A Spinozist Approach to Affective Patterns in Revolutionary Springs



Arthur Duhé

Balliol College
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Oxford

Supervised by Pr. Edward Keene

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Abstract

This thesis is about revolutionary springs, defined as fast transnational diffusion of revolutionary uprisings in the absence of any financial or military collaboration. Due to their speed, their international nature, and their spontaneity, I argue that these phenomena cannot be satisfactorily explained by material or ideological factors alone, hence the need for original analytical tools. To analyse the structures of affects, I offer to look at three affective patterns, namely repressive fear, revolutionary fraternity, and revolutionary martyrdom. The first part of this thesis draws from Baruch Spinoza's philosophy to understand how collective affects emerge and circulate transnationally within and across multitudes, and briefly distinguishes this perspective from the one developed by Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt. The second part describes how affective patterns interplay in revolutionary dynamics in two empirical cases, namely the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring. It first connects Spinoza's ontological foundations with methodology by presenting the textual, visual, and sound materials and respective methods that are handled to investigate affective patterns in revolutionary times. Then, I examine these affective patterns at the national level during the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring to show how they contribute to the emergence of the revolutionary multitude. The last two chapters offer an international theory of affective patterns in revolutionary springs by showing how a transnational multitude may emerge and be set in motion through affective patterns. This part also uses affective patterns to investigate negative cases, that is, countries that could have joined the revolutionary movement and did not. This work has implications for the understanding of both revolutions, especially but not exclusively revolutionary springs, and transnational affective circulations.

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Note

A substantial part of this thesis is dedicated to Spinoza's philosophical work. Instead of referring to his works following the Chicago Manual of Style 17th edition, like the rest of the works quoted in this thesis, I privileged the traditional practice of the Spinozist scholarship, for example, *Ethics* III, prop. 6.

Unless I mention otherwise, all quotations from Spinoza's works are from the two volumes of *The Collected Works of Spinoza* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) edited and translated by Edwin Curley. I have however consulted other translations, such as:

- In English:

Spinoza, Baruch. *Complete Works*, translated by Samuel Shirley (Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002).

- In French:

Spinoza, Baruch. *Traité théologico-politique*, translated by Charles Appuhn (Paris: Éditions Flammarion, 1965).

Spinoza, Baruch. *Traité politique*, translated by Charles Appuhn (Paris: Éditions Flammarion, 1966).

Spinoza, Baruch. *Éthique*, translated by Bernard Pautrat (Paris: Éditions du Point, 1988).

Spinoza, Baruch. *Oeuvres*, edited by Pierre-François Moreau, 5 volumes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009-2020).

Introduction

> This, gentlemen, is my profound conviction, I believe that we are at this moment sleeping on a volcano … I know not how, nor whence it will come, bring with it a most serious revolution: be assured that that is so.
>
> Tocqueville, Speech in the Chamber of the Deputies, 29th of January 1848.[1]

> Tunisians erupted like a volcano.
>
> Ahlem Yazidi, Tunisian demonstrator in 2011.[2]

On May 25th 2020, a video revealed that George Floyd died after a police officer had knelt on his neck for eight minutes. The following day, local protests in support of Black Lives Matter and against police brutality started in the Minneapolis-Saint Paul area, before quickly spreading nationwide. Over 2,000 U.S. cities and towns experienced protests and demonstrations in the following two weeks.[3] This indignation also crossed borders and triggered strikes in no less than sixty countries. In France, an illegal demonstration that involved around 20,000 people paid homage to George Floyd while asking for justice regarding local issues, such as another black man's death, Adama Traoré, allegedly due to police brutality. In many countries, unprecedently antiracist movements, sometimes organised by political organisations, sometimes spontaneous, marched to demand the recognition of systemic racism and to denounce police violence. And thus, the death of a

[1] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville* (New York: Macmillan, 1896), 14.
[2] Asaad al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring: Personal Stories of the Arab Revolutions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 26.
[3] Audra D. S. Burch et al., 'How Black Lives Matter Reached Every Corner of America', *The New York Times*, 13 June 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/06/13/us/george-floyd-protests-cities-photos.html, last accessed 7th September 2020.

man in Minneapolis led to the fall of imperialist Cecil Rhodes's statue in Oxford, 4,000 miles away.

Spontaneous upheavals have long been described as storms, earthquakes, or volcanoes. The persistence of these metaphors, used in virtually all historical contexts,[4] tells us something about how riots, uprisings, and revolutions are perceived. This imagery is indeed consistent with the primitive brutality of the blind and passionate crowd in counter-revolutionary representations. As John Dunn once underlined, revolutions, like the Roman God Janus, have two faces.[5] These elementary images are indeed reversible: they may also underline the extraordinary popular power that may emerge spontaneously, ignoring borders and shaking profoundly, if only for a moment, the world order. This popular spontaneity, encapsulated by metaphors, raises a question: why do people, who sometimes do not belong to any political organisation, suddenly decide to take to the streets together, potentially at the risk of being arrested, harmed, or killed?

This popular spontaneity is most striking in 'revolutionary springs'. The term 'spring' seems to have been first popularised in the 20th century to retrospectively refer to the European revolutions of 1848 and was then used to describe events as different as the Prague Spring in 1968, the Tehran Spring during Mohammad Khatami's presidency (1997-2005), or the Maple Spring during the Quebec student protests in 2012. Despite the growing popularity of the term, perhaps as an attempt to avoid the loaded notion of 'revolution', no clear

[4] It would be too ambitious to recount its history here, but the classical *topos* of the movement of the crowd as an ocean is first found in the *Iliad*, II, v. 142-146, and was extremely common in classical Greek and Latin texts. These metaphors also nourished modern thinkers, see for instance Edmund Burke who described the French Revolution as 'a general earthquake in the political world' (Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 132).

[5] John Dunn, *Modern Revolutions: An Introduction to the Analysis of a Political Phenomenon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4 quoted in George Lawson, *Negotiated Revolutions: The Czech Republic, South Africa, and Chile* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 1.

definition of what qualifies as a spring has been offered either by journalists or scholars.[6] In this research, I define revolutionary springs[7] as the fast transnational diffusion of social protests in the absence of any important military or financial collaboration. These two characteristics lead to a third: the multitude involved in the events of revolutionary springs reacts spontaneously to foreign events, beyond the activities of any pre-existent political organisation.

Revolutionary springs are not only spectacular in their effects, they are also puzzling as they occur successively or simultaneously despite the diversity of political, social, and economic contexts. To shed light on this phenomenon, this research looks at affective patterns, especially repressive fear, revolutionary fraternity, and revolutionary indignation. By doing so, it does not claim that revolutionary springs or revolutions in general could be fully understood through the study of affective patterns while ignoring material or ideological dimensions. It seeks, rather, to theorise the nature and existence of certain phenomena, namely affectively-constituted transnational multitudes, that other scholars have overlooked, or lacked the theoretical vocabulary and tools to address. Although affects have an impact on revolutionary processes, the fact that they are difficult to pin down and measure and that other factors are also at stake qualifies any attempt to offer a causal explanation of revolutionary springs based on affects. This theoretical shift towards affects implies a focus on the aesthetic dimension of revolutions to analyse revolutionary events as performances that reveal and cause affective experiences.

[6] Analysing the emergence of the term, how it was used and by whom, could, I believe, raise some fascinating questions on contemporary representations of revolutions. This would, however, exceed the point of the argument here.

[7] The term 'spring', in my understanding of the notion 'revolutionary spring' refers less to the season than it hints this sudden move.

Spinoza's philosophy is decisively deterministic: nothing escapes the chains of causes and effects.[8] Unlike the understandings of determinism defended by other 17th century thinkers such as Gottfried Leibniz, Spinoza's one excludes the possibility of any 'free will' (including any divine free will)[9] as well as any lack of determination, is purely mechanical and aimless. To echo what Pierre Simon Laplace wrote about his own determinist perspective: if an intelligent being could know the natures and situations of all the beings at any given moment and be capable to embrace all these data, they could predict any phenomenon,[10] including, I suppose, revolutions.

This is not, however, the ambition of this thesis. The theory focuses on one phenomenon – affectively-constituted national and transnational revolutionary multitudes – which is entangled with all sorts of social and political phenomena. Due to this inherent complexity of social and political realities, this theory does not aim to predict revolutions and the way they develop. This project is ontological and shows that affective circulations, affective patterns, and transnational multitudes, even though they are largely missing and neglected in scholarly accounts, are part and parcel of the picture of these revolutionary springs.

To analyse these affective patterns in revolutionary springs, this investigation deals with two questions: how do collective emotions emerge and circulate within and across communities? How do affective patterns interplay to create national and transnational revolutionary dynamics that contribute to trigger spontaneous mass uprisings?

[8] *Ethic* I, prop. 26-27.
[9] *Ethics* I, prop. 33.
[10] Pierre-Simon Laplace, *Essai philosophique sur les probabilités* (Paris: Éditions Courcier, 1814), 2.

This introduction is divided into four parts. First, I present the challenges that revolutionary springs bring up to both the literature on revolutions and International Relations (IR) and to the literature on revolutions at large. Furthermore, although the fourth wave of revolution theory has advocated for the analysis of revolutions beyond structural factors, affects and emotions are still largely overlooked. To see more developments about the relationship between protests and emotions, we thus have to turn to recent works in Social Movement Theory (SMT).

However, SMT literature focuses mainly on political organisations and on protests at the national level. Understanding how affects can circulate within and across countries thus invites us to engage with the growing literature on Emotions in International Relations (EIR).[11] As I will show in a second part, EIR scholars have indeed rightly identified the ontological issues that arise with the thorny question of collective emotions or affects and have suggested diverse lines of inquiry relying on distinct ontological and methodological foundations.

Third, I argue that turning to Spinoza's philosophy provides us with conceptual tools to further conceptualise the spontaneity of mass uprisings. This turn to Spinoza may be disconcerting, as Spinoza has been largely ignored both in IR theory in general and in EIR specifically. Spinoza was however one of the major theorists of affects, his *Ethics* having influenced authors as different and prominent as Gilles Deleuze or António Damásio. Moreover, his *Political Treatise* ties his theory of affects to politics in general, including to the question of revolutions.

Eventually, in a fourth part, I present the plan of this thesis.

[11] I believe the acronym well-fitted since Eir was the Nordic goddess of empathy.

Social protests, riots, and revolutions

Almost thirty years later, it seems that Fred Halliday's reflection on the field of IR still stands: 'Revolutions [in 'the academic study of IR'], by contrast [with the study of war], enjoy a marginal existence'.[12] Halliday identified however at least four areas of investigation that were directly relevant to IR as a discipline:

> *cause* – that is, how far international factors produce revolutions; *foreign policy* – that is, how revolutionary states conduct their foreign relations; *responses* – that is, the reactions of other states; *formation* – that is, how, over a longer time-span, international factors, the system as a whole, constrain the post-revolutionary internal development of states and shape their political, social and economic evolutions.[13]

These four areas of investigation, rightly stressed by Halliday, are all about the interrelation between the revolutionary state and the international system. Either it is the revolution that impacts international order by magnifying the importance of the revolutionary states, by upsetting existing alliance, or because of attempts of the revolutionary state to export the revolution;[14] or, conversely, international factors are responsible for the development of a revolution in a given state. Theorists of revolution have also long paid attention to this second dimension by analysing the foreign factors that favour domestic instability, such as international military and economic competition.[15]

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[12] Fred Halliday, '"The Sixth Great Power": On the Study of Revolution and International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 16, no. 3 (1990): 207.
[13] The italics are mine, Halliday, '"The Sixth Great Power"', 213.
[14] Mark N. Katz, *Revolution: International Dimensions* (Washington: CQ Press, 2001), 1.
[15] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 19–24.

As aforementioned, revolutionary springs raise, however, a distinct question: how can we explain the spontaneous diffusion of a revolutionary movement across borders? Beyond the question of the international system – how it causes revolutions or how it is impacted by revolutions –, this thesis tackles the question of the spontaneous internationalisation of revolutions. In that sense, revolutionary springs invite us to adopt a new angle on these long-debated questions.

Kurt Weyland was the first scholar who noticed that revolutionary springs challenged certain assumptions about revolutions and the way they diffused transnationally.[16] Although Weyland does not use the concept of 'revolutionary spring' itself, his work identifies the same three features I mentioned. The first feature is a fast and transnational diffusion of mass uprisings that crosses borders in a few weeks or a few months. This characteristic distinguishes revolutionary springs from what Mark N. Katz termed 'revolutionary waves'.[17]

The second feature is the absence of any substantial military or financial cooperation. To use the distinctions offered by Jonathan Fox, revolutionary springs mostly display transnational networks and not transnational coalitions.[18] Although they may exchange information and experiences, their support is mostly discursive with loose or no coordination, and they do not necessarily share ideologies or political culture. A fortiori, it also means that these revolutions do not spread manu militari like, for instance, the 1789 French Revolution in Europe through the Napoleonian armies.

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[16] Kurt Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Revolution: "1848" in Europe and Latin America', *International Organization* 63, no. 3 (2009): 391–423; Kurt Weyland, 'The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?' 10, no. 4 (2012): 917–934; Kurt Weyland, *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[17] Mark N. Katz, *Revolutions and Revolutionary Waves* (New York: Macmillan, 1997).

[18] Jonathan A. Fox, 'Lessons from Mexico-US Civil Society Coalitions', in *Cross-Border Dialogues: U.S.-Mexico Social Movement Networking*, by David Brooks and Jonathan Fox (San Diego: University of California, 2002), 352.

Third – and this goes hand in hand with the second feature – revolutionary springs are spontaneous. Although political and social organisations, such as political parties and unions, may join the uprisings, the revolutionary process relies heavily on spontaneous popular masses.

Revolutionary springs, because of these characteristics, raise specific questions. To respond to these particular challenges, I theorise and analyse affectively-constituted national and transnational multitudes, which requires to take into account transnational circulations of revolutionary affects.

The literature on revolution has been diverse both in terms of the empirical cases it has tackled and of the theoretical perspectives it has adopted. Scholars usually distinguish four waves or generations of revolution theory.[19] The first generation is mostly associated with Crane Brinton who considered revolution as a fever that followed certain steps. Although emotions were mentioned, they remained somewhat anecdotal.[20] It is only with the second wave of revolution theory, with authors like Ted Gurr,[21] that psychological mechanisms gained in importance. Gurr argued that collective discontent was due to relative deprivation, that is, a gap experienced between value expectations and value capabilities. Once relative deprivation is perceived, collective discontent emerges and there is a potential for collective violence.

However, Gurr's theory is not suitable to examine transnational affects. His notion of anger is indeed a self-centred emotion only based on someone's expectations for themselves. Collective anger is only the bare accumulation of individual self-centred anger at

[19] John Foran, 'Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation', *Sociological Theory* 11, no. 1 (1993): 1–20; Jack A. Goldstone, 'Toward a Fourth Generation of Revolutionary Theory', *Annual Review of Political Science* 4, no. 1 (2001): 139–187; George Lawson, 'Within and Beyond the "Fourth Generation" of Revolutionary Theory', *Sociological Theory* 34, no. 2 (2016): 106–127.
[20] See for instance Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1952), 78; 238.
[21] It is most explicit in Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971).

the national level.[22] As a result, as Rod Aya notices, 'it remains unclear just who bears the brunt of frustration, who takes part in revolutions, and what connection (if any) exists between these two sets of actors'.[23] Although Gurr does not justify why he privileges the national scale over local or international ones, his model seems inadequate to explain revolutionary springs.

The third wave of revolution theory, which developed from the 1960s to the 1990s, distanced itself from emotions and considered them epiphenomenal. As Rod Aya summarises in his criticism of 'volcanic models': 'angry people doing ugly things are endemic to revolutions; their rage is not, however, what brings on revolutionary situations. The origins of revolution … lie in the structure and working of politics'.[24] It is thus these structural factors, at domestic and international levels, that the third wave has endeavoured to bring out. Theda Skocpol's influential *States and Social Revolutions*[25] is illustrative of this 'structural perspective'[26] with a special attention paid to international contexts, the organisation of the state, and the relations of class to one another and to the state, from the dominants to the peasants.

As George Lawson noted, these approaches seem however 'ill-equipped to explain how revolutions are made in unpromising circumstances and why revolutions do not occur when the right structural conditions are in place'.[27] This is particularly striking when it comes to revolutionary springs. Weyland rightly remarks that structural factors are insufficient to explain the burst of (quasi) simultaneous revolutions since domestic factors vary across

[22] Gurr, 83.
[23] Aya, 'Theories of Revolution Reconsidered', *Theory and Society* 8, no. 1 (1979): 65.
[24] Rod Aya, 'Theories of Revolution Reconsidered', 69.
[25] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*.
[26] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 14-18.
[27] George Lawson, 'Within and Beyond the "Fourth Generation" of Revolutionary Theory', *Sociological Theory* 34, no. 2 (2016): 109.

countries in terms of intensity,[28] which mitigates the role of domestic structural factors in revolutionary springs. The fact that both the Springtime of the Peoples[29] and the Arab Spring[30] followed economic crises is certainly relevant, but it does not explain, however, why these revolutions occurred at this given moment and why other countries, equally hit by the economic crises, were not similarly affected by the revolutionary springs.

In her defence of this structural perspective, Skocpol affirms that 'any valid explanation of revolution depends upon the analyst's "rising" above the viewpoints of participants to find important regularities across given historical instances'.[31] This understanding of social sciences is not only due to Skocpol's structural approach, but also to the material nature of the structures accounted for. Other scholars, like William Sewell,[32] have indeed theorised non-material structures, such as cultural structures. To respond to the perceived limits of the third generation of revolution, the fourth wave has thus paid increasing attention to culture and ideology[33] without necessarily abandoning a structure perspective.

Including reflections on culture and ideology has proved particularly fertile, including to theorise transnational revolutionary movement. Katz's work on revolutionary waves has showed the importance of transnational diffusion of revolutionary ideas. The revolutionary waves are thus defined in relation to a revolutionary ideology, such as Marxist Leninism,

[28] Weyland, 'The Arab Spring', 919.
[29] Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 23–26; Reinhart Koselleck, 'How European Was the Revolution of 1848/49?', in *1848—A European Revolution?* by Axel Körner (New York: Springer, 2000), 210.
[30] For a class-oriented understanding of the Arab Spring, see Jamie Allinson, 'Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria', *Democratization* 22, no. 2 (2015): 1–21.
[31] Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, 18.
[32] William H. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
[33] John Foran, 'Theories of Revolution Revisited: Toward a Fourth Generation', *Sociological Theory* 11, no. 1 (1993): 9–10; Lawson, 'Within and Beyond the "Fourth Generation" of Revolutionary Theory', 109–110.

Arab nationalism, or Islamic fundamentalism. Beyond Katz, other scholars such as Colin J. Beck[34] or Jack Goldstone[35] have also defended this theoretical angle to explain revolutionary springs.[36]

Without denying the importance of ideological factors in general, one may however nuance their role in revolutionary springs. While the revolutionary ideologies studied by Katz took years to spread, the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring occurred over the course of only a few weeks or months. In such a short period of time, Weyland argues, it seems unlikely that an ideological conversion like the ones Katz analyses happened on such a large scale.[37]

Furthermore, there is no clear ideological unity in either of these historical episodes. The majority of protestors in the German states aimed to establish parliamentary monarchies similar to the one that was overthrown in favour of a republic in France.[38] Similarly, the ideological and social situations in North Africa and the Middle-East varied significantly so that the fairly liberal Tunisian society had little in common with a more traditional country such as Yemen.[39] I would even push this argument a bit further and argue that even at the domestic level, it would be difficult to perceive any clear ideological unity between demonstrators. Although revolutionary springs were not a-ideological, the tracing of ideological diffusion is apparently not key to understanding fast diffusions of transnational revolutions. There is thus a fundamental difference between revolutionary waves and

[34] Colin J. Beck, 'The World-Cultural Origins of Revolutionary Waves: Five Centuries of European Contention', *Social Science History* 35, no. 2 (2011): 167–207.
[35] Goldstone even considers that 'the European Revolutions of 1848 [were] propelled by liberalism', see Goldstone, *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World*, 145.
[36] This question was also tackled in SMT, see for instance Doug McAdam and Dieter Rucht, 'The Cross-National Diffusion of Movement Ideas', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 528 (1993): 56–74.
[37] Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Revolution', 404–406.
[38] Weyland, 404–406.
[39] Weyland, 'The Arab Spring', 920.

revolutionary springs, and the latter require a specific theoretical approach. As I will show later in the thesis, I respond to this theoretical challenge by focusing on the circulations of affects to see how they rely on affective structures and institutions – the latter term being broadly understood as social institutions and repertoire –.

To respond to these theoretical challenges, Weyland develops his own theory, based on the articulation of cognitive biases and levels of political organisation. However, for reasons I will explain later in this thesis, this rationalist lens, not only relies on dubious assumptions, but, more importantly, fails to account for the spatial dimension of these revolutionary springs.

To capture the popular spontaneity at the heart of these episodes, this force that makes people take to the streets together, I investigate the role of revolutionary affects. This stress on affects does not imply that other factors, such as material or ideological ones, are not at stake – they are –. It is also the case that these factors are translated in terms of emotions: ideologies and material conditions are intertwined with feelings.[40] This theoretical stress on feelings supposes however a certain independence of emotions that cannot be entirely reduced to other factors. Even though material conditions and ideology play a role in revolutions and revolutionary springs, including in terms of revolutionary feelings, emotions may also be studied as relatively independent factors.

With its accent on culture and agents, the on-going fourth wave of revolution theory has paved the way to the return of emotions under scholarly scrutiny. Influenced both by the general cultural turn in social sciences and the works on emotions in SMT, fourth-wave

[40] Frédéric Lordon, *Les affects de la politique* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2016), 26.

theorists have indeed acknowledged the role played by emotions.[41] This role, however, has rarely been directly tackled in revolution theory.[42]

One needs to turn to SMT to see a more detailed analysis of emotions in contentious politics.[43] Rejecting simultaneously the 'crowd tradition' and its rationalist opponent that appeared in the 1970s, a group of scholars have been drawing from feminist scholarships to bring emotions to the fore of their analyses, without caricaturing them.[44] Coming from the margins of the field, the study of emotions has since the 1990s gained momentum and tackled a large diversity of empirical phenomena and theoretical questions, from identity formation to repertoire of protest.[45]

However, despite the importance of these contributions, including for this research, SMT work has tended to focus on 'the more constructed, cognitive end of [politics]'.[46] This is consistent with the typical objects of the field, since SMT largely focuses on activist groups, sometimes over long periods of time. On the contrary, revolutionary springs are spontaneous which invites us to look at revolutionary bursts involving large numbers of people that do

[41] See Foran, 'Theories of Revolution Revisited', 6–7; John Foran, *Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5–29; Colin J. Beck, *Radicals, Revolutionaries, and Terrorists* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 69–76; George Lawson, *Anatomies of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 82–88.

[42] A notable exception is Jean-Pierre Reed, 'Emotions in Context: Revolutionary Accelerators, Hope, Moral Outrage, and Other Emotions in the Making of Nicaragua's Revolution', *Theory and Society* 33, no. 6 (2004): 653–703. Another exception, on the Arab Spring, is Wendy Pearlman, 'Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings', *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (2013): 387–409.

[43] Some have argued that the growing convergence between SMT and revolution theory, sometimes under the umbrella of 'contentious politics' was one of the characteristics of a 'fifth generation of revolution theory', consistent with the recent revolutionary events (see Jamie Allinson, 'A Fifth Generation of Revolution Theory?', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 32, no. 1 (2019): 142–151). The notion of 'fifth generation' is however debated and other scholars have refused it, see for instance Benjamin Abrams, 'A Fifth Generation of Revolutionary Theory Is Yet to Come', *Journal of Historical Sociology* 32, no. 3 (2019): 378–386.

[44] For a review of the main perspective on social movements of the past century, see Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, 'The Return of The Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (2000): 65–83.

[45] James M. Jasper, 'Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research', *Annual Review of Sociology* 37 (2011): 285–303.

[46] Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 'The Return of The Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory', 79.

not necessarily belong to political organisations of any sort. While SMT has already produced some work on emotions in the context of transnational social movements,[47] the circulations of emotions across countries in spontaneous protests have not received the same attention yet.

This generational reading of revolution scholarship is 'heuristic' and 'helps illuminate the buildup of a self-conscious canon in the study of revolutions'.[48] An alternative reading of this scholarship would distinguish the fundamental questions diversely tackled by these theories. For many scholars, the central question is the following: *why* do revolutions occur? Skocpol's work is here exemplary and illustrates a rigorous attempt to identify causal factors. Beyond the diversity of phenomena, similar social structures lead to similar outcomes – precisely the ones that she defines as revolutionary.

Other works have addressed important questions. Charles Tilly's *Contentious Performances*[49] looks at the evolution of contentious performances and repertoires. The question here is not so much *why* revolutions occur, but *how* contentious politics, including revolutions, is expressed through certain performances chosen from restricted and evolving repertoires. Similarly, Sidney Tarrow studies *how* contentious politics is expressed through language.[50]

Some works, eventually, adopt a narrower approach by shedding light on *what* occurs when a revolution is triggered. Eric Selbin's *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance* is one of these studies. Selbin identifies 'basic stories of revolution which show up in a surprising number

[47] See Verta Taylor and Leila Rupp, 'Loving Internationalism: The Emotion Culture of Transnational Women's Organizations, 1888-1945', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 7, no. 2 (2002): 141–158.
[48] Lawson, 'Within and Beyond the "Fourth Generation" of Revolutionary Theory', 2016, 107.
[49] Charles Tilly, *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
[50] Sidney G. Tarrow, *The Language of Contention: Revolutions in Words, 1688--2012* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

of places and cultures across impressive stretches of time'.[51] Selbin recognises that 'currently, the theories, much less the instruments to measure the impact of a story, a song, a dance, a symbol on societies and cultures, are lacking'.[52] Although it does not precisely assess the causal mechanisms at stake,[53] this ontological perspective brings out dimensions of revolutions that had been neglected so far, thus enriching our understanding of these phenomena. In examining affective patterns, this thesis belongs to the latter endeavour. Unlike Selbin's work though, this thesis has a closer look at empirical details to show how affective patterns are illustrated in the eventful details of the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring.

In the following chapters, I focus on an aspect of revolutionary springs, that is transnational multitudes that emerge through transnational circulations of affects. More precisely, this research looks at the combination of three affective patterns, namely repressive fear, revolutionary martyrdom, and revolutionary fraternity. Instead of identifying clear causal mechanisms, I analyse what George Lawson calls a 'recurrent causal pattern', that is, 'interactive dynamics that shed light on diverse revolutionary episodes'.[54] These patterns are affective in so that they bring out the emergence and national and transnational circulations of affects. But these affective patterns first requires us to theorise how national and transnational affective circulations work.

[51] Eric Selbin, *Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story* (London: Zed, 2010), 3.
[52] Selbin, 35.
[53] However, Selbin does believe that this 'challenge' is 'one worth taking up' (*Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance*, p. 35). Similarly, he affirms that 'this work is driven by the questions that lead so many to the study of revolutions: why do revolutions here and not there, now and not then, among these people and not those?' (p. 6). Although Selbin does argue that there is something causal in the stories he studies, his work does not give us tools to assess the precise causal mechanisms at stake – and I suspect it would be difficult, not to say impossible, to do so.
[54] George Lawson, *Anatomies of Revolution*, 10.

International Relations and the nature of collective emotions

The analysis of national and transnational affective dynamics is precisely central in EIR. In an article published in 2000,[55] Neta C. Crawford argued that emotions mattered in international affairs and had been undertheorized so far. Crawford's statement seems to have been heard and well received given that, since then, an increasing number of scholars coming from diverse parts of the field have scrutinised emotions. Emotions, however, raise a certain number of methodological issues because they are 'deeply internal',[56] 'ephemeral',[57] and therefore, 'hard to define, hard to operationalize, hard to measure and hard to isolate from other factors'.[58] As a consequence, in order to catch emotions live, IR scholars have often focused on 'what happens when [they] become most acutely visible: in time of crisis'.[59] This methodological concern as well as the historical events at the time explains the predominance of the studies on terrorist attacks, especially 9/11,[60] and wars.[61] Social protests, riots, and

[55] Neta C. Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships', *International Security* 24, no. 4 (2000): 116–156.
[56] Crawford, 118.
[57] Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, 'Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics', *Review of International Studies* 34, no. S1 (2008): 115.
[58] Jean-Marc Coicaud, 'Emotions and Passions in the Discipline of International Relations', *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 15, no. 3 (2014): 495.
[59] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics', 129.
[60] See for instance Muriel Dumont et al., 'Social Categorization and Fear Reactions to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 29, no. 12 (2003): 1509–1520; Deborah A. Small, Jennifer S. Lerner, and Baruch Fischhoff, 'Emotion Priming and Attributions for Terrorism: Americans' Reactions in a National Field Experiment', *Political Psychology* 27, no. 2 (2006): 289–298; Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics'; Neta C. Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy' 6, no. 3 (2014): 535–557; Andrew G. Ross, *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), chap. 3; Andrew A. G. Ross, 'Exceptionalism, Counterterrorism, and the Emotional Politics of Human Rights', in *Emotions in International Politics - Beyond Mainstream International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 315–340; Todd Hall and Andrew G. Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11', *International Organization*, no. 69 (2015): 11.
[61] See for instance Coicaud, 'Emotions and Passions in the Discipline of International Relations'; Ross, *Mixed Emotions*; Pierre Hassner, 'The Dialectic of Rage - How Anger, Fear, Pride, and Other Passions Combine Interact and Fight Each Other in the Post-Cold War World', in *Emotions in International Politics - Beyond Mainstream International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 341–357.

revolutions, objects of study that are arguably far less typical in IR, are nevertheless also situations of crises in which affects are more visible.

Another risk inherent to the subjective and intimate nature of emotions is that 'emotions are … inclined to determine a subjectivist view of the social world'.[62] In the same vein, Patricia T. Clough notes that the affective turn 'was often returned to the subject, the subject of emotion, as a surplus of freedom'.[63] This individualism is particularly challenging in IR, a field in which scholars traditionally deal with communities such as states. Consequently, the most crucial challenge is 'to theorize the processes that render individual emotions collective and thus political'.[64] This passage from individual to collective emotions, one aspect of the aggregation problem,[65] stirs up a certain number of ontological issues that have been diversely approached.

