

# Philosophical Readings in Virgil's *Aeneid*

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Abstract

This study examines how and why Virgil makes reference to philosophy and engages with contemporary philosophical debate in the *Aeneid*. Each of the six chapters has a different philosophical focus, and offers literary analyses of the poem that are supported and enriched by situating it within its philosophical context. Cicero and Lucretius are our principal sources for Roman philosophy during the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, and Stoics, Epicureans and Academics were the most influential philosophical schools. The topics I explore include: the relationship between words, especially names, and their referents; the characterization of fate in the *Aeneid* as Stoic, and the meaning of *F/fortuna*; Virgil's engagement with Lucretius' explanation of visual perception, which I argue embodies a refutation of the materialism integral to Epicurean philosophy; and, given that Cicero and Lucretius provide the first extant references to 'free will' (*libera...voluntas* Lucr. 2.256-7; *voluntate libera* Cic. *Fat.* 20) in Western literature, the articulation of this concept in the *Aeneid*. I conclude that Virgil's use of philosophy is both politically and poetically motivated: he shows that poetry and literature are valuable philosophical and political tools by demonstrating that our experience of reality is fundamentally mediated through language and texts.

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Abbreviations

- CIL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum
- D-K DIELS, H. and KRANZ, W. (1962), *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: griechisch und deutsch* (6<sup>th</sup> ed.), Berlin.
- DDG DIELS, H. (1879), *Doxographi Graeci*, Berlin.
- FGrH JACOBY, F. (1923ff.), *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, Leiden
- HRR PETER, H. (1914), *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquiae*, Leipzig.
- L&S LONG, A. A. and SEDLEY, D. N. (1987), *The Hellenistic Philosophers: Volumes 1 and 2*, Cambridge.
- LSJ LIDDELL, H.G. and SCOTT, R. G. (1996), *A Greek-English Lexicon* (9<sup>th</sup> ed.), Oxford.
- OLD GLARE, P. G. W. (2012), *Oxford Latin dictionary* (2<sup>nd</sup> ed.), Oxford.
- RIC MATTINGLY, H. and SYDENHAM, E. A. (1926), *The Roman Imperial Coinage. Vol. 2, Vespasian to Hadrian*, London.
- RRC CRAWFORD, M. H. (1974), *Roman Republican Coinage*, London.
- SVF ADLER, M. and VON ARNIM, H. F. A. (1903-5, 1924), *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, Leipzig.
- TLL Thesaurus Linguae Latinae

References to Latin and Greek texts follow the Oxford Classical Dictionary, with the exception of references to the *Aeneid*, which are given simply by book and line number. Translations, unless otherwise marked, are my own.

## Introduction

In this thesis, I argue that an understanding of the philosophical context in which Virgil was writing can complicate and enrich our reading of the *Aeneid*. I aim to show that Virgil is not only making reference to philosophy, but also doing philosophy: he engages with, tests, and responds to philosophical ideas in a productive and challenging way.

By way of introduction, I will give an outline of Virgil's philosophical context, and a justification for the general enterprise of philosophical readings in the *Aeneid*. I will then explain my methodology (what do I look for as a basis for individual philosophical readings, and what do these comprise?), and the aims of my study. I finally offer suggestions as to what this sort of analysis can contribute to Virgilian scholarship, and possible areas for further research.

### i. Virgil's philosophical context

Cicero and Lucretius are the principal sources for Roman philosophy in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC. The works of these two authors can be combined with other more limited literary and papyrological evidence to gain a reasonable picture of the philosophical climate during Virgil's lifetime: the period when Cicero and Lucretius were active, despite being several decades before the composition of the *Aeneid*, coincided with Virgil's youth and education.

By this point, philosophy embraced a very broad range of topics, some of which we might now group under different academic disciplines.<sup>1</sup> Natural philosophy was a central component: in his brief history of philosophy in the fifth book of *Tusculanae Disputationes*, Cicero claims that philosophy is at heart the study of *rerum natura* (Cic. *Tusc.* 5.9), which is also the title that Lucretius gave his Epicurean poem.<sup>2</sup> This comprised enquiries which we might label ‘scientific’, such as cosmology, physics, meteorology, and astronomy, as well as theology and religious speculation.<sup>3</sup> Socrates, according to Cicero, was the first to summon ‘philosophy down from the heavens and set her in the cities of men... and compel her to ask questions about life and morality and things good and evil’ (Cic. *Tusc.* 5.11, trans. King). Judging from the subjects and issues treated in the Platonic dialogues, this human focus entailed not only moral and political philosophy, but also eschatology, psychology, epistemology and the beginnings of philosophy of language.<sup>4</sup> Importantly, ethics and natural philosophy were not considered discrete disciplines, but remained closely intertwined: Lucretius, for example, uses an atomistic explanation of the universe to underpin ethical arguments as to why humans should not fear death, and the dangers of passionate love. Cicero’s *Topica*, following Aristotle’s treatise of the same name, additionally reflects the fact that certain philosophical schools (though not the Epicureans) also studied

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<sup>1</sup> Cicero called philosophy *omnium mater artium* (*Tusc.* 1.64).

<sup>2</sup> Following Greek philosophical works titled *Περὶ Φύσεως*, such as the poem of the pre-Socratic Parmenides, as well as Epicurus’ prose treatise of the same name.

<sup>3</sup> On ‘science’ in Lucretius see also Lehoux, Morrison & Sharrock (2013). Cicero explicitly introduces his *De Natura Deorum* as a philosophical rather than a religious dialogue (Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.1).

<sup>4</sup> E.g. Plato’s *Cratylus*, a dialogue discussing the theory of the ‘correctness of names’, which I will discuss in chapter one (*True and False Names*).

logic and dialectic. He accordingly divides the broad range of topics embraced by philosophy into three groups (Cic. *Tusc.* 5.68-9):

**‘unus** in cognitione rerum positus et in explicatione naturae; **alter** in discriptione expetendarum fugiendarumve rerum et in ratione vivendi; **tertius** in iudicando quid cuique rei sit consequens, quid repugnans, in quo inest omnis cum subtilitas disserendi tum veritas iudicandi.’

**‘one** centred in the knowledge of the universe and the disentanglement of the secrets of nature; **the second** in distinguishing the things that should be sought out or avoided and in framing a rule of life; **the third** in judging what is the consequence to every premise, what is incompatible with it, and in this lies all refinement of argument and truth of judgment.’ (trans. King)

Philosophy was largely studied through Greek teachers with allegiance to certain philosophical schools.<sup>5</sup> The evidence of Cicero and Lucretius suggests that the sects with the most influence at Rome in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC were Stoics, Epicureans, and Academics. Stoicism and Epicureanism seem to have been particularly prominent, perhaps in part due to the fact that their philosophies were holistic and comprehensive systems, which meant that it was easier to clearly identify Stoics and Epicureans than the more nuanced and eclectic positions of other thinkers.<sup>6</sup> Some upper class young men travelled to Athens or Rhodes to learn

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<sup>5</sup> Sedley (1989: 97) underlines the strength of this allegiance: ‘what gives philosophical movements their cohesion and identity is less a disinterested common quest for the truth than a virtually religious commitment to the authority of a founder figure.’

<sup>6</sup> Long & Sedley (1987(1): 6): ‘there is little point in trying to supply summaries of Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism. Neither school would even have welcomed the attribution of a ‘system’.’

directly from esteemed Greek philosophers as part of their education.<sup>7</sup> However, there were also philosophers and philosophical texts circulating in Italy and Rome.<sup>8</sup> For example, Epicurean philosophers such as Philodemus and Siro made a base in Campania, and their circle of students and friends comprised many of the Roman elite, including poets such as Virgil.<sup>9</sup>

Both Cicero and Lucretius were anxious about Romanizing philosophy, which was still largely written in Greek and associated with the Greeks.<sup>10</sup> Perhaps related to this, there was also some experimentation as to the best medium or genre for the exposition and discussion of philosophy during this period. In the *DRN*, Lucretius united the metre, style and language of Ennian epic with Epicurean content and themes. This was a striking move: despite Ennius' canonical status as a poet amongst Romans (the *Annales* was a school-text),

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<sup>7</sup> Both Cicero and his son travelled to Athens to study philosophy and rhetoric (Cic. *Off.* 1.1-2). He assumes that his anonymous pupil in *Tusculanae Disputationes* will have done the same (Cic. *Tusc.* 2.26).

<sup>8</sup> Wealthy and highly educated Romans had libraries, which evidence suggests would have included philosophical works. The philosophical texts discovered at the Villa dei Papiri in Herculaneum date from this period and include many works of the Epicurean philosopher Philodemus as well as a copy of Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* (*PHerc* 1829, 1830, 1831; see Sider (1997: 68-9)). When Sulla returned from sacking Athens in 86 BC, he brought with him a library of Peripatetic philosophy, including works of Aristotle and Theophrastus (Strabo 13.1.54). Cicero himself had a large library of philosophical texts (Cic. *Top.* 1.1), and describes himself borrowing Lucullus' copy of Aristotle's *commentarii* (Cic. *Fin.* 3.10).

<sup>9</sup> Siro is named twice in the *Catalepton* (5.9, 8.1), which may have been written by Virgil during his youth. Even if the poems are not Virgil's own, it is likely that they drew on true and widely-known biographical information. *PHerc.* Paris 2, and *PHerc.* 1082 col. xi, identified as fragments of Philodemus' *On Vices*, name Virgil along with a 'coterie of poetically minded Romans' (Blank 2014) such as L. Varius Rufus, Plotius Tucca, and P. Quintilius Varus. For a critical survey of the evidence for Virgil's association with Philodemus, see especially Gigante (2004). On Philodemus and his milieu more generally see e.g. Rawson (1985: 295-7), Sedley (1989: 103-117), Obbink (1995), Sider (1997), and Armstrong, Fish, Johnston & Skinner (2004).

<sup>10</sup> E.g. Cic. *Acad.* 1.4-5, 2.6; *Tusc.* 1.1-6; *Lucr.* 1.136-145.

Epicureans were at best sceptical as to the philosophical utility of poetry.<sup>11</sup> The form of Cicero's philosophical writing, on the other hand, mostly follows Platonic dialogue. Like Plato's works, Cicero's dialogues have a dramatic setting, and feature interlocutors.<sup>12</sup> But Cicero reduces the amount of question and answer, instead tending to present different speakers explaining different views on the same topic at some length (e.g. the Epicurean, Stoic and Academic speakers that dominate the three books of *De Natura Deorum* respectively).<sup>13</sup> He even followed Plato in closing his *De Re Publica* with a Platonic myth: the *Somnium Scipionis*, his Romanized version of the Myth of Er. Meanwhile, Varro, in addition to philosophical dialogues,<sup>14</sup> wrote satires modelled on the writings of the third-century Cynic philosopher Menippus, which poked fun at the theories of other schools, especially the Stoics and Epicureans, and Horace experimented with the verse epistle form.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Both Lucretius and Cicero praise Ennius, and use the inclusive formulation *noster Ennius* to refer to him (Lucr. 1.117-26, Cic. *Arch.* 18). The Epicurean attitude to poetry and its implications for Lucretius are the subject of considerable scholarly debate. Asmis (1995: 30) plausibly argues that 'whereas Epicurus emphasized the harmful educational influence of poetry and the need to replace poetic teaching by philosophy, his followers took the more hospitable view that it is not the function of poetry to teach and that philosophy may form an alliance with poetry, in which both pursuits achieve their own ends'. Primary sources that suggest that Epicureans were averse to poetry include: Cic. *Pis.* 70, *Fin.* 1.72; Heraclitus, *Homericae Quaestiones* 4, 79; Plut. *Mor.* 15d; Diog. Laert. 10.120-1. See also Gale (1994).

<sup>12</sup> Cicero justifies the Socratic dialogue form of his writing at *Tusc.* 1.8. He also writes treatises in the style of Aristotle, e.g. *Topica*.

<sup>13</sup> *De Divinatione*, *De Finibus* and *Academica* also follow this structure and style.

<sup>14</sup> E.g. *De Philosophia*, and three books *De Forma Philosophiae*, now lost. Varro is the addressee of Cicero's *Academica*, and identified as a philosopher by Jerome and Appian. See further Rawson (1985: 286-7).

<sup>15</sup> See e.g. Mayer (1994) and Harrison (1995) on the relationship between the philosophical content, form and style of Horace's first book of *Epistles*.

As the status and identity of its practitioners and students may suggest, philosophy in this period was highly politically charged.<sup>16</sup> Cicero wrote the majority of his philosophical works between 46 and 44 BC, when he had retired from politics and during the last years of his life.<sup>17</sup> He explains his decision to do so as a function of recent political change: though he had been pardoned by Caesar for his support of the Pompeians and the Republican cause, he saw no place for oratory under Caesar's dictatorship (Cic. *Fam.* 4.3.4, to Servius Sulpicius Rufus):

tantum dico, quod te spero approbaturum, me, postea quam illi arti cui  
studueram nihil esse loci neque in curia neque in foro viderim, omnem  
meam curam atque operam ad philosophiam contulisse.

I shall only say something I think you will approve: seeing that there is no further place in Senate House or Forum for the craft which I have studied, I have devoted all my time and attention to philosophy. (trans. Shackleton Bailey)

Politics accordingly infuses Cicero's philosophy, which replaced oratory as his political outlet. For example, the dramatic settings of his dialogues often have political significance,<sup>18</sup> and Cicero selects important political figures as

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<sup>16</sup> See Griffin (1989) on the relationship between politics and philosophy at Rome; Fowler (1989) and Schiesaro (2007) on Lucretius and politics. Scholars such as Hardie (1986), Galinsky (1994) and Braund (1997) have accordingly incorporated philosophical perspectives with political considerations in their interpretation and analysis of the *Aeneid*.

<sup>17</sup> With the exception of *De Oratore* and *De Republica*, which were written in the 50s BC.

<sup>18</sup> I will argue in chapter three (*Causation and Moral Responsibility*) for the significance of the dramatic setting of the *De Fato* in the days immediately following Caesar's assassination.

addressees, interlocutors and *personae*.<sup>19</sup> Likewise, Memmius, Lucretius' addressee in the *DRN*, was probably Gaius Memmius, the prominent Roman statesman who travelled as praetor to Bithynia with the poets Catullus and Cinna.<sup>20</sup> Conversely, certain philosophers were intimately associated with and even housed by influential noble families at Rome. The Stoics Arius Didymus and Athenodorus, for example, had strong ties with Augustus and his household.<sup>21</sup> Another Stoic, Diodotus, lived with Cicero himself, whilst the Epicurean Philodemus was as a close companion of L. Calpurnius Piso.<sup>22</sup>

Philosophy during Virgil's lifetime therefore covered a broad range of topics, and was divided into a few influential schools or sects. It was still considered a Greek discipline, though Romans were experimenting with suitable styles and genres

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<sup>19</sup> E.g. Cato the Elder, Torquatus (both in *De Finibus*), Lucullus (*Academica*), Hirtius (*De Fato*), Cotta (*De Natura Deorum*), and Cicero's brother Quintus (*De Divinatione*, *De Oratore*). *De Finibus* and *Tusculanae Disputationes* are dedicated to Brutus.

<sup>20</sup> Lucretius makes clear that his addressee Memmius is important to the state (Lucr. 1.41-3), which has encouraged scholars to identify him with the contemporary politician Gaius Memmius. Cicero writes three letters to this C. Memmius (*Fam.* 13.1, 2, 3), the first of which politely requests that Memmius does not include the ruins of Epicurus' house in Athens in his building project. He was tribune in 66 BC, praetor in 58 BC, then was given *ex praetura* command of the province of Bithynia in 57 BC. See also Catull. 10, and 28.

<sup>21</sup> Arius Didymus was an Alexandrian philosopher whom Augustus probably brought back to Rome in 30 BC after the defeat of Cleopatra. He wrote an epitome of Stoic ethics preserved by Stobaeus, and taught Augustus philosophy (Suet. *Aug.* 89). Athenodorus was a Stoic philosopher from Tarsus, whom Augustus brought to Rome in 44 BC. He addressed a work to Augustus' sister Octavia (Plut. *Publ.* 17), and Augustus eventually sent him back to Tarsus to remove the tyrant Boethus, and become chief citizen in his place (Strabo 14.5.13-4).

<sup>22</sup> Cic. *Pis.* 68-72. Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer* is addressed to a younger member of the Piso family. In addition, Lucullus had a close friendship with Antiochus of Ascalon (Cic. *Acad.* 2.4), a different Stoic Athenodorus lived with Cato (Strabo 14.5.14), and, earlier, the Stoic Panaetius lived with Scipio Aemilianus (e.g. Cic. *Acad.* 2.6, *Rep.* 1. 15, 34).

for Latin philosophy. Finally, it was popular with the elite, and subsequently politically motivated and influential.

ii. The justification for philosophical readings in the *Aeneid*

‘Pretending that a particular work of fiction is specifically philosophical can unfortunately become a pastime of lazy *literati*.’

Laird (2007: 302)

The justification for philosophical readings in the *Aeneid* cannot rest on any suggestion that it is first and foremost a philosophical text: it does not claim to be so, nor does Virgil ever name philosophers or different philosophical schools. Nevertheless, it is clear from the opening lines that Virgil engages with and challenges philosophical ideas in this poem (1.8-11):<sup>23</sup>

Musa, mihi causas memora, quo numine laeso

quidve dolens regina deum tot volvere casus

insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores

impulerit. **tantaene animis caelestibus irae?**

Muse, tell me the causes, because of the slighting of which divinity, or grieving what, did the queen of the gods drive a man notable for his piety to undergo so many misfortunes, and face so many struggles – **are the angers in heavenly hearts so great?**

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<sup>23</sup> I will additionally argue in chapters two and three that the proem of the *Aeneid* signposts engagement with philosophy through the use of the word *fatum* (1.2) and the emphasis on *causae*.

As noted above, Virgil was acquainted with the Epicurean Philodemus, and he knew Lucretius' *DRN* well.<sup>24</sup> Epicureans argued that the gods lived in a perfect state of ἀταραξία and were not involved in human life at all (Lucr. 1.44-9):<sup>25</sup>

omnis enim per se divom natura necessest  
 inmortalī aevo summa cum pace fruatur  
 semota ab nostris rebus seiunctaque longe;  
 nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,  
 ipsa suis pollens opibus, nil indiga nostri,  
 nec bene promeritis capitur **neque tangitur ira.**

For the very nature of divinity must necessarily enjoy immortal life in the deepest peace, far removed and separated from our affairs; for without any pain, without danger, itself mighty by its own resources, needing us not at all, it is neither propitiated with services **nor touched by wrath.** (trans. Rouse)

Yet here Virgil emphasizes that the gods of the *Aeneid* are not those of Epicurean philosophy: instead, they are angry, vengeful deities who take an active role in human life.

Needless to say, the pervasive influence of Lucretius on Virgil in itself offers strong support for philosophical readings in the *Aeneid*.<sup>26</sup> The *DRN* was the most recent Latin epic of comparable scale, and it was a philosophical poem. Virgil pays further heed to the tradition of philosophical epic in his depiction of the

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<sup>24</sup> See n. 9 above.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Lucr. 1.44-9, 3.18, 5.82, 6.58; Epicurus *R.S.* 1. See also 4.377-8 '*scilicet is superis labor est, ea cura quietos/sollicitat*' – Dido's sarcastic response when Aeneas tells her that he has been visited and given divine commands by Mercury.

<sup>26</sup> See especially Hardie (1986: 157-240) on the influence of Lucretius on the *Aeneid*, Gale (2000) on the *Georgics*.

bard Iopas, who entertains the Trojans and Carthaginians during the welcome-feast at the end of book one. In the *Odyssey*, the bard Demodocus sings of the divine love affair of Ares and Aphrodite, and the fall of Troy. His counterpart in the *Aeneid*, however, sings of natural philosophy and cosmology (1.740-6):<sup>27</sup>

... cithara crinitus Iopas 740

personat aurata, docuit quem maximus Atlas.

hic canit errantem lunam solisque labores,

unde hominum genus et pecudes, unde imber et ignes,

Arcturum pluviasque Hyadas geminosque Triones,

quid tantum Oceano properent se tingere soles 745

hiberni, vel quae tardis mora noctibus obstet.

Long-haired Iopas, whom greatest Atlas taught, made [the halls] resonate with his golden cithara. He sung of the wandering moon and the toils of the sun, of where animals and the race of men came from, whence rain and fire, and of Arcturus and the rainy Hyades and twin Triones, and why winter suns are in such a rush to dip themselves into the Ocean, or rather what delay obstructs late [summer] nights.

Virgil thereby demonstrates at this programmatic moment at the end of the first book that he is engaging with both Homeric and philosophical epic traditions.<sup>28</sup>

In fact, the strongly Homeric nature of the *Aeneid* constitutes further justification for philosophical readings in the poem.<sup>29</sup> Since Virgil was composing a Homeric

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. the song of Silenus in the *Eclogues* (Verg. *Ecl.* 6.31-40). Segal (1971) explores the potential philosophical and literary significance of the content of Iopas' song.

<sup>28</sup> The correspondences between Iopas' song and Verg. *G.* 2.475-482 suggest a closer association between Iopas and Lucretius. Cf. Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*).

epic, he could expect, amongst other things, that his poem would be treated philosophically. There was a long tradition of philosophical commentary and scholarship on Homer.<sup>30</sup> Virgil was aware of this, and it was continued and developed in the writing of his contemporaries and associates.<sup>31</sup> For example, one of the many facets of this tradition was to treat Homer's characters as moral exempla. Philodemus accordingly wrote a treatise *On the Good King According to Homer*, which offered guidelines for a moral reading of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, and demonstrated that Homer's kings were better examples of good leadership than historical figures.<sup>32</sup> Horace, who was also acquainted with Philodemus and a close friend of Virgil's,<sup>33</sup> likewise asserts that Homer offers better and clearer demonstrations of ethical standards than well-known philosophers (Hor. *Ep.* 1.2.1-4):<sup>34</sup>

Troiani belli scriptorem, Maxime Lolli,  
dum tu declamas Romae, Praeneste relegi;

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<sup>29</sup> Propertius described the *Aeneid* as *nescioquid maius... Iliade* whilst it was being written (Prop. 2.34.61-6, following Heyworth's text (2007)). The bibliography on the relationship between the *Aeneid* and the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* is vast. Knauer (1964), Gransden (1984), and Cairns (1989 esp. 177-248) provide a good introduction.

<sup>30</sup> Braund (1997: 206): 'the view that philosophy was learned from poetry, starting from Homer, was axiomatic in antiquity'.

<sup>31</sup> See e.g. Hardie (1986), Farrell (1991: 253-72).

<sup>32</sup> See above n. 9. Fish (2004) traces the influence of Philodemus' *On the Good King According to Homer* on Virgil, and argues that this offers support for the authenticity of the Helen episode (2.567-89).

<sup>33</sup> The precise relationship between Horace and Philodemus is uncertain. It is very probable that they were acquainted, though less certain that Philodemus was more closely involved with Horace, e.g. as his mentor. See Tsakiropolou-Summers (1998) for an overview of the evidence and arguments. Horace explicitly claims close friendship with Virgil – he calls him *animae dimidium meae* (Hor. *Carm.* 1.3.8).

<sup>34</sup> That Horace asserts the supremacy of Homer over Stoic (Chrysippus) and Academic (Crantor) philosophers rather than Epicureans is perhaps testament to the recent poetic efforts of Epicurean philosophers such as Lucretius and Philodemus.

qui, quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,  
planus ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.

While you, Lollius Maximus, declaim at Rome, I have been reading afresh at Praeneste the writer of the Trojan War; who tells us what is fair, what is foul, what is helpful, what not, more plainly and better than Chrysippus or Crantor. (trans. Fairclough)

Horace goes on to cite Odysseus in particular as an exemplum of *sapientia* and *virtus* (Hor. *Ep.* 1.2.17-8). Against this backdrop, Virgil's pointedly negative portrayal of Odysseus in the *Aeneid* constitutes a challenge to Homer's moral standards, and indicates that his characters offer different (Roman? updated?) models of behaviour and conduct from their Homeric counterparts.<sup>35</sup> Aeneas is proffered as a replacement, and scholars have accordingly analysed his behaviour, emotions, actions and leadership from a philosophical perspective.<sup>36</sup>

Homer's gods were also subjected to philosophical scrutiny. The pre-Socratic Xenophanes, who himself wrote poetry, criticized other poets, in chief Homer and Hesiod, for their false and impious depictions of the gods.<sup>37</sup> In response to this and related charges, later philosophers, in particular the Stoics, sought to rehabilitate mythological epic by treating it as philosophical allegory: they aimed to show that stories of divine violence and adultery were in fact acting as

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<sup>35</sup> Odysseus is described as *durus* (2.7); deceitful (2.44), especially with words (2.90, 9.602); criminal (2.97-8, 164); *dirus* (2.261, 762) and *saevus* (3.273). Achaemenides, an Ithacan who was originally one of Odysseus' crew, gives a slightly more favourable description, calling his king *infelix* (3.613) and explaining that he wouldn't tolerate the wrongs inflicted on his men by the Cyclops (3.628-9). Nevertheless, the fact that Achaemenides was forgotten and abandoned by Odysseus clarifies that he is in fact a bad leader.

<sup>36</sup> E.g. Bowra (1933), Putnam (1990), Galinsky (1994), and Gill (2003).

<sup>37</sup> Diog. Laert. 9.18.

explanations for natural phenomena. Balbus, Cicero's Stoic speaker in the *De Natura Deorum*, gives an excellent example (Cic. *Nat. D.* 2. 63-4):<sup>38</sup>

'nam cum vetus haec opinio Graeciam opplevisset, exsectum Caelum a filio Saturno, vinctum autem Saturnum ipsum a filio Iove, **physica ratio non inelegans inclusa est in impias fabulas**. caelestem enim altissimam aetheriamque naturam, id est igneam, quae per sese omnia gigneret, vacare voluerunt ea parte corporis quae coniunctione alterius egeret ad procreandum.'

'For example, an ancient belief prevailed throughout Greece that Caelus was mutilated by his son Saturn, and Saturn himself thrown into bondage by his son Jove: now **these immoral fables enshrined a decidedly clever scientific theory**. Their meaning was that the highest element of celestial ether or fire, which by itself generates all things, is devoid of that bodily part which requires union with another for the work of procreation.' (trans. Rackham)

This philosophical treatment of Hesiod and particularly Homer also involved etymologizing divine names with the aim of discovering the 'true' moral or physical significance of individual gods.<sup>39</sup> Feeney (1991) demonstrates that this tradition is relevant to the *Aeneid* in his discussion of Juno, whom Virgil strongly associates with air and clouds following philosophical commentary on Homer according to which Ὕψα was connected with the physical element ἀήρ.<sup>40</sup> Hardie (1986) likewise bases his argument for the affinity of *cosmos* and *imperium* in the

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<sup>38</sup> See also *ibid.* 2.70; Heraclitus, *Homericæ Quaestiones*.

<sup>39</sup> E.g. SVF 1061-1100, Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.62-3. The etymology of divine names was an essential feature of the 1<sup>st</sup> c. AD Stoic Cornutus' *Compendium of Greek Theology*.

<sup>40</sup> Feeney (1991: 20-1, 150). Cf. Hom. *Il.* 21.6-7, Pl. *Cra.* 404c, Eur. *Hel.* 31-6, Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.646-8. I discuss the connection between Juno and ἀήρ in more depth in chapter one (*True and False Names*).

*Aeneid* on the premise that Virgil engineered his epic to be the subject of philosophical allegory.<sup>41</sup>

Equally important is the opposing philosophical tradition which, following Xenophanes, argued that there ought to be a divorce between Homeric poetry and philosophy. This critical tradition was particularly associated with Plato, and the views and arguments he attributes to Socrates in the *Republic*. For Plato, poets, especially Homer, have no place in the ideal city-state (Pl. *Resp.* 605a, Socrates speaking):

καὶ οὕτως ἤδη ἂν ἐν δίκη οὐ παραδεχοίμεθα εἰς μέλλουσιν εὐνομεῖσθαι πόλιν.

‘And so we would finally be justified in not allowing him [the poet] into a state which is going to be well run.’ (trans. Emlyn-Jones)

The *Aeneid* was intended to assume a central position in Roman culture comparable to that of Homer amongst Plato’s contemporaries, and itself explores the foundation of an enormously successful and influential city-state: the origin of Rome, as well as Augustus’ regeneration of society after Actium. Indeed, at several points in the thesis I will suggest that Virgil’s engagement with philosophy is politically motivated. It is therefore essential that Virgil responds to the charge that Homeric epic has no place in a well-governed state.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Hardie (1986: 29): ‘the use of Greek allegorization of myth and poetry to illustrate the *Aeneid* is a central concern of this book.’

<sup>42</sup> Virgil’s engagement with Plato’s *Republic* is additionally suggested by the influence of the Myth of Er and the *Somnium Scipionis* (part of Cicero’s *De Re Publica*) on the eschatological ideas in book six. See e.g. Norden (1926).

Central to Plato's rejection of poetry is the claim that it is not based on knowledge and truth, and that poets do not have knowledge of the things they speak/write about.<sup>43</sup> Rather, he argues that poetry is fundamentally mimetic, and only mirrors or imitates the sensible world, which itself is only an imitation of the true world of the Forms.<sup>44</sup> The result is that poetry is at three removes from the truth (counting inclusively). For this reason, Plato concludes that poetry could be seriously misleading and damaging to a society ignorant of its merely mimetic nature, and that it should be rejected from the ideal city-state.

Horace's instructions in the *Ars Poetica* demonstrate the perceived relevance of Plato's rejection of poetry to 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC poets (Hor. *Ars P.* 309-18):

scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons.  
 rem tibi **Socraticae** poterunt ostendere **chartae**,                      310  
 verbaque provisam rem non invita sequentur.  
 qui didicit patriae quid debeat et quid amicis,  
 quo sit amore parens, quo frater amandus et hospes,  
 quod sit conscripti, quod iudicis officium, quae  
 partes in bellum missi ducis, ille profecto                      315  
 reddere personae scit convenientia cuique.  
 respicere exemplar vitae morumque iubebo

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<sup>43</sup> Cf. the distinction in Plato's *Ion* between a rhapsode having the knowledge of a skill vs. the inspiration of a divinity (*ibid.* 533d-e, 542b), and note that Virgil explicitly points out that Iopas, who appears to have knowledge of natural philosophy, was taught by a god (1.740-1). Plato also argues that poetry offers bad moral exempla, and has a disturbing and negative psychological effect on its audience (Pl. *Resp.* 604b-5c, 606b).

<sup>44</sup> E.g. Pl. *Resp.* 596c-e, in which mimetic art is compared to a mirror; 600e- 601a.

**doctum imitatore** et vivas hinc ducere voces.

The starting point and source of writing well is being wise. **The Socratic scrolls** can introduce you to the material, and once the material has been provided, willing words will follow. The man who has learnt what he owes to his fatherland, and what to his friends, with what sort of love a parent should be loved, and with what a brother and a guest, what the duty of a conscripted soldier is, and what the duty of a judge, and the roles of a leader sent to war – he certainly knows how to render the things that are appropriate for each character. **Once you are a learned imitator**, I order you to look again at the example of life and customs, and to draw lifelike words from there.

In spite of the adverse presentation of poetry in Plato's works, Horace jokily tells the would-be poet to skim the Platonic dialogues as a preparation and aid for speedy composition (*non invita*).<sup>45</sup> Moreover, without challenging Plato's dubious characterization of poetry as μίμησις, he turns Plato's criticism of the mimetic nature of poetry on its head, suggesting that an overview of Socratic philosophy will make the poet a *doctus imitator*.<sup>46</sup>

This humorous treatment veils an implicit criticism of Plato's assertion that poetic imitation by definition lacks learning and knowledge. In fact, as Virgil abundantly demonstrates in the *Aeneid*, poetic *imitatio*, i.e. imitation of other texts rather than the sensible world, is a demonstration of knowledge and learning. For example, when Virgil describes Juno creating the *imago Aeneae* in book ten, he draws on two Greek sources: an εἶδωλον of Aeneas in the *Iliad*, and

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<sup>45</sup> This passage constitutes further evidence for the circulation of philosophical texts (in this case the works of Plato) amongst the Roman political and literary elite in this period.

<sup>46</sup> The suggestion that Horace is being humorous here is further supported by the contrasting attitude to poetry vs. philosophy expressed in the *Epistles* passage quoted above (Hor. *Ep.* 1.2.1-4).

an εἶδωλον of Helen in Euripides.<sup>47</sup> This both confirms and undermines Plato's scathing designation of the poet as merely an εἶδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα (Pl. *Resp.* 605c). On one reading, Plato is right, because that is indeed what Virgil is doing here – constructing an image from other images. But the way Virgil does so, as a *doctus imitator*, challenges Plato's more fundamental claim that poetry *qua* mimesis lacks knowledge. Furthermore, though this sort of learned reference to previous literature may not constitute philosophical knowledge, one of the central arguments of this thesis is that the *Aeneid* demonstrates the value of literary intertextuality as a philosophical tool.

Philosophical readings in the *Aeneid* are therefore justified by the influence of philosophical epic, especially Lucretius, on Virgil, and by the varied but persistent philosophical reception of Homer, one of Virgil's most important models.

### iii. Methodology

The body of the thesis is comprised of six chapters, each of which has a different philosophical focus.<sup>48</sup> It is my contention that the following criteria, either individually or in combination, offer grounds for a philosophical reading. For one, cases in which Virgil is treating a philosophical issue, especially if that philosophical issue was a subject of contemporary philosophical debate, and

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<sup>47</sup> 10.633-44, Hom. *Il.* 5.449-53 and Eur. *Hel.* 31-6 respectively. I will discuss both passages in the context of the Epicurean account of visual perception and imagination in chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception and materialism*).

<sup>48</sup> See *Contents*.

discussed by Lucretius and/or Cicero.<sup>49</sup> Secondly, and often in conjunction with this, Virgil's use of terminology that has a specific meaning in contemporary philosophical discourse, and may be unusual in literature that is not explicitly philosophical, for example: *verum nomen*, *fatum* in the singular, *causa*, *visus*, *fortuna*, *simulacrum*, and *volitare*.<sup>50</sup> Both of these criteria are related to my third, which is intertextuality with sources whose explicit aim is the exposition of philosophical ideas and arguments. I have made this a separate category, as philosophical allusion/intertextuality in Virgil's poetry is not always restricted to passages whose content initially appears to be philosophical.<sup>51</sup> Finally, I also look for intertextuality with sources which are not themselves explicitly philosophical, but nevertheless have often been incorporated into philosophical argument or been made the object of philosophical allegory.<sup>52</sup>

I use these grounds as starting points with which to consider what a philosophical perspective can add to our interpretation and understanding of the *Aeneid*. I focus my analysis on two areas: firstly, the relationship between Virgil

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<sup>49</sup> E.g. my discussion of fate and moral responsibility in chapters two (*Fate, Literature and Narrative*), and three (*Causation and Moral Responsibility*), which draws especially on Cicero's *De Fato*; or my discussion of epistemology and sense perception in chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception and materialism*), which draws on book four of the *DRN*.

<sup>50</sup> For the perceived importance of terminology to philosophical discourse see e.g. Cic. *Acad.* 1.5, *Fin.* 3.4-5; Lucr. 1.830-3, 3.258-61.

<sup>51</sup> E.g. in chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*), I discuss how Aeneas' distraught reaction to the burning of the ship (5.700-4) can be illuminated by a passage from *Tusculanae Disputationes* which outlines how the wise man should respond to misfortune.

<sup>52</sup> E.g. in *Georgics* 4, the nymph Clymene sings about the affair between Ares and Aphrodite (*ibid.* 345-6). The story of Ares and Aphrodite in the *Odyssey* was read as a natural philosophical allegory (e.g. Heraclitus, *Quaestiones Homericæ* 69), which supports my philosophical reading of the *Georgics* passage (*4. Philosophy, Poetry and Rivers*).

and his philosophical source/s; secondly, within the poem, how a philosophical perspective relates to other viewpoints (religious, political, literary etc.).

In terms of the former, I show that Virgil not only references but also engages with his philosophical sources, for example by using his poem to offer counter examples or revisions of philosophical theories.<sup>53</sup> I try as far as possible to use contemporary or earlier sources to reconstruct these theories, though in some cases in which the evidence is especially limited, I also look to later evidence for further support. In addition, when discussing the relationship between texts, I aim to give a balanced treatment of both ‘target’ and ‘model’ (e.g. not to oversimplify Lucretius in discussion of the *Aeneid*),<sup>54</sup> and not to privilege literary over philosophical intertexts, and vice versa. Though I point out Virgil’s sustained antagonism towards certain aspects of Epicurean doctrine presented by Lucretius, I am not concerned with identifying Virgil’s allegiance to any particular philosophical school: his use of philosophy is eclectic rather than partisan.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> E.g. in chapter one (*True Names and False Names*) I argue that Virgil’s manipulation of names in the *Aeneid* revises philosophical ideas about the correctness of names and the origin of language and encourages the reader towards a conclusion that is unattested in ancient philosophy: that the relationship between *verba* and *res* is two-way. In chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception and materialism*), I show that Virgil offers counter-examples to Lucretius’ explanation of visual perception and imagination.

<sup>54</sup> Following Fowler (2000: 16).

<sup>55</sup> Scholars and commentators who see Virgil’s use of philosophy in the *Aeneid* as eclectic include Servius (*ad Aen.* 10.467): *sectis philosophorum poetae pro qualitate negotiorum semper utuntur*; Feeney (1986: 2): ‘Virgil’s eclecticism is by no means synthetic’; Galinsky (1994: 196): ‘when we add to this Virgil’s own eclecticism, we should not expect the poet of the *Aeneid*, therefore, to provide a mere textbook illustration of every viewpoint expressed in the *De Ira*. The salient issue is that the horizon of expectation of Vergil’s audience went ever so far beyond a simple reliance on Stoicism.’; Braund (1997:

In terms of the latter, I demonstrate that Virgil makes productive use of the interplay of ideas and multiplicity of perspectives in his poem. When a philosophical reading or interpretation is incompatible with e.g. a religious or literary one, he utilizes the tension between these to promote philosophical reflection on the issue at hand – a sort of internal dialectic.<sup>56</sup> In some cases, the conclusion of my philosophical analysis offers support for traditional literary interpretations, and hopefully adds clarity and nuance to previous analysis. In others, it identifies fresh ways of looking at familiar passages and problems, and opens up exciting new paths for enquiry into Virgil's poetry.

#### iv. Aims

‘Certain truths about life can only be fittingly and accurately stated in the language and forms characteristic of the narrative artist’

Nussbaum (1990: 19)

διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.

Consequently, poetry is more philosophical and more elevated than history, since poetry relates more of the universal, while history relates particulars.

Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451b (trans. Halliwell)

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206, 220): ‘to assign crude labels to this most complex of authors is of limited usefulness... Virgil was not a doctrinaire member of any particular school of thought.’

<sup>56</sup> E.g. in chapter two (*Fate, Literature and Narrative*), I argue that Virgil creates a productive tension between the characterization of fate as Stoic on the one hand and as literature and narrative on the other which provides a platform from which he can explore the fixity and influence of fate.

As the explanation of my methodology demonstrates, first and foremost I aim to show that Virgil is doing philosophy as well as referencing it. However, this does not mean that we have to treat the *Aeneid* as a philosophical text.<sup>57</sup> Rather, Virgil shows us that the reading conventions, as well as the style, techniques, language and form of mythological epic poetry are philosophically useful, and promote philosophical thinking. There are philosophical advantages to approaching philosophy in a non-philosophical way. I will now suggest a few of these, to lay the ground for the identification of others in the course of the thesis.

Lucretius used the simile of the honeyed cup to show one philosophical advantage of poetry: that its 'sweetness' and pleasure could provide a lure for those put off by philosophy on the grounds that it doesn't seem enjoyable.<sup>58</sup> But the way Lucretius chooses to present this claim for the utility of poetry as a vehicle for philosophy, i.e. in a simile, makes a further point. Similes are a stylistic feature of Homeric epic, and one of their aims is to elucidate the content of the narrative by drawing comparisons with other situations. Philosophers also use comparisons, analogies and examples to clarify and evidence their arguments. However, they are much more restricted in their ability to do so than

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<sup>57</sup> For the modern view that the salient difference between philosophy and other literature e.g. poetry lies in the 'method of regarding' these texts, rather than the texts themselves, see: Fowler (2000: 138), who writes of the 'differing reading practices of two interpretative communities'; Laird (2007).

<sup>58</sup> Lucr. 1.935-50, 4.10-25. This simile, and its implications, have been much discussed. See e.g. Mitsis (1994), and Volk (2002: 96-99). Cicero's repeated assertions that philosophy was unpopular and frowned upon by some of his peers (e.g. Cic. *Fin.* 1.1., *Acad.* 2.5, *Tusc.* 1.5-6, 5.6) suggest that Lucretius' presentation of Epicurean doctrine in a lengthy Latin hexameter poem may genuinely have been an attempt to attract an otherwise reticent Roman audience. Cicero also wrote a treatise *Hortensius*, now lost, that defended the study of philosophy against critics. See Rawson (1985: 284-5) for the inferiority of earlier Stoic and Epicurean writing in Latin.

poets.<sup>59</sup> For one, philosophers are expected to draw their examples from real life.<sup>60</sup> Virgil, on the other hand, can elucidate the zealous industry of a hive of bees by means of a simile comparing them to Cyclopes dividing up the labour of forging thunderbolts in Etna (Verg. *G.* 4.170-8). Surprisingly, in doing so, he invites direct comparison with stricter philosophical analogy: *si parva licet componere magnis* (*ibid.* 176), as well as being proverbial,<sup>61</sup> recalls Plato's philosophical use of large things (e.g. cities) to illustrate small (e.g. souls).<sup>62</sup> Some

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<sup>59</sup> E.g. Plato's definition of a παράδειγμα (*Plt.* 278c): οὐκοῦν τοῦτο μὲν ἱκανῶς συνειλήφμεν, ὅτι παραδείγματός γ' ἐστὶ τότε γενεσις, ὁπόταν ὃν ταύτῳ ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένῳ δοξαζόμενον ὀρθῶς καὶ συναχθὲν περὶ ἑκάτερον ὡς συνάμφῳ μίαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἀποτελεῖ; 'Is this, then, a satisfactory definition, that an example is formed when that which is the same in some second unconnected thing is rightly conceived and compared with the first, so that the two together form one true idea?' (trans. Fowler)

<sup>60</sup> E.g. Plut. *Mor.* 20c: οἱ γοῦν **φιλόσοφοι παραδείγμασι χρῶνται**, νουθετοῦντες καὶ παιδεύοντες **ἐξ ὑποκειμένων**· οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ ταύτῃ ποιοῦσι πλάττοντες αὐτοὶ πράγματα καὶ μυθολογοῦντες **'Philosophers**, at any rate, for admonition and instruction, **use examples taken from known facts**; but the poets accomplish the same result by inventing actions of their own imagination, and by recounting mythical tales' (trans. Babbitt). We might compare how Quintilian (*Inst.* 8.6.73) says that, though orators are bound in their use of similes to illustrate the obscure with the familiar, poets can reverse this, and paradoxically illustrate the familiar with the obscure. He uses an example from the *Aeneid* to illustrate his point (4.143-4). See also Lyne (1989: 63-99) on how similes achieve 'narrative through imagery'. Note, however, that ancient philosophers, especially Plato, do use non-falsifiable mythological and imaginary examples and thought-experiments in discussion of things beyond human experience, e.g. Gyges' ring of invisibility (Pl. *Resp.* 359c- 360c, Cic. *Off.* 3.39), or the Myth of Er.

<sup>61</sup> See Mynors (1990 *ad loc.*).

<sup>62</sup> E.g. Pl. *Resp.* 368d, which introduces the city-soul analogy: ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, δοκεῖ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοιαύτην ποιήσασθαι ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ, οἷαν περ ἂν εἰ προσέταξέ τις γράμματα **σμικρὰ** πόρρωθεν ἀναγνῶναι μὴ πάνυ ὁξὺ βλέπουσιν, ἔπειτά τις ἐνενόησεν, ὅτι | τὰ αὐτὰ γράμματα ἔστι που καὶ ἄλλοθι **μείζω** τε καὶ **ἐν μείζονι**, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἐφάνη οἷμα **ἐκεῖνα πρῶτον ἀναγνόντας οὕτως ἐπισκοπεῖν τὰ ἐλάττω**, εἰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα τυγχάνει 'Since therefore,' I said, 'we are not good at making an inquiry of such a kind, I think we should employ the kind of investigation suitable for people who are not very keen-sighted, if someone had ordered them to read **small** letters from a distance, but then someone noticed that the same letters existed somewhere else written **larger** and **on a larger background**. I think it would seem a godsend **to read those first and then examine the smaller ones** to see if they were the same' (trans. Emlyn-Jones). Cf.

similes in the *Aeneid* are even reworkings of prosaic philosophical examples. Virgil thereby simultaneously imparts philosophical content, and demonstrates that the epic simile is a suitable vehicle for philosophy. For example, the Fury Allecto's effect on the Latin queen Amata is likened to that of children whipping on a spinning top. Rabel (1981) and Feeney (1991) have convincingly argued that Virgil draws here on the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus' use of a spinning top to exemplify moral responsibility. I will explore the philosophical force of this in more detail in chapter one (*True and False Names*).

As suggested above, I also aim to show that Virgil uses literary intertextuality as a philosophical tool, making use of the different expectations and traditions about the treatment of sources and models in literary and philosophical texts.<sup>63</sup> When we approach philosophical texts, we usually expect sources to be clearly signposted, and their content to be relevant. In addition, references and sources are considered critically: is Cicero correct to attribute the spinning top example to Chrysippus? If so, was Chrysippus' use of this example to argue for the compatibility of moral responsibility and universal causal determinism accepted as orthodox by other Stoics?<sup>64</sup> Literary texts and especially poetry, on the other hand, are much more fluid in their use of sources. Intertextuality can range enormously in scope: an intertext can be anything from one word (e.g. *simulacra*) to an entire work ('the *Aeneid* is Odyssean'). And the function of intertextuality is not only to evoke similarities, but also differences, and to broaden and multiply

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Tityrus' explanation that Rome defies comparison (Verg. *Ecl.* 1.22-3): *sic canibus catulos similis, sic matribus haedos/ noram, sic parvis componere magna solebam*.

<sup>63</sup> Sharrock (2013: 4) summarizes these as 'intertextuality vs. source criticism'.

<sup>64</sup> For the perceived necessity of strict allegiance to certain philosophical schools, see above (i. *Virgil's philosophical context*), and n. 5.

perspectives.<sup>65</sup> Indeed, in a densely intertextual/allusive poet such as Virgil, scholars often identify many intertexts in a single passage. One of the positive philosophical effects of this is that it leaves the onus of interpretation on readers, creating a puzzle for them to consider and, in some instances, solve (Fowler 2000: 121):

‘intertextuality creates meaning in texts through a **dialectic** between resemblance and difference.’

The freedom and flexibility of poetic similes and intertextuality therefore constitute two examples of ways in which the reading conventions and style of epic poetry may be philosophically useful.

My study broadens the horizons of philosophical analysis of the *Aeneid* in several respects. For one, whilst there has already been excellent work on some philosophical topics in the poem, such as the emotions, theology, eschatology and natural philosophy, I investigate other areas that have been relatively neglected, such as causation, logic, and the imagination.<sup>66</sup> In some cases, this comprises looking at a subject familiar to scholars of Virgil from an unfamiliar, philosophical perspective. For example, in chapter one, I approach naming, wordplay and etymologies in the *Aeneid* via philosophical ideas about the

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<sup>65</sup> Sharrock (2013: 5): ‘literary intertextuality requires the evocation (intentional or unintentional) of the intertext, whether the effect is one of similarity or difference... use of other texts... functions at a looser, more impressionistic level than would be necessary for philosophers.’

<sup>66</sup> Philosophical studies of emotions in the *Aeneid* include Putnam (1990), Galinsky (1994), and Gill (2003). Hardie (1986) remains the strongest discussion of natural philosophy and cosmology, and Feeney (1991) of theology. On eschatology and book six see especially Norden (1926).

correctness of names and the origin of language. In addition, I offer precise and detailed reconstructions of philosophical theories in order to trace and explore their influence on the *Aeneid*. This affords the valuable opportunity for clarity on difficult but critical interpretative issues, such as the role and nature of fate in the poem. In general, I hope that my approach and conclusions demonstrate the possibility not only for a wider range of possible philosophical enquiries into the poem, but also for deeper and richer analyses in individual instances.

Recent monographs have focussed on philosophy in the *Eclogues* and the *Georgics*,<sup>67</sup> and Hardie (1986) offers an extended cosmological and natural philosophical reading of the *Aeneid*. Though Hardie's work shows that episodic philosophical interpretations of the poem can be synthesized into a more comprehensive analysis, there is not yet a monograph that addresses philosophy as a whole in the *Aeneid*. This thesis certainly does not exhaust the topic, but I nevertheless hope that it demonstrates the potential for such a study. In some cases, as noted above, omissions are due to the quality of previous scholarship. In others, I think there is more work to be done. Areas which offer particular promise for further research include epistemology, political philosophy and theories of rhetoric, the relationship between natural philosophy and ethics, and the attribution of different philosophical perspectives and world-views to different characters.

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<sup>67</sup> Davis (2012) and Gale (2000) on the *Eclogues* and the *Georgics* respectively.

### 1. True and False Names<sup>1</sup>

That the native Latins should keep their language and name is one of the few stipulations made by Juno when she strikes her final bargain with Jupiter at the end of the epic (12.819-28, 833-6):

[Juno] 'illud te, nulla fati quod lege tenetur,  
pro Latio obtestor, pro maiestate tuorum: 820

cum iam conubiis pacem felicibus (esto)  
component, cum iam leges et foedera iungent,

**ne vetus indigenas nomen mutare Latinos**

neu Troas fieri iubeas **Teucrosque vocari**

**aut vocem mutare viros** aut vertere vestem. 825

sit Latium, sint Albani per saecula reges,

sit Romana potens Itala virtute propago:

**occidit, occideritque sinas cum nomine Troia.'**

...

[Jupiter] 'do quod vis, et me victusque volensque remitto.

**sermonem Ausonii patrium** moresque **tenebunt,**

**utque est nomen erit;** commixti corpore tantum 835

subsident Teucri.'

[Juno] 'This, which is bound by no law of fate, I beg of you on behalf of Latium and the sovereignty of your peoples: when they arrange peace through these prosperous marriages (let it be so), when they unite their lands and treaties, **may you not order the indigenous Latins to change their name**, nor to become Trojans **or be called Teucrians, and may you not order these men to change their language** or their

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<sup>1</sup> Following O'Hara (1996).

attire. Let it be Latium, let there be Alban kings throughout the generations, let the Roman line be strong through Italian virtue. **Troy has died, so let it die, along with its name.**'... [Jupiter] 'I grant what you wish and willingly let myself draw back in defeat. **The Ausonians will keep their ancestral language and customs, and their name will be as it is.** The Trojans will subside, integrated only physically.'

This reflects Virgil's interest in both the origin of individual names (*vetus... nomen*) and, which has received less attention from scholars, of the Latin language as a whole (*vocem, sermonem... patrium*).<sup>2</sup> The *Aeneid* traces the beginnings of the Roman people, and Virgil makes it clear explicitly and implicitly that explaining the origin of the language Romans speak, and the names they use, is an important part of this.

In this chapter, I explore Virgil's engagement with philosophical ideas about the relationship between words and their referents and the origin of language. It is central to my analysis that etymologies in the *Aeneid* have philosophical content, and are vehicles for philosophical reflection as well as the intellectual pleasure of wordplay. I will show that Virgil creates a productive tension in the *Aeneid* by simultaneously attributing true meaning to proper names, and making clear that this meaning is both artificially constructed and ambiguous. Despite the fact that he undermines the potential for a natural and meaningful connection between proper names and their bearers with name changes, homonyms, synonyms, and the use of different languages, names in the *Aeneid* surprisingly retain the power

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<sup>2</sup> In fact, Virgil's choice of words here implicitly suggests that the native Latin language at this point may be Greek: *indigenas...Latinos* (823: *-genas* is cognate with γίγνομαι, cf. Latin *genus* vs. Greek γένος) and *sermonem Ausonii patrium* (834: Ausonia is the Greek name for Italy at Dion. Hal. 1.35). This may reflect contemporary debate about the relationship between the Latin and Greek languages. Gitner (2015) provides a useful overview of the arguments. See also n. 5 and 17 below.

to reveal and determine important features of their referents. Virgil therefore uses ancient philosophical ideas about etymology and the origins of language to express an idea unattested in ancient philosophy: that the relationship between *verba* and *res* is two-way. Names are functions of their referents, and referents are functions of their names. I will also show that Virgil uses words and particularly names to reflect the linguistic diversity misleadingly described by his purely Latin epic. The way he does so highlights the presence of alternative languages and interpretations but inevitably prioritizes a Latin and Roman reading. This technique unmasks the power dynamics inherent in language and naming and guides the reader towards the perspective that both language and meaning are culturally constructed.<sup>3</sup>

I begin by considering the only explicit example of a ‘true name’ (*verum nomen*) in the *Aeneid*: Evander’s assertion that the old, true name of the Tiber was Albula (1. i. *Evander and the early name-givers of Rome*). In order to try and explain why Evander makes this claim, I explore the philosophy behind the idea of truth or correctness in names, starting with Plato’s *Cratylus*. In doing so, I also situate Evander’s knowledge about such things within the context of 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC debate about the role of early Italian and Roman kings in the creation of the Latin language.

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<sup>3</sup> Virgil’s constructive relativism when dealing with naming might accordingly be compared with Fowler’s when dealing with the interpretations of classical texts (Fowler 2000: i, ix): ‘meaning is constructed, not discovered... it makes no sense to contrast a formalist concern with texts and a historicist concern with lived reality if that reality is constructed out of readings of texts.’

This leads to a more in depth philosophical inquiry into the relationship between words and their referents, and how this is relevant to Latin poetry in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC (1. ii. *The origin of language and ὀνόματα μιμητικά τῶν πραγμάτων*). I explain the differing views of Stoics and Epicureans on the origins of language and etymology, and give examples of how Virgil's use of homonyms, name changes and onomatopoeia engages with this debate.

I then consider how and why Virgil incorporates both Latin and Greek etymologies into his poem (1. iii. *The problem of different languages: Latin and Greek*). As mentioned in the introduction, Homer's epics were mined by later literary commentators and philosophers, especially the Stoics, for etymologies, particularly of divine names. Virgil engages with this tradition, but often distinguishes Greek glosses (e.g. relating Mercury to ἑρμηνεία, or Juno to ἄηρ) from Latin ones (e.g. relating Juno to *iuvo* or *iungo*). This both reinforces the philosophical idea that names are descriptive or mimetic of their referents, and undermines it by highlighting that meaning is relative and culturally constructed.

I continue to explore different languages, and their relevance to these questions, in the following subsection (1. iv. *Latin, Italian languages and Punic: the prioritization of a Roman reading*). Though Virgil is writing in Latin, he acknowledges that the ancient peoples he describes and the peoples of the Roman empire under Augustus speak many different languages. One of the ways he can show linguistic diversity in his Latin poem is through the use of proper names. I argue that the meaning of these names and the connection between them and their referents is not fixed. Rather, the relationship between Rome and

foreign peoples is reflected in how much notice Virgil's Latin context and narrative takes of the semantics and meaning of these foreign names in their original language. Virgil therefore demonstrates not only that meaning is culturally constructed, but also that it is defined by the dominant culture, in this case Rome.

The simile likening Amata to a spinning top when she is sent into a frenzy by Allecto is one of only a few passages in the *Aeneid* that has attracted close philosophical analysis and been read as engaging with Stoic philosophy.<sup>4</sup> What is more, Virgil's choice of Allecto as a name for the most important fury in the *Aeneid* is unusual and therefore demands attention. Bringing both of these ideas together, I finally offer a more detailed Stoic analysis of this episode (1.v. Allecto: the unnameable), arguing that, in the case of Allecto, Virgil uses etymology, a technique beloved by the Stoics, to challenge Stoic logic.

### 1. i. Evander and the early name-givers of Rome

When Aeneas reaches Pallanteum, the future site of Rome, in book eight, the Arcadian king Evander takes him on a tour of the city. In doing so, Evander traces the history of the region from the mythological time of Faunus, the nymphs, and Saturn. He takes care to point out the functions and changing names of places, and the reasons behind these. The Tiber, for example, was named when different kings ruled the region, after the monarch Thybris. But this was not its original name (8.328-332):

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<sup>4</sup> Rabel (1981).

'tum manus Ausonia et gentes venere Sicanae,  
 saepius et **nomen** posuit Saturnia tellus;  
 tum reges asperque immani corpore Thybris,      330  
 a quo post Itali fluvium **cognomine** Thybrim  
 diximus; amisit **verum** vetus Albula **nomen**.'

'At that time an Ausonian troop and Sicanian tribes came, and the Saturnian land gave up its **name** several times; then there were kings and Thybris, rough and with a huge bulk. Afterwards we Italians called the river by his **cognomen** Thybris– old Albula lost his **true name**.'

Though we (*diximus* draws the reader into Evander's narrative) all call Rome's river the Tiber,<sup>5</sup> its 'true name' was Albula. With this remark, Virgil weighs into contemporary discussion about the history of the Tiber's name,<sup>6</sup> and demonstrates that names are closely related to politics: to which person/people is in charge. He also involves his character Evander in a long-standing and multi-

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<sup>5</sup> The reader is similarly drawn into the perspective of the Augustan Roman at the beginning of book seven, which explains the name of the coastal town Caieta 7.1-2 *tu quoque litoribus nostris, Aeneia nutrix, / aeternam moriens famam, Caieta, dedisti*. That the recently Arcadian Evander here groups himself confidently with the *Itali* again suggests that Virgil implicitly blends Greek and the Greeks into Italian and Roman identity. See above n. 2, below n. 17.

<sup>6</sup> Varro, *Ling.* 5.30 *sed de Tiberis nomine anceps historia. nam et suum Etruria et Latium suum esse credit, quod fuerunt qui ab Thebri vicino regulo Venientum dixerint appellatum primo Thebrim. sunt qui Tiberim priscum nomen latinum Albulam vocitatum litteris tradiderint. posterius propter Tiberinum regem Latinorum mutatum, quod ibi interierit*. 'But about the name of the Tiber there are two accounts. For Etruria believes it is hers, and so does Latium, because there have been those who said that at first, from Thebris, the near-by chieftain of the Veians, it was called the Thebris. There are also those who in their writings have handed down the story that the Tiber was called Albula as its early Latin name, and that later it was changed on account of Tiberinus king of the Latins, because he died there' (trans. Kent). See also Ov. *Fast.* 5.645-6. Cairns (2006) explores Virgil's use of *Thybris*, *Tiberinus* and *Tiberis* elsewhere in the poem. By giving the Tiber two names, Virgil also follows Homer's treatment of Troy's rivers (ὃν Ἐάνθον καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον Hom. *Il.* 20.74)

faceted philosophical debate about the relationship between words and their referents, and the origin of language.

The idea of a *verum nomen* suggests that names can be true or false.<sup>7</sup> Plato's *Cratylus* is the first explicit treatment of this idea of a standard of correctness for names.<sup>8</sup> The opening of the dialogue is prompted by the humorous consideration of the respective suitability of the three names Cratylus, Socrates and Hermogenes, and provides a useful introduction to the network of concepts and beliefs that surround naming and etymology from Plato onwards (Pl. *Cra.* 383a-b):

ΕΡΜ. Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, **ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι**  
**ἐκάστω** τῶν ὄντων **φύσει** πεφυκυῖαν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἄν  
 τινες ξυνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι, τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς μόριον  
 ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι, ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι **καὶ**  
**Ἕλλησι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν.** ἐρωτῶ οὖν αὐτὸν ἐγώ, εἰ

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<sup>7</sup> The term *verum nomen* is unusual in pre-Virgilian Latin literature. In Plautus' *Stichus*, the parasite Gelasimus, now poor and hungry, jokes that his true name is Miccotrogus 'small-biter' (Plaut. *Stich.* 241-2). Cicero uses the phrase twice to describe the names of constellations in his *Aratea* (Cic. *Arat.* 34.163, 318), but only once casually in his speeches (Cic. *Lig.* 17.9). Horace likewise only uses it once (Hor. *Epist.* 1.7.92-3). This makes it all the more remarkable that Virgil refers to *vera nomina* twice: not only in this passage, but also of the *hippomanes* at Verg. *G.* 3.280-3, which I will discuss below. Following Virgil, the idea of a *verum nomen* grows more popular, and is, for example, a common feature in the Servian commentaries.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 16 for why the usual disclaimer, 'earliest extant' may not be necessary here. Dionysius, writing in Rome in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, regards the *Cratylus* as the earliest literary work to treat language in this way, and demonstrates that this text was read and discussed by Virgil's contemporaries. However, within the *Cratylus* Plato alludes to an earlier interest in the correctness of names on the part of Prodicus (384b) and Protagoras (391c).

αὐτῷ Κρατύλος τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὄνομα· ὁ δὲ ὁμολογεῖ. “τί δὲ Σωκράτει;” ἔφην.  
 “Σωκράτης,” ἦ δ’ ὅς. “οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν, ὅπερ  
 καλοῦμεν ὄνομα ἕκαστον, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ ὄνομα;” ὁ δέ· “οὐκ οὐν σοί  
 γε,” ἦ δ’ ὅς, “ὄνομα Ἑρμογένους, οὐδὲ ἂν πάντες καλῶσιν ἄνθρωποι.”

Hermogenes: Cratylus, whom you see here, Socrates, says **that everything has a right name of its own**, which comes **by nature**, and that a name is not whatever people call a thing by agreement, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing, but that there is a kind of inherent correctness in names, **which is the same for all men, both Greeks and barbarians**. So I ask him whether his name is in truth Cratylus, and he agrees that it is. ‘And what is Socrates’ name?’ I said. ‘Socrates,’ said he. ‘Then that applies to all men, and the particular name by which we call each person is his name?’ And he said, ‘Well, your name is not Hermogenes, even if all mankind call you so.’ (trans. Fowler)

Cratylus is portrayed as a proponent of the view that there is a standard of correctness for names (ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα). This standard is described as natural (φύσει πεφυκυῖαν) and as applying equally to all languages (καὶ Ἑλλήσι καὶ βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν). According to Cratylus, the correctness of a name is not derived from custom or ordinary usage. Just because it is normal to use a certain φωνῆς μόριον to refer to something does not mean that that φωνῆς μόριον can truly (τῇ ἀληθείᾳ) be considered an ὄνομα (οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἂν τινες ξυνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι).<sup>9</sup> This distinction between imperfect customary language and true names almost correlates with the distinction Evander makes between Thybris and Albula. However, there is a subtle difference. Evander allows the possibility for two sorts of names, both a *cognomen*, which ordinary people use (*diximus*), and a *verum nomen*. Cratylus, on the other hand, would deny that any name other than a τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὄνομα should be deemed a name at all (οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα...).

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<sup>9</sup> I follow Ademollo’s (2011: esp. 1-6) interpretation of this passage, and Cratylus’ position in the dialogue as a whole. See also Barney (2001) and Sedley (2003).

So what is it that determines the correctness of a name, if not customary usage? Hermogenes is told by Cratylus that even if everyone called him Hermogenes it wouldn't really be his name. This is because he is neither literally 'born from Hermes', nor blessed with any of the traits (e.g. money-making) associated with the god (Pl. *Cra.* 384c). It is therefore clear that an important criterion of correctness is a name's ability to accurately describe its referent. This idea is borne out by the later discussion of the respective suitability of the two names for Hector's son in the *Iliad*, which also demonstrates that epic poetry was deemed a suitable object for this sort of philosophical enquiry. Socrates suggests that it would be correct to call him Astyanax rather than Skamandrios (Pl. *Cra.* 392d-e):

ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ διὰ τί ποτε. ἢ αὐτὸς ἡμῖν κάλλιστα ὑφηγεῖται τὸ διότι; φησὶν γάρ·

οἷος γάρ σφιν ἔρυστο πόλιν καὶ τείχεα μακρά. (Hom. *Il.* 22.506)

διὰ ταῦτα δὴ, ὥς ἔοικεν, ὀρθῶς ἔχει καλεῖν τὸν τοῦ σωτήρος υἱὸν

Ἀστυάνακτα τούτου ὃ ἔσωζεν ὁ πατήρ αὐτοῦ, ὥς φησιν Ὅμηρος.

Socrates: Let us, then, consider the reason for this. Does he not himself indicate the reason most admirably? For he says 'He alone defended their city and long walls.' Therefore, as it seems, it is right to call the son of the defender Lord of the City (Astyanax), ruler of that which his father, as Homer says, defended. (trans. Fowler)

Socrates points out that Homer tells us that Hector alone bore the responsibility for protecting Troy. Ἀστυάναξ ('Lord of the city') is a fitting name for a son intended to grow up to rule what his father has defended, even if it tragically

encapsulates Trojan hope for the future that will be dashed by the death of Hector and his people's defeat.<sup>10</sup>

Evander might, therefore, be making the assertion that Albula is a better description of this particular river than Thybris. This seems plausible: *albus* means 'white', 'light-coloured' or 'pale', which would suit the characteristically light colour of the Tiber's water. Horace repeatedly labels the Tiber *flavus*,<sup>11</sup> presumably not only following Ennius (*et Tiberis flumen <flavom> vomit in mare salsum* Enn. *Ann.* 453 Skutsch)<sup>12</sup> but also in response to the pale river he saw. Virgil describes the Tiber in similar terms when Aeneas and the Trojans first encounter it at the beginning of book seven (7.30-2):<sup>13</sup>

... hunc inter fluvio Tiberinus amoenus  
verticibus rapidis et **multa flavus harena**  
in mare prorumpit.

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<sup>10</sup> Some readers of the etymologies in the *Cratylus* find them purposefully ridiculous. See e.g. Sedley (2013a): 'Scholarly opinion has long been divided as to how Socrates' own eventual position should be understood... If Socrates is read as actually dismissing naturalism, it is almost inevitable that his naturalistic etymological decoding of words, to which over half the dialogue is devoted, should be taken as not seriously intended, and in fact as making fun of the entire etymological enterprise.' To such a reader, the fact that the eventual Trojan defeat makes this name utterly inappropriate for Hector's son might suggest that Socrates has intentionally chosen this as a bad example, and is not being entirely serious here.

<sup>11</sup> Hor. *Carm.* 1.2.13, 1.8.8, 2.3.18

<sup>12</sup> When Macrobius cites this verse, he omits *flavom* (Macrobius *Sat.* 6.4.3). However, the result is a metrically defective line. Skutsch therefore suggests the addition of *<flavom>* as a simple and plausible way to restore the line to completion.

<sup>13</sup> See also 9.816 *cum gurgite flavo*. For Virgil, calling the Tiber *flavus* may also constitute a gloss on the Homeric river Ξάνθος ('yellow') in Troy, especially as the Sibyl said that Aeneas would find another Xanthus in Italy (6.86-9).

... amidst this grove the Tiber with his lovely stream burst forth into the sea with forceful eddies and **yellow with lots of sand**.

Moreover, he uses the adjective *albus* to refer to the sulphurous Nar, a river which later joins the Tiber (*sulpurea Nar **albus** aqua* 7.517). Perhaps the old name Albula suits the *flavum fluvium Tiberim* better than the rough (*asper*), ungainly (*immani corpore*) and regal connotations of Thybris.<sup>14</sup> It may also have constituted a better match for the Alban people.<sup>15</sup>

Evander's insight into naming in the *Aeneid* reflects the link made in 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC texts between Rome's early kings and the formation of the Latin language. For example, Varro claims that everyday Latin words are inherited from Latinus and Romulus, and are perhaps even more worthy of etymological scrutiny than the poetic vocabulary of Ennius and Livius Andronicus (Varro, *Ling.* 5.9):

non enim videbatur consentaneum quaerere me in eo verbo quod  
finxisset Ennius causam, negligere **quod ante rex Latinus finxisset**, cum  
poeticis multis verbis magis delecter quam utar, antiquis magis utar quam  
delecter. **an non potius mea verba illa quae hereditate a Romulo rege  
venerunt** quam quae a poeta Livio relicta?

For it did not seem meet that I seek the source in the case of the word which Ennius had made, and neglect that **which long before king Latinus had made**, in view of the fact that I get pleasure rather than utility from many words of the poets, and more utility than pleasure from the ancient words. And in fact **are not those words mine which**

<sup>14</sup> There is ancient support for this etymology: Mart. *Ep.* 1.12.2 **canaque sulphureis Albula fumat aquis**, Serv. *ad Aen.* 8.332 *antiquum hoc nomen a colore habuit*.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. 12.826 *Albani patres* (above), which suggests that *Albani* were already living in Latium. However, elsewhere in the *Aeneid* there is some confusion about when the Albans (9.387-8), the Alban mount (12.134-5) and Alba Longa (6.763-6) were named - see the amusing comment *ad* 12.826 in Tarrant (2012).

**have come to me by inheritance from King Romulus**, rather than those which were left behind by the poet Livius? (trans. Kent)

Varro also references Evander as the source of Greek etymologies for current Latin words on the basis that he moved from Arcadia to settle in Italy (Varro, *Ling.* 5.21). Evander likewise has associations with the origins of Latin literacy and language in Livy, where he is described as a *venerabilis vir miraculo litterarum, rei novae inter rudes artium homines* (Livy 1.7), suggesting that he was credited with the introduction of the alphabet to Italy.<sup>16</sup> Remarkably, Virgil does not choose to develop the onomastic role of either Romulus or Latinus, beyond a brief reference to Romulus' naming of the Romans (*Romanos suo de nomine dicet* 1.277). However, Evander's status as a literary culture hero forms an important context for his aetiological knowledge and etymological explanations in book eight.<sup>17</sup>

### 1. ii. The origin of language and ὀνόματα μιμητικά τῶν πραγμάτων

The idea that early Italian and Roman kings were name-givers and fixed words to things is only one example of a theory about the origin of language, in this case

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<sup>16</sup> Papiouannou (2003: 691) additionally makes reference to HRR fr. 19 = Lydus, *Mag.* 1.5 who, though writing in the 5-6<sup>th</sup> c. AD, claims to be using Cato as his source for the belief that Evander brought the Aeolic dialect to Italy, and that Romulus spoke Greek. Tacitus (*Ann.* 11.14) also writes that the Aborigines, pre-Roman inhabitants of Italy, learnt literacy from Evander, and so first wrote Greek letters.

<sup>17</sup> Though there is no suggestion that Albula was originally a Greek word, Virgil's emphasis on the role of Evander, a Greek-speaker from Arcadia, as name-giver may suggest that he sided with those of his contemporaries who argued that Latin developed from Greek. See also above n. 2 and n. 5. The implicit linguistic prominence of Greek in the *Aeneid* is perhaps in contrast with explicit statements about the cultural and political relationship between Romans and Greeks (e.g. 6.847-53, 2.49).

Latin. Such theories are of wider interest to the reader of Virgil because they help to show that etymologies in the *Aeneid* hold philosophical content as well as the intellectual pleasure of wordplay. For example, in the case of the Tiber, Evander assumes that old name = true name (*amisit **verum vetus** Albula nomen* 8.332); that the more ancient name is a better fit for who/what it denotes. This assumption in turn rests on the belief that there was originally a rational explanation for the allocation of words, which belief can be justified by certain reconstructions of the origins and development of human language. This idea is at the core of etymological enquiry in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, which aimed both to discover what the ancient form of a word was, and thereby to explain why this word matched its referent: *cur ut unde sint verba* (Varro, *Ling.* 5.2); *qua de causa quaeque essent ita nominata* (Cic. *Acad.* 1.32).

Theories about the origin of language may usefully be divided into two groups according to divergent views about human history in general: one that posits human decline from an original ‘Golden Age’ (variously conceived), and one that tracks human progress and development from animal status.<sup>18</sup> Theories involving name-givers, like Evander, Romulus and Latinus, belong to the former group. On this view, early man had a privileged insight into the world around him that has since been lost. He (variously conceived of as a king, a sage, someone granted divine intuition etc.) used this insight to name things appropriately. This explains why old name = true name: recovering the ancient root of a word offers access to the knowledge and intent of the name-giver who

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<sup>18</sup> For this division, particularly in Ancient Greek thought, see especially Gera (2003: 18ff.).

initially matched word with referent during the earliest, enlightened stages of the human race (Pl. *Cra.* 418c):

ΣΩ. οἴσθα οὖν ὅτι μόνον τούτων δηλοῖ τὸ ἀρχαῖον ὄνομα τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ θεμένου;

Socrates: Only the ancient word discloses the intention of the name-giver, don't you know? (trans. Fowler)

Cicero traces the idea of a name-giver creating language even further back than Plato to Pythagoras (*qui primus, quod summae sapientiae Pythagorae visum est, omnibus rebus imposuit nomina* Cic. *Tusc.* 1.62).<sup>19</sup> It is also implicit in the Old Testament,<sup>20</sup> and Varro's *De Lingua Latina* (see above), and is often associated with the Stoics.<sup>21</sup> But further investigation is necessary to conjecture what the insight of these early humans might have been; what knowledge and skill gave the original name-givers their capacity to match word to thing.

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<sup>19</sup> Proclus does too (Procl. *in Cra.* 16), though, as Duvick & Tarrant (2007 *ad loc.*) point out, it is unclear to what degree his portrayal of Pythagorean doctrine is distorted by neo-Platonism.

<sup>20</sup> Adam names the animals at Genesis 2.19-20. See also Philo, *De Opificio Mundi* 148.

<sup>21</sup> Ancient evidence explicitly linking name-giver/s with Stoicism is in fact limited to Cornutus 76.2-5 (Lang) οὐχ οἱ τυχόντες ἐγένοντο οἱ παλαιοί, ἀλλὰ καὶ συνιέναι τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἱκανοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ διὰ συμβόλων καὶ αἰνιγμάτων φιλοσοφῆσαι περὶ αὐτῆς εὐεπίφοροι 'primitive humans were not normal, everyday men, rather they were equipped to understand the nature of the universe, and inclined to philosophize about this through codes and riddles'. That this was a Stoic position has also been extrapolated from its appearance in Plato's *Cratylus*, from Lucretius' rejection of it (Lucr. 5.1041-3: though Atherton (2005: 108 n.21) suggests this could also be a reference to 'Plato's *Cratylus*, Democritus, sundry rhetoricians and Pythagoras'), from Philo (*De Opificio Mundi* 148, *Quaestiones in Genesim* 1.20), and assumptions drawn from a combination of other Stoic ideas and theories.

Reconstructing the Stoic view about the origin of language in any detail is exceptionally difficult due to the limitations of the evidence - Origen and Augustine, dating from the 3<sup>rd</sup> and the 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> c. AD respectively, are the two most explicit primary sources.<sup>22</sup> According to Origen, the Stoics posited some kind of mimetic relationship between the sounds (φωνῶν) that comprise words (όνόματα), and the objects they represent (Origen, *C. Cels.* 1.24):

ὥς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει, μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν  
τὰ πράγματα, καθ' ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα, καθὸ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινα τῆς  
ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγουσιν

[or], as the Stoics hold, [the origin of language is] by nature, the first utterances being imitations of the things described and becoming their names (in accordance with which they introduce certain etymological principles)... (trans. Chadwick)

Origen perhaps plays here on what he perceives to be the etymologizing tendencies of the Stoic school (τῆς Στοᾶς) by pointing out that it is on this basis that they introduce the first principles (στοιχεῖά) of etymology.

