Change or continuity? Intergenerational social mobility and post-communist transition

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Abstract

Regime change experienced in post-communist societies is of great significance for research in social stratification and mobility. Nonetheless, the existing literature does not provide a clear answer if cross-national differences in social mobility are determined by communist legacies or by the divergent paths these countries followed in their transition to the capitalist system. It is hypothesised that higher income inequality and an overall decline in material wellbeing would increase the importance of parental economic capital, whereas the relative role of parental cultural capital in offspring's life chances would decline. For 24 societies in Central and Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, I find evidence on the decisive role of social origins, particularly parental education, in predicting individuals' educational and occupational attainment. However, significant and systematic changes in intergenerational social mobility from pre- to post-transitional cohorts are not observed. The derived findings are robust to alternative specifications of social origins and destinations. Arguably, differences in intergenerational links between parents' and offspring's socio-economic status resulted from historical discrepancies in the communist period rather than the consequences of idiosyncratic developments in post-communist transition.

Keywords: Social mobility; life chances; post-communism; cultural capital; economic capital.

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1. Introduction

From the late 1980s the transition from authoritarian politico-economic regimes to democratic, market-based institutions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has changed the lives of millions in dramatic ways. Life paths and careers were interrupted and new ones established as countries began to offer new opportunities and challenges to their masses and elites (Szelényi & Szelényi, 1995; Titma & Trapido, 2002). On the positive side, private ownership has been allowed, political freedoms and civil liberties have been introduced, new educational opportunities have emerged, and highly paid jobs have been created (Freedom House, 2010; Heritage Foundation, 2006; Kogan, Noelke, & Gebel, 2011; Mickiewicz, 2005). However, the transition also resulted, for millions of individuals, in poverty and income inequality, long-term unemployment, labour migration, premature retirement and death (Azarova et al., 2017; Gugushvili, 2011, 2015b; Mansoor & Quillin, 2006; Timár, 1995; Vanhuysse, 2006; Verhoeven, Dessens, & Jansen, 2008). Now, after more than two decades of transition, the post-communist generations stand at the forefront of political, economic and social life in their respective countries.

This article investigates one of the most important dimensions of post-communist transformation – the emerging patterns of intergenerational transmission of socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages (Shkaratan & Yastrebov, 2010). I am particularly interested in the role of parental characteristics in individuals' educational and occupational attainment as the decades of social stratification literature has convincingly proved that they are the major channels to life chances in industrial, post-industrial, and post-communist societies (Bernardi & Ballarino, 2016; Blau & Duncan, 1967; Breen, Luijkx, Müller, & Pollak, 2009; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992; Müller & Shavit, 1998; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). Life chances can be understood in the Weberian perspective whereby a group-based situation provides to individuals with related education and occupations "shared typical probability of procuring goods, gaining a position in life, and finding inner satisfaction" (Weber, 1978). Whether or not regime change

experienced by post-communist societies affected the intergenerational equality of opportunities, and produced new social mobility patterns is an open empirical question. So far, research on the topic has primarily concentrated on the new EU member states and on Russia, while the short time span of available data sets has prevented scholars from making broader conclusions on the existing and emerging social mobility regimes, especially in economically and politically more turbulent countries with inadequate survey data coverage (Gugushvili, 2014).

Regime changes experienced in post-communist societies are obviously of great sociological significance but most stratification researchers were noticeably absent in the region as a whole during these times (Evans, 2006). Beyond the general theory of market transition (see Nee, 1989; Verhoeven et al., 2008), there is no unified framework that would suggest what type of social mobility regime to expect in post-communism, yet the available evidence indicates that intergenerational social mobility levels vary among these societies (Bukodi, Paskov, & Nolan, 2017; Gugushvili, 2016b, 2017; Veraschagina, 2012). Using European Values Studies (EVS, 2010), Figure 1 demonstrates β coefficients taken from linear probability models, on the intergenerational links between parental and offspring's tertiary education and salariat class attainment. It is clear that associations between parent-offspring educational and occupation attainment are higher in some countries such as Georgia, Slovak Republic, and Hungary than in others such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Azerbaijan, and Estonia. Probably the major trend depicted in Figure 1 is that seven out of the nine countries with the highest levels of social class mobility are former Soviet Union republics; whereas eight out of the nine least mobile countries are Central and East European post-communist societies. The described statistical snapshot, however, does not address the question of whether or not the observed differences are the result of transitional processes, or of variation between countries that existed before the collapse of the communist regimes.

Figure 1 near here

Only limited comparative and systematic research exists on post-communist intergenerational social mobility, despite being highly relevant for academic and public policy realms. The most influential works describing intergenerational social mobility trends only include a handful of post-communist states—mostly new EU members and Russia (Bernardi &

Ballarino, 2016; Breen, 2004; Bukodi et al., 2017; Shavit & Blossfeld, 1993). Thus far fragmented evidence regarding changes to social mobility in separate countries did not permit making conclusions about how these societies differed from one another along with the demise of the communist system, nor about the present state of intergenerational equality of opportunities. To address the main research question, this article is structured as follows. The next section describes the early communist revolution, the later erosion of mobility and the nature of the communist stratification regime. Section 3 presents a research framework and, based on a review of the available literature, offers hypotheses that speak to changing levels of social mobility and the shifting relative importance of cultural and economic capital in the stratification process. Section 4 describes the utilised data set and variables and corresponding statistical methods. Section 5 presents the findings from various tests and robustness checks of the main results. The final section summarises the findings and discusses their implications.

2. The making of intergenerational communist mobility regimes

2.1. The early communist revolution and the later erosion of mobility

Although communist countries differed from one another right from the start of totalitarian regimes in the 1920s, existing studies and an analysis of data permit a division of intergenerational social mobility models into an early communist revolutionary period and a mature stratification system that had more similarities with capitalist social mobility regimes (Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta, 1999). The acts of massive political repressions created voids in professional and managerial occupations, which were often filled by individuals with disadvantaged social origins whose academic performance and qualifications were hardly taken into consideration (Marshall, Sydorenko and Roberts, 1995). In the first half of the 20th century, the implementation and consequences of these affirmative action policies varied from country to country, and the full results of this experiment are not known, but already in the 1950s some scholars claimed that communist regimes had succeeded in establishing a stratification system with a high degree of mobility attributed mainly to the expansion of the national economies and, to a lesser extent, to a high rate of natural attrition during the revolutionary process (Inkeles,

1950). Aitov (1986) argued that in the Soviet Union 'society does not yet enjoy full social equality' but 'is far more open than its capitalist counterpart' (p. 256, 270, cited by Marshall et al., 1995). Along these lines, social mobility in Czechoslovakia was identified as 'pronouncedly non-capitalist' because no significant advantage of former private property owners or their children was found (Machonin, 1970).

