THESIS ABSTRACT

TITLE: GOVERNING MONTREAL: THE IMPACT OF FRENCH-ENGLISH DIFFERENCES ON METROPOLITAN POLITICS

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In comparison with Toronto and Winnipeg, structural reform of metropolitan governmental institutions in Montreal has taken considerably longer and has been far less comprehensive. Why? The main objective of this thesis is to answer this question. The answer centres mainly on the existence of two major linguistic communities—a condition not present in the other two cities.

The thesis suggests that there have been three different varieties of motivational factors behind the metropolitan reform movement in Montreal: 1) the need to establish new metropolitan institutions to respond to particular crises resulting from the breakdown of local government services; 2) the desire to establish a set of metropolitan structures which meet the requirements of organizational rationality; and 3) the desire of Quebec nationalists to re-arrange local institutions in such a way as to eliminate any official recognition of the English-speaking minority.

The first variety of factors serves to explain the creation of the Montreal Urban Community in 1969. The second variety was behind the attempts in the early 1970s to restructure municipal boundaries, to integrate the various municipal police forces, and to re-organize the social service network. The third variety has been important primarily in relation to debates about the re-organization of Montreal's school boards. Judging from recent events, it is likely to become even more apparent in other fields in the near future.

Insofar as organizational rationality involves the simplification of governmental structures, the aims of many Quebec nationalists are likely to promote this type of reform rather than hinder it. However, in Montreal, unlike Toronto and Winnipeg, reforms justified solely on the basis of organizational rationality have either not been implemented at all or have been done so in a very slow or modified manner. This can be explained primarily in terms of the impact of Montreal's linguistic cleavage.
GOVERNING MONTREAL: THE IMPACT OF FRENCH-ENGLISH DIFFERENCES ON METROPOLITAN POLITICS

Andrew Sancton
The Queen's College, Oxford
1978
PREFACE

The assistance of all who co-operated in the research required for this work is deeply appreciated. Many of those involved are listed in Appendix III.

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The University of Western Ontario
London, Canada
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A.S.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

A.J.C.S. - Allied Jewish Community Services
CEGEP - College de l'enseignement générale et professionnelle
C.H.S.S.M.M. - Council of Health and Social Service of Metropolitan Montreal
C.M.A. - Census metropolitan area
C.M.H.C. - Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation
C.S.M.M. - Conference of Suburban Mayors of Montreal
F.L.Q. - Front de libération du Québec
FRAP - Front d'action politique
F.S.S.F.Q. - Fédération des services sociaux à la famille du Québec
G.V.R.D. - Greater Vancouver Regional District
I.C.C. - Intermunicipal Co-ordinating Committee
M.C.M. - Montreal Citizens Movement
M.C.S.C. - Montreal Catholic School Commission
M.M.C. - Montreal Metropolitan Commission
M.M.C. - Montreal Metropolitan Corporation
M.N.A. - Member of the National Assembly
M.P.C.S.B. - Montreal Protestant Central School Board
M.S.A. - Mouvement Souveraineté Association
M.T.C. - Montreal Transportation Commission
M.U.C. - Montreal Urban Community
M.U.C.P.D. - Montreal Urban Community Police Department
M.U.C.T.C. - Montreal Urban Community Transportation Commission
N.D.G. - Notre-Dame-de-Grace
N.D.P. - New Democratic Party
N.F.C. - Non-French Canadian
P.C. - Progressive Conservative
P.Q. - Parti québécois
P.S.B.G.M. - Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal
P.S.C. - Public Security Council
Q.M.C. - Quebec Municipal Commission
Q.P.C. - Quebec Police Commission
Q.P.D.B. - Quebec Planning and Development Board
R.C. - Ralliement créditiste
R.I.N. - Rassemblement pour l'indépendance nationale
R.N. - Ralliement national
S.C. - Social Credit
S.C.I.M. - School Council of the Island of Montreal
S.S.C. - Social Service Centre
U.N. - Union nationale
CHAPTER I

THE POLITICS OF METROPOLITAN RE-ORGANIZATION

Canada is a country with two official languages and two founding cultures. The city of Montreal is the main point at which they meet. Founded in 1642 by Paul de Chomedey, Sieur de Maisonneuve, as an outpost for zealous French missionaries, Montreal soon displaced Quebec City as the metropolis of Canada. However, since the conquest of Montreal in 1760, the city's dominant economic group has traced its origins to the British Isles.\(^1\) Although this group held a numerical majority for a brief period in the mid-nineteenth century, it has now been in a minority position for well over a hundred years. After noting this, and other factors, J. R. Mallory concluded in 1955 that 'Montreal is an extremely difficult city to govern. Within it the two major races in Canada, aloof in their two solitudes, must somehow live together'.\(^2\) Since that time the urban politics of Montreal have become infinitely more complex. Not only has Montreal experienced its share of the usual urban problems

\(^1\)Complete histories of Montreal can be found in a number of works, the most useful English ones being William Henry Atherton, Montreal: 1535-1914 (Montreal, S. J. Clarke, 1914), 3 vols. and John Irwin Cooper, Montreal: A Brief History (Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1969). Cooper's book is mainly concerned with the period since 1800.

of Canadian cities,\(^1\) it has also been the main setting for a drastic change in the nature of the relationship between Canada's French- and English-speaking communities.\(^2\) One of the objects of this thesis is to illustrate how this change has affected the process of metropolitan re-organization.

In comparison with the United States, Canadian initiatives in restructuring local government in metropolitan areas have been impressive. Two American observers have referred to 'the vitality, the variety, and the significance of Canadian adjustments to urbanization ... since World War II'.\(^3\) They point to the cases of Toronto and Winnipeg as being the most important and best known. The first chapter of this thesis briefly explains how the Toronto and Winnipeg reforms came about and why reform has taken place in these cities when it has generally proved impossible in the United States. There will also be a brief discussion of why so little reform has taken place in the important Canadian city of Vancouver.

This chapter is designed to show that, in most respects, the environment for reform in Montreal has been quite similar to that of Toronto and Winnipeg. Although limited structural change has been implemented in Montreal, it came significantly later, was much less extensive, and remains a much more politically explosive issue than in

\(^1\)For a systematic analysis of the nature of these problems, see N. H. Lithwick, Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects (Ottawa, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1970).

\(^2\)See Chapter II-6 for a full discussion of these changes.

Toronto and Winnipeg. The central concern of this thesis is to explain why this is so. Why has the Montreal experience been different?

It is, of course, inherently implausible to suggest that this difference can be accounted for solely by looking at one social or political variable. The social make-up and political development of Toronto and Winnipeg are themselves sufficiently dissimilar to preclude such a simplistic approach. Even if a comparison were being made with just one of these cities, it would still be obvious to any informed observer that differences in political structures and behaviour could only be explained by looking at a wide range of variables relating to historical, geographical, economic, and cultural factors. This thesis will not overlook these various factors. However, it is impossible to understand the social and political reality of Montreal without recognizing the pervasiveness of language. Consequently, this thesis focuses on the one most obvious difference in the social make-up of Montreal as compared to the other two cities. Toronto and Winnipeg are both overwhelmingly English. Montreal, on the other hand, has a French-speaking majority and a strong English-speaking minority. Municipal reformers in Montreal have been burdened with this situation for decades. As early as 1899 an anonymous citizen, complaining about municipal problems in his city, wrote:

I have touched so far on obstacles to municipal reform which I believe exist in most cities, as well as in Montreal. But in addition to these, the metropolis of Canada suffers from a condition which is peculiar to itself. I refer to the division of the population into French- and English-speaking.¹

The writer went on to suggest that incompetence or corruption on the part of a member of one group would invariably be excused by his own people, especially if it were being strenuously denounced by those of the other language. For this reason, reform was next to impossible.

In Montreal the linguistic factor is not merely one social variable having the same general significance as others. The impact of language is so politically significant that, in the case of French-speakers at least, it, more than any other factor, serves to define what is in fact a distinct national entity.¹ Similarly, being English-speaking in Montreal is so closely linked to being relatively well-off in terms of income and to having relatively high levels of education, that political sociologists point out that these two variables have explanatory value for analyzing political allegiance in Quebec only after language use has been controlled.² In short, language use in Montreal is a variable around which a whole array of other social, economic and political differences tend to cluster. The full extent and significance of the French-English cleavage is explained in Chapter II of this thesis.

Subsequent chapters show how this cleavage has dramatically strengthened the power of suburban interests and helped them to defeat most proposals for metropolitan reform. Other chapters show how

¹This has been a common theme in recent writing about Quebec society and politics. It has been made most recently and most effectively in André Bernard, What Does Quebec Want? (Toronto, Lorimer, 1978), Ch. 1, especially p. 45.

French-English differences in Montreal have forced the provincial government to abandon attempts to create unified organizational systems for schools and social services. The final chapter assesses the relative weight of the main factors bearing on metropolitan re-organization in Montreal and suggests possible future directions for the working out of Montreal's current problems. Although considerable reference will be made to Toronto and Winnipeg, this thesis is not an exercise in systematic comparative political analysis. The focus of attention is Montreal. The experience of other cities is introduced to provide a reference point to which Montreal can be compared.

1. Metropolitan Re-organization in Canadian Cities

For the purposes of this thesis the term 'metropolitan area' refers to the territory extending over all or most of a continuously built-up area and its immediate zone of influence. In most metropolitan areas in Canada and the United States there are a great many municipalities, school boards, and special purpose bodies serving only a small portion of the area's population and land. Although these structures are appropriately labelled as being 'urban', they are not metropolitan. A metropolitan political structure is, for the purpose of this thesis, a structure which co-ordinates, federates, or even replaces previously existing independent urban political institutions covering smaller territories.

As metropolitan areas become larger and more complex, the inevitable response of academic theorists and policy-makers at the

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1 This is the essence of the approach taken by Statistics Canada. For more details, see Chapter II-2 of this thesis.
central level is to advocate the establishment of metropolitan political structures designed to comprehend the actual geographical extent of urban development. If these structures already exist, the response is that they be reformed in order to facilitate more effective operation. There is seldom agreement, however, as to the form these new structures should take. Disputes inevitably occur concerning the nature of their proposed functions, their territorial boundaries, and the method of choosing their political decision-makers. In normal circumstances, one expects those politicians representing the centre part of the city to support powerful multi-functional metropolitan structures, the boundaries of which would take in as much area as possible without tilting the political balance of power towards those living outside the central area. In opposition to centre city interests, one expects politicians with a suburban constituency to advocate substantial independence for suburban political structures to solve individual problems as they arise. In particular, there is a notable tendency for suburban politicians to insist on the maintenance of control over those governmental functions which are especially necessary for supporting the dominant lifestyle of the area in question. Functions which are particularly important in this regard are zoning, education, housing, urban renewal, and recreation.\(^1\) This struggle for power in metropolitan areas reflects the substantial differences in income levels and social class that are usually found

\(^1\)This point is made by O. P. Williams, 'Lifestyle Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas', in Terry N. Clark et al., eds., Community Politics: A Behavioural Approach (London, Collier-Macmillan, 1971), p. 61.
between residents of the central city and its suburbs. In many cases, municipal boundaries in general, and the central city boundary in particular, serve to define and perpetuate distinct socio-economic communities. ¹

In the United States the suburban interests have generally prevailed. Although numerous cities have considered plans for metropolitan restructuring, only a very few have experienced significant reform.² Most reform proposals have been blocked by suburban residents who, because of the provisions of many American state constitutions, must approve any major structural changes by referendum. On other occasions, change has been blocked by suburban representatives in state legislatures. Unfettered by the party discipline inherent in a parliamentary system, suburban legislators have been able to convince rural colleagues to combine with them to defeat most initiatives inspired by the central city.³

In the Canadian provinces the political strength of suburban interests is not nearly so great. This is because, in accordance with


³For a useful account of the political obstacles to metropolitan reform in the United States, see Scott Greer, Metropolitics (London, John Wiley, 1963).
British practice, the provinces do not have any constitutional limitations on their ability to legislate within their own fields of jurisdiction. As the organization of municipal institutions is clearly a provincial responsibility, there has been general support for the proposition that the provincial legislatures can change municipal structures and boundaries without requiring the electoral approval of affected residents. Furthermore, because most provincial governments are generally backed by a loyal and disciplined legislative majority, a party which is committed to metropolitan change is likely to be able to see it through.

Canada's five largest metropolitan areas are Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Ottawa-Hull, and Winnipeg.\(^1\) All but one have a two-tier system of metropolitan government established since 1950. Winnipeg had a two-tier system from 1960 until 1971 when a complete amalgamation created the new 'Unicity'. Ottawa-Hull is a special case. It will not be discussed because its unique position as the country's capital has led to extensive involvement by the federal government which is not found in other Canadian cities. Furthermore, the fact that the Ontario-Quebec provincial boundary bisects the metropolitan area makes it quite different, in political terms, from all other major Canadian cities.\(^2\)

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Vancouver, with a population in 1971 of 1,116,000, is different from the other cities being discussed in that its provincial government has never had any clear commitment to extensive metropolitan reorganization. Although legislation was passed in 1957 to enable the establishment of a metropolitan corporation, the same legislation stated that this could only be accomplished after public approval in a referendum. When a study committee recommended such a corporation, the British Columbia government did not proceed further and no referendum was held. Observers of the Vancouver situation have noted that the metropolitan reform ideas were put forward largely by professors at the University of British Columbia and that 'the provincial Minister of Municipal Affairs took no active part in the matter'.¹ In the late 1960s the government established a network of 'regional districts' covering the entire province. The Greater Vancouver Regional District (G.V.R.D.), containing fourteen municipalities, was established in 1967. However, the government repeatedly insisted that it was simply a new administrative arrangement rather than a new level of government.² This claim was made even though the G.V.R.D. controls, among other things, land use planning for the whole region, air pollution, regional parks, and hospital construction.

Whether or not the G.V.R.D. is a 'real government' is a semantic debate that is not of concern here. The point is that it is an example of a new metropolitan structure. In the United States it would

²Ibid., 130.
undoubtedly have been seen as a major metropolitan reform. As with many American reform proposals, the establishment of the G.V.R.D. was justified primarily on the basis that it furthered the goals of economy and efficiency in the provision of governmental services. Unlike reform proposals in other Canadian cities, there was virtually no emphasis on improving the accountability of governmental officials, increasing the opportunities for citizen participation, or redistributing financial resources. One of the best illustrations of this is that the government of British Columbia has never proposed to tamper with the boundaries of the second-tier authorities. Throughout the British Columbia experience the right of the constituent municipalities to continue to exist has been held to be sacred. The explanation for this is probably related to the fact that since World War II the major governing party in British Columbia has been committed to a free-enterprise brand of conservatism firmly opposed to any interventionist policies which can be seen as interfering with individual rights.\(^1\) In this aspect of political life the British Columbia government has followed the American practice of non-interference in local affairs. For the purposes of this thesis, the important conclusion from the Vancouver case is that thorough metropolitan re-organization has never been a declared objective of the provincial government of British Columbia.

Toronto, Montreal, and Winnipeg are all located within provinces in which the government has, at one time or another, proclaimed a

\(^1\)Gordon S. Galbraith, 'British Columbia', in D. J. Bellamy et al., eds., The Provincial Political Systems (Toronto, Methuen, 1976), p. 70.
commitment to extensive metropolitan re-organization. The Toronto experience is well known. On 1 January 1954 thirteen municipalities were federated and the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto came into being. Initially, it was mainly concerned with planning and physical development problems in the suburbs. In 1957, with very little controversy, the police departments of the thirteen municipalities were integrated to form one metropolitan police department. In 1967, following a royal commission report, the second-tier municipalities and school boards were completely re-organized such that the new Metropolitan Toronto consisted of one central City and five 'boroughs'. In thirteen years the system of local government in Toronto had gone through a remarkable period of innovation and development.

In Winnipeg the extent of reform has been even more dramatic. In 1960 the Manitoba government created Canada's second two-tier system of metropolitan government. The Winnipeg system, however, was plagued by a considerable lack of co-ordination between the two tiers, perhaps because, unlike Toronto, direct elections were held at both levels. In 1971 the New Democratic Party government introduced legislation to merge all the existing governments and territory of Greater Winnipeg into a new City of Winnipeg, commonly called 'Unicity'. The new system came into effect on 1 January 1972.

1The most useful recent accounts are Rose, Toronto and Ontario, Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto (Toronto, 1977), 2 vols.

Montreal had a very limited form of metropolitan government as early as 1921.¹ In the 1960s the mayor of the central city made a determined effort to bring about fundamental change, primarily by annexation. Unlike most other expansion-minded mayors, he could claim that his municipality could easily correspond to a natural boundary—the island on which it was located. However, it was not until mid-1969 that the Quebec provincial government formally declared a policy to establish a multi-functional metropolitan government to be called the Montreal Urban Community (M.U.C.). This initial proposal was superseded by another plan which was approved in late 1969, following a catastrophic police strike in the central City. Although the legislation did not affect the existing municipal boundaries, it did state that the new metropolitan authority had the obligation to draw up a new plan for boundaries by 1975. In late 1971 the Quebec minister of municipal affairs stated that his immediate objective was to decrease the number of municipalities in the M.U.C. from twenty-nine to five, six, or seven.²

The commitment of the Quebec government to structural change in urban institutions has been underlined by its policies concerning school boards and social service facilities. In the early 1970s the government declared in no uncertain terms that it wished to abolish the existing complex network of confessional and linguistic structures and replace them with unified, simpler structures in which the will of the

¹The Montreal case is fully explained and documented in Chapters III-V of this thesis.

²This is discussed in detail in Chapter V-4.
majority within a given territory would prevail. These proposals were more sweeping than anything that had ever taken place in Toronto and, as far as educational administration was concerned, paralleled the policy of the Manitoba government, adopted in 1890, to do away with independent school boards for its French catholic minority. Although later chapters of this thesis show that it was impossible for the Quebec government to implement these changes in their original form, they certainly indicate the extent of the government's objective concerning institutional change.

The environment for reform in the metropolitan areas of Toronto, Montreal, and Winnipeg was similar in two central respects. First, all three cities faced serious service problems resulting from rapid suburban development in the period since 1945. Second, all three cities were under the control of provincial governments which were clearly committed to the idea that metropolitan areas should be governed by political structures which met the requirements of what can best be labelled 'organizational rationality'. In other words, all three provincial governments believed that by rationalizing structures they could improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of urban government.

Toronto's service problems resulted from explosive growth in suburban municipalities. Between 1946 and 1950 the population of the city's five largest suburbs increased by 48% (from 209,929 to 310,743). These areas were faced with enormous problems in providing such basic

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1. This notion is explained in Chapter V-1.
2. Rose, Toronto, p. 18.
municipal services as water supply, sewage and garbage disposal, police and fire protection and, especially, educational facilities. It was the existence of this service crisis which caused the Ontario Municipal Board in 1953 to recommend the creation of a metropolitan federation and the provincial government to act so quickly in establishing it.

When Metropolitan Toronto was reformed in 1967, the major motivation seemed to be the desire to consolidate the second-tier units so as to increase administrative efficiency and to facilitate equitable representation. The establishment of a uniform school tax rate over the whole territory of the federation was an effort to correct the mal-distribution of local financial resources. Both these motivations were related to what Roscoe C. Martin has called 'considerations of logic or doctrine'. Bollens and Schmandt point out that in the United States these arguments for change have not received much political support. They have generally been of concern only to 'good government groups and civic notables who have been disturbed by the "irrationality" of the system'. In Britain the desire for organizational rationality seems to have been taken more seriously. This is particularly true with regard to the creation of the Greater London Council in 1964. The restructuring of Metropolitan Toronto in 1967 owes much more to the British experience than the American.

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The pattern of change in Winnipeg has been quite similar to that of Toronto. However, because its post-War development was not as rapid or extensive as that of metropolitan Toronto, the service crisis was not as severe. Nevertheless, metropolitan Winnipeg's traffic problems had become serious by the mid-1950s, mainly because the area was trisected by rivers which also served as municipal boundaries. Planning for, and building, the necessary inter-municipal bridges did not seem possible without a metropolitan authority.\(^1\) Following presentation of the Cumming Report in 1959, the legislature approved a law establishing the Corporation of Greater Winnipeg.

Although the Corporation's accomplishments concerning the improvement of traffic thoroughfares, sewers, and parks were quite impressive, the organization was plagued by political disputes between the two levels of government. In order to overcome these, the government in 1971, abolished the two-tier system and created one unified municipal government covering the whole area of the Corporation. This was justified almost entirely in terms of organizational rationality.\(^2\) In the Winnipeg case there was also special emphasis on the need to have a representation system that facilitated public participation. In actual practice, however, the main benefits of the new system relate to improvements in management capabilities due to the complete consolidation


\(^2\)Manitoba, Proposals for Urban Reorganization in the Greater Winnipeg Area (Winnipeg, 1970).
of financial and administrative resources.¹

Like Winnipeg, Montreal's post-War suburban growth was not as dramatic as that of Toronto. However, metropolitan Montreal did experience severe traffic problems and a completely uncontrolled spread of suburban sprawl. These developments were not sufficient to force the conservative, rural-based government of Maurice Duplessis to take any action. The reforming Liberal government, which took office in 1960, helped ease the traffic problem by financing metropolitan expressways but did nothing in the way of re-organizing the structures of Montreal's metropolitan political system. Given the sweeping structural reforms made in other aspects of provincial life and the important municipal amalgamations made elsewhere in the province,² the government's inaction in Montreal seems, at first glance, difficult to explain. When the Union nationale government finally did take action by establishing the Montreal Urban Community in 1969, it was in response to a uniquely dramatic breakdown in a vital urban service--policing. The government established the M.U.C. primarily so that it would act as the vehicle for the transfer of funds from suburban municipalities to the central City. This enabled the latter to pay its policemen a competitive wage. Because this was the main purpose of the M.U.C., the structures of the new organization were set up in such a way that they could accomplish little else. In spite of two government reports calling for further

¹Manitoba, City of Winnipeg Review, Report, pp. 9-30.
²The most significant municipal amalgamation took place in Ile-Jésus just north of Montreal. In 1965 thirteen municipalities were merged to create the new City of Laval.
changes and numerous declarations of intent by the provincial government, no significant further changes have been made. Why has the Montreal Urban Community been allowed to languish as a 'failed reform'?\(^1\) When the experience of the M.U.C. is examined in combination with attempts to reform Montreal's school boards and social service facilities, a probable explanation clearly emerges.

2. Language Differences and Metropolitan Reform

The previous section briefly noted the importance of the central city-suburban cleavage in the politics of metropolitan re-organization. This cleavage undoubtedly exists in Montreal and can easily be cited as the apparent reason why reform has been so difficult. However, if this is so, the more interesting question is: Why has this cleavage been more significant in Montreal than in Toronto and Winnipeg? This thesis aims to show that the answer to this question lies primarily in the linguistic make-up of Montreal's population. A full description of the nature of the French-English cleavage in Montreal is attempted in the next chapter. At this stage, it need only be pointed out that about 66% of the population of metropolitan Montreal is French-speaking. The English-speaking group constitutes 25% but, in economic terms, is much more powerful than its numbers suggest.

In Toronto and Winnipeg the situation is substantially different. In 1971 the census metropolitan area of Toronto had a population of

\(^1\)This is the translated title of Jacques Benjamin's book, La Communauté urbaine de Montréal: Une réforme ratée (Montreal, L'Aurore, 1975).
2,602,098.\textsuperscript{1} Only 72.8% of these people used the English language more than any other within their homes. However, only 0.7% used French. In short, more than a quarter of the population used languages other than English or French; 7.2% used Italian. In terms of ethnic origin, 57.5% of the population traced their paternal ancestry to the British Isles and only 3.5% to France. This means that just over 40% of the population of metropolitan Toronto were of an ethnic origin other than English or French.

The figures for metropolitan Winnipeg (1971 population 548,808) indicate that this city has a lower proportion of people of British ethnic origin (42.2%) than Toronto but a higher proportion (85.0%) who use English regularly in their homes. This suggests that the people in Winnipeg who are not of British or French ethnic origin have been in Winnipeg long enough to have absorbed the English language. In percentage terms, the French population is more important than in Toronto. French is second to English in terms of language used in the home, but the figure is only 3.2%. The figures for ethnic origin show that the French are outnumbered by the Ukrainians, 11.7% to 8.4%. However, there was one municipality in metropolitan Winnipeg, St. Boniface (1971 population 46,750), in which the French, with 35.6% of the population, were the largest ethnic group. Even in St. Boniface, however, the English language prevailed dramatically over French. The former was regularly used by 73.1% of the population and the latter by only 23.0%. The

\textsuperscript{1}All figures in this paragraph and the next are derived from Canada, Statistics Canada, \textit{1971 Census of Canada} (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1973).
existence of St. Boniface, which has often been viewed as the main outpost of French-Canadian culture in western Canada, makes the Winnipeg situation substantially different from that of Toronto, but it is still hardly comparable to that of Montreal.

The concentrated strength of the French group within St. Boniface has complicated the process of metropolitan reform in Winnipeg. French Canadians living there have been motivated to cling to their municipal institutions not just for the usual parochial and economic reasons but also as a way of protecting and enhancing their threatened culture and language. Because of the federal government's emphasis on protecting French minorities outside Quebec, these motivations have been perceived by many as being highly legitimate. When the Manitoba government presented legislation in 1971 to create the new Unicity by merging all the existing suburbs into a new City of Winnipeg, St. Boniface was adamantly opposed. Unlike other affected suburbs, St. Boniface could argue that its municipal autonomy was important for linguistic and cultural reasons. The government responded to this by claiming that the special nature of St. Boniface could be adequately protected and represented by its 'community committee' which would consist of the four Unicity councillors to be selected from the territory of the old municipality. Although other suburban areas would have similar committees, St. Boniface was given special concessions concerning the use of the French language.²

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¹For a discussion of the period prior to the mid-1960s, see Murray Donnelly, 'Ethnic Participation in Municipal Government: Winnipeg, St. Boniface and the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg', Report for Division V-A of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, 1965).

²For more details, see Axworthy, Politics of Innovation, pp. 56-7 and 63.
It would appear that, although the St. Boniface situation was a factor in the Winnipeg experience, it was not of decisive importance in affecting the course of metropolitan reform.

There has been very little study of the effect of ethnicity and language on urban politics in Toronto.\(^1\) As far as the debate about metropolitan structures is concerned, the relevance of these factors has been negligible. Members of any one ethnic minority are not in control of any municipality and could hardly expect to be. These minorities, and the minorities in Winnipeg, generally behave in a manner similar to white ethnic minorities in the United States.\(^2\)

Because the blacks in northern American cities constitute such a large proportion of the population and because they are physically different from the white majority, their pattern of behaviour has not been similar to that of other American ethnic groups. They have not been assimilated in the normal pattern and, in some cases, have been successful in winning control of centre city political structures without significant reliance on the political support of other groups. In these circumstances, it is interesting to note that black central city political leaders have generally been less enthusiastic for metropolitan government than the whites whom they replaced. For example, the first

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\(^1\)For an account of how the electoral campaigns of Alderman M. D. Goldrick were affected by the presence of large groups of foreign language speakers, see Irene Harris, 'How to Run and Win', in James Lorimer and Evelyn Ross, eds., The City Book (Toronto, Lorimer, 1976), pp. 148-59.

black major of Gary, Indiana, Richard Hatcher, has been quoted as saying that a proposal to bring in metropolitan government was an attempt 'to mute black votes'.

Although this is consistent with the normal concern of centre city leaders that they not be outnumbered by suburbanites, it adds an important new dimension to the situation. In the white suburbs of central cities controlled by blacks one would similarly expect racial considerations to heighten suburban opposition to any metropolitan plan which might help open suburban areas to an outflow of the centre city's black population. It seems ironic that proposals for metropolitan re-organization in U.S. cities are in fact often opposed by both blacks and whites. Both groups see their position threatened. This illustrates the important point that even though municipal consolidation or federation might be expected to be in the interests of the majority within the area concerned, the losses resulting from a decrease in homogeneity can be just as threatening to the majority as to the minority, especially if the majority is weak economically. Later chapters will show that such a situation exists in Montreal in relation to its main linguistic groups.

The parallels between the racial cleavage in the United States and the linguistic cleavage in Montreal, although interesting, cannot be pushed too far. A crucial difference between French Montrealers and urban black Americans is that the former have traditionally possessed

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1 Quoted in Bollens and Schmandt, The Metropolis, p. 321.


3 The most famous comparison of American blacks and French Canadians is found in the title of Pierre Vallière's book, White Niggers of America, trans, by Joan Pinkham (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart), 1971.
their own institutional superstructure in which their own members could control municipal governments, police forces, school systems, and social services. Although it can be argued that these institutions were often operated in such a way as to maintain the underprivileged status of French Montrealers, the dynamics of the situation would have been completely different if, like the blacks, the French had controlled no political structures at all. Other differences relate to the fact that, unlike urban blacks in the United States, French Montreal has always contained an important, if numerically small, middle and upper class. In fact, these well-off French Montrealers have controlled certain suburban municipalities, thereby making it impossible to equate suburban interests exclusively with English interests in the same way that one can equate wealthy suburban interests in the United States with white interests.

The fact that language rather than race is the important cleavage in Montreal has meant that there has been a greater tendency for people on both sides to find legitimate grounds to defend a system in which local institutions, particularly schools and social services, are established for each separate group. This network of separate institutions in Montreal has reinforced and perpetuated the linguistic cleavage and has, of course, been an obstacle in any attempt to bring the two groups closer together, either informally or through integrated institutions.

Although there are other cities in the western industrialized world in which more than one language receives significant official recognition, there is little to be gained by an extensive analysis of
their experience concerning metropolitan re-organization. This is because of great differences in institutional practices and political beliefs concerning the role and structure of local government. Brussels is the city which seems to have the most obvious similarities to Montreal. Its metropolitan area has a population of about 1.1 million people, 80% of whom are French-speaking.\(^1\) The city is surrounded by the Flemish-speaking section of the country. The Flemish generally view Brussels as a French-speaking 'oil stain' constantly expanding into their countryside. The French-speaking majority in Brussels, the Bruxellois, see themselves as being unduly restricted by successive national governments which have not been able to do anything which might be interpreted as allowing Brussels to expand its territory.

In Belgium there has been an explicit attempt by the central government to establish different language policies in different parts of the country. One of the most contentious aspects of this policy, particularly in the Brussels area, has been the determination of the exact location of the boundaries. The government of Quebec has only recently introduced far-reaching language legislation. However, it has scrupulously avoided the Belgian example of establishing linguistic boundaries. This is the main reason why, for purposes of studying metropolitan governmental structures, Montreal and Brussels cannot be meaningfully compared.

Helsinki, Berne, and Johannesburg are all cities in which official provision is made for the existence of linguistic

minorities. Unfortunately, however, there is no published information concerning the extent to which linguistic factors have affected the establishment or operation of governmental structures covering entire metropolitan areas. This makes any kind of international comparison within the context of this thesis virtually impossible. As a result, the comparative element in this thesis is fundamentally Canadian. It is known that metropolitan re-organization in Toronto and Winnipeg has been comprehensive and far-reaching. In all major respects, except one, the environment for reform in Montreal was no different. It is in this way that this thesis aims to illustrate the significance of French-English differences in explaining the process of metropolitan re-organization in Montreal.

3. The Framework of the Thesis

There have been few attempts in the literature of Canadian political science to link the study of urban politics to the wider issues of Canadian political life. One of these great issues—if not the central one—is the relationship between 'the two founding peoples',

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2 A notable exception to this is James Lorimer. He attempts to show how the local political process generally serves the interests of what he calls 'the property industry', an industry which also is treated sympathetically by federal and provincial governments. See his A Citizen's Guide to City Politics (Toronto, James Lewis and Samuel, 1972).
the French and the English. The province of Quebec is inevitably, and quite properly, viewed as the homeland of the French. What is often forgotten is that Quebec, when ranked with all Canadian provinces, has the fourth largest English-speaking population.\(^1\) Not only have the English been a strong minority in terms of size and economic power, they have also benefited from having a wide network of social and political institutions which have been separate from those of the French majority. This thesis studies those aspects of the network which are clearly part of the urban governmental system or which have recently been absorbed into it. To this extent, the thesis is not just about urban politics in Canada but is also about the broader issue of the relationship between the French and the English.

An important Quebec government commission which investigated the language situation in the province in the late 1960s tried to find the reason why 'a good portion of Quebec's population does not need to know French in the ordinary course of events'.\(^2\) It put forward the following explanation for this apparently anomalous situation:

The answer lies in the social organization which serves as a framework for the everyday life of Quebecers. The Province has a double network of institutions and services .... Herein lies the explanation of this peculiar phenomenon of two communities living side by side without having to communicate with each other .... This double network of institutions and services is known fact. It is so well known and such an accepted part of Quebec life, that it escapes attention ....

\(^1\) In this regard, Quebec ranks behind Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta. This is based on 1971 Census figures for language used most often in the home.

hospital levels; it is evident in the information media and entertainment fields (newspapers, magazines, radio, television and so forth); it applies in the area of culture and even at the . . . provincial administration level . . .; and it exists in private organizations such as banks and even, to some extent, in commerce.  

Nowhere in the province is the English 'network of services and institutions' stronger than on the Island of Montreal.

One of the most important features of the above statement is its claim that the existence of the double network of institutions is so well known and accepted that it 'escapes attention'. It must be remembered that this was the situation prior to the passage of the province's first comprehensive language legislation in 1974 and prior to the dramatic election of the Parti québécois in 1976. Both these events served to focus attention on the special position and the special problems of Quebec's English-language institutions. Most of the events discussed in this thesis took place prior to 1974 and all of them prior to the election of 1976. This means that they occurred at a time when official Quebec government policy concerning continued support of English institutions was completely unknown. Most of the events described here took place in an atmosphere of complete uncertainty. English-speaking Montrealers knew that their role was changing and that the future of their school boards, social services and municipalities was open to question. Although there was a general consensus in the French community that the Quebec government needed considerably more authority in relation to Ottawa, few had addressed the problem of the future relationship within the province between institutions dominated by the linguistic minority and those controlled by the majority.

1Ibid.
This thesis is not a study of mass attitudes or beliefs. The next chapter describes the important socio-economic characteristics of the French and English in Montreal and outlines the most important events in the history of their inter-communal relations. However, the rest of the thesis is concerned with how provincial and local political actors related their understanding of these relationships to their own activities. In particular, the thesis is concerned with the extent to which proposals for institutional change were perceived as affecting the balance of power between the French- and English-speaking communities. These perceptions were, of course, strongly affected by the attitudes and beliefs of ordinary citizens but, for the purposes of this work, it is not essential to know exactly what those attitudes and beliefs really were. Metropolitan governmental institutions are probably the least visible of all in Canada and the opportunity for public participation, even through elections, is limited. It is for this reason that the thesis is primarily concerned with the motivations and calculations of a relatively small group of specialized bureaucrats and politicians.

Studying the causes of recent political decisions or non-decisions is difficult at the best of times. It is particularly difficult when one wants to analyze the impact of an all-pervading cleavage such as language is in Montreal. Just as Newton found local politicians in Birmingham who were blind to the existence of class,¹ some local politicians in Montreal have denied, in interviews with the

author, the salience of language. However, even the most perfunctory analysis of the political process in the two cities would reveal that cleavages based on class and language are at the heart of the identity of virtually all the political actors—especially, perhaps, the ones who most vehemently deny it. What does a social scientist do when confronted with this kind of behaviour? Surely the answer is that he must use all the evidence available in order to form his own judgement about the nature of the social reality he is studying. If this conflicts with the expressed views of some of the participants, then so be it. In Montreal it has been in the interests of a great many local politicians to deny the salience of linguistic cleavages. What this thesis attempts to do is to go beyond their political rhetoric and to look at what has actually happened. The evidence shows that, although Montreal, like all cities, has many important social cleavages which affect the political process, there is one in particular which has the most explanatory value in relation to the process of metropolitan re-organization. It is a factor which is almost completely absent from the other two Canadian cities with which it can most appropriately be compared. That factor is language. It is not suggested, however, that language differences in Montreal have affected all issues relating to metropolitan reform in the same way. Chapters III to VI are concerned with showing that at different times and on different sorts of issues the language cleavage had different effects. The concluding chapter analyzes the reasons for these different effects and outlines alternative possibilities for future development.

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1This thesis does not rest on the presentation of data collected from a series of systematic interviews. However, material in written sources was supplemented by material gleaned through informal interviews of selected people. For a list of people interviewed, see Appendix III.
CHAPTER II

FRENCH AND ENGLISH IN MONTREAL

In 1958 Ralf Dahrendorf pointed out that there are two different kinds of endogenous social conflicts in modern societies.¹ One kind includes all the conflicts which arise in specific historical and geographical circumstances. He cited as examples the conflict between blacks and whites in the United States, protestants and catholics in the Netherlands, and Flemings and Walloons in Belgium. The second type was made up of all the conflicts which reflected the general structural features of societies in the same stage of development. The main example here is class conflict in industrialized societies. Although Dahrendorf claimed that 'a theory of minority or religious conflict is as meaningful as that of class conflict',² he went on to argue that there was a greater need for class analysis and consequently most of Dahrendorf's work is directed to this end.³

Although Dahrendorf and other modern social scientists have paid a great deal of attention to class conflict, attempts to develop

²Ibid., 172.
³See especially Class and Class Conflict in Industrialized Societies (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959).
meaningful theories about other kinds of conflict have been less fruitful. This makes it difficult to describe and analyze the conflict between the French and English of Montreal, a conflict which clearly falls into Dahrendorf's first category. Nevertheless, some useful frameworks for analysis so exist. The most notable is that provided by Georg Simmel as revised by Lewis Coser.\(^1\) The Simmel-Coser analysis is extremely broad in that it is concerned with the social functions of all forms of human conflict. Its virtue for the purpose of this thesis is that it clearly includes the types of conflict included in Dahrendorf's first category. This means that it is highly relevant to a description of the basic social relations between the French and English of Montreal. Such a description is one of the main objects of this chapter and consequently the insights of Simmel and Coser will frequently be cited.

Their insights are less useful in describing relationships amongst politicians and bureaucrats operating within highly specialized roles and structures. For this reason, it cannot be used so extensively in the chapters that follow. Another problem with the framework is that its emphasis is on conflict rather than on compromise or accommodation. Coser defines social conflict in harsh terms. It is

\[\ldots\text{a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power, and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate, their rivals.}\]  

\(^2\)

A frequent objective of politicians operating within political systems in which there are deep social cleavages is to avoid this type of

\(^1\)Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1956).

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 8.
conflict as much as is possible and to arrive at arrangements whereby the various groups can co-exist, even if this involves relative social isolation from each other. The notion that political elites within certain deeply divided liberal democratic systems engage in a conscious effort to accommodate the interests of the various groups by avoiding outright majority rule is developed by Arend Lijphart in his concept of consociational democracy.\(^1\) The literature on consociational democracy does not directly conflict with the Simmel-Coser framework but, for purposes of political analysis, it does add an important dimension.\(^2\) The main object of this chapter is to describe the development and current manifestations of the French-English cleavage in Montreal. In part, this will be accomplished by showing how it relates to the main insights of the theorists who have just been mentioned.

1. **Changing Patterns of French-English Relations: The City of Montreal**

The history of the French in North America is 'the story of the ceaseless struggle of a minority group to maintain its culture in the face of all manner of conscious and unconscious pressures to conform to the dominant civilization of other ethnic groups and other cultures'.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) See his 'Typologies of Democratic Systems', *Comparative Political Systems*, I (1968), 46-80 and 'Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, IV (1971), 1-14. For Lijphart's 'Consociational Democracy' and other important articles by other authors, see Kenneth McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy* (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1974).

\(^2\) The relevance of consociational democracy for Montreal will be explored further in the final chapter.

French has been the dominant language on the shores of the St. Lawrence River for more than three hundred and fifty years. For more than two hundred years the language has survived in almost complete isolation from the political and social influence of the original colonizing power. From 1760 until 1960 the French language and culture in Quebec was mainly protected by the Roman Catholic church. French-speaking politicians, acting with the blessing of their spiritual leaders, were successful in maintaining educational, social, and cultural institutions under the control of the church itself or of governmental institutions controlled by its faithful adherents. What they were not able to control, however, was the economy.

Immediately after the occupation of Montreal in 1760, the British merchants who had been accompanying the army seized control of the valuable fur trade. They quickly formed a mutually profitable partnership with expert French-Canadian traders who had been commercially isolated following the departure of the French government officials. This partnership lasted until 1821 when the Montreal-based North West Company was absorbed by the Hudson's Bay Company. This marked the end of the sole private commercial venture in which British entrepreneurs in Montreal relied on special French-Canadian skill and expertise not obtainable elsewhere. In later years, French-Canadian society 'turned inward upon itself and poured its brains and energy into the professions, the church, the petty trades, and agriculture'.¹ Meanwhile, British capitalists in Montreal accumulated large fortunes and great

power through the development of the squared timber trade, steamships, canals, and railroads. In the second half of the nineteenth century, they brought the industrial revolution to Montreal. The city became known across the country for its clothing, textile, tobacco, and leather-processing factories. In virtually all instances the British were the bosses and the French and recent immigrants from Ireland were the workers. This was the beginning of a pattern which still exists to this day—the superimposition of class and ethnic cleavages. Those cleavages, as they are currently manifested, will be explored in more detail later in this chapter. At this stage, it need only be pointed out that the introduction of British capitalism to Montreal sparked a great rise in population. This is shown in Table II.1.

### Table II.1

Non-Indian Population of the Island of Montreal, 1700-1860

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1700</td>
<td>2,105</td>
<td>1790</td>
<td>26,010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>3,492</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>32,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1720</td>
<td>5,314</td>
<td>1810</td>
<td>40,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1730</td>
<td>6,351</td>
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<td>41,820</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>8,824</td>
<td>1840</td>
<td>59,654</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>8,312</td>
<td>1850</td>
<td>77,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770</td>
<td>9,770</td>
<td>1860</td>
<td>120,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>17,945</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. An ethnically-mixed, working class neighbourhood in the centre part of the city was described in a fascinating book first published in 1897. See Herbert Brown Ames, *The City Below the Hill* (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1972).

The relative size of the two groups has been carefully monitored since the early nineteenth century. In the three decades immediately prior to Confederation in 1867, people of British ethnic origin actually constituted a majority within the municipal boundaries of the City of Montreal.\(^1\) In the long run, however, the British could not compete with the high French birth rate and the rapid immigration from the rural areas which resulted from industrialization. For more than a century, the economically powerful British group has been in the minority. The fact that Montreal is located on an island has made it relatively easy for demographers to make meaningful comparisons over long periods of time using the same natural boundaries. Table II-2 shows the strength of the two major ethnic groups on the Island between 1871 and 1971.

\[\begin{array}{lcccccccccccc}
\hline
\text{French} & 60.3 & 62.1 & n.a. & 63.9 & 62.7 & 60.7 & 60.2 & 62.6 & 63.8 & 62.0 & 59.0 \\
\text{British} & 38.1 & 35.2 & n.a. & 33.7 & 26.2 & 27.3 & 26.3 & 24.2 & 22.2 & 18.2 & 17.0 \\
\text{Others} & 1.6 & 2.7 & n.a. & 2.4 & 11.1 & 12.0 & 13.5 & 13.2 & 14.0 & 19.9 & 24.0 \\
\text{Total (000's)} & 144 & 193 & 277 & 361 & 555 & 724 & 1004 & 1117 & 1320 & 1748 & 1955 \\
\end{array}\]


The figures in this table are based on responses to the following question: To what ethnic or cultural group did you or your ancestors (on the male side) belong on coming to this Continent? The table shows that the French held a remarkably steady percentage on the Island throughout the period in question. Meanwhile, the British have lost more than one half of their relative strength. By 1961 there were more 'others' than British in Montreal. This trend was accelerated in the period 1961-71.

If members of other ethnic groups had shown any significant tendency to be assimilated by the French majority, the relative strength of the French group would have been greatly increased. This was not the case, however, because most immigrants throughout Quebec's history have tended to learn English before learning French. Given the economic dominance of the British within Montreal, and the economic strength of the English language within North America, this was not surprising. Until very recently, the French have made no effort to assimilate immigrants, preferring instead to keep their culture as free as possible from any outside influences. As long as their birth rate remained one of the highest in the western world, natural increase could offset the effect of having virtually all the immigrants turning to English. When the birth rate plunged dramatically in the 1960s, the French would no longer be so complacent. The implications of this development will be discussed later.

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1 Canada, Statistics Canada, 1971 Census of Canada (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1973), Bulletin 1.3-2, inside front cover.

The main feature of the history of the relations between French and English in Montreal has been that, despite the potentially explosive social situation, the city has been surprisingly free of overt communal conflict. Using Coser's analysis, this is not surprising. He points out that 'unequal distributions of privileges and rights may lead to sentiments of hostility, but they do not necessarily lead to conflict'.\(^1\) Conflict only takes place when the negatively privileged group develops 'the awareness that it is being denied rights to which it is entitled. It must reject any justification for the existing distribution of rights and privileges'.\(^2\) In other words, conflict will not take place if the position of the privileged group is perceived of as legitimate. Throughout most of Quebec's history, the British role seemed to have acquired the requisite legitimacy. This was mainly because French Quebec's most important institution, the church, did not encourage its members to become entrepreneurs and because it raised no objection to British political rule as long as the rights and privileges of the church were respected. The most serious threat to Montreal's social peace came during the Rebellion of 1837, but even then the rebels were in a clear minority, even among French Canadians. Furthermore, most of the sporadic fighting in Lower Canada did not take place within Montreal. Later in the nineteenth century, there was a number of serious violent incidents but they resulted from perceived insults to religious beliefs rather than from any demands from French Canadians for more political or economic power.

\(^1\)Coser, *Social Conflict*, p. 137.

\(^2\)Ibid.
The main sources of communal conflict in the first half of the twentieth century were events taking place in Europe. In 1917 serious riots broke out in Montreal when French Canadians protested the enforcement of military conscription aimed at bolstering Canada's contribution to the European trenches. The Montreal Star was particularly zealous in its support for the measure. In August there was an unsuccessful attempt to dynamite the home of Sir Hugh Graham, the newspaper's proprietor.¹ In the late 1930s French-speaking university students took to the streets to support Spanish fascism while most English intellectuals attempted to hold public meetings in support of the Republic. At the same time Jewish shopkeepers in Montreal found their businesses physically attacked by small groups of French-speaking anti-Semitic vandals.² Primarily because of the delicate political manoeuvring of Prime Minister MacKenzie King, there were no conscription riots in Montreal during World War II.³ There was still profound disagreement between the French and English communities on this issue but it was virtually all contained within the normal political process. This is because, at the federal level, Prime Minister King was one of the greatest practitioners of consociational democracy that Canada has ever known.

Communal violence did not break out again in Montreal until the 1960s. This time it was an explicit attack on the economically

²Ibid., p. 170.
³However, Montreal Mayor Camillien Houde was interned throughout World War II for urging young men not to register for compulsory military service.
privileged English minority. At this stage it is important to note that the previous violence was not related to this issue. In the late nineteenth century the questions at issue were religious ones and in the twentieth century they related to European wars and the federal government's policies concerning Canada's role in relation to them. Before the 1960s there was little overt challenge to the economic dominance of the English.

The economic dominance of the English, and their social isolation from the French, has been a constant theme in novels having Montreal as their main setting. Antoine Sirois has studied twenty-two French and twelve English novelists whose work appeared between 1942 and 1965. In virtually all cases the novelists implicitly or explicitly agreed with Hugh Maclennan's conception of English-French relations as consisting of 'two solitudes,' interacting with each other only to the extent required for English-speaking businessmen to control French-speaking politicians and workers. As far as normal social, cultural, and religious relations are concerned, the two groups are consistently portrayed as being totally isolated from each other.

This novelists' view undoubtedly corresponds to the everyday experience of most Montrealers. In hundreds of subtle ways, they are continually aware of the constant complications of living in a city with two distinct cultures and languages. To avoid these complications, many

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1 *Montréal dans le roman canadien* (Montreal, Marcel Didier, 1968).

2 The title of one of Maclennan's best known novels (Toronto, Macmillan, 1957). It was first published in 1945.
members of each group successfully live their lives without any real contact with members of the other group. The two groups seem to merge only in a narrow strip in the centre of the city. Rather than being a French-English mixture, this area is a kind of buffer zone or 'third solitude' occupied primarily by recent immigrants who are not yet comfortable in either official language. Although a few other linguistically balanced areas do exist, they tend not to be well known by the vast majority of Montrealers. Until fairly recently, Montreal was characterized by having two quite separate networks of retail and commercial institutions. It still has dual systems of universities, cinemas, newspapers, and television and radio stations which serve quite distinct French and English clienteles. The 'two solitudes' have existed since soon after 1760 and they are still a crucial reality of Montreal life.

So far there has been no mention of the electoral behaviour of the French and the English. In federal elections, since 1896 at least, both groups have traditionally supported the Liberal Party, although the English have had a somewhat higher propensity to vote Conservative. Until 1935 this pattern was also found at the provincial level. However, after Maurice Duplessis absorbed the Conservatives into his Union nationale, English votes in Montreal swung decisively to the Liberals. Although English businessmen found the Union nationale a satisfactory business partner after Duplessis took office as Premier in 1936, English voters could never accept its nationalist rhetoric and particularly its opposition to Canada's full participation in World War II. ¹ With the

exception of the period 1939-44, the Union nationale remained in office until 1960. Although most French-speaking Montrealers voted U.N. during this period, Duplessis' strength was based in rural and small town Quebec rather than in Montreal. Because of the way in which the province's electoral map favoured the rural areas, Duplessis was able to remain in power while treating the province's largest city almost as if it were politically irrelevant. Voting behaviour in more recent federal and provincial elections will be discussed in the last section of this chapter.

Particularly important within the context of this thesis is an examination of the roles occupied by the French and the English within the municipal political system of the City of Montreal. In modern times the City has always contained well over half the population of the Island of Montreal. Later chapters in the thesis describe the political relationship of the City to its suburbs and how this relationship has been affected by the French-English cleavage. At this point, however, it is important to understand the patterns of French-English accommodation within the City itself.

From 1760 to 1764 Montreal was ruled by an English military governor. This office was replaced by a panel of twenty-seven local magistrates, rotating two-by-two, who were empowered to make local ordinances. In 1792 Montreal was officially given the status of a City and its boundaries were formally defined. At the same time, the new City was divided into two wards, the boundary being St. Lawrence

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¹Cooper, Montreal, p. 25.
Boulevard. To this day, St. Lawrence acts as an official boundary, for street-naming purposes, between east and west and as an unofficial boundary dividing the French and English sectors.

In 1831, when Montreal's population was 31,000, the legislature of Lower Canada passed an act incorporating the City for a limited period and giving it an elected council, but Montreal held its first municipal election only in 1833, the year the Act was proclaimed. The sixteen elected councillors chose Jacques Viger as the City's first mayor. In 1836, at the height of the political crisis which was to lead to the Rebellion of 1837, the charter expired and was not renewed. Until 1840 rule by magistrates was restored. In 1840 the Governor-General granted a new charter to Montreal, giving himself authority to appoint the new mayor and councillors. The appointment of Peter McGill as the second mayor of Montreal began the practice of alternating the office between English and French Canadians, a practice which was to last into the twentieth century. By 1843 the elective principle was fully restored, although the mayor was not directly elected by the property owners until 1852. In 1860 the tenants received the vote.

Guy Bourassa, the foremost student of Montreal politics, has divided the City's political history into three eras. From 1843 to

1Raymond Tanghe, 'L'administration de Montréal', Le Canada français, XXIII-2 (October, 1935), 125.
2Ibid., p. 27.
1873 'wealth constituted the fundamental political resource: it conferred high social status and the right to lead'.\(^1\) During this period the council was usually about 60% English,\(^2\) reflecting their numerical strength and their firm control of business and commerce. The forty years between 1873 and 1914 constituted a period of transition in which the hegemony of the old elite was finally broken. The process was aided in 1889 by the introduction of the secret ballot.\(^3\) By the turn of the century French Canadians, as a result of their increasing numbers and the gradual withdrawal of the wealthy English from overt political activity, were constituting almost 70% of the Council.\(^4\) The transition from English to French dominance was not without its difficulties. In the late nineteenth century politicians and newspapermen from both linguistic groups tended to jealously guard the prerogatives of their respective groups. French-speakers attacked a 'Scotchman' who was the autocratic superintendent of Mount Royal Park; English-speakers were unhappy with the actions of the French-speaking police chief and the superintendent of water works. Both linguistic groups defended their own people. Debates about the installation of new City utilities were dominated by the issue of whether it was the French or English who benefited.\(^5\) Such conflicts in the local council would not really disappear from public debate until it was finally clear that it was the

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 125. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 126. 
\(^3\)Ibid., p. 128. \(^4\)Ibid. 
French who were in command. Having lost control of the City, the English were forced to turn to other more subtle ways of protecting their perceived interests.

The withdrawal of the financial elite from local politics has been well documented in other cities, particularly in the United States. Robert Dahl's description of how the 'entrepreneurs' gave way to the 'ex-plebes' in the local politics of New Haven between 1842 and 1900\(^1\) is a particularly apt parallel to the Montreal experience. E. Digby Baltzell's account of the withdrawal of the 'Philadelphia gentlemen' from local politics\(^2\) corresponds to the behaviour of Montreal's English. Like their Philadelphia counterparts, Anglo-Saxon protestants in Montreal channelled their public service away from governmental bodies to private cultural and charitable institutions such as hospitals, libraries, art galleries, schools, and colleges. Most of the new local politicians who replaced them were professionals and small businessmen who often combined local politics with a legislative position in Ottawa or Quebec City.

The English withdrawal was not only political. Like their American counterparts, thousands of wealthy English removed themselves physically from the central City. The movement to the suburbs began in the late nineteenth century. In 1881 Canadians of French ethnic origin were proportionately far less numerous in the City of Montreal than in the municipalities which were on the Island but outside the City. These

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municipalities were either rural parishes or working class suburbs which had grown up around major industrial or transport installations located outside the City. Table II-3 shows that French Canadians constituted 79.9% of the population of these municipalities. At this time Canadians of British origin (including Irish) still lived largely within the City, although there were some working class suburbs with large Irish populations. British Canadians constituted 41.2% of the population of the City. By 1921 the situation had changed substantially.

### TABLE II-3

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<th>Ethnic Origin</th>
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<th>Suburbs (1881)</th>
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<th>Suburbs (1921)</th>
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</tbody>
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1 Data prepared from Canada, Census of Canada, 1880-81 (Ottawa, Maclean, Roger and Co., 1882), i, 52 and 56; Canada, Sixth Census of Canada, 1921 (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1924), i, 534 and 542; and Canada, 1971 Census of Canada Bulletin 1.3-2.
Most of the previously independent French-Canadian working class suburbs had been annexed by the City and many of the rural parishes in the western part of the Island were being populated by British-Canadian suburbanites. In 1921, French Canadians constituted only 47.0% of the Island municipalities outside the City. At this time, British Canadians constituted only 24.0% of the City's population. This pattern of French dominance in the City and weakness in the suburbs has been the central feature of metropolitan politics in Montreal since 1921, even though the relative strength of British-Canadians has been declining in both sectors. The main feature of events since 1921 has been the growing importance in both sectors of the people of 'other' ethnic origins.

Bourassa considers the third and present era of Montreal local politics to have begun in 1914. He points out that the main characteristic of this period has been the mobilization of the mass of voters behind powerful and popular mayors who frequently succeeded in being re-elected.\(^1\) The first such mayor was Méderic Martin, a skilful politician who carefully exploited his working-class origins and occupation as a cigar-maker. His somewhat dubious political practices made him a target for the English-dominated reform coalition of businessmen and progressives which had been battling since the mid-1890s against the growing strength of patronage-based political machines in local elections.\(^2\) As a result of the Cannon commission inquiry in 1909 Martin

\(^{1}\)Bourassa, 'The Political Elite of Montreal', p. 130.

was forced to resign his seat on City council. Nevertheless, he was re-elected in 1912 in order to lead the opposition of the 'little men' against the 'vested interests'. In 1914, when it was considered the turn of the English to nominate a mayor, Martin violated the tradition, ran for the position himself, and defeated his chief opponent, George Washington Stevens, by 40,753 votes to 35,192. The tradition of alternating the mayor's position between English and French was never revived. In fact, in 1926 Mayor Martin campaigned successfully under the slogan 'No more English mayors here'.

Martin remained as mayor, with one two-year interruption, until 1928 during which time he presided over a thoroughly corrupt and virtually bankrupt city administration. In 1918 the provincial government, whose members were themselves not free from questionable involvements in the Montreal property market, virtually took over the administration of the City. They replaced the board of control with a provincially-appointed five-man administrative commission, leaving Martin as little more than a figurehead. In 1921 the provincial government restored some of Martin's powers and abolished the commission. In its place the government set up an executive committee which, although composed of and elected by councillors, had substantial authority independent of both the mayor and the council. The executive committee still survives as

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1Cooper, Montreal, p. 138.
2Ibid., pp. 138-9.
3Ibid., p. 142.
an important and unique mechanism of Montreal's municipal government. Its chairman has often wielded more political power than the mayor himself. From 1921 until 1974 the position of vice-chairman of the executive committee was traditionally filled by an English-speaking Montrealer. Whether it is still a position to which such people can reasonably aspire is not yet clear.

By the late 1920s Martin's political appeal was fading. He had clearly amassed considerable personal wealth during his period of alleged service to the working man. He was unable to establish the same personal contact with the unskilled recent immigrants to Montreal as he had developed with the semi-skilled long-time residents. In the election of 1928, Camillien Houde, a Conservative-member of the provincial legislative since 1923, challenged Martin for the office of mayor and defeated him by 22,000 votes.¹ Houde's origins were even humbler than Martin's and he gained great support from the people whom Martin once viewed as his own. Houde was mayor from 1928 to 1932, 1934 to 1936 and 1938 to 1940. During this period he did not have a firm grip on the City of Montreal, largely due to his heavy involvement in provincial politics. His political career was interrupted in 1940 when he was arrested after urging young men not to register under the National Resources Mobilization Act. He spent the next few years under military guard at Petawawa and Fredericton, thereby becoming a war-time hero in the eyes of many French Canadians.

Prior to his arrest, Houde had already lost most of his powers as mayor. In 1940, for the second time in his mayoralty, the

¹Cooper, Montreal, p. 163.
provincial government had placed the City under trusteeship in an attempt to remedy its dangerous financial position. Although the period of trusteeship was to last for four years, the provincial government acted quickly to give Montreal its twelfth different form of city government since 1833. The membership of the council was increased to ninety-nine. One-third were to be elected by the property-owners in eleven new wards (Class A councillors); one-third by all householders voting in the same eleven wards (Class B councillors) and one-third by thirteen designated public bodies such as universities, unions, chambers of commerce (Class C councillors). The council was to elect a six-man executive committee which in turn elected its chairman and vice-chairman. The mayor was to continue to be elected by all householders on a city-wide basis. This system was to last, with some modifications until 1962. Its main effect was to protect the interests of the property-owners and to bolster English representation on the Council. The property-owning and English groups overlapped to a considerable extent. Both benefited from the creation of Class A and Class C councillors. The English, however, gained most from Class C because they controlled six of the thirteen designated organizations. As with the tradition of having an English-speaking vice-chairman of the executive committee, the existence of Class C councillors can be considered an example of what Lijphart would call a 'consociational device'. These devices

1Cooper, Montreal, p. 168.
2Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen, p. 57.
3Bourassa, Les relations ethniques, p. 148.
4'Consociational Democracy', p. 88.
guaranteed the English a certain level of representation, a level which would not likely result from the working of the ordinary electoral process.