Brent E. Sasley distinguishes between three political ontologies that have dominated in EIR. First, the state can be considered as a person, as it often is in IR, but this assumption 'does not provide explicit theorizing about the "state's" emotions'[66] and 'while IR scholars have been willing to accept beliefs, volitions, and even values and identities as attributes of collectives, ascribing affect and emotions to anything but individuals has remained a bridge too far'.[67] Second, one may 'focus on individual state leaders as representatives of the state, who make the decision for the state',[68] either by showing how their emotions influence

[62] Frédéric Lordon, *La société des affects : pour un structuralisme des passions* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2013), 10.
[63] Patricia Ticineto Clough and Jean O'Malley Halley, *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2007), 219.
[64] Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, 'Introduction: Emotions and World Politics', *International Theory 6:3*, 2014, 491.
[65] On this point, see Ross James Gildea, 'Psychology and Aggregation in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 26, no. 1 (2020): 166–183.
[66] Brent Sasley, 'Theorizing States' Emotions', *International Studies Review* 13, no. 3 (2011): 453.
[67] Hall and Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11', 856.
[68] Sasley, 'Theorizing States' Emotions', 453.

decision-makers;[69] or by paying attention to the emotions expressed on behalf of the collective by decision-makers.[70] Even though this method has the considerable advantage of being clearer theoretically and methodologically, it seems nonetheless to limit the spectrum of IR issues to foreign policy analysis. Eventually, Sasley favours a third method: 'understanding the state as a *group*',[71] and therefore using the recent social psychological works on intergroup emotions theory (IET)[72] to shed light on collective emotions. This latter method focuses either on 'the internal process by which group members' (state decision makers') cognitive and emotional practices represent, comprise, and reflect that of the group (state) and so determine how the state will act'.[73]

Although Sasley's typology is useful, it does not fully encapsulate the richness in EIR, especially regarding the group-based approach. First of all, even though research on emotions has been so far carried out 'predominantly at the level of the state',[74] collective

[69] Assia Alexieva, 'The Role of Emotions in Foreign Policy Decision Making - Embarrassment from the Bay of Pigs', in *Emotions in International Politics - Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, ed. Yohan Ariffin, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Vesselin Popovski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 221–53; Yohan Ariffin, 'Assessing the Role of Emotives in International Relations', in *Emotions in International Politics - Beyond Mainstream International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 207–220.
[70] Todd H. Hall, 'We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger', *Security Studies* 20, no. 4 (2011): 521–555; Todd Hall, 'Sympathetic States: Explaining the Russian and Chinese Responses September 11', *Political Science Quarterly* 127, no. 3 (2012): 369–400; Todd H. Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy: Official Emotion on the International Stage* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).
[71] Sasley, 'Theorizing States' Emotions', 454.
[72] See Eliot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger, and Diane M. Mackie, 'Can Emotions Be Truly Group Level? Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 93, no. 3 (2007): 431–446.
[73] Sasley, 'Theorizing States' Emotions', 454.
[74] Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics', *International Theory: A Journal Of International Politics, Law And Philosophy* 6, no. 3 (2014): 500.

emotions have also been analysed in other groups, such as subnational,[75] transnational,[76] or supranational[77] communities. Furthermore, while most scholars have taken already constituted communities as starting points to analyse collective emotions, others have inversed this relation and shed light on how collective emotions could create or shape communities.[78]

Moreover, despite Christian Reus-Smit's remark on the fact that 'individuals do not exist in single groups, they live in multiple, overlapping, semi-porous, internally contested social groupings, and part of the art of social existence is navigating one's way through this complex social universe',[79] few scholars have addressed the question of this entanglement of communities and its consequences for collective affects.[80] A path, recently opened by Todd Hall and Andrew G. Ross, has consisted in analysing collective emotions as affective dynamics, granting more flexibility in the theorisation of collective emotions. They distinguish between three larger categories. The first one, bottom-up, derives from SIT and thus analyses how individuals are going to experience emotions in relation with their collective identities. The second dynamic, horizontal, shows how affective contagions can escape from these already-made identities. Drawing from neuroscientific insights and

[75] This literature often focuses on civil wars, see for instance Arjun Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2006); Pierre de Senarclens, "From Group Identity to Ethnic Violence," in *Emotions in International Politics - Beyond Mainstream International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 299–314; Naomi Head, 'A Politics of Empathy: Encounters with Empathy in Israel and Palestine', *Review of International Studies* 42, no. 1 (2016): 95–113.
[76] Wendy Pearlman, 'Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings', *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (2013): 387–409.
[77] Dominique Moïsi, *The Geopolitics of Emotion: How Cultures of Fear, Humiliation and Hope Are Reshaping the World* (London: Bodley Head, 2009).
[78] See Emma Hutchison, 'Trauma and the Politics of Emotions: Constituting Identity, Security and Community after the Bali Bombing', *International Relations* 24, no. 1 (2010): 65–86; Emma Hutchison, *Affective Communities in World Politics: Collective Emotions after Trauma* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, 155.
[79] Christian Reus-Smit, 'Emotions and the Social', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 570.
[80] A notable exception is Andrew G. Ross, 'Realism, Emotion, and Dynamic Allegiances in Global Politics', *International Theory* 5, no. 2 (2013): 273–299.

especially from Giacomo Rizzolatti's theory of mirror neurons,[81] horizontal contagion is thought to occur thanks to spontaneous automatic responses to the perception of emotional displays. Lastly, affects can be harmonised in a top-down manner due to social expectations and norms, potentially enforced by institutions. Although this more fine-grained approach allows for better tracing of affects within and across communities, this line of research is still in its infancy, and 'how contagion works remains unclear'.[82]

Ontological debates and the use of Spinoza in IR

These new explorations regarding the nature of collective emotions have led scholars to tackle some fundamental ontological questions, such as the matter/idea dualism[83] or the existence of a human nature,[84] and may give a second wind to the 'wave of second order or meta-theorizing'[85] which appeared in the mid-1980s and increased the relative importance of meta-theory and constitutive theory.[86] Partly due to Alexander Wendt's work,[87] and the

[81] Giacomo Rizzolatti, *Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions, Emotions, and Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[82] Jonathan Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 524.
[83] Andrew G. Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions', *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (2006): 197–222.
[84] Neta C. Crawford, 'Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking `Man", *International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2009): 271–88.
[85] Alexander Wendt, 'Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations', *Review of International Studies* 17, no. 4 (1991): 383.
[86] I use here the terms coined in Stefano Guzzini, 'The Ends of International Relations Theory: Stages of Reflexivity and Modes of Theorizing', *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 521–541. Guzzini distinguishes indeed between four theorizing modes: 1. Normative theorizing, consisting in 'applying the scientific criteria of moral and political philosophy to issues of international relations' (p. 533); 2. Meta-theoretical theorizing, bringing out the fundaments of any theory, such as the questions related to ontology, epistemology, and methodology; 3. Ontological or constitutive theorizing, which reflects on the 'central phenomena that constitute the field of inquiry' (p. 534), and 4. Empirical theorizing, being 'inductively driven research agendas' (p. 535). All these theories, however, are connected and, to a certain extent, co-dependent.
[87] Alexander Wendt, 'The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory', *International Organization* 41, no. 3 (1987): 335–370; Wendt, 'Bridging the Theory/Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations'; Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 391–425; Alexander Wendt,

reactions it has provoked, a few debates crystallised the tensions and the oppositions within the field, such as agent/structure, individualism/holism, positivism/post-positivism, materialism/idealism, and so on. Even though these issues may appear as quite far away from everyday practice in IR research, so to speak, they did not come unnoticed: a survey to which U.S. and Canadian IR scholars responded in 2006, reveals that 'a full 85% of respondents name as the most important divide in IR one that is tied to the unresolved state of the foundational debate'.[88] The same year, Colin Wight, one of the most active participants in these debates, could argue that 'politics [was] the terrain of competing ontologies'.[89] However, a few years later, in an article published collectively with Tim Dunne and Lene Hansen, Wight recognised that, on the basis of their experience as editors of the *European Journal of International Relations* from 2008 to 2013, it appears that 'pieces engaging solely in theoretical development are now largely rare. Of course, theory still plays a role in almost all the articles published in the journal in the last five years, but it is (with a few exceptions) very much in terms of "theory testing" as opposed to "theory development".'[90] The situation is probably not drastically different today, and 'after occupying a prominent place in recent theoretical debates … metatheory is now fading from the spotlight.'[91] In light of the above remarks, however, the growing literature on emotions seems to echo concerns and issues

Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Alexander Wendt, 'Why a World State Is Inevitable', *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (2003): 491–542.

[88] Nuno P. Monteiro and Keven G. Ruby, 'IR and the False Promise of Philosophical Foundations', *International Theory* 1, no. 1 (2009): 19. The authors base this claim on Daniel Maliniak et al., 'The View For the Ivory Tower: TRIP Survey of International Relations Faculty in the United States and Canada', February 2007.

[89] Colin Wight, *Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 2.

[90] Tim Dunne, Lene Hansen, and Colin Wight, 'The End of International Relations Theory?', *European Journal of International Relations* 19, no. 3 (2013): 405–425.

[91] Scott Hamilton, 'A Genealogy of Metatheory in IR: How "Ontology" Emerged from the Inter-Paradigm Debate', *International Theory* 9, no. 1 (2017): 136. In this article, Scott Hamilton offers a rigorous and truly fascinating genealogy of the concern for ontological and epistemological issues in IR.

that were previously handled in meta-theory debates, yet, admittedly, with different angles and agendas.

To further develop the conceptualisation of affective dynamics, I draw on Spinoza's philosophy. Although the Dutch philosopher has been largely 'neglected if not completely ignored within IR',[92] including in EIR,[93] some of his philosophy's conceptual elements are already disseminated in EIR. This is due to the substantial influence of his philosophy on several authors that have contributed to shape our understanding of emotions, especially Gilles Deleuze and António Damásio. As Robert Seyfert rightly points out, 'Affect Studies often derives its notion of the body from Benedict de Spinoza (via Gilles Deleuze)'[94] so that Deleuze has been, so to speak, the Trojan horse of a Spinozist approach to affects. Another

[92] Seãn Molloy, 'Spinoza, Carr, and the Ethics of The Twenty Years' Crisis', *Review of International Studies* 39, no. 2 (2013): 252. This statement should however be qualified, as several IR scholars have mentioned Spinoza, see: H. Lauterpacht, 'Spinoza and International Law', *British Yearbook of International Law* 8 (1927): 89; Edward Hallett Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations* (New York: Macmillan, 1939); Théodore Ruyssen, *Les sources doctrinales de l'internationalisme* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 10; 18; 25; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Martin Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1991), 13; 17; 30–31; 261; Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (London: The Penguin Press, 2004); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Assembly* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). I do not include here the literature on Spinoza in International Law, which recently got a second wind in the German-writing world. The limited reception of Spinoza's texts in International Relations is consistent with the fact that Spinoza's philosophy was little studied in the Anglo-Saxon world where International Relations, as a discipline, is most influential. On the Anglo-Saxon reading of Spinoza, see Steven Barbone and Lee C. Rice, 'La naissance d'une politique', in *Architectures de la Raison. Mélanges offerts à Alexandre Matheron* (Lyon: Éditions ENS LSH, 1996), 47–50.

[93] Spinoza is recognised as an influential theorist of affects, yet in vague terms, in Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics', 125; for other similar statements referring to Spinoza as a theorist of affects see Jonathan Mercer, 'Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, no. 3 (2006): 290; Coicaud, 'Emotions and Passions in the Discipline of International Relations', 486; Pierre Hassner, *La revanche des passions* (Paris: Fayard, 2015).

[94] Robert Seyfert, 'Beyond Personal Feelings and Collective Emotions: Toward a Theory of Social Affect', *Theory, Culture & Society* 29, no. 6 (2012): 32. On the influence of Spinoza on Deleuze, see Adrian Parr, *The Deleuze Dictionary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), 260–264. For a Deleuzian use of affects, see Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold', 204; Paul Saurette, 'You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics', *Review of International Studies* 32, no. 3 (2006): 495–522; Clough and Halley, *The Affective Turn*.

self-proclaimed Spinozist, Damásio, has also hugely contributed to challenge Cartesian dualism and the dichotomy it had maintained between rationality and emotions. Instead of this Cartesian ontology, Damásio's distinction between emotions and feelings echoes the Spinozist discrimination between affection of the body and affects.[95] Beyond these two major figures, Spinoza has also influenced psychologist and philosopher William James[96] or, partly through Deleuze, political theorists, such as Brian Massumi[97] and William E. Conolly.[98] Despite the little scholarly attention it has received, Spinoza's shadow is thus already cast over EIR.

This project has however no genealogical ambition and the indirect influence of Spinoza only signals the relevance that his philosophy could have. More precisely, I believe that the contributions of a Spinozist approach to affects are threefold. First, as I mentioned, EIR has locally resuscitated some of the ontological debates in the field, especially in rejection of Cartesian dualism. In order to conceptualise collective affects, I argue that this rejection should also be extended to Cartesian individualism and that Spinoza's philosophy appears as fecund to conceive of transindividual bodies.

Second, in the developments of the *Ethics* on the psychological mechanisms underlying affective circulations, Spinoza offers two notions, namely affective transfer and affective imitation, that have already been introduced into other social sciences[99] and that

[95] António R. Damásio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Heinemann, 2003), 28.
[96] Kate Stanley, 'Affect and Emotion: James, Dewey, Tomkins, Damasio, Massumi, Spinoza', in *The Palgrave Handbook of Affect Studies and Textual Criticism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 97–112.
[97] Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002); Brian Massumi, *Politics of Affect* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015).
[98] William E. Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). Connolly also wrote an article specifically on Spinoza, see William E. Connolly, 'Spinoza and Us', *Political Theory* 29, no. 4 (2001): 583–594.
[99] See Yves Citton and Frédéric Lordon, *Spinoza et les sciences sociales. De la puissance de la multitude à l'économie des affects* (Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2008).

offer insights to further conceptualise the mechanisms that allow affects to spread within and across communities. Conversely, as Spinoza's ontology is processual, these affective circulations also shed light on how communities emerge and dissolve.

Lastly, Spinoza's conception of affects is intrinsically linked to power, both on the individual and the collective level. The power-affect nexus, oddly neglected in EIR,[100] is nevertheless crucial to understand political phenomena such as uprisings in which the question of power is central. Spinoza's theory of affects, elaborated in the *Ethics*, led to developments in the *Political Treatise* on how states attempt to channel affective circulations within the multitude, and how these affects can shape, strengthen, undermine, and sometimes overthrow the state. On the basis of these reflections, I thus conceptualise how affective circulations can have disempowering and empowering effects on large groups of individuals and how they can lead to the emergence of a revolutionary transnational multitude.

Plan of the thesis

The first three chapters establish the Spinozist ontological foundations to understand how collective affects emerge and circulate transnationally. The first chapter draws from Spinoza's theory of affects to reject Cartesian dualism and individualism and conceptualise collective emotions as affective circulations. These empowering or disempowering affective circulations are triggered by affective imitation, a tendency to imitate someone else's affects, relying on a fluid identification with them.

[100] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics', 507.

The second chapter builds on Spinoza's concept of 'multitude' to analyse the role played by affects in social and political dynamics. Unlike social contract theorists, like Hobbes, Spinoza thinks that popular emotions are never excluded from the political sphere since the state constantly channels the multitude's affects to sustain itself. The multitude's power is however never fully captured and circulations of indignation, intensified by complex affections, may set the multitude into motion against the state. Through its action, the state has turned the multitude into an imagined community, which makes it particularly conductive to affective circulations at the national level. This is an effect of what I call the social structure of affects. However, through Spinoza's theory, I conceptualise the emergence of a transnational multitude: transnational affective circulations are indeed possible and may fuel social unrest across countries, bringing into opposition a transnational revolutionary multitude and a bloc of regimes.

The third chapter is an excursus to address Hardt and Negri's works on the multitude through the question of its consistency. Whereas for them the consistency of the heterogeneous groups forming the multitude relies on a common ideology, I argue that, for Spinoza, the multitude emerges through common affects only. The multitude is thus defined formally through the affective dynamics it creates – and conversely, that created it – rather than substantially through any given characteristic.

The fourth and fifth chapters illustrate how affective patterns interplay in revolutionary dynamics. The fourth chapter connects Spinoza's ontological foundations with empirical analysis. By contrast with Kurt Weyland's approach to revolutionary springs, this research focuses on three affective patterns: repressive fear; revolutionary fraternity, a reciprocal affect that prompts the emergence of the multitude; and revolutionary martyrdom, that ignites circulations of indignation. To address the blind spots in Weyland's theory, I

examine the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring, two canonical examples analysed by Weyland, displaying the three characteristics that define revolutionary springs. I then present the diverse material – textual, visual, sound, and audio-visual resources – and respective methods through which I investigate these affective patterns.

The fifth chapter examines how they interplay in both revolutionary springs at the national level. The articulation between revolutionary fraternity, the shared blood, and revolutionary martyrdom, the shed blood, overwhelms repressive fear, understood as a visceral reaction to revolutionary atmosphere. Revolutionary fraternity was expressed and experienced in both revolutionary springs as a national communion, beyond social divides, opposing a regime orchestrating fratricidal violence. Revolutionary martyrdom, analysed through the massacre of the Capucines in 1848 and Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in 2010, shows that these events generated circulations of indignation that turned local events into martyrdom and the multitude into a revolutionary volcano.

Eventually, the final two chapters offer an international theory of affective patterns in revolutionary springs by showing how a transnational multitude may emerge and be set in motion through affective patterns. The sixth chapter argues that, despite the importance of nationalism, revolutionaries experienced and expressed a transnational form of fraternity. Through direct or indirect identification, revolutionary martyrs sparked transnational circulations of indignation that fuelled social unrest across borders. The articulation of these two affective patterns, exemplified by 'martyr peoples' such as the Polish or the Palestinians, informed the revolutionaries' perspective on international relations: instead of rival states competing in an international system, revolutionaries perceived international affairs as a struggle between a transnational revolutionary multitude and a bloc of counter-revolutionary regimes.

The seventh chapter extends this study of affective patterns to shed light on the spatial and temporal limits of revolutionary springs. Through an analysis of the limitations inherent to revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom, it elucidates various negative cases during the two revolutionary springs and accounts for the affective dynamics that participated in the revolutionary process.

Chapter 1 – A wandering force: a Spinozist theory of affective circulations

> Of what is revolt composed? Of nothing and of everything. Of an electricity disengaged, little by little, of a flame suddenly darting forth, of a wandering force, of a passing breath. This breath encounters heads which speak, brains which dream, souls which suffer, passions which burn, wretchedness which howls, and bears them away.
>
> Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables*[1]

Introduction

The 'wandering force' that makes revolutionary passions burn is the key to our reflection on revolutionary springs. This chapter aims at investigating how affects wander, that is, how they become collective and circulate within and across communities, with a specific focus on indignation. To do so, it establishes a Spinozist ontology of affects.

Emotions are not merely tricky to pin down, measure, and analyse,[2] they are also notoriously complicated to define. In their attempts to settle upon an ontology of emotions, scholars have multiplied the terms to refer to them, such as emotions, feelings, affects, or passions. While some authors explicitly contrast these notions – albeit at times in an idiosyncratic manner – others use them indistinctly.[3] Although some have touted the risk of

[1] Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables* (Minneapolis: Lerner Publishing Group, 2015), 954.
[2] Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, 'Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics', *Review of International Studies* 34, no. S1 (2008): 115–135.
[3] Jean-Michel Roy, 'From Intersubjectivity to International Relations - The Relevance of the "Emotive Turn" of Cognitive Science', in *Emotions in International Politics - Beyond Mainstream*

fragmentation,[4] a few fundamental distinctions are largely accepted and structure the Emotions in International Relations (EIR) subfield. One of them, Hutchison and Bleiker argue,[5] is the difference between emotions and affects: the former is perceived as personal and conscious whereas the latter is rather defined as a non-reflective and bodily dynamic.

By contrast with neighbouring fields, such as geography,[6] the distinction between affects and emotions in EIR has apparently not crystallised into a sharp opposition. Two reasons might help explain this absence of polemic, which is arguably unusual in academic territory. First, the contrast between emotions and affects does not denote, for EIR scholars, an ontological debate, which would imply a radical difference in the way of perceiving the world, but two complementary perspectives that refer to distinct elements of reality. Emotion often denotes 'socially recognized, structured episodes of affectively valenced response, such as "anger", "pride", or "fear"'. Affects, on the other hand, would be 'biases at levels of intensity below conscious awareness'.[7] Emotion and affect would therefore describe two ends of a similar spectrum.

Second, this agreement within the subfield may be explained by the fact that most of the polemic efforts happen beyond the borders of EIR. Even though the role of emotions and affects in international relations is increasingly recognised, and thus scrutinised, this has required combined scholarly efforts against preconceived representations of emotions. It

International Relations, ed. Yohan Ariffin, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Vesselin Popovski (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 81.

[4] Yohan Ariffin, 'Introduction: How Emotions Can Explain Outcomes in International Relations', in *Emotions in International Politics - Beyond Mainstream International Relations*, ed. Yohan Ariffin, Jean-Marc Coicaud, and Vesselin Popovski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 8.

[5] Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics', *International Theory: A Journal Of International Politics, Law And Philosophy* 6, no. 3 (2014): 501–503.

[6] Steve Pile, 'Emotions and Affect in Recent Human Geography', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 35, no. 1 (2010): 5–20.

[7] Todd Hall and Andrew G. Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11', *International Organization*, no. 69 (2015): 3.

follows that the debate has been polarised between EIR scholars and the rest of the IR field, and not amongst EIR scholars themselves.

To understand collective emotions, how they emerge and circulate, I resolutely turn to an ontology of affects.[8] More specifically, I resort to the theory of affects that Spinoza developed in the *Ethics* (1677) and in the *Political Treatise* (1677). Despite the fact that affect theory is often a discussion of 'Massumi's reading of Deleuze's reading of Spinoza and/or Deleuze's reading of Spinoza',[9] Spinoza's texts themselves have received virtually no attention in EIR.[10] Beyond Deleuze, Spinoza has however influenced William James,[11] William E. Connolly,[12] and António R. Damásio,[13] all sources from which EIR has drawn. I do not offer here a genealogical account of Spinozist notions, but I show how and why Spinozism offers a particularly rich ground for conceptualising affective patterns in revolutions.

In this chapter, I describe the foundations of Spinoza's theory of affects. In continuity with EIR, I first argue that studying collective emotions requires getting rid of the Cartesian framework. However, while EIR scholars have focused on the demolition of Descartes's dualism, I contend that these polemical efforts should be extended to his individualism. An individualistic approach of the body makes the understanding of collective

[8] As a result, I only use the terms 'emotion' and 'feeling' in a trivial sense.
[9] Pile, 'Emotions and Affect in Recent Human Geography', 5.
[10] As aforementioned, the importance of Spinoza's theory of affects is acknowledged by several EIR scholars, such as Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics', 125; other similar statements can be read in Jonathan Mercer, 'Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, no. 3 (2006): 290; Coicaud, 'Emotions and Passions in the Discipline of International Relations', 486; Pierre Hassner, *La revanche des passions* (Paris: Fayard, 2015). However, no significant analysis of his philosophy has been made so far.
[11] Kate Stanley, 'Affect and Emotion: James, Dewey, Tomkins, Damasio, Massumi, Spinoza', in *The Palgrave Handbook of Affect Studies and Textual Criticism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 97–112.
[12] William E. Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). Connolly also wrote an article specifically on Spinoza, see William E. Connolly, 'Spinoza and Us', *Political Theory* 29, no. 4 (2001): 583–594.
[13] As the title of his work reveals, see António R. Damásio, *Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain* (London: Heineman, 2003).

emotions impossible, as I show through the example of the Cartesian take on indignation. Through his criticisms of Descartes's system, Spinoza sets out a monist and transindividualist ontology.

This Spinozist ontology paves the way for a conceptualisation of collective emotions, and more precisely, of affective circulations. Spinoza's concept of affective imitation brings out the dynamics underlying these circulations and, because of the role it gives to imagination,[14] explains their flexibility. More specifically, affective imitation is crucial to understanding indignation, the revolutionary affect at the heart of the affective patterns analysed in this thesis.

The last part of this chapter is dedicated to the link between affects and power in Spinoza's system. Unlike classical definitions of power, I underline that the Spinozist concept of power also encompasses the capacity to be affected.[15] This inclusion, consistent with his transindividualism, allows Spinoza to conceive of the composition of collective power through interactions. Affective circulations may be empowering by contributing to these compositions of collective power or disempowering by undermining collective power.

[14] The role of imagination in Spinoza's theory of affects, and in affect studies in general, has already been underlined, see Caroline Williams, 'Affective Processes without a Subject: Rethinking the Relation between Subjectivity and Affect with Spinoza', *Subjectivity* 3, no. 3 (2010): 248; Lisa Blackman, *Immaterial Bodies: Affect, Embodiment, Mediation* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012), 24. On the question of imagination in Spinoza's philosophy at large, see Moira Gatens and Genevieve Lloyd, *Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present* (London: Routledge, 1999).

[15] This question has also been underlined by affect theorists, see for instance Brian Massumi, *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002), 15. It has also been echoed by social scientists who have inherited from the notion of affect, see for instance in geography Ben Anderson, 'Neoliberal Affects', *Progress in Human Geography* 40, no. 6 (2016): 735.

I. An anti-Cartesian theory of emotions

1. Cartesian dualism and Spinozist equalitarism of attributes

Cartesian dualism of attributes has incurred the wrath of the recent literature on emotions in social sciences. Arguably a major turning point in the history of philosophy, Descartes offered in the 17th century a new ontology. The keystone of his system is the substance that he defines as 'a thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence'.[16] These substances are categorised as related to either the attribute of the mind or to the one of the body.[17] These two realms of substances, the souls or minds, on the one hand, and the bodies, on the other, are ontologically separated so that they do not cause each other.[18] The consequence of this fundamental dichotomy, when it comes to feelings, is that emotions (passions, for Descartes) are produced by the body and are therefore completely separated from the 'acts of the soul' which express our free-will and our rationality.[19] By doing so, Descartes gave its most refined form to the dichotomy between emotions and reason.

Certainly, few IR theorists would claim inheritance of Descartes and his system.[20] However, the 'Cartesian assumption',[21] whilst mostly unconscious, has shaped the field by

[16] René Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy* (Whitefish: Kessinger Publishing, 2010), 20.
[17] René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy: With Selections from the Objections and Replies* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), bk. I; Descartes, *The Principles of Philosophy*, chap. I, §53.
[18] Such a philosophy therefore requires an intermediary term, which allows us to understand how our mind can set in motion our body. For Descartes, this was the role played by the pineal gland, in which the soul is joined to the whole body, see René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul and Other Late Philosophical Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), para 31–32, 208.
[19] Descartes, para 17, 203.
[20] With the exception of Alexander Wendt who explicitly defined his early work as Cartesian, a perspective from which he progressively distanced himself. On this point, see Alexander Wendt, 'Social Theory as Cartesian Science: An Auto-Critique from a Quantum Perspective', in *Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics*, ed. Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (London: Routledge, 2006), 181–219; Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
[21] Marcus Holmes, 'International Politics at the Brain's Edge: Social Neuroscience and a New "Via Media"', *International Studies Perspectives* 15, no. 2 (2014): 211.

opposing materialists and idealists. This legacy is even more significant in our understanding of emotional realities. Cartesian ontology, as Neta C. Crawford regrets, 'has long assumed and reified sharp mind/body, brain/mind, thinking/feeling, rational/irrational dichotomies'.[22] Against dualist assumptions, the neurologist Damásio provides evidence that people deprived of their full emotional capacities would actually be irrational.[23] Following the path Damásio opened, IR scholars, and primarily Jonathan Mercer,[24] have refused these dichotomies and argued that emotions were part and parcel of rational cognitive processes.

Diverse ontologies have been conceived of or integrated into IR theory to debunk Cartesianism.[25] I suggest that Spinoza's philosophy could provide us with a radical and fertile alternative. A caveat though: whereas he uncompromisingly refuted Descartes, Spinoza kept using distinctively Cartesian concepts, although with different meanings.[26] Understanding the novelty and the originality of Spinoza's thought thus requires from us a close attention to these theoretical shifts.

In contrast to Descartes, Spinoza does not consider attributes as separate categories of things, but as two expressions of the same substance.[27] This equalitarism of attributes[28]

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[22] Neta C. Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy' 6, no. 3 (2014): 536.

[23] António R. Damásio, *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason and the Human Brain* (London: Picador, 1995); Damásio, *Looking for Spinoza*.

[24] Mercer, 'Human Nature and the First Image'.

[25] Andrew A. G. Ross has brilliantly situated this debate within IR by showing the limits and contradictions of Wendt's Cartesianism while affirming another ontology based on William James's work, see Andrew G. Ross, 'Coming in from the Cold: Constructivism and Emotions', *European Journal of International Relations* 12, no. 2 (2006): 197–222.

[26] Yirmiyahu Yovel shows how Spinoza hides his polemical arguments under classical concepts that he borrows from his adversaries (here Descartes, elsewhere Hobbes as I will show in chapter 2), a practice that Yovel interprets as part of the Marrano identity of Spinoza. On this Marrano dimension of Spinoza's rhetoric, see Yirmiyahu Yovel, *Spinoza et autres hérétiques* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1991), 29.

[27] *Ethics* I, prop. 10, schol.

[28] As it has been convincingly argued by Chantal Jaquet, the term parallelist, often used to describe Spinoza's position, is somewhat misleading because minds and bodies are not parallel – which would imply that there are distinct – but equal, see Chantal Jaquet, *Affects, Actions and Passions in Spinoza: The Unity of Body and Mind* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018), chap. 1. I derive from equality the terms 'equalitarism' and 'equalitarist'.

contends that the ideas of our minds express certain affections of our bodies.[29] To briefly summarise this perspective, I shall take an example. You are reading. At the body level, the materiality of the text, black letters inked on a page, affects your eyes and then your brain; at the mind level, you are formulating ideas and affects. Both these dimensions are implied at the same time in the act of reading, the physical affection of the page and the affects. Attributes are two ways for things to express themselves and through which we can perceive how they interact, or, in Spinoza's lexicon, how they affect each other.[30]

Spinoza's ontology effectively get rid of Descartes's dualism. Due to the influence of Connolly, Deleuze & Guattari, and Damásio on the subfield, themselves influenced by Spinoza, the equalitarism of attributes may not seem entirely foreign to EIR scholars. However, Spinoza pushes the conversation forward by targeting Descartes's individualism.

