A Tale of Two Citizenships: Henry Jones, T. H. Marshall and the Changing Conceptions of Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Britain

Eugenia Low

St. John's College

University of Oxford



(97,812 words – excluding bibliography)

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of examination requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Modern History, University of Oxford, Trinity Term 2000.

A Tale of Two Citizenships: Henry Jones, T. H. Marshall and the Changing Conceptions of Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Britain

Eugenia Low
St. John's College
University of Oxford

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Modern History, Trinity Term 2000.

Abstract

This thesis examines the development of citizenship as a political concept in twentieth-century Britain, by considering how different political and intellectual circumstances shaped changes in ideas about citizenship. By examining how and why the conception of citizenship formulated in the early twentieth century by the idealist philosopher Henry Jones (1852-1922), differed from that articulated by the sociologist and theorist of the post-war welfare state T. H. Marshall (1893-1981) in the years after the Second World War, the work identifies a process by which changing structures of thought shifted the meaning of citizenship over the years.

The thesis consists of three major sections. In the first section, the contrasting personal histories of Jones and Marshall are presented. The effects of different social realities and personal contexts on the production of political ideas are considered. The next section then examines the different idea environments within which Jones and Marshall developed their thought. The differences between the idealist intellectual framework represented by Jones, and the systematic sociological approach represented by Marshall, are mapped out. Finally, the conceptual structures of the two different conceptions of citizenship that emerged in Britain in the course of the twentieth century are examined; and the way in which changing ideas about citizenship were played out in practical debates over social policy is outlined in an analysis of the debates over the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws of 1905-9 and the 1948 National Assistance Act.

By unravelling the intellectual and ideological processes that have occurred in the development and articulation of particular conceptions of citizenship, the work makes an original contribution to historical understandings of the distinction between 'idealist' and 'positivist' idea structures in twentieth-century Britain, and of the role played by such structures in shaping the development of the welfare state as a policy option.

A Tale of Two Citizenships: Henry Jones, T. H. Marshall and the Changing Conceptions of Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Britain

Eugenia Low
St. John's College
University of Oxford

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Modern History, Trinity Term 2000.

Abstract of Thesis

This thesis presents a history of ideas analysis of the development of citizenship as a political concept in twentieth-century Britain, with the aim of clarifying how ideas about the relationship between the individual and the state interacted with changing intellectual and institutional structures, and practical political realities. It contends that a clearer understanding of the nature of citizenship as a political concept can be gained from an empirical historical analysis of the way in which such developments affected the conceptualisation of citizenship. As an ideological tool, citizenship has proved to be a malleable concept, susceptible to being presented in a variety of ways to support a wide range of political positions. By suggesting explanations as to why particular constructions of citizenship developed at particular times, a historical perspective brings thought to bear on the relationship between particular lines of thought and the political contexts in which they operated. An understanding of this relationship in turn provides a clearer view of the limitations and applicability of particular ideas in the discourse on citizenship, and a sense of the boundaries within which citizenship works as a concept.

The particular aim of this thesis is to consider how specific historical environments may be seen to affect the way in which the concept of citizenship was constructed in twentieth-century Britain. Approached as an exercise in the history of ideas, the work attempts to recover some of the contexts within which conceptions of citizenship found expression in twentieth-century Britain, and to identify the processes by which changing structures of thought shifted the meaning of citizenship over the years. The object of such an analysis is not to present a normative model of what citizenship ought to be, or to make any general statement about the

ultimate nature of citizenship, but, rather, to unravel the various elements that have shaped the ways in which ideas about citizenship have been conceptualised and presented. In other words, the concern is to understand the intellectual and ideological processes that occur in the development of a conception of citizenship, rather than to engage directly in any particular process of defining a concept of citizenship.

The work takes the form of a comparative case study of the way in which two particular theorists of citizenship formulated their ideas in two distinct periods in British political history: the late nineteenth century through to the 1910s, and the 1940s through to the 1970s. The two periods represent different ideological frameworks for the conceptualisation of citizenship. In the earlier period, discourse on citizenship was to be associated with the dominance of idealist thought in British intellectual life; in the later period, the idea of citizenship was articulated within the context of the possibilities presented by the emergence of the post-war welfare state. The two theorists to be considered – the Edwardian idealist philosopher Henry Jones (1852-1922), and the London School of Economics sociologist and post-war theorist of the British welfare state T. H. Marshall (1893-1981) – have been chosen, respectively, to exemplify each of the two periods. Because both operated at the crucial interface between theory and practical politics, and articulated their concepts of citizenship to a wide audience in their times, they provide a useful focus for an analysis of the effects of different intellectual and political contexts on the conceptualisation of citizenship. By their distinct personal histories, moreover, a consideration of the effects of personal contexts for the production of particular ideas, which are all too often analysed without regard to any fixed social realities, is made possible.

The thesis proceeds by examining the various contextual situations that shaped the way in which the two theorists constructed their different models of citizenship. In the first part, the effects of different social realities and personal and political experiences on the production of political ideas are considered. In the first chapter, an analysis is made of the way in which Jones' artisanal working-class upbringing in rural Wales, his subsequent education and rise to the position of a professor of moral philosophy, his experience of non-conformist religion and the specific interests of Welsh radical politics, led to the prioritisation of a particular set of social and

political concerns. The second chapter presents a corresponding biographical analysis of Marshall, whose experience stood in strong contrast to Jones' and presented him with a different set of personal priorities. Marshall's metropolitan upbringing within an élite social milieu, his experience of being held in a civilian internment camp in Germany for the duration of the First World War, his brief political involvement with the Labour Party, and the international dimension of his involvement in public affairs, will be analysed.

The second part then examines the nature of the ideational and conceptual environments which shaped the political language used by Jones and Marshall in their respective articulations of citizenship. In the first chapter, the system of philosophical ideas which fashioned Jones' understanding of society is considered. It is argued that the acceptance of a particular notion of society as a 'social organism', within an idealist philosophical framework, focussed Jones' conception of citizenship on a set of moral considerations which determined his conclusions with regard to the 'right' relationship between the individual and the state. The set of considerations that moulded Marshall's understanding, on the other hand, produced a fundamentally different conception of human nature and the operation of social processes. These are examined in the next chapter, in which Marshall's academic and methodological predilections are unravelled and considered in relation to the prevailing political context of planning and the establishment of the post-war welfare state.

In the final part of the thesis, the differing conceptions of citizenship that Jones and Marshall articulated are analysed conceptually, and then considered with regard to practical political debates. Using the historical methods suggested by recent 'conceptual' and 'ideological' approaches to the history of political thought, the first chapter in this section unravels the conceptual structure of the idea of citizenship, considering how the definition of citizenship depended upon a range of mutually constraining attachments to other political concepts. The way in which different understandings of personal identity, individuality, equality and the social structure affected what was implied in the idea of citizenship is examined, and a close consideration is made of the way in which Jones and Marshall defined their conceptions of citizenship in relation to the concept of class in twentieth-century Britain. A conceptual

framework for citizenship is established and a significant shift from 'moral' to 'material' concerns is identified as a notable development in the consideration of citizenship over the course of the twentieth century. The next chapter in this section then considers the extent to which the structure of practical policy debates may be understood within this conceptual framework. The particular way in which developments in the conceptualisation of citizenship interacted with the construction of welfare policy is considered through a comparative analysis of the nature of the debates over the two reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws of 1905-9 on the one hand, and the arguments raised during the passage of the National Assistance Act of 1948 on the other. The extent to which conceptual and institutional frameworks reacted upon each other in the policy-making environment is examined.

In this thesis, the concept of citizenship is considered as an empirical development, emerging through interactions with particular social, institutional and intellectual contexts. However, although it is argued that a contextual understanding is necessary to unravel the complex meanings embodied in different conceptions of citizenship, the thesis does not conclude that the concept of citizenship has meaning only in isolated, individual utterances. The various manifestations of notions of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain are used to illuminate the nature of the concept of citizenship as a single and coherent unit that is susceptible to historical analysis. By unravelling the intellectual and ideological processes involved in the conceptualisation of citizenship in two different historical contexts in twentieth-century Britain, the work identifies two broad dimensions along which the citizenship debate occurred within the British political tradition: a 'moral' dimension in which political relationships were conceived predominantly from ethical and spiritual perspectives, based on the understanding that the structure of the body politic depended upon the operations of individual consciousness; and a 'materialist' dimension in which distributive issues took priority within a more instrumental conception of the structure of the polity.

Such a study differs from most of the recent work on citizenship in the fields of political theory and sociology in that its aim is not to present a normative model of what citizenship ought to be. It also differs from the more traditional histories of the idea of citizenship, in which

narratives of the concept's manifestations through history are pursued. Instead, the thesis focuses upon uncovering the frameworks which shaped the production and consumption of ideas about citizenship. Through this approach, it not only provides new insights into the nature of citizenship as a concept in political thought, but also makes a contribution to understandings of the distinction between 'idealist' and 'positivist' idea structures in twentieth-century Britain, and of the role played by such structures in shaping the development of the welfare state as a policy option.

A Tale of Two Citizenships: Henry Jones, T. H. Marshall and the Changing Conceptions of Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Britain

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In the course of writing this thesis, I have been helped by many people. Significant scholarly debts are owed to: my supervisor Prof. Jose Harris; Dr. John Davis and Prof. Michael Freeden, who examined the preliminary essay from which this work was developed, as one of my submissions for the M.St. in Historical Research degree; Prof. Brian Harrison; Prof. Desmond King; Dr. Ross McKibbin; and Dr. Marc Stears. I am also grateful to the participants of the various seminars and conferences at which parts of this thesis have been presented as papers: their collective wisdom and useful comments have greatly benefited the work.

Research debts are owed to Mrs. Nadine Marshall, Mrs. Frances Partridge and Prof. Jean Floud, who were kind enough to agree to personal interviews, and provided interesting and much needed background on T. H. Marshall. I would also like to thank Prof. Jennifer Platt and Mieke Izjermans for providing invaluable assistance to my negotiation of the International Sociological Association archives at the International Institute for Social History in Amsterdam; Dr. Peter Liddle for allowing me access to his Ruhleben Collection at the Brotherton Library in Leeds; and the archivists and staff at the British Library of Political and Economic Science, the Special Collections department at the Brotherton Library, the National Library of Wales in Aberystwyth, and the Harvard Law Library in Cambridge, Massachusetts for all their help.

This thesis could not have been written without financial support from the Overseas Research Students Award Scheme, the Oxford Overseas Bursary scheme, and the generosity of my mother, Ms. Edna Chia. St. John's College also provided much needed funding for numerous research trips, generous book grants, and a comfortable environment within which to carry out the work.

Finally, invaluable intellectual, moral and social support was provided by Paul Martin, Gordon Woods, Sue Palmer and Peter Brinton, Angela Williams, Ruth Ogden and the St. John's College Library community. I am deeply grateful to them all.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE: INDIVIDUALS, CONTEXTS AND CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 5

I. DEVELOPING AN APPROACH 9

II. INDIVIDUALS AND CONTEXTS 17

III. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 28

PART I: PERSONAL CONTEXTS

CHAPTER TWO: HENRY JONES – LIFE AND INFLUENCES 32

I. BIOGRAPHY 34

II. EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CONTEXT AND PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 47

THE TRADITION OF WORKING-CLASS RESPECTABILITY 48

NONCONFORMIST RELIGION 53

III. POLITICS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 58

LIBERAL INVOLVEMENT 59

POLITICAL INFLUENCE 63

CHAPTER THREE: T. H. MARSHALL – LIFE AND INFLUENCES 69

I. BIOGRAPHY 72

II. EFFECTS OF SOCIAL CONTEXT AND PERSONAL EXPERIENCE 82

THE MARSHALLS OF LEEDS 83

RUHLEBEN 86

III. PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLITICS 90

THE LABOUR PARTY AND ETHICAL SOCIALISM 92

WORLD WAR TWO AND THE FOREIGN OFFICE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT 98

PART II: IDEA ENVIRONMENTS

CHAPTER FOUR: MAPPING HENRY JONES' SYSTEM OF THOUGHT 103

I. THE SOCIAL ORGANISM 104

ORGANIC MODELS OF SOCIETY 105

THE IDEA OF EVOLUTION 113

PERSONALITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 117

II. The Philosophical System of Idealist Unity 125

III. Political Implications 132

Morality, Materialism and the State *132*

Social Work and Reform *139*

CHAPTER FIVE: THE BASES OF T. H. MARSHALL'S THOUGHT 144

I. Notions of History 147

II. The Practice of Sociology 154

III. Political Implications 161

The Context of Planning *162*

The Welfare State *167*

PART III: CITIZENSHIP IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

CHAPTER SIX: THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF CITIZENSHIP 174

I. Conceptual Issues in the Citizenship Debate 177

II. Constructing Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Britain 186

Jones' Idealist Conception of Citizenship *187*

Marshall's Post-War Conception of Citizenship *193*

III. Class and the Conceptualisation of Citizenship 201

CHAPTER SEVEN: CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL WELFARE 213

I. The Poor Law Reports of 1909 214

II. The 1948 National Assistance Act 228

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER EIGHT: A TALE OF TWO CITIZENSHIPS? 244

Epilogue: Contemporary Perspectives on Citizenship in Britain 247

BIBLIOGRAPHY 254

I. Manuscript Sources 254

II. Printed Sources 255

Primary Sources *255*

Secondary Sources *264*

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER ONE

INDIVIDUALS, CONTEXTS AND CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONCEPTUALISATION OF CITIZENSHIP IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN

As a concept in Western political thought, citizenship has a history that can be traced back to ancient times. Historians of political thought have, for the most part, succeeded in marking out the 'stations' of this history: the classical articulation in Aristotle's *Politics*, reflecting upon the constitution of the Athenian *polis*; citizenship under the Roman Republic and Empire; civic ideas in the city states of medieval Italy; civic humanism in Renaissance Italy; the Commonwealth ideology of the English civil war; and the republicanism of the Enlightenment, culminating in the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution.[1] Each of these moments is regarded as significant in defining the meaning of the concept of citizenship, and it is this succession of 'ideal types' of citizenship that tends to be employed when the historical perspective is called upon to illuminate understandings of how the concept operates in twentieth-century Western democracies.[2] Compared to the these earlier moments of inspiration, it would seem that the particular way in which the concept of citizenship developed in the twentieth century is held to be of little consequence to the history of the idea.

Indeed, the story of citizenship since the French Revolution has been seen as one of decline. Despite intermittent revivals, citizenship was, as Michael Walzer has argued,

> 'unlikely to be the primary identity or the consuming passion of men and women living in complex and highly differentiated societies, where politics competes for time and attention with class, ethnicity, religion, and family, and where these latter four do not draw people together but rather separate and divide them'.[3]

Yet, the twentieth century has also been described as being distinctive because of 'the ubiquity and authority of the state and those social institutions which stand between the

---

[1] M. Ignatieff, 'The Myth of Citizenship' in R. Beiner (ed), *Theorizing Citizenship* (New York, 1995), p.54. See, for example, J. G. A. Pocock, 'The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times' in Beiner (ed), *Theorizing Citizenship*, pp.29-52; *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, NJ, 1975); P. Riesenberg, *Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992); M. Walzer, 'Citizenship' in T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge, 1989), pp.211-19.

[2] See Ignatieff, 'Myth of Citizenship', pp.53-77 and Walzer, 'Citizenship', pp.211-19.

[3] Walzer, 'Citizenship', p.218.

individual and the state'.[4] As conceptions of citizenship are essentially reflections of the way in which relationships between the individual and the state are understood, the lack of any specific historical analysis of the intellectual and ideological processes which shaped the concept in the political thought of this period seems somewhat surprising. The conceptualisation of citizenship has not been completely absent in the political discourse of the twentieth century, and the way in which the concept has been constructed in this period can usefully be analysed as a means of clarifying developments in ideas about the state and society in twentieth-century political thought.

This particular historical perspective, however, has not been pursued in current considerations of the concept of citizenship. Insofar as the twentieth-century conception of citizenship *has* been elucidated, it has been by political theorists and sociologists for whom the concept provides a perspective on social rights, welfare issues, political membership and social identity,[5] as well as a means of addressing the contemporary debate between liberals and communitarians.[6] The 1990s witnessed the rediscovery of citizenship as a salient political concept among political theorists who saw an urgent need to rethink the idea within the context of liberal democracy. For the most part, however, this renewed interest was particularly shaped by the specific concerns raised by recent global political events and trends. The theoretical problems of twentieth-century citizenship have been conceived essentially in terms of such pressing political concerns as the rise of voter apathy and long-term welfare dependency in the United States, the stresses caused by the increasing multiculturalism of the Western European population, and the New Right challenge to the welfare state tradition in Britain.[7] While models of citizenship drawn from the history of political thought have sometimes been used as a means of enriching the recent citizenship debate, the debate itself has been framed in terms of issues of current political or theoretical relevance, with a view to establishing a normative model of what citizenship ought to be.[8] Thus, despite the current wave of academic interest in citizenship, the historical account

---

[4] 'Editorial', *Twentieth Century British History*, I (1990), p.3.
[5] Preface to B. S. Turner (ed), *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London, 1993), p.ix.
[6] W. Kymlicka and W. Norman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory' in Beiner (ed), *Theorizing Citizenship*, p.283.
[7] *Ibid.*
[8] See, for example, R. Dagger, *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism* (Oxford, 1997); A. Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World* (London, 1990).

of the intellectual and ideological processes that shaped the way in which the concept actually developed in the course of the twentieth century has remained sketchy.

This thesis contends that a clearer understanding of the nature of citizenship as a political concept can be gained from an empirical historical analysis of twentieth-century developments in the conception of citizenship. As an ideological tool, citizenship has proved to be a malleable concept, susceptible to being presented in a variety of ways to support a wide range of political positions.[9] By suggesting explanations for the development of particular constructions of citizenship at particular times, a historical perspective brings thought to bear on the relationship between particular lines of thought and the political contexts in which they operated. An understanding of this relationship in turn provides a clearer view of the limitations and applicability of particular ideas in the discourse on citizenship, and a sense of the boundaries within which citizenship works as a concept. Thus, the particular aim of this thesis is to consider how specific historical environments affected the way in which the concept of citizenship was constructed in twentieth-century Britain. Approached as an exercise in the history of ideas, the work attempts to recover some of the contexts within which conceptions of citizenship found expression in twentieth-century Britain, and to identify the processes by which changing structures of thought shifted the meaning of citizenship over the years. The way in which the changing social, political and intellectual contexts of twentieth-century Britain shaped the development of different ideas about citizenship will be examined.

For the purposes of this work, citizenship will be considered mainly as a socio-political, rather than a legal, concept. As a means of focusing the analysis, a comparative case study of how two particular social thinkers formulated their different ideas about citizenship within two distinct historical contexts in twentieth-century Britain – the late nineteenth century through to the 1910s, and the 1940s through to the 1970s – will be used to address the specific question of how and why the conception of citizenship formulated in the early twentieth century differed from that articulated in the years after the Second World War. The two thinkers who will be studied are the idealist philosopher Henry Jones (1852-1922), whose ideas about citizenship

reflected a significant interaction between the political concerns of the late Victorian and Edwardian period and the intellectual framework of social and philosophical idealism; and the London School of Economics sociologist T. H. Marshall (1893-1981), who produced a model of citizenship based on the workings of the British welfare state in the post-war period.

In this thesis, Jones and Marshall are presented as representatives not only of their periods, but also of two substantially different contexts of political discourse, framed by different sets of theoretical considerations. Whereas Jones presented his ideas in the language of philosophical idealism, Marshall embraced a more empirical and positivistic sociological approach. As both thinkers were influential at the critical interface between theory and practical politics in their respective periods, however, their theories did not merely engage with the specific traditions of thought represented within their respective intellectual milieus, but tended also to reflect the wider currents of political thinking that occurred within the different social and political contexts in which they worked. Thus, Jones and Marshall serve as useful nodal points for the themes to be addressed in this thesis, and it is on these grounds that they will be considered in the work.

The aim of this thesis is not to present a normative model of what citizenship ought to be, or to make any general statement about the ultimate nature of citizenship, but, rather, to unravel the various elements that have shaped the ways in which ideas about citizenship have been conceptualised and presented. In other words, the concern is to understand the intellectual and ideological processes that occur in the development of a conception of citizenship, rather than to engage directly in any particular process of defining a concept of citizenship. Jose Harris has suggested that the task of the historian of ideas is 'not to rewind or re-write the policies and political theories of past times, but to draw out the large elements of culture, convention and rhetoric in what are often seen as "scientific" policies or models of abstract justice'.[10] The particular way in which such objectives are pursued in the thesis will be addressed in the following sections of this chapter.

---

[9] See A. M. Rees, 'The Other T. H. Marshall', *Journal of Social Policy*, XXIV (1995), p.342.
[10] J. Harris, '"Contract" and "Citizenship"' in D. Marquand and A. Seldon (eds), *The Ideas that Shaped Post-*

I. DEVELOPING AN APPROACH

The political thought of the twentieth-century has not, in general, received as much attention from historians as that of earlier centuries. There is a long-held view that the twentieth century has conspicuously lacked 'great' political thinkers, and it is often assumed, as a result, that no significant ideas were produced in this period. Nevertheless, political historians have become increasingly conscious of the significance of 'currents of thought, as distinct from eminent thinkers' in defining the range of political thinking within a historical period, and connections between political ideas and the development of public policy have been acknowledged.[11] In the field of British political history, Michael Freeden's study of 'new liberalism'[12] and Jose Harris' work on the 'intellectual frameworks' for social policy formulation,[13] for example, have emphasised the role of political thought in explaining the forms of political action that occurred in the twentieth century.

More recently, the role of 'public intellectuals' in the development of British political thought since the closing decades of the nineteenth century has also drawn scholarly attention.[14] The political thought of British idealists and pluralists have been closely examined; and studies have been made of ways of conceptualising the state in British political theory, at a time when significant changes were seen to be taking place in the character and functions of the political state.[15] What these studies have shown is that, within the framework of British political thought

---

War Britain (London, 1996), p.138.

[11] M. Freeden, 'The Stranger at the Feast: Ideology and Public Policy in Twentieth Century Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, I (1990), p.9.

[12] M. Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform* (Oxford, 1978);

[13] For example, J. Harris, 'The Webbs, the Charity Organisation Society and the Ratan Tata Foundation: Social policy from the perspective of 1912' in M. Bulmer, J. Lewis and D. Piachaud (eds), *The Goals of Social Policy* (London, 1989), pp.27-63; 'Political Thought and the Welfare State 1870-1940: An Intellectual Framework for British Social Policy', *Past and Present*, CXXXV (1992), pp.116-41; 'Political thought and the state' in R. Whiting and S. Green (eds), *The Boundaries of the State* (Cambridge, 1996), pp.15-28.

[14] See, for example, S. Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930* (Oxford, 1991); J. Stapleton, *Englishness and the Study of Politics: The social and political thought of Ernest Barker* (Cambridge, 1994).

[15] See, for example, R. Plant and A. Vincent, *Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Thought of the British Idealists* (Oxford, 1984); P. P. Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: Selected Studies* (Cambridge, 1990); D. Boucher and A. Vincent, *A Radical Hegelian: The Political and Social Philosophy of Henry Jones* (Cardiff, 1993); S. M. den Otter, *British Idealism and Social Explanation: A Study in Late Victorian Thought* (Oxford, 1996); M. Stears, 'Socialism and Pluralism: a study in inter-war British ideology', Oxford D.Phil. Thesis, 1997; C. Laborde, *Pluralist Thinking and the State in Britain and France, 1900-25* (Basingstoke, 2000); J. Meadowcroft, *Conceptualizing the State: Innovation and Dispute in British Political Thought, 1880-1914* (Oxford,

in the twentieth century, identifiable *groups* of political thinkers – rather than prominent individuals – were producing ideas in response to the particular demands of the practical politics of the time. With this in mind, the range of methodological approaches that can be employed to analyse the development of ideas about citizenship in such a setting will now be evaluated.

In what is perhaps the most traditional of approaches to the history of ideas, political concepts are analysed with respect to 'an apostolic succession, a chain of discourse situated in some grand historical continuum, in which the thoughts of "great thinkers" are expounded and related to each other'.[16] Such an approach depends upon the identification of an international and trans-historical canon of 'classic texts', upheld by 'academic tradition' as 'perennially important attempts to set down universal propositions about political reality'.[17] It is assumed that the range of political thinking is defined by a set of 'perennial problems' that all thinkers – regardless of any historical, national or cultural boundaries – invariably addressed on identical terms.[18] From such a perspective, the history of ideas is presented as a sweeping narrative of progress in human thought, represented by a sequence of notable individual contributions to a universal repository of timeless truths. Within this narrative, ideas are to be regarded as entities that could be abstracted from the processes of thought by which they were produced, to attain an independent historical existence as part of an artificially created tradition.[19]

For a variety of reasons, this particular conception of the history of ideas enterprise does not effectively lend itself to a consideration of the political thought of twentieth-century Britain, and would be ill-suited as a framework for the analysis to be pursued in this thesis. As has been pointed out, a significant feature of British political thought in the twentieth-century is the extent to which the intellectual landscape was shaped by communities of thinkers operating within a practical political framework, rather than dominated by heroic individuals engaging in a display of

---

1995).

[16] M. Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford, 1996), p.109.

[17] W. T. Bluhm, *Theories of the Political System* (New Jersey, 1965), p.v; J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time* (London, 1972), p.4.

[18] See Q. Skinner, 'A Reply to My Critics' in J. Tully (ed), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (Oxford, 1988), p.283.

[19] See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pp.109-10.

intellectual prowess and innovation within the abstract context of pure academe.[20] As the traditional approach to the history of ideas depends upon the construction of an academic canon of 'classic texts' produced by prominent individuals who may be identified as 'great thinkers', therefore, it fails fundamentally to account for the forms of political thinking by which the intellectual history of twentieth-century Britain is characterised.

Although this thesis does reflect a concern with the individual contributions of Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall to the historical development of the idea of citizenship, it is not the aim of the work to establish these individuals as canonical figures in twentieth-century thought. More importantly, although the thesis is fundamentally concerned with the development over time of the concept of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain, the analysis does not proceed by regarding the contributions made by Jones and Marshall to the discourse on citizenship as universal and timeless truths that transcend the specific contexts of their articulation. Instead of considering the development of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain as part of a trans-historical evolution of chains of thinking, the thesis presents an empirical assessment of the way in which ideas about citizenship are constructed in relation to specific historical situations and structures of thought that may be seen to change over the course of the century. In such an analysis, the notion that ideas can be detached from the axioms of thinking by which they are produced is firmly rejected.

Insofar as the thesis thus acknowledges the importance of understanding ideas as particular products of the specific contexts in which they are expressed, its approach is informed by methodological considerations associated with Quentin Skinner's 'revisionist' approach to the history of ideas. This approach has, for the most part, supplanted the traditional version of the enterprise by redefining the basis for the historical study of ideas. In a seminal article published in 1969,[21] Skinner asserted that the study of the history of ideas could not be justified in terms of 'perennial problems' or 'universal truths', because each expression of a particular idea was 'inescapably the embodiment of a particular intention, on a particular occasion, addressed to the

---

[20] See Freeden, 'Stranger at the Feast', pp.11, 22-3.
[21] Q. Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding in the history of ideas', *History and Theory*, VIII (1969), pp.3-53.

solution of a particular problem, and thus specific to its situation in a way that it can only be naïve to try to transcend'.[22] On the basis of this observation, he reached the methodological conclusion that the meaning of any given idea could only be understood in relation to the conscious intentions of the intellectual agent who performed the purposive 'speech-act' by which the idea was expressed. Thus, he established the recovery of 'authorial intentions' as the central task of the historian of ideas.[23] According to Skinner, it was a mistake to think that the 'history' of an idea could be traced by considering the nature of its development over time.[24] As ideas could not be seen to possess any form of 'essential meaning' that they retained beyond the immediate contexts of their articulation,[25] they could only be studied as sets of self-contained and unrelated individual utterances. As such, in Skinner's view, it was only at this atomistic level that the historical analysis of ideas could legitimately be pursued.

It cannot be denied that Skinner's analytical imperatives have won a dominant position on the methodological agenda for the history of political thought. Yet, it would be a mistake to assume that the only valid questions to be addressed in the history of political ideas are those that can be answered in terms of this single methodological approach. Skinner's methodology focuses the analysis in the history of ideas on two particular features of the process by which ideas are generated. It presupposes, firstly, that every expression of an idea is produced intentionally as a conscious act; and, secondly, that these acts can invariably be attributed to individual authors with identifiable intentions.[26] Such a perspective clearly establishes the notion that the history of political thought should be written 'as real history – that is, as the record of an actual activity'.[27] However, by concentrating exclusively on *individual* agents and considering them only as *producers* of ideas, Skinner's approach effectively limits the range of intellectual activity that can be accommodated within the terms of his methodology.

Forms of political thought produced by groups rather than individuals, for example,

---

References in this thesis will be to reprint of article in Tully (ed), *Meaning and Context*, pp.29-67.
[22] *Ibid.*, p.65.
[23] See *Ibid.*, p.64; Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pp.100-1.
[24] Skinner, 'Meaning and understanding', p.63.
[25] *Ibid.*, p.55.
[26] See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p.104.
[27] Q. Skinner, 'Some Problems in the Analysis of Political Thought and Action', *Political Theory*, II (1974),

cannot be adequately addressed on such a basis, because the method does not provide a satisfactory framework for an account of the interactive processes by which ideas are formed within 'communities of interpretation'.[28] Within such communities, moreover, the mere *production* of ideas cannot be seen as the be-all and end-all of the intellectual activity occurring within a particular historical setting. Ideas are not only produced, but also consumed and interpreted by significant political publics engaging in real historical activity. Accordingly, an appreciation of how ideas are perceived, understood and applied in the various practical contexts into which they are received is as vital to the analysis of the way in which ideas operate in 'real history' as considerations of their production.[29] To develop such an appreciation, however, it is necessary to move beyond the analytical framework set by Skinner's methodology.

Given the observations that have been made of the nature of British political thought in the twentieth century, it is clear that the concerns of this thesis cannot be fully addressed if the terms of Skinner's approach are exclusively applied. Although the work does depend upon a consideration of how two individual authors articulated their respective conceptions of citizenship in two different historical contexts, it is not as individual agents *per se* that Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall are harnessed to the analysis. For the purposes of this thesis, Jones and Marshall are not singled out as paragons of political thought in their respective contexts. Their significance to the analysis stems instead from the fact that they may be regarded as representative participants of the wider processes of social thinking that occurred in their respective periods. As articulate individuals active at the crucial interface between academic thought and practical politics, Jones and Marshall plausibly served as effective channels for the expression of the more widely held concerns of the ideological groups to which they belonged.[30] In this regard, the conceptual processes involved in their articulation of citizenship as a political concept cannot be understood solely in terms of authorial intent. To consider the respective ways in which Jones and Marshall constructed their notions of citizenship, the thesis will present the

---

p.280. Quoted in Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p.100.

[28] See Freeden, 'Stranger at the Feast', p.22.

[29] See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p.105; T. Ball, 'Reappraising Political Theory' in *Reappraising Political Theory: Revisionist Studies in the History of Political Thought* (Oxford, 1995), pp.13, 27, 32.

development of their thought in relation to the complex idea structures generated by the different political, social, cultural and intellectual environments within which they worked.

Insofar as such an approach de-emphasises the ultimate role of 'authorial intention' in the study of ideas, it indicates a significant departure from Skinner's methodological perspective. However, a more fundamental deviation from the Skinnerian approach is inherent in the way in which the thesis seeks to establish *relationships* between a range of ideas in its analysis of the development of citizenship as a political concept, and attempts to explain the *changes* that occurred in the conception of citizenship over the course of the century by considering developments in these relationships. The analytical framework implied by these objectives belies Skinner's judgement that ideas can only be studied as a series of unconnected utterances, each representing a particularistic and purposive 'speech-act' endowed with a meaning specific only to its occasion.[31] In its consideration of the concept of citizenship, the thesis focuses on the idea itself as a unit of analysis, and maintains that a meaningful comparison can be made between the idea of citizenship expressed by Jones at the beginning of the twentieth century and that expressed by Marshall in the post-war years. It pursues this line of analysis, however, without contending that ideas have a life of their own, or in any way suggesting that the relationship between Jones' and Marshall's respective ideas about citizenship existed on an abstract plane of pure meaning that wholly transcended the concrete historical situations in which the ideas were presented.

The approach that is taken in this thesis addresses the tension between contingency and continuity in the construction of political concepts. It accepts the understanding that ideas may not possess 'essential meanings' that are intrinsic to their existence, without pushing the view to its logical extreme, and representing the conceptualisation of political ideas as nothing more than a random and desultory activity in which thinkers attach meanings to ideas on a fundamentally arbitrary basis. Recent contributions to the methodological debate over the study of political concepts have emphasised the extent to which the historical mutability of political concepts

---

[30] See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p.106.
[31] See above, pp.11-12.

needs to be seen in relation to the processes of political change that occur in actual historical situations.[32] Within such empirical contexts, it is argued, political concepts do not simply exist as the random products of abstract linguistic exercises, but as social constructs that are used to order and interpret observable facts and concrete social practices. In this regard, they are 'located within a pattern of ideas concerning the understanding and the shaping – through changing or conserving – of the political world', and their viability depends upon their ability to account for and explain the changing empirical realities to which they relate.[33]

The meaning of a political concept is thus determined by its usage, and cannot be changed 'at will or by whim'.[34] A concept may be indeterminate with regard to any logical imperatives derived from an immutable and universal definition, but its existence and meaning are, to a significant degree, practically circumscribed by established traditions of usage. Indeed, it is notable that conceptual innovation rarely occurs as an act of 'unprecedented originality', but through a process of 'extending and rearranging old ideas, shifting emphasis among them, playing variations on them and so forth'.[35] As such, it cannot be denied that historical continuity is an important empirical consideration in the process of conceptual development. The existence of this continuity, however, needs to be empirically established through a close examination of how specific concepts are constructed and employed over a range of different historical situations. In other words, a diachronic perspective for the study of political concepts has to be derived from multiple synchronic examinations of the occurrence of a concept within specific contexts.[36]

This thesis' consideration of the dialectical relationship between contingency and continuity in the development of citizenship as a political concept proceeds on this account. By closely analysing how two individual thinkers constructed their conceptions of citizenship in relation to the particular political and social priorities that characterised two specific historical contexts, the thesis develops a synchronic understanding of the conceptualisation of citizenship

---

[32] See, for example, J. Farr, 'Understanding conceptual change politically' in Ball, Farr and Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, pp.24-49; Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*.
[33] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pp.3, 51-2.
[34] *Ibid.*, p.61; 'Editors' Introduction' in Ball, Farr and Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change*, p.3.
[35] J. V. Femia, 'An historicist critique of "revisionist" methods for studying the history of ideas' in Tully (ed), *Meaning and Context*, p.174.

in two distinct periods over the course of the twentieth-century in Britain. This empirical understanding then forms the basis for a diachronic analysis that considers the way in which the coherence of the concept of citizenship as a specific and identifiable idea unit was effectively retained while interpretations of its meaning were adapted to reflect the intellectual structures of different idea environments.

To pursue this analysis systematically, the thesis draws significantly upon a set of theoretical insights presented by Michael Freeden in a recent work advocating a conceptual approach to the study of ideologies.[37] In this methodological approach, the political concept is represented not as a monolithic unit of meaning, but as a complex structure of interconnected idea components related to specific morphology. According to Freeden, a political concept is defined by a combination of two factors: the presence of an 'ineliminable component' that conventionally identifies the concept because all known usages of the concept have employed it as a constant feature; and a variable collection of 'quasi-contingent' features that develop the meaning of the concept by substantiating the 'ineliminable component' in different ways.[38] The additional components of the concept are individually contingent, but they occupy 'categories' that are structurally necessary to the conceptual definition. As such, they are secured to the 'ineliminable component' in a limited number of recognisable patterns, which lends a certain regularity to the way in which meanings are accorded to a specific political concept.[39] This regularity provides a stable conceptual framework within which a whole range of contingent interpretations may be related and compared on an empirical basis. In this thesis, the notion of an enduring structural regularity is used as a means of analysing the changes that occurred in the conception of citizenship over the course of the twentieth-century in Britain.[40]

Essentially, this work represents an attempt to balance an appreciation of the contingent contextual limitations on the conceptualisation of citizenship, with an empirical understanding of the way in which historical continuity operated to maintain the coherence of the concept across

---

[36] See Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, pp.52, 61.
[37] See *Ibid.*, pp.47-136.
[38] See *Ibid.*, pp.61-2, 65.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp.65-6.

contextual boundaries. In its overall approach, a range of analytical perspectives is employed to locate the historical development of the concept of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain within a complex empirical framework. This framework stands at the heart of the thesis, and is defined in relation to the two individual thinkers, Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall, and the specific contexts in which they articulated their ideas about citizenship. The analysis is constructed at a number of levels to reflect the diverse range of factors that can affect the way in which a particular concept is interpreted and expressed in any given situation. Thus, the structure of the thesis incorporates a biographical consideration of Jones and Marshall, in which the deep-seated effects of personality, experience and cultural identity on the formation of their ideas about citizenship are examined; a contextual consideration of the changing conceptual and ideological environments that defined the political language available to the two identified thinkers and set the boundaries for the political discourse in which they engaged; as well as a conceptual consideration of the way in which the morphology of the idea of citizenship directed the construction of the concept in particular ways within the different contexts. Through this multi-layered approach, a complex understanding of the way in which citizenship developed as a political concept in twentieth-century Britain is achieved.

II. Individuals and Contexts

As this understanding is crucially dependent upon a well-defined empirical framework, the nature of the concrete historical situations represented by Jones and Marshall as individual thinkers has to be established clearly before the analysis can proceed. With this in mind, this section presents a detailed examination of the individuals and contexts that form the substantial basis of this work. Beginning with an account of the changing historical structures that defined the specific contexts within which the two thinkers developed their thought, what follows identifies the social, political, cultural and intellectual points of reference by which Jones and Marshall orientated their respective interpretations of the concept of citizenship. The significance of Jones and Marshall as individual actors in their respective periods is then critically assessed and interpreted in relation to the analytical objectives of the work. The particular way in which

---

[40] See Chapter Six, pp.174-212.

biographical analyses of these two specific individuals are used in this thesis to establish a clearer sense of its empirical framework, is defended.

In the period lasting from the late nineteenth century to the years immediately after the First World War, the expression of ideas about citizenship in Britain occurred within the context of a political community adjusting to a significant redefinition of its boundaries. At the end of the nineteenth century, a range of economic and social developments had combined to shift the balance of social life away from the local provinces to the national metropolis. As international finance replaced manufacturing as the key to commercial prosperity, economic activity gravitated towards London and gave rise to new social groups for whom local eminence held far less sway as a source of social power than the 'delocalised irresponsible wealth' that could be gained from business activity in the metropolis.[41] At the same time, advances in technology, the rise of mass-production and the growth of heavily capitalised industries made significant increases in the scale of economic enterprise possible, facilitating the emergence of a 'national' economy that saw considerations of international trade cycles and market forces replace those of local custom in the organisation of labour.[42] As traditional, work-related patterns of community life gradually declined in the face of these developments, the growth of large-scale urban environments populated by 'industrial masses' made for an increasingly integrated and uniform 'national' society.[43]

The sum of these developments meant that British society in the early twentieth century could no longer be seen in terms of 'petty rural or urban units, each leading its own secluded life, speaking its own dialect, cherishing its own particular customs, meeting its own peculiar wants', but had become 'one tumultuous whole', stratified into classes on the basis of conflicting economic interests.[44] This restructuring of social life coincided with constitutional changes that enlarged the scope of the political franchise in this period. Although manhood suffrage was only achieved in 1918, the Reform Acts of the late nineteenth-century had resulted in the evolution of

---

[41] See J. Harris, *Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain 1870-1914* (Oxford, 1993), pp.19-20.
[42] *Ibid.*, pp.126-7.
[43] *Ibid.*, p.21.
[44] H. Jones, 'The Working Faith of the Social Reformer' in *The Working Faith of the Social Reformer and other*

a more democratic national polity, as well as a new kind of mass political culture. Within this new culture, the interests of popular democracy began to transform the traditional concerns of 'high politics': appeals to an 'ancient constitution' based on 'the sterling independence of the Anglo-Saxon freeman, and the republic of civic virtue', were replaced by a more practical and populist frame of reference that heralded the rise of a more professional and strategic approach to the conduct of modern British politics.[45] Thus, British society in the late Victorian and Edwardian era saw changes on a number of fronts, with social, economic and political developments combining to transform the structure of the national community in fundamental ways.

In the wake of these changes, however, fears of mediocrity and the 'levelling down' of society grew amongst the literary and social élites of the time.[46] The rise of mass politics was perceived as a threat to social and political stability, particularly as the social fabric seemed to be disintegrating as a result of the periodic depressions which hit the economy, the decline of British agriculture, and the pressures of the growing ranks of casual and poorly-paid unskilled labour in large urban centres. As poverty and unemployment emerged as national problems, anxieties about the degeneration of the body politic were heightened.[47] It was in the face of such crises that existing ideas about the state and society were then reconsidered. As the problems that occurred within the setting of a more integrated national community had to be resolved at a national level, the central government was assuming new responsibilities that significantly extended the practical role of the state in society. This raised important questions about the changing nature and purposes of the state, and of its relationship to society, particularly as the social basis of the national polity was itself undergoing a transformation.

These questions were taken up by a wide-ranging community of public intellectuals, actively engaging in speculative thought at a time when, as Jose Harris put it, political theorising was 'virtually a national sport of British intellectuals of all ideological and professional

---

essays (London, 1910), p.22.

[45] Harris, *Private Lives, Public Spirit*, pp.14-16.

[46] See, for example, J. Carey, *The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice Among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1880-1939* (London, 1992).

[47] den Otter, *British Idealism and Social Explanation*, pp.4-5.

complexions'.[48] Issues of fundamental importance for political and social philosophy were expounded as such thinkers addressed the need to develop a more comprehensive basis upon which the social identity of an enlarged political community could be defined. The means by which isolated individuals could be led towards an understanding of their roles and duties within a complex social organism was a recurrent theme in the analyses, with the goal of 'awakening citizen consciousness' amongst the masses being constantly referred to in public discourse.[49] The mutual interaction between speculative thought and practical politics, moreover, gave the concept of citizenship a particular richness in this period.

The vocabulary for this rich culture of political discourse has been characterised as being drawn from a predominantly 'idealist' frame of reference, in which 'corporate identity, individual altruism, ethical imperatives and active citizen-participation' were emphasised as key considerations for the achievement of an 'ideal state'.[50] Although purely philosophical idealism was relatively limited in its immediate political influence, the pervasive incorporation of idealist categories into the political discussions that occurred at a more mundane level effectively shaped the way in which the issues of the period were understood and expressed. The prominence of idealist structures of thought may be observed in the concern with establishing the existence of a 'common will' upon which to found a conception of the 'common good' in society; the belief that the fragmentation and relativism of modern industrial society could be subdued to the 'common end of the good life'; and the significant conception of society as a 'spiritual personality' with a 'moral will'.[51]

Such ideas, however, depended upon a conception of the moral and material order that was effectively destroyed by the First World War. It belonged, as Gilbert Murray put it, to a time when people 'were actuated by hope rather than fear, ...believed that men were as a rule influenced by reason, [and] that justice was the great healer of social troubles and the natural aim

---

[48] Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.16.
[49] *Ibid.*, p.19
[50] Harris, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State', pp.123, 137.
[51] See L. T. Hobhouse, 'The Future of Liberalism' in *Liberalism and Other Writings*, ed. J. Meadowcroft, pp.110-11; Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.19; Harris, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State', p.124.

of wise statesmanship'.[52] In the aftermath of the war, these assumptions no longer seemed to hold true. Yet, the idealist enterprise did not simply disappear. Idealist articulations of citizenship during and immediately after the First World War did seek to engage with the new political realities. Arguments about the morality of nations, and a realised experience of sacrifice and national duty, for example, could be used to emphasise the importance of conceiving the state as a moral personality, and the possibility of a spiritual identification of the individual will with its purposes. Similarly, concerns raised by the development of popular democracy and the extension of the sphere of state intervention were addressed by appealing to ideas of moral development and the mutual implication of state and citizen.

Nevertheless, by the middle of the twentieth century, the dominance of idealism in political discourse was clearly beginning to decline as the idealist frame of reference was openly attacked on a number of fronts. Criticisms of idealist political thought in particular, and political philosophy in general, had been emanating from British philosophy since the 1930s. The argument of linguistic positivists to the effect that all normative statements had no genuine logical status, and Bertrand Russell's claim that what was commonly called 'political philosophy' had nothing whatsoever to do with philosophy proper, had undermined the project of idealism on academic grounds. More importantly, in the face of mass unemployment and prolonged depression, the optimistic moral assumptions of the idealist vision appeared increasingly untenable on political grounds, and idealist political philosophy came to be seen as 'a philosophy that put up barriers against any realistic examination of politics'.[53] The perceived association of idealist thought with ideas current in Nazi Germany with respect to community, moreover, severely damaged its reputation in the context of the period. Idealism, with its Hegelian and Platonic resonances, came to be ideologically linked to negative doctrines, such as fascism and illiberal statism,[54] and the whole idealist enterprise was presented as an alien episode in the British empiricist tradition, and 'nothing but an unfortunate aberration in the development of modern

---

[52] Quoted in M. Richter, *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and his Age* (London, 1964), p.375.
[53] J. M. Buchanan, quoted in Vincent and Plant, *Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship*, p.1.
[54] Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.21.

philosophy'.[55]

As Britain entered the Second World War, the need for a philosophical basis for notions of national solidarity and unity was replaced by a practical reality arising out of the political necessities of total war. For William Beveridge – amongst others – national unity was seen to be 'the great moral achievement of the Second World War', establishing a 'mutual understanding between Government and people'.[56] Yet, the extent to which the war did in fact succeed in transforming the underlying realities of the British social structure remains questionable. From a theoretical perspective, mass military conscription, evacuation, and the collective experience of rationing could be seen as an embodiment of a unifying ethic of common identity. However, in practice, evacuation served to accentuate rather than reduce the consciousness of social divisions; and evidence of an active 'black market' arising out of attempts to evade wartime rationing suggests that the 'civic culture' of the time was far from the perceived ideal.[57] Nevertheless, although the social and cultural transformation of Britain was somewhat incomplete at the popular level, national solidarity seemed to be assumed by those responsible for developing policies for reconstruction.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, mass democracy was an unquestioned reality; public opinion reflected a high degree of confidence in the civic and administrative institutions of government;[58] and there was a widespread feeling that the exigencies of war had given 'reality and legitimate purpose to the collective interests of society and the corporate role of the state'.[59] On the assumption that the wartime standards of corporate solidarity and national devotion were enduring achievements, major government initiatives – such as the nationalisation of major industries and the creation of a 'cradle-to-grave' welfare state – were implemented with relatively little controversy, by an ebullient policy-making élite operating within the euphoric political climate of the immediate post-war years. These measures dramatically transformed the nature and

---

[55] A. J. M. Milne, *Social Philosophy of English Idealism* (London, 1962), p.11.
[56] W. Beveridge, *Pillars of Society* (London, 1943), p.109. See K. O. Morgan, *The People's Peace: British History Since 1945* (Oxford, 1990; 1999), p.3.
[57] See Morgan, *People's Peace*, p.18.
[58] See *Ibid.*, p.557; Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.26.
[59] D. Morgan and M. Evans, *The Battle for Britain: Citizenship and Ideology in the Second World War* (London, 1993), p.113.

purposes of the British state, and, following from this, the way in which it related to its citizens. 'In virtually no other period of British history,' Jose Harris has suggested, 'were the powers and functions of government so radically extended and redefined, and in no other period were the roles of state, citizen, economy, society and private voluntary associations more drastically remoulded.'[60]

In stark contrast to the rich political discourse that flourished in the wake of the social and political changes that occurred in the late Victorian and Edwardian period, however, the radical social developments of the post-war period were greeted with a 'widespread silence' in the field of speculative political thought.[61] Amongst the social reformers engaged in the task of reconstruction at the time, there was a firm belief that what was needed to build 'the brave new world' was not deep discussion of theoretical 'generalities', but immediate social action to direct the economy and engineer a better society according to an ethic of planning based on 'scientific' principles.[62] As the country emerged from the austerity of the 1940s and advanced into growing affluence in the 1950s and 1960s, the reality of a contented society enjoying rising living standards and social mobility in the context of a developing culture of consumerism seemed sufficient as a pragmatic justification of the state's new functions.[63] A sense of 'the democratic redundancy of political theorising' – derived from the belief that the national solidarity fostered by the experience of war, and the affluence that developed as the years progressed, had practically resolved most of the fundamental philosophical issues regarding the political relationship between the individual and the state – thus dominated the political understanding of this period.

This practical understanding dovetailed significantly with the academic crisis of confidence over the essential validity of the practice of normative political philosophy referred to above,[64] entailing the emergence of a new disciplinary context for the consideration of political problems. Speculative political ideas drawn from an abstract philosophical framework no longer provided the relevant vocabulary for the political debate. Instead, the concerns of the post-war

---

[60] Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.15.
[61] *Ibid.*
[62] *Ibid.*, p.23; Morgan, *People's Peace*, pp.30-2; Morgan and Evans, *The Battle for Britain*, p.8.
[63] See Morgan, *People's Peace*, pp.123-4, 191-3, 554; Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.26.

period were constructed in relation to a more 'positivistic' conception of politics. The terms of reference used in political discourse drew upon social scientific understandings of the way in which social institutions and structures function; and focused upon the identification of technical goals and expert diagnosis, rather than the morality and rationality of individuals, as the means by which social progress would be achieved. This provided the intellectual framework within which ideas about citizenship – insofar as they were considered – were constructed in the post-war period.

At the outset of this chapter, it was established that primary aim of the thesis is to present an empirical analysis of the way in which ideas about citizenship conceived in the late Victorian and Edwardian period differed from those developed after the Second World War in Britain.[65] What may be discerned from the account given above of the changing political, social and cultural realities that shaped the history of these two periods, is the extent to which such changes entailed a significant redefinition of accepted notions concerning the nature of the state and its relationship with society. In this respect, the social and political developments that occurred may be seen to affect the way in which citizenship could be thought about. More importantly, however, the redefinition that was a notable feature of both the periods to be considered, seems to have occurred within strikingly different intellectual contexts in each of the two periods. What we have, therefore, are two periods in which citizenship appeared as a central idea in the political arena, but in which it was conceptualised according to different priorities and terms of reference.

As representative thinkers operating in these two periods, the two individuals who provide the empirical focus for this thesis serve as useful periscopes into the intellectual and cultural behaviour by which changing historical structures are incorporated into the construction of political ideas. In their respective periods, both Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall made notable contributions to the discourse on citizenship in twentieth-century Britain. Their significance for the analytical purposes of this thesis, however, does not stem from any claim to the effect that

---

[64] See above, p.21.
[65] See above, p.7.

they were particularly innovative or heroic thinkers, or that the influence of their ideas effectively transformed the landscape of political thought in their time.[66] Indeed, the claim that *is* made on behalf of these two individuals proceeds in precisely the opposite direction. From a historical perspective, it should be emphasised that neither Jones nor Marshall sought actively to position themselves at the 'cutting edge' of critical thought in their respective disciplines. Instead, as social and political thinkers, Jones and Marshall engaged in academic discourse at a more practical level, with contributions to the citizenship debate that worked at the interface between speculative political thought and the development of social policy.

Although Marshall has, in recent years, come to be regarded as a key figure in the modern debate on citizenship, it is important to note that this reputation is largely consequent upon the current revival of interest in citizenship, and, in particular, the rediscovery of ideas articulated by Marshall in his 1949 lectures on 'Citizenship and Social Class', as a retrospective theoretical justification for the functions of the welfare state.[67] For the most part, Marshall's current reputation does not appear to be indicative of any general recognition of his pre-eminence as a 'great thinker' in his own time. Marshall's ideas about citizenship occurred as part of a sociological analysis of the way in which patterns of social inequality were being modified, as he saw it, within the context of the post-war welfare state. In this respect, the path of his thought depended upon a passive observation of the social processes unleashed by the political creators of the welfare state, rather than a rather more proactive analysis of the underlying principles of citizenship and the state that could have provided a theoretical basis for the institutional development of the welfare state. At this level, however, Marshall's approach successfully related a form of theoretical understanding to the realities of practical politics, and provides an apt example of the way in which the political concerns of the post-war period affected the conceptual development of citizenship at this time.

As a sociologist, Marshall may have inspired a distinguished set of successors, amongst whom Ralf Dahrendorf, Seymour Martin Lipset, A. H. Halsey and Reinhard Bendix may be

---

[66] See above, pp.11, 13-14.
[67] See Chapter Three, pp.70-1.

numbered. However, he was always mainly regarded as a 'synthesizing "man of wisdom"', rather than a thrusting innovator, in the sociological discipline.[68] Indeed, in its time, 'Citizenship and Social Class' only succeeded in gaining attention as a useful contribution to sociological discipline when it was included as the centrepiece to *Sociology at the Crossroads*, a collection of Marshall's essays and lectures published in 1963, some seven years after his official retirement from the London School of Economics.[69] More importantly, however, the notion that Marshall's work represented a significant development in the political theory of citizenship did not emerge until the mid-1980s, by which time the work had become almost completely detached from its original context. Given the analytical objectives of this thesis, it is important to recover a sense of the way in which Marshall's thought related to the particular social, political and intellectual frameworks within which it was produced; and to acknowledge these frameworks as an active element of the ideological processes in which Marshall engaged, in the course of developing his ideas on citizenship. It is in this light that Marshall's contribution to the citizenship debate in Britain will be considered in this thesis.

In contrast to Marshall, Jones had an immense reputation as a political thinker in his lifetime, and his ideas about citizenship drew the attention of a significant political public in the late Victorian and Edwardian period. Yet, his significance as a theorist of citizenship does not seem to have survived much beyond his time. As an idealist thinker, Jones is not held to possess the authoritative stature accorded to figures such as T. H. Green or Bernard Bosanquet. In a recent work on the political philosophy of British idealism, for example, Peter Nicholson described Jones as one of the 'minor British Idealists': those whose 'original contributions are for the most part slight'.[70] Operating as an idealist philosopher at a time when speculative political discourse formed an important part of the political culture, however, Jones was particularly successful in articulating his conception of citizenship directly to the general public, and pitching his ideas at the level of public consciousness. His firm conviction of the need to apply

---

[68] A. M. Rees, 'T. H. Marshall and the progress of citizenship' in M. Bulmer and A. M. Rees (eds), *Citizenship Today: The contemporary relevance of T. H. Marshall* (London, 1996), p.2.
[69] *Ibid.*, p.1.
[70] Nicholson, *Political Philosophy of the British Idealists*, p.1.

philosophical principles to political and social problems, his practical involvement in politics, and his cultivation of personal friendships with leading Liberals, meant that he was constantly in a position to develop ideas that fully engaged with the practical realities of the time.

As his biographer Hector Hetherington put it, Jones' best service to the doctrine of idealism was 'to put the weight of personal conviction behind it, to show it to his students as a faith capable of sustaining both thought and practice', thereby stimulating individuals among them to 'philosophical enterprises larger than he himself could compass'.[71] The significance of Jones' contribution to political thought lay in his ability to relate his idealist principles to a political reality, rather than in the extent to which the content of his thought was 'original'. His significance for the purposes of this thesis derives from this quality; and it is on such grounds that his ideas are taken to be representative of the idealist discourse on citizenship in the public arena, and of the way in which such ideas engaged with the political practice of the period. Essentially, both Jones and Marshall were concerned with setting out a conception of citizenship that accorded with their respective understandings of the society in which they lived. It is in this respect that they have been chosen as representative case studies for the analytical concerns of this thesis.

In this thesis, biographical analyses are used as a means of unravelling the complex ways in which personal factors may have directed the political thought of an individual thinker along particular lines. A sense of the way in which the individual identities of Jones and Marshall were reflected in their thinking adds a significant dimension the analysis of context with regard their ideas, insofar as it reveals something about the relation in which the individual stands to his experience. It should be stressed, however, that such considerations can only be tentative and merely suggestive as the choice of which aspects of personal background to regard as significant, and the interpretation involved in establishing this significance, depend upon judgements that are easily challenged. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, at some level, the peculiarities of an individual's identity does affect the way in which he perceives and constructs the society in which

---

[71] H. J. W. Hetherington, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow* (London, 1924), p.156.

he is placed. Personal experiences, and the cultural inheritance gained from one's lineage, may be seen to have deep resonances in the development of values, prejudices and assumptions, that act as filters through which the operations of society are observed and, consequently, understood. Thus, for example, the contrast between Jones' strongly provincial background – defined chiefly by his childhood in a rural Welsh village and his firm commitment to the cause of Welsh nationalism – and Marshall's patrician and metropolitan social background as part of a cultural and intellectual élite based in London,[72] cannot be completely overlooked in the consideration of how and why their ideas about citizenship differed. The effects of their different cultural outlooks need to be taken into account, if a full and clear picture of the intellectual and ideological processes that shaped the development of different notions of citizenship is to be presented in this thesis.

III. The Structure of the Thesis

The main body of this thesis has a three-part structure. In Part I, the personal histories of Jones and Marshall are presented, and the effects of different social realities, and personal contexts, on the production of political ideas are considered. The chapters take the form of biographical analyses, in which the different senses of identity that Jones and Marshall derived from their contrasting cultural inheritances and life experiences are recovered. The first chapter (Chapter Two, 'Henry Jones: Life and Influences') examines Jones' artisanal working-class upbringing in rural Wales, his experience of non-conformist religion, his subsequent education and rise to the position of a professor of moral philosophy, and the nature of his involvement in Edwardian Liberal politics, which can be firmly located within a specific tradition of Welsh radicalism. The second chapter (Chapter Three, 'T. H. Marshall: Life and Influences') presents a corresponding biographical analysis of Marshall, exploring the implications of his position within the ranks of the 'intellectual aristocracy' through his family connections, his experience of being held in a civilian internment camp in Germany for the duration of the First World War, his brief political involvement with the Labour Party, and the international dimension of his involvement in public affairs.

---

[72] See full accounts in Chapter Two (for Jones) and Chapter Three (for Marshall).

Part II of the thesis then examines the nature of the idea-environments that shaped the political language used by Jones and Marshall in their respective articulations of citizenship. It considers how this language related to the political realities that the two thinkers sought to address in their respective periods, and thus establishes the ideological and conceptual boundaries within which they interpreted the meaning of the concept. The first chapter in this part (Chapter Four, 'Mapping Henry Jones' System of Thought') considers the system of philosophical ideas which fashioned Jones' understanding of society. It is argued that the acceptance of a particular notion of society as a 'social organism', within an idealist philosophical framework, focused Jones' conception of citizenship on a set of moral considerations which determined his conclusions with regard to the 'right' relationship between the individual and the state. The set of considerations that moulded Marshall's understanding, on the other hand, produced a fundamentally different conception of human nature and the operation of social processes. These are examined in the next chapter (Chapter Five, 'The Bases of T. H. Marshall's Thought'), in which Marshall's academic and methodological predilections are unravelled and considered in relation to the prevailing political context of planning and the establishment of the post-war welfare state.

In Part III of the thesis, the two different conceptions of citizenship that emerged from the different idea-environments and personal contexts identified in Parts I and II are analysed conceptually, and then considered with regard to practical political debates. Using the methods suggested by recent 'conceptual' and 'ideological' approaches to the history of political thought, the first chapter in this part (Chapter Six, 'The Conceptual Structure of Citizenship') considers the conceptual issues that are raised with regard to citizenship, and presents a comparative ideological analysis of the way in which Jones and Marshall constructed their respective notions of citizenship. The process by which citizenship is defined is examined by establishing the range and scope of the citizenship debate in twentieth-century Britain and locating the concept of citizenship within a structural framework of related political concepts. The way in which different understandings of personal identity, individuality, equality and the social structure affected what was implied in the idea of citizenship is unravelled, and a close consideration is made of the way

in which Jones and Marshall defined their conceptions of citizenship in relation to the concept of class in twentieth-century Britain. A conceptual framework for citizenship is established and a significant shift from 'moral' to 'material' concerns is identified as a notable development in the consideration of citizenship over the course of the twentieth century. The next chapter in this section (Chapter Seven, 'Citizenship and Welfare') then considers the extent to which the structure of practical policy debates may be understood within this conceptual framework. The particular way in which developments in the conceptualisation of citizenship interacted with the construction of welfare policy is considered through a comparative analysis of the nature of the debates over the two reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws of 1905-9 on the one hand, and the arguments raised during the passage of the National Assistance Act of 1948 on the other. The extent to which conceptual and institutional frameworks reacted upon each other in the policy-making environment is examined.

PART I

PERSONAL CONTEXTS

CHAPTER TWO

HENRY JONES: LIFE AND INFLUENCES

The aim of this chapter is to develop a biographical analysis of Henry Jones as a means of uncovering the personal contexts within which his ideas and convictions developed. In relation to the central theme of this thesis – namely the consideration of the impact of two different intellectual and ideological frameworks on the development of ideas about citizenship – such an analysis will shed light on the way in which personal social realities shaped Jones' intentions and the particular social outlook from which he developed his conception of citizenship. Although the details of Jones' life are readily available in a variety of sources,[1] the implications of his personal experiences have not been fully analysed in relation to the development of his thought and self-perception. In pursuing such an analysis, the concern is not just with the facts of Jones' biography, but also with the *significance* that Jones attached to the various aspects of his experience. To this end, the major sources for Jones' biography need to be read as something more than mere recollections of a set of biographical 'facts'. In Jones' case, the nature of the available sources, in fact, lend themselves particularly well to such use. Indeed, works such as Jones' autobiography, *Old Memories*, and the biographical accounts produced by Hector Hetherington and Thomas Jones,[2] cannot truly be described as objective, impartial accounts of a life, but are probably better seen as retrospective and creative constructions of a meaningful identity within a project of self-presentation. By examining the way in which Jones' life is presented in these works, a sense of the particular meanings that were ascribed to the experiences perceived to be significant in defining Jones' self-identity may be gleaned.

As David Vincent has argued in his study of working-class autobiography, an individual setting down a record of his life does not present 'a collection of remembered facts', but 'a pattern of recollected experiences', woven in an attempt to reconstruct the development of one's personality. 'More than any other form of source material,' Vincent asserted, 'autobiography has

---

[1] See Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, pp.2, 188 (n.5).

[2] H. Jones, *Old Memories: Autobiography of Sir Henry Jones, CH, Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow*, ed. T. Jones (London, 1922); Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.1-178; T. Jones, *A Theme with Variations* (Newtown, 1933), pp.85-113; T. Jones, 'Shoemaker's Son to University Professor', *John*

the potential to tell us not merely what happened but the impact of an event or situation upon an actor in the past."[3] In *Old Memories*, a work of reminiscence written in the year before his death in 1922 and published posthumously by Thomas Jones, Jones presented an account of his 'working-class' childhood in Wales, his scramble for education and the development of his career, leading up to his appointment as Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow in 1894. The work was written with the main objective of 'leav[ing] behind, for the encouragement of the youth of Wales and Scotland in particular, the story of his struggle for education'.[4] The story of Jones' early days was seen in terms of its 'inspirational value' to the Welsh people of his generation, who 'held up the example of the illustrious shoemaker as a beacon light to the boys and girls of Wales'.[5] The life was thus given meaning and value as a fable to extol the virtues of education, through a narrative of heroic struggle.

