MUSICAL THOUGHT AND THE EARLY GERMAN REFORMATION

Patrick Edward Gilday

Jesus College

University of Oxford

Doctor of Philosophy in Music

Trinity Term 2011

For Lydia

Et huic licet editioni, eo quod ardua sit, tum theologiam, tum philosophiam, tum poesim concernens, ingenium cantoris impar agnoscas, haud me vitii praesumptionis profecto accusabis si non ignores in ardua tendere proprium esse virtutis.

– TINCTORIS, *Complexus effectuum musices*

CONTENTS

ABBREVIATIONS

22Ps	M. LUTHER, *Luther's Complete Commentary on the First Twenty-Two Psalms*, trans. H.P. Cole, 2 vols. (London: Simpkin & Marshall, 1826).
AfMf	*Archiv für Musikforschung*
AfMw	*Archiv für Musikwissenschaft*
CM	*Current Musicology*
EMH	*Early Music History*
Fs.	Festschrift
HTR	*The Harvard Theological Review*
JAAC	*Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*
JAMS	*Journal of the American Musicological Society*
JEH	*Journal of Ecclesiastical History*
JHI	*Journal of the History of Ideas*
JM	*Journal of Musicology*
JR	*The Journal of Religion*
JRME	*Journal of Research in Music Education*
L-Jb	*Luther-Jahrbuch*
LLM	R.A. LEAVER, *Luther's Liturgical Music: Principles and Implications* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2007)
LQ	*The Lutheran Quarterly*
LW	*Luther's Works: American Edition*, 56 vols, (St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1955–68)
MD	*Musica Disciplina*

Mf	*Die Musikforschung*
MGG	*Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Allgemeine Enzyklopädie der Musik*, ed. Friedrich Blume, 17 vols. (Kassel & London: Bärenreiter, 1949–1986)
MGG II	*Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart: Allgemeine Enzyklopädie der Musik*, 2nd ed. Ludwig Finscher, 19+7 vols. (Kassel: Bärenreiter and Stuttgart: Metzler, 1994–2008)
ML	*Music & Letters*
MQ	*The Musical Quarterly*
MTS	*Music Theory Spectrum*
New Grove 2	*The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 2nd ed., ed. S. Sadie and J. Tyrrell, 29 vols. (New York: Grove, 2001)
NLH	*New Literary History*
RISM	*Répertoire International des Sources Musicales*
RQ	*Renaissance Quarterly*
SCH	*Studies in Church History*
SCJ	*The Sixteenth Century Journal*
UP	University Press
WA	*D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, 67+2 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883–2009)
WA BR	*D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Briefwechsel*, 18 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1930–85).
WA TR	*D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Tischreden*, 6 vols. (Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1912–21)

States of the United States are referred to using standard Postal Service abbreviations.

Library sigla follow the conventions of RISM.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

Tables

NOTE TO THE READER

Musical Thought

In both the title and what follows in this dissertation, I have referred consistently to the category of 'musical thought'. This category, first explored in detail by Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht ('Musikalisches Denken', *AfMw*, XXXII (1975), 228–40), is distinguished from the narrower category of 'music theory' (Germ.: *Musiktheorie*). The latter might be described as thought about music's *internal* workings; whereas the former is broader, encompassing not just music's grammar and indigenous systems of thought, but also those interactions with other realms of thought by which *musica*'s own parameters are defined and justified. As a category, musical thought includes aesthetic evaluation, philosophical and theological judgements, as well as the rudiments of music: it is the background process by which music comes to make sense 'as another manifestation of the patterns for perceiving and imposing order on the phenomenal world' (S.B. Hoffmann, 'Epistemology and Music: A Javanese Example', *Ethnomusicology*, XXII (1978), 69). Studying 'musical thought', rather than simply 'music theory' or 'musical discourse' in sixteenth-century Germany is instructive, because it allows a wealth of so-called non-musical literature to contribute to the formation of our understanding of a Reformation-era musical epistemology. Those non-musical discussions about music, as we shall see, amend and nuance the understanding of music's conceptual development we have already gained from music treatises. For a thorough introduction to the category of musical thought, see esp. M. Haas, *Musikalisches Denken im Mittelalter: Eine Einführung*, pp. 1–6.

Copyright and Conventions

Where they appear in English, the scripture quotations contained herein are from *The New Revised Standard Version* of the Bible, Anglicized Edition. Images of early prints are from the digital collections of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, and ownership and copyright of the images belongs to the BSB.

For the reader's convenience, page references to Listenius' *Musica* are to the edition made at Nuremberg: Petreius, 1549, reproduced in facs. ed. by Georg Schünemann (Berlin: Breslauer, 1927).

Transcriptions of early printed texts have followed standard conventions, with the following exceptions. Line breaks have been notated using the double-strike (‖) rather than the older, and potentially confusing single-strike (/), which is used in early modern German texts as the comma mark (I have always transcribed a comma with the modern mark). I have generally retained original spellings, except where, in German texts, the printers have used 'u' and 'v' interchangeably, in which case the modern usage has been preferred.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writing of a doctoral dissertation is almost sacramental for a young academic—only the outward visible sign of an inward intellectual development (though no less a baptism by fire for it). I have received invaluable assistance from many individuals, both during the 'hot' periods of library research, presentation of findings, discussions and (eventually) the process of writing, as well as during the 'colder' periods of reflection and mental digestion. The stamina required for both is exhausting not only for the protagonist but also for those who support him, and I owe a

great debt of gratitude to those who have borne with me and encouraged me throughout the years when every conversation somehow turned back to sixteenth-century Germany, and to how agonizingly conflicted about it musicological scholarship has become.

My supervisor, Owen Rees, has been a paragon of virtue towards an errant graduate student throughout four and a half years of research. Combining grace and firmness with humour and incisiveness, he has afforded me almost boundless scope to pursue a rather unorthodox programme of research, whilst never allowing me to get carried away into flights of intellectual fancy. He has become a wise counsel and respected friend.

It was my undergraduate tutor, John Caldwell, who first introduced me to early Lutheran music theory. His resolute pursuit of precision and healthy scepticism towards the worst excesses of 'New Musicology' were an unparalleled preparation for the rigours of academic life, whilst his love and deep knowledge of late mediæval musical thought was infectious.

A chance conversation with Reinhard Strohm about *ad placitum* voices in early modern German sources led to his posing the question (what is *musica poetica*?) that initiated this study. Very early on in my studies, it became clear that another question was just as relevant (what is *musica poetica* not?), which could not have been answered without the grounding in modern historiographical methods taught in Reinhard's Historiography of Music seminar. Another chance conversation, this time with a group of students to whom I acted as tutor for his undergraduate course 'Rhetoric and Passion in Baroque Music', drew out for me the problems with Dietrich Bartel's book, which in turn became the impetus for the research presented in Chapter I.

The multifaceted approach necessitated by such an oddly-shaped study as this has afforded me the pleasure of working with colleagues in a number of different disciplines. I am grateful to David Cram and Paul Hedley in Linguistics, as well as to Andrew and Elisabeth Goddard in Theology, and Felicity Heal in Reformation History. In my own discipline of musicology,

countless early, middle and late career academics have offered guidance and encouragement, and answered and asked pertinent questions—the sort of help that a graduate student treasures. In particular, I am grateful to Suzanne Aspden, Abigail Ballantyne, Bonnie Blackburn, Joanna Bullivant, Catherine Bradley, Katherine Butler, Sean Curran, Tom Czepiel, Lawrence Dreyfus, Barbara Eichner, Joyce Irwin, Martin Ham, Julian Johnson, Lawrence Kramer, Liz Leach, Grantley McDonald, Cathie Miserandino, Guy Newbury, Mark Peters, Markus Rathey, Stephen Rice, Ben Skipp, Reinhard Strohm, Peter Ward Jones and Bennett Zon. Grantley McDonald generously supplied me with a copy of his PhD thesis, in my view a hidden jewel of recent musicological scholarship. General help and advice was provided during the later stages of writing by Victoria and Paul Thomas, Dan Christian, Sheila Girling Macadam, the staff at Wycliffe Hall, Oxford, and by my parents and parents-in-law.

Numerous libraries across Germany gave me the opportunity to view much under-studied musical manuscripts, early music prints, and religious books, receiving me with the sort of enthusiasm that transformed dreary homesickness into academic adventure. I am especially grateful to Sabine Kurth at the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Irene Friedl at the Universitätsbibliothek München, Jean Christophe Prümm and Katrin Böhme at the Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Christine Sawatzki at the Sächsische Landesbibliothek, Christoph Mackert at the Universitätsbibliothek Leipzig, Gregor Hermann at the Ratsschulbibliothek Zwickau, Annette Geisler at the Stadtarchiv Heilbronn, Sigrid Kohlmann at the Universitätsbiblithek Erlangen, and Raymond Dittrich at the Proske Collection of the Bischöfliche Zentralbibliothek zu Regensburg. Funding for the tour of these collections, as well as for the project of research as a whole, was given by the Arts and Humanities Research Council.

No doctoral student is ever an island, and it helps to be married to another one. From the start of this project, when we had only just met, to the final submission, Lydia has had to live not just with me but with Luther, Cochlaeus, Wimpina, Witzel, Eck and countless twentieth-century

musicologists occupying my attention. She now knows more about the discipline of musicology and the Oxford Faculty of Music than any supramolecular chemist should, and has supported me through the lows and highs of this long journey with acts of unspoken kindness that have sustained me throughout. To her this dissertation is dedicated, with love and gratitude.

INTRODUCTION

In the late 1990s, the German musicologist Heinz von Loesch commenced a study which he provisionally entitled 'Die Geburt des Werkbegriffs aus dem Geiste des Protestantismus'. The research was subsequently submitted as his *Habilitationsschrift* (1999), and then published as the inaugural volume in the series *Studien zur Geschichte der Musiktheorie*.[1] The author described his initial intention for the research to undertake 'a study into the striking phenomenon that the first explicit expression of the musical work-concept... stemmed from the intimate circle of the Wittenberg Reformers, and for the most part, even if not exclusively, remained limited to the northern German Protestant areas'.[2] Evidently, however, von Loesch found his prior expectation that the rise of a musical work-concept was a manifestation of the spirit of Protestantism to be irreconcilable with the evidence presented in German music theory textbooks of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: 'Closer examination of Protestant doctrines and the treatises on *musica poetica*... made it plain that a relationship of the type expected between work-concept and Protestantism emphatically did not exist'.[3]

The premise of von Loesch's original hypothesis was that Protestantism begat the musical work-concept. Whatever its historical veracity, his hypothesis rested on a philosophical

[1] H. von LOESCH, *Der Werkbegriff in der protestantischen Musiktheorie des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Ein Mißverständnis*. Full details of this and of all works cited in short form can be found in the Bibliography.
[2] Ibid., p. 1.
[3] Ibid., p. 2.

assumption: that theological doctrines could be the ultimate source of music-aesthetic concepts—that ideas forged in the crucible of one discourse could, by means of mental 'migration', be transformed to have functional valency in another discourse altogether. In von Loesch's case, the presumption was that a new Lutheran theology of work, in which output was prioritized and moralized, was reimagined in aesthetic thought to produce the concept of the artwork, the chief moral and ideal 'end' of artistic endeavour.

Reformation Theology and Aesthetic Concepts

The assumption that musical aesthetics represents a microcosmic, idealist outworking of a macrocosmic, theological or philosophical system can be traced back at least as far as Hegel, who also happened to be the most forthright proponent of the idea that the ultimate purpose of the artwork was to convey truth.[4] Hegel's truth-in-art concept, and its supposition in autonomous forms, came to function as the central idea of Western musical aesthetics; in spite of many spirited attempts in recent decades to deprivilege it, it continues to exert a powerful influence upon musicological research. The idea that a musical work conveys the truth of a composer's intention remains, for example, the basis upon which any music-hermeneutical analysis is built; the idea that timeless form can speak universal truths to us today without the need for historical mediation is the bedrock of both the historical authenticity movement and the appeals to 'presentism' that apparently contradict it.

The persistence of a 'high' Hegelian concept of the artwork-as-truth throughout modern and even postmodern discourse might seem to suggest that it is a philosophical universal. But, excepting a few aestheticians,[5] it is widely agreed that the musical work-concept belongs within specific discourses conditioned by specific historical contingencies, and that it is constantly both

[4] G.W.F. HEGEL, *Phän. d. Geistes*, 701.

[5] For example, Nicholas Wolterstorff (e.g. his *Works and World of Art*). Wolterstorff narrows his category of the artwork so that he is able to regard it a philosophical universal only instantiated in the art of modernity.

formed by and formative of the particular instantiations in which it is recognized. The category of the musical artwork, noted Carl Dahlhaus, is central to the musical aesthetics of modernity; its presence in other epochs is marginal or flimsy by comparison.[6] It is now a commonplace to describe the musical work-concept as something indigenous to the narrative of modernity: abstraction, the Absolute and the autonomy of art all belong in modern discourse in a way that they do not belong outside it. Indeed, some have even gone so far as to suggest that the very systematic study of art, complete with categories and concepts and the ideology of a universal aesthetic, are myths belonging to modernity and its own self-explanation.[7]

The identification of the musical work-concept as the nucleus, or centre of gravity (*systematische Mitte*[8]), in a modern musical aesthetic system has inevitably led to its ontology and historical evolution becoming important focal-points for self-declaredly 'modern' musicologists. Exactly how the musical work-concept arose, and what its ultimate sources were, have been questions fundamental to German musicological enterprise since at least the mid-twentieth century.

The obvious place in which to search for the aesthetic 'beginning' of a modern musical aesthetic, and consequently the obvious soil in which to dig to find the roots of the musical work-concept, is the sixteenth century. Long considered to be the pivot between the Middle Ages (*Mittelalter*) and modernity (*Neuzeit*), the sixteenth century witnessed a number of decisive social and intellectual upheavals that might legitimately be credited with instigating a new epoch. Reformation and Renaissance together confessionalized Europe, inspired political realignments,

[6] At the most restrictive end of the spectrum, L. GOEHR, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, and C. DAHLHAUS, 'Musikwissenschaft und systematische Musikwissenschaft', propose that the work-concept becomes regulative only around 1800, even though it begins to be discussed in the Middle Ages; at the most conservative end, R. STROHM, '"Opus": An Aspect of the Early History of the Musical Work-Concept', notes that Tinctoris suggests that the compositions of the *ars nova* ought to be considered as works. But even Strohm links this new work focus to humanism, which since Eugenio Garin's *Italian Humanism* (1965) has been considered the first context for the exploration of a 'modern' consciousness.

[7] E.g. B. HEILE, *The Modernist Legacy*, p. 23.

[8] DAHLHAUS, 'Musikwissenschaft und systematische Musikwissenschaft', p. 38.

dramatically altered the concept of education, deprivileged the intellectual elitism of monastic universities, and even altered the meaning of history itself.[9] The best-intentioned humanist support of rhetorical education ended up only furthering the divisions, as rhetoric became a weapon in the Reformation battle for Europe's souls.[10] The mediæval authority of the pope and his bishops came tumbling down simply on the basis that, once a critical mass of individuals had rejected it, it was no longer tenable on account of its universality. The Reformers argued for a profound internalization and individualization of religious devotion that mirrored the classicist humanists' promotion of the dignity of man as an individual creature.[11] The sheer force of the Renaissance and the Reformation upon the experiences and thought of Western Europeans is considered so great that the magnitude of the epistemic earthquake they effected is often taken for granted. But, to borrow the evocative phrase of one literary historian, the whole world was 'turned upside down' by the events of the sixteenth century.[12]

The historical-philosophical consequence of all this revolution, reasoned countless historians after Hegel and Burckhardt, was an irrevocable shift in the way in which all of life was conceptualized and rationalized. The sixteenth century is conventionally considered 'early modernity' (*frühe Neuzeit*), a designation that presupposes its epochal distinction from the late Middle Ages. Cultural historians have noted that this epistemological shift (which has been placed as early as *c.*1450, and as late as 1585),[13] was apparently replicated in a corresponding shift in the structure of aesthetic paradigms. The rise of the Renaissance and the end of the Middle

[9] On this last development, see R. KOSELLECK, *Futures Past*, esp. pp. 6–8.

[10] This fact was recognized, and lamented, very early on: Montaigne noted (in his essay *De L'Expérience* [1588]) that the Reformation could be viewed as an argument about the meaning of words; Jean Bodin (in his *Heptaplomeres* of the same year) proposed that if only the protagonists had had a better humanistic education, the Reformation might never have occurred.

[11] See D. WENDEBOURG, 'Luther on Monasticism', pp. 340–47, for a discussion of the way in which Luther's anti-monastic theology aided the individualization and internalization of religious *habitus*, effectively universalizing the monastic experience.

[12] E.R. CURTIUS, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, London, 1953, pp. 94–8; cit. R.W. SCRIBNER, 'Reformation, Carnival and the World Turned Upside Down', 326.

[13] The earlier date is the more normal: see e.g. J. KMETZ, 'Preface' to his ed. vol. *Music in the German Renaissance*, p. xiii; the later is taken from Thomas Washington's translation of Nicolas de Nicolay's *Navigations, Peregrinations and Voyages*, in which 'modern' ideas are first discussed in opposition to the 'ancients' and the mediævals.

Ages brought about a complete reimagining of the way in which art served human endeavour.[14] With this reimagining came new paradigms: the concepts of originality, *imitatio*, *ingenium*, the dignity of composition and forms, and—above all—the artwork as independent instantiation of all these ideas.[15]

The search for the music-aesthetic shadows cast by the epochal shift from Middle Ages to early modernity has long been a focus of musicological attention.[16] Dahlhaus' central category, the musical work-concept, has been the focus of especial scrutiny. Dahlhaus, Walter Wiora, and Wilhelm Seidel all produced studies on the evolution of the musical work-concept in sixteenth-century aesthetic discourse,[17] and Hermann Zenck began a tradition (that virtually everyone else followed) of noting that the appearance of the terms *opus* (Lat., 'work') and *musica poetica* (from Gk., i.e. 'composition') in the earliest reformed German music theory textbook appears to link the rise of a modern musical aesthetic to the humanistic tendencies of the Wittenberg Reformers themselves.[18] By the time of von Loesch's *Habilitation* research, the conventional wisdom dictated that the musical work-concept was born in the sixteenth century, and that its parentage was an odd combination of humanism and Reformation theology.

For this reason, von Loesch began his study convinced that his hypothesis was supported by the two previous generations of German musicologists. This was perhaps a simplification of matters, since none of the authors whom von Loesch cited in his description of the musicological prevailing wisdom about the birth of the musical work-concept explicitly supported the

[14] This reimagining is a constant trope of studies of Renaissance art; for but one splendid discussion, see J.L. KOERNER, *The Moment of Self-Portraiture in German Renaissance Art*, esp. pp. 34–51. I use the term 'Renaissance' here and elsewhere to denote the ideas, people and places which shared an ideology of 'rebirth'. I do not mean to imply or lend credence to a broader 'period', identified by some with the years *c.*1300–1600.

[15] We shall investigate the musical work-concept in greater detail below. Of import here is E.E. LOWINSKY, 'Musical Genius—Evolution and Origins of a Concept'.

[16] Consider esp. DAHLHAUS, 'Epochen und Epochenbewusstsein in der Musikgeschichte'.

[17] DAHLHAUS, 'Musikwissenschaft und systematische Musikwissenschaft'; W. WIORA, 'Musica poetica und musikalisches Kunstwerk'; W. SEIDEL, *Werk und Werkbegriff in der Musikgeschichte*.

[18] In H. ZENCK, 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung'.

hypothesis as he presented it.[19] But the very fact that he began his study giving such credence to such a supposedly prevalent view points to the reality of its currency in late twentieth-century German musicology, irrespective of whether anyone had enunciated it.

Von Loesch's work was reactive to that of other scholars' interests. His original hypothesis therefore accepted a number of propositions as if they were *a priori* facts: (1) the musical work-concept represents the core component of a modern musical aesthetic; (2) it is indigenous to it; and (3) the sixteenth century Reformation was the point of the modern aesthetic's origination.

Von Loesch's conclusion—that there was no 'prompt' for the aesthetic category of the musical work-concept in the theology of the German Reformers—was a syllogistic one, based upon these *a priori* propositions. It was identical to his original hypothesis, except that he concluded that proposition (3) was erroneous. Following Werner Braun (who did not explicitly conclude similarly),[20] von Loesch instead claimed (3a) that the sixteenth century *did not witness* the rise of any such modern musical aesthetic. His final conclusion asserted that (4) the sixteenth century consequently knew *no musical work-concept whatsoever*, on the grounds that if (1), (2) and (3a) were true, it must be the case that (4).

Von Loesch's axiomatic approach has now been shown to have admitted a potentially false proposition.[21] In brief, his error was to insist (following Dahlhaus and Goehr[22]) that the musical work-concept is ontologically such that, *in order to be said to exist at all*, it must exist in its fullest

[19] The list can be found most pithily presented in von LOESCH, 'Musica Poetica – Die Geburtsstunde des Komponisten?', 84–5 and nn. 1–9. It included the publications of Zenck, Dahlhaus, Wiora, and Seidel which we have already mentioned above, in addition to P. CAHN, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des "Opus perfectum et absolutum" in der Musikauffassung um 1500' ; H.H. EGGEBRECHT, 'Opusmusik', and his *Musik im Abendland*, Munich, 1991; K.W. Niemöller's publications on music and rhetorical education in sixteenth-century Germany; and K.-J. SACHS, 'Musikanschauung, Musiklehre, Musikausbildung'. His most vehement rejection was reserved for W. GURLITT, 'Musik und Rhetorik'. DAHLHAUS, 'Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie' is the only publication that explicitly theorizes about a mechanism for the Loeschian hypothesis.

[20] W. BRAUN, *Deutsche Musiktheorie des 15. bis 17. Jahrhunderts. II: Von Calvisius bis Mattheson*, p. 40.

[21] STROHM, '"Opus"', p. 314 and n. 16; M. HAAS, *Musikalisches Denken im Mittelalter*, pp. 160–67.

[22] DAHLHAUS, 'Musikwissenschaft und Systematische Musikwissenschaft', p. 38; L. GOEHR, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, pp. 106–11; GOEHR, '"On the Problems of Dating" or "Looking Backward and Forward with Strohm"', pp. 237–8. For an excellent summary, see J. BUTT, 'The Seventeenth-Century Musical "Work"', esp. pp. 28–31.

manifestation.[23] Consequently, von Loesch tested the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century discussions of the musical *opus* and *musica poetica* against anachronistic criteria for a 'thick' work- and composition-concept derived from nineteenth-century musical thought. Unsurprisingly, he found the earlier discussions of the *opus* wanting in their fulfilment of these later criteria.

The very propositions upon which von Loesch's conclusions were based, however, have also been subject to challenge. Reinhard Strohm has argued that the historical evidence suggests that, far from being exclusive to a modern musical aesthetic, the musical work-concept was known before Tinctoris;[24] Martin Staehelin has demonstrated that Renaissance copyists must have conceived of musical compositions as works, and Nancy Van Deusen has noted that Robert Grosseteste raised the idea of musical works as early as the thirteenth century.[25] Assuming we can accept the *possibility* of an unmodern musical work-concept, von Loesch's proposition (2) is therefore false, and proposition (1) may also be false. Von Loesch himself, meanwhile, appears to have contradicted his own assertion that *musica poetica* did not mean 'composition' in the modern sense during the time-window scrutinized in his *Habilitationsschrift* by his observation in another publication that it *did* mean 'composition' in the modern sense after the music theory lectures of Gallus Dressler at Magdeburg in 1563/4.[26] At the very least, this compromise reduces the timescale for which proposition (3a) is true.

[23] Compare Goehr's characterization of a concept 'gestating', in which 'the concept [only] functions… by intimation and without stable meaning' and her description of a concept when it has 'emerged', the point at which it 'explicitly functions in is regulative capacity'. The criterion for the latter seems to be that it functions in an 'accepted manner… its existence is taken so much for granted that we find it difficult to think of the practice without it'. GOEHR, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, p. 109. This ontologistic, 'high' view of the musical work concept was derived from R. INGARDEN, *The Musical Work and the Problem of Its Identity*.

[24] In STROHM, '"Opus"'.

[25] M. STAEHELIN, 'Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Werkcharacter und Filiation in der Musik der Renaissance'; N. VAN DEUSEN, *Theology and Music at the Early University*, pp. 146–60.

[26] Von LOESCH, 'Musica poetica – die Geburtsstunde des Komponisten?', 90. In the same publication (85), he asserted that only the *earliest* description of *musica poetica* (1537) did 'not mean "composition" at all', but his *Der Werkbegriff* promotes the suggestion that *musica poetica* cannot have meant 'composition' to any of the theorists between Listenius and Mattheson, on the basis that the later theorists essentially copied their ideas *verbatim* from Listenius and Heinrich Faber (1550).

It seems to me that, *pace* a still-ongoing disagreement between Lydia Goehr (representing the ontologists) and Reinhard Strohm (representing the phenomenologists) about the nature of the musical work-concept,[27] a conceptual continuity between *this* individual performance of a musical piece and *that* one was a component of musical criticism well before the work-concept's earliest discussion in sixteenth-century music theory textbooks.[28] The conceptual continuity is more than just *likeness*; it is *identity*, even if work-identity did not have the same ontological resonances in the Middle Ages as it did for twentieth-century musicologists. In other words, I accept Strohm's maximalist concept of the musical work, and consequently consider it operative for music across most of the last millennium.

Prologomena

Beginning from this maximalist position, it becomes possible (again) that the theology of the Reformation inspired at least a significant rise in the relative importance of the musical work-concept (even if it did not beget the concept itself); if von Loesch's reasons for rejecting his initial hypothesis are now disproven, the original hypothesis demands renewed scrutiny. My original intention in this dissertation was to undertake precisely that study: an investigation of the way in which the theological concepts of the German Reformation led to the rise of the musical work-concept in a modern musical aesthetic. In particular, I was intrigued by the possibility that the emergent idea of composition (*musica poetica*), which was given its earliest explicit airing in Nicolaus Listenius' music theory textbook of 1533/7, might have been related to the increased emphasis placed upon predicatory rhetoric by Luther and some of his humanist colleagues at Wittenberg. Indeed, this latter possibility had been marked out as an important arena for

[27] Cf. their respective essays in M. TALBOT, ed., *The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?*, Liverpool, 2000.

[28] Although it falls well outside the scope of our inquiry here, J. HAAR, 'A Sixteenth-Century Attempt at Music Criticism', and J. Milsom's recent work on Josquin's self-quotation, is offered as evidence of some universal concept of a musical 'work' in the sixteenth century. See also R.C. WEGMAN, 'From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low Countries, 1450–1500'.

exploration by Zenck (1942), and was the subject of a brief analysis by Peter Cahn in 1987.[29] Since von Loesch's rejection of the putative relationship between sixteenth-century theological ideas and sixteenth-century musical ideas was based upon a methodology too sceptically restrictive, the previous positive assumption remained unaffected by them, and the prospects for my research looked rosy.

For reasons wholly different from von Loesch's, however, I soon reached the conclusion that no such causal relationship existed. Von Loesch's rejection of the hypothesis of relationship was based on syllogistic reasoning, and consequently upon philosophical necessity; my rejection of the hypothesis of relationship was based instead upon the historical contingencies of sixteenth century discourse about music. The more I examined the development of early sixteenth-century music theory, for example, the less revolutionary the earliest discussions of the musical work-concept appeared; as I became more convinced of the long-term mediæval gestation of the musical work-concept which Listenius 'named' the *opus* in 1537, the less his discussion of it required an external prompt from Reformation theology. The more I traced the twentieth-century historiography of both Lutheran theology on the one hand and sixteenth-century German music theory on the other, the more I became convinced that it was only by wishful thinking—ideology—that previous historians had seen been able to regard the latter as a music-aesthetic manifestation of the former. The more I assessed Listenius' own contribution to the history of music theory, the more convinced I became that to read his textbook as logical sentences on the aesthetics of music is to commit a category mistake. His music theory, and the theory of those who copied (almost *verbatim*) his concepts of *opus* and *musica poetica*, ought to be regarded as sufficient proof neither for the operation of a musical work-concept in his thought, nor for its absence.

[29] P. CAHN, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des "Opus perfectum et absolutum"', p. 15: 'Hinter dem Konzept der Musica poetica steht demnach wohl eine höhere Autorität als des Magister Listenius'—Cahn means Quintilian, whose oratorical proposals Luther praised.

At the same time, however, I also became convinced that the way in which previous scholarship had discussed potential relationships (or lack of them) between sixteenth-century theology and sixteenth-century musical thought was historiographically compromised: the model for theological engagement with musical aesthetics was *Hegel's* (much later) concept of art-as-religion, and not a model drawn from the sixteenth century. Von Loesch's initial premise, for example, was that Protestantism's 'modernity' begat modern aesthetics. But the paradigm for 'modern aesthetics' that von Loesch applied was derived from Hegel; whilst the paradigm for 'Lutheran theology' was drawn from the writings of Luther himself.[30]

Now, from an historiographical perspective this simply will not do, because the paradigmatic aesthetic and the paradigmatic theology are historically far removed from one another; the comparison being made is not like-for-like. To talk about a relationship between *subsequent* perceptions of the Reformation's sociological import and the *subsequent* evaluation of aesthetic categories is quite different from attributing the nineteenth-century musical work-concept to the ideas discussed during the Reformation. Whilst it might under certain circumstances be acceptable to talk of the influence of a Lutheran theology of work on the development of a European musical work-concept *longue durée*,[31] to invoke specific instantiations of that development as ostensible evidence for it brings the inquiry squarely into the remit of *histoire événementielle*.[32] In that case, if the hypothesis of relationship between Reformation theological concepts and sixteenth-century music-theoretical concepts is to stand up to scrutiny, then neither the theology nor the music theory of the sixteenth century may be refracted through the prisms of their subsequent reception; a causal relationship must be demonstrated to have existed *in the sixteenth century*,

[30] SEIDEL, *Werk und Werkbegriff*, p. 82, did similarly.

[31] As did e.g. the transcendental philosopher Odo Marquard in MARQUARD, 'Gesamtkunstwerk und Identitätssytem. Überlegungen im Anschluß an Hegels Schellingkritik', an analysis that von Loesch critiqued in *Der Werkbegriff*, p. 102.

[32] I use the terms and their translations Braudelianly.

leading directly from Luther's theological proposals to the early reformed German theorists' new concepts of *musica poetica* and the *opus*.

No such *Begriffsgeschichte événementielle* (to coin a portmanteau) of the aesthetic system's correspondence to theological innovations has been undertaken. As it transpires, there is good reason for this: there is no evidence, at an evenemential level, that a correspondence occurred. Sixteenth-century German pro- and anti-reform theologians had bigger fish to fry than contemporary aesthetics; sixteenth-century German Protestant music theorists, though they used their books to push confessionally partisan ideas, never sourced their aesthetic categories in their theological preferences. Theologians certainly did make aesthetic proposals, and music theorists confessional ones, but neither ever 'joined up' theological ideas with aesthetic ideas in the sort of philosophical or psycho-sociological way that von Loesch's original hypothesis presumed must have occurred.[33]

This lack of evenemential evidence might well have been the reason why scholars seeking to analyse a potential relationship between sixteenth-century aesthetics and sixteenth-century theological concepts have preferred to deal in *longue durée* analysis, often leaping back and forth from Luther's theology to modern sociology, and from Listenius' *opus* and *musica poetica* to the twentieth-century musical work-concept, usually employing Hegel's philosophy of history as a sort of 'wormhole' to link the two. But the continued credibility of the Reformation-theology-begat-modern-aesthetics thesis well into the 1990s was only possible because the aesthetic proposals of Reformation-era theologians remained a blind-spot in musicological scholarship: as matters stand, there is no blueprint of sixteenth-century German theologians' aesthetics against which von Loesch's Hegelian thesis can be tested, even despite some high-profile attempts to

[33] I wish to be clear, at this early juncture, that I am not arguing that this was *necessarily* the case (i.e. because theological ideas about aesthetics and *scientia*-specific ideas about aesthetics somehow 'don't mix'); rather, I am arguing that it was the case *contingently*. Developments in sixteenth-century theology *could have* inspired a (sixteenth-century) modern musical aesthetic, but they *did not*.

address sixteenth-century theological aesthetics in recent years. In the face of such a lacuna, it is hardly surprising that historians' philosophically-driven expectations about the (quasi-Hegelian) commensurability of Reformation theology to contemporary music-aesthetic ideas have remained believable.

Luther

Our knowledge of Luther's aesthetics, for example, is patchy, even though the Reformer's musical opinions have been assessed in numerous studies. In the last century, Walter E. Buszin published an article gathering together some of the Reformer's most pertinent observations about music (in 1946,[34] several years before the publication of the still-incomplete American Edition of *Luther's Works*);[35] Paul Nettl had his German monograph *Luther und Musik* translated (badly) into English in 1948;[36] and in 1988 Carl Schalk re-presented most of Buszin's observations with a touch more commentary, perhaps indicating that the earlier claims of Luther's relevance for musicology had not yet gained proper traction.[37] Today's *magnum opus* on Luther and music, however, is Robin A. Leaver's *Luther's Liturgical Music* (2007), a compilation of a number of earlier essays and articles by the same author in which Luther's importance for the development of music history is argued for.[38] But even this latter publication, for all its impressive comprehensiveness, addresses Luther's musical opinions primarily in terms of their significance for *others*—for catechumens, for later composers (above all J.S. Bach), for subsequent liturgists—and it is clear that Leaver's primary

[34] W.E. BUSZIN, 'Luther on Music'. For some reason, the earlier E.M. GREW, 'Martin Luther and Music', which dealt with much of the same material, has been largely overlooked by subsequent commentators. (The simplicity of the commentary in both Buszin's and Grew's articles reflects not simply the gingerliness with which musicological observers address theological hermeneutics, but also the elementary state of research into Luther's musical opinions throughout most of its lifespan.)

[35] *Luther's Works: American Edition*, 55 vols., St. Louis, MO, 1955–68 [hereafter '*LW*'].

[36] As P. NETTL, *Luther and Music*. One reviewer wrote that the book was 'not recommended', since 'neither translator knew much about the history of music' (R.S. HILL, Review of *Luther and Music* by Nettl, *Notes*, V [1948], 568–9). The integrated library catalogues of UK and Irish universities list only four copies of the New York, 1967 republ., and none of the original 1948 version. American libraries fare little better.

[37] C. SCHALK, *Luther on Music: Paradigms of Praise*.

[38] R.A. LEAVER, *Luther's Liturgical Music: Principles and Implications* [hereafter '*LLM*'].

purpose is to argue for the inclusion of Luther within the pantheon of musical thinkers, rather than to undertake a detailed analysis of Luther's aesthetic thought. Indeed, with the exception of one volume produced as a result of a Scandinavian conference on Luther's significance for the arts,[39] and one doctoral thesis completed very recently,[40] the *aesthetic system* lying behind Luther's comments on music, and its integration with his theological system, has remained unexamined. This means that the possibility of commensurability between theological and aesthetic ideas even in Luther's *own* thought has not been addressed; indeed, this very point has been made by both Leaver and Hubert Guicharrousse.[41]

The German Romanists[42]

A serious inquiry into the interaction between music-aesthetic ideas and theological ideas in early Reformation Germany demands not simply a conceptual or systematic analysis of Luther's theology of music, however. For early sixteenth-century Germany witnessed an explosion of publications of printed polemic against the Reformation. In general, these texts ignored musical aesthetic issues; but a few polemics that would prove highly effective weapons against the spread of Reformation ideas used musical discussion to heighten the rhetorical force of their attacks on Luther. These publications asked questions purely to demonstrate Lutheran theological error (what ought music to be like, if God is like this or like that? What ought we to make of those who deliberately distinguish themselves from other Christians by virtue of their song practices, if the

[39] E. ØSTREM, J. FLEISCHER and N. HOLGER-PETERSON, eds., *The Arts and the Cultural Heritage of Martin Luther*.

[40] M.E. ANTTILA, 'The Innocent Pleasure: A Study on Luther's Theology of Music', assesses Luther's theological reasons for embracing music where other Reformers did not, finding that the high premium the Reformer placed upon music and musical practice indicated a proximity in his thought between aesthetic beauty and the joy of faith. Although the thesis was submitted too late to be consulted in my research, Anttila's findings broadly concur with those I present below, in Chapter IV.

[41] LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 20; H. GUICHARROUSSE, *Les musiques de Luther*, p. 161.

[42] Following D.V.N. BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents: Catholic Controversialists, 1518–1525*, p. 2 and n. 5, I prefer the term 'Romanist' to simply 'Catholic', which implies a post-Tridentine confessional identity to the polemicists' work that is anachronous, and to 'papist' which implies that all of Luther's opponents were enthusiastic supporters of the papacy (which they were not). The term *Romanistae* is Luther's.

main theological principles of mediæval Christian aesthetics are unity and harmony?[43] How is music purposeful in the arrangement of divine-human relations, and what will alterations of musical practice do to that arrangement? What is to be made of the purely sensuous aesthetic component of songs which purport to be *carmina* of virtue and godliness?). Such questions opened up a front in the German Reformation propaganda war in which music-aesthetic ideas were used as ammunition.

That the Romanist polemicists' invocations of music-aesthetic ideas were generally opportunist or propagandist in intention, rather than designed as serious contributions to music-aesthetic discourse, explains why their writings have, to date, been completely overlooked by musicologists. But whatever the intentions behind the Romanists' invocations of musical issues in their polemic, their ensuing discussions nevertheless promote a particular agenda for music's design and use in a Christian church. Conrad Wimpina, for example, argued that the singing of the *Gloria in excelsis Deo* should be retained at the Mass without any changes, because to reject it amounted to a rejection of the reliable economy of relations between God and man which the Lucan *chorus angelorum* had instigated. The Reformers' habit of composing their own songs, Georg Witzel noted, ought to be considered an attempt to disguise their Reformed doctrines behind a smokescreen of pleasant music. Johannes Cochlaeus (better known to musicologists as the author of the highly successful *Tetrachordum Musices* [1511]), meanwhile, invoked the musical metaphor of *dissonantia* to condemn the Lutherans, clearly relying upon an understanding of the objective wrongness of dissonance (drawn from chant theory) to prop up a theological claim to Romanist doxastic hegemony. In these and other arguments of the early anti-Lutheran polemicists, questions of musical aesthetics and theology rubbed up against one another in startling and revealing ways.

[43] For an introduction to the virtue of *harmonia* in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century civic discourse, see J.E. CUMMING, 'Concord Out of Discord', pp. 6–8. What was good for the *πόλις* was also good for the *ἐκκλησία*.

Whilst the Romanist polemicists' observations about musical aesthetics were often contradictory, were 'dropped in' to their arguments for purely polemical reasons, and in no way represented a unified 'Roman' musical aesthetic, they nevertheless cohered around a single notion: that musical difference is a manifestation of doctrinal difference. The utilization of music-aesthetic identity to prop up a propagandist logic of theological alterity was, of course, determined by the polemical literary concerns of the authors concerned, but the association between difference in song and difference in belief was not original to them or to their context. On the contrary, it had a long tradition in Western thought, having been débuted in Christian theology by St Augustine (who, in turn, borrowed it from Plato's *Timaeus*).[43a] That Luther's earliest indigenous opponents saw fit to raise it again attests to its continued resonance in the sixteenth century.[44]

What makes the combined theological-aesthetic proposals of the Romanist polemicists all the more interesting is that, far from deploying aesthetic metaphor in the same way, they each used musical imagery and aesthetic proposals according to the needs of their individual theological claims. The common recourse to musical-aesthetic proposals as metaphorical or symbolic exemplars in theological disputation, together with the diversity of ways in which such exemplars were used in the service of theological proposals, demonstrates that musical-aesthetic ideas were intellectually proximate to theological ideas in the minds of early sixteenth-century theologians. This proximity of music to theology in their propaganda suggests that the boundary between the two intellectual disciplines was much more porous than we have hitherto imagined.

[43a] AUGUSTINE, *En. in Psal.* cxlix, 4; PLATO, *Tim.* 47d, 80b.

[44] It also adds an elite theological dimension to some recent proposals made by the late R.W. SCRIBNER (*For the Sake of Simple Folk*) and R.W. OETTINGER (*Music as Propaganda in the German Reformation*) about the relationship between heterodoxy movements and the use of song as propaganda.

Recasting Luther as a Mediæval Musical Thinker

The German polemicists' assertion that musical convention and *doxa* went hand in hand was not made in response to a suggestion by Luther that musical diversity or theological diversity were acceptable things. This is instructive, as the vast majority of the Romanists' arguments responded to something Luther had proposed, or that they supposed him to have proposed, or that they wanted to put into Luther's mouth. But the Romanists appear to have ignored Luther's own distinctive musical proposals altogether, in that none of them responded to his ideas about music's non-rational or anti-linguistic status. This may indicate that Luther's personal musical opinions were not considered important during his own lifetime, or that they were considered to represent merely the smaller sins of an arch-heresiarch.

This relative lack of interest in Luther's musical theology on the part of his early opponents must be noted: it demonstrates that, *pace* Leaver, who wished to promote Luther to the first tier of musical thinkers, the Reformer's personal musical theology did not inspire the sort of pushback we might expect if it really was the cause of a significant change in the trajectory of musical aesthetics. This might well have been because Luther's personal musical aesthetic was so deeply bound up with his theology, and was set far back in the mixture of his theological 'soundscape'. Certainly this would explain the lack of any present-day overview of the way in which Luther's musical thought was conditioned by his theological thought.[45] The Romanists instead focused on particular themes of Luther's reform agenda that had ramifications for musical life (Mass reform, and the rejection of religious profession, in particular) without engaging the ideas behind them.

In fact, Luther's ideas about music were highly complex, and often bound up with dialectical ideas about devotion in the context of faith. All the evidence is that neither Luther's reformist

[45] The fifth chapter of GUICHARROUSSE, *Les musiques de Luther*, pp. 161–88, examines some ways in which music was bound up with the concept of justification in Luther's theology; the discussion is rather limited.

successors nor his opponents really grasped the theology of music he proposed, piecemeal, in sermons, lectures, letters and sayings over the course of his career.[46] The fact that his theology of music was not a static area of his thought may have contributed to this: throughout his life, as his concept of *fides* underwent a radical shift and further developed after the Reformation breakthrough, Luther's concept of *musica* changed accordingly. Whereas the young Luther interpreted musical devotions as acts conceived primarily in terms of *relationality* between singer and sung-to, the mature Luther understood them as acts primarily concerned with rejoicing; whereas Luther's earliest theology of music regarded singing as a token for human acts of penitence, his later theology of music shunned the idea of musical tokenism altogether. The same shift, from a devotional paradigm of musical vocalizations that equated them with a specific exchange-value, to one that held them to be transcendent of all attempts at evaluation, was the cause of a gradual shift in Luther's approach to musical meaning. Whereas in his pre-Reformation thought song was understood as a hidden *vox* of the secret revelation of Christ (its referent), it later came to be almost antithetical to any referential meaning at all.

This shift, *away from* a quasi-referential, content-laden paradigm for *musica* and *towards* a referent-less, content-less paradigm is, be it noted, almost exactly the opposite of the shift with which later historians have characterized sixteenth-century musical development (and, indeed, of the paradigm for *musica* promoted by many of Luther's own followers). Wilibald Gurlitt, Hermann Zenck, and Klaus Wolfgang Niemöller all noted that the sixteenth century witnessed a shift from a generically referent paradigm of *musica* to a specific (textual) one.[47] If Gurlitt's, Zenck's, and Niemöller's 'linguistic' or 'rhetorical' paradigm for music is defined as the characteristic concept for an early modern musical aesthetic, then we must conclude that Luther is

[46] It is perfectly possible that Luther's followers were not interested in his personal theology of music. Certainly, as we shall see in Chapters III and IV, below, it was very much a product of its time, and must have seemed badly dated within a few decades of his death.

[47] W. GURLITT, 'Musik und Rhetorik'; ZENCK, 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung'; K.W. NIEMÖLLER, 'Zum Paradigmenwechsel in der Musik der Renaissance: Vom *numerus sonorus* zur *musica poetica*'.

profoundly *un-modern* in his musical aesthetics. Indeed, it is one of my principal proposals in this dissertation that Luther's musical thought represented a logical extension of late mediæval mystical musical thought, and that his supposed contributions to musical 'modernity' are therefore significantly overblown.

Were this study presented for an audience of ecclesiastical historians, the proposal that Luther was essentially a mediæval would be quite uncontroversial. The venerable Luther scholar Scott Hendrix recently noted that whilst Luther 'did not conceive of his century as medieval or modern', there was no doubt that 'Martin Luther was a medieval man'.[48] The (even more venerable) historian of mediæval theology Heiko A. Oberman argued in several publications that the Reformation was in fact made up of *two* Reformations: one thoroughly mediæval in spirit (Luther's) and another humanistic and decidedly modern (Calvin's and Zwingli's).[49] Indeed, it is now deeply unfashionable in ecclesiastical-historical circles to address Luther's Reformation as modern history. In art and cultural history, however, Luther's identity as the father of modernity has become so entrenched that depriving him of this position risks doing significant violence to subsequent historiography. There is an extent to which this is bound up, in musicology's case, with an ideology of musical commensurability between the fifteenth-century Renaissance and the present day, and of the concomitant desire to read Luther's contribution to music history within this framework of a humanistic modernity.[50] But I wish to emphasize at this juncture that to do so runs counter to the best and most recent scholarship in Luther studies.

[48] S.H. HENDRIX, *Luther: A Very Short Introduction*, p. 122.
[49] Most virtuosically in H.A. OBERMAN, *The Two Reformations*, which was published posthumously.
[50] For an introduction to this ideology of continuity, see G. TOMLINSON, *Music and Renaissance Magic*, pp. 1–43. I discuss the chief components of Tomlinson's argument below, on pp. 48–50.

Prospectus

This introduction should serve to demarcate the territory over which this dissertation roams. At once a contribution to the historiography of Renaissance musical thought, to the study of Luther's music theology, and to the history of music theory, it is ambitious (in the proper sense of the word). Tinctoris' gnome, placed at the head of this study, is an apt motto.

Accordingly, the research is presented here in a number of different miniature studies, the first two of which can be classed as deconstructive, and the latter two of which can be considered reconstructive.[51]

The first analysis is an historiographical one. That the position of Luther as father of modernity is bound up with the sort of modernity narrative (ideology) that also ontologizes the musical work-concept is obvious enough, but the precise way in which early sixteenth-century music theory has been used to shore up that narrative requires attention. In **Chapter I**, I present an investigation of the way in which ideologies of modernity and Germanicity have drawn both Luther's theology and sixteenth-century music theory into their orbit, and suggest that the only reason why Zenck, Gurlitt, and subsequent music historians have expected that sixteenth-century theological ideas should have caused a paradigm shift in contemporary musical aesthetics is because the ideologies of modernity and Germanicity exert a strong gravitational pull on both categories.

In **Chapter II**, I analyse the music theory textbook in which the paradigm shift has been situated—the textbook in which the earliest discussion of the concepts of *opus* and *musica poetica* took place—Listenius' *Musica* (1537). I demonstrate that, like others of his generation of music theorists, Listenius was an educator whose principal concern was for the proper teaching of his students. The nature of his textbook, together with the ends it set out to achieve, are such that

[51] I do not mean, in distinguishing between deconstructing and reconstruction, to suggest that deconstruction is not itself reconstructive.

any attempt to read his concepts of *opus* and *musica poetica* as instantiations of a novel aesthetic distorts the author's intention.

Having fully deconstructed the existing narrative of the relationship between sixteenth-century theology and sixteenth-century musical thought, shown its reliance upon twentieth-century ideology and its supposed proof-text to be unsupportive of it, I turn my attention to assessing the relationship as it is presented in the theological texts by Luther and his earliest opponents. The method in this second part of the dissertation is a traditional intellectual-historical narrative.

In the case of Luther, the findings are presented in two chapters: **Chapter III** deals with the climate of music-theological thought in which Luther's own ideas grew and matured, and notes the development of Luther's musical thought from within this existing tradition. It also observes the degree to which, even at this early stage in his career, Luther's musical thought was in large part dictated by other theological ideas, and argues strongly that Luther's musical thought ought to be considered essentially mediæval. **Chapter IV**, meanwhile, assesses Luther's theology of music after his Reformation breakthrough in *c.*1517. We note that, in keeping with the trajectory of his broader theology, Luther's musical thought becomes increasingly dialectical, in maturity noting that music's ability to hold together contradictory things (rather than to *harmonize* diverse things) was what made it worthwhile.

In **Chapter V**, I assess the (quite different) treatment of music within the theological discourse of Luther's earliest opponents, and assert that their divergent treatments of music in their polemic suggests that the conceptualization of music in early sixteenth-century theological discourse was determined purely by ideology.

Taken together, the two approaches and four different studies paint a picture of early sixteenth-century German musical thought more nuanced than many conventional portraits: Luther is recast as a late mediæval thinker whose own musical aesthetics had little effect upon the

aesthetics of his contemporaries; Listenius' theory is divested of its supposed resonances with the aesthetics of modernity; and the willingness of anti-Reformation theological thinkers to subordinate musical ideas to the service of their polemic is presented as evidence against the assertion that *musica* became a discipline isolated from theological thought in the early sixteenth century. Overall, I seek to portray musical thought in the period *c.*1513–*c.*1546 in Germany as altogether more fluid, less unified, and more contradictory than is normally proposed. For this reason, it is my contention that the 'dating' of a modern musical epoch and its paradigms in sixteenth-century Germany should be pushed back to after *c.*1550, and that musical thought in early Reformation Germany should be considered as either mediæval in spirit, or a no-man's-land between the musical thought of the late Middle Ages and early modernity.

A Word on Humanism

A substantial area of contemporary interest within the study of both sixteenth-century music theory and Reformation theology is the influence of Renaissance humanism upon its development. It will not escape my reader's attention that I do not treat the impact of humanism upon the potential relationship between Luther's theology and contemporary music theory in any distinctive way (indeed, it might be asserted that my decision not to treat it as such reinforces my conclusion that early sixteenth-century German musical thought is not modern). But there are good reasons for my decision.

The first is the inherent slipperiness of the term. What exactly is meant by 'humanism'? Too often used as a catch-all term for a variety of (often contradictory) proposals, 'humanism' has been equated variously with vernacularism, imagined nostalgia for the far distant past, a focus on linguistic poetics, the discovery of subjective autonomy, a campaign for history and the wisdom of the Classics to be studied in universities alongside the *artes liberales* and theology, and the

Renaissance revival of Platonist thought.[52] All too often in twentieth-century musicology (and particularly in German musicology) one finds musical ideas attributed willy-nilly to 'humanism', as if the term identified a unified philosophical proposal that held common currency in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Paul Oskar Kristeller argued strongly that the equation of 'humanism' with a set of philosophical or conceptual proposals is historically inappropriate. By contrast, he argued, 'humanism' is best described as a movement for educational reform with attention focused on the teaching of rhetoric.[53]

Kristeller's definition precludes the possibility that, as a movement, humanism was capable of engendering conceptual changes in any arena of thought other than that of rhetorical pedagogy. The influence of this qualification upon Reformation studies has been profound, in that it has resulted in a clarification about the impact of humanism on the Reformation itself. Alister McGrath noted (following Kristeller) that humanism '*merely acted as midwife at* [the Reformation's] *birth*' (the emphases are his), but cannot be considered its progenitor nor its sibling.[54] Oberman argued that humanism exerted a much lesser influence upon Luther's Reformation than some have suggested.[55]

Even, however, if we accept a Burckhardtian view of Renaissance humanism and equate it with the rise of modern consciousness and moral autonomy, then it is not possible to lay the blame for the development of musical ideas in Germany at the feet of Renaissance humanism. For Burckhardt was insistent that Renaissance humanism was contained within the Italian peninsula until *after* the Reformation in Germany.[56]

[52] See TOMLINSON, 'Renaissance Humanism and Music' for an introduction.
[53] P.O. KRISTELLER, 'Humanism and Scholasticism in Renaissance Italy'.
[54] A.E. MCGRATH, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, p. 53.
[55] OBERMAN, 'Quoscunque Tulit Fœcunda Vetustas: Ad Lectorem'.
[56] J. BURCKHARDT, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. See B. BOUCHER, 'Jacob Burckhardt and the "Renaissance" North of the Alps'.

Since the Kristellerian definition of humanism appears to rule out the possibility of the humanists' agenda leading to the invention of particular musical concepts, and since the relationship of Reformation theology to the emergence of German humanism in the early sixteenth century is argued against by the leading scholars in recent Reformation studies, I have judged it best not to highlight humanism in this study.[57] This does not mean I have ignored the effects of humanism altogether in my analysis; indeed, wherever those effects have been relevant, they have been noted and drawn into the discussion at hand.

There is one additional benefit to excluding a detailed discussion of the potential impact of humanism on the development of Reformation-era musical aesthetics. Musicologists have been relatively slow to absorb Kristeller's findings (so slow that the authors of two monographs dealing with sixteenth-century musical thought have, as recently as the late 2000s, felt the need to devote significant space to expounding Kristeller),[58] such that in musicology the meaning of the term 'humanism' remains relatively unstable and, at times, plainly vague. The instability and vaguery of the term means that (like its sibling-idea, 'Renaissance') it risks becoming the site for retrofitted ideologies.[59] Remaining an imprecise semantic field for musicologists, the diverse hopes, expectations and interpretive baggage of modern-day historiographers are all too easily invested in it. Avoiding its discussion altogether is, therefore, not so cowardly a scholarly choice as it might initially appear: its omission spares us significant historiographical confusion.

Finally, others have treated the subject of humanism's reception in Germany in a way that it seems foolish to try and emulate here. I refer the reader to Alister McGrath's brief exploration of

[57] To be clear: neither Oberman nor McGrath suggested that the course of Reformation history, or the spread of Reformation ideas, was not affected by the humanist educational programmes of Melanchthon and others; rather they note that the *theological ideas* of Luther and his immediate successors were not descended from humanism.

[58] H.-A. KIM, *Humanism and the Reform of Sacred Music in Early Modern England*; J. WILLIS, *Church Music and Protestantism in Post Reformation England: Discourses, Sites, and Identities*.

[59] The term 'retrofitting' in relation to the Renaissance is borrowed from P.M. HIGGINS, 'The Apotheosis of Josquin des Prez'; see also L. LOCKWOOD 'Renaissance', esp. pp. 179–80; J.A. OWENS, 'Music Historiography and the Definition of "Renaissance"'.

the impact of humanism on Luther's early thought,[60] Heiko Oberman's assessment of the *oltramontani* humanists' influence on religious philosophy,[61] Lewis W. Spitz' assessment of the relationship between Reformation and humanism,[62] Klaus Wolfgang Niemöller's investigation of the influence of the humanist programme of educational reform upon German university life,[63] and Grantley McDonald's first doctoral dissertation on the reception of Ficino in Germany.[64]

On Being Interdisciplinary

In the course of researching this study, I have become accustomed to navigating the scholarly waters between the disciplines of musicology and ecclesiastical history. There is no escaping the fact that it is at once undesirable and manifestly impossible to discuss the relationship between theological ideas and musical ideas without having a profound understanding of both. The fruits of this interdisciplinarity are both positive and negative.

On the positive side: it allows us access to a much deeper understanding of the nature of Reformation-era thought, and to Reformation-era musical thought. The musicians of sixteenth-century Germany were by no means irreligious; and their theologian contemporaries were not unmusical either. Collapsing the academic boundary between the two disciplinary approaches affords us a more realistic view of the relationship between theology and music in early modern Germany on precisely the grounds that the threshold was more porous to sixteenth-century thinkers. Foucault observed that the sixteenth-century *episteme* was one in which 'the world must fold in upon itself',[65] confounding neat twentieth-century distinctions between musical thought

[60] MCGRATH, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, pp. 59–68.
[61] OBERMAN, 'Quoscunque Tulit Fœcunda Vetustas'.
[62] L.W. SPITZ, 'The Course of German Humanism'.
[63] K.W. NIEMÖLLER, 'Zum Einfluß des Humanismus auf Position und Konzeption von Musik im deutschen Bildungssystem der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts'.
[64] G. MCDONALD, 'Orpheus Germanicus: Metrical Music and the Reception of Marsilio Ficino's Poetics and Music Theory in Renaissance Germany'. Cf. MCDONALD, *Marsilio Ficino in Renaissance Germany: A Reception History*, forthcoming. I am grateful to Dr McDonald for supplying me with a copy of his first PhD thesis whilst its monograph version is in preparation.
[65] M. FOUCAULT, *The Order of Things*, p. 29.

and theological thought. In this study, I have worked on the basis that it would consequently be unhistorical to insist too rigidly upon the preservation of modern-day disciplinary distinctions in determining the direction of the research.

On the negative side: the nature of academic discourse in twentieth-century Britain is such that interdisciplinary research is the exception, not the the norm. There is not yet a 'ready-made' community of scholars for whom a dissertation with one foot in Reformation studies and the other in musicology can be written. In the context of this dissertation, the fact that the history of musical aesthetics and the history of theology remain basically separate areas of research has meant that ideas, concepts, and even historical facts apparently basic to one field have had to be explained in depth for the benefit of readers in the other. The study is presented for a musicological audience, since the initial question prompting the research was a musicological one; but the content of the answer has required a substantial exploration of theological ideas and their development, ideas that are not necessarily meaningful to musicological readers. For this reason it has been necessary to spend a good deal of space exploring concepts and events that undoubtedly seem elementary to a Reformation historian.

My working method has followed a number of basic principles. Wherever an idea is critical to the thrust of an argument, I have explained it briefly and without any assumption of foreknowledge. At times this means that the introduction to and contextualization of a point can demand more attention than the argument itself; but I have judged that it is better to assume too little prior knowledge than too much. Where theological ideas are relevant to, but not critical to, the analysis at hand, the reader is referred by way of a footnote to a good introductory text. I accept, however, that to a reader with little knowledge of Christian theology and at least a basic awareness of Reformation history, many of the ideas contained in this dissertation will be entirely foreign. The constraints of presenting a study that remained coherent mean that it has been, unfortunately, impossible to provide low-level introductions to all key concepts.

My experience of balancing the twin concerns of introductory description and analysis, together with the experience of deconstructing the scholarly boundary between two disciplines, has assured me of one thing: however much musicology as a field may like to think of itself as instinctively interdisciplinary, the disciplinary boundary between musicology and theology remains firmly demarcated.

The reason for this, according to Bennett Zon, is not only that the two disciplines have different vocabularies, but also that they use entirely different languages with different grammars and syntax.[66] Certainly, I have been aware when researching in two disciplinary areas at once that ecclesiastical historians and musicologists *write* very differently; their respective means of demonstrating proof is dissimilar. Generally, ecclesiastical historians begin from a less sceptical position than musicologists, and are less given to instinctive problematization, their discipline not having been so ravaged by postmodernism as musicology has; furthermore, ecclesiastical history is a much bigger and better-known field, and there is much less need to reference basic assertions about Reformation protagonists than there is to reference basic assertions about, say, sixteenth-century music theorists. I have generally tried to imitate the less sceptical approach of the church historians when playing on their turf, purely for reasons of convenience. To have begun from a position of scepticism when dealing with theological material would have crippled the flow of the argument as well as presented uninitiated musicological readers with unnecessarily confusing side-issues that have been put to rest within another academic arena.

Zon's warning of a 'translation deficit' between musicology and theology also offers a salutary reminder of the unfamiliarity of other disciplines' conventions, and of the concomitant temptation to run wild in intellectual territory far from the ken of many music historians. Such licentiousness leads to bad history and, as we shall see below, in Chapter I, has been the Achilles'

[66] Zon referred to a 'translation deficit' several times in his inaugural paper at the launch of the International Network for Music Theology, University of Boston, 27 February 2010.

heel of much twentieth-century commentary on the relationship between Reformation ideas and musical thought. In writing this dissertation I have been acutely aware of this potential pitfall, and have consequently sought to integrate my account of Reformation musical thought with the intellectual history of the period as portrayed by ecclesiastical historians. That the developments in musical thought I have observed generally mirror broader philosophical and epistemological developments agreed amongst church historians offers, I believe, credible supporting evidence for my findings.

PART I

CHAPTER I

THE HISTORIOGRAPHICAL MARRIAGE OF LUTHER AND LISTENIUS

In 1537, a schoolmaster from a declining trading town in central Germany introduced a little book about music with the following observations.

> *Musica* is the art of singing correctly and properly. To sing well is to present a song appropriately in its notes and directions, according to given conventions and measure. And it is threefold: Θεωρική, Πρακτική, Ποιητική.
>
> [*Musica*] *Theorica* [is that] which is directed only towards the contemplation of [a composer's] ingenuity and the understanding of [music as] a subject; its goal is understanding. Hence the *Theoricus Musicus*, who fully understands [musical] skill itself, content in every way in this, produces no evidence of what he does.
>
> [*Musica*] *Practica* [is that] which takes delight not only in the inward workings of [composerly] ingenuity, but adds to it its own work, even though no work is left behind afterwards; its goal is practical activity. Hence the *Practicus Musicus*, who teaches others more than the appreciation of skill, trains himself in it [i.e. *musica practica*] so he can perform any and all works.
>
> [*Musica*] *Poetica* [is that] which is content with neither understanding [music as] a subject, nor with practice alone, but which after its labour leaves behind it something of a work, like when music or a musical song is composed by someone; its goal is the completed and executed work. For *musica poetica* involves processes of fashioning and creating, that is, the sort of undertaking which, even after the death of the author himself, leaves behind a perfected and absolute work. Hence the *Poeticus Musicus* is one who is directed towards the business of leaving something behind. And these latter two [classes of musical knowledge] are always dependent upon the former, but the reverse is not true.
>
> [*Musica*] *Practica* is also divided again in two, into *choralis* and *figuralis*. *Choralis* [is that music] which moves from one note to the next and is measured uniformly, without increases and decreases in prolation, and which is also known by the other names Gregorian, *plana*, ancient, because it is widely considered to have been cultivated by Gregory, Ambrose, and the ancients. *Figuralis* [is that music] which varies the measure and the number of notes by way of changes of signs and figures with the increase and decrease of prolation. This is also identified by the other terms *mensuralis* or *nova*, because it incorporates a variety of mensural arrangements and figures. And both [*choralis* and *figuralis*] are used, by both wordless instruments and the speaking human voice (and so I summarize in brief all the species of this art [of *musica*]).[67]

[67] N. LISTENIUS, *Musica*, fols. Aiij^{v}–Aiv^{r}: 'MVSICA EST RITE ‖ ac bene canendi scientia. Bene ‖ canere, est cantum sub certa ali-‖ qua regula ac mensura, per suas ‖ uoces, & notulas apte proferre. ‖ Et est triplex. Θεωρική, Πρακτική. ‖ Ποιητική. ‖ Theorica est, quae in ingenij contemplatione ‖ ac rei cognitione tantum uersatur, cuius finis ‖ *(cont.)*

The schoolmaster's name was Nicolaus Listenius; the town's, Salzwedel. By rights the first chapter of the rather humble textbook ought to have remained as unexceptional in the later historiography of musical thought as did the town for which it was written. For several centuries it did: copies of the textbook gathered dust in library collections, and the exploits of Salzwedel's music teacher were concealed in pay receipts and matriculation records until an early nineteenth-century leader of Salzwedel's local history club, Johann Friedrich Danneil, decided to write a history of the Salzwedel school at which Listenius had taught.[68] In his account, however, Danneil made no mention of Listenius' textbook. His discussion of Listenius is conspicuously unrelated to any of the lofty claims to music-historical significance the schoolmaster's name has since accrued. Danneil instead recounted Listenius' open goading of the local Margrave (at that time still Romanist in allegiance) through his one-man programme for the reform of Salzwedel's church music practices. For Danneil, the confrontation between the schoolmaster's over-eager reformist zeal and the Margrave's softly-softly agenda for change represented Listenius' chief contribution to world history. The Margrave's political moderation, exemplified by a chastening

(cont.)

est scire. Vnde Theoricus Musicus, qui artem ‖ ipsam nouit, uerum hoc ipso contentus, nul-‖ lum eius specimen agendo exhibet. ‖ Practica, quae non solum in ingenij penetra-‖ libus delitescit, sed in opus ipsum prodit, nul-‖ lo tamen post actum relicto opere, cuius finis‖ est agere. Vnde Practicus Musicus, qui ultra‖ artis cognitionem caeteros docet, in eaque se cir-‖ ca alicuius operis effectum exercet. ‖ Poetica, quae neque rei cognitione, neque solo ‖ exercitio contenta, sed aliquid post laborem ‖ relinquit operis, ueluti cum à quopiam Musi-‖ ca aut Musicum carmen conscribitur, cuius fi-‖ nis est opus consumatum *(sic)* et effectum. Consi-‖ stit enim in faciendo siue fabricando, hoc est, ‖ in labore tali, qui post se etiam artifice mortuo ‖ opus perfectum & absolutum relinquat. Vn-‖ de Poeticus Musicus, qui in negotio aliquid re[-] ‖ liquendo uersatur. Et habent hae duae poste- [*fol. Aiv*^{r}] riores sibi perpetuo coniunctam superiorem ‖ sed non e contra. ‖ Practica uero rursus bifariam diuiditur in ‖ Choralem & Figuralem. Choralis est, quae uni[-] ‖ formiter suas notulas profert & mensurat, sine ‖ incremento & decremento prolationis, & uo-‖ catur alio nomine Gregoriana, Plana, Vetus, ‖ quod à Gregorio, Ambrosio, & ueteribus ut ‖ plurimum exculta sit. Figuralis, quae mensu-‖ ram & notarum quantitatem uariat, pro si-‖ gnorum ac figurarum inaequalitate, cum in[-] ‖ cremento & decremento prolationis. Haec ‖ alio nomine Mensuralis, alio Noua appella-‖ tur, quod uarias mensuras ac figuras admittat. ‖ Estque utriusque usus, tam in mutis per se instru-‖ mentis (ut sic breuiter omnes huius artis spe-‖ cies complectar) quam in uiua hominis uoce.' My translation is based upon *Nicolaus Listenius: Music (Musica)*, trans. Albert Seay, Colorado Springs, 1975, the only existing full English translation. Seay's translation errs heavily on the side of the literal, and on numerous occasions simply errs. I am grateful to John Caldwell for the loan of his review copy of Seay's translation, which includes some of Caldwell's useful corrections. Other translations of sections of this chapter can be found variously in von LOESCH, *Der Werkbegriff* (in German), as well as GOEHR, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works*, pp. 115–6; and R. FORGÁCS, *Gallus Dressler's* Præcepta musicæ poëticæ, p. 67 and n.9.

[68] J.F. DANNEIL, *Geschichte der Lateinschule zu Salzwedel*. Danneil himself merited a biographical pamphlet: J. BERANEK, *Johann Friedrich Danneil*, a masters dissertation.

letter informing Listenius to give up his constant push for greater and greater reform, is the star in Danneil's drama; the figure of Listenius dropped out of Danneil's field of vision as quickly as he had dropped into it.

Listenius and his textbook would probably have retained a relatively lowly place in the history of music theory—and with the exception of two studies by Georg Schünemann (in 1927 and 1928, respectively[69]) did so in the first decades after its rediscovery[70]—had it not been for the interest of Hermann Zenck in 1942, Wilibald Gurlitt in 1944, and Carl Dahlhaus in 1966. In an article entitled 'Musik und Rhetorik', Gurlitt found Listenius' discussion of *musica poetica* (the fourth paragraph in the chapter quoted above) to be the 'Geburtsstunde des Komponisten'.[71] Dahlhaus' article, 'Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie', sought to demonstrate that musical poetics was a constituent concern of a modern[72] musical aesthetic, and found in Listenius' first chapter evidence of its fledgling existence at the dawn of the modern era.[73] Zenck, meanwhile, searching for the 'basic contour of the Germanic understanding of music', found in Listenius' textbook the first declaration of music's aesthetic autonomy, a declaration borne out of a unique pairing of humanistic confidence and the Reformers' emphasis on the Word of God.[74]

These were big claims for a small textbook, and they vaulted Listenius' *Musica* out of the lower league of music theory textbooks and into the top tier of source-texts for music's intellectual history. Previously of interest only to a small handful of music pedagogy specialists (Schünemann's facsimile ed. of 1927 ran to just 380 copies), now Listenius' textbook presciently heralded the beginnings of musical modernity. Here was the 'birth hour' of music-as-we-know-it,

[69] G. SCHÜNEMANN, 'Einführung'; SCHÜNEMANN, *Geschichte der deutschen Schulmusik*.

[70] Listenius' work was apparently not known by, or did not prove interesting to, Hugo Riemann, whose *Geschichte der Musiktheorie* makes no mention of it.

[71] W. GURLITT, 'Musik und Rhetorik'.

[72] By 'modern', here and elsewhere, I mean 'of modernity'; when referring to German texts it is usually a translation of *neuzeitlich*. The exception to my equation of 'modernness' with 'modernity' is in the phrase 'modern-day', which I use colloquially.

[73] DAHLHAUS, 'Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie', 112.

[74] H. ZENCK, 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung', pp. 23, 28.

the beginnings of composition and an aesthetics based around the musical work-concept as central paradigm (*systematische Mitte*),[75] and the foundation-stone of a Germanic musical imagination. Publications by Kurt von Fischer (1961),[76] Walter Wiora (1962),[77] Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht (1975),[78] Wilhelm Seidel (1987),[79] and Klaus-Jürgen Sachs (1989) followed,[80] in which the relevance of the first chapter of Listenius' *Musica* to the development of a modern and Germanic musical aesthetic (bound up with the concepts of *opus* and *musica poetica*) was reiterated.[81]

Certainly, Zenck, Gurlitt and Dahlhaus were not wrong to consider Listenius' textbook innovative. Its first chapter includes the earliest discussion we know of in which the concepts of musical composition and the musical work are explicitly discussed. But it is difficult, on a plain reading, to imagine quite how so many respected musicologists could have seen in it the evidence of a paradigm shift underway in musical aesthetics. Read in context, the chapter is hardly impressive; it contains none of the *useful* stuff of the textbook (which begins in earnest with Cap. 2 a leaf later). Listenius' textbook as a whole deals not with composition (indeed, its author's mention of *musica poetica* on the first page is probably occasioned only to make clear that he has *no intention of speaking about composition* in subsequent chapters) but with the practical business of judging intervals; Listenius makes no further reference to either of the categories that garnered so much attention in the middle of the twentieth century. We can easily conclude that Listenius was basically uninterested in the *opus* and *musica poetica*, and would have been altogether nonplussed by the assertion that his theory represented a major leap forward for musical

[75] DAHLHAUS, 'Musikwissenschaft und systematische Musikwissenschaft', p. 38.
[76] K. von FISCHER, 'Der Begriff des "Neuen" in der Musik von der Ars nova bis zur Gegenwart'.
[77] WIORA, 'Musica poetica und musikalische Kunstwerk'.
[78] H.H. EGGEBRECHT, 'Opusmusik'.
[79] SEIDEL, *Werk und Werkbegriff in der Musikgeschichte*.
[80] K.-J. SACHS, 'Musikanschauung, Musiklehre, Musikausbildung'.
[81] Each did so for differing reasons and with differing degrees of credibility. It is not right to 'lump together' these historians as straightforwardly misguided, as von LOESCH, 'Musica Poetica – Die Geburtsstunde des Komponisten?' does.

aesthetics. (Even if, by some fluke of history, Listenius' treatise *did* nail modernity's colours to the mast of musical aesthetics, then at the very least, two things must be observed: firstly, that Listenius apparently did not know he was doing it; and, secondly, that for the first four hundred years after its publication, no one else knew he was doing it, either.)