Some Western scholars also supported the idea that repressive state activities, and egalitarian social and economic policies, led to a relatively weak association between conventional stratification indicators such as accumulated wealth, social status, and educational and occupational attainment (Evans and Mills, 1999). Although in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland the actual odds of attaining highly-skilled professional and managerial positions were still low, they were comparatively higher than those in capitalist societies (Wong, 1995). In Hungary, not only did the relative odds of every individual completing a basic educational level increase but socio-economic differentials were generally smaller than in capitalist societies (Simkus and Andorka, 1982). An analysis of mobility data from 1930 to 1973 also found that, for the sons of workers and peasants, the chances of attaining highly advantageous labour market positions increased strongly during the 1930s and 1940s, while a daughter's chances of upward mobility continuously improved (Andorka, 1983). Prior to the 1960s in Yugoslavia, intergenerational mobility across the manual/non-manual boundary was very high, for persons of manual non-farming origins, and this achievement of intergenerational social mobility was believed to be a result of Stalinist 'extensive' industrialisation and the subsequent high rate of structural change (Milić, 1965).

Many studies, nonetheless, indicated that intergenerational status reproduction remained in place across communist societies. A comparison of five communist and 25 other industrialised nations by Simkus (1995) revealed that rates of mobility in populations after the 1960s in Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia were nearly matched by Japan, while the same rates in Hungary came close to those in France. In the final years of communism in Soviet Russia, social background played a significant role in educational attainment. Children with high-status origins performed better in schools, and were also more likely to have higher expectations than their peers with equal grades but with a low-status social background (Dobson and Swafford,

1980).[1] A study of temporal changes in intergenerational social mobility in Hungary during a large part of the 20th century revealed that, while persistence in occupational mobility declined significantly between older cohorts, the decline slowed or halted in the more recent period (Wong and Hauser, 1992). A comparative study of inequalities in educational attainment in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia from 1940-1979 also showed stability or slight increases in intergenerational status reproduction when it came to school continuation probabilities in schooling transitions (Nieuwbeerta and Rijken, 1996). In addition, a recent comparative study of intergenerational educational mobility in twelve socialist societies found no clear trends in educational mobility from the second half of 20th century. The trend in decreasing intergenerational transmission of inequality evidenced up until the 1950s after which the tendency appeared to have halted in the subsequent years (Veraschagina, 2012).

2.2. The nature of the communist mobility regime

A thorough review of the literature indicates that early de-stratification and reverse discrimination against former elites in favour of the less advantaged classes, reduced the influence of family background in the intergenerational transmission of inequalities (Wong, 2002). The second phase of the social mobility evolution is likely to have begun in the beginning of the 1960s, when the most extensive political repressions ceased and softer measures of egalitarianism were prioritised. The latter gradually eroded largely equalised life chances between various social groups (Iannelli, 2002). Comparing intergenerational social mobility in Lithuania and Norway just after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, Hernes and Knudsen (1991) concluded that the basic causes and effects of intergenerational inequality are impossible to alter substantially. Considering the described communist policies, and the ideology of de-stratification, results pointing to high intergenerational inequality might seem surprising. Existing literature suggests several possible causes for these trends. Parkin (1969) suggested that the communist class systems could be best understood in terms of two contrasting ideal types:

[1] Since children with advantageous social backgrounds achieving low and average grades were more likely to apply for higher education, we can infer that secondary effects (for primary and secondary effects see Jackson et al. (2007)) in socialist societies were also present.

the classlessness model and a separate model corresponding more closely to class systems observed in modern Western capitalism. The former ideal type was appropriate in the early phase of 'communist reconstruction,' while the latter more accurately reflected the condition of communist states entering the phase of modern industrialisation.[2]

Once the newly-formed regimes succeeded in establishing political legitimacy and stability, industrial efficiency became a major preoccupation and challenged social stratification policies (Parkin, 1973). One aspect in which communist stratification systems stood out was in the importance of specific social background variables. As a result of totalitarian oppression and related social and economic policies, new forms of power substituted more conventional indicators of social stratification. The new political and cultural elites had gradually established social closure very similar to traditional social and economic class formation (Crompton, 1998). This is in line with the Weberian idea that the bureaucratic elites in order to secure their own reproduction monopolise channels to power and corresponding valued resources (Weber, 1978). An illustrative comparative study of social mobility systems in five communist societies in the 1970s showed that parental cultural capital had a direct influence on occupational attainment, even after a slow retreat from egalitarian ideology and practices (Wong, 2004). However, the role of specific forms of parental capital is probably not the main explanation for the remaining intergenerational status reproduction.

More fundamentally, the communist experience could indicate that the intergenerational reproduction of advantages and disadvantages is a fundamental component of social order: one that is infeasible to eradicate and cannot be easily regulated by centrally implemented policies (Goldthorpe, 2013; Hayek, 1960; Parsons, 1940). On the other hand, an alternative and more plausible perspective suggests that governments' implementation of equality measures were not always as rigorous as one would have expected. For instance, Stalin himself turned against egalitarian principles in income distribution, after the first couple of decades of the proletariat dictatorship (Parkin, 1973).[3] In addition, de-stratifying educational policies weakened after the

[2] This variation can be explained by the fact that socialist ideology and institutions initially created a political climate in which an established middle class was considered a potential threat to the new social order.

[3] The Soviet dictator arguably became convinced that without differentials in reward systems there would be no incentives to learn skills and assume more challenging responsibilities.