The evidence of the *De Dialectica* attributed to Augustine demonstrates that onomatopoeia might be one way that this mimetic relationship manifests itself ([August.] *De Dial.* 6):

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<sup>22</sup> There is considerably less evidence about this facet of Stoic philosophy than e.g. the much-discussed Stoic views on fate, which I will discuss in chapter two (*Fate, Literature and Narrative*). For different reconstructions of the Stoic position see Dahlmann (1932: 6), Frede (1978: esp. 68-9), Snyder (1980: 61), Rawson (1985: 117, who perhaps unhelpfully suggests that the Stoic and Epicureans have 'opposite' views on the origins of language), Amsler (1989: 22), O'Hara (1996: 19-21), Allen (2005 *passim*), and Long (2005 *passim*).

Stoici autumant, quos Cicero in hac re ut Cicero inridet, **nullum esse verbum, cuius non certa explicari origo possit...** quaerendum esse, donec perveniatur eo, ut **res cum sono verbi aliqua similitudine concinat**, ut cum dicimus aeris tinnitum, equorum hinnitum, ovium balatum, tubarum clangorem, stridorem catenarum. perspicis enim haec verba ita sonare ut ipsae res quae his verbis significantur.

The Stoics (whom Cicero derides on this point, as Cicero does) think that **there is no word whose precise origin cannot be explained...** that the inquiry must continue until it reaches the point that **the referent sounds like the sound of the word by some resemblance**, like when we say the ‘clash’ of bronze, the ‘whinny’ of horses, the ‘bleating’ of sheep, the ‘clang’ of trumpets, the ‘screech’ of chains. For you can clearly see that these words sound like the things they signify.

The word *hinnitus*, like the English ‘whinny’, sounds like and imitates the noise horses actually make. According to the author of the *De Dialectica*, therefore, the Stoics used onomatopoeia as a clear example of how words can be rationally explained as being originally mimetic of their referents.

Though the author gives onomatopoeia as the first example of how words imitate their referents, he notes that there is an obvious limitation to a theory that posits that language was created on this basis: not all things we use words to describe make a sound ([August.] *De Dial.* 6)

sed quia sunt res quae non sonant, in his similitudinem tactus valere, ut, si leniter vel aspere sensum tangunt, lenitas vel asperitas litterarum ut tangit auditum sic eis nomina pepererit: ut ipsum ‘lene’ cum dicimus leniter sonat. quis item ‘asperitatem’ non et ipso nomine asperam iudicet?

lene est auribus cum dicimus 'voluptas', asperum cum dicimus 'crux'. **ita res ipsae afficiunt, ut verba sentiuntur**

But because there are things that make no noise, in these cases [they say] that some resemblance of touch influences the word. So, if things are soft or rough to touch, the softness or roughness of letters when they make contact with the ear also produces the names for these things: as when we say the very word 'soft', it sounds soft. For who, by the same token, wouldn't judge that 'roughness' was something rough from its very name? It's soft on our ears when we say 'pleasure', rough when we say 'crucifix'. **So the way things affect us is in accordance with how the words for them make us feel.**

In cases in which things don't make a sound that their name can imitate, the author of the *De Dialectica* records a view that advocates recourse to the sense of touch. If something is rough to the touch, its name should reflect this by being composed of letters that have a similarly rough effect upon the listener.

The potential of letters to imitate even non-sonic referents in fact pre-dates the Stoics, and is found in Plato's *Cratylus*. As noted above with the examples of Hermogenes and Astyanax, one criterion for the correctness of a name in the *Cratylus* is that it should describe its referent. This, of course, only works with names like these, which are compounds of semantic units (Ἑρμῆς + γένος; ἄστν + ἄναξ). So what should the standard of correctness be for words that do not break down into smaller semantic units? Socrates and Hermogenes come to the further conclusion that a name-giver should imitate the essence of a referent with letters and syllables, suggesting that this is what makes a name correct (Pl. *Cra.* 423e-424b):

ΣΩ. τί δὲ δὴ τόδε; οὐ καὶ οὐσία δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν

ούσία τις ἐκατέρω αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅσα ἡξίωται ταύτης τῆς  
προσρήσεως, τοῦ εἶναι;

ΕΡΜ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν; εἰ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμεῖσθαι δύναιτο ἐκάστου, τὴν οὐσίαν,  
γράμμασί τε καὶ συλλαβαῖς, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἕκαστον ὃ ἔστιν; ἢ οὐ;

ΕΡΜ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΣΩ. καὶ τί ἂν φαίης τὸν τοῦτο δυνάμενον, ὥσπερ τοὺς προτέρους τὸν μὲν  
μουσικὸν ἔφησθα, τὸν δὲ γραφικόν. τοῦτον δὲ τίνα;

ΕΡΜ. τοῦτο ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὅπερ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν, οὗτος ἂν  
εἶναι ὁ ὀνομαστικός.

Socrates: Here is another point. Has not each thing an essential nature, just as it has a colour and the other qualities we just mentioned? Indeed, in the first place, have not colour and sound and all other things which may properly be said to exist, each and all an essential nature?

Hermogenes: I think so.

Socrates: Well, then, **if anyone could imitate this essential nature of each thing by means of letters and syllables, he would show what each thing really is**, would he not?

Hermogenes: Certainly.

Socrates: And what will you call him who can do this, as you called the others musician and painter? What will you call this man?

Hermogenes: I think, Socrates, he is what we have been looking for all along, **the name-maker**. (trans. Fowler)

Though Plato's Socrates does not give a full account of how syllables and letters might function in this way, he does furnish us with a few examples, such as the aptly smooth and flowing *rho* of ῥοή. Looking back once more to Evander's comments about the name of the Tiber, one might note the smooth sounds and gentle dactylic roll of *Albula* in comparison to the *asper...Thybris*.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>23</sup> Lucretius' use of letters as an analogy for atoms (Lucr. 1.196-8, 823-26, 907-14; 2.688-99, 1013-22) is different precisely because it is just an analogy. He uses it to elucidate

These ideas, therefore, theorize that appropriate names were given to things during an early, enlightened stage of the human race. Old names more accurately reveal the intention of the name-giver/s, and therefore the nature of their referents by both describing and imitating them. Before comparing and contrasting this group of ideas with the Epicurean account of the development of human language from animal status, it will be revealing to consider characters and places with similar or even the same names in the *Aeneid* within this philosophical context. Homonyms and easily confused names pose an interesting problem for such theories. If a name describes and imitates its referent, shouldn't things with the same name be the same, and things with similar names be similar to one another? Indeed, this objection is one raised in ancient sources. For example, Proclus presents Democritus as arguing against a natural and meaningful relationship between words and referents on a fourfold basis (Procl. *In Cra.* 16 = Democr. fr. 26): 1. homonyms, i.e. different things that have the same name (ἐκ τῆς ὁμωνυμίας); 2. the fact that the same thing can have more than one name (ἐκ τῆς πολωνυμίας); 3. name changes (ἐκ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων μεταθέσεως); and 4. the fact that, though a class of referents may have the same name, they are not in fact identical (ἐκ δὲ τῆς τῶν ὁμοίων ἐλλείψεως).

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two points: that many things have many *elementa* in common, and that the same *elementa* can make up different things if they are rearranged. It is true that Lucretius takes advantage of some instances where two words share many of the same letters and also have closely related referents to demonstrate this (e.g. *lignum/ignis* Lucr. 1.907-14). But he is not thereby asserting that individual letters always correspond with the atomic composition of their referents: these are just some canny examples that help the reader visualize an otherwise difficult conceptual idea. For further clarification see e.g. Montarese (2012: 186-90), Taylor (2013).

At least three of these objections to philosophical theories that claim there is more than an arbitrary relationship between words and their referents offer context for and insight into language and naming in the *Aeneid*.<sup>24</sup> For example, Virgil's calculated treatment and portrayal of homonyms and similar names leads to false conclusions and unsettling associations. The reader is encouraged in some instances to read significance into homonyms. Anchises, attempting to interpret Apollo's instruction '*antiquam exquirite matrem*' (3.96), leans towards Crete in part because Crete, like Troy, has a Mt. Ida, and an *antiqua mater* in the form of Cybele (3.103-5, 111-2):<sup>25</sup>

'audite, o proceres', ait 'et spes discite vestras.

Creta Iovis magni medio iacet insula ponto,

**mons Idaeus** ubi et gentis cunabula nostrae... 105

...

hinc **mater** cultrix **Cybeli** Corybantiaque aera

**Idaeumque nemus...**'

'Listen up, leaders,' he said, 'and learn your prospects. Crete, the island of great Jove, lies in the middle of the sea, where there is an **Idaeian mountain** and a cradle of our people... hence came the **mother** who dwells on Mt. **Cybelus**, and the Corybantian cymbals, and the **Idaeian grove...**'

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<sup>24</sup> In addition to homonymy, which I explore here, see above for Juno's stipulation that the Trojans change their name, and below for a discussion of polyonymy focussed on Dido/Elissa.

<sup>25</sup> Fletcher comments on the encouragement furnished by the homonymy (2015: 106-7): 'the connection he makes between two mountains of the same name reveals an important factor of the identification of places in the ancient and modern world: there is a significance to multiple places having the same name; this sharing of nomenclature somehow reveals - or creates - a link.'

Presumably this suggestion that Crete is their home because it has a mountain of the same name is persuasive to the Trojans, who consequently move there, only to find that they have in fact been mistaken and/or misled.

It is also noteworthy that the Trojans, Tyrians and Tyrrhenians all have confusingly similar names. Virgil encourages the reader to notice this at several points. For example, the verbal similarity between *Tros* and *Tyrius* seems to reinforce Dido's claim that she will not discriminate between the groups (1.574):

*'Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.'*

'I will make no distinction between Trojan and Tyrian.'

The narrator then follows her lead (1.747):

*ingeminant plausu Tyrii, Troesque sequuntur.*

The Tyrians redoubled with applause, and the Trojans followed.

*ingeminant* elegantly foreshadows the doubling that will take place in this line: the juxtaposition of *Tyrii* and *Troes* within a chiasmus underlines the similarity of the words, whilst the caesura between them creates a verbal echo that conveys the redoubled applause. When the Trojans reach Italy, we learn that there is both a Trojan called *Tyres* (10.403), and a Latin called *Tyrrhus* (7.485, 508, 532). Indeed, the Latin Tyrrhus, despite the confusing connotations of his name, plays a central role in the breakout of war between the Trojans and Latins. If a name describes and imitates its referent, these characters and races should share characteristics and identity in proportion to the similarity of their names. The

fact that they are often violent and hostile to one another within the epic therefore not only complicates things for the reader but also potentially characterizes their disputes as self-destructive and civil war.<sup>26</sup> In each of these two examples, Virgil creates a tension. On the one hand, he generates an expectation both on the part of characters in the epic and the reader that things with the same or similar names will themselves be related. On the other, he confounds this expectation by making the voyage to Crete a mistake, and the Tyrians and Trojans enemies, showing that words are dangerously misleading.

Returning to the exploration of theories about the origins of language, Epicureans also posited a natural and causal connection between word and referent.<sup>27</sup> However, whilst the Stoics idealized the early age of man as wise and rational, the Epicureans viewed humans as progressing from primitive, animal origins. This distinction is reflected in their discussion of the beginning of human speech. They theorized that early humans issued involuntary vocal responses to things around them in a way comparable to how animals involuntarily use different noises in response to different stimuli.<sup>28</sup> These noises will vary in

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<sup>26</sup> In particular, some readers see the war in Latium in the latter half of the *Aeneid* as anticipating the Social War and the civil wars of the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC. Note in this vein the nominal approximation of Aeneas and Turnus at 12.502 (*nunc **Turnus** agit, nunc **Troius** heros*), and how this relates to the following lines (12.503-4 ... *tantone placuit concurrere motu, / Iuppiter, aeterna gentis in pace futuras?*).

<sup>27</sup> For scholarly accounts and discussions of the Epicurean brand of linguistic naturalism see especially Everson (1994), Reinhardt (2008), Atherton (2009), and Taylor (2013).

<sup>28</sup> Lucr. 5.1028-9 *at varios linguae sonitus **natura subegit** / mittere, et utilitas expressit nomina rerum* 'but the various sounds of the tongue **nature drove them** to utter, and convenience moulded the names for things' (trans. Rouse). Lucretius continually compares humans to animals in his discussion of language in book five of the *DRN*. See also Origen, *C. Cels.* 1.24 = Epicurus fr. 334 (Usener) ὡς διδάσκει Ἐπίκουρος, ἑτέρως ἢ ὡς οἴονται οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, **ἀπορρηξάντων** τῶν πρώτων

accordance with habitat and natural environment, which accounts for the development of different languages.<sup>29</sup> Over time, groups of humans agreed upon which sound should refer to which thing, and human reason developed the original involuntary natural sounds into language.<sup>30</sup> The emphasis on involuntary animalistic origins and the possibility for linguistic diversity notably distinguish the Epicurean account from the Stoic. Nevertheless, in both cases, a consideration of the origin of language suggests the possibility of a causal (= for the Stoics mimetic) as well as a descriptive or semantic relationship between words and referents.<sup>31</sup>

The incorporation of these philosophical ideas about the original and ideal forms of words into literary aesthetics in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC demonstrates that they provide an important context for the poetry of this period (Dion. Hal. *Comp.* 16):

καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν δὴ κατασκευάζουσιν οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογογράφοι πρὸς  
 χρῆμα ὀρῶντες οἰκεῖα καὶ δηλωτικὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων τὰ ὀνόματα,  
 ὥσπερ ἔφην· πολλὰ δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λαμβάνουσιν ὡς ἐκεῖνοι

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ἀνθρώπων τινὰς φωνὰς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων 'or, as Epicurus teaches, (he differs on this from what the Stoics think) names come about by nature, with the first men **barking out** certain sounds in response to their circumstances'; Procl. *In Cra.* 16 = Epicurus fr. 335 (Usener) ... ὁ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἔλεγεν, ὅτι οὐχὶ ἐπιστημόνως οὔτοι (οἱ πρῶτοι θέμενοι) ἔθεντο τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀλλὰ φυσικῶς κινούμενοι, ὡς οἱ βήσσοντες καὶ πταίροντες καὶ μυκώμενοι καὶ ὑλακτοῦντες καὶ στενάζοντες 'for Epicurus said, that these men, the first name-givers, in no way used knowledge when they allotted names, rather they were naturally moved, like people coughing and sneezing and lowing and barking and groaning'.

<sup>29</sup> Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 75-6 (= Diog. Laert. 10.75-6), Diod. Sic. 1.8.4.

<sup>30</sup> Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 76 = (Diog. Laert. 10.76).

<sup>31</sup> Baxter (1992: 56) helpfully uses this distinction between 'semantic' and 'mimetic' in his discussion of the *Cratylus*.

κατεσκεύασαν, ὅσα μιμητικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστίν'... μεγάλη δὲ  
 τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ διδάσκαλος ἡ φύσις ἡ ποιοῦσα μιμητικούς καὶ θετικούς  
 ἡμᾶς τῶν ὀνομάτων, οἷς δηλοῦται τὰ πράγματα κατὰ τινὰς εὐλόγους καὶ  
 κινητικὰς τῆς διανοίας ὁμοιότητας'... ὥστε πολλὴ ἀνάγκη... ἡδεῖαν δὲ  
 διάλεκτον ἐκ τῶν ἡδυνόντων τὴν ἀκοὴν γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ  
 παραπλήσιον ὀνομάτων τε καὶ συλλαβῶν καὶ γραμμάτων.

**Thus the poets and prose authors on their own account look to the subject they are treating and furnish it with words which suit it and illustrate it**, as I said. But they also borrow many words from earlier writers, in the very form in which they fashioned them – **words which imitate things**... The great source and teacher in these matters is Nature, who prompts us to imitate, and to coin words which represent things according to certain resemblances which are based on reason and appeal to our intelligence... **This leads us forcibly to conclude that... the attractiveness of language is due to words, syllables and letters which please the ear by virtue of some affinity.** (trans. Usher)

Dionysius here describes the project of poets and prose-writers as being similar to that of the name-givers (θετικούς... τῶν ὀνομάτων) outlined in the philosophical texts above. He encourages writers to follow nature's lead in creating or selecting words that are appropriate and reveal their referents. Crucially, poetic vocabulary is successful when it is mimetic (μιμητικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων). It is clear here, as well as from the philosophical texts examined above, that the perceived mimetic potential of words should not be limited to the descriptive suitability of their semantic units or onomatopoeia: in Dionysius' opinion, the pleasure of literature is brought about through the affinity, correspondence or resemblance (παραπλήσιον is difficult to translate here) of not only words, but also syllables and letters to the things they are describing. Varro accordingly spends book seven of the *De Lingua Latina* investigating examples of the vocabulary of Latin poetry, and Philodemus and Lucretius are

likewise practitioners and advocates of the theory, based on the Epicurean account of the origin of language as a tool for communication, that the careful selection of vocabulary is paramount to achieving philosophical and poetic clarity.<sup>32</sup>

As the introductory examples of the *verum nomen* of the Tiber and misleading homonyms/similar names have shown, such theories about the origins of language, the mimetic potential of words and poetic aesthetics can enrich and illuminate certain passages of the *Aeneid*. A further powerful and thought-provoking example occurs in the simile in book 12 likening Aeneas and Turnus to fighting bulls, and the Trojan and Latin spectators to the rest of the frightened herd watching the battle. In this case, Virgil extends the application of these ideas beyond proper names to verbs, nouns and adjectives (12.718-22):

stat pecus **omne metu mutum, mussantque** iuvencae  
 quis nemori imperitet, quem tota armenta sequantur;  
 illi inter sese multa vi vulnera miscent 720  
 cornuaque obnixa infigunt et sanguine largo  
 colla armosque lavant, **gemitu nemus omne remugit...**

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<sup>32</sup> Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 37-8 (=Diog. Laert. 10.37-8), Lucr. 1.136-45, Phld. *De poem.* 5. col. xxiii 1-4. Snyder (1980: 24): 'In Philodemus' view, the poet who can successfully imitate the original human speech will find that his poetry automatically contains the stylistic virtues of utility and clarity.' Clay (1995: 6): '... in writing poetry radiant with its evocations of the sensuous world that illuminate the invisible workings of nature, Lucretius is following, in his own manner, Epicurus' insistence of clear expression (σαφήνεια); to which one could add that Lucretius followed Epicurus' advice on being aware of the primary or current meaning of words.' See also Janko & Mangoni (2000: 132)

The whole herd stands mute with fear, and heifers mutter about who should lord it over the grove, whom the herds should follow; but they deal wounds to one another with great force, and, resolute, embed their horns and wash their necks and flanks with copious blood, and the whole grove bellows with their groans.

One of the ways Virgil brings the simile to life is by using words that imitate the mooing noise of the cows, thus fulfilling Dionysius' mimetic criterion for poetic vocabulary by using a common example of onomatopoeia.<sup>33</sup> This is equally the case in both lines 718 and 722; the latter line therefore balances and literally echoes (*remugit*) the former, as well as Virgil's earlier and related portrayal of sparring bulls in the *Georgics* (*reboant* Verg. *G.* 3.223). Indeed, the proximity of *gemitu* and *remugit* prompts reflection on their remarkably similar composition: they share all the same letters apart from 'r'. Perhaps Virgil is playfully challenging Lucretius' account of echoes using Lucretius' own analogy between letters and atoms.<sup>34</sup> In his discussion of sound and hearing in book four, Lucretius explains why echoes, unlike visual reflections, retain the order of the original sound, instead of being inverted (Lucr. 4.572-4):<sup>35</sup>

quae bene cum videas, rationem reddere possis

tute tibi atque aliis, quo pacto per loca sola

saxa paris formas verborum **ex ordine** reddant...

When you perceive this well, you may be able to give a reason to yourself and others, how it is in solitary places that rocks give back the same shapes of words **in their order**. (trans. Rouse)

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<sup>33</sup> Noted by Tarrant (2012 *ad loc.*). Quintilian gives *mugitus* as an archetypal example of onomatopoeia (Quint. *Inst.* 8.6.31).

<sup>34</sup> Lucr. 1.196-8, 823-26, 907-14; 2.688-99, 1013-22. See above n. 23.

<sup>35</sup> See chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception and materialism*) for a more extended discussion of Virgil's engagement with Lucretius' theory of sense perception, in particular vision.

Virgil's *gemitu*, on the contrary, is a jumbled and diminished (- 'r') echo of the moos of the fighting bulls (*remugit*).

*Mutum* and *mussant* are not only onomatopoeically appropriate for cattle, but also supposedly etymologically linked to one another. Commenting on a passage of Ennius in which he uses the verb *mussare*, Varro writes (Varro, *Ling.* 7.101)

mussare dictum, quod muti non amplius quam μῦ dicunt

'mussare' is said because the 'muti' (mutes) say nothing more than 'mu' (trans. Kent)

Varro suggests that the words *mussare* and *muti* are both linked to the 'mu' noise made (he claims) by people who cannot speak. The way Virgil uses them in the animal world here, however, suggests a different onomatopoeic origin by linking them to the moo of cows rather than the 'mu' of the mute.<sup>36</sup> With his choice of words Virgil therefore blurs the distinction between humans and beasts: simile and narrative. The on-looking herd are humanized by being portrayed as mutes. But the language that conceptually distinguishes humans from animals (e.g. for Lucretius, the *pecus* is *mutum* by definition)<sup>37</sup> is in turn animalized when Virgil suggests an onomatopoeic etymology for *mugio*, and perhaps other 'mu-' words, drawn from cows.<sup>38</sup> The confusion is compounded by the recollection that when Lucretius describes Iphigenia as *muta metu* it is within a description intended to

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<sup>36</sup> Indeed, Varro continues to discuss this sort of onomatopoeia a later section of book seven: *multa ab animalium vocibus tralata in homines...* (Varro, *Ling.* 7.103ff.).

<sup>37</sup> E.g. Lucr. 5.1056-60, 5.1087-90. In these contexts, *mutus* does not mean 'silent', but rather 'without language'.

<sup>38</sup> See also Wheeler (1993: 453-4).

create shock in part through likening her murder to an animal sacrifice (Lucr. 1.92).<sup>39</sup>

Virgil's use of language therefore corroborates the analogy between animal and human upon which the simile relies by appealing to an etymology that suggests human language had primitive, animal origins. The resultant and many-layered breakdown of any firm separation between the human and the animal world inextricably binds together the characters of the simile and the narrative, so that each mutually informs the other for the reader, and transferences and comparisons work both ways.<sup>40</sup> Exposing the intricate machinery of Virgil's poetry here shows that he is not merely being extraordinarily clever, but also engaging with contemporary philosophical and aesthetic debates about etymology and the origin of language.

### 1. iii. The problem of different languages: Latin and Greek

Apart from Evander's comments about the names of the Tiber (see above), there is only one further instance of an explicit *verum nomen* in Virgil, in *Georgics* 3. At the end of his demonstration that all living things alike are subject to the destructive force of love (Verg. *G.* 3.243ff.), Virgil describes the passionate power

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<sup>39</sup> Ovid's description of Io, changed from a girl into a cow, uses comparable techniques. Io is shocked to discover she can only complain with *mugitus* (Ov. *Met.* 1.637), and Ovid scatters the passage with suitably onomatopoeic *mu*- words (*ibid.* 650 *mutati*, 655 *mutua*). But Ovid playfully suggests that Io gets around the fact that she has lost human speech by being literate – she still manages to trace her name in the dust with a hoof.

<sup>40</sup> For the blurring of boundaries between simile and narrative in Virgil ('transfusion', 'transgression'), see e.g. West (1969), Lyne (1989: 63-99).

of mares on heat. The ointment *hippomanes* is procured from these (Verg. *G.* 3.280-3):<sup>41</sup>

hic demum, **hippomanes** vero quod **nomine** dicunt  
pastores, lentum **distillat** ab inguine virus,  
**hippomanes**, quod saepe malae legere novercae  
miscueruntque herbas et non innoxia verba.

Then, at last, a sticky venom, which shepherds, **using its true name**, call **hippomanes**, **drips** from their groins; **hippomanes**, which evil step-mothers have often collected and mixed together with herbs and harmful incantations.

As Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*) has pointed out, it looks as though Virgil is using *distillat* to suggest an etymological link between *hippomanes* and the Latin verb *manare* ('drop', 'distil'). *hippomanes* would therefore be a *verum nomen* because of a bilingual etymology: it drips (*manare*) from a horse (ἵππος).

But ἵππομανές is a Greek word. Theocritus confirms what one might suspect, that *hippomanes* is so called because horses (ἵπποι) are mad for it (μαίνονται). He also tells us, problematically for Virgil, that it is a plant (Theoc. *Id.* 2.48-9):

ἵππομανές φυτόν ἐστι παρ' Ἀρκάσι· τῷ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσαι  
καὶ πῶλοι **μαίνονται** ἀν' ὥρεα καὶ θοαὶ ἵπποι.

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<sup>41</sup> Hippomanes also refers to 'a small black fleshy substance on the forehead of a newborn foal' (*OLD s.v.*). Dido seeks out this sort of hippomanes as an ingredient for magic (4.515-6 *quaeritur et nascentis equi de fronte revulsus/ et matri praereptus amor.*) There is some confusion between these two meanings and their uses: love magic (Tib. 2.4.58, Prop. 4.5.18), or poison, as seems to be the case in the *Georgics* – perhaps a function of Virgil's negativity about *amor* in the previous passage.

**Hippomanes** is a plant which grows among the Arcadians, and in the mountains all the foals and swift **horses are mad for it**. (trans. Hopkinson)

We cannot doubt that Virgil read and used Theocritus' *Idylls*. He would have known these lines, and perhaps even signals allusion to Theocritus' bucolic etymology with *dicunt pastores*. It is therefore even more striking that in the *Georgics* he simultaneously designates *hippomanes* a *verum nomen* and claims that it is an ointment rather than a plant, giving a sham Latin etymology to boot.

This strange and forced (counter-?) example of a bilingual *verum nomen* raises the wider question of how the close mimetic and/or descriptive relationship between word and referent can be consistent with the fact that humans speak a variety of different languages. The divergent etymologies of *hippomanes* pointedly demonstrate that a name may signify one thing in Latin, and quite another in Greek. Nevertheless, as the opening lines of the *Cratylus* show, some philosophers argued that the standard of correctness for names should be universal and transcend linguistic variance (Pl. *Cra.* 383a - also quoted above):

ΕΡΜ. Κρατύλος φησὶν ὅδε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀνόματος ὀρθότητα εἶναι  
ἐκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων φύσει πεφυκυῖαν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτο εἶναι ὄνομα ὃ ἂν τινες  
ξυνθέμενοι καλεῖν καλῶσι, τῆς αὐτῶν φωνῆς μῶριον ἐπιφθεγγόμενοι,  
**ἀλλὰ ὀρθότητά τινα τῶν ὀνομάτων πεφυκέναι καὶ Ἑλλήσι καὶ**  
**βαρβάροις τὴν αὐτὴν ἅπασιν.**

Hermogenes: Cratylus, whom you see here, Socrates, says that everything has a right name of its own, which comes by nature, and that a name is not whatever people call a thing by agreement, just a piece of their own voice applied to the thing, **but that there is a kind of inherent correctness in names, which is the same for all men, both Greeks and barbarians**. (trans. Fowler)

But only Epicureanism explicitly gave an account of how a natural relationship between words and their referents could be compatible with different languages.<sup>42</sup> For other theories about the origin of language, perhaps especially those featuring name-givers, this obstacle threatened to undermine logically dependent claims postulating a significant and enlightening relationship between words and things.

The gods are a good place to start an exploration into the philosophical and literary significance of bilingual etymologies in Virgil. This is not only because Virgil's gods are heavily influenced by those of Greek literature, especially Homer, but also because the earliest and most enduring focus of ancient etymology was on divine names in literature and mythology. There are two reasons for this focus. Firstly, divine names naturally came under scrutiny in the long tradition of literary scholarship and commentary, in particular of the works of Homer. Secondly, it was a function of the persistent desire to reconcile popular religion and mythology with philosophy through allegorical readings supported by rationalizing etymologies of divine names. This technique is particularly associated with the Stoics.<sup>43</sup> Indeed, these two motivations for the etymological

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<sup>42</sup> As explained above. See especially Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 75-6 (= Diog. Laert. 10.75-6).

<sup>43</sup> As discussed in the *Introduction*. Feeney (1991: 20-1): 'In enquiries that overlapped with allegory, sophists and non-sophists alike investigated the names from the myths in order to discover what their true moral or physical significance might be.' See also SVF 1061-1100; Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.62-3 (Academic speaker Cotta) '*magnam molestiam suscepit et minime necessariam primus Zeno, post Cleanthes, deinde Chrysippus, commenticiarum fabularum reddere rationem, vocabulorum cur quidque ita appellatum sit causas explicare*' 'a great deal of quite unnecessary trouble was taken first by Zeno, then by Cleanthes and lastly by Chrysippus to rationalize these purely fanciful myths and explain the reasons for the names by which the various deities are called' (trans. Rackham), 2.70

explanations of divine names in literature and mythology could easily overlap, for example in the 'Homeric Problems' of 1<sup>st</sup> c. AD Stoic Heraclitus.<sup>44</sup>

Latin writers who gave etymologies of divine names before Virgil seem to have aimed to find Latin explanations that paralleled rather than simply translated more long-standing and traditional Greek glosses. Ennius, for example, in a didactic poem probably based on the work of the Greek philosopher/dramatist Epicharmus, explains the names of Ceres and Jupiter with reference to the Latin verbs *gero* and *iuvo* respectively (Enn. *Epich.* fr. 4-6, 10-4 (Warmington) = Varro, *Ling.* 5.64-5):

quod **gerit** fruges **Ceres**

Ceres, because she gets us crops.

...

haec propter **Iuppiter** sunt ista quae dico tibi

quando mortalis atque urbes belvasque omnes **iuvat**.

Jupiter is the name for all I have spoken of, since he rejuvenates all men and cities and beasts. (trans. Warmington)

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(Stoic speaker Balbus) '*videtisne igitur a physicis rebus bene atque utiliter inventis tracta ratio sit ad commenticios et fictos deos?*' 'do you see therefore how from a true and valuable philosophy of nature has been evolved this imaginary and fanciful pantheon?' (trans. Rackham); Cornutus' *De Natura Deorum*.

<sup>44</sup> Again, see *Introduction* for a broad overview of Homeric allegory. Very little is known about Heraclitus except his name. The oldest manuscript (M) transmits the full title of this work: 'Homeric problems concerning what Homer has expressed allegorically in respect to the gods'. Russell & Konstan (2005) suggest that he was active in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. AD, and was roughly contemporary with Plutarch. See also Woodhead (1928: 79-80).

In Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*, the Stoic speaker Balbus not only repeats these two etymologies,<sup>45</sup> but adds many more (Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.64-6). These are succinctly held up to ridicule by Cotta in the following book (Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.62):

‘in enodandis autem nominibus quod miserandum sit laboratis: ‘Saturnus quia se saturat annis, Mavors quia magna vertit, Minerva quia minuit aut quia minatur, Venus quia venit ad omnia, Ceres a gerendo.’”

‘But as for your strained etymologies, one can only pity your misplaced ingenuity! ‘Saturnus is so called because he is sated with years, Mars because he subverts the great, Minerva because she minishes or because she is minatory, Venus because she visits all things, Ceres from *gero* to bear.’” (trans. Rackham)

Virgil, however, unlike his extant predecessors, prefers to translate Greek etymologies into Latin, rather than providing an independent Latin explanation for the gods' names. As well as clearly stamping the influence of Greek literature on his poetry, the effect is more elusive, and, because of the lack of verbal correspondence or similarity, raises more suggestively the question of the plausibility of the etymology, and its relevance to a Latin speaker.

For example, Virgil glosses Mercury twice as *interpres divum*. Aeneas first uses the phrase to underline to Dido that he has been commanded by the gods to leave Carthage (4.356), then Dido sarcastically echoes him in her response (4.378). This is a compression of Hesiod's description of Hermes as θεῶν κῆρυξ

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<sup>45</sup> Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.64 *sed ipse Iuppiter, id est iuvans pater, quem conversis casibus appellamus a iuvando Iovem*, 2.67 *Mater autem est a gerendis frugibus Ceres tamquam geres, casuque prima littera itidem immutata ut a Graecis; nam ab illis quoque Δημήτηρ quasi Γημήτηρ nominata est.*

(Hes. *Op.* 79) and philosophical etymologizing traditions connecting Ἑρμῆς with cognates of ἑρμηνεύω 'interpret' (Pl. *Cra.* 408a):

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἔοικε περὶ λόγον τι εἶναι ὃ Ἑρμῆς, καὶ τὸ ἑρμηνέα  
εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἄγγελον

Socrates: Well then, this name **Hermes** seems to me to have to do with speech – he is an **interpreter** (ἑρμηνέα) and a messenger. (trans. Fowler)

Virgil's Latin calls attention to the Greek tradition of explaining Mercury/Hermes' name through the idea of 'interpretation', but, as it is only a translation, offers no support for the reading: *interpres* bears no obvious relation to *Mercurius*. The argument for the etymology is, paradoxically given Hermes' role as a messenger, lost in translation. The same thing happens with Apollo (*animusque/Delius inspirat vates aperitque futura* 6.11-2, δηλώω vs. *aperio*) and, perhaps most noticeably, Juno.

Juno, queen of the gods and both wife and sister of Jupiter, corresponds to the Greek Ἥρα. Probably since as early as Homer,<sup>46</sup> Greek authors linked Ἥρα allegorically and etymologically with ἀήρ.<sup>47</sup> Though Virgil's Roman goddess is named Juno, she is nevertheless associated with air, clouds and storms throughout the poem. This is perhaps most noticeable in the storm in book one,

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<sup>46</sup> Hom. *Il.* 21.6-7 τῇ ῥ' οἳ γε προχέοντο πεφυζότες, **ἥερα δ' Ἥρη**/ πítνα πρόσθε βαθεῖαν ἐρυκέμεν 'there some poured in flight, and **Hera** spread before them a thick **mist** to hinder them' (trans. Murray).

<sup>47</sup> E.g. Pl. *Cra.* 404c, Eur. *Hel.* 31-6, Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.646-8.

or when she descends from the sky to distract Turnus from danger with a phantom Aeneas made of cloud (10.633-8):<sup>48</sup>

haec ubi dicta dedit, **caelo** se protinus alto  
 misit agens hiemem **nimbo** succincta **per auras**,  
 Iliacamque aciem et Laurentia castra petivit. 635  
 tum dea **nube** cava tenuem sine viribus umbram  
 in faciem Aeneae (visu mirabile monstrum)  
 Dardaniis ornat telis...

When she said these words, she straight away sent herself down from the high **heavens through the air**, bringing with her a storm, and shrouded in a **rain cloud**, and she made for the Trojan line and the Laurentian camps. Then the goddess [made] a strengthless, insubstantial shadow from hollow **cloud** into a likeness of Aeneas, [and] decorated it with Trojan weapons (a spectacle miraculous to see) ...

Virgil clearly expects that his Roman reader's knowledge of Greek will restore the dislocated etymological link between *caelo*, *nimbo*, *auras* and *nube*, via ἄήρ and Ἥρα, back to Juno. There are some attempts to bridge the two languages: the Latin *auras* is a neat parallel for ἄήρ, and *nube* perhaps even proffers a connection between Hera's airy associations and Juno's role as goddess of marriage (*nubere*).

Even so, none of these words bears any similarity at all to the name Juno. In the Latin tradition, Juno was linked etymologically with *iuvo* and *iungo*.<sup>49</sup> Though

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<sup>48</sup> See 6. i. *Relational Seeing* for a full discussion of this passage and its models in Homer, Euripides and Lucretius.

<sup>49</sup> E.g. Varro, *Ling.* 5.67 *ea dicta, quod una iuvat cum Iove, Iuno, 5.69 ficta ab iuvando et luce Iuno Lucina*; Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.66 *sed Iunonem a iuvando credo nominatam*. 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC poets

Virgil does allude to her verbal and religious associations with joining and marriage,<sup>50</sup> Juno's disruptive and antagonistic role in the epic is most often in stark opposition to these. As Feeney has noted, Juno stops troublemaking at the same time as she sheds Hera's Greek associations in her final reconciliation with Jupiter (Feeney 1991: 150):

'At the beginning of the scene, Juno is looking down at the human action from a cloud (12.792), 'from her own element' as Servius comments; at the end she leaves it (*nubemque relinquit* 12.842). Juno throughout has been the principal embodiment of the anarchy which threatens the progress of poem and empire, in opposition to the aspect of her *persona* and name which leads to joining (*iungo*).'

Finally, like the Roman bride, she yields (*et nunc cedo equidem* 12.818), and joins the Trojans and Latins in marriage and peace (*cum iam conubiis pacem felicibus (esto)/ component, cum iam leges et foedera iungent* 12.821-2). Juno sheds the etymological associations of her Greek name Hera, and fulfils the etymological associations of her Latin name.

Despite the fact that they are one and the same deity, Virgil therefore uses etymology to subtly distance the now stable and compliant Roman goddess of marriage from her vengeful and unpredictable Greek and Homeric counterpart. The way he does so both reinforces and undermines the philosophical idea that names are descriptive or mimetic of their referents. On the one hand Juno's associations with the element of air and, eventually, joining and marriage encourage the reader to seek meaning in her Greek and Latin names. On the

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often play on Juno's name and cognates of *iungo* and *coniugium*, e.g. Catull. 68.138-9, Prop. 2.28.33.

<sup>50</sup> E.g. at 1.73 '*conubio iungam stabili propriamque dicabo*', or 4.59 *Iunoni ante omnes, cui vincla iugalicia curae*.

other, the way that Virgil translates ἄηρ into several Latin words that remain dislocated from Juno's name, and the way that he allows her to shift or perhaps progress from her Greek associations to more palatable Latin ones clearly shows that this meaning is fluid and constructed.

1. iv. Latin, Italian languages and Punic: the prioritization of a Roman reading

It is now clear that the *Aeneid* presumes a bilingual readership that can read meaning into words and names from the perspective of two different languages: Latin and Greek. Interestingly, in the case of Juno, the Latin and Roman reading ultimately prevails. This is already gently suggestive of an idea that I will now develop: that Virgil's use of other languages in conjunction with Latin can be read as a reflection of power dynamics between Roman and non-Roman cultures. When etymologies compete, the privileging of a Latin interpretation or reading of a word can be read as a function of Roman dominance.

Greek is not the only other language that contextualizes and colours Virgil's Latin. His verse also bears traces of many other languages with which Latin was in contact in this period. These notably include Punic as well as Italic languages and dialects such as Etruscan, Oscan, and Sabine. Virgil's description of Mantua is a rich example of his manipulation of multilingual etymologies. It appears in book ten, when he introduces Mantua's founder, Ocnus (10.198-203):

ille etiam patriis agmen ciet Ocnus ab oris,

**fatidicae Mantus** et Tusci filius amnis,

qui muros matrisque dedit tibi, Mantua, nomen, 200

**Mantua dives avis**, sed non genus omnibus unum:

**gens illi triplex**, populi sub gente quaterni,

ipsa caput populis, Tusco de sanguine vires.

For that man, Ocnus, raises his troops from his father's shores, son of **Manto, who spoke the fates**, and the Tuscan river, who gave walls and the name of his mother to you, Mantua, **Mantua rich in ancestors**, though they are not all of one stock: **her race is threefold**, and there are four peoples under each race. She is the head of her peoples: their strength comes from their Etruscan blood.

Virgil, perhaps aligning himself with Ennius and his declaration of a threefold identity,<sup>51</sup> tells us that the Mantuans are of three different races. The way he does so stresses the cohesion and harmony of Mantua's ethnic components. For one, '*gens triplex* is used rather than *tres gentes* to express both racial diversity and political unity' (Harrison 1991 *ad loc.*). Moreover, the presence of these three *gentes* is integrated into Virgil's language. We are told that Ocnus named Mantua after his mother, Μαντώ, in mythology the daughter of Tiresias. The epithet *fatidicae* 'brings out the Greek etymology of the name, which is clearly connected with μάντις, 'prophet' (Harrison 1991 *ad loc.*).<sup>52</sup> That *Mantus* retains the Greek genitive perhaps strengthens the sense of a Greek ethnic identity.<sup>53</sup>

Only a few lines later, though it has earned less scholarly interest, Virgil alludes to a different, Etruscan etymology. *Mantua dives avis* reflects the fact that the

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<sup>51</sup> Gell. *N.A.* 17.17.1 *Quintus Ennius tria corda habere sese dicebat, quod loqui Graece et Osce et Latine sciret.*

<sup>52</sup> That Virgil, a poet, so closely aligns his birthplace with prophets and prophecy feeds into my broader discussion in chapter two (*Fate, Literature and Narrative*) of the comparisons he draws between fate and narrative poetry.

<sup>53</sup> See Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.58-60 and Adams (2003: 369), both quoted in my discussion of Dido below.

Etruscans named their god of the dead Mantus, as noted by Servius (Serv. *ad Aen.* 10.201):<sup>54</sup>

Mantuam autem ideo nominatum, quod Etrusca lingua Mantum Ditem  
patrem appellant

But Mantua is so named for the reason that in the Etruscan language they call *Dis Pater* 'Mantus'.

Further evidence supplements Servius: *man-* in Etruscan is related to tombs and the dead,<sup>55</sup> and the tusked comic figure Manducus (= *Manium Dux?*) is represented on Etruscan vases as *Dis pater*.<sup>56</sup> *dives avis*, 'rich in ancestors' constitutes an elegant gloss on Mantua's Etruscan associations with the Underworld. These two etymologies therefore reflect Mantua's apparently harmonious ethnic diversity by sensitively preserving two non-Latin linguistic backgrounds circumscribed by Virgil's Latin epic.

In the case of Mantua, Etruscan, Greek and Latin readings each add nuance and detail to the characterization of the region and its origins. They are not incompatible, which perhaps reflects Mantua's political and cultural relationship with Rome - or at least what Virgil wants this relationship to be. This compatibility is in stark contrast with another notable example of a name with multilingual etymologies and significance in the *Aeneid* - 'Dido'.

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<sup>54</sup> Pittau (2005) s.v. 'Manθ': 'Dite, Plutone'; s.v. 'Manthatnei', 'Manθnate', 'Manθnatnei': 'nativo od originario di Mantova'.

<sup>55</sup> Cf. D'Aversa (1994), Bonfante (1990) s.v. 'Manes'.

<sup>56</sup> Dennis (1907: 207-8).

Dido is one of a few characters in the *Aeneid* who has two names.<sup>57</sup> She is most frequently referred to as Dido (34 times), but is also called Elissa (three times). Scholars have debated the significance of this, with various unsatisfying conclusions including chance variation, the avoidance of oblique forms of Dido (which remains unchanged for nominative and accusative whilst Elissa only appears in the genitive),<sup>58</sup> metrical convenience and even the idea that Elissa is Aeneas' pet name for Dido.<sup>59</sup>

Latin-Punic epigraphic evidence provides useful context for considering Virgil's choices when naming the Carthaginian queen. Adams (2003: 215-6) notes that 'the (partially) Romanised Punic speaking inhabitants of Tripolitania often had two names, one traditional, the other Roman.' Indeed, Virgil specifically mentions that Dido's people can speak two languages: *Tyriosque bilinguis* (1.661). A similar trend can be observed in the naming habits of speakers of Greek and Italian languages during the later stages of the Roman Republic and Empire. Adams (2003: 170) in particular points out that Etruscans often chose semantically ill-fitting Roman names when they obtained the citizenship, maintaining their original Etruscan names alongside. Dido's having two names might accordingly be read as a reflection of a genuine onomastic trend amongst later Romanised North Africans, and also as a function of her interaction with another dominant culture.

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<sup>57</sup> Others include Ascanius/Iulus, Neoptolemus/Pyrrius and Hippolytus/Virbius.

<sup>58</sup> Pease (1935 *ad* 4.335): 'Elissa is used by Virgil... apparently to avoid the form Didonis... and it is noteworthy that he does not employ oblique cases of Dido.'

<sup>59</sup> McDermott (1943).



Fig. 1: CIL VIII 17467. The stele of a North African living under Roman rule who had two names: one neo-Punic (Tasdat), the other Roman (Rufus). The neo-Punic text reads: Stay still, passer by, and read/ the text which is on this stel-/e, man trusts when he is young/ and he goes his way, but finds opposition./Tasdat, the son of Metat, the son of Gautal/ the Nagarite, owner of a/ crown and owner of a name/ of heroism, he lived fifty years; a monument of/ his family for ever (illustration and trans. Jongeling 2008)

Adams makes a further interesting comment about the morphology of non-Latin names in Latin (2003: 369):

‘The name is such an inseparable part of a person’s identity that it may retain its grammatical characteristics when it is transferred to another language; it is as if the referent’s personal identity may be diminished if his name is integrated into an alien morphological system.’

The evidence of Quintilian supports this idea (Quint. *Inst.* 1.5.58-60):

inde illa quaestio exoritur, an eadem ratione per casus duci externa qua nostra conveniat. ac si reperias grammaticum veterum amatorem, neget quicquam ex Latina ratione mutandum, quia, cum sit apud nos casus ablativus, quem illi non habent, parum conveniat uno casu nostro, quinque Graecis uti: **quin etiam laudet virtutem eorum qui potentiolem facere linguam Latinam studebant nec alienis egere institutis fatebantur.**

The question then arises whether foreign words should be declined in the same way as ours. If you come across a *grammaticus* who loves the old writers, he would probably say that there must be no change from the Latin rule, because, since we have an ablative and they do not, it would be irrational to use one Latin case and five Greek. **He would also praise the patriotism of those who tried to make Latin a more authoritative language and did not allow that it needed foreign rules.** (trans. Russell)

If giving foreign words Latin endings was emblematic of *virtus* and the power of the Latin language, could allowing them to remain grammatically unchanged, as in the case of Dido, be an assertion of ethnic identity and independence? We might also note that, whereas Naevius Latinized the names Aeneas (*Aeneas*) and Anchises (*Anchisa*), Virgil chose not to.

Not only does Dido have two names, but the interpretative possibilities of each are numerous. One of the reasons for this is that they can be read in three different languages: Greek, Punic and Latin. To begin with 'Dido', both the *Etymologicon Magnum* and the anonymous *De Mulieribus* claim that this name

means ‘wandering’ in Punic.<sup>60</sup> Though these are late texts, the *De Mulieribus* cites the 3<sup>rd</sup> c. BC historian Timaeus as its source.<sup>61</sup> Virgil describes Dido wandering at several points, vesting this Punic reading with significance.<sup>62</sup> Perhaps of particular note is that Iarbas, a fellow North African, angrily glosses her in this way (4.211-4):<sup>63</sup>

‘femina, quae nostris **errans** in finibus urbem

exiguam pretio posuit, cui litus arandum

cuique loci leges dedimus, conubia nostra

reppulit ac dominum Aenean in regna recepit.’

‘This woman, who, **roaming** in our territory, has founded a small city for a price, and to whom I granted a shore to plough and the laws of this place, has rejected my offers of marriage, and received Aeneas into her kingdom as her master.’

She even continues to wander in the Underworld, after her death (6.450-4).

The text certainly supplies greater evidence for this reading than for that preserved in Servius Auctus, which claims that Elissa became Dido, *id est virago Punica lingua*, only posthumously after her suicide and stubborn refusal to remarry.<sup>64</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> *Etymologicon Magnum* (s.v. Διδώ): Φασὶ δὲ αὐτὴν Ἑλέσσαρ ἦτοι Ἑλίσσαν ὀνομαζομένην κληθῆναι ὕστερον **τῇ Τυρίων φωνῇ Διδώ**, διὰ τὸ πολλὰ **πλανηθῆναι** ἀπὸ Φοινίκης...; similarly in the extract of the *De Mulieribus* preserved as FGrH 556F we find διὰ τὴν πολλὴν αὐτῆς **πλάνην**.

<sup>61</sup> Jacobson (2005) lends support to the etymology linking Dido to ‘wandering’, suggesting Timaeus may have had access to a Punic source.

<sup>62</sup> 4.211, 4.68-9, 6.450-4. She also has *errantibus oculis* at 4.691.

<sup>63</sup> See also O’Hara (1996 *ad loc.*).

<sup>64</sup> Serv. auct. *ad Aen.* 1.340.

‘Dido’, of course, can also be read in Greek as δίδω to suggest ‘giving’.<sup>65</sup> Paschalis (1997: 7) has aptly demonstrated how Virgil manipulates this reading: gift-giving becomes one of the defining features of Dido’s character, and her gifts to the Trojans embody her lasting mark on the plot.<sup>66</sup> The description of Juno’s temple in Carthage offers an excellent example (1.446-7):

hic templum Iunoni ingens **Sidonia Dido**

condebat, **donis** opulentum et numine divae...

Here **Sidonian Dido** was building a huge temple to Juno, splendid with the **gifts** and the power of the goddess.

The placement and choice of the adjective *Sidonia* next to Dido/δίδω prompts recognition of the suggestion of giving it contains with *-don-*. This reading finds confirmation in the following line with *donis*. The gift-giving connotations of Dido’s name when read in Greek also links her with the Greeks in the poem, the original enemies of the Trojans, who are strongly associated with gifts in book two (*‘quidquid id est, timeo Danaos et dona ferentis.’* 2.49), and whose names (*Myrmidonum, Danaos* etc.) are chosen by Virgil to highlight this.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> Though this has not yet earned comment, a Stoic etymology preserved by John of Lydia may also link the name to Venus and love. SVF 2.1098 = Lydus, *Mens.* 4.44 ‘Ο δὲ Χρύσιππος οὐ Διώνην ἀλλὰ Διδόνην αὐτὴν ὀνομάζεσθαι ἀξιοῖ παρὰ τὸ ἐπιδιδόναι τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἡδονάς. It is certainly not difficult to find corroboration for this reading in the main character of the dominant romantic plot in the epic: see e.g. 1.685-7, 5.571-2, 4.307-8 for passages that connect Dido’s characteristic love with giving.

<sup>66</sup> 1.659-60, 4.263, 4.606 ‘...memet super ipsa **dedissem**’, 5.571-2, 9.266 *cratera antiquum quem dat Sidonia Dido*, 11.74. Paschalis (1997: 7): ‘In all these passages and elsewhere the name ‘Dido’, with or without ‘Sidonia’, also suggests Gift (Giving). The story of ‘Dido’ is actually encapsulated in the semantic development of this component.’

<sup>67</sup> See also Moskalew (1990).

Elissa, according to Servius Auctus Dido's *verum nomen* (Serv. auct. *ad Aen.* 1.340),<sup>68</sup> also admits of readings in three languages. Virgil appears to develop similarities with both the Greek words λίσσομαι and ἐλίσσω (e.g. *Dido sanguineam volvens aciem*).<sup>69</sup> The name Elissa has also been plausibly related to the Phoenician god El, which would suggest that its bearer was godlike or even divine.<sup>70</sup> This would justify her translation into Theiosso (connected to θεῖος) by Timaeus.<sup>71</sup> However, it is not an association supported or suggested in any way by Virgil's use of the name Elissa in the *Aeneid*. To the contrary, this name is only presumed to apply to her at and after her death, when she is most definitively mortal.<sup>72</sup> Though the divine associations of the Punic reading are remarkably ill-suited to these contexts, a Latin reading makes more sense. *Elis(s)a*, the perfect passive participle of *elido*, marks Dido as 'crushed'; 'forcibly removed'; 'eliminated'.<sup>73</sup> The utter incompatibility between the Latin and Punic readings of her name ('godlike' vs. 'destroyed') reflects the historically incompatible perspectives of the Romans and Carthaginians. The resounding relevance and

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<sup>68</sup> The *Etymologicon Magnum* (s.v. Διδώ) similarly suggests Elissa was her original name: Φασὶ δὲ αὐτὴν Ἑλέασσαρ ἦτοι Ἑλίσσαν ὀνομαζομένην κληθῆναι, ὕστερον τῇ Τυρίων φωνῇ Διδώ... (also quoted above n. 60).

<sup>69</sup> The whirling connotations of ἐλίσσω may further link Dido with bacchants, and Apollonius' dizzied request for inspiration from the Muse to tell the story of Medea's escape (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.1-5).

<sup>70</sup> Pease (1935 *ad* 4.335), Reed (2007: 78). El shares the same Semitic root as the Arabic 'Allah'.

<sup>71</sup> According to the author of *De Mulieribus*.

<sup>72</sup> Aeneas imagines looking back on his relationship with Dido '*nec me meminisse pigebit Elissae* 4.335; Dido calls upon the gods as she is dying '*di morientis Elissae*'; Aeneas looks back at the flames from Dido's pyre 5.3.

<sup>73</sup> OLD '*elido*'.

significance of the Latin reading rather than the Punic becomes an assertion of Rome's power, and a reminder of the irrelevance of the Punic viewpoint.<sup>74</sup>

In his manipulation of Dido's two names, Virgil therefore again creates a tension. Dido's names often describe aspects of her character in the poem (giving, wandering etc.), encouraging the reader to look for meaningful semantic links between the name and whom it describes. But her possession of multiple names, πολυωνυμία, simultaneously undermines these readings by posing an objection to the claim that names shared anything more than an arbitrary relationship with their referents (Procl. *In Crat.* 16). Virgil develops this using the interpretations of different languages to point out that the links between Dido her names are multiple, relative, culturally constructed and ambiguous. The way Dido's character can be read from many perspectives, and the way that these readings shape and determine her character in the *Aeneid*, firstly reflects how her mythological/historical character has been variously received and handled in three cultural traditions. However, it also creates a hierarchy of readings, with, in this case at least, Latin at the top. The Roman perspective (*Elis(s)a*) is ultimately privileged by Dido's exclusion from the narrative.<sup>75</sup> The suggestion that the relationship between Latin and other languages in Virgil's bi- and multilingual etymologies reflects the power dynamics between Rome and other

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<sup>74</sup> Adams (2003: 636), discussing the use of Latin rather than local languages in official documents in the empire, talks comparably of 'language use as a symbolic show of power'.

<sup>75</sup> The forceful introduction of Carthage, which in Punic means 'New Town', as *urbs antiqua* (1.12) looks to be part of the same technique.

peoples and cultures finds support in the following passage, the final scene described on Aeneas' shield (8.720-3):

ipse sedens niveo candentis limine Phoebi  
 dona recognoscit populorum aptatque superbis  
 postibus; incedunt **victae** longo ordine **gentes**,  
**quam variae linguis**, habitu tam vestis et armis.

Augustus himself, seated on the snow-white threshold of brilliant Phoebus, acknowledges the gifts of his peoples and fits them to the proud doorposts. The **conquered races** proceed in a long line – **as varied in their languages** as in their manner of dress and in their arms.

This is one of only a few explicit acknowledgements of the linguistic diversity circumscribed by Virgil's Latin epic, and it is couched within the image of Augustus surveying defeated, subject peoples.

### 1. v. The unnameable: Allecto

I will finally consider the etymology and depiction of Allecto. My discussion introduces topics that I will explore in more detail in chapter two and three: fate, causation and moral responsibility in Stoic philosophy.

Virgil's description of Amata's response to Allecto's second, heightened attack is one of only a few passages in the *Aeneid* to receive close philosophical analysis from scholars (7.373-384):

his ubi nequiquam dictis experta Latinum

contra stare videt, penitusque in viscera lapsum  
 serpentis furiale malum totamque pererrat, 375  
 tum vero infelix **ingentibus excita monstribus**  
 immensam sine more furit lymphata per urbem.  
 ceu quondam torto volitans sub verbere **turbo**,  
 quem pueri magno in gyro vacua atria circum  
 intenti ludo exercent – ille actus habena 380  
 curvatis fertur spatiis; stupet inscia supra  
 impubesque manus mirata volubile buxum;  
 dant animos plagae: non cursu segnior illo  
 per medias urbes agitur populosque ferocis.

When she saw that she had tried these words in vain, and that Latinus stood firm against her, and when the maddening poison of Allecto's serpent slipped deeper into her gut and roamed her entire body, then truly she, unfortunate, was **stirred by huge monsters**, and frantic, uncivilized, went frenzied through the boundless city. Just as when a **spinning top** whirls under the twisted whip, which children keep spinning in a great circle around empty halls, intent on their game, and, driven by the lash, it is borne in arcing loops, and the ignorant, youthful group are dumbstruck in wonder over the rotating piece of wood, and their blows give it renewed force: no slower than that was she driven through the middle of cities and ferocious peoples.

Rabel (1981) convincingly argues that Virgil's description of Amata as a spinning top draws on Stoic imagery and ideas. The Stoics conceived of the universe as causally determined, and on this basis believed everything in it was fated.<sup>76</sup> However, at least by the time of Chrysippus, they attempted to distinguish their causal determinism from necessitation, not wishing to lift all moral responsibility from human agents. Central to this distinction was their account of

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<sup>76</sup> I explain the Stoic theory of fate, and how this is relevant to the *Aeneid*, in the following chapter (*Fate, Literature and Narrative*).

the human faculty of assent. According to the Stoics human interaction with the environment could be divided up into stages: external stimulus  $\Rightarrow$  impression  $\Rightarrow$  assent  $\Rightarrow$  impulse  $\Rightarrow$  action.<sup>77</sup> The same external stimulus often causes different actions/reactions in different people; everyone on a crowded station platform will react differently to the news that their train has been cancelled. For the Stoics, this is a function of assent, which uniquely characterizes our response to things on an individual basis. Crucially, assent is a different sort of cause from external stimuli. The latter is only a 'triggering' cause: it does not completely characterize its result, and will not necessarily cause a particular response in different people. A person's response is a function of the combination of this 'triggering' cause with the 'primary' cause of his/her assent.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, Stoics argued that human actions were fated but not bound by necessity.

Chrysippus is known for explaining this distinction using the image of a cylinder or spinning top (Cic. *Fat.* 42-3):

[Chrysippus] revertitur ad cylindrum et ad **turbinem** suum, quae moveri incipere nisi pulsa non possunt. id autem cum accidit, suapte natura, quod superest, et cylindrum volvi et versari turbinem putat. 'Ut igitur', inquit, 'qui protrusit cylindrum, dedit ei principium motionis, volubilitatem

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<sup>77</sup> In chapter three (*Causation and Moral Responsibility*), I explore the Stoic explanation of the faculty of assent in more detail, and use this to show that Aeneas assents to the appearance and orders of Mercury in book four, and can therefore be held responsible for his decision to leave Carthage.

<sup>78</sup> My use of 'triggering' and 'primary' to describe the hierarchy of causes in Stoic determinism follows Long & Sedley (1987(1): 393).

autem non dedit, sic visum obiectum **imprimet** illud quidem et quasi  
signabit in animo suam speciem, sed ad sensio **nostra** erit **in potestate**.

But he resorts to his cylinder and **spinning top**: these cannot begin to move without a push; but once that has happened, he holds that it is thereafter through their own nature that the cylinder rolls and the top spins. 'Hence', he says, 'just as the person who pushed the cylinder gave it its beginning of motion but not its capacity for rolling, likewise, although the impression encountered will **print** and, as it were, emblazon its appearance on the mind, assent will be **in our power**. (trans. Long & Sedley)

If someone placed a cube, a cone and a cylinder at the top of a slope, and gave an equal push (*protrusit*) to all three, they would each move differently. In this example, the push is the 'triggering' cause. But the nature of the objects themselves (cylindrical, smooth etc.) is the 'principal' cause, because it is this that characterizes the effect stimulus has (rolling, sliding, toppling etc.). This is comparable (*ut... sic*) to the way our faculty of assent is the 'principal' cause that determines how we react to the impression (*visum obiectum imprimet*) of the 'triggering' cause of external stimulus. Assent, like the *volubilitas* of the cylinder, acts as an internal cause that combines with external (*extrinsecus*) causes in such a way as to, according to the Stoics, render the outcome *nostra in potestate*.<sup>79</sup>

Returning to Virgil, the comparison of Amata to a spinning top eagerly whipped round by children initially appears to suggest that she is not in control of her

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<sup>79</sup> Though I will introduce the term 'free will' in the next two chapters, where I discuss autonomy, agency, decision-making and moral responsibility in more detail, I have tried to avoid it here. It does not find an easy corollary in ancient philosophy - see e.g. Bobzien (1998a). 'In our power' is the closest thing to the modern notion of moral responsibility, though crucially different from it: 'answerability for our actions in no way requires an open future and might even be seriously jeopardized by one. What it requires is a proper system for apportioning responsibility between the relevant causal factors. For actions to be in our power is simply for us to be their principal causes. Fate can be said to bring them about through us.' (Long & Sedley 1987(1): 394).

descent into frenzy. In the simile, we equate Juno and Allecto with the boy spectators watching and spurring on the top as a game (*ludo*), and Amata with the passive object in their control. The density of passive verbs (*excita*, *lymphata*, *actus*, *fertur*, *agitur*) further emphasizes that Amata's madness, like the turning of the spinning top, is externally caused.

However, if we follow Rabel in linking this simile to Chrysippus' *cylindrum et... turbinem*, it suggests the opposite. Amata, like the cylinder in Cicero's account, is set in motion by an external force (*excita* 7.376, *excitata* Cic. *Fat.* 42). However, just as the shape of the *turbo* causes it to spin, so, comparison with the Stoic example suggests, Amata's individual character determines her response to the goads of Juno and Allecto, which is thus 'in her power'.<sup>80</sup> She is the 'principal' cause, whereas their actions can only be 'triggering'. Feeney (1991: 167-8), in a complementary analysis of this passage, supports the creation of this interpretative tension by pointing out that wordplay linking *ingens* and *ingenium* could have suggested belief in an etymological and semantic connection between the two words.<sup>81</sup> 'Amata is presented in these three words [*ingentibus excita monstribus*] as stirred up by something at once supernatural and innate' (*ibid.*). We remember that she was inflamed with anger and concern even before Allecto arrived (*femineae ardentem curaeque iraeque coquebant* 7.345).

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<sup>80</sup> See n. 79 above. 'In her power', confusingly for the modern reader, does not mean that Amata could have acted otherwise. Rather, it means that Amata can be identified as the principal causal factor in her behaviour. The Stoics claimed that this satisfied the criteria for moral responsibility.

<sup>81</sup> For example at Hor. *Sat.* 1.3.33 at *ingenium ingens inculto latet hoc sub corpore* or Sen. *Controv.* 10.5 *animus inter vitia ingens et ad similitudinem ingeni sui violentus*. Feeney further cites Mackail (1912), and Ross (1987) in support of the connection.

To return to names, Virgil is our earliest Latin source for three Furies called Megaera, Tisiphone and Allecto.<sup>82</sup> Despite this, little attention has been paid to the significance of their names. Allecto, who undoubtedly enjoys the most prominent role in the narrative, is portrayed on Italian ceramics from as early as the 4<sup>th</sup> c. BC. Here she is labeled with her Greek title, Ἀλ(λ)ηκτώ, which literally means ‘unceasing’.<sup>83</sup> I will suggest an additional Greek interpretation of the name Allecto that complements Rabel and Feeney’s persuasive arguments for a Stoic reading of this passage, and Virgil’s careful characterization of the Furies, and in particular Allecto, throughout the poem. A philosophical reading of this passage is further supported by the fact that Hellenistic philosophers often used the example of visions and experiences of the Furies in epistemological debate.<sup>84</sup>

Read with a short ‘e’ as ἀ-λεκτός, Allecto means ‘indescribable’. Her name therefore paradoxically encapsulates her inexhaustible inexpressibility (*tibi nomina mille* 7.337). Indeed, this is not the only way that Allecto and her fellow Furies trick the senses and are beyond the capacity of human comprehension. The snake Allecto plucks from her head is intangible when it creeps into Amata’s soul (7.349-51):

ille inter vestis et levia pectora lapsus  
 volvitur **attactu nullo, fallitque** furentem  
 vipeream inspirans animam...

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<sup>82</sup> Mackie (1992: 354).

<sup>83</sup> LSJ ‘ἄληκτος’.

<sup>84</sup> E.g. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.169-71, 244-5, 249; 8.63, 67. See also chapter two n. 58 on Dido, Orestes and the Furies. I discuss the Epicurean explanation of hallucination, and Virgil’s response to it, in chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception, and materialiam*).

The serpent slid between her robes and her smooth breast, winding its course but **imperceptible to touch, and went unnoticed** as it inspired her with a frenzied, snake-like spirit.

The Furies also pose challenges for visual perception and are difficult to see: they are characterized several times as both 'hated' and 'unseen' with the ambiguous adjective *invisus*.<sup>85</sup>

But λεκτόν (translated 'sayable' by Long & Sedley) is also an important piece of terminology in Stoic logic and semantics. The Stoics analyzed language and thought into corporeal and incorporeal components. Seneca provides a useful explanation (Sen. *Ep.* 117.13 = L&S 33E):

'sunt' inquit 'naturae corporum, tamquam hic homo est, hic equus; has deinde sequuntur motus animorum enuntiativi corporum. hi habent proprium quiddam et a corporibus seductum, tamquam video Catonem ambulans: hoc sensus ostendit, animus credidit. corpus est quod video, cui et oculos intendi et animum. dico deinde: 'Cato ambulat'. non corpus' inquit 'est quod nunc loquor, sed enuntiativum quiddam de corpore, quod alii effatum vocant, alii enuntiatum, alii dictum. sic cum dicimus 'sapientiam', corporale quiddam intellegimus; cum dicimus 'sapit', de corpore loquimur. plurimum autem interest utrum illud dicas an de illo.'

He says 'There are bodily natures, such as this human being is and this horse is; they are then accompanied by motions of the mind which express the bodies. These motions have something about them which is distinctive and is abstracted from the bodies. For example, I see Cato walking; sense perception showed this and the mind believed it. What I see is a body and I directed my eyes and my mind to the body. Then I say: 'Cato

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<sup>85</sup> *invisum* numen 7.571, *abdiderat sese atque aris invisa sedebat* 2.574 (when Helen is described as a Fury).

walks’.’ He says, ‘What I am now saying is not a body but something expressible about the body and some people call this an *effatum*, others call it an *enuntiatum*, still others call it a *dictum*. Thus when we say ‘wisdom’ we understand something which is bodily; when we say ‘is wise’ we are talking *about* a body. It makes an enormous difference whether you mention the person or talk *about* the person.’ (trans. Inwood)

Cato is a body, and has a physical, corporeal existence. When he walks, his movement makes a similarly physical, corporeal impression on the mind of the observer. This physical impression is attended by and rationally interpreted as the proposition ‘Cato is walking’, which thought may become speech should the observer speak it out loud. In Seneca’s scheme, which aims at elucidating the Stoic position (though he claims not to be interested in the *minutiae*), the λεκτόν, translated as *effatum*, *enuntiatum* or *dictum*, is this proposition *Cato ambulat*. Unlike the corporeal Cato himself, or the corporeal spoken utterance ‘Cato is walking’, this λεκτόν is incorporeal (*non corpus... est*).<sup>86</sup> It is the incorporeal proposition, expressed in language, connected with the physical impression generated by Cato walking.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Long & Sedley (1987(1): 199-200): ‘Ontologically, it is sharply distinguished from the ‘signifier’ (utterance) and the ‘name bearer’ (the corporeal entity which the sayable is about) in being ‘incorporeal’... the sayable expressed by ‘Cato is walking’ is not itself a body, but something which can be said *about* a body... sayables can be regarded as abstractions from bodies - things which are ‘body-less’ (the literal meaning of ἀσώματον, the word for ‘incorporeal’)’.

<sup>87</sup> Though it is not necessary for my analysis of the *Aeneid*, it is important to note that not all λεκτά are propositions, though all propositions are λεκτά. Some λεκτά are ‘incomplete’, which means that they do not form complete propositions (e.g. ‘Cato is walking’ vs. ‘is walking’). Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.70-3, Diog. Laert. 7.63.

There is a close relationship between rationality and language in Stoic philosophy. It is therefore only rational impressions that are attended by a λεκτόν (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8.70):<sup>88</sup>

ἡξίουں οἱ στωικοὶ κοινῶς ἐν λεκτῶ τὸ ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ τὸ ψευδὸς. λεκτόν δὲ ὑπάρχειν φασὶ τὸ **κατὰ λογικὴν φαντασίαν** ὑφιστάμενον, λογικὴν δὲ εἶναι φαντασίαν καθ' ἣν τὸ φαντασθὲν ἔστι **λόγῳ παραστῆσαι**.

The Stoics maintained that truth and falsity exist in the 'sayable.' And they say that a 'sayable' is 'that which subsists **in conformity with a rational impression**,' and that a rational impression is one in which it is possible to **show/describe** the content of the impression **by reason/with an account/in language**. (trans. Long & Sedley, adapted)

Propositional λεκτά can be true or false: 'Cato is walking' is true when he is, and false when he's not. Each incorporeal λεκτόν, whether it is true or false, corresponds to a corporeal 'rational impression', λογικὴν φαντασίαν. The criterion for rationality is not correctness. Rather, for an impression to be rational it seems as though one must be able to explain or express how it arose. For example, imagine someone who looks like Cato is walking towards you. This creates an impression on your mind that is attended by the proposition 'Cato is walking towards me'. This proposition is false, but the impression that it corresponds to can nevertheless be rational because you can explain it: 'he had the same haircut', 'I was expecting Cato' etc. The Greek is particularly ambiguous in the last sentence, but it is nevertheless clear that the definition of a rational

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<sup>88</sup> See also L&S 33D = Diog. Laert. 7.49 προηγείται γὰρ ἡ φαντασία, εἴθ' ἡ διάνοια ἐκκλητική ὑπάρχουσα, ὃ πάσχει ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας, τοῦτο ἐκφέρει λόγῳ. 'For the impression arises first, and then thought, which has the power of talking, expresses in language what it experiences by the agency of the impression.' (trans. Long & Sedley)

impression is closely related to λόγος and its broad range of meanings: language, explanation and rationality.

Returning to the *Aeneid*, Allecto's name when subjected to Stoic etymological analysis confusingly tells the reader that she is not a λεκτόν according to Stoic logic. She is not a 'sayable', which means that she cannot be expressed in language because she does not correspond to a rational impression. This firmly characterizes her and the reaction she engenders in both Amata and the reader as irrational. Accordingly, both Allecto and the emotional response she creates should be indescribable, incorporeal and impossible to define as either true or false. This interpretation of her name lends support and depth to the tension created in the reader by the two contradictory readings of the simile likening Amata to a spinning top (Feeney 1991: 168):

'From beginning to end, reading the Allecto-Amata episode is like looking at an object through a pair of binoculars with incompatible lenses. If you close each eye in turn you can get the picture into focus, but it is impossible to harmonize the image with both open at once... By laying bare the impossibilities of adequately narrating such extremes of behavior, this technique involves the reader in the recognition of our inability to understand madness in others, or acknowledge it in ourselves... It is remarkable testimony to Vergil's confidence in his art that he can enmesh us in such reflections on human behavior even as his technique flaunts the fictionality of the entire episode by continually unsettling us, keeping us dithering between two incompatible reading conventions.'

Virgil reminds the reader using the etymology of Allecto's name that Stoic philosophers posited a close relationship between rationality and language that suggested that experiences that are irrational are those that you cannot explain or describe. Virgil's verse describing Allecto rises to the challenge and shows us

that this is not true: the reader of this passage is offered two powerful but irreconcilable interpretations, and the irresolvable tension between these thwarts the satisfaction of comprehension in a way that encapsulates the essence of irrationality.

### Conclusion

In the *Aeneid*, it is only the name *Albula* that Virgil labels *verum*, a true match for the Tiber, its smoothly flowing, pale and bubbling referent. On the whole, names are cultural constructs, but nevertheless describe or even determine their referents. Virgil's poem shows that this is an ominous claim: how something is read defines what it is, despite this reading being a function of the language and interpretation of one dominant culture, Rome. Non-Roman names only continue to make sense as long as they are compatible with Roman power, which is sadly not the case for the epic's 'losers'.<sup>89</sup> That Turnus should be a king (τύραννος),<sup>90</sup> Andromache should fight for her husband,<sup>91</sup> Elissa should be godlike, or Carthage a 'new city' is irreconcilable with the future of Rome.<sup>92</sup> Nevertheless, Virgil tempers the oppression of Rome's linguistic and cultural monopoly by showing that other languages are a part of Latin. The *genus mixtum* of the Romans is reflected in multilingual etymologies – for example the provocatively Greek

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<sup>89</sup> My phrasing follows Quint (1993) and Armstrong (2002).

<sup>90</sup> 8.17 *Turno regi*; 9.327 *regi Turno*, 369 *Turno regi*. After his retreat in book nine references to his kingship dwindle (along with his chances of success?), though he is numbered amongst the *reges* at 12.164. Cf. Cairns (1989: 67).

<sup>91</sup> 3.297 *et patrio Andromachen iterum cessisse marito*. 'cedo' in Latin has marital connotations, but also means 'give ground' or 'fall back' in a military context (*OLD s.v.*): the opposite of the Greek μάχομαι.

<sup>92</sup> See n. 75 above.

flavour of *indigenas* Latinos, or *sermonem Ausonii patrium* (12.823, 834 and see n. 2, 5 and 17 above).

This explains why language and names are of central importance in the *Aeneid*. It matters what language the future Romans will speak, and that they will no longer be called Teucrians. This is because, though it is insubstantial and incorporeal (*utque est nomen erit* vs. *commixti corpore tantum/subsident Teucri*) a name shapes the interpretation and therefore the future of its referent.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>93</sup> In chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception and materialism*) I further explore Virgil's demonstration of the immaterial yet powerful effects of language in the context of literary imagination.

## 2. Fate, Literature and Narrative

This chapter introduces the large and complex topic of fate in the *Aeneid*. The content lays the foundation for my exploration of several questions related to fate in subsequent chapters: 3. Causation and Moral Responsibility, 4. Philosophy, Poetry and Rivers, and 5. F/fortuna, religion and philosophy.

I begin by clarifying what Virgil means by fate (2. i. Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid). The sheer prominence of fate in the poem, coupled with other characteristics such as its close association with Jupiter, are suggestive of Stoicism. I therefore reconstruct the salient features of Stoic causal determinism in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC in order to assess the extent to which fate in the *Aeneid* is Stoic. This is certainly one important context for understanding fate in the poem, but it is equally clear that Virgil is eclectic and inconsistent. He also challenges the universality of fate by suggesting that it can be avoided or delayed, incorporates ideas and deities from Roman religion, and raises questions about whether the teleology and providence supposedly inherent in fate privileges the Romans.

In addition, Virgil persistently characterizes fate as literature, and prophets as poets. I turn to this in the remainder of the chapter, arguing that Virgil creates a productive tension between the Stoic and literary features of fate that allows him to explore philosophical questions related to fate's influence and fixity. My first argument (2. ii Determinism and literary precedent) is that Virgil aligns fate and literature by encouraging his characters' experience of the influence of fate to be compared with his own navigation of the restrictions imposed by literary

precedent. Dido's suicide *nec fato* (4.696) can accordingly be read as a gloss on her departure from the course marked out by two of her literary models, Ariadne and Medea, who are both rescued by gods. Likewise, the absence of fate or divine involvement in Nisus and Euryalus' night mission, coupled with the questions they ask about motivation and autonomy, mirror Virgil's reformulation and distortion of the events of *Iliad* 10 and the Attic tragedy *Rhesus*. The comparison between fate and literature therefore provides a basis for an exploration of the limitations imposed by determinism.