The Liberal government which imposed this system was anxious to improve Montreal's financial reputation and the scheme ultimately did aid in this objective, however opposed it was to majoritarian principles. Houde's successor, elected under the new system in 1940, was Adhémar Raynault, a former protégé of Premier Maurice Duplessis, who had also succeeded Houde in 1936 when the City was similarly under temporary provincial supervision. Houde's internment was a federal-provincial-municipal issue throughout the war. He was finally released in 1944 in time to be a candidate in the municipal elections of that year. He defeated Raynault by almost 15,000 votes. For obvious reasons, Houde received virtually no English support. With a trace of bitterness, Raynault suggests in his memoirs that, as usual, most English Montrealers did not vote at all—they used their political influence only on the federal scene where they had more chance of success.

In 1947 Houde became the only mayor this century to be elected by acclamation. He was again re-elected for a four-year term in 1950. During this period, Houde's Montreal was noted for its almost totally corrupt city government. The close relationship of the police force to criminal organization based on gambling and prostitution was the main

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2 Ibid., p. 174.
3 Ibid., pp. 178-9.
feature of this corruption. It was first exposed in 1949 and 1950 in articles in *Le Devoir* by assistant police director Pacifique Plante.\(^1\) Although Plante was dismissed from his position soon afterwards, he continued his battle with the support of the almost exclusively French Civic Action League and its offshoot, the Committee for Public Morality. In 1950 the latter group succeeded in forcing a judicial inquiry into commercialized vice in Montreal.\(^2\) The chairman of the inquiry was Judge François Caron. Its two investigating lawyers were Plante and Jean Drapeau, a young lawyer with a strong nationalist political background. Judge Caron's report was made public in 1954. Although it implicated many prominent City politicians and policemen, Houde, who had refused to co-operate, was ignored and hence allowed to retire with a theoretically unblemished record.

The Civic Action League's candidate to succeed Houde in the election of 1954 was Jean Drapeau. On the strength of his prominence during the Caron inquiry, Drapeau was the easy victor although the League did not gain full control of the council. Once in office, Drapeau did little to solidify his political position. He was opposed in Quebec by Premier Duplessis and his reputation amongst the English as a dangerous nationalist was confirmed when he replaced the Queen's picture in the mayor's office by a crucifix.\(^3\) In the 1957 election

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\(^1\)These articles were then published in a book entitled *Montréal sous la régime de la pgre* (Montréal, Editions de l'Action nationale, 1950).

\(^2\)J.-Z. Léon Patenaude, 'Le Comité de moralité publique et l'enquête Caron', *De Devoir* (Montréal), August 10, 1972, p. 5.

Drapeau was defeated by Sarto Fournier, a Liberal Senator who was supported by virtually all of Drapeau's enemies. Although Fournier had a 4,000 vote majority, his nebulous local party, the Greater Montreal Rally, did not win as many seats in the council as did the Civic Action League. The period 1957-60 was one of political stalemate.

During these years Drapeau had no formal role in local government. Instead, he made a national reputation for himself by speaking publicly about a wide variety of federal and provincial issues. It appeared that his political future might lie outside Montreal. But Drapeau decided instead to re-enter municipal elections, this time as the undisputed leader of his own highly disciplined local party. As a result of some rather treacherous manoeuvring in 1960, Drapeau disassociated himself from the Civic Action League, taking most of its City councillors with him to form the new Civic Party. Drapeau's action, just before the 1960 election, came too late for the League to react effectively. Drapeau easily defeated Fournier and his Civic Party followers won forty-six of the sixty-six Class A and B Seats. In a referendum held at the same time, 74.7% of the electors followed Drapeau's advice and voted to abolish the Class C councillors. Not surprisingly, voters in English areas of the City were generally not as willing as the French.

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1 Roberts, Montreal, p. 340.
2 These speeches were published as Jean Drapeau vous parle (Montréal, Editions de la cité, 1959).
3 This is described in full, from an anti-Drapeau perspective in J.-Z. Léon Patenaude, Le vrai visage de Jean Drapeau (Montréal, Editions du jour, 1962).
4 Cooper, Montreal, p. 192.
to part with this special form of representation. Nor did they appear to trust Drapeau any more than previously. The 1960 election marked the destruction of the Civic Action League, a scrupulously democratic movement for honest local government, and its replacement by an authoritarian political party devoted only to maintaining Jean Drapeau in office. Apart from Drapeau himself, the party's main asset was Lucien Saulnier, an experienced councillor who was to serve as Chairman of the Executive Committee for ten years.

Drapeau's first objective was to restructure Montreal's system of government. Under his new system, which came into effect in 1962, the mayor retained substantial authority, although most of the normal administration of the City remained in the hands of the chairman of the executive committee. The executive committee consisted of the mayor and five members, including a chairman and a vice-chairman, elected by the council on the nomination of the mayor. The council was composed of forty-five members, three each from fifteen electoral districts. Starting in 1962, municipal elections were to be held every four years. Because of three recent annexations, and the creation of a new electoral district in 1974, the council now consists of fifty-five members. Within each district, separate district-wide elections are held for each available seat, each elector having one vote in each contest.

The election of 1962 is notable because this was the occasion on which Drapeau finally gained the wholehearted electoral support of

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1Bourassa, Les relations ethniques, p. 42.
English Montrealers. They were at last convinced that his nationalist background was well behind him and that he should be given a full opportunity to build a subway for Montreal and to fulfil various other promises designed to modernize and improve Canada's largest city. Drapeau won 89.8% of the vote in the predominantly English electoral district of Notre-Dame-de-Grace in which his main competitor, former mayor Fournier, still lived. He did equally well in the other English districts of Snowdon and Cote-des-Neiges. Civic Party candidates in these districts were almost all English and, until 1974, they were to provide the City with its vice-chairman of the executive committee. Throughout all of Montreal, Drapeau won 87.1% of the vote and his Civic Party won forty-two of the forty-five council seats. As was usual for Montreal elections, the turnout was quite low, 42.6%. Four years later, in 1966, Drapeau gained 94.4% of the popular vote and his party won forty-five of the forty-eight council seats. This time the turnout was even lower--only 32.7%. As in 1962, the tiny opposition came only from some of the working-class sections of the centre city.

In 1970 certain trade unions and left-wing nationalist organizations joined together at the local level to form the Front d'action politique (FRAP). This movement did not nominate a candidate for mayor but attempted to win council seats in the poorer areas of French Montreal.

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1 Data taken from Montreal Municipal Archives, Elections municipales 28-10-62.


in order to build a base for future action. The election was scheduled for 25 October. During the final three weeks of what was the most active campaign since 1960, the City was shaken by the kidnappings, by the Front de libération du Québec (F.L.Q.), of British trade commissioner James Cross and provincial cabinet minister Pierre Laporte. While Drapeau took the strongest position possible against the F.L.Q., FRAP declared its approval of the revolutionary F.L.Q. political manifesto while at the same time expressing its disapproval of their methods.\(^1\) During the last two weeks of the campaign, FRAP's small chances of electoral success were totally smashed by its apparent association with the F.L.Q. In fact, when the federal government proclaimed the War Measures Act on 16 October, a number of FRAP candidates and organizers were jailed. Although the remaining FRAP members pleaded that the elections be postponed, the provincial government refused the request. Montrealers voted as planned, with the streets and polling booths guarded by soldiers. On this occasion 51% of eligible voters turned out to exercise their franchise. Many were obviously interested simply in showing their support for the existing system of government and their opposition to the F.L.Q. In this hostile environment, FRAP failed miserably, the Civic Party won all the council's fifty-two seats, and Drapeau won 91.8% of the popular vote.\(^2\)

During the period 1970-74 there was increasing opposition to Drapeau from two main sources. Those who constituted the remnants of

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\(^1\) Denis Smith, *Bleeding Hearts ... Bleeding Country* (Edmonton, Hurtig, 1971), p. 27.

FRAP were anxious to build a left-wing municipal political movement devoted to attacking Drapeau's failure to provide sufficient housing and social and recreational services in the poorer sections of the City. At the same time a more middle-class movement emerged which was devoted to stopping uncontrolled high rise development in downtown Montreal, saving the City's older buildings and neighbourhoods, and bringing about a more democratic and open municipal system of government. This movement had a strong English component and was in many ways very similar to the municipal reform groups that had already gained power in Toronto and Vancouver. In early 1974 these two sections of anti-Drapeau opinion came together to form the Montreal Citizens Movement (M.C.M.).

When voting took place on 10 November 1974 Drapeau was given one of the greatest shocks of his political career. He received only 55.1% of the popular vote while the M.C.M. candidate obtained 39.1%. More importantly, the M.C.M. won eighteen council seats and a small group called Democracy Montreal won another. Drapeau's Civic Party delegation to the council was cut to thirty-six. From the standpoint of municipal politics in Montreal, the most important feature of the 1974 election was that it placed a strong opposition group in Montreal's city council. But the significance of the M.C.M. was even greater because it proved that it was possible to create a reform movement in Montreal that could gain strong support from both the English and French communities. In fact, in relative terms, the English tended to desert Drapeau at a greater rate than the French. This is particularly

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surprising when it is remembered that the M.C.M. was essentially a left-wing movement. However, after its unexpected success, the M.C.M. was so torn by internal ideological divisions that its chances of mounting a serious campaign in the next election seem slim.

This section has shown that, since the mid-nineteenth century, Montreal's French majority has successfully taken over the main institution of municipal government—the City of Montreal. Evidence of consociational patterns of accommodation between the two groups within the City's political institutions has become increasingly difficult to find. Citizens of British origin have unobtrusively withdrawn from the central City, both politically and physically. In relation to the French, their share of the Island's population has dramatically decreased. However, because of the rapid increase in size of the other ethnic groups, the relative strength of the French has remained constant. Prior to 1960 there was little or no political agitation directed against the economic role of the English. This absence of significant overt conflict did not mean that there was an absence of hostility, nor did it mean that the situation was stable. As long as the English were so obviously in an economically dominant position, the likelihood of future conflict remained inevitable.

2. Anglophones, Francophones, and Others

The main object of this section is to define and determine the present strength of the various ethnic and linguistic groups in Montreal. Figures relating to the strength of ethnic groups in Montreal during the

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1 Coser, Social Conflict, pp. 81-3.
past hundred years were presented in the previous section. In recent years the federal census has also determined the mother tongue of Canadians, the language they use most often in the home, and their ability to speak one or other of the two official languages. All these sets of data are invaluable in determining the relative strength of the country's many ethnic-linguistic groups. The exact relevance of each set depends, of course, on the use to which it is being put. The language used in one's home is especially useful because it gives the best indication of the language that a person is most comfortable with, or most attached to. Since complete fluency in, and acceptance of, the French language is undoubtedly the most important defining characteristic of Quebec's French majority, it follows that the data relating to home language are the most useful for the purposes of studying French-English relations in Montreal. Using these data, acknowledges the fact that recent immigrants who now use either French or English regularly in their homes have in fact started the assimilation process to the language group they have chosen. Immigrants who still use their mother tongues in their homes remain uncommitted. It is also important to emphasize that English-speaking people who are fluent in French but who only use it in their work are not counted in these data as being French. One cannot, for these purposes, claim to be both French and English at the same time. The words 'French-speaking' and 'English-speaking', apart from being somewhat clumsy, do not imply this element of mutual exclusiveness and are therefore not totally appropriate in describing the two groups. Fortunately, the two French words 'anglophone' and 'francophone' have recently come into common English usage in Quebec in such a way as to
generally convey the desired meaning. They will therefore be used in this sense throughout the rest of the thesis. A francophone is a person who uses French as his main language at home and an anglophone uses English.

Francophones in Quebec are often referred to as an ethnic group. This is because so few post-Conquest immigrants to Quebec have either been francophones from other countries or have been willing to adopt the French language. The figures in Table II-4 show that there is virtually no difference in size between the group of people who are of French ethnic origin and the group who use French regularly in the home. This leads to the reasonable assumption that, with few exceptions, these are in fact the same people. Historically, this French group has been united by a common religion. Any history of French Canada points to the inestimable role of the Roman catholic church in preserving Quebec's French culture. Until recently at least, the role of the church was so pervasive that it has been impossible to discuss French-Canadian society without at the same time discussing the church. In short, part of being a French Canadian involved being a Roman catholic. As far as francophones in Quebec are concerned, it is fruitless to attempt to isolate the influence of language, culture, religion and nationality on their ethnic identity. All are inextricably intertwined.

The problems involved in arriving at a clear operational definition of the term 'ethnic group' are great. After a thorough study of existing sociological and anthropological approaches to defining ethnicity, Wsevolod W. Isajiw has arrived at what he calls a 'composite' definition, which includes both objective and subjective elements.
TABLE II-4\(^1\)

Percentage Distribution of the Population of Selected Areas by Ethnic Origin, Mother Tongue, and Home Language, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>British/English</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ethnic origin</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- mother tongue</td>
<td>60.2</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>22.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- home language</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>26.2</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>French</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ethnic origin</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>79.0</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>59.0</td>
<td>64.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- mother tongue</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>63.2</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>67.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- home language</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>80.9</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ethnic origin</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- mother tongue</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- home language</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total N</strong> (ooo's)</td>
<td>21,568</td>
<td>6,028</td>
<td>2,743</td>
<td>2,187</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>1,214</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* M.U.C. figures include St.-Jean-de-Dieu. Other geographical divisions are explained in following pages.

\(^1\)Prepared from data found in Canada, 1971 Census, Cat. 92-723, 92-725, and 92-726.
For Isajiw an ethnic group is

... a group or category of persons who have common ancestral origin and the same cultural traits, who have a sense of peoplehood and Gemeinschaft type of relations, who are of immigrant background and who have either minority or majority status within a larger society.¹

Under these criteria Quebec's francophones constitute one of the best examples of a clearly delineated ethnic group in the entire world. In the foreseeable future, however, this clear delineation could become blurred. Recent government policies have been directed at encouraging immigration from French-speaking countries and ensuring that non-French immigrants eventually become francophones. If such policies are successful they could have a dramatic effect on the relationship between ethnicity and the use of French.

Quebec's anglophones are another matter. Most of the early residents were Scottish and many settled in rural areas south and west of Montreal. However, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the anglophone element became much more ethnically diversified and their presence in rural areas dwindled.² In fact by 1971 almost 75% of them were living in metropolitan Montreal.³ The anglophone community in Montreal has not been comprehensively studied. The most useful published comments on it have been made by J. R. Mallory.⁴ He points out that

¹'Definitions of Ethnicity', Ethnicity, I (1974), 118.


³Calculated from Table II-4.

there is a substantial difference in outlook between those middle and upper class anglophones whose families are deeply rooted in Quebec and those who simply find themselves in the province for a few years as part of a business or professional career that requires constant mobility. Mallory suggested that many of the former group (which includes most of Montreal's Jews) have already become bilingual and would be likely to stay in Quebec even if francophone nationalist pressure increases. The latter group, however, see no reason to become bilingual, are less tolerant of Quebec's idiosyncrasies, and are likely soon to be replaced by Quebec's emerging francophone middle class. Mallory's third type are the migrants from the maritime provinces. Historically, Montreal has been the Canadian metropolitan centre for the maritimes, but with the increasing importance of French in Montreal they are likely to view Toronto as a more attractive magnet. Mallory's final type consists of recent European immigrants who have come to Montreal since 1945 and who have assimilated to the English group. The growing size of this group has been at the heart of the recent debate about language policy in Quebec.

Montreal's anglophones clearly do not constitute an ethnic group in the same sense that francophones do. For one thing, they are divided by religion. For example, anglophone catholics and protestants have each built up their own network of educational and social service institutions. Although Montreal's Jews have been largely educated in protestant schools, they have often been isolated from anglophones in many important ways. In 1971, 4.2% of the population of metropolitan Montreal claimed 'Jewish' as their ethnic origin.\footnote{Canada, 1971 Census, Cat. 92-723.} Life in Jewish areas
of Montreal has been richly portrayed in recent fiction, particularly in the well-known works of Leonard Cohen and Mordecai Richler.\textsuperscript{1} Prior to recent political attacks by Quebec nationalists, there has been little unity among Montreal anglophones. Although this unity is now developing, it would still be stretching the use of the English language to call them an 'ethnic group'. For our purposes, Montreal's anglophones are simply a 'linguistic group'. An analysis of the extent to which members of this group have recently come to share common political interests as a self-conscious minority is one of the underlying concerns of this thesis.

Montreal's 'other' ethnic groups have been more closely studied than the British. This is particularly true of the Italians. In 1971 5.6\% of the residents of metropolitan Montreal were of Italian ethnic origin.\textsuperscript{2} They were the largest group behind the French and the British. The Italians are also notable for being the group that was most likely to voluntarily send their children to French schools. However, according to a study done for the federal Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism,\textsuperscript{3} 75\% of Italian-Canadian parents in 1962-63 were sending their children to English language schools. Twenty years earlier, when there were about one-fifth as many Italian pupils in the school system, only 55\% were going to English schools. The most common reasons Italian

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{1}See especially Richler's \textit{The Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz} (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1969). The novel was first published in 1959.
\textsuperscript{2}Canada, \textit{1971 Census}, Cat. 92-723.
\textsuperscript{3}Jeremy Boissevain, \textit{The Italians of Montreal}, Study No. 7 of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1970).
\end{footnotesize}
parents gave for preferring English schools was that this would facilitate moving to other parts of Canada and would make it easier for their children to get jobs. The most common reason given for preferring French schools was that they were closer than English ones. In general, Italians viewed English as being more important for advancement at the place of work.\(^1\) The most important feature of the Italian community, however, is that most of its members have simply not had time to assimilate to one major language group or the other. In 1961, 62% of the people of Italian origin in metropolitan Montreal were born outside of Canada.\(^2\) Census figures for 1971 show that almost 70% of people of Italian origin still use Italian in their home more than any other language.\(^3\) In many respects, the linguistic future of the Italian population is still uncertain.

Paul Cappon has recently conducted an exhaustive study of personal relationships between immigrants and francophones in Montreal.\(^4\) His method was to observe patterns of interaction in small controlled discussion groups. His conclusion was that conflict between francophones and immigrants was of the type that Lewis Coser would call 'non-real'.\(^5\) It was non-real in the sense that francophones often used immigrants as scapegoats for the anglophones who, because of their economic dominance, 

\(^1\) Ibid., pp. 37-9.
\(^2\) Ibid., p. 2.
\(^3\) Calculated from Canada, 1971 Census, Cat. 92-723 and 92-726.
\(^4\) Conflit entre les néo-canadiens et les francophones (Québec, Les presses de l'Université Laval, 1974).
\(^5\) Coser, Social Conflict, p. 49.
were the real object of francophone hostility. Immigrants were more likely targets for this hostility because they usually live and work in much closer proximity to francophones than anglophones do. In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that many immigrants felt drawn to identify with anglophones.

While discussing population figures in previous paragraphs, reference has been made to the area called 'metropolitan Montreal'. This is in fact the census metropolitan area as defined by Statistics Canada. For statistical purposes, it is by far the most useful definition of the Montreal area. It consists of two parts, an urbanized core and a fringe. The former is defined as the continuous built-up area covered by a street pattern and meeting a density of 1,000 persons per square mile. The fringe is the immediate zone of influence of the core; it in turn is divided into rural and urban sections. This is shown in Map II-1. The 1971 population of the census metropolitan area of Montreal was 2,743,210. This covers one hundred separate municipalities and an Indian reserve.

Because there are no governmental institutions in Montreal whose boundaries correspond to the census metropolitan area, there is a need for population figures covering smaller, more politically relevant territories. One smaller version of Montreal consists of the collection of islands found at the junction of the Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers.

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1 Cappon, Conflict, pp. 127-9.
2 Canada, 1971 Census, Bulletin 1.18, inside front cover.
3 Ibid., Census Tract Bulletin (Montreal), CT-4A. Population figures in the following paragraphs are also derived from this source.
Map II-1


The largest is the Island of Montreal and the second largest is Ile-Jésus. The two are separated only by a narrow stretch of water known as Rivière-des-Prairies. Surrounding these two islands are dozens of smaller ones, but only Ile-Bizard and Nuns' Island possess any significant permanent population.¹ Both the federal and provincial governments make use of this collection of islands as a recognizable territorial unit. The federal government uses it as one of the main provincial sub-divisions of the federal census. The islands of Montreal and Jésus correspond, for census purposes, to the municipal counties found in rural Quebec. More importantly, the provincial government uses them as the territorial base for the Council of Health and Social Services of Metropolitan Montreal. The work of the Council will be discussed in Chapter V-3.

The Montreal Urban Community (M.U.C.) has existed since 1970 as Montreal's metropolitan level of government. Its territory corresponds very closely to that of the Island of Montreal. However, the M.U.C. includes a number of small islands in the St. Lawrence which are legally part of various Island municipalities. The M.U.C. also includes two islands which are municipalities in their own right: Dorval Island (with a permanent 1971 population of seven) and St. Raphael-de-l'Ile-Bizard (population 2,950). The M.U.C. does not include the municipality of St.-Jean-de-Dieu which is found in the southeastern part of the Island of Montreal. It consists only of a psychiatric hospital, the permanent population of which is 3,765. Because the total population of the M.U.C. in 1971 was 1,955,380, there is no need to be

¹Ile-Perrot is not included here because, for other purposes, it is not included as being part of Montreal and Jésus Islands.
concerned about these subtle distinctions between the Island of Montreal and the M.U.C. The M.U.C. officially contains thirty municipalities, while the Island itself contains twenty-nine.

Finally, there is the City of Montreal. For the first fifty years after its incorporation (1833-83) the City occupied 9.8 square miles including old Montreal and what is now the central area. Between 1883 and 1918 the City annexed twenty other island municipalities, thereby increasing its area to 50.2 square miles. In the process of this great territorial expansion, the City completely surrounded two municipalities, Westmount and St.-Jean-de-Dieu, which remain independent to this day. In 1954 and 1963 the City annexed two pieces of land which were not contiguous. The first, a small plot of land in the west and the site of one of the City's incinerators, has no population. The second was a bankrupt municipality, Rivière-des-Prairies, in the north-east corner of the Island. This sector of the City has a population of 10,880. There were two more annexations of contiguous municipalities in 1964 and 1968. In 1971, therefore, the City covered 68.3 square miles and had a population of 1,214,355. Because of its anomalous

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3Pick, Paris and Montreal, p. 127.
4For an account of the politics involved in the City of Montreal's various annexations, see Chapter III-1.
5Montreal, City of, Bureau de recherches économiques, Montréal et son gouvernement: Précis d'organisation politique et administrative (Montreal, 1971), p. 15.
territorial make-up, City is not, in itself, a useful statistical unit. However, it will prove advantageous to be aware of various features of the population of the City in order to understand certain political positions taken by the City's leaders.

Table II-4 presented the various types of available ethnic and linguistic data for Canada, Quebec, and the four versions of Montreal just described. It showed that, for Canada as a whole, there are many more people who use the English language on a regular basis than there are people of British ethnic origin. However, there are slightly fewer people who use French than there are people of French ethnic origin. This reflects the weak position of the French language outside Quebec because, within Quebec, the reverse is the case. However, even within Quebec the English language seems to have more drawing power than the French. This is particularly true within the various versions of Montreal. For example, the figures showed that 64.3% of the people within metropolitan Montreal are of French ethnic origin while 66.3% use the French language most often in the home. The figures for British ethnic origin and use of the English language in the home are 16.0% and 24.9%, respectively. These figures clearly imply that a much higher proportion of people with 'other' ethnic origins have adopted English as their usual language than would be expected if the 'others' were to split according to the existing French-English proportions. This further implies that if the 'others' group continues to grow, as it has constantly since 1871, then there is potential for a considerable proportional decline in the use of the French language within metropolitan Montreal. This possibility has been the cause of considerable debate
among Quebec demographers and has been one of the main motivations for the recent introduction of controversial legislation to protect and encourage the use of the French language within Quebec. The implications of this legislation will be discussed later in this chapter.

Table II-5 shows the extent to which Canadians, Quebecers, and Montrealers are capable of speaking the country's two official languages. The most notable feature of these data is the relatively high degree of bilingualism found in Montreal. Because the table includes people in the 'English only' and 'French only' categories who do not normally use these languages, it does not show which linguistic groups have the

TABLE II-5

Percentage Distribution of the Population of Selected Areas by Ability to Speak Official Languages, 1971

<table>
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<tr>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>English only</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French only</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English &amp; French</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N (000's)</td>
<td>21568</td>
<td>6028</td>
<td>2743</td>
<td>2187</td>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1214</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*M.U.C. figures include St.-Jean-de-Dieu.

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2Prepared from data found in Canada, 1971 Census, Cat. 92-726.
highest propensity to be bilingual. There has, however, been some research in this field based on 1961 data. It was found, for example, that only 45% of the men in the labour force having English as a mother tongue were bilingual, compared with 75% of those with French as a mother tongue.\footnote{Stanley Lieberson, Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada (London, John Wiley, 1970), p. 139.} Level of education and bilingualism did not appear to be related for Montrealers who had English as a mother tongue. Bilingualism rose sharply with educational achievement in the French sector. French-speaking Montrealers with hardly any schooling were as likely to be bilingual as anglophone Montrealers who had attended university.\footnote{Ibid., p. 140.} These facts are closely related to economic factors which are to be discussed in section four of this chapter.

Although the figures in Tables II-4 and II-5 clearly suggest that French predominates in Montreal, the same figures also show that the French language is weaker there than in Quebec as a whole and that English seems to be more attractive to immigrants than French is. It is for these reasons that the issue of the relative strengths of the two major linguistic groups in Montreal has been so politically sensitive. It would be surprising indeed if the issue did not, in one way or another, become entangled in political debate about local governmental institutions and boundaries.

3. The Mass Media

The mass media are important for this thesis because it is mainly through them that Montrealers form their perceptions of the
metropolitan political process. Unfortunately no research has been done on the extent to which the different local media affect these perceptions. Some work which is vaguely relevant was done by the Davey committee, which, in 1969, conducted a thorough investigation of the mass media in Canada as a whole.\(^1\) Part of the committee's work was to conduct a survey across the country asking respondents which medium they considered most important in transmitting local news. The results for Canada and Quebec are presented in Table II-6. Unlike the country as a whole, it appears that both francophone and anglophone Quebecers rely more on the electronic media for local news than on newspapers. Because metropolitan Montreal is obviously better served by the electronic media than other parts of the province, it could be argued that this tendency might be even greater amongst Montrealers.

The Davey committee research did not break down responses according to education, income, or other indicators of potential political influence. However, it is a well-known fact that those with more education and influence are more likely to rely on newspapers. Because this thesis is more concerned with elite attitudes than mass opinion, the newspaper situation in Montreal deserves serious analysis. Table II-7 presents relevant information concerning Montreal's six daily newspapers. Montréal Matin and Le Journal de Montréal are popular tabloids. Le Devoir is clearly directed toward a more intellectual readership and contains much more political content and analysis than is found in most North American newspapers. It was founded in 1910 by

\(^1\)Canada, Senate, Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1970), 3 vols.
### TABLE II-6^{1}

Percentage Distribution of Perceptions Concerning Which Medium is Most Important for Local News

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Quebec Anglophone</th>
<th>Quebec Francophone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Television</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspapers</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magazines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No opinion</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE II-7^{2}

Daily Newspapers in Montreal

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>La Presse</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>P.M.</td>
<td>227,272</td>
<td>184,155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Montreal Star</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>P.M.</td>
<td>195,302</td>
<td>172,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal Matin</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>A.M.</td>
<td>154,936</td>
<td>125,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gazette</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>A.M.</td>
<td>136,811</td>
<td>116,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Devoir</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>A.M.</td>
<td>41,473</td>
<td>28,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal de Montréal</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>A.M.</td>
<td>99,683</td>
<td>165,509</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

^{1}Canada, Senate, Report of the Special Senate Committee on Mass Media, iii, 42.

the famous French-Canadian nationalist, Henri Bourassa. Claude Ryan, its editor from 1964 to 1978, has been the most influential journalist in Montreal for the past decade. La Presse, The Montreal Star, and The Gazette have a great variety of content as is the normal practice with most North American newspapers. La Presse and The Montreal Star are notable for their large size due to a very high advertising content. It is interesting to note that between 1971 and 1976 all Montreal's daily newspapers, except Le Journal de Montréal, suffered substantial circulation losses.

Both the federal Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism and the provincial commission on the use of the French language sponsored research which shed light on the mass media consumption habits of Montrealers. The research done for the former,¹ while valuable because it looked only at metropolitan Montreal, was based on data obtained as long ago as 1960. The research for the latter,² which is based on 1971 data, covers the entire province. However, the provincial survey, as well as being more recent, also looks at the audiences of individual Montreal newspapers and radio and television stations and therefore is more useful for our purposes.

The provincial survey found that 98% of Quebec anglophones and 83% of francophones read, at least occasionally, a daily newspaper. Of

¹M. Mousseau, 'La consommation des mass media chez les montréalais', unpublished study of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

these anglophones, 12% read a French newspaper; of the francophones, 18% read an English one.\textsuperscript{1} Tables II-8 and II-9, which deal with the readership of Montreal dailies, show that it is the most educated amongst the francophones who have a greater tendency to read newspapers in the other languages. Amongst anglophones this pattern appears only in the figures in Table II-9 for \textit{Le Devoir}. Because of their clearly different readerships, it is conventional wisdom in Montreal that the francophone and anglophone newspapers have quite different priorities in reporting the news. This is undoubtedly still the case, although in recent years \textit{The Montreal Star} and \textit{The Gazette} have made much greater efforts to cover provincial and municipal events that are of importance to both linguistic communities rather than just to anglophones.

In regard to weekly newspapers, the survey found that they were read by 60% of the francophone respondents but only by 28% of the anglophones.\textsuperscript{2} The high francophone response undoubtedly reflects the great popularity of various province-wide French weeklies which are primarily devoted to sports, crime, and entertainment. In the anglophone community, local weekly newspapers are probably more important. On the Island of Montreal there are four paid circulation English weeklies. \textit{The Westmount Examiner}, \textit{The Town of Mount Royal Weekly Post}, \textit{The North Shore News} and \textit{The News and Chronicle} (West Island) are the principal media defenders of the real and alleged rights of anglophone suburban Montrealers; consequently they have a loyal and attentive readership, even though their

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 23.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 47.
TABLE II-8

Montreal Daily Newspapers Read at Some Time During the Last Four Weeks - by Percentage of Educational and Linguistic Groups in Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Francophones</th>
<th></th>
<th>Anglophones</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13+ Years of Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13+ Years of Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal Matin</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Presse</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal de Montréal</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Devoir</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gazette</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Montreal Star</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE II-9

Montreal Daily Newspapers Most Often Read - by Percentage of Educational and Linguistic Groups in Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Francophones</th>
<th></th>
<th>Anglophones</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13+ Years of Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>13+ Years of Education</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montréal Matin</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Presse</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal de Montréal</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Devoir</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gazette</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Montreal Star</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Ibid., p.30.
2Ibid., p.46.
combined circulation is only 33,000.\(^1\) There are also a host of other free distribution French, English, and multi-lingual weeklies with widely varying levels of news content.

The provincial media survey found the same kind of audience patterns for radio and television stations as it did for daily newspapers. The data for these media are presented in Tables II-10 and II-11. The tables seem to suggest that francophones, particularly the well educated ones, seem to be more exposed to English electronic media than to English print media. The opposite seems to be the case for anglophones. In general, however, the two tables confirm the pattern that was suggested in the case of daily newspapers; Montreal has two quite distinct and separate mass media systems--one English and one French.

4. **Income and Occupation**

This section is concerned with showing the extent to which linguistic and class cleavages in Montreal coincide. The first systematic academic investigations of the social structure of Montreal took place at McGill University in the 1930s and 1940s. Working mainly under Professor Everett C. Hughes, various graduate students in sociology documented the extent of English dominance within the city's economic life.\(^2\) Hughes himself made substantial contributions to our understanding

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\(^1\)Canadian Advertising Rates & Data, December 1974, p. 49.

### TABLE II-10

Montreal Television Stations Most Often Watched - by Percentage of Educational and Linguistic Groups in Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>13+ Years of Education</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>13+ Years of Education</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CFTM</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBFT (CBC)</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFCF</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBMT (CBC)</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>156</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE II-11

Montreal Radio Stations Most Often Listened to - by Percentage of Educational and Linguistic Groups in Quebec

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Language</th>
<th>13+ Years of Education</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>13+ Years of Education</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CJMS</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKVL</td>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBF (CBC)</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKAC</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFMB</td>
<td>Bilingual</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKGM</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJAD</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFCF</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFOX</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBM (CBC)</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td></td>
<td>152</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Ibid., p.110.
of French Canada. Within the Montreal context he viewed French Canadians as playing a rather unique auxiliary economic role. After claiming that the English of Montreal controlled 'half a continent', he pointed out that:

The French of Montreal enter into these naturally dominant institutions in minor and less specialized roles . . . [T]he very presence of the numerous French allows the English to be more specialized and more devoted to control functions than they could be if Montreal were a purely English city. Those of the French who are in dominant positions are concentrated in institutions which have for their hinterland, not the continent, but merely the province.

Hughes was careful to distinguish between the economic and social roles of the Anglo-Saxons and the Jews. Jewish businesses tended to be smaller than Anglo-Saxon ones and therefore more visibly in direct competition with those of the French Canadians. This, according to Hughes, helps explain why some of the economic frustrations felt by French Canadians in the 1930s were manifested through various forms of anti-semitism.

In recent years most of the significant research on class and language in Montreal has been sponsored by government. In the mid-1960s the federal Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism paid special attention to Montreal when it was researching the impact of ethnic and linguistic factors at the place of work. Volume III of the

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2Ibid., p. 218.
3Five of its research studies were specifically devoted to this topic. See Jacques Dofny, Les ingénieurs canadiens-français et canadien-anglais à Montréal, Documents de la Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme, No. 6 (Ottawa, Information
Royal Commission's Report, published in 1969, presents the most systematic analysis yet undertaken of Anglo-Saxon dominance in Montreal's economic life. Table II-12 presents 1961 occupational and ethnic origin data for metropolitan Montreal in a particularly interesting light.

Commenting on these figures, the Commission stated:

In relation to those of British origin, those of French origin fare better on the occupational scale in Canada as a whole than they do in the one province where they form a majority of the population; and they fare better on the occupational scale in Quebec as a whole than they do in the industrial centre of the province, Montreal. For those of British origin the converse is the case. The increasing disparity however, is not due to a lower position for those of French origin, since, in these terms they fare a little better in Montreal. Rather it is the result of the fact that those of British origin fare far better in Montreal than anywhere else in the country.¹

The commissioners also looked at 1961 income figures. They found an average difference of $1,898 in the annual labour income of Montrealers of French and British origin. After detailed statistical analysis, they concluded that 45.1% of this difference could be accounted for by the different educational achievements, and hence occupational positions, of the two groups. Other factors were age (Anglo-Saxon professionals, etc. tended to be older than French ones),

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TABLE II-12

Percentage Distribution of Ethnic Groups
by Occupation, 1961

CANADA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; Technical</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsman &amp; Production</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>43.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N (000's)</td>
<td>2071</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

QUEBEC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; Technical</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsman &amp; Production</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N (000's)</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C.M.A. MONTREAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Group</th>
<th>British</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; Technical</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Craftsman &amp; Production</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>44.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total N (000's)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1969), iii, 39, 43 and 44. Other occupational classifications not included here are: clerical, sales, service, transport & communications.
which accounted for a further 5.9% of the difference; type of industry (Anglo-Saxons worked in higher paying ones), 4.2%; and differential impact of unemployment, 6.3%. These factors only explain 61.5% of the difference. In Ottawa they explain 89.9% of the difference ($1,496) and, in Toronto, 77.6% of the difference ($1,093).\footnote{Ibid., 69.} Although it is true that French Canadians in Ottawa and Toronto are much more likely to be bilingual than those in Montreal, the only other possible explanation is that Montreal's anglophone employers tended to discriminate, consciously or unconsciously, against French Canadians simply because of their ethnic origin or language.

The Royal Commission sponsored its own data-gathering research on the issue of language use. In 1964 it obtained responses from thirty-six large manufacturing firms having salaried personnel in metropolitan Montreal. The collected data, presented here in Table II-13, showed that anglophones had a virtual stranglehold on the highest paying jobs. Among the francophones, 78% had to speak English.\footnote{Ibid., 461-2.} Stanley Lieberson, one of the researchers for the Royal Commission, has made the startling discovery, using 1961 Census data, that bilingual people of British origin in metropolitan Montreal were not likely to have as high incomes as those who were unilingual. This held true even when education and occupation were held constant. He explains this apparent anomaly by stating:

... British bilinguals earn less than monolinguals not because acquisition of French creates a handicap, which it obviously does not, but because those lower in position
within a given occupation and educational level are more likely to need a knowledge of French.¹

This explanation tells us a great deal about the status of French within Montreal's work world in the early 1960s.

TABLE II-13²

Language Group* of Salaried Personnel in Metropolitan Montreal, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Salary in Dollars</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Francophones (%)</th>
<th>Anglophones (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5,000 - 6,499</td>
<td>2,655</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,500 - 7,999</td>
<td>1,946</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,000 - 9,999</td>
<td>1,337</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,000 - 11,999</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12,000 - 14,999</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15,000 -</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>7,613</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Anglophones and francophones were classified mainly according to mother tongue. If mother tongue was neither English nor French, respondents were classified according to which language they were most fluent in.

In 1968 the Government of Quebec appointed a Commission to study 'the position of the French language in Quebec and measures to be taken to insure its full expansion, and to inquire into the linguistic rights of Quebec citizens'.³ The Commission reported on 31 December, 1972.

¹Lieberson, Language and Ethnic Relations, p. 172.
²Ibid., p. 457.
During its four-year existence, the Commission sponsored a great deal of research, including one study by Serge Carlos on the use of French at the workplace within Quebec.\(^1\) It was based on the results of a survey of 5,000 members of the Quebec labour force in January, 1971.\(^2\) Carlos discovered that, within metropolitan Montreal, francophone workers spent 78% of their time working in French but anglophones spent 84% of their time working in English.\(^3\) The data also showed that francophone industrial labourers worked in French 82% of the time while the figure for francophone office workers was only 71%.\(^4\) Only 33% of anglophone workers had to be able to communicate in French to do their job while 54% of francophones had to be able to communicate in English.\(^5\)

In another survey, the Commission studied the head offices of ten large companies located in Montreal.\(^6\) Of 3,125 employees, only 28.2% were francophones. Francophones constituted 35% of the people earning salaries of under $10,000 but only 15% of those having salaries above $22,000.\(^7\) Although it is quite likely that francophones made much progress in the Montreal business world in the 1960s, it appears

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\(^1\) L'utilisation du français dans le monde du travail du Québec, Etude E-3 de la Commission d'enquête sur la situation de la langue française et sur les droits linguistiques au Québec (Québec, l'Éditeur officiel, 1973).

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 12.

\(^3\) Ibid., p. 31.

\(^4\) Ibid., p. 37.

\(^5\) Ibid., p. 24.


\(^7\) Ibid., p. 119.
that the top positions are still firmly in anglophone hands.¹

The object of this section has been to present data from the 1960s to show the extent of the superimposition of Montreal's class and linguistic cleavages.² The fact that anglophones have controlled the top-ranking positions in most enterprises has led to the use of English as the main language of business. This is just one of the factors which has perpetuated the exclusion of francophones from top positions in the private sector. Such a superimposition of cleavages inevitably leads to 'a situation in which one inclusive conflict dominates the picture of the total society'.³ Such conflicts, according to Dahrendorf, are bound to be more intense than those which break out between groups which are themselves divided by other kinds of 'cross-cutting' cleavages.

It would be misleading to suggest that all social conflict in Montreal is in fact subsumed by 'one inclusive conflict'. As more and more francophones obtain high status positions in governmental, para-public, and some private institutions, the likelihood of growing class conflict within the francophone community increases. Similarly, as new unskilled immigrants from southern Europe replace older immigrants from Britain and northern Europe, the class composition of the anglophone group becomes more diverse. However, these recent developments have

¹ For a description of the business establishment in Montreal, see Peter C. Newman, The Canadian Establishment (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1975), i, 191-201.

² In the early 1960s Jacques Dofny and Marcel Rioux considered this superimposition to be so great that they referred to Quebec francophones as an 'ethnic class'. See their 'Social Class in French Canada', in Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin, eds., French-Canadian Society, Vol. 1 (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1964), pp. 307-18.

³ Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict, p. 215.
not led to a decline in the salience of language differences. In fact, they have probably increased it. This is because anglophones and francophones are now more frequently competing for the same jobs. The desire of francophone leaders to open up private sector employment for their growing middle class, combined with their desire to prevent immigrants from assimilating to the anglophone group, has led to the introduction of legislation which has limited traditional linguistic freedoms. This legislation, to be described later in this chapter, further exacerbates and reinforces Montreal's basic language cleavage.

5. Residential Segregation

Montreal's anglophone residents have always tended to live close to each other. Invariably they have lived in that part of the city which Montrealers consider to be 'the west'. During the nineteenth century a residential pattern emerged which found the rich anglophones living on the slopes of Mount Royal and the poorer anglophone workers—usually Irish—living below them. During the early twentieth century, the slopes of Mount Royal lost their reputation as the sites for Montreal's most fashionable houses. A slightly smaller hill to the west, called Westmount, became the new centre of anglophone affluence. By mid-century, middle-class English Canadians had taken over the entire western half of Montreal Island. While the anglophones spread westward the francophones generally spread eastward and northward. The 'third force' immigrants arrived to take over the centre part of the city, thereby forming a kind of buffer zone between French and English.

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1Westmount is a popular literary symbol of anglophone dominance. See Sirois, Montreal, p. 27.
Although financially successful immigrant families often left the central zone, they have always been replaced by new ones.

The map in Appendix IV reveals the extent of linguistic residential segregation on the Island of Montreal. Although the map is restricted to the Island, it shows all areas of anglophone dominance within the metropolitan area except for: small pockets in Chateauguay, St. Lambert, Greenfield Park, and Otterburn Park on the south shore; Pincourt and Hudson to the west; the Chomedey section of western Laval; and Deux Montagnes to the north.\(^1\) On the Island itself, the map shows that the English live in the west and the French in the east. In addition, it shows that almost all the English areas also have above-average family incomes. Most of the French areas have below-average family incomes, particularly in the more central parts of the Island. There are many exceptions to these general statements which must be carefully examined. However, it is first necessary to discuss the nature of the data being presented in Appendix IV. It is concerned with two variables—language and income. Census data relating to 'language most often spoken in the home' are used to illustrate the linguistic variable. A census tract\(^2\) is shown as being either French or English if more than 50% of its inhabitants claim to speak that language most often

\(^{1}\) See Map.II-1 for the location of these places.

\(^{2}\) Census tracts are defined by Statistics Canada according to four criteria: '(1) a population between 2,500 and 8,000, except for tracts in the central business district and for institutional tracts either of which may have a smaller population; (2) an area as homogeneous as possible in terms of economic status and living conditions; (3) boundaries that follow permanent and easily recognizable geographic features; (4) a shape as compact as possible'. Canada, 1971 Census, CT-4A, Introduction.
in their home. It should be remembered that the proportions of the Island's population classified in this way as being English or French are 61.2% and 27.4%, respectively. If the francophone population were spread evenly over the Island every census tract would be shown on the map as being francophone. The fact that 88 of the 414 inhabited census tracts are classified as anglophone testifies to the extent of Montreal's linguistic residential segregation. Those areas classified as neither French nor English have relatively high concentrations of people using other languages and/or a close balance between French and English.

The income variable is a rough attempt to illustrate certain of the territorial features of social class in Montreal.\(^1\) In fact, it only serves to show us the locations of those census tracts whose inhabitants have income above and below the median. There are two obvious drawbacks to presenting the data in this manner. First, a knowledge of a person's income level is probably less useful in determining his social class than a knowledge of his occupation.\(^2\) Even if this contention is accepted, it cannot be easily acted upon. Published Canadian census tract data relating to occupation are unsuited for use as an indicator of social class because they do not sufficiently distinguish between

\(^1\)A much more statistically sophisticated attempt to determine 'zones défavorisées' in terms of families with children under eighteen years of age can be found in Conseil scolaire de l'Ile de Montreal, Rapport sur les zones défavorisées de l'Ile de Montreal (Montreal, 1974).

\(^2\)The obvious sociological problems involved in this statement are not crucial to the subject matter of this thesis. John Porter addressed the problem in the Canadian context in his The Vertical Mosaic (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1965), particularly Chapters I and IV.
occupations of greatly differing social status. One occupational group is called 'occupations in medicine and health'; specialist physicians and all kinds of para-medical occupations are therefore mixed together. Given the lack of useful alternatives, the income data are presented here because they are the best available indicator of social class. The second drawback to this presentation of income data is the restriction to two general income levels—above and below the median. Ideally, one would want to present this income data in all their various gradations. However, if one were still trying to show ethnic-linguistic differences, this would necessitate a complete series of highly detailed and complex maps. As such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this thesis, the reader will have to rely on the commentary that follows in order to fully understand the territorial nature of the income distribution.

The actual measure of income used for the purpose of the map is 'median total income per family'. Statistics Canada defines a family as 'a husband and wife (with or without children who have never married, regardless of age) or a parent with one or more children never married living in the same dwelling'. Total family income, then, refers to

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1Canada, 1971 Census, CT-4B, pp. 188-93.


3Canada, 1971 Census, CT-4B, pp. 188-93.
'the sum of the incomes received by all members of the family fifteen years and over, from all sources, during the calendar year 1970'.\textsuperscript{1}

For metropolitan Montreal the median total family income for 1970 was $8,616.\textsuperscript{2} The map shows whether each census tract has an income level above or below this figure.

To begin the analysis of the map, let us start with the one of central Montreal and look at the linguistically mixed strip of land running east of l'Acadie Boulevard, the City of Outremont, and Park Avenue. This is the area in Montreal where most European immigrants settle when they first arrive. The area's main boundary on the east is St. Lawrence Boulevard, the traditional dividing line between east and west, between French and English. It is perhaps of symbolic significance that most immigrants in this area choose to live just west of St. Lawrence. The part of the strip which is south of Mount Royal Avenue is probably the most diverse neighbourhood in the city. Italian, Greek, Portuguese, and Jewish grocery stores, restaurants, clothing stores, and homes are found everywhere. Almost any language imaginable can be heard on the busy streets. Although it is not the commercial, financial, or industrial centre of the city, it is the meeting place of Montreal's different cultures. Francophones and anglophones can both feel at home in this part of the city because neither group dominates it.

The area just west of Park Avenue and north of Pine is in fact largely uninhabited due to the existence of McGill University and Mount Royal Park. South of Pine, the area is dominated by low income

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 126.
anglophones. The section north of de Maisonneuve and east of University Street has recently been mainly inhabited by McGill University students and other young people requiring low rental accommodation. However, much of it is now being redeveloped by Concordia Estates and soon the area will be dominated by high rent apartments, hotels, and office and commercial space. ¹ Immediately west of University Street is McGill University itself. The western side of McGill constitutes the easternmost point of the area dominated by well-to-do anglophones. This is just north of the heart of Montreal's downtown shopping area. Most of the inhabitants here are apartment dwellers. This area of wealthy anglophone dominance extends westward right through the municipality of Westmount to the Decarie Expressway. The census tracts in the northern sections of Westmount, which overlook much of the south-central part of the Island, are the richest in the entire metropolitan area. Their income medians are well over $20,000.²

² South of this high income anglophone area is a smaller low income one. It is bounded on the south by St. Antoine Street and extends right across southern Westmount. But the best-known section for poor anglophones is further south still, adjoining the river. The area known as Pointe St. Charles has been dominated by Irish working people ever since the construction of the Lachine Canal in the mid-nineteenth century.


² This figure and others in the rest of this section come from Canada, 1971 Census, CT-4B, pp. 1-45 and 126-169.
To the west of Pointe St. Charles are the riverside municipalities of Verdun, LaSalle, and Lachine—all are linguistically mixed, low-to-middle income areas. In Verdun and Lachine the wealthier areas are dominated by anglophones. In LaSalle there are both French and English areas with above average income levels, but the French areas predominate. Bordering Lachine is the tiny French working-class suburb of Ville St. Pierre. North of Verdun are the French working-class areas of the City of Montreal known as Côte St. Paul, Ville Emard and St. Henri. The only other predominantly French area in the west central region is found in the municipality of Outremont, and in the area just west of it which includes the University of Montréal. Outremont is often considered as 'the French Westmount' but its income figures are not nearly as high.

North of Outremont, and extending westward, is another wealthy anglophone inner suburban municipality, the Town of Mount Royal. Unlike Westmount and Outremont, it has no areas with income figures below the median. It also benefits financially from having an industrial sector in its extreme western portion. The area south of the Town of Mount Royal and west of Outremont is linguistically balanced with high proportions of immigrants and Jews. Its income levels are below the median.

South of the Canadian Pacific tracks, and on both sides of the Decarie

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2 St. Henri is actually immediately south of Westmount 'on the other side of the tracks'. Life there has been described in Benoît Michaudville et al., Les gens du Québec: St. Henri (Montréal, Editions québécoises, 1972).
Expressway, is a strip of census tracts dominated by lower income anglophones. West of Decarie are three more wealthy anglophone inner suburban municipalities—Montreal West, Hampstead, and Cote St. Luc. The latter two are the only municipalities in Quebec with Jewish majorities, 60% and 74% respectively. The area within the City of Montreal that is bounded by these municipalities, the Decarie Expressway to the east and the Canadian Pacific tracks to the south is usually referred to as Notre-Dame-de-Grace. It is largely anglophone with income levels above the median.

The heart of French-speaking Montreal starts in the very poor areas east of the linguistically mixed section in the centre of the city and stretches almost uninterrupted to the easternmost tip of the Island. As one goes further east there is a tendency to find higher income levels, particularly in the municipality of Anjou, but these levels are generally well below those of the wealthier anglophone areas previously described. Some census tracts near the Metropolitan Boulevard in the eastern half of the Island have high proportions (25% to 50%) of families who still usually use Italian in their homes. Generally speaking, the poorer Italian families live in the City of Montreal and the wealthier ones live in the southern part of the municipality of St. Leonard. Much of the area in the extreme east end of the Island, particularly in the middle income municipality of Montreal East, is not populated at all. It consists largely of oil refineries and other industrial establishments.

Within the City of Montreal, the wealthiest French-speaking areas are found north of the Metropolitan Boulevard and east of the
Laurentian Autoroute in the areas known as Bordeaux and Ahuntsic. These sections of the city can be viewed as the French equivalents of Notre-Dame-de-Grace. A number of the census tracts have income medians in the $10,000 to $15,000 range. In the eastern part of this area are three census tracts, with income levels slightly above the median, in which Italian is used at home by about 45% of the population. East of this area is the largely middle income francophone municipality of Montreal North. Further east still is the Rivière-des-Prairies section of the City of Montreal. It is largely undeveloped, overwhelmingly French, and slightly below the median in income level. Going west from the Laurentian Autoroute one passes through the Cartierville and Saraguay sections of the City of Montreal. Cartierville is heavily French with slightly above average income levels. Saraguay is slightly less French but with a high income median of $12,600. South of Cartierville and Saraguay is the large municipality of St. Laurent. It is mixed, both in ethnicity and income levels. Much of the area marked on the map as being dominated by well-to-do anglophones is in fact uninhabited because it is largely occupied by industries and the Dorval Airport.

The airport acts as the main barrier between the centre part of the Island and the region that Montrealers generally refer to as the 'West Island'. The Trans-Canada Highway, which runs north of the airport through the central part of the Island, is the main transport corridor connecting the West Island to the central region. The highway is largely surrounded by industrial rather than residential development. Other main connecting thoroughfares are found along the north and south shores. The south shore, usually referred to as 'the Lakeshore', contains high-
income anglophone residential development starting immediately south of the airport and ending only at the westernmost part of the Lakeshore at Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue. The old section of Ste. Anne's is one of the two small parts of the West Island in which low income francophones predominate. The 'North Shore' is dominated by the long, geographically fragmented municipality of Pierrefonds. In the east, where it joins the Saraguay section of the City of Montreal, Pierrefonds contains the only census tract in the West Island which has both an anglophone majority and an income level below the median. The rest of the eastern section is above the income median but is linguistically mixed. The remainder of the developed part of Pierrefonds and the separate municipality of Roxboro consist entirely of anglophone census tracts having income levels above the median. However, the western part of Pierrefonds, which is largely undeveloped, is linguistically mixed. The North Shore contains one small municipality, Ste. Geneviève, which has linguistic and income characteristics similar to the old part of Ste. Anne's. From Ste. Geneviève one can cross a bridge to Ile-Bizard, a separate island municipality which is included within the boundaries of the M.U.C. It is developed only along its shores and is dominated by francophones. The income level is just below the median.

Apart from the few exceptions already noted, the census tracts of the West Island are totally dominated by moderately high income anglophones. It is not surprising therefore that the area is usually viewed as a whole despite the existence of twelve separate municipalities. In reality, of course, there are important factors differentiating one area from another. For example, Beaconsfield and Baie d'Urfé, which
are 90% anglophone, have average incomes of about $18,000, while all other municipalities have significantly lower percentages of anglophones and median incomes below $15,000. There is also a natural cleavage caused by geography. The Lakeshore and North Shore areas use different transportation and recreational facilities and this results in their having different problems and viewpoints. Although the West Island has a justified reputation as an anglophone stronghold, it should be noted that, while 536,000 people on the whole Island regularly use English in their homes, only 109,200 of them live in the West Island. The City of Montreal has twice as many anglophones (225,845) as the entire West Island. These figures probably do not fit most Montrealers' perceptions of their Island's demography. The difference between the real figures and the perceptions can no doubt be explained by the fact that, in the West Island, anglophones constitute a clear majority in nine different municipalities while they make up only 19% of the population of the City.

Although all cities have their distinct neighbourhoods and regions, Montreal's are particularly obvious and especially important. The usual pattern of residential segregation according to income is clearly evident in Montreal. But the fact that most wealthy areas are English and most poor areas are French dramatically deepens and changes the nature of this fundamental cleavage. In addition, Montreal's numerous municipal boundaries tend to separate many of these into distinct, homogeneous political communities, thereby adding yet another complication to the city's tangled patterns of ethnic relations.
6. The 'Quiet Revolution', Quebec Nationalism, and the Threat to English Power

Quebec's 'Quiet Revolution' is generally considered to have begun in 1960 with the election of the provincial Liberals led by Jean Lesage. Its implications for Quebec society and politics were extremely far-reaching and were not restricted to metropolitan Montreal. For this reason, a complete description and analysis of the Quiet Revolution is well beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, many of the reform proposals to be discussed in later chapters emerge directly out of the development of Quiet Revolution policies.

Whatever its fundamental cause, the Quiet Revolution was closely bound up with the process of urbanization. In 1941 only 55% of Quebec's francophones lived in urban areas. By 1971 the figure was 78%. Between 1941 and 1971 the percentage of Quebecers living in the census metropolitan area of Montreal increased from thirty-four to forty-five. Its population increased from 1.4 million to over 2.7 million. The percentage of French-origin Quebecers living in metropolitan Montreal increased from twenty-seven to thirty-seven. These changes were related both to

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2 Posgate and McRoberts, Quebec, p. 48. The term 'urban areas' refers to settlements of over 1,000 people.

3 Calculated from Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1951 Census of Canada (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1953), Vol. 1 and 1971 Census, Cat. 92-723. Although the boundary of the census metropolitan area expanded during this period, most of the population in the new sections is accounted for by the outward expansion of the city.
the causes and the effects of a pattern of changes which, in a few short years, saw the transformation of French Quebec from a church-dominated, defensive, economically backward section of Canada to a secular, aggressively nationalist, modernizing society, the leaders of which invariably gave top priority to the political interests of the Quebec government.

Montreal anglophones were among the most fervent supporters of the new Lesage government. They supported its attempts to eliminate patronage and to transform the provincial civil service into a more efficient and capable bureaucracy. In short, the Lesage government seemed to be transforming Quebec's governmental system in such a way that it became more suited to traditional Anglo-Saxon values and sensibilities. Paradoxically, however, it was precisely this tendency which eventually became the greatest threat to anglophone economic dominance. Because francophone Quebecers were now anxious to participate in all aspects of Quebec society, there was no longer any perceived legitimacy in their almost systematic exclusion from the top positions in the private sector. The conditions for an overt social conflict based on language differences had already emerged.

Viewed by Canadians outside Quebec, the Quiet Revolution was, initially at least, an encouraging sign. Many saw it as an indication that the francophone majority in Quebec was finally self-confident enough to emerge from its defensive, clerical nationalism and to pursue policies that had long since been adopted elsewhere. Examples of such policies were the nationalization of Quebec's electricity suppliers and the creation of a secular Department of Education. Even the increasing
demands for more provincial power were not necessarily seen as a threat but rather as a further indication that francophones in Quebec now felt sufficiently secure within Canada that they could risk taking action which might be interpreted as aggressively antagonistic toward English-Canadian interests. As Coser points out, such healthy, open forms of conflict can in fact be signs of 'the better integration of a minority group in the total community'.

This line of thinking unfortunately neglected the fact that Quebec is a well-defined territory having its own governmental apparatus. Rather than leading to integration into the total Canadian community, these demands eventually led to further demands and eventually to the demand for outright separation.

With the Liberals firmly in power and the Quiet Revolution clearly underway, the stage was set for the emergence of a brand of nationalism which saw little virtue in simply improving the position of Quebec's small middle class or in increasing the capabilities of Quebec's governmental bureaucracy. Initially, this nationalism was associated with a group of violent young extremists calling themselves the Front de Libération du Quebec (F.L.Q.). Their early activities, which began in 1963, consisted of a series of bombings directed at various federal government and anglophone institutions within Montreal. After a sporadic existence throughout the 1960s, the F.L.Q. attained world-wide prominence in 1970 when some of its members kidnapped the British trade commissioner in Montreal and a prominent provincial cabinet minister. As a result

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1 Coser, Social Conflict, p. 85.

2 The 'October Crisis' has been extensively described and analyzed. The most useful book is Smith, Bleeding Hearts ... Bleeding Country.
of a massive army and police operation following the assassination of the minister, the F.L.Q. was eliminated. Nevertheless, throughout the 1960s the terrorist threat was never far from the consciousness of most Montrealers, particularly anglophones.