1960s (Gerber and Hout, 1995). Probably the main factor in explaining why discriminatory policies had little effect in communist countries is that these measures had unintended consequences. Within this system of stratification, communist meritocracies combined technical skills with ideological commitment, to provide a more enduring justification for inequality than the values of individualism characterised by the capitalistic order (Hollander, 1980). As a result, though economic differences among social groups were markedly higher in capitalist countries, qualitative and cultural differences in lifestyle were more definitive in communist regimes than in Western class societies (Teckenberg and Vale, 1989).

3. Hypotheses

3.1. Intensifying intergenerational status reproduction

The classic intergenerational social mobility paradigm assumes that social origins affect attained levels of education, which then influences the destination social class and an individual's life chances for gaining access to scarce and valued resources, while direct effects from social origins on social destination can be also considerable (Gugushvili, Bukodi, & Goldthorpe, 2017) (see Figure 2). Transitional shock in post-communist societies could affect the outlined links by means of changing the nature of social origins (parents' deteriorating socio-economic status vs. winners of transition), education (expanding educational opportunities vs. privatisation of educational institutions) and destination (higher unemployment levels vs. changing demand on certain occupations). Without theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence, it is difficult to argue that these changes would lead to weaker or stronger intergenerational inequality in different countries because of the dominance of separate effects are shaped by societies' idiosyncratic characteristics. Although the outlined transitional shock takes place on the macro level, stratification patterns of my interest are ultimately derived from the action and interaction of individuals, so it is natural to seek explanations of intergenerational social mobility within a so-called micro or behavioural model of social stratification (Breen, 2004).

Figure 2 near here

The industrialisation thesis (Treiman, 1970) is likely the most influential approach which explains temporal changes to intergenerational social mobility. The theory suggests that in economically developed societies, the origin-destination link vanishes, the strength of the origin-education nexus weakens, the allocation of life chances is increasingly driven by attained education, and education achievement depends on merit and effort, leading to a more meritocratic society (Breen and Jonsson, 2005). The transition from communist to capitalist systems caused a decline in economic output for many countries, which, if the latter theory is relevant for the post-communist context, meant that intergenerational status reproduction intensified. Chances for social mobility were affected by dramatic shifts in the educational system and occupational structure. The expansion of higher education institutions (Kogan, Noelke and Gebel, 2011), declines in the significance of unskilled manual labour, and growth in the skilled and unskilled service sectors (Blanchard, 1997) surely had a major impact on educational and occupational attainment. In addition to the absolute mobility incurred by structural changes, social mobility is defined by the capital possessed by one generation that helps to shape the career paths of the following generation (Breen, 2004).

A second line of thought, considering the region's growing economic inequality, assumes that there are negative links between income inequality and intergenerational social mobility. This perspective is referred to as the 'resource approach', which considers income inequality as restrictive to social mobility, and which appears to be substantiated by empirical findings (Andrews & Leigh, 2009; Björklund & Jäntti, 1997; Treiman & Yip, 1989). In other words, the wider the income inequality, the easier for the wealthier classes to provide their children with advantages that the poorer classes cannot afford. On the other hand, perspectives based on libertarian and free market ideology predict positive associations between newly-introduced economic systems and intergenerational social mobility (Hayek, 1960; Nee, 1989). The 'incentive approach' implies that individuals' motivation to pursue upward mobility is affected by existing income inequality and that, without unequal rewards on the labour market, the payoff for this intergenerational upgrade in mobility does not exist (Torche, 2005). Furthermore, the so-called 'meritocracy as functional imperative' perspective implies that labour market opportunities depend on the employers' efficiency considerations rather than on individuals' social origins (Bukodi and Goldthorpe, 2010). Contrary to the latter expectations, preliminary

patterns of tightened links between social origins and destination have been found in a number of studies that analysed intergenerational social mobility after the collapse of the Berlin Wall.

A study in Bulgaria revealed that in 1995-2001 severe economic depression led to a sharp decline in the educational performance of children from less well-off families (Hertz, Meurs and Selcuk, 2009). An analysis of intergenerational social mobility in Romania reveals that the effect of a father's socioeconomic status on a child's socioeconomic status was not important in 1988, but became significant in the post-communist era (Tomescu-Dubrow, 2006). In a Hungarian study, Bukodi and Goldthorpe (2010) concluded that the origin-education association strengthened, while the role of class origin in obtaining access to professional and managerial jobs increased under the capitalist system. Intensifying intergenerational status reproduction trends were also observed in Baltic countries. In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania parental education has strong positive effects on tertiary education attainment in the post-communist period (Hazans, Trapeznikova and Rastrigina, 2008). In Russia, the transition from a command to a market economy strengthened the links between social origins and occupational destination (Gerber and Hout, 2004). Lippényi and Gerber (2016) also reveal that in post-transition Hungary economic capital became more salient factor in the process of intergenerational social mobility. Finally, in a recent study Jackson and Evans (2017), using data for 13 post-communist societies find a decline in relative social mobility from the early 1990s to the late 2000s. In sum, I test the following hypothesis for the pooled sample of post-communist societies:

Hypothesis 1: *Intergenerational status reproduction – both in terms of educational and occupational attainment – intensified during post-communist transition.*

3.2. Cultural vs. economic capital

In spite of existing cross-country differences, I assume that most, if not all, communist societies, were operating under a similar type of social mobility regime. From the outset, the egalitarian policies of communist regimes prevented the acquisition and accumulation of wealth, which was the reason why individuals diverted their attention to cultural forms of social reproduction (Ganzeboom and Nieuwbeerta, 1999). This reasoning is related to Bourdieu's (1986) theory in which two major forms of capital – economic and cultural – determine an

individual's position in the social mobility system. Economic capital includes monetary resources, entrepreneurial skills, corresponding tastes, aspirations, and social networks, with cultural capital consisting of formal educational attainment, experience and expertise, and corresponding preferences for intellectual complexity and social network. Available studies confirm that in communist societies cultural capital was a more important factor of stratification than economic capital (Kraaykamp and Nieuwbeerta, 2000). Having less material resources and the ability to inherit, the privileged classes transferred cultural capital to their children which included a high value on 'interesting, clean, and creative work', among other things (Pohorila, 2011).[4]

