- Abstract:
-
Here is a surprisingly neglected question in contemporary epistemology: what is it for an agent to believe that p in response to a normative reason for them to believe that p? On one style of answer, believing for the normative reason that q factors into believing that p in the light of the apparent reason that q, where one can be in that kind of state even if q is false, in conjunction with further independent conditions such as q’s being a normative reason to believe that p. The primary obj...
Expand abstract - Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
- Version:
- Publisher's version
- Publisher:
- Springer Netherlands Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Synthese Journal website
- Volume:
- 196
- Issue:
- 9
- Pages:
- 3889–3910
- Publication date:
- 2017-11-30
- Acceptance date:
- 2017-11-14
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1573-0964
- ISSN:
-
0039-7857
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:797957
- URN:
-
uri:0c904420-1e04-45d7-8a69-a8a02b873a66
- UUID:
-
uuid:0c904420-1e04-45d7-8a69-a8a02b873a66
- Local pid:
- pubs:797957
- Copyright holder:
- Joseph Cunningham
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- © The Author 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Journal article
Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?
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