The strength of the F.L.Q., such as it was, lay in bombs, not political theory. The theory was provided by the contributors to a militantly socialist and nationalist periodical called Parti Pris. Writers in Parti Pris viewed Montreal as the bridgehead city for the English and American colonization of Quebec.\(^1\) Quebec for them was a North American Algeria and Montreal was its Algiers. This was radically different from the conventional perspective of the Quiet Revolution which claimed that French Canadians had only themselves to blame for their political and economic backwardness.\(^2\) The Parti Pris group wrote a number of novels which strikingly portrayed the colonized status of the francophone Montrealer. One of their number, Pierre Maheu, wrote an article in which he claimed that nobody can feel at home in Montreal; it is 'la ville des autres'. Francophones, though in the majority, do not own or control the city's most important economic institutions. Anglophones, on the other hand, are constantly aware that they are part of a threatened, privileged minority whose time is coming to an end.\(^3\)

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1. The work of the Parti Pris writers is described in Malcolm Reid, The Shouting Signpainters: A Literary and Political Account of Quebec Revolutionary Nationalism (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1972).

2. For the best known expression of this viewpoint, see Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto, Macmillan, 1968).

By 1966 the political option of a separate, independent Quebec had begun to emerge. In the provincial election of that year there were two separatist parties. The Rassemblement pour l'independance nationale (R.I.N.) used the kind of analysis found in Parti Pris to advocate an independent, socialist Quebec while another group, the Ralliement nationale (R.N.) argued for independence on more conservative grounds. Between them these two parties won only 9% of the popular vote. However, in parts of east-end Montreal the R.I.N. served to decrease Liberal strength just enough to allow the election of a handful of new Union nationale members. In the rest of the province, the U.N. did even better. Capitalizing on rural unease at the speed of social reform in Quebec, the U.N. won 56 of the legislature's 108 seats and, under Premier Daniel Johnson, formed a government which was to slow the pace of the Quiet Revolution.¹

Great changes took place in the political landscape of Quebec between 1966 and 1970. In 1966 Daniel Johnson died and was replaced as premier by Jean-Jacques Bertrand. The Quebec branch of Social Credit entered provincial politics, thereby further splitting the strength of right-wing voters who had been traditionally loyal to the Union nationale. However, the most important event was the creation of the Parti québécois in 1968. Réné Lévesque, one of Lesage's most important former ministers, left the Liberal party and, with a number of political supporters, created a new broadly-based party committed to Quebec independence. The R.I.N. and the R.N. disbanded and their members were absorbed into the P.Q., thereby enabling it to channel virtually all elements of the growing

¹Posgate and McRoberts, Quebec, p. 125.
independence movement into one political force.¹

Apart from the question of political independence, much of the political debate in this period was concerned with how best to promote the use and protection of the French language. The concern of the demographers about the linguistic future of the Island of Montreal was referred to earlier. The issue was also promoted by the thousands of francophone young people who were receiving more education than ever before. By the time they graduated from college or university, most were neither willing nor able to work in any language other than French. Many joined the Quebec civil service and, because of its virtual non-existence prior to 1960, soon found themselves in positions of considerable authority. On the other hand, those few who entered the private sector found that English was a necessity, even for positions in the lower levels of management. Their anglophone superiors were usually incapable of speaking French. It was in this environment, in 1968, that the Quebec government named a commission, headed by Professor Jean-Denis Gendron, to conduct 'an inquiry into the position of the French language in Quebec and measures to be taken to insure its full expansion, and to inquire into the linguistic rights of Quebec citizens'.²

While the commission deliberated, Quebec politics was largely dominated by the issue of whether immigrant parents in Montreal should have the right to send their children to English schools. In the short


term the Minister of Education was forced to act on this issue even though the government as a whole could not evolve a comprehensive language policy until the commission reported. His actions in this regard are briefly described in Chapter VI. When the commission finally reported in December of 1972, it recommended a comprehensive plan to achieve 'the general goal of making French the common language of Quebecers'. Special emphasis was placed on making French the main language of work in all of the province's industrial, commercial, and public service establishments. But the report did not recommend any explicit legal sanctions that the Quebec government might use to enforce such a policy. In the field of education the report specifically recommended against any legally coercive measures 'at this time'.

Instead, the commissioners called for the implementation of a set of non-coercive measures to encourage immigrant children to attend French schools. In general, the commissioners took the seemingly logical position that the problem of how to direct immigrant children toward the French educational system would tend to solve itself once it became apparent that French was becoming the one essential language of work within the entire province.

The Gendron Report was received by a Liberal government led by Robert Bourassa, a young economist first elected to the legislature in 1966. Bourassa had replaced Lesage following the latter's retirement as Liberal leader in early 1970. Bourassa then went on to soundly defeat both the Union nationale and the Parti québécois in the provincial

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1Ibid., 291.
2Ibid., iii, 273.
election of April 1970. Bourassa's main political objective was to use Quebec's role within the Canadian federation to promote Quebec's economic development while at the same time insisting that Quebec be given increased control over social and cultural policies affecting the province. Although he won another election in 1973, he was eventually defeated in 1976 by Réne Lévesque's Parti québécois.

Following the 1973 election, Bourassa acted on the Gendron Report. In mid-1974 he published a proposed Official Language Act, commonly known as Bill 22. After extensive public hearings the Bill became law on 31 July. In general, the law tended to go slightly beyond the main Gendron recommendations. It declared French to be 'the official language of the province of Quebec' but stated that official 'texts and documents' may be accompanied by an English version. Bilingual 'texts and documents' were made compulsory for all municipalities and public educational institutions whose clientele was more than 10% anglophone. French was made the language of internal communication for all public and educational authorities except those whose clientele was over 50% anglophone. In these bodies both languages were to be used. In the private sector all business firms were expected to apply for 'certificates ... attesting that they have adopted and are applying a francization program'. Details of what constituted 'francization' were to be established by regulation. Firms without the necessary certificate

1Québec, National Assembly, Bill No. 22 (1974), s. 1.
2Ibid., s. 8. 3Ibid., s. 9.
4Ibid., s. 12 and s. 13. 5Ibid., s. 26.
would not 'be entitled to receive the premiums, subsidies, concessions, or benefits from the public administration ... or to make with the government ... contracts to purchase, service, lease or public works'.

Other sections of the law stated that various forms, contracts, and receipts must be in French, unless specifically requested by clients in another language. Furthermore, by 1979, there could not longer be any outside advertising which did not include the use of French.

As far as education was concerned, Bill 22 stated that, although 'the language of instruction shall be French ... the school boards, regional school boards and corporations of trustees shall continue to provide instruction in English'. However, the law also stated that

An existing or future school board ... cannot validly decide to commence, cease, increase, or reduce instruction in English unless it has received prior authorization from the Minister of Education, who shall not give it unless he considered that the number of pupils whose mother tongue is English and who are under the jurisdiction of such body warrants it.

Students were to be allowed to be educated in English only if they could prove sufficient knowledge of the language. Similarly, anglophone children could go to French schools only if they could prove sufficient knowledge of French. Students lacking sufficient knowledge of either language were to be educated in French. It was left up to the Minister of Education to establish the necessary testing procedures to implement the above rules. This part of Bill 22 was the most controversial. It

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1Ibid., s. 28.  
2Ibid., s. 33.  
3Ibid., s. 35-7.  
4Ibid., s. 40.  
5Ibid.
removed the existing right of Quebec parents to choose the language of education of their children. In actual practice, of course, this right had existed only in those few parts of the province in which there had been enough anglophones to establish English schools.

Bill 22 was attacked by the Parti québécois and other nationalist groups for giving too many concessions to the use of English; by anglophones and immigrants for removing their established rights; by some francophones for limiting the opportunity of French Canadians to learn English; and by everybody for being too vague and imprecise. However, it was the anglophone and immigrant opposition which became the most intense and long lasting. Immigrant groups in Montreal objected strenuously to being forced to send some of their children to French schools. Apart from this, Bill 22 as a whole was not of great concern. For established anglophones, however, it was the principle of the bill—not its vague details that caused the outrage. Anglophones were not accustomed to having their language placed in such an obviously inferior position.

The passage of Bill 22 had a profound effect on Montreal anglophones. Regardless of their being part of the linguistic majority in Canada, they were shown to be without constitutional protection in relation to provincial legislative authority concerning language.

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1 Ibid., s. 41-3.

Politically they were shown to be incapable of defending their own interests. The old pattern of behind-the-scenes negotiation and compromise had broken down. Silent anglophone politicians and business leaders were openly repudiated by their previously apathetic followers. A strange alliance of school commissioners, media personalities, and rebellious Liberal politicians became temporary leaders of an anglophone community now perceiving itself as an oppressed minority facing a tyrannical francophone government. The fact that anglophones began to view themselves in this perspective acted as a profoundly unifying factor. For the first time virtually all anglophones saw themselves as being affected by a particular government policy in the same way. The passage of Bill 22 demonstrated to anglophones that they do have certain basic political interests in common.

Coser has pointed out that 'conflict sets boundaries between groups within a social system by strengthening group consciousness and awareness of separateness thus establishing the identity of groups within the system'. The conflict arising from Bill 22 forced anglophones to come to the realization that despite their religious and ethnic differences, they formed a recognizable and distinct collectivity within Quebec society. A better example of Coser's point could hardly be found. The political implications of this development concerning anglophones are still unclear. However, we need not expect, in the short term at least, that anglophones develop any new form of unified political action. Precisely because the final outcome of the debate about language is so important to anglophones, we must expect inner divergencies concerning

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1Coser, Social Conflict, p. 34.
the exact definition of anglophone needs and the ways and means of achieving them. The anglophone response to Bill 22, and to subsequent events, indicates that such divergencies are indeed present.

The concern with language policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s reflected vital changes in the cultural identity of Quebec's French Canadians. The Roman Catholic church was no longer an institution with sufficient strength to nurture and protect the French identity in North America. The stereotype of the sturdy habitant working his land with the help of a dozen children was no longer an appropriate symbol of French Quebec's economic aspirations. Quebec francophones are now largely urbanized and secularized and much more open to the anglicizing influences of mass consumption society. In short, French Quebecers now have only their language to protect them from total assimilation to the North American way of life. It is not surprising, under these changed circumstances, that they began to define themselves primarily in terms of language and to take legislative steps to protect that language. Neither is it surprising, given the strength of anglophones, that it was the situation in Montreal to which the language legislation was primarily directed.

7. Voting Behaviour

If the difference between francophones and anglophones in Montreal does in fact constitute a significant political cleavage, one would expect to find differences in their voting behaviour. The analysis of results in recent federal and provincial general elections shows that

1Ibid., p. 93.
the existence of such differences can easily be established, although it is not until the provincial election of 1976 that they become unusually dramatic.

Looking at federal politics first, it is immediately apparent that Montreal is overwhelmingly Liberal. Although John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives made a significant breakthrough on the Island of Montreal in 1958, only one Conservative was successful in the elections of 1962, 1963, and 1965. Prior to the 1968 election, there was a substantial re-arrangement of constituency boundaries. They were redrawn in the manner shown in Map II-2. As a result there were twenty-three constituencies on the Island of Montreal. One of them, Vaudreuil, includes the western part of the Island of Montreal, Ile-Bizard, and that part of the Province of Quebec located between the Ottawa and St. Lawrence Rivers. Table II-14 shows the results of the 1968, 1972 and 1974 elections for Canada, Quebec, and the twenty-three Montreal constituencies. The most notable features of the table are the relatively low turnout figures for Montreal and the relatively high proportion of rejected ballots. The popular vote section of the table shows that the Liberals have done consistently better in Montreal than they have in both Quebec and Canada, although the ebb and flow of their support in Montreal has corresponded to federal and provincial patterns. The Conservatives and New Democrats have performed abysmally in Quebec, but within Montreal have generally done slightly better than their provincial average. The Social Credit party, with its base in rural Quebec, has never seriously broken into the Montreal area, although it did receive just over 10% of the Montreal vote in 1972. The figures
Map II-2

FEDERAL ELECTORAL DISTRICTS ON THE ISLAND OF MONTREAL,
ELECTIONS OF 1968, 1972, 1974

Richard Arès, 'Composition linguistique des 24 comtés fédéraux de la zone de Montréal', Relations, 374 (Sept. 1972), pg. 104.
# TABLE II-14

Federal General Election Results for Canada, Quebec, and The Island of Montreal, 1968, 1972, and 1974

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CANADA</th>
<th>Quebec</th>
<th>Island of Montreal **</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turnout (%)*</td>
<td>75.7</td>
<td>76.7</td>
<td>71.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Votes Cast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>42.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.C.</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.C.</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.D.P.</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Votes Rejected</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Seats</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.C. Seats</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.C. Seats</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.D.P. Seats</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Turnout equals the number of votes cast divided by the number of electors on the list. The number of votes cast in each of the three different elections in each of the three territories is as follows:

- **Canada:** 8,217,916; 9,974,661; and 9,671,002
- **Quebec:** 2,229,345; 2,790,172; and 2,592,861
- **Island of Montreal:** 736,701; 893,404; and 793,313

**Includes all of the constituency of Vaudreuil.

1Prepared from data found in Canada, Chief Electoral Officer, Twenty-Eighth General Election, 1968 (Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1969); Canada Chief Electoral Officer, Twenty-Ninth General Election, 1972 (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1973); and Canada, Chief Electoral Officer, Thirtieth General Election, 1974 (Ottawa, Information Canada, 1975).
relating to seats are notable only in that they show the Liberals' total political dominance within the Island.

A study of the detailed constituency results for the Island of Montreal illustrates subtle differences between anglophone and francophone political behaviour. Only five of these constituencies contain populations in which more than 50% of the residents have English as their mother tongue. These are: Lachine, Mount Royal, Notre-Dame-de-Grace, Vaudreuil, and Westmount. All of them produced turnouts above the average for the Island of Montreal. The only other constituencies with this characteristic were Ahuntsic, Dollard, and Outremont. In Dollard 47% of the population have English as a mother tongue. Ahuntsic and Outremont include the wealthiest francophone areas on the Island. It is important to note that these two constituencies, unlike the anglophone ones, consistently produced more rejected ballots than the Montreal average. This undoubtedly was the result of a campaign by the Parti québécois to convince electors to show their dissatisfaction with federalism by destroying their ballots. This campaign was more successful in the federal election immediately prior to the provincial election of 1973 than in the one following it. As far as party support is concerned, the figures for Liberal support show that they did better in

\[\text{footnote} 1\text{Such a study was carried out by the author from data found in the reports referred to in the previous footnote.}\]

\[\text{footnote} 2\text{Richard Arès, 'Composition linguistique des 24 comtes federaux de la zone de Montreal', Relations, 374 (September, 1972), pp. 232-3. Arès includes the two federal constituencies in Laval in his analysis but not Vaudreuil.}\]

\[\text{footnote} 3\text{Ibid.}\]
anglophone ridings than in francophone ones. The most Liberal riding of all is that of Mount Royal. In addition to having Prime Minister Trudeau as its Liberal candidate, it is also the Montreal riding containing the highest proportion of people having English as a mother tongue (58.9%). In 1974, however, anglophone support for the Liberals seemed to be slipping as Conservatives made substantial gains in Lachine, Notre-Dame-de-Grace, and Westmount. Conservatives generally performed above the Island average in such working-class francophone ridings as Hochelaga, Lafontaine, Maisonneuve, St. Jacques, and Ste. Marie. The size of the N.D.P. and Social Credit vote in particular ridings was largely dependent on the quality of the local candidate. Interestingly enough, the socialist N.D.P. has totally failed in the city's working-class areas, the same areas in which Social Credit has found its limited Montreal support.

Although Montreal is usually conceived of as being monolithic bedrock of Liberal strength in Canada, the figures from the constituencies demonstrate that there are observable distinctions between the federal political behaviour of the Island's anglophones and francophones. The most significant is that anglophones are more likely to turn out to vote and less likely to spoil their ballots. They clearly have a closer identification with federal politics than do their francophone counterparts.

For the purposes of this thesis provincial election results are considerably more significant than federal. This is because the control of most aspects of language policy in Quebec is clearly under the jurisdiction of the provincial government as are the local governmental

\[1\text{Ibid.}\]
institutions, the organization of which will be discussed in later chapters. Results of the last four provincial elections for the province as a whole and the Island of Montreal are presented in Table II-15. Because constituency boundaries changed before the 1973 election, the next table, Table II-16, presents detailed results for Montreal Island only for the elections of 1966 and 1970. It also shows the percentage of people on the voters' lists in each riding who were classified in 1970 as being 'Non-French-Canadian' (N.F.C.). People classified as N.F.C. were considered to have surnames which were not French. In questionable cases, the classification was made on the basis of the language used by the voter in stating his occupation and on the basis of the area in which he lived.2 The table shows that in four ridings--D'Arcy McGee, Notre-Dame-de-Grace, Westmount, and Robert Baldwin--the Liberals received over 75% of the vote in both elections.3 These ridings also contained by far the highest percentages of N.F.C.s. In D'Arcy McGee, where the Liberal share of the vote approached 90%, N.F.C.s constituted 85.2% of the population. Only seven ridings on the Island at one election or the other elected a U.N. or P.Q. candidate. All had N.F.C. populations of 20% and under. In general terms, the table shows that, although the Liberals had a strong base (over 30%)

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2 Bernard Smith, Le coup d'état du 29 avril, pp. 74-5.

3 Combining Séguin's and the official Liberal's vote in Robert Baldwin produces a figure of 83.8%.
TABLE II-15
Quebec Provincial Election Results for Province and Island of Montreal, 1966, 1970, and 1973

| YEAR | QUEBEC | | | | | ISLAND OF MONTREAL | | | | |
|------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| % Turnout* | 73.6 | 84.2 | 82.0 | 83.5 | 60.9 | 79.8 | 77.0 | 82.1 |  |
| % Valid Votes Cast: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Liberal | 47.2 | 45.4 | 54.0 | 33.8 | 53.6 | 57.3 | 60.5 | 38.3 |  |
| P.Q. | - | 23.1 | 31.0 | 41.4 | - | 29.0 | 33.7 | 39.1 |  |
| R.C. | - | 11.2 | 11.0 | 4.6 | - | 2.4 | 3.3 | 1.7 |  |
| U.N. | 40.9 | 19.7 | 5.0 | 18.2 | 29.4 | 10.1 | 1.6 | 16.7 |  |
| Others | 11.9 | 0.6 | 0.0 | 1.1 | 18.0 | 0.6 | 0.9 | 4.2 |  |
| % Votes Rejected** | 2.0 | 2.0 | 1.8 | 2.1 | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 2.4 |  |
| Liberal Seats | 50 | 72 | 102 | 26 | 17 | 19 | 27 | 13 |  |
| P.Q. Seats | - | 7 | 6 | 71 | - | 6 | 4 | 17 |  |
| R.C. Seats | - | 12 | 2 | 1 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| U.N. Seats | 56 | 17 | 0 | 11 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  |
| Others | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |
| TOTAL | 108 | 108 | 110 | 110 | 25 | 25 | 31 | 31 |  |

*The number of valid votes cast divided by the number of electors on the list. The number of valid votes cast in the four different elections is as follows:
  Quebec: 2,370,510; 2,929,999; 3,087,680; and 3,360,785
  Island of Montreal: 656,134; 909,117; 894,771; and 960,076

**The number of rejected votes divided by the number of valid votes cast.

## TABLE II-16

Quebec Provincial Election Results for Island of Montreal Constituencies, 1966 and 1970

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*In the 1966 election in Robert Baldwin, the winner was Art Séguin, an Independent Liberal who polled 52.3% of the vote. He was soon admitted to the Liberal caucus and subsequently ran and was elected as an official Liberal.

#In the 1966 election in Ste. Anne the winner was Frank Hanley, an Independent who polled 37.6% of the vote. In 1970 he was defeated by a Liberal.
in all ridings, they did exceptionally well in anglophone areas. Conversely, their opponents' strength seemed to be inversely related to the strength of the N.F.C. population. In this regard it is interesting to note that the heavily francophone middle-class riding of Ahuntsic gave only 26.7% of its vote to the U.N. in 1966 while in 1970 it gave 42.3% to the P.Q. This is in contrast to inner city working-class francophone ridings where the U.N. did better in 1966 than did the P.Q. in 1970.

Table II-17 presents the election results for 1973 and 1976 and Map II-3 shows the revised boundaries of the constituencies. The creation of the two new anglophone ridings of Mount Royal and Pointe Claire meant that there were six which were predominantly anglophone. The 1973 results were quite similar to 1970. The six anglophone ridings were the only ones on the Island to give the Liberals more than 75% of the vote. In constituencies which were overwhelmingly francophone, however, a full two-party system had clearly emerged. In fact, a swing of five percentage points to the P.Q. would have produced an additional eight seats. The only francophone constituency in which the P.Q. obtained less than 30% of the vote was middle-class L'Acadie. But even here the P.Q. did at least twice as well as in the anglophone constituencies.

The 1976 results were substantially different. For one thing, the turnout on the Island of Montreal was the most impressive in recent years. The highest turnouts--approaching 90%--were found in the northern and eastern sections of the Island, especially in areas which had previously been Liberal. The P.Q. increased its strength in every
### TABLE I-17

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<td>75.3</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marg. Bour.</td>
<td>36,600</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercier</td>
<td>26,770</td>
<td>75.1</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Royal</td>
<td>29,255</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.D.G.</td>
<td>29,037</td>
<td>77.7</td>
<td>80.1</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outremont</td>
<td>28,526</td>
<td>77.4</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe Claire</td>
<td>30,991</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Baldwin</td>
<td>32,815</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosemont</td>
<td>30,158</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>49.7</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste. Anne</td>
<td>23,726</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Henri</td>
<td>28,781</td>
<td>78.3</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Jacques</td>
<td>22,488</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
<td>29,369</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>23,037</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>61.2</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste. Marie</td>
<td>24,584</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>43.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sauge</td>
<td>36,419</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td>42.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Verdun</td>
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<td>80.2</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vieu</td>
<td>29,471</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>55.7</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmount</td>
<td>28,233</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Number of votes cast divided by number of electors on list.

**Number of rejected ballots divided by number of votes cast. Party percentages also based on number of votes cast.

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PROVINCIAL ELECTORAL DISTRICTS ON THE
ISLAND OF MONTREAL, ELECTIONS OF 1973 AND 1976

Shaded electoral districts were won by P.Q. in 1976.
constituency except Westmount. Although it only increased its share of the popular vote by 5.3 percentage points on the Island, it increased its seats from four to seventeen. The P.Q. won 38.2% of the Island's popular vote while in the province as a whole it won 41%. The apparent relative weakness of the P.Q. on Montreal Island is explained by its complete inability to win the support of anglophones. The fact that the P.Q. now clearly dominates francophone Montreal is shown in Map II-3. Seats won by the P.Q. in 1976 are shaded. This map almost exactly reflects the areas of francophone strength as shown in Appendix IV.

The main reason why the modest increase in P.Q. popular vote resulted in so many individual victories was because of the resurgence of the Union nationale. Under a new leader, it managed to increase its share of the Island's vote from 1.6% in 1973 to 16.3% in 1976. In the constituencies of Bourassa, Jeanne Mance, Sainte Anne, Saint Henri, and Viau, the increase in the U.N. vote was enough to allow the P.Q. candidate to slip past the Liberal. Although these ridings are predominantly francophone, they all have substantial numbers of immigrant voters who probably deserted the Liberals as a result of Bill 22. In predominantly anglophone ridings the explosion of U.N. strength was even more dramatic. Here the voters had no cause to fear the election of the P.Q. candidate. Only in D'Arcy McGee and Mount Royal did the Liberals win more than 60% of the vote, but even in these ridings the Liberal share decreased by more than 20 percentage points compared to 1973. In Pointe Claire the U.N. candidate actually won, increasing his party's share of the vote from a tiny 0.9% to an impressive 44.5%.

Because so many anglophones deserted the Liberals in 1976, it
appears as if the anglophones had lost their previous political unity. In one sense, this is obviously true, but in a more profound sense it is not. In 1976 anglophones were united in their dislike of Bill 22 and their distrust of Robert Bourassa and his Liberals. The problem was, as Coser might have predicted, that they could not agree concerning what to do about it. Many voted U.N. in protest and in the hope that its ambiguous language policy was in fact better than the Liberals. Many more reluctantly voted Liberal simply because they feared the Parti québécois and they knew that the Liberals were the only ones who could prevent it coming to power. In spite of the interesting anglophone flirtation with the U.N., the most significant feature of the 1976 election was that almost all francophone constituencies elected P.Q. members while anglophones ones did not. For the first time since the heyday of Duplessis, Montreal's language divisions were baldly reflected in the results of a crucial election.

It must be remembered that most of the events described in later chapters took place prior to the passage of Bill 22 and the election of 1976. These events relate to metropolitan government, police integration, and the restructuring of the governing bodies of public schools and social services. They unfolded in an environment in which French and English political behaviour was not as overtly different as it was in 1976. The passage of the language law has had the effect of resolving a number of problems concerning which language is to be used under what circumstances within various local institutions. But the issue of how anglophones and francophones will accommodate each other's varying interests within these institutions
has become, if anything, even more intractable as a result of recent events. Anglophones are now much more aware of perceived threats to their position and, as a result, their local institutions have become even more cherished than they were during the period of the late 1960s and early 1970s.
CHAPTER III

ATTEMPTS AT METROPOLITAN REFORM, 1883-1969

This chapter describes the evolution of the system of municipal government on the Island of Montreal prior to the creation of the Montreal Urban Community (M.U.C.) in 1969. It is impossible to understand the politics of the M.U.C. without being aware of the complex pattern of events which originally shaped the main features of the relationship between the City of Montreal and its suburbs. An important consideration to remember in this context is that this relationship was forged long before the Quiet Revolution and the subsequent effort to assert the new political power of Quebec francophones. Serious attempts at the reform of municipal institutions and relationships were evident long before 1960. Unlike other policy debates to be discussed in this thesis, the metropolitan reform debate pre-dated the Quiet Revolution, was not greatly affected by it, and still remains fundamentally unresolved. In the period being discussed in this chapter, changes in Montreal's system of municipal government came about as the result of rather traditional political machinations on the part of the premier of Quebec, the mayor of Montreal, and other local politicians. Plans for reform based on theory imported from Britain and France were put forward, but they had little practical effect.
Early in the twentieth century quite distinct English-speaking and French-speaking suburbs came into being. However, the common political interests of suburban politicians from both linguistic communities brought them together to defend the sacred cause of suburban autonomy. Meanwhile, the City of Montreal looked covetously upon the suburbs as new sources of local tax revenue and undeveloped land. The City portrayed itself as being at the heart of the French-Canadian metropolis and the suburbs, either English or French, as being irritants in its worthy attempts to shape the destiny of the world's second largest French-speaking city. The central City was continually foiled, however, because increased power for Montreal was a threat to the province as well as to the suburbs. Because the province determined the legal authority of the City, the latter was always kept in check and the suburbs had little to complain about.

This chapter shows that language differences complicated the debate about metropolitan reform in Montreal but they did not overtly dominate it. Chapter V, however, demonstrates that the very existence of Montreal's suburbs in their present form results from the importance of the linguistic cleavage. Consequently, the thesis eventually shows that the suburbs have survived not just because of their skilful political manoeuvring but also because any plan to change municipal boundaries involves tampering with the balance of French-English relations. This chapter, however, concentrates on the original creation of the suburbs and their subsequent efforts to protect themselves. Until 1969 such efforts prevented any significant loss of suburban power.
1. A Tradition of Metropolitan Reform

In 1881 twenty-eight municipalities existed on the Island other than the City itself.¹ For the next forty years the municipal situation on the Island was in a state of constant change. Land developers bought up parts of parishes and had no difficulty in getting them incorporated as new villages and towns. Just as quickly as the new municipalities appeared, others found themselves in serious financial difficulty and sought to be annexed, usually by the City of Montreal, so that they could share their collective debts with others. As the new municipalities sunk into debt, their original developers were benefiting from substantial profits made as a result of selling land and houses, the services of which were either deficient or could never be paid for, or both. The creators and developers of these doomed municipalities required and received the co-operation of politicians, particularly provincial ones. In return the politicians received shares of the profit.² The losers in this exercise were the new property owners and the City of Montreal. The City was often forced by the province to take over totally unplanned and bankrupt municipalities whose only contribution was the land which they occupied. From 1881 to 1921 both the

¹Montréal, Bureau de recherches économiques, Tableaux schématiques de l'évolution des municipalités de la région de Montréal (Montréal, 1970), p. 4.

²Naturally enough, this pattern of events is not well documented. The best example of it is the City of Maisonneuve which was annexed in 1918. However, given the huge debts of other annexed municipalities, it is only reasonable to conclude that many of these earlier annexations followed a similar pattern. For a careful reference to 'apparently ill-advised real estate developments', see Quebec, Department of Municipal Affairs, Study Commission of Intermunicipal Problems on the Island of Montreal (Quebec, Queen's Printer, 1964), p. 2.
territory and the debt of the City grew dramatically. Much of the City's financial trouble later in the twentieth century was caused by the burden of debt it inherited from the annexations. Similarly, the bizarre municipal boundaries still existing on the Island can largely be traced to this period. The City absorbed what was bankrupt and was denied those few municipalities where expensive houses had been sold only to people who could also finance their own services. Consequently, such territorial anomalies as Westmount, Outremont, Hampstead and Montreal West still appear on the map.

Table III-1 lists the municipalities annexed by Montreal in the period 1881-1921. It also shows certain relevant characteristics such as the extent of their debt, their population and the degree to which they were inhabited by French Canadians. Compared to what would follow, the nineteenth century annexations appear to be of little importance. However, these annexations, particularly that of Hochelaga, were important at that time because they tipped the delicate French-English political balance in the City decisively towards the French. Anglophone municipal politicians appeared capable of surviving if the City boundaries remained static but their days were clearly numbered if they were

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1 Except for the western part of Hochelaga, this table only includes annexations which involved whole municipalities. Dates are taken from Montreal, Tableaux schematiques. Population figures are from Canada, Census of Canada, 1880-81, pp. 52 and 56; Canada Fourth Census of Canada, 1901 (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1901), i, 104-116 and 366-378; and Canada, Fifth Census of Canada (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1913), ii, 104-112 and 278-288. Debt figures are from Montreal, Memoire du comité executif de la Cité de Montreal (Montréal, 1962), p. 8.

2 William Henry Atherton, Montreal, 1535-1914 (Montreal, S. J. Clarke, 1914), ii, 184.
TABLE III-1

City of Montreal Annexations
1881-1921

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annexed Municipality</th>
<th>Date Incorporated</th>
<th>Date Annexed</th>
<th>Population*</th>
<th>% French Mother Tongue*</th>
<th>Debt Dollars</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hochelaga (western part)</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>4,111</td>
<td>82.5</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Jean Baptiste</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>1884</td>
<td>5,874</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>35,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Gabriel</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>1887</td>
<td>4,506</td>
<td>40.2</td>
<td>65,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte St. Louis</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>1893</td>
<td>9,025</td>
<td>84.9</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste. Cunégonde</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>1904</td>
<td>8,494</td>
<td>77.8</td>
<td>776,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Henri</td>
<td>1874</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>17,455</td>
<td>82.4</td>
<td>1,776,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villeray</td>
<td>1896</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>443</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notre-Dame-des-Neiges</td>
<td>1889</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DeLormier</td>
<td>1895</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>10,453</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>591,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td>1909</td>
<td>37,000</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>3,175,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetreaultville</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,087</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>14,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahuntsic</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaurivage</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td>13,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notre-Dame-de-Grace-Ouest</td>
<td>1876</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>5,217</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>1,145,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosemont</td>
<td>1905</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>52,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bordeaux</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>78.5</td>
<td>84,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cote-des-Neiges</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>2,444</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emard</td>
<td>1908</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>6,179</td>
<td>82.9</td>
<td>327,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Paul</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3,421</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>399,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longue Pointe</td>
<td>1907</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>5,531</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>359,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartierville</td>
<td>1906</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>90.3</td>
<td>653,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sault-au-Recollet</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,311</td>
<td>90.5</td>
<td>1,080,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maisonneuve</td>
<td>1898</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>18,684</td>
<td>82.3</td>
<td>17,137,723</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>154,111</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>28,057,109</td>
</tr>
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</table>

*At the year of the federal census closest to the annexation date. Hochelaga figures include the whole municipality. St. Gabriel and Cote St. Louis figures are for 1881 and 1901 respectively. Cartierville, Sault-au-Recollet and Maisonneuve are for 1911.

See footnote p. 125.
to be forced to contend with the new suburban working class. Robert Dahl, in his study of New Haven, points out that the 'entrepreneurs withdrew from local politics when they found themselves unable to control the new immigrant vote.'¹ In Montreal's case, the 'immigrants' were in large part the francophone residents of the annexed municipalities.

The table shows that most of the annexations took place from 1901 to 1911. During this time the population of the City increased by 79.5% (267,730 to 470,480).² Slightly more than half this growth (51.6%) can be accounted for by annexations. Of the 109,705 people in the annexed municipalities, 69.6% were of French origin, 25.4% were British, and 4.9% were 'others'. For this period the impact of annexation was clearly an important factor in increasing French strength in the City from 60.9% to 63.5%. During the same period, British strength declined from 33.7% to 25.8%; this was due partly to annexation and also to a British exodus from the City. It was during this period 1901 to 1921 that such anglophone municipalities as Baie d'Urfé, Beaconsfield, Cote St. Luc, Hampstead, Mount Royal, Pointe Claire, and Roxboro were first incorporated. Because the 'others' constituted 5.4% of the City's population in 1901, the annexations actually worked against their relative strength in the City. However, by 1911 the 'others' made up 11.7% of the City's population. This unprecedented increase was clearly


²Canada, Fourth Census of Canada, 1901, i, 104-116 and Canada, Fifth Census of Canada, ii, 104-112 and 278-288. Other figures in this paragraph come either from these censuses or from Table IV-2.
caused by the arrival of large numbers of immigrants, mainly Jews and Italians\(^1\) who chose to settle in Montreal rather than move west.

Metropolitan government for Montreal was first seriously advocated in a book published in 1910. G. A. Nantel, a former provincial minister of public works and director of *La Presse*,\(^2\) saw municipal federation for the whole Island of Montreal, rather than piecemeal annexation by the City, as the best answer to Montreal's problems.\(^3\) He wanted a general council of the City and Island of Montreal to be formed under the aegis of the provincial government. The City's mayor and council and delegates from groups of other Island municipalities would form the general council. This body would concern itself with services for the whole Island, particularly roads. To fulfill its functions it could divide itself into various commissions, following the procedure then used by the Montreal city council. Nantel was careful to emphasize that under his scheme all towns, villages, and parishes, would maintain their identity and most of their existing functions.\(^4\) Although no action was taken on Nantel's scheme at the time, his proposals were remarkably similar to the main features of the metropolitan government which Montreal was finally to receive sixty years later.

As might be expected, Montreal's first step towards metropolitan


\(^{4}\)Ibid., pp. 128-9.
government came as a result of practical political difficulties, not of well thought out, rational proposals. In 1920 four municipalities, Montreal North, Pointe-aux-Trembles, St. Michel, and Laval-de-Montréal, were approaching bankruptcy. Annexation appeared inevitable, but it was clear that the City would agree only if it was allowed to annex most of the rest of the Island at the same time. It was also clear that the provincial government's solution was to establish some form of metropolitan commission which would force the wealthier suburbs to pay the debts of the poorer ones. In January, 1921, suburban mayors met to decide their strategy. Unlike their meetings in later years, part of this one was held in the presence of the press. Nine suburbs voted to accept the commission idea, if annexation was the only alternative. It is interesting to note that such wealthy 'inner suburbs' as Westmount, Outremont, and Montreal West were part of this group. However, eleven suburbs were totally opposed to the commission under any circumstances.\footnote{La Patrie, 11 January 1921.} This group included such suburbs as Rivière-des-Prairies, Dorval, Ste. Geneviève, and Pointe Claire which were far enough away from Montreal to consider themselves safe from all but the most wide-ranging annexations. In spite of the suburban objections, the provincial government went ahead with the plans for a commission. At the legislative committee hearings on the resulting bill, Méderic Martin, mayor of Montreal, shocked his audience by injecting the linguistic factor into the debate. He claimed that the only reason the citizens of Westmount, Montreal West, and Outremont avoided annexation was because 'ces messieurs sont
des anglais'. Although Outremont is now dominated by francophones, this is an important observation about the politics of metropolitan Montreal which still remains valid today.

When the debate was over, both the suburbs and the City had little alternative but to accept the provincial government's compromise between their opposing interests. The terms of the compromise can be found in the act which established the Island of Montreal Metropolitan Commission. Its name was changed in 1922 to the Montreal Metropolitan Commission. The Act called for a fifteen-man commission: seven councillors and the city comptroller from the City of Montreal; one representative each from Westmount, Outremont, Verdun, and Lachine; one councillor representing LaSalle, St. Pierre, Hampstead, Mount Royal, and Montreal West; and one councillor representing Montreal North, St. Michel, Montreal East, Pointe-aux-Trembles, and Laval-de-Montreal. There was also a non-voting commissioner appointed by the Department of Municipal Affairs. This structure lasted until 1959. However, in 1931 Montreal East was given its own non-voting member. In 1958, a seventeenth member, in the form of a provincially appointed chairman, was added.

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1 Le Devoir, 10 March 1921.
2 Quebec, Statutes, 1921, Chapter 140.
3 Ibid., 1922, Chapter 105.
4 Ibid., 1921, Chapter 140, s. 3.
5 Ibid., 1930-31, Chapter 139, s. 1.
6 Ibid., 1957-58, Chapter 52, s. 32.
The original functions of the Commission were purely financial. No member municipality, except the City of Montreal, could issue bonds or contract loans, other than of a temporary nature, without the approval of the Commission. Any municipality failing to meet its obligations had all its financial affairs placed in the control of the Commission. This provision was directed at the four bankrupt municipalities which had originally prompted the creation of the Commission. All member municipalities which were financially solvent were liable, in proportion to their share of the total property assessment in the Commission's territory, for the interest or the debts of the bankrupt municipalities and for the Commission's operating expenses. Thus, the City paid 85% of the total annual bill. The defaulting municipalities were eventually supposed to repay the others. In 1946 Pointe-aux-Trembles (which had annexed Laval-de-Montréal in 1925), Montreal North, and St. Michel, collectively owed the other municipalities $22,089,430.15. As a result of a complete financial restructuring for the City and the Commission, this debt was forgiven by the creditor councils. The net effect was that, for the period 1921-1946, the City has subsidized the debtors by $17,902,600.30, while the others had paid out $4,186,739.85.

1Ibid., Chapter 140, s. 31.
2Ibid., s. 18.
3Ibid., s. 19.
6Ibid.
7Ibid., p. 15.
In 1962 the Drapeau administration would claim that these figures showed the Commission to have been 'un simple truc pour faire payer par Montréal les dettes et les déficits de villes voisines'.\(^1\) It claimed that in actual fact Montreal would have been better off had it annexed the four debtor municipalities in 1921, thereby removing the original need for the establishment of the Commission. In general, the Commission succeeded in accomplishing its limited financial objective, but it did so largely at the expense of the City.

Unsuccessful attempts were initiated to make the Commission into a multi-functional metropolitan government. In 1922 it was given the authority to prepare a plan for a metropolitan boulevard crossing the Island from east to west.\(^2\) The Commission grappled unsuccessfully with the issue of the boulevard and it was not until 1956 that the first contract was awarded.\(^3\) The road had not been completed when the Commission ceased to exist in 1959. In 1949 the Commission's chairman, J. O. Asselin, approached the provincial government to seek authority for the Commission to take over such functions as traffic control, public transit, and economic promotion. The mayor of Montreal, Camillien Houde, opposed this proposal as it implied a loss of power for the City. He was supported by Premier Duplessis and the proposed changes were therefore doomed.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)Montréal, Memoire, p. 18.
\(^2\)Quebec, Statutes, 1923, Chapter 105, s. 11.
\(^3\)George E. Shortt, 'Government of the Metropolitan Area of Montreal in the Right of Experience Elsewhere', 1961, typescript filed at the Montreal Board of Trade, p. 79.
\(^4\)The Gazette, 3 March 1949.
The most ardent metropolitan reformers had long realized that the Commission needed drastic reform before it could become a suitable organism for metropolitan government. They had decided that the 'borough system of local government' was the answer. The first detailed proposals for a borough system for Montreal were made in 1928 by private organization called the Municipal Service Bureau.¹ It suggested that the City be divided into eighteen boroughs, each having a representative on the Montreal City Commission. Other member municipalities of the existing Montreal Metropolitan Commission would be represented on the new Commission in similar fashion as on the old. The new Commission would have jurisdiction over main drainage, main roads, police and fire protection, public health, building by-laws, town planning and zoning, hospitals and public assistance, and general finance.² The realization that any attempt of government would involve drastic municipal boundary changes was, and still is, an obstacle that confronts serious reformers.

The Municipal Service Bureau was almost completely removed from the realm of active politics and hence its proposals had no chance of implementation. Its heavily anglophone orientation is shown by its defence of the borough system as being 'British in character and Canadian in spirit'.³ Such a justification was clearly not designed to rally popular francophone support. Proposals similar to the borough plan were

²Ibid., p. 11.
³Ibid., back cover.
made in French by Raymond Tanghe, a geographer at the University of Montreal. He argued for a new level of metropolitan government to control public works, finance, police, public health, and construction standards. While the Municipal Service Bureau tended to follow the British model of having no overt central presence in local government, Tanghe, not surprisingly, saw advantages in the French prefectorial system. He thought that Montreal's metropolitan government would benefit by having a provincially appointed chairman.¹

Mayor Houde was interested in more practical solutions to metropolitan problems, particularly solutions which involved increased revenue and extra-territorial authority for the City of Montreal. In 1935, Houde convinced Premier Taschereau to grant him three new taxation powers. The first was a municipal income tax. The City was allowed to levy an income tax of up to 20% of the federal income tax paid by 'any individual having his ordinary residence, domocile, or place of business' in the cities of Montreal, Westmount, Outremont, Verdun, Mount Royal, Montreal East, Montreal North, St. Michel, St. Laurent, Montreal West, and Pointe-aux-Trembles. The proceeds of the tax were to be distributed amongst these municipalities according to population.² The municipal income tax remained in force until 1940 when it was abolished as a result of the war-time tax agreements.³

¹Raymond Tanghe, La géographie humaine de Montréal (Montréal, Arbour et Dupont, 1928), p. 279.
²Ibid., Chapter 112, s. 12 and 13.
³Québec, Rapport de la commission royale d'enquête sur la fiscalité (Québec, Queen's Printer, 1965), p. 86.
In 1935 the provincial government granted the City the authority to levy Canada's first direct sales tax. From then until 1964 the City collected 2% of the value of most retail sales in the municipalities mentioned above. As with the income tax, the proceeds were allocated amongst the municipalities according to population. In 1941 the municipalities of LaSalle, St. Pierre, Hampstead, and Lachine were included with the others for municipal sales tax purposes. The City fought this change because the inclusion of the four new municipalities, which were all relatively more residential than commercial in comparison with the City, scarcely increased the total sales tax revenue but did force it to be more widely distributed. During the 1940s and 1950s the sales tax situation in the province as a whole became extremely complex, with municipalities, school boards, and the province itself all having their own levy. In 1964 all this was replaced by one single provincial sales tax. This new arrangement included various complicated formulae whereby municipalities would receive certain proportions of sales tax collected in their areas. Not surprisingly, both the income and sales taxes of 1935 were vigorously opposed in the affected suburban municipalities. Brigadier C. A. Smart, representing Westmount in the provincial legislature, claimed that the taxes violated municipal autonomy while contributing only to the City's extravagance.

Mayor Houde's third new source of increased revenue was related

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1 Quebec, Statutes, 1941, Chapter 37, s. 64.
2 Quebec, Department of Revenue, Retail Sales Tax Act 1964 and Amendments (Quebec, 1968).
3 The Gazette, 13 March 1935.
to the water tax. Until 1935 the City of Montreal was supplying water to the citizens of Westmount, Outremont, Cote St. Luc, and St. Pierre on the same basis as to its own citizens, i.e. each householder had to pay 4% of the rental valuation of his residence to the City as a 'water tax'. In 1935 Houde decided to raise this rate to 6% in Montreal and in Cote St. Luc and St. Pierre (where the water tax rate was tied to that of the City anyway) and to 7.5% in Westmount and Outremont. Naturally enough, Westmount and Outremont objected strenuously to this arbitrary increase which in reality had nothing to do with the cost of water and a great deal to do with Montreal's financial difficulties. Houde's answer was this:

The people of Westmount and Outremont for a long time ... have been facing annexation, and would prefer a borough system. The reason that we tax them this year is in view of the incoming system ... This taxation upon them is the forerunner of the new system.1

Houde undoubtedly had little personal use for the borough system but he was quite willing to hold it out to the citizens of Westmount and Outremont as the desirable result of paying higher water taxes to the City.

After World War II the advocates of the borough system resurrected their proposals in the hope, perhaps, that political circumstances had changed in their favour. The new version of their system2 differed from the 1928 proposals only in that they placed much less emphasis on

1 Westmount Examiner, 22 March 1935.

2 This can be found in Frederick Wright, ed., The Borough System of Government for Greater Montreal (Montreal, Municipal Service Bureau, 1947) and T. Taggart Smyth, 'Metropolitan Re-organization in Montreal and District', Municipal Review of Canada, LXII-3 (March 1946), pp. 4-6.
the desirability of splitting up the City. Practical politicians once again paid little or no attention to the scheme. One anglophone local and provincial politician, George Marler, suggested that the suburbs recognize the City's pre-eminent position and rely on it to provide regional services at a fair, negotiated cost.¹ None of these post-war suggestions for change, including the proposals referred to earlier to increase the functions of the Commission, was accepted by the City or the provincial government. From this time on, little was heard from the anglophone-dominated 'good government' groups which had sparked most of the previous discussions of metropolitan reform. The borough plan was forgotten until it was resurrected in 1971 by the City of Westmount as a possible solution to restructuring the Montreal Urban Community.² Although the Montreal Metropolitan Commission lingered on through the 1950s, it finally became clear that it could not be the basis of any multi-functional metropolitan government. While various commissions studied Montreal, few paid much attention to the Commission except to recognize that it had fulfilled its original function and halted the process of bankruptcy and annexation characteristic of the early part of the twentieth century. The Commission ceased to exist in April of 1959, its remaining functions being taken over by the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation.³

¹George C. Marler, 'The Metropolitan Problem', Metropole I-1 (April 1947), pp. 11 and 17.
²Westmount's proposals are discussed in Chapter V-4.
³Quebec, Statutes, 1959, Chapter 52, s. 18.
2. Duplessis and Metropolitan Government

The phenomenal growth in suburban Montreal in the immediate post-World War II period—and the great traffic problems resulting from the new reliance on the automobile—forced the politicians to re-open the issue of metropolitan government. In 1952 the provincial government authorized the City of Montreal to establish a commission to study Montreal's metropolitan problems. Later that year the City council established a twenty-two member body composed of Mayor Houde, fourteen city councillors, and six representatives from the other municipalities which were members of the Montreal Metropolitan Commission. The chairman was the chief judge of Montreal, Roland Paquette.\(^1\) In early 1955 the Commission finally reported. It called for the creation of a new metropolitan organism to administer various inter-municipal services and to act as a general conciliator of all municipal interests on the Island. It was to be composed of fourteen members named by the City, fourteen by the Island suburbs and one by the provincial government. There was to be an executive committee of seven members. The new body was to be responsible for major sewer and water supply systems, traffic control on main arteries, fire prevention standards, public transport and metropolitan planning. It was also meant to administer the sales tax, coordinate valuation for property tax purposes, and regulate store closing hours and taxi permits.\(^2\)

Four City councillors expressed reservations about the report, \(^3\)

\(^1\)Montréal, Rapport général et final de la Commission d'étude des problèmes métropolitains (Montréal, 1955), pp. 3-9.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 71-75.
mainly because its recommendations placed many existing City functions under the control of a new government in which the City would not have a clear voting majority. However, one commission member, Councillor Donat Beauchamp of Lachine, was totally opposed.¹ His basic argument was that the suburbs would lose too much power if the Paquette recommendations were accepted. He was convinced that most of the Island's problems could be overcome without impinging on municipal autonomy.² Beauchamp's final point was that Premier Maurice Duplessis would never agree to these changes if they were urged by the City against the wishes of the suburbs.

I affirm that the municipalities can rest assured that for the present Premier, who has shown himself so able a defender against the encroachments of centralization, it will be impossible to acquiesce in such a demand on the part of the City of Montreal.³

Although Beauchamp's analysis of metropolitan problems might have been rather unsophisticated, his knowledge of Duplessis was ultimately proved to be totally accurate. But it was not the release of the Paquette report which tested Duplessis' intentions. The report was forgotten almost as soon as it appeared, mainly because the new mayor, Jean Drapeau, was uninterested in any form of metropolitan government.

It was Premier Duplessis who re-opened the issue. In early 1957, when faced with some difficult political decisions on various inter-municipal problems on the Island, he began to realize that the existence

¹Ibid., p. 76.
³Ibid., p. 9.
of some form of metropolitan government might absolve him of these embarrassing choices. He announced that he intended to create, within the next year, a new metropolitan institution for the Island of Montreal.\(^1\) Suburban response was not encouraging. Although most mayors phrased their objections in terms of elaborate defences of local autonomy, one simply stated: 'I don't know anything about metropolitan government; I don't want to know anything about it, and I'm against it'.\(^2\)

At a series of meetings arranged by the Montreal Board of Trade in 1957, various City and suburban representatives studied all the usual problems involved in metropolitan re-organization. They even tackled the problem of how to respect the existence of separate French and English communities—but they met with no success.\(^3\) With characteristic extreme caution, Duplessis tried to make it appear that he was not coercing anybody into metropolitan government. However, in August, 1957, he implied that he would have to act without local co-operation if the Island municipalities could not agree among themselves.\(^4\)

The suburban response to Duplessis' initiative was led by Mayor Reginald Dawson of Mount Royal. In October, 1957, he called a meeting of mayors of all Island suburbs at Mount Royal town hall. Fifteen municipalities sent representatives.\(^5\) Some mayors supported the Paquette

\(^1\) Shortt, 'Government of the Metropolitan Area', p. 83.
\(^2\) Quoted in Ibid., p. 84.
\(^3\) Ibid., p. 85.
\(^4\) Ibid., p. 88.
report because it gave the suburbs considerable control over the City. Mayor Playfair of Hampstead, a member of the Paquette commission, went so far as to suggest that, if there were a City councillor from Notre-Dame-de-Grace on the metropolitan institution, he could easily be swung to the suburban side.¹ As N.D.G. was the most obviously anglophone ward in the City, Playfair was clearly implying that the interests of the suburbs and of the anglophones were very similar indeed. Other mayors, particularly those further removed from the central part of the Island, were much more suspicious of the Paquette recommendations. Nobody was sure exactly what the Quebec authorities intended, but they all agreed that the provincial government should be presented with information demonstrating that the suburbs were currently paying their share of metropolitan costs through sales and water tax and that the City's claims to the contrary were not true. Twenty municipalities were represented at a second meeting held one month later.² Mayor Dawson reported that he had recently met Paul Dozois, the minister of municipal affairs, and had been left with the impression that the government was really not ready to proceed. In fact, Dozois had suggested to Dawson that the suburbs ask the government to appoint a royal commission to study the matter.³ With the sense of urgency removed, the mayors decided to do nothing further except to establish a committee capable

¹Ibid., p. 5.
²Minutes of Meetings of Mayors of Municipalities in the Montreal Area Re Metropolitan Government held in the Elizabeth Salon, Town Hall, November 20, 1957, at 8:00 P.M., Town of Mount Royal (metropolitan government file of Mayor R. J. P. Dawson), p. 1.
³Ibid.
of reacting to future events. On this occasion, because of Duplessis' lack of commitment to metropolitan government, the potential suburban strength, which Dawson had attempted to mobilize, was not needed. However, these two meetings are important because they foreshadowed various loose organizations formed by the suburbs to protect their autonomy against City and provincial interference. It should be noted that these meetings were conducted in English by a chairman who was mayor of a wealthy anglophone suburb. Francophone suburbs were represented, but their role was not nearly so prominent.

During the period between the two suburban meetings, a civic election was held in the City. Its main feature was the defeat of Jean Drapeau and the temporary rise to prominence of the Greater Montreal Rally. This local party had been formed by Councillor Lucien Croteau who had once been secretary to Camillien Houde. Croteau's main election theme was that the City's financial problems would be eased by establishing a metropolitan government which would force the suburbs to pay a fair price for services they received from the City. The Rally's candidate for mayor, Senator Sarto Fournier, was elected but the party failed to gain control of the Council. Despite this ambiguous result, Premier Duplessis was later to claim that Fournier's election had given the provincial government a mandate to introduce metropolitan government.¹

A year after its election, the new City administration appointed a twelve-man committee, headed by Councillor Croteau, to study the Pacquette report and to make recommendations for action. Although the

¹Shortt, 'Government of the Metropolitan Area', p. 90.
Croteau committee employed two outside consultants, its members were entirely drawn from the Montreal City Council. It was therefore viewed with considerable suspicion by the suburbs. Their suspicions were confirmed when the Croteau report was released in December, 1958. It called for the creation of Paquette's metropolitan body, but with much greater power, including control over integrated police and fire departments.\(^1\) The area covered by the new 'Corporation of Greater Montreal' was to include forty-five municipalities: all of Montreal Island and Ile-Île-Jésus and eight municipalities on the south shore. The corporation's thirteen-man council was to consist of six directly elected representatives from the City and one each from six separate suburban electoral divisions. The chairman was to be appointed by the provincial government.\(^2\) At a meeting in Mount Royal in January, 1959, thirty-four suburban municipalities unanimously rejected the report.\(^3\) The suburban position had hardened.

Duplessis acted quickly to break the potential deadlock. He skilfully presented his own proposals for the establishment of a very weak Montreal Metropolitan Corporation before the City of Montreal Council had a change to commit itself to the Croteau report. For a few days in February, 1959, the issue of metropolitan government was publicly debated in the private bills committee of the Quebec legislative. The main municipal actors were Mayor Dawson, Mayor Fournier, and Councillor

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\(^1\) Montreal, A Metropolitan Organism for Greater Montreal (Montreal, 1955), pp. 69-71.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 109.

\(^3\) Shortt, 'Government in the Metropolitan Area', p. 95.
Croteau. But Duplessis controlled the proceedings and overshadowed them all. Finally, his proposals were agreed to by everybody. The new Corporation was to be made up of fourteen members named by the City and one each from the same fourteen municipalities which were part of the Montreal Metropolitan Commission. The chairman was to be appointed by the provincial government. The Corporation was to take over the financial functions of the Commission and was also empowered to provide norms for property valuation, to complete the metropolitan boulevard, and to co-ordinate various inter-municipal services to the extent that member municipalities agreed to such co-ordination. The establishment of this weak Corporation was a great victory for the suburbs. They gained equal representation with the City—something they lacked on the Commission—and they lost none of their existing powers. Their satisfaction is demonstrated by this paragraph in the Westmount Letter, published by that city's council.

The important point for all of us living in Westmount is that we are not to lose the standards of service we now enjoy. Westmount is in no way precluded from exercising complete autonomy in respect to what Council feels is best for the citizens and property owners.

On 6 April 1959 the Corporation came into existence. One of its first actions was to re-assess the financing of the metropolitan boulevard project. However, in the provincial election campaign of 1960 the Liberal Party pledged, if elected, to take over this vital road. The new government met this commitment in April, 1961, at which time it declared the road a provincial highway and reimbursed the municipalities

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1Quebec, Statutes, 1959, Chapter 52, Div. II.
for the money they had spent on it. The Corporation's only remaining function in this regard was to finance the service roads of the boulevard, charging the costs to the municipalities in which they were located.¹ In other matters the Corporation made absolutely no progress. The year after its creation Jean Drapeau and his Civic Party were in full control of the Montreal City Council. Drapeau refused to co-operate with a metropolitan body over which the City did not have full control. The Corporation remained as a legal entity until the end of 1969. During its ten years of existence it accomplished nothing of any significance. Its futile existence was proof that no metropolitan institution could have any effect without the full political support of both the Government of Quebec and the City of Montreal. When the personnel of both these governments changed in 1960, the Corporation was doomed.

Duplessis' response to the need for metropolitan reform on the Island of Montreal was typical of his style of government.² He handled the problem personally, producing ad hoc compromises only when absolutely necessary. He sympathized with the desires of the suburban mayors--some of whom were his own local political organizers--to remain in full control of their own municipalities. Just as they saw a powerful metropolitan government as a threat to their local influence, Duplessis saw it as a threat to his personal control over the province. Because his political machine was based in rural Quebec, he showed no understanding

¹Quebec, Statutes, 1961, Chapter 61.
²This is described in Herbert F. Quinn, The Union Nationale (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1963), particularly Chapter 7. See also Conrad Black, Duplessis (Toronto, McClelland and Stuart, 1976).
of the pressing urban problems constantly confronted by the City of Montreal's francophone working class. Despite his reputation as a nationalist, financial support from anglophone companies was vital to his government's survival. For this reason, he was reluctant to alienate the powerful residents of anglophone suburbs by denying them full control over their own municipal services and institutions. Had Duplessis faced Mayor Drapeau's powerful and united City administration after 1960, he might have acted differently. But the weakness of the City's government in the 1950s facilitated his adoption of the suburban position.

3. 'One Island, One City'

When Jean Drapeau became mayor again in 1960, this time with Lucien Saulnier as chairman of his executive committee, he was determined to gain complete control over the Island's essential urban services. His strategy involved three main features. The first was to obtain a voting majority for the City on the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation. In order to accomplish this, the City appealed to the provincial legislature through the private bills procedure. At the hearings on one of the bills, Lucien Saulnier made this telling remark about his motives:

La Corporation de Montréal métropolitaine--et tout autre régime métropolitaine--sont impensables parce qu'ils signifient une diminution de l'influence de groupe de la langue française.¹

To the extent that the suburbs had more metropolitan representation than

they were entitled to on a population basis, Saulnier's remark was undoubtedly accurate. Although the City's attempt to change the representation system was unsuccessful, the refusal of Drapeau and Saulnier to co-operate with the Corporation made its operations so difficult that its chairman, Rolland Chagnon, resigned in protest in November 1961.  

The second element of the City's strategy was to gain control of essential metropolitan functions such as public transit and regional planning. By starting to build Montreal's subway system in 1961 without financial assistance from either the province or the suburbs, the City took the initiative in public transit. Before the project was completed in 1966 the provincial government had forced the suburbs served by the public transit network to contribute but by this time Drapeau was clearly in control. In the field of regional planning, Drapeau instructed City employees to draw up a plan concerning the shaping of metropolitan expansion in the period until 2000. The end product was an impressive audio-visual display which was presented at Expo 67. Although 'Horizon 2000' had little practical effect, it did demonstrate that the City of Montreal was the only government with the capability to engage in metropolitan planning.