In this respect, the work fell within a long tradition of didactic working-class autobiographical writing,[6] which presented a particular framework within which Jones' experiences could be reconstructed. The story of his upward mobility through education was ultimately seen in terms of a triumph for the values of working-class respectability, which were particularly important to Jones' definition of his self-identity and world-view. In *Old Memories*, these values were presented in relation to two prominent themes in his life: on the one hand, there was the 'thoroughly secular but also thoroughly moral spirit' of honesty, simplicity, fidelity, industry and respect for learning, which Jones associated with an idealised conception of the rural artisan represented by his father; on the other, there was the intuition, passion, and dedication to 'the things "beyond"... this life' that characterised the religious consciousness that he saw in his mother.[7] The particular way in which respectability and religion shaped Jones' outlook needs therefore to be more closely considered.

Turning now to examine the nature of the evidence presented by the biographical

---

O'London's Weekly, 11 March 1922, p.751.

[3] D. Vincent, *Bread, Knowledge and Freedom: a Study of Nineteenth-Century Working Class Autobiography* (London, 1981), p.5.

[4] T. Jones, Preface to Jones, *Old Memories*, p.5.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp.6, 7.

[6] For an analysis of this genre of writing, see Vincent, *Bread, Knowledge and Freedom.*

[7] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.16.

accounts of Jones' life, what seems immediately obvious is the extent to which these also formed part of the project of representation. Through his university teaching and political involvement, Jones had attracted a loyal following of 'disciples', of whom Thomas Jones and Hector Hetherington are perhaps the most notable. These two men, however, are also the key figures through whom his biography has been recorded for posterity. Their efforts reflect the desire to remember a figure who had been influential in their lives, and tended therefore to resonate with admiration rather than analytical objectivity. Their accounts clearly reflected their close association with Jones, and presented a reading of his life which accorded with Jones' distinctive consciousness of his own identity. Their purpose was to enhance Jones' reputation and to perpetuate the myth of his personality. They were writing the life of a public figure, it may be argued, as part of a process of canonisation, and it is in this light that their contributions should be seen.

In this chapter, it will be argued that Jones' notions of working-class community and respectability, together with his nonconformist religious commitment, played a significant role in defining his political and philosophical outlooks. These outlooks were expressed in, and further shaped by, the practical political contexts within which Jones engaged with the public issues that seemed salient to him. The three sections of the chapter build up this general picture. The first section presents a roughly chronological narrative of Jones' biography, outlining his personal experiences essentially as they have been recorded in the sources. The next section then aims at a more critical and objective analysis of what these experiences represented and how they acted to shape Jones' particular approach to political thought and the issue of citizenship, focusing particularly on the effects of the tradition of working-class respectability and nonconformist religion. Finally, the third section establishes the nature of Jones' political influence through an examination of his political involvement and public activities.

I. BIOGRAPHY

Henry Jones was born in a cottage called Cwm, near the village of Llangernyw in Denbighshire, on 30 November 1852. His father, Elias Jones, was the village shoemaker and his mother, Elizabeth, had been a servant-maid in a succession of farms. Jones had two elder

brothers, William and John, with whom he had close relationships; and two younger sisters, one of whom died in infancy and the other in early middle life. According to Jones, his father 'never made a pound a week' and the family of six lived in accommodation that consisted of little more than a ten-foot-square kitchen and equivalent room upstairs. The lack of space meant that Jones and his siblings were 'habitually turned out of the house to play in the open air' when they were not at school; and at meal times, because neither table nor room was big enough to sit the whole family at once, food was eaten either 'in relays', or with one or two of them sitting on the doorstep with plates on their knees.[8] Jones' description of these childhood experiences was almost wholly positive. He stressed that his mother's skill and careful management meant that the family 'never lacked anything... whether in the way of wholesome food or of comfortable and respectable clothing'; and that, in his view, '[a] happier household... there never was'.[9]

A large part of Jones' family life, however, revolved around the Calvinistic Methodist chapel which stood close by the family home. Jones recalled spending all day each Sunday, as well as practically every weekday evening, engaged in communal religious activities within this chapel.[10] Religion thus formed a major part of Jones' upbringing. Other influences, however, were also at work. According to Jones, for example, learning was held in high esteem in his household. Although Elias Jones was himself uneducated, having left school at the age of seven, his respect for learning meant that he would allow nothing to break the regularity of his sons' attendance at the village school. Jones and his brothers were also encouraged to follow intellectual pursuits, and their successes were a source of pride for their father.[11] Schooling, however, ended when the boys were old enough to begin trade apprenticeships. At the age of twelve-and-a-half, Jones left school to become a shoemaker apprenticed to his father. Although other crafts were urged upon him as being "better than shoemaking", his decision was made on a desire to 'sit side by side with [his] father whose favourite [he] was, and whom [he] adored'. At that time, Jones recalled having two mastering ambitions: one was to be a first-rate shoemaker,

---

[8] *Ibid.*, pp.17-8, 21-2.
[9] *Ibid.*, pp.18, 20.
[10] *Ibid.*, pp.59-60.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp.29-30.

and the other was to be made an elder in his chapel when he was a man.[12]

The course of his life came to be changed, however, when at the age of fourteen Jones drew the attentions of a patron. Mrs. Alexander Roxburgh was a well-to-do Scotswoman living in Jones' neighbourhood who, having seen him perform in village entertainments, resolved that he should set his sights on something better than shoemaking as a career. In particular, she wanted him to 'go to college and become a minister' and, with her firm belief in education and 'limitless enthusiasm', set about persuading him to this end. She lent him Pollock's *Course of Time* and successive parts of Cassells' *Popular Educator*, encouraged him to talk and accompanied his singing, but more importantly, she persistently reiterated her purpose and never concealed her wish that he should not be one of the 'intemperate and low set' of shoemakers. For a time, however, Jones remained committed to shoemaking, believing that it was 'a thoroughly respectable trade to those who looked after themselves'. By aiming to be the best shoemaker in the country as well as an elder in the chapel, Jones believed that he could be 'one of the neighbourhood's real but uncrowned leaders'.[13]

This conviction was thrown into crisis, however, when, walking along the streets of Llanrwst one day with a companion, Jones came across 'a group of disreputable loungers hanging around the door of a tavern'. Disgust turned to horror as he realised that these were in fact his shop-mates. Jones described the experience as 'by far the most startling event in [his] whole life'. As the views that Mrs. Roxburgh had been pouring into him seemed suddenly confirmed before his eyes, Jones was filled with a 'deep repugnancy at the very thought of spending [his] life at shoemaking', which no longer seemed to hold a respectable future for him.[14] He resolved therefore to become, as Mrs. Roxburgh wished, 'something better than shoemaker', and made a solemn oath to be a graduate of a university.[15] Thus began Jones' defining personal struggle for further education, which sent him 'scrambling from a shoemaker's seat to a professor's'.[16]

---

[12] *Ibid.*, pp.37-8.
[13] *Ibid.*, pp.66-9; Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.12.
[14] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.72.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp.73-4.
[16] National Library of Wales [henceforth NLW], Thomas Jones Collection [henceforth TJC], Class U, Vol. III, f.221: Jones to E. H. Jones, June 1921.

In many ways, his journey took the typical path of social mobility for members of the 'respectable' working class in Wales, passing – as it did – through efforts to become a schoolmaster, then a Calvinist minister, before he was 'born again' in Edward Caird's classes on moral philosophy.[17] For Jones at the time, however, the path was by no means clear. His family's poverty, and the lack of educational provision beyond the elementary level in Wales at the time, left him helpless. For some time after his change of mind, therefore, nothing was done. Then, his mother's initiative at a chance meeting with the schoolmaster of a neighbouring parish led to an arrangement by which Jones was to be allowed to attend the school at Pandy three days a week, while working at his trade on the remaining days to pay for his keep.[18] This scheme was pursued for eighteen months, between May 1869 and November 1870, with Jones' zeal for study resulting in a plan that involved going to bed in the workshop at about eight in the evening, being woken at about one in the morning, and studying until morning came.

In December 1870, at the age of nineteen, Jones went to Bangor and sat for the Queen's Scholarship and entrance examinations to the Normal College there.[19] This training college for teachers had been set up in 1858 by Hugh Owen, and served as 'a kind of alternative working-class university which extended its sights far beyond a narrow course of instruction in education alone'.[20] Jones returned after a week in Bangor convinced that he had failed. He resolved, nevertheless, to gain some practical teaching experience, and succeeded in getting a junior appointment as an uncertified undermaster in a private school at Ormskirk, near Liverpool.[21] This course lasted no more than ten days, for, against his expectations, Jones had in fact come top of the list in the Bangor examination. He thus joined the Normal College in 1871 and spent two happy years there, making progress in mathematical work and discovering the work of Thomas Carlyle – with which he fell in 'love at first sight' – in the college library.[22] He passed out of the College in 1872, graduating at the top of his class.

---

[17] H. W. Morris-Jones, 'The Life and Philosophy of Sir Henry Jones' in *Henry Jones, 1852-1922: Centenary Addresses delivered at the University College of North Wales on the first day of December, 1952* (Cardiff, 1953), p.5.
[18] Jones, *Old Memories*, pp.75-77.
[19] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.13-14.
[20] K. O. Morgan, *Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880-1980* (Oxford, 1981), p.23.
[21] Jones, *Old Memories*, pp.89-90.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp.91, 94, 95.

In 1873, Jones was appointed to a schoolmastership at Brynaman, a South Wales colliery village in East Carmarthenshire. By his own admission, he was 'exceedingly happy' there: he '*felt* the goodwill of [his] neighbours', and, perhaps because of this, the school 'flourished amazingly'.[23] Towards the end of his second year at the school, however, Jones' mind was 'turning to preaching rather than teaching'. He was then a member of the Moriah Calvinist Methodist chapel in Brynamman and spoke to one of its deacons of his desire to preach.[24] This led to an interview with the Revd. Thomas James of Llanelly, who approved Jones as a preacher, and told him that he might think of competing, in time, for a Dr. Williams's Scholarship for English and Welsh nonconformist students, which would maintain him in a course of study at the University of Glasgow if he won it.[25] Jones thus embarked upon a preaching career, delivering sermons by invitation.[26] When he completed his two-year contract and received his full certificate as a qualified teacher in May 1875, he resigned his school and was formally received as a preacher for the 'Vale of Conway' district, by the Calvinist Methodist denomination in which he had been brought up. As part of his desire to be a minister, however, Jones resolved to enter for the Dr. Williams's Scholarship examination and devoted himself to studying for this in the summer of 1875. In October, Jones won the scholarship, passed the matriculation examination for Glasgow, and duly began his university course in November, shortly before his twenty-third birthday.[27] Another chapter of his life had begun.

The seven years that Jones came to spend at Glasgow – three as an undergraduate, and four as a Fellow and assistant to Edward Caird – were, as Hetherington put it, 'beyond all question, the formative, even the decisive, years of his life'.[28] He was taught by such men as Sir Richard Jebb in Greek, Lord Kelvin in natural philosophy, John Veitch in logic, John Nichol in English literature and Edward Caird in moral philosophy. Jones respected and admired the scholarship of Jebb, but found Veitch's Hamiltonian philosophy to be 'rich in bones and poor in

---

[23] *Ibid.*, p.103.
[24] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.16-7.
[25] Jones, *Old Memories*, pp.117-8.
[26] *Ibid.*, p.119.
[27] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.18.
[28] *Ibid.*, p.19.

meat'.[29] He flourished in the world of English literature that Nichol opened to him, and, until the latter's death in 1894, enjoyed a warm friendship with him. It was, however, Caird who was to prove 'the great influence of [Jones'] student days, and indeed the dominating philosophical influence of his whole life'.[30] Caird's historical approach introduced Jones to the concept of 'a world-old dialectic', and suggested to him the idea – which came to be one of the pillars of Jones' philosophical construction – of a refining process in the world's experience, from age to age, which was leading to the 'conquest of spiritual truth'.[31]

While at Glasgow, Jones found himself within a group of philosophical students bound by their keen devotion to Caird and to philosophy. Among his contemporaries were J. H. Muirhead and J. S. Mackenzie, both of whom in due course developed reputations as significant 'second generation' idealist philosophers.[32] As Caird's teaching led Jones to rebel against the more negative aspects of the orthodox religion in which he had been brought up, philosophical studies gradually came to replace his devotion to the Calvinist chapel, although Jones continued to regard religious ministry as his destined profession. In 1878 – after spending a summer studying in Bonn and travelling through Switzerland, in the company of his college friend Hugh Walker – Jones took the honours examination in philosophy, and, pushed by Caird, competed for the George A. Clark Fellowship. He was given a First in the examination, and won the Clark fellowship over more favoured candidates.

As Clark Fellow, Jones began by assisting Caird with class examinations and essays. He also, however, joined first the Free Church College, and then the Established Church College, as a divinity student; spent the summer of 1879 in Dresden, furthering his classical studies under the guidance of James Denney; and, with Hugh Walker, went to Oxford in the autumn of 1879, with a view to taking a complete course of study and graduating there. Jones passed the Preliminary and the Balliol Entrance examinations, but went no further. Partly, this was because he felt, at the age of twenty-seven, disinclined to face three further years engaged in the minutiae of classical

---

[29] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.1/2-3: Jones to J. Maclehose, 3 June 1878.
[30] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.20.
[31] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.132.
[32] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.21.

scholarship which was 'the passport to the best that Oxford had to offer'.[33] More significantly, however, Jones also felt that there was 'not such earnestness and anxiety about the problems of life' in Oxford, as there was in Glasgow: 'They do not know what it is to fight their doubts,' he observed. 'Jowett... has taken up a position of indifference with regard to philosophy; and the tone of the place is more polished and dilettante. They have a comfortable way of settling questions – they pass them off with an epigram or joke.'[34]

In the beginning of 1880, therefore, Jones returned to Glasgow, where he gave himself ardently to the study of Hegel, and was thrust into a yet closer relationship with Caird, for whom he worked as an assistant. As the tenure of his fellowship drew to a close, Jones looked finally to fulfil his intention of becoming a minister in the Calvinistic Methodist denomination. He knew that his transformed theological beliefs would be problematic; nevertheless, in 1881, he formally accepted a call to a large church in Liverpool.[35] An intervention by Caird, however, put an immediate stop to this plan, as he made clear that he intended Jones to be a professor of philosophy, and not a minister of the church. Upon this pronouncement, Jones, with apparently no reservations, resigned his pastorate and embarked immediately upon a philosophical career.

At the beginning of 1883, having recently married Hugh Walker's sister Annie, Jones began his work as a university teacher, with a Lectureship in Philosophy at the University College of Wales in Aberystwyth. He was, however, only to spend a term in this appointment before it came to an unhappy end, ostensibly over Jones' attempt to participate in a movement for the establishment of a university college in North Wales. Jones had joined the Aberystwyth college at a time when the location of university colleges in Wales was highly contested. In 1880, the Aberdare Commission on Intermediate and Higher Education in Wales had recommended the establishment of two university colleges – one in North Wales and the other in the South – each to be aided by government grants of £4000. As it was located in the extreme west of mid-Wales, Aberystwyth could not compete for the privilege of serving as either the North nor the South Wales college, and feared the prospect of two rivals with financial positions strengthened by

---

[33] *Ibid.*, p.24.
[34] Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.25.

government backing.

Shortly after he began his lectureship at Aberystwyth, Jones was invited by a committee led by William Rathbone, the Member of Parliament for North Carnarvonshire, to serve as the secretary of North Wales college movement. His Principal, the Reverend Thomas Charles Edwards, would not, at first, sanction Jones' acceptance of this invitation, but gave way under pressure. However, upon the announcement of Jones' appointment as secretary, the president of the college, Lord Aberdare, cancelled the Principal's permission on the grounds that the establishment of the North Wales college could be seen as a death-blow for the college at Aberystwyth, and it was not appropriate that a member of the Aberystwyth staff should be involved in the process. The committee for the North Wales movement acquiesced in this decision, and Jones duly took no part in the movement. Soon after the end of term, however, Jones found that his post as lecturer was being advertised. He had effectively been dismissed, although it was only from the public advertisement that he learnt of this. Jones thus found himself with no college duties in the summer of 1883, and occupied himself with drawing up the constitution of the new North Wales college for William Rathbone. He was also appointed Examiner for Degrees in the University of Glasgow's department of philosophy and English literature, a three-year appointment which provided a salary of £80 a year.[36]

By the summer of 1884, it had been decided that the new college for North Wales would be established at Bangor, and Jones presented himself as a candidate for the Principalship of the new institution. He was passed over in favour of Sir Harry Reichel, but was immediately elected to the Professorship of Philosophy and Political Economy. Jones spent seven years in Bangor, where he not only lectured, but preached fairly regularly in the neighbouring chapels (although his theological orthodoxy was questioned), and spoke out freely on behalf of the Liberal cause in North Wales.[37] In particular, Jones joined the fight for the establishment of intermediate schools in Wales, a cause which lay close to his heart as a result of his own struggle for education. The Welsh Intermediate Education Act was passed in 1889, and together with Thomas Edward Ellis,

---

[35] *Ibid.*, pp.26-7.
[36] *Ibid.*, pp.33-4; Jones, *Old Memories*, pp.166-71.

Arthur Acland and Cadwaladr Davies, Jones worked to ensure that enough schools were being established.[38]

In 1891, Jones' first book, *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher*, was published. The work was a study of Browning's poetical achievement which sought to establish the content and validity of the poet's philosophical thought. The fact that Jones' first major contribution to philosophical literature revolved around a literary figure reflects the influence of John Nichol's teaching. In Jones' mind, Carlyle and the Romantic poets expressed his philosophical beliefs as well as any of the great Idealist philosophers, albeit through imagination rather than the more laborious methods of logical reasoning. Soon after the publication of *Browning*, Jones was elected to the Professorship of Logic and English in the University of St. Andrews – the post vacated by Andrew Seth, who had taken the chair of Logic and Metaphysics at Edinburgh. Thus, in the autumn of 1891, Jones once again moved from Wales to Scotland.

In many ways, the three years that Jones spent at St. Andrews registered as hardly more than an episode. A number of important friendships were, however, made. Jones developed a life-long friendship with Ronald Mungo-Ferguson – 'a rising young leader of Scottish Liberalism in the House of Commons' – and through this connection, met and campaigned for Asquith, who was then member for the Fifeshire burghs.[39] Academically, this time saw Jones beginning to engage with questions about the role and nature of philosophical systems, which he considered in his inaugural lecture.[40] The pass course that Jones had to teach included an introduction to psychology, work on deductive and inductive logic, the theory of judgement and an elementary course on metaphysics, which was mainly comprised of Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge*. With the honours class, he read and discussed Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* and Plato's *Theaetetus*.[41] In his own work, he sought to address the problem of the relation of thought to reality. He was much engrossed in the study of F. H. Bradley's writings; and made his own contributions to the subject, first with a lengthy essay for *Mind*, and then, more substantially, with

---

[37] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.197; Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.38, 43.
[38] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.40.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp.54-5.
[40] Published as 'The Nature and Aims of Philosophy', *Mind*, NS II (1893), pp.160-73.

his work on Lotze.[42]

When Jones was entering into his third year at St. Andrews, Edward Caird, upon accepting the Mastership of Balliol College, Oxford, wrote to him to ask if he would 'care for an old pair of boots'.[43] There was scarcely any doubt that Jones did. Caird's moral philosophy chair in Glasgow was for him, as Hetherington put it, 'the office which above all others in the world he would have coveted for himself'.[44] In a letter to Thomas Edward Ellis, Jones described the position as 'the most important in Scotland in my line, with its 218 students, this year', and expressed his desire 'to see a Welsh flag flying in my old University, for the first time in History, amongst the rest'.[45] In under three months, Jones completed his second book, which presented a critical philosophical analysis of the logic of the German philosopher Lotze. *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze* was reckoned to be Jones' 'most noteworthy philosophical publication', and served to strengthen his academic reputation as a philosopher.[46] In June 1894, he was elected Caird's successor to the Professorship of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow.

This appointment placed Jones in a position of influence. His most enduring service was undoubtedly to be found in his teaching, although his activities ranged far beyond the university in this period of his life. Jones was responsible for two moral philosophy classes at Glasgow: a large ordinary or pass class, and a smaller honours class. With the former, Jones ranged widely over the field of moral philosophy, aiming, as Hetherington put it, 'to give his students some kind of clear and coherent *Weltanschauung*'; with the latter, his method was more focused and based on specific philosophical texts which dealt with particular problems in metaphysics, including recent works such as Bradley's *Appearance and Reality*, Bosanquet's *Principle of Individuality and Value* and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, along with classics such as Aristotle's *Ethics*, Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*.[47] Most the students who passed through his classroom were destined for the professional life, and from their number many

---

[41] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.53.
[42] H. Jones, 'Idealism and Epistemology', *Mind*, NS II (1893), pp.289-306, 457-72; H. Jones, *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze: The Doctrine of Thought* (Glasgow, 1895).
[43] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.221.
[44] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.71.
[45] NLW, Thomas Edward Ellis Papers, f.1069: Jones to T. E. Ellis, 7 Jan. 1894.
[46] Morris-Jones, 'Life and Philosophy of Sir Henry Jones', p.9.

leaders of national life in the succeeding generation would be drawn.[48] One of this number was Thomas Jones – later Cabinet Secretary to Lloyd George – whose relationship with Jones was to be deep, enduring and significant.

Apart from teaching, Jones also took an active part in the discussion of university business, and acted to influence the direction of university policy. One of his key concerns was that there should be better provision for the study of moral and social sciences, believing that an extension to the scientific study of psychological, economic, and political fact would yield profit to the moral philosopher as well as social practitioners and statesmen. As a group of earnest students had asked for a class in which civic problems could be dealt with, Jones took it upon himself in 1905 to raise a sufficient sum from some of his city friends to endow a lectureship in political philosophy for a number of years. In 1910, the lectureship was provided with a permanent endowment as a memorial to Edward Caird.[49] Jones also took an active interest in the Glasgow Students' Settlement movement, which followed the lines of Toynbee's movement in London, and found opportunities to express his commitment to the study of civic problems outside the university. In addition to eagerly preaching the cause of good citizenship to the various educational, political and even business organisations that invited him to address them in Glasgow, Jones also founded a Civic Society to serve as an agency of civic education. The Society was to be a forum where opinions of every shade – 'from the reddest Communism to the tamest view of the daily darg', as Jones put it – could be discussed with the aim of discovering 'more truth'.[50]

Other activities took him beyond Glasgow and Scotland. From 1906-12, he undertook the duties of the Hibbert Lectureship in Metaphysics at Manchester College, Oxford, travelling between Glasgow and Oxford once a fortnight during the two winter terms.[51] The sphere of his influence, however, was soon to extend even further, as Jones took up an invitation to give a

---

[47] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.76, 80.
[48] *Ibid.*, p.72; NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. IV, f.146/1: Draft of Jones' unpublished final chapter for *Old Memories*.
[49] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.87.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp.88-9.
[51] *Ibid.*, p.110.

series of university extension lectures in Sydney during his long vacation of 1908, and ended up lecturing also in Melbourne, Adelaide, Hobart, and Brisbane, to enthusiastic audiences. In Brisbane, he had occasion to exercise an almost political influence when he spoke strongly on the need for the foundation and endowment of a University of Queensland: this university was established by the state in less than a year's time after his visit.[52] In 1912, Jones visited the United States as part of a company of European professors invited to participate in the inauguration of the Rice Institute, a new university in Texas. Jones delivered three lectures on 'Philosophical Landmarks' at the Institute, and made a point of encouraging it to make provision for the study of human as well as natural sciences.[53] Most of Jones' writing during this period took the form of articles on ethical, political and religious subjects, for which he found a conducive forum in the pages of L. P. Jacks' *Hibbert Journal*, founded in 1902. Under Jacks' editorship, the journal quickly became an important liberalising influence in the religious and social thought of the day. Jones contributed regularly and served on its editorial board.[54] In 1909, Jones published his Sydney lectures as *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, and the following year saw the publication of *The Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, which was a collection of his essays and addresses on various matters of social and ethical interest.

In 1913, a cancerous growth was discovered in Jones' left jaw and a major operation was required to remove it. Although he made a rapid recovery from this operation and was able to resume many of his old interests, the pace of his life, according to Hetherington, was definitely slower. He was more readily tired by his work, and had to conserve his strength.[55] With the onset of the First World War, however, the demands that were made on him in the public sphere increased. To help with the government's recruiting campaign, Jones was called upon to make various addresses and appeals to the civilian population in the summer and autumn of 1915. In particular, he gave a long series of public speeches in South Wales, where the war effort seemed to be threatened by increasing industrial unrest and difficulty. According to Hetherington, Jones'

---

[52] *Ibid.*, pp.106-8.
[53] *Ibid.*, p.113.
[54] *Ibid.*, pp.98-9.
[55] *Ibid.*, pp.117, 120.

speeches tended to be more like 'a series of lectures on moral and political philosophy' than orthodox recruiting spiels, as he sought to make his appeal on grounds of ethical principle.[56] This ethical appeal, however, was strengthened by personal example: Jones' three sons had all joined the military effort by the winter of 1915.

In 1917, on Lloyd George's instruction, Thomas Jones wrote to the Principal of the University of Glasgow to ask that Jones be released from teaching duties in order that he might participate in the series of War Aims lectures, organised to keep up civilian morale throughout the country. At the time, Jones was also serving as a member of the Royal Commission on University Education in Wales and the Reconstruction Committee on Adult Education.[57] These activities occupied Jones fully until the spring of 1918, when the loss of his youngest son in battle brought him back to Glasgow. In July 1918, Jones was asked by the then director of the Y.M.C.A.'s educational work with the army in France, Sir Henry Hadow, to write a textbook on citizenship for use in the army classes. Jones' *The Principles of Citizenship*, which was published in 1919,[58] did not – in his own view, and in the views of others – conform to the usual conception of a textbook. In a letter to Hetherington, Jones admitted, 'Ordinary Handbook, it is not. I can't and won't aspire to that.'[59] The book developed the concerns that he had articulated in his wartime lectures and was written in six weeks, before Jones was due to sail to America as part of the British Educational Mission to the universities of the United States in September 1918.[60]

While working on *The Principles of Citizenship*, Jones had received an invitation to stand as the University of Wales' first Member of Parliament, following the 1918 Reform Act. Although he believed the office would have provided a useful platform from which to advance the cause of educational reform that he held dear, considerations of health and other claims prevented him from accepting the invitation.[61] In early 1919, Jones' cancer recurred and it was clear from then that there would be no cure for it. Jones, however, continued to teach his classes at Glasgow. At

---

[56] *Ibid.*, p.123.
[57] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.25: T. Jones to Principal MacAlister, 25 Aug. 1917; Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.127.
[58] H. Jones, *The Principles of Citizenship* (London, 1919).
[59] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. III, f.70/2: Jones to H. J. W. Hetherington, 27 Aug. 1918.
[60] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.135.
[61] *Ibid.*, pp.137-8.

the end of 1920, he was unanimously appointed to succeed Arthur Balfour in the Gifford Lectureship in natural theology, just as his health took another turn for the worse. Jones saw the election as an occasion to undertake the last great work of his life and, through much pain and discomfort, wrote and delivered his Gifford lectures, *A Faith that Enquires*, in the university session of 1920-21. Jones' final lecture ended with a message of gladness and trust, and it was on this note that his teaching work came to a close.[62]

On the New Year Honours List of 1912, Jones had been given a knighthood that he did not particularly welcome: 'it is the reward for mediocrity', he wrote to Gilbert Murray.[63] Shortly before his death, however, Jones was made a member of the Order of the Companions of Honour. He had 'never heard of this honour', but hoped that the addition of his name to the list would not 'lower its value to anybody else'.[64] As Jones was unable to receive the insignia personally from the king in London, it was sent to him on 21 January 1922, with the hope that he 'may live long to enjoy the Honour which no one more worthily deserves'.[65] This, however, was not to be, as Jones passed away early in the morning on 4 February 1922.

II. Effects of Social Context and Personal Experience

In *Old Memories*, Jones wrote of the extent to which his personality had been permanently shaped by the social influences of his boyhood. He believed that 'the elements introduced into [his] very being when [he] was a growing boy and youth' were constitutive elements of his personality. 'I often feel,' he maintained, 'as I move amongst my students and my colleagues, that the little village shoemaker and Calvinistic Methodist chapel-goer has still his part in what I say and do.'[66] To some extent, this portrayal of himself may have stemmed from Jones' commitment to a social philosophy that attached a prominent role to social experience in the development of the individual's mind and personality. For him, the individual will was 'saturated with that portion of the world which has been the object of [the individual's] experience'. As he put it,

'The country in which I was born, the father and mother which were given to

---

[62] *Ibid.*, pp.141, 143, 150.
[63] Bodleian Library [henceforth BOD], MS Gilbert Murray 19, f.102: Jones to G. Murray, 8 Jan. 1912.
[64] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.132: Jones to D. Lloyd George, 18 Dec. 1921.
[65] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.136: D. Lloyd George to Jones, 21 Jan. 1922.
[66] Jones, *Old Memories*, pp.47-8.

> me, the hearth, the school, the college, the religious community, the secular sphere, the stream of changing circumstances, the response that I have made to them from time to time, are they not at this moment living propensities, agencies active in my personality? Without these, without any others, what would my personality be, but a name or nothingness?'[67]

To Jones, therefore, his personal experiences were an important part of his social development. In this section, it will be argued that the particular way in which he internalised his own subjective experiences provided him with a set of values and concerns, as well as a particular approach, within which he developed his philosophical and political ideas. Insofar as these explain at least some of the assumptions to which Jones held fast, they are important with regard to establishing some of the constraints on his ideas. In connection with the idea of citizenship, Jones' understanding of working-class respectability and his foundational belief in religion – both born of his early life-experience – served as fixed points of reference, conditioning the direction and emphasis of his whole approach.

The Tradition of Working-Class Respectability

An important part of Jones' conceptualisation of citizenship was based on his belief in a particular form of working-class citizenship. This, in turn, depended upon his particular understanding of the tradition of working-class respectability. The facts of Jones' success in the 'scramble' for education may be interpreted as a classic example of the possibilities for upward social mobility open to members of the artisanal working class. His revulsion at the lack of 'respectability' displayed by his workmates, and his own desire for a 'respectable' future, placed Jones within a working-class tradition that championed the notion of self-improvement and progress. Yet, this picture is, to some extent, complicated by Jones' response to his rise. In many respects, Jones seemed not to have considered his progress in terms of social mobility, the very notion of which seemed somewhat irrelevant to his outlook. Rather, he seemed to have regarded it more as an expansion of experience, and a widening of opportunities, than as a simple elevation in social class. His attitude was that 'if [he] could not be a professor, [he] could be a minister; if [he] could not be a minister, [he] could be an elementary school teacher…; and if [he]

---

[67] H. Jones, 'The Immanence of God and the Individuality of Man', Provincial Assembly Lecture, Manchester (Manchester, 1912), p.32.

could not get a school, [he] could make shoes'.[68]

The notion of 'respectability' that deeply influenced parts of the working class in the nineteenth century was a complicated concept. As Brian Harrison has pointed out, it is 'misleading to see working-class respectability simply as involving emulation of conduct prevalent within another class'.[69] Rather the notion involved more of a redefinition of the concept. 'Whereas respectability at first denoted a position of established social standing, reinforced by the appropriate amount of property,' Harrison suggested, 'its implications for morality assumed increasing significance, and eventually came to describe a life-style which could be observed at all levels.'[70] Jones' idea of working-class respectability clearly reflected this understanding. In his characterisation of his family as 'poor but respectable', a sense of morality and a certain 'goodness of heart' was emphasised as central elements in the behaviour of both his parents. Jones' assessment of his father, in particular, encapsulated the idea that moral goodness counted for more than social prominence as an expression of respectability. According to Jones, his father was 'not in the least intellectual; he read slowly and with some difficulty and stumbled at the long words, and he read very little; he was not a social leader in any direction, nor sought to be'.[71] In Jones' mind, however, his moral virtues made him 'the most beautiful sample of gentle humanity in all the land'.[72]

For Jones, therefore, respectability was not a given status that could be objectively defined, but a quality that could be achieved by every individual endowed with moral resources. It is in this light that Jones' revulsion at the lack of 'respectability' in the behaviour of his workmates needs to be seen. A commitment to respectability, according to Harrison, 'often required the working man to express disgust with members of his own order', but this tended not to be based on a rejection of the class as a whole.[73] Although it was originally a belief that the shoemaking trade offered no respectable future to him that motivated his pursuit of educational

---

[68] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.152.
[69] B. Harrison, 'Traditions of Respectability in British Labour History' in *Peaceable Kingdom: Stability and Change in Modern Britain* (Oxford, 1982), p.176.
[70] *Ibid.*, p.157.
[71] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.44.
[72] *Ibid.*, p.43.
[73] Harrison, 'Traditions of Respectability', p.176.

advancement, the moral example of his father nevertheless remained the basis for his profound belief in an ideal of working-class citizenship. In a dedication, Jones described him as 'a good citizen, one who was first pure, then peaceable, gentle, and easy to be intreated, full of mercy and good fruits, without partiality, and without hypocrisy';[74] and he seemed to conceive of all working men as being capable of attaining to this measure. It is in this light that his particular combination of an alleged sympathy for the working class, and an unbending faith in the 'purity of [the working-man's] citizenship',[75] needs to be seen. As he readily admitted,

> 'The memory of my father comes up when I try to measure the value of the services and the pay of the workers. But my sympathy for the employer and capitalist is always slow to flow; and I find myself wondering what *their* wages would be were they paid according to the value of their social services. Day by day I find new evidence that to be fair all round is beyond my power.'[76]

According to Hetherington, it was his father who instilled in Jones his 'profound belief in the beneficence of duty, and in the unfailing spiritual good that comes from the simple doing of what is next to hand'.[77] This belief was central to the way in which Jones developed his ideas of citizenship.

Jones' memories of his early experience within an artisanal community also formed the basis for his claim to a deep personal affinity with the working class. In a letter to Sidney Webb, written in 1918, Jones claimed to 'belong to [the working class]'. He continued, 'I think I belong to it more fully than when I worked at my trade side by side with my father'.[78] What Jones meant by this rather strange assertion repays closer analysis. To some extent, it reflected his deep aversion to '"class" interpreted in terms of economics'.[79] In making the claim that, as a professor, he belonged to the working class more than he did as a shoemaker, Jones seems to be suggesting a redefinition of the conceptual boundaries of 'class', such that the emphasis fell away from the idea of positions on an economic scale.

Why Jones should see himself as belonging 'more fully', however, suggests a further

---

[74] Jones, *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p.v.
[75] H. Jones, 'The Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', *Hibbert Journal*, X (1911-12), p.165.
[76] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.48.
[77] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.4-5.
[78] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.45: Jones to S. Webb, 29 Mar. 1918.
[79] *Ibid.*

consideration. It may be argued that it was only as a professor of moral philosophy that Jones saw himself as coming to a full understanding the nature of the moral conditions of working class citizenship, as represented by his father's ideal, although not intellectualised, conduct. To some extent, Jones may have intended this strange assertion to reflect his deep aversion to "'class" interpreted in terms of economics'.[80] His claim that, as a professor, he belonged to the working class more than he did as a shoemaker, may also have been an articulation of his belief that it was chiefly through internal, psychic developments that individuals found their place within the context of society. However, there can be little doubt that Jones' conception of the working class at this stage was highly idealised. The world of the self-employed rural artisan that he knew intimately was very far removed from that of the vast majority of the working class in the early twentieth century, and he had little knowledge of the life of the industrial, factory-based working class that was becoming more dominant in Wales at the time. According to Hetherington, Jones 'felt deeply the loss of the ethical and intellectual opportunity that the working man suffered by the transition from small- to large-scale industry'.[81] As he saw it, however, it was only by recreating this opportunity within the industrial setting that the life of the urban working class could be improved.

The extent to which Jones' memories represented an idealised reconstruction of the 'working-class community' cannot therefore be overlooked. Jones saw his purpose to be that of 'helping Wales to good workmen'.[82] This could only be achieved, in his view, through a high-minded appeal to the ethical nature of the working class, and the provision of an education that would free the working man to 'think' about the 'great things of life'. Appealing to the working class to act solely in terms of its own economic and political interests, as Jones alleged to be the aim of some Labour leaders, was an insult to the working man and no less than a corruption of his citizenship.[83] It confined the working man's mind to 'bickerings about Capital and Labour',

---

[80] *Ibid.*
[81] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.11.
[82] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.10: Jones to T. Jones, 26 Feb. 1916.
[83] Jones, 'Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', p.178. It should be noted that Labour leaders such as Ramsay MacDonald, Philip Snowden, George Lansbury and Arthur Henderson would probably have agreed with the bulk of Jones' arguments, but Jones seemed to have regarded the entire Labour Party in this unfavourable light. It is unclear if he was merely mistaken in his understanding or if he

which Jones seemed to regard as being inconsequential; and limited the working man's political activities to 'wrangling meetings at pit mouths', which appalled him.[84] The example that Jones probably had in mind was that of Keir Hardie in Merthyr Tydfil. In a letter to his son written in 1912, he wrote that Hardie had been 'lowering the tone of my countrymen down there, aggravating labour difficulties and teaching the working man that unlimited greed and aggression which were the monopoly of the landowners a wee while ago'.[85] On these grounds, Jones regarded the political use of 'class', as a social category, as a taint on 'the very spirit of citizenship'.[86] The working man, Jones maintained, knew himself to be 'the citizen of a great State', and believed the State to be 'the common guardian of all just interests'.[87] 'I stand out and out for the honesty and the rectitude and the intelligence of the working men of this country;' he wrote to Munro-Ferguson, 'they are the least prejudiced class I know; and <u>that</u> is why I am as angry with the Labour Leaders for prostituting them, as I am with Rosebery for his implicit distrust of them.'[88]

Jones was not blind to the fact that society was stratified into classes; however, with his understanding of respectability, he was committed to the view that an individual's class position could have no bearing on his character and moral worth. As such, he regarded class as being largely irrelevant, if not essentially contrary to the spirit of, the concept of citizenship. Boucher and Vincent have referred to a degree of élitism in Jones' outlook, at a time when fears of democracy and the widening electorate were commonplace, and élitist rule was advocated even by some socialist groups. For Jones, however, the 'élite' in question was 'neither aristocratic, nor the most knowledgeable or technically able, but rather the most ethical'.[89] As Jones put it, 'The hammer and the chisel, the daily task and the simple life are as good teachers in citizenship as the counting-house of the merchant, and better than the easy plenty of the undisciplined rich.'[90] As

---

was pursuing a deliberate agenda in pushing this line.

[84] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.27: Jones to T. Jones, 3 Oct. 1917.

[85] Jones to J. W. Jones, 19 Nov. 1912, in Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.229.

[86] H. Jones, 'The Ethical Demand of the Present Political Situation', *Hibbert Journal*, VIII (1909-10), p.539-40.

[87] Jones, 'Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', p.177.

[88] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.175/2: Jones to R. Munro-Ferguson, 6 Apr. 1910.

[89] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.113.

[90] Jones, 'Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', p.165.

Harrison has noted, the idea of respectability should be seen as 'an attitude of mind which deeply influenced those who rose, remained stationary, or fell'.[91] In this way, the tradition of working-class respectability exercised a strong and lasting influence over the shape of Jones' thinking.

NONCONFORMIST RELIGION

Another significant and defining influence on Jones' thought was his adherence to a strong religious faith. Although he renounced 'the legal and vindictive creed in which [he] had been nurtured' when he became a moral philosopher,[92] Jones nevertheless maintained that 'the essentials of [his] faith' – the hypothesis without which the world would be, to him, 'a wild chaos', and the life of man 'a tragical blunder' – remained the same.[93] Indeed, the singular assuredness of Jones' philosophical belief in the existence and goodness of the 'Absolute' cannot be fully understood unless it is placed within the context of the milieu of religious conviction in which he grew up.

Jones' family were members of the Calvinist Methodist denomination, an 'offshoot' of Methodism that had established itself particularly in Wales.[94] His maternal great-grandparents were, he believed, amongst the earliest dissenters in Wales who, having felt 'the power of the things of the spirit', were wholly dedicated to their religion.[95] His mother, as a result, was 'deeply religious', and the effect of a religious mind, as Jones saw it, revealed itself in her imaginative, aesthetic and intuitive powers. More importantly, however, the family's commitment to a Calvinistic religion also presented itself in terms of a capacity to look 'beyond' the immediate realities of ordinary experience. 'There was intuition, passion, yearning after perfection, imagination of what the best might be, and the pursuit of it,' Jones wrote of his maternal heritage, 'and the soul was so dedicated to the things "beyond", that *this* life, with its opportunities and chances and even ethical obligations, was in the background'.[96]

Welsh social reformers, such as Daniel Lleufer Thomas, tended to regard the 'other-

---

[91] Harrison, 'Traditions of Respectability', p.176.
[92] Quoted in Morris-Jones, 'The Life and Philosophy of Sir Henry Jones', p.6.
[93] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.59.
[94] See O. Chadwick, *The Victorian Church, Part II, 1860-1901* (London, 1970), p.227; R. Currie, *Methodism Divided: A Study in the Sociology of Ecumenicalism* (London, 1968), p.55.
[95] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.11.
[96] *Ibid.*, pp.16-7.

worldliness' of the Calvinist religion in Wales appeared as the main obstacle to creating a movement for social change. Because religion was 'considered as a matter of man's soul and "life hereafter," with little if any relation to the conditions of his physical existence', as the Reverend Gwilym Davies explained, '... a man could, on his way home from a fervent prayer meeting, walk through a bad slum and feel nothing of its horror'.[97] The spiritual happiness that Jones claimed his family enjoyed despite their material poverty may be considered from this perspective. Jones' personal experience of the way in which a spiritual outlook could transcend the material realities of ordinary experience gave him no reason to think that material difficulties could – and often did – make the 'good life' an unattainable ideal. His tendency to emphasise 'spiritual' rather than material considerations in his advocacy of social reform and the idea of citizenship derived its force largely from this personal conviction.

Jones' understanding of religion, however, did not remain static. Under the influence of Caird, he was led to abandon the negative narrowness of the Calvinistic doctrine in which he was brought up and to embrace instead a religious faith that emphasised God's omnipresence and universal beneficence. Whereas he had once accepted as fact a view of divine foreordination in which salvation was the sole preserve of the 'elect', Jones came to see the essential message of Christianity in terms of the immanence of God in the self-conscious minds of all human beings operating within the day-to-day world of ordinary life. According to Hetherington, Jones 'felt with special keenness the larger freedom of his later religious view', in which '*every* form of human experience could become witness to God's presence in man'.[98] Yet, although such a religious outlook may have shifted Jones' perspective towards the more immediate realities of physical existence, his belief in the immanence of God in the world did not diminish his conviction of 'the reality of a kingdom not of this world', nor of the existence of 'a good that transcended all particular and finite things'. Indeed, Jones' broader religious creed emphasised

---

[97] G. Davies, *Welsh School of Social Service, 1911-25* (Cardiff, 1925), p.4. Quoted in R. Lewis, 'The Welsh radical tradition and the ideal of a democratic popular culture' in E. F. Biagini (ed), *Citizenship and community: Liberals, radicals and collective identities in the British Isles 1865-1931* (Cambridge, 1996), p.334.
[98] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.7-9.

'the infinite friendliness of the world' through the omnipresence of God in ordinary life;[99] and although he was not unaware of the evils to be found in city slums, Jones nevertheless maintained that it was impossible to 'estimate what good might arise from such a situation'.[100] In this way, Jones' religious conviction continued to account for the 'eternal optimism' that has been seen as the characteristic sentiment in all of his work.[101]

Jones' religious disposition also affected his philosophical approach and academic style. As a philosopher, Jones did not believe that it was given to him to discover any new philosophical principle, but only to expound and perhaps to clarify the body of wisdom which he had received. Seeing idealism in religious terms, he pursued this aim with great passion and conviction. Indeed, he often seemed more of a preacher than a philosopher. An Oxford Greats man, encountering Jones in his Hibbert Lectureship, complained that idealism, to Jones, 'was not so much a theorem to be argued and expounded, as a gospel and religion to which converts must be made'.[102] Sir Harry Reichel, in his reminiscences of Jones, described him as having 'had in him an element of the Prophet';[103] and Rudolf Metz proclaimed him as the 'prophet and apostle' of Hegelianism, who 'bore it like a missionary to the farthest frontier of the Empire'.[104] The experience of a Jones lecture was described in *The Inquirer* as consisting of him

> 'flashing and scintillating with spiritual and intellectual energy, launching the rays of his own life and personality out into an intellectually unreceptive but spiritually sympathetic medium, maintaining by sheer personal radiance his hold upon an audience which his matter might have jaded and bewildered had he not himself kept them in hand and sustained an atmosphere of keenest life around them.'[105]

Jones himself seemed to be conscious that this was what he was doing: in a letter to Andrew Seth, regarding his contribution to *Essays in Philosophical Criticism*, Jones made 'a shriek to be translated into an awful appeal for *time*', because '[the] subject is not as a fire in my bones, and

---

[99] *Ibid.*, pp.8-9.
[100] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.55.
[101] *Ibid.*, p.183.
[102] Quoted in Dr. Estlin Carpenter's testimony, in Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.111.
[103] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol.4, f.122/4: H. Reichel's reminiscence of Jones.
[104] R. Metz, *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy* (London, 1938), p.302.
[105] P. H. W., 'Philosophers of the Spirit', *The Inquirer*, 25 Nov. 1905, p.749. Quoted in Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.10.

till I feel its heat I scarcely dare to prophesy'.[106] These were the terms in which Jones saw his academic contributions, prompting Caird to write in affectionate despair, with regard to Jones' criticisms of F. H. Bradley and Andrew Seth: 'Can't you philosophise without "fectin"?'[107]

Yet, Jones seemed also to be aware of the dangers of an excess of passion being obvious in one's work. Reporting on L. T. Hobhouse's *Progress and Reaction* (eventually published as *Democracy and Reaction*) for Macmillan, Jones wrote, 'The passion in it is quite right, but it requires to be made to walk quite soberly. The deeper the passion, the more grey should be its garb.'[108] In particular, Jones believed strongly in the need for balance and proportion in criticism, and an ability to treat rival theories without distortion and dogmatism. The achievement of these ends depended on thorough-going scholarship and a 'scientific' approach. Yet, Jones also seemed to value originality, sincerity and 'freshness'. He was often dismissive of what he called 'second-hand' knowledge, and critical of analyses that merely repeated 'the commonplaces of popular science'.[109]

This combination of scholarly caution over excessive passion and dogmatism with a desire for originality of thought encapsulates Jones' intellectual approach. Jones' conviction was that philosophy, at any time, was, and could be, no more than a 'hypothesis'. In one of his earlier articles, he advanced his belief that the 'discovery of a valid method has been too often confused with the establishment of an ultimate and final system of philosophy'. He ventured to think, however, 'that no such system existed; and... that a valid, ultimate, fixed system of philosophical doctrine is radically impossible'. To expect such a consummation to the philosopher's endeavour, Jones held, 'betrays a fundamental misapprehension of the nature of the metaphysical science.'[110] Yet, while it seemed to Jones 'fruitless to search for any general proof of the validity of a philosophical hypothesis or system', he did not waver in the belief that there *was* a need for some 'hypothesis', or philosophical system, to interpret the world as a whole. The validity of such a

---

[106] Jones to A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, 1 June 1882, in Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.181-2.
[107] E. Caird to Jones, 28 Aug. 1893, in H. Jones and J. H. Muirhead, *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird* (Glasgow, 1921), p.191.
[108] British Museum Library, Macmillan Archives, Part I, Readers' Reports, Third Series, Vol. MCCI, f.124. [Chadwyck-Healy microfilm reel 7]
[109] See, for example, Macmillan Archives, Vol. MCLXIX, ff.86, 108, 122-3; Vol. MCLXXII, ff.252-3; Vol. MCLXXIII, f.165; Vol. MCLXXV, f.23. [Chadwyck-Healey microfilm reel 3]

conception would depend on its 'power... to interpret and illumine the various regions and facets of human experience.'[111]

Jones did not conceive of philosophy 'as a technical discipline of the schools, nor as a succession of systems of abstract thought, each in turn professing a rounded completeness and refuted and overturned by the one which follows'. Philosophy was 'an attitude of mind, rather than a doctrine'; it was 'the experience of the world becoming reflective, and endeavouring to comprehend itself'.[112] Such a conception informed his approach to his teaching. A professor of moral philosophy, Jones argued,

> 'must above all else inculcate in his pupils that attitude of mind which we call "scientific". This means, amongst other things, that whatever value he may set upon right conduct, however convinced he may be that right conduct can flow only from right principles, he must treat such principles as hypotheses, deserving of respect only on so far as they seem to account for or explain facts.'[113]

What Jones called a "scientific" attitude of mind consisted mainly of an attitude of rational enquiry: an ability to reconcile reason and experience in the search for 'moral good', or 'right conduct'. He opposed the notion that natural science should have 'the monopoly of the use of reason', and saw the 'hypotheses' of philosophy as needing to be tested by reason, as scientific hypotheses were.[114] However, Jones' understanding of the term 'scientific' was particular and limited. He always 'made the whole the starting point, not the particular',[115] assumed a general hypothesis to be tested and tended to presuppose an underlying unity of social and moral facts. Insofar as this underlying unity was for Jones essentially spiritual, religion formed the foundation upon which Jones built his idealist edifice. It came closest to being the 'end' to which his philosophy aspired, and seems central to any understanding of Jones' apparently unwavering belief in 'the good' and the morality of the state, and the extent to which he emphasised an ethical basis for citizenship.

It was not, however, only at the metaphysical level that Jones' religion may be seen to

---

[110] Jones, 'Nature and Aims of Philosophy', p.161.
[111] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.157.
[112] H. Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed* (Glasgow, 1909), p.7.
[113] H. Jones and J. H. Muirhead, *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird* (Glasgow, 1921), pp.52-3.
[114] Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, p.18.

shape his political agenda. As a Welsh nonconformist advocating disestablishment, Jones had a particular view of the role of religion in the institutional structure of the Welsh nation. According to Boucher and Vincent, he believed Wales to be a religious nation whose politics was inspired by its religious character.[116] In Jones' view, nonconformist chapels were an important part of Welsh civic life and identity, and he opposed the notion of an established church on the grounds that it limited the development of the people and their sense of citizenship. For Jones, the Welsh Sunday School, by bringing together members of widely different ages and experiences to discuss a wide range of religious and ethical issues, served as 'an educational centre of first-rate importance in Welsh life'.[117]

At a meeting in Corwen in August 1919, he urged an alliance between the university and churches of all denominations in Wales, to carry out the work of adult education in rural areas, where the power of churches and chapels was greatest. Jones believed that such an alliance would not only serve to open to the university 'the channels of educational demand and the agencies of educational effort' in constituencies that were otherwise difficult to reach, but also stimulate the life of the churches through contact with what Jones saw as 'another of the great spiritual forces in the nation'.[118] Based on his personal experience, Jones saw the role of religion in politics in institutional as well as metaphysical terms. In both respects, however, his religious outlook shaped particular social understandings that were crucial to the development of Jones' views on citizenship.

III. Politics and Public Affairs

Speaking at Jones' funeral in 1922, his colleague Macneile Dixon was 'persuaded that [Jones] would have preferred to have it said of him that he was a great citizen rather than a great philosopher'. As he put it, Jones saw knowledge as 'a pleasurable pursuit, not for its rewards, nor for its own sake, but rather as a means whereby the welfare of the world might be advanced –

---

[115] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. IV, f.121/2: E. H. Mahler's reminiscence of Jones.
[116] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.139.
[117] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.7.
[118] *Ibid.*, p.142.

that was his philosophical creed.'[119] The development of Jones' views on citizenship needs therefore to be seen in relation to a practical political context. Jones believed in a form of philosophical idealism that was intended as a practical approach to life, rather than an abstruse philosophy. By relating his academic discipline to the society in which he operated, he actively sought to make idealism a social and political influence. In this section, the nature of this influence, and the way in which Jones' political involvement and engagement with particular public issues shaped his definition of citizenship, will be considered.

Liberal Involvement

To a large extent, Jones' politics was influenced by his Welsh origins. Welsh nationalism was traditionally associated with issues of land reform, temperance, church disestablishment and educational provision. Between 1868 and 1922, according to Kenneth Morgan, these problems were acknowledged as significant political issues, and the 'Welsh question' was emerging as a political reality.[120] The Liberal party played a major part in this process, particularly through its connection with the issue of church disestablishment. In the general election of 1885, for example, the Liberals captured 30 of the 34 seats in Wales, with all but one of the new members of parliament committed to disestablishment. Thus, after 1886, Morgan suggests, Liberalism emphasised 'the fact that Wales was a nation, that the Church had for many centuries been alienated from national life, and that the democratically-expressed wishes of the Welsh electorate for disestablishment should therefore be heeded at Westminster'.[121]

As a Welsh nonconformist, Jones' attachment to the Liberal party may be traced partly to this commitment to disestablishment. In 1906, he was one of four nonconformists called to serve on the Royal Commission on the Church of England and Other Religious Bodies in Wales and Monmouthshire, appointed by the Liberal government to inquire into the spiritual provision made available by churches of all denominations in Wales. Jones did not enjoy his experience on the commission, finding what he described as 'an atmosphere of distrust, suspicion, and pious

---

[119] Quoted in *Ibid.*, p.155.
[120] K. O. Morgan, *Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922* (Cardiff, 1963), p.viii.
[121] K. O. Morgan, *Freedom or Sacrilege? A History of the Campaign for Welsh Disestablishment* (Church in Wales Publications, 1966), p.13.

malice' intolerable.[122] After six months he, along with two other nonconformist members, resigned from the commission. For Jones, however, disestablishment was rooted in a wider concern for Welsh autonomy. Thus, although the Liberal party's commitment to church disestablishment gradually waned in the 1910s, Jones continued to believe that it was through the Liberal party that Wales would win the freedom to deal with its own problems. It was on these grounds that Jones' Liberal affiliation was forged.

His long-lasting relationship with the Liberal party was also based on a network of personal friendships which included such key political figures as his compatriot Lloyd George, R. Munro-Ferguson, H. A. L. Fisher, H. H. Asquith and R. B. Haldane. These personal relationships were significant in two respects: on the one hand, such friendships give an indication of the channels along which it was possible for Jones' influence to flow; on the other hand, they also motivated, at least to some extent, his more active political participation. For example, Jones' interest in the conflict between the Lords and the Commons in 1909-10 was stirred by the fact that it was occasioned by Lloyd George's budget proposals. Jones took a vigorous part in the two general elections of 1910, and delivered public speeches in Leith, Carlisle and Greenock in December.[123] Similarly, his active membership of Rosebery's Liberal League, and his alignment with the Liberal Imperialists,[124] grew out of his friendships with Munro-Ferguson, Haldane and Asquith.

This particular alignment, however, also defined Jones politically. The 'Liberal Imperialist' label is a confusing one, insofar as it incorporated those seeking a positive social policy, along with those reflecting a right-wing imperialist sentiment. Jones' position within this grouping needs thus to be more closely examined. With regard to social reform policies, Jones was connected with the progressive, New Liberal wing of Liberal Imperialism. According to Hetherington, while Jones maintained a strong conviction of the 'social healthfulness of the individual enterprise' based around the family as a social unit, he 'believed thoroughly in using the resources and even the powers of the State for the provision of common services and the

---

[122] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.95.
[123] *Ibid.*, p.93.

fulfilment of ends... of common concern'.[125] As a fervent advocate of Free Trade, moreover, he concurred with the Liberal Imperialists' adherence to this principle as the basis for social reform policies, in reaction to Chamberlain's policy of Tariff Reform. Jones, however, remained committed to the Free Trade doctrine throughout his life. The implication of Lloyd George in the protectionism of the Coalition Government – which resulted in the Safeguarding of Industries Act of 1921, with its 33½ per cent tariff on certain goods – made Jones 'awfully angry', and was the only of Lloyd George's 'sins' that he could not forgive or justify, although he continued to maintain an affection for the prime minister.[126] Jones' commitment to Free Trade was partly the result of an imperial sentiment, as he saw Free Trade as a moral bond by which the British Empire was held together. Yet, Jones' position within the Liberal Imperialists on the crucial question of 'social imperialism' was somewhat ambivalent. He was strongly opposed to a materialistic conception of Empire and agreed with critics such as Hobhouse as to the debilitating effects of this aspect of militaristic imperialism. Jones, however, believed that events such as the Boer War, 'while undeniably reflecting elements of brutality and economic greed, was at the same time a war to restore freedom to a conquered people and strengthen the moral bond of the Empire'.[127] It was on these moral grounds that Jones sought to defend this imperialist action.

Jones believed that the Liberal party needed a 'passion for the public good' with which to approach the advocacy of great social reforms.[128] Writing to Munro-Ferguson in 1898, he had argued that 'the Liberals must be possessed by ideals'; and the party should not let itself be 'galvanised' into enthusiasm for positive legislation, but should 'keep strictly to the criticism of the other side, till an ideal rises in its usual inevitable and spontaneous way and possesses the people'.[129] He put his case more lucidly in an article published in the *New Liberal Review* in 1902: 'The wise man,' he wrote,

---

[124] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.143.
[125] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.91.
[126] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.125: Jones to T. Jones, 10 Sept. 1921; f.128: Jones to T. Jones, 30 Nov. 1921.
[127] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, pp.146-7.
[128] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.94: Jones to R. Ferguson, 22 Jan. 1901.
[129] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.89/2: Jones to R. Munro-Ferguson, 8 Feb. 1898.

> 'whether engaged upon his private affairs or on those of the nation, guides his conduct by principles; and principles are not fixed policies, but living things, which respond to the call of circumstances in the very act of ruling them.'

Thus, according to Jones, the Liberal Party should 'keep itself and its projects in more intimate contact with the moving life of the nation', and confront the difficulties of putting the ideals of public welfare into practice.[130] The means that Jones advocated for the achievement of this was characteristic of his idealistic faith in the 'public mind' of society:

> 'It seems to me that our Liberal statesmen must think before the public, and teach the public to think on these great questions. They must not merely mention great subjects, but dwell upon them... If they did this with regard to the graver social problems of the day, they would deepen the public interest in these questions, as well as inform the public mind.'[131]

While Jones clearly did not shy away from taking a public part in political struggles and identifying himself politically with what he saw as just causes,[132] he was clear about the distinction that had to exist between the professional politician and the political philosopher. Although he was adamant that becoming a professor did not mean giving up any of what he called 'the rights of good citizens' to speak on political questions,[133] he was of the opinion that whereas 'violent alternations of opinion' on the part of the politician were 'pardonable', the philosopher had to eschew inflamed language and any exaggeration of the issues, maintaining 'a calm mind' and 'a wide outlook'.[134] Jones was thus often critical of the partiality of politics, as well as what he saw as the sordid and crude practical compromises that political conduct often involved. In the aftermath of the First World War, he asserted:

> 'Never was [the country] more in need of upright men and honest dealing... [Lloyd?] George... is true to big ideals, every one of them and he is not selfish in a mean way; but he is unscrupulous as to how to get his ideals, and has been so long in politics that he can't be simple... Meantime we are governed not by principles but by expedients.'[135]

For Jones, general ethical principles stood at the heart of good politics, and exclusive notions of party affiliation were not central to his political ideal. As Thomas Jones noted in 1918

---

[130] H. Jones, 'How to Attain Liberal Unity', *New Liberal Review*, XXI (1902), p.339.
[131] *Ibid.*, p.342.
[132] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.5.
[133] Jones, *Old Memories*, p.182.
[134] H. Jones, 'Idealism and Politics' in *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p.183.
[135] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. III, f.122/1-2: Jones to R. Munro-Ferguson, 8 Feb. 1920.

– when the possibility that Jones should stand for the parliamentary seat of the University of Wales was being mooted – if Jones himself should become the Member of Parliament, he 'would not tie himself to the machinery of any party'.[136] Indeed, Jones often seemed deeply cynical about the very nature of parliamentary politics. Commenting in 1916 on the suggestion that Thomas Jones should enter parliament, for example, he wrote: 'Parliament is horrible except in so far as it gives a good platform on occasion and except for those few who are at the Top.'[137] In 1919, he expressed his irritation at the fact that 'nothing political at present is "frank"!'. [138] Jones' ideal conception of politics was based on personal ethical virtues rather than party affiliation, and his political contributions tended to be motivated by ethical concerns that stood above partisan considerations. Thus, although Jones' Liberal affiliation was longstanding, his political contributions were not circumscribed by party interests. The nature of Jones' political influence, and the arenas in which it found expression, may be considered in this light.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Jones' impact on politics was most notable in two areas, both of which were concerned with the promotion of a particular conception of citizenship. His main political concern – not surprisingly, given the nature of his experience with its pursuit – was education; but his contribution to special war-time activities was also significant. In an important respect, however, the main arena for Jones' influence was defined by his national identity. His contribution to educational politics, for example, was predominantly motivated by Welsh nationalistic considerations. Similarly, his particular concern with church disestablishment and class relations placed him firmly within the Welsh political context. Jones' position within the Welsh radical tradition, and the extent to which his ideas emerged out of a very localised set of concerns, cannot be overlooked.

Indeed, Jones' commitment to educational issues was primarily motivated by considerations of the situation in Wales, where he quickly gained a reputation as an energetic public speaker on behalf of the campaign for public education. While he was at Bangor, Jones

---

[136] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.34/1: T. Jones to J. C. Davies, 14 Feb. 1918.
[137] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.15: Jones to T. Jones, 9 Sept. 1916.

played an important part in bringing about and implementing the Intermediate Education Act of 1889, which established a number of intermediate schools in Welsh villages. His firm conviction that the people would respond favourably to the proposal of putting a penny on the rates to pay for the schools, and his vigorous efforts to rally support for rating provisions in Wales, helped to overcome the alleged reluctance of Welsh members of parliament to pass the Intermediate Education Bill for fear that an increased rate would infuriate their constituents.[139] In 1916, Jones was nominated to serve as a member of the Royal Commission on University Education in Wales chaired by Haldane. With regard to his contribution to the commission, there was one measure that Jones wished to lay a specific and personal claim to: '*I introduced the idea of a penny rate for university purposes*,' he asserted, in the unpublished concluding chapter of his autobiography. Universities had long had grants, usually small, from local rates; but Jones' idea was 'to get the *whole* of the area served by the Welsh University – that is, the whole of Wales – to rate itself at a penny in the pound', which would ensure that higher education in Wales would be free. Although, owing to the change in the value of money, the resulting income was not, in fact, sufficient to achieve this original aim, Jones was sure that it was 'a great step in advance', which, in being gradually incorporated in the social system, would ensure that 'as time goes on, considerations of material wealth will have less and less to do with deciding whether a man shall or shall not enter a university'.[140]

This aim encapsulated the tenets of Jones' conception of the means by which an ideal society was to be created. From the Welsh context, therefore, Jones derived a general principle of the role of education in public life. Writing to Thomas Jones in 1918, Jones implored him to secure that, during Fisher's reign as President of the Board of Education, two things 'shall be not only talked about but done': first, that 'The Citizen's Education' should be established 'on a broad and secure basis at all the Universities'; and second, that university education should be

---

[138] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.100: Jones to T. Jones, 30 Sept. 1919.
[139] See Jones, *Old Memories*, pp.179-81.
[140] Quoted in Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.127-8. The line of Jones' cross-examination of evidence given by members of the Denbighshire Local Authority to the Commission provides a sense of his keenness for the idea of a penny rate. See *Parliamentary Papers 1917-18*, Vol. XII (Royal Commission on University Education in Wales, Appendix to Second Report, Minutes of Evidence [December 1916-March 1917], Cd.8699), p.658.

