bass. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
- . *Positions*. Translated by Alan Bass and Henri Ronsbo. London: Athlone Press, 1981.
- . *Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs*. Translated by David B. Allison. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.
- . *Writing and Difference*. Translated by Alan Bass. 1978. London: Routledge, 2001.
- Desmond, William. *God and the Between*. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008.
- . *Being and the Between*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995.
- . *Beyond Hegel and Dialectic: Speculation, Cult, and Comedy*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992.
- Dickinson, Colby. *Agamben and Theology*. London: T & T Clark, 2011.
- Downey, Anthony. "Zones of Indistinction: Giorgio Agamben's 'Bare Life' and the Politics of Aesthetics." *Third Text* 23, no. 2 (2009): 109-25.
- Drozdek, Adam. *Greek Philosophers as Theologians: The Divine Arche*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.
- Durantaye, Leland de la. "Homo Profanus: Giorgio Agamben's Profane Philosophy." *Boundary 2* 35, no. 3 (2008): 27-62.
- Eagleton, Terry. *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.
- Edensor, Tim. "Rhythm and Arrhythmia." In *The Routledge Handbook of Mobilities*, edited by Peter Adey, David Bissell, Kevin Hannam, Peter Merriman, and Mimi Sheller, 163-171. London: Taylor and Francis, 2014.
<http://www.oxford.eblib.com/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=1596850&g=N&echo=1&useid=55oKjn7d%2fmAdl8bbhs6fTOajaWA%3d&tstamp=1434108799&id=5cfab9ec8801f6d7a651521632295f3bf629c643&extsrc=shib-pid&patrontype=member%40ox.ac.uk> (accessed 16-06-2015).
- Eikelboom, Lexi. "Erich Przywara and Giorgio Agamben: Rhythm as a Space for Dialogue between Catholic Metaphysics and Postmodernism." *The Heythrop Journal* 56, no. 3 (2014). DOI: 10.1111/heyj.12149.
- Encyclopædia Britannica* 2015. "Arsis and thesis."
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/36376/arsis-and-thesis> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Fiddes, Paul S. *The Creative Suffering of God*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988.
- . *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2000.

- . *Participating in God: A Pastoral Doctrine of the Trinity*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2000.
- . *Past Event and Present Salvation: The Christian Idea of Atonement*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1989.
- . *The Promised End: Eschatology in Theology and Literature*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000.
- . *Seeing the World and Knowing God: Hebrew Wisdom and Christian Doctrine in a Late-Modern Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- . "The Sublime and the Beautiful: Intersections Between Theology and Literature." In *Literature and Theology: New Interdisciplinary Spaces*, edited by Heather Walton, 127-51. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011.
- . "The Sublime, the Conflicted Self and Attention to the Other Towards a Theopoetics with Iris Murdoch and Julia Kristeva," *Theopoetic Folds: Philosophizing Multifariousness*, edited by Roland Faber and Jeremy Fackenthal, 159-78. New York: Fordham University Press, 2014.
- Fletcher, Paul, and Arthur Bradley, eds. *The Politics to Come: Power, Modernity and the Messianic*. London: Continuum, 2010.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10372203> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Ford, David. *Self and Salvation: Being Transformed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Fowl, Stephen E. *Philippians*. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2005.
- Friese, Heidrun. *The Moment: Time and Rupture in Modern Thought*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2001.
- Frost, Tom. "Agamben's Sovereign Legalization of Foucault." *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 30, no. 3 (2010): 545-77.
- Furnall, Joshua R. "Book Review: Agamben and Theology. By Colby Dickinson." *Literature and Theology* (2012): 1-3.
<http://litthe.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/01/03/litthe.frr062.full> (accessed 01-10-2012).
- Gibellini, Rosino. *Paths of African Theology*. London: SCM, 1994.
- Gittoes, Julie. *Anamnesis and the Eucharist: Contemporary Anglican Approaches*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.
- Goosen, Gideon. *Spacetime and Theology in Dialogue*. Milwaukee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2008.
- Gorman, Michael J. *Inhabiting the Cruciform God: Kenosis, Justification, and Theosis in Paul's Narrative Soteriology*. Grand Rapids, MI: W. B. Eerdmans, 2009.

