To name your venture after Oxbridge or not, that is the question!

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Abstract. This paper examines the significance of including a company's location of origin in its name, a practice known as using an *eponymous location name*. Our theory demonstrates that signalling an origin from a prestigious location is an appealing strategy for relatively weaker companies, whereas stronger companies tend to avoid it. We empirically test this theory on a sample of UK university spin-outs from 2010-2021. Eponymous location names are particularly prevalent among spin-outs from Oxford and Cambridge. As predicted by our theory, eponymous location names are negatively related to measures of fundraising success after controlling for spin-out origin.

JEL codes: D82, G24, L26

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Forthcoming in the Canadian Journal of Economics

Acknowledgements. We thank our discussant, Michel Poitevin, the participants of the James Brander Festschrift Conference (UBC, June 2024) and Henry Sauermann for their insightful comments, as well as Julia Ibsen, Michael Lee, Lucas Rollinson and Subleen Kaur for helpful research assistance. The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest relevant to this paper. All remaining errors are our own.

1. Introduction

What do Oxford Brain Diagnostics, Cambridge Simulation Solutions, and Lancaster Cryogenics have in common? They are all university spin-outs that bear their university's town name in their company name. Selecting an appropriate company name is important, as suggested by numerous practitioner guides and the existence of an entire industry of naming consultants (Meyerson 2021; Furgurson 2023; Allard 2020). Prior research has shown that company names can significantly influence investor behaviour, driven by factors such as investor sentiment and heuristic-based decision-making (Cooper et al. 2001; Jacobs and Hillert 2016; Bergers and Blomkvist 2023; Green and Jame 2013). However, location-based signalling in company names has received little academic attention.

A company has an eponymous location name when it includes its location of origin in the company name.[1] The company name is a highly visible choice all new spin-out founders must consider. The conjecture is that signalling a prestigious location is beneficial. To explore this, we are naturally drawn to university towns that lend themselves to signalling prestige; arguably none more so than Oxford and Cambridge. The question arises whether incorporating Oxford or Cambridge in the company name offers distinct advantages. More broadly, this paper examines the signalling value that eponymous location names provide.

Prior literature has examined the signalling value of eponymous companies that include their founders' names. Famous examples include Dell, Gucci, and Johnson and Johnson. Guzman and Stern (2015) find that eponymous firms are less likely to achieve significant growth, while Belenzon et al. (2017) show that these firms tend to be more profitable. A common argument in this literature is that eponymous founder-based names act as a commitment mechanism through which founders associate their personal reputations with the company's performance. However, this argument does not apply to eponymous location names, as founders are not risking their own reputations. In contrast, we propose an alternative hypothesis that eponymous location names are intended to signal quality.

Our data come from the UK and focus specifically on university spin-outs, defined as ventures that are founded to exploit university intellectual property. Specifically, our sample contains 1,036 spin-outs from UK universities between 2010-2021. The idea that certain locations signal quality is based on the concept of agglomeration economies, where specific locations offer advantages over others (Krugman and Venables 1996; Ellison and Glaeser 1999). Top universities tend to concentrate on high quality scientific research and may therefore generate higher-quality spin-outs. This context raises the question of what kinds of ventures choose eponymous location names and what the implications are. Among the 1,036 UK spin-outs in our sample, we identify 76 eponymous university names: 57% reference Oxford, and another 18% reference Cambridge.[2] Yet, if prestigious eponymous names convey a favourable signal, why do some Oxbridge spin-outs choose not to use them?

To answer this question, we develop a simple signalling model that examines the conditions under which only some ventures choose the free signal of a prestigious eponymous name. In the model, there is asymmetric information about the quality of the venture, which can

[1] In onomastics, such company names derived from geographical locations would be classified as toponymic names.

[2] Oxford and Cambridge are town names, so while the name 'University of Oxford' is protected, the name 'Oxford' can be used provided there is no confusion with any university entity.

also be interpreted as the founders' confidence. In line with our empirical data, we focus on the challenge of securing fundraising. Using a prestigious eponymous name increases the likelihood of attracting investor attention. We characterize a separating equilibrium of this signalling game. In principle, both high- and low-quality ventures could benefit from the use of an eponymous name. But this cannot be part of an equilibrium since, if both types were to choose an eponymous name, high-quality types could signal their quality by not choosing such a name. It turns out that the only separating equilibrium is one in which only low types use an eponymous name.[3] High-types deliberately forgo the use of these names to signal greater confidence. By not relying on the prestigious eponymous name, they signal their private conviction that they can raise funding on their merits, without leveraging their location's prestige. The key prediction from the model is thus that ventures using eponymous location names have a lower probability of raising funding.

Our central empirical finding is that firms with eponymous names are less likely to secure equity funding. Initially, regressions without university-specific controls show no significant correlation between eponymy and funding outcomes. However, once we control for university origin, we observe a negative and significant effect. Our analysis reveals that if we compare eponymous Cambridge spin-outs with other non-eponymous Cambridge spin-outs, the former are significantly less likely to attract funding. In fact, this effect is particularly pronounced in Cambridge, where eponymous spin-outs are 40% less likely to raise funding.

In our empirical analysis, we do not make any causal claims. That is, we do not assert that including "Cambridge" in the company name decreases a spin-out's chances of raising funds. Such an assertion would imply that no rational spin-out would ever choose to use that name. Instead, our theory provides a rational equilibrium explanation for our empirical finding. In prestigious environments, lower-quality ventures rationally use eponymous names to distinguish themselves from ventures with less prestigious origins. However, higher-quality ventures in prestigious environments avoid using eponymous names, thereby signaling greater confidence.

Empirically, we verify that this central result holds across a variety of specifications, both in the cross section and in a panel, and also using alternative outcome metrics (probability of raising any equity, of raising venture capital, and amounts raised). Given the strength of the negative Cambridge name effect, we also verify that this result is not driven by the 2018 Cambridge Analytica scandal.

To explain the use of eponymous names in less prestigious locations, we propose an alternative explanation. Prior literature about the choice of individuals' first names argues that they convey cultural identity (Lieberson 2000).[4] Similarly, in our context, using an eponymous name in a less prestigious location may signal cultural identity, indicating local commitment. For example, we would not expect a company that includes Lancaster in its name to be planning to move to London or San Francisco. In line with the local affinity hypothesis, we find that

[3] In addition to the pure separating equilibrium, there is also a partial pooling equilibrium with very similar properties. The model also allows for pooling equilibria. However, they are less relevant for the empirical analysis because they predict that either all or no ventures use eponymous names, which is immediately contradicted by the data.

[4] In this context it is worth mentioning the work of Fryer and Levitt (2004) who argue that distinctively Black names signal identity and community loyalty within the Black community, despite carrying economic and social disadvantages. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) empirically demonstrate the economic disadvantages in their seminal field experiment on labour market discrimination. See also related work by Jowell and Prescott-Clarke (1970), Hubbuck and Carter (1980), Brown and Gay (1985), and Bart et al. (1997).

eponymous spin-outs outside of Oxbridge are relatively more likely to attract local than non-local investors.