None of this is to say that his enunciation of *musica poetica* and the musical work-concept *did not* have paradigm-shifting consequences (or, on the other hand, demonstrate a new paradigm that Listenius already reckoned self-evident). It might very well be the case that they did. What is curious, however, is that Listenius' treatise only came to the interest of musicologists as the potential baptismal-font of a new musical epoch in the mid-twentieth century. The widespread take-up of Listenius' textbook within Germanic musicological discourse in the 1940s, 50s, 60s, 70s and 80s, points to some non-historical reason for its sudden scrutiny for epochal or paradigmatic significance. The fact that, part-way through the Second World War, scholars began to see something in Listenius' textbook that previous musicologists had not noticed, clarifies that the new place accorded to Listenius' *Musica* in the historiography of Western musical thought was not something that the textbook itself prompted. In this chapter, we shall address the reasons behind the mid-twentieth century surge in interest in Listenius' music theory, and note that twentieth-century treatments of both Listenius' *Musica* and Luther's musical thought have, virtually without exception, been ideologically driven and conditioned. As we shall see, the interest in Listenius' concepts of *opus* and *musica poetica*, as well as the musicological interest in Luther's Reformation, are consequences of a single set of ideologies governing twentieth-century German music historiography.

1. BEGINNINGS

At the outset it is instructive to assess the degree to which Listenius' *Musica* has been subordinated to, and used as a proof-text for, a variety of narratives of novelty in recent scholarship. We shall survey four recent examples here.

(a) Klaus Wolfgang Niemöller

Klaus Wolfgang Niemöller, the successor to Georg Schünemann's crown as the leading scholar of sixteenth-century German school music pedagogy, viewed Listenius' textbook not simply as the instigator of a paradigm shift in musical aesthetics, but as the *site* of the shift itself.[82] In an influential paper from 1989, he explained that in 1501 music was still conceived as sounding number (*numerus sonorus*),[83] bound up with arithmetic, astronomy, and geometry in the ancient Quadrivium, and still conceptualized chiefly with reference to a putative celestial harmony.[84] By 1537, on the other hand, music had come to be considered primarily in poetic terms, as the stylized phonic equivalent of poetry. To prove his point that the intervening years witnessed a paradigm shift in the conceptualization of *musica*, Niemöller cited several instances of what he claimed was music's 'poetic' turn underway. The first was Raffaele Brandolini's *De Musica et poetica opusculum* (publ. before 1513), a text which demonstrated a significant concern for music's affective power. Joachim Vadianus' *De poetica et carminis ratione* (Vienna, 1518), meanwhile, which explicitly associated music with 'poetics', Niemöller fitted a little further along in the continuum between arithmetic and poetic conceptualizations of music. By the time of the

[82] NIEMÖLLER, 'Zum Paradigmenwechsel in der Musik der Renaissance: Vom *numerus sonorus* zur *musica poetica*', pp. 213–4. He had made a similar assertion in several previous publications.

[83] This distinguishes Niemöller's position from that of GURLITT, 'Musik und Rhetorik', which had proposed that 1501 was the year in which paradigm shift took place.

[84] The reality of this celestial harmony is not at issue. See G. RICO, '"Auctoritas cereum habet nasum": Boethius, Aristotle, and the Music of the Spheres in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries', for a discussion of the long-term debate surrounding the reality and audibility of celestial harmonies.

publication of Caspar Othmayr's anthology of songs under the title *Symbola* (1547), Niemöller noted, the paradigm shift had been so completely effected that the anthology only makes sense if it is viewed as a musical attempt to mirror text for rhetorical signification. The theoretical proposal for a new rhetoric-oriented musical paradigm was made, Niemöller asserted, in Listenius' 1537 *Musica*, and, specifically, in his discussion of *musica poetica*.

Niemöller's situation of a paradigm shift in Listenius' textbook was bizarre, to say the least, since there was no good reason for him to situate it anywhere. His thesis would have been no weaker for having not picked a specific date; furthermore, he made no case explaining why the shift should be localized to Listenius' textbook and not to any other theoretical texts between 1501 and 1547.[85] Although Niemöller has since deprivileged the year 1537 in his analysis by suggesting 1495, 1500, and 1513 as possible dates for the paradigm shift, his association of his 'poetic' paradigm with Listenius' *musica poetica* stands, and has come to be a component in the conventional interpretation of Listenius' textbook.[86]

Why should Niemöller have seen fit to isolate the beginning of music's rhetorical character in Listenius' *musica poetica*? It seems to be a classic case of procrusteanism. Niemöller appears to have developed his idea of a gradual shift from music mathematically-imagined to music imagined as speechlike, or linguistic, localized it to the sixteenth century, and then gone looking for some enunciation that proof-texts his thesis most closely. There is not any other good reason for isolating Listenius' concept of *musica poetica* as the locus of theorization of a novel aesthetic,

[85] In a different analysis (NIEMÖLLER, *Nikolaus Wollick, 1480–1541, und sein Musiktraktat*, p. 15) he asserted that Wollick's *Opus aureum* might well have done the trick itself, patently undermining his whole case in 'Zum Paradigmenwechsel'. This point had already been made in GURLITT, 'Musik und Rhetorik'.

[86] In NIEMÖLLER, 'Kölner Musikgeschichte zwischen Mittelalter und Renaissance', p. 15. It is probable that Niemöller is intending to argue here that Cologne was an 'early adopter' of the new musical paradigm that was not absorbed elsewhere until several decades later, so the alternative dates he suggests may not imply a loss of confidence in the year 1537 as the 'dating' of the paradigm shift *outside* the Cologne 'school'.

especially since Listenius' discussion of *musica poetica* involves neither of the concepts of rhetoric or poetics that Niemöller considers central to the new paradigm.[87]

Two further observations back up my claim that Niemöller's version of events is procrustean. In the context of his discussion of Othmayr's *Symbola*, he observed that for the first time 'Text und Musik bilden ein integrales Ganzes' in 1547.[88] Niemöller's other work makes clear that he considers the music-aesthetic unity between word (either literal or 'rhetorical', in absolute music) and sound to be the foundation of a modern musical aesthetic, in much the same way that Dahlhaus reckoned the work-concept to be its nucleus.[89] But Ewald Jammers had already noted, only twenty years previously, that the unity of *Wort* and *Ton*—held up by Niemöller in several publications as the defining feature of a Renaissance musical paradigm—was in fact indigenous to *mediæval* musical aesthetics, too.[90] Apparently Niemöller has made up a 'defining feature' of a modern humanistic musical aesthetic that is not so defining after all. His invocation of Listenius purely to prove a point that is (a) historically overblown and (b) not supported by Listenius' own words amounts to a classic case of cutting the sleeper to fit the bed already constructed.[91]

[87] Listenius' *poetica* is simply a transliteration of the Gk. 'ποιητική', from 'ποιέω', lit. 'I bear fruit', 'I bring forth', or 'I create [from my labour]' (and, sometimes, perhaps ironically, 'I perform'). Conventionally the word used for the writing of poetry, too, 'ποιέω' is the verb used in the Septuagint for God's creative work (Gen. 1). FABER, *Musica poetica* (Ms., 1548), clarifies the etymology of *poetica* with the observation '[n]omen deductum est a ποιέω quod est facio'. There is no indication in either Listenius' or Faber's description of *poetica* that poetic forms or conventions (or any ideas about musical rhetoric) are implied. DAHLHAUS, 'Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie', 110, notes that even as late as 1739, Johann Mattheson understood of *musica poetica* 'nichts anderes als die "Setz-Kunst oder Composition"'.

[88] NIEMÖLLER, 'Zum Paradigmenwechsel', pp. 207, 215. See also NIEMÖLLER, *Der sprachhafte Charakter der Musik*.

[89] Particularly so because ZENCK, 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung', p. 28, had already made the claim that this *Einheit* of *Wort* and *Ton* was the very lifeblood of the German musical aesthetic, a claim that made no secret of its implied superiority-complex.

[90] E. JAMMERS, 'Die Wahrheit der Sprache und die Musik in der mittelalterlichen Dichtung: Eine Übersicht': in the Middle Ages, 'die Musik tritt nicht als eine eigene Sprache *neben* die literarische Sprache, sondern bildet *mit* ihr eine Einheit' (p. 15); 'Hier sei nun gefragt, inwiefern die Musik mit dem Text eine Einheit bilden kann, inwiefern sie ihn dabei formt. Die Antwort kann nur lauten: mit allen Mitteln, über die sie verfügt, und als unentbehrliche Partnerin' (p. 24); cf. also his *Ausgewählte Melodien des Minnesangs*, pp. 10–16, the highly measured doctrine of mediæval word-music relations expounded in which was reaffirmed by J.E. STEVENS, *Words and Music in the Middle Ages: Song, Narrative, Dance, and Drama, 1050–1350*, esp. ch. 15, 'Words and music: a balanced relationship', pp. 492–504. ZENCK, 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung' applied the *Einheit* to music on *both* sides of the paradigm shift, an altogether more interesting proposal.

[91] The procrusteanism of many Renaissancist histories of music's rhetorical or affective turn was eloquently demolished in M. BENT, 'Grammar and Rhetoric in Late Medieval Polyphony', p. 62.

Secondly, Niemöller reveals that his own paradigm for the Renaissance 'unity' of word and sound is Monteverdi's *seconda pratica*.[92] This establishes a *telos*, towards which any previous mention of music as a poetic or speechlike 'language' must necessarily point.[93] Since Niemöller views sixteenth-century musical thought as a long-term trajectory towards the subordination of music to words, it is only natural that he should have read Listenius' *poetica* as if a prefiguring of the rhetorical paradigm for music that Monteverdi would later propose.

The invocation of Monteverdi, however, makes clear that even for Niemöller, whose expertise in the history of musical thought in sixteenth-century Germany can scarcely be rivalled by any other contemporary musicologist, the real drama of music's development in the sixteenth century took place not in Germany but in Italy. That Niemöller was seeking to align early sixteenth-century German humanist thought about music with a later Italocentric concept of music's servitude to text perhaps goes some way towards explaining why he was keen to invest Listenius' first chapter with so much more intellectual significance than, on a dispassionate reading, it ought to bear. One cannot help but wonder whether this intensified attempt to subordinate developments in German music theory to an Italianate Renaissance might represent a psychological reaction, under *Vergangenheitsbewältigung*, against the pre-War superiority complex of German music.

Niemöller's pursuit of the arithmetic/poetic paradigm shift that he really reckons occurred in a different national context—and his use of Listenius' theory to exemplify it—is instructive, in that it helps to isolate two characteristics of modern-day analyses of Listenius' *Musica*. The first is that discussions of Listenius' music theory tend to occur in the context of a *search for the origins of*

[92] NIEMÖLLER, 'Die musikalische Rhetorik und ihre Genese in Musik und Musikanschauung der Renaissance', p. 287.

[93] Niemöller overlooks the obvious problem with G.C. Monteverdi's proposal for a *seconda pratica*—the fact, recently examined in R. KATZ, *A Language of Its Own: Sense and Meaning in the Making of Western Art Music*, e.g. pp. 109–13, that it involved a deliberate separation of sense from meaning. Precisely why Niemöller should have picked the Fifth Book of Madrigals (1605) is not clear, except that it is the better-loved term for what Caccini described in 1602 as the *stile moderno*, a moniker that makes Niemöller's subconscious point all too easily.

something else. The *Musica*, together with its core concepts, are seen but through a glass darkly (or, rose-tinted spectacles, depending on the perspective). Routinely, one finds Listenius' treatise discussed as evidence for this or that paradigm or conceptual shift, invoked as a proof-text for this or that thesis the commentator has already concluded to be true. (We shall see more evidence of this below.)

The second thing to note is that the 'something else' whose origins are being searched out is something that the historian doing the searching *cares about*—put another way, the 'something else' is something that is bound up with the historian's subjective sense of self-identity.[94] (In Niemöller's case, this is the 'speechlike character' of Renaissance musical style.) This latter point may appear obvious enough—no one has ever researched something that didn't interest them at all—but is, as we shall see, a crucial part of the historiographical ideology that has led to the misappropriation and misreading of both Listenius' *Musica* and Luther's musical theology.

(b) Dietrich Bartel

Another recent invocation of Listenius' concept of *musica poetica*—again, viewed through a later lens—can be found in Dietrich Bartel's monograph *Musica Poetica* (1997). In a passage echoing much of Niemöller's ideology, Bartel writes:

> Throughout the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the cosmological focus of musica revealed in the numerological abstractions of musica theoretica shifted to an anthropological focus revealed in the rhetorical powers of musica poetica. This paralleled the Renaissance shift in emphasis from the mathematical quadrivium to the linguistic trivium. In Italy, this change was accomplished at the dawn of the Baroque era. The musical composition was thus perceived aesthetically rather than speculatively. Music itself had become the language. While Italian Renaissance and Baroque writers tended to adhere to the bipartite divisions into musica theoretica (naturalis, speculativa) and musica practica (artificialis), some German Lutheran writers began to promote a third category, musica poetica. This order of music combined with the established truths of musica theoretica with the heightened Renaissance concept of the composer as artist, who is called upon to reveal the

[94] The self-identity need not be conscious or individual; it can easily be subconscious and/or socially or academically conditioned.

> meaning of the text in and through his music. The speculative medieval tradition was not cast off but rather refined in the Lutheran north. In reaction to the growing scepticism of medieval speculative music theory Adam von Fulda exclaimed: "The unfortunates! They do not seem to know that Boethius said in the XXXIII chapter of the first book of his Institutione: 'id musicus est, qui ratione perpensa' (the musician is one who measures by reason)." It was only few years later [*sic*] that Nicolaus Listenius introduced the term musica poetica as a genre of musical composition.[95]

In the same way that Niemöller's anachronistic gaze caused him to read Listenius' theory procrusteanly, here Bartel also misreads Listenius in order to fit the sixteenth-century schoolmaster's theory into his own Baroquist narrative. Bartel's assertion is that the Renaissance witnessed a Niemöllerian reconceptualization of *musica*, in which the previous equation of *musica* with *musica speculativa* gave way to a new equation of *musica* with *musica poetica*. Bartel's narrative makes clear that this represents the basic hermeneutic for German Baroque music, and Listenius (with his term *musica poetica*) is invoked at the decisive point in the narrative structure in order to apparently substantiate what Bartel goes on to treat as an *a priori* truth: after 1533, *musica*'s default shape in the collective imagination was *poetica* rather than *theoretica*.

But Listenius did not say this, and, indeed, his own theory seems to point in a different direction. Listenius was careful not to propose that *any* one class of musical knowledge could function as a trope for the whole category *musica*,[96] employing the term *musicus* only in conjunction with either *theoricus*, *practicus*, or *poeticus* as a qualifier. Bartel's misreading is subtle but important: he reckons Listenius' opening chapter to redefine a *musicus* as someone who is competent in all three classes of musical knowledge (not 'orders of music', as Bartel suggests), when instead Listenius states that someone who is competent in all three classes of knowledge is a *musicus poeticus*. The slip causes Bartel to read *musicus poeticus* as a synonym for *musicus*, and by transferrance *musica poetica* as a synonym for *musica*. The latter equation has the effect of

[95] D. BARTEL, *Musica Poetica: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music*, pp. 19–20.

[96] CAHN, 'Zur Vorgeschichte', pp. 12–15, makes clear that whilst the *poeticus musicus* must be a master in all three classes of musical knowledge in Listenius' scheme, the *theoricus* or *practicus musicus* is no less a *musicus* for not having also mastered *musica poetica*.

rendering music ontologically poetic, causing Bartel to career away from sixteenth-century musical thought into assertions like 'music itself had become the language', and 'the composer… is called upon to reveal the meaning of the text in and through his music', as if the furtherance of textual or linguistic meaning was now the very reason for music's composition.[97]

In Bartel's narrative, however, the greater issue is that Listenius' *musica poetica* (which Bartel borrowed as the title for his own monograph) is subordinated to a history of something else entirely: the use of rhetorical figures in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century German music. Bartel is not really concerned for the historical truth of Listenius' discussion of *musica poetica*; Listenius is invoked purely so that the Baroque concept of *musica poetica* which Bartel employs (and which was very different from Listenius') can be demonstrated to have had such historical longevity that it effectively came to regulate the (ontological) concept of music. This was a necessary component in Bartel's overall argument: it was important to demonstrate that the idea of music-as-rhetoric was initially bound to a theological and national identity to which many of the subsequent protagonists in Bartel's narrative belonged, in order that a rhetorical *Figurenlehre* could be established as the most appropriate hermeneutic through which to expound their music-historical worth.

Here, again, Listenius's concept of *musica poetica* is served up as evidence for something else, and here, again, it is isolated as a 'source' of a new idea. The first section of Bartel's book (from which the passage quoted above is taken) is precisely the *search for origins* of the idea upon which Bartel's whole study rests: that music was considered a poetic art (and ontologically so) by

[97] It was, of course, if Monteverdi's *seconda pratica* is supposited in the thought of 'some German Lutheran writers', by which Bartel implies Listenius and Heinrich Faber. There are other problems with Bartel's book, including (as J. BUTT, Review of *Musica Poetica* by Bartel, *EMH*, XVIII (1999), 399, noted) that Bartel has a 'rather simplistic conception of the historiography of the period'. Sometimes, however, it is not Bartel's historiography but his history that is at fault; in the passage just quoted, for example, his chronology gives the impression that Adam von Fulda was a Lutheran, when in fact he was dead three years before Luther was sent to Wittenberg, and twelve years before the beginning of the Reformation.

composers of the German Baroque. It hardly needs to be observed that such a reading does not address Listenius' theory on its own terms.

(c) Wilhelm Seidel

Wilhelm Seidel, unlike Bartel and Niemöller, was interested in Listenius' textbook for the development in the concept of the musical *opus*, or 'work', it seems to substantiate. That Seidel's study is a conceptual history (*Begriffsgeschichte*) seeking to deal with the relationship between a concept and its instantiations is made clear by its title: *Werk und Werkbegriff in der Musikgeschichte* (1987). This polarization of concept from instantiation is an important device in Seidel's study, because it makes clear that the object of study is not the work-concept itself, but the *dialectic* between the musical work-concept and musical works throughout history.

Nevertheless, Seidel's study is a quest for origins, too. Ostensibly, he does not situate the origin of the musical work-concept in Listenius' *opus*, but rather sees it already evident in Tinctoris' *resfacta*.[98] But Seidel still situates the beginning of a 'modern' work-concept in Listenius—and, indeed, in Luther's theology.[99] As went Bartel, so goes Seidel (*mutatis mutandis*): on his opening page, Seidel observes that '*Musica poetica* is the discipline (*Lehre*) of creating music, and in a modern (*neuzeitlichen*) sense it is the discipline of composition'.[100] To be strictly accurate, Seidel is wrong, at least as far as Listenius (whom he is discussing) is concerned, for whom *musica poetica* is not the discipline of creating music, but the discipline of creating an *opus*.[101] This is not merely a cosmetic error, for Seidel's specific conflation of Listenius' *opus* with

[98] The questions about the meaning of *resfacta*, raised by E.T. FERAND, 'What is *Res facta*?', *JAMS*, X (1957), 141–50, and then answered decisively by BENT, '*Res facta* and *cantare super librum*', demonstrates the fragility of such an equation.

[99] SEIDEL, *Werk und Werkbegriff*, p. 83.

[100] Ibid., p. 3.

[101] Perhaps ironically, had Seidel been writing more generally about early German music theory, his statement would have been more accurate. Heinrich Faber, for example, reckoned *musica poetica* to be the discipline of the creation of new musical entities, either in written form or improvised. See H. FABER, *Musica Poetica*, (1548), and C. STROUX, 'Die Musica Poetica des Magisters Heinrich Faber'.

the much more general category *Musik* lays the foundation for asserting that the *opus*-criterion represents the principal designator of whether a musical composition is also a musical artwork.

Where Bartel ontologized *musica* to be *poetica*, Seidel ontologizes *Musik* to become a *Werk*. Again, this process of ontologism is not entertained by Listenius' text. Where Seidel places great significance on Listenius' enunciation of the musical *opus* and interprets that enunciation to give weight to the idea that *musica* is now to be understood as work-oriented, Listenius instead dwells on the construction-work that *musica poetica* demands. With double force, the sixteenth-century schoolmaster accentuates not only the end product but the procedural activity of *musica poetica* as a discipline, noting that it is that discipline concerned with 'making or fabricating' music (as if the apparent tautology was an important component of *musica poetica*,[102] and as if its *opus*-producing end was really only a way of identifying the point of completion of the process).[103] As the analysis of Bartel's study demonstrates, it is all too easy to turn an historical concept into an ontological proposition just by being sloppy with translations.

The interchangeability, then, that Seidel observes between the concept of *Musik* and Listenius' *opus* cannot be read out of the treatise's text. Seidel's amendment of Listenius' definition of *musica poetica* (the discipline whose end-product is an *opus perfectum et absolutum*) to something much broader (the discipline of creating *Musik*) comes about only because, *in Seidel's modern imagination*, musical work and *Musik* are interchangeable concepts. He consequently assumes, all too easily, that they were interchangeable concepts to Listenius, too.

[102] Lest I be accused of approximating Listenius' meaning, it should be noted that his 'faciendo sive fabricando' entails two very slightly different sorts of creation. 'Faciendo' is the sort of creation that is undertaken by those who make statues—a creation that derives from reality via imitation. 'Fabricando', on the other hand, refers to a sort of construction that is more architectural and is contributive to, rather than derivative of, existing reality.

[103] Von LOESCH, *Der Werkbegriff*, pp. 36–7, and GOEHR, *The Imaginary Museum*, p. 118, both dispute the suggestion that Listenius' process of *musica poetica* offers up a complete 'work' in the same sense a score might offer up a completed 'work' in twentieth-century musical thought. STROHM, 'Looking Back at Ourselves: The Problem with the Musical Work-Concept', p. 142, is right to dismiss these objections, which Listenius' treatise does not entertain. There is an important distinction between the observation that modern scholarship has tended to overstate the metahistorical significance of Listenius' *opus* as a complete composition and the suggestion that Listenius never really meant the *opus* to be complete in the first place.

Seidel's study is a quest for origins—this much is obvious enough. What is less clear, however, is that the origins which Seidel is searching out (the relationship between musical works and the work-concept) are the origins of the very system of musical aesthetics to which Seidel subscribes. In this sense the study represents a quest for its author's own origins as a modern historical and systematic musicologist, and its findings serve to entrench the validity of traditional systematic musicology even as they analyse it. Seidel is quite open about the fact that, as a consequence, his paradigmatic musical work-concept is shaped much less by its original promptings and much more by its aesthetic theorization after Hegel, which perhaps explains why he regarded Listenius' *opus* as a trope for the more general category *Musik*.[104]

(d) Carl Dahlhaus

The musical work-concept apologist *par excellence*, however, was Carl Dahlhaus. Arguably the most important European musicologist of the second half of the twentieth century, Dahlhaus sought to observe the aesthetics of a musical art that had become absolute (i.e. aesthetically autonomous), and to uncover their origins. In one of his later publications, he summarized the significance of Listenius' treatise for music history:

> An attempt to create a counter-model to the ancient and mediæval "theory of music" which (antithetically, in a way, with every step) constitutes a systematic musicology drawn from the European art music of modernity can conclude that the famous concept of the 'opus perfectum et absolutum' (with which Nicolaus Listenius (1533) characterized the musical artwork of the age of Josquin, and which has often been commented upon by music historians and described as nothing less than a manifestation of the emphatically 'Renaissance spirit' in music theory), had already been used, in late antiquity, by Martianus Capella, to describe the system of tones (*Tonsystem*). The difference implies, if one takes it seriously in the context of the history of ideas, nothing less than that in musical thought, the idea of the system of tones gave way to the idea of the work as the paradigm (or central concept) of a systematic musicology. (The 'dating' of the modern work-concept, which in some art forms came to prevail relatively early on whilst in others, by contrast, it never did, is not the point—rather, the mere fact that the work-concept undoubtedly represents one of the constituent categories of musical thought in modernity.)[105]

[104] SEIDEL, *Werk und Werkbegriff*, pp. 82ff.

[105] DAHLHAUS, 'Musikwissenschaft und systematische Musikwissenschaft', p. 38; the prose defies straightforward translation. Dahlhaus was wrong to ascribe the 'opus perfectum et absolutum' to Listenius' 1533 textbook; as we shall observe below, on p. 86, the phrase did not enter Listenius' lexicon until 1537.

Dahlhaus actually did not consider the musical work-concept to become a regulative concept (in the Kantian sense) for music until around 1800; I disagree, preferring Strohm's dating.[106] Nevertheless, in Dahlhaus' version of events, the beginnings of 'modernity' in music belong to this concept, the *opus* that had engendered the paradigm shift away from Martianus' *Tonsystem*.

Pace Dahlhaus' claim that 'the "dating"… is not the point', it is clear that he reckoned something important in the conceptualization of *musica* to have changed when Listenius discussed the *opus perfectum et absolutum*.[107] Given that his discussion above takes place in a section devoted to the exploration of the origins of a modern musical 'system', we can take it as read that Dahlhaus' isolation of the paradigm shift in Listenius' textbook amounts to a quest for the origins of the aesthetic system Dahlhaus devoted his entire career to studying.

* * *

These four musicologists represent some of the most prolific of recent writers to discuss Listenius, and their treatments of him and his theory can be regarded as broadly representative of others' contributions. (Two I have not discussed—Lydia Goehr and Reinhard Strohm—take a different view about Listenius, deprivileging his treatise's significance in the history of musical aesthetics, albeit for very different reasons.) All four treat Listenius as the 'horizon' for a particular concept that they seek to render normative for musical aesthetics; all four consider his treatise as the point of origination for an idea—the *beginning* of something important.

In a moment we shall turn our attention to the question of why they should have done so; but first, it is instructive to draw one conclusion. Listenius' *Musica*, and the music theory it expounds,

[106] E.g. STROHM, 'Looking Back at Ourselves', p. 136.
[107] This is not to say that Dahlhaus considered it to be fully *regulative*; indeed, he did not.

have classically been addressed from one of two perspectives: (i) as the origination point of a language- or rhetoric-oriented music-conceptual paradigm; and (ii) as either the point of origination or at least as evidence of the contemporary existence of a 'strong' musical work-concept. It is not my intention here to write off these approaches, because, as in each of the four cases discussed above, they serve their own purposes. But it is important to note that neither of them treats Listenius' theory simply *as* Listenius' theory; each invokes it to prove something else or to prop up a narrative on which the historiography and interpretation of later music has become dependent.

2. THE PREJUDICE OF EQUALITY

The subordination of Listenius' theory to narratives into whose shape it is made to fit raises important questions about the way in which music history is made up. In a paper from 1993, Reinhard Strohm noted, with characteristic eloquence, that '[m]usic history… does not hang together by material cohesion but by the thin air of thought'.[108] This may sound obvious enough, but in fact it is a profound statement about the nature of history: history exists in the eye of the beholder, and *only in the eye of the beholder*.[109] A similar observation was made by Foucault, who regarded the classical method of history writing to essentially be a means of seizing the past for one's own psychological gain.[110]

[108] STROHM, 'Musical Analysis as Part of Music History', p. 61.

[109] Or, if Le Goff is to believed, in the *memory* of the beholder. We submit that Augustine's definition of *memoria*, which Henry Chadwick aligned with Plato's *ἀνάμνησις* and explained as a sort of repository of knowledge that one knows but doesn't *know* one knows, is helpful here. STROHM, 'Late Medieval Sacred Songs', has explored some of the effects of these themes upon music historiography. The historical and thematic proximity of Strohm's subject-matter in this paper (the late mediæval *cantio* repertories) to Reformation song repertories suggests that his emerging Ricœurian methodology will be of great importance for students of Reformation music history in the years to come.

[110] FOUCAULT, *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 30–31.

The two characteristics of recent invocations of Listenius' *Musica*—that it represents the point of *beginning* for something else, and that the 'something else' is related to the historian in some way—both clarify as *acts of the historian* in the 'thin air of thought'. The associations are *made* by historians, not *discovered*. The quest for origins and the self-engagement of the historian-subject with the historical object of his (or her) gaze are not the necessary consequences of writing history; they are acts of the historian's will.[111]

1.2.1 Erecting Shared Horizons

I make this clarification because, in what follows below, we shall see that the same force of historiographical will-power has formed the image of Luther and his Reformation that has been absorbed into musicological studies. The fundamental issue, according to Gary Tomlinson in his excellent monograph *Music in Renaissance Magic* (1993), is that historians of the Renaissance (and we can add, the Reformation) generally prejudice the outcome of their historical research in two ways.[112] The first is by erecting a 'shared horizon' with the historicized object of scrutiny, finding a 'point of origin' that we and the true object of our concern can regard as generative for *both of us*.[113] The second is by using that 'shared horizon' as a means of collapsing the historical distance between the historian-subject and the historicized object, so that the historian-subject can consider the historicized object commensurable to himself. Borrowing conceptual apparatus from Tzvetan Todorov, Tomlinson described this pair of actions as a sort of presumption of 'translateability' across time and even across different *epistemes*, a kind of adoration that presupposes the historical subject under scrutiny can be addressed as Self, rather than alien Other. Historians, he noted, often

[111] That the will (*voluntas*) is not only self-ideological but also *socially conditioned* is worth clarifying: associations might be perfectly innocent (i.e. conventional) rather than subjectively motivated.

[112] TOMLINSON, *Music in Renaissance Magic*, p. 9. Tomlinson is one of a small number of historiographers of the sixteenth century who has addressed in some depth the reasons for the presentization of Renaissance historical figures. In addition to *Music in Renaissance Magic*, pp. 4–9, see TOMLINSON, 'Renaissance Humanism and Music'.

[113] Desire is a relevant concept in the historical gaze.

> [refuse] to put their own world in jeopardy, as Clifford might say. And they do this, in turn, in one of two ways: by asserting or implying the superiority of their modes of thought, those that dominate modern western society… or, conversely, by ignoring the distance between their modes of thought and those of their [historical subjects]. … Todorov conceives of these two failures as two distinct forms of prejudice: "If it is incontestable that the prejudice of superiority is an obstacle in the road to knowledge, we must also admit that the prejudice of equality is a still greater one, for it consists of identifying the other purely and simply with one's own 'ego ideal' (or with oneself)" (p. 165). Both of Todorov's prejudices function in the establishment and maintenance of Gramscian hegemonies. The prejudice of superiority does so by noting different conceptions of the world but simultaneously asserting their inferiority—their lesser truthfulness or naturalness. The prejudice of equality instead ignores difference altogether and thus proffers its own worldview as universal and unassailably true.[114]

The 'prejudice of superiority' which characterized imperial-era colonialist historiography is, thankfully, relatively uncommon nowadays in music historiography (though it maintains its stranglehold with disturbing vigour in certain 'presentist' analyses of mediæval music).[115] The 'prejudice of equality', meanwhile, globalizes the historian's perspective of himself and applies it anachronistically on to the events of the past. Present-day self-worth comes to be bolstered by the heritage the historian writes for himself. In the worst cases, the past is pillaged for nuggets of assurance that stabilize what Kevin Korsyn has called 'the often precarious identity of the individual' historian writing.[116]

The interrelated ideas of the linearity of time and a cumulativist (Whiggist) approach to history are critical props in this process of self-identification with the past. That the historiography of the German sixteenth century remains curiously obsessed with the categories of *innovation*, *development*, and—though one seldom hears it said any longer—*progress*, confirms the persistence of an evolutionary approach which relates Renaissance ancestor and modern descendent in the historiographical equivalent of genetic inheritance. In this sort of

[114] TOMLINSON, *Music in Renaissance Magic*, pp. 9–10, citing T. TODOROV, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, trans. R. Howard, New York, 1984. Tomlinson's assertion that historians *cannot* be entirely free from one or other of the two Todorovian prejudices is accepted here. That this is a controversial assertion is not a sufficient reason for rejecting it.

[115] See BENT, 'Grammar and Rhetoric in Late Medieval Polyphony', as well as her 'The Grammar of Early Music'.

[116] K. KORSYN, *Decentering Music*, p. 43, discussing an idea postulated by Terry Eagleton.

historiography the isolation of a common point of origination, or retrospective 'horizon', becomes a vital component in the ideology of history. If I can establish the *beginning* of something of which I am part (an epoch, or movement, or paradigm) then I can localize the revolution that gave birth to the self-identity I wish to inherit. If I can establish a continuum between an epochal or epistemic revolution and myself as historical agent, then I can establish a continuum between a past idea and my own subjectivity. In the case of the four historians of Listenius discussed in § 1, above, then, Listenius functions as this 'point of origin' for Niemöller's *sprachhafte Musik*, Bartel's *Figurenlehre*, Seidel's Hegelian work-concept, and Dahlhaus' autonomous aesthetic of absolute music.

Cultural historians, and cultural historians of the Renaissance in particular, seem strangely prone to this sort of horizon-building. It is made all the easier, in the case of students of the Renaissance, by the fact that their historical subject matter played the same game. As the philosopher Agnes Heller noted, 'the Renaissance was the first era'—not the last—'that *chose for itself a past*'.[117] Since the ideology of self-identity with a concocted past is actually autochthonous to the European Renaissance, modern-day historians' self-identification with their Renaissance-era subject acquires a veneer of historical authenticity.

A fine example is the case of Erwin Panofsky, an art historian whose ideological posturing is of redoubled interest because of the delayed impact of his findings upon musicological scholarship.[118] Panofsky was a 'Renaissance man' in the truest sense of the word: a specialist in the *Quattrocento*, he was also a leader in a significant revival of the *studia humanitatis* in America after

[117] A. HELLER, *Renaissance Man*, p. 90. It has been suggested that Heller was wrong and that the Renaissance was not the *first* era to do so; my argument stands, however, on the basis that the Renaissancists made a habit of choosing their own past, rather than upon their originality in doing so.

[118] STROHM, 'The Humanist Idea of a Common Revival of the Arts and Its Implications for Music History' (1991), which was then rewritten and expanded as his 'Music, Humanism, and the Idea of a "Rebirth" of the Arts' for the *New Oxford History of Music* supplementary vol. III.1 (2001), relies strongly on Panofsky's findings. Panofsky's influence is also discernible in STROHM, *The Rise of European Music*. Notwithstanding what follows here, I do not see that Panofsky's historiographical faults should invalidate Strohm's history, since Strohm provided so much further evidence for his assertions. Moreover, Strohm's reliance on Panofsky did not extend to Panofsky's qualitative distinction of the *rinascimento*.

the Second World War, and a great believer in the moral qualities the study of them could instil. He also argued in his *Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art* (1960) for a qualitative distinction between the cultural 'renascences' (little r) of the twelfth century and the 'Renaissance' (capital R) of the fifteenth—a proposal that amounted to the Victorine renascences being 'lesser' and 'not so significant' or 'meaningful' as the *quattrocento* Renaissance—on the grounds that the latter *chose for itself a past*.[119]

Panofsky's Renaissancist ideology was not properly subjected to a full critique until the 1980s, but it has now been widely acknowledged that his insistence on the uniqueness of fifteenth-century humanism was in large part dictated by the fact that he idolized the *Quattrocento*. Put another way, his claim for the importance of the fifteenth-century Renaissance was one means by which he *chose for himself a past*; the history he told was intimately related to his own self-identity as an art historian.[120] One historiographer noted that

> [i]f the classical past became the "object of a passionate nostalgia which found its symbolic expression in the re-emergence—after fifteen centuries—of that enchanting vision, Arcady," the Renaissance past assumed for Panofsky—despite his insistence on the permanence of the Renaissance—a similar object of nostalgia, a similar Arcady. Almost all of those things which Panofsky most prized, with the exception of Thomistic rationality, were embodied by the Renaissance. His very profession, that of historian, was the calling of an entire age. … Panofsky's nostalgic enterprise, his glorification of the Quattrocento, was finally a self-mirroring. Or rather, the idealized world of the Italian Renaissance was largely a projection of his idealized self.[121]

Panofsky's means of achieving self-identity with this Arcadian past was to bind it up into a single epoch with his own present:

> Panofsky asserted that due to the work of the Quattrocento, antiquity was recovered for good… Panofsky is taking the old tripartite division of history into antique, medieval, and modern epochs quite seriously, implying that the Renaissance and [Panofsky's] present are both parts of what the Germans call "die Neuzeit".[122]

[119] E. PANOFSKY, *Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art*; the thesis was based upon an earlier piece for the *Kenyon Review* (1944), a journal which shared much of Panofsky's ideology.

[120] K. MOXEY, 'Perspective, Panofsky, and the Philosophy of History'.

[121] C. LANDAUER, 'Erwin Panofsky and the Renascence of the Renaissance', 279, quoting PANOFSKY, *Renaissance and Renascences*, p. 113.

[122] LANDAUER, ibid., 274.

The Renaissancist ideology of an epochal shift through the 'rebirth' of all things antique was, for Panofsky, the antetype of the paradigm shift *he* hoped to embed in the mid-twentieth-century American academy (which had given him refuge from Nazism) through the 'rebirth' of the *studia humanitatis*. It was devotion to an idealized past, with which he could identify his own hopes and dreams for a humanistic future, that led Panofsky to insist so strongly upon the preservation of the fifteenth-century renascence as uniquely a Renaissance.

The quest for epochal beginnings and historians' self-identifying 'prejudice of equality', then, can be regarded as transformations of one another. Self-identity with the past implies that we are in the same 'time' as the past we observe and, epistemologically speaking, can consequently address the historical Other from a posture of assumed affinity. The focus on epochal and paradigm shifts, meanwhile, serves to delineate the extent to which addressing the past from a posture of assumed 'sameness' can be done, and to expand the compass of our structural domination to whatever point we find most compelling for our own self-identity. This represents a sort of historical 'power-grab', a mechanism that at once assimilates to the historian that part of the past he wishes to own and dominate for the purposes of his own self-worth, and rejects all that he does not wish to keep as a skeleton in his closet.[123] Such a power-grab, as Foucault noted, reifies the historical subject, petrifies his thought, abstracts it from the historical discourse in which it was situated and consequently deprives it of its own internal dynamic. Using this method, the historian can hardly fail to find what he set out to find; he becomes *possessor* of the past.[124]

[123] FOUCAULT, *The Order of Things*, noted the assumption of epistemic identity between historian and historical subject. He described his concept of *episteme* (p. xxiii) as 'the epistemological field… in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity'.

[124] FOUCAULT, 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History', p. 163; cit. TOMLINSON, *Music in Renaissance Magic*, p. 39.

1.2.2 Hagiographizing a Cultic Figure: Schünemann on Listenius

The erection of common 'horizons', assertions of common intellectual ancestry, and claims to structural continuity are likely enough consequences when, as in the Panofskian case, there is some moment in the historical past or some action by an historical agent with which we seek to identify. To a degree, these are the inescapable by-products of historiography; no one ever writes histories about events or agents in whom they have no interest, so the possibility of a wholly disinterested historical narrative is as good as negligible.

Unsurprisingly, then, Listenius' treatise has always been subjected to this sort of subordination to ideological horizon-building, too. In his facsimile edition of Listenius' *Musica* (1927), and in his broader study *Geschichte der deutschen Schulmusik* (1928—the original research for which led to Listenius' textbook's rediscovery), Georg Schünemann established for himself and Listenius a shared *telos* in the ideal of innovative music pedagogy:

> through his *Musica*, Listenius gave direction and purpose to music teaching that lasted over a generation. By his contribution, he assisted in safeguarding German musical culture and musical education.[125]

Schünemann hoped his own epitaph might read similarly. He was a leading educationalist in Weimar-Republic Germany, a deputy to Leo Kestenberg at the Prussian Ministry of Education and the Arts, and often proposed far-reaching educational reforms to school-music teaching.[126] Educational reform was a potentially dangerous area of research in interwar Germany, because any experimentation was often viewed as intrinsically communist.[127] Hans-Joachim Moser accused

[125] SCHÜNEMANN, 'Einführung', p. xxv.

[126] Schünemann and Kestenberg were colleagues as well as friends who corresponded all the way through the 1920s; their public personae, however, were very different from one another. 'War Kestenberg die Entscheidungskraft und der praktische Politiker, so fiel Schünemann die Rolle der Wissenschaftlers mit praktischen Sachverstand zu. Kestenberg kam aus den Reihen der linken Sozialdemokratie und hatte sich schon vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg als Kulturpolitiker profiliert. Er zeigte sich als energisch progressiver und politisch engagierter Künstler. Schünemann verkörperte der bürgerlichen Akademiker mit sozialen Ambitionen und die kritische Sachlichkeit des Wissenschaftlers, der versuchte, die politisch Problematik weitestgehen auszuklammern.' H. ELFTMANN, *Georg Schünemann (1884–1945): Musiker, Pädagoge, Wissenschaftler und Organisator*, p. 65.

[127] E.g. H.-J. MOSER, 'Zwischen Kultur und Zivilisation der Musik', which accused Heinrich Besseler—a future member of the SA!—of socialism for his 'Grundfragen des musikalischen Hörens'; cf. WEGMAN, '"Das musikalische

(cont.)

Kestenberg of 'Jewish-communist educational experiments',[128] and Schünemann's senior was swiftly dismissed when the National Socialists swept to power in 1933.[129] Schünemann himself, however, successfully assumed the guise of educational historian whenever his position became politically volatile, and was able to pass off his experimentalist tendencies as researches into past possibilities.

One cannot help but read out of Schünemann's estimation of Listenius a longing for a time when pedagogical innovation and experimentation was encouraged, in much the same way as Panofsky longed for a *rinascimento* 'Arcady' in which the *studia humanitatis* were prioritized. Indeed, Schünemann's sense of idealistic longing for pedagogical free-rein actually led him to *over*-emphasize the novelty of Listenius' method, and to vest in the sixteenth-century schoolmaster a music-pedagogical effloration that was in fact not unique to him. (Heinrich Faber, for instance, was at least as significant in the musical education of sixteenth-century German schoolboys, and in 'safeguarding German musical culture and musical education'.[130])

Since Schünemann's research into Listenius was the scholarship that first drew the *Musica* down from dusty library shelf and into the mainstream of music history, and since he was obviously taken with Listenius because he recognized a good deal of his own hopes for music pedagogy in the sixteenth-century schoolmaster's endeavours, we can say with confidence that Listenius' modern reception has always been ideologically driven in one way or another. The earliest subordination of Listenius to an ideological narrative (Schünemann's) was arguably the most convincing.[131] Since school music-teaching, as a discrete discipline with its own textbooks

(cont.)

Hören' in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance', esp. 438–41. Being identified as a socialist musicologist was tantamount to career suicide: one need only consider the ostracism of Hans Eisler, for example.

[128] MOSER, 'Die Stellung der Musik im deutschen Geistesleben der Gegenwart'.

[129] See A. GERHARD, 'Musikwissenschaft', p. 176.

[130] See NIEMÖLLER, 'Deutsche Musiktheorie im 16. Jahrhunderts' for a comparison of the number of impressions through which Listenius' *Musica* and Faber's *Compendiolum* went.

[131] The earliest review of Schünemann's facs. ed. of the *Musica*—written by a Frenchman for the *Revue Belge de Musicologie*—simply regurgitated Schünemann's conclusions uncritically, arguably lending them further credence. Had

(cont.)

and sacrosanct lesson times, began with the *Schulordnungen* of the German Reformation, and since Listenius' *Musica* represented the first music textbook written in response to a *Schulordnung* (see below, pp. 92–3), it is easy to conclude that Germanic school music pedagogy had always been implicitly innovative and progressive.[132]

But it is less obvious why Dahlhaus, Gurlitt, Niemöller, Bartel, and Seidel should have chosen to isolate the 'beginning' of (respectively) the regulative work-concept, the idea of composition, music's poetic paradigm, music's rhetorical paradigm, and the idea of a repeatable work in Listenius' 1537 textbook. All of them could easily have sourced their concept's origination elsewhere (for example in Hegel, Machaut, Monteverdi, Burmeister, and Tinctoris), and could arguably have done so more convincingly.

The only explanation is that there was some other reason—some other force of historical gravity—that led them to source the origin of their respective concepts in 1537, and in Listenius' textbook. We shall now turn our attention to what that other force of historical gravity was, and to why such eminent historians were under the impression that a major shift in aesthetic ideas ought to have occurred during the first part of the sixteenth century.

(cont.)

Schünemann's ideology been easier to detect we might expect that this should have been raised in the review. (L. de la LAURENCIE, Review of *Musica Nicolaii Listenii*, facs. ed. by Schünemann, *Revue Belge de Musicologie*, VIII (1927), 163.)

[132] Schünemann very eagerly noted ('Einführung', p. xxv) that the examples in Listenius' *Musica* were singable and came from real sources. I suspect Schünemann was globalizing the real-world origins of certain examples in the chant-theory section of his textbook to apply to the examples of the *pars secunda* as well. In spite of NIEMÖLLER, *Untersuchungen zur Musikpflege und Musikunterricht an den deutschen Lateinschulen vom ausgehenden Mittelalter bis um 1600*, p. 54, who notes that the examples are 'Musterwerke', I have not been able to identify them, nor to find anyone else who could.

3. THE IDEOLOGICAL WORTH OF LUTHER'S REFORMATION

On 31 October 1517, an Augustinian friar who taught biblical theology to young men at Wittenberg presented ninety-five theses the verity of which he intended to dispute on a future date.[133] Their subject matter was the hot-button theological issue of the moment in Wittenberg: the status of papal indulgences, currently being sold over the border in Saxony to recoup income on behalf of Albrecht, Archbishop-Elector of Mainz, who owed significant sums to the Fuggers after he had borrowed from them in order to finance his bid for the Electorship.[134] At the time it must have appeared as if the recalcitrant friar from the upstart university was seeking after only momentary notoriety, and, indeed, had the ecclesiastical authorities within and without Germany reacted in a different way, the whole business of his theses might have been quietly swept under the carpet and crisis averted. As it was, however, crisis was not averted; and Luther began his public dispute with the hierarchy of the German church, hammering out his distinctive set of theological proposals as he went. Only a few years later, Luther's theses and the year 1517 came to be regarded as the beginning of what we now call the Protestant Reformation in Europe.[135]

From the outset, then, Luther's Reformation was bound up with the category of the novel, of the epoch-shifting. This presentation by the Reformers of their movement as one having superhistorical significance poses a significant historiographical problem. As Reinhart Koselleck has noted, '[t]he Reformation as a movement of religious renewal carried with it all the signs of the End of the World', meaning that a defiance of historicization was implicit in its own self-

[133] E. ISERLOH, 'Luthers Thesenanlag—Tatsache oder Legende?' threw doubt upon the old legend that Luther actually nailed his theses to the door of the Castle Church at Wittenberg, on the basis that neither Luther nor any of his contemporaries made reference to it as an event. Numerous respondents have noted that the lack of reference to the event does not indicate that they weren't posted: see K. ALAND, ed., *Martin Luther's 95 Theses*; P.F. GRENDLER, 'The Universities of the Renaissance and Reformation', esp. 14–20.

[134] The specific nature of the Ninety-Five theses, as well as the deference to papal authority that runs through them, is often overlooked, as is the fact that they stood in the context of a long-running discussion of the nature of free will. See BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, pp. 17–44.

[135] Philipp Melanchthon, in his biography of Luther for the second impression of Luther's collected works (Wittenberg, 1548). In E. VANDIVER, R. KEEN, and T.D. FRAZEL, *Luther's Lives*, p. 19.

explanation.[136] The ideas of the Reformation were *meant* to be timeless; the Reformation disputes were fought over eternal, and not historical, truths. At the same time, however, the Reformation represents a point of decisive historical fracture, and is, as such, something profoundly *not* eternal. There was German life and culture *before* the Reformation and there was German life and culture *after* the Reformation, and in a very real sense they were quite different from one another.

The historiographical difficulty posed by the Reformation can be summarized as follows. The architecture of (at least Germanic) history writing takes its cue from certain epochal shifts, of which the Reformation is the latest; the *Neuzeit* is decisively separated from the *Mittelalter* by virtue of the tumult of Reformation—and the (Hegelian) liberation that it caused, historico-philosophically speaking. The Reformation comes, therefore, to demarcate history itself, to cut at the fabric of historicality, whilst being at once wholly and completely within it. How is an historian to deal with an event that quite literally—to borrow journalese, there being no better coinage—'made history'?

Even if one gets round the historical polyvalency of the Reformation as an event, one is met with the figure of Luther himself, an individual about whom one cannot be completely historiographically neutral. In the drama of history, Luther was either the heroic innovator who propelled the world forward into a new order, or he was the iconoclast *par excellence* who shattered a thousand years of doctrinal unity and order. This ought to be obvious enough: the Reformer 'belongs' to Protestants in a sort of timeless, eternal hagiographic present; in ecclesial communities across the world 'Reformation Day' is celebrated annually. To confessional Catholics, meanwhile, Luther remained until very recently an arch-heresiarch, a figure of devilishness who 'prowleth about, waiting to devour' the unguarded student, someone best relegated to the dustbin of historical obscurity for the sake of innocent souls.[137]

[136] KOSELLECK, *Futures Past*, p. 6.

[137] Indeed, Luther remained anathematized until the Second Vatican Council (1962–5) such that it was only possible to work openly on his thought if it found him a heretic (though a few historians got around this proscription

(cont.)

The significance of Luther and his Reformation for the architecture of German historiography and for the German historical imagination cannot be overstated; nor can his importance for the formation of German national identity. In the ideology of German imperialist historiography—which grew throughout the nineteenth century, was actively encouraged (albeit in a pacifist guise) by the Weimar authorities, took a turn towards racial prejudice under Nazism, and lived on, in a much reduced form and under the guise of modernism, after denazification—Luther's Reformation functions as the source of modernity (with its Bourgeois freedoms and enlightened consciences), the source of Germanicity (with its indigenous religion), and the source of vernacular linguistic creativity.

The phenomenal historico-philosophical power of the Reformation, and its chief protagonist, Luther, renders to both massive gravitational force whenever they are deployed in historical accounts. Like stars on the verge of collapse, they have the capacity to draw almost any historical data into their orbit by virtue of the sheer magnitude of their historico-philosophical gravity, a gravity that intensifies the nearer the data gets to their centre. The nature of their gravitational attraction is such that, the more massive the conceptual gravity of the idea they draw towards them, the stronger the attractive force. Modernity, Germanicity, and vernacular creativity (rhetorical poetics) are all significant structures in their own right, and all both *strengthen* and *are strengthened by* conceptual relations and interactions with the category of the Lutheran Reformation.

(cont.)

by asserting that Luther was 'forced' into his heresy by mediæval theological *Unklarheit*). Only with the publication of the Dogmatic Constitution *Lumen Gentium* (1964) were Catholic theologians enabled to study Luther from a perspective that did not begin from an accusation of heresy. This policy reversal meant that the Catholic histories of previous generations had to be effectively discarded: cf. H. JEDIN, 'Die Erforschung der kirchlichen Reformationsgeschichte seit 1876'; R. BÄUMER, 'Die Erforschung der kirchlichen Reformationsgeschichte seit 1931'. The apogee of Luther's rehabilitation amongst Catholics seems only to have passed very recently: see esp. the *Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification* by the Lutheran World Federation and the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity (1999), for which then-Joseph Card. Ratzinger is understood to have pushed; as well as Ratzinger's Luther-friendly General Audience as Pope Benedict XVI, 19 November 2008, in which he explained that 'l'espressione "sola fide" di Lutero è vera, se non si oppone la fede alla carità, all'amore'.

In what follows in this section, we observe the effect of this conceptual barycentricism upon the historiography of Listenius' textbook as a characteristically reformed music treatise.

1.3.1 Initia Reformationis – Initia Modernitatis

It was Hegel who identified Luther's Reformation as the moment of the liberation of the German psyche and the 'emancipation' of the immanent freedom of all humanity.[138] The Reformation, in Hegel's view, cut Germany (and later all of Northern Europe) away from a servitude to Rome that was so deep it amounted to totalitarianism. With its theology of salvation by faith alone, reformed religion abandoned the need for good works and a constant self-hatred still referred to colloquially as 'Catholic guilt'. It opened up the civic sphere to free and productive exchanges of ideas and prompted a reorganization of the social hierarchy best described in the terms of a new world order.[139]

Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Weber, either side of the turn of the twentieth century, both reckoned Hegel wrong about the nature of the Reformation's effects. Far from being *liberating*, they argued, the Reformation instead drove the 'free' into socially and psychologically orchestrated regimens so strict that they may even have been *worse* than what they replaced; Weber called this state 'incarceration'. But both Nietzsche and Weber identified this loss of true freedom as the identifying feature of *modernity*, an epoch distinct from that which came before the Reformation, so that in spite of their differences with Hegel's interpretation they ended up lending credence to the epochal shift he identified.[140] The Reformation was encoded into the

[138] This was immanent to Germanicity's *reine Innigkeit*, which stood in stark contrast to the Latin peoples' alienation of spirituality from sensuality (*Entzweiung*). HEGEL, *Phil. d. Weltg.*, II, 925; cit. L.W. BECK, 'The Reformation, the Revolution, and the Restoration in Hegel's Political Philosophy', 55.

[139] On Hegel's understanding of the Reformation, see M. WESTPHAL, *Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity*, pp. 149–64; for a revisionist reading, see C. FASOLT, 'Hegel's Ghost: Europe, the Reformation, and the Middle Ages'.

[140] M. WEBER, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, p. 181. F. NIETZSCHE, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, II, xxvii. On Nietzsche's view of Luther, see esp. M. BAEUMER, 'Nietzsche and Luther: A Testimony to Germanophilia'. For an enlightening application of the incarceration theme to music history, see D.K.L. CHUA, *Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning*, pp. 23–8.

German historiographical imagination as the gateway to *Neuzeit* even as late as 1962, by which time the thesis of 'modernity' ought really to have fallen into disuse: Jürgen Habermas used his *Habilitationsschrift* to assert that the Reformation ushered in a new era of socio-economic individuality and particularism later given the moniker *Neuzeit*.[141]

The nature of modernity itself—whether it amounts basically to a liberating force, or an incarcerating one—is a moot point;[142] what matters is that historians on every side agree that, *whatever sort of epoch the Reformation ushered in, we are still in it now*.[143] This erects a particularly strong 'shared horizon' in the Reformation for both the present-day historian with *any who came after it*.

The fundamental concepts of modernity are reckoned to be the rise of subjectivity, the creativity and dignity of man, and the right to self-determination (autonomy). These concepts are critical to a modern aesthetic, as well as to modern historiography, and it is no surprise that their point of origination in history is of concern to aesthetic and cultural historians. Amongst musicologists, Walter Wiora and Hermann Zenck both noted that the musical work-concept is necessarily bound up with the ideas of human creativity and self-awareness (*Bewußtsein*) that Hegel attributed to the German Reformation, an observation that automatically led them to view Listenius' *opus* as a manifestation of those ideas.[144] Others (e.g. Klaus Hortschansky) have preferred to attribute these concepts to the Italian Renaissance philosophy of man,[145] rather than the German Reformation;[146] but the ascription to Italy is simply a reflection of the fact that Italian

[141] J. HABERMAS, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit*.

[142] Indeed, one that is debated up to this very day: e.g. M.T. MJAARLAND, 'Does Modernity Begin with Luther?', *Studia Theologica: Nordic Journal of Theology*, LXIII (2009), 42–66.

[143] Notwithstanding the claims of postmodernists, who have made only muted headway in historiography.

[144] WIORA, 'Musica poetica und musikalisches Kunstwerk', p. 581; ZENCK, 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung', pp. 23–4.

[145] See esp. E. CASSIRER, J.H. RANDALL, and P.O. KRISTELLER, eds., *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, Chicago, 1948, pp. 1–20, for an introduction.

[146] K. HORTSCHANSKY, 'Musikwissenschaft und Bedeutungsforschung. Überlegungen zu einer Heuristik im Bereich der Musik der Renaissance', p. 85. It is too easy to blame the Hortschanskian attribution of 'modern' artistic autonomy to the Italian Renaissance-men (which, in any case, had a long tradition before Hortschansky proposed it) on a sort of Germanic inferiority complex. But it is worthy of note that the early historian-students of Italian Renaissance ideas were Germans; during World War II the pre-eminent researchers were German émigrés. Early interpretations of

(cont.)

humanists were consciously exploring concepts of human individuality that (Hegel argued) were already *innerlich* to Germans. (Edward Lowinsky, meanwhile, was happy to attribute the rise of the *ingenium*-concept to both cultures.[147])

One further concept of modernity, and one related specifically to the Reformation's liberating effects, that of capitalist market enterprise, was of particular importance for the emergent discipline of sociology at the turn of the twentieth century—the discipline upon whose methodology later German musicology would model its own. In a pair of essays first published in 1904–5 and then monographed in 1920, the German sociologist Max Weber asserted that Protestant teachings about the holiness of secular work contributed to the development of Western European capitalism.[148] Weber's suggestion was not that Protestantism begat capitalism—a common misreading easily deflected on the grounds that there had been capitalism long beforehand—but rather that Luther's theology of work proposed that making profit was now of ethical value. Luther's theology of work, argued Weber, replaced the (now rejected) hierarchy of Catholic morality enshrined in the principle of doing good works to gain salvation. Where good works in the unreformed understanding were consistently intangible and could never be perceived discretely—their only consequence or output being the eventual salvation of the believer's soul—Luther's idea of work was bound up with his understanding of God's calling on

(cont.)

the Italian Renaissance (which retain significant authority today) were consequently bound up with existing categories of *Neuzeit*.

[147] Cf. LOWINSKY, 'Musical Genius', 491–3, which notes that the music theory of Coclico demonstrated a detailed understanding of composerly genius. The concept of *ingenium* (which Lowinsky perhaps inadvisedly, in hindsight, translated with the English word 'genius') was not by any means new to the late *Quattrocento*; it had been used by St AUGUSTINE, *Contra Acad.* II, vii, 17; *De Conf.* XI.5, to describe that part of the human soul's ability that could not be learned by training. (Augustine had simply lifted the concept from QUINTILIAN, *Institutio Oratoria* Bk. X, ch. ii, 12.) The idea of art *per ingenium* had held currency at least since Abelard, who instructively considered his own *ingenium* a component in his exegetical process (his *ars*; see R.W. SOUTHERN, *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*, II, pp. 108–112), but was apparently not used to describe graphic artists until the early *Quattrocento* (see M. KEMP, 'From "Mimesis" to "Fantasia": The Quattrocento Vocabulary of Creation, Inspiration and Genius in the Visual Arts'). The difficulty in reconciling the twin concepts of *ars et ingenium*, frequently applied to Renaissance works of art by contemporary commentators, is discussed in an historiographical *tour de force* by P.A. EMISON, *Creating the "Divine" Artist: From Dante to Michaelangelo*, Appendix, 'The Historiography of *Ingegno*', pp. 321–48.

[148] M. WEBER, *The Protestant Ethic*, ch. 3.

an individual's life in *this* world—the individual's *job*, the successful and godly execution of which could be judged quantifiably in terms of output or production.

Weber exemplified his thesis via recourse to a translation made by Luther of a passage from the deutero-canonical scripture, Ecclesiasticus (which Weber refers to as 'Sirach', the usual title given to the book outside the Anglophone world), ch. 11 vv. 20–21. In English, the passage reads 'Stand by your agreement and attend to it, and grow old in your work. Do not wonder at the works of a sinner, but trust in the Lord and keep at your job; for it is easy in the sight of the Lord to make the poor rich suddenly, in an instant'. Weber noted that Luther translated the Greek ἔργον (for which the Hebrew is מְלָאכָה, from the root לאךְ) as 'Beruf', which for the Reformer denoted both 'job' and 'calling' or 'vocation', where Jerome's Latin used 'opus/opera' to translate both the word ἔργον (and מְלָאכָה) and the word more commonly rendered as work or works. This distinction in Luther's German translation between a 'job' ('Beruf') and the 'work' ('Arbeit') that the job entails demonstrated, according to Weber, the emergence of a morality of work in Luther's theology that reified the job or task of a worker. Furthermore, the transitiveness of Luther's sense, in which 'Beruf' identifies at once a 'job' and the calling on a believer's life to do that job, established a moral criterion for the adherence of the believer to his calling or vocation in the quantifiable success-rate of his output rate. In other words, under Luther's theology of calling and work, the devotion of the Christian to his calling from God could be determined by how well he *did his job*, a determination quantified in terms of profit.[149]

[149] Insofar as Weber's thesis relies on Luther's translation of the passage in question, it is rather weak. Luther was fond of Ecclesiasticus for what it was—a book of advice on how, practically speaking, the regular layman could serve God (cf. Luther's Bible xii:144–51). But he never preached from the book, and, indeed, campaigned for its exclusion from the canon of scripture. Within the translation of Ecclesiasticus, Luther's only uses 'Beruf' once; his other uses of the word (including *WA* x/III:95b, xli:624, and *WA BR* iv:534–6) apply specifically to ministry, or to the calling of a Christian to the gospel, or in the context of the rejection of good works as doctrinally necessary. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the passage in question was actually translated by Luther himself, since Melanchthon and Caspar Cruciger were also involved in the translation of the book. (S. RAEDER, 'The Exegetical and Hermeneutical Work of Martin Luther', p. 399.)

Although Weber's proposal (now usually simply called the 'Weber thesis') was critiqued almost from the day it appeared in print,[150] it was picked up by Dahlhaus in 1966 and applied to the *musical* work-concept that he saw emerging in Listenius' *opus*. Dahlhaus observed that

> [t]he positive accentuation of 'opus' and 'labor' betray Listenius' Protestant spirit. That Luther translated the Greek ἔργον [ergon] and the Latin 'opus' with the word *Beruf* (Sirach 11 v. 20) has already been pointed out by Max Weber.[151]

Here, Weber's capitalist *output* (which, recall, was now *ethically good*) is analogized with Listenius' *opus*. Luther's supposed theology of work, with its putative emphasis on the ethics of output (an *opus perfectum et absolutum*?) is offered as the impetus for Listenius' *opus* (which Dahlhaus would later describe as the basis of a modern musical aesthetic system). This allegiance of Luther's theology of work, via Weber's thesis, to Listenius' concept of the *opus* firmly wedded Reformation theology to Dahlhaus' claims about the development of modern musical aesthetics.[152]

The historical coincidence of a modern work-concept, Luther's theology and Listenius' *opus*—all emergent after about 1530—gives further credence to their relatedness. The proposed title of von Loesch's work, which we saw him reject on p. 1, above, was 'Die Geburt des Werkbegriffs aus dem Geiste des Protestantismus'. Punning on Weber's title ('Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus')—although he scarcely references Weber's work in the final *Schrift*—von Loesch makes clear that the assumption he made about the structural similarity between a musical work-concept, Listenius' *opus*, and Luther's theology was based not just upon the intermediary of Weber's modern-capitalism thesis, but also on the apparent historical relationship between them.

[150] Two representative and readable critiques include A. HYMA, 'The Economic Views of the Protestant Reformers', in R.W. Green, ed., *Protestantism and Capitalism: The Weber Thesis and Its Critics*, Boston, 1959; and G. LINDT GOLLIN, 'The Religious Factor in Social Change: Max Weber and the Moravian Paradox', *Archives de Sociologie de Réligions*, XXIII (1967), 91–7. MCGRATH, *Reformation Thought: An Introduction*, p. 270, notes sagely that '[i]n some circles, the Weber thesis is regarded as utterly discredited; in others, it lives on'.

[151] DAHLHAUS, 'Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie', 114 and n. 20.

[152] A similar marriage was performed by O. MARQUARD, 'Gesamtkunstwerk und Identitätssystem', which proposed that the concept of fine arts (*schöne Kunste*) grew from Luther's rejection of Roman 'good works'. (The idea makes sense only in the context in which Marquard made it: in a critique of Hegel's philosophy.)

> Listenius had studied at the University of Wittenberg between 1529 and 1531, at a time when Martin Luther and Philipp Melanchthon taught there. No lesser figure than Johannes Bugenhagen had written the foreword to the first impression of the *Musica*. Virtually all the theorists following Listenius [in his discussion of the work-concept] were Lutherans and had often also studied at the University of Wittenberg.[153]

The means of association ('in the thin air of thought') of Listenius' work-concept and Luther's theology, then, is simply their historical proximity to one another, and their common subordination to a narrative of modernity.

All the characteristics of a Todorovian prejudice are fulfilled in this sort of association. The 'shared horizon' of a Lutheran concept of work is erected so that the historian and the historical object (Listenius) can become part of the same 'modernity' in which effortful acts count as 'work'; the metaphysical distance between historian and historical is collapsed, so that the 'modern' work-concept of musical thought post-1800 can be globalized back on to Listenius' textbook.

1.3.2 Martin Luther, summus germanicus

If the modernity narrative is the most important ideology to which both Listenius' music theory and Reformation theology have been subordinated, then it is closely followed in importance by the ideology of German national identity. We have already seen how, via Hegel's concept of Reformation and artistic originality as *innerlich* to Germanic history, and via Schünemann's claims that Listenius represented a principal forefather of Germanic music pedagogy, Listenius' treatise could be strong-armed into supporting a German musical identity-narrative.

But a more potent emulsifier of Listenius' theory and German national identity is the apparent proximity (both historically and ideologically) between Listenius as father of German music theory and Luther as father of the German nation and (on account of his love of music) German

[153] Von LOESCH, *Der Werkbegriff*, p. 1.

musical 'spirit'. For the equation of Luther with (a) German national identity; and (b) German musical greatness became increasingly important in the years after 1883.

As early as 1807 the figure of Luther had already been dehistoricized and apotheosed as *homo germanicus* by Fichte.[154] After the unification of the German Empire in 1871, the shared vision of a German racial ideal became all the more intensely sought-after, and the ideological autonomization begun in Fichte's Luther became mainstream. This investiture of the horizon for Germanic racial idealism in a dehistoricized Luther was vital, sociologically speaking, for the health of the new German imperial spirit: if the source of *Deutschtum* (rather than local identity) could be identified in Luther as father of Germany, then German nationality could congeal around a pre-existing common heritage.[155]

That for the sake of political expediency Luther positioned himself as a German nationalist in his own writings served only to intensify the self-identity of German Romantic historians with the Reformer.[156] (It did not hurt, either, for the identification of the Germanic character with Luther's, that Luther had gone to Rome in 1517, and come back disgusted at what he saw as Italianate complacency about religion.[157]) In 1883, Heinrich von Treitschke wrote of Luther that

> [a] puzzled foreigner may well ask how such miraculous contrasts can go together in one soul: the violence of his crushing wrath and the intensity of his pious belief, such high wisdom and such childish simplicity, so much deep mysticism and so much love of life, such ungainly coarseness and such tender goodness of heart.… For us Germans there is no mystery in this, we can just say: this is blood of our blood. From the deep eyes of this genuine German farmer's son flashed the old heroism of the Germanic people, which does not flee the world but tries to rule it through the power of the moral will…[158]

[154] J.G. FICHTE, *Addresses to the German Nation*, pp. 94–107.

[155] For a concise introduction, see A.T. DAVIES, *Infected Christianity*, esp. ch. 2, 'The Germanic Christ', pp. 27–54. The themes of modernity, self-testimony, power, and historiographical witness are discussed in P. RICŒUR, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, *passim*, but esp. pp. 305–14.

[156] E.g. his *An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation* (1520; *WA* vi:404–69), which played up the 'Germanness' of the nobility to whom Luther was addressing his proposals, in an attempt to raise their hackles about papal interventionism.

[157] The one-sided biography of Luther, R.H. BAINTON, *Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther*, pp. 29–32, makes this point rather nicely.

[158] H. von TREITSCHKE, 'Luther und die deutsche Nation', *Preußische Jahrbücher*, LII (1883), 469–86: 484; cit. and trans. J.H. BRINKS, 'Luther and the German State', 2.

In the same year (the 400th anniversary of the Reformer's birth), the *Weimare Ausgabe* of Luther's complete works (only very recently completed[159]) was begun, in order that the thought of the *Urdeutscher* might be mined for its wisdom.[160] Almost forty years later, Karl Holl's highly influential view of Luther as prototypical German revived von Treitschke's cultic figure of Germanic self-identity,[161] which was perpetuated by Emanuel Hirsch and others in the years after the Great War.[162] Over the course of the early twentieth century, Luther, as *summus germanicus*, continued to represent at once source and fulfilment of *Deutschtum*, the Germanic nationalist ideal.

With the foundation of *Musikwissenschaft* as a serious university discipline (proposed by Guido Adler in 1885, and finally achieved meaningfully after Riemann's chair at Leipzig was revived in the late 1920s), the question of *Deutschtum* was incorporated into musicological research, too.[163] Indeed, the humiliation of defeat in the First World War, the break-up of imperial territory, and the profound lack of funding from central government conspired to intensify the search for it.[164] *Deutschtum* became a recurring theme in Weimar-era musicological study, and serving the 'public good' by promoting German culture and heritage through research and editions of early German music provided musicologists with a sure-fire mechanism for securing funding. This survivalist adaptability of Weimar-era musicologists to government grant restrictions only strengthened the latent association between music and *Deutschtum*: if, as the nationalists had supposed ever since Riemann,[165] the best music was *de facto* German music, then

[159] In 2009.

[160] See K. KUPISCH, 'The "Luther Renaissance"', 41.

[161] K. HOLL, *Gesammelte Aufsätze der Kirchengeschichte*, I, ch. 1, 'Luther', pp. 18, 396–404, but esp. 108–10.

[162] See H. ASSEL, *Der Andere Aufbruch. Die Lutherrenaissance*, pp. 15–16.

[163] See H. HÜSCHEN, 'Universität und Musik'. Although Riemann won his chair at Leipzig in 1901, it was personal and lapsed on his death. Berlin (1904), Munich (1909), Bonn (1915) and Halle (1918) all founded named chairs, and then over the course of the Weimar Republic, with the establishment of either personal or named chairs at Breslau, Göttingen, Leipzig, Heidelberg, Kiel, Freiburg and Cologne, the teaching of *Musikwissenschaft* became mainstream.

[164] P.M. POTTER, 'Musical Life in Berlin from Weimar to Hitler', p. 92.

[165] A. REHDING, *Hugo Riemann and the Birth of Musical Thought*, p. 130, notes that in the '*Geschichte der Musiktheorie* of 1898, the summation of his theoretical ideas, [Riemann] included an extraordinary account of the purported origin of music, which amounts to no less than a musicological "myth of ethnic election".' Another 'myth of

(cont.)

research into music was useful insofar as it offered a penetrating insight into the German psyche. The wellspring of German music's ontological greatness was a cause of great concern: between 1918 and 1932, six new scholarly journals were established whose aim was specifically the research of German musical culture, alongside ten further journals which might broadly be grouped together under emphases on German music education and youth music;[166] Paul Bülow's edited volume entitled *Deutschtum und Musik* and Joseph Müller-Blattau's article 'Das Deutsche in der Musik' both went to press in 1929,[167] but they had already been exceeded in historical research by Moser's *Geschichte der deutschen Musik* (1920), which, its author explained, was written so that, despite the 'break-up' of Germany following the Great War, Germans of all nations may not be 'ashamed of their Germanness'.[168]

Moser's other *magnum opus*—his *Evangelische Kirchenmusik in Deutschland*—points (at least in his mind) to a latent association between Lutheran musical invention and German national identity.[169] Patriotic *Burschenschaften* assembled during the nineteenth century across German lands, whose regular meetings were characterized by nationalist singing, not only of folk ballads but also of Lutheran chorales.[170] Post-Bismarkian nationalist fervour was consequently bound up with singing practices that were considered intrinsically German; their intrinsic Germanness was, in turn, assured by their stylistic relationship with the song practices of the early Reformation.

(cont.)

ethnic election' was proposed by Heinrich Schenker, who noted that Mozart's formal 'law of synthesis' was received 'from God's hand' (SCHENKER, *Der Tonwille*, Cambridge, 2004, p. 64). The study of music psychology, so privileged under the Weimar Republic, was little more than a smokescreen for universalizing nineteenth-century German harmony and form as the pinnacle of a musical perfection that had been immanent in human biology since time immemorial.