In the transitional period, however, income inequality and the importance of economic capital increased, which likely led to significant consequences for the existing social mobility regimes. Material capital is easier to acquire than cultural capital because the latter can only be generated through a long socialisation process that is mostly fixed across a life span and involves family and educational institutions. In turn, the acquisition of material capital depends on personal characteristics, contextual conditions and luck, which could be accumulated in relatively short periods of time. Parental cultural capital is largely fixed over time and only marginally changing due to structural economic adjustments. Furthermore, it is often argued that the post-communist transition created 'winners' and 'losers' almost overnight (Horvat and Evans, 2010), with the main driver of growing inequality the 'hollowing out of the middle', or the reallocation of employees from the state-sector into either 'rich' private industry, or 'poor' and less attractive public and private sectors (Milanovic, 1999). Occupational social background clearly became a more important covariate of life chances. Thus it is logical to expect that the effect of parental economic capital would have been more likely to change during times of crisis than the parents' cultural capital. Of course it is also possible that after the withdrawal of public investment from education, health and other social services, the importance of parental cultural capital for offspring's life chances intensified, but in relative terms, it is expected to become less important than economic capital.

[4] Independent and distinctive effects of parental education and parental social class have been also identified in Western European context (see Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2013).

Hypothesis 2: *Post-communist transition led to the diminishing relative role of parental cultural capital in the intergenerational social mobility process, while the relative role of parental economic capital intensified.*

4. Research design

To test the derived hypotheses, I use data from the European Values Study (EVS) which is a large-scale cross-national survey project. Many countries of our interest, such as South Caucasian and Balkan states, appear only in the latest wave of EVS. About 1500 face-to-face interviews in each country were conducted in 2008-2009 using a representative, multi-stage or stratified random sample of the 18 and older adult population. The main analysis includes the following 24 post-communist societies in Central and Easter Europe and the South Caucasus: Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, FYR Macedonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Ukraine. The EVS did not collect data in the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia. For comparative reasons, in the main text and Appendix, I also present some of the effects of parental cultural and economic capital on individuals' life chances in the pooled sample of 20 non-communist European societies which are included in the EVS: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

The quality of the EVS is affirmed by its wide application in comparative social research (De Regt, Smits, & Mortelmans, 2012; Gugushvili, 2015a, 2016a, 2016b, 2017; Paskov & Dewilde, 2012; Stam, Verbakel, & De Graaf, 2012).[5] Overall, after list-wise deletion of missing data and the age restriction described in the methods' section 15,359 individuals remained for the multivariate analysis of post-communist societies. As shown in Table 1, most of the missing data come from social origins variables; however I do not employ the multiple imputation option to deal with data missingness mainly because it is at random and only a few control variables are

[5] For more information regarding the methodological approaches of EVS, consult the survey's official website (www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu).

used in the main analysis. In turn, descriptive statistics for Western European societies are presented in Table A.1 in Appendix.

4.1. Independent and dependent variables

Unlike the majority of studies that differentiate between intergenerational inequality in educational and occupational attainment, in this article I analyse both dimensions of stratification to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the determinants of life chances and to mitigate data availability constraints for cross-national comparative research of a large number of post-communist societies. Educational institutions can be considered as 'sorting machines' of stratification because they are the major contributors to a process that differentiates a society into strata (Kerckhoff, 2001), while labour market outcomes and related characteristics are the ultimate indicators of individuals' success in life (Goldthorpe, Llewellyn and Payne, 1980). Parental education can be considered as the cultural capital of the respondents and will be referred to in this way in our analysis. The EVS provides information on levels of completed education using the 1-digit International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). However, this variable is not completely comparable across countries as some independent national surveys lacked information on post-secondary non-tertiary (ISCED 4) and the second stage of tertiary (ISCED 6) education. This problem is mitigated by collapsing respondents' and parental education into primary (ISCED 0-2), secondary (ISCED 3-4) and tertiary (ISCED 5-6) levels.

The second most important characteristic of social origins is parental social class which can be considered as a proxy variable for the economic capital of respondents. In the EVS occupational structure was classified using the three-fold Erikson-Goldthorpe (EGP) social class scheme. The following EGP classes were used: Salariat class (EGP I/II), intermediate class (EGP IIIa/IV/V), and working class (EGP IIIb/VI/VII). The main concern with using the EGP social class scheme for describing social mobility during communism is that the restriction of private ownership makes the comparison of petty-bourgeois class (EGP IV) before and after transition problematic. However, the share of the EGP IV class is 6% for the parental generation. The EGP classification combines the group of small proprietors, with and without employees, and does not

necessarily imply private ownership of assets, at least in the minds of the respondents when they are asked to recall their parents and their own occupational groups. The private owners in the 1990s accounted for the highest proportion of growth in occupational structure relative to other occupational classes (Domański, 2000) which can be seen in Table 1 in the expansion of intermediate class from parents to their offspring generation. We can assume that the restriction of private ownership was characteristic of all post-communist societies, which can further mitigate the problem of the comparability of the petty-bourgeois class between pre- and post-transitional cohorts across the considered countries.

Table 1 near here

When the EGP social class serves as the dependent variable it refers to the current job of those respondents who were employed at the time of the interview, or the last job of those with some prior work experience. Respondents are asked about parental social class when they were around 14 years old, while for parental education the respondents' age is not fixed. For both parental education and social class, the dominance approach is used which means that if parents have different levels of education and types of occupation, the higher level educational or occupational position is selected (Erikson, 1984). Those respondents who come from disrupted families (e.g. being raised by grandparents or other relatives) are excluded from the analysis. Descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that post-communist societies experienced significant upgrades in educational and occupational attainment. If only 18% of parents were tertiary educated, this share increased up to 28% among respondents. For occupational structure, the share of salariat class increased significantly from the parental generation to the offspring generation, while the share of working class significantly decreased.