'free in some of the Universities' and 'in all the great working man centres'.[141] Perhaps because education in Wales was closely related to a sense of national identity, Jones came to see education as the key to promoting the kind of citizenship he believed in. It was this conviction that made educational policy a central interest on his political agenda. When the Departmental Committee on Adult Education was established under the auspices of the Ministry of Reconstruction in 1917, Jones served as a member and took active part in the preparation of its first interim reports.[142] In 1918, he was strongly urged to stand for Parliament in the Welsh University seat and Thomas Jones was sure that '[w]hile he would not restrict himself to education, education would, undoubtedly, be his main care in the House'.[143] Indeed, education was the one issue that obliged Jones even to consider the suggestion when his personal inclination to stand was, as he put it, 'below zero'.[144] In the event, Jones did not stand for election, although his involvement in educational issues continued undiminished.

Jones' war-time political activities also reflected many of his ethical concerns and his particular conception of social community. Jones accepted the British war aims, as articulated by her leading statesmen, and believed that it was the duty of every clear-thinking citizen to help, by every means in his power, to break the German military machine. However, he also believed that the war was the result of the errors and selfishness of all nations, and Britain herself was thus not free from blame; although he did perceive, in Britain, a gradual turning of the mind towards a better light. In particular, Jones saw crude materialism as the obstacle, and the cause of the failure in international relations. The appeal of his powerful public speeches was, thus, made 'on the highest ground he could take of ethical principle'.[145] He did not want to be 'mixed up in political or economic wrangling of the usual kind'; and was convinced that the best means in his power, with regard to the conduct of the war, was to aim at 'something substantial in the way of

---

[141] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.85: Jones to T. Jones, 1918.
[142] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.132-3. See also *Parliamentary Papers 1918*, Vol. IX, pp.321-47: Ministry of Reconstruction, Adult Education Committee, 'Interim Report on Industrial and Social Conditions in relation to Adult Education'.
[143] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.34/1: T. Jones to J. C. Davies, 14 Feb. 1918.
[144] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.37: Jones to T. Jones, 1 Mar. 1918.
[145] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.123.

expounding the obligations and privileges of citizenship'.[146] Discussing the meetings he was to address in South Wales, Jones wrote to Thomas Jones: 'I am out for the world peace, for that at any cost and before such a possible permanent good of that kind, all bickerings about Capital and Labour, pacificism, etc, should be out of place and disappear.' Thus, Jones' view was that the meetings should be 'a civic or communal thing' – chaired by the mayor, with invited ministers and representations from each of the political parties, and ending with 'a resolution from the town to its own lads at the Front and to bind itself to persevere in the attempt to secure the conditions of permanent peace'.[147] On the whole, Jones was pleased with the outcome of the meetings: they strengthened his belief that it was a 'high level of ethical appeal which alone seems really to tell'.[148]

In this way, Jones' public activities seemed to support his deepest beliefs, which, in turn, informed his approach to the idealist philosophy he preached. There was evidently a close relationship between Jones' public politics and his philosophical understandings. Yet, it is important to note that it was predominantly within a Welsh context that Jones evolved his political ideas and exercised his political influence. In a recent study, Richard Lewis identified a 'loosely knit coterie of social radicals' in south Wales during the Edwardian period, who 'sought to elevate the low tastes of the masses...; to foster a sense of citizenship and equip the workers with an ability to select wise and responsible leaders; and to rekindle their spiritual and consolation of religion, through a religion conscious of its social as well as it soul-saving purposes'. Their aim was to foster a Welsh ideal of democratic popular culture which would engage with the changing politics of South Wales and contain the clash between Capital and Labour that was developing within the industrial arena. According to Lewis, Jones provided the movement with 'a philosophical underpinning for their ambitions, though his ideas were often received in an attenuated and partially understood form'.[149] It may also be argued that Jones' emphasis on the ethical basis for the citizenship of the working man was fostered by the

---

[146] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.28: Jones to T. Jones, 7 Oct. 1917.
[147] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.27: Jones to T. Jones, 3 Oct. 1917.
[148] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.41: Jones to Capt. Guest, 15 Mar. 1918.
[149] Lewis, 'The Welsh radical tradition and the ideal of a democratic popular culture', p.328.

engagement with this particular outlet for his ideas.

The prominence of Jones' ideas within this particular coterie of Welsh social radicals may be attributed to the fact that his former pupil Thomas Jones was a key figure in the movement. The extent of Jones' immediate influence on politics did not depend solely on his public interventions. Indeed, it may be argued that – in some ways – his cultivation of intimate influences and personal networks involving certain significant political actors was of greater note. In the case of Thomas Jones, Jones exercised a not insignificant amount of his influence to advance his old student's interests in an administrative position in government. In 1911, Thomas Jones had applied, at the last minute, for a post as a Welsh Insurance Commissioner.[150] Jones wrote immediately to Lloyd George, and took advantage of the fact that he would be staying at 11 Downing Street the next night to add his 'word of mouth'.[151] On 1 January 1912, Thomas Jones became the secretary of the National Health Insurance Commission (Wales), and began his long career in the civil service.[152] Thanking Jones for his efforts, Thomas Jones promised 'to try to be loyal to the inspiration of the old Moral class-room'.[153]

More importantly, he remained loyal to his old teacher, and, arguably, open to his influence. Writing to Jones about Fisher's election to the Presidency of the Board of Education in 1916, Thomas Jones admitted that he had put Fisher's name forward to Addison on the basis of all that he had heard Jones say about Fisher's quality and distinction. Fisher, therefore, owed his election to Jones, and Thomas Jones believed that Jones could 'keep him right on all main issues.'[154] Certainly, the issues raised by Fisher in his statement introducing the Education Act of 1918 to the House of Commons embodied many of Jones' ideals. For example, Fisher pointed out in his speech that 'a new way of thinking about education [had] sprung up among many of the more reflecting members of our industrial army', who did not 'want education only in order that they may become better technical workmen and earn higher wages' or to 'rise out of their own class', but 'because they know that in the treasures of the mind the can find an aid to good

---

[150] T. Jones, *Welsh Broth* (London, 1951), p.133.
[151] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.3: Jones to T. Jones, 5 Dec. 1911.
[152] Jones, *Welsh Broth*, p.134.
[153] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.5: T. Jones to Jones, 18 Dec. 1911.

citizenship, a source of pure enjoyment and a refuge from the necessary hardships of a life spent in the midst of clanging machinery in our hideous cities of toil'.[155] Jones' view of the working class and their interest in citizenship is clearly reflected in this articulation. The concern with 'the education of the whole man' and the development of 'civic spirit' through education, moreover, reflected aims that were high on Jones' agenda.[156]

To a significant degree, therefore, Jones' political influence flowed through the channels of his personal relationships. Indeed, it may be suggested that it was at this individual and personal level that Jones was most successful in shaping the political agenda of his time. Jones' personal context played an important role in determining the issues which would form the basis for his conceptualisation of citizenship. His religious background, for example, provided an indispensable spiritual foundation that dominated the very structure of his thought; and his personal experience of class and the conditions for the development of a Welsh national identity shaped the way in which he considered the social community. The extent to which Jones' personal context determined his ideological and conceptual preferences and priorities should be borne in mind as such themes are more comprehensively analysed in the course of this thesis.

---

[154] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.16: T. Jones to Jones, 10 Dec. 1916.
[155] 'Statement by Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, President of the Board of Education, introducing the Education Bill. Hansard: August 10, 1917' in J. S. Maclure, *Educational Documents: England and Wales, 1816-1963* (London, 1965), p.174.
[156] *Ibid.*, p.175.

CHAPTER THREE

T. H. MARSHALL: LIFE AND INFLUENCES

Turning now to a consideration of the way in which T. H. Marshall's personal experiences shaped his intellectual and political development, the relative lack of analysis on the subject, as compared to the range of readily available biographical material on Jones, is striking. The outlines of Marshall's biography have been sketched in a number of works. Marshall himself produced a short autobiographical article for a UNESCO journal in 1973,[1] and a few memorial articles, written by his fellow sociologists with a view to appraising Marshall's contribution to sociology, have involved attempts to connect his biography to his sociological outlook.[2] For the most part, however, these accounts have tended to be rather impressionistic in nature. Marshall's personal account of his life provided little more than a framework of the steps by which he became a sociologist, and the limits of this material is evident in the other accounts of his biography. Whereas the boundaries of Jones' personal contexts were positively marked out in his own reflections, the personal contexts within which Marshall's ideas and convictions developed are very much less defined.

The reasons for this lack of definition are, in my opinion, two-fold. Firstly, the problem rests with the availability of evidence. With the exception of his letters home from Ruhleben – the German civilian internment camp in which Marshall was held for four years during the First World War – Marshall's personal correspondence have not been preserved. The manuscript collection of Marshall's papers that has been deposited at the British Library of Political and Economic Science contains most of his unpublished writings and public lectures, but provides little by way of personal material. Yet, elements of Marshall's childhood home and family experience can be drawn out from the autobiography of Frances Partridge – a member of the Bloomsbury set and Marshall's youngest sister.[3] Similarly, W. G. Rimmer's study of the Marshalls of Leeds, as a family of prominent linen manufacturers in the nineteenth century, unexpectedly

---

[1] T. H. Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', *International Social Science Journal*, XXV (1973), pp.88-100.
[2] See, for example, A. H. Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall: Past and Present 1893-1981', *Sociology*, XVIII (1984), pp.1-18.
[3] F. Partridge, *Memories* (London, 1981; 1996).

provides a fascinating account of what may be seen as Marshall's social inheritance, through an analysis of the social relationships that defined the earlier generations of his family.[4]

More importantly, the single exception of the preservation of Marshall's Ruhleben letters does provide a full and personal account of an experience which he believed to be 'the most powerful formative experience of [his] early years'.[5] This archival source,[6] which provides important insights into the particular ways in which Marshall's experiences at Ruhleben shaped his thinking, does not appear to have been considered in any of the existing studies of Marshall. In much the same way, there appears to have been no attempt to uncover the nature of Marshall's activities and the development of his thought within the context of his involvement with the Foreign Office Research Department during the Second World War, which would have been possible through an analysis of archival evidence in the public records of the Foreign Office. By examining these sources for the first time, this chapter will shed a more precise light on the way in which Marshall's outlooks were shaped by an individual context.

The second reason for the lack of analysis given to Marshall's personal context may be traced to the particular way in which Marshall's influence has been perceived. Since he presented 'Citizenship and Social Class' as a series of lectures in Cambridge in 1949, the significance accorded to the work has undergone a transformation. Whereas it was primarily notable to sociologists in the 1950s and 1960s as an original analysis of the processes of societal conflict and integration,[7] thinkers on the Left of the political spectrum in the late 1980s and 1990s, faced with the critiques mounted by New Right theorists on the legitimacy of the welfare state and its entitlements, rediscovered it as a classic theoretical foundation upon which a defence of the welfare state could be based. In this respect, Marshall came to be seen as the 'principal theorist of the "social citizenship" idea',[8] and 'Citizenship and Social Class' as something of a canonical work. Marshall's contribution came to be defined in terms of its ideological significance, with the

---

[4] W. G. Rimmer, *Marshalls of Leeds: Flax-Spinners, 1788-1886* (Cambridge, 1960).
[5] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.89.
[6] Brotherton Library [henceforth Brotherton], Liddle Collection [henceforth LC], RUH33 'Marshall, Tom H.' [henceforth RUH33], Letters I-IV.
[7] See J. M. Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Milton Keynes, 1988), p.11.
[8] D. S. King and J. Waldron, 'Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision', *British Journal of Political Science*, XVIII (1988), p.418.

work being seen as a theoretical construct establishing a definitive articulation of the 'modern' idea of citizenship in Britain.

As a result, Marshall has become, almost invariably, the starting point for recent writers on the subject of citizenship.[9] Indeed, it may be argued that the widespread use of Marshall's conceptualisation in recent work has in fact exaggerated his significance within the discourse of citizenship in Britain. In such studies, however, the key concern is with a current interpretation of the ideas presented in 'Citizenship and Social Class'. Thus, whereas these ideas – especially Marshall's identification of social rights as a key element in the development of citizenship – have been rehearsed and analysed in great detail, the individual context for Marshall's conceptualisation of citizenship has not been seen to be relevant to the analysis. The historical contexts within which Marshall developed his ideas have tended to be overlooked as a creative factor in the conceptual process, and little attention has been paid to Marshall himself as the intellectual agent behind his ideas.

The aim of this chapter is to contextualise the development of Marshall's thought at the individual level, and to consider the role of personal preferences and priorities – derived either from long-standing emotional and intellectual commitments, or from responses to a more immediate set of circumstances operating at the level of personal experience – in the development of his ideas and convictions. This should not, in any way, be interpreted as some form of deterministic psycho-analysis. Rather, the aim is merely to flesh out the personal context behind particular ideas – using sources that range from personal interviews to previously untapped archival holdings – so that they may be analysed with due regard for some of the fixed social realities that Marshall experienced. In this way, the personal dimension of Marshall's life will be considered, in this chapter, as a factor in the shaping of his ideas on citizenship.

The chapter consists of three sections. The first presents a straightforward narrative of Marshall's life, from which a number of significant elements will then be taken up and analysed in greater detail in the next two sections. The second section considers the significance of Marshall's

---

[9] See, for example, Barbalet, *Citizenship*; chapters by B. S. Turner, B. Hindess, J. M. Barbalet, P. Saunders in Turner (ed), *Citizenship and Social Theory*; Kymlicka and Norman, 'Return of the Citizen'.

family background and his imprisonment in Ruhleben, mapping out the particular ways in which these experiences may have shaped certain intellectual understandings and emotional attachments upon which his later construction of citizenship depended. Finally, the third section of the chapter presents an analysis of Marshall's political activities, considering how these provided a context for his conceptualisation of citizenship. The significance of his involvement with Labour politics and his work for the Foreign Office Research Department during the Second World War will be examined.

I. BIOGRAPHY

Thomas Humphrey Marshall was born on 19 December 1893 in London, the fourth child and second son of a successful architect living in Bloomsbury. His father, William Cecil Marshall, came from a 'well-connected, socially elevated family'.[10] In the nineteenth century, Marshall's paternal great-grandfather had built up a fortune as a successful mill-owner in the linen industry of Leeds, and used his wealth to establish his family within the gentry society of the Lake District.[11] In her autobiography, Marshall's youngest sister, Frances Partridge, described her father as 'above all a product of Lake District culture', whose 'love for Nature in its wildest and most romantic form; ... for Wordsworthian poetry and its pantheistic outlook; for eugenics, agnosticism and the march of science; for class distinctions courteously observed' formed a dominating 'backdrop' to his children's lives.[12] Marshall's mother, Margaret, inherited a less dominating family influence. She had been one of the ten children of Archdeacon J. F. Lloyd, an Irish clergyman who had transported his whole family to New Zealand by sailing ship. Orphaned at a young age, the children were then adopted by their uncle, the Provost of Trinity College, Dublin, and grew up in Ireland.[13] Margaret Marshall, however, was a keen suffragist, and her interest in the women's movement brought about a connection with the Stracheys. Three of Lytton Strachey's sisters – Pippa, Marjorie and Mrs. Rendel – were regular visitors with regard to the cause; and through this interaction, Dick Rendel, his nephew, came to marry Marshall's eldest

---

[10] Rimmer, *Marshalls of Leeds*, p.220.
[11] See *Ibid.*, p.102.
[12] Partridge, *Memories*, p.12.
[13] *Ibid.*, p.17; R. Pinker, 'Marshall, Thomas Humphrey 1893-1981' in Lord Blake and C. S. Nicholls (eds),

sister, Judy, thus relating the Marshalls to the Stracheys.[14]

Marshall's childhood was, according to A. H. Halsey, 'one of calm, ordered and assured, if unostentatious, privilege', fostered in a home that was 'educative, not to any narrow vocation, but for the life of gentlemanly culture'.[15] Marshall himself described his childhood home as being 'typical of the higher professional classes of the period – intellectually and artistically cultured and financially well-endowed'.[16] His more literary sister Frances, however, provides details of a 'fine, old, creaking building on the corner of Bedford Square', with William Morris wallpapers and a 'beautiful L-shaped drawing room with its Adam ceiling and swinging chandeliers'.[17] In this, maids 'toiled with coal-scuttles and hot-water jugs', up and down 'the great flights of stairs'; and 'fierce and often foreign cooks raged' in the kitchen, to provide for 'a great many dinner-parties', which often involved ten courses of food and guests who included such members of the intellectual and political élite as the 'Asquiths and Ricardos..., Pollocks and Nettleships'.[18] Moreover, there was a country house at Hindhead in Surrey, to which the family moved, en bloc, in the Spring and Christmas holidays. Here, the Marshalls associated with the Tyndalls, the Nettleships, William Beveridge and his 'terrifying old mother', and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle.[19]

Marshall's schooling began in 'a very select preparatory boarding-school' (Lockhurst Park in Hemel Hampstead).[20] He then followed in his father's educational footsteps,[21] first to Rugby School and then to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he read history with a view to career in the Foreign Service.[22] Frances Partridge recalls that her brother enjoyed his time at Cambridge, shining as an actor in the Marlowe Society and pursuing his musical talent as a violinist by performing in chamber groups. He was not, however, a Cambridge Apostle, and

---

The Dictionary of National Biography, 1981-1985 (Oxford, 1990), p.266.

[14] Partridge, *Memories*, pp.32-3.

[15] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.1.

[16] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.88.

[17] Partridge, *Memories*, p.23.

[18] *Ibid.*, p.24.

[19] *Ibid.*, p.29.

[20] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.88; Brotherton, LC, RUH 33: Tape-recording of interview with T. H. Marshall, conducted by Dr. Peter Liddle, February 1977.

[21] See W. W. Rouse Ball and J. A. Venn, *Admissions to Trinity College, Cambridge – Vol. V: 1851-1900* (London, 1913), p.351.

[22] Partridge, *Memories*, p.42.

according to Partridge, did not mingle much with the Bloomsbury group in Cambridge.[23] His musical friends included Howard and Kennard Bliss, brothers of the composer Sir Arthur Bliss,[24] but his closest friendship was with 'a philosophical free-thinker and educational reformist' called Wyatt Rawson, through whose influence Marshall came to shed the devout commitment to the Anglican faith that he had maintained while at school.[25] Rawson was at Trinity with Marshall, and read philosophy and psychology as part of the Moral Sciences Tripos.[26] Academically, although Marshall claimed that history was 'at that time, with a few exceptions, very badly taught', he was positively influenced by John Clapham's lectures on English economic history and Galliard Lapsley's instruction in medieval history. Clapham interested Marshall in economic history and later gave him the subject for the economic history dissertation which opened the door to his academic career. Lapsley, on the other hand, introduced him to the study of social structures, as pursued by scholars such as Seebohm, Maitland and Vinogradoff, which provided him with an analytical approach that could be applied to sociological ends in his future work.[27]

Marshall's time at Cambridge was, however, interrupted when, after obtaining a First in Part I of the History Tripos, an untimely holiday in Germany which coincided with the outbreak of the First World War ended with a four-year internment in the civilian prison camp of Ruhleben, near Berlin. In the summer of 1914, Marshall and Rawson had gone to stay with a family in Weimar to improve their German language skills, for the most part seemingly unaware of the growing militarism in Germany and the international situation that was developing in Europe. On 1 August, Germany declared war on Russia and by 3 August, Britain was officially involved. Marshall and Rawson were unlucky to miss the last train that left Weimar, and thus found themselves trapped in what was officially an enemy state. After a week in prison in Weimar, they were moved to Berlin and then to the prison camp at Ruhleben, where they joined a population of some 4000 British men – ranging in social position from company directors to

---

[23] Personal interview with Frances Partridge, 23 Sept. 1996.
[24] Partridge, *Memories*, p.31.
[25] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.88.
[26] Brotherton, LC, RUH43 'Rawson, Wyatt T. R.': Tape-recording of interview with Wyatt Rawson, conducted by Dr. Peter Liddle, February 1977.
[27] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', pp.88-9.

seamen, from concert musicians to factory workers, from science professors to jockeys – whose only common bond was their British citizenship.[28]

Ruhleben was a converted racing stable and the prisoners were accommodated in the lofts and the stalls. According to J. Davidson Ketchum, living conditions were horrible: overcrowding, a poor water supply, the lack of lighting and heating, all made for a rather inhumane situation. Yet, Marshall and many like him felt that something remarkable happened at Ruhleben.[29] Indeed, Marshall described his experience as being 'the most powerful formative influence of [his] early years'.[30] He felt that he had lived through a 'remarkable real-life social experiment', watching a structured society emerge from the miscellaneous collection of individuals in the camp.[31] As an enforced escape from what Marshall called 'the secluded world of the bourgeois intelligentsia in which I had been brought up',[32] moreover, the experience was, as A. H. Halsey put it, 'morally and intellectually crucial, generating in him a new dimension of social sensibility'.[33]

The particular ways in which Ruhleben affected Marshall's outlook will be more fully considered later in this chapter.[34] At this point, however, an overview of his activities in the camp will provide a sense of how Marshall's life proceeded in the four years of his internment. Marshall participated actively in the social life that developed within the camp. He found opportunities to play his violin, often alongside professional musicians, in the numerous performances of orchestral and chamber music that were organised; he sang in the choir; he also acted and provided incidental music for several theatrical productions.[35] More importantly, however, Marshall also used his time at the camp to engage in study, and to develop his ideas. Involving himself with the camp school, Marshall took language classes, mastering the Italian language to an advanced level, and improving his abilities with German and French. His involvement in

---

[28] J. D. Ketchum, *Ruhleben: A Prison Camp Society* (Toronto, 1965), p.3.
[29] See *Ibid.*, pp.12-20.
[30] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.89.
[31] *Ibid.*, p.89-90.
[32] *Ibid.*, p.90.
[33] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.3.
[34] See below, pp.86-90.
[35] See leaflets and magazines preserved in Harvard Law Library [henceforth Harvard], Ruhleben Civilian Internment Camp Papers 1914-1918 [henceforth Ruhleben], Box 1: Memorabilia, Folder 3/13.

educational pursuits gradually deepened and he began to teach history and Italian in the school, and become involved in its administration.[36]

Working with J. C. Masterman, an Oxford history don and a fellow internee, Marshall helped to start a history circle and broadened his own historical knowledge. He read Carlyle's *French Revolution*, Acton's essays, and some of the writings of Graham Wallas, whom he liked because 'he is very free'.[37] For the history circle, Marshall wrote and presented papers on the role of history in education, Bismarck, and Hobbes' and Locke's theory of the state.[38] Through such work, he came to see history 'not as a science that will lead to progress in our ideas, but as an invaluable mental training free from some of the dangers of philosophy'.[39] Marshall admitted to being 'prejudiced against Philosophy', because he believed it was 'too abstracted from personal experience'.[40] His study of Hobbes and Locke had proved less interesting than he had hoped, as he found their writings to be 'completely out of touch with modern problems, unlike most big historical questions of a much earlier date'.[41] On the other hand, studying Bismarck and working on the French Revolution came to be of great interest to him. The subject of the French Revolution, he felt, continually offered 'new ideas that seem absolutely modern' and was 'fruitful in analogies'.[42]

It was at Ruhleben that Marshall developed an interest in education. He had enjoyed his role in the administration and organisation of the camp school in Ruhleben, and this practical experience led him to consider a career in the Education Office after his release.[43] This did not materialise, but his interest was evidently continuing and manifested itself in the form of his later activities. In July 1915, Marshall had learnt that it would be possible for him to take his Cambridge history degree by proxy on the first part of the Tripos, without taking the second part, as a concession offered to those who were serving in the war or were prisoners of war.

---

[36] Brotherton, LC, RUH33: Ruhleben Camp School Prospectus of Work for Autumn Term 1917, pp.4, 9.
[37] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters I: 7 Mar. 1915; Letters II: 31 July 1915.
[38] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters II: 29 Oct. 1915, 11 Jan. 1916; Letters III: 6 Aug. 1916; Letters IV: 16 Feb. 1917.
[39] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters IV: 3 Mar. 1917.
[40] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters IV: 28 Oct. 1916.
[41] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters IV: 16 Feb. 1917.
[42] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters IV: 3 Mar. 1917.
[43] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters IV: 10 May 1917.

Marshall saw this opportunity as 'a great advantage', which would leave him 'a very useful freedom in [his] choice of work'.[44] In the event, however, Marshall did return to Cambridge upon his return from Ruhleben, having been advised by Galliard Lapsley to compete for a Trinity fellowship by which he could enter into an academic career.

In August 1919, then, Marshall submitted his dissertation, 'A Survey of the Industrial Development of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War', for the fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge.[45] The work – which sought to examine the inner working of gilds in England during the period of their decay – was researched and written in the space of six months, during which time, for reasons of health, Marshall was unable to work at full pressure.[46] Nevertheless, Marshall succeeded in being elected to the fellowship in October 1919, and entered the academic world as a professional historian. During the tenure of his Trinity fellowship, he prepared his dissertation for publication; revised and extended George Warner Townsend's *Landmarks in English Industrial History*, adding chapters covering developments in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and wrote a short life of James Watt.[47]

Yet, Marshall's activities at this time were not confined to the cloister of academia. In 1921, he accepted an invitation to stand as a Labour candidate for the Farnham constituency in Surrey in the general election of 1922. Marshall maintained that this experience brought him into close co-operation with the working class people of the area, and opened his eyes to the realities of class prejudice. The contested seat was, however, safely Conservative: Marshall was standing against the sitting Coalition member A. M. Samuel, who had held the seat since 1918 and remained there until 1937. In the event, Marshall did well to poll over 5000 votes, but Samuel

---

[44] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters II: Marshall to W. C. Marshall, 2 July 1915.

[45] The significance of this work for Marshall's later social and political thought will be more fully considered below. See pp.93, 95 in this chapter, pp.153-4 in Chapter Five.

[46] British Library of Political and Economic Science [henceforth BLPES], T. H. Marshall Papers [henceforth Marshall], 4/1: 'A Survey of the Industrial Development of England from the Accession of James I to the Outbreak of the Civil War; dissertation submitted to the Electors to Fellowships at Trinity College, Cambridge', August 1919, p.1.

[47] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.90. See G. T. Warner, *Landmarks in English Industrial History*, revised and extended by T. H. Marshall (London, 1924); T. H. Marshall, *James Watt, 1736-1819* (London, 1925); T. H. Marshall, 'Capitalism and the decline of the English gilds', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, III (1929), pp.23-33.

won the election with a majority of over 9000.[48] Parliamentary politics, in any case, did not attract Marshall. Although his interest in politics was 'great', as he put it, 'campaigning did not suit [his] temperament'.[49] For a time, therefore, he settled back into an orthodox academic career in Cambridge.

As his fellowship drew to a close in 1925, however, Marshall was keen to get away from Cambridge and applied for the post of a tutor to students of social work at the London School of Economics (LSE). As he explained to an LSE audience in 1962, his feeling at that time was that 'it would be very bad for [him] to take a job [in Cambridge] and spend the rest of [his] life in that cloistered atmosphere'.[50] Another consideration, however, may have been his marriage in the same year to Marjorie Tomson, who had worked with Virginia and Leonard Woolf at the Hogarth Press in London. At the time, Marshall 'knew nothing about social work', and was given the job because William Beveridge 'thought [he] should prove useful somewhere'.[51] In the event, Marshall was appointed Assistant Lecturer in Social Science in October 1925, to lecture on English constitutional history after 1689 and prepare a course on English economic thought before Alfred Marshall.[52] The head of the department at the time was Mostyn Lloyd, who was also the assistant editor of the 'New Statesman'. Marshall remembered him as 'a stimulating personality [who] had a strong sense of social realities and a deep concern about social problems, their causes and possible remedies', and who, like Tawney, according to Marshall, knew 'how to combine activities in public and in academic life so that they mutually enriched one another'.[53]

Officially, Marshall only remained with the department for a year, but according to him the experience left a deep impression.[54] Although it was only in the period of his retirement that he published much that was overtly in the field of social policy and administration, there was always a strong practical aspect to Marshall's pursuit of sociology which may be attributed to the early influence of the social work department on his intellectual development. In 1926, Marshall

---

[48] F. W. S. Craig (ed), *British Parliamentary Election Results, 1918-1948* (London, 1977), p.476.
[49] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.90.
[50] BLPES, Marshall, 4/13: 'Reminiscences', 1962, p.8.
[51] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.90.
[52] BLPES, Marshall, 4/13: 'Reminiscences', 1962, p.8.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] *Ibid.*

was appointed Sir Ernest Cassel Lecturer in Commercial and Industrial History, working under R. H. Tawney;[55] and when L. T. Hobhouse died in 1929, his successor as professor of sociology, Morris Ginsberg, suggested that Marshall should join his department. Thus, Marshall became a sociologist, taking advantage of the remarkable ease with which it was possible to move across disciplinary boundaries in the arts and social sciences in his time. He absorbed the sociological ideas of Hobhouse and Ginsberg,[56] and indulged the sociological curiosity he had developed in Ruhleben and through his historical studies, but did not, as he put it, 'make a systematic attempt to master the classics of sociological theory' at that time.[57]

In 1930, Marshall was appointed to a Readership in Sociology, with the intention that he should 'approach the subject historically and from the study of institutions';[58] in 1944, after a period of war leave, he was made Professor of Social Institutions. Marshall's chief interests as a sociologist were social stratification and social policy, with a side interest in professionalism as a branch of occupational sociology.[59] In none of these fields, however, did he choose to adopt the statistical methods that were available to him from his colleagues at the time. While he clearly understood the methods of survey and social measurement, he was more inclined to use the results of statistical analysis in his work, rather than to initiate and engage in such specific research himself.[60] Within the LSE context, therefore, Marshall was regarded as 'the archetypal theorist of the middle range', standing between Morris Ginsberg, the social philosopher, and David Glass, the empiricist, in the professorial triumvirate of the sociology department.[61] Between 1944 and 1949, Marshall also headed the department of social work, until Richard Titmuss was appointed to the first chair of social administration. Upon Ginsberg's resignation in

---

[55] See BLPES, London School of Economics Archives [henceforth LSE], Correspondence relating to T. H. Marshall's appointment to the University Readership in Sociology, 1930 [henceforth University Readership], 416/B: Beveridge to R. H. Tawney, 1 July 1930. Beveridge tells Tawney of Marshall's appointment and advises him to make the necessary arrangements for the History teaching on Marshall's departure.

[56] See Chapter Five, pp.154-7, for a fuller consideration of the influence of these ideas on Marshall's thought.

[57] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.91.

[58] BLPES, LSE, University Readership, 416/B: Beveridge to Principal of the University of London, 26 May 1930.

[59] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.91.

[60] See Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.7.

[61] R. Dahrendorf, *LSE: A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895-1995* (Oxford,

1954, he took over the Martin White Chair in Sociology. However, he only held the post for two years, before resigning in 1956 to join UNESCO as director of the Social Sciences Department.

It should be noted that Marshall was at the LSE at a time when the institution was deeply embroiled in fierce political and intellectual battles: over the preservation of academic freedom, for example, and ideological commitments to Marxism. Yet, for the most part, Marshall seemed to have kept aloof from any direct involvement in these vital academic controversies. His pursuit of an academic career was marked by a certain detachment towards the profession that perhaps indicated that Marshall did not regard his academic vocation as the primary source of his identity. As A. H. Halsey put it, Marshall 'never acquired the driving puritanical dedication to research and writing which might have been possible in the ethos of Houghton Street'. For Marshall, there was always 'the constant pull of a highly civilized private life of music and friendship' beyond his academic responsibilities.[62] Thus, compared to contemporaries such as Harold Laski and Lionel Robbins, Marshall's approach to his work at the LSE seems somewhat lacking in intellectual drive and ambition. He did not seem to be driven by any need to be at the cutting edge of academic research, and was apparently content to make his reputation as a sophisticated interpreter of existing ideas, rather than an innovator.[63]

During his time at the LSE, Marshall also moved freely and easily between academic life and public service. During the Second World War, he was enrolled in Arnold Toynbee's Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS), an organisation that monitored the foreign press, using the gathered material to review the situation in these countries and to advise the British Foreign Office on policy issues as requested. Originally based in Balliol College, Oxford, as the war-time incarnation of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (otherwise known as Chatham House) – an independent and scholarly body of experts engaged in the 'scientific study of international questions' – the unit was collectively transferred in 1943 to the Foreign Office in London, becoming the Foreign Office Research Department (FORD) in the process.[64] Marshall headed

---

1995), p.204.
[62] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.7.
[63] See Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.91.
[64] See C. Brewin, 'Arnold Toynbee and Chatham House' in A. Bosco and C. Navari (eds), *Chatham House*

the German Section of the department and was involved in advising the Foreign Office on the nature of the political forces operating at various levels in Germany, as well as on specific issues such as the question of the grounds on which British propaganda could be made to appeal to the German civilian population.[65]

Marshall began to withdraw from his public commitment to FORD in 1944 to resume his position at the LSE, but then went on to serve as an Educational Adviser with the British Control Commission in Germany from the summer of 1949 to the end of 1950. In this position, he was responsible for administering the programme through which German education was being helped to recover 'from the material damage of the war and from the mental isolation and political indoctrination it had endured'.[66] It was in this period that Marshall produced what has come to be seen as his seminal work, 'Citizenship and Social Class', and the implications of this particular political context for the concerns that shaped the work will be considered in the final section of this chapter. By Marshall's own admission, his growing interest in modern social policy was at least partly stimulated by his period of service in Germany, during which he had to consider 'how to present post-war British society to the Germans'. For Marshall, this 'involved identifying the essential characteristics of the Welfare State', which provided a basis for his continuing interest.[67]

The international aspect of Marshall's public career was a dominant feature of his work after his semi-retirement from the LSE in 1956. In his capacity as director of the Social Sciences Department at UNESCO in Paris between 1956 and 1960, Marshall travelled widely to oversee the development of the teaching of sociology in the universities of developing countries.[68] In one of his missions to promote the study of sociology and encourage the setting up of sociological associations, he visited Beirut, Teheran, New Delhi, Calcutta, Bangkok and Cairo, all in the space

---

and British Foreign Policy, 1919-45: The Royal Institute of International Affairs during the inter-war period (London, 1992), pp.138-9.

[65] See Public Record Office [henceforth PRO], FO/371/26510, C4406/18/18: T. H. Marshall, 'Political Forces and Prospects in Germany', 25 April 1941; PRO, FO/371/26532, C8352/154/18: T. H. Marshall, 'A Note on Propaganda to Germany', 14 July 1941.

[66] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.93.

[67] T. H. Marshall, Preface to *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays* (London, 1963), p.viii.

[68] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.94; see also papers relating to UNESCO in BLPES, Marshall, 3/2.

of a month.[69] Although he officially retired to Cambridge in 1960, between 1959 and 1962 Marshall served as President of the International Sociological Association (ISA), which continued to involve him in internationalist considerations in the pursuit of sociology.[70] At the same time, he helped to establish the teaching of sociology in Cambridge by lecturing part-time in the Economics Faculty. In what was a long and fruitful retirement, Marshall continued to write and advise, producing an important textbook on social policy[71] and continuing to develop his ideas on social welfare. Indeed, it was in this period that, according to Robert Pinker, he produced the definitive studies in social policy that demonstrated his 'unique ability to relate the sociological aspects of social institutions to issues of social policy'.[72]

II. Effects of Social Context and Personal Experience

Unlike Jones, Marshall did not see fit to leave an unequivocal testimony as to how his personal experiences and social background affected his development as an individual. Jones' social philosophy provided him with a framework of thought within which the internalisation of subjective experience was a central aspect of the creation of personality; Marshall's sociological understanding, on the other hand, operated on the basis of more objective considerations. Marshall was not unaware of the impact of personal experience on the way in which subjects such as social class were understood, even by the sociologist. In an early article on social class, for example, he wrote,

> 'The investigator who chooses his own society as his field of research is able to use the knowledge he can derive from intuition and observation as a guide in his analysis. Social Class is a phenomenon of which he has direct personal experience as a force in his own life. He can say, with certainty, what it is not. He can frame a working hypothesis of what it is.'[73]

Yet, he seemed disinclined to dwell on the issue, much less subject his own thought to

---

[69] BLPES, Marshall, 3/2: 'Report of Mission to Beirut, Teheran, New Delhi, Calcutta, Bangkok and Cairo: 26 Oct. To 25 Nov. 1959', 3 Dec. 1959.

[70] Marshall's involvement with the ISA should be accorded further analysis. The ISA archive held at the International Institute for Social History (IISG) in Amsterdam is a useful source of primary material for the consideration of Marshall's role and activities in this international organisation. Unfortunately, due to constraints of space and time, it has not been possible to proceed with this analysis in this thesis. It is hoped, however, that the material will be used in an envisaged future work on Marshall. For an account of the history of the ISA, see J. Platt, *A Brief History of the ISA: 1948-1997.* (I would like to thank Professor Platt for providing me with a copy of this piece in advance of its publication.)

[71] T. H. Marshall, *Social Policy* (London, 1965; 2nd edition, 1967; 3rd edition, 1970; 4th edition, 1975).

[72] Pinker, 'Marshall, Thomas Humphrey', p.267.

such close personal examination. In considering the effects of social context and personal experience on the development of Marshall's thought in this section, the choice of the aspects to regard as significant, and the interpretation involved in establishing this significance, are both easily challenged. To a considerable degree, therefore, the analysis will remain, probably to the very end, tentative and merely suggestive. The perspectives that are presented should be seen as provisional suggestions which provide at least plausible explanations for some of the priorities and preferences that Marshall displayed in his construction of the idea of citizenship.

The Marshalls of Leeds

Seen in this light, Marshall's family history provides important clues to an understanding of his particular conception of the nature of social relationships and the means of social mobility. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Marshall's great-grandfather, John, made a fortune in the linen industry, through his use of pioneering methods of production. At that time, however, his nonconformity, and his following of a calling not connected with the wool trade, barred him from becoming a part of the civic bourgeoisie in Leeds. Men like John Marshall had to establish their characters and to invest in respectability – by buying a large house and entertaining, becoming a local benefactor, or taking a discreet part in politics – so as to 'anchor themselves socially in the town'.[74] John Marshall's aspiration to a social standing higher than that attached to a successful mill-owner, therefore, could only be fulfilled through the use of his wealth to improve his social position. It was with this end in mind that he turned to buying country estates, moving the family from Leeds to Hallsteads, in the Lake District, in 1815. There, his children came to think of themselves as part of the gentry society around them, and to expect much the same things in life, education, occupations, sports, and, in time, spouses.[75]

In 1837, Marshall's grandfather, Henry Cowper Marshall, gained immediate prominence in the local liberal circles through his marriage to Catherine Spring-Rice, the youngest daughter of the Chancellor of the Exchequer in Melbourne's second administration. By 1841, the Marshall family was united to the Spring-Rices by two further marriages: Henry's elder sister Mary Anne

---

[73] T. H. Marshall, 'Social Class – A Preliminary Analysis', *Sociological Review*, XXVI (1934), p.57.
[74] Rimmer, *Marshalls of Leeds*, pp.18-9.

married Thomas Spring-Rice (Lord Monteagle), and his elder brother James Garth married Mary Spring-Rice. This family connection lasted well into Marshall's day: while he was in Ruhleben, the influence of Cecil Spring-Rice was used to bring his situation to the attention of the American embassy.[76] Also in 1841, Cordelia Marshall married William Whewell, the Professor of Moral Philosophy in Cambridge, who became Master of Trinity a month after the marriage. These marital and other social connections brought an entourage of scholars, introduced by Whewell, social reformers like Josephine Butler, and poets such as Wordsworth (an old family friend, as John Marshall's wife had been at school with Dorothy Wordsworth) and Southey, into their social gatherings.[77] Thus, as a family, the Marshalls were not only materially wealthy, but moved within the milieu of the intellectual aristocracy. As Rimmer put it, 'In a society where connexions played a prominent part in family success, the Marshall clan was well-placed in Cambridge..., Leeds and the Lake District.'[78]

As part of his drive to attain social stature, however, John Marshall also entered parliament and ventured into London society. Although he was too old to be very ambitious for himself in politics by that time, he sought to widen his social web through patronage. In particular, his preference for new ideas in political economy drew him towards the Benthamite Utilitarian circle, to which he offered financial support. In three years (1825-8), he spent £3000 on the *Parliamentary History and Review*, a publication of Parliamentary Debates classified according to subjects and accompanied by commentaries pointing out the fallacies of the speakers.[79] John Stuart Mill contributed several articles to the journal, and, in this respect, John Marshall appears in his *Autobiography* as 'an earnest parliamentary reformer, and a man of large fortune'.[80] Through such associations, John Marshall also developed an interest in social problems and attempted to practice his own version of Utilitarianism in Leeds. He gave addresses to the Leeds Philosophical Society on subjects such as "The relative happiness of cultivated and savage life", "On the

---

[75] *Ibid.*, p.102.
[76] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters I: 7 Mar. 1915; 4 Apr. 1915.
[77] Rimmer, *Marshalls of Leeds*, pp.221-5.
[78] *Ibid.*, p.225.
[79] *Ibid.*, p.104-5.
[80] J. S. Mill, *Autobiography* (London, 1873, 1989), p.102.

production of wealth, and the propriety of discussing subjects of political economy as distinguished from politics" and "The present state of education in England as a preparation for active life".[81] Practically, he founded schools and offered free education to his young working-class employees, in the belief that education was the only way "to promote the improvement of the rising generation" and hence society at large.[82]

John Marshall's offspring did, to some extent, follow in his footsteps. They were prominent amongst those who sought to improve conditions: they led parliamentary and municipal reform, preached temperance, sponsored a friendly society, supported the distribution of allotments to the working class and provided education.[83] Despite all this, however, by the 1870s, declining profits and a lack of interest in the mills led to the third generation of Marshalls finally severing their connections with Leeds and settling down as country gentlemen living on interest and parental estates. Marshall's father entered the professions as a partner in a firm of London architects, and by his generation, Marshall could claim that he 'knew nothing of working-class life, and the great industrial north was a nightmare land of smoke and grime through which one had to travel to get from London to the Lake District'.[84]

While it is impossible to ascertain conclusively the exact effects of such a family history on Marshall's thought, it is interesting to note the way in which, for Marshall's early family, social relationships and patterns of consumption seemed to determine social position. This had a bearing on Marshall's later conception of the nature of social class and the means by which social mobility could be achieved, which *may*, in turn, account for the more materialistic emphasis of his approach to the conception of citizenship. Whereas Jones' notion of working-class respectability tended to de-emphasise the idea that social standing depended upon having an appropriate amount of physical property, Marshall's family experience presented the opposite case, in which social position depended upon the pursuit of a particular lifestyle.

With regard to intellectual heritage, it is difficult to establish a firm link between John

---

[81] Rimmer, *Marshalls of Leeds*, p.104.
[82] *Ibid.*, p.105-7.
[83] *Ibid.*, pp.216, 218.
[84] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.88.

Marshall's association with Utilitarianism and political economy, and his concern with social problems, and Marshall's later academic interests. However, according to Frances Partridge's autobiography, what her father and his family stood for, was a dominating 'backdrop' in his children's lives; and the Marshall family stood, at least in part, 'for eugenics, agnosticism and the march of science'.[85] The extent to which this was internalised by Marshall cannot be ascertained. Nevertheless, the existence of such a 'backdrop' is not inconsistent with the lines of thought that Marshall was to follow.

Finally, Marshall's social heritage determined his own social position. As A. H. Halsey put it, 'He was a gentleman: and the meaning of that persona... had significant professional as well as distinctive personal consequences.'[86] In his social circle as an adult, Marshall hovered on the fringes of Bloomsbury. He was familiar with the 'Roger Fry, Clive Bell set' and, through his short-lived first marriage to Marjorie Tomson (who died in 1931), was briefly associated with Leonard and Virginia Woolf.[87] His elder sister Ray was married to David Garnett, a Bloomsbury writer, and his youngest sister Frances had entered into the centre of the Bloomsbury circle through her involvement with Ralph Partridge. Marshall's social connections defined him as a 'gentleman' and a member of the 'intellectual aristocracy', and Halsey maintains that Marshall never moved far from the Cambridge and Bloomsbury connection. It was from this social position that he developed his ideas about class inequality and the role of the welfare state, using the perspective of a 'detached and civilized observer from the study and the library rather than the party or the hustings'.[88]

RUHLEBEN

Marshall's detachment, however, may also have been the outcome of the experience he described as 'the most powerful formative influence of [his] early years'.[89] The four years Marshall spent interned in the German prison camp Ruhleben profoundly affected his attitude to

---

[85] Partridge, *Memories*, p.12.
[86] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.5.
[87] In her diary entry for 10 May 1926, for example, Virginia Woolf wrote that she came home 'to find Tom Marshall cabaling with L[eonard Woolf]'. A. Olivier Bell (ed), *The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Vol. III: 1925-1930* (London, 1980), p.82.
[88] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.6.
[89] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.89.

the world around him, not least because the experience shook at least some of the social certainties that had structured his life up to that point. As J. Davidson Ketchum observed,

> 'The men and boys herded into Ruhleben were normal human beings, but they were in a highly abnormal situation. Each of them had been plucked up by the roots, torn from his accustomed setting, and plunged into a totally strange one. Such an uprooting is deeply disturbing, for the human being depends on his familiar social context for most of his psychological needs.'[90]

Marshall's experience of Ruhleben shaped his future outlook in a number of ways. In the following analysis, the various levels at which the experience may be seen to develop Marshall's particular understandings and convictions will be unravelled.

A. H. Halsey has suggested that what Marshall experienced at Ruhleben was 'a temporary marginality thrust upon a most unmarginal young man'; and that this marginality played an important part in characterising him as a sociologist. According to Halsey, a widely observed characteristic of most notable sociologists is that they 'negotiate social marginality', usually by moving between at least two social worlds: Jewish and gentile, for example, or rural and urban. The disjunctive personal experiences concomitant upon such marginality induced a certain curiosity about society that, in turn, developed into sociological interests.[91] The extent to which such an analysis may be applied to Marshall's experience at Ruhleben is, however, limited. In terms of the company he kept and the activities in which he engaged while at Ruhleben, the facts of his internment experience do not suggest that he was – even temporarily – significantly marginalised from the social world to which he was accustomed.

It has been suggested that the camp forced an escape from the 'narrow social confines of his upbringing in the English bourgeois intelligentsia';[92] and it is true that, in Ruhleben, Marshall would have come face to face with 'a cross-section of British society, from the manor house to the slum'.[93] He described this in his first letter to his mother, in which he wrote, 'it is fun to see so many people of every sort – over 3000 I believe, and a lot of sailors'.[94] However, a considerable degree of segregation was maintained in the camp. There were two, separate, so-

---

[90] Ketchum, *Ruhleben*, p.31.
[91] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.3.
[92] *Ibid.*, p.2.
[93] Ketchum, *Ruhleben*, p.3.

called 'ethnic' barracks – for the Jewish and the black internees respectively – and the majority of the sailors stayed together. More importantly, Marshall's barrack was 'always regarded as the élite barrack',[95] and his social circle within the camp seems to have consisted largely of intellectuals and artists. As social types, such individuals hardly differed from those with whom Marshall would have associated in the social setting in which he was brought up.

Through such associations, Marshall sought to recreate a familiar social context, albeit one stripped of the usually concomitant material comforts. In his letters, he seemed keen to establish the extent to which the men with whom he was 'messing' in the camp were familiar with the social circles that he and his family were a part of in England. In one letter, for example, he wrote,

> 'We are doing well as to food as we have joined the Mr Prichard I told you of and he gets biscuits and chocolates regularly. He says he knows Cecil Spring-Rice and the Roger Fry, Clive Bell set too... There is a young Polish artist from Paris called Winzer who knows the Blisses and several Cambridge people and talks about six languages. We happened to drop into the middle of the Camp activities and have met nearly all the interesting people and seen the starting of the artistic and educational work. It has been a great experience in that way.'[96]

From a more directly sociological perspective, however, Ruhleben did offer Marshall the opportunity of observing, at first hand, 'the emergence of a structured society from a miscellaneous collection of individuals (all male)', which, he maintained, developed in him a growing sociological curiosity.[97] His attempts to analyse the processes that were taking place are interesting, reflecting not only his nascent sociological interest, but also, to some extent, the way in which the experience shaped some particular understandings. Marshall saw Ruhleben as an experience that was teaching him 'what is and what is not essential', and believed that he would be 'quite changed' when he and his family met again.[98] There were, he wrote in another letter, 'so many things to think about, things which are beginning to be clear for the first time, and they seem very important and more real than the past'.[99]

---

[94] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters I: 31 Nov. 1914.
[95] Brotherton, LC, RUH33: T. H. Marshall interview (February 1977).
[96] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters I: 30 Mar. 1915.
[97] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.91.
[98] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters I: Marshall to M. A. Marshall, 7 Mar. 1915.
[99] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters I: Marshall to M. A. Marshall, 13 May 1915.

The nature of the things that were beginning to become clear for Marshall, however, was to a large extent determined by the very peculiar circumstances of the camp. His experience and analysis of associational life, for example, were based on an almost claustrophobic camp society, in which, as Marshall observed, it was necessary to form large societies which were 'by no means unanimous as to their aims', because the camp did not afford enough room for all to pursue their own courses independently. 'The result,' Marshall wrote in 1915,

> 'is that there are continual quarrels between societies and groups in societies, which are sometimes very entertaining, but hinder serious work. I hope that finally the muddling methods of societies and committees will be knocked on the head, and when everyone is tired of intrigue and scandal-mongering, we shall arrange things by simple agreement.'[100]

By 1917, Marshall was longing to return to 'conditions in which it is possible to play the violin without being involved thereby in party politics and do a little private reading without swearing allegiance to a rather objectionable society and so offending the members of some other society'.[101] This deeply felt desire for private space may have served to accentuate Marshall's recognition of the need to protect a private sphere in social life, which he combined with an understanding that arrangements 'by simple agreement' were preferable to complicated political manoeuvrings within the public sphere.

Being interned in Ruhleben also effectively isolated and excluded Marshall from the British war effort and the general experience of the Great War. In his letters home, Marshall made constant requests for news of his brother Horace and his brother-in-law Dick Rendel, who were both involved in the military effort. This may be seen as a reflection of Marshall's frustrated desire to participate in what he called 'this great effort of devotion, patriotism and self-sacrifice and unselfishness on all sides'.[102] News of family and friends in England, Marshall wrote to his mother, made him 'realise how much alive they are, as though the whole force of the nation were pulsing through each individual doing its work'. Marshall's efforts to reconcile himself to his enforced exclusion from civic participation are illustrated in a letter to his mother, in which he wrote:

---

[100] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters II: 24 June 1915.
[101] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters IV: 13 Jan. 1917.

> 'As we are entirely excluded from the world, and obliged to live our own life and to make the best of it, so we expect no one outside to take an unnatural or curious interest in our condition and our work. ...To make a fuss about us, will be only to increase the difficulties of our position when we come out. We do ask for, because we need it, the material assistance in the form of money, food, and books and so on which we have a right to expect from those interested in us as friends and citizens. We do not ask for sympathy, not for the sentimental sympathy of those who are not interested in us and should have something better to think about. Some people here still think we are suffering and are afraid of using opportunities of improving their condition for fear it should get abroad that they are well treated. Such an attitude of waiting and denial of liberty, destroys all hope of progress. We hope it will die out, we do not wish to emphasise it. Our only suffering is that we are forced to be selfish when "the nations are casting off selfishness". We do not feel like heroes, our difficulty is to realise that we are not shirkers.'[103]

In this respect, Marshall did experience a form of marginality, although not in the way envisioned by Halsey.[104] Marshall's internment meant an enforced exclusion from civic participation and a detachment from the 'citizenship experience' of the war. This did not involve the negotiation of different social worlds, but rather a sense of exclusion from public service and 'doing one's duty' in common with most of his generation.[105] Although he was discomforted by it at the time, this detachment meant that Marshall's articulation of ideas of citizenship after the Second World War was effectively free from personal memories of participation at a time when the model of citizenship consisted of strong ideas of national duty, devotion and self-sacrifice, based on a still prevalent idealist notion that involved the identification of the individual, private will with the moral purposes of the state. Instead, when he came to construct his conception of citizenship for post-war Britain, it could be singularly rooted in the possibilities offered by the systematic provisions of the new welfare state.

III. Public Affairs and Politics

In a memorial lecture, A. H. Halsey described Marshall as 'in one sense the outstanding sociological interpreter of British Butskellism, the subtle advocate of the British version of the welfare state, legitimizing it by placing it in the long march of British developmental history'.[106] This characterisation of Marshall's contribution to political discourse in Britain has been widely,

---

[102] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters II: 15 Mar. 1916.
[103] Brotherton, LC, RUH33, Letters II: 18 July 1915.
[104] See above, p.87.
[105] See M. Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (London, 1989), pp.174-5.

and for the most part uncritically, accepted. Yet, the basis for this view seems to be derived from a present-day interpretation of Marshall's significance, rather than any detailed examination of Marshall's political activities within their actual historical context. The idea that, in the post-war period, Marshall 'almost single-handedly revived the notion of citizenship, and disseminated a view of it so successfully that it came to be seen (at least in England) as the only possible account', as Anthony Rees has claimed,[107] is perhaps best seen as an extrapolation based on contemporary expectations rather than an historical account of Marshall's actions.

Criticisms of Marshall have also tended to proceed from such a basis. Without a contextual framework within which Marshall's conscious, or indeed his unconscious, intentions may be identified, certain peculiarities of his work have tended to be regarded as oversights or shortcomings in his analytical approach, rather than explained. An important criticism that has been made of Marshall's approach to citizenship concerns the inherently 'Anglocentric' focus of his work. Michael Mann, for example, has pointed out that Marshall's sequence of civil, political and social rights in 'Citizenship and Social Class' describes only one strategy of citizenship, while ignoring at least four other strategies.[108] In particular, Mann argues that an "authoritarian-monarchist" model of citizenship – in which limited social rights were granted as part of a divide-and-rule strategy, and tended thus to precede rather than succeed political rights – 'was not envisaged by Marshall, or indeed by any other modern sociologist'.[109] This claim that Marshall simply failed to envisage alternative strategies of citizenship, however, does not seem to take into account what may have been Marshall's conscious intentions. The extent to which Marshall was aware of the alternatives to his construction of citizenship needs to be substantiated with regard to the political context within which 'Citizenship and Social Class' was produced.

In this section, therefore, the way in which Marshall's political activities shaped his approach to conceptualising citizenship will be critically examined. The nature of his association with the Labour Party and ethical socialism will be considered, and archival evidence will be used

---

[106] A. H. Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall and ethical socialism' in Bulmer and Rees (eds), *Citizenship Today*, p.81.
[107] Rees, 'T. H. Marshall and the progress of citizenship', p.3.
[108] M. Mann, 'Ruling class strategies and citizenship' in Bulmer and Rees (eds), *Citizenship Today*, p.126. Marshall's theory of citizenship will be more fully examined in Chapter Five of this thesis.

to shed light on the way in which his commitments during the Second World War led to the prioritisation of certain intentions in his approach to citizenship.

The Labour Party and Ethical Socialism

When, in April 1921, the *Woking News and Mail* reported the 'interesting announcement' that T. H. Marshall of Tweenways, Hindhead, was to contest the Farnham-Woking Parliamentary Division in the Labour interest, in opposition to the sitting Coalition member, A. M. Samuel, the new candidate was described as 'quite a young man, ... a member of a well-known Hindhead family, who have shown active interest in local and public work during their 30 years' residence'.[110] At the time, Marshall's mother, who had long been politically active in the cause of women's suffrage, was discovering a new political purpose within the ranks of the Labour Party. After the death of her husband in 1921, according to Frances Partridge, Margaret Marshall had become 'openly left-wing and joined the Labour Party'.[111] It may be suggested, therefore, that Marshall's early involvement with the Labour Party occurred at least partly as the result of his mother's interests and on account of her influence.

Marshall's entry into Labour politics, however, occurred at a time when British socialism was undergoing a remarkable period of theoretical debate and embarking upon an independent political future. The apparent dominance of Fabian socialism, with its statist commitment to centralisation and bureaucratisation, was being challenged by movements such as guild socialism, whose adherents variously championed the role of decentralised political and economic authorities.[112] Ideas about industrial democracy were flourishing, and issues of individual liberty within a socialist community were being addressed by a variety of socialist theorists concerned with the re-ordering of political, social and industrial relationships. All of these debates involved central themes in the definition of citizenship, and the extent to which they provided a context for the development of Marshall's thought needs to be considered. Although evidence is limited,

---

[109] *Ibid.*, pp.133-4, 140; Rees, 'T. H. Marshall and the progress of citizenship', p.14.
[110] *The Woking News and Mail*, 15 April 1921, from press-cuttings made by Marshall and held privately by Mrs. Nadine Marshall. I am grateful to Mrs. Marshall for allowing me to view these during a personal interview at her home on 18 October 1996.
[111] Partridge, *Memories*, p.71.
[112] For an analysis of a range of these debates in the decade after the First World War, see M. Stears, 'Guild socialism and ideological diversity on the British left, 1914-1926', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, III (1998),

Marshall's position with regard to these political debates may be deduced through a critical examination of the statements he made in the course of his election campaign, as they were recorded by the local press.

Speaking at a meeting in Woking, Marshall stated that his study of industrial history had led to him finding himself 'in absolute sympathy with the Labour Party'.[113] As has been noted, Marshall's dissertation for his Trinity fellowship in 1919 was a survey of industrial development in England in the seventeenth century. Specifically, Marshall considered the decline of gilds and the rise of capitalism.[114] Although the thesis was for the most part concerned with an historical analysis, some of the assertions made by Marshall in the thesis reflected a particular political perspective. In the conclusion to his dissertation, for example, Marshall claimed that developments in the seventeenth century had 'the power to teach us much of the coming of national unity and the birth of that industrial division which has led to tyranny and suffering and the threat of class war'.[115] He described the inevitable change from a local to a national economy that occurred in this period as a process that involved a shift in the conception of the structure of industry – a shift that ultimately disadvantaged the working man. As he explained:

> 'The essential idea of an industrial company had been that it comprised all classes of craftsmen engaged in that industry in a certain neighbourhood, and that every class had its recognised place and its inalienable rights. To the Stuart Company promoters an industry consisted of and belonged to capitalists, and the first need for successful enterprise was capital. The Charters of incorporation subtly followed the lines of the old gild constitutions, but they disinherited the working man.'[116]

This perspective on the historical development of industrial structures led Marshall to a particular view of the task to be fulfilled by Labour politics in the twentieth century.

In 1921, Marshall supported the view that the Labour Party should aim to be 'a party of the nation, rather than of one class, a party of community rather than division', and that Labour's socialism tended towards integrating the working class into a larger collectivity.[117] Marshall

---

pp.289-306.
[113] *The Woking News and Mail*, 15 April 1921.
[114] See above, p.77.
[115] BLPES, Marshall, 4/1: 'A Survey of the Industrial Development of England', p.204.
[116] *Ibid.*, pp.202-3.
[117] S. Brooke, *Labour's War: The Labour Party during the Second World War* (Oxford, 1992), p.14.

identified the basis and foundation of the Labour Party as being 'in its wide sense, organised labour', whose 'solid support' was needed for success. However, with its new constitution, Marshall thought that the party was not 'confined simply to "Labour" [but] should unquestionably be open to all who showed sympathy with its aims and ideals'.[118] More significantly, Marshall also maintained that 'the object of the Labour movement since its start had been to bring Labour really and honestly within the community'. Working men, according to Marshall, were not within the community when the movement began: they 'had not got the rights that belonged to every free citizen of the community'. Labour's 'first task', therefore, was 'to make itself a part of the community'.[119]

How this would be achieved, however, was less well defined within the Labour movement. At the heart of the issue was the question of how social life should be ordered, but different strands of socialist thinking had different ideological positions on the matter in the 1920s. Fabian socialism stressed the role of a central authority which would, on behalf of the community as a whole, 'systematically... think out the function that each person has to perform and the relation in which each must stand to the whole'.[120] Guild socialism as defined by thinkers such as Ramiro de Maeztu retained the idea that each individual had a 'function' that he or she should be compelled to perform for the benefit of the community, but insisted that these social relationships should be decided by a range of decentralised organisations covering each of the essential functions of communal life, rather than a central authority.[121] Theorists such as G. D. H. Cole and R. H. Tawney, on the other hand, held that neither guilds nor a central authority should be allowed to allocate individuals to functions, as individuals should be allowed the freedom to make their own decisions as to how best to participate in the community. This view emphasised the need for decentralised authority on the grounds that individual freedom would be best preserved by the delicate balance of social powers; and insisted upon the need for well-developed

---

[118] *The Woking News and Mail*, 15 April 1921.
[119] *The Farnham, Haslemere and Hindhead Herald, The Alton Mail*, 7 May 1921, from press-cuttings held by Mrs. Nadine Marshall.
[120] S. and B. Webb, *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (London, 1920), p.202.
[121] See Stears, 'Guild socialism and ideological diversity', pp.296-7.

democratic mechanisms within each decentralised social organisation, so that individual members could control the actions of their various associations.[122]

The extent to which Marshall's academic concerns with the gilds of the early modern era fed an interest in the more contemporary political concerns of the guild socialist movement cannot be conclusively established. Marshall's focus on industrial structures and relationships as an important aspect of the social order may, however, have inclined him towards the arguments for industrial reorganisation that were being advanced within this arena by theorists such as Cole and Tawney. In a speech, Marshall described the 'particular qualities' of the Labour Party as being '(1) Democratic, as it was essentially a movement of the rank and file: and (2) that it took into account the moral side of life. It was ethical as well as economic'.[123] Such concerns reflected an appreciation of Tawney's approach to socialism, which emphasised the importance of democracy in industrial relationships and the moral reconstruction of society as prerequisites for the creation of a socialist community.[124] A. H. Halsey has described Marshall as 'a late child' of the ethical socialist tradition, of which Tawney was 'the great modern master'.[125] More specifically, Jean Floud, who worked with Marshall at the LSE, recalls that Marshall 'had an influential and subtle notion of a society which built on Tawney's notion of equality'.[126] The nature and extent of Marshall's identification with Tawney and the tradition of ethical socialism, however, needs to be more critically considered.

In the first place, it should be noted that Marshall's cultural framework differed from Tawney's in a number of significant respects. Whereas Tawney's views were formed through his extensive intercourse with working people as a result of his involvement with organisations such as the Workers' Educational Association (WEA), Marshall's encounters with the working class tended, on the whole, to be episodic and brief. Marshall never had the sustained engagement with the personal lives of the working class that Tawney experienced; as a result, his approach in

---

[122] See *Ibid.*, pp.299-300.
[123] *The Woking News and Mail*, 15 April 1921.
[124] See R. H. Tawney, 'The Conditions of Economic Liberty' in *The Radical Tradition: Twelve Essays on Politics, Education and Literature*, ed. R. Hinden (London, 1964), p.104; A. Wright, *R. H. Tawney* (Manchester, 1987), p.15.
[125] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall and ethical socialism', p.86.
[126] Personal interview with Prof. Jean Floud, 14 Nov. 1996.

thinking about the working class and equality was qualitatively different. As Halsey acknowledges, a belief 'in the power of moral character to perfect a person and ennoble a nation' was of foremost importance within the tradition of ethical socialism; yet Marshall 'wrote little or nothing directly about personal character'.[127] Whereas Tawney saw democracy, equality, liberty and fraternity in terms of their impact on the personal moral development of the individual; Marshall was committed to these values as the defining conditions of a social order.