Overall, our analysis provides new evidence on the role of eponymous location names, which exhibit different empirical characteristics from previously studied eponymous founder names. After controlling for the location of spin-out ventures, we find that using an eponymous name is associated with lower probabilities of raising equity funding. The results are consistent with a simple signalling model, where prestigious eponymous names may initially attract investor attention, but the best ventures signal their confidence by not relying on such names. Finally, for firms in less prestigious locations, the evidence points to a local affinity rationale.

2. Theory

We first develop a formal theory to provide a conceptual foundation to our empirical analysis. The model is deliberately as simple as possible and focuses on deriving one key empirical prediction. There are three stages in the model, called the naming, the search, and the investment stage. Names are inherently signals, so we develop a simple signalling model where at the initial naming stage, ventures choose between using an eponymous location name or not. We denote this by $n = \{epo, not\}$. We assume that eponymous names are freely available, so anyone can use them. However, since it is easy to verify whether a venture actually comes from that location, we assume that any eponymous name is always truthful, i.e., only ventures from that location ever use its eponymous name.

At the search stage, ventures are seeking the attention of an investor whose funding is needed to build the venture. We denote the probability of getting the investor's attention by a where $a \in (0,1)$. At the investment stage, the investor performs some due diligence, and invests with probability b, where $b \in (0,1)$. Below we explain how b depends on investor expectations. The objective for the venture is to maximize the probability of obtaining an investment, given by $a * b$.

For simplicity, we assume that each venture is matched with an investor. Investors are homogeneous, but there are two types of ventures: high types (subscript H) and low types (subscript L). The fraction of high types is given by $\mu \in (0,1)$. There is asymmetric information about types, i.e., only ventures know their true types. The key difference between high and low types are:

$a_H > a_L$ and $b_H > b_L$.

This says that (i) high types have a better chance of attracting investor attention; and (ii) if investors believe ventures to be high types, they are more likely to invest in them. Note that it is not the intrinsic quality of the venture but the investors' beliefs that determines the investment probability b. More specifically, investors cannot directly observe types, but infer them on the basis of the name signal n. Let us denote investors' beliefs by β_n, which measures the investment probability at the second stage. Names and beliefs matter in this model because they affect investors' perceptions of the venture, and thus influence their investment probabilities. For example, if investors believe that only low types use eponymous names, then $\beta_{epo} = b_L$. This

means that the probability of an eponymous venture receiving an investment is b_L. This is true irrespective of whether the venture's true type is L or H.

Consider now a venture from a prestigious location that considers using an eponymous name to attract investor attention. We assume that $n = \{epo\}$ increases the probability of investors paying attention in the first stage, specifically from a to $a + \sigma$ (where $a_H + \sigma < 1$). For the theory we are only interested in prestigious locations and assume $\sigma > 0$, so that an eponymous name increases investor attention.

Let us focus now on deriving a separating equilibrium where some types choose eponymous names and others eschew them. For a given location, suppose investors associate an eponymous name with lower types, and a non-eponymous name with higher types. Formally:

$\beta_{epo} = b_L$ and $\beta_{non} = b_H$.

This is a separating equilibrium if two conditions hold. First, it must be true that high types prefer non-eponymous names, which requires:

$$a_H\beta_{non} > (a_H+\sigma)\beta_{epo} \Leftrightarrow\ a_H b_H > (a_H+\sigma)b_L$$

Second, low types must prefer eponymous names, which requires:

$$(a_L+\sigma)\beta_{epo} > a_L\beta_{non} \Leftrightarrow\ (a_L+\sigma)b_L > a_L b_H$$

These two conditions are satisfied whenever:

$$\frac{a_H}{a_H+\sigma} > \frac{b_L}{b_H} > \frac{a_L}{a_L+\sigma}.$$

We obtain the following key model prediction:

In a separating equilibrium, high type ventures choose non-eponymous names and are more likely to receive an investment than low type ventures who choose eponymous names.

So far we focused on the separating equilibrium, but in Appendix 2 we characterize all equilibria of the model. The above condition identifies the only separating equilibrium, and suggests that it holds for an intermediate range of the ratio $B = \frac{b_L}{b_H}$. If B falls below the lower boundary ($\frac{a_L}{a_L+\sigma}$) we obtain a partial pooling equilibrium where all high types choose non-eponymous names, and low types randomize between eponymous and non-eponymous names. The intuition is that, for lower values of B, low types have lower investment probabilities, and therefore want to look like high types. Put differently, low types are worried about revealing their type by choosing eponymous names and therefore start to imitate high types who do not use eponymous names. In Appendix 2 we show that the key model prediction about eponymous ventures having a lower probability of receiving financing continues to hold in this partial pooling equilibrium.[5]

[5] The role of our theory is to generate the key model prediction, but we cannot empirically estimate the boundary conditions of the theory. This would require fine-grained estimates of all the individual model parameters, which is beyond what is possible with the available data.

For even lower values of B, we obtain a pure pooling equilibrium with all types choosing non-eponymous names. This is because low types become too afraid of revealing their type by choosing eponymous names. Note also that if B goes above the upper boundary ($\frac{a_H}{a_H+\sigma}$) then we obtain a pure pooling equilibrium where all types choose eponymous names. There the difference between low and high types becomes relatively small, so there is no need to differentiate by using non-eponymous names. While pure pooling equilibria (either only with eponymous or only with non-eponymous names) are possible in our theory, they are less interesting for our empirical analysis. This is because they predict no variation, when our data clearly show variation between companies using eponymous and non-eponymous names. The key model prediction from the separating equilibrium stated above is therefore the relevant one for the empirical analysis.

3. Data and Empirical Strategy

3.1. *Data Sources*

We obtain a list of spin-outs from Beauhurst, the leading commercial database for start-ups and spin-outs in the UK. A spin-out is defined as any company created to commercialize IP owned by a UK university. Beauhurst considers multiple sources to identify university spin-outs, including press releases, disclosures from Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs), and disclosures from the companies themselves.[6] Our sample consists of 1,036 spin-outs, formed between 2010 and 2021. Similar data have been used by Hellmann et al. (2025) to study the impact of university ownership in spin-outs on their subsequent fundraising success.

A firm is defined as having an eponymous name if it includes the name of its location of origin. In our context, we classify a spin-out as eponymous if it meets either of the following two criteria: i) full eponymy: the spin-out name contains the full name of the city it originated from (e.g., Cambridge GaN Devices), or ii) partial eponymy: the spin-out name includes part of the city name, either at the beginning or the end (e.g., CamGaN, GyreOx).[7] Using these criteria, we identify 76 eponymous spin-outs. The identified eponymous firm names are listed in Appendix 1.