I also employ the supplementary measures of parental cultural and economic capital to further scrutinize the relative importance of parental cultural and economic capital for individuals' educational attainment and temporal changes in these associations by employing retrospective questions in the EVS that ask respondents at the time they were around 14 years old about their parents' propensity for reading ('my father liked to read books' and 'my mother liked to read books') and their parents' material wellbeing ('my parent(s) had problems making ends meet' and 'my parents had problems in replacing broken things'). The answers (from yes=1 to

no=4) were recoded, summed and standardised so that the higher values indicate greater cultural and economic capital with Cronbach's Alpha reliability scale equal to 0.61 and 0.80, respectively. As alternative measures of occupational and labour market outcomes I also employed the International Socio-Economic Index of occupational status (ISEI) (Ganzeboom & Treiman, 1996) and the experience of a continuous period of unemployment longer than 3 months in duration. The latter variable is important because unemployment became one of the most important social problems in post-communist transition (Gerber, 2012).

4.2. Methods

Conditioned by the type of dependent variable, I employ several alternative regression specifications to understand the effect of social origins on life chances. Ordered logistic regressions are used when the dependent variable is educational attainment, which is in line with the approach used by Breen et al. (2010) and Ballarino et al. (2009) who analysed educational inequalities and their trends across Western European societies. All models control for age, age squared, and country fixed effects. Robust standard errors are calculated but not shown. I also apply weights that correct for the representativeness of the national samples and are readily available within the data set. Controlling for other covariates, I enter into the regressions parental education, which is supplemented by parental social class in a follow-up model.

$$\text{Educational attainment}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Gender}_i + \beta_2 \text{Age}_i + \beta_3 \text{Country dummies}_i + \beta_4 \text{Parental education/cultural capital}_i + \beta_5 \text{Parental social class/economic capital}_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$_i$ in Model 1 indicates the individual respondents and ε_i represents the error term. I study changes to intergenerational inequality in educational attainment from the communist to the post-communist period by comparing the performance of cohorts born in 1958-1972 and 1973-1987. The oldest individuals born after 1972 had to make the transition to post-secondary education in 1989-1990, during the collapse of the communist system and at the age of 16-17. On the other hand, 1987 marks the birth year of the youngest members of the sample who were about to complete their educational trajectories at the age of 21 in 2008. Overall, those individuals who

were born in the 15-year period between 1973 and 1987 can be considered as belonging to the transitional cohort. To make the transitional results comparable with earlier trends, I select only those individuals born in the previous 15-year period between 1958 and 1972. Changes across time are detected by the interaction terms between cohort 1973-1987 and social origins variables. When the latter coefficients are statistically significant in Model 2, the life chances or, more specifically, the intergenerational educational inequality for those individuals born in 1973-1987 were affected.

$$\text{Educational attainment}_i = \widehat{\text{Model 1}} + \beta_6 \text{Transitional cohort}_i + \beta_7 \text{Parental education/cultural capital}_i * \text{Transitional cohort}_I + \beta_8 \text{Parental occupation/economic capital}_i * \text{Transitional cohort}_i \quad (2)$$

Researching occupation attainment with the employed data set is a more challenging task than analysing the links between social origins and the attainment of qualifications. Unlike education, which is typically completed when individuals are in their early twenties, labour market attainment is a longer-lasting and dynamic process and generally leads to the highest level of social position evidenced in a person's mid 30s (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2016). A comparison of individuals born between 1958 and 1972, aged 36-50, with individuals born between 1973 and 1987, aged 21-35, is problematic, even after controlling for the age variable. Therefore, this analysis only involves individuals aged 21-35 who are described as the transitional cohort. The dependent variables used in this section are attainment of salariat class (EGP I/II) and the avoidance of working class (EGP IIIb/VI/VII), which are analysed with the help of marginal effects after running multinomial logistic regression in Model 3. When the dependent variables are the attainment of ISEI status and experiencing long-term unemployment, I employ OLS and linear probability models, respectively.

$$\text{Destination social class/status/unemploy.}_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Gender}_i + \beta_2 \text{Age}_i + \beta_3 \text{Country dummies}_i + \beta_4 \text{Parental education}_i + \beta_5 \text{Parental occupation}_i + \beta_6 \text{Respondents' education} + \varepsilon_i \quad (3)$$

5. Results

5.1. Social origins and educational attainment

I start with the analysis of links between respondents' social origins and their educational attainment, which is followed by the findings with alternative social origins variables. In Models 1-3, Table 2, I study the sample without considering the effects of the transitional period – whether or not individuals experienced decisive educational attainment before or after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In terms of the importance of parental education for respondents' educational attainment, we can see that regression coefficients both for parental primary and tertiary education, are statistically significant, which is unaffected when parental social class in Model 3 is controlled for. Individuals coming from salariat class and working class have, respectively, higher and lower chances of educational attainment in comparison to individuals' with intermediate class origin. If we assume that McFadden's Pseudo R^2 is a proxy for the proportion of explained variance in the dependent variable, the model explains about 12% of variation in respondents' educational attainment when parental education is accounted for; but when only social class is controlled in the regression, Pseudo R^2 reaches only 0.09. The latter tentatively corroborates my hypothesis on the relative importance of parental cultural vs. economic capital for individuals' educational attainment.

Table 2 near here

The hypothesis regarding the effect of the transition on intergenerational inequality in educational attainment is tested by introducing a dummy variable for the transitional cohort, and its interaction terms with parental education and occupational social class. With this regression specification in Model 4, Table 2, coefficients for social origins refer to the communist period. The characteristics of Model 3, particularly in terms of parental education, are largely maintained for individuals born between 1958 and 1972, which suggests that there have not been radical changes in intergenerational social mobility patterns in post-communist societies. Still, the coefficients for social origins and their interactions with the transitional cohort indicate that intergenerational inequality in educational attainment has been affected in the following ways:

the interaction term between primary education and transitional cohort is statistically significant and has negative sign, which suggests that the disadvantage associated with low parental education intensified in post-communist societies. Nonetheless, the tertiary education-transitional cohort interaction coefficient indicates that the advantage of having parents with a high level of education was simultaneously reduced. Related trends are observed in relation to parental social class. In this case, the positive effect of salariat origin on individuals' educational attainment declined, but the negative effect of working class origin intensified. In other words, the gap between individuals from working and intermediate class origin widened during the transition. This is in line with existing evidence that indicates that the workers were in privileged conditions in the communist era but that their situation deteriorated thereafter (Eyal & Townsley, 1995; Szelenyi, 2002).