[166] POTTER, *Most German of the Arts*, p. 105.

[167] P. BÜLOW, ed., *Deutschtum und Musik*, Leipzig, 1929 (the subject-matter was contemporary music); J. MÜLLER-BLATTAU, 'Das Deutsche in der Musik', *Singgemeinde*, V (1928/29), 145–54, 188–94.

[168] MOSER, *Geschichte der Musik in Deutschland*, I, pp. xi–xii.

[169] Berlin, 1953.

[170] By the early twentieth century, the importance of Protestant hymn-singing in the rituals of the fraternities had intensified. Hymn-singing took on a militaristic lustre in the interwar years: see D.L. BERGEN, 'Hosanna or "Hilf, O Herr Uns": National Identity, the German Christian Movement, and the "Dejudaization" of Sacred Music in the Third Reich', pp. 142–5, for an overview.

The most clear isolation of Luther as both the source of German *Volkish*ness and German musical superiority during this period came with the publication of Hermann Abert's pamphlet-piece, *Luther und die Musik* (1924, republ. 1929). The assimilation of Luther as 'source' of German history with German musical superiority is so seamless that it is difficult to represent without regurgitating Abert's text. Here are some selections:

> In former and present times, 'Luther and music' has been a topic that has stirred our whole German nation right across the spectrum of theological and musical experts and beyond. For alongside the Luther who pinned up his theses in Wittenberg and later burned the papal bull, alongside the Luther of the Reichstag at Worms and the Luther of the Wartburg, there lives on in our own day another, more familiar Luther, who, alone at home, pays homage to his beloved *Frau Musica* with delight in his heart. That [other Luther] has become such a part of our flesh and blood that we would not be able even to consider an unmusical Luther.[171]

> That which we first catch sight of in Luther the Musician, and which recurs subsequently in all great German musicians (most strongly in Bach and Beethoven), is the high, idealistic notion of the moral power and purpose of music, that we can identify as specifically German, the very opposite of Roman. … With Luther, [the worth, power and purpose] of music permeates his whole being; his love for music was so deep and real, just like his whole soul, and moreover it took over his unique streak of energy and zeal. In the same way that his whole personality was true to his origin (*ursprünglich*), Luther was true to his origin in going right to the heart of music, above all else. In this there is nothing of the modern, anaemic, lighthearted musical puppy-love, but rather one is reminded of the potent saying of Beethoven, that music should strike men like fire of the soul. All his musical remarks speak of the truly Lutheran devotion to the whole person in all things, [the devotion] that knows neither trivialities nor obscurity. Music struck like fire in Luther's soul in a way that it did in few others.[172]

> The idea, that music is one of the things that builds up the whole *Volk* for the shared experience that undergirds [a people's] vital power, was already present in [Luther's] generation, but it was restored to the *Volk* in ever increasing measure and was so firmly grafted in to her Germanness in the German music of the seventeenth century that it can be held up as a counterpart to the unleashing of the personally-centred current of Italian Renaissancism. A Bach was only possible on German soil, and that is, in the end, Luther's doing.[173]

> Our motto [for the present] should not, however, be: back to Luther!, but rather: forwards to Luther! Then we shall be on the road, in the musical arena, to a future that is better and filled with greater blessings for our whole nation.[174]

[171] H. ABERT, *Luther und die Musik* (Wittenberg, 1924), republ. in ABERT, *Gesammelte Schriften*, p. 103.
[172] Ibid. p. 104.
[173] Ibid., p. 118.
[174] Ibid., p. 119.

Abert's strongly nationalistic, slightly unsettling, and fiercely musical analysis of Luther went a good deal further both in its assimilation of Germanicity, musicality and Lutheranism, and in its imperialist tone, than did any of the other Weimar-era commentaries. This does not mean that Abert's contemporaries in German musicology departments regarded Luther as less significant for musical *Deutschtum* than he did; on the contrary, it suggests they reckoned the Reformer's significance went without saying.[175] Fichte's, Treitschke's, Holl's, and Hirsch's observations about the *Deutschtum* of Luther's religious character were givens in this climate of *Deutschtum*-pursuit, and even the unlikeliest of scholars gave credence to the idea that Luther was the ultimate fount of German musical superiority.[176]

Under Nazism, nationalism and musicology and nationalism and Lutheranism continued to intermingle, taking (as with so much of German nationalism) a sinister turn. The *Reichsmusiktage* of 1938, which included an exhibition of 'degenerate music' that failed to meet the Germanic ideal, heard papers from such musicological luminaries as Gerhard Pietzsch, Rudolf Steglich, Joseph Müller-Blattau and Friedrich Blume,[177] as well as Joseph Göbbels, Reichsminister for Propaganda.[178] Göbbels isolated what, in the government's view, made German music so superior:

[175] Blume's editorship of Abert's *Gesammelte Schriften*, for example, and his inclusion of 'Luther und die Musik' in the collection, suggests that he had high regard for Abert's Lutherolatry.

[176] Wilibald Gurlitt, for example, who was not well inclined towards the search for *Deutschtum* in music (e.g. GURLITT, 'Der gegenwärtige Stand der deutschen Musikwissenschaft'; 'Vom Deutschtum in der Musik'; both articles are conspicuous by their absence from Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht's edited Gurlitt *variorum*, *Musikgeschichte und Gegenwart*), nevertheless undertook to examine the significance of Walter from the perspective of Germanicity, and fidelity to Luther's theology, and found him to be Germany's *Urkantor*. See GURLITT, 'Johannes Walter', esp. 79–101, which essentially overturn the historiographical methodology used in the previous ninety pages.

[177] Most of the participants at the *Reichsmusiktage* evaded denazification. Müller-Blattau actively supported Nazism (though this may have had more to do with his own career prospects than a personal political persuasion: see POTTER, *Most German of the Arts*, pp. 103–4); Moser wrote in favour of the Führer's racial policies in the 1930s; Blume went on to edit *MGG* (L. LÜTTEKEN, Report on *MGG II*, 139) and head up the *Gesellschaft für Musikforschung*, having been supplied with fake references by Oxford friends and colleagues (THACKER, *Music after Hitler*, p. 73). Eggebrecht, meanwhile, who had not even gained his doctorate at the time war broke out, served as a volunteer in a brutal division of the SA served with carrying out mass executions of the Jews, before lying about his wartime deployment to officials in order to secure a teaching position at Jena (see B. von HAKEN, *Holocaust und Musikwissenschaft: Biographische Untersuchungen zu Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht*, Tübingen, 2011).

[178] See A. DÜMLING and P. GIRTH, eds., *Entartete Musik*, pp. 105–10; for an account, cf. DÜMLING, 'The Target of Racial Purity: The 'Degenerate Music' Exhibition in Düsseldorf, 1938'.

Melodie.[179] Truly patriotic German composers, he counselled, could be identified by their dedication to it. It cannot have evaded his listeners' notice that the originator of *Melodie* as an explicit *topos* of German musical culture was held to be none other than Luther, in his rallying-cry for German chorale composers.[180]

The exaltation of Luther as *summus germanicus* further intensified under Nazism, to the extent that one post-War historian has even labelled pre-1945 treatments of the Reformer biographies not of Luther but of the 'Person der Weltgeschichte'.[181] So strong was the force of Luther's *Deutschtum* in the German national identity narrative that Joseph Lortz, as 'brown' a theologian as ever there was (and a Catholic priest to boot),[182] actually reckoned Luther to be a *unifying* figure for Christian ecumenism, rather than a figure of division between Catholic and Protestant.[183]

As the chief begetter of all that is German, it was always going to be the case that Luther, and his Reformation—which since Hegel had been considered Germany's revolution[184]—was also viewed as the ultimate progenitor of that which made German music characteristically German. Zenck, in his 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung', noted that, unlike the Italian humanists, the German humanists codified their understanding of human poietic creativity in

[179] J. GÖBBELS, 'Zehn Grundsätze deutschen Musikschaffens', speech, 28 May 1938; facs. in DÜMLING and GIRTH, eds., *Entartete Musik*, p. 123.

[180] The association between *Melodie* and chorale was well established by the 1930s. A. REISSMANN, *Illustrierte Geschichte der deutschen Musik*, p. 172, noted 'Wie der katholische Kirchengesang am alten *gregorianischen* Hymnus festhield und sich dabei ausschliesslich der lateinischen Sprache bedeinte, so wurde Quelle und Grundlage des *protestantischen* Kirchengesanges die *Liedmelodie*, in *deutscher* Sprache gesungen' (emphases original). MOSER, *Geschichte der deutschen Musik*, I, p. 389, quoted the observation of hymnologist Paul Eber (1511–69) that Luther '[hat] die Stücke des Katechismus und etlich Bet- und Dankpsalmen Davids in deutsche Reime und *liebliche Melodien* gefaßt' (emphases original), as well as similar remarks from Johannes Sleidanus (an early Reformation archivist) and Walter.

[181] OBERMAN, 'Luther and the *Via Moderna*: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough', 644–5 and n. 11.

[182] Lortz was a Nazi party member (he appears never to have withdrawn his membership) and the co-founder of the organization 'Kreuz und Hakenkreuz' ('Cross and Swastika'). See R. MARIUS, *Luther*, pp. 246–8.

[183] J. LORTZ, *Die Reformation: Thesen als Handreichung bei ökumenischen Gesprächen*, Meitigen-bei-Augsburg, 1940, repr. 1945, p. 2; cit. OBERMAN, 'Luther and the Via Moderna', 644–5 and n. 11. See also J.M. WINTER, *Luther Bible Research in the Context of Volkish Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 15–30, for an introduction to the reception of Luther in German nationalism.

[184] BECK, 'The Reformation, the Revolution', 55.

Listenius' *musica poetica*—a codification that was owed to Luther;[185] Dahlhaus' invocation of Listenius in his article from 1966, quoted above, was actually made only so that he could demonstrate that *musica poetica* was a 'precarious concept', whose stable interpretation as 'Kompositionslehre' in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Germany was made possible only through the hermeneutic unity afforded by a common Lutheran religiosity.[186] Bartel, likewise, situated the beginnings of Listenius' *musica poetica* in 'the Lutheran north', whilst Seidel reckoned that Luther actually fleshed out Listenius' concept of *opus* by suggesting it was ontologically polyphonic.[187] The strongest equation of Luther with German music's origins, however, actually *post*-date both Listenius and Luther. For, since his own revival in the early nineteenth century, J.S. Bach has been considered both the *musicus germanicus* and *musicus evangelicalis* bar none. That Bach was a devout Lutheran has inspired countless studies in which Bach's pre-eminence as Germanic composer has been merged with Luther's pre-eminence as Germanic theologian; one recent scholar has even noted that Bach was treated by many twentieth-century scholars as 'Luther's musical prophet'.[188] (The flip side of this coin, of course, is that Luther has long been treated as Bach's musical deity.)

1.3.3 Vernacularity and Rhetoric

One important transformation of both the modernity and Germanicity narratives by which the Reformation's metahistorical significance has been determined is the narrative of modern German

[185] ZENCK, 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung', p. 28: the musical ideas that 'gewiß als spezifisch deutsch angesprochen darf'… 'hat seine Wurzeln in der persönlichen musikalischen Grunderfahrung Luthers'.

[186] DAHLHAUS, 'Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie', 114. The apparent necessity of an output to Listenius' *musica poetica* was something Dahlhaus could not reconcile to the concept of music as an *ars liberalis*. Instead, he proposed that the Germans treated music more as an *ars mechanicalis* as the *opus* became an increasingly important concept to them. But Listenius and his contemporaries made no suggestion that music should be conceptualized as anything other than an *ars liberalis* (indeed, the opening words of the *Musica* reiterate the classic definition of an *musica* as a *scientia*, i.e., an *ars liberalis*); it was rather Dahlhaus' rigid application of Weber's thesis, and his artificial polarization between Germanic musical ideas and Italian musical ideas, that caused him to read Listenius' *opus* as if it mandated the reclassification of *musica*.

[187] SEIDEL, *Werk und Werkbegriff*, p. 83.

[188] R. LLOYD, 'Bach: Luther's Musical Prophet?'

vernacularity. Luther's rôle in the campaign for vernacularity (begun during the thirteenth century and won decisively by the eighteenth) can hardly be overstated; his rejection of Latin as the sole normative language for worship, and his promotion of vernacular hymnody are two of the most widely celebrated consequences of the Reformation—both now components of Roman Catholic worship, too.

The ideology of a 'linguistic reformation', proposed by Niemöller as an explanation of Listenius' *musica poetica*, was supported by Thrasybulos Georgiades in his *Musik und Sprache* of 1964 in a slightly different form. Georgiades was Greek by birth, but moved to Munich in 1930 and became a great lover of German culture. For Georgiades, the influence of the German *language* upon musical development explains German music's later superiority, and functions as the breakwater between a mediæval and modern musical paradigm.

> In Latin the act of speaking is not completely identical with the meaning. A wide gulf separates [the German] linguistic attitude from that of Latin. … The content of meaning not only is represented indirectly by means of the sentence structure, but is realized directly in the sound. … The German language is attached to a human attitude in which the objective can only be viewed through the medium of the subjective, the outer world only through the inner. How great is the significance thus attached to accentuation, in that it becomes the vehicle of meaning, that it seems to take on the power of creating the word! And how fundamentally does this transform the task of music![189]

In this version of events, the Luther who is *fons et origo* of Germanicity and modernity recedes, and the credit for the German *Neuzeit* aesthetic is instead lain at the feet of German vernacularity. (Luther merely embraced what was immanently German.) Nevertheless, the idea of a linguistic reformation is predicated upon Luther's promotion of the German language and the Reformation-era emphasis upon textual meaning:

> Thus we can say that the German language's dependence on meaning and thereby its quality of immediate presence are forces on which the Reformation also draws. Luther's creative act consists not least in having subjected himself to the command of the German word.[190]

[189] T. GEORGIADES, *Music and Language*, pp. 49–51.
[190] Ibid., 58.

Georgiades' account presents Luther not as the *Urdeutscher*, but as the great discoverer of what it really meant to *be* a German—to 'subject himself' to the very essence of German identity, 'the command of the German word'. Georgiades thereby gave musicological credence to an ideological assumption first explored by the nationalist formalist aestheticians Forkel, Hanslick, and Humboldt, all of whom identified linguistic earthiness (authenticity)—like Abert's musical earthiness—with the Germanic psyche refined and clarified in the Reformation:[191] German music, German linguistic identity, the German psyche, and the German Reformation ideal are all equivalent transformations of one another.

It may well be that those music historians who have equated Listenius' *musica poetica* with a proposal for music's rhetoricization (Zenck, Gurlitt, Niemöller) have done so because they expected Luther's putative vernacularization and rhetoricization of the German language to have been reflected in musical aesthetics. Certainly, the idea that music should be rhetorical because Luther was concerned for rhetoric was expounded in Peter Cahn's study on the prehistory of the *opus perfectum et absolutum* from 1987. The 'invention' of *musica poetica* by Listenius, Cahn suggested, represented a 'narrowing' of the idea of musical poetics brought about by the Reformation-humanist concern for rhetoric in preaching.[192] Cahn supplied evidence for this concern in the form of a letter from Luther to Spalatin (1519) in which the Reformer pleaded for the teaching of Quintilian's oratory.[193] Listenius' discussion of *musica poetica*, Cahn asserted, is basically the *Inst. Orat.* II/18 applied to music.[194] In this version of events, Luther's plea for solid preaching is applied laterally to music theory, and the oratorical concern of Luther functions as the direct prompt for the invention of a rhetorical musical poetics.[195]

[191] For a discussion, see DAHLHAUS, *The Idea of Absolute Music*, pp. 103–16.
[192] CAHN, 'Zur Vorgeschichte', p. 15.
[193] *WA BR* i:562.
[194] DAHLHAUS, 'Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie', 113, had made the same point.
[195] CAHN, 'Zur Vorgeschichte', pp. 15–16. The latter idea had been floated by GURLITT, 'Musik und Rhetorik'.

The conflation of Luther's concern for preaching the word and the apparent rhetorical turn in contemporaneous music theory textbooks is persuasive, not least because Luther *was* profoundly concerned with the rhetoric of preaching on theological grounds. The word, Luther historian Marc Lienhard explained, was central to the Reformer's understanding of the way in which human beings could relate to God:

> Christ became incarnate. He accomplished the work of salvation. He reconciled us with God and triumphed over the powers which oppressed us. But how can we benefit from this work of salvation? How is the individual person integrated into this salvation thus obtained once for all? How do I recognize my Savior in this Christ, this man of the past, submissive in the ambiguity of the incarnation and the passion? Christ must come to me in a certain way if they are to be present for me and convince me of their saving activity. That is done by the announcement of the Word. If the gospel, as a Word binding us to Christ, is not preached, Christ does not exist for us.[196]

Robin Leaver, in particular, has argued strongly for the idea of music's predicatory potential to be considered a core component of Luther's musical aesthetic.[197]

But noting that Luther's concern for rhetorical preaching grows out of a concern for evangelistic ministry is not at all the same thing as noting that contemporary rhetorical developments in music theory grow out of the Reformer's attention to evangelism. There are a number of problems with Cahn's claim (though there is nothing necessarily wrong with the conclusions Cahn draws). The first is that, even if Listenius was indeed channelling Quintilian in his discussion of *musica poetica*, Quintilian cannot be regarded as the sole reason for his reclassification of *musica* into three classes rather than two, since (as Dahlhaus noted) Quintilian's *Inst. Orat.* had been applied to *musica* before, without the ensuing tripartitism;[198] the second is that Luther's correspondence with Spalatin, which was concentrated in the early years of the Reformation, was partly conditioned by the intellectual position of the recipient, decidedly

[196] M. LIENHARD, *Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ*, pp. 185–6; the context in which Lienhard's discussion of the Word takes place is an analysis of the sermons and *postilla* of 1522.

[197] LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 108, citing another letter to Spalatin. Cf. *WA BR* iii:220; *LW* liii:221.

[198] I do not mean that a renewed application of Quintilian's *Inst. Orat.* II.viii *cannot* have been in Listenius' mind when he described *musica* as *triplex*; what I mean is that, by virtue of the fact that the application had already been made, any reapplication of Quintilian ought not to be used as the basis of an argument in favour of a paradigm shift, or 'rhetorical turn' in musical thought, as it has been by Cahn.

more humanist than Luther's; a third is that there is no reason to assume that a putative application of Quintilian by Listenius was prompted by *Luther's* ideas on oratorical preaching, since many others besides had emphasized Quintilian.[199]

4. CONCLUSION

Cahn's attempt to draw together Luther's theology and Quintilian's rhetoric teaching in Listenius' *opus perfectum et absolutum* brings us to a critical question. If there was no clear causal evidence that Listenius intended to channel Quintilian's rhetoric in the first section of his treatise, and no clear evidence that if he did so it was on account of Luther's purported support for Quintilian, *why should Cahn have linked the two narratives up at all*? Given that a sufficient case could be made on the grounds of *Schulordnungen* and publication data alone that Quintilian's oratory was an important component of German Renaissance education, it was clearly not to demonstrate the centrality of Quintilian to the curriculum. And given that a case for Luther's preference for Quintilian over Aristotle is exceptionally straightforward, it cannot have been to advance our understanding of Luther's rhetorical preferences.

No: Cahn's thesis was proposed in order to demonstrate that the *opus perfectum et absolutum* (the *systematische Mitte* of a modern musical aesthetic) had its headwaters in (i) the humanistic rhetorical programme, and (ii) the investment of that programme with moral urgency by Luther's Reformation. It does not really matter for our purposes whether Cahn's conclusions about Listenius' concepts are accurate or not (although, for the sake of academic transparency, I admit that I favour them even as I find proper evidence for them lacking). What is instructive is that the positive expectation of an intellectual link between Listenius' theory and Luther's theological position is so overwhelming that the lack of any robust evidence in support of one goes

[199] J.O. WARD, 'Quintilian and the Rhetorical Revolution of the Middle Ages', *Rhetorica*, XIII (1995), 231–84, offers a fascinating account.

unnoticed. The thesis *appears* to hold together, and *appears to hold together so strongly* that no one—Cahn included—seems to have noticed that *it does not*.

This is important, because it reveals the power of the ideological imagination in cohering an historical account, and demonstrates the degree to which both Listenius' theory and Luther's theology have been drawn together simply by the force of historians' expectation that they should belong together. That expectation has been formed by the establishment by successive generations of Germanic music historians of a sort of 'continuum of relations', with Luther at one end and Listenius at the other.[200]

Such a continuum, it need hardly be noted, is forged 'in the thin air of thought'—in the conditioned will of the historian. That conditioning involves a number of ideologies that are reinforced whenever the 'continuum' is supported: the ideology of German musical superiority (and therefore German music-theoretical superiority), the ideology of modernity (born in the Reformation), the ideology of a modern musical aesthetic (centred on the musical work-concept) and the ideology of musical Renaissance (centred on the equation of music and language). The idea of an history carved up into epochal shifts is a product of modernity's self-identity narrative, too, and so is the concomitant validating quest for the beginnings of epochs.[201] Since modernity's self-identity has been so interwoven, after Hegel, with Luther's emancipating Reformation and the Weberian notion of productive output (Marx' exchange value), *and* since modern music's self-identity has been so interwoven with the concept of the musical work and with quasi-linguistic referential meaning, it was inevitable that Listenius' textbook, which appears to situate a musical *opus*-concept in early sixteenth-century Wittenberg, should have become the repository for modernist investment of the past with contemporary ideas via a Todorovian 'prejudice of

[200] The continuum might run like this: Luther-Reformation-Modernity-Modern Aesthetic-Musical work-concept-*opus*-Listenius; or: Luther-Reformation-Preaching-Rhetoric-*muisca poetica*-Listenius.

[201] DAHLHAUS, 'Epochen und Epochenbewusstsein', p. 96, observes that the 'Sinn- und Funktionszusammenhang' of a Weberian ideal type is a criterion for musical periodization.

equality'. That Listenius' textbook was also both German and easily classified as 'Lutheran' music theory certainly solidified this investment, because it could enable the two ideological narratives of musical modernity and musical Germanicity to establish a node of conceptual connection.

There is no *évènementielle* way of linking Luther's theology, or even a humanistic sense of *rinascimento*,[202] with the eventual music theory of Listenius. The latter cites no sources in his first chapter, and there was no correspondence between Listenius and either Melanchthon or Luther. Nor does Listenius give any suggestion that his concepts of *opus* or *musica poetica* bear any relation to theology or contemporary rhetorical teaching. Proving the case that Listenius' theory was influenced by developments in sixteenth-century theology is consequently manifestly impossible.

In fact, no one had ever *tried* to prove the case, until Heinz von Loesch began his *Habilitation* research. Previous musicologists, von Loesch asserted, had simply *assumed* it to be true on the basis that it seemed so likely. As we have seen, however, its likelihood was contingent upon ideological identity narratives of modernity and Germanicity in which the Reformation's epoch-shifting significance and the genesis of a modern musical aesthetic in the sixteenth century were accepted truths. But so strong were those ideological identity narratives in the formation of early and mid twentieth-century historiographical method that, apparently, historians did not notice (or were not troubled by) the lack of evenemential connection between the concepts of Listenius' theory and Luther's theology.

The conventional musicological narratives in which Listenius and Luther are situated, therefore, demand reassessment—a reassessment in which the ideologies of modernity and Germanicity, in particular, are not brought to bear upon the interpretation of the musical thought of our two protagonists. We shall now turn our attentions to Listenius' textbook; in Chapters III

[202] STROHM, 'The Humanist Idea', notes that *rinascimento* ideology incorporated a strong sense of reinvention.

and IV, below, we shall seek to address Luther's musical thought disentangled from the ideologies to which it has conventionally been subordinated.

CHAPTER II

THE INTENTIONS OF EARLY 'LUTHERAN' MUSIC THEORY: THE CASE OF LISTENIUS' *MUSICA* (1537)

> The succinct brevity of this little book might well move you,
> It is a small volume, but it does not thereby lack in art.
>
> Valentinus Chudenius of Salzwedel.
> *Ad lectorem*, LISTENIUS, *Musica*, 1537.[203]

1. A TALE OF TWO TREATISES: 1533 AND 1537

In 1523 the former Leipzig Thomanerchor *Kantor* and Eisleben schoolmaster Georg Rhau established his print house in Wittenberg; his press went on to prove the chief technological powerhouse in the dissemination of reformist ideas.[204] That Rhau was also a music teacher was the cause of a substantial flowering of music-pedagogical publication in evangelical Germany. As *Kantor* in Leipzig Rhau himself had composed a music theory textbook (published there in two parts—one on chant [1517] and the other on mensural music [1520]) for young men at the University of Leipzig, where he also taught *musica*; when he came to Wittenberg he reprinted the second part of his own textbook (1530) at the same time as he embarked upon an unprecedented

[203] The translation is Seay's.

[204] On printing in Wittenberg before Rhau, see M. GROSSMANN, 'Wittenberg Printing, Early Sixteenth Century', *Sixteenth Century Essays and Studies*, I (1970), 53–74.

programme of music-pedagogical publications. Between 1523 and his death in 1548, Rhau's publications in music theory included:

> Martin Agricola, *Ein kurtz deudsche Musica* (1528), *Musica instrumentalis deudsch* (1529 and 1545), *Büchlein von den Proporcionibus* (1532), *Musica figuralis deudsch* (1532), *Musica choralis deudsch* (1533), *Rudimenta musices* (1539);
> Nicolaus Listenius, *Rudimenta Musicae* (1533), *Musica* (1537);
> Venceslaus Philomathes, *De nova domo musicorum libri quatuor* (1534);
> Johann Spangenberg, *Prosodia in usum iuventutis Northus* (1538), *Quaestiones musicae* (1542, orig. publ. Nuremberg 1536);
> Johann Walter, *Lob und Preis der löblichen Kunst Musica* (1538).[205]

Undoubtedly Rhau's two books of *Bicinia* (RISM 1545[5] and 1545[6]), almost certainly his *Tricinia* (RISM 1542[8]), and probably also his four-part anthology *Symphoniae Jucundae* (RISM 1538[8]) were intended for use as exercises by Lateinschüler;[206] his *Newe deudsche geistliche Gesenge* (RISM 1544[21]) are dedicated to school use but, being in German, were presumably intended for the use of only those less important schools in which German was routinely spoken.[207]

Rhau's shift towards publishing music and music theory books is probably related on the one hand to the reduction in reformed polemical publications during the 1530s, and on the other to the fact that only in the 1530s did music printing come of age in Germany. (Previously engraving of musical notation had been more of a liability than a perfected art.[208]) Most of all, however, it should be seen in the light of the development of a new market at Wittenberg, and in the city's intellectual 'satellites', for textbooks on music theory for schoolroom use. The first of Rhau's responses to this need were relatively unsuccessful, for a number of reasons. His republication of his own *Enchiridion* in 1530 had only a modicum of success, presumably because it was originally

[205] This list is compiled from V.H. MATTFELD, 'Rhau [Rhaw], Georg', p. 256.

[206] The *Symphoniae Jucundae* had initially been reckoned by Blume to be a set of short motets for each of 52 Sundays throughout the year; the fact that not all of the *symphoniae* are in fact religious works and that this reckoning cannot be correct was noted by Hans Albrecht.

[207] On the hierarchies of various different sorts of Lateinschulen and German schools in sixteenth-century Germany, see E.F. LIVINGSTONE, 'The Place of Music in German Education', 264.

[208] M.K. DUGGEN, *Italian Music Incunabula: Printers and Type*, Berkeley, CA, 1992, pp. 42–75; cit. C.C. JUDD, *Reading Renaissance Music Theory*, p. 18 and n. 5. Wollick's/Schanpecher's treatise (the earliest treatise to illustrate consonances via a ten-line staff) omitted the notes altogether; see H.E. BUSH, 'The Recognition of Chordal Formation by Early Music Theorists', esp. 233–4.

written for undergraduates rather than schoolboys. Martin Agricola's slew of treatises between 1528 and 1533 retained a relatively low profile, for no other reason than they were written in German, and most school music teaching took place in Latin. Philomathes' *Musicorum libri quatuor* represented a curiosity rather than a useable teaching manual, not only because its contents were the author's music theory lectures at Vienna (originally published there in 1512, and by Rhau at Leipzig in 1518), but also because the whole book was written in Latin hexameters.[209]

When Listenius' *Rudimenta Musicae* was published in 1533, therefore, it responded to a growing need for a music theory textbook in Latin that could be used in schools; this need brought with it requirements of brevity (hence Valentinus Chudenius' recommendation for the 1537 version, on p. 79, above) and simplicity, in order that a local schoolmaster could bend its curriculum to suit the needs of his students.

The textbook's popularity with the music-theory-hungry market was remarkable. The 1533 initial impression at Wittenberg was followed by four others in as many years at Augsburg (by Heinrich Steiner, in 1535, 1536, 1537 and 1540) as well as a Swiss publication (Bern, 1537). Within four years, Listenius had updated the treatise and republished it with Rhau under the new title *Musica Nicolai Listenii* (the author's name only marginally smaller in the title than the word *Musica*, suggesting that Listenius had become a well-known music-pedagogical authority even by 1537). In the new revised version, Listenius' textbook was imprinted nine times by the Rhau press at Wittenberg (1537, 1539, 1542, 1544, 1548, 1549, 1554, 1555 and 1557), at Augsburg (again, by Steiner) in 1538, eight times by Petreius at Nuremberg (1539, 1541, 1544, 1547, 1548, 1549, 1550 and 1551), four times at Nuremberg by others after Petreius' death (by Gabriel Hain in 1557, and then by the Gerlach house in 1569, 1577 and 1583 and once more [without date]), six times in

[209] The pre-eminent German Lateinschule textbook of earlier years, Cochlaeus' *Tetrachordum Musices*, was published only at Nuremberg, and apparently was unused by Wittenberg graduates tutoring in music.

Leipzig (1542, 1543, 1546, 1547, 1549, and 1557), once in Frankfurt/Oder (1550) and once in Breslau (1573).[210] Only Heinrich Faber's *Compendiolum* would undergo such widespread dissemination over the course of the sixteenth century.

The print histories of Listenius' *Rudimenta Musicae* and *Musica* demonstrate that the market perceived the 1537 *Musica* to be essentially the same book as the earlier *Rudimenta*. Though the *Rudimenta* is commended in *Schulordnungen* well after the publication of its revision, it is universally the case that the *Musica* replaced the *Rudimenta Musicae* at print houses which had also issued impressions of the 1533 book. This apparent perception of continuity between the two publications has historiographical consequences: it means that, from Listenius' perspective as well as from his publishers', the 1537 *Musica* cannot have been intended to promote any great 'novelties' in musical thought, since it represented little more than a revision and expansion of an earlier treatise. The substance of the *Rudimenta Musicae* bears this out, differing only slightly from that of the *Musica*. Both are books concerned with basic knowledge of scale divisions, mutations, modus, tempus and prolation, proportion and sesquialtera rules. The principal difference between the two books is that the 1537 edition includes more examples.

The 1533 book is often overlooked by music historians, presumably because the 1537 revision outsold it many times over.[211] Post-production, it was quickly incorporated into the school

[210] These details are derived from NIEMÖLLER, 'Listen(ius), Nikolaus', and Å. DAVIDSSON, *Bibliographie der musiktheoretischen Drucke des 16. Jahrhunderts*.

[211] Dahlhaus situated the separation of *musica poetica* from *musica practica* in 1537 ('Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie', 110) even though it was evident in protean form in 1533, and misplaced the first mention of the *opus perfectum et absolutum* in 1533, even though the term does not appear till 1537 ('Musikwissenschaft und systematische Musikwissenschaft', p. 38). His confusion arose from a tendency in German scholarship to consider the *Rudimenta Musicae* and the *Musica* as essentially the same textbook in two different editions. Judd imports the same unclarity into her *Reading Renaissance Music Theory*, noting of Listenius' *Musica* (which she dates to 1539, as she is dealing with the textbook's publication in Nuremberg) that it 'was first published in Wittenberg in 1533' (p. 82 and n. 3). WIORA, 'Musica Poetica und musikalisches Kunstwerk', notes that '[d]ie *musica poetica* besteht in einer Anleitung zu künstlichen Verfertigen (fabricare) und wurde daher nach Heinrich Faber (1548) von manchen auch *musica fabricativa* genannt'. Had Wiora known Listenius' 1533 textbook better, he would have sourced the idea of *fabricativa* there and not in Faber's later book; this in turn would have altered Wiora's understanding of the historical development of *musica poetica* into the 'öffentlichen Bewußtsein' of expression. Here I consider the 1533 and 1537 publications of Listenius to be essentially the same *textbook*, expounding basically identical music theory, but nevertheless distinguish

(cont.)

curriculum of Lüneberg, and its sale at Augsburg and Wittenberg demonstrates that it was used in both cities. The first two pages of the main text are reproduced overleaf (Fig. II.1a–b). The much longer lifespan of the *Musica* and the fact that publishers considered it a continuation of the treatise Listenius had written in 1533, however, risks obscuring what differences there are between the 1533 textbook and its 1537 replacement. In the 1533 *Rudimenta*, for instance, *musica* is not *triplex* but rather *duplex*—it is *theorica* and *practica*. On fol. Aiiij^{r} Listenius introduces *poetica sive fabricativa* as a sub-type of *musica practica*, but does not go on to discuss it in his later subdivision of 'bimembral' *practica* (into *choralis* and *figuralis*).

Comparing and contrasting the first chapters of the 1533 *Rudimenta* and the 1537 *Musica* is instructive. The fact that Listenius developed *musica poetica* into a fully fledged, third class of musical knowledge in 1537 demonstrates that he did not consider his earlier description of it (as a sub-class of *musica practica*) to be fully adequate. For some reason, his opinion on what *musica poetica* was, and how it functioned in the architecture of musical thought, changed over the four years between the publication of the *Rudimenta* and the *Musica*. At the same time, the fact that Listenius had already discussed *musica poetica* in 1533 confirms conclusively that Niemöller's 1537 shift from arithmetic to rhetorical musical paradigm is erroneous, if the reason for its placement in 1537 in the first place was Listenius' use of the term *musica poetica*. Since nothing substantive changed in Listenius' concept of *musica poetica* between 1533 and 1537, any paradigm shift attributed to or read out of Listenius' 1537 music theory must also be attributed to or read out of his theory in 1533.

(cont.)

between the two as distinct *versions* of it which expounded the theory in slightly different ways and with different priorities.



RVDIMENTA MVSI-
cæ planæ Magiſtri Nicolai Li-
ſtenij, in gratiam ſtudioſæ
iuuentutis diligenter
comportata.

MVSI-
ca, eſt ars
bene can-
tandi: Et
eſt duplex

THEORICA, quæ cir-
ca ingenij contemplatio-
nem & cognitionem tan-
tū uerſatur, cuius finis eſt
ſcire: hinc theoricus mu-
ſicus, qui artem nouit, ue-
rum hoc ipſo contentus,
nihil de ea ſcribit, nec do-
cet quenquam.

PRACTICA, quæ non
ſolum in ingenij penetra-
libus delitescit, ſed in opus
ipſum erumpit, cuius finis
eſt agere: hinc practicus
muſicus, qui ultra artis co
gnitionem, cæteros eam



docet, atq; artis præcepta agendo ex-
hibet: ita tamen, ut poſt actum nihil
ſuperſit operis. Poëtica ſiue fabrica-
tiua dicitur, quando opus poſt labo-
rem relinquitur, ueluti cum a quoquā
muſica conſcribitur.

PRACTI
ca rurſus
bimēbris
eſt:

CHORALIS, quæ u-
niformiter ſuas notulas ꝓ
fert & mēſuras, ſine incre-
mento et decremento pro-
lationis.

FIGVRALIS, quæ
menſuram uariat ſecundū
ſignorum ac figurarū in-
æqualitatem, cum increme-
mento et decremento pro-
lationis. Huius utriuſq;
uſus, tam eſt in mutis per
ſe inſtrumentis (ut ſic bre-
uiter omnes ſpecies com-
plectar) q̄ in uiua homīs
uoce.

A iiij

Figure II.1a & II.1b LISTENIUS, *Rudimenta Musicae*, fols. Aiii^{v} and Aiiij^{r}

The portion of Listenius' first chapter dealing with *musica poetica* as it appears in both the 1533 *Rudimenta* and the 1537 *Musica* is set out below, in Table II.1. Certain portions of the text are virtually identical ('a work is left behind after the labour'/'after its labour, leaves behind it some sort of works'; 'like when music is composed'/'like when music, or a musical song is composed by someone').

What changes, however, is the way in which Listenius expounds *musica poetica*. The most obvious and most significant change is the partition of *musica* not into two classes of knowledge, but three. In 1537 Listenius abandons the traditional binary-structured teaching method of his predecessor theorists (and many of his successors, too) which presumed that the most helpful

***Rudimenta Musicae* (1533)**	***Musica* (1537)**
It [*musica practica*] is called [*musica*] *poetica* or *fabricativa*	[*Musica*] *poetica* [is that] which is content with neither understanding [music as] a subject, nor with practice alone, but which
when a work is left behind after the labour,	after its labour leaves behind it something of a work,
like when music is composed by someone.[212]	like when music, or a musical song is composed by someone; its goal is the completed and executed work. For *musica poetica* involves processes of fashioning and creating, that is, the sort of undertaking which, even after the death of the author himself, leaves behind a perfected and absolute work. Hence the *Musicus Poeticus* is one who is directed towards the business of leaving something behind.[213]

Table II.1 Excerpt from Listenius' first chapter, 1533 and 1537

[212] LISTENIUS, *Rudimenta*, fol. Aiiij^{r}: 'Poëtica sive fabricativa dicitur, quando opus post laborem relinquitur, veluti cum a quoqua[m] musica conscribitur.'

[213] LISTENIUS, *Musica*, fol. Aiii^{v}. (Cf. pp. 31–2, and n. 67, above, for the original Latin text.)



Figure II.2 Reasoning pathways in Listenius' 1533 and 1537 first chapters

way of learning was to establish binary categories that could be navigated by a succession of true/false pathway judgements.[214] Where previously the denomination *musica poetica* could be arrived at only via a true/false assessment of whether music is interpreted or produced, in the later version it is determined by being *neither* interpreted *nor* produced through practice (see Figure II.2, above). Indeed, Listenius deliberately specifies that *musica poetica* can be determined by its being 'not content with understanding or just practising'.

Second, Listenius' 1537 text notes not that *musica poetica* leaves behind it an *opus* (as in 1533) but 'something of a work' *(aliquid operis)*. The later version admits, by its vagueness, that 'works' may not necessarily be coterminous with 'musical songs' or written compositions. In 1533, the *opus* is exemplified 'when music is composed by someone';[215] in 1537, that composition must end in a 'completed and executed work' *(opus consumatum et effectum)*. It is not good enough, Listenius clarifies, for the 'work' to remain in the mind of the composer; it must be given a legacy

[214] See E. KOTZAKIDOU PACE, 'Ramism in 16th-Century German Music Theory: The "New" Dialectic Method of Dichotomies and the Cognitive Structure of Friedrich Beurhaus' Treatises', *Musiktheorie im Kontext*, ed. Jan Philipp Sprick, Reinhard Bahr and Michael von Troschke, Hamburg, 2005, for an account of how binarism would come to dominate further in later sixteenth-century theory.

[215] By 'is composed' *(conscribitur)* Listenius means more than just note-against-note counterpoint. His terminology implies a practice involving writing, but is not so prescriptive as to exclude the notion of writing in the mind. On the idea of mental composing in the sixteenth century, see BENT, '*Res facta* and *Cantare super librum*'.

by which the composition can exist 'even after the death of the author himself'. (Precisely what Listenius means by this is not determinable from his *Musica*. Must the composition be written down, or can it be learnt by ear and then repeated? Listenius does not specify conclusively.)

Third, Listenius' new class of musical knowledge admits a new class of musical knower. Where generations of previous theorists had differentiated between the practitioners of music and those loftier minds that contemplated it, Listenius establishes the *Poeticus Musicus* as a savant who can both understand and practise, and whose understanding and practical faculties lead him to skill in 'the business of leaving something behind'.[216]

The distinctions between Listenius' descriptions of *musica poetica* in 1533 and 1537 are at once important and insubstantial. They do demonstrate a marked development in Listenius' pedagogical method four years apart, even if they do not demonstrate a shift in the underlying theory. We shall return to the implications of this different approach shortly; for now it is necessary only to note that the distinction between *duplex* and *triplex* approaches to *musica* is (as far as Listenius is concerned) a distinction in ways of talking about *musica*—a development in his *teaching method*—and not a distinction in his understanding of what *musica* is.

2. LISTENIUS' CAREER AND THE REASONS FOR HIS TEXTBOOK'S REVISION

Our close reading of the relationship between Listenius' musical thought in 1533 and 1537 proscribes the assertion that Listenius rewrote his 1533 textbook to accommodate new ideas about either music's poetics or its aesthetic organization. For what reason, then, did Listenius rewrite his textbook?

[216] See CAHN, 'Zur Vorgeschichte', esp. pp. 12–15, on the *poeticus musicus*'s mastery.

Some of the answer can be distilled from Listenius' biography.[217] Born in Hamburg, Listenius was brought up in the Altmark town of Salzwedel.[218] He matriculated at the University of Wittenberg in 1529.[219] Within four years, he had published the *Rudimenta Musicae*. No record exists for his employment as a schoolmaster in Wittenberg at any point, and the next documentation conclusively establishing his whereabouts and employment is dated 1536 (in Salzwedel, as Lateinschule master). But it seems likely that, even if Listenius did not teach at a school in Wittenberg before he returned to Salzwedel, he undertook some sort of music teaching after gaining his *baccalaureus* (probably in 1531). That his curriculum for the teaching of *musica* to schoolboys was published there several years later suggests that he had become respected as a music teacher in Wittenberg.

Listenius' movements after 1533 cannot be traced with certainty; but certainly by 1536, he had returned to Salzwedel. The next mention of him appears in diplomatic papers of the Margraviate of Brandenburg, in a letter which deals explicitly with a 'M. Nicolaus Listen', whose actions are deserving of official condemnation. The communication is dated 15 July 1536 and signed by the Elector himself; it is directed towards the Salzwedeler Rat, which governed the day-to-day activity of school and ecclesiastical life in the town on behalf of the Elector. In it, Listenius is instructed that it is the Elector's express wish that 'for the time being all ceremonies and festivals of the Apostles, and other feasts, as have taken place in the past and have been handed down, be retained

[217] What follows relies upon SCHÜNEMANN, 'Einführung'.

[218] The Altmark, as distinguished from the Neumark and Mittelmark, had been part of the Margraviate of Brandenburg since 1157. Salzwedel remained administratively divided into Altstadt (the elder settlement, first recorded in 1112) and Neustadt (settled in 1247) until the eighteenth century; this meant that Salzwedel, unusually, operated two Lateinschulen. From 1263, Salzwedel was a member of the Hanseatic League, and minted its own coinage accordingly. Following a period of instability, the town was ejected from the League in 1518; the League itself would decline over the course of the sixteenth century. Listenius' upbringing in Salzwedel consequently took place at a time when the town's glory was fading.

[219] Listenius' matriculation was into the Arts Faculty; he never studied the higher degree of theology.

and kept without a single alteration'. Listenius is explicitly instructed to 'refrain from reforming'.[220]

That Listenius' activity in Salzwedel, and his propensity for 'reforming' worship, is referred to in this letter tells us a number of things. The most trivial is that Listenius can only have been working in the city for a relatively short period (otherwise the letter of warning would have come earlier) but that he must (by the same token) have been up to his 'reforming' in Salzwedel long enough for someone to have complained to the Elector. (Von Loesch and Niemöller both follow Schünemann in reckoning Listenius to have arrived in Salzwedel sometime in 1534 or 1535, which is consonant with the evidence of this letter.[221]) More significantly, however, the Elector's letter makes clear that Listenius was a reformer by inclination.

The Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg, on the other hand, were not: a staunch defender of Romanist orthodoxy, the late Elector Joachim I 'Nestor' (1484–1535) actively promoted the sale of papal indulgences,[222] and vigorously opposed reformed doctrine in his territories to such a fearsome extent that his wife, Elizabeth of Denmark, actually fled following her conversion in 1528. A condition of the inheritance rights of Nestor's eldest son, Joachim II 'Hector' (1505–1571), was that he would remain faithful to the papacy throughout his reign. In 1555 Hector reneged and openly converted to evangelicalism; but his journey towards Lutheranism had begun much earlier. In 1539, he began receiving communion in both kinds—a practice identified with the Reform movement—and gradually after that point towns and cities under his electorate fell to the Reformers with Hector's tacit blessing. Salzwedel became a reformed city officially in 1541,

[220] A.J.F. RIEDEL, *Codex Diplomaticus Brandenburgiensis*, Berlin, 1838–62, Pt. 1, vol. 16, p. 281.

[221] Von LOESCH, 'Listenius, Nikolaus'; NIEMÖLLER, 'Listen(ius)'; SCHÜNEMANN, 'Einführung'.

[222] Joachim Nestor's active promotion of indulgence sales was more politically and financially driven than religiously. As Elector of Brandenburg, in Nestor the Hohenzollerns held one of the seven electoral votes for the imperial crown and consequently wielded massive political influence; when in 1514 the family secured Joachim Nestor's brother Albert the archbishopric of Mainz, one of the most significant sees in Christendom, they gained a second vote. The elevation of Albrecht, however, incurred major debts for the family. Under an impressive display of sixteenth-century 'crony capitalism', the Hohenzollerns entered an arrangement with the pope, allowing the sale of plenary indulgences in Brandenburg, and taking a fifty per-cent cut of Rome's profits.

with the Rat's enaction of the *Kirchenvisitation* recommendations; but by that time many distinctives of reformed worship had become the local norm anyway.[223] For Listenius, arriving from Wittenberg,[224] the combination of a pro-reform populace and a new sympathetic ruler must have seemed to give the go-ahead for liturgical reform.[225]

Hector's 1536 letter to the Rat about Listenius, then, must be regarded not as an outright denunciation of Listenius' reformism, but rather as a temporary slap-down. (Indeed, it refers to the retention of historic forms of worship 'for the time being', a decidedly provisional instruction.) Listenius probably read the letter in this way, and, if the lack of any subsequent correspondence from the Elector is a trusty sign, simply lay low for several years as he waited for Hector to come round to his way of thinking. We can very easily conclude that after being chastised for his attempts to modernize Salwedel's worship, Listenius simply rechanneled his energies into modernizing his teaching programme.

Whether or not this latter speculation is accurate, the best reason that can be given for Listenius' revision and expansion of his *Rudimenta Musicae* into the *Musica* is that the way in which he taught classroom music had changed. On these grounds, any proposals Listenius may have made in his *Musica* about the ontology of music must be considered in the light of the audience for which the book was intended; likewise the overall significance for musical thought of concepts his textbook raises must be measured against the reading practices of 1530s and early 1540s German school music-students and their teachers.

[223] 'Im gesamten Bereich der Mark Brandenburg, so auch in Salzwedel, war die Reformation kein Ereignis, das sich genau auf ein konkretes Datum legen läßt, an dem die bestehenden Verhältnisse umgestürzt wurden. Vielmehr handelte es sich um einen länger andauernden Vorgang der Veränderung. Schon vor der offiziellen Einführung der Reformation in der Mark Brandenburg kam es zu Veränderungen im Salzwedeler Kirchenleben.' U. KALMBACH and J.M. PIETSCH, *Der Weinberg-Altar von Lucas Cranach dem Jüngeren aus der Mönchskirche in Salzwedel*, Spröda, 1996, p. 25.

[224] On the various conclusions that can be drawn about worship practices in Wittenberg during the late 1520s and 1530s from the *Kirchenordnungen*, see R.L. GOULD, 'The Latin Lutheran Mass at Wittenberg', esp. ch. 1.

[225] J.F. DANNEIL, *Geschichte der Gymnasium zu Salzwedel*, Salzwedel, 1842, [n.p.]. Documentation to which Danneil refers in support of this has now been lost, presumably in the fire at the Salzwedel municipal library during the Second World War.

Such a contextually-aware reading is quite different from those hitherto undertaken by music historians, who have preferred to view Listenius' textbook as a major contributor to the history of musical ideas. But, as Lydia Goehr has observed, 'Listenius was neither an exceptional genius nor Robinson Crusoe', and there is no reason to expect that he *meant* to introduce major aesthetic concepts to his 1537 textbook simply on the basis that later scholars have wondered whether the *opus* and *musica poetica* might subsequently have functioned as such.[226] Nor should we conclude that Listenius' contemporaries (and successors) reckoned him a particularly important musical thinker; even the contribution of Johannes Bugenhagen, Wittenberg's great humanist pastor, of a foreword to the *Rudimenta Musicae*, can be easily explained for reasons unrelated to the textbook's content—Bugenhagen was Listenius' parish priest. The evidence of Listenius' scanty biography, taken together with the paucity of contemporary references to the man, imply that Goehr is correct to note that Listenius and his theory had relatively little impact upon the philosophical conceptualization of music.

3. LISTENIUS' TEXTBOOKS AND REFORMATION PEDAGOGY

This does not mean, however, that Listenius' contribution to music history was slight. On the contrary: I believe we should consider him a master educator whose pedagogical method was at once holistic and contextually sensitive.

The Reformation had a significant impact upon the educational policies of reformed localities, since the division of the civic and the ecclesiastical spheres from one another (Luther's 'two kingdoms') cast schooling adrift from the ready-made curricula of the mediæval church.[227] Over the course of the sixteenth century, *Kirchenvisitatoren* (ecclesiastical visitors) made visitations

[226] GOEHR, *The Imaginary Museum*, p. 116.

[227] For a brief introduction to the effect of this upon music tuition, cf. F.W. STERNFELD, 'Music in the Schools of the Reformation'.

across reformed Germany, drawing up new instructions for worship (*Kirchenordnungen*) and school curricula (*Schulordnungen*).

The latter often restructured Lateinschule education altogether, advocating a thorough study of Greek and Latin texts, and the education of Lateinschüler in the trivial disciplines of grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric. The 1528 *Kirchenvisitation* for Wittenberg and Ernestine Saxony was the prototype for others across reformed Germany. The 1528 report was completed without the aid of a Visitation Book,[228] which goes some way to explaining Luther's personal involvement in the final report. It prescribed the continuation of late mediæval divisions into three *Haufen* (classes) by age group, and directed that the first *Haufe* was to prioritize learning to read (prose: via the writings of Cato and Aelius Donatus), the second grammar (using Aesop, Petrus Mosellanus' *Paedologia* and correspondence with Erasmus, then later Terence, the sections of Plautus deemed virtuous, and basic exegesis of some simpler psalmody), and the third grammar, together with its trivial sister disciplines of dialetic and rhetoric (using Virgil, Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, Cicero, and then more Virgil). Although the three *Haufen* were routinely taught by the same master in the same room, and the three groups came together daily for prayers in church, they were instructed to *learn* together for only one period: the lunchtime music class.[229] For the first hour after midday every day, all the boys 'klein und gros' were to have music practice—to learn to sing.[230] This pattern of corporate music learning was repeated throughout subsequent *Schulordnungen*: the visitation articles for the next major *Kirchenvisitation* (to Meissen and Voitlandt *Kreis* in 1533), for example, prescribed more singing at daily prayers, and reiterated the hour's daily singing practice.

[228] See E. SEHLING, ed., *Die Evangelischen Kirchenvisitationen des XVI. Jahrhunderts*, Pt. I, vol. 1, p. 39.

[229] On the evolution of German school music teaching until the civic reforms of Melanchthon and others, see LIVINGSTONE, 'The Place of Music'.

[230] SEHLING, *Kirchenvisitationen*, 168–70.

In contrast, however, to this strict prescription about *when* music was to be learned (and in stark contrast to the detailed prescriptions supplied for the teaching of the *trivium*), no details were given in either 1528 or 1533 as to *what* was to be taught during the midday music hour. Unquestionably it was this (as yet empty) midday music-practice hour for which Listenius wrote his *Rudimenta Musicae*, and his revised *Musica*.[231]

As we might expect, Listenius' audience determined the textbook's content. The needs of schoolboys to achieve a solid grounding in music theory and the needs of their schoolmasters for a ready-made curriculum were Listenius' uppermost concerns. These two needs are profoundly different; but both had to be met if Listenius' textbook was to be successful. This plurality of requirements is further complicated by the fact that the needs of Lateinschüler were different according to age. Most *Schulordnungen* stipulated that all three *Haufen* should learn music together, simply returning to the beginning of the curriculum and repeating it once it had been completed. A Lateinschuler would consequently be taught Listenius' textbook at least three times over. The eldest students, who had been led through Listenius' textbook previously, needed to find in it sufficient depth to engage their attention, whilst younger schüler needed new ideas to be presented clearly and definitively. We must, consequently, consider Listenius' treatise a text whose content was intended to apply differently to different groups of readers, and whose meaning was intended by its author to colour differently according to its reader's station: for the schoolmaster, as a book to deploy flexibly to teach from; for the very young Lateinschuler to learn Latin from; for the Latin-initiated Lateinschuler to learn rudimentary *musica* from; and for the older Lateinschuler to repeat to the extent of mental absorption.

[231] Prior to Listenius' publication, the two most likely textbook to have been used in reformed Lateinschulen were Rhau's *Enchiridion* (repr. 1530, Wittenberg, from which much of Listenius' material is drawn [cf. SCHÜNEMANN, 'Einführhung']).

A full interpretation of Listenius' textbook's meaning, then, must take account of a number of different learning objectives. The most elementary is simply to facilitate the continued learning of technical Latin.[232] For the youngest, whose knowledge of Latin was still elementary, the corporate following of a textbook in Latin was itself a new experience.[233] The conventional Lateinschule exercise of following the text and repeating it (an exercise one must presume was identical to the learning of musical intervals) was an important means of familiarization with a language not spoken at home. Not all the users of Listenius' textbook were eight year-old first *Haufe* boys, however. Second and third *Haufe* boys' experience of the textbook would have been increasingly deepened year on year. The first chapter in particular would likely have been subject to a trio of different interpretations: it would have been all but meaningless to a first *Haufe* boy, challenging to a second, and enlightening to a third.[234]

The fact that Listenius' textbook was open to a number of simultaneous readings and interpretations means that any attempt to definitively 'pin down' Listenius' meaning of specific concepts is provisional at best: Listenius' *Musica* represents an 'open' text (in Eco's sense) in which a conclusive interpretation is far from easily attainable.[235] If, even in Listenius' own classroom, his words were so open to such a broad range of different understandings, then it is all but impossible for his treatise to be read in a 'closed' way in the twenty-first century.[236]

[232] The traditional method for disciplining a Lateinschuler who had spoken in German was to wear a sign with the word *asinus* (ass) inscribed on it until someone else made the same mistake. Often the wearer was beaten. Cf. SCHÜNEMANN, *Geschichte der deutschen Schulmusik*, p. 54.

[233] Whether following a textbook meant, for the youngest students, reading it through in a personal copy, following examples on a blackboard, or simply watching the older students participate and joining in wherever possible, is not clear. A woodcut from the frontispiece of Paulus Naivis' *Latinum idioma* (Nuremberg, 1494) shows boys gathered around their teacher, each with their own textbook (not identifiably a music textbook) with musical notation on a blackboard behind.

[234] If the introduction Gallus Dressler gave to his lectures on *musica poetica* (1563/4) is considered representative, then we must conclude that university was the first opportunity most students had to examine Listenius' division of *musica* into *theorica* and *poetica* as well as *practica*. The Lateinschule and university education of a *musicus* ought, then, to be considered as a single continuum.

[235] See U. ECO, *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts*, Bloomington, IN, 1984.

[236] This does not invalidate the possibility of a 'top-level', definitive understanding being intended by Listenius; it does, however, imply that such an understanding is not *inherent* to the text itself, which is *designed* to admit other possible readings.

The 'control' on the potentially limitless openness of Listenius' text is the *teacher*: the presence of a schoolmaster who directed the use of Listenius' textbook, drew attention to sections he regarded as important, and used the textbook as a means for controlling classroom behaviour. The presence of the teacher in a classroom as exponent of Listenius' music theory further undermines a stable, 'closed' reading of his treatise; indeed, it renders the concepts of Listenius' first chapter fully re-interpretable according to context. There is no question that the openness of Listenius' text was part of its design, because textual openness grants maximal authority to the classroom teacher. Indeed, as we shall see later on in this chapter, Listenius deliberately manipulated the presentation of knowledge in his *Musica* in order to control access to it and to emphasize the student's lack of knowledge *versus* the teacher's possession of it.[237]

Listenius' sensitivity to the inevitable openness of texts, digested in the classroom context of rote learning under the direction of a schoolmaster, might go some way to explaining the apparent opacity of the concepts he deploys in the first chapter of the *Musica*. But it also hints at one reason why he might have seen fit to revise the first chapter of the *Rudimenta* for his 1537 *Musica*. The first chapter of the 1533 textbook may have proven unnecessarily confusing to Lateinschüler, because it incorporates both a 'true/false' and a 'both/and' reasoning pathway (see Fig. II.2, on p. 86, above): one of the divisions can go by two different names according to what its end product is ([*practica*] *dicitur poetica sive fabricativa*). A *triplex* division of *musica*, however, is methodologically much simpler, requiring only a succession of 'true/false' answers.[238]

[237] On the emergence of disciplinarianism in the pedagogue's rôle during the sixteenth century, see C. LUKE, *Pedagogy, Printing, and Protestantism: The Discourse on Childhood*, pp. 1–20.

[238] This interpretation obviously undermines the assertion, made by von Loesch and others, that Listenius sought simply to apply Aristotle's tripartite division of human action to *musica*. It might, indeed, be regarded instead as a precursor to the later dialectical pedagogy of Petrus Ramus.

2.3.1 Listenius' Examples

Listenius' textbook demonstrates a remarkably holistic view of Lateinschule education, and of music education in particular. Mindful of the potential market for his textbook (which would have included Wittenberg) and (probably) eager to undertake a touch of Reformation indoctrination at Salzwedel before it was officially sanctioned, Listenius chose illustrative examples that both taught an evangelical faith and musical precepts. In bk. I cap. 8 of the *Musica*, *De Clauium Transpositione* (Figure II.3, below), his example of clef transposition is the German Creed by Luther, *Wir glauben all an einem Gott*. Listenius could have chosen virtually any chant to exemplify this, and his choice of the German Creed was certainly not based upon its suitability—it was already widely disseminated in a version which required no transposition (compare Listenius' Figure II.3, below, with Figure II.4, overleaf, the *Wir glauben all* as it appears in Johann Walter's *Geystliches gesangk Buchleyn* of 1524—without transposition).

For Listenius' inclusion of the *Wir glauben all* serves a double purpose: to teach the boys the principle of clef transposition, but also to force the memorization of the German Creed. Singing the example requires the singer already to know the text after the incipit, and its underlay. In the



Figure II.3 LISTENIUS, *Musica* (1549 ed.), fol. Bvi[r].



Figure II.4 J. WALTER, *Geystliches gesangk Buchleyn*, Wittenberg, 1524, fol. G^{v} (tenor); note the absence of clef transposition.

context of a Lateinschule in Salzwedel, where worship was still sung in 1537 'without a single alteration' (i.e. in Latin, to traditional chants) and where all classroom interaction took place in Latin, this choice of example appears bizarre, to say the least, and can only satisfactorily be explained if we accept that Listenius was using his music curriculum to undertake some light indoctrination.

In the context of a Lateinschule in Wittenberg, meanwhile, the inclusion of the German Creed makes a good deal of sense. For music lessons now became revision classes for a new chant the boys were required to sing at Sunday Eucharist; vice versa, every Sunday Eucharist, with its German Creed, now became a revision class in the learning of *musica* with the mental reinforcement of the lesson on clef transposition.

Listenius' other examples reinforce the view of the *Musica* as a music-curriculum planned out with the remainder of the schoolboys' working week in mind. Schünemann noted that Listenius' treatise leans heavily on Georg Rhau's *Enchiridion utriusque Musicae Practicae* (1530, a revision of the 1517 Leipzig publication) and the *Enchiridion musicae mensuralis* (1520; reprinted at Wittenberg in 1530) for its pedagogical inspiration. Nowhere is this more evident than in



Figure II.5 RHAU, *Enchiridion utriusque musicae practicae*, Leipzig 1520 [Wittenberg, 1530], fol. Eviii^{r}.



Figure II.6 LISTENIUS, *Musica*, fol. Ciii^{r}.
(This impression, Frankfurt an der Oder, 1550.)

Listenius' section on the modes and psalm tones (fols. Bvii^{v}–Cvi^{r}), which corresponds directly to Rhau's Cap. 8 (see overleaf, Figures II.5 and II.6, which demonstrate the similarity between Rhau's and Listenius' respective examples for the first tone). Mostly Listenius' deviations from Rhau's *Enchiridion* examples in the chapter are cosmetic and favour brevity where Rhau has favoured comprehensiveness. But when it comes to illustrating the psalm tones in four parts, Listenius borrows Rhau's principle (of exemplifying via recourse to well-known chants, harmonized) whilst rejecting his specific examples.

In the first place, Listenius only bothers with a single example for each tone, where Rhau provides a psalm and a Magnificat for each tone. Second, where Rhau's examples from psalmody set the *Dixit dominus* (Ps. 109 [110]) five times (for the first, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth tones), the *Laudate pueri* (Ps. 112 [113]) twice (for the second and fifth tones), and the *Gloria Patri* for the third tone, Listenius knows that singing different psalms out loud in music lessons is a good way of embedding psalm texts in the memory, and that the learning and exegesis of 'simpler psalms' is a central part of the second *Haufe*'s grammar curriculum. Accordingly, Listenius borrows Rhau's *Dixit dominus* for the first tone and his *Laudate pueri* for the second, but then sets the *Credidi propter quod* (Ps. 115 [116]) for the third, the *Laudate Dominum omnes gentes* (Ps. 116 [117]) for the fourth, *Beati omnes qui timent* (Ps. 125 [126]) for the fifth, *Lauda Hierusalem* (Ps. 147) for the sixth, *Memento Domine David* (Ps. 131 [132]) for the seventh, and the *Ecce quam bonum* (Ps. 132 [133]) for the eighth. (Listenius supplies no example for the *tonus peregrinus*, for which Rhau supplies *In exitu Israel* (Ps. 113 [114]).) In this way, Listenius' music curriculum not only teaches the psalm tones, but also reinscribes in his readers' minds numerous incipits for psalms that are both expounded in the classroom and sung in divine worship.[239] Rhau's

[239] Both Listenius and Rhau used the Hebrew numbering, here identified in brackets. The Psalms they exemplified are all Sunday Psalms for (Marian) Vespers, with the addition of Ps. 116 [117], the shortest psalm, frequently added to the liturgy; Ps. 131 [132] and 132 [133] here represent the Gradual Psalms.

exemplification, meanwhile, with its unnecessary repetition of texts, passes up an opportunity to integrate Lateinschule music practice with Lateinschule trivial study and to reinforce the learning of one with the other.

2.3.2 Listenius' Voice, Greek Writing, and Schoolmasterly Control

The publication history of the *Musica* testifies to the fact that Listenius' pedagogy, with its integrated approach to music practice and the trivium, remained the dominant way of teaching music in reformed Lateinschulen until the end of the sixteenth century. Besides the cities in which the *Musica* was printed, *Kirchenordnungen* and *Schulordnungen* prescribed its use in classrooms in Annaberg (1557), the cities of Pomerania (Stralsund, Stettin, Stargard, Stolp, Belgard, Treptow, Cammin, all in 1563), Halberstadt (1564), Neuhaldensleben (1564), Geringswalde (1567), Mittweida (1578), Württemburg (1582), Görlitz (1584), and at the Greyfriars' school in Berlin.[240] In places where Heinrich Faber's *Compendiolum* was also used, Listenius' book was considered the second part to Faber's first. When the constant stream of other Latin textbooks on music published in Germany during the sixteenth century is borne in mind, the staying-power of Listenius' *Musica* is all the more remarkable.[241]

The straightforward and clear approach, the plenitude of examples, and the fact that Listenius' *Musica* was basically the first Latin music textbook for school use were no doubt major contributors to this staying-power. But I would like to suggest a further reason for the remarkable durability of Listenius' textbook—a reason that has not so much to do with the book's *content* as with its author's *rhetoric*.

Ever since Foucault observed the apparent similarity between the disciplinarian control over knowledge exercised by the schoolmaster and the authoritarian control over freedom exercised by

[240] This list is drawn from SCHÜNEMANN, 'Einführung', p. xviii, and JUDD, *Reading Renaissance Music Theory*.
[241] See NIEMÖLLER, 'Deutsche Musiktheorie im 16. Jahrhundert', pp. 75–6, for an overview.

the prison officer in his *Discipline and Punish*,[242] the rôle of the schoolteacher's authority in education has become a significant component in pedagogical analysis. If Foucault's basic assertion—that knowledge and power are transformations of one another—is accepted, then the classroom dynamic in which learning occurs must be regarded as a multifaceted process in which access to knowledge is controlled by power politics.

Listenius was apparently very good at controlling access to knowledge, and doing so in a productive way, by means of his own authoritative (textual) voice. The power dynamic this control established within the classroom—a dynamic of authority, alien knowledge and strict organization mediated by the pedagogical sensitivity of the individual teacher—is productive in two ways: first, it situates learning in a disciplinarized environment conducive to knowledge acquisition; second, it paces the exchange of knowledge so that learning becomes manageable.

This was not a new approach in pedagogy, but Listenius' application of it (to significant effect) in his *Musica* incorporated it into the music curriculum of early Reformation schoolboys. The anchor of the productive-learning power-dynamic is Listenius' use of techniques of alienation in order to 'other' the learner from the knowledge he seeks to acquire. One method Listenius employs is to use his own treatise to refer to *others'* writings, at once clarifying his own absolute authority as mediator of knowledge and emphasizing the broader ignorance of his reader. In the most straightforward instance, Listenius simply reports the theory of older authorities: 'There are, according to Guido [of Arezzo] twenty *claves* [i.e. notes between Γ and dd], or twenty-two according to Franchinus [Gaffurius]'.[243] By their mention, Listenius establishes his own music

[242] FOUCAULT, *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 175–6.

[243] LISTENIUS, *Musica*, fol. Av^{r} : 'Licet claues numero uiginti sint secundum Guidonem, aut duae & uiginti secundum Franchinum...'. Guido in fact discussed *twenty-one* notes (which he did not refer to as *claves*; this usage seems to have had currency only after John of Salisbury's *Metalogicon*) in the *Micrologus*, cap. ii. It may be that the association of Guido with twenty *claves* represents a misreading of his 'XX et una', as in the *Commentarius Anonymus in Micrologum* (see the ed. in S. VAN WAESBERGHE, *Expositiones in Micrologum Guidonis Aretini*, Amsterdam, 1957, p. 104). *Duae et uiginti* in Gaffurius is simply the extension of Guido's scale to encompass ee. I am grateful to Prof. John Caldwell for these observations.

theory as built upon one of the most ancient masters of *musica* and one of the most modern (Gaffurius' book was published in 1498). But Listenius is also careful to position his own authorial voice between the two masters, as a mediator, who not only holds these alien (threatening?) authorities at arms length but also determines what degree of credence their complex theoretical ideas are given. 'But, at the beginning of a chant, for the purpose of its [i.e. its mode's] demonstration and clarity', he observes, 'we use no more than five, namely Γ, F, c, g, & dd' (who is 'we'?).[244] The possibilities apparently opened up by the earlier authorities' teaching on *claves* are collapsed again, with the implication that Listenius does not think his student needs to consider them. What Listenius has given with one hand he takes away with the other (the knowledge, so to speak, is too wonderful for them to bear), at once making sure that the theory he presents is easily digestible and entrenching his readers' reliance on his own position as knowledge-giver. The success of his pedagogy depends upon both: his schoolmasterly voice must simultaneously lead his student towards relevant knowledge, steer him away from irrelevant knowledge, and defend the position of authorial power which makes such shepherding possible.

Later on, Listenius appeals to intertextual authority to subtly remind his student of the position of intellectual superiority that props up his text's authoritativeness. Describing intervals, Listenius observes that '[a]n interval is the movement from one note to another by a defined interval. Or, according to Boethius, it is the distance between a high and a low sound'.[245] One must surely wonder which Listenius considered the better description, even as we recall that Listenius knew very well that his Lateinschuler-reader has no access to Boethius. The effect of 'name-dropping' Boethius is simply to shore up Listenius' position as one licensed to draw up binding definitions.

[244] '[T]amen in principio cantus ad eius notionem & reserationem, non pluribus quinque utimur, scilicet, Γ, F, c, g, & dd'.

[245] Fol. Bvi^{v}: 'Modus, est uocis ad uocem, certo interuallo, migratio. Vel ut Boetius. Est acuti grauisque soni dissonantia.'

A slightly different example of knowledge access-control occurs when Listenius refers to musical examples beyond those he quotes. This happens only twice: once in the chapter on rests, where he quotes the end of Johann Walter's *Non moriar* and refers to Josquin's *Quae est ipsa* Mass,[246] and once in his discussion of *modus*, where he notes that there are many examples of minor *modus* in common use, including Josquin's motet *Praeter rerum seriem*, sections of his *Missa pro defunctis*, and Mouton's *Puer natus*.[247] It is not clear whether Listenius expects his reader to know the examples to which he refers, or whether he means simply to prove the point he is making by citing authoritative texts. But either is demonstrative of Listenius' creative attempt to both broaden his students' knowledge and reinforce his own position as giver of it.

This understanding of Listenius' authorial control of access to knowledge might also helpfully be used in interpreting the problematic first chapter of the *Musica*. The opening observation '[musica] est triplex. Θεωρική, Πρακτική, Ποιητική', which frames his entire curriculum of music (see above, p. 31), has the effect of rendering the proper understanding of *musica*'s division *foreign*. If we view this foreignized terminology as an alienation tactic, then its apparent strangeness becomes a means by which Listenius establishes an authority over his audience's relationship to music—a relationship that would otherwise have remained negotiable. The same formula is used to antiquate the list of intervals in Cap. 9, *De Modis seu Interuallis*: 'Musicians [i.e. theorists] however disagree about the number of intervals. Some count fifteen, others nine, and others only six. The most customary in our time are: Τόνος, ἡμίτονος, δίτονος, ἡμιδίτονος, διατεσσάρῶν, διάπεντε, τόνος διάπεντε, ἡμίτονος διάπεντε, διαπάσον.'[248]

[246] Fol. Cviii^{v}.
[247] Fol. Dv^{r}.
[248] Fol. Bvi^{v}: 'Variunt autem de numero Modorum Musici. Nonnulli quindecim, alij nouem, quidam tantum sex numerant. Vsitatiores tamen sunt ha nostra tempestate. Τόνος, ἡμίτονος, δίτονος, ἡμιδίτονος, διατεσσάρῶν, διάπεντε, τόνος διάπεντε, ἡμίτονος διάπεντε, διαπάσον.' Listenius has in fact mistransliterated the Latin *diapason* back into Greek; it should have been spelled διαπάσῶν. Again, I am grateful to John Caldwell for this observation.

Whether or not these passages are read aloud, and however well schooled in Greek a Lateinschuler might have been, the sudden onslaught of listed Greek words feels cases like a clunky change of gear. For print houses of 1530s and 1540s Germany, Greek letters still presented a challenge, and rarely appeared as neat as their Latin equivalents (indeed, in Petreius' 1549 Nuremberg publication, the *diapason* on fol. Bvi^{v} appears as 'διαπάσομ', a mistake first made in Rhau's 1543 impression, and repeated in Petreius' 1547, 1549, and 1551 editions (though not his 1548 imprint) as well as Eichorn's Frankfurt edition of 1550. Gerlach sought to correct Listenius' spelling in his 1569 impression at Nuremberg, but still retained the earlier printers' error, resulting in the combination διάπασῶμ!). For readers whose Greek is only elementary, the switch from Latin (to which some students in the first *Haufe* are still only recently initiated) to Greek is a stumbling block to fluent reading that completely alters the mode of engagement with the text: it becomes image, to be beheld as a foreign 'other', rather than text that is accessible to the reader's critical faculties. Many readers would have had to spell out, letter by letter in their minds, the Greek letters, particularly in the case of the more complex words in the first chapter.