My second argument (2.iii Fate as 'text') is that Virgil complicates and emphasizes the interrelation between prophecies and narrative poetry to prompt reflection on the truth status and stability of both. Analysis of the overlaps between the Sibyl, Jupiter, and the narrative voice of Virgil himself leads to the conclusion that Virgil portrays prophets and poets (united in his innovative use of the word *vates*) as being engaged in the same activity, even though prophets describe and advise on future events, and poets normally recount the past. On the one hand, this reinforces confidence in prophecies because, as this is a historical epic, their predictions are mostly guaranteed. On the other, through association with prophecy, the history on which this sense of stability relies becomes as uncertain as the future. Trying to apply the critical toolbox of narratology to the *Aeneid* clearly outlines the problem, and leads me to conclude that, for Virgil, fate and history are not true or factual, but rather malleable literary artefacts. I finally corroborate this conclusion by discussing Virgil's manipulation of *ordo*, a central feature both of Stoic causal determinism and a well-structured literary work, in the service of Rome and Augustus.

## 2. i. Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid

Fate in the *Aeneid* demands attention for several reasons. For one, Virgil gives it a prominent role in the epic from the outset: Aeneas is introduced in the second line as *fato profugus* (1.2), a man forced to flee his country because of fate.<sup>1</sup> *fatum/a*, the most common word for fate in the poem, appears 125 times. If we exclude the *De Fato*, this is considerably more than in the entirety of the Ciceronian corpus.<sup>2</sup> Indeed, *fatum/a* is only one of the words that Virgil uses to talk about fate: the reader also frequently encounters *fortuna*, the *Parcae*, and *sors/sortes*, each of which add their own colour and perspective to fate and its role in events.<sup>3</sup>

Virgil's characterization of fate is also a notable point of contrast between the *Aeneid* and the Homeric epics, in particular the *Iliad*. The king of the gods is closely aligned with fate in both authors,<sup>4</sup> but Homer's Zeus, unlike Virgil's Jupiter, has changes of heart, is inconsistent, and even suggests the possibility of

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<sup>1</sup> See further *Introduction* and *3. Causation and Moral Responsibility* for arguments that the opening lines are programmatic in signalling Virgil's engagement with philosophical ideas in the *Aeneid*.

<sup>2</sup> *Fatum/a* appears 59 times in the *De Fato*, and 95 times in all Cicero's other works.

<sup>3</sup> *Fortuna* appears 71 times. Five of these are instances of the cognate adjective *fortunatus* (1.437; 6.639; 9.446; 11.252, 416), and only one is in the plural (6.683). *sors/sortes* has a meaning related to fate 13 times (including one instance of the verb *sortitur* 3.376), and *Parcae* appears eight times. I will discuss *sors/sortes* and *Parcae* below; *F/fortuna* in detail in chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*).

<sup>4</sup> I will discuss Jupiter's relationship to fate in the *Aeneid* below. The events of the *Iliad* are described as fulfilling the will of Zeus (Hom. *Il.* 1.5 Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή). Allan (2012) argues that the Διὸς βουλή is a recognisable narrative pattern in early Greek epic which has a cosmic scale and 'opens up connections to the wider song tradition' (*ibid.* 206). Homer's Zeus is also connected with fate through his performance of the *kerostasia* (Hom. *Il.* 8.66-72, 22.208-213; Morrison (1997)), and his explanation of what will happen to other gods (e.g. Hom. *Il.* 8.438-388).

altering fate.<sup>5</sup> Secondly, most of the words that connote fate in Homer are rooted in the idea of a 'share' or 'lot'.<sup>6</sup> When fate is mentioned, therefore, it is usually portrayed as negative, and limited to determining death and the span of a person's life, rather than the details of his/her actions within this.<sup>7</sup> *sors/sortes* and *Parcae* to some extent mirror this in Virgil,<sup>8</sup> but *fatum* and *fortuna*, which are considerably more frequent, have a much broader scope. In the same vein, the words for fate in Homer usually reference a specific person or group, e.g. Achilles or the Achaeans.<sup>9</sup> This is also common in Virgil, but there is in addition a strong sense of an abstracted, universal concept of fate - 'the destiny of the world' (Bailey 1935: 214) - behind it.<sup>10</sup> It is true that the *Iliad* is pervaded with an undeniable sense that Troy must and will fall. Yet in the *Aeneid*, unlike in Homer, the fated future foundation of Rome is situated within a comprehensive world order. Though the endings of the *Iliad* and the *Aeneid* are comparable in that they fall short of the fated sack of Troy and the foundation of Rome respectively, Virgil additionally forecasts fated events, such as the reign of Augustus and Roman 'imperium sine fine' (1.279), that are directly relevant to his initial, Augustan reader. This underlines the awesome temporal reach of *fatum/a* by suggesting

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<sup>5</sup> E.g. during his discussion with Hera about the possibility of averting the death of his beloved son Sarpedon (Hom. *Il.* 16.431-60), or when he asks the gods if they should save Hector from death, or let Achilles kill him (Hom. *Il.* 22.167-76).

<sup>6</sup> E.g. αἶσα; μοῖρα and μόρος (from μέρομαι); πέπρωται (unusual, but at e.g. Hom. *Il.* 18.329; from πόρω). See *Lexikon des Frühgriechischen Epos* s.v.; Duffy (1947); Yamagata (1994: 105-120).

<sup>7</sup> On the relationship between fate and humans in Homer, see Edwards (1987: 124-142), Jones (1996), Lesky (2001), and Miller (2009).

<sup>8</sup> E.g. *sors* at 2.554-5 'haec finis Priami fatorum, hic exitus illum/ **sorte** tulit...', 10.501 *nescia mens hominum fati **sortisque futurae***; *Parcae* at 9.107-8 *ergo aderat promissa dies et tempora Parcae/ debita complerant*, 10.814-5 *extremaque Lauso/ Parcae fila legunt*.

<sup>9</sup> E.g. Achilles at Hom. *Il.* 1.413-8, the Achaeans at Hom. *Il.* 8.70-2.

<sup>10</sup> See further Bailey (1935: 208-14).

that the same fate directing Aeneas' flight from Troy is guiding Roman politics when Virgil is writing.

It has been suggested that Stoicism influenced Virgil's decision to make fate so prominent in his epic, and to differentiate it from fate in the *Iliad* in this way:<sup>11</sup> certainly a dynamic philosophical debate had developed on fate and related topics between the archaic period and the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC.<sup>12</sup> To assess the extent to which fate in the *Aeneid* is Stoic, I will sketch the key features of the concept of fate attributed to the Stoics in this period, before considering whether or not these features are consistent with the characterization of fate in the *Aeneid*. I argue that, though Stoicism is one important context for understanding fate in the poem, Virgil is not consistent.<sup>13</sup> It is therefore equally valuable to consider different literary, religious and cultural perspectives alongside Stoicism, as it is often through the confluence of these with the objective claims of philosophy that Virgil generates insight and meaning for the reader.

The Stoics, unlike the Epicureans, and more so than the Academics or any other school of ancient philosophy, emphasized the role of fate in the universe. That Virgil's contemporaries considered this characteristic of Stoicism can be seen from the comments of the speakers in Cicero's *De Natura Deorum*. The Epicurean

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<sup>11</sup> Scholars who read Stoicism into fate in the *Aeneid* include: Servius (Serv. *ad Aen.* 1.257, 2.689, 3.376, 8.334, 10.467), Heinze (1903: 293-304), Bailey (1935: 208), Edwards (1960), Rabel (1981), Lyne (1987: 73), and Quint (1993: 93).

<sup>12</sup> Miller (2009) suggests that the questions Homer raised about fate and related issues were partly responsible for the development of philosophical debate on these topics.

<sup>13</sup> Bailey (1935: 204) likewise foregrounds his discussion of fate in the *Aeneid* by noting that 'Virgil uses it in a very considerable range of different senses.'

speaker Velleius criticizes Stoics on the grounds that their conception of the gods leads to an old-womanly and superstitious belief in fate (Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.55):

‘hinc vobis extitit primum illa fatalis necessitas quam εἰμαρμένην dicitis,  
ut quicquid accidat id ex aeterna veritate causarumque continuatione  
fluxisse dicatis. quanti autem haec philosophia aestimanda est cui  
tamquam aniculis, et iis quidem indoctis, fato fieri videantur omnia?’

‘An outcome of this theology was first of all your doctrine of Necessity or Fate, εἰμαρμένη as you termed it, the theory that every event is the result of an eternal truth and an unbroken series of causation. But what value can be assigned to a philosophy which thinks that everything happens by fate? It is a belief for old women, and ignorant old women at that.’ (trans. Rackham)

In a similar vein, the Academic Cotta argues that the Stoic belief in fate and consequent reliance on divination is neither useful nor beneficial (Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.14):

‘saepe autem ne utile quidem est scire quid futurum sit; miserum est enim  
nihil proficientem angere nec habere ne spei quidem extremum et tamen  
commune solacium, praesertim cum vos iidem fato fieri dicatis omnia,  
quod autem semper ex omni aeternitate verum fuerit id esse fatum: quid  
igitur iuvat aut quid adfert ad cavendum scire aliquid futurum, cum id  
certe futurum sit?’

‘But often it is not even an advantage to know what is going to happen, for it is miserable to suffer unavailing torments, and to lack even the last, yet universal, consolation of hope, especially when your school also asserts that all events are fated, fate meaning that which has always from all eternity been true; what good is it therefore to know that something is going to happen, or how does it help us avoid it, when it certainly will happen?’ (trans. Rackham)

The perceived centrality of fate to Stoicism can be seen from how other schools define themselves against this.<sup>14</sup>

These sources also give an inkling of what is entailed by the Stoic theory of fate. Though Stoic ideas about fate change through time, and according to different sources, in 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC Roman authors, the concept of fate most commonly attributed to the Stoics is that of universal causal determinism (*causarumque continuatione* and *fato fieri... omnia* above).<sup>15</sup> This is associated first and foremost with the Stoic leader Chrysippus, for whose views on fate Cicero's *De Fato* is our earliest extant source.<sup>16</sup> However, due to the fragmentary nature of this dialogue, the *De Divinatione* in fact offers a better definition of Stoic *fatum*. We can use this, along with a collection of supporting materials, to reconstruct the salient features of the Stoic account as it is likely to have been encountered by Virgil (Cic. *Div.* 1.125-6 = SVF 2.921, the speaker is Cicero's brother Quintus):

‘*fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἰμαρμένην, id est ordinem  
seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat. ea est  
ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. quod cum ita sit, nihil est  
factum quod non futurum fuerit, eodemque modo nihil est futurum cuius  
non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat. ex quo intellegitur ut  
fatum sit non id quod superstitiose, sed id quod physice dicitur, causa*

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<sup>14</sup> Begemann (2014) notes the prevalence of negative accounts of Stoic fate in ‘Cicero’s theological triad’ (= *De Divinatione, De Natura Deorum, De Fato*).

<sup>15</sup> Bobzien (1998b: 18ff.), Long & Sedley (1987(1): 323-43). Though universal causal determinism is overwhelmingly the theory ascribed to the Stoics in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, from the point of view of Alexander of Aphrodisias, writing in the 2<sup>nd</sup> – 3<sup>rd</sup> c. AD, not all Stoics were committed to the universality of fate (*De Fato* 166).

<sup>16</sup> Bobzien (1998b: 9).

aeterna rerum, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint. ita fit ut et observatione notari possit quae res quamque causam plerumque consequatur, etiamsi non semper (nam id quidem adfirmare difficile est), easdemque causas veri simile est rerum futurarum cerni ab iis qui aut per furorem eas aut in quiete videant.'

'Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἰμαρμένη, that is, **an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect**. That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening. Consequently, we know that Fate is that which is called, not ignorantly, but scientifically, 'the eternal cause of things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and of things to come.' Hence it is that it may be known by observation what effect will in most instances follow any cause, even if it is not known in all; for it would be too much to say that it is known in every case. And it is probable that these causes of coming events are perceived by those who see them during frenzy or in sleep' (trans. Falconer)

Fate is construed as a universal causal nexus; the interconnection of causes that embodies the universe.<sup>17</sup> This is strongly deterministic in the sense that this causal nexus embraces absolutely everything that will and has happened (*nihil est factum quod non futurum fuerit...nihil est futurum cuius non causas id ipsum efficientes natura contineat*). The realm of possibility does not really exist, and is

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.55 *causarumque continuatione*; Serv. *ad Aen.* 3.376 (considered to be a fragment from the *De Fato*) *fatum est conexio rerum per aeternitatem se invicem tenens*; Cic. *Fat.* 38 *nexa causis aeternis*. See also Lucr. 2.251-5, in which he is most probably arguing against a Stoic theory of fate: *denique si semper motus conectitur omnis/ et vetere exoritur motu novus ordine certo,/ nec declinando faciunt primordia motus/ principium quoddam, quod fati foedera rumpat/ ex infinito ne causam causa sequatur,/ libera per terras unde haec animantibus exstat,/ unde est haec, inquam, fati avolsa voluntas...* 'Again, if **all motion is always one long chain**, and new motion arises out of the old **in order invariable**, and if the first beginnings do not make by swerving a beginning of motion such as to break the decrees of **fate**, that **cause may not follow cause from infinity**, whence comes this free will in living creatures all over the earth, whence I say is this will wrested from the **fates**...' (trans. Rouse).

only a function of human ignorance.<sup>18</sup> A Stoic would not say ‘It is possible that David will win the lottery, and it is possible that he will not’, but rather ‘Even if I do not know what is fated to happen, it has been causally determined for eternity whether or not David will win the lottery.’<sup>19</sup> Because the Stoics had this conception of fate they believed that knowledge of future events was possible both through the scientific study of *causae (ita fit...)* and through various means of divination, including prophecy, dreams, astrology, augury and haruspicy (*easdem causas...*).<sup>20</sup>

It is also worth pointing out that Stoic causal determinism is different from what Bobzien (1998b: 44) calls modern ‘mechanical’ determinism because it entails

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<sup>18</sup> In chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*) I discuss how Virgil creates dramatic irony by showing that some characters are ignorant of fate.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. Cic. *Fat.* 13 *ille [Chrysippus] enim id solum fieri posse dicit quod aut sit verum aut futurum sit verum, et quidquid futurum sit id dicit fieri necesse esse et quidquid non sit futurum id negat fieri posse* ‘he says that only what is either true or will be true is a possibility, and whatever will be, he says, must necessarily happen, and whatever will not be, according to him, cannot possibly happen’ (trans. Rackham). See also Long & Sedley 1987(1): 230-6.

<sup>20</sup> Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.55 (the speaker is the Epicurean Velleius) ‘*sequitur μαντική vestra, quae Latine divinatio dicitur, qua tanta inbuemur superstitione, si vos audire vellemus, ut haruspices, augures, harioli, vates, coniectores nobis essent colendi...*’ ‘and next follows your doctrine of μαντική, or divination, which would so steep us in superstition, if we consented to listen to you, that we should be the devotees of soothsayers, augurs, oracle-mongers, seers and interpreters of dreams...’; vs. 2.162-3 (the speaker is the Stoic Balbus) ‘*est enim profecto divinatio, quae multis locis, rebus, temporibus apparet cum in privatis, tum maxime in publicis: multa cernunt haruspices, multa augures provident, multa oraculis declarantur, multa vaticinationibus, multa somniis, multa portentis; quibus cognitis multae saepe res [ex] hominum sententia atque utilitate partae, multa etiam pericula depulsa sunt*’. ‘I refer of course to divination, which we see practised in many regions and upon various matters and occasions both private and more especially public. Many observations are made by those who inspect the victims at sacrifices, many events are foreseen by augurs or revealed in oracles and prophecies, dreams and portents, a knowledge of which has often led to the acquisition of many things gratifying men’s wishes and requirements, and also to the avoidance of many dangers.’ (trans. Rackham)

both teleology (the universe is arranged as it is for a purpose) and providence (the universe is arranged according to the will of a god/gods). This confluence of both teleology and providence in Stoic causal determinism is evidenced by Stoic identity statements that equate the universe, fate, reason and god (Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.39 = L&S 54B = SVF 2.1077):<sup>21</sup>

ait enim [Chrysippus] vim divinam in ratione esse positam et in universae naturae animo atque mente, ipsumque mundum deum dicit esse et eius animi fusionem universam, tum eius ipsius principatum, qui in mente et ratione versetur, communemque rerum naturam universam atque omnia continentem, tum fatalem †vim† et necessitatem rerum futurarum.

‘For he [Chrysippus] says that divine power resides in reason and in the mind and intellect of universal nature. He says that god is the world itself, and the universal pervasiveness of the mind; also that he is the world’s own commanding faculty, since he is located in intellect and reason; that he is the common nature of things, universal and all-embracing; also the force of fate and the necessity of future events.’ (trans. Long & Sedley)

This presentation of Stoicism by the Epicurean Velleius is corroborated in book two by the Stoic speaker Balbus, who gives a logical argument that aims to prove that the universe, because it is by definition perfect and complete, must therefore also be virtuous, wise *et propterea deus* (Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.37-9). Stoics argued that the universe is organized in the best possible way, that is rationally, and that this organization can be construed as both the will of god (conceived as the universe

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<sup>21</sup> I follow the text of Long & Sedley, who read *vim* instead of the MS reading *umbram*. For a defence of the latter, and explanation of other options, see Pease (1973 *ad loc.*). On the Stoic equation of the universe, reason, and god, see also Diog. Laert. 7.135 = L&S 46B *ἐν τ’ εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία· πολλὰς τ’ ἑτέρας ὀνομασίας προσονομάζεσθαι* ‘God; intelligence; fate and Zeus are all one, and many other names are applied to him’ (trans. Long & Sedley).

itself and immanent) and fate. In other Stoic sources, this universal world-god is identified with the Zeus of popular religion (Plut. *Mor.* 1056c = L&S 55R = SVF 2.997):<sup>22</sup>

αὐτὸς [Chrysippus] δὲ πολλὰ τούτοις<sup>23</sup> ὁμολογούμενα γράφει, τέλος δὲ  
φησι μηδὲν ἴσχεσθαι μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ τούλάχιστον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν  
τοῦ Διὸς λόγον, ὃν τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι.

[Chrysippus] himself writes many things in agreement with this, and ends up saying that no state or process is to the slightest degree other than in accordance with the rationale of Zeus, which he says is identical to fate. (trans. Long & Sedley)

Mention of the king of the gods and his connection to fate encourages return to the *Aeneid*, and the start of my assessment of the extent to which the Stoic characterization of fate correlates with Virgil's. For the close connection between Jupiter and fate in the poem is one of the things that could be read as having Stoic connotations. At points, fate seems to be aligned with the god himself (e.g. '*rex Iuppiter omnibus idem*' 10.112), perhaps following the Stoic identification of Zeus with the world-god described above. Virgil even sometimes references an abstract singular *deus* in connection with fate, which recalls the universal god of

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<sup>22</sup> See also Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*. Thom (2005) supplies an updated translation and commentary.

<sup>23</sup> τούτοις refers to two short extracts of Homer and Euripides: Hom. *Il.* 15.109 [Hera speaking] τὼ ἔχεθ' ὅττι κεν ὕμμι κακὸν πέμπῃσιν ἐκάστω 'so content yourselves with whatever evil thing he sends to each' (trans. Murray); Eur. *Supp.* 734-6 (Adrastus) ὦ Ζεῦ, τί δῆτα τοὺς ταλαιπώρους βροτοὺς/φρονεῖν λέγουσι; σοῦ γὰρ ἐξηρτήμεθα/δρῶμέν τε τοιαῦθ' ἂν σὺ τυγχάνῃς θέλων 'O Zeus, why do men say that hapless mortals have any wisdom? We are dependent upon you and do whatever is your will.' (trans. Kovacs)

Stoic theology more than Roman polytheism.<sup>24</sup> Jupiter more generally demonstrates knowledge of fate, which is described as being in his power (*'sic fata deum rex/ sortitur'* 3.375-6, *'imperio Iovis fatisque'* 5.784), and is closely connected with his words (*'fabor... fatorum arcana'* 1.261-2, and see below iii. Fate as 'text'). Fate is also characterized as his will (*'neque me sententia vertit'* 1.260), which suggests Stoic providence (τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον above) as well as Homer's Διὸς βουλή.<sup>25</sup> Indeed, some of the changes between Jupiter in the *Aeneid* and Zeus in the *Iliad*, for example that Jupiter does not countenance changing fate, and that he appears more distanced and objective, might also be referred back to Stoicism.

A simpler point is that the sheer prominence of fate in the poem may encourage Stoic associations – the critics and adherents of Stoic philosophy that Cicero present are united in portraying belief in fate as one of the defining characteristics of the school. In this vein, I noted above that *fatum/a* is used especially frequently in the poem. In the singular (*fatum*), which is how it appears in the programmatic opening lines (*fato profugus* 1.2), this is a relatively rare word in Latin used specifically in philosophical works to refer to the Stoic brand of causal determinism.<sup>26</sup> Both the poet and his characters also exhibit a

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<sup>24</sup> E.g. 4.440 *fata obstant placidasque viri deus obstruit auris*, 4.651 *'dum fata deusque sinebat'*, 12.677 *'quo deus et quo dura vocat Fortuna sequamur'*.

<sup>25</sup> Braund (1997: 205): 'the divine apparatus of the poem can be seen as a manifestation in poetic terms of the Stoic Providence.'

<sup>26</sup> TLL *'fatum'*. Cf. especially Verg. *G.* 2.491 *inexorabile fatum*, where causal determinism must be the sense because of the proximity of *rerum... causas*; 8.334 *ineluctabile fatum* and Servius *ad loc.* (*secundum Stoicos locutus est*). I discuss both passages in chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*). The plural, on the other hand, doesn't seem as suitable for philosophical discourse – Cicero never uses it in the *De Fato*.

rather surprising and perhaps related interest in *causae*.<sup>27</sup> Virgil's initial request to the Muse constitutes a good example (1.8-11):

Musa, mihi **causas** memora, quo numine laeso  
 quidve dolens regina deum tot volvere casus  
 insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores  
 impulerit. tantaene animis caelestibus irae?

Muse, tell me the **causes**, because of the slighting of which divinity, or grieving what, did the queen of the gods drive a man notable for his piety to undergo so many misfortunes, and face so many troubles – are the angers in heavenly hearts so great?

Again, this represents a departure from Homer, who asks the more direct question τίς τ' ἄρ σφωε θεῶν ἔριδι ξυνέηκε μάχεσθαι; 'who then of the gods was it that brought these two together to contend?' (Hom. *Il.* 1.8, trans. Murray). In addition, characters in the *Aeneid* exhibit a belief in and dependence on divination similar to that of the Stoics. The future is portrayed as an object of knowledge (or ignorance);<sup>28</sup> prophecies and prophetic dreams are frequent and

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<sup>27</sup> Interest in *causae* clusters around a few events in particular. These notably include: the cause of Juno's anger (1.8, 1.25); the cause of Dido's death (4.170, 6.458, and 5.5 of the fire in Carthage caused by her pyre); and the causes of the war in Latium (6.93, 7.482, 7.553, 10.90, 11.361, 11.480, 12.567, 12.600). The extended discussion of causation in Cicero's *De Fato* and references to *causae* in the definitions of Stoic fate quoted above demonstrate the strong association between causes and Stoic fate. See the following chapter (*3. Causation and Moral Responsibility*).

<sup>28</sup> E.g. the *Parcae* forbid Helenus knowledge of the future at 3.379-80; Dido is *fati nescia* 1.299; *nescia mens hominum fati sortisque futurae* 10.501. Prophets therefore 'teach' fate: Anchises at 6.752-9 '*discere... docebo*'; Helenus at 3.379 '*expediam*', and 3.460 (re: the Sibyl) '*expediat*'.

taken seriously;<sup>29</sup> the gods send *monstra* and *signa* that guide human action;<sup>30</sup> and the stars are characterized as *conscia fati*, which is suggestive of astrology.<sup>31</sup>

The imagery of fate in the *Aeneid* has also been analysed for Stoic traits. For example, Virgil in some instances characterizes the relationship between his characters and fate using verbs of either following or dragging.<sup>32</sup> Edwards (1960) suggests that this may follow Stoic precedent, and for evidence draws on similar phrasing in passages such as Seneca's translation of Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus* (Sen. Ep. 107.11 *ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt*),<sup>33</sup> or Hippolytus' preservation of the following Stoic example (Hippol. *Haer.* 1.21 = L&S 62A, SVF 2.975):<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> The following characters give oral prophecies: Jupiter 1.257-96; Creusa's ghost 2.756-89; Phoebus Apollo 3.94-98; the harpy Celaeno 3.247-57; Helenus 3.374-462; the Sibyl 6.83-97; and Anchises' ghost 5.724-39, 6.755-886. Aeneas often experiences prophetic dreams: of Hector 2.270-297; of the *penates* 3.147-178; of his father 4.351-3, 5.724-39; of Mercury 4.556-570; and of the Tiber 8.26-65.

<sup>30</sup> The horse head Juno leaves at the site of Carthage 1.441-5; the *signa* encouraging Aeneas to leave Troy 2.679-704; the four war horses 3.535-547; the eating of the tables 3.255-7, 3.394-5, 7.107-9; the white sow 3.388-393, 8.42-5; the appearance of Aeneas' armour 8.520-40; the eagle and the swan 12.244-256.

<sup>31</sup> 4.519-20 (of Dido) *testatur moritura deos et conscia fati/sidera*; 9.429 (Nisus) '*caelum hoc et conscia sidera testor*'.

<sup>32</sup> E.g. 1.382 (Aeneas) '*matre dea monstrante viam data fata secutus*', 5.709 (Nautes) '*nate dea, quo fata trahunt retrahuntque sequamur*', 9.204 (Euryalus) '*magnanimum Aenean et fata extrema secutus*', 12.676-7 (Turnus) '*iam iam fata, soror, superant, absiste morari;/ quo deus et quo dura fata vocat Fortuna sequamur*'. I discuss the last instance in chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*).

<sup>33</sup> Seneca appears to add this fifth line to Cleanthes' tetrastich (= SVF 1.527), raising the question of authenticity. The most plausible response is that, even if this verse is not Cleanthes', it is drawn from an example of Chrysippus or Zeno, perhaps even the dog and cart image (below). Cf. Marcovich (1959). See also n. 18 in ch. 4.

<sup>34</sup> I also discuss this passage in chapter four (*Philosophy, Poetry and Rivers*) in connection with the oarsman simile in *Georgics* 1.

καὶ αὐτοὶ [ὁ Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος] δὲ τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα  
 διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος  
 ἐὰν ᾗ ἐξηρητημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἔπεσθαι, **καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ**  
**ἔπεται**, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης [οἷον τῆς  
 εἰμαρμένης]· **ἐὰν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἔπεσθαι, πάντως ἀναγκασθήσεται**·  
 τὸ αὐτὸ δήπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ  
 ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν.

They too [Zeno and Chrysippus] affirmed that everything is fated with the following model. When a dog is tied to a cart, **if it wants to follow, it is pulled and follows**, making its spontaneous act coincide with necessity, **but if it does not want to follow it will be compelled in any case**. So it is with men: even if they do not want to, they will be compelled in any case to follow what is destined. (trans. Long & Sedley)

Virgil also refers to the unrolling of fate/the fates several times.<sup>35</sup> Servius connects this with Stoicism (3.374-80; Serv. *ad Aen.* 3.376, Helenus speaking):

‘nate dea (nam te maioribus ire per altum  
 auspiciis manifesta fides; **sic fata deum rex**                      375  
**sortitur volvitque vices, is vertitur ordo**),  
 pauca tibi e multis, quo tutior hospita lustres  
 aequora et Ausonio possis considerare portu,  
 expediam dictis; prohibent nam cetera Parcae  
 scire Helenum farique vetat Saturnia Iuno.’                      380

<sup>35</sup> 1.22 *sic volvere Parcas*; 1.262 (Jupiter) ‘*volvens fatorum arcana*’; 3.374-6 (above); 6.449 (of Caeneus) *rursus et in veterem fato revoluta figuram*; and perhaps also 10.60-2 (Venus) ‘*...Xanthum et Simoenta/ redde, oro, miseris iterumque revolvere casus/ da, pater, Iliacos Teucris*.’

VOLVITQUE VICES definitio fati secundum Tullium, qui ait ‘fatum est  
conexio rerum per aeternitatem se invicem tenens, quae **suo ordine** et  
lege variatur ita tamen, ut ipsa varietas habeat aeternitatem.’

‘Son of the goddess (for there is clear proof that you are travelling across the deep under greater auspices; **thus the king of the gods allots the fates, and unfurls them in succession, thus the order revolves**), I will explain a few things (out of many) to you in words so that you may more safely traverse foreign seas and can come to rest in an Ausonian port: for the *Parcae* forbid Helenus to know the rest, and Saturnian Juno bars me from saying it.’

‘unfurls them in succession’: The definition of fate follows Cicero, who says ‘fate is the interconnection of the universe which mutually holds itself together for eternity, which is in a process of change **according to its own order** and regulation in such a way that the process of change takes up all of time.’

Servius’ quotation from Cicero (*secundum Tullium*) is probably a fragment from a lost section of the *De Fato*, and the description of *fatum* as *conexio rerum* clearly identifies this as a definition of the Stoic brand of causal determinism. His comment is directed at *volvitur vices*, suggesting that it is the image of fate unrolling that has prompted him to make the link (Cic. *Div.* 1.127 = SVF 2.944):<sup>36</sup>

non enim illa, quae futura sunt, subito existunt, sed **est quasi rudentis**

**explicatio**: sic traductio temporis nihil novi efficientis et primum quidque replicantis.

‘Things which are to be do not suddenly spring into existence, but **the evolution of time is like the unwinding of a cable**: it creates nothing new and only unfolds each event in its order.’ (trans. Falconer)

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<sup>36</sup> See also Diogenianus (in Eus. *Praep. Ev.* 6.8.9). Bobzien (1998b: 54) writes that this image aids the conceptualization of ‘the fact that everything has been predetermined from eternity, and nothing is newly created when it happens’.

It is also notable that both Helenus' words and Cicero's definition reference the characteristic *ordo* of Stoic fate.

However, as may already be clear, many of these Stoic aspects of fate in the poem can equally well be read from different perspectives. For example, Virgil's interest in *causae* need not exclusively follow Stoic philosophy: it may also be influenced by Lucretius, historiography, aetiological poetry and rhetoric.<sup>37</sup> Divination had been integral to Roman religion long before the Romans encountered Stoic philosophy, and, as noted above, the suggestion that the events of the epic are (at least to some degree) providently determined by the will of Jupiter/J Zeus follows Homer as well as the Stoics.<sup>38</sup> *volvere* may also imagine the fates as a text written on a book scroll, and *ordo* can accordingly designate the desirable structure and flow of a literary narrative – ideas that I will explore in more detail below.

Moreover, many aspects of fate in the *Aeneid* are incompatible with Stoic causal determinism. This is most clearly indicated by passages in which Virgil suggests that fate can be avoided, and that its power does not extend over everything in the universe. Dido's suicide for example, is *nec fato* (4.696),<sup>39</sup> and at the close of the epic, Juno asks Jupiter for some concessions '*nulla fati quod lege tenetur*' (12.819).<sup>40</sup> Such comments are irreconcilable with the universality of the

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<sup>37</sup> See 3. *Causation and Moral Responsibility*.

<sup>38</sup> In fact, Chrysippus apparently praised Homer for portraying the events of the *Iliad* as in accordance with the providence of Zeus (Plut. *Mor.* 1056b-c = L&S 55R = SVF 2.997).

<sup>39</sup> I offer an explanation for this below (2. ii *Determinism and literary precedent*).

<sup>40</sup> Wilson's interpretation of this passage (1979: 265-6) accords with my argument below (2. iii. *Fate as 'text'*) that Virgil portrays fate as a malleable literary artefact: 'Juno

concept of fate attributed to the Stoics in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, by virtue of which every detail of every event is predetermined. Similarly jarring is the idea that, even if it cannot be avoided, fate can be postponed.<sup>41</sup> Juno spitefully points out as much before enlisting the destructive help of Allecto in book seven (7.313-6):

‘non dabitur regnis, esto, prohibere Latinis,  
 atque immota manet fatis Lavinia coniunx:  
**at trahere atque moras tantis licet addere rebus,**  
 at licet amborum populos excindere regum.’

‘It will not be granted that I keep him away from the Latin kingdoms, and that Lavinia should be his wife remains fixed by the fates. **But it is permitted to drag things out and add delays to these great events**, and it is permitted to exterminate the peoples of both kings.’

The subsequent ruinous events of the second half of the epic are thereby cast as delays to fate – a notion inconceivable within a system of universal causal determinism. Her harrowing claim that she is free to kill Trojans and Latins moreover suggests that fate is only interested in important people like kings. Virgil must be relying on a looser conception of fate in these passages, perhaps closer to that found in tragedy, whereby only certain events are set in stone, and there is some freedom as to when and how these fated events come about.

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is engaged... in the constructive interpretation of history’. Cf. also Evander’s words at Pallas’ funeral (11.160 ‘*contra ego vivendo vici mea fata, superstes/ restarem ut genitor*’). However, the strange formulation *libera... fati* to describe the Etruscans (10.154-5) does not mean that they are not subject to fate but rather than they have finally fulfilled fate’s requirements. See Harrison (1991: *ad loc.*).

<sup>41</sup> Cf. Jupiter’s comment to Juno at 10.624-5: ‘*tolle fuga Turnum atque instantibus eripe fatis:/ hactenus indulsisse vacat.*’

Vulcan likewise challenges the repeated assertion elsewhere in the *Aeneid* that the fall of Troy was fated by claiming that it could have been delayed by another ten years.<sup>42</sup> Venus, his wife, wants him to make armour for her (not his) son Aeneas. She grounds her emotional plea on the fact that, though he made arms for Achilles and Memnon to fight in the Trojan war, he never helped the Trojans or her beloved son. He takes the bait (8.395-9):

‘quid causas petis ex alto? fiducia cessit  
quo tibi, diva, mei? similis si cura fuisset,  
tum quoque fas nobis Teucros armare fuisset;  
nec pater omnipotens Troiam nec fata vetabant  
stare decemque alios Priamum superesse per annos.’

‘Why are you digging so deep for a justification? Where has your faith in me gone, goddess? If you had been as worried as this, I could have also made arms for the Trojans back then: neither the all-powerful father nor the fates forbade that Troy should stand and Priam survive for ten more years.’

These sorts of claims and demonstrations by other gods that they can delay fate are incompatible with the universal causal determinism attributed to the Stoics in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC. They also undermine Jupiter’s control, complicating any easy assimilation of him with the Stoic universal *deus*.

Furthermore, the sense of providential teleology behind fate in the *Aeneid* is different from that in Stoic philosophy. For the Stoics, fate is also what is best for the universe. But the *Aeneid* shows that whilst *fatum/a* is positive for the

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<sup>42</sup> Vulcan’s divine boast here certainly undercuts Aeneas’ frequent claims (e.g. 2.54-6, 246-7, 257, 294) that the fall of Troy was fated.

Romans, whose city and empire it supports, it is negative for others, who must give way to Roman power. Though fate in the *Aeneid* has a universal reach, the τέλος to which it is directed privileges the Romans (Bailey 1935: 219):<sup>43</sup>

‘by far the most frequent occurrence of the idea [of fate] is in reference to the fatal settlement in Italy of Aeneas and the Trojan fugitives - that is the purpose to which fate is directing the whole course of events in the story.’

One could argue, with the support of the poem, that this τέλος is both Roman and universal: the foundation of Rome and the eventual spread of her *imperium* may be best for everyone, not just the Romans.<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, the sympathetic portrayal of those precluded from fate in the course of the epic (e.g. Dido and Turnus), and the explicit admission that the dominion of Romans involves fear and subjugation for other peoples at least challenges this view.<sup>45</sup> The perhaps uncomfortably Roman focus of the teleology of fate in the *Aeneid* is also revealed by statements to the effect that there are different fates for different people,<sup>46</sup> and often ‘good’ fate for the Trojans/future Romans entails ‘bad’ fate for others.

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<sup>43</sup> See also Hejduk (2009: 281).

<sup>44</sup> i.e. because it would guarantee world peace. See e.g. 1.291-6, 6.851-3.

<sup>45</sup> E.g. 1.284-5 ‘...domus Assaraci Phthiam clarasque Mycenae/ **servitio** premet ac **victis dominabitur** Argis’; 6.792-800 ‘Augustus Caesar/... super et Garamantas et Indos/ proferet imperium.../ huius in adventum iam nunc et Caspia regna/ responsis **horrent** divum et Maeotia tellus,/ et septemgemini **turbant trepida** ostia Nili’; 8.722-728 *incedunt victae longo ordine gentes...*

<sup>46</sup> *fata* often have a possessive adjective/genitive/dative, especially in character text (1.257-8, 2.506, 4.20-1, 6.511, 6.759, 7.234, 10.438 (authorial voice), 10.471-2, 11.160, 12.395). Two different *fata* can be set in opposition: ‘*fata contraria fata rependens*’ 1.239, ‘*nos alia ex aliis in fata vocamur*’ 3.494, 7.293 and 9.133-8 quoted above, *Iuppiter ipse duas aequato examine lances/ sustinet et fata imponit diversa duorum,/ quem damnet labor et quo vergat pondere letum* 12.725-7.

As might be expected, this is most clearly evidenced in the words of the epic's great antagonists, Juno and Turnus (Juno 7.293-4, Turnus 9.133-8):<sup>47</sup>

'heu stirpem invisam **et fatis contraria nostris**

**fata Phrygum!**'

'Alas for that hated stock **and the fates of the Phrygians, set against those of our people!**'

... 'nil me fatalia terrent,

si qua Phryges prae se iactant, responsa deorum;

sat fatis Venerique datum, tetigere quod arva 135

fertilis Ausoniae Troes. **sunt et mea contra**

**fata mihi**, ferro sceleratam excindere gentem

coniuge praerepta...'

'... the fate-revealing oracles of the gods don't scare me at all, even if the Phrygians make a great show of them. Enough has been conceded to the fates and Venus, in that the Trojans have reached the fields of fertile Ausonia. **I also have my own fates that oppose theirs** – to annihilate their criminal race with the sword in recompense for my stolen wife.'

Finally, and as I suggested above with reference to divination, there is an important religious strand running through the characterization of fate in the *Aeneid* which a too-blinkered focus on Stoicism runs the risk of overlooking. For example, Aeneas offers the Sibyl an important position in Roman religion, along

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<sup>47</sup> Cf. Hardie (1994 *ad.* 9.136-7): 'T. almost redefines fate as 'that which is morally fitting', or even as 'that which lies in the strength of my weapons'; the implied rejection of a supernatural sanction brings him close to Mezentius, the *contemptor divum...* (10.773-4).'

with a central temple and attendants, in exchange for her prophecy and guidance through the Underworld (6.69-74, Aeneas speaking):

‘tum Phoebo et Triviae solido de marmore templum  
instituum festosque dies de nomine Phoebi.  
te quoque magna manent regnis penetralia nostris:  
hic ego namque tuas sortis arcanaque fata  
dicta meae genti ponam, lectosque sacrabo,  
alma, viros.’

‘Then I will set up a temple of solid marble to Phoebus and Diana, and festivals in the name of Phoebus. Great things also await you at the heart of our kingdoms – for here I will also place your lots and the secret fates you have spoken for my people, and I will consecrate chosen men to you, kindly one.’

Though divination was important to the Stoics, Virgil’s depiction of the Sibyl must also be understood from the perspective of her integration into Roman politics and religion. Moreover, the Sibyl was a priestess of Apollo, who, as well as Jupiter, is closely associated with fate throughout the poem.<sup>48</sup> Likewise, I will explore in chapter five (E/fortuna, religion and philosophy) the importance of considering that *Fortuna* was a popular and long-standing goddess, as well as a word used by Latin philosophers as a translation for τύχη. Though there is less evidence for their integration into Roman culture, the same goes for the *Parcae*. Their role in the poem, which is predominantly negative, and involved with

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<sup>48</sup> Though note that, according to Celaeno, Jupiter is the source of Apollo’s prophetic information (3.251-2): ‘*quae Phoebo pater omnipotens, mihi Phoebus Apollo/ praedixit, vobis Furiarum ego maxima pando.*’

restrictions and limitations, is contextualized in particular by their literary heritage as personifications and goddesses of death.<sup>49</sup>

In this preliminary discussion, I hope to have highlighted the complexity and multivalence of fate in the *Aeneid*. Fate is unusually prominent in this poem. This fact in itself encourages a Stoic reading of fate, which is further supported by the use of the philosophical terms *fatum* and *ordo*, interest in *causae*, the close relationship between Jupiter and fate, the importance of divination, and the imagery of unrolling, dragging and following. However, the characterization of fate in the *Aeneid* is not exhausted by the strict Stoic conception of fate as providential, teleological and universal causal determinism. According to Virgil, fate can be changed and delayed, divination is fallible,<sup>50</sup> and it is only Roman fate that has been providently geared towards a positive τέλος: other people/s are sidelined or excluded.<sup>51</sup> In addition, we must take into account the religious and cultural significance of the Sibyl, the goddess *Fortuna* and the *Parcae*.

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<sup>49</sup> In Latin literature, the *Parcae* appear in *Eclogue* 4 and, before Virgil, only in Catullus (64.305-22, 68.85), Tibullus (1.7.1) and very briefly in Cicero (*Nat. D.* 3.44) and Varro (*Ling.* 6.52). They are depicted as three goddesses who spin threads that determine the fates, and in particular the length of individual human lives (see e.g. Clausen (1994 *ad* Verg. *Ecl.* 4.46-7)), seeming to be the Roman equivalent of the Greek Μοῖραι (see e.g. Hes. *Theog.* 904-6). There is only one reference to the threads of the *Parcae* in the *Aeneid* (10.814-5, Aeneas speaking), and, unlike in *Eclogue* 4, they are predominantly cast as negative influences associated with the imposition of limitations and especially death. I will argue in chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*) that Virgil distracts the reader from the non-teleological and negative implications of fate by associating these with figures and ideas from Roman religion, such as *F/fortuna*. His use of *Parcae* in the *Aeneid* might be viewed as part of the same technique.

<sup>50</sup> E.g. 3.684 *contra iussa monent Heleni*, 3.712-3 (above), 6.190-3 and Feeney (1991: 184 *ad loc.*).

<sup>51</sup> E.g. Dido/Elis(s)a, as discussed above (*1. True Names and False Names*).

But perhaps the most persistent characterization of fate that runs alongside Stoicism is its alignment with literature and narrative. It is to this that I shall turn for the remainder of the chapter, arguing that Virgil creates a productive tension between Stoic and literary features of fate in the poem that provides a platform for philosophical exploration of the influence and fixity of fate. My argument has two main parts: 2. ii. *Determinism and literary precedent*, and 2. iii. *Fate as 'text'*. I first show that fate's guidance in the poem is aligned with the influence of previous literature over its content, before demonstrating the converse, i.e. that departure from fate constitutes breaking with a literary model/s. The comparison between fate and literature therefore provides a basis for an exploration of the limitations imposed by determinism. I then analyse the presentation of the Sibyl, Jupiter and the narrator-poet of the *Aeneid* to show that prophets and poets are characterized in similar ways in the poem. This allows Virgil to compare the truth-status of prophecy and the future vs. poetry and the past, and to explore the idea that fate may in fact be as malleable as a literary artefact.

#### 2. ii. *Determinism and literary precedent*

Virgil encourages his reader to associate the guidance offered to characters in his poem by prophecies with the guidance he is offered in his composition of the *Aeneid* by literary precedent. I will demonstrate this by giving two examples of cases in which the content of a prophecy in the *Aeneid* is comprised of the content of a prophecy in previous epic poetry. Fate supplies Virgil's characters

with both limitations and direction in a manner similar to the poet's own relationship with Ennius and Homer.

Virgil's opening description of Juno and the fate of Carthage foregrounds the idea that what is fated in Virgil's epic coincides to a large degree with what other epic poets have written about his subject (1.12-22):<sup>52</sup>

urbs antiqua fuit (Tyrii tenuere coloni)  
 Karthago, Italiam contra Tiberinaque longe  
 ostia, dives opum studiisque asperrima belli,  
 quam Iuno **fertur** terris magis omnibus unam      15  
 posthabita coluisse Samo. hic illius arma,  
 hic currus fuit; hoc regnum dea gentibus esse,  
**si qua fata sinant**, iam tum tenditque fovetque.  
 progeniem sed enim Troiano a sanguine duci  
**audierat** Tyrias olim quae verteret arces;      20  
 hinc populum late regem belloque superbum  
 venturum excidio Libyae; **sic volvere Parcae.**

There was an ancient city (Tyrian colonists lived there), Carthage, facing Italy and, far off, the mouth of the Tiber, rich in resources and most ferocious in its zeal for war. Juno **is said** to have cherished this above all other lands – she even held Samos in lower esteem. Here were her arms, here her chariot: the goddess even then strove for and favoured this as the kingdom for her peoples, **if in any way the fates would allow it**. But **she had heard that**, at one time, a descendant drawn from Trojan blood would overthrow the Tyrian citadels, and that a people from this lineage would rule far and wide, proud in war, and come to destroy Libya – the fates twisted thus.

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<sup>52</sup> Note the disjunction, discussed above (1. *True Names and False Names*), between the description *urbs antiqua* and the name 'Karthago', which means 'New Town' in Punic.

Before mentioning the fated destruction of Carthage, Virgil describes Juno's affection for the city. *fertur* acts as a signpost; a 'reflexive annotation', strongly suggesting that Virgil is drawing on another literary source for his information.<sup>53</sup> He then tells us that Juno wants Carthage to be the kingdom for her peoples *si qua fata sinant*. The reason why she is concerned that *fata* may restrict the future success of Carthage is that she had heard a prophecy that one day someone descended from the Trojans will destroy her city. *audierat* constitutes another 'reflexive annotation', creating a sort of mise en abyme: Virgil is relying on previous literature for his account of Juno, whilst Juno, his character, is also relying on previous literature for her understanding of fate.

Feeney (1984) makes a convincing case that the previous literature to which both author and character refer is Ennius' *Annales*, which treated the Punic wars in books 7-9. This is where Virgil learned about Juno's fondness for Carthage: 'Ennius' *Annales* will have shown her ranged against the Romans on the side of Carthage' (Feeney 1984: 179). *audierat* may additionally reference a prophecy Jupiter makes about the Roman destruction of Carthage in the *Annales* (Serv. *ad Aen.* 1.20):

et perite 'audierat'; in Ennio enim inducitur Iuppiter promittens Romanis  
excidium Carthaginis.

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<sup>53</sup> Hinds (1995: 41-2, see also 1998 *passim*, esp. 1-16) argues that the style mimics learned scholarly citation, probably in commentaries. Other markers include *fama est*, *dicitur*, *perhibent* etc. The opening of Catullus 64 is probably the most famous example of this sort of reflexive annotation: see especially Thomas (1982).



The instruction ‘*antiquam exquirite matrem*’ precedes a very strong Homeric allusion. During *Iliad* 20, Aeneas, following Apollo’s urging, meets Achilles in battle. Poseidon, watching from the walls of Troy along with the other gods, grows afraid on Aeneas’ account, and speaks in favour of rescuing him (Hom. *Il.* 20.293-308):

‘ὦ πόποι ἦ μοι ἄχος μεγαλήτορος Αἰνείαιο,  
 ὃς τάχα Πηλεΐωνι δαμείς Ἀϊδος δὲ κάτεισι  
**πειθόμενος μύθοισιν Ἀπόλλωνος ἐκάτοιο** 295  
**νήπιος,** οὐδέ τί οἱ χραισμήσει λυγρὸν ὄλεθρον.  
 ἀλλὰ τί ἦ νῦν οὗτος ἀναίτιος ἄλγεα πάσχει  
 μὰ ψ ἔνεκ’ ἄλλοτρίων ἀχέων, κεχαρισμένα δ’ αἰεὶ  
 δῶρα θεοῖσι δίδωσι τοὶ οὐρανὸν εὐρὺν ἔχουσιν;  
 ἀλλ’ ἄγεθ’ ἡμεῖς πέρ μιν ὑπὲκ θανάτου ἀγάγωμεν, 300  
 μή πως καὶ Κρονίδης κεχολώσεται, αἴ κεν Ἀχιλλεὺς  
 τόνδε κατακτείνῃ· **μόριμον δέ οἱ ἔστ’ ἀλέασθαι,**  
 ὄφρα μὴ ἄσπερμος γενεὴ καὶ ἄφαντος ὄληται  
 Δαρδάνου, δὲ Κρονίδης περὶ πάντων φίλατο παίδων  
 οἳ ἔθεν ἐξεγένοντο γυναικῶν τε θνητῶν. 305  
 ἦδη γὰρ Πριάμου γενεὴν ἔχθηρε Κρονίων·  
**νῦν δὲ δὴ Αἰνείαιο βίῃ Τρώεσσιν ἀνάξει**  
**καὶ παίδων παῖδες, τοί κεν μετόπισθε γένωνται.’**

‘Well, now! I have grief for greathearted Aeneas, who soon will go down to the house of Hades, vanquished by the son of Peleus, **since he listened to the words of Apollo who strikes from afar - fool that he was!** Nor will the god in any way ward from him woeful

destruction. But why should he, a guiltless man, suffer woes vainly because of sorrows that are not his own, though he always gives acceptable gifts to the gods who hold broad heaven? But come, let us lead him out from death, lest the son of Cronos be angry in some way if Achilles slays him; **for it is fated for him to escape** so that the race of Dardanus may not perish without seed and be seen no more - Dardanus whom the son of Cronos loved above all the children born to him from mortal women. For now has the son of Cronos come to hate the race of Priam; **and now surely will the mighty Aeneas be king among the Trojans, and his sons' sons who will be born in days to come.**' (trans. Murray)

The close of Poseidon's speech in the *Iliad*, which describes Aeneas' fate (μόριμον 302), provides the model for the close of Apollo's prophecy in the *Aeneid*. Aeneas is in the same position in the line as Αἰνείας, *Dardanidae* as Δαρδάνου, *dominabitur* picks up ἀνάξει, and line 98 is almost an exact translation of *Iliad* 20.308. The only significant change Virgil makes is to broaden the scope of the prophecy: Homer's Poseidon claims that Aeneas will rule the Trojans, Virgil's Apollo that Aeneas' descendants will rule the world. Therefore, in a manner comparable to the case of Juno discussed above, Apollo has inherited this prophecy from Poseidon in Homer, and *fata* in the *Aeneid* are dictated by previous literature. That prophecy and poetry should be combined in the figure of Apollo is fitting given his divine association with both. Indeed, both contexts underscore that what Apollo says, in prophecy and otherwise, can be misleading. In the *Iliad*, Poseidon claims that Aeneas is foolish to have been persuaded by Apollo's words, and in the *Aeneid*, the Trojans famously misinterpret the ambiguous instruction '*antiquam exquirite matrem*', and make for Crete rather than Italy.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> On the role of misleading homonyms in this decision, see above (1. *True and False Names*).

I will now argue that this connection between fate and literary precedent offers an explanation for a persistent interpretative difficulty in the *Aeneid*: Dido's death *nec fato* (4.696). The following passage is the lynchpin between Dido's increasing certainty that *fata* are against her, and her final decision to die (4.464-73). In the lead up to this moment, her sister Anna has tried to speak to Aeneas, but *fata obstant placidasque viri deus obstruit auris* (4.440).<sup>56</sup> Dido herself has been described as *fatis exterrita* (4.450), witnesses terrible omens in sacrifice (4.454-5),<sup>57</sup> and hears voices from her shrine to Sychaeus (4.460-1).

multaque praeterea **vatum** praedicta **priorum**

terribili monitu horrificant. agit ipse furentem 465

in somnis ferus Aeneas, semperque relinqui

sola sibi, semper longam incommitata videtur

ire viam et Tyrios deserta quaerere terra,

**Eumenidum** veluti demens videt agmina Pentheus

et solem geminum et duplices se ostendere Thebas, 470

aut Agamemnonius scaenis agitatus Orestes

armatam facibus matrem et serpentibus atris

cum fugit ultricesque sedent in limine **Dirae.**

Besides these, many predictions **of earlier prophets** made her shudder with their terrible warnings. Aeneas himself drove her frenzied in her dreams, and she always seemed to be left alone, always to travel a long road with no companions, and to search for the Tyrians in a deserted land. Just as Pentheus, out of his mind, sees the columns of the **Eumenides** and the appearance of a twinned sun and two cities of Thebes, or like

<sup>56</sup> This is one of the instances in which Virgil refers to an abstract singular *deus* akin to the Stoic world-god – see above n. 24.

<sup>57</sup> Note the similarity of some of these omens to those that appear at Caesar's death (Verg. *G.* 1.464-488). I will discuss the connection between Dido and Caesar in the following chapter.

Orestes, son of Agamemnon, pursued on stage, when he sees his mother armed with brands and black snakes and the avenging **Furies** sit on the threshold.

To express Dido's helpless and frenzied state of mind at the point exactly before she decides on suicide, Virgil describes her nightmares: first directly (*agit... terra* 4.465-8), and then with a remarkable simile (4.469-73). In the simile, Virgil likens Dido's sense of confusion and abandonment in her dreams to the feelings of the dramatic characters Pentheus and Orestes when they are on stage (*scaenis* 4.471). The comparison is rich and multivalent. Theatre is a good analogy for a dream because in both cases the viewer is experiencing or watching something (the content of a dream; a play) which is in fact not real.<sup>58</sup> However, Virgil is not comparing Dido to the spectator in a theatre: he is comparing her to an actor on stage. What she sees and experiences in her dream-state is likened to Pentheus' and Orestes' visions (of the Furies, twin suns, and two cities of Thebes; and a vengeful, monstrous version of his mother Clytemnestra, respectively) in the course of a play.<sup>59</sup>

The dramatic context is pointed, and may at first seem unnecessary. If Pentheus and Orestes' visions in the simile illustrate Dido's dreams in the main narrative, what does the fact that they are on stage, and in popular tragedies illustrate? For one, it casts the reader of Dido's story in the *Aeneid* as a spectator of a familiar tragic plot. This resonates with Virgil's characterization of the Dido and Aeneas

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<sup>58</sup> For further philosophical discussion of dreams and visions in the *Aeneid* see chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception and materialism*).

<sup>59</sup> This strongly suggests Dido is delusional: Orestes seeing the Furies was used by ancient philosophers as a stock example of hallucination. E.g. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.169-71, 244-5, 249; 8.63, 67. See also below n. 60, and chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception and materialism*).

episode as a tragedy more generally: in book one, the *scaena* is set, and Venus plays the role of a divinity giving introductory details; in book four, Anna acts as the tragic confidante, and Dido is described as a frenzied bacchant.<sup>60</sup> What is more, Virgil dramatizes the reading process by framing the simile with *Eumenidum* and *Dirae*, so that the reader is in some sense looking at the stage framed by Furies described in the passage (*ultricesque sedent in limine Dirae* 4.473).<sup>61</sup> We are thereby both distanced from Dido's demise and made complicit, as experienced theatre-goers familiar with tragedies, in the knowledge of its necessity.

But I would additionally argue that likening Dido at this point to a character that has been played out again and again (one meaning of *agitatus*) on Roman and Greek stages is Virgil's way of expressing the restrictions imposed on her by fate. Her life is determined by the tragic and unfortunate 'role' that she has been given.<sup>62</sup> The ambiguity of *vatum... priorum* (4.464) supports this reading: *vates*

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<sup>60</sup> 1.164-5 *tum silvis scaena coruscis/ desuper*; 1.314ff. Venus wears tragic buskins (*coturno* 1.337) and introduces Dido, Carthage and the Carthaginians; 4.6-55 Anna as confidante (and Barce the nurse 4.632-4); 4.300-3 Dido as bacchant. See especially Harrison (1989).

<sup>61</sup> It is debated whether or not the Furies would have been visible on stage at the end of Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*. Collard (2002: xlvii) think they weren't, but also records opposing arguments: 'in *Libation Bearers*, Orestes in his hallucination is faced with the terrifying Furies, invisible to the spectators (*Ibid.* 1048); their full horror is shown soon afterwards, at the start of the *Eumenides*.'

<sup>62</sup> A comparison might be drawn with the necessity imposed by the story-line of Shakespeare's *Hamlet* on the characters in Tom Stoppard's *Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead* (1968, Act 3):

ROS: They had it in for us, didn't they? Right from the beginning. Who'd have thought that we were so important?

GUIL: But why? Was it all for this? Who are we that so much should converge on our little deaths? (in anguish to the PLAYER) Who are we?

PLAYER: You are Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. That's enough.

can mean both prophet, priest and poet.<sup>63</sup> Dido has accordingly been warned of the necessity of Aeneas' departure and the ill-fatedness of their relationship both by the warnings of earlier prophets, and, on a metaliterary reading, previous literature. For the reader of book four has been privy via intertext to the necessity of her eventual abandonment: she has been strongly associated with Medea and Ariadne, both of whom were deserted by their perfidious foreign lovers, as she will imminently be by Aeneas.<sup>64</sup> Earlier poetry, in a manner similar to prophecy, foretold what would happen to her; the determinism of fate is expressed through the restrictions and inevitability imposed by literary precedent.

This analogy between fate and literary precedent helps to explain why Virgil describes Dido's death as *nec fato* (4.696-7):<sup>65</sup>

...quia **nec fato** merita nec morte peribat,

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Cf. also Williams (1993: 141), in discussion of Aeschylus' *Libation Bearers*: 'the idea of supernatural necessity involves something else, an idea that the structure of things is purposive, that it is, so to speak, playing against you.'

<sup>63</sup> I will explore Virgil's use of *vates* in more detail below (2. iii. *Fate as 'text'*).

<sup>64</sup> The general story-line is similar: exotic, royal women prioritizing love for a foreign hero over patriotism and family. Dido calls Aeneas '*perfide*' (4.305), following Catullus' Ariadne (Catull. 64.132-3). She also resorts to magic (4.493), like Medea. Dido's exclamation at 4.657-8 ('*felix, heu, nimium felix...!*') recalls both characters (Catull. 64.171-2, Enn. *Med.* 1-2, Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.32-3, Eur. *Med.* 1-2). I discuss further implications of these connections in chapter three (*Causation and Moral Responsibility*).

<sup>65</sup> Aulus Gellius (Gell. *N. A.* 13.1.1-8) connects this passage with Cic. *Phil.* 1.10, which he in turn links to Dem. *De cor.* 205. In both Cicero and Demosthenes, death that doesn't accord with fate means a violent death that anticipates one's natural lifespan. Cicero fears this for himself in the political climate of 44/3 BC, and Demosthenes describes it as being the lot of the man dedicated to his πατρίς. In both cases, therefore, this sort of death is closely tied up with allegiance to one's state, which adds a further perspective to Dido's suicide.

sed misera ante diem subitoque accensa furore.

Because she died **neither by fate**, nor by a death she deserved, but wretched, before her time, and inflamed by sudden madness.

As noted above, the implication that Dido's death was not fated is incompatible with the theory of universal causal determinism ascribed to the Stoics in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, and jars with the prominent and comprehensive role of fate in book four and the *Aeneid* as a whole.<sup>66</sup> The suggestion is that, though Aeneas' departure was fated, Dido's suicide was not – she wrested her life from its fated course by ending it prematurely.

Interestingly, breaking with fate is also breaking with literary precedent. For according to mythological and literary tradition, neither Ariadne nor Medea kill themselves, or even die. Indeed, far from dying, they are both rescued by gods: Ariadne by Bacchus, who marries her and makes her crown an immortal constellation; Medea by her grandfather Helios.<sup>67</sup> There is also divine intervention at the close of Dido's story - Juno pities Dido, and sends Iris to cut off a lock of her hair as an offering to Proserpina (4.693-5).<sup>68</sup> But this *deus ex machina* moment, which enables the departure of Dido's soul from her body and legitimizes her passage to the Underworld, forms a stark and tragic contrast with the rescue and immortalization of two of her most important literary models.

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<sup>66</sup> Virgil's memorable and surprising move here may even have influenced later Stoicism: Alexander of Aphrodisias, writing in the 2<sup>nd</sup>/3<sup>rd</sup> c. AD, claims that not all Stoics were bound to universal causal determinism, and that some allowed for events *παρὰ μοῖραν, ὥς οἱ ποιηταὶ φασιν*, καὶ παρὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην (*De Fato*, 166).

<sup>67</sup> In Euripides' version (Eur. *Med.* 1317-22). The scholia at *Med.* 1320 say that the chariot in which Helios rescues Medea was drawn by dragons, which suggests that this was also the ending of the myth in other authors. See Gantz (1993: 371).

<sup>68</sup> I analyse this episode in more detail in connection with Catullus 66 and Callimachus' 'The Lock of Berenice' in the following chapter (*Causation and Moral Responsibility*).

When Dido finally realises fate is against her, as we saw above, her feeling of isolation and powerlessness is expressed through a comparison with famously deluded tragic characters (Pentheus and Orestes) playing a fixed and well-known part before a detached audience. Her departure from fate, on the other hand, and expression of control over her own destiny is mirrored metapoetically by Virgil's departure from his literary models. The comparison between fate and literature therefore provides a basis for an exploration of the limitations imposed by determinism. For Virgil, unlike for the Stoics, these are not absolute – even if Dido's self-determination is restricted to the negative act of suicide.<sup>69</sup>

Nisus and Euryalus' night mission in book nine constitutes another example of the overlap between the demonstration of autonomy on the part of Virgil's characters, and a deviation from literary precedent on the part of Virgil himself. The episode is modelled on the quest of Odysseus and Diomedes in book ten of the *Iliad*, sometimes called the 'Doloneia' after the Trojan spy Dolon whom they kill. The context of both is the same: in book nine of the *Aeneid*, the Trojan camp on the shore of Latium has been heavily attacked by Turnus' forces, just as the Greek camp on the shore of Troy had been heavily attacked by Hector's forces in *Iliad* 8. In both instances, two men offer to undertake a dangerous nocturnal mission in order to help the dire situation: Odysseus and Diomedes by gleaning information about the enemy plans, Nisus and Euryalus by bringing back the Trojan leader Aeneas.

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<sup>69</sup> Though suicide was not necessarily condemned in the ancient world (e.g. Cato the younger was even praised for his suicide - see Cic. *Tusc.* 1.71-5, *Off.* 1.112), Virgil's description of suicides in the Underworld (6.434-7) suggest that he considered suicide a negative act: the souls of suicides are described as *maesti*, and Virgil claims that they would rather live and endure any difficulties than be where they are now.

Virgil gives further reminders of the Homeric precedent throughout the episode, for example in his description of how Nisus and Euryalus are armed by their fellow Trojans,<sup>70</sup> or of the gifts that Ascanius pledges to the pair should they successfully bring back Aeneas. Though Diomedes and Odysseus are neither offered nor seek compensation from their leaders through material reward, the gifts that Ascanius promises Nisus and Euryalus are decidedly Homeric in that they recall both the offerings made by the embassy to Achilles in book nine, and the Trojan spy Dolon's request to Hector that, if he succeeds, he should be awarded Achilles' horses and chariot (Hom. *Il.* 10.319-27) – Ascanius likewise prospectively offers Nisus and Euryalus Turnus' horse and arms (9.269-71). The blending of Homeric episodes and characters creates some confusion: are Nisus and Euryalus like the Greeks Diomedes and Odysseus, or the Trojan spy Dolon? The presentation of differing Trojan and Greek readings in turn reflects another important influence on this episode, the Attic tragedy *Rhesus*, in which the largely Greek-focalized events of *Iliad* 10 are retold from a Trojan perspective.<sup>71</sup>

However, there are also key differences between Virgil's night time raid and Homer's. For one, Euryalus' youth is stressed,<sup>72</sup> and he and Nisus are lovers,<sup>73</sup> who passionately offer to get a message to Aeneas before it is requested of them by their leaders. Diomedes and Odysseus, on the other hand, are neither young

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<sup>70</sup> 9.303-8, Hom. *Il.* 10.254-71.

<sup>71</sup> Though this play was historically attributed to Euripides, scholars now mostly agree that this was mistaken. See e.g. Fries (2014) for a presentation of the argument. Hardie (1994) marks the influence of the *Rhesus* at 9.242-3, 316-7, 355-6, and 376-7.

<sup>72</sup> E.g. 9.181, 212, 275-7.

<sup>73</sup> 5.294-6 *amore pio*, 334 *amorum*; 9.182 *his amor unus erat* and Hardie (1994 *ad loc*): 'probably 'common love [for each other]', rather than 'shared passion [for war]'.

nor in love, and only volunteer to complete a pre-conceived mission after they have been asked. Indeed, the latter, more mature warriors complete their aim of finding out information about the Trojan encampment before they begin killing and plundering, whereas Nisus and Euryalus get carried away by slaughter and booty before they are anywhere near Pallanteum and Aeneas. But the most important divergences are firstly the complete absence of divine involvement in Nisus and Euryalus' actions in comparison to the prominent role of Athena in the *Iliad*,<sup>74</sup> and secondly the fact that, though Diomedes and Odysseus triumphantly return to the camp with both intelligence and spoils, Nisus and Euryalus are violently and tragically killed. I think that these two aspects of Nisus and Euryalus' stories are related. The absence of divine involvement in their plan and actions corresponds with an increase in autonomy. And, as we saw above in the case of Dido, one way that Virgil expresses a character's agency in the *Aeneid* is through notable departure from literary precedent, for example by confounding expectations through exchanging success for failure and survival for death.

Athena plays a direct and explicit role in the narrative of *Iliad* 10. Diomedes chooses Odysseus as his companion because Athena loves him (Hom. *Il.* 10.245). As they depart, Athena sends a heron as an omen (274-6), and both heroes pray to the goddess (278-94). They then successfully extract information from Dolon, kill him, and find Rhesus and his men, at which point Diomedes slaughters the enemy whilst Odysseus steals Rhesus' horses. It is again Athena's timely intervention (509-11) which stops Diomedes' killing in time for both of them to

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<sup>74</sup> See e.g. Duckworth (1967: 260), who comments that there is 'no divine motivation at all' in Nisus and Euryalus' mission in book nine.

return safely to the Greek camp with both the information from Dolon and the plunder.

No god plays a comparable role in book nine of the *Aeneid*. Nisus first suggests the mission to Euryalus whilst they are on shared guard duty. Interestingly, he begins by questioning the source of motivation: does a god give it to us, or is it innate? (9.184-7)<sup>75</sup>

Nisus ait: 'dine hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,  
Euryale, an sua cuique deus fit **dira cupido**?  
aut pugnam aut aliquid iamdudum invadere magnum  
mens agitat mihi, **nec placida contenta quiete est.**'

Nisus said: 'Do gods implant this burning wish in our minds, Euryalus, or is each man's **awful lust** his own god? My mind goads me this very instant to enter into the fight, or some other great enterprise, **and it is not content with peaceful rest.**'

Virgil thereby opens the episode by setting divine and human motivation in opposition, raising questions about the involvement of the gods and autonomy. Indeed, Nisus' phrasing *dira cupido* recalls Lucretius, who, as an Epicurean, advocated free will (*libera... voluntas* Lucr. 2.256-7) and denied that either fate or the gods determined anything in the universe, let alone human actions and decisions.<sup>76</sup> However, though it would seem fitting given the philosophical

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<sup>75</sup> See also Hardie (1994 *ad loc.*), Feeney (1991: 180), Schaerer (1944). Servius *ad loc.* has a different interpretation of the question Nisus is framing, suggesting that Nisus is wondering whether this is a good or bad idea: if a god has given it to him, it must be good (!), if not, it could be bad.

<sup>76</sup> See especially Lucr. 2.251-93, and Fowler (2002 *ad loc.*). *dira cupido* also intratextually links back to Aeneas' question to Anchises in the Underworld as to why anyone would want to be reincarnated (6.719-21).

question Nisus is asking here, the two passages of Lucretius particularly recalled by *dira cupido* do not discuss these themes. Instead, they appear in book three of the *DRN*, which attempts to abolish the fear of death. In the first, Lucretius argues that this is the root cause of such negative traits as desire for material gain, criminal behaviour, and selfish ambition (Lucr. 3.59-64):

denique avarities et honorum **caeca cupido**  
 quae miseros homines cogunt transcendere fines                      60  
 iuris et inter dum socios scelerum atque ministros  
 noctes atque dies niti praestante labore  
 ad summas emergere opes, haec vulnera vitae  
 non minimam partem mortis formidine aluntur.

Moreover, avarice and the **blind lust** for distinction, which drive wretched men to transgress the bounds of law, and sometimes by sharing and scheming crime to strive night and day with exceeding toil to climb the pinnacle of power, these sores of life in no small degree are fed by fear of death. (trans. Rouse)

This casts an unpleasant shadow over Nisus' plan, as it is clear that he too, just like the men described here, who are wretched and vicious from an Epicurean perspective, is inspired by the hope of wealth and honour (9.194-5). In the second, Lucretius asks what 'evil lust' forces non-Epicureans to want to keep living in uncertainty and danger, rather than meeting with certain and painless death (Lucr. 3.1076-7):

denique tanto opere in dubiis trepidare periclis  
 quae **mala** nos subigit vitae tanta **cupido**?

Besides, what is this great **evil lust** of life that drives us to be so greatly agitated amidst doubt and peril? (trans Rouse)

As in the case of the earlier passage, the context here shows that, though Nisus is using Lucretian phrasing and asking a Lucretian question about free will, his behaviour and desires are markedly un-Epicurean and even morally vicious. This is cemented by his final claim that he is not satisfied by '*placida... quiete*', also a Lucretian formulation (Lucr. 1.463), which therefore constitutes a rejection of ἀταραξία, the divine state of freedom from disturbance idealised by Epicureans.<sup>77</sup>

Nisus continues to question the gods and divine motivation in what follows. When he has explained the plan and Euryalus objects to him completing the mission alone, Nisus swears it is not because he doubts Euryalus' courage that he wants to do so, but because he is concerned something may happen to his beloved friend (9.207-12):

Nisus ad haec: 'equidem de te nil tale verebar,  
nec fas; non ita me referat tibi magnus ovantem

Iuppiter **aut quicumque oculis haec aspicit aequis.**

sed si quis (quae multa vides discrimine tali) 210

si quis in adversum rapiat **casusve deusve,**

te superesse velim, tua vita dignior aetas.'

Nisus responded to this 'I really wasn't fearing anything like that from you, nor was it right to - may great Jupiter, **or whoever is watching this with impartial eyes**, not return me in triumph to you on those terms. But if anyone (you see these things happen

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<sup>77</sup> E.g. Lucr. 3.18 *apparet divum numen sedesque quietae...* See also my discussion of Virgil's un-Epicurean gods in the *Introduction*.

a lot in such a crisis), **if any god or misfortune** should snatch me away, I want you to survive – your youth is more deserving of life.’

In this short passage, Nisus questions divine involvement twice.<sup>78</sup> He first imagines either great Jupiter, or ‘whoever is watching this with impartial eyes’, bringing him back to Euryalus, demonstrating uncertainty about the king of the gods and his role. He then claims that he wants Euryalus to survive him, if *either* chance *or* a god should turn against him. This latter comment links more closely to his initial query ‘*dine hunc ardorem mentibus addunt,/ Euryale, an sua cuique deus fit dira cupido?*’ (9.184-5). Nisus’ lack of certainty about whether Jupiter is watching belies his more extreme suspicion that free will and chance may supplant the gods.

Indeed, it is not only the gods, but also *fatum/a* that is completely absent from this episode.<sup>79</sup> The description of the first person Nisus kills, Rhamnes, emphasizes the point (9.327-8):

rex idem et regi Turno gratissimus augur,  
sed non augurio potuit depellere pestem.

This one man was both a king himself and the favourite augur to the king Turnus – but he was not able to avert death with his augury.

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<sup>78</sup> See Hardie (1994 *ad loc.*), who also links this passage to 9.184-5, and comments: ‘Nisus is given to metaphysical suspension of belief... *quicumque* here raises doubt as to the identity of the deity presiding over human affairs.’

<sup>79</sup> Though there is no explicit reference to fate, Virgil does use dramatic foreshadowing, e.g. 9.213-3 *multa patri mandata dabat portanda; sed aurae/ omnia discerpunt et nubibus inrita donant* ‘he gave them many orders to carry to his father, but the breezes tore them all to shreds and delivered them useless to the clouds’; 372 *laevo... limite*.

Rhamnes was the royal augur for Turnus, yet Virgil's comment (*sed non...*) and his unconcerned slumber during the attack show that no help was offered in this instance by his supposed knowledge of fate. Instead of *fatum/a*, as I will discuss in chapter five, both Nisus and Euryalus exhibit a reliance on *F/fortuna*, and events are governed by chance, which should not exist in a fated world. For example, Nisus and Euryalus do not make prayers before their departure, they just hope that *fortuna* will be on their side (Nisus 9.240-1 '*... si fortuna permittitis uti/ quaesitum Aenean et moenia Pallantea*'; Euryalus 282-3 '*tantum fortuna secunda/ haud adversa cadat.*').<sup>80</sup> It is only after he loses Euryalus that Nisus thinks to pray, and he requests help from the moon (404-9), but Virgil gives no indication at all as to whether the prayer is heard. However, earlier, it was moonlight reflected off Euryalus' helmet that fatally revealed his location to the enemy.<sup>81</sup> If the gods do play a role in this episode, therefore, perhaps they should be understood as rationalized natural forces - the moon's power is demonstrated by moonlight rather than an anthropomorphized intervention.<sup>82</sup> What is more, these natural forces are clearly adverse to Nisus and Euryalus: *et galea Euryalum sublustri noctis in umbra/ **prodidit*** (9.373-4).

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<sup>80</sup> See also 9.241, and the famous authorial apostrophe '*fortunati ambo...!*' (9.446). I discuss the implications of Nisus and Euryalus' association with *F/fortuna* rather than *fatum/a* in chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*).

<sup>81</sup> The baleful reflection of moonlight off Euryalus' plundered helmet forms a contrast with the appearance of flames (= Phoebus rather than Diana?) on the heads of successful Julians (Iulus (2.681-6), Lavinia (7.71-80), Augustus (8.680-1), Aeneas (10.270-5)) which are taken as positive omens. I discuss these in connection with the *sidus Iulium* and the *Coma Berenices* in chapter three (*Causation and Moral Responsibility*).

<sup>82</sup> On the allegorization of the gods in the *Aeneid* see *Introduction*, and *1. True and False Names*.

It is clear, therefore, that Nisus and Euryalus' mission is remarkable for its lack of divine involvement, even more so considering the prominent role of Athena in Odysseus and Diomedes' night raid in the *Iliad*. This absence of divine involvement is accompanied by a demonstration of reliance on *F/fortuna* rather than *fatum/a*, and by questions about free will. I argued above both that a strong connection was made between fate and previous poetry in the *Aeneid*, and that *nec fato* (4.696) in the case of Dido's suicide could be understood as 'not following literary precedent', because by killing herself Dido finally diverged from the path of two characters on which she is modelled, Medea and Ariadne. I think the above analysis of the Nisus and Euryalus episode corroborates this argument, demonstrating that, in the *Aeneid*, a character's exhibition or discussion of free will as opposed to divine or fatal motivation is reflected on a metaliterary level by Virgil's departure from particularly strong poetic models. Uncomfortably, as in the case of Dido, the result of exercising autonomy is death.

Nisus' failure to recover Euryalus and evade the Rutulian scouts is accordingly glossed as a failure to follow the successful tracks of Odysseus and Diomedes in *Iliad* 10 (9.389-93):<sup>83</sup>

ut stetit et frustra absentem respexit amicum:

'Euryale infelix, qua te regione reliqui?