2. Cartesian individualism and Cartesian indignation

Though Cartesianism has been largely recused in EIR, scholars have limited their criticisms to his opposition between reason and emotions. The analysis of Spinoza's philosophy, however, points to another issue with the Cartesian system: its fundamental individualism. Individualism has hardly been questioned by EIR scholars. On the contrary, the emotional turn, by referring to a subjectivity that had been hidden by rationalist or structural approaches, may have favoured the idea of a full subject, provided with individuality and freedom.[31] However, individualism prevents us from understanding collective affects.

[29] *Ethics* II, prop. 13.
[30] This distinction seems close to the one established by Damásio between emotions, that is, the movements of and within the body, and feelings, i.e. the mental images which give meanings to the former, see Damásio, *Looking for Spinoza*, chap. II.
[31] Patricia Ticineto Clough, 'The Affective Turn - Theorizing the Social', in *The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social*, by Jean O'Malley Halley and Patricia Ticineto Clough (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2007), 219.

Due to his definition of the substance, Descartes offers a strong version of individualism: each individual stands alone,[32] ontologically separated from the others. Each individual is thus a self-sufficient unit. And since our bodies are individual so are the passions produced by these bodies. As a result, Descartes's theory implies an individualistic approach that undermines the very possibility of conceptualising collective emotions.

Cartesian individualism is indeed part and parcel of his understanding of emotions, as it appears, for instance, when one looks at his definition of indignation. Jon Elster defines Cartesian indignation as a 'third-party emotion', an anger triggered when a wrong is inflicted to someone you love.[33] A third-party emotion makes collective emotions theoretically possible since two individuals, and potentially many more, may share the same feeling. Drawing from Elster's work, Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri show for instance the role played by indignation in enrolment in civil war.[34] In the same way, a third-party emotion is precisely what is needed to analyse revolutionary springs.

This is not what Cartesian indignation is about. Certainly, Elster is right in that Descartes defines indignation as the 'kind of hatred or aversion that we naturally have towards those who do some evil, whatever it may be'.[35] Pity is triggered, Descartes affirms, 'because [people] think of the evil afflicting others as capable of befalling themselves'.[36] Indignation, it appears, has an individualistic root. It only relies on the reflexive idea that you

[32] 'Substance' comes from Latin *substare*, to stand firm (literally, to stand under).
[33] Jon Elster, 'Emotions and Economic Theory', *Journal of Economic Literature* 36, no. 1 (1998): 47–74; Jon Elster, 'Indeterminacy of Emotional Mechanisms', in *Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms*, by Pierre Demeulenaere (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 50–63.
[34] Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri, 'Indignation, Ideologies, and Armed Mobilization: Civil War in Italy, 1943-45', *International Security* 40, no. 2 (2015): 119–157; Stefano Costalli and Andrea Ruggeri, 'Symposium on "Emotions, Ideologies, and Violent Political Mobilization": Introduction', *PS: Political Science and Politics* 50 (2017): 923–927.
[35] René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 397.
[36] Descartes, I, 395.

may suffer from the same evil.[37] Conversely, 'when our indignation concerns an evil deed which cannot harm us … this gives some pleasure',[38] hence, for instance, our enjoyment in mocking people's misfortunes. Although indignation is a third-party emotion, it appears as strongly limited by distance. It seems indeed unlikely that this passion would be experienced across borders since we are unlikely to be affected by the same evil deed that affects or affected foreigners.

Cartesian indignation is not only unlikely to trigger protests *abroad*, it is unlikely to produce protests *at all*. Indignation is indeed less intense than anger, and less likely to be followed by any action since 'It is desire [of revenge], joined to self-love, which makes anger involve as much agitation of the blood as courage and boldness can bring about'.[39] As Elster argues,[40] Descartes acknowledges that experiencing love towards the victim of a wrong may make indignation more intense,[41] but this statement is immediately qualified, as Descartes adds that, even in this exceptional situation due to the outstanding goodness of the subject, this 'commotion does not last'.[42]

Consequently, Cartesian indignation is more suitable to describing mocking and ribbing, which is Descartes's recurrent example, than to understand spontaneous uprisings. His reluctance to imagine an overwhelming indignation that would lead to radical actions is nevertheless consistent with his individualist ontology, hence the need for a non-individualistic ontology to conceptualise a transnational revolutionary indignation.

[37] When the body experiences indignation, it is impacted by an external body, but only in a reflexive way as it is ultimately the idea of your own body that is at stake.
[38] Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, I, 398.
[39] Descartes, I, 399.
[40] Jon Elster, 'Indeterminacy of Emotional Mechanisms', *Analytical Sociology and Social Mechanisms* 50 (2011): 52.
[41] Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, I, 400.
[42] Descartes, I, 400.

3. Spinozist transindividualism: there are no such things as individuals

Spinoza offers such an ontology. As we know, Descartes's keystone was the notion of substance that claimed the ontological self-sufficiency of things, be they bodies or minds. Spinoza inherits from this Cartesian definition[43] but changes the extension of the concept: only God, which is for Spinoza the whole Nature, is actually a substance.[44] By contrast with the Cartesian plurality of substances, Spinoza affirms the existence of one unique substance.

The consequence of this shift is that individual things – what Spinoza calls modes[45] or individuals, and which are, for instance, me, this thesis, you my reader – are *not* substances.[46] Individuals are not self-sufficient units, and this for several reasons. First, any individual mode, apart from the simplest ones, is composed of several individuals.[47] Second, and more importantly for us, an individual is always *affecting* and *being affected* – in short, interacting – with others. Individuals are thus produced through continuous internal and external interactions and are never fully separated from each other.[48] Strictly speaking, there are no such things as *individuals*.

Spinoza's equalitarism consequently avoids any illusory opposition between materialism and idealism, bodies and minds, ideas and emotions, individuals and

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[43] *Ethics* I, def 6: 'what is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that those whose concept does not require the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed'. It may be noticed that in his definition, Spinoza transfers the question to the epistemological level. This is due to the fact that, for Spinoza, to exist independently and to be conceived independently are strictly equivalent.

[44] *Ethics* I, def. 6.

[45] Defined as 'the affections of a substance, or that which is in another through which it is also conceived', see *Ethics* I, def. 5.

[46] This proposition should not be read in a narrowed theological way, the creatures not being granted the ontological dignity of the Creator, since the substance – God, the Nature – does not exist outside of its multiple individual modes. In other words, Nature is nothing transcendent but only the totality of things.

[47] *Ethics* II, prop. 13, definition.

[48] To be precise, there is no individuation for Spinoza, understood as an individual process through which the individual would emerge, but he maintains individualisation understood as the production of a unique being. In other words, individuals are truly unique in that they are the unique combinations of given affections. On this point, see Étienne Balibar, *Spinoza from Individuality to Transindividuality*.

communities.[49] Several IR scholars have expressed scepticism towards a materialistic approach to collective emotions. The body being individual, they argue, it makes the understanding of collective emotions impossible, hence Mercer's argument that, the body being individual, 'emotion is ontologically irreducible to the body'.[50] Similarly, Renee Jeffery affirms that 'a straightforwardly materialist understanding of the emotions, with its emphasis on the neural processes of the individual brain, appears unable to account for collective emotions insofar as they are more than the sum of individual members' experiences'.[51] However, as we saw, the theory defended here is hardly threatened since Spinoza's equalitarism refuses any opposition between minds and bodies while his transindividualism refutes the individualistic conception of bodies.

Even though there is no individuation for Spinoza, in so that individuals are always composed of individuals and never fully separated from others, affects prompt individualisation by which I mean that affects, because they mark and shape the bodies, make individuals unique. What makes an individual unique is indeed the specific combination of affections that have shaped and marked their body. Past affects create what Spinoza calls a

[49] The fact that Spinoza rejects classical typologies explains why he is difficult to label. While Wendt refers to Spinoza as a panpsychist author (see Wendt, 'Social Theory as Cartesian Science: An Auto-Critique from a Quantum Perspective'; Alexander Wendt, *Quantum Mind and Social Science: Unifying Physical and Social Ontology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), he is most often defined as a materialist (see Louis Althusser, 'The Only Materialist Tradition, Part 1: Spinoza', in *The New Spinoza*, ed. Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 1–9; Emilia Giancotti, 'The Birth of Modern Materialism in Hobbes and Spinoza', in *The New Spinoza*, ed. Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 48–62.). For reasons expressed in this chapter, I believe that, strictly speaking, he is neither. Paradoxically, this might be a chance for materialism. Spinoza is one of the authors used by new-materialist scholars who attempt to conceive a form of materialism including 'ideational' aspects of reality that have been brought out by poststructuralist, feminist, and post-colonial studies. On this, see Diana H. Coole and Samantha Frost, *New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010).

[50] Jonathan Mercer, 'Feeling like a State: Social Emotion and Identity', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 520.

[51] Renée Jeffery, 'The Promise and Problems of the Neuroscientific Approach to Emotions', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 587.

'complexion' (*ingenium*)[52] and what EIR scholars define as 'an affective disposition',[53] that is, a tendency to be affected in certain ways. Since affects can be collective, some affective dispositions may also be so.[54]

This theoretical move is profound and should not be reduced to a question of level of analysis. It is not a shift from individuals to collectives, but more decisively, from individuals to continuous interactions. The rejection of Descartes's substantialist and individualist philosophy,[55] and the subsequent adoption of a Spinozist approach that could be defined as processual[56] and transindividualist[57] also changes the perspective on emotions. An affective theory does not only stress the importance of collective affects, it also conceptualises these affects as processes that emerge and circulate through interactions – i.e. how people affect each other –.[58] Collective emotions are not just emotions shared by a plurality of individuals but a wandering force that emerges and circulates across individuals.

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[52] The notion of 'complexion' is used throughout the *Ethics*, see its first occurrence in *Ethics* I, prop. 36, appendix.

[53] See for instance Lucile Eznack, 'Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies' Relationships', *Security Studies* 20, no. 2 (1 April 2011): 238–265; Lucile Eznack, 'The Mood Was Grave: Affective Dispositions and States' Anger-Related Behaviour', *Contemporary Security Policy* 34, no. 3 (8 October 2013): 1–29; Lucile Eznack, 'Let's Stay Friends! Relational Repair in Friendly Interstate Relations', *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 22, no. 4 (2013): 55–76; Andrew G. Ross, *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 44.

[54] Pierre-François Moreau, *Spinoza, L'expérience et l'éternité* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994), 427–467.

[55] On the use of Spinoza to counter individualism in social sciences, see Yves Citton and Frédéric Lordon, *Spinoza et les sciences sociales : De la puissance de la multitude à l'économie des affects* (Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2008), 29.

[56] For a processual perspective in IR, see Patrick Jackson and Daniel Nexon, 'Relations before States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics', *European Journal of International Relations* 5, no. 3 (1999): 291–332.

[57] Étienne Balibar has borrowed from Gilbert Simondon's the concept of transindividual to conceptualise this form of fluid individuality (see Balibar, *Spinoza from Individuality to Transindividuality*). Since then, this path has been followed by several other Spinozists, see Warren Montag, 'Who's Afraid of the Multitude? Between the Individual and the State', *South Atlantic Quarterly* 104, no. 4 (2005): 655–673; Vittorio Morfino, *Plural Temporality: Transindividuality and the Aleatory between Spinoza and Althusser* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Jason Read, *The Politics of Transindividuality* (Leiden: Brill, 2015).

[58] As Caroline Williams affirms, 'affects are forms of encounter; they circulate – sometimes ambivalently, but always productively – between and within bodies (of all kinds), telling us something

Figure 1 – Comparison between Descartes's and Spinoza's ontologies	
Descartes	*Spinoza*
Ontology of substance	Ontology of relations
Dualism	Equalitarist monism
The individual is a substance (individualism)	The individual is produced through internal and external interactions

II. Affective circulations

1. Affective circulations as an approach to collective emotions

Collective emotions are the holy grail of EIR. While some scholars develop macro-level models to look at shared feelings in a community, such as the state,[59] processual approaches examine how emotions *become* collective. This processual ontology has several advantages. It first prevents the risk of homogenizing emotions at the macro-level and gives the possibility of analysing different scales and different forms of communities at the same time.[60] Second, while Social Identity Theories (SIT) begin with collective identities and then analyse their collective emotions, affective circulations invites to analyse collective emotions outside of constituted communities and to investigate the role played by these circulations in the emergence of new communities.[61]

The most elaborate model of affective circulations in EIR was first presented in Andrew G. Ross's work, *Mixed Emotions*,[62] and then developed in 'Affective Politics after

important about the power of affect to unravel subjectivity and modify the political body', see Caroline Williams, 'Affective Processes without a Subject', 246.

[59] See Brent Sasley, 'Theorizing States' Emotions', *International Studies Review* 13, no. 3 (2011): 452–476; Mercer, 'Feeling like a State'.

[60] Hutchison and Bleiker, 'Theorizing Emotions in World Politics', 496–500.

[61] Hall and Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11', 859.

[62] See Andrew G. Ross, *Mixed Emotions*.

9/11'[63] written in collaboration with Todd Hall. In the latter piece, the authors bring out three affective circulations. The first one, bottom-up, derives from SIT and reveals how individuals experience emotions in relation with their collective identities. The second dynamic, horizontal, shows precisely how affective contagions can escape from these already-made identities. Drawing from neuroscientific insights and especially from Rizzolatti's theory of mirror neurons,[64] horizontal contagion occurs due to spontaneous automatic responses to the perception of emotional displays. Lastly, affects can be harmonised in a top-down manner due to social expectations and norms, potentially enforced by institutions.

2. Affective imitation as the spring of affective circulations

Spinoza's conceptualisation of affective circulations shares important similarities with the model presented by Hall and Ross. However, while Ross insists on the creative dimension of these circulations,[65] Spinoza rather highlights the importance of affective dynamics, including one he terms 'affective imitation' (*affectuum imitatio*). Affective imitation points to the fact that 'if we imagine a thing like us, toward which we have had no affect, to be affected, we are thereby affected with a like affect'.[66] This assumption derives from Spinoza's equalitarism, which postulates that what happens in the mind also happens in the body. As a result, as soon as our mind imagines[67] the suffering of a body conceived as similar to ours,

[63] Hall and Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11'.
[64] Giacomo Rizzolatti, *Mirrors in the Brain: How Our Minds Share Actions, Emotions, and Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
[65] Ross, *Mixed Emotions*, chap. II.
[66] *Ethics* III, prop. 27. This affective imitation is thus what Benjamin Cuff & alii call transpathy and should be distinguished from empathy, defined as the capacity to understand someone else's emotions. On this distinction, see Benjamin M. P. Cuff et al., 'Empathy: A Review of the Concept', *Emotion Review* 8, no. 2 (2016): 145.
[67] Implicitly, this insistence on imagination or images leads us to focus on the role and power of sight. This perspective is little surprising and seems to have been privileged by most scholars when it comes to emotions. However, other affect theorists have explored other paths, see for instance Brennan's

some parts of our body move in the same way as if we were suffering ourselves. And consequently, we do suffer.[68] Unlike materialist philosophers of his time such as Hobbes[69] or dualist thinkers like Descartes, Spinoza affirms that affects circulate from a body to another thanks to affective imitation.

Even though affective imitation is an unconscious dynamic, it is triggered by the representation of similarities between the imitator and the imitated. Moreover, a high degree of similarity or some affective predispositions towards the imitated may increase affective contagion but Spinoza contends that belonging to humanity is the only similarity required.[70]

The importance of social identities in affective responses seems to be largely supported by works in neurosciences. Although the neural foundations at stake are diverse and should not be limited to Giacomo Rizzolatti's famous theory of mirror neurons,[71] I will focus on the latter due to the importance it has had in social sciences. Rizzolatti notices that, at a visceromotor level, our mirror neurons fire when we perceive emotional stimuli. This allows us to assess someone's situation, and the emotional response that may be caused.

reflections on the role of smell: Teresa Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004), 68–70.

[68] This dynamic is clearly exposed in Alexandre Matheron, *Individu et communauté chez Spinoza* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1969), 154–155. Alexandre Matheron sadly passed away in January 2020 and I would like to acknowledge here what Spinozist studies, in general, and my intellectual path, more personally, owe to a work outstanding by its rigour and its dazzling insights. *Aliquid remanet, quod aeternum est.*

[69] In comparison, Hobbesian pity is limited to be the reaction to the imagined possibility that the same wrong that happens to someone could happen to you, the more likely that is, the stronger the feeling. By comparison with Spinoza's, this approach appears as more rationalistic (as commonly understood) and individualist. See Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), chap. VI, p. 43.

[70] *Ethics* IV, prop. 37, schol. 1.

[71] See for instance Inbal Ben-Ami Bartal, Jean Decety, and Peggy Mason, 'Empathy and Pro-Social Behavior in Rats', *Science* 334, no. 6061 (2011): 1427–1430; Jean Decety et al., 'A Neurobehavioral Evolutionary Perspective on the Mechanisms Underlying Empathy', *Progress in Neurobiology* 98, no. 1 (2012): 38–48; Cuff et al., 'Empathy'; Christian Keysers and Valeria Gazzola, 'Neural Correlates of Empathy in Humans, and the Need for Animal Models', in *Neuronal Correlates of Empathy* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2018), 37–52. I thank Clara Voyvodic Casabo for her remarks and suggestions on this point.

Furthermore, these neurons would also be partly responsible for empathy. Considering the potential discrepancy between these two situations, Rizzolatti affirms that:

> compassion depends on many factors other than the recognition of pain; just to name a few: who the other person is, what our relationship with them is, the more or less important capacity we have to imagine ourselves in their position, whether we want to assume responsibility for their emotive state, wishes and expectations, and so on. If it is someone we know or against whom we have nothing, the emotive mirroring caused by the sight of their plight may provoke our pity or compassion; if on the other hand the person is an enemy or is doing something that constitutes a threat for us, or if we are declared sadists, then the situation changes radically.[72]

In other words and in conformity with Spinoza's view of affective imitation, our social and personal representations are already at stake in a dynamic which remains unconscious and visceral.

These representations, be they social or subjective, are not given once for all either. If they influence the way affects circulate, they are also conversely shaped by affects that, in

[72] Rizzolatti, *Mirrors in the Brain*, 191. I have modified here two crucial passages of Frances Anderson's translation. First, I translate 'dal fatto che siamo più o meno in grado di metterci nei suoi panni' (p.181 in the original version) by 'the more or less important capacity we have to imagine ourselves in his position' instead of 'whether or not we are able to imagine ourselves in his situation'. The original version presents indeed a graduation ('more or less') which had become a dichotomy in Anderson's translation. Furthermore, I also translate 'Se è qualcuno che conosciamo o contro cui non abbiamo nulla' (p.181) by 'If it is someone we know or against whom we have nothing' instead of 'If it is someone we know and love'. This is significant, as it drastically changes the extension of empathy. While Anderson's translation limits empathy to the relatively few people we know and love, Rizzolatti actually claims that empathy is extended to people towards whom we do not have hard feelings, such as complete strangers, which is also what Spinoza argued.

Spinoza's lexicon, leave their marks on the body[73] and thus on the mind, in accordance to Spinoza's equalitarism. This plasticity of the body, and more precisely, of the brain, received the support of recent discoveries on neuroplasticity[74] that 'uncovers a much more plastic, fluid conception of human nature'.[75]

3. Processual identification over substantial identities

Understanding the role of these social representations supposes a distinction between identity and identification. Intergroup Emotions Theory (IET) has convincingly showed the role of social representations in the experience of group-level emotions.[76] However, 'identity' and 'identification' are often conflated. With the rise of constructivism, the concept of identity has received increasing attention in IR theory,[77] despite conflicting definitions and uses. While 'identity' was primarily put in the spotlight to stress the constructed nature of social representations,[78] it was soon used as a predicate[79] or a variable.[80] Radical constructivists, such as Maja Zehfuss, criticised the essentialism that was commonly

[73] *Ethics* III, post. 2.
[74] On the importance of neuroplasticity for social sciences, see Elizabeth A. Wilson, *Psychosomatic: Feminism and the Neurological Body* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004); Brennan, *The Transmission of Affect*; Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics'; Blackman, *Immaterial Bodies*; Christian Reus-Smit, 'Emotions and the Social', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 568–574.
[75] Duncan Bell, 'In Biology We Trust: Biopolitical Science and the Elusive Self', in *Human Beings in International Relations*, by Daniel Jacobi and Annette Freyberg-Inan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 128.
[76] See Eliot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger, and Diane M. Mackie, 'Can Emotions Be Truly Group Level? Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria', *Journal Of Personality And Social Psychology* 93, no. 3 (2007): 431–446; Roger Giner-Sorolla, Diane M. Mackie, and Eliot R. Smith, 'Special Issue on Intergroup Emotions: Introduction', *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations* 10, no. 1 (2007): 5–8; Diane M. Mackie, Eliot R. Smith, and Devin G. Ray, 'Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations', *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2, no. 5 (2008): 1866–1880. For an application of IET in EIR, see Sasley, 'Theorizing States' Emotions'.
[77] James D. Fearon, 'What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)?', *Unpublished Manuscript, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif*, 1999, 4–5.
[78] Felix Berenskoetter, 'Identity in International Relations', in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 2010, 7.
[79] Fearon, 'What Is Identity (as We Now Use the Word)?', 12.
[80] Rawi Abdelal et al., 'Identity as a Variable', *Perspectives on Politics* 4, no. 4 (2006): 695–711.

associated to identity.[81] In other social sciences, in which a similar shift in meaning occurred, some have advocated for the term identification instead.[82] While identity refers to 'relatively stable'[83] qualities over time, identification is an act, 'a construction, a process never completed – always "in process".'[84] The distinction between identity – as a set of self-representations – , and identification – as the way these representations are used at a given moment – offers more precision and clarity.

Affective imitation stresses identification over identity while stressing the importance of imagination.[85] This has two main consequences. It first means that affective imitation relies on imagined, and possibly imaginary, similarities between the imitator and the imitated. The reality or the objective importance of these similarities have therefore no consequence on affective imitation as long as the imitator imagines that they are real and important. Affective imitation is thus open to approximations, clichés, and mistakes. Conversely, some actual similarities between the imitator and the imitated may exist and be ignored or considered of little importance by the imitator, weakening affective imitation or even preventing it completely from happening.

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[81] Maja Zehfuss, 'Constructivism and Identity':, *European Journal of International Relations* 7, no. 3 (2001): 315–348.

[82] See Stuart Hall, 'Who Needs Identity?', in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, by Stuart Hall and Paul Du Gay (New York: Sage, 1996), 1–17; Rogers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, 'Beyond "Identity"', *Theory and Society* 29, no. 1 (2000): 1–47. The transposition of this distinction into IR is still largely unexplored with the recent exception of Bernd Bucher and Ursula Jasper, 'Revisiting "Identity" in International Relations: From Identity as Substance to Identifications in Action', *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2018): 391. Even though the method presented by Bucher and Jasper is relevant to our project, they do not link the question of identity/identification to affects or emotions.

[83] Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (1992): 397.

[84] Hall, 'Who Needs Identity?', 2.

[85] Imagination is for Spinoza the 'first kind of cognition' which encompasses direction perception, sensations, recollections of facts, and imagining through reading and hearing (*Ethics* II, prop. 40, school. 2, I-II). As such 'imagination is an idea which indicates the present constitution of the human body more than the nature of an external body' (*Ethics* IV, prop.1, schol.). In simpler terms, imagination tells us more about the person imagining than the object imagined.

The other consequence of the stress on identification is that more attention is paid to the context in which this process occurs. Circumstantial elements can impact the intensity and the clarity of imagined similarities between the imitator and the imitated. An experiment conducted by psychologists concludes that framing social categorization influences the intensity of emotional experiences.[86] They conducted an experiment in which they asked two groups of Belgian and Dutch students to measure their level of fear in reaction to 9/11. In the questions, one group was referred to as Europeans (for whom U.S. citizens were an out-group) and the other as Westerners (for whom U.S. citizens were an in-group). Even though there were virtually no differences in terms of identities, the context in which identification occurred framed the representations of the groups so that the second group experienced on average a higher level of fear. The intensity of affective imitation may thus vary substantially due to changes in context.

Stressing the role of identification over identity with regards to collective emotions avoids assuming pre-existing blocks, the state, the civilisation, in which emotions are collectively and homogenously experienced. Identification, depending on imagination and context, is fluid and can therefore vary across time. Since identification is not restricted to any form of identity (local, national, transnational) but relies on them nevertheless, it sheds light both on national and transnational affective circulations. Unlike Ross and Hall's model, the same dynamic is at stake in bottom-up and horizontal dynamics for Spinoza. Affective imitation explains both the importance of pre-existent identities and communities and the possibility for affect to circulate across these communities. Shifting from the notion of identity to that of identification facilitates the investigation of transnational affective circulations that exceed national identities.

[86] Muriel Dumont et al., 'Social Categorization and Fear Reactions to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 29, no. 12 (2003): 1509–1520.

4. Affective imitation and indignation

Whereas Descartes's indignation could not convincingly explain social protests, let alone transnational ones, Spinoza's notion of indignation does. Cartesian indignation is limited to a mild passion unlikely to lead to any action, because it is rooted in Cartesian individualism. Spinozist indignation, relying on the fluidity between bodies, does not suffer such a limit. Spinozist indignation does not rely on self-interest[87] but only on imagining a wrong inflicted to someone. This type of indignation can travel further and even across borders as there is no need to be under the same threat to experience it.

Other concepts are required to fully unpack Spinoza's concept of indignation, as we will see in chapter 2 but affective imitation offers a first insight into how this affect is triggered. Echoing Descartes, Spinoza defines indignation as the 'hatred toward him who has done evil to another'.[88] Indignation draws from affective imitation because an individual (A) immediately imitates the hatred they imagine is experienced by the victim of a wrong (B) towards the one who committed it (C). The more the victim is loved by us, if we know them, or imagined similar to us in any case, the more intense indignation is felt. The affective experience represented by the red line is thus caused by the imaginary representations symbolised by the dotted line.

As often with the *Ethics*, the text goes straight to the point and the reader is left with the task of spelling out the argument. In the situation described above, there is a direct

[87] I take 'self-interest' in a narrow sense here. Unlike deontological philosophies such as the one professed by Immanuel Kant, Spinoza believes that all our acts are derived from our own interests. However, our own interests may lead to altruistic behaviours as the latter may make us joyful through affective imitation or other affective dynamics. On this point, see Frédéric Lordon, *L'Intérêt souverain : Essai d'anthropologie économique spinoziste* (Paris: Éditions la Découverte, 2006).

[88] *Ethics* III, prop. 22, schol. Spinoza considers indignation as a form of hatred and not of anger (defined in *Ethics* III, prop. 40, note on prop. 40), as might be expected. This is because love, hatred, and desire are the primary colours in Spinoza's affective palette, from which he derives all the other affects.

identification between A and the victim B based on imagined similarities between them. The dotted line in the figure below signifies that this process may not be conscious.

Direct identification can be triggered by an individual or a group. In the former case, individual direct identification occurs when the victim B is an individual. In the latter, B is a group of persons so that there is a mass direct identification.[89] By contrast with individual direct identification, the characteristics of a group of victims are not always precise. They are often limited to national, religious, ethnic, ideological or social belonging, and, obviously, their humanity. Although there are less characteristics with which one can identify, this is counterbalanced by the fact that the number of victims increases the affective experience.[90]



Figure 2 – Direct identification

[89] In the *Ethics*, Spinoza only refers to interindividual affective imitation, which I believe is due to the dry style of the text and not to a theoretical impossibility. Elsewhere, Spinoza evokes the possibility of generic representations, that is, representations of a social group based on nationality or class (see for instance *Ethics* III, prop. 46). As far as I can tell, there is thus no contradiction in imagining a wrong inflicted to a group of people instead of to a single individual.

[90] To the extent that this would make the situation more outstanding and thus more striking, see *Ethics*, III, prop. 52.

Frédéric Lordon argues that, instead of a subjective account of emotions, Spinoza's system provides us with structures of affects.[91] Emotions are indeed not primarily seen as part of a subjective inner life but rather as the causes and consequences of social forces. The model above shows what could be called the ontological structure of indignation as it relies on the ontology of both individuals and affects. I will further developed the reflection on the structures of affects in chapter 2 before applying them to revolutionary springs.

III. Affect and power

1. The relation between affect and power

Affects and power are entangled in Spinoza's thought, a nexus that has been reclaimed in various ways by affective studies scholars.[92] This is already apparent in Spinoza's definition of affect: 'by affect, I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of affecting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time the ideas of these affections'.[93] An affect is the effect of the use of power in my body. However, this affection of my body conversely produces an increase or a decrease of my power. This power is measured by the degree at which the body is 'capable of affecting external bodies in a great many ways' but also of 'being affected in a great many ways'.[94] This power is thus modulated through the affections it receives from external objects.

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[91] Frédéric Lordon, *La société des affects : pour un structuralisme des passions* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2013).
[92] Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', in *The Affect Theory Reader*, by Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), 2.
[93] *Ethics* III, def. 3.
[94] *Ethics* IV, prop. 38. The proposition explicitly concerns the human body but, except that the human body is particularly capable of affecting and being affected in many ways as it is 'composed of a great many individuals of different natures, each of which is highly composite' (*Ethics* II, prop. 13, post. 1), which is a difference of degree rather than of quality, there is apparently no reason to consider that this would not apply to other beings.

Due to Spinoza's equalitarism of attributes, these affections of the body are expressed simultaneously as affects at the mind level. An affection that increases the power of the body is generally at the same time an affect of joy, whereas a decrease of power is commonly experienced as sadness.[95] In order to clarify what Spinoza has in mind, let's have a look at both ends of the power spectrum. On the one hand, there is the free man[96] who understands the natural causal dynamics and can joyfully act upon the world and interact with other beings, amongst whom other free men.[97] Even though the figure of the free man illustrates how power, for Spinoza, is expressed through acting and interacting, it nevertheless constitutes an ideal that is, if not impossible to reach, at least rare and thus of little use in social sciences. On the other hand, there is the man who fears death. Fear is a debilitating affect as it prevents an individual from acting in conformity with their desires.[98] Affect may consequently favour or hinder actions.