- Gorner, Paul. *Heidegger's Being and Time: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
- Gorodetzky, Nadejda. *The Humiliated Christ in Modern Russian Thought*. London: Macmillan, 1938.
- Gosetti-Ferencei, Jennifer Anna. *Heidegger, Hölderlin, and the Subject of Poetic Language: Toward a New Poetics of Dasein*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004.
- Gräbner, Cornelia, and Arturo Casas. *Performing Poetry: Body, Place and Rhythm in the Poetry Performance*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011.
- Gumperz, John J. "Dialect and Conversational Inference." *Language in Society* 7, no. 3 (1978): 393-409.
- Gunton, Colin E. *The Actuality of Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition*. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1998.
- Gutiérrez, Gustavo. *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation*. Translated by Caridad Inda and John Eagleson. London: SCM Press, 1974.
- Hölderlin, Friedrich. *Friedrich Hölderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory*. Translated by and Thomas Pfau. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1988.
- Halporn, James W. "Nietzsche: On the Theory of Quantitative Rhythm." *Arion* 6, no. 2 (1967): 233-43.
- Hankey, W. J., and Douglas Hedley, eds. *Deconstructing Radical Orthodoxy: Postmodern Theology, Rhetoric and Truth*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
- Harding, Denys Clement Wyatt. *Words into Rhythm: English Speech Rhythm in Verse and Prose*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Harink, Douglas Karel. *Paul, Philosophy, and the Theopolitical Vision: Critical Engagements with Agamben, Badiou, Žižek, and Others*. Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2010.
- Harrison, Carol. *Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
- Hart, David Bentley. *The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss*. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2013.
- Hart, Kevin, and Barbara Eileen Wall, eds. *The Experience of God: A Postmodern Response*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005. <http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2165/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;idno=heb08535> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Hasty, Christopher Francis. *Meter as Rhythm*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Hawthorne, Gerald F. *Philippians*. Waco, TX: Word Books, 1983.
- Hector, Kevin. *Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

- Hegel, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy vol. 1*. Translated by E. S. Haldane. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1995. <http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2165/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;cc=acls;idno=heb30754.0001.001;node=heb30754.0001.001%3A1;view=toc> (accessed 26-06-2015).
- . *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Translated by A. V. Miller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977.
- Heidegger, Martin. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. Translated by Ralph Manheim. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
- . *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*. Translated by Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2008.
- . *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988.
- . *Basic Writings: From "Being and Time" (1927) to "The Task of Thinking" (1964)*. Translated by David Farrell Krell. 1978. London: Routledge, 2011.
- . *Being and Time*. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward S. Robinson. 1953. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.
- . *The Concept of Time*. Translated by and Ingo Farin. London; New York: Continuum, 2011.
- . *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*. Translated by Keith Hoeller. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000.
- . *Hölderlin's Hymn "the Ister."* Translated by William McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
- . *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Translated by Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
- . *Nietzsche*. Translated by David Farrell Krell. 1979. San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991.
- . *On Time and Being*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. 1972. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002.
- . *Pathmarks*. Translated by William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- . *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Parvis Emas and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- . *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter. 1971. New York: Harper & Row, 2001.