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quave sequar?' rursus perplexum iter omne **revolvens**

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<sup>83</sup> Odysseus, unlike Nisus and Euryalus, notably plans ahead for the return journey. He takes pains to mark where they have left Dolon's spoils so they do not miss them on the way back (Hom. *Il.* 10.465-8), and moves aside corpses so that when they escape the horses won't tread on them and get scared (Hom. *Il.* 10.488-93).

**fallacis silvae simul et vestigia retro**

observata **legit dumisque silentibus** errat.

When he stopped and looked back in vain for his missing friend: 'O unfortunate Euryalus! Where did I leave you? By what route should I follow you?' Again, **rewinding** the whole muddled journey through the **deceptive wood**, and, having looked carefully for his **footsteps, he traced them** back and wandered in the **silent thickets**.

The forest in which he is lost is described as deceptive. As Hinds (1998: 12-5) has shown in his discussion of the metaliterary as well as political implications of the Trojans' entry into an *antiquam silvam* to collect wood for Misenus' funeral pyre (6.179-82), the Latin word *silva* can be understood as a translation of the Greek ὕλη, which means both 'forest' but also 'matter for a poem or treatise'.<sup>84</sup> *silvae* in the *Aeneid* may consequently function as an elegant marker of the use of another poet's material. In this case, that material, *Iliad* 10, is deceptive, because it suggests that the mission of Nisus and Euryalus, like that of Odysseus and Diomedes, will succeed.<sup>85</sup> Homer's poetry has deceived Nisus, and *fraude loci* a little later (9.397) suggests it has deceived Euryalus, too. Nisus' futile retracing of steps is cast as a re-reading (*revolvens, legit*), and as an attempt to get back onto the track marked out by his Homeric predecessors: *vestigia*, like the 'Alexandrian footnotes' discussed above, is also a popular allusive marker, here intended to reference the marks left not only by actual feet, but also the metrical feet of

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<sup>84</sup> LSJ 'ὕλη'.

<sup>85</sup> The precedent for Nisus and Euryalus' quest is perhaps additionally deceptive in that both *Iliad* 10 and the Attic tragedy *Rhesus* are of dubious authorship. Virgil may have been aware of the speculation surrounding *Iliad* 10 from the Homeric scholia: he also references the 'Doloneia' at 12.346-52, and 1.469-71. The latter instance alludes to a different version of the story, not found in the *Iliad* but recorded in the Homeric scholia (Σ<sup>AD</sup> Il. 10.435 = Eust. 817.27-8), according to which Rhesus was guaranteed invincibility once his horses had grazed on Trojan land and drunk from the Scamander.

poetry. The age of Homeric heroes and oral poetry is over – now Nisus wanders lost in *dumis silentibus*.

### 2. iii. Fate as 'text'

I will now move to my second argument - that Virgil complicates and emphasizes the interrelation between prophecies and narrative poetry to prompt reflection on the truth status and stability of both. First, I identify the similarities in Virgil's descriptions of Jupiter 'speaking' fate (*fabor... fatorum* 1.261-2), the Sibyl prophesying, and himself writing poetry. I then explore in greater detail the unsettling implications of Helenus' warnings that the *ordo* of the Sibyl's written but not oral prophecies is subject to confusion and disorder. The general effect of these overlapping associations between fate and poetry and prophets and poets is a confusion between future and past events, and between history and stories. I consequently use the terminology of narratology to demonstrate how unsettling this confusion is for the reader: fate and history are characterized as 'text', malleable literary artefacts. I conclude the chapter with another analysis of *ordo*, this time in Anchises' prophecy of Rome in book six, which corroborates this suggestion by showing that Virgil subjugates the *ordo* of fate and history to the artistic *ordo* of his poem, restructuring it in the service of Rome and Augustus.

I argued above that Virgil connects fate and literary precedent in the *Aeneid*.

More generally, fate and narrative are necessarily intertwined: the content of the former cannot be expressed without the latter, i.e. the spoken or written account of events. But Virgil further emphasizes and complicates their interrelation. For

one, he reminds the reader that both fate and narrative are conceived of as speech acts or songs. *fata*, like poetry, are ‘sung’ (*canere*),<sup>86</sup> and in the *Aeneid*, the singers are both poets and storytellers (including Virgil himself: *arma virumque cano...* 1.1),<sup>87</sup> and prophets and priests.<sup>88</sup> Accordingly, in Virgil’s innovative and influential usage, the word *vates* can refer to each of these groups of people.<sup>89</sup>

Indeed, the character most often referred to as a *vates*, the Sibyl Deiphobe, is characterized as poet, prophet and priestess simultaneously.<sup>90</sup> Just as the ‘real’ Sibylline prophecies were recorded as hexameter poems, in the *Aeneid*, the Sibyl sings and writes down *fata* as verse. The following excerpt, taken from Helenus’

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<sup>86</sup> E.g. *fata canit* 3.444; *fata canens* 8.499, 10.417. See also 3.182-3, 7.79-80, 7.270-3.

<sup>87</sup> *canere* is used of poets and storytellers in the following places: the bard Iopas 1.742; Aeneas when he has completed his story of Troy’s fall and the Trojans’ wanderings 4.14; *Fama* 4.190; Virgil 9.525; Cretheus *amicus Musarum* 9.777; Cycnus 10.191-2.

<sup>88</sup> *canere* is used of prophets and priests in the following places: Calchas 2.176; Apollo/the Penates 3.155; Cassandra 3.183; Celaeno 3.366; Helenus 3.373, 3.559; the Sibyl 3.444, 3.457, 6.76, 6.98-9; Apollo at 6.344-5; general prophets 7.79, 7.271, 12.28; the Tiber 8.49; a *haruspex* 8.499; the prophet father of Halaesus at 10.417. Elsewhere it is used of (religious) songs or music.

<sup>89</sup> Poets: Musaeus 6.669; Virgil himself 7.41. Prophets: Calchas 2.122; Helenus 3.358, 3.433, 3.463, 3.712; Cassandra 3.187, 5.636; Celaeno 3.246; Apollo 6.12; Carmentis (whose name also links her with poetry) 8.340. Priests: Calybe priestess of Juno 7.435, 7.442; the priest Chloereus 11.774-5; general priests/prophets 6.662, 7.68. Habinek (1998: 37-40) explains that *vates* was a term for poets before professional, ‘Musaic’ literature – this is why Ennius distances himself from them, to show he is part of a new, learned group of *poetae* that e.g. use Greek hexameters rather than Latin Saturnians (Enn. *Ann.* 206-7 Skutsch). Lucretius also distances himself from *vates*, but on different grounds, because they are involved in telling fear-mongering and false stories about the gods (Lucr. 1.102-6; Hardie (1986: 17-8)). Dahlmann (1948) and Newman (1967) argue that the Augustan poets’ adoption and positive redefinition of *vates* was linked to Varro’s explanation of its history and etymology (Varro, *Ling.* 7.36). Virgil’s poetry is central to this shift; he ‘is the most important figure in the development of the *vates* concept’ (Hardie 1986: 22). Cf. also Hor. *Carm.* 1.1.35-6, 3.19.13-5.

<sup>90</sup> *vates* is used of the Sibyl at 3.443, 456; 6.65, 78, 82, 125, 161, 189, 211, 259, 372, 398, 415, 419, 562.

advice to the departing Trojans in book three, clearly demonstrates the resulting confusion between *fata* and poetry (3.443-447):

‘... insanam **vatem** aspicias, quae rupe sub ima

**fata canit** foliisque notas et nomina mandat.

quaecumque in foliis **descripsit carmina** virgo 445

**digerit in numerum** atque antro seclusa relinquit:

illa **manent immota** locis neque **ab ordine** cedunt.

‘You will see a raving **prophetess**, who **sings the fates** at the base of a cliff, and commits markings and words to leaves. Whatever **poems** the virgin priestess has **written** on leaves she **arranges in order** and leaves them shut up in the cave. They **remain fixed** in their places, and never depart **from their order**.’

*vates* and *canit*, as I have explained, make the Sibyl comparable to a poet. This suggested comparison is made unequivocal when she is described as ‘writing down’ the ‘poems’ she has sung (*descripsit carmina*).<sup>91</sup> *numerum* bears connotations both of sequential ordering and of poetic metre and rhythm.<sup>92</sup>

We can compare this description of the Sibyl with that of Jupiter speaking the fates in book one (1.257-63):

‘parce metu, Cytherea, **manent immota** tuorum

**fata** tibi; cernes urbem et promissa Lavini

moenia, sublimemque feres ad sidera caeli

<sup>91</sup> *carmen* can mean ‘1. A solemn or ritual utterance, usually sung or chanted and in metrical form’, as well as ‘2. A song, poem, play’ (*OLD s.v.*). Virgil’s stress on writing here suggests the latter.

<sup>92</sup> See *OLD* ‘*numerus*’ 3, 13b, 14.

magnanimum Aenean; neque me sententia vertit. 260

hic tibi (**fabor** enim, quando haec te cura remordet,

longius, et **volvens fatorum arcana** movebo)

bellum ingens geret Italia...'

'Don't worry, goddess of Cythera, **the fates** of your people **remain unchanged**; you will see the city and the promised walls of Lavinium, and you will bear noble-spirited Aeneas on high to the stars of the heavens; no opinion has swayed me. This man (for **I will speak** at greater length, since this anxiety is gnawing at you, and I will disturb **the secrets of the fates, unrolling them**) will wage a huge war in Italy for you...'

Jupiter's language encourages a link between *fabor* and *fatorum*, suggesting that *fata* are things that he has said.<sup>93</sup> *manent immota* connects these *fata* with the poetic prophecies that the Sibyl writes down on leaves (3.452); *volvens* furthermore conjures, as well as if not more so than the Stoic uncoiling of the rope of fate (see above), the unrolling of a book-scroll.<sup>94</sup> Fate is linked to speech and literature.

Jupiter's prophecy in book one is structurally and thematically linked with Virgil's invocation of the muse Erato at the opening of the second half of the epic (7.37-45):

nunc age, qui reges, Erato, quae tempora, rerum

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<sup>93</sup> Feeney (1991: 139-40): 'Jupiter's foresight appears to be not simply a matter of knowledge, for the fates (*fata*) which he reveals are his will: by a bald etymological play, Jupiter gives us to understand that the *fata* are what he 'says''. Fowler (2000: 227): 'It is notoriously unclear in the *Aeneid* whether *fatum* is just what Jupiter says or something external... Jupiter never offers to show the big book of fate to anyone... the master-narrative really is here in the mind of the god, and Jupiter's utterances escape from the hazards of textuality to attain real presence; what happens is what Jupiter says, and what he says is what he means.' Cf. O'Hara (1996 *ad loc.*), Lyne (1987: 73-4).

<sup>94</sup> See above n. 35 and n. 53.

quis Latio antiquo fuerit status, advena classem  
 cum primum Ausoniis exercitus appulit oris,  
**expediam**, et primae revocabo exordia pugnae. 40  
 tu **vatem**, tu, diva, mone. **dicam** horrida bella,  
**dicam** acies actosque animis in funera reges,  
 Tyrrhenamque manum totamque sub arma coactam  
 Hesperiam. **maior rerum mihi nascitur ordo**,  
 maius opus **moveo**. 45

Come now Erato, **I will explain** who the kings were, what the situation and circumstances were in ancient Latium, when first the foreign army drove its fleet to the shores of Ausonia, and I will recall the starting points of the first conflict. You, goddess, advise your **poet-priest**. **I will tell** of terrible wars, **I will tell** of battle lines and kings driven by their hearts to death, and the Tyrrhenian troop and the whole of Hesperia forced to arms. **A greater world order is rising before me – I am setting** a greater work **in motion**.

Here, Virgil is the *vates*. He addresses Erato as *diva*, thereby uniting the religious and poetic connotations of the word - we might compare Horace's description of himself as *Musarum sacerdos* (Hor. *Carm.* 3.1.3). He will now tell (*dicam... dicam*) the story of the war in Italy (*horrida bella*), precisely the fated event which Jupiter chose to unveil at the beginning of the poem ('*bellum ingens geret Italia*' 1.263), and the Sibyl warned of in book six ('*bella, horrida bella*' 6.86). Virgil even sets his fated tale in motion (*moveo*) using the same verb as Jupiter (*movebo* 1.262). These examples of the Sibyl, Jupiter and Virgil, coupled with Virgil's innovative use of the word *vates*, therefore demonstrate that the prophets and poets of the *Aeneid* are portrayed as being engaged in the same activity. Virgil aligns himself with Jupiter and the Sibyl, and his poetry with the *fata* they prophesy.

Virgil's reference to *ordo* in this passage deserves further analysis. We saw above that *ordo* was a defining feature both of Stoic causal determinism and the Sibyl's prophecies ('*illa manent immota locis neque ab ordine cedunt*' 3.447). *nascitur ordo* in particular reminds the reader of Virgil's description of the Sibylline prophecies in the *Eclogues* (Verg. *Ecl.* 4.3-4):

ultima **Cumaei** venit iam **carminis** aetas;

**magnus** ab integro saeculorum **nascitur ordo**.

Already the last age of **Sibylline song** has come; **a great order of ages is being born** anew.

The *maior ordo* that constitutes the events of the second half of the *Aeneid* is referred back to the *magnus ordo* following from the last age of Sibylline prophecy in *Eclogue* 4, further fusing the connection between Virgil and the Sibyl, his poetry and her prophecies. Though the idea that one *ordo* has ended and another, greater one has begun seems in tension with the infinite reach of *ordo* in the Stoic definitions of causal determinism above, it has been linked with the Platonic and Stoic concept of a 'Great Year'; the span of time after which all the heavenly bodies revert to their original positions.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> For eternal *ordo* in Stoic definitions of causal determinism see Cic. *Div.* 1.125-6 = SVF 2.921; Serv. *ad Aen.* 3.376. For the Platonic/Stoic concept of the Great Year see Pl. *Ti.* 39d; Clausen (1994 *ad Verg. Ecl.* 4.4, though he rejects its relevance there); Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.51, and Pease (1958 *ad loc.*); Cic. *Rep.* 6.24-5. NB whilst Plato in the *Timaeus* defines the Great Year by the return of the planets to their original position, Cicero's phrasing in *De Re Publica* (*cuncta astra redierint*) is more ambiguous: *astra* could mean stars, planets or constellations (see *OLD* 'astrum' 1, 2 and 3).

But the attribution of immutable *ordo* to the Sibylline prophecies in the *Aeneid* is undercut by Helenus' subsequent warning that the leaves on which they are written can be irrevocably disordered by the slightest breeze (3.448-457, continuing the extract quoted above):

'verum eadem, verso tenuis cum cardine ventus  
impulit et teneras turbavit ianua frondes,  
numquam deinde cavo volitantia prendere saxo 450  
nec revocare situs aut iungere **carmina** curat:  
**inconsulti abeunt sedemque odere Sibyllae.**  
hic tibi ne qua morae fuerint dispendia tanti,  
quamvis increpitent socii et vi cursus in altum  
vela vocet, possisque sinus implere secundos, 455  
quin adeas **vatem** precibusque oracula poscas  
**ipsa canat vocemque volens atque ora resolvat.'**

'However, when a light draught has blown in because of a swinging hinge and the opening has disturbed the delicate leaves, she never bothers to catch these prophecies as they fly around the hollow cave, nor to recall their original positions or join up **the poems: people who do not receive advice leave and hate the Sibyl's home**. When you are there, don't let the cost of delaying your journey stop you – even if your comrades reproach you, the onward motion [of the winds] forcefully call your sails onto the ocean, and you could fill their folds with following breezes – from approaching **the priestess** and demanding with prayer that **she herself sing the oracles and willingly free her voice and mouth**'

As a consequence, her *oracula* are more trustworthy when delivered orally, in person. Virgil thus builds into his poem a comment on the potential inaccuracies and mistakes in the transmitted text of the Sibylline verses, perhaps thereby, given her strong characterization as a poet, also reflecting on the reordering and

distortion inherent is his own literary narrative of fate. The implicit hierarchy suggested between written and oral poetry strikes a self-conscious note.<sup>96</sup>

Considering Helenus' claim, it is rather strange that acrostics, which only work in written texts because they rely on how words look rather than how they sound, were one of the most renowned features of the 'real' Sibylline verses.<sup>97</sup> Virgil also uses acrostics in the *Aeneid*,<sup>98</sup> and scholars have traditionally viewed them as being testament to the influence of Hellenistic poets, such as Aratus.<sup>99</sup> However, one of the more recently 'discovered' acrostics is pointedly Sibylline in content and context (6.74-86, Aeneas speaking):

... **'foliis tantum ne carmina manda,**  
 ne turbata volent rapidis ludibria ventis; 75  
 ipsa canas oro.' finem dedit ore loquendi.  
 at Phoebi nondum patiens immanis in antro  
 bacchatur vates, magnum si pectore possit  
 excusisse deum; tanto magis ille fatigat  
**os** rabidum, fera corda domans, fingitque premendo. 80  
 ostia iamque domus patuere ingentia centum

<sup>96</sup> See Lightfoot (2007: esp. 16-8) on literary and oral characteristics of Sibylline verse.

<sup>97</sup> See e.g. Cic. *Div.* 2.111-2, where he argues that skilful acrostics, supposedly an authenticating feature of Sibylline prophecies, in fact demonstrate them to be the work of a learned, careful poet rather than a victim of prophetic *furor* and *insania*. I discuss reading as a complicated example of visual perception in chapter six (inania verba, visual perception and materialism).

<sup>98</sup> The most well-known acrostic in the *Aeneid* is probably MARS (7.601-4), to signify the opening of the gates of war. See Fowler (1983), and Feeney & Nelis (2005). Likewise the *Georgics* yield the autobiographical MA-VE-PU (Verg. *G.* 1.429-33), and the *Eclogues* INANIS (Verg. *Ecl.* 8.42-7), amongst others.

<sup>99</sup> E.g. the famous λεπτή acrostic (Aratus, *Phaen.* 783-7).

sponte sua vatisque ferunt responsa per auras:

‘o tandem magnis pelagi defuncte periclis

(sed terrae graviora manent), in regna Lavini

Dardanidae venient (mitte hanc de pectore curam), 85

sed non et venisse volent...’

‘...**just don’t entrust your poems to leaves**, lest they get disordered and fly around as playthings of the swift wind; I beg that you sing them yourself.’ He closed his mouth and stopped speaking. But the priestess raged in the cave, not yet submissive to mighty Phoebus, to see if she could beat the great god out of her chest; but all the more did he wear down her rabid mouth, taming her wild heart, and moulded her under pressure. And now the hundred huge doors of her home opened of their own accord, and bore the oracles of the priestess through the air: ‘O you, who are finally rid of the great perils of the ocean (but more troublesome ones await on land)! The Trojans will come into the kingdoms of Lavinium (free your heart of this worry), but they will wish they hadn’t come...’

Aeneas, following Helenus’ advice (see above 3.448-457), begs the Sibyl to sing in her own voice rather than entrusting her prophecies to leaves. The most plausible reading of the acrostic, which runs from lines 77-84, is *ABEO OSO(=U)S*: ‘I depart, discontented’.<sup>100</sup> Given the context, Adkin (2015) ingeniously links this to Helenus’ earlier warning about the people who visit the Sibyl and, because they receive one of the prophecies that has been irrevocably disordered by the wind, depart without any advice and dissatisfied: *inconsulti **abeunt** sedemque **odere** Sibyllae* (3.452). The sense of the acrostic therefore seems to suit its situation perfectly: as Aeneas waits to see whether he will in fact receive a useful oral prophecy, the acrostic reflects the possibility that this may be in vain.

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<sup>100</sup> This reading follows Adkin (2015), who builds on the work of Katz (2013), whose work originally noted the acrostic without identifying its meaning.

Adding to Adkin's analysis, *-OS* ('mouth') also fittingly marks the point at which the Sibyl opens her mouth, a reading supported by *os rabidum... ostia* at the beginning of lines 80 and 81.<sup>101</sup> Furthermore, it is notable that Virgil, in using an acrostic, is choosing a peculiarly Sibylline technique. However, this means that the acrostic in fact has an unsettling effect. For though Aeneas is supposed to be receiving an oral and therefore more reliable prophecy here, acrostics, as noted above, can only feature in written text. A similar tension arises in the *Eclogues* when a highly literary acrostic spans the speech of two rustic goatherds, self-consciously undercutting the portrayal of two different uneducated people singing impromptu songs through a demonstration that what we are dealing with is in fact a highly polished written artifice that is the product of one poet (Verg. *Ecl.* 9.34-9). The effect in this passage of the *Aeneid* is comparable. Virgil's acrostic characterizes his own verse as written Sibylline prophecy. But it equally reminds the reader that his portrayal of the Sibyl giving an oral prophecy is part of a written account, whose *ordo* has been artfully structured, and whose reliability, following Helenus' warning, may therefore be in question, even if his verse will not be blown away like the leaves of the Sibyl. The persistent and deeply-ingrained confusion of fate and narrative and conflation of prophets and poets in Virgil's depiction of the Sibyl is disconcerting: we are subtly encouraged to trust neither Virgil's poetry, nor the oral Sibylline prophecies it describes.

These overlapping associations between fate and poetry and prophets and poets generally create temporal confusion between future and past events, as well as a

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<sup>101</sup> It is common in Virgilian acrostics to find the word spelled by the acrostic within or near the lines it spans. E.g. *undis* the line after *UNDIS* Verg. *Ecl.* 9.34-9, *Martem* within *MARS* 7.601-4, *formicae* in the muddled *FRO-MI-AC* 4.399-402 (see Katz (2008)).

blending of history and stories. The confusion is compounded by the timeframe of the *Aeneid*: the prophecies that unveil the future to characters in the epic are a record of past events for Virgil's reader. The narrativizing retrospection of Virgil's poem is likened to the narrativizing providence of prophecy. This is unsettling and reassuring in equal measure. Subsequent Roman history vindicates the prophecies of Jupiter and Anchises about the future of Rome, but this is a hollow and artificially constructed victory, proving nothing about prophecy's potential ability to reveal a fate still in the future for the reader of the *Aeneid*.<sup>102</sup> Virgil raises the question: can the patterns of *fata* only be delineated and verified with hindsight? What is more, the characterization of the reader's history as future *fata* within the timeframe of the poem not only questions the truth and authenticity of prophecy, but also unsettles our conviction that past events are immutable by infecting them with the uncertainty of the future. Mixing prophecy and history destabilizes both.

It is hard to get one's head around this plait of chronology, narrative, fiction and perspective. The critical toolbox of narratology is helpful insofar as it pinpoints the problem. Narratological analysis depends on the delineation of fabula, story and text (de Jong 2014: 77):

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<sup>102</sup> Note that some scholars, including Trimble (2013) in discussion of the prophetic voice in *Eclogues* 4, have argued this the other way around: that presenting historical events with hindsight as prophecy reinforces rather than undermines prophecy, and in particular strengthens the idea that the glorious destiny of Rome is fated. Trimble quotes W.H. Auden's poem 'Secondary Epic', also relevant in my discussion: No, Virgil, no:/ Not even the first of the Romans can learn/ His Roman history in the future tense./ Not even to serve your political turn;/ Hindsight as foresight makes no sense.

'The reconstructed fabula consists of the events in their full form in chronological order. When a focalizer looks at or remembers these events, they are turned into a story, which means that events may be presented in a different order, left out, told more than once, or reported at greater or lesser length. A narrator, finally puts the story into a text, and this text is the practical yardstick by which all these temporal effects can be measured: how many words or pages are spent on an event?'

The fabula of the *Aeneid* is the chronological series of events from the fall of Troy to the death of Turnus. The story is the order in which Virgil puts these events in the poem (e.g. starting *in medias res* at sea then telling the earlier part of the story through Aeneas in books two and three). Finally, the poem itself; the presentation of this story in hexameter verse, is the text.

The *ordo* of fate should presumably map on to the fabula; what actually has happened or will happen, in the correct order. Moreover, the *Aeneid* is a historical epic, so this chronological series of events is accessible and should be fixed. Despite this, the way that Virgil presents fate in the poem does not suggest that it corresponds with the underlying, chronological fabula, but rather with the text (in narratological terms): fate is presented as the speech or song of a *vates*, as written verse. The implication is that fate, like poetry, is subjective, fictional and liable to restructuring and variation.




Fig. 2: A traditional object of narratological analysis (left) vs. the *Aeneid* (right). The arrows signify the direction of the reader's inference.

Virgil therefore encourages reflection on the truth status and stability of the fabula, which is the bedrock of narratology, and the touchstone at which a literary account of events departs from those events themselves. Whilst this is an enjoyable cognitive puzzle for the modern reader, it is perhaps a more disconcerting statement in the context of the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC. For Virgil and his contemporaries, the past was to a large degree only accessible through literature; this was the 'last word' on historical events. The characterization of fate as text rather than fabula in the *Aeneid* emphasizes this; the centrality of literature as a means to pinning down and understanding both past and future events. However, in doing so, it simultaneously highlights some of the problematic implications: by denying access to something with a more grounded or material claim to truth than poetry, Virgil exchanges the definition of fate as *veritas sempiterna* and *quod physice dicitur* (Cic. *Div.* 1.125-6) for simply *quod dicitur*.<sup>103</sup>

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Laird's discussion of fiction in Classical texts (2007: 285): 'The insistence that narratives are all we have, that underlying realities are only constructions – the tendency Rorty conveniently labels 'textualism' – obviously poses a threat of some kind

The close of Aeneas' tale to Dido and the Carthaginians is a succinct example (3.716-7):

sic pater Aeneas intentis omnibus unus

**fata renarrabat divum** cursusque docebat.

Thus father Aeneas alone, whilst everyone else eagerly listened, **narrated again the fates of the gods** and taught them of his journeys.

*fata* here must refer to Aeneas' description of the fall of Troy and his wanderings before reaching Carthage. It is striking not only that it refers to past rather than future events, but also that it refers to a pointedly subjective and focalized description of these events:<sup>104</sup> this is Aeneas' account, not *the* account, despite the contrary assertions of the genitive *divum*, and the repetitive prefix *re-*, suggesting that he is retelling the gods' *fata* rather than writing his own. Indeed, the verb *renarrabat* completely blends fate and narrative, and leaves us in no doubt that *fata* does not here correspond in narratological terms to the objective fabula, but rather to Aeneas' version of events, and Virgil's text. Virgil forces the reader to see that, in the *Aeneid*, *fata* is a subjective, constructed narrative.

I will now conclude my discussion of how Virgil depicts *fatum/a* as a malleable literary artefact with an analysis of his artistic manipulation of the supposedly

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to the legitimacy or our everyday concern with 'what really happened'.<sup>1</sup> Laird goes on to suggest that the distinction between fiction and history can be found in our approach to texts rather than in the texts themselves.

<sup>104</sup> On the plausibility and reliability of Aeneas' narration see e.g. Bowie (2008), Powell (2011).

shared *ordo* of fate and narrative poetry in the prophecy of Anchises in book six.

*ordo* is a feature of Anchises' speech from the outset (6.723-6):

suscipit Anchises atque **ordine** singula pandit.

'principio caelum ac terras camposque liquentis

lucentemque globum lunae Titaniaque astra

spiritus intus alit...'

Anchises continued and laid out each successive thing **in order**. 'In the beginning an internal spirit nourished the heavens, the earth, the watery fields, the glowing orb of the moon and the stars of the Titans...'

This creates the expectation that his account will be chronological, which is initially satisfied by '*principio*' (6.724) and his succinct cosmological and philosophical account of the beginning of the universe.<sup>105</sup> Later, when he turns to teaching Aeneas about his descendants, he leads his son and the Sibyl to the top of a hill so that they can get a better look over all the future souls (6.752-9):

dixerat Anchises natumque unaque Sibyllam

**conventus** trahit **in medios** turbamque sonantem,

et tumulum capit unde omnis **longo ordine** posset

adversos **legere** et venientum discere vultus. 755

'nunc age, Dardaniam prolem quae deinde sequatur

gloria, qui maneant Itala de gente nepotes,

inlustris animas nostrumque in nomen ituras,

expediam dictis, et **te tua fata docebo**.'

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<sup>105</sup> See especially Norden (1926) on the varied philosophical influences on Anchises' cosmology and eschatology.

Anchises had spoken and drew his son and the Sibyl together **into the middle of the gathering** and the noisy crowd, and he took hold of a mound from which he could **pick out** all those facing him **in their long succession**, and learn their faces as they came. 'Come now, I will give an account of the glory that follows the race of Dardanus from now on, the descendants from the Italian race that await, and the illustrious souls that will come into our name, and **I will teach you your fates.**'

Anchises explicitly claims that he will explain the fate (*fata*) of the Trojans and Italians to Aeneas. '*longo ordine*' and '*Dardaniam prolem quae deinde sequatur*' suggest that he will do so chronologically - at least to the reader, who is armed with the knowledge of hindsight – though as we shall see, *ordo* from Anchises' forward-looking perspective may not be the same.

Indeed, Anchises does begin chronologically, starting with the Alban kings Silvius (*ille... proxima sorte tenet lucis loca* 6.754-5), Procas (*proximus ille* 6.767), Capys, Numitor, and Silvius Aeneas (6.768-9). Romulus, the first king of Rome, follows next (6.777-80):

'quin et **avo comitem** sese Mavortius addet  
Romulus, Assaraci quem sanguinis Ilia mater  
educet. viden, ut geminae stant vertice cristae  
et pater ipse suo superum iam signat honore?'

'Yet Romulus, son of Mars, will join himself **in company to his grandfather**, Romulus whom his mother Ilia, of Assaracan blood, will bear. Do you see, how twin crests stand on his helmet, and the father of the gods himself distinguishes him with his own mark of honour?'

Again, a link of temporal succession is forged by *avo*, referring to Romulus' grandfather Numitor. However, the same line undermines this sense of *ordo* and

sequential history by reminding the reader that these figures are appearing simultaneously: the soul of Romulus is a *comitem* of the souls of his ancestors; they are all crowded together regardless of age and time around Aeneas, Ascanius and the Sibyl. This paves the way for the striking and anachronistic insertion of Augustus directly after Romulus, the first mythical founder of a city on the site of Rome more than 700 years before him (6.788-92):

**huc geminas nunc flecte acies, hanc aspice gentem**

Romanosque tuos. hic Caesar et omnis Iuli

progenies magnum caeli ventura sub axem.

790

hic vir, hic est, tibi quem promitti saepius audis,

Augustus Caesar, divi genus...

**‘Now turn your twinned eyes over here, look** at this race and your Romans. Here is Caesar and the whole family of Iulus that will come up to the great axis of heaven. This is the man, this is the one, whom you have often heard to be promised to you – Augustus Caesar, the offspring of a god.’

Aeneas has no way of knowing that Augustus does not come directly after Romulus, especially since Anchises told him that he would teach him his *fata*, and suggested that this would be *ordine*.

Virgil is creating an *ordo* that is not consistently based, as we might expect fate to be, on chronology or reality. Instead of corresponding with actual events, the *ordo* of *fata* in the *Aeneid* is unstable, and can prioritize episodes and individuals according to their significance to Rome.<sup>106</sup> Interestingly, as part of this technique,

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<sup>106</sup> Hardie (2012: 103) also discusses the ‘selective revelation’ of Anchises, but sees this as one of Virgil’s ‘attempts to weld together *fama* and *fatum* indissolubly’: though

we are presented with a circular and spatial rather than linear and temporal vision of *fata*: Anchises, Aeneas and the Sibyl are on a raised mound in the centre of all the souls from all periods of Roman history. This mirrors the closely-related reconstruction of Roman history in book eight, where Augustus and Actium appear at the centre of Aeneas' circular shield.<sup>107</sup> It also ensures that what the reader perceives as a 700-year leap can be configured spatially as a redirection of the gaze (*huc geminas nunc flecte acies, hanc aspice gentem/Romanosque tuos*).

### Conclusion

Fate is a prevalent influence on the characters and events of the *Aeneid*. This prevalence is suggestive of Stoicism, and the Stoic explanation of fate as universal causal determinism, which resonates with certain other aspects of Virgil's characterization of fate in the poem. However, the Stoic perspective is one amongst many, and Virgil encourages the reader to combine his/her consideration of fate in philosophical terms with the suggestion that fate is closely related to literature and narrative. The tension between these two standpoints - the philosophical and literary - promotes reflection. For example, Virgil compares the influence of *fata* on characters in his poem with the restrictions imposed on his poetry by literary precedent, thereby suggesting that

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Anchises introduces the content of the prophecy as '*fata*' (6.759 above), Virgil later suggests that it contained *fama* (6.889 *incenditque animum famae venientis amore*).

<sup>107</sup> 8.675 *in medio classis aeratas, Actia bella....* Virgil also links the content of this ecphrasis with fate (8.731 *famamque et fata nepotum*) and prophecy (8.626-9 *illic res Italas Romanorumque triumphos/ haud vatam ignarus venturique inscius aevi/ fecerat ignipotens* 'on it, the fire god had wrought Italian history and the triumphs of the Romans, **not ignorant of the prophets, and with knowledge of the age to come**').

his ability to be creative with myth and history is an analogy for the possibility of self-determination within a fated universe. He also confuses poets and prophets, and poetry and fate, to such a degree that fate and history seem as malleable as literature. The providence of Stoic fate is reformulated as the intention of the poet who restructures its *ordo* to his own artistic or political ends.

### 3. Causation and Moral Responsibility

Unlike either of the Homeric epics,<sup>1</sup> Apollonius' *Argonautica* or Ennius' *Annales*, the *Aeneid* opens with a request to the Muse for causes (1.8-11):<sup>2</sup>

Musa, **mihi causas memora**, quo **numine** laeso

quidve dolens **regina deum** tot volvere casus

insignem pietate virum, tot adire labores

impulerit. tantaene animis caelestibus irae?

Muse, **tell me the causes**, because of the slighting of which **divinity**, or grieving what, did the **queen of the gods** drive a man notable for his piety to undergo so many misfortunes, and face so many struggles - are the angers in heavenly hearts so great?

Whilst philosophers and historians commonly emphasize their interest in causes, this is more unusual for an epic poet.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, even though exploration of *causae*

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<sup>1</sup> This is not to say that Homer is not interested in causation at all. In the *Iliad*, several characters debate related questions. For example, Achilles says it is Agamemenon and Menelaus, not the Trojans, who are the reason why he came to fight at Troy (Hom. *Il.* 1.153; see also Eur. *I.A.* 932-43, where Achilles again cites Agamemenon as τὸ... αἴτιον, but this time of Iphigenia's death); Priam, as demonstrated below, reassures Helen by saying that she is not the cause of the war (Hom. *Il.* 3.161-5).

<sup>2</sup> The openings of Lucan's *Bellum Civile* (1.67 *fert animus causas tantarum expromere rerum*) and Silius Italicus' *Punica* (1.17-9 *tantarum causas irarum odiumque perenni/servatum studio et mandata nepotibus arma/fas aperire mihi, superasque recludere mentes*) are testament to Virgil's influence.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. Pl. *Phd.* 96a6-8, where the aim of natural philosophy (περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαν) is described as 'knowledge of the causes of individual things', εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου. Herodotus defines the project of his *Histories* as being to make known the 'great and marvellous deeds of the Greeks and foreigners and especially the reason (δι' ἣν αἰτίην) why they warred against each other' (Hdt. 1.1, trans. Godley). Though at the opening of the epic Virgil is asking about the cause of Juno's anger, elsewhere in the epic he, like historians, is most interested in the causes of war, and in particular of the cause of the war in Latium, which I will discuss in more detail below. Herodotus accordingly continues the introduction to his *Histories* by reporting differing Persian and Phoenician views on the cause of Greek wars with barbarians, though he does not adjudicate

might be deemed philosophical, Virgil is here pointedly antagonistic to the philosopher-poet Lucretius. It is central to Lucretius' mission to set out the true cause, *veram exponere causam* (Lucr. 3.951) of universal phenomena. His aim by doing so is to eradicate fear by stopping humans attributing things they don't understand to the gods (Lucr. 1.151-4):<sup>4</sup>

quippe ita formido mortalis continet omnis,  
quod multa in terris fieri caeloque tuentur,  
quorum operum **causas** nulla ratione videre  
possunt, ac fieri **divino numine** rentur.<sup>5</sup>

For assuredly a dread holds all mortals thus in bond, because they behold many things happening in heaven and earth whose **causes** they can by no means see, and they think them to be done by **divine power**. (trans. Rouse)

Virgil's proem clearly challenges Lucretius' separation of causal explanation and divine intervention: the motives of the gods are precisely the *causae* Virgil is interested in (*quo numine laeso/ quidve dolens regina deum...*; 1.25-6 *necdum etiam causae irarum saevique dolores/ exciderant animo*). As noted in the introduction, that the gods should be angry or involved in human affairs at all goes against Epicurean doctrine.<sup>6</sup> Virgil thus pointedly and uncomfortably re-

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between them (Hdt. 1.1-4). Thucydides likewise reports different views as to the causes of the Peloponnesian wars, but additionally seems to consider it part of the job of a historian to give his own argument as to which cause should be considered the most important (e.g. Thuc. 1.23.6).

<sup>4</sup> See also Lucr. 5.1161ff., 1183-7, 6.53ff.

<sup>5</sup> Note that Virgil follows the Lucretian habit of placing *numine* in the 5<sup>th</sup> foot.

<sup>6</sup> Lucr. 5.82= 6.58 *nam bene qui didicere deos securum agere aevom*. As noted in the *Introduction*, Virgil also challenges this facet of Epicurean theology at 4.379-80.

appropriates the *causae* of Lucretius' natural philosophy into the religious machinery of his epic.<sup>7</sup>

This chapter will accordingly explore *causae* in the *Aeneid* from a philosophical perspective, drawing on my discussion of fate and Virgil's engagement with the Stoic theory of causal determinism in the previous chapter. I argue that Virgil makes *causae* prominent in his narrative because he is interested in the following questions:

1. Is it possible to make a narrative out of causation?
2. What constitutes a cause, and how can causes be identified?
3. What is the relationship between causation and moral responsibility?

My discussion of each of these issues will follow the order outlined above. To begin (3.1. *Narrating causes*), I suggest that the characterization of fate in the *Aeneid* both as Stoic causal determinism and as narrative poetry raises the question of whether the two are compatible, particularly in their use of causes. Is the Stoic conception of a *series causarum*, a cause as one inextricable part of an infinite causal nexus, compatible with the narrative necessity of selecting and emphasizing a few causes for the sake of clarity and understanding? I argue that Virgil highlights this problem, thereby intimating that it is difficult to reconcile the objective worldview of Stoic philosophy with human perspective, understanding and explanation.

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<sup>7</sup> The prominence of *causae* in Virgil's proem may also reflect the influence of Callimachus, who, like Virgil, is interested in the αἴτιον of divine anger, and in particular the anger of the queen of the gods (Callim. *Hymn* 4.218-21 – Iris tells Hera that Leto is giving birth to Zeus' child Apollo): “**Ἡρῆ** τιμῆσσα, πολὺ προὔχουσα θεάων/ σὴ μὲν ἐγώ, σὰ δὲ πάντα, σὺ δὲ κρείουσα κάθησαι/ γνησίῃ Οὐλύμποιο, καὶ οὐ χέρα δειδμεν ἄλλην/ θηλυτέρην, **σὺ δ', ἄνασσα, τὸν αἴτιον εἶσεαι ὀργῆς...**”

I continue to explore this suggestion in what follows (3. ii. *causae belli: the many causes of the war in Latium*), which traces the varying *causae* of the war in Latium, and in doing so engages with the second question above. For, using a technique familiar from historiography, both Virgil and his characters give varying and sometimes contradictory reasons for the outbreak of war. However, unlike in historiography, Virgil does not adjudicate between these varying *causae*. Instead, his narrative demonstrates that it is people's subjective beliefs and claims about causes, even if they are mistaken, that drive the plot and determine the action. The fallible perspective of individual humans on causation is once more set in opposition to the supposedly objective perspectives of philosophy and historiography, and Virgil tantalizingly suggests that the former may be more important.

I finally turn to examine causes and the related question of moral responsibility in Dido and Aeneas' relationship and her subsequent suicide (3. iii. *Dido's culpa and Aeneas' culpa*). Virgil severely obfuscates causation and agency in this episode. Firstly, fire and wound metaphors suggest that Dido's love caused her death, but it is unclear whether Venus, Dido or Aeneas (who is implicated via the doe simile 4.68-73) are responsible for this. I then use Cicero's *De Fato* to show that Dido's famous claim that she would have been lucky if only the Trojans never arrived (*'felix, heu nimium felix...!'* 4.657-8) is philosophically spurious: though the arrival of the Trojans was a necessary precursor, it was not sufficient to determine her love. But equally, though Aeneas tries to abnegate responsibility for Dido's suicide by saying he left Carthage unwillingly, a Stoic

analysis of his decision-making shows that this is not the case. I additionally argue that the much-discussed allusion to Catullus 66 in Aeneas' final words to Dido in the Underworld (*'invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi.'* 6.460) forges a connection, via the *Coma Berenices*, to the *sidus Iulium* and the death and deification of Julius Caesar. I therefore conclude by considering the possible political implications of ultimately leaving the question of causation and moral responsibility unanswered whilst demonstrating traces of guilt on all sides.

### 3. i. Narrating causes

In the last chapter I discussed ways in which Virgil's narrative poetry helps the reader think philosophically about fate. I focussed particularly but not exclusively on Virgil's engagement with the Stoic theory of causal determinism, and justified this focus through reference to Virgil's terminology, imagery and intellectual context. As I will now look more closely at causes in the *Aeneid*, let us revisit Cicero's definition of causal determinism (Cic. *Div.* 1.125):<sup>8</sup>

fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἰμαρμένην, **id est ordinem  
seriemque causarum, cum causae causa nexa rem ex se gignat.** ea est  
ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. quod cum ita sit, nihil est  
factum quod non futurum fuerit, eodem modo **nihil est futurum cuius  
non causas id ipsum efficientis natura contineat.** ex quo intellegitur, ut  
fatum sit non id, quod superstitiose, sed id, quod physice dicitur, **causa**

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<sup>8</sup> Cicero also explains and defines *causae* at Cic. *Part. Or.* 110, *Top.* 58-9, and *Fat.* 34 (quoted below).

**aeterna rerum**, cur et ea, quae praeterierunt, facta sint et, quae instant, fiant et, quae sequuntur, futura sint.

Now by Fate I mean the same that the Greeks call εἰμαρμένη, **that is, an orderly succession of causes wherein cause is linked to cause and each cause of itself produces an effect.** That is an immortal truth having its source in all eternity. Therefore nothing has happened which was not bound to happen, and, likewise, **nothing is going to happen which will not find in nature every efficient cause of its happening.** Consequently, we know that fate is that which is called, not ignorantly, but scientifically, the eternal cause of things, the wherefore of things past, of things present, and of things to come. (trans. Falconer)

The arrangement and inter-relationship of causes constitutes the entire past, present and future universe. Absolutely everything is ultimately connected in mutual interdependence. The first problem the inclusion of the *causae* of causal determinism in his epic raises for Virgil is therefore one of scope. If the Muse does supply *causas*, where will she begin and end? Even once these beginnings and endings have been determined, it will be impossible for Virgil to explain every *causae causa nexa*. The second problem is accordingly one of relative importance. The poet will have to select some *causae* from this infinite nexus to include and emphasize, and some to ignore.

In terms of the latter, I explained above (1. v. *Allecto: the unnameable*) that Stoics did differentiate between different types of cause. Cicero's account of Chrysippus' explanation of the compatibility of universal causal determinism with moral responsibility utilized the distinction between 'triggering' and 'primary' causes.<sup>9</sup> External stimuli are 'triggering' causes, which means that they are necessary precursors to our responses and actions, but not sufficient to determine them. The human faculty of assent, however, is a 'primary' cause,

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<sup>9</sup> Cic. *Fat.* 41-3. Again, my use of 'triggering' and 'primary' to describe the hierarchy of causes in Stoic determinism follows Long & Sedley (1987(1): 383).

which characterizes the effect the external stimulus has, and determines and explains our reaction. I will additionally explore below the related distinction between ‘antecedent’ events on the one hand, and events which are both ‘antecedent’ and ‘efficient’ on the other – Cicero suggests that only the latter are *causae* (3. iii. *Dido’s culpa and Aeneas’ culpa*). But these distinctions between causes do not provide a solution for the epic poet as to which *causae* to include in a narrative and which to omit. For one, they proliferate rather than minimize *causae*. Moreover, it would not be possible to explain an event through only ‘primary’ or ‘efficient’ causes: the Stoics argued that it was the combination of different causes/types of causes that rendered events.

These problems with causal determinism are not exclusive to epic poetry. For anyone trying to understand or explain event or state of affairs *E*, it is impossible and unhelpful to conceive of the infinite interconnection of causes contributing to it. Instead we first have to take a snapshot in space and time, the dimensions of whose frame, even if delineated at one end by *E*, will to some extent be arbitrary (the problem of scope). Within this snapshot it is then necessary to select a number of notable causes that seem particularly significant in creating the outcome *E* (the problem of relative importance). This two-step process, the snapshot followed by selection of causes, creates a narrative of causation essential to our ability to understand and think about *E*. It is, for example, essential to the project of historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides. However, it is also, inescapably, to some extent both subjective and haphazard.

Even if one accepts causal determinism as an explanation of what has happened and will happen in the universe, therefore, these problems raise the question of the relevance of the perspective of causal determinism to human lived experience. Let's say someone manages to conceive of the world objectively as an infinite interconnection of causes. How will he/she answer the question 'what is the cause of this?'. The answer will always be the same and it will always be endless – an account of the mutual causal relationship between everything in the universe. This answer is not practically helpful, nor does it help our understanding of individual events. Therefore, it is necessary not just for the epic poet but also for every human being to subjugate this universal, physical outlook to a subjective and selective narrative of causation. This holds equally in science, philosophy, history/historiography, poetry and everyday conversation.

Virgil neatly addresses this issue through his simultaneous characterization of fate as both Stoic causal determinism, according to which *causae* are integrated into an infinite and universal causal network, and narrative poetry, in which a few select *causae* are given prominence for the sake of the clarity of the story. In particular, he explores the problem of the relative importance of *causae* through the suggestion that there are crucial moments or turning points in history and in stories, and the problem of appropriate scope in his selection of the beginnings and endings of his poem and of narratives within it.

Horace makes this problem of scope integral to his discussion of epic poetry in the *Ars Poetica* (Hor. *Ars P.* 136-52), which is roughly contemporaneous with the

*Aeneid*.<sup>10</sup> According to him, an epic poet should not seek to tell the whole story of the Trojan war, but should rather delineate a manageable part (just as the *Odyssey* focusses on one man), and launch *in medias res* (just as the *Iliad* starts in the ninth year of the conflict). Virgil perfectly fulfils these criteria at the beginning of the *Aeneid*, which specifies his subject Aeneas in a brief proem, before almost immediately entering the story at the point when the Trojans are sailing away from Sicily, seven years after the fall of Troy. This makes clear that Virgil is not interested in tracing an infinite causal chain, or in sticking doggedly to the definition of *causae* in Stoic causal determinism. Rather, the *causas* he requests from the Muse are those compatible with Homeric epic.<sup>11</sup> This is true both of the poem as a whole, and of extended narratives told by characters within it. Dido, for example, asks Aeneas to tell his story ‘from the very beginning’ (1.753-6):

‘immo age et **a prima** dic, hospes, **origine** nobis  
insidias’ inquit ‘Danaum casusque tuorum  
erroresque tuos; nam te iam septima portat

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<sup>10</sup> Cf. Aristotle’s discussion of the construction of tragic plots, esp. *Poet.* 1450b22-1451a36. On the dating of the *Ars Poetica* see: Smith (1936), who argues it was published between 23-22 BC; Duckworth (1965), who argues for a later date based on Horace’s use of hexameters; and d’Anna (1983), who bases his argument for publication after 13 BC on the evidence of the manuscript tradition.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. Arist. *Poet.* 1451a25-6 on Homer’s composition of the *Odyssey*: ‘Ὀδύσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη ‘though composing an *Odyssey*, he did not include every feature of the hero’s life’ (trans. Fyfe). Cosmogonical or philosophical epic, by contrast, attempts to explain the origins of things from the very beginning. Cf. Hes. *Theog.* 108, 116; Ov. *Met.* 1.3 *primaeque ab origine mundi*. Lucretius both pays heed to and corrects this tradition by starting with his explanation of how nothing can come into being from nothing (Lucr. 1. 155-6), and Virgil alludes to this different sort of epic when he describes the songs of Iopas in the *Aeneid* (1.743 *unde hominum genus et pecudes*), and Silenus in the *Eclogues* (Verg. *Ecl.* 6.33 *ut his ex omnia primis*).

omnibus errantem terris et fluctibus aestas.'

'Yes, come on, tell us **from the very beginning**, guest, the story of the treachery of the Greeks, and the misfortunes of your people and your wanderings. For it is now the seventh summer that carries you wandering over all lands and seas.'

However, her request is not granted, for Aeneas, like a good epic poet, gives an abridged (*breviter* 2.11) account of things, sidestepping events covered in the *Iliad* and the epic cycle.

Likewise, though Virgil claims that he will tell the story of Rome's foundation (*dum **conderet** urbem* 1.5, *tantae molis erat Romanam **condere** gentem* 1.33), he does not actually include this event in the *Aeneid*. Instead, the dark and unsettling ending of the poem highlights the truncated and restricted scope of Virgil's explanation (12.950-2):

hoc dicens ferrum adverso sub pectore **condit**

fervidus; ast illi solvuntur frigore membra

vitaque cum gemitu fugit indignata sub umbras.

Saying this he **buried** his sword beneath his enemy's chest, seething with rage, and Turnus' limbs slackened and went cold, and his aggrieved life fled down to the shades with a groan.

*condit* links this passage to the opening of the *Aeneid* (see above), and suggests that the act of killing Turnus plays a crucial role in Rome's foundation. But this is surely an unusual choice of focus for the final scene of a ktistic epic: there is no explanation of how this act is conclusive in securing a Roman future, and the violence and speed of the killing is hardly closural. In terms of both beginnings and endings, therefore, Virgil jars his reader into awareness that he is offering a

questionably limited snapshot of the events leading to Rome's foundation rather than the full story.

Within this limited scope, he also makes clear that some *causae* or events are more important than others. For example, when Venus disguises herself as a huntress to meet Aeneas in book one, she self-consciously selects only the salient points in Dido's story to tell her son by way of background information (1.340-2):

‘imperium Dido Tyria regit urbe profecta,  
germanum fugiens. longa est iniuria, longae  
ambages; sed **summa sequar fastigia rerum.**’

‘Dido rules this realm, who left the city of Tyre in flight from her brother. The story of the injustice is wrong, and long is its winding course; but **I will attend to the most important parts of what happened.**’

Her narrative gives a summary and highlights rather than exhaustively tracing the long and ambiguous explanation as to why Dido is in Carthage. Further attention is drawn to her selectivity by Virgil's innovative use of *fastigium*, which literally means ‘tip’ or ‘apex’.<sup>12</sup> Virgil likewise makes a point of depicting Aeneas' stay in Carthage as pivotal. Again this appears in the speech of Venus, who is expressing her concerns about Juno's intentions (1.670-2):

‘nunc Phoenissa tenet Dido blandisque moratur  
vocibus et vereor quo se Iunonia vertant

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<sup>12</sup> See OLD ‘*fastigium*’, 5b ‘*fig.* the highest point of any activity, peak, pinnacle’; TLL s.v. 2B ‘*caput, summa*’. Virgil is the earliest example of this usage.

hospitia: haud **tanto** cessabit **cardine rerum.**'

'Now Phoenician Dido has him in her clutches and delays him with flattering words, and I fear to what end Juno's hospitality is directing itself: she won't give up at **such a decisive moment in history.**'

The Servian commentaries suggest that *cardo*, which means 'pivot' or 'hinge', is indicative of uncertainty, because a door on a hinge can move in different directions.<sup>13</sup> However, other uses of this word in the *Aeneid* are within a context where a door or gate can be one of two things: open or closed.<sup>14</sup> It therefore seems more fitting to read *cardo* here as indicating that this is a decisive moment; Venus is defining Aeneas' stay in Carthage as a turning point, rather than a period of more general uncertainty.<sup>15</sup> Again, as in the case of *fastigium*, Virgil seems to be innovating when he uses *cardo* figuratively to articulate the relative importance of different parts of a story/history.<sup>16</sup>

Further support for this reading of *cardo*, according to which Aeneas' stay in Carthage is 'a decisive moment in history', can be found at the end of book three. Here, Aeneas ends his narration of his '*casusque...erroresque*' (1.754-5) with the following lines (3.714-5):

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<sup>13</sup> Serv. auct. *ad Aen.* 1.672: *quidam sic intellegunt: cum in incerto statutae res sunt, in cardine esse dicuntur et translationem verbi ianua tractam volunt, quae motu cardinis hac atque illac inpelli potest.*

<sup>14</sup> E.g. 6.573, 7.621, 9.724. In the latter two cases, which describe Juno's opening of the Gates of War and Pandarus' shutting of the gates of the Trojan camp respectively, the literal turning of a hinge is also figuratively a turning point in events.

<sup>15</sup> Serv. *ad Aen.* 1.672: *proverbio dicitur 'res in cardine est', hoc est in articulo.* But this proverbial usage is not attested in Publilius Syrus, or any author earlier than Virgil (TLL 'cardo' 2B).

<sup>16</sup> See OLD 'cardo': '6. a turning point or critical juncture in a situation', and n. 12 above.

'hic labor extremus, **longarumque haec meta viarum,**

hinc me digressum vestris deus appulit oris.'

'This was our final toil, **this was the goal-post of our long journeys,** once I had departed from here the god drove me to your shores.'

A *meta* is the 'cone-shaped turning post at either end of a racetrack'.<sup>17</sup> During a chariot-race, it acts as a turning point, but at the end it also functions as the finish line. On one reading, therefore, the ambiguity of Aeneas' phrasing is rhetorically apt, as it could either mean that the Trojans have completed a difficult lap of their journey towards Rome, or flatter Dido into thinking that Carthage was their final destination (a supposition supported by '*labor extremus*').<sup>18</sup> On another, it pathetically encapsulates the disjunction between Aeneas' perspective and wish that this is the end of his struggles, and the reader's awareness that it is not. In either case, Virgil's innovative and figurative use of *meta*, as well as *fastigium* and *cardo*, demonstrates that telling stories and giving accounts involves a selection of causes, and an emphasis on particular moments. This selection and emphasis does not correspond with the Stoic differentiation of causes: the *fastigia rerum* which Venus includes in the summary of Dido's story, for example, are not 'principal' or 'efficient' causes, as opposed to 'triggering' and 'antecedent' ones. It therefore remains difficult to reconcile the demands of a literary narrative of causation with the universal perspective of causal determinism.

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<sup>17</sup> OLD '*meta*', 2. Aristotle compares the difference between enquiries from first principles and enquiries to first principles with an athletic race either from the judges to the finish-line, or from the finish-line to the judges (Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1095a32-b2). Again, Virgil is the earliest attested author to use *meta* in this way (TLL s.v.).

<sup>18</sup> NB Jupiter's prophecy in book one suggests that Roman history will not have turning points or limits (1.278-9): '*his ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono:/ imperium sine fine dedi...*'

### 3. ii. Causae belli: the many causes of the war in Latium

The importance and difficulty of selecting *causae* is explored in more detail in Virgil's account of the war in Latium in the second half of the *Aeneid*. Here, Virgil's authorial voice does not clearly select or validate the causes of events. Instead, he uses his characters to present different incompatible and unresolved perspectives on the *causa* of the fighting. Drances, the Sibyl, Aeneas and Amata each identify one significant event, object or person as the cause, and who or what they choose has a huge impact on their actions and their attitude towards events and vice versa. As a reflection of this multiplicity, even the narrator makes different and contradictory statements about causes. The effect is that *causae* are underlined as being important in the poem, and do determine the plot. However, the *causae* that matter are not the objective, interconnected causes of causal determinism. Instead, it is the *causae* that arise as a function of blinkered human perspectives and differing agendas that drive, explain and justify the things that happen.

The Sibyl is the first to designate a *causa* for the conflict in Italy (6.86-7, 93-4):

'...bella, horrida bella,  
et Thybrim multo spumantem sanguine cerno...  
...  
**causa** mali tanti **coniunx** iterum **hospita** Teucris  
externique iterum thalami.'

‘Wars, horrific wars I see, and the Tiber foaming with blood... Again the **cause** of such great evil for the Trojans will be the **wife of a host**, again foreign marriage.’

She, the mouthpiece of Apollo (6.77-80, 100-1), predicts that a foreign wife will be the cause of the great evil that will befall Aeneas and the Trojans. This must be Lavinia, though neither Aeneas nor the reader has met her yet. Prophecy and history overlap here too (see above 2. Fate, Literature and Narrative): *iterum...* *iterum* reminds Aeneas that the last Trojan war was also ‘caused’ by a foreign wife, Helen.<sup>19</sup> In this way, Virgil encourages the reader to consider his imminent depiction of the war in Italy alongside Homer’s *Iliad*, and in particular to compare Helen and Lavinia as respective *causae* of conflict. Indeed, the broader trend of alleging stolen women as the causes of conflict and enmity is also reflected in historiography. Herodotus in particular records the Persian view that the Phoenicians set off all the wars between the Greeks and barbarians by stealing Io from the Argives, which in turn led to the Argive Jason’s theft of Colchean Medea, and the Trojan prince Paris’ abduction of Helen (Hdt. 1.1-4). But he also notes that the Persians thought that the Greek response to the theft of Helen was disproportionate and unjustified, suggesting that this was only a pretext for war.

Indeed, although Helen seems to have been proverbially considered the cause of the Trojan war,<sup>20</sup> in the *Iliad*, Priam tells Helen that it is not she, but the gods, who are αἴτιοί (Hom. *Il.* 3.161-5):<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> *thalami* has a suitably Greek ring.

<sup>20</sup> E.g. Cic. *Phil.* 2.55, Hor. *Sat.* 1.3.107-10.

<sup>21</sup> Hector likewise says the war is because of Paris, not Helen (Hom. *Il.* 6.328-9): σέο δ’ εἵνεκ’ αὐτῇ τε πτόλεμός τε/ ἄστυ τόδ’ ἀμφιδέδεε.

... Πρίαμος δ' Ἑλένην ἐκαλέσσατο φωνῇ·

“δεῦρο πάροιθ' ἐλθοῦσα φίλον τέκος ἴζευ ἐμεῖο,

ὄφρα ἴδῃ πρότερόν τε πόσιν πηούς τε φίλους τε·

**οὐ τί μοι αἰτία ἐσσί, θεοί νύ μοι αἴτιοί εἰσιν**

οἳ μοι ἐφώρμησαν πόλεμον πολύδακρυν Ἀχαιῶν.”

But Priam spoke, and called Helen to him: ‘Come here, dear child, and sit in front of me, so that you may see your former husband and your kinspeople and those dear to you. **You are in no way to blame in my eyes: it is the gods, surely, who are to blame**, who roused against me the tearful war of the Achaeans.’ (trans. Murray)

Even though Lavinia’s role in events is not yet clear, the Homeric allusion already makes the Sibyl’s claim that she is *causa mali tanti* questionable. Other real and fictional foreign wives cast (spuriously?) as causes of wars also lurk in the shadows, especially Dido, whose dying curse on her ‘husband’ Aeneas and his descendants functions as an αἴτιον for the Punic Wars (‘...*nullus amor populis nec foedera sunt*’ 4.624-9), and Cleopatra, depicted on Aeneas’ shield with her ‘husband’ Mark Antony at the battle of Actium (*Aegyptia coniunx* 8.688).

In book seven, Juno, via Allecto, sets the war in motion by inflaming Turnus and Amata, and instigating a conflict between the Trojans and Italians. Now it is Virgil who designates one of Allecto’s actions the *prima causa* of their difficulties (7.475-82):

dum Turnus Rutulos animis audacibus implet,

Allecto in Teucros Stygiis se concitat alis,

arte nova, speculata locum, quo litore pulcher

insidiis cursuque feras agitabat Iulus.

hic subitam canibus rabiem Cocytia virgo

obicit et noto naris contingit odore, 480

ut cervum ardentem agerent; **quae prima laborum**

**causa fuit belloque animos accendit agrestis.**

While Turnus filled the Rutulians with hearts of daring, Allecto roused herself against the Trojans on her infernal wings. This time, she used a different technique, having spied out the place on the shore where Iulus used to drive beasts with traps and his chase. Here the maiden of Cocytus cast a sudden frenzy over the dogs and touched their nostrils with a well-known scent, so that, burning with desire, they would pursue the stag. **This was the first cause of their difficulties, and inflamed the hearts of the country people with war.**

Allecto gives Iulus' hunting dogs the scent not just of any stag, but of a cherished, pet stag belonging to Silvia, the daughter of Tyrrhus,<sup>22</sup> Latinus' gamekeeper. It is this action, rather than Iulus' eventual wounding of the animal, which Virgil claims is the initial *causa* of unrest. The mysterious yet powerful role of Allecto further obscures the causation of this entire episode – Duckworth (1956: 359) goes so far as to suggest that she is designed to acquit both sides of responsibility.<sup>23</sup>

Virgil's view on the *causa laborum* is not, however, corroborated by the opinion of the Latin orator Drances. Virgil introduces this character much later, in book 11, after four books of fighting (11.122-32). He is part of the Latin embassy to Aeneas, and described as an unpleasant old man who is good with words and has

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<sup>22</sup> See chapter one (*True Names and False Names*) for discussion of similarly named Trojans, Tyrrhenians and Tyrians.

<sup>23</sup> See chapter one (*True Names and False Names*) for discussion of Allecto, and how she relates to our understanding of fate and moral responsibility.

an abiding jealousy and dislike for Turnus.<sup>24</sup> As we might expect, therefore, when he speaks in the *concilium* called by Latinus, he argues that Turnus is the *causa* of the war and their misfortunes (11.336-342, 360-1):

tum Drances idem infensus, quem gloria Turni  
 obliqua invidia stimulisque agitabat amaris,  
 largus opum et lingua melior, sed frigida bello  
 dextera, consiliis habitus non futilis auctor,  
 seditione potens (genus huic materna superbum        340  
 nobilitas dabat, incertum de patre ferebat),  
 surgit et his onerat dictis atque aggerat iras:  
 ...  
 ‘quid miseros totiens in aperta pericula civis        360  
 proicis, **o Latio caput horum et causa malorum?**’<sup>25</sup>

Then that same savage Drances – he who was harassed by twisted envy and bitter goads at the thought of Turnus’ glory, a wealthy man who was rather good with words, but whose right hand was chill to war, who wasn’t considered to be an insignificant authority during debates, and who was powerful in sedition (for his mother’s nobility gave him a proud lineage, whilst he bore an uncertain one on his father’s side) - got up and oppressed them with his words and added to their anger:... ‘Why do you so many times hurl our poor citizens into open dangers, **you who are the source and cause of all these evils in Latium?**’

Though Drances is airing a viewpoint shared by others,<sup>26</sup> Virgil makes clear that he has his own personal motivations for designating Turnus the *causa*. He is

<sup>24</sup> See 11.336-40 (quoted above), 11.122-3 *tum senior semperque odiis et crimine Drances/ infensus iuveni Turno*, and 11.220-1 *ingravat haec saevus Drances solumque vocari/ testatur, solum posci in certamina Turnum*.

<sup>25</sup> Drances’ wording is reminiscent of Eur. *I.A.* 895 (Old Man speaking): Μενέλεως ἀφείλεθ’ ἡμᾶς, ὃς **κακῶν τῶνδ’ αἴτιος**...

generally a hostile character (*infensus*), and particularly goaded by envy of Turnus' *gloria*. Moreover, he himself has no wish to take part in a war (*sed frigida bello/ dextera*) – why not solve both problems by suggesting that Turnus fights a duel to end the fighting? Virgil lays bare the subjective calculations that lead to his conclusion.

The description of a *concilium* at a time of crisis is a regular feature of historiography, and commentators have rightly suggested that the style of Drances' character sketch and speech is reminiscent of late Republican politics.<sup>27</sup> One might accordingly compare Drances' rhetoric and claims that Turnus is the *caput... et causa* of all the Latins' misfortunes with Cicero's lambasting of Mark Antony in the *Philippics* (Cic. *Phil.* 2.53, 55):

tu, tu, inquam, M. Antoni, princeps C. Caesarioni perturbare cupienti  
**causam belli** contra patriam ferendi dedisti. quid enim aliud ille dicebat,  
 quam **causam** sui dementissimi consili et facti adferebat, nisi quod  
 intercessio neglecta, ius tribunicium sublatum, circumscriptus a senatu  
 esset Antonius? omitto quam haec falsa, quam levia, praesertim cum  
 omnino **nulla causa iusta** cuiquam esse possit contra patriam arma  
 capiendi. **sed nihil de Caesare: tibi certe confitendum est causam**  
**perniciossimi belli in persona tua constitisse...** ut igitur in seminibus

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<sup>26</sup> 11.215-9 *hic matres miseraeque nurus, hic cara sororum/ pectora maerentum puerique parentibus orbi/ dirum exsecrantur bellum Turnique hymenaeos;/ ipsum armis ipsumque iubent decernere ferro,/ qui regnum Italiae et primos sibi poscat honores.*

<sup>27</sup> Most commentators now reject the Renaissance suggestion that Drances was specifically intended as a portrait of Cicero, but agree that Drances' portrayal is laced with the demagoguery and rhetoric of late Republican politics. See e.g. Horsfall (2003 *ad* 11.122-32, 343-75); Gransden (1991: 14-5); Kennedy (1972: 394-5).

est **causa** arborum et stirpium, sic huius luctuosissimi belli semen tu  
 fuisti... **ut Helena Troianis, sic iste huic rei publicae belli causa, causa**  
**pestis atque exiti** fuit.

You, yes, you, Marcus Antonius, were the first one to give Gaius Caesar, who desired to throw everything into confusion, **a pretext for making war** upon his native land. What else did Caesar say, what **pretext** did he offer for his absolutely mad design and deed except that the veto had been ignored, the tribunician prerogative annulled, Antonius curtailed of his rights by the senate? I refrain from saying how false and frivolous these pretexts were, especially **since no excuse whatsoever can justify** any man in taking up arms against his native land. **But leave Caesar out of it: you at least must admit that your person constituted the occasion of that most terrible war ...** Thus, just as the cause of trees and shrubs is in their seeds, so you were the seed of this most lamentable war... **As Helen was to the Trojans, so this fellow was to this Republic, the cause of war, the cause of ruinous destruction.** (trans. Shackleton Bailey)

Cicero's bitter invective underlines the historical power and importance of competing claims about the *causae* of war and civil disturbance. In this short passage, he uses *causa* seven times, and capitalizes on its different meanings: Caesar was looking for a 'pretext' for civil war, though there is never a just 'reason' for this, but Antony, you were really the 'cause' of everything. Like Virgil and Herodotus, he uses Helen → Trojan war as one stereotypical example of a cause. The other, seed → tree, adds further weight to his argument by imbuing it with the empiricism and objectivity of natural philosophy.

In response to Drances, Turnus delivers a passionate call to arms (11.378-444). Before the *concilium* can reach a conclusion about their differing viewpoints, a messenger rushes in and interrupts their discussion by announcing that the Trojan army is approaching the city. The meeting is dissolved and, whilst Turnus leads men into battle, the rest of Latinus' people prepare to defend the city. In

this melee, the women, including Lavinia and her mother, bring offerings to a temple of Pallas Athena (11.477-485):

nec non **ad templum summasque ad Palladis arces**  
 subvehitur magna matrum regina caterva  
**dona ferens**, iuxtaque comes Lavinia virgo,  
**causa mali tanti**, oculos deiecta decoros. 480  
 succedunt matres et templum ture vaporant  
 et **maestas alto fundunt de limine voces**:  
 ‘**armipotens, praeses belli, Tritonia virgo,**  
**frange manu telum Phrygii praedonis, et ipsum**  
**prorum sterne solo portisque effunde sub altis.**’ 485

The queen was being transported **up to the temple and the highest citadels of Pallas**, accompanied by a great crowd of matrons, and **bearing gifts**. And unwed Lavinia went next to her as a companion, **the cause of such great evil**, with her fair eyes cast down. The matrons arrive and smoke the temple with incense and **roll forth sorrowful cries from the high threshold**: ‘**O goddess powerful in arms, guardian of war, Tritonian virgin, break with your hand the spear of the Trojan robber, lay him stretched out on the earth and send him headlong beneath the high gates.**’

The authorial voice here exactly echoes the words of the Sibyl, designating Lavinia once more the *causa mali tanti* (see above 6.93-4). However, at this later stage in the poem, the reader has more information with which to assess this claim, and to weigh it against other competing assertions. Lavinia has been entirely passive as events have unfolded, and she has ostensibly neither said or done anything to instigate, perpetuate, or worsen matters. So why does Virgil repeat the already questionable claim of the Sibyl?

Again, the assertion that Lavinia is the cause of the strife between the Trojans and the Latins has Homeric resonances. The women of a city under attack have brought gifts to Athena before (Hom. *Il.* 6.293-307):<sup>28</sup>

τῶν ἔν' ἀειραμένη Ἑκάβη **φέρει δῶρον** Ἀθήνῃ,  
 ὃς κάλλιστος ἔην ποικίλμασιν ἡδὲ μέγιστος,  
 ἀστήρ δ' ὥς ἀπέλαμπεν· ἔκειτο δὲ νείατος ἄλλων. 295  
 βῆ δ' ἰέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μετεσσεύοντο γεραιαί  
**αἱ δ' ὅτε νηὸν ἵκανον Ἀθήνης ἐν πόλει ἄκρῃ,**  
 τῇσι θύρας ὥϊξε Θεανῶ καλλιπάρῃος  
 Κισσηΐς ἄλοχος Ἀντήνορος ἵπποδάμοιο·  
 τὴν γὰρ Τρῶες ἔθηκαν Ἀθηναίης ἱέρειαν. 300  
**αἱ δ' ὀλολυγῇ πᾶσαι Ἀθήνῃ χειρὰς ἀνέσχον·**  
 ἡ δ' ἄρα πέπλον ἐλοῦσα Θεανῶ καλλιπάρῃος  
 θῆκεν Ἀθηναίης ἐπὶ γούνασιν ἡϋκόμοιο,  
 εὐχομένη δ' ἡρᾶτο Διὸς κούρῃ μεγάλῳ·  
**‘πότνι’ Ἀθηναίη ἐρυσίπολι δῖα θεάων 305**  
**ἄξον δὴ ἔγχος Διομήδεος, ἡδὲ καὶ αὐτὸν**  
**πρηνέα δὸς πεσέειν Σκαιῶν προπάροιθε πυλάων...’**

Of these [robes] Hecabe took one, and **brought it as an offering** for Athene, the one that was fairest in its embroiderings and amplest, and shone like a star, and lay beneath all the rest. Then she set out to go, and the throng of older women hurried after her. **When they came to the shrine of Athene in the citadel**, the doors were opened for them by fair-cheeked Theano, Cisses' daughter, wife of Antenor, tamer of horses; for her had the Trojans made priestess of Athene. **Then with ecstatic cries they all lifted up their hands to Athene**; and fair-cheeked Theano took the robe and laid it on the knees of fair-haired Athene, and with vows made prayer to the daughter of great Zeus: **'Lady Athene,**

<sup>28</sup> See also Hom. *Il.* 6.86-95, 6.269-76. This is also one of the scenes on the temple of Juno at Carthage in book one (1.479-82).

**you who guard our city, fairest among goddesses, break now the spear of Diomedes, and grant also that he himself may fall headlong before the Scaean gates...**' (trans. Murray)

Virgil's condensed version is at times stunningly similar to the Homeric original.<sup>29</sup> Most noticeably, the three-line prayer that the Latin women cry from the citadel ('*armipotens... sub altis*' 11.483-5) is almost an exact translation of the opening lines of Hecuba's request (Hom. *Il.* 6.305-7): both use three appellations for Athena that fill an entire hexameter line, then pray that an enemy's spear will be shattered before he is cast to the earth in front of the gates of their city.

However, where in Homer it was the Trojans praying to be saved from a Greek enemy, in Virgil it is the Latins praying to be saved from the Trojans. By switching to associate Amata, Lavinia and the Latin mothers with the women of Troy, Virgil further confuses the claim that Lavinia is the *causa mali tanti*, which previously relied on a comparison with the Greek Helen. Furthermore, in both episodes, the offerings and displays of religious devotion fail to move Athena to help, suggesting that, far from humans being *causae*, events are in fact out of their control.

Though the question of causation is already complicated enough, Virgil offers two additional perspectives in the final book of the epic. Aeneas encourages his men to attack Latinus' city with the following violent words (12.567-9, 571)

'urbem hodie, **causam belli**, regna ipsa Latini,

ni frenum accipere et victi parere fatentur,

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<sup>29</sup> Close comparisons include: φέρε δῶρον, *dona ferens*; νηὸν... Ἀθήνης ἐν πόλει ἄκρα, *ad templum summasque ad Palladis arces*; αἱ δ' ὀλολυγῆ πάσαι Ἀθήνη χεῖρας ἀνέσχον, *maestas alto fundunt de limine voces*.

eruam et aequa solo fumantia culmina ponam.

...

**hoc caput**, o cives, haec belli summa nefandi.'

'Today, unless they declare that they will accept the yoke and, conquered, obey us, I will raze the city, **the cause of the war**, the very kingdoms of Latinus, to the ground, and I will level its roofs, smoking, to the earth... **this is the source**, citizens, this is summit of this impious war.'

As we have come to expect, this claim is not straightforward. Not only does it follow other, incompatible assertions (the *causa* is Lavinia, Turnus, Allecto etc.), but Virgil tells us that this is not Aeneas' own idea – his mother gave it to him (12.554-6):

hic mentem Aeneae genetrix pulcherrima misit

iret ut ad muros urbique adverteret agmen

ocius et subita turbaret clade Latinos.

Then the most beautiful mother of Aeneas gave him the desire to go to the walls, more quickly direct the battle line to the city, and surprise the Latins with sudden destruction.

Aeneas' designation of the city as the *causam belli* is therefore cast as a means to an end, as in the case of Drances citing Turnus as the *causa*. The difference is that, in this case, it is a means to an end that he hasn't chosen: it is Venus who wants Aeneas to storm the city to help him win the war, and Aeneas claims that the city is the *causam belli* in order to incite his men to achieve this aim. Despite this, the power of claiming something is a *causa* is clear: his words are immediately taken to heart by the troops, who rally to storm the walls.

Meanwhile, behind these same walls, Amata grows afraid that Turnus has died in the tumult and, thinking she is responsible, decides to take her own life (12.598-600):

infelix pugnae iuvenem in certamine credit

exstinctum et subito mentem turbata dolore

**se causam clamat crimenque caputque malorum.**

Unfortunate, she believed that the young man had died in the battle-fray, and, her mind clouded by the sudden pain, **she cried that she was the cause, to blame, and the source of the misfortunes.**

Again, though her conclusion is based on transparently faulty reasoning (Turnus isn't dead!), the idea that she is a *causa*, whether or not it is true, is enough to force her to suicide. Whereas Drances and Aeneas formulated claims about the *causae belli* based on their desires and aims, Amata's desires and aims are determined by her beliefs about causation.