More importantly, Marshall also clearly did not share Tawney's inherent belief in Christianity as the basis for ethical socialism, having lost his Christian faith 'totally', as he put it, by the end of his first year at Cambridge.[128] Thus, whereas Tawney's writings depended on a 'well of moral knowledge which is "the common property of Christian nations"',[129] Marshall's writings were often opaque on the subject of religion and morality. As A. H. Halsey notes, apart from a brief mention in his autobiographical article, Marshall did not discuss his loss of faith anywhere else in his writings, nor did he consider declining religious belief as a social fact, or a determinant of social integration in society.[130] In an article on the 'value problems of welfare-capitalism' published in 1972, for example, Marshall claimed that 'welfare decisions... are essentially altruistic and they must draw on standards of value embodied in an autonomous ethical system'; but, he maintained, it was 'impossible to say exactly how these ethical standards arise in a society or are recognised by its members'.[131] Marshall may have believed in a form of ethical religion: in 1935, he addressed the Ethical Union in London on 'The Approach of the Utopians', in a series of lectures on *The Ethical Factor in Economic Thought.* Yet, although Marshall seemed to suggest in this address that 'something in the nature of a new social religion' was required for a utopian ethical revolution,[132] he nevertheless maintained that human behaviour could be 'modified by the modification of social institutions, by altering the character of human experience rather than of

---

[127] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall and ethical socialism', p.88.
[128] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.88.
[129] Wright, R. *H. Tawney*, p.14.
[130] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.4.
[131] T. H. Marshall, 'Value Problems of Welfare-Capitalism' in *The Right to Welfare and other essays* (London, 1981), p.109.
[132] T. H. Marshall, 'The Approach of the Utopians' in T. H. Marshall, E. F. M. Durbin and H. J. Bridges, *The Ethical Factor in Economic Thought* (London, 1935), p.12.

human psychology'.[133]

This raises the question of the extent to which the simple description of Marshall as an ethical socialist may obscure more than it clarifies with regard to his ideological position. Certainly, the specific concerns of an ethical socialist tradition may be expected to shift according to changing social conditions. Marshall, moreover, did seem to hold lasting commitments to the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity that have been described as being central to the tradition.[134] Yet, these principles were by no means *exclusive* to the ethical socialist tradition, and the particular ways in which Marshall understood these concepts reflected a more complex set of political and intellectual concerns. Marshall effectively withdrew from party political activities after his 1922 election campaign, and it is thus considerably more difficult to trace the way in which his political views developed after this time. While he was at the LSE during the 1930s and 1940s, Marshall maintained a close friendship with Evan Durbin, who, as Stephen Brooke argues, 'tried to pick up the strands of ethical socialism and weave them with a Fabian interest in planning and efficiency'.[135] Marshall's writings on the welfare state and sociology in the 1940s embraced planning as a reality,[136] and his participation in Fabian Society conferences after the Second World War suggests a continuing engagement with socialist thinking.[137] In this respect, developments in the Labour Party's socialist ideology may be seen to shape the frameworks for Marshall's thinking.

Marshall, however, was never as politically engaged as either Tawney or Durbin in seeking to define a socialist ideology for the Labour Party, and it would be difficult to claim that he was, at any time, a 'Labour intellectual'. It is interesting to note that Marshall is often described as an 'interpreter' or 'advocate' of, rather than an active influence on, the development of post-war social democracy. In a sense, this would seem to imply that the development of his thought operated *in response* to developments in policy, rather than as an influence on their

---

[133] *Ibid.*, p.8.
[134] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall and ethical socialism', p.88.
[135] Brooke, *Labour's War*, p.296.
[136] See, for example, T. H. Marshall, 'Sociology at the Crossroads' in *Sociology at the Crossroads*, pp.8-9; 'Social Selection in the Welfare State' in *Sociology at the Crossroads*, p.247.
[137] See BLPES, Fabian Society Papers [henceforth Fabian], G49: Weekend Conference on the Psychological and Sociological Problems of Modern Socialism.

direction. In the post-war years, the extent to which Marshall' ideas *could* have had an impact on the development of policy was probably limited by the tendency on the part of the Labour government to dismiss the need for theoretical considerations in the debate over reconstruction.[138] As Jose Harris has pointed out, the public and academic debate over major social and political issues in the immediate post-war period was 'curiously devoid of reference to first principles'. 'The legislation that set up the welfare state', Harris maintained, 'generated some discussion about whether the nation could afford it... but very little analysis of the impact of welfare upon state power – or upon the rights, duties, attitudes and behaviour of individual citizens.'[139] Thus, although the model of citizenship that Marshall presented in 'Citizenship and Social Class' has come to have an ideological significance for political theorists in the present day, Marshall's political significance for the Labour Party was arguably more marginal in his own time. Whereas Jones could see himself as actively shaping the political agenda of his time – at least in some respects – through his participation and his personal influence, Marshall was somewhat more detached from such concerns of shaping his immediate political environment according to a particular set of views.

World War Two and the Foreign Office Research Department

Marshall's ideas were, however, forged within the ideological crucible of the Second World War, and the particular implications of this context cannot be overlooked. Anthony Rees has suggested that 'Citizenship and Social Class' should be seen as being 'as much a product of the war and its immediate aftermath as Titmuss' *Problems of Social Policy* (1950)'.[140] Titmuss' work, however, was based on observations of how radical social change had occurred as a result of the impact of the war within the domestic context. The particular way in which the war affected Marshall's outlook was somewhat different. Marshall spent the major part of the war observing the activities of the Nazi regime, and analysing the means by which its totalitarian ideology could be overturned. It was within this international context that Marshall developed his vision of the British state, as an alternative to what he saw as the Nazi system of complete control over the

---

[138] See Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.23.
[139] *Ibid.*, p.24.

body politic.

Recalling the criticism that has been made of Marshall's Anglocentric approach to citizenship, and the implication that it was a failure of vision that prevented him from considering the possibility of other strategies, an examination of the actual context within which Marshall developed his ideas would seem to suggest that he was in fact all too aware of the authoritarian alternative to his construction of citizenship. Within the context of the war, it may be argued that Marshall's Anglocentric focus was in fact the reflection of a continuing need to establish the nature of a particularly British alternative to the authoritarian German regime. Marshall was clearly not unaware that Nazi Germany had, as Michael Mann argues, 'moved furthest towards social citizenship', though it had provided neither civil nor any real political rights.[141] In a paper prepared for the Greenwood Committee on political forces and prospects in Germany, for example, he pointed out that 'State socialism already exists in Germany, and there will be no question of destroying it'.[142] In Marshall's estimation, however, the Nazi regime would be overthrown, 'not because it [was] authoritarian rather than democratic', but because, in its extreme radicalism, Hitlerism had overstepped the limits of public acceptance for 'almost any form of central government which allows local and private life to continue in a manner that appears tolerable and normal'.[143]

In a memorandum on the question of British propaganda to Germany, Marshall thus argued that the nature of England's appeal to the German people would have to be conservative rather than revolutionary. England represented 'the Old Order', and was 'an example of that normal, well-tried, civilised life'. However, Marshall stressed that,

> 'We must show that we, too, are moving towards socialism, that is to say towards social and economic planning, social equality, and better social services, and that we are doing this without destroying individual liberty and the freedom of the mind, and without making the people the slaves of the State, and the servants of the State the masters of the people. The aspect of democratic civilisation which we have to stress is... the quality of individual life in its daily round. We must dwell on the civil liberties. We must make the Germans sick of

---

[140] Rees, 'The Other T. H. Marshall', p.345.
[141] Mann, 'Ruling class strategies and citizenship', p.140.
[142] PRO, FO/371/26510, C4406/18/18: T. H. Marshall, 'Political Forces and Prospects in Germany', 25 April 1941, f.48.
[143] *Ibid.*, f.42.

> the glorification of the national government, or Leader, and home-sick for the less spectacular, but less dangerous and exacting life of town, of village, and of home.'[144]

He concluded by emphasising the need to 'divert attention from the State and international politics, to the local community and the life of the individual', arguing that

> 'We must show that efficiency and security can be combined with liberty. We must play on the conservative desire to return to a normal, peaceful, life, free from the stresses and strains of a life given to the State, and convince them that in such a life are found the seeds of natural progress.'[145]

In the light of such analyses, Marshall's interpretation of the development of citizenship in Britain at least partly reflected a conscious intention to establish civil liberties as the basis of a 'democratic civilisation' concerned with the preservation of 'the quality of individual life in its daily round'.

Marshall's overall experience of the Second World War led him to conclude that it had 'produced a slump in ideologies'. 'We may do big things on a big scale after the war,' he maintained, 'but they will be inspired by common sense.'[146] For Marshall, 'the practical task of running services which, with more or less modification, must exist in any civilised society, loom[ed] larger than political theory'.[147] It was in this spirit that he approached the ideas he presented in 'Citizenship and Social Class'. His formulation of citizenship in the post-war years did not depend upon a utopian vision derived from abstract philosophising, but an attachment to practical experience as the basis for ideas.

The relative weakness of his emphasis on the idea of duties in his conception of citizenship may be seen in this regard.[148] 'A successful appeal to the duties of citizenship can be made in times of emergency,' Marshall argued, 'but the Dunkirk spirit cannot be a permanent feature of any civilisation'. The national community was 'too large and remote to command this kind of loyalty and to make it a continual driving force'.[149] Instead, Marshall linked the idea of

---

[144] PRO, FO/371/26532, C8352/154/18: T. H. Marshall, 'A Note on Propaganda to Germany', 14 July 1941, f.3-4.
[145] *Ibid.*, f.6.
[146] *Ibid.*, f.7.
[147] PRO, FO/371/26510, C4406/18/18: 'Political Forces and Prospects in Germany', ff.47-8.
[148] See Rees, 'The Other T. H. Marshall', p.349.
[149] T. H. Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class' in T. H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, *Citizenship and Social*

citizenship to a notion of 'the standard of civilised life',[150] by which, it may be argued, he simply meant a life in which it was possible to pursue individual aims within a private sphere. In the context of planning, this private sphere would be maintained within a public framework of planned social institutions, but the citizen would be 'urged to respond to the call of duty by allowing some scope to the motive of individual self-interest'.[151] Marshall's sense that the basis for social integration had 'spread from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of material enjoyment' may be seen in this light.[152] If the enrichment of human relations and of national culture that Marshall sought through citizenship could only be achieved through consumption and the satisfaction of material needs, the benefits of citizenship that he envisioned would ultimately be enjoyed simply as a part of the private life of the individual citizen.

The extent to which Marshall seemed to prioritise the protection of a private sphere in individual life may be traced to the emotional attachment to privacy that he derived from his experience of the claustrophobic associational setting in Ruhleben. In this respect, Marshall's 'common sense' may be seen as the reflection of a personal preference for a particular form of life. It seems clear that Marshall's personal background did act to shape his intellectual development in number of significant ways. The analysis in this chapter sheds some light on how, for example, Marshall's family background may have inclined him towards a particular conception of the structure of social relationships; how his preference for practical realities rather than abstract philosophising may have defined the limits of his vision of citizenship; and how his ideas about citizenship and the British state developed within the international rather than the domestic context during the Second World War. These considerations form an important setting for the later analysis of the structure of Marshall's thought, in this thesis.

Class (London, 1992; 1996), pp.46-7.
[150] *Ibid.*, p.6.
[151] *Ibid.*, p.43.
[152] *Ibid.*, p.28.

PART II

IDEA ENVIRONMENTS

CHAPTER FOUR

MAPPING HENRY JONES' SYSTEM OF THOUGHT

'Neither life, nor the theoretic exposition of it, depends for its worth upon the multiplicity of its principles. We do best with very few. I am not sure that we need more than one, provided it will bear the articulation of practice.'

Henry Jones, Preface to *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p.viii.

The aim of this chapter is to unravel the ideational and conceptual environment within which Jones' ideas about citizenship developed. As has been noted in this thesis,[1] the case for Jones' significance in political thought rests not on any particular originality in his contribution to idealist thought, but on his acknowledged ability to expound and clarify this inherited body of wisdom, and to apply it to practical issues. Moreover, it has been suggested that his direct and immediate involvement in practical politics put him in a unique position of influence. In this chapter, the way in which the various elements of Jones' thought fed into his conceptualisation of citizenship will be examined. To do this, it is necessary to gain some idea of how Jones related the various concepts that made up the whole of his idealist thought. This chapter therefore attempts to map Jones' system of thought, with reference to certain key ideas. Such a mapping of thought is of particular importance in the case of a theorist such as Jones, because of his belief that all different spheres of thought and action were interdependent. As he put it, 'the need of a working theory of life, and therefore of the world which is its arena, is permanent, and all men must think their thoughts into some kind of whole'.[2] An understanding of Jones' thought, then, depends on a clear idea of the way in which it operated *as a whole.*

The analysis in this chapter begins with a consideration of the idea of the social organism, with which Jones' writing began in 1883. The organic analogy provided many nineteenth-century thinkers with a rich source for ideas. How Jones defined his position within this conceptual milieu may thus furnish an insight into the structure of his thought. Moreover, it will be argued that Jones' way of thinking about the social organism facilitated the emphasis of

---

[1] See Chapter One, pp.26-7.
[2] H. Jones, 'Is the Order of Nature Opposed to the Moral Life?', Address delivered in the University of

certain elements that were to prove central to his thought: specifically, the nature of individuality and an idea of the process of evolution.

Jones' ethics and social philosophy, however, cannot be detached from his metaphysical assumptions. In the context of this chapter, whether these were valid or mistaken is not at issue. Jones' metaphysical system needs to be considered only with regard to his social and political ideas. The nature of these beliefs and their role in buttressing, and contributing to, the positions reached by Jones need therefore to be established. With this in mind, the second section of this chapter will consider the place of Jones' metaphysical thought with reference to his other ideas.

Above all, however, the significance of Jones for this thesis lies in his interpretation of the idealist concepts that he inherited, and their application to particular contexts. Indeed, Jones' political writings often addressed what he saw as immediate problems within a specific political situation. Yet, the extent to which his ideas conditioned Jones' reading of the political developments of his day, is an important factor to consider. An understanding of the principles which lay behind Jones' conception of citizenship depends on a clear idea of the interaction between his thought and his politics. This will be examined in the final section of this chapter.

I. THE SOCIAL ORGANISM

In 1883, Jones' first academic article was published in a collection of essays, edited by Andrew Seth (later Pringle-Pattison) and R. B. Haldane, and dedicated to T. H. Green.[3] The subject of Jones' article was 'The Social Organism', and the choice, according to Hetherington, 'was significant of the direction of his interest then and afterwards'.[4] Hetherington does not say why he thought this, but the article related to Jones' subsequent interests in a number of ways. In this section, it will be argued that Jones' construction of the social organism provided him with a framework for further philosophical development; in particular, that it brought to the fore ideas about the process of evolution, individuality, and the relationship between the individual and society.

Glasgow on 23 October 1894-5 (Glasgow, 1894), p.6.

[3] *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (London, 1883).

The popularity of the organic model in nineteenth-century social thought may be attributed to a variety of developments. From a scientific perspective, overtly evolutionary theorists such as Comte and Spencer were reinvigorating the comparison of society to a natural organism, with the aim of establishing a more scientific basis for the study of society. As Spencer put it,

> 'A perception that there exists some analogy between the body politic and a living individual body, was early reached; and has from time to time re-appeared in literature. But this perception was necessarily vague and more or less fanciful. In the absence of physiological science, and especially of those comprehensive generalizations which it has but lately reached, it was impossible to discern the real parallelisms.'[5]

For Spencer, therefore, the attraction of social organicism rested in the possibility that, with the advances in physiological science afforded by the application of Darwinian ideas, a sustainable analogy of society as an organism could be established, thus making possible the discovery of 'social laws'. Through this, social thought could see its way to becoming, as Michael Freeden put it, 'one particular manifestation of a general cosmology'.[6]

In the philosophical arena, a different force was acting through the resurgence of Platonic studies and an increasing interest in German idealism as articulated by Hegel. For the British idealists, the ideas of social organicism seemed to lend force to conceptions of idealist unity and the very possibility of self-determination within the context of the social whole. Whereas Spencer focused on the possibility of discovering 'social laws' from a scientific perspective, idealists like Edward Caird saw the notion of organic unity as a means of establishing the idea that the rational ordering of the world depended upon the free activity of the individual mind. As an organism, human society was not presented as 'a mere collection of units externally related to each other', but as an integral 'whole in which there is some kind of unity or self which is present in every part'. For Caird, this meant 'the denial of external necessity as the final

---

[4] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, pp.27-8.
[5] H. Spencer, 'The Social Organism' (1860) in *Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative*, I (London, 1891; repr. 1996), p.269.
[6] Freeden, *New Liberalism*, p.76.

explanation of everything'.[7] If the 'whole' was seen to be 'in every part', it was 'determined, only as its *self* is present in all its determinations'.[8] An organic unity implied that the individual was not helpless within a deterministic universe, but a part of a universe that was ordered through his own consciousness.

Social organicism seems to have benefited, therefore, from a confluence of two intellectual currents. Each, however, embodied significantly different emphases: whereas the idealist perspective focused upon the idea of a co-ordinating social mind as a form of self-consciousness, the scientific conception of organicism rejected any such notion. Nevertheless, the organic analogy served as an important *leitmotiv* in late nineteenth-century social thought, providing a focus for a community of discourse between theorists of a variety of persuasions. It may be argued that the dominance of evolutionary thought was such that the intellectual credibility of any social or political theory depended upon its coming to terms with at least some form of social organicism. Yet, the extent to which the idea came to dominate the social and political imagination of the period suggests a significance that went beyond purely academic interests. As Sandra den Otter points out, the late nineteenth century also saw a marked concern with restoring 'community' and buttressing connections between individuals.[9] In the face of such disintegrating social tendencies as economic depression, unemployment and poverty, the turning of thought in this direction is unsurprising. In this context, the organic model provided a means by which 'community' could be conceptualised. This, however, places the organic argument in a more 'prescriptive' dimension. Organicism was not merely an objective analytical tool in this context, but an analogy susceptible to interpretations that were aimed at upholding or re-creating particular, and often pre-existing, positions.

Could there have been, therefore, a common understanding of what constituted 'social organicism'? Sandra den Otter argues that, although it appeared in many different guises, 'social organicism most often meant that the parts of an organism were mutually dependent, and thus that the value and definition of each part were derived from the whole; and also that the whole

---

[7] E. Caird, *Hegel* (London, 1903), p.192.
[8] *Ibid.*, p.194.

was in some way different from the sum of these parts'.[10] Yet Spencer, who is often regarded as a dominant force in establishing the idea of social organicism, contended that while it was 'well that the lives of all parts of an animal should be merged in the life of the whole, because the whole has a corporate consciousness capable of happiness or misery', the same could not be said for a society because 'its living units do not and cannot lose individual consciousness, and since the community as a whole has no corporate consciousness'. This, Spencer held as an 'everlasting reason' why the welfares of citizens cannot be sacrificed to the benefit of the State, and why the State had to be 'maintained solely for the benefit of citizens'. The corporate life had to be subservient to the life of its parts.[11]

Spencer's version of the social organism thus seemed to involve a separation of the whole from its parts rather than an identification, creating a dichotomy that would have seemed alien to an idealist conception. Whereas the idealists sought liberty for the individual through a self-determining principle which could only be realised in an organic society, for Spencer the organic society was a given, within which the integrity of the individual had to be protected. Indeed, in *The Study of Sociology*, Spencer claimed that it was 'society as a whole, *considered apart from its living units*' that presented 'phenomena of growth, structure, and function, analogous to those of growth, structure, and function in an animal'.[12] Spencer's 'organism', it may be argued, was not conceived as a consideration of the nature of the relationship between individual life and the life of the 'whole', whereas this was the central point to the idealists' organic models. Different conceptions of the organic model would, therefore, appear to result from different starting points for analysis, and differing sets of assumptions about the nature of reality.

Jones' understanding of the social organism needs to be seen in this light. In order to write 'The Social Organism', Jones felt the need to establish a thorough understanding of such widely divergent texts as Hegel's *Rechts Philosophie*, Fichte's *Lectures on the Nation* and Spencer's

---

[9] den Otter, *British Idealism and Social Explanation*, p.4.
[10] *Ibid.*, p.156.
[11] Spencer, 'Social Organism', pp.276-7.
[12] H. Spencer, *The Study of Sociology* (9th edition; London, 1880), p.326. Emphasis added.

Sociology.[13] In a letter to Caird, he made clear where he stood with regard to Spencer; and the fact that the resultant essay was written as a critique of Spencer's conception of society as organism suggests the importance Jones attached to defining, and establishing, his position as against Spencer's. It may be suggested that, given Spencer's intellectual prominence in the arena, Jones had little choice but to engage with Spencer if he was to write anything on the subject of the social organism. However, the vehemence with which Jones challenged Spencer's conception seems to manifest a more fundamental need. Jones' objections formed the starting point for his identification of areas for further philosophical engagement, and reflected his particular concerns. His criticisms did not engage with Spencer on Spencer's own intellectual premises; indeed, they constituted an attack on the very core of Spencer's project. A consideration of the nature of Jones' critique sheds light on his particular conception of the purposes of academic speculation, and provides a sense of the different objectives which lay behind the late nineteenth-century preoccupation with the organic idea.

In his letter to Caird, Jones wrote that he found Spencer's speculations 'very disappointing and... very shallow'. Jones could find little to say of 'one who speaks of society as if it had no moral or intellectual elements within it... as if all its differentiations and integrations were directed, if directed at all, by external wants, physical desires and contingent terrestrial and climatic facts'. He further criticised Spencer for beginning to 'speculate on society before seeing the character of humanity'.[14] Yet, as has been suggested, the 'character of humanity' was not, in essence, what Spencer was concerned with. The idea of society as an organism operated, for Spencer, primarily at the level of metaphor and analogy. While this may have held true for most theorists, it is arguable that it was more explicitly so with Spencer. The case that he was keen to make was that there was a 'real analogy' between an individual organism and a social organism,[15] and to show that similar laws to those that had been discovered for the individual organism could, with justification, be seen to apply to the development of society. To this end, Spencer was concerned with drawing parallels between the *structure* of society and that of an organism, and was

---

[13] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.9: H. Jones to A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, 1 June 1882.
[14] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.10: Jones to E. Caird, 3 June 1882.

especially keen to define precise and specific parallels between the structural components he identified.[16]

To Jones, however, Spencer's 'elaborate analogies' represented no more than ingenious flourishes. Commenting on Spencer's parallelisms, he wrote, 'In this strain he has proceeded far, but there is no reason in the nature of *things* why he should not have proceeded further; for ingenuity has a greater hand than truth in the production of analogies…'.[17] In a later article, Jones articulated his position with regard to analogies and metaphors in greater detail.[18] '[T]he sciences of man,' he wrote,

> 'and especially of human society, are "the playground of analogies." These unconscious analogies… are allowed to fill the part of scientific hypotheses; and the power of a hypothesis of explaining facts, if it is true, or of falsifying facts, if it is false, is not easily measured.'[19]

More importantly, however, Jones took issue with Spencer's search for analogies between the animal organism and the mechanical organism of trades and occupations, instead of between the former and the 'spiritual organism of society itself'. On these grounds, Jones held that Spencer's 'analogies give no light, and his doctrines need not be tested by the law of consistency, for he has no system'. That Jones should have arrived at this conclusion was to some extent understandable, given that he was attempting to connect Spencer's speculations with those of Hegel. Not surprisingly, Jones found this a 'difficult and almost useless task' and judged Spencer to be 'quite unscientific' as compared to Hegel.[20] What seems to be at issue here, however, is not so much the validity of Spencer's view, as a reflection of a different conception of what constituted a scientific enterprise. Jones' main criticism of Spencer seems to have been that his 'theory' ignored any spiritual aspect of existence. By leaving the ethical dimension as something external to the theory, Spencer's analysis did not take into account what Jones saw as

---

[15] Spencer, *Study of Sociology*, p.326.
[16] On this point, Spencer may be seen to be indebted to Hobbes' thought. As 'the first self-consciously "scientific" political theorist', Hobbes believed that 'the Acquisition of Science' was to be obtained through 'the right Definition of Names', and it was through metaphor and analogy that his ideas were presented. See T. Ball, 'Hobbes's Linguistic Turn' in *Reappraising Political Theory*, pp.83, 99, 101.
[17] H. Jones, 'The Social Organism' in A. Seth and R. B. Haldane (eds), *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (London, 1883), p.189.
[18] See H. Jones, 'The Misuse of Metaphors in the Human Sciences', the second part of 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer'.
[19] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.35.

the whole of society and, on that basis, failed.

Yet, to the extent that Spencer did attempt to derive ethical speculations from his analogy, they pointed to a position with which Jones had little sympathy. Spencer conceived of his organic analogy as a means by which the rival analogy of a machine could be rejected. Whereas the organic analogy is often seen as implying a collectivist political theory and holistic methods of analysis, the mechanistic analogy is seen as sustaining the position of individualism and atomism.[21] Yet, Spencer sought to use the former for the support of his chosen position of *laissez-faire* individualism. The importance of establishing a 'living' universe as against a mechanistic one was, for Spencer, the fact that the former was capable of development and growth. More importantly, if society was an organism, this growth was *natural.* As organisms progressed by evolution from the simple to the complex, without apparent intervention, Spencer argued for a similar process in the social organism. It was on these grounds that Spencer criticised Hobbes' and Plato's earlier conceptions of organic society for assuming that society was an artificial construct, created by man.[22] Spencer was concerned to establish the nature of the means by which societies developed as a natural process. Artificial human intervention, would destroy this fragile complexity of multifarious functions and it was, therefore, best to maintain the *laissez-faire* approach.

To Jones, Spencer's ethical speculations were essentially misplaced. Spencer's use of the conceptions of evolution and organism were interesting and of value insofar as they had been 'adopted out of the current thought of the age on scientific subjects', but they were 'superimposed on an alien philosophy' through Spencer's commitment to purely individualistic principles. In Jones' view, this reflected a failure, on Spencer's part, to engage with the deeper meaning of prevalent intellectual tendencies.[23] Jones wrote from the belief that the problems of individualism were coming to be of little interest to contemporary philosophy. 'The educated

---

[20] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.10: Jones to E. Caird, 3 June 1882.
[21] J. D. Y. Peel, *Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist* (London, 1968), p.168.
[22] Spencer, 'Social Organism', p.271.
[23] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.188. Jones was not alone in considering Spencer to be misguided by his commitments: J. A. Hobson, for whom Spencer was an influential figure, explained away an acknowledged failure of consistency in Spencer's political thought by arguing that it was resultant on the fact that he had politically committed himself at too early a stage in his mental development, and had not allowed his

attention of the present,' he wrote, 'is directed to the relations of individuals rather than to individuals themselves'. Moreover, 'these relations are regarded, in a more or less uncertain sense, as essential to, if not constitutive of, individuals'.[24] It was in these terms that Jones conceived of the project of organicism. As he put it in a later lecture,

> 'Modern ethics has discovered, I can almost say for the first time, the relations which bind the individual to his fellows, and which make him, as he never was before, a member of a moral partnership which contains the living and the dead. He is now known as the heir of the achievements of his people, and the organ of its far-reaching purposes. He has not to confront the task of living a moral life in the weakness and nakedness of individualism, but the pulse and the power of the whole beat within him.'[25]

Thus, for Jones, the essence of the organic analogy consisted in its suggestion of the mutual implication in the relationship between individuals and their society – between the particular and the whole. Spencer, on the other hand, had no such aim. According to Jones, Spencer 'denies society as an end and makes it a means by which the welfare of individuals is secured; the last and only end is the welfare of the individuals composing it'. Yet, Jones argued, if society was a means, it had, in the first place, to exist outside and independently of its individuals. As society does not and never has existed apart from individuals, it had to be something more than mere means. Moreover, a means must perish in the attainment of the end, and society in fact proved the opposite, because 'it is the society which fails to secure the welfare of its members that is disintegrated, not that which succeeds in doing so'.[26]

Jones and Spencer therefore conceived of the project with regard to an organic model of society in different ways, and this, as much as their supposed identification with opposing positions on an individualist-collectivist spectrum, put them at odds in their ideas of the social organism. Jones' conception of society as a social organism was, in a sense, at once less ambitious, and yet more grandiose than Spencer's. It was less ambitious in that Jones did not see the conceptualisation of society as an organism as needing to be a perfect, scientifically-valid model of society. Indeed, Jones did not think that this was, in fact, possible. In 'The Working

---

politics to evolve from his science. See Freeden, *New Liberalism*, p.79.
[24] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.187.
[25] Jones, 'Is the Order of Nature Opposed to the Moral Life?', p.10.
[26] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.191.

Faith of the Social Reformer', written in 1905-6, Jones attempted to show that biological and purely natural analogies of human society failed to embrace the whole reality of social existence. Insofar as the biological idea admitted 'the possibility of the mutual welfare of the parts' and indicated 'that a certain independence and variety of functions is compatible with the unity of the whole', Jones accepted that society was 'more like an animal than a machine'. However, he maintained that society *was* not an animal. 'Human society contains both physical and biological elements,' he wrote, 'but its *basis* is neither physical nor biological. Its basis is the rational nature of man.'[27] Society, as Jones saw it, was the product of conscious ends, which could not be explained solely by biology. Society was, for Jones, an organism, '[n]ot because it is like an animal, and because the individual components are like joints and limbs; but because the individual realises himself as an ethical being in society, and society realises its aims in the freedom of individuals'.[28]

In this latter sense, Jones' conception was more grandiose, because Jones saw the social organism as a 'doctrine' to hold to, and one that had to be made more than a metaphor. Spencer had conceded that there was in the social organism, as in the individual organism, 'a life of the whole quite unlike the lines of the units; though it is a life produced by them'.[29] He had qualified this notion, however, with an important distinction, arising from an 'extreme unlikeness' between the social organism and the individual organism. 'The parts of an animal,' he asserted, 'form a concrete whole; but the parts of a society form a whole that is discrete.'[30] Jones accepted that Spencer's statement about the discrete character of society was not to be denied, but, if society was an organic whole, the important point, as Jones saw it, was to overcome this discreteness, so that unity could be asserted 'through and amidst the differences'.[31] In other words, Jones held that notions of the discreteness of society and of its organic wholeness, could not simply be combined as Spencer proposed. Indeed, by separating the concept of organic wholeness from the 'living units' of society, Spencer's society was, in Jones' opinion, not even organic because 'it is

---

[27] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.40.
[28] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.208.
[29] H. Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, I (London, 1876), p.475.
[30] *Ibid.*

not a whole, the parts are not its parts. And its end is the welfare and happiness of that which is not and cannot be itself.'[32]

Whatever the difficulties may be in finding the unity of the social organism, Jones believed that it had to be recognised that 'society and individuals actually form such a whole, and that apart from each other they are both nothing but names; and we must cease to speak of individuals as if they could exist apart from society, or could attain their purposes except by becoming its organs and carrying out its purposes'.[33] To this end, Jones was arguing for a society that was *more* organic than the living body. Jones' social organism was more concrete *because* it was more discrete: 'its self-integration is more intense because its self-differentiation is more complete'.[34] Whereas Spencer argued from the basis that there was no 'social sensorium', Jones sought to establish one in what he saw as the *life* of society. It was this *life*, and not tissues and nervous currents, that made the organic unity according to Jones. A 'part' became an 'organ' through the operation of consciousness: a combination of feeling and thought. The conditions imposed upon a man by his environment were as nothing to him, Jones argued, 'until they have penetrated into his consciousness'. However, when this had been achieved, such conditions become transmuted by the power of the individual's will, and 'are no longer mere conditions but *thoughts* – parts of the possession of the power which understands them'.[35] It was through this process that the social organism was realised in Jones' conception.

The Idea of Evolution

The idea of process formed a central part in Jones' thought. This needs to be considered in the light of his acceptance of the concept of evolution as the 'dominant category' of his day. It is important to note, however, that Jones endowed the concept with a particular interpretation. To Jones, the concept of evolution was 'profoundly optimistic in character'. Although he acknowledged that it admitted of 'the difference and antagonism of elements, of discontent and strife', he was adamant that 'the main emphasis necessarily falls upon the identity beneath the

---

[31] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.190.
[32] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.10: Jones to E. Caird, 3 June 1882.
[33] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.193.
[34] *Ibid.*, p.194.

differences, and upon the triumphant realization, through struggle and strife, of a single final purpose'. Moreover, on the grounds that this 'final purpose' was also 'planted in the lowest form of being', Jones saw evolution as presenting everything in nature with 'immeasurable dignity and worth' and justifying every step by which the end was achieved. Thus, Jones' profoundly optimistic vision, based on his idea of the evolutionary process, was of a world to be regarded 'not only as a universal order, but as an order which ascends towards some higher form of being, in obedience to an inward necessity'.[36] The nature of this 'inward necessity'; the extent to which the process of ascent, as it were, depended solely on 'natural' progress; and, indeed, what constituted a 'natural' process; are all issues that need to be addressed in the analysis of Jones' thought.

In his famous Romanes Lecture of 1893, 'Evolution and Ethics', T. H. Huxley questioned the optimism of those who believed in the moral purpose of nature and the ability of the cosmic process to aid social progress. For him, 'the ethical progress of society' depended upon 'combatting' the cosmic process, rather than trusting in it. Huxley used this insight to challenge what he called 'the fanatical individualism of our time', which sought to question the extent to which members of a community were 'justified in using their combined strength to constrain one of their number to contribute his share to the maintenance of it; or even to prevent him from doing his best to destroy it', on the grounds that '[t]he struggle for existence, which has done such admirable work in cosmic nature, must... be equally beneficent in the ethical sphere'.[37] Insofar as such a position countered the ideas proposed by Spencer, one might expect that Jones would have been in accord with it. However, in his inaugural address at the University of Glasgow in 1894, Jones in fact opposed such a conception, on the grounds that the alleged antagonism of the natural order to the moral life, implied a moral world that was completely constructed by man, with no help from the 'macrocosm'. This, as Jones saw it, was 'to attribute too much to man and too little to the world'.[38] Given that he seems to have criticised Spencer for

---

[35] *Ibid.*, p.197.
[36] Jones, 'Is the Order of Nature Opposed to the Moral Life?', p.9.
[37] *Ibid.*, p.34.
[38] *Ibid.*, p.25.

attributing *too much* to the world – to the exclusion of its living, spiritual units – it is interesting to find that his criticism of Huxley seems to have been the precise opposite. Jones' position involved a subtle balance between the two positions. More importantly, however, it reflected a different conception of what constituted a 'natural' process, and, by extension, what constituted the character of 'nature' itself.

As has been argued, Jones' construction of the social organism insisted upon the inclusion of the spiritual nature of humanity. Moreover, it saw the operation of the individual will within the social organism as a central part of the process. Both of these aspects may be seen in Jones' conception of 'nature' with regard to the evolutionary process. Certainly, Jones believed that however loyal one remained to the idea of the unity of being, the difference between rational life, and organic or physical processes should not be ignored or minimised. '[I]f science stops short of moralizing nature,' Jones argued, 'it is equally evident that no moral theory can so naturalize the phenomena of self-consciousness as to make the conflicting motives of an intelligent being purely physical.'[39] In this sense, Jones held that there was a distinction that could be drawn between 'ordinary' or 'scientific' evolution, with its materialistic emphasis; and 'spiritual' evolution, which was the development of rational life. It was, indeed, on this basis that Jones challenged Spencer's conception. In 'The Working Faith of the Social Reformer', Jones likened the civilised modern state to 'a vast primaeval forest', insofar as it was 'a thing self-sown, renewing its immortality from age to age', with 'its laws of growth… and its own grave grandeur'. However, Jones concluded that society differed from the native forest, because its structure was spiritual, and it was 'the product, in every part, of the rational nature of man, and by far the most glorious exhibition of his powers'.[40]

Yet, Jones also held that it would not be 'faithful to the facts' to 'deny to nature all participation in the processes and achievements of the human spirit'. He reasoned that, as man did not 'think or know *except by the help of nature*', knowledge and morality could not be conceived as 'the achievements of *either* man *or* of the world in which he lives'. 'Nature must furnish the

---

[39] *Ibid.*, p.20.
[40] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.17.

facts, as well as evolve the interpreting intelligence;' Jones argued, 'and, in so far as she furnishes the facts the product, namely knowledge, is as much hers as it is man's.'[41] Thus, Jones' conception of 'nature' did not allow for the complete exclusion of the spiritual and rational. By the same token then, the 'natural' or 'cosmic' process could not be separated from ethical or spiritual progress. Moreover, nature, according to Jones, was 'not a crass, material lump', and a mechanical explanation of it could not suffice, because 'it is too obviously and intimately related to Spirit'.[42] 'Spirit', for Jones, meant 'thought and feeling and will and all the powers of man in interpenetration and indivisible unity'.[43] By this definition, the concept of 'nature' was also inclusive of the mind and will of the individual. For Jones, such a conclusion accorded with the concern with the interrelationship and inclusiveness embodied in his conception of idealist unity.

The *form* of this interrelationship and inclusiveness, however, reflected some of Jones' other concerns. It should be emphasised that Jones' conceptual aim for what he saw as the evolutionary process was an 'identity *beneath the differences*'.[44] As will be suggested later,[45] Jones saw this as being a defining feature of his idealism, and it is important to note here its relation to his understanding of evolution. In the context of evolution and organicism, Jones believed that it was possible that

> 'nature's deepest law provides not merely, nor primarily, for the single blessedness of the fittest survivor; but for the evolution and maintenance of an equilibrium, of a complex organism of interrelated species, in which the innocent and the helpless have their permanent place, no less than the self-assertive and strong'.[46]

In this articulation, Jones shaped the idea of evolution to the needs of his ideal for society. It is important to note, however, that his conception of the 'deepest law', or the 'inward necessity', of the evolutionary process was framed in terms of a balance – the 'maintenance of an equilibrium'. Moreover, the organism he conceived of was a '*complex* organism', whereby variety would be maintained. The idea of evolution, thus conceptualised, provided Jones with a

---

[41] *Ibid.*, pp.26-7.
[42] Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p.107.
[43] *Ibid.*, p.36, n.1.
[44] Jones, 'Is the Order of Nature Opposed to the Moral Life?', p.9. Emphasis added.
[45] See below, pp.126-7.
[46] Jones, 'Is the Order of Nature Opposed to the Moral Life?', p.24.

framework within which it was possible for him to resolve some of the dualistic difficulties he confronted in his idealism.

It is in this context, perhaps, that Jones' construction of his idea of freedom as a progressive ideal should be seen. In *Idealism as a Practical Creed* – a series of lectures delivered in 1909 in Sydney which sought to address the young Australian commonwealth on the building up of a nation's life – Jones presented the emancipation of the individual as a process. Spirit, Jones held, was free by nature,[47] but the freedom of the individual had to be acquired through an integrative process, which made for the realisation of Jones' social organism. The question of whether the 'Will of Man' was free could not, in Jones' opinion, be answered with a definitive 'Yes' or 'No'. 'Static categories are all out of place when applied to things in process,' he argued. To do justice to such things, an answer that was both 'Yes' and 'No' was required.[48] 'Man's life,' Jones argued,

> '*is* the working of his ideals. His nature *is* a process. He is not bond or free, rational or irrational; but he is moving from promise to fulfilment, in so far as he is true to himself. He is *becoming* free, and *acquiring* reason; and it is only because he can *become* that we can call him either free or rational.'[49]

The concept of evolution therefore provided Jones with a way of maintaining, and reconciling, his commitments both to the freedom of the individual and to his implication in the social whole.

Personality and the Individual

For Jones, as for those of a similar idealist persuasion, the question of freedom was – albeit, perhaps, to varying extents – inseparable from the idea of individuality within the organic model. Simply put, the idealist conviction was that membership in a society conferred meaning on the individual. This simple construction, however, belied a deep complexity of subtle interpretations. Questions of the balance of priority between the individual and the whole, and of the nature of the whole with regard to the individual, could, and often did, mark differences

---

[47] Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p.36.
[48] *Ibid.*, p.37.
[49] *Ibid.*, pp.38-9.

amongst idealists.[50] Given, moreover, the persistent tendency to regard idealism as a holist and illiberal ideology because of its perceived primary concern with subsuming individual liberty under the auspices of the 'common good', the construction of the problem of personality and individuality and the attempts to resolve it within an organic whole become of particular significance.

Avital Simhony has suggested that an idealist organicism transcended the traditional dichotomy between holist and individualist models of society and that, in fact, far from being characterised by a holist conception of society, the idealist position of 'relational organicism', as she termed it, should be seen as a rejection of the holistic perspective.[51] Simhony bases her argument on the numerous statements made by idealists with regard to the relationship between the individual and society, which have stressed that the social good was 'neither separate from, nor more valuable than, the well-being of the individual'.[52] Jones' conception of the social organism accorded with such a view. 'No theory of the organism of society can avail,' Jones argued in 'The Social Organism', 'if in its ardour to reconstruct society it does violence to the individual's independence and compromises his right to seek his own welfare.' The individual had to be fitted into his surroundings, and thus 'made the means of the good of society *without compromising his right to realise his own purposes*'.[53] Thus, Jones was at pains to stress not only the value of the individual, but of his purposes *as an individual*, within the social organism. The good of the community, Jones believed, was inseparable from the good of the individual and its realisation depended on individual self-realisation. Society, as he saw it, came to its own self-consciousness, and attained its purposes, 'in the self-consciousness and purposes of *every* individual'.[54]

However, Jones believed that although society apart from individuals was nothing, it was 'equally true that *individuals apart from society* are nothing'.[55] 'The life that animates the individual,' he asserted, 'is that of the social whole as much as it is his own. His purpose is not to his own

---

[50] See, for example, J. Morrow, 'Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy: A Reassessment', *History of Political Thought*, V (1984), pp.91-108.
[51] A. Simhony, 'Idealist Organicism: Beyond Holism and Individualism', *History of Political Thought*, XII (1991), pp.515, 519.
[52] *Ibid.*, p.533.
[53] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.199. Emphasis added.
[54] *Ibid.*, p.213.

particular welfare, nor is it the particular welfare of his neighbours; but it is the welfare of the social whole to which they all belong and which lives in them.'[56] In Jones' construction, however, this did not in any way diminish the claims for individuality made above. How this was achieved may be understood if a distinction is made between Jones' *definition* of the individual on the one hand, and his conception of the proper expression of the relationship between such an individual and society on the other.

With respect to the former, Jones seems to have held to an Aristotelian notion, by which society was seen to be 'logically, or by intrinsic necessity, prior to the individual'.[57] To this end, it may be said that he saw the individual as being, necessarily, 'created' by society. 'Our debt to human society and, in particular, to our own country,' Jones contended, 'is not measurable. It is as deep as our being; we have borrowed the stuff and structure of our souls.'[58] The substance of individual nature was, according to Jones, assimilated through the social environment and, as such, 'self-hood, individuality, independence, freedom' depended not on what the individual excluded, but on what he was able to include.[59] The development of individuality was thus defined as an inclusive process, which necessarily – and, it may be added, naturally – involved society. Indeed, Jones held that an individual who severed himself from his surroundings and lived entirely in and for himself was actually contradicting his freedom. 'We can no more imagine an individual "who has not suckled at the breast of the universal ethos," who has not lived in a spiritual environment and converted (or perverted) that environment into his own nature,' he asserted in 'The Social Organism', 'than we can conceive an oak tree which has grown where there is neither earth nor air, without light and without darkness.'[60]

In 'The Social Organism', Jones argued that '[t]he progress of humanity is not from egoism to altruism, but from an egoism which is from the first altruistic to an altruism which

---

[55] *Ibid.*, p.190.
[56] *Ibid.*, p.192.
[57] Jones, 'Man and his Environment' in *Social Powers: Three Popular Lectures on the Environment, the Press and the Pulpit* (Glasgow, 1913), p.39. In Book I of his *Politics*, Ch.2, xii-xiv, Aristotle wrote: 'It is clear that the *polis* is both natural and prior to the individual'.
[58] H. Jones, 'The Obligations and Privileges of Citizenship', *Rice Institute Studies*, VI (1919), p.146.
[59] Jones, 'Immanence of God and the Individuality of Man', p.33.
[60] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.204.

must ever remain egoistic.'[61] To Jones, a world in which individual men and women were 'separate and distinct and exclusive, and clink against one another like seaside pebbles'; in which one would fulfil one's whole duty simply by letting others alone; was 'as much the creation of the imagination as Prospero's island'.[62] The world into which all men and women are born, according to Jones, 'is one complex system of interrelated human beings, every one of whom is structurally affected in mind, body and soul by that system, and finds in the mutual obligations between himself and his fellows the conditions of living the life of a rational being'.[63] Social relations, therefore, were neither contingent nor external. In fact, it seemed rather to bear the character of an inward necessity. As a definition of the nature of the individual, it was one that Jones held throughout his career, occurring in much the same form in his last philosophical work, *A Faith that Enquires*, as it did in his first articulation of the principle in 'The Social Organism'.

In the essay 'Social and Individual Evolution', which appeared in *The New World*, he set out the following argument:

> 'If the ends of society and those of the individual come into collision, it is because both society and the individual are in contradiction with themselves. The conflict arises because either the individual or the society has *blundered* and *sought an illegitimate end*, even from its own point of view. A social will that does not justify itself in particular benefits to the individuals who constitute the community must delete itself; and an individual end which is anti-social tends to destroy the individual himself.'[64]

By characterising any conflict of ends between the individual and society as a *mistake*; and by suggesting that the failure to accord mutual benefits tended to lead to the self-destruction of the party seeking gain for itself; Jones emphasised again the extent to which he saw the organic unity of society as an inescapable conclusion.

More realistically perhaps, Jones also argued that, without a foothold in the outer world, the individual would have 'no sphere for his activities, no trust or responsibilities, no duties, and, therefore, no opportunity of realising his personality or learning virtue.' Moreover, 'having no

---

[61] *Ibid.*, p.210.
[62] Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*, p.180.
[63] *Ibid.*, p.181.
[64] H. Jones, 'Social and Individual Evolution' in *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, pp.246-7. Emphases added.

right to impress his own will on any object he would not be able to impress himself in any act'.[65] Thus, without the purposes of society, Jones believed that the individual had 'no purposes at all, and cannot even be egoistic'.[66] In other words, without society the individual could have no conception of himself, let alone of his freedom. Thus, Jones argued, 'Apart from society the individual cannot realise his freedom; neither his own particular self nor the Universal will could afford him a single motive. The individual is free only because he finds his duties in society, and his duties are his ethical life.'[67] This held important consequences for the conception of freedom.

On the one hand, it is important to note that Jones did not see the conceptual necessity of a social individual as imposing limits upon the individual. 'No theory of ethics,' Jones held, 'can afford to cast away the absolute liberty and infinite worth of the individual. Freedom has been bought at too great a price to be bartered away.'[68] Although the individual was conceptually implicated in the social whole, the extent to which his purposes were identified with society's was a matter of individual determination. This followed from the idealist notion that the rational ordering of the world depended upon the free activity of the individual mind.[69] Society could not impose an ideal, or necessity, that was alien or external to the individual; it was the individual himself, as a rational being, who gave voice to, and interpreted, his social environment. The individual, therefore, is seen to create his own ideal. 'Whatever the necessity may be which encircles his life,' Jones held, 'it cannot affect his character until he has put his signature to it, adopted it, and made it his motive.' Insofar as it was *his* motive, then, it was '*in* him, not around him or above: it [was] his own necessity and not an alien one'.[70] Morality, for Jones, was self-articulated and a means of self-realisation. As he put it, the individual who makes the 'welfare of the race' his aim does so because he sees it as 'his own ideal; what he must realise in order to be what he *ought* to be. The welfare of the race is his own welfare, which he must seek because he must be *himself*.'[71]

---

[65] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.95.
[66] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.192.
[67] *Ibid.*, p.207.
[68] *Ibid.*, p.200.
[69] See above, p.105.
[70] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.197.
[71] *Ibid.*, p.209.

On the other hand, however, the concept of freedom had become entangled in the conception of an ideal. Thus, it could be maintained that the individual was 'free only to the extent of his purposes. Where they are narrow and near, his liberty is limited. But it expands with his comprehension of his world, and is fullest when the better trend and tendencies of his time have passed into his life and become his intelligent will.'[72] The idea of a progressive freedom is not one with which many present-day theorists will be comfortable. Yet, it played an important part in Jones' thought. Within the context of organic unity, the idea of freedom was associated with the idea of self-determination, which lent it a specific meaning. Inasmuch as the individual was thus implicated in the unfolding of a vast organic unity, the concept of freedom as self-determination came to be seen as 'the *life* which forms the unity of the moral organism.'[73] In a rather paradoxical use of language, Jones asserted that the '*bond* of the social organism, that which is its self-differentiating, self-integrating life, is *freedom*.'[74] This paradox, however, encompassed the notion that it was the very possibility that the individual *could* identify his purposes with that of the organic whole that freed him from what would otherwise be a deterministic and external universe. In this particular way, therefore, freedom was central to Jones' idealist conception of organic unity.

This, however, impacted upon the way in which Jones conceived of a right expression for the relationship between the individual and the whole. Jones always maintained the notion that man remained, and must remain, a unique personality. 'To the end,' Jones argued, in a lecture to the Rice Institute in Houston, in 1915, '[man] will maintain his subjective integrity and inviolable privacy; he will look upon the wide world through his own most individual thought, and act upon it from the secret depths of his own most exclusive will.' The thought and will of the individual, however, was 'capable of a wide comprehension', because, through this form of rational life, the individual was 'also being revealed as an individuated organ of a vast whole'. Thus, Jones concluded, the individual was to be seen as 'a pulse-throb of a universal mind which sustains the natural order, and operates in him, and through him, by him, and, I believe, for

---

[72] Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p.21.
[73] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.208.

him.'[75] In this, Jones may have seen himself as following Socrates, for whom, according to Jones' interpretation, 'the rights of individuality lay, not in its singularity or caprice, but in its universal nature'.[76] The idea of unity to which Jones subscribed was one in which the individual is seen as being afforded a greater liberty. The consequence of the individual being a part of a whole was not that he should lose his freedom to it, but that he should gain from his own universality.

It was on these grounds that Jones challenged Bernard Bosanquet's presentation of the relationship between the finite individual and the infinite Absolute. 'I think he underestimates the significance of personality,' Jones wrote to E. M. Mahler in 1913, referring to Bosanquet's *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, 'and goes further in the way of absorbing and transmuting finite selves in the Absolute than he has a right to do.'[77] The metaphysical doctrine of 'the Absolute' in idealist thought described the presence of 'a final, complete and perfect Reality incorporating all being in one harmonious whole',[78] but it was upheld in different ways by different idealists, depending upon how the 'Reality' was defined. For Jones, the Absolute represented an idea of 'a complete, self-consistent and self-sustaining reality within which falls every particular fact and form of experience, and of which all these are partial manifestations'.[79] However, he also held that the 'principle of individuality *is* Absolute, and the crudest rational being is in principle an individual'. Thus, self-consciousness, according to Jones, did not depend on an absolute "other" and the individual 'does not transcend himself in the course of his progress'.[80] Jones' position depended on the individual's active *identification* with, rather than absorption by, the Absolute, and his concern was with the means by which this could be realised. In Bosanquet's Absolute, Jones argued, the finite was either lost or transmuted beyond recognition.[81] By supposing man's real nature as being finite, Bosanquet implied that one had to pass "beyond" oneself to achieve the infinite. For Jones, however, a rational self was, by definition, self-determined, and 'what is self-

---

[74] *Ibid.*, p.200. Emphases added.
[75] H. Jones, 'Philosophical Landmarks. Being a Survey of the Recent Gains and the Present Problems of Reflective Thought', *Rice Institute Pamphlet*, I (1915), p.202.
[76] Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p.77.
[77] Jones to E. M. Mahler, March 1913, in Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.235.
[78] den Otter, *British Idealism and Social Explanation*, pp.77-8.
[79] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.139.
[80] Jones, 'Review of B. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*', *Hibbert Journal*, XI (1912-13), p.907.
[81] Jones, *A Faith that Enquires*, p.187.

determined is at once both infinite and absolute'. As a result, man did not need to go *beyond* himself, or be transmuted, in order to become an element of the Absolute; rather, each person, as an individual, represented 'the infinite in process' and expressed the Absolute in each instance by uniting the finite with the infinite.[82]

Jones' conception of the evolutionary process provided the means by which Jones sought to preserve the integrity of the individual within the Absolute, or organic, unity. Through a combination of his social organicism and his idea of evolution, it was possible for Jones to maintain that 'every step in spiritual well-doing is at once the actual attainment of the Best, the realization, as demanded and made possible by the circumstances of the moment, of a good that is moral and therefore Absolute, and also it is the building up of the individual as an individual'.[83] For Jones, the social organism meant that 'subjective and objective, the self and not-self, the particular and the universal, the individual and society, interpenetrate and become an organic whole'. Thus, he concluded, 'Society exists only in the individual, and the individual exists only in society.'[84] It followed from this that there was only one way of building up or maintaining the social fabric for Jones, and it was not that of 'subduing others to the self, or the self to others', but the way of 'concurrent endowment' – not either/or but "both".[85]

The idea of the social organism thus provided Jones with several touchstones for further philosophical development. The evolutionary aspect of the organic argument, for example, could be seen as being continued in Jones' commitment to the idea of progress and adaptation in philosophy. More importantly, however, the complex nature of the interplay between ideas of unity and harmony on the one hand, and individuality, freedom and the development of a moral personality on the other, emerges in some form or other in almost all of Jones' work. In particular, the conception of individuality that has been considered had important implications for Jones' approach to the question of social reform and the way in which he conceived of the purposes of social work, which will be explored in the final section of this chapter. The problem

---

[82] *Ibid.*, pp.189-90.
[83] *Ibid.*, pp.190-1.
[84] Jones, 'Social Organism', p.207.
[85] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', pp.84-5.

clearly exercised his thought in all aspects of, and throughout, his career. Fundamentally, however, Jones' conceptualisation of the problem was informed by a particular metaphysical understanding of the reality of the world, derived from his philosophical position as an idealist. This position will be analysed in the next section.

II. The Philosophical System of Idealist Unity

Within the tradition of philosophical idealism in Britain, Jones' position was that of an Absolute Idealist, identified with the movement exemplified by the ideas of F. H. Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet. Absolute Idealism emphasised the ontological unity of experience as a whole, and held that reality could only be explained and accounted for by reference to this Absolute unity. Beyond this basic position, however, Absolute Idealists were split between those for whom the Absolute was beyond rational description and ultimately beyond practical experience, and those who believed that the Absolute manifested itself within human experience and that its unity 'embodies the principle of rationality which is expressed in and through all the differentiations of the whole'.[86] Jones and Edward Caird were prominent within the latter group, and it was from this position that Jones accused both Bradley and Bosanquet of positing an abstract Absolute unity that excluded all difference. Although his entire philosophical project was founded on the idea that there was a single principle which held the key to the understanding of life as a whole, Jones believed that a unity which obliterated differences in the process of transcending them was untenable. 'A unity which becomes itself unknowable, or lies beyond the reach of predication,' he argued in *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, 'holds no differences together, but sinks itself into an empty affirmation of the all-in-allness of everything.'[87]

It was on these grounds that Jones criticised the conception of idealist unity articulated by Bradley in *Appearance and Reality* as being fundamentally mistaken. In 'The Working Faith of the Social Reformer', Jones described the 'main mission of Idealism' as being 'to insist upon the internalising, subjectivising process by which reality comes to be apprehended in the form of experience'. However, in 'proving that self-consciousness must unite all things, or find all things

---

[86] D. Boucher (ed), *The British Idealists* (Cambridge, 1997), p.xiii.
[87] Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p.263.

to be united, in itself; in destroying dualism, whether of nature and spirit, or of thing and thought, or of real and ideal, or of subject and object', idealism fell easily into what Jones termed an 'abstract Monism'.[88] For Jones, the assertion that 'reality is experience', as understood by Bradley and his followers, implied this 'abstract Monism' because it allowed for 'no division, no difference, no distinction, no relation'.[89] By making being and reality the same as sentience, Bradley, according to Jones,

> 'asks us to believe that time, space, matter, spirit, sticks, stones, selves, human society, any object whatsoever which we can feel, think, or will, is itself just feeling, or thought, or volition, or some combination of them; that the objects of consciousness are themselves consciousness'.[90]

As Jones saw it, this relation of objects to self-consciousness 'robbed them of all their characters save those which are directly ideal', and 'reduced nature into a mere shadow of spirit'.[91] Because Bradley's Absolute was to 'contain, combine, transmute, nay *be* all finite things', it depended upon the elimination of all differences and relations between the ideal and the existing, and assumed that all the rational functions of man were aimed at this end.[92] Yet, Jones argued, if rational activities were to achieve this end of making the ideal and the existing one and the same, they and their object would cease to exist because there would be no relational structure for the operations of thought, will and feeling upon reality. This, in Jones' view, would result in 'blank Nihilism; a universal collapse into abstract sameness'. 'Knowledge would be no more,' he asserted, 'nor morality nor art any more; and not even their transmutation in the Absolute would avail, unless that transmutation still left to them the differences in which alone they find their existence, that is, unless even the Absolute kept them from attaining their end.'[93]

For Jones, differences were as much a part of the reality of the Absolute as unity. While he upheld the fundamental idealist principle of the systematic and rational coherence of reality, based on the Kantian assumption that reality was intelligible only as an organic rational system,

---

[88] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.70.
[89] *Ibid.*, p.76.
[90] *Ibid.*, p.72.
[91] *Ibid.*, p.65.
[92] *Ibid.*, p.74.
[93] *Ibid.*, p.75.

everywhere manifesting a single principle,[94] Jones was adamant that the Absolute was a unity that was realised *through* difference. Just as the evolutionary ideal was 'as vitally interested in maintaining the variety of the manifestations of life as it is in maintaining its unity', Jones argued, the rational spirit could also be seen to be 'as vitally interested in difference as it is in unity'. Thus, rather than seeking to 'reduce all things into spirit', it was possible that self-consciousness, through which objects were related to one another, could seek not to abolish but to maintain 'the mutual externality of things in space and time'.[95] Spirit, as Jones saw it, did not only surpass natural life 'in the intensity of its oneness', but also 'in the variety of its content, in the depth of the differences it comprises, and the independent significance with which it endows them'.[96] In Jones' understanding, the infinite Absolute manifested itself in each manifestation of the finite, presenting a reality that possessed 'the richer identity of harmonious system' rather than 'the monotonous identity of sameness'.[97]

Jones' particular conception of an Absolute that was involved in the fate of the finite drew its strength from what was for him a fundamentally religious conviction. In several of his writings, he identified the Absolute as God: 'All is one scheme,' he claimed, 'and God is the meaning of it.'[98] The notion of divine immanence, which Jones saw as 'a fact of religious experience', manifested his conception of the idealist unity in presenting a 'conception of the infinite and the finite in a relation of uttermost intimacy'.[99] According to Jones, this sense of divine indwelling and omnipresence within finite human experience was, within the religious consciousness, maintained in combination with the idea of a transcendent, infinite and perfect God; and, as he saw it, neither of the two conceptions could be given up if religion was to keep its essence.[100] Religious experience thus provided Jones with an interpretation of the mutual implication of difference and unity.

---

[94] Jones, *Philosophy of Lotze*, p.372.
[95] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.77.
[96] *Ibid.*, p.78.
[97] Jones, 'Immanence of God and the Individuality of Man', p.17.
[98] H. Jones, 'Divine Immanence', *Hibbert Journal*, V (1906-7), p.748.
[99] H. Jones, 'Divine Transcendence', Address given at Manchester College, Oxford, on the occasion of the opening of the 122nd session, 14 October 1907, pp.13, 15.
[100] See Jones, 'Divine Immanence', p.751. It should be noted that Jones' perspective on religion relied almost exclusively on Christian conceptions of deity. References to 'religion' or 'the religious

In Jones' understanding, spiritual communion was not possible if there was mere difference or mere unity. As he explained, 'A man can commune with himself only because he can distinguish himself from himself and be the object of his own contemplation. He can commune with nature or with God only because there underlies his difference from them some form of ontological continuity.'[101] For Jones, all the 'manifestations of the spirit of man' revealed 'universals immanent in the particulars'.[102] Yet, as knowledge, art, morality and religion, they 'must be acquired or possessed by individuals in their singleness and separateness'. 'All the possibilities and responsibilities of spirit,' Jones argued, 'imply that it is solitary.'[103] Righteousness, Jones emphasised, was 'real only because realised, and permanent only through being re-perpetuated in the righteous deeds of independent wills'. Thus, spirit was spirit 'only in so far as it individualises the world of objects within itself, making their meaning the content of its knowing and willing'.[104] Jones' argument led to the conclusion that divine immanence itself implied transcendence: 'We can believe in a God who is transcendent *because* He is immanent,' he asserted.[105] In this way, Jones upheld the principle of preserving individuality within a conception of idealist unity by reference to a spiritual argument, drawn from his religious convictions.

For Jones, idealist unity was not to be realised through the merging of finite and infinite identities into an undifferentiated whole. Within the religious consciousness, he argued, the finite and the infinite 'are not grasped together; they do not come together *as one* in our thoughts'. The universal principle, in his understanding, while sustaining all things, stood apart from them and appeared 'as a bond, a connecting entity, a third somewhat over and above the particulars it conjoins'.[106] The unity of the Absolute did not represent 'the putting of things *together*', Jones explained, but a form of 'self-articulation' and the 'flowing forth' of an all-comprehending love.[107] Jones' idea of unity thus possessed a dynamic and active quality, which accorded with his view of idealism 'as a theory which represents the universe as a thinking activity, an activity which reaches

---

consciousness' tended not, for the most part, to take into account religions other than Christianity.

[101] *Ibid.*, p.760.
[102] *Ibid.*, p.761.
[103] *Ibid.*, p.762.
[104] *Ibid.*, p.763.
[105] *Ibid.*, pp.766-7.
[106] Jones, 'Divine Transcendence', p.14.

its highest form in this world of man'.[108] The emphasis on 'activity', and on the active process of 'thinking' as opposed the rather more static 'system of thoughts',[109] stood at the core of Jones' particular formulation of idealist unity. To him, it was mind, rather than thoughts, that provided the clue to the interpretation of reality, and it was through thinking that the individual united himself with the world. As he put it, 'Man and the world conspire together whenever thinking takes place, and the resulting thought is the product and revelation of both, or rather of that which is greater than both because it comprehends them.'[110]

In Jones' interpretation of reality, rational activity was the universal principle which connected the individual and the Absolute. Indeed, it was his view that man as rational was 'the only key to the nature of society.'[111] Jones was 'perhaps apt to overestimate the contribution of conscious thought to the determination of individual action and to the building of traditions and institutions of society', as Hetherington put it;[112] nevertheless, within his particular conception of the universe, it was precisely the operations of the individual mind that served as the organising principle shaping society and the social environment. It was from this perspective that Jones understood the significance of the individual within the idealist unity. Yet, as has been argued, Jones derived his conception of unity from an understanding of the immanence of God as the Absolute. This understanding shaped his construction of rational nature in a particular direction. Because rational activity was not simply the preserve of the individual but also the expression of the immanent spirit within the world, Jones believed that rational nature, 'in its very make and structure, must seek its own realization, and that by means of what it calls good'.[113] In a letter to E. M. Mahler, he maintained that a rational nature was 'the original endowment of man', which, to him, meant that 'by nature [the individual] must seek the good however much he errs'.[114] This conception of 'the good' as the ultimate object of rational activity was central to Jones' metaphysical understanding of the idealist unity. The individual was thus seen to act within a

---

[107] *Ibid.*, p.18.
[108] Jones, 'Idealism and Epistemology', p.294.
[109] *Ibid.*, p.301.
[110] Jones, *Philosophy of Lotze*, p.42.
[111] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.41.
[112] Hetherington, *Life and Letters*, p.166.
[113] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.100/2: Jones to E. M. Mahler, 5 Dec. 1904. Underlining in original.

wider context, in which every act possessed a universal significance. For Jones, every 'act of knowing the truth and of doing the right' was 'in its particular context, an attempt to attain what is taken as Absolute',[115] and even the poorest moral victory was 'felt to be in some dim and devious way the triumph of the supreme good'. The ideal was thus always 'in course of realization' through the moral activities of the finite individual.[116]

For Jones, moreover, the ontological relationship which saw the universal existing in and through the particular provided a medium for the individual that could not but be beneficent. Set between evil and good, with process and volition as 'the very essence and inner necessity of his life', Jones argued, the individual never failed utterly in his failure to attain either complete truth or complete goodness because, in the greater context, incomplete knowledge was still knowledge, and the least good, was still good. '[T]hat which stands between him and failure,' Jones contended, 'is just this fact of his vital ontological relation in all his intelligent life to the Reality which lives and moves in all things revealing itself everywhere, but most completely, so far as human experience shows, in the spiritual life of Man.'[117] In Jones' understanding of the moral world, this universal reality could touch the individual in any number of ways. As he put it, in an essay on 'Tennyson',

> 'The soul of man is like a walled city, immured at first within itself, ignorant of the meaning of the wider world, callous to its beauty, selfishly exclusive of its larger purposes. But the powers which compass it round about are friendly... The great rich universe sits in perpetual siege against it, as if resolved in one way or another to break down its isolation and flood it with its bounty. If the portals of reason are closed, and the engines of argument and armed proof fail to force the gates, the beauty of the arts may win a way... bringing with them a Good needed but not sought.'[118]

Thus, Jones bracketed '"the Idealism of faith" with "the implied Idealism of the sciences" and "the imaginative Idealism of the poets"'.[119] For him, this represented the incorporation of the greatest number of means by which the ontological relationship between the universal and the particular could be realised.

