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Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision

Abstract:

It is often suggested that incentive schemes under moral hazard can be gamed by an agent with superior knowledge of the environment, and that deliberate lack of transparency about the incentive scheme can reduce gaming. We formally investigate these arguments in a two-task moral hazard model in which the agent is privately informed about which task is less costly for him to work on. We examine two simple classes of incentive scheme that are “opaque” in that th...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Reviewed (other)

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
Economics
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Cowles Foundation Publisher's website
Volume:
1935
Pages:
1935
Series:
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper
Host title:
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper
Publication date:
2014-01-20
Source identifiers:
584916
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:584916
UUID:
uuid:0ca3f22d-d870-4e48-a347-ca1d901de392
Local pid:
pubs:584916
Deposit date:
2018-05-07

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