The war in Latium is fated from the outset, and repeatedly referred to in prophecies.<sup>30</sup> This already makes it seem inevitable, and muddies the question of causes. However, in the *Aeneid*, *causae* are part of fate rather than incompatible with it – Virgil characterizes fate to some extent as Stoic causal determinism. The Sibyl herself, a priestess of Apollo and prophet of *fata*, simultaneously claims that wars in Italy are fated, and that Lavinia is the *causa mali tanti*. But this implication about Lavinia doesn't marry well either with the Homeric allusions

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<sup>30</sup> By Jupiter '*hic tibi.../ bellum ingens geret Italia populosque ferocis*' 1.261-3, by Helenus '*illa tibi Italiae populos venturaque bella/ et quo quemque modo fugiasque ferasque laborem/ expediet*', and by the Sibyl '*bella, horrida bella,/ et Thybrim multo spumantem sanguine cerno.*' 6.86-7.

that underlie it, or with Virgil's subsequent account of what happens. Virgil strips Lavinia's role in events to the bare minimum – she is not even given any direct speech – with the result that when the claim that she is the *causa mali tanti* reappears in book 11 it seems almost sarcastic. This raises the philosophical question: how is causation related to moral responsibility? In Greek, they are the same word (αἷτιος – see Hom. *Il.* 3.164 above). Even if the fact that marriage to Lavinia is the goal that motivates Aeneas and Turnus to fight makes her in some sense a *causa*, her utter passivity calls into question whether or not this should mean she is responsible, or to blame.

What is more, Virgil offers multiple other identifications of the *causa* of the war: Allecto, Turnus, the very existence of Latinus' city, and Amata. These perspectives are couched as subjective, generated by ulterior motives, and questionable if not unequivocally mistaken. In spite of this, and in spite of the fact that each of the five different claims for the *causa* of the war mutually undermines one another, these identifications of *causae* do drive the action and determine the plot. When Aeneas claims that Latinus' city is the *causam belli*, his men immediately rush to attack it; when Amata decides she is the *causa* of the situation leading to Turnus' death, she can no longer bear to live with herself. Which leads to a further philosophical question: are subjective beliefs and spurious claims about *causae* more/as influential over future events as the objective truth about them? The way Virgil engineers the second half of the *Aeneid* suggests that this is the case.

### 3. iii. Dido's culpa and Aeneas' culpa<sup>31</sup>

The above discussion of Lavinia raised the question of the connection between *causa* and *culpa* in the *Aeneid*. I will now investigate this in more detail, arguing that Virgil uses Dido's death as a vehicle for philosophical thinking about fate, causation, and moral responsibility, and the relationship between them. He does so explicitly, for example through Aeneas' unanswered question '*funeris heu tibi causa fui?*' (6.458). He also does so implicitly, especially through similes and intertexts. In terms of the latter, I am particularly interested in the role of allusions to Catullus 66, his translation of Callimachus' 'The Lock of Berenice', in Dido and Aeneas' relationship. Reference to this ἀῖτιον constitutes further evidence for Virgil's interest in causes and causation. I will additionally argue, drawing on the well-established pun on *Caesar* and *caesaries* ('hair'), and the shared theme of immortality through catasterism, that allusion to Catullus 66 in the *Aeneid* encourages a comparison between the circumstances of Dido's death and those surrounding that of Julius Caesar, an event conspicuous by its absence from the poem. The complicated web of agency, blame and responsibility surrounding Dido's suicide may therefore be compared to Cicero's citing of Caesar's assassination as the context that prompted his philosophical discussion of fate and moral responsibility in *De Fato*.

As noted in the previous chapter,<sup>32</sup> there are three things in the *Aeneid* whose *causae* Virgil pointedly questions: Juno's anger, the war in Latium, and Dido's

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<sup>31</sup> Following Rudd (1990).

<sup>32</sup> pg. 96, n. 27.

death. The question of causation in the Dido and Aeneas episode must be divided into two separate but related parts: the cause of the love affair and the cause of Dido's suicide. Venus, Cupid, Dido, Anna, and Aeneas are each depicted as contributing to the former. It is Venus who initially determines to safeguard Aeneas' stay in Carthage by making the Carthaginian queen fall in love with him (1.657-60), and Cupid, disguised as Ascanius, who implements her command (1.715-22). Dido is easily hooked, and perhaps makes the mistake of confiding in Anna, who delivers a persuasive speech that plays a decisive role in encouraging her sister to move on from her late husband Sychaeus (4.31-53).

Common sense suggests Aeneas must be involved ('it takes two to tango'<sup>33</sup>...), but the extent of his implication is more mysterious. This simile fills in some of the gaps (4.68-73):<sup>34</sup>

uritur infelix Dido totaque vagatur  
 urbe furens, qualis coniecta cerva sagitta,  
 quam procul incautam nemora inter Cresia fixit                      70  
 pastor agens telis liquitque volatile ferrum  
 nescius: illa fuga silvas saltusque peragrat  
 Dictaeos; haeret lateri letalis harundo.

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<sup>33</sup> Lyne (1989: 77), who uses this as a paradigm case of how Virgil achieves 'narrative through imagery', i.e. how he uses similes to suggestively fill in sensitive bits of the story left untold.

<sup>34</sup> On this simile see especially Armstrong (2006: 105-8), who uses the Cretan setting to explore the connection between Dido, Pasiphae, Phaedra and Ariadne; Keith (2000: 113-4); Connors (1992), who connects it with the shooting of Sylvia's stag that 'causes' the war in book seven; Lyne (1989: 77-9); Pease (1935 *ad loc.*).

Unfortunate Dido burned with passion and roamed in a frenzy through the entire city. She was just like a doe whom a shepherd, harrying her with weapons whilst she is far off and incautious amidst the Cretan groves, has pierced with an arrow-shot, and unknowingly left behind the flying iron arrow-tip: she ranges in flight through the woods and Dictaeon glens as the deadly arrow sticks in her side.

Dido is likened to a Cretan doe that a hunting shepherd has unknowingly (*nescius* – NB not accidentally) pierced with an arrow that will ultimately cause her death (*letalis*). The suggestion is that the shepherd intended to hit the doe, but wasn't aware that he had succeeded, or of the severity of the wound that he had caused. Are we to connect Aeneas with the shepherd? It seems the most obvious deduction from the context, and he compares himself to a shepherd in a simile in book two (2.304-8). Courtship is often cast as a hunt in ancient literature, and the implication here is that Aeneas as a lover has intentionally pursued Dido, even if he is unaware that one of his arrows has fatally hit home:<sup>35</sup> *letalis harundo* suggests a strong link between Aeneas' pursuit of Dido and the cause of her death. This connection between the cause of her love and the cause of her death is corroborated more generally by the imagery in book four. Fire and wound are the most common metaphors for Dido's love, and her eventual suicide, rendered by stabbing herself on a blazing pyre, seems a poignant actualization of these.<sup>36</sup>

This is not to say that Dido is a completely passive figure either in her own love affair, or in its fatal consequences. To the contrary, Virgil writes that the day of her 'wedding' to Aeneas was the cause of her death because after that she no longer kept the affair secret and lost all concern for her reputation (4.169-72):

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<sup>35</sup> Following Lyne (1989: 79).

<sup>36</sup> See e.g. Keith (2000: 116).

ille dies **primus** leti **primusque** malorum

**causa fuit**; neque enim specie famave movetur

nec iam furtivum Dido meditatur amorem:

coniugium vocat, hoc **praetexit** nomine culpam.

That day **first was the cause** of her death and her misfortunes; for neither was Dido concerned with appearances or rumours, nor did she any longer practise a secret love-affair. She called it a marriage, and **disguised** her guilt with this name.

*causa fuit* is emphatic, and Virgil is unequivocal that this event brought about her death (*leti*). Indeed, contrary to the suggestions of the *letalis harundo* in the simile discussed above, the repeated *primus* gives priority to this moment over other previous events in determining her death. Failure to keep the affair a secret made it politically dangerous for Dido, as the ensuing description of *Fama* and the later complaint of Iarbas suggest.<sup>37</sup> The reader is encouraged to recall Medea and Jason's 'wedding' in the *Argonautica* (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.1128-1169), which was also held secretly in a cave, with the duplicitous intention of tricking King Alcinous into thinking that they were already man and wife.

Picking up on the connotations of wilful deception in *praetexit*, I would argue that there is a further suggestion that Dido isn't being entirely honest about her role in events later in the book. The following are some of Dido's final words (4.655-58):

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<sup>37</sup> *Fama* at 4.173-197, Iarbas' reaction upon hearing the news at 4.198-218. Indeed, it is this that sets in motion Mercury and Jupiter's orders to Aeneas, and his departure from Carthage. The fear that Dido's 'marriage' to Aeneas has caused North Africans to turn against her is repeated at 4.320-1, and 534-6.

‘urbem praeclaram statui, mea moenia vidi,  
 ulta virum poenas inimico a fratre recepi,  
 felix, heu nimium felix, si litora tantum  
 numquam Dardaniae tetigissent nostra carinae.’

‘I founded a far-famed city, I saw my own city’s walls, I took punishment from my hostile brother in vengeance for my husband – I would have been lucky, oh too lucky, if the Dardanian ships had never reached our shores.’

These lines are usually cited as examples of Virgil’s comparison of Dido to Ariadne and Medea, two other royal women abandoned by foreign lovers.<sup>38</sup> The closest model for Dido’s wish that the Trojan ships had never landed on her shores is Catullus’ Ariadne (Catull. 64.171-2):

‘Iuppiter omnipotens, utinam ne tempore primo  
 Cnosia Cecropidae tetigissent litora puppes!’

‘Almighty Jupiter, I would the Attic ships had never touched Cnosian shores!’ (trans. Goold)

Apollonius’ Medea, and Medea’s nurse in Euripides, voice similar wishes (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.32-3; Eur. *Med.* 1-2):<sup>39</sup>

‘... αἶθε σε πόντος,  
 ξεῖνε, διέρραισεν, πρὶν Κολχίδα γαῖαν ἰκέσθαι.’

‘Would that the sea had torn you to pieces, stranger, before you had come to the Colchian land!’ (trans. Race)

εἴθ’ ὥφελ’ Ἀργοῦς μὴ διαπτᾶσθαι σκάφος

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<sup>38</sup> See further 2. ii. *Determinism and Literary Precedent*.

<sup>39</sup> See also Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 3.773-6.

Κόλχων ἐς αἴαν κυανέας Συμπληγάδας...

'Would that the Argo had never winged its way to the land of Colchis through the dark blue Symplegades!' (trans. Kovacs)

But Virgil's Dido and Catullus' Ariadne also recall the presentation of Medea's story in a Latin text. The nurse in Ennius' *Medea* doesn't start by bemoaning the arrival of Jason's ships, but with the cutting down of a tree to make them, thereby correcting the ὕστερον πρότερον order in which these events were listed by the nurse in Euripides (Enn. *Med.* 1-2):<sup>40</sup>

utinam ne in nemore Pelio securibus

caesa accidisset abiegna ad terram trabes...

'Would that firwood timber had not fallen to earth hewn by axes in a Pelian grove!' (trans. Warmington, adapted)

Clearly this line of reference was well-worn, and therefore easily noticeable. As a consequence, Dido's own behaviour towards her brother (*poenas inimico a fratre recepi*), which has previously been characterized as necessary and just (1.346-56), becomes suspiciously like fratricide through comparison with Ariadne and Medea, both of whom either directly or indirectly killed their brothers as part of a betrayal of their fatherlands for men they had fallen in love with.<sup>41</sup> Readers may begin to wonder what exactly it was that Dido did to punish her brother, and whether this was comparable.

<sup>40</sup> fr. 103 Jocelyn. Cicero often quotes one or both of these lines (e.g. *Inv.* 1.91, *Top.* 61, *Cael.* 18, *Fat.* 34). See below n. 42 for a discussion of *trabes* as either singular or plural.

<sup>41</sup> Ariadne was only an accomplice to Theseus killing her brother, the Minotaur. Compare Catull. 64.181 (Ariadne) '*respersum iuvenem **fraterna caede** secuta*' with 4.21 (Dido) '*sparsos **fraterna caede** penatis*'. In Euripides' tragedy, Medea has killed her brother (Eur. *Med.* 166-7). In the *Argonautica*, Jason performs the act, but Medea is an accomplice and spectator (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 4.464-7).

What has garnered less attention is the role that these lines from Ennius' *Medea* play in Cicero's discussion of causation in *De Fato*. The context is Cicero's definition of a cause as something that is 'efficient' rather than merely 'antecedent'; something that necessarily renders its effect rather than simply comes before it. This distinction between what and what is not a cause forms a prelude to his later delineation (Cic. *Fat.* 41-3, see above 1. v. *Allecto: the unnameable*), following Chrysippus, of different types of *causae* (Cic. *Fat.* 34):

causa autem ea est, quae id efficit, cuius est causa, ut **vulnus mortis**,  
 cruditas morbi, **ignis ardoris**. itaque non sic causa intellegi debet, ut,  
 quod cuique antecedit, id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter  
 antecedit...

But a cause is that which makes the thing of which it is the cause come about - as a **wound is the cause of death**, failure to digest one's food of illness, **fire of heat**. Accordingly 'cause' is not to be understood in such a way as to make what precedes a thing the cause of that thing, but what precedes it effectively... (trans. Rackham)

For one, it is interesting that two of the stereotypical examples he gives of genuinely 'efficient' causes are a wound  $\Rightarrow$  death, and fire  $\Rightarrow$  heat. This even more strongly suggests that, from a philosophical perspective, Virgil's choice to describe Dido's love with the metaphors of wound and fire asserts a necessary causal connection between her love and her death.

However, Cicero goes on to illustrate this distinction by using the nurse's words at the beginning of Ennius' *Medea* as a counterexample (Cic. *Fat.* 35):

ex hoc genere illud est Ennii

**‘utinam ne** in nemore Pelio securibus

caesae **accidissent** abiegnae ad terram trabes!’<sup>42</sup>

licuit vel altius: ‘utinam ne in Pelio nata ulla umquam esset arbor!’ etiam

supra: ‘utinam ne esset mons ullus Pelius!’ **similiterque superiora**

**repetentem regredi infinite licet.**

‘neve inde navis inchoandi exordium

cepisset.’

quorsum haec praeterita? quia sequitur illud,

**‘nam numquam era errans mea domo efferret pedem**

Medea, animo aegra, amore saevo saucia,’

**non erat ut eae res causam adferrent amoris.**

To this class of expression belongs the phrase of Ennius—

**Would that** in Pelius’ glade the pine-tree beams

**Had never fallen** to earth by axes hewn!

He might have gone even further back, ‘Would that no tree had ever grown on Pelius!’

and even further, ‘Would that no Mount Pelius existed!’ and **similarly one may go on**

**recalling preceding events in infinite regress.**

Nor thence had made inception of the task

Of laying down a ship.

What is the point of recounting these past events? because what follows is this:

**For were it so, my roving royal mistress,**

Medea, **from her home had ne’er set forth,**

Heartsick and by love’s cruel weapon wounded.

**It was not the case that those events brought the cause of love.** (trans. Rackham)

The nurse traces a chain of events leading up to Medea’s falling in love with

Jason. However, Cicero points out that whilst these events may be ‘antecedent’ to

Medea’s love, they should not be considered *causae* of it. This is because, whilst

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<sup>42</sup> See n. 40 above. Cicero here makes *trabes* plural, though in other sources (esp. Varro, *Ling.* 7.33, following Eur. *Med.* 4 τμηθεῖσα πεύκη) it is singular. See Vahlen (1903 *ad loc.*).

they are necessary precursors to her love, they are not sufficient to determine it. It is true that someone first had to cut down a tree on Mt. Pelion before any of the events could unfold. But it is not a necessary consequence of this tree-felling that Medea would fall in love with Jason and subsequently commit the atrocities which have consigned her to infamy in myth. The suggestion is that Medea is in fact the cause, though the nurse is reluctant to admit this: the plaintive '*utinam...*' is a (philosophically) spurious attempt to exculpate her.<sup>43</sup> In fact, *non erat ut eae res causam adferrent amoris*, and aetiologies of this sort are subject to infinite regress ('would that trees had never existed!' etc.). This passage of the *De Fato* both provides evidence for the philosophical scrutiny of poetry/drama in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, and hints that Virgil's Dido is trying to cover up her own implication in the affair and its consequences by over-emphasizing the role of antecedent events in her demise instead of taking responsibility for her part. Though the imagery of wound and flame strongly suggests that love once conceived is deadly, Dido's attempt to draw the chain of causation for her love back to the arrival of the Trojan fleet in Carthage is, philosophically at least, dubious.

So, Virgil initially claims that the wedding day in the cave was the *causa* of Dido's death, but also complicates the relationship between the cause of her death and the cause of her love through the doe simile and fire and wound metaphors. So far, Aeneas has only been implicitly implicated. But later, when Aeneas meets Dido in the Underworld, he directly asks her, with no prompting, whether he was the *causa* of her death. He has apparently heard a report that she had died, and

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<sup>43</sup> The way Cicero uses these lines of Ennius' *Medea* as an example in other philosophical dialogues accords with this interpretation. See e.g. Cic. *Top.* 61, and Reinhardt (2003) *ad loc.*

emphatically swears that he didn't want to leave Carthage, but was forced to by the gods (6.456-64):

'infelix Dido, verus mihi nuntius ergo  
 venerat exstinctam ferroque extrema secutam?  
**funeris heu tibi causa fui? per sidera iuro,**  
 per superos et, si qua fides tellure sub ima est,  
**invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi.** 460  
 sed me iussa deum, quae nunc has ire per umbras,  
 per loca senta situ cogunt noctemque profundam,  
 imperiis egere suis; nec credere quivi  
 hunc tantum tibi me discessu ferre dolorem.'

'Unfortunate Dido, so was the news that reached me true, that you had died, and sought the end by the sword? **Alas, was I the cause of your death? I swear by the stars,** by the gods above and if there is any faith under the depths of the earth: **unwilling, queen, did I leave your shores.** But the orders of the gods forced me with their supreme power, the same orders which now compel me to journey through these shades, through places rough with decay and the deep night. Nor was I able to believe that with my departure I brought you pain so great as this.'

In what follows, I will deal with two interesting philosophical questions that Aeneas' words raise. First: how are we to take Aeneas' claim that he left Carthage unwillingly, and how does this bear on the question of blame and responsibility for Dido's death? Second: what can the well-attested allusion to Catullus 66, an αἴτιον, in these lines add to our understanding of causation in this episode?

The first question is an important one because Aeneas uses the fact that he is being forced to act against his will as his main line of defence both in the Underworld and in book four. When Dido first rails at him upon realising that he

is secretly preparing the Trojan fleet for departure, he responds that it is fate, not his own desire or decision, that both made him leave Troy, and is now making him depart for Italy (4.340-346, 360-1):

‘me si fata **meis** paterentur ducere vitam 340

**auspiciis** et **sponte mea** componere curas

urbem Troianam primum dulcisque meorum

reliquias colerem, Priami tecta alta manerent,

et recidiva manu posuissem Pergama victis.

sed nunc Italiam magnam Gryneus Apollo, 345

Italiam Lyciae iussere capessere sortes...

...desine meque tuis incendere teque querelis; 360

Italiam **non sponte** sequor.’

‘If the fates had allowed me to lead my life **under my own auspices**, and to settle my cares **according to my own will**, I would first and foremost attend to a Trojan city and the sweet remnants of my people, the high homes of Priam would endure, and I would have established with my own hand a reborn Pergamum for the conquered Trojans. But now Grynean Apollo and the Lycian lots have ordered me to make for Italy... so stop inflaming us both with your complaints: I am not pursuing Italy of my own accord.’

Aeneas clearly outlines that his will (*meis auspiciis, sponte mea, sponte*) is opposed to fate and the will of Apollo (*fata, Gryneus Apollo, Lyciae sortes*). As it is the latter rather than the former that is directing his life, he asks Dido not to complain about his departure, insinuating that criticism or censure is unfair. This is the same argument that he uses in the Underworld: ‘*invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi./ sed me iussa deum... / imperiis egere suis*’ (4.460-1, 463).

Voluntary action is certainly connected with moral responsibility in both ancient and modern philosophy: Aristotle, for example, claims that delineating voluntary and involuntary action is necessary for the correct apportionment of praise and blame.<sup>44</sup> However, the connection is not straightforward, in part because of varying accounts of the criteria and basis for voluntary action. I have argued that Stoicism is one important context for understanding fate in the poem. Despite arguing for a theory of universal causal determinism, the Stoics maintained the possibility for voluntary action and moral accountability, and situated this in the faculty of assent.<sup>45</sup> I will therefore analyse Aeneas' decision to abandon Dido from a Stoic perspective, and argue that, on a Stoic reading, the Trojan leader is responsible and blameworthy for his actions, even if they are fated.

As explained in chapter one (*True Names and False Names*), Stoic psychology posits four different stages for human interaction with the outside world:

Impression → Assent → Impulse → Action

External circumstances and stimuli make an impression (*visum*, φαντασία) on us through sense perception. We then use reason (λόγος, *ratio/animus/mens*) to

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<sup>44</sup> Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1109b30-34 τῆς ἀρετῆς δὲ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὕσης, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἐκουσίοις ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἐκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι 'virtue however is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntary' (trans. Rackham). NB Aristotle also introduces a third category, οὐχ ἐκούσιον.

<sup>45</sup> I introduced this facet of Stoic philosophy above in my discussion of Amata, and the simile comparing her to a spinning top (1. v. *Amata: the unnameable*).

deliberate as to whether or not to give rational assent (*adsensio*, συγκατάθεσις) to this impression. If we decide it is a 'true' impression, we give assent, but if on the other hand we decide it is 'false', we withhold our approbation. For example, if I thought I saw a person with three legs, my reason might suggest I reject the impression because it is unlikely, based on my prior knowledge and experience, to be true. Once we have assented to an impression, thus rationally judging it to be 'true', our minds produce an impulse (*adpetitio*, ὁρμή) that drives our response to the stimulus, usually, but not always, in the form of an action.

Assent is the part of this fourfold psychology which the Stoics argued left room for human autonomy and accountability within causal determinism. It is, however, important to underline that assent is not a faculty that operates independently of fate. Whether we assent to an impression or not is just as fated as what we do as a result of assenting. But, as the example of Chrysippus' spinning top (Cic. *Fat.* 41-3, discussed above) shows, the faculty of assent reflects our character. Therefore it does not make sense to say that we are externally forced to act in a certain way: different people react differently to the same external stimulus, and the way we react to an impression depends on who we are. Assent is thus the part of the causal nexus that explains why our actions can plausibly be deemed 'up to us' (ἐφ' ἡμιν, *in nostra potestate*): because our actions are a product and function of our individual faculties of assent, the Stoics believed and argued that praising and blaming human action was compatible with determinism.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> When discussing moral responsibility, ancient philosophers and commentators are primarily concerned with issues of praise and blame. Cf. Cic. *Fat.* 40 *ex quo efficitur, ut*

Returning to the *Aeneid*, the driver for Aeneas' decision to leave Carthage is his vision of Mercury, who reminds him that his duties and fate are directing him to Italy. Interestingly for our consideration of fate and moral responsibility in the Dido and Aeneas episode, the way Aeneas reacts to the appearance of Mercury accords with some of the terminology and stages used in Stoic psychology (4.276-288):

...tali Cyllenius ore locutus

mortalis **visus** medio sermone reliquit  
et procul in tenuem ex oculis evanuit auram.

at **vero** Aeneas **aspectu** obmutuit amens,  
arrectaeque horrore comae et uox faucibus haesit. 280

**ardet** abire fuga dulcisque relinquere terras,  
attonitus tanto monitu imperioque deorum.

heu quid agat? quo nunc reginam ambire furentem  
audeat adfatu? quae prima exordia sumat?

**atque animum nunc huc celerem nunc diuidit illuc** 285  
**in partisque rapit uarias perque omnia uersat.**

haec alternanti potior **sententia uisa** est:  
Mnesthea Sergestumque uocat...

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*nec laudationes iustae sine nec vituperationes nec honores nec supplicia...*'; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1109b30-5; Gell. *N.A.* 7.2.6-13; Diog. Laert. 7.23; Euseb. *Praep. evang.* 6.8.25-9. This is a much narrower conception of accountability than that we find in modern ethics, where, for example, it is possible to describe someone as being 'responsible' for an action whilst not being 'blameworthy'.

Mercury said such words and discarded his mortal **appearance** in the middle of the conversation. And, far away, he vanished from sight into thin air. But Aeneas was out of his senses, **truly** dumbstruck by the **impression**. His hair stood on end in fright and his voice stuck in his throat. He **burned with desire** to leave in flight and abandon the sweet lands, stunned by this momentous warning and the command of the gods. Oh, how should he proceed?<sup>47</sup> With what words should he dare approach the frenzied queen? What first steps should he take? **He divided his quick mind now this way now that, snatched it in different directions, and twisted it through all the options.** This decision seemed better to him, though he wavered: he summoned Mnesticus and Sergestus...

First, Mercury's appearance makes an impression on him. The noun *visus*, though here referring to the god's mortal guise, recalls the use of *visum* in Latin accounts of Stoicism as a counterpart for the Greek φαντασία;<sup>48</sup> the later *aspectu* has a similar sense, and the grammatically ambiguous (adjective? adverb?) *vero* further hints at the Stoic division of 'true' and 'false' impressions.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> *heu quid agat?* at first glance appears to mean 'what should he do?'. But that does not seem to be the sense here: Aeneas has already decided what to do (*abire fuga*), and the other two questions show he is now interested not in changing this plan but in implementing it.

<sup>48</sup> E.g. Cic. *Acad.* 1.40: ... *de sensibus ipsis quaedam* [Zeno] *dixit nova, quos iunctos esse censuit e quadam quasi impulsione oblata extrinsecus, **quam ille φαντασίαν, nos visum apellemus licet, et teneamus hoc quidem verbum, erit enim utendum in reliquo sermone saepius...*** 'he [Zeno] made some new pronouncements about sensation itself, which he held to be a combination of a sort of impact offered from outside (which he called φαντασία, and we may call a *visum*, and let us retain this term at all events, for we shall have to employ it several times in the remainder of my discourse...' (trans. Rackham)

<sup>49</sup> E.g. Cic. *Acad.* 2.35, on the topic of the problem of distinguishing which impressions are true: *nam si quod cuique occurrit et primo quasi aspectu probabile videtur id confirmatur, quid eo levius?* 'For if what a particular person happens to encounter, and almost at first glance thinks probable, is accepted as certain, what could be more frivolous than that?' (trans. Rackham). It appears that assenting to something quickly *primo aspectu* is a fickle (*levius*) thing to do. Virgil also uses *vero* in his description of Aeneas' response to the second appearance of Mercury later in the book. Here, however, its grammatical function is not ambiguous, as it is clearly an adverb: 4.571 *tum vero Aeneas...* Either way, its proximity to *visus* is suggestive.

Aeneas does not use reason to deliberate as to whether or not to give rational assent to the impression. Instead, he reacts irrationally (*amens*), instinctively (*arrectaeque horrore comae et vox faucibus haesit*) and immediately. He doesn't reflect on whether he should leave Carthage or not, he just deeply and unquestioningly desires to do so (*ardet*). What he does reflect on, however, is the way in which he should leave Carthage. This is demonstrated by the three rhetorical questions (*quid...? quo...? quae...?*) and the vivid image of his mind ranging this way and that through the various alternatives (285-6), until he finally reaches a conclusion (*sententia*), and acts (*Mnesthea Sergestumque vocat*).

In fact, there are strong suggestions that Virgil is particularly drawing on Stoic explanations of impulse, the third stage of the fourfold psychology, in these lines. Cicero, for example, describes impulse (*adpetitio/ὁρμή*) in very similar terms in *De Officiis* (Cic. *Off.* 1.100-2):

duplex est enim vis animorum atque natura; una pars in appetitu posita est, quae est ὁρμή Graece, **quae hominem huc et illuc rapit**, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumque sit. {ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtemperet. omnis autem actio vacare debet temeritate et negligentia nec vero agere quicquam, cuius non possit causam probabilem reddere; haec est enim fere discriptio officii.}<sup>50</sup>

For the power of the spirit, that is its nature, is twofold: one part of it consists of impulse, called in Greek ὁρμή, **which snatches a man this way and that**; the other of reason, which teaches and explains what should be done and what avoided. Reason therefore commands, and impulse obeys. All action should be free from rashness and

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<sup>50</sup> There is considerable discussion about the authenticity of this passage: for a summary see Dyck (1996 *ad loc.*), who nevertheless keeps it in his text.

carelessness; nor should anyone do anything for which he cannot give a persuasive justification: that is practically a definition of duty. (trans. Griffin)

Stoic psychology is difficult to disentangle, especially because it changes significantly over time and according to particular thinkers. Cicero's statement about the *duplex vis* of the soul recalls the Stoic assertion that the soul is unified, but has δύο...δυνάμεις, one rational, the other irrational (SVF 2.849 = Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.359). From Chrysippus onwards, ὁρμή and λόγος seem to have been grouped together in the ἡγεμονικόν part of the soul (SVF 2.836, 837). But here Cicero looks to be following Panaetius, who 'differed from the older Stoa in recognizing ὁρμή as an irrational element (*quae hominem hunc et illuc rapit*) independent of λόγος (Dyck 1996 *ad loc.*). He describes the former as a force which seizes (*rapit*) a man this way and that (*huc et illuc*) – the similarities with Virgil's lines are striking. But importantly, according to Cicero, reason should always be in charge, and appetite should submit to it. Ideally, and as a consequence of this, every action would be well thought out and explicable. Aeneas' reaction to Mercury hardly stands the test: far from using *ratio*, he is *amens*, and reacts instinctively and without thinking things through.<sup>51</sup> It seems to be impulse that is in charge of *ratio* rather than the other way round - note that *animus* is the object rather than the subject of the verb.

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<sup>51</sup> The suggestion that Aeneas may have been too hasty to assent to the appearance of Mercury is additionally interesting in the context of the exploration of the truth-status and materiality of visions and dreams more generally in the *Aeneid*. See chapter six (*inania verba, visual perception and materialism*).



an allusion to a description of Medea's deliberation in the *Argonautica* (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 3.755-60):<sup>53</sup>

πυκνὰ δέ οἱ κραδίη στηθέων ἔντοσθεν ἔθουιν,  
 ἡελίου ὥς τίς τε δόμοις ἐνιπάλλεται αἴγλη  
 ὕδατος ἑξάνιοῦσα, τὸ δὴ νέον ἢ **λέβητι**  
 ἡέ που ἐν γαυλῷ κέχυται· ἡ δ' **ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα**  
 ὠκεῖη στροφάλιγγι τινάσσεται **αἴσσουσα**  
 ὥς δὲ καὶ ἐν στήθεσσι κέαρ ἐλελίζετο κούρης.

Over and over the heart within her breast fluttered wildly, as when a ray of sunlight bounds inside a house as it leaps from water freshly poured into a **cauldron** or perhaps into a bucket, and quivers and **darts here and there** from the rapid swirling – thus did the girl's heart tremble in her breast. (trans. Race)

We can see that Virgil's description recalls Apollonius' in several respects. Both passages use the imagery of light reflected off water to describe psychological uncertainty. But there are also closer textual echoes: *huc... illuc* picks up ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα, *labris* mirrors λέβητι, and Apollonius' αἴσσουσα is matched by the speed of *celerem*. Virgil's additional emphasis on the different levels (*radiantis imagine lunae*) and extent (*summique ferit laquearia tecti*) of the reflection constitute a metapoetic gloss on his poetic relationship to Apollonius' simile, which itself has been mirrored in the *Aeneid*.<sup>54</sup>

<sup>53</sup> E.g. Fraenkel (1950), Gransden (1976 *ad loc.*).

<sup>54</sup> Virgil's inclusion of the reflection of the night sky may also recall Lucretius, who uses water's ability to instantaneously reflect the starry heavens to demonstrate the speed of *simulacra* (Lucr. 4.209-15, esp. *radiantia* 213, *imago* 214). The discovery that the moon's light is reflected from the sun was attributed to Anaxagoras in the 5<sup>th</sup> c. BC (Pl. *Crat.* 409a-b) — lunar imagery may therefore be a particularly suitable way of glossing indebtedness to a particular literary predecessor, imagined as the sun/original source of light.

Fraenkel (1950: 127 n.29) tantalizingly postulates a further link between this imagery and Stoic psychology. He notes that, apart from these examples from Apollonius and Virgil, and Silius' imitation of them both (Sil. *Pun.* 7.141-5), there is only one further case of a simile with this sort of content - in Epictetus (Arr. *Epict. diss.* 3.20-2):

οἷόν ἐστιν ἡ λεκάνη τοῦ ὕδατος, τοιοῦτον ἢ ψυχὴ, οἷον ἡ αὐγὴ ἡ  
προσπίπτουσα τῷ ὕδατι, τοιοῦτον αἱ φαντασίαι. ὅταν οὖν τὸ ὕδωρ  
κινηθῇ, δοκεῖ μὲν καὶ ἡ αὐγὴ κινεῖσθαι, οὐ μέντοι κινεῖται.

The soul is something like a bowl of water, and the external impressions something like the ray of light that falls upon the water. Now when the water is disturbed, it looks as though the ray of light is disturbed too, but it is not disturbed. (trans. Oldfather)

Here it is used in a Stoic context to describe exactly what Aeneas is experiencing in the *Aeneid*: the soul receiving impressions. We should note also that Epictetus' explanation designates both Aeneas and Medea's souls as being in a disordered state that leads to a distortion of impressions. Though Epictetus was active in the late first and early second century AD, Fraenkel plausibly argues that he and Apollonius share an original Stoic source for their imagery, especially considering the influence of Hellenistic philosophy on the *Argonautica* more widely.<sup>55</sup> This significantly strengthens my earlier suggestions of a Stoic reading of Aeneas' decision-making in both instances on the basis of intertextuality with Cicero and Virgil's use of some of the terminology of Stoic psychology.

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<sup>55</sup> Apollonius' Heracles, for example, in his rejection of bodily pleasures in favour of duty, seems more Stoic than his traditional mythological representations (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 1.853-7, 1187ff.).

It is also important to note that Apollonius is describing the workings of Medea's mind in this passage – certainly not an entirely flattering comparison for Aeneas. This is especially the case in book four, where, as I have noted, the reader is also encouraged to compare Dido with Medea and therefore Aeneas with Jason rather than his foreign, magical and filicidal wife. Apollonius describes Medea in the anguish of love trying to decide between the options of secretly helping Jason, killing herself, or doing neither in favour of attempting to control her passion. The Apollonian context of betrayal of family and fatherland and irrational love, combined with the Stoic reading of a disordered psychic state and a failure to correctly and rationally deal with impressions, therefore further taint Aeneas' reasoning and decision here.

Virgil therefore uses Stoic terminology and phrasing to show that Aeneas reacts irrationally (*amens*), to the impression (*visus, aspectu*) of Mercury, and that his decision is guided by impulse (*nunc huc... nunc illuc*) rather than reason.

Intertextuality with Apollonius and Epictetus also suggests that his soul is in a disordered state when he experiences the vision of Mercury. None of this is good from a Stoic standpoint. Nevertheless, Aeneas appears to assent immediately to the truth of the impression (*vero?*), which leads him to make a decision (*sententia*) to act. As the Stoics situated the capacity for voluntary action and moral responsibility in the faculty of assent, Virgil thereby suggests that, even though his departure is fated and provoked by the commands of the two gods Jupiter and Mercury, from the Stoic perspective at least, Aeneas is leaving Carthage *sua sponte*, and can therefore be held accountable for the events which

follow. Aeneas makes a potentially mistaken and unjustified decision here, but one for which he is nevertheless culpable.<sup>56</sup>

I will now move to the second stage of my argument, which will explore the role of the allusion to Catullus 66 in Aeneas' words to Dido in the Underworld. This passage of the *Aeneid* (6.456-64, quoted above) has primarily been noted for an especially strong intertext with this poem, the *Coma Berenices* (Catull. 66.39-40):

invita, o regina, tuo de vertice cessi,

invita: adiuro teque tuumque caput.

Unwillingly, O queen, I was parted from your head, unwillingly, I swear both by you and by your head. (trans. Goold)

Aeneas' claim '*invitus, regina, tuo de litore cessi*' very nearly quotes Catullus exactly, and his oath (*iuro*) picks up on Catullus' *adiuro*. Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that there are several other notable allusions to Catullus 66 in the *Aeneid*, in particular in the context of Dido and Aeneas' relationship.<sup>57</sup> Examples include Aeneas' swearing on 'both heads' that he has received divine instructions to depart from Carthage ('*testor utrumque caput*' 4.357),<sup>58</sup> and Dido's promise to Anna that she is resorting to magic unwillingly ('*testor, cara, deos et te, germana, tuumque/ dulce caput, magicas invitam accingier artis*' 4.492-3, both of which

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<sup>56</sup> Contrast the analysis of e.g. Braund (1997: 211): 'In a universe ruled by an autocrat, there seems to be little place for free will. Despite arguments to the contrary, humans seem to be entirely subject to divine will. Take the case of Aeneas' departure from Carthage...'

<sup>57</sup> E.g. Wills (1990), Lyne (1994).

<sup>58</sup> Exactly which two heads Aeneas is referring to is unclear – see Pease (1935 *ad loc.*). Possible pairings include himself and Dido, Jupiter and Mercury, or himself and Ascanius. The latter is suggested by Ascanius' claim in book nine that his father habitually swore on his head (9.300).

recall Catull. 66.40 above. Book four also closes with Iris cutting a lock of Dido's hair to enable her passage to the Underworld (4.698-9, 704-5).

To understand Virgil's allusion, we must further investigate Catullus' poem and its background. Catullus 66 is a translation of the fragmentary poem which closes book four of Callimachus' *Aetia*, 'The Lock of Berenice'.<sup>59</sup> The context is that Queen Berenice had dedicated a lock of her hair in exchange for the safe return of her husband from war. The lock is subsequently catasterized as a newly-invented constellation, and now addresses the queen from heaven, claiming that, despite its new home, it would still have preferred to be on Berenice's head. One strong parallel with Virgil's context is that the lock, like Aeneas, has unwillingly departed from a North African queen. Moreover, that Aeneas swears first on the stars (*per sidera*) may recall the astral context of the Catullus. Indeed, Aeneas himself, like the lock, is one day to be set in the stars: Jupiter tells Venus in book one that she will bear her son on high to the heavens (1.259-60):

'...sumblimemque feres **ad sidera** caeli

**magnanimum** Aenean...'

'You will bear **noble-spirited** Aeneas on high **to the stars** of the heavens...'

A closer correspondence is suggested by the use of the adjective *magnanimum* in this context, which is also used in Catullus 66 to describe Berenice (*cognoram a*

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<sup>59</sup> It seems as though Catullus 66 is for the most part a close translation of Callimachus' poem. However, Catull. 66.79-88 is not matched by any text in the Callimachus fragments, and Catullus may have simplified astronomical details (Harder 2012 *ad loc.*). In addition, Catullus may not follow Callimachus in ending the poem with a final farewell from the lock – though see e.g. Agnesini (2011) for the argument that the opening lines of Catullus 67 may in fact constitute the close of Catullus 66.

*parva virgine magnanimam* Catull. 66.26). But the overall tone of Catullus 66, unlike that of the emotional and tragic interaction between Aeneas and Dido in the Underworld, is playfully encomiastic.

Though the starkly different settings and tones of Catullus 66 and these lines of the *Aeneid* have traditionally posed an interpretative problem, scholars such as Wills (1990) and Lyne (1994) have now clearly outlined several possibilities as to the effects of this intertext. I will not repeat these here - instead, I would like to focus on how this allusion reflects on *causae* and responsibility both within the epic and recent Roman history. As noted above, the very fact that this allusion is to an αἴτιον makes it a good vehicle for reflection on causes and causation. My argument has two main parts. First, I argue that allusion to Catullus 66 helps to forge a broader connection between the death of Dido in the *Aeneid* and the death of Julius Caesar, an event otherwise conspicuously absent from the poem.<sup>60</sup> I then use this to link Virgil's interrogation of the role of fate, causes and blame in Dido's suicide with the comparable philosophical discussion of these issues that arose as a consequence of and in connection with Caesar's assassination.

Catullus' poem is a story about a lock of hair turning into a star. Though Catullus is of course writing before the death of Caesar, when thinking about the later reception of this poem a broad connection might be seen with the *sidus Iulium*, a comet (literally a 'hairy star'; κομήτης) which appeared for seven days in 44 BC

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<sup>60</sup> An absence especially notable given the explicit reference to Caesar's death in the *Georgics* (Verg. *G.* 1.466ff.), and the implicit connotations of the death of Daphnis in the *Eclogues* (Verg. *Ecl.* 5.20-44, 56-80; 9.47). Though Caesar's death does not feature in the *Aeneid*, there are several references to the *sidus Iulium* (e.g. 5.522-8, 8.681), and to his apotheosis (1.286-90).

during Julius Caesar's funeral games, and was widely taken as a demonstration of his divinity. Virgil hints at the connection between comets, hair and the *sidus Iulium* in his simile describing the blazing flight of Acestes' arrow in book five (5.525-8):

namque volans liquidis in nubibus arsit harundo  
 signavitque viam flammis tenuisque recessit  
 consumpta in ventos, caelo ceu saepe refixa  
 transcurrunt **crinem**que volantia sidera ducunt.

For the arrow blazed as it flew in the fluid clouds, and marked out a path with flames, then disappeared, taken up into thin air, just as stars often run past when they are dislodged from the heavens, and as they fly lead their **hair** behind them.

By glossing the κόμη of κομήτης, *crinem* demonstrates that Virgil is describing a comet. Situating this passage in the wider context of Aeneas' memorial games for his father points to a more specific connection with the *sidus Iulium*, which likewise appeared during the funeral games Augustus held for his adoptive father Julius Caesar.<sup>61</sup> More generally, visions of flames on and around hair and heads in the *Aeneid* are good omens for the Julian line.<sup>62</sup>

So, both the *Coma Berenices* and the *sidus Iulium* are hairy stars, and hairy stars and flaming hair are implicitly connected with the glory of Caesar and the Iulii in

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<sup>61</sup> Cf. Ovid's description of Caesar's comet at *Met.* 15.848-51.

<sup>62</sup> The flame that appears on Iulus' hair during the fall of Troy is taken as a good omen by Anchises, and encourages him to finally agree to abandon the city (2.681-686); the flames that appear on the victorious Augustus' head at Actium are directly linked to the *sidus Iulium* (8.680-1); Aeneas' helmet appears to flame like a comet (10.270-5). The flames that appear on Lavinia's head are more ambiguous, (7.71-80) as they are taken to signify both that she will be *inlustrem fama fatisque* (7.79) and, less positively, that there will be a great war.

the *Aeneid*. This already suggests that Virgil's allusion to Catullus 66 may have Caesarean connotations. The simple observation that in Latin the word for 'lock of hair' is *caesaries* offers further encouragement (*e Bereniceo vertice caesariem* Catull. 66.8).<sup>63</sup> It should also be noted that when, at the beginning of *Georgics* 1, Virgil forecasts Octavian's divinity by suggesting he may like his father be catasterized and become a star, he imagines Octavian's new constellation to be near the *Coma Berenices* (Verg. *G.* 1.32-5):

anne **novum** tardis **sidus** te mensibus addas,  
qua locus **Erigonen** inter Chelasque sequentis  
panditur (ipse tibi iam brachia contrahit ardens  
Scorpius et caeli iusta plus parte reliquit).

Or whether you should add yourself as a **new constellation** to the sluggish months, where a space lies open between **Virgo** and the pursuing Claws (blazing Scorpius already draws in his arms for you and leaves more than a fair share of the sky).

Octavian's *novum sidus* is to be between Virgo (*Erigonen*) and the claws of Scorpio (*Chelas*). One explanation for this is that Scorpio's claws are otherwise known as Libra, the zodiac sign for Augustus' birth in October (Suet. *Aug.* 5). But this cluster of constellations is also right next to the *Coma Berenices*, as the lock itself tells us in Catullus' poem (Catull. 66.64-7):

**sidus** in antiquis diva **novum** posuit.

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<sup>63</sup> Wills (1990: 288): 'in Augustan literature, puns like *Caesar/caesaries* and *coma/κομήτης* play on that special name, catasterism and celestial hair.' Nadeau (1982) argues that Virgil's use of *caesaries* in his description of Venus' beautification of Aeneas for his first meeting with Dido is part of a more general comparison between the Trojan hero and his descendants Augustus and Julius Caesar (*namque ipsa decoram/ caesariem nato genetrix...* 1.589-90). He draws on Ovid (*Met.* 1.170-80, 200-5) in further support of the connection between *caesaries* and the Caesars.

**Virginis** et saevi contingens namque Leonis

lumina, Callisto iuncta Lycaoniae,

**vector** in occasum...

...me a **new constellation** among the ancient stars did the goddess set; for I, touching the fires of the **Virgin** and the raging Lion, and close by Callisto daughter of Lycaon, **move** to my setting... (trans. Goold)

The *caesaries* in Catullus likewise refers to itself as a *sidus novum* and is placed nearby Octavian's constellation in the *Georgics*, between Virgo and Leo.<sup>64</sup>

Therefore, though Virgil's description of Octavian's *novum sidus* in the *Georgics* does not directly pertain to Julius Caesar, it forges another subtle but clear link between the deification of the Julian line and Catullus and Callimachus' poems about the formation of the *Coma Berenices*. Finally, Ovid's description of Julius Caesar's deification and catasterism in the *Metamorphoses* might be taken as cementing the connection (Ov. *Met.* 15.746-51):

Caesar in urbe sua **deus** est; quem Marte togaque

praecipuum non bella magis finita triumphis

resque domi gestae properataque gloria rerum

**in sidus vertere novum stellamque comantem,**

quam sua progenies; neque enim de Caesaris actis 750

ullum maius opus, quam quod pater exstitit huius.

Caesar is **god** in his own city. Him, illustrious in war and peace, not so much his wars triumphantly achieved, his civic deeds accomplished, and his glory quickly won, **changed to a new heavenly body, a flaming star**; but still more his offspring deified him. For there is no work among all Caesar's achievements greater than this, that he became the father of this our Emperor (trans. Miller).

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<sup>64</sup> Thomas (1988 *ad Verg. G.* 1.32-5) notes this connection and uses it to demonstrate that Virgil's astronomical references are highly literary.

Confusingly and rather humorously, Ovid claims that Caesar's adoptive fatherhood of Augustus played a greater role in his attainment of divinity (signified here by the references to a 'new constellation' and the comet) than his considerable political and military achievements. Ovid's choice to describe the *sidus Iulium* as a catasterism as well as a comet using the particular phrasing *sidus... novum* recalls both the *Georgics* passage and Catullus 66 (note also *vertere* Ov. *Met.* 15.749 and *vertor* Catull. 66. 67).

It therefore looks as though allusion to Catullus 66 and the *Coma Berenices* was associated after 44 BC with the *sidus Iulium* and the deification of Julius Caesar and his line. The fact that Virgil most noticeably alludes to Catullus 66 during the Dido and Aeneas episode, and in particular in connection with Dido's death, encourages further exploration of how this part of the *Aeneid* might be related to the death and apotheosis of Caesar. For one, some of the portents surrounding Dido's death in the *Aeneid* recall those surrounding Caesar's death and the ensuing civil war at the end of *Georgics* 1. For example, Dido seems to hear voices from Sychaeus' shrine (4.461-2)

hinc **exaudiri voces** et verba vocantis

**visa** viri...

She **seemed to clearly hear voices** from here and the words of her husband calling her...

This mirrors the booming voice and apparitions that appear *extincto... Caesare* (Verg. *G.* 1.466) and as *signa* of civil war at the end of *Georgics* 1 (Verg. *G.* 1.476-8):

**vox** quoque per lucos vulgo **exaudita** silentis

ingens, et **simulacra** modis pallentia miris

**visa** sub obscurum noctis.

A great **voice** was also **heard clearly** everywhere, through silent groves, and **phantoms**, pale in mysterious ways, **appeared** under the dark of the night.

In this passage, Virgil also describes birds of ill-omen (Verg. *G.* 1.470 *importunae volucres*) and well-water turning into blood (Verg. *G.* 1.485). Similar signs appear to Dido in book four of the *Aeneid* (4.455, 462-3):

fusaque in obscenum se vertere vina cruorem

...

solaque culminibus ferali carmine bubo

saepe queri et longas in fletum ducere voces.

The wine she poured turned itself into foul blood... and an owl, alone on the rooftops, [seemed] often to lament with a funereal song and to draw out its long cries into weeping.

Cicero's *De Fato* may constitute another connection between the death of Dido and the death of Caesar. I noted above one example of how *De Fato* helped to elucidate the various *causae* of Dido's death. But now a more general connection between the deaths of Caesar and Dido has been suggested, it is interesting to note that the *De Fato* is intimately connected with Julius Caesar: its dramatic setting is during the days immediately following his assassination (Cic. *Fat.* 2):

nam cum essem in Puteolano Hirtiusque noster, consul designatus, isdem in locis, vir nobis amicissimus et his studiis, in quibus nos a pueritia viximus, deditus, multum una eramus, maxime nos quidem exquirentes ea consilia, quae ad pacem et ad concordiam civium pertinerent. **cum enim omnes post interitum Caesaris novarum perturbationum causae quaeri viderentur** iisque esse occurrendum putaremus, omnis fere nostra in his deliberationibus consumebatur oratio, idque et saepe alias et quodam liberiore, quam solebat, et magis vacuo ab interventoribus die, cum ad me ille venisset, primo ea, quae erant cotidiana et quasi legitima nobis, de pace et de otio.

For I was at my place in Puteoli, and my friend Hirtius, the consul designate, a very close friend of mine and a devoted student of the subjects that have occupied my life from boyhood, was in the neighbourhood. Consequently we were a great deal together, being engrossed as we for our part were in seeking for a line of policy that might lead to peace and concord in the state. **For since the death of Caesar it had seemed as if a search was being made for every possible means of causing fresh upheavals,** and we thought that resistance must be offered to these tendencies. Consequently almost all our conversation was spent in considering those matters, - and this both on many occasions and also, on a day less occupied by engagements than usual and less interrupted by visitors, Hirtius having come to my house, we began with our daily and regular topics of peace and tranquillity. (trans. Rackham)

The dramatic settings of Cicero's philosophical works are often significant,<sup>65</sup> and that Cicero has specifically chosen Caesar's death as the context for the discussion of fate and causation is underscored by further reference to this in the extant dialogue. The context is a discussion about environmental determinism, the traditional idea that environment and circumstance influence human life. Cicero concedes this to some extent, but argues that, though it may be the case

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<sup>65</sup> For example, Cicero sets his *De Re Publica* in 129 BC, the year Scipio Aemilianus died in suspicious circumstances. See e.g. Mackendrick & Singh (1989: 21), and above (*Introduction*).

that e.g. the more rarefied air in Athens on the whole breeds cleverer citizens, this does not determine the details of their individual choices and actions, such as one man's decision to go and hear Zeno speaking. He further elucidates this with the following example (Cic. *Fat.* 8):

quid enim loci natura adferre potest, ut **in porticu Pompeii** potius quam in campo ambulemus? tecum quam cum alio? **Idibus potius quam Kalendis?** ut igitur ad quasdam res natura loci pertinet aliquid, ad quasdam autem nihil, sic astrorum adfectio valeat, si vis, ad quasdam res, ad omnis certe non valebit.

Tell me, can the nature of the locality cause us to take our walk **in Pompey's Porch** rather than in the Campus? In your company sooner than in someone else's? **On the 15<sup>th</sup> of the month rather than on the 1<sup>st</sup>**? Well then, just as the nature of the locality has some effect on some things but none on others, so the condition of the heavenly bodies may if you like influence some things, but it certainly will not influence everything (trans. Rackham).

The location and date of Caesar's death, like the decision of an Athenian to go and hear Zeno speaking, are given as examples of the sorts of things that are outside the realms of both environmental and astral (*astrorum adfectio*) determinism.

The connection that Cicero makes between Caesar's death and his discussion of fate reflects a wider trend: subsequent retellings of Caesar's assassination are almost unanimously infused with suspicion about the role of destiny, fate and chance in the details of his death.<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Strabo 17; Ov. *Met.* 15.761-3, 779ff.; the fragment of Nicolaus of Damascus preserved as *FGrH* F130; Suet. *Iul.* 81; Plut. *Caes.* 63, *Brut.* 14-5.

This, then, may form a further connection between the death of Dido and the death of Caesar. As noted above, though this may seem strange because it is a suicide, Dido's death is one of the three events in the *Aeneid* that Virgil uses as a vehicle for philosophical thinking about causation and moral responsibility. Though Virgil need not be directly alluding to Cicero's *De Fato*, he was no doubt aware that Cicero, following a wider trend of speculation about predestination and culpability in the events of 44 BC, chose to stage his own philosophical discussion of fate, causation and moral responsibility against the backdrop of Caesar's assassination. Whereas Cicero selected the death of Caesar for this purpose, Virgil selected the death of Dido. This broad analogy corroborates other connections made between the two, such as the portents repeated in *Georgics* 1 and the fourth book of the *Aeneid*, or the reminder of the *sidus Iulium* inherent in reference to the *Coma Berenices* in the Dido and Aeneas episode.

However, the comparison between Dido and Julius Caesar is fundamentally surprising and unsettling. Shouldn't Aeneas, rather than Dido, bear a greater resemblance to Julius Caesar, not only because he is a man, but also because he is a Trojan/Roman leader, departing from a North African queen after a love affair? Moreover, though my discussion has demonstrated the extent to which Virgil additionally obfuscates and complicates different causes and the role of different agents in this episode, I have not yet suggested any reasons for this. It is clear that certain judgements of responsibility and blame are almost impossible for the reader. But it is less clear why Virgil makes this the case – what is to be gained from leaving questions and claims about causes unanswered and unverified?

One might seek answers to the second question in the historical resonances of Dido and Aeneas' affair, and especially in the causal and allegorical connection between this and the Punic Wars. For Virgil both makes Aeneas' departure from Dido the αἴτιον for Rome's historical enmity with Carthage through the queen's final curse (4.622-4 and following):

'tum vos, o Tyrii, stirpem et genus omne futurum  
exercete odiis, cinerique haec mittite nostro  
munera. nullus amor populis nec foedera sunt...

'Then, Tyrians, you must plague their stock and all their future race with hatred, and offer this last service to my ashes. Let there be no love or treaties between our peoples...'

and encourages the reader to view Dido's suicide as emblematic of Carthage's fall at the hands of the Romans (4.669-671):

non aliter quam si immissis ruat hostibus omnis  
Karthago aut antiqua Tyros, flammaeque furentes  
culmina perque hominum volvantur perque deorum.

Not otherwise than if the whole of Karthage or ancient Tyre was falling to ruin after enemies had been let into the city, and furious flames swirled across the roofs of gods and men.

The strong connection between Dido and Aeneas' affair and the Punic Wars would therefore make Virgil's notable interest in *causae* in this episode comparable to his interest in the differing *causae* of the war in Latium in the second half of the poem. Causes of war are a difficult and sensitive topic, in part

because claims one way or another are integral to rhetoric that strives to identify which side of the conflict is justified and in the right.<sup>67</sup> This might explain why, especially in the context of recent and bloody civil wars, Virgil makes the *causae* of the war in Latium and Dido's death so difficult to delineate.

A narrative telling of the suicide of a North African queen 'married' to a Roman leader inevitably invites further historical comparison with Antony and Cleopatra and the events leading up to and surrounding Actium. Indeed, the marriage of Antony and Cleopatra is referred to explicitly later in the *Aeneid*, in the description of the depiction of the battle of Actium on Aeneas' shield: *sequiturque (nefas) Aegyptia coniunx* (8.688). The confusion of questions of causation and blame in the Dido and Aeneas episode could therefore also reflect similar concerns in contemporary understanding and retelling of the story of Antony and Cleopatra. A particular correspondence might be found in the speculation surrounding Cleopatra's suicide. The Augustan version seems to have been that she killed herself against Octavian's wishes, because he wanted to keep her alive both so that he could parade her in triumph in Rome and as a demonstration of his clemency. But questions and doubts still remained: how did she do it? Was she in fact killed by Octavian?<sup>68</sup> Did he really grieve over her

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<sup>67</sup> E.g. Cic. *Phil.* 2.53 (quoted above), in which he skilfully (and dubiously) casts Mark Antony as the ultimate *causa* of civil war because it was he who gave Caesar the *causam belli*.

<sup>68</sup> On the murky political circumstances surrounding Cleopatra's suicide, and the possibility that Octavian cast her death as suicide for propaganda reasons, see e.g. Powell (2013: 171-99), Kostuch (2009), Tyldesley (2008: 171-98), Tronson (1998). He certainly killed the son she had with Julius Caesar, Caesarion, presumably out of concern that he might also be considered Caesar's heir.

death, and try and revive her?<sup>69</sup> τὸ μὲν σαφὲς οὐδεὶς οἶδεν ὧ τρόπῳ διεφθάρη (Dio Cass. 51.14). The difficulty of clearly ascertaining the respective roles of Aeneas and Dido in her death, and, even though it is a suicide, of gaining a clear understanding of the causes leading to it, is a fitting reflection of confusion about Cleopatra and Octavian's role in her death after Actium. In both cases, the obfuscation of the question of responsibility is politically expedient. How the reader of the *Aeneid* feels about Aeneas might be compared with how Romans felt about Augustus after the civil war. Though there may be doubt about Aeneas' intentions and actions, it is equally clear that there are different sides to every story, and that there may have been no practical alternatives. The end, which for Aeneas is founding Rome, and for Augustus is achieving peace after years of strife, may well justify the means.

The mapping of the political interaction between Mark Antony, Octavian and Cleopatra onto the amatory relationship between Aeneas and Dido is not simple: Aeneas, as 'husband' of Dido, recalls Mark Antony, yet when he departs and is implicated in her suicide, he can be compared more closely with Octavian. To confuse things further, we are also reminded of Cleopatra's earlier love affair not with Octavian but with his adoptive father, Julius Caesar. Aeneas therefore can be compared not only with Mark Antony and Octavian, but also with Julius Caesar. Both Aeneas and Julius Caesar eventually reject the North African queen with whom they have a love affair, and both are destined to be set among the stars: Aeneas' speech to Dido in the Underworld (6.456-6, quoted above) forges

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<sup>69</sup> Some sources, e.g. Suet. *Aug.* 17 and Dio Cass. 51.14, claim that Caesar attempted to reverse the effects of the poison on Cleopatra.

through intertextuality with Catullus 66 a connection between the Trojan hero, the *Coma Berenices*, and the *sidus Iulium* that marked Caesar's deification.

Yet I have also argued for a comparison between Dido and Caesar, because Dido's death is like Caesar's in several ways. Firstly, this suggests that Virgil may problematize questions of causation and blame in this episode of the *Aeneid* because of parallel uncertainties not only about Octavian's role in Cleopatra's suicide, but also about Julius Caesar's assassination. Again, the reader is perhaps led to understand the political expedience of admitting that it is sometimes impossible to untangle the complicated nexus of fate, causation, responsibility and blame. Secondly, it shows that Dido and Aeneas' story divides the story of Julius Caesar's assassination and attainment of divinity into two parts: Dido's suicide reflects Caesar's death, as we saw with the comparable portents and interrogation of causation; Aeneas' passage to the heavens and eternal glory reflects his deification (1.259-60). Virgil retells Caesar's chronological reversal of fortune as the synchronic interaction between two characters, one of whom dies whilst the other departs on a journey towards immortality.

The Catullan intertext explains the necessary even if tragic connection between these two events. The lock must be cut from Berenice's head as an offering in order to be set amongst the stars; Aeneas must leave Dido, regardless of the possibility of her suicide, in order to found Rome; Julius Caesar must be assassinated to be deified and, by proxy, to deify the Julian line. In each case, sacrifice is a necessary component of achievement; indeed, in the case of Julius

Caesar and Dido, the sacrifice of a mortal life is a necessary component of immortal achievement. As Apollo says to Ascanius after his first kill (9.641-2):

‘macte nova virtute, puer, sic itur ad astra,  
dis genite et geniture deos.’

‘That’s the way to the stars, boy, glorified by your new manliness, you who are born from gods and who will bear gods.’

The Catullan intertext also explains the role of the poet in this exchange of death for divinity, sacrifice for reward. For whilst Berenice cut the lock, and Conon designated its constellation, it is also the literature of Callimachus and Catullus that made Berenice’s lock renowned and thereby secured it a place in the heavens. Poetry, and the way that it guides our understanding and reinforces our memory of events, is also a cause. In part, therefore, I additionally think that Virgil’s inclusion of a striking allusion to Catullus 66 in Aeneas’ words to Dido in the Underworld highlights the political power of encomiastic poetry to rewrite history and allot immortal fame.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>70</sup> It is interesting that it is Apollo, the god of poetry and driving force behind the plot of the *Iliad*, who utters the words quoted above to Ascanius. Putting them in context reveals that Virgil also points to his own relationship with Augustus in this passage. Before shooting the arrow with which he kills a man for the first time, Ascanius prays to Jupiter (9.625-629):

‘Iuppiter omnipotens, **audacibus adnue coeptis.**  
ipse tibi ad tua templa **feram sollemnia dona,**  
et statuam ante aras aurata fronte **iuuncum**  
candentem pariterque caput cum matre ferentem,  
iam cornu petat et pedibus qui spargat harenam.’

‘All powerful Jupiter, **nod in assent to my daring undertakings. I myself will bring ritual offerings** to your temples, and I will set before your altars a bullock gleaming

It is now possible, therefore, to answer the question as to why Virgil endlessly complicates causation and blame in Dido and Aeneas' affair and Dido's eventual suicide. For Cicero, delineating *causae* in the wake of Julius Caesar's murder seemed essential *ad pacem* and *ad concordiam civium* (Cic. *Fat.* 2). Virgil in contrast suggests that, in some cases, clouding and confusing the causes of historical and politically significant events may have the same aim. Despite suspicions, it is best for the reader of the *Aeneid* to support Aeneas and leave questions about the causes of Dido's death unanswered, just as it is best for a Roman not to seek black and white answers about the causes of recent civil wars, or the deaths of Julius Caesar and Cleopatra.

### Conclusion

It is clear that Virgil is interested in philosophical questions about causation and moral responsibility in the *Aeneid*. Though he sometimes characterizes fate in the poem as Stoic causal determinism, the way he narrates fate demonstrates that the Stoic conception of an infinite *series causarum* is incompatible with the selection and delineation of causes necessary to the project of a narrator. Like a historian, Virgil takes an interest in *causae* of the war in Latium. However, he

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with golden brow, who carries his head level with his mother's, and who already attacks with his horn and scatters sand with his feet.'

*audacibus adnue coeptis* exactly echoes Virgil's request to Octavian at the beginning of the *Georgics* (Verg. *G.* 1.40), and Ascanius' description of the sacrifice he will offer to Jupiter verbally recalls Virgil's metaphorical sacrifice to the leader at the beginning of *Georgics* 3.

offers many different contradictory perspectives on this, and though he unveils some claims, such as that of Drances, as being self-interested and disingenuous, he does not finally adjudicate between them. Nevertheless, the many subjective and misinformed claims about *causae* drive events, demonstrating that subjective beliefs about causes have as much if not more influence than the objective truth in a way that challenges contemporary philosophical discussion of causation. Finally, Virgil again resists clarity and certainty in his articulation of the complicated relationship between causation and moral responsibility in Dido and Aeneas' love affair and Dido's suicide. His decision to do so may rest on recent Roman history and politics, and the apparent necessity of suspending judgement as to the definitive guilt of either side of a civil war in order to make positive steps towards peace.

#### 4. Philosophy, Poetry and Rivers

Rivers are metaphors for both time and poetry in ancient literature. In this chapter, I argue for a simultaneously philosophical and poetic reading of rivers that spans both the *Georgics* and the *Aeneid*. In doing so, I build on my earlier exploration of fate and narrative, and consider in more detail the relationship between fate and morality, as well as the complex and eclectic integration of dissonant strands of Stoic and Epicurean thought in Virgil's poetry. I also investigate further facets to the connection between poetry and politics in Virgil's poetry.

Beginning with the *Georgics*, I argue that the oarsman simile of *Georgics* 1 encourages a Stoic reading, according to which the river represents the inevitable flow of fate against which it is morally vicious for man to struggle. This imagery extends into the Aristaeus-Orpheus episode in *Georgics* 4, in which rivers are pervasive and provide an essential key to interpretation. I therefore use my Stoic analysis of *Georgics* 1 to join other scholars who have argued that the image of Orpheus' dismembered head flowing down the Hebrus crying 'Eurydice!' symbolizes the 'power of poetry to preserve the memory of the dead':<sup>1</sup> though he cannot physically bring his wife back, he is countering the flow of time and her death with his retrospective poetic apostrophe. In doing so, I lay greater stress on the fact that, to make this point, Virgil carefully utilizes the bivalent philosophical and metapoetic associations of rivers. I then consider how

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<sup>1</sup> Gale (2003: 332 n. 27). See also Griffin (1979: 71), Perkell (1989: 89), and Jones (2005: 61).

this might consequently colour our interpretation of rivers in the *Aeneid*, in particular in books eight and nine. I argue that the Tiber stopping his flow so that Aeneas and his men can row upstream to Pallanteum expresses both that this is a journey back to origins, and that it has divine approval and is in accordance with fate. Turnus' desperate leap into the Tiber at the end of book nine similarly shows that he is following the direction laid out for him by fate. However, unlike Aeneas, but like the oarsman in *Georgics* 1, he is borne downstream, the direction of natural decline and destruction.

#### 4. i. Fate, morality, and Callimachean poetics: rivers in the Georgics

In *Georgics* 1, Virgil describes the farmer's struggle against fated natural decline with a simile comparing him to an oarsman rowing hard against the current of a river, who accidentally slips and is dragged downstream (Verg. *G.* 1.197-203):<sup>2</sup>

vidi **lecta** diu et multo spectata **labore**  
 degenerare tamen, **ni vis humana** quotannis  
 maxima quaeque manu **legeret**: sic omnia **fatis**  
 in peius ruere ac **retro** **sublapsa** referri,                      200  
 non aliter quam qui **adverso** vix **flumine** lembum  
**remigiis** subigit, si brachia **forte** remisit,  
 atque illum **in praeceps** pronò **rapit** alveus amni.

I have seen seeds that **have been picked** for a long time and watched over with a great amount of **toil** nevertheless degenerate, **unless human force** every year **picks off** the

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<sup>2</sup> Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*) classes Verg. *G.* 1.176-203 as 'Nature's assaults on man's efforts... the ways in which *labor* may be frustrated by natural forces.'

biggest ones by hand. Thus everything, **by the fates**, descends into decline, and, **once it has slipped away, is borne backwards**, not unlike if someone who scarcely propels a boat with oars, **the river against him**, accidentally slackens his arms, and the current **drags him headlong** downstream.

Virgil is here explaining the importance of seed selection – the farmer must always pick the largest seeds to make sure his crop doesn't degenerate. Otherwise, his work may be suddenly and totally in vain: a point elucidated by the contrast between the use of *labore* (from *labor* 'work') and *sublapsa* (cognate with *labor* 'to slip, to slide'). Man's fraught struggle for progress against nature is depicted as an effortful battle against a subsuming fate (*fatis*), imagined as the powerful current of a river, and characterized as a retrogressive (*retro... referri... (remigiis)... remisit*) and negative (*peius*) force moving in the opposite (*adverso... flumine*) direction. The river simile in the *Aeneid* describing Aeneas' perception of the fall of Troy shows another instance in which a river is used as a powerful image of fated decline and destruction (2.304-8):<sup>3</sup>

in segetem veluti cum flamma furentibus Austris  
incidit, aut **rapidus** montano **flumine** torrens  
sternit agros, sternit sata laeta boumque **labores**  
**praecipitisque** trahit silvas; stupet inscius alto  
accipiens sonitum saxi de vertice pastor.

Just as when a flame falls on crops when the South winds are raging, or a **violent** torrent from a mountain **river** lays low fields, lays low flourishing crops and the **labours** of

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<sup>3</sup> Aeneas describes the fall of Troy as fated (2.54-6, 246-7, 257, 294 form a prelude to this passage), and efforts to stop it as *labor* ('Troiae supremum...laborem' 2.11). See also 2. i. Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid, where I discuss how Vulcan, despite Aeneas' claims, suggests that he could have postponed the fated destruction of Troy by another ten years.

oxen and drags woods **headlong**; a shepherd gapes in ignorance as he takes in the sound from the high summit of a rock.

*rapidus* (2.305) picks up on *rapit* (Verg. *G.* 1.203); in both cases, *flumine* is in the fifth foot,<sup>4</sup> it is *labor* that is washed away (*labores* 2.306, *labore* Verg. *G.* 1.197), and the river seizes its victims headlong (*praecipites* 2.307, *in praeceps* Verg. *G.* 1.203).

There are several factors that encourage a philosophical analysis of the unsettling and memorable passage from the *Georgics*. For one, it references fate (*fatis*):<sup>5</sup> a force which, though prevalent in the *Aeneid*, is rarely mentioned in this poem. Where fate does appear, it is either in an explicitly philosophical sense (Verg. *G.* 1.415-16, 2.491-2), or related to the story of Orpheus and Eurydice. The comparison of fate to a river also encourages a philosophical reading, for the connection between the passing of time and the flow of rivers is often utilized in philosophical texts. Though philosophers as early as Heraclitus drew on this commonplace,<sup>6</sup> by Virgil's time, it seems to have been particularly associated

<sup>4</sup> As is commonly, but not always, the case in Virgil. Cf. 7.663, Verg. *Ecl.* 3.96.

<sup>5</sup> The presence of both *forte* and *fatis* here is uncomfortable: *forte* suggests 'chance', something that cannot exist within a fated universe. It must therefore be understood as a term that focalizes the fallible, human perspective of the oarsman/farmer, who mistakenly believes that his slip is bad luck rather than part of a universal and subsuming fate. See chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*) for further discussion of this technique of drawing attention to characters' ignorance of fate through use of *F/fortuna* rather than *fatum* in the *Aeneid*.

<sup>6</sup> Pl. *Cra.* 402a ΣΩ. λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι **πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα** λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης. 'Socrates: Heracleitus says, you know, that all things move and nothing remains still, and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice into the same stream' (trans. Fowler). See also Diog. Laert. 9.1.8, Arist. *Metaph.* 1010a10-15, Plut. *Mor.* 392b-c. Ademollo (2011 *ad loc.*) suggests that there is an implied etymological link between Κρόνος and κρουνός, noting that 'the same conception was shared by Homer,

with the Stoics.<sup>7</sup> The following example from Horace's *Odes* is perhaps most akin to Virgil's simile in *Georgics* 1 because it uses the force of a river to describe destructive and negative fate (Hor. *Carm.* 3.29.29-41):<sup>8</sup>

**prudens futuri temporis** exitum  
 caliginosa nocte premit **deus** 30  
 ridetque, si mortalis ultra  
**fas** trepidat. quod adest memento  
  
 componere aequus; **cetera fluminis**  
**ritu feruntur**, nunc medio alveo  
 cum pace delabentis Etruscum 35  
 in mare, nunc lapides adesos  
  
 stirpisque raptas et pecus et domos  
 volentis una, non sine montium  
 clamore vicinaeque silvae,

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Hesiod and Orpheus'. A potential connection between time, rivers and Orpheus is particularly promising for my later discussion of rivers and fate in *Georgics* 4. Ovid also portrays Pythagoras mimicking Heraclitus' maxim 'everything is in flux' in the *Metamorphoses* (Ov. *Met.* 15.176ff.).

<sup>7</sup> For example, in the writing of Virgil's contemporaries Philodemus and Horace. For Philodemus see e.g. SVF 2.1076 = *DDG* p. 546 c. 12 καὶ Κρόνον (μὲν τὸ)ν τοῦ ῥεύ(μ)ατος ῥ(όο)ν. Diels identifies this as a potential fragment of Philodemus' *De Pietate* (in which, as often in Philodemus, it would represent the viewpoint of his Stoic opponents), but it does not appear in Obbink's 1996 edition. Horace uses rivers to connote time/fate in a Stoic context at Hor. *Carm.* 3.29.29-41 (above), 2.14.2 (*labuntur* and cf. Nisbet & Hubbard 1991 *ad loc.*), and *Epist.* 1.2.41-3 (where the sense is different but the imagery the same).

<sup>8</sup> Nisbet & Rudd (2004 *ad* Hor. *Carm.* 3.29.33-4) comment on 'the age-old image of time as a stream', offering some of the references above in support of this.

cum fera diluvies quietos

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inritat **amnis**.

**God in his providence** hides **future events** in murky darkness, and laughs if a mere mortal frets about what is beyond his control. Make sure to settle immediate problems calmly. **Everything else flows away like a river** that now glides peacefully in the middle of its channel down to the Etruscan sea, now rolls along eroded boulders, uprooted trees, livestock and houses all mixed together amid the roar of the mountain and its neighbouring woods, when a wild flood enrages its quiet **stream**. (trans. Rudd)

That Stoicism is an important context for the interpretation of this passage is suggested by the provident *deus* and the clear role of fate (*futuri temporis... fas*).<sup>9</sup>

The later evidence of Seneca and Marcus Aurelius helps to cement the association between Stoicism and the image of fate or time as a river.<sup>10</sup>

The oarsman simile in *Georgics* 1 therefore suggests Stoicism because it references fate, and because Virgil here uses river imagery to describe the power and direction of fate. It may also appear to suggest Epicureanism, because Virgil alludes to books two and five of Lucretius' Epicurean *DRN*. There are two particularly close verbal echoes: *ni vis humana* and *in praeceps... rapit*.<sup>11</sup> Placing the former in context, Lucretius is arguing, contrary to the Stoics, that the flaws of the world prove that it was not divinely and providently created: very little is

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<sup>9</sup> On the potential Stoic connotations of the use of the singular *deus* in the *Aeneid*, see 2. i. Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. Sen. *Ep.* 58.22-3 (in which he references Heraclitus), 1.1, *Dial.* 6.22.1 (= *De Consolatione*); M. Aur. *Med.* 4.43, 2.17, 5.23, 6.15.

<sup>11</sup> Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*) notes that *vis humana* is Lucretian.

habitable by humans, and the few places they can live they must farm laboriously for food (Lucr. 5.206-9):<sup>12</sup>

quod super est arvi, tamen id natura sua vi  
sentibus obducat, **ni vis humana resistat**  
vitai causa valido consueta bidenti  
ingemere et terram pressis proscindere aratris...

Even the land that is left, nature would still cover in brambles by her own power, **but that man's power resists**, well accustomed to groan over the stout mattock for very life, and to cleave the soil with the pressure of the plough. (trans. Rouse)

Both passages share a pessimistic agricultural context. But whereas Lucretius uses the difficulty of agriculture as proof that the gods did not create the world with mortals in mind, for Virgil, the painful struggle between humans and nature is divinely ordained (Verg. *G.* 1.121-2 *pater ipse colendi/ haud facilem esse viam voluit*): a pointed inversion, and a much more distressing assertion. The second allusion also subverts Lucretius' Epicurean philosophy (Lucr. 2.277-80):<sup>13</sup>

iamne vides igitur, quamquam vis externa multos  
pellat et invitos cogat procedere saepe  
**praecipitesque rapi**, tamen esse in pectore nostro  
quiddam quod contra pugnare obstareque possit?

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<sup>12</sup> In addition to Thomas, Della Corte (1986 *ad loc.*), Mynors (1990 *ad loc.*) and Farrell (1991: 176-7) also connect Verg. *G.* 1.197-203 with this passage of Lucretius. The last additionally notes the similar wording of *magno quaesita labore* (Lucr. 2.213) to *multo spectata labore* (Verg. *G.* 1.197). Gale (2008: 107 n. 34) likewise marks the oarsman simile as Lucretian by noting similarities with passages including Lucr. 5.206-7 and 2.1173-4 (above).