While the name of a university (e.g., "University of Oxford") is legally protected in the UK, the name of the university's city (e.g., "Oxford") is broadly available, as long as there is no risk of being mistaken for a university department or a legal subsidiary of the university.[8] We

[6] In order to ensure that a company is accurately classified as a university spin-out, Beauhurst (2023) requires at least one of the following criteria are met: (i) the university holds intellectual property that it has licensed to the company; (ii) the university possesses shares in the company; and (iii) the university has the right to buy shares in the company at a future date through an options or warrants contract. We exclude 'university startups' (ventures that do not satisfy these three criteria but have founders who are related to the university, such as current or former students or staff) from our sample, as this group is not consistently identifiable based on the available data.

[7] We define "eponymous" spin-outs as those named after their originating city. In terms of special cases, spin-outs named after universities that do not denote a specific city, such as Aston or Teesside, are excluded, but including them yields similar results. For spin-outs originating from London-based universities, we checked for references to both London and its boroughs but found none. One spin-out, CityDefend, from City University of London, is not classified as eponymous because its name does not reference London or any of its boroughs. For spin-outs from more than one university, we classify them as eponymous if they are fully (or partially) named after either university's city.

[8] For example, there have been some legal disputes surrounding the use of the name Oxford. In one notable case, Oxford Ltd, a wholly-owned subsidiary of the University of Oxford, opposed a registered trademark by a Japanese tailoring business that

thus find that spin-out names can include the university's location, but not the word "university" itself (see Appendix 1).[9] University spin-outs register their name with the university's agreement anyway, so there is no litigation risk. We also verified that in our sample, all eponymous names are truthful, i.e., no eponymous spin-out claimed to be from a university where it had no legitimate connection.[10]

To examine the relationship between eponymous location names and spin-outs' subsequent performance, we gather spin-out characteristics and fundraising outcomes from Beauhurst, which provides information about the university from which the company spun out from, its industry classifications, and its location in terms of postcode. Beauhurst also offers comprehensive records for each funding round, drawn from the corresponding administrative filings in the UK company registry, Companies House. This includes details such as the amount raised, the date of the fundraising, and the name and category of each investor.[11] The latest funding round in our sample occurred on June 24, 2021. We also hand-collect publicly available data on the location of each investor, recording the postcode of its UK offices.

3.2. Key Variables

The key variable of interest is the 'Eponymous' dummy, taking the value of 1 if the spin-out is (fully or partially) named after the university's location. Panel A of Table II contains the distribution of eponymous spin-outs by type of eponymy and across universities. Out of the 1,036 spin-outs in our sample, 49 (27) are fully (partially) eponymous.[12]

There are several underlying reasons why a spin-out might choose an eponymous name. Most eponymous spin-outs (75%) originate from Oxford or Cambridge. This aligns with our theory, which assumes that spin-outs from prestigious universities use eponymous names to signal their origin. However, we also find some eponymous names in less prestigious universities. We will explore whether eponymous names play a different role at these other locations.

All independent and dependent variables are defined in Table I. Summary statistics for these variables are presented in Panel B of Table II, while their pairwise correlations are shown in Panel C of the same table. Panel D of Table II depicts the distribution of spin-outs across different universities, as well as their fundraising outcomes by university.

Insert Table I about here

We examine several dependent variables to measure spin-out fundraising performance. We begin by looking at the broadest measure of fundraising success. The 'Raised Eq' dummy

included the term "Oxford" (Mikami 2021). In another example, the University of Oxford took legal action in an attempt to prevent Oxford Programs from using the "OXFORD ROYALE" and "OXFORD ROYALE ACADEMY" signs (Marks and Clerk 2023). The university has also opposed a UK trademark application containing the phrase "Oxford Business School" (Intellectual Property Office 2016).

[9] The only exception is the spin-out Nottingham University Architecture and Urban Design (NUAUD), which is a consultancy company established to create connections between the University campuses in Nottingham and China, as well as with the Chinese architectural and urban design market (University of Nottingham 2017).

[10] We discuss the case of Cambridge Analytica, which was not a spin-out, nor from Cambridge, in section IV.E.

[11] We also augmented some missing investor categorizations using the Beauhurst taxonomy.

[12] In percentage terms, this is less than half as frequent as firms named after their owners (see Belenzon et al. 2017).

measures whether or not spin-outs secured any equity investment. The 'Raised VC' dummy measures whether spin-outs raised any venture capital, which is widely considered to be the most prestigious and difficult-to-obtain category of startup funding.[13] We further consider the 'Inv Amount' variable, which measures the total amount raised by the firm over the relevant time horizon.

To examine the possibility that eponymous names signal local affinity, we define the 'Raised Local Inv' variable as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-out raised funding from any private local investor. Conversely, 'Raised Non-Local Inv' is set to 1 if the spin-out raised funding from any private non-local investor. An investor is defined as local (non-local) if it has at least one office (no office) in the area where the spin-out operates, as identified by the first two letters of the UK postcodes.[14]

Insert Table II about here

The descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table II indicate that eponymous spin-outs are more likely to attract local investment, supporting the local affinity hypothesis. However, there are no significant differences between eponymous and non-eponymous spin-outs for other fundraising outcomes. Naturally, these descriptive statistics have no control variables. In Section III we show that to understand the effect of eponymous names, one also needs to account for a venture's origin by controlling for university fixed effects.

The remaining control variables account for industry, university origin, and temporal factors. Relying on UK Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) groups, we use dummies for software, manufacturing, scientific, and other sectors. Additionally, we use university fixed effects to account for consistent factors related to the entrepreneurial climate within each university and its level of connectivity with investors.[15] Year dummies, based on the incorporation date, are included to account for national shocks that might influence spin-outs, universities, and the fundraising climate. Lastly, we include a set of yearly spin-out age dummies in the panel specifications.

3.3. Empirical Strategy

For our baseline empirical specifications, we use two different models that account for temporal differences in fundraising outcomes. Firstly, we consider a cross-sectional Ordinary Least

[13] A substantial prior literature on startup finance suggests that securing VC funding is a strong indicator of firm performance, because it is more challenging to obtain and signifies investor confidence in a company's potential for rapid growth and exceptional returns (see Gompers and Lerner 2001; Hellmann and Puri 2002; Shane and Stuart 2002; Hsu 2004; Da Rin et al. 2013; Ewens et al. 2018).

[14] We group postcodes in Greater London area together, such that even if the first two letters of the spin-out postcode differ from those of the investors, if both the investor and the spin-out is in Greater London, the investor is classified as "local".

[15] There are companies in our sample which spun out from more than one university. Since these spin-outs may be influenced by the entrepreneurial climate of all universities and have more resources available at their disposal, we include a separate fixed effect for any distinct university pairs (e.g., a separate fixed effect is included for companies which spun out jointly from Cambridge and Imperial College London, a separate fixed effect is included for companies which spun out only from Cambridge, and another fixed effect is included for companies which spun out only from Imperial College).

Squares (OLS) specification for whether the spin-out raised funding three years after incorporation. The second specification is a yearly panel model.