In contrast, by repeating the identical analysis for the pooled sample of other European societies in Table A.2, in Appendix, we see that the role of parental education declined for individuals' educational attainment in the considered period, while the effect of parental social class did not change. These results corroborate the findings by Breen et al. (2009) and Ballarino et al. (2009) for eight European countries without a communist history.

The hypothesis on the relative importance of parental cultural and economic capital for educational attainment is further tested by employing retrospective questions in the EVS that asked respondents about their parents' propensity for reading and their parents' material wellbeing. Mirroring the analysis reported above, I initially test the effect of parental cultural capital and its change over time, followed by an analysis of parental economic capital's association with respondents' educational attainment. The findings in Table 3 suggest that both regression coefficients from ordered logistic models and corresponding Pseudo R^2 are higher for parental cultural capital (β=0.644, Pseudo R^2=0.08) than for parental economic capital (β=0.343, Pseudo R^2=0.06). However, I cannot confirm that the effect of either form of parental capital changed during the post-communist period because the interaction terms between the transitional cohort and the social origins variables fall short of statistical significance. In Table A.3, Appendix, I also present the results from the logistic regressions on respondents' attainment of tertiary education which are in line with the described findings. Based on the presented analysis, I can conclude that there is a strong intergenerational reproduction of educational attainment in

post-communist societies and in this process parental cultural capital plays a more salient role than parental economic capital.

Table 3 near here

5.2. Social origins and destination social class

The effect of social origins on the attainment of the service class and the avoidance of working class positions is tested in Figure 3. The major difference from the analysis in the previous sub-section is that now the pooled sample is constrained to individuals aged 21-35. To test the relative importance of parental cultural vs. economic capital, post-communist societies are also explicitly compared with trends in the pooled sample of other European countries. Here, I calculate the marginal effects after multinomial regression models to observe how social origins are linked to individuals' propensity to enter salariat class and avoid employment in working class. Following Kastellec and Leoni's (2007) recommendation, the results the latter exercise are presented graphically in Figure 3. When I only include social origins variables in regressions, the results (not shown) again indicate a relatively strong influence of parental cultural capital in post-communist countries. For instance, having parents with primary and tertiary education is associated with 16% and 4% lower and higher chances of respondents' attaining salariat class, respectively, while in the comparable Western European sample the same effect is 11% and 2%.

Figure 3 near here

Figures 3a and 3b show the effect of social origins variables when multinomial logistic models also control for respondents' own educational attainment. Obviously, the latter is a strong predictor of occupational outcomes and it more than doubles the value of Pseudo R^2. In line with our expectation, the respondents' education has stronger effects on their destination in post-communist societies, where primary and tertiary education (in comparison to secondary) lead to 23% and 34% lower and higher chances of attaining salariat class, respectively, while the same

effect is 16% and 31% in other European countries. Substantively important findings are the marginal effects of social origins after controlling for the respondents' level of education. The differences between the former communist and other European societies become less pronounced in this case, but parental education has a marginally stronger effect in post-communist countries; social origin from the salariat class secures a 7.6% higher chance of entering a service class occupation in Western Europe, while the same effect is slightly lower in post-communist countries at 7.1%.

In order to further test the relevance of social origins for occupational outcomes, in Table 4 I demonstrate how parental characteristics associate with respondents' ISEI scores and their experience of long-term unemployment. For both analyses I account for the effect of respondents' own educational attainment in addition to the inclusion of country fixed effects and controlling for respondents' gender, age and age squared. Models 1 and 2 suggest that, based on the size of regression coefficients, in countries with a communist history education plays a more salient role in the attainment of occupational status than in other European societies. Finally, in the empirical analysis in Models 3 and 4 a dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the respondents experienced unemployment longer than 3 month across their lifetimes. The results suggest that respondents' own educational attainment is strongly correlated with the likelihood of long-term unemployment both in Eastern and Western European societies; however from the social origins variables, parental education only explains respondents' propensity to be unemployed in post-communist societies. To summarise, the presented results suggest that there is a strong effect of social origins on destination social class and individuals' other occupational outcomes in post-communist countries, while parental cultural capital remains a more significant factor in the social stratification process than parental economic capital when compared with the pooled sample of other European societies.

Table 4 near here

6. Conclusions and discussion

In this article I have attempted to account for developments in post-communist intergenerational social mobility regimes. Previous fragmented empirical studies reveal the growing role of social origins in individual life chances in separate countries but there is little supporting evidence of common intergenerational social mobility trends across the broader post-communist region. I hypothesised that intergenerational links to educational and occupational attainment would increase in the post-communist era. In addition, based on previous studies, I elaborated on specific expectations for two types of parental capital. Unlike Western Europe, strict egalitarian policies in communist societies prevented people from acquiring and transferring material resources to offspring, forcing individuals to divert their attention to socially-distinctive reproductive behaviour for the accumulation of cultural capital. This specific characteristic of a communist intergenerational social mobility has been confirmed in numerous studies, but less is known about how the salience of parental cultural and economic capital changed in the post-communist period. I hypothesised that an overall decline in material wellbeing and higher income inequality would increase the importance of parental economic capital, whereas the relative role of cultural capital in offspring's life chances would decline.

Using the EVS data set and multivariate statistical techniques, I found a strong reproduction of educational attainment from one generation to the next. The derived results once again confirm that communist policies, alone and as a whole, did not eliminate the effect of social origins on individual educational and occupational attainment. When it comes to specific hypotheses on the role of cultural vs. economic capital, my findings indicate that parental education, as opposed to occupation, played a more salient role in social mobility. The results also suggest that parental education is equally important as parental social class in shaping destination social class of respondents aged 21-35 in 2008. The output from regression models suggest that for those born between 1972 and 1987 – the transitional cohort – the salience of social origins was not significantly and systematically affected. However, more detailed analysis suggests that the disadvantage associated with low parental education and working class origin intensified, while the advantage of having parents with a high level of education and salariat class declined. Furthermore, the analysis of alternative variables on the parents' reading behaviour and their material conditions did not reveal an increasing effect of either aspect of social origins during transition. The latter analysis, however, confirmed the dominance of parental cultural capital over economic assets for offspring's educational attainment.