<sup>13</sup> I have not found another scholar who suggests a possible connection between Verg. *G.* 1.197-203 and this passage of Lucretius.

In this case do you see then that, although an external force propels many men and forces them often to move on and **to be hurried headlong**, yet there is in our breast something strong enough to fight against it and to resist? (trans. Rouse)

Lucretius argues against fate and for free will. Nevertheless, he admits that men can 'be seized headlong' (*praecipites rapi*) by external force contrary to their wishes. In the *Georgics* passage (*atque illum in praeceps prono rapit alveus amni*), Virgil rehabilitates Lucretius' phrasing, and the sense of unwilling downward descent. However, he does so in a context that, contrary to the arguments of Epicurean philosophy, asserts the existence of fate (Virgil's *omnia fatis... ruere*), and underlines that human will's struggle against this is prone to failure.

The reader of the *Georgics* might also connect this simile with the comparable context and image of decline that closes book two of the *DRN* (Lucr. 2.1168-74):

tristis item vetulae vitis sator atque vietae  
temporis incusat momen saeculumque fatigat,  
et crepat antiquum genus ut pietate repletum                      1170  
perfacile angustis tolerarit finibus aevom,  
cum minor esset agri multo modus ante viritim;  
nec tenet omnia paulatim tabescere et ire  
ad scopulum,<sup>14</sup> spatio aetatis defessa vetusto.

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<sup>14</sup> Variant reading *capulum* (*Q*). But *scopulum* (*O, Q. corr., P*), preferred by Rouse/Smith, Lambinus and Possanza (1990), uses the imagery of a ship, and is as such even closer to Virgil's simile in the *Georgics*. Cf. Gale (2008: 107 n. 34): 'The latter passage [i.e. Lucr. 2.1173-4] may have suggested the image of the oarsman, if the MS reading '*ad scopulum*' is retained (as I think it should be) in 1174.' The importance of fate in Virgil as compared

Sadly also the cultivator of the degenerate and shrivelled vine rails at the progress of time and continually criticizes the age, and grumbles how the old world, full of piety, supported life with great ease on a narrow domain, though the man's portion of land was formerly much smaller than it is now; nor does he comprehend that all things gradually decay, and go to the reef of destruction, outworn by the ancient lapse of years. (trans. Rouse)

Whereas Lucretius depicts a farmer lamenting natural degeneration, Virgil advises farmers to constantly select the biggest seeds to avoid it. Lucretius additionally generates pathos by explaining that the farmer doesn't understand that everything declines over time; Virgil corrects the farmer's ignorance by directly explaining to him that he must fight continuously against regression, which he casts not only as natural, but also, contrary to the Epicureans, as fated. Therefore, though the fate-as-river simile in *Georgics* 1 probably has Stoic connotations, the simultaneous inclusion of references to the Epicurean *DRN* do not undermine this, but in fact strengthen it, because they are carefully subverted and reworked to suit Virgil's un-Epicurean purpose.<sup>15</sup>

What do these philosophical, and in particular Stoic, perspectives contribute to our interpretation? For one, the actions of the oarsman are in striking opposition

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to Lucretius is underscored by his transformation of the directionless 'sea of matter' that underlies this shipwreck metaphor (Lucr. 2.550 *materiai tanto in pelago*) into a river flowing one way.

<sup>15</sup> Contrast Gale (2008: 107): 'The train of thought here is familiar: Virgil is in fact following fairly closely the Lucretian argument that nature is in terminal decline, and once again, the allusion is 'flagged' with direct echoes of Lucretius' text.' As will be clear from my argument, I instead stress the dissonance of the Lucretian intertext here. Yes, both passages depict natural decline. But Lucretius argued against the existence of fate and vociferously denied that the world was created by a provident deity. It is therefore remarkable that Virgil recalls Lucretius in a passage that describes fated (*fatis*) decline as part of the world that Jupiter created for mortals.

to the canonical Stoic equation of happiness, or in some formulations ‘the virtue of a happy man’, to ‘a smooth flow of life’ (SVF 3.4 = Diog. Laert. 7.88):<sup>16</sup>

εἶναι δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο **τὴν τοῦ εὐδαίμονος ἀρετὴν καὶ εὐροίαν βίου**,  
 ὅταν πάντα πράττηται κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τοῦ παρ' ἐκάστῳ δαίμονος  
 πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου διοικητοῦ βούλησιν

And this very thing constitutes **the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life**, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe. (trans. Hicks)

In *Georgics* 1, Virgil's farmer is in a perpetual struggle against nature, already problematic when considered in the light of the Stoic maxim to live κατὰ φύσιν. The oarsman of this simile corresponds to the farmer, and his struggle against the flow of a river emphasizes this point using a different Stoic image, that of the εὐροία βίου. Thinking more specifically about fate, Virgil's way of imagining the relationship between man and fate as a rower striving against a river can also be compared with the illustrative example of the dog and cart used by the Stoics (Hippol. *Haer.* 1.21 = L&S 62A, SVF 2.975):<sup>17</sup>

καὶ αὐτοὶ [ὁ Ζήνων καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος] δὲ τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα  
 διεβεβαιώσαντο παραδείγματι χρησάμενοι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι ὥσπερ ὀχήματος  
 ἐὰν ἢ ἐξηρητημένος κύων, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται ἔπεσθαι, **καὶ ἔλκεται καὶ**  
**ἔπεται**, ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης [οἷον τῆς

<sup>16</sup> See also SVF 1.154, 1.184 (attributed to Zeno), 3.16 = L&S 63A, 3.73 (attributed to the followers of Zeno, Cleanthes and Chrysippus).

<sup>17</sup> I also quote this passage above as evidence that the use of verbs of following and dragging in conjunction with fate may have Stoic connotations (2. i. *Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid*).

εἰμαρμένης]· ἔαν δὲ μὴ βούληται ἔπεσθαι, πάντως **ἀναγκασθήσεται**· τὸ αὐτὸ δῆπου καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· καὶ μὴ βουλόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρωμένον εἰσελθεῖν.

They too [Zeno and Chrysippus] affirmed that everything is fated with the following model. When a dog is tied to a cart, if it wants to follow, **it is pulled and follows**, making its spontaneous act coincide with necessity, but if it does not want to follow it will be compelled in any case. So it is with men: even if they do not want to, **they will be compelled** in any case to follow what is destined. (trans. Long & Sedley)

Everything happens according to fate (τὸ καθ' εἰμαρμένην εἶναι πάντα).

Whatever a dog does when it is tied to a cart, it will always be forced to follow it, just as humans will always live as fate demands. However, if the dog, though still tied to the cart, decides to run after it anyway, 'it is both dragged and follows'.

Likewise, humans can make a difference to their lives to the extent that they can choose whether they align their will with fate or not (ποιῶν καὶ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης [οἶον τῆς εἰμαρμένης]). Seneca, translating and expanding Cleanthes' *Hymn to Zeus*, puts it succinctly: *ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt* (Sen. *Ep.* 107.11).<sup>18</sup> The virtuous and happy man is willingly led rather than unwillingly dragged, as the complementary image of happiness as εὐροια βίου suggests. There are similarities between this example and Verg. *G.* 1.197-203: both portray fate as having a direction, and as something that is separate

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<sup>18</sup> See also above, n. 33 in chapter two (*Fate, Literature and Narrative*). In context: *duc, o parens celsique dominator poli,/ quocumque placuit: nulla parendi mora est./ adsum impiger. fac nolle, comitabor gemens/ malusque patiar, facere quod licuit bono./ ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt*. 'Lead me, o master of the lofty heavens,/ my father, whithersoever thou shalt wish;/ I shall not falter, but obey with speed./ And though I would not, I shall go, and suffer/ in sin and sorrow what I might have done/ in noble virtue. Aye the willing soul/ fate leads, but the unwilling drags along' (trans. Gummere). Seneca appears to add this fifth line to Cleanthes' tetrastich (= SVF 1.527), raising the question of authenticity. The most plausible response is that, even if this verse is not Cleanthes', it is drawn from an example of Chrysippus or Zeno, perhaps even the dog and cart image (above). Cf. Marcovich (1959).

from, but relevant to and powerful over human existence. In each case, despite their efforts, humans are portrayed as passive to the force that controls them (*referri*; ἔλκεται... ἀναγκασθήσεται). The Stoic context therefore characterizes the farmer/rower's struggle not only as doomed (fate will always win), but also as morally vicious.<sup>19</sup>

I will now argue that thoroughly situating the fate-as-river simile of *Georgics* 1 in its complicated philosophical context provides an interpretative key for the important role played by rivers and fate in *Georgics* 4. In the latter half of the poem, Aristaeus and Orpheus exemplify the most basic and urgent form of mortal struggle against inevitable fate in their attempts to reverse death.

Interestingly, rivers pervade the narrative: Aristaeus mourns beside one for the loss of his bees (Verg. *G.* 4.319-20), and (in Virgil's version) his mother Cyrene is a river deity. Eurydice is tragically killed running alongside a river (Verg. *G.* 4.457). The head of Orpheus is torn from his body by jealous maenads then borne downstream by the icy Hebrus (Verg. *G.* 4.523-5). One of the final images of the poem is Caesar thundering by the deep Euphrates (Verg. *G.* 4.560-1). In what follows, I bring these ideas together, and combine them with the use of rivers as metaphors for poetry and poetic composition. I hope to show that the prominence of rivers in this portion of the poem is a function of Virgil's

exploration of the limits on the potential of humans and, in particular, of human

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<sup>19</sup> This reading is supported by the reappearance of *retro sublapsa referri* in the *Aeneid*, where Sinon (though he is lying) uses it to describe the deadly consequences of the Greeks' impiety in attempting to steal the statue of Pallas from her Trojan temple (2.169-70): '*ex illo fluere ac retro sublapsa referri / spes Danaum, fractae vires, aversa deae mens.*' I would not, however, like to claim that Virgil necessarily intends to characterize the farmer's struggle against nature as morally vicious throughout the *Georgics*, nor indeed that he is philosophically consistent in this poem.

art and literature, to oppose and rewrite fate. I conclude with a political, philosophical and literary analysis of the sphragis, in which I draw distinctions between Virgil's relationship with Augustus and Orpheus' relationship with Aristaeus: the role Virgil's forward-facing, Callimachean and perhaps encomiastic poetry will play in the successful regeneration of Roman society after civil war contrasts with Orpheus' failure to resurrect Eurydice because he looked back.<sup>20</sup>

Virgil uses the Nile to situate bugonia, the strange ritual sacrifice by which Aristaeus will get new bees, in Egypt (Verg. *G.* 4.285-94). But the reason why bugonia happens is traced back to the River Peneios, in Thessaly, to the source of which the grieving shepherd Aristaeus travelled when his bees died (Verg. *G.* 4.319-22):

tristis ad extremi sacrum caput astitit amnis  
 multa querens, atque hac adfatus voce parentem:  
 'mater, Cyrene mater, quae gurgitis huius  
 ima tenes...'

Sad, he stood at the sacred head of the river, its furthest point, making many protests, and he addressed his parent with these words: 'Mother, mother Cyrene, you who occupy the depths of this stream...'

Aristaeus' attempt to resurrect his bees involves going back to origins (his mother; the source of a river), and the role of poetry in this is strongly

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<sup>20</sup> This adds to my argument in the previous chapter (3. iii. *Dido's culpa and Aeneas' culpa*) that one of the functions of Virgil's allusions to Catullus and Callimachus' *Coma Berenices* in the *Aeneid* is to underline the role of encomiastic poetry in securing immortal renown for Rome and Roman leaders.

emphasized. Cyrene has strong associations with poetry: the name is inextricably linked with Callimachus, and according to some accounts, she is a lover of Apollo.<sup>21</sup> The river nymphs that Virgil describes with Cyrene in the Peneios are also deeply metapoetic. Not only are they engaged in singing songs and working wool (4.334-5, 345-9),<sup>22</sup> but they have names that pointedly suggest literary significance.<sup>23</sup> Most of them are not attested elsewhere as nymphs: 'Cydippe' recalls Callimachus' Acontius and Cydippe, 'Lycorias' the Roman elegist Gallus' beloved Lycoris. 'Clio', of course, is the Muse of history, and 'Deiopea' was the wife of Musaeus.<sup>24</sup> 'Arethusa', who is elsewhere a nymph, nevertheless bears rich metapoetic suggestions at the beginning of *Eclogue* 10 (Verg. *Ecl.* 10.1-6), and may likewise have associations with Gallus. Finally, 'Clymene' is a nymph from Homer (Hom. *Il.* 18.47), who additionally sings 'a Homeric song, the account of the affair between Ares and Aphrodite from Hom. *Od.* 8. 266-366' (Thomas 1988 *ad loc.*). This further illustrates the role of philosophy in this episode: the story of

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<sup>21</sup> Callimachus was a native of Cyrene – accordingly, Cyrene receives special mention at e.g. Callim. *Hymn* 2.94 (= *to Apollo*). Cyrene also embodies the connection between Thessaly and Northern Africa: in Pindar's *Pythian* 9, Apollo falls in love with Cyrene, originally a Thessalian huntress, and transports her to Libya, where he makes her queen, and she gives birth to Aristaeus. The same story is told at Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 2.500ff., but in this case, Apollo is named as the father of Aristaeus. Though she is not always a river deity, for Propertius, reference to Cyrene's waters carries Callimachean associations (Prop. 4.6.4).

<sup>22</sup> See e.g. above n. 53, chapter two (*Fate, Literature and Narrative*) for the metapoetic suggestions of the Fates twisting threads.

<sup>23</sup> Noted by Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*).

<sup>24</sup> Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*) writes that Beroe 'is a complete mystery, as is the Beroe at Ov. *Met.* 3.278 (the nurse of Semele)'. Possible (but still unknown) literary significance is further suggested by the fact that Beroe is also the name of the Trojan woman whom Iris disguises herself as in the *Aeneid* to encourage the burning of the ships (5.620). See chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*) for my discussion of this episode.

Ares and Aphrodite in the *Odyssey* was ‘commonly explained in antiquity as an allegorical poem of natural philosophy’ (Farrell 1991: 260).<sup>25</sup>

Aristaeus must enter this watery metapoetic context to find out why his bees died, and what to do about it (Verg. *G.* 4.359-65). When he does so, he is amazed at the subterranean passage of rivers he sees (Verg. *G.* 4.365-73):<sup>26</sup>

... et ingenti motu stupefactus aquarum                      365  
omnia sub magna **labentia** flumina terra  
spectabat diversa locis, Phasimque Lycumque,  
et caput unde altus primum se erumpit Enipeus,  
unde pater Tiberinus et unde Aniena fluenta  
saxosusque sonans Hypanis Mysusque Caicus              370  
et gemina auratus taurino cornua cultu  
Eridanus,<sup>27</sup> quo non alius per pingua culta  
in mare purpureum violentior effluit amnis.

... amazed by the huge movement of waters, he watched all the rivers from different places **gliding** beneath the great earth: Phasis and Lycus, and the source whence deep Enipeus first springs forth, whence father Tiber and the streams of the Anio, and the rocky, roaring Hypanis and Mysian Caicus and Eridanus, adorned with gold on his twin

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<sup>25</sup> See e.g. Heraclitus, *Quaestiones Homericae* 69, who seeks to rescue Homer from the charge of portraying adulterous gods by reading this episode as an allegory either for the Empedoclean union of love and strife, or for the need of not just two, but three things, flame (Hephaestus), iron (Ares) and delicacy (Venus) in bronzework (!).

<sup>26</sup> For the theory that rivers have a subterranean source, see especially Arist. *Mete.* 349bff. This is usually in opposition to the theory that they all come from the ocean (Hes. *Theog.* 337-70, Xenophanes fr. 30 D-K), though in Virgil the two seem to be conflated, as Cyrene later calls Ocean ‘*patrem rerum*’ (Verg. *G.* 4.382). The elision between *unde altus... unde Aniena* makes the sound ‘*unda*’ – an appropriate wordplay.

<sup>27</sup> The Eridanus is a river of the underworld at 6.659.

horns in the style of a bull – no other river flows more violently than he through fertile farmland into the purple sea.

As Thomas notes,<sup>28</sup> this is most probably also amongst other things a reference to Callimachus, who wrote a treatise (now lost) on the rivers of the known world. It is remarkable given the Thessalian setting, and supportive of a political reading of this episode, that Rome's rivers, the Tiber and its tributary the Anio, are prominently placed at the centre of the catalogue.

Cyrene tells her son to capture the prophet Proteus *ut omnem/ expediat morbi causam eventusque secundet* (4.396-7). That this episode is closely modelled on the instructions of Eidothea (Proteus' daughter) to Menelaus in the *Odyssey* (Hom. *Od.* 4.384ff.) again supports a philosophical reading, because, as in the case of the tale of Ares and Aphrodite (see above), Virgil's Homeric model was read as philosophical allegory.<sup>29</sup> When Aristaeus has bound Proteus to achieve these two aims, Proteus tells the story of the poet Orpheus and Eurydice. Though this does to an extent explain why Aristaeus' bees have died, interestingly it is left to Cyrene to fulfil the latter objective by giving the instructions for the bugonia. Both fate and rivers are prominent in Proteus' narration from the outset (Verg. *G.* 4.453-9):

'non te nullius exercent numinis irae;

magna luis commissa: tibi has miserabilis Orpheus

haudquaquam ob meritum poenas, **ni fata resistant**, 455

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<sup>28</sup> Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*).

<sup>29</sup> Farrell (1991: 265-6), Heraclitus *Quaestiones Homericae* 65-7. Proteus' transformation into lion, snake, panther, boar, water and a tree was allegorized as the formation of primordial matter into different earthly elements.

suscitat, et rapta graviter pro coniuge saevit.

illa quidem, **dum te fugeret per flumina praeceps,**

**immanem** ante pedes hydrum **moritura** puella

servantem ripas alta non vidit in herba.'

'The angers of not no god are troubling you; you are paying for great crimes. Poor Orpheus calls forth these punishments upon you, which you would by no means deserve, **were it not that the fates were in opposition**, and he rages passionately for the wife snatched from him. For that girl, **while she was fleeing you headlong along the river**, did not see, **doomed to die**, the huge snake before her feet, that guarded the river banks in the deep grass.'

The sense of lines 454-5 is deceptively difficult to disentangle,<sup>30</sup> but *ni fata resistant* suggest that it is fate, not Aristaeus' pursuit, that killed Eurydice, and that the punishment Orpheus is exacting from Aristaeus in recompense for her death is therefore disproportionate and ill-deserved.<sup>31</sup> Fate's role in the death of Eurydice is stressed by the future participle *moritura*, and the inherently deadly connotations of *immanem*.<sup>32</sup> *ni fata resistant* also provides a link to the oarsman simile of *Georgics* 1 by recalling the same passage of Lucretius (Lucr. 5.207 *ni vis humana resistat*), again in an antagonistic way that stresses, contrary to Epicurean doctrine, the role that fate plays in human life. Bearing this in mind, the image of Eurydice running along the river banks (rather than struggling upstream), coupled with the additional verbal echo of the oarsman simile in

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<sup>30</sup> Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*) accordingly offers three translations, preferring 'penalties which you have by no means deserved [because you did not intend Eurydice's death].' My translation follows his reading. However, Mynors (1990 *ad loc.*) suggests that we 'read *ad* for *ob* with the Palatinus, and translate 'by no means up to your deserts'.

<sup>31</sup> See above (3. iii. *Dido's culpa and Aeneas' culpa*) for a discussion of the relationship between fate and moral responsibility in Dido and Aeneas' relationship.

<sup>32</sup> Virgil often plays on *immanes* and *Manes* in book six of the *Aeneid*, e.g. 6.237 *spelunca alta fuit vastoque immanis hiatu*, which is a fitting description for the entrance to the underworld. The adjective appears 11 times in this book, considerably more than in any other. See OLD s.v. (= *IN* + *manes*).



illa 'quis et me' inquit 'miseram et te perdidit, Orpheu,

quis tantus furor? **en iterum crudelia retro** 495

**fata vocant**, conditque **natantia** lumina somnus.

iamque vale: **feror** ingenti circumdata nocte

invalidasque tibi tendens, heu non tua, palmas.'

dixit et oculis subito, **ceu fumus in auras**

**commixtus tenuis**, fugit diversa, neque illum 500

prensantem nequiquam umbras et multa volentem

dicere praeterea vidit; **nec portitor Orci**

**amplius obiectam passus transire paludem.**

And already, **retracing his steps**, he had escaped all the dangers, and Eurydice, **restored**, was making her way to the upper air, following behind (for Proserpina had given this as a condition), when a sudden madness seized the incautious lover – certainly pardonable, if the dead knew how to pardon. **He stopped**, and – alas! – not thinking of the consequences, his heart vanquished, **he looked back** at his Eurydice, already under the very light. **Then all his hard work flowed away**, the treaties of the pitiless tyrant were broken, and a crash resounded three times in the pools of Avernus. She said 'What furious longing, Orpheus, what enormity of furious longing destroyed both wretched me and you? **Look, again the cruel fates summon me back**, and sleep buries my **swimming** eyes. And now, farewell: **I am carried off** in the embrace of great night as I, alas no longer yours, reach out to you my strengthless hands.' She spoke and suddenly fled away from his eyes, **like smoke mixed in with insubstantial air**, and she did not see him grasping in vain at the shades and wishing to say much more besides this. **Nor did the ferryman of Orcus allow him to cross the marsh that barred his way again.**

As in the oarsman simile, the episode is characterized by return, repetition, retrospection, and regression (*referens, reddita, restitit, respexit, iterum, retro* here; *retro, referri, (remigiis), remisit* in *Georgics* 1 above). Crucially, the moment at which Orpheus looks back, and all of his hard work is undone, mirrors the

earlier episode in several respects.<sup>35</sup> Destruction again spills over the line (*ibi omnis/ effusus labor; sic omnia fatis/ in peius ruere*), and the choice of the verb *effusus* ‘flowed away’, coupled with its positioning next to *labor* recall both the image of the river and the play on *labor/sublapsa*. The fates are depicted as dragging Eurydice back to death, just as they did to the farmer’s crops in the first book (*en iterum crudelia **retro/ fata** vocant...‘**feror**’; sic omnia **fatis/ in peius ruere ac retro sublapsa referri***). A river bounds the episode, as Charon refuses to let Orpheus cross the Styx and enter the Underworld again.

A further point of comparison is the re-appropriation of Lucretian phrasing into a pointedly un-Epicurean context. In book three of the *DRN*, Lucretius argues that the soul dies with us, and that there is no afterlife. In doing so, he consistently compares the material consistency of the soul to that of smoke and water. He uses this comparison to support the idea that the constituents of the soul dissolve and separate when we die, just as water flows away when a container is broken, and smoke dissipates into air (Lucr. 3.434-9):

nunc igitur quoniam quassatis undique vasis  
**diffluere** umorem et laticem discedere cernis,  
 et nebula ac **fumus** quoniam discedit **in auras**,  
 crede animam quoque **diffundi** multoque perire  
 ocius et citius dissolvi in corpora prima,  
 cum semel ex hominis membris ablata recessit...

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<sup>35</sup> Only Miles (1980: 277) links the ‘reversal of Orpheus’ fortunes’ with the oarsman simile in *Georgics* 1. He does not analyse the connection.

Now, therefore, since, when vessels are shattered, you perceive the water **flowing out** on all sides and the liquid dispersing, and since mist and **smoke** disperse abroad **into the air**, believe that the spirit also is **spread abroad** and passes away far more quickly, and is more speedily dissolved into its first bodies, as soon as it has departed, withdrawn from the limbs of a man. (trans. Rouse)

Virgil adopts both these images to describe Eurydice's second demise: she flows away, and in doing so is *ceu fumus in auras* (Verg. *G.* 4.499). His phrasing closely mirrors the above passage, and one following (Lucr. 3.455-6):<sup>36</sup>

ergo dissolvi quoque convenit omnem animai

naturam, **ceu fumus in** altas aeris **auras...**

It follows therefore that the whole nature of the spirit is dissolved abroad, like smoke, into the high winds of the air. (trans. Rouse)

However, in stark and direct contradiction of Lucretius' philosophy, Virgil is describing an immortal soul returning to the Underworld.

The implications of the comparison between these episodes in *Georgics* 1 and 4 are many-layered, and unsettling. I argued that the oarsman simile invited a Stoic reading which cast the struggle of the farmer against fated natural decline as both morally vicious and doomed. This is already a difficult assertion – humans must farm to live: surely it cannot be wrong? Applying it to Orpheus' vain attempt to bring back Eurydice from the dead feels comparably uncomfortable, not because this is a necessary and customary activity like farming, but because our sympathy for him and our familiarity with his story tend to override concerns that what he tries to achieve is definitively against nature. This is

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<sup>36</sup> Noted by Mynors (1990 *ad Verg. G.* 4.499). Both Mynors and Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*) also connect this passage to Homer's description of Patroclus' ghost (Hom. *Il.* 23.99-101).

especially so because, in some other accounts, Orpheus succeeds, and this is a glorious story of the triumph of poetry and love over death.<sup>37</sup> In fact, one of the effects of comparing the farmer's *labor* in *Georgics* 1 with Orpheus' in *Georgics* 4 is that it suggests the desire to resurrect loved ones is as human as the desire to grow healthy crops to eat.

But another effect of the comparison is that it suggests that Orpheus was wrong to even try and use his poetry to counter fate and bring Eurydice back, and that his laborious attempt was doomed to fail. Are we to conclude that poetry cannot and should not bring back the dead? Perhaps, but it is difficult to reconcile this with the fact that, unlike in the case of the rower, Virgil does not make Orpheus' mission seem doomed from the outset. In fact, lines 485-6 (*evaserat, reddita, veniebat*) suggest that he would have achieved his supernatural aim had he not been seized by insanity and turned back to look at his wife. There is therefore a tension between the Stoic connotations of the comparison with *Georgics* 1, which suggests that Orpheus' attempt as a whole is morally vicious, and the way that Virgil tells the story, which encourages the reader to isolate Orpheus' act of retrospection as wrong, not his entire project. So should we conclude instead that if poets and poetry aim to regenerate what is lost (Eurydice/bees... and

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<sup>37</sup> Noted by Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*), and perhaps suggested by a metapoetic reading of *pedem referens* Verg. *G.* 4.485. Orpheus is successful in the *Lament for Bion* attributed to Moschus (115-27), and partially so at Pl. *Symp.* 179d, where Phaedrus tells that Orpheus succeeds in bringing back a *φάσμα* of Eurydice (he is denied the real thing because travelling to the Underworld to bring back a beloved is deemed cowardly in comparison to the actions of braver figures, such as Alcestis and Achilles, who sacrificed their own lives for love). However, in the Attic relief of Eurydice, Hermes and Orpheus which Mynors references (1990 *ad loc.*), and of which several Roman copies survive (e.g. item 6727, Museo archeologico nazionale di Napoli, dated to the Augustan era), it looks as though, as Orpheus reaches to lift his wife's veil, Hermes is preparing to draw her back into the underworld.

Roman society?), they must not look back, and must not fixate on individuals from the past?<sup>38</sup>

Having lost Eurydice for the second time, Orpheus laments at the edge of the Strymon, a river in his native Thrace. He does so for so long that he is torn apart by impatient Thracian women because he refuses to marry them for enduring love of Eurydice. His limbs are scattered *per agros*, but his decapitated head is left to flow down the Hebrus, another river further east in Thrace (Verg. *G.* 4.523-7):

tum quoque marmorea caput a cervice revulsum

gurgite cum medio portans Oeagrius Hebrus

volveret, **Eurydicen** vox ipsa et frigida lingua, 525

“a miseram **Eurydicen!**” anima fugiente vocabat:

**Eurydicen** toto referebant flumine ripae.’

Then also, when the Oeagrian Hebrus was rolling along, carrying his head torn from its marbled neck in the middle of its stream, did his voice itself and his chill tongue call **Eurydice**, ‘Oh, poor **Eurydice!**’, as his soul fled: the banks echoed **Eurydice** down the whole river.

The Hebrus was mentioned earlier as being amongst the natural locations that wept for Eurydice’s death (Verg. *G.* 4.463), and *Oeagrius* is pathetically appropriate, as it is an adjective that designates Thrace through Orpheus’ father

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<sup>38</sup> Cf. Miles (1980: 281): Orpheus’ ‘example is a dramatic warning to Aristaeus and to us all that we must not attempt to live in the past, that we must accept loss, even of the most personal and tragic kind, as the natural complement of growth and new life... It demands that we respect the human suffering that loss and change entail...’; Perkell (1989: 82): ‘Orpheus fails of his goal because he is backward-looking... part of the characteristic pattern of his absorption with and idealization of the past.’

Oeagrus. The characterization of Orpheus' relationship with the Hebrus as filial also encourages the reader to compare it with that of Aristaeus and his mother Cyrene: the latter travelled to the head (*caput*) of the Peneios at the start of this episode, now Orpheus' dismembered head (*caput*) flows down the Hebrus towards its close.

*caput a cervice revulsum*, as Thomas notes, is Ennian (Enn. *Ann.* 483 Skutsch).<sup>39</sup>

Virgil prefaces it with *marmorea*, which designates Orpheus' head as chill statuary. The combination of this adjective with the four Ennian words which follow it perhaps distances and dulls the immediacy of this otherwise violent and graphic image by making it seem more like art than life. Though he must be dead, Virgil leaves the poet Orpheus with the power of speech even as his soul leaves him (*anima fugiente* - the phrasing is probably Lucretian).<sup>40</sup> The reader is drawn more closely into the scene when Virgil's voice seems to break through Proteus' narration to Aristaeus with the apostrophe *a miseram Eurydicen!*<sup>41</sup> The threefold repetition of *Eurydicen* in Virgil's text reflects the echo of her name down the Hebrus' banks, simultaneously enacting the closural *conclamatio* at a Roman funeral, and countering closure by bringing Orpheus' cry to the present reader's

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<sup>39</sup> *oscitat in campis a cervice revulsum/ semianimesque micant oculi lucemque requirunt*. Skutsch (1985 *ad loc.*) assigns this fragment 'with great probability' to the battle of Magnesia.

<sup>40</sup> E.g. Lucr. 3.228-30, 4.37-8.

<sup>41</sup> This sense of apostrophe is encouraged by the elision between *miseram* and *Eurydicen*, which delays certainty that this is the accusative case. Either way, the accusative need not make *miseram Eurydicen* the object of *vocabat* - it is also used of exclamations. Virgil's grammar is deliberately ambiguous. Cf. Bakker on the apostrophe to Patroclus at Hom. *Il.* 16.784-90 (1993: 23), '*a! virgo infelix...*' Verg. *Ecl.* 6.47, 52.

ears and/or lips.<sup>42</sup> The style of the apostrophe follows Calvus, Catullus and probably Gallus.<sup>43</sup> Therefore, whilst Orpheus' words memorialize his beloved Eurydice, Virgil's simultaneously memorialize poets: Ennius, Lucretius, Calvus, Catullus, Gallus etc. Though Gallus was probably still alive at the publication of the *Georgics*, in the case of the other allusions, the disjointed verbal echoes of past poets metapoetically exemplify exactly what Virgil is depicting here: death separates the poet from his words, but his words can live on.

The image of flowing downstream suggests that Orpheus has finally submitted to fate: in this case, both his own death and the death of Eurydice. Poetry cannot stave off the inevitable, reverse the past or bring back the dead, and it should not try to do so. Nevertheless, the representation of Orpheus' head crying 'Eurydice, Eurydice, Eurydice!', coupled with these intertexts, shows that what it can do is memorialize and immortalize characters and events in a verbal form. This, unlike Orpheus' earlier attempt, is not a doomed or morally vicious activity – it does not involve a struggle against the flow of fate. Virgil limits the awesome power Orpheus' music and poetry was given in myth and cult to charm nature and challenge the laws of fate and mortality to something more realistic: the power of the word to record, remind, and resurrect in the imagination.

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<sup>42</sup> The *conclamatio* at Roman funerals involved the threefold repetition of the deceased's name. *frater* is accordingly repeated three times in Catullus 101, the poet's funereal elegy to his dead brother. Cf. also 11.188-9 0 *ter... ter*. Many thanks to Matthew Robinson for suggesting the relevance of this here.

<sup>43</sup> The emotive '*a!*' follows Catullus (*a misera!* 64.71) and Calvus (*a virgo infelix, herbis pascere amaris* Serv. *ad Ecl.* 6.47, on which see n. 41 above). Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*) persuasively suggests that this may also be Gallus, citing its threefold repetition in *Eclogue* 10 as evidence (Verg. *Ecl.* 10.47-9). Some may additionally see in these sorts of stylistic features traces of the elusive '*laudes Galli*': see Thomas (1988: 13-6) for a summary of the debate.

As noted above, Proteus does not, in the end, provide the solution to Aristaeus' problem of how to get his bees back: his narration abruptly finishes here, and we return to Cyrene and Aristaeus. Nevertheless, Cyrene steps in, giving her son the instructions for the bugonia, which he successfully follows.<sup>44</sup> His bees are miraculously reborn from the rotting carcasses of the animals he has sacrificed to Orpheus and Eurydice. This provides a striking contrast to Orpheus' failure to bring back his beloved Eurydice, whose double loss the reader surely feels more keenly. As Perkell (1989: 81-7) notes, Aristaeus' action is crucially different from Orpheus' not just for its violence, but also in that it is an exchange (dead cattle for live bees) rather than a resurrection, and in that he is not concerned with bringing back the exact same bees which died. This helps to answer my earlier question, as to why it is particularly Orpheus' looking back that Virgil casts as wrong, rather than his entire attempt to resurrect Eurydice. Orpheus' looking back is symbolic of a more general retrospection; an idealization and fixation on a past individual that is concomitant with a refusal to accept fate and move on. Virgil engineers a morally complex situation in which it seems as though it is this, rather than Aristaeus' violent sacrifice, that is doomed and morally vicious. He therefore demonstrates that poets and poetry can memorialize the dead whilst stressing that they should be forward-facing rather than reluctant to let go of the

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<sup>44</sup> Note also that the ritual sacrifice Aristaeus performs at the end of *Georgics* 4 is different from the procedure of bugonia initially described at Verg. *G.* 4.295-314 (on this see e.g. Habinek 1990), and that whereas Proteus initially claims Aristaeus is being punished by Orpheus (Verg. *G.* 4.453-6), Cyrene later tells her son that his bees were taken away by the nymphs (Verg. *G.* 4.532-4) because they miss dancing in the mountains with Eurydice.

past. To conclude my discussion, I suggest that the ending of *Georgics* 4 answers some of our questions about what this may mean in practice.

Though Orpheus only succeeds in memorializing rather than resurrecting his beloved Eurydice, the fact that the object of Aristaeus' successful regeneration is bees nevertheless suggests a connection between poetry and rebirth: bees were used both as metaphors for poets, and as symbols for the souls of the dead.<sup>45</sup> I demonstrated above that the start of Aristaeus' attempt to get some new bees, his journey into the source of the river Peneios to see his Callimachean mother Cyrene and other heavily metapoetic river nymphs, forged the same connection between poetry and rebirth. Virgil himself uses the image of bees to describe the souls awaiting reincarnation in Elysium in the *Aeneid* (6.707-9):

ac veluti in pratis ubi apes aestate serena

floribus insidunt variis et candida circum

lilia funduntur, strepit omnis murmure campus.

Just as, when bees settle on different flowers in the meadows during cloudless summer, and they pour round white lilies, the whole field is filled with the noise of their hum.

The sphragis, immediately following the birth of the bees, may contain some of the answers as to the connection Virgil intends his reader to understand between poetry and regeneration (Verg. *G.* 4.559-566):

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<sup>45</sup> On bees as metaphors for poets see e.g. Pl. *Ion* 534b, Pind. *Pyth.* 10.53-4 (also an encomiastic context), Pind. fr.152, Hor. *Carm.* 4.2.27-32. The image is surely related to the pervasive theme of the honey and sweetness of the Muses and song (e.g. Lucr. 1.936-50). Virgil's use of a bee simile to describe the souls in Elysium is suggestive of pre-existing literary tradition connecting the two, and supported by e.g. Soph. fr. 879 (Radt) βομβεῖ δὲ νεκρῶν σμήνος, and Porph. *De Antr. nymph.* 18-9.

haec super arborum cultu pecorumque canebam  
 et super arboribus, Caesar dum **magnus** ad altum 560  
 fulminat **Euphraten** bello **victorque volentis**  
**per populos dat iura** viamque adfectat Olympo.  
 illo Vergilium me tempore dulcis alebat  
 Parthenope studiis florentem ignobilis oti,  
 carmina qui lusi pastorum audaxque iuventa, 565  
 Tityre, te patulae cecini sub tegmine fagi.

I was singing these [poems] on the subject of the farming of fields and flocks, and on trees, whilst **great** Caesar thundered in war at the deep **Euphrates**, and, **victorious**, **gave laws through willing peoples**, and paved the way to Olympus. At that time, sweet Parthenope fostered me, Virgil, as I flourished in the pursuits of inglorious leisure – I who played with the poetry of shepherds, and, bold with youth, sung of you, Tityrus, under the protection of a spreading beech tree.

For one, these lines parcel together Virgil's poetic activity with Octavian's political and military achievements. Additionally, the near seamless transition from bugonia to discussion of the young Caesar reminds the reader that we were encouraged to read the bees as at least in part an allegory for human and particularly Roman society at the beginning of *Georgics* 4.<sup>46</sup> This suggests a connection between Octavian's success and leadership and the regeneration of Roman society.

Unlike Orpheus, Virgil is not looking back. He ends the poem with a positive and forward-looking portrayal of the state of the Roman world and Octavian's role within this that contrasts starkly both with Orpheus' fixation on Eurydice, and

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<sup>46</sup> Most notably at Verg. *G.* 4.201, where their young are called *parvos Quirites*.

with the pessimism, horror and bloodshed at the end of *Georgics* 1. In the course of the *Georgics*, therefore, Virgil has shifted his gaze: away from the gruesome civil and foreign wars of the recent past, and towards future peace. These lines extend the promise of a rebuilding of Roman society, albeit under the rulership of one man; and of stability and peace, albeit one that is only guaranteed by sustained military efforts. The wording of *victorque volentis/ per populos dat iura* connects Octavian's achievements both with Virgil's prospective poetic triumph in *Georgics* 3 (Verg. *G.* 3.9 *victorque virum volitare per ora*), and the epitaph Ennius wrote for himself (*volito vivos per ora virum*). Virgil thus redirects poetry's backward-facing memorializing power (as exemplified by the inscription on Ennius' tombstone) in the service of forecasting his own poetic success along with Octavian's divinity (Verg. *G.* 4.562 *viamque adfectat Olympo*).

Close analysis of the final line of the *Georgics* supports this reading. This takes the reader back to the first line of the *Eclogues* (Verg. *Ecl.* 1.1):

Tityre, tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi

Tityrus, as you recline under the protection of a spreading beech tree...

In the *Georgics*, however, Virgil both addresses Tityrus, the pastoral character from his *Eclogues*, and adopts his behaviour: sitting under a spreading beech tree, and singing poetry. The effects are twofold. For one, as with Orpheus crying 'Eurydice!', Virgil brings to life a character from his poetry through the technique of apostrophe: though *Tityre* is not an authorial apostrophe in the dramatic text of *Eclogue* 1, it becomes one in the final line of the *Georgics*. This draws Tityrus

out of poetic fiction, and blurs the line between fiction and reality – Virgil is addressing a fictional character in the same way as he addressed Maecenas at the start of the poem (Verg. *G.* 1.2). The fact that he simultaneously aligns himself with Tityrus, as in the *Eclogues*, where Apollo apparently addresses Virgil as ‘Tityre’ (Verg. *Ecl.* 6.4), further confuses the boundary between life and art. But it also connects a poet’s ability to influence and even create reality with his art with what Tityrus does in *Eclogues* 1 – sing positive poetry about the nascent Augustan regime. There is a sense that, under Octavian, a poet who composes prospective propaganda will both contribute to this coming true by spreading a positive political message, and have the joy of seeing his fictions come to life.

Remarkably, the endings of the first and final books of the *Georgics* are also linked by a river. The Euphrates, the last river mentioned in the poem, accordingly encircles the work (Verg. *G.* 1.509, 4.561), as we will see the Tiber encircles books eight and nine of the *Aeneid*. As Scodel and Thomas (1984) note, in both *Georgics* 1 and 4, the Euphrates is mentioned six lines from the end of the book in imitation of Callimachus’ *Hymn to Apollo* (Callim. *Hymn* 2.105-14):<sup>47</sup>

ὁ Φθόνος Ἀπόλλωνος ἐπ’ οὐατα λάθριος εἶπεν 105

“οὐκ ἄγαμαι τὸν αἰδὸν ὃς οὐδ’ ὅσα πόντος ἀεῖδει.”

τὸν Φθόνον ὠπόλλων ποδί τ’ ἤλασεν ὧδέ τ’ εἶπεν·

**“Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο μέγας ῥόος, ἀλλὰ τὰ πολλὰ**

λύματα γῆς καὶ πολλὸν ἐφ’ ὕδατι συρφετὸν ἔλκει.

<sup>47</sup> Though Jenkyns (1993: 116) prioritizes self-reference over allusion to Callimachus: ‘the most obvious allusion in such a symmetry is self-referential: the last book appears to echo the first’.

Δηοῖ δ' οὐκ ἀπὸ παντὸς ὕδωρ φορέουσι **Μέλισσαι**,

110

ἀλλ' ἥτις καθαρὴ τε καὶ ἀχράαντος ἀνέρπει

πίδακος ἐξ ἱερῆς ὀλίγη λιβάς ἄκρον ἄωτον.”

χαῖρε ἄναξ· ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἴν' ὁ Φθόνος, ἔνθα νέοιτο.

Envy whispered into Apollo's ear: 'I don't like a poet who doesn't sing like the sea.'  
Apollo kicked Envy aside and said: 'The Assyrian river rolls a massive stream, but it's mainly silt and garbage that it sweeps along. The bees bring water to Deo not from every source but where it bubbles up pure and undefiled from a holy spring, its very essence.'  
Farewell, Lord! Let Criticism go where Envy's gone! (trans. Nisetich)

The link between this passage of Callimachus and the end of the *Georgics*

suggested by the Euphrates encourages broader exploration of the context to see if it can further inform our understanding of Virgil's poem. Both Envy and Apollo use bodies of water as ways of talking about poetic style. In particular, Apollo contrasts the large, muddy and congested river Euphrates (Ἀσσυρίου ποταμοῖο), signifying lengthy, opaque and bombastic poetry, with the transparent and unsullied stream from which the priestesses of Demeter draw water, representing verse that is small-scale, crystal-clear, sacred and *recherché*.

Octavian's thundering by the Euphrates accordingly corresponds with the sort of poetry that Callimachus' Apollo rejects. Indeed, thunder is the weapon of Zeus/Jupiter, and *fulminat* may additionally recall another Callimachean maxim much-referenced by Latin poets: βροντᾶν οὐκ ἐμόν, ἀλλὰ Διός (Callim. *Aet.* 1.20). In both cases, Octavian's activity, though it is portrayed as glorious and successful, is also associated with the sort of poetry Callimachus would not want to write.<sup>48</sup>

<sup>48</sup> Fowler's comment on how interpreters of Roman poetry read Callimachean poetics into everything applies here (2000: 30): 'surrogacy cannot be restricted to a one-way process. Seeing the world in terms of poetics, of readers, works and poets, inevitably

Bees constitute another connection between Virgil's sphragis and the programmatic ending to Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo*. For the priestesses of Demeter to which Apollo refers are called Μέλισσαι, literally 'Bees'. This further supports the idea that Aristaeus' bees have poetic as well as political (*parvos Quirites* Verg. *G.* 4. 201) significance. As noted above, Callimachus' 'Bees' only draw water from clear and unsullied streams. This firmly connects them, unlike Octavian, with Callimachus' preferred poetic aesthetic. We remember that it was Cyrene, a river-nymph closely associated with Callimachus, who explained to Aristaeus how to regenerate his bees, perhaps indicating that Callimachean poetics and praise poetry will play a crucial role in the successful regeneration of Roman society.<sup>49</sup> But Cyrene's instructions must be carried out; Aristaeus must perform a violent and bloody sacrificial ritual to actually get new bees. This is reflected in the sphragis by the compartmentalized yet symbiotic relationship between Virgil and Octavian. Both will contribute to the rebuilding of Rome after the civil wars: the former through poetry; the latter through politics and war. And in Virgil's articulation, the two activities are mutually dependent and beneficial: Virgil's poetry can bolster and support Octavian's rule, just as the peace and stability achieved through Octavian's wars afford Virgil the opportunity for writing poetry.

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involved seeing the components of fictional creation in terms of the world. In contaminating the field of discourse, poetics becomes itself contaminated by ideology.'

<sup>49</sup> Jenkyns (1993: 117) also suggests that at least part of the significance of the Callimachean allusion here concerns the encomium strongly associated with the poet: 'all three of Virgil's references to the Euphrates [i.e. the *Georgics* passages and 8.726] come in the context of praise of Caesar Augustus: that can hardly be pure coincidence.' See in addition my discussion of the function of allusion to Callimachus and Catullus' *Coma Berenices* above (3. iii. *Dido's culpa and Aeneas' culpa*).

#### 4. ii. Aeneas, Turnus and the Tiber

Having demonstrated the confluence of philosophical and metapoetic rivers in the *Georgics*, and offered some potential interpretative consequences of this, I will now discuss two instances in which I think this reading of rivers is relevant in the *Aeneid*.

Rivers, and in particular the Tiber, play an important role in books eight and nine of the *Aeneid*. In book eight, the focus is on Aeneas, whereas in book nine, the focus is on Turnus. To begin with the former, at the opening of book eight, the Tiber appears to Aeneas in a dream. He soothes Aeneas' anxiety about the war in Italy, and advises him to row upstream to Pallanteum, where he will find allies in Evander and his people. The Tiber additionally says that he will change the direction of his flow to ease their journey (8.57-8):<sup>50</sup>

‘ipse ego te ripis et recto **flumine** ducam,

**adversum remis** superes subvectus ut amnem.’

‘I myself will lead you with my banks and the direction of my **flow**, so that, borne upstream, you can overcome the **adverse current with your oars**.’

The verbal echoes with the oarsman simile in the *Georgics* (*flumine*, *adversum*, *remis* and *remigiis*) highlight the stark contrast between the two passages.<sup>51</sup>

Aeneas' smooth-flowing journey will clearly be in accordance with fate and

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<sup>50</sup> Cf. the different connotations of a reversed river flow at Eur. *Med.* 410-20.

<sup>51</sup> There is no comment on this link in the commentaries of Fordyce (1977), Gransden (1976) or Eden (1975).

divine purpose, unlike the task of the farmer of the *Georgics*, illustrated by the rower struggling in vain against the stream. Moreover, Aeneas will not travel downstream, a direction associated in the *Georgics* with decline and degeneration: he will be going up.

On one reading, this is a sign of progress; on another, it is strange and unnatural. Rivers changing their courses are frequently used as ἀδύνατα in ancient literature,<sup>52</sup> and it is not always a good sign.<sup>53</sup> However, the philosophical connection between the passing of time and the flow of a river helps to disentangle this interpretative problem. The Tiber's reversal suggests turning back time, and casts Aeneas' journey to the future site of Rome as a return to origins. This accords with how the foundation of Rome has been portrayed in the *Aeneid* ('*antiquam exquirite matrem*' 3.96), and with the rhetoric of cultural renewal and re-foundation that characterized Augustus' consolidation of power. It also reflects the confluence of the perspective of character and reader: the foundation of Rome, which is in the future for Aeneas, is in the past for Virgil's contemporaries. There are parallels with Aristaeus' quest for the rebirth of his bees in the *Georgics*: he must also journey to the source of a river in search of his mother.

Soon after the appearance of the Tiber in his dream, Aeneas finds that the river-god is true to his word (8.86-96):

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<sup>52</sup> See e.g. Prop. 1.15.29-31 and Ov. *Tr.* 1.8.1-2.

<sup>53</sup> The Tiber's change of direction and flooding is one of the symptoms/portents of civil war at Hor. *Carm.* 1.2.13-20. See Nisbet & Hubbard (1970 *ad loc.*).

Thybris ea fluvium, quam longa est, nocte tumentem  
 leniit, et tacita **refluens** ita substitit unda,  
 mitis ut in morem stagni placidaeque paludis  
 sterneret aequor aquis, **remo ut luctamen abesset**.  
**ergo iter inceptum celerant rumore secundo:** 90  
**labitur uncta vadis abies;** mirantur et undae,  
 miratur nemus insuetum fulgentia longe  
 scuta virum fluvio pictasque innare carinas.  
 olli remigio noctemque diemque fatigant  
 et longos superant flexus, variisque teguntur 95  
 arboribus, viridisque secant placido aequore silvas.

The Tiber calmed his swollen stream for that night, as long as it lasted, and halted, **ebbing back** with silent wave, in such a way that, like a gentle lake or peaceful pool, he laid out a level plain on his waters, **so that there should be no struggle for the oars. So they hastened on the journey they had undertaken with cheers following behind them:** the varnished fir glides through the shallows, and the waves wonder, the grove, unaccustomed to such things, wonders at the far-gleaming shields of men and the painted hulls swimming in the river. They exhaust a night and a day with their rowing, and they overcome the long meanders under the covering of different trees, and carve through the green woods on the calm surface of the water.

As discussed, the fact that Aeneas is permitted to travel relatively easily up the Tiber's stream symbolizes that his journey is in accordance with divine purpose and equally progressive and regressive.<sup>54</sup> The Tiber also allegedly performed miraculous feats, especially flooding, for Romulus, Remus and Augustus.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>54</sup> Virgil may be in part modelling this episode on Hom. *Od.* 5.451-3, when the river on the coast of the Phaeacians stops its flow to let Odysseus escape from the sea.

<sup>55</sup> Livy 1.4.4-6 on the Tiber safely accepting the infants Romulus and Remus; Dio Cass. 53.20 on the Tiber flooding in 27 BC the day that Octavian was granted the title Augustus. Note the potential wordplay: **remo ut luctamen abesset** (8.89), *adversum remis* (8.58).

Interestingly, the Tiber's acquiescence does not mean it is a completely effortless journey: Aeneas and his men still have to row hard, day and night (*olli remigio noctemque diemque fatigant*) – there is an element of demythologization. Human effort and progress is supported by divine approval, not supplanted. Though the setting is the sea rather than a river, something similar happens at the end of book five: despite the loss of the helmsman Palinurus, Aeneas' fleet continues onwards no less safely, because it has the support of Neptune. Nevertheless, Aeneas is compelled to take the helm (missing a rudder), and guide the ship through the sea to Italy.<sup>56</sup> As well as demythologizing, therefore, Virgil demonstrates that god and human work together to bring fate to fruition.

Intratextually, *ergo iter inceptum* (90) takes the reader back to the Underworld, and a different, deathly river (6.384-91):

**ergo iter inceptum** peragunt **fluvioque propinquant.**

navita quos iam inde ut Stygia prospexit ab unda 385

**per tacitum nemus ire** pedemque advertere ripae,

sic prior adgreditur dictis atque increpat ultro:

‘quisquis es, armatus qui **nostra ad flumina tendis,**

fare age, quid venias, iam istinc et comprime gressum.

umbrarum hic locus est, somni noctisque soporae: 390

corpora viva nefas Stygia vectare carina.’

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<sup>56</sup> See chapter five (*F/fortuna, religion and philosophy*) for further discussion of this episode. One might also compare the combination of human effort and divine approval operating at 6.210-1, when Aeneas roughly snatches the resistant golden bough.

And so they **carried out the journey they had undertaken** and **approached the river**. The sailor, as he had already seen from the wave of the Styx that **they were going through the silent grove** and turning their path to the shore, thus approached them first with words and reproached them of his own accord: 'Whoever you are, **who make armed for our rivers**, come, tell me why you are coming, and now hold your step there. This is the place of the shades, of sleep and sleepy night. It is forbidden to transport living bodies in the Stygian boat.'

The effect is that Aeneas' divinely-aided journey up the Tiber is cast as a κατάβασις. Overtones of the Underworld continue when Aeneas and his men reach Pallanteum (8.107-8):

ut celsas videre rates atque inter **opacum**

adlabi **nemus** et **tacitos** incumbere remis...

When they saw the high ships gliding towards them through the **dark grove** and the **silent** men leaning over their oars...

The adjective *opacus* is frequently used to describe the Underworld in book six, and *nemus... tacitos* picks up more directly on the passage quoted above.

Moreover, Pallas' indignant questions in response to the sudden appearance of armed men on the river that flows through their territory recall Charon's words, also to Aeneas (8.112-4):<sup>57</sup>

'iuvenes, quae causa subegit

ignotas temptare vias? quo tenditis?' inquit.

'qui genus? unde domo? pacemne huc fertis an arma?'

'Young men, what reason has compelled you to try these unfamiliar paths? Where are you making for?' he said. 'What's your ancestry? From which home have you come? Do you bring peace here or arms?'

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<sup>57</sup> Both connections are noted by Gransden (1976 *ad loc.*).

The reader is therefore encouraged on several accounts to connect Aeneas travelling up the Tiber to the future site of Rome with his journey to the Underworld. Though the suggestion that journeying to Pallanteum is like journeying to the world of the dead is initially unsettling, it in fact accords with my earlier analysis. For book six constitutes another example of when Aeneas has to go backwards, seeking the soul of his dead father, to go forwards, by means of the instructions and prophecies that Anchises gives his son.

The inextricable association of κατάβασις with Orpheus and Orphism provides another potential parallel with *Georgics* 4, and further suggests the centrality of poetry to the project of rebirth. There are particularly prominent intertexts in this passage. One function of these is to enact metapoetically the *rumor* that attends the progress of Aeneas and his men upstream.<sup>58</sup> *rumore secundo* is Ennian, as is *labitur uncta carina*, which occurs twice in the extant fragments of the *Annales*.<sup>59</sup> The evocation of wonder (*mirantur... miratur*) by the passage of the ship follows the reaction to the Argo as described by Catullus (64.12-15) and Apollonius (Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 1.540-553).<sup>60</sup> These epic resonances aggrandize

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<sup>58</sup> Commentators have suppressed the meaning 'rumour' (*OLD* 'rumor' 2, 3, 4) in favour of the more general 'clamour', 'cheering' (*OLD* *ib.* 1). See e.g. Fordyce (1977 *ad loc.*): 'amid murmurs of applause'; Gransden (1976 *ad loc.*) 'with favourable noise/ with approving cries'. However, I would suggest at least maintaining the sense 'rumour' alongside 'clamour'. This is how Virgil most often uses *rumor* in the *Aeneid* (4.203; 7.144, 549; 12.228 vs. only 9.464 'shouting'/'encouragement'), and it works well metapoetically given the strong intertexts in this passage.

<sup>59</sup> *rumore secundo* at Enn. *Ann.* 244; *labitur uncta carina* at 376, 505 (Skutsch).

<sup>60</sup> Virgil's *fulgentia.../scuta* pick up on the flashing arms at Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 1.544-5, and *mirantur.../miratur* on how Apollonius' nymphs wonder at the ship at 1.550. This

Aeneas' journey for the reader, mirroring in a metaliterary way the effect of the favourable reputation and/or applause that attends him within the narrative.

They also demonstrate the support that poetry offers Aeneas' foundational mission: in the passage of Apollonius to which Virgil alludes, the Argonauts are rowing to a beat set by Orpheus' lyre.

It is perhaps related that wonder and novelty (*miratur... insuetum* 92) also attend other transgressive and self-consciously literary journeys in Virgil that are related to immortality, or at least immortal fame: the apotheosis of Daphnis in the *Eclogues* (Verg. *Ecl.* 5.56-7), and Daedalus' ill-fated flight over the (not yet) Icarian sea (6.14-19). Furthermore, here, at the beginning of the book, the grove and waves wonder at the shields of Aeneas' men as they glint in the river (*mirantur... fluvio* 8.91-3). In a delicate ring composition, which forges together the physical world and artistic depictions of it, at the end of the book, it is Aeneas who wonders (*miratur* 8.730), but not at how shields gleam on a river, rather at how rivers gleam on his shield (*Euphrates ibat iam mollior undis...* 8.726-8). This is the last of three references to the Euphrates in Virgil's poetry, and links the closure of book eight of the *Aeneid* with the end of *Georgics* 1 and 4. As noted above, this embodies an allusion to Callimachus' *Hymn to Apollo*, as well as to Callimachean poetic aesthetics and praise poetry utilized by Virgil in his encomium of Augustus. However, as I hope to have shown, it also connects the philosophical and literary symbolism of rivers in the two poems.

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passage of Apollonius also balances human and divine action: the ship is the divine work of Athena, but still needs men to row it (1.551-2).

As Hardie notes in his commentary, rivers also frame book nine.<sup>61</sup> Turnus prays at the edge of the Tiber before launching his attack on the Trojan camp in Aeneas' absence (9.22-4):

... et sic effatus ad undam  
processit summoque haesit de gurgite lymphas  
multa deos orans, oneravit aethera votis.

And thus having spoken he went to the waves and drew water from the top of the stream, begging the gods for many things, and weighed down the sky with his prayers.

He appears to have a pious and close relationship with the rustic Italian deities – not only the Tiber, but also his ancestor Pilumnus, in whose sacred grove he is residing at this point in the poem. It seems, moreover, that his prayers are successful, as the Trojans suffer heavy losses in the attack on their camp, and Turnus himself manages to break into their fortifications and cause considerable damage. This foreshadows his successful prayer to Faunus and *Terra* in book 12 that Aeneas' spear should remain stuck in the stump of Faunus' sacred olive-tree.

Despite the success of the attack, at the end of the book, Turnus is finally overwhelmed and forced to retreat. Exhausted, he leaps into the Tiber, in whose flow he is transported downstream to his comrades (9.812-8):

... tum toto corpore sudor  
liquitur et piceum (nec respirare potestas)  
flumen agit, fessos quatit aeger anhelitus artus.

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<sup>61</sup> Hardie (1994: 4).

tum demum **praeceps** saltu sese omnibus armis 815

**in fluvium** dedit. ille **suo cum gurgite** flavo

accepit venientem ac **mollibus** extulit **undis**

et laetum sociis abluta caede remisit.

By then, sweat poured from his entire body, and made a tar-coloured rivulet (nor was he able to breath), and exhausted panting shook his weary limbs. At last, with a leap, he gave himself **headlong into the river** with all his armour. The Tiber welcomed him as he came **with his** tawny **stream**, carried him away **in his gentle waves**, and restored him to his companions, happy and cleansed of slaughter.

Since at least as early as Servius, readers and scholars have been puzzled by the significance of this image. In book eight the Tiber favoured Aeneas - why should it help Turnus now? Servius' solution, that Virgil and the Tiber are complicit in saving the glory of killing Turnus for Aeneas, seems over-simplistic.<sup>62</sup> To add to this interpretative confusion, the way Turnus throws himself into the river, exhausted from battle and with his armour still on, seems to recall the story of an exemplary brave and patriotic early Roman, Horatius Cocles.<sup>63</sup> According to legend,<sup>64</sup> when Rome was under attack, Horatius told his comrades to retreat over the only bridge fording the Tiber, and destroy it when they had done so to thwart the enemy advance. Horatius, left on the other side, bravely and effectively fought off the enemy until he was satisfied that the danger to his

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<sup>62</sup> Serv. *ad Aen.* 9.813: *sane quaerunt multi, cum Tiberis Aeneae faveat, cur liberaverit Turnum; sed solvitur ista ratione: nam ob hoc Turnum esse liberatum, ut maior Aeneae gloria servaretur.* 'Of course many ask, since the Tiber supports Aeneas, why it has rescued Turnus. This problem is solved in this way: Turnus is rescued so that the greater glory [of killing him] should be saved for Aeneas.'

<sup>63</sup> E.g. Hardie (1994 *ad loc.*) 'it is impossible here not to think of the famous leap of the great Roman patriot Horatius Cocles into the Tiber.'

<sup>64</sup> Livy comments (Livy 2.10) that Horatius Cocles *rem ausus plus famae habituram ad posteros quam fidei.*

country had passed. At this point, and on some accounts with a prayer, he leapt into the river, and was transported safely back to his troops.<sup>65</sup>

I would like to offer some suggestions and potential solutions for this interpretative difficulty. To deal first with Horatius Cocles: there certainly are similarities with Turnus' situation, but there are also differences. There is no bridge in the *Aeneid* version. More importantly, Horatius Cocles is defending rather than attacking. He has put his fellow citizens and comrades first, allowing them to retreat, unlike Turnus, who has forged on ahead without them. The comparison with this great Roman hero therefore is not entirely flattering – Turnus appears more selfish, rash, and aggressive.

Moreover, Horatius is not borne down the Tiber, he just swims safely across. Given the connection between rivers and fate in Virgil generally, and the particular verbal echoes (*praeceps, fluvium, gurgite*) of *Georgics* 1 and 4, the fact that Turnus is carried down with the flow of the river could suggest that he is succumbing to his fate. That this passage may be symbolic of Turnus' relationship with fate is further supported by the fact that it is Jupiter who intervenes to make his retreat happen (9.801-5):<sup>66</sup>

sed manus e castris propere coit omnis in unum  
nec contra viris audet Saturnia Iuno

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<sup>65</sup> For the story of Horatius Cocles see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom.* 5.24-5, Livy 2.10-3, Sen. *Ep.* 120.7-8.

<sup>66</sup> On the connection between Jupiter and fate in the *Aeneid* see above (2. i. *Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid*).

sufficere; aeriam caelo nam Iuppiter Irim  
 demisit germanae haud mollia iussa ferentem,  
 ni Turnus cedat Teucrorum moenibus altis.

But the whole group of fighters from the camps came together quickly into one place, nor did Saturnian Juno dare to supply force against them: for Jupiter had sent down airborne Iris from heaven carrying firm orders to his sister, if Turnus would not retreat from the high walls of the Trojans.

Indeed, the context of retreat and turning back provides another parallel with the passages from the *Georgics*: Turnus **retro redit** (9.794);<sup>67</sup> *haud aliter retro dubius vestigia Turnus/improperata refert* (9.797-8). This recalls the fated degeneration illustrated by the oarsman simile (*sic omnia fatis/in peius ruere ac retro sublapsa referri* Verg. *G.* 1.199-200), and Eurydice's second loss ('*crudelia retro/fata vocant... feror*' Verg. *G.* 4.495-7). Turnus and fate may be working together, but they are moving towards death and destruction. This resonates with the negative implications of the imagery of flowing downstream for the oarsman, Eurydice, and Orpheus in the *Georgics*, and contrasts with Aeneas' smooth journey upstream; back to Rome's origins for the creation of a positive future.

### Conclusion

I first argued for a philosophical reading of the oarsman simile in *Georgics* 1, which suggested that the farmer's struggle against fated natural decline was both doomed and morally vicious. The river imagery from this simile also pervades Orpheus' loss of Eurydice in *Georgics* 4, connecting Orpheus' supernatural

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<sup>67</sup> Linked to Verg. *G.* 1.200 by Della Corte (1986 *ad loc.*).

attempt to use poetry to reverse Eurydice's fate with the farmer's battle to maintain his crops, and therefore suggesting that this, too, is not only doomed, but also immoral. In Orpheus' case, his mistake seems to be looking back. Drawing further on the literary and philosophical associations of rivers, and connecting the poet Orpheus with Virgil's self-presentation in the sphragis, clarifies why Orpheus' retrospection is wrong: it symbolizes a particular type of poetry, which pointlessly idolizes the past and those who are dead, and is therefore of little use in the regeneration of Roman society after Actium and years of bloody civil war. Virgil weaves in reference to Callimachus and Callimachean poetics (via the river Euphrates) to offer positive and encomiastic poetry as an alternative that should be mutually beneficial for poet and *princeps*. Rivers maintain this symbolism in the *Aeneid*, especially in books eight and nine. The Tiber stops its flow so that Aeneas can row with ease upstream, suggesting that his journey is in accordance with fate. The connection between the flow of rivers and fate or time also marks this voyage towards Pallanteum, the future site of Rome, as in some senses retrogressive. In fact, this idea of going backwards to go forwards pervades the *Aeneid* (e.g. 3.76 '*antiquam exquirite matrem*', or the κατάβασις in book six), and reflects Augustus' portrayal of his consolidation of control and peace as a regeneration and rebirth of Roman society. In both the *Georgics* and the *Aeneid*, Virgil combines the philosophical and literary associations of rivers to show that poetry is central to this Augustan project. The Euphrates seals both *Georgics* 4 and *Aeneid* 8, forging a connection between the two, and underlining that the type of poetry suitable for these political ends is Callimachean encomium.

## 5. F/fortuna, religion and philosophy<sup>1</sup>

In this chapter I will clarify the meaning and role of *F/fortuna* in the *Aeneid*. Though *F/fortuna* is one of the words Virgil uses to talk about fate, it bears different meanings and associations from *fatum/a*. These are drawn from philosophy, in which *fortuna* commonly translates τύχη, and from Roman religion and culture, in which *Fortuna* is an important goddess and ‘divine quality’.<sup>2</sup> I show that these different meanings govern the careful and calculated use of *F/fortuna* in the poem, and offer analyses of particular characters or episodes enriched by sensitivity to this wider context.

As there has been some confusion about the role of *fortuna* in Stoic philosophy, and how this relates to fate in the *Aeneid*, I will begin by identifying the meaning of this word in philosophical texts from the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, especially Cicero (5. i. fortuna in philosophy).<sup>3</sup> When Cicero uses *fortuna* in contexts that discuss fate and Stoicism, it translates τύχη, ‘chance’, a force whose existence was incompatible with the Stoic theory of universal causal determinism.<sup>4</sup> Cicero

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<sup>1</sup> I use a capital ‘F’ in instances in which *Fortuna* is personified, e.g. as a goddess. The capitalization of *Fortuna* in passages from the *Aeneid* follows the text of Mynors (1969).

<sup>2</sup> Following Clark (2007).

<sup>3</sup> In particular, I will offer an alternative argument to the suggestion of some scholars that *fatum/a* and *fortuna* are pretty much the same thing in Stoicism and therefore the *Aeneid*. Examples of this view include: Quint (1993: 93 *ad* 5.709-10) ‘the language is of course Stoic... in Stoic vocabulary, Fate and Fortune are notoriously hard to tell apart’; Edwards (1960: 153 n. 5) ‘on the whole... Virgil, like the Stoics, seems to make no important differentiation between *fata* and *fortuna*.’

<sup>4</sup> See above 2. i. Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid for an explanation of the Stoic theory of causal determinism and its relevance to the *Aeneid*, and 2. ii. Determinism and Literary Precedent on chance, *F/fortuna*, and the absence of fate in Nisus and Euryalus’ night mission.

therefore follows Chrysippus, who attempted to reconcile popular belief in chance with the Stoic theory of fate by arguing that events which seem random or unexpected are not in fact uncaused, but rather have causes which we do not understand or know about. This understanding of *fortuna* helps to explain why Virgil very rarely utters the word *fortuna* in the omniscient authorial voice, and why he associates *fortuna* particularly closely with characters who are ignorant of fate, such as Turnus and Dido. When Cicero uses *fortuna* outside of contexts that discuss fate and Stoicism, it still means ‘chance’, and is cast as a negative and unreliable force to which wise and virtuous men should be immune. This further explains why Aeneas is progressively distanced from *fortuna* in the course of the poem, and why characters who leave things down to luck, such as Nisus and Euryalus, are fatally unsuccessful.

I then move on to exploring *Fortuna*’s associations in Roman religion and culture (5. ii. *Fortuna in religion*). As she was an oracular goddess, she is linked with fate. But she also has especial connections with women; with farmers and farming; with sailors and sea-travel; and with military victory, civil war, and the generals of the end of the Republic. I explain each of these, and offer examples of cases in which Virgil’s use of *Fortuna* draws on this wider context. To conclude the chapter, I provide an extended analysis of the different meanings of *F/fortuna* and *fatum/a* in book five of the *Aeneid*, which I argue constitutes an important stage in the progress of the Trojan mission away from uncertainty and instability and towards the security of their fated future (5. iii. *F/fortuna in book five*).

### 5. i. fortuna in philosophy

Cicero's philosophical works provide good evidence for the range of meanings *fortuna* carried in philosophical contexts in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC. When Cicero uses *fortuna* in discussions of fate, it is usually as a translation of τύχη. The following passage is a good example, as it contains other indications that Cicero is translating Greek sources (Cic. *Acad.* 1.29):<sup>5</sup>

... quam [rationem] vim **animus** esse dicunt mundi, eandemque esse **mentem sapientiamque perfectam**, quem **deum** appellant... quam interdum eandem **necessitatem** appellant, quia nihil aliter possit atque ab ea constitutum sit, inter quasi fatalem et immutabilem continuationem ordinis sempiterni, non numquam quidem eandem **fortunam**, quod efficiat multa improvisa et necopinata nobis propter obscuritatem ignorationemque causarum.

... and this force [all-pervading reason] they say is the **soul of the world**, and is also **perfect intelligence and wisdom**, which they entitle **God**...and this force they also sometimes call **Necessity**, because nothing can happen otherwise than has been ordained by it under a 'fated and unchangeable concatenation of everlasting order'; although they sometimes also term it **Fortune**, because many of its operations are unforeseen and unexpected by us on account of their obscurity and our ignorance of causes. (trans. Rackham)

In this portion of book one of the *Academica*, Cicero's speaker Varro gives an account of the philosophy of the Old Academy, and defends this, following Antiochus, against what he sees as the innovations of the New Academy.<sup>6</sup> Despite

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<sup>5</sup> See Reid (1874 *ad loc.*).

<sup>6</sup> Academics generally should be taken to be the subject of '*dicunt*'.

not ostensibly being a Stoic text, this section draws on Stoic themes.<sup>7</sup> Particularly recognisable is the Stoic conception of the universal *deus*, which was equated in identity statements with fate and reason.<sup>8</sup> In this passage, we are told that the soul of the world may also be called ‘God’, ‘Wisdom’ or ‘Necessity’ etc., and it looks as though Cicero is suggesting that *fortuna* is yet another term that can be used to refer to this nexus of concepts integral to Stoic fate and cosmology.

However, closer analysis reveals that things are more complicated. *fortuna* is defined as a force which brings about things that are unexpected or unforeseen because their causes are either unknown or hidden. This description is strongly reminiscent of Chrysippus’ explanation of τύχη (‘chance’) as an αἰτία ἄδηλος (cf. Cicero’s *obscuritatem...causarum*).<sup>9</sup> The sources suggest that this explanation was in response to a specific criticism of causal determinism: how can it explain random or chance events, that do not seem to have a cause?<sup>10</sup> This is a serious

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<sup>7</sup> Reid, for example, comments (1874 *ad loc.*) that ‘the whole of this section is so undilutely Stoic that one can only marvel how Antiochus tried to harmonize it with the teaching of the earlier Platonists and Aristotelians.’

<sup>8</sup> For Stoic identity statements equating fate with god, reason and the universe, see e.g. Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.39 = L&S 54B = SVF 2.1077; Diog. Laert. 7.135 = L&S 46B; and my discussion of these passages above (2. i. *Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid*).

<sup>9</sup> Reid (1874 *ad loc.*) also notes the connection between Cicero’s definition of *fortuna* and Chrysippus’ explanation of τύχη. Dyck (1996 *ad Cic. Off.* 1.115-21): ‘the Stoa explained fortune as a construct that covered human ignorance of causal relations’. The Stoics may have shared this definition with earlier philosophers, including Aristotle (e.g. Arist. *Ph.* 196b5), which helps to explain its presence in the *Academica*. See especially SVF 2.965-7, 971, 973. For the Chrysippean origin of the explanation of τύχη as an αἰτία ἄδηλος, see especially SVF 2.973 ταυτα μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς γνωριμοτάτοις ἐστὶ τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ [= Chrysippus] πολλάκις εἰρημένων. However, SVF 2.965 οὐχ ὑπὸ πρώτων νομισθῆναι τῶν Στωϊκῶν, ὥς τινες οἴονται might suggest otherwise: though there is then a case to be made that Chrysippus would not be counted amongst the ‘first’ founders of the School.

<sup>10</sup> For further discussion of the problems that may arise from the Stoic account of universal causal determinism, see chapter three (*Causation and Moral Responsibility*).

objection: belief in chance ‘and in an all-encompassing determinism of the Stoic variety are mutually exclusive’ (Dyck 1996 *ad* Cic. *Off.* 1.115-21).<sup>11</sup> Chrysippus answered it by re-characterizing τύχη as an αἰτία, and thus maintaining the central tenet that everything happens through antecedent causes.<sup>12</sup> Though they may seem causeless, random events attributed to τύχη are in fact simply events whose causes humans do not and cannot understand. Crucially, this was not an admission that chance or causeless events existed, but rather an explanation for why people think they exist (Alexander of Aphrodisias, *On Fate* 179.6 = SVF 2.967):

τὸ δὲ λέγειν τὴν τύχην αἰτίαν ἄδηλον ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ οὐκ ἔστι φύσιν  
τινὰ τύχης τιθεμένων, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς τὰ αἰτία ποιᾷ  
σχέσει τὴν τύχην εἶναι λεγόντων.

<sup>11</sup> This explains why, elsewhere, Cicero uses the existence of *fortuna* as an argument against universal causal determinism (Cic. *Div.* 2. 19): *si enim nihil fieri potest, nihil accidere, nihil evenire, nisi quod ab omni aeternitate certum fuerit esse futurum rato tempore, quae potest esse fortuna?* ‘For if nothing can happen, nothing befall, nothing come to pass, except what has been determined from all eternity as bound to happen at a fixed time, how can there be such a thing as chance?’ (trans. Falconer)

<sup>12</sup> The view that everything happens by fate through antecedent causes is repeatedly attributed to Chrysippus in the *De Fato*. As discussed above (1. v. *Allecto: the unnameable*), Chrysippus distinguished between different types of antecedent cause (Cic. *Fat.* 41): ‘*causarum enim*,’ [Chrysippus] *inquit, ‘aliae sunt perfectae et principales, aliae adiuvantes et proximae; quam ob rem cum dicimus omnia fato fieri causis antecedentibus, non hoc intellegi volumus, causis perfectis et principalibus, sed causis adiuvantibus et proximis.’* ‘Some causes,’ he says, ‘are perfect and principal, others auxiliary and proximate. Hence when we say that everything takes place by fate owing to antecedent causes, what we wish to be understood is not perfect and principal causes but auxiliary and proximate causes.’ (trans. Rackham). These distinctions and ideas should be carefully set apart from Cicero’s (rather than Chrysippus’) definition of *causa* (Cic. *Fat.* 34, discussed above 3. iii. *Dido’s culpa and Aeneas’ culpa*): *itaque non sic causa intellegi debet, ut, quod cuique antecedit, id ei causa sit, sed quod cuique efficienter antecedit...* ‘Accordingly, ‘cause’ is not to be understood in such a way as to make what precedes a thing the cause of that thing, but what precedes it effectively...’ (trans. Rackham).