The third element in the City's strategy was the most important. Drapeau and Saulnier wished to annex all the Island's municipalities in

2 Quebec, Statutes, 1965, Chapter 86, s. 4.
order to fulfill Saulnier's prophecy that 'l'histoire, la géographie et l'économie commanderont un jour ou l'autre l'existence d'une seule ville sur toute l'étendue de l'Ile de Montréal'. Because they wished to woo both the francophone and anglophone suburbanite, Drapeau and Saulnier did not couch their appeal for annexation in terms of French domination. In fact, Drapeau (more than Saulnier) viewed the City of Montreal as a great cosmopolitan world metropolis in which English Montrealers should be proud to share—even if it meant higher taxes. Drapeau never seemed to understand that many suburban citizens, both francophone and anglophone, were not affected by appeals to civic prestige and that anglophones living in small municipalities had an additional linguistic motivation for clinging to their apparently insignificant and parochial institutions.

In 1961 the City proposed that its executive committee be empowered to annex a municipality simply by having the necessary resolution approved first by the City council and then by the Quebec Municipal Commission. This would have replaced the existing system which required the approval of both councils and of the electorate in the municipality which was the object of the annexation attempt. The Lesage government refused to yield to Drapeau's demands. In 1963 the City made another attempt to obtain 'easy annexation' powers. This time the province did make some changes. Under the new system a City proposal for annexation was to be sent to the council of the affected

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1 Quoted in Bédard, La bataille, pp. 14-5.
2 Ibid., p. 16.
3 Quebec, Statutes, 1959-60, Chapter 102, s. 13-30.
municipality. If accepted, the annexation would go ahead, although citizens had a right to force a binding referendum on the subject. If rejected, the City could apply to the Quebec Municipal Commission to hold a binding referendum within the affected municipality. This system, still in force today, enabled the City to get around an intransigent suburban council, but annexation remained an impossibility if the majority of residents were opposed. Shortly after the passage of these new rules, Montreal annexed the bankrupt municipality of Rivière-des-Prairies—the first major annexation in forty-five years. Although the City and Rivière-des-Prairies were not contiguous, the new area provided the City with both a strong territorial base in the east of the Island and with much needed undeveloped land for future growth. In early 1964 the City also annexed the tiny northern municipality of Saraguay. Neither annexation caused much controversy but they did demonstrate to suburban mayors the seriousness of the City's intentions.

In February 1964 the minister of municipal affairs, Pierre Laporte, named a three-man commission to study:

(1) The existence and nature of intermunicipal problems on the Island of Montreal;
(2) The problem of regrouping the municipalities on the Island, if need be, or that of reorganizing the political structures;
(3) Any other problem of municipal or intermunicipal nature of interest to the municipalities and citizens of the Island.2

The appointment of the commission temporarily released the government

1 Ibid., 1963, Chapter 70, s. 1-11.
2 Quebec, Intermunicipal Problems, p. viii.
from the need to make its own policy decisions. It is difficult to know what further objectives existed, particularly as Montreal had already been extensively studied. Laporte appointed Camille Blier, an assistant deputy minister in the department of municipal affairs, as chairman. Laporte decided to let the main protagonists name the other two members. When Drapeau delegated Lucien Saulnier, the suburbs responded with Reginald Dawson. Although these two gentlemen clearly represented the main alternative viewpoints, it is doubtful that their appointment to the commission was a wise decision. Recognizing this before the commission began its work, Dawson offered to resign if Saulnier would as well. When Saulnier failed to respond, it was clear that the Blier commission would have a controversial existence.

Just after the Blier commission was created, the Island suburbs formally joined together in an organization called the Intermunicipal Co-ordinating Committee (I.C.C.). It had grown out of the informal meetings which had taken place ever since Mayor Dawson had called his colleagues together to discuss Duplessis' plans for metropolitan government. Since then suburban representatives had gone to Quebec City once or twice a year to fight various expansionist proposals found in the private bills which the City presented to the legislature. In the face of the renewed annexation initiative, the suburbs had recognized a need for a more sophisticated organization with the financial ability to engage expert legal and public relations advice. For public relations reasons, it was perhaps no accident that the I.C.C.'s first president, vice-president, and secretary were all francophones (Mayors Laurin of St. Laurent, Crépault of Anjou, and Bergeron of St. Michel respectively).\(^1\)

\(^1\)Bédard, La bataille, p. 63.
Prior to the formal creation of the I.C.C., the suburbs had fought disorganized, ad hoc battles against the City under a leadership that often appeared to be dominated by wealthy anglophones. This was not a useful image for any politically involved group during the height of Quebec's 'Quiet Revolution'. By mid-1964 the I.C.C. was firmly established as a francophone-led, bilingual group devoted to protecting what it considered to be the vital interests of an important and growing section of Quebec society.

Although the I.C.C. decided to present a brief to the Blier commission, this did not prevent sixteen suburban municipalities from making their own submissions. In general, the suburbs called either for some form of regional government covering an area larger than the Island or for a provincially appointed semi-judicial body to adjudicate inter-municipal disputes involving such functions as roads, sewers, and planning. The main thrust of these briefs was that no municipality should be forced out of existence against the will of its citizens. Seventeen briefs were heard from various private citizens and organizations (excluding the I.C.C.). Most supported the general suburban position, but one, from a group of property-owners in St. Michel, clearly recommended annexation of their municipality by the City. The Montreal Policemen's Brotherhood urged integration of all the Island's police forces. The City itself did not present a brief. It claimed that its arguments were sufficiently well-known and that Mr. Saulnier was quite capable of expressing them when the need arose.¹

¹A list of all the briefs presented can be found on p. 75 of Quebec, Intermunicipal Problems. Most of them are available in the
Before the I.C.C. presented its brief, the work of the commission was almost brought to a complete halt. In mid-July 1964, Saulnier announced that the City was going to continue its annexation attempts regardless of the activities of the commission of which he was a member. On the same day that the I.C.C. was supposed to present its brief, the City council approved annexation resolutions for Roxboro, St. Michel, and Pointe-aux-Trembles. The I.C.C. refused to present its brief under these circumstances and urged Mr. Laporte to impose a halt on all annexation proceedings. Laporte pointed out that he had no legal power to do this. The I.C.C. took the initiative in mid-August by announcing that it would provide all possible aid to the three municipalities then under the threat of annexation. Each of the three would hold their own annexation referendum on 3 September to demonstrate the extent of citizen opposition to the City plans. At the same time the I.C.C. finally did present its brief to the commission. It called for a grand scheme involving the creation of two additional levels of government. The first would involve the grouping of municipalities into boroughs to deal with such functions as roads, water supply, and sewer systems. The second would consist of all the boroughs in the provincial administrative region of Montreal grouped together in order to provide such functions as public transit and regional planning. Not surprisingly, this complex system would also require an 'Intermunicipal Relations Board' to adjudicate disputes among the municipalities, the boroughs,

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library of the Department of Municipal Affairs, Quebec City. They are systematically discussed in Bédard, *La bataille*, Chapter 3.

1Bédard, *La bataille*, pp. 67-70.
and the regional authority. This scheme was so complex and far-reaching that it could hardly be taken seriously. Its virtue was that, because it was so unlikely to be adopted, all the suburbs could agree to it. It also served the valuable public relations purpose of appearing to be positive, outward-looking, and imaginative—virtues for which the suburbs had not previously been noted.

By the time it presented its brief, the I.C.C. was obviously more concerned with the annexation battle than with the Blier commission. It viewed the 3 September referenda as extremely important. Perhaps sensing that the I.C.C. held the initiative at this time, Saulnier announced in advance that the City would urge the Quebec Municipal Commission to hold its own referenda regardless of the results on September 3. The results were as follows:\(^2\)

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<th>For Annexation</th>
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<td>St. Michel</td>
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<td>2,068</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pointe-aux-Trembles</td>
<td>871</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>Roxboro</td>
<td>481</td>
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In spite of his decisive defeat in St. Michel and Roxboro, Saulnier decided to continue the proceedings to annex Pointe-aux-Trembles. The suburbs, of course, claimed overall victory against the annexation

\(^1\) Intermunicipal Co-ordinating Council, Memoire présenté à la commission d'étude sur les problèmes intermunicipaux dans l'Île de Montréal (Montréal, 1964).

\(^2\) Bédard, La bataille, p. 51.
policy. At the regular suburban municipal elections on 2 November, anti-annexation candidates were decisively elected in all three municipalities. In Pointe-aux-Trembles the Quebec Municipal Commission conducted a final, official referendum on annexation. This time it was defeated by 1,141 to 1,065 votes. The City's most ambitious annexation crusade had failed.

The annexation debate in St. Michel and Pointe-aux-Trembles mainly concerned the financial difficulties of the two municipalities. The issues involved local personalities and the question of whether the property tax would be higher in or out of the City of Montreal. There was no linguistic dimension to the debate because both were overwhelmingly francophone and both were in the east end of the Island. Roxboro, a predominantly anglophone suburb in the west part of the Island was different. The mayor, René Labelle, came from an old French-Canadian family which had been in Roxboro long before the anglophone suburbanites, whose representatives dominated the town council. Labelle realized that he and his followers could retain power in the future only as Jean Drapeau's agents in the Roxboro ward of the City of Montreal. He was eager to respond to Saulnier's annexation initiatives but was blocked by the anglophone majority on the council. In the referendum campaign that followed, Saulnier promised many improved amenities for the town with no increase in taxes. Because Roxboro had been totally built up, he claimed that the town itself would not be able to provide these improvements without raising its tax rate above that of the City. In the elections of 2 November, W.G. Boll, the leader of the anglophone councillors, became mayor by decisively defeating Labelle's main annexationist ally. The main effect

\[1\] Ibid., p. 74.
of this episode was that the anglophone suburbanites gained full political control of the town, thus ensuring that such incidents would not re-occur.¹

Just at the height of the annexation controversy, the Blier commission, without the aid of any research staff, was beginning to draft its report. It was clear from the beginning that the chairman's main objective was to find a compromise between the positions of Messrs. Dawson and Saulnier that would be acceptable to both and to his minister. Blier's first proposal was that the Island suburbs elect members to the Montreal city council so that they might participate in governing and financing various regional concerns such as an integrated Island police force.² Mayor Dawson totally rejected this idea as impractical. He felt that the I.C.C. brief deserved serious attention. Blier responded by claiming that the brief was drafted

...dans le seul intérêt des banlieues et non en vue de l'intérêt commun. Pour éviter à un moment donné que la ville de Montréal présume trop d'emprise, on veut créer des gouvernements à une autre échelle ou enfin un 'board', ce qui me paraît inconcevable.³

Word soon leaked out to the other suburban mayors that Blier was not looking on their viewpoint with much sympathy. In mid-September they asked Mayor Dawson to resign from the commission in protest against Blier's anti-suburban position. Dawson rejected this request so that

¹These events are described in the North Shore News, 25 June - 5 November 1964.

²Quebec, Department of Municipal Affairs, Proces-Verbaux: Commission d'étude des problemes intermunicipaux de l'île de Montréal (Québec, 1964), Vol. II, 8th meeting, August 18, 1964.

³Ibid., 9th meeting, August 28, 1964.
he would be able to continue to present the suburban case.¹

Blier's next proposal was that the Island be divided into two

cities, one based on the City of Montreal, the other on Pointe Claire.

All municipalities east of Pierrefonds, Dollard-des-Ormeaux, and Dorval

would be annexed to the City while Pointe Claire would become the nucleus

of a powerful new anglophone municipality.² Given Dawson's position as

mayor of the inner suburb of Mount Royal, it is not surprising that he

also rejected this proposal. There is no evidence that West Island

politicians were even informed of this proposal. Had it been publicly
debated, the West Island residents might well have accepted it as a

substantial guarantee that they would be free of the City for a good

many years to come.

Because Laporte had insisted that the report be unanimous, Blier

was forced to make yet another attempt at compromise. This time he

returned to the main theme of his original proposal. He suggested the

establishment of a 'Montreal General Council' composed of seventy members,

forty-six of whom would be the members of the Montreal City council. The

other members would come from the suburbs according to their respective

populations. There would be an executive committee and three suburban

representatives. The Council would have jurisdiction over various

'regional services' including social welfare, property valuation, fire

protection, police, health, and public transit. Blier originally pro-

posed that a two-thirds majority be needed for any major Council

¹The Gazette, September 16, 1964.

decisions, but Dawson objected to this because it would allow a united City vote to push through projects against a united suburban vote.\(^1\)

The ensuing compromise was a masterpiece of ambiguous phraseology. It appeared in the report as follows:

> The rules of procedure shall be so drafted as to provide for the possibility that the representation of Montreal may form a block and render the representation of the suburban municipalities inoperative. Therefore the majorities required for decisions of the General Council must be such as not to prevent the representatives of the suburbs from exercising their prerogatives.\(^2\)

When the report was released in January, 1965, it was not favourably received. Everyone recognized it as a patchwork compromise between two diametrically opposed policies for metropolitan reorganization. Mayor Drapeau claimed that the report gave him 'three-quarters of a loaf', which was better than none. He said that annexation attempts would resume if the report were not fully implemented.\(^3\) Mayor Dawson was the object of considerable suburban criticism for failing to take a tougher position than he did. The chairman of the I.C.C. labelled the report as a 'dishonest, subtrefuge formula'.\(^4\) In light of Dawson's steadfast opposition to the favoured proposals of both the City and the provincial government, it is hard to understand why his accomplishments were not given more recognition by his like-minded colleagues.

Guy Bourassa has attempted to analyze the role of the ethnic (i.e. linguistic) factor in the Blier deliberations. First, he makes

\(^1\)Ibid., meetings of 15-23 December, 1964.


\(^3\)The *Gazette*, 1 February 1965.

\(^4\)Ibid., 8 February 1965.
the important point that the debate involved very few organizations except in an area such as Roxboro, where the anglophone population felt genuinely threatened, the whole issue seemed rather technical and removed from everyday concerns. Nevertheless, the arguments received considerable attention in the media of both language groups, although only the local weeklies became passionately concerned about them. Bourassa's analysis of the briefs presented to the commission and of interviews conducted with the participants suggests that suburban anglophone leaders claimed to be more concerned with the virtues of small, democratic, responsive local governments while francophone leaders were more concerned with objecting to the financial and political practices of the City. In some of the interviews, participants openly acknowledged that, although the ethnic factor was not publicly mentioned, it was in fact at the heart of much of the debate. Bourassa clearly agrees with this viewpoint but is quick to admit that it is difficult to prove.


2Ibid., p. 113.

3Ibid., p. 115.

4Ibid., pp. 119-121.

5Ibid., pp. 115-116.
Since the Blier report, the City has made one further annexation. In 1968 St. Michel was placed under the control of the Quebec Municipal Commission because of alleged corruption in the city administration. The St. Michel council then held another referendum on the annexation issue. This time it was approved by a vote of 5,043 to 2,947. Because of suspected illegalities, a special provincial law was passed to validate the whole annexation procedure. St. Michel became part of the City of Montreal on 24 October 1968. The Quebec Municipal Commission then investigated the City administration and in 1970 published a report documenting the corrupt practices of Mayor Bergeron and some of his colleagues. Concurrently, the same Commission published a report outlining the unethical practices of Mayor Crépault of Anjou. The publication of these two reports meant that two prominent officials of the I.C.C. had been totally discredited. It was perhaps not surprising that the I.C.C. was no longer an important factor when the suburbs were next engaged in major negotiations about the government of metropolitan Montreal.

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1Le Devoir, 21 October 1968.
2Quebec, Statutes, 1968, Chapter 94.
3Quebec, Quebec Municipal Commission, Rapport sur l'administration de la Cité de Saint-Michel (Quebec, 1970).
4Quebec, Quebec Municipal Commission, Rapport de la commission d'enquête sur l'administration de Ville d'Anjou (Quebec, 1970). There was a similar report in 1969 about patronage and administrative irregularities in Pointe-aux-Trembles. The reports of the Quebec Municipal Commission make fascinating reading for anyone who wishes to understand the nature of municipal corruption in east-end suburban Montreal in the 1960s.
4. The Lack of Provincial Action

After the release of the Blier report in early 1965, a special provincial cabinet committee was established to study it and to suggest legislative action. The I.C.C. urged the cabinet to reject the report on the grounds that 'for the most part its presentation is confused and confusing, its statements unjustifiable and unrealistic'. When the City of Westmount urged the provincial government to 'go slow' on the Blier recommendations, Mr. Laporte responded by saying that there would be enough time for everyone to have their opinions heard. Having accepted the Blier report only as the expression of his minimum objectives, Mr. Saulnier was not satisfied with Laporte's apparent vulnerability to suburban appeals. Laporte's main immediate reason for not responding to the Blier report was his preoccupation with his bill for the voluntary amalgamation of municipalities (Bill 13). Its main object, which became law in April 1965, was to reduce the number of Quebec municipalities from 1,600 to 900. Most of the objections came from the rural areas to which it was primarily directed. However, Mayor Art Séguin of Pointe Claire, speaking for the I.C.C., objected to the bill on the grounds that, under its provisions, municipal councils could abolish their municipalities without consulting their electors. During its period of operation (1965 to 1971), Bill 13 did not accomplish its objective of reducing the number of municipalities in the province. It was never

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1Quoted in Montreal Star, 19 February 1965.
2Ibid., 9 and 11 March 1965.
3Quebec, Statutes, 1965, Chapter 56.
used on the Island of Montreal and only to a limited extent in the rest of the province. In the short term, the debate about Bill 13 served to divert attention from the Blier report. In the longer term, it helped promote the resurgence of the Union nationale in rural Quebec which led to the change of government in 1966. The Liberal government was therefore out of office before having done anything about the problem of governing the Island of Montreal.

The Liberals had, however, managed to take drastic action in another part of metropolitan Montreal. In 1965 legislation was passed which formed the City of Laval out of the fourteen municipalities on Ile-Jésus and the tiny islands surrounding it. For our purposes the important feature of the Laval amalgamation was that it proved that the provincial government was willing and able to make significant municipal changes in the Montreal area. The fact that Ile-Jésus was an island and that it was overwhelmingly French made the process less difficult than it otherwise might have been. The government also took steps to encourage amalgamation in the south shore area but no comprehensive policy was ever adopted. This can be explained by difficulties in defining the appropriate territorial extent of a unified south shore municipality and by the fact that a few municipalities in the area, particularly St. Lambert, were composed of wealthy anglophones. Furthermore, Laporte himself represented a south shore constituency and would

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1 For a description of some of the Bill 13 amalgamations, see Jean Meynaud and Jacques Léveillé, Quelques experiences de fusion municipale au Québec (Montréal, Editions nouvelle frontière, 1972).

2 Quebec, Statutes, 1965, Chapter 89.
therefore have had to personally suffer the political consequences of unpopular government action. In later years, a few important amalgamations did take place, but the south shore remains as an area that is plagued by inter-municipal disputes and problems.

When the Union nationale took over the provincial government in 1966, Premier Daniel Johnson appointed Paul Dozois as minister of finance and municipal affairs, the latter post being the portfolio Dozois also held under Duplessis. Dozois inherited a largely unsuccessful program to encourage municipal amalgamations and the unsolved dilemma of the Island of Montreal. While in opposition in 1964 Dozois had advocated the 'two cities' solution, with the City annexing the entire central and eastern parts of the island, leaving a new anglophone city to be established in the west. At the time Dozois admitted that this could never be accomplished voluntarily. He had claimed that the province was obliged to use its authority to force this type of change for the protection of the common good against a collection of particular interests.¹ When he was once again the minister of 1966, Dozois flatly contradicted this policy stating that he would not force any municipal amalgamation not approved by the local taxpayers.² In general, Dozois failed to act on any of the municipal matters which he had inherited from Pierre Laporte. This was most likely because he, like Johnson's other senior ministerial colleagues, was seriously over-loaded with responsibility and because he knew that the government's political appeal rested largely

¹ _Le Devoir_, 19 February 1964.
² _The Gazette_, 3 September 1966.
on the fact that many Quebecers desired a pause in the relentless pace of institutional change.

In 1968 Premier Johnson appointed Dr. Robert Lussier as minister of municipal affairs, leaving Dozois as minister of finance. Dr. Lussier took over a department whose civil servants had been impressed by recent local government innovations in France. On 1 January 1968, 'communautés urbanies' were established for the urban areas of Lille-Roubaix-Turcoing, Bordeaux, and Strasbourg. In these areas, local municipal councils sent delegates to a council for the urban community which had jurisdiction over such matters as planning, road, sanitation, water supply, public transport, secondary schools, housing, industrial estates, hospitals, and recreation facilities.¹ Lussier was soon convinced by his officials that this French model could be applied, in general terms, to certain areas of Quebec where inter-municipal problems were most serious. On 11 June 1969 Lussier tabled a plan in the Quebec National Assembly calling for the creation of a Montreal Urban Community. On the next two days he tabled similar plans for the Quebec City and Hull areas. The Montreal plan included provisions for a ten-member executive committee, five of whom would be elected by all Island residents. Members of the executive would serve four-year terms during which time they would not be allowed to hold any other municipal office. There would also be a council consisting of all of Montreal's councillors and the mayors of the other twenty-eight municipalities. The main functions of the new Community would relate to policing, air and water pollution

control, and regional planning.\textsuperscript{1}

Reaction to Lussier's proposals was not favourable. Lucien Saulnier called them 'contradictory and ridiculous'.\textsuperscript{2} He also stated that they did not withstand serious analysis and that they were an insult to the Montreal administration.\textsuperscript{3} Saulnier's main objection clearly related to the composition of the executive committee. City politicians such as himself would not be permitted to be members and the City appointees would not be able to overcome a provincial-suburban alliance. Speaking for the suburbs, Mayor Ernest Crépault of Anjou, the president of the I.C.C., complained about the lack of consultation about the bill.\textsuperscript{4} In general terms, the City opposed the plan because in its provisions for the executive committee, it departed, in the suburbs' favour, from the Blier recommendations. As these recommendations had represented Saulnier's limits in accepting a separate level of metropolitan government, it is not surprising that he objected so strenuously to Lussier's plan. On the other hand, the suburbs were opposed because Lussier's plan implied the same threat as the Blier report: the eventual take-over of inter-municipal services by the City of Montreal. Although all participants in the latest debate were anxious not to resurrect the bitterness of the debate surrounding the Blier commission, the same divisive issues were still at hand. Lussier's plan was an attempt at compromise which satisfied no one.

\textsuperscript{1}Quebec, Department of Municipal Affairs, \textit{Avant projet de la communauté urbaine de Montréal} (Quebec, 1969).
\textsuperscript{2}Quoted in \textit{Montreal Star}, 12 June 1969.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., 18 June 1969.
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., 28 July 1969.
The experience of the Montreal Metropolitan Corporation demonstrated that metropolitan institutions could not function without the active co-operation of the City. Lussier must have realized this because on 24 September he announced that the implementation of his plan would be postponed for one year.¹ His rapid retreat makes it difficult to believe that he was ever personally convinced of the utility of his own plan. Because Lussier had obviously not mobilized any support for the plan in advance, it is logical to conclude that its presentation was simply a gesture to indicate that the government was concerned with the problem, if not fully committed to dealing with it.

During the period from 1960 until September, 1969, governments formed by both parties had been reluctant to tamper with the Island's complex municipal structure. There were many reasons for this, not the least of which was simply that, because of the other pressing demands associated with the Quiet Revolution, municipal reform was not a top priority. In comparison with the field of education, for example, Quebec's municipal system was remarkably advanced. Another factor inhibiting metropolitan reform in this period was that the Quiet Revolution was fundamentally concerned with enhancing the capability and influence of the provincial government based in Quebec City. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that ministers in this government were unwilling to turn over control of the province's largest metropolitan centre to a new level of government which would have jurisdiction over more than one-third of the province's total population.

The kinds of factors mentioned in the previous paragraph were

¹Ibid., 2 September 1969.
also relevant, in different ways, in other Canadian provinces, including Ontario and Manitoba. However, these provinces did not have to face the Montreal situation in which, by changing municipal boundaries, one would also upset the delicate pattern of French-English accommodations of which municipal arrangements formed an important part. The Liberals were particularly conscious of the need not to alienate their strong base of support in anglophone suburbia. Although they implemented many reforms which centralized political power within the Quebec government, they never threatened the existence or viability of any local institutions dominated by anglophones. The Union nationale government, in office from 1966 to 1970, was faced with different restraints. Although it had no pressing need to conciliate anglophone suburban interests, it was so lacking in any kind of urban strength that it had no political resources with which to defy the powerful administration which controlled the City of Montreal. Since Drapeau and Saulnier objected to any reformed metropolitan arrangement which they could not control, the first Union nationale plan for a Montreal Urban Community was foiled.

This chapter has traced the events of a fifty-year period in which many serious proposals for significant metropolitan reforms were advanced. However, during this time there were very few changes in the real pattern of metropolitan political power. The creation of the Montreal Metropolitan Commission was a useful financial innovation which temporarily placed Montreal in the forefront of metropolitan reform. But that institution failed to grow beyond its original limited area and jurisdiction. After World War II it was Toronto that became the model for metropolitan reform in North America. Reform was difficult
in Toronto, but it was not complicated by the existence of a city
dominated by one linguistic group and of important suburbs dominated
by another. The metropolitan debate in Toronto could be conducted
almost solely in terms of arguments relating to such issues as economies
of scale, efficiency, and effective public participation. Similar
arguments were made in Montreal, but lurking beneath the public rhetoric
of all political actors was the constant knowledge that metropolitan
reform also meant change--however unpredictable--in the balance of
power between French and English. From 1921 until mid-1969 there were
no provincial politicians sufficiently motivated to venture seriously
into such politically dangerous territory.
Although Dr. Lussier had announced on 24 September 1969 that he would postpone consideration of his Montreal Urban Community plans for one year, the M.U.C. in fact came into existence on 1 January 1970. Instead of being introduced by the provincial government as a rational, wide-ranging response to a variety of metropolitan problems, a revised M.U.C. was quickly imposed in order to counter the devastating effect of an unpredictable breakdown in the provision of a vital urban service—policing. This chapter first describes the policing problem and the re-action of the provincial government. It then goes on to show that, except in a few areas not subject to much political controversy, the M.U.C. has been notably unsuccessful in becoming a powerful and viable metropolitan institution.

The M.U.C. has been the object of much abuse within virtually all Island suburbs. This is simply because, in most cases, it has led to significantly higher local taxes with little evidence of any improvement in levels of service. Few Montrealers seem to realize, however, that the M.U.C. itself has never been in a position to make any firm political decisions that were crucial to their everyday lives. This is probably the main reason why, as this chapter shows, there is little evidence of the saliency of the French-English cleavage within the normal operations of the M.U.C. The potential jurisdiction of the
Community, according to the Act which established it, is almost as extensive as that of the metropolitan governments formed in Toronto and Winnipeg. For a number of reasons, however, the full measure of this jurisdiction has never been utilized. Although these reasons are not obviously connected to the language cleavage, further analysis suggests that until the boundaries of the constituent municipalities of the M.U.C. are restructured, an equitable and efficient system of political representation within the M.U.C. is virtually impossible. Until such representation is implemented, the M.U.C. cannot realistically increase its power or receive public acceptance as a legitimate and important political institution. Although this problem is dealt with briefly in this chapter, it is not fully analyzed until the end of Chapter V. Chapter IV is more concerned with the creation of the M.U.C. and how it actually operates. It is not so concerned with problems of reform.

1. The Police Strike of October 1969

Throughout 1969 policemen in the City of Montreal had tried to negotiate a pay claim to obtain the same salaries as the policemen of metropolitan Toronto. Their basic objective was to increase the salary of a beginning constable from $7,300 to $9,200 a year.¹ Their case was argued largely on the grounds that they had a demonstrably more difficult job than Toronto policemen. Between June 1968 and October 1969, two Montreal policemen had been killed and over 250 injured while on duty.² Most of the violence directed against the police resulted from

¹The Gazette, 3 October 1969.
²Ibid., 8 October 1969.
linguistically based demonstrations and bombings, matters with which
the Toronto police rarely had to contend. The period of serious demon­
strations in Montreal started on St. Jean Baptiste day (24 June),
immediately preceding the 1968 federal election.¹ This was followed
in rapid succession by occupations and demonstrations on the part of
thousands of francophone 'CEGEP' (junior college) students objecting to
the shortage of university places; militant action by taxi drivers pro­
testing the ground transport monopoly at Dorval airport held by the
Murray Hill Company; the 'McGill français' demonstration of March 1969,
and the various street confrontations concerning language practices in
the Roman catholic schools.² By October 1969, large demonstrations with
accompanying violence had become a regular feature of Montreal life.
This development affected Montreal's policemen more than anybody else.

In the first week of October 1969 word leaked out to the
Montreal police that the arbitration commission set up to study the pay
claim had awarded them a basic raise of only $1,180 a year, leaving them
far below the Toronto pay scale.³ The response of the policemen's
brotherhood (their union) was to call a 'study session' at the Paul
Sauvé arena in east-end Montreal. Such sessions had been held before by
off-duty policemen, but the unique feature of this session was that all

¹Because of Prime Minister Trudeau's televised defiance of the
rioters, this event has been considered a vital factor in his decisive
electoral victory.

²These matters are discussed in Robert Chodos and Nick Auf der
Maur, Quebec: A Chronicle, 1968-1972 (Toronto, James Lewis & Samuel,

³The Gazette, 8 October 1969.
the policemen were expected to meet at the same time, thus leaving the City without protection. The police took this action without any apparent warning. On 7 October 1969 the City of Montreal police were effectively on strike for a period of sixteen hours. The police remained in the arena throughout this period, at one stage shouting down Lucien Saulnier before he had a chance to address them. While the police were off the job, there were nine armed bank robberies, thirty other armed robberies, and 494 complaints involving $853,882 worth of reported damage.¹ Most of the violence took place at the headquarters of the Murray Hill Company where taxi drivers, Murray Hill employees, and provincial policemen shot at each other. One provincial policeman was killed.² Because suburban police forces remained on duty, there was no trouble outside the boundaries of the City. Never were suburban citizens more appreciative of their independent police forces. The provincial government reacted to this crisis by placing all Montreal region police forces under the temporary control of the Quebec Provincial Police and by sending its officers, who usually operate in rural Quebec, into the City. At the request of the province, the federal government provided six hundred troops to guard important buildings and thoroughfares. On the evening of 7 October the provincial government presented a bill to the National Assembly forcing the police to go back to work. With all-party support it became law a few hours later. The police chose not to disobey the new law and early on 8 October they

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¹Ibid., 24 October 1969.
²Chodos and Auf der Maur, Quebec, pp. 30-1.
reported once again for duty.\textsuperscript{1}

Lucien Saulnier was the politician most involved with the police during and after the strike. While it was in progress, Mayor Drapeau was on an economic promotion visit to St. Louis. At the provincial level, ministers had no alternative but to leave Saulnier in control. The Gazette commented that it was Saulnier who 'presented Montreal's case to the Quebec Government, who informed, advised, and guided the government in the prompt action it took to bring the police walk-off to an end'.\textsuperscript{2} One of the most important political results of the strike was to force the Union nationale government and Saulnier into a working relationship in which Saulnier was clearly the dominant partner. Although Saulnier had made predictable statements about police irresponsibility during the strike, he was fully aware that he could not afford to continually criticize their illegal action. The police were needed as much as ever to control political demonstrations, particularly one scheduled for the end of October concerning language rights in schools. Saulnier's objective was to settle with the police at virtually any cost. On 23 October he announced that the City would give the police a raise of $1,450, thus giving them a salary 54.2\% above the average salary level in Montreal. The salary level of Toronto policemen was at that time 54.2\% above the average in Toronto. The police were quite satisfied with this method of calculating parity, particularly as they also won victories on virtually all other clauses concerning grievance procedures and working conditions.\textsuperscript{3} While announcing the settlement,

\textsuperscript{1}The Gazette, 8 October 1969.  
\textsuperscript{2}Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., 24 October 1969.
Saulnier pointed out that Toronto's metropolitan police force had a per capita cost per year of $19.47 while Montreal's was $27.92. He went on to say:

Montreal's police department is effectively the shield which protects all of the Island of Montreal. Justice would almost be restored if the cost of all police services of Montreal Island were shared by all citizens of the island. If the police services in Montreal were unified as in Toronto they would have some 4,845 policemen with a total annual cost of $39,679,121 for a population of 1,931,793 persons—and if equally divided the cost would be $20.54 per capita.

Saulnier's strategy was to have the suburbs pay for much of the City's increased police costs. The next day Dr. Lussier announced provincial support for this strategy. He summoned the suburban mayors to his Montreal office to tell them that the police strike had convinced him of the urgency of taking action to share police costs and of establishing some form of metropolitan government. This action effectively reversed his September decision to postpone consideration of the metropolitan government issue for one further year.

The politics of the events following the police strike were based on the fact that the provincial government, the suburbs, and the City all had crucial weaknesses. The government was weak because of its lack of urban support and its fear of the growing impact of continued mass demonstrations. It had counted on the Montreal police to contain these demonstrations. The strike showed that the police would not again be reliable unless they were paid considerably more money. Only by forcing the suburbs to contribute some of this money could the government ensure that Lucien Saulnier would be able to maintain law and order in the province's most important city. The suburbs were weak because they had virtually no influence within the Union nationale. They were
not well organized, possibly because their official leader—Mayor Crépault, the president of the I.C.C.—was under investigation for corruption. The City of Montreal was in some ways in the weakest position of all. The strike had shown the fragile nature of the City's authority over its own policemen. It had also shown that, largely because of overexpenditure related to Expo '67, the City was in an extremely precarious financial position. The City simply could not afford to pay competitive salaries, even to its most important employees. But the City did have Lucien Saulnier—a man of far more political skill than could be found amongst any of the other participating groups. Saulnier realized that he could exploit everybody's weaknesses in order finally to bring the Island suburbs under the effective control of the City of Montreal. In late October and November 1969 he spent a great deal of time consulting with the provincial government. On 28 November Dr. Lussier presented a new M.U.C. plan to the Quebec National Assembly,¹ a plan containing nothing with which Lucien Saulnier did not agree. In less than four weeks it was law.

The single most important fact in understanding the M.U.C. is to know that it was created in a moment of crisis. From the government's point of view, its only significant objective was to create a mechanism whereby the suburbs would be forced to share police costs. All else was peripheral. The intensity of the crisis was much greater and more obvious than the service crises which sparked the creation of metropolitan institutions in Toronto and Winnipeg. The government's desire

¹Québec, l'Assemblée nationale, Débats, 28e Legislature, 4e Session, viii, 4365.
for action was so great that the predictable suburban objections were virtually ignored.

Before making any further analysis of the politics of the M.U.C., one important point must be emphasized. Policing was so unusually crucial in Montreal in the late 1960s because of the explosiveness of the city's political, social, and economic situation. This explosiveness was being constantly reflected in street demonstrations and marches and in the terrorist activities conducted by the F.L.Q. and other extremist groups. Whenever such incidents occurred, the City police were on the front line. Their work was clearly much more difficult and dangerous than that carried out by any other police force in Canada. It is no exaggeration to state that this resulted in large part from the fact that they had to deal with serious threats to the peace caused by people acting on their perceptions of the unjust relationship between anglophones and francophones. Consequently, the claim can be made not only that the introduction of metropolitan government for the Island of Montreal was delayed as a result of the linguistic cleavage but also that the timing of, and reasons for, its hurried introduction in late 1969 also resulted from a political situation generated by this cleavage. Paradoxical as it may seem, this does appear to be an accurate view of a confusing pattern of events.

2. The Creation of the M.U.C.

Dr. Lussier's proposals for a Montreal Urban Community reflected the urgent desire of both the province and the City to ensure that the Island suburbs contributed to the City's increased police costs. The M.U.C. was to be established on 1 January 1970 and as of that date all
Island police costs were to be consolidated. Each municipality would then contribute to the total bill in proportion to its share of the total assessed value of the Island's property. The M.U.C. itself, on the recommendation of a Public Security Council (P.S.C.), was to decide on the extent to which the existing police forces were eventually to be integrated. The other important difference between the new proposals and the original ones concerned the structure of the M.U.C.'s executive committee. Lussier now called for a twelve-man committee, seven of whom would be the members of the executive committee of the City of Montreal. The other five members would be suburban mayors. There would be no provincial representatives and no provision for the future direct election of the chairman. These changes reflected Saulnier's insistence that City politicians be in complete control of any new metropolitan institution. Because of the rural origin of most of the Union nationale's elected members, the M.U.C. proposals were not of much interest to government backbenchers. They were content to let Lussier give Saulnier whatever was necessary to restore stability to Montreal.

The Liberals, however, because of their strength in suburban Montreal, were deeply concerned with the issue of metropolitan government. Because of their general commitment to institutional reform in Quebec, it was not surprising that they claimed to support the overall objectives of the new plan. Jean Lesage, who had announced his desire to retire from the Liberal leadership, was the party's main spokesman on this issue. As an M.N.A. for a Quebec City constituency, Lesage had a special interest in the government's plans to create similar metropolitan institutions in Quebec City and Hull. In fact, Lesage's eventual support of
the prompt passage of the M.U.C. bill probably resulted from the government's pledge to act simultaneously to solve the municipal problems of the provincial capital. Although the bills creating the Quebec Urban Community and the regional community around Hull received even less publicity than the M.U.C. bill, they were presented and approved at about the same time. Pierre Laporte, the party's municipal affairs critic was not much involved in the activities as he was preoccupied trying to mobilize support in the party for his attempt to succeed Lesage as leader. Largely because of his imminent retirement, Lesage had great difficulty ensuring that his followers in suburban Montreal would adhere to the official Liberal position. Georges E. Tremblay, a Liberal M.N.A. whose constituency included Montreal North, summed up their thoughts when he said, 'C'est un bill hypocrite, c'est un façon hypocrite de passer l'annexion'. Despite their apparent disunity, the Liberals were not powerless. Their main weapon was time. If Lussier wanted the M.U.C. to be operating on 1 January he could not afford to provoke the Liberals into debating the bill for more than a few days. Lussier was therefore prepared to make concessions but only insofar as they did not upset his new arrangement with Lucien Saulnier. His first concession to the Liberals and the suburbs was to allow the M.U.C. bill (Bill 75) to be referred to the municipal affairs commission of the National Assembly where interested municipalities and unions could make representations.

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1 The institutions of the Quebec City and Hull communities are well described in Québec, Ministère de l'industrie et du commerce, 'La communauté urbaine: une formule d'organisation et gestion des agglomérations', Annuaire du Québec, 1971 (Québec, l'Editeur officiel, 1971), pp. 26-63.

2 Québec, Débats, viii, 4743.
before the bill received second reading. It was here where the plan underwent its closest public examination.

The commission held its hearings on 10 and 11 December. There was little or no pattern to the discussion. Each witness discussed various aspects of the bill, in no apparent order. However, there did seem to be six areas of major concern and they will be looked at in turn.

1. Haste vs. delay: Suburban spokesmen claimed that the bill needed far more study than could possibly be given to it within the three-week period before it was meant to come into effect. Messrs. Drapeau and Saulnier, pointing to the numerous study commissions of the past, were the most eloquent advocates of the need for immediate legislation.

2. Financial provisions: The main problem regarding finance related to the sharing of the police costs. Lussier calculated that the total Island police costs would make up $53,300,000 of the initial budget of $72,709,000. Most of the other $19,409,000 in expenses were to be brought about by services which were then being provided by individual municipalities. This led him to claim that since the government would grant a subsidy of $8,939,000 to the M.U.C. during its first year, the total costs for all the municipalities would be reduced by that amount. What the suburbs hastened to point out was that most suburban municipalities would in fact pay much more money to the M.U.C. than they would for their own police. Only the City and a very few poor suburbs would

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1 The transcript of these hearings can be found in Québec, Débats, Commission permanente des affaires municipales, viii, 4007-4154.

2 Ibid., 4040.
benefit from the provincial subsidy and the sharing of police costs.

3. Police integration: Although the two issues were often confused, the question of police integration is different in principle from the sharing of police costs. The bill called for the establishment of a three-man Public Security Council consisting of a provincial judge, and the chiefs of the Quebec and Montreal police forces. The P.S.C. would have the authority to recommend to the M.U.C. Council various steps to co-ordinate, and possible to integrate, the Island's police forces. As well as objecting to the composition of the P.S.C., the suburbs presented various arguments against integration. The government refused to respond to these arguments on the grounds that the desirability of police integration was a subject which the P.S.C. and the M.U.C. would decide for themselves after their establishment. However, Lussier did eventually yield to some of the suburban pressure by including one suburban police chief in a P.S.C. enlarged to four members.

4. City of Montreal dominance: The suburbs objected strenuously to the City's proposed dominance in the executive committee but they made little headway. They were more successful in their attempts to gain additional power within the Council. It was to consist of the fifty-two City councillors and the mayor of Montreal. Each of the twenty-eight other municipalities was to have one representative. This arrangement gave the City a clear majority which, given the cohesiveness and dominating pattern of Drapeau's Civic Party, could easily be swung against the suburbs should the need arise. The provision that one-third of the City councillors and one-third of the suburban representatives would have to approve each by-law was not considered by the suburbs to be
sufficient protection. During a rather confused period of the debate when proposals were being made to further protect the suburbs, Saulnier made this statement:

...[Q]uant au droit du veto, nous disons qu'il est effectif s'il y a un tiers des municipalités du banlieu qui s'opposent ou la moitié - je ne fais pas d'objection non plus pour la moitié - mais des membres présents.¹

Saulnier appeared to be confused at this point and, in his confusion, made an important concession to the suburbs. The bill did not provide for a one-third suburban veto as Saulnier implied—in fact it provided that two-thirds of the suburbs would have to unite to 'veto' a motion presented to the Council. Saulnier's words were understandably taken to mean that he was willing to allow only one-half of the suburbs to exercise a veto. Although Saulnier's concession on this point was apparently unintentional, the government made the change.

5. **Weighted votes in the M.U.C. Council:** The government originally proposed that each Council member would have one vote even though the suburban mayors represented populations varying widely in size. Mr. Lesage suggested a system whereby votes would be weighted according to the size of the population represented. Not surprisingly, the larger suburbs voiced strong support for this approval. Lussier eventually announced that each suburban mayor would cast one vote for every one thousand residents in his municipality and that each of the fifty-three City representatives would have as many votes as 53,000 divided by the population of the City. The weighted vote system would not affect the 'veto provisions' so measures would still need the approval of half the suburbs and half the City representatives before

¹Ibid., 4112.
they could be approved.¹

6. Territory of the M.U.C.: A number of suburban representatives suggested that the M.U.C. would be more effective if it included Ile-Jésus and the south shore as well as the Island of Montreal. This also would have had the effect of diluting the influence of the City. Much time was spent discussing whether or not Ile-Bizard should be included within the territory of the Community. The mayor of Ile-Bizard saw no logic in this policy.² Saulnier, who owned a home in Ile-Bizard, insisted that the island would benefit from M.U.C. membership, particularly regarding police and fire services. The most likely reason for including Ile-Bizard, apart from administrative convenience, was that it contained much needed undeveloped land which would be very useful to future M.U.C. planners. Despite the suburban pleas, the government refused to change any of its proposals concerning the territorial extent of the M.U.C.

When the National Assembly finally voted on the second reading of Bill 75, the few Liberals present (mostly from suburban Montreal) voted against it. Lesage claimed that they still supported the principle of the bill but objected to the refusal of the minister to answer Liberal arguments against its specific provisions.³ In reality, it appeared that Lesage simply could not control the suburban Liberals, who by then had realized the full financial implications of the M.U.C. for their

¹Québec, Statutes, 1969, Chapter 84, s. 52 and 53.
²Québec, Débats, affaires municipales, viii, 4009.
³Québec, Débats, viii, 4930.
municipalities. As debate dragged on in the Committee of the Whole, Premier Jean-Jacques Bertrand finally intervened. He criticized the suburban mayors and Liberal M.N.A.'s who claimed to be in favour of the principle of the bill.

Je pense que, dans le fond, ceux qui disent qu'ils sont pour, ils sont contre! Et pour ne pas montrer qu'ils sont contre, ils disent: Remettez-le donc. Si le gouvernement le remettait, ils arriveraient encore et ils diraient: On est pour, vous savez, mais on est contre telle modalité ou tel aspect du bill. Il faut qu'un gouvernement prenne ses responsabilités.¹

Although making a partisan political point, Bertrand seemed to be summing up the situation quite accurately. On 18 December the bill finally received third reading. Although there was no recorded vote, two West Island Liberals (Séguin and St. Germain) said they would have voted against while Messrs. Lesage and Laporte announced that they would have voted in favour. Lesage was no doubt being totally candid when he stated that he was neither surprised nor upset by the open split within his party.² Lesage's main objective had been to prevent a suburban filibuster and this he accomplished. Two weeks later, on 1 January 1970, the Cities of Montreal and Quebec became the main beneficiaries of the new urban communities.

When it finally came into being, the M.U.C. was nothing but a legal shell, although it did inherit office furnishings, a few employees, and some financial responsibility from the dormant Montreal Metropolitan Corporation.³ The fact that the M.U.C. came into being with no planning

¹Ibid., 5111.
²Ibid., 5285.
³Quebec, Statutes, 1969, Chapter 84, s. 362-4.
or administrative apparatus whatsoever is a vivid illustration of the fact that its original purpose was to act merely as a conduit for funds rather than as an important force in the management of Montreal's urban development. This is in direct contrast with the establishment of the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto in 1953. The bill establishing Metro was approved early in the year and on 15 April an interim administration was set up. By 1 January 1954, when the metropolitan government came into full legal existence, the administrative apparatus was firmly established.¹

Because of the short period of time in which the M.U.C. Act was implemented, there was no immediate transfer of existing municipal services and employees to the direct control of the new institution. However, the Community was given the authority to take action regarding the following functions: the valuation of property, the establishment of a development plan, the centralized processing of municipal data, the elimination of air pollution, traffic control on main thoroughfares, the supply of drinking water, sewage and garbage disposal, construction standards, the co-ordination of police and fire services and, if deemed necessary, the integration of police services.² Until the M.U.C. acted, the member municipalities were to retain whatever jurisdiction they already had in these fields.³ The Council was also given the authority, with the approval of the provincial cabinet, to take over jurisdiction

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²Quebec, Statutes, 1969, Chapter 84, s. 112.
³Ibid., s. 113.
in the following fields: recreation and regional parks, public housing, integration of fire services, and libraries.¹ So far the M.U.C. has not extended its jurisdiction in this way.

The M.U.C. Act also changed the name of the Montreal Transit Commission to that of the 'Montreal Urban Community Transit Commission' (M.U.C.T.C.).² Its legal connection with the City was severed and it was linked instead to the M.U.C. The new Commission is composed of three members—a chairman appointed by the provincial government, one member appointed by the City, and one by the suburbs.³ For the purposes of the M.U.C.T.C., the south shore suburb of Longueuil has both a voice and a vote.⁴ The operating deficits of the M.U.C.T.C. are shared by those suburbs served by it in the same way as other M.U.C. expenses.⁵ Because the M.U.C.T.C. has not yet extended its service to West Island suburbs, they have not had to help finance these deficits, but neither have they had the right to vote on Commission matters. The M.U.C.T.C. has the authority 'to organize, possess, develop, and administer, within its territory, a general network for public transportation above or beneath the surface of the ground'.⁶ It should be noted that it does not have the authority to actually construct facilities such as subways. This is a matter for the M.U.C. itself. However, the municipalities served by the M.U.C.T.C. share the costs of construction in the same way that they share the M.U.C.T.C. operating deficits. When the construction is completed, the new facilities are placed in the control of the

¹Ibid., s. 114. ²Ibid., s. 268. ³Ibid., s. 274. ⁴Ibid., s. 272. ⁵Ibid., s. 304. ⁶Ibid., s. 269.
The passage of the M.U.C. Act did not cause much public controversy. There were probably four main reasons for this. First, bills concerning language rights in schools and the reorganization of Montreal's educational system (Bills 63 and 62 respectively) were being debated at the same time. The emotional issues raised by these bills ensured that the media, which was also pre-occupied with the Liberal leadership race, gave little attention to the debate about the M.U.C. Secondly, because of Lesage's co-operation, the government was successful in its attempt to rush the legislation through. Bill 75 was approved before the suburbs had an opportunity to mobilize public opinion against it. The fact that the short debate took place in the immediate pre-Christmas period did not help the suburbs either. Thirdly, the bill appeared to be dealing primarily with technical matters, of interest only to municipal politicians and administrators. The immediate financial implications of the bill for most suburban taxpayers were not made clear. The issue of police integration was potentially explosive but the government skillfully maintained that this issue was to be decided later. Finally, many observers were reluctant to object to important details of the bill when its apparent objective--providing the Island with a government capable of controlling such vital matters as regional planning, public transit, and water and air pollution--was so obviously desirable. All these factors acting together ensured that when the M.U.C. actually began to operate, most citizens had no idea of how and why it had come into being.

\[1\] Ibid., s. 318.

\[2\] These bills are discussed in Chapter VI.
The M.U.C. Act makes no mention of language. However, because of francophone dominance on the Island, it was assumed that French would be the chief working language of the Community. There were no suggestions that there should be any kind of guarantee concerning the status of the English language. It was quite clear that, within the Community, the anglophones would be treated in the same way as anglophones within the City or as francophones within a predominantly anglophone suburb.\(^1\) English could be used at meetings of the M.U.C. Council and its executive committee, but at the risk of not being fully understood. Given the political reality of the time, residents of anglophone suburbs were willing to resign themselves to these arrangements. They were less willing to accept the possibility that eventually they might find themselves controlling municipalities which no longer had jurisdiction over any important urban services. As long as these services were controlled at the local level, there would be no problem ensuring that a citizen's use of English would not be to his advantage. If the service was transferred to the M.U.C., there would not be the same certainty. Despite these considerations, language use was not at the heart of the debate about the M.U.C. The over-riding issues were the financing of the police and the distribution of power within the Island of Montreal between the City and the suburbs. The creation of the M.U.C. increased the resources and power of the City and decreased

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\(^1\)For details of the legal situation concerning language use in Quebec municipalities prior to 1974, see Quebec, The Position of the French Language in Quebec's Report of the Commission of Inquiry (Quebec, l'Editeur officiel, 1972), i, 238-9.
the resources and power of the independent suburbs. Because of the territorial distribution of the two main linguistic groups, this could only mean that anglophones would tend to lose while francophones would tend to gain.

3. Personnel and Organization

The first responsibility of the suburbs in the M.U.C. was to elect their representatives to the executive committee. For this purpose, the M.U.C. Act divided the suburbs into four different sectors.\(^1\) The west, centre-west and east sectors were to elect one representative each, and the centre sector, two. At meetings held in January 1970, the following five mayors were elected: Clark Graham of Baie d'Urfé (west), Marcel Laurin of St. Laurent (centre-west), Yves Ryan of Montreal North (east) and Albert Gariepy of Verdun and Reginald Dawson of Mount Royal (centre).\(^2\) All these men, except Graham, were experienced mayors of large municipalities and all were active supporters of either the federal Progressive Conservatives, the provincial Union nationale, or both. Laurin and Dawson had played prominent roles in defending the suburbs against the City's annexation policy of the early 1960s. These five suburban representatives joined the seven members of the City's executive committee to constitute the M.U.C. executive committee. As well as Drapeau and Saulnier, the City members were Gerry Snyder, Fernand Drapeau, Jean Labelle, Gerard Niding and Maurice Landes.\(^3\) Late in 1970, Appendix II shows the division of the M.U.C. municipalities by sector. Montreal Urban Community, 1970 Annual Report (Montreal, 1971), pp. 2-3. Ibid., p. 3.
Messes. Saulnier, Snyder and Landes had been replaced by Councillors John Lynch-Staunton, Lawrence Hanigan and Yvon Lamarre. Overall, the M.U.C. executive committee had three anglophones, Dawson, Graham and Snyder (and then, Lynch-Staunton). Snyder and Lynch-Staunton filled the traditionally anglophone position of vice-chairman of the City's executive committee.

Although the suburbs realized that the M.U.C. would largely be subject to the dominance of the City, they basically viewed it as a new level of metropolitan government which was politically and legally separate from the City of Montreal. Drapeau, on the other hand, viewed the M.U.C. as an extension of the City, established to deal with certain problems soluble only on an Island-wide basis. Although he acknowledged that limited suburban participation was necessary, he saw no reason why the City should radically change its ways in order to accommodate their desires. An example of the difference in viewpoint concerned the meeting place for the M.U.C. Council. Drapeau felt it should meet in the chambers of the City Council because that was the most convenient place for most members. The suburbs were opposed to this because they felt meetings should be held on 'neutral ground'. Although the first meeting was held at the University of Montreal, Drapeau eventually won his point and subsequent meetings were held at City Hall. Drapeau also felt that the M.U.C. could largely be staffed by City of Montreal employees working on contract to the Community while the suburbs felt that the M.U.C. required its own separate and independent civil service.

As far as political leadership of the M.U.C. was concerned, Drapeau felt it should be the same as that of the City. He thought Saulnier should preside over the executive committee of the M.U.C.,
therefore being its effective leader. He envisioned the mayor of Montreal as the symbolic head of the M.U.C., presiding over the public meetings of its council in the same way that he presided at the meetings of the Montreal city council. At the first meeting of the M.U.C. Council on 9 February 1970, Saulnier and Drapeau were acclaimed to these respective positions.\(^1\) At this early stage, the suburbs were too disorganized and unsure of themselves to use their veto. Although they could have blocked the election of Saulnier and Drapeau, they did not have the power to elect their own candidate. In practical terms, they had no choice but to accept the takeover of the M.U.C. by the Drapeau-Saulnier team. The suburbs did, however, have the symbolic prerogative of choosing the two vice-chairmen. For the executive committee they chose Reginald Dawson. After their experiences on the Blier commission there was considerable irony that Saulnier and Dawson should now be together at the head of the M.U.C. The reality of the situation, however, was that Dawson's position gave him no special influence. For the council, the suburbs chose Sarto Desnoyers, the mayor of Dorval. He was soon to be elected president of the Conference of Suburban Mayors of Montreal (C.S.M.M.), the successor organization to the I.C.C.

Saulnier quickly established his complete control over the M.U.C. executive committee. The suburban members did not at first cause him much more concern than his faithful majority from the City. Saulnier's greatest procedural victory was to impose the same conventions of secrecy and cabinet solidarity at the M.U.C. level as had been established within the City. The only public source of information about

\(^{1}\)Ibid., pp. 3-4.
executive committee activities was Saulnier himself. Other members were not expected to talk to the press about their positions on forthcoming issues, certainly not if they were against the majority position. Although mutual public opposition and various unofficial leaks were later to occur, the incredible feature of early M.U.C. development was Saulnier's success in controlling the suburban representatives. His accomplishment was made possible by the general reluctance of suburban politicians to appear to be obstructing the work of a man who was obviously getting things done, and by the rather passive unquestioning habits of the Montreal press.¹ City hall reporters, who reluctantly accepted the Drapeau-Saulnier policy of new management at city hall, seemed to consider it quite natural that these policies were extended to the M.U.C. Suburban politicians were not themselves well placed to object to Saulnier's tactics. Many suburban councils tended to conduct their internal arguments in private so suburban mayors could hardly object when Saulnier insisted on the same policy for the metropolitan level.

As the October, 1970 City of Montreal elections approached, Saulnier announced his wish to retire from City politics. However, he said that he would accept a special appointment from the provincial government to continue his position with the M.U.C.² This plan required special legislation in order to change the procedure for choosing the M.U.C. executive committee chairman. It was duly presented to the

¹See Marcel Adam, La démocratie à Montreal (Montreal, Editions du jour, 1972), Chapter 7.

National Assembly by Maurice Tessier, the new Liberal minister of municipal affairs. The only dissent to the plan came from the Parti québécois, who wanted the chairman to be elected by the executive committee, not appointed by the government.\(^1\) The new act provided for the chairman to be appointed for a non-renewable four-year term. When the appointee eventually left the position, succeeding chairmen were to be elected according to the original provisions of the 1969 M.U.C. Act.\(^2\) This episode clearly demonstrated how essential Saulnier was to the M.U.C. Everyone involved was willing to change the rules in such a way to respond uniquely to his personal requirements. From October 1970 until his resignation from the M.U.C. in February 1972, Saulnier served as the provincially-appointed leader of the M.U.C. For a man who had previously insisted that Montreal's metropolitan government not be led by a provincial appointee, his acceptance of this position seemed hypocritical. For all practical purposes, however, nothing had changed, except that Saulnier now would be able to devote his full attention to M.U.C. affairs. In spite of the nature of his appointment, he remained a trusted colleague of Mayor Drapeau and a devoted servant of his conception of the City's interests.

The last twelve months of Saulnier's period in office were difficult ones. The Liberal government finally made it clear that they would not allow the City to totally dominate metropolitan politics. During the same period, the suburbs lost their reluctance to object to Saulnier's policies and began to use their veto in the M.U.C. Council.

\(^1\)Quebec, Débats, 29e Legislature, 1e Session, x, 1205-14.
\(^2\)Quebec, Statutes, 1969, Chapter 84, s. 13.
with increasing effectiveness. Finally, in January 1972, Le Devoir published a series of damaging articles which accused Saulnier's brother, Jean-Jacques, of corrupt behaviour while pursuing his career as a high-ranking City policeman.\(^1\) When Saulnier resigned, he claimed that he had accomplished his main mission—'to put in place the structures and mechanisms essential to the life of the M.U.C.'\(^2\) Leaving aside the complex subject of police integration, it is worthwhile to review Saulnier's administrative accomplishments. Apart from overseeing the growth of the secretariat and the creation of a separate treasury department, he also supervised the creation of six separate functional departments, each with its own director. By the end of 1971, the M.U.C. employed over 1,500 people, not counting police officers.\(^3\) Most of these employees were transferred from the civil service of the City of Montreal. Although Saulnier had many enemies when he retired, virtually everyone acknowledged that he was probably the only person who could have transformed the M.U.C. from a legal shell to a functioning government in such a short period of time.

Mayor Drapeau insisted on replacing Saulnier with another member of the City's executive committee. The suburbs, however, felt that they now had a right to place one of their own men in the top position. When the M.U.C. Council met in special session on 16 February 1972 to elect Saulnier's successor, Mayor Drapeau nominated Lawrence Hanigan, a Civic

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\(^1\)See Le Devoir, 12 and 13 January 1972.

\(^2\)Ibid., 11 February 1972.