After summarising the findings, it is also important to consider the caveats associated with the presented analysis. One of the concerns for the study of trends in post-communist stratification is the sample selection problem. This is important because the presented analysis of intergenerational social mobility is based on respondents' retrospective answers about their social origins and educational and occupational attainment. Due to emigration some of those countries lost as much as one-fifth of their populations since the 1990s (Mansoor & Quillin, 2006). Therefore, retrospective questions could miss social mobility information from emigrated residents of a particular country. If migrants possessed distinct patterns of social mobility before emigration, the results of the retrospective datasets might be biased. Having a limited number of observations in separate countries is a reason why the current study neither focused on specific post-communist countries nor on trends in intergenerational social mobility separately during the first few years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the later developments in the transitional period (Yastrebov, 2016). Moreover, the employed statistical models controlled for individuals' sex, but gender was not a primary focus of the present analysis. The differences between men and women could be particularly important because post-communist societies were relatively successful in achieving the emancipation of women in many aspects of socioeconomic life and it is not clear how the political and economic transition was reflected in intergenerational social mobility across gender. In future studies it would also be interesting to test how social origins affect school-to-work transitions (see Buchmann & Solga, 2016), which was not possible with the employed data set.

Keeping in mind the limitations of the study, I do not observe radical changes in intergenerational social mobility from pre- to post-transitional cohorts. These findings cast doubt on the predictions of market transition theory on increased social fluidity and advancement opportunities (Hayek, 1960; Nee, 1989) as well as on the perspectives such as 'market versus meritocracy' on declining levels of social fluidity (Bukodi & Goldthorpe, 2010; Jackson & Evans, 2017), but rather support the notion of path dependency in social mobility in post-communist societies (Hout & DiPrete, 2006; Szelenyi, 2002; Verhoeven et al., 2008). It is reasonable to assume that the presented differences in intergenerational links between parental and offspring's educational and social class attainment across post-communist countries, shown in Figure 1, resulted from historical discrepancies in the communist period by the end of the 1980s rather than the consequences of idiosyncratic developments in post-communist transition.

Arguably, the Soviet Union's more ambitious de-stratification policies led to higher mobility rates which path-dependently shape intergenerational social mobility today in these societies. In fact, the recent findings reveal that the legacy of the Soviet Union is one of the most important explanations of variance in intergenerational social mobility in post-communist countries even after other macro-sociological characteristics are accounted for (Gugushvili, 2017).

In addition to the historical trend of higher social mobility rates in the Soviet Union and its successive republics, it is also possible that non-democratic societies in general provide higher mobility opportunities because authoritarian rulers, just as democratically-elected leaders, need legitimacy from their own constituencies (Schatz, 2006). One intriguing hypothesis could be that high levels of social mobility may facilitate the stability of the regime through middle- or lower-class behaviour (Gugushvili, 2014). For instance, it has been demonstrated that in the politically-restrictive Chinese system respondents express fairly positive views about opportunities for upward mobility (Whyte, 2010). Opportunities for upward mobility give the lower classes weaker incentives to support democratic transition (Leventoglu, 2013). In this scenario, the existing regime could try to sustain the autocracy by providing the lower classes with more opportunities for social mobility, which in turn makes it less likely that they will support democratic transition. The latter could be relevant during the demise of the communist regimes and can partially explain the emergence and sustainability of the authoritarian but socially-mobile newly-independent states of the former Soviet Union.

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Figures

Figure 1:
Links between parents' and children's education and social class, regression coefficients from country-level linear probability models



Note: Bars show 95% confidence intervals. All associations are statistically significant at 0.05 level or higher. Models do not control for any covariates, weights applied. *Source:* Author's calculations based on data from the EVS (2010).

Figure 2:
Social origins, education and destination triangle and transitional shock



Source: Author's interpretation.

Figure 3:
Respondents' destination social class conditional to social origins, marginal effects from multinomial logit regressions, the cohort born in 1973-1987



Notes: Bars show 95% confidence intervals. Models control for country fixed effects, respondents' age, age^2 and gender, weights applied. Reference categories are secondary education and intermediate class.
Source: Author's calculations based on data from the EVS (2010).

Table 1:
Summary statistics for dependent, independent and control variables

	Parents		Respondents	
	N	% / mean (SD)	N	% / mean (SD)
Education				
Primary	6,779	34.3	2,655	12.8
Secondary	9,483	48.0	12,277	59.0
Tertiary	3,483	17.6	5,895	28.3
Total	*19,745*	*100.0*	*20,827*	*100.0*
Social class				
Salariat	4,148	25.3	5,773	34.4
Intermediate	2,290	14.0	3,219	19.2
Working	9,947	60.7	7,796	46.4
Total	*16,385*	*100.0*	*16,788*	*100.0*
Further origins and destination variables				
Cultural capital (metric 2-8)	16,642	4.9 (2.0)	—	—
Material wellbeing (metric 2-8)	17,914	5.5 (2.0)	—	—
ISEI (metric 16-90)	—	—	16,073	43.4 (16.4)
Job satisfaction (metric 1-10)	—	—	12,818	7.1 (2.3)
Control variables				
Females	—	—	10,549	50.3
Males	—	—	10,411	49.7
Age (21-50)	—	—	20,249	35.0 (8.8)

Source: Author's calculation based on data from the EVS (2010).

Table 2:
Respondents' educational attainment conditional to social origins, coefficients from ordered logistic regressions, the cohorts born in 1957-1972 and 1973-1987

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Parental education				
Primary	–1.314***	——	–1.221***	–1.113***
Secondary	[Ref.]		[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Tertiary	1.215***	——	0.890***	1.034***
Parental social class				
Salariat	——	0.976***	0.425***	0.624***
Intermediate	——	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Working class		–0.361***	–0.183***	0.006
Transitional cohort	——	——	——	0.508***
Cohort – social origins interactions				
Transitional cohort * Primary	——	——	——	–0.243**
Transitional cohort * Tertiary	——	——	——	–0.232*
Transitional cohort * Salariat	——	——	——	–0.355**
Transitional cohort * Working class	——	——	——	–0.347**
Cutting points				
α_1	–0.244	–0.087	–0.284	0.191
α_2	3.233***	3.189***	3.219***	3.698***
Number of observations	15,359	15,359	15,359	15,359
Pseudo R^2	0.124	0.088	0.129	0.130

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Robust standard errors are calculated, not shown. Models control for country fixed effects, respondents' age, age^2 and gender, weights applied. *Source:* Author's calculations based on data from the EVS (2010).