The curious thing is that none of the words Listenius transliterates in Greek *needs* to be spelled in Greek, either to preserve their integrity or to explicitly denote their source language.[249] They are the same words in Latin (*theorica*, *practica*, *poetica*; the Greek interval names had been Latinized centuries ago) and any half-decent student would recognize the Hellenism just by looking at the words. Furthermore, Listenius wrote them in Latin letters in 1533; and despite inserting the Greek words in 1537, retained the Latin terms then, too (often transliterating them directly after writing them in Greek). In the case of the more complex words—Θεωρική, Πρακτική, Ποιητική—a gloss in Latin is provided for them; in the case of the interval names, they are simply

[249] In the case of the interval names, Listenius is following Rhau in his *Enchiridion* (1520 [1530]), who calls five of them by their Greek names. Rhau's Leipzig audience, however, were fluent in Greek; that university-level music tuition and Lateinschule-level music tuition are very different tasks is arguably what prompted Listenius to write his textbook in the first place.

transliterated into Latin in the titles of the examples that follow the Greek word list. Listenius could, in other words, very happily have done without referring to them in Greek. Talking about music in Greek certainly makes his theory of music no clearer; on the contrary, it almost certainly makes it murkier, not least because the concepts Listenius is describing in Greek are without exception Latin-era concepts, retrofitted with Greek terminology.[250]

There is certainly something to the assertion that Listenius simply wanted to make himself sound a better humanist than he was by dropping Greek words into his textbook. But much more is at play here. By deliberately eschewing the language of the remainder of his textbook (and of the schoolroom in which it was used), Listenius may well, wittingly or unwittingly, have been acknowledging the frailty of regular language for framing a concept like *musica*. Or he might have been suggesting that music is too 'natural' for a young language like Latin, too primeval:[251] that *musica* is first Θεωρική, Πρακτική, Ποιητική before it is Latinized suggests that he considers *musica* itself to be in some way a dislocated concept, a discipline whose origins stretch back further into antiquity than even the words themselves suggest. Either way, the foreignness of these Greek terms gives them the tripartite division of *musica* and the eight notes of the scale the veneer of time-honoured foundations of music threory. It is important to recall that they are *not* time-honoured foundations of music theory (in the case of the scale divisions, even Listenius himself admits that 'variunt autem de numero Modorum Musici', and the tripartite division is original to Listenius.) But the invocation of ancient Greece brings with it an historical authority, and an unquestionability drawn from its pseudo-status as derivative of a wiser, golden age.

[250] This latter point is strengthened if we accept that Listenius was trying to channel Quintilian, who wrote in Latin, with the exception of some technical vocabulary for which Greek was used.

[251] The same point is frequently made by present-day musicologists; consider, for example, S.G. CUSICK, 'On a Lesbian Relationship with Music: A Serious Effort Not to Think Straight', in P. Brett, E. Wood, and G. Thomas, eds., *Queering the Pitch: The New Gay and Lesbian Musicology*, New York & London, 1994, pp. 67–84, who, although writing in English, observed that 'E sarebbe più facile dire'l mio tutto in italiano… la lingua nel quale io vivo la mia vita più interiore' (p. 67).



Figure II.7 LISTENIUS, *Musica*, fol. Bvii[r].

The pedagogical consequences of this rhetorical posturing are not insignificant. At the outset of the two sections demanding the most concentration—the conceptual division of *musica*, and the learning of intervals (the latter of which required the reader to sing a set of increasingly difficult intervals out loud, as well as look at the book; see Figure II.7, above)—Listenius manoeuvres his reader into a position of ignorance. The lists of Greek words act as a sort of 'pay attention' warning that prolonged concentration is about to be required, at the same time as it re-entrenches the schoolmaster's voice as one of othering authority. To the reader of Listenius' textbook of 1537, knowledge equals power; and the author shows his power by rendering complexity into unquestionable Greek the meaning of which he can choose to reveal or conceal.[252]

[252] There is a correlation here with some arguments presented in SIMPSON, *Burning to Read*, about Reformation reading.

This is a canny pedagogical trick: it provides a sixteenth-century schoolmaster with a book whose authorial voice at once keeps discipline, keeps attention, and consequently helps the boys to learn effectively and commit what they have learned to memory. In a chaotic schoolroom of three *Haufen* (around sixty boys) this must have made Listenius' textbook extremely useful.

Even the apparent undesirability of opening a textbook with a discussion of *musica* that is deliberately aporetic can be viewed as a deliberate pedagogical device. The Reformation historian Brian Cummings has noted that appealing to the authority of Greek thought on account of the antiquity of its terms initiated a problem that quickly consumed much of humanist thought in Germany: the grammatical structure of the language claiming chronological (and moral) priority, 'could not be rationalized fully by the terminology developed in relation to Latin', the normative means by which language and logic was explained.[253] This problem was exacerbated further by the Reformers' conscious intention to render vernacular German at least on a par with Latin in certain contexts; the result of this combined attack from humanist nostalgia on one side and from progressive vernacularists on the other was a significant loss of confidence in Latin as a sufficient language for everything that might conceivably be *thought*. In switching between languages in his textbook (which, recall, was designed for classrooms in which *only Latin was spoken*) Listenius imported the problems provoked by humanist language comparison and translation studies into the relationship between word and meaning, and in so doing established *musica* as something that cannot really be properly explained by either Latin or Greek—as something that cannot be properly explained by *words*.

This, too, is a clever trick, pedagogically speaking, not to mention a characteristically humanist affectation. Listenius' first chapter proposes that *musica* is both graspable and logically

[253] B. CUMMINGS, *The Literary Culture of the Reformation: Grammar and Grace*, p. 24. Much of the reasoning that follows is derived from Cummings' assessment.

describable, but that it is not *fully* graspable in words. In implying this paradoxical approach to music's organization, Listenius forces his reader to think deeper than the words in the textbook, to engage other levels of awareness (how is music *poetica*, for example?) that simultaneously bedrock the basic statement Listenius has made about *musica* being *triplex*. In classroom dialectic, the unclarity of Listenius' linguistic presentation of his theory combines with the authority of his authorial voice (boosted as it is by the veneer of antiquity) to establish a sort of mental disputation for the reader, in which Listenius' words—however problematic—become a truth-proposal that must be engaged by the reader's own thought. From this perspective, we might conclude that it was precisely the *problems* in Listenius' textbook that made it such a successful teaching resource.

3. THE LEGACY OF LISTENIUS' AUTHORITY

If such an interpretation appears counterintuitive, then the legacy of Listenius' textbook suggests that something about its author's pedagogical method made it unusually enduring. Besides the extensive publication history of the *Musica* itself, the book was quoted on numerous occasions. Albert Seay noted that Jean Yssandon borrowed layout and some content from it in his *Traité de musique pratique* (1582),[254] and famously Listenius' example on fols. Dvi^{v}–vii^{r} of prolation was reused by Sebaldus Heyden in his *Musicae* of 1537 (it was also picked up by Heyden's pupil, Heinrich Glarean, and used in his *Dodecachordon* of 1547).[255] The copyist Wolfgang Küffer, who matriculated at Wittenberg in the late 1540s, included the dedicatory epistle to the *Musica* in the vagans book (which served as his commonplace-book) to his personal collection of music; the contents of the partbooks (c. 1557–1563) are mostly four-part instrumental songs, and a few five-

[254] A. SEAY, 'French Renaissance Theory and Jean Yssandon', *Journal of Music Theory*, XV (1971), 254–72.
[255] See JUDD, *Reading Renaissance Music Theory*, p. 144.

part songs. The remaining space in the fifth partbook Küffer gives over to his favourite passages of Ovid, Virgil, Cicero, and Listenius.[256] Georg Donat, a Wittenberg matriculand in 1542, made notes on the *Rudimenta Musicae* in his personal notebook.[257] That Listenius' textbook was considered worthy of borrowing from (in the case of Heyden and Glarean) and copying (in the case of Küffer and Donat) demonstrates that it was considered a significant authority whose wisdom deserved repetition.

The first chapter of Listenius' book, in particular, was subjected to this sort of repetition. This chapter was the most novel and least commonplace; that it should have been quoted so many times demonstrates that it gained remarkable traction and proved eminently believable. (That it proved so convincing may well have been a result of Listenius' authorial rhetoric, and the pseudo-Hellenism of the tripartitism he proposed.) The division was parroted by most of the school music theory textbooks published in reformed Germany during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In Heinrich Faber's *Musica Poetica* of c. 1548, a textbook never printed but copied several times over, Listenius' overreaching in Greek was subjected to a translation ('[*musica poetica*] est ars ipsa fingendi musicum carmen. Nomen deductum est a *ποιέω* quod est facio').[258] Hermann Finck dropped the Greek altogether in his *Practica musica*, the next properly successful school music theory textbook to be issued at Wittenberg (by Rhau's heirs) in 1556 ('Mvsica diuiditur tripliciter ... Poëticam, quae fingit carmina & cantilenas, et post laborem operis fabricati aliquid relinquit, estque proprie Componistarum' [fol. Aii^{v}].)

[256] The partbooks are now held by the Bischöfliche Zentralbibliothek at Regensburg as ms. A.R. 940/41 of the Proske Sammlung. I am grateful to Raymond Dittrich for directing me to this source. See W. BRENNECKE, *Die Handschrift A.R. 940/41 der Proske-Bibliothek zu Regensburg*.

[257] See A. ABER, 'Das musikalische Studienheft des Wittenberger Studenten Georg Donat (um 1543)', *Sammelbände der International Musik-Gesellschaft*, XV (1913), 68–98.

[258] The text I quote here is from Hof Gymnasium-Bibliothek Ms. Paed. 3713, which is usually considered the 'definitive' copy. The copy Zwickau Ratsschulbibliothek Mus. 13.3 (*olim* Vollhardt 213) is bound together with Faber's *Ad Musicam Practicam Introductio*, Nuremberg, 1550, which is a textbook very similar to Listenius' *Musica* and divides music three ways in homage to Listenius; the description of *poetica* provided by Faber in 1550, however, is much simpler: 'Poetica fingit musica carmina. Huius partis studiosos Symphonistas passim uocant.' (Fol. Bii^{r}.)

After Finck, a distinction can be made between those theorists who borrow Listenius' division of music because they have borrowed from Faber, and those who borrow it directly from Listenius' 1537 textbook. Johannes Oridryus (*Practicae Musicae praecepta*, Düsseldorf, 1557), Sethus Calvisius (*Melopoiia*, Erfurt, 1592), Peter Eichmann (*Praecepta musicae practicae*, Stettin, 1604), Johannes Nucius (*Musicae poeticae*, Neisse, 1613) follow Listenius' text more closely, whilst Gallus Dressler (*Praecepta Musicae Poëticae*, ms,1563/4), Cyracius Snegassius (*Isagoges Musicae Libri Duo*, Erfurt, 1591), Burmeister (*Musica*, Rostock, 1601), and Joachim Thuringus (*Opusculum*, Berlin, 1624) betray ancestry from Faber.[259] A table, showing the use of certain

	Musica poetica	facere/ fabricare	post laborem	artifice mortuo	opus	perfectum	absolutum	consumatum	effectum
Listenius 1533	•	•	•		•				
Listenius 1537	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	•
Faber ca. 1548	•	•		•	•	•	•		
Faber 1550	•								
Finck 1556	•		•						
Oridryus 1557	•		•		•	•	•		
Dressler 1563/64	•		•	•	•		•		
Dedekind 1590	•								
Schneegass 1591	•								
Calvisius 1592	•								
Burmeister 1601	•	•							
Burmeister 1606	•								
Eichmann 1604	•		•						
Nucius 1613	•				•				
Thuringus 1624	•	•			•				
Herbst 1643	•	•		•	•				
Printz 1696	•								
Walther 1708	•								
Walther 1732	•	•							
Mattheson 1739	•								
Spiess 1745	•								

Table II.2 Dissemination of the concepts *musica poetica* and *opus* and their epithets
Von LOESCH, *Der Werkbegriff*, p. 15.

[259] The relevant portions of these texts, as well as German translations of them, are included in von LOESCH, *Der Werkbegriff*, pp. 121–141.

phrases derived from Listenius' first chapter, throughout sixteenth- and seventeenth-century music theory publications from reformed Germany, was drawn up by Heinz von Loesch and is reproduced above, as Table II.2.

Music theory instructors throughout the sixteenth century were apparently convinced by Listenius' invention of *musica poetica* and, in many cases, his discussion of what that involved. Their conviction, in turn, provided the grounds for another century's writers on music theory to delve deeper into what *musica poetica* was.

2.4.1 The Opus *and* Musica poetica *in Listenius' Pedagogy*

If Listenius was indeed as focused on the pedagogical implications of his words as the rhetoric of his *Musica* suggests, then there are a range of conclusions we can draw about how his first chapter ought to be interpreted today.

The first is that, in a certain sense, the introduction to the main text of the *Musica* needs to be read not just as a description of musical knowledge, but also as an introduction to the experience of *being taught* about musical knowledge—to the experience of being under authority as a pupil, and to having one's access to knowledge controlled. As such, one can imagine that Listenius might well have *intended* the first chapter of his textbook to be deliberately bewildering. For, if he could 'blind his reader with science' at the outset, he could both establish the authority-dynamic under which a disciplined musical education could be received and make clear the magnitude of the task lying ahead—both valuable tools in pedagogy. Such an interpretation would oblige us to give up our attempts to find conceptual precision in Listenius' *musica poetica* and *opus*, since one reason for their invention could now be that they were *not* conceptually precise terms.

Second, if Listenius' textbook was successful on account of its suitability for the level of understanding of young boys, we might question whether it is appropriate to *expect* conceptual

clarity from its introductory chapter. Part of the success of the *Musica* was its clear focus on the needs of its audience. On these grounds, to mine it for nuggets of *musica*'s paradigmatization or to treat its contents as descriptive of a complex aesthetic system is to commit a category mistake. The book is *the wrong sort of text* in which to find applications of Aristotelian philosophy to musical thought, the wrong kind of book in which to find serious discussions of music's aesthetic criteria.

Both conclusions suggest that the twin concepts of *opus* and *musica poetica*, long prized as Listenius' most important contributions to musical thought, were of comparatively little importance in the overall thrust of his textbook. (This is not the same as saying that they represent nothing more than empty concepts to him, which von Loesch asserted, but rather that they were not laden with the systematic significance they have subsequently gained.) The apparent unremarkableness of the two concepts to Listenius probably indicates a conviction on his part that they were self-evident to those who understood them, and of only marginal interest to those who did not.

In either version of events, the concepts *musica poetica* and *opus* as presented by Listenius are simply too weak (too 'thin', to borrow Strohm's terminology), to function as the bases upon which any distinctive musical aesthetic principles can be based. They are certainly too opaque to attest to any dependence on Reformation theology. In truth, the likeliest reason for Listenius' mention of *musica poetica* in the first place was the same as for his mention of *musica theorica*: to make clear the categories of musical knowledge into which he did not intend to delve.

2.4.2 Conclusion

The initial impetus for this dissertation—to seek out the headwaters of a modern musical work-concept in the music theory of early Reformation Germany—rested on an interpretation of

Listenius' concepts of *opus* and *musica poetica* that gave them functional significance in a sixteenth-century musical aesthetic. Our reading of Listenius' *Musica* from a pedagogical perspective challenges the conclusion that the two concepts can be relied upon in this way.

This reading has important consequences for the possibility of a relationship between theological concepts and musical concepts during the Reformation. For, without the 'link' of a concept that can 'function' analogously in either field (the work-concept, or rhetoric-concept), there is no way to propose a conceptual commensurability between the two arenas of thought. In Chapter I, I argued that the *expectation* of some sort of commensurability could be attributed to the ideological self-identity narratives of modernity and Germanicity (to which much twentieth-century German musicological research was, wittingly or unwittingly, subservient); in this chapter, we have seen that the proposed conceptual loci of such commensurability were, in fact, non-existent.

Our study of Listenius' two textbooks in this chapter is instructive, too, for the fact that it reveals a side to the history of music education not usually examined. Numerous histories of sixteenth-century school music teaching in Germany have been written; but none have yet examined the consequences of the power-dynamic inherent to a pedagogical relationship for German Reformation school music. Nor have they explored the effect that the explosion of printed music textbooks had upon the development of this relationship, and indeed, to to the development of music teaching in general. A post-Foucauldian analysis of music theory teaching in the sixteenth-century classroom (a context in which, if Nietzsche is to be believed, the immutability of the printed text was beginning to have major sociological consequences) will prove an enlightening area for future research.

We have reached the natural end of our deconstructive approach: the original hypothesis that Luther's theological reforms initiated music-aesthetic developments via Listenius' music theory is

proven defunct, on the grounds of lack of evidence. But this does not mean that the Reformer himself, and his opponents, did not have distinct musical opinions that represented major contributions to sixteenth-century musical thought, or that musical ideas and theological ideas never met in sixteenth-century intellectual history. If the contents of this dissertation up to this point have shown us anything, it is that twentieth-century musicological treatments of early sixteenth-century German musical thought have been handicapped by a constant redirection into narratives of modernity and post-Hegelian aesthetic structures on the one hand, and by over-rigid equation of musical thought with music theory treatises on the other. In order to assess the wider picture of musical thought during the early German Reformation period, we now turn our attention to one alternative category of contributions to musical discourse: the theological writings of early sixteenth-century Germany.

PART II

CHAPTER III

LUTHER AS MEDIÆVAL MUSICAL THINKER

In Chapter I we saw that the figure of Martin Luther, and his contribution to musical thought, has become strongly aligned with a version of history in which the Reformation functions as the birthplace of modernity. Musicologists writing in the years after the decline of modernity narratives have generally treated Luther from one of two perspectives: either (i) as an intellectual island, whose austerity stands at odds with both the Italian Renaissance thinkers (who shared his love of music) and the radical Protestants Calvin and Zwingli (who did not); or (ii) as a precursor to the musical creativity of J.S. Bach. Both treatments, however, for all their avoidance of the terminology of modernity, continue to treat Luther as if his theology and his musical thought are best considered as radical *innovations*, and to relate to him as if his epistemology was essentially *modern*. In this way, the most recent treatments of Luther's musical thought (including Guicharrousse's *Les musiques de Luther*, which includes a chapter entitled 'Vers une *nouvelle* théologie de musique', and Leaver's *LLM*) subtly engage in the same quests for origins and assumptions of commensurability with later historical agents' vantage-points that their unashamedly modernist predecessors did.

The basic consideration of Luther as a *modern* in much musicological scholarship, however, stands in stark contrast to his conventional characterization, by ecclesiastical historians after 1945, as a late mediæval. The mediævalist turn in Luther studies really began with Heinrich Denifle, and was built upon by Joseph Lortz, whose *Die Reformation in Deutschland* (1939/40) proposed that

Luther's theological breakthrough[260] was a logical response to philosophical problems inherent in previous theology.[261] The characterization of mediæval theology that Lortz proposed—riddled with doctrinal *Unklarheit*—has since been broadly rejected,[262] but the relevance of the *Wegestreit* disputes within late mediæval scholastic theology to Luther's theological breakthrough and subsequent theological identity has been reiterated over and over again.[263]

By far the most significant contributor to the now-mainstream tradition of sourcing Luther's theological ideas in their mediæval headwaters was the late Heiko A. Oberman (1930–2001). A Dutch Protestant by birth, Oberman began his career with a study on Thomas Bradwardine (an early fourteenth-century member of the Merton College, Oxford conceptualist school who later became Archbishop of Canterbury) before undertaking a major study of mediæval German nominalism which led him to completely re-conceptualize the Reformation that followed it as a late mediæval theological *dénouement*. Oberman was to Reformation studies what Kristeller was to Renaissance humanism, in that his method prized both archival study and historiographical revisionism, and his findings instigated a disciplinary-wide turn towards studying Luther as a *receiver* and processor of mediæval theology rather than as *ex nihilo* innovator.[264] The shift was so seminal that one commentator on sixteenth-century religious reform has observed that 'neither the events nor the ideas of the sixteenth century may be properly understood [any longer] unless seen as the culmination of developments in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries' as proposed by Oberman.[265]

[260] To postmodern eyes this term appears unthinkably ideological; within ecclesiastical history, however, it remains current and in regular usage to describe the epistemological shift Luther's scholarship underwent during the years between *c.*1515 and *c.*1519.

[261] LORTZ, *Die Reformation in Deutschland*, I, p. 156.

[262] See BÄUMER, 'Die Erforschung', and BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, pp. 4–8.

[263] For an introduction to the most prominent *viae* in late mediæval scholastic theology, see D.R. JANZ, 'Late medieval theology'.

[264] Oberman's approach differed from Denifle's and Lortz', in that they compared Luther's thought with older thinkers whereas Oberman more-or-less single-handedly resurrected the study of fifteenth-century north European theology. The fruits of Oberman's approach can be seen in the work of Alister E. McGrath, Thomas A. Brady, David Steinmetz, Scott Hendrix, David V.N. Bagchi, Katherine G. Brady, Susan Karant-Nunn, Christopher Ocker, Andrew Pettegree, William J. Courtenay and many other Reformation historians.

[265] Alister McGrath, cit. in T.A. BRADY, Obituary for Oberman, *German History*, XIX (2001), 571–572.

The root of Oberman's approach was the conviction that, in order to understand the thought of the Reformer, one needed first to understand the thought he had received. In this chapter, I seek to situate Luther's earliest musical thought in the context of its mediæval headwaters. This necessitates a detailed study of the 'scaffolding' of his knowledge—the epistemology to which his thought was subordinated. Before we begin our study, however, it is helpful to gain an overview of the proximity between musical thought and theological thought in Luther's theology as a whole.

1. MUSIC NEXT TO THEOLOGY

Luther famously noted in his preface to Georg Rhau's four-part vocal anthology *Symphoniae jucundae* (RISM 1538[8]),[266] that music is 'after the word of God' 'the highest treasure in the world'.[267] The degree of credence that can be given to this remark has long been debated (it does not, for example, occur in any of Luther's sermons or theological writings), but it has now been demonstrated that Luther must have made a roughly identical observation on at least three occasions: once in the *Symphoniae Jucundae*; once for a now-lost German songbook pre-dating the *Symphoniae Jucundae* by a few years (but Luther's foreword for which survives in Wolfgang Figulus' *Cantionum* (RISM 1575[2]);[268] and a third time in a private letter to the composer Ludwig Senfl, where it appears thus:

[266] The foreword was repr. in *WA* l/III:68–74; cf. *LW* liii:321–4. The whole anthology appears as vol. III to *Georg Rhau, Musikdrucke aus den Jahren 1538 bis 1545*, ed. H. Albrecht, Kassel, 1959.

[267] 'In summa die edle Musica ist nach Gottes wordt der höchste Schatz auff Erden'. Cit. and trans. LEAVER, *LLM*, pp. 322 and 316, respectively.

[268] See W. BLANKENBURG, 'Überlieferung und Textgeschichte von Martin Luthers "Encomion musices"'; for a full discussion, see LEAVER, *LLM*, pp. 11–12 and 313–24.

> I plainly judge, and do not hesitate to affirm, that except for theology there is no art that could be put on the same level with music, since except for theology [music] alone produces what otherwise only theology can do, namely, a calm and joyful disposition.[269]

Leaver noted that 'this distinctive statement—"music is next to theology"—distinguishes Luther from his predecessors' by the high premium it places upon music.[270] As we shall see, this is not strictly true, since Luther's mediæval predecessors were not exactly dismissive of music, but the Reformer's overwhelming positivity towards music is indeed worthy of attention.

Luther's remark has been used by his musicological devotees primarily to promote his consideration as a musical thinker, and to argue for his inclusion in the pantheon of sixteenth-century pioneers of musical ideas. Sometimes the observation has been used to prop up ideological statements (such as Abert's 'musical' Luther), but it has also been highlighted more recently for ostensibly corrective purposes. In addition to Leaver, Buszin and John Windh both used it to lay weight upon the fact that Luther loved music,[271] presumably because they felt that the perceived indifference towards music in worship of Jean Calvin (1509–64) and the outright rejection of it by Huldrych Zwingli (1481–1531) has led music historians to expect Luther's perspective to be similarly disapproving.[272] The clarification that the Wittenberger in fact reckoned music second only to theology/the word of God in the order of God's gifts to the created order has the advantage both of dispelling this myth and of bidding for a significant rôle for the Reformer in music history.

Recapitulating the commonplace that Luther was a lover of music is helpful if only to dispel this misconception; but the really remarkable thing about his reckoning music 'the first thing, after the word of God' is not simply that Luther was speaking of music positively when many

[269] To Senfl, 4 October 1530. *LW* xlix:427; cf. *WA BR* v:639.
[270] LEAVER, 'Luther on Music', 125.
[271] BUSZIN, 'Luther on Music', 83; J.E. WINDH, 'Early Lutheran Masses', p. 3.
[272] Of the theological discussions of music I have examined in detail, 54% speak of music in a positive way, 33% are neutral, whilst just 12% are negative. Contrast Luther: 'ich nicht der meinung byn, das durchs Euangelion sollten alle künste zu boden geschlagen werden', with e.g. the position of his Wittenberg colleague Anton von Karlstadt, described in H. BARGE, *Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*, pp. 491–3.

contemporary Reformers condemned it.[273] Rather, what makes Luther's statement worthy of our attention is the fact that he made it as a *biblical scholar*—as a specialist in the word of God.[274] Appointed to the chair in biblical theology at the ten year-old University of Wittenberg in 1512, the Augustinian's whole agenda of reform was based upon his biblical theology; in the 1520s and 30s, Luther translated the entire Bible from the original languages into German, a hitherto unparalleled undertaking.[275] When Luther declared music second only to 'the word of God' or to 'theology', then, he was making no idle comparison: he was saying that music was the gift of God second only to that which had occupied his life's work, and to that which had come to function as the kernel holding together his entire *Weltanschauung*. (The fact that in the earliest of the three statements referred to above (the letter to Senfl) Luther refers to music as 'after theology' (*theologiam*), whereas in the latter two he refers to music as 'after the word of God' (Germ.: 'nach Gottes wordt'; Lat.: 'post verbum Dei') is not important, since the Reformer *can* be distinguished from many of his predecessors by his insistence that scriptural interpretation and *theologia* are the same discipline.[276])

At times Luther seems to have equated music-making with the fundamental theological *praxis* itself: scriptural lection. A number of the Reformer's observations about music suggest that singing hymns or psalms could perform at least one of the functions usually reserved to reading

[273] As LEAVER, *LLM*, p.6, has noted, the fact that Luther did not give over a great deal of his attention to the discussion of music has led some to suggest the Reformer was not particularly concerned about it. In the context of sixteenth-century theological discourse, however, *any* statement by a respected theological authority was considered to be invested with the fullness of that individual's authority. There was no distinction between an on-duty and an off-duty theologian in sixteenth-century Germany, an idea that belongs to a much later era. Indeed, Luther came from a tradition that prized this totality of theological reasoning particularly highly (the Augustinian); and the total theological authority of any Catholic preacher (and the fact that Luther's early anti-Roman postulations in the academic disputations of 1517–19 might consequently be considered binding for the Catholic faithful) was one of the main reasons behind the early German attempts to declare him a heretic. See BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, p. 30.

[274] G. EBERLING, 'Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik', 174, noted that the foundation of Luther's chair of biblical exegesis at Wittenberg was a novelty in the late mediæval university.

[275] Jerome worked from the original languages too, but his brief from Pope Damasus for the New Testament and the Psalter was to provide a revision of previous Latin translations (the *vetus latina* and Old Latin texts); accordingly, the New Testament translations he provided were based on both. The proto-reformers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries had translated either entirely from Jerome's Latin, or used original sources only in part. Luther's was the first translation to bypass a Latin intermediary altogether (Tyndale's translation, which, most scholars now agree, *was* made from both the original Greek and Hebrew, was never fully completed).

[276] See e.g. U. LEINSLE, *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*, pp. 43–54.

the Bible. Whereas many late mediæval theologians prescribed scriptural lection for those feeling tormented by the devil (for he, it was said, could not remain when the word of God was preached),[277] Luther counselled music for the relief of diabolical torment.[278] 'Satan is the spirit of sorrows, and since he cannot bear joy, he flees as far away as he can from music';[279] 'Music is a divine and optimal gift, by which many temptations are driven off. So Satan hates music most of all, and gives you no trouble [when you make music]'.[280] He made a similar point in his letter to Senfl,[281] and on several further occasions.[282] In a letter to the Freiberger organist Matthias Weller, Luther advised that depression was best countered by song, on account of its ability to 'defy the devil'.[283] On at least one occasion the Reformer apparently took a dose of his own medicine, if his earliest biographer Matthäus Ratzeberger (his physician) is to be believed: rendered 'unconscious' by the devil's consistent attacks, Luther could only be fully roused when his coterie started singing to him.[284]

The foundation of Luther's belief in music's power to trope scriptural lection in this way was the account, in 1 Sam. 16:23, of David's playing the harp to rid Saul of his evil spirit. This passage was referred to by Luther more often than any other scriptural *sententia* in discussions about

[277] J.B. RUSSELL, *Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages*, p. 208, argued that the devil's significance declined in later mediæval theology. (The most dualist theology remained that of the Augustinians.) OBERMAN, *Luther*, shows that Luther bucked this trend, considering himself to be in a lifelong wrestling-match with the devil.

[278] This is all the more remarkable given that the classic sources on music's devotional use (particularly Augustine's) binarize its use from that of scriptural lection. See J. DYER, 'The Place of Musica in Medieval Classifications of Knowledge', 5–6.

[279] Tischrede N°. 194; *WA TR* i/1:86.

[280] Tischrede N°. 2387a; *WA TR* ii:441.

[281] '[D]iabolus… ad vocem musicae paene similiter fugit ad verbum theologiae'.

[282] Tischrede N°. 7034: 'So vertreibt [musica] auch den Teufel… Ich gebe nach der Theologia der Musica den nehesten Locum und höchste Ehre', *WA TR* vi:348; at the Diet of Worms, following a serious headache, he is reported to have announced, 'Nun woollen wir dem Teuffel zu leid unnd verdrieß dem Psalmen…mit vier Stimmen singen'; J. MANLIUS, *Locorum communium*, Frankfurt, 1574, fol. vii^{r}; cit. LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 400 and n. 18. The accuracy of this latter account must be held lightly; but the fact that Luther said similar things on several other occasions makes it all the likelier to be a fair report.

[283] *WA BR* vii:105; trans. T.G. Tappert in *Luther: Letters of Spiritual Counsel*, Philadelphia, 1955, p. 97; cit. LEAVER, 'Luther as Musician', 150.

[284] M. RATZEBERGER, *Die handschriftliche Geschichte Ratzeberger's Über Luther und seine Zeit* (1555), ed. C.G. Neudecker, Jena, 1850, p. 58; cit. LEAVER, ibid., 150. The observation is all the more interesting for the fact that it was made by a physician, and one not known to have been influenced by the Ficinian medicinal movement. Doubtless the account is propagandist, especially since Luther was perfectly capable of writing himself into the biblical narrative of Christ's temptation, sorrows, and passion when necessary (see esp. BAINTON, 'Dürer and the Man of Sorrows'), but OBERMAN, *Luther*, p. 136, noted that Ratzeberger was 'Luther's generally reliable biographer'.

music,[285] and grounded Luther's notion that music could perform this particular function of scripture in a scriptural source. Some, including Leaver, have found in Luther's conflation of musical and scriptural-lectional purposes an implication that Luther considered music's primary purpose to be preaching.[286] This use of music 'similiter…ad verbum theologiae' to reject the devil might lead one to the conclusion that music causes the devil to flee because it is a trope of the 'word of God' preached, or of the gospel being preached. Whilst it is admittedly possible that Luther may have thought this to be the case, the consistent reliance on 1 Sam. 16:23 and David suggests the association between music's power and that of scriptural lection to reject the devil may have been brought about in a different way. Luther noted in 1537 that 'David himself composed the songs' of worship used by Israel (i.e. the Psalms).[287] Luther almost certainly presumed that David's singing to Saul, by which the evil spirit was cast out, was of his newly-composed Psalms, songs which Luther describes as having been designed 'to sing praise and blessings to God'.[288] If the secret to driving away the devil is to sing songs of *praise* to God, then music's function is not to 'preach the devil away' by confronting him with the 'truth', but rather to offer a 'triumphal song about Christ and the church' that confronts the devil with 'joy'.[289] This is consistent with Luther's statements about the devil's flight, which is always at the experience of *joy*, and not at the experience of *truth*.[290] The subtle distinction amends one of the strands contributing to Leaver's thesis that Luther considered music inherently proclamatory.[291]

[285] E.g. *WA* iii:182; *WA* v/II:98; *WA TR* ii:518 (Tischrede N^o. 2545a); *WA* liv:33–4; *WA* xxxv:483; *WA TR* l/I:86 (Tischrede N^o. 194); *WA TR* ii:518 (Tischrede N^o. 2545a); the letter to Weller (*WA BR* vii:104).

[286] LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 168, citing a letter to Spalatin (*LW* liii:221; cf. *WA BR* iii:220); and p. 6, responding to M.S. VIERTEL, 'Kirchenmusik zwischen Kerygma und Charisma: Anmerkungen zu einer protestantischen Theologie der Musik', *Jahrbuch für Liturgik und Hymnologie*, XXIX (1985), 111–23, which denied that Luther gave music a predicatory function.

[287] *WA* xlv:206b (Sermon for All Saints' Day, on Ps. 8).

[288] Loc. cit.

[289] *LW* x:208; cf. *WA* iii:253.

[290] This concurs with the conclusion of ANTTILA, 'The Innocent Pleasure'.

[291] I do not at all reject Leaver's suggestion that Luther reckoned music capable of proclamation and preaching; I simply do not find it central to Luther's musical aesthetic.

It ought, nonetheless, to be beyond doubt that Luther reckoned music and theology/the word of God to be in some way related to one another. This is a helpful place from which to begin our analysis, in that it enables us to address the Augustinian's musical ideas alongside his theological ideas. This possibility itself suggests that Luther might more appropriately be categorized as a late mediæval musical thinker than a Renaissance or modern one, since the separation of the *artes* from theological speculation is routinely held up as a motif of both the Renaissance and modernity.[292] In what follows, then, I assume the mediævalism of Luther's early musical thought, with two consequences. The first is that I treat Luther's musical aesthetic as a theological question, investigating the way in which received theological ideas and practices of devotion formed some of the central tenets of the young friar's understanding of *musica*. The second is that I contrast the young Luther's musical thought with that of his Renaissancist contemporaries. The latter is all the more pertinent, since some very recent scholarship has sought to draw similarities between Luther's earliest musical thought and the syncretist musical poetics of the Italian humanists.

First, a disclaimer. Whilst Luther's observation from 1538 that music was second only to theology is broadly consonant with the evidence of his musical thought from all periods in his life, his theology underwent radical upheavals over the course of his career; it would consequently be unrealistic to expect his musical thought to have remained static when his theological thought did not. We ought to be prepared for Luther's musical thought to change and develop at the same time as his approach to 'the word of God' changed and developed. At times, therefore, our focus will need not to be on Luther's musical thought *per se*, but rather upon the context for that

[292] E.g. D.K.L. CHUA, *Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning*, p. 18, which notes prosaically that '[w]ith its supernatural aura demystified as natural and its inaudible, invisible essences dismissed as non-existent, modern music became an autonomous object open to the manipulations of instrumental reason' in the sixteenth century; LOCKWOOD, 'Renaissance', p. 179, observes that '[f]ew have denied [the] importance' of 'the rise of secular humanism as an educational programme emphasizing rhetoric, grammar and moral philosophy, in opposition to the metaphysical scholasticism of the Middle Ages' to the Renaissance.

thought. We shall keep one eye on his musical concepts and music-aesthetic 'scaffolding', and another on the concepts and structural 'scaffolding' of his broader thought.

2. THE INSTABILITY OF LATE MEDIÆVAL THOUGHT ABOUT MUSIC

3.2.1 Luther's Musical Knowledge and the Decline of the Quadrivium

In a section of commentary written afresh for his 2007 monograph, Leaver asserted that Luther probably drew his musical thought from Augustine, Boethius, de Muris, Jean Gerson, and Tinctoris. Leaver (somewhat meekly) admitted that 'even if he was not aware of all the names of such music theorists he would nevertheless have been familiar with the substance of their treatises since all of these authors by and large shared the same basic perspectives'—namely, that music was a quadrivial art, which gave glory to God through its internal order—a statement rather underwhelming in its support of his previous observations.[293]

Luther knew Augustine's theological position on music very well; it is possible that he may have known Boethius' *De institutione musica* as a text in its own right (it had been printed, at Venice, in 1491), but, even if he didn't, he certainly knew Boethius. Assuming the University of Erfurt followed its own statutes (as Leaver notes) de Muris' *Musica speculativa secundum Boetiam* would have been the one textbook on music Luther would certainly have known. Whether or not Luther would have read Tinctoris is not clear; his *Complexus effectuum musicae* (*c.*1474–5) may well have been circulated amongst the Brethren of the Common Life in the Low Countries,[294] and Luther was briefly a pupil at their school in Magdeburg (in 1497).[295] The fact that Tinctoris was a

[293] LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 66. The assertion that Augustine and Tinctoris 'by and large shared the same basic perspective' obviously involves significant simplification.

[294] Egidius Carlerius' *Tractatus* (*c.*1470), upon which Tinctoris' *Complexus* was based, was published by the Brethren at Brussels in 1479. See D.J. CULLINGTON and R. STROHM, eds., *On the Dignity and Effects of Music*, pp. 8–15.

[295] E. BARNIKOL, 'Luther in Magdeburg und die dortige Brüderschule', *Theologische Arbeiten aus dem Rheinischen Wissenschaftlichen Prediger-Verein*, XVIII (1917), 1–62.

leading commentator of Thomistic theology and that Luther is notable for his apparent ignorance of Thomism might suggest that his exposure to Tinctoris was rather less thorough than Leaver presumes (if indeed he was exposed to Tinctoris at all).[296] It is, however, difficult to draw conclusions either way on inference alone.

The likeliest contender for the formation-text of Luther's musical thought was Adam von Fulda's *De musica* of 1490.[297] Although never printed, it circulated in Wittenberg (where Adam was a founding professor until his death in 1505) and probably Erfurt, too.[298] A basic primer on most of the critical practical issues in *musica*, its easy digestibility and relatively recent composition combined with the Saxon provenance of its author to prevent the hegemony of Nicolaus Wollick's *Opus Aureum* (1501, published at Paris) stretching eastward from Cologne.[299]

It is difficult, however, as Leaver pointed out, to be certain about what musical texts Luther had read. The reason for this is that the contexts in which he might have encountered such texts were diverse. Luther's knowledge of Augustine's musical thought, for example, would have been drawn from the Theologian's *Confessions*, a text which, as an Augustinian, Luther absorbed almost as keenly as the Bible.[300] (Luther probably did *not* know Augustine's six books of *De Musica*, the metrical theory expounded in which was handed down by subsequent music theorists in a game of garbled Chinese whispers.[301]) But it appears that Luther did not simply absorb Augustine's musical opinions without qualification: the Theologian's perspective on music in the

[296] Luther's knowledge of late mediæval Thomism has been disputed; whilst agreeing with Lortz that Luther did not know *Thomas*' theology well, Oberman and others argued that Luther *did* understand late mediæval Thom*ism*, and just didn't like it very much. JANZ, *Luther and Late Medieval Thomism*, pp. 154–8, however, argues that the view of Thomism Luther received was probably a caricature of the school's real philosophy.

[297] Adam's treatise can be found in Gerbert's *Scriptores*, pp. 239–81. The reader is referred to the helpful translation and commentary, P.J. SLEMON, 'Adam von Fulda on *Musica Plana* and *Compositio. De Musica*, Book II: A Translation and Commentary', unpubl. PhD thesis, University of British Columbia, 1994.

[298] LEAVER, *LLM*, pp. 71–2.

[299] NIEMÖLLER, *Nikolaus Wollick, 1480–1541, und sein Musiktraktat*, pp. 276–9, notes that almost immediately upon its absorption in Cologne, Wollick's *Opus aureum* extended its influence south-east to Nuremberg through Cochlaeus' and de Quercus' writings.

[300] Cf. Melanchthon's declaration that the young Luther 'read all the works of Augustine frequently, and remembered them the best', despite also reading Thomas (did he?), Duns Scotus, Biel, Pierre d'Ailly, and Gerson. In E. VANDIVER, R. KEEN, and T.D. FRAZEL, *Luther's Lives*, p. 17.

[301] See W.R. BOWEN, 'Augustine in Renaissance and Medieval Musical Science', p. 37.

Confessions is sharply negative[302]—music is the locus of potential fleshly temptation, and must be handled with extraordinary care, always as subordinate to text[303]—whereas Luther remained consistently *positive* towards music throughout his life.

The theology of music Luther learned from Augustine should, in theory, have been tempered by an in-depth study of *musica* as a quadrivial discipline at Erfurt. In the original *baccalaureus* curricula of Paris, imitated across Europe in the centuries afterwards and still the basis for Erfurt's teaching programme in the early sixteenth century, each of the *artes liberales* were studied for a year. But formal university tuition of *musica speculativa* was effectively ignored in all the European universities by the fifteenth century. Paris, Joseph Dyer noted, had all but given up teaching *musica* by the middle of the thirteenth century;[304] and John Caldwell suggested that the same was probably true for Oxford.[305] Although the University of Prague made a concerted effort to revive the Quadrivium at the end of the century,[306] neither its statutes nor that of its daughter-institution, the University of Leipzig, prescribed more than three weeks' lectures on *musica*—all of de Muris' *Musica Speculativa*.[307] The time recovered by jettisoning music lectures was given over to more of Aristotle's natural philosophy and to the emerging discipline of optics.[308] The German universities founded during the fifteenth century paid obeisance to *musica*, retaining it as a component of the arts faculty curriculum when there was probably no great willingness amongst their founders to do so. Assuming Luther did receive the statutory period of lectures in *musica* whilst at Erfurt (and there is no reason to presume that he did not) his formal musical education

[302] In fact Augustine's position in Book VI of the *De Musica* was equally negative (the first five books had been written before his conversion in 391).

[303] S.G. NICHOLS, 'Voice and Writing in Augustine and the Troubadour Lyric', p. 148.

[304] DYER, 'Speculative "Musica" and the Medieval University of Paris', 194 and 196.

[305] J. CALDWELL, 'Music in the Faculty of Arts', in J. McConica, ed., *The History of the University of Oxford*, III, Oxford, 1986, p. 203; cit. DYER, ibid., 202.

[306] See E. WITKOWSKA-ZAREMBA, 'Music between *Quadrivium* and *Ars canendi*: *Musica speculativa* by Johannes de Muris and Its Reception in Central and East-Central Europe', in *Cantus Planus: Papers Read at the Fourth Meeting, Pécs, Hungary, 3–8 September 1990*, Budapest, 1992, pp. 119–26.

[307] LIVINGSTONE, 'The Place of Music in German Education', 259; DYER, 'Speculative "Musica"', 202.

[308] LIVINGSTONE, ibid., 260.

would have lasted no more than a month, in the context of a *magister artium* degree education that could last anything from five to seven years in total.[309]

This last point is worth emphasizing, since Luther had been a student, and later taught as a professor, at universities statutorily required to teach *musica* as a component of the *magister artium* curriculum. But Luther would have paid *almost no intellectual attention to music* in the context of his formal studies. This did not mean that his education was free from *musica*—far from it. But the majority of music tuition in university cities had, in any case, long since moved out from the arts faculty to the *bursae* into which students were organized, and occasionally out further still to private gatherings.[310]

The effect of this resituation of *musica* from within the formal university context was to uncouple *musica* from its conceptual association with the scientific Quadrivium, and to reassign it to *ars canendi* (or, to use Niemöller's term, *gesang*).[311] The result was a gradual change in the situation of *musica* in the overall schema of knowledge. Joyce Irwin has noted that the idea of the music of the spheres, on which music's claim to quadrivial stature was based, had already been demoted to the status of metaphor by the late fourteenth century.[312] Whilst in the high Middle Ages, music was considered almost exclusively from a philosophical and scientific perspective, by the mid-fourteenth century *musica* had come to mean something sounding, or at the very least something imagined as sounding. With the exception of the Renaissance Platonist disciples of Ficino, no serious philosophers after de Muris (1323) addressed music from a speculative perspective until Kepler.

[309] See G. PIETZSCH, 'Zur Pflege der Musik an den deutschen Universitäten bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts', VI, 23; but Pietzsch also notes that the specific Erfurter requirement for music lectures to be from de Muris was not repeated when the requirement for a month's lectures was in the 1449 statute.

[310] A significant proportion of the earliest printed music theory textbooks were written as private lecture courses, including Philomathes' (Vienna), Rhau's (Leipzig), and Dressler's (Magdeburg).

[311] NIEMÖLLER, 'Zum Einfluß des Humanismus auf Position und Konzeption von Musik im deutschen Bildungssystem der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts', p. 94; cf. pp. 85–6.

[312] J.L. IRWIN, 'The Mystical Music of Jean Gerson', 188. Indeed, Aristotle's scepticism towards any knowledge not derived through sensory perception had already dealt the concept of *musica mundana* a mortal blow in the twelfth century.

Any similarity or proximity Luther perceived between music and theology, then, was not caused by the supporting rôle that music, as a *scientia*, could play to *theologia* in the *artes liberales*, or by the fact that *musica speculativa* made manifest God's orderliness.

3.2.2 Music as Transactional Devotion: The Prehistory of Luther's Musical Thought

The very idea that *musica* ought to be addressed as something scientific (quadrivial) was the logical consequent of a metaphysical approach to the observable order based on the teaching of St Paul in Rom. 1:19: 'Ever since the creation of the world [God's] eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made'. During the high Middle Ages, study of contingent things (including music) was valuable because knowledge of their internal order revealed God's 'divine nature' and 'eternal power'.[313] But how did contingent things relate to, and reveal the Creator? Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, absorbing Aristotle's philosophy into Western Christianity from the East, set God in the rôle of the Stagirite's 'Unmoved Mover' and then applied Plotinus' (Porphyry's, Boethius') Neoplatonist theory of 'emanations of being' and 'emanations of form' to the created order.[314] According to this theory, God, the ultimate Source, issued forth all things from himself, as if in concentric circles or as if down 'rungs' on a 'ladder'. Each 'rung' possessed the qualities of the Source in lesser and lesser echoes in what Thomas referred to as an *analogia entis*, or analogy of being.[315]

The whole basis of this ontological, emanationist metaphysics was the notion that observations about the world and about God were primarily observations about being (*esse*), and that a continuity of 'being' (*ens*) could be assured between heavenly and earthly realms. But by the

[313] The destabilizing impact of the rise of natural philosophy is explored in E. GRANT, *God and Reason in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge, 2001.

[314] For an accessible introduction to Plotinus, see J.M. RIST, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*, esp. pp. 66–83; H.M. SCHUELLER, *The Idea of Music: An Introduction to Musical Aesthetics in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*, pp. 173–8.

[315] OBERMAN, 'Luther and the Via Moderna', 649, describes the *analogia entis* as 'an epistemological conduit between creatures and their Creator'.

middle of the fourteenth century, problems reconciling Aristotle's pagan philosophy with Christian theology (especially regarding the immortality of the soul) had led to the increasing rejection of Thomistic metaphysics as a valid way of addressing knowledge. According to Oberman, the fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, witnessed a 'momentous paradigm shift from God as Being to God as Person', in which ontologism and metaphysics were displaced altogether as modes of reasoning in favour of 'a tradition that stretched back through St Bonaventure to St Francis of Assisi, a tradition that rejected the Thomistic "Unmoved Mover" and envisaged a covenantal "God who acts"'.[316] In this new paradigm, the relevant questions about God were no longer questions of his Being or his nature (i.e. of *contemplatio*), but rather questions of what he could and would *do*.[317]

The consequences of this paradigm shift for music were numerous and significant. The first consequence was that the very basis of a speculative understanding of *musica* came crashing down: the notion that earthly *musica* was a sort of analogy of heavenly order was now a defunct concept.[318] The second, successive consequence was that there was no need to address *musica* metaphysically any longer. The very logic behind a quadrivial approach to *musica* had been dismantled. The third consequence, which was by far the most significant, was a wholesale transferral of music from the conceptual realm of philosophy (*scientia*) to the devotional realm

[316] The paraphrase is by Joshua Rosenthal, Abstract to OBERMAN, ibid., 641. Oberman's own description (649) noted that '[t]he Thomistic "Unmoved Mover" was becoming the highly mobile covenantal "God who acts", a God whose words are deeds and who wants to be known by these deeds. When God is discovered to be the Supreme Person in his *aseitas* and the Lord of history in his *opera ad extra*, that is, a Person both in his inner council and his outer rule, a tremendous paradigm shift is in the making'.

[317] Mediæval nominalism, which began to exert significant intellectual influence during the tenth century (cf. W.J. COURTENAY, *Ockham and Ockhamism*, pp. 31–8), was unable to attain the intellectual respectability of Thomist realism, on account of its propensity towards heresy: if there were no universal *substantiae*, then how could God be at once three and one? William of Ockham (*c.*1288–*c.*1348) proposed a moderate nominalism, in which universal forms themselves were treated as concepts of the mind, each radically singular ('quodlibet universale… non est universale nisi per significationem, quia est signum plurimum', OCKHAM, *Sum. tot. log.* I.c.14). Such concepts, argued Ockham, could be held to refer to that which they referred not through formal unity but rather by a reliance upon God's action *de potentia ordinata* to treat *voces* and *res* as signifiers and referents.

[318] Niemöller's thesis of a paradigm shift away from an 'arithmetic' conception of *musica* after 1501 must consequently be back-dated by at least half a century, at the most conservative estimate.

(*cultus*).[319] This foregrounded Christian *action*, rather than Christian contemplation of Being, as the manner of conducting that relationship. In such a context, speech-acts like prayer, praise and song came increasingly into focus, as did 'good works' of faith.

At the same time as God's relationality was discovered, however, the possibility of his radical freedom to act as he chose—and perhaps even to do so capriciously—led to a recoloration of devotional activity as a means of 'persuading' God to look favourably on his people. The downside of the nominalist discovery of God's complete freedom was that it had the effect of 'cutting loose' human beings from any certainty about God's interaction with them,[320] and of sharply restricting the divine-human exchange of grace to a set of predetermined and ecclesiastically-mediated mechanisms (the *pactum*, or theological covenant).[321] These mechanisms were predominantly sacramental—baptism, communion, anointing—but also prioritized devotional acts of prayer, good works, and (above all) sacramental penance, a practice only codified in the later Middle Ages.[322] The musicologist Blake Wilson characterized this covenantal paradigm as one of 'arithmetical' grace-exchange, in which singing played a vital rôle.[323]

Accordingly the centuries after Thomas, when nominalism began to take root as the predominant epistemology in the West, witnessed an explosion of lay, vernacular, devotional song repertories. These sacred song repertories arose as a direct result of the new need of lay Christians

[319] The impact of the theological and philosophical paradigm shift upon the rôle of music in devotional life has not, to my knowledge, been comprehensively addressed. D.E. TANAY, 'Music in the Age of Ockham: The Interrelations between Music, Mathematics, and Philosophy in the Fourteenth Century', addresses the possible impact of Ockham's conceptualism on de Muris' *Musica Speculativa*, and, in its final chapter (pp. 206–19) makes some broad observations about possible consequences of Ockham's philosophy on the musical thought of the *Quattrocento*. Tanay drew most of her observations in this latter speculation from OBERMAN, 'Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism'.

[320] OBERMAN, ibid., 51: 'the absolute power of God undercuts any rules theologians want to draw up on the basis of God's historical acts'.

[321] BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, p. 23, notes that the need for such cleansing acts stemmed from a lingering understanding prevalent in mediæval theology that the death and resurrection of Christ atoned only for *original* sin, and that any post-baptismal sins needed to be cleansed subsequently through the receipt of supplementary grace.

[322] Sacramental penance was mandated in canon law by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215.

[323] B. WILSON, *Music and Merchants: The Laudesi Companies of Republican Florence*, Oxford, 1992, p. 12. See also B.J. BLACKBURN, 'For Whom Do the Singers Sing?', 595, which noted that songs sung in this spirit ought not to be equated with the singing of indulgenced prayers.

to communicate relationally with the God covenanting with them. Beginning with the Franciscan lay movements, *laude spirituali*, *cantiones sacrae*, carols, and the German *Leisen* proliferated and embedded devotional song in the life and practice of most Christians.[324] In this context of devotion, with its focus on speech-acts and persuasive petitions, the aphorism attributed to Augustine (*qui canat, bis orat*) established singing as a doubly-efficacious good work. Luther, as Leaver notes, knew the *Leise* repertory well, although as a chorister and later friar his experience of music went substantially beyond these vernacular repertories.[325]

That music belonged to the category of *devotion* more than it belonged to the category of *speculative metaphysics* is an important feature of the late mediæval musical thought that Luther inherited. Luther was no fan of the system of transactional grace exchange (indeed, it would eventually precipitate his Reformation breakthrough); but he was fully acquainted with its logic and subscribed to it in his early years. Within the central German university context, the anti-metaphysical epistemology of the *via moderna* was privileged over the Thomistic metaphysics of the *via antiqua*.[326] By the turn of the sixteenth century, almost all the German universities taught both *viae* but emphasized the *moderna*, and some, including Wittenberg, apparently subdivided the *via moderna* further.[327] (Only at Cologne, at once back-breakingly traditional in its prescription of the *via antiqua* alone and forward-looking in the embrace of Albertism and

[324] These corpora have been under-studied. For an intriguing introduction to the issues they raise, see STROHM, 'Late-medieval Sacred Songs'. Strohm's Ricœrian doctrine of 'memory history' (cf. pp. 134–7) is strikingly similar to the conceptualist approach to history taken by Ockham; see G. LEFF, *William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse*, pp. 55–60.

[325] LEAVER, 'Luther as Musician', 125.

[326] The qualifiers *antiqua* and *moderna* are conventional and not descriptive terms. By the time of Luther's education, the *via antiqua* had begun a slight resurgence, and in many ways represented a more 'fashionable' (and modern!) philosophical way than the *via moderna* did. The popularity of the *via antiqua*, however, did not extend either to Erfurt or to Wittenberg.

[327] There has been significant scholarly disagreement over the meaning of the '*via Gregorii*', prescribed in the founding statutes of Wittenberg University's theology faculty. OBERMAN, *Werden und Wertung der Reformation*, pp. 81–90, argues that the *via Gregorii* refers to the method of Gregory of Rimini (*c.*1300–1358), the 'last great scholastic theologian' who introduced Ockham's moderate nominalism to Paris in the 1340s, and allied it to a strongly Augustinian fideism. His commentary on Lombard's *Sentences* were printed in 1482—just five years after Duns Scotus' commentary on the *Sentences*, which was itself the first imprint of any commentaries on the Lombardian compilation—and several times afterwards, attesting to its regular use in university settings. MCGRATH, 'Forerunners of the Reformation', 236–41, disagrees, however, finding that the *via Gregorii* is probably identical to the *via moderna*.

Thomism in its major *bursae*, was bereft of a modernist inclination.[328]) Erfurt, Luther's own *alma mater*, was notoriously modernist in its preferences, having developed a curriculum of Augustinian nominalism over the course of the fifteenth century.[329] The works of Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel and Agostino Favaroni—all Augustinian disciples of Ockham—were circulated there, and Luther is thought to have read them all.[330] Certainly Luther was not coy about his own philosophical preference for a relational and devotional theological paradigm over a Thomistic metaphysical one: in his Leipzig Disputation with the humanist Romanist Johann Eck (whom we shall meet again in Chapter V, below), Luther openly admitted his modernist tendency, referring to Ockham as 'magister meus'.[331]

3.2.3 Luther and Mysticism

Acutely fideistic, however, the covenantal nature of late mediæval theology incorporated significant problems. For one thing, it denied the believer any of the absolute certainty of his or her eternal destiny that a Thomistic ontologistic principle had offered. Its emphasis on God's freedom *de potentia absoluta* had the twin devotional effect of utterly alienating the believer from the Almighty, and of bidding for God's freedom to be capricious in his judgement. One result of this was the institution of regularized 'transactional' religion, culminating in a system of covenantal exchange so complex that it could encompass the whole spectrum of 'good works' from blind faith and trust at one end to the purchasing of plenary indulgences at the other,

[328] I.M. GROOTE, 'Die Kölner Musiktheoretiker – ein humanistisches Netzwerk?', p. 146.

[329] W. URBAN, 'Die "via moderna" an der Universität Erfurt am Vorabend der Reformation', in Oberman, ed., *Gregor von Rimini: Werk und Wirkung bis zur Reformation*, Berlin, 1981, pp. 311–30.

[330] On Biel see OBERMAN, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, p. 1; on Favaroni, A.V. MÜLLER, 'Agostino Favaroni e la teologia di Lutero'.

[331] Tischrede N$^{o.}$ 2544a (*WA TR* ii:516; cf. with N$^{o.}$ 2544b [*WA TR* ii:517]); Luther made similar comments in *WA* vi:599 and Tischrede No. 193 (*WA TR* i:85) cf. also O. SCHEEL, *Dokumenten zu Luthers Entwicklung (bis 1519)*, pp. 86–7, 94, 110, 114, 162, and 175. Almost certainly, Luther's purpose in asserting his dependence on Ockham in the Leipzig Disputation was to claim that his theological argument with Eck was a conventional scholastic disputation—a matter of *Wegestreit*, rather than of orthodoxy. As an experienced disputant, Luther presumably also found the scholastic method helpful for thrashing out genuine theological disagreements; Eck came to the table having already promised, however, that he was not going to oblige his opponents by confining his method to scholastic convention.

incorporating a heady dose of monastic asceticism along the way.[332] In Luther's case the perceived capriciousness of God combined with a self-hatred inspired by the devotional practice (covenantal 'good work') of self-mortification to result in a particularly toxic reaction.[333] In 1545, giving an account of his Reformation breakthrough, Luther recalled that, as a young monk in Wittenberg,

> I hated this word 'the justice of God' which according to the use and custom of all the teachers I was taught to understand philosophically in terms of that so-called formal or active justice with which God is just and punishes the sinners and unrighteous. For however irreproachably I lived as a monk, I felt myself before God to be a sinner with a most disturbed conscience, nor could I be confident that I had pleased him with my satisfaction. I did not love, yes, rather I hated this righteous God who punishes sinners, and if not with blasphemy, certainly with huge murmurings I was angry with God, saying, 'As though it really were not enough that miserable sinners should be eternally damned with original sin and have all kinds of calamities laid on them by the law of the Ten Commandments, God must go and add sorrow upon sorrow and even through the gospel itself bring justice and wrath to bear!' I raged in this way with a wildly aroused and disturbed conscience.[334]

This 'disturbed conscience' would eventually prove unsustainable, and Luther would reject his existing understanding of God in favour of a different paradigm. But in the years prior to *c.*1517, the Augustinian sought to mollify his conscience, and to comfort his soul via means consonant with the prevailing epistemology. Following several generations of Augustinians before him, Luther attempted to salve his conscience by means of a retreat into devotional mysticism, a sort of combination of faith-acts and monastic contemplation.[335] The path was well-trodden: Gabriel Biel had been a member of the Brethren of the Common Life, the crucible of the *devotio moderna*,

[332] Transactional religiosity only manifested its full absurdity—an absurdity to which there was admittedly no answer—in the application of plenary indulgences retrospectively to souls in purgatory, sanctioned in 1476 by Pope Sixtus IV. With his Ninety-Five Theses Luther was neither the first, nor the most illustrious, to find against plenary indulgences. BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, p. 18, notes that both Cardinal Cajetan (who would later try Luther for heresy) and the Paris theologians raised concerns in 1517–18, the latter proposing that retrospective indulgences 'should be revoked for the sake of troubled consciences'.

[333] Psychological approaches to Luther's Reformation, focusing on his character, were first undertaken in the eighteenth century, but acquired a Jungian flavour after P. REITER, *Martin Luthers Umwelt, Charakter, und Psychose*, 2 vols., Copenhagen, 1937–41. The approach was epitomized by E.H. ERIKSON, *Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History*, New York, 1958.

[334] From Luther's preface to the first volume of his *Collected Works* (Wittenberg, 1545); cit. and trans. after J. DILLENBERGER, *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings*, New York, 1961, p. 11, by M.R. MILES, '"The Rope Breaks When It Is Tightest": Luther on the Body, Consciousness, and the Word', 240.

[335] Karl Holl described mysticism (rather dismissively) as 'a subtle search for enjoyment'. K. HOLL, *Was verstand Luther unter Religion?*, Tübingen, 1917, p. 5; cit. and trans. D.C. STEINMETZ, 'Religious Ecstasy in Staupitz and the Young Luther', 23.

a movement that had gained ground within the *schola Augustiniana moderna* with which Luther probably identified most readily;[336] Jean Gerson (1363–1429), had sought to introduce mystical theology to Paris whilst he was Chancellor.[337] Luther's mysticism was deliberate and chosen, rather than simply ingested: in 1516, he read and wrote commentaries on the sermons of Johannes Tauler (*c.*1300–1361), who had developed a mystical theology alongside the Friends of God in Basel; and in 1516 and 1518 respectively, Luther issued two editions of the anonymous mystical tract, the *Theologia Germanica*.[338] In his introduction to the latter, Luther explained that 'next to the Bible and St. Augustine, no book has ever come into my hands, whence I have learnt, or would wish to learn more of what God, and Christ, and man and all things are'.[339] The *Theologia Germanica* promoted quite unreservedly the mystical union (*unio mystica*) of Christian soul to the will of God through acts of personal faith:

> if our inward man were to make a leap and spring into the Perfect, we should find and taste how that the Perfect is without measure, number or end, better and nobler than all which is imperfect and in part, and the Eternal above the temporal or perishable, and the fountain and source above all that floweth or can ever flow from it. Thus that which is imperfect and in part would become tasteless and be as nothing to us.[340]

That Luther should have raised such lofty praise for a book that was so esoteric in its subject matter attests to the force of mystical devotion within his mental furniture.[341] Steven Ozment noted that Luther's spiritual anthropology prior to his Reformation breakthrough was practically

[336] OBERMAN, 'Headwaters of the Reformation: *Initia Lutheri – Initia Reformationis*', pp. 71–4.
[337] See W. DRESS, 'Gerson und Luther', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, LII (1933), 122–61.
[338] It is often speculated that the author of the *libellus* might have been the Meister Eckhart.
[339] Introduction to *Theol. Germ.*, trans. S. Winkworth, London, 1907, p. xxi.
[340] *Theol. Germ.*, p. 19.
[341] Quasi-formalist catch-phrases are in evidence here—with the discussions of the 'Perfect' and 'Imperfect' and the ideas of 'measure, number or end'—but the author of the *Theol. Germ.* understood that the only way to 'leap and spring into the Perfect' was to pass through death, which Favaroni had already labelled the *consummata perfectio*: A. ZUMKELLER, O.S.A., *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters*, p. 468, notes that '[b]ei Favaroni finde sich der Lehre, daß die Gerechtigkeit des Gerechtfertigen wegen der ihm auch nach der Taufe verbliebenden Konkupiszenz bis zum Tod der *consummata perfectio* entbehrt, daß ferner aus dem gleichen Grund niemand in diesem Leben das Gebot der Gottesliebe "aus ganzem Herzen" wirklich zu erfüllen vermag und daß selbst dem Leben der Heiligen immer *aliquid iniustitiae* beigemischt ist, sofern sie vor ihrer *mens* her "geistlich", von ihrer *caro* her "fleischlich" seien.' This is, needless to say, deeply un-Renaissance Platonist. See also MÜLLER, 'Agostino Favaroni e la teologia di Lutero', esp. 375–8; and E. STAKEMEIER, *Der Kampf um Augustin*, esp. p. 35, which disagrees strongly about the influence of Favaroni on Luther directly or via others.

identical to that of Tauler and Gerson.[342] Tauler's and Eckhart's sermons were published in Augsburg in 1508, and copies circulated in Wittenberg in the 1520s; Luther referred to Gerson's writings favourably on a number of occasions, citing the Doctor Consolatorius' influence on his own theology.[343] The profoundest influence, however, was probably that of Johann Staupitz (*c.*1460–1524), Luther's superior at the Augustinerkloster, and a rational mystic.[344]

The rôle of music within late mediæval mysticism, and accordingly within Luther's earliest theology, was important. Jean Gerson had already proposed music as a key mode of 'ascending' to mystical contemplation of God.[345] Luther followed suit in his first theological discussion of music, expressing his opinion of the centrality of music to devotions in the *Dictata super Psalterium* of 1513:

> I certainly believe that when David was… excited by the recollection of God's benefits and by the musical chant, as was evident in these verses [of Ps. 4], he received wonderful revelations in that very devotion.[346]

The 'wonderful revelations' Luther proposes are what the *Theologia Germanica* described as 'find[ing] and tast[ing] how that the Perfect is without measure, number or end…' etc.—a sort of aporetic devotional experience in which the soul's *metaphysical* separation from the Godhead could be overcome by *spiritual* union with it. In the lecture on Ps. 80 [81],[347] Luther used the language of 'rising' to God through prayer and devotion to describe this *unio mystica*, which had,

[342] S.E. OZMENT, *Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson and Martin Luther (1509–16) in the Context of Their Theological Thought*, p. 102.

[343] LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 376 and n. 33, lists *LW* liv:42, 132, 141, and 443 as evidence.

[344] STEINMETZ, 'Religious Ecstasy in Staupitz and the Young Luther', 27–31.

[345] IRWIN, 'The Mystical Music of Jean Gerson', 190.

[346] *LW* x:54; cf. *WA* iii:47.

[347] Two different numbering systems are applied to the Psalms. Until the Reformation, the numbering from Septuagint was applied universally. After the Reformation, Luther began to apply numbering from the Hebrew text. In the UK and the US Hebrew numbering is normative on account of the force of Reformation textual scholarship, but in Roman Catholic sources until the Second Vatican Council the Septuagint numbering was retained, and it is still conventionally preferred by most continental European Catholic sources. In the *Dictata super Psalterium*, Luther was still referring to the Psalms by their Septuagint divisions. Here, I use Luther's own numbering, and, where there is a distinction, give the Hebrew number in square brackets.

on account of a thematic link in the Psalms, become associated for him with the instruments upon which the psalms were accompanied:

> I have said that allegorically the lyre is Christ and the psalm is His works and words, while the harp is the church joined to Him. And these two joined together are pleasant. Or, the same Christ is the harp because of suffering and the lyre because of action, but both pleasant at the same time. Or, He is the sweet lyre and must be taken up with the harp (that is, He with the church), or, it is He working with Himself as suffering.… Many take Christ as a miracle worker and want to follow Him in the glory and majesty of works but are unwilling to do so in sufferings. These take the sweet lyre, but not with the harp, and they raise a psalm but do not sound the timbrel. They want to reign with Christ, be elevated with His honor in the church's offices, have the administration from above with relation to others, and let hierarchical acts flow downward. That is, they want to sound downward and be heard and received with reverence, obedience, and politeness. But they, in turn, do not want to sound upward through obedience and reverence to God and His representatives. They all want to imitate the form of God in Christ and not the form of a servant (Phil. 2:6–7).[348]

In the first place we must remark that Luther's habit of reading Scripture predominantly as *allegory* situates him within a long tradition of mediæval *mystical* exegesis, with its headwaters in Origen and Augustine, and with its fullest effloration in the works of Bernard of Clairvaux. There is further evidence of Luther's inclination towards mysticism, however, beyond simply his reading of the Psalms as moral allegories. For in the portion quoted above, Luther brings a number of significant mystical devotional concepts to bear in his exegesis: the *imitatio Christi* ('they all want to imitate the form of God in Christ…'), the Staupitzian variant of *unio mystica* (Christ and the church 'joined together are pleasant'), and the theme of deification (or raising of the soul upward to the heavenly realms) through faith.[349] In the Lecture on Ps. 4—the very first lecture he gave as professor of biblical studies—he further enunciated the function of music to enable the soul to be 'aroused' or lifted up to union with God, noting that David 'composed this psalm… as something inciting, stirring, and inflaming, so that he might have something to arouse him to stir up the

[348] *LW* xi:103–4; cf. *WA* iii:614.

[349] A number of recent studies have (controversially) foregrounded 'deification'—a mystical process by which ontic union with God can be achieved through spiritual union—as a key concept in Luther's early thought (in particular, S. PEURA, *Mehr als ein Mensch? Die Vergöttlichung als Thema der Theologie Martin Luthers von 1513 bis 1519*, Mainz, 1994); for a discussion, see D. BIELFELDT, 'Deification as a Motif in Luther's *Dictata super Psalterium*', pp. 402–5.

devotion and inclination of his heart, and in order that this might be done more sharply, he did it with musical instruments'.[350]

Luther related the mystical power of music to effect *unio mystica* with its affectivity, and specifically to its ability to settle the believer's soul into a state of faithful joy, though he was not entirely clear as to whether he thought the act of music-making to *prompt* this joy, or to be *prompted by* it, or both. '[A] song and singing spring from the fullness of a rejoicing heart', he noted in his Lecture on Ps. 44 [45],[351] but six years later in the *Operationes in Psalmos* (on Ps. 5) counselled that 'if thy soul be sad and cast down, begin some joyful song or psalm, or something that brings thy God to thy memory'.[352] The inversion in the value of song between these two statements nevertheless demonstrates a thematic association in Luther's thought between singing, joy, and goodness. In the *Dictata* Lecture on Ps. 76 [77], he presented the logical consequence of this thematic association, arguing that ungodliness shuns music: 'The remorseful man… he loathes public spectacles, he loathes music, he loathes stories and jokes. What he likes best is silence, quiet, and night, because he has become angry and disturbed and enraged within himself'.[353] As we remarked, above, on p. 122, Luther observed that the devil, the author of ungodliness, flees from music for the same reason.

Luther's musical mysticism almost certainly took its lead from Gerson's.[354] But the two theologians' mysticism, and their applications of it to music, are not identical. A brief comparison of Luther's mysticism with that of Gerson, will serve to illustrate this.

Gerson's *Carmen de laude musicae*, used by Adam in his *De Musica* and consequently in circulation in Wittenberg during the early sixteenth century, thematized the motifs of 'part' and

[350] *LW* x:42; cf. *WA* iii:40.
[351] *LW* x:228; cf. *WA* iii:276.
[352] *22Ps*, I, p. 270; cf. *WA* v/II:182.
[353] *LW* xi:20–21; cf. *WA* iii:538.
[354] See F. PANNEN, 'Luther on John Gerson', which notes (50) that 'Luther refers to or cites Gerson in at least 87 places', and reconfirms the Reformer's enduring fondness for the Doctor Consolatorius' mystical theology even after the Reformation breakthrough.