2. Empowering and disempowering affective circulations

Affect and power are also in relation at the collective level. Spinoza's definition of power is dual and, Massumi warns us,[99] the second half should not be forgotten: power is the capacity to affect *and* to be affected. The insistence on this second dimension of power is at odds with classical definitions of power. Over the last half-century, debates in social sciences have

[95] *Ethics* III, prop. 11. 'Generally' and 'commonly' but not always. An increase of the power of a part of the body, experienced as joy, may undermine the proportions of a body and thus lead to a diminution of power of the whole body (see *Ethics* IV, prop. 30).
[96] The free man is the object of *Ethics* V.
[97] *Ethics* IV, prop. 35.
[98] *Ethics* III, prop. 39, schol. On this question, see Chantal Jaquet, *Les expressions de la puissance d'agir chez Spinoza* (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2005), pt. IV, chap. 6.
[99] Brian Massumi, *Politics of Affect* (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 48.

added layers of complexity to the definition of power.[100] First limited to be the capacity for A to make B do something they would not otherwise do,[101] the notion has been enlarged to the capacity to set the political and social agenda.[102] Steven Lukes, drawing from Antonio Gramsci's analysis of ideology, shed light on the power for A to shape B's very wants.[103] All these definitions, however, from Dahl to Lukes, and despite the indisputable variety of perspectives, examine power as the capacity to affect, and not to be affected.

The insistence on the power to be affected is profoundly rooted in Spinoza's ontology, and I will not unpack here all the consequences of this theoretical stand.[104] More specifically, this affirmation informs our interpretation of Spinoza's rejection of individualism. Power is not limited to be the individual's ability to make the world obey its desires, but is also and above all the 'capacity to be really in the world'.[105] The highest degree of action is not acting upon something, but *interacting*. Strictly speaking, bodies constantly affect each other and thus interact. Insisting on the power to be affected is consistent with Spinoza's reflections on interactions, although it may surprise at first sight. It is through the affections of the bodies, that is, through the way our body is affected by other bodies, that we learn both about ourselves[106] and about the world.[107]

[100] For a convincing and committed summary of the debates on the question of power in social sciences, see Terry Hathaway, 'Lukes Reloaded: An Actor-Centred Three-Dimensional Power Framework', *Politics* 36, no. 2 (2016): 118–130.
[101] Robert A. Dahl, 'The Concept of Power', *Behavioral Science* 2, no. 3 (1957): 201–215.
[102] Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', *American Political Science Review* 56, no. 4 (1962): 947–952.
[103] Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
[104] For a more exhaustive presentation of this question, see Michael Hardt, 'The Power to Be Affected', *International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society* 28, no. 3 (2015): 215–222.
[105] Hardt, 216.
[106] *Ethics* II, prop. 19.
[107] *Ethics* II, prop. 14.

Defining power as the capacity to be affected allows Spinoza to conceive of a higher degree of interaction, what he calls a 'composition'.[108] 'For if … two individuals of entirely the same nature are joined to one another,' he says, 'they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one'.[109] This sort of interaction is thus, for an individual, an increase of power, both because it affects the individual positively, increasing its individual power, and because this individual may benefit from the collective power that emerges from the composition. By insisting on the power to be affected, Spinoza opens the path to reflections on collective power.

Circulations of affects play a crucial role in compositions of collective power. A disempowering affective circulation, for instance fear, increasingly isolates individuals from each other preventing them from interacting. Evoking the possibility for a state to maintain its subjects into fear so that they do not rebel, Spinoza exclaims: 'it would be more properly called a wasteland (*solitudo*) than a Commonwealth'.[110] The term '*solitudo*', a probable allusion to Tacitus,[111] summarises the effect of collective fear on the community, as it means both 'wasteland' and 'solitude'. Fear dissolves social relations and weakens collective powers.

On the contrary, an empowering collective affect makes people act and interact.[112] It favours the emergence and the strengthening of a community. In a community of free men,

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[108] This term of composition is not used by Spinoza to refer exclusively to human interactions. On the question of interhuman compositions, see Sophie Laveran, *Le Concours Des Parties : Critique de l'atomisme et Redéfinition Du Singulier Chez Spinoza* (Paris: Garnier, 2015), 297–331.

[109] *Ethics* IV, prop. 18, schol. Two individuals cannot be entirely similar (by definition, otherwise they would be the same individual and therefore would not be two individuals), then their composition cannot be twice as powerful, *stricto sensu*.

[110] *Political Treatise*, chap. V §4. On the fear of solitude, see Filippo Del Lucchese, *Conflict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza: Tumult and Indignation* (London: Continuum, 2009), 155.

[111] 'They make a desert and call it "peace"' (*ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*), see Tacitus, *Agricola and Germany* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 22.

[112] In that sense, Spinoza's approach shares some similarities with Randall Collins's concept of 'emotional energy' which occurs in an interactional ritual. Collins indeed states that 'Emotional energy is like the psychological concept of "drive", but it has a specifically social orientation. High emotional energy is a feeling of confidence and enthusiasm for social interaction … Low emotional energy is a

this positive dynamic would be always on-going since free men, characterised by their rationality, would agree on everything. For the rest of us, however, changeable and inconstant as we are, these empowering collective affects may not last too long.[113] These compositions of power, instable as they may be, are nonetheless exceptionally powerful and, as long as the circulations of affects nourishing them last, change the social world in which they occur. Empowering affective circulations provoke spontaneous bursts of power and creativity that are at the heart of revolutionary movements.

Conclusion

Affective circulations constitute this wandering force that sparks revolutions. To understand how collective emotions emerge and circulate within and across communities, I turn to an ontology of affects. Building such foundations first supposes pursuing the on-going removal of the Cartesian conceptual framework. While it is now largely accepted that Cartesian dualism, because of the dichotomy it creates between reason and passions, does not allow for a convincing understanding of emotions and their collective effects, I have pushed this rejection further by analysing the issues that come with Cartesian individualism. By contrast with Descartes's philosophy, I showed how Spinozism develops a monist approach to reality, refusing the separation between reason, ideas, emotions, and bodies. Furthermore, by the

lack of Durkheimian solidarity. One is not attracted to the group; one is drained or depressed by it; one wants to avoid it.' (Randall Collins, *Interaction Ritual Chains* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 108.) This term of 'emotional energy' has then been taken over by EIR authors, such as Ross, or by social scientists working on emotions, such as James Jasper. Despite this conceptual proximity, Spinozist notion of power has also some important differences with the 'emotional energy' described by Collins, most notably the fact that it does not always result from a ritual but from any affection, even at a distance.

[113] *Ethics* IV, prop. 33.

focus it has on affects, that is, the interaction between bodies, it conceives bodies as fluid and open to external affections.

Spinozism offers foundations on which we can build our understanding of collective emotions. This notion of affective imitation is crucial: not only is it key to understanding how collective affects emerge and circulate, it also explains how these affective circulations travel across communities, because of the role it gives to imagination. From this general notion of affective imitation, I deduce the more specific process underlying the affective circulation of indignation. This shows how indignation circulates beyond the victim to reach people who do not personally know them.

Lastly, Spinoza's ontology of affects leads us to the question of the relationship between affects and power. Unlike classical definitions of this concept, power is not thought only as a capacity to affect, but also as one to be affected. This perspective, consistent with Spinoza's transindividualism, puts at the centre the question of collective power. Affective circulations favour or undermine compositions of collective power, which have empowering or disempowering effects. Although these affective circulations may not last, they may have powerful effects on the social world in which they occur.

In this chapter, I have brought out the core of a Spinozist ontology of affects. However, in this first step of our theoretical investigation, affects are analysed abstractly, *in vitro*. The following chapter brings this perspective further by looking at affects in a social and political world.

Chapter 2 – Those we don't know, those we don't count: the multitude's affects

Ils s'appellent *vulgus*, *plebs*, la tourbe, la foule.	They are called *vulgus*, *plebs*, the swarm, the crowd.
Ils sont ce qui murmure, applaudit, siffle, coule,	They are what whispers, applauds, whistles, sinks,
Bat des mains, foule aux pieds, bâille, dit oui, dit non,	Claps with their hands, tramples things underfoot, yawns, says yes, says no,
N'a jamais de figure et n'a jamais de nom ;	Has never got a face and has never got a name;
…	…
Ceux qu'on ne connaît pas, ceux qu'on ne compte pas.	Those we don't know, those we don't count.

Victor Hugo, *Les Châtiments*, Livre IV, IX[1]



Figure 1 – The revolt of the pawns[2]

[1] Victor Hugo, *Les Châtiments* (Paris: Librairie Générale Française, 1985), bk. IV, IX, v.15–18, 25, my translation.
[2] Photograph by Lewis Sanders IV, see Samia Mehrez, *Translating Egypt's Revolution: The Language of Tahrir* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 166.

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine Spinoza's concept of multitude to show how circulations of indignation spread and how they lead to revolutionary situations in which multitudes oppose regimes. To unpack this argument, I present Spinoza's theory of the multitude, a theoretical endeavour to put at the centre of political thought the multitude and its affects.

Revolutionary episodes display spontaneous bursts of popular indignation. Todd Hall and Andrew Ross rightly argue that any theory examining popular emotions faces two pitfalls. First, popular emotion may be sublimated into a 'communal emotion', that is 'the pure, noble, or righteous sentiments that ostensibly unify a community'.[3] Communal emotion, however, is a top-down construction by a political authority that assumes or assesses popular emotions. As the authors show with the example of World War I, this construction is politically motivated and has political aims. It would be misleading, therefore, to assume that narratives about communal emotions are necessarily accurate representations of popular emotions.

The second pitfall, on the other hand, is 'mass emotions', depicted by political authorities as 'the dangerous product of an irrational mob prone to panics, bursts of outrage, or other base impulses – susceptible to manipulation but also very volatile'.[4] Again, mass emotion can be less an actual characterisation of popular emotion than a political foil by authority. This pitfall is salient when it comes to the analysis of revolutionary affects. A trope that goes back as far as Homer describes the passions of the crowd as if they were primitive and organic forces. To put it in Quintus Curtius's words, 'no deep sea, no vast and storm-

[3] Todd Hall and Andrew G. Ross, 'Rethinking Affective Experience and Popular Emotion: World War I and the Construction of Group Emotion in International Relations', *Political Psychology* 40, no. 6 (2019): 1357-1372, 1358.
[4] Hall and Ross, 1358.

swept Ocean rouses such great tumults as the movements, emotions and revolts of the multitude'.[5]

This dichotomy between communal and mass emotions parallels a classical tension in political philosophy with regards to the concept of 'people'. This notion may indeed refer either to the whole of the nation or the seditious poor.[6] The way popular emotions are perceived is thus to be read in relation with the broader perspective on the people. In their work, Hall and Ross decide to focus on the narratives about popular emotions as, precisely, narratives. On the contrary, while acknowledging these two pitfalls, this chapter investigates Spinoza's theory of the multitude in order to examine actual affective dynamics in revolutionary situations.

Spinoza's theory of the multitude, presented in the *Political Treatise* (1677), results from the theory of affects developed in the *Ethics*. Affects are not presented as irrational impulses but as part and parcel of politics. In the same way Spinoza responded to Descartes to redeem affects, his *Political Treatise* engages with another contemporary thinker, Thomas Hobbes, to redeem the multitude.[7] Behind this notion, what is at stake is the role of spontaneous popular emotions in politics.

In the first part of this chapter, I analyse Hobbes's political theory. Although Hobbes was the first to conceptualise the multitude, which he defined as a heterogenous group of scattered individuals, he rejected altogether this rebellious multitude and the popular emotions that are associated with it. Spinoza, who inherited the term from Hobbes, refuses

[5] Quintus Curtius Rufus, *Historiae Alexandri Magni* (Los Altos, California: Packard Humanities Institute, 1991), book X, chap. 7, §11, my translation.
[6] Giorgio Agamben, *Means without End: Notes on Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 29–35.
[7] *Letter to Jarig Jelles*, 50.

his political elitism, and argues, on the contrary, that the multitude and its affects are involved in the production of the state.

The relationship between the state and the multitude is not limited to a genealogical dimension, that is, the production of the state. The Spinozist multitude does not disappear with the emergence of the state and it is continuously involved in the reproduction of the state. The relationship between the state and the multitude is thus constant and raises the question of power. Power is, for Spinoza, intertwined with affects. The state and its institutions derive their power from the power of the multitude.[8] To maintain itself, the state needs to channel the multitude's affects and to do so, uses affective levers. The multitude's affects are thus the ends and the means of the exercise of power. However, the multitude's affects are never entirely channelled and its power never fully captured. Affects, such as indignation, may spread and turn the multitude against the state. This is how revolutions occur.

Lastly, I present how the state and its institutions produce a national identity that frames identification so that the multitude is particularly conductive to affective circulations. This is the social structure of affects, which, unlike the ontological structure of affects, may change over time. Beyond national multitudes, there is a plurality of multitudes, be they subnational, supranational, or transnational, which explains how affective circulations can reach foreigners. Transnational circulations of indignation may thus go across borders and even trigger social protests across countries if there is what Spinoza calls an 'affective transfer' from a regime to another. Pushing the Spinozist argument further, I argue that the

[8] Frédéric Lordon affirms that 'the *Political Treatise* raises the question of institutional affections and affects in general. This is the reason why there is a number of fundamental mechanisms that can be considered as a grammar of institutional relationships … and consequently that can be applied to various institutional cases', Frédéric Lordon, *La Société des affects : pour un structuralisme des passions* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2013), 138, my translation.

combination of this affective transfer and affective imitation changes the way international affairs are commonly perceived – as relations between states – to replace it with an opposition between the counter-revolutionary bloc and a transnational revolutionary multitude.

I. The emergence of the multitude and the state

1. Hobbesian political elitism: a rejection of the multitude and its emotions from the political sphere

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's influential works[9] have for many readers associated the concept of the multitude with Spinoza. However, it is in fact Hobbes who firstly conceptualised the notion. Investigating the way Hobbes conceives of the multitude, as distinct from other terms such as people or plebs,[10] reveals an understanding of popular emotions that is held before and after Hobbes and that I term here political elitism.

[9] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (London: The Penguin Press, 2004); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009); Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Assembly* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

[10] The notion of multitude is thoroughly used by Hobbes, from the *Elements of Law*, published in 1640, to the *De Cive* (1642; 1647) and the *Leviathan* (1651), see Thomas Hobbes, *The Elements of Law, Natural and Politic*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Thomas Hobbes, *De Cive: Philosophicall Rudiments Concerning Government and Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). In this chapter, my analysis relies uniquely on the *De Cive* where the concept of multitude receives a more explicit and developed analysis. To the best of my knowledge, there is no substantive difference in the understanding of the concept in the *De Cive* and the *Leviathan*. The term 'multitude' is negatively connoted for Hobbes: over 57 occurrences of the term multitude in the *De Cive*, he uses five times the expression 'dissolute multitude' (Hobbes, *De Cive*, 109; 111; 113; 151; and 211) once 'rude multitude' (Hobbes, 111) and even refers to it 'as the durt and dregs of men' (Hobbes, 131). Before Hobbes, the term 'multitude', used by Roman historians and Republican Renaissance thinkers, was a synonym of people, masses, and plebs, yet, perhaps, slightly more pejorative, see Gregersen, K. J. 'Coining collective identities: the multitude in *De Cive* and *Tractatus Politicus*', *SATS: Northern European Journal of Philosophy*, 13, no.2 (2012): 170-189. On Machiavelli's use of the concept, see Stefano Visentin, 'The Different Faces of the People: On Machiavelli's Political Topography', in *The Radical Machiavelli*, by Filippo Del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini, and Vittorio Morfino (Basingstoke: Brill, 2015), 368–390.

The author of the *De Cive* looks at the multitude through the angle of agency. For Hobbes, indeed, agency supposes a person, that is, a unity.[11] But the multitude, as its etymology indicates,[12] is not a unity and refers, for Hobbes, to a group of people characterised by its lack of cohesion and even coherence. 'Multitude' designates a community of people who have little in common. It is a collective *word*, not a *thing*.

In the state of nature, the mutual fear towards each other leads individuals to fight for their lives at any cost. Ironically this mutual fear is also what maintains the state of nature, making these lives 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short'.[13] This disastrous situation, Annette Freyberg-Inan argues, is nevertheless rational.[14] Mutual distrust is sensible in the state of nature since there is no guarantee regarding each other's intentions and actions. Hobbesian fear is not irrational: 'Hobbes stresses that the mutual fear which motivates human beings to live in civil contract has nothing to do with hysterical fear, or panic'.[15] Hobbesian fear is better understood as a rational evaluation of the risks, which are numerous in the state of nature.[16]

Leaving the state of nature requires a Sovereign. But the Sovereign needs unity to act and the multitude is by definition scattered and plural, hence the necessity of a social contract. This social contract is expressed by the laws of nature that are universal since they are 'the dictates of reason',[17] a universally shared faculty. It implies a transfer of rights from the

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[11] Hobbes, *De Cive*, 91.
[12] *Multi* meaning numerous, plural, see Hobbes, 92.
[13] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 89.
[14] Annette Freyberg-Inan, *What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 46.
[15] Freyberg-Inan, 48.
[16] On the formalisation of Hobbes's state of nature by game theory, see Andrew Alexandra, 'Should Hobbes's State of Nature Be Represented As a Prisoner's Dilemma?', *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 30, no. 2 (1992): 1–16; John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 238; Michael Moehler, 'Why Hobbes' State of Nature Is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game', *Utilitas* 21, no. 3 (2009): 297–326.
[17] Hobbes, *De Cive*, 72 and 188.

multitude to a unique Sovereign, which guarantees to the Sovereign unity and thus agency. By doing so, the multitude abolishes its own nature and becomes the People.[18] The two concepts, multitude and People, are not so much opposed as ordered in a succession that is less chronological, since the state of nature does not describe any historical moment, than logical. As the multitude is plural and, for Hobbes, deprived of any agency, it is an apolitical or pre-political concept. Politics starts with this trinity composed of the State, the People, and Sovereignty.

This social peace is however threatened by the return of passions, which destabilises Sovereignty at two levels. At its top, kings are led by their passions, neglecting the interest of the people. At its bottom, the rebellious and passionate multitude appears as the real threat in the *De Cive*.[19] Paradoxically, Hobbes affirms that seditions are in fact 'the Multitude against the People':[20]

> Men distinguish not enough between a People and a Multitude. The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man; but the Multitude are Citizens, that is to say, Subjects … And in a Monarchy, the Subjects are the Multitude, and

[18] Hobbes, 92.
[19] In that sense, Hobbes is not a theorist of absolutism. His theory is rather an attempt to avoid both an absolutist understanding of sovereignty and popular sovereignty. See Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Volume 3, Hobbes and Civil Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Quentin Skinner, 'The Sovereign State', in *Sovereignty in Fragments: The Past, Present, and Future of a Contested Concept*, ed. Quentin Skinner and Hent Kalmo, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 26–46.
[20] Hobbes, *De Cive*, 152.

> (however it seeme a Paradox) the King is the People. The common sort of men, and others who little consider these truthes, do alwayes speak of a great number of men, as of the People, that is to say, the City; they say that the City hath rebelled against the King (which is impossible) and that the People will, and nill, what murmuring and discontented Subjects would have, or would not have, under pretence of the People, stirring up the Citizens against the City, that is to say, the Multitude against the People.[21]

This passage adds new layers to the relationship between the multitude and the People. People and multitude are not presented here as two stages of a process but as two distinct and violently opposed entities. This conflictual situation is thus created or revealed by seditions.

Hobbes identifies several causes underlying the revolt of the multitude against the Sovereign. There are first ideological elements, 'seditious opinions'[22] that affirm, for instance, the right to rebel or the lawfulness of tyrannicide. Hobbes refutes all these opinions one after the other.[23] Material elements, such as poverty, may also favour protests, especially when the situation is caused by the Sovereign itself, through heavy taxes.[24] Lastly, the spark that ignites the riots is of emotional nature. Beyond the desire to obtain honours, it is hope that triggers the protests. Hope is based on certain conditions: 'Numbers, Instruments, mutuall trust, and Commanders'.[25] A revolution requires a great number of people possessing weapons and

[21] Hobbes, 152.
[22] Hobbes, 145.
[23] One of these opinions is precisely the incapacity to distinguish between the People, who is the Sovereign, and the multitude.
[24] Hobbes, *De Cive*, 152.
[25] Hobbes, 153.

munitions and bounded by mutual trust. Such a gathering, however, is not possible without a commander leading the movement and to whom the multitude obeys.[26]

As a consequence, even in riots, the multitude is not a political agent. The revolutionary explosion needs an external element: eloquent speakers who 'can turn their Auditors out of fools into madmen'[27] by stimulating their hope and their anger. The multitude receives its temporary unity and impulse from outside. This external trigger mitigates the rationality of the multitude. Although the multitude is calculating its chances of success – since hope, like fear, is for Hobbes a calculation –, it is fundamentally irrational in its very desire to overthrow the Sovereign, which goes against the laws of nature, and passively subjected to any leader's suggestions. The multitude, this spontaneous group outside of any political organisation, is thus not a political actor, even in revolutionary situations in which it is most obviously acting.

This description of the multitude as passionate and passively submitted to charismatic leaders is consistent with Hobbes's ontology and political theory. The multitude is what remains of the state of nature in civil society and what, consequently, Hobbes endeavours to push outside of the political sphere. As we can see, this rejection of the multitude goes hand in hand with a rejection of irrational emotions. The Hobbesian political framework illustrates a long tradition of political elitism. Even though few would arguably refer to Hobbes to conceptualise the multitude, this political elitism is still very much alive. An author like Gustave Le Bon,[28] for instance, who has long influenced the understanding

[26] Hobbes, 153.
[27] Hobbes, 154.
[28] Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* (New York: Viking Press, 1972).

of popular movements,[29] describes the crowd as irrational, passionate, passive, feminine,[30] and subjected to charismatic leaders.

The depiction of popular emotions as irrational deviances from rational calculations[31] may also be read in revolution theory, especially in the first and second waves, and in Social Movement Theory (SMT). Crane Brinton, describing the French revolutionaries in 1789, would for instance ironically remark that: 'No one has yet said the final word on the psychology of crowds, but it is fairly well accepted that the behavior of crowds cannot be completely gauged in advance by the cleverest of mob leaders … The rioting seems to have died out less because the Bastille fell than because the rioters were tired out. Three days is a long time to be riotous, or drunk, or both'.[32] Although the emotional turn, that occurred first in SMT in the 1960s,[33] has since then raised more attention to these questions, this elitism remains in the field under diverse forms.[34]

This political elitism ties together two assumptions about politics: on the one hand, the centrality of the Sovereign who is the main – and for Hobbes, the only – political agent since the multitude is presented as passive; on the other hand, the suspicion towards the role of emotions in politics. Spinoza radically refuses both claims.

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[29] Le Bon's works are still at the heart of police training in many countries. In the United Kingdom, see for instance James Hoggett and Clifford Stott, 'Crowd Psychology, Public Order Police Training and the Policing of Football Crowds', *Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management* 33, no. 2 (2010): 218–235.

[30] Le Bon illustrates here the traditional opposition between female sensitivity and male rationality. Feminist scholars were the first to challenge this dichotomy, hence the influences of their works on the emotional turn in social sciences as Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta underline, see Jeff Goodwin, James M Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, 'The Return of The Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 5, no. 1 (2000): 74.

[31] Jonathan Mercer, 'Human Nature and the First Image: Emotion in International Politics', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9, no. 3 (2006): 288-303, 291-292.

[32] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1952), 83–84.

[33] Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 'The Return of The Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory', 66.

[34] I argue in chapter 4 that Kurt Weyland displays the same ambiguity in his approach to popular emotions.

2. The Spinozist multitude as a constituent force

Although Spinoza did not invent the notion of multitude, he put it at the very heart of his political system. The emphasis placed on the multitude was a late development in Spinoza's thought,[35] one that occurred in the *Political Treatise* (1677) after the *Theological-Political Treatise* (1670).[36] This theoretical shift was only possible thanks to a concept that Spinoza created during the writing of the *Ethics* between the two treatises: affective imitation.

Due to affective imitation, Spinoza affirms, *contra* Hobbes, that an affect becomes collective through affective circulations. This implies that the multitude is affectively unified, and thus, active[37] and that the social contract becomes consequently superfluous:

> Men, we've said, are guided more by affect than by reason. So, a multitude naturally agrees (*naturaliter convenire*), and wishes to be led, as if by one mind, not because reason is guiding them, but because of some common affect. As we said in III, 9, they have a common hope, or fear, or a common desire to avenge some harm. Moreover, all men fear being alone, because no one alone has the strength to defend himself and no one alone can provide

[35] Antonio Negri's book (Antonio Negri, *The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991)) was instrumental in the interpretation of this concept. As Balibar notices (Étienne Balibar, 'Spinoza, l'anti-Orwell. La crainte des masses', *Les Temps modernes Paris* 41, no. 470 (1985): 106, n°4), the concept was diversely translated before Negri's work: for instance, Charles Appuhn (1929) uses the words 'mass', 'multitude', 'population', 'people', and 'mass of people' and Sylvain Zac (1968) 'multitude' and 'population'.

[36] Spinozist scholars have debated on the extent of this shift between the two treatises, see Etienne Balibar, *Spinoza et la politique* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2011), 63–70; Alexandre Matheron, *Études sur Spinoza et les philosophies de l'âge classique* (Lyon: ENS éditions, 2011), chap. 'Le problème de l'évolution de Spinoza. *Du Traité théologico-politique* au *Traité politique*', 417-435.

[37] Spinoza usually qualified his statements on the multitude's agency with the word 'quasi'. On this question and the debates it raises, see Matheron, *Études sur Spinoza et les philosophies de l'âge classique*, 417–435.

> the things necessary for life. So, by nature men desire a civil order. It can't happen by nature that they'll ever completely dissolve it.[38]

As he did with Descartes in the *Ethics*, Spinoza uses Hobbes's lexicon, while profoundly alienating his theory. Like in the *De Cive*, the multitude is unified through an agreement but one that is natural and spontaneous. The social contract becomes supererogatory and Spinoza refuses to draw a line between civil society and state of nature.[39] This passage gives us a fundamental definition of the multitude: a group of people unified by a common affect.

Spinoza is not explicit about how this multitude emerges and how it produces the state (*imperium*), but Alexandre Matheron has used the theory of affects developed in the *Ethics* to bring out the main steps of this process.[40] The latter starts with indignation: a group of individuals witnesses an attack towards someone. Due to affective imitation, these individuals are commonly affected with indignation, becoming a multitude. This indignant multitude wants to punish the aggressor.[41] Because of ambition, another consequence of affective imitation, others emulate this indignation to comply with what they imagine people want, love, and hate.[42] This is what Lordon coins as an 'immediate autoaffection of the

[38] *Political Treatise*, VI, §1. This passage is surprisingly late and only appears at the beginning of the chapter on Monarchy. Even though this oddity may be due to the unfinished nature of the treatise, it reveals perhaps how secondary this question was for Spinoza, despite the efforts that his contemporaries were dedicating to it.
[39] *Letter to Jarig Jelles*, 50. Furthermore, the fear at the root of this agreement is not anymore the fear of others, a passion individually experienced by everyone, but its exact contrary, the fear of solitude.
[40] I only outline Matheron's sophisticated argumentation, for more details see Alexandre Matheron, *Individu et communauté chez Spinoza* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1969), 285–354.
[41] *Ethics* III, prop. 39.
[42] *Ethics* III, prop. 29.

multitude':[43] the interactions within the multitude trigger an affect that circulates within the multitude.

This indignation towards the aggressor is then generalised and crystallised into a moral principle: it is *evil* to attack people.[44] This process is the seed of both morality and political laws since individuals have now incentives to conform to social rules and to reproduce them, either because they fear punishment[45] or because they crave for love, praise, and admiration.[46] In this situation, every member of the community virtually affects all the other members in certain ways, for example by publicly disapproving and punishing what is considered as evil This simple situation reveals how affects are institutionalising and institutionalised. I define indeed an institutions as set of acts and ideas that are socially established and given to individuals.[47] Once principles and rules are reified into laws, some individuals become experts of moral and legal questions. The affective dynamics within the multitude have thus produced a primitive state apparatus: the multitude is constituent[48] as it creates social institutions – like hand-shaking –[49] and political ones – like the state –. This genealogy of the multitude and the state is sketchy, but it shows the centrality of affects in the relationship between the state and the multitude.

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[43] Frédéric Lordon, *Imperium : structures et affects des corps politiques* (Paris: Éditions La fabrique, 2015), 111.
[44] *Ethics* IV, Preface.
[45] *Ethics* III, prop. 18, scol. 2.
[46] *Ethics* III, prop. 33.
[47] This is the definition used by Frédéric Lordon in his Spinozist analysis, see Frédéric Lordon, *Vivre sans ? Institutions, Police, Travail, Argent...* (Paris: Éditions La fabrique, 2019), 105–107. Although Lordon refers here to other perspectives, such as the ones developed by anthropologists like Marcel Mauss, he also provides us with a more original and Spinozist definition of institutions as 'any effect and manifestation of the multitude's power' [*puissance*, the French translation of *potentia*] (p. 105).
[48] Negri uses the term 'constituent' to refer to the multitude's capacity to create political forms, Antonio Negri, *Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
[49] This is the example developed by Lordon, see Lordon, *Vivre Sans ?*, 105.

II. Power and affective dynamics between the state and the multitude

1. The power of the state

Thanks to its institutions, the state codifies all sorts of human activities, be they economic, religious, political, or social.[50] The state constantly regulates the multitude. However, and Spinoza insists on that point throughout the *Political Treatise*, the power of the state (*imperium potestas*) is only a derivation or a 'capture'[51] of the multitude's power (*multitudinis potentia*).[52] This assumption, that reminds one of the radical thoughts presented by Estienne de La Boétie in his *Discours de la servitude volontaire*,[53] is in line with Spinoza's immanent ontology[54] as well as with his Republicanism.[55] The power of the state is ultimately the power to make the multitude's bodies affect and be affected by other bodies – often the multitude's ones – in a certain way. By opposition with an immediate auto-affection of the multitude, the state is capable of imposing an auto-affection of the multitude[56] that is mediated by its institutional power.