- Heidegger, Martin, and Eugen Fink. *Heraclitus Seminar*. Translated by Charles H. Seibert. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993.
- Hellman, John. "Jacques Chevalier, Bergsonism, and Modern French Catholic Intellectuals." *Biography* 4, no. 2 (1981): 138-53.
- Hirshfield, Jane. *Hiddenness, Surprise, Uncertainty: Three Generative Energies of Poetry*. Tarsset: Bloodaxe, 2008.
- Hobsbaum, Philip. *Metre, Rhythm, and Verse Form*. London: Routledge, 1996.
- Hoff, Johannes. *The Analogical Turn: Rethinking Modernity with Nicholas of Cusa*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2013.
- Holland, Nancy J., and Patricia Huntington, eds. *Feminist Interpretations of Martin Heidegger*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001.
- Hoogstad, Jan Hein and Birgitte Stougaard Pederson, ed. *Off Beat: Pluralizing Rhythm*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2013.
- Hyman, Gavin. *The Predicament of Postmodern Theology: Radical Orthodoxy or Nihilist Textualism?* Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001.
- James, William. *The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature*. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1902.
- Janack, Marianne. *What We Mean by Experience*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012.
- Jenson, Robert W. "Beauty." *Dialog* 25, no. 4 (1986): 250-54.
- . "The End Is Music." *Edwards in Our Time: Jonathan Edwards and the Shaping of American Religion*. Edited by Sang Hyun Lee and Allen C. Guelzo. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 1999.
- . *The Triune God*. Vol. 1 of *Systematic Theology*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- . "Worship as Word and Tone." *The Futurist Option*. Edited by Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson. New York: Newman Press, 1970.
- Johnson, Keith L. *Karl Barth and the Analogia Entis*. London: T&T Clark, 2010.
- Johnson, William Stacy. *The Mystery of God: Karl Barth and the Postmodern Foundations of Theology*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997.
- Kangas, David J. *Kierkegaard's Instant: On Beginnings*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007.
- Kearney, Richard. *Strangers, Gods and Monsters: Interpreting Otherness*. London: Routledge, 2003.

- Keller, Catherine. *The Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- Kelly, Thomas A. F. *Between System and Poetics: William Desmond and Philosophy after Dialectic*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.
- Kelly, Thomas M. *Theology at the Void: The Retrieval of Experience*. Notre Dame, IN.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
- Kierkegaard, Søren. *Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript*. Translated by Walter Lowrie and David F. Swenson. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941.
- . *Philosophical Fragments: Johannes Climacus*. Translated by Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- . *Repetition: An Essay in Experimental Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1942.
- . *The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening*. Translated by Edna H. Hong and Howard V. Hong. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Kilby, Karen. *Balthasar: A (Very) Critical Introduction*. Grand Rapids, MI: W.B. Eerdmans, 2012.
- Kivy, Peter. *The Fine Art of Repetition: Essays in the Philosophy of Music*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Knowles, Gerry. "Prosodic Labelling: The Problem of Tone Group Boundaries." In *English Computer Corpora: Selected Papers and Research Guide*, edited by Bern Kortmann, 149-63. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10598385> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Kramer, Jonathan D. *The Time of Music: New Meanings, New Temporalities, New Listening Strategies*. London: Collier Macmillan, 1988.
- Kristeva, Julia. *Black Sun: Depression and Melancholia*. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- . *The Kristeva Reader*. Translated by Toril Moi. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
- . *Proust and the Sense of Time*. Translated by Stephen Bann. London: Faber and Faber, 1993.
- . *Revolution in Poetic Language*. Translated by Margaret Waller. New York: Columbia University Press, 1984.
- La Croix, Richard R. *Augustine on Music: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays*. Lewiston, ME: Edwin Mellen Press, 1988.
- Lachieze-Rey, Pierre. "Blondel Et Bergson." *Les Etudes philosophiques* 7, no. 4 (1952): 383-86.

- Lacoste, Jean-Yves. *Experience and the Absolute: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man*. Translated by Mark Raftery-Skehan. New York: Fordham University Press, 2004.
- Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe. *Heidegger, Art and Politics: The Fiction of the Political*. Translated by Chris Turner. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
- . *Musica Ficta: Figures of Wagner*. Translated by Christian Bourgois. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994.
- . *Poetry as Experience*. Translated by Andrea Tarnowski. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
- . *Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics*. Translated by Christopher Fynsk. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.
- Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, and Jean-Luc Nancy. *The Literary Absolute: The Theory of Literature in German Romanticism*. Translated by Philip Barnard and Cheryl Lester. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988.
- LaMothe, Kimerer L. *Between Dancing and Writing: The Practice of Religious Studies*. New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2004.
- Lash, Nicholas. *Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990.
- Leachman, James G. *The Liturgical Subject: Subject, Subjectivity and the Human Person in Contemporary Liturgical Discussion and Critique*. London: SCM Press, 2008.
- Leeuw, G. van der. *Sacred and Profane Beauty: The Holy in Art*. Translated by David Green. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1963.
- Lefebvre, Henri. *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*. Translated by Stuart Elden and Gerald Moore. London: Bloomsbury, 2013.
- L'Engle, Madeleine. *A Wrinkle in Time*. 1962. London: Puffin, 1995.
- Lévinas, Emmanuel. *Alterity and Transcendence*. Translated by Michael B. Smith. Linton: Athlone, 1999.
- . *Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other*. Translated by Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998.
- . *Of God Who Comes to Mind*. Translated by Bettina Bergo. 1986. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.
- . *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. London: Kluwer Academic, 1991.
- Löwith, Karl. *Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same*. Translated by Harvey Lomax. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.