'whole' that were characteristic of the dialectic of *unio mystica*, before observing that joining in the songs of heaven (the Psalms) effects the mystical union between the believer's heart and God's dwelling-place: 'Here and now begins heaven, and dwells in exile ‖ with the custom and manner of the blessed life; ‖ death comes in time that looses the bonds of the flesh ‖ and victoriously raises the singer of psalms aloft'.[355] For Gerson, this 'raising' (the act of *unio* itself) occurred on account of music's ability to 'refresh', 'move', 'soothe', 'sharpen', 'placate' and 'please' the soul,[356] noting approvingly that 'Father Augustine, you confess that you were moved ‖ by the voices of the Church to drench your face with tears'.[357] The act of participating in song *itself* effected the union of the heart with heaven via the singing's affective power: 'Cecilia sang to herself ‖ only in her heart', but by that singing she attained 'a heart full of God'.[358] In Gerson's mystical theology, union with the Godhead was possible *through the affective power of song itself*, with the sole additional criterion being the singer's intention to be united with God.

Luther's *unio mystica*, however, even at this early stage, is reliant on *faith* as well as music and intention. In Luther's economy there is a distinction between what a 'song'—music in its own power—can achieve, and what a 'spiritual song'—music that can lift the soul to mystical heights—can. The latter is 'the very jubilation of the heart',[359] whereas Luther would characterize the former as lifeless, dull, and even 'dumb' throughout his life. This distinction Luther later clarified as being one between *psallere*, that is, to sing with joy and faith, 'in which the whole active life consists', and *cantare*, which is to 'praise with the mouth only'.[360]

We shall assess the subtle dualism Luther establishes between acts of faith and acts of duty in his theology further below; for now it is enough to note that '[t]he presupposition for religious

[355] J. GERSON, *Oeuvres Complètes*, ed. P. Glorieux, Paris, 1961- , iv:136; trans. L. Holford-Strevens in LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 310.
[356] The verbs in Latin are: 'recreat'; 'movet'; 'solatur'; 'exacuit'; 'placat'; 'placet'.
[357] LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 310.
[358] Loc. cit.
[359] *LW* x:208; cf. *WA* iii:253.
[360] *LW* x:244; cf. *WA* iii:405.

ecstasy' in Luther's thought 'is not [straightforward] likeness to God, not synderesis, not a process of ascetic discipline and self-denial' associated with duty, 'but faith alone'.[361] In this regard, Luther's mystical *musica* is profoundly internal. It echoes more the 'internal music' of Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos* rather than any mediæval musical paradigm, in that it is refracted through faith.[362] This fideistic approach to music is a key component of Luther's musical thought. Two people might be singing a song alongside one another and, to all intents and purposes, singing identically; but if one has faith in what he is singing and the other does not, then one is singing a 'spiritual song' and the other is not. Even at this early stage, Luther's musical aesthetic is subordinated to faith in a way that relativizes any philosophical ideas about music he may have. This subordination of music's internal aesthetic to the faith of the *musicus does* distinguish Luther from his predecessors, who in general were substantially less fideistic in their outlook towards *musica*; and it establishes that, within his epistemology, musical thought represented a component of devotional mysticism.

But it also distinguishes Luther's musical thought from the burgeoning musical theology of the Florentine *Academisti*, who, influenced by their readings of Plato, reasoned that music's power was effectively natural to it. In this regard Luther's fideistic musical mysticism bucks the trend of contemporary (modernizing) Renaissancist thought, remaining firmly wedded to categories of *fides* and *humilitas* central to mediæval philosophy, and shunning the Platonizing essentialism of humanism.

[361] STEINMETZ, 'Religious Ecstasy in Staupitz and the Young Luther', 36.

[362] The homiletic commentaries on the psalms were begun after Augustine's priestly ordination in 391, and only finished in 421/22 (see AUGUSTINE, *Expositions of the Psalms 1–32*, The Works of Saint Augustine III/15, trans. M. Boulding O.S.B., ed. J. Routelle, O.S.A., New York, 2000, p. 15). On *musica* in the *Enarrationes*, see. L. FOLLI, '*Canticum cordis*: La musica e l'interiorità nelle *Enarrationes in Psalmos* di Agostino'; one musicologist called Augustine's 'interior' appreciation of music a 'psychologic' one: K. MEYER-BAER, 'Psychologic and Ontologic Ideas in Augustine's *De Musica*, 229. Meyer-Baer's own story was a testimony to the potency of a *musica interior*; the first woman to gain a Ph.D. in musicology (Leipzig, 1916), she struggled to be taken seriously as an academic for most of her life. A fascinating account of her life and work is given by D. JOSEPHSON, '"Why Then All the Difficulties!": A Life of Kathi Meyer-Baer', *Notes*, LXV (2008), 227–67.

3. THE *DICTATA SUPER PSALTERIUM* (1513–15)

With this backdrop now in place, we can begin our analysis of Luther's musical thought itself. The first port of call is the Augustinian's pre-Reformation musical thought, presented in his first major work, the *Dictata super Psalterium* (1513–15). It has been described as 'a maiden voyage in the history of ideas',[363] and, being a study of the Psalter, is also the site for some of Luther's most detailed and enlightening theological discussions about music. As we shall see, the Augustinian professor was exceptionally adept at using musical ideas to make theological points.

To a new professor of biblical studies plotting his inaugural lecture course, the Psalter must have appeared an obvious choice of subject matter.[364] Arguably more than any other set of biblical texts, the Psalter provided the most material and the most exciting context for an exegete. The Psalms were liturgical songs used on a daily basis; they were a fair representation of the historic worship-practices of ancient Israel; they dealt with all the major ethical themes of the Bible; and (above all) they were used by the faithful as parts of their own devotional life. In Luther's case, however, the real attraction to the Psalter was that it offered him the most scope to expound his favourite area of theology in these early years—Christology. For the Psalms, it had been believed since at least Origen, were a special revelation of Christ in a way that far exceeded the rest of the Old Testament.[365] (Gerson, too, had maintained the tradition.[366])

Like Gerson and Augustine, Luther regarded the Psalter as saturated with Christ's self-revelation, a self-revelation that was nevertheless hidden by the Psalmic text itself. Luther expounded the simultaneous revelation and 'hiddenness' of Christ in the Psalter in musical (organological) terms, explaining the verse 'I will open on the psaltery' with the observation that

[363] OZMENT, *Homo Spiritualis*, p. 90.
[364] As, indeed, it had done to countless *magistri regentes* before.
[365] Cf. OZMENT, *Homo Spiritualis*, pp. 128–9.
[366] IRWIN, 'The Mystical Music of Jean Gerson', 193.

> "Psaltery" can here be taken as the revelation of the Psalter. For through Christ the mysteries placed in the Psalter concerning Him were opened. Second, here in the Psalter, that is, in this psalm, Christ teaches what He later taught in the Gospel. And thus His propositions, which He later opened in the Gospel, He opens here, too, prophetically. Third, as among the rest of the Scriptures the Psalter is especially hidden and veiled, so also the Lord veiled and concealed His meaning in parables, and thus in the Gospel He opened His propositions in the Psalter, that is, in the manner of the Psalter, namely, enigmatically and parabolically, for the entire spirit of the letter is told in parables by the Psalter.[367]

'I will open on the psaltery' is here understood to entail a self-disclosure by Christ that is unenunciated; wordless and therefore without its referential meaning, the revelation is instead musical and referentially enigmatic—like the plucking of psaltery strings.

Continuing a tradition stretching back to the twelfth-century Victorine monastics, Luther reckoned that Christ *wrote* the Psalter about himself: 'Christ teaches' in the Psalter 'what He later taught in the Gospel', and 'the Lord veiled and concealed His meaning in parables'. Whilst Luther's assumption of the Psalter's divine authorship was not new, the equation of the *meaning* of the text (what is *revealed* in it) with the text *per se* (the words with which its content is veiled) was quite different from the older hermeneutic, which presumed the two to be like opposite sides of a coin. The Victorines had reckoned the text to be a veil but the meaning to be a revelation; the humanist Biblicist Jacques Lefèvre d'Étaples (Jacob Fabri, or [Jacob] Faber Stapulensis, *c.*1455–1536) was the first to propose (in 1509) that the Psalter's text was *both* veil *and* revelation,[368] and Luther was the first to expound the Psalms on that basis. In Luther's exegesis, Christ 'taught' and 'opened' himself in revelation in the Psalter, even as he 'veiled and concealed his meaning'.[369]

But Luther was under no illusion that Christ's self-revelation in the Psalter was obvious or superficial—observing rather that Christ is revealed 'enigmatically and parabolically'. The slightly cryptic observation that 'the entire spirit of the letter is told in parables by the Psalter' in fact

[367] *LW* x:228; cf. *WA* iii:276.

[368] J. LEFÈVRE D'ÉTAPLES, foreword to *Psalterium quincuplex: gallicum, romanum, hebraicum, vétus, conciliarum*, Paris, 1509.

[369] MCGRATH, *The Intellectual Origins*, p. 163. The fact that Luther's exegesis here casts Christ as the divine musician ought not to be overlooked.

reveals Luther's Faberian theory about the way in which the revelation of Christ in the Psalms works. 2 Cor. 3:6 reads, 'the letter kills, but the spirit gives life', of which Luther remarked, 'one is secretive, the other is spiritual'.[370] Luther reckoned that the Psalter actually divided hearers into two groups: those who saw only the letter (*litera occidens*), and those who understood the spirit. The distinction was made on the basis of *faith*. Those who had faith in Christ could see through the parabolic veil to the content of its revelation—the *spiritus vivificans*—even if they were not aware of the precise terms of what it was prophesying; those who did not have faith could not see the revelation at all, seeing only the letters themselves.[371]

The model Luther proposed for exemplifying the nature of a text that was meaningful to those who could see (by faith) and senseless to those who could not (by lack of it) was, again, a musical one. The 'letter' of the Old Testament, Luther observed, was almost like a tune whose words have not yet entered:

> Fourth, as that musical instrument, the psaltery, does not produce a word, but only a sound (that is, a sound that is not articulated by syllables that are intellectually significative, but only sound that is perceived by the senses), so the letter, or parable, is like a sound that is neither articulated nor distinct. And so the entire ancient law is only a voice or a sound, because it deals only with things subject to the senses, and the mystical meanings are without a word. For as through the incarnation of Christ the Word of God was added to the flesh, so the Spirit was revealed through the same. The Spirit is like the word of the voice and like the Godhead of the flesh. And so the prophet wants to say that Christ will open the word, the Spirit and hidden Godhead, on the psaltery, that is, He will reveal them in the parabolic voice and sound.[372]

Here Luther likens the whole Psalter in its prophetic sense to something 'neither articulated nor distinct'; you cannot identify it simply by listening. The Psalmic revelation is parabolic; if you do not understand the parable, then you hear only a collection of letters, signs with no referent. Only a *mystical faith* can rectify this and connect the signs to their referent: in the words of one

[370] *WA* i:461; cit. EBERLING, 'Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik', 184.
[371] EBERLING, loc. cit.
[372] *LW* x:228–9; cf. *WA* iii:276.

commentator, '[t]he ecstasy of faith elevates one beyond oneself so that one can see the… so-called "things that do not appear"'.[373]

It is critical to Luther's exegetical method in the *Dictata* that the 'veiledness' of the Psalter's prophecy was inherent *to the text itself*, and consequently inherent to the intention of its author (Christ). The very fact that the self-revelation of God in prophecy is deliberately hidden through his authorial intention has the effect of making the *content* of the prophecy (the coming full revelation of Christ's divinity in the most undivine of natures—human flesh) manifest in the *mode of its expression*. For if there were 'articulation and distinction' in the prophecy (as when words are added to a melody) then the nature of the Author would have been self-revealed. Rather, as the divinity of Christ is shrouded by humanity in the Incarnation, so too the prophecy of Christ's coming is shrouded by rhetorical disguises inherent to the prophecy.

The transition from veiled meaninglessness to sensical revelation, Luther makes clear elsewhere in the *Dictata*, is made possible only through the *faith* of the believer.[374] In the lecture we are analysing here, Luther clarifies the syllogistic mechanism by which God's self-revelation is made possible: (i) the believer looks upon Christ with faith; (ii) revelation is granted to the faithful believer in a mystical process; (iii) the realization of Christ's divinity causes the believer to humble himself before Christ; (iv) in his humility, the believer now sees clearly the identity of Christ that was, previously, enigmatic to him:

> This articulation does to the sound what the mystery does to the letter, the spirit to the flesh, the divinity to the humanity of Christ. One who looks at the flesh of Christ dimly will undoubtedly understand nothing and will in no way put himself into relation with Him. But if you have distinguished that He is God, you will then fall on the ground and adore Him, for you have distinctly articulated His flesh into the word so that now you understand.[375]

[373] STEINMETZ, 'Religious Ecstasy in Staupitz and the Young Luther', 35.
[374] *WA* iv:147. Cf. below, pp. 176–7, for a discussion.
[375] *LW* x:229; cf. *WA* iii:276.

This whole process of self-aware humiliation in the face of the divinity of Christ was something Luther frequently referred to as *humilitas fidei*, the reconceptualization of which would become a vital element in his Reformation breakthrough.

Lecturing on another psalm (Ps. 32 [33]), Luther regurgitated the (by-now conventionalized) allegorical association between the psalmic harp/psaltery binary and the dual natures of Christ in his incarnation first proposed by Augustine in his *Enarrationes in Psalmos*.[376] In his exegesis, however, Luther reveals that the faith required to 'unlock' the parabolic and enigmatic nature of psalmic prophecy remains, at this stage in his thought, an intentional 'work' of the soul.

> The harp is a musical instrument that differs from the psaltery in this way: Both have the same shape, which is the letter delta, and like the delta a triangle, but the harp [it is a vertical delta and] has its resonance from the lower part, that is, this is curved, and the strings are attached to it. The psaltery, on the other hand [is an inverted delta and] has the same things from the upper part and sounds louder and better than the harp. Both instruments can be taken in a literal sense at this place, because God is to be praised by Christians, and He is praised today with both and with many other musical instruments. Yet it is more appropriate to take the instruments in a mystical sense, so that God alone, and not man, can be praised by them. But the mysteries of both are endless. In the first place, the harp is Christ Himself according to the human nature, who was stretched on the cross for us like a string on the harp. Thus to confess with the harp means to think about the acts and sufferings of Christ according to the flesh, for such meditation has its resonance from below, from humanity to divinity. The fingers of the harpists are the thinking forces and powers in the soul (this is what Augustine says on Ps. 56). The psaltery is the very same Christ according to divinity, as He dwells among the ten choirs of angels. And thus to confess with the psaltery means to think about divine and heavenly things and about the angels.[377]

The two efforts of 'thinking' (*meditari*) and 'confessing' (*confiteri*) are works of the believer—works, specifically, of *humilitas*: they involve 'put[ting one]self into relation with [God]', and 'fall[ing] on the ground and ador[ing] Him'. Luther's understanding of 'faith' is, at this juncture, still bound up with the transactional devotion of the *pactum*.

The covenantal reward for the work of *humilitas fidei* that Luther describes is a gift of grace: to become united with Christ in spirit, to identify with him through the *unio mystica* of faith. The

[376] The degree of influence of Augustine's *Enarrationes in Psalmos* upon the *Dictata* was explored in F. HELM, 'Augustins *Enarrationes in Psalmos* als exegetische Vorlage für Luthers erste Psalmenvorlesungen', unpubl. Ph.D. thesis, Universität Kiel, 1929, which I have unfortunately not yet had the opportunity to consult.

[377] *LW* x:152–3; cf. *WA* iii:181–2.

'thinking' and 'confessing' of Christ, however, involves a mystical unity with him in *both* his human and his divine natures. It is not good enough, Luther observes, continuing with the Augustinian allegory of harp and psaltery, only to want to be united with Christ in glory. Those who 'want to follow Him in the glory and majesty of works but are unwilling to do so in sufferings…', he noted,

> …all want to imitate the form of God in Christ and not the form of a servant (Phil. 2:6–7). The form of God is the lyre, producing great works by teaching, guiding, and commanding. But the harp is the form of a servant, obedient, patient, bearing affliction.[378]

Indeed, Luther is very clear that it is quite impossible for human beings to bring glory to themselves. The only true unity between man and God is with Christ in his humanity, as a suffering and humiliated servant; but by man's unity with Christ in his humanity, man can also become united to 'the good things of God' (i.e. glorification) as a result of Christ's glorification in his divinity. Once again, Luther finds a musical (organological) allegory to expound this theme. Lecturing on Ps. 97:6 [98:6], which exhorts the speaker to 'make a joyful noise' 'with trumpets and the sound of the horn', Luther binarizes the two sorts of trumpets according to their different metals, and allegorizes the pairing with man's sinful flesh and holy spirit:

> For the material we have the one from the Lord, the other from ourselves. The one is the good things of God in us, the other our bad things in ourselves. Thus to teach the spirit to rejoice and the flesh to be sad, the spiritual to rejoice and the carnal to be sad, these are the two trumpets. With the one we sing of the righteousness which is for us from God, with the other we sing of judgment. With the one [we proclaim] the sufferings and cross of Christ; with the other, the resurrection, the glory, and the consolations of Christ.[379]

Luther's mysticism is therefore shot through with the inadequacy of man and the glory of Christ. 'Luther views the believer as simultaneously *(simul)* ecstatic and humiliated, exalted and in

[378] *LW* xi:104; cf. *WA* iii:614–5.
[379] *LW* xi:273; cf. *WA* iv:121.

consternation'.[380] The humiliation and consternation is, as far as Luther is concerned, the task of man in *humilitas fidei*;[381] Christ will provide the glory of ecstasy and exaltation.

Our whistlestop tour of Luther's earliest theological discussions of music in the *Dictata* brings us to five conclusions.

First, Luther does not, in the *Dictata*, address music separately from the exegesis he is already undertaking; his musical reasoning is subordinated to his theological enterprise.

Second, Luther's use of music in his theological exegesis is always as a metaphor for *hiddenness* or *disguise*. As such, it is the metaphorical opposite of *words*, which symbolize *revelation* or *disclosure*.

Third, the devotional value of singing is determined less by *content* than it is by the *faith of the singer*.

Fourth, the putative proclamatory possibilities of Psalmic singing—dependent as they are upon a particular Hermetic meaning being conveyed—are determined by the faith of the hearer. For the encoded 'meaning' of the Psalms (Christ's incarnation) is audible only to one who has a deposit of faith that he or she makes good in acts of humility (*meditari*; *confiteri*). That 'meaning' was *deliberately hidden* from those who did not have faith (it is expounded 'parabolically'). Psalmic singing is therefore *revelatory of* something (Christ's incarnation) and *contingent upon* something (the singer's faith).

Fifth, Christ's incarnation is *itself* something at once revelatory and hidden: God is revealed in Christ, but his divinity is hidden in Christ's humanity. Luther finds that musical allegories, especially organological ones, are profoundly helpful in demonstrating this dialectic of revelation/hiddenness; the harp and psaltery are binarized, as are the two sorts of trumpets. But

[380] STEINMETZ, 'Religious Ecstasy in Staupitz and the Young Luther', 35.

[381] MCGRATH, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, p. 117 and n. 67, cites *WA* iii:588, iv:127, 231, and lvi:282 as examples of Luther's double concept of *humilitas fidei*, to which we shall return below, in Chapter IV.

so, too, are 'intellectually significative' sounds and sounds 'that [are] neither articulated nor distinct'. The 'intellectually significative' sounds are audible to those who 'put [themselves] into relation with' Christ; to others, they are indistinct. Luther's early theology of music comes to turn, therefore, on a profound marriage of sign and referent, solemnized in the sanctuary of mystical devotion: the thematic content of Christ's self-revelation is made manifest in the mode of its expression.

Some broader conclusions can also be drawn. The first is that, because Luther's musical thought was bound up with his understanding of *unio mystica*, which in turn was bound up with the category of faith and the process of *humilitas fidei*, music's power and worth was subordinated to the faithfulness of the believer in his thought. Unlike many Renaissance thinkers, who began to expound a subtle separation between *musica* and theological categories (preferring to consider music in terms of human creativity and dignity), Luther *embedded* his musical ideas firmly within theological reasoning, arguably interweaving musical and theological ideas more intricately even than Gerson had.

The second is that music's worth is in the fact that it can function as a-referential, as the very opposite of words. Luther's view of music in the *Dictata* sets up *Wort* and *Ton* as polar opposites of one another (the one as revelation, the other as veil). This, it hardly needs to be observed, is a precise inversion of the 'rhetorical paradigm' Niemöller proposed for music after 1537. Indeed, Luther's continued reliance upon musical imagery to mediate two contradictory ideas simultaneously suggests that, far from conceiving of music as the sonic equivalent of rhetoric in the Trivium, the Augustinian considered it the sonic equivalent of *dialectic*. The general hermeneutic principle behind the *Dictata* was summed up by Luther several times in the idea that God's actions are hidden 'through opposition' (*sub contrariis abscondita*);[382] he might very well

[382] Cf. *WA* iv:83, 243, 449, 451. Cit. McGrath, ibid., p. 155.

have observed that music, as a metaphor for the veil in which Christ couches his self-revelation, is itself a *contrarium* under which the Word is hidden.[383]

These two characteristics of Luther's early musical thought—that it inevitably mediates dialectics, and that its value is subordinated to the believer's faith—are fused together in a number of discussions in the *Dictata*, which I reproduce here.

> Note that there is a difference between singing and saying, as there is between chanting or saying a psalm and only knowing and teaching with the understanding. But by adding the voice it becomes a song, and the voice is the feeling. Therefore, as the word is the understanding, so the voice is the feeling. Therefore Ps. 98.5–6 has "with the voice of a psalm" and "with the sound of cornet," that is, the Gospel with feeling and in public, etc.[384]
>
> Only a new man can sing *a new song*. But the new man is a man of grace, a spiritual and inner man before God. The old man, however, is the man of sin, the carnal and outer man before the world. … It is clear, then, that this "new song" is so called not because of time, but because of the new holy thing…[385]
>
> Some people confess with their lips only. They are the ones who say one thing in the heart and another with the mouth, like the sinner who has evil intentions and sings to God nevertheless.[386]
>
> But to sing *(psallere)* means to praise God with heart and mouth and hand, for this takes place with the singing of the mouth and the touch of the hands. And in this the conduct of the whole active life consists. But to chant *(cantare)* means to praise with the mouth only, to jubilate *(iubilare)* is to do it with the heart, etc.[387]

We should certainly concur with David Steinmetz that Luther's emphasis on the dialectic of faith 'is a theological shift of great importance in the history of Western Christianity'.[388] But we should also observe that such a spiritual and dialectical aesthetic of music runs precisely counter to the prevailing winds of sixteenth-century musical thought, which were towards a Renaissance rhetorical aesthetic. From the evidence of his earliest musical thought, we must conclude, Luther was no modern, and no Renaissancist.

[383] The term *contrarium* was an Aristotelian and Ciceronian term used in mediæval logical arguments to mean the antipole in a dialectic, a term with which Luther was familiar from his academic background.

[384] *LW* xi:294; cf. *WA* iv:140.

[385] *LW* x:154; cf. *WA* iii:182. The emphasis is original, and simply denotes scriptural quotation.

[386] *LW* x:92; cf. *WA* iii:89.

[387] *LW* x:344; cf. *WA* iii:405.

[388] STEINMETZ, 'Religious Ecstasy in Staupitz and the Young Luther', 37.

4. LUTHER'S MUSICAL NEOPLATONISM?

Before we conclude this chapter we must address a contrary reading of Luther's earliest musical thought, a reading that challenges my interpretation of Luther as (essentially) a mediæval and which has gained traction in some recent studies. The idea that Luther's early work on the Psalter (and his earliest understanding of singing) was influenced by the fashionable Renaissance Platonist[389] movement was first proposed by A.W. Hunzinger in 1906.[390] Despite the fact that Hunzinger's thesis was persuasively rejected by Eberling in 1951,[391] Luther scholars have tried to 'sit on the fence' with regards to Luther's putative Neoplatonism for a number of years. Marc Lienhard has noted that '[o]ne is not able to exclude entirely the idea that the [Neoplatonist] theme of divinization was present to a certain extent in the mind of Luther' as he penned the *Dictata*;[392] in his doctoral dissertation Steven Ozment described Luther as a part-time *ante rem* realist,[393] whilst also observing that the dualism of Platonist forms and bodies was antithetical to Luther ('[t]here is… no *terra immacula* for the life of man').[394] Recently, however, the Renaissance Platonist divinization-thesis has resurfaced in Luther studies;[395] and very recently it has been suggested that Luther's musical thought before *c.*1517 had Renaissance Platonist resonances.[396] This suggestion is not, I believe, supported by the balance of the evidence in the *Dictata*. As we have seen, Luther's philosophical inheritance—decidedly nominalist—gives no credence whatsoever to it.

[389] KRISTELLER, 'Renaissance Platonism', esp. pp. 93–104, noted that Renaissance Platonism was not really Platonism at all, but rather a cobbling together of certain Platonist principles with cabbalist philosophy and syncretist theology.

[390] HUNZINGER, *Luthers Neoplatonismus in der Psalmen-Vorlesungen*, e.g. p. 18.

[391] EBERLING, 'Die Anfänge', pp. 188–9.

[392] LIENHARD, *Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ*, p. 53.

[393] OZMENT, *Homo Spiritualis*, p. 90.

[394] Ibid., p. 93.

[395] Esp. PEURA, *Mehr als ein Mensch?*.

[396] MCDONALD, 'Orpheus Germanicus', p. 269.

It is true that, if Luther were to have deployed Renaissance Platonist thought in his theology, the *Dictata super Psalterium* is the likeliest place in which it might be found. Thematic links between the Psalter and music were not uncommon, and Ficino, the father of the 'new learning', frequently discussed the Davidic Psalms as proof of an underlying 'theology' of metrics. (Indeed, Reuchlin suggested the Psalms and Orphic singing were in some way equivalent to one another.[397]) Since 'poetry, a central concern of the humanists, was elevated to divine status in Ficino's Neoplatonism',[398] it is reasonable that the Renaissance Platonists should have found the Psalms—divine poetry—a playground for their theory. The Psalter consequently represented an established interface between Platonist poetics and Christian theology by the time Luther came to lecture on it.

The assumption that Luther was influenced by the Renaissance Platonist movement seems to stem from two ideas. The first is that Luther's circle at Erfurt was made up of several individuals who would go on to become leading central German humanists: amongst his group of friends there he counted Crotus Rubeanus, Eobanus Hessus, Peter Eberbach, Ulrich von Hutten, Justas Jonas and Spalatin; Crotus later remarked that Luther had been 'the musician and the erudite philosopher of our little club'.[399] Even if the young students were too inexperienced to have absorbed a Platonist ideology themselves, they nevertheless studied in an environment where Platonist ideas were beginning to circulate. Jonas, a lifelong friend, however, recounted that Luther's secretive cloistering in 1505 seemed to involve putting aside previous ideas he now deemed incompatible with his profession.[400] If Jonas was right, then any Platonism Luther had learned hitherto would have been subordinated to the scholarly will of his order for the three

[397] Ibid., p. 154.
[398] Ibid., p. 7.
[399] To Luther, 28 April 1520, transcr. in U. von HUTTEN, *Opera*, ed. E. Böcking, Leipzig, 1859, I, p. 340; cit. and trans. MCDONALD, ibid., p. 212.
[400] P. TSCHACKERT, 'Justus Jonas' Bericht aus dem Jahre 1538 über Martin Luthers Eintritt in das Kloster (1505)', *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, LXX (1897), 579; cit. and trans. E.G. SCHWEIBERT, *Luther and His Times*, St. Louis, MO, 1950, p. 137; cit. LEAVER, 'Luther as Musician', 134.

years prior to his appointment to the chair in philosophy at Wittenberg; and the will of his order at Erfurt leaned strongly against Platonism. The Platonist Mutianus Rufus, for example, who had taken vows at the Erfurter Augustinerkloster two years prior to Luther, was considered increasingly heterodox on account of his Platonism; his 'direct influence on a wider public', meanwhile, 'was limited by his refusal to publish', a refusal almost certainly inspired by the looming spectre of condemnation by his order.[401] There is some other evidence that Luther could have been influenced indirectly by disciples of Ficino.[402] But the evidence is hardly conclusive. Any ultimate assessment of Luther's relationship to Platonist philosophy must consequently be based on an analysis of his own theology, and not on inferences about his personal relationships.

The second potential reason for concluding that Luther's early musical thought was Platonist in orientation is that much of his musical discussion in the Psalm Lectures promotes the idea that music can 'lift' the soul. The rousing effect of poetics upon the soul was a central tenet of Ficinian Neoplatonism, too; this shared theme, it has been asserted, identifies Luther's earliest musical thought with that of his Platonist contemporaries. But there is good reason to be sceptical of this association, since it is made possible only through a hermeneutic of positive expectation. Many of Luther's proposals about music's capacity to arouse the soul were borrowed more-or-less directly from Augustine, who certainly was a Neoplatonist; any resonances of Platonism in the *Dictata* therefore do not necessarily denote a philosophical preference on Luther's part so much as a deference to Augustine's existing teaching. Those pseudo-Platonistic proposals that were not Augustinian in provenance can be satisfactorily explained by Luther's Staupitzian mysticism, which, though it appeared similar to Neoplatonism in its ends of 'moving' the soul, certainly did not share its formalist mechanisms.

[401] McDonald, 'Orpheus Germanicus', p. 211.

[402] Ibid., pp. 267–9, points to the friendship between Luther and Otto Beckman, as well as Luther's early interest in Reuchlin.

Moreover, psalmody was sung scripture; late mediæval theologians understood that the Psalms had always been sung, even in their initial invention by the Psalmist. This meant that their musical poetics had to be assessed in any half-decent exegesis, irrespective of the individual exegete's philosophy of poetics.[403] Accordingly Luther considered the Psalms from the perspective of their auditory performance as well as their textual inscription. In the lecture on Ps. 4, for example (some of which we have already remarked upon), Luther observed that

> [t]he psalms and music have been designed to arouse devotion. But if they are handled with excessive noise, they quench the spirit rather than restore it. Let us, then, speak to the first word, [Mnazeah]. It is derived from the verb [Naza], which means to urge, to incite, to provoke, to arouse, as the soldier is stirred up to battle by the drum, and the horse by the sound of the trumpet, as Job says (Job 39:25): "When it hears the sound of the trumpet." It is the function of music to arouse the sad, sluggish, and dull spirit. Thus Elisha summoned a minstrel so that he might be stirred up to prophesy (2 Kings 3:15). Hence [Mnazeah] properly means stimulus, incitement, challenge, and, as it were, a spur of the spirit, a goad, and an exhortation. Such were also the heroic songs and triumphal hymns of the poets, which the Greeks call *ἐπινίχια* ("victory songs"), as in the Book of Chronicles (1 Chron. 15:21). For in all these the listless mind is sharpened and kindled, so that it may be alert and vigorous as it proceeds to the task.[404]

That Luther not only invokes Greek song genres but also goes on to explain that his observations about the nature of song were based on the exegesis of Johann Reuchlin[405]—a noted humanist and cabbalist student of Ficino—is enlightening. For, even if Luther did not accept the philosophical premises of the Platonist humanists, they nevertheless seemed to be dictating the material and motifs of his exegesis, which may well explain the Neoplatonist interpretations of Luther's philosophy in the *Dictata*.[406]

Here we must concede that all the Platonist musical shibboleths are there—arousal of the spirit, the reception of revelations, the power of musical chant. It is one thing, however, to note

[403] The Psalter includes instructions for most psalms regarding their musical context: some are labelled simply as 'a song', whilst others include instructions about tunes and instrumentation, and still others bear a dedication 'to the choirmaster'. Although frequently omitted from modern Bibles, St Jerome included the instructions as verses within his Latin translation, and Luther lectured on them as components of the Psalms.

[404] *LW* x:42; cf. *WA* iii:40.

[405] 'Hec ex Ioh. Reuchlin' (*WA* iii:41).

[406] This risks overstatement; responding to common contemporary ideas in exegesis may denote nothing more than that Luther was an exegete highly sensitive to his students' context—a trait we now recognize as a strength in a university lecturer.

that Luther's observation that 'the psalms and music have been designed to arouse devotion' is a statement Ficino could happily have accepted, and another thing entirely to presume that such a statement indicates Luther's support of Ficino's philosophical *mechanism* explaining *how* the Psalms arouse devotion.[407] Ficino's poetics were governed by a Platonist 'divine frenzy', in which metrical poets and singers were 'seized with the Bacchic transport'.[408] This *furor divinus* is a sort of magical Gnosticism, in which the soul transcends the physical and temporal limitations of the body and surveys the future in a kind of out-of-body experience.[409] It is a process of '*vacatio*—the departure of the soul or mind from the body for a period of time'.[410] Luther's version of 'musical arousal', on the other hand, knows none of this out-of-body frenzy and instead emphasizes it as an *in*-body experience, situating it mystically *in corde* and the physical body.[411]

Luther's few explicitly philosophical statements in the *Dictata* also lean heavily against a Platonist interpretation. In 1514, Luther noted that 'temporal things' were not to be considered instantiations of universals, 'because two [people] cannot enjoy one and the same thing at once. For whatever you consume, I cannot consume; it is possible to consume something that is similar but it is other'.[412] Furthermore, Luther offered a profoundly creative approach to the age-old nominalist heresy of implying that the three persons of the Trinity could not be a single substance by a means so straightforward—assuming that the universal of a universal is itself a reality only *in*

[407] See TOMLINSON, *Music in Renaissance Magic*, pp. 84–9, as well as MCDONALD, 'Orpheus Germanicus' for a concise introduction to Ficino's Platonist musical poetics. For a briefer summary, I refer the reader to the early essay, TOMLINSON, 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Relations of Music and Magic during the Renaissance', esp. pp. 121–33.

[408] PLATO, *Ion*, 534a, cit. MCDONALD, ibid., p. 73.

[409] FICINO, *Theol. Plat.* XIII, discussed in MCDONALD, ibid., pp. 78–9.

[410] MCDONALD, ibid., p. 78 and n. 410, reads 'There is good biblical evidence for prophecy, legitimating the entire doctrine of *furor divinus*. The similarity between the Christian doctrine of glossolalia and the frequent inability of poets to remember or understand what they have uttered under the influence of frenzy ([Plato's] *Ion* 534) could have been adduced as further proof of the commensurability of Platonic teaching and Christianity, although as far as I know it never was.' (McDonald is referring to 1 Cor. 14:2). I know of no occasion when it was, either; this is probably because *glossolalia* was viewed with scepticism by mediæval Christianity. See below, p. 172 and nn. 473–4.

[411] E.g. *WA* iii:405: 'Psallere autem est corde, ore et manu deum laudare'.

[412] *WA* iv:440–1; a similar statement ('temporalia dividunt hominem in multa, spiritualia colligunt divisum in unum') appears in *WA* iii:151. HUNZINGER, *Luthers Neoplatonismus*, p. 18, reckoned this evidence of Neoplatonism, but, as EBERLING, 'Die Anfänge', 188–9 noted, adherence to the Platonist habit of distinguishing between divisibles and universals is not reliant, in Luther's case, on the claim that real universals exist.

mente—that it is hard to believe it was not appropriated by others. The solution permitted him to allow for the Church's mystical union with Christ to establish a sort of substantive unity between apparently singular things on account of the *faith* of the church. 'We, however', he noted, '*if we are citizens of that [heavenly] city*, behold there is one bread, one cup, one faith, one Lord, and all things are one to us. Rather, Christ is all things *in us*. For spiritual things have such a nature that they cannot be divided into parts, but diverse and divided things hold together in one' (emphases added).[413] The indivisibility of 'one bread, one cup, one faith, one Lord' is a matter of faith to Luther, an ecclesiological affirmation that comes only as a result of a mystical union with Christ: '[f]or since Christ is the foundation for all things, he who is one within himself draws all of us into himself and *makes us one*' (emphasis mine). The result is that 'whatever you eat, wear, possess, I eat, drink and possess the same' insofar as 'you' and 'I' are both united with Christ.[414] Certainly, if there were any hint of Platonism in Luther's philosophy, he would not have been able to make such an assertion. Gerhard Eberling found similarly:

> The overall picture [of a Platonist Luther in the *Dictata*] is found wanting. [Hunzinger] himself has to admit that the defining theoretical idea of Neoplatonism, the ladder of emanations, is absent with Luther and replaced by the [mystical] creation principle.[415]

We must conclude, then, that in spite of any overtones of Renaissance Platonism, the young Luther was essentially a late *via moderna* theologian in the years of the *Dictata super Psalterium*, whose theology of music was dominated by a dialectical, fideistic mysticism.[416]

He would not remain one much longer.

[413] *WA* iv:441.
[414] Loc. cit.
[415] EBERLING, 'Die Anfänge', 188–9.
[416] See also MCGRATH, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, pp. 126–7.

CHAPTER IV

LUTHER'S REFORMED MUSICAL AESTHETIC

1. LUTHER'S THEOLOGICAL BREAKTHROUGH

Our protagonist, notes Alister McGrath, 'stepped on to the stage of human history on account of an idea. That idea convinced him that the church of his day had misunderstood the gospel, the essence of Christianity'.[417] This idea was not something Luther was born with. It developed over the course of the second decade of the sixteenth century, although its genesis may well have begun during the period between 1508 and 1511 when he held the Wittenberg chair in moral philosophy.[418] The general consensus amongst Luther scholars is that what has been called his *reformatorische Entdeckung* or *reformatorische Erkenntnis*—in English his Reformation breakthrough—occurred either in the years of 1513–15 or 1518–19.[419] If it was during the former, then the *Dictata super Psalterium* represent a piece of work in which the new epistemology was stumbled upon;[420] if it was during the latter, then the results of epistemological challenges borne out by the *Dictata* lectures came to a head sometime before Luther began his preparatory work for a later study of the Psalter, the *Operationes in Psalmos* (1519).[421]

[417] McGRATH, *Reformation Thought*, p. 104.

[418] McGRATH, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, pp. 141–7, recounts a full historiography of the theological breakthrough, and of the diverse suggestions about its 'dating'.

[419] McGRATH, ibid., pp. 142, 144.

[420] Perhaps in the lecture on Ps. 70 [71] and 71 [72]; this was the claim of E. VOGELSANG, *Die Anfänge von Luthers Christologie nach der ersten Psalmenvorlesung*, Berlin, 1929.

[421] Though there is some dispute surrounding the quality of Luther's recall, the Reformer's own account of his breakthrough notes that it was the reason for his commencing work on the *Operationes in Psalmos* (*WA* liv:186).

The content of the epistemological breakthrough has been summarized pithily by McGrath. Referring to the Reformer's 1545 own account of it, from which we quoted a part, above, on p. 134, McGrath explains thus:

> The basic change is fundamental. Originally Luther regarded the precondition for justification [i.e. the means of salvation] as a human work, something which the sinner had to perform, before he or she could be justified. Increasingly convinced, through his reading of Augustine, that such an act was an impossibility, Luther could interpret the 'righteousness of God' only as a *punishing* righteousness. But in this passage, he narrates how he discovered a 'new' meaning of the phrase – a righteousness which God *gives* to the sinner. In other words, God himself meets the precondition, graciously giving sinners what they require if they are to be justified.[422]

McGrath then imagines an analogy that is helpful in its clarity.

> Let us suppose that you are in prison, and are offered your freedom on condition that you pay a heavy fine. The promise is real – so long as you can meet the precondition, the promise will be fulfilled. Pelagius and, albeit in a slightly different manner, Gabriel Biel work on the presupposition, initially shared by Luther, that you have the necessary money stashed away somewhere. As your freedom is worth far more than the money, you are being offered a bargain. So you pay the fine. This presents no difficulties so long as you have the necessary resources. But Luther increasingly came to share the view of Augustine that sinful humanity just doesn't have the resources. They work on the assumption that, since you don't have the money, the promise of freedom has little relevance to your situation. For both Augustine and Luther, therefore, the good news of the gospel is that you have been *given* the necessary money with which you buy your freedom. In other words, the precondition has been met for you by someone else.[423]

Luther's process of arriving at this point led him to redefine the concepts of God's justice (*iustitia Dei*), faith (*fides*), and the whole idea of 'righteousness' that had so horrified him earlier in his life. It also had profound consequences for the way in which he viewed the church, the way in which he viewed salvation ('the crucial question of human existence'),[424] and the way in which he viewed human nature. One major reconceptualization was that of faith, whose effects had previously been considered tantamount to those of *humilitas*, and which, as the double concept *humilitas fidei*, had come to feature heavily in Luther's mysticism.[425] Like humility's effects, the

[422] MCGRATH, *Reformation Thought*, p. 109.
[423] Loc. cit.
[424] MCGRATH, ibid., p. 108.
[425] E. BIZER, *Fides ex auditu: Eine Untersuchung über die Entdeckung der Gerechtigkeit Gottes durch Martin Luther*, 3rd ed., Neukirchen, 1966, pp. 19–21; cit. MCGRATH, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, p. 117 and n. 68; see also MCGRATH, ibid., pp. 125–6, citing *WA* iii:462–3.

effects of faith (justification in God's sight, and resulting salvation) were held to be basically works of man, according to what God had bestowed him with in creation (*quod in se est*). But over the mid-1510s, Luther moved gradually towards the view that the effects of *fides* were not, in fact, coterminous with those of *humilitas*, but were rather something *granted externally* to the *viator separately from* the powers of man *quod in se est*. Justification and salvation were taken out of the realm of human activity and reassigned to a graceful act of God; *fides* was changed from being a precondition for grace to being an acceptance of it; and *humilitas*, previously an experience of self-deprecation bound up with man's utter sinfulness, became associated instead with God's mercy and generosity.

However subtle the philosophical alteration may appear, the epistemological shift that resulted from it was seismic in proportions. Having redefined the nature of salvific relations between God and man, the whole basis of the nominalist *pactum* between God and man began to disintegrate in Luther's hands. The passivity of man in his own salvation now became absolute, at the same time as the logic of God was discovered to be utterly alien to human ken.[426] This had a structural effect in Luther's theology: where previously relations between God and man had been defined by the uneasy dialectic of debt and payment—a negotiation, as it were, between two parties—they were now determined unilaterally by God. Man owed and was incapable of paying; God paid and was incapable of owing. This, in Luther's view, was the core concept of the 'gospel', the good news of Christianity: that justification was simply *granted*, and was not determined by man's futile attempts to fulfil a set of preconditions.[427] The very basis of *pactum*-theology now became the antithesis of Luther's Reformed theology—a highly original theology which, as we

[426] Cf. *WA* lvi:382, where Luther clarifies this development himself. God was now by definition acting contrary to human reason, since he gave undeserved justification in return for nothing.

[427] Cf. e.g. *WA* xxxx/III:352; *WA* liv:179–87.

saw in Chapter III, was forged in the heat of a crisis of faith brought on by the worst excesses of *pactum*-theology-doubt.[428]

As we saw in the previous chapter, music's validity was determined by the *faith* of the believer in Luther's early thought. Since his Reformation breakthrough turned upon a new conceptualization of *fides* around *c.*1517, it had ramifications for his conceptualization of *musica* as devotional and theological practice, too.

2. MUSIC AND FAITH IN LUTHER'S EARLY REFORMIST POLEMIC

4.2.1 Against Monastic Singing

The first clear distinctions between Luther's pre-Reformation and reformed theology of music on the basis of this theological revision emerged in the years 1519 and 1520, in the context of denunciations of the religious life. Motivated partly by his own experiences, Luther had come to view religious profession as a lifelong commitment to *via moderna* 'works-righteousness' (*Werkgerechtigkeit*),[429] a full-time devotion to the little acts of holiness that, under the *pactum*, might 'earn' one justification. Since he reckoned the *pactum* itself now to be the antithesis of the gospel, he came to despise not just the daily work of the consecrated life but also of the monastic ideal itself.

Since a large proportion of the daily life of religious was given over to sung prayers, it is not surprising that songs come under significant criticism in these contexts. In the *Exposition on the Lord's Prayer* (1519), for example, Luther observed of religious that

[428] Cf. further *WA* liv:185. MCGRATH, ibid., pp. 95–8, provides a new and persuasive translation, noting that the idiosyncrasies of numerous English translations have led to confusion about its meaning in a way that appeared risible to German scholars (p. 98 and n. 2).

[429] This term is not Luther's but rather was coined in HOLL, 'Was verstand Luther unter Religion', (in HOLL, *Gesammelte Aufsätze*, 3 vols., Tübingen, 1928, I, pp. 1–110).

> [t]hese people utter this prayer with their lips, but contradict it with their hearts. They are like lead organ pipes which fairly drawl or shout out their sounds in church, yet lack both words and meaning. Perhaps these organs represent and symbolize these singers and petitioners.[430]

Already in the *Dictata super Psalterium*, Luther had used the binary pairing of wordless sounds (those lacking 'articulation and distinction') and meaningful words to distinguish between a music of the 'letter' and a music of the 'spirit'. This distinction he thematized there with the musical terms *cantare* and *psallere*, a distinction determined by the faith of the singer.

In the passage just quoted from the *Exposition on the Lord's Prayer*, however, we see a hardening of that position, in which the earlier distinction between *cantare* and *psallere* on the basis of the individual singer's faith is applied to *groups* of singers—to all 'these people' who maintain religious vows. The relative evaluation of a musical utterance is no longer assessed purely on the individual faith of the singer, but is now deduced on the basis of the belief of the *community* in which the individual singer performs his songs. Furthermore, the previous pejorative associations of *cantare* are intensified here: *cantare* is no longer simply 'to praise with the mouth only', but is now described as 'drawl[ing] or shout[ing]', an activity that is 'contradict[ory]' to the meaning of the chant being sung.

This view of monastic song practice incorporates a globalization of individuals' defective faith to stand for an entire community's, and, whilst it makes for good Reformation polemic, it is somewhat disingenuous of Luther. In order to make the statements he does about monks' and nuns' song practices, Luther has first to equate his own experience as a friar with everyone else's; he has to assume that because as a brother he 'hated this righteous God' of the *pactum* even as he sang (contradictory) songs of praise to him, so too must *all* religious' singing be shot through with a hatred that contradicts the praises they vocalize. Increasingly, as Luther's campaign for the suppression of monastic orders gathered pace, this equation became a *leitmotif* in his polemic

[430] *LW* xlii:39; cf. *WA* ii:97.

against them, as if the hatred and resistance Luther reckoned characteristic of the religious experience was almost essential to it.[431]

The contradictoriness of the 'works' or daily practices of religious to the freedom of the gospel about which they supposedly sang was not, for Luther, the sole problem with the monastic life. Finding no solace from their hatred of their harsh God, Luther opined, the religious inevitably look for comfort in the outward respectability of their religiosity. In 1521, in his treatise *On Monastic Vows*, Luther asserted that

> [i]n [the monastic] idea of worship disciplines, penances, clauses, statues, sin, and merits are given the place of honor. It might even be said that this very demanding worship of God is performed so that during their lifetime these important and serious-minded men might learn at least a little bit about grammar and music. What else can they be judged as seeking? If now (as Paul says) some unbeliever were to enter into the midst of these men and heard them braying, mumbling, and bellowing, and saw that they were neither preaching nor praying, but rather, as their custom is, were sounding forth like these pipe organs (with which they have so brilliantly associated themselves, each one set in a row just like his neighbour), would this unbeliever not be perfectly justified in asking, "Have you gone mad?" [I Cor. 14:23] What else are these monks but the tubes and pipes Paul referred to as giving no distinct note but rather blasting out into the air [I Cor. 4:7]?[432]

Here there is 'honour' given over to the activity itself, and to the respectability of being 'set in a row' like organ pipes. The outward appearance of the canonical regimen serves to paper over its spiritual vacuity.[433]

But Luther has another criticism still, which is that, believing the covenantal theology of the *via moderna*, the monks and nuns are not only secretly despising God in their hearts, but in so doing are demonstrating that they have no idea of the actual meaning of the prayers they sing: for, if they did, they would recognize them as expressing a theology contrary to that of their own practice.[434] As far as Luther is concerned this makes religious not only anti-gospel, but stupid and

[431] Cf. *WA* i:275; *WA* x/i:138; *WA* x/i:234.

[432] *LW* xliv:324; cf. *WA* viii:621–2.

[433] Art. III.14 of the Schmalkald Articles notes that religious 'believe they lead a better life than common Christians', even though they are 'denying Christ'.

[434] As Luther himself had; cf. *WA* xxxviii:147–8.

self-serving as well. In his *Responsio* to Ambrosius Catharinus' Book (1521), Luther referred to the Old Testament prophecy of Amos to explain this:[435]

> The canonical hours are hooted and murmured with great gusto, and yet in such a way that they are never actually prayed. These regular services are added to by services for the Blessed Virgin, the holy Cross; and of the noise of those songs (Amos 5:33), to which God declared through the prophets that he would not listen, there is no end. And who can count the number of rules for this one work, and who can count the number of souls it threathens? Voices are added, the chant is of infinite types and variety. For both musical instruments and all forms of musical expression are put to work on this musical utterance.[436]

And in his *An den Bock zu Leyptzck*, published in 1521 and one of Luther's most antagonistic controversial responses, the newly-minted Heresiarch noted that his understanding of the process of justification far exceeds theirs. Their blind acceptance of canonical hour song-practices Luther attributes to a sort of falsely pious reasoning that God demands devotions (parroted from the conclusions of scholastic logical reasoning, which Luther had taught at Wittenberg from 1508).[437] But, Luther noted, he is not only a theologian with deeper understanding than they but also a philosopher and logician better than they:

> If I did not know logic and philosophy, you crude asses might well dare to make a name for yourselves as logicians and philosophers, even though you know as much about these things as an ass knows about music. And although you have learned to use the words—*as nuns use the psalter* and the parakeet uses language—you nevertheless know neither the use nor the application of them.[438]

This negative assessment of monastic worship practices had probably been gestating for some time in Luther's thought, but his continued submission to the discipline of the church prevented him from applying it to the institution of the religious life as a whole. His excommunication and

[435] Amos 5:23 reads, 'Take away from me the noise of your songs; I will not listen to the melody of your harps'.

[436] *WA* vii:734.

[437] His first lecture course at Wittenberg was Aristotle's *Ethics*; Luther was deeply unpersuaded by Aristotle's philosophy throughout his life, though, as McGRATH, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, p. 137, notes, the reasons for his unfavourable disposition towards it changed. It is not clear why Luther's philosophical erudition is not more privileged in contemporary Luther studies.

[438] *LW* xxxix:209 (emphases added); cf. *WA* vii:676. The full title of the work translates as 'Response to the Hyperchristian, Hyperspiritual, and Hyperlearned Book by the Goat Emser in Leipzig', a response to Emser's own 'Answer to the Unchristian Book of the Augustinian Martin Luther Addressed to the German Nobility' (i.e. *An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation*). Luther frequently referred to his opponents in controversies by derogatory nicknames; Emser's (the 'Goat of Leipzig') was awarded thanks to a goat on his family's crest.

anathematization, however, at once freed him from this discipline and goaded him into the sort of provocative polemic we have witnessed here, in which *all* religious life is characterized as theologically and morally contrary to true Christian practice.

4.2.2 Fides *and* Musica

At this juncture it is helpful to assess in more detail the reason for Luther's negativity towards monastic sung prayers. Here the redefinition of *fides* is the relevant issue.

When Luther considered *fides* almost coterminous with *humilitas*,[439] faith was by nature a human work, one which (we saw in the previous chapter) involved the rejection of the 'lower' parts of human nature and a mystical 'rise' to the 'higher' parts of God in *unio mystica*.[440] But in Luther's new hermeneutic *fides* is divorced from *humilitas*; now it is simply the response of the believer to the magnanimity of God. It is now this *responsive* faith, rather than an effortful striving to subjugate oneself to God's will, that is the rôle granted man in his own salvation.

The difference between Luther's pre-Reformation and early reformed musical thought is consequently much greater than it might initially appear. For whilst the gradual hardening of Luther's attitude towards *cantare* and *psallere* from a conceptual dialectic to a rigid and real dichotomy may seem to be little more than a steady process of essentialization easily attributed to the Heresiarch's crankiness, the reconceptualization of *fides* has the effect of migrating music from the category of *petitive devotions* (like David's) to *responsive devotions*. The worth of musical activity in God's sight is no longer determined by the intention of the believer singing it, but rather by the faith-revelation the believer has accepted. Musical practice, meanwhile, moves from its earlier supplicatory function to perform a new *recognitive*, or *exaltative*, function. By

[439] McGrath, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, p. 117 and n. 67, cites Luther's reliance on the equation between *humilitas* and *fides* in *WA* iii:588; iv:127, 231; lvi:449, 'Universalis ergo iustitia est humilitas'. For a discussion of the nature of *humilitas*, see Oberman, 'Wir sind Pettler. Hoc est verum. Bunde und Gnade in der Theologie des Mittelalters und der Reformation'.

[440] Cf. *WA* iii:149; cit. and trans. Ozment, *Homo Spiritualis*, p. 102.

1523, Luther's judgement on the holiness of music had begun to be determined not solely by the singer's faith, but by the *understanding* that singer's faith granted him:

> we possess the fruit [of the Spirit], whereby we know what makes a true Christian. For the man who is not at peace within himself, who, like the world, has a vain restlessness about him and is pleased by whatever is in the world that is vain, sorrowful, and sad—that man is not yet a Christian and still does not really believe. This truth is sung everywhere at this time of year in the song of the Lord's resurrection, but scarcely anyone understands it. The composer of that song certainly had a proper understanding of it, in that he does not stop [with the observation that] the Lord is risen in his phrase, 'Christ is risen' etc…. but follows it with 'therefore we shall all be glad'. But how can we be glad, if we have grasped nothing of it and it is not our reality?[441]

Leaver demonstrated amply in a remarkable essay from 1995 that Luther's musical reforms to the mass liturgy in the 1523 *Formula missae* and the 1526 *Deutsche Messe* were concerned precisely with resituating musical liturgics from transactional, *pactum*-theological function to a responsive, declarative one that demonstrated understanding;[442] I concur with its findings with the additional observation that this attempt at resituation was a direct consequence of the reconceptualization of *fides* that took place in *c.*1515, and was not a component of Luther's earlier musical thought.[443]

3. MUSIC AND THE *VERBUM CORDIS*

4.3.1 Reconceptualizing ratio

Luther's reconceptualization of *fides* required a secondary reconceptualization: that of *ratio*. For if God did indeed grant the righteousness of faith as a free gift to human beings, then he committed a classically irrational act (giving something in return for nothing). As Gabriel Biel had asserted, permitting God to act irrationally would have left the Almighty open to the charge of injustice,

[441] *WA* xii:520–1 (Sermon for Low Sunday).

[442] LEAVER, 'Theological Consistency, Liturgical Integrity, and Musical Hermeneutics in Luther's Liturgical Reforms', 123.

[443] To be clear: Leaver's article did not assert that the resituation *had* been part of the young Luther's thought.

amd consequently represented a philosophical impossibility.[444] The only solution was to redefine *ratio*.

This was what Luther did, although he saw the conceptual revision as merely an extension of Augustine's idea of *ratio*. Luther contended that what seemed irrational from a human perspective may not seem irrational from God's, for the reason that *ratio* is not univocal.[445] The logical consequence of Luther's belief that *ratio* was equivocal was that human reasoning could not be trusted *at all* to explain God's reasoning—an idea that Luther frequently summed up with the term *Deus absconditus* (the 'hidden God' or 'ungraspable God'). Indeed, reliance upon human reasoning to explain God amounted to idolatry in Luther's view, since it effectively involved making God in man's own image.

This intense distrust of *ratio*, and the conclusion that others' trust in it was idolatrous, led Luther to some of his harshest criticisms of monastic song practices. For what are songs, but the most ostensibly rational of works?

> Reason knows very well that one should be godly and serve God; it can chatter a lot about this and opines that it can teach the whole world. Very well, this is true and well put, but when reason is called on to act and to show how and in what way we should be come godly or serve God, then it can do nothing; it is as blind as a bat and says that we must fast, pray, sing, and do the works of the law. It continues to fool around in this manner with works, until it has gone so far astray and thinks we serve God by building churches, ringing bells, burning incense, reciting by rote, singing, wearing hoods, having tonsures, burning candles, and by other countless foolish acts of which the world is full, indeed, more than full.[446]

Luther's profound scepticism of *ratio* put his thought at odds not only with that of Aristotle, Biel and the late scholastic philosophers, but also with that of his spiritual father—Augustine. As an unabashed Neoplatonist, the Theologian regarded the mental faculty of *ratio* to be a *donum*

[444] G. BIEL, *Sacri canonis missae expositio*, Basel, 1510, lect. 59 S: 'Ita etiam quod stante sua promissione qua polliticus est dare vitam eternam servantibus [and its opposite] sua mandata *non posset sine iniustitica* subtrahere eis premia repromissa' (emphases mine); cit. MCGRATH, *Luther's Theology of the Cross*, p. 106.

[445] B. LOHSE, *Ratio und Fides*, pp. 82–6. Univocity was a significant concern of late mediæval philosophers; since Duns Scotus it had been generally accepted that the qualities ascribed to God that could also be ascribed to human beings were 'univocal', that is, different only in degree. A univocal claim to *ratio* required that both God and man work with essentially the same 'reasoning', even as God will inevitably be somehow 'more reasonable' than man.

[446] *LW* lii:59; cf. *WA* x/i:205.

Dei whereby man might be able to 'sanctify' his fleshly sensory experiences. Much late mediæval theological thought on the relationship between words and music was in fact drawn from the African bishop's *Confessions*, which found music's phonic properties godly when 'mastered' by words, and which thus accorded music's reception and use a morality of its own.[447]

As might be expected of an ex-Augustinian friar, Luther's thought traced that of Augustine quite closely. But Luther's reformed musical aesthetic differed in one fundamental regard from that that of Augustine—on the value of *ratio*. At this juncture it is worthwhile to tease out some of the ways in which Luther's divergence from a prevalent Augustinian theory of music came about.

4.3.2 Luther versus *Augustine on* musica

In several ways, Luther's Reformed theology was unusually reliant upon Augustine. One is the underlying belief that man is essentially depraved, and can ultimately do no good in the sight of God. This anti-Pelagian belief, as we have seen, rose in importance for Luther as he revised his theology of justification; it was drawn from Augustine's Neoplatonist dualist theory of the soul, and was by no means universal to late mediæval theology.[448] Another is the conviction that human words were divided into two components: the *verbum interius* and the *vox verbi* (again, a classic Neoplatonist dualism).[449] First explored by Augustine in *De Trin.* XV.11.20, the idea of a separate internal 'thought' and an external 'sense' was mapped retrospectively on to Aristotle's theory of νους by Thomas, and further explored by Lorenzo Valla.[450]

[447] Cf. *De Conf.* 11.28.38; *De Mus.* VI.viii.21. Henry Chadwick translated *De Conf.* 10.33.50 as '[N]ow I am moved not by the chant but by the words being sung, when they are sung with a clear voice and entirely appropriate modulation' (AUGUSTINE, *Confessions*, p. 208).

[448] Indeed, the 'arithmetical' basis of *pactum* religion could only be reconciled with it via a highly circuitous reasoning route.

[449] For an introduction to the distinction and function of each, see S. MEIER-OESER, *Die Spur des Zeichen. Das Zeichen und seine Funktion in der Philosophie des Mittelalters und der Frühen Neuzeit*, Berlin, 1997, pp. 30–32.

[450] B.J.F. LONERGAN, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 2 vols., South Bend, IN, 1967, I, pp. 13–14.

Augustine concluded that God, knowing the secrets of men's hearts, had no need of the *voces* by which the *verbum cordis* was signified, and could simply 'see' the intention of the soul without recourse to the intermediary of signs.[451] (This immediacy of expression between the soul and the Almighty was, for obvious reasons, somewhat compromised by the late mediæval nominalist idea of covenantal acts, undertaken as they are through signs.) The whole of the Theologian's *Enarrationes in Psalmos* are based around the dialectic between the two *verba*—the outward and the inward—in much the same way as Luther's *Dictata* was focused on the dialectic between the 'literal' and the 'mystical' senses of the Psalter.[452] By proper, informed reasoning, Augustine's reader of the *verbum literalis* could discover the true meaning of its hidden prophecy *in cordis*. Since, as we noted above, Augustine found that music distracted the senses and thus *undermined* the capacity to reason, singing the Psalms was, as far as he was concerned, liable to counteract any possibility of understanding their prophetic content.[453]

But Luther, as we have seen, considered *ratio* quite differently. Whereas the fourth-century bishop reckoned it the primary means of man's sanctification, the sixteenth-century Reformer reckoned it a symptom of man's depravity. At best, in Luther's view, *ratio* was useless in the explanation of eternal things; at the worst, it was a means by which a human thinker could pretend to himself that he was not really depraved by nature.

In Luther's anti-rational economy, verbal signs (*verborum voces*) were consequently judged precarious. Words, at best, get in the way of faith; at worst, they distort it.[454] The basis of the problem Luther perceived with human verbal signs was simply that they could not be relied upon

[451] *De doct. chr.* II.3.

[452] See FOLLI, '*Canticum cordis*: La musica e l'interiorità nelle *Enarrationes in Psalmos* di Agostino', p. 181.

[453] It is too simplistic to treat Augustine, as NICHOLS, 'Voice and Writing' seems to, as the Milton Babbitt of his age.

[454] The distinctions between Ockham's nominalist sign theory and the semiotics of Augustine provide a helpful backdrop for Luther's creative merging of the two. For a brief investigation, see U. ECO, 'Signification and Denotation from Boethius to Ockham'.

to convey the *res* to which they supposedly referred—a shortcoming that differentiated them sharply from the Word of God:

> [T]he German proverb says: The mouth flows over with what fills the heart. Thus all the world fully agrees that no image of the heart is so nearly like it and true to it as are the words of the mouth. The bird is known by its song, for it sings as its beak allows exactly as if the heart were essentially in the word. This is exactly as it is with God. His word is so much like himself, that the godhead is wholly in it, and he who has the word has the whole godhead. But this comparison admittedly has its limitation. The human word does not carry with itself the essence or the nature of the heart; but it is only able to signify or to act as a sign, just as a wooden or gold statue does not carry with it the essence of the human being whom it portrays. But here, in God, the word brings not only the sign and representation, but also the whole being and it is as full of God as he whose image or word it is. If human words expressed a pure heart or the intention of the heart or if the meaning of the heart were words, the comparison would be perfect. But that is impossible. Therefore this word of God is above all words and there is none like it among all creatures.[455]

The 'essence or the nature of the heart' here is the amended Augustinian concept of *verbum interius*, which Luther referred to elsewhere as the 'word of the heart' (*verbum cordis*):

> A word is not merely the utterance of the mouth; rather it is the thought of the heart. Without this thought the external word is not spoken; or if it is spoken, it has substance only when the word of the mouth is in accord with the word of the heart. Only then is the external word meaningful; otherwise it is worthless.[456]

The possibility of the 'word of the mouth' being 'in accord with the word of the heart' here presupposes that the opposite is also possible.[456a]

Augustine and Luther both accept that this is so; but they respond to the fragility of the relationship between sign and referent in different ways. Whereas Augustine seems to suggest that the inadequacy of the sign (*vox*) was evidence of man's insufficient or defective capacity to reason some better sign into being, Luther reckoned that the sign's inadequacy was caused by the

[455] *LW* lii:48; cf. *WA* x/I:188. The context is a Christmas homily on the first chapter of St John's Gospel (*verbum caro factum est*) from 1522.

[456] *LW* xxii:11; cf. *WA* xlvi:625.

[456a] Luther's translation theory in the *Sendbrief von Dolmetzschen* (1530) made precisely this point. In a passage (*WA* xxx/II:639) discussing the translation of Dan. 9, Luther distinguished between translation of the mere 'buchstaben' and a translation of the sense they seek to convey, noting that 'Darumb mus ich hie die buchstaben faren lassen, und forschen, wie der Deutsche man solchs redet…'. The distinction between letter and sense in the *Sendbrief* is regarded as the foundation of modern translation theory.

original sin of its human constructor. In Luther's view, no better sign could ever overcome this fundamental construction.

The distinction between the two theologians' approaches to *ratio* is nowhere better exemplified than in their contrasting estimations of birdsong. Augustine's view, expressed most forcefully in the *De Musica*, was that any sound without signification was unbridled sensuousness and therefore meaningless. He used birdsong as an example of pleasant noise, which could be contrasted with the reasoned sense of proper music.[457] (Human imitations of such pleasant noise, without verbal or metrical sense, were necessarily regressive, because they sought to negate the rational power of the human mind.[458]) The Augustinian approach was reiterated by Jean Calvin in the latter's foreword to the *Geneva Psalter* (1543):

> [T]he heart implies intelligence, which, says St. Augustine, is the difference between the singing of men and that of birds. For though a linnet, a nightingale, or a parrot sing ever so well, it will be without understanding. Now it is man's gift to be able to sing and to know what he is singing.[459]

Luther, by contrast, spoke of birdsong in a (peculiarly Franciscan) way that leaves us in no doubt that he considered a bird's lack of reason as no impediment to its song's moral value, and that he would, indeed, have preferred it if human beings would become more like the birds in their song:[460]

[457] *De Musica* II.iv.5; ed. and trans. R. TALIAFERRO in *Fathers of the Church 4*, New York, 1947, pp. 151–379: pp. 178–80. LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 75, citing J. MCKINNON, *Music in Early Christian Literature*, Cambridge, 1987, p. 166 (N^o. 386), leaves the reader with the impression that Augustine looked favourably on birdsong as music; in fact Augustine enjoyed birdsong as pleasant, but ultimately meaningless sound, and not as *musica*.

[458] *De Musica* I.vi.12. W.F. JACKSON KNIGHT, *St. Augustine's De Musica*, London, 1949, pp. 13–14, paraphrases as follows: 'obviously stage musicians value applause and payment more than the music itself, proving that they, who have not knowledge nad comprehension, are first and foremost not musicians, but tradesmen…'. NICHOLS, 'Voice and Writing', p. 149, clarifies that Augustine's approach to phonicity was that sound had to 'die' to words (a sort of 'confession') in order for the soul to be converted to its truth.

[459] J. CALVIN, 'Préface' to *Les Psaumes mis en rime françoise*, Geneva, 1565, repr. from Marot's *Cinquante Psaumes*, Geneva, 1543.

[460] WIORA, 'Josquin und *des Fincken Gesang*', argues (and I am persuaded, notwithstanding the conclusions of E. ØSTREM, 'Luther, Josquin and *des fincken gesang*') that Luther distinguished between the caged nightingale, whose song represented a non-musical, forced *cantus*, and the free/liberated nightingale, who could sing freely and honestly. Luther makes this point obliquely in *WA* xxxii:462: '[w]enn man sie [i.e. die Vogelin] ein sperret das sie singen sollen, und schuettet jn voll auff zu essen fur, das sie solten dencken: Nu hab ich gnug… Das thuen sie nicht, sondern sind viel lieber frey jnn der lufft, werden auch fetter und singen feiner und lieblicher jrem herrn…'.

> In other words, we have as many teachers and preachers as there are little birds in the air. Their living example is an embarrassment to us. Whenever we hear a bird singing toward heaven and proclaiming God's praises and our disgrace, we should feel ashamed and not even dare to lift up our eyes. But we are as hard as stone, and we pay no attention even though we hear the great multitude preaching and singing every day. … Whenever you listen to a nightingale, therefore, you are listening to an excellent preacher. He exhorts you with this Gospel, not with mere simple words but with a living deed and an example. He sings all night and practically screams his lungs out. … Thus this is an excellent illustration that puts us all to shame. We, *who are rational people and who have the Scriptures in addition*, do not have enough wisdom to imitate the birds. When we listen to the little birds singing every day, we are listening to our own embarrassment before God and the people. But after his fall from the word and the commandment of God, man became crazy and foolish; and there is no creature alive which is not wiser than he. A little finch, *which can neither speak nor read*, is his theologian and master in the Scriptures, even though he has the whole Bible and his reason to help him.[461]

In this last passage, Luther not only proposes that birds are irrational (and still sing despite it), but that they are 'excellent preachers' *because they do not have the burden of reason*. The human faculty of *ratio* is reduced to an impediment preventing the human 'heart [being] essentially in the word' uttered by the mouth.

This proposal is the precise opposite of Augustine's (and Calvin's), and marks Luther out in his musical aesthetics as an independent thinker. It also demonstrates that Luther reckoned there to be a profound fallibility (a fundamental dislocation) inherent in human utterances. A number of his discussions of vocalization provide suggestions for overcoming this fallibility, and they can be gathered together under two headings. We shall briefly examine each in turn here.

4.3.3 Uniting verbum cordis *with the* vox verbi

In a festival homily for Christmas Night transcribed by Stephan Roth, Luther advised his listeners to 'see to it that as you sing this precious song with your lips you also give word to it and trust in it with your heart'.[462] The song under discussion was the *Gloria in excelsis*, sung by the angels to the shepherds on the night of Christ's birth, retained from the Latin liturgy by Luther in his

[461] *LW* xxi:197; cf. *WA* xxxii:462; from a sermon on the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. 5–7), emphases added.
[462] *WA* xvii/II:307.

Formula missae for Wittenberg (1523)[463] and, after initially being omitted from the *Deutsche Messe* at its début in Advent 1525, quickly replaced with the chorale *All Ehr und Lob soll Gottes sein*.[464] The song was precious because it was scriptural; but its words were mere signs, even if scriptural ones. Luther instructs his congregation to 'give word to it… in your heart' (*mit dem hertzen so saget*), so that their *verba cordis* might become consonant with what their words signify. The fallible signs (*verba*) of the mouth are 'repaired' by being filled with the truthfulness of the trustworthy referent (*verbum cordis*).

The connection Luther is proposing between *vox* and *verbum cordis* is a spiritual connection; the *voces* do not cease to be mere 'signs', but, in an obscure fideistic twist reminiscent of the best *pactum* theology, come to 'count' as more in devotional terms. The manner of achieving this connection is further spelled out in Luther's lecture on the *Schöne Confitemini*, i.e. Ps. 118 [119], from 1530, a year when he worked studiously on the Psalter again.

> As I have said, however, the important thing is to realize that these words are wholly spiritual and must be heard, sung, and understood by faith.[465]

Luther is clear that understanding is a vital component in connecting the *verbum cordis* and the 'word of the mouth'; but he also clarifies that such understanding occurs only 'by faith'.

4.3.4 Rejecting verba

Luther's other potential solution to the problem of the fracture between human utterances and the *verbum cordis* is to reject the semiotics of speech altogether, and to embrace pneumatic *glossolalia* instead. First proposed by St Paul in his Second Epistle to the Corinthians (14:2),[466]

[463] Cf. *WA* xii:208.
[464] A discussion can be found in LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 187.
[465] *LW* xiv:83; cf. *WA* xxxi:146b.
[466] 'Those who speak in a tongue do not speak to other people but to God; for nobody understands them, since they are speaking mysteries in the Spirit.'

glossolalia or 'speaking in tongues' intentionally deprives utterances of significatory possibility and leaves the *verbum cordis* to try and 'break out' apart from *voces verborum*:

> [b]ut when one ponders well His divine works in the depths of the heart and regards them with wonder and gratitude so that one breaks out from very ardour into sighs and groanings rather than into speech; when the words, not nicely chosen nor prescribed, flow forth in such a way that the spirit comes seething from them, and the words live and have hands and feet, in fact, the whole body and life with all its members strives and strains for utterance—that is indeed a worship of God in spirit and truth, and such words are all fire, light and life.[467]

The superiority of this sort of expression ('sighs and groanings') is derived from the 'very ardour' of 'the depths of the heart'; *glossolalia* is, as it were, the vocalization of the *verbum cordis* unmediated by *voces*. These unmediated referents 'live and have hands and feet', where regular words (*voces*) lifelessly 'signify or act as a sign'.