Table 3:

Respondents' educational attainment conditional to parental cultural capital and material deprivation, coefficients from ordered logistic regressions, the cohorts born in 1957-1972 and 1973-1987

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Social origins				
Cultural capital	0.644***	—	0.618***	0.601***
Material wellbeing	—	0.343***	0.303***	0.313***
Transitional cohort	—	—	—	0.103
Cohort – social origins interactions				
Transitional cohort * cultural capital	—	—	—	0.034
Transitional cohort * mat. wellbeing	—	—	—	–0.019
Cutting points				
α_1	–0.725*	–1.021**	–0.875**	–0.662
α_2	2.566***	2.177***	2.463***	2.676***
Number of observations	13,324	13,324	13,324	13,324
Pseudo R^2	0.078	0.059	0.087	0.087

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Robust standard errors are calculated, not shown. Models control for country fixed effects, respondents' age, age^2 and gender, weights applied. *Source:* Author's calculations based on data from the EVS (2010).

Table 4:
Respondents' attainment of ISEI scores and experiencing unemployment longer than 3 months conditional to social origins and own educational attainment, point estimates from OLS regressions, the cohort born in 1973-1987

	ISEI Score		Long-term unemployment	
	Post-socialist	Other European	Post-socialist	Other European
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Social origins				
Parental education				
Primary	–2.279***	–1.421**	0.003	–0.002
Secondary	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Tertiary	1.857***	0.559	–0.044**	0.013
Parental social class				
Salariat	3.549***	2.492***	–0.008	–0.016
Intermediate	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Working	0.404	–1.284**	0.022	0.021
Respondents' education				
Primary	–7.042***	–7.233***	0.099***	0.117***
Secondary	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Tertiary	15.914***	13.720***	–0.078***	–0.055***
Intercept	27.855**	–2.379	0.502*	0.547*
N of observations	5,881	4,490	7,629	4,966
Adjusted R^2	0.359	0.336	0.167	0.060

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Robust standard errors are calculated, not shown. Models control for country fixed effects, respondents' age, age^2 and gender, weights applied. *Source:* Author's calculations based on data from the EVS (2010).

Appendix

Table A.1:
Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables in Western European societies

	Parents		Respondents	
	N	% / mean (SD)	N	% / mean (SD)
Education				
Primary	7,143	52.3	3,547	23.6
Secondary	4,262	31.2	6,799	45.3
Tertiary	2,267	16.6	4,663	31.1
Total	*13,672*	*100.0*	*15,009*	*100.0*
Social class				
Salariat	5,393	39.0	3,600	27.5
Intermediate	2,953	21.3	3,753	28.7
Working	5,490	39.7	5,724	43.8
Total	*13,835*	*100.0*	*16,788*	*100.0*
Further origins and destination variables				
Cultural capital (metric 2-8)	11,424	4.9 (2.0)	—	—
Material wellbeing (metric 2-8)	11,919	6.2 (2.0)	—	—
ISEI (metric 16-90)	—	—	12,633	44.3 (16.3)
Job satisfaction (metric 1-10)	—	—	10,468	7.6 (1.9)
Control variables				
Females	—	—	7,477	49.4
Males	—	—	7,648	50.6
Age (21-50)	—	—	13,885	35.9 (8.5)

Source: Author's calculation based on data from the EVS (2010).

Table A.2:

Respondents' educational attainment conditional to social origins in Western European societies, coefficients from ordered logistic regressions, the cohorts born in 1957-1972 and 1973-1987

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Parental education				
Primary	–1.022***	——	–0.883***	–3.578***
Secondary	[Ref.]		[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Tertiary	0.995***	——	0.605***	0.789***
Parental social class				
Salariat	——	0.954***	0.463***	0.477***
Intermediate	——	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Working class		–0.528***	–0.430***	–0.467***
Transitional cohort	——	——	——	0.082
Cohort – social origins interactions				
Transitional cohort * Primary	——	——	——	0.458***
Transitional cohort * Tertiary	——	——	——	–0.283*
Transitional cohort * Salariat	——	——	——	0.030
Transitional cohort * Working class	——	——	——	0.078
Cutting points				
α_1	1.248***	0.962**	1.146**	1.535***
α_2	3.631***	3.301***	3.578***	3.979***
Number of observations	11265	11,265	11,265	11,265
Pseudo R^2	0.115	0.093	0.117	0.121

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Robust standard errors are calculated, not shown. Models control for country fixed effects, respondents' age, age^2 and gender, weights applied. *Source:* Author's calculations based on data from the EVS (2010).

Table A.3:
Respondents' attainment of tertiary education conditional to social origins, coefficients from logistic regressions, the cohorts born in 1957-1972 and 1973-1987

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Parental education				
Primary	–0.167***	——	–0.146***	–0.134***
Secondary	[Ref.]		[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Tertiary	0.285***	——	0.215***	0.247***
Parental social class				
Salariat	——	0.196***	0.078***	0.114***
Intermediate	——	[Ref.]	[Ref.]	[Ref.]
Working class		–0.084***	–0.050***	–0.026
Transitional cohort	——	——	——	0.105***
Cohort – social origins interactions				
Transitional cohort * Primary	——	——	——	–0.019
Transitional cohort * Tertiary	——	——	——	–0.050
Transitional cohort * Salariat	——	——	——	–0.064*
Transitional cohort * Working class	——	——	——	–0.045*
Intercept	–0.177**	–0.130*	–0.159*	–0.286***
Number of observations	15,359	15,359	15,359	15,359
Pseudo R^2	0.165	0.132	0.174	0.176

Notes: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Robust standard errors are calculated, not shown. Models control for country fixed effects, respondents' age, age^2 and gender, weights applied. *Source:* Author's calculations based on data from EVS (2010).