- Abstract:
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In many everyday activities, individuals have a common interest in coordinating their actions. Orthodox game theory cannot explain such intuitively obvious forms of coordination as the selection of an outcome that is best for all in a common-interest game. Theories of team reasoning provide a convincing solution by proposing that people are sometimes motivated to maximize the collective payoff of a group and that they adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to decisions. This a...
Expand abstract - Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
- Version:
- Publisher's version
- Files:
-
-
(pdf, 670.0kb)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.3758/s13423-017-1399-0
-
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- Publisher:
- Springer Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Psychonomic Bulletin and Review Journal website
- Publication date:
- 2017-11-03
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1531-5320
- ISSN:
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1069-9384
- Pubs id:
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pubs:846370
- URN:
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uri:0bf64174-28af-4c4c-8106-2e2969e494fd
- UUID:
-
uuid:0bf64174-28af-4c4c-8106-2e2969e494fd
- Local pid:
- pubs:846370
- Copyright holder:
- Colman and Gold
- Copyright date:
- 2017
- Notes:
- © The Author(s) 2017. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
- License:
- CC BY
Journal article
Team reasoning: Solving the puzzle of coordination
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