Luther's palpable admiration for such 'sighs and groanings' was not matched, however, by a commitment to see pneumatic *glossolalia* introduced as a liturgical practice within his own context. Perhaps on account of the association between *glossolalia* and heresy movements and the resulting suspicion of the practice within orthodox Christianity,[468] Luther remained disapproving towards such exclusively phonic vocalizations in the liturgical context.[469]

Nevertheless, a number of Luther's statements about music can be happily read as encouraging of glossolalic prayer and praise. It could be concluded that the Reformer considered textless music to be tantamount to a form of *glossolalia* itself, when it amounts to a vocalization of the *verbum cordis* in faith. In the 1538 *encomion musices*, Luther observes that music *sua infinita varietate et utilitate longe superat eloquentissimorum eloquentissimam eloquentiam* ('by its infinite variety and application far outstrips the eloquentest eloquency of the most eloquent'), a

[467] *LW* xxi:326; cf. *WA* vii:572 (Sermon on the Magnificat, 1522).

[468] The Waldensians, Albigensians and (later) the Anabaptists all privileged praying in tongues, as did some (braver) Franciscans. See S. BURGESS, 'Medieval Examples of Charismatic Piety in the Roman Catholic Church', in *Perspectives on the New Pentecostalism*, ed. R.P. Spittler, Grand Rapids, MI, 1977. Hildegard of Bingen's *lingua ignota* ought not to be considered glossolalic, according to S.L. HIGLEY, *Hildegard of Bingen's Unknown Language: An Edition, Translation, and Discussion*, New York, 2007.

[469] He was sharply critical, for example, of the Zwickau prophets; cf. his letter to Melanchthon dated 13 January 1522, *WA BR* ii:424–8.

rhetorically brilliant formulation that conveys the sense it signifies by demonstrating the significatory fragility of words.[470] In the same place, he asked, *Quis enim omnia complectatur?* ('for who can encompass all [here: of music]?')—neatly encompassing none of it in his own question by virtue of omission—before noting that 'even if you were to wish to encompass all of it, you would be seen to have encompassed nothing at all'.[471] That the strongest praise for music's non-significatory character is made in a sentence that omits music's own sign (*vox*) is telling. Freed from sign theory altogether, music is free to serve the *verbum cordis* and, as such, far surpasses all eloquencies of speech.

In one of his Lectures on Genesis (1538), Luther effectively equated the ideal *musica* with the unmediated expression of the *verbum cordis*:

> Therefore nothing else was left than the indescribable groan of a despairing heart [*animi*]. Ishamel confesses that he is unworthy of his father's house and inheritance, just as the prodigal son in the Gospel says: "I am not worthy to be called your son." This groan God sees and hears. To be sure, Ishmael cried with his voice; but it was chiefly the distress of his heart and his contrition that led him to groan from the throat and to heave deep sighs. This music [*musica*], which seems to us very sad and mournful, pleases God more than any other form of worship…[472]

The 'indescribable groan of a despairing heart' is expressed in a wordless 'music' that makes sense to God in a way that it does not to human ears (for *ratio* is not univocal!).

4. MUSIC AND PROCLAMATION

Since Luther is so anti-rational in his praise of music, and since he seems to promote wordless (and apparently senseless) music as the ideal, what are we to make of suggestions of those like Leaver, who consider music's predicatory and proclamatory rôle to be fundamental to Luther's

[470] *WA* l:370.

[471] 'Atque si velis omnia complecti, nihil complexus videare' (*WA* l:368). U.S. Leopold trades Luther's repetition of the verb *complector* for variety in his translation (*LW* liii:322), but Luther meant to assert precisely that any attempt to 'grasp' music was empty rhetoric, rhetoric which by its emptiness emphasized music's intangibility further.

[472] *LW* iv:56; cf. *WA* xliii:175.

musical aesthetic? Certainly we cannot accept that Luther reckoned music a sort of imitation verbal language—his idea of music's worth, after all, was based on the fact that it evaded verbal signs altogether. (Cahn's implication, then, that Lutheran music theory increasingly prioritized musico-rhetorical devices as a direct result of a Lutheran concern that music should 'preach' is problematized; at best, we can conclude that any such 'Lutheran' concern was not Luther's own.)

Leaver makes a strong case in favour of a Lutheran view of music as a simple vehicle of catechesis.[473] Music functions in this approach as a sort of *aide-mémoire* to a song's content, with occasional musical devices (word-painting, intertextual references) employed to emphasize certain ideas and 'bed them in' to the mind of the singer the more securely. Whilst I believe that Leaver is right to observe as he does about Luther's promotion of hymnody as a catechetical tool, I do not accept that the Reformer's pragmatic embrace of music in the service of his preaching goals is tantamount to a proclamatory aesthetic of music.

Instead, I suggest that the Reformer considered music to be a sort of proclamation *in its own right*, separate from the verbal content with which it could be underlaid. Ishmael's 'groan' and 'sighs', for example, amount to a confession, Luther notes, a proclamative act, despite its lack of words. Similarly, the bird of the air is an 'excellent *preacher*', even as its song contains no words. The vocalized (but not verbalized) *verbum cordis* of both Ishmael and the bird of the air is proclamatory, even as it is not semiotically referential.

But what is the content of this *verbum cordis*—what is proclaimed in its vocalization? There are two potential answers to this question.

[473] See LEAVER, 'Luther's Catechism Hymns'.

4.4.1 Vocalizing Soteriological Dependence

The theologian Margaret Miles noted, in an important paper from 1984, that Luther's situation of the 'event of justification', that is, the acceptance of the free gift of justification through faith, in the 'bottom of the heart', was a decisive innovation in his theology. The innovation shifted the focus of religious devotions away from the covenantal acts of the *pactum*, and towards (what we would now call) an interiorized or personal faith.[474]

> Martin Luther's revolutionary insight concerning the location of the event of justification in the "bottom of the heart" contained, as is well known, some ancillary results toward the displacing of external activities—"works"—from a central position in the quest for salvation. One effect of his theology was a radical redistribution of weight in his anthropological understanding, a shifting of focus away from a person's active participation in liturgy and the sacraments, asceticism and good works, and toward the event of justification in the "consciousness," "depths of the heart," or "the inmost heart."[475]

This 'event of justification in the "consciousness"' cannot be 'faked' as *cantus* can be 'faked' (merely chanted, but not given word to in the heart); rather, it must be true to the 'depths of the heart'. It follows, then, that the *word* of the heart (the *verbum cordis*) is something that must spring from 'the inmost heart'—the locus of the 'event of justification'.

The content of the *verbum cordis*, meanwhile, is the expression of whatever is *in* the depths of the heart. In the case of Ishmael, for example, it is the 'confession' equated with that of the prodigal son's declaration, 'I am not worthy to be called your son'. This *humilitas*, we should note, occurs *after* the justification event, rather than as a pre-requisite to it. The *verbum cordis* is therefore a testimony of *humilitas* to a gift of justifying *fides*: a grateful 'groan' or 'sigh' in the heart for the salvation granted freely by God. It is a confession that the human being is *simul iustus et peccator* (at once a [condemned] sinner and a justified man) by virtue of Christ.

[474] See WENDEBOURG, 'Luther on Monasticism', p. 347.
[475] MILES, '"The Rope Breaks When It Is Tightest": Luther on the Body, Consciousness, and the Word', 239.

The content of the *verbum cordis*, therefore, can be summarized as a grateful proclamation of one's humility as a response to the justification wrought by God.

4.4.2 Vocalizing Ontological Difference

One alternative possibility for the content of the *verbum cordis* is that Luther equated it not simply with a testimony to the justification of a sinner, but with a testimony to the *justifier* of a sinner—that is, not simply to the *action* of God in the Word, but to the *person* of the confronting Word. In the gloss to Ps. 118:147 [119:147] from 1514, Luther asserted that the preaching of the Word was like the 'seed' of Christ's incarnation being 'planted' in the 'womb' of the 'heart';[476] in the same way that the 'seed' of the Holy Spirit in the womb of the Virgin Mary led to the physical birth of Christ, so too the 'seed' of psalmic prophecy gives way to the spiritual birth of Christ in the heart of a believer.[477] In fact, Luther considered there to be *three* 'comings' of the incarnate Christ: one in flesh, one in the Word, and one in his second coming.

> For the face of Christ is threefold. Firstly: in his first coming, when the Son of God was made flesh, who was the face of the Father.… Secondly: in his spiritual coming. *Unless this is already there, nothing comes out of the first*.… Thirdly, in his second and final coming when his face will be seen fully.[478]

Although of these the 'first coming' was chronologically first, the 'spiritual coming' of Christ in preaching is a prerequisite to it in order that anything good 'comes out of the first'. The Word, so to speak, precedes the Word incarnate. The observation made by Lienhard, which we quoted above, on p. 74, is a helpful summary of Luther's position: 'If the gospel, as a Word binding us to Christ, is not preached, Christ does not exist for us'.

[476] *WA* iv:376; see OZMENT, *Homo Spiritualis*, p. 96.

[477] This is, as far as I can tell, an echo of Ockham's insistence that only a referent that is already held in the mind/soul can be referred to (OCKHAM, *Sum. tot. log.*, I.i.7), meaning that, as ECO, 'Signification and Denotation from Boethius to Ockham', 20–21, observes, something like faith cannot be born in the soul unless it has already been 'planted' there. Luther reckons that the audition of prophecy itself can perform this 'planting' function.

[478] *Scholion* to Ps. 101:2 [102:2], emphases added; *WA* iv:147, cit. and trans. OZMENT, *Homo Spiritualis*, p. 129.

The job of preaching the Word is to 'sow the seed of Christ' in the believer's heart, so that the Word can begin his confronting process of justification. The 'seed' must be one not just of Christ's deeds, but also of his incarnate *identity*—of his two natures. The Word must be 'sown' in the heart as something ontologically different from the recipient, as something both recognizably human and alienly divine. In a curious passage from a Christmas sermon preached on John 1:14 (*verbum caro factum est*) in 1538, Luther noted that *musical difference* was a key component in expressing the *ontological difference* of the divine Word from the flesh he assumed in incarnation.

> These words, too, "And the Word became flesh," were held in reverence. They were sung daily in every Mass in a slow tempo and were set to a special melody, different from that for the other words. And when the congregation came to the words "from the Virgin Mary, and was made man," everyone genuflected and removed his hat. It would still be proper and appropriate to kneel at the words "and was made man," to sing them with long notes as formerly, to listen with happy hearts to the message that the Divine Majesty abased Himself and became like us poor bags of worms, and to thank God for the ineffable mercy and compassion reflected in the incarnation of the Deity.[479]

It is not entirely clear what part of the Mass liturgy Luther is referring to here—the words *et verbum caro factum est* do not appear in the credo as do the words *et homo factus est*.[480] Nevertheless, the 'message that the Divine Majesty abased Himself' in his incarnation as a lowly man, with all the paradoxicality that implies, is expressed best in Luther's mind by *singing that message differently*. It is not simply the physicality of genuflecting and doffing one's cap that represents a proper and joyful response to the expression of the incarnation in words (though, certainly, if we take seriously Luther's insistence that the unbridled *verbum cordis* ought to express itself by 'flow[ing] over with what fills the heart' then we should expect such a response to be physical, uninterrupted by the *mens*). In this case, radical alienation is foregrounded in the doctrine being expressed (incarnation) as well as in the mode of expression ('to sing them with long notes', i.e. differently from the remainder of the credo). The doctrine is the *difference-from-*

[479] *LW* xxii:102–3; cf. *WA* xlvi:624–5.

[480] The likeliest explanation is that Luther has conflated two moments in the liturgy. The Gospel text on which he is preaching (the Prologue to John's Gospel) was sung at the close of the Roman mass liturgy in many places, though the 'special melody' to which Luther refers appears to have been a local custom.

self of a God who is at once a man, and the mode of expression is *difference* from the remainder of the creed's setting. Since, as we have already seen, Luther considered that 'there is a difference between singing and saying' it is not too far an extension of principle to conclude that he also considered different types of singing to be suitable vehicles for proclaiming the ontological differentness of Christ.[481]

If this is true, then the *verbum cordis*' content must also contain an expression of the ontological difference and superiority of Christ; and the utterance of the *verbum cordis* in non-verbal (non-referential, i.e. musical) means becomes a sign of the *ontological differentiation* that the *verbum cordis* expresses. In other words, the *verbum cordis* becomes the appropriate responsive act of *humilitas* to the work of salvation in Christ.

It is impossible to demonstrate conclusively that Luther regarded the content of the *verbum cordis* in this way; there is not sufficient evidence in Luther's writings to confirm or deny the hypothesis. Two things in particular prevent it. First, the Reformer was, throughout his entire life, an obsessive Christologian ('in my heart', he noted in 1535, 'there rules this one doctrine, namely, faith in Christ. From it, through it, and to it all my theological thought flows and returns day and night'[482]), so the apparent association between song and the incarnation doctrine may be nothing more than evidence that Luther saw the doctrine expressed in all things. Second, the years of Luther's most productive sermon-writing (1521–22) were those of his incarceration at the Wartburg, during which he chose to focus on Advent and Christmas themes in his work;[483] Advent and Christmas were the traditional seasons for examining the major biblical canticles of

[481] Sixteenth-century liturgists across Western Europe seem to have frequently isolated the *et incarnatus est* of the credo as a moment deserving of musical differentiation. Iberian liturgies often provide for the words to be sung to polyphony even when the remainder of the credo is sung to chant. I am grateful to Owen Rees for alerting me to this fact.

[482] *LW* xxvii:45; cf. *WA* xl/i:33.

[483] See LIENHARD, *Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ*, pp. 153–5. Luther's study culminated in numerous sermons and *postilla*.

Christ (the *Sanctus* from Isaiah 6;[484] the *Surge, illuminare* of Isaiah 60;[485] the *Magnificat* and *Benedictus Dominus* of Luke 1;[486] the *Gloria in excelsis* and *Nunc dimittis* of Luke 2[487]) as well as a topical focus on the Psalter, at the same time as they focused on the seasonal devotions of waiting for the Christ and adoring the Christ-child. A thematic association between incarnation and singing is one that is, consequently, easily made.

On the other hand, the fact that a significant proportion of the Reformer's theological invocations of music or musical ideas occurred in the context of sermons related to the feasts of Christmas or Epiphany (i.e. feasts of the incarnation), suggests that Luther might have made a subconscious association between the musical or physical expression of the *verbum cordis* and the incarnation of the *verbum Dei*.

This alternative possibility for the content of the *verbum cordis* in Luther's thought is, in any case, really only a transformation of the first possibility, rather than a potential substitute for it: where in the first version of events (§ 4.4.1, above) the *verbum cordis*' content is a testimony to the confronting Word of God's *effect* in the believer's life, in the second version its content is a testimony of the Word of God's *nature and identity*. The two reinforce one another. Whichever is the likelier, Luther was keen that the *verbum cordis*—the knowledge of justification by the confronting Word, both human and divine—should be expressed musically. This sort of 'new song' was a necessary component of what it meant to be someone whose soul had been justified:

> Thus there is now in the New Testament a better service of God, of which the Psalm [96:1] here says: "Sing to the Lord a new song. Sing to the Lord all the earth." For God has cheered our hearts and minds through his dear Son, whom he gave for us to redeem us from sin, death, and the devil. He who believes this earnestly cannot be quiet about it. But

[484] Both Isaiah's calling ('whom shall we send?'), which was analogized with John the Baptist's injunction to prepare the way for the coming Christ, and the Revelation to St John, in which the *tersanctus* of Isaiah 6 is repeated (Rev. 4:8), were thematically privileged during Advent.

[485] Epistle for the Feast of the Epiphany (Isaiah 60:1–6).

[486] Mary's response to the Annunciation of Christ and Zachariah's song of prophecy about John the Baptist's rôle respectively.

[487] The *Gloria* concludes the Gospel for Christmas Night *(Dominus Dixit)*; the *Nunc dimittis* is repeated several times during the Purification Liturgy for 2 February, and functions as the tract replacing the Alleluia after Septuagesima.

> he must gladly and willingly sing and speak about it so that others also may come and hear it. And whoever does not want to sing and speak of it shows that he does not believe and that he does not belong under the new and joyful testament, but under the old, lazy, and tedious testament.[488]

5. MUSICAL DIALECTICS

But how might the *verbum cordis* of a true believer, justified by Christ in faith and confessive of his person and acts in *humilitas*, be uttered musically? How can one 'sing… of it', if the surest means for proclamation (verbal speech) is compromised by an excessive reliance upon *ratio*?

Luther was perfectly happy to involve very limited non-semantic structures in the expression of the *verbum cordis*, especially where they could enable the confession of Christ's person or justifying acts to be expressed. In 1538, Luther discussed a motet he is said to have sung around the dinner table.

> On 26 December they were singing *Haec dicit Dominus*, composed for six voices by Conrad Rupsch, which he [Luther] wanted to have sung to him when he was in the throes of death. And it is [he explained] a remarkable motet that makes sense of the Law and the Gospel, of death and life. Two plaintive voices make the lament *Circumdederunt me gemitus mortis* [the pains of death compass me round about] etc. and then four voices counter with these words: *Haec dicit Dominus, de manu morte liberabo populum meum* [thus said the Lord: from the hand of death I will liberate my people] etc. It is well composed, and comforting.[489]

The 'Law' condemns and declares the human being a *peccator*; the 'Gospel' is the good news that the human sinner is also *iustus* by Christ. The juxtaposition of them in the motet to which Luther refers is therefore confessive *by its form* of the 'event of justification' that (as we saw above) elicits the believer's *verbum cordis*.

The *Haec dicit Dominus* referred to in this *Tischrede* is Conrad Rupsch's contrafactum of Josquin's chanson, *Nimphes, nappés*, for six voices.[490] In both the original and contrafacted

[488] *LW* liii:333; cf. *WA* xxxv:477.
[489] Tischrede N^o. 4316 (1538); *WA TR* iv:215.
[490] The contrafacted version appears in Ott/Formschneider, *Novum et insigne opus musicum* (RISM 1537[1]).



Figure IV.1 *Opening of Rupsch's* Haec dicit Dominus

versions, two inner voices sing a Latin cantus firmus in canon on the text *Circumdederunt me*, whilst the remaining four voices make complex polyphony. Leaver reckons that it is the tension between the canonic interaction between the chant voices and the freedom of the polyphonic voices (and not the textual interaction) that expresses most fully the paradox of Law and Gospel, of 'death and life' to Luther.[491] This is undoubtedly true, because, as Royston Gustavson has observed, Rupsch's links with Luther (he had been involved in the provision of music for the *Deutsche Messe* in 1526) combined with Luther's enthusiasm for his contrafactum, and the close relationship between Hans Ott (the motet's publisher) and Wittenberg, suggests that Luther almost certainly knew the provenance of Rupsch's *Haec dicit Dominus*;[492] indeed, he may even have been the instigator of its contrafaction. If Luther's praise was directed solely towards the juxtaposition of texts (rather than musical construction), it is unlikely he would have chosen to praise a contrafactum, and he certainly would not have praised it for being 'trostlich componirt'. Moreover, in the *encomium musices* (also from 1538), the Reformer emphasized that the *musical* relationship between voices is important in its own right, apart from text:

> it is most remarkable that one single voice continues to sing the tenor, while at the same time many other voices play around it, exulting and adorning it in exuberant strains and, as it were, leading it forth in a divine roundelay…[493]

Luther's fondness for Rupsch's *Haec dicit Dominus*, then, is musical, and is determined by his appreciation of the way in which the paradox of *lex* and *evangelium* is handled in the motet:[494] through its musical counterpoint. (See Figure IV.1, above.) The *Circumdederunt me* antiphon for

[491] LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 103. I agree with Leaver's conclusion, except that in other cases textual contrast is extremely important in Luther's estimation, too. In his foreword to the Wittenberger *Begräbnislieder* (1542), Luther noted that fine musical composition was worth very little if the texts it set were not such that the 'holy Word of God' is sung, praised, and honoured: 'Also haben sie [im Bapstum] auch warlich viel treffliche schoene Musica oder Gesang, sonderlich in den Stifften und Pfarrhen, Aber viel unfletiger abgoettischer Text da mit geziert. Darumb wir solche abgoettische todte und tolle Text entkleidet, und jnen die schoene Musica abgestreifft, und dem lebendigen heiligen Gottes wort angezogen' (*WA* xxxv:478–9).

[492] R.R. GUSTAVSON, 'Hans Ott, Hieronymus Formschneider, and the *Novum et insigne opus musicum*', p. 320.

[493] *LW* liii.324; cf. *WA* l:372–3.

[494] Van CREVEL, *Adrianus Petit Coclico*, p. 103, noted that '…Luther es liebte, den Gegensatz *lex-evangelium* allegorisch auf alle möglichen Lebensumstände anzuwenden, und besonders … auf die Musik'.

the office of the dead *ad matutinam*,[494a] a text that speaks of death and decay, is sung as a chant (a *cantus*!) by the quintus and sextus voices, which are held together in canon-like imitation, as if they cannot be freed from their internal compulsion. The four free voices, meanwhile, almost mock the strictness of canonic imitation by their comparative freedom. Yet the free voices, too, are highly imitative of one another, and are tightly bound together with the canonic interaction between the two chant voices (indeed, until moments before the entry of the cantus firmus the cantus and altus are in canon at the fifth below). The free voices operate according to the existing requirements of the chant (in that the chant determines the structure of the motet) at the same time as they remain motivically unbound by it. This Luther sees as representative of 'the Gospel' of Jesus Christ, who in Matt. 5:17, explained that he came into the world 'not to abolish but to fulfil' the Law. How *fulfilling* the Law, such that it no longer holds dominion over the Christian, can be distinguished from *abolishing* it is difficult to express; it was all the more pertinent for Luther as he accused the Roman traditionalists of seeking to earn their own salvation through 'works of the Law' (*opera legis*, which later in his life Luther often conflated with *lex*) and contrasted papal religion with his own, which was founded on the 'Gospel' (*evangelium*). In the case of *Haec dicit Dominus*, Luther notes that the essence of reformed Christianity is expressed 'wol und trostlich' by the internal order of Josquin's music.

This expression of the Law/Gospel theological paradox by internal (musical) organization is not unique in Luther's *Tischreden*. In 1530, the Reformer observed that

> In music, the B flat [i.e. the B *mollis*] is the gospel; the other notes [*claves*] are the law. And just as the law submits to the gospel, so the B flat disciplines the other notes; and just as the gospel is a doctrine of great sweetness, so too the B flat is, of all notes, the sweetest.[495]

Another *Tischrede* from 1533 is basically identical.

[494a] Ibid., p. 104 and n. 2.
[495] Tischrede N$^{o.}$ 816; *WA TR* i/II.396.

> In music the B flat is the Gospel; for it changes all music. The other notes are the law, and in the same way that the law is made palatable by the Gospel, so the B flat comes to regulate all the voices; the B natural [i.e. the B *durum*] is the law, the B flat the Gospel.[496]

In both these cases Luther regards the paradox of Law/Gospel to be mediated not simply by the internal organization of a musical work, but in the internal organization of musical *grammar*. A conflict between modal theory and hexachordal theory precipitated the idea: under modal theory, the eight notes of a mode are pre-determined and fixed in their relationship to one another and are simply repeated either side of the mode's natural ambitus. Hexachordal theory, however, allows for mutations such that placement of semitones can differ.[497] The insertion of a B flat into the signature of a voice enforces this arrangement. This insertion Luther likens to 'the Gospel' because 'the Law' of modal transpotion is 'disciplined' and 'regulated' by the quasi-tonal sweetness of the key signature.[498]

The capacity of music to *juxtapose* contradictory things is apparently not something Luther considered hindering to the *verbum cordis*' immediate expression but rather a means making it possible. In the case of B flats, *Haec dicit Dominus*, and the Law/Gospel mediation, this is because the content of the *verbum cordis* (recognitive devotion on account of the knowledge of one's justification in the gospel) is consonant with the idea expressed in music's own internal grammar and theoretical organization. As Leaver has observed, only a true musical connoisseur could make such an observation.[499] He is right; Luther's appreciation and theological understanding of music

[496] Tischrede N°. 2996; *WA TR* iii.136.

[497] For example, a plagal voice beginning on A re mutates from the G (hard) hexachord at either C fa ut or D sol re to the C (natural) hexachord, within the compass of which it can happily stay as long as no note higher than a la mi re is required. As soon as any notes above a la mi re are required, it is unclear to the singer whether he should mutate to the F (soft) hexachord, in which B is sung as fa, or the next G (hard) hexachord, in which it is sung as mi. The singer is required to use judgement regarding the formal function of the B he is approaching, permitting the introduction of sharpened leading notes. It is the choice of mutation between hexachords that permits (tonal) transposition, and the illegal mutation between hexachords that permits *musica ficta*. Luther's invocation of the question of B fa mi may also relate to his experience as a performer: when one singer sings a B fa mi as B fa, it is often a sign to the other singers that their voice parts will shortly require it, too ('the B flat comes to regulate all the voices').

[498] Theorist readers will note that Luther's understanding of modal and hexachordal theory is not particularly precise, or at any rate, is not couched in the sort of (theorists') terms that would make it possible to discern precision in his understanding. Presumably Luther learnt his theory in practice.

[499] LEAVER, 'Luther as Musician', 159.

is profound enough that we must consider him among the most important musical thinkers of the sixteenth century.

But what our investigation of Luther's reformed musical aesthetic has made clear is that his theological handling of music was not only historically important, but also astonishingly original. The idea that music's value arose at once out of the incapacity of wordless vocalizations to refer semiotically, and out of the need of the human heart to express spiritual truths far surpassing the reason of human word-signs, is striking not only for its aesthetic comprehensiveness but also for its intellectual symmetry. That music, by the capacity of its technical mechanics to mediate completely contradictory ideas dialectically, should function as the trustiest vehicle for the content of the unmediated *verbum cordis* (which is either the paradox of *homo simul iustus et peccator est*, or the paradox of *verbum caro factum est*) renders to it a proclamatory rôle far outclassing that given to word-signs (*voces verborum*) in Luther's sign theory.

6. CONCLUSION

We noted earlier that Luther never goes so far as to provide a music-aesthetic 'manifesto' in any of his works (*pace* Leaver's suggestion that a scrap of paper, ostensibly a draft contents page to a future theological treatise on music from the year 1530, might be read as such).[500] We have found, however, that a number of conclusions can be drawn about Luther's overall musical aesthetic. I concede that whether or not Luther considered this 'aesthetic' as a unity, or whether it represents simply the piecemeal application of his broader theological aesthetic to his musical thought, is something we shall never know; but its reality is not thereby undermined.

A number of general observations can be made. The most striking is that Luther never considered music apart from theological categories. *All* musical activity (whether speculative,

[500] *WA* xxx/II:696. Cf. LEAVER, *LLM*, p. 86.

practical, or poietic) was theological activity to him. A concomitant observation is that, as Luther's theology changed, so too did his musical thought. Bound up with categories of *unio mystica*, *pactum* grace-exchange, *fides* and *humilitas*, *musica*'s theological meaning changed as each of these categories was redefined.

We can draw three broad conclusions about Luther's musical thought.

The first is that Luther's discussions of music are characterized by an overwhelming emphasis on dialectical categories and the holding together of ideas that are apparently opposed to one another. This dialectical approach to *musica* is similar to his theology in general, which leant heavily on Augustine's predilection for paradox. Luther's association between dialectical reasoning and musical reasoning is demonstrated by the fact that he both invoked musical metaphors to exemplify paradoxes in his exegesis, and praised music that handled paradoxical ideas in its internal organization. Such an association is not 'strong' enough to be called a 'structure' of musical thought, or to be referred to as an aesthetic principle; but it nevertheless lingers behind virtually every statement Luther made pertaining to music.

Second, Luther never considered the benefits of music to be natural to it. The making of a chant into a 'spiritual song' was not simply a matter of the addition of more musical interest, or an amendment of its material, but rather an act of *faith*. On either side of the Reformation breakthrough, Luther's estimation of the worth of a musical song was determined by the faith of its singer more than anything internal to the song. In his musical aesthetics, then, Luther sought not to promote abstract rules and regulations for musical composition or performance (although he clearly enjoyed and trusted such rules and regulations), but rather to promote a 'God's-eye view' of musical activity *as a whole*. This approach is profoundly at odds with the fashionable Renaissance Platonism that many of Luther's German humanist contemporaries were exploring, which promoted music's *inherent* power to affect (and even control) the human psyche apart from the individual's will (*voluntas*).

Third—and most relevantly for our purposes—Luther's musical thought shunned acts of *ratio* and verbal (rhetorical) categories as inhibitors to the unmediated expression of the true *verbum cordis*. Immediacy made for godly song ('a new song'), whereas verbiage only served to lead men and women into idolatrous attempts to win their own salvation. We have not, in either of these chapters, examined any of the (relatively few) often-quoted remarks by Luther that *liturgical music* must be rationally (and even rhetorically) composed, because our focus has been on Luther's *personal musical aesthetic* and not on his ideas for liturgical practice (an area that Leaver has covered admirably). Those remarks, I concede, paint a different picture of Luther's attitude towards the relationship of music to text. But in those remarks, Luther never discussed music aesthetically, and instead treated music as little more than a pragmatic aid to text-retention. I do not believe it is meaningful, then, to include them in an assessment of his aesthetics or of his musical thought, simply because they might be included in his musical remarks.[501]

If Luther's aesthetic of music is wary of *ratio* and distrusting of verbal rhetoric, then it is manifestly impossible to use it as evidence for a shift in the paradigm of *musica* from a generally quadrivial *scientia* to a generally rhetorical *Affektenlehre*. If we accept that the sixteenth century witnessed a reconceptualization of music from *numerus sonorus* to the *seconda pratica*, then we must also accept that, fleeing the sort of rhetorical subservience to textual models that the *stile moderno* advocated, Luther's musical thought ran contrary to the trajectory of that development. By contrast, Luther's understanding of music as a means by which dialectics and paradoxes are mediated must be considered tantamount to that aesthetic of juxtaposition with which Margaret Bent has characterized a *late mediæval* musical style.[502]

[501] A similar case might be made for the observations of today's art-film music composers' observations on composing music for TV jingles, for example. The latter would not be considered relevant to such composers' defining aesthetic.

[502] BENT, 'Grammar and Rhetoric in Late Medieval Polyphony', p. 62.

This, in turn, means that, if we consider the shift to a logological paradigm for *musica* to be the instigator of musical modernity (as do Niemöller, Gurlitt, Zenck, Bartel, and others), then *Luther must be described as a resistor to modernization*. Indeed, we must conclude that his musical thought was conspicuously old-fashioned in its reliance on old theological categories, its preference for dialectic over rhetoric, and its engagement with faith as a necessary criterion of its efficacy in the face of humanist assertions to the contrary. Although it is highly idiosyncratic and by no means representative of any wider epoch, it is my conviction that Luther's musical thought is best addressed in terms of his late mediæval predecessors' theology, than it is in terms of his Renaissancist and modern successors' aesthetics. It might be helpful for musicologists to recast Luther in the same mold their ecclesiastical historian-colleagues have: as a 'medieval man'.

CHAPTER V

MUSIC IN THE THOUGHT OF LUTHER'S GERMAN THEOLOGICAL OPPONENTS, 1523–49

Was Luther's musical thought representative of that of other sixteenth-century German theologians'? Can we characterize musical thought of the early German Reformation period as basically mediæval in shape? We cannot, any more than we can characterize it as basically humanistic in intention. To do so would artificially homogenize the musical thought of a period in which remarkable diversity in the conceptualization of *musica* was displayed.

Instinctive attempts to globalize this or that thinker's contribution to the development of musical thought as if it spoke for an entire generation are often indicative of ignorance of other thinkers' contributions. The musical thought of Luther and the music theorists of Rhau's generation has been thoroughly scrutinized, but discussions of music in texts not explicitly pertaining either to music or liturgical practice from this period have been consistently overlooked in musicological studies. Given that the early sixteenth century is often characterized as a period of intellectual-historical 'transition' or 'upheaval' in which a heady cocktail of conflicting ideas, methodologies, and assumptions reoriented Western thought towards modernity, it is perhaps all the more surprising that musical discourse outside the conventional texts has not been analysed.

For the early German Reformation years constituted a period of extraordinary intellectual creativity, challenge, and clarification. The theological and philosophical 'bottom line' of the Tridentine Council had not yet been set down; and humanist scholarship had been neither decisively accepted nor rejected by either those on the Romanist side or those of the many Protestant factions. Confessionalization had not fully entrenched a division between 'Catholic' and 'Protestant' in the way it would do a generation later; and the demarcation of musical thought from wider questions of civic governance, social harmony, and philosophical idealism had not yet been fully effected.

In amongst all these competing intellectual currents, a propaganda war for the soul of Germany was being waged. In this chapter we shall assess the treatment of music as a concept by four prolific writers against Luther and his theology—Johannes Cochlaeus, Conrad Wimpina, Johann Eck, and Georg Witzel—and contrast their approaches to that of both Luther and the conventional (homuncular) figure of the early sixteenth-century musical thinker presented by some modern-day scholars. I shall argue that their ideas about music and its aesthetics were subordinated entirely to their theological polemic, and that when they made claims for music's conceptualization they did so purely for ideological reasons. Moreover, I shall note that, since their polemic served divergent ends, their treatments of music were also sharply divergent according to ideological need.

1. THE CONTEXTS FOR REFORMATION AND ANTI-REFORMATION DISCOURSE

The contingencies of Reformation-era theological debate shaped the Romanists' contributions to it. The Romanist polemicists were *respondents* to ideas proposed by Luther, and as such were never able to set the terms of the debate to which they contributed. Furthermore, after Luther's

excommunication any writer finding in favour of Luther's teachings was liable to excommunication himself; with the exception of the very earliest controversial responses to Luther's writings, therefore, the Romanists' responses were overwhelmingly polemical, to the extent that they were unlikely to have won over any readers besides those who already agreed with them.[503]

For all this, however, Luther's opponents did pay serious attention to his proposals. The process of the Augustinian's gradual exclusion from the church was such that his theology was picked apart by those at the highest levels on successive occasions. After the publication of the Ninety-Five Theses in 1517,[504] Luther was declared by the church authorities first to be suspected of heresy,[505] and then—when the young friar had not offered a clarification—a formal accusation of heresy followed from the Emperor. This initiated a process of formal inquisition by the papal legate, Tomasso Card. Cajetan, at the Diet of Augsburg in 1518, who, whilst finding in favour of several of the principles behind Luther's theses, judged that the Wittenberger's subsequent sermons placed him outside the bounds of the church's teaching. For a brief period—between the end of 1518 and June 1520—Luther was considered heretical but technically correctable, and in the intervening period Johann Eck, professor of theology at the University of Ingolstadt, arranged a major disputation with Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt, Luther's senior colleague at Wittenberg who was widely considered to be his theological disciple.[506]

[503] Often the early Romanist polemicists were faced with a dilemma: either reject Luther's argumentation piecemeal, requiring an exposition of Luther's proposals which would grant them an even wider hearing, or refer to them in a circumspect and less convincing manner. H. EMSER, *Auff Luthers grewel wider die heiligen Stillmess* (1525), chose the former, and in so doing arguably did more harm than good to the Catholic reception of the secret Mass in the late 1520s.

[504] Luther maintained, in early correspondence with his immediate superiors and with the pope, that he had never intended for the Theses to be published; he consistently argued that if he had intended for their widespread dissemination as some of his detractors claimed, he would not have published them in scholarly Latin (*WA* i:527–9). Nevertheless, the Theses were published, printed and circulated in both Latin and translation remarkably quickly, turning what might have amounted to little more than an internal disagreement between a German friar and Rome into a major public relations crisis for the church.

[505] By Prierias (Sylvester Mazzolini, Pope Leo X's personal theologian). BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, pp. 21–2.

[506] The disputation lasted from 27 June–4 July 1519. On the relationship between Luther and Karlstadt and its relevance to the disputation method preferred by Luther, see MCGRATH, *The Intellectual Origins*, pp. 58–66. On

(cont.)

After several days of disputation in which Eck's intellect outpaced Karlstadt's, Luther himself replaced Karlstadt for the final disputed thesis (the thirteenth; on the Petrine primacy), and proved a more even match for Eck.[507] Nevertheless, Eck was unpersuaded and, after rumours circulated that the University of Paris was to adjudicate in his favour against Luther, he set out to Rome to press for Luther's immediate excommunication.[508] The bull excommunicating the heresiarch, *Exsurge Domine*, was issued by Leo X on 15 June 1520, and the responsibility for enforcing it in Saxony was given over to Eck.[509] The bull gave Luther several months in which to recant, during which time it was forbidden to enter into disputation with him. On 10 December 1520, the period for recantation expired; on that day Luther burned his copy of the bull at Wittenberg, along with copies of canon law texts. The following month, a second bull, *Decet Romanum Pontificem*, was published from Rome, declaring Luther an unrepentant heretic.

After the publication of *Decet Romanum Pontificem*, however, there was no longer any point in trying to convince Luther to change his mind. What was now important was demonstrating, sometimes in painstaking detail, that Luther was wrong and that Rome was the only arbiter of the Catholic faith. When making the case against Luther required hyperbole, misleading attributions, and *ad hominem* attacks, the Romanists were happy to oblige; after all, the souls of a nation were

(cont.)

Karlstadt's personal stance, see R.J. SIDER, *Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt: The Development of His Thought: 1517–1525,* Leiden, 1974. Eck is widely considered to have been a friend of Luther before 1519 (BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, p. 22). Luther had sent theses against Pelagianism to Eck in 1517 since, as someone with doubts about scholastic methodology frequently associated with the heresy, he expected the Ingolstadter professor to hold similar views. Eck's scholarly opinion, however, was to reject Luther's theses (*Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam*, *WA* i:224–28; *LW* xxxi:9–16), in his *Obelisci* of 1518 (republ. in *WA* i:281–314).

[507] Luther subsequently published an explanation of his argument in the thirteenth disputation with Eck in his *Acta Augustana* (*WA* ii:183–240). For an introductory account of the Leipzig Disputation, see W.R. ESTEP, *Renaissance and Reformation*, Grand Rapids, MI, 1986, pp. 124–7. On the public relations campaign waged in open letters by both sides in the Leipzig Disputation before and after 1519, see L. ROPER, '"To his Most Learned and Dearest Friend": Reading Luther's Letters', *German History*, XXVIII (2010), 283–95, esp. 285–91.

[508] See OBERMAN, *Forerunners of the Reformation*, pp. 24–6. The decision on the winner of the Leipzig Disputation was contracted to the Universities of Paris and Erfurt immediately upon the completion of the contest, but the Erfurt faculty subsequently refused to adjudicate, and the Paris faculty never declared its opinion formally.

[509] There is no biography of Eck in English; the standard text is ISERLOH, *Johannes Eck (1486–1543): Scholastiker Humanist Kontroverstheologe*, Münster-Westfalen, 1981, which classifies Eck as a hybrid scholastic-humanist. M. ZIEGELBAUER, *Johannes Eck: Mann der Kirche im Zeitalter der Glaubensspaltung*, St. Ottilien, 1987, is also useful.

at stake. It is often concluded that, in spite of their attempts, the Romanists 'lost' the pamphlet war, since much of Germany converted to Protesantism, and that their 'defeat' could be blamed upon their lack of engagement with the propaganda campaign waged by the Reformers. But this conclusion is erroneous, because the Romanists were nothing if not forthright in their condemnation. More than 350 authors published nearly 3,500 titles *against* Luther over the course of the sixteenth century,[510] a figure so large that if Luther's own writings are ignored, then the Romanist publications may actually have exceeded reformist publications in number during Luther's lifetime.[511] Anti-Lutheran polemic was a massive literary genre.

In 1520 and 1521 Luther published several judgements that would have concrete consequences for the musical life of the Western church (on the Eucharist, monastic vows, and the saints),[512] drawing music and musical discussion into the scope of anti-Lutheran controversies. That Luther sought the closure of religious communities in Germany, reasoned his opponents, obviously meant that he despised the sung prayers that formed the daily routine of enclosed religious; that he rejected the Roman Mass *ordo* on account of its sacrificial nature led most traditionalists to believe that the Reformer wanted to outlaw the Eucharist itself, too.[513] In the latter case, of course, Luther proved his critics wrong, maintaining the vast majority of the Roman liturgy and

[510] W. KLAIBER, *Katholische Kontroverstheologen und Reformer des 16. Jahrhunderts: Ein Werkverzeichnis* Münster-Westfalen, 1978; cit. BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, p. 1 and n. 3. Bagchi notes that these figures 'exclude the entire corpora of such prolific figures as Canisius, Cochlaeus, Eck, Ellenbog, Erasmus, Loyola, and More, on the grounds that their writings have already been adequately catalogued'.

[511] R.A. CROFTS, 'Books, Reform and the Reformation', *SCJ*, XVI (1985), 369–81, cit. BAGCHI, ibid., p. 1. By contrast, when impressions rather than titles are considered and Luther's writings are factored back into the equation, reformers outpublished Romanists more than five times over.

[512] In particular, the *Verklärung D. Martin Luthers… von dem heiligen Sakrament* (*WA* vi:78–83), the *Ad schedulam inhibitionis… de sacramento eucharistiae* (*WA* vi:144–53), *Eyn Sermon von dem newen Testament* (*WA* vi:353–78), *De abroganda missa privata* (*WA* viii:482–563; trans. into German as *Vom Misbrauch der Messen* [*WA* viii:411–76]), and *De votis monasticis Martini Lutheri iudicium* (*WA* viii:573–669), which followed a number of sermons condemning monastic orders and vows.

[513] With the exception of the Cologne Archdiocese, which followed its own rite until the Tridentine *ordo* was imposed, all German states used the Roman rite in the first half of the sixteenth century. But many opponents expected the Lutheran Mass to be much more than a new *ordo*, and rather a dismissal of the *whole* Eucharist. M. SLEGEL, *Was nützung enntspring von den falschen Lutherischen Catzen* (1523), fol. Aii^{v}, for example, noted that the Lutherans 'propose to introduce a "German mass", for which little enthusiasm will be found. They also propose that the holy sacrament be received daily… the mass will be revered by Mr and Mrs Bloggs as an ordinary meal'. Cit. and trans. BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, p. 172.

excising from it only the offertory.[514] In the case of monastic orders, meanwhile, Luther's Romanist opponents extrapolated correctly his fundamental position.

The need to provide arguments against the perceived Lutheran animosity towards the Mass and the actual Lutheran animosity towards the religious life moved the focus of Luther's earliest Romanist opponents to areas in which music and musical thought was a component concern. Their invocation of matters musical in their critiques of the Reformer's theology, however, was not limited to liturgical discussion; as we shall see, musical difference came increasingly to serve in their polemic as a rhetorical trope for theological heterodoxy. This alone ought to attract our attention, since the analogy of theological orthodoxy with musical orthodoxy dates back to at least Plato, and it has been comparatively neglected in systematic musicological studies.

That reformed musical practices—which remained undefined and variable during the early decades[515]—were not the focus of the Romanists' polemic goes some way towards explaining why modern-day scholarship has overlooked the controversial and polemical literary corpora in constructing a view of Reformation-era musical thought in Germany. But it also illustrates the importance of a proper investigation of the way in which music *was* invoked by Catholic writers in their anti-Lutheran writings, because of what such invocations represent: attempts to strong-arm the musical sensibilities of Catholic readers into service against theological innovations.

Four case-studies will serve to map out the terrain.

[514] Cf. *LW* liii:20–30, *WA* xii:206–13.

[515] Wide variations in liturgical practice represent only the most obvious distinctions in local musical practice amongst different reformed congregations. Katharina Schütz Zell (*c.*1498–1562), for example, married to the leading reformer Matthias Zell and a Reformation leader in her own right in Calvinist-influenced Strasbourg, encouraged women to sing psalms in public worship (see E.A. McKee, 'Context, Contours, Contents: Towards a Description of the Classical Reformed Teaching on Worship', *Princeton Seminary Bulletin*, XVI (1995), 172–201). R. Wagner, 'Wilhelm Breitengraser und die Nürnburger Kirchen- und Schulmusik seiner Zeit', found evidence in the Nuremberger Ratsverlaß that women's singing was not completely unknown there before the Reformation (170–1); but von Günzburg, *Wolfaria* (1521), the first Protestant utopia, expressly forbade women's public singing in the ideal-world of Wolfaria, an injunction which suggests the author had encountered women leading singing in church in the real world.

2. MAKING MUSIC A THEOLOGICAL METAPHOR: JOHANNES COCHLAEUS

That no central authority dictated the polemicists' publications means that isolating a single, 'party line' in their theology is an impossible task. Some sought to respond to specific issues raised by Luther; others sought to demolish his theological edifice piece-by-piece. One polemicist, Johannes Cochlaeus (1479–1552), was a prolific contributor to anti-Reformation literature who turned almost every literary form to the service of destroying the Reformation; his last work—his *magnum opus*—succeeded in doing lasting damage to the Reformer's reputation on account of its distinctive methodology. After initially attempting to act as a mediator for reconciliation between Luther and Rome, Cochlaeus came to the conclusion following the Diet of Worms that Luther was incorrigible.[516] Effectively opting himself out of the ongoing project of persuasive polemic,[517] Cochlaeus focused his work instead on a lengthy and vitriolic biography of Luther designed to prove one thing: Martin Luther was the spawn of the devil. It was eventually published in 1549[518] as the *Commentary on the Acts and Writings of Martin Luther the Saxon*,[519] and—though it had little impact on the course of theological reform in Germany or in post-Tridentine Rome—was relied upon as the principal source-text for Catholic Luther studies until Adolf Herte demonstrated from within the Catholic constituency in 1935 that Cochlaeus' commentary was too polemical to be treated as 'history' in the modern sense.[520]

[516] Cochlaeus was involved with the Diets of Worms (1521), Speyer (1526/29), Augsburg (1530) and Regensburg (1541). See BÄUMER, *Johannes Cochlaeus, (1479–1552): Leben und Werk im Dienst der katholischen Reform*, Münster-Westfalen, 1980, and M. SAMUEL-SCHEYDER, *Johannes Cochlaeus: Humaniste et adversaire de Luther*, Nancy, 1993; rev. ed. in German, *Johannes Cochlaeus aus Wendelstein: ein Humanistenleben in der Herausforderung seiner Zeit*, Heimbach, 2009, each of which leads the field of Cochlaeus biography in its respective area of emphasis. In English, R. KEEN, 'Johannes Cochlaeus: An Introduction to His Life and Work', provides a good introduction.

[517] KEEN, ibid., pp. 45–8.

[518] The majority of the text was completed by 1534; only much later were further, shorter chapters added to cover later years. 'Introduction' to VANDIVER et al., *Luther's Lives*, p. 3.

[519] J. COCHLAEUS [i.e. Dob(e)neck], *Commentaria Ioannis Cochlaei, de Actis et Scriptis Martini Lutheri Saxonis* (1549). The main body of the *Commentaria* (but not the prefatory material, sig. a♠^{r}–c♣iiij^{v}) has been translated by Elizabeth Vandiver, in VANDIVER et al., *Luther's Lives*, pp. 53–351.

[520] A. HERTE, *Die Lutherkommentare des Johannes Cochläus*, Münster-Westfalen, 1935. The study was broadened in 1943 as *Das katholische Lutherbild im Bann der Lutherkommentare des Cochläus*, 3 vols., Münster-Westfalen, 1943.

5.2.1 Cochlaeus' Polemical Intentions

Cochlaeus' intention was to demonstrate the incoherence of Lutheran theology, and through the disorder of the Lutheran programme of theological reform, to show that Luther was possessed by the devil (the father of disorder). *Non ex Deo*, wrote Cochlaeus of Luther, *sed ex Diabolo sit*.[521] The position was powerfully enunciated and iconized in a work published in 1529, entitled *Sieben Köpffe Martini Luthers* ('The Seven Heads of Martin Luther'),[522] in which Luther's different 'personalities' or 'heads' are set against one another to demonstrate the overall disorderliness of his theology, a not-so-subtle allusion to the 'seven-headed beast' of the Antichrist in Rev. 12–13.[523] The title page of Cochlaeus' publication included a woodcut by Hans Brosamer of the *Septiceps* (reproduced in Figure V.1, overleaf) which was copied in broadsides throughout the sixteenth century. The image made the author's point far more forcefully than did his writing.[524] Cochlaeus' iconography of Luther's disorderliness was a stroke of genius. Rather than simply establishing that Luther was anti-Christian, Cochlaeus sought to heighten the rhetorical force of his assertions by *metaphorizing*, and then *iconizing* them. Acutely aware of the political ramifications of his writings,[525] Cochlaeus understood that metaphoriziong and iconizing his point as in his *Septiceps* not only made his argument much more accessible to readers,[526] but also permitted him to prove his arguments without recourse to theological arguments. Brosamer's woodcut makes the same point as Cochlaeus' text, by means of a memorable and obvious

[521] LORTZ, *The Reformation in Germany*, I, pp. 296–7.

[522] Leipzig, 1529.

[523] See the essays in P. NEWMAN BROOKS (ED.), *The Seven-headed Luther: Essays in Commemoration of a Quincentenary*, Oxford, 1983, esp. that by Leif Grane.

[524] See H. OELKE, *Die Konfessionsbildung des 16. Jahrhunderts im Spiegel illustrierter Flugblätter*, pp. 263–4.

[525] Especially with regards to Melanchthon's scholarship, which Cochlaeus objected to on the grounds of its political content, and not its theological content. See KEEN, 'The Arguments and Audiences of Cochlaeus's *Philippica VII*', *Catholic Historical Review*, LXXVIII (1992), 371–94.

[526] Indeed, not just readers. Literacy in Reformation-era Germany is generally reckoned at around 10%; the *Flugschriften* and their title pages (broadsides) were frequently intended to convey the message of their contents pictorially. For a discussion, see the impeccably-titled study by BAGCHI, 'Poets, Peasants, and Pamphlets: Who Wrote and Who Read Reformation Flugschriften?' *SCH*, XLII (2006), 189–96.

Figure V.1 '*Septiceps Lutherus*'
COCHLAEUS, *Sieben Köpffe Martini Luthers* (1529)

syllogism: Luther has seven contradictory personalities, the Antichrist has seven heads, therefore Luther is the Antichrist.

Cochlaeus invoked musical terminology in his polemic in the hope that it would perform a similar function to Brosamer's woodcut. Talking about Luther's incompatibility with historic belief in musical terms enabled Cochlaeus to thematize and metaphorize Luther's heresy, and then—via the internal logic of his metaphor—to reject heresy without recourse to detailed theological proofs. What better way to thematize and metaphorize the objective disorder of Lutheran theology than to equate it with disorder that one could *hear*? What better way to suggest that Luther's theology was devilish than to liken it to the *diabolus in musica*—dissonance?

> No heresy has infected or roamed the globe as widely or as damagingly as Arianism. It has had as defenders and supporters the most powerful princes, the Roman emperors Constantine, Julian and Valens, as well as the belligerent kings of the mightiest of tribes: of the Vandals, Ostrogoths and Visigoths, Genseric, Thrasamund, Huneric, Alaric, Theoderic, Totila, and so on. And yet in truth the Arians had far fewer falsehoods in their doctrine, and held far fewer beliefs dissonant to the Catholic faith, than this sect of Luther's does. The Lutherans are so much more dissonant with the faith and doctrine of the Catholic Church that they not only disorder the wholesome teaching, godly rites and ancient ceremonies of the holy fathers, but go further still and disorder all the sacraments, either by changing them for the worse, or by abolishing them altogether.[527]

He elaborated:

> The particular struggle of the Arians against the Catholics was concerning the Son of God, whom they supposed not to be homoousios, that is, consubstantial with the Father. Luther struggles against the Church with the same unholy cry [as the Arians] not only concerning the doctrine of the homoousia: for does he not also [struggle] against the seven sacraments, against the primacy of the papacy, against the Mass, against the doctrine of purgatorial cleansing, against ceremonies, against relics of the dead, against whatever might arouse strife, either old or maliciously reinvigorated? And on top of the dissonance of his doctrine, he adds many [errors] besides, in every realm of the Church…[528]

[527] COCHLAEUS, *Commentaria*, fol. C♣ij^{r}: 'Nulla quidem haeresis aut latius aut violentius per orbem vagata atque grassata est, quam Arriana: Quae potentissimos Principes, Imperatores Romanos, Constantium, Iulianumque & Valentem, atque etiam fortissimarum gentium Vandalorum, Ostrogothorum, & Vuisigothorum, Reges bellicosos, Gensericum, Trasimundum, Hunericum, Alaricum, Theodericum, Totilam etc. habuit defensores ac propugnatores. Verum tamen secta illa longe pauciores habuit in doctrina sua reprobos, & à fide Catholica dissonos articulos, quam habet haec secta Lutheri. Quae usque adeo dissonant ab Ecclesiae Catholicae fide & doctrina, ut non solum turbet sanam sanctorum patrum doctrinam, piosque ritus & antiquas Caeremonias: Verum etiam cuncta Ecclesiae Sacramenta, aut in peius mutet, aut penitus aboleat.'

[528] Fols. C♣ij^{r-v}: 'Praecipua Arrianorum contentio contra Catholicos erat de Filio Dei, quod non esset Homousius, hoc est, consubstantialis Patri: Lutherus non solum de Homousio, tanquam de prophana voce, contra Ecclesiam contendit: verum etiam de septem Sacramentis, de summo Pontificatu, de Missa, de Purgatorio igne, de

(cont.)

The force of Cochlaeus' musical analogy is all the stronger if we recall that, as well as being 'perhaps Martin Luther's most prolific and fierce Catholic literary opponent',[529] Cochlaeus was also one of early sixteenth-century Germany's most prominent musical thinkers. Educated at the University of Cologne at the turn of the sixteenth century, he published two music treatises there before the end of the decade (the previously unattributed Cologne treatise of 1500 reprinted in 1504,[530] and the much more widely disseminated *De Musica* of 1507,[531] from which several of Cochlaeus' pedagogical compositions were borrowed by his pupil Heinrich Glarean in the *ΔΩΔΕΚΑΧΟΡΔΟΝ* of 1547).[532] Thereafter (in 1510) Cochlaeus went to Nuremberg, to become Rector of the St Lorenzschule, where a year later he published his important *isagoge* on music theory, the *Tetrachordum Musices*.[533] After 1511 Cochlaeus published no further works on music theory, and it has been suggested by some that it might be misleading to consider him a music theorist 'in the narrow sense of the term'—particularly since he was so prolific as a polemicist whose strident theological position might compromise an independent reading of his music theory.[534] But to conclude that Cochlaeus should effectively be divided into two people (Cochlaeus the music theorist-humanist; Cochlaeus the old-fashioned polemicist) is predicated upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the unity of Cochlaeus' output. To Cochlaeus, 'music

(cont.)

Caeremonijs, de Exequijs mortuorum, de quo autem non novas aut male renovatas exuscitat lites? Et ultra doctrinae dissonantiam, superaddit plurima in omnem statum Ecclesiasticum continua…'

[529] MARIUS, Review of Cochlaeus' Philippicae I–VII in a new ed. by Ralph Keen, *SCJ*, XXVIII (1997), 50–51.

[530] SACHS, 'Cochlaeus', col. 1297.

[531] COCHLAEUS, *De Musica*, Cologne, 1507; Nuremberg, 1511. According to MILLER, 'Cochlaeus', p. 78, the 1504 edition of the anonymous publication included 'plainsong notes … hand drawn on printed staves'; by the time of the 1507 *Musica* Cologne printers had evidently mastered the woodcutting of musical notation, as the black notes are printed.

[532] H. GLAREAN, *ΔΩΔΕΚΑΧΟΡΔΟΝ* [*Dodecachordon*], Basel, 1547. Cf. also C.C. JUDD, *Reading Renaissance Music Theory: Hearing with the Eyes*, p. 132, Table 5.1A. Cochlaeus and Glarean remained in contact well after their teacher-pupil relationship had matured. E.g. the letter from Cochlaeus to Glarean in COCHLAEUS, *Catalogus brevis eorum quae contra novas sectas scripsit Ioannes Cochlaeus*, Mainz, 1549, fols. Bvi^{v}–Bvij^{v}.

[533] COCHLAEUS, *Tetrachordum Musices*, Nuremberg, 1511.

[534] This is the position taken in L. SCHRADE, 'Johannes Cochlaeus, Musiktheoretiker in Köln', p. 127. Schrade does not discuss the 1507 *De Musica*, nor the anonymous treatise of 1500/04, so it may well be the case that he was relying on only the *Tetrachordum* in his assessment of the significance of music theory for Cochlaeus' wider thought.

was only [ever] an instrument, an intellectual prop serving higher ends'.[535] Cochlaeus under both guises was the same man, with the same intellect; his late writings represent a development, and not a rejection, of ideas expressed in his earlier writings.

5.2.2 Cochlaeus on Dissonance

He knew very well, then, when he accused the Lutherans of being 'dissonant', that in contemporary mensural music theory, *dissonantia* was both required and, when properly handled, even considered beautiful. But Cochlaeus conspicuously ignored this (music-theoretical) possibility in extracting the concept of *dissonantia* from the music-theoretical lexicon and using it as a metaphor in his theology. Shorn of its mensural-theory nuances and gradations, Cochlaeus preferred to import the black-and-white opposition between *dissonantia* and *consonantia* still maintained in chant theory.[536]

This is a mark of intellectual independence on Cochlaeus' part, and a sign of the complete subordination of musical terminology to theological ideology in his polemic. For, whilst the use of 'dissonance' terminology to describe social or intellectual discord was not original to Cochlaeus (Augustine had done the same),[537] the reference to *dissonantia* without the inevitability of a positive resolution was. The conventional aphorism 'harmonia est discordia concors', which was an *idée fixe* in texts on civic governance (Plato's *Republic*, Aristotle's *Politics*, Cicero's *Republic* and Augustine's *City of God*) repeated by the early proponents of the *studia*

[535] SCHRADE, ibid, p. 131: 'Ihm selbst war die Musik … nur ein Instrument, ein adminiculum, das höheren Zwecken diente'. On Cochlaeus' thought more generally, cf. BÄUMER, 'Johannes Cochlaeus und die Reform der Kirche', in *Reformatio Ecclesiae: Beiträge zu kirchlichen Reformbemühungen von der Alten Kirche bis zur Neuzeit. Festschrift für Edwin Iserloh,* Paderborn, 1980, pp. 333–54.

[536] In the context of mensural theory, 'the notion of a continuum stretching from consonance to dissonance prevails throughout the Middle Ages and Renaissance' (R. CROCKER, 'Discant, Counterpoint, and Harmony', 3); the same cannot be said about chant theory. The author of the thirteenth-century *Summa Musice* was clear about the impossibility of a 'good' dissonance in chant theory: 'Pairings of hexachord degrees which do not constitute any of the nine intervals described above [i.e. consonances] are rightly avoided by a trained musician; they are not the genuine material of melody but produce a hateful dissonance and are rightly judged hostile to the aim of music.' (C. PAGE, *The Summa Musice: A Thirteenth-Century Manual for Singers*, Cambridge, 1991, p. 56.)

[537] AUGUSTINE, *De Conf.* 10.33.49.

humanitatis,[538] presupposes that two dissonant ideas are the prerequisites for the social harmony of a city. As a conventionalized metaphor, then, the discordance of *dissonantia* is merely the beginning of a process of harmonization.

In Cochlaeus' use of the term *dissonantia* this conventional resonance is flatly ignored—indeed, virtually the opposite of it is implied. Cochaleus' rejection of the prevalent metaphorical nuance of *dissonantia*, as well as his deflection of the original music-theoretical nuances of the term, is a sign of his single-minded subordination of all discourse to the service of his ideological goals. Cochlaeus picked his musical metaphor on the basis of what he wanted to exemplify; nuance was not on his radar. The binary opposition between *dissonantia* and *consonantia* in chant theory is imported; no other possible interpretations are admitted.

Cochaleus' chant theory was expounded in the first book of his *Tetrachordum*, where he answered his own question 'What is dissonance?' with the response 'It is the nasty and unpleasant grating of two sounds arriving at the ear, clashing with one another'.[539] Providing a helpful visual aid, Cochlaeus iconized consonances and dissonances on a ten-line staff (see Figure V.2, overleaf), a pictorialization which did not appear in his earlier *De Musica*, but the drawing of which had apparently, by the time of Ornithoparcus' *Micrologus* of 1517, become a standard elementary exercise for students of music.[540] In the diagram, perfect and imperfect consonances are separated visually from dissonances. The distinction permits for no 'grey area' between consonance and dissonance, and the description of 'nasty and unpleasant' sounds which are 'clashing' leaves no room for the idea that certain dissonances on certain occasions might be considered charming.

[538] CUMMING, 'Concord out of Discord', pp. 6–8.

[539] COCHLAEUS, *Tetrachordum*, fol. Aiij^{r}: 'Quid est dissonantia? Est duorum sonorum sibimet impermixtorum ad aures pervenientium, aspera et iniocunda collisio'.

[540] ORNITHOPARCUS, *Musice active Micrologus* (1517), fol. Lij^{v}; BUSH, 'The Recognition of Chordal Formation by Early Music Theorists', 324.



Figure V.2 COCHLAEUS, *Tetrachordum Musices*, from fol. Aiij^{v}.

Three pages later in his *Tetrachordum*, Cochlaeus extended his analysis of consonance to include semitonic intervals, offering a small depiction of each on a five-line staff (reproduced from woodcuts cut for his earlier treatise) and a short explanatory note.[541] In this chapter, the only interval Cochlaeus explicitly described as *dissonantia* is the semidiapason, even though he doubtless considered others among them to be dissonant.[542] He wrote:

> What is the semidiapason? It is the interval made up of four tones and three semitones: it appears similar to the diapason in that it has the same letter names, when mi [that is B natural] and fa [that is, B flat] are placed at opposite ends. Hence it is a dissonance.[543]

[541] COCHLAEUS, *Tetrachordum*, fols. Aiiij^{v}–Av^{r}.

[542] This is presumably because, unlike other *dissonantiae*, the semidiapason *looks* like a consonance.

[543] COCHLAEUS, *Tetrachordum*, fol. Av^{r}: 'Quid est Semidiapason? Spacium constans ex quatuor tonis ac tribus semitoniis: fit quoque vt diapason in eadem littera, quando mi ponitur contra fa. Est proinde dissonantia.'

The semidiapason is beguiling, on account of its 'spelling': it appears to be consonant, but is in sounding the most unpleasant dissonance. We might speculate that this interval was uppermost in Cochlaeus' mind when he applied the terminology of *dissonantia* to Lutheran theology—a theology by which, at the time of Cochlaeus' writing, many had already been 'beguiled'.

There are three conclusions to be drawn from Cochlaeus' labelling of Lutheran theology as dissonant, and from his deliberate exclusion of mensural-theory nuances in the concept of *dissonantia* he imagined. First, Cochlaeus intended, by his term *dissonantia*, to clearly divide Lutherans from the orthodox, and to make clear that the two are ontologically different. Certain intervals—of which the semidiapason is perhaps the pre-eminent—simply *are* dissonant. The metaphor makes clear that the same is true of Lutherans. They simply *are* heretics; the designation is natural to them; there is no 'grey area'.

Second, Cochlaeus' description of the semidiapason reveals what resolution will, in his opinion, dispense with the problem of theological dissonance. The case of the semidiapason is similar to that problem raised by Luther in his *Tischreden* N^os.^ 816 and 2996, discussed above, on pp. 184–5, in that it occurs when *an error of judgement* is made by singers on account of unclarity surrounding whether B fa mi ought to be sung as B mi or B fa. It can never occur in *musica recta*.[544] Only one of the Bs is correct; the other is dissonant because the singer has transposed to the wrong hexachord. Whenever such a case arises in practice, dissonant singers are faced with

[544] Cochlaeus' example of the semidiapason makes this point graphically, requiring the invention of a new, double-B clef-signature (*Tetrachordum*, fol. Av^r^, fig. P):

two options: either one singer must correct his note to match that of the other and thereby erase the dissonance, or one singer must stop singing his note altogether.[545]

Cochlaeus is making exactly this point about Lutheran doctrine. As with a dissonant B occurring as a result of incorrect hexachordal transposition, Cochlaeus considers there to be only two solutions to the problem of Lutheran heresy. Either they must recant, and fall back into line with 'the faith and doctrine of the Catholic church', or they must be silenced. There is no possibility of reconciliation, since (just as the mistaken singer is in the *wrong* hexachord) the Lutherans are objectively, theologically *wrong*.

The third conclusion we can draw is inferred from the presumption that, like the semidiapason, not all musical dissonances *appear* to be dissonant in advance; some are stumbled upon, and others wear all the clothing of a consonance but because of hexachordal transposition fail to materialize as one. It may be the case that Cochlaeus is intending to suggest that, at first sight, Lutheranism appears reasonable or even consonant with orthodox doctrine. (Cochlaeus' biography suggests that he himself might once have so thought.) Like the semidiapason, however, such apparent consonance cloaks only the 'nasty and unpleasant' 'grating' of heresy.

[545] To be clear: what is in Cochlaeus' mind is a relatively straightforward example of hexachordal error, probably in simple counterpoint. O.L. REES, 'Singing Sweetly to the Virgin: Josquin's *Inviolata*', in M. Gragnolati and A. Suerbaum, eds., *Aspects of the Performative in Medieval Culture*, Berlin, 2010, pp. 199–219, proposes that Josquin intentionally engineered situations in which singers were forced into a semidiapason unless they had agreed beforehand what hexachord to prefer at certain moments. It goes without saying that Cochlaeus did not intend to refer to such a situation; the case was very clear cut for him. Luther was a heretic; and the church Catholic was infallibly orthodox.

5.2.3 Dissonance and The Confessio Augustana

The force of Cochlaeus' understanding of dissonance, together with his repeated insistence that Lutheran doctrine and belief is 'dissonant', is doubled when we observe that one of the central ideas behind the peace-making (but doomed) Augsburg Confession of 1530—presented to a team of Catholic negotiators (including Cochlaeus) by Melanchthon's surrogates, and rejected by them—was that of *adiaphora*.[546] This idea, of things 'indifferent' to the proper faith and order of the church, borrowed (in Melanchthon's case) from Stoic philosophy, was meant as a means of separating out what the Reformers considered first-order issues on which agreement had to be reached (e.g. the doctrine of justification by faith alone) and second-order issues on which Catholics and reformists could agree to disagree (e.g. the primacy of the pope, or the use of vestments in service). These second-order issues Melanchthon proposed to be *adiaphorous*—things neither required by scripture nor forbidden by it—in an attempt to reduce the distance between Lutherans and their Romanist opponents and to clarify different types of disagreement.[547]

The language in which the concept of *adiaphora* was introduced into the *Confessio Augustana* was borrowed from Irenaeus, and was thoroughly musical: *et Irenaeus inquit: dissonantia ieiunii fidei consonantiam non solvit* ('dissonance [i.e. disagreement] about fasting does not dissolve the greater consonance of the faith').[548] Cochlaeus knew the Augsburg Confession as a document very well, describing it and his personal interaction with it in the year 1530 on pp. 207–17 of his

[546] The term (borrowed from ancient Greek philosophy) is not present in the *Confessio Augustana*, only coming into use with the Leipzig Interim of 1548. But the concept was familiar to Melanchthon much earlier from both his mediæval inheritance and his research in ancient philosophy; it lies behind most of his defence of the Articles of the *Confessio* (cf. esp. *Apologia* on Articles XV, 1–3, XXVI, 40–43, XXVIII, 55–6).

[547] The concept was no more clearly defined than it was popular amongst Lutherans. See M. FRIEDRICH, 'Orthodoxy and Variation: The Role of Adiaphorism in Early Modern Protestantism', in R.C. Head and D. Christensen (eds.), *Orthodoxies and Heterodoxies in Early Modern German Culture: Order and Creativity, 1550–1750*, Leiden, 2007, pp. 45–68.

[548] The discussion actually occurs in the context of Article XXVI, concerning the consumption of certain meats, which St Paul (I Cor. 8) proposes as an example of the way in which exercising Gospel-freedoms might compromise the spiritual liberty of a fellow believer, and argues that non-binding doctrinal decisions ought to be held lightly. The Article uses St Paul's 'Distinction of Meats' as a test-case for second-order issues.

Commentaria (sig. Sij^{r}–T^{r}). It is highly likely that his assertion of Lutheran 'dissonance' alluded to this proposal for *adiaphora*.[549] The very practices the Augsburg Confession sought to classify as adiaphorous were those named as *dissonantiae* by Cochlaeus in his Preface to the *Commentaria*: 'the wholesome teaching, godly rites and ancient ceremonies of the Holy Fathers', 'the seven sacraments, the primacy of the papacy, the Mass, the doctrine of purgatorial cleansing, ceremonies, and relics of the dead'. These, Cochlaeus contended, the Lutherans wanted to call *adiaphora*, things that didn't really matter.[550] But they *are* critical to the faith, he insisted, and one cannot hold a wrong opinion on them and remain a Christian. We might observe that it would be no more possible for a semidiapason, brought about by hexachordal error, to be musically adiaphorous than it is for certain doctrines to be theologically adiaphorous. Just as one of the singers in a B fa mi dissonance must either conform to the correct singer or stop singing, so too, preachers of heresy must either recant and conform to the right doctrine of the church catholic or be prevented—by whatever means—from sounding.

5.2.4 Music as Metaphor

Cochlaeus' use of music's internal grammar as a metaphorical means for proving theological points offers an insight into the way in which musical thought and theological thought intersected in anti-Lutheran polemic. Even for Cochlaeus, the music theory teacher of Sebaldus Heyden and Heinrich Glarean, *musica* was essentially reduced to little more than an exemplification strategy in his polemic.

Music's value to Cochlaeus in this regard was twofold. First, musical error is objective, and not subject to the fluctuating fashions of intellectual life. Its evaluation is unbiased and clear: everyone knows dissonance sounds bad. Second, the allegorization of theology with musical

[549] COCHLAEUS, *Commentaria*, pp. 207–8.
[550] Ibid., fol. C♣ij$^{r–v}$.

terms enabled Cochlaeus to prove his theological point via syllogistic allegory. The critical problem Cochlaeus observed amongst the German laity was that 'the majority of persons living today think, by the crudest of errors, that Luther was a good man and his gospel was a holy one';[551] his solution was to present 'the deeds and teachings of heretics in the most sinister light possible' so as to 'demonstrate the complete unacceptability of their work as guides for doctrine'.[552] Invoking the binary states of consonance and dissonance (and with them, *musica recta* and *musica falsa*) imported into Cochlaeus' argument a total, polar separation between rightness and wrongness, obliterating any intermixing of consonance and dissonance. The use of *musica* as allegory for theological system effects a binarization in Cochlaeus' reader's mind, forbidding the dangerous assumption that—even if he went too far in the end—Luther might have been a reasonable man whose ideas were worthy of consideration.

That Cochlaeus was a music teacher before he was a polemicist heightens the force of invocations of *musica* in his theology. For this reason it has been instructive to begin this survey of music in the thought of Luther's early German opponents with his *Commentaria*, even though its date of publication (1549) situates it at the very end of the period for our enquiry. This was Cochlaeus' polemical trick: to use music's rules to condemn Lutheran theology.

[551] COCHLAEUS, Letter to Alessandro Card. Farnese (dated 27 April 1550), cit. and trans. KEEN, 'Johannes Cochlaeus: An Introduction', p. 48.

[552] KEEN, ibid., p. 49.

3. MUSIC AND ANALOGY: CONRAD WIMPINA AND JOHANN ECK

Cochlaeus was an unrepentant idealist, happy to condemn himself to contemporary irrelevancy so long as the intellectual integrity of his theology was not compromised. His arguments about Lutheran 'dissonance' were consequently designed to iconize heresy and clarify its objective wrongness, rather than to function as persuasive argumentation against Luther's theology itself.