Unlike what social contract theories present, the authority of the state is not guaranteed once and for all but continuously produced and reproduced. The state and its institutions continuously reproduce their existence through the fear, respect, or love that the

[50] 'Institutions, by definition, limit the spontaneous diversity of affects, and, consequently, homogenise the behaviours that follow from them', see Frédéric Lordon, *La Société des affects : pour un structuralisme des passions* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2013), 180, my translation.
[51] Lordon, *Imperium*, 111.
[52] While this point as well as the distinction between *potestas* and *potentia* are now commonly accepted in French and Italian scholarships, the English-speaking academia is usually more sceptical, see Benedictus de Spinoza, *The Collected Works of Spinoza. Volume II* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), sec. Glossary, 650.
[53] Estienne de La Boétie, *Discours de la servitude volontaire* (Porrentruy: Éditions des Portes de France, 1943). For an analysis of La Boétie's thought in an IR context, see Roland Bleiker, *Popular Dissent, Human Agency, and Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
[54] As described in chapter 1.
[55] On Spinoza's Republicanism and its relation with Republican movements at the time, see Raia Prokhovnik, *Spinoza and Republicanism* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).
[56] It can also make the multitude affect another multitude, in war times for instance.

multitude experiences. Although this action of the state on collective affects is, as Neta Crawford noticed, 'ubiquitous in world politics',[57] it is most obvious in times of crisis. Several scholars, including, yet briefly, Crawford herself,[58] have analysed, for instance, the institutionalisation of collective affects in the United States after 9/11.[59] President Bush and his administration used terror and anger to justify hypervigilance on the U.S. territory[60] and to wage a crusade against the enemies of Christendom in the Arab world.[61] The reproduction of its power to affect the multitude, obtained through the multitude's affects, is thus the ultimate endeavour of the state. Power and affects are intricated, simultaneously means and ends for the state to continuously reproduce itself.

2. The exceeding power of the multitude

Although the state captures the multitude's power, the multitude should not be perceived as passive. On the contrary, it is fundamentally powerful, that is, active. For Spinoza, indeed, the multitude's power always exceeds the power of the state.[62] Despite its power, the state can never entirely 'direct' or 'restrain'[63] the multitude's thoughts, affects, and acts.[64] The multitude's activity is not entirely shaped by institutions. To echo Hugo's poem, the

[57] Neta C. Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics: Fear and Empathy', *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 537.
[58] Crawford, 549.
[59] To the point that Janice Bially Mattern considers that the burgeoning literature on emotions has been triggered by 9/11 – as well as by the constructivist theoretical production –, see Janice Bially Mattern, 'A Practice Theory of Emotion for International Relations', *Cambridge Studies in International Relations* 119, no. 1 (2011): 65.
[60] Crawford, 'Institutionalizing Passion in World Politics', 549.
[61] Andrew G. Ross, *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), chap. 3; Todd Hall and Andrew G. Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11', *International Organization*, no. 69 (2015): 847–879.
[62] This point was first argued in Antonio Negri's ground-breaking work, *The Savage Anomaly*. Although Negri's reflections on Spinoza are sometimes byzantine, not to say largely debatable (on that point, see Matheron, *Études sur Spinoza et les philosophies de l'âge classique*, 447–463), his conceptualisation of the multitude and its power has been extremely fertile in Spinozist scholarship.
[63] *Political Treatise*, I, §3.
[64] Balibar, *Spinoza et la politique*, 38–42.

multitude may whisper, applaud, whistle, sink, clap with their hands, trample things underfoot, yawn, say yes, say no, and this, despite laws and moral principles. The multitude's power, from which the power of the state is derived, also draws the limit of the power of the state.

There is therefore an unsurpassable limit imposed upon the state. In reaction, the state can develop two distinct strategies. On the one hand, it may increase its grasp on the multitude, as it was the case for the Hebrew theocracy. To do so, it needs to rigorously control the ideology, notably through a political command of religious institutions,[65] a solution which is, however, only possible if there is a complete, and thus, to a certain extent, illusory, isolation from foreign populations. On the other hand, Spinoza advocates in the *Political Treatise* another path that Matheron describes as 'liberal'.[66] Confronted with the limit of its power, the state gives some room to the multitude by conceding religious and ideological freedom and allows popular demands to be discussed in parliaments. Within the permanent frame of its institutions, the state continuously catches up on the multitude's thoughts, affects, and acts. The two alternatives that Spinoza describes should be less conceived as a dichotomy than as two ends of a spectrum between which every state oscillates: either a top-down imposition to stifle circulations of affects and ideas, or the support of bottom-up circulations to reduce the risk of social upheaval.

[65] Spinoza devotes a large part of the *Theological and Political Treatise* to the study of the Hebrew state. For a rigorous, detailed, and, I believe, brilliant analysis of this regime, see Matheron, *Individu et communauté chez Spinoza*, 355–464.
[66] Matheron, 465–514.

3. Affective circulations of indignation

Social upheavals may nevertheless occur. Spinoza is not a revolutionary thinker. Perhaps because he experienced in person the Dutch civil wars, including episodes of popular lynching,[67] there is no call for popular revolts in his works. On the contrary, the *Political Treatise* is an endeavour to conceive of and establish regimes that could maintain themselves indefinitely.[68] However, his immanent ontology and his Republicanism lead Spinoza to the conclusion that the legitimacy of the state only relies on its power, which is derived from the multitude's power.[69] Revolutions and revolts directly threaten the power of the state and its legitimacy since they oppose the multitude to the state.

Although Spinoza was not himself a revolutionary thinker, a substantial part of recent Spinozist scholarship has been devoted to the analysis of revolutionary indignation. This hermeneutic focus is not foreign to the influence of Marxism on the study of Spinoza since the 1960s, especially, yet not only, in France and Italy.[70] Unlike Marxism, which analyses the material conditions conducive to a proletarian revolution, Spinoza stresses the affective impulse at the heart of revolutionary movements. In Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's words: 'the ground zero, the basic material from which movements of revolt and rebellion develop'.[71]

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[67] Warren Montag, 'Who's Afraid of the Multitude? Between the Individual and the State', *South Atlantic Quarterly* 104, no. 4 (2005): 655–673.
[68] François Zourabichvili, *Le Conservatisme paradoxal de Spinoza: enfance et royauté* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2002).
[69] *Political Treatise*, III, §2. The same claim can be read in II, §16, §21; III, §2, §5, §7; IV, §1; VI, §1; and VIII, §6.
[70] For a good, yet now slightly outdated, presentation of the relation between Marxism and Spinozism, see Cesare Casarino, 'Marx before Spinoza: Notes toward an Investigation', in *Spinoza Now*, by Dimitris Vardoulakis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 179–234. The relationship between Marxism and Spinozism is not one-sided though, and Spinozism has reciprocally led to analyse revolutions, including in its economic and social dimensions, through an affective angle, see Frédéric Lordon, *Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire* (London: Verso, 2014).
[71] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth*, 236.

Like affective imitation, from which it is deduced, indignation is absent from the *Theological and Political Treatise*, defined in the *Ethics,* and deployed in a political context in the *Political Treatise*. As previously mentioned, indignation is the 'hatred toward him who has done evil to another'[72] and the more similar or loved the victim is, the more intense indignation is felt. Indignation is the affect that triggers the process leading to the establishment of the state and is part and parcel of the affective dynamics that support the state. Conversely, indignation may also overthrow the state. If the state leader, Spinoza warns, 'slaughter[s] and rob[s] his subjects, … rape[s] their young women, and actions of that kind, [it will] turn fear into indignation, and hence turn the civil order into a state of hostility.'[73] Indignation oscillates from supporting the state against those who upset the political and social order to disrupting and, potentially, overthrowing this order.[74]

Why is the multitude's indignation so effective? At first, indignation only affects a limited number of people, the direct witnesses of the wrong. If the affect is intense, individuals may actively and spontaneously try to spread it.[75] Circulations of indignation spark consequently activity and even creativity. Complex affections, indeed, may occur through discussions and whispers, but also more spectacularly through revolutionary performances, such as demonstrations, songs, slogans, etc. Unlike Hobbes for whom the multitude was passive and only on the receiving end, the Spinozist multitude is fundamentally characterised by its power. Following Spinoza's definition of power, this power is the capacity to affect

[72] *Ethics* III, 22, schol.
[73] *Political Treatise*, IV, §4. Similar quotations in IV, §6 ; VII, §2; and X, §8.
[74] Matheron, *Études sur Spinoza et les philosophies de l'âge classique*, 226.
[75] This is also due to the affect termed ambition. If ambition makes us want, love, and hate what we imagine others also want, love, and hate, it conversely leads individuals to 'wan[t] the others to live according to [their] temperament[s]' (*Ethics* III, prop. 31, cor.). The dynamics that create the state are thus exactly the same as the ones that overthrow it. On that point, see Lordon, *Willing Slaves of Capital*, 142.

and be affected. No need for charismatic leaders for the multitude to spontaneously manifest its indignation, and thus, for indignation to circulate.

Once indignation has largely spread, all these interactions cause 'complex affections'. An individual may be affected, simultaneously or over time, by a great number of interactions, potentially through diverse media. Complex affections have consequences in terms of the extension of affective circulations as well as of intensity. The iteration of affections and the diversity of media may eventually affect someone with indignation who did not experience this affect – at least at a sufficient level of intensity for it to be conscious – at the first affection. Furthermore, complex affections increase the intensity of indignation, heating the social atmosphere until it ignites the rebellion. In that sense, circulations of indignation are not produced uniquely by the perception of a wrong but constantly produced and reproduced – and possibly intensified – by the multitude's activity. The multitude's power turns a local event into a rebellion or a revolution and a spark into a volcano.

Indignation may be intense enough to overcome the fear imposed by the state. In the *Ethics*, Spinoza defines fear as an affect of displeasure arising when imagining an uncertain thing in the future[76] so that 'there is no hope without fear and no fear without hope'.[77] Fear may be caused by actual threats, and the more we imagine them to be possible, the stronger the affect is.[78] Fear is however not always correlated with actual threats. Due to its relation with imagination: 'anything whatever can be the accidental cause of … fear'.[79] Fear is constantly used by the state to channel the multitude affects through judiciary and penal institutions. This level of fear, never null but varying depending on the countries, usually

[76] *Ethics* III, prop. 18, schol. 2. Fear is here distinguished from 'despair' which refers to a thing that is certain.
[77] *Ethics* III, prop. 25.
[78] *Ethics* IV, prop. 12.
[79] *Ethics* III, prop. 50.

increases in reaction to protests. Fear, through repression, is used to demobilise and disempower demonstrations.

Fear, like any affect, is in relation with other affects. When two opposite affects co-exist at the same level of intensity, there is an affective confusion, what Spinoza coins as the 'wavering of the mind' (*fluctuatio animi*).[80] If an affect is more intense than an opposite one, it overcomes the latter.[81] Circulations of indignation relying on complex affections, can be quite intense and, eventually, overcome fear. This does not mean that fear disappears or that people are oblivious of the risks they take. The Hobbesian multitude revolts because some skilled orators convinced people not to be afraid. The Spinozist multitude takes to the street because, whilst afraid, people experience strong indignation. Empowering circulations of indignation 'set the multitude back into motion'[82] by making individuals act and interact in their attempt to overthrow the regime.[83]

Fear and indignation should not be thought of in succession – there would first be fear and then some rebellious indignation –. This couple of affects works together, creating an on-going affective dynamic that varies over time. At times, fear may overcome indignation, and thus, put an end to social protests. Indignation may break through the walls of fear, but these walls may also be re-built at any moment by a repressive drive.

[80] *Ethics* III, prop. 17, schol. I changed here Edwin Curley's translation 'vacillation of the mind' to maintain the fluid and aquatic connotation.
[81] *Ethics* IV, prop. 7.
[82] Lordon, *Willing Slaves of Capital*, 140.
[83] *Ethics* III, prop. 25.

III. Transnational affective circulations

1. The reifying power of the state

The concept of multitude refers to a group of people sharing a common affect and, consequently, interacting. Unlike Hobbes, Spinoza does not use multitude in a social sense, as an equivalent to 'the poorest'. The concept of multitude, I believe, does not say anything about the characteristics of a group but intends to shed light on affective dynamics within groups, and especially masses.

The *Political Treatise* is a reflection on political regimes. In that work, Spinoza conceives of the multitude at the national level. National communities are particularly conductive to affective circulations since the state, through its institutions, produces and reproduces a group identity based on imaginary or actual similarities between its members, which favours affective imitations amongst its members. This reminds us that, despite its fluidity, identification can be framed by the constitution of identities or, in Spinozist terms, of common 'complexions'. In that sense, the production of a group identity is part and parcel of the state's attempt to channel affective circulations within the multitude. This process is endlessly on-going, as Spinoza shows with the example of the continuous cultural assimilation of immigrants.[84]

Benedict Anderson famously affirmed that nations were 'imagined communities'.[85] The notion of 'imagined community' does not mean that the similarities between fellow-citizens are not actual. Even when these similarities are real, imagination is still at stake. As

[84] To assimilate meaning literally to make something similar. *Political Treatise* VI, §32 and VIII, §12. It is probably no coincidence that Spinoza, the son of Jewish Portuguese-Spanish immigrants himself, was one of the few classical thinkers who paid attention to the question of immigration.
[85] Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2016).

Anderson repeats, while quoting Ernest Renan,[86] nationalism supposes that the similarities between members of the same community are imagined to be more important than their dissimilarities. I would add that it conversely supposes forgetting about or, at least, minimising all the actual similarities shared with foreigners and to stress the dissimilarities with them. Spinoza ironically remarks that insignificant cultural differences, such as different haircuts or clothes,[87] are sufficient to prevent people from recognising the fundamental similarity that exists amongst human beings.

National institutions, because they create similarities and present them as most important, stabilise the fluidity of identification. An 'imagined community' is thus likely to be highly conductive to affective circulations, although its exact degree may vary historically and geographically. It follows that a national community is likely to be a multitude: a group unified by common affects since affects circulate easily due to a group identity. The corollary is that the national multitude may be less conductive to affective circulations that come from outside. In his analysis of ancient Hebrews, Spinoza shows how the national pride and chauvinism of the 'elected people' had led them to be completely isolated from their foreign neighbours.[88] This is particularly true for radical and explicit xenophobia. Identity Emotion Theory (IET) shows evidence that the constitution of in-groups and out-groups of any sort is enough to impact the intensity of our emotional reactions.[89] The state and its institutions, through the production and reproduction of a national identity, reifies identification and, by so doing, favours affective circulations within the multitude.

[86] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 6.
[87] *Theological-Political Treatise*, Preface, 81.
[88] *Theological-Political Treatise*, chap. 16, 124.
[89] Diane M. Mackie, Eliot R. Smith, and Devin G. Ray, 'Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations', *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* 2, no. 5 (2008): 1866–1880.

Institutions produce a social structure of affects. Unlike the ontological structure of affects, which was implied by the ontology of both affects and human beings established by Spinoza, the social structure of affects relies on the representations shaped by institutions, including the ones established by the state, and thus varies across countries. In that sense, institutions have a structuration effect on the affective circulations as they tend to favour the circulations within the national community.

2. A plurality of multitudes

National communities are not the only forms of groups sharing common affects. There are a plurality of multitudes and therefore a plurality of social structures of affects. This diversity of multitudes plays a major role in transnational circulations of affects.[90] As previously mentioned, the multitude's power exceeds the state's power and affective dynamics are never fully channelled by institutions. One of the consequences is that identification is never fully framed by the state. Certainly, the state benefits from powerful institutions, such as schools, that play a fundamental role in shaping identities, framing affective imitation, and thus channelling affective circulations. This explains why affective circulations are so importantly impacted by national allegiances. And still, the state and its institutions fail to fully frame affective imitation.

[90] See William E. Connolly, *Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 185: 'The need today, however, is to complicate the images of nationalism and civilizopolism by paying attention to numerous eccentric connections that exceed them. The idea is not to delegitimate all concentric identifications as such. For you may well have a sense of belonging to the family that nourishes you or wish to participate in the state that governs you. It is to appreciate how – particularly during a time when speed compresses distance – concentric circles of political culture are complicated and compromised by numerous crosscutting allegiances, connections, and modes of collaboration'.

This does not mean that affective imitation escapes determination. As Lordon shows, while some affective dynamics bring people together, even beyond the national community, other dynamics disintegrate the national community into smaller groups.[91] The conjunction of these dynamics creates a complex intertwining of groups, based on diverse identities, and sharing some common affects. To echo Christian Reus-Smit, 'individuals do not exist in single groups, they live in multiple, overlapping, semi-porous, internally contested social groupings, and part of the art of social existence is navigating one's way through this complex social universe'.[92]

Some of these communities are as stable as the national ones. Although Spinoza only uses the term 'multitude' at the national level, he also acknowledges how other associations such as social classes or religious groups impact affective dynamics. In that sense, one always belongs to diverse multitudes at the same time.[93] Several multitudes constantly co-exist and overlap at national, sub-national, supra-national, and transnational levels.[94] Not differently from what happens with the state, these stable multitudes that are not national also lead to the emergence of institutions based on rules and principles, such as the Church. Although transnational or regional allegiances may compete with the nation-state imagined community,[95] it is also possible for these diverse allegiances to be combined without triggering any conflict. Furthermore, since identification is context-dependent, the extension of affective circulations varies depending on the situation.

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[91] At least, as long as people are not fully rational, *Ethics* IV, prop. 32. On that point, see Lordon, *Willing Slaves of Capital*, 84–101.
[92] Christian Reus-Smit, 'Emotions and the Social' *International Theory* 6, no. 3 (2014): 570.
[93] In that sense, any identity is Creole, as being not only the product of diverse groups, but an original combination of groups and influences that exceeds any of them taken separately. On Creolity, see Jean Bernabé, *Éloge de la créolité* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1993); and listen to Danyel Waro, 'Batarsité' in *Batarsité* (Piros, 1994).
[94] See for instance Spinoza's reflections on aristocracy in *Political Treatise*, VIII.
[95] For a reflection on the emotions involved in a shift of allegiances, see Andrew G. Ross, 'Realism, Emotion, and Dynamic Allegiances in Global Politics', *International Theory* 5, no. 2 (2013): 273–299.

This plurality of multitudes implies a plurality of social structures of affects. I take inspiration here from William H. Sewell's work on the multiplicity of overlapping structures. I should add a caveat though: although Sewell mentions emotions, his focus is mostly on culture. Here, the perspective is inverted: although culture and social representations are mentioned, the focus is – and should be kept – on affects. Sewell acknowledges the coexistence of 'many distinct structures, which exist at different levels, operate in different modalities, and are themselves based on widely varying types and quantities of resources'.[96] For instance, 'consider an immigrant Bengali chemical engineer who lives and works in Houston … Such a person participates simultaneously in an American culture, a Bengali culture, and an international scientific and engineering culture – among others'[97] – and thus, I would add, to as many multitudes.

Most often, affects spread within diverse and overlapping stable multitudes. However, in times of crisis – riots and revolutions are such times –, events may witness the emergence of ephemeral multitudes or a new articulation of pre-existing ones. These multitudes create new institutions or articulate in a new way pre-existing ones. Revolutionary repertoires, on which I will come back in chapter 4, are such institutions. Here too, Sewell's reflections are enlightening. Sewell notices that 'events are characterized by heightened emotions'[98] and 'collective creativity'.[99] This perspective matches ours, and we would even underline the close relation between emotions and creativity since, in our terms, intense circulations of indignation spark – and are nourished by – complex affections.

[96] William H. Sewell, *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 140.
[97] Sewell, 205.
[98] Sewell, 248.
[99] Sewell, 251.

These events, Sewell adds, are a dislocation and a rearticulation of social structures.[100] In the same way, events may cause or be caused by the dislocation and rearticulation of social structures of affects through the emergence of ephemeral multitudes or the rearticulation of former ones. In these situations, groups of individuals, who do not necessarily know each other, may experience identifications with each other that trumps national identifications. The emergence of these affectively constituted multitudes is thus part and parcel of revolutionary processes.

All sorts of feelings may become revolutionary common affects. James Jasper distinguishes between two broad categories of emotions involved in contentious politics, namely 'reciprocal emotions', i.e. 'participants' ongoing feelings toward each other'[101] and 'shared emotions' that are 'held by a group at the same time'.[102] Both categories may be involved in the emergence of revolutionary multitudes, as it appears with two of the affective patterns studied in this thesis: fraternity, which is a form of reciprocal love, and indignation, a shared affect of hatred. To understand better how the emergence of transnational multitudes is possible, one must first analyse how the circulation of transnational indignation works and at what conditions it may nourish a revolutionary spring.

3. The transnational circulation of indignation

Spinoza only mentions indignation within the multitude at a national level. However, indignation may circulate transnationally and even trigger revolutions in a foreign context.

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[100] Sewell shows, for instance, the taking of the Bastille in 1789 led to a shift from a social organisation based on the grace of God to one relying on popular sovereignty. For more details, see Sewell, chap. 8.

[101] Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 'The Return of The Repressed: The Fall and Rise of Emotions in Social Movement Theory', 76.

[102] Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, 76.

As stated in chapter 1, the ontological structure of indignation is the following: indignation is triggered by direct identification when someone A imagines a wrong inflicted by someone else C on a third-party B, with the latter being either an individual or a group. When it comes to revolution, C is thus an individual, a group, or the regime leading the state.



Figure 2 – Direct identification

In direct identification, be it individual or mass-based, A identifies with B, which means that A imagines some similarities with B and/or loves them. Given the power of the state and, consequently, the importance of national identities as sources of identification, this process may occur more easily if these common national characteristics are imagined by A – which depends of the context –. In that situation, a national multitude may experience a circulation of indignation. The prominence of the national community should not, however, hide the existence of other subnational, transnational, supranational multitudes that may also be conductive to direct identification, allowing affective circulations to go across borders. As a result, an individual A may experience indignation towards a foreign regime C for what it inflicts to its population B. Transnational solidarities have long been playing a role in international affairs: for instance, Christian institutions as well as individuals have regularly

expressed indignation about the situation of Christians in the Middle-East, despite them being strangers and foreigners. A transnational multitude may thus experience a common affect.

In such situations, indignation does not contribute to the transnational diffusion of revolutions since A is not living under the rule of C and has no reason to revolt against their own regime. Revolutionary springs require another affective dynamic: affective transfer. 'From the mere fact that we imagine a thing to have some likeness to an object which usually affects the mind with joy or sadness,' Spinoza affirms, 'we love it or hate it, even though that in which the thing is like the object is not the efficient cause of these affects'.[103] This affective dynamic also relies on imagination: it initiates a transfer of affects from one thing to another as these two things are imagined to be similar.

Affective transfer complexifies identification in two ways. First, it opens a path to indirect identification. Instead of A directly identifying with B, identification is mediated through imagined similarities between B and someone else B' that A loves or with whom they imagine sharing similarities. Affective transfer extends considerably the number of people who may experience indignation.

[103] *Ethics* III, prop. 16.



Figure 3 – Indirect identification

Affective transfer also plays a role when it comes to the object of indignation. If similarities are imagined between C, the wrong-doer, and someone or something else C', then, the indignation experienced towards C will be transferred to C'.



Figure 4 – Affective transfer of indignation

In this model, indignation towards a foreign regime C also triggers indignation towards another regime C' as both regimes are imagined similar. Through this affective dynamic,

indignation about a single event may trigger social protests against diverse regimes across countries. This transnational affective circulation paves the way for revolutionary springs.

4. An internationalisation of revolutions

Revolutionary springs are ignited by transnational circulations of indignation, transferred to foreign regimes, which overwhelms the fear of repression. Revolts and revolutions spontaneously occur in several countries, while affects circulate back and forth across countries. In each of these countries, protesters share some common indignation towards their regime and act to overthrow it. Beyond each of these revolutionary multitudes, however, a transnational multitude, including revolutionaries in their respective countries, emerges. This transnational revolutionary multitude lasts as long as affective circulations are maintaining some consistency to it. This group of revolutionary multitudes, combining in a blurry, yet powerful, transnational revolutionary multitudes, is powerful enough to threaten several regimes at the same time.

These regimes are imagined by revolutionaries as similar, a conservative bloc – which they may well be if they combine their counter-revolutionary efforts –. A revolution usually opposes revolutionaries to the state or the regime. A revolutionary spring brings into opposition two groups, the revolutionaries and the counter-revolutionaries, but at a transnational level. What may appear as only scaling-up revolutions actually produces a fundamental change in the way international affairs are perceived.

Hobbes famously described states in international affairs as being in a 'posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another'.[104] This is the classical representation of international affairs, common to most IR theories: international

[104] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, 90.

affairs are about the alliances, rivalries, and conflicts between states. In this state-centric perspective, the divide between states is fundamental and definitional. It is uncommon for IR grand theories to mention people, what Spinoza calls the multitude, as they often focus on the Sovereign, state-leaders and their institutions. Similarly to in Hobbes's philosophy, multitudes disappear in favour of their sovereigns.



Figure 5 – Classical IR theory

Revolutionary springs offer another account of international affairs. Instead of opposing states (and their respective multitudes), the dividing line is shifted between a counter-revolutionary bloc of regimes and a group of revolutionary multitudes, creating an emergent transnational multitude.



Figure 6 – Representation of international affairs during revolutionary springs

Revolutionary springs, however, do not last for long and this perspective disappears as soon as the transnational multitude crumbles. Once revolutionaries do not share the same indignation and see the similarities they share with their foreign counterparts anymore, this representation of international affairs fades away. Yet ephemeral, this perspective on international affairs may however strongly impact the social world while transnational multitudes are set into motion.

Conclusion

Spinoza's theory of the multitude describes the ambivalent relationship between the multitude and the state. For Hobbes, the multitude was fundamentally passionate, and thus irrational, and incapable of agency, and thus, passive and subjected to the Sovereign or to charismatic orators. On the contrary, Spinoza believes that the multitude is powerful and constituent: it creates institutions, including the State.

The multitude does not disappear with the state. The relationship between these two entities is not limited to a genealogical link: the state is not produced once for all, it is always sustained and maintained by the power of the multitude. This power must be captured by channelling the multitude's affects, which can never be fully achieved since the multitude's power always exceeds the state's. This becomes even more apparent when indignation spreads within the multitude and set it in motion. The multitude constantly auto-affects itself, which produces complex affections that increase the intensity of affects. Indignation, supported by complex affections, may thus become intense enough to overcome the fear of repression and turn the multitude against the state.

The multitude is particularly conductive to affective circulations, including circulations of indignation, because it perceives some common identity that favours identification. This common identity is produced by the state in its attempt to channel the multitude's affects. While national identities explain why affective circulations are particularly important amongst fellow citizens, it does not prevent transnational affective circulations. There is indeed a plurality of multitudes (and therefore, a plurality of social structures of affects), be they subnational, supranational, or transnational. Some of these multitudes are quite stable but others may emerge and disappear in times of crisis. Despite the prominence of national identities, transnational affective circulations are possible. Indignation may thus circulate across countries and, when combined with affective transfer, even spread the revolutionary movement abroad. This transnational diffusion of revolutions leads to another conception of international affairs, one that does not bring into opposition states to each other, but a counter-revolutionary bloc and a transnational revolutionary multitude.

Spinoza, who first and foremost attempted to conceive stable regimes, did not think about the multitude at an international or transnational level. This perspective is thus drawing

from Spinoza's philosophy, more than it applies his philosophy. This is not the first attempt to apply the concept of multitude to transnational revolutions, as Hardt and Negri also endeavoured to do so. In the following chapter, I will however show how the theory developed in this thesis differs from the one presented by these two authors and why it matters.

Chapter 3 – Excursus: A critical account of Hardt and Negri's concept of multitude

Introduction

The previous chapter analysed the distinction between the People and the multitude. Another difference, Paolo Virno affirms, is that:

> When we speak of 'multitude', we run up against a complex problem: we must confront a concept without a history, without a lexicon, whereas the concept of 'people' is a completely codified concept for which we have appropriate words and nuance of every sort … With regard to the multitude, we are left, instead, with the absolute lack of codification, with the absence of a clear conceptual vocabulary. But this is a wonderful challenge for philosophers and sociologists, above all for doing research in the field.[1]

After the success of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's books that gave a new interpretation of the concept of multitude, the statement above should perhaps be qualified. Using the concept of multitude to analyse revolutions cannot forgo Hardt and Negri's contribution. Hardt and Negri's work is monumental and notoriously tortuous.[2] This chapter tackles a single theoretical question: the differences between Hardt and Negri's intellectual project and

[1] Paolo Virno, *A Grammar of the Multitude: For an Analysis of Contemporary Forms of Life* (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2004), 44–45.
[2] Warren Montag maliciously introduced his presentation of Negri's *Insurgencies* by referring to the last sentence of the *Ethics*, 'all things excellent are as difficult as they are', see Warren Montag, 'From the Standpoint of the Multitude', *Historical Materialism* 9 (2001): 196. This would also be applicable to the four volumes written in collaboration with Hardt.

the theory developed in this thesis with regards to the consistence of the multitude.[3] By consistency of the multitude, I mean both the conceptual consistency that gives to the notion of 'multitude' its coherence and the empirical consistency that gives an account of what holds these diverse individuals together.

The rediscovery of Spinoza's political philosophy is due to conjoined efforts of French and Italian scholars over the second half of the twentieth century. The analysis and the development of Spinoza's theory of the multitude, specifically, owes to *operaist* (workerist) thinkers,[4] namely Paolo Virno, Antonio Negri, and Michael Hardt. While Negri's early work, *The Savage Anomaly*,[5] was dedicated to an interpretation of Spinoza's thought, his later works – first *Insurgencies*[6] and then the four volumes written in collaboration with Hardt – drew from Spinoza's concept of multitude to elaborate an original political theory.

Hardt and Negri's common work, *Empire* (2000),[7] *Multitude* (2004),[8] *Commonwealth* (2009),[9] and *Assembly* (2017),[10] has received careful attention from scholars and activists alike.

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[3] This comes with two caveats. First, my response to Hardt and Negri's works is entirely theoretical. For a critical response to their theory based on empirical arguments, see Giovanni Arrighi, 'Lineages of Empire', in *Debating Empire*, by Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 2003), 29–42. The first volumes have also often been criticised for the absence of political guidance, see Alex Callinicos, 'Toni Negri in Perspective', in *Debating Empire*, by Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 2003), 121–145. Second, despite references to other books, this analysis of their system focuses largely on *Multitude* in which, unsurprisingly, the concept of multitude is most central.

[4] *Operaismo* was an intellectual and political Leftist movement under the influence of Mario Tronti that challenged the Italian Communist Party and Gramsci's heirs during the 1960-70s. On the influence of *operaismo* on Hardt and Negri, see Marcella Bencivenni, 'The New World Order and the Possibility of Change: A Critical Analysis of Hardt and Negri's Multitude', *Socialism and Democracy* 20, no. 1 (2006): 23–43.