Party councillor since 1960 and a member of the executive committee since 1970. The suburbs proposed Yves Ryan, the mayor of Montreal North. After three ballots which failed to produce the necessary dual majority from the City councillors and the suburban mayors, the latter group finally gave way and supported Hanigan. Saulnier's resignation had also brought about an automatic vacancy in the vice-chairmanship of the executive committee. Mayor Paul Ouimet of Westmount proposed that Mayor Dawson be re-elected, but Mayor Drapeau ruled this out of order on the grounds that Mayor Dawson was not present. Instead, the suburbs proposed Mayor Ryan and he was unanimously elected. Despite his name, Hanigan is a francophone, as is Ryan. The M.U.C. appears not to have established any conventions concerning the automatic election of anglophones to symbolic positions of authority within the executive committee and the council. This is not surprising given that the legislation requires the chairmanship and vice-chairmanship to be split between the City and the suburbs. If the anglophone suburbanites were to expect automatically to receive the vice-chairmanships, it would mean that the francophone suburbs could expect nothing.

Hanigan has been chairman of the M.U.C. during an extended period of consolidation. The government has been reassessing its future and

\[1\text{Le Devoir, 27 March 1972.}\]
\[2\text{Ibid., 17 February 1972.}\]
\[3\text{These names reflect the fact that some descendants of English soldiers and Irish immigrants have been assimilated into the French-Canadian community. Daniel Johnson is another example of such a name.}\]
\[4\text{The latest public re-assessment can be found in Québec, Rapport du groupe de travail sur l'urbanisation (Québec, 1976), Chapter 6 and}\]
has consequently refused to give it either the funds or the authority which it would need to expand its activities further. Hanigan has been able to do little more than continue the programs which Saulnier began. His main virtue has been that his style of leadership, far more cautious and less abrasive than Saulnier's, has enabled him to gain some suburban support.

In early 1974 the terms of the five suburban mayors on the M.U.C. executive committee expired. Only two were not re-elected, Mayor Ryan gave way to Mayor Bernard Benoît of Pointe-aux-Trembles and Mayor Gariepy to Mayor Pierre DesMarais II of Outremont. The latter then replaced Mayor Ryan as the executive committee's vice-chairman. In late 1974, after the City's elections, the composition of the City's executive committee changed again. Councillors Lynch-Staunton, Labelle, and Drapeau were replaced by Fernand Desjardins, Pierre Lorange, and Ernest Rousille. The result was that at the end of 1974 the M.U.C. executive committee consisted of ten francophones and two anglophones.

The reduction in anglophone strength from three to two was simply the result of Drapeau's appointment of an all-francophone City executive committee following the action of most anglophones in 1974 in voting for councillors belonging to the Montreal Citizens Movement. 1 In terms of French-English relations in Montreal, the change was scarcely noticed. Few citizens were aware of the composition of either executive committee.


1See Chapter II-1.
They realized that Drapeau himself made the important decisions on both. As far as anglophones were concerned, neither the City nor the M.U.C. were perceived as important battlegrounds for the defence of their rapidly eroding position. Since his gentle chastisement of General de Gaulle in 1967 and his rigid position against political extremists, Mayor Drapeau was in fact seen as more of a defender of anglophones than as a threat. While his candidates for council lost anglophone support in 1974, Drapeau's personal vote remained high. Although Drapeau had not given up his wish to extend City influence over the entire Island, it had already become apparent that the M.U.C., burdened with the suburban veto provisions, would not be an effective mechanism for achieving this objective.

4. Accomplishments

Although the M.U.C. has featured in a great deal of local political discussion and debate during its existence, there has been very little public awareness of its accomplishments and failures. There has been nothing to compare with the accomplishments in the 1950s of Metro Toronto in the field of suburban development or with those of Metro Winnipeg in the 1960s concerning transportation, water supply, sewers, and parks.1 Because of a multitude of jurisdictional and political disputes, the overall record of the M.U.C. is not impressive. However, there are four areas in which it has at least had some degree of impact. Each of these areas will be described in turn.

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1. Subway Construction: On 12 February 1971 the M.U.C. Council authorized a $430,000,000 loan to finance the construction of 28.4 miles of subway and fifty-three new stations. This would be in addition to the 13.7 miles and twenty-eight stations already existing.\(^1\) Work on the extensions began in late 1971, with priority going to the extension of the line which was to serve the 1976 Olympic site. On 9 August 1973 Mr. Hanigan announced that the extensions would include an additional four miles of tracks and eight additional stations.\(^2\) Most of the controversy surrounding the Metro extensions has related to their cost, especially in relation to above-ground commuter trains in areas outside the central core.\(^3\) By mid-1975 estimates had risen to $1.5 billion.\(^4\) The provincial government later announced that it would pay 60% of the cost of retiring the debt\(^5\) but even this left the M.U.C. with a large financial burden. The ultimate fate of the complete Metro extension program is not clear. However, recent provincial action indicates that the M.U.C. has neither the financial resources nor the territorial jurisdiction to enable it to cope with Montreal's mass transit problems. Further provincial control in this area seems inevitable.

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\(^2\)Le Devoir, 10 August 1973.

\(^3\)This argument has been presented most effectively by Douglas Fullerton, the former head of the provincial agency concerned with developing plans for such a system. See Le Devoir, 25 February 1976.

\(^4\)The Gazette, 16 August 1975.

\(^5\)The Montreal Star, 6 May 1976.
2. **Property Valuation:** Although the M.U.C. was supposed to standardize property valuation on the Island of Montreal, the original valuation department found its task to be impossible due to the lack of suburban co-operation.\(^1\) However, in late 1971 the government, as part of an overall provincial reform of the valuation system, passed legislation which created an integrated M.U.C. valuation department. The new department officially absorbed the relevant departments of the M.U.C. municipalities on 1 January 1972. By the end of the year the first common valuation roll had been presented.\(^2\) The M.U.C. then had the administrative machinery to eventually ensure that all property on the island was assessed by the same procedures according to exactly the same standards.

Although the issue of an integrated valuation department caused a great deal of bitterness, it was certainly not something with which the general public was much concerned. It was more of a bureaucratic power struggle than anything else. Suburban mayors were anxious to maintain control over their own valuation establishment. In some respects they were responding to the desires of their own employees who did not wish to have their positions and procedures radically upset. They were also responding to their personal desires not to preside over the disappearance of their own municipal civil service. Furthermore, they had genuine and justified concerns about the efficiency and accessibility of a vast metropolitan valuation department dominated by former City officials not familiar with suburban conditions. But hovering above

\(^1\)M.U.C., 1970 Annual Report.

this seemingly petty squabble was an important matter of principle: all M.U.C. municipalities should have their property assessed in exactly the same way so that all would pay their fair share of M.U.C. costs. Those in the City and provincial governments who advocated integration could always appeal to that principle. Rightly or wrongly, any suburban politician who was opposed to integration could not escape the suspicion that, regardless of his public pronouncements, he was trying to subvert it.

3. Pollution Control and Water Supply: One of the Community's most notable successes has been the fact that it has substantially reduced air pollution on the Island of Montreal. This has been accomplished by approving a series of by-laws governing motor vehicle and industrial emissions, heating fuels, and domestic incinerators. These by-laws have been enforced by the M.U.C.'s air purification and food inspection department.

A much more difficult problem is that of water pollution. Most of the water surrounding the Island of Montreal is so polluted that it is a definite hazard to public health. This is caused in large part by the dumping of sewage and industrial wastes into the Ottawa River and upstream sections of the St. Lawrence River systems. In addition, the Montreal area adds over five hundred million gallons a day of completely untreated sewage to the waters that surround it. In 1971 the Quebec

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1The figures which attest to this are presented in M.U.C., Annual Reports, 1971-74.

2M.U.C., Planning Department, Proposals for Urban Development (Montreal, 1973), pp. 94-5.

Water Board ordered the M.U.C. to build a purification plant to treat sewage emanating from all municipalities within the Community. In 1974 construction of the integrated sewer system was commenced. The plant itself is to be built in the northeast corner of the Island at Rivière-des-Prairies. Half of the estimated cost of around $700,000,000 is being paid by the federal government, while the province and the M.U.C. are paying one-third and one-sixth, respectively. Even when the plant is completed, the water discharged into the St. Lawrence at the eastern tip of the Island will still be quite polluted. However, because the stream moves quickly at that point, it is claimed that the resulting environmental damage will not be great. Although this scheme is far from perfect, it is bound to bring about a great improvement in the quality of the water surrounding Montreal.

Because the Island's water supply is produced by only six municipalities (Montreal, Dorval, Lachine, Pierrefonds, Pointe Claire, and Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue), the resulting inter-municipal negotiations have been quite bitter and controversial. This has been particularly true regarding the water that the City has supplied to its neighbouring municipalities. It was not surprising that, as early as 1970, some suburban mayors were urging that the M.U.C. take over the function of

3Le Devoir, 6 April 1973.
4M.U.C., 1972 Annual Report, p. 36.
5See Chapter III-1.
supplying water to municipalities. Late in that year the water purification department commenced the necessary studies.¹ These studies were complicated in March 1973 by a provincial government decision to allow Pierrefonds to expand its water supply capability in order to meet the growing requirements of the northwestern part of the Island.² This decision reduced the likelihood that the integration of the Island's water supply will take place in the foreseeable future.

On most of the issues related to pollution control and water supply, there has been a noticeable split between the West Island suburbs and the other M.U.C. municipalities. The West Island group does not feel particularly threatened by air pollution and considers that it would generally be cheaper and more efficient for them to manage their own water supply and sewage systems. Given the manner in which two airports physically separate the West Island from the central part of the M.U.C., there is some validity in their case. However, it has largely been the inability of these suburbs to co-operate with each other in establishing their own inter-municipal structures that has led to their loss of power at the expense of the M.U.C.

4. Planning: The main accomplishment of the planning department has been to produce a document, released in May 1973, entitled Proposals for Urban Development. It called for the creation of new metropolitan parks, a halt to the continued expansion of the Island's highway network, the integration of the Metro and the commuter railway lines, and the

²News and Chronicle (Pointe Claire, Quebec), 15 March 1973.
establishment of 'satellite centres' in the east and west of the Island to ease the pressure on the central area. The proposals have been the subject of two separate investigations by committees of M.U.C. council-lors, the second of which was particularly concerned with the cost of implementation. The main barrier to the approval of the plan has been the position taken by the suburbs. Those municipalities containing land which was to be protected from commercial, industrial, or residential development have objected to the loss of potential tax revenue. Some suburbs have seen the plan as simply a mechanism whereby the City of Montreal will force other municipalities to share in the financing of its larger parks by having them transferred to M.U.C. jurisdiction. The suburbs have also been concerned with the threat of losing control over physical planning within their own territories and with having to pay for certain new services and facilities which they feel the Community cannot afford.

As a result of suburban intransigence, the M.U.C. still does not possess an official plan for its future development. The leaders of the M.U.C. have continually accepted suburban pleas to postpone a final vote on the plan because they would prefer continued delay to an outright suburban veto. Nevertheless, the inability of the M.U.C. to confront the issue of large-scale physical planning is a further illustration of the Community's basic weakness. It now seems that this is another area in which increased provincial incursion will become inevitable.

1For the committee reports, see M.U.C., Report of the Special Commission on the Development Plan (Montreal, 1974) and Financial Evaluation of the Development Plan (Montreal, 1975).
5. Finance

The general ineffectiveness of the M.U.C. can best be explained by remembering that the main immediate cause of its creation was the need to aid the City of Montreal in financing its spiralling police costs. From 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1971 there were no important changes in the actual structure of the Island's police forces. While the debate raged on about integration, the police were still controlled by the various municipal councils, although the Public Security Council did have some important overall authority. During this period the councils submitted bills for all their police costs to the M.U.C. The Community then amalgamated these costs to produce a total police bill for the entire M.U.C. This bill was then paid by the member municipalities in proportion to their share of the total property valuation within the M.U.C. The City, of course, was the main beneficiary of this process. Most other municipalities were financial losers. An analysis of the way in which various municipalities gained and lost can indicate the real extent to which the M.U.C. redistributed the Island's local revenues. The presentation of such an analysis is one of the main purposes of this section.

The figures concerning police costs from 1 January 1972 onwards are less useful. This is because, as of that date, there was one integrated M.U.C. police department. This means that individual municipalities no longer have police costs which are clearly separate from other municipalities' police costs. Although it is known how much each municipality pays toward the financing of the new force, it is no longer known how much is spent for the policing of each individual municipality.
Therefore, the extent to which municipalities gain or lose, in financial terms, from the existence of an integrated force cannot be judged. This is why most of the analysis presented in this section will relate to the period prior to integration, i.e. 1970 and 1971. Nevertheless, it should be noted that since 1971 police costs have still completely dominated the M.U.C. budget. In 1973 they made up 88.1% of the budget.¹

By 1976, when Metro extension and sewage treatment plant costs were beginning to be absorbed, policing took up 55.4% of a total budget of $279,142,419.²

Table IV-1 shows that during 1970 and 1971 the member municipalities of the M.U.C. spent $167,193,197 on policing. When the costs were shared out the total amount paid was $137,778,949. This means that $29,414,248 came from sources other than the general revenues of M.U.C. municipalities. There were, in fact, two such sources. The first was the provincial government. The original M.U.C. legislation authorized the minister of municipal affairs to pay the M.U.C. a one-dollar per capita 'foundation' grant in 1970 and 1971 and a three-dollar per capita grant for police and health services in 1970, 1971 and 1972.³ During 1970 and 1971 the three-dollar per capita grant was applied exclusively to police costs. It produced $13,218,285.⁴ The second source of revenue was a special M.U.C. surtax of $.40 per $100 valuation on the

³Quebec, Statutes, 1969, Chapter 84, s. 371.
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<td>13,022</td>
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<td>46,904</td>
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<td>LaSalle</td>
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<td>Verdun</td>
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<td>+ .28</td>
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<td>Westmount</td>
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<td>3,496,683</td>
<td>947,939</td>
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<td>Suburban Total</td>
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<td>4,467,597</td>
<td>6,029</td>
<td>33,600,702</td>
<td>57,009,517</td>
<td>23,408,815</td>
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<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,955,375</td>
<td>10,741,484</td>
<td>5,493</td>
<td>167,193,197</td>
<td>137,778,949</td>
<td>29,414,248</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>+ .27</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Notes: in Column A compare for Canada, Statistics Canada, 1971 Census of Canada, Cat. No. 12-47-0, Table IV-2. Information Canada, 1971, Column B.

TABLE IV-1

DATA RELATING TO POLICE COST SHARING, 1970-71
amount by which any taxable property in the M.U.C. surpassed an assessed value of $100,000. This tax, which had previously been applied by and within the City, became a M.U.C. tax by virtue of provincial legislation passed in April 1971. From then on, all municipalities had to collect the tax and forward its proceeds directly to the M.U.C. Most suburbs opposed its imposition mainly on the grounds that it would be a disincentive to industries to locate in their municipalities. During 1971 this tax produced $16,195,163 for the M.U.C., $10,674,513 of which came from properties located within the City.

Column F of Table IV-1 shows that during 1970 and 1971 the City received $52,823,063 from the M.U.C. This represented just under 40% of its total police costs for that period. Only three suburbs gained from the pooling of police costs and the one which gained the most, Verdun, received only $502,842. For all practical purposes, the pooling of police costs can be seen as a mechanism whereby the suburbs and the provincial government combined to subsidize the City. The real extent of the subsidy was about $42 million, i.e. $53 million minus the $11 million of the M.U.C. surtax which originated within the City. The suburbs produced about $29 million with about $6 million of this amount coming through the surtax. The province produced the other $13 million.

Because of the anglophone concentration in the suburbs, the foregoing figures might lead to the conclusion that the creation of the M.U.C. forced anglophone suburbs to subsidize the francophone City.

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1 Quebec, Statutes, 1971, Chapter 90, s. 18.
Because this conclusion is only partially justified, it is best to look at the figures for each municipality in more detail. In a sense, the figures presented in Column F are misleading because they do not include surtax payments which the municipalities had to forward to the M.U.C. However, on balance it seems fair to omit these payments. Except in a purely administrative sense, the surtax goes directly to the M.U.C. It is a tax which, by their own admission, the suburbs would never have voluntarily levied themselves. Although some municipalities have more property holders paying more surtax than others, the existence of the tax has not significantly affected the financial capabilities of the municipalities themselves.

Leaving surtax payments aside then, Columns C, G, and H of Table IV-1 present the data which allow meaningful conclusions to be drawn concerning the redistributive effects of pooling police costs. All these columns use property valuation as the measure of a municipality's wealth. This can be justified on the grounds that revenue from property taxes constitutes well over half the total operating revenue in virtually all M.U.C. municipalities.\(^1\) Column H shows that there were twelve suburbs which contributed less than the suburban average towards defraying the City's police costs. The twelve were: Montreal North, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Pierrefonds, Ste. Geneviève, Senneville, Hampstead, Montreal West, Outremont, Westmount, Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue, St. Pierre, and Verdun. The final three in the list, all of which have francophone majorities, actually gained from the pooling. This was mainly because of the high cost of their police compared to their total valuation, as

\(^1\)Québec, 'La communauté urbaine'. 
shown in Column G. Column C also shows these municipalities to have a very low per capita valuation. The municipalities of Montreal North, Pointe-aux-Trembles, Pierrefonds, Ste. Geneviève and Outremont show similar, but less extreme, characteristics. Consequently, these municipalities, all with francophone majorities except Pierrefonds, did not actually gain from the process of pooling costs.

The municipalities of Senneville, Montreal West, Hampstead, and Westmount did not actually gain either. But the surprising feature of their condition is that, although they all have high per capita valuations, they still paid less than the average share. This can only be explained by Column G which shows their high police costs in relation to their valuation. These municipalities, all of which have strong anglophone majorities, have obviously made conscious political decisions in the past to provide their citizens with comprehensive, and therefore expensive, police services. They could afford the cost because of their ample financial resources. After the costs were shared, these municipalities were refunded the full cost of their expensive tastes. Consequently they ended up paying less than their share of the suburban contribution to City police costs.

This suggests that the sharing of police costs was not the great mechanism for distributive justice that Robert Lussier originally made it out to be. Jacques Benjamin reports that Lussier viewed the policy as a means of tilting the financial balance on the Island of Montreal toward the francophone majority.\footnote{La Communauté urbaine de Montréal: Une réforme ratée (Montréal, L'Aurore, 1975), pp. 18 and 30.} If the analysis is restricted to
comparing the City with the suburbs as a whole, this view is correct. However, if the distribution of the burden within the suburban municipalities is studied, it would appear that francophone suburbanites were not treated fairly. Residents of Senneville, Montreal West, Hampstead, and Westmount—who are overwhelmingly anglophone—simply did not pay their share. This is one reason, among many, why total integration of the police forces was inevitable. If the cost-sharing procedures of 1970 and 1971 had been continued much longer, its inequitable features would soon have become obvious and demands to cut back on police expenditures in the wealthy anglophone municipalities would have grown. The original inequity was temporarily disguised by the fact that virtually all suburban municipalities, even these wealthy ones, faced impressive increases in police costs due to the funds required by the central City.

Given the obvious problems in the cost-sharing mechanism, it seems surprising that the Union nationale government did not legislate complete police integration in the first place. The explanation for this is that it was simply not willing to take political responsibility for such a move. Chapter V-2 points out that the police integration issue was much more controversial in Montreal than in Toronto or Winnipeg. In these latter two cases, integration went relatively smoothly without any preliminary period of sharing costs. A major reason for this is that in Toronto and Winnipeg this issue was primarily a technical one, while in Montreal it touched on the much more delicate issue of the respective rights, privileges, and expectations of members of the two major linguistic communities.

Because of certain transitional arrangements for the financing of Montreal's police, the 1972 budget of the M.U.C. projected a staggering
one-third increase, compared to 1971, in the cost of policing.\textsuperscript{1} For this reason the suburbs conducted a filibuster during the budget debate and it never came to a final vote. By virtue of some rather curious provisions of the M.U.C. Act,\textsuperscript{2} the budget was deemed to have been adopted on 31 January 1971. The fact that it was never approved by the Council made no difference.

The suburbs did have one avenue through which they could attempt to escape this apparently anti-democratic trap. The M.U.C. Act allowed them to appeal the provisions of a disputed budget to the Quebec Municipal Commission (Q.M.C.).\textsuperscript{3} Twenty suburban municipalities made a common approach to the Q.M.C. Interestingly enough, the large municipalities of Montreal North, Verdun, and St. Laurent were not involved, possibly because their mayors sat on the executive committee which had initially approved the budget. The main thrust of the suburban argument was that the massive increases made inevitable by the 1972 budget were unfair to their residents. The City argued that the budget merely implemented the law and that the Q.M.C. had no jurisdiction to overrule the National Assembly. At one stage in the proceedings, lawyers for the City introduced evidence that only 40% of the citizens in the objecting municipalities were French-speaking. The implication of these figures was clear; it was the English who were objecting. The judge presiding over the commission, John Shaheen, refused to accept the

\textsuperscript{1}Part of this was due to the establishment on 1 January 1972 of an interested Montreal Urban County Police Department. See Chapter V-2.

\textsuperscript{2}Quebec, Statutes, 1969, Chapter 84, s. 248, as amended by Statutes, 1971, Chapter 92, s. 8.

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid.
relevance of these figures and they were therefore not admitted as evidence. However, the judge did admit other evidence which showed that the citizens of the municipalities in question were in a much higher socio-economic position than the Island's other citizens.\footnote{Le Devoir, 7 February 1972.} This incident was one of the rare occasions on which the privileged position of anglophone suburbanites was publicly raised by City representatives. It is ironic that the City chose to raise the issue at what was clearly one of the most inappropriate occasions—the hearings of a quasi-judicial body.

The Q.M.C. handed down its decision on 11 February 1972. As expected, it approved the budget. However, it also recommended that the government establish a committee to study the structures, finances, and services of the M.U.C.\footnote{Quebec, Quebec Municipal Commission, Budget de la Communaute urbaine de Montréal pour l'année, 1972 (mimeo., 1972).} The suburbs interpreted this part of the Commission's decision as a confirmation that it sympathized with many of their complaints. On 9 March, Mr. Tessier, the minister of municipal affairs, announced the establishment of the study committee which the Q.M.C. had called for.\footnote{Le Devoir, 10 March 1972.} Lawrence Hanigan was to be the chairman. The work of the Hanigan committee will be discussed in the next chapter.

A study of the finances of the M.U.C. leads to the inevitable conclusion that its main purpose has been to redistribute financial resources from the suburbs to the centre City. There are few other existing metropolitan governments in which this effect is so obvious.
However, one possible parallel case is the reorganization of local government in New Brunswick in 1967. Its primary objective was to redistribute the financial resources of wealthy areas of the province toward the poorer areas.\(^1\) Frank Smallwood suggested in 1970 that the New Brunswick model might serve as a useful model for U.S. policymakers.\(^2\) However, now that the M.U.C. is fully operational, it could serve as an even better model. Many centre city municipalities in the U.S. are even more in need of financial assistance from the suburbs than was the City of Montreal in 1969. Unfortunately, it is constitutionally and politically impossible for any state government in the U.S. to wield the kind of arbitrary power over its suburban municipalities that Quebec's Union nationale government did in 1969.

6. **The Suburbs**\(^3\)

The way in which Saulnier out-maneuvered the suburbs in late 1969 made it quite obvious that they had lost much of their political strength shown during the time of the Blier commission. The main reasons for this decline--the advent of the Union nationale government and the evidence of corruption on the part of certain suburban mayors--have already been outlined. However, the return of the Liberals to power and the emergence of the M.U.C. as a functioning organization meant that, by the spring of

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\(^3\)For selected data on M.U.C. municipalities, see Appendix I.
1970, the suburbs were facing a quite different political environment. They chose to react to the changed circumstances by winding-up the dormant Intermunicipal Co-ordinating Committee and establishing in its place a new organization, the Conference of Suburban Mayors of Montreal (C.S.M.M.). Since its establishment, the C.S.M.M. has had four presidents, all francophones. Since 1975 its political leaders have been supported by a small full-time permanent staff. Prior to that time, the C.S.M.M. relied exclusively on the part-time professional advice of lawyers, public relations advisors, chartered accountants, and various other expert consultants.

Most of the discussion at meetings of the Conference is related to forthcoming business in the M.U.C. Council. The activity of the C.S.M.M. tends to ebb and flow in relation to the activity of the Council, with meetings being held more frequently immediately prior to important votes. One of the greatest collective efforts of the Conference was the appeal of the 1972 budget. This was largely organized by Paul Ouimet, a francophone patrician with excellent connections in Quebec City who, at that time, had recently been acclaimed as mayor of Westmount. In late 1975 the C.S.M.M. climaxed an extensive research program on the M.U.C. by presenting a plan for its complete rearrangement. The main feature of the plan was its provision for equal suburban representation on a new governing body that would replace both the M.U.C. Council and the executive committee.¹ In spite of the considerable effort taken by the C.S.M.M., it seems unlikely that their plan will ever bear fruit.

¹The Gazette, 3 December 1975.
There have been two important and related ways in which the Conference has failed to ensure the clear expression of a united suburban viewpoint on M.U.C. matters. First, the Conference has been unable to significantly affect the behaviour of the suburban representatives on the M.U.C. executive committee. This is largely because they accepted Saulnier's 'cabinet solidarity' principle but also because they simply do not have time to communicate effectively with their suburban colleagues. Running their own municipalities and attending the weekly executive committee meetings leaves them little time for the activities of the Conference. Although they are classic victims of co-option, there is very little the Conference can do about it. The Conference has also been largely unsuccessful in controlling the suburban vote at M.U.C. Council meetings. Although the Conference holds its own informal votes on issues coming before the Council, the results are in no way binding. Consequently, the suburbs often appear disunited, especially in comparison to Mayor Drapeau's solid bloc of Civic Party councillors.

From the creation of the M.U.C. until the Montreal municipal elections in 1974, there were thirty-three recorded votes in the M.U.C. Council. A clear analysis of these votes is difficult because of the complicated nature of the Council's voting system. On one occasion even the M.U.C. officials in charge of calculating the votes made a mistake. On 29 December 1971, during the height of the controversial budget debate, all forty-eight City councillors present (1,344 votes) voted for adjournment, as did thirteen suburban mayors (380 votes). The opponents of adjournment only mustered 332 votes but, because these votes were cast by fourteen suburban mayors, the motion should have
been declared defeated. Instead, it was declared to have been approved.\(^1\) There were only six votes in which enough support was mobilized in order to have the motion at hand properly approved. There were five other motions which failed because there was neither a City nor a suburban majority in their favour. Of the remaining twenty-two votes, thirteen were (or should have been) defeated because a majority of suburbs failed to vote for the motion and nine were defeated because of the lack of a majority from the City. An analysis of the voting of the City representatives is not particularly useful because there were only eight occasions on which they were not unanimous. Drapeau's lonely rebels never came close to seriously embarrassing him. The bloc voting by the City representatives meant that the weighted vote system was virtually irrelevant. It was the suburban veto, which is not based on weighted votes, that became all important.

Because the pattern of suburban voting is much more interesting than that of the City, it is presented in detail in Table IV-2.\(^2\) The table shows that there were only seven suburbs which voted with the City as much, or more than, they voted against it. The seven were Montreal North, St. Laurent Verdun, Mount Royal, Ste. Geneviève, and Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue. The behaviour of the first five can be explained by the fact that their mayors sat on the executive committee throughout most of the time period under study. Being on the executive committee seems to have been an important factor in co-opting some suburban mayors into supporting

\(^1\)M.U.C., Minutes of the Council, 29 December 1971.

\(^2\)Ibid., meetings from January 1970 to October 1974.
Table IV-2 *(See p. 214)*

VOTING RECORD OF SUBURBS IN M.U.C. COUNCIL

JANUARY 1970 - OCTOBER 1974

SUBURBS RANKED ACCORDING TO PER CENT OF TOTAL VOTES CAST WHICH WERE IN ACCORD WITH CITY OF MONTREAL POSITION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Suburb</th>
<th>Votes With City</th>
<th>Votes Against City</th>
<th>I Divided by (I + II) %</th>
<th>IV</th>
<th>V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Montreal North</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>78.8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Verdun</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Baie d'Urfé</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ste. Geneviève</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Mount Royal</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>53.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pierrefonds</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Senneville</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Anjou</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Dorval</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>35.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Ile-Bizard</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Côte St. Luc</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Roxboro</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Hampstead</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>St. Pierre</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Westmount</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>St. Léonard</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Beaconsfield</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Montreal West</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Dollard-des-Ormeaux</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Montreal East</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Outremont</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Kirkland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Pointe-aux-Trembles</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Lachine</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Pointe Claire</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Longueuil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Only those municipalities covered by the M.U.C.T.C. can vote in matters concerning it. Longueuil can vote only on matters of land use.
many of the City's positions. The two other suburbs on the list are both in the western sector of the M.U.C. and both have francophone majorities. The voting behaviour of these municipalities can perhaps be explained by assuming that they perceived themselves as being threatened by the anglophone majority in the West Island area. Because there were constant and serious efforts during this period on the part of some anglophone politicians to create one unified West Island municipality, their fears were probably justified. The two municipalities might have seen the City, through its majority on the M.U.C. Council, as the institution that could best preserve the francophone nature of the entire Island. If this were the case, it was not surprising that they tended to vote more often with the City than with the anglophone suburbs which surrounded them. Apart from these few cases, there appears to be no discernible pattern to explain the voting behaviour of the other suburbs. Francophone suburbs in the rest of the Island were just as likely to vote against the City as anglophone ones.

Since the arrival of the Montreal Citizens Movement (M.C.M.) in late 1974, the pattern of voting in the M.U.C. Council has been somewhat more complex. For one thing, the M.C.M. has tended to force a good many more recorded votes. Although there have been occasional alliances between M.C.M. councillors and suburban mayors, the alliance is not as potent as one might expect. This is because the Civic Party councillors can still exercise the City's veto power by themselves. Furthermore, on any issue relating to the role of the City within the M.U.C., the M.C.M. has been just as devoted as Mayor Drapeau to furthering the City's power. In short, the emergence of the M.C.M. has confirmed that
the suburbs cannot realistically look for serious support within the ranks of the Montreal City Council.

The suburbs have not been successful in their attempts to control the M.U.C. They have not convinced the provincial government to grant them parity on its institutions nor have they been able to form an effective alliance with the M.C.M. However, the suburbs have been far from powerless. By using, or threatening to use, their veto, they have almost totally frustrated any efforts to extend M.U.C. functions and policies beyond those which were originally imposed at the time of its creation. The M.U.C. is, however, still successfully accomplishing its main original purpose, which was to provide suburban funding for Island policing.

It was the policing issue which caused the creation of the M.U.C. and it remains the only one on which the suburbs have suffered any significant financial or political loss. The M.U.C. was created in a moment of crisis to perform a specific and well-defined task. The other functions that were assigned to it were little more than window dressing. To the extent that these functions are in fact being carried out by the M.U.C., it is only because the main decisions and funding are being carried out by other levels of government.

Within the M.U.C. the most important and obvious cleavage has been the City-suburban one. It has been so destructive that the M.U.C. has been virtually paralyzed by it. Although this chapter has shown some minor examples of French-English frictions within the M.U.C., this cleavage is in fact of little apparent importance in the day-to-day operation of metropolitan government. This is because the M.U.C. has
not been given jurisdiction over subjects which are of immediate relevance in the lifestyles of French and English Montrealers. ¹ Had the M.U.C. been concerned with such lifestyle matters as schools, housing, urban renewal, libraries, and social services, we might have expected more overt conflict along linguistic lines. The fact that the M.U.C. has not had this jurisdiction is, of course, partly attributable to the problems caused by the language division. In this light it is interesting to note that the metropolitan level of government in Toronto is heavily involved in such lifestyle functions as housing, libraries, and social services.²

Disputes within the M.U.C., as they currently exist, have mainly centred around the relative power, on fairly technical issues, of City and suburban politicians and their dependent bureaucracies. They have generally not sparked great public concern. To the extent that the M.U.C. has appeared to have made highly visible decisions, as with the subway extensions, it has soon become apparent that it was the provincial government that had the final word. The M.U.C. will only develop the capability to become a political institution of some independent significance if it goes through the kind of provincially imposed internal restructuring which was experienced by Toronto in 1967 and Winnipeg in

¹See Oliver P. Williams, 'Life-style Values and Political Decentralization in Metropolitan Areas', in Terry N. Clark et al., eds., Community Politics: A Behavioural Approach (London, Collier-Macmillan, 1971), pp. 56-64. Williams' approach is discussed further in the concluding chapter.

1971. Until smaller suburban municipalities are amalgamated and the City's territory made less extensive, it is impossible to have a fair and democratic representational system within the political structures of the M.U.C. Until this is created, crucial political decisions cannot be made at the metropolitan level. The changing of municipal boundaries is never easy, even in Toronto and Winnipeg. However, in Montreal it is even more difficult because each boundary change has the potential to place a French or English resident or neighbourhood in a minority position within the new municipality, when it might previously have been part of the majority. This is a problem that is addressed more fully in the next chapter.
CHAPTER V

THE SEARCH FOR ORGANIZATIONAL RATIONALITY

The previous chapter has shown that the Montreal Urban Community was created as a direct response to a service crisis. This chapter looks at attempts by the Quebec provincial government to reform certain urban institutions in Montreal so as to conform to the dictates of a set of principles that can best be described as 'organizational rationality'. The chapter shows that, although such reforms have taken place in Toronto and Winnipeg, they have been accomplished either with great difficulty, or not at all, in Montreal. The suggested explanation for this is that in Montreal the complications caused by the existence of the two major linguistic groups have forced provincial policy-makers to proceed much more carefully than they have in Toronto and Winnipeg.

1. Organizational Rationality

There is a vast literature on metropolitan reform in the United States. The main message of the American metropolitan reform movement is this:

Problems arising from the social and economic interaction of the metropolis failed to respect the political boundaries that artificially divided the metropolitan community. Thus, almost every urban problem was a metropolitan problem that could not be resolved by the fragmented political system, with its fiscal
inequalities and lack of comprehensive planning. The inadequacy of the structure of government was the metropolitan problem.\footnote{1}

Although this line of thinking received much attention from academics and 'good government' groups, it met with little real political success. In fact, to the extent that there has been any structural change in metropolitan America, it has resulted from isolated actions to correct particular problems requiring unusual structural solutions.

Chapter I of this thesis pointed out that the original creation of metropolitan governments in Toronto and Winnipeg was a direct response to certain service crises. The creation of the M.U.C. is also most accurately viewed in this way. In this sense, the original Canadian experience with metropolitan reform was quite similar to the American. However, the notable feature of subsequent developments in Ontario and Manitoba is that policy-makers eventually went far beyond their original concern with meeting the service crisis. In what is best described as a second stage of reform, they began to be concerned with problems that relate to the notion of organizational rationality. In fact, they seemed to be implementing many of the idealistic dreams of the American metropolitan reform movement. In this regard, the reality of the reform experience in Toronto and Winnipeg has been much closer to the British model than the American. For example, the Goldenberg Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto, which in 1965 called for the restructuring of Toronto's second-tier municipalities,\footnote{2} was undoubtedly influenced by

\footnote{1}{Michael N. Danielson, Metropolitan Politics: A Reader (Boston, Little Brown, 1971), pp. 247-8. Chapter 5 of this reader contains much of the important literature on the American metropolitan reform movement.}

\footnote{2}{Ontario, Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto (Toronto, Queen's Printer, 1965).}
what Peter Self has called 'the rational and logical force'\(^1\) of the Herbert Royal Commission on Greater London.

The creation of Unicity in Winnipeg in 1971 is the best Canadian example of the triumph of organizational rationality. In its White Paper the Manitoba government pointed to problems related to planning and finance within the metropolitan area. It concluded that, to the extent that these problems did not result from federal and provincial policies,

...almost all of the urban area's difficulties stem, in whole or in part, from three main roots - fragmented authority, segmented financial capacity, and lack of citizen involvement.\(^2\)

This brief statement includes the three main demands of the argument for organizational rationality: 1) the creation of a single regional authority for various governmental functions designated as being regional in scope; 2) the abolition or consolidation of second-tier units of government in order to increase administrative efficiency and facilitate equitable representation; and 3) the establishment of redistributive mechanisms to correct territorial maldistributions in local financial resources and services.

The remainder of this chapter is concerned with showing that in three crucial policy fields--policing, social services, and the restructuring of municipal boundaries--the Quebec government was just as devoted to the arguments for organizational rationality as the governments of Ontario or Manitoba. However, this commitment did not lead to the same

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results. After a great deal of difficulty, the government's policy for Montreal's police force is slowly being implemented; its social service policy was implemented only after being substantially changed; and its attempts to bring about second-tier municipal consolidations were fruitless. These case studies attempt to show that the eventual outcome in each of these cases can largely be explained in terms of the relevance of linguistic differences or the extent to which they could be accommodated within the reformed system.

2. The Integration of the Police Forces

Unlike the case of Montreal, policing was not an issue in the creation of metropolitan governments for Toronto and Winnipeg. The literature on these two cities scarcely mentions policing at all. In the previous chapter it was shown that the M.U.C. was created as a direct cause of a crisis in the financing of the police and that the legislation authorized the M.U.C. to partially or completely integrate the Island's police forces. The original legislation for Toronto and Winnipeg did not affect policing in any way—the constituent municipalities continued to finance and administer their own forces. Metropolitan Toronto's thirteen police departments were amalgamated as a result of special provincial legislation which was passed in 1957. The province was acting on a recommendation from a committee of Metro Council which was chaired by a suburban mayor.¹ The whole process took place in an orderly, non-controversial fashion. There was little serious opposition to the notion that one metropolitan police force would be a more

¹Arnold Rose, Governing Metropolitan Toronto (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972), p. 36.
effective and efficient vehicle to fight crime, manage traffic, and protect the population. Police forces in metropolitan Winnipeg were not legally amalgamated until the creation of Unicity and effective amalgamation did not take place until October 1974.¹ Throughout the debate on the creation of Unicity, the policing issue did not play an important role in public discussion.

In Montreal the police issue took precedence over all others during the early years of the M.U.C. The initial focus of attention was centred on the Public Security Council (P.S.C.), a four-man body which was given ultimate control over the Island's police forces and the responsibility to make recommendations concerning future integration. The government appointed a provincial judge, Jacques Coderre as the chairman. Other members were Maurice St. Pierre, the executive director of the Quebec Provincial Police, and Maurice St. Aubin, the director of the City of Montreal Police Department. These three members then chose Walter H. Boyle, director of Mount Royal police and fire department, to join them as the representative of the suburban police forces.² The P.S.C. therefore consisted of three francophones, one of whom was an employee of the City of Montreal, and one anglophone suburbanite.

After taking preliminary steps in early 1970 to place controls on police expenditures in the various municipalities and after establishing a few centralized services (including a bomb disposal unit),

¹Manitoba, Committee of Review of the City of Winnipeg Act, Report and Recommendations (Winnipeg, 1976), p. 15.

the P.S.C. then confronted its main task—preparing a plan for the total or partial integration of the Island's police forces. For this purpose, the P.S.C. engaged a research staff of six people led by Guy Tardif, then a criminologist at the University of Montreal. The staff was obviously greatly hindered by the fact that it only had a few months—until 1 September 1970—to do its job. Nevertheless, a great deal of data concerning crime patterns, and police resources within the M.U.C. territory were accumulated. This is all presented in a statistical supplement to the P.S.C. report on integration, a document which soon became known as the Coderre report. The authors of the report justified their recommendations almost exclusively in terms of organizational rationality, particularly as viewed by policemen. Had they wanted to ensure that their plan actually received final approval, they might have paid at least some attention to improving the political, instead of just the administrative, appeal of its main provisions. Apart from ignoring politics, the P.S.C. also ignored the language problem on the Island of Montreal. Except for one population table showing the linguistic make-up of the various municipalities, there is no mention of the possibility that Montreal's policing problems might be complicated by the fact that anglophones live on one end of the Island and francophones on the other.

The main conclusions drawn by the P.S.C. from its accumulated data were that the existence of so many police forces led to inequities in public protection, costly duplications, and lack of efficiency. From the viewpoint of metropolitan politics, the most important conclusion

\footnote{M.U.C., P.S.C., Report, Statistical Supplement, Table 0-2.}
was probably this:

From one municipality to another, protection is often not provided in terms of needs, but rather in terms of what each municipality can or is willing to pay.¹

The P.S.C. decided that a partial integration of the Island's police forces would not substantially correct any of these defects.² Its main recommendation called for

The unification of all police forces and civil defence organizations of the Community into a single department called the 'Montreal Urban Community Police Department'.³

As well as providing for an administrative structure in which specialized police services would be centralized and made available throughout the Community, the P.S.C. also insisted on

The reorganization, for police purposes, of the territory of the Community based on demographic and territorial realities, and taking into account physical barriers such as autoroutes, rail lines and bodies of water, rather than artificial municipal boundaries.⁴

The report then outlined a plan whereby there would be six separate geographical police divisions covering between 300,000 and 400,000 people each. Twenty-five police stations would be located within these divisions. This would mean that fourteen existing suburban police stations and one City station would be made redundant. Although Messrs. St. Pierre and Boyle expressed minor reservations about certain aspects of the report, particularly concerning the locations of the new police stations,⁵ all the members of the P.S.C. accepted its main provisions.

The conclusions of the Coderre report were universally condemned in the suburbs. In spite of this, the M.U.C. executive committee drew up a by-law based on its recommendations. On this issue the suburban representatives on the executive committee publicly expressed their opposition. Nevertheless, Lucien Saulnier proposed a by-law to the M.U.C. Council which called for integration by 1 January 1972. When he realized that the suburbs would veto this, he accepted a compromise worked out by Mayors Dawson and Ryan which called for further study concerning the mechanism for bringing about integration. The compromise served its purpose—enough suburban mayors were persuaded to support it even though the principle of total integration remained intact. On 2 March 1971 the M.U.C. Council gave final approval to the integration by-law, although nine suburbs remained opposed. Mayor Dawson was placed in the ironic position of being the chief suburban defender of the integration by-law. He voted for it despite the unanimous opposition of his own city council and of the powerful Mount Royal Property Owners Association. At this stage in the development of the M.U.C., he appeared to be the prime example of the co-opted suburban politician. He had obviously been strongly influenced both by Lucien Saulnier's considerable political skills and by the realities of the existing situation.

According to the M.U.C. Act, the Quebec Municipal Commission was obliged to hold a public hearing on the integration by-law once it had been approved by the M.U.C. Council. It was then the duty of the Commission to recommend to the provincial cabinet whether or not it

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1M.U.C., Minutes of the Council, 2 March 1971.
should be given final approval. The hearings were held in late March and early April, 1971. The Commission received thirteen written briefs. Nine were from various suburban mayors or municipalities, three from anglophone suburban property-owners associations, and one from the welfare and pension organization of the Montreal policemen. All the briefs except this last one urged the Commission to recommend against ratification of the by-law. One of the most outspoken briefs came from the Mount Royal Property Owners Association. Reflecting a general suburban concern about the power of the policemen's brotherhood, the brief pointed to

The danger of total unionization of an integrated Police Force resulting in the grave risk of dictatorial power and control in the hands of police union leaders and members.¹

The same brief described Mayor Dawson's vote in favour of integration as being a 'dictatorial and autocratic act', 'morally indefensible', and 'probably illegal'.² This last charge was argued on the flimsy grounds that Dawson had a conflict of interest because he was both their local representative and a paid member of the M.U.C. executive committee. Similar emotive language was used by the mayor of Beaconsfield when he drew a parallel between Hitler's control of nazi Germany through a centralized police force and the possible dangers of police integration on the Island of Montreal.³ Few briefs, even those prepared by lawyers,  


²Ibid., p. 6.

actually argued that the by-law was illegal, although the lawyers for Mount Royal claimed that, because it would not demonstrably increase police efficiency, it was not in accordance with the M.U.C. Act.\textsuperscript{1} Such arguments could hardly be taken seriously. It appeared that the main function of the hearings was to allow the suburbs once again to proclaim their opposition to losing their police departments. It is interesting to note that all of the suburban briefs came from predominantly anglophone municipalities.

The decision of the Quebec Municipal Commission on the police integration by-law was never publicly released. This was because the minister of municipal affairs took no action on it. Mr. Tessier kept postponing M.U.C. decisions throughout the summer of 1971. On 30 July, however, the minister of justice, Jérôme Choquette, released a white paper on policing in Quebec. Apart from a great many recommendations concerning the province's police forces, most of which involved increased power over the police for the minister of justice, the white paper also recommended the formation of regional police forces under the control of public security councils, the members of which would largely be appointed by the provincial government.\textsuperscript{2} The publication of the white paper made it quite clear that the government favoured police integration, but the fate of the M.U.C. by-law was still unknown. The continuing uncertainty helped lead to the crisis concerning the 1972 M.U.C. budget which was described in the preceding chapter. Provincial policy for the M.U.C.

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\textsuperscript{1}Mount Royal, 'Brief of the Quebec Municipal Commission' (1971).

\textsuperscript{2}Quebec, Department of Justice, \textit{La police et la sécurité des citoyens} (Quebec, Quebec Official Publisher, 1971), pp. 130-5.
police was finally announced on 23 September 1971--by Mr. Choquette, not Mr. Tessier. Choquette made it quite clear that the Quebec Municipal Commission had found serious defects in the M.U.C. by-law, mainly that it had failed to outline a plan for the implementation of integration and it had been drawn up without consulting the policemen's unions. Both these omissions appeared to place the by-law in contravention of Section 233 of the M.U.C. Act. But the government was not concerned with the legal subtleties of the situation. It had decided to ignore the Commission's findings by simply introducing a new bill, the effect of which would be to use provincial law to integrate the police forces of the M.U.C.

On 10 December 1971, Choquette finally presented his bill to the National Assembly. He justified it on the grounds that it was necessary in order to enact the decision of the M.U.C. and that it was a desirable first step in the implementation of his own white paper proposals. His main motivation, however, was his belief that the existence of an M.U.C. Police Department, largely under his indirect control, was essential to his personal crusade against organized crime. Although he did want to eliminate those suburban forces which were corrupt and inefficient, he was more concerned with removing the Montreal police from the direct influence of Jean Drapeau, a man whose concern with fighting organized crime no longer seemed as fervent as it had been twenty years before. Although the suburbs had a brief opportunity to object to the bill during the committee stage, they realized their case was lost and did not put up much of a fight. Bernard Benoît, the president of the

1Le Devoir, 24 September 1971.
Conference of Suburban Mayors of Montreal, expressed their mood of resignation:

...[D]ijisons que toutes les villes de banlieue réalisent une chose: c'est que l'intégration frappe à la porte. Il n'y a pas de doute la-dessus, on le réalise et je pense qu'il n'est pas question de faire marche arrière. Nous sommes assez réalisistes pour admettre que la principe d'intégration a été accepté au sien de la Communauté urbaine, même sur division, il a été accepté.1

The policemen's unions, both in the City and the suburbs, strongly endorsed the bill. The City, which was not represented at the hearings, supported integration but objected to the provisions of the bill which decreased the power of local politicians over the police. Lucien Saulnier expressed this attitude to reporters when he said:

Quant à moi, je crois que l'intérêt public est mieux servi lorsque le pouvoir d'administrer et le de taxer sont entre les mains des mêmes personnes élues. C'est là le principe à la base du gouvernement responsable.2

The fact that Saulnier lost this particular battle with the provincial government was probably one of the reasons contributing to his resignation as chairman of the M.U.C. executive committee two months later.

The bill to establish the Montreal Urban Community Police Department (M.U.C.P.D.) became law on 23 December 1971. On 1 January 1972 the new Department legally replaced the existing twenty-five police departments. The hasty passage of the bill and the short time allowed for its implementation left the Liberal government open to the same criticism that had been levelled against the Union nationale government's handling of the original M.U.C. bill in late 1969.

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1Quebec, National Assembly, Débats, 29e legislature, 2e session, xi, B-6015.
2Quoted in Le Devoir, 11 December 1971.
Apart from legally integrating the police departments and providing guidelines for later practical integration, the bill also completely changed the structure and authority of the Public Security Council. The new P.S.C. was to consist of six members: three, including the chairman, appointed by the provincial government and three elected by the M.U.C. Council from amongst its own members, at least one of whom had to be from the suburbs. The chairman was to have an ordinary vote as well as a casting vote, thus giving the provincial appointees a voting majority. The new P.S.C. was given virtually complete control over the police, subject only to the guidelines of the minister of justice and the Quebec Police Commission. It was also given the exclusive authority to make collective agreements with the police unions. The only responsibility given to the M.U.C. Council was to provide the necessary money. The minister of justice was given the responsibility of appointing the director of the new department but he was to do so only on the recommendation of the P.S.C.\(^1\) However, the first director was to be appointed exclusively by the minister.\(^2\) It was the director who was given the task of making integration a reality. The practical and political difficulties in achieving this, proved far more difficult than the relatively simple process of pushing legislation through the National Assembly.

On 12 January 1972 the new, or 'second', Public Security Council officially took office. The provincially appointed chairman was once again Judge Jacques Coderre. Another provincial appointee was Marcel

\(^1\)Quebec, Statutes, 1971, Chapter 93, s. 2.

\(^2\)Ibid., s. 22.
St. Aubin who had recently retired as the director of the City of Montreal police. The rest of the members were all newcomers to the P.S.C. including Gilles Yergau, a chartered accountant, who was the third provincial appointee. The City representatives were the chairman and vice-chairman of the City's executive committee, Gérard Niding and John Lynch-Staunton, respectively. The suburban representative was Pierre DesMarais II, the mayor of Outremont. All the members except Mr. Lynch-Staunton were francophones. It is important to note that the position of the City representatives on the P.S.C. is unusually difficult. Unlike the M.U.C. itself, the P.S.C. is not controlled by the City and consequently Mayor Drapeau is actively opposed to it. So far the City representatives have been successful in maintaining their loyalty to Drapeau and have not become particularly identified with the policies of the P.S.C.

On 28 January 1972, Mr. Choquette announced the appointment of René Daigneault, an associate director of the City force, as the first director of the Montreal Urban Community Police Department. This was in direct opposition to the wishes of Mayor Drapeau. Choquette's appointment of Daigneault was one of the most dramatic indications of the fact that Drapeau had lost political control over the Montreal police. By taking command of the Montreal police situation, Choquette had done more to reduce Drapeau's power within Montreal than any other politician at any level since 1960.

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1 Le Devoir, 13 January 1972.
2 Ibid., 29 January 1972.
Director Daigneault's first challenge was to deal with the continuing objections from the suburbs concerning the loss of local control over the police. The objections were particularly strong from those anglophone suburbs which had gone to special efforts to provide themselves with superior policing. Westmount was the municipality which presented the most detailed arguments in favour of maintaining the status quo. Its council's apparent objective was to ensure that Westmount received the same police services from the same personnel even after integration was implemented. It seemed to feel that integration could be restricted to a few symbolic rearrangements of authority at the top level while actual patrols and other police functions within the municipalities remained as before. Such a situation would, of course, have defeated the whole purpose of integration which was to equalize and rationalize the allocation of police resources throughout the Island. Much of the Westmount case clearly rested on a desire to maintain a close relationship between citizens and police. This is made clear in a passage from one of the city council's major statements on the integration issue:

The friendly atmosphere which now exists between the Police and the public is based on the close contact which results from the willingness of Police Personnel to provide services to individuals--services which the Police are uniquely qualified to supply. Returning a lost child or senile person to his home, helping someone to put an aged person or invalid back in bed, providing an escort for a business person with late closing hours--these are examples of services provided by the Police...which convince the individual citizen that the Policeman is, indeed, his friend.¹

This kind of argument, which was also made by other anglophone suburbs, omits two important factors. First it makes no mention of

¹Westmount, 'Transfer of Jurisdiction of Police Department--Effect on Operations of the City of Westmount' (18 April 1972), p. 3.
language. Surely one factor which helps a policeman in an anglophone suburb to become the citizen's friend is the likelihood that he will be completely fluent in English and therefore able to totally understand exactly what a distressed citizen might require. As on so many other occasions, the language question was studiously ignored in the debate although it was clearly evident, if not vital to most of the arguments raised. The second omission was the lack of consideration for any of the possible needs of citizens in other municipalities who did not benefit from such comprehensive police services. If personal contact between citizens and police was so important to Westmount citizens, why should other people be denied it? At the same time as Westmount was arguing that its standard of policing should be maintained, it was also arguing for economy on police expenditures within the City of Montreal. The only possible conclusion is that Westmount opposed the extension of its own standards throughout the territory of the M.U.C.

Another subject which concerned the suburbs was a decision made by Director Daigneault in April 1972 to integrate and centralize the communications network of the M.U.C. Police. His plan called for the creation of a system whereby all calls to the M.U.C. Police would be channelled through a central switchboard. This would mean that suburban citizens would no longer be able to place direct telephone calls to their own local police. It would also mean that senior local police officers would lose control of the dispatching of policemen. There were a number of technical objections to this plan, but one communications consultant made the obvious point that any plan for a centralized communications system would at least have to consider the question of the circumstances
under which one or other of the two official languages would be used.\(^1\) Once again, this potentially controversial question was neglected.

Suburban politicians were generally extremely successful in ensuring that their citizens were not immediately affected by the inevitable results of police integration. The only obvious difference that most citizens noticed was that all the Island's police cars were painted with new M.U.C. markings.

If suburban citizens were largely shielded from the immediate effects of integration, suburban policemen were not. It was the younger, ambitious suburban policemen who were most affected by the integration process. Some of them, such as Sergeant Edward Hughes, simply left the force. In May 1974 Sergeant Hughes, who holds an M.A. in criminology, resigned from the M.U.C. police in Westmount. He was quoted in the local newspaper as saying:

> The roads of advancement are closed here....I couldn't work in a professional capacity as a criminologist within the French milieu....If it [the force] had remained Westmount's I don't think I would have left.\(^2\)

The departure of the more talented policemen for these reasons was one of the great fears of anglophone suburban politicians throughout the police integration debate.

Section 53 of the M.U.C. Police Department Act placed this responsibility on the director:

> By priority, after consultation with the municipalities, and the associations representing the policemen and the functionaries, the director...shall prepare and submit to the

\(^1\)W. Ornstein, 'Project of Centralization of Radio Communications on the Territory of the Montreal Urban Community' (report prepared for the City of Westmount, 12 May 1972), p. 10.

\(^2\)Westmount Examiner, 16 May 1974.
Security Council and to the Quebec Police Commission a plan for the allocation of the human and material resources of the department, having regard to the needs of the Community, and to fire prevention in municipalities in which the policemen also act as firemen.¹

The plan then had to be approved by the P.S.C. which had the duty of informing the municipalities of its final content. If a municipality objected to the provisions of the plan, it could appeal to the Quebec Police Commission.² The most interesting feature of this procedure was that there were no occasions on which either the M.U.C. executive committee or council had an opportunity to vote on the final plan for the implementation of police integration.

Director Daigneault chose to go about his assigned task in two distinct phases. In the first phase he worked out a draft of his report as if he had no obligation to consult anyone. The draft report then became the starting point for consultations with the municipalities and the policemen's associations. This process of consultation, and the writing of the final version of the report, constituted the second phase of the project. Although this procedure appeared on the surface to be relatively efficient, it had the effect of upsetting the opponents of integration who, upon the release of the draft report, felt they were being presented with a fait accompli.

The draft version of the report, entitled Allocation des ressources humaines et physiques, was released on 3 August 1972. It was prepared by the planning and research section of the M.U.C. Police Department which consisted exclusively of central City policemen. The report

¹Quebec, Statutes, 1971, Chapter 93, s. 53.
²Ibid.
recommended that, for the purposes of territorial surveillance, the M.U.C. be divided into five operational commands. Each of these commands would be responsible for four or five police stations, of which there would be twenty-four altogether. The division of the territory for operational purposes, and the allocation of men and resources within these territories, raised a storm of protest from the suburbs. In their consideration of territorial allocation the authors of the report attempted to be as objective as possible. The basic geographic unit with which they worked was the municipality as a whole in the case of the suburbs and the area covered by the sixteen police stations in the case of the City. They worked out a system of 'factoral analysis' which determined police requirements for each area on the basis of a complex formula involving size of the population, miles of streets, industrial and commercial concentration, residential concentration, and past records of police calls and occurrences of crimes. The main result of this analysis was to arrive at a percentage of total police resources to which each unit was entitled. Since the existing M.U.C. police force had 146 different patrol sectors and 179 patrol vehicles, these were considered to be the principal resources which were being allocated. The effect of this allocation on each municipality is shown in Table V-1. This table shows that two suburban municipalities, Anjou and Montreal North, gain both patrol sectors and vehicles. Four others—LaSalle, Pointe-aux-Trembles, St. Léonard, and Verdun—gain in one or other of

1Montreal Urban Community, Police Department, Allocation des ressources humaines et physiques (Projet) (Montreal, 1972), p. 28.

2Ibid., p. 127.
Table V-1

EFFECT OF DRAFT DAIGNEAULT REPORT ON ALLOCATION OF POLICE PATROL SECTORS AND VEHICLES ON M.U.C. MUNICIPALITIES HAVING POLICE FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Present No. of Sectors</th>
<th>Allocated No. of Sectors</th>
<th>Present No. of Vehicles</th>
<th>Allocated No. of Vehicles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>95.55</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>117.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anjou</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaconsfield</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.78</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte St. Luc</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollard des Ormeaux</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorval</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.07</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampstead</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.65</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lachine</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaSalle</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal East</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.81</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal North</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal West</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Royal</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierrefonds</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.05</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe Claire</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.86</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe-aux-Trembles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.83</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Léonard</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Pierre</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senneville</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmount</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>146</strong></td>
<td><strong>146</strong></td>
<td><strong>179</strong></td>
<td><strong>179</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1Ibid., p.140.
these categories. All of these municipalities have francophone majorities.

Many suburban observers mocked that part of the report which allocated fractions of police cars to various municipalities. Such figures were, of course, complete abstractions because it was not the intent of the report to be bound by existing municipal boundaries in making all the required territorial divisions. Instead, the authors drew new boundaries derived from their 'factoral analysis'. There were to be twenty-four police stations, each with its own territory and its own assigned number of police cars and patrol sectors. This figure of twenty-four was apparently arrived at by assuming that most City police stations would remain approximately as they were and that suburban stations would be allocated in such a way that each one would have about the same responsibility as the average City one. Three inner suburbs—Westmount, Mount Royal, and Outremont—were all combined with the territory of neighbouring City police stations. Montreal North and St. Laurent were to have police stations of their own. There were to be twelve police stations exclusively serving the City. The remaining seven suburbs and two outlying parts of the City, Rivière-des-Prairies and Notre-Dame-de-Grace. The five geographical commands into which the twenty-four police stations were grouped for administrative purposes bore no relation to any proposed plan for municipal reorganization. They were clearly devised in such a way as to ensure that all commands would have an equal policing burden as calculated by the factoral analysis.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 142-54.
In spite of all the detailed statistical analysis, the report failed to make any clear recommendations concerning the actual locations of the twenty-four proposed police stations. This was surely a glaring omission in a report which was supposed to provide a detailed plan for the implementation of integration. Because of the way in which all the new police station territories were numbered, it was implied that the City police station territories would maintain their identity and hence their actual stations. This in turn implied that Outremont, Mount Royal, and Westmount would all lose their police stations. Protest against the loss became extremely strong in these municipalities and in some others in which citizens feared that their new station would be located too far away. Anyone who turns to the draft Daigneault report for serious analysis concerning this controversial matter will find nothing.