To say that luck is ‘a cause obscure to human reasoning’ is not [the assertion] of those who are laying down some [real] nature that luck has, but of those who are saying that luck consists in men’s being in a certain state in relation to the causes. (trans. Sharples, who here translates τύχη as ‘luck’)

Returning to the original passage from the *Academica*, it is now clear that, instead of claiming that *fortuna* is another word for fate, Cicero’s speaker is here explaining that the attribution of *fortuna* to an event is simply a symptom of human ignorance: it is what we call fate when we fail to understand it. Cicero also uses *fortuna* as a translation for Chrysippean τύχη elsewhere (Cic. *Top.* 63):<sup>13</sup>

cum enim nihil sine causa fiat, hoc ipsum est fortunae eventus, **obscura causa** quae **latenter** efficitur.

For since nothing happens without cause, this is exactly what Fortune is, an event which is the result of an **obscure and unseen cause** (trans. (and capitalization) Hubbell)

This might already help to explain a certain aspect of Virgil’s usage of the word in the *Aeneid*. For it is overwhelmingly used in direct speech or ‘character text’:<sup>14</sup> to represent the viewpoint of a character rather than that of the (omniscient?) narrator.<sup>15</sup> The authorial voice only utters *F/fortuna* eight times;<sup>16</sup> other characters do so 63 times. Indeed, of the instances in which the narrator uses

<sup>13</sup> The presence of this passage in Cicero’s *Topica*, closely modelled on Aristotle’s *Topica*, again suggests that the Stoics may have shared this explanation of *fortuna*/ τύχη as an αἰτία ἄδηλος with Peripatetics. See n. 9 above.

<sup>14</sup> My use of ‘character text’ follows De Jong (1987). The examples at 1.454, 517; 8.15; 9.41, 723 and 11.761, whilst not direct speech, seem clearly to represent the question or perspective of a character.

<sup>15</sup> Contrast e.g. how the narrator’s voice emphasizes the role of *fatum* in the opening lines of the poem (1.2 *fato*).

<sup>16</sup> *F/fortuna* at 5.604, 6.683, 7.413, 10.435, 12.593, 12.920; *fortunatus* at 6.639, 9.446.

*F/fortuna*, it is only appealed to as a force over the narrative and events in three cases within the entire epic: the burning of the ships (5.604),<sup>17</sup> the deaths of Pallas and Lausus (10.435),<sup>18</sup> and Amata's suicide (12.593).<sup>19</sup> Characters that appeal to or reference *fortuna* thereby signify their belief that things could or might turn out differently. This belief is tantamount to an ignorance of *fatum/a* - of what must happen within the poem and Rome's history. Dido, for example, speaks about *fortuna* a lot (4.433-4, 603, 652):<sup>20</sup>

'tempus inane peto, requiem spatiumque furori

dum mea me victam doceat fortuna dolere.'

'I seek empty time, some respite and space for my passion, until my *fortuna* teaches me to grieve, defeated.'

'verum anceps pugnae fuerat fortuna.'

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<sup>17</sup> I will discuss this episode below (5. iii. *F/fortuna in book five*).

<sup>18</sup> In an interesting parallel, one of only two references to *Fortuna* in Augustus' *Res Gestae* designates it as the force responsible for the deaths of his adoptive heirs Gaius and Lucius (Aug. R. G. 14 *filios meos, quos iuvenes mihi eripuit Fortuna, Gaium et Lucium Caesares*). *Fortuna* particularly characterizes Pallas' story: Evander hopes that *Fortuna* won't kill his son (8.572), and Aeneas begrudges *Fortuna*'s role in both Pallas' short-lived military success and his death (11.42-4). Attributing sad or negative events to *Fortuna* may have been a technique by which to alienate them from the supposedly positive teleology of fate or providence: *Fortuna* appears fairly frequently in sepulchral inscriptions. Marcellus' death is, on the other hand, attributed to *fata* (6.868-70, 882-3), though this may be because it is referenced within Anchises' prophecy (6.759 '*te tua fata docebo*') rather than by characters who only have an imperfect knowledge of fate.

<sup>19</sup> I discuss the cause of Amata's suicide above (3. ii. *Causae belli: the many causes of the war in Latium*). It is particularly strange to assert that a suicide is a chance occurrence. Amata is, like Dido, called *infelix* (12.598) and *moritura* (12.602), which additionally undercuts the sense that her death is random by foreshadowing it. Perhaps there is a case to make that this use of *Fortuna* also constitutes 'character text', representing the viewpoint of the Latins when they receive news of her death.

<sup>20</sup> On 4.603 see further n. 59 below. In support of my suggestion in n. 18 above about the sepulchral associations of *Fortuna*, 4.652 has been found quoted on epitaphs (e.g. CIL 15 316.1-2).

‘However, the *fortuna* of the fight could have gone either way.’

‘vixi et quem dederat cursum Fortuna peregi...’

‘I have lived, and completed the course which *Fortuna* gave me.’

The narrator, however, describes her as *fati nescia* (1.299). Likewise, Virgil underlines that Turnus, whose speech to the Latins in book 11 constitutes the densest usage of *fortuna* in the whole poem,<sup>21</sup> and who utters the proverbial ‘*audentis Fortuna iuvat*’ (10.284),<sup>22</sup> is ignorant and deluded about fate (10.501-4):<sup>23</sup>

**nescia** mens hominum **fati** sortisque futurae

et servare modum rebus sublata secundis!

Turno tempus erit magno cum optaverit emptum

intactum Pallanta...

The mind of men is **ignorant of fate** and of their future lot, and does not know how to preserve moderation when it is raised high by favourable events. There will come a time when Turnus will have wished that he hadn’t touched Pallas, and had ransomed him for a great price...

This use of *fortuna* in character text, explicated by Stoic (and Aristotelian) definition of *fortuna* as a false label for unexplained occurrences, is therefore part of the poetic technique that brings out the poignant disjunction between human vs. cosmic or authorial perspectives in the poem: human characters think

<sup>21</sup> 11.378-444. Turnus references *fortuna* at 11.413, 416, and 425-7.

<sup>22</sup> *fortes Fortuna iuvat* (numbered 144 in Otto 1890); *fortibus est fortuna viris data* (Enn. Ann. 233 Skutsch).

<sup>23</sup> See also 9.133-8, which I discuss above (2. i. *Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid*).

that things might turn out differently, whereas the narrator knows that they will not.

More broadly, that is outside of contexts that particularly discuss fate and Stoicism, Cicero admits the existence of *fortuna* (i.e. 'chance') in his philosophical works.<sup>24</sup> However, it (or she) is not cast in a positive light.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, for Cicero, the man who relies on *fortuna* is making a mistake and will fail to be happy (Cic. *Para. Stoic.* 2.17):<sup>26</sup>

nemo potest non beatissimus esse qui est totus aptus ex sese quique in se uno sua ponit omnia; cui spes omnis et ratio et cogitatio pendet ex fortuna huic nihil potest esse certi, nihil quod exploratum habeat permansurum sibi unum diem.

No one can fail to be supremely happy who relies solely on himself and who places all his possessions within himself alone; whereas he whose hope and purpose and thought hang entirely on fortune can have nothing certain, nothing that he is assured will remain with him for a single day. (trans. Rackham)

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<sup>24</sup> E.g. Cic. *Off.* 2.44 *aliquo casu atque fortuna*, *Fin.* 2.89 where *fortuna* glosses *casu* earlier. See also Cic. *Marc.* 7 where *fortuna* is linked with *temeritas* and *casus*, which are set in opposition to *sapientia* and *consilium*.

<sup>25</sup> E.g. Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.61 (on Stoic deified abstractions being ridiculous) *quo in genere vel maxime est Fortuna numeranda, **quam nemo ab inconstantia et temeritate seiunget, quae digna certe non sunt deo*** 'Fortune has a very strong claim to be counted in this list, **and nobody will dissociate fortune from inconstancy and haphazard action**, which are certainly unworthy of a deity' (trans. Rackham); Cic. *Div.* 2.18 *nihil enim est tam contrarium rationi et constantiae quam fortuna* 'Surely nothing is so at variance with reason and stability as chance.' (trans. Falconer)

<sup>26</sup> The following proverb is among the *sententiae* attributed to Publilius Syrus (711): *virtuti melius quam fortunae creditur*. We find something similar in Lucretius, when he tries to eradicate the fear of death by arguing that being alive is more worrisome because we are subject to chance and fortune (Lucr. 3.1085-6): *posteraque in dubiost fortunam quam vehat aetas, / quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet* 'and it is uncertain what fortune the next years may bring, what chance has in store, what end awaits us.' (trans. Rouse)

As the opposition in this passage suggests, the wise man or philosopher should instead strive to be self-sufficient; without the need of good luck, and immune to any catastrophes that *fortuna* may bring.<sup>27</sup>

Again, this helps to explain the association of *fortuna* with certain characters rather than others in the *Aeneid*. Nisus and Euryalus, for example, make the mistake of embarking on a mission that will only succeed if they are lucky (9.280-3):<sup>28</sup>

... contra quem talia fatur

Euryalus: 'me nulla dies tam fortibus ausis

dissimilem arguerit; tantum fortuna secunda

haud adversa cadat.'

In response to him Euryalus said the following: 'May no day prove me unequal to such daring undertakings: only let fortune turn out favourable, not hostile.'

Their subsequent death underscores that 'chancing it' in life-threatening, military situations is ill-advised. This quote also makes clear that *fortuna* can be both good (*secunda*) and bad (*adversa*). I would suggest that both senses are inherent in Virgil's use of the adjective *fortunatus* in his final apostrophe to the pair (9.446-449):<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Cic. *Tusc.* 5.17, 19; *Fin.* 4.17.

<sup>28</sup> See also 9.214, 240.

<sup>29</sup> Note that usually only the positive sense is stressed. See *OLD* s.v., and below for my discussion of *fortunatus* applied to farmers in the *Georgics*, and indigenous Italians at 11.252-4.

fortunati ambo! si quid mea carmina possunt,  
 nulla dies umquam memori vos eximet aevo,  
 dum domus Aeneae Capitoli immobile saxum  
 accolet imperiumque pater Romanus habebit.

Fortunate pair! If my poems have any force, there will never be a day which removes you from the remembrance of the ages, as long as the house of Aeneas dwells by the immovable rock of the Capitol, and a Roman father holds power.

*fortunati* glosses Nisus and Euryalus' reliance on *F/fortuna* in life, as well as their misfortune in death. It also, ironically, describes their good fortune to have secured through this death a place in poetry which may ensure that they are remembered for eternity.<sup>30</sup>

In contrast, whereas Aeneas invoked *F/fortuna* regularly during the fall of Troy,<sup>31</sup> in the course of the epic he is increasingly distanced from it. By book six, he can say to the Sibyl (6.103-5):

'... non ulla laborum  
 o virgo, nova mi facies inopinave surgit;

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<sup>30</sup> Leigh (1997: 67) makes a different but comparable comment about the *fortuna* of Julius Caesar in Lucan: 'this episode (4.256) is marked by the bitter ironies of *fortuna*. Caesar when winning the civil war was never so lucky as when he won the judgement of posterity.' Note the use of *fortunatus* in the description of Elysium (6.638-9): *devenere locos laetos et amoena virecta/ fortunatorum nemorum sedesque beatas*. Like Nisus and Euryalus, the souls in Elysium experience misfortune in that they have died, but are also fortunate in their deaths.

<sup>31</sup> 2.350, 2.385, 656. Note that at 6.62-4 he also relegates Troy's *fortuna* to the past: *hac Troiana tenus fuerit fortuna secuta;/ vos quoque Pergameae iam fas et parcere genti,/ dique deaeque omnes...* 'Trojan *fortuna* has followed us this far; but now it is also right for you spare the people of Pergamum, all you gods and goddesses...'. Bowra (1933) also uses a philosophical perspective to argue that Aeneas develops and makes progress towards *virtus* throughout the poem.

omnia **praecepi** atque animo mecum ante peregi.’

‘No unknown or unexpected form of difficulty rises before me, o priestess: I have **anticipated** everything, and gone through it all in my mind in advance.’

Instead of leaving anything up to chance, he has thought through everything in advance. As Bowra (1933: 15) notes, he thus fulfils Cicero’s criterion for a ‘brave and resolute man’, *fortis vero animi et constantis* (Cic. *Off.* 1.81):

quamquam hoc animi illud etiam ingenii magni est, **praecipere**  
cogitatione futura et aliquanto ante constituere, quid accidere possit in  
utramque partem, et quid agendum sit, cum quid evenerit, nec  
committere, ut aliquando dicendum sit: ‘non putaram’.

Now all this requires great personal courage; but it calls also for great intellectual ability by reflection to **anticipate** the future, to discover some time in advance what may happen whether for good or for ill, and what must be done in any possible event, and never to be reduced to having to say ‘I had not thought of that’. (trans. Miller)

This kind of preparation and virtuous forward planning minimizes the threat posed by the unexpected and therefore the influence of *F/fortuna*.

Likewise, Aeneas’ parting words to Ascanius before he re-enters the fight are (12.435-6):

‘disce, puer, virtutem ex me verumque laborem,  
fortunam ex aliis.’

‘Learn from me, son, virtue and true hardship, learn *fortuna* from others.’

*fortuna*, as explained above, can be good or bad. Aeneas' words here are usually understood as a wish that his son learns good *fortuna* from others.<sup>32</sup> This is in part due to their similarity to Sophocles' Ajax's last words to his son before his suicide (Soph. *Aj.* 550-1):<sup>33</sup>

ὦ παῖ, γένοιτο πατρὸς εὐτυχέστερος, τὰ δ' ἄλλ' ὁμοῖος

'Boy, may you be **luckier** than your father, but in all other ways resemble him!' (trans. Lloyd-Jones).

Virgil's *fortuna* looks like it mirrors Sophocles' εὐτυχέστερος, and should accordingly be supposed to reference good fortune rather than bad. However, given the alienation of *fortuna* from the wise and virtuous man in Cicero's philosophical texts, I would also suggest that this advice constitutes a distancing of *fortuna* from Aeneas and the project of founding Rome.

Turnus, on the other hand, fatally follows *fortuna* till the bitter end (12.676-7, and see above):

'iam iam fata, soror, superant, absiste morari;

quo deus et quo dura vocat Fortuna sequamur.'

'Now, sister, now the fates have the upper hand – stop your attempts at delay. Where the god and unyielding *Fortuna* call us, let us follow.'

The negative attitude to *fortuna* in Cicero's philosophical writing, coupled with the contrast drawn between the idealized self-sufficiency and stability of virtue

<sup>32</sup> Tarrant (2012 *ad loc.*) accordingly notes: 'V. takes a considerable risk in having A. complain of bad luck immediately after being saved yet again by his mother.'

<sup>33</sup> Cf. also Acc. *Trag.* 123 (Warmingtton): *virtuti sis par, dispar fortunae patris*.

and the uncertainty and risk of relying on chance, provide a backdrop against which the reader can chart Aeneas' progress vs. the mistakes of other characters, and thereby learn which traits will contribute profitably to the Roman mission.

### 5. ii. Fortuna in religion

Even more importantly, *Fortuna* would summon a variety of religious associations for a Roman. *Fortuna*, unlike *fatum*, is personified in traditional Roman religion, and was a popular goddess with several cult titles.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, it may be partly due to the various and long-standing religious associations of *Fortuna* that the word seemed apt to describe the irrational, un-philosophical force of random chance discussed above: religion was increasingly set in opposition to the more 'rational' sphere of philosophy in 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC literature.<sup>35</sup> Her religious associations link her with fate in the sense of prophecy: she was an oracular goddess. However, they also suggest other equally strong associations, such as with women; with farmers and farming; with sailors and sea-travel; and with military victory, civil war, and the generals of the end of the Republic. I will now explain each of these, offering examples of cases in which this religious context can explain Virgil's vocabulary and enrich our reading of his poetry.

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<sup>34</sup> Weinstock (1971: 112 n.8) even goes so far as to say that 'no other deity, perhaps not even Jupiter, had as many dedications and shrines at Rome as she had'. Cic. *Leg.* 2.28 numbers several of her popular titles.

<sup>35</sup> Especially in Epicurean texts: Lucr. 1.62-79, 107-9; Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.115, 118. The Stoics also, however, opposed the two by distancing 'true religion' from irrational superstition: Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.71. Cf. Verg. *G.* 2.490-4; Hor. *Carm.* 1.34 - in each case *fortuna* is sided with religion against philosophy. See Brunt (1989) for further discussion. I also consider Virgil's union of religious and philosophical ideas in his characterization of fate in the *Aeneid* above (2. i. Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid).

*Fortuna* is linked in a number of ways to femininity. Her cult titles make clear that, aside from simply being a female goddess, she was particularly associated with women.<sup>36</sup> Cicero describes *Fortuna Primigenia* as primarily a ‘companion in childbirth’ (*gignendo comes* Cic. *Leg.* 2.28), who was worshipped by mothers (*castissime colitur a matribus* Cic. *Div.* 2.85) and makes reference to a cult statue before the shrine, featuring a young Jupiter who suckled, along with his sister, at the breast of *Fortuna* (*ibid.*). An inscription found at the site additionally suggests that women would pray to the goddess in the hope of children.<sup>37</sup> It seems that *Fortuna Virilis* (Ov. *Fast.* 4.133-164), *Muliebris* (Livy 2.40.1-12) and *Virgo/Virginalis* were also all the objects of female worship.<sup>38</sup> Indeed, according to Livy (*ibid.*), women spearheaded both the funding and the founding of the temple of *Fortuna Muliebris* in the 5<sup>th</sup> c. BC at the time of Coriolanus’ siege of Rome. In addition, the ancient temple to *Fortuna* in the Forum Boarium was contiguous with that of *Mater Matuta*,<sup>39</sup> and both shared the same day of dedication: the *Matralia* on the 11 June.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Warde Fowler (1914: 64), Graf (2006). See also Ovid’s account of *Fortuna* in the *Fasti* (Ov. *Fast.* 6.569-36). Ovid strongly associates her with women and positions his description of her next to his account of *Mater Matuta* (Ov. *Fast.* 6.473-568).

<sup>37</sup> CIL 1 60.

<sup>38</sup> See also Graf (2006).

<sup>39</sup> Livy 25.7, 33.27; Platner & Ashby (2002: 330-1); Littlewood (2006: 147-8) ‘the two Republican temples in the *Forum Boarium*, dedicated to *Fortuna* and *Mater Matuta*, formed a similar complex dedicated to the cycle of women’s cult. *Fortuna* presided over a woman’s passage from virginity to fecundity in the early weeks of marriage, while *Mater Matuta*, a kourotrophos goddess, was responsible for the care of children entrusted to women who were not their natural mothers.’

<sup>40</sup> Ov. *Fast.* 6.569 (part of his discussion of the *Mater Matuta* and the *Matralia*): *lux eadem, Fortuna, tua est auctorque locusque*.

Both the shrine of *Fortuna* at Praeneste and that at Antium combine these female associations with prophecy. Cicero (*Div.* 2.85-7) tells us that at the ancient shrine in Praeneste a specially appointed *puer* would give prophecies by retrieving carved lots kept in a chest.<sup>41</sup> Likewise, Martial references *veridicae sorores* (Mart. 5.1.3) at the shrine in Antium.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, repeated wordplay in literary sources suggests that there was at least a popular belief that *F/fortuna* was etymologically related to *ferre*.<sup>43</sup> This may explain the link between femininity and prophecy: *ferre* can also be used of childbirth, so perhaps *Fortuna's* predictions traditionally related in particular to the new-born child.<sup>44</sup> Note that, contrary to the suggestions of some scholars,<sup>45</sup> when Virgil uses *F/fortuna* with reference to fate or prophecy, he is activating a religious rather than philosophical meaning.

<sup>41</sup> Strabo also calls the shrine χρηστηριάζων, 'a seat of oracles' (Strabo 5.3.11).

<sup>42</sup> Note, however, that Horace does not mention the prophetic role of the goddess (Hor. *Carm.* 1.35).

<sup>43</sup> The frequency of placements of *F/fortuna* next to cognates of *ferre* in Latin poetry suggests this was thought to be etymological as well as alliterative wordplay. Cf. Enn. fr. 186 Skutsch ... *quidve ferat Fors*; Lucr. 3.983 *casumque timent quem cuique ferat fors*, 3.1085-86 *posteraque in dubiis fortunam quam vehat aetas, / quidve ferat nobis casus quive exitus instet*, 5.960-61 *quod cuique obtulerat praedae fortuna, ferebat / sponte sua sibi quisque...*; Catull. 64.222 *nec te ferre sinam fortunae signa secundae*; Verg. *Ecl.* 6.58-59 *si qua forte ferant oculis sese obvia nostris / errabunda bovis vestigia; forsitan illum...*; and numerous examples from the *Aeneid*, e.g. 5.356 '*ni me, quae Salium, fortuna inimica tulisset?*', 5.710 '*quidquid erit, superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est.*', 10.111-2 '*...sua cuique exorsa laborem / fortunamque ferent*', 11.345 '*quid fortuna ferat populi...*'. An etymological link between *ferre* and *fortuna* is further suggested by Bailey (1935: 23), Canter (1922: 65 and n.1), and Kajanto (1957: 13). Maltby (1991) references Lydus, *Mens.* 4.7 Φορτοῦναν... ἀπὸ τῆς φορᾶς ἐμφερῶς ὀνομάσαντες; *ibid.* 4.100 Φορτοῦναν λέγουσιν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἀπὸ τῆς φορᾶς.

<sup>44</sup> This is also suggested by Bailey (1935: 235).

<sup>45</sup> E.g. Edwards (1960: 153 n. 5), and Quint (1993: 93), who claim that *fatum* and *F/fortuna* were equated by Stoics. See n. 3 above.

I will offer a detailed analysis of the femininity of *F/fortuna* in book five of the *Aeneid* below. Consider in addition the following passage, in which Evander explains to Aeneas how he ended up in Pallanteum (8.333-6):

‘me pulsum patria pelagique extrema sequentem

**Fortuna** omnipotens et ineluctabile **fatum**

his posuere locis, matrisque egere tremenda

Carmentis nymphae monita et deus auctor Apollo.’

‘When I had been expelled from my fatherland, and was chasing the edges of the ocean, **Fortuna** all-powerful and unavoidable **fate** set me in this place; the fearsome warnings of my mother, the nymph Carmentis, and the founder god Apollo forced me here.’

Evander claims that *Fortuna* and *fatum*, along with Carmentis and Apollo, forced him to settle in this part of Latium. Servius argues that Evander’s use of *Fortuna* here is Stoic (Serv. *ad Aen.* 8.334):<sup>46</sup>

FORTUNA OMNIPOTENS ET INELUCTABILE FATUM: **secundum Stoicos**

**locutus est**, qui nasci et mori fatis dant, media omnia fortunae: nam vitae

humanae incerta sunt omnia. unde et miscuit, ut quasi plenum ostenderet

dogma: nam nihil tam contrarium est fato quam casus; **sed secundum**

**Stoicos dixit.**

**He spoke following the Stoics**, who attribute birth and death to the fates, and everything in between to *fortuna*: for all of human life is uncertain. That’s why Virgil’s combined *fatum* and *fortuna*, so that he could show, as it were, the whole doctrine: for nothing is so opposed to *fatum* as chance; **but he spoke following the Stoics.**

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<sup>46</sup> This is perhaps one of the comments responsible for scholarly confusion about the meanings of *fatum* and *fortuna* in Stoicism: see above n. 3 and n. 45.

We saw above that, when *fortuna* appears in contexts discussing fate and Stoicism, it is as a translation for τύχη in Stoic sources and should be taken to mean ‘chance’, a force which doesn’t exist according to Stoic philosophy. Attributing events to *fortuna* therefore demonstrates ignorance of causation and fate, rather than the existence of chance: Servius perhaps intends his comment *nihil tam contrarium est fato quam casus* to clarify that *fortuna* cannot mean chance here as that would be incompatible with Stoicism. However, it is not clear how Servius’ Stoic reading works with the description of *Fortuna* here as *omnipotens*, or how it helps our understanding of Evander’s words.

I would therefore like to suggest a different argument from Servius, which draws on *Fortuna*’s religious associations with women and femininity. Carmentis was an ancient Roman goddess who, like *Fortuna*, had prophetic powers and was associated with childbirth.<sup>47</sup> The similarities between the two and the suggestion of a connection is strengthened by the fact that, in the *Fasti*, Ovid weaves Carmentis into his account of the *Matralia*, which, as I mentioned above, was the day dedicated both to *Mater Matuta* and *Fortuna* (Ov. *Fast.* 6.525-36).<sup>48</sup> Considering that the male Apollo is associated with fate rather than *fortuna* throughout the poem, perhaps 335-6 could be viewed as a repetition and expansion of the ideas in 334; Evander’s reference to the *Carmentis nymphae monita* could work as a fuller expression of his earlier mention of *Fortuna*.

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<sup>47</sup> Ov. *Fast.* 1.461-586. See also Wissowa (1902: 200-1); Gransden (1976 *ad* 8.334).

<sup>48</sup> Littlewood connects Carmentis, *Fortuna* and *Mater Matuta* (2006 *ad* Ov. *Fast.* 6.603): ‘the two Carmentis celebrations in *Fasti* 1 show Carmentis first as a prophetic goddess and second as a kouroutrophos, while in *Fasti* 6 the cult of *Mater Matuta*, the kouroutrophos, precedes that of *Fortuna*, who is associated with prophecy.’

The perceived etymological link between *F/fortuna* and *ferre* is also relevant to the cult of *Fors Fortuna*. According to tradition, this was founded by Servius Tullius,<sup>49</sup> and Columella associated the worship of *Fors Fortuna* with farmers (*Rust.* 10.311-7). Both *ferre* and *felicitas/felix*<sup>50</sup> (also closely connected with *F/fortuna*) have agricultural meanings that support this connection. Iconographically, *Fortuna* is often depicted with a cornucopia (see figs. 3 and 4 below), and Horace describes her as a rustic deity in his ode to *Fortuna* (*Hor. Carm.* 1.35.5-6):

te pauper ambit sollicita prece  
ruris colonus...

'Your support is sought with anxious prayers by the poor tenant farmer...' (trans. Rudd)

Virgil draws on this agricultural association in his use of the word *fortunatus*, for example in *Georgics* 2 (*Verg. G.* 2.458-9; 490-4), but also elsewhere:<sup>51</sup>

o fortunatos nimium, sua si bona norint,  
agricolas!

O farmers, over-blessed by fortune, if only they recognized the goods they have!'

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<sup>49</sup> *Ov. Fast.* 6.783-4; Varro, *Ling.* 6.3.17. Livy (10.46) also suggests that Servius Tullius was responsible for an early (/the earliest?) temple to the goddess.

<sup>50</sup> *felix* originally means 'fertile', but later comes to mean 'lucky'. See *OLD* s.v.

<sup>51</sup> For example *Verg. Ecl.* 1.46, where Meliboeus calls Tityrus '*fortunate senex, ergo tua rura manebunt...*'; or 11.252-4, the words of Diomedes reported by Venulus '*fortunatae gentes, Saturnia regna/ antiqui Ausonii, quae vos fortuna quietos/ sollicitat suadetque ignota lacescere bella*', in which *F/fortuna* is associated both with a Golden, rural age, and with the disruption of this by war. See above for my related discussion of the positive and negative associations of the adjective *fortunatus* when applied to Nisus and Euryalus. I will discuss the military connotations of *F/fortuna* in more detail below.

**felix** qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas

atque metus omnis et inexorabile **fatum**

subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari:

**fortunatus et ille deos qui novit agrestis**

Panaque Silvanumque senem Nymphasque sorores.

**Lucky** is the man who could understand the causes of things and who tramples all fears and inexorable **fate** underfoot, along with the din of greedy Acheron. **But that man who has recognized the gods of the countryside**, Pan, old Silvanus, and the sister Nymphs, **is also blessed by fortune**.

Indeed, in the latter case, the word *fortunatus* seems part of the characterization that distinguishes religion (*deos... agrestis... Panaque Silvanumque senem Nymphasque sorores*) from the more rational (*rerum cognoscere causas*) and philosophical topics discussed in the preceding lines.<sup>52</sup>

*Fortuna's* religious associations with success and luck encouraged Republican generals to vow temples to the goddess in the event of victory in important battles. Matthews argues that the temple to *Fors Fortuna* dedicated by Carvilius in 293 BC after defeating the Samnites and Etruscans marked the first express association of *Fortuna* with military victory.<sup>53</sup> After this, the consul Sempronius vowed a temple to *Fortuna Primigenia* in case of victory against Hannibal at Croton in 204 BC,<sup>54</sup> and Catulus swore to dedicate a temple to *Fortuna Huiusce*

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<sup>52</sup> See n. 35 above for the opposition of *religio* and philosophy or *ratio* in literature of the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC; e.g. Thornton (1976: 31-3), or Thomas (1988 *ad loc.*) for further discussion of the 'double μακαρισμός'.

<sup>53</sup> Livy 10.46; Matthews (2012: 50).

<sup>54</sup> Livy 29.36

*Diei* were he to be successful at the battle of Vercellae in 101 BC.<sup>55</sup> We might compare these examples with Augustus' dedication of an altar to *Fortuna Redux* upon his return from military campaign in the East in 19 BC.<sup>56</sup> That said, the *F/fortuna* of war was generally considered unstable and changeable.<sup>57</sup> The ability of military *F/fortuna* to reverse is an idea that appears as early as Ennius,<sup>58</sup> and that recurs in Caesar's writing, for example (Caes. *B. Civ.* 3.68.1):<sup>59</sup>

sed Fortuna, quae plurimum potest cum in reliquis rebus tum praecipue  
in bello, parvis momentis magnas rerum commutationes efficit, ut tum  
accidit.

But Fortune has vast power both in other activities and particularly in warfare, causing huge reversals by tilting her balance slightly, as happened then. (trans. Damon)

This capacity is no doubt related to the more general proverbial characterization of *fortuna* as fickle (Publilius Syrus, *Sententiae* 431):

levis est Fortuna: cito reposcit quod dedit.

*Fortuna* is fickle: she quickly demands back what she has granted.

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<sup>55</sup> Plut. *Mar.* 26.3. Note that the title *huiusce diei* did not, in fact, limit *Fortuna*'s power to specific days: as Cicero points out *valet in omnis dies* (Cic. *Leg.* 2.28).

<sup>56</sup> Aug. *R.G.* 11.

<sup>57</sup> It is not always clear whether military *F/fortuna* is personified as a goddess, or whether she/it should be considered more broadly as a 'divine quality' (Clark 2007).

<sup>58</sup> e.g. at Enn. *Ann.* 258-60 Skutsch, discussed in more detail below.

<sup>59</sup> See also Caes. *B. Gall.* 3.6.2, 7.63.8; *B. Civ.* 1.52.3, 2.14.3, 3.10.6-7, 3.27.1, 3.68.1. Livy likewise recalls the *anceps fortuna* of the Punic Wars (Livy 21.1.2). Note the similarity to Dido's description of her relationship with Aeneas (4.603): '*verum anceps pugnae fuerat fortuna*'. Elsewhere Virgil connects the destruction of their love affair with the Punic Wars (4.622-9, 669-71).

Nevertheless, prominent generals and statesman of the late Republic took pains to advertise their close and special relationship with *Fortuna*. Sulla was perhaps the first, strikingly adopting the *cognomen* 'Felix' for his family. It is likely that Marius and Pompey followed suit, claiming that, though for others she/it was unstable, they consistently enjoyed good *F/fortuna* in war.<sup>60</sup> To this end, Clark notes that 'there are hints that temples to *F/fortuna* may have featured in *horti* of other 'great men' of the late Republic' (2007: 234), mentioning in particular Pompey, Lucullus and Caesar. Indeed, evidence suggests that it is Julius Caesar who especially strove to establish and monopolize association with good *F/fortuna*, whether as goddess or 'divine quality'.<sup>61</sup> This was evidently an important link to cultivate: *F/fortuna* would later be uniquely appropriated by the emperors in imperial cult.<sup>62</sup> *F/fortuna*'s proverbial changeability coupled with her strong links to generals from the late Republic and triumviral period led to a further connection between *F/fortuna* and unstable and turbulent periods of

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<sup>60</sup> For Pompey as the favourite of fortune, see Cic. *De Imp. Cn.* 28 *ego enim sic existimo, in summo imperatore quattuor res inesse oportere: scientiam rei militaris, virtutem, auctoritatem, felicitatem*; and *ibid.* 47-9; Weinstock (1971: 124) who suggests that Pompeians were responsible for the first appearance of the goddess *Fortuna* on coinage. Marius is likewise associated with *fortuna* by Cicero at *De Imp. Cn.* 47; see also Val. Max. 6.9.14. It is also perhaps relevant that the final defeat of the Marians resulted from a siege of Praeneste (the location of an enormous shrine to *Fortuna Primigenia*) in 83 BC, after which Marius himself committed suicide.

<sup>61</sup> In terms of propaganda that he himself generated, Weinstock (1971: 115) points us to Caes. *B. Gall.* 6.30.2 *multum cum in omnibus rebus tum in re militari potest fortuna*. Cicero appears to comment on an established link between Caesar and *fortuna* at *Deiot.* 19-21 'tua te' inquit 'eadem, quae saepe, fortuna servavit'... 'at te eadem tua fortuna servavit'; Cic. *Ep. ad Nep.* fr. 5 (= Amm. Marc. 21.16.13); and perhaps at Cic. *Marc.* 7. Later literature strengthens this link: Suet. *Iul.* 36 *prosperrime semper ac ne ancipiti quidem umquam fortuna... dimicavit*; Plut. *de fort. Rom.* 319C-D; Luc. 1.225-6 (of Caesar crossing the Rubicon) 'hic', ait 'hic pacem temerataque iura relinquo;/ te, Fortuna, sequar'.

<sup>62</sup> See e.g. fig. 3 below. Weinstock (1971: 127) suggests that the altar of *Fortuna Redux* was a prototype for the *Fortuna Augusti*, which 'first appears on the coinage of Galba' (Fishwick 1990: 465-6). Emperors were said to have kept statuettes of *Fortuna* in their bedrooms (e.g. Suet. *Galb.* 3).

civil war.<sup>63</sup> Horace, for example, opens his second book of odes with a description of the civil wars following the formation of the first triumvirate in 60 BC as a 'game of *fortuna*' (Hor. *Carm.* 2.1.1-5):

motum ex Metello consule civicum

bellique causas et vitia et modos

ludum fortunae gravisque

principum amicitias et arma,

nondum expiatis uncta cruoribus...

The civil strife that began with Metellus' consulship, the causes, and blunders, and phases of war, Fortune's sport, the protagonists' deadly friendships, weapons smeared with still unexpiated blood... (trans. Rudd, and his capitalization)

Of course, the connection between civil war and *F/fortuna* is cemented in Lucan's *Pharsalia*.<sup>64</sup>

In this light, let us consider again Turnus' especial connection with *F/fortuna*. I noted above, drawing on Cicero's use of *fortuna* as a translation for τύχη, whose existence the Stoics explained by designating it an αἰτία ἄδηλος, that associating Turnus with *fortuna* underlines his ignorance of fate; of what must and will happen in the poem and Roman history. It now seems that Turnus may also be tainted by the military connotations of the goddess/divine quality, and especially her involvement with the turbulent politics and dangerous personalities of

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<sup>63</sup> See Quint (1993: 94), who suggests that 'the disavowal of fortune may contain a polemic against recent history'. *Fortuna* appeared on both Caesarian and Antonian coinage (see e.g. fig. 4 below).

<sup>64</sup> On *F/fortuna* in Lucan see e.g. Dick (1967), Ahl (1976), and Leigh (1997).

recent civil wars. His attempt to use *Fortuna* to rouse the Latin council in book 11 constitutes a good example (11.425-7):<sup>65</sup>

**‘multa dies variique labor mutabilis aevi**

rettulit in melius, multos **alterna** revisens

lusit et **in solido rursus** Fortuna locavit.’

**Many things** has the passing **day** and the **changing** hardships of **uncertain** time rendered better; **ambivalent** Fortuna has deceived many men, and then, visiting them **again**, set them on solid ground.

Turnus’ phrasing (*varii, mutabilis, alterna*) underscores the proverbial changeability of *F/fortuna*, and Virgil shares with Horace the idea that war is *Fortuna*’s game; she toys (*lusit*) with humans on such important matters as life and death. The connections between *F/fortuna* and prominent generals of the late Republic make it possible that Virgil’s initial reader would have connected this sort of rhetoric with recent history.

This passage is also closely modelled on Ennius (Enn. *Ann.* 258-60 Skutsch):

**multa dies** in bello conficit unus

et **rursus** multae fortunae forte recumbent:

haud quaquam quemquam semper **fortuna** secuta est.

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<sup>65</sup> Drances, another character associated with the turbulent politics of the late Republic and triumviral period (see above 2. ii. *causae belli: the many causes of the war in Latium*), also uses *F/fortuna* several times in his speeches (11.128, 345). Cf. also Lucretius’ explanation of the vanity and futility of ambition (Lucr. 5.1120-1): *at claros homines voluerunt se atque potentes/ ut fundamento stabili fortuna maneret* ‘yet men desired to be famous and powerful, that their fortune might stand fast upon a firm foundation’ (trans. Rouse).

**Many things** does one **day** bring about in war and many fortunes through chance sink low **again**. In no wise has fortune followed any man all his days. (trans. Warmington)

Virgil mirrors Ennius precisely in his use and placement of *multa dies* and *fortuna*. In addition, *rursus* appears in both texts, along with verbs with the prefix *re-*: Ennius' *recumbent* finds parallel in Virgil's *rettulit* and *revisens*. However, the meaning and intention of the two passages is very different. Turnus' speech aims to encourage the Latins to take heart and keep fighting by suggesting that defeat can become success in a day and *Fortuna* can change things for the better. The context and purpose of the Ennian lines is exactly the opposite: they are 'apparently from a speech of Aemilius Paullus refusing to follow up a success won by Terentius Varro' (Skutsch 1985 *ad loc.*), and therefore contain a warning that things may get worse rather than better. Turnus' words, and appeal to *Fortuna*, thereby gain a doomed quality. Intertextuality, by definition recursive and repetitive, adds depth and pathos to *F/fortuna's* cyclical characterization here, and underscores both Turnus' ignorance of fate and the subsequent dramatic irony of his futile hopes and wishes.

*Fortuna's* power also extended in particular over the sea. She is commonly portrayed in the iconography of the triumviral period and empire with a rudder (see e.g. *RIC* 2, 699, fig. 3; *RRC* 516/1, fig. 4 below). Matthews suggests that the coin minted by P. Sepullius Macer in 44 BC (*RRC* 480/25) is amongst the first instances of such a portrayal, and postulates a link between the emergence of this iconography and one of the most famous examples of Julius Caesar's

relationship with *F/fortuna*.<sup>66</sup> Caesar is said to have snuck into a small fishing boat to cross the Adriatic. When he reveals himself, he tells the fisherman not to worry about their crossing – Plutarch here uses Τύχη as a Greek translation of *F/fortuna* (Plut. *de fort. Rom.* 319C-D):<sup>67</sup>

‘γενναῖε, τόλμα καὶ δέδιθι μηδέν, ἀλλ’ ἐπιδίδου τῇ **Τύχῃ** τὰ ἱστία καὶ

δέχου τὸ πνεῦμα, πιστεύων ὅτι Καίσαρα φέρεις καὶ τὴν Καίσαρος **Τύχην**.’

‘Go on, good sir, be brave and fear nothing! But entrust your sails to **Fortune** and receive her breeze, confident because you bear Caesar and Caesar’s **Fortune**.’ (trans. Babbitt)



Fig. 3: RIC 2, 699. Aureus of Vespasian, 74 AD. Laureate head of Vespasian on obverse; *Fortuna* standing on a pediment decorated with a ram’s head, and holding a rudder and cornucopia on reverse. ©Trustees of the British Museum.

<sup>66</sup> Matthews (2012: 84, 78 n. 254)

<sup>67</sup> See also Weinstock (1971: 121-7); Ahl (1976: 295 n.41) ‘Plutarch selects Caesar’s attempt to cross the Adriatic as an example of his *fortuna*’.



Fig. 4: RRC 516/1. Aureus of Mark Antony, 41 BC. Head of M. Antonius on obverse; *Fortuna* standing holding a rudder and cornucopia with a stork at her feet on reverse. ©Trustees of the British Museum.

Likewise, Weinstock relates the alleged historical occurrence of this event to Horace's description, probably following Pindar's portrayal of Τύχη (Pind. *Ol.* 12), of *Fortuna* as a goddess for seafarers (Hor. *Carm.* 1.35.1-8, an extract of which was quoted above):<sup>68</sup>

o diva, **gratum quae regis Antium,**  
 praesens vel imo tollere de gradu  
 mortale corpus vel superbos  
 vertere funeribus triumphos,  
 te pauper ambit sollicita prece  
 ruris colonus, **te dominam aequoris**

5

<sup>68</sup> Weinstock (1971: 126): 'This is the first explicit evidence that Fortuna, even if only the Fortuna of Antium, was the goddess of seafarers. She comes from the Pindaric model, where Tyche as Σώτειρα sits at the ship's helm.' This may not be right if Matthews' suggestion about the coin of 44 BC is valid.

**quicumque Bythyna laccessit**

**Carpathium pelagus carina.**

O goddess, **you who reign over your favourite Antium**, ready at hand to raise mortal flesh from the lowest level or to turn an arrogant triumph into a funeral cortege, your support is sought with anxious prayers by the poor tenant farmer, **and, as you are mistress of the deep, by whoever provokes the Carpathian Sea in a Bithynian boat.** (trans. Rudd)

Indeed, this poem is particularly addressed to *Fortuna* at Antium, and Antium was a port.

### 5. iii. F/fortuna in book five

I will now offer an extended analysis of book five to illustrate how awareness of the philosophical distinction between *fortuna* and *fatum* and sensitivity to the especial importance of *Fortuna* to women and sailors in Roman religion and culture can clarify the role of both these concepts in the *Aeneid*. *F/fortuna* plays a prominent role in this book, and this role is different from the role of *fatum/a*. As the Trojan fleet leaves Carthage, the sky darkens with storm-clouds, and the worried helmsman Palinurus advises Aeneas that they should divert their course from Italy (5.17-25):

‘magnanime Aeneas, non, si mihi Iuppiter auctor  
spondeat, hoc sperem Italiam contingere caelo.

mutati transversa fremunt et vespere ab atro  
consurgunt venti, atque in nubem cogitur aer.

20

**nec nos obniti contra nec tendere tantum**

**sufficimus. superat quoniam Fortuna, sequamur,**

**quoque vocat vertamus iter.** nec litora longe

fida reor fraterna Erycis portusque Sicanos...'

25

'Great-hearted Aeneas, not, even if father Jupiter were to promise it to me, would I hope to reach Italy under a sky like this. The winds are changed; they roar at cross purposes, rising up together from the darkening west, and the air is compressed into cloud. **We have the strength neither to struggle against them, nor even to direct our course. Since *Fortuna* has the upper-hand, let us follow her, and direct our journey where she calls.** Not far from here are the shores, I think, of your brother Eryx, that are loyal to us, and the Sicilian ports...'

Palinurus stresses the adverse weather conditions, and claims that the Trojans do not have the strength to struggle against them. Like Dido less than a hundred lines earlier (4.653, see above), he advocates following the path that *Fortuna* has given by returning to Sicily. Aeneas agrees. The marine associations of *Fortuna* discussed above make it fitting that Palinurus, a seaman, should invoke *Fortuna* here as a power over the sea.

Once they have landed on Sicily, Aeneas arranges memorial games for his father Anchises. It is during these that *Fortuna* reappears. Firstly, in association with Nisus and Euryalus during the footrace.<sup>69</sup> This episode is an important forerunner to the role of *F/fortuna* in these characters' death in book nine:<sup>70</sup> as in the case of Dido and Turnus, the 'losers'<sup>71</sup> of the epic are consistently associated with *F/fortuna* rather than *fatum/a*. Secondly, *F/fortuna* pervades the events surrounding the Trojan women deciding in desperation to burn the ships. Virgil

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<sup>69</sup> At 5.353-6, Nisus claims that he and Salius were tripped up by *inimica fortuna*. Though Nisus in fact tripped up Salius on purpose, the role of *F/fortuna* in the footrace is suggested by *infelix, forte* (both 5.529) and *casus* (5.350).

<sup>70</sup> On Nisus and Euryalus, see also 2. ii. *Determinism and literary precedent*.

<sup>71</sup> As in chapter one, my phrasing follows Quint (1993) and Armstrong (2002).



traxerit ad letum patriae sub moenibus! o gens

infelix, cui te exitio Fortuna reservat?’

‘O wretched women,’ she said ‘whom during the war the Achaean army didn’t drag to death beneath the walls of your homeland! O unfortunate race, for what destruction is *Fortuna* reserving you?’

Iris/Beroe successfully appeals both to her female audience and to their particular fear of the sea by invoking *Fortuna* as a power over their destiny. The Trojan women seize torches and brands to set the ships alight.<sup>74</sup> Any hesitations they have (*primo ancipites* 654), including concerns about *fata* (*fatis vocantia regna* 656) are dispelled when Iris sheds her mortal disguise and departs, creating a rainbow (657-60) which is taken as a confirmatory omen.

When news of what the women have done reaches the men, Aeneas is distraught. His behaviour contrast with Cicero’s explanation of the wise and happy man, who must be immune to the potential benefits as well as the vicissitudes of *fortuna* (Cic. *Para. Stoic.* 2.17, quoted above). The following passage constitutes another example of this sentiment, and may provide illuminating context to Virgil’s portrayal of Aeneas here. Cicero is discussing the appropriateness/naturalness of emotional responses to misfortunes, and in doing so offers his own version of a passage of Sophocles (Cic. *Tusc.* 3.71):<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> Both Servius and Cicero suggest that *incendia* as well as *naufugia* are events characteristic of *fortuna*: Cic. *Off.* 2.19, Serv. *ad Aen.* 4.653 (following Cicero?).

<sup>75</sup> The passage of Sophocles that Cicero is reworking here has been identified as fr. 576 (Jebb), probably from the lost play *Teucer*. Pacuvius’ Latin *Teucer* was also popular, and quoted by Cicero (e.g. *De or.* 2.193). The comment is directed at Oileus. The likely context is that, though Oileus comforted Telamon when Teucer announced the death of Telamon’s son Ajax, he is nevertheless inconsolable when he hears of the death of his own son, Locrian Ajax. See Jebb, Headlam & Pearson (1917: 215).

nec vero tanta praeditus sapientia  
 quisquam est, qui aliorum aerumnam dictis adlevans  
 non idem, cum **fortuna mutata** impetum  
 convertat, clade subita frangatur sua,  
 ut illa ad alios dicta et praecepta excidant.

‘And there is none of wisdom so possessed, who with mild words has soothed another’s woes, but does not, **when a turn of fortune comes**, fall broken by his own calamity; so words, for others wise, his own needs fail.’ (trans. King)

Though a wise man may counsel others well in the face of misfortune, nevertheless, when his fortune changes (*fortuna mutata* - note the same wording as 5.604), he cannot take his own advice, and, the context suggests, is overcome by emotion. Is this true of Aeneas here? His reaction to his own *fortuna mutata* is certainly different from the smile (*risit pater optimus illi* 5.358) with which he greets Nisus’ misfortune (*fortuna inimica* 5.356) in the footrace. Going back a little further, his dramatic behaviour and wish for death after the burning of the ships in book five isn’t that far removed from Dido’s exasperation and suicide, even though he tried to counsel her to calm down (*‘desine meque tuis incendere teque querelis’* 4.360; *quamquam lenire dolentem solando cupit et dictis avertere curas* 4.393-4 – note similar wording to *aliorum aerumnam dictis adlevans* Cic. *Tusc.* 3.71). This reading suggests that Aeneas, by still being liable to emotional turmoil and distress in the face of unexpected adversity, is yet to obtain *virtus* and *sapientia*.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>76</sup> See above (5. i. *fortuna in philosophy*) for further discussion of Aeneas’ progress towards *virtus* in the course of the epic.

In his turmoil, he prays to Jupiter to either put out the flames or kill him on the spot with a thunderbolt. Thankfully, the king of the gods immediately answers his prayers by sending rain. But Aeneas is still shaken, and contemplates abandoning his plan to make for Italy until Nautes steps in with some advice (5.700-10):

|                                                                |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| at pater Aeneas casu concussus acerbo                          | 700 |
| nunc huc ingentis, nunc illuc pectore curas                    |     |
| mutabat versans, Siculisne resideret arvis                     |     |
| <b>oblitus fatorum</b> , Italiasne capesseret oras.            |     |
| tum senior Nautes, unum Tritonia Pallas                        |     |
| quem docuit multaque insignem reddidit arte -                  | 705 |
| haec responsa dabat, vel quae portenderet ira                  |     |
| magna deum vel <b>quae fatorum posceret ordo</b> ;             |     |
| isque his Aenean solatus vocibus inquit:                       |     |
| ‘nate dea, <b>quo fata trahunt retrahuntque sequamur</b> ;     |     |
| <b>quidquid erit, superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est...</b> ’ | 710 |

But father Aeneas, shaken by this bitter misfortune, shifted the great worries in his heart now this way, now that, thinking over whether he should settle in the fields of Sicily, **having forgotten the fates**, or whether he should make for the shores of Italy. Then the elder Nautes, the only man whom Tritonian Pallas had taught and rendered eminent for his many skills - she used to give him answers either as to what the great anger of the gods portended or **what the order of the fates demanded** - he, having comforted Aeneas, spoke these words: ‘Son of the goddess, **let us follow where the fates drag us back and forth**: whatever happens, **every unexpected event must be overcome by endurance**.’

This passage shows that the intrusion of *F/fortuna*, the burning of the ships, has worked against *fatum/a*: Aeneas is tempted to forget his divinely ordained

mission and settle in Sicily (*Siculisne resideret arvis/ oblitus fatorum*). Nautes, on the other hand, is associated with *fatum/a* rather than *F/fortuna* (*responsa; fatorum... ordo*), and introduces his practical suggestion that Aeneas should leave the women behind with a reminder that they should follow the fates, and endure *F/fortuna*. This advice is subtly but crucially different from Palinurus' at the opening of the book (5.17-25, above): where the helmsman advocated following *fortuna*, Nautes substitutes this for *fata* ('*superat quoniam Fortuna, sequamur*' vs. '*quo fata trahunt retrahuntque sequamur*').

This substitution becomes significant when Aeneas, after further encouragement from a dream-vision of Anchises, finally sets sail once more for Italy.<sup>77</sup> Virgil describes his departure as follows (5.774-78):

ipse caput tonsae foliis evinctus olivae

**stans** procul **in prora** pateram tenet, extaque salsos 775

proicit in fluctus ac vina liquentia fundit.

certatim socii feriunt mare et aequora verrunt; 778

prosequitur surgens a puppi ventus euntis. 777

He, head encircled with leaves shorn from an olive tree, holds a libation bowl, **standing** far out **on the prow**, and casts entrails into the salty waves and pours flowing wine. His comrades, trying to outdo each other, strike at the sea and tear up the ocean's planes; a wind, rising from the stern, follows them as they go.

As demonstrated in the previous chapter, rowing against the current was associated with struggling against *fata* in the *Georgics* (Verg. *G.* 1.199-203).<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>77</sup> See the following chapter (6. *inania verba, visual perception and materialism*) on the connection between the dreams of Anchises that Aeneas experiences and the shade of Anchises that Aeneas meets in the Underworld.

However, now the Trojans' efforts are in the right direction, and they are rowing accompanied by a favourable wind. The image of Aeneas standing high on the prow foreshadows the depiction of Augustus at Actium on his future shield (8.678-81):<sup>79</sup>

hinc Augustus agens Italos in proelia Caesar  
 cum patribus populoque, penatibus et magnis dis,  
**stans** celsa **in puppi**, geminas cui tempora flammās                      680  
 laeta comunt patriumque aperitur vertice sidus.

From this side comes Augustus Caesar, leading the Italians into battle with the senate and the people, the *penates* and the great gods, **standing high on the stern**. His glad temples are garlanded with two flames, and his father's star appears at his head.

Virgil therefore matches Aeneas' imminent arrival in Italy with Augustus' achievements at Actium, suggesting both have equal significance in securing Roman *fata*.

Crucially, Aeneas' alignment with *fatum/a* and divine purpose as he finally sails towards Italy comes with exclusion of *F/fortuna* from the Trojan/Roman mission.<sup>80</sup> For one, the feminine contingent, linked with *F/fortuna* and

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<sup>78</sup> See above (4. *Philosophy, Poetry and Rivers*).

<sup>79</sup> This is one of the references to the *sidus Iulium* discussed above (3. iii. *Dido's culpa and Aeneas' culpa*).

<sup>80</sup> As I have mentioned, this motif of the increasing exclusion of *F/fortuna* from the future of Rome pervades the poem. All of the characters most associated with *F/fortuna* die (e.g. Dido, Turnus, Nisus and Euryalus).

unpredictability, have now been left behind on Sicily.<sup>81</sup> In addition, Aeneas loses his helmsman, Palinurus, who at the beginning of the book (5.17-24 above) was closely associated with *Fortuna* (5.857-863):

vix primos inopina quies laxaverat artus,  
 et super incumbens cum puppis parte revulsa  
**cumque gubernaclo** liquidas proiecit in undas  
 praecipitem ac socios nequiquam saepe vocantem; 860  
 ipse volans tenuis se sustulit ales ad auras.  
 currit iter tutum non setius aequore classis...

Scarcely had the slumber that he didn't want relaxed the tips of his limbs. And Sleep, leaning over him, together with a part of the stern that had been wrenched off and **together with the rudder** cast him forth into the flowing waves headfirst and calling often to his companions in vain. The god Sleep, a flying bird, lifted himself up into thin air. The fleet nevertheless continued to make a safe course on the ocean's plane.

Phrontis in the *Odyssey* and Tiphys in the *Argonautica* provide precedent for the death of a helmsman in epic poetry,<sup>82</sup> but one of the ways that Virgil differentiates the case of Palinurus is by specifying that the rudder itself is lost along with its guide. The iconographic connection between the goddess *Fortuna* and the *gubernaculum* discussed above corroborates the symbolism suggested by Palinurus' association with *Fortuna* earlier in the book. With rudder and

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<sup>81</sup> With the notable exception of Euryalus' mother. Mention of her in book nine (9.283-6, 473-502) coincides with the destructive resurgence of *F/fortuna* in Nisus and Euryalus' night mission.

<sup>82</sup> Hom. *Od.* 3.276-83; Ap. Rhod. *Argon.* 2.851-63.

helmsman gone, in place of the path proffered by *Fortuna*, Aeneas' fleet is now following the course (*iter*) of *fatum/a* and divine purpose.<sup>83</sup>

A passage of Cicero encourages a political reading of Palinurus' death, and the exclusion of *F/fortuna* from the Roman mission that it symbolizes. The following is taken from a letter of 60/59 BC to his brother, in which he informs Quintus that his (i.e. Quintus') proconsulship in the province of Asia has been extended for a third year. By way of encouragement, he describes how, unlike in other forms of public service such as generalship, in the role of *proconsul*, success can be guaranteed, because it depends on thought and application rather than *F/fortuna* (Cic. *Q. Fr.* 1.1.5-6):

nunc vero ea pars tibi rei publicae commissa est **in qua aut nullam aut perexiguam partem Fortuna tenet et quae mihi tota in tua virtute ac moderatione animi posita esse videatur**. nullas, ut opinor, insidias hostium, nullam proeli dimicationem...(etc.) pertimescimus; quae persaepe sapientissimis viris acciderunt, ut, **quem ad modum gubernatores optimi vim tempestatis, sic illi impetum fortunae superare non possent**. tibi data est summa pax, summa tranquillitas, **ita tamen ut ea dormientem gubernatorem vel obruere**, vigilantem etiam delectare possit.

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<sup>83</sup> For a complementary analysis that sidesteps observations about the religious significance of *F/fortuna*, and the symbolism of the rudder, see Nicoll (1988: 465): 'It could be said, therefore, that one reason why Palinurus must die is that he is the embodiment of a way of life – following *Fortuna* – which may be adequate, perhaps inevitable, for the pilot at sea, but which will no longer be sufficient for Aeneas once he reaches Italy... Aeneas' further progress must be made on the basis of a knowledge of *fata* to be given him by his father (6.759 *te tua fata docebo*) - a surer guide than *Fortuna*.'

But as matters stand, ***Fortuna* has no part, or only a very small part**, in the public responsibility which has been entrusted to you. **It seems to me to lie wholly in your own ability and discretion.** We do not, I think, have to fear a hostile ambushade or a pitched battle... such things have happened time and time again to very wise men; **they could not overcome *Fortuna's* onset any more than the best of seamen can master a violent storm.** Your portion is perfect peace and calm; and **yet if the helmsman falls asleep he could go to the bottom in such weather**, while if he keeps wide awake he may actually enjoy it.

Cicero here draws on the well-worn analogy between ship and state: *gubernator* of course means 'helmsman' before it comes to mean 'ruler' or 'governor'. The absence of *F/fortuna* from a stable political situation creates such calm that a helmsman/governor might fall asleep and be knocked overboard – just like Palinurus. On the other hand, one who stays awake will enjoy the ride. This passage therefore suggests that both Palinurus' death and Aeneas taking the (rudderless) helm at the end of book five have political significance (*ipse ratem... rexit* 5.868). Virgil encourages the reader to understand that Aeneas taking command of the fleet is symbolic of his strengthening government and resolve more generally, and to associate his assumption of control with a rejection of *F/fortuna*: the women, Palinurus and even the rudder were all identified closely with the uncertainty and danger of *F/fortuna*, and have all been left behind. The resultant sense of confident progress and accordance with *fata* and divine purpose forms a fitting transition to book six, when Aeneas' fleet will finally reach Italy, and he will gain confirmation from Anchises of Roman *fata* ('*te tua fata docebo*' 6.759).<sup>84</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> Though note that, as I have shown in chapter two (2. iii. *Fate as 'text'*), the *fata* that Anchises teaches are not straightforward.

### Conclusion

Once again, it is difficult to separate philosophy from politics. There are certain characters who make reference to and rely on *F/fortuna* more than others. These include Dido, Turnus, and Nisus and Euryalus, all of whom die in the course of the poem, and are precluded from the positive trajectory of the Roman future. The philosophical, religious and cultural connotations of *F/fortuna* explain why she/it is associated with the 'losers'<sup>85</sup> of the epic. From a philosophical perspective, *fortuna* means 'chance', and translates τύχη. It is neither wise nor virtuous to leave anything to chance, and, according to the Stoic theory of universal causal determinism, belief in *fortuna* demonstrates ignorance of fate. *F/fortuna* was also a goddess and divine quality, connected in particular to war and the power-hungry generals of the late Republic and triumviral period who plunged Rome into years of civil war. Accordingly, Virgil's 'disavowal of fortune may constitute a polemic against recent history' (Quint 1993: 94). Aeneas, unlike these characters associated with *F/fortuna*, makes progress in the course of the epic: away from *F/fortuna*, uncertainty, and the past of Troy; and towards increasing surety, stability, and the future of Rome. His success is connected to a different strategy and world-view. For one, it is hard work and forward-planning, rather than good luck, that reaps rewards. However, crucially, Aeneas is also confident that his project has the support of the gods, and that he is following fate. Other characters are less fortunate with regards to their integration into the divine plan. Nevertheless, ironically, Virgil's poem compensates them with the good fortune of eternal commemoration.

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<sup>85</sup> See n. 71 above.

## 6. inania verba, visual perception and materialism

Vision in the *Aeneid* is a rich and complex topic, which recent scholarship has analysed using various approaches and methods: vision has been linked to gender, politics, psychology, narrative focalization, art and ekphrasis and much more.<sup>1</sup> This chapter will further broaden the scope of this stimulating discussion by exploring the topic from the perspective of Epicurean philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

I will use four terms to help clarify my discussion. The first two, following Reinhardt's recent analysis of vision in Lucretius and Cicero,<sup>3</sup> are adjectives to describe different types of seeing. I will use 'relational' to describe seeing that implies a relationship between objects and subjects in the world, for example 'I see a book', 'the librarian sees me' etc. I intend 'phenomenal' seeing, on the other hand, to refer to what a subject experiences in their head as mental pictures: thoughts, imagination, hallucinations, dreams. What is seen in these two types of seeing can be either 'veridical', which means that it accurately represents reality,

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<sup>1</sup> Recent monographs on vision in the *Aeneid* include Smith (2005); Reed (2007); and Lovatt (2013), for whom Virgil is an important part of her broader exploration of vision in ancient epic. Bartsch (2006), who discusses *inter alia* the relationship between vision and identity, with a particular focus on mirrors; and Webb (2009), who clarifies especially the role of and visual imagery and imagination in ancient rhetorical theory, are further testament to current scholarly interest in vision in the ancient world, including Rome in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC.

<sup>2</sup> Hardie (2009) likewise discusses vision in the *Aeneid* from a Lucretian and Epicurean standpoint. In this article, he focusses on vision as a didactic technique and metaphor for Epicurean enlightenment. I will focus instead on Virgil's engagement with the atomic mechanics of visual perception. See also Mac Góráin (2017, forthcoming).

<sup>3</sup> Reinhardt (2015).

or ‘non-veridical’, which means that it does not. I hope that the following table will clarify this fourfold distinction.

|                   | <b>Veridical</b>                                                                                                                                                                                                   | <b>Non-veridical</b>                                                                                                                                                                                  |
|-------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| <b>Relational</b> | Straightforward vision. E.g. ‘I see a book’, ‘the librarian sees me’.                                                                                                                                              | Optical illusions and tricks of perspective. E.g. seeing an oar dipped in water that appears bent; blurred buildings on the horizon.                                                                  |
| <b>Phenomenal</b> | Visual thinking or imagination based on prior sensory experience that accurately reflects this. E.g. picturing someone’s shape and size so that you can buy them clothes that fit; Einstein’s thought experiments. | Dreams, hallucinations, and fantastical imagination not based on prior sensory experience, e.g. imagining mythical creatures or what happens after we die, or dreaming about alien life. <sup>4</sup> |

I will begin by giving an account of Lucretius’ explanation of veridical and non-veridical relational seeing (*6.i. Relational seeing*). Epicurean philosophers maintained that objects constantly emitted extremely fine and rapidly moving films of atoms (Lucretius calls them *simulacra*). Relational vision is a physical process caused by these hitting our eyes. Non-veridical relational vision occurs when there has been some physical disturbance in their journey towards us, e.g. the *simulacra* have collided with others, causing a distortion. My first example of Virgil’s engagement with Lucretius’ explanation of visual perception in the *Aeneid* is the *imago Aeneae* created by Juno in book ten (10.633-44). Though this passage is saturated with vocabulary and phrasing from Lucretius’ explanation of relational seeing in book four of the *DRN*, it in fact constitutes a counter-

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<sup>4</sup> Note that what constitutes non-veridical phenomenal seeing depends to some extent on the subjective beliefs of the seer. E.g. for some, a phenomenal vision of god would be considered veridical, and for others it would not.

example to it, because Virgil in this instance undermines Lucretius' materialism by describing Turnus seeing and hearing something immaterial. I argue that Virgil's comment *visu mirabile monstrum* (10.637) furthermore encourages the reader to compare what he/she imagines whilst reading this passage, i.e. what he/she phenomenally sees, with Turnus' relational vision.

This prompts recourse to the *DRN* and Lucretius' explanation of phenomenal seeing (6. ii. *Phenomenal seeing a) the imagination*). Lucretius explains this analogously to relational seeing, as being caused by the external impingement of *simulacra*. The only difference is that, in the case of phenomenal seeing, the *simulacra* are so small and fine that they can impact upon us and stir our soul without needing to enter through the eyes. I discuss several problems with this, in particular how difficult it is for Lucretius' materialist explanation of phenomenal seeing to explain ἐνάργεια and literary imagination. What is the physical source for the *simulacra* that cause the mental pictures experienced whilst reading? Relational vision of words on a page generates phenomenal vision not of those words but of their referents. I therefore suggest that Virgil engineers the *imago Aeneae* not only as a counter-example to Lucretius' explanation of visual perception, but also as a thought experiment for the reader, who is encouraged to imagine the scene vividly despite the fact that what is being described has no physical counterpart in the real world. Rather, the reader's imagination is aided by intertexts, and Virgil's allusion to passages of Homer and Euripides in which other airy, insubstantial phantoms are created. Virgil therefore substitutes the physical source emitting *simulacra*, which

Epicureans maintained was essential to relational and phenomenal seeing, for a literary source: previous poetry.

Lucretius does, however, try to explain how it is that we can imagine what either has never existed or no longer exists (6. iii. Phenomenal seeing b) mythical beings and ghosts). We can phenomenally see dead people because the *simulacra* emitted from their bodies during life endure and remain in the air long after their death. And we can imagine Centaurs even though they never existed because *simulacra* emitted from horses and men have collided and combined in the air. Again, I show that Virgil engages with this aspect of Lucretius' philosophy by engineering the content of his poetry as a counter-example, and the process of reading it as a challenging thought experiment. In this case, the passage which does both of these jobs is suitably drawn from Virgil's description of the Underworld, whose very existence was denied by Epicureans.

I finally turn to dreams (6. iv. Phenomenal seeing c) dreams), which both pervade Virgil's account of the Underworld, and constitute another example of phenomenal seeing. I conclude the chapter by offering an analysis of Aeneas' dream of Hector in book two of the *Aeneid* that brings together many of the ideas I have discussed, in particular Virgil's use of intertextuality as a philosophical tool with which to challenge the theory that all phenomenal seeing can be explained as a material process. Despite the divorce between literary imagination and the physical world, Virgil demonstrates the powerful ability of stories and words to create lasting and vivid mental pictures that blur the line

between veridical and non-veridical, and undermine our confidence in our ability to distinguish between what is real and what is not.

### 6. i. Relational seeing

Within the Epicurean system, everything in the universe is essentially composed of matter and void; *corpora* and *inane*.<sup>5</sup> Void is necessary to permit movement, as it offers space for matter to move into. Matter, on the other hand, is necessary to create movement and interaction by physically impacting upon other *corpora*, which void cannot do. Sense perception, which was fundamental to Epicurean philosophy and epistemology, is on the basis of this twofold distinction described as a physical process, in which external *corpora* impact upon our sensory organs (Lucr. 1.298-304):<sup>6</sup>

tum porro varios rerum sentimus odores  
 nec tamen ad naris venientis cernimus umquam,  
 nec calidos aestus tuimur nec frigora quimus 300  
 usurpare oculis nec voces cernere suemus;  
**quae tamen omnia corporea constare necessest**  
**tangere enim et tangi, nisi corpus, nulla potest res.**

<sup>5</sup> E.g. Lucr. 1.418-21 *sed nunc ut repetam coeptum pertexere dictis,/ omnis ut est igitur per se natura duabus/ constitit in rebus; nam corpora sunt et inane,/ haec in quo sita sunt et qua diversa moventur*. 'But now to resume my task begun of weaving the web of this discourse: the nature of the universe therefore, as it is in itself, is made up of two things; for there are bodies, and there is void, in which these bodies are, and through which they move this way and that' (trans. Rouse).

<sup>6</sup> Note the emphasis on vision here, even in discussion of the other senses: *cernimus, tuimur, usurpare oculis, cernere*.

Then, further, we smell the various odours of things and yet we never see them approaching our nostrils, nor do we behold scorching heat, nor can we set eyes on cold, nor are we accustomed to see sounds; **yet all these must of necessity consist of bodily structure since they can act upon our senses. For nothing can touch or be touched, except body.** (trans. Rouse)

All perception, including visual perception, must have a material, atomic cause because it constitutes a stirring of our senses, which would not be possible without the impact of *corpora*.<sup>7</sup>

This begins to explain why the senses are so important to Epicurean epistemology (Lucr. 4.478-9):<sup>8</sup>

invenies primis ab sensibus esse creatam

notitiam veri neque sensus posse refelli...

You will find that it is from the senses in the first instance that the concept of truth has come, and that the senses cannot be refuted. (trans. Rouse)

As noted above, all sense perception, including visual perception, was held to have a physical cause in the external, material world. For this reason, Epicureans maintain that sensations are always 'true', even if they may in fact be misleading in the case of, for example, optical illusions. They are always true because they are genuinely caused by the impact of matter on our sense organs. However, they are not always 'veridical' (I will use this term in opposition to true to help clarify

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<sup>7</sup> On the analogy between vision and touch see e.g. Lucr. 4.230-8.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Epicurus *R.S.* 23 (= L&S 16D): εἰ μαχῇ πάσαις ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν, οὐχ ἔξεις οὐδ' ἅς ἂν φῆς αὐτῶν διεψεῦσθαι πρὸς τί ποιούμενος τὴν ἀγωγὴν κρίνης... 'If you fight against all your sensations, you will have no standard to which to refer, and thus no means of judging even those judgments which you pronounce false' (trans. Hicks). See also Long & Sedley (1987(1): 78-86).

this rather unintuitive distinction), because the way this matter impacts upon our sense organs does not always accurately reflect reality. The possibility of true but nevertheless non-veridical sense perception can be explained by some physical disturbance in the sensory process, for example a disruption to the atoms on their passage to our sense organs, or an altered bodily/mental state.<sup>9</sup>

The specific case of visual perception is explained in detail in book four of the *DRN*. The basic process of relational seeing is simple. Lucretius explains that thin<sup>10</sup> films of minute<sup>11</sup> and rapidly-moving<sup>12</sup> atoms (*simulacra*/εἶδωλα) are constantly released from objects into the air (Lucr. 4.29-32):

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<sup>9</sup> This holds for both phenomenal and relational seeing: Epicureans would say that hallucinations and dreams were 'true' even if they do not accurately reflect reality (Diog. Laert. 10. 32): τά τε τῶν μαινομένων φαντάσματα καὶ <τὰ> κατ' ὄναρ ἀληθῆ, κινεῖ γάρ· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν οὐ κινεῖ 'and the objects presented to madmen and to people in dreams are **true**, for they produce effects - i.e. movements in the mind - which that which is unreal never does' (trans. Hicks). I will explain phenomenal seeing in more detail below. Epicureans also maintained that mental/psychological states are physical. See Long & Sedley (1987(1): 65-72). Lucretius explains that the soul is corporeal and therefore mortal in book three of the *DRN*.

<sup>10</sup> The thinness and fineness of the atoms is strongly and repeatedly emphasized by Lucretius and other Epicurean sources. Lucretius often uses the adjective *tenuis* to describe them (Lucr. 4.42, 63, 66, 85, 95 etc.), along with other circumlocutions (e.g. Lucr. 4.88 *subtili praedita filo*, 196 *textura praedita rara*). He gives the argument as to why they are so thin at 4.110-28. Cf. Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 48 (= Diog. Laert. 10.48), which describes ταῖς λεπτότησιν ἀνυπερβλήτοις of the εἶδωλα.

<sup>11</sup> E.g. Lucr. 4.112-3 *tantoque minora/ quam quae primum oculi coeptant non posse tueri* 'so much smaller than the point at which our eyes begin not to be able to see' (trans. Rouse); 122 *quamque minuta* etc.

<sup>12</sup> Lucretius gives an extended explanation of the speed of the images at Lucr. 4.176-216. See also Lucr. 4.70 *multo citius*, 143 *celeri ratione*, 159-60 *ergo multa brevis spatio simulacra genuntur, ut merito celer his rebus dicatur origo* 'therefore many images arise in brief space, so that there is good reason to call the origin of these things rapid' (trans. Rouse). Cf. Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 47-8 (= Diog. Laert. 10.47-8) ὅθεν καὶ τάχῃ ἀνυπερβλήτα ἔχει... πρὸς τε τούτοις, ὅτι ἡ γένεσις τῶν εἰδώλων ἅμα νοήματι συμβαίνει 'hence also their velocities are enormous... besides this, remember that the production of the images is as quick as thought' (trans. Hicks).

nunc agere incipiam tibi, quid vementer ad has res  
 attinet, esse ea quae **rerum simulacra** vocamus;  
 quae, quasi membranae summo de corpore rerum  
 dereptae, volitant ultroque citroque per auras...

You will now see me begin to deal with what is of high importance for this subject, and to show that there exist what we call **images of things**; which like films drawn from the outermost surface of things, flit about hither and thither through the air ... (trans. Rouse)

These cause vision by entering the eye and making a physical impression (*visum*/φαντασία) on the mind (Lucr. 4.239-49).<sup>13</sup> Because these *simulacra* originate from the outer surface of objects, the impressions that they leave on our mind are simply imprints of the objects themselves.<sup>14</sup> When relational seeing functions normally, therefore, the consequent *visum*/φαντασία is both true in the sense that it is caused by the external impingement of matter, and veridical in the sense that it accurately represents reality.

Non-veridical relational seeing, as suggested above, occurs because of some physical disturbance in the causal process of vision. For example, the *simulacra*

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<sup>13</sup> Lucretius often uses violent verbs to describe this process, which underline that it involves matter hitting matter. Cf. 4.217 *corpora quae feriant oculos visumque laccessant*; 4.691 *quae feriunt oculorum acies visumque laccessunt*.

<sup>14</sup> Lucr. 4.51-3 *esse ea quae rerum simulacra vocamus, / quae quasi membranae vel cortex nomenclantur, / quod speciem ac formam simile gerit eius imago / cuiuscumque cluet de corpore fusa vagari* 'there exist what we term images of things, which are to be called as it were their films or bark, because the image bears a look and shape like the object, whatever it is, from whose body it is shed to go on its way' (trans. Rouse); 4.67-9 *praesertim cum sint in summis corpora rebus / multa minuta, iaci quae possint ordine eodem / quo fuerint et formae servare figuram* 'especially since there are numerous minute bodies on the outermost side of things, which can be cast off in the same arrangement as they were in before, preserving the shape of the object' (trans. Rouse); 4.87 *formarum vestigia certa*. Lucretius accordingly calls the films of atoms imprinted with the object from whose surface they originate *effigias* (Lucr. 4.42, 85, 104-5 etc.). Cf. Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 48 (= Diog. Laert. 10.48).



of the circumstances from which the tower was viewed.<sup>15</sup> As Long and Sedley suggest, the 'truth' of a photograph is a useful analogy.<sup>16</sup>

I will now turn to my first example from the *Aeneid*: the *imago Aeneae* which Juno creates in book ten, and which Turnus, having mistaken it for the real Aeneas, pursues out of the fighting to safety. This episode is laden with Lucretian terminology and allusions. However, its content embodies a striking counter-example to Lucretius' philosophy, and in particular his explanation of visual perception, because Virgil underlines that the *imago* that Turnus sees and hears is immaterial. I will also suggest that Virgil simultaneously engineers these lines as a thought-experiment for the reader, using intertextuality as a philosophical tool to question a type of phenomenal seeing: literary imagination, the visual process of converting words into mental pictures.

As a consequence of Turnus' killing Pallas, Aeneas is driven into a frenzy of slaughter. The extent of his battle fury compels Jupiter to tell Juno that her earlier claim that Venus was helping the Trojans was correct (though in fact Venus' divine assistance is not emphasized at this point). In response, Juno begs her husband to let her rescue Turnus. Jupiter assents to his, but only for the time being, and stresses that the outcome of the war will remain unchanged. Juno is

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<sup>15</sup> See also Lucr. 4.244-55 on how *simulacra* enable us to distinguish the relative distance of visual stimuli.