---

[114] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.108: Jones to E. M. Mahler, 18 Nov. 1904.
[115] Jones, 'Divine Immanence', p.758.
[116] Jones, *Philosophy of Lotze*, p.23.
[117] *Ibid.*, pp.374-5.
[118] H. Jones, 'Tennyson' in *Essays on Literature and Education*, ed. H. J. W. Hetherington (London, 1924),

Undoubtedly, Jones' vision was profoundly optimistic. Within his incarnationalist perspective, the persistence of unethical institutions, conflict, suffering, sin and the multiplicity of ends could not be adequately addressed. Yet, Jones' optimism did not simply overlook what he called the 'the sorrow of mankind'. Such an optimism, he argued, would be 'absurd'. Instead, Jones asserted that the immanence of God meant that he could be sought even in 'the obscure and troubled sea of human history, with its injustice and wrong, its suffering and sorrow, its selfish passions and follies and the utter misery of its sinfulness'.[120] 'We shall not be constrained to deny the finite,' Jones proclaimed,

> 'we shall not be callous to the pain of the world, but awake to it, sharers of its fate, mingling our sighs with its groaning, travailing in its labour as it seeks delivery from the bondage of corruption; and, at the same time, we shall know that God Himself is within its striving, sharing its sorrows, inspiring all its struggles and guiding its stumbling steps.'[121]

Jones' faith was in a process of realisation, rather than 'any idea of static perfection' or 'fixed goodness'.[122] From this position, suffering and pain could be accepted as part of the process of revelation, rather than a negation of 'the Good'.

Jones' metaphysical convictions remained essentially unchanged throughout his career. The metaphysical basis for the ideas he presented in his final work in 1922, *A Faith that Enquires*, was substantially similar to that articulated in his earliest philosophical writings. Yet, it is important to note that Jones saw the possibility of conceiving unity in this way as being very much a product of the times. His claims for it were rooted in its relation to the contemporary situation, and the success with which it ministered to contemporary needs. '[A] final philosophic theory is not to be attained, and a fixed system is not to be sought,' he made clear in *Idealism as a Practical Creed.* 'Experience changes and grows, for it is a process, and a completed doctrine of an evolving process, a static theory of dynamic reality, must prove false.'[123] The only systematic unity that would prevail, in Jones' thought, was thus one that evolved in response to the changing

---

p.60.
[119] A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, 'Review of *Idealism as a Practical Creed*', *Hibbert Journal*, VIII (1909-10), p.199.
[120] Jones, 'Divine Transcendence', p.6.
[121] *Ibid.*, p.18.
[122] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. III, f.226: Jones to E. H. Jones, 6 Aug. 1921.
[123] Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p.7.

needs of society. The ultimate test for Jones' philosophical system of idealist unity would be the way in which it 'bore the articulation of practice'.[124]

III. Political Implications

Jones' social philosophy and the implications of his metaphysics were therefore closely related to his interpretation of more overtly political beliefs. Most of his more political writings were, as Jones himself admitted, written 'in response to the incitement of some quite temporary circumstance'. He believed, however, that the principles around which they turned could be of a more cardinal importance.[125] It has been argued, elsewhere in this thesis, that some of Jones' reactions to certain philosophical, social and political issues may be attributed to particular understandings developed from his personal experience. In this section, the nature of the relationship between Jones' philosophical principles and his ideas for social reform is considered. Jones was overt in his conviction that ethical or social principles were of little worth if held apart from 'the articulation of practice'.[126] In his time, Jones found many opportunities to apply the principles of his philosophy to various practical situations. The extent to which his philosophical principles in fact determined how he understood the nature of political practice and shaped his response to political developments will be considered in this section, with particular reference to the way in which Jones conceived of the state, and how he approached the issue of social reform.

Morality, Materialism and the State

Jones' conception of the state involved a integration of various aspects of his thought with an evaluation of the political reality. In *The Principles of Citizenship*, Jones' main purpose was 'to show that the welfare of the State and the well-being of the citizens depend upon moral conditions; and that the recognition of this truth stands foremost amongst our practical needs'.[127] Jones believed that a state and its citizens stood in moral relation to each other, and the basis of a state's authority over its citizens came from its being itself in the service of a 'higher authority'

---

[124] Jones, Preface to *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p.viii.
[125] *Ibid.*, p.vii.
[126] *Ibid.*, p.viii.
[127] Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, p.33.

and thus 'rooted in righteousness'.[128] Given this, the way in which Jones defined the morality that would form the basis of the relationship between the citizen and the state, and the means he advocated for the achievement of this relationship, provide evidence of the way in which Jones saw his ideas as operating in a practical political context. The commitment to the morality of the state tended to motivate most of his political writings, as Jones spoke out when he perceived political developments to be threatening the moral basis of the relationship between the citizens and the state.

At various times, the threat appeared in different guises. In the face of the economic problems and industrial strife that affected British society in the years before the First World War, for example, Jones saw the moral relationship as being threatened by a 'morally crude' materialistic outlook and attacked the materialism that he saw in the campaign for Tariff Reform and the rise of trade unionism. He was also concerned about the stirring of 'political passions' in political campaigns such as those for the 1910 elections, in the face of the growth of popular democracy. The First World War, however, gave Jones what was perhaps his best platform for emphasising the moral relationship between the citizen and the state, at the behest of a government anxious to maintain morale. It was in this immediate context that Jones developed his 'principles of citizenship', although the war also served, in some ways, to destroy the moral certainties upon which Jones' ethical principles depended.

The fundamental basis of Jones' conception of the relationship between a state and its citizens, however, drew much from his idea of the social organism. The vocabulary that he used with regard to the state-citizen relationship is identifiable as that belonging to his articulation of the organic nature of social relations, and the place of the individual within this system. Thus, we find Jones writing, in 'The Working Faith of the Social Reformer', of the state and the citizen living and developing 'only in and through each other.'[129] Moreover, he maintained that there remained in the moral life of the citizens 'an intensely individual element which the State must never over-ride':

---

[128] H. Jones, 'The Education of the Citizen' in *Essays on Literature and Education*, pp.257-8.
[129] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.110.

> 'The rights of personality can be wisely sacrificed to nothing, nor its good postponed to either city or State or humanity. But, on the other hand, the sovereignty of the individual's will and all its sacredness come from its identification with a wider will... Hence, the individual can resist the will of the community or the extension of the functions of his city or State only when he has identified his own will with a will that is more universal, more concrete, and the source of higher imperatives than either.'[130]

The basis of the moral relationship that Jones envisaged as existing between the state and the citizen was, therefore, essentially that of the relationship of the individual to society within the social organism, as Jones conceived it.

In the light of this, the way in which Jones defined morality with regard to the state may also be understood in terms of the concerns raised within this aspect of his thought. Jones' opposition of morality, to the pure and exclusive materialism of what he termed 'the "Economic" mind', for example, reflects the distinction he made between the purely physical, and the rational and spiritual, aspects of evolution. With reference to property, Jones postulated the following distinction between 'material' and 'spiritual' property: whereas it was clearly possible for spiritual property to be shared without particular loss, Jones argued, the same was seen not to be true for material property. 'No individual becomes ignorant by teaching others;' Jones pointed out, 'nor do the wills which unite in the pursuit of a common good lose either their privacy or their spontaneity.' Yet, material property, such as gold or land, seemed to derive its character from being exclusively the property of one, as opposed to another. For Jones, this represented 'the essential distinction between spirit and nature'. Physical nature depended on mutual exclusion, but the spirit could have 'no genuine "other"'. Therefore,

> 'if self-exclusion... be the last word about material things, and if property be a purely material things, then the assertion of one economic will against another, the "struggle for existence," the brute force of competition, in which the individual not only strengthens himself but weakens his neighbour, are the ultimate facts of social life.'[131]

If social harmony was to be sought, one might expect that the individual will that asserted itself in material property would have to be expelled. Jones, however, eschewed this conclusion. Certainly, it did not accord with several of the elements that have been identified as

---

[130] *Ibid.*, pp.113-4.
[131] *Ibid.*, p.91.

being central to his social philosophy.

To resolve this apparent contradiction, Jones challenged, instead, the perception of property as '*merely* material fact'. It was on these grounds that he spoke out against what he saw as the destructive – because purely materialistic – economic forces of his day. 'If we could only get [the country] to think more of the best ways of using money,' he bemoaned, 'and less of merely getting it into its possession... Business is an uglier scramble than ever it was; the distrust and antagonism of employer and worker and their suspicion and misunderstanding of one another appals me.'[132] More importantly, however, Jones was distressed by what he saw as the increasing domination of politics by these forces. In a letter to Gilbert Murray, he wrote:

> 'My soul is in revolt about the present inhuman treatment of the State by the politicians, and I often think of Burke's angry protest against it being a partnership in selling coffee and tobacco... I do feel that in discussing economics we are in danger of forgetting all the ideals of the Greek state, which I thought we were beginning to win back. Oh for a touch of Pericles or Plato and Aristotle's enthusiasm for things greater than the individual and his pocket.'[133]

It was on these grounds that Jones saw political methods that did not appeal to the moral instinct of citizenship, but attempted to foster unity on the grounds of similarity in economic conditions, as being harmful to citizenship. Trade unionism, as such, was regarded as a danger to the state because it undermined what Jones saw as a natural and fundamental moral unity, for the contentious, unstable and 'morally crude' values of the 'world of industrialism'.[134]

In the face of such developments, Jones thought it imperative that political projects should be subjected to moral criteria. The 'practical man', Jones observed, was reluctant to do so, thinking it not 'desirable that our statesman should complicate their task by raising moral problems'.[135] The exclusion of moral considerations from the province of business, however, led, as Jones saw it, to immoral outcomes. His strong criticism of Chamberlain's Tariff Reform policy derived its force from this belief. For Jones, Tariff Reform represented the replacement of the moral basis for imperial relationships with interests of a purely commercial and materialistic nature. In his view, any such policy in which the British Empire was viewed merely as 'a fiscal

---

[132] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. III, f.46/1-2: Jones to R. Ferguson, 29 Dec. 1916.
[133] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.104/2: Jones to G. Murray, Feb. 1904.
[134] Jones, 'Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', p.177.

unit... whose unity consisted in economic ties' involved a wrongful conception of the state as 'a business concern and nothing more'.[136] From this perspective, he condemned Chamberlain's views on the matter as 'non-human and un-ethical and unstatesmanlike', and believed that they led to the violation of 'the best elements of civilization'.[137]

Along with Bosanquet and Green, Jones believed that improvements in the international sphere would have to be premised on 'the improvement of moral sentiments, rather than the mere reform of political institutions'. As such, the 'ultimate destiny of the nation and its Empire... lay not in fiscal reform, but in moral improvement' in the domestic sphere. On these grounds, Jones applauded many of the criticisms of imperialism put forward by such opponents as Hobhouse. However, whereas Hobhouse concluded that the militaristic imperialism of the late nineteenth century implied the degradation of the British people and their political principles, Jones believed that the country was in fact engaged in a moral struggle. Moral progress could only be achieved through a view of the Empire as being held together by 'bonds of sentiment', and possessed of a 'moral foundation'.[138]

Jones strongly believed that it was not sufficient to depend merely on material, or practical, criteria to determine policy, leaving morality to take care of itself. Thus it was that he saw, 'with dismay' according to Hetherington, the preparations made for the reorganisation of all departments of economic and social life after the First World War. To Jones, the reforms did not do enough to address the necessity of deepening and enlarging the ethical spirit on which, he believed, all social health depended. 'My soul revolts,' he wrote,

> 'against the present fashion of going off on side or departmental social matters. Town-planning; housing; Poor Law; and so on and so on. These should come in the wake and as the application of ethical and social principles; but these latter are unknown almost. What is being taught about the relation of the State and the citizen, or the limits of the duties or opportunities of either?'[139]

Jones sought to remedy this, but, as with a number of other idealists, he sounded 'ill at

---

[135] H. Jones, 'The Moral Aspect of the Fiscal Question' in *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p.118.
[136] Jones, 'Moral Aspect of the Fiscal Question', p.129.
[137] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. II, f.106: Jones to R. Ferguson, 3 April 1904.
[138] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.146.
[139] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.90: Jones to T. Jones, 16 Apr. 1919.

ease in the post-war era'.[140] Bertrand Russell's reaction to Jones' *Principles of Citizenship* clearly reflected this judgement. In his review of the work, Russell described Jones as 'a belated Victorian', 'amiable and high-minded', but ultimately, 'out of place in the stern modern world'.[141]

Yet, Jones' articulations of citizenship during and immediately after the First World War did engage with the new political realities. Arguments about the morality of nations and a realised experience of sacrifice and national duty were used to emphasise the importance of conceiving the state as a moral personality and the possibility of a spiritual identification of the individual will with its purposes. Similarly, concerns raised by the development of popular democracy and the extension of the sphere of state intervention were addressed by appealing to ideas of moral development and the mutual implication of state and citizen. Jones never abandoned the conviction that, although the state did not, and had no right to, 'directly inculcate morality', the 'truth that it ought to foster the conditions favourable to the good life' was not diminished. In so doing, however, the state, in Jones' opinion, was acting as a moral agent. Hence, he argued, it was in fact 'a wrong to the State to regard it as a mere organ of secular force, ...its policy having no ethical character'. The state was never 'a mere secular force, and its might, in reference to its own citizens, [was] always measured by its moral right; for it itself [was] nothing else than the embodied conscience of the people.'[142]

Thus, Jones saw the state as having an interest in developing the conscience of its people and, insofar as morality was to be associated with the rational life, this meant that the state's moral right could be seen to depend on the rational life of its citizens. The development of the latter, therefore, had to be assiduously pursued by the state if it was to justify itself. It was in this regard that Jones, writing in 1910 with reference to recent political campaigns, expressed his discontent with a political process that treated the British public 'as if its taste was low, its ignorance great, and its motives mean'.[143] In particular, Jones had in mind the methods of political campaigning which sought to '*manipulate the mind of the nation*', without any intention to

---

[140] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.11.
[141] B. Russell, 'Philosophy and Virtue', *The Athenaeum*, no.4644 (1919); reprinted in J. G. Slater (ed), *The Collected Works of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 9: Essays on Language, Mind and Matter* (London, 1988), p.329.
[142] Jones, 'Moral Aspect of the Fiscal Question', p.123.

illumine or instruct the public.[144] In this regard, he spoke strongly against political methods that sought merely the raising of 'political passions', which he saw as 'corrupting' working-class citizenship. Moreover, Jones saw the application of such political methods to social life as a violation of the privileges and responsibilities of citizenship because it implied an 'irreverence towards the personality of the citizen', which 'would reduce him from "*a person*" into a "*thing*" *which can be* "*used*".[145] Personality, Jones maintained, was 'a thing too majestical to suffer violence at the hand of anyone, or for any cause', and, as morality was '*rooted* in a reverence towards personality', it followed that such methods were immoral, in Jones' view.[146] For the state, which depended 'entirely for its being and character upon the character of its citizens', as Jones saw it, such activities could only eventually be self-defeating.[147]

By the same token, however, the educative function of the state was seen to be paramount. As Boucher and Vincent argue, education, for the idealists, was seen not as the means to economic ends, but as 'the great social healer and class leveller which would ultimately lead to the evaporation of social evils associated with moral depravation, and class antagonism born of privilege'.[148] In other words, education was seen as the means by which morality could be achieved. Yet, if this was to be so, it was important for such education to be pursued with regard to moral aims. 'There is nothing secular till it is touched by a secular spirit,' Jones warned.

> 'We may seek natural knowledge with no high purpose, and we can make it the instrument of unworthy ends; for knowledge, like every other human gift, is capable of being misused. There is nothing, not even the Temple of the Most High, which we can not desecrate if our minds are low.'[149]

With this in mind, Jones keenly advocated the provision of a purposive moral education – what he saw as education for citizenship – with a view to advancing citizenship in the interest of the state. This was needed, he held, to correct the 'chaotic character' of industrial education, which had little regard for 'reflective research in matters of character' and offered little to the

---

[143] H. Jones, 'Ethics and Politics', *Quarterly Examiner*, XLIV (1910), p.399.
[144] *Ibid.*, p.401.
[145] *Ibid.*, p.398.
[146] *Ibid.*, p.403.
[147] Jones, 'Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', p.155.
[148] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.106.
[149] H. Jones, 'North Wales Heroes' Memorial: Speeches Delivered by the Right Hon. Lord Kenyon and Prof. Sir Henry Jones in the Town Hall, Holyhead, 24 April 1917' (Bangor, 1917), p.11.

'souls of men'.[150] A conception of education such as that represented by the mine owners of South Wales, who appeared before the Welsh Education Commission in 1916 seeking University privileges for their Mining Schools,[151] had to be countered. In several letters, Jones described his encounter with these men of industry as leading him to despair. 'They had no more thought of Educating the youth,' he wrote to Fisher, 'than of educating their pit-ponies: it was all a question of converting human raw-material into productive machinery.' He continued,

> 'They have no use for the things of the spirit, and no least conception of what they mean: All that you and I think of when we hear of "Citizenship" or "Ethics" – the service of the Most High through the washing of feet, if we only could – all that is pure jargon for these, within the whole domain of their business, and intercourse with the workers and with the markets of the world.'[152]

The provision of education by the state, therefore, needed to overcome this if it was to afford its citizens a larger and freer life. It was only by addressing the need for 'things of the spirit' that the purposes of the state could be achieved, through the moral unity it formed with its citizens. Thus, Jones' practical recommendations with regard to education involved an applied rendering of his social and metaphysical thought.

Social Work and Reform

Apart from education, however, the practical implications of Jones' political thought may also be considered through an analysis of his approach to social work and social reform. The centrality of the issue of social work to the thought of the idealists, is evidenced by the number of idealist thinkers who were involved in establishing departments of social work. Jones' interest in social work did not revolve around a department, but his attitudes are reflected in his writing and bore upon his conception of citizenship. Moreover, insofar as Jones' conceptualisation of the possibilities for social work and social reform were derived from his more general system of ideas, his approach to social work serves as an example of the way in which Jones related his social thought to practical affairs. Michael Freeden maintains that the influence of idealism with

---

[150] Jones, 'Education of the Citizen', pp.240, 244.
[151] See, for example, Royal Commission on University Education in Wales, Appendix to First Report, Minutes of Evidence (October 1915-November 1916), Cd.8507, p.45, q.673-678. [Parliamentary Papers 1917-18, Vol. XII, p.53.] Jones' questioning of Hugh M. Ingledew, Secretary and Treasurer of the School of Mines at Cardiff established by mine owners for the training of managers and agents, demonstrated his concern that 'economic and ethical questions' remained untouched.
[152] BOD, MS Fisher 62, f.260: Jones to H. A. L. Fisher, 18 Dec. 1916(?).

regard to new liberalism lay not in the transformation of liberal thought, but in 'supplying a motivation to social service'.[153] Although this may be too limited a view, the nature of this motivation needs to be more closely considered. The way in which Jones' arguments fitted in with the prevailing flux of thought in the arena of social reform in the period needs to be made clear.

Stefan Collini has suggested that 'the ideal of character' enjoyed a privileged prominence in Victorian political thought.[154] In the case of Jones, it would certainly be difficult to gain an understanding of his approach to social reform without addressing what was meant by this term. It is important to note, however, that whereas Collini seems to associate the 'language of character' with a paradigm of society that envisaged an isolated individual 'confronting the task of maintaining his will in the face of adversity',[155] Jones' conceptualisation of the idea of character was firmly rooted within his paradigm of the social organism. For Jones, the late nineteenth-century concerns with the relative significance of 'character', on the one hand, and 'environment', on the other, in the formation of the individual, were interpreted in the light of his idea of "the social environment", in which the individual character was implicated from the beginning. This condition, as we have seen, was held to be a power 'within man as well as without him'.[156] Thus, Jones argued that character and environment represented the same thing looked at in different ways. 'Character and environment are not even separate elements,' he maintained, 'far less are they independent, isolated, externally interacting objects.'[157]

Applied to a consideration of the possibilities for social reform, Jones' conceptual identification of character with environment entailed a paradoxical conclusion. Insofar as character was 'simply environment', it would appear that it could be moulded in any way the social reformer pleased. Yet, insofar as environment was character, and character was 'always an inward and private possession', there was nothing a social reformer could do. On the other hand,

---

153 Freeden, *New Liberalism*, p.55.
154 S. Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930* (Oxford, 1991; repr. 1994), p.94.
155 *Ibid.*, p.114.
156 Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.7.
157 *Ibid.*, p.48.

as Jones conceived of the social organism as a process – by which 'the outer world' was 'formed anew within the individual's mind and will', and the individual formed himself by taking the world into himself as his own content, and becoming, thus, 'a person with powers, rights, and duties' – there did follow, Jones believed, a practical conclusion for the social reformer.[158] While character was still in the making, it was possible to do 'well-nigh everything to bring out its latent powers', by moulding the environment which was to be its content. However, once character had been formed, and the environment internalised and controlled by the individual will, the social reformer was powerless.[159] It was in these terms, then, that Jones saw the possibilities for social reform. Insofar as character was not wholly determined by inherited characteristics, it was possible that 'the evils of society [were] capable of being remedied by state or civic enactments which affect the outward circumstances of life'.[160] However, insofar as it was the mind and will of the individual that controlled the formation of his character through what he internalised of the environment, the way in which social reform was approached had to take this into account.

For Jones, social reform was to be seen in relation to morality. Insofar as society was, as Jones held, a 'spiritual, mind-made environment',[161] the social problem was material or economic 'only on the surface'. 'In its deeper bearings,' Jones argued, 'it is ethical: it is the question of the rights of personality.'[162] Social reform was not simply a material function that aimed merely at the amelioration of environmental conditions. The end of the action was to recover the individual's 'rights of personality' and the purpose of social work was to enable those who were unable, through circumstance, to participate in the social whole to recover their social relationship. On these grounds, Jones argued that the provision of succour for the less fortunate was only justified 'if it promises to restore the individual into social relations that will sustain whatever of good remains in him'.[163] Social work, therefore, could not be seen as an external variable, imposing order on society from without, through the application of mechanical techniques and methods.

---

[158] *Ibid.*, p.52-3.
[159] *Ibid.*, p.53.
[160] *Ibid.*, p.46.
[161] *Ibid.*, p.20.
[162] *Ibid.*, p.93.
[163] *Ibid.*, p.55.

The 'mark of the successful worker in the social field', was that he did not

> 'merely contemplate his fellows in the mass, nor employ the "method of averages" when he seeks to help or understand them. He knows that every individual of them all has his own internal life, intensely real and significant to him; and society is not to him a general term, but a system of personalities, every one of them unique'.[164]

However, if social reform depended upon the realisation of the individual's internal life – and the 'mere force of circumstance, taken by itself, has no potency once the character is formed' – the truth was that 'if society allows any of its members to entrench themselves in their inner world of character as enemies of the public weal, it cannot add to the opportunities of their environment without degrading them further.'[165] It is in this light that Jones' keenness to emphasise that 'the true social reformer realises the supreme value of it all... [and] is quick to discern the touch of good that lives in every man, and makes him live', needs to be seen.[166] The social worker had to possess 'a living sense of the truth', and 'the gift of sympathetic imagination, to construct [the experience of his fellows] from within'.[167] It was only thus, by the insights of sympathy, that he could get near to the facts of human character, which Jones saw as a 'confused and obscure struggle for something believed to be good, which, after all, is the ultimate reason of any human act.'[168]

Social reform, therefore, as Jones conceived it, was not possible without an understanding of 'the good that is in the world'. In this regard, the world, Jones maintained, tended towards the ends of the reformer, and the efficiency of the reformer depended on his power to apprehend and use this tendency, which, 'like an unconscious purpose', was 'the essential significance of his facts'.[169] Moreover, Jones saw morality as an evolving process. Whether personal or social, it could only be acquired 'step by step': 'There is a scale of ideals along which, in due order, man must travel to the Good,' he argued.[170] Jones' conception of social reform thus drew its hope from a conception of society that was a vast, metaphysical unity

---

[164] *Ibid.*, p.7.
[165] *Ibid.*, p.55.
[166] *Ibid.*, p.8.
[167] *Ibid.*, p.7.
[168] *Ibid.*, p.8.
[169] *Ibid.*, p.33.
[170] *Ibid.*, p.26.

based on a conception of Good. Yet, insofar as the realisation of the Good depended upon the individual, the focus of reform had to be directed towards the development of individual character, within the context of society.

The core themes of Jones' citizenship revolved around such moral ideals, which Jones understood within a particular metaphysical framework. Defining the state as a moral personality, Jones' idea of citizenship depended upon a process by which the moral purposes of the individual came to be identified with those of the state. This involved an internal realisation, on the part of the citizen, of the moral unity that existed between the individual and the state, and it was this moralisation of social relations that was seen as the key to the development of a civic community. These ideas were very much a part of the idealist conceptual framework that dominated political thinking in the early decades of the twentieth century. This framework, however, was gradually to fall into disrepute as the century wore on. The economic crisis of the 1930s, for example, made it difficult for many to accept idealist claims that the state embodied the common good; while the spread of fascism on the continent raised serious concerns over the ends to which idealist modes of thought could be seen to lead.[171] In the face of the gradual erosion of 'Christian belief, national and imperial success, localized kinship and the collective self-help institutions of the urban proletariat' as bases for social integration,[172] the metaphysical declamations of the idealists no longer seemed to describe a realistic ideal. The rise of new circumstances and ways of thought was thus signalled.

---

[171] See Harris, 'Political thought and the state', pp.18-21.
[172] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall and ethical socialism', p.100.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE BASES OF T. H. MARSHALL'S THOUGHT

'I do not recommend the way to the stars; sociologists should not, I think, expend all their energies climbing in search of vast generalizations, universal laws, and a total comprehension of human society as such... Nor do I recommend the way into the sands of whirling facts which blow into the eyes and ears until nothing can be clearly seen or heard. But I believe there is a middle way which runs over firm ground... where sociology can choose units of study of a manageable size – not society, progress, morals, and civilization, but specific social structures in which the basic processes and functions have determined meanings.'

T. H. Marshall, 'Sociology at the Crossroads', p.21.

Speaking on the occasion of Jones' centenary in 1952, H. W. Morris-Jones noted that, by that time, '[t]he philosophy which Henry Jones learnt and taught' had become 'extremely unfashionable'. He continued:

> 'Today most writers not merely reject the things he and other idealists believed and said, but find great difficulty in understanding what it was they meant. They claimed that metaphysics was fundamental and that moral, political, aesthetic, and religious principles could be deduced from metaphysics. And that metaphysics appears to us to be unduly dogmatic and speculative. We tend, in our tough-minded way, to be sceptical, empirical and pragmatic. They were rationalistic, confident and serenely optimistic.'[1]

With the collapse of idealism as a viable mode of political thinking, the notion that a single, hegemonic philosophical framework could form the basis for the consideration of political and social questions was discredited. As a result, the character of political discourse began to change and the role of political thought came to be differently conceived. Where the concern had once been to speculate about the nature and moral authority of the state in relation to a clearly stated philosophical framework, the 'proper function' of political thought in the post-war period, as described by a political thinker of the time, was simply 'to define the necessary and sufficient social conditions for the successful pursuit of happiness [and] to determine the institutions and organizations that are the most efficient instruments to guarantee these conditions'.[2]

In the 1950s, there was a widespread sense that political philosophy in Britain was in terminal decline.[3] The sociologist Raymond Aron, for example, observed that political

---

[1] Morris-Jones, 'Life and Philosophy of Sir Henry Jones', p.10.
[2] I. Jenkins, 'The Analysis of Justice', *Ethics*, LVII (1946-47), p.3.
[3] Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.26.

philosophy seemed to be regarded as 'a species of speculation which was practised in past centuries', and relevant only as the subject of historical studies. 'The influence of logical positivism,' he suggested, 'combines with the large measure of unanimity on essentials (mixed economy, parliamentary regime) to discourage any approach to problems of social organisation by way of philosophical reflection, properly so called.'[4] For Aron, the 'renunciation of reflection on the nature and the end of man' was 'the expression of a self-sufficient faith in positive science – or at least in science as interpreted by one kind of positivism'. Being content with 'a science which makes possible the manipulation of natural forces and social beings', political thinkers 'neglect[ed] the quest for reason', which was, according to Aron, 'far beyond sciences and techniques, ... the essential nature of man and his historical achievement'.[5]

It was out of the development of this intellectual environment that Marshall's political thinking on the subject of citizenship emerged, and the implications of such a political culture need to be taken into account in the consideration of his ideas. Although there had been a very strong sense of practical citizenship during, and in the immediate aftermath of, the Second World War, the post-war period in Britain was not, on the whole, one which saw flourishing political debate on the nature of citizenship, conceived in terms of the relationship between the individual and the state. Anthony Rees' claim that Marshall 'almost single-handedly revived the notion of citizenship, and disseminated a view of it so successfully that it came to be seen (at least in England) as the only possible account' needs to be more critically evaluated within this context.[6] Unlike Jones, Marshall did not develop his theory of citizenship within the culture of a rich civic discourse, nor, it may be argued, did he seek to create such an intellectual environment through his work. It was thus within a rather limited conceptual environment that Marshall developed his ideas of citizenship, and the extent to which this was reflected in his conception will be considered in this chapter.

---

[4] International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam [henceforth IISG], International Sociological Association Archive [henceforth ISA], Correspondence – Individuals: Raymond Aron (1950-1963), 37/2: 'Industrial Society and the Western Political Dialogue', n.d., f.12.
[5] *Ibid.*, f.13.
[6] Rees, 'T. H. Marshall and the progress of citizenship', p.3.

The aim of this chapter is to identify and analyse the bases of Marshall's thought, with a view to suggesting how certain methodological predilections informed his approach to the concept of citizenship. The way in which Marshall pursued his intellectual enterprise stood in stark contrast to Jones' approach. Whereas Jones had a conception of the world as a whole, based on a philosophical system that he believed embraced the whole of human experience, Marshall possessed no such unifying focus for his thought. As has been noted, Marshall reached the conclusion that philosophy did not provide an adequate view of reality at an early stage in his intellectual development, and did not openly identify with any particular philosophical system.[7] Indeed, his was a generation in which the very concept of 'philosophical systems' had fallen into disrepute. Compared to Jones' system of thought, therefore, the bases of Marshall's ideas may seem more disparate. Yet, the importance of certain themes and preoccupations can be perceived.

The chapter begins with an analysis of the historical notions that formed an important aspect of Marshall's intellectual approach. It has not escaped the attention of Marshall's many commentators that, in presenting his model of citizenship, Marshall used an idea of historical progression as a justificatory device. There is some uncertainty, however, over the theoretical status of this historical treatment. In the first section of this chapter, the nature of Marshall's historical understanding, and its impact on the development of his thought, will be considered through an examination of his early historical work. The combination of influences that shaped his historical perspective, and the way in which his historical work reflected particular understandings of human nature and the operation of social processes, will be noted. The next section then proceeds to consider how Marshall's sociological approach appropriated his historical understanding, and shaped a particular conception of the nature of society and social behaviour from the range of sociological interests represented at the LSE. Marshall's view of sociology as a synthesising discipline, and the way in which he regarded social institutions as the unit of his analyses, will be examined. Finally, the way in which Marshall's ideas related to the

---

[7] See Chapter Three, p.76.

political contexts which provided him with a framework of practical realities for his conception of citizenship will be analysed in the third section of this chapter. Marshall's engagement with planning as a political reality and his conception of the welfare state as the basis for his conception of citizenship will be unravelled.

I. Notions of History

Famously, Marshall presented his theory of citizenship in the form of a 'general evolutionary approach',[8] portraying the development of citizenship in terms of the progressive establishment of civil, political and social rights through the development of the institutional contexts for their expression. This portrayal has led, in some cases, to the description of Marshall's approach as being 'in the spirit of the Whig interpretation of history',[9] on the assumption that it was his intention to chart 'an inevitable progression to the sunny uplands of the 1950s and a then contemporary version of the end of history' through his historical analysis.[10]

The charge of 'end-ism' on the part of Marshall is easily refuted: at the end of 'Citizenship and Social Class', Marshall clearly stated his view that the current phase in the development of democratic citizenship would not 'continue indefinitely'.[11] Nevertheless, Marshall's historical *leitmotiv* has come to be seen as the distinguishing feature of his theory of citizenship. A. H. Halsey, for example, implies that it was by 'placing it in the long march of British developmental history' that Marshall legitimised the British version of the welfare state; while Peter Baldwin makes the claim that

> 'Marshall's grand teleology of an historical progression... portrayed the Beveridge/Labour reforms as the culmination of a centuries-long process, and imbued them with a transcendent importance that carried them, in terms of their role in history, far beyond what a framework of social policy legislation would otherwise have aspired to'.[12]

In this respect, Baldwin saw Marshall as the 'world historical interpreter' of the British

---

[8] Mann, 'Ruling class strategies and citizenship', p.126.
[9] A. O. Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy* (Cambridge, MA, 1991), p.1. Quoted in Rees, 'T. H. Marshall and the progress of citizenship', p.21.
[10] Rees, 'T. H. Marshall and the progress of citizenship', p.21.
[11] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.49.
[12] P. Baldwin, 'Beveridge in the *Longue Durée*' in J. Hills, J. Ditch and H. Glennerster (eds), *Beveridge and Social Security: An International Perspective* (Oxford, 1994), p.39.

welfare state embodied in the Beveridge Plan.[13]

Such characterisations of Marshall's contribution need to be more critically evaluated. As a straight description of historical development, Marshall's theory and historical periodisation seem overly simplistic. Indeed, many commentators have found his portrayal of a singular and orderly evolution of rights problematic in the light of an obviously more disparate reality. The development of citizenship seems better described as a process involving a continuous engagement between the often competing claims of civil, political and social rights, rather than a linear process in which civil, political and social rights may be seen to emerge in stages. These considerations have raised some uncertainty as to the precise status of Marshall's typology of citizenship. Did Marshall intend to present, as Martin Bulmer and Anthony Rees put it, 'a specifically historical hypothesis about linear social development', or was he attempting to establish civil, political and social rights each as 'an ideal type to serve a heuristic purpose in analysis'?[14] In this section, the question will be addressed by analysing the historical progression that Marshall presented in 'Citizenship and Social Class', in relation to the historical understandings that formed the basis for his intellectual development.

In 'Citizenship and Social Class', Marshall described the 'evolution of citizenship' as having been 'in continuous progress for some 250 years'.[15] Following from this, the division of citizenship into three parts was, according to him, 'dictated by history even more clearly than by logic'. Marshall saw the civil element of citizenship as being composed of 'the rights necessary for individual freedom – liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice'. The political element represented 'the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body'; and the social element consisted of 'the whole range [of rights] from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a

---

[13] *Ibid.*, p.40.

[14] M. Bulmer and A. M. Rees, 'Conclusion: citizenship in the twenty-first century' in Bulmer and Rees (eds), *Citizenship Today*, p.270.

civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society'.[16] In early times, these three strands were, according to Marshall, 'blended because the institutions were amalgamated'. However, when the institutions on which the three elements of citizenship depended parted company, it became possible for the rights to go separate ways, and to establish themselves singularly under the aegis of different institutions, at different times.[17]

Thus, according to Marshall, the development of the civil element of citizenship was to be associated with the establishment of the rule of law in the eighteenth century;[18] the political element was seen to belong to a process of franchise reform which began in the nineteenth century, but only became fully established with the institution of universal adult suffrage in the twentieth century;[19] finally, the social element of citizenship came to be 'woven into the fabric of citizenship' in the twentieth century, with the development of the welfare state.[20] Although he accepted that social rights could be seen as having existed previously in the form of the Poor Law; and that a tentative move towards the concept of social security had been attempted at the end of the eighteenth century; Marshall maintained that, by the act of 1834, social rights had come to be detached from the status of citizenship. Under the new Poor Law, the claims of the poor were met on the grounds that, as paupers, they forfeited in practice the civil right of personal liberty and, by law, any political rights that they might possess. Social rights were thus offered as an *alternative* to the status of citizenship.[21] For Marshall, therefore, it was only the institution of the welfare state that established social security as an integral part of citizenship.

Within this single narrative, Marshall combined two different methodological approaches. On the one hand, it is clear that Marshall chose to base his theory of citizenship on a historical foundation. The conception of citizenship as the product of some two-and-a-half centuries of 'continuous progress', moreover, would seem to suggest a rather Whiggish mentality.

---

[15] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.7.
[16] *Ibid.*, p.8.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp.8-9.
[18] *Ibid.*, pp.8, 10.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp.8, 13.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp.8, 27.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp.14-5.

On the other hand, however, Marshall did not endow his notion of progress with overtones either of historical inevitability or of universality, nor did he seem to conceive of the process in terms of the moral and ethical progress of human civilisation as a whole. In fact, the historical analysis in 'Citizenship and Social Class' seems only to be used to identify the different institutional contexts within which the rights of citizenship found expression, and Marshall's description of the process by which citizenship evolved was firmly based on the notion that it occurred as a result of changes at an institutional level. This reflected the workings of a sociological approach that Marshall was known to favour, as will be considered later in this chapter.

Marshall's analysis in 'Citizenship and Social Class' reflected a significant interrelationship between historical and sociological considerations in his methodological understanding. This interrelationship was a central feature of Marshall's whole approach. According to one of his academic colleagues, Marshall was always interested in how far sociological theories arose out of and applied to historical circumstances, and often used historical examples in his sociology lectures at the LSE.[22] The methodological context within which Marshall defined a conception of human nature and the social structure needs, therefore, to be seen in terms of an interaction between a historical understanding and the sociological analysis of the operation of social processes.

Marshall's understanding of the processes of historical development originated from his early academic career as an economic historian in Cambridge. As an undergraduate student of history at Trinity College, Marshall became interested in English economic history through the teaching of John Clapham. At the same time, he was also introduced to the study of social systems in the work of Seebohm, Maitland and Vinogradoff, by the medievalist Galliard Lapsley.[23] When the nature of these influences are considered historiographically, it seems unlikely that Marshall would have developed a progressive theory of historical development from this foundation. F. W. Maitland's organising principle for the writing of history, for example,

---

[22] Personal interview with Prof. Jean Floud, 14 Nov. 1996.

emphasised analysis rather than narrative.[24] Although he believed that an understanding of the present could be used to illuminate the darker recesses of the past, Maitland's method suggested that the past and its ways should be reconstructed from the sources of the time, with no thought for their future.[25]

John Clapham's approach to economic history also downplayed the idea of progressive development. In a note on 'Economic History as a Discipline', Clapham argued that it was impossible to identify precise and progressive stages in economic development. Moreover, he maintained, 'Although stage schemes furnish convenient categories for the classification of economic phenomena and have provided scholars with Max Weber's "ideal types" with which the varied reality may be contrasted, they have done more harm than good to the study of economic history.'[26] The significance of these influences on the development of Marshall's thought cannot be ignored, although it may be further observed that other influences were also to have a part in shaping the particular structure of his historical understanding.

As has been noted, Marshall's historical studies at Cambridge were interrupted when, after completing the first part of the History Tripos at Cambridge, he was interned in the German civilian prison camp of Ruhleben. The effect of the experience in developing his sociological curiosity has already been noted.[27] Marshall, however, also used his time at Ruhleben to broaden his historical knowledge, to which end he placed himself under the tutelage of the Oxford historian J. C. Masterman. Through this engagement, Marshall came to be exposed to an alternative set of historical influences, which added another dimension to his historical understanding. These influences are uncovered through an analysis of the lectures delivered by Masterman in Ruhleben.[28]

The historical approach that Masterman chose for his lectures seems to have been at

---

[23] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.89.
[24] G. R. Elton, *F. W. Maitland* (London, 1985), p.31.
[25] *Ibid.*, pp.35-6, 51-2.
[26] J. H. Clapham, 'Economic History as a Discipline' in F. Stern (ed), *The Varieties of History from Voltaire to the Present* (London, 1956), p.311.
[27] See Chapter Three, pp.74-7, 86-90.
[28] Manuscripts of these lectures in Masterman's notebooks have been preserved in a collection of Ruhleben memorabilia held at the Harvard Law Library. See Harvard, Ruhleben, Box 6: J. C. Masterman Notebooks,

least partly forced upon him by the lack of resources upon which historical teaching could be based, within the confines of the prison camp. In the Ruhleben context, the idea that historical enterprise involved the immersion of the historian in original documents was simply untenable. There was little enough access to books, let alone original documents. Yet, although Masterman saw fit to warn his students that lectures of a 'general and discursive nature' could be regarded as "bad history", he nevertheless maintained that 'sometimes in historical work we are unable to see the wood for the trees – in the mess of often conflicting evidence we lose sight, temporarily at any rate, of the main lines of development; we get lost in detail, and find it difficult to keep the important and the unimportant in their proper perspective'. 'Facts,' he suggested, 'particularly minor facts, tend to obscure judgment.'[29] Thus, to this extent at least, it may be suggested that Masterman sought to make a virtue out of necessity.

The historical perspective espoused in Masterman's lectures evoked a clear idea of evolutionary progress and optimism. Perhaps this was merely a device to keep spirits up in the difficult conditions of the prison camp; but even if it was, it does not seem implausible that Marshall would have absorbed at least some of these ideas into his historical understanding. Masterman urged that the study of the past in terms of the present 'not only [made] certain things clearer which were otherwise difficult to comprehend, it also [tended] to prevent that most depressing of feelings – the feeling that we are arrived at an impasse, whence further progress is impossible'.[30] For Masterman, the seeds of future progress were to be found in the past. History, therefore, played an important part in illuminating the path for further development. By attributing the causes of events to the force of historical inheritance, however, Masterman's conception of history was effectively also making a claim about the *way* in which historical development occurred. As he put it,

> 'It follows from our conception of history that the influence of the individual upon the course of events, great though that influence may be, is ... circumscribed within certain limits. A nation pursues the development for which its geographical position, the character of its people, and its gradual historical

---

1915-17 [henceforth Masterman].
[29] Harvard, Ruhleben, Masterman: 'Lectures on English History, 1485-1715', 1915.
[30] *Ibid.*

growth best fit it.'[31]

This aspect of Masterman's ideas seems to have attracted Marshall. Upon his return to Cambridge to embark upon an academic career after being released from Ruhleben, Marshall developed a historical approach that focused on the interaction between the dynamic forces of natural evolution and static conceptions of social structure. Thus, he incorporated the ideas he drew from Masterman into the analysis of social systems that he had acquired through the study of Maitland, Seebohm and Vinogradoff.

Using this approach in the field of economic history, Marshall wrote a dissertation on seventeenth-century guilds and the rise of capitalism in England for a fellowship at Trinity College, Cambridge, to which he was elected in October 1919. In this dissertation, he reflected upon what he saw as 'a deep and fundamental change in the industrial life of the nation', arguing that the seventeenth century was decisive in bringing about the substitution of a national for a local economy, as the principles of local corporate monopoly and regulation were broken down.[32] This decay of the old order, Marshall argued, was not brought about by government action or the conscious will of the participants in the process, but by external 'natural economic forces', which served to undermine the rigid scheme of social and economic relationships that had prevailed in the medieval gild.[33] This emphasis on 'natural economic forces' as the vehicle of historical progress pervaded nearly all of Marshall's historical writings during the tenure of his fellowship at Trinity.

In Marshall's historical analysis, changes in the social structure were brought about by changing social relationships, which were, in turn, the result of 'natural' economic development. Marshall's concern was to consider the interaction between social institutions and economic forces, in an approach that reflected Clapham's conception of economic history as 'a branch of general institutional history, a study of the economic aspects of the social institutions of the

---

[31] *Ibid.*
[32] BLPES, Marshall, 4/1: 'A Survey of the Industrial Development of England', f.2-3.
[33] *Ibid.*, f.4, 85.

past'.[34] Such an approach does not suggest that Marshall had any interest in developing a Whiggish teleology. Marshall's 'natural economic forces' did not so much represent an idea of progress, as a rejection of the view that the course of social development could be significantly directed by individual will and consciousness. On the whole, Marshall's approach was more concerned with identifying a materialist framework within which social relationships could be understood in economic terms. His analysis thus tended to de-emphasise the role of rational agency, both as a vehicle for historical progress and, it may be argued, as an integral part of human nature.

It cannot be denied, however, that Marshall did have a view of history that was more concerned with the schematic tracing of broad lines of development, than with the close analysis of historical details. As he put it, he did not believe that it was 'in [his] nature to spend [his] working life poring over original documents to the extent demanded by reputable historical research'.[35] In this respect, the sweeping historical progression that he presented in 'Citizenship and Social Class' seems characteristic of his general style. However, its much-noted teleology does not correspond with Marshall's general understanding of the historical enterprise. In the light of this, the historical foundation upon which Marshall based 'Citizenship and Social Class' is probably best seen more as an empirical tool than an evolutionary doctrine in his formulation of citizenship. Although Marshall seemed to portray a unilinear and orderly evolution of rights in his theory of citizenship, his aim was arguably not to present the evolution of abstract rights in themselves as the key to his analysis, but to establish 'the requirement to understand citizenship in terms of rights and the institutional contexts through which rights are expressed'.[36] This consideration may be further clarified by examining how Marshall approached his work as a sociologist.

II. The Practice of Sociology

Marshall's entry into the sociological discipline occurred largely by accident. At a time

---

[34] Clapham, 'Economic History as a Discipline', p.308.
[35] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.91.
[36] Barbalet, *Citizenship*, p.6.

when the fluidity of disciplinary boundaries presented few barriers to such movement, Marshall's transformation from historian to sociologist took place, it would appear, almost without him noticing. He 'became a sociologist' when Morris Ginsberg, as professor of sociology, invited him to join his department and take over the teaching of 'Comparative Social Institutions'. As Marshall himself admitted, his recollection of 'this critical episode in [his] academic career' was 'peculiarly vague'. He was certain, however, that he was 'quite ignorant of sociology in the professional sense' when he first joined the department at the LSE, and was content to depend upon the skills and ideas that he had acquired through his historical studies as a means of approaching the task of sociological analysis.[37] Thus, as Jean Floud recalled, Marshall always had a historical approach to his sociology: he was interested in how far sociological theories arose out of and applied to historical circumstances, and used historical examples from the French Revolution and Bismarck in his LSE lectures on sociology.[38]

As an emergent sociologist at the LSE, Marshall claimed that he was 'very naturally, almost totally under the influence of [L. T.] Hobhouse, as interpreted by Ginsberg'.[39] Beyond this, it was his recollection that he did not make a systematic effort to 'master the classics of sociological theory' at that time: a mistake, he claimed, that he had regretted ever since.[40] Yet, through his considerations of Hobhouse's work, Marshall did develop related interests in the sociological analyses of social systems presented by Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. For example, being, as he put it, 'impressed by the way [Hobhouse] manipulated historical data by methods which were simultaneously analytical and comparative' and finding his 'threefold categorization of kinship, authority and citizenship as the basic principles of social order' useful, Marshall proceeded to consider Weber's more profound analysis of the same theme. Similarly, he discovered Durkheim's ideas about the role of law and justice in the evolution of 'organic' systems via his interest in the way Hobhouse used institutions of justice 'to illustrate the way in which changes in the parts of a system are shaped by the pressure to preserve compatibility...,

---

[37] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.91.
[38] Personal interview with Prof. Jean Floud, 14 Nov. 1996.
[39] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.95.

and to show the experience of operating an institution at one level may generate, in a predictable manner, the forces which will guide it to its next level'.[41] Thus, although Marshall never made a *systematic* study of the great sociological theorists, his development as a sociologist did not take place entirely within a vacuum of sociological theory. The way in which figures such as Weber, Durkheim and Hobhouse may have influenced Marshall's thinking needs to be taken into account in analysing his sociological approach to issues such as citizenship and social class.

The extent to which Marshall may be defined in terms of simple descent from such sociologically eminent predecessors, however, is far from obvious. Although all three shared essentially evolutionist conceptions in their analysis of society – for example, Durkheim was concerned with the development of 'organic' solidarity from 'mechanical' solidarity, Weber with the development of rational as opposed to traditional action in modern society, and Hobhouse with the 'growing power of the human mind' in social development – the processes they described differed sharply from each other and reflected, as A. H. Halsey put it, 'very different theoretical understandings of social structure and change'.[42] Marshall was fully aware that Weber and Durkheim had fundamentally different ideas about sociology. Accordingly, as he put it, he 'did not expect to swallow either of them whole – to become a Durkheimian or a Weberian'. Instead, he sought to 'learn from both', and to transmute the ideas they suggested to him into 'the substance of [his] own humbler, and yet at its own level, original thinking'.[43]

Thus, Marshall's work cannot be seen as a simple reflection of the analytical frameworks presented by his sociological forebears. His exposure to the ideas of Hobhouse and Ginsberg may have influenced him to develop an evolutionary understanding of sociology. However, whereas both Hobhouse and Ginsberg based their sociological ideas of progress on a philosophical foundation, it has been noted that Marshall believed philosophy to be 'too abstracted from personal experience' to be of any practical use.[44] Whereas Hobhouse 'had faith in

---

[40] *Ibid.*, p.91.
[41] *Ibid.*, p.95.
[42] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', pp.9-10.
[43] Marshall, 'A British Sociological Career', p.95.
[44] Brotherton, LC, RUH 33, Letters IV: 28 Oct. 1916.

the ultimate drive of the human mind towards unity and social integration',[45] Marshall was much more sceptical of such ideas about the growth of the human mind in the description of social progress. He also did not subscribe to the idea that sociology should be primarily concerned with the search for 'universal laws of historical development, for general principles of social psychology, or for the fundamental meaning and value of social life' as, it may be suggested, Ginsberg did.[46] Instead, Marshall's conception of sociology involved a complex and subtle interaction between a historical approach to the analysis of social institutions, and a concern for the practical needs to be met by objective research in his own time.

Within the academic environment of sociology at the LSE, Marshall was seen to occupy the middle ground between Morris Ginsberg's desire to 'interpret the whole course of human history as part of a wider philosophical world view',[47] and David Glass' 'passionately empirical' concerns with establishing the use of quantitative methods in sociology and focusing on the collection of a multitude of measurable facts as the basis for sociological analysis.[48] In this position, Marshall may have seen the historical approach as an alternative to either philosophy or survey data as the basis for sociological analysis. Although he sympathised with the intentions of both Ginsberg and Glass and was more than willing to make use the results of Glass' empirical surveys in his own work,[49] Marshall nevertheless held that research and speculation on ultimate values should not be the main preoccupation of sociologists, and that the mere accumulation of quantitative facts did not in itself provide sociological knowledge.[50] Between these two extremes, however, he believed there was a middle way which led 'into a country whose features are neither Gargantuan nor Lilliputian, where sociology can choose units of study of a manageable size – not society, progress, morals, and civilization, but specific social structures in which the basic processes and functions have determined meanings'.[51]

---

[45] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.10.
[46] Marshall, 'Sociology at the Crossroads', p.11.
[47] M. Ginsberg, *Sociology*, p.25. Quoted in Marshall, 'Sociology at the Crossroads', p.11.
[48] Marshall, 'Sociology at the Crossroads', pp.15-16. See Dahrendorf, *LSE*, p.204.
[49] Personal interview with Prof. Jean Floud, 14 Nov. 1996.
[50] Marshall, 'Sociology at the Crossroads', pp.11, 17.
[51] *Ibid.*, p.21.

When, in his inaugural lecture as Professor of Social Institutions at the LSE in 1946, Marshall put forward his firm conviction that 'synthesis' was 'the distinctive task of sociology', what he had in mind was a 'movement from abstraction towards reality' through the re-integration of abstract categories created by analysis, into the concrete setting of 'living groups' within which the 'complex forces of social life' met and interacted.[52] Marshall believed that sociological inquiry should be directed towards the study of such complex interactions within concrete settings, upon the basis of which a range of explanatory propositions that he described as 'stepping-stones in the middle distance' could be gained for the discipline of sociology.[53] By focusing the terms of sociological analysis in this way, Marshall's sociological methodology may be seen simply as an extension of the lines of analysis that he had applied to historical social institutions.

For Marshall, sociology was a 'study of social structure and processes'.[54] It was concerned with analysing the workings of social groups more than with the study of individual character. Marshall's definition of 'society' as 'a state of affairs, a process, in which numerous sentient, mobile and communicating beings live and interact in an "orderly" manner' may be seen to reflect this.[55] Indeed, in one of the lectures on sociology that he gave in Cambridge in the 1960s, Marshall presented 'individual actions' as 'interactions': 'they impinge on others and produce reactions', and 'there are endless chains and complex networks of these'.[56] The idea of the individual as being characterised by the processes of his mind did not seem to figure in Marshall's method, and there seemed to be no sense in which the individual, as a unique *persona*, was seen as an independent factor of the social processes in which he participated. To this extent, Marshall's approach to an understanding of social processes seemed to preclude any conception of the individual as a person.

Indeed, to some extent, it would appear that Marshall believed that institutional

---

[52] *Ibid.*, pp.5-6, 8-11.
[53] *Ibid.*, pp.13, 22.
[54] T. H. Marshall, 'The Basic Training for All Types of Social Work' in Nuffield College, *Training for Social Work* (London, 1946), p.14.
[55] BLPES, Marshall, 2/15: 'Cambridge Lectures: Introduction to Sociology', Lecture II.

frameworks were, in fact, constitutive of individual character. Marshall understood an institution to be 'any regular, accepted – and repeated – pattern of behaviour applicable to particular situations',[57] and at a Fabian Society conference on the 'Psychological and Sociological Problems of Modern Socialism' in 1945, he spoke of 'the influence of social institutions in determining national character, which was really a matter of patterns of behaviour in various situations'. 'National patterns of behaviour,' Marshall maintained, 'did in fact change quite rapidly in response to environmental change; and the real question was how flexible were environmental conditions.'[58] In other words, Marshall seemed to think that it was possible to produce desired patterns of behaviour by changing the social institutions that framed society.

The implications of such an understanding for the way in which Marshall conceptualised citizenship are two-fold. Firstly, it may be argued that the de-emphasising of the significance of individual character in Marshall's sociological approach meant that his conception of citizenship was based on something other than an idea of the development of individuality. To some extent, therefore, Marshall's idea of citizenship was distanced from the notion of personal, moral responsibility as an element of citizenship. The second point relates to the first, insofar as the idea of the individual seems to be mediated, in Marshall's understanding, through the functioning of social institutions. This emphasis on institutions and the structure of society as an alternative to the abstraction of the individual, led to a conception of citizenship as the product of an institutional framework, to be maintained and protected by the operations of further social institutions. Citizenship itself was also regarded as an institution, and, as such, its workings could be seen as being more instrumental than substantive. Thus, the possibilities for Marshall's conception of citizenship were circumscribed by the operations of his sociological method.

The extent to which this method was also shaped by what Marshall called 'the pressure of events', however, cannot be overlooked.[59] 'In choosing topics,' Marshall maintained, 'it is

---

[56] BLPES, Marshall, 2/15: 'Introduction to Sociology', Lecture I.
[57] BLPES, Marshall, 2/15: 'Introduction to Sociology', Lecture II.
[58] BLPES, Fabian, G49: Weekend Conference on the Psychological and Sociological Problems of Modern Socialism, f.27.
[59] Marshall, 'Sociology at the Crossroads', p.11.

natural that we should be influenced by the nature of the practical problems that face us. Sociology need not be ashamed of wishing to be useful.'[60] Thus, Marshall's institutional approach may be seen as a reflection of the significance he attached to practical experience – as opposed to abstract philosophising – as the basis for ideas. Jean Floud maintains that, amidst the positivistic impulses represented at the LSE at the time, Marshall's approach to sociology was better described as 'pragmatic' rather than positivist.[61] As has been noted, Marshall did not seek to discover scientific 'laws' that governed relationships between men in society, nor did he believe that sociology could be pursued purely by scientific methods. Yet, even within the field of sociology alone, positivism is a concept that has many different meanings. In one sense, Marshall's concern with structural conditions rather than the perfectibility of man as the key to the reorganisation of society may be described as a positivistic approach, insofar as it would seem to reflect a belief in the possibility of *producing* a good society simply by improving its material structures.

It was, however, a belief that was to a large extent buttressed by the development of planning as a key practical consideration in post-war Britain. As Marshall noted, it was an 'indisputable fact that planning [was] taking place on an increasing scale and arousing a growing interest in and demand for sociological investigations'.[62] The task of synthesis, according to Marshall, was necessary because planning could 'only be translated into action through impact on individuals, groups and communities in which the complex forces of social life interact and meet'; and those who were preparing for the reconstruction of society were 'talking about "neighbourhood units" and "community spirit" and looking to sociology to help them discover the realities which lie behind these concepts'.[63] Such concerns suggest that the terms on which Marshall chose to conduct his sociological analysis were at least partly governed by the practical settings within which he operated. In this respect, Marshall's approach was founded upon a sense of historical contingency: there was, as A. H. Halsey suggests, 'an openness and voluntariness' in

---

[60] *Ibid.*, p.22.
[61] Personal interview with Prof. Jean Floud, 14 Nov. 1996.
[62] Marshall, 'Sociology at the Crossroads', pp.8-9.

his view of future developments.[64] The particular way in which Marshall's ideas related to the political contexts within which they were conceived should be considered in this light.

III. Political Implications

In a recent work, Anthony Rees asserted that 'if any intellectual figure of the period can be said to embody the spirit of the "post-war settlement" it is Marshall'.[65] In this section, the implication of this claim will be more critically and empirically established. In the first place, the nature of the 'post-war settlement' needs to be more closely considered. The prevalent conception that the post-war years in Britain represented a period of ideological consensus has been challenged in recent years by a range of revisionist writing.[66] It is no longer held definitively to be the case that there were no more radical choices to be made between conflicting social values in this period, or that political conduct merely reflected a conformity to the fixed path of progress mechanically determined by the processes of technological change.[67]

Yet, although important ideological differences over the essentials of policy may be discerned in this period, there was nevertheless a sense in which a practical consensus on the way in which post-war reconstruction should be approached was maintained. 'If there was common ground amongst the many factions lobbying for change,' David Morgan and Mary Evans argued in a recent work, 'it was the belief that the problems of post-war society should be met by comprehensive planning rather than short-term measures and piecemeal reforms.' A belief in the need for social and economic planning thus formed 'a common intellectual framework' for progressive elements in the post-war period.[68] Insofar as a single 'post-war settlement' may be postulated, therefore, it was a settlement that was largely defined in pragmatic terms.

It is in this light that Marshall's identification with the post-war context needs to be seen. Given his methodological concern with basing his ideas on the operations of concrete

---

[63] *Ibid.*, p.8.
[64] Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall', p.10.
[65] Rees, 'T. H. Marshall and the progress of citizenship', p.22.
[66] See, for example, Brooke, *Labour's War*; K. Jeffreys, 'British Politics and Social Policy during the Second World War', *Historical Journal*, XXX (1987), pp.123-44; H. Jones and M. Kandiah (eds), *The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History 1945-1964* (Basingstoke, 1996).
[67] See R. Titmuss, 'Introduction' in R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (London, 1931; 1964), p.14. Quoted in Brooke, *Labour's War*, pp.3-4.

frameworks, Marshall undoubtedly saw the institutional context of the post-war period as an important practical setting for his ideas. However, the particular way in which the concerns of the period shaped the development of Marshall's thought requires a deeper examination. The following analysis considers the way in which the context of planning was reflected in Marshall's thought, and unravels the complex significance of the political reality of the post-war welfare state as the institutional framework upon which Marshall based his conception of citizenship.

The Context of Planning

The agenda for reconstruction in the post-war world had been shaped by the aims of the 'people's war'. In the spirit of collective endeavour and radicalism generated by the Second World War – encouraged by a wartime rhetoric that stressed liberty, equality and democracy as cherished institutions of British life against the fascism and intolerance of Hitler's Reich – support for a future that would be socially just and based on citizenship became 'identified with patriotic sentiment and the justification for war'.[69] The process by which such a future was to be realised, however, was conceived in relation to the possibilities of social and economic planning, rather than in terms of political or ideological change. The wartime experience of the benefits that could be achieved through the reorganisation of the economy, industry and social services along systematic and planned lines, had led to a common belief that social and economic problems could be viewed comprehensively and tackled through an application of the principles of scientific management. The planning that had been an 'indispensable condition of victory' in the war came to be seen as 'the key to a fair and efficient society when the war was won', and formed 'a common intellectual framework' for the consideration of the problems of post-war society.[70]

For Marshall, the belief in the possibilities of planning meant a consciousness of having in mind, as an objective for society, 'a form of life, an intelligible, meaningful form of life which

---

[68] Morgan and Evans, *The Battle for Britain*, p.127.
[69] *Ibid.*, pp.1, 127.
[70] *Ibid.*, pp.8, 127.

goes according to plan, and plan is perhaps the key-word in this picture'.[71] His articulations were engaged with what he called 'a new image of society' and 'a new picture of a social structure'. In the light of this, he maintained that 'what we are trying to produce in this twentieth century – consciously trying to produce – is a society which works according to a pattern which we believe to be good'. Planning, according to Marshall, was implied by this 'conscious attempt to establish a pattern'.[72]

In Marshall's estimation, there were two types of planning that were generally pursued. In what he termed 'conservative' planning, a system that worked according to certain recognised principles was assumed to exist – and, in a sense, to have always existed – such that the planner's task was simply to ensure its preservation through his planning. Although such a society would work according to a plan under the general control of the government, Marshall argued, the greater part of what happened was not imposed on the people by the intervention of the government, but was done because the people had been socially conditioned to that way of life from one generation to another.[73] On the other hand, in what he termed 'creative' planning, the ultimate aim was the achievement of an ideal Utopia. This tended to involve an undermining of the set way of life, and the imposition of new ways of behaviour in order to "create" a new society. By definition, the people were not conditioned to the way of life that was being introduced, and therefore had to be 'pushed around by the planners and be forced or induced to behave in the right way'.[74]

Marshall maintained that the planning that was being pursued in post-war Britain occupied the middle ground between 'conservative' and 'creative' planning. Social change was conceived as 'revolutionary change achieved by evolutionary means'; and social controls were primarily directed to 'the creation of an environment in which social life, as we envisage it, can go on of itself'. By addressing itself to structural conditions, such planning ensured the achievement

---

[71] BLPES, Marshall, 4/2: 'Social Change in Britain: A Sociological Perspective', Lecture by Professor T. H. Marshall, f.6.
[72] *Ibid.*, f.9.
[73] *Ibid.*, f.10
[74] *Ibid.*

of a desired social end without the need for direct compulsion to make individuals conform to a particular way of life.[75] It has been noted that Marshall's conception of society seemed to focus on the idea that a good social order could be produced through the material improvement of institutional structures, without the need to address the individual consciousness.[76] In this regard, Marshall's conception of post-war planning closely reflected the ideas about society and social behaviour that Marshall held as a sociologist. In the context of planning, Marshall maintained that social relationships could be ordered by legislative enactments, and through the mechanical application of objective techniques and methods. Thus, effective and rational legislation – neutral, mechanical and non-moral in its impact – was to be the means by which the state, assuming a corporate responsibility for the welfare of its citizens, would produce a better society.