After its release the draft Daigneault report received virtually no public support. The policemen who wrote it were hardly in a position to openly proclaim its virtues in the public political arena. The suburban mayors were, of course, expected to oppose it—and they did. Fortunately for the mayors, the rather crude mathematics in the report supplied them with a great deal of ammunition. Even the City politicians failed to defend it. Their position was no doubt motivated by a desire to regain political control over the P.S.C. before integration became a practical reality. But the greatest blow to the report's credibility was that even Judge Coderre publicly criticized it. In an interview in

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1 See the list on p. 146 of Ibid. which shows that all but one of the existing City police station territories would retain their same number after integration.
La Presse, the chairman of the P.S.C. said that it had been badly presented and badly defended. It was ambiguous and incomplete and therefore suburban opposition was quite understandable. Considerably Coderre's attitude, it was not surprising that there was virtually no provincial support for the plan. Although Jérôme Choquette continued to defend the principle of police integration, he did nothing to hasten the implementation of the Daigneault proposals. Meanwhile other ministers, including Mr. Tessier and ministers with suburban constituencies, expressed public sympathy with the suburban case.

The final version of the Daigneault report was not made public until the summer of 1974, a full two years after the release of the draft. There were few significant changes. The final report divided the M.U.C. territory into regions and police station areas in exactly the same way as the draft version did. However, the final report did more openly confront the issue of the location of the police stations. It recommended that three new stations be built and that twenty stations, four of them in the City, be declared redundant. The list of sixteen redundant suburban stations did not include those of Westmount and Mount Royal. The fact that these were allowed to remain was just one indication of the increased political sensitivity of the final version of the report. However, there were, of course, strong feelings within some other suburbs that they too should not lose their station. People in

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1 La Presse, 14 November 1972.

2 The only difference was that some of the police stations were given different numbers. M.U.C.P.D., Allocation of the Human and Physical Resources (Montreal, 1974), p. 61.

3 Ibid., p. 62.
LaSalle were especially upset because Daigneault had once again recommended that their station be closed and that they be served by the one in Verdun instead.

Although factorial analysis was still the basis for the territorial allocation of resources, the final version of the report contained fewer mathematical formulations than the draft. In the final version there were no calculations based on existing municipalities and hence there were no references to fractions of patrol cars and other units of police equipment. This, combined with a well organized and colourful method of graphic presentation, made the whole report appear to be much more professional and credible than its predecessor. In fact, however, the substance was not much different. The M.U.C. was to have a centralized police force with virtually no structural ties to existing municipalities. Its resources were to be allocated according to strict mathematical formulae using data of dubious value. Its operating procedures and structures were to be established without any explicit recognition of Montreal's unique linguistic and cultural environment.

The final Daigneault report was considered by the Public Security Council in July 1974, immediately prior to its public release. The Council seemed mainly concerned with the future relationship between itself and the integrated, restructured force. In particular, Council members wanted to ensure that they maintained full financial and budgetary control over the actions of the force. The Daigneault report was not at all clear concerning this issue, particularly since it called for the establishment of a vaguely defined 'management control' unit reporting directly to the director.\(^1\) Two members of the Council, Pierre

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 12.
DesMarais and Gilles Yergau actually voted against approving the report,¹ precisely for this reason. As the suburban representative on the Council, DesMarais was particularly anxious to ensure that the police force did not gain increased control over its already rapidly rising expenditures.²

When the final Daigneault report was released after its approval by the P.S.C., there was very little public reaction or debate. This can no doubt be explained by the fact that it was the middle of the summer and that the debate on Bill 22 was focussing most Montrealers' attention on Quebec City. In fact, opponents of the proposed closure of the police station in LaSalle suggested that the timing of the release of the report was deliberately arranged so that public reaction would be muted.³ Because provincial legislation demanded that objections to the Daigneault report be filed within fifteen days, suburban municipalities had little choice but to react quickly. Twenty-three M.U.C. municipalities consequently notified the Quebec Police Commission that they wished their objections to be formally considered.⁴ Daigneault's plan for bringing about real police integration was still far from being implemented.

¹M.U.C., P.S.C., Minutes, meeting of 17 July 1974.
³Ibid., 26 July 1974.
⁴Quebec, Quebec Police Commission, Décisions, ordonnances et recommandations relative au plan d'allocation des ressources humaines et physiques de Service de police de la Communauté urbaine de Montréal (Quebec, Quebec Official Publisher, 1975), pp. 8-9. The suburban municipalities which did not object were: Montreal North, Verdun, Cote St. Luc, Baie d'Urfé, Roxboro, Senneville, and Ste. Geneviève.
Shortly after the approval of the Daigneault report by the P.S.C. Judge Coderre announced his resignation. Nobody was particularly sorry to see him go as he had proven to be a somewhat rigid administrator, intent on implementing the letter of the law rather than on conciliating conflicting interests. However, when justice minister Choquette announced that his successor would be Paul-Emile L'Ecuyer, a personal advisor on organized crime in Choquette's own office, there was considerable feeling in Montreal that this was further evidence that Choquette wanted the Montreal police directly under his personal control. L'Ecuyer assumed his new office on 28 August 1974. Three months later, following the City of Montreal elections, John Lynch-Staunton was forced off the P.S.C. because he had lost his seat on the City council. He was replaced by a member of the new City executive committee, Fernard Desjardins. This meant that none of the six members of L'Ecuyer's P.S.C. were anglophones. Because Lynch-Staunton, as a follower of Jean Drapeau, was no friend of the suburbs, his departure from the P.S.C. had no bearing on the issue of whether or not local anglophone police forces would retain autonomy. Furthermore, it was already apparent that, regardless of the composition of the P.S.C., the main decisions on this issue would be taken at the provincial level anyway.

In early 1975 Mr. L'Ecuyer made a concerted effort to win support from the suburbs. After making pledges that he would allow for more local control, impose tighter limits on spending, and improve the

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1 Le Devoir, 22 August 1974.
3 The Gazette, 10 December 1974.
morale and leadership of the force, L'Ecuyer appeared to have gained
the trust and support of many suburban mayors.\(^1\) At one point, he even
tackled the hitherto neglected issue of the ethnic make-up of the force.
In July 1975 he pointed out that the M.U.C. police force was 94.1%
French while the population it served was only 60% French. He was
particularly concerned with having more Greek and Italian policemen who
could be assigned to sections of the city in which those ethnic groups
were concentrated. He even stated that some courses for policemen-in-
training would be conducted in English.\(^2\) Although rarely discussed in
public, the issue of the language capabilities of policemen had
surfaced briefly earlier in the year when a prominent member of the
Westmount Municipal Association complained that, as a result of the
arrival of new recruits, 'communications problems' had developed between
citizens and police. He pointed out that 'unilingual French is no good
when 80% of the population which the police are dealing with is
English'.\(^3\) Although L'Ecuyer seemed to be addressing himself to these
types of problems, suburban mayors soon became disenchanted with his
leadership. Despite his promises, there was little indication, even
two years after his appointment, that significant improvements were
being made.

The Quebec Police Commission held public hearings on the
Daigneault report from 25 February to 20 June 1975.\(^4\) This was the

\(^1\) For example, see North Shore News, 1 May 1975 and Westmount
Examiner, 29 May and 12 June 1975.
\(^2\) The Gazette, 7 July 1975.
\(^3\) Westmount Examiner, 15 May 1975.
\(^4\) Quebec, Q.P.C., Decisions, p. 10.
first time the issue of police integration had been the subject of formal public discussion since the fruitless Quebec Municipal Commission hearings on the Coderre report four years earlier. The hearings gave the suburbs another chance to reiterate their concerns about declining police effectiveness and the need for local political control. In all, the Commission heard sixty witnesses and received fourteen written briefs.¹

The Commission's conclusions were made public at the end of November. In a highly complex judgment the Commission gave only partial approval to the Daigneault report and made a long series of recommendations to replace or supplement those made by Daigneault. In general, the Commission objected to the report for relying too extensively on City of Montreal models and experiences, for not taking sufficient account of local differences, and for placing too much weight on questionable quantitative data.² The Commission also criticized the report for not making sufficient distinction between the duties of the director of the force and those of the Public Security Council.³

The Commission's most drastic amendments had to do with the division of the territory. As a general principle, the Commission accepted the argument put forward by many of the suburbs:

La Commission est d'avis que pour effectuer la délimitation des districts et des divisions dans le cadre d'une régionalisation policier, un facteur prépondérant emerge soit le respect des communautés d'intérêt, des traditions, des affinités et des particularismes des populations desservies.⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 9-10. ²Ibid., pp. 49-51. ³Ibid., p. 79. ⁴Ibid., pp. 124-5.
Starting from this assumption, the Commission drew a new map containing twenty-three, instead of twenty-four, police districts. The map was substantially different than Daigneault's. The fact that Westmount was grouped with anglophone Notre-Dame-de-Grace rather than francophone St. Henri and Ville Emard indicated a more realistic appreciation of the constraints imposed both by Montreal's road network and by its patterns of linguistic concentration. As far as the regional divisions were concerned, the Commission stated that it was more concerned with the homogeneity of each region than with ensuring that they were all equal in size. As a result, the Commission called for the establishment of seven regions rather than five. The Commission dealt with the different subject of the closure of police stations by stating that they should all remain, except for the one in St. Pierre, which could be closed as soon as its policemen were no longer needed as firemen. The Commission suggested that many police districts would benefit by containing various existing police stations which could serve as small 'satellites' to the main one.

Reaction to the Commission's report was generally favourable. Most suburban mayors applauded its emphasis on decentralization and the protection of suburban police stations. In spite of the fact that his report was heavily criticized by the Commission, Director Daigneault seemed quite content with its findings. This was undoubtedly because the Commission seemed to have taken his side in a growing struggle for power between the director's office and the Public Security Council.

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1Ibid., pp. 145-9.
2Ibid., p. 164.
3Ibid., p. 349.
4Ibid., p. 344.
In fact, Paul-Emile L'Ecuyer was the only public opponent of the report. He claimed that the Q.P.C. wanted to turn the P.S.C. into a 'rubber stamp' and that it was completely insensitive to the need for civilian control over police administration and finance.¹ By not publicly backing L'Ecuyer's position, the suburbs, particularly the inner ones, showed that their main concern was to protect their police stations and to ensure that police districts were established in such a way as to be responsive to local needs and peculiarities. In spite of L'Ecuyer's good intentions, the suburbs had no particular reason to come to the defence of the P.S.C. They were content to accept the Q.P.C. report and hope that the government would act on it.

Government action was, as usual, rather slow. The reason for the delay on this occasion was that Jérôme Choquette was no longer the minister in charge of the police. In a cabinet shuffle on 30 July 1975, Premier Bourassa moved Choquette to the ministry of education and placed responsibility for the province's police forces in the hands of Fernand Lalonde, the new solicitor-general and M.N.A. for Montreal suburban constituency of Marguerite-Bourgeoys.² Unlike Choquette, Lalonde was a close and trusted colleague of Bourassa who had already been given the politically difficult task of implementing the non-educational provisions of Bill 22 (the Official Language Act). Before acting on the Q.P.C. report, Lalonde needed to ensure that he had a complete grasp of a policy area that, over the last few years, had become Choquette's personal preserve.

¹The Gazette, 29 November 1975.
²Ibid., 31 July 1975.
Lalonde's period of contemplation ended on 15 June 1976 when he announced that the cabinet had approved the Q.P.C. report almost in its entirety. Like the Q.P.C., Lalonde seemed to have accepted suburban arguments concerning the need for decentralization and for a territorial division based on social reality rather than statistical formulation. He went even further in meeting suburban requests by simultaneously tabling legislation that would add an additional suburban representative to the P.S.C. By this action the provincial government seemed to be recognizing the principle that, in police matters at least, the suburbs and the City were equal. In its pre-Olympic state of political weakness, there was little the Drapeau administration could do to object. However, Montreal Citizens Movement spokesmen deplored the further erosion of the City's political power.

The police integration issue was bungled at the provincial level from the very beginning. The problems began in 1969 when the Union nationale government decided to integrate the police costs of the Island of Montreal without at the same time taking direct responsibility for integrating the various existing forces. This meant that the first two years of the M.U.C.--so crucial to its emergence as a viable institution--were poisoned by the existence of this highly controversial and divisive

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1Ibid., 16 June 1976. Notwithstanding this statement, the final Order-in-Council was not approved until 25 October 1976. This gave the P.S.C. the power to make further changes in the plan. Such changes were still being made in early 1978.

2The proposed legislation had still not been approved when the National Assembly was dissolved in October 1976. In 1977 the new government passed legislation which reduced the powers of the P.S.C., reduced provincial control, and granted City-suburban equality.
issue. When the M.U.C. and the Quebec Municipal Commission proved incapable of dealing with it, Jérôme Choquette convinced the Liberal cabinet, in late 1971, to let him take control of the burgeoning confusion.

Rather than imposing increased cost control and administrative supervision on the various police forces pending the development of a plan to implement formal integration, Choquette chose to legislate integration and develop the plan later. To compound the problem, Choquette placed the development of the plan in the hands of the director of the formally integrated police department but did not give him the authority to implement it. It became evident that the director and his small staff had neither the competence to draw up a plan to suit Montreal's special needs and resources nor the ability to rally support for their objectives in the political arena. The Quebec Police Commission, acting more as a political broker than a quasi-judicial agency, eventually worked out a formula that was acceptable even to the suburbs. The package was further adapted to suburban demands when Fernand Lalonde offered them a concession or two of his own.

This bizarre process resulted from the tendency of most of the important sets of actors to insist on ignoring certain vital facts. The provincial government refused to acknowledge that police integration was a political issue and that, once the process has been set in motion, it could not escape the political responsibility for carrying it out. Director Daigneault and his staff went along with the pretense that integration was a purely technical matter and found themselves vilified on all sides for relying too much on technical skills and procedures.
The City of Montreal refused to adapt to its loss of control of police matters and hence ignored the integration issue altogether. The English suburbs never accepted the principle that all parts of the Island should have the same standard of policing and that it should be paid for by the municipalities in direct relation to their financial resources. Because they did not accept this principle, they could not fully participate in the process of working out its implementation. French suburban councils generally seemed more concerned with the cost of integration and the loss of local control than with standards of local service. They seemed more likely to ignore the obvious need for levels of police training, clearly structured lines of control, and the provision of adequate salaries and resources.  

The effects of linguistic divisions on the police integration process were subtle and did not feature in open public discussion. This can no doubt be explained by realizing that the police are controlled by a body (the P.S.C.) that is far removed from public view; that most politically active citizens do not interact with the police on a regular basis; and that the nature of police work precludes any significant division of the force into French and English units. Nevertheless, the police integration process was far more complicated and controversial in Montreal than it was in Toronto and Winnipeg. This difference cannot be totally accounted for by the effects of Montreal's peculiar linguistic make-up. The fact that the suburbs had escaped the effects of the City

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1In many respects, the differences in approach towards the police parallels differences found in American cities. See James Q. Wilson, Varieties of Police Behaviour (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1968), especially Chapters 5-7.
of Montreal police strike in 1969 undoubtedly made suburban politicians particularly anxious to maintain control of the police. However, there is an important linguistic dimension to this issue. Many suburban anglophones were disturbed at the prospect of losing well-known local policemen who were totally fluent in English. Anglophone suburban policemen were justifiably concerned that their prospects for advancement and promotion would be limited unless they could work in French as well as in English. As a result, a good many left in order to work elsewhere. This in turn exacerbated general anglophone distrust of the integration process. Although most anglophones did not see police integration as a threat to their presence on the Island of Montreal, it was just one more piece of evidence that they were losing control of their own local environment.

The dictates of organizational rationality clearly pointed to one unified police force for the Island of Montreal, especially given the nature of existing municipal boundaries and the fact that the decision had already been taken in late 1969 to pool the costs of policing the Island. In light of these circumstances, it seems astonishing that the final government approval of the actual integration plan did not take place until July 1976. On the policing issue the requirements of organizational rationality eventually won out, but only after a long, and largely private, period of bitter political and bureaucratic in-fighting. This section has shown that language differences were a complicating, although not a predominant factor, in the final outcome.

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Because the language division is not so relevant to policing as it is to other services, the creation of a unified police department eventually proved possible.

3. Social Services

The delivery of personal social services through community-based institutions has not received much attention from students of Canadian urban politics. This is mainly because these institutions have traditionally been administered by private boards of directors and financed through charitable foundations. However, as private philanthropy became increasingly incapable of meeting constantly expanding demands, the federal and provincial levels of government were forced to provide extensive subsidies. These governments managed Canada's tax resources in such a way that municipalities were rarely given sufficient funds to make anything more than short-term, limited contributions. Consequently, their degree of power within this field has never been significant. It is because hospitals, residential institutions, and social service organizations have largely escaped control by municipal government or other public bodies that their method of governance has been ignored.

In most instances, Canada's provincial governments have exercised their constitutional responsibility for the regulation of social service facilities by bringing them under some form of direct provincial control.\(^1\) Although local boards of directors have usually continued to exist, they have rarely been of interest to the political scientist. This is because they have only a limited scope for decision-making, their

\(^1\)H. Philip Hepworth, *Personal Social Services in Canada* (Ottawa, Canadian Council on Social Development, 1975), 1, 9.
meetings are usually closed to the public, and few, if any, of their members are chosen through a process of election. Only in British Columbia and Quebec have there been serious efforts to establish public, territorially-based councils with some degree of control over local social service facilities. So far, these efforts have not been particularly successful. Although other provinces are contemplating less radical schemes for making social service institutions more responsive to local needs, none have chosen to place them under the control of municipal councils. Consequently, such institutions are likely to remain insulated from the normal urban political process.

As implied in the previous paragraph, personal social services in Toronto and Winnipeg, as in most Canadian cities, are administered mainly by government-funded private organizations and to a lesser extent by agencies of municipal governments. In neither of these two cities has there been any significant pressure to change this situation, although a recent study of Metro Toronto has urged that the metropolitan government take over exclusive authority in the field of child welfare services from the Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto, Catholic Children's Aid, and Jewish Child and Family Services. Because neither Ontario nor Manitoba has attempted the kind of reform found in Quebec, it is impossible to compare the Montreal experience to that of Toronto and Winnipeg. However, the reorganization of social services is included

1The British Columbia experience has been described by Vaughan Lyon in 'The Community Resource Boards of British Columbia: A Preliminary Evaluation', a paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Quebec City, 30 May 1976.

2Ontario, Metropolitan Toronto (1977), pp. 358 and 370.
in this thesis because it vividly illustrates two important points that are highly relevant in the context of this study.

First, a survey of the evolution of the social services system in Montreal serves as one of the most dramatic indicators of the deepness of the linguistic cleavage in Montreal. Although Montreal's religious cleavages have also been reflected in social service structures, it is important to note that English catholic social service agencies have co-operated much more closely with the English protestants than they have with French catholics. In fact, the apparent widespread desire in both linguistic communities to have separate language-based social service agencies makes the option of municipal control much less realistic than it is for Metropolitan Toronto.

The second reason why the social services case is important is that it dramatically indicates the commitment of the Quebec government to principles of organizational rationality. The reformed network of social service institutions in Quebec comes much closer to satisfying these principles than that of any other province in Canada. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that, because Quebec's system was previously much more antiquated and fragmented, the need for drastic reform was more desperate. Nevertheless, similar arguments could be made for Quebec's municipal system, especially as it exists in Montreal—yet in the municipal field much less reform has taken place. The probable reason for this is that for social services the linguistic cleavage can be accommodated by providing dual networks of institutions. Because there can only be one municipality covering a given territory, such a solution is not possible in the municipal arena and, despite Quebec's
obvious commitments to structural reform based on principles of organizational rationality, little has been accomplished.

In order to understand the social services issue in Quebec, it must be realized that until well into the twentieth century social services in Quebec were provided almost exclusively by the Roman catholic and protestant churches and by various ethnic-based organizations such as the St. Patrick's Society. In 1882 the Municipal Code entrusted municipalities with administering direct assistance and with subsidizing charitable institutions. However, because this was a discretionary rather than an obligatory function, few municipalities exercised it. The first significant provincial government intervention in the social services took place in 1921. In that year the Legislative Assembly approved the Public Charities Act. It was implemented in order to provide financial assistance to any religious, charitable, or municipal institution that either hospitalized or housed those poor people who were unable to look after themselves. For the purposes of the Act, these institutions were to be recognized by a new provincial agency called the Bureau of Public Charities. Recognized institutions were to have one-third of the cost of looking after each person paid by the government and one-third by the municipality in which he lived. The institution itself continued to be responsible for the remaining one-third.

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1 Quebec, Report of the Study Committee on Public Assistance (Quebec, 1963), p. 31.
2 Quebec, Statutes, 1921, Chapter 79.
3 Esdras Minville, Labour Legislation and Social Services, A Study Prepared for the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939), p. 55.
Act aroused considerable opposition from some Roman catholics on the grounds that it would lead to a state take-over of the social services. However, the Act was later administered in such a way that these fears were totally unjustified.

In its original form, the Public Charities Act did not apply to the work of social service organizations which assisted poor people within their own homes. Nevertheless, the work and responsibilities of these agencies had increased greatly during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Anglophone agencies had grouped themselves into three different federations for the purpose of co-ordinating their activities and for raising and distributing charitable funds. The federations were known by the following names: Montreal Council of Social Agencies, which served protestant charities; the Federation of Catholic Charities, later known as the Federation of Catholic Community Services; and the Federation of Jewish Philanthropies, later called Allied Jewish Community Services. ¹ Although these federations were recognized as being methodical, efficient, and advanced, ² even they could not cope with the demands placed upon them by the Great Depression of the 1930s. In order to provide them with some additional help, the provincial government began to subsidize their financial assistance programme under the terms of the Public Charities Act, thereby treating them as 'institutions without walls'. ³ This was the beginning of a slow

process of growing government intervention in Montreal's anglophone social services.

Because of the influence of the religious orders, the development of lay social structures was considerably retarded amongst Montreal francophones. It was not until 1938 that the first lay agency, the Bureau d'assistance aux familles (later the Société de service social aux familles) was founded. Prior to that time, in order to take advantage of government assistance to social service agencies, the church had established various social service agencies within most of its dioceses. In Montreal these agencies were not federated until 1933, with the establishment of the Fédération des oeuvres de charité canadienne-françaises. Its activities were restricted to fund raising while coordination was carried out by a parallel organization known as Conseil des oeuvres de Montréal (later the Conseil de développement social du Montréal métropolitain).¹

At the outbreak of World War II, Montreal possessed four separate federations of social service agencies. However, the anglophone agencies of all faiths were now being co-ordinated by the Montreal Council for Social Agencies. Fund-raising for protestant and non-sectarian charities was carried out by a nominally separate group known as the Red Feather organization. Generally speaking, though, each linguistic or religious group was allowed to go its own way. Because of their greater resources and smaller number of cases, the anglophones were able to provide an exceedingly high level of service. Francophones, however,

¹Quebec, Report on Health and Social Services, vi, 46.
undoubtedly lagged behind. Their system of social service delivery was confused, splintered and poorly co-ordinated.¹ Their church-dominated institutions seemed unable to cope with the complex social problems of the industrial age.

Although a separate provincial Department of Social Welfare was first established in 1944, most aspects of social service remained under the jurisdiction of either the Provincial Secretary or the Minister of Health until 1957. In that year the Department took control of orphanages, nurseries, and social service agencies.² In the same year the City of Montreal took on a much more active role in the social service field. Its welfare department was recognized as a public charitable institution with authority to grant financial assistance and to place children and sick and aged adults in residential institutions. It appeared at this time that, in the field of social services, it was the Montreal municipal government that was destined to replace the church. This trend was confirmed in 1959 when the City gained exclusive authority to administer financial assistance within its territory. It also took control of the placement of all francophones requiring residential social assistance. Under the agreement francophone social service agencies agreed to restrict themselves to prevention and rehabilitation functions. Anglophone agencies continued as before except that they no longer granted any direct financial aid.³

²Quebec, Report on Public Assistance, p. 34.
³Ibid., p. 35.
This structurally shaky system came under great strain in the early 1960s. In 1959 Quebec signed a federal-provincial agreement which provided for 50% federal funding of a general public assistance scheme for those people without unemployment insurance who were unable to find work. 'For the first time in the history of social security in the Province of Quebec, a social measure was adopted which, whatever may have been the legislator's intention, considered indigence, irrespective of the causes, as a factual situation justifying assistance by the State'.¹ Formerly, there had been no uniform scheme of general assistance throughout the province, and social service agencies and municipal governments had chosen their recipients by a detailed, and often humiliating, series of means tests which varied throughout the province. Since the new scheme fell under the Public Charities Act, municipalities and social service agencies were each supposed to be paying a share of the cost. However, due to high unemployment and because many people found that the new scheme weakened their inhibitions about applying for public assistance, only the provincial government had sufficient funds to pay its share of the greatly increased costs. In May of 1960, immediately before the provincial election, the requirement that social service agencies and municipalities contribute to the scheme was abolished.² Faced with spiralling costs, the Department of Social Welfare soon placed rigid financial controls on social service agencies and those municipalities dispensing public assistance. For the agencies it meant a further decline in the extent of their independence. For municipal social welfare departments, it meant that they had become

¹Ibid., p. 55.  
²Ibid., p. 36.
little more than funnels for provincial funds. In fact, the provincial
government soon established its own welfare offices in every part of
the province except Montreal. The provincial take-over also ended the
unfortunate practices of some municipalities, including certain Montreal
suburbs, which strove to ensure that they contained no indigents to
whose support they might have to contribute. Some municipalities went
so far as to pay the moving expenses of indigents whom they had convinced
to relocate in another municipality.¹

By the mid-1960s Quebec's social services were a tangled mess of
hundreds of nominally private and independent institutions administering
dozens of provincial programs under varying levels of central control.
Within Montreal the two linguistic groups had developed completely self-
contained systems for the delivery of personal services and the religious
groups within the anglophone sector still possessed considerable inde­
pendence. Although rationalization and co-ordination throughout the
province was obviously required, it was not at all clear how this might
be brought about, particularly within an area so diverse and heavily
populated as metropolitan Montreal. By 1971 the Montreal Council of
Social Agencies and The Conseil de développement social du Montréal
métropolitain were beginning to pool their resources² but, from the
viewpoint of the government, this was undoubtedly an action that had
come many years too late.

¹Ibid., p. 154.

²See Report of the Activities of the Montreal Council of Social
Agencies and Le Conseil de développement social du Montréal métropolitain
(Montreal, 1972).
Shortly after he took office in 1966, the Union nationale minister who headed both the health and social welfare departments announced the appointment of a commission of inquiry to study the 'entire field of health and social welfare'. Its first chairman was Claude Castonguay, a Quebec City actuary. Of the other seven members, five were from the Island of Montreal and one of these was an anglophone social worker. From 1970 onwards the chairman was Gerard Nepveu, a civil servant who had first been appointed as the commission's secretary. Castonguay had left the commission in order to enter politics as Robert Bourassa's minister of social affairs. Although the subject matter of the Castonguay-Nepveu commission was extremely broad, this thesis is concerned only with the material relating to the political and administrative organization of the province's social services.

The commission's recommendations on this subject were made public in 1972. It suggested that social service organization be based on the province's ten administrative regions but that the Montreal region be divided into three parts: the Islands of Montreal, Jésus, and Bizard; the area south of the St. Lawrence and Ottawa Rivers; and the area north of these rivers. Each of the twelve regions would have one major social service organization to be known as a 'centre for the delivery of personal adjustment services'. However, the Island of Montreal and Quebec City regions, because of their population size, would have an unspecified number of extra centres. 'Community centres' would also be established

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1Quebec, Report on Health and Social Services (1967), i, ix.
2Ibid., x. 3Ibid., vi, 6.
4Ibid., vi (Tome 1), 131. 5Ibid., 222-3.
to serve populations of between 15,000 and 40,000. They would provide
day care centres, community organization workers, and various other
preventative social services. In Montreal certain community centres
would be designated to work with each of the city's main ethnic communi-
ties. Apart from this one reference to Montreal's heterogeneous ethnic
composition, the commission made no suggestions as to how Montreal's
existing social service system might be adapted to the proposed unified,
monolithic system.

The recommendations also suggested that all residential social
service institutions be thoroughly integrated into the new system. Each
region would have a network of institutions for such people as the
handicapped, those requiring specialized care, old people, orphans, and
those temporarily in need of refuge and assistance. All these institu-
tions and the two types of social service centre mentioned above would
come under the administrative control of a 'regional social services
office'.

Unfortunately for the commission, its recommendations on the
social services came out after the government had already legislated a
massive reorganization in which Quebec's health and social services
were dealt with together. This had been done under the leadership of
Claude Castonguay whose first legislative project in late 1970 had been
to merge the ministries of health and social services into a new Ministry
of Social Affairs. Castonguay had justified this action on the grounds

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1Ibid., 228.
2Ibid., vi (Tome 2), 53-5.
3Ibid., 57.
that it would lead to more efficient delivery of both kinds of services.\(^1\)

Given that the commission's social service recommendations were based on the assumption that there would be two separate ministries, it is not surprising that they were not implemented in the manner that the commission had proposed.

Castonguay announced the government's plan for reorganizing the province's health and social services in July of 1971. His proposed law, Bill 65, stated that the administration of all these services was to be completely reorganized and decentralized. 'Regional offices of social affairs' were to be established in order to decentralize the administration and control of both health and social services.\(^2\) Bill 65 also stated that 'local community service centres' were to be set up. They would be the main local point of delivery for social services as well as day-to-day health care. Residential social service institutions were to be treated in accordance with the main proposals of the commission. They were to be totally subsidized and totally public. Private institutions could remain but receive no subsidies. 'Social service centres' were to be established in each region to correspond to the commission's centres for the delivery of personal adjustment services.\(^3\)

Hearings on the main principles of Bill 65 were held by the social affairs committee of the National Assembly from 24 August to 2 December 1971. Sixty-one organizations or individuals made oral presentations and another twenty-one groups submitted written briefs.

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\(^1\)Québec, Assemblée Nationale, Débats, x (1970), 1890.
\(^2\)Ibid., xi (1971), 3281-2.
\(^3\)Ibid.
which were not publicly considered by the committee.\footnote{For a general analysis of the briefs presented, see Vincent Lemieux, François Renaud, and Brigitte von Schoenberg, Les conseils régionaux de la santé et des services sociaux: Une analyse politique (Département de science politique, Université Laval, 1974), pp. 26-33.} Many were from professional groups concerned with the extent of government interference in professional activities. There were also a good many from individual institutions concerned with how Bill 65 would affect their particular activities and functions. The over-riding concern of most groups was that the government was establishing mechanisms that were far too complex and bureaucratic. Most feared that the proposed regional offices would either be under the direct control of the ministry and therefore would be simply another source of 'red tape' or that they would have too much freedom and therefore would arbitrarily be able to interfere in the internal operations of individual institutions.

Only a few of the briefs dealt directly with the unique problems of delivering social services on the Island of Montreal. However, the committee did hear separate pleas for the maintenance of autonomy for Montreal's French catholics, English catholics, and Jews. Mr. Pierre Hurteau, the director of the Société d'adoption et de protection de l'enfance de Montréal, was upset that Bill 65 made no provisions for the distinct ethnic, cultural, and linguistic characteristics of the population.\footnote{Québec, Débats, xi (1971), B3609.} He suggested that Quebec could learn from the experience of Holland where the state officially recognizes the plural nature of the society and provides for special representation of catholics and protestants. Although Mr. Hurteau recognized that such representation
might not be necessary in other parts of the province, he felt that Montreal was especially suited for it. Possessing what seems in retrospect to be an uncanny foreknowledge of things to come, Mr. Hurteau made this interesting remark: 'Il serait assez bizarre qu'au Québec seule la minorité juive puisse maintenir des services confessionels'. No other Montreal French catholic took such a firm stand in favour of maintaining French catholic social service structures. Most others accepted the need for state-controlled secular structures, although not all accepted the government proposals for bringing this about.

Montreal's English catholics made only one presentation to the committee. It came from Mr. Richard MacKlewn, chairman of the social agency called Catholic Family and Children's Services. Mr. MacKlewn earned his living by being the North American director of the operations of the Rolls-Royce company. His concern seemed to be more with language than religion; 'the main thrust of all these recommendations is to demonstrate the need for a continuation of English language services for clients who speak that language'. Castonguay pointed out that social service legislation in Quebec had never taken language into account. He assumed that Bill 65 would have no effect on the practices that had been built up concerning the language in which Montreal's various health and social services were delivered. In taking this position, Castonguay was readily supported by the parliamentary leader of the Parti québécois, Camille Laurin, who stated that the minister was quite correct in deliberately omitting any reference to language.

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1 Ibid., B3623. 2 Ibid., B3614. 3 Ibid., B5338. 4 Ibid., B5339.
He stated that this was a problem 'which really has not arisen practically'. Of course, the reason it had not arisen was that until then there had been separate social service agencies for each of the four main ethnic-linguistic groups. The English catholics were clearly quite justified in fearing that, because Bill 65 was changing the structures, it might also be changing the practices.

A joint brief from various Jewish organizations in Montreal pleaded with the government to allow their separate institutions for health and social services to continue to exist. Their spokesman stated that experience in other cities had shown that unified, non-sectarian agencies were incapable of dealing with the special needs of the Jewish family. Although Castonguay made no promises to the Jews, spokesmen for the Union nationale and Créditiste parties stated that they supported the idea of separate social services for francophones, Jews, and 'anglo-saxons'. Interestingly enough, however, the committee hearings did not produce a single protestant 'anglo-saxon' demand for the maintenance of any kind of ethnic or linguistic social service structures.

Following the committee hearings, Castonguay presented a completely new version of Bill 65. Its most notable feature was the virtual abandonment of the idea of establishing powerful regional offices. Instead, these were replaced by 'regional councils of health and social services' which were to have almost no administrative responsibilities. Their main role was to act as a link between the ministry and the various

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1Ibid.  
2Ibid., B4843.  
3Ibid., B4845.  
4Ibid., B4885.
establishments. This change represented a major concession to those professionals and administrators who had protested so strenuously against the imposition of another layer of governmental control. It also meant that further centralization in Quebec City would become inevitable. The new version of Bill 65 provoked little debate and it became law on 24 December 1971. Although the bill was less disruptive of the status quo than had originally been envisioned, it did open up the hitherto private boards of directors of the province's health and social service institutions to a much broader range of the population; it brought all institutions under much closer governmental control; and it established the new regional councils. However, the more detailed changes caused by the bill, particularly as they affected Montreal, were not to be known for another ten to fifteen months.

Although the boundaries of the territories to be covered by each regional council were not stated in Bill 65, it was clear by mid-1972 that the one for Montreal would consist of the Islands of Montreal, Bizard, and Jésus. This territory is larger than that covered by the Montreal Urban Community because it included the City of Laval (Île-Jésus). Although the Council of Health and Social Services of Metropolitan Montreal (C.H.S.S.M.M.) began operations in late 1972, it was not fully operational until March of 1973 when its board of directors

1 Lemieux, Renaud, and von Schoenberg, Les conseils régionaux, pp. 33-5.

2 For population figures, see Chapter II-2.

3 For an account of these early months, see Council of Health and Social Services of Metropolitan Montreal, Annual Report 1972 (Montreal, 1973).
was complete and its first director-general was established in office.

The C.H.S.S.M.M. has the same official functions as the province's other regional health and social service councils. In fact, these functions are very few. Its chief administrative responsibility is to regulate and supervise the election of the boards of directors of the various health and social service institutions. It also receives complaints concerning the services provided in these institutions; makes recommendations resulting from these complaints; promotes the setting up of common services; and carries out any special regional task assigned by the minister. It has a general responsibility to promote co-operation, planning, and citizen participation but it has no independent authority to implement policies based on these lofty ideals.¹

The local environment in which the C.H.S.S.M.M. is forced to operate is completely unlike that of the other regional councils. It has the largest population (36% of the province) and the smallest territory. Its health and social service facilities are larger, more complex, and more specialized than those found elsewhere.² In a study of the activities of the province's regional councils, three researchers at Université Laval discovered that the Montreal council has the most difficulty in penetrating the independence of the existing institutions and in making contact with the population.³ The first problem was

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¹Quebec, Statutes, 1971, Chapter 48, s. 16 and 17. See also Claude E. Forget, 'Développement et implantion des services de santé et des services sociaux au Québec', Canadian Public Administration, XVII (1974), 32-5.


³Lemieux, Renaud, and von Schoenberg, Les conseils régionaux, ch. VII and VII. Lemieux et al. identify the various regional councils
undoubtedly caused by the fact that so many of its institutions were so large and important that they were accustomed to dealing directly with the top levels of the ministry. The second was simply the result of the size and heterogeneity of a population which was, at the same time, also being confronted with the existence of a number of other new metropolitan structures.

There is nothing in Bill 65 or the regulations made under it which acknowledged that the C.H.S.S.M.M., unlike other regional councils, contains both French and English networks of health and social services, each of which is separate and complete in itself. Research for the Gendron commission on language policy, conducted immediately prior to the implementation of Bill 65, has shown the extent to which this linguistic separation actually existed. First of all the study found that there was no such thing in Montreal as a hospital that was totally bilingual. All could be classified as either French or English. However, hospital administrators of both languages did make special efforts to ensure that employees working for outpatient or emergency services were capable of operating in both languages.\(^1\) Although hospitals did not keep only by randomly selected letters. This is an attempt to preserve their individual anonymity in a study that was government-sponsored and which dealt with certain delicate issues. However, on page 157, a table concerning responses to a questionnaire shows that metropolitan Montreal was the only region for which there were seventeen responses. In other tables concerning the questionnaire in the study, the N for Region E is consistently seventeen. This, together with certain statements in the study concerning the nature of Region E, lead to the unmistakable conclusion that it is in fact metropolitan Montreal.

\(^1\)Claude Gousse, Pratiques et usages linguistiques de la clientele québécoise en rapport avec des organismes de service: Une approche qualitative, Étude E-18 de la Commission d'enquéte sur la situation de la langue française et sur les droits linguistiques au Québec (Québec, l'Editeur officiel, 1973).
exact figures concerning the linguistic practices of their patients, there seemed to be a definite tendency for English hospitals to admit a higher proportion of francophone patients than the proportion of anglophone patients admitted by French hospitals. In spite of this, personnel in French hospitals seemed to have a higher capability to communicate in English than personnel in English hospitals had in French. These findings are not surprising. They reflect, in a hospital setting, the fact that Montreal contains a francophone majority which is more bilingual than the anglophone minority. They might also reflect a perceived superiority amongst francophones of English hospitals. In other words, some bilingual francophone doctors and patients might wish to use English hospitals for medical reasons even though they might not be able to make full use of their first language.

The same study found that social service agencies in Montreal were similarly divided on a language basis. But because these agencies do not have the same kind of emergency capabilities as hospitals, they have had even less incentive to operate bilingually. The researcher saw no reason why this was likely to change. However, he did note a tendency for French agencies to become more openly unilingual while English agencies shifted at least towards a bilingual image. This was done by sending senior personnel off to French courses and by hiring bilingual secretaries who could direct stray francophones in French to agencies operating in their own language.

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1Ibid., pp. 20-1.  
2Ibid., p. 39.  
3Ibid., p. 119.  
4Ibid., p. 122.
The process of English institutions becoming bilingual is likely to increase in the years ahead. This would be a natural outgrowth of many events that have taken place in Quebec since 1960. However, it was especially encouraged by recent Quebec laws affecting the qualifications for professional accreditation within the province. In 1970 the National Assembly passed a bill stating that all non-Canadians wishing to be admitted to a Quebec professional corporation had to possess a working knowledge of French. The main practical effect of this was to make it extremely difficult for English hospitals to continue to recruit qualified nurses from such places as Britain and the British West Indies. In 1973, when it approved a new Professional Code, the National Assembly took this policy one step further. The Code states that, as of 1 July 1976, Canadian citizens also will have to be able to work in French if they wish to practice a profession within Quebec. This rule does not apply to those already in a professional corporation prior to that date. As time goes on, unilingual anglophone doctors, nurses and social workers will become increasingly rare.

This does not mean, however, that there will no longer be any desire on the part of Montrealers for separate networks of health and social service establishments. There is every likelihood that both francophones and anglophones would prefer to have efficient unilingual institutions rather than cumbersome bilingual ones. Everyone acknowledges, though, that there must be communication and co-operation between

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1 René Dussault and Louis Borgeat, 'La reforme des professions au Québec', Canadian Public Administration, XVIII (1974), 418.

2 Ibid., pp. 420-1.
the two. In the past, communication between the two networks was conducted almost exclusively in English, if it was conducted at all. The Professional Code, and other language laws will ensure that in the future such communication will take place in French. Until the creation of the C.H.S.S.M.M. there was no official forum in which co-operative policies would be formulated. Whether or not the C.H.S.S.M.M. will be effective in this role is still unclear.

So far the history of the C.H.S.S.M.M. has been characterized by frustration and powerlessness. The ministry of social affairs has not given it either the resources or the authority which would be necessary for it to have a direct impact on the delivery of Montreal's health and social services. Such a policy would greatly reduce the influence of ministry officials in Quebec City and is therefore not acceptable to them. It would be acceptable to administrators of large institutions only if they were sure that they could use the Council to protect and maintain their institutional autonomy rather than to bring about a thorough co-ordination of services. To the extent that these administrators do feel a need to act together, they seem to find the various functional organizations better suited to their needs than is the Council. The Association des hopitaux de la province de Québec and the Fédération des Centres de services sociaux du Québec are particularly notable in this regard. The potential virtue of a regional council is that it can express the overall desires and needs of a region as a whole rather than those of particular institutions or types of institutions. But the area covered by the C.H.S.S.M.M. includes so many institutions and such a large and culturally diverse population that a regional viewpoint exists
only in a very limited form. A study of the regional councils established by Bill 65 has shown that they can have two potential types of functions: 1) to act as the regional agent of the Ministry of Social Affairs; or 2) to act on the ministry as a pressure group for regional interests. Although the permanent employees and some of the members of the C.H.S.S.M.M. have desired the first role, it has largely been denied them. The second role seems particularly suitable for councils covering hitherto poorly served and outlying areas of the province and therefore is not a realistic option for Montreal's regional council. The inevitable conclusion is that the C.H.S.S.M.M. is destined to be a relatively unimportant institution in the total network of Montreal's health and social services.

The process of reorganizing the social service agencies of Montreal in accordance with the provisions of Bill 65 was fundamentally different from the process of establishing the regional council. The latter process involved the creation of a new institution to fulfil coordinating functions which had not previously been formally attended to. The reorganization of the social service agencies, however, involved tampering with agencies that have been in existence for decades and which were deeply rooted in the city's various ethnic and religious communities. From the very beginning, the government was anxious to have agencies throughout the province intimately involved in the

1Lemieux, Renaud, and von Schoenberg, Les conseils régionaux, pp. 139-49. Their 'conclusion générale' in fact inspired the main thrust of this paragraph.

2Ibid., p. 146.
reorganization process. To this end, it accepted a proposal from the Federation des services sociaux à la famille du Québec (F.S.S.F.Q.) that organizing committees, composed of representatives from each affected agency, be established in each of the province's twelve social affairs regions. The work of these committees was to be co-ordinated by a 'provincial mission' made up of five members of the Ministry of Social Affairs and five representatives of the F.S.S.F.Q. The mission began its work in January of 1973.¹ One of its first acts was to hire professional consultants to assist the various regions in their work.

In the case of Montreal, the mission hired two consultants, one for the French language sector and one for the English. From the very beginning, therefore, the reorganization process was carried out with a tendency toward linguistic separation. When the Montreal regional committee met for the first time on February 15, it delegated future preparations to a joint committee made up of the executive directors of all of the agencies. This group in turn recommended that the work of the committee be done 'for purposes of efficiency' by two separate language-based task forces. Consequently, each executive director found himself in one task force or the other.² In mid-March and early April both task forces met repeatedly.

After considering various organizational alternatives, the anglophone task force concluded that the most desirable were those that

¹ John R. Walker, 'Implementation of Social Service Center, Chapter 48 (Bill 65)', mimeo.

did not involve any separation of structures according to language.
They settled on two possible structural models that were consistent
with this objective. The first involved the creation of five to seven
territorially-based social service centres (S.S.C.) for Montreal, each
of which would draw on a population of between 200,000 and 500,000.
Their work would be co-ordinated by a kind of 'superboard' which could
conceivably be the C.H.S.S.M.M. The alternative was that one S.S.C.
should cover the whole region but that its work should be decentralized
on a regional basis such that each regional unit would have its own
board of directors. Under both alternatives, the anglophones acknowled­
ged that the working language of the structures would be French but
that services would have to be provided in the language of the client.¹
The francophone task force inevitably faced the same kind of alterna­
tives confronted by the anglophones. However, it opted for a system
based on the separation of structures according to language. It proposed
that there be two separate social service centers, one francophone and
one anglophone. It wanted the francophone one to be relatively centra­
lized with local units not having their own boards of directors. It
proposed that a joint committee be established to co-ordinate the work
of the two centers on a regional basis.²

It is not entirely clear exactly why the different task forces
took their respective positions. The anglophones undoubtedly felt that
by advocating anything other than linguistic integration they could be
accused of trying to make a final effort to protect their privileged
autonomy. Since most anglophone social workers traditionally took

¹Ibid., p. 17.  ²Ibid., p. 18.
'progressive' positions within their community, they had no desire to align themselves with the generally conservative forces intent on defending anglophone rights. Besides, as professionals, they were already having to work more and more in a French environment. Given the government's policy as expressed in Bill 65, it is not surprising that the anglophones felt they had little choice but to contribute constructively to an integrated system. The French social work establishment was, however, under no such constraints. It saw grave difficulties with an integrated system and suffered no political embarrassment in pointing them out. There was, of course, the problem of language. Under a truly integrated system it would seem that more francophone social workers would have to possess the capability to deal with clients in English. However, probably more important than this were the different internal problems of the two linguistic groups of social workers. The French group was pre-occupied with questions of syndicalism and nationalism and could hardly be expected to absorb any significant number of anglophones. The English group was plagued by vicious internal jealousies relating primarily to different conceptions of the social role of the profession but also to different religious backgrounds. The French were anxious not to have to add these disputes to the ones already simmering within their own group.

The two task forces held a joint meeting on 6 April. They reached a tentative conclusion to support the francophone position. Although the decision could not possibly have been a major disappointment for most anglophone social workers, it undoubtedly left the English catholics and the Jews in a rather ambiguous position. Under the
anglophone task force alternative, all anglophones would be in the minority, thereby probably leaving relatively more autonomy to the smaller religious components of that minority. Under the decision that was finally taken, they were being asked to subject themselves to the secular anglophone majority. At this stage, Jewish Family Services made it clear that, for the short term at least, it would not participate in this arrangement and would therefore remain out of the system altogether. ¹

It is important to realize that none of this manoeuvring was being done in public. There were no public hearings or meetings and only a very few Montrealers knew what was happening. To this day, it remains difficult, even for the researcher, to determine the exact course of events.

On 16 April the two consultants to the Montreal committee met with Claude Castonguay and his senior officials to present the conclusions of the two task forces. Mr. Castonguay saw no difficulty in establishing language-based S.S.C.s in Montreal. In fact, he explicitly stated that such a policy was bound to appear reasonable given the difficulties encountered in the educational sphere. ² There is no available evidence to suggest that the ministry itself, even at this stage, had developed a well thought out policy for Montreal. Castonguay was obviously acting as a careful politician responding to recent political events and not as a technocratic administrator concerned only with orderly organizational charts. When the meeting was over, it was clear that the government was willing to establish a French and an English S.S.C. for Montreal, and even a Jewish one if the Jews agreed to conform


² *Ibid.*, p. 20. See the next chapter for the debate on educational structures.
fully to the other provisions of Bill 65.¹

Once Castonguay had given his approval, there was nothing to stop the implementation of the francophone task force position. On 1 July 1973, two social service centres—Montréal Métropolitain and Ville Marie—were officially brought into being.² In spite of its name, Ville Marie is the anglophone one. It absorbed six agencies, including Catholic Family and Children's Services. The Jewish agency declined to participate and continued its activities as a private institution. Montréal Métropolitain absorbed eight existing agencies. Both S.S.C.s have subsequently taken over the administration of hospital and school social workers operating in their respective languages.

In 1974 the Jewish agency made the decision that, for financial reasons, it was desirable that it enter the public sector. This involved the legal separation of the agency from Allied Jewish Community Services (A.J.C.S.) and the creation of a new legal entity known as the Jewish Family Services Social Service Centre. This took place after 'an agonizing process of evaluation, appraisal, and negotiation'.³ In the last annual report of the agency as a private body, its officers ask the following set of questions which vividly express Jewish concern about the whole process of social service reorganization:

Is life within the public sector in fact incongruent with our tradition? Can our ethnically and culturally-laden vitality survive the incursions of government bureaucracy? Will the human responses be diluted by computerised

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¹Ibid.
anonymity? Can the persistent tradition transcend techno-
cratic values?

The agency claims that if these questions are not answered satisfactorily in years to come, it will remove itself from the public sector and once again rely on charitable support through the A.J.C.S. It would appear that, by refusing to join the anglophone S.S.C. in the first place, the Jews protected their independence and then were able to enter the public sector in their own right. They also claim to have the necessary community support to leave it if this becomes absolutely necessary. Many English catholics would have preferred this option as well. But it was never open to them because the necessary support, both from the government and from its own community, was not forthcoming.

In the rest of the province outside Montreal, the planners and administrators in the ministry of social affairs successfully achieved their objective of merging all social service agencies into one social service centre for each region. Montreal, however, has three. Their work is formally co-ordinated by a committee of the C.H.S.S.M.M. but this group has not had any major impact. Most of the liaison is done on an informal basis by various officers of the different S.S.C.s but many of their mutual dealings are plagued by suspicions and jurisdictional jealousies. One of the most serious problems of co-ordination relates to the problem of territoriality. In an effort to avoid the duplication of physical facilities in the same neighbourhoods, the social service centres are in the process of dividing the territory of

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1 Ibid.

the region in such a way that all of it is formally served by one, and only one, S.S.C. Even though it has always been understood that clients will be free to choose the S.S.C. of their choice, the latter are anxious to ensure that they gain formal control of the maximum amount of territory. Although it is clear that Montréal Métropolitain will get the eastern parts of Montreal and Jésus Islands, Ville Marie the western parts, and Jewish Family Services the Snowdon area, it is not all clear how the exact determinations are to be made. Fortunately, this rather irrelevant debate has been conducted in private because, if it were public, it could be potentially explosive. On no other occasion have governmental bodies tried to officially divide up the Island's territory on a linguistic or ethnic basis. Such a policy, if it were also followed in other areas, would quickly lead Montreal into the same kind of difficulties experienced in Belgium. Until now, this has been an example which virtually everybody has wished to avoid.

More than any other recent piece of Quebec legislation, Bill 65 was almost exclusively concerned with organizational rationality. It had the effect, in Montreal alone, of abolishing dozens of social service institutions that had existed for decades. The justifications for this massive upheaval were many. The old institutions, although publicly funded, were governed by self-perpetuating, middle-class boards of directors to which the public had little access, either for information or for exerting political pressure. The old institutions were hopelessly fragmented in that many of them offered the same services to different religious, ethnic, or language groups. Some parts of the metropolitan area were well served by many institutions; other newer sections were
hardly served at all. Furthermore, the institutions were structured in such a way that they were not easily subject to careful control by a centralized, bureaucratic ministry with growing capabilities to digest information and monitor performance. All these factors led the government to introduce a program of structural reform, the object of which was to correct these deficiencies. The result was the creation of the regional councils of health and social services and, more important, the amalgamation of social service agencies into new social service centres.

This section has shown that the master plan for the whole province did not prove suitable for Montreal. The Council of Health and Social Services of Metropolitan Montreal has been incapable of establishing an independent presence as a significant intermediary between the ministry and the large Montreal institutions. The original attempt to ignore linguistic considerations in plans for the establishment of social service centres were so inappropriate that it soon proved to be in everybody's interest to make special provisions for them. Montreal now has three public social service centres: French, English, and Jewish. They each draw clients from all parts of the Island of Montreal. In terms of organizational rationality, this is a considerable advance on the previous haphazard arrangements. However, the fact that a Quebec government in the 1970s would see fit to base public social services on this kind of institutional framework is a powerful testimony to the strength of Montreal's linguistic and ethnic diversity.

Of all the structural reforms discussed in this thesis, those relating to social services received the least public attention. The
The irony of this is that one of the central objects of Bill 65 was to expose the hitherto closed world of private charities to public debate and accountability. However, the reality of Quebec politics is such that the creation of the new system would probably not have been possible if the provincial government had encouraged an open public debate concerning social service structures for Montreal. Had the issue emerged from the obscurity of specialist task forces and private negotiations, there undoubtedly would have been strong demands from francophone nationalists that no official recognition be given to the English, the Jews, or anybody else. Because the debate was largely conducted behind closed doors, an accommodation was possible.

4. Re-arranging Municipal Boundaries

Chapter IV described the creation and operation of the Montreal Urban Community and pointed out that its main purpose was to solve an immediate financial crisis concerning the police rather than to reform metropolitan political structures according to the canons of organizational rationality. However, the Act which established the M.U.C. did contain this provision:

Within five years of the coming into force of this Act [i.e. 1 January 1975], the Community shall prepare and submit to the Minister a project for rearranging the territorial limits of the municipalities.¹

The clear intent of this provision was to ensure that the lower-tier units of the M.U.C. would be consolidated in much the same way as those of Metropolitan Toronto were in 1967. Such a consolidation would result in fewer units which would be more equal in size and financial resources.

¹Quebec, Statutes, 1969, Chapter 84, s. 195.
This in turn would facilitate the task of devising an equitable representation system for the upper tier. However, the apparent expectation of the Union nationale government that this could be worked out by the existing municipalities themselves was clearly unrealistic. The government undoubtedly wished to avoid taking responsibility for a task that was obviously fraught with political difficulties.

The original demands of the M.U.C. Act have never been met and, as 1975 approached, the Act had to be amended to delete any reference to the deadline. Nevertheless, the original provision did provoke a considerable amount of activity, if not decisions. Between January 1971 and January 1973, three separate reports were published, all inspired by the suburbs, which related to the question of future boundary arrangements. Although none of these reports have been of much practical significance, they do present the main dilemmas facing any reformer. For that reason alone, they deserve consideration. The most important report was that released in May 1973 by the Hanigan committee which was established as a result of the Quebec Municipal Commission hearings on the 1972 M.U.C. budget. Its deliberations and recommendations will be discussed after a brief look at the suburban reports that preceded it.

The first suburban report—and the most comprehensive—is prepared by the senior employees of the City of Westmount. Although its recommendations were never officially adopted by the Westmount city

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1Ibid., 1974, Chapter 82, s. 14.
2See Chapter IV-5 for details.
council, it was released in January 1971 with the approval of the mayor, Peter McEntyre. Its main feature was the proposal for the almost complete abolition of the existing municipal boundaries and the establishment of thirteen 'bourgs' whose populations would vary between 10,000 and 250,000. The smallest 'bourgs' would be the ones most likely to experience significant future growth. The optimum 'bourg' size was seen as 200,000. The boundaries of the 'bourgs' would be based as nearly as possible on natural and man-made phenomena in the Island. The east-west Metropolitan boulevard was seen as particularly significant. Five 'bourgs' were to be north of it and eight to the south. The boundaries of the proposed 'bourgs' are shown in Map V-1. The main feature of the division of functions between the metropolitan authority and the 'bourgs' was the provision that, as far as police and fire services were concerned, the former would act only as a co-ordinator and as a provider of specialized services. Each 'bourg' would control local police and fire services. The 'bourgs' would have their own elected councils and mayors. There would be a weighted voting system in the metropolitan council to take account of differences in population and, significantly, the value of assessed property within the 'bourgs'.

The Westmount plan was well publicized and explained, particularly to the mayors of the other suburbs, most of whom saw considerable merit in its main proposals. However, the reaction of Messrs. Drapeau and Saulnier was negative in the extreme. Finding no merit whatever in the proposals, both gentlemen based the attack on linguistic arguments. Mr. Saulnier said this:

The richest municipality on the Island wants to reduce the French influence in Canada's metropolis and try to dilute
the French population of the Island in the midst of new English municipalities.¹

The charge that Westmount was consciously trying to gerrymander the proposed boundaries in favour of anglophones was a serious one. It is unlikely that it could ever be proved. However, Tables V-2 and V-3, which compare the linguistic make-up of the existing suburbs to that of the proposed 'bourgs' shows that the Westmount plan can be interpreted as favouring the anglophone element on the Island. Under the existing system, 1,668,365 people (1971 figures) live in M.U.C. municipalities in which francophones are in the majority. Under the Westmount scheme, only 1,383,575 people would live in francophone 'bourgs'. In this sense, francophone influence would, in fact, be diluted. This would mainly come about because the currently francophone municipalities of St. Pierre, Outremont, Lachine, and Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue would all be absorbed into anglophone 'bourgs'. At the same time, the anglophone City areas of Notre-Dame-de-Grace and Cote-des-Neiges and the francophone area of St. Henri would also become part of anglophone 'bourgs'. Under the Westmount plan, most of the linguistically balanced municipality of St. Laurent would become part of a francophone 'bourg' but no other strongly anglophone areas would be absorbed in such a way. The Westmount plan also would undoubtedly weaken francophone influence simply by dismantling the City of Montreal. Under the present arrangements, the francophone City can control the M.U.C. simply by its overwhelming size. Under Westmount's scheme, no single 'bourg' could control the metropolitan council and quite probably the anglophone 'bourgs' would form the only stable coalition of interests.