- Lewis, Alan E. *Between Cross and Resurrection: A Theology of Holy Saturday*. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 2001.
- Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. *Liddell and Scott's Greek-English Lexicon, Abridged: The Little Liddell*. 1909. Simon Wallenberg Press, 2007.
- Lindbeck, George A. *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age*. London: SPCK, 1984.
- Lods, Marc. "La Personne Du Christ Dans La 'Conversion' De Saint Augustin." *Recherche Augustinienne* 11 (1976): 3-34.
- Long, Steven A. *Analogia Entis: On the Analogy of Being, Metaphysics, and the Act of Faith*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011.
- Luchte, James. *Heidegger's Early Philosophy: The Phenomenology of Ecstatic Temporality*. London: Continuum, 2008.
- Marga, Amy. *Karl Barth's Dialogue with Catholicism in Göttingen and Münster: Its Significance for His Doctrine of God*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010.
- Marion, Jean-Luc. *God Without Being: Hors-Texte*. 2nd ed. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012.
- . *In Excess: Studies of Saturated Phenomena*. Translated by Robyn Horner. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002.
- . *Prolegomena to Charity*. Translated by Stephen E. Lewis. New York: Fordham University Press, 2002.
- . *Reduction and Givenness: Investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, and Phenomenology*. Translated by Thomas A. Carlson. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998.
- McCormack, Bruce L. *Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and Development, 1909-1936*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- McGilchrist, Iain. *The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World*. New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2009.
- McGrath, S. J. *Heidegger: A Very Critical Introduction*. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2008.
- McKim, Joel. "Agamben at Ground Zero: A Memorial without Content." *Theory, Culture & Society* 25, no. 5 (2008): 83-103.
- McKinney, Jason Thomas. "Secret Agreements and Slight Adjustments: On Giorgio Agamben's Messianic Citations." *The Journal of Religion* 91, no. 4 (2011): 496-518.
- McNeill, William Hardy. *Keeping Together in Time Dance and Drill in Human History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10314192> (accessed 12-06-2015).

- Mehler, Jacques, Peter Jusczyk, and Ghislaine Lambertz. "A Precursor of Language Acquisition in Young Infants." *Cognition* 29 (1988): 143-78.
- Meschonnic, Henri. *Critique Du Rythme: Anthropologie Historique Du Langage*. Lagrasse: Verdier, 1982.
- Milbank, John. *Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon*. London: Routledge, 2003.
- . *The Suspended Middle: Henri De Lubac and the Debate Concerning the Supernatural*. London: SCM Press, 2005.
- . *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990.
- Milbank, John, Graham Ward, and Catherine Pickstock. *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology*. London: Routledge, 1999.
- Milbank, John, Slavoj Žižek, Creston Davies, and Catherine Pickstock. *Paul's New Moment: Continental Philosophy and the Future of Christian Theology*. Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos, 2010.
- Miller, Elaine P. "Harnessing Dionysos: Nietzsche on Rhythm, Time, and Restraint." *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 17 (1999): 1-32.
- Mills, Catherine. *The Philosophy of Agamben*. Stocksfield: Acumen, 2008.
- Moltmann, Jürgen. *The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology*. Translated by Margaret Kohl. London: SCM Press, 1996.
- . *The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology*. Translated by Dick Wilson and John Bowden. London: SCM. Press, 1976.
- . *Religion, Revolution, and the Future*. Translated by M. Douglas Meeks. New York: Scribner, 1969.
- . *Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology*. Translated by James W. Leitch. London: SCM, 1967.
- Moore, A. W. *The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of Things*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- Morrison, Robert G. *Nietzsche and Buddhism: A Study in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities*. 1999. Reprint, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. <http://ezproxy-prd.bodleian.ox.ac.uk:2153/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198238652.001.0001/acprof-9780198238652> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Moten, Fred. *In the Break: The Aesthetics of the Black Radical Tradition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10151178> (accessed 12-06-2015).