Equations (1A) and (1B) describe our baseline cross-sectional OLS regression specification:

$$Raised\ Equity\ (3\ yr)_i = \alpha + \beta Eponymous_i + \gamma' X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1A)$$

where the dependent variable $Raised\ Equity\ (3\ yr)_i$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-out raised funding within three years after its incorporation. We restrict the sample to spin-outs that are at least three years old, in order to allow enough time for the spin-outs to raise funding. $Eponymous_i$ indicates partial or full eponymy and X_i is a vector containing the following controls: university, industry, and incorporation year fixed effects. We specify robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. In this model, β describes the difference in fundraising probability three-years after incorporation for eponymous spin-outs, compared to non-eponymous spin-outs. To assess whether the marginal effect of eponymous names differs depending on the prestige of the university, in model Equation 1B we interact the $Eponymous$ dummy with three dummy variables indicating Oxford, Cambridge and Non-Oxbridge universities:

$$Raised\ Equity\ (3\ yr)_i = \alpha + \beta_1 Eponymous_i\ Oxford_i + \beta_2 Eponymous_i\ Cambridge_i + \beta_3 Eponymous_i\ Non\ Oxbridge_i + \gamma' X_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (1B)$$

Equations (2A) and (2B) describe our panel OLS regression specification:

$$Raised\ Equity_{it} = \alpha^{Panel} + \beta^{Panel} Eponymous_i + \gamma^{Panel\prime} X_i + \delta_t^{Panel} + \xi_{it} \quad (2A)$$

$$= \alpha^{Panel} + \beta_1^{Panel} Eponymous_i\ Oxford_i + \beta_2^{Panel} Eponymous_i\ Cambridge_i + \beta_3^{Panel}\ Eponymous_i\ Non\ Oxbridge_i + \gamma^{Panel\prime} X_i + \delta_t^{Panel} + \xi_{it} \quad (2B)$$

where the dependent variable $Raised\ Equity_{it}$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-out raised funding yearly after its incorporation, δ_t^{Panel} indicates the age of the spin-out and the rest of the controls are defined as above. Since our focus is on how eponymous names influence the likelihood of initial fundraising, we exclude a spin-out from our sample in subsequent years once it has raised funding. To account for autocorrelations of ξ_{it} across years t, we cluster standard errors at the spin-out level i.

In this paper we do not claim to find any causal effects; i.e., we do not claim any treatment effects. Instead, we interpret our estimated coefficients as conditional correlations that describe heterogeneity across spin-outs. This is fully consistent with our theory model, which explicitly derives an equilibrium based on heterogeneous spin-outs that differ in terms of some unobservable asymmetric information. Note also that in a separating equilibrium, the estimated β coefficient represents the difference in the probability of obtaining an investment between low (eponymous) versus high (non-eponymous) types; this is given by $(a_L + \sigma)b_L - a_H b_H$, which is negative in a separating equilibrium.

4. Empirical Results

4.1. Who uses Eponymous Names?

We begin by examining the relationship between institutional prestige and the adoption of eponymous location names. Table III examines the factors that determine whether a spin-out adopts a name after its founding university's location. The dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to one if the spin-out has an eponymous name and zero otherwise. We use a cross-sectional OLS regression model with robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity.

Insert Table III about here

In column (1), both Oxford and Cambridge have a strong, statistically significant positive effect on the likelihood of a spin-out adopting an eponymous name compared to the excluded baseline, Imperial College London. Since Imperial College does not have any eponymous ventures, the coefficients for Oxford and Cambridge reflect their total probabilities of adopting eponymous names, with the comparison made against a zero baseline for Imperial College. Specifically, the coefficient for Oxford is 0.3182 and, for Cambridge, it is 0.1308, both significant at the 1% level. This indicates that spin-outs from these prestigious institutions are more likely to adopt names reflecting their university origin. Column (2) introduces additional controls for sector and year of incorporation. The coefficients for Oxford and Cambridge remain positive and significant, with Oxford's coefficient slightly increasing to 0.3201 and Cambridge's coefficient decreasing slightly to 0.1276. These results suggest that the relationship between being a spin-out from these universities and adopting an eponymous name is strong and robust.

4.2. Eponymous Names and Fundraising Outcomes: Raising Equity

This section examines the relationship between eponymous names and key fundraising success metrics. These metrics include the probability of raising external capital, venture capital in particular, and the amount raised in these fundraising rounds. We begin by analyzing the association between eponymous names and the subsequent fundraising success of spin-outs from external investors.

Table IV presents the results of OLS regressions on the probability of raising equity funding from external investors, divided into cross-sectional (Panel A) and panel models (Panel B) to provide a comprehensive view of their determinants across different temporal landscapes.

Insert Table IV about here

Panel A shows the cross-sectional analysis, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator of whether a spin-out received investment within three years of its incorporation. The sample is therefore limited to spin-outs that are at least three years old. The findings indicate that eponymous names are negatively associated with the probability of fundraising, with statistically significant coefficients observed after controlling for university fixed effects. Column (4) shows that the interaction term for eponymous Cambridge spin-outs is particularly negative. However, these results do not suggest that Oxbridge spin-outs are less likely to receive funding; for instance,

Oxford spin-outs have a 32% higher probability of raising funding compared to Imperial College London, which serves as the baseline category.

Panel B provides insights from the panel regression analysis, where the dependent variable is an annual binary indicator for whether a spin-out raised external funding in a given year post-incorporation. This approach accounts for repeated observations over time until the spin-out secures funding, offering a dynamic perspective on funding outcomes. The results reinforce the main cross-sectional findings; for instance, the negative impact of being eponymous remains significant, particularly for Cambridge-affiliated spin-outs. The magnitude of the coefficients in the panel regressions is smaller, reflecting the annual effect in contrast to the three-year effect in the cross-sectional regressions.

4.3. *Eponymous Names and Fundraising Outcomes: Raising Venture Capital*

Table V presents the results of OLS cross-sectional and panel regressions examining the determinants of raising venture capital (VC). The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether a spin-out company received VC funding. Columns (1) and (2) display estimates from the cross-sectional model, while columns (3) and (4) show results from the panel data.

Insert Table V about here

Columns (1) and (3) reveal that the coefficient for eponymous names is negative, and it is statistically significant in the panel model. Columns (2) and (4) separate the effects for Oxford, Cambridge, and non-Oxbridge spin-outs. The coefficient for Cambridge-eponymous spin-outs is the most negative and highly significant. These negative coefficients reflect the differential effects of eponymous names, while the positive and statistically significant effects of Oxbridge origins remain, compared to the baseline of Imperial College London.

4.4. *Eponymous Names and Fundraising Outcomes: Amounts Raised*

An alternative measure of fundraising success is the total amount of funds raised. Table VI presents four regression models: two Tobit regressions (columns 1 and 2) that analyze the determinants of investment amounts, including spin-outs that raised no funding, and two OLS regressions (columns 3 and 4) that examine the amount raised, conditional on successful fundraising.