Others amongst Cochlaeus' Romanist colleagues were more pragmatic in their polemical intentions. Conrad Wimpina and Johann Eck both understood that, intellectually, at least, Pandora's box had been opened by the Reformers, and that appealing to historic theological standards that were no longer unquestioned would have little persuasive impact. With papal authority to declare Luther to be a heretic now under question,[553] condemnation of the Reformer as the Antichrist (such as Cochlaeus') remained credible only to loyal Catholics; to undecided minds, such iconicity risked appearing petty. Eck and Wimpina instead sought to demonstrate the danger of *specific proposals* that Luther made in the early 1520s, in an attempt to engage popular German devotion to existing religious practices against the Reformation. 'Faced with the new problems raised by Luther, Wimpina's method was to appeal to contemporary sacramental practice', because his primary purpose was 'to defend the integrity of the sacramental system', the very epicentre of the *pactum*.[554] Johann Eck, meanwhile—once he had given up on academic disputation with Luther—published a point-by-point, proof-texted rejection of Luther's proposals under the title *Enchiridion of Commonplaces Against Luther and Other Enemies of the Church* in 1525.[555] Both discussed musical practices in their arguments.

[553] The force of papal authority *was* its unquestionability and the internal coherence of its system; once papal authority had been questioned, its mystique was shattered and its authority immediately diminished.

[554] BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, pp. 24–5.

[555] J. ECK, *Enchiridion locorum communium adversus Lutherum & alios hostes ecclesiae* (1525). The *Enchiridion* was republished on numerous occasions, and we refer here to the 1536 edition. Some twentieth-century scholars have assumed that Eck's handbook of (biblical) commonplaces was inspired by Melanchthon's *Loci Communes* of 1521—a book of biblical commonplaces defending reformed practice and belief—but others have questioned this assumption more recently. See N.H. MINNICH, 'On the Origins of Eck's *Enchiridion*', in *Johannes Eck (1486–1543) im Streit der Jahrhunderte*, ed. Iserloh, Münster-Westfalen, 1988, pp. 37–73.

5.2.1 Conrad Wimpina (c.1465–1531): Appealing to Musical Experience

Conrad Wimpina was the patriarch of German polemicists against the Reformation, the *de facto* leader of the Catholic theological delegation to the Diet of Augsburg in 1530, and author of easily the most comprehensive early theological work against Luther. A generation older than his Augsburg colleagues (Cochlaeus and Eck), Wimpina died only a year after their theological showdown with Melanchthon;[556] indeed, by the time the Reformation began in earnest with Luther's disputation at Leipzig, Wimpina was already well over fifty and had been the Rector at the University of Frankfurt/Oder for more then a decade. Although in his earlier career at Leipzig he had showed significant promise as a humanist *rhetor*,[557] his methodological preference was for forthright disputation, and his efforts as a humanist have since been judged 'meagre' in comparison with those who would come after him.[558]

Wimpina never wrote on music explicitly, but we can reconstruct his musical thought from a passage of a Mass-liturgy defence he wrote in the early 1520s. Essentially a *pactum* theologian whose application of the order of grace-exchange was so formal that it could be mediated by the sacramental system alone, Wimpina's major contribution to polemical literature was his *Anacephalaeosis*—a massive, unwieldy tome (folio, 162 pp.)—published at Frankfurt in 1528.[559] The publication date belies its date of completion (1523), and given its size and comprehensiveness it must have taken some considerable time to write. Much of the text is given over to a detailed defence of the Roman Mass making no mention of Luther's *Formula missae* of

[556] Of the three Catholic theologians sent to Augsburg in 1530, Wimpina was by far the best qualified. Apart from his seniority—he had twenty years on both Cochlaeus and Eck—his published work represented by far the most substantial theological repudiation of reformed theology.

[557] He had, for example, published 'two extensive poetical works': *Alme universitatis Studii Lipzensis et vrbis Liptzg descripciones poeticae* (Leipzig, 1488; republ. Leipzig, 1802), and *Epitoma bellorum illustriumque actorum Principis Alberti…* (Leipzig, 1497).

[558] J.H. OVERFIELD, 'Scholastic Opposition to Humanism in Pre-Reformation Germany', *Viator* VII (1976), 391–420: 399. J.A. NEGWER, *Konrad Wimpina: Ein katholischer Theologe aus der Reformationszeit,* Breslau, 1909 (repr. Nieuwkoop, 1967), remains the standard biography of Wimpina.

[559] C. WIMPINA [i.e. Koch], *Sectarum errores, hallucinationes et schismatica ab origine ferme christianae ecclesiae ad haec usque nostra tempora concisioris Anacephalaeosis…* (1528).

1523—surely a critical text for a discussion of reformed eucharistic heresies—so it is possible that Wimpina had already completed the manuscript before Luther's new liturgy was released.[560]

Wimpina understood God's grace to be given to human beings through the sacramental system—acts in obedience to Christ's biblical instruction undertaken regularly by the Church whose outward visible signs 'convey the grace they signify'.[561] The earthly act of a sacramental rite was the 'work' that precipitated the bestowal of grace, a precipitation that in order to remain trustworthy had to function automatically. The *pactum*-theological approach therefore focused its attention on the tangible sign (the rite), and upon the experienced reality of the symbology of the sacraments. So deep was Wimpina's commitment to the emphasis upon the sign and its integrity for the efficacy of the sacrament that he reckoned the songs of the Mass to be immutable, on account of the fact that they referred to angelic song (which was immutable):[562]

> The entrance of the priest to the altar signifies the advent of Christ. And the introit of the Mass articulates the longing for his coming. And therefore, in solemn Masses, the priest should not enter until the [singing of] the introit has been begun, because Christ had been longed for before he came, too. And because in Christ's coming a season of mercy was begun, the Kyrie Eleison is [sung] directly after the introit… Then comes the Gloria in Excelsis, to represent the hymn which the angels sang to the shepherds at the birth of the Lord. I argue that [the Gloria] follows because suddenly there was with the angel a multitude of the heavenly host, praising and saying etc. The prayers that follow, however, represent the requests that Christ offered up to his Father later in his life, for the people. The Epistle that precedes the gospel signifies the law, for John preached repentance; and because according to Christ's saying, there is comfort after mourning: Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted: so after the Gradual the Alleluia is sung, which signifies the ineffable joy of the angels, and of those men, who praise God in eternal bliss…[563]

[560] On the other hand, polemical literature after 1523 makes virtually no reference to either the *Formula missae* or the *Deutsche Messe*, suggesting that the new liturgies had no circulation amongst enemies of the Reformation.

[561] The formulation is Hugh of St Victor's (*De sacr. Chr. fid.* 2.6.3), promulgated by Peter Lombard in his *Sententiae*, the pre-eminent theology textbook in late mediæval Europe.

[562] By contrast, Luther considered music to be a sign of 'adornment' rather than necessity. E.g. *WA* xxxi/II:127; *WA* xxv:162; *WA* xlii:233–4.

[563] WIMPINA, *Anacephalaeosis*, Bk V, fol. 47 (sig. Hh.iiij^{v}–v^{r}): 'Introitus sacerdotis ad altare, adventum Christi significat. Et introitus Missae, desiderium adventus eius insinuat. Et ideo in missa solenni, non debet intrare sacerdos, quousque incoeptus sit introitus missae, quia ante fuit Chr[istu]s desideratus, que veniret: & q[ui]a in adventu Christi fuit tempus misericordiae, ideo post introitum subiungitur Kirie eleyson… Subiungitur, Gloria in excelsis, ad representandum hymnum, quem angeli pastoribus nato domino cecinerunt, do [*sc.* dico?] prosequitur, quia subito facta fuit, cum angelo multitudo militiae coelestis, laudantium & dicentium etc. Orationes autem quae subsequuntur, quas Christus post suam navitatem praeces, pro populo, patri exhibuit, repraesentant. Epistola quae praemittitur evangelio, legem significat, quia Ioannes poenitentiam praedicabat: Et quia post luctum sequitur consolatio, dicente Christo. Beati qui lugent, quoniam ipsi consolabuntur, ideo post Graduale canitur Alleluia, quod significat ineffabile gaudium angelorum & ho[m]i[nu]m, in aeterna foelicitate deum laudantium'.

Wimpina did not feel the need to explain that all the components of the Mass liturgy described were, under normal circumstances, sung components; presumably it was self-evident. When read against other Mass defences of the 1520s, however, Wimpina's seems positively symphonic in its focus on musical moments, and for their meaning. (Other contemporary Mass defences uniformly prioritized lengthy discussions about the philosophical importance of this or that sentence. Even Cochlaeus' *Von der Heyligen Mess* [1524] is profoundly dry by comparison with Wimpina's, focusing heavily on textual significance.)

Wimpina's theological exposition of the Mass is unusual, in that it addresses each component not as a logical sentence, but in terms of the Mass-goer's experience. For a start, the liturgy of the Mass is explored *sequentially*, the components addressed in their proper liturgical order, which was by no means a given in Mass defences of the early polemical corpora. Then, the significatory content of each liturgical component is analysed from both sides of the human-divine threshold opened up in sacramental grace-exchange: the Introit, for example, at once *represents* the longing for Christ's coming of the Old Testament Israelites, and *performs* the longing of Christ's subsequent coming among the congregation at the eucharistic canon. Similarly, the Alleluia at once *signifies* (and is) the song of the angelic chorus in heaven, and *performs* that song in this world. Wimpina's focus on a double-sided meaning of the Mass liturgy's components entails a presumption of analogy between heaven and earth, and of communicability between them through devotional song practices; and his experience-led sequential exposition relates each component to the reader's own devotional engagement with the Mass liturgy.

Wimpina's theology bears the hallmark of late mediæval Thomism—the acceptance of an *analogia entis*.[564] Accordingly, Wimpina's view of sacramental signs was not only that they 'convey

[564] Wimpina's Thomism was partly related to his profession (as a Dominican) and ought not to be read as representative of an uncompromising acceptance of the Stagirite's philosophy. In 1493 he had written against Aristotle on a number of points (*Tractatus de erroribus philosophorum*).

the grace they signify', but also that they do so *analogously*, i.e. by cutting across Plotinus' ontologistic 'emanations'.[565] It was of vital importance to Wimpina, then, that sacramental signs be maintained *not only* because they represented the precondition for the bestowal of grace in sacramental exchange, *but also* because the signs caused human worship to be 'aligned' to the heavenly worship a rung up on the ontological 'ladder'.[566]

The consequence of *changing* the existing liturgical components of the Mass under such an understanding is the loss of its efficacy altogether. This is the heart of Wimpina's Mass defence: by interfering with the *signs* of the Mass liturgy (its songs), you interfere not with arbitrary signs, but with *specific, necessary signs* that cause the sacrament to be efficacious both by their agreed (*pactum*) value *and* by their analogical nature. The final sentence we quoted above clarifies this position: 'the Alleluia… signifies the ineffable joy of the angels' a rung above on the ontological ladder; participating in their song is not only a sign of *pactum*-theology grace-exchange (a 'good work'), but is also an acting-out of the *analogia entis*. In Wimpina's theology it would not be possible to participate in 'the ineffable joy of the angels' unless one also participated in the Alleluia itself; no other song will do, because the *sign* of the angels' joy—their Alleluia—is a necessary component of it.

Wimpina's defence of the Mass on the basis that its liturgical components have heavenly, as well as earthly, currency, and that they play a rôle in making the sacrament of the Mass efficacious, was predicated upon his Thomistic belief that that sacramental signs were specific and necessary signs inseparable from the sacrament itself. In his *Anacephalaeosis* he sought to argue that, symbologically, the *entirety* of the Mass liturgy was involved in making the sacrament

[565] This merger of *pactum* theology with Thomas' *analogia entis* was not uncommon amongst *via antiqua* theologians of the late Middle Ages. See JANZ, 'Late medieval theology'.

[566] R. HAMMERSTEIN, *Die Musik der Engel: Untersuchung zur Musikanschauung des Mittelalters*, provides a marvellous exploration of the way in which this affected late mediæval musical thought about angelic song. Since the leading figure in present-day accounts of late mediæval musical thought, Johannes Tinctoris, was also a Dominican and a Thomist, one might be forgiven for believing that *all* late mediæval musical thought was Thomist—a dangerous syllogism.

efficacious; the eucharistic canon was not a 'standalone' *hocus pocus* consecration that could be separated from the liturgical integrity of the Mass as a rite. Since the majority of Wimpina's readers would have been religious (the book's size and language confirm that it was intended for a monastic, and possibly secular university, audience), it was sensible to address the Mass in this way. Wimpina's readers were both educated and regular participants at the Mass; most would have been accustomed to singing the liturgy themselves.

5.3.2 Johann Eck (1486–1543) and the Music of the Angels

Eck's *Enchiridion* shared many of Wimpina's goals, as well as the assertion that heavenly and earthly music ought to correspond. But they were quite different types of book. Whereas Wimpina's polemic was engaged against Luther's expected liturgical reforms on the basis that they would destroy the sacramental mechanics of grace-exchagne, Eck accused Luther of abandoning heavenly ordinances laid down in biblical passages.

Eck's 1525 theological attack on Lutheran song habits was backed up with a set of scriptural and patristic proof-texts, a distinction that identifies him as a much better humanist than Wimpina. The *Enchiridion* is a commonplace-book, a favourite humanist format in which short sayings or quotations were compiled together in a single, portable, personal volume that the owner could carry with him at all times; away from his many books, the owner of a commonplace-book was always in the company of their wisdom.[567] Eck's aim was to arm the Catholic reader with all the relevant scriptural and patristic passages needful to reject Lutheran theology, in a single, thematically ordered place.[568]

[567] For a lucid description of the use of commonplace-books, see JUDD, *Reading Renaissance Music Theory*, pp. 128–30.

[568] The *Enchiridion*, in its Latin version, has thirty-seven chapters: 1. On the Church and Its Authority; 2. On the Councils; 3. On the Primacy of the Apostolic See (i.e. Rome); 4. On the Scriptures; 5. On Faith and Works; 6. On [the Sacrament of] Confirmation; 7. On [the Sacrament of] Ordination; 8. On [the Sacrament of] Confession; 9. On Satisfaction; 10. On the Eucharist; 11. On Marriage; 12. On Extreme Unction; 13. On Human Inventions [i.e. Ecclesiastical Traditions]; 14. On Feasts and Fasts; 15. On the Veneration of the Saints; 16. On Images of the Crucifix

(cont.)



DE ORATIONE ET

Mar.6 autem ſecedebat in deſertum & orabat.

Luc.5.6 Factum eſt autem illis diebus exĩjt, in montem orare, & erat pernoctans in oratione dei.

Luc.9 Et aſcendit in montem vt oraret, & factum eſt dum oraret, ſpecies vultus eius altera.

Luc.22 Poſitis genubus orabat di-

Mat.26. cens, pater ſi vis transfer calicem iſtũ à me. Et factus in agonia prolixius orabat.

Mar.14. Orate autem vt non fiat fu-

Mat.24. ga veſtra hyeme vel ſabbato.

Mar.13. Videte vigilate & orare, neſcitis enim quando tempus ſit.

Mat.5 Orate pro pſequẽtibus & calumniantibus vos.

Luc.18 Oportet ſemper orare, & nõ deficere.

Ibidem. Deus non faciet vindictam electorum clamantium ad ſe die ac nocte.

Mat.26; Actu.4 Orate ne intretis in tẽtationẽ. Et cũ oraſſent, motus eſt lo-

Figure V.3 ECK, *Enchiridion* (rev. ed. 1536), fol. 200^{v} (sig. Miij^{v}).

The approach was apparently a successful one: the *Enchridion* was the most widely disseminated polemical text during Luther's lifetime, undergoing twelve revisions before Eck's death.[569] Figure V.3, above, shows how liberally Eck used proof-texts in his argument: on this one

(cont.)

and of Saints; 17. On the Sacrifice of the Mass; 18. On [Religious] Vows; 19. On Priestly Celibacy; 20. On the Cardinals and Order of the Apostolic See; 21. On Excommunication; 22. On the War Against the Turks; 23. On the Inerrancy and Divinity of the Church; 24. On Indulgences; 25. On Purgatory; 26. On the Church's Calendar; 27. On the Burning of Heretics; 28. On the Prohibition Against Disputation with Heretics; 29. On the Corporeal Presence of Christ at the Eucharist; 30. On the Baptism of Infants; 31. On Free Will; 32. On Prayer and the Canonic Hours; 33. On the Plurality of Sacraments and Their Number; 34. On Churches and Their Ornaments; 35. On Character [i.e. Virtue]; 36. On Transubstantiation; 37. On Saying the Mass in Latin.

[569] J.S. WORKMAN, Review of Eck's *Enchiridion* in new eds. and trans., 150, records that 'published in 1525, the work underwent continual revision: by J. Host in 1525, by T. Smeling in 1529 and 1532, and nine more times by Eck

(cont.)

side alone, thirteen verses are cited to prove the validity of public sung prayers. The thirty-second chapter of the *Enchiridion*, *De Oratione & horis canonicis*, in which singing is discussed most thoroughly, offers a good exemplar of Eck's method. The chapter follows one about free will and the liberation of the human soul from the works of the law—a subject which Luther and Eck had disputed in 1519—and Eck comes straight from his claim that not all sanctification of the soul comes about *sola gratia* (in Chapter XXI) to discuss the continued necessity of monastic petition. So Eck presents Luther's objection to the canonic hours (correctly) as an objection to the idea that human beings can earn their salvation in prayer, asserting that 'many of his [i.e. Luther's] doctrines, against the words of the scriptures, deny that prayer is needful, since Christ should advocate for us enough'.[570] Making full use of his format, Eck proceeds to cite forty-one biblical sources, as well as the patristic arguments of SS. Cyprian, Cassiodorus, Jerome, Basil, John Chrysostom, Augustine, and the Council of Agde (Agatha), for the purposes of proving Luther's claim wrong.[571] After thus defending monastic prayer in general, Eck then provides twelve biblical passages and two patristic sources in defence of matutinal prayer,[572] one biblical and five patristic sources defending nocturnal prayer (as well as two councils),[573] fifteen Bible passages and five arguments of the fathers for the retention of hymns and antiphons,[574] before stating the

(cont.)

before his death in 1543. Ten of the 121 known editions appeared in translation: one Flemish, four French, and five German'.

[570] Fol. 200^{r} (sig. Miij^{r}): 'Quia Lutherus docuit, omnia fieri absoluta necessitate, abstulit liberum arbitrium, plures eius sequaces contra expressas scripturas negant orandum esse, quia Christus pro nobis sufficienter oraverit'.

[571] Fols. 200^{r}–205^{v} (sig. Miij^{r}–Mvij^{v}). The references are Luke 11, Matt. 5, Matt. 14, Mark 6, Luke 5:6, Luke 9, Luke 22, Matt. 26, Mark 14, Mark 24, Mark 13, Luke 18 (twice), Matt. 26, Acts 4, Acts 1 (twice), Acts 13, Acts 14, Matt. 17, Mark 9, Matt. 26, II Cor. 13, II Thess. 3, I Tim. 2 (twice), Ecclesiasticus 16, Ps. 118 [119], Dan. 6, Acts 3, Acts 10, Acts 15, Deut. 9, Ecclesiasticus 3, I Cor. 14, Joshua 6, Is. 66, Matt. 5, Ps. 118 [119], Ps. 54 [55], in addition to the patristic sources.

[572] Fols. 205^{v}–206^{v} (sig. Mvij^{v}–N^{v}): Ps. 118 [119] (twice), Ps. 133 [134], Ps. 6:9, Ex. 12, Matt. 25, Jerome, Ps. 81 [82], Matt. 26, John 18, Acts 16, an 'irony', Acts 12, John Chrysostom, and Numbers 3.

[573] Fols. 206^{v}–208^{r} (sig. N^{v}–Niij^{r}): Philo of Alexandria and Eusebius, Cassianus, the Council of Laodicea, Jerome, Luke 4, Augustine, Ambrose, and the Council of Africa.

[574] Fols. 208^{r}–210^{v} (sig. Niij^{r}–O^{v}): Matt. 26, Col. 3, Ps. 99 [100] (twice), Ps. 64 [65], Ps. 118 [119], II Macc. 10, I Cor. 14, Ps. 9, Ps. 46 [47], Eph. 5, I Tim. 2, John Chrysostom, the Council of Toledo, Augustine, Ps. 44 [45], Is. 6, Isidore of Seville, Ambrose, and Rev. 4.

objections of the Lutherans and responding (disputation-like) on behalf of Catholics. Finally, Eck anoints the Catholics the winners.[575]

These proof-texts do not require thorough reading in order to exert their full effect: the purpose of their citation and discussion is principally to overwhelm the reader with evidence that Luther's argument *cannot* be right in the face of this much contrary biblical and patristic material.[576] And, if this much biblical and patristic material proves the Lutherans wrong, then it stands to reason that the Catholic correctors from Rome and Germany must also be right.

Eck's subsection specifically dealing with the song of the church, *De Hymnis et antiphonis & psallendi usu*, is the most pertinent for our analysis here. (The title of the section, with its trilogy of song terms, is an allusion to St Paul, and to one of the passages he cites below—Eph. 5:19: *loquentes vobismet ipsis in psalmis et hymnis et canticis spiritualibus*.) Each verse Eck cites is deployed with maximal theological force (Matt. 26:30: *Et hymno dicto exierunt in montem Oliueti*;[577] Col. 3:16: *Verbum Christi habitet in vobis abundanter, in omni sapientia docentes & commonentes vosmetipsos in psalmis, hymnis, & canticis spiritualibus, & gratia, cantantes in cordibus vestris domino*; Ps. 99:4 [100:4]: *Introite portas eius in confessione, atria eius, in hymnis confitemini illi*;[578] Ps. 64:2 [65:2]: *Te decet hymnus deus in Sion*;[579] Psalm 118:171 [119:171]: *Eructabant labia mea hymnum, cum docueris me iustificationes tuas*;[580] II Macc. 10:38: *Quibus gestis in hymnis et confessionibus benedicebant Dominum qui magna fecit in Israel*;[581] I Cor. 14:15: *Orabo spiritu,*

[575] Fols. 210^{v}–213^{v} (sig. O^{v}–Oiiij^{v}).

[576] As Eck aged, he became less antagonistic towards his opponents. See STEINMETZ, 'Uncovering a Second Narrative: Detective Fiction and the Construction of Historical Method', in E.F. Davis and R.B. Hays, eds., *The Art of Reading Scripture*, Grand Rapids, MI, 2003, pp. 54–65: p. 60, which notes that, were we to be unaware of the chronology of Eck's publications, we might assume that his more moderate work of the 1540s predated the polemics of the 1520s.

[577] 'When they had sung the hymn, they went out to the Mount of Olives.' (This, and the following translations, are made directly from the Latin.) The 'hymn' in question (which Jerome renders as *dicto*, rather than *cantato*) was almost certainly one of the Psalms of Ascent, sung in preparation for the Passover festival.

[578] 'Enter his gates with thanksgiving, and his courts with hymns of praise'.

[579] 'Praise is due to you, O God, in Zion'.

[580] 'My lips will pour forth your praise, because you teach me your statutes.'

[581] 'When they had accomplished these things, with hymns and thanksgivings they blessed the Lord who shows great kindness to Israel'.

orabo & mente: psallam spiritu, psallam & mente;[582] Ps. 9:11: *Psallite domine qui habitat in Sion, psallans nomini tuo altissime, in psalmis per totam*;[583] Ps. 46:7 [47:7]: *Psallite deo nostro psallite*;[584] Eph. 5:18, 19: *Impleamini spiritu sancto, loquentes vobismetipsis in Psalmis, & hymnis, et canticis spiritualibus, cantantes & psallentes in cordibus vestris, & caetera*;[585] I Tim. 2:1[586]). The purpose of Eck's biblical *loci* is to demonstrate unequivocally that *those who deny the value of sung prayers and praise disobey the commandments of God*, and therefore can no longer be considered Christians.[587]

Having demonstrated conclusively that Lutheran musical habits are anti-biblical, Eck now moves to explain why retaining a biblical standard of sung prayer is critical to the life of the church. He cites four respected church fathers, and one ecumenical council: St. John Chrysostom, the Council of Toledo, Augustine, Isidore of Seville, and Ignatius of Antioch. The value of invoking such authorities is, in part, rhetorical flourish: Augustine of Hippo was, at the time of Eck's writing, still the *summus theologicus* of the Western church; St John Chrysostom, though a doctor of the Eastern church rather than the Western, was effectively regarded as a Western Doctor.[588] Eck's appeal to the decisions of the Council of Toledo (IV) serves to associate standardized musical practices with standardized orthodox theology[589]—the Third

[582] 'I will pray with the spirit, but I will pray with mind also; I will sing praise with the spirit, but I will sing praise with the mind also.'

[583] 'Sing praises to the Lord who dwells in Sion, singing of your name, O Most High, in psalms among all the peoples'. Eck seems to have reconstituted the verse in question (*Psallite Domino, qui habitat in Sion; annuntiate inter gentes studia eius*) with what is probably an Augustinian prayer.

[584] 'Sing praises with a psalm'.

[585] 'Be filled with the Spirit, as you sing psalms and hymns and spiritual songs among yourselves, singing and making melody to the Lord in your hearts.'

[586] Eck does not actually quote this verse ('First of all, then, I urge that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and thanksgivings should be made for everyone') but discusses its obliquely: 'The psalm sounds a supplication, the antiphon a prayer, the collect intercession, and the hymn a thanksgiving: for Paul draws our attention to these four'. (Fols. 208^{v}–209^{r} [sig. Niij^{v}–Niiij^{r}]: 'Psalmus obsecrationem, Antiphona postulationem, Collecta orationem, Hymnus gratiarum actionem sonat: horum enim quatuor meminit Paulus.')

[587] It does not matter, for Eck's purposes, that Lutherans reject the canonic hours only in part, and singing praises not at all. Indeed, the Lutherans' retention of certain elements of the canonical hours is, according to Eck, an inconsistency designed to conceal their true motives. (Fol. 210^{v} [sig. O^{v}]: 'Luther egregie hic despicit, Cum enim passim reijciat constitutiones humanas, hic ne videatur totus pigritare, horas canonicas non reijcit omnino, sed pro suis apostatis & periuris, permittat, vt tres duntaxat psalmos pro matutino sumant officio, tres pro vespertino.')

[588] The four doctors of the Eastern Church were incorporated as doctors of the Western Church by Pius V in 1568.

[589] Ms Vat. Lat. 1341, *Collectio Hispania Gallica Augustodunensis*, contains the minutes of the first thirteen Councils and Synods of Toledo, which met between 400 and 683. The Council to which Eck is referring here is the fourth (633), which standardized liturgies across Spain. Fols. 73^{v}b and 74^{r}a record decrees xiii through xvi, which

(cont.)

Synod of Toledo (which took place immediately prior to the council to which Eck refers) had witnessed the final renunciation by the Spanish Church of its long-standing Arianism, 'the archetypal heresy' against which the Church had fought since the First Council of Nicaea in 325,[590] whilst the Fourth Council of Toledo, meanwhile, standardized the worship practices of the Spanish church and banned certain heretical songs; Isidore of Seville, who presided over the Fourth Council, was involved in the conversion to orthodoxy of the Visigoth king and Arian disciple, Reccared, in 587. By the sixteenth century, Isidore's name had come to be associated with the concept of conversion from heresy to normalized orthodoxy. Together Isidore, Chrysostom, Augustine, Ignatius, and the participants in Toledo III and IV represented unquestionable heroes of the faith whose incorporation into a discussion of musical prayer represented a significant rhetorical climax for Eck's argument.

But Eck's invocation of patristic sources is not exclusively for rhetorical purposes. References to Ignatius and Isidore, in particular, allude to their *vitae* and to specific legends about ecclesiastical song. By lengthy tradition, Isidore and Ignatius were considered the human 'sources' of antiphonal singing. According to Socrates Scholasticus, the early church historian, 'the origin of this custom in the church of responsive [i.e. antiphonal] singing' was a vision of Ignatius:

> Ignatius third bishop of Antioch in Syria from the apostle Peter, who also held intercourse with the apostles themselves, saw a vision of angels hymning in alternate chants to the Holy Trinity. Accordingly he introduced the mode of singing he had observed into the Antiochian church, whence it was transmitted by tradition to all the other churches.[591]

Eck imports this legend wholesale into his own argument. Isidore, he explained, 'discovered' that

(cont.)

provide the way in which hymns and psalms are to be sung within the liturgy, and what hymns are acceptable. Many of the Fourth Council of Toledo's judgements were incorporated without revision into the *Decretium Gratiani* during the twelfth century, a text whose first six chapters became the official corpus of canon law, remaining in force until 27 May 1917.

[590] R. WILLIAMS, *Arius: Heresy and Tradition*, p. 1. Cf. also below, p. 233 and n. 638.

[591] SOCRATES Scholasticus (b. 380), *Historia ecclesiastica* VI.viii, in *Socrates Scholasticus & Sozomenus: Ecclesiastical Histories*, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, Edinburgh, 1885, p. 144.

> the Greeks sang antiphons in alternating choirs, as [they were sung] by the two seraphin and attendants crying out one to another. St. Ambrose, in imitation of the Greeks, instituted antiphons amongst the Latins: the witness to a three-part history. First Ignatius, who was taught by angels in a vision, instituted [singing] antiphons at Antioch.[592]

That the practice of antiphonal singing—the heart of the canonic hours—was given to the church by the angels is an assertion Eck backs up with scripture: he cited Is. 6 (the *Sanctus*) before discussing antiphonal song, and after making his claim about antiphonal singing he quoted from Rev. 4, *Et quatuor animalia requiem non habebant die ac nocte, dicentia: Sanctus, Sanctus, Sanctus, dominus deus omnipotens* ('And the four living creatures … [d]ay and night without ceasing they sing, "Holy, holy, holy, the Lord God the Almighty…"'). Antiphony, postulates Eck, is not just how the angels have been *thought* to sing, but how the Bible *records* them singing. Eck then makes a rare departure from his conventional form and offers a lengthy explanation:

> In imitating the angels the church rouses herself to song, saying in the Preface: 'The heavens and all the heavenly hosts, with the blessed rank of Seraphin, together lift praises in exultation, with whom we pray that we order our voices also to be admitted, saying with humble confession, 'Holy, holy'.[593]

The final twist of Eck's rhetorical knife comes at the very end of Cap. XXXII. Dismissing Lutheran replacements of the canonic hours, he notes the similarity between Lutheran singing and previous heretical song practices, condemning their practices as dehumanizing disorders:

> The Lutherans and other heretics, rejecting as they do the daily offices of singing, reading, and praying, and coming up with new orders off the top of their madly deranged heads, for singing, spewing forth, and praying, are doing exactly the same as the heretic Paul of Samosata. He had the saying of psalms about Christ stopped, as if they were recently concocted; and instead he had women sing psalms he himself had composed, on Easter Day, in full view of the whole church – women he had taught. This is what idiotic heretics do with their new songs and their oinkings and barkings.[594]

[592] Fol. 209^{v} (sig. Niiij^{v}): 'Isidorus, Antiphonas Graeci alternis choris cecinerunt, velut duobus seraphin ac testamentis inuicem sibi clamantibus. Sanctus Ambrosius Graecos imitatus, apud Latinos Antiphonas instituit: testis tripertita historia. Ignatius primus per visionem doctus angelorum antiphonas Antiochiae instituit.'

[593] Fol. 210^{r} (sig. O^{r}): 'Ad angelorum imitationem ecclesia se exhortatur ad cantum, in praefationedicens *(sic)*. Coeli coelorumque virtutes, ac beata Seraphin socia exultatione concelebrant, cum quibus & nostras voces ut admitti iubeas depre[ca]mur, supplici confessione dicentes, Sanctus sanctus.' (The strange omission of letters from 'deprecamur' occurs over a line break.) I am grateful to John Caldwell for his advice in translating Eck's Latin.

[594] Fol. 215^{v} (sig. Oiiij^{r}): 'Lutherani et alij haeretici, explodentes ritum canendi, legendi, et orandi ecclesiasticum, atque mixta vaesana eorum capita novas conficientes formulas cantandi, missandi, ac orandi, faciunt sicut Paulus Samosatenus haereticus: qui psalmos Christo dicatos cessare fecit, velut nuper inventos; in semetipsum autem

(cont.)

5.3.3 Thomism, Renaissance Humanism

Both Eck and Wimpina found that Lutheran reforms to liturgical practice prevented earth-bound human beings from participating in heaven's grace. For Wimpina, the problem was that any potential reforms to the signs of the sacramental process (such as the liturgical words and tunes themselves) would disestablish the entire *pactum* on which human engagement with the Divine had been based. Presuming that Luther was, like his predecessor-reformers Jan Hus (*c.*1365–1415) and John Wycliffe (*c.*1328–84), opposed iconoclastically to any sacramental system altogether, Wimpina found him essentially devilish.[595]

The heresy, as far as Wimpina was concerned, linking Luther with Hus and Wycliffe, was a rejection of any meaningful interaction between God and man whatsoever.[596] Being both a *pactum* theologian and a Thomist, Wimpina believed in *two* mechanisms for such interaction: one ontological, and the other covenantal. As we have seen, Wimpina's criticism of potential Mass reforms, and his criticism of inevitable changes in song practices, was dependent upon both his ontologistic Thomism (man must sing analogously to the angels) and his *pactum* theology (in order that he might gain grace and be saved). It is worthy of note that Luther made reference to angelic song practice only in relation to the *Gloria in excelsis*, which was (as Wimpina concurs) essentially an act of *earthly* singing by heavenly visitors. A committed Ockhamist, Luther had even less affection for the ontologistic paradigm of Thomas (indeed, some historians have suggested he knew almost nothing about it[597]) than he did for the *pactum*, and so Wimpina's

(cont.)

compositos in die Paschae in medio ecclesiae canere mulieres, maxime quas prius instituerat, faciebat. Sic modo faciunt stulti haeretici cum suis cantilenis et porcinis ac caninis novis ululatibus.'

[595] The full title of the *Anacephalaeosis* explains that the work includes a refutation of the 'Pikarti [i.e. Hussite], Wycliffite, and Lutheran heresies'.

[596] Some of the early controversies were framed in such terms; Luther was frequently accused of denying the reality of human free will altogether, rendering human interaction with the Almighty little more than that of a puppet to his master. This accusation was not entirely fair; although Luther seems to have *wished* he could reject human free will, he never actually did so.

[597] The thesis first appeared in Lortz' *Die Reformation in Deutschland*, though was intensified in his contribution to J. WICKS, S.J.,ed., *Catholic Scholars Dialogue with Luther*, Chicago, 1970, p. 7. (Luther was 'more

(cont.)

criticism of his potential Mass reforms—and their effects upon song practices—must be viewed as a distinctly Thomist argument.

Eck, by contrast, was no Thomist. Schooled at Heidelberg, Tübingen, Cologne and Freiburg, he was well educated in both *viae* and was as learned a scholastic philosopher as Wimpina. His early works identify him as a modernist, a successor to Biel's semi-Pelagianist extreme nominalism. Unlike Wimpina, whose Dominican profession linked him spiritually to Thomas, Eck was a secular theologian with no commitment to Thomas. He appears, indeed, to have been a relatively reluctant schoolman, indicating his desire in advance of the Leipzig Disputation that it should not become too scholastic in methodology. He even referred to the theology of Ficino at the Heidelberg Disputation (1518).[598] Eck's insistence that the songs of the church should mirror the songs of heaven cannot, consequently, be related to a Thomistic ontologism; his promotion of similarity between heavenly and earthly song was not determined by a philosophical reliance upon Aquinas' *analogia entis*, but rather upon scriptural and patristic grounds.

Nevertheless, Plotinus was still in Eck's background. The *Celestial Hierarchy* of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (5th/6th century), whom Eck considered to be one of St Paul's disciples (cf. Acts 17:34),[599] enjoyed a renaissance in the late mediæval West. Card. Cajetan had opened the second session of the Fifth Lateran Council in 1512 with an exposition of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, giving it a refreshed curial seal of approval.[600] In large measure Plotinus' tiers of 'emanation of being' applied to heavenly and earthly order, the *Celestial Hierarchy* was invoked by

(cont.)

Catholic than' Lortz had previously realized, he admitted, and certainly would not have instigated a Reformation if he had known he could abandon his Ockhamist *pactum*-theology for Thomistic rationalism.) For a layman's introduction to Luther's ignorance of Thomas, see STEINMETZ, 'What Luther Got Wrong', *The Christian Century*, 23 August 2005, pp. 23–5.

[598] EBERLING, *Disputato de homine: Lutherstudium II*, Tübingen, 1982, p. 131; cit. MCDONALD, 'Orpheus Germanicus', p. 274 and n. 1525.

[599] The identity of the pseudo-Areopagite was disputed by Eck and Luther at Leipzig (*WA* ii:155); Luther subsequently rejected Eck's assumption that the man named in Acts 17:34 was in fact the author of the *Celestial Hierarchy*.

[600] HENDRIX, *Luther and the Papacy: Stages in a Reformation Conflict*, Philadelphia, 1981, pp. 57–8; cit. BAGCHI, *Luther's Earlist Opponents*, p. 245.

Eck at the Leipzig Disputation as a proof-text for a Platonist 'mirror' between heaven and earth ('as above, so also below').[601] Just several years prior to the Disputation, Eck had completed a commentary on the pseudo-Areopagite's *Mystical Theology*,[602] suggesting that his later insistence that legitimate earthly song practices must emulate those of the celestial order was almost certainly drawn from a tradition *prior* to that Thomas—that of pseudo-Dionysius. [603]

The purpose of Eck's invocation of the pseudo-Areopagite and the Platonic ontological 'mirror' was that both enabled him to prop up papal claims to total earthly authority: if heaven and earth were supposed to 'mirror' one another in terms of their order, then papal authority over the earthly realm could be justified on the basis that it was analogous to Christ's authority over the heavenly realm. Eck was not the only polemicist to invoke the *Celestial Hierarchy* for this reason;[604] but he appears to have been one of just two to have applied its principles to music.

The other (outside the scope of our inquiry here) serves only to strengthen the case. The *Antilutherus* of Jodocus Clichtoveus (†1543),[605] a cleric of the Low Countries and personal theologian to Louis Guillard, bishop of Tournai and later Chartres, makes basically the same points as does Eck's *Enchiridion*, for the same reasons.[606] A student of Lefèvre d'Étaples, Clichtoveus included several chapters on pseudo-Dionysius and his hierarchy in his multi-part

[601] *WA* ii:255–6.

[602] ECK, *D. Dionysii Areopagitae De mystica Theologia*, Augsburg, 1519, but completed two years earlier. In the mid-1520s, Eck would edit Pico's *apologia* for St Dionysius' writings. See K. FROELICH, 'Pseudo-Dionysius and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century', for an overview.

[603] The case for a pseudo-Dionysian thesis of hierarchy of being amongst early Romanist polemicists was advanced by P. FRAENKEL, 'An der Grenze vor Luthers Einfluss: Aversion gegen Umwertung', *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, LXXXIX (1978), 21–30, following P. POLMAN, *L'élement historique dans la controverse religieuse du XVIe siècle,* Gembloux, 1932; cit. FROEHLICH, ibid., p. 41 and n. 39. BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, pp. 245–8, recounts the to-and-fro in recent scholarship regarding how far the pseudo-Areopagite influenced the early Catholic respondents to Luther, before finding in favour of Fraenkel's claims. To Bagchi's judgement we can now add the observation, noted in MCDONALD, 'Orpheus Germanicus', p. 109, Graph 3, that pseudo-Dionysius was a major influence on Ficino, and that Ficino's translation of the *Mystical Theology* was widely circulated amongst German humanists. The evidence of the polemicists' musical thought has not been previously factored in to any judgement about pseudo-Dionysius' influence in sixteenth-century Germany; I suggest that the evidence strengthens the case in Fraenkel's favour.

[604] BAGCHI, *Luther's Earliest Opponents*, pp. 141–5, 247.

[605] J. CLICHTOVEUS [Josse van Clichtove], *Antilutherus tres libros complectens*, Paris, 1524.

[606] The standard biography of Clichtoveus remains J.-P. MASSAUT, *Josse Clichtove: l'Humanisme et la réforme du Clergé*, 2 vols., Paris, 1968, which emphasizes Clichtoveus' rôle as a reformer.

rejection of Luther's theology,[607] before going on to defend the canonic hours using almost precisely the same set of proofs as Eck.[608] In his defence of the traditional Mass canon, Clichtoveus asserts that Lutheran eucharistic doctrine is derived from an attempt to divorce the realm of bodies from the realm of forms,[609] before insisting that the value of sung liturgy in divine worship is precisely that it permits the gulf between the bodily and the *mysteria* to be bridged affectively.[610] Indeed, Clichtoveus can think of no way in which valid praise can be rendered to the Almighty if it is not through song.[611]

Whilst Clichtoveus' *Antilutherus* does not meet the requirements for inclusion in this study—since it represents a Parisian response to Luther's theology rather than a German one—the strong pseudo-Dionysian Neoplatonism running through Clichtoveus' treatment of music is concordant with Eck's understanding of earthly music as an analogy of heavenly singing; indeed, Eck almost certainly knew the book and may well have developed his idea about the necessity of analogy between heavenly song and the canonical hours directly from Clichtoveus'.[612]

[607] CLICHTOVEUS, *Antilutherus*, Bk. I, cap. v, fols. 10^{v}–12^{r}, 'Beatum Dionysium Areopagitam, a Sancto Paulo conversum'; Bk. I, cap. vii, fols. 13^{v}–15^{v}, 'Dionysium etiam Areopagitam, in Galliam ad Christum illi annunciandum venisse', a biographical chapter; and Bk. II, cap. ii, fols. 57^{r}–59^{v}, 'Ecclesiam Christi, diversos grados atque ordines sortiri', esp. fol. 57^{v}.

[608] Ibid., Bk. III, cap. xxiiii, fols. 98^{v}–100^{r}, 'Horarum canonicarum lectionem non esse damnandam'.

[609] Bk. II, cap. xvii, fol. 86^{v}: 'Qui autem zelum habet & contentionem, qui sacra divinarum rerum contemnit mysteria: nonne animalis est & carnalis?'

[610] Fol. 88^{v}: 'Sed quid hymnos diei illius solemnis commemorem: quam suavi decurrant modulatione, quanto sententiarum pondere abundent, quantaque mysteriorum exuberant plenitudine?' and 89^{r}: 'Postremum si prosam ipsam [i.e. *O salutaris hostia*], in solenni missae officio concini solitam attendas: nihil illa concinnius aut suavis invenias. Gratissima quippe in ea rythmorum sonoritas: & dulcissima percipitur vocalitas.'

[611] Fol. 99^{v}: 'Sed ubinam ex institutione ecclesiastica dicuntur hymni & psalmi in laudem dei: nisi in horarum canonicarum decantatione aut lectione? Quomodo etiam fideles potissimum presbyteri & clerici, loquentur sibi ipsis in hymnis & psalmis atque canticis: si non annotentur hymni vel psalmi certa quadam assignatione, & recto digerantur ordine: in quibus concorditer & consona voce sibi ipsis loquantur & psallant?'

[612] Although the *Antilutherus* was published at Paris in 1524, it was republished in Cologne the following year by Quentel.

4. GEORG WITZEL AND MUSICAL MORALITY

If Wimpina's and Eck's interest in linking heavenly and earthly musical practices suggests that the Romanists' musical aesthetic was focused around imitating the music of the angels, then the polemic of Georg Witzel (1501–73) suggests otherwise.[613] A generation younger than Wimpina, Cochlaeus, or Eck, Witzel's concept of *musica* as he enunciated it in 1537 seems to have been quite unphilosophical and virtually identical to *ars canendi*.[614] Rather than suggesting that musical propriety represented an analogy for doctrinal orthodoxy or heavenly order, Witzel reckoned music practices to be a trope for Christian *morality*. Witzel's basic argument was that Lutherans write new songs, in which they expound their own doctrines; those doctrines are made attractive by the sweetness of the songs; the songs therefore 'lure' unsuspecting Christians into heresies that will condemn them to hell. Witzel thought that the Lutherans were *deliberately* seeking to convert Catholics to clearly heretical doctrinal positions through the same music they then used to anaesthetize their new converts to the obscenity of the doctrines contained in them. If Witzel was right, then the Lutherans were morally reprehensible irrespective of whether one agreed with their doctrines or not, for their method of conversion was trickery.

Witzel's morality-centred approach to anti-Lutheran polemic was partly conditioned by the tenor of theological disputation in the 1530s. After the circulation of the *Confessio Augustana* in 1530 and the publication a year later of Melanchthon's explanation of the text,[615] Lutheran and Catholic confessions began to separate from one another. German historians have labelled the

[613] Variously referred to by historians as a 'reformed Catholic' (I.G. LELOS, 'The Spirit in the Flesh: The Translation of German Pietist Imagery into Anglo-American Cultures', unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Texas-Austin, 2009, p. 38), an 'Erasmian' (W. MÖLLER, *Reformation and Counter-Reformation*, History of the Christian Church III, London, 1893, p. 136), a '*Vermittlungstheologe*' (B. HENZE, *Aus Liebe der Kirche Reform: Die Bemühung Georg Witzel's (1501–1573) um die Kircheneinheit*, Münster-Westfalen, 1995—the standard text on Witzel's theology—p. 207) and someone who wanted to 'follow a middle path between papal and Lutheran extremes' (I. BACKUS, *Historical Method and Confessional Identity in the Era of the Reformation (1385–1615)*, Leiden, 2003, p. 46), Witzel's methodology as a polemicist has only recently begun to elicit more interest than his perceived ecumenical value.

[614] In G. WITZEL, *De moribus veteris haereticorum & quibus cum illi hac aetate affinitatem habeant*, *passim.*

[615] MELANCHTHON, *Apologia Confessionis Augustanae*, Wittenberg, 1531.

period preceding the *Confessio* to be one of 'Glaubensspaltung', or 'separation of belief',[616] and the period following its publication to be one of 'Konfessionalisierung', or 'confessionalization'.[617] Assumptions valid in the 1520s about the necessity of church unity could, therefore, no longer be relied upon as bases upon which to construct persuasive arguments, since church unity was a thing of the past. The polemical ground had shifted, and it had done so, in Bagchi's words, on account of the fact 'that the traditional tactics [had] failed to hit home because Lutherans [did] not accept that they [were] heretics'.[618] The emphasis of Catholic polemics shifted over the course of the 1530s to take account of this, moving their goalposts from demonstrations of Lutheran doctrinal deviancy to straightforward proofs that the Lutherans were morally bankrupt. For 'if Protestants could be shown to *behave* in the same way as past heretics, there was no need to establish a doctrinal identity between them'.[619]

But expediency alone cannot account for the vigour with which Witzel attacked his opponents in his polemics and in his sermons; his was a convert's zeal. An Augustinian priested in 1522, Witzel converted to Lutheranism early in his adult life (at least by the middle of 1524), married and assumed the (reformed) pastorate of Wenigenlupnitz, before being translated to the pastorate of Niemeck by Luther. By 1531, however, Witzel had resigned his pastorate, returned to his home town of Vacha, and begun a preaching and teaching ministry against Luther and his followers. Unable to continue any pastoral duties as a Catholic on account of his marriage, Witzel dedicated the remainder of his life to itinerant preaching and teaching Hebrew, moving between Vacha, Dresden, Bohemia, Fulda and Mainz, with a stint in Leipzig where in 1538–9 he worked with the

[616] C. AUGUSTIJN, *Erasmus. Der Humanist als Theologe und Kirchenreformer*, Leiden, 1996, esp. ch. 8, 'Die Stellung der Humanisten zur Glaubensspaltung, 1518–30', pp. 141–53, notes that the period of 'Glaubensspaltung' was especially productive to the Biblicist-humanists—including Lefèvre, Clichtoveus, and Eck.

[617] See BRADY, 'Confessionalization: The Career of a Concept', in *Confessionalization in Europe, 1555–1700: Essays in Honour and Memory of Bodo Nischan*, ed. John M. Headley, Hans J. Hillerbrand and Anthony J. Papalas, Aldershot, 2004, pp. 1–20.

[618] BAGCHI, 'Defining Heresies: Catholic Heresiologies, 1520–50', 242.

[619] Loc. cit.

reformer Martin Bucer on potential avenues for reunion between moderate reformists and the Catholic Church.

The reasoning for Witzel's return to Rome, according to his own account, was dissatisfaction with the behaviour, rather than the doctrines, of Protestants.[620] Freed from the association between good works and salvation, Witzel found that Lutherans lived less, not more, righteous lives than their unreformed opponents. The twin axes of Lutheran theology—*sola fides* (the doctrine deprivileging good works) and the circumscription of human free will it necessitated—prompted Witzel's fiercest objections. 'For they sing thus: *Sie gelten nichts / sie künden nicht behütten*, that is, none of them [i.e. works] is any use, for they can't protect you'. *Sola fides*, he went on, 'excludes charity and the fruits of charity', leading German Christianity into an abyss of immorality.[621]

5.4.1 The Allure of Vernacular Song

As this little quotation demonstrates, Witzel's hatred of the quintessential Lutheran doctrine was associated in his mind with their singing. In 1539 he added to the ongoing dispute surrounding human free will (upon which a 'works-righteousness' theology was necessarily based, but upon which *sola fides* was not) by reframing the argument not in terms of competing doctrines, but in terms of competing songs.[622] As well as being an itinerant preacher, popular theologian, and heresiographer, Witzel was also an important hymnologist. He contributed five songs to the first

[620] WITZEL, *Apologia: das ist: ein vertedigs rede Georgij Wicelij wider seyde affterrede die Luteristen*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1536 (1533). Having been persecuted by both sides in the Reformation, Witzel was aware that he was in a unique position to critique the ongoing disputes within German religion, and published some 140 works, including his own genealogy (*Genealogion quoddam Georgij Wicelli*, 1557; facs. Fulda, 1976), indicating that he was acutely self-aware.

[621] WITZEL, *Postilla*, p. 64: 'Novi evangelistae bona opera sua orbant laude, negantes ea ut iustificare, aut servare. Sic enim cantillant: Sie gelten nichts / sie künden nicht behütten, hoc est, nullus eorum est usus, neque enim custodire possunt. O purum putum evangelium, illime plane est, Sola fides iustificat, etiam exclusa charitate *(sic)* & omnibus charitatis fructibus'.

[622] WITZEL, *Dialogorum Libri Tres*, Leipzig, 1539; cit. J. BEUMER, *Auf dem Wege der christlichen Einheit*, p. 110.

Catholic vernacular hymnbook, Michael Vehe's *New Gesangbüchlein* of 1537,[623] before going on to publish a number of songs in his own publications.[624] By his own admission, vernacular hymnody for the Catholic faithful was a necessity simply because Luther's vernacular songs were luring people away from the church.[625]

The accusation that the Lutherans used songs to tempt unsuspecting faithful away from the Catholic religion to embrace heresy lies at the heart of Witzel's moral objection to Lutheranism. Why, he asked, should the Lutherans have chosen to compose their own songs, there being so many perfectly usable biblical and patristic songs that they could easily and uncontroversially have used, unless it was because they wanted to indoctrinate their singers with unbiblical and unpatristic theology?

[623] M. VEHE, *Ein New Gesangbüchlein geistlicher Lieder*, Leipzig, 1537; facs. ed. W. Lipphardt, Mainz, 1970. Lipphardt identified five hymns *addenda* bearing the attribution 'G.W.' as Witzel's (cf. LIPPHARDT, 'Geleitwort').

[624] WITZEL, *Deutsch Betbuch* (1537; 2nd ed. 1539). No copy of the 1537 print run is known to have survived, which, since one reckons on around a 2.5% rate of survival for books from this period, suggests that the initial impression was only of a small number. The book was successful enough to warrant reprinting in another city two years later, and again in 1557 at Leipzig (to which impression the pagination below refers).

Following a short *Vorrede* (fols. Aii^{r}–Aiij^{v}), the contents of the *Betbuch* are as follows: Aiv^{r}–Bv^{r}: Declarations of Faith (Apostles' Creed, Nicene Creed, Irenaeus Bk. I ch. ii, St Basil on the faith, Athanasian Creed); Bv^{r}–Diij^{v}: Biblical Prayers (Vater Unser; Observations by Witzel on Prayer; Song of Moses; Prayer of Job; of Solomon [1 Kings 8]; of Isaiah [ch. 63f.]; of Jeremiah [Lamentations 5]; of Daniel [ch. 9]; of Joel [ch. 12]; Thanksgiving of Isaiah [ch. 12]; another [ch. 25]; of King David [1 Chr. 29]; of Tobias [Tobit ch. 3]; of Judith [ch. 7, 9]; of Mordecai [Esther ch. 13]; Thanksgiving of Joshua Syrach [Ecclesiasticus ch. 51]; of Susannah; in the Garden of Gethsemane [Matt. 26]; another [John ch. 17]; from Luke [which Witzel glosses as 'sehr kurtz und sehr gut']; of the healed beggar [Luke 17, 18]; of the Apostles [Acts 1, 4]; of Stephen [Acts 7]); Diij^{v}–Fvij^{r}: new prayers by Witzel (for faith, wisdom, forbearance, against tyranny, for the Christian life, the Church, of thanksgiving, for a repentant Christian returning to the Church, for the morning, for the evening, for night, for dinner, after dinner, of St Cyprian); Fvij^{v}–Kvi^{v}: Collects by Witzel (52 general collects; after David; Lenten prayers; Holy Week prayers); Kvi^{v}–M^{r}: Collected Sayings by St Paul on Prayer. Part II: M^{r}–Nij^{r}: Sayings by Witzel against Sin; Nij^{v}–Aa.iij^{v}: Collects by Witzel for Sunday Epistles and Gospels; Aa.iij^{v}–Aa.v^{v}: Prayer against the Turks; Aa.vi^{r}–Cc.iv^{r}: Rhymed Songs (strophic) by Witzel (1. Christmas Song [to the tune, *Ein Kindlein so löbelich*]; 2. *Corde Natus* Deutsch [usual chant]; 3. German *Ad coenam agni* [usual chant]; 4. German *Festum nunc celebre* [usual chant]; 5. Komm heyliger Geyst [*Veni sancte Spiritus*]; 6. Jerusalem du selig stadt ['fröhlich' (!) to *Urbs beata*]; 7. Song of the Three [i.e. Benedicite; no tune suggested]; 8. German Litany for the Laity [no tune suggested]; 9. Feyn Lied vom Geldt [*Christe qui lux es* in the tenor]; 10. Seven last words [no tune]; 11. Song for the Mass [to *Pange Lingua*]); Cc.iv^{r}–Ee.viij^{r}: General Prayers (esp. for children); Ee.viij^{v}–Ff.v^{v}: *Psaltes Ecclesiasticus* by Witzel (short, collect-like prayers on various themes); Ff.vi^{r}–Ffvij^{v}: Prayers for the Departed by Witzel; Ff.viij^{r}–Gg.vi^{v}: Discourse between Gottesforcht and Weltliebe (Witzel claims that this is not his, attributing it to one 'A.L.', a Burgermann of Nuremberg [1524]); Gg.vi^{v}–Hh^{v}: New Prayer for the 1539 Edition (what this replaced in the 1537 original is unclear—with no prayer on these fols., half a gathering would remain blank).

It is clear that, in the context of the *Betbuch* as a whole, the songs do not represent a significant proportion. Nevertheless, they appear to have been the most popular section, since they were republished with the prayers for children, the Discourse, and the 1539 prayer under the title *Odae Christianae* (1541). The *Psaltes Ecclesiasticus* was also published separately (Mainz, 1551).

[625] WITZEL, *Postilla*, p. 281.

> There are many Psalms in the Bible, very full of the spirit of David. The Catholic Church has the hymns of Ambrose, Augustine, and others, not of [Paul of] Samosata and the heretics. They are spiritual songs, even the prosas and sequences of the Church, and in them the Spirit is in full force, the extent of which you can see in the sentiment of the prosa containing these words:
>
> Now let us take our rest and sing,
> with the beloved tarrying,
> the marriage hour is come;
> The trumpets, as the guests go in,
> with echoing tones the feast begin,
> the psaltery charms them home;
> Ten thousand thousand voices raise
> with one shared tune the Bridegroom's praise,
> and Alleluya! Alleluya! cry
> in everlasting joy, unceasingly.[626]

Witzel considered that Luther's plea for 'good poets' to compose vernacular and edited versions of the Psalms amounted to a plea for a heretical doctrine to be dressed up in aesthetically pleasing clothing so that more people would ingest it.[627] As far as Witzel was concerned, this attempt to spread a new teaching by stealth-singing established a moral distinction between the songs in which 'the Spirit is in full force' that he and other 'hymnothetes' composed, and the 'dirges' of the Lutheran heretics:

> The songs [I have composed] are hymns of praise to God, which are either sung publicly or privately.… The hymnothetes of the church are not deserving of reprehension. I say the 'hymnothetes' of the church in order to distinguish them from the schismatics' dirges, for heretics have always had their composers. They sang Paul of Samosata his own songs in his presence: all sects have their songs, with which they make a mockery of the services of the church: examples of which, even today, Germany hears, and which I condemn.[628]

[626] Ibid., p. 603: 'Psalmi sunt multi in Biblijs, maxime spiritus pleni Daudici. Hymnos habet ecclesia catholicorum, Ambrosij, Augustini, & aliorum, non Samosaten & haereticorum. Cantica spiritualia sunt, etiam ecclesiae Prosae & Sequentiae, et hic spiritus est plenitudo, quale vides in Prosae sententia, quae sic habet: Iam in lecto cum dilecto / Quiescamus, & psallamus: Adsunt enim nuptiae / Quarum tonat initium / In tubis epulantium, Et finis per psalterium. Sponsum millena millia / Vna laudant melodia / Sine fine dicentia, Alleluia. Psallentes in cordibus, ait.' The prosa quoted by Witzel is the second part of the Sequence for the Octave of a church's Dedication, also used for the consecration of new churches in the Sarum Rite. The translation of it given here is by F. WARREN, *The Sarum Missal in English*, London, 1911, p. 421, with minor adjustments.

[627] *LW* liii:221; cf. *WA BR* iii:220.

[628] WITZEL, *Postilla*, p. 281: 'Sunt hymni cantica laudum Dei, sive ea publice decantentur, sive privatim…. Non ergo repraehendendi ecclesiae hymnothete. Ecclesiae hymnothetas dico, ad excipiendas naenias schismaticorum, habuerunt haeretici semper suos poetas. Paulum Samosatenum sui tanquam ipsum praesentem cecinerunt: aliae sectae sua cantica habuerunt, quibus ecclesiae perturbarent officia: quale exemplum etiam hodie sentit Germania, talia non probo.'

Witzel is adamant that the uncritically-minded were flocking to the Reformers' cause on the basis of their songs, and that reformed doctrine would be far less attractive were it not sugar-coated in songs. In a sermon for Passion Sunday, Witzel borrowed from one of Luther's most celebrated hymns to drive home his point—

> [h]eresies are kisses that try to sell their own gospel. Schisms are kisses that promise the reform of the church to themselves. They draw you to a new gospel and a reformation with their most enticing songs: *And were our world all devils here, and wished us to devour, yet we'd not feel such awful fear.*[629]

—before going on to add that, like kisses (and, we should perhaps infer, the viruses that come with them) Lutheran songs are catching and dangerous. Witzel's awareness of the practical impact of Lutheran songs in the early years of the Reformation was presumably drawn from first-hand experience at Niemeck.

That preaching and propagandizing through song was a significant force in the age of Reformation is by now well documented;[630] what is less well documented is that Catholics in sixteenth-century Germany realized it, and realized they had to start competing in the vernacular-song arena. Witzel pretended that his own songs were composed with only himself in mind ('These and many more similar songs I composed some time ago in Saxony, whenever I was overcome with enthusiasm for singing', he wrote in the introduction to the republication of songs from the *Deutsch Betbuch* in 1541).[631] But one can hardly take his suggestion that, stuck for some

[629] WITZEL, *Postilla*, p. 287: 'Oscula sunt haereses, Euangelion sese venditantes: oscula sunt schismata, reformationem ecclesiae sibi pollicentia. Quadrant euangelio novo & reformationi sua cantica concitatissima: wan die welt deufel were / unsere feihende toben / sie wollen uns fressen'. The hymn text is from the second stanza of *Ein feste Burg*. By quoting from it, Witzel is meaning to refer to the Lutheran rejection of the necessity of good works to the growth of the Christian soul towards a state worthy of heaven: Lutherans suggest they can simply flummox the devil without any virtue of their own.

[630] See e.g. Lipphard's demonstration that Vehe's hymnal was compiled precisely so that Catholic communities would not lose out in this respect (LIPPHARDT, 'Geleitwort', p. 8); also OETTINGER, *Music as Propaganda in the German Reformation*; SCRIBNER, 'Reformation, Carnival, and the World Turned Upside Down'.

[631] WITZEL, *Odae Christianae*, fol. Aij^{r}: 'Dise und der gleychen vil mehr Cantilen, machet ich vorzeytten in Sachssen, wenn mich etwa ein lust zu singen ankame.' Although the contents of the *Odae Christianae* are almost completely lifted from the *Deutsch Betbuch* it is evident that both new plates were made for the *Odae Christianae* (the format is different) and the text was also reprepared from scratch (frequently, spellings in the later book do not match those in the earlier text). The whole new book runs to just four gatherings (A^{r}–Dviii^{v}), though no text appears on the last leaf.

pious song to sing, he translated his favourite seasonal chants into German, at face value (why translate them at all, since he was a Latinist?). Rather, Witzel's heresiology makes clear that his songs were composed in an attempt to prevent other Catholics from defecting to Lutheranism on account of their populist singing habits.[632]

5.4.2 New Songs, Old Heresies, and Morality

Certainly Witzel had taken note of the attractiveness of the new Lutheran songs, and the inclusion of the laity in ecclesiastical singing, for he notes in his heresiology of 1537 that—at least in terms of the infectiousness of their songs—the Lutherans match and exceed the mythologized heresies of the past.

> In their services the Arians used to sing hymns and antiphons composed by themselves from their own doctrines. The present [i.e. Lutheran] practice is similar to their example, because in our time the sect makes up songs for the mockery of [right] doctrine. Drive out the songs of Lutheranism, and you will see with how much deceit they are composed. It is especially little women, insufficiently cautious, whom they have ensnared with their [songs'] novelty. A great number devoid of knowledge, devoid of restraint, a great number I declare badly fallen away and which has no soul, judges it more honourable and evangelical to sing with the Apostate than [to sing] with the Prophet (I mean David).[633]

> The Faustinians [i.e. Manichees] used to sing their doctrines daily, through both their patterns of worship and their own voices, precisely so as to impress them indelibly on everyone's minds.[634]

[632] Witzel makes a similar point, explaining that the lack of decent singing was one reason for his conversion to Lutheranism, in the foreword to the *Psaltes Ecclesiasticus*, fol. 1*ij^{v}–iij^{r}: 'Welchs zu Welchs zugeschehen anieng, wenn der Christen Läy in sich selbst schlüge, gedechte und spreche, Gott Herr und Vater, wes habe ich mich doch geziehen, das ich die Kirche also geflohen, und den Lateinischen Chor also gehasset habe, so ich doch dessen nichts höre noch lese, das ungöttlich, böss, und ergerlich sey, wie ich mich mit geferbe- *[1*iij^{r}]* ten falschen worten uberreden lassen habe?', and on fol. 1iij^{v} explains how he wishes his songs to be used 'zur erbawung Christlicher einigkeit, und zur mehrung Catholischer Kirchen'. Much of the remainder of the foreword to the *Psaltes Ecclesiasticus* (fols. 1*iv^{r}–2*iij^{v}) is given over to proving that Witzel's German songs stand in a long tradition of Catholic worship, from the fathers through to more recent times.

[633] WITZEL, *De moribus*, fol. Biv^{v}: 'Ariani hymnos et antiphonas ex suo ipsorum dogmate compositas in conventibus canebant. Cui exemplo mos ille affinis [*sc.* affines] est, quo hac tempestate sectae suas quaeque effingit cantilenas ad oppr[ob]rium dogmation *(sic)*. Excute cantiones Luterismi, & liquebit tibi quanto dolo compositae sint. Mulierculas parum sobrias ea novitate sibi plurimum devinxerunt. Populus absque scientia, absque iugo, populus inquam misere seductus & qui non habet cor, praedarius & magis Evangelicum esse iudicat, cum Apostata quam cum Propheta (Davidem sentio) psallere.'

[634] Fol. Dvij^{v}. 'Faustiniani sua dogmata quotidie & moribus & vocibus cantabant, ut ea videlicet penitissime in animos omnium imprimerent.'

> [Paul of Samosata] got women to sing [psalms] composed by himself, on the days after Easter, in the midst of the whole church—women many of whom he himself had brought in to sing to suit his own whim—and did it so as to antagonize anyone who heard it. He loved listening to those psalms of his, with a raised eyebrow. And isn't it true, that the German Sect dares to do exactly the same thing? … At the canticles of holy Scripture, at doxologies, at prayers held to be most sacred because they are ancient, at the most holy of readings they recoil and grow sick, whereas at their new songs—or at worse crimes, with which they gently instil their heresy in the hearts of simple folk, in which they wage war against the Church, in which they rant and rail, in which they pray for evil, in which they praise, idolize and worship themselves and their works: in short, in which they do whatever heretical sects do—at these things they get amazingly high.[635]
>
> This is exactly what is written about the Donatists, because they certainly sang songs composed by their human nature. Now remember what sort of compositions the Lutherans choose as tunes for their childish ditties, and you'll see how great the similarity between Lutheranism and Donatism really is.[636]

Likening Lutheran musical practice to the musical practices of Arianism,[637] Donatism,[638] Faustinianism,[639] Samosatenism[640] (and, indeed, to other practices of the Manichees, Pelagians,

[635] Fol. Civ^{r}–Civ^{v}: 'In semetipsum vero compositos, diebus paschae in medio Ecclesiae canere mulieres, maxime quas ipse prius ad canendum pro more instituerat, faciebat, ita ut horresceret, si quis audiret. Psalmos illos suos elato supercilio delectabatur audire. Nunquid verissimum est, quod Secta Germanica idem propemodum audet? … Ad cantica sacrae scripturae, ad Doxologias, ad precationes longe piissimas, ad lectiones sacratiss[imas] horrent ac nausent, ad sua vero nova carmina aut potius crimina, in quibus haeresin suam simplicium cordibus suaviter instillant, in quibus Ecclesiam criminantur, in quibus fulminant, in quibus male precantur, in quibus seipsos ac sua laudant, praeferunt, extollunt, breviter in quibus ea quae sunt sectae quaerunt, mirifice exhilarantur.' Witzel has borrowed much of his text from Eck (see above, p. 221–2 and n. 594).

[636] Fol. Civ^{v}: 'Huc spectat, quod scribitur de Donatistis, nempe quod Psalmos cecinerent humano ingenio compositos. Nunc recogita quali compositione Luteristae suas cantinunculas modulentur, & maximam inter hos confinitatem agnosces.'

[637] Arius, a presbyter serving under Alexander of Alexandria, was a third- and fourth-century heresiarch who claimed that the Son of God was created by God the Father, not begotten. The dissemination of his teachings and the controversy it inspired resulted in the calling of the first ecumenical council (of Nicaea in 325) and of the standardization of Christian doctrine on the incarnation. WILLIAMS, *Arius*, p. 1, notes that by the Middle Ages Arius' name had become associated with the Antichrist's; see also M. WILES, *Archetypical Heresies: Arianism Through the Centuries*, Oxford, 1996. The origin of the popular legend surrounding the musical practices of Arius' followers is Socrates Scholasticus, who recorded that they 'sang responsive verses adapted to the Arian heresy' as well as 'nocturnal hymns'. De VORAIGNE [de Voragine] reported in the *Legenda Aurea* (a hagiography of *c.*1260) in a passage clearly reliant on Socrates that 'the Arians, whose numbers were increasing, and who had a church outside the city, became so bold that one Sunday they pushed their way into John's own church, singing their hymns and antiphons, and shouting derisively, "Look at the fools who believe that three make one!"' (trans. Granger Ryan and Helmut Ripperger, *The Golden Legend*, London, 1941, p. 140); it is all but certain that Voraigne is Witzel's source, since Witzel used it as a basis for his own hagiography, *Hagiologum seu De Sanctis Ecclesiae* (Mainz, 1541). See S.L. REAMES, *The Legenda Aurea: A Reexamination of Its Paradoxical History*, Madison, WI, 1985), esp. pp. 54–6. I am indebted to Melissa M. Coll-Smith for drawing my attention to Witzel's relationship with the *Legenda Aurea*.

[638] Donatus Magnus led an early fourth-century schism in the church when, after the persecutions of Diocletian (esp. 302–5), his followers refused to accept the ministry of those clerics who had compromised the faith and repented. Essentially a purity movement, the sect grew to outnumber other Christians in North Africa during the later fourth century; they would later come to be classed as a movement that denied the indelibility of holy orders, which was condemned as heresy.

[639] Faustus of Milevis (now Mila, Algeria) was a Manichaean bishop, remembered principally because, after he converted to Christianity from Manichaeism, St Augustine wrote a tract against his teachings. (*Contra Faust. Manich.*) Witzel here refers to 'Faustinian' songs to mean Manichaean songs more widely, which included a 'very extensive tradition of psalm-composition': see I. GARDNER and S.N.C. LIEU, eds., *Manichaean Texts from the Roman Empire*, Cambridge, 2004, p. 253, and esp. pp. 176–9, 237–44, 246–9, 253–8. On Manichaeism, see n. 642, below.

and Nestorians)[641] was a useful trick for Witzel. Unlike encouraging clerics and religious to marry (another of the habits with which Witzel associated historic heretics) which was primarily a question of ecclesiastical governance, brainwashing 'little women, insufficiently cautious', 'get[ting] amazingly high', 'impress[ing] … indelibly on everyone's minds', 'instil[ling] their heresy in the hearts of simple folk' and 'pray[ing] for evil' are universal, fear-inducing, sinister motives; Witzel has inserted them carefully into his rhetoric for polemical effect. The overtones of Witzel's argument—that with their songs, the Lutherans perform a sort of forced indoctrination on the German populace—elevate his condemnation of Protestants out of the muddy waters of doctrinal dispute and into the clear-cut arena of basic morality. Tried against the laws of human morality, reasoned Witzel, the Lutherans could never be acquitted, since they rejected all good works in favour of a morally uninterested faith-practice.

Witzel's musical thought was noticeably different from that of Cochlaeus, Wimpina, and Eck: there is no suggestion in Witzel's sermons, heresiology, hagiography, or other writings that he was concerned with pseudo-Dionysian cosmic order, or that he thought of music in primarily a Thomistic way. Nor did he invoke music-theoretical concepts, focusing instead on the

(cont.)

[640] Paul of Samosata, bishop of Antioch between 260 and 268, was deposed in 269 for advocating Monarchianism (the heresy that full Godhead is retained by the Father alone) and adoptionism (the heresy that the person of Jesus of Nazareth was infused with divinity subsequent to his birth). The early church historian Eusebius recorded that Paul 'stops the psalms to our Lord Jesus Christ, as being the modern productions of modern men, and trains women to sing psalms to himself in the midst of the church on the great day of the passover, which any one might shudder to hear, and persuades the bishops and presbyters of the neighboring districts and cities who fawn upon him, to advance the same ideas in their discourses to the people.' EUSEBIUS, *Historia Ecclesia*, VII, xxx, trans. in *Eusebius Pamphilius: Church History*, ed. Philip Schaff and Henry Wace, FCC II, Edinburgh, 1885, I, p. 315.

[641] WITZEL, *De moribus*, fol. Av^{v}. Manichaeism is usually considered a Christian heresy on account of its similarity to and derivation from Syriac-Persian Gnosticism. Its provenance can also be traced, however, as an entirely separate religion, inspired by the writings of Mani (always referred to by Augustine of Hippo as 'Manichaeus', whence Witzel's term). Its invocation by Witzel and Catholic polemicists is derived from the strength of its association with Augustine's conversion. Pelagius (340–420 or 440) denied the doctrine of original sin, claiming that free will is absolute and does not depend on divine will for acts of objective goodness. Nestor (Nestorius) was Patriarch of Constantinople between 428 and 431. His view that the divine and human natures of the Second Person of the Trinity were entirely separate was condemned by the First Council of Ephesus (431) and the Council of Chalcedon (451), which held that the divine and human essences of Christ were distinct but not separable.

propaganda influence the musical practices of Lutheran communities had upon the behaviour of their followers.