- Mouroux, Jean. *The Christian Experience: An Introduction to a Theology*. London: Sheed and Ward, 1955.
- Moyle, Tristan. *Heidegger's Transcendental Aesthetic: An Interpretation of the Ereignis*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
- Mulhall, Stephen. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Heidegger and Being and Time*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Munro, Martin. *Different Drummers: Rhythm and Race in the Americas*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2010.
- Murray, Alex. *Giorgio Agamben*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- Murray, Alex and Jessica Whyte. *The Agamben Dictionary*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011.
- Nanian, Richard A. *Plerosis/Kenosis: Poetic Language and Its Energies*. New York: Peter Lang, 2012. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10574859> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Nazzi, Thierry, Josiane Bertocini, and Jacques Mehler. "Language Discrimination by Newborns: Toward an Understanding of the Role of Rhythm." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 24, no. 3 (1998): 756-66.
- Nazzi, Thierry, Peter W. Juszyk, and Elizabeth K. Johnson. "Language Discrimination by English-Learning 5-Month-Olds: Effects of Rhythm and Familiarity." *Journal of Memory and Language* 43, no. 1 (2000): 1-19.
- Neder, Adam. *Participation in Christ: An Entry into Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2009.
- Negri, Antonio. "The Sacred Dilemma of Inoperosity. On Giorgio Agamben's Opus Dei." *Unimode*. Translated by Jason Francis McGimsey. Last modified 18 September 2012. <http://www.uninomade.org/negri-on-agamben-opus-dei/> (accessed 11-06-2015).
- Nelson, Derek R. *What's Wrong with Sin? Sin in Individual and Social Perspective from Schleiermacher to Theologies of Liberation*. London: T&T Clark, 2009.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. *The Birth of Tragedy*. Translated by Douglas Smith. 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
- . *Ecce Homo: How to Become What You Are*. Translated by Duncan Large. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- . *Friedrich Nietzsche: Writings from the Early Notebooks*. Translated by Raymond Geuss, Alexander Nehamas, and Ladislaus Löb. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

- . *The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an Appendix of Songs*. Translated by Bernard Arthur Owen Williams, Josefine Nauckhoff, and Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- . "Nietzsches Werke: Historisch-Kritische Ausgabe. Electronic Edition." Edited by Malcolm Brown. Charlottesville, VA: Intelix, 1995.
- . *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for Everyone and No One*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. 1961. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969.
- . *Twilight of the Idols and the Anti-Christ*. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. London: Penguin, 2003.
- . *Untimely Meditations*. Translated by Daniel Breazeale and R. J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- . *The Will to Power*. Translated by Walter Arnold Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968.
- Norris, Andrew. "Giorgio Agamben and the Politics of the Living Dead." *Diacritics* 30, no. 4 (2000): 38-58.
- Norris, Andrew, ed. *Politics, Metaphysics, and Death: Essays on Giorgio Agamben's Homo Sacer*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2005.
- O'Connell, Robert J. *Art and the Christian Intelligence in St. Augustine*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.
- O'Meara, Thomas F. *Erich Przywara, S. J.: His Theology and His World*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002.
- Oliver, Simon. *Philosophy, God and Motion*. London: Routledge, 2005.
- Oliver, Simon, and John Milbank. *The Radical Orthodoxy Reader*. London: Routledge, 2009.
- Pabst, Adrian. *Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy*. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 2012.
- Panikkar, Raimon. *The Rhythm of Being: The Unbroken Trinity*. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010.
- Parratt, John. *A Reader in African Christian Theology*. London: SPCK, 1997.
- Patel, Aniruddh D. *Music, Language, and the Brain*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/bodleian/detail.action?docID=10211997> (accessed 12-06-2015).
- Pattison, George. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to the Later Heidegger*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- Pickstock, Catherine. *After Writing: On the Liturgical Consummation of Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1995.