Insert Table VI about here

In the Tobit regression models, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the investment amount raised over the three years following incorporation. Regression (1) shows that, on average, eponymous firms raise significantly less investment than non-eponymous firms. Column (2) also finds that the eponymous name effect is strongest in Cambridge. Columns (3) and (4) are based on the smaller sample of companies that raised funding, excluding spin-outs

that raised no equity. The results follow a similar pattern, though the levels of significance are lower due to the smaller sample size. Notably, the coefficient on the interaction of the Eponymous x Other variables is positive and significant in column 4. Similar results are observed in the unreported panel version of Table VI.

Overall, the results consistently highlight that eponymous firms face disadvantages in their fundraising efforts, as they are less likely to raise equity funding and tend to raise smaller amounts. These effects are most pronounced for Oxbridge spin-outs, consistent with our signalling model, where weaker spin-outs at prestigious universities choose eponymous signalling.

4.5. *The Cambridge Analytica Scandal*

Given the strong negative effect for eponymous Cambridge ventures, the question arises whether this is related to the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which emerged in March 2018. The scandal involved the unauthorized harvesting of personal data from millions of Facebook users, which was then used for political advertising, significantly affecting both the 2016 US presidential election and the Brexit referendum.

Notably, Cambridge Analytica was not a spin-out of Cambridge University and did not have any substantial connection to the institution. However, concerns might arise that the scandal created a negative reputational effect for the broader Cambridge brand. To verify that this scandal is not driving our results, we estimate an additional regression model that separates the eponymous Cambridge variable into pre- and post-scandal components.

Insert Table VII about here

The regression results in Table VII reveal no significant negative impact of the Cambridge Analytica scandal on Cambridge-affiliated spin-outs' likelihood of receiving equity investment. In the cross-sectional model (Column 1), spin-outs from Cambridge prior to the scandal show a significantly lower probability of raising equity. This negative effect persisted post-scandal, although it became smaller and was no longer significant at the 10% level. In the panel model for first fundraising (Column 2), the negative impact remains significant both pre- and post-scandal. These findings suggest that the Cambridge Analytica scandal is not driving our results.[16]

4.6. Do eponymous names attract different investors?

Eponymous names can also indicate local affinity, which creates a stronger bond with local customers and investors (Bergien 2013). Specifically, they can evoke emotional and psychological responses, fostering a sense of community, trust, and loyalty among local stakeholders. At Oxbridge, this aspect of eponymous names is likely overshadowed by brand recognition, whereas outside of Oxbridge, it may be more salient. Thus, we conjecture that in less prestigious universities, eponymous names are predominantly used to signal local affinity. We

[16] It is also worth mentioning that after the 2018 Cambridge Analytica Scandal we find no new spin-out in our sample that chose an eponymous Cambridge name. The scandal may well have affected the attractiveness of using the name in Cambridge going forward.

empirically test this by examining whether local investors respond more positively to eponymous names than non-local investors.

Table VIII presents an analysis of receiving local and non-local investment over a three-year horizon. The two outcomes are likely correlated because factors influencing a spin-out's ability to attract local investments may also affect its ability to attract non-local investments. We therefore use seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to account for potential correlations between the error terms. The dependent variables are dummies for local (columns 1 and 3) and non-local (columns 2 and 4) investments three years after spin-out. Columns (1) and (2) are part of a single SUR model that jointly estimates local and non-local investment effects. Similarly, columns (3) and (4) are generated from a separate SUR model that breaks out the eponymous names effect into the three categories of Oxford, Cambridge, and Other.

Insert Table VIII about here

In column 1 of Table VIII, the coefficient for Eponymous on local investment is negative but not statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficient in column (2) is almost three times larger in magnitude, negative, and statistically significant. This indicates that local investors are less negatively affected by eponymous names. However, since the p-value for the difference between the two coefficients is 0.3161, this result is only suggestive, implying that local affinity may mitigate the primary signalling effects observed in Tables IV - VI.

Columns (3) and (4) report the results of the model that breaks down the eponymous effect into the three categories: Oxford, Cambridge, and Other. The coefficients for non-local investors are consistently more negative than those for local investors, though these differences are not statistically significant. Notably, the effect of eponymous names on local investments is positive outside of Oxbridge. In fact, the coefficient on Eponymous x Other is 0.1324 in column (3) approaches significance at the 10% level, with a p-value of 0.1108. This hints at a possible role of local affinity effects for less prestigious eponymous names, as they appear to primarily attract the interest of local investors outside of Oxbridge.

Table IX examines the relationship between eponymous names and the likelihood of receiving local investments, conditional on raising equity. Columns (1) and (2) present the results from cross-sectional models, where the dependent variable is a binary indicator representing whether a spin-out firm received local investment three years after its incorporation, conditional on successfully raising funding within the period. The only significant coefficient is the interaction term Eponymous x Other, which is both positive and statistically significant. Columns (3) and (4) show results for the panel specification. The coefficient for the interaction Eponymous x Other is 0.1554 and almost significant at the 10% (p-value is 0.1153). These findings reinforce the message from Table VIII, suggesting that outside of Oxbridge, eponymous names play a role in attracting local investors, consistent with the notion that they signal local affinity.

Insert Table IX about here

5. Conclusion

Prior literature has examined the role of companies adopting eponymous founder names. In this paper, we examine the role of eponymous location names, specifically focusing on university spin-outs that may or may not include their location in their name. We develop a signalling theory that generates a separating equilibrium where, in a prestigious location, relatively lower-quality ventures use eponymous names to attract attention, but higher-quality ventures signal their confidence by eschewing such eponymous names. The theory predicts that, in a prestigious location, eponymous location names are associated with a lower probability of raising funds. Using data on UK spin-outs, we find evidence that confirms this central prediction. More specifically, focusing on Oxford and Cambridge as prestigious locations, we find that eponymous Oxbridge ventures are less likely to obtain funding than their non-eponymous counterparts.

Our analysis thus suggests that eponymous location names follow a different logic than eponymous founder names. With the latter, founders put their own reputation on the line, but with the former, there are no direct costs. Yet, our analysis suggests a more subtle signalling cost of using prestigious eponymous location names. Future research might therefore consider the broader question of what costs and benefits are associated with eponymous location names. This paper briefly considers non-prestigious location names and finds some preliminary evidence for local affinity effects where eponymous names attract relatively more local investors. Future research could examine this conjecture more systematically, also going beyond the specific context of university spin-outs. Finally, our analysis focuses on the financing of new ventures. With more data, it would also be interesting to examine further performance measures such as sales growth, employment, and eventual exit performance.