[5] Antonio Negri, *The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza's Metaphysics and Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991).

[6] Antonio Negri, *Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[7] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2000).

[8] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire* (New York: The Penguin Press, 2004).

[9] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Commonwealth* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2009).

[10] Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Assembly* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

Their post-Marxist approach argues that imperialism shifted from nation-states to a new global entity called Empire.[11] This global imperial power is however challenged by a rising force: the multitude. Explicitly inheriting this concept from Spinoza's thought, the authors use it to analyse as well as predict a global and revolutionary movement.

Given the popularity of Hardt and Negri's political thought, Spinoza's concept of multitude is now immediately read through the lens of their interpretation. As the present thesis also relies on Spinoza's concept of multitude in order to analyse revolutionary springs, it appears necessary to see how these two interpretations relate. More than a critical response to Hardt and Negri, this chapter is thus an effort of clarification to disentangle these two perspectives which, despite both drawing from Spinoza, differ conceptually.

In a first part, I show how Hardt and Negri define the multitude as diverse and global by contrast with the Hobbesian unity of sovereignty. Their definition is problematic as it encompasses everyone at the risk of making the concept indistinct and potentially applicable to anyone. The multitude is however described through another characteristic: its democratic commitment. The diverse people across the globe who compose the multitude are bound together by this democratic ideology.

In a second part, I argue that Hardt and Negri's definition of the multitude is in tension with Spinoza's philosophy – which is not an issue *per se* – and differs from the concept elaborated in chapter 2. Unlike theirs, my approach to the concept of multitude does not rely on a given ideological content but on affective dynamics. It is only the interplay of affects that makes multitudes emerge as collective groups. It follows, given the ephemeral nature of

[11] A concept that etymologically echoes 'imperialism' but that is also reminiscent of Spinoza's notion of '*imperium*' that I translated by 'the state' in chapter 2.

affects, that these multitudes may vanish or fade away as well. The consistency of multitudes is thus dynamic and subject to changes.

I. The evasive unity of Hardt and Negri's multitude

1. Against the Hobbesian unity of the people and the indifferent masses

A multitude defined as essentially heterogeneous

Hobbes tied together the rejection of the multitude – this spontaneous and popular force that, he thought, was deprived of agency – and emotions, which he limited to irrational impulses. Spinoza's philosophy paved a way of escaping such political elitism. *Operaist* thinkers, such as Virno and Hardt and Negri indeed interpreted Spinoza's multitude as an alternative to Hobbes's people. The Hobbesian understanding of politics, they argue, is indeed nothing but 'a pretense to validate a ruling authority'.[12]

As aforementioned, Hobbes affirms that Sovereignty relies on unity so that 'the multitude cannot be sovereign'.[13] On the contrary, Hardt and Negri intend to show that the multitude, maintained as a diverse and heterogeneous group, can be sovereign or rather, in Negri's terms, constituent. The Hobbesian definition of the People is thus a foil to unpack their own concept of multitude: 'the people is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can be properly said of the multitude … The multitude is a multiplicity, a plane of singularities, an open set of relations, which is not homogeneous or identical with itself and bears an indistinct, inclusive relation to those outside of it'.[14]

[12] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 79.
[13] Hardt and Negri, 330.
[14] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 103.

This essential diversity of the multitude allows Hardt and Negri to integrate the insights of feminist and post-colonial critics to their theory. The concept of multitude acknowledges indeed 'different cultures, races, ethnicities, genders, and sexual orientations'[15] while 'the people reduces that diversity to a unity and makes of the population a single identity'. [16] The Hobbesian reduction *e pluribus unum* operated by the People is thus denounced as a form of 'racial subordination and social purification'[17] that eliminates minorities in favour of a national unity and uniformity. The opposition between the multitude and the People echoes consequently the political debates on universalism versus particularism or pluralism.

The global multitude in Seattle

The heterogeneity of the multitude is empirically observable. Through the concept of multitude, Hardt and Negri intend to shed light on an emergent form of protests that, they believe, reached its most achieved form with the Seattle protests in 1999. The Seattle protests consisted of large groups of demonstrators gathering to criticise the economic globalisation represented by the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, or the World Bank. One of the striking elements of this historical event was that transnational 'groups previously thought to be in opposition to each other – trade unionists and environmentalists, church groups and anarchists, and so forth – acted together without any central, unifying structure that subordinates or sets aside their differences'.[18]

[15] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, Preface, XIV.
[16] Hardt and Negri, Preface, XIV.
[17] Hardt and Negri, Preface, XIV.
[18] Hardt and Negri, 217.

Because of their transnational dimension, the Seattle protests appeared as a new paradigm for social struggles: 'Seattle was the first global protest … the first major protest against the global system as a whole, the first real *convergence* of the innumerable grievances against the injustices and inequalities of the global system, and it opened a cycle of similar protests'.[19] Other protests followed the example of the Seattle protests indeed. The Genoa Group of Eight Summit protest, for instance, from July 18th to July 22nd, 2001, was particularly attended, quite diverse, and brutally repressed by the Carabinieri. The Seattle protests created a momentum that inspired future demonstrations.

For the two authors, the Seattle protests are 'the most fully realized political example we have of the concept of the multitude'.[20] The event indeed revealed a key aspect of the multitude: it relies on what its constituents have in common, despite their differences. The diversity of movements that composed the Seattle protests was unified by their common struggle. This importance of the common, that should be distinguished from the Hobbesian unity of the people, guarantees the empirical consistency of the group, despite its heterogeneity. It also differentiates the multitude from other terms, such as the crowd, the masses, and the mob, since 'the essence of the masses is indifference: all differences are submerged and drowned in the masses. All the colors of the population fade to gray'.[21] In sum, the common contrasts with, on the one hand, the unity of the People that suppresses all differences in favour of universalism; on the other, the notion of masses that refers to a heterogeneous reality but that loses this heterogeneity due to a lack of differentiation.

The common is not just instrumental for Hardt and Negri. The diverse heterogeneous movements that are part and parcel of the multitude and that act together do

[19] Hardt and Negri, 286.
[20] Hardt and Negri, 217.
[21] Hardt and Negri, Preface, XIV.

not consider the common as a way to achieve certain political goals. On the contrary, the common *is* the political goal that the multitude endeavours to achieve, so that it creates a common front against 'the forces that do not want the common, that block and dissolve it, that separate and reappropriate it privately'.[22] The common, as a political goal, seems to give its theoretical and empirical consistency to the multitude.

2. An operaist multitude

A post-Marxist multitude

Hardt and Negri's reflections on the common stand at the cross-road of Marx's and Foucault's philosophies. The renewal of Spinoza's philosophy is due to Marxist scholars so that Spinoza was conceived of in continuity and in reaction to Marx.[23] Hardt and Negri, who worked on Marx,[24] also conceptualise the multitude in relation with Marx's theory, especially with regards to the question of the means of production. Reminiscent of the shift introduced by *operaismo* from 'mass worker' to 'social worker',[25] Hardt and Negri remark that the organisation of the means of production has profoundly evolved. This process has led to the prominence of immaterial or affective labour,[26] that is, 'the production of communications,

[22] Nicholas Brown and Imre Szeman, 'What Is the Multitude?: Questions for Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri', *Cultural Studies* 19, no. 3 (2005): 378.
[23] The renewal of Spinozist studies started with the 'Groupe Spinoza' created by Louis Althusser, one of the prominent French Marxists, at the École Normale Supérieure in 1967, see Louis Althusser, *Solitude de Machiavel et autres textes* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1998), 181; Edouard Delruelle, 'Nous avons été spinozistes. Spinoza et le marxisme en France', in *L'actualité du* Tractatus *de Spinoza et la question théologico-politique*, by Quentin Landenne and Tristan Storme (Bruxelles: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 2014), 235–247. For a more exhaustive, yet not updated, presentation of Spinozist Marxism, see Cesare Casarino, 'Marx before Spinoza: Notes toward an Investigation', in *Spinoza Now*, by Dimitris Vardoulakis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), 179–234.
[24] See Antonio Negri, *Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse* (London: Autonomedia, 1991).
[25] See Callinicos, 'Toni Negri in Perspective', 125–126.
[26] Although the term 'affective labour' is closer to the objects of this thesis, I privilege in the rest of this chapter the expression of 'immaterial labour' more often used by the authors.

relationships, and forms of life'.[27] The expansion of the service sector, which increases the diversity in terms of works, 'blur[s] the distinction between work time and nonwork time, extending the working day … to function without stable long-term contracts and thus to adopt the precarious position of becoming flexible (to accomplish several tasks) and mobile (to move continually among locations)'.[28] Another consequence is that labour becomes less centralised around spaces dedicated to work as factories. Drawing from Foucault's concept, the authors describe a newly dominant biopolitical model of production, which 'touches on and produces all facets of social life, economic, cultural, and political'.[29] Immaterial labour supposes and reproduces the common, such as the existence of a common language that allows social interactions and that is maintained by social interactions.

Hardt and Negri's concept of multitude is post-Marxist in every sense of the word. The two authors indeed refuse the classical distinction that Marx makes between workers and owners, or the proletariat and other workers. The multitude is indeed an 'open, inclusive concept'[30] that includes all the members of society since the common does not belong to any social group. This passage from social class to the multitude is however theoretically justified by a change in the means of production. Drawing from the lessons of historical materialism, Hardt and Negri see in immaterial labour a new characteristic of contemporary production, one that can only be thought through the all-encompassing concept of multitude. And by doing so, the notion of multitude integrates within a post-Marxist approach the recent developments made in identity politics and studies.

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[27] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, Preface, XV. Several scholars have judged that Hardt and Negri's concept of immaterial labour was inadequate to describe contemporary relations of production, see Timothy Brennan, 'The Italian Ideology', in *Debating Empire*, by Gopal Balakrishnan (London: Verso, 2003), 101; Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, 'Gems and Baubles in Empire', *Historical Materialism* 10, no. 2 (2002): 55.
[28] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 66.
[29] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, Preface, XVI.
[30] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, Preface, XIV.

An all-encompassing multitude

The multitude is characterised through broadly-defined immaterial labour, that is, by elements of the common such as language. The common that underlies the multitude is largely extended across society. Although this is consistent with Hardt and Negri's affirmation that the multitude is not a delimited section of society – that would exclude the rest – or, more broadly, with the idea that the multitude is by definition heterogeneous, it is also somewhat problematic as it does not say much about what the multitude is and why these specific individuals decided to come together and act.

In other passages, the question becomes even more confused as Hardt and Negri associate the multitude with the figure of the poor: 'the part of those who have no part, the party of the poor, is an excellent initial definition of the multitude'.[31] As previously mentioned in regards to Hobbes and his interpretation of the multitude, it is not unusual to look at the multitude as the dominated element of society. Hardt and Negri, however, conceive of the poor as an 'ideal limit' to 'help us understand the power of the common'.[32] In that sense, 'the party of the poor, in contrast, is not an identity of one exclusive portion of society but rather a formation of all those inserted in the mechanisms of social production without respect to rank or property, in all their diversity, animated by an open and plural production of subjectivity'.[33] Neither the multitude, nor the poor are thus defined as excluding terms.

Paradoxically, Hardt and Negri's notion of multitude also aspires to a form of universality, yet different from the one supporting Sovereignty. This raises the question of the delimitation of the multitude since, if everyone is included in the global and diverse multitude, the concept would lack any conceptual utility. Not everyone was involved in the

[31] Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 45.
[32] Brown and Szeman, 'What Is the Multitude?', 384.
[33] Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 45.

Seattle protests, and the universality of the multitude threatens the concept's ability to make sense of any empirical phenomenon.

3. The democratic multitude

Ontological and historical multitudes

The concept of multitude is vague in terms of its extension – to whom it refers – but the authors offer a further characterisation of the multitude. In a passage of *Multitude*, the two authors distinguish between two uses of the notion:

> The first is the multitude *sub specie aeternitatis*, the multitude from the standpoint of eternity. This is the multitude that, as Spinoza says, through reason and passions, in the complex interplay of historical forces, creates a freedom that he calls absolute: throughout history humans have refused authority and command, expressed the irreducible difference of singularity, and sought freedom in innumerable revolts and revolutions … This first multitude is ontological and we could not conceive our social being without it. The other is the historical multitude, or, really, the not-yet multitude. This multitude has never yet existed … These two multitudes, however, although conceptually distinct, are not really separable. If the multitude were not already latent and implicit in our social being, we could not even imagine it as a political project.[34]

[34] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 221.

The dichotomy between eternal and historical multitudes is maintained and echoed in all their books with slogans such as 'from being to making the multitude'[35] or 'the virtuality of the multitude passes through possibility and becomes reality'.[36]

Immaterial labour is characterised by the fact that it is 'always excessive with respect to the value that capital can extract from it because capital can never capture all of life'.[37] This excess echoes the one that Negri pointed out in the Spinozist multitude with respect to the fact that the state could never fully channel the multitude and its affects. Through the emergence of a new dominant form of production – immaterial labour – history actualises the constituent power of the multitude that Spinoza described.

A constituent and democratic multitude

In *Insurgencies*, Negri affirms that 'to speak of constituent power is to speak of democracy'[38] since 'constituent power tends to become identified with the very concept of politics as its concept is understood in a democratic society'.[39] The democratic and horizontal dimension of the multitude is expressed in all sorts of human activities existing in this historical moment. Hardt and Negri use Foucault's concept of isomorphism to recognise a coherence in the organisation of society as a network:

> we see networks everywhere we look – military organizations, social movements, business formations, migration patterns, communications systems,

[35] Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 173.
[36] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 368.
[37] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 146.
[38] Negri, *Insurgencies*, 1.
[39] Negri, 1.

> physiological structures, linguistic relations, neural transmitters, and even personal relationships. It is not that networks were not around before or that the structure of the brain has changed. It is that network has become a common form that tends to define our ways of understanding the world and acting in it.[40]

The network as a social form has everything to do with the emergence of immaterial labour, which is 'based on communication, collaboration, and affective relationships'.[41] It also explains why the multitude is 'driven at base … by a profound desire for democracy'.[42] Hardt and Negri's multitude, therefore, is not only horizontal and constituent *de facto*, but endeavours to be more horizontal and democratic.

A revolutionary multitude

Such a democracy supposes a new organisation of the economy around the notion of common and cannot be established without a profound revolution of global order. Even though the authors assure that they 'do not have such a positive view of bloodshed and rebellion under any and all circumstances',[43] a substantial part of the four volumes is dedicated to a reflection on revolution, including a development on the 'theory of "revolutionary biopolitics," or rather revolution in the biopolitical context'.[44] In that context, the authors, who already explained how immaterial labour introduced affects as economic products, show the importance of revolutionary affects, including Spinoza's indignation.

[40] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 142.
[41] Hardt and Negri, 66.
[42] Hardt and Negri, 67.
[43] Hardt and Negri, 248.
[44] Hardt and Negri, *Commonwealth*, 240.

Indignation is not the only affect involved in the revolutionary process. The authors also offer a singular place to feelings that have received little attention in classical political thought: love and joy. Far from being marginal in their work, 'a concept of love is just what we need to grasp the constituent power of the multitude',[45] the authors claim, as 'love serves as the basis for our political projects in common and the construction of a new society'.[46] Spinoza is the main reference once again: 'love … was posed by Spinoza as the only possible foundation of the liberation of singularities and as the ethical cement of collective life'.[47] Love is not only a political affect, it is specifically a revolutionary one since the revolution is 'a project of love'.[48]

This constellation of concepts gives a certain consistency to Hardt and Negri's concept of multitude: it is a revolutionary force that seeks to achieve democracy. The consistency of Hardt and Negri's multitude, this transnational and heterogeneous group, is first of all ideological and only then translated in terms of affects.

II. Another perspective on the multitude

1. Hardt and Negri's multitude as a post-Spinozist multitude?

Hardt and Negri have played an essential role in Spinozist scholarship and their political theory has been instrumental in putting Spinoza's philosophy and the concept of multitude specifically under the spotlight. However, despite regular references to Spinoza, their interpretation of his works is quite loose and the gaps with the original theory are not always

[45] Hardt and Negri, *Multitude*, 351.
[46] Hardt and Negri, 352.
[47] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 78.
[48] Hardt and Negri, 413.

explicit. As a result, the distinction between Spinoza's theory and their own is sometimes blurry.

This heretic approach to Spinoza is not an issue *per se* and the authors themselves claim an eclectic approach to philosophical references. As Timothy Brennan remarks:

> what strikes one about the project is its deeply incommensurable enlistment of theoretical precursors in the name of interdisciplinarity whose frank utilitarianism reveals itself methodologically as 'assemblage'. Assemblage, a term taken from *A Thousand Plateaus*, refers to a methodological eclecticism Deleuze and Guattari counterpose to science. It expresses itself as a gathering of substantively incompatible positions. In *Empire's* assemblage, the juxtaposition of figures whose political views are mutually hostile to one another (Spinoza and Machiavelli, for instance, or Schmitt and Gramsci) is presented as the supersession of earlier divisions in pursuit of a more supple and inclusive combination. A less exacting process of distinctions can in this way pass itself off as a more inventive less sectarian vision.[49]

The diversity of intellectual sources from which Hardt and Negri draw creates a colourful plurality without any perceptible common ground.[50] Elements of Spinoza's

[49] On the relation between the concept of Left assemblage and the multitude, see Nicholas Tampio, 'Assemblages and the Multitude: Deleuze, Hardt, Negri, and the Postmodern Left', *European Journal of Political Theory* 8, no. 3 (2009): 111.

[50] 'Melville's Bartleby, Coetzee's Michael X, the International Workers of the World (IWW), myriad refugees and migrant labourers, St Francis of Assisi and St Augustine are figures who have little in common except in some instances the activity only of passive resistance or bare survival', see Michael Rustin, '*Empire*: A Postmodern Theory of Revolution', *New Political Economy* 7, no. 3 (2002): 9.

philosophy are thus combined with concepts from Marx, Foucault, or Deleuze and Guattari.

This creative assemblage leads to several theoretical tensions since the authors combined in their texts contradict each other. Unfortunately, these tensions are rarely tackled by the authors. Hardt and Negri's concept of multitude, I believe, is one of the question that concentrates such tensions.

2. Hardt and Negri's optimism

A problematic teleology

Hardt and Negri's very project, analysing the emergence of the global multitude, results from an assemblage that is based on unclear foundations. This analysis relies indeed on the idea that there are two multitudes, one that enjoys a form of universality, the ontological multitude, and the other that emerges at a given historical moment and that can be recognised in specific events. This very distinction between two multitudes that puts the historical multitude as the realisation of a potential that has always been there is however problematic.[51]

There are famous precedents to teleological perspectives, such as Hegel or Marx, and the authors claim that Spinoza's philosophy displays a similar 'materialist teleology'[52] – although they do not really explain where and how he did so –.[53] The differences in terms of dialectic and teleology between Marx and Hegel, on the one hand, and Spinoza, on the other,

[51] Timothy Brennan denounces that 'the term "multitude" betrays a reverse teleology that is religious in form' (see Brennan, 'The Italian Ideology', 115). Michael Rustin affirms in '*Empire*: A Postmodern Theory of Revolution' that 'Hardt and Negri share with – indeed take from – Hegel and Marx a teleological theory of historical development, in which each new stage of evolution creates the potential for a fuller expression of human potential' (see Michael Rustin, 'Empire: A Postmodern Theory of Revolution', 451).
[52] Hardt and Negri, *Empire*, 65.
[53] They refer to the *Theological-Political Treatise* without specifying any precise passage.

have however been long known and acknowledged by Spinozist Marxist scholars.[54] Spinoza is indeed a radical determinist[55] but this determination is aimless and purely mechanical: history is 'not yet written and without any teleological guarantees'.[56]

Hardt and Negri's teleology, that supposedly relies on Spinoza, suffers from unclear theoretical foundations. The issue is not so much that they create an assemblage of authors and concepts but rather that this assemblage blurs their own ontological position so that their theory seems to display undemonstrated optimism.

A glowing multitude

Hardt and Negri's optimism paints a glowing picture of the multitude and its affects. As aforementioned, their multitude is defined as fundamentally democratic. This raises two distinct issues. The first is that Hardt and Negri confuse the constituent dimension of the multitude, the fact that any political power is derived from the power of a group of people – which is, in that sense, democratic – and the ideology defended by the multitude. For Spinoza, on the contrary, the multitude is ontologically democratic – to the extent that its power is the composition of individual powers – but not necessarily ideologically so.

The multitude may indeed defend antidemocratic positions or principles. Spinoza, to whom the authors refer to defend their democratic interpretation, offered a much more contrasted image of the multitude.[57] One may say that Spinoza also described in the *Political*

[54] See Florence Hulak, 'Spinoza après Marx, ou le problème de l'ontologie marxienne', *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 56, no. 4 (2007): 483–498.
[55] *Ethics* I, prop. 29.
[56] Frédéric Lordon, *Willing Slaves of Capital: Spinoza and Marx on Desire* (London: Verso, 2014), 149.
[57] This is the reason why Warren Montag affirms that Hardt and Negri neglect Spinoza's fear of the multitude, see Warren Montag, 'Who's Afraid of the Multitude? Between the Individual and the State', *South Atlantic Quarterly* 104, no. 4 (2005): 657.

Treatise an ideal monarchy and aristocracy, alongside his ideal democracy – on which he said very little since he died before finishing the manuscript. But more radically, Spinoza who witnessed the potential violence of the multitude who lynched in August 1672 the brothers de Witt, the leaders of the Dutch Republican movement, knew that the multitude was not *per se* a progressive and republican force, even though it could be.[58]

More generally, this misinterpretation of Spinoza's concept of multitude is due to a misinterpretation of his anthropology. Hardt and Negri are not the only one to do so. In the IR literature, Kenneth Waltz also affirms that, for Spinoza, human beings are torn between reason and passion and are repeatedly defeated by the latter.[59] As Jonathan Havercroft notices, this reading of Spinoza is however problematic.[60] First, it relies on a dichotomy between reason and emotion that, as described in chapter 1, does not exist for Spinoza. Second, Waltz approaches Spinoza's anthropology as a content, a list of characteristics attributed to human beings. On the contrary, for the Dutch philosopher, individuals are constantly interacting, shaping each other's complexions (*ingenia*). It follows that the multitude does not have any substantial characteristic or affect but is formally described by affective dynamics. As Slavoj Žižek summarises:

> Spinoza thus avoids both traps of the standard approach: he neither dismisses the mechanism that constitutes a multitude as the source of the irrational destructive mob nor does he celebrate it as the source of altruistic self-overcoming and solidarity … in short, democracy and a lynching mob have the

[58] In the *Political Treatise*, V, §6, and VII, 26, Spinoza evokes a free multitude.
[59] Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, Topical Studies in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 3.
[60] Jonathan Havercroft, 'The First Image Revisited: Waltz, Spinoza, and Affect in Global Politics', *(British International Studies Association)*, 2012.

> same source. It is with regard to this neutrality that the gap that separates Negri and Hardt from Spinoza becomes palpable.[61]

The second issue is that, since the multitude is global, all-encompassing, constituent, and democratic, or, in other terms, since there is nothing outside of the democratic multitude to constitute powers, it is unclear how antidemocratic powers emerge – but they do as they have been and are still dominating politics. There is no internal contradiction nor an external counter-part to the multitude that would explain how the Empire is sustained in their theory.

Claudio Albertani affirms that 'despite its declared aversion to the dialectical thought, Negri's theoretical framework has never stopped being Hegelian … we always find, underlying, the idea of a necessary theology, a circular movement and a happy ending already present since the beginning'.[62] There is certainly something of the movement of history in Hardt and Negri's work. But this historical movement is one that is deprived of any substantial elements of negation. Hardt and Negri's multitude does not have any internal contradiction nor any external conflict. It simply is, which is puzzling.

Revolutionary joy and love

The same optimism exists with regards to the multitude's affects, as the insistence on joy and love over indignation reveals. The problem is not that Spinoza himself did not mention joy or love as revolutionary affects: his text is laconic enough for it to be fleshed out in many ways and indignation relies either on an imagined similarity or on love. The issue is that the

[61] Slavoj Žižek, *Organs without Bodies: Deleuze and Consequences* (New York: Routledge, 2003), 34.
[62] Claudio Albertani, 'Toni Negri et la déconcertante trajectoire de l'opéraïsme Italien', *À Contretemps*, no. 13 (2003): 15, my translation.

emphasis placed upon positive affects reinforces Hardt and Negri's tendency to hollow out the tensions of Spinoza's philosophy.

Sean Grattan remarks that Hardt and Negri have a distorted view of Spinoza's theory of affects.[63] In their article 'Value and affect', they define Spinozist affect as 'a power of transformation', 'a force of self-valorization', a 'power of appropriation' or 'an expansive power'.[64] As aforementioned, Spinoza's definition is ambivalent: 'by affect, I understand affections of the body by which the body's power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained'.[65] While some affects are empowering indeed, others are disempowering. Hardt and Negri's focus on love and joy is thus revelatory of a glowing interpretation of affects in general.[66]

A fundamentally democratic multitude, joyful rebellious affects, a revolution without opponent: it is little surprising to see that Hardt and Negri's book was largely criticised for being impractical.[67] This rosy picture of the multitude is also underlined by Michael Rustin who denounces 'a splitting of good and bad, love and hate, the destructive and the creative. In Hardt and Negri's argument, this splitting involves the location of all destructive forces in external authorities and of all creative powers in subjugated individuals'.[68]

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[63] Sean Grattan, 'The Indignant Multitude: Spinozist Marxism after *Empire*', *Mediations* 25, no. 2 (2011): 6–7.
[64] Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, 'Value and Affect', *Boundary 2* 26, no. 2 (1999): 85–86.
[65] *Ethics* III, def. 3.
[66] Gregory Seigworth and Melissa Gregg warned against this risk in their analysis of affects: 'As much as we sometimes might want to believe that affect is highly *invested* in us and with somehow magically providing for a better tomorrow, as if affect was always already sutured into a progressive or liberatory politics or at least the marrow of our best angels, as if affect were somehow producing always better states of being and belonging – affect instead bears an intense and thoroughly immanent neutrality' (Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', in *The Affect Theory Reader*, by Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2010), 10).
[67] See for instance Rustin, '*Empire*: A Postmodern Theory of Revolution', 12. Nevertheless, Hardt and Negri's last volume, *Assembly* – which is also the least Spinozist of them all – is more substantially dedicated to the question of concrete political actions.
[68] Rustin, 12.

3. A dynamic unity

Although the theory of multitudes presented in chapter 2 has inherited from Negri's early analyses on the concept, the concept of multitude developed in this thesis differs substantially from Hardt and Negri's multitude. Their multitude is based on an ideological unity: the multitude's democratic commitment. On the contrary, I argue that Spinoza's concept of multitude – and therefore, the concept used in this thesis – relies on common affects. Several affects may be common, depending on the situation. Unlike Hobbes and Le Bon, Spinoza does not limit the multitude to be an irrational crowd – even though it may be so. Fear, hope, indignation, love, may all be common affects.

Beyond the specific common affects that may lead to its emergence, the multitude is defined by affective dynamics. I presented in chapter 2 some of these affective dynamics that Spinoza conceptualised in the *Ethics* and in the *Political Treatise*, such as affective imitation, which makes the circulation of affects within the multitude possible; complex affection that increases affective intensities; and affective transfers that extend affects from an object to others on the basis of imagined similarities. These dynamics shed light on affective circulations within the multitude, but they do not tell anything about the multitude's characteristics. The multitude is defined formally, not substantially. Focusing on the multitude's affects is thus a way, as Ruth Leys notices, 'to shift attention away from considerations of meaning or "ideology"' in order to open new paths.[69]

For Hardt and Negri, ideology gives consistency to the multitude both as a notion and as a group. This common ideology was given once for all, as it was included in the very definition of the multitude and, as such, it offers a stable foundation. No such constancy is granted to the common affects on which our multitude relies. If a common affect is imposed

[69] Ruth Leys, 'The Turn to Affect: A Critique', *Critical Inquiry* 37, no. 3 (2011): 450.

on the multitude by the state and its institutions in a top-down manner, this affect may be crystallised and sustained by the state, which confers stability to it. A common affect may also be spontaneous and due to a direct auto-affection of the multitude so that it circulates without institutions playing any role. These spontaneous affects, if they are not institutionalised later on, may change over time, since affects are by nature inconstant.[70] As these spontaneous common affects are inconstant, it follows that the multitudes that emerge on their basis are so too. With spontaneous affective circulations, new multitudes may thus emerge, grow, be set into motion, crumble, and disappear.

Conclusion

Hardt and Negri's interpretation of Spinoza integrates his notion of multitude within a complex assemblage of concepts coming from diverse thinkers. Theoretical orthodoxy may not be valuable as such, but this eclectic perspective makes their approach to the multitude harder to understand, and thus, to operationalise.

There is a fundamental tension within the concept of multitude that Hobbes perfectly noticed and that Spinoza addressed: the multitude is plural, which raises the question of its consistency. In continuity with Spinoza, Hardt and Negri affirm, *contra* Hobbes, that the multitude has some consistency. However, as they present the multitude as global and all-encompassing, the only element that characterises the multitude, beyond its heterogeneity, is its democratic commitment. The consistency of the multitude is thus ideological.

Hardt and Negri's theory appears as particularly glowing: the multitude is essentially democratic and rising, affects are joyful and empowering, and the revolution does not have

[70] *Ethics* IV, prop. 32-34.

any substantial opposition. This optimism is not only little documented empirically, it is also unclear ontologically. Hardt and Negri's ontology is eclectic and it is uncertain how diverse theoretical elements, borrowed from different ontologies, are articulated together.

By contrast with Hardt and Negri's multitude, the concept of multitude that has been presented in this thesis does not rely on ideology. The multitude is not bound together by common ideological principles but by common affects.[71] As a consequence, the multitude is defined formally through affective dynamics rather than substantially through any given characteristics. Common affects, if they are not sustained by constant affections or institutionalised, may fade away and the multitude that emerged out of them may crumble. Multitudes are thus dynamic: they emerge, they grow, they crumble, and they disappear.

This definition of the multitude is not only closer to Spinoza's philosophy, it also has the benefit of describing affective dynamics more accurately, and is, as such, more operational. The first three chapters of this thesis have drawn from Spinoza's philosophy to establish an ontology of political affects. The next chapter will push this reflection further by deriving from this ontological frame a theory of revolutionary springs based on affective patterns and on a specific methodology.