¹The Gazette, 28 January 1971.
Table V-2\(^1\)

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION OF EXISTING M.U.C. MUNICIPALITIES USING FRENCH AS MAIN LANGUAGE IN THE HOME, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Majority Municipalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pointe-aux-Trembles</td>
<td>35,555</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ile-Bizard</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>91.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste. Geneviève</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anjou</td>
<td>33,895</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal East</td>
<td>5,060</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal North</td>
<td>89,135</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Pierre</td>
<td>6,795</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>1,214,380</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Léonard</td>
<td>52,040</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdin</td>
<td>74,695</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outremont</td>
<td>28,630</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste. Anne's</td>
<td>5,035</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lachine</td>
<td>44,440</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaSalle</td>
<td>72,905</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Total</td>
<td>1,668,365</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Minority Municipalities</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
<td>62,940</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senneville</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxboro</td>
<td>7,635</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierrefonds</td>
<td>33,015</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Royal</td>
<td>21,570</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorval</td>
<td>20,465</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkland</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollard</td>
<td>25,220</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmount</td>
<td>23,570</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe Claire</td>
<td>27,305</td>
<td>13.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beaconsfield</td>
<td>19,450</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hampstead</td>
<td>7,030</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baie d'Urfé</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte St. Luc</td>
<td>24,375</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal West</td>
<td>6,365</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Total</td>
<td>287,055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Canada, 1971 Census of Canada, Cat. 75-704 (CT-4B).
Table V-3

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN WESTMOUNT PLAN 'BOURGS' USING FRENCH AS MAIN LANGUAGE IN THE HOME, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Majority 'bourgs'</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>14,985</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>120,185</td>
<td>84.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>301,710</td>
<td>80.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>135,955</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>9,135</td>
<td>78.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>166,295</td>
<td>74.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>248,015</td>
<td>74.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>196,420</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>190,875</td>
<td>59.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,383,575</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Minority 'bourgs'</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>190,105</td>
<td>33.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>125,145</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>197,800</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>62,535</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>575,585</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 The data for the 'bourgs' was derived from the census figures in Ibid. Westmount, Local Government was used as a guide for the definition of the boundaries. Because the census tracts did not always co-incide with the 'bourg' boundaries (Particularly in the West Island area) some census tracts were assigned to 'bourgs' the population of which was not wholly within that 'bourg.'
The Westmount plan is an almost perfect model of organizational rationality, although there is room for argument about the size of the 'bourgs' and the use of property valuation in determining voting strength. Even on the linguistic issue the plan remains true to its rational and logical premises. There is no overt gerrymandering. In fact, the plan does call for nine of the thirteen 'bourgs' to have francophone majorities, while under the existing arrangements only fourteen of the twenty-nine M.U.C. municipalities fall into this category. This is a plan to which all conscientious city administrators could agree. What it lacks, however, is an understanding of political reality within Quebec. The reality is that the main aim of all provincial political parties is to maintain Quebec as a French-speaking state. This aim depends on the maintenance of Montreal as a francophone metropolitcan centre. Without the continued existence of a large francophone City of Montreal, this becomes a difficult objective. Any plan which proposes to dismantle the City—particularly if it comes from anglophone Westmount—is inevitably doomed.

In June 1971, a report prepared by T. J. Plunkett concerning the creation of a new West Island municipality was made public. This report was commissioned by the Fusion Study Committee, which consisted of the mayors of Baie d'Urfé, Beaconsfield, Dollard-des-Ormeaux, Kirkland, Pointe Claire, Roxboro, and Senneville. The report recommended that all twelve municipalities in the west sector of the M.U.C. merge to form one new city. The Plunkett proposals were generally compatible

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1Fusion Study Committee, The Status Quo or Municipal Fusion in the West Sector of the Montreal Urban Community, 2 vols. (Montreal, 1971).
with the existing M.U.C. structures, although they were obviously aimed at increasing the West Island's influence. The only major recommendation that conflicted with M.U.C. policy was the proposal that the new city have its own public safety department to handle police and fire services.

The report was not greeted with much enthusiasm by the francophone municipalities of Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue, Ste. Geneviève, and Ile-Bizard. The francophone mayor of Pierrefonds, Eddie Lalonde, led the opposition to fusion using a variety of vague arguments which, like those of the plan's proponents, studiously ignored the question of the linguistic make-up of the new city. It was quite obvious though that these municipalities were not anxious to be absorbed into a new city in which francophones would constitute less than 25% of the population. In spite of this, the initial reaction of the provincial government was favourable. In December 1971, municipal affairs minister Tessier stated that he approved of the principle of the plan and that it was consistent with his objective for 1972, which was to merge the Island's twenty-nine municipalities into five, six, or seven new cities. ¹ However, Tessier's plans for quick action were aborted by the debate over the 1972 M.U.C. budget and the subsequent creation of the Hanigan committee. Once it began its comprehensive deliberations, there could be no debate on West Island fusion. In 1973, when the Hanigan committee recommended against the immediate formation of a West Island City, the Plunkett proposals, and Tessier's plan for the whole Island, were effectively dead. By this time, the provincial government had become more sensitive to the desires

¹Le Devoir, 3 December, 1971.
of West Island francophones and more aware of the political dangers of allowing West Island anglophones to consolidate their position in one huge municipality.¹

In June of 1972, the City of Lachine made its contribution to the debate about the future of the M.U.C. It released a report² prepared for it by Roger Pominville Ltée., a management consulting firm. The original mandate of the firm was to study the prospects for Lachine's possible fusion with neighbouring municipalities, but the study inevitably grew into an analysis of the merger possibilities throughout the M.U.C. area. Pominville concluded by recommending the creation of seven new cities to cover the entire Island. Their boundaries are shown in Map V-2. Table V-4 shows their potential linguistic make-up. It is clear from this table that, under the Pominville plan, even fewer people would be in francophone-controlled municipalities than under the Westmount plan. However, this plan has two characteristics which make it more favourable to the francophone position than was the Westmount plan. First, it allows for a strong City of Montreal, which would have just under half the Island's total population. Second, it calls for the City to absorb the two wealthy anglophone suburbs of Westmount and Mount Royal. In general, however, the Pominville report was not taken very seriously. It was not nearly as well thought out as the Westmount plan and was presented in a shabby, sometimes incomprehensible manner. It also suffered from catering too obviously to the special interests

¹André Dubois, 'La Communauté urbaine de Montréal; forces en présence' (Université de Montréal, M.A. thesis, 1974), p. 194.

²Roger Pominville Ltée., Une étude de regroupement municipal pour la Cité de Lachine (Montreal, 1972).
LACHINE'S SEVEN CITIES PLAN
### Table V-1

**Percentage of Population in Lachine's Proposed Seven Cities Using French as Main Language in the Home, 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Majority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe-aux-Trembles</td>
<td>135,170</td>
<td>85.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Léonard</td>
<td>259,360</td>
<td>76.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>945,395</td>
<td>66.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,339,925</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>French Minority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
<td>131,430</td>
<td>46.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lachine</td>
<td>376,055</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierrefonds</td>
<td>53,045</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe Claire</td>
<td>59,905</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>620,435</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Prepared from Ibid. and Canada, *1971 Census of Canada*, Cat. 75-704 (CT-4B).
of Lachine. Because the authors of the report named their new southwest city 'Lachine', they gave the impression that they were advocating that Lachine, with a population of 44,000, should annex all or part of nine other municipalities having a total population of 332,000. This would make the new 'Lachine' the second largest municipality on the Island—a tempting thought for the Lachine city councillors who were the patrons of the report.

The Hanigan committee was established just before the Plunkett and Pominville reports were released. It took about a year, starting in the spring of 1972, to prepare its report. Apart from Lawrence Hanigan, the other members were Mayor Bernard Benoit, chairman of the C.S.M.M., Paul Blier, Quebec's assistant deputy minister of municipal affairs; and Jacques Piche, a chartered accountant from the provincial ministry of finance. Rather than hold public hearings at which interested parties would present briefs advocating positions which had already been heard many times before, the committee chose to establish nine separate sub-committees to consider, in private, the various alternatives to open to the M.U.C. Membership in these sub-committees was the mechanism whereby views of interested parties could be expressed.

In a broad political sense, the most important sub-committee was that concerned with 'administrative structures'. Its chairman during most of its existence was Pierre Shooner, the director-general of the Montreal Chamber of Commerce. Other members were Jean Comtois from the provincial civil service, Rolland Cousineau from the M.U.C. planning department, Councillor Pierre Lorange of the City of Montreal, and significantly, Mayor Reginald Dawson of Mount Royal, who had by then been
arguing the suburban case at such committees for about twenty years. Although most other members of the committee were willing to go along with provincial plans to create five new municipalities on the Island, Mayor Dawson once again resisted any plan involving the wholesale absorption of suburban municipalities. At the same time he was, of course, scuttling any possibility of the committee recommending the establishment of a united West Island city. His case was strengthened in February 1973 when Premier Bourassa appointed Victor Goldbloom, an M.N.A. representing an inner suburban anglophone consistency, as his new minister of municipal affairs.\(^1\) It was clear from the beginning that Goldbloom was much less likely than Tessier to press ahead with the plans of civil servants for major municipal fusions. With Goldbloom now as minister, it was even less politically realistic for the committee to recommend any major changes to which the suburbs had not agreed. Ultimately the committee did recommend the gradual establishment of five new cities but, bowing to reality, it suggested that the first step was to reduce the number of M.U.C. municipalities to fifteen.\(^2\) At Dawson's suggestion, the committee chose 20,000 as the lowest population needed by a municipality in order to survive. Once again, he had ensured the continued existence of the inner suburbs of Mount Royal, Westmount, and Outremont—all of which had populations of between 20,000 and 30,000.

When the main committee made its report in May 1973, it proved

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\(^2\) *Quebec, Department of Municipal Affairs, Comité d'étude de la C.U.M.*, *Rapport du sous-comité: Structures administratives* (Québec, 1973), Chapter 3.
even less ambitious than the sub-committee. Rather than recommending the eventual establishment of five cities, it recommended the creation of five 'consolidation sectors' within which voluntary amalgamations could take place. The sectors would also be used as units for administrative decentralization and for financial equalization programmes within the M.U.C. As a short-term objective, the committee recommended that seven mergers affecting sixteen municipalities be implemented immediately. The committee accepted the idea that all M.U.C. municipalities having a population of over 20,000 should be allowed to continue to exist. The effects of these proposed mergers are shown in Table V-5. All three francophone West Island municipalities would be absorbed by anglophone ones, while Montreal West would be the only anglophone municipality to lose its linguistic identity. In general though, these proposals are much less damaging to the francophone position than any others previously discussed. Nevertheless, no action was taken even on these relatively innocuous recommendations and municipal boundaries in Montreal remain the same as they were in 1969.

Why have municipal boundaries in Montreal been so impervious to change? Why have the existing municipalities survived in spite of all the pressure for reform and in spite of the models provided by Toronto and Winnipeg? To the student of urban politics who is accustomed to the American experience, this lack of change does not seem strange or unusual.

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2. However, the Hanigan committee's recommendations for municipal mergers were endorsed in 1976 by the provincial task force on urbanization. See Quebec, Rapport du groupe de travail sur l'urbanisation (Quebec, 1976), p. 147.
### Table V-1

**EFFECTS OF MUNICIPAL Mergers Proposed by Hanigan Committee ON THE LINGUISTIC COMPOSITION OF M.U.C. MUNICIPALITIES BY LANGUAGE USED MOST OFTEN IN THE HOME, 1971**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The Proposed Mergers:</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Montreal</td>
<td>1,214,380</td>
<td>67.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal West</td>
<td>6,365</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW MONTREAL</td>
<td>1,220,745</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lachine</td>
<td>44,440</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Pierre</td>
<td>6,795</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW LACHINE</td>
<td>51,235</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Pierrefonds</td>
<td>33,015</td>
<td>31.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roxboro</td>
<td>7,635</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste. Geneviève</td>
<td>2,870</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ile-Bizard</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW PIERREFONDS</td>
<td>46,450</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Pointe-aux-Trembles</td>
<td>35,565</td>
<td>91.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal East</td>
<td>5,060</td>
<td>83.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW POINTE-AUX-TREMbles</td>
<td>40,615</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Côte St. Luc</td>
<td>24,375</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampstead</td>
<td>7,030</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW COTE ST. LUC</td>
<td>31,405</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Beaconsfield</td>
<td>19,450</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirkland</td>
<td>2,860</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW BEACONSFIELD</td>
<td>22,310</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Ste. Anne's</td>
<td>5,035</td>
<td>57.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baie d'Urfé</td>
<td>3,880</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senneville</td>
<td>1,375</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW STE. ANNE'S</td>
<td>10,290</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cont'd....
### The Proposed New M.U.C.

#### French Majority Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pointe-aux-Trembles</td>
<td>40,615</td>
<td>90.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anjou</td>
<td>33,895</td>
<td>83.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal North</td>
<td>89,135</td>
<td>82.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td>1,220,745</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Léonard</td>
<td>52,040</td>
<td>62.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdun</td>
<td>74,695</td>
<td>61.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lachine</td>
<td>51,235</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outremont</td>
<td>28,630</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaSalle</td>
<td>72,905</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,663,895</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### French Minority Municipalities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Laurent</td>
<td>62,940</td>
<td>42.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierrefonds</td>
<td>46,450</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste.-Anne-de-Bellevue</td>
<td>10,290</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Royal</td>
<td>21,560</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dorval</td>
<td>20,465</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dollard-des-Ormeaux</td>
<td>25,220</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westmount</td>
<td>23,570</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pointe Claire</td>
<td>27,305</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaconsfield</td>
<td>22,310</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte St. Luc</td>
<td>31,405</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>291,515</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1 Preapared from Ibid. and Canada, 1971 Census of Canada,
But when it is remembered that Montreal, unlike American cities, exists within a larger territory whose government has the unquestioned legal authority to rearrange municipal boundaries at will, it does seem unusual that the M.U.C. still contains twenty-eight suburban municipalities. It is even more unusual that some of them exist on the very fringes of the city core. Not even many American cities still have independent inner suburbs such as Westmount and Outremont. The continued existence of such apparent anomalies would seem to make the case for change in Montreal exceptionally obvious. Despite this, no change has taken place. As an attempt to explain this, it cannot be argued that francophone citizens of Quebec have more inherent respect for municipalities than anglophone citizens in other parts of Canada. Municipalities in Quebec owe their existence to the English colonial authorities rather than the French. Furthermore, most Montreal municipalities were established as recently as the early twentieth century.

The continued existence of so many municipalities on the Island of Montreal can only be explained in terms of its linguistic make-up. Any provincial government contemplating a restructuring of municipal boundaries must make the kinds of calculations presented in this section. It is not surprising that the resulting permutations and combinations have profoundly discouraged any cautious policy-maker. However, the explanation does not end here. The existing suburbs themselves have consistently constituted a powerful political alliance. The alliance is based on motives of self-preservation and hence has had little potential for initiating political change. However, in relation to its raison d'être, it has been powerful indeed.
To understand the structure of the alliance is to understand the impact of language differences on metropolitan Montreal's municipal structure. The fundamental assumption of the alliance is that every existing municipality has the right to continue to exist. To take any other position would be to sacrifice the political support of any municipality whose continued existence was threatened. This aspect of the alliance is not in the least unusual. All suburban municipalities everywhere would no doubt subscribe to it. In Montreal the alliance gains its uniqueness from the municipalities' special motivations for supporting the assumption with unusual fervour. Anglophone municipalities support it because many of their citizens fear being swallowed up by the francophone City of Montreal, thereby losing not only their position as a linguistic majority but also their cherished patterns of responsible, efficient, service-oriented local government. West Island francophone municipalities support it because they fear losing their identity in an anglophone West Island city. Other francophone municipalities support it because their leaders have no desire to lose power over local political systems which have proven to be valuable sources of political influence, patronage, or even personal profit. The beauty of this arrangement, from the point of view of the anglophone, is that their cause does not appear to be an exclusively anglophone one. In fact, the most eloquent spokesmen for suburban autonomy have been mayors of francophone suburbs. From the point of view of these people, the alliance is likewise perfect because it enables them to justify their existence on the basis of traditional English arguments about the virtue of local self-government. Furthermore, any proposal to abolish corrupt
francophone municipalities can be portrayed as discriminatory unless it also calls for the abolition of English municipalities at the same time.

The alliance described above is almost totally symbiotic. Mayors of anglophone and francophone suburban municipalities are inextricably tied to each other's interests. This means that it is extremely difficult for the provincial government or the City of Montreal to take any action against their combined strength. Isolated attacks on any particular suburb or group of suburbs inevitably lead to an implied attack on all of them. An attack on all the suburbs means taking on a greater political force than even the Government of Quebec is accustomed to coping with. It is a force made up of elements that no other provincial government in Canada has to confront. In these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that the M.U.C. still contains twenty-eight suburban municipalities.
CHAPTER VI

EDUCATION

The issue of governmental structures for education in Montreal receives special attention in this chapter because it is significantly different from other matters discussed in previous chapters. Unlike municipal and social service institutions, public school boards in Quebec are referred to in the Canadian constitution and the jurisdiction of the Quebec legislature concerning them is somewhat restricted. Another difference is that educational structures, unlike the others referred to in this thesis, have been directly and overtly affected by the new Quebec nationalism associated with the Parti québécois. These factors have ensured that the debate about educational reform in Montreal has taken place in a significantly different political environment, an environment in which linguistic considerations have been much more openly discussed. Although some of the proposed reforms dealt with in this chapter have been justified on grounds of organizational rationality, many have been explicitly tied to nationalist objectives relating to the protection of the French language and the reduction of the strength of anglophones. Sometimes the same reform proposal has been justified on both these grounds at the same time, thereby creating a political debate of unusual complexity.

This chapter is not about Montreal's entire educational system or about the crucially important issue of who should be allowed to
attend English schools. Like Chapters III and IV, this chapter is concerned with structures. In this case, the structures are the school boards which are entrusted with the running of public elementary and secondary schools. Other issues of concern to education will only be discussed to the extent that they are relevant to the debate about the most appropriate organizational principles for the existence of a network of school boards in metropolitan Montreal.

1. Catholics, Protestants, and Jews

Because the debate about educational structures in Montreal is linked to the British North America Act of 1867, it is impossible to fully understand it without some knowledge of pre-Confederation schooling arrangements. This section aims to describe those arrangements and to outline the evolution of the unique situation of English catholics and Jews. Once the constitutional rights and acquired privileges of the different groups are fully explained, it will then be possible to discuss political debates concerning modern attempts at structural reform.

Local school boards in the United Province of Canada were first established by the Education Act of 1841. It provided for elected boards in all townships and parishes. They were given the responsibility of acquiring sites for schools, supervising their building and maintenance, appointing teachers, regulating courses of study, and selecting textbooks.¹ There were also provisions in the Act which stated that the religious minority (catholic or protestant) within each

¹Quebec, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education in the Province of Quebec (Quebec, 1963-66), i, 10.
township had the right to elect their own school trustees to administer their own schools. These provisions constitute the origin of the right of religious dissent for school purposes which still exists in Quebec and Ontario to this day. Concerning incorporated cities and towns (such as the City of Montreal), the 1841 Act stated that the municipal council was to be responsible for all public schools. However, each municipality was also to establish a board of examiners consisting of an equal number of appointed protestants and catholics presided over by the mayor. The board as a whole would administer those schools serving both religious groups but would divide into separate sections to administer those catering exclusively to one group or the other. These provisions were not particularly satisfactory in Canada East (Quebec) and were drastically amended in 1845 and 1846.

The 1846 Act 'to make better provision for Elementary Instruction in Lower Canada' reinforced the 1842 rule requiring school boards to levy land taxes on their inhabitants in order to benefit from any government subsidies for schools. Other provisions of the 1846 Act completely removed education from the jurisdiction of municipal councils. Cities and towns other than Quebec City and Montreal were required to adopt the system of local school boards outlined in the 1841 Act. The Act went on to state

That in Quebec and Montreal the municipal Corporation shall appoint twelve School Commissioners...six of whom shall be Roman Catholics and six Protestants; and such Commissioners

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1 Ibid., 11.
2 Ibid.
3 Canada, Province of, Statutes, 1846, Chapter 27.
shall form two separate and distinct Corporations, the one for the Roman Catholics and the one for the Protestants.\footnote{Ibid., Chapter 27, s. 42.}

It is this provision which was the origin of both the Montreal Catholic School Commission and the Protestant Board of School Commissioners of the City of Montreal.

There were no further major changes in the school law of Lower Canada prior to Confederation in 1867. The British North America Act of that year made certain guarantees concerning denominational education in Quebec and Ontario that are still of great importance today, particularly in regard to educational structures in Montreal. After stating that 'for each Province the Legislature may exclusively make Laws in relation to Education', Article 93 provided the following safeguards:

\begin{enumerate}
\item Nothing in any such law shall prejudicially affect any Right or Privilege with respect to Denominational Schools which any Class of Persons have by Law in the Province at the Union:
\item All the Powers, Privileges, and Duties at the Union by law, conferred and imposed in Upper Canada on the Separate Schools and School Trustees of the Queen's Roman Catholic subjects shall be the same and are hereby extended to the Dissentient Schools of the Queen's Protestant and Roman Catholic subjects in Quebec.
\end{enumerate}

Subsections (3) and (4) outline the appeal procedure to be followed if a minority group feels that its rights under (1) and (2) have been violated.

There has been considerable legal debate concerning how the provisions apply to Montreal.\footnote{The problem is analyzed in great detail in François Chevrette, Herbert Marx, and André Tremblay, Les problèmes constitutionnels posés par la restructuration scolaire de l'Île de Montréal (Québec, l'Éditeur officiel, 1971), Chapters 1-3.} There seems to be a general consensus
that subsection (1) protects the denominational nature of all dissenting (catholic and protestant) school boards which existed in 1867 as well as the denominational nature of the Montreal Catholic School Commission and the Protestant Board of School Commissioners of the City of Montreal. Although the latter two are denominational, they are also common, which means that they have an obligation to accept students who are neither catholic nor protestant. Dissenting school boards have no such obligation. Common school boards are, by definition, not legally denominational, and hence are not protected by subsection (1). In practice, however, common school boards in Quebec have adapted to the religious practices of the majority and, in this regard, have not been distinguishable from dissenting ones.

Subsection (2) protects the system of religious dissent for educational purposes. Because neither of the two Montreal school boards in 1867 were dissenting ones, this subsection does not apply to them. It does, however, apply to certain other boards in the Montreal area. Considerable difficulty seems to be caused by the fact that the boundaries of the City of Montreal are much wider today than they were in 1867.\(^1\) However, prior to 1867, the government of the Province of Canada had the authority to 'changer les limites des municipalités existantes pour les fins des écoles, les subdiviser, ou en établir de nouvelles'.\(^2\) There is no provision stating that this does not apply within Montreal. Consequently, there appears to be no constitutional protection for the

\(^{1}\)See Chapter III-1 of this thesis.

\(^{2}\)Canada, Province of, Les statuts refondus pour le Bas Canada (Quebec City, 1861), Chapter 15, s. 30.
existence of any particular school board anywhere in the province. What is protected is the right of dissent. If, for example, the protestant board for the City of Montreal were abolished, the protesters within the new school municipality would almost certainly have the right to establish their own dissenting board. Apart from possessing the right to merely establish such a board, it is not clear what other rights the religious minority might have. If they were to receive only the degree of governmental assistance provided in 1867, their constitutional protection would be virtually useless.

Article 93 is as noteworthy for what it omits as for what it includes. There is no reference at all either to the rights of people who are neither catholic nor protestant or to any kind of educational rights relating to language. Since 1867 problems have arisen concerning both these matters. The status of the Jews in Montreal has historically caused most difficulty, although language questions are currently the source of great public controversy. Each will be examined in turn.

Jews were first recognized in educational legislation for Montreal in 1870. They were given the right to choose between having their school taxes allocated either to the catholic or the protestant school commission and their children were given the right to attend the school of whatever board was chosen. Some groups of Jews made special arrangements with the catholic board, but most found the protestant system more hospitable. In 1894 the protestant commission agreed to

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1 This is the position taken by Chevrette, Marx, and Tremblay in Les problèmes constitutionnels, pp. 29-35.

subsidize the Baron de Hirsch school for Jewish immigrants on the condition that all Jewish property owners chose to pay their taxes to the protestant board.\(^1\) However, as a result of the onslaught of poor Jewish immigrants from eastern Europe immediately after this agreement was reached, the protestants ended up losing a great deal of money. Protestant resentment was clearly shown in 1902 when the protestant board refused to award a scholarship that was won by a Jewish boy whose father was not a taxpayer.\(^2\) The provincial legislature entered the dispute in 1903 when it passed a statute for all Quebec stating that Jews were to be treated as protestants for educational purposes except that Jewish children would be excused from worship and would be allowed to be absent for Jewish holidays.\(^3\) This arrangement worked moderately well until 1922, save that protestants in Montreal resisted all attempts to have a Jew named to the school board.\(^4\)

As a result of the post-World-War-I wave of Jewish immigration, the protestants once more tried to get rid of their expensive obligation to educate Montreal's Jews. The end result was the sponsoring of a court case to determine the exact legal status of the Jews of Montreal.\(^5\) The case, known as \textit{Hirsch v. Protestant School Commissioners of Montreal}, was finally ruled on by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1928. The British judges ruled that the 1903 Act was generally \textit{intra vires} of the Quebec legislature according to Article 93 of the BNA Act.

\(^1\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 18. \(^2\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 18a. \\
but that it was *ultra vires* to the extent that it might be interpreted as giving Jewish children the right to attend schools administered by protestant dissenting boards or as giving Jews the right to be members of dissenting protestant boards or of the Montreal protestant board. However, the judges did rule that the provincial legislature had the authority to establish separate school boards for Jews wherever and however it wished.\(^1\) This was seen by many as the only way out of the dilemma and in 1930 the provincial legislature passed an act which established a Jewish School Commission covering the entire Island of Montreal. Its seven commissioners were appointed by the provincial government and had the power either to negotiate an agreement for Jewish education with another school board or to establish their own network of Jewish schools.\(^2\)

Although many Jews wanted their own system, the somewhat cautious commissioners chose to negotiate with the protestant boards in Montreal and Outremont. In 1931 they reached an agreement with both of them. Its provisions were very similar to those of the 1903 Act. The agreement could be cancelled by either of the parties at fifteen-year intervals. In the same year, the provincial legislature, with the approval of the commissioners, passed an act which ratified the agreements and which at the same time removed all powers of the Jewish School Commission to do anything other than to uphold or reject the

\(^1\)The Hirsch ruling is presented in Hyman Neatman, 'The Place of the Jews in the Public School System of Montreal' (April 1940), Annex B of Canadian Jewish Congress, 'Brief to the Quebec Royal Commission of Inquiry on Education (mimeo, 1962).

\(^2\)Quebec, *Statutes*, 1930, Chapter 61.
agreements. At this point all members of the Commission resigned. These bizarre events seem explicable only by assuming that the commissioners and the provincial government had previously worked out some kind of mutual arrangement to ensure that the whole question would be disposed of without independent Jewish schools ever being established. The 1931 Act remained on the books until 1972 even though no members of the Jewish School Commission were ever again appointed.

The 1931 agreement protected only those Jews living in the territories covered by the City of Montreal and Outremont boards. From 1931 to 1972 most Jews living in other parts of Montreal had no legal right to attend protestant schools, although most did. In some areas, due to the highly complicated tax laws, they ended up paying higher school taxes than Protestants. Only in the few areas where the Protestants constituted the common board did Jews have the unquestioned right to sit on Protestant school boards. The situation was not at all satisfactory from any kind of liberal democratic viewpoint. However, the general feeling on all sides seemed to be that nothing could be done because any attempt to change or reinterpret Article 93 would provoke political feelings that were best left undisturbed. The legal status of the Jews in Montreal is still unclear as is that of other growing groups such as the Greek Orthodox and the Moslems. The important factor to note is that virtually all non-catholic groups have been absorbed within the Protestant system and have therefore been educated almost exclusively in English.

1 Ibid., 1930-31, Chapter 63.
2 Ross, 'The Jew', p. 64.
3 See Canadian Jewish Congress, 'Brief'.

Another group which is somewhat anomalous in relation to the 1867 arrangements are the English-speaking catholics. The group was originally formed in the mid-nineteenth century by Irish immigrants, but it now consists of members of many other catholic ethnic groups, particularly Italians, who have chosen to speak English rather than French. In constitutional and legal terms, the English catholics are not entitled to separate educational structures. However, the educational authorities in Quebec and in catholic school commissions throughout the province have traditionally recognized them and allowed them to have their own schools wherever numbers have permitted. The anglophone catholic system of education in Quebec has developed as a result of a process of accommodation and compromise, a successful process which one English catholic educator has attributed to 'the basic fairness of the French Canadian'.\(^1\) The important conclusion from this is that English-speaking catholics have always been just as anxious as English protestants to have English language schools. The fact that they are officially within the same system as the French has made little or no difference to their linguistic practices.

Because most of the province's English catholics live in the territory served by the Montreal Catholic School Commission, it is this body which has had the most influence on the development of English catholic education. Between 1947 and 1973 the Commission consisted of seven members, four appointed by the provincial government and three by the archbishop of Montreal. By law one of the appointees had to be

English-speaking.¹ Within the administrative structures of the Commission, the English have been virtually independent since 1928. In the 1940s the English gained virtually complete control over curriculum and personnel policy.² By 1960 the English had succeeded in establishing what in effect was a dual linguistic structure within a school commission that was unified only at the very top. Some Montreal English catholics felt that their educational facilities were still not sufficient in relation to those of the protestants. However, Canon Carter was probably right when he wrote:

...[T]he English catholics...have succeeded in moving forward in education more rapidly than perhaps any comparable group in the country. Beginning with practically nothing, they now have a completely organized system.³

There were virtually no French Canadians who argued that Irish catholics should not have the right to manage their own schools. This no doubt explains how the Irish obtained so much freedom when they were finally in a position to claim it. However, in recent years many have been arguing that this freedom granted to Irish catholics does not involve the right to absorb recent Italian, Portuguese and other European immigrants into the English catholic system, thereby ensuring that they will never become francophones. The same issue arises, in a somewhat different context, when one looks at the way in which the protestant system has been directing Greek Orthodox students toward the English language. Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter will show the

¹Guy Houle, Le cadre juridique de l'administration scolaire locale au Québec (Québec, 1966), p. 69.
²Carter, The Catholic Public Schools, p. 95.
³Ibid., p. 96.
importance of this aspect of the language issue in the recent attempts to rationalize and modernize the school system of the Island of Montreal.

The most important structural change on the protestant side between 1846 and 1973 took place in 1925. This was the year in which the Montreal Protestant Central School Board (M.P.C.S.B.) was created.\(^1\) It was a kind of federal union involving the City board and ten neighbouring protestant ones. It was brought about by the inability of the Verdun protestant board to pay its bills. Rather than providing direct economic assistance to Verdun, the provincial government saw no reason why wealthier protestant boards should not collectively take responsibility for Verdun's debts. The creation of the Central Board seems quite analogous to the creation of the Montreal Metropolitan Commission in 1921.\(^2\) While the M.M.C. never went beyond its financial duties, the M.P.C.S.B. soon took over most of the administrative functions of its constituent boards. The suburban school boards had no reason to resist the leadership exercised by the City board because all members of the M.P.C.S.B. were anglophone protestants who shared the same basic values and objectives.

By 1945, when the name of the Board changed to the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal (P.S.B.G.M.),\(^3\) the local school boards had become little more than tax collecting agencies. In the years that followed, the P.S.B.G.M. supervised a great expansion of the anglophone educational system due to the post-war 'baby boom'. In 1965, both the

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\(^1\) Quebec, Statutes, 1925, Chapter 45.  
\(^2\) See Chapter III-1 of this thesis.  
\(^3\) Quebec, Royal Commission on Education, iii (1966), 188.
P.S.B.G.M. and the City of Montreal protestant board went through one of their periodic changes in the structure of their membership. A provincial act of that year enlarged the membership of the City board to ten, five of whom were to be appointed by the province and five by the protestant members of the Montreal City council. All were automatically members of the P.S.B.G.M. The other ten protestant boards were to be entitled to one representative each. The most important change was the provision for the appointment by the provincial government of five Jews to the P.S.B.G.M. These appointments were to take place after consultation with 'a highly representative institution of the Jewish community of Montreal'.\(^1\) With five of the twenty-five members of the P.S.B.G.M., the Jewish community's strength amongst students in protestant schools was accurately reflected. In light of the features of the Hirsch judgment, a good case could have been made that this entire provision was unconstitutional.\(^2\) However, during the period until 1973 while the P.S.B.G.M. existed in this form, its make-up was never legally challenged.

Placing Jews on the P.S.B.G.M. was a kind of ad hoc measure designed to correct one of the most glaring anomalies in Quebec's antiquated educational system. By the early 1960s such measures were not sufficient to cope with the growing demands for a completely new, and possibly even secular, system of educational structures. Most political, social, and economic leaders in Quebec realized that the modernization of their society could take place only if the educational system were modernized first.

\(^{1}\)Quebec, Statutes, 1965, Chapter 87, s. 3(c).
\(^{2}\)Neatman, 'The Place of the Jews', p. 4.
2. The Parent Report

During its first year in office, the Liberal provincial government of Jean Lesage established a royal commission 'to study the organization and financing of education in the Province of Quebec, report its findings and opinions and submit its recommendations as regards measures to be taken to ensure the progress of education in the Province'. The commission, which was in existence from 1961 to 1966, was to provide the framework for the total overhaul of Quebec's educational system. Its chairman was the Rt. Rev. Alphonse-Marie Parent, the vice-rector of Laval University in Quebec City. Of the other seven members, six were from Montreal and two of these were anglophones. One was John McIlhone, the senior English-speaking official in the Montreal Catholic School Commission and the other was David Munro, the head of the Institute of Education at McGill University.

The first objective of the commission was to address itself to the reform of educational structures at the provincial level. Throughout most of its history, Quebec's educational system had been directed by two independent committees of a body called the Council of Public Instruction. The Council as a whole rarely met, thereby enabling its catholic and protestant committees to have a free hand in running their respective systems. All school boards, even the so-called common ones, had to choose to be under the jurisdiction of one committee or the other. The system was nominally held together by a Department of Education headed by a civil servant known as the Superintendent of Public

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1 Quebec, Royal Commission on Education, i, viii.
2 Ibid., ii (1964), v.
Instruction. He was inevitably a catholic and concerned himself almost exclusively with the catholic side of the system. The Associate Superintendent was a protestant who was given great freedom in the supervision of all protestant schools. The Superintendent reported to the government through a cabinet minister designated for that purpose, usually the Provincial Secretary. For eight years after 1867 Quebec was actually blessed with a cabinet minister holding the title Minister of Education. But in 1875, the provincial legislature abolished the post on the grounds that education was not suited to the meddling of politicians.¹

The Parent commission was convinced that this system was incapable of carrying out the reforms that were necessary to adapt French Quebec education to the requirements of a modernized society. It therefore recommended, in 1963, that the Superintendent be replaced by a cabinet minister² and that the Council of Public Instruction be replaced by an advisory body to be known as the Superior Council of Education. The Superior Council would have both catholic and protestant committees but most of its work would be done by the entire body meeting together.³ The government immediately announced its intention to implement these recommendations. From June 1963 until March 1964, there was an intense public debate concerning the government’s proposals.⁴ Finally, on 13 May 1964, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, the cabinet minister who had been directing

¹Ibid., i. 16.
²Ibid., 88.
³Ibid., 118-9.
⁴See Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Pourquoi le Bill 60 (Montréal, Les Editions du jour, 1963), and Léon Dion, Le Bill 60 et la société québécoise (Montréal, Editions HMH, 1967).
the government's educational policies, became Quebec's first modern Minister of Education. ¹

While these changes were taking place in Quebec City, the Parent commission was studying what it called the 'pedagogical structures' of the system. In 1964 it published a blueprint of a system in which, for the first time, all students in Quebec would follow roughly the same course of study in the same type of institutions. The government accepted most of the proposed changes and during the late 1960s educational institutions throughout the province, especially at the post-secondary level, experienced a period of drastic structural change. One of the results of these reforms was that many more francophone youths were being prepared either for highly skilled jobs or for entrance to university. When neither the jobs nor the university places materialized, the resulting frustration fuelled many of the nationalist riots and demonstrations of the late 1960s. ²

The final volumes of the Parent report were released during the provincial election campaign of 1966. They dealt mainly with educational structures and finances at the local level. Their most important recommendation was that school boards no longer have any confessional status. In constitutional terms, the Commission was in effect urging that all common boards become truly common and that the right to establish dissenting boards be removed. The Commission members did not, however, wish to do away with the confessional nature of individual


schools. Rather they wanted parents to be able to choose from amongst three different types of institutions: catholic, protestant, and non-confessional. For demographic reasons the full range of choices would probably be available only in the large cities.¹ These suggestions were so radical and so obviously unconstitutional, particularly as they affected rural areas, that the provincial government has only attempted to implement them within Montreal. The next section will show how and why even these limited attempts were unsuccessful.

The Commission members also made recommendations concerning language use in Quebec schools. They envisioned the continuance of separate English and French schools within each board,² thereby implying that each of the three types of schools referred to in the previous paragraph would have to operate in one or other of the two languages. An individual school board could therefore theoretically have the responsibility of operating six different kinds of elementary and secondary schools. On the potentially controversial question of the language of education for immigrants, the Commission said this:

> Even though the state has the right to enact regulatory measures concerning language, it would seem only just that no one be forced to place his children in a French or an English school....³

In general, the Commission seemed more concerned with religious questions rather than with language.

For the Island of Montreal, the Commission members recommended

¹Quebec, Royal Commission on Education, iv, 85.
²Ibid., 115.
³Ibid., 114.
that the existing twenty-four catholic and fifteen protestant school boards\textsuperscript{1} be replaced by seven new ones, each to have responsibility for all elementary and secondary education within its respective area.

Map VI-1 shows their boundaries and Table VI-1 indicates their linguistic make-up in 1971. It is interesting to note that under this plan the English would have been in clear control of two boards (3 and 7) thereby placing 145,005 francophones, including the citizens of Outremont, in a minority situation. Amongst the anglophones, 234,145 would have been in the minority, most of them in St. Laurent, Verdun, LaSalle, and the south-central part of the City of Montreal.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{TABLE VI-1\textsuperscript{2}}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Board & English & French & Other & Population \\
\hline
1 & 34.4 & 58.4 & 7.2 & 285,335 \\
2 & 7.7 & 81.2 & 11.1 & 298,870 \\
3 & 59.6 & 27.3 & 14.1 & 293,540 \\
4 & 9.3 & 66.6 & 24.1 & 317,840 \\
5 & 27.0 & 62.6 & 10.4 & 173,700 \\
6 & 9.3 & 82.5 & 8.2 & 390,540 \\
7 & 63.9 & 32.3 & 3.8 & 200,415 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., 187-9.

\textsuperscript{2}Data derived from Ibid., final pages and Canada, Statistics Canada, 1971 Census of Canada, Catalogue 95-734(CT-4B), pp. 2-45. The figures do not include the population of Ile-Bizard which was not included in these proposals.
Map VI -1

Parent Report Proposals for Seven Unified School Boards, 1966

Ibid., final pages.
The plan also called for the establishment of a Council of School Development to be made up of government appointees and representatives of the seven boards. It would have jurisdiction over such matters as the collection and distribution of property taxes and government grants, the wages and salaries of personnel, school transportation, and various other auxiliary services. The Commission did not really address itself to the constitutional and political problems involved in abolishing institutions that were perceived as being important protectors of different confessional and linguistic groups. It covered itself on this question by recommending that confessional matters in individual schools be under the jurisdiction of school committees elected by parents. But, for many devoted French catholics and frightened English protestants, this hardly seemed sufficient.

During the period immediately after their publication, the recommendations concerning Montreal did not receive a great deal of public attention. There was much more concern with the general issue of confessionality throughout the entire province. The fact that there was an election campaign going on did not contribute to the quality of the public debate on this or most other matters connected with educational reform. However, when the election was over and the new Union nationale government had taken office, the issues raised by the Parent report had to be disposed of. Not surprisingly, the new government never seriously considered abolishing the traditional confessional identity of school boards outside the Montreal area. Its policy for

\(^1\)Ibid., 203-4.

\(^2\)Ibid., 171.
dealing with the complex educational problems of the Island was not so clear.¹

3. The Pagé Report

The new government's first action on this issue was to refer the whole subject matter of confessionality in school boards to the Superior Council of Education. In August of 1967 the Council endorsed the idea of non-confessional schools by a vote of 14-4.² The Council as a whole did not specifically address itself to the recommendations concerning Montreal, although its Protestant Committee made a special point of rejecting them as part of its general opposition to the proposed abolition of confessional school boards.³ The Catholic Committee accepted non-confessionality but did not address itself to the Montreal recommendations.⁴

Because of its general policy not to impose measures of educational reform on unwilling communities, the Union nationale government chose not to act on the Montreal issue without further consultation with the leaders of various educational interest groups. On 30 September 1967 the government created the Council for School Reorganization on the Island of Montreal.⁵ In its final form, the Council consisted of

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¹From this point onwards, events in the reorganization controversy became increasingly complex and confusing. For a simplified chronology, see Appendix II.


³Ibid., pp. 342-4. ⁴Ibid., p. 326.

eighteen members. Nine were appointed by the school boards: four from the Montreal Catholic School Commission (two French, one Irish, one Italian), two from other catholic school boards, two from the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal, and one from the protestant Lakeshore Regional Board. Five represented the teachers' organizations: three from the French catholic groups and one each from the English catholics and protestants. Four were from parent groups: two from the French catholics and one each from the English catholics and protestants. ¹

The Council's membership was thoroughly representative and carefully balanced. These virtues, however, made the Council both unwieldy and unlikely ever to reach agreement. At its first meeting it elected Joseph Pagé, vice-chairman of the M.C.S.C., as its chairman. ²

The Council's terms of reference were 'to promote the regionalization of school administration on the Island of Montreal' in the light of the recommendations of both the Parent Commission and the Montreal Metropolitan Co-ordinating Regional School Planning Committee. ³ This latter committee has been formed in December of 1964 in order to co-ordinate the implementation in Montreal of the provincial government's plan to create regional school boards throughout the province for the purpose of administering large multi-purpose secondary schools. ⁴

¹Ibid., pp. 12-4.
²Quebec, Department of Education, Council for School Reorganization on the Island of Montreal, Minutes, Meeting of 13 October 1968.
committee had grappled with the possibility of recommending the creation of non-confessional boards but decided that they were neither necessary nor desirable. Following its report, regional school boards in Montreal were created in the west for protestants (Lakeshore) and in the east for catholics (Jérôme Le Royer).

During late 1967, the Council held a number of informational meetings to acquaint themselves with the general problems of administering school systems in metropolitan areas. At one of their sessions, representatives of the Metropolitan Toronto School Board outlined their experience with structural change. The metropolitan Toronto board had been established at the same time as the original metropolitan government and the boundaries of its constituent public school boards were changed in 1966 to match those of the new boroughs. Catholic school boards continued to exist, as guaranteed by the constitution, and were equitably represented in the metropolitan board. In general, the Toronto experience serves once again to illustrate the fact that structural reform was much easier in that city than in Montreal because in Toronto there was no serious questioning of the co-existence of both public and separate catholic schools and there were no significant language problems because English, with a few isolated exceptions, was the only language of instruction.

1Ibid., p. 13.

2Quebec, Minutes, Meeting of 20 November 1967.

In early 1968 the Council finally came to grips with its main problem—the nature of Montreal's future school boards. Chairman Pagé put forward a proposal that there be two types of school boards: a) one for all Catholics of any language and all non-Catholics who wished to be educated in French; and b) one for all Protestants and all non-Catholics and non-Protestants who wished to be educated in English. Each type of board would operate confessional and non-confessional and French and English schools depending on parental demand.\(^1\) In effect, this was a proposal to perpetuate the status quo, with the important difference that the new boards would not legally have a confessional character, thereby making everybody equal within them. A uniform tax rate would be set by a metropolitan school council; citizens would choose which type of board they wished to be electors for; and parents could choose which type of school to send their children.\(^2\) Although the proposal appeared clumsy and unwieldy, it had the virtues of offending no major group and of requiring virtually no administrative disruption.

From February until June, the Council studies other proposals submitted by various interest groups.\(^3\) The Alliance des professeurs de Montréal (teachers in the French schools of the M.C.S.C.) wanted two school boards for the whole Island of Montreal—one French and one English.\(^4\) The P.S.B.G.M. asked for a network of language-based boards

\(^1\)Ibid., Meeting of 29 January 1968.
\(^2\)Ibid.
\(^3\)For an analysis of the 32 briefs presented, see Louise Bigras, 'Analyse du contenu des reponses au questionnaire du Conseil de restructuration scolaire de l'Ile de Montréal sur certaines recommendations du Rapport Parent' (Québec, Ministère de l'éducation, 1968).
\(^4\)Quebec, Minutes, Meeting of 18 March 1968.
backed up by new constitutional guarantees for anglophones to replace those based on religion. This plan was supported by the Quebec Federation of Protestant Home and School Associations and by the Montreal Teachers Association (teachers employed by the P.S.B.G.M.). The latter group suggested, however, that anglophone catholics should be free to decide with which type of board they wished to associate. The Comité conjoint des parents de Montréal (French catholic parents) asked for unified school boards in line with the Parent recommendations.

The most dramatic presentation was made on 6 May when the M.C.S.C. made its first public response to the Parent recommendations. The Commission stated that after long study it had decided to favour two networks of school boards based on language. This proposal infuriated Montreal's anglophone catholics who felt that they were being cruelly jettisoned. They were particularly upset that the M.C.S.C. had approved this position by a 3-2 vote, with the chairman casting the deciding ballot, in the absence of the only anglophone commissioner. Furthermore, there had been no consultation with anglophone teachers or parents. Although the anglophone catholic opposition to this proposal was vehement, the group as a whole was not clear what alternative it preferred.

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1 Ibid., Meeting of 8 April 1968.
2 Ibid., Meeting of 24 April 1968.
3 Ibid., Meeting of 19 April 1968.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid., Meeting of 6 May 1968.
6 See copy of a letter from Mr. Kevin Quinn attached to Ibid.
The Federation of English-speaking catholic teachers was arguing for separate school boards for anglophone catholics while John McIlhone, the top anglophone M.C.S.C. administrator, supported the proposals of the Parent commission, of which he had been a member.  

At its 5 June meeting, the Council made a final decision about what type of school board system it would recommend. The P.S.B.G.M. representatives voted for the Pagé proposal on the grounds that there was no likelihood of constitutional protection for any other type of arrangement. No one else, except Pagé himself, supported this proposal. The representative of the Verdun Catholic School Commission was the sole supporter of a system in which there would be one set of school boards for catholics and another set for all others. The anglophone catholic teachers' representative was likewise alone in supporting a plan for three types of boards: French, English catholic, and English non-catholic. John McIlhone and two of the parent representatives supported the Parent proposals for unified boards. The remaining eight members present all supported the linguistic division as recommended by the M.C.S.C. This became the fundamental assumption upon which the rest of the Council's work was based.

At this same meeting, the Council unanimously agreed that all parents should have the right to choose the type of school in which their children were to be educated. This took place in the early stages of what was to become known as the 'St. Léonard school crisis'. The crisis

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1Ibid.
2Ibid., Meeting of 5 June 1968.
3Ibid.
arose out of the decision of the Catholic St. Léonard School Commission on 20 November 1967 to phase out bilingual classes, mainly attended by Italian immigrants, and to replace them by unilingual French classes. The decision immediately caused extreme bitterness and controversy both within St. Léonard and throughout the province. Two opposing pressure groups—the Association of Parents of St. Léonard and the Mouvement pour l'intégration scolaire (M.I.S.)—fought for political support. Four days after the Council decision on freedom of choice, which was not public knowledge, school board elections were held in St. Léonard. The M.I.S. gained complete control and announced their intention to fully implement their policy of unilingualism. As the crisis grew in intensity, the Union nationale government refused to take action on the grounds that the Council for School Reorganization would be concerning itself with the matter. Much of the work of the Council during the summer of 1968 was concerned with this problem.

In its final report, made public on 7 November 1968, the Council stated that the French language in Quebec could be protected only by an overall government language policy and not through taking action in certain isolated instances such as the existing situation in St. Léonard.

1Richard Issenman, St. Léonard Put in Perspective--Background to a Crisis (Montreal, Montreal Star, 1970), p. 5.

2For details of their activities, see John E. Parisella, 'Pressure Group Politics: Case Study of the St. Léonard Crisis' (McGill University, M.A. thesis, 1971).

3Issenman, St. Leonard, p. 9.

4Montreal Star, 9 October 1968.
The Council agreed that no action should be taken to diminish the existing language rights of people already living in Montreal but 'was unfortunately not able to reach a consensus on a formal recommendation regarding the principal language of instruction for the children of future immigrants who speak neither English nor French'.

This statement prompted the two M.C.S.C. francophone teachers, the representative of the Le Royer regional school board, and one of the francophone parents to present a formal minority proposal that some form of coercion should be used to ensure that future immigrants be educated in French. On the other hand, six of the anglophones on the Council signed a separate minority statement objecting to any reference to even the possibility of changing the linguistic rights of future immigrants. Interestingly enough, the two Italian Canadians on the Council did not associate themselves with this statement, presumably preferring to remain on the sidelines and accept the non-committal majority position. The Council's difficulty with this issue undoubtedly made it more difficult than ever for the members to arrive at some kind of overall agreement.

On the issue of the nature of the school boards, the Council recommended that there be nine French boards and four English. The French boards would provide both catholic and 'pluralist' schools, while the English would provide three different types: catholic, 'pluralist', and protestant. By this time, all the protestants and the one Jew on

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2 Ibid., pp. 132-8.
3 Ibid., p. 139.
4 Ibid., pp. 75-6.
the Council had rallied to the P.S.B.G.M. position that linguistic boards were not a satisfactory substitute for the present confessional arrangements unless they were accompanied by the appropriate constitutional guarantees. They all joined together in presenting a minority statement to this effect. In a similar fashion, the two Irish catholics united to sign a minority statement supporting McIlhone's consistent pleadings for a unified system. They were joined by the representative from the Le Royer regional board. Their statement was accompanied by a map showing the division of the Island into eleven different school board areas. Finally, there was a separate statement from the Verdun representative insisting that the confessional division was still the ideal structural arrangement. This plethora of minority reports (twelve altogether) ensured that the majority recommendation was almost totally lacking in credibility. This impression was further reinforced when Chairman Pagé publicly declared in October 1969 that even he did not support the majority position of his own Council. However, by this time he was no longer supporting his original proposal but instead had rallied to the unified school board position.

Other major recommendations of the Council supported the Parent proposals concerning school committees and the establishment of an Island-wide body consisting of one representative from each of the thirteen proposed boards. This latter body, the School Council for

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1 Ibid., p. 131.
2 Ibid., pp. 141-5. 3 Ibid., pp. 146-51.
the Island of Montreal, was to have control over taxation, financing, planning, co-ordination, and certain common services.¹ This proposal itself inspired two minority statements urging the clarification and limitation of the School Council's role. All but one of the nine signatures were those of anglophones.²

Although the Pagé Report majority recommendations were supported editorially in Le Devoir as being more judicious, flexible, and realistic than the Parent proposals,³ there were few people who ever took them seriously. The work of the Council for School Reorganization on the Island of Montreal deserves attention not because of its lasting influence but because of the particularly vivid way in which it exposed all the alternatives, difficulties, and frictions inherent in any attempt to change the traditional patterns of school administration in Montreal.

4. The Language Issue and Bill 62

When the Council for School Reorganization reported in November of 1968, Jean-Jacques Bertrand, who succeeded to the premiership after the death of Daniel Johnson, had been in office for less than two months. Facing a by-election on December 4 in the anglophone constituency of Notre-Dame-de-Grace,⁴ Bertrand was anxious to calm anglophone fears.

¹Ibid., p. 58.
²Ibid., pp. 164-7.
³Le Devoir, 11 November 1975.
⁴The election had been caused by the decision of Eric Kierans to leave provincial politics in order to enter the federal arena. At this time, there were no anglophone U.N. members of the provincial legislature from the Island of Montreal.
On November 22 he promised that his government would present new legislation to guarantee freedom of language choice in the province's schools.¹ Despite this pledge, the strong U.N. candidate in N.D.G., John Lynch-Staunton² was handily defeated by the Liberal candidate, William Tetley. Even after the loss, Bertrand still felt obliged to proceed with his promised legislation. On 9 December he presented Bill 85 to the National Assembly. The bill had three main provisions: 1) it gave the Minister of Education the responsibility to ensure that the children of future immigrants be educated in French language schools; 2) it set up a linguistic committee within the Superior Council of Education, the main task of which would be to recognize schools as being either English or French; and 3) school boards throughout the province were given the responsibility to provide both French and English education 'to all children domiciled in the territory under their jurisdiction if they are deemed capable of following such courses and if their parents are desirous of enrolling them therein'.³ This somewhat ambiguous legislation satisfied neither of the major groups involved in the St. Léonard dispute but it seemed to enrage French unilingualists more than anglophones. However, by December 16, Premier Bertrand could no longer defend it because he was in hospital following a heart attack. It became the responsibility of Jean-Guy Cardinal, the education minister, who had by


3 Québec, Assemblée nationale, Bill 85, 1968.
then firmly established himself as Bertrand's main nationalist opponent within the cabinet. In spite of Liberal objections, Cardinal had Bill 85 referred to committee for study before it reached second reading. A few days later the session was over and the bill was dead.¹

At the same time as he introduced Bill 85, Premier Bertrand established the Gendron Commission to study the entire issue of a language policy for Quebec.² Although this action made it possible for the government to avoid the larger issue for as long as the Commission was deliberating, it also became more difficult for it to mobilize support for the kind of short-term, isolated actions that might have been politically expedient. For example, when asked to comment on Bill 85, the Superior Council simply replied that it could not do so without more information concerning the government's overall language policy objectives.³

As the St. Léonard dispute smouldered on through early 1969, the education committee of the National Assembly held public hearings on the proposals contained in Bill 85.⁴ On 10 September the situation in St. Léonard reached a climax when about a thousand unilingualists took to the streets causing massive property damage and considerable violence.⁵ By this time, the rioters were far more concerned with the larger

¹Parisella, 'Pressure Group Politics', p. 147.

²See Chapter II-6 of this thesis.


⁵Issenman, St. Léonard, p. 13.
provincial scene because within St. Léonard they seemed to have virtu­ally won their case. After the riot it became clear to Premier Bertrand that the provincial government had to regain the initiative. He and Cardinal agreed on a legislative package which they could both support. First, Bill 85 would be approved in a modified form. Second, a new bill would be introduced to restructure Montreal's school system in accordance with the Parent proposals for unified school boards.

Bill 85's successor, Bill 63, was introduced on 23 October 1969. It dispensed with the provisions concerning a linguistic commit­tee but gave more authority to the French Language Bureau of the Department of Cultural Affairs. Responsibility for encouraging immi­grants to have their children educated in French was given to the immigration minister, but the Minister of Education was given the task of ensuring that all children educated in English also obtained a working knowledge of French. After making the general statement that 'all school commissions must teach courses in French to all children within their territory who are deemed capable and desirous of enrolling for them', the bill went on to make this vital additional statement: 'They shall be given in the English language to any child for whom his parents or the persons acting in their stead so request at his enrolment'.

Regardless of what else anglophones and immigrants thought of the rest of the bill, it was this provision that they all welcomed. It was this same provision that further outraged the unilingualists. There were no

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2 Québec, Débats, viii (1969), 3293.
3 Quebec, Statutes, 1969, Chapter 9, s. 4.
public hearings on Bill 63 and it was opposed only by René Lévesque, one dissident Liberal, two dissident members of the U.N., and an independent. After numerous demonstrations outside the National Assembly, and turbulent debates within, the bill became law on 28 November. Although this brought the St. Léonard crisis to an end, the debate on an overall language policy had just begun.

During the height of the controversy surrounding Bill 63, Mr. Cardinal introduced the second part of the legislative package on education. It was given first reading, as Bill 62, on 4 November. It called for the creation of eleven unified school boards. Their boundaries (see Map VI-2) were the same as those suggested in the minority in the Pagé recommendation, except that the boundary between Boards 8 and 10 was made on a north-south rather than on an east-west basis, thereby ensuring that anglophones did not have control of Board 8. Table VI-2 shows that, in 1971, francophones would have been in the majority in seven of the proposed boards, anglophones in two, with two having no majority linguistic group. Under these proposals, 210,880 francophones would be included within school boards in which they did not have a majority of the population. However, francophones in Board 8 are so close to having a majority (49.3%) that it can justifiably be treated as a francophone board. This leaves only 127,800 francophones within

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1Québec, Débats, viii (1969), 3549. For an account of the debate on Bill 63 written by one of the dissident U.N. members (who is now a P.Q. M.N.A.), see Jérôme Proulx, Le panier de crabes: Un témoignage vecu sur l'Union nationale sous Daniel Johnson (Montréal, Editions Parti Pris, 1971), Chapter 7.

2Québec, Débats, viii (1969), 3509.
### TABLE VI-2


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Board</th>
<th>English</th>
<th>French</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
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<td>13.6</td>
<td>208,895</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>35.9</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>11.2</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOTAL 1,959,230**

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1Data from [1971 Census of Canada, 'Catalogue 95-734 (CT-4B), 2-45'].
anglophone school board territories. This compares with 145,005 under the Parent proposals. If Board 2 is considered as anglophone-dominated, there are then eight boards, containing 224,425 anglophones, in which this group is in a clear minority.\(^1\) The analogous figure under the Parent proposals was 234,145. The real reason for increasing the number of school boards was to limit their power. However, the proposal to have eleven rather than seven did have a slight tendency to ensure that both linguistic groups emerged with fewer of their members in a minority situation.

Bill 62 stated that the boards were to have six to nine members each, elected every four years. One-third were to be chosen by the school committees and two-thirds by universal suffrage.\(^2\) As far as the rest of the bill was concerned, it largely followed the Parent recommendations. However, there was an important difference concerning the proposed School Council. Bill 62 stated that it would be composed of eleven school board representatives and four others. However, all would be named by the government.\(^3\) The School Council would have a great deal of financial power, particularly since it would assume the ownership of all school buildings and land. Although the bill did provide for six

\(^1\)During the committee hearings, figures were presented showing the projected number, for 1971, of francophone and anglophone children aged 5-16 living in the territory of each school board. These figures showed that there would be 6,000 more francophone than anglophone children within Board 4. This apparent difference from the figures presented in Table VI-2 is undoubtedly caused by the fact that so many anglophones living in the centre part of the city are childless. The proportion of francophone and anglophone students projected for the other boards was not significantly different than the proportions presented in Table VI-2. See Quebec, Débats, viii (1969), V4414.


\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 33-5.
different types of linguistic and confessional schools, it made very few concessions to these considerations at the level of the school boards or the School Council. When the Superior Council considered Bill 62, it urged that each board have a director of French education and a director of English education in addition to the associate directors for each of the three religious classifications that the bill already provided for. The Superior Council also wanted the board members themselves to choose their representatives on the School Council.1

Six of the twenty-four members, including four of the five anglophones on the Superior Council, dissented from the majority's approval of the concept of unified boards.2 However, only one specifically claimed that the existing boards were protected by Section 93 of the B.N.A. Act.3

Although Cardinal was committed to having the bill passed before the forthcoming provincial general election, it was referred to the education committee prior to second reading.4 At the committee's first meeting, René Lévesque suggested that it would be preferable to have separate school boards for anglophones and francophones. The School Council, he claimed, could act to ensure that anglophones would no longer be in a superior financial situation.5 Despite Lévesque's original position on this issue, the P.Q. was later to fervently express

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2 Ibid., pp. 129-34.