Marshall's formulation of citizenship as 'a status *bestowed* on those who are full members of a political community' may be seen in this light.[77] To some extent, this statement seems tautological: those who were 'full members of a political community', it may be suggested, would already possess a sense of citizenship and would not need it to be 'bestowed'. For Marshall, however, citizenship represented something other than an individual sense of belonging. Citizenship as 'status', in Marshall's conception, entailed 'distinctive rights or duties, capacities or incapacities, determined and upheld by public law'.[78] Citizenship, as such, was not seen in terms of a personal identification with the political community, nor was it something that could be individually earned or acquired. Insofar as it depended upon conditions that were to be 'upheld by public law', it would appear that Marshall's conception of citizenship could only be established through legislation by the state. The ideal of citizenship was thus conceived in terms of an external political reality created by a state concerned with the mechanical planning of social relationships.

Indeed, when Marshall addressed the question of the changing balance between rights

---

[75] *Ibid.*, ff.10-11.
[76] See above, pp.158-60.
[77] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.18. Emphasis added.
[78] T. H. Marshall, 'Changes in Social Stratification in the Twentieth Century' in *Sociology at the Crossroads*, p.134.

and duties at the end of 'Citizenship and Social Class', he concluded that the rights that had been multiplied were 'precise', each individual knowing 'just what he is entitled to claim'. Following from this, duties which were 'most obviously and immediately necessary' for the fulfilment of these rights – such as the duty to pay taxes and insurance contributions – were 'compulsory', such that 'no act of will is involved, and no keen sentiment of loyalty'. Other duties were, as Marshall put it, 'vague', and 'included in the general obligation to live the life of a good citizen, giving such service as one can to promote the welfare of the community'. 'But,' he continued, 'the community is so large that the obligation appears remote and unreal.'[79] In Marshall's understanding, it would seem that a stable balance between rights and duties could only be maintained in relation to a recognised national plan. The reciprocal relationship between rights and duties was not defined at the level of the individual consciousness, but derived its meaning from the operations of a particular institutional context.

A similar consideration may be seen in respect of Marshall's definition of social work in the post-war period. Writing in 1946, when he was heading the LSE department for social work training, Marshall suggested that social work should be defined as 'a matter of professional technique'.[80] The '*primary* task' of the social worker, according to him, was 'to aid the realization of *agreed objective standards*'.[81] As social development had reached a stage at which society was 'held responsible for making the realization of these standards possible', and the 'machinery' for meeting this responsibility was provided 'by the State or by voluntary organizations working in close collaboration with the State', Marshall argued that social workers needed only to 'apply existing standards, assess needs in terms of them, and bring the appropriate machinery into effective contact with the individual case'.[82] For Marshall, social work was the means by which 'the collective apparatus of social security and social services reach[ed] its individual goals'.[83] These individual goals, however, seemed to be defined in terms of institutional objectives.

---

[79] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.45.
[80] Marshall, 'Basic Training for Social Work', p.5.
[81] *Ibid.*, p.7. Emphasis added.
[82] *Ibid.*, pp.7-8.
[83] T. H. Marshall, 'Welfare in the Context of Social Policy' in *The Right to Welfare*, p.80.

Indeed, Marshall held that certain material needs could be 'standardized';[84] and that the 'social diagnosis' that was the basis of all social work should be concerned with 'private life and its approach to or deviation from what we regard as a *satisfactory product* of our civilization'.[85] How the individual internalised the experience of welfare seemed not to have been an issue.

Seen in contrast to the conception of social work presented by Jones, Marshall's approach seems profoundly mechanical. Whereas Jones believed that it was necessary for the social worker morally to engage with the 'inner worlds' and spiritual personalities of those he wished to help, Marshall interpreted the relationship between the social worker and his 'client' according to the operations of a more material institutional framework.[86] According to Marshall, whereas nineteenth-century philanthropists were 'apt to consider that most of their cases could only be completely solved by the moral re-education of the subjects', twentieth-century social workers could take a more collectivist approach to social reform. Social legislation could be used to 'adjust the social system to the people', as Marshall put it, thus enabling social work to operate in what he believed to be 'a much more favourable setting'.[87] Thus, Marshall's conception of social work was framed by the reality of planning in post-war Britain.

The prevalence of planning as an ideal of post-war reconstruction seemed to provide Marshall with a useful framework for his thought. In producing his theory of citizenship in the post-war period, Marshall would have been directed by the available meanings with which the political language of the time was endowed. As planning formed a significant element of this thought-environment, it is not surprising to find that it acted to shape the way in which Marshall presented his conceptions. More importantly, however, the concern with planning also suited Marshall's predilection for an institutional approach to social analysis. For Marshall, planning expressed the workings of a particular institutional framework, in relation to which his ideas were defined. In the light of this, the importance of the institutional reality of the post-war welfare state to Marshall's conception of citizenship cannot be overlooked.

---

[84] Marshall, 'Basic Training for Social Work', p.15.
[85] *Ibid.*, p.9. Emphasis added.
[86] See Chapter Four, p.142; Marshall, 'Basic Training for Social Work', p.7.

THE WELFARE STATE

Although the fact that Marshall wrote within the context of the post-war welfare state is often alluded to, the nature of its impact on the way in which he presented his theory of citizenship needs further consideration. In a lecture on 'Social Change in Britain', Marshall argued that the welfare state '*implie[d]*... a new conception of citizenship'.[88] It would appear, therefore, that he saw the institution of the welfare state as constituting the *basis* for a new conception of citizenship. Thus, instead of the 'incorporation [of citizenship rights] in the institutions of the welfare state',[89] it may in fact be more appropriate to consider Marshall's theory of citizenship as the incorporation of the possibilities offered by the operations of the welfare state into a conception of citizenship rights.

Marshall's conception of the social rights of citizenship was not formulated through a process of political theorising from an autonomous philosophical standpoint, but derived from the workings of an institutional reality. To some extent, this explains Marshall's apparently contradictory theoretical position of holding, in effect, that 'something which was a *product* of social action could also be a predicate of that action'.[90] More importantly, however, if Marshall defined the notion of citizenship rights with regard to the specific conditions of the post-war welfare state, the central importance of social rights in his formulation may be seen to be meaningful only within this particular context. This raises the question of the extent to which Marshall's conceptualisation of social citizenship effectively established welfare rights as being, in a general sense, 'integral to the contemporary sense of citizenship'.[91]

Marshall specifically related his conception of 'the rights of citizenship in the modern democratic state' to the universality of the welfare state modelled on the Beveridge Plan. As Marshall saw it, however, the central principle of Beveridge's policy guaranteed a subsistence income 'as of right', to all men and their families, at all times, on the basis of a system of

---

[87] Marshall, 'Welfare in the Context of Social Policy', p.80.
[88] BLPES, Marshall, 4/2: 'Social Change in Britain', f.14-5. Emphasis added.
[89] D. S. King, *The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship* (London, 1987), p.164.
[90] Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.25.
[91] King and Waldron, 'Citizenship, Social Citizenship and Welfare Provision', p.417.

universal contributory insurance which meant that 'all who pay the premiums are entitled to receive the benefits'.[92] In one of his later writings, Marshall pointed out that Beveridge's plan 'took no account of needs at all, chiefly because to do so would involve applying a means test and this ... would impair the right'. Under the Beveridgian welfare state, he observed, 'national social insurance [was] no longer a system for fulfilling obligations derived from "impulses of common humanity" by meeting a need that is common to all human beings, the need for the means of subsistence', but 'a fiscal arrangement devised by the citizens of a particular society to adjust the distribution of the income of that society in a manner considered most conducive to the welfare of all'. As such, Marshall argued, 'the rights it confers are not rights rooted in the nature of man as a human being, but rights *created* by the community itself and *attached* to the status of its citizenship'.[93]

Thus, Marshall saw the rights of citizenship instituted in the Beveridgian system as being defined and, to some extent, circumscribed by the framework of the institution and its particular values. The notion of rights '*created* by the community itself' and then '*attached* to the status of its citizenship' would appear to denote rights of a rather conditional and unstable nature. By grounding his formulation of citizenship in the practical realisation of the welfare state, Marshall effectively rendered it susceptible to changes in that basis, especially as he believed that it was not possible to 'construct an ideal model of the Welfare State'. 'There are too many different ways in which a State can pursue the end of social welfare,' Marshall argued, 'and too many possible combinations of all the methods which might be adopted for this purpose.'[94] Marshall therefore implied that the 'Welfare State' could not 'serve as a general concept or an ideal type'. 'To use it as such,' he argued in a lecture delivered to the University of Leeds in 1961, 'is bound to falsify the issue by suggesting that there is one structural pattern which is, so to speak, the orthodox or

---

[92] T. H. Marshall, 'The Welfare State and the Affluent Society' in *Sociology at the Crossroads*, p.278; BLPES, Marshall, 2/17: 'The Welfare State – The Next Phase', Address delivered to the Annual Meeting of the London Council of Social Services, 1951, ff.6, 10.
[93] T. H. Marshall, 'The Right to Welfare' in *The Right to Welfare*, p.88. Emphases added.
[94] Marshall, 'The Welfare State and the Affluent Society', p.268.

correct one. Whereas in fact the pattern must change with the times.'[95]

Indeed, Marshall was already speaking of the welfare state as entering 'a new phase' in 1951.[96] After five years of recovery, reconstruction and progress, the cost of living was rising and the conditions of the immediate post-war world had dissolved. Thus, although the institutions, practices, procedures and expertise of what was first given the name of 'Welfare State' still existed, they were, as Marshall put it, 'operating in a different setting and without the original consensus which welded them into a social system with a distinctive spirit of its own'. The 'Welfare State' could only be preserved if it was 'so adjusted to the conditions of the time that it may once more become a central part of the social system accepted by all', which meant the remodelling of its machinery.[97] Yet, it was on the operations of this machinery that Marshall based his original formulation of the social rights of citizenship.

In the light of this, it may be argued that the notion of social rights in Marshall's conceptualisation of citizenship was little more than a contingent manifestation of a more fundamental consideration. When Marshall considered the basic principles of the post-war social order, he claimed that it was 'right to say that the guiding principle is that of equality – equality in terms of citizenship'.[98] The aim of equality, as Marshall saw it, was 'to establish a common minimum standard of life rich enough in substance to unite all in a common civilisation'.[99] Marshall's conception of citizenship thus consisted of an interaction between the principle of equality and the idea of social integration. Seen in terms of an outcome to be produced through social planning, however, this interaction was understood with regard to the establishment of an alternative structure for social relations. It was in this context that a concern with establishing a material basis for the conception of citizenship arose; and the incorporation of social rights into the notion of citizenship should be understood in this regard.

In Marshall's understanding, social relations could not be separated from the

---

[95] *Ibid.*, p.287.
[96] BLPES, Marshall, 2/17: 'The Welfare State – The Next Phase', f.3.
[97] Marshall, 'The Welfare State and the Affluent Society', p.287.
[98] BLPES, Marshall, 4/2: 'Social Change in Britain', f.11.
[99] BLPES, Marshall, 3/1: 'The Socialist Experiment in England', Talk given at International University

consumption of material goods. It was in this light that he saw the provision of social services which would be used in common by all as the means by which social integration, as a basis for citizenship, would be achieved. Insofar as these services were the product of a conception of social rights in the post-war welfare state, the importance of social rights as the means by which the material basis for citizenship would be established was acknowledged. However, when Marshall spoke of the social services as 'a centre-piece in the *tableau vivant* of the good society and a permanent, praiseworthy and admirable feature of twentieth-century life',[100] he had in mind their effect as 'an action modifying the whole pattern of social inequality'.[101] The expression of this was to be found in the social integration brought about by the comprehensive consumption of the services provided, rather than in the rights to the services as such.

Thus, within Marshall's conceptual framework, while social rights could create the conditions in which citizenship could be expressed, they did not, in themselves, constitute an expression of that citizenship. Moreover, insofar as they were contingent upon a particular set of institutional practices and dependent upon the availability of resources which could not be guaranteed, social rights, according to Marshall, could never be absolutely asserted. In this regard, he maintained that the social rights of citizenship could not, in fact, be precisely defined: 'Nobody can say exactly what he is entitled to receive,' he argued in 1951, 'and a complaint that a man's rights have been denied to him will usually be a matter for political rather than judicial decision.'[102] At first sight, this position seems sharply to contradict Marshall's assertion in 'Citizenship and Social Class', as noted earlier in this chapter, that the rights of citizenship that had been multiplied in the twentieth century were 'precise', and that each individual knew 'just what he [was] entitled to claim'.[103] Thus juxtaposed, these views clearly reflected the ambivalence of his position on the rights of citizenship.[104]

Vacation Course, Monschau – Technische Hochschule, Aachen, f.13.

[100] T. H. Marshall, 'The Role of the Social Services' in W. A. Robson and B. Crick (eds), *The Future of the Social Services* (London, 1970), p.12.

[101] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.28.

[102] BLPES, Marshall, 2/17: 'The Welfare State – The Next Phase', f.13.

[103] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.45. See above, p.164.

[104] The conceptual significance of rights and duties in Marshall's construction of citizenship will be further discussed in Chapter Six, pp.196-200.

Yet, Marshall's assertion of the 'precise' nature of rights is presented in this chapter as a reflection of his belief in planning – insofar as such 'precise' rights could logically entail 'compulsory' duties that were 'obviously and immediately necessary' for their fulfilment – and it is in this regard that the apparently conflicting views may be reconciled.[105] Marshall could have held that the social rights of citizenship could not, *in general*, be precisely defined, while nevertheless believing that *within a particular planned context*, such rights would have to be 'precise'. The idea that individual entitlement was 'a matter for political rather than judicial decision' would seem to imply that it was only by reference to a specific set of politically-defined conditions that social rights could be determined. Indeed, Marshall made this point more directly when he suggested, in 'Citizenship and Social Class', that individual rights 'must be subordinated to national plans'.[106]

Seen as the product of the institutional framework of the welfare state, Marshall's conception of citizenship seems somewhat less imposing as an organising principle for his thought. Many commentators have seen Marshall's theory of citizenship as his 'single big idea'.[107] Yet, as has been noted, Marshall was more concerned with studying specific social structures than with developing universal concepts in his sociological analysis.[108] The extent to which his conceptualisation of citizenship represented a particular account, based on the operations of a particular institutional context, is reflected in the consideration of his ideas in relation to the institutional reality of the post-war welfare state.

Both Jones and Marshall related their theories to practical political contexts in their respective approaches to the conceptualisation of citizenship. However, whereas Jones based his ideas on a theoretic principle which, as he put it, would 'bear the articulation of practice',[109] Marshall tended towards deriving his principles from practical contexts. Such an approach reflected Marshall's prioritisation of institutional considerations as the key to establishing patterns

---

[105] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.45.
[106] *Ibid.*, p.35.
[107] Rees, 'The Other T. H. Marshall', p.360.
[108] See above, p.157.
[109] Jones, Preface to *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p.viii.

of individual behaviour. Whereas Jones' theoretical position emphasised the role of rational processes in the construction of a social order, Marshall's sociological and historical understandings were essentially focused upon the way in which structural frameworks tended to bypass the individual consciousness in establishing the conditions for social life. These different methodological predilections provided Jones and Marshall with different conceptual frameworks for the construction of their ideas of citizenship. In the following chapters, the implications of this for the way in which notions of citizenship developed in twentieth-century Britain will be considered with regard to the conceptual structure of citizenship and the changing nature of political debates over the aims of welfare policy.

PART III

CONCEPTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

CHAPTER SIX

THE CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE OF CITIZENSHIP

In the Introduction to this thesis, it was suggested that a new and interesting theoretical framework for the analysis of political concepts, defined by Michael Freeden in his recent work on the role of ideologies in the study of political theory, provides a useful methodological basis for the consideration of the concept of citizenship in this work.[1] Freeden advocated a view of political concepts as 'neither arbitrary, nor simply stipulative, models that the theorist invites us to adopt, but constructs that reflect social and historical usage'.[2] Political concepts, according to him, 'exist in the "real world" of time and space and their meanings derive... from an interplay between thought and the facts of the external world'.[3] In the light of such an understanding, the meaning of a concept may be seen to depend on the way in which it is engaged in context. In order to understand the sense in which it is being used, therefore, it is necessary to analyse the contexts – both social and ideological – in which the concept is articulated. With this consideration in mind, the first two parts of this thesis concentrated on an analysis of the particular personal and ideational environments which conditioned the thought-behaviour of two notable theorists of citizenship, as part of its attempt to advance the empirical understanding of the way in which citizenship developed as a political concept in twentieth-century Britain. Through this consideration of Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall as individuals 'serving as nodal and eloquent points of ideological discourse',[4] two different conceptual frameworks for citizenship were identified as empirical contexts within which the 'interplay between thought and the facts of the external world' occurred.

In addition to such considerations of 'time and space', however, Freeden further suggests that political concepts should also be comprehended as obtaining their meaning from a 'third dimension', represented by the 'morphology of ... interlinkages' within a conceptual pool. Political concepts, according to Freeden, 'acquire meaning not only through accumulative

---

[1] See Chapter One, pp.14-16.
[2] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p.52.
[3] *Ibid.*, p.51.

traditions of discourse, and not only through diverse cultural contexts, but also by means of their particular structural position within a configuration of other political concepts'.[5] The development of a conceptual definition, therefore, depended not only upon context, but also upon the way in which the concept is related structurally to other ideas within the ideological milieu. The aim of this chapter is to apply the structural considerations suggested in Freeden's theoretical approach to an analysis of the changes that occurred in the development of citizenship as a political concept in twentieth-century Britain. Having established the particular attributes that defined the ideational arenas within which the concept was produced, the focus of the thesis shifts, in this chapter, towards an analysis of the particular attributes of the product itself, seen in relation to the range of mutually constraining conceptual attachments formed in the process of its definition.

This process may be more closely examined. Because there are many ways in which relevant conceptual attachments can be made, the morphology of a political concept is theoretically open to an enormous range of variations.[6] In practice, however, there are empirical constraints on the indeterminate range of meanings that may be invoked in the definition of a political concept. According to Freeden, the specificity of political concepts derives from a combination of 'the presence of an ineliminable component' – a minimum core understanding, without which the concept would be bereft of any stable meaning, but which alone cannot define the concept – and 'a non-random, even if widely variable, collection of additional components that are secured to that vacuous "*de facto*" core in a limited number of recognizable patterns'. These 'additional components' function within a regular system of interrelated structural categories that are seen to be indispensable to the definition of the concept. While these categories are necessary, however, their particular instances are contingent. The choice that is made within each category is 'essentially contestable', and it is within this morphological

---

[4] *Ibid.*, p.106.
[5] *Ibid.*, p.4.
[6] *Ibid.*, p.74.

framework that the variability of conceptual meaning occurs.[7]

The process by which a political concept is defined thus involves an initial commitment to the empirically ascertainable structural framework by which the specificity of the concept as 'a linguistic and cultural artefact' is maintained.[8] The way in which this framework is fleshed out, however, allows for a variety of understandings to emerge, and the incorporation of contingent components within the necessary structural categories of the political concept occurs within an ideological context. Freeden defines an ideology as 'the macroscopic structural arrangement that attributes meaning to a range of mutually defining political concepts'.[9] By providing a 'bridging mechanism between contestability and determinacy', ideologies convert the variety of options available in the definition of a political concept into a 'monolithic certainty' based on a political decision.[10] Within an ideological context, political concepts are defined through a process of 'decontestation', whereby a specific interpretation of the meaning of a concept is asserted, and other possible interpretations closed off, as a result of particular preferences and priorities. The function of decontesting political concepts in this way, Freeden suggests, is 'not connected to underscoring truths of logical purism, but to supporting courses of political action, enabling the development of organizational practices'.[11] As such, the process by which a political concept is defined is significantly related to considerations of practical politics, and cannot be seen simply as a logical exercise predetermined by abstract rules of structure. Moreover, as each political concept is decontested in relation to other political concepts, the interaction between political concepts can also have important consequences for the way in which a particular concept is defined.

The process by which a political concept is defined thus involves a range of considerations. To analyse the development of citizenship as a political concept in twentieth-century Britain, this chapter begins by considering the range and scope of the citizenship debate

---

[7] *Ibid.*, pp.64-6. The notion of 'essentially contested concepts' was first put forward by W. B. Gallie, in 'Essentially-contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, LVI (1955-6), pp.167-98. Freeden adds to this analysis, however, by suggesting a morphological analysis that must precede Gallie's inquiry, as the feature of ideological morphology 'identifies a cause in relation to which essential contestability is but an effect' (*Ibid.*, p.55).

[8] *Ibid.*, p.61.

[9] *Ibid.*, p.54.

[10] *Ibid.*, pp.76-7.

in twentieth-century Britain. The conceptual issues within the citizenship debate will be identified through an examination of the conceptual structure of citizenship, and the significance of the conceptual dichotomy between active and passive citizenship will be addressed in this regard. The next section then presents an analysis of Jones' and Marshall's conceptions of citizenship as concrete instances of the construction of the concept within two different idea-environments in twentieth-century Britain. The conceptual structure of Jones' Edwardian idealist conception of citizenship will be compared with Marshall's post-war sociological conception, and the way in which different social frameworks affected the definition of citizenship will be examined. In the final section, particular consideration will be given to the different ways in which Jones and Marshall related their conceptions of citizenship to the concept of class in twentieth-century Britain. The analysis will show how, through their different decontestations of class as a social concept, Jones and Marshall developed fundamentally different understandings of the nature of citizenship as a political concept. Thus, the significance of a decontestation of the concept of class within the conceptual structure of citizenship will be established. It will also be argued that this particular decontestation presents an apt example of the way in which the boundaries of the citizenship debate changed over the course of the twentieth century, as a result of wider social, political and intellectual developments that occurred in Britain.

I. Conceptual Issues in the Citizenship Debate

At its most fundamental level, the term citizenship simply describes the condition of being a member of a political community, bearing such privileges and obligations as are attached to this membership. Such a definition, however, merely constitutes what Michael Freeden has termed the 'ineliminable component' of the concept: it reflects the common denominator that has been empirically observed in all known linguistic usages of the concept, rather than a feature that is intrinsic, or logically necessary, to the meaning of the word.[12] Although this 'ineliminable component' can be seen to exert a curbing and organising influence on the various ways in which

---

[11] *Ibid.*, p.129.
[12] See *Ibid.*, pp.61-3.

the concept is constituted,[13] on its own, it does not define the concept. Indeed, as Freeden maintains, the reduction of a political concept to its minimum component would render it 'entirely vacuous'.[14] In the case of citizenship, the simple notion of membership conveys a sense that citizenship involves 'being a part of' an entity. However, unless this basic notion is fleshed out by a range of additional components, the identity of citizenship as a political concept remains essentially indeterminate when reduced to this fundamental minimum. Notions of identity, equality, individuality, social structure, and, it may be added, an evaluation of the desirability of membership, all contribute critical dimensions to the minimum component of citizenship. Moreover, a large part of the meaning of membership will be derived from the way in which the political community in question is itself conceived. The conceptualisation of citizenship thus involves various levels of decontestation, and the number of conceptual issues that have been raised in the process is correspondingly great. In the following analysis, some of the more significant issues with respect to the citizenship debate in twentieth-century Britain will be analysed.

The structure of most 'modern' theories of citizenship may be presented as modified extrapolations from an ideal originally articulated in ancient Greece and Rome. As J. G. A. Pocock has pointed out, '[i]t is Athenians and Romans who are supposed to have articulated the "ideal of citizenship" for us',[15] and their definitions have remained a powerful source of ideas for the conceptualisation of citizenship over a range of different historical contexts. Classical conceptions of citizenship, however, manifest an inherent duality. Whereas Greek and Roman republican traditions defined the citizen as a political being – 'one who both rules and is ruled' – and supposed 'a scheme of values in which political action was a good in itself and not merely instrumental to goods beyond it';[16] the juristic tradition of the later Roman empire presented the citizen as a legal being, defined in terms of the rights and immunities he possessed as a result of

---

[13] *Ibid.*, p.75.
[14] *Ibid.*, p.64.
[15] Pocock, 'The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times', p.29.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp.30-1, 34.

having the status of citizenship.[17] Thus, two different senses in which an individual could be described as a citizen can be derived from the classical frame of reference, providing a basis for the rough conceptual dichotomy between the 'active' and the 'passive' conceptions of the citizen,[18] which has framed the citizenship debate for much of its history. The conceptual issues raised in the citizenship debate need to be seen within the context of this dichotomy, as different ideas about the nature of a political community and different definitions of the nature of humanity are fundamental to the distinction between active and passive notions of citizenship.

The notion of active citizenship draws largely upon the doctrines of classical republicanism and assumes 'a closely knit body of citizens, its members committed to one another'.[19] A communal consensus of values, resulting in a positive conception of an objective common good, is presupposed; and the good of the individual is seen to be closely related to the good of the society. Active citizenship is expressed through the identification of the private, individual will, with the public, social world. Indeed, there is little recognition of a realm apart from this social world: the public and the private are one. Within such a context, as Michael Walzer has suggested, citizenship is lifted to 'what was probably primacy among self-conceptions'.[20] One's citizenship – rather than any privacy, personal rights or freedoms – represented the core of one's personality, and the political community is seen as the only suitable arena for 'ethical self-creation'.[21] Citizenship is thus presented as 'an office, a responsibility, a burden proudly assumed',[22] as it is only through active participation in social and political life that the individual is seen to realise his humanity.

Passive citizenship, on the other hand, is usually premised on the very idea of a distinction between the public and private realms.[23] More importantly, it may even be suggested that the private realm is held *above* the public, insofar as the key guarantees within a system of

---

[17] See *Ibid.*, p.36.
[18] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.88.
[19] Walzer, 'Citizenship', p.216.
[20] *Ibid.*, p.214.
[21] *Ibid.*, p.212.
[22] *Ibid.*, p.216.
[23] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.88.

passive citizenship are for the protection of the private individual's person, property and liberty. In the context of a 'diverse and loosely connected body, its members (mostly) committed elsewhere', citizenship forms the outer frame of the life of an individual rather than its core.[24] Within a 'minimal rule of law framework', individuals are left to pursue their own senses of the good life.[25] Ethical values are perceived as essentially a private matter, and any publicly generated set of moral goals would represent an unwarranted intrusion upon the protected private sphere of the individual. Self-interest and privacy, rather than civic participation in the public sphere, are thus accorded primacy in the definition of individuality. For passive citizens, the notion of a political community did not describe 'a common life', but merely represented 'a necessary framework', consisting of 'a set of external arrangements'. Citizenship is thus regarded as 'an important but occasional identity'; 'a status, an entitlement, a right or set of rights passively enjoyed', rather than a form of life to be actively pursued.[26]

To a degree, the way in which a political community is conceived depends simply upon the scale of the political organisation involved. In the classical context, for example, the Greek *polis* was a small society, characterised by a limited range of social differentiation. Under such circumstances, the notion of a political community based on the personal political commitment of each individual citizen to a publicly defined common good was a realisable ideal. The Roman empire, on the other hand, involved a political organisation that was much vaster in scale, as Rome had expanded by granting citizenship to the peoples it conquered. As a result, the body of Roman citizens came to include people of different ethnic origins from the original Romans, with different religions and different conceptions of the political life. At this level, a less personal and moral understanding of the political community was necessary, because the common good could no longer be easily defined. Yet, the concept of a political community does more than merely describe the nature of political interactions on the basis of a fixed and objective set of predetermined considerations. In fact, it may be argued that the scale of a political organisation

---

[24] Walzer, 'Citizenship', p.216.
[25] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, pp.88-9.
[26] Walzer, 'Citizenship', pp.215-6.

itself essentially reflects a determination made on the basis of a conception of what a political community should be. The large scale of the Roman empire, for example, resulted from a political decision to grant common citizenship to a diverse group of peoples; whereas the Greek *polis* reinforced the homogeneity of a small community through the definition of exclusive prerequisites for citizenship.

In different forms, such ideas have persisted in more modern conceptualisations of the political community and citizenship. The Aristotelian stipulation that a citizen 'must be a male of known genealogy, a patriarch, a warrior, and the master of the labor of others (normally slaves)' may seem out of place in the modern context for citizenship,[27] yet participation in war service has been a major feature of the advance of modern democratic citizenship, and gender restrictions on full citizenship were only gradually eroded in the course of the twentieth century. The idea that membership in a political community should be determined on the basis of a range of qualifications thus remains an important consideration in the citizenship debate. The formal qualifications which, for a significant part of the twentieth century, limited the political franchise in Britain on the basis of age, gender, the ownership of property, or the payment of rates, for example, reflected such concerns. Full membership in the political community was theoretically to be restricted to individuals who displayed a particular set of personal qualities, showing them to be capable of ruling themselves and others in a rational and impartial manner. Because such individual qualities were seen as the basis for a well-ordered political community, the relationship between the individual and the state was conceived primarily in terms of individual personalities rather than impersonal structures, with the personal virtues of each individual contributing to a conception of the common good. The public good was seen to be the good of every individual collected.

On such an understanding, the extension of citizenship could only occur through the realisation of civic potential in a wider range of individuals, the active development of civic virtues within the society, and the encouragement of a closer personal and moral identification

---

[27] Pocock, 'The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times', p.31.

with the purposes of the state. With a less personal conception of the nature of the political community, however, such appeals to the individual consciousness were deemed to be unnecessary. Citizenship could be extended simply by bestowing rights and entitlements upon previously excluded groups. Because a person's citizenship was defined by the rights he possessed rather than his personal qualities, the quality of his citizenship was simply determined by the nature of the institutional arrangements which provided the rights he passively enjoyed. On this basis, virtuous institutions, rather than virtuous people, were the key to a well-ordered political community. Within the framework of these institutions, it did not matter if every individual pursued his own interests according to various and conflicting private definitions of the good. The public good – defined usually in terms of material rather than moral objectives – was maintained by an instrumental, formal structure which served to organise such interests for the benefit of the community.

Within the context of twentieth-century Britain, such ideas were expressed in the conception of citizenship that emerged in the wake of the Second World War. With mass democracy accepted as an unquestioned reality and public institutions automatically validated by their success in maintaining national solidarity during the war, the idea that citizenship should be conditional upon individual qualities seemed redundant.[28] On the other hand, the institutional structures by which the British economy and society had been successfully organised for the war effort could be seen to provide a new basis for the political community. It was in the context of this redefinition of the terms of civic engagement that ideals of the post-war welfare state developed. The relationship between the individual and the state was not conceived in terms of a personal identification, but depended upon an instrumental process by which each citizen's monetary contribution to a common fund gave him the right to be protected against illness, old age and unemployment. As Michael Ignatieff put it, civic solidarity was 'built upon the presumption that the more a citizen received from the state the more easily he would connect his

---

[28] See Morgan and Evans, *The Battle for Britain*, p.1.

private interest to the public'.[29] This connection, however, would not affect the nature of the citizenship enjoyed by the individual: the public good did not depend upon such an identification, but upon the operations of the institutional framework.

Different ideas about the nature of a political community thus entailed different conceptions of citizenship, making the particular decontestation of the notion an important conceptual issue in the citizenship debate. The process by which notions of the political community were defined, however, reflected fundamental conceptual associations with various notions of individuality and the sources of personal identity. Different conceptions of the individual were thus also important components to be decontested within the conceptual structure of citizenship. As a concept, individuality has been associated with a wide range of constitutive elements. Notions of dignity, autonomy, privacy, and self-development have all served as key considerations in various definitions of what it means to be an individual.[30] More importantly, however, ideas about individuality have also been shaped by methodological assumptions with regard to how social phenomena should be explained.[31]

Within the citizenship debate, active conceptions of the citizen prioritise notions of dignity, autonomy and self-development as significant aspects of individuality. The human person is defined as a 'cognitive, active and purposive' being,[32] and perceived as an end in himself. The development of a citizenship identity is seen as the means by which the individual could realise his full humanity, thus fulfilling an ideal of self-development; and membership in the political community is related to a self-determined action, rather than the enjoyment of privileges that are externally presented. On the other hand, passive citizenship prioritises privacy as the defining feature of individuality. Although the notion of autonomy is also an important aspect of the passive conception, the freedom of the individual is seen to derive from the protection of a private sphere in which his individuality could be expressed, which in turn depends upon the operations of an external institutional framework. Insofar as the citizenship identity does not

---

[29] Ignatieff, 'The Myth of Citizenship', p.67.
[30] See S. Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford, 1973), pp.51-72.
[31] See Chapter Five, pp.171-2.

prescribe an ideal for the life of the individual, moreover, the notion of self-development is also less clearly defined. Yet, passive citizenship has been seen as the form of citizenship that is most closely related to individualistic conceptions of humanity, precisely because it does not prescribe an ideal individuality. Whereas active citizenship involves an identification with a conception of the common good, passive citizenship provides its citizens with the freedom to pursue various individual conceptions of the good, albeit within a given framework.

Conceptions of individuality underwent a number of important developments in the course of the twentieth century in Britain, with significant implications for the way in which citizenship was constructed. At the end of the nineteenth century, ideas about humanity and the nature of the individual were vigorously contested, as the *laissez faire* individualist conception of humanity as a disconnected set of atomistic and competitive individuals, came to be challenged by a more social conception of humanity as an organic whole in which individuals were constituted by their relations to society.[33] In the early part of the twentieth century, this notion of a social individual was taken up within an idealist conceptual framework that emphasised the role of the individual mind and will in the construction of reality. Although the social individual was seen to derive his substantive identity and personhood from society, the individual was nevertheless conceived as a coherent and rational *persona*, whose consciousness had to be addressed as an important part of his implication within the social whole. The unity between the individual and society was seen as a rational process in which the individual extended the sphere of his autonomy and his capacity for self-determination by identifying with the social whole that shaped his personality.[34] As the century progressed, however, the representation of the individual as a rational entity came to be undermined by changing political realities and concomitant developments in social thought. As a political concept, rationality came to be seen not as a personal quality reflected in individuals, but as an organising principle that formed the basis for

---

[32] Pocock, 'The Ideal of Citizenship Since Classical Times', p.33.
[33] See Jones' criticism of Spencer, as discussed in Chapter Four, pp.110-11.
[34] This theory is more specifically described in the consideration of Jones' approach to individuality in Chapter Four, pp.117-25.

particular sets of social and political arrangements.[35] As the coherent identity of the individual as a rational *persona* became fragmented, the system of social relations came to be abstracted away from the individual consciousness, such that the social individual was reduced to being little more than 'the filler of a place' within 'the structure of society'.[36] Such an individual was conceived not as an independent source of intentions and purposes that gave him the capacity to act as 'an agent and a chooser', but merely as the bearer of some 'contingent and socially defined' attributes, whose behaviour could be moulded by the operations of a set of social institutions.[37]

These different decontestations of individuality made for different conceptions of citizenship. On the earlier understanding, citizenship could be conceived as the achievement of a rational, thinking individual, developing his personality through an active identification with the moral purposes of society and the state. With a less coherent sense of the individual as a source of independent rational activity, however, the conception of citizenship that developed in Britain after the Second World War was defined in terms of a set of objective conditions that could be produced by the instruments of the state. In such considerations, the individual consciousness was effectively bypassed. Changing notions of individuality thus shifted, in significant ways, the conceptual focus for the citizenship debate in twentieth-century Britain.

Essentially, the concept of citizenship defines a relationship between the individual and the state, described in terms of the rights and duties that are seen to constitute it. In this regard, the development of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain has been presented as a process by which the balance between rights and duties shifted in favour of the former.[38] Yet, the way in which the rights and duties of citizenship are conceived needs to be seen in relation to changing notions of the individual and the political community. Citizenship rights are held by individuals in their capacity as members of the political community in question; their duties are similarly defined in relation to the concept of membership. As such, these rights and duties are products

---

[35] See, for example, Michael Oakeshott's criticisms of the epistemological rationalism that he claimed reformers on the left sought to use as a tool to reconstruct the social institutions of the post-war British state, in M. Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and other essays* (London, 1962).
[36] E. Jordan, 'The Structure of Society', *Ethics*, LV (1944-45), p.80.
[37] Lukes, *Individualism*, p.133.

of a particular set of circumstances: they cannot be measured with regard to any unchanging, abstract, and objective standard, except perhaps where such a standard is prescribed within the particular conception of citizenship.[39] The analysis in this section has suggested that conceptions of citizenship are constructed through the decontestation of notions of individuality and the political community – these latter factors being key components that flesh out the fundamental notion of membership within the conceptual structure of citizenship. Within this structure, rights and duties may be seen as peripheral components that exist as ephemeral ideas, straddling 'the interface between the conceptualization of social realities and the external contexts and concrete manifestations in and through which those conceptualizations occur'.[40] This will be more closely considered in the following section, in which two concrete instances of the conceptualisation of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain will be analysed.

II. Constructing Citizenship in Twentieth-Century Britain

In the first two parts of this thesis, the consideration of the different personal and ideational contexts within which Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall developed their thought suggested why these two thinkers were predisposed to decontest political concepts in particular ways. In this section, what this decontestation amounted to and what it meant in terms of the organisation of the political concept of citizenship will be examined.[41] The way in which Jones and Marshall constructed their particular conceptions of citizenship present empirical examples of the process of conceptual definition. Both thinkers engaged in decontestations of notions of the individual and the nature of the political community with regard to citizenship; and both saw a need to address their ideas to the prevailing concerns of a practical political reality. How their two conceptions differed thus provides an interesting perspective on the extent to which the morphological structure of citizenship allowed the idea to be stretched and recast. Moreover, Jones' and Marshall's ideas about rights, duties and nature of political participation reflected an important interaction between the conceptualisation of citizenship and the way in which it was

---

[38] See Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', pp.7, 45.
[39] See below, p.190.
[40] Freeden, *Ideologies and Political Theory*, p.79.

embodied within a practical context. By analysing how these ideas were presented, a better understanding of the way in which citizenship worked as a concept in twentieth-century Britain may be gained.

JONES' IDEALIST CONCEPTION OF CITIZENSHIP

The idealist conception of citizenship developed at a time when the fabric of British society seemed to be under threat. In the context of a society in an advanced stage of urbanisation and industrialisation, class conflict seemed to be an impending reality; and the emergence of poverty and unemployment as national problems as a result of a series of economic depressions only served to heighten anxieties about the degeneration of the body politic. In the midst of all this, however, British society was also beginning to open itself up to popular democracy. Given the structure of the constitution, the extension of the franchise in this period, although by no means complete, indicated that some degree of popular control of the state would result.[42] Within this context, worries about the breakdown of community and the sacrifice of social harmony resulting from the enlargement of society took on a political significance.

In response to this perceived threat of social breakdown, idealist thinkers in this period came to see citizenship as the means by which the idea of community could be given a political meaning, and the extension of suffrage was associated with 'a spiritual advance imposing new duties as well as new rights'.[43] Working from a belief in 'the conjunction between philosophy and public life',[44] they drew upon ideas from Plato and Aristotle, mediated through the influence of Hegelian thought, to articulate a conception of citizenship through which isolated individuals could recover a sense of their roles within a larger social organism. The idealist conviction was of the existence, in the world, of a fundamental metaphysical unity to be realised through a process of developing self-consciousness, and there was to be no distinction between the metaphysics and the practice of citizenship.[45] This shaped a particular conception of the state and the

---

[41] See *Ibid.*, p.125.
[42] Harris, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State', p.140.
[43] Richter, *Politics of Conscience*, p.344.
[44] den Otter, *British Idealism and Social Explanation*, p.1.
[45] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.93.

constitution of a body politic, and placed the understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state within a specific moral framework.

As part of this intellectual movement, Jones' conception of citizenship fundamentally assumed the existence of a transcendent moral universe within which both the state and the individual found their being. Outside of this relation, Jones argued, the actions of men and states had little value.[46] The welfare of the state and the well-being of its citizens thus depended upon moral conditions, and it was within a moral framework that the unity of the body politic was to be realised. According to Jones, the state could not reject morality, nor stand above its obligations. As a moral agent, it was bound 'to aim at a moral good, and to base its sovereignty on its obedience to it'.[47] However, the moral 'personality' of the state was complex. Its 'individuality' was not focused upon a distinct 'ego', because the state could be seen to be, as Jones put it, 'nothing apart from its citizens, except an empty name'. The relations by which it was constituted were 'the relations of will to will, or of man to man', and, in this sense, the state was 'nothing more than an institution and a mere product of men's activities'.[48] Yet, although it was impossible to deny that the state was in this respect nothing more than an instrument for the well-being of its citizens, Jones argued that there was equally a sense in which 'legislators, judges, soldiers, nay every common citizen at his station and amidst his duties' served as instruments of the state when they acted in their country's interest. In such actions, citizens often appeared to be expressing the will of 'a more or less harmonious unity and individuality', rather than a mere aggregate of individuals.[49] The state, as such, was a moral entity, possessed of its own moral purposes. Its citizens were as much the means for the fulfilment of these purposes, as the state was the means of their well-being.

Within the metaphysical unity of the transcendent moral universe, Jones held that the state could not claim authority over its citizens, except by being itself in the service of a higher moral authority, which was 'rooted in righteousness'. Provided that the state's authority *was*

---

[46] Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, p.70.
[47] *Ibid.*, p.46.
[48] *Ibid.*, p.51.

rooted in righteousness, however, Jones believed that service to the state was the citizens' 'one way to self-respect'.[50] Thus, the state and its citizens stood in moral relation to each other, and were mutually implicated – with 'the unity and intensity of a single life', as Jones saw it – in their respective pursuits of moral ends.[51] The state could not seek to achieve moral perfection independently of its citizens. Insofar as it was a moral personality, Jones maintained, it depended 'entirely for its being and character upon the character of its citizens'.[52] The moral personality of the individual citizen, however, in turn derived its substance and significance, according to Jones, through a process of assimilating the traditions of society represented by the state. Thus, the individual, in Jones' conception, developed in the context of the universal,[53] and the relationship between the individual and the state thus involved a process by which the moral purposes of the individual came to be identified with those of the state.

For the idealist, 'virtuous people and good citizens rather than well-contrived policies', as Jose Harris put it, 'were the indispensable prerequisites of a well-ordered state'.[54] Although economic and constitutional arrangements were recognised to be important, in the idealist conception of the state the justice and well-being of the body politic depended, ultimately, upon the ethical disposition of its citizens. In the light of this, the focus for the idealist conception of citizenship fell upon the individual, whose nature was defined as being 'social, rational, and developing in ethical awareness'.[55] The citizen was not a static entity, and citizenship could not be conceived simply as a political or a legal category. It was, rather, a state of mind and being, within a process of moral growth and development.[56] The idealist conception of citizenship sought to address the internalisation of subjective experience within the individual mind. As the basis for social integration, citizenship was seen to depend upon the internal realisation by the individual of the moral unity that existed between himself and the state. The internal development of the

---

[49] *Ibid.*, p.53.
[50] Jones, 'Education of the Citizen', pp.257-8.
[51] Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, p.90.
[52] Jones, 'Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', p.155.
[53] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.93.
[54] Harris, 'The Webbs, the Charity Organisation Society and the Ratan Tata Foundation', p.55.
[55] Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.98.
[56] *Ibid.*, p.95.

individual was seen as the key to the development of a citizenship that was defined in terms of spiritual and personal identification, operating within a transcendent moral framework.

In such a setting, rights, according to Jones, were 'rooted in the conception of a good which is absolute both for States and individuals'. The value of this good depended on nothing beyond itself, was complete and not to be made better in quality, or added to and made more comprehensive.[57] For Jones, there were no rights or duties that were not moral. As he put it, 'all rights alike draw their life-sap from the moral law, the universal good, the *objective* rightness, of which no jot or tittle can pass away'.[58] Thus, neither the state nor the citizen could assert rights which did not derive their legitimacy from a shared recognition of the moral framework. As such, according to Jones, the state did not have the full authority to 'lift claims into rights'. It could not 'make [rights] absolute and categorically binding, *except in so far as it arbitrates in accordance with universal reason* and therefore with the nature of things'. Thus, the authority of the state was 'derivative': it spoke 'in the name of a still higher power'.[59] As this 'higher power' was not the exclusive possession of the state but accessible and available to every individual citizen, however, the articulation of rights merely represented the expression of the moral unity between the state and the citizen.

In the context of this moral unity, Jones maintained that the state 'may do, and the citizen may claim, anything that makes for the good life of the citizen and nothing else'.[60] This placed the notion of rights firmly within a social context. Although Jones accepted that the rights of a human being were innate, inalienable and grounded 'in the man himself', he maintained that it was only as a 'social being' that the individual enjoyed them.[61] Thus, while he would 'accord to individuals every *item* claimed for them, in the way of privacy, sacredness, independence and inviolability', it was clear to him that the rights that were attributed to persons existed on a condition that appeared to be 'the exact opposite of their private and individual character'.

---

[57] Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, p.142.
[58] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.113.
[59] Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, pp.139-40. Emphasis added.
[60] *Ibid.*, p.157.
[61] *Ibid.*, p.148.

According to Jones, rights were 'individual, private, personal, *because in the first place they are social*'.[62] The 'purely individual or isolated will' could not constitute a right because rights, in Jones' definition, only belonged to the individual 'in virtue of the recognition of a common good by the community in which he lives a more or less rational life'.[63]

From such a perspective, rights and duties not only implied one another, but were the same facts looked at from opposite points of view. 'The obligations or duties of the State,' as Jones put it, 'are the rights of individual citizens'.[64] The extension of such rights by the state to its citizens developed their citizenship insofar as it 'widen[ed] the compass of their private effective wills and enlarg[ed] the significance of their personality', thus encouraging a closer moral identification with the purposes of the state.[65] Just as the rights of the individual depended upon the recognition of the community, however, duties were binding only to individuals who discovered and imposed them upon themselves.[66] Thus, the balance of rights and duties within Jones' conception of citizenship was predicated upon the individual internalisation of the collective moral consciousness.

Political participation was also conceived in these terms, insofar as it involved the identification of the individual will with the purposes of the state. In the idealist setting, participation in the body politic was the means by which the individual realised his social being, as well as the key to the moral well-being of the state. In this sense, however, what was seen as 'political' participation did not refer merely to the narrowly defined sphere of electoral politics. For Jones, the private station and duties of each individual had a 'political significance'. 'The good citizen,' he argued, 'goes forth to his labour in the morning and returns at eve, and he knows not that by fulfilling the duties of his station he has been strengthening the structure of his State, and serving purposes which far outspan his own.'[67] As the sphere of politics could no longer be defined solely in terms of the processes of law-making and administration, political

---

[62] Jones, 'Obligations and Privileges of Citizenship', pp.170-1.
[63] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', pp.97-8.
[64] Jones, 'Obligations and Privileges of Citizenship', p.138.
[65] *Ibid.*, p.172.
[66] H. Jones, 'Social Responsibilities' in *Working Faith of the Social Reformer*, p.297.

participation merely required a conscious identification of the private sphere of activity with the wider purposes of the state.

What this identification did imply, however, was a developed moral consciousness, from which an active social conscience could evolve. To improve society, Jones maintained, citizens needed to learn 'to mass together the will for good', and 'to set free the latent moral forces and direct them towards social ends'.[68] Although he accepted without doubt that many laws and institutions did need to be changed, he believed that 'if the social conscience were more generally active, and civic duties were more unconditionally imperative, reforms, wise in their conception and far-reaching in their beneficent effects, would follow almost of themselves'.[69] What was required was a 'community whose morals are genuinely socialized', and legislative enactments that did not 'lag behind the moral convictions and purposes of the times'.[70] Politics, according to Jones, had to be moralised,[71] and the means by which this would be done was by educating the citizen to a moral consciousness of his social identity, which would be expressed through his participation in the body politic.

With its emphasis on individual moral development within the context of an objective common good, and its idea of the interpenetration between the private and the public spheres, the idealist notion of citizenship may be characterised as a form of 'active citizenship'. The extent of an individual's citizenship was closely associated with the development of personality and humanity. The particular way in which the concept was formulated, however, reflected the effects of an engagement with specific political realities. The idealists' 'active citizenship' was articulated as an attempt to recover the idea of social unity in the face of an enlarged social entity and threats of social disintegration. The closely-knit republican community was seen as an ideal to be gained through the conceptualisation of an active citizenship, rather than the foundation of the conception. The aim of the idealist conception of citizenship was the creation of a morally-

---

[67] Jones, 'Moral Aspect of the Fiscal Question', p.133.
[68] Jones, 'Social Responsibilities', p.262.
[69] *Ibid.*, p.260.
[70] *Ibid.*, pp.270, 260.
[71] Jones, 'Ethics and Politics', p.408.

motivated community, through which social inclusion and unity would be achieved. The moralisation of social relations, it was believed, was the means by which a sense of civic solidarity would emerge.[72]

Ultimately, however, the idealist conception involved a notion of citizenship as the expression of social unity through an internalised moral consciousness. As such, it depended on internal and moral, rather than external and material conditions. Citizenship was an office to be assumed by each individual, through an active, personal identification with the purposes of the community. It could not be presented to the individual from without, because no other human being or social institution could effectively *make* an individual a citizen on such an understanding. Thus, citizenship could not be 'enacted' by legislation, and it was only by educating the individual mind, within a framework of moral relationships, that a citizen identity would be discovered as the basis for a morally-motivated community within the idealist conception.

MARSHALL'S POST-WAR CONCEPTION OF CITIZENSHIP

The conception of citizenship that emerged in the context of the Second World War and its aftermath was premised on almost entirely different grounds. The legislation that established the post-war welfare state, although originally conceived by Beveridge and others in quasi-idealist terms, had defined the terms for the civic bargain between the citizen and the state in a quite new way. This new relationship was based on a system of universal social insurance in which, by virtue of his contribution to a common fund, the citizen could, as a matter of contractual right, expect to be protected against illness, old age, unemployment.[73] The rhetoric emphasised the virtues of universal and 'impersonal' entitlement, as opposed to the discretionary and 'moralistic'

---

[72] Such an understanding was based on the assumption that moral resources, unlike material resources, were infinite and therefore, in theory, available to all without restriction. Social inclusion on a moral basis depended only upon individual willingness; and it was held that only those who chose to reject the moral community would, by their own volition, be excluded from the social unity. In practice, of course, there were individuals who failed to achieve the rational or moral ideal for a variety of reasons, who would effectively be excluded from the moral unity. The recovery of such individuals was seen to depend upon the rebuilding of their moral identity through social education.

[73] Ignatieff, 'The Myth of Citizenship', p.67. This 'contractual' approach to social welfare had been evolving since the 1890s, but it was only in the post-war years that universal contributory insurance was established as the keystone of a unified and comprehensive scheme of social security organised at the national level by the state.

treatment that had gone on before.[74] Social welfare was no longer seen as a means of addressing the finite needs of specific individuals, with a view to helping them regain their citizenship function. It was concerned, instead, with promoting the kind of social *structures* in which it was believed autonomous and self-reliant individuals could multiply and flourish. Although Beveridge himself had seen it as 'a medium for the promotion of personal independence, enlarged citizenship, enforcement of duties, and common civic culture',[75] the welfare state was associated with a concept of citizenship that did not seem to *depend* on the internal development of the individual. Through the operation of the system of universal contributory insurance, the relationship between the individual and the state had taken the form of a material, contractual arrangement by which the external conditions for citizenship were guaranteed, but individual attitudes and beliefs were seen to be, for the most part, irrelevant. This was the context within which Marshall constructed his conception of citizenship.

It has been noted in this thesis that Marshall significantly based his conception of citizenship on the concrete setting of the post-war institution of the welfare state in Britain. Whereas Jones assumed the existence of a transcendent moral framework and saw citizenship as essentially a spiritual experience, Marshall observed the workings of an instrumental structure which defined the relationship between the individual and the state with a greater emphasis on material rather than spiritual circumstances. It has been suggested that the history of the welfare state may be interpreted 'as a struggle to undergird formal legal rights with entitlements to social and economic security so that citizenship could become a real as opposed to a purely formal experience'.[76] What was seen as 'real', however, depended upon the way in which the political community was conceived. For Marshall, the twentieth century represented the age of 'mass society'. As he saw it, the physical congestion of urban centres and public places, the prevalence of techniques of mass production and the forces of mass communication that had come to dominate the social experience after the Second World War, all meant that the individual was

---

[74] Harris, '"Contract" and "Citizenship"', p.122.
[75] J. Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography* (Oxford, 1997), p.496.
[76] Ignatieff, 'The Myth of Citizenship', p.66.

often 'lost in a host of repetitions of himself'.[77] Thus, whereas Jones saw the reality of the relationship between the individual and the state as part of the spiritual inheritance of each individual citizen, and rooted the notion of citizenship in an act of personal identification; Marshall saw the reality that bound the individual to the collectivity within the context of a more faceless set of circumstances, and identified the more general condition of welfare, rather than any form of moral identification, as being fundamental to modern citizenship.[78] It was in terms of welfare, therefore, that the political community was defined in Marshall's conception.

In 'Citizenship and Social Class', Marshall defined citizenship as 'a status *bestowed* on those who are full members of a community', such that all who possessed the status were 'equal with respect to the rights and duties *with which the status is endowed*'.[79] Implicit in this definition is a conception of the political community simply as the passive and unitary recipient of a set of uniform privileges created by the state, rather than an active body of individual citizens, each defining his own humanity. Whereas the focus for Jones' conception of citizenship fell upon the personal character of the individual as the guarantor of the moral perfection of the state, the focus for Marshall's conception fell upon the state as the creator of an equal status of citizenship that related individuals to the state on the basis of what they received from it. Citizenship, as such, was seen as the *product* of social and political legislation, whereas it may be argued that it was an idea of citizenship that *propelled* such legislation in the earlier part of the century. The idea that the state could simply create a form of citizenship as part of its social legislation was not a part of the earlier understanding of citizenship: the condition of membership was seen as something to be earned or acquired through the possession of certain innate qualities, and citizenship was seen as an expression of the personal identity of the individual. In Marshall's conception, however, the quality of citizenship was measured according to an external ideal that was set by the state. The individual did not contribute to the definition of this ideal, although his material well-being could seen to depend upon it as Marshall identified welfare as the central

---

[77] T. H. Marshall, 'Welfare in the Context of Social Development' in *The Right to Welfare*, pp.61-2.
[78] See Marshall, 'Welfare in the Context of Social Policy', p.81.
[79] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.18. Emphases added.

object of the ideal.

In Marshall's view, the concept of welfare operated along two axes: moving between the poles of wealth and happiness in one dimension, and between the individual and the society on the other.[80] With regard to the wealth-happiness axis, Marshall maintained that welfare was 'a qualitative, not a quantitative, concept', but argued that the emphasis on quality as against quantity could not be expressed 'in idealistic or even ascetic terms by setting human worth and worldly wealth against one another as opposites'. Welfare, according to Marshall, 'does not treat wealth and happiness as alternatives, but oscillates between them and partakes of the essence of both'. It was not 'idealistic in a derogatory sense', but 'realistic and severely practical', being 'deeply concerned with the state of the world and the needs of the flesh'.[81] To Marshall, it was obvious that 'welfare, in its broadest sense, is achieved largely by the consumption of goods and services that money can buy, and money is wealth'. Yet, wealth alone did not constitute welfare because welfare involved the satisfaction of wants, rather than the mere possession of goods or money. Happiness, on the other hand, was seen to be the result of the satisfaction of wants, yet it was too subjective a notion, and 'too personal and unpredictable to be the direct object of policy'.[82] Welfare, according to Marshall, was thus 'a compound of material means and immaterial ends',[83] and a material framework was a necessary feature of the relationship between the individual and the state as Marshall conceived it.

This material framework, however, moved along the individual-society axis. Although welfare was, as Marshall argued, '[u]ltimately... an individual matter, since it is only individuals who can have wants and be conscious of their satisfaction', the circumstances which affected the welfare of individuals often operated 'in and on groups as a whole'. It was thus 'necessary to make a careful study of the working of society as a whole in order to learn how best to promote the individual welfare of each member of it'.[84] As Marshall saw it, the claim of the individual to

---

[80] Marshall, 'Welfare in the Context of Social Development', p.55.
[81] *Ibid.*, p.65.
[82] *Ibid.*, pp.53-4.
[83] Marshall, 'The Right to Welfare', p.83.
[84] Marshall, 'Welfare in the Context of Social Development', p.55.

welfare was, within the context of the welfare state, 'sacred and irrefutable', partaking of 'the character of a natural right'. Yet, as the welfare state was the 'responsible promoter and guardian of the welfare of the whole community' and thus concerned with 'something more complex than the sum total of the welfare of all its individual members arrived at by simple addition', Marshall qualified such a notion by maintaining that the claims of the individual had to be 'defined and limited so as to fit into the complex and balanced pattern of the welfare of the community'. As a result, 'the right to welfare' could never have 'the full stature of a natural right'.[85] It is in such a setting that Marshall's conception of the rights and duties of citizenship needs to be seen.

As has been noted, Marshall defined the three principal elements in his conception of citizenship with regard to the possession of civil, political and social rights.[86] Within his conceptual framework, however, these rights were identified as products of social and political legislation, presented to society by the state. Thus, whereas Jones' conception of rights was rooted in the conception of a moral good that was absolute for *both* the state and the individual such that their existence represented an expression of the moral unity between the citizen and the state, Marshall's notion of rights originated from the state and manifested less of an expressive function. Indeed, as Marshall saw it, the modern rights established within the context of the welfare state were not only to be 'recognised as being social in origin', but formed 'part of the *mechanism* by which the individual is *absorbed* into society'.[87] In this regard, the establishment of social rights did not involve any engagement with the individual consciousness and remained essentially external to the construction of personal identity. The way in which Marshall's post-war theory of citizenship engaged with the notion of individuality thus differed significantly from Jones' earlier understanding.

Marshall's theory of citizenship has been noted for its identification of social and welfare rights as the ultimate achievement of citizenship in the twentieth century.[88] It is significant, however, that Marshall did seem to see social rights as being qualitatively different from the

---

[85] Marshall, 'Social Selection in the Welfare State', pp.246-7.
[86] See Chapter Five, pp.147-9; Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.8.
[87] Marshall, 'The Right to Welfare', p.91. Emphases added.

rights contained in the civil and political components of citizenship. In a lecture delivered in 1969, Marshall suggested that civil rights are 'a form of power', which could 'become part of the individual's personality, a pervasive element in his daily life, an intrinsic component of his culture, the foundation of his capacity to act socially and the creator of environmental conditions which make social action possible in a democratic civilisation'. In sharp contrast to this, social rights 'are not designed for the exercise of power at all'. Although they reflected a 'strong individualist element in mass society', they referred to individuals 'as consumers, not as actors', with the power of influence vested in the hands of the providing government.[89] Given further that the resources needed to provide social rights depended on the performance of the economy and could not be guaranteed, any conception of social rights as entitlements strictly enforceable by law had to be relatively weak.

For Marshall, the content of individual rights 'must always be related to the resources at our disposal'.[90] Thus, it was 'clearly impossible to base all ... redistributional and welfare services on a system of precisely defined rights and duties', because no exact level or quality of service could be objectively guaranteed.[91] Moreover, Marshall suggested that the established 'right to social benefit' did not mean that it was 'to be had for the asking, but that, when the qualifying circumstances have been rigorously examined, the basic award will be made according to a scale that is published'. In this regard, he specified three conditions that had to be satisfied if social rights were to be safeguarded as rights: firstly, the principles and aims of social policy had to be 'fully understood and accepted by the great majority of its citizens, and progressively absorbed into their culture'; secondly, the agents who carried out the policy had to be trained and equipped to translate the principles and aims of social policy into action; and thirdly, all claimants for benefit or service should know, or be able to find out easily, what their rights were in each particular case and be able to 'present and press their claims on those who have the power the

---

[88] See, for example, King and Waldron, 'Citizenship, Social Citizenship and Welfare Provision', p.417.
[89] T. H. Marshall, 'Reflections on Power' in *The Right to Welfare*, p.141.
[90] BLPES, Marshall, 2/17: 'The Welfare State – The Next Phase', f.13.
[91] BLPES, Marshall, 2/14: 'The Philosophy and History of Need', f.3.

meet them'.[92] The third condition, according to Marshall, presented the greatest difficulty, because the rights of citizenship could be seen as 'a reality only for those who have belief in their authenticity and the skills needed to exercise them'.[93] All three conditions, however, referred to citizens merely as consumers of the state's provisions rather than active participants in the process of securing their well-being. The power of the individual as an actor was limited by the operations of an institutional framework.

In Marshall's construction of citizenship, this framework was defined with regard to economic rather than political or constitutional considerations. The roots of welfare, he argued, lay 'deep in the social and economic system as a whole', and its realisation and enjoyment depended upon the material source of national wealth, produced and distributed by the economic activities of individuals within the framework of national institutions.[94] Marshall's conception of the balance between the rights and duties of citizenship was conceived in relation to this perspective. For example, in 'Citizenship and Social Class', Marshall stressed the 'duty to work' as being of 'paramount importance' to the status of citizenship.[95] The foundation for this claim, however, was not defended on moral grounds, but with regard to economic considerations and, to some extent, material self-interest. Marshall believed that it would be no easy matter to revive the notion of a 'personal obligation to work', given that the size of the national community meant that 'the effect of one man's labour on the well-being of the whole society is so infinitely small that it is hard for him to believe that he can do much harm by withholding or curtailing it'.[96] However, on the grounds that the expectation of welfare was, as he put it, 'one aspect of the general expectation that social and economic progress would be continuous and that the standard of living would keep on rising', it was clear that it would only be realised 'if the people who entertain it are ready to work for it'. Thus, Marshall maintained that the citizen's right to welfare could be seen as 'the right to their fair share of the individual enjoyment of the fruits of the

---

[92] T. H. Marshall, *Social Policy in the Twentieth Century* (London, 1975), p.206.
[93] *Ibid.*, p.207.
[94] Marshall, 'The Right to Welfare', p.93.
[95] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.45.
[96] *Ibid.*, p.46.

collective labour'.[97] It was on these grounds that the duty to work was justified in Marshall's conception of citizenship. Thus, the balance of social rights and duties in Marshall's conception of citizenship was determined by an essentially contractual understanding, which sought to appeal to the individual on material rather than moral grounds.