[71] However, common ideological principles may imply common affects. But the focus is maintained on affects rather than on ideological principles.

Chapter 4 – Navigating revolutionary affects: from ontology to theory, case selection, and methodology

> Sensibility and History: new topic … and, please forgive a poor historian for this artistic cry: such a beautiful topic! So many people are wandering, distressed at every step because there is nothing new to discover, it seems, in these oceans in which so many people have navigated. They should dive into the darkness of Psychology and tempt to grasp History: they would develop a taste for exploration!
>
> Lucien Febvre, 'La sensibilité et l'histoire'[1]

Introduction

If poets and classical philosophers largely agreed on describing revolutionary affects as a storming ocean, scholars are yet to agree on a way to safely navigate these deep waters. Even though Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison lamented in 2008, almost a decade after the apparition of EIR, that there were 'hardly any sustained discussions about how to go about studying emotions in world politics',[2] discussions on methods have fortunately largely increased in both number and sophistication since then. Despite being almost only qualitative, the methods developed in EIR have been particularly diverse and handled a variety of resources at different levels of analysis. This diversity, that was deemed as

[1] Lucien Febvre, 'La sensibilité et l'histoire: Comment reconstituer la vie affective d'autrefois?', *Annales d'histoire sociale (1939-1941)* 3, no. 1/2 (1941): 5, my translation.
[2] Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, 'Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics', *Review of International Studies* 34, no. S1 (2008): 124.

problematic with regards to ontology, is on the contrary entirely beneficial when it comes to methodology. Given the particularly evasive nature of emotions, 'it might be particularly fruitful to increase triangulation through the use of multiple methods and/or of multiple materials in order to compare and potentially aggregate insights'.[3]

Although it is convenient for scholars to have all these methodological tools at hand, it is nevertheless necessary to select them in accordance with ontology. In the first three chapters, I have brought out the affective dynamics that turn the multitude against the regime. This ontology gives us a springboard to investigate how revolutionary indignation emerges, circulates, and spreads within and across countries. This chapter builds on these ontological foundations to approach more specifically the two cases, the Springtime of the Peoples in 1848 and the Arab Spring in 2010-2011.

In the first part, I turn this fundamental ontology into a narrower theory of revolutionary springs. To do so, I engage with Kurt Weyland who first conceptualised revolutionary springs, although he did not label them. If Weyland's work convincingly isolates revolutionary springs to show how they challenge current revolution theories, his own theory, based on cognitive biases, has however a few blind spots which prevent him from analysing the spatial diffusion of revolutionary springs. In response to these shortcomings, I develop an approach based on three affective patterns to show how revolutionary martyrdom and revolutionary fraternity can overcome repressive fear.

This analysis of revolutionary springs is developed through the studies of the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring. Even though the universe of cases is larger than these two episodes, this case selection, which follows Weyland's one, is justified by the

[3] Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar, *Researching Emotions in International Relations: Methodological Perspectives on the Emotional Turn* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 11.

historical importance of these events and their richness in terms of empirical materials. Furthermore, I present how these two cases display the three features that characterise revolutionary springs: a fast transnational diffusion of mass uprisings; an absence of any substantial financial or military cooperation between revolutionaries across borders; and spontaneous popular uprisings exceeding political organisations.

Lastly, acknowledging the challenges that come with the analysis of collective emotions, this research uses 'multiple methods and … multiple materials'[4] at different levels of analysis. Revolutionary periods are indeed characterised by intense surges of creativity: the multitude affects itself and the world, producing artefacts through diverse media. I present consequently the textual, visual, and audio resources as well as the respective methods I use to analyse them.

I. An affective approach to revolutionary springs

1. The blind spots in Weyland's theory of revolutionary springs

A presentation of Weyland's model

Kurt Weyland was the first to identify the specificity of revolutionary springs, even though he did not use the term, and offered the most influential theory of transnational diffusion of revolutionary movements. Weyland's theory combines cognitive micro-foundations with organisational macro-structures. The cognitive aspect relies mostly on two cognitive shortcuts, namely the heuristics of availability that makes striking events such as victorious revolutions more memorable; and the heuristics of representativeness that overemphasise the importance of apparent similarities between cases, neglecting fundamental differences.

[4] Clément and Sangar, 11.

Due to these two mechanisms, the success of a revolution distorts foreign aspirant revolutionaries' cost-benefit calculations, unleashing irrational hope in the success of their own uprisings,[5] and therefore, spreading the revolution across countries.

However, the outcomes of these cognitive shortcuts vary depending on the organisational macro-structure, which is the level of political organisation in each society. The argument goes as such: while people outside of mass organisations 'had sparse information, limited processing capacity, and little experience in making political decisions', 'representative leaders [in these mass organisations had] much better access to information, greater processing capacity, and considerable experience in politics'[6] and, consequently, were less prone to cognitive heuristics. This variable would thus explain why regime contention has been increasingly slower over the modern period since political organisation has increased, limiting the impact of cognitive biases.[7] Weyland's theory is thus particularly elegant as it aims to explain not only the transnational diffusion of democratic contention, but also the reasons of its recurrent failures, and this with only two cognitive biases and the level of political organisation.

Weyland's blind spots

Despite Weyland's contributions, his theory suffers from certain limits. Although Weyland's refuses the lineage with Gustave Le Bon,[8] his premises, which contrasts political experts who

[5] Kurt Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Revolution: "1848" in Europe and Latin America', *International Organization* 63, no. 3 (2009): 391–423; Kurt Weyland, 'The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?', *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 4 (2012): 917–934; Kurt Weyland, *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), chaps. 1–4.
[6] Weyland, *Making Waves*, 8.
[7] Weyland, chap. 3.
[8] Kurt Weyland, 'Response to Barbara Wejnert's Review of *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848*', *Perspectives on Politics* 13, no. 2 (2015): 499.

are 'less subjects to cognitive heuristics'[9] with the multitude, prone to follow the most 'skilful orator'[10], display similar elements of political elitism.[11] The distinction between knowledgeable political elites and the crowd appears more as an ideological standpoint than as based on clear evidence. The success of any revolutionary movement seems indeed hardly foreseeable, even for the intellectual and the social elite at the time. If Tocqueville warned the Parliament about the risks of a revolution in 1848, he also described how the members of the said Parliament were caught off-guard by the events which stormed Paris and soon large parts of Europe.[12] Closer to us, the Failed States Index[13] as well as most scholars[14] also failed to predict the uprisings of the Arab Spring, let alone their consequences. More radically, one may even doubt that revolutions can be predicted at all, not only because their developments may rely on contingent episodes,[15] but also because their processes drastically change the contexts in which they happen.[16]

But even if we take Weyland's assumptions for granted, the theory suffers from major blind spots. As we saw, the theory relies on psychological micro-foundations and organisational macro-structures and, as only the latter vary through time, the changes and differences through space and time should only be explained by differences in terms of organisation. However, Weyland's theory does not seem to pay attention to the diversity of situations across countries and only compares historical periods in order to explain why waves of contention have slowed down since 1848.

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[9] Weyland, *Making Waves*, 8.
[10] Weyland, *Making Waves*, 113.
[11] See chapter 2.
[12] Alexis de Tocqueville, *Souvenirs* (Paris: Gallimard, 1999), 83.
[13] Jeff Goodwin, 'Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring', *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 452.
[14] Martin Beck, 'The Arab Spring as a Challenge to Political Science', in *The International Politics of the Arab Spring*, by Robert Mason (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 9–10.
[15] See Ivan Ermakoff, 'The Structure of Contingency', *The American Journal of Sociology* 121, no. 1 (2015): 64–125.
[16] Goodwin, 'Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring', 453.

Following his model, communities that have different levels of political organisation should react differently to the news of a revolution. We would expect countries having higher levels of political organisation to be less responsive to foreign revolutions. However, no strong correlation is noticeable here. The Springtime of the Peoples did not spread to the Russian Empire, yet still a largely agrarian society, but did in German states where political and social organisations were much more centralised. Furthermore, if the Arab societies, because of their authoritarian regimes, did not benefit from broad-based associations,[17] the same could be said for several African countries which, however, did not experience similar uprisings. Weyland's model does not account, therefore, for the spatial diffusion of revolutionary springs, hence the need for another theoretical approach.

2. A Spinozist theory of revolutionary affects: fear, revolutionary martyrdom, and revolutionary fraternity

In a nutshell, I have shown that, for Spinoza, the multitude spontaneously rebels when a circulation of indignation, relying on affective imitation, overcomes the fear inspired by the state. Furthermore, this circulation of indignation may circulate across borders, but only triggers social unrest if there is an affective transfer due to the fact that these regimes are imagined as sharing similarities. This general perspective now needs to be narrowed and specified.

[17] Weyland, 'The Arab Spring', 923. A statement that should be singularly qualified, as the situation largely varied from a country to another, on that point see Jamie Allinson, 'Class Forces, Transition and the Arab Uprisings: A Comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria', *Democratization* 22, no. 2 (2015): 1–21.

Repressive fear

State repression causes fear. Repression is usually defined by the literature as the 'actual or threatened use of physical sanctions against an individual or organization … for the purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities and/or beliefs perceived to be challenging to government personnel, practices or institutions'.[18] The wording of the definition reveals the leanings of the repression literature, largely influenced by rational choice theory. Acknowledging the emotional impact of repression is however not contradictory *per se* with such a perspective and may even offer insights to explain the efficiency of repression as a political tool. Lauren Young's work on the psychology of state repression shows, for instance, how fear increases pessimism and risk aversion which conversely decreases practices of dissent.[19] There is no denying, therefore, that states use repression as a tool to inflict fear on certain categories of the population and that this emotional tool can achieve its political objective.

Fear is not, however, simply a lever in the regime's hands. An affective approach to repression qualifies the definition above in two ways. First, the regime does not have a complete control on the micro-dimensions of repression. There is an insurmountable gap between the repressive strategies and tactics elaborated in executive cabinets and their applications on the ground, and when it comes to the emotional impact of repression, it is the study of the latter that should be privileged. Second, revolutionary testimonies reveal a striking insistence on the physical dimensions of repression, such as smells or noises, all elements that are usually neglected by the literature since they do not clearly increase the cost

[18] Christian Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', *Annual review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007): 2.

[19] Abraham Aldama, Mateo Vásquez-Cortés, and Lauren Elyssa Young, 'Fear and Citizen Coordination against Dictatorship', *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 31, no. 1 (2019): 103–125; Lauren Young, 'The Psychology of State Repression: Fear and Dissent Decisions in Zimbabwe', *The American Political Science Review* 113, no. 1 (2019): 140–155.

of certain behaviours. This discrepancy between first-hand accounts of repression and scholarly studies underline that fear should not be limited to a psychological translation of a rational measure of the risks to be harmed or constrained. It is also a visceral reaction to what Tocqueville calls the 'revolutionary atmosphere'.[20] The analysis of fear thus constitutes repression and social protests as aesthetic experiences – aesthetic being understood in the etymologic sense (αἰσθητικός) of physical perceptions –.

The indignation about revolutionary martyrdom

'Rayes Le Bled', the song by El Général that some newspapers considered to be the anthem of the Arab Spring[21] is a pamphlet against the Tunisian government:

بالجوع يموت شكون فمّ مازال	It's 2011 and there's still a man who's dying of hunger.
موش صوته لكن يعيش بش يخدم يحبّ مسموع	He wants to work to survive, but his voice is not heard!
وحوش ولّات العباد وشوف للشارع اهبط	Go out into the street and see [how] people have become animals.
بالهُش على ما تاكاتاك بالماتراك الحاكم شوف	Look at the police with batons. Thwack-thwack-thwack! They don't care![22]

[20] Tocqueville, *Souvenirs*, 50, my translation.
[21] See for instance 'El Général and the Rap Anthem of the Mideast Revolution - TIME', 15 February 2011, accessed 30 June 2019, http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2049456,00.html. Like Ted Swedenburg, I have however failed to see any evidence of the diffusion of this song outside of Tunisia, see Ted Swedenburg 'Hip-Hop of the Revolution (The Sharif Don't Like It)', *Middle East Report Online*, January 5, 2012.
[22] Lyrics and translation on Sean O'keefe, 'Revolutionary Arab Rap: The Index الثوري العربي الراب: الفهرس: El Général - Rais Lebled', *Revolutionary Arab Rap* (blog), 30 August 2011, http://revolutionaryarabraptheindex.blogspot.com/2011/08/el-general-rais-lebled.html.

A few weeks before the fall of the regime, El Général produces a list of grievances: misery, unemployment, negation of political rights, police brutality… All of them may trigger indignation, and probably have. As we can see, some of these grievances, such as misery or unemployment, overlap with factors analysed within structural approaches. In the same way, as Frédéric Lordon rightly argues, ideologies also influence our affects, including indignation.[23] Affects, thus, translate material and ideological factors at a psychological level.

However, affects are not entirely reducible to these material and ideological dimensions, which also means, if affects play a role in revolutionary processes, that revolutions should not be reduced to material factors and ideologies. To support these claims, this study focuses specifically on one form of indignation: the indignation triggered by revolutionary martyrs. Although revolutionary martyrdom is anchored in economic, political, social, and ideological structures, it cannot be limited to any of these dimensions. This form of indignation is thus sufficiently distinct to shed light on an aspect of revolutions that other approaches have not tackled yet.

Both the term martyr and its Arabic equivalent, ***shahīd***, etymologically mean witness since the martyr 'has suffered death as a witness to his or her faith or the principles he or she stands for'.[24] To put it differently, one becomes a martyr because of their specific qualities or because of the specific circumstances of their martyrdom. In this study, however, I am less interested in what qualifies to be a martyr than in the social processes that lead people to refer to an individual or a group as martyrs, which I coin as a process of martyrisation.[25] The revolutionary martyr is thus the product of the multitude's power and creativity.

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[23] Frédéric Lordon, *Les Affects de la politique* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2016), 26.
[24] Karin M. Fierke, *Political Self-Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 198.
[25] I echo here the distinction between 'heroism' and 'process of heroization' that Alain Garrigou introduced in his work on the French Republican hero Alphonse Baudin, see Alain Garrigou, *Mourir pour des idées : La vie posthume d'Alphonse Baudin* (Paris: Belles Lettres, 2010).

Virtually all revolutions have their martyrs, from Spartacus to Che Guevarra. This specific form of indignation is thus generalisable to a great number of cases: it is an affective pattern. George Lawson calls 'recurrent causal patterns' the 'interactive dynamics that shed light on diverse revolutionary episodes'.[26] Focusing on this specific affective pattern, revolutionary martyrdom, conveniently narrows down our investigation[27] in order to avoid making only allusions to affective circulations without clear objects. Eventually, as studies on psychology showed, the harm inflicted on individuals was the first motive for retributive actions.[28] This makes martyrs revolutionary figures with a strong emotional impact, capable of triggering intense circulations of indignation.

In sum, this research does not discard the importance of other factors, be they material or ideological. Through the definite analysis of revolutionary martyrs, it sheds light on an affective pattern that explains key outcomes that the focus on material factors and ideology cannot account for.

Revolutionary fraternity

Indignation is triggered by affective imitation, that is, the fact that one imagines similarities with someone who is imagined as experiencing certain affects. Representations of others are thus crucial. However, these representations are fluid, processual, hence the necessity to see how they are actualised during the process at stake, here, revolutionary springs.[29] To do so, I examine another affective pattern, one that Spinoza did not mention: experiences and expressions of fraternity.

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[26] George Lawson, *Anatomies of Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 10.
[27] Clément and Sangar invite EIR scholars to 'narro[w] down the variety of emotional phenomena in a concrete research project' (see Clément and Sangar, *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, 8).
[28] See An Adriaenssen et al., 'Public Perceptions of the Seriousness of Crime: Weighing the Harm and the Wrong', *European Journal of Criminology* 17, no. 2 (2018): 127–150.
[29] Bernd Bucher and Ursula Jasper, 'Revisiting "Identity" in International Relations: From Identity as Substance to Identifications in Action', *European Journal of International Relations* 23, no. 2 (2018): 391.

Fraternity is a reciprocal affect that links revolutionaries together. Embedded in the organic reality of the family, the use of the fraternal metaphor is immemorial and virtually universal. Already in the Antiquity, sovereigns would refer to each other as brothers in their diplomatic exchanges.[30] This does not imply, however, that fraternity, as a notion, does not have a history. Two periods appear as particularly crucial. First, the emergence of the three monotheisms[31] which established the believers as a community of brothers. Second, a period starting with the French Revolution and culminating with the Springtime of the Peoples,[32] during which fraternity gradually rose until becoming the French motto, alongside liberty and equality.

Fraternity is a loose concept but one filled with a 'powerful emotional charge'.[33] This looseness is partly due to the diversity of its ideological sources. Christian and Muslim thoughts rely on this brotherhood, as I mentioned, but so did Jacobins, Republicans, and even socialists and anarchists. Ideological hybrids drawing from several of these ideologies also exist, adding layers of complexity to the term fraternity.[34] The conceptional looseness of

[30] Keith Hamilton, *The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration* (London: Routledge, 1995).
[31] This seems to be especially true for Christianism, see Jean-Yves Guillaumin, 'Aux origines latines du terme fraternité: Fraternitas', in *Fraternité : Regards croisés*, by Frédéric Brahami and Odile Roynette (Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2006): 47–58. As for Islam, see for example Muhammad Abdel Haleem, trans., *The Qur'an* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pt. Al-Hujurat (The Private Rooms, 49), v. 10: 'The believers are brothers, so make peace between your two brothers and be mindful of God'.
[32] Owen Jackson notices, for instance, that in the British newspapers he analysed 'in the first three weeks of March 1848 alone, uses of the term were almost as numerous as they had been in the previous sample years of 1792, 1812, and 1832 *combined*', see Owen Jackson, 'Receiving Revolution: The Newspaper Press, Revolutionary Ideology and Politics in Britain, 1789-1848' (PhD diss., The University of Bristol, 2000), 62.
[33] François Furet, Mona Ozouf, and Arthur Goldhammer, *A Critical Dictionary of the French Revolution* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1989), 694.
[34] Frank Paul Bowman, *Le Christ des barricades: 1789-1848* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1987).

the term may have contributed to its success. As Sidney Tarrow notices, 'ambiguity helps create coalitions … Ambiguity also condenses meanings'.[35]

But more fundamentally, this looseness may be due to what fraternity expresses, that is, an organic and obvious bound to the other. In that sense, it is based both on imagined similarities and on love. Fraternity is an emotional impetus, 'more carnal than intellectual … more spontaneous than contemplative'.[36] It is not that fraternity has not been theorised – it has –[37] but rather that it is experienced as an emotional recognition beyond any theorisation.

And yet, fraternity is a powerful notion. Benedict Anderson has underlined the role of fraternity: despite being a metaphor, 'ultimately it is this fraternity that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such limited imaginings'.[38] As aforementioned, Anderson's definition of nationalism draws from Renan's quote 'the essence of national is that all individuals have a lot in common and also that they have all forgotten many things'.[39] Fraternity is precisely one of the emotions that make us forget about social divides, be they racial, class-based, or regional.[40] Experiences and expressions of fraternity are involved in the process of nation-building, which explains the importance of the notion in Europe and in the Americas over the 19th century when and where nation-states emerged.

But because of this theoretical looseness, fraternity does not have a clear delimited referent. Undoubtedly, my fellow-citizen may be my brother, but so can be a member of my

[35] Sidney G. Tarrow, *The Language of Contention: Revolutions in Words, 1688--2012* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 15.
[36] Mona Ozouf, 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity', in *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*, by Pierre Nora, vol. 3 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 86.
[37] Marcel David, *Le printemps de la fraternité. Genèse et vicissitudes, 1830-1851* (Paris: Aubier, 1992), chap. II and III.
[38] Benedict R. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 2006), 7.
[39] Anderson, 6, my translation.
[40] Anderson, 202–203.

ideological, religious, or ethnic group, or even any human being. To put it differently, fraternity does not point out an identity, including national identity, but expresses an identification with one or several groups. Expressions and experiences of fraternity may thus vary across time depending of the context. This context-dependent dimension of fraternity makes it particularly adequate to pin down a notion as fluid as identification. Taking experiences and expressions of fraternity seriously strengthens our analysis of identification at work and the national and transnational circulations of indignation it triggers.

Summary

This investigation looks at the interplay between three affects, the fear caused by repression, the indignation inspired by revolutionary martyrdom, and experiences and expressions of revolutionary fraternity. However, circulations of indignation do not nourish social unrest across borders unless there is an affective transfer relying on imagined similarities between regimes.

II. Two revolutionary springs

1. Case selection

I examine here two revolutionary springs, namely the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring. I define revolutionary springs through three characteristics: first, a fast transnational diffusion of social protests; second, the absence of any important military or financial collaboration; third, a spontaneity that exceeds the activities of pre-existent political organisations. This definition can be generalised and applied to other historical episodes, such as the decolonisation of the Americas over the first half of the 19th century, the 1830 revolutions in Europe, or the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, amongst others. Furthermore, as this analysis is more about the causes of revolutions and their

diffusion than about their consequences, massive transnational protests, such as the students' protests in the 1960s, the Gilets jaunes movement in 2019-2020, or the on-going Black Lives Matter protests in 2020, display close characteristics.[41]

This selection is motivated by several reasons. The Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring were particularly fast in their diffusions, rich in terms of the economic, social, ideological, and political diversity of the countries they reached, and historically consequential. Furthermore, the comparison between these two cases is enlightening: the important historical and geographical differences are opportunities for the theory to increase its empirical breadth and, hopefully, to avoid idiosyncratic explanations. This comparison mitigates, for instance, the journalistic and scholarly insistence on the role played by social media during the Arab Spring, since the inexistence of these media in 1848 did not prevent any transnational diffusion of the revolution. Eventually, Weyland also examined these two cases, probably for reasons that are not foreign to the arguments presented above. It follows that the selection responds more precisely to Weyland's theory by grounding my argument on the same empirical cases.[42] Although affective circulations likely played similar roles in other historical events, these cases are thus particularly appropriate for our investigation.

2. The Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring as revolutionary springs

The Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring are complex and intricated historical episodes.[43] While outlining their main events, I will show how they match the three

[41] One may distinguish here between revolutionary springs and riot springs, as in the latter the desire to overthrow the government or the regime is not as clear.
[42] Other scholars also made comparisons between the two cases, see for instance Robert Springborg, 'Whither the Arab Spring? 1989 or 1848?', *The International Spectator* 46, no. 3 (2011): 5–12; Mark Almond, 'The Arab Spring-Contemporary Revolutions in Historical Comparison', *All Azimuth* 1, no. 2 (2012): 35.
[43] See Annexe 1.

characteristics that define revolutionary springs: a fast transnational diffusion of mass uprisings; an absence of any substantial financial or military cooperation between revolutionaries across borders; and spontaneous popular uprisings exceeding political organisations.

Fast transnational revolutions

The Springtime of the Peoples, halfway between the French Revolution in 1789 and the Soviet Revolution in 1917, soon stopped by the counter-revolutionary wave in Europe and condemned even by its most radical participants, like Karl Marx, almost appears as a 'forgotten revolution'.[44] However, this retrospective judgement overlooks how powerful the revolutionary wave was and how deeply this episode shaped the second half of the 19th century.

Like in 1789 and in 1830, the Springtime of the Peoples started in Paris. Due to a political crisis between liberal and republican members of the Parliament, on the one hand, and the conservative majority led by François Guizot on the other, the Parisians rioted in February 1848 until the resignation of Guizot the 23rd and the fall of the July Monarchy the 24th. In the following days, newspapers and telegraphic messages spread the news outside of the capital and uprisings stormed other French cities and the countryside.[45]

The news also crossed borders and reached the German states. On February 27th, demonstrations broke in Mannheim; two days after, a march in Karlsruhe forced the Grand Duke to appoint a new ministry and call for a new constitution. His example would soon be imitated in the Duchy of Nassau and in the Kingdom of Württemberg. On March 5th, the

[44] Maurice Agulhon, *Les Quarante-Huitards* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2013), 10, my translation.
[45] Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 124–125.

Grand Duke of Hesse abdicated in favour of his son. The day after, King Frederick Augustus II of Saxony dismissed his conservative minister and King Ludwig of Bavaria accepted the demands for reforms, before relinquishing the power on the 20th. In less than a month, the Third Germany, an expression referring to the German states outside of Prussia and Austria, had been completely shattered.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire, centre of the conservative forces, seemed to be standing firmly against this revolutionary wave, but on March 3rd, Lajos Kossuth gave a speech advocating for the independence of the Hungarian, igniting demonstrations in the whole empire. Ten days later, riots in Vienna forced the Archduke Albert to dismiss Klemens von Metternich, architect of the 1815 international order and symbol of the conservative Holy Alliance, while Kossuth was welcomed by cheering crowds.

Metternich's fall was a turning point. Other nationalist minorities living in the empire, such as the Czechs and the Romanians, joined the debates adding to the political chaos. In the Italian territories annexed by the empire, the news was welcomed enthusiastically. On March 18th, the Milanese protested and, supported by the Lombard peasants, managed to free the city. The same day, Venetians converged across Saint Mark's Square and, after five days of battle in the city, defeated the Austrian troops and proclaimed the Venetian Republic.

Outside of the empire, the fall of Metternich also increased the pressure on conservative powers. On March 18th, Frederick William, King of Prussia, abolished the censorship and called the Prussian estates to reform the German confederation. The presence of the troops in the city, however, triggered unrest so that the king conceded the establishment of a constitution on March 22nd and left the city. Beyond these territories, other protests occurred in many parts of Europe, like Spain, Russia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, yet to a lesser extent.

A month after the fall of the French monarchy, France, the German states, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and some Italian states had been massively impacted. The success of these revolutions did not last for long. In June, Cavaignac violently suppressed a second wave of riots in Paris. This repression put the first nail in the Republican coffin, which was definitely six feet under after the election of Louis Napoléon Bonaparte in December 1848, a year before he became Emperor. Since April 1848, the Austro-Hungarian Empire had stirred the conflicts up between Hungarians and other minorities in the empire, leading to a civil war. Although Hungarians and radicals occupied Vienna in October, they were soon defeated, and Budapest seized in December. The same month, the Prussian government dissolved the Constituent assembly and guaranteed the supremacy of the King. In 1849, most of the compromises accepted by the regimes were eventually withdrawn.

Despite the existence of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), the diffusion of the Arab Spring was paradoxically slower. While the 1848 revolutions started in a European centre, Paris, the Arab Spring was sparked on the margins of the region, in Tunisia. The self-immolation of a young fruit-vendor on December 17th 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, Mohamed Bouazizi, immediately ignited demonstrations in the city and soon in the whole region. On January 14th, uprisings in the whole country, including in Tunis, compelled Ben Ali to resign and leave the country.

The fall of the Tunisian authoritarian regime was received with uttermost attention in the region. The very same day, the Facebook group 'We all are Khaled Said', created after the murder of a young man, Khaled Said, by the Egyptian police, organised a demonstration for Police day, on January 25th.[46] This demonstration was a success everywhere in Egypt and

[46] Kara Alaimo, 'How the Facebook Arabic Page "We Are All Khaled Said" Helped Promote the Egyptian Revolution', *Social Media + Society* 1, no. 2 (2015): 5.

was followed by upheavals and riots. On January 29th, a large crowd occupied Tahrir Square that immediately became the heart of the revolution. On February 11th, after two weeks of social unrest, Hosni Mubarak eventually resigned.

Unlike Tunisia, Egypt was culturally, economically, and geopolitically a major country in the region and the contestation against the regime, followed by the fall of Mubarak, had a domino effect. The Arab Spring stormed the whole region. On January 22nd, a major demonstration marched in Sanaa, Yemen, forcing Saleh to announce that he would not seek re-election in 2013. Despite the violent repression, Saleh was then compelled by the uprisings to relinquish power on November 23rd. On February 15th, riots burst in the East of Libya, following the arrest of lawyer Fathi Terbil. The revolution soon turned into a civil war. On March 19th, the French airstrike got involved in the operations, supporting the rebels, soon followed by NATO's forces. By the end of August 2011, Tripoli was under the rebels' control and Qaddafi eventually got killed on October 20th. In Syria, the protests organised in March 2011 were little successful at first. However, on March 5th, fifteen children, who had written anti-government graffiti inspired by Arab Spring slogans, got arrested in Daraa and tortured, while their families were humiliated and threatened. In reaction to this treatment, outraged families started demonstrations. Despite the violent repression, armed gangs, the *shabiḥa*, or snipers, the uprisings did not stop. The Syrian revolution turned into a brutal conflict between the government forces and diverse rebellious groups, each side receiving foreign military and financial support.

Although the impact of the Arab Spring was most striking in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Syria, it also sparked protests and marches, sometimes violently repressed, in all

the countries of the region.[47] It is still too early to fully measure the impact of the Arab Spring on the region. In a sense, the Arab Spring may still be on-going, if one considers the second Egyptian revolution that overthrew Mohamed Morsi in 2013,[48] the Hirak movement in Algeria, or the Syrian civil war. Our investigation, however, will be limited to the period going from December 2010 to early 2012 as, after this period, other factors than affective dynamics seem to predominate.

An absence of transnational coordination

The second characteristic of revolutionary springs is the absence of any transnational military or financial coordination.[49] This does not mean that each national revolution was fully isolated from the others. On the contrary, there is no doubt that individuals crossed borders to actively spread the revolution abroad.[50] However, these were individual initiatives: the revolutionary states did not actively spread the revolution and no political transnational organisation was involved either.

The absence of revolutionary foreign policy may surprise as it seems to go against the totalising ambition that characterises revolutions. As Fred Halliday reminds us, revolutionary

[47] Although the literature largely focuses on the countries mentioned above, this should not make us forget about the actual extension of the phenomenon in the whole region. See for instance the chapters on Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Sudan in Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad, *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013).

[48] I happened to be in Cairo during the uprisings in July 2013. Something of the impressions I had, as a foreign and largely ignorant bystander witnessing the frightening uncertainty as well as explosions of joy, has probably inspired this research. I would like to express here my gratitude for all the encounters there, with thankful thoughts to Camille Marrou.

[49] Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Revolution', 402–403; Weyland, 'The Arab Spring', 920.