3 See the dissenting opinion of Marcel Fox in Ibid., pp. 132-3.

4 Québec, Débats, viii (1969), 3512.

5 Ibid., B3983.
its opposition to this alternative. This was the last occasion on which
the bill was debated during the 1969 session.

When the committee convened early in 1970 to study Bill 62, it
held a number of public hearings. Sixteen different presentations were
made, of which four were from groups concerned exclusively with various
aspects of the school tax situation. Of the remaining twelve groups,
nine were anglophone. All of them opposed the principle of unified
boards. Many suggested that the Page proposals were much more desirable
and realistic. One Liberal member of the committee pointed out that
English catholic schools had always existed on a satisfactory basis
within the M.C.S.C. If this had been the case for anglophones within
a catholic board, why could the same thing not happen within unified
boards? John Parker, Montreal City councillor and principal of a
protestant school, gave an answer which demonstrates an impressive
insight into the complicated reality of education in Montreal:

You are talking about a situation where there is an English
catholic section belonging to the Montreal Catholic School
Commission, but in an island situation where there is also a
P.S.B.G.M., which is a constant reminder that English quality
education is available and which provided some kind of
encouragement to the Catholic School Commissions of Greater
Montreal to continue to provide quality to its English
adherents.¹

No advocate of unified boards ever attempted to rebut this rather
fascinating assertion.

Throughout this period, Montreal's protestant educators were
conducting what the Montreal Star called 'an insidious campaign' to
spread anxiety and confusion amongst anglophone parents.² Typical of

¹Ibid., ix (1970), B7.
this was the claim by Stanley Frost, a vice-principal of McGill University, that 'Bill 62 virtually spells the end of the English language teaching profession in Quebec'.

This assertion was based on the unsubstantiated assumption that protestant teachers' unions would not be able to exist within the unified structure. Unlike the St. Léonard crisis, which only affected catholics, Bill 62 struck at the heart of the protestant educational establishment. Led by Dr. Rocke Robertson, McGill's principal, they formed a group called the Association for the Reform of Education which was devoted to mobilizing anglophone protest. It met with little success. Although The Gazette began to gently criticize some of the bill's provisions, it also suggested that the protestant educators themselves could do more to bring about an atmosphere of trust and tolerance.

On another occasion, however, The Gazette did support the Association's claims by pointing out that Bill 62 was probably unconstitutional and that the government had no justification in simply ignoring this aspect of the problem. Although the Association for the Reform of Education did not last, it merits attention because it represents one of the very few occasions when part of Montreal's anglophone establishment has openly entered the public arena in order to mobilize opposition to a government policy which it perceived as being seriously detrimental to anglophone interests.

During this time, the most effective argument for linguistic boards was expressed cautiously and moderately by Claude Ryan in a series

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1 The Gazette, 3 February 1970.
2 Ibid., 6 February 1970.
3 Ibid., 12 February 1970.
of three articles in Le Devoir.¹ He pointed out that Bill 62 completely
ignored the social reality of the existence of two distinct linguistic
communities in Montreal. He reiterated his support for the Page proposals and pointed out in passing that Mr. Pagé himself had held three
different opinions on the issue of school reorganization within the
space of two years. Ryan's arguments would undoubtedly have received
more francophone support if public attitudes had not become so hardened
as a result of the St. Léonard crisis and Bill 63. Bill 62 was generally
perceived as being a symbolic reassertion of francophone power, and few
were willing to dispassionately consider whether it was in fact in the
long-term interest of francophone Montrealers.

At its meetings of 4 and 11 March 1970, the education committee
of the National Assembly heard representatives of the M.C.S.C. Six of
its seven members now favoured unified boards, although they did insist
on more confessional and linguistic guarantees than were contained
within Bill 62.² The one dissenter, André Gagnon was the member who
had been the main force behind the M.C.S.C.'s previous policy of favouring
linguistic school boards. He claimed that the unification of the
protestant and catholic systems would mean that francophone catholics
would lose out. They needed to be helped by their own financially
secure school boards rather than being thrust into the same system as
the more advanced anglophones.³ The M.C.S.C. testimony was not completed

¹Le Devoir, 6, 7, and 9 February 1970.

²Québec, Débats, ix (1970), 167.

³Ibid., B174-6.
before the National Assembly was dissolved, thereby ensuring that Bill 62 would be proceeded with no further. Premier Bertrand's decision to call an unexpectedly early election meant that Bill 63 now stood alone in the statute books without the accompanying bill that Mr. Cardinal felt to be so essential to the future of French language education.

5. **Bill 28**

Because all parties except the Creditistes favoured the principle of unified school boards for Montreal, Bill 62 was not an important issue in the 1970 election campaign. Montreal anglophones voted overwhelmingly Liberal\(^1\) in the undoubted expectation that Robert Bourassa would treat them more kindly than anyone else. In some respects, they were right. The new Minister of Education, Guy St. Pierre, and his Jewish minister of state, Victor Goldbloom, were certainly more sympathetic to anglophone concerns than was Jean-Guy Cardinal. Although St. Pierre was determined to continue Cardinal's policy of creating unified school boards on the Island of Montreal, he made a great effort to do so only with the consent of anglophone educational leaders.\(^2\) He was also anxious to ensure that his plan could survive any possible constitutional challenge, whether by protestants or ardent catholics. These considerations explain why St. Pierre's version of Bill 62, called Bill 28, was not officially made public until 6 July 1971.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) See Chapter II-7 of this thesis.

\(^2\) Fournier stresses the importance of the way in which anglophone business and education interests affected St. Pierre's thinking during the period mid-1970 to mid-1971. See his 'A Political Analysis', pp. 101-7.

\(^3\) Québec, Débats, xi (1971), 3058-9.
In most respects, Bill 28 simply reintroduced the main provisions of Bill 62. For example, the boundaries of the eleven proposed unified school boards were exactly the same in both bills. However, there were a number of significant differences. According to St. Pierre's plan, each board would consist of fifteen members elected by universal franchise. However, if this produced a result in which the linguistic minority was not represented, the minister of education was given the right to appoint two additional members to represent that minority. Each school board would have to appoint two deputy directors-general, one anglophone and one francophone. The directors of academic, student, and personnel services would each be required to have an assistant whose mother tongue, either English or French, was different from that of the director. Each board would also have both a protestant and a catholic committee made up of delegates from the relevant school committees. These committees would have the right to insist that the board appoint officials responsible for catholic and protestant education within the board's schools. The School Council would consist of one representative chosen from each board and four by the minister of education. Unlike Bill 62, Bill 28 did not state that the School Council would take over ownership of the real estate of the various boards. All these measures were clearly aimed at reducing anglophone opposition to the Bill. Although there were prompt objections from educational groups, initial editorial reaction in the *Montreal Star* and

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2 Ibid., p. 4.

3 Ibid., p. 5.

4 Ibid., p. 4.

5 Ibid., p. 6.
The Gazette\(^1\) indicated that Bill 28 was being received quite favourably.

In late October the provisions of the bill were considered by the Superior Council of Education. This body accepted the main principles of the bill but recommended that they be implemented in stages rather than all at once. The first stage would be to democratize the City school boards; the second would be to establish the School Council which, among other things, would have the task of drawing up a plan for the establishment of unified school boards; and the third would be to implement the Council's plan.\(^2\) This recommendation was accepted by all the anglophone members of the Superior Council but was opposed by three francophone catholics\(^3\) who still did not accept the principle of unified boards.

As part of his determination to take all possible measures to build support for his bill, Mr. St. Pierre decided to send it to the education committee of the National Assembly prior to second reading so that extensive public hearings could be conducted. From 28 September until 18 November the committee met for fifty hours and heard thirty-nine separate presentations. Ten of these were either from groups which were concerned with minor issues of interest to their specialized membership or from various other miscellaneous groups whose position on the educational structures of Montreal was of little political importance. The other twenty-nine presentations can be most meaningfully grouped

\(^1\)The Gazette, 7 and 8 July 1971.


\(^3\)Their notes of dissent are recorded in Ibid., pp. 55-9.
into five major categories. Each will be described in turn.

There were eight presentations from catholic school boards and associations of francophone catholic school administrators. These were the organizations in which the government's policy found the most support. The most important presentation in this group came from the M.C.S.C. It wanted the bill to force new immigrants to be educated in French; to declare French as the working language of the new structures; to provide for more autonomy for the new school boards; and to be implemented in steps rather than all at once. However, on the fundamental issue of having unified boards co-existing with certain linguistic and confessional guarantees for established groups, the M.C.S.C. fully supported the government's proposals. The Baldwin-Cartier School Commission, serving catholics in most of the West Island, took a similar position but stressed the need for protection of linguistic minorities rather than the need to increase the use of French. Since this board was the only catholic one in the province containing an anglophone majority, their position was not surprising. The catholic school board in Ville St. Pierre requested that its territory be switched from the proposed territory of Board 4 to that of Board 8. This would have the effect of placing this heavily francophone municipality under the jurisdiction of a francophone rather than an anglophone board and of giving francophones a clear majority within Board 8. This was one of the few proposals that Mr. St. Pierre readily accepted.

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1 Québec, Debats, xi (1971), B4606-11.
2 Ibid., B4316-20.
3 Ibid., B5113.
Seven of the presentations supported the policy of having unified boards but fervently opposed that of giving any kind of special guarantees to the linguistic minority. These briefs also stressed the need to take action to ensure that French became either the paramount or the only language of education on the Island of Montreal. This approach was argued by the province's two major trade union federations, by two Quebec nationalist movements, and by francophone teachers' unions. The most extreme position was taken by a group called 'Front commun pour la défense de la langue française' which was led by Raymond Lemieux, the former leader of the Mouvement pour l'intégration scolaire in St. Léonard. It was the only group to argue for the abolition of all state subsidies to all anglophone schools. The most common demand coming from these groups was for the repeal of Bill 63 and the implementation of a comprehensive pro-French language policy in conjunction with the implementation of Bill 28. They feared that without such a policy, Bill 28 would ensure that future francophone school employees and administrators would have to be bilingual and that anglophone schools would absorb all the immigrants. St. Pierre rejected their language policy demands on the grounds that the Gendron commission was still studying the problem and that Bill 28 was simply an administrative measure, the approval of which would have no effect on the existing linguistic arrangements. However, in response to other demands from these groups that school boards should not contain members representing the linguistic minority appointed by the government, St. Pierre made a concession. He stated that the bill would be amended so that these

1Ibid., B5142.
government appointees would be official observers, not voting members.\(^1\)

A source of somewhat ambiguous support for the bill was the anglophone catholic community. Four of their educational organizations made presentations which, while fully accepting the principle of unified school boards, insisted on additional guarantees for linguistic and confessional groups existing within each board. They also wanted fewer boards so that the number of anglophone catholic pupils within each one would be more likely to support a full network of services and administrative structures that would be both anglophone and catholic. The most comprehensive submission was made by the anglophone teachers working for the M.C.S.C. This group seemed particularly concerned that school board elections be structured so as to increase anglophone catholic political strength. It wanted all residents over eighteen, not just Canadian citizens, to have a vote in school board elections, thereby enfranchising many catholic immigrants. It also supported a scheme whereby all members would be elected at large but each elector would cast only one vote.\(^2\) This formula has obvious benefits for well organized minorities such as the anglophone catholics. Mr. St. Pierre was fully aware that Bill 28 suited anglophone catholic interests far better than either the Page\(^\text{é}\) recommendations or Bill 62. Consequently, he took no further steps to satisfy their expressed desires or requirements.

As was shown in the deliberations of the Superior Council, some of the most adamant opponents of Bill 28 were to be found amongst those francophones who wished to maintain catholic educational structures. Three presentations were made to the committee along these lines. A

\(^1\)Ibid., B5115.  \(^2\)Ibid., B4597-8.
spokesman for the archbishop of Montreal stated that the church favoured the establishment of the School Council and the regrouping of local school boards but, for the immediate future, it wished to maintain separate catholic and protestant systems. Unification would perhaps be desirable in a number of years but it was not desirable now. A truly catholic system requires a pedagogical administrative structure that is itself inherently catholic. Similar arguments were expressed more strenuously by an organization known as the 'Association des parents catholiques du Québec'. This group's fervent defence of catholic education made the church's official spokesman appear so moderate as to seem almost indifferent. Although St. Pierre was later to announce minor amendments to increase the authority of the confessional committee within each board, he gave no indication of making any further concessions concerning this aspect of the bill.

The greatest source of opposition to the bill came from the protestants. This was despite the fact that St. Pierre had gone to considerable effort to gain their support. The eight protestant presentations to the committee proved that he had been far from successful. All argued against the principle of unified boards and in favour of separate French and English networks of school boards. Some insisted on constitutional guarantees based on language to replace the existing religious ones. Many presentations pointed out that if unified boards were actually established, many anglophones finding themselves in a minority would move to school board areas in which anglophones dominated.

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1Ibid., B4664-76.  
2Ibid., B4288-95.  
3Ibid., 4565.
The tendency for the West Island to become an anglophone ghetto would be greatly strengthened. The most important protestant presentation came from the P.S.B.G.M. Unlike most other groups, it did not hesitate to raise the issue of Section 93 of the B.N.A. Act. Its spokesman, Mr. Samuel Godinsky, claimed that lawyers for the P.S.B.G.M. were convinced that the bill was unconstitutional.\(^1\) Liberal, Union nationale, and Parti québécois members all expressed disapproval of Godinsky's introduction of the constitutional issue. One Liberal member, William Tetley, pointed out that it was probably unconstitutional for Godinsky, a Jew, to be a member of the P.S.B.G.M.\(^2\) Although he made a brief defence of the constitutionality of his own situation, Godinsky's case was not convincing. If nothing else, this episode demonstrated the inherent dangers in making arguments based on the B.N.A. Act. Perhaps realizing this, one organization, the Montreal Teachers' Association, specifically stated that it did not favour the use of the B.N.A. Act in debates about the desirability of Bill 28.\(^3\) Although the teachers disagreed with their employers on the matter of tactics, it is important to note that, on the vital issues, they were in full agreement. In spite of their usually different interests, the various components of the protestant educational establishment came together in the face of this obvious threat to their continued existence.

Mr. St. Pierre did not take any moves toward the protestant position, nor did he seem unduly concerned about any protestant threat to challenge the constitutionality of Bill 28. This was because he was

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\(^1\)Ibid., B4576.  
\(^2\)Ibid., B4582.  
\(^3\)Ibid., B4707.
armed with a lengthy legal opinion from lawyers at the University of Montreal stating that the bill's major provisions did not violate Section 93 and that if a broad interpretation of the constitution were taken, the whole bill was constitutional 'sans aucune reserve'. The main concern of the lawyers was that the bill purported to abolish the right of confessional minorities, within school board territories, to establish dissident school boards to administer elementary schools. St. Pierre eventually protected himself on this point by introducing amendments allowing for the right of dissidence. This was not much of a concession, however, because without full government co-operation the use protestants could make of this right would be virtually negligible.

Throughout the hearings of the education committee, the only political party that consistently opposed Bill 28 was the Ralliement créditiste. They objected to the idea of abolishing confessional school boards. Although the Parti québécois sympathized with the presentations which attacked the bill because of its lack of concern for language, it seemed fully committed to the bill's main principles. However, as the hearings went on, the P.Q. education critic, Claude Charron, seemed to focus his attention more and more on the need to repeal Bill 63 and to do away with all special provisions for minority linguistic representation within the new school boards. The official position of the P.Q. became clear on 7 December when its leaders held a press conference to announce that they would be introducing many amendments which would have

1 Chevrette, Marx, and Tremblay, Les problèmes constitutionels, p. 83.
2 Beauchamp, 'La restructuration scolaire', p. 23.
the effect of making the bill linguistically acceptable.¹ On the same day, the P.Q. voted with the Liberals and the U.N. to support the principle of the bill on second reading.²

On 8, 13 and 14 December, Bill 28 was given detailed clause-by-clause study in the education committee. During this period, it became clear that the government would not get the bill through before Christmas unless it made substantial concessions to the P.Q. on the language issue. Charron, with the assistance of some other P.Q. members, began what in effect was a systematic filibuster. Meanwhile various francophone nationalist and labour organizations sponsored demonstrations against Bill 28 in both Montreal and Quebec City. On 11 December Claude Ryan of Le Devoir came out in favour of the P.Q. position. In an important editorial he supported their suggestion that Bill 28 be amended in such a way that only children having English as a mother tongue or who are already enrolled in English schools would be permitted to be educated in English.³ The education committee sent the bill back to the assembly only after the P.Q. had temporarily boycotted the meeting. On 21 and 22 December the bill was once again debated by the whole assembly. By this time the U.N. and R.C. members had joined the P.Q. in wishing to take credit for the bill's demise. All opposition parties spoke at length against its passage in the existing form and the government could do little to stop them. On 23 December the government announced

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¹Ibid.
²Québec, Débats, xi (1971), 4746.
³Le Devoir, 11 December 1971.
that debate on Bill 28 would be suspended.¹ Like Bill 62, Bill 28 had been abandoned.

Both The Gazette and The Montreal Star regretted the fact that the success of the filibuster against Bill 28 meant that now even the less controversial reforms could not be implemented. The Gazette had been urging the establishment of a School Council even though it preferred language-based school commissions to unified ones.² As usual, the most thoughtful comments came from Claude Ryan in Le Devoir. He pointed out that recent events had shown school reform to be impossible in Montreal without the existence of an overall consensus. He suggested that the government's resolve had been shaken not only by the P.Q. and other nationalists but also by the Roman Catholic church.³ Had the church supported the bill, the government might have been more prepared to continue debate in the period immediately after Christmas. It is important to note that the immediate cause of the bill's defeat was the disagreement amongst francophones. It appeared that the protestant anglophones, in spite of their impressive unity, were more the beneficiary of the defeat rather than the cause. Nevertheless, a deeper analysis suggests that were it not for anglophone influence, which was bolstered by their ability to appeal to the constitution, St. Pierre would never have had to make as many concessions to linguistic and confessional minorities. Had the 1970 Liberal electoral promise to provide 100,000

¹Ibid., 24 December 1971.

²The Gazette, 29 December 1971. The Montreal Star's editorial appeared on December 29. La Presse was on strike during most of the Bill 28 debate.

³Le Devoir, 28 December 1971.
new jobs not been so dependent on the anglophone-dominated private sector, St. Pierre might have been able to accept the P.Q. position on language policy. Under these hypothetical circumstances, he might have been able to ignore the objections of the church. Nothing better demonstrates the delicate political balance amongst Montreal's linguistic and confessional groups than the debate about Bill 28.

6. Bill 71 and the School Council of the Island of Montreal

Soon after his forced retreat on Bill 28, Guy St. Pierre was moved out of the education portfolio and replaced by Dr. François Cloutier who, in addition to being education minister, also continued his previous task of overseeing the development of a language policy. Cloutier was not anxious to receive Bill 28. Not only did he want to avoid the political difficulties confronted by St. Pierre, but he was also genuinely suspicious of any policy that would create unified boards. Despite the fact that he had publicly supported such a policy during the Bill 28 debate, Cloutier now stated his fear that unified boards would encourage the formation of linguistic ghettos and that immigrants would flock to anglophone areas to ensure top quality English language education for their children. He also criticized the complex administrative system that would be needed within unified boards. In summary, he was convinced that the process of unification would neither improve the position of French Canadians nor help reduce linguistic tensions. ¹ Although Cloutier was always careful to state

that such a policy might be appropriate in the future, the nature of his arguments against it seemed such that they would remain powerful for many years to come.

Throughout 1972 Cloutier's officials were working on a new, less ambitious scheme to bring the process of school board reorganization. They worked in very close consultation with leaders of Montreal's various educational groupings. The finished product was finally unveiled, as Bill 71, on 1 December. The main purpose of the bill was to establish a School Council of the Island of Montreal with the same functions as were provided for in Bill 28. Bill 71 reduced the number of school boards on the Island from thirty-three to eight, of which six were catholic and two protestant. The bill did not affect the boundaries or internal structures of the M.C.S.C. in any way. The other five catholic boards were formed out of seventeen suburban ones. The existing P.S.B.G.M. was theoretically abolished along with its ten suburban constituent boards. They were all absorbed by the Protestant Board of School Commissioners of the City of Montreal which changed its name to the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal and extended its territory to cover that of the old P.S.B.G.M. In reality, the administrative structure of the P.S.B.G.M. was allowed to exist very much as before. This unusual way of describing the rationalization of the P.S.B.G.M. was undoubtedly caused by a desire not to disturb the existing constitutional position of Montreal's protestants. The second

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1Québec, Débats, xii (1972), 2908-10.
2Québec, Statutes, 1972, Chapter 60, Schedule A.
3Ibid., Schedule B.
protestant board included that part of the West Island not covered by the P.S.B.G.M. The boundaries of the eight boards are shown in Map VI-3 and characteristics of the student population in their territories in September 1972 are shown in Table VI-3. Each of the six new boards were to choose a member to sit on the School Council, while the M.C.S.C. and the P.S.B.G.M. chose six and two, respectively. The government was to appoint three additional members.\(^1\) Cloutier did not pretend that this restructuring of the boards was final. One of the provisions of the bill called on the School Council 'to make an intensive and objective study of the factors pertinent to an adequate school reorganization' and to submit a plan to the minister by 31 December 1975.\(^2\) Considering that two successive ministers of education had failed in their efforts to produce an acceptable plan, it was obvious that this provision placed a heavy burden on the new School Council.

Bill 71 was clearly designed to be acceptable to almost all of the Island's major educational interests. It satisfied the Roman catholic church and its devout adherents by maintaining confessional school boards; the M.C.S.C. and the P.S.B.G.M. by not tampering with their boundaries; the P.Q. and other nationalist groups by not pretending that a final solution could be decided upon in the absence of an overall language policy; and protestant businessmen by not affecting the administration of their children's schools in any way.\(^3\) Although the

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 3.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 7. This deadline was extended by one year by Bill 42 (1976). The same bill postponed the scheduled 1976 school board elections until 1977.

\(^3\)Beauchamp, 'La restructuration scolaire', p. 32.
Map VI -3

CATHOLIC AND PROTESTANT SCHOOL BOARDS IN MONTREAL RESULTING FROM BILL 71, 1972

Table VI - 3

STUDENT POPULATION IN SEPTEMBER 1972 IN THE TERRITORIES OF THE EIGHT SCHOOL COMMISSIONS ESTABLISHED BY BILL 71

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>School Board</th>
<th>Pupils in French Schools</th>
<th>Pupils in English Schools</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CATHOLIC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M.C.S.C.</td>
<td>164,125</td>
<td>44,450</td>
<td>208,575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Royer</td>
<td>25,303</td>
<td>5,812</td>
<td>31,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baldwin-Cartier</td>
<td>10,185</td>
<td>9,597</td>
<td>19,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sault St. Louis</td>
<td>14,568</td>
<td>6,885</td>
<td>21,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ste. Croix</td>
<td>11,210</td>
<td>4,013</td>
<td>15,223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verdun</td>
<td>9,977</td>
<td>2,337</td>
<td>12,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Catholic</td>
<td>235,368</td>
<td>73,194</td>
<td>308,562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROTESTANT</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.S.B.G.M.</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>54,613</td>
<td>55,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lakeshore</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14,281</td>
<td>14,281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Protestant</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>68,894</td>
<td>69,958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Totals</strong></td>
<td>236,432</td>
<td>142,088</td>
<td>378,520</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Adapted from data in Ibid., 11 January 1973.
Superior Council of Education did not formally consider the bill, it could hardly object. Dr. Cloutier was following their advice on Bill 28 almost to the letter.

The only dissatisfied people were the anglophone catholics. Because all members of the new boards were to be elected by universal franchise, they no longer had any guarantee of representation on the M.C.S.C. Although there were more catholics than protestants attending anglophone schools on the Island (see Table VI-3), the anglophone catholics were given no official recognition while the protestants had two school boards of their own and a guarantee of having at least three representatives on the School Council. An organization called the Committee for the Co-ordination of Anglophone Catholic Education, which was composed of parents', teachers', and principals' groups, conducted a vigorous campaign to convince Cloutier to establish two separate school boards for Montreal's anglophone catholics. The campaign failed. Cloutier firmly refused their demands on the grounds that if they were granted he would soon face justified requests from other groups, most notably the Jews, to have their own systems as well.

Bill 71 was opposed in the National Assembly by all three opposition parties. Jean-Guy Cardinal (U.N.) accused the government of shirking its responsibility in delegating the problem of further restructuring to the School Council; the créditiste spokesman said

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1See the Committee's full page advertisement in The Montreal Star, 4 December 1972.

2Le Devoir, 8 December 1972.

3Québec, Débats, xii (1972), 2988.
the bill was being rushed through without adequate public debate;\(^1\) and Claude Charron (P.Q.) claimed that its provisions had been dictated to the government by Montreal's anglophone minority.\(^2\) During the clause-by-clause study, the P.Q. and U.N. repeatedly proposed amendments to strengthen the position of French within Montreal's educational system. All were defeated by the Liberal majority. Cloutier refused to accept proposals to make the School Council officially French but claimed that, in practice, French would be its predominant language.\(^3\) There was also considerable debate concerning the apparent over-representation of protestants and under-representation of the M.C.S.C. on the School Council and on the role of the School Council in equalizing school resources. But compared to the Bill 28 debate, the atmosphere was extremely calm and co-operative. On 21 December 1972, the bill became law.\(^4\)

Although the new law seemed modest in comparison with Bills 62 and 28, it had profound effects on Montreal's educational system. From 1973 onward all individual property owners on the Island were subject to one uniform school tax and all companies were subject to another. In June of 1973 residents covered by the M.C.S.C. and the old Protestant School Commissioners of the City of Montreal experienced their first elections for school board members. Although the voting turnout throughout the Island was only about 25%, there were some lively contests. As a result of an apparently disproportionately high anglophone turnout,

\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\)Ibid., 2994.
\(\text{\textsuperscript{2}}\)Ibid., 2996.  \(\text{\textsuperscript{3}}\)Ibid., B7294.
\(\text{\textsuperscript{4}}\)Quebec, Statutes, 1972, Chapter 60.
anglophone catholics won three of the nineteen M.C.S.C. seats. Their fears of losing all their representation as a result of Bill 71 turned out not to have been justified.

Bill 71 also affected the legal position of the Jews. It repealed the 1931 law which had ratified the agreement between the protestants and the Jewish School Commission. The new law gave Jews, and other minority religious groups throughout the Island, equal rights within the school board of their choice. In fact, a few Jewish candidates were elected as members of the new P.S.B.G.M. When it is remembered that the new P.S.B.G.M. is legally the continuation of the old City of Montreal protestant board, it becomes apparent that the existing situation violates the rulings made in 1928 in the Hirsch case. However, if the matter were ever to be taken to a Canadian court, there is every likelihood that that aspect of the Hirsch ruling would be overturned.

The debate about school board re-organization in Montreal is still far from over. With great difficulty and much debate, the School Council for the Island of Montreal, after conducting yet another lengthy study of this issue, finally recommended that the existing confessional system be maintained. This was not because of any great attachment to

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2 Quebec, *Statutes*, 1972, Chapter 60, s. 27.

it but simply because a majority of the Council voted against every other possible alternative, once again proving how contentious the whole issue was. However, because the Parti québécois is committed to the principles of unified boards, it is not all clear that the existing system will remain.

The attempt by Quebec nationalists to abolish protestant, and therefore English, school boards has a remarkable parallel with the successful effort in 1890 by Manitoba's English protestants to abolish that province's catholic and French school boards. One of the justifications for this move was that, as the result of immigration, Manitoba had become overwhelmingly English and protestant, and therefore French and catholic school boards were an unnecessary burden. It is because of this legislation that modern Winnipeg has not had to cope with the administrative complications caused by the existence of two networks of school boards. In recent years, Manitoba has partially reversed the decisions of the 1890s and has allowed French to be re-introduced as a language of instruction. However, there has been no significant demand to re-establish a separate network of school boards that would serve the particular interests of Manitoba's catholic francophones.

The original proposals for unified school boards, made by the Parent report, were not based on any kind of nationalist thinking. The francophone members of the commission were not ardent nationalists and

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even the anglophones, who were both prominent educators, supported the unified concept. They did so because they felt that the unified boards would be the most effective and efficient mechanisms for governing a remodelled Montreal school system in which there would be more, not less, educational choice. The Parent report proposed that parents have full freedom of choice in deciding among French or English and catholic, protestant, or neutral schools. It was because the establishment of six separate networks of school boards was clearly unrealistic that the commission opted for one instead. In Toronto there are significant demands for only two types of schools—English neutral and English catholic. Given these circumstances and the fact that catholic school boards have constitutional protection in Ontario, it is not surprising that there have been no recent demands to establish unified boards in Toronto. The factors which pushed the Parent commission toward unified boards simply do not exist in metropolitan Toronto. The most important of these factors is, of course, the existence of two major linguistic groups.

When the Union nationale government moved to implement the Parent proposal in Montreal, political circumstances had changed. The St. Léonard school crisis had taken place and, in Bill 63, the government had confirmed the right of all parents to choose the language of education of their children. The legislation for unified school boards, Bill 62, was explicitly introduced not simply as a means of organizational reform, but also as a measure to appease nationalist elements in the province and the cabinet who had objected to the liberal provisions of Bill 63. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the debate became quickly embroiled in larger issues relating to the role
of non-franocphones in an increasingly French Quebec.

With Bill 28 the Liberal government tried to show that it too was not afraid to take on the anglophone educational establishment. However, the Liberals placed much more emphasis on justifying their bill in terms of organizational rationality. But by this time, there were few in Quebec who were willing to debate the measure in these terms. Nationalists, anglophones, and fervent catholics all objected to the symbolic significance of the bill's provisions, even if they had not fully examined their substance. The role of the French catholics in forcing the abandonment of Bill 28 must not be under-estimated, but it must also be remembered that, were it not for the strident demands of English catholics and protestants, the demands of fervent French catholics could easily have been accommodated, just as those of English catholics in Toronto have been.

Bill 71 succeeded because it rationalized Montreal's network of school boards as much as was possible without coming into conflict with any linguistic or religious sensibilities. It would appear now that the only way in the near future in which further structural change could come about would be as the result of increased popular support for nationalist demands to abolish all educational structures, based on religion or language. Such a policy would have little to do with organizational rationality; it could best be compared to the systematic policy of English protestants to wipe out French catholic institutions in Manitoba in the 1890s.
CHAPTER VII

LANGUAGE DIFFERENCES AND METROPOLITAN REFORM IN MONTREAL

The preceding chapters have shown that the linguistic cleavage in Montreal has affected the structures and processes or metropolitan politics in quite different ways, depending on the governmental functions under consideration. The first two chapters demonstrated how language use in Montreal is more than just an ordinary social indicator. Speaking French in Quebec is closely associated with being Roman catholic, earning less money in relation to anglophones, and having one's ancestry deeply rooted in Canada. As recent political events in Quebec have vividly shown, this combination of factors has led Quebec's francophones to identify themselves more and more as belonging to a distinct nation, the territorial base of which is Quebec. It is in Montreal where the cultural identity of this French national group is most threatened. The threat has come from a substantial pocket of anglophones, living mainly in the west end of Montreal Island, who have controlled Quebec's economy in the interests of English Canadian, British, and American capital. It also came from a growing number of post-War European immigrants who, although settling in many previously French areas, have insisted on sending their children to English schools. The tensions and conflicts arising from this situation form one of the central themes of modern Canadian political debate. This concluding
chapter, however, is concerned with explaining the differing effects of this conflict on various attempts to reorganize the many structures and functions of urban government in Montreal. The second part of this chapter suggests possible alternative frameworks in which significant metropolitan reform might actually take place at some time in the future.

1. The Differing Effects of the Linguistic Cleavage

Prior to the late 1960s there was no real political threat to the privileged social and economic position of Montreal's anglophones. There were no serious attempts to improve the position of the French language in business and consequently English remained dominant. In the nineteenth century anglophone representation within the governments of the province of Quebec and the City of Montreal was quite substantial. Even though this representation eroded rapidly in the early twentieth century, the English had little cause for concern. Because of their unchallenged economic importance to both the province and the city, there were many opportunities for anglophone businessmen to exert private political influence on francophone government leaders concerned with providing jobs and promoting economic growth. Successive provincial governments did nothing to prevent the emergence of an English network of suburban municipalities, schools, and social service agencies which in many ways provided far superior services to those available to francophones.

Chapter II-1 showed that during the period 1881-1921 large numbers of middle-class anglophones left the City to take up residence in independent suburbs. This allowed them to control, among other
things, the functions of land use planning and policing within their own local communities. Because of the structure of the educational and social service systems, members of the anglophone economic and social elite, including those residing in the City itself, were also able to control the institutions which provided these important services. This statement applies even to English Roman catholics because, although they were officially part of the predominantly francophone catholic school board, the English schools had substantial administrative independence. As far as social services were concerned, there was a distinct network of institutions for both English catholics and Jews.

Because educational and social service institutions were established on the basis of religion, not language, and because francophone suburbs emerged in addition to anglophone ones, it is inaccurate to claim that Montreal's local institutions reflected a one-dimensional French-English cleavage. However, what is important is that the structure of these institutions made it possible for a very large proportion of francophones and anglophones to manage their local affairs with very little reference to, or contact with, the other linguistic group. To the extent that institutional co-operation and contact took place across municipal and religious barriers it occurred mainly within the same linguistic group rather than between linguistic groups. Examples of this abound. Attempts at inter-municipal co-operation in the mainly anglophone West Island met with little support from the francophone municipalities in the same area. English catholics within the Montreal Catholic School Commission chose to construct their system along the lines of the 'high school' model used by English protestants rather
than the dual network of vocational secondary schools and private
classical colleges used by the French. The English catholic and Jewish
social service agencies developed co-operative mechanisms with the
English secular institutions rather than the French catholic ones.

Although no one wished to upset the traditional educational and
social service arrangements prior to the late 1960s, there were some
serious attempts to alter municipal structures. However, the creation
of the Montreal Metropolitan Commission and then the Montreal Metropolitan
Corporation had no effect on municipal boundaries. The limited functions
that these bodies performed related exclusively to what Oliver Williams
has called 'system maintenance' functions. They were concerned with
establishing financial stability and ensuring, in a physical sense, that
the overall metropolitan area could continue to function. This meant,
for example, that they imposed restrictions on capital borrowing and
they promoted the development of urban expressways. Both these activi­
ties encouraged, rather than hindered, the growth of independent suburbs.

Prior to the establishment of the Montreal Urban Community, the
greatest threat to the independent suburbs came from annexation attempts
by the City of Montreal. Chapter III pointed out that the rash of
annexations at the turn of the century posed no threat to those suburbs
which were financially stable. This meant that the anglophone ones were
generally safe. However, the Drapeau-Saulnier annexation drive of the
early 1960s was aimed at the entire Island. The fact that this grandiose

1Oliver P. Williams, 'Life-Style Values and Political Decentral­
ization in Metropolitan Areas', in Terry N. Clark et al., eds.,
Community Politics: A Behavioural Approach (London, Collier-Macmillan,
plan failed is not surprising and its defeat cannot be attributed exclusively, or even primarily, to the linguistic cleavage. The provincial government certainly had no interest in encouraging a powerful politician such as Jean Drapeau to become the mayor of over one-third of the province's population. Nevertheless, as Guy Bourassa has shown, the annexation debate of the 1960s did contain a linguistic dimension not found in the earlier attempts of the City of Toronto to annex its neighbours rather than submit to metropolitan federation.

Until the late 1960s the provincial government stayed aloof from concerns with the structure of local political power in metropolitan Montreal. Prior to 1960, both the Liberal and Union nationale governments proved completely incapable or unwilling to do anything to upset the privileged position of Quebec anglophones. Given the reformist credentials of the Lesage Liberal government of 1960-66, one might have expected it to openly address itself to this situation. Apart from a few threatening speeches by René Lévesque, this never happened. The Lesage Liberals were pre-occupied with rationalizing and modernizing the structure of government at the provincial level, a necessary first step in any attempt to exert francophone political power. By adopting such policies as increasing provincial subsidies to local school boards, the Lesage Liberals encouraged the redistribution of wealth from English to French. However, they made no attempt to change existing local institutions within Montreal.

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Their reticence concerning Montreal was in sharp contrast to their policies concerning other parts of the province. There they began the regionalization of school boards and the amalgamation of many small municipalities. Even on Ile-Jésus, just north of Montreal, they merged thirteen municipalities into the new City of Laval. These facts point to the conclusion that the Lesage Liberals were simply not ready to confront the complex social and political forces on the Island of Montreal, the one area of the province where anglophone strength was so obviously concentrated. Had they remained in office beyond 1966 they, like their successors, would eventually have had to confront this increasingly obvious political problem. The assumption that anglophone interests could not be tampered with by the provincial government was, by the late 1960s, no longer an accepted principle of Quebec politics.

The first of a series of dramatic changes in local institutions did not come about as the result of a well planned effort to rationalize Montreal's local institutions. The creation of the M.U.C. in 1969 was in direct response to a peculiar kind of service crisis. Because of the political violence in Quebec in the late 1960s, Montreal had more need for effective policing than any other Canadian city. In October 1969 the City's policemen made it clear that the City would get no policing at all unless they were adequately paid. Given that both the City and the province were in severe financial straits and that neither had anything to lose by alienating suburban voters, the Union nationale government decided to force the suburbs to help pay the extra amount. In order to make this policy appear to be something other than an outright confiscation of suburban funds, the government created the M.U.C.,
an institution which began its existence as little more than a channel for redistributing the costs of policing. Its creation was justified on the grounds that it would soon become a multi-functional metropolitan government capable of providing services to benefit suburban areas as well as the central City.

In comparison with developments in Winnipeg and Toronto, the subsequent development of the M.U.C. has not been impressive. Nevertheless, with strong financial assistance from other levels of government, the M.U.C. has managed to launch massive extensions to the subway system and to begin construction of a sewage treatment plant and new collector sewers. Both these activities are further examples of Williams' system maintenance functions and, as Williams would have predicted, they have not been the cause of great political controversy, even though the subway extensions have led to the inevitable debates among specialists about the most appropriate technology and location of routes.

Apart from the abolition of local police forces, the existence of the M.U.C. has not caused a significant diminution in local autonomy. This is particularly evident in the fact that the M.U.C. has proven totally incapable of carrying out any significant form of metropolitan land use planning. Although this was an original function of the M.U.C., the suburbs have blocked all attempts to introduce an official plan which would in any way restrict their authority to control land use within their territories. According to Williams' analysis, this is not at all surprising. His claim that the functions of municipal governments can be categorized as either 'lifestyle' or 'system-maintenance'
has already been noted. Lifestyle functions are those which 'enable households, factories, stores, churches, offices, clubs, etc.' to pursue their own particular 'hierarchy of values'. For example, 'Households may seek quality education, convenient shopping, pleasant neighbours, and a short trip to work'. Because land use planning has such a direct influence on the local environment, Williams considers it to be the municipal government function most directly related to lifestyles. System-maintenance functions, on the other hand, are those relating to communications and transport networks, public utilities, and central facilities such as hospitals and stadia. They 'maintain the overall system, and in the process, assure that particular lifestyle values are preserved or enhanced'. Since Williams predicts that suburban municipalities will cling to their lifestyle functions and be willing to give up system-maintenance ones, the pattern within the M.U.C., in terms of Williams' framework at least, is quite normal.

Nevertheless, the experience of Toronto and Winnipeg suggests that, in the face of provincial governments firmly committed to principles of organizational rationality, the interests of existing suburban municipalities in controlling land use planning have been over-ruled. This has happened not so much as the result of removing planning from local jurisdiction, but from making drastic municipal boundary changes in order to create much larger and more heterogeneous municipal units. This is a policy option that has generally not been

1Williams, 'Life-Style Values', p. 61.
2Ibid., p. 60.
3See Chapter V-1 for a discussion of this notion.
available in the United States. The evidence shows that the government of Quebec has been just as committed to the principles of organizational rationality as have the governments of Ontario and Manitoba. Why then have the M.U.C. municipalities been capable of holding on to both their full power and their existing boundaries? They have maintained the former by using their veto within the M.U.C. Council and they have perpetuated their existence by entering into the powerful, mutually protective alliance described at the end of Chapter V.

The existence of the suburban veto within the M.U.C. is best explained by remembering that without it the City would have been in a position of absolute control. Until 1974 this City control would have been exercised exclusively by the Civic Party of Jean Drapeau, a party which held virtually every seat on the Montreal City council. Under these circumstances, it is not at all surprising that francophone and anglophone suburbs have been especially anxious to protect themselves from Drapeau's municipal imperialism. They have come together in the Conference of Suburban Mayors of Montreal for just this purpose. The peculiar force of the language division is not seen within the C.S.M.M. or in relation to the frequent use of the suburban veto. It is best seen in the incapacity of the provincial government, after so many years of study, to achieve some degree of rationality in terms of municipal boundaries. The difficulties arise because any significant boundary change would serve to change the linguistic balance within municipalities and many such changes would in fact transform some citizens from being part of a linguistic majority within their old municipality to

1 See Chapter I for an explanation.
being part of a minority within the new. The political difficulties resulting from such changes would, from the viewpoint of most politicians, be sufficiently serious to outweigh any resulting gains in terms of organizational rationality. It is in this way that linguistic cleavages have served to make the experience of metropolitan government in Montreal different from that of Toronto and Winnipeg.

Policing is, in Williams' terms, a lifestyle function, although he ranks it of considerably less importance in this regard than land use planning. The evidence in the cases of Toronto and Winnipeg is that their suburban municipalities did not see the loss of local police forces as a major political issue. Chapter V-2 showed, however, that Montreal's English municipalities, particularly Westmount, viewed the loss of the police force as extremely serious because the style of the policing carried out by the force in fact helped define the very nature of the community. The relevance of the issue of the linguistic capabilities of individual policemen is difficult to quantify, especially since all Montreal policemen are, in theory, bilingual. Nevertheless, the sense of belonging of an anglophone policeman within the Westmount force would be substantially different than with an integrated M.U.C. force. Similarly, the degree of strictness in ensuring that policemen were fluent in English would be greater on the part of Westmount officials than those of the M.U.C.

Despite these factors, police integration was in fact carried out, although in a much slower and more politically difficult manner than was the case in Toronto and Winnipeg. The case for police integration, as initially argued in the Coderre report, was couched primarily

\[1\] Williams, 'Life-Style Values', p. 61.
in terms of organizational rationality. However, it was not this report which led to integration—it was the political decision of justice minister Jérôme Choquette. Choquette's justification for integration related much more to his overall policy of improving police capabilities to fight the growing menace of organized crime. This line of argument was based on the assumption that, if criminals work in large organizations, so must the police. The suburbs argued that in fact most police work is not directed at fighting organized crime, but this rather obvious point could not compete with the rhetoric of a dedicated crime-buster. Another factor which encouraged integration was that, since costs were integrated as of 1 July 1970, operational integration was inevitable at some point anyway. The fact that integration was carried out in two stages rather than one, as in Toronto and Winnipeg, served to facilitate the ultimate result.

The impact of the linguistic cleavage was no more clear than in the reorganization of Montreal's social service institutions. In this case, a plan for organizational reform, which initially involved a common pattern for the entire province, was altered to take special account of Montreal's unique linguistic make-up. Instead of following the province-wide pattern of having only one social service centre to cover a given territory, the government soon saw the wisdom of having two—one for anglophones and one for francophones. The fact that the Jews, by initially staying out of the anglophone system, were eventually able to have their own social service network recognized as a public social service centre does not diminish the fact that the fundamental government decision concerning how to proceed in Montreal was taken on the basis of language.
Why was the language criterion so readily adopted in the realm of social services? There are four plausible answers to this question. First, the provision of personal social services was not a particularly visible aspect of government activity. Unlike education, social services have never been the subject of great political dispute among ethnic, language, or religious groups and consequently there have never been any statutory or constitutional guarantees concerning the acquired rights of any particular group. This has meant that social service administrators and provincial politicians and civil servants have been able to accommodate each other's interests in an atmosphere so removed from the glare of publicity that it can almost be called secret. Such accommodations are invariably easier for both sides when every move in the negotiating process does not require public justification by the negotiators to their respective constituencies.

Secondly, there can be little doubt that, if such social services are to be provided at all, they must be provided in the language of the client. Even more than in education, language is at the absolute centre of the service itself. For example, many people in both language groups have argued that students gain great benefits from being immersed in an educational environment in which a language other than their own mother tongue predominates. Some French nationalists, on the other hand, have argued that the very existence of English schools somehow subverts the French language and culture. Nobody has ever argued, though, that there is anything to be gained for individuals, or for society, by counselling social service clients about personal and family problems in any language other than their own. This consideration leads toward the conclusion
that language-based administrative structures for these services are logical mechanisms for attaining desired objectives.

A third factor is that, in a densely populated urban area such as Montreal, there is no over-riding need for territoriality to be the main criterion for the provision of social services. This is not the case, for example, with policing. There clearly cannot be more than one police force with the same legal jurisdiction covering the same given territory; there cannot be an English force and a French force. Consequently, the single police force must, in one way or another, cope with the linguistic environment in which it operates. In a situation in which certain languages are concentrated in certain areas, the territory to be covered by each force becomes potentially important. In the case of social services (and education), there is no reason why there cannot be separate linguistic networks covering the same area. Although the cost factor might be raised as an objection, the likelihood is that the costs involved in having a single network of institutions with internal bilingualism could be at least as much, if not more.

The final factor relates to social class. Although personal social services delivered by public agencies are theoretically available to all members of society, their clientele is overwhelmingly from a low income background. This means that English social service agencies, unlike a school system or a wealthy municipality, can hardly be perceived as bastions of anglophone privilege. Social service agencies do not serve to socialize future economic elites, nor are they symbols of economic superiority. When social service agencies were financed primarily by private philanthropy, it was true that English Montreal
had better social services than French. However, under the Bill 65 reforms the agencies were to be completely public and funding was to be based on demonstrated need. All these factors helped ensure that the establishment of language-based social service agencies was politically possible and even desirable.

The previous paragraphs have already indicated some of the special characteristics of the debate about educational structures in Montreal. Although the establishment of language-based school boards might, in theory, have been just as sensible as language-based social service agencies, the political circumstances were much different. The school system was highly visible in all segments of society and guarantees for religious groups were enshrined in Section 93 of the B.N.A. Act. Although the debate about who should be allowed access to English schools is logically separate from the question of the organization of school boards, Chapter VI showed how the two issues soon became closely linked in public discussion. This meant that most of the spokesmen for francophone Quebec nationalism argued against the establishment of separate French and English school boards. Because no other alternative could be agreed on and because many French catholics still insisted on the importance of catholic administrative structures, the limited reorganization that took place did not change the basic elements of a system that has persisted since prior to Confederation.

The francophone nationalists intervened in the debate about educational structures to a far greater degree than they did on any other issue considered in this thesis. The extent to which their position might be relevant to future attempts at metropolitan reform is considered in more detail in the final section of this thesis.
Language differences have affected metropolitan reorganization in Montreal in the following ways: 1) prior to the 1960s, the long established positions of the two major linguistic communities were a major factor—but not the only one—in discouraging the provincial government from adopting any significant reorganization plans; 2) language differences were not directly relevant in the creation of the M.U.C. and there is no evidence that language is a significant variable in explaining subsequent voting behaviour on the M.U.C. Council; 3) language differences have had drastic effects on the ultimate fate of reorganization plans based on principles of organizational rationality. The only government function that was totally integrated, after much difficulty, was policing. Educational and social service institutions were not integrated into one common organizational structure despite initial government commitments to this policy. Finally, the language cleavage made the reorganization of municipal boundaries virtually impossible.

2. Models for Change

The previous section implied that, as long as the language cleavage persists in Montreal, any attempt to rationalize metropolitan governmental structures will be foiled by the political forces generated by the cleavage. Although this has been the case until now, it need not be so in the future. It is quite possible, and perhaps even probable, that the attitude of ordinary citizens and policy-makers in Montreal and Quebec City will change and new political arrangements will be worked out such that significant reorganization will in fact be possible. The object of this concluding section is to sketch out two possible models of such arrangements.
The first model can best be labelled 'consociational'. Arend Lijphart has defined 'consociational democracy' as 'government by élite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy'.\(^1\) He goes on to list four conditions that are required for successful consociational democracies:

1. That the élites have the ability to accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures.
2. This requires that they have the ability to transcend cleavages and join in a common effort with the élites of rival subcultures. (3) This in turn depends on their commitment to the maintenance of the system and to the improvement of its cohesion and stability. (4) Finally, all of the above requirements are based on the assumption that the élites understand the perils of political fragmentation.\(^2\)

An argument can be made that, prior to 1960, political life in Quebec demonstrated many consociational characteristics. The two important subcultures were clearly defined as French catholic and English protestant. Although their fundamental values were quite different, both groups were devoted to the maintenance of political stability and both were quite willing to be governed by traditional élites. The French catholics were led by conservative politicians with close ties to the catholic hierarchy. The English protestants were quietly and unobtrusively led by powerful businessmen who used their economic power to discourage francophone politicians from taking any action that ran counter to anglophone interests. The English and French were partners in an implicit bargain: English capital and technical...


\(^2\)Ibid.
skill would be used to develop Quebec's natural resources and manufacturing potential in order to provide Quebec with increased tax revenue and with jobs. Both groups agreed that as far as education and many other local activities were concerned, they would leave each other alone.

This meant that in Montreal, where the anglophone presence was particularly strong, there was little real need for anglophones and francophones to have contact with each other, particularly since they generally chose to live at opposite ends of the Island. There was little evidence of consociational democracy in Montreal because the two elites accommodated each other in behind-the-scene deals at the provincial level rather than within Montreal's local institutions. In the nineteenth century, however, when significant numbers of politically active anglophone leaders still lived within the City boundaries, consociational devices were present—the most notable being the alternation of the mayorality between francophones and anglophones. By mid-twentieth century anglophones could expect little more than having one of their number appointed as vice-chairman of the executive committee.

Even at the provincial level, however, it is difficult to argue that consociational democracy really existed. In actual fact, francophone Quebecers cannot realistically be seen as willing or equal partners. They had neither the technological skill nor the capital to develop their own economy; available agricultural land was exhausted; and, without the creation of jobs in Quebec, the exodus to New England and other parts of Canada would have been even greater than it was.¹

¹Between 1851 and 1931, 700,000 Quebec francophones emigrated
Anglophone businessmen moved into the province and, while refusing to speak French, took control of the whole process of economic development. This arrangement has more in common with colonialism than with consociational democracy.

Chapter II briefly outlined how the Quiet Revolution was directed at using the Quebec government to help francophones begin to gain control of their own economy. The same chapter also noted how the Quiet Revolution unleashed a form of Quebec nationalism that was not religious in inspiration and which, as well as advocating political sovereignty for Quebec, also aimed at reducing the rights and privileges of the English linguistic minority. This development was, of course, antithetical to the emergence of any real form of consociational democracy. According to Brian Barry, such a development should not be surprising. He has argued that 'divisions based on ethnic identity ... are likely to be resistant to consociational management'.¹ Unlike religious divisions, ethnic (or linguistic) divisions are not based on organizations such as churches; ethnic group members are not in any way restrained by authoritative leaders such as bishops or ministers.² He in effect, claims that ethnic cleavages which are not moderated by

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²The Northern Ireland situation proves, of course, that religious identification need not always be associated with control by churches over the actions of their adherents.
other cross-cutting cleavages constitute 'a situation of potential
civil war or of civil war averted by effective oppression of one group
by the other .... Once ethnic feeling has been whipped up it has a
terrifying life of its own'.

Given these observations, and the recent strength of francophone
nationalists, it would appear that there is little likelihood of the
emergence of consociational democracy in Montreal in the foreseeable
future. The inexorable movement toward a totally French society in
Quebec is likely to force many anglophones to leave and those who remain
to give up their separate local institutions. These developments lead
to the conclusion that it might be nationalism which will become the
principle cause of metropolitan change in Montreal. It is easy to
foresee the continued growth of the kind of nationalist demands that
were expressed during the debate on the reorganization of Montreal's
educational structures. The strength of francophone support for such
demands will encourage some anglophones to leave and others to become
thoroughly bilingual. These developments will in turn cause the pro-
vincial government to consider the political advantages of simply
ignoring any anglophone demands for continued special recognition.
Under these circumstances we could expect the end result of the politi-
cal process concerning metropolitan reorganization to be similar to
that of Toronto and Winnipeg. In other words, we can expect the
demands of organizational rationality, in this case fuelled by nation-
alism, to prevail. In addition to having an integrated police force on
the Island of Montreal, there would also be a single public educational

\(^1\)Barry, 'Political Accommodation', pp. 504-5.
system, a single social services system, and, in spite of continued suburban opposition, a drastic restructuring of municipal boundaries without reference to small pockets of remaining anglophones.

Such a scenario implies the beginning of the end of a situation of social conflict that has existed since the conquest of Montreal in 1760. Although francophones would still be subject to the influence of American and English Canadian political and economic developments, they would be effectively free of the direct local evidence that they were once a conquered people. It was noted in Chapter II that Lewis Coser has defined a social conflict as 'a struggle ... in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure, or eliminate their rivals'.

In this case, the end result for Montreal anglophones, in an institutional sense at least, would be elimination.

It is conceivable, however, that once the constitutional future of Quebec is clarified, francophone nationalists will have less desire to obliterate the presence of English institutions in Montreal and those English Montrealers committed to staying in Quebec will begin to organize themselves politically as a linguistic minority. Coser's analysis suggests that such organization on the part of anglophones could well meet the implicit requirements of the francophone majority.

It would give them a recognized body through which they could deal on any matter related to the role of the linguistic minority within Quebec society and, if led by the established anglophone élite, would probably

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2 Ibid., p. 129.
serve as a force for moderation and stability.

The objective of such organization would not be to insist on the perpetuation of anglophone economic dominance but rather to maintain a limited network of local institutions. Schools and social services would probably be of most concern but a desire to protect the right of certain municipal units with high levels of anglophone population to conduct their internal affairs in English can also be envisioned. Under such arrangements, there would have to be continuing contact and coordination between the different institutions. Such bodies as the Montreal Urban Community, the School Council of the Island of Montreal and the Council of Health and Social Services of Metropolitan Montreal would continue to ensure that French and English local administrators did not exist in total isolation from each other as they did prior to 1960.

What has been described above is a rough outline of a metropolitan variety of consociational democracy. It would exist within a province that is fundamentally French. Regardless of the constitutional future of Quebec, the use of French, and only French, as the common public language of the province seems now to be assured. Once francophone Quebecers are aware of this, there is reason to expect that they would be willing to arrive at a new accommodation with Montreal's anglophone population. Such an accommodation could involve the guarantee that, although existing institutions and boundaries could be changed through negotiation, the right of anglophones to organize and control their own local services would continue. If this were ever to happen, it would be a much greater political accomplishment than anything that has taken place in Toronto or Winnipeg. It would be an accomplishment to merit the attention not just of students of metropolitan reorganization but of all who are concerned with the peaceful settlement of human conflict.
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*Includes the populations of St. Michel, Riviere des Prairies, and Saraguay which were annexed during this period. See Chapter IV for details.

For figures relating to 1971 population, evaluation, and French English make up of the M.U.C. municipalities, see Table III Chapter V. Data in this Table comes from the 1971 Census of Canada (Ottawa, 1973), Cat. 92-704 (CT 48); names of mayors from Montreal Annual Reports 1970-85 (Montreal, City of Montreal, 1970-1985); d's from Park, R. P. (1975), "Montreal: A History, 1642-1975," Montreal, PQ.
APPENDIX II

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS CONCERNING SCHOOL BOARD
REORGANIZATION ON THE ISLAND OF MONTREAL
1966-73

1966
June
- Publication of Parent report recommendations concerning
Montreal; calls for seven non-confessional boards.
- Union Nationale government of Daniel Johnson takes
office; Jean-Jacques Bertrand becomes minister of
education.

1967
Aug.
- Superior Council of Education accepts idea of non-
confessional boards.
Sept.
- Provincial government establishes Council for School
Reorganization on the Island of Montreal; Joseph
Pagé becomes chairman.
Nov.
- St. Léonard School Commission (catholic) decides to
phase out bilingual classes.

1968
Sept.
- Daniel Johnson dies; Bertrand becomes premier and
Jean-Guy Cardinal becomes minister of education.
Nov.
- Council for School Reorganization submits its report;
calls for nine French and four English school boards.
Dec.
- Bertrand introduces Bill 85 concerning a language
policy for schools.

1969
Sept.
- Massive unilingualist demonstration in St. Léonard.
Oct.
- Bill 63 introduced as a substitute for Bill 85.
Nov.
- Bill 63 becomes law.
- Bill 62 introduced; calls for eleven unified, non-
confessional boards.

1970
March
- National Assembly dissolved; Bill 62 dies.
April
- Liberal government of Robert Bourassa takes office;
Guy St. Pierre becomes minister of education.

1971
July
- Bill 28 introduced; calls for unified, non-confessional
boards and contains same territorial provisions as
Bill 62.
Oct.
- Superior Council of Education accepts main principles
of Bill 28.
Dec.
- Debate on Bill 28 is permanently suspended.

cont'd....
1972
Feb. - François Cloutier becomes minister of education.
Dec. - Introduction and passage of Bill 71; established six catholic and two protestant school boards and the School Council of the Island of Montreal.

1973
June - First school board elections for the new P.S.B.G.M. and the M.C.S.C.
July - New school boards and government choose members of the S.C.I.M.
APPENDIX III

INTERVIEWS

As noted in Chapter I, this thesis does not rest on material gleaned from a systematic pattern of structured interviews. However, formal appointments for interviews were made with the people listed below. Other informal conversations were held with numerous officials during visits to particular offices. These were not listed because they were not pre-arranged and because some people specifically asked to remain anonymous.

July 11, 1972 - His Worship Paul Ouimet, Mayor of Westmount
July 12, 1972 - His Worship R. J. P. Dawson, Mayor of Mount Royal
July 17, 1972 - His Worship W. G. Boll, Mayor of Roxboro
July 18, 1972 - Mr. John Lynch-Staunton, Vice-chairman of the Executive Committee, City of Montreal
July 26, 1972 - Mr. Peter McIntyre, Mayor of Westmount, 1969-1971
July 28, 1972 - His Worship Stuart Finlayson, Mayor of Hampstead
July 28, 1972 - His Worship Arthur Séguin, M.N.A., Mayor of Pointe Claire and member for Robert Baldwin
August 1, 1972 - His Worship Clark Graham, Mayor of Baie d'Urfé and member of the Executive Committee, Montreal Urban Community
August 9, 1972 - M. Jacques Déry, Directeur de la recherche et de l'information, Union des municipalités du Québec
August 22, 1972 - M. Paul Blier, Sous-ministre adjoint, Ministère des affaires municipales, Gouvernement du Québec
February 27, 1973 - Hon, Kevin Drummond, M.N.A., Minister of Lands and Forests and member for Westmount
January 17, 1975 - Ms. Phyliss Amber, Planning Associate, Allied Jewish Community Services of Montreal
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