The idea of a material framework was central to Marshall's understanding of citizenship in relation to political participation. As he saw it, the setting for the progress of citizenship had been profoundly altered by the social and economic changes that had occurred in the twentieth century. As the 'components for a civilised and cultured life' were brought within the reach of many, the basis for social integration, according to Marshall, had 'spread from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of material enjoyment'.[98] Given the contractual basis for the expression of rights and duties, participation by the citizen seemed to be limited to a 'citizenship-by-consumption'.[99] The citizen was defined by his consumption of the goods and services provided by the state from the national wealth that he had worked for, rather than through an active expression of his political identity as a citizen. Indeed, Marshall's whole conception of citizenship had very little to say with regard to the way in which an individual could express his identity as a citizen. To some extent, this dovetailed with the effects of post-war planning on the role of the individual citizen. With the operations of society becoming increasingly dominated by large-scale organisations, there was a sense on the part of the individual that the centralised authorities which controlled his life were increasingly remote.[100] There appeared, therefore, to be no compelling moral need for the citizen to participate; and although a significant amount of time and intellectual effort was given to the consideration of the problem, no solution was ultimately sufficient to address it, given the strength of the public's preference for consumption, affluence and, above all, privacy.[101]

---

[97] Marshall, 'The Right to Welfare', p.93.
[98] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.28.
[99] J. E. Cronin, 'Class, Citizenship and Party Allegiance: The Labour Party and Class Formation in Twentieth Century Britain', *Studies in Political Economy*, XXI (1986), p.129.
[100] A. Beach, 'Forging a "nation of participants": Political and Economic Planning in Labour's Britain' in R. Weight and A. Beach (eds), *The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 1930-1960* (London, 1998), p.94.
[101] *Ibid.*, p.108.

Thus, the dominant sense of citizenship in the post-war period came to be identified as a series of rights, entitlements and benefits, with no real opportunities for active political participation. The idea that the post-war conception of citizenship represents a notion of 'passive citizenship' has tended to stem from this identification. There are, however, other ways in which post-war citizenship more closely approximated the passive notion. The idea that it was essentially the responsibility of the state to produce a better society through planning represented a clear distinction between the private sphere of consumption and the public sphere of legislation. Moreover, it led to a tendency to focus on the external conditions of citizenship rather than the internal development of the individual, implying a conception of citizenship that was based on a material, rather than a moral, framework. Yet, like the idealist conception, the post-war conception of citizenship was concerned with developing social cohesion. The difference was that the social unity envisioned had a strong material basis, depended upon a guarantee of equality that was bestowed by legislation, and was to be realised by the individual as a passive consumer, rather than as an actor. These developments had occurred as a result of changes in political, social and economic realities, and the dominance of a different intellectual framework for the understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state.

III. Class and the Conceptualisation of Citizenship

Cutting across and threatening to subvert the concept of citizenship as defined by both Jones and Marshall, however, was the issue of social class. In this section, the way in which notions of class were 'decontested' with regard to ideas about citizenship will be analysed, and it will be suggested that the conceptual boundaries for both class and citizenship were significantly shaped by this interaction. The claim that the concept of class stands in need of 'decontestation' stems from an understanding of the nature of class as an 'essentially-contested concept'. The identification of class as such a concept was put forward by Peter Calvert in 1982. Using W. B. Gallie's criteria, Calvert argued that class was 'appraisive', in that it signified some type of valued achievement; and that this achievement was 'internally complex', and '*initially* variously describable'. Moreover, it was liable to 'considerable modification in the light of changing

circumstances', which could not be 'prescribed or predicted in advance'.[102] The concept of class is thus rendered multifarious by the variety of criteria on which it can draw, and the process by which it acquires meaning, in any single context, becomes an interesting issue. As a political concept, however, class may also be seen to acquire at least some of its meaning through its position with respect to other political concepts. In this regard, its juxtaposition to the concept of citizenship, in various contexts, becomes significant. An understanding of the role of class in the conceptualisation of citizenship may thus clarify the way in which citizenship operated as a political concept in twentieth-century Britain.

Both Jones and Marshall were concerned with setting out a conception of citizenship to accord with their understanding of the society in which they lived; and both conceptualised citizenship with reference to class. By considering the relationship between their conception of class and their conception of citizenship, therefore, a sense of the way in which interpretations of class operated to shape understandings of citizenship may be obtained. It has been suggested that reconsiderations of accepted notions about state and society affected how citizenship could be thought about in the two periods with which the thesis is concerned.[103] In the midst of these changes, however, conceptions of class were also being contested: in the first period, the rise of the Labour Party added new dimensions to understandings of the role of class in the political community; in the second period, the rise of the so-called 'affluent worker' and the 'new' working class changed the social expectations held by this class within the existing class structure. Thus, the two periods represent interesting historical contexts for a consideration of the processes by which the concept of class interacted with the concept of citizenship.

Jones' particular view of citizenship was, to a large extent, a response to the dangers he perceived to be arising from changes in the structure of society. In 'The Working Faith of the Social Reformer', Jones observed that,

> 'The very structure of human society has changed, even though the fundamental passions of mankind remain the same from age to age. For society no longer consists of petty rural or urban units, each leading its own secluded life, speaking

---

[102] See P. Calvert, *The Concept of Class: An historical introduction* (London, 1982), pp.209-12.
[103] See Chapter One, pp.18-24.

> its own dialect, cherishing its own particular customs, meeting its own peculiar wants. Modern society is one tumultuous whole.'[104]

For Jones, the issue that needed to be addressed was how this enlargement of society was to be accommodated without the sacrifice of community and social harmony, which he held to be vital. Social relations needed to be reconstituted, and, in this context, the concept of the 'social organism' served as a means by which connections between individuals could be buttressed through an appeal to a deeper, 'natural' universality. It was on this basis that Jones saw the 'mutual implication of State and citizen' as having 'the unity and intensity of a single life'.[105]

More importantly, however, it was in the context of this 'tumultuous whole' that Jones understood society to be 'stratified into classes', and believed that 'the impact of their collision [shook] the state'.[106] Moreover, he believed that the terms on which this 'collision' was taking place derived their force from a mistaken, and destructive, conception of human relationships as being ruled by purely materialistic forces. Herein, then, lay the basis for Jones' vociferous opposition to the politics of the Labour Party. 'The appeal to the good citizen,' as he put it to Sidney Webb,

> 'even when it is an appeal for remedying the evils or affirming the rights of a class, must be direct and authoritative. Were I to join the Labour Party, the first and last service I should like to perform for it would be that of asking it to forget itself, cease to speak of "class", especially of "class" interpreted in terms of economics, and to escape from the sphere of collisions by seeking *first* the good things which do not grow less for each when shared by all, and its own ends as *means* and *subordinate* means to *that*.'[107]

In arguing this, Jones revealed a particular understanding of the nature of economic competition, as well as a peculiar 'decontestation' of the place of the industrial process within a conception of society. The latter may be illustrated by considering Ramsay MacDonald's defence of the Labour Party in response to Jones' attack in the article 'The Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', published in the *Hibbert Journal*.[108] Contrary to Jones' understanding, the

---

[104] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.22.
[105] Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, p.90.
[106] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.22.
[107] NLW, TJC, Class U, Vol. I, f.45: Jones to S. Webb, 29 Mar. 1918.
[108] Jones, 'Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', pp.155-78; J. R. MacDonald, 'The "Corruption" of the Citizenship of the Working Man: A Reply', *Hibbert Journal*, X (1911-12), pp.344-61.

Labour Party's economics, MacDonald argued, was 'an assertion that human interests should dominate all industrial operations'. It aimed at 'a cooperative use of factors that [were being] employed as rivals – like capital and labour'; and involved 'a denial of the rivalry between man and the instruments of production', stressing, instead, a claim to 'a unity based upon the sovereignty of the living factors in production over the dead ones'. Thus, he maintained that, in spite of its apparent class appeal, it was a conception of an organic society that drove Labour's economic doctrine, which in turn governed its sociology, its ethics, and its politics.[109]

Economics, according to MacDonald, spoke for a 'scientific' method. Moreover, he argued, 'economic suggestions [called] up conceptions of right and wrong, of sympathy and pity, of fraternity and justice, in the minds of a poverty-stricken people'. They were thus 'gateways to the moral sentiments', and were used as such by the Labour Party.[110] MacDonald's inclusion of the industrial process as part of what he conceived of as the social organism provides an interesting insight into the contrasting bases on which the concept of class could be contested in the period. To Jones, the industrial process represented an arena of selfish wranglings and 'bickerings', and was therefore a subversion of a 'natural', spiritual harmony. He saw the organisation of society for industrial purposes as an alternative social framework: based on a purely materialist understanding of social processes, and operating, therefore, against what Jones understood to be the interests of citizenship. In this sense, the industrial process, as it stood, was a threat to Jones' conception of the social organism.

To some extent, this was a consequence of Jones' particular understanding of the nature of economic competition. Jones' conception of material wealth seems to have been based on the understanding that the total quantity of this resource was fixed and finite. Economic competition, therefore, thrived on the principle of mutual exclusion, and involved 'the assertion of one economic will against another, the "struggle for existence," the brute force of competition, in which the individual not only [strengthened] himself but [weakened] his neighbour'.[111] Moreover,

---

[109] MacDonald, 'The "Corruption" of the Citizenship of the Working Man: A Reply', pp.352-3.
[110] *Ibid.*, pp.353-4.
[111] Jones, 'Working Faith of the Social Reformer', p.91.

as Jones saw it, the structure of economic society tended to consist of 'powerful organisations whose interaction [had] a quasi-mechanical character', rather than of 'individuals in personal relation to one another'.[112] The sphere of economics, Jones maintained, was the sphere of 'the abstract, self-regulating will', in which any unity or mutual service was indirect and came 'by the way, unsought of any of [the individual or corporate units within the sphere]'.[113]

By identifying the appeal to class as operating within this arena, Jones placed the notion of class in an oppositional position to his conception of citizenship, which was based on the idea of a spiritual relationship between the self-realised individual and the morally attuned state, deriving from the idea of the social organism. In contrast to the appeal to class, the 'unit' for citizenship was the individual personality: *each* citizen found his own place in relation to the state, and, although the theory of the social organism involved the interpenetration of lives within a unified whole, this whole was 'one without ceasing to be many'.[114] In this sense, then, Jones saw class identity as a form of false consciousness. An economic similarity did not determine, or circumscribe, the extent of one's social involvement in the political community, nor did one's ability to participate or contribute to public life depend upon it. Therefore, although Jones did not deny the existence of class, he did not consider the ownership of factors of production to be the thing which determined the extent of a person's citizenship. As he saw it,

> 'The citizen has but to stand in his station and perform his duties in order to fulfil the demands of citizenship. He is like an organ to the organism, best where he is – at his own work... He would find right things to do where his skill is greatest, namely, in his own vocation, and perform therein the unique service which society demands of him... There is no humblest task which a high purpose may not ennoble.'[115]

There is a sense in which this may be associated with Bernard Bosanquet's understanding of class as 'function'.[116] Yet, Bosanquet's particular identification involved a conclusion that class was an integral and permanent feature of society,[117] whereas Jones

---

[112] Jones, 'Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', p.172.
[113] *Ibid.*, p.173.
[114] Jones, *Principles of Citizenship*, p.88.
[115] Jones, *Idealism as a Practical Creed*, p.123.
[116] See den Otter, *British Idealism and Social Explanation*, pp.189-195.
[117] *Ibid.*, p.192.

recognised a need for class to be transcended by the individual. As has been suggested in this thesis,[118] Jones' position is perhaps better identified with the nineteenth-century working-class tradition of respectability, in which the idea that respectability 'denoted a position of established social standing', as Brian Harrison has suggested, was gradually replaced by the notion that it described 'a life-style which could be observed at all levels', as moral implications assumed greater significance.[119] The idea that it was possible to achieve respectability through individual will was one that Jones' conceptions of both class and citizenship endorsed. Although Jones undoubtedly exaggerated the ease with which class could be transcended by the individual, it seems clear that he intended this to be the outcome made possible by an adherence to virtuous citizenship.

Such an outcome was also the objective in Marshall's conception of citizenship, although the process by which it was to be achieved was conceived on very different terms. As with Jones, Marshall's articulations were engaged with what he called 'a new image of society' and 'a new picture of a social structure';[120] however, for Marshall, these were occurring within the context of mass democracy and post-war planning. When he came to consider the relationship between class and citizenship, Marshall observed that certain post-war social changes had brought about a compression at both ends of the scale of income distribution and a great extension of the area of common culture and common experience.[121] As a result of economic growth, full employment, the expansion of welfare services and increased opportunities for social mobility, the economic situation of the working class in the second half of the twentieth century had changed substantially.

Sociologists, led by John Goldthorpe, have credited this transformation in the economic and social position of the workers with bringing forth a 'new' working class – or a new type of 'middle-class society' – characterised by the so-called 'affluent worker'.[122] In many ways, therefore, the period in which Marshall was writing represented the golden age of the working

---

[118] See Chapter Two, pp.48-53.
[119] Harrison, 'Traditions of Respectability', p.157.
[120] BLPES, Marshall, 4/2: 'Social Change in Britain', f.6.
[121] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.44.
[122] See, for example, J. H. Goldthorpe, *et al.*, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure* (Cambridge, 1969).

class. Yet, to some extent, notions of class had been undermined by the universalist political rhetoric of the time: the universalism that characterised the post-war welfare state could be related to the various articulations of universal models of citizenship that had been prevalent in the early 1940s. The way in which these two trends could be combined provides an interesting perspective from which to consider the nature of the relationship between class and citizenship in Marshall's thought.

James Cronin has argued that the changes of the post-war years had 'in a very real sense, made British workers into citizens'. Not only could claims to minimum standards of welfare and health be made as a matter of right, but the income with which to participate meaningfully in what Cronin terms 'the citizenship-by-consumption that is the main benefit of contemporary capitalism' was also available.[123] In the post-war understanding, citizenship was seen to be most usefully employed to refer to 'the new set of rights that working people came to enjoy, or at least to expect'.[124] Moreover, this citizenship was seen to be 'interpreted and fulfilled in a very material fashion'.[125] Thus, the very affluence of the workers became the mainstay of a certain conception of citizenship. Marshall, indeed, argued that the enrichment of the universal status of citizenship was made possible partly by the extent to which status differentials between classes had diminished – or could potentially be diminished – through the operation of social mobility.[126]

The way in which the nature of class had altered, therefore, had an effect on thinking about the means by which citizenship could be achieved; or, to put it another way, the means by which class could be transcended. As Marshall put it,

> 'Class-abatement is still the aim of social rights, but it has acquired a new meaning. It is no longer merely an attempt to abate the obvious nuisance of destitution in the lowest ranks of society. It has assumed the guise of an action modifying the whole pattern of social inequality. It is no longer content to raise the floor-level in the basement of the social edifice, leaving the superstructure as it was. It has begun to remodel the whole building, and it might even end by converting a skyscraper into a bungalow.'[127]

---

[123] Cronin, 'Class, Citizenship and Party Allegiance', p.129.
[124] *Ibid.*, p.135, n.32.
[125] *Ibid.*, p.129.
[126] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.44.
[127] *Ibid.*, p.28.

Marshall's opposition of the concept of citizenship to that of social class was characterised by the distinction he made between 'class' on the one hand and 'status' on the other. Whereas social class was 'a system of inequality', all who possessed the status of citizenship were 'equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed'.[128]

Yet, Marshall's understandings of the concept of class and the concept of status were specifically 'decontested'. Given that Marshall approached the subject of class as part of a sociological exercise, his conception of class was considerably more objective than Jones'. Nevertheless, Marshall did not believe that class was 'automatically determined by definite criteria, especially wealth and occupation', but that 'the objectivity of Class consists, not in the criteria that distinguish it, but in the social relations that it produces, and its subjectivity in the basic need for mutual conscious recognition'.[129] Recognition, in this sense, implied 'the admission to certain social relationships, and therefore... the offer of a certain "Lebenschance"'.[130] Thus, social class represented 'a group of persons with similar social chances, rather than... a group of persons with similar internal or external attributes'.[131] Seen in this respect, Marshall's conception of class seems fundamentally instrumental. In order to overcome class thus defined, what citizenship had to offer was an alternative structure of social opportunities and relationships, based on an equality bestowed by legislation.

The nature of this alternative structure was determined by Marshall's understanding of the concept of status, and the nature of social relationships. Social relations, according to Marshall, were materially based. 'It is completely wrong,' he maintained, '... to build up an antithesis between material goods and social relations. Material goods are the instruments of a cultured life, and you cannot separate the two.'[132] Following Weber's definition, Marshall saw status groups as being stratified according to principles of consumption and consequent styles of

---

[128] *Ibid.*, p.18.
[129] Marshall, 'Social Class – A Preliminary Analysis', p.61.
[130] *Ibid.*, p.59.
[131] *Ibid.*, p.60.
[132] BLPES, Marshall, 4/2: 'Social Change in Britain', f.9.

life.[133] Such a notion, however, was enriched by additional sources in the post-war period. In *The Future of Socialism* (1956), for example, Anthony Crosland observed,

> 'Not only are social attitudes less and less dominated by crude economic resentments, but the decline in the hours of work, combined with the higher standards and greater variety of consumption goods, are gradually weakening the significance from class evaluations of work relationships, and magnifying instead the impact of consumption and leisure relationships.'[134]

Within the context of academic sociology, Marshall's understanding of social stratification could draw support from the work of the American sociologist Jessie Bernard, who contrasted the modern economy of abundance with former systems based on scarcity and concluded that in modern mechanised civilisations – where 'the prosperity of the masses is necessary as the basis of the market through which the few become rich' – a Marxist conception of the force of class-consciousness and class-conflict was falsified. Although the result of this was not a homogeneous or wholly egalitarian society, it was nevertheless one in which 'social status [counted] for more than class interest as a basis of stratification'.[135] For Marshall, the twentieth century had witnessed 'the transformation of the wage-earning classes from a mere labour force, or instrument of production, into a body of consumers for whose custom industries compete by studying their tastes, catering for their wants, and stimulating their appetites'.[136] The idea of a consumption community was thus given primacy in Marshall's conception of society.

To some extent, all this was simply a reflection of the practical consequences of Keynesian economics, which shaped the post-war mind. The concept of status, however, could also be defined in legal terms. This definition considered 'status' as 'membership of a group carrying distinctive rights or duties, capacities or incapacities, determined and upheld by public law'.[137] Although Marshall was keen to make a distinction between this form of status and what he termed 'social status' – represented by 'lifestyle' aggregations – there is a clear sense in which his vision of citizenship involved a subtle combination of both aspects of the concept.

---

[133] Marshall, 'Changes in Social Stratification', p.134.
[134] C. A. R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism* (London, 1956; abridged and revised 1963), p.106.
[135] Marshall, 'Changes in Social Stratification', p.142.
[136] Marshall, 'Welfare in the Context of Social Development', p.60.
[137] Marshall, 'Changes in Social Stratification', p.134.

Citizenship as status was, for Marshall, based on 'a loyalty of free men endowed with rights and protected by a common law.'[138] In the twentieth century, however, the basis for social integration had 'spread from the sphere of sentiment and patriotism into that of material enjoyment' as the components of 'a civilised and cultured life' were brought within the reach of many.[139] The substance of Marshall's conception of citizenship, therefore, bore a legal definition which was to be realised in material terms.

Both Jones and Marshall conceived of class as being in opposition to their concepts of citizenship; and both argued the case for this on the grounds that the bases on which class operated as a societal institution conflicted with the ideal represented by their notions of citizenship. At the heart of the conception of class and citizenship as ideals opposed to each other, however, was the issue of equality. In *Equality*, R. H. Tawney wrote,

> 'A society which values equality will attach a high degree of significance to differences of character and intelligence between different individuals, and a low degree of significance to economic and social differences between different groups... A society which is in love with inequality will take such differences seriously, and will allow them to overflow from the regions, such as economic life, where they have their origin... till they become a kind of morbid obsession, colouring the whole world of social relations.'[140]

Seen in this light, both Jones' and Marshall's conceptions of citizenship were aimed at the creation of an equality-valuing society. Both thinkers conceived of citizenship with some reference to the question of individuality: both saw citizenship as a means by which the individual could be realised, chiefly by transcending the boundaries of class. Their ideas about the constituent elements of individuality, however, differed; and, following from this, so did the form of equality envisioned in each case. This impacted upon their notions of class, and of the means by which it was to be transcended, which, to some extent, determined the way in which the alternatives presented by the concept of citizenship were articulated.

Whereas Jones emphasised a process of self-development in which the operations of the individual mind defined the relationship between a person and his social environment, the idea of

---

[138] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.24.
[139] *Ibid.*, p.28.
[140] R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (London, 1952; 1983), p.58.

an individual as being characterised by the processes of his mind did not figure in Marshall's thought. For Marshall, the basis for social solidarity was seen to derive from the development of a socially unifying 'consumption community',[141] within which the citizen would be appealed to as a mass consumer, rather than an individual actor. Jones, on the other hand, saw the premise for citizenship in terms of the existence of a moral unity, to be internally realised and expressed by each individual.

Thus, with regard to equality, Jones adhered to 'an ideal of equality of respect' which, as Bernard Williams put it, 'made no contact with such things as the economic needs of society for certain skills, and human desire for some sorts of prestige'.[142] Respect was owed equally to each individual insofar as each was a moral agent, in possession of a transcendent, free and rational will. Equality was seen in terms of equal moral capacities, and not with regard to any empirical characteristics.[143] For Marshall, on the other hand, equality was to be understood in terms of an ideal of equal opportunity, guaranteed by political and social structures which would first 'establish a common minimum standard of life rich enough in substance to unite all in a common civilisation'.[144] On the basis of this 'foundation of equality', however, Marshall maintained that a 'structure of inequality could be built'.[145] Equality of opportunity was not aimed at asserting the complete equality of all individual citizens, but that inequality should not be based on hereditary social positions. Its pursuit would not in itself 'make all men equal' and 'abolish class distinctions'; but, according to Marshall, if the system 'worked perfectly', a constant class mobility between one generation and the next could lead to class attitudes and class consciousness being 'weakened and perhaps destroyed'.[146]

In the final analysis, the fundamental difference between Jones' and Marshall's conceptions of citizenship, however, consisted mainly in that Marshall's 'citizenship' was firmly

---

[141] See M. J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA, 1996), pp.222-23.
[142] B. A. O. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality' in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds), *Philosophy, Politics and Society*, (2nd Series, Oxford, 1962), p.130.
[143] *Ibid.*, p.116.
[144] BLPES, Marshall, 3/1: 'The Socialist Experiment in England', f.13.
[145] Marshall, 'Citizenship and Social Class', p.21.
[146] BLPES, Marshall, 3/1: 'The Socialist Experiment in England', ff.11-12.

identified with a material basis, whereas Jones' was defined against 'materialism'. This may be seen to derive almost directly from their respective understandings, and active interpretations, of the concept of class. In shaping this key difference, therefore, the decontestation of class played a significant role in the conceptualisation of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL WELFARE

The considerations of the previous chapter may be established more empirically by locating the operations of conceptual decontestation within the specific historical contexts of particular public policy debates. The extent to which practical political concerns shaped the ways in which citizenship was conceptualised has been noted at various points in this thesis.[1] Indeed, public policy considerations formed a significant part of the ideational environment within which political concepts such as citizenship derive much of their meaning. However, in addition to providing a context for the *production* of ideas, the policy-making process is also an arena in which the *consumption* of political ideas may be studied. Thus far, this thesis has been concerned mainly with the way in which ideas about citizenship were produced: it has considered the personal and intellectual environments which shaped the development of Jones' and Marshall's ideas about citizenship, and the conceptual processes by which citizenship was defined within two different historical contexts. In this chapter, brief but important consideration will be given to the way in which citizenship ideas were reflected in the formation of social policy.

The development of social welfare in Britain has been analysed from a variety of historical perspectives: some commentators have presented the evolution of social policy in terms of an *ad hoc* process of legislation, driven by the practical necessity of solving problems as they arise; others have emphasised the extent to which social policy reflects the social and intellectual ethos of a period, insofar as particular policies are justified according to contemporary values and ideals. If it is true that essential notions about the identification of social problems such as 'poverty', 'health' and 'unemployment' are 'relativistic and socially constructed concepts' rather than 'fixed, objective and self-explanatory social phenomena',[2] then the idea that the development of social policy could have been entirely determined by pragmatic improvisations in response to material pressures seems untenable. The policy making process has been described as

---

[1] See, for example, Chapter Two, pp.58-68; Chapter Three, pp.98-101; Chapter Four, pp.132-43; Chapter Five, pp.161-72.

[2] Harris, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State', p.119.

a 'constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories, and the definition of ideals that guide the way people behave'.[3] In this way, ideas may be seen as exerting an important pressure on the policy process. However, the relationship between ideas and policy is shaped by many interrelated factors, including the practical limitations of material and institutional circumstances. Just as pragmatic considerations do not entirely account for policy decisions, therefore, ideas do not in themselves wholly determine the direction of policy. To assess the impact of changing conceptions of citizenship on the construction of social policy, the process by which structural and ideational considerations are knit together should be examined.

The focus of this chapter will be on the welfare policy debates over the reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress (1905-9), and the passage of the 1948 National Assistance Act which finally abolished the Poor Law in Britain: two episodes which may be seen as major landmarks in the application of ideas about 'citizenship' to concrete historical situations. These debates will be analysed as case studies of the extent to which the changing character of the citizenship debate was woven into considerations of practical policy over the course of the two periods considered in this work. The decision to use social welfare debates as the means of analysing the impact of different conceptions of citizenship on public policy was made on the grounds that concerns over social conditions provided one of the most significant contexts for the citizenship debate in twentieth-century Britain.[4] Both Jones and Marshall made significant conceptual links between 'citizenship' and social work and welfare issues, and the two particular debates that will be analysed in this chapter may be seen as important concrete settings for the practical representation of their respective conceptions of citizenship.

I. THE POOR LAW REPORTS OF 1909

The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress was appointed by the Prime Minister Arthur Balfour in 1905, to inquire into the working of the laws relating to the

---

[3] D. Stone, *Capturing the Political Imagination* (London, 1996), p.11. See D. King, *In the Name of Liberalism: Illiberal Social Policy in the US and Britain* (Oxford, 1999), p.30.
[4] See Rees, 'T. H. Marshall and the progress of citizenship', pp.3-4.

relief of poor persons in the United Kingdom, and into the various means which had been adopted outside of the Poor Laws for meeting distress arising from want of employment, particularly during periods of severe industrial depression. The twenty members of the Commission represented a body of experts, either in the field of Poor Law administration or in social investigation. All were, according to Beatrice Webb, primarily concerned with public objectives, however much they may have disagreed about what these objectives were and how to arrive at them. As such, there was 'hardly any personal vanity, or personal ambition, and no personal interest at work in the Commission'.[5] Yet, as its considerations progressed, the Commission famously split into a conflict between two opposing groups that culminated in the production of two separate reports, representing two different approaches to the solution of the problem of destitution. The Poor Law Commission reflected many of the social and intellectual cross-currents that defined the ideological environment of the Edwardian period; and the differences of opinion between the Majority and the Minority Reports of the Commission evoked a massive public debate on the underlying principles of government, citizenship and social welfare between 1905 and 1909, and for some years afterward. The specific proposals of both reports have been compared and analysed in detail in a number of current studies.[6] The analysis in this section will not rehearse these accounts in detail, but focus on the grounds upon which the proposals were justified and the way in which the concept of citizenship was employed in this process.

The conventional account of the two reports portray them as respectively epitomising two different social and intellectual perspectives. The Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission was influenced and largely written by Helen Bosanquet, who was seen as

---

[5] B. Webb, *Our Partnership*, ed. B. Drake and M. I. Cole (London, 1948), pp.331-2.

[6] See, for example, A. M. McBriar, *An Edwardian Mixed Doubles, The Bosanquets versus the Webbs: A Study in British Social Policy 1890-1929* (Oxford, 1987), pp.209-305; U. Cormack, *The Welfare State, the Formative Years 1905-9*, C. S. Loch Memorial Lecture (London, 1953); K. Woodroofe, 'The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws 1905-09', *International Review of Social History*, XXII (1988), pp.137-64. In addition, A. W. Vincent, 'The Poor Law Reports of 1909 and the Social Theory of the Charity Organization Society', *Victorian Studies*, XXVII (1984), pp.343-63 and A. J. Kidd, 'The State and Moral Progress: The Webbs' Case for Social Reform c.1905 to 1940', *Twentieth Century British History*, VII (1996), pp.189-205, have looked beyond the proposals themselves to address fundamental questions with regard to the social theories upon which the proposals were based.

representing the more traditionally individualist views of the Charity Organisation Society (COS) with regard to poverty and pauperism; while the Minority Report, drafted by Beatrice Webb with the help of her husband Sidney, was seen as embracing a more bureaucratic and socialistic Fabian approach, in which the question of social reform was addressed on the basis of considerations of 'national efficiency'. To some extent, these perspectives were reflected in the proposed reforms. The Minority Report advocated the complete 'break-up of the Poor Law' and set out arrangements for a more efficient network of public services under which responsibility for different categories of recipients of relief would be divided amongst specialised local authority committees. In this respect, it was essentially concerned with the radical overhaul of Poor Law machinery on the grounds of efficiency. The Majority Report, on the other hand, favoured the retention of one main 'destitution authority' that would be singly responsible for the restorative treatment of destitute individuals in each county or county borough, on the grounds that the condition of destitution represented a particular state of the individual mind that had to be addressed as a concrete whole rather than in abstract parts, as they believed the Minority to be proposing.

Seen in this light, the two reports appear irreconcilable, with the Majority presented as being committed mainly to a reactionary defence of the status quo and nineteenth-century *laissez faire* notions of individualism, while the Minority heralded the future development of the welfare state. A more critical examination of the bases upon which the proposals were made, however, reveals the extent to which the ideas of the Majority encapsulated a more developed and complex social theory of the nature of the individual than the simple assumptions of *laissez faire* individualism; while, on the other hand, even the 'progressive' aspects of the Minority Report were effectively bound by the particular assumptions of the period in which it was written.[7] It is generally accepted that there was much common ground between the two reports in their basic criticisms of the existing system of poor relief. Both unreservedly condemned the general mixed workhouse, and were critical of the wasteful overlapping of services between the Poor Law and

---

[7] See Vincent, 'The Poor Law Reports of 1909', p.345.

the local authorities. More importantly, however, both reports also recognised the need for a new system of public relief and shared the view that social policy to this end should be 'preventative, curative and restorative' rather than 'crudely deterrent'.[8] These ideas represented a notable movement away from the principles on which Poor Law provision had hitherto been based; but a more significant consideration for the purposes of this thesis may be observed in the way in which both reports in 1909 regarded improvement of the condition of democratic citizenship as the ultimate achievement that they hoped would result from their proposed reforms. Evidence demonstrating this relatively neglected aspect of the Commissioners' concerns will be reviewed here.

In his evidence to the Poor Law Commission, Philip Bagenal, a Local Government Board inspector, asserted that 'the ideal condition of citizenship' was 'an independent man living in his own home and supporting himself without help from his neighbours'. He continued,

> 'That is what we want to perpetuate. We want to enlarge that idea of citizenship. Therefore, any help that is given to people who are in want should be so given as not to make that ideal difficult or less common that it ought to be. Consequently, your relief system ought to be such as to make it to the advantage of the applicant not to avail himself of the Poor Law, because he can get on better without it.'[9]

Bagenal's defence of deterrence as a principle for the Poor Law made a clear link between independence and the condition of citizenship, and this idea represented a key consideration in the Poor Law debates. In suggesting that independence could be maintained simply by discouraging applicants from availing themselves to relief, however, Bagenal appealed to a notion of independence that no longer seemed supportable by the time the Commission drew to a close. While independence remained an important consideration in the discussion, the basis upon which it was decontested had altered as the work of the Commission's own social investigators suggested that the 'official view' of poverty needed to be redefined. These findings merely confirmed the conclusions of a long line of theorists and investigators – including such

---

[8] Harris, *Private Lives, Public Spirit*, p.240.

[9] *Parliamentary Papers 1909*, Vol. XXXIX (Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, 1905-9, Appendix Vol. I, Minutes of Evidence (1st to 34th days) being mainly the evidence given by Officials of the Local Government Board for England and Wales, Cd.4625), p.350: Evidence of Philip

figures as Alfred Marshall, J. A. Hobson, Seebohm Rowntree and Charles Booth – whose writings on the nature of poverty, unemployment and the economic situation in late Victorian Britain had, since the 1870s, contributed to a cumulative process by which the need for change in the official conception of poverty was eventually acknowledged.[10]

The Poor Law had originally been conceived simply as a means of providing relief for 'those who had arrived at the last extremity'. Although the reforms of 1834 introduced the principle of deterrence as a negative incentive to ensure that independence was maintained in the main body of the working class, as J. H. Muirhead pointed out in 1909, there was no provision within the Workhouse system for the 'reclamation and reinstatement in economic independence' of those who had become destitute.[11] Indeed, the Poor Law reforms envisaged in 1834 treated pauperism simply as a problem of administration as it assumed that individuals only became destitute because the availability of relief had created an incentive for able-bodied persons to *choose* not to support themselves.[12] The 1834 reformers did not accept that any general industrial reasons for the incidence of unemployment and distress existed; thus, from their point of view, the problem of pauperism could be solved 'automatically' if relief was made 'less attractive than the most unattractive independent existence'. By simply ensuring that there was no incentive *not* to be an independent labourer, it was believed that the Poor Law, administered according to the principles of 1834, would eliminate pauperism by automatically converting all who were not either diseased or suddenly misfortuned into 'independent producers of wealth'.[13]

In 1909, however, it was no longer held to be possible to base the Poor Law system on a theory that assumed, as R. H. Tawney put it,

> 'firstly, that every man who wants work can get it; secondly, that there is a sharp line between the pauper and the man who is independent, a line coincident with the man who gets relief, and the man who does not; and, thirdly, that in order to convert the former into the latter it is only necessary to make his condition

---

Henry Bagenal, 27 Mar. 1906.

[10] Harris, *Private Lives, Public Spirit*, p.238.

[11] J. H. Muirhead, *By What Authority? The Principles In Common and At Issue in the Reports of the Poor Law Commission* (London, 1909), p.4.

[12] See R. H. Tawney, 'The Theory of Pauperism', *Sociological Review*, II (1909), p.364.

[13] *Ibid.*, p.365.

unpleasant'.[14]

In the face of findings that identified economic and industrial factors such as the operation of trade cycles, casual labour and other bad industrial practices as significant causes of distress, the condition of economic independence came to be seen as something that was not entirely within the control of individuals at a personal level. Thus, merely appealing to negative motives for action was no longer seen as sufficient to stem the incidence of destitution. Without an appeal to a wider range of human affections and interests through education, the dread of pauperism in itself could not stimulate the poorer classes to effect improvements in their standards of life. For the 'next great rise in the standard of living of the working classes', as Muirhead put it, the 'interests and affections' of the working population would have to be cultivated.[15] As it could not be wholly denied that there were 'sectors of British society in which it was both morally and practically impossible to make the "moral exertions" which the avoidance of poverty required', pure economic independence could no longer be seen as an absolute indicator of a virtuous citizen.[16]

A more considered approach towards the conceptualisation and maintenance of citizen virtue was thus called for; and it was in this respect that the idea of preventive and curative treatment that found expression in both reports reflected a new standard in the construction of policies for public relief. The incorporation of notions of citizenship into considerations of poor relief provided a framework within which justificatory arguments for both sets of proposals were set out. It has been argued in this thesis that citizenship was primarily conceived in the Edwardian period as the expression of an ethical identity, achieved through the internalisation of the moral purposes of the community within the consciousness of the individual. In this respect, citizenship was associated with an ideal of individual moral development within the context of a collective moral consciousness represented by society.[17] In the following analysis, the way in which the main authors and respective supporters of both the Majority and the Minority Reports

---

[14] *Ibid.*, p.366.
[15] Muirhead, *By What Authority?*, p.7.
[16] Harris, *Private Lives, Public Spirit*, p.240.

applied this understanding of citizenship in their considerations of social reform will be unravelled to demonstrate the practical operation of such ideas within the prevailing political context.

The extent to which both reports concurred in the belief that poverty and destitution represented a moral problem needs to be emphasised with regard to this analysis. There is a tendency to regard the Majority as the side that was primarily concerned with the moral aspect of destitution, while the Minority is seen to have focused on the economic and social causes of poverty to the apparent exclusion of any moral considerations. Yet, as Alan Kidd has pointed out in a recent article, the Webbs' case against the Poor Law illustrated the extent to which their version of 'national efficiency' and the notion of the 'national minimum' were 'as much about a moral relationship between the individual and the community as they were about material advance and physical efficiency'.[18] The seeming obsession of the Minority Report with issues of administrative rationalisation, he maintained, 'should not be allowed to conceal the extent to which a central concern was for the "moralisation" of society's response to poverty'.[19]

In *The Prevention of Destitution*, published in 1916, the Webbs observed that it was 'a special feature of destitution in modern urban communities that it means not merely a lack of food, clothing, and shelter, *but also a condition of mental degradation*', leading to '*the degradation of the soul*'.[20] Although the Webbs have often been seen to favour a more bureaucratic and expert-oriented approach to social welfare, their identification of the *nature* of the problem of destitution reflected their commitment to a moral understanding of the relationship between the individual and the political community. As they saw it, the worst of the evils that had to be overcome in social reform was not 'the material privation or physical suffering which destitution connotes, but the moral degradation with which it is, in modern communities, almost always accompanied'. Thus, material results were not the only factor to be addressed in the consideration of the problem; and 'the inevitable psychological reactions in human motive and human character' had

---

[17] See Chapter Six, pp.187-93.
[18] Kidd, 'The State and Moral Progress', p.190.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp.194-5.

to be given weighty consideration in any proposal for reform. 'It is, indeed, after all, the "Moral Factor" in the problem,' they maintained, 'whether manifested in the fuller development of individual faculty, the finer tone of family life, or the widening grasp of public spirit, that is and must remain the dominant consideration in every attempt at Social Reconstruction.'[21] In their consideration of the problem of destitution, therefore, the Webbs were as concerned with issues of personal character and spiritual vitality as the Bosanquets and the COS. Moral considerations were significant to both sets of proposals, and may be seen to reflect the extent to which prevailing notions about the nature of citizenship defined the terms on which social policy was debated.

The two reports, however, made their appeals to the idea of a 'moral factor' in destitution in fundamentally different ways. The Majority emphasised a failure of moral character that manifested itself in the individual as the singular and common element to which all actual occasions of destitution could be traced, whereas the Minority believed that the incidence of moral failure could be found in the social order as well as in each individual citizen and destitution was thus 'an effect as manifold as its causes'.[22] Thus, although both reports agreed that poverty and destitution were linked to bad moral character, the Majority were more inclined to present defective moral character in the individual as a *cause* of destitution, whereas the Minority held that demoralisation was a *consequence* rather than a cause of the condition of destitution created by and that destitution was caused by a failure of morality in the social organisation. As Bernard Bosanquet explained in an article in *The Sociological Review* in 1909:

> 'The Majority proceed upon the principle that where there is a failure of social self-maintenance... there is a defect in the citizen-character, or at least a grave danger to its integrity; and that therefore every case of this kind raises a problem which is "moral," in the sense of affecting the whole capacity of self-management, *to begin with in the person who has failed, and, secondarily, in the whole community so far as influenced by expectation and example.*'[23]

---

[20] S. and B. Webb, *The Prevention of Destitution* (London, 1916), pp.1-2. Emphases added.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp.333-4.
[22] See J. Seth, 'The Problem of Destitution: A Plea for the Minority Report', *International Journal of Ethics*, XXII (1911-12), pp.41, 43, 45.
[23] B. Bosanquet, 'The Reports of the Poor Law Commission: I. The Majority Report', *Sociological Review*, II (1909), pp.114-5. Emphasis added.

The Webbs accepted that 'the question of human character and personality' stood at the heart of the problem of destitution, and that the 'moral factor' was 'the supreme issue' in considerations of public relief. 'If our social order suffers from the Disease of Destitution,' they argued, 'we attribute it... to a definite "moral" failure; either to an obtuseness, if not a lack, of moral consciousness, or to a refusal to act on its dictates.' Crucially, however, they continued:

> 'But the "moral" failure may not be in those who are destitute. Sometimes, it is true, the moral failure is definitely that of the individual destitute man himself; and the consequent tragedy, in spite of all human effort to avert it, might happen, so far as we can foresee, in any social order. Sometimes, on the other hand, the failure is that of other individuals, or of the community itself; and the consequent wrecking of individual lives is all the more tragic in that... it overwhelms, so far as we can compute, good and bad alike.'[24]

Significantly, both positions were defended by appeals not to different conceptions of citizenship, but to what may be seen as different aspects of a common conception. As has been argued, the Edwardian idealist conception of citizenship was premised on organic notions of society in which self-determination was achieved through the operation of individual minds that were *simultaneously* constructing and being constructed by social reality.[25] It would appear, however, that the essential fluidity of such an idea could not be practically sustained in the development of concrete proposals for reform. In the Poor Law debates, the two aspects that were unproblematically contained within a single theoretical conception were uncoupled: Bosanquet and the Majority chose to focus on the former aspect by asserting the ultimate capacity of the mind to shape material and social conditions; the Webbs and their supporters, on the other hand, saw their primary concern in relation to the latter aspect and emphasised the extent to which individual character was fundamentally shaped by the social environment. Both groups, however, were committed to the ultimate aim of recovering and redeeming the individual to a life of active participation in the community, through which they believed the true condition of democratic citizenship would be achieved.

In an article written to support the position of the Majority Report, Bernard Bosanquet stated clearly that the COS started 'from the idea of democratic citizenship'. He continued,

---

[24] Webbs, *Prevention of Destitution*, p.294.

> 'In the modern State all are citizens. In this respect all are equal. In the widest sense all depend on each other and on the whole; but there is no presumption of special dependence between class and class or person and person, except within the family. Obligations and liabilities are innumerable; but they are reciprocal and voluntary. Within the conditions prescribed in general by the social whole, the citizen is independent.'

This independence, according to Bosanquet, was 'not negative, but positive', demanding 'inwardly a certain completeness of will and ideas, and outwardly a certain degree of success in the control of circumstances'. To him, it was obvious that 'outward success' could not be achieved without 'some degree of the mental attitude': 'It is certain,' Bosanquet stressed, 'that prosperity cannot be utilized nor adversity resisted without such a mental attitude.' The extent to which one could 'have the mental attitude without the external success' was, however, 'arguable'. Bosanquet accepted that no one would attempt to deny that *everything* could be resisted with the right mental attitude. 'Yet,' he maintained, 'the power of mind to turn disadvantage into advantage seems greater to us the more experience we possess.'[26]

Thus, according to Bosanquet, the 'spirit of pauperism' reflected 'a weakness of the citizen mind which prevent[ed] it from being equal to the situation', and 'a defective participation in the social mind, on which the adjustment of life to social standards depend[ed]'.[27] Economic self-reliance was seen as a product of the capacity for self-determination, which spoke of a rational disposition in the individual. It was this rational disposition that was valuable, according to Bosanquet's understanding, as the basic qualification for citizenship.[28] As such, because pauperism reflected an inability to control one's own circumstances, 'a defect in the citizen character' was implied. The individual's 'whole capacity for self-management' was at stake, and it was this distinctive feature, as Bosanquet saw it, that separated 'the treatment required by the destitute or necessitous from anything that can be offered to citizens who are maintaining themselves in a normal course of life'.[29] For Bosanquet, moreover, individual rationality and self-

---

[25] See Chapter Four, pp.105-6, 117-24; Chapter Six, p.184.
[26] B. Bosanquet, 'Charity Organization and the Majority Report', *International Journal of Ethics*, XX (1909-10), pp.397-8.
[27] *Ibid.*, p.398.
[28] See Vincent, 'The Poor Law Reports of 1909', p.353.
[29] Bosanquet, 'I. The Majority Report', p.115.

determination were the key to participation in the social mind. The rational citizen was the individual 'who determined his own actions within social parameters'.[30] Thus, the focus for his analysis was the individual mind and will, rather than the social mind. The idea that the individual mind could also be seen to be shaped by the universal was, to some extent, underemphasised in his approach.

Bosanquet's idea of the independent rational citizen was founded on a complex theory of mind and will. According to this theory, all circumstances and material conditions were created and structured by actions, which were in their turn structured by the will of an individual, or the dominant ideas of the individual mind. Essentially, therefore, the activity of the individual determined his environment, and all conditions and circumstances were ultimately the product of the rational disposition of the individual, reflecting the structure of his mind and will.[31] Because all action was seen to pass through mediation of mind, this was the real source of poverty. In order to change social conditions, therefore, it was this element of the individual personality that needed to be addressed. Thus, the policy of 'individual and adequate treatment' as proposed by the Majority, according to Bosanquet, meant 'the formation and execution of a plan which enlists on its side the mind of the distressed person, and gradually evokes and restores in him that capacity for control of circumstances without which social function and social independence are impossible'.[32] By appealing to the mind, Bosanquet claimed, the Majority appealed to a powerful preventive force that the Minority, by focusing primarily on the manifestations of poverty, did not even contemplate.[33]

Responding to Bernard Bosanquet's suggestion that supporters of the Minority Report failed to appreciate fully the role of the citizen mind as a preventive force, however, Thomas Jones asserted that the aim of supporting or restoring the citizen mind was not exclusive to the Majority. It could be maintained, he argued, 'that English charity organizers underestimate the power of economic conditions to manufacture and perpetuate civic weakness just as their

---

[30] Vincent, 'The Poor Law Reports of 1909', p.354.
[31] See *Ibid.*, p.355.
[32] Bosanquet, 'Charity Organization and the Majority Report', p.400.

opponents are apt to belittle the power of mind to shape adverse circumstances to advantage'.[34] Supporting the Minority Report, Thomas Jones believed that the approach of the COS reflected a reluctance to 'use the citizen mind in collective ways to redress wrongs and remove hindrances to the good life', whereas the Minority appealed to a 'collective capacity to strain ourselves to the utmost in the great enterprises of fighting disease at its source and of regularizing employment'. For him, realising this part of the Minority's programme would 'liberate resources of character and intelligence greater beyond all question than the encroachment it involves upon the liberty of the patient and the employer'.[35]

Thomas Jones' justification of the proposals of the Minority Report thus appealed to a concept of citizenship that was based on the notion of the individual as a moral personality whose spiritual resources of character and intelligence had to be liberated. The notion of individual self-development through the realisation of moral potential was not neglected in the Minority; nor was the idea that moral improvement should be founded in the conduct of the individual. The ability to control one's own circumstances was, however, seen in relation to the bearing of the social environment on the development of the individual mind, and the role of the community in realising the moral potential of the individual was emphasised. Thus, despite their different approach, the authors and supporters of the Minority Report were essentially as concerned as the Majority to ensure 'the utmost possible development of faculty in the individual human being' in relation to the development of citizenship.[36]

In this connection, it should also be noted that neither the Majority nor the Minority saw the question of social policy and its link to the condition of citizenship in terms of the establishment of social rights. The recovery of the citizen function of the individual was deemed to lie in the rediscovery of social obligations rather than in the ability to lay claim to a set of rights to welfare. The Minority's proposals for a comprehensive range of specialised public services that would be equally available to all may be presented as a basis for the extension of universal welfare

---

[33] See *Ibid.*, p.405.
[34] T. Jones, 'Charity Organization', *International Journal of Ethics*, XXI (1910-11), p.174.
[35] *Ibid.*, pp.175, 178.

rights. This, however, was not what the Webbs intended. Indeed, it may be suggested that they did not perceive the question of universal provision as an issue of rights at all. In a letter to Millicent Garrett Fawcett, Beatrice Webb wrote of her 'disbelief in the validity of any "abstract rights", whether to votes or to property, or even to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness"'. 'I prefer to regard life as a series of obligations... of the individual to the community and of the community to the individual,' she claimed.[37] Her ideas with regard to social policy reflected this principle as she regarded the Poor Law scheme in terms of a 'theory of mutual obligation between the individual and the state', and expressed her preference for a 'forward movement based on the obligation of each individual to serve'.[38]

In an article setting out the grounds for ending the Poor Law in the manner proposed by the Minority, Sidney Webb maintained that the position of the Minority rested 'on the assumption that between the individual and the community there is a mutual obligation'. However, as he explained further:

> 'The individual must do his part. But the State cannot with impunity neglect its own part. We have come to believe that the universal maintenance of any standard of civilised life cannot safely be left to individual self-interest. The universal maintenance of a definite minimum standard of civilisation, and the progressive elevation of that minimum is regarded as the joint responsibility of an indissoluble partnership. The community, far from washing its hands of the individual, finds itself forced, in the interest of the community as a whole, to assume definite duties with regard to him.'[39]

Thus, the Webbs saw the path of progress proceeding through the mutual recognition of the *duties* of citizenship within the context of a moral whole in which both the individual and the community were implicated. The 'whole "moral" effect of the work of the preventive Authorities', in their view, was 'tending always to increase the consciousness of obligation, and to promote a more extensive fulfilment of it'. By encouraging individuals to seek help before that fell into destitution, the Webbs believed that measures of prevention, far from encouraging a

---

[36] Kidd, 'The State and Moral Progress', p.192.
[37] B. Webb to M. Fawcett, 2 Nov. 1906, in N. Mackenzie (ed), *The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb: Vol. II, Partnership, 1892-1912* (Cambridge, 1978), p.241.
[38] Webb, *Our Partnership*, p.385.
[39] S. Webb, 'The Reports of the Poor Law Commission: II. The End of the Poor Law', *Sociological Review*, II (1909), p.132.

laxness of moral character and making people less conscious of their obligations, would in fact serve to extend the range of social obligations recognised by the individual citizen.[40] It was with this end in view that they addressed their proposals for social reform towards the creation of better social conditions.

In the final analysis, it may be suggested that the fundamental assumptions of both the Majority and Minority Reports and their respective supporters were that social reform could only be achieved by addressing the moral consciousness of society, although they may have differed over whether attention should be focused on the destitute individual or on the moral condition of society as a whole. In a work that considered the principles of both reports, J. H. Muirhead, while not committing himself to 'the entirely misleading assertion that all poverty is the result of bad character', maintained that there was 'no way of escaping the conclusion that the defects of a social organisation rest in the last instance on defects of character' because, at any one time, the social condition reflected 'the intellectual and moral condition of the community as a whole'. For Muirhead, 'civic spirit' would be the foundation on which hope could be built and it was in this respect that he agreed that character was 'the one ultimate *cause* of all social failure' while everything else counted as 'little more than *occasion*'. Legislation could 'remove obstructions of bad organisation which will hinder the free course of intelligence and goodwill... [b]ut no legislative legedemain will give you the results you desire ready made'.[41]

The Bosanquets clearly maintained that it was only by addressing the 'spirit of pauperism' in the individual mind that the problem of destitution could be resolved. It should be noted, however, that even the Webbs did not see fit to change merely the law, but, as Beatrice Webb put it to Winston Churchill, also 'the mind of the people with regard to the facts of destitution – to make them feel the infamy of it and the possibility of avoiding it'.[42] Through their propaganda efforts for the Minority Report, the Webbs sought to change the way in which the collective mind regarded poverty, and firmly held that it was only by addressing mental attitudes

---

[40] Webbs, *Prevention of Destitution*, pp.301-2.
[41] Muirhead, *By What Authority?*, pp.88-9.
[42] Sidney Webb to Mrs. Joseph Fels, 20 Oct. 1909, in Mackenzie (ed), *Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb: Vol.*

and the moral consciousness that they would achieve their ends. The idea that the individual consciousness could be bypassed simply by changing the institutional structure through legislation was entertained by neither the Majority nor the Minority in the social policy debate in this period. Within the context of this debate, the ideal of democratic citizenship was seen to be achieved through the development of individual character, and the conscious internalisation of the moral unity between the individual and society in the active pursuit of a common good.

II. The 1948 National Assistance Act

The fact that the debates over practical policy generated by the Poor Law Reports of 1909 were fuelled by such speculative ideas concerning the mind of the individual citizen, as well as the nature and moral purposes of the state, indicates the extent to which philosophical principles formed the essence of Edwardian political discourse. It is important to note, however, that, while undoubtedly evoking a vigorous and rich debate in their wake, neither the Majority nor the Minority scheme was fully implemented in the array of welfare legislation introduced after 1909.[43] By way of contrast, the piece of legislation that *did* eventually abolish the Poor Law – some forty years after the deliberations of the 1905-9 Commission, and over a hundred years since the 'New Poor Law of 1834' was initiated – provoked hardly any political controversy at all. The Bill that became the National Assistance Act of 1948 passed through the House of Commons in the 1947-8 session of parliament on a wave of cross-party support and approval of its fundamental aims and provisions.[44] Although the intense emotionalism that coloured much of the proceedings reflected the measure of post-war optimism and the depth of the sense of guilt felt by many over what they saw as the evils perpetuated against the poor as a result of the Poor Law system of relief, it did not, on the whole, make for a constructive debate in which the implications of the measure could be fully examined in relation to issues beyond purely practical

---

II, p.335.

[43] Cormack, *The Welfare State*, p.23.

[44] See debates in *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxliv, 1603-716; cdxlviii, 673-759. Arguments over particular details did arise, but, these were largely concerned with administrative issues rather than general principle. As the Member of Parliament for High Peak (Mr. Molson) noted at the Third Reading, the Bill 'had a very easy passage; there were very few divisions in Committee, which is the best proof that there were very few differences of opinion' (*Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxlviii, 716).

and administrative matters.

Yet, the measure that was being proposed was by no means trivial. Conceived as the final instalment of a planned scheme of social legislation, the National Assistance Bill sought to repeal a system of legislation that had been in the statute books since 1601, and to facilitate its replacement by a comprehensive scheme of social security, consisting of 'entirely new services founded on modern conceptions of social welfare' and embracing a 'new spirit'.[45] Its passage marked an important change in the way in which the British state would discharge its responsibility for the welfare of its citizens and created a new structural framework for the interaction between state and individual citizen. As such, it could be seen to raise fundamental issues relating to the nature of the relationship between the state and the individual. That hardly a voice was raised in speculation over the philosophical or metaphysical implications of this legislative development reflects the extent to which, in contrast to the earlier period considered, traditional concerns of moral and political philosophy had been rendered irrelevant to the structure of political discourse in the post-war period.[46] Questions of the proper purposes and boundaries of state action in society were not considered in the discussions that shaped the development of the Bill, nor were such concerns evoked in the course of its progress through parliament. Instead, discussion of the measure revolved predominantly around practical and administrative considerations.

The National Assistance Bill that Aneurin Bevan introduced to the House of Commons in October 1947 proposed

> 'to terminate the existing poor law and to provide in lieu thereof for the assistance of persons in need by the National Assistance Board and by local authorities; to make further provision for the welfare of disabled, sick, aged and other persons and for regulating homes for disabled and aged persons and charities for disabled persons; to amend the law relating to non-contributory old age pensions; to make provision as to the burial or cremation of deceased persons, and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid'.[47]

---

[45] PRO, MH/80/48, 'National Assistance Bill, 1948: Bill Papers – Preliminary Correspondence, June-Dec. 1946': 'National Assistance Bill – Summary of the proposed new National Assistance and Local Authority Services', 15 Nov. 1946, f.1.
[46] See Chapter One, pp.21-4; Chapter Five, pp.144-5.
[47] *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxliii, 1093.

The general object of the Bill was to provide 'a comprehensive scheme of assistance and welfare services' that would 'complete the main pattern of the new social legislation, of which the Family Allowances Act, the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, the National Insurance Act, and the National Health Service Act are other principal features'.[48] This idea that National Assistance formed part of a co-ordinated plan was central to the conception of the Bill, and reflected the way in which the planning ideal structured the political debate in this period. A major concern in the debate over social legislation was the means by which 'a totality of benefits' could be provided to cover all aspects of social need.[49] Such an approach, it may be argued, focused the discussion on the structural arrangements for the implementation of social policy, rather than on the way in which the new social measures could act to transform personal conduct in a manner conducive to the individual pursuit of citizenship.[50]

It has been noted in this thesis that T. H. Marshall, at least, believed 'a new conception of citizenship' was implied by the development of the welfare state along these lines.[51] Unlike the 1909 Poor Law debates, however, the social policy debate in this period did not engage with the notion of democratic citizenship as a fundamental issue of philosophical principle. The particular way in which the concept of citizenship was to be understood was not openly discussed, or subjected to rigorous analytical consideration, within the structure of the policy debate in 1948. What Marshall saw as a new understanding of citizenship was implicit in the particular way in which social legislation was constructed, rather than explicitly articulated as a theory of society, by those involved in the legislative process. To gain a sense of what was understood as the

---

[48] PRO, MH/80/48: 'Summary of the proposed new National Assistance and Local Authority Services', 15 Nov. 1946, f.1.

[49] PRO, MH/80/47, 'National Assistance Bill, 1948: Bill Papers – Break-up of the Poor Law and Preliminary Correspondence': 'National Assistance Bill – Memorandum by the Minister of Health and the Minister of National Insurance', March 1946.

[50] It should be noted, however, that many of the punitive powers of the Poor Law relating to the 'work-shy' *were* transferred to the National Assistance Act; although, within the context of the 1948 Act, they were no longer seen as potentially relevant to *all* the able-bodied poor, but applied only to what was seen as a deviant minority who would have to be 're-conditioned' to become productive members of society. See PRO, MH/80/47: 'Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Break-Up of the Poor Law (Rucker Committee)', 27 Mar. 1946, f.5; PRO, MH/80/48: 'Poor Law committee Proposals for Breaking Up the Poor Law – Draft Memorandum by the Minister of Health, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister of National Insurance', 29 July 1946.

[51] BLPES, Marshall, 4/2: 'Social Change in Britain', f.14. See analysis in Chapter Five, pp.167-72.

citizenship ideal in this period, therefore, what needs to be recovered is not a great theoretical debate establishing an idea of citizenship from first principles, but the set of assumptions that formed the basis for the operation of the proposed social legislation. With this in mind, the following analysis will consider the structure of the new system of social services set out by the post-war government, to establish how citizenship ideas were played out in the practical measures proposed. The way in which policy concerns relating to the development of the 1948 National Assistance Act reflected particular ideas about the basis for social relationships within the political community and the nature of individuality and personal identity will be examined.

In the previous chapter,[52] it was suggested that the conception of citizenship that emerged in the wake of the Second World War entailed a redefinition of the terms of civic engagement as the social reality of mass democracy, and the ultimate validation of public institutions as the means by which society could be organised according to plan, changed the context within which the concept of citizenship was seen to operate. The debates over the Poor Law reports of 1909 occurred at a time when citizenship was defined in relation to a conception of the political community that upheld virtuous individuals as the key to a well-ordered state. The condition of citizenship was seen in terms of a personal identification with the political community, consequent upon the full development of moral capacities and characteristics that each individual possessed as a part of their personality. In the post-war period, however, the idea that citizenship should be conditional upon individual qualities seemed redundant. There was a widespread conviction that the wartime experience of solidarity had realised, once and for all, the essential unity between the state and its people. As such, qualifications for citizenship came to be seen as rights to be met, where necessary, by the state whose responsibility it was to ensure that all would enjoy the fullest citizenship that could be maintained.[53] Citizenship thus came to be defined primarily in terms of a set of objective conditions that could be produced by the policy instruments at the state's disposal, rather than the capacities possessed by individuals. The basis

---

[52] See Chapter Six, pp.182-3.
[53] See R. Barker, *Politics, Peoples and Government: Themes in British Political Thought since the Nineteenth Century* (Basingstoke, 1994), p.131.

for the relationship between considerations of citizenship and social policy had been fundamentally transformed. Whereas the social policy debates of 1909 were essentially concerned with the moral development of the individual, the central issue to be addressed in the debate over the 1948 National Assistance Act was the way in which the moral stigma attached to the receipt of public relief could be removed through administrative changes to the structure of public assistance.

For legislators such as the Secretary of State for Scotland, Arthur Woodburn, the fact that those who received relief under the Poor Law system were 'deprived of their self-respect' constituted 'the greatest injury done to the poor in the past'. 'The destruction of the dignity of man,' he asserted, 'was the greatest crime against the poor in days gone by.'[54] Under the new system, therefore, what had to be achieved was the removal of any sense that those who depended on public relief for maintenance were in any way socially inferior to those who were able to provide for themselves. Writing about the relationship between social policy and citizenship in 1975, Julia Parker was of the opinion that the idea of citizenship meant that 'there should be no stigma attached to the use of public services, either because of popular attitudes condemning dependency or as a result of deterrent administrative procedures or poor standards of provision'.[55] Regardless of whether or not the individual possessed the virtues or capacities that had been deemed necessary qualifications for citizenship in earlier contexts, therefore, the notion of citizenship that prevailed in the post-war period seemed to insist that the dependent and poor had a right to equal respect, because the very fact of being accepted as part of the society gave them a notional entitlement to a defined standard of living that society through the state had a duty to uphold.[56]

The nature of this entitlement, however, needs to be more closely examined in the context of the post-war social legislation. Despite the rhetoric of universality and impartiality of entitlement that coloured the debate at the time, it is significant that the main structure of the

---

[54] *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxliv, 1653.
[55] J. Parker, *Social Policy and Citizenship* (London, 1975), p.145.
[56] See *Ibid.*, p.146.

social security scheme devised by the post-war Labour government was established in relation to a system of contributory insurance rather than a strictly as-of-right communitarian welfare system financed by direct taxation. Although the National Health Service did establish a right to healthcare that was available to all and did not depend upon insurance, this particular instance of the principle of universal provision was seen as something of an exception. Similarly, although the provisions for National Assistance were to be financed directly from the Exchequer, this measure was intended merely as 'a residuary service against want',[57] rather than the standard upon which the plan as a whole would be executed. As Aneurin Bevan put it, National Assistance was to be seen as 'the coping stone on the structure of the social services', existing mainly to 'assist people in peculiar and special circumstances': namely, those who were not eligible for insurance or unemployment benefit, or who were the subject of sudden affliction.[58]

Indeed, in his closing speech at the Second Reading of the National Assistance Bill in October 1947, James Griffiths, the Minister of National Insurance, stressed 'how very important' it was not to think about the Bill and its consequences 'in isolation'. He pointed out that National Assistance would come into operation on the same date as the National Insurance Act, and that it was 'essential to realise that one of the effects of the National Insurance Act will be to take people out of public assistance who have been in it in the past'.[59] The National Insurance Act of 1946 had been designed to provide 'a unified and comprehensive scheme' under which 'practically everyone in Great Britain' would eventually be covered.[60] With the operation of such a scheme, the main function of National Assistance would simply be 'to care for those people whose lives are so afflicted that they will not come inside the insurance field at all'.[61] In other words, only the 'residual categories' of persons whose needs could not be met through insurance benefit would be covered by the provisions of National Assistance.[62] In the majority of cases, it was envisaged that the right to benefit should be guaranteed primarily on account of the

---

[57] *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxlviii, 712.
[58] *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxliv, 1603-4.
[59] *Ibid.*, 1709.
[60] D. Marsh, *National Insurance and Assistance in Great Britain* (London, 1950), p.75.
[61] *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxliv, 1710.

contributions made by individuals to a social insurance fund administered by the state.

Such an approach established a contractual basis for the provision of welfare benefits 'as of right', insofar as it implied that only those who had paid the contributions could claim to have an effective *right* to the benefit.[63] As recent commentators have pointed out, the provision of welfare on this basis limited the operation of a citizenship principle that affirmed unconditional rights to a defined standard of living for *all* who were acknowledged to belong to the society.[64] In the context of the debate over the National Assistance provisions, such considerations raised the issue of the extent to which a distinction should be maintained between benefits available under National Assistance – for which no contributions would have been made – and insurance benefits that were available as of contractual right to those who had made contributions under the National Insurance scheme. Given that a key consideration in the development of the new system of social welfare was the final removal of any implication of social inferiority that could be associated with the receipt of public relief, the balance that had to be struck in the matter was by no means obvious.