This contrast can be explained in a number of ways. First, Witzel was younger than Cochlaeus, Wimpina, and Eck, and in his adulthood had never experienced life in a church not divided over doctrine. There was no point in arguing that Lutheran changes to liturgical or musical practice were unconscionable or should not be allowed, for by the 1530s those changes were already well established and showed no signs of declining. It was more sensible to argue that such changes were dangerous.

Second, Witzel's experience as a former Lutheran drew his attention to more pressing pastoral concerns than cosmic order; if the salvation of the German laity was at stake, what could be more relevant than the need for them to live lives of Christian responsibility? The plea not to abandon good works formed the heart of Witzel's preaching ministry, whereas the mandate of proving the Lutherans intellectually disordered formed the basis of Cochlaeus', Eck's, and Wimpina's work as theologians.

Third, whilst Cochlaeus, Wimpina, and Eck knew almost none of the repertory of the corpus of Lutheran songs, Witzel had first-hand experience of Protestant music-making. Accordingly, music and theology were most closely aligned in Witzel's thought in terms of the hymnological repertory, and not in terms of the relationship between heaven and earth.

5. CONCLUSION

The generational gap between Witzel and his earlier polemicist colleagues serves to underscore the degree to which the Romanists' ideas about music were determined by the necessities of their theological arguments. This does not mean that the Romanists' polemical invocations of music ought to be considered wholly removed from the discourse on musical aesthetics, for, indeed, all

of their invocations of music were aesthetic ones. Cochlaeus, for example, relied upon an aesthetic distinction (in chant theory) between *dissonantia* and *consonantia* for his polemic to make sense; Wimpina argued that the music of the church needed to be as closely identical to the music of the angels as it could to have its fullest efficacy (a long-time mainstay of mediæval musical aesthetics); Eck used the patristic invention of antiphonal song to prop up the canonic hours; and Witzel criticized the musical pleasantness of songs whose texts he considered abhorrent. Each of these proposals *is* an aesthetic proposal; but it is not *driven by* aesthetic concerns.

Rather, each invoked music for theological reasons. Cochlaeus invoked musical discourse in order to paint Luther as devilish, naturally wrong and incapable of being reasoned with, by analogizing him and his followers with musical dissonance. Wimpina saw the musical signs of the sacrament as necessities and rejected any attempts to alter the musical practices of the church as attempts to demolish the sacramental system of grace exchange. Eck, whose primary purpose as a controversialist and polemicist was to argue that papal authority was not unreasonable, relied upon the Dionysian *Celestial Hierarchy* (and probably Clichtoveus) to defend the papacy, but was obliged to apply its principle of the hierarchy of being to heavenly and earthly song practices, too. Witzel, meanwhile, saw Lutheran musical thought with probably the most sensitive eye: he regarded Lutheran songs to be nothing more than propaganda.

In spite of their sharp differences, however, the theological understanding of music demonstrated by these four Romanist opponents of Luther is similar in one core regard. All four consider musical difference to be a sign of theological difference; all four reckon that orthodoxy and conservation of existing song practice (or musical laws) belong together. In this regard, the polemicists' view of music differed sharply from that of Luther, who saw no natural relationship between musical difference and theological difference. Indeed, we can observe that the acceptability of inventing new songs for worship became one of the most clear distinctions

between the Lutherans and their Romanist opponents early on in the process of confessionalization, and that it was noted as such by Witzel.

* * *

At the beginning of this chapter, we posed two questions. First: can we consider Luther's musical thought representative of all contemporary theologians' musical thought? And second: can we characterize early sixteenth-century German musical thought as basically mediæval in nature?

The answer to the first question is clearly that we cannot. Each of the polemicists examined in this chapter demonstrated approaches to music's engagement with theological ideas strikingly different from that of his colleagues', because the ideological ends of his individual polemic were different from those of his contemporaries' publications. One polemicist reckoned *musica* basically a metaphorical 'field' for exemplifying theology, two considered music as a mirror of heavenly order, and a fourth treated music as a moral and practical concern. In the same way that the Romanist polemicists' invocations of music were dictated exclusively by the needs of their respective theological arguments, Luther's musical thought was conditioned by his own theological proposals—proposals not shared by his opponents. On the evidence of the four polemicists explored in this chapter, no single basic approach to musical thought was shared even *within* the community of those writers whose end goal was the support of Roman religion. If grouping together the Romanist polemicists' musical thought in this way is a futile endeavour, then grouping together *all* the Reformation-era theological contributors' thought on music—as if Luther's musical thought stood for that of his opponents, and vice versa—is all the more senseless a task.

The answer to the second question draws upon the first. We cannot conclude that the anti-Lutheran polemicists' musical thought was 'mediæval' any more than we can conclude that it was not, *precisely because* their ideas about music were subordinated to their theological concerns. As the theological position went, so went the musical position: Wimpina, for example, was a scholastic Thomist, so his musical thought reflected that. Eck, meanwhile, was basically a *via moderna* humanist, and his musical thought borrowed from Ficinian humanism accordingly. (The apparent similarity between Eck's and Wimpina's musical thought on the grounds that both appealed to the music of the angels consequently disguises a sharp methodological difference in their musical and theological reasoning.) Cochlaeus' contribution to music-theological discourse, meanwhile, makes sense only if we accept that he deliberately ignored some of his own musical knowledge in making his theological points about *dissonantia*. And Witzel's attention to music as a practical, moral act defies characterization as indigenous to one epoch or the other.

To describe the musical thought of these thinkers as basically 'mediæval' or 'early modern', then, is to miss the point. Their musical ideas were consistently *secondary* to their overriding concern of winning the theological argument by whatever means available. We must conclude that if, for example, Cochlaeus had been able to demonstrate Luther's objective wrongness by a thoroughly 'modern' argument, he would have done so. Similarly, if Witzel had been able to demonstrate conclusively that Lutherans were morally bankrupt via much older modes of thought, he would have used them.

The evidence of this chapter broadens our portrait of musical thought in the early German Reformation period in two ways. First, it disabuses us of the notion that epochal distinctions or philosophical fashions are relevant concerns in the deployment of musical ideas and musical reasoning in theological arguments. The theological writers of early sixteenth-century Germany were essentially opportunist in their use of musical ideas to make theological points. Second, it confirms that, *in spite of this opportunism*, musical thought remained proximate to theological

thought in the early sixteenth-century German imagination. The fact that the polemicists *did* invoke music at all to shore up their arguments, demonstrates that they still reckoned music to be a theological discipline.

CONCLUSION:
PROCRUSTES' BED AND EARLY GERMAN REFORMATION-ERA MUSICAL THOUGHT

The initial impetus for this study was, I observed in the Introduction, the possibility that the religious Reformation of early sixteenth-century Germany effected a paradigm shift in the conceptualization and treatment of music by later music theorists. The broader idea under scrutiny was that the theology of the Reformation effected an epochal shift in Western history, as well as in Western aesthetics. We shall examine the consequences of our findings for each of these notions in turn, beginning with specific and working outward to general conclusions. Finally, we shall enunciate some of the historiographical truths that this dissertation has exemplified.

Μικρόκόσμος*: von Loesch and the Musical Work-Concept*

When von Loesch began his *Habilitation* research, he had a specific relation between the theology of the German Reformation and contemporary musical aesthetics in mind. The commensurability of one system of thought to the other was brokered by the concept of *work*, a 'pivot' common to both frameworks of knowledge. The pivotal nature of that concept for the two systems, however, was a phenomenon integral to Hegel's philosophy of history, and not to the sixteenth century. Equating the musical work-concept with the aesthetic category of Hegel, von Loesch rejected not only the *specific* relationship of commensurability he had expected to witness between sixteenth-century music theory and sixteenth-century theology, but the *possibility of any* commensurability

between the two systems of thought in the sixteenth century. In other words, von Loesch's rejection of commensurability occurred because he made the category of the musical work *necessary* to musical-theological commensurability, on the grounds that Hegel had done so in the *Phänomenologie des Geistes*.

The evidence presented in Chapters II, III, IV, and V of this dissertation all support the notion that the commensurability between theological work-concept and musical work-concept von Loesch expected to find did not occur in the sixteenth century. That does not mean, as von Loesch presumed it did, that there was no theological work-concept or no musical work-concept in the sixteenth century; nor does it mean that there was no commensurability between sixteenth-century theological ideas and sixteenth-century musical aesthetics more generally—for, indeed, my findings in chapters III, IV, and V confirm that there was. Rather, it means that, for contingent reasons, the theological work-concept of Luther was not the formal cause of the innovative enunciation of the musical work-concept in early Lutheran music-theory textbooks.

The distinction between von Loesch's and my findings is that his are based on philosophical *necessity*, and mine are based upon historical *contingency*. This distinction has become a commonplace in recent arguments about the ontology of the musical work-concept; Strohm and Goehr argued over it (Strohm, 'Looking Back at Ourselves', p. 140; Goehr, '"On the Problems of Dating"', pp. 236–8), and Haas complained about the philosophical over-emphasis of von Loesch's *Habilitationsschrift* (Haas, *Musikalisches Denken im Mittelalter*, pp. 160–67). If this dissertation contains a plea to the music history discipline of some sort, it is a plea for musicological *Begriffsgeschichten* to focus attention more on historical contingencies than on philosophical-conceptual integrities.

The analyses that have arisen from such a pro-contingential position paint a picture of musical thought in the early German Reformation which is different from that conventionally exhibited in

music history books. Where conventional accounts of early sixteenth-century music history have refracted the period as one of 'transition', of absorption of ideas from other disciplines, or (when dealing with the influence of Protestantism) of an almost puritanically single-minded focus on text declamation, each of my substantive chapters notes the difficulty of identifying their respective subject(s) within these standard refractions. Perhaps the most pressing conclusion to have come from the research for this dissertation is that, when contextualized and subjected to close reading, the musical thought of early Reformation Germany cannot be treated homogeneously at all. As such, the 'musical thought' of the period must consequently be addressed as a category incorporating contradiction, difference, and dynamic dependency upon thought originating in other fields.

Μάκροκόσμος: *Musical History and the Quest for the Modern Self*

How, then, can we make sense of the musical thought of the early German Reformation period in the light of other music histories? The findings in this dissertation challenge the neat 'boxes' into which early sixteenth-century musical discourse has been pressed to fit. It is not possible, for example, to label Listenius', Luther's, or the Romanist polemicists' musical ideas as either squarely 'modern' or 'mediæval'—or, for that matter, as solidly 'innovative' or 'conservative'. Examined on its own terms, each has been shown to be dislocated from those historico-philosophically driven categories inevitably brought to bear upon accounts of sixteenth-century discourse, and to be sensical only when radically integrated into its own web of historical relations.

But no proposition, historical or historiographical, (to borrow from Taruskin) 'ever comes "on its own terms"'; no proposition about the past 'can ever be truly innocent' historically speaking (R. Taruskin, *The Oxford History of Western Music*, IV, p. 478), when the gaze of an historian is brought to bear. Nowhere is this truism more evident than when dealing with the

history and ontology of modernity itself, and with the way in which modern and postmodern historians have constructed the drama of history as an *Auf-* or *Abbau* of modernity.

The modernist philosophy of history, in which the unity of the Absolute determines historico-philosophical immanence, the contour of history, and the lenses through which historical contours are refracted, is the great contribution to thought of Hegel. This same philosophy of history produced the interface between aesthetic thought and theological thought that brokered the interface between musical and theological work-concepts in von Loesch's horizon of expectation. So normative has this lens become to subsequent historiographical prospection that its refraction of the historical vista has been rendered almost indiscernible, and events and ideas that run contrary to it have become all but invisible. In the case of the Reformation, theological ideas about music that cannot be incorporated into such a modernist, epochal and paradigmatic, view of the Reformation as a 'liberation' have (recent contributions by Oettinger, Alexander Fisher, Joseph Herl, and Christopher Boyd Brown aside) largely been filtered out, or pushed to the edges of the historical field of vision. The result, in present-day histories of music, is that Reformation-era musical thought is automatically categorized either as modern (in the Hegelian sense) or mediæval (the paradigmatic antipode of modernity). Both automatic categorizations, as the evidence of Chapters III, IV and V confirms, perform procrustean surgery on the objects of their classification.

Automatic categorizations cannot take account of the contradictions inherent in much early sixteenth-century musical thought. Luther, for example, *did* think systematically and theologically about music in a dialectical way that—if Hegel's historico-philosophical characterization of modernity is applied to it—makes it appear continuous with Hegel's own aesthetics; but he conspicuously *did not* pivot between his aesthetic and theological thought via the concept of the artwork (as Hegel did). In this and in many other regards, Luther's aesthetic

thought is profoundly unmodern. There is a sense in which Luther's musical thought therefore fits *neither* the criteria for classification as 'mediæval' *nor* those for classification as 'modern'. For the reason that their musical aesthetics were entirely subordinated to divergent rhetorical-polemical goals, meanwhile, the Romanist polemicists' musical thought defies easy categorization according to classical Hegelian epochs altogether.

This epochal-category defiance tempts us to consider the contributions of the Reformation-era theological writers to contemporary musical thought in one of two ways. The first (which von Loesch chose) is to treat sixteenth-century theological ideas about music in isolation from other ideas that fit better into the conventional historical category-schema. In this temptation, there seems to be no point in trying to integrate the contributions of early German Reformation-era thinkers to musical aesthetic discourse with other contemporary contributions that better fit the epochally-predetermined narratives. This approach looks at the evidence of Luther's musical thought and the musical discussions of the Romanists in their polemic, notes their apparent irreconcilability with conventional narratives of Renaissance and modernity, and declares them insignificant for the trajectory of music history.

The second temptation is to focus attention on those singular Reformation-era theological assertions which, *abstracted from their context*, nevertheless support the broader narrative-categories, and to ignore both those assertions which contradict them and the theological 'thick description' which contextualizes them. (This temptation is exemplified by Cahn, Gurlitt, Dahlhaus, and, occasionally, Leaver).[642]

Both approaches are self-fulfilling prophecies. The more isolated a music-historical idea is from its historical or theological 'thick description', the more abstracted and reified that idea can

[642] This approach is the historically more appropriate, since Luther's followers did, by and large, treat his musical thought in this way—i.e. apart from his broader theological nexus. But however appropriate it may be, it still does violence to the history of early sixteenth-century German musical thought, because it abstracts Luther's contribution from its own *intentional* context.

become in the historiographical imagination; and the more it is cut loose from the historical-contextual moorings that might prevent its utilization in the stabilization of ideological narratives. Needless to say, such narratives then go on to entrench the analytic method by which they themselves have been constructed, an entrenchment that (as we saw in Chapter I) results in the construction of Reformation-era theology and aesthetics in the image of the constructor.

Ἱστόριογραφή, ἱστόριοποίησις: Music History and the 'thin air of thought'

Part of the problem is that the *historical and intellectual context* from which theological ideas are abstracted is itself an historiographical construct, and is consequently *itself* malleable to the needs of the historical narrative it circumstantiates. The observation of Strohm, that music history holds together 'not by material cohesion but in the thin air of thought' is, strictly speaking, true for all history; but it is all the more so for musicology, because music historians (as Dahlhaus observed on numerous occasions) deal with timelessly re-presentable artefacts as a matter of course, and with the accumulated 'memory historical' baggage they bring with them.

The attention to the category of timelessness in music-historical research (and probably the relative youth of the discipline) has led music historians to downplay the radical historical contingency of the past which they address, and to render the past 'translateable' to the present. One trusty mechanism for achieving this is to equate historical specificity with *ideological* specificity. For example: musicology is peculiarly obsessed with globalizing the idea of 'Renaissance' (which, properly speaking, was only ever an *ideology* of history) to count as an historical 'period', too. (Even anti-periodic periodizations (e.g. 'the Age of Josquin') do not seek to veil their attempt to equate an historical time-window with a particular ideal.) Identifying historical specificity with ideological specificity has the desired effect of anachronizing the historical past so that it can become commensurable to the present-day music-lover. The most

enduring of such tropes are those which are apparently the most comprehensive—Reformation, modernity, and (especially in recent decades) Renaissance. Where the historical time-windows to which they often refer (the *Quattrocento*, the sixteenth century, early modernity) remain distant and meaningless designations to the art-lover, the *ideas* equated with them can now carry their historical currency (and, be it noted, *moral* currency) in the present-day imagination.

The Other thus 'Selfed'—the alien thus assimilated—the now-timeless commensurability of the idea/ideal establishes itself in an alterity with the historically-anchored incommensurability of the period out of which that idea/ideal grew. Idea/ideal, as timeless, now stands in opposition to the punctiliar historical time-window in which it operated, simply on the grounds that the one is radically dehistoricized and the other is shifted further into the past historic. Such a psychological distinction (of the idea/ideal 'humanism' from the period of 'the Middle Ages', for example) is misleading (for where else did 'humanism' come from, if not from 'the Middle Ages'?), but nevertheless persuasive: the *commensurability* of the idea/ideal itself functions as its mode of separation from the *incommensurable* 'thick description' that now provides mere historiographical wadding for the idea/ideal.

Παράδειγματα: *The Consequences of Music-Historiographical Conventions for Music History*

As Bent, Strohm, and others have shown, this process of *idealization* of a particular past, which privileges certain historiographical motifs over others, has led in musicological studies to an often one-dimensional view of the Middle Ages as 'not-Renaissance' or 'not humanist'. We can add that it has also led to a monochrome portrait of the interaction between musical thought and theological-philosophical ideas—one in which the quadrivial understanding of *musica* as scientific *ars liberalis* has become a synecdoche for mediæval musical aesthetics. Our findings in Chapter III challenge this synecdoche; however central the quadrivial paradigm may have been in mediæval

musical thought, the evidence of Gerson and the rise of musical mysticism demonstrates that it was not *everything* there was to mediæval musical aesthetics.

The tendency to treat it as if it was anomalizes the sort of non-normative historical accounts presented in this dissertation. Such anomalization entrenches itself, in that, having been excluded from music-historical accounts, these non-normative histories are never allowed to challenge the paradigm that initially anomalized them in the first place. At the same time, the anomalization contributes both to the ease with which Reformation-era musical thought can be dehistoricized, abstracted, and reified, and to the consignment to historical and epochal insignificance of those early German Reformation-era theological discussions of music that do not fit Procrustes' bed.

The solution is not, as James Webster (Webster, 'The Eighteenth Century as a Music-Historical Period?', *Eighteenth-Century Music*, I (2004), 47–60) has noted, to throw out music-historical periodization altogether, nor to sound the death-knell of musical 'paradigms', as if historical phenomena as intellectually important as these could be undone by the force of wishful thinking alone. Rather, it is to hold on to periods and paradigms less tightly. For, had our pursuit of a Renaissancist aesthetic ideal not so conditioned our approach to Listenius' *Musica*, we would have noticed and been impressed by the remarkable pedagogical dexterity his textbook displays.

Had our view of Luther not been so bound up with the category of modernity, we would have noticed sooner that his musical aesthetic is profoundly unmodern.

Had our reception of the German Romanists not been pre-conditioned by the notion that, before humanism, all musical aesthetics were basically theological in nature, whereas after it, theological observations about music's grammar, station, or use were not aesthetic statements, the picture of Reformation-era musical aesthetics that von Loesch used as the backdrop for his *Habilitationsschrift* would have portrayed a rich and complex landscape of interactions between

musical and theological ideas in sixteenth-century Germany—a landscape in which the Hegelian broker of the artwork-concept was unnecessary.

Proposals

Holding our epochal designations lightly, then, we must wonder whether the musical thought of the early German Reformation period can really be considered 'modern' in the sense that Dahlhaus, von Loesch, Zenck, Gurlitt, Seidel, and others characterized it.

Hendrix' observation that 'Martin Luther was a medieval man' makes it tempting simply to propose the extension of the musical Middle Ages into the middle of the German sixteenth century, ending only at the point when Dressler began to speak meaningfully about *musica poetica* as a serious component of musical research (1563/4), and when the pseudo-rhetorical turn in music that Niemöller erroneously equated with Listenius' textbook begins to surface as a *topos* in forewords to Lutheran music anthologies (in the period after the 1560s; see esp. R. Redeker, *Lateinische Widmungsvorrede zu Mess- und Motettendrucken der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts*, pp. 375–80, for an account of how the Italian humanistic consideration of musical anthologies as *texts* came to gradually extend its influence over Germany over the course of the 1540s, 1550s, and 1560s).

But even a description of the period as 'more mediæval than modern' is problematized by some of the evidence presented in this dissertation. Listenius, for example, appears to have been a keen humanist in the sense that he prized pedagogical practice; and the anti-Reformation polemicists' musical thought fits into neither of the established categories of 'conservative' or 'innovative'. Indeed, if we *were* to extend the period of 'late mediæval musical thought' forward to include early Reformation Germany, then we would be obliged to note that much of the evidence undermines the very characterization we were proposing—an annotation that diminishes the

purposefulness of proposing any specific paradigm for musical thought in the first place. It might be better to simply admit that the period of musical thought between *c.*1513 and *c.*1549 fits into neither epochal category convincingly, and to allow the contradictory and conflicting evidence the period presents to speak for itself.

However we choose to categorize the musical thought we have examined in this study, one thing is clear. Early Reformation theology was not the cause of a paradigm shift in *musica*. Removing this plank from the structural hermeneutic with which we address sixteenth-century musical thought is liberating: Niemöller's dating problems fall away; Dahlhaus' *systematische Mitte* can be returned to the systematic toolkit from which it was originally borrowed (its historical ancestry left undisclosed); the prejudice of equality of modern-day historians towards the past inches towards deconstruction; and the mythology of the commensurability of the past to the present is revealed for the mental construct that it is. Listenius theory can be reviewed on its own terms, in the context of the sixteenth-century classroom, rather than in the context of twentieth-century debates about the musical work-concept; Luther's musical aesthetic can be recognized as at once exceptionally original and well-developed, at the same time as it is conceded that it had virtually no impact upon his followers' musical thought; and the Romanist polemicists' subordination of music to theology can be addressed as the opportunistic attempt it was to use sixteenth-century Germans' musical prejudices against the Reformation.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SIXTEENTH-CENTURY SOURCES

COCHLAEUS, Johannes. *Commentaria Ioannis Cochlaei, de Actis et Scriptis Martini Lutheri Saxonis*. Leipzig: F. Behem, 1549.

———. *Tetrachordum Musices*. Nuremberg: Weyssenburger, 1511; H. Stuchs, 1512; Peypus, 1514, 1516, 1520. Facs. ed. Hildesheim: G. Olms, 1971.

ECK, Johann. *Enchiridion locorum communium adversus Lutherum & alios hostes ecclesiae*. Landshut, 1525. Republ. as *Corpus Catholicorum – Werke katholische Schriftstellen im Zeitalter der Glaubesspaltung 34*, ed. P. Fraenkel. Münster-Wesfalen: Aschendorff, 1979.

FABER, Heinrich. *Musica poetica*. Ms. 1548.

LISTENIUS, Nicolaus. *Musica Nicolai Listenii.* Wittenberg: G. Rhau, 1537, 1539, 1542, 1544, 1548, 1549, 1554, 1555, 1557. Augsburg: H. Steiner, 1538. Nuremberg: Petreius, 1539, 1541, 1544, 1547, 1548, 1549 (facs. ed. Georg Schünemann, Berlin: Breslauer, 1927), 1550, 1551; G. Hain, 1557; D. Gerlach, 1569; K. Gerlach, 1577, 1583. Leipzig: Blum, 1542, 1543, 1546, 1549, 1553. Trans. Albert Seay, *Nicolaus Listenius: Music* (Musica), Colorado Springs: Colorado College Music Press, 1975.

———. *Rudimenta musicae planae*. Wittenberg: G. Rhau, 1533. Augsburg: H. Steiner, 1535, 1536, 1537, 1540. Bern: S. Apiarius, 1537.

WIMPINA [i.e. KOCH], Conrad. *Sectarum errores, hallucinationes et schismatica ab origine ferme christianae ecclesiae ad haec usque nostra tempora concisioris Anacephalaeosis, una cum aliquantis Pigardicarum, Vuiglefticarum et Lutheranum haeresum confutationibus librorum partes tres*. Frankfurt/Oder: Hanau, 1528.

WITZEL, Georg. *Dn. Georgij Wicelij Postilla, hoc est, enarratio Epistolarum et Euangeliarum de tempore et de Sanctis per totum annum*. Cologne: J. Quentel, 1553.

———. *Psaltes ecclesiasticus. Chorbuch der Heiligen Catholischen Kirchen*. Cologne: Quentel, 1550.

———. *Odae christianae. Etliche christliche Gesenge, Gebete vnd Reymen, für die Gotsförchtigen Läyen*. Mainz: F. Behem, 1541.

———. *Deutsch Betbuch*. [N.p.], [1537]. 2nd ed. [n.p.] 1539, 1557.

———. *De moribus veterum haereticorum & quibus cum illi hac aetate affinitatem habeant*. Leipzig: Wolrab [and Eisleben], 1537.

SECONDARY SOURCES

ABERT, Heinrich. *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Friedrich Blume. Halle: Schneider, 1929.

ALAND, Karl, ed. *Martin Luther's 95 Theses: With the Pertinent Documents from the History of the Reformation*. St Louis, MO: Concordia, 1967.

ANTTILA, Miikka E. 'The Innocent Pleasure: A Study on Luther's Theology of Music'. Unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Helsinki, 2011.

ASSEL, Heinrich. *Der Andere Aufbruch. Die Lutherrenaissance – Ursprünge, Aporien und Wege: Karl Holl, Emanuel Hirsch, Rudolf Hermann (1910–1935)*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994.

ATLAS, Allan W. *Renaissance Music: Music in Western Europe, 1400–1600*. New York & London: W.W. Norton, 1998.

St AUGUSTINE of Hippo. *Confessions*. Trans. Henry Chadwick. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998.

BAEUMER, Max. 'Nietzsche and Luther: A Testimony to Germanophilia'. In James O'Flaherty, Timothy F. Sellner and Robert M. Helm, eds., *Studies in Nietzsche and the Judaeo-Christian Tradition*, pp. 143–60. Chapel Hill, N.C.: UNC Press, 1985.

BAGCHI, David V.N. 'Defining Heresies: Catholic Heresiologies, 1520–50'. *SCH*, XLIII (2005), 241–51.

———. 'Luther's Catholic Opponents'. In Andrew Pettegrew, ed., *The Reformation World*, pp. 97–108. London: Routledge, 2000.

———. *Luther's Earliest Opponents: Catholic Controversialists 1518–1525*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991.

BAINTON, Roland H. *Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther*. New York: Abingdon Press, 1950.

———. 'Dürer and Luther as the Man of Sorrows'. *The Art Bulletin*, XXIX (1947), 269–72.

BARGE, Hermann. *Andreas Bodenstein von Karlstadt*. Leipzig: Brandseter, 1905, 2 vols. Repr. Nieukoop: De Graaf, 1968.

BARTEL, Dietrich. *Musica Poetica: Musical-Rhetorical Figures in German Baroque Music*. Lincoln, NE: Nebraska UP, 1997.

BÄUMER, Remegius. 'Die Erforschung der kirchlichen Reformationsgeschichte seit 1931: Reformation, katholische Reform und Gegenreformation in der neueren katholischen Reformationsgeschichtsschreibung in Deutschland'. *Erträge der Forschung*, XXXIV (1975), 39–127.

BECK, Lewis White. 'The Reformation, the Revolution, and the Restoration in Hegel's Political Philosophy'. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, XIV (1976), 51–61.

BENT, Margaret. 'Grammar and Rhetoric in Late Medieval Polyphony'. In Mary Carruthers, ed., *Rhetoric Beyond Words: Delight and Persuasion in the Arts of the Middle Ages*, pp. 52–72. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2010.

———. 'The Grammar of Early Music: Preconditions for Analysis'. In Cristle Collins Judd, ed., *Tonal Structures in Early Music*, pp. 15–60. New York: Garland, 1998.

———. '*Res facta* and *Cantare super librum*'. *JAMS*, XXXVI (1983), 371–91.

BERANEK, Joseph. *Johann Friedrich Danneil. Seine Verdienst um die Heimat- und Urgeschichtsforschung in der Altmark*. Halle: Martin Luther-Universität, 1969.

BERGEN, Doris L. 'Hosanna or "Hilf, O Herr Uns": National Identity, the German Christian Movement, and the "Dejudaization" of Sacred Music in the Third Reich'. In C. Applegate and P. Potter, eds., *Music & German National Identity*, pp. 140–54. Chicago: Chicago UP, 2002.

BEUMER, Johannes. *Auf dem Wege zur christlichen Einheit. Vorlänger der ökumenischen Bewegung von der Anfängen des Humanismus bis zum Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts*. Bremen: Schünemann, 1966.

BIELFELDT, Dennis. 'Deification as a Motif in Luther's *Dictata super Psalterium*'. *SCJ*, XXVIII (1997), 401–20.

BLACKBURN, Bonnie J. 'For Whom Do the Singers Sing?'. *EM*, XXV (1997), 593–609.

BLANKENBURG, Walter. 'Überlieferung und Textgeschichte von Martin Luthers "Encomion musices"'. *L-Jb*, XXXIX (1972), 80–104.

BOUCHER, Bruce. 'Jacob Burckhardt and the "Renaissance" North of the Alps'. In Thomas DaCosta Kaufmann and Elizabeth Pilliod, eds., *Time and Place: The Geohistory of Art*, pp. 21–36. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.

BOWEN, William R. 'Augustine in Medieval and Renaissance Musical Science'. In Richard R. LaCroix, ed., *Augustine on Music: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays*, pp. 29–52. Lampeter: Mellen, 1988.

BRAUN, Werner. *Deutsche Musiktheorie des 15. bis 17. Jahrhunderts. II: Von Calvisius bis Mattheson*. Ed. Thomas Ertelt and Friedrich Zaminer. Geschichte der Musiktheorie, VIII/2. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994.

BRENNECKE, Wilifried. *Die Handschrift A.R. 940/41 der Proske-Bibliothek zu Regensburg. Ein Beitrag zur Musikgeschichte im zweiten Drittel des 16. Jahrhunderts*. Schriften des Landesinstituts für Musikforschung Kiel, I. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1953.

BRINKS, Jan Herman. 'Luther and the German State'. *Heythrop Jounal*, XXXIX (1998), 1–17.

BROWN, Christopher Boyd. *Singing the Gospel: Lutheran Hymns and the Success of the Reformation*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 2005.

BURCKHARDT, Jacob. *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. Trans. S.G.C. Middlemore. London: C.K. Paul, 1878.

BURGESS, Stanley. 'Medieval Examples of Charismatic Piety in the Roman Catholic Church'. In Russell P. Spittler, ed., *Perspectives on the New Pentecostalism*, pp. 14–26. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1977.

BUSH, Helen E. 'The Recognition of Chordal Formation by Early Music Theorists'. *MQ*, XXXII (1946), 227–43.

BUSZIN, Walter E. 'Luther on Music'. *MQ*, XXXII (1946), 80–97.

BUTT, John. 'The Seventeenth-Century Musical "Work"'. In T. Carter and J. Butt, eds., *The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Music*, pp. 27–54. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005.

CAHN, 'Zur Vorgeschichte des "Opus perfectum et absolutum" in der Musikauffassung um 1500'. In Klaus Hortschansky, ed., *Zeichen und Struktur in der Musik der Renaissance: Ein Symposium aus Anlass der Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Musikforschung, Münster (Westfalen) 1987*, pp. 11–26. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1989.

———. '"Ars poetica" und Musica poetica — Quintilian und Horaz in der Musiktheorie und Kompositionslehre des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts'. In *Ainigma*, pp. 23–33. Fs. Helmut Rahn, pp. 23–33. Bibliothek der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaften (Neue Forschungen) II/LXXVIII. Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1987.

CHUA, Daniel K.L. *Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999.

COLEMAN, Janet. 'The Practical Use of *Begriffsgeschichte*'. *Finnish Yearbook of Political Thought*, III (1999), 23–49.

COPELAND, Rita. *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages: Academic Traditions and Vernacular Texts*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991.

COURTENAY, William J. *Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*. Leiden: Brill, 2008.

CREVEL, Marcus van. *Adrianus Petit Coclico: Leben und Beziehungen eines nach Deutschland emigrierten Josquinschülers*. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1940.

CROCKER, Richard. 'Discant, Counterpoint, and Harmony'. *JAMS*, XV (1962), 1–21.

CULLINGTON, J. Donald, and Reinhard STROHM, eds., *On the Dignity and Effects of Music. Egidius Carlerius, Johannes Tinctoris: Two Fifteenth-Century Treatises*. Translations by J. Donald Cullington. London: King's College London, 1996.

CUMMING, Julie E. 'Concord out of Discord: Occasional Motets of the Early Quattrocento'. Unpubl. PhD thesis, University of California-Berkeley, 1987.

CUMMINGS, Brian. *The Literary Culture of the Reformation: Grammar and Grace*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002.

DAHLHAUS, Carl. *The Idea of Absolute Music*. Trans. R. Lustig. Chicago & London: Chicago UP, 1989.
———. 'Epochen und Epochenbewusstsein in der Musikgeschichte'. In R. Herzog and R. Koselleck, *Epochenschwelle und Epochenbewusstsein*, pp. 81–96. Munich: W. Fink, 1987.
———. *Foundations of Music History*. Trans. J.B. Robinson. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1983.
———. 'Musikwissenschaft und systematische Musikwissenschaft'. In Dahlhaus and Helga de la Motte-Haber, *Systematische Musikwissenschaft*, chapter 2. Neue Handbuch der Musik, X. Laaber: Laaber Verlag, 1982.
———. 'Plädoyer für eine romantische Kategorie – Der Begriff des Kunstwerks in der neuesten Musik'. In Dahlhaus, *Schönberg und Andere. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Neuen Musik*. Mainz: Schott, 1978.
———. 'Musica poetica und musikalische Poesie'. *AfMw*, XXIII (1966), 110–124.

DANNEIL, Johann Friedrich. *Geschichte der Lateinschule zu Salzwedel*. Salzwedel, 1824.

DAVIDSSON, Åke. *Bibliographie der musikalischen Drucke des 16. Jahrhunderts*. Baden Baden: Verlag Heitz, 1962.

DAVIES, Alan T. *Infected Christianity: A Study of Modern Racism*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's UP, 1988

DÜMLING, Albrecht. 'The Target of Racial Purity: The 'Degenerate Music' Exhibition in Düsseldorf, 1938'. In Richard A. Etlin, ed., *Art, Culture, and Media under the Third Reich*, pp. 43–72. Chicago: Chicago UP, 2002.

DÜMLING, Albrecht and Peter GIRTH, eds. *Entartete Musik. Zur Düsseldorfer Ausstellung von 1938: Eine kommentierte Rekonstruktion*. Düsseldorf: n.p., 1988.

DYER, Joseph. 'Speculative "Musica" and the Medieval University of Paris'. *ML*, XL (2009), 177–204.
———. 'The Place of Musica in Medieval Classifications of Knowledge'. *JM*, XXIV (2007), 3–71.

EBERLING, Gerhard. 'Die Anfänge von Luthers Hermeneutik'. *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, XLVIII (1951), 172–230.
———. 'Evangelische Evangelienauslegung. Eine Untersuchung zur Luthers Hermeneutik'. Unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Zürich, 1942.

ECO, Umberto. 'Signification and Denotation from Boethius to Ockham'. *Franciscan Studies*, XLIV (1984), 1–29.
———. *The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts*. London: Hutchinson, 1981.

EGGEBRECHT, Hans Heinrich. 'Opusmusik'. *Schweizerische Musikzeitung*, CXV (1975), 2–11. Repr. in Eggebrecht, *Musikalisches Denken. Aufsätze zur Theorie und Ästhetik der Musik*, pp. 219–42. Wilhelmshaven: Heinrichshofen, 1977.
———. 'Musikalisches Denken'. *AfMw*, XXXII (1975), 228–40.

ELFTMANN, Heike. *Georg Schünemann (1884–1945): Musiker, Pädagoge, Wissenschaftler und Organisator. Eine Situationsbeschreibung des Berliner Musiklebens*. Sinzig: Studio, 2001

EMISON, Patricia A. *Creating the "Divine" Artist: From Dante to Michaelangelo*. Leiden: Brill, 2004.

FASOLT, Constantin. 'Hegel's Ghost: Europe, the Reformation, and the Middle Ages'. *Viator*, XXXIX (2008), 345–86.

FICHTE, Johann Gottlieb. *Addresses to the German Nation*. Ed. George Armstrong Kelly, trans. R.F. Jones and G.H. Turnbull. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

FISCHER, Kurt von. 'Der Begriff des "Neuen" in der Musik von der Ars nova bis zur Gegenwart'. IMS New York 1961, Congress Report, I, pp. 184–95.

FISHER, Alexander J. *Music and Religious Identity in Counter-Reformation Augsburg, 1580–1630*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004.

FOLLI, Laura. '*Canticum cordis*: La musica e l'interiorità nelle *Enarrationes in Psalmos* di Agostino'. In Letterio Mauro, ed., *La musica nel pensiero medievale*, pp. 177–83. Ravenna: Longo, 2001.

FORGÁCS, Robert. *Gallus Dressler's* Præcepta musicæ poëticæ. Urbana, IL: Illinois UP, 2007.

FORMAN, Robert J. 'Augustine's Music: "Keys" to the Logos'. In Richard R. LaCroix, ed., *Augustine on Music: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays*, pp. 17–28. Lampeter: Mellen, 1988.

FOUCAULT, Michel. *The Order of Things*. Trans. from *Les mots et les choses* (Paris, 1966). New York: Routledge Classics, 2002.

———. 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History'. In Foucault, *Language, Counter-memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, pp. 139–64. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell UP, 1997.

———. *Discipline and Punish*. New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

FROELICH, Karlfried. 'Pseudo-Dionysius and the Reformation of the Sixteenth Century'. In *Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works*, pp. 33–46. New York: Paulist Press, 1987.

GEORGIADES, Thrasybulos. *Music and Language: The Rise of Western Music as Exemplified in Settings of the Mass*. Trans. Marie-Louise Göllner. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982.

GERHARD, Anselm. 'Musikwissenschaft'. In F. Rutger-Hausmann, ed., *Die Rolle der Geisteswissenschaften im Dritten Reich, 1933–1945*, pp. 165–92. Schriften des Historischen Kollegs Kolloquien LIII. Munich: Oldenbourg, 2002.

GOEHR, Lydia. '"On the Problems of Dating" or "Looking Backward and Forward with Strohm"'. In Michael Talbot, ed., *The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?*, pp. 231–46. Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2000.

———. *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.

GOULD, Ronald Lee. 'The Latin Lutheran Mass at Wittenberg 1523–1545: A Survey of the Early Reformation Mass and the Lutheran Theology of Music, as Evidenced in the Liturgical Writings of Martin Luther, the Relevant Kirchenordnungen, and the Georg Rhau Musikdrucke for the Hauptgottesdienst'. Unpubl. SMD thesis, Union Theological Seminary, 1970.

GRENDLER, Paul. 'The Universities of the Renaissance and Reformation'. *RQ*, LVII (2004), 1–42.

GREW, Eva Mary. 'Martin Luther and Music'. *ML*, XIX (1938), 67–78.

GROOTE, Inga Mai. 'Die Kölner Musiktheoretiker – ein humanistisches Netzwerk?'. In Klaus Pietschmann, ed., *Das Erzbistum Köln in der Musikgeschichte des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts. Kongressbericht Köln 2005*, pp. 131–55. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2008.

GUICHARROUSSE, Hubert. *Les musiques de Luther*. Geneva: Spes et Fides, 1995.

GURLITT, Wilibald. *Musikgeschichte und Gegenwart*. Ed. Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht. Wiesbaden: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1966, 2 vols.
———. 'Der Begriff der Sortisatio in der deutschen Kompositionslehre des 16. Jahrhunderts'. *Tijdschrift voor Nederlandisches Muziekgeschiedenis*, XVI (1942), 194–211.
———. 'Der gegenwärtige Stand der deutschen Musikwissenschaft'. *Deutsche Vierteljahresschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte*, XVII (1939), 1–82.
———. 'Johannes Walter und die Musik der Reformationszeit'. *L-Jb*, XV (1933), 1–112.
———. 'Vom Deutschtum in der Musik'. *Musik in Zeitbewußtsein*, I (1933), 1–2.

GUSTAVSON, Royston R. 'Hans Ott, Hieronymus Formschneider, and the *Novum et insigne opus musicum* (Nuremberg: 1537–1538). Unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 1997.

HAAR, James. 'A Sixteenth-Century Attempt at Music Criticism'. *JAMS*, XXXVI (1983), 191–209.

HAAS, Max. *Musikalisches Denken im Mittelalter: Eine Einführhung*. 2nd ed. Bern & New York: Peter Lang, 2007.

HABERMAS, Jürgen. *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit: Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft*. Berlin: Luchterhand, 1962

HAMMERSTEIN, Reinhold. *Die Musik der Engel: Untersuchungen zur Musikanschauung des Mittelalters*. Bern: Francke, 1962.

HEILE, Björn. *The Modernist Legacy: Essays on New Music*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.

HELLER, Agnes. *Renaissance Man*. Trans. Richard E. Allen. London: Routledge, 1978.

HENDRIX, Scott H. *Luther: A Very Short Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2010.

HERL, Joseph. *Worship Wars in Early Lutheranism: Choir, Congregation, and Three Centuries of Conflict*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004.

HERZOG, Reinhart, and Reinhart KOSELLECK, eds. *Epochenschwelle und Epochenbewußtsein*. Munich: Fink, 1987.

HIGGINS, Paula M. 'The Apotheosis of Josquin des Prez and Other Mythologies of Musical Genius'. *JAMS*, LVII (2004), 443–510.

HOLL, Karl. *Gesammelte Aufsätze der Kirchengeschichte*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1921–1928, 3 vols.

HORTSCHANSKY, Klaus. 'Musikwissenschaft und Bedeutungsforschung. Überlegungen zu einer Heuristik im Bereich der Musik der Renaissance'. In Hortschansky, ed., *Zeichen und Struktur in der Musik der Renaissance: Ein Symposium aus Anlass der Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Musikforschung, Münster (Westfalen) 1987*, pp. 65–86. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1989.

HÜSCHEN, Heinrich. 'Universität und Musik'. Art., *MGG*, xiii, cols. 1093–1138.

INGARDEN, Roman. *The Work of Music and the Problem of Its Identity*. Trans. Adam Czerniawski, ed. J.G. Harrell. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986.

IRWIN, Joyce L. 'The Mystical Music of Jean Gerson'. *EMH*, I (1981), 187–201.

ISERLOH, Erwin. 'Luthers Thesenanlag—Tatsache oder Legende?'. *Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift*, LXX (1961), 303–12.

JAMMERS, Ewald. 'Die Wahrheit der Sprache und die Musik in der mittelalterlichen Dichtung: Eine Übersicht'. In *Wahrheit und Sprache*, Fs. Bert Nagel, pp. 15–33. Göppingen: A. Kümmerle, 1972.
———. *Ausgewählte Melodien des Minnesangs.* Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1963.

JANZ, Denis R. 'Late medieval theology'. In David Bagchi and David Steinmetz, eds., *The Cambridge Companion to Reformation Theology*, pp. 5–14. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004.
———. *Luther and Late Medieval Thomism: A Study in Theological Anthropology*. Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfrid Laurier UP, 1983.

JEDIN, Hubert. 'Die Erforschung der kirchlichen Reformationsgeschichte seit 1876: Leistungen und Aufgabe der deutschen Katholiken' (1931); republ. *Erträge der Forschung*, XXXIV (1975), vii–38.

Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification. Lutheran World Federation & Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, 1999.

JUDD, Cristle Collins. *Reading Renaissance Music Theory: Hearing with the Eyes*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000.

KATZ, Ruth. *A Language of Its Own: Sense and Meaning in the Making of Western Art Music*. London & Chicago: Chicago UP, 2009.

KEEN, Ralph. 'Johannes Cochlaeus: An Introduction to His Life and Work'. In Elizabeth Vandiver, Ralph Keen and Thomas D. Frazel, eds., *Luther's Lives: Two Contemporary Accounts of Martin Luther* (q.v.), pp. 40–52. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2002.

KEMP, Martin. 'From "Mimesis" to "Fantasia": The Quattrocento Vocabulary of Creation, Inspiration and Genius in the Visual Arts'. *Viator*, VIII (1977), 347–404.

KERMAN, Joseph. 'American Musicology in the 1990s'. *JM*, IX (1991), 131–44.
———. *Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1985.

KIM, Hyun-Ah. *Humanism and the Reform of Sacred Music in Early Modern England: John Merbecke the Orator and* The Booke of Common Praier Noted *(1550)*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.

KMETZ, John. *Music in the German Renaissance: Sources, Styles, and Contexts*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994.

KOERNER, Joseph Leo. *The Moment of Self-Portraiture in German Renaissance Art*. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1993.

KRISTELLER, Paul Oskar. *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters*. Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1956–96, 4 vols.

———. 'The European Diffusion of Humanism'. *Italica*, XXXIX (1962), 1–20.

———. 'Renaissance Platonism'. In W.H. Werckmeister, ed., *Facets of the Renaissance*, pp. 87–107. Los Angeles: California UP, 1959; republ. in Kristeller, *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (q.v.), III, pp. 3–21.

———. 'Humanism and Scholasticism in Renaissance Italy'. *Byzantion*, XVII (1944/45), 346–74; republ. in Kristeller, *Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters* (q.v.), I, pp. 553–83.

KORSYN, Kevin. *Decentering Music: A Critique of Contemporary Musical Research*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.

KOSELLECK, Reinhart. *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time*. Trans. Keith Tribe. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard UP, 1985.

KÜNG, Georg. 'Nominalism'. Art. *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, X, pp. 410–14. 2nd ed. Detroit: Catholic University of America, 2003, 15 vols.

KUNTZ, Marion Leathers. 'Harmony and the Heptaplomeres of Jean Bodin'. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, XII (1974), 31–41.

KUPISCH, Karl. 'The "Luther Renaissance"'. *Journal of Contemporary History*, II (1967), 39–49.

LANDAUER, Carl. 'Erwin Panofsky and the Renascence of the Renaissance'. *RQ*, XLVII (1994), 255–81.

LEACH, Elizabeth Eva. 'Gendering the Semitone, Sexing the Leading-Note: Fourteenth-Century Music Theory and the Directed Progression'. *MTS*, XXVIII (2006), 1–21.

LEAVER, Robin A. *Luther's Liturgical Music: Principles and Implications*. Grand Rapids, MI & Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2007 ['*LLM*'].

———. 'Luther's Theological Understanding of Music'. *LQ*, XX (2006), 1–21. Republ. in P. Vendrix, ed. *Music and the Renaissance* (q.v.).

———. 'Luther as Musician'. *LQ*, XVIII (2004), 125–83.

———. 'Luther's Catechism Hymns'. *LQ*, XI (1997), 397–421, and XII (1998), 79–98, 160–80, 303–23.

———. 'Theological Consistency, Liturgical Integrity, and Musical Hermeneutics in Luther's Liturgical Reforms'. *LQ*, IX (1995), 117–38.

LEFF, Gordon. *William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse*. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1975.

LEINSLE, Ulrich. *Introduction to Scholastic Theology*. Trans. Michael J. Miller. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2010.

LIENHARD, Marc. *Luther: Witness to Jesus Christ. Stages and Themes of the Reformer's Christology*. Trans. Edwin H. Robertson. Minneapolis: Augsburg Press, 1982.

LIPPHARDT, Walther. 'Geleitwort'. In Michael Vehe, *Ein New Gesangbüchlein Geistlicher Lieder* (1537), pp. 5–29. Facs. ed. Lipphardt. Beiträge zur Mittelrheinischen Musikgeschichte, XI. Mainz: Schott, 1970.

LIVINGSTONE, Ernest F. 'The Place of Music in German Education from the Beginnings through the 16th Century'. *JRME*, XV (1967), 243–77.

LLOYD, Rebecca. 'Luther: Bach's Musical Prophet?'. *CM*, LXXXIII (2007), 5–32.

LOCKWOOD, Lewis. 'Renaissance'. Art. in *New Grove 2*, XXI, pp. 179–86.

LOESCH, Heinz von. 'Listenius, Nicolaus'. Art. in *MGG II*, P/t XI, cols. 202–3.
———. *Der Werkbegriff in der protestantischen Musiktheorie des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts: Ein Mißverständnis*. Studien zur Geschichte der Musiktheorie, I (=Veröffentlichungen des Staatlichen Instituts für Musikforschung, XI). Hildesheim: G. Olms, 2001.
———. 'Musica Poetica – Die Geburtsstunde des Komponisten?'. *Jahrbuch des Staatlichen Instituts für Musikforschung Preußischer Kulturbesitz*, 2001, 84–91.
———. 'Nicolaus Listenius, *Musica* (1537)'. *Musiktheorie*, XIV (1999), 359–64.
———. '"Musica" und "opus musicum": Zur Frühgeschichte des musikalischen Werkbegriffs'. In Reinhard Kopiez, et al., eds., *Musikwissenschaft zwischen Kunst, Ästhetik und Experiment*, Fs. Helga de la Motte-Haber, pp. 337–42. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1998.
———. 'Glaubensspaltung – Spaltung der Musik? oder: Was ist evangelisch an den evangelischen Kirchenmusik'. In Helga de la Motte-Haber, ed., *Musik und Religion*, pp. 75–100. Laaber: Laaber Verlag, 1995.

LOHSE, Bernhard. *Ratio und Fides: Eine Untersuchung über die Ratio in der Theologie Luthers*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1958.

LORTZ, Joseph. *The Reformation in Germany*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1968, 2 vols. (Trans. from *Die Reformation in Deutschland*, q.v.)
———. *Die Reformation in Deutschland*. Freiburg: Herder, 1939–40, 2 vols.

LOWINSKY, Edward E. 'Musical Genius—Evolution and Origins of a Concept'. *MQ*, L (1964), 321–40, 476–95.

LUKE, Carmen. *Pedagogy, Printing, and Protestantism: The Discourse on Childhood*. New York: New York State UP, 1989.

[*LW*] *Luther's Works: American Edition*. Ed. Jaroslav Pelikan. St. Louis, MO: Concordia, 1955–86, 56 vols.

LÜTTEKEN, Laurenz. Report on *MGG II. Eighteenth-Century Music*, VI (2009), 139–40.

MARIUS, Richard. *Luther*. London: Quartet Books, 1975.

MARQUARD, Odo. 'Gesamtkunstwerk und Identitätssystem. Überlegungen im Anschluß an Hegels Schellingkritik'. In *Der Hang zum Gesamtkunstwerk. Europäische Utopien seit 1800*, pp. 40–51. Frankfurt: Sauerländer, 1983.

MARROU, Henri Irénée. 'Les Arts Libéraux dans l'Antiquité Classique'. In *Arts Libéraux et Philosophie au Moyen Âge: Actes du Quatrième Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale*, pp. 6–27. Paris: J. Vrin, 1969.

MATTFELD, Victor H. 'Rhau [Rhaw], Georg'. Art., *The New Grove 2*, XXI, pp. 255–7.

MCDONALD, Grantley. *Marsilio Ficino in Renaissance Germany: A Reception History*. Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2011, forthcoming.
———. 'Orpheus Germanicus: Metrical Music and the Reception of Marsilio Ficino's Poetics and Music Theory in Renaissance Germany'. Unpubl. PhD thesis, University of Melbourne, 2002.

MCGRATH, Alister E. *Reformation Thought: An Introduction*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1999.
———. *The Intellectual Origins of the European Reformation*. 2nd ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987.
———. *Luther's Theology of the Cross: Martin Luther's Theological Breakthrough*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985.
———. 'Forerunners of the Reformation: A Critical Examination of the Evidence for Precursors of the Reformation Doctrines of Justification'. *HTR*, LXXV (1982), 219–42.

MCKEE, Elsie Ann. *Reforming Popular Piety in Sixteenth-Century Strasbourg: Katharina Schütz Zell and Her Hymnbook*. Studies in Reformed Theology and History, II/iv (1994).

MEYER-BAER, Kathi. 'Psychologic and Ontologic Ideas in Augustine's *De Musica*'. *JAAC*, XI (1953), 224–30.

MILES, Margaret R. '"The Rope Breaks When It Is Tightest": Luther on the Body, Consciousness, and the Word'. *HTR*, LXXVII (1984), 239–58.
———. 'Vision: The Eye of the Body and the Eye of the Mind in Augustine's *De Trinitate* and the *Confessions*'. *JR*, LXVI (1983), 125–42.

MILLER, Clement A. 'Cochlaeus [Dobneck, Wendelstein], Johannes'. Art., *New Grove 2*, VI, pp. 77–8.

MOSER, Hans-Joachim. 'Zwischen Kultur und Zivilisation der Musik'. *Deutsches Musikjahrbuch*, IV (1926), 29–33.
———. 'Die Stellung der Musik im deutschen Geistesleben der Gegenwart'. *Deutsches Musikjahbuch*, II–III (1925), 114–26.
———. *Geschichte der Musik in Deutschland*. Stuttgart & Berlin: J.G. Cotta, 1920.

MOXEY, Keith. 'Perspective, Panofsky, and the Philosophy of History'. *NLH*, XXVI (1995), 775–86.

MÜLLER, Alphons Victor. 'Agostino Favaroni e la teologia di Lutero'. *Bilychnis* [i.e. *Rivista mensile di studi religiosi*], III (1914), 323–87.

NETTL, Paul. *Luther and Music*. Trans. Frida Best and Ralph Wood. Philadelphia: Russell & Russell, 1948.

NICHOLS, Stephen G. 'Voice and Writing in Augustine and the Troubadour Lyric'. In A.N. Doane and Carol Braun Pasternack, eds., *Vox intexta: Orality and Textuality in the Middle Ages*, pp. 137–61. Madison, WI: Wisconsin UP, 1991.

NIEMÖLLER, Klaus Wolfgang. 'Kölner Musikgeschichte zwischen Mittelalter und Renaissance'. In Klaus Pietschmann, ed. *Das Erzbistum Köln in der Musikgeschichte des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts. Kongressbericht Köln 2005*, pp. 13–59. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 2008.
———. 'Zum Paradigmenwechsel in der Musik der Renaissance: Vom *numerus sonorus* zur *musica poetica*'. In Hartmut Boockmann et al., eds., *Literatur, Musik und Kunst im Übergang vom Mittelalter bis zur Neuzeit: Bericht über Kolloquien der Kommission zur Erforschung der Kultur des Spätmittelalters 1989 bis 1992*, pp. 187–215. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995. Repr. in P. Vendrix, ed., *Music and the Renaissance* (q.v.).
———. 'Deutsche Musiktheorie im 16. Jahrhunderts: Geistes- und Institutionsgeschichtliche Grundlagen'. In Thomas Ertelt and Friedrich Zaminer, eds., *Deutsche Musiktheorie des 15. bis 17. Jahrhunderts*, pp. 69–98. Geschichte der Musiktheorie, VIII/1. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1994.
———. 'Die musikalische Rhetorik und ihre Genese in Musik und Musikanschauung der Renaissance'. In Heinrich F. Plett, ed., *Renaissance Rhetorik*, pp. 285–311. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993.
———. 'Musik als Lehrgegenstand an den deutschen Universitäten des 16. Jahrhunderts'. *Mf*, XL (1987), 313–19.
———. 'Zum Einfluß des Humanismus auf Position und Konzeption von Musik im deutschen Bildungssystem der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts'. In Walter Ruegg and Annegrit Schmitt, eds., *Musik im Humanismus und Renaissance*, pp. 77–98. Weinheim: VCH, 1983.
———. *Der sprachhafte Charakter der Musik*. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1980.
———. *Untersuchungen zur Musikpflege und Musikunterricht an den deutschen Lateinschulen vom ausgehenden Mittelalter bis um 1600*. Kölner Beiträge zur Musikforschung, LIV. Regensburg: Bosse, 1969.
———. 'Listen(ius), Nikolaus'. Art., *MGG*, viii, cols. 962–4.
———. *Nikolaus Wollick, 1480–1541, und sein Musiktraktat*. Beiträge zur rheinischen Musikgeschichte XIII. Cologne: Arno Volk-Verlag, 1955.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. *Also sprach Zarathustra*. Chemnitz: Schmeitzner, 1883–4, 3 vols.

OBERMAN, Heiko A. *The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the Modern World*. Ed. Donald Weinstein. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2003.
———. 'Luther and the *Via Moderna*: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough'. *JEH*, LIV (2003), 641–70.
———. *Luther: Man between God and the Devil*. New York: Image Books, 1992.
———. *Werden und Wertung der Reformation: Vom Wegestreit zum Glaubenskampf*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1977. Trans. as *Masters of the Reformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981.
———. 'Quoscunque Tulit Fœcunda Vetustas: Ad Lectorem'. In Heiko Oberman and Thomas A. Brady, eds., *Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of Its European Transformations*, pp. ix–xxviii. Fs. Paul Oskar Kristeller. Leiden: Brill, 1975.
———. 'Headwaters of the Reformation: *initia Lutheri – initia Reformationis*. In Oberman, ed., *Luther and the Dawn of the Modern Era: Papers for the Fourth International Congress for Luther Research*, pp. 40–88. Leiden: Brill, 1974.
———. 'Wir sind Pettler. Hoc est verum. Bunde und Gnade in der Theologie des Mittelalters und der Reformation'. *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, LXXVIII (1967), 232–52.

———. *Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought*. Trans. Paul L. Nyhus. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966.
———. *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1963.
———. 'Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism: With Attention to Its Relation to the Renaissance'. *HTR*, LIII (1960), 47–76.

OCKER, Christopher. *Biblical Poetics before Humanism and Reformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002.

OELKE, Harry. *Die Konfessionsbildung des 16. Jahrhunderts im Spiegel illustrierter Flugblätter*. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1992.

OETTINGER, Rebecca Wagner. *Music as Propaganda in the German Reformation*. St Andrews Studies in Reformation History. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001.

ØSTREM, Eyolf. 'Luther, Josquin and *des fincken gesang*'. In Eyolf Østrem, Jens Fleischer and Nils Holger-Peterson, eds. *The Arts and the Cultural Heritage of Martin Luther* (q.v.), pp. 51–79. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2003.

ØSTREM, Eyolf, Jens FLEISCHER and Nils HOLGER-PETERSON, eds. *The Arts and the Cultural Heritage of Martin Luther*. Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2003.

OWENS, Jessie Ann. 'Music Historiography and the Definition of "Renaissance"'. *Notes*, XLVII (1990), 305–30. Repr. in P. Vendrix, ed., *Music and the Renaissance* (q.v.).

OZMENT, Steven E. *Homo Spiritualis: A Comparative Study of the Anthropology of Johannes Tauler, Jean Gerson and Martin Luther (1509–16) in the Context of Their Theological Thought*. Leiden: Brill, 1969.

PANNEN, Friedemann. 'Luther on John Gerson'. *Luther Digest*, XI (2003), 50–54. Trans. and abrgd. from 'Luther über Johannes Gerson: Eine Untersuchung der Aussagen Luthers über den "Doktor des Trostes"', *Luther*, LXXI (2000), 117–25.

PANOFSKY, Erwin. *Renaissance and Renascences in Western Art*. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1960.

PELIKAN, Jaroslav. *Luther the Expositor: Introduction to the Reformer's Exegetical Writings*. Companion vol. to *Luther's Works: American Edition* (q.v.). St. Louis: Concordia, 1959.

PIETZSCH, Gerhard. 'Zur Pflege der Musik an den deutschen Universitäten bis zur Mitte des 16. Jahrhunderts'. *AfMf*, I (1936), 257–92, 424–51; III (1938), 302–30; V (1940), 65–83; VI (1941) 23–56.

POTTER, Pamela M. 'Musical Life in Berlin from Weimar to Hitler'. In Michael H. Kater and Albrecht Riethmüller, eds., *Music and Nazism: Art Under Tyranny, 1933–1945*, pp. 90–101. Laaber: Laaber Verlag, 2002.
———. *Most German of the Arts: Musicology and Society from the Weimar Republic to the End of Hitler's Reich*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
———. 'German Musicology and Early Music Performance, 1918–1933'. In Bryan Gilliam, ed., *Music and Performance during the Weimar Republic*, pp. 94–106. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994.

RAEDER, Siegfried. 'The Exegetical and Hermeneutic Work of Martin Luther'. In Magne Sæbø, ed. *Hebrew Bible, Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation*, pp. 363–406. Göttingen: Vanderhoeck & Rupprecht, 2008.

REDEKER, Raimund. *Lateinische Widmungsvorreden zu Mess- und Motettendrucken der ersten Hälfte des 16. Jahrhunderts*. Eisenach: K.D. Wagner, 1995.

REHDING, Alexander. *Hugo Riemann and the Birth of Musical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003.

REISSMANN, August. *Illustrierte Geschichte der deutschen Musik*. Leipzig: Fues, 1881.

RICO, Gilles. '"Auctoritas cereum habet nasum": Boethius, Aristotle, and the Music of the Spheres in the Thirteenth and Early Fourteenth Centuries'. In Suzannah Clark and Elizabeth Eva Leach, eds., *Citation and Authority in Medieval and Renaissance Musical Culture: Learning from the Learned*, pp. 20–28. Fs. Margaret Bent. Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Music, IV. Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2005.

RICŒUR, Paul. *Memory, History, Forgetting*. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: Chicago UP, 2004.

RIEMANN, Hugo. *Geschichte der Musiktheorie im IX.–XIX. Jahrhunderts*. 2 vols. Leipzig, 1898.

RIST, John M. *Plotinus: The Road to Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1977.

RUSSELL, Jeffrey Burton. *Lucifer: The Devil in the Middle Ages*. Ithaca, N.Y. & London: Cornell UP, 1984.

SACHS, Klaus-Jürgen. 'Cochlaeus'. Art., *MGG II*, P/t IV, cols. 1297–1300.

———. 'Musikanschauung, Musiklehre, Musikausbildung'. In Ludwig Finscher, ed., *Die Musik des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts*, pp. 129–57. Neues Handbuch der Musikwissenschaft, III/1. Laaber: Laaber Verlag, 1989.

SCHALK, Carl. *Luther on Music: Paradigms of Praise*. St Louis, MO: Concordia, 1998.

SCHEEL, Otto. *Dokumenten zu Luthers Entwicklung (bis 1519)*. 2nd ed. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1929.

SCHRADE, Leo. 'Johannes Cochlaeus, Musiktheoretiker in Köln'. In *Studien zur Musikgeschichte des Rheinlandes. Festschrift zum 80. Geburtstag von Ludwig Scheidermair*, ed. Willi Kahl, Heinrich Lemacher and Joseph Schmidt-Görg, pp. 124–42. Cologne: Arno Volk-Verlag, 1956.

SCHUELLER, Herbert M. *The Idea of Music: An Introduction to Musical Aesthetics in Antiquity and the Middle Ages*. Kalamazoo, MI: Medieval Institute Publications, 1988.

SCHÜNEMANN, Georg. *Geschichte der deutschen Schulmusik*. Berlin: Breslauer, 1928.

———. 'Einführung' to Nicolaus Listenius, *Musica Nicolai Listenii*. Facs. ed. (Nuremberg, 1549), pp. i–xxv. Berlin: Breslauer, 1927.

SCRIBNER, Robert W. 'Elements of Popular Belief'. In Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Heiko A. Oberman, and James D. Tracy, *Handbook of European History, 1400–1600: Late Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformation. Volume 1: Structures and Assertions*, pp. 231–62. Leiden: Brill, 1994.

———. *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1981.

——— [as Bob Scribner]. 'Reformation, Carnival, and the World Turned Upside Down'. *Social History*, III (1978), 303–29.

SEIDEL, Wilhelm. *Werk und Werkbegriff in der Musikgeschichte*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1987.

SEHLING, Emil, ed. *Die Evangelischen Kirchenvisitationen des XVI. Jahrhunderts*. 19 vols. Leipzig: Reisland, 1911.

SIMPSON, James. *Burning to Read: English Fundamentalism and Its Reformation Opponents*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard UP, 2007.

SOUTHERN, Robert W. *Scholastic Humanism and the Unification of Europe*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001, 2 vols.

SPITZ, Lewis W. 'The Course of German Humanism'. In Heiko Oberman and Thomas A. Brady, eds., *Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirror of Its European Transformations*, pp. 371–436. Fs. Paul Oskar Kristeller. Leiden: Brill, 1975.

STAKEMEIER, Eduard. *Der Kampf um Augustin. Augustinus und die Augustiner auf dem Tridentium*. Paderborn: Verlag der Bonifacius-Drückerei, 1937.

STAEHELIN, Martin. 'Bemerkungen zum Verhältnis von Werkcharacter und Filiation in der Musik der Renaissance'. In Ludwig Finscher, ed., *Quellenstudien zur Musik der Renaissance II: Datierung und Filiation von Musikhandschriften der Josquin-Zeit*, pp. 199–215. Wolfenbütteler Forschungen, XXVI. Wiesbaden: Breitkopf & Härtel, 1983.

STEINMETZ, David C. 'Religious Ecstasy in Staupitz and the Young Luther', *SCJ*, XI (1980), 23–38.

STERNFELD, Frederick W. 'Music in the Schools of the Reformation'. *MD*, II (1948), 99–122.

STEVENS, John E. *Words and Music in the Middle Ages: Song, Narrative, Dance, and Drama, 1050–1350*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1986.

STROHM, Reinhard. 'Late-medieval Sacred Songs: Tradition, Memory, and History'. In Jason Stoessel, ed., *Identity and Locality in Early European Music, 1028–1740*, pp. 129–49. Farnham: Ashgate, 2009.

———. '"Opus": An Aspect of the Early History of the Musical Work-Concept'. In Thomas Jez, ed., *Complexus effectuum musicologiae studia Miroslao Perz septuagenario dedicata*, pp. 309–19. Krakow: Rabid, 2003.

———. 'Music, Humanism, and the Idea of a "Rebirth" of the Arts'. In Bonnie J. Blackburn and Reinhard Strohm, eds., *Music as Concept and Practice in the Late Middle Ages*. New Oxford History of Music, III/1. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001. Repr. in P. Vendrix, ed., *Music and the Renaissance* (q.v.).

———. 'Looking Back at Ourselves: The Problem with the Musical Work-Concept'. In Michael Talbot, ed., *The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?*, pp. 128–52. Liverpool: Liverpool UP, 2000.
———. 'Musical Analysis as Part of Musical History'. In Raffaele Pozzi, ed., *Tendenze e metodi nella ricerca musicologica*, pp. 61–81. Florence: Leo Olschki, 1995.
———. 'The Humanist Idea of a Common Revival of the Arts and Its Implications for Music History'. In Maciej Jabłonski and Jan Steszewski, eds., *Interdisciplinary Studies in Musicology: Report for the First Interdisciplinary Conference, Poznan, November 23–24, 1991*, pp. 7–25. Poznan: Ars Nova, 1993.
———. *The Rise of European Music 1380–1500*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993.

STROUX, Christoph. 'Die Musica Poetica des Magisters Heinrich Faber'. PhD thesis, Freiburg am Breisgau, 1972. Publ. Port Elizabeth: n.p., 1976

TANAY, Dorit Elizabeth. 'Music in the Age of Ockham: The Interrelations between Music, Mathematics, and Philosophy in the Fourteenth Century'. Unpubl. PhD thesis, University of California-Berkeley, 1993.

TARUSKIN, Richard. *The Oxford History of Western Music*. 6 vols. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2007.

THACKER, Toby. *Music after Hitler, 1945–1955*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.

Theologia Germanica. Trans. Susanna Winkworth. London: Macmillan & C°., 1907.

TOMLINSON, Gary. 'Renaissance Humanism and Music'. In James Haar, ed., *European Music 1520–1640*, pp. 1–19. Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2006.
———. *Music in Renaissance Magic: Toward a Historiography of Others*. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1993.
———. 'Preliminary Thoughts on the Relations of Music and Magic during the Renaissance'. In Fabrizio Seta and Franco Piperno, eds., *In cantu et in sermone: For Nino Pirrotta on His 80th Birthday*, pp. 121–41. Florence: Leo Olschki, 1989.

VAN DEUSEN, Nancy. *Theology and Music at the Early University: The Case of Robert Grosseteste and Anonymous IV*. Leiden: Brill, 1994.

VANDIVER, Elizabeth, Ralph KEEN and Thomas D. FRAZEL. *Luther's Lives: Two Contemporary Accounts of Martin Luther*. Manchester: Manchester UP, 2002.

VENDRIX, Philippe, ed. *Music and the Renaissance: Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011.

[*WA*] *D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1883–2003, 67+2 vols.

[*WA BR*] *D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Briefwechsel*. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1930–85, 18 vols.

[*WA TR*] *D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe. Tischreden*. Weimar: H. Böhlau, 1912–21, 6 vols.

WAGNER, Rudolf. 'Wilhelm Breitengraser und die Nürnberger Kirchen- und Schulmusik seiner Zeit'. *Mf*, II (1949), 141–77.

WEBER, Max. *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Trans. Talcott Parsons. London: Allen & Unwin, 1976.

WEGMAN, Rob C. '"Das musikalische Hören" in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance: Perspectives from Pre-War Germany'. *MQ*, LXXXII (1998), 434–45.
———. 'From Maker to Composer: Improvisation and Musical Authorship in the Low Countries, 1450–1500'. *JAMS*, XLIX (1996), 409–79.

WENDEBOURG, Dorothea. 'Luther on Monasticism'. In Timothy J. Wengert, ed., *The Pastoral Luther: Essays on Martin Luther's Pastoral Theology*, pp. 327–54. Grand Rapids, MI & Cambridge: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2009.

WESTPHAL, Merold. *Hegel, Freedom, and Modernity*. Albany, N.Y.: SUNY Press, 1992.

WHITE, Hayden V. *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1978.

WILLIAMS, Rowan. *Arius: Heresy and Tradition*. London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1987.

WILLIS, Jonathan. *Church Music and Protestantism in Post Reformation England: Discourses, Sites, and Identities*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2010.

WINDH, John E. 'Early Lutheran Masses'. Unpubl. DMA thesis, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, 1971.

WINTER, Julie M. *Luther Bible Research in the Context of Volkish Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Peter Lang, 1998.

WIORA, Walter. 'Josquin und *des Fincken Gesang*'. *Deutsche Jahrbuch für Musik*, XIII (1968), 72–81.
———. 'Musica poetica und musikalisches Kunstwerk'. In Heinrich Hüschen, ed., *Festschrift Karl Gustav Fellerer zum 60. Geburtstag*, pp. 579–89. Regensburg: Bosse, 1962. Repr. in Wiora, *Historische und systematische Musikwissenschaft*, pp. 240–50. Tutzing: Schneider, 1972.

WOLTERSTORFF, Nicholas. *Works and Worlds of Art*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.

WORKMAN, John S. Review of *Enchiridion locorum communium* by Eck in a new ed. and two trans. *SCJ*, XIII (1982), 150–1.

ZENCK, Hermann. 'Grundformen deutscher Musikanschauung'. *Jahrbuch der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen* 1941/2, 15–40. Republ. in Zenck, *Numerus und affectus. Studien zur Musikgeschichte*, pp. 19–36. Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1959.

ZUMKELLER, Adolar, O.S.A. *Erbsünde, Gnade, Rechtfertigung und Verdienst nach der Lehre der Erfurter Augustinertheologen des Spätmittelalters*. Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1984.