<sup>16</sup> Long & Sedley (1987(1): 85): 'The point is best pursued by the analogy of a photograph. A photograph is properly regarded as a photograph of an external object, not of light waves, yet is 'true' not in so far as it accurately depicts the shape and colour of the object itself - it may well not do, e.g., because of perspective, and the use of a black and white film - but in so far as (to simplify somewhat) it accurately reports the pattern of light waves arriving at the lens, and thus provides *bona fide* evidence about the external object reflecting the light.'

upset, but nevertheless immediately takes steps to remove Turnus from imminent danger by distracting him with a fake Aeneas that she makes from a 'hollow cloud' (10.633-44):

haec ubi dicta dedit, caelo se protinus alto  
 misit agens hiemem nimbo succincta **per auras**,  
 Iliacamque **aciem** et Laurentia castra petivit. 635  
 tum dea **nube cava tenuem** sine viribus **umbram**  
 in **faciem** Aeneae (**visu mirabile** monstrum)  
 Dardaniis ornat telis, clipeumque iubasque  
 divini **adsimulat capitis**, dat **inania verba**  
 dat sine mente sonum gressusque effingit euntis, 640  
**morte obita** qualis fama est **volitare figuras**  
 aut quae sopitos deludunt somnia sensus.  
 at primas laeta **ante acies** exsultat **imago**  
 inritatque virum telis et voce **laccessit**.

When she said these words, she straightaway sent herself down from the high heavens **through the air**, bringing with her a storm, and shrouded in a rain-cloud, and she made for the Trojan **line** and the Laurentian camps. Then the goddess [made] a strengthless **insubstantial shadow from hollow cloud** into the **likeness** of Aeneas, [and] decorated it with Trojan weapons (**a spectacle miraculous to see**), and she **mimicked** Aeneas' shield and the crests of his divine head. She gave it **empty words**, she gave it sound, but no mind, and fashioned moving feet, just like **the shapes** that rumour says **flit around after they have met their death**, or the dreams that trick our sleeping senses. And the happy **image** leapt **before the front lines** and provoked the man with weapons and **challenged him** with words.

There is a great deal of Lucretian vocabulary and phrasing in this passage, drawn in particular from book four of the *DRN*.<sup>17</sup> *per auras* (634) is a common Lucretian line ending, occurring in no earlier author, but used five times in that book to describe the medium through which *corpora* travel before striking the body and generating sensation.<sup>18</sup> Virgil uses the word *imago* (643) to describe Juno's creation. This word is also used by Lucretius as a synonym for *simulacra*, a connection cemented by the verb *laccessit* (644), which Lucretius regularly uses to describe *simulacra* striking the eye and causing vision.<sup>19</sup> This in turn, by conjuring the context of visual perception, confuses the sense of *acies* (635, 643), which can mean both 'battle line' and 'sight'.<sup>20</sup> Read aloud, *adsimulat capitis* (639) even sounds like *simulacra*. Virgil likens the *imago* of Aeneas to both apparitions of the dead and dreams (641-2). This technique of parallel explanation is itself common in the *DRN*, and again the phrasing is Lucretian, especially *morte obita*, and *volitare*.<sup>21</sup> Lucretius generally uses the latter to describe the movement of *corpora*, but also more specifically in his discussion of ghosts (Lucr. 4.37-9):

... ne forte animas Acherunte reamur  
effugere aut **umbras** inter vivos **volitare**  
neve aliquid nostri post mortem posse relinqui.

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<sup>17</sup> The Lucretian feel of this passage has not gone unnoticed. See e.g. Macrob. *Sat.* 6.1.48, Lyne (1989: 110-1), Harrison (1991 *ad loc.*), Mac Góráin (2017, forthcoming).

<sup>18</sup> Lucr. 4.32, 221, 569, 678, 703.

<sup>19</sup> For *imago* as a synonym for *simulacra*, see e.g. Lucr. 2.112-3; 4.51-3, 63, 101, 110, 214-5. For Lucretius' use of the verb *laccessit* to describe *simulacra* striking the eye, see 4.217, 691, and n. 13 above.

<sup>20</sup> *acies* is also used regularly in Lucretius book four: 4.248, 280, 357, 691, 718.

<sup>21</sup> *morte obita* at Lucr. 1.135, 4.734; *volitare* at Lucr. 4.32, 38, 88.

... lest by chance we should think that spirits escape from Acheron or **ghosts flit about** amongst the living, or that anything of us can be left after death. (trans. Rouse)

Ghosts are also the subject of *volitare* in this passage of Virgil (*morte obita... volitare figuras*).

But it is equally clear that Virgil's engagement with Lucretius in this passage is antagonistic. For one, he depicts a decidedly un-Epicurean goddess, who is neither enjoying the mental/emotional state of ἀταραξία, nor remaining detached from human life.<sup>22</sup> Though Virgil's simile likening the *imago* to ghosts or dreams used Lucretian phrasing, Virgil here discounts the visions of the dead (*fama est* 641) that Lucretius tried to rationally explain, and challenges the reliance of Epicurean epistemology on the senses by suggesting that they are fallible (*deludunt... sensus* 642). Most importantly, he emphasizes that the *imago* is insubstantial, and possibly immaterial. Though it is *tenuis* (636), like the *imagines/simulacra* in Lucretius book four, it is moulded from a *nube cava* (636),<sup>23</sup> and has *inania verba* (639). Despite this lack of substance, the *imago Aeneae* and its words have a strong and physical impact upon Turnus' senses (*exsultat imago/ irritatque virum telis et voce lacessit* 643-4). Virgil therefore presents a counter-example to Lucretius' materialistic explanation of perception, and especially vision.

Lucretius is not Virgil's only source: he also models Juno's creation of a phantom Aeneas on two passages from texts that are not explicitly philosophical. Firstly,

<sup>22</sup> Discussed above (*Introduction*, and chapter two n. 76). See e.g. Lucr. 1.44-9, 3.18, 5.82, 6.58, and Epicurus R.S. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Itself Lucretian phrasing: Lucr. 6.272.

the Homeric passage in which Apollo rescues Aeneas from the battle and Diomedes' attacks (Hom. *Il.* 5.449-53):

αὐτὰρ ὃ εἶδωλον τεῦξ' ἀργυρότοξος Ἀπόλλων

αὐτῷ τ' Αἰνεία ἴκελον καὶ τεύχεσι τοῖον, 450

ἀμφὶ δ' ἄρ' εἰδῶλῳ Τρῶες καὶ δῖοι Ἀχαιοὶ

δῆρουν ἀλλήλων ἀμφὶ στήθεσσι βοείας

ἀσπίδας εὐκύκλους λαισήϊά τε πτερόεντα.

But Apollo of the silver bow fashioned a **wraith in the likeness of Aeneas himself** and in **armour** like his; and around the **wraith** the Trojans and noble Achaeans struck the bull's hide shields about one another's chest, the round shields and fluttering buckles. (trans. Murray)

Both Homer and Virgil describe a phantom Aeneas. In the *Iliad*, the creation of this protects Aeneas, whereas in the *Aeneid*, it protects his enemy Turnus. There are also close textual similarities: αὐτῷ τ' Αἰνεία ἴκελον is mirrored by *in faciem Aeneae* (637); τεύχεσι by *telis* (644). Virgil thus reminds us that Juno's *imago* of Aeneas in the *Aeneid* is also a literary *imago* of Apollo's εἶδωλον of Aeneas in the *Iliad*. I noted above that *imago* was one of the words chosen by Lucretius to designate the thin films of atoms which impinge on our eyes to cause vision. Interestingly, εἶδωλον is the counterpart of this in Greek sources for Epicureanism (Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 46 = Diog. Laert. 10.46):

καὶ μὴν καὶ τύποι ὁμοιοσχήμονες τοῖς στερεμνίοις εἰσί... τούτους δὲ τοὺς τύπους εἶδωλα προσαγορεύομεν.

Again, there are outlines or films, which are of the same shape as solid bodies... To these films we give the name of **'images' or 'idols.'** (trans. Hicks)

Homer, of course, cannot have been aware of this, but presumably Virgil was. I will explore the implications of this in more detail below.

The cloudiness and airy components of Virgil's *imago*, along with Juno's role in creating it, are drawn instead from Euripides' *Helen* (Eur. *Hel.* 31-6, Helen speaking):

Ἥρα δὲ μεμφθεῖσ' οὐνεκ' οὐ νικᾷ θεάς,

ἐξηνέμωσε τᾶμ' Ἀλεξάνδρῳ λέχη,

δίδωσι δ' οὐκ ἔμ', ἀλλ' ὁμοιώσας' ἐμοὶ

εἶδωλον ἔμπνου οὐρανοῦ ξυνθεῖσ' ἄπο,

Πριάμου τυράννου παιδί' καὶ δοκεῖ μ' ἔχειν — 35

κενὴν δόκησιν, οὐκ ἔχων.

'But Hera, annoyed that she did not defeat the other goddesses, **made** Alexandros' union with me **as vain as the wind**: she gave to King Priam's son not me **but a breathing image she fashioned from the heavens** to resemble me. He imagines – **vain imagination** – that he has me, though he does not.' (trans. Kovacs)

Helen here tells the audience that it was only a phantom version of her that went to Troy (!), whilst the real her has been in Egypt all along. Though Euripides' description is of a likeness of Helen rather than Aeneas, there are similarities with the *imago* in the *Aeneid*. Firstly, both are created by Juno/Hera. Virgil describes Juno travelling from heaven (*caelo... protinus alto* 633), whereas Euripides' Hera makes the fake Helen out of the heavenly sky (οὐρανοῦ ξυνθεῖσ' ἄπο). Virgil links Juno closely with storms, air and clouds (*agens hiemem nimbo succincta per auras... nube cava* 634, 636) expanding on the connotations of

ἔμπνουν and the unusual verb ἐξηνέμωσε in Euripides. Both authors are possibly drawing on the popular etymology linking Ἥρα to ἀήρ.<sup>24</sup> Indeed, the philosophical flavour of κενὴν δόκησιν marks Euripides' phantom Helen as a forerunner of Virgil's phantom Aeneas not only in terms of narrative content, but also in terms of philosophical agenda: both apparitions question and probe assumptions concerning epistemology, perception, and the difference between appearance and reality.<sup>25</sup> Virgil's *imago Aeneae* is therefore itself a likeness of two εἶδωλα in Homer and Euripides:<sup>26</sup> note that Euripides also uses this term that will later be adopted by Epicureans.

So: when Virgil describes Juno making an *imago* of Aeneas, he is using vocabulary and phrasing that recall Lucretius' explanation of *imagines* as being films of atoms that are released off external objects and impinge on our eyes to cause vision. This Lucretian phrasing is at odds with Virgil's un-Epicurean content: an agitated divinity involving herself in human life, and what seems like

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<sup>24</sup> Ἥρα and ἀήρ were probably connected from as early as Homer: see *Introduction* and 1. iii. *The problem of different languages: Latin and Greek*. As the Stoics were particularly fond of tracing the etymologies of the names of the gods, the airiness of Juno in 10.633-4 may add to the anti-Epicurean flavour of this passage.

<sup>25</sup> Allan (2008: 49) in this vein comments on 'the characters' insistent use of δοκεῖν and its cognates (cf. esp. 35, 54, 576, 611, 658, 1020), and particularly... the use of the abstract noun δόκησις (36, 119, 121), a newly coined term characteristic of late fifth-century philosophical debate'. Moreover, he suggests that Helen's fame in literature and myth makes her a particularly apt focus for such debate: 'if the characters in the play, and the audience itself, turn out to be utterly wrong in their beliefs about such a notorious figure, how certain can they be that they know anything?'.

<sup>26</sup> This doesn't quite constitute a 'window reference', according to Thomas' definition (Thomas 1980: 188): 'the very close adaptation of a model, noticeably interrupted in order to allow reference back to the source of that model: the intermediate model thus serves as a sort of window onto the ultimate source, whose version is otherwise not visible. In the process the immediate, or chief, model is in some fashion 'corrected''. Though Euripides' εἶδωλον follows Homer's, and is perhaps influenced by it, it seems to me that Virgil integrates both into his description without privileging one or the other.

a case of immaterial visual perception. As well as Lucretius, Virgil also recalls non-philosophical texts, in particular two scenes in Homer and Euripides that contain descriptions of gods creating phantom versions of humans. Though Homer and Euripides are writing before Epicurus, given that Virgil has so strongly framed this passage in Lucretian terms, and with particular reference to the *simulacra* and *imagines* involved in visual perception, it seems significant for Virgil's reader that both Homer and Euripides use the term εἰδωλον.<sup>27</sup>

This is where I think we can talk about Virgil engineering this episode not only as a philosophical counter-example, but also as a thought experiment. The confusion of sources, and of Virgil's *imago* being a replica of Aeneas in the *Aeneid*, but also of both Homer and Euripides' εἰδωλα, which are themselves only likenesses of the characters they represent, leads the reader to share in Turnus' psychological state: we too are left (very) uncertain about what's real and what's not. More specifically, the reader is encouraged to compare the process by which *simulacra* cause relational vision with the process by which literary models inform both the composition and reading of poetry. I am particularly interested in reading, because it is an activity that simultaneously combines relational and phenomenal seeing: as we see words on a page (relational seeing), we also imagine what they are describing (phenomenal seeing). Indeed, Virgil's interjection *visu mirabile monstrum* (10.637) urges the reader to visualize what Turnus is seeing, drawing together our imagination and the vision of a character.

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<sup>27</sup> In the *Introduction* I gave an alternative explanation: Virgil's choice of models for his *imago Aeneae* embodies a response to Plato's claim that the activity of poets was limited to εἰδωλα εἰδωλοποιοῦντα (Pl. *Resp.* 605c). Virgil here demonstrates that, even in cases where this may be true, poetic *imitatio* involves considerable knowledge: not of truth and the Forms, but of previous literature.

This observation requires recourse to Lucretius and other Epicurean sources in order to better understand their explanation of phenomenal seeing. I will then return to the question of the *imago Aeneae* as a thought experiment.

#### 6. ii. Phenomenal seeing a) the imagination

Not every *visum*/φαντασία is relational, or consequent to actually seeing something. Vision can also be merely phenomenal, and refer to what a subject experiences in his/her head: hallucinations, dreams, and figments of the imagination. Though these two sorts of seeing seem very different, Epicurean philosophy is committed to maintaining that the reasoning behind both is much the same (Lucr. 4.750-1):

quatenus hoc simile est illi, quod **mente** videmus

atque **oculis**, simili fieri ratione necessest.

Since this is like that - what we see with the **mind** is like what we see with the **eye** - it must come about in a like way. (trans. Rouse)

As noted above, Epicureans argued that the soul was material; composed of *corpora*. Experiences are generated by movement of the soul's *corpora*.<sup>28</sup> This is true equally of sensations, such as sight or touch, and mental activities, such as thought and the phenomenal sorts of vision described above. For any sort of movement to happen, *corpora* must travel through void and strike other *corpora*. Therefore, all our experiences, because they are all generated by movement of

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<sup>28</sup> Epicureans attributed the origins of sensation to the mysterious and unnamed fourth part of the soul, composed of the finest and most dynamic *elementa* (Lucr. 3.241-5).

the soul's *corpora*, must ultimately rely on external impingement. This means that phenomenal vision (hallucinations, dreams, and figments of the imagination), like relational vision, must also be caused by *simulacra* (Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 49 (= Diog. Laert. 10. 49)):<sup>29</sup>

δεῖ δὲ καὶ νομίζειν ἐπεισιόντος τινὸς ἀπὸ τῶν ἔξωθεν ὁρᾶν ἡμᾶς καὶ  
διανοεῖσθαι.

We must also consider that it is by the entrance of something coming from external objects that we **see** their shapes **and think** of them. (trans. Hicks)

The salient difference in the process, according to Lucretius, is simply that *simulacra* that trigger phenomenal vision are smaller than those that trigger relational vision to the degree that they can enter the body at any point rather than simply through the eyes (Lucr. 4.722-731):

nunc age, quae **moveant animum** res accipe, et **unde**  
quae veniunt **veniant in mentem** percipe paucis.  
principio hoc dico, rerum simulacra vagari  
tenvia, quae facile inter se iunguntur in auris, 725  
obvia cum veniunt, ut aranea bratteaque auri.  
quippe etenim **multo magis haec sunt tenvia textu**  
quam quae percipiunt oculos visumque laccessunt,  
**corporis** haec quoniam **penetrant per rara** cientque  
tenvem animi naturam intus sensumque laccessunt. 730

<sup>29</sup> See also Cic. *Fin.* 1.21, where he argues that this theory is originally Democritean: ‘... *imagines, quae εἶδωλα nominant, quorum incursione non solum **videamus**, sed etiam **cogitemus**.*’

Now listen, and hear what things **stir the mind**, and learn in a few words **whence those things come into the mind** that there do come. In the first place I tell you that many images of things are moving about in many ways and in all directions, very thin, which easily unite in the air when they meet, being like spider's web or leaf of gold. In truth, **these are much more thin in texture** than those which take the eyes and assail the vision, since these **penetrate through the interstices of the body**, and awake the thin substance of mind within, and assail the sense. (trans. Rouse)

Lucretius here emphasizes that imagination is a physical process, involving the movement of the soul (*moveant animum*) by external impingement (*unde... veniant in mentem*).

Returning to the idea of the *imago Aeneae* as a thought experiment for the reader, how does Lucretius' account explain literary imagination, and the ability of words to conjure phenomenal seeing? Even if listening to or reading the word 'cat' can be explained in physical and atomic terms, what we imagine as a consequence of this (a cat) does not simply correspond to the material stimulus. Lucretius in fact anticipates this objection, as well as others (Lucr. 4.779-87):

|                                                 |     |
|-------------------------------------------------|-----|
| quaeritur in primis quare, quod cuique libido   |     |
| venerit, extemplo mens cogitet eius id ipsum.   | 780 |
| anne voluntatem nostram simulacra tuentur       |     |
| et simul ac volumus nobis occurrit imago,       |     |
| si mare, si terram cordist, si denique caelum?  |     |
| conventus hominum pompam convivia pugnās,       |     |
| <b>omnia sub verbone creat natura paratque?</b> | 785 |
| cum praesertim aliis eadem in regione locoque   |     |
| longe dissimilis animus res cogitet omnis.      |     |

The first question is why the mind immediately thinks of whatever the whim takes it to think of. Do the images wait on our will, and as soon as we wish it does an image present itself to us, be it sea, be it earth we desire, or be it heaven? Congregations of men, processions, banquets, battles – **does nature make and prepare them all at a word?** And that too although others in the same region and place have the mind thinking of all sorts of things quite different. (trans. Rouse)

Basing even phenomenal seeing such as imagination on external impingement first raises the question of how we seem to be able to choose what to imagine.

Selective imagination suggests that mental images are generated internally rather than externally; that they are a product of will rather than the *simulacra* surrounding us. Related to this is the question of how words and language can act as triggers (*sub verbo*) for phenomenal seeing. In both cases, it is furthermore remarkable that, regardless of where we are in the world, we are able to phenomenally see whatever we want, or whatever we talk about or read.

Lucretius first of all lays the groundwork for responding to these objections by underlining the speed and enormous number of *simulacra* flitting around at any one moment (4.704-810). The idea seems to be that it is subsequently not implausible that imagination at will or triggered by words should be caused by external impingement because we are constantly surrounded by *simulacra* of everything we could ever want to think about or imagine. This then raises the question of filtering and selectivity – why are we not continuously assaulted with mental images from all of these *simulacra*? At this point, Lucretius introduces the ideas of mental preparation and attention (Lucr. 4.802-15):

et quia tenuia sunt, nisi quae contendit, acute

cernere non potis est animus; proinde omnia quae sunt

praeterea pereunt, nisi si ad quae se ipse paravit.

**ipse parat sese** porro speratque futurum 805

ut videat quod consequitur rem quamque; fit ergo.

nonne vides oculos etiam, cum tenvia quae sunt

cernere coeperunt, contendere se atque parare,

nec sine eo fieri posse ut cernamus acute?

et tamen in rebus quoque apertis noscere possis, 810

**si non advertas animum**, proinde esse quasi omni

tempore semotum fuerit longeque remotum.

cur igitur mirumst, animus si cetera perdit

praeterquam quibus est in rebus deditus ipse?

And because they (i.e. the *simulacra*) are thin, the mind cannot perceive any sharply except those which it strains itself to see; therefore all the others perish except those for which it has prepared itself. **It does, moreover, prepare itself**, and hopes to see that which follows on each thing: therefore that does follow. Do you not see the eyes themselves, when they begin to perceive something that is thin, try hard and prepare themselves, without which we cannot possibly perceive sharply? And yet even in things plainly visible you can observe that, **if your mind fails to attend**, it is just as if the thing were all the while withdrawn and far removed from you. Then what wonder is it, if the mind misses everything except what it itself is intent on? (trans. Rouse)

Again, he stresses the similarity between relational seeing and phenomenal seeing, suggesting that the mind can focus on certain *simulacra* rather than others, just as we strain our eyes to make out particular objects more clearly. But Lucretius does not explain how the mind prepares itself, or what makes it direct its attention. Strictly speaking, this must also be a physical process, set in motion by the impact of *corpora* on *corpora*. It is therefore difficult to see how these ideas of mental preparation and focus rescue his account of phenomenal seeing

from the objections raised, as it looks as though they must also rely fundamentally on external impingement.

More specifically, Lucretius does not go on to explain how words can act as triggers for the mental focus which filters *simulacra*. Though Epicurean sources do not explicitly deal with reading and literary imagination, the Epicurean account of προλήψεις ‘preconceptions’ seems to go some way towards addressing this issue by giving an account of how spoken (not written) language conjures phenomenal vision (Diog. Laert. 10. 33). A preconception is an idea or recollection of something built up through repeated experience of that thing (*ibid.* τουτέστι μνήμην του πολλάκις ἔξωθεν φανέντος). I have met many women, which gives me a preconceived idea of what a woman is, so that when someone says ‘woman’, I can conjure a mental picture of a woman. The concept of preconceptions is not intended to negate that all phenomenal seeing is caused by external impingement of material stimulus. Rather, it seems that, when I hear ‘woman’, my preconception prepares the mind and focusses it on receiving *simulacra/imagines* of women, rather than any of the infinite amount of other *simulacra* that are floating around (Lucr. 4.802-815).

However, this still does not explain literary imagination either of new words/concepts, or of fantastical or fictional things that we can have no experience of – a weakness in the Epicurean argument that I will argue Virgil emphasizes. Let us return to the *imago Aeneae* in *Aeneid* 10. Virgil saturates this episode with terminology and phrasing drawn from Lucretius’ explanation of visual perception. Given this Epicurean context, it seems remarkable that two of

Virgil's non-philosophical sources for his description of the airy, phantom Aeneas use the word εἶδωλον, which was Epicurus' Greek term for *simulacra/imagines*. I noted above that this encourages a comparison between Turnus' relational vision of the *imago Aeneae*, and the reader's phenomenal vision, that is his/her mental picture of the phantom Aeneas. This connection seems stronger now it is clear that Epicureans explained both relational seeing and phenomenal seeing as being caused by the external impingement of *simulacra/εἶδωλα*.

But Virgil's thought experiment also contains problems for the Epicurean account. By dramatizing the construction of literary imagination as an instance of phenomenal seeing (*visu mirabile monstrum* 10.637), he underlines to the reader that they have constructed their mental picture of the *imago Aeneae* not from εἶδωλα released in rapid streams from objects in the world, but rather from the εἶδωλα described in the poetry of Homer and Euripides. The fantastical strangeness of these episodes, and the insubstantiality of the phantoms themselves, suggests that there is in fact no external material cause for our phenomenal vision of them aside from words on a page. Nor does it seem plausible that we have developed a preconception of these airy likenesses of mythical characters from repeated experiences of them. Yet despite this, we are easily and vividly able to imagine what is being described not because we have experienced such things, but because we have read about them before. Virgil therefore uses intertextuality as a philosophical tool with which to challenge

Epicureans to offer a coherent, materialist explanation of the phenomenal seeing that arises during reading.<sup>30</sup>

Though I am not aware of a passage that makes the link explicit,<sup>31</sup> I believe that the ancient rhetorical and literary theory of ἐνάργεια reinforces Virgil's challenge to Epicureanism on this point. ἐνάργεια is the persuasive technique of using spoken or written language and description to make the listener vividly imagine something as if he could see it: of creating phenomenal vision that is so lucid it seems like relational vision. Quintilian, for example, defines it in a rhetorical context as follows (Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.62-3):<sup>32</sup>

magna virtus res de quibus loquimur clare atque **ut cerni videantur** enuntiare. non enim satis efficit neque, ut debet, plene dominatur oratio si usque ad aures valet, atque ea sibi iudex de quibus cognoscit narrari credit, **non exprimi et oculis mentis ostendi**. sed quoniam pluribus modis accipi solet, non equidem in omnis eam particulas secabo, quarum ambitiose a quibusdam numerus augetur, sed maxime necessarias

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<sup>30</sup> Virgil may even be following Lucretius in using intertextuality as a philosophical tool, even if he does so for a different purpose. See e.g. Fowler (2000: 148), who argues that Lucretius' reuse and reformulation of non-Epicurean literature in the service of Epicurean argument constitutes an extension of the atoms/letters analogy by similarly demonstrating that the same matter is recycled to become new things. I briefly discuss the atoms/letters analogy above (*1. True Names and False Names*).

<sup>31</sup> Though ἐνάργεια is the word chosen by Sextus Empiricus to describe the clarity of veridical relational seeing in the context of Epicurean philosophy (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 8. 63), there does not seem to be a link between this and the rhetorical/literary technique ἐνάργεια.

<sup>32</sup> Dionysus of Halicarnassus similarly describes ἐνάργεια as the ability to trick the senses into hearing words but 'seeing' events (Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 7).

attingam. est igitur unum genus, quo **tota rerum imago quodam modo  
verbis depingitur:**

constitit in digitos extemplo arrectus uterque

et cetera, quae nobis illam pugilum congregientum faciem ita ostendunt  
**ut non clarior futura fuerit spectantibus.**

It is a great virtue to express our subject clearly and **in such a way that it seems to be actually seen**. A speech does not adequately fulfil its purpose or attain the total domination it should have if it goes no further than the ears, and the judge feels that he is merely being told the story of the matters he has to decide, **without their being brought out and displayed to his mind's eye**. But since *enargeia* is understood in more ways than one, I shall not attempt to subdivide it into all its minute varieties, the number of which is pretentiously exaggerated by some writers, but shall merely touch on the most essential. One kind, then, is that in which **a whole scene is somehow painted in words:**

At once, both took their stand, up on their toes . . .

and the ensuing passage, which gives us the picture of the two boxers confronting each other **so vividly that it could not have been any clearer to the spectators**. (trans. Russell)

Quintilian attests to the popularity and status of *ἐνάργεια* by alluding to an apparently over-zealous scholarly tradition of delineating its component parts and types (*non equidem...*). He then goes on to quote a line of Virgil, taken from the description of the boxing match in *Aeneid* 5, as an example of the technique (5.426) – clearly Virgil was viewed as a master of the art.<sup>33</sup> This extract successfully achieves *ἐνάργεια*, Quintilian argues, because the reader feels like a spectator: their phenomenal vision of the boxers overrides the words they hear, or their relational vision of words on a page.

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<sup>33</sup> Quintilian gives two more examples from the *Aeneid* in this short section on *ἐνάργεια* (Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.61-71): 3.29-30 and 7.518.

Both Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Dion. Hal. *Lys.* 7) and Quintilian (Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.64-70) explain that including lots of details is one route to achieving ἐνάργεια. Schmitz (2000: 72), writing on the Attic orators, notes another technique: the use of ideas and cultural references that the audience would be comfortable with, in particular the quotation of well-known maxims. Thinking once more about the *imago Aeneae*, this might well find a corollary in the use of intertextuality in literature. It becomes easier to imagine something if we are led to compare it with similar scenes and descriptions in previous literature. Yet it is precisely this which it is difficult for the Epicurean materialist account of phenomenal seeing to explain. Preconceptions must be caused by external impingement. So how can it be that we have gained a preconception of something, like the phantom Aeneas/Helen, which we have never experienced, but only read about? And how can it be that our past experiences of hearing/seeing the words of Homer and Euripides help us to phenomenally see not words on a page but what those words describe? Moreover, in the case of the *imago Aeneae*, but unlike in the case of legal maxims, intertextuality simultaneously adds credibility, aiding our mental picture of the narrative, and signposts the fictionality of the construction, both in terms of the presence and design of the author, and the literary heritage of the idea.

ἐνάργεια, therefore, was a well-established rhetorical technique that acknowledged and utilized the power of words to create phenomenal seeing. Though primarily discussed in a rhetorical context, Quintilian's choice to quote lines of the *Aeneid* (see above) encourages us to extend the application of this technique to the poetic sphere. Indeed, links are drawn between verisimilitude,

plausibility and credibility in poetry and oratory from as early as Aristotle,<sup>34</sup> and Virgil and his elite Roman contemporaries would have been exposed to a considerable amount of rhetorical training during their education. This supports my suggestion above that Virgil consciously engineers his description of the *imago Aeneae* in book 10 not only as a counter-example to Lucretius' explanation of relational seeing, but also as a thought experiment for the reader which highlights some of the problems with the Epicurean account of phenomenal seeing when applied to reading and literary imagination. Finally, Schmitz alerts us to a crucial difference between the use of ἐνάργεια in rhetoric vs. poetry (Schmitz 2000: 53):

‘the important difference between court speeches and fictional texts can be described as one of logical status. Whereas fictional texts produce their objects instead of referring to existing things... the speeches are, at least ideally, referential, that is, they presuppose an extra-textual reality to which they refer.’

Where fictional texts such as poetry do adopt the rhetorical technique of ἐνάργεια, therefore, it may be viewed as part of a literary strategy that stresses the power of literature over our imagination in its capacity to vividly and realistically present things that do not exist.

#### 6. iii. Phenomenal seeing b) mythical beings and ghosts

Lucretius in fact tackles head-on the issue of our ability to phenomenally see things that either have never existed or no longer exist. Non-veridical

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<sup>34</sup> On the link drawn by Aristotle between plausibility in rhetoric and poetry see e.g. Schmitz (2000: 51) and Eden (1986 esp. 18-20, 69-70).

phenomenal vision of this sort initially seems to present a serious problem to Lucretius' materialist explanation because, as in the case of the *imago Aeneae*, it is difficult to understand how something non-existent can be the physical source of the *simulacra* which cause phenomenal vision. Nevertheless, Lucretius intends his materialist account, according to which phenomenal seeing is caused by the external impingement of *simulacra*, to explain how we can imagine, hallucinate or dream about mythical creatures such as Centaurs, Scyllae and Cerberus, as well as people who are dead (Lucr. 4.732-43):

**Centauros itaque et Scyllarum membra videmus**

Cerbereasque canum facies simulacraque eorum

quorum morte obita tellus amplectitur ossa;

omne genus quoniam passim simulacra feruntur, 735

**partim sponte sua quae fiunt aere in ipso,**

partim quae variis ab rebus cumque recedunt

et quae confiunt ex horum facta figuris.

**nam certe ex vivo Centauri non fit imago,**

**nulla fuit quoniam talis natura animantis,** 740

verum ubi equi atque hominis casu convenit imago,

haerescit facile extemplo, quod diximus ante,

propter subtilem naturam et tenvia texta.

Thus it is **we see Centaurs**, and the frames of **Scyllas**, and faces of dogs like Cerberus, and images of those for whom death is past, whose bones rest in earth's embrace, since images of all kinds are being carried about everywhere, **some that arise spontaneously in the air itself**, some that are thrown off from all sorts of things, others that are made of a combination of these shapes. **For certainly no image of a Centaur comes from one living, since there never was a living thing of this nature;** but when

the images of man and horse meet by accident, they easily adhere at once, as I said before, on account of their fine nature and thin texture. (trans. Rouse)

Lucretius again begins by stressing the number and variety of *simulacra* constantly in the air (*omne genus quoniam passim simulacra feruntur* 735). The next line (*partim... ipso* 736) is difficult. It looks as though he is suggesting that *simulacra* can spontaneously appear in the air without being emitted from the outside of objects. Though this would help to explain our phenomenal vision of non-existent beings, it would also contradict one of the fundamental tenets of Epicurean philosophy: *nullam rem e nilo gigni* (Lucr. 1.150).<sup>35</sup> It is therefore a possibility that we must discard, in favour of an explanation that entails the *simulacra* having a physical source (*quae variis ab rebus cumque recedunt* 737). Lucretius subsequently ends up explaining our non-veridical phenomenal vision of centaurs etc. in a manner analogous to his explanation of non-veridical relational vision: as a function of some physical disturbance of the *simulacra* during their journey from their source. He argues that imagining a centaur is caused by the random (*casu*) collision and combination of atomic emissions from a horse and a man, *equi atque hominis*.

There are obvious problems with this account. For one, Lucretius has wisely chosen a non-existent being (*nam certe ex vivo Centauri non fit imago* 739) which

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<sup>35</sup> Lucr. 1.150-264 contains the essential arguments that nothing can come into being from nothing. Cf. Epicurus, *Ep. Hdt.* 38 = Diog. Laert. 10.38 πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι οὐδὲν γίνεται ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος 'To begin with, nothing comes into being out of what is non-existent.' (trans. Hicks).

is a composite of two existent creatures (man and horse).<sup>36</sup> This allows him to claim that our phenomenal vision of a centaur has been caused by *simulacra* that have been emitted from two different physical sources and then combined. But what about entirely fictional things? Moreover, it is not yet clear from this explanation how we can imagine, hallucinate or dream about dead people. Cicero provides evidence that similar objections were made by non-Epicurean philosophers in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC (Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.105-6; the speaker is the Academic Cotta who is criticizing the Epicurean Velleius):

‘omnem enim talem conformationem animi **ceteri philosophi motum inanem vocant**, vos autem adventum in animos et introitum imaginum dicitis. ut igitur Ti. Gracchum cum videor contionantem in Capitolio videre de M. Octavio deferentem sitellam tum eum **motum animi** dico esse **inanem**, tu autem et **Gracchi et Octavii imagines remanere** quae in Capitolium cum pervenerim tum ad animum meum referantur...’

‘Such mental pictures **are called by all other philosophers mere empty imaginations**, but you say they are the arrival and entrance into our minds of certain images. Well then, when I seem to see Tiberius Gracchus in the middle of his speech in the Capitol producing the ballot-box for the vote on Marcus Octavius, I explain this as **an empty imagination of the mind**, but your explanation is that **the images of Gracchus and Octavius have actually remained on the spot**, so that when I come to the Capitol these images are borne to my mind...’ (trans. Rackham)

In contrast to the Epicureans, for the majority of philosophers (*ceteri; ille reprehensus a multis est* Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.107), phenomenal vision is explained as an immaterial process (*motum inanem*), and as a spontaneous and purely internal

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<sup>36</sup> Cf. Hume’s explanation of ‘compounding’, how we create new ideas by combining pre-existing ones (1748: 2.5): ‘when we think of a golden mountain, we only join two consistent ideas, gold, and mountain, with which we were formerly acquainted’.

movement of the mind. In fact, this objection to Epicureanism offers a better explanation than Lucretius as to how we can phenomenally see dead people. It seems as though Epicureans argued that the *simulacra* emitted from people such as Tiberius Gracchus while they were alive stayed in the air even after their death.

Cotta's criticism continues (Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.107-8):

'quae autem istae imagines vestrae aut unde?... nam quid est quod minus probari possit, quam omnino in me incidere **imagines Homeri** Archilochi Romuli Numae Pythagorae Platonis - nedum ea forma qua illi fuerunt? quo modo illae ergo et quorum imagines? Orpheum poetam docet Aristoteles numquam fuisse, et hoc Orphicum carmen Pythagorei ferunt cuiusdam fuisse Cercopis; at Orpheus, id est imago eius ut vos vultis, in animum meum saepe incurrit. quid quod eiusdem hominis in meum aliae, aliae in tuum? quid quod earum rerum quae numquam omnino fuerunt neque esse potuerunt, **ut Scyllae, ut Chimaerae?**'

'But what is the nature of these images of yours, and whence do they arise?... For what can be more improbable than that **images of Homer**, Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras and Plato should impinge on me at all - much less that they should do so in the actual shape that those men really bore? How then do those images arise? and of whom are they the images? Aristotle tells us that the poet Orpheus never existed, and the Pythagoreans say that the Orphic poem which we possess was the work of a certain Cercops; yet Orpheus, that is, according to you, the image of him, often comes into my mind. What of the fact that different images of the same person enter my mind and yours? or that images come to us of things that never existed at all and never can have existed - **for instance, Scylla, and the Chimaera?**' (trans. Rackham)

Cotta further problematizes the source of the *imagines* which Epicureans argued cause phenomenal vision. He lists famous Romans and Greeks who died long ago

(*Homeri... Platonis*) to suggest that it is unlikely that their *simulacra* are still flitting about now.<sup>37</sup> Furthermore, if our imagination of these figures is caused by atomic emissions originating from and bearing the imprint of the men themselves, we should be able to accurately envision what each of these men really looked like (*ea forma qua illi fuerunt*), which does not seem to be the case.<sup>38</sup> As for our ability to phenomenally see non-existent things and beings, he first uses the example of Orpheus, and then, like Lucretius, of Scyllas and Chimaeras, as well as Centaurs (earlier at Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.105).<sup>39</sup> This is no accident: Cicero uses these examples repeatedly in his philosophical writing,<sup>40</sup> a reflection of the fact that, by the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC, there was a long history of philosophers and scholars regarding in particular Centaurs, but also creatures such as Scylla and the Chimaera, as ‘a type of non-ens’;<sup>41</sup> ἀνυπαρξίας

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<sup>37</sup> I will discuss the example of the *imago Homeri* in more detail below (6. iv. *Phenomenal seeing c) dreams*).

<sup>38</sup> Aeneas, for example, sees a larger-than-life *simulacrum* of his dead wife Creusa during his flight from Troy (2.771-3): *quaerenti et tectis urbis sine fine ruenti/ infelix simulacrum atque ipsius umbra Creusae/ visa mihi ante oculos et nota maior imago* ‘as I was searching and rushing endlessly through the city’s houses, a wretched likeness and shade of Creusa herself appeared **before my eyes**, and an **image larger than the Creusa I knew**.’ Cf. also Cic. *Rep.* 6.10 *Africanus se ostendit ea forma, quae mihi ex imagine eius quam ex ipso erat notior*.

<sup>39</sup> Lucretius explains the impossibility and nonexistence of the Chimaera at *Lucr.* 2.700-6, and of Centaurs and Scyllas at *Lucr.* 5.878-94. Despite their nonexistence, he explains our ability to imagine them at 4.732-43 (quoted above).

<sup>40</sup> E.g. at Cic. *Tusc.* 1.90; *Nat. D.* 2.5, where they are given as stereotypes of old-fashioned beliefs that are shown to be false (*fictas atque vanas*) by their inability to stand the test of time. The fact that Lucretius chooses to explain such apparently outdated mythological figures is an example of how his poem is isolated from contemporary developments in Epicureanism, and how he engages with philosophical opponents from Epicurus’ time rather than his own. See Sedley (2013b).

<sup>41</sup> Pease (1935 *ad Cic. Nat. D.* 1.105) ‘by philosophers and jurists this animal came to be regarded as a type of non-ens.’ As early as Xenophanes, Centaurs were considered πλάσματα τῶν προτέρων (fr. 1.21-2 D-K, where they are an example of things that a philosopher poet should not sing of). See also Gale (2000: 123 esp. n.20; 22).

παράδειγμα.<sup>42</sup> The popularity of these stock examples further suggests a philosophical context in which this facet of Epicurean philosophy was criticized.

Bearing in mind the role Centaurs, Scyllas and Chimaeras played in philosophical debate about ontology and imagination, and in criticism of the Epicurean account of phenomenal seeing, it is remarkable that Virgil reinvigorates precisely these creatures in the *Aeneid*. He includes all of them in his list of the monsters at the gates of the Underworld (6.282-294):

in medio ramos annosaque bracchia pandit  
 ulmus opaca, ingens, quam sedem **Somnia** vulgo  
**vana** tenere ferunt, foliisque sub omnibus haerent.  
 multaue praeterea variarum monstra ferarum, 285  
**Centauroi** in foribus stabulant **Scyllaeque** biformes  
 et centumgeminus Briareus ac belua Lerna  
 horrendum stridens, flammisque armata **Chimaera**,  
 Gorgones Harpyiaeque et forma tricorporis umbrae.  
 corripit hic subita trepidus formidine ferrum 290  
 Aeneas strictamque **aciem** venientibus offert,  
 et ni docta comes **tenuis sine corpore vitas**  
 admoneat **volitare cava sub imagine formae**,  
 inruat et frustra ferro diverberet umbras.

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<sup>42</sup> Sext. Emp. *Pyr.* 1.162 καὶ ὅταν τὸν τῶν ἵπποκενταύρων μῦθον ἀναιρῶσιν, **ἀνυπαρξίας παράδειγμα** τὸν ἵπποκένταυρον ἡμῖν φέροντες... 'and when these same philosophers demolish the legend of the hippocentaurs, and offer us the hippocentaur as a type of unreality' (trans. Bury).

In the centre, an elm stretched out its branches and aged arms, dark and huge. People commonly say that **empty dreams** live here and cling under all the leaves. Besides this there were many monstrous forms of different beasts: **Centaurs** were stabled at the doors, and hybrid **Scyllas** and hundred-armed Briareus and the monster of Lerna, screeching terribly, and the Chimera armed with flames, and Gorgons and Harpies and the shape of a three-bodied shade. Here Aeneas snatched his sword, panicked by a sudden fear, and offered its **blade** to them as they came towards him. And if his learned companion had not warned him that these **insubstantial, bodiless lives were flitting around under the hollow illusion of mere appearance**, he would have rushed forth and in vain cleaved through shadows with his blade.

As in the case of Virgil's description of the *imago Aeneae*, this passage is dense with vocabulary and phrasing drawn from Lucretius' explanation of relational and phenomenal seeing in book four of the *DRN*, such as *imago*, *tenuis*, *acies*, *volitare*, *corpus* and *forma*. Yet though this passage is Lucretian in style, it is decidedly un-Epicurean in content. Firstly, Virgil is describing the Underworld, which Epicureans argued did not exist. Lucretius also argued against the existence of Centaurs, Scyllas and the Chimaera, yet nevertheless attempted to explain how external impingement of *simulacra* caused phenomenal vision of such creatures. Virgil, by contrast, asserts that each of these creatures exists, and, though Aeneas sees them, and the reader imagines them, antagonizes Lucretius by underlining that they are immaterial: *sine corpore... cava sub imagine*. Though they were stereotypical examples used in philosophical debate, there is no other evidence suggesting that Scyllas and Centaurs guarded the entrance to the Underworld,<sup>43</sup> which increases the likelihood that Virgil's inclusion of these particular monsters is philosophically motivated. Indeed, Virgil stresses the insubstantiality of the Underworld from the very start of his description (6.268-9):

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<sup>43</sup> Horsfall (2013 *ad loc.*)

ibant obscuri sola sub nocte per umbram

perque domos Ditis **vacuas** et **inania** regna

They went through the shade, in darkness under the lonely night, and through the **empty** homes of Dis and his **void** kingdoms.

Virgil therefore again engineers his poetry as both a counter-example to Epicurean philosophy and a thought experiment. Though Lucretius argued that both relational seeing and phenomenal seeing were material processes caused by external impingement of *simulacra* emitted from physical objects, here Virgil describes Aeneas seeing immaterial beings which he simultaneously makes the reader vividly imagine. Moreover, though these mythical beings have no physical existence, they are familiar from myth and literature. This once more suggests that words and language have a powerful ability to create phenomenal vision that need not bear any relation to the physical, material world.

#### 6. iv. Phenomenal seeing c) dreams

As well as the Centaurs, Scyllas, and other mythical beasts, Virgil also describes a tree of *Somnia... vana* at the entrance of the Underworld (6.283-4 above). In fact, dreams and sleep are incorporated into Virgil's account of the Underworld in several ways. Amongst the personifications that the Sibyl and Aeneas meet when they first enter Dis are Death, and Death's brother, Sleep (6.277-8).<sup>44</sup> When

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<sup>44</sup> According to Hesiod, Death and Sleep are brothers and the children of Night (Hes. *Theog.* 755-66).

Aeneas tries to embrace the shade of his father Anchises three times, it eludes him *par levibus ventis* **volucrique simillima somno** (6.700-2).<sup>45</sup> Finally, when Aeneas and the Sibyl leave the Underworld, they exit through the gate of ivory, which is for *falsa insomnia* (6.893-99):

sunt geminae Somni portae, quarum altera fertur  
cornea, qua **veris** facilis datur exitus **umbris**,  
altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, 895  
sed **falsa** ad caelum mittunt **insomnia** Manes.  
his ibi tum natum Anchises unaque Sibyllam  
prosequitur dictis portaque emittit eburna.  
ille viam secat ad navis sociosque revisit.

There are twin gates of Sleep/Dream. One of these is said to be made of horn, through which it is granted for **true shades** to easily depart. The other, shining, is finished with gleaming ivory, but the dead send **false dreams** through this to the heavens. Anchises escorted his son and the Sibyl there with these words, and sent them out of the ivory gate. Aeneas cleaved his way to the ships and revisited his comrades.

One of the reasons why sleep, dreams and the Underworld are intertwined in the *Aeneid* is because some thought that phenomenal vision of dead people in dreams was caused by the dead person's soul leaving the Underworld and visiting the sleeper.<sup>46</sup> Lucretius is therefore particularly anxious to explain

<sup>45</sup> Virgil models this episode on Odysseus' attempt to embrace his mother (Hom. *Od.* 11. 207-8): τρὶς δέ μοι ἐκ χειρῶν **σκιῇ εἴκελον ἢ καὶ ὀνείρω**/ ἔπτειπ'.

<sup>46</sup> Thus Achilles' response to seeing Patroclus' shade in a dream is to say (Hom. *Il.* 23.103-4): ὦ πόποι ἦ ῥά τίς ἐστι καὶ εἰν Ἄϊδαο δόμοισι/ ψυχῇ καὶ **εἴδωλον** 'Well now! Even in the house of Hades there is something - spirit and phantom' (trans. Murray). Cf. also Propertius' dream of Cynthia after she has died (Prop. 4.7.1-2): *sunt aliquid Manes: letum non omnia finit, / luridaque extinctos effugit umbra rogos* (following Heyworth's text (2007)).

dreams that feature the appearance of dead people, because it is central to Epicurean philosophy that the soul is mortal, there is no Underworld, and nothing remains of us after we die. He accordingly forecasts that this is something he will tackle in his account of relational and phenomenal seeing at the beginning of book four (Lucr. 4.37-41, partially quoted above):

... ne forte animas Acherunte reamur  
effugere aut umbras inter vivos volitare  
neve aliquid nostri post mortem posse relinqui,  
cum corpus simul atque animi natura perempta                      40  
in sua discessum dederint primordia quaeque.

... lest by chance we should think that spirits escape from Acheron or ghosts flit about amongst the living, or that anything of us can be left after death, when body and mind both taken off together have dissolved abroad, each into its own first-beginnings. (trans. Rouse)

Unsurprisingly, Lucretius explains dreams in the same way as he explained other types of phenomenal seeing. In every instance, they are caused by the external impingement of *simulacra* (Lucr. 4.757-67):

**nec ratione alia**, cum somnus membra profudit,  
mens animi vigilat, **nisi quod simulacra lacesunt**  
**haec eadem nostros animos quae cum vigilamus,**  
usque adeo, certe ut videamur cernere eum quem                      760  
rellicta vita iam mors et terra potitast.  
hoc ideo fieri cogit natura, quod **omnes**

**corporis effecti sensus per membra quiescent**

**nec possunt falsum veris convincere rebus.**

**praeterea meminisse iacet languetque sopore,** 765

nec dissentit eum mortis letique potitum

iam pridem, quem mens vivom se cernere credit.

**Nor is there any other reason** why the mind's intelligence is awake, when sleep has relaxed the limbs, **except that the same images assail our minds as when we wake**, and to such a degree, that we seem surely to see him who has left his life, and of whom now death and dust are masters. This nature compels to happen, for the reason that **all our senses are obstructed and quiet throughout the frame, and unable to refute the false by the true. Besides, in sleep memory lies inactive and is relaxed**, and does not urge in contradiction that he has long since been in the power of death and destruction whom the mind believes itself to see alive. (trans. Rouse)

Lucretius emphasizes the similarity of his explanation of dreams to his explanation of other sorts of phenomenal vision (*nec ratione alia* 757; *haec eadem* 759). As noted above, Epicureans argued that phenomenal vision of the dead was compatible with their theory of *simulacra* and external impingement because the *simulacra* constantly emitted from people during their lives remained in the air after they had died (Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.105-6). The case of dreaming is only different in that, whilst we are asleep, some part of our rational or discerning faculty is also dormant, along with our memory (764-5). If we were awake, we would rationally reject these visions, and remember that the person is dead. But because we are asleep, we do not reject them (*nec dissentit...*), and are confused into believing they are real and/or alive (*mens vivom se cernere credit* 767).<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Cf. Epicurus *Ep. Hdt.* 50-1 = Diog. Laert. 10.50-1; Diogenes of Oenoanda fr. 9, 4.7-6.3 (Smith 1993).

Unfortunately for Lucretius, despite the generally dream-like feel of *Aeneid* 6, Aeneas is awake when he meets the souls of the dead in the Underworld, so no such excuse can be made in his case. However, Aeneas also experiences dreams of the dead.<sup>48</sup> In particular, during his narration of the story of the fall of Troy in book two, he tells Dido and the Carthaginians that, on the eve of the destruction of the city, Hector appeared to him in a dream (2.268-86):

‘tempus erat quo prima quies **mortalibus aegris**  
 incipit et **dono divum** gratissima serpit.  
**in somnis, ecce, ante oculos** maestissimus Hector                    270  
**visus adesse mihi largosque effundere fletus,**  
 raptatus bigis ut quondam, aterque cruento  
 pulvere perque pedes traiectus lora tumentis.  
 ei mihi, qualis erat, quantum mutatus ab illo  
 Hectore qui redit exuvias indutus Achilli                                275  
 vel Danaum Phrygios iaculatus puppibus ignis!  
 squalentem barbam et concretos sanguine crinis  
**vulneraque illa gerens,** quae circum plurima muros  
 accepit patrios. ultro flens ipse videbar  
 compellare virum et maestas expromere voces:                        280  
 'o lux Dardaniae, spes o fidissima Teucrum,  
 quae tantae tenuere morae? quibus Hector ab oris

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<sup>48</sup> E.g. his repeated dreams of his father Anchises (4.351-3): *'me patris Anchisae, quotiens umentibus umbris/ nox operit terras, quotiens astra ignea surgunt,/ admonet in somnis et turbida terret imago'* 'the troubled ghost of my father Anchises terrorizes and admonishes me, whenever the night shrouds the lands in dewy shadow, and whenever the fiery stars rise.' See also 6.695-7.

exspectate venis? ut te post multa tuorum  
 funera, post varios hominumque urbisque labores  
 defessi aspiciamus! quae causa indigna serenos 285  
 foedavit vultus? **aut cur haec vulnera cerno?**"

It was the time at which sleep first begins **for weary mortals**, and creeps over them as a most welcome **gift from the gods. In my dreams - look! - before my eyes** Hector, in deepest sorrow, **seemed to appear before me, and to pour forth copious tears**, as he once was when he had been swept along by Achilles' chariot, and he was blackened by bloody dust and his swollen feet were pierced with leather thongs. Alas, he was like this, so changed from the Hector who returned bearing the spoils of Achilles, or who hurled Trojan fires at the ships of the Greeks! His beard was crusted and his hair hardened with blood, and **he bore those many wounds** which he received around the walls of his fatherland. I spontaneously seemed, weeping, to call to him and draw forth sorrowful words: 'O light of Troy, o most trusted hope of the Trojans, what delays so great kept you? From which shores do you come, long-awaited Hector? How exhausted we are who look upon you, after many deaths of your people, after the changing struggles of men and of the city! What unworthy reason has disfigured your serene face? **Or why am I looking at these wounds?**'

This passage, like the other examples of relational and phenomenal seeing in the *Aeneid* discussed in this chapter, signals engagement with Lucretius in several ways. *mortalibus aegris* recalls the opening of the final book of the *DRN* (Lucr. 6.1-2)

primae frugiparos fetus **mortalibus aegris**  
 dididerunt quondam praeclaro nomine Athenae

It was Athens of illustrious name that first in former days spread abroad the corn bearing crops among **suffering mankind**. (trans. Rouse)

In these lines, Lucretius designates Athens, and her people, as those who relieve weary mortals by their gift (*dididerunt*). However, in *Aeneid* 2, it is the gods who do so (*dono divum*). Virgil therefore immediately sets up the expectation that this passage will engage with Lucretius and Epicurean philosophy in a challenging

way: according to Epicureans, the gods have not given humans anything, as they live a life of perfect peace and tranquility.<sup>49</sup>

Virgil also follows Lucretius in his use of the phrasing *in somnis* and *ante oculos*.<sup>50</sup>

Most notably, though, Aeneas' dream of Hector is Lucretian in that it recalls Lucretius' description of Ennius' vision of Homer at the beginning of the first book of the *DRN* (Lucr. 1.120-6):

etsi praeterea tamen esse Acherusia templa  
 Ennius aeternis exponit versibus edens,  
 quo neque permaneant animae neque corpora nostra  
 sed quaedam simulacra modis pallentia miris;  
 unde sibi exortam semper florentis Homeri  
 commemorat speciem **lacrimas effundere salsas** 125  
 coepisse et rerum naturam expandere dictis.

Although nevertheless he also sets forth in everlasting verses that there exist regions of Acheron, which neither our spirits nor our bodies endure to reach, but certain similitudes of them pale in wondrous wise; whence he avers that the likeness of ever deathless Homer issued forth, and began **to shed salt tears** and to unfold the nature of things. (trans. Rouse)

Though the lines directly before this passage praise Ennius as a poet (Lucr. 1.117-9), here Lucretius tempers this praise by criticizing Ennius as a

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<sup>49</sup> See above n. 22, and e.g. Lucr. 2.180-1 = 5.198-9 *nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam/ naturam rerum: tanta stat praedita culpa* 'the world was certainly not made for us by divine power: so great are the faults with which it stands endowed.'

<sup>50</sup> *in somnis* appears nine times in book four (Lucr. 4.34, 770, 789, 965, 972, 988, 1006, 1012, 1097). It is also used by Ennius, and common in Plautus and Cicero. *ante oculos* occurs ten times in the *DRN* (Lucr. 1.62, 342, 998; 2.113, 732; 3.75, 185, 488, 995; 4.979). Cicero in particular uses this formula a lot, which is perhaps testament to its use in rhetorical and literary *ἐνάργεια*.

philosopher: Ennius, against the dictates of Epicurean philosophy, asserted in his poetry that the Underworld existed, and that souls of the dead visited us in a ghostly form. Famously, Ennius claimed at the opening of his *Annales* that the dead poet Homer appeared to him in a dream,<sup>51</sup> perhaps to let him know that Ennius was his reincarnation, but certainly as a symbol of Ennius' Homeric influence, style and genre. Here, Lucretius describes this moment, and how Homer's *species* seemed to Ennius 'to pour forth salty tears' (*lacrimas effundere salsas* Lucr. 1.125). The general sense of these three words is matched by Aeneas' description of Hector (*largos effundere fletus* 2.271), and *effundere* is used by both authors in the same position in the line. Indeed, Virgil's *visus adesse* also recalls Ennius directly: *visus Homerus adesse poeta* (Enn. *Ann.* 3 Skutsch). In the *Annales*, Ennius, a poet, dreamed of Homer, another poet; in the *Aeneid*, Aeneas, a Homeric character, dreams of Hector, another Homeric character. Both passages constitute a hallmark of Homeric influence in different ways, and that Aeneas corresponds to Ennius as the recipient of the dream fittingly marks him as the epic narrator at this point.

Given these Lucretian markers, how does Aeneas' narration of his dream-experience match up with the Epicurean explanation of dreaming? For one, Aeneas' memory is incapacitated during his dream. When he describes the appearance of Hector with hindsight (2.272-9), he clearly remembers the details of Hector's death and the mistreatment of his corpse: how, according to the *Iliad*,

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<sup>51</sup> Though it is not explicitly clear from the fragment that this is a dream, the reception of this passage in later authors always refers to it as such. See e.g. Cic. *Acad.* 2.51, which also constitutes further evidence for the philosophical use of this line of the *Annales*: here, Cicero is discussing how to distinguish non-veridical from veridical impressions.

his feet were pierced with thongs, and he was dragged in the dust behind Achilles' chariot.<sup>52</sup> However, when he addresses Hector in his dream-state (2.281-6), he does so as if Hector were still alive, and could still help the Trojans, and he shows surprise at Hector's wounds (2.286 '*aut cur haec vulnera cerno?*'). This reflects Lucretius' explanation of how the faculty of memory is dormant during sleep (Lucr. 4.765 *praeterea meminisse iacet languetque sopore*, quoted above). Moreover, the opening of Aeneas' speech to the dream-vision of Hector (2.281 '*o lux Dardaniae...*') closely mirrors Cassandra's prophecy in Ennius' tragedy *Alexander* (fr. XXV Jocelyn = Macrob. *Sat.* 6.2.18):

o lux Troiae, germane Hector,  
quid ita cum tuo lacerato corpore  
miser es, aut qui te sic respectantibus  
tractavere nobis?

O my own brother, Hector, you light of Troy, how is it you are thus made pitiful with your torn body? And who are they who have dragged you before our very eyes? (trans. Warmington)

Cassandra's words foresee the death of Hector, which is in the past for Aeneas at the time of his dream, though he does not remember this. The way the intertext confuses the timeframe of events reflects Aeneas' bewilderment: Virgil skilfully uses his own memory of Ennius to express Aeneas' forgetfulness.

Aeneas' failure to remember that Hector is dead during his dream therefore accords with the Lucretian explanation of dreaming. Virgil also lays stress on

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<sup>52</sup> Hom. *Il.* 22.395-404.

vision in this passage: *ecce, ante oculos* (2.270); *visus* (2.271); *aspicimus* (285); *cerno* (286). This encourages the reader to consider what Aeneas phenomenally sees during his dream, and how Hector appears to him. Aeneas emphasizes Hector's tragic and defiled appearance: he is covered in blood and dust, and is heavily wounded (2.277-8). As explained, according to the Epicurean explanation of dreams and phenomenal seeing, this dream-vision must be caused by the external impingement of *simulacra* from a physical source in the past or present material world. There is therefore some confusion as to why Hector appears to Aeneas in this state. Famously, in the *Iliad*, the gods preserved Hector's body perfectly, despite Achilles' mistreatment of his corpse (Hom. *Il.* 24.411-23 Hermes speaking to Priam):<sup>53</sup>

“ὦ γέρον, οὗ πω τόν γε κύνες φάγον οὐδ’ οἴωνοί,  
 ἀλλ’ ἔτι κεῖνος κεῖται Ἀχιλλῆος παρὰ νηὶ  
 αὐτῶς ἐν κλισίῃσι· δυωδεκάτῃ δέ οἱ ἠὼς  
 κειμένῳ, οὐδέ τί οἱ χρῶς σήπεται, οὐδέ μιν εὐλαὶ  
 ἔσθουσ’, αἳ ῥά τε φῶτας ἀρηιφάτους κατέδουσιν. 415  
 ἦ μὲν μιν περὶ σῆμα ἐοῦ ἐτάριοιο φίλοιο  
 ἔλκει ἀκηδέστως, ἥως ὅτε δῖα φανήῃ,  
**οὐδέ μιν αἰσχύνει**· θηοῖό κεν αὐτὸς ἐπελθὼν  
 οἶον ἐερσήεις κεῖται, **περὶ δ’ αἶμα νένιπται,**  
**οὐδέ ποθι μιάρός· σὺν δ’ ἔλκεα πάντα μέμυκεν,** 420  
 ὅσσ’ ἐτύπη· πολέες γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ χαλκὸν ἔλασσαν.  
 ὥς τοι κήδονται μάκαρες θεοὶ υἱὸς ἐοῖο

<sup>53</sup> See also Hom. *Il.* 23.184-91, 24.18-24.

καὶ νέκυός περ ἐόντος, ἐπεὶ σφι φίλος περὶ κῆρι.”

‘Old sir, not yet have dogs and birds devoured him, but he still lies there beside the ship of Achilles among the huts as he was at the first; and this is now the twelfth day that he lies there, yet his flesh decays not at all, nor do worms consume it, such as feed on men slain in battle. To be sure, Achilles drags him ruthlessly about the mound of his dear comrade, as often as sacred Dawn appears, **but he mars him not**; you would yourself marvel, were you to come and see how dewy-fresh he lies, and **is washed clean of blood, nor is he anywhere stained; and all the wounds are closed** with which he was struck, for many there were who drove the bronze into his flesh. In such a way do the blessed gods care for your son, corpse though he is, since he was dear to their hearts.’  
(trans. Murray)

Virgil’s Aeneas continues the story of Aeneas in the *Iliad*, and the events of the *Iliad* and the epic cycle are construed as the past of the character Aeneas in the *Aeneid*.<sup>54</sup> We might therefore expect that the way Hector appears to Aeneas would accord with Homer’s account. It doesn’t, and though the way Aeneas dreams of Hector is more realistic, it nevertheless lacks credibility because it doesn’t fit with the story, and is not supported by literary precedent. Virgil challenges the reader to consider how they should judge Aeneas’ reliability: on how strictly Aeneas adheres to Homer’s fictionalized and dramatized version of events, or on whether he describes things plausibly and realistically.

‘*ecce, ante oculos*’, like *visu mirabile monstrum* (10.637) in the *imago Aeneae* episode discussed above, introduces ἐνάργεια, and encourages the reader to override relational vision of words on a page with phenomenal vision of what

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<sup>54</sup> There are many examples of this. When Aeneas sees the Trojan war depicted on Juno’s temple in Carthage, he says ‘*quae regio in terris nostri non plena laboris?*’ (1.460). At 12.52-3, Turnus alludes to the episode described at Hom. *Il.* 5.311-453, in which Aphrodite saved Aeneas from Diomedes by protecting him in a cloud, and claims that Aeneas won’t be so lucky this time. See also my discussion of Juno in the *Aeneid*’s relationship to Juno in Ennius’ *Annales*, and Hera in the *Iliad* (2. ii. *Determinism and literary precedent*).

those words describe. Again, as with earlier examples, this is problematic from an Epicurean perspective. Imagination, like dreams, should, according to Epicureans, be a physical process, caused by the external impingement of *simulacra* emitted from an object/objects in the real world. It is difficult for this materialist account to explain our ability to imagine Homer, whose existence is in the distant past and shrouded in mystery, let alone a dream of one of Homer's characters (Cic. *Nat. D.* 1.107, quoted above):

nam quid est quod minus probari possit, quam omnino in me incidere

**imagines Homeri** Archilochi Romuli Numae Pythagorae Platonis - nedum  
ea forma qua illi fuerunt...?

'For what can be more improbable than that **images of Homer**, Archilochus, Romulus, Numa, Pythagoras and Plato should impinge on me at all - much less that they should do so in the actual shape that those men really bore?' (trans. Rackham)

Yet we are nevertheless able to vividly imagine Hector as Aeneas describes seeing him in his dreams. In fact, Virgil makes Aeneas as narrator a skilful practitioner of ἐνάργεια: as Quintilian advised, he gives lots of detail (2.271-278; Quint, *Inst.* 8.3.64-70), and uses cultural references (e.g. to the *Iliad*) with which Virgil's reader would be familiar. Virgil therefore demonstrates that reading and listening can generate powerful phenomenal vision, even of objects and scenarios that might have never physically existed. Indeed, he may even be using an Epicurean technique to challenge the Epicurean explanation of relational and phenomenal seeing. Schroeder notes that Philodemus incorporated the act of envisioning into Epicurean therapy (2004: 149):

‘the person suffering from passion, such as fear or anger, is summoned to an act of envisioning in order to return to peace.’<sup>55</sup>

This is signalled in Philodemus’ works through phrases like τίθεναι πρὸ ὀμμάτων (cf. *ante oculos* 2.270), or ἐν ὄψει.<sup>56</sup> If this was indeed an innovative Epicurean therapeutic technique in the 1<sup>st</sup> c. BC,<sup>57</sup> Virgil’s use of it to challenge the Epicurean explanation of phenomenal seeing is both pointed and effective.

Intertexts both aid the reader’s imagination by recalling well-known characters and scenarios, and, because of the way they combine and contradict one another,<sup>58</sup> draw the reader into a state of confusion, comparable to Aeneas’ dream state, in which it is difficult to firmly grasp either fiction or reality. For example, Virgil uses intertextuality to align his epic character Aeneas with Lucretius and Ennius - real, historical poets. Indeed, the allusions to Lucretius and Ennius conjure two opposing viewpoints on the event Virgil is describing here: Ennius suggests that the souls of the dead can visit us in dreams, whilst Lucretius argues that they cannot. The reader is not sure which to side with, and Virgil does not lead them decisively in either direction. Some of Aeneas’ dreams, such as those in which he sees his father Anchises, are caused by souls visiting

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<sup>55</sup> Note that envisioning seems to have the opposite effect in the *Aeneid*: of inflaming emotions rather than calming them down. E.g. Aeneas becomes even more alarmed when he envisions his own father as he watches Priam die (2.560). See also 9.294, and 10.824.

<sup>56</sup> E.g. Phld. col i. 2. 20-25 Indelli, col. iii. 113-4 Indelli, col. iv. 16 Indelli.

<sup>57</sup> Schroeder (2004: 141): ‘His [i.e. Philodemus] act of envisioning is (*pace* Nussbaum 1986) an original contribution to Epicurean therapy.’

<sup>58</sup> See Elliott (2008) on the effect of combining allusions to Ennian tragedy and epic in this passage.

him from the Underworld.<sup>59</sup> But if, following Ennius, this is Hector's soul visiting Aeneas from the land of the dead, why does Aeneas not meet Hector when he travels there in book six? Similarly, though *mortalibus aegris* and *dono divum* suggest antagonism towards Lucretius, the depiction of Aeneas' loss of memory in his dream-state accords with Lucretius' explanation of dreaming. Like Lucretius' dreamer, we are left unable 'to refute the false by the true', *falsum veris convincere rebus* (Lucr. 4.764).

### Conclusion

In the *Aeneid*, Virgil engages with, tests and challenges Lucretius' account of relational and phenomenal seeing in the *DRN*. In particular, Virgil problematizes Lucretius' explanation of both types of seeing as physical processes relying on the external impingement of *simulacra* which, at least at one stage, were emitted from the surface of objects in the real world. He does so in several ways. Firstly, by offering counter-examples to Epicurean materialism in the course of the poem, and depicting characters who relationally see things that are not only insubstantial and immaterial (the *imago Aeneae*), but also fantastical and non-existent (the creatures at the entrance to the Underworld). In addition, he simultaneously encourages (*visu mirabile monstrum* 10.637, *ecce* 2.270) the reader/listener to phenomenally see what his characters relationally see or even dream, prompting philosophical reflection on the process of literary imagination. Contrary to the Epicurean argument, it is not clear that this can be explained as a

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<sup>59</sup> See my discussion above, and 6.695-702, which frames the *imago* of Anchises that Aeneas meets in the Underworld as being the same *imago* of Anchises that visited him in his dreams.

physical process, and it does not necessarily seem to be the case that everything that literature can make us imagine has some basis in the real world. Literature's ability to create powerful and vivid mental images is not proportional to whether or not it presents physical reality and/or the truth. Rather, as orators realized, this ability derives from certain techniques, such as focusing on details, or drawing on familiar models. Virgil particularly emphasizes the latter by using intertextuality as philosophical tool. He substitutes the physical source emitting *simulacra*, which Epicureans maintained was essential to relational and phenomenal seeing, for a literary source/s: previous poetry.

The Epicurean explanation of sense-perception as a physical and atomic process was integral to their broader claim that sensation was the primary standard of truth, and the basis of knowledge.<sup>60</sup> Virgil's challenge is therefore a serious one that threatened the basis of Epicurean philosophy and empiricism. There is, moreover, a clear reason why Virgil, a poet, should take this philosophical stance. Virgil is showing that language and poetry can create phenomenal vision which may not need to have a basis in the real world, which can override relational vision (e.g. during reading or listening), and which can leave its mark on us and our memories in the same way that genuine empirical experience does. Words have the awesome potential to psychologically rival and mimic past and present reality.

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<sup>60</sup> Epicurus *R.S.* 23; Lucr. 1.422-5, 699-700, 4.469-521; Diog. Laert. 10.33

### Final Conclusion

To conclude, I will trace some of the unifying features of my philosophical readings in the *Aeneid*, and offer suggestions as to the reasons and motivations behind Virgil's use of philosophy.

In several cases, my analysis showed that the way Virgil engages with philosophical ideas constitutes a rejection of the behaviour and values associated with the recent civil wars. For example, in chapter five it became clear that the dwindling role of *F/fortuna* in Aeneas' mission to found Rome can be understood both in philosophical terms, and as a move away from the turbulence and uncertainty of the decades before Actium, a period which Horace characterized as 'Fortune's sport',<sup>1</sup> and during which prominent generals made competing claims to *F/fortuna* and power. Investigation of the causes of the war in Latium in chapter three led to some comparisons with the politics of the late Republic and triumviral period, and showed the destructive force of varying subjective beliefs and calculated allegations about *causae*, blame and guilt. Philosophical and poetic analysis of rivers in *Georgics* 4 revealed that Orpheus represents a poet whose vain fixation on personal loss and idealization of the past contributes to society's destruction (the loss of Aristaeus' Roman bees) rather than aiding its renewal.

As a counter to this, Virgil also incorporates philosophical perspectives to illustrate the instrumental role that poetry can play in the transition to peace and

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<sup>1</sup> *ludum... Fortunae*, Hor. *Carm.* 2.1.3 (quoted above 5. ii. Fortuna in religion, pg. 277).

stability under Augustus. For one, he demonstrates the potential for and benefits of a constructive (re)interpretation of history.<sup>2</sup> Central to this is Virgil's use of fate, which bolsters Augustus' rule by retrospectively adding a sense of purpose, organization and justification to the historical events that culminated in it. Virgil also explores the overlaps between prophecy, poetry and successful propaganda, folding philosophy of language into his verse to provide inherent support for poetry's ability to change perceptions and influence the future in a meaningful and positive way: a name can change the interpretation and therefore the future of its referent;<sup>3</sup> words can immaterially mimic the psychological impact of genuine experience;<sup>4</sup> poetry can make fictions come true.<sup>5</sup>

Virgil's persistent antagonism towards Lucretius' philosophy and the Epicurean world-view is also to some degree politically motivated: a function of his decision to support Augustus, rather than Epicurus and his teachings, as the potential saviour of Roman society.<sup>6</sup> This pragmatic switch of allegiance<sup>7</sup> is suggested as early as *Eclogue* 1, in which Tityrus hails the *iuvenis* usually identified with Octavian as a *deus* in terms that recall Lucretius' ascription of divinity to the philosopher Epicurus.<sup>8</sup> It may also provide the key to his

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<sup>2</sup> My phrasing follows Wilson (1979: 265-6), quoted above pg. 100-1 n. 40.

<sup>3</sup> 1. *True Names and False Names*, pg. 83.

<sup>4</sup> 6. *inania verba, visual perception and the refutation of materialism*, pg. 343.

<sup>5</sup> 4. i. *Fate, morality, and Callimachean poetics: rivers in the Georgics*, pg. 239.

<sup>6</sup> Issues on which Virgil disagrees with Lucretius include: the divine creation of the world (pg. 216); the existence of fate (pg. 217), the Underworld (pg. 328) and immortal souls (pg. 229-30); and Lucretius' materialist explanation of perception (chapter six, *inania verba, visual perception and materialism*).

<sup>7</sup> As noted in the *Introduction*, Virgil was associated with the Epicurean school and the Epicurean philosophers Philodemus and Siro during his youth and education.

<sup>8</sup> Verg. *Ecl.* 1.6-8 (Tityrus speaking): *o Meliboe, deus nobis haec otia fecit./ namque erit ille mihi semper deus, illius aram/ saepe tener nostris ab ovilibus imbuet agnus 'a god,*

divergence from and challenges to Epicureanism in the *Aeneid*. For example, Virgil's un-Epicurean gods and goddesses, who are deeply concerned with mortal affairs and directly involved in human life, can offer support and religious validation to Aeneas and the ongoing project of securing Rome's future. Venus, especially, is transformed from her increasingly abstracted, natural philosophical role in the *DRN* into an anthropomorphized deity who is personally invested in defending her son and his line, which will include Julius Caesar and Augustus.<sup>9</sup> Venus is even depicted on Aeneas' shield fighting in alliance with Augustus at Actium, alongside Minerva, Neptune and Apollo.<sup>10</sup>

This, then, constitutes Virgil's response to Plato's argument that Homeric poetry has no place in a well-run state.<sup>11</sup> In fact, the *Aeneid* demonstrates that poetry can play an essential role in establishing a government that is perceived as positive and justified, and can therefore become successful. In responding to Plato's objection, Virgil does not challenge the claim that poetry *qua* mimesis is at three removes from the truth. Rather, Virgil complicates the idea of truth, and

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Meliboeus, created this leisure for us. For **that man will** always **be a god** to me, and a slender lamb from our flocks will always wet his altar.' Lucr. 5.8-10: ... **deus ille fuit, deus**, inclute Memmi,/ *qui princeps vitae rationem invenit eam quae/ nunc appellatur sapientia...* '**he was a god**, noble Memmius, **a god he was**, who first discovered that reasoned plan of life which is now called Wisdom' (trans. Rouse). For the identification of the *iuvenis* in *Eclogue* 1 as Octavian, see e.g. Coleman (1977 *ad loc.*).

<sup>9</sup> When comforting his daughter in book one, Jupiter gives a prophecy that traces Venus' line from Aeneas down to Julius Caesar (1.261-290). Anchises takes the further step of adding Augustus to Iulus' descendants in book six (6.789-807).

<sup>10</sup> 8.699, 704. Mars is also described here, but he rages in the centre of the battle rather than definitively supporting either side (8.700-1). Casali (2006) makes a persuasive argument that Vulcan's creation of Aeneas' shield for Venus is an allegory for Virgil's composition of the *Aeneid* for Augustus.

<sup>11</sup> See *Introduction*.

questions its utility.<sup>12</sup> For example, though fate can be understood as a universal interconnection of causes which embodies *veritas sempiterna*,<sup>13</sup> Virgil shows that our access to fate is always through the filter and restructuring lens of literature and narrative. Furthermore, when dealing with sensitive questions such as the causes of war and responsibility for death, it can in fact be beneficial to resist truth, clarity and decisive judgement for the sake of reconciliation and making constructive steps towards peace.<sup>14</sup>

However, Virgil does challenge Plato's assertion that imitative poetry by definition lacks learning and knowledge: he is a *doctus imitator*, who makes learned references to previous literature and uses intertextuality as a philosophical tool. During the course of this thesis, it has additionally become clear that Virgil is invested in demonstrating that our experience and understanding of reality is mediated through language and texts. This in turn leads to the conclusion that, contrary to Plato's criticism, the poet's contingent knowledge may be as important to human society as the supposedly universal and objective knowledge of the philosopher.

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<sup>12</sup> During a fortuitously-timed *Aeneid* 6 tutorial on 9<sup>th</sup> November, 2016, the day of Donald Trump's election, it became abundantly clear that 'post-truth politics' is nothing new.

<sup>13</sup> Cic. *Div.* 1.125 = SVF 1.125-6, quoted above (2. i. *Stoic and non-Stoic aspects of fate in the Aeneid*, pg. 90). Cf. also Cic. *Nat. D.* 3.14, where fate is described as *semper ex omni aeternitate verum* (*ibid.*, pg. 89)

<sup>14</sup> 3. *Causation and Moral Responsibility*, especially 3. iii. *Dido's culpa and Aeneas' culpa*.



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