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TABLE 1
Variable definitions

Main Independent Variable	
Eponymous	A dummy variable equal to 1 if any of the following conditions are satisfied: (i) full eponymy: the spin-out name contains the full name of the city it originated from (e.g., Cambridge GaN Devices), or (ii) partial eponymy: the spin-out name includes part of the city's name, either at the beginning or the end (e.g., GyreOx). Spin-outs from more than one city are classified as eponymous if they are fully (or partially) named after either city Source: Based on spin-out names provided by Beauhurst.
Dependent Variables	
Raised Eq	A dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-out received investment after incorporation. The time horizon considered varies by the type of regression; please see Section III.C for more details. Source: Beauhurst.
Raised VC	A dummy variable equal to 1 if the spinout received VC investment. The time-horizon considered varies by the type of regression, please see Section III.C for more details. Source: Beauhurst.
Inv Amount	Amount raised by a particular spin-out. The time horizon considered varies by the type of regression; please see Section III.C for more details. Source: Beauhurst.
Raised Local Inv	A dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-out received investment from any private investor who has at least one office in the area of the spin-out, defined by the first two letters of UK postcodes. Greater London postcodes are taken as a single category. Private investors include the following: Angel Network, Asset Management, Bank, Business Angel(s), Commercialisation Company, Corporate, Family Office, Private Equity and Venture Capital, Private Investment Vehicle. The time horizon considered varies by the type of regression; please see Section III.C for more details. Source: Investor Websites, Companies House.
Raised Non-Local Inv	A dummy variable equal to 1 if the spin-out received investment from any private investor who does not have an office in the area of the spin-out, defined by the first two letters of UK postcodes. Greater London postcodes are taken as a single category. Private investors include the following: Angel Network, Asset Management, Bank, Business Angel(s), Commercialisation Company, Corporate, Family Office, Private Equity and Venture Capital, Private Investment Vehicle. The time horizon considered varies by the type of regression; please see Section III.C for more details. Source: Investor Websites, Companies House.
Fixed Effects	
Universities	A set of dummy variables for the university a spin-out spawned from. For spin-outs from more than one university, a separate fixed effect is specified for any distinct university pairs. Source: Beauhurst.
Industries	A set of dummy variables for each spin-out's industry. We differentiate between Manufacturing (SIC Group C), IT (SIC Group J), Scientific (SIC Group M), and Other industries. Source: Beauhurst.
Spinout Age	A set of dummy variables for the age of a particular spin-out firm, measured in years since the incorporation date. Source: Beauhurst.
Incorporation Year	A set of dummy variables for the year in which the company was incorporated. Source: Beauhurst.

TABLE 2
Summary statistics

Panel A: Distribution of Eponymous firms

Eponymy Type	*Nr. Spin-outs*	*Example*
- Named after University	49	Cambridge GaN Devices
- Partially Named after University	27	GyreOx

City	*Nr. Spin-outs*	*Fraction of Eponymous Spin-outs*
- Oxford	43	0.57
- Cambridge	14	0.18
- Lancaster, Swansea	3 each	0.08
- Manchester, Edinburgh	2 each	0.05
- Warwick, Coventry, Glasgow, Nottingham, Bradford, Bristol, St Andrews, Liverpool, Durham	1 each	0.12

Total Nr. Eponymous Spin-outs	76 out of 1,036 spin-outs in our sample

Panel B: Summary Statistics by Eponymous Sub-sample

	Full Sample			*Eponymous*	*Not Eponymous*
	Obs.	Mean	St.dev.	Mean	
Eponymous	1,036	0.0734	0.2609	1.0000	0.0000
Raised Equity	1,036	0.5367	0.4989	0.5263	0.5375
Raised VC	1,036	0.2066	0.4050	0.2763	0.2010
Inv Amount	537	3.8329	12.9409	3.5211	3.8573
Raised Local Inv	1,036	0.1438	0.3511	0.2237*	0.1375
Raised Non-Local Inv	1,036	0.2384	0.4263	0.2895	0.2344
Manufacturing	1,036	0.1795	0.3840	0.1579	0.1813
IT	1,036	0.1902	0.3926	0.1053**	0.1969
Scientific	1,036	0.5203	0.4998	0.5921	0.5146
Other Industries	1,036	0.1100	0.3131	0.1447	0.1073

Panel C: Pairwise correlations

		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
(1)	Eponymous	1				
(2)	Raised Equity	-0.01	1			
(3)	Raised VC	0.05	0.47***	1		
(4)	Inv Amount	-0.01	0.20***	0.28***	1	
(5)	Raised Local Inv	0.06**	0.38***	0.50***	0.27***	1
(6)	Raised Non-Local Inv	0.03	0.52***	0.68***	0.25***	0.25***

Panel D: Fraction of spin-outs that raised equity/VC by originating university

	Nr. Spin-outs	Raised Eq	Raised VC
University of Oxford	134	0.7463	0.3507
University of Cambridge	113	0.6372	0.4867
Imperial College London	65	0.5538	0.1385
University College London	48	0.5625	0.2917
University of Bristol	48	0.5625	0.1458
Swansea University	41	0.1463	0.0000
University of Manchester	41	0.4390	0.0976
Queen's University Belfast	34	0.5588	0.1765
University of Warwick	34	0.6471	0.2941
University of Edinburgh	31	0.7742	0.2581
Remaining Universities	447	0.4586	0.1208

NOTES: This table shows summary statistics for the overall sample, eponymous, and non-eponymous subsamples. Panel A shows the frequency of eponymous spin-outs by type of eponymy and across universities. Panel B shows summary statistics for all dependent and control variables. For the purpose of the table in Panel B, we employ the following definitions: Raised Equity/VC/Local Inv/Non-Local Inv is a dummy variable indicating whether a spin-out raised the particular funding type 3 years after incorporation; Inv Amount is the amount raised 3 years after incorporation in million GBP, conditional on fundraising success; Post-money Val is also recorded in million GBP. A two-sided Welch test was conducted for mean equality across subsamples. Panel C shows pairwise variable correlations between the dependent variables and the eponymous dummy. Panel D shows the distribution of spin-outs across the top 10 universities, ranked by the number of spin-outs produced, along with the fraction of spin-outs that raised equity or venture capital within each group. For the purposes of Panel D, spin-outs originating from more than one university were assigned to the university with the highest number of spin-outs in the dataset. Significance: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels.

TABLE 3
Determinants of eponymous firm names

	DV: Eponymous Dummy	
	(1)	(2)
Oxford University	0.3182***	0.3201***
	(0.0429)	(0.0427)
Cambridge University	0.1308***	0.1276***
	(0.0345)	(0.0343)
Manufacturing		-0.0144
		(0.0346)
IT		-0.0602*
		(0.0331)
Scientific		-0.0190
		(0.0312)
Remaining University Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes
Incorporation Year fixed effects	No	Yes
Observations	1,036	1,036
R^2	0.1853	0.2113

NOTES: This table shows the determinants of the probability of a particular spin-out being fully or partially named after the university's location. The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the spin-out has an eponymous name and zero otherwise. The model is a cross-sectional OLS regression with an intercept. Robust standard errors are specified. Baseline excluded fixed effects are as follows: Rest of SIC groups for sectors and Imperial College London for universities. OLS coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels.