The drafting of an introduction for the Second Reading of the National Assistance Bill by social service officials in 1947 provides a salient example of the ambiguity with which the issue of benefits provided 'as of right' was perceived in relation to National Assistance. In an initial draft of the introduction, presented by W. H. Boucher (Department of Health) to J. W. M. Siberry (Assistance Board), it was claimed that, by abolishing the Poor Law, the government 'determined that the social services of the future, in every branch, shall be services to which any member of the community will readily have recourse, as of right, and without fear of stigma, whenever his need may arise'. Amending this draft, Siberry marked out the phrase 'as of right' in the statement quoted, and wrote 'Dangerous' in the margin next to it.[65] In the following draft

---

[62] *Ibid.*, 1603.

[63] In terms of strict political theory, of course, the absence of a contract does not necessarily mean the absence of a right. However, in the popular discourse and political debate of the period, welfare was for the most part seen as a contractual entitlement that was strictly available only because people had 'paid for it'.

[64] See Parker, *Social Policy and Citizenship*, p.150.

[65] PRO, AST/7/921, 'National Assistance Bill 1947 – Introduction and Debates': 'Introduction for 2nd Reading', n.d.

sent to Siberry by Boucher, the statement was changed to exclude the 'as of right' clause, promising instead that the Government would provide 'services to which any member of the community will readily have recourse *without loss of self-respect* and without fear of stigma'.[66] This exchange raises two important considerations with regard to the way in which the National Assistance Bill was conceived: firstly, the basis of Siberry's view that promising services 'as of right' was 'dangerous' bears closer analysis; secondly, the extent to which social service provision 'without loss of self-respect' was seen as an appropriate substitute for 'as of right' provision needs to be carefully examined.

Siberry's concern may be interpreted as a belief that only services based on contributions could have the status of an absolute right in the system of social welfare. In this regard, the suggestion that services provided directly out of the national Exchequer would also be available, 'as of right', to all who needed it, could have been seen as a 'danger' to the integrity of the operation of National Insurance. Another factor that may be considered, however, is the extent to which it was in fact possible, in any case, to guarantee absolute rights to welfare, given that the availability of the material resources required for adequate welfare provision depended upon factors that could not for the most part be safeguarded by mere legislation.[67] In a speech at the Second Reading of the National Assistance Bill, William Shepherd, the Member of Parliament for Bucklow, asserted that '[t]he capacity for social legislation depends not merely upon the will to implement it, but upon the material capacity of a country to produce'. The 'standard of social advantages' at any given time thus depended upon standards of production over which the government could not have total control.[68]

As David Marsh noted in a work examining the new scheme of social security in 1951,

> 'The acceptance of a social policy which demands a minimum standard of subsistence for all, at all times, places upon all active members of the community an obligation – the duty of making the economic system so efficient that sufficient wealth will be produced to enable every working member to satisfy all his needs, and yet leave a surplus which can be allocated to those who are too young, too old or otherwise incapable of self-support. The plan for

---

[66] PRO, AST/7/921: 'Introduction for 2nd Reading', 3 Nov. 1947. Emphasis added.
[67] See Chapter Six, pp.198-200.
[68] *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxliv, 1672.

> social security now in operation aims at abolishing want; its fulfilment depends upon the successful solution of our economic problems.'[69]

Without 'a high level of production and the full co-operation of every citizen in producing the greatest possible amount of real wealth', in other words, social security could not be guaranteed.[70] From such a perspective, the indiscriminate promise of services and benefits provided 'as of right' could be seen to be 'dangerous' because it would encourage unsustainable notions of national insurance and assistance as 'something which comes out of a bottomless purse possessed by the Government'[71] As a practical reality, rights to social welfare were contingent on a wider range of factors than could be embodied in the entirety of the government's scheme for social security. In this respect, the notion of 'rights' was not fundamental to the operation of the citizenship principle within the specific context of the post-war social legislation. In fact, it may be argued that 'rights' as such were not at all a prominent feature of the political debate in the post-war period. From this point of view, it is perhaps unsurprising that an exclusively rights-based understanding of citizenship was not regarded as the primary means by which the dependent and poor could be assured of equal respect as citizens within the political community.

Instead, as the amendment that removed the 'as of right' clause from the offending statement in the draft introduction for the Second Reading of the National Assistance Bill seems to suggest, an administrative structure ensuring that citizens could avail themselves of public relief 'without loss of self-respect' was conceived as an alternative to a guarantee of the right to welfare.[72] The way in which such an alternative would work, however, depended upon specific assumptions about the basis of a person's self-respect that reflected the particular constructions of notions of individuality and personal identity in this period. It has been suggested in this thesis that changing ideas about the expression of individual identity affected the way in which the

---

[69] Marsh, *National Insurance and Assistance*, p.178.
[70] *Ibid.*, p.180.
[71] *Ibid.*, p.181.
[72] See above, pp.234-5.

concept of citizenship was constructed in the two periods considered.[73] In the earlier context, the individual was conceived as an active, purposive being whose dignity and self-respect depended upon his moral capacity for self-determination in relation to a pursuit of the public good. As such, the condition of citizenship was seen in terms of the personal development of a moral individual. In the post-war period, however, the idea of the individual as a self-determining, rational being possessing a coherent moral consciousness, had been undermined by the realities of mass society. The expression of individual identity came to be defined in relation to private rather than public activities, and was seen to occur mainly within a commercial arena of material consumption that stood apart from the sphere of politics. In such a context, what an individual consumed, and the terms on which such consumption occurred, were seen as the key indicators of social status. The source of an individual's self-respect was thus externalised, and judgements were made on the basis of the material rather than moral considerations of the individual. Effectively, self-respect was no longer seen as a function of each individual's moral capacities, but of his ability to participate in a consumption community.

Such an understanding represented an important feature of the social policy debate in the post-war context, and may be seen as the basis upon which most of the National Assistance provisions were conceived. The National Assistance Bill provided for the complete abolition of the existing Poor Law system by establishing an alternative administrative framework for the relief of exceptional needs that could not be fully covered by the National Insurance Act, the Family Allowances Act or the National Health Service Act. Stipulating that functions connected with 'the direct administration of relief in cash and kind' should be separated from other welfare services, the Bill set up a structural division that split the so-called 'residual problem' into two parts.[74] It then proposed an administrative structure in which the responsibility for financial assistance would be transferred from the various local authorities to a centralised national authority, while the provision of welfare services such as residential and institutional care remained a local responsibility.

---

[73] See Chapter Six, pp.184-5.

Crucially, this separation of functions in the system of relief marked the beginning of a process of 'depersonalisation' in the administration of benefits. As the centralised authority charged with providing financial aid, the National Assistance Board was conceived as the institutional means by which the distribution of cash benefits could be removed from 'the danger of local intrusiveness into personal affairs',[75] and administered more impartially on the basis of a nationally-defined uniform standard of need. The National Assistance Act stipulated that the question of whether a person was in need of assistance would be settled by the Board according to regulations 'as to the computation of requirements and resources'.[76] An individual's need would no longer be determined on the basis of personal assessments of particular circumstances. Instead, a complex set of statistical calculations would establish the level of assistance to be provided. Individual 'requirements' would be defined in relation to fixed scales, constructed according to statistical assessments of the average costs of subsistence across the country.[77] The allowance that an individual would receive would then be determined by a simple mathematical process of deducting his available resources, computed according to a given schedule of regulations, from the fixed sum that represented his requirements in purely monetary terms.[78]

The operation of such a system ensured that the encounter between the recipient of relief and the relieving authority remained essentially impersonal, even in the case of benefits that required a form of means-testing. This was seen as the key to preserving the self-respect of the individual receiving such relief, insofar as it tended towards the elimination of any association between the provision of relief and moral judgements of the personal qualities of the individual in question. Bearing in mind that expressions of personal identity and individuality tended to be associated with consumption opportunities in the post-war period, however, a more significant measure of the way in which considerations of self-respect were upheld in the construction of the

---

[74] *Hansard*, 5th series, cdxliv, 1604, 1638.
[75] O. Stevenson, *Claimant or Client? A Social Worker's View of the Supplementary Benefits Commission* (London, 1973), p.18.
[76] 11 & 12 Geo. 6. Ch. 29: The National Assistance Act, 1948, Part II Section 5, p.45. Page references refer to Act as printed in R. D. Steele, *The National Assistance Act, 1948* (London, 1949).
[77] See PRO, AST/7/931, 'Determination of Need Regulations, 1948': 'National Assistance Regulations', ff.3-4.
[78] See PRO, AST/7/931: Letter to P. H. See, Parliamentary Counsel Office, 17 Oct. 1947.

National Assistance scheme may be seen in the fact that the financial relief that the National Assistance Board would provide was conceived exclusively in terms of material resources that would serve to maintain the individual's ability to act as a consumer in the commercial arena.

The notion of commercial consumption was indeed an important consideration within the National Assistance debate. In discussions of the way in which institutional relief should be provided, the commercialisation of the relationship between the recipient of such relief and the welfare authorities providing the service was presented as the key to preserving the dignity and self-respect of the institutionalised individual. Because of the administrative separation of the monetary functions of National Assistance from the actual provision of institutional care, the idea that local authority institutions should provide only 'for people destitute in the financial sense' could be overturned.[79] As strictly *financial* destitution would be treated separately through the cash functions of the National Assistance Board, it was possible to maintain that the local authorities should act as 'a hotel keeper rather than a relieving officer' in its approach to institutional provisions.[80] By charging an economic rent for its services, it was held that local authorities could operate their institutions on a commercial basis to meet the needs, not only of the poor, but also of persons with 'sufficient means to live outside if they were capable of looking after themselves but who are not so capable and therefore need care and attention in an institution'.[81] Those without the resources to pay the economic rent would appeal to the National Assistance Board, and it was the Board that would put them in a position to pay for their accommodation. Although a lower rate would be charged to such individuals, the important consideration was that the National Assistance Board would not be making the payment for an individual's upkeep directly to the local authority, but to the individual himself. Thus, as Aneurin Bevan envisaged, the individual could go, 'in a perfectly respectable and dignified way', to pay the local authority for the services he consumed; and there would be no evident distinction between

---

[79] PRO, MH/80/47: 'Abolition of the Poor Law – Committee to consider Proposed Bill', 16 Apr. 1946.
[80] PRO, MH/80/48: 'Report of the Committee on the Break-Up of the Poor Law – Memorandum by the Minister of Health, the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Minister of National Insurance' (Cabinet Social Services Committee), 12 July 1946.
[81] PRO, MH/80/47: 'Abolition of the Poor Law', 16 Apr. 1946.

the pattern of consumption maintained by those who paid the charges out of their personal resources, and that available to those who depended upon the financial provisions of the state. For Bevan, this was the main consideration to be borne in mind in the debate over institutional relief.[82] The maintenance of an individual's capacity for commercial participation in a consumption community was thus seen as the key to the construction of social policy in the post-war period.

In the light of such considerations, it seems clear that the essence of the post-war notion of citizenship was not to be found in the idea that an individual should possess certain virtues and personal capacities as qualifications for citizenship.[83] The fact that the central part of the social welfare scheme was based on an insurance principle, however, has led recent commentators to question the extent to which the full implications of a conception of citizenship that took absolutely no account of individual abilities were in fact realised in the post-war social legislation. Insofar as the entitlement to a defined standard of living was not fundamentally guaranteed by the individual's mere membership of the community but depended upon individual contributions, the scheme could be seen to have upheld the ability to earn a living through paid work as a form of citizenship qualification.[84] In this respect, it may be suggested that the idea that citizenship had to be related to some form of civic virtue and moral action had not been entirely abandoned in the social policy considerations of the post-war years.[85] Yet, the way in which the issue was approached reflected a rather more modernist interpretation of the civic relationship between the individual and the state. In the earlier period considered, social reformers directly addressed the development of moral potential in the minds of individuals as the means of maintaining their capacity for citizenship. The post-war reformers, on the other hand, built the notion of civic virtue into the operations of an administrative framework that was

---

[82] See *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxliv, 1610-11.
[83] See above, p.231-2.
[84] See Parker, *Social Policy and Citizenship*, p.150; Harris, "'Contract" and "Citizenship"', p.124. It should be noted, however, that a key assumption of the period was that the social welfare scheme would operate under full employment conditions. On this basis, it was plausible to suppose that the 'contract' for welfare provision could be 'universal', because 'everybody' was assumed to be in the labour market and thus engaged in paid work.
[85] See Harris, "'Contract" and "Citizenship"', p.133.

seen to maintain the relationship between state and citizen through the organisation of individual behaviour according to institutional norms. The civic ideal was thus to be upheld by external social arrangements that did not depend upon the moral determinations of the individual citizen.

In contrast to the conduct of the social policy debate in 1909, the basic assumption that ran through the whole debate over National Assistance seems to have been that a fundamental transformation in the way in which social relationships were constructed could be brought about simply through legislative actions establishing new administrative structures. A few individuals may have raised doubts as to the extent to which a mere change in administrative form could generate an entirely different spirit for the provision of welfare: at the Second Reading of the Bill, for example, Albert Evans, the Member of Parliament for West Islington, argued that the eradication of stigma from the minds of the poor could not be achieved 'merely by passing legislation', but would require 'a different attitude of mind on the part of the administrators of outdoor and other relief for the poor';[86] at the Third Reading, William Shepherd of Bucklow similarly maintained that it was questionable that a 'mere change of administrative form' could, in itself, result in the abolition of the Poor Law spirit.[87] For the most part, however, such doubts were summarily dismissed. Responding to William Shepherd's comments at the Third Reading of the Bill, for example, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Health, John Edwards, saw off the idea that 'change in administrative form' was insufficient by claiming that it came from 'those persons who live exclusively in the realm of cold logic'. For the majority who were, as Edwards put it, 'concerned not with what is true as a matter of practice at the moment, but... with the vast field in which we live – which is a field of emotion and feeling – change in administrative form is significant'. Even if nothing else happened, he maintained, the simple fact that the Poor Law system had ended was of profound significance.[88] In sharp contrast to the way in which those involved in the Poor Law debates of 1909 sought to achieve their reformist aims, the legislators who passed the 1948 National Assistance Bill did not actively seek to address the

---

[86] *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxliv, 1675.
[87] *Hansard*, 5th series, 1947-8, cdxlviii, 746.
[88] *Ibid.*, 754-5.

collective or the individual mind in their approach, believing instead that the ideal society could ultimately be produced through the manipulation and regulation of institutional structures that were seen to shape the essential patterns of social behaviour.

All the complex ramifications of citizenship as a political concept operating within a practical context cannot be exhaustively explored in two case studies alone. Nevertheless, the different frameworks within which issues of public relief were addressed in these two episodes in the history of social welfare in Britain are offered here as reflecting the evolution of the citizenship debate in twentieth-century Britain. Changing ideas about what constituted the condition of citizenship affected the way in which welfare policies were constructed, because social welfare was seen to be closely associated with expressions of citizenship. In the first case study, citizenship was seen to be expressed as a moral identification. Thus, considerations of social policy were directed towards the means by which the moral potential of individuals would be fulfilled. In the second case study, the expression of citizenship was defined in relation to material consumption. Accordingly, the social legislation that was developed focused on the provision of material resources that would sustain such capacities.

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER EIGHT

A TALE OF TWO CITIZENSHIPS?

The main concern of this thesis has been to present a history of ideas analysis of the development of citizenship as a political concept in twentieth-century Britain. By unravelling the intellectual and ideological processes involved in the articulation of two particular conceptions of citizenship by two thinkers operating in different historical contexts in twentieth-century Britain, the work identified two broad dimensions along which the conceptualisation of citizenship occurred within the British political tradition: a 'moral' dimension in which political relationships were conceived predominantly from ethical and spiritual perspectives, based on the understanding that the structure of the body politic depended upon the operations of individual consciousness; and a 'materialist' dimension in which distributive issues took priority within a more instrumental conception of the structure of the polity. These dimensions did not emerge randomly; nor can they be explained wholly as outcomes of conscious choices made by individual authors acting with identifiable intentions. Within the analytical framework of this thesis, the two dimensions represent complex interpretative environments generated by the collective discourse of concrete groups engaging with the specific political and social realities of their respective historical situations.

The thesis contended that two different models of citizenship were respectively conceived by Henry Jones and T. H. Marshall in the course of the twentieth century in Britain; and that the changing nature of the interpretative environment for the conceptualisation of citizenship accounted for the key differences between the two conceptions. Throughout its history, the citizenship debate has been characterised by a dualistic structure, with notions of citizenship understood in terms of a long-standing dichotomy that has been variously described as 'active/passive', 'ancient/modern', and 'republican/liberal'.[1] In this thesis, however, the existence of this conceptual dichotomy was not simply assumed as a logical necessity, but

---

[1] See above, Chapter Six, pp.178-84; Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, p.88; Walzer, 'Citizenship', p.216; A. Ryan, 'Citizenship' in D. Miller (ed), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought* (Oxford, 1987), p.75.

analysed in terms of the changing empirical contexts that shaped the attachment of particular meanings to the concept of citizenship, at particular times. On the basis of this analysis, the fact that a more 'active' conception of citizenship was proposed in the late Victorian and Edwardian period represented by Jones, and a more 'passive' conception in the post-war era represented by Marshall, was understood in terms of the application of two different intellectual approaches to the conceptualisation of citizenship, rather than as a random conceptual difference.

Recent historical considerations of the nature of political discourse in twentieth-century Britain have alluded to two competing 'models' for the organisation of social knowledge.[2] These models have been broadly classified as 'idealist': when *a priori* categories are used to structure the real world, on the basis of mental ideas relating to such essentially philosophical notions as 'meaning' and 'purpose';[3] and 'positivist': when the concern is with the (often mechanical) solving of particular and specific social problems, through the discovery of causal laws by which the collective behaviour of humans in society may be manipulated. A number of major twentieth-century figures in the field of British social policy seem to have been torn between the two models in their approach analyses of society as a whole. For example, according to Jose Harris, when William Beveridge 'thought about individuals in the public or political sphere his ideas were deeply imbued with civic and ethical idealism; but when he thought about them as workers, consumers, and benefit claimants his assumptions were those of scientific positivism and rational choice'.[4] Similarly, the social and political thought of Richard Titmuss manifested a certain tension between high-minded moral commitments to 'community', 'service' and 'citizenship' derived from Edwardian idealism, on the one hand; and an approach to practical politics that was largely utilitarian, on the other.[5]

The respective approaches of Jones and Marshall to the question of citizenship, however, may be seen to exemplify this cleavage in twentieth-century thinking on the subject of

---

[2] See Harris, *William Beveridge*, pp.482-9; Harris, 'Political thought and the state'; Harris, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State', pp.135-7.
[3] Harris, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State', p.123.
[4] Harris, *William Beveridge*, p.487.
[5] Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.26.

'good politics'. In this thesis, the historical development of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain has been described as a transition from a conception of citizenship as a form of social virtue, to a conception of citizenship as an instrument of equality. In the idealist approach taken by Jones, citizenship was predicated on the processes of the individual mind and individual moral action, as the real world was understood to be structured by thought. The condition of citizenship was thus interpreted primarily with regard to a conception of the virtuous individual. In Marshall's more 'positivistic' post-war approach, on the other hand, the concern was with the effective management of institutional structures that would direct social behaviour towards the achievement of specifically desired social outcomes. Accordingly, citizenship was seen as an organising principle of mass democracy, with a material framework providing the medium for its realisation.

Both approaches, however, were concerned with citizenship as the means by which a sense of social unity would be achieved. What had changed was the basis on which this was seen to occur: whereas the idealist approach emphasised a moral basis for social identity, the post-war understanding of social relations was more materially based. Perhaps because of the lack of a clearly defined legal tradition of constitutional citizenship, discourse on the concept of citizenship in Britain has tended to occur as an aspect of social thought, interpreted in social terms and concerned with 'the nature of social membership within modern political collectivities'.[6] Civic solidarity, as such, tended to be sought through social conceptions. It was in these terms that both Jones' and Marshall's conceptions of citizenship were conceived; except that within the moral framework adhered to by Jones, the focus for these social conceptions was the moral individual, whereas in the more materialist framework that was available to Marshall in the post-war period, state planning was seen as the key.

As a final caveat to the analysis and interpretation of the historical development of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain presented in this thesis, it should be noted that both Jones and Marshall understood the question of citizenship and social unity in a relatively

---

[6] B. S. Turner, 'Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship' in Turner (ed), *Citizenship and Social*

uncomplicated manner. For both thinkers, social inclusion depended simply upon the possession of the right type of social resources: for Jones, spiritual and moral resources were the key; while for Marshall, material resources were more fundamental. In neither case was there any apparent concern with issues of identity and social exclusion based on gender, cultural or ethnic differences, as significant cross-cutting factors affecting the citizenship debate. As a result, these important dimensions are missing from the conceptual history of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain that has been presented in this thesis. Undoubtedly, different perspectives on the history of the concept can be developed by focusing on the way in which the changing bases of gender identity have shaped civic understandings of citizenship; or by relating the development of conceptions of citizenship to immigration trends and the rise of multi-ethnicity in Britain. Because of the constraints of time and space, however, it has not been possible to pursue these lines of inquiry here.

EPILOGUE: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CITIZENSHIP IN BRITAIN

In recent years, 'citizenship' has, as Tony Wright put it, 'established a ubiquitous presence in the language of British politics'.[7] Yet, far from reflecting the emergence of a single ideological framework for British politics, the 'ubiquitous presence' of the idea of citizenship in political language has revealed merely the extent to which citizenship is a contested concept. As Anthony Rees has suggested, the idea of citizenship 'has something for every shade of opinion', and 'appears to be promiscuous in the company it keeps'.[8] The way in which the concept of citizenship has been used in recent British politics would seem to provide clear evidence of this particular characteristic.

Citizenship discourse in twentieth-century Britain has tended to be associated with the problem of social inclusion and, especially after the Second World War, with the nature of state welfare.[9] It is not surprising, therefore, to find that concerns about deteriorating social conditions and the costs of social welfare lie at the heart of at least part of the recent revival of interest in

---

Theory, p.3.
[7] T. Wright, *Citizens and Subjects: An Essay on British Politics* (London, 1994), p.126.
[8] Rees, 'The Other T. H. Marshall', p.342.

the concept of citizenship. The debates over the future of the welfare state in the late 1980s and 1990s, however, hit a contradictory note over the idea of citizenship. On the one hand, elements of the Right have seized upon citizenship as the basis for championing a personal and social responsibility on the part of citizens, to overcome what they denounced as a morally debilitating, passive reliance on the provisions of the welfare state.[10] At the same time, on the other hand, the Left and Centre have continued to insist upon the idea that the modern welfare state should be seen as the embodiment and the very basis of the rights and entitlements of citizenship, with welfare 'rights' being seen as 'integral to the contemporary sense of citizenship' and 'a core element of citizenship in Western society'.[11] The concept of citizenship was central to the debate, but it did not provide a means by which the ideologically contested ground could be transcended. The meaning of citizenship was not successfully decontested by either party in the debate, as both sides seemed content merely to treat the concept as a political catchphrase rather than a serious ideological entity.

To some extent, this apparent impasse in the development of a coherent notion of citizenship in the social sphere was exacerbated by the fact that the statutory definition of citizenship in Britain has remained relatively undeveloped, although a substantial body of case law on citizenship has existed since the seventeenth century. Historically, the British conception of the legal relationship between the individual and the state has borne the influence of the concept of subjecthood. It was only with the enactment of the British Nationality Act of 1948 that the concept of a 'citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies' was introduced as a sub-category within the status of a 'British subject'.[12] Although Enoch Powell alleged that the act 'removed the status of "subject of the King" as the basis of British Nationality, and substituted for allegiance to the Crown the concept of a number... [of] separate citizenships combined

---

[9] A. M. Rees, 'The Promise of Social Citizenship', *Policy and Politics*, XXIII (1995), p.313.
[10] D. Heater, 'Citizenship: A Remarkable Case of Sudden Interest', *Parliamentary Affairs*, XLIV (1991), p.141. It should be noted that such ideas have, more recently, also been adopted by elements of 'New Labour', whose citizenship agenda may be seen as an endorsement of a similar approach.
[11] King and Waldron, 'Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision', p.417.
[12] C. Parry, *British Nationality, Including Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the Status of Aliens* (London, 1951), p.8.

together by statute',[13] a primary concern of the legislation reflected the attempt to *maintain* a uniform definition of subjecthood in the face of growing nationalism in the Dominions and, in particular, the anomalies created by Canada's unilateral introduction of its own citizenship.[14]

The citizenship created by the British Nationality Act was not attached to any positive body of citizen rights. The 'definition' of the content of British citizenship was limited to 'immunity from the various disabilities which attach to alien status', and there has been no real change to a constitutional settlement based upon the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament.[15] The continuance of the notion that the British citizen stands in a subject-sovereign relationship to the state has imposed an essentially personal and reciprocal character to the legal understanding of the relationship. The rights of the British citizen are not "entrenched": they have not been codified into statements of general principle; nor are they guaranteed any greater legal sanctity than that accorded to routine Acts of Parliament.[16] Citizenship rights are protected by the ordinary law of the land, but these are enacted by parliament, and there are no legal limits as to what it can do.[17] Thus, the notion of citizenship in Britain has remained essentially malleable and, as such, particularly vulnerable to political and ideological interpretation.

In recent years, the doctrine of complete parliamentary sovereignty has come to be seen as a problem, and calls have been made for a reform of the hitherto 'unwritten' British constitution by those for whom the operation of the so-called Thatcherite 'elective dictatorship' had become a source of frustration and a cause for political concern. At the heart of the envisioned reform was to be a clear and legally defined status of citizenship, which was seen as the means by which Britain's status as a democratic polity could be restored. As Lord Scarman put it, 'The less internal control Parliament is prepared to accept, the greater the need for a constitutional settlement protecting entrenched provisions in the field of fundamental human

---

[13] Quoted in R. Hansen, 'The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act', *Twentieth Century British History*, X (1999), p.67.
[14] See *Ibid.*, pp.74-7.
[15] J. P. Gardner, 'What Lawyers Mean by Citizenship', Appendix D in HMSO, *Encouraging Citizenship: Report of the Commission on Citizenship* (London, 1990), pp.65, 66.
[16] S. E. Finer, V. Bogdanor and B. Rudden, *Comparing Constitutions* (Oxford, 1995), p.98.
[17] Gardner, 'What Lawyers Mean by Citizenship', p.67. The development of a European dimension has, however, introduced the possibility of a check on the British parliament's exercise of complete sovereignty.

rights'.[18] In 1992, he concluded that 'today our constitution is not "unwritten" but hidden and difficult to find', and regretted the fact that the British citizen lacked 'a constitution which he can read and understand and which enables him, if need be, to claim a right which he can enforce'.[19] Thus, at about the same time that the notion of citizenship was being ideologically contested in the social arena, it had also come to be conceived as the legal foundation for the rebuilding of what was seen to be a derelict constitutional edifice. In the hands of groups such as Charter 88, the 'citizenship of entitlement' that had been the basis for a social citizenship founded on the welfare state was associated with a different agenda. The concept was reinterpreted with an emphasis on the hitherto relatively undeveloped legal dimension of citizenship in Britain, and yet another understanding of the concept of citizenship in the British political context emerged through this development.

In the context of threats to social cohesion and questions over the legitimacy of the political order, therefore, citizenship – a concept that had not too long ago been seen as having 'gone out of fashion among political thinkers'[20] and widely regarded 'as a litmus test of corny moralism, false consciousness and intellectual confusion'[21] – seems to have re-emerged in the 1990s in Britain as a somewhat fragmented concept, with its definition constructed in response to particular ideological agendas or political aspirations. To some extent, this disintegration of citizenship in recent debate may be seen as the result of a failure to appreciate the complex conceptual structures within which citizenship operates as a concept. The way in which the Conservatives laid claim to a notion of 'active citizenship', for example, seems to involve an attempt to derive the active citizen from the possessive market individual. When, in April 1988, Home Secretary Douglas Hurd, called for 'a new definition of "good citizenship"', what he had in mind was the idea that 'strong and able people' would discover a responsibility to 'the weak

---

[18] Lord Scarman, *English Law: The New Dimension* (London, 1974), p.75.
[19] Lord Scarman, 'Why Britain Needs a Written Constitution'. Quoted in B. Harrison, *The Transformation of British Politics, 1860-1995* (Oxford, 1996), pp.155-6.
[20] H. van Gunsteren, 'Notes towards a Theory of Citizenship' in Fred Dallmayr (ed), *From Contract to Community* (New York, 1978), p.9. Quoted in Kymlicka and Norrman, 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory', p.283.
[21] Harris, 'Political thought and the state', p.16.

and less fortunate in their community'.[22] The 'active citizen', however, was the successful market individual, whose positive moral duties to the community emerged from the financial gains made through productive activity, rather than through any spiritual identification with society as a whole.

The idea of active citizenship was thus imposed upon a context in which the single-minded pursuit of a commercial market ethos was seen as the solution to all social and economic problems.[23] The notion of 'active citizenship' proposed by the Conservatives did not tap into any real sense of the communal aspect of human nature. Indeed, as A. H. Halsey has commented, the market 'promotes neither solidarity nor equality'.[24] Citizens were not expected to act collectively, and the value of mutual obligation was seen to derive from a self-interest in maintaining the social order. The nature of this obligation, moreover, was characteristically non-political. Indeed, the Conservatives have seemed 'anxious to eliminate political activity from many aspects of community life'.[25] In nearly all respects, therefore, the context for the Conservative notion of 'active citizenship' may be seen as a negation of the republican setting for a political conception of citizenship.

The idea that citizenship consists of obligations and duties had been abstracted from the activist context of political participation and human fruition through involvement, and attached instead to conceptions of the individual and the state which are more attuned to a passive conception. This, in turn, affected the construction of alternatives to the Conservative conception. The grounds for citizenship had been rearranged in such a way that further paradoxical relationships had become, to some extent, inevitable. For example, to counter the rise of a purely market-driven political community, constitutional reformers appealed for a clearer legal framework of citizenship rights on the grounds of encouraging greater political participation. In this way, the mantle of an activist notion of citizenship came to be associated

---

[22] K. Fierlbeck, 'Redefining Responsibility: The Politics of Citizenship in the United Kingdom', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXIV (1991), p.585.
[23] A. Vincent, 'Citizenship', *Contemporary Record*, IV (Sept. 1990), pp.17, 18.
[24] A. H. Halsey, *Change in British Society: From 1900 to the present day* (4th edition, Oxford, 1995), p.221.
[25] D. Oliver, 'Active Citizenship in the 1990s', *Parliamentary Affairs*, XLIV (1991), p.165.

with the idea of citizenship as a legal status to be upheld by a framework of rules, an understanding more traditionally linked to a passive conception of citizenship.

The central argument of this thesis is that the development of the concept of citizenship in twentieth-century Britain occurred within two different conceptual frameworks: the 'moral' framework favoured by idealists such as Henry Jones, and the 'material' framework that T. H. Marshall and his contemporaries tended to apply to their considerations of the issue. If the present situation with regard to citizenship is considered in this light, however, it may be suggested that there is a less than clear conception of the framework within which citizenship should occur. In the last three decades, the material conditions upon which the post-war conception of citizenship depended have been eroded, and the idea that it was within the power of the state to control the operations of the economy and society has waned in the face of the rise of the global economy. The material framework that buttressed the 'social citizenship' of the post-war years has thus been weakened.

The reaction to this has involved a return to a conception of the individual as the central concern in social and economic thought. However, the individual is seen as a rational, self-interested economic actor, rather than a repository for social traditions within a moral unity. The Conservative attempt to promote a conception of active citizenship within this context may have involved making moralistic demands on the individual, but the basis for these demands was not a conception of a unified moral framework within which both state and citizen found their being. There was no sense of the need for an active, morally-motivated community and state as the foundation for the idea of citizenship, and civic solidarity remained, for the most part, undeveloped. In the face of this apparent current inadequacy of the social frameworks that had hitherto been seen to form the bases for civic solidarity in Britain, it may be argued that a different framework for citizenship has come to be sought. The constitutional reformers' call for a clear legal definition of citizenship may be understood, in this regard, as an attempt to establish a legal framework within which an expression of the unity of the democratic polity could occur. It remains to be seen, however, if this direct relationship between citizenship and constitutional

reform will provide a successful context for the development of citizenship in present-day Britain.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. MANUSCRIPT SOURCES

Bodleian Library, University of Oxford: Gilbert Murray Papers.

Bodleian Library, University of Oxford: H. A. L. Fisher Papers.

British Library of Political and Economic Science, London: Committee for the Prevention of Destitution Minute Books.

British Library of Political and Economic Science, London: Fabian Society Papers.

British Library of Political and Economic Science, London: London School of Economics Archives.

British Library of Political and Economic Science, London: T. H. Marshall Papers.

British Museum Library, London: Macmillan Archives, Part I, Readers' Reports, Third Series.

Brotherton Library, University of Leeds: Material relating to Ruhleben from the Liddle Collection.

Harvard University Law Library (Special Collections), Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ruhleben Civilian Internment Camp Papers, 1914-1918.

International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam (IISG): International Sociological Association Archives.

National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth: Thomas Jones Collection, Class U, Vols. I-IV.

National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth: Thomas Edward Ellis Papers.

National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth: David Lloyd George Papers.

Public Record Office, Kew: Foreign Office Papers (FO).

Public Record Office, Kew: Ministry of Health and Social Security Papers (MH).

Public Record Office, Kew: Ministry of Social Security and National Assistance Board Papers (AST).

II. PRINTED SOURCES

PRIMARY SOURCES

B. Bosanquet, 'The Reports of the Poor Law Commission: I. The Majority Report', *Sociological Review*, II (1909), pp.109-26.

_____ , 'Charity Organization and the Majority Report', *International Journal of Ethics*, XX (1909-10), pp.395-408.

_____ , *The Principle of Individuality and Value. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the year 1911* (London, 1912).

_____ , *The Value and Destiny of the Individual. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the year 1912* (London, 1913).

E. Caird, *Hegel* (London, 1903).

J. H. Clapham, 'Economic History as a Discipline' in F. Stern (ed), *The Varieties of History from Voltaire to the Present* (London, 1956), pp.308-13.

F. W. S. Craig (ed), *British Parliamentary Election Results, 1918-1948* (London, 1977).

C. A. R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism* (London, 1956; abridged and revised 1963).

H. J. W. Hetherington, *The Life and Letters of Sir Henry Jones, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow* (London, 1924).

L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism and Other Writings*, ed. J. Meadowcroft (Cambridge, 1994).

I. Jenkins, 'The Analysis of Justice', *Ethics*, LVII (1946-7), pp.1-13.

H. Jones,[1] 'The Social Organism' in A. Seth and R. B. Haldane (eds), *Essays in Philosophical Criticism* (London, 1883), pp.187-213.

_____ , 'On Some of the Social and Economic Aspects of the Land Question in Wales' (Philosophical Society of Glasgow, 1888).

_____ , *Morality as Freedom* (London, 1888).

_____ , *Wales and Its Prospects* (Wrexham, North Wales Liberal Federation, n.d., Preface 1889).

---

[1] All of Jones' published writings, including items which have not been referred to in the thesis, are included in this bibliography to provide a complete picture of his output. The bibliography presented here is drawn from that published in Boucher and Vincent, *Radical Hegelian*, pp.237-9. Of Jones' published

_____ , 'Home Rule For Wales', *Westminster Review*, CXXXIII (1890), pp.400-4.

_____ , *Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher* (Glasgow, 1891).

_____ , 'The Nature and Aims of Philosophy', *Mind* NS II (1893), pp.160-73.

_____ , 'Idealism and Epistemology', *Mind* NS II (1893), pp.289-306, 457-72.

_____ , *Browning as a Dramatic Poet* (Boston, 1894).

_____ , 'Is the Order of Nature Opposed to the Moral Life?', Address delivered in the University of Glasgow on 23 October 1894-5 (Glasgow, 1894).

_____ , 'The Higher Learning in its Bearing Upon the National Life of Wales', Address delivered at the closing ceremony of the session 1894-5, 28 June 1895 (Bangor, 1895).

_____ , *A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Lotze: The Doctrine of Thought* (Glasgow, 1895).

_____ , 'Corporate and Individual Charity', 6th Annual Conference of the Charity and Relief Societies of the United Kingdom held in Glasgow, 11-13 May 1897 (Glasgow, 1897).

_____ , 'Principal Caird', Address delivered to the Moral Philosophy class on the opening day of the Session 1898-9 (Glasgow, 1898).

_____ , 'How to Attain Liberal Unity', *New Liberal Review*, XXI (1902), pp.338-42.

_____ , 'The Late Professor Adamson', *Mind* NS XI (1902), pp.431-5.

_____ , 'The Present Attitude of Reflective Thought towards Religion', *Hibbert Journal*, I (1902-3), pp.228-52 and II (1903-4), pp.20-43.

_____ , *Scottish Education Reform: A Scheme of District School Boards and a National Council*, with Charles M. Douglas (Glasgow, 1903).

_____ , 'The Moral Aspect of the Fiscal Problem', *Hibbert Journal*, II (1903-4). In *Working Faith of the Social Reformer and other essays.*

_____ , 'Mr. Balfour as a Sophist', *Hibbert Journal*, III (1904-5), pp.452-77.

_____ , 'The Philosophy of Martineau in Relation to the Idealism of the Present Day', Address delivered in Manchester College, Oxford, at the celebration of the Centenary of Dr. Martineau (London, 1905).

---

reviews and critical notices, however, only those to which reference is made in the thesis have been listed.

_____ , 'The Child and Heredity' in T. Stephens (ed), *The Child and Religion* (London, 1905). In *Working Faith of the Social Reformer and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Immortality of the Soul in the Poems of Tennyson and Browning', Lecture delivered at Essex Hall (London, 1905).

_____ , 'The Library as a Maker of Character', Address given to Annual Meeting of the Subscribers to Stirling and Glasgow's Public Library, April 1905 (Glasgow, 1905). In *Essays on Literature and Education.*

_____ , 'The Function of the University in the State', Inaugural Lecture delivered for the Session, 1905-6, University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, 4 October 1905 (Aberystwyth, *Welsh Gazette*, 1905).

_____ , *Social Responsibilities: Lectures to Businessmen* (Glasgow, 1905). In *Working Faith of the Social Reformer and other essays.*

_____ , 'The University of Wales: The Line of Its Growth', Address delivered at Cardiff, 3 October 1905 (Cardiff, 1905).

_____ , 'Y Diwygiad: a'r hyn eill ddod ohono' (Caernarfon, 1905).

_____ , 'The Working Faith of the Social Reformer', *Hibbert Journal*, IV (1905-6). In *Working Faith of the Social Reformer and other essays.*

_____ , 'Francis Hutcheson', Discourse delivered in University of Glasgow on Commemoration Day 18 April 1906 (Glasgow, 1906).

_____ , 'Divine Immanence', *Hibbert Journal*, V (1906-7), pp.745-67.

_____ , 'Divine Transcendence', Address given at Manchester College, Oxford, on the occasion of the opening of the 122nd Session, 14 October 1907.

_____ , 'Idealism and Politics', *Contemporary Review*, XLII (1907). In *Working Faith of the Social Reformer and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Idealism of Jesus', *Hibbert Journal*, Supplement for 1909, pp.81-106.

_____ , *Idealism as a Practical Creed* (Glasgow, 1909).

_____ , 'The Ethical Demand of the Present Political Situation', *Hibbert Journal*, VIII (1909-10), pp.528-42.

_____ , 'Tennyson', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, IV (1909-10) and *Hibbert Journal*, VIII (1909-10). In *Essays on Literature and Education.*

_____ , 'Ethics and Politics', *Quarterly Examiner*, XLIV (1910), pp.394-412.

_____ , 'Modern Science and Philosophical Thought Regarding Human Society' in J. B. Paton, P. W. Bunting and A. E. Garvie (eds), *Christ and Civilization* (London, 1910), pp.491-521.

_____ , *The Working Faith of the Social Reformer and other essays* (London, 1910).

_____ , *Dinasyddiaeth Bur ac Areithiau Ereill* (Caernarfon, 1911).

_____ , 'The Corruption of the Citizenship of the Working Man', *Hibbert Journal*, X (1911-12), pp.155-78.

_____ , 'The Immanence of God and the Individuality of Man', Provincial Assembly Lecture, Manchester (Manchester, 1912).

_____ , 'Review of B. Bosanquet, *The Principle of Individuality and Value*', *Hibbert Journal*, X (1911-12), pp.949-54.

_____ , 'Review of B. Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*', *Hibbert Journal*, XI (1912-13), pp.902-9.

_____ , *Social Powers: Three Popular Lectures on the Environment, the Press and the Pulpit* (Glasgow, 1913).

_____ , 'Why We Are Fighting', *Hibbert Journal*, XIII(1914-15), pp.30-67.

_____ , 'Philosophical Landmarks. Being a Survey of the Recent Gains and the Present Problems of Reflective Thought', *Rice Institute Studies*, I (1915), pp.195-255.

_____ , 'The Huge Machinery of Sin and Sorrow', *The Free Catholic*, I (1916), pp.58-62.

_____ , 'Morality and Its Relation to the War' in J. E. Carpenter (ed), *Ethical and Religious Problems of the War* (London, 1916), pp.21-45.

_____ , 'Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barret Browning' in *Cambridge History of English Literature*, XIII (Cambridge, 1916). In *Essays on Literature and Education.*

_____ , 'The Education of the Citizen', *The Round Table*, VII (1916-17). In *Essays on Literature and Education.*

_____ , North Wales Heroes Memorial, Speeches delivered by the Rt. Hon. Lord Kenyon and

Prof. Sir Henry Jones in the Town Hall, Holyhead, 24 April 1917 (Bangor, North Wales Chronicle, 1917).

_____, 'Form a League of Peace Now: An Appeal to my Fellow-Citizens', League of Nations Union Pamphlet, Series 2, No. 5 (London, 1918).

_____, 'A League of Learning', *Rice Institute Studies*, VI (1919), pp.290-302.

_____, 'The Obligations and Privileges of Citizenship – A Plea for the Study of Social Science', *Rice Institute Studies*, VI (1919), pp.119-83.

_____, *The Principles of Citizenship* (London, 1919).

_____, *A Faith that Enquires. The Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the years 1920 and 1921* (London, 1922).

_____, *Old Memories: Autobiography of Sir Henry Jones, CH, Late Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow*, ed. T. Jones (London, 1922).

_____, *Essays on Literature and Education*, ed. H. J. W. Hetherington (London, 1924).

H. Jones and J. H. Muirhead, *The Life and Philosophy of Edward Caird* (Glasgow, 1921).

T. Jones, 'Charity Organization', *International Journal of Ethics*, XXI (1910-11), pp.165-78.

_____, 'Shoemaker's Son to University Professor', *John O'London's Weekly*, 11 March 1922.

_____, *A Theme with Variations* (Newtown, 1933).

_____, *Welsh Broth* (London, 1951).

E. Jordan, 'The Structure of Society', *Ethics*, LV (1944-45), pp.79-87.

J. R. MacDonald, 'The "Corruption" of the Citizenship of the Working Man: A Reply', *Hibbert Journal*, X (1911-12), pp.344-61.

N. Mackenzie (ed), *The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb: Vol. II, Partnership, 1892-1912* (Cambridge, 1978).

J. S. Maclure, *Educational Documents: England and Wales, 1816-1963* (London, 1965).

T. H. Marshall (ed),[2] G. T. Warner, *Landmarks in English Industrial History* (London, 1924, repr. 1926).

---

[2] All of Marshall's published work, including items which have not been referred to in the thesis, are

T. H. Marshall, *James Watt (1736-1819)* (London, 1925).

_____ , 'Capitalism and the Decline of the English Gilds', *Cambridge Historical Journal*, III (1929), pp.23-33.

_____ , 'Jethro Tull and the "New Husbandry" of the Eighteenth Century', *Economic History Review*, II (1929), pp.41-60.

_____ , 'The Population Problem during the Industrial Revolution', *Economic Journal* (1929). Reprinted in E. M. Carus-Wilson (ed), *Essays in Economic History* (London, 1954), pp.306-30.

_____ , 'Social Class: a preliminary analysis', *Sociological Review*, XXVI (1934). In *Citizenship and Social Class and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Approach of the Utopians' in T. H. Marshall, E. F. M. Durbin and H. J. Bridges, *The Ethical Factor in Economic Thought* (London, 1935), pp.3-12.

_____ , 'The Population of England and Wales from the Industrial Revolution to the World War', *Economic History Review*, V (1935). Reprinted in Carus-Wilson (ed), *Essays in Economic History*, pp.331-43.

_____ , 'Authority and the Family', *Sociological Review*, XXIX (1937), pp.1-19.

_____ , 'L'aristocratie britannique de nos jours', *Annales d'histoire économique et sociale*, IX (1937).

_____ , 'General Conclusions' in *The Population Problem: The Experts and the Public*, (London, 1938), pp.159-76.

_____ , 'The Nature of Class Conflict' in T. H. Marshall (ed), *Class Conflict and Social Stratification* (London, 1938). In *Citizenship and Social Class and other essays* and *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Recent History of Professionalism in Relation to Social Structure and Social Policy', *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, August 1939. In *Citizenship and Social Class and other* essays and *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

---

included in this bibliography to provide a complete picture of his output.

_____ , 'Work and Wealth', Address to Institute of Labour Management, 1945. In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Basic Training for All Types of Social Work' in Nuffield College, *Training for Social Work* (London, 1946), pp.4-19.

_____ , 'Sociology at the Crossroads', Inaugural lecture at the London School of Economics, February 1946. In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'Citizenship and Social Class', Alfred Marshall Lectures delivered in Cambridge, 1949. In *Citizenship and Social Class and other essays* and *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.* Page references in this thesis are taken from T. H. Marshall and T. Bottomore, *Citizenship and Social Class* (London, 1996).

_____ , 'Voluntary Action', *Political Quarterly*, XX (1949). In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , *Citizenship and Social Class and other essays* (Cambridge, 1950).

_____ , 'The Nature and Determinants of Social Status', *Yearbook of Education*, 1953. In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'Social Selection in the Welfare State', Galton Lecture, *Eugenics Review*, XLV (1953). In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'A Note on "Status"', *Ghurye Felicitation Volume.* In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'Changes in Social Stratification in the Twentieth Century', *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, III (1956). In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'International Comprehension in and through Social Science', Hobhouse Memorial Lecture for 1959. In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'Sociology and Social Pathology', *British Journal of Sociology*, XI (1960), pp.82-6.

_____ , 'Sociology – the Road Ahead', Public lecture delivered in Cambridge, November 1960. In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Welfare State – a Comparative Study', *The European Journal of Sociology*, II (1961). In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Welfare State and the Affluent Society', Lecture delivered at the University of Leeds, January 1961. In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Affluent Society in Perspective', Lecture delivered at the British Sociological Association conference in Brighton, March 1962. In *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays.*

_____ , 'Presidential Address', *Transactions of the Fifth World Congress of Sociology*, IV (1962), pp.9-15.

_____ , *Sociology at the Crossroads and other essays* (London, 1963).

_____ , 'Freedom as a Factor in Social Development', Paper presented at the India International Centre, New Delhi, 1965. In *The Right to Welfare and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Right to Welfare', *Sociological Review*, XIII (1965). In *The Right to Welfare and other essays.*

_____ , *Social Policy* (London, 1965; 2nd edition, 1967; 3rd edition, 1970; 4th edition, 1975).

_____ , 'Welfare in the Context of Social Development' and 'Welfare in the Context of Social Policy' in J. Morgan (ed), *Welfare and Wisdom* (Toronto, 1966). In *The Right to Welfare and other essays.*

_____ , 'Reflections on Power', *Sociology*, III (1969). In *The Right to Welfare and other essays.*

_____ , 'Changing Ideas about Poverty', Paper presented at a conference on *Poverty and Stratification*, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, n.d. (1960s). In *The Right to Welfare and other essays.*

_____ , 'The Role of the Social Services' in W. A. Robson and B. Crick (eds), *The Future of the Social Services* (London, 1970), pp.11-22.

_____ , 'Value Problems of Welfare-Capitalism', *Journal of Social Policy*, I (1972). In *The Right to Welfare and other essays.*

_____ , 'A British Sociological Career', *International Social Science Journal*, XXV (1973), pp.88-100.

_____ , *The Right to Welfare and other essays*, ed. R. Pinker (London, 1981).

T. H. Marshall and D. G. MacRae, 'Morris Ginsberg, 1889-1970', *British Journal of Sociology*, XXI

(1970), pp.357-61.

J. H. Muirhead, *By What Authority? The Principles In Common and At Issue in the Reports of the Poor Law Commission* (London, 1909).

J. H. Muirhead (ed), *Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends: Letters Illustrating the Sources and the Development of His Philosophical Opinions* (London, 1935).

M. Oakeshott, *Rationalism in Politics and other essays* (London, 1962).

A. Olivier Bell (ed), *The Diary of Virginia Woolf, Vol. III: 1925-1930* (London, 1980).

Parliamentary Debates, 1947-8, *Hansard,* 5th series, cdxliii, cdxliv, cdxlviii.

Parliamentary Papers, 1909, XXXVII-XXXIX, *Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress 1905-1909, Majority and Minority Reports for England, Scotland and Ireland* and *Appendix Vol. I, Minutes of Evidence (1st to 34th days) being mainly the evidence given by Officials of the Local Government Board for England and Wales.*

Parliamentary Papers 1917-18, XII, *Royal Commission on University Education in Wales.*

Parliamentary Papers 1918, IX, *Ministry of Reconstruction (Adult Education Committee)*, 'Interim Report on Industrial and Social Conditions in relation to Adult Education'.

W. W. Rouse Ball and J. A. Venn, *Admissions to Trinity College, Cambridge – Vol. V: 1851-1900* (London, 1913).

J. Seth, 'The Problem of Destitution: A Plea for the Minority Report', *International Journal of Ethics*, XXII (1911-12), pp.39-50.

A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, 'Review of *Idealism as a Practical Creed*', *Hibbert Journal*, VIII (1909-10), pp.198-204.

J. G. Slater (ed), *The Collected Works of Bertrand Russell, Vol. 9: Essays on Language, Mind and Matter* (London, 1988).

H. Spencer, 'The Social Organism' (1860) in *Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative*, I (London, 1891; repr. 1996), pp.265-307.

_____, *The Principles of Sociology*, I (London, 1876).

_____, *The Study of Sociology* (9th edition; London, 1880).

R. D. Steele, *The National Assistance Act, 1948* (London, 1949).

R. H. Tawney, 'The Theory of Pauperism', *Sociological Review*, II (1909), pp.361-74.

_____ , *Equality* (London, 1952, 1983).

_____ , 'The Conditions of Economic Liberty' in *The Radical Tradition: Twelve Essays on Politics, Education and Literature*, ed. R. Hinden (London, 1964), pp.97-117.

B. Webb, *Our Partnership*, ed. B. Drake and M. I. Cole (London, 1948).

S. Webb, 'The Reports of the Poor Law Comission: II. The End of the Poor Law', *Sociological Review*, II (1909), pp.127-39.

S. and B. Webb, *The Prevention of Destitution* (London, 1916).

_____ , *A Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (London, 1920).

SECONDARY SOURCES

T. Ball, *Reappraising Political Theory: Revisionist Studies in the History of Political Thought* (Oxford, 1995).

T. Ball, J. Farr and R. L. Hanson (eds), *Political Innovation and Conceptual Change* (Cambridge, 1989).

J. M. Barbalet, *Citizenship: Rights, Struggle and Class Inequality* (Milton Keynes, 1988).

R. Barker, *Politics, Peoples and Government: Themes in British Political Thought since the Nineteenth Century* (Basingstoke, 1994).

R. Beiner (ed), *Theorizing Citizenship* (New York, 1995).

W. T. Bluhm, *Theories of the Political System* (New Jersey, 1965).

D. Boucher (ed), *The British Idealists* (Cambridge, 1997).

D. Boucher and A. Vincent, *A Radical Hegelian: The Political and Social Philosophy of Henry Jones* (Cardiff, 1993).

C. Brewin, 'Arnold Toynbee and Chatham House' in A. Bosco and C. Navari (eds), *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919-45: The Royal Institute of International Affairs during the inter-war period* (London, 1992), pp.137-61.

S. Brooke, *Labour's War: The Labour Party during the Second World War* (Oxford, 1992).

M. Bruce, *The Coming of the Welfare State* (London, 1968).

M. Bulmer and A. M. Rees (eds), *Citizenship Today: The contemporary relevance of T. H. Marshall* (London, 1996).

P. Calvert, *The Concept of Class: An historical introduction* (London, 1982).

J. Carey, *The Intellectuals and the Masses: Pride and Prejudice Among the Literary Intelligentsia, 1880-1939* (London, 1992).

O. Chadwick, *The Victorian Church, Part II, 1860-1901* (London, 1970).

S. Collini, *Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850-1930* (Oxford, 1991).

U. Cormack, *The Welfare State: the formative years 1905-9* (London, 1953).

J. E. Cronin, 'Class, Citizenship and Party Allegiance: The Labour Party and Class Formation in Twentieth Century Britain', *Studies in Political Economy*, XXI (1986), pp.107-35.

R. Currie, *Methodism Divided: A Study in the Sociology of Ecumenicalism* (London, 1968).

R. Dagger, *Civic Virtues: Rights, Citizenship and Republican Liberalism* (Oxford, 1997).

R. Dahrendorf, *LSE: A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1895-1995* (Oxford, 1995).

S. M. den Otter, *British Idealism and Social Explanation: A Study in Late Victorian Thought* (Oxford, 1996).

M. Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (London, 1989).

G. R. Elton, *F. W. Maitland* (London, 1985).

A. C. Ewing, *Idealism: A Critical Survey* (London, 1963).

V. Feske, *From Belloc to Churchill: Private Scholars, Public Culture, and the Crisis of British Liberalism, 1900-1939* (London, 1996).

K. Fierlbeck, 'Redefining Responsibility: The Politics of Citizenship in the United Kingdom', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, XXIV (1991), pp.575-93.

S. E. Finer, V. Bogdanor and B. Rudden, *Comparing Constitutions* (Oxford, 1995).

M. Freeden, *The New Liberalism: An ideology of social reform* (Oxford, 1978).

_____ , 'The Stranger at the Feast: Ideology and Public Policy in Twentieth Century Britain', *Twentieth Century British History*, I (1990), pp.9-34.

_____ , *Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach* (Oxford, 1996).

W. B. Gallie, 'Essentially-contested Concepts', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, LVI (1955-6), pp.167-98.

J. H. Goldthorpe, *et al.*, *The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure* (Cambridge, 1969).

P. Gurney, '"Measuring the Distance": D. H. Lawrence, Raymond Williams and the Quest for "Community"' in K. Laybourn (ed), *Social Conditions, Status and Community, 1860-c.1920* (Stroud, 1997), pp.160-183.

HMSO, *Encouraging Citizenship: Report of the Commission on Citizenship* (London, 1990).

A. H. Halsey, 'T. H. Marshall: Past and Present 1893-1981', *Sociology*, XVIII (1984), pp.1-18.

_____, *Change in British Society: From 1900 to the present day* (4th edition, Oxford, 1995).

R. Hansen, 'The Politics of Citizenship in 1940s Britain: The British Nationality Act', *Twentieth Century British History*, X (1999), pp.67-95.

D. C. Harris, 'Citizenship and the Welfare State: one approach to justifying the welfare state'. Oxford D.Phil. Thesis, 1982.

J. Harris, 'The Webbs, the Charity Organisation Society and the Ratan Tata Foundation: Social policy from the perspective of 1912' in M. Bulmer, J. Lewis and D. Piachaud (eds), *The Goals of Social Policy* (London, 1989), pp.27-63.

_____, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State 1870-1940: An Intellectual Framework for British Social Policy', *Past and Present*, CXXXV (1992), pp.116-41.

_____, *Private Lives, Public Spirit: Britain 1870-1914* (London, 1993).

_____, '"Contract" and "Citizenship"' in D. Marquand and A. Seldon (eds), *The Ideas that Shaped Post-War Britain* (London, 1996), pp.122-38.

_____, 'Political thought and the state' in R. Whiting and S. Green (eds), *The Boundaries of the State* (Cambridge, 1996), pp.15-28.

_____, *William Beveridge: A Biography* (Oxford, 1997).

B. Harrison, *Peaceable Kingdom: Stability and Change in Modern Britain* (Oxford, 1982).

_____, *The Transformation of British Politics, 1860-1995* (Oxford, 1996).

D. Heater, 'Citizenship: A Remarkable Case of Sudden Interest', *Parliamentary Affairs*, XLIV (1991), pp.140-71.

J. Hills, J. Ditch and H. Glennerster (eds), *Beveridge and Social Security: An International Perspective* (Oxford, 1994).

K. Jeffreys, 'British Politics and Social Policy during the Second World War', *Historical Journal*,

XXX (1987), pp.123-44.

H. Jones and M. Kandiah (eds), *The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-1964* (Basingstoke, 1996).

J. L. Jowell and D. Oliver (eds), *The Changing Constitution* (Oxford, 1994).

J. D. Ketchum, *Ruhleben: A Prison Camp Society* (Toronto, 1965).

A. J. Kidd, 'The State and Moral Progress: The Webbs' Case for Social Reform c.1905 to 1940', *Twentieth Century British History*, VII (1996), pp.189-205.

D. S. King, *The New Right: Politics, Markets and Citizenship* (London, 1987).

_____, *In the Name of Liberalism: Illiberal Social Policy in the US and Britain* (Oxford, 1999).

D. S. King and J. Waldron, 'Citizenship, Social Citizenship and the Defence of Welfare Provision', *British Journal of Political Science*, XVIII (1988), pp.415-43.

C. Laborde, *Pluralist Thinking and the State in Britain and France, 1900-25* (Basingstoke, 2000).

L. H. Lees, *The Solidarities of Strangers: The English Poor Laws and the People* (Cambridge, 1998).

R. Lewis, 'The Welsh radical tradition and the ideal of a democratic popular culture' in E. Biagini (ed), *Citizenship and community: Liberals, radicals and collective identities in the British Isles, 1865-1931* (Cambridge, 1996), pp.325-40.

R. Lowe, *The Welfare State in Britain since 1945* (2nd edition, London, 1999).

S. Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford, 1973).

A. M. McBriar, *An Edwardian Mixed Doubles, The Bosanquets versus the Webbs: A Study in British Social Policy, 1890-1929* (Oxford, 1987).

D. Marsh, *National Insurance and Assistance in Great Britain* (London, 1950).

A. Marwick, *British Society Since 1945* (London, 1982).

J. Meadowcroft, *Conceptualizing the State: Innovation and Dispute in British Political Thought, 1880-1914* (Oxford, 1995).

R. Metz, *A Hundred Years of British Philosophy* (London, 1938).

J. S. Mill, *Autobiography* (London, 1873; 1989).

D. Miller (ed), *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought* (Oxford, 1987).

A. J. M. Milne, *Social Philosophy of English Idealism* (London, 1962).

D. Morgan and M. Evans, *The Battle for Britain: Citizenship and Ideology in the Second World War* (London, 1993).

K. O. Morgan, *Freedom or Sacrilege? A History of the Campaign for Welsh Disestablishment* (Church in Wales Publications, 1966).

_____, *Wales in British Politics, 1868-1922* (Cardiff, 1963).

_____, *Rebirth of a Nation: Wales 1880-1980* (Oxford, 1981).

_____, *The People's Peace: British History Since 1945* (Oxford, 1990; 1999).

H. W. Morris-Jones, 'The Life and Philosophy of Sir Henry Jones' in *Henry Jones 1852-1922: Centenary Addresses delivered at the University College of North Wales on the first day of December, 1952* (Cardiff, 1952).

J. Morrow, 'Liberalism and British Idealist Political Philosophy: A Reassessment', *History of Political Thought*, V (1984), pp.91-108.

P. P. Nicholson, *The Political Philosophy of the British Idealists: Selected Studies* (Cambridge, 1990).

A. Oldfield, *Citizenship and Community: Civic Republicanism and the Modern World* (London, 1990).

D. Oliver, 'Active Citizenship in the 1990s', *Parliamentary Affairs*, XLIV (1991), pp.157-71.

B. Parekh and R. N. Berki, 'The History of Political Ideas: A Critique of Q. Skinner's Methodology', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, XXXIV (1973), pp.163-84.

J. Parker, *Social Policy and Citizenship* (London, 1975).

F. Partridge, *Memories* (London, 1981; 1996).

C. Parry, *British Nationality, Including Citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies and the Status of Aliens* (London, 1951).

J. D. Y. Peel, *Herbert Spencer: The Evolution of a Sociologist* (London, 1968).

R. Pinker, 'Marshall, Thomas Humphrey 1893-1981' in Lord Blake and C. S. Nicholls (eds), *The Dictionary of National Biography, 1981-1985* (Oxford, 1990), pp.266-7.

R. Plant and A. Vincent, *Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Thought of the British Idealists* (Oxford, 1984).

J. G. A. Pocock, *Politics, Language and Time* (London, 1972).

_____, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican*

Tradition (Princeton, NJ, 1975).

M. Pugh, *The Making of Modern British Politics 1867-1939* (Oxford, 1982; 1993).

A. M. Rees, 'The Other T. H. Marshall', *Journal of Social Policy*, XXIV (1995), pp.341-62.

_____, 'The Promise of Social Citizenship', *Policy and Politics*, XXIII (1995), pp.313-25.

M. Richter, *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and his Age* (London, 1964).

P. Riesenberg, *Citizenship in the Western Tradition: Plato to Rousseau* (Chapel Hill, NC, 1992).

W. G. Rimmer, *Marshalls of Leeds: Flax-Spinners, 1788-1886* (Cambridge, 1960).

M. J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy* (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1996).

Lord Scarman, *English Law: The New Dimension* (London, 1974).

A. Simhony, 'Idealist Organicism: Beyond Holism and Individualism', *History of Political Thought*, XII (1991), pp.515-35.

J. Stapleton, *Englishness and the Study of Politics: The social and political thought of Ernest Barker* (Cambridge, 1994).

M. Stears, 'Guild socialism and ideological diversity on the British left, 1914-1926', *Journal of Political Ideologies*, III (1998), pp.289-306.

_____, 'Socialism and Pluralism: a study in inter-war British ideology'. Oxford D.Phil. Thesis, 1997.

O. Stevenson, *Claimant or Client? A Social Worker's View of the Supplementary Benefits Commission* (London, 1973).

J. Tully (ed), *Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics* (Oxford, 1988).

B. S. Turner, 'Outline of a Theory of Citizenship', *Sociology*, XXIV (1990), pp.189-217.

B. S. Turner (ed), *Citizenship and Social Theory* (London, 1993).

A. W. Vincent, 'The Poor Law Reports of 1909 and the Social Theory of the Charity Organisation Society', *Victorian Studies*, XXVII (1984), pp.343-65.

_____, 'Citizenship', *Contemporary Record*, IV (Sept. 1990), pp.15-18.

_____, 'Citizenship, poverty and the real will', *Sociological Review*, XL (1992), pp.702-25.

D. Vincent, *Bread, Knowledge and Freedom: a Study of Nineteenth-Century Working Class Autobiography*

(London, 1981).

_____ , *Poor Citizens: The State and the Poor in Twentieth-Century Britain* (London, 1991).

R. Weight and A. Beach, *The Right to Belong: Citizenship and National Identity in Britain, 1930-1960* (London, 1998).

B. A. O. Williams, 'The Idea of Equality' in P. Laslett and W. G. Runciman (eds), *Philosophy, Politics and Society* (2nd Series, Oxford, 1962), pp.110-31.

K. Woodroofe, 'The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws 1905-09', *International Review of Social History*, XXII (1988), pp.137-64.

A. Wright, *R. H. Tawney* (Manchester, 1987).

T. Wright, *Citizens and Subjects: An Essay on British Politics* (London, 1994).