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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?

Abstract:

Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a normative reason to believe that p. The primary obj...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Publisher's version

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/s11229-017-1630-6

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
Humanities Division
Oxford college:
Jesus College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Springer Netherlands Publisher's website
Journal:
Synthese Journal website
Volume:
196
Issue:
9
Pages:
3889–3910
Publication date:
2017-11-30
Acceptance date:
2017-11-14
DOI:
EISSN:
1573-0964
ISSN:
0039-7857
Pubs id:
pubs:797957
URN:
uri:0c904420-1e04-45d7-8a69-a8a02b873a66
UUID:
uuid:0c904420-1e04-45d7-8a69-a8a02b873a66
Local pid:
pubs:797957

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