TABLE 4
Eponymous firm names and the probability to raise funding

Panel A: Cross-sectional Model

	DV: Raised Equity			
	Cross-Sectional: 3 - year horizon			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eponymous	-0.0175	-0.1896***	-0.1937***	
	(0.0639)	(0.0651)	(0.0644)	
Eponymous#Oxford				-0.1402
				(0.0894)
Eponymous#Cambridge				-0.4049***
				(0.1452)
Eponymous#Other				-0.1109
				(0.1059)
Oxford University		0.3351***	0.3341***	0.3153***
		(0.0873)	(0.0868)	(0.0875)
Cambridge University		0.0916	0.0823	0.1130
		(0.0916)	(0.0922)	(0.0940)
Manufacturing			0.1315**	0.1356**
			(0.0661)	(0.0658)
IT			0.0555	0.0573
			(0.0678)	(0.0675)
Scientific			0.1362**	0.1367**
			(0.0576)	(0.0574)
Remaining University fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incorporation year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	No	No	No	No
Nr of Spin-outs	818	818	818	818
Observations	818	818	818	818
R^2	0.0115	0.2577	0.2661	0.2695

Panel B: Panel Model

	DV: Raised Equity			
	Panel: First fundraising			
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Eponymous	-0.0050	-0.0907***	-0.0909***	
	(0.0255)	(0.0314)	(0.0316)	
Eponymous#Oxford				-0.0893
				(0.0866)
Eponymous#Cambridge				-0.1596***
				(0.0470)
Eponymous#Other				-0.0496
				(0.0328)
Oxford University		0.2594***	0.2639***	0.2631***
		(0.0548)	(0.0533)	(0.0612)
Cambridge University		0.0672*	0.0646	0.0794*
		(0.0401)	(0.0400)	(0.0426)
Manufacturing			0.0477*	0.0511*
			(0.0289)	(0.0288)
IT			0.0237	0.0260
			(0.0305)	(0.0305)
Scientific			0.0482*	0.0494**
			(0.0252)	(0.0251)
Remaining University fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incorporation year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Nr of Spin-outs	1,014	1,014	1,014	1,014
Observations	3,193	3,193	3,193	3,193
R^2	0.0652	0.1614	0.1630	0.1638

NOTES: This table shows OLS cross-sectional (Panel A) and panel regressions (Panel B) for the determinants of fundraising success. Columns (1)–(4) in Panel A show estimates of a cross-sectional model, where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a spin-out received investment 3 years after incorporation. The sample here is restricted to spin-outs that are at least 3 years old. Robust standard errors are used. Columns (5)–(6) in Panel B show estimates of a panel regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the spin-out received investment yearly after incorporation. Once a spin-out raises investment, it is removed from the panel. Spin-outs that are not old enough to have observations in a particular year are also dropped. All spin-outs are, hence, at least 1 year old in the panel regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the spin-out level. An intercept is included in all models. Baseline excluded fixed effects are as follows: Rest of SIC groups for sectors and Imperial College London for universities. OLS coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels.

TABLE 5
Eponymous firm names and the probability to raise VC funding

	DV: Raised VC			
	Cross-Sectional: 3-year horizon		Panel: First fundraising	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eponymous	-0.0826		-0.0421**	
	(0.0695)		(0.0200)	
Eponymous#Oxford		-0.0746		-0.0457
		(0.1076)		(0.0350)
Eponymous#Cambridge		-0.4028***		-0.1279***
		(0.1176)		(0.0360)
Eponymous#Other		0.1412		0.0215
		(0.1059)		(0.0259)
Oxford University	0.2714***	0.2691***	0.0966***	0.0981***
	(0.0801)	(0.0860)	(0.0246)	(0.0286)
Cambridge University	0.3294***	0.3759***	0.1089***	0.1260***
	(0.0788)	(0.0815)	(0.0240)	(0.0267)
Manufacturing	0.0319	0.0420	0.0152	0.0183
	(0.0489)	(0.0472)	(0.0122)	(0.0121)
IT	0.0435	0.0465	0.0184	0.0193
	(0.0529)	(0.0520)	(0.0132)	(0.0132)
Scientific	0.0660	0.0691*	0.0233**	0.0238**
	(0.0421)	(0.0410)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)
Remaining University Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incorporation year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Nr of Spin-outs	818	818	1,014	1,014
Observations	818	818	4,653	4,653
R^2	0.2421	0.2570	0.0923	0.0955

NOTES: This table shows OLS cross-sectional and panel regressions for the determinants of VC fundraising success. Columns (1)–(2) show estimates of a cross-sectional model, where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a spin-out received VC 3 years after incorporation. The sample here is restricted to spin-outs that are at least 3 years old. Robust standard errors are used. Columns (3)–(4) show estimates of a panel regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the spin-out received VC yearly after incorporation. Once a spin-out raises VC, it is removed from the panel. Spin-outs that are not old enough to have observations in a particular year are also dropped. All spin-outs are, hence, at least 1 year old in the panel regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the spin-out level. An intercept is included in all models. Baseline excluded fixed effects are as follows: Rest of SIC groups for sectors and Imperial College London for universities. OLS coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels.

TABLE 6
Eponymous firm names and the funding amount raised

	DV: Ln(1+Amount Inv)		DV: Ln(Amount Inv|Fundraising Success)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eponymous	-5.2891***		-0.2392	
	(1.6150)		(0.3444)	
Eponymous#Oxford		-3.2600*		-0.4380
		(1.7673)		(0.3680)
Eponymous#Cambridge		-14.3515***		-1.9233**
		(4.9306)		(0.7578)
Eponymous#Other		-2.9114		1.2932**
		(3.5608)		(0.5972)
Oxford University	8.9767***	8.2353***	1.6711***	1.7281***
	(1.8811)	(1.8703)	(0.4779)	(0.4799)
Cambridge University	2.0370	2.9416	1.2607**	1.3318***
	(2.0228)	(2.0285)	(0.4898)	(0.4909)
Manufacturing	4.0976**	4.1518**	0.1821	0.2656
	(1.7073)	(1.6891)	(0.4079)	(0.4099)
IT	2.1860	2.2010	-0.0870	-0.0843
	(1.7068)	(1.6931)	(0.3743)	(0.3726)
Scientific	4.2780***	4.2681***	0.4292	0.4837
	(1.4875)	(1.4766)	(0.3530)	(0.3539)
Remaining University fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incorporation year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	No	No	No	No
Nr of Spin-outs	784	784	405	405
Observations	784	784	405	405
R^2	0.0789	0.0808	0.4213	0.4316

NOTES: This table shows Tobit and OLS regressions for the determinants of the investment amount raised 3 years after incorporation. Regressions (1) and (2) are cross-sectional Tobit regressions for the determinants of the investment amount raised unconditionally on fundraising success, whereas (3) and (4) are cross-sectional OLS regressions for the determinants of investment amount raised conditional on fundraising success. The dependent variable for (1) and (2) is the natural logarithm of 1 + investment amount raised in the 3-year period after incorporation. The dependent variable for (3) and (4) is the natural logarithm of the investment amount raised in the 3-year period after incorporation, conditional on spin-outs that raised funding during this time period. Only spin-outs that are at least 3 years old and that have raised funding are included in all regressions. Moreover, because the amount is missing for some funding rounds, all regressions exclude spin-outs with any missing investment amount for any round falling in the 3-year period. Robust standard errors are used throughout. An intercept is included in all regressions. Baseline excluded fixed effects are as follows: Rest of SIC groups for sectors and Imperial College London for universities. Tobit and OLS coefficients are reported in regressions (1)–(2) and (3)–(4), respectively, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels.