- . *Repetition and Identity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
- Plato, *Timaeus*. Translated by Donald J. Zeyl. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2000.
- Politis, Vasilis. *Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Aristotle and the Metaphysics*. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Polt, Richard F. H. *Heidegger's Being and Time: Critical Essays*. Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005.
- Prieto, Eric. "Musical Imprints and Mimetic Echoes in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe." *L'Esprit Createur* 47, no. 2 (2007): 17-32.
- Prozorov, Sergei. "Giorgio Agamben and the End of History: Inoperative Praxis and the Interruption of the Dialectic." *European Journal of Social Theory* 12, no. 4 (2009): 523-42.
- Przybyslawski, Artur. "Nietzsche Contra Heraclitus." *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, no. 23 (2002): 88-95.
- Przywara, Erich. *Analogia Entis: Metaphysics: Original Structure and Universal Rhythm*. Translated by John Betz and David Bentley Hart. Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 2014.
- . "Gott in Uns Oder Gott Uber Uns? Immanenz Und Transzendenz Im Heutigen Geistesleben." *Stimmen der Zeit* 53 (1923): 343-62.
- . *Polarity: A German Catholic's Interpretation of Religion*. Translated by A. C. Bouquet. London: Oxford University Press: H. Milford, 1935.
- . *Schriften*. Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1962.
- Purcell, Michael. *Levinas and Theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Rose, Gillian. *The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society*. Oxford: Blackwell, 1992.
- Rubenstein, Mary-Jane. *Strange Wonder: The Closure of Metaphysics and the Opening of Awe*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.
- Ruether, Rosemary Radford and Marion Grau, ed. *Interpreting the Postmodern: Responses to "Radical Orthodoxy"*. London: T&T Clark, 2006.
- Schaefer, Christian. *Philosophy of Dionysius the Areopagite: An Introduction to the Structure and the Content of the Treatise on the Divine Names*. Leiden: Brill, 2006.
- Schinkel, Willem. "From Zoepolitics to Biopolitics: Citizenship and the Construction of 'Society.'" *European Journal of Social Theory* 13, no. 2 (2010): 155-72.
- Schwartz, Regina M., ed. *Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, and Theology Approach the Beyond*. London: Routledge, 2004.
- Shakespeare, Steven. *Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Introduction*. London: SPCK, 2007.

- Sigurdson, Ola. "Beyond Secularism? Towards a Post-Secular Political Theology." *Modern Theology* 26, no. 2 (2010): 177-96.
- Simons, Jon. *From Agamben to Žižek: Contemporary Critical Theorists*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010.
- Simpson, Christopher Ben. *Deleuze and Theology*. London: T&T Clark, 2012.
- Small, Christopher. *Music of the Common Tongue: Survival and Celebration in Afro-American Music*. 1987. London: Calder, 1994.
- Smith, Anthony Paul, and Daniel Whistler, ed. *After the Postsecular and the Postmodern: New Essays in Continental Philosophy of Religion*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010.
- Smith, James K. A. *Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-Secular Theology*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004.
- Smith, James K. A. and James H. Olthuis, ed. *Creation, Covenant, and Participation: Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005.
- . *Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: Creation, Covenant, and Participation*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2005.
- Soskice, Janet M. "Creatio ex nihilo: its Jewish and Christian Foundations." In *Creation and the God of Abraham*, edited by David B. Burrell, Carlo Cogliati, Janet M. Soskice, and William R. Stoeger, 24-39. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
- Spencer, Jon Michael. *Protest & Praise: Sacred Music of Black Religion*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1990.
- Svirsky, Marcelo, and Simone Bignall, eds. *Agamben and Colonialism*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012.
- Sykes, Stephen. *Karl Barth: Studies of His Theological Method*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979.
- Tanner, Kathryn. *Theories of Culture: A New Agenda for Theology*. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1997.
- Taylor, Charles. *Varieties of Religion Today: William James Revisited*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002.
- Tsur, Reuven. *Poetic Rhythm: Structure and Performance: An Empirical Study in Cognitive Poetics*. Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2012.
- Tsur, Reuven, and Motti Benari. *On the Shore of Nothingness: Space, Rhythm, and Semantic Structure in Religious Poetry and Its Mystic-Secular Counterpart: A Study in Cognitive Poetics*. Thorverton: Imprint Academic, 2003.
- Turetzky, Philip. *Time*. London: Routledge, 1998.