TABLE 7
The Cambridge Analytica scandal

	DV: Raised Equity	
	Cross-Sectional: 3-year horizon	Panel: First Fundraising
	(1)	(2)
Eponymous#Oxford	-0.1413	-0.0892
	(0.0896)	(0.0866)
Eponymous#Cambridge#Post-Scandal	-0.1816	-0.1753***
	(0.2398)	(0.0441)
Eponymous#Cambridge#Pre-Scandal	-0.5766***	-0.1481**
	(0.1384)	(0.0624)
Eponymous#Other	-0.1113	-0.0497
	(0.1058)	(0.0329)
Oxford University	0.3170***	0.2632***
	(0.0876)	(0.0612)
Cambridge University	0.1142	0.0794
	(0.0939)	(0.0426)
Manufacturing	0.1379**	0.0510*
	(0.0657)	(0.0288)
IT	0.0562	0.0262
	(0.0676)	(0.0305)
Scientific	0.1326**	0.0496**
	(0.0575)	(0.0251)
p-value for difference pre vs post scandal	0.1410	0.6533
Remaining University fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Inc. year fixed effects	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	No	Yes
Nr of Spin-outs	818	1,014
Observations	818	3,193
R^2	0.2721	0.1638

NOTES: This table shows OLS cross-sectional and panel regressions for the determinants of receiving equity investment. Column (1) shows estimates of a cross-sectional model, where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a spin-out received investment 3 years after incorporation. The sample here is restricted to spin-outs that are at least 3 years old. Robust standard errors are used. Column (2) shows estimates of a panel regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the spin-out received investment yearly after incorporation. Once a spin-out raises investment, it is removed from the panel. Spin-outs that are not old enough to have observations in a particular year are also dropped. All spin-outs are, hence, at least 1 year old in the panel regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the spin-out level. An intercept is included in all models. OLS coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels.

TABLE 8
Eponymous firm names and the geography of investors

	DV: Raised Loc Inv	DV: Raised Non-Loc Inv	DV: Raised Loc Inv	DV: Raised Non-Loc Inv
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eponymous	-0.0670	-0.1431**		
	(0.0580)	(0.0608)		
Eponymous#Oxford			-0.1516	-0.1577
			(0.1009)	(0.1023)
Eponymous#Cambridge			-0.1841**	-0.3098***
			(0.0868)	(0.1184)
Eponymous#Other			0.1324	-0.0013
			(0.0830)	(0.0834)
Oxford University	0.3568***	0.3477***	0.3874***	0.3533***
	(0.0691)	(0.0761)	(0.0762)	(0.0822)
Cambridge University	0.1344**	0.2820***	0.1516**	0.3063***
	(0.0627)	(0.0745)	(0.0657)	(0.0773)
Manufacturing	0.0228	0.0688	0.0311	0.0750
	(0.0413)	(0.0497)	(0.0413)	(0.0488)
IT	0.0788*	-0.0140	0.0801*	-0.0124
	(0.0453)	(0.0514)	(0.0450)	(0.0510)
Scientific	0.0460	0.0555	0.0498	0.0577
	(0.0344)	(0.0428)	(0.0342)	(0.0421)
Remaining University fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incorporation year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	No	No	No	No
Nr of Spin-outs	818	818	818	818
Observations	818	818	818	818
R^2	0.2299	0.2468	0.2392	0.2511

NOTES: This table shows estimates from Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) for the determinants of receiving local and non-local investment. The dependent variable for (1) and (3) is a dummy for whether a spin-out received local investment 3 years after incorporation. The dependent variable for (2) and (4) is a dummy for whether a spin-out received non-local investment 3 years after incorporation. Only spin-outs that are at least 3 years old are included in all regressions. Robust standard errors are specified. A small-sample degrees-of-freedom adjustment is applied when estimating the covariance matrix of residuals. An intercept is included in all regressions. Baseline excluded fixed effects are as follows: Rest of SIC groups for sectors and Imperial College London for universities. Coefficients from SUR estimation are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels, based on small sample statistics.

TABLE 9
Eponymous firm names and local investment, conditional on fundraising success

	DV: Raised Loc Inv | Fundraising Success			
	Cross-Sectional: 3 - year horizon		Panel: First fundraising	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Eponymous	0.0113		-0.0036	
	(0.1107)		(0.0376)	
Eponymous#Oxford		-0.0832		-0.0487
		(0.1294)		(0.0502)
Eponymous#Cambridge		-0.1944		0.0210
		(0.2675)		(0.0578)
Eponymous#Other		0.5424***		0.1554
		(0.1927)		(0.0986)
Oxford University	0.3271***	0.3566***	0.1287***	0.1468***
	(0.1061)	(0.1096)	(0.0346)	(0.0392)
Cambridge University	0.1654	0.1805*	0.0721***	0.0706***
	(0.1067)	(0.1090)	(0.0238)	(0.0244)
Manufacturing	-0.0449	-0.0171	-0.0155	-0.0093
	(0.0881)	(0.0895)	(0.0219)	(0.0219)
IT	0.1099	0.1105	0.0229	0.0261
	(0.0939)	(0.0938)	(0.0239)	(0.0239)
Scientific	0.0162	0.0312	-0.0009	0.0047
	(0.0794)	(0.0802)	(0.0193)	(0.0195)
Remaining University fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Incorporation year fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Age fixed effects	No	No	Yes	Yes
Nr of Spin-outs	439	439	626	626
Observations	439	439	2,977	2,977
R^2	0.2729	0.2899	0.1157	0.1189

NOTES: This table shows OLS cross-sectional and panel regressions for the determinants of receiving local investment, conditional on fundraising success. Columns (1)–(2) show estimates of a cross-sectional model, where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether a spin-out received local investment 3 years after incorporation, conditional on the spin-out having raised funding during this period. The sample here is restricted to spin-outs that are at least 3 years old. Robust standard errors are used. Columns (3)–(4) show estimates of a panel regression, where the dependent variable is a dummy for whether the spin-out received local investment yearly after incorporation, conditional on the spin-out raising funding during its lifetime. Once a spin-out raises local investment, it is removed from the panel. Spin-outs that are not old enough to have observations in a particular year are also dropped. All spin-outs are hence at least 1 year old in the panel regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the spin-out level. An intercept is included in all models. Baseline excluded fixed effects are as follows: Rest of SIC groups for sectors and Imperial College London for universities. OLS coefficients are reported, with standard errors in parentheses. Significance: ***, **, * denote 99%, 95%, and 90% confidence levels.