- Utter, Hans. *Trance, Ritual and Rhythm: The Cult of Mahasu Deota in the Western Himalayas*. Delhi: B.R. Rhythms, 2010.
- Verdicchio, Massimo, and Robert W. Burch. *Between Philosophy and Poetry: Writing, Rhythm, History*. London: Continuum, 2002.
- Wall, Thomas Carl, and William Flesch. *Radical Passivity: Lévinas, Blanchot, and Agamben*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- Walter, Gregory. "Critique and Promise in Paul Tillich's Political Theology: Engaging Giorgio Agamben on Sovereignty and Possibility." *The Journal of Religion* 90, no. 4 (2010): 453-74.
- Ward, Graham. *Cities of God*. London: Routledge, 2000.
- . "Milbank's *Divina Commedia*." *New Blackfriars* 73 (2007): 311-18.
- . *The Politics of Discipleship: Becoming Postmaterial Citizens*. The Church and Postmodern Culture. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2009.
- Ward, Koral. *Augenblick: The Concept of the 'Decisive Moment' in 19th and 20th Century Western Philosophy*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008.
- Watkin, William. *Agamben and Indifference: A Critical Overview*. London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014.
- . *The Literary Agamben: Adventures in Logopoiesis*. London: Continuum, 2010.
- . "The Materialization of Prose: *Poiesis* Versus *Dianoia* in the Work of Godzich & Kittay, Shklovsky, Silliman and Agamben." *Paragraph* 31, no. 3 (2008): 344-64.
- Westphal, Merold. *Transcendence and Self-Transcendence: On God and the Soul*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2004.
- White, Roger M. *Talking About God: The Concept of Analogy and the Problem of Religious Language*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010.
- White, Thomas Joseph. *The Analogy of Being: Invention of the Antichrist or the Wisdom of God?* Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans, 2011.
- Williams, James. *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003.
- Williams, Rowan. *The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language*. London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
- . *Lost Icons: Reflections on Cultural Bereavement*. London: T&T Clark, 2003.
- . *Open to Judgement: Sermons and Addresses*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2014.
- . *Resurrection: Interpreting the Easter Gospel*. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1982.

- . "Saving Time: Thoughts on Practice, Patience and Vision." *New Blackfriars* 73, no. 861 (2007): 319-26.
- . *Wrestling with Angels: Conversations in Modern Theology*. Edited by Mike Higton. London: SCM, 2007.
- Wolfe, J. E. *Heidegger and Theology*. New York: T&T Clark, 2014.
- Wood, David. *The Deconstruction of Time*. 2nd ed. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001.
- . *Time After Time*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007.
- Woolf, Virginia. *The Waves*. 2000. London: Vintage, 2004.
- Wright, N. T. *The Climax of the Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology*. Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991.
- You, Haili. "Defining Rhythm: Aspects of an Anthropology of Rhythm." *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 18 (1994): 361-84.
- Young, Julian. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Art*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Zartaloudis, Thanos. *Giorgio Agamben: Power, Law and the Uses of Criticism*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2010.
- Zeitz, James V. "Przywara and Von Balthasar on Analogy." *Thomist Press* 52, no. 3 (2006): 473-98.
- Zijlstra, Onno. *Letting Go: Rethinking Kenosis*. Oxford: Lang, 2002.
- Zizioulas, John D. *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church*. 1985. London: Darton Longman & Todd, 2004.
- Zuckerandl, Victor. *Man the Musician*. Vol 2 of *Sound and Symbol: Music and the Eternal World*. Translated by Norbert Guterman. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- . *The Sense of Music*. 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971.