[50] Some immigrants endeavoured to spread the revolution in their own country, such as Romanian students who left Paris to organise demonstrations in Bucharest and Iasi, see Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions*, 121. Similarly, around 1,200 French volunteers went to support Italians in their struggle against Austria, see Anne-Claire Ignace, 'French Volunteers in Italy, 1848–49: A Collective Incarnation of the Fraternity of the Peoples and of the Tradition of French Military Engagement in Italy and Europe', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 14, no. 4 (2009), 445–460.

states usually prioritise tackling domestic unrest so that revolutionary states 'tend at first to enjoy good relations with external forces, a "period of grace", and only after some time to enter into full conflict'.[51] In other terms, what constitutes the exceptionality of revolutionary springs is not that revolutionary governments did not actively spread the revolution immediately after their establishment, but rather that foreigners spontaneously reacted to these events.

In 1848, Lamartine, prominent figure of the French revolutionary government, had to find an equilibrium between radical republicans who intended to promulgate their values abroad, on the one hand, and moderates who feared that the 1848 revolution would follow the path of 1789 and end up in the Terror, on the other. The latter side eventually won and on March the 4th, Lamartine published a 'Manifesto to Europe' to claim that the French Republic would respect the peace treaties of 1815 and would not wage war on its neighbours.

Tunisia, a country of 10,7 million inhabitants in 2011, was not in capacity to profoundly impact the international system by diplomatic or military means. Mohamed Ghannouchi, prime minister after the fall of Ben Ali, nevertheless clarified on CNN, not without a touch of humour, that 'Tunisia … is an exporting country, but we do not pretend that we export revolutions'.[52] The fall of Mubarak's regime was a bigger threat for the stability of the region. Nevertheless, here again, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which held power from February the 11th to June the 30th 2012, maintained all international agreements and treaties. Despite some attempts to open a dialogue with Iran, the SCAF did not fundamentally change Egypt's foreign policy and largely maintained the *status quo*.[53]

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[51] Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 135.
[52] Amar and Prashad, *Dispatches from the Arab Spring*, 1.
[53] Gamal Hassan, 'A Revolution without a Revolutionary Foreign Policy', *Adelphi Series* 55, no. 453–454 (2015): 158–161.

Spontaneous multitudes

Furthermore, these revolutionary bursts, first in France and Tunisia, then abroad, were largely the doing of spontaneous crowds. Unlike Weyland, I do not suggest that revolutionary springs occurred in a void of political and social organisations. Since 1789, diverse political clubs had emerged in all European industrialised countries in parallel with workers movements, such as Chartism in the United Kingdom. However, both forms of organisations were significantly restricted due to the interdiction of association which forced them either to comply with police permission or to be illegal and run secrete activities, like the Carbonari.[54] In other words, the rumours that accused these movements of having plotted the 1848 events largely overestimated the capacities of these movements. These organisations rather joined popular uprisings that were essentially leaderless.[55] The Tahrir Data Project survey provides similar evidence of the spontaneity of the movement in Egypt: 66.3% of the respondents who participated to the revolution were not affiliated to political organisations and had not participated in protests before. Only 8.2% belonged to an union and 7% to political parties.[56] This revolutionary spontaneity appeared visually in the thousands of signs and pictures in demonstrations, mostly made by individuals with their own slogans and requests.[57]

The situation of political and social organisations in MENA countries varied. This diversity of situations, more important than in 1848, forces Weyland's theory to a stretch.

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[54] Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 158.
[55] Priscilla Smith Robertson, *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 28; Jean-Pierre Filiu, *The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 5: Leaderless movements can win. The Egyptian activist Alia Mossallam preferred the term of 'leaderful', see John Chalcraft, 'Horizontalism in the Egyptian Revolutionary Process', *Middle East Report*, no. 262 (2012): 8.
[56] Joo-Young Jung, 'Social Media, Global Communications, and the Arab Spring: Cross-Level and Cross-Media Story Flows', in *Mediated Identities and New Journalism in the Arab World* by Aziz Douai and Mohamed Ben Moussa (New York: Springer, 2016), 30.
[57] Mohammed Bamyeh, 'The Egyptian Revolution: First Impressions from the Field', *Asia-Pacific Journal - Japan Focus* 9, no. 7 (2011): 4.

Weyland affirms indeed that 'since decades of authoritarian imposition stifled organizational development in the MENA, broad-based associations and consolidated mass parties were rare in late 2010'.[58] Although it is accurate that certain countries, such as Libya, could not develop any political organisations due to the degree of authoritarianism, this is certainly not true for all countries. As Weyland recognises himself, large organisations existed, if only the Muslim Brotherhood, solidly established in Egypt. Beyond political parties, labour organisations sometimes played a central role, such as the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) in Tunisia, which benefited from the central role it played in the decolonisation and had 517,000 members out of 4 million active workers in 2011.[59]

Shadi Hamid advises us not to underestimate Islamist movements because of the differences that exist with Western-style political parties: 'Most political parties, after all, do not double as states-within-states, with parallel networks of mosques, clinics, banks, businesses, daycare centers, and even Boy Scout troops. Islamist parties do.'[60] The Brotherhood was particularly strong, indeed, and although it suffered from internal divisions in the 1990s, the appointment of Mahdi Akif in 2004 gave a new impulse to the movement. Despite irregularities, frauds, violence, and intimidation orchestrated by the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood obtained in 2005 88 seats out of the 444 up for grabs, making it the leading party of the opposition.[61]

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[58] Weyland, 'The Arab Spring', 923.
[59] Hèla Yousfi, 'The Tunisian Revolution. Narratives of the Tunisian General Labour Union', in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2014), 320.
[60] Shadi Hamid, 'Political Party Development before and after the Arab Spring', in *Beyond the Arab Spring: The Evolving Ruling Bargain in the Middle East*, ed. Mehran Kamrava (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 131.
[61] Ana Belén Soage and Jorge Fuentelsaz Franganillo, 'The Muslim Brothers in Egypt', in *The Muslim Brotherhood*, ed. Barry Rubin (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 46–53.

However, as Weyland noticed, the Muslim Brotherhood did not trigger the revolution in Egypt[62] and, even after they joined and played a crucial role in the protests,[63] the uprisings remained mostly leaderless and spontaneous.[64] What seems to be a serious counter-argument to Weyland's theory and the role it gives to the level of political organisation, is nevertheless not acknowledged as such. Weyland only limited his response to the affirmation that the Muslim Brotherhood 'did not play a leading role in initiating the challenge of 2011 … As a result, the contention of the Arab Spring lacked clear organizational leadership that could authoritatively guide and speak for the protesting masses'.[65] In other words, there is no strong evidence from the cases that the spontaneity of these popular bursts would be due to a lack of political and social organisations since, when they exist, these organisations may also be overwhelmed by the multitude.

The perspective developed here does not pretend that these organisations did not exist, but intends to take into account the spontaneous actions, beyond any formal organisation, that occurred during the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring. As James C. Scott affirms:

> The condensation of history, our desire for clean narratives, and the need for elites and organizations to project an image of control and purpose all conspire to convey a false image of historical causation. They blind us to the

[62] Weyland, 'The Arab Spring', 923.
[63] The role of the Muslim Brotherhood is quite apparent in Jehane Noujaim, *The Square* (Noujaim Films Worldview Entertainment, 2013).
[64] Chalcraft, 'Horizontalism in the Egyptian Revolutionary Process'. As Carrie Rosefsky Wickham explains, this was a deliberate strategy from the Muslim Brothers who did not want to be perceived as trying to impose their own agenda, see Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, *The Muslim Brotherhood: Evolution of an Islamist Movement* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 162–169.
[65] Weyland, 'The Arab Spring', 923.

> fact that most revolutions are not the work of revolutionary parties, but the precipitate of spontaneous and improvised action ("adventurism" in the Marxist lexicon), that organized social movements are usually the product, not the cause, of uncoordinated protests and demonstrations, and that the great emancipatory gains for human freedom have not been the result of orderly, institutional procedures but of disorderly, unpredictable, spontaneous action cracking open the social order from below.[66]

These organisations alone did not spark the popular bursts. On the contrary, popular bursts did contribute to create new organisations and strengthen former ones, illustrating Spinoza's argument that the power of the multitude ends up crystallised and captured by institutions and organisations. Freed from the ban on associations, two hundreds clubs appeared in Paris during the Springtime of the Peoples, counting approximately 70,000 members.[67] In the same period, between 1 and 1,5 million Germans joined a political club, that being 10-15% of the adult male population.[68] Alongside these political organisations, labour associations also appeared, yet to a lesser extent, with 50,000 members of Parisian cooperatives in 1848-1851, and, 15,000 members in the German Workers' Fraternization.[69] Consequently, the Springtime of the Peoples highly contributed in the emergence of civil

[66] James C. Scott, *Two Cheers for Anarchism: Six Easy Pieces on Autonomy, Dignity, and Meaningful Work and Play* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 141.
[67] Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 2005, 158.
[68] Sperber, 163.
[69] Sperber, 170.

society.[70] The same phenomenon occurred in the MENA countries in which the regimes fell, suddenly allowing the 'proliferation of new parties',[71] be they liberal or Islamist.

As a result, it would be oversimplifying to oppose organisations and spontaneous movements since they nourished each other during these revolutionary springs. Focusing on spontaneous and popular uprisings does not aim to diminish political and social organisations, but is an endeavour to shed light on a fundamental aspect of revolutionary springs that might otherwise neglected.

III. Investigating affects: methods and sources

1. Methodology of affects

The methodological challenges faced by the analysis of affects are considerable. As aforementioned, emotions are 'deeply internal',[72] 'ephemeral',[73] and, as such, 'hard to define, hard to operationalize, hard to measure and hard to isolate from other factors'.[74] Furthermore, 'if the methodological challenges are significant when investigating individual or interpersonal emotional dynamics they are far greater when it comes to analysing emotions at the level of larger collectives, such as in national and transnational spheres'.[75] Instead of

[70] Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, '1848 En Allemagne : Une perspective comparative', in *1848 : Actes du colloque international du cent-cinquantenaire, tenu à l'Assemblée Nationale à Paris, les 23-25 février 1998* by Jean-Luc Mayaud (Ivry-sur-Seine: Créaphis, 1998), 471.
[71] Hamid, 'Political Party Development before and after the Arab Spring', 145; Corinna Mullin, 'Tunisia's Revolution and the Domestic–International Nexus', in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring*, ed. Larbi Sadiki (Routledge: New York, 2014), 90.
[72] Neta C. Crawford, 'The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional Relationships', *International Security* 24, no. 4 (2000): 118.
[73] Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, 'Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics', 115.
[74] Jean-Marc Coicaud, 'Emotions and Passions in the Discipline of International Relations', *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 15, no. 3 (2014): 495.
[75] Roland Bleiker and Emma Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', in *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, by Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 332.

clear causal mechanisms, our approaches to emotions are often limited to presenting bundles of empirical evidence to support our claims, and this argument is no exception.

The methodology used here may be perceived as cherry-picking. To reach a certain level of generality and avoid idiosyncratic observations, I handle various sources (textual, visual, audio, and audio-visual) and different levels of analysis. It is true, however, that the ontological ambition of this research leads to a form of cherry-picking. While scholars have so far largely focused on the apples and oranges in the revolutionary fruit salad, this work aims to show that the fruit salad also contains cherries. This study focuses indeed on three affective patterns and brings out phenomena that illustrate them to give theoretical tools to see them and analyse them.

In continuity with a Spinozist ontology, this investigation particularly focuses on affective circulations within and across multitudes, that is, pre-existing or emergent groups bound by common affects. This stress on multitudes does not deny the role played by activists and organisations, that are also part of these multitudes, but intends to look beyond these groups to pay a particular attention to popular and spontaneous affective experiences and expressions. To do so, I examine the powerful creativity of the multitude expressed in 'vernacular, ephemeral, and anonymous'[76] sources and practices.

As it follows from the concept of auto-affection of the multitude, affects are at both ends of this creative process. On the one hand, affects, such as indignation, set the multitude into motion: it makes people act, which includes creating all these artefacts. On the other, these resources also contributed to spreading affects. This attention to the spontaneous actions and creations of the multitude allows us to trace, as much as possible, how affects

[76] Quentin Deluermoz et al., 'Le XIXe Siècle au prisme des Visual Studies. Entretien de Quentin Deluermoz et Emmanuel Fureix avec Manuel Charpy, Christian Joschke, Ségolène Le Men, Neil McWilliam, Vanessa Schwartz', *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle. Société d'histoire de la Révolution de 1848 et des révolutions du XIXe siècle*, no. 49 (2014): 140, my translation.

circulated nationally and transnationally. As a result, I privilege when possible sources that circulated and impacted a great number of people rather than creations that had a more confidential dimension. In other words, this research focuses on engravings over paintings and popular songs over poems.

Another challenge was related to the transnational perspective of this research. However, a large part of the literature on the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring has focused on a single country. Certainly, the national dimension of many academic studies is legitimate given the breadth of the phenomenon and the diversity of languages at stake. It has also echoed the institutional memory of the events that is often elaborated through a national(ist) perspective.[77] More recently, with the rise of global history, some historians have paid more attention to the transnational dimension of the Springtime of the Peoples. However, the international dimension of both revolutionary springs is still too often analysed through a juxtaposition of or a comparison between simultaneous national revolutions instead of being fully conceived as a transnational revolution. As this research is largely dependent on these studies, it has brought out elements that had been left on the margins of these studies and multiplied the resources to address the transnational dimension of revolutionary springs.

Looking at the repertoires at stake underlines the unity of these transnational phenomena. Charles Tilly defines a repertoire as a set of possible collective actions available to people and 'established for their place, time, and pair'.[78] Tilly and other scholars have consequently created catalogues of events with categories of formal descriptions of performances and repertoires, such as 'march', 'petition' or 'damage to property'. Such

[77] On the French example, see Jean-Claude Caron, '"Printemps des peuples": pour une autre lecture des révolutions de 1848', *Revue d'histoire du XIXe siècle* 52, no. 52 (2016): 36.
[78] Charles Tilly, *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 15.

catalogues shed light on the existence of repertoires at a given moment and on the changes of these repertoires over time. In continuity with our theory, repertoires may be defined as social institutions of contentious politics since they are a set of acts and ideas socially established.

In the absence of such detailed catalogues, the secondary literature reveals the diffusion of repertoires. The use of barricades in France over the 19th century is well-documented, especially with regards to the 1830, 1848, and 1871 revolutions.[79] The Springtime of the Peoples diffused this repertoire across Europe which led the Prague journalist Ferdinand Kopp to affirm that 'the historians who deal with the history of this period will have to name it the barricade age'.[80] Similarly, the occupation of Tahrir square has influenced the repertoire of contentious actions in Egypt, but also in the rest of the region[81] and perhaps even beyond.[82] These diffusions of repertoire in a short period of time underline both the transnational dimension and the unity of revolutionary springs.

A fine-grained analysis of these repertoires reveals the ambivalent dimension of revolutionary springs. Charles Tilly notes for instance that 19th century British repertoire included the 'display of programs, slogans, and symbols of common membership such as flags, colors, and lettered banners'.[83] In 1848, this repertoire seems common to all the

[79] Jean-Marie Mayeur and Alain Corbin, eds., *La barricade* (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 2016).
[80] Květa Mejdřická, 'Les barricades à Prague en 1848', in *La barricade*, by Jean-Marie Mayeur and Alain Corbin (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 1997), 383–393.
[81] See for instance the example of the Pearl Roundabout in Bahrain: Adam Hanieh, 'Bahrain', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 77–84.
[82] Some scholars have indeed underlined a diffusion from the Arab Spring occupations to the Indignados occupation of the Puerta del Sol and Occupy Wall Street in New York. See Benjamín Tejerina et al., 'From Indignation to Occupation: A New Wave of Global Mobilization', *Current Sociology* 61, no. 4 (2013): 377–392; Eduardo Romanos, 'From Tahrir to Puerta Del Sol to Wall Street: The Transnational Diffusion of Social Movements in Comparative Perspective', *Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (REIS)* 154, no. 1 (2016): 103–133.
[83] Tilly, *Contentious Performances*, 44.

European populations. But beyond this formal[84] community of action, what could be termed as the 'content' of this collective action should be analysed too. 1848 revolutionaries did not display any kind of flags. In Paris, some displayed red flags while others privileged the Republican tricolour one, contrasting different meanings despite – or, more precisely, beyond – a common repertoire. In the rest of Europe, national tricolour flags, adapting the French model to diverse national contexts, spread during the Springtime of the Peoples. The French flag itself was displayed in several foreign countries. Beyond the formal dimension of the repertoire, its content is also central to our perspective,[85] as I will show in more details in the following chapters.

Acknowledging the important inputs of the aesthetic turn and its use for EIR scholars,[86] I diversify the range of materials traditionally studied by including textual as well as visual, audio, and audio-visual resources. To approach them, I use 'messy methods', that is 'a heterogeneous combination of seemingly incompatible methods', [87] borrowed from humanities and adapted to our purposes.

2. Presentation of resources

Although men, weapons, or money did not massively travel across borders during these events, telegraphic messages, rumours, letters, newspapers, engravings, Tweets, and songs

[84] The notion of 'formal description' is used by Tilly, see Tilly, 19.
[85] Tilly himself did not ignore the importance of repertoire content. He remarks for instance that 'the recent French revolution of 1830 made the French tricolor a symbol of concerted popular resistance', see Tilly, 78.
[86] Roland Bleiker, 'The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory', *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 30, no. 3 (2001): 509–533; Roland Bleiker, 'In Search of Thinking Space: Reflections on the Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 45, no. 2 (2017): 258–264.
[87] Bleiker and Hutchison, 'Methods and Methodologies for the Study of Emotions in World Politics', 336.

did. These textual, visual, audio, and audio-visual resources are thus central to understand affective circulations during revolutionary springs. Todd Hall distinguishes three ways for a discourse to be emotional: it can be *indicative of emotion*, 'as offering evidence of and insight into the emotional state of its author or utterer'; *provocative of emotion*, 'constructed to elicit emotional reactions from its audience by use of particularly symbols, themes, and narratives', and *invocative of emotions*, that is, 'capable of deploying emotions as socially – and even politically – consequential referents'.[88] This distinction, initially about discourses, is also relevant when it comes to handling other resources.

Textual resources

Texts are the most common resources in EIR. Following Koschut's recommendation, this study 'combine[s] different textual genres to get a more comprehensive picture of and better access to the emotions involved'.[89] Testimonies, diversely delivered in private letters, newspapers, social networks messages, or interviews, are of primary interest for they indicative value.[90] It is therefore little surprising to see the importance that Weyland gave to this form of resource in his analyses of revolutionary springs.

Testimonies, however, come with a bias: not everyone is willing, capable, or invited to testify, and not all testimonies are as likely to be published. In other words, a large proportion of our testimonies comes from social classes with strong cultural capital.[91] Take for example *Voices of the Arab Spring* edited by Asaad al-Saleh. While this book is of the

[88] Todd Hall, 'Three Approaches to Emotion and Affect in the Aftermath of the Zhuhai Incident', *International Studies Review* 19, no. 3 (2017): 487.
[89] Simon Koschut, 'Speaking from the Heart: Emotion Discourse Analysis in International Relations', in *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, by Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 281.
[90] Jean-Pierre Reed, 'Emotions in Context: Revolutionary Accelerators, Hope, Moral Outrage, and Other Emotions in the Making of Nicaragua's Revolution', *Theory and Society* 33, no. 6 (2004): 656.
[91] Pierre Bourdieu, *La reproduction : éléments pour une théorie du système d'enseignement* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1970).

uttermost importance for giving an insight into 'the participants' emotional, psychological, and cultural foundations and assumptions',[92] a look at the professional activities of these witnesses reveals a strong social bias (figure 1). While 52% of the testimonies are written by University professors, researchers, teachers, and students, no farmer or worker has participated in the project.



Figure 1 – Professions of the contributors to *Voices of the Arab Spring*[93]

I do not blame *Voices of the Arab Spring* specifically. This limit also exists to diverse degrees in other anthologies of testimonies of the Arab Spring[94] or in the selection of the six testimonies that documented Weyland's analysis of 1848.[95]

[92] Asaad al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring: Personal Stories of the Arab Revolutions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 1.
[93] I have realised this diagram based on the pieces of information provided by the contributors.
[94] See for instance Wendy Pearlman, 'Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings', *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (2013): 387–409; Wendy Pearlman, *We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria* (New York: Custom House, 2018).
[95] Weyland, *Making Waves*, chap. 4.

When these testimonies were published during the events, they should not only be studied as indicative of emotions but also as provocative. This is, for example, the case of testimonies published in newspapers during the Springtime of the Peoples. While telegraphic messages covered the main information, newspapers would offer vivid descriptions, often made by direct witnesses of the events.[96] Although we have only little information on the emotional reception of these news, discourse analysis tools help to make plausible guesses. Furthermore, the strong demand for these newspapers is also a hint of the emotional excitement they produced. Beyond the actual number of publications, the circulation of these newspapers increased as political press achieved an unprecedented level of penetration in the countryside.[97]

This provocative dimension of newspapers has been underlined by EIR scholars and largely explored regarding the Arab Spring specifically.[98] It may seem, however, that this emotional framing is top-down, imposing certain emotional reactions to passive masses, the polar opposite of the active and creative multitude depicted by Spinoza. This should be nuanced in two ways. First, it appears that these revolutionary springs gave birth to new newspapers and blogs. As for an example, Austria had 19 political newspapers prior to the revolution, a number which rose to 306 in 1848.[99] This growing diversity corresponded to a

[96] Frédéric Chauvaud and Jean-Jacques Yvorel, 'Les provinces face à février 1848 : échos et contre-échos (22 Février - 16 Mars)', in *1848 : Actes du colloque international du cent-cinquantenaire, tenu à l'Assemblée Nationale à Paris, les 23-25 février 1998* by Jean-Luc Mayaud (Ivry-sur-Seine: Créaphis, 2002), 254.
[97] Hans J. Hahn, *The 1848 Revolutions in German-Speaking Europe* (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 66.
[98] On the role of media in the Arab Spring, see Naila Hamdy and Ehab H. Gomaa, 'Framing the Egyptian Uprising in Arabic Language Newspapers and Social Media', *Journal of Communication* 62, no. 2 (2012): 195–211; Michel M. Haigh and Michael Bruce, 'A Comparison of the Visual and Story Frames Al Jazeera English and CNN Employed during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution', *International Communication Gazette* 79, no. 4 (2017): 419–433.
[99] Hahn, *The 1848 Revolutions in German-Speaking Europe*, 66.

rise of publications in general as it increased by 79% from 1847 to 1850.[100] Without denying the importance of big media producers – the mid-19th century witnessed the apparition of the first transnational newspapers[101] –, these big players should not conversely hide the importance of the myriad of smaller producers. Al-Jazeera, said to be the 'igniter and extinguisher of Arab revolutions',[102] is an interesting case. During the early phases of the revolution in Tunisia, Al-Jazeera and other international media were denied access to the country so that they heavily relied on videos, pictures, and testimonies sent by 'citizen journalists' on the ground.[103] This dependency of international media on citizen journalists[104] or activists' platforms[105] no little stimulated the creations of numerous accounts on social networks to create and share this content.[106]

The second point regards the transmission of these news. A Hungarian student narrates how the first news about the Springtime of the Peoples were received:

> We were impatiently waiting for the newspapers from Vienna, especially the *Allgemeine Zeitung* from Augsburg, famous on foreign policy. At that time, few newspapers would arrive to the country; censorship did not let us much choice. The Count Othon Zichy was generally in charge of the public reading so that as

[100] Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann and Robert Evans, *The Revolutions in Europe, 1848-1849: From Reform to Reaction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3. Similar situations can also be identified in other countries: in Prussia, political publications increased by 56% in the same period.
[101] Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 1 Une république nouvelle (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), chap. 1.
[102] Gilles Kepel, *Passion Arabe: Journal, 2011-2013* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2013), 299, my translation.
[103] Sam Cherribi, *Fridays of Rage: Al Jazeera, the Arab Spring, and Political Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), chap. 3.
[104] Cherribi, 77.
[105] Lina Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East: The Role of the Visual in Political Struggle* (London: IBTauris, 2012), 118.
[106] Khatib, 118.

> many people as possible would discover the interesting news and would then relay them in the city.[107]

To reach their full audience, especially if they are censored, these media need people to relay them, either by reading them publicly, as it was the case during the Springtime of the Peoples in café or public spaces,[108] or by sharing them on social networks. This is not to say that media do not have an impact in shaping collective emotions, but rather that, to have this impact, they first need to be actively relayed by the public.

Lastly, I would like to mention the question of messages on social networks, essentially Twitter and Facebook.[109] The role of the Internet in the Arab Spring has been underlined to the point that it was sometimes referred to as 'the Facebook revolution'. This role, undoubtedly real, should however be severely qualified since only a minority of users had access to the Internet in 2010 in the region.[110] Moreover, despite not having the Internet, the diffusion of the Springtime of the Peoples was faster than the Arab Spring. This is not to deny the importance of communication technologies. Although no substantial study has tackled the question, as far as I know, the Springtime of the Peoples may have benefited from the development of electric telegraphy in the 1830s-40s. But focusing on these new

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[107] Paul Bouteiller, *La Révolution Française de 1848 vue par les Hongrois* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949), 127, my translation.

[108] This allowed newspapers to reach a bigger audience in a time when illiteracy was still high. In France, by 1848, about 60% of the population could read, which was slightly lower than Prussia with 80%, but far higher than Russia with 5%, see Mike Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 22.

[109] Some scholars have raised the question of emotions and ICT, see for instance Constance Duncombe, 'The Politics of Twitter: Emotions and the Power of Social Media', *International Political Sociology* 13, no. 4 (2019): 409–429. As I argue below, I am still to be convinced that ICT data are ontologically different from other textual resources, although I believe they offer methodological opportunities.

[110] In 2010, 36.7% of the population had access to the Internet in Tunisia, 21.6% in Egypt, 14% in Libya, 20.7 in Syria, and 12.4% in Yemen, see World Bank Development Indicators, 2010, see 'World Development Indicators | DataBank', accessed 28 August 2020, https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators..

communication technologies is at the risk of neglecting the largest part of the picture. Merlyna Lim showed, for instance, the importance of the 'hybrid network', in which the Internet was in synergy with other devices such as mobiles, most of them being deprived of the Internet.[111]

That being said, digital messages come with an advantage: they are easily quantifiable. Private conversations and chitchats, the fuel of any social movement and what John-Paul Ghobrial calls the 'dark matter … of history',[112] are indeed inaccessible. Like physicists, we can however infer the existence of this invisible dark matter from what is observable. The use of hashtags on Tweets, for instance, allows us to notice, and potentially quantify, the emergence of some topics in (a certain) public space.

Visual resources

Visual resources are slowly but steadily integrating IR agenda.[113] Like discourses, images can be indicative and invocative of emotions, but scholars have particularly insisted on their provocative force. Images, maybe more than words, have a powerful affective impact. An evidence of that, as Bleiker notices, is, for instance, that media often feel compelled to warn their audiences before displaying shocking images whereas they do not do so with verbal depictions.[114]

[111] Merlyna Lim, 'Framing Bouazizi: "White Lies", Hybrid Network, and Collective/Connective Action in the 2010–11 Tunisian Uprising', *Journalism* 14, no. 7 (2013): 921–941; on that point, see Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East*, 4–7 and 137–140.
[112] John-Paul A. Ghobrial, *The Whispers of Cities: Information Flows in Istanbul, London, and Paris in the Age of William Trumbull* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), sec. abstract.
[113] See for instance Bleiker, 'The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory'; Bleiker, 'In Search of Thinking Space'; Aida A. Hozić, 'Introduction: The Aesthetic Turn at 15 (Legacies, Limits and Prospects)', *Millennium* 45, no. 2 (2017): 201–205; Roland Bleiker, *Visual Global Politics*, (London: Routledge, 2018).
[114] Bleiker, *Visual Global Politics*, 9.

Despite a few exceptions, such as the picture of the young Alan Kurdi,[115] we usually have little information on the emotional reception of these images. To cope with this lack, several 'sites of interpretation' can be explored.[116] The first pertains to the production and reproduction of these images.[117] A large production and reproduction of certain images may indeed indicate a high demand and thus a strong emotional reaction to these images. This raises the question of the materiality of the image. Thanks to constant technological innovation over the first half of the 19th century, lithography and wood engraving allowed the 'technological reproducibility'[118] of images.[119] The Springtime of the Peoples triggered 'an unprecedented wave of images, illustrations, and caricatures that … come along, diffuse, criticise, and discuss the political news'.[120] However, little of this abundant and diverse production has remained: these images, published in illustrated newspapers or as separate etchings of various qualities, were indeed less considered than paintings, more fragile, and more tightly tied to their times. Unless these images have been preserved and archived by

[115] Werner Binder and Bernadette Nadya Jaworsky, 'Refugees as Icons: Culture and Iconic Representation', *Sociology Compass* 12, no. 3 (2018); Thomas Olesen, 'Memetic Protest and the Dramatic Diffusion of Alan Kurdi', *Media, Culture & Society* 40, no. 5 (2018): 656–672; Lin Prøitz, 'Visual Social Media and Affectivity: The Impact of the Image of Alan Kurdi and Young People's Response to the Refugee Crisis in Oslo and Sheffield', *Information, Communication & Society* 21, no. 4 (2018): 548–563; Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Katrine Emilie Andersen, and Lene Hansen, 'Images, Emotions, and International Politics: The Death of Alan Kurdi' 46, no. 1 (2020): 75–95; for a more nuanced approach that shows other forms of reaction to this picture, see Robert J. Topinka, 'Politically Incorrect Participatory Media: Racist Nationalism on r/ImGoingToHellForThis', *New Media & Society* 20, no. 5 (2018): 2050–2069.

[116] Gabi Schlag, 'Moving Images and the Politics of Pity: A Multilevel Approach to the Interpretation of Images and Emotions', in *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, by Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 213–215.

[117] Deluermoz et al., 'Le XIXe Siècle au prisme des Visual Studies. Entretien de Quentin Deluermoz et Emmanuel Fureix avec Manuel Charpy, Christian Joschke, Ségolène Le Men, Neil McWilliam, Vanessa Schwartz', 145.

[118] Walter Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2008).

[119] Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), 20–23.

[120] Agulhon and Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 19, my translation.

legal submission or by the newspapers which published them, they are thus lost for historians.

ICTs have made the productions, modifications, and transmissions of images more accessible and faster[121] so that the Arab Spring triggered an intense circulation of visual resources through social networks and mobiles. As Lina Khatib affirms, these images are 'floating' as they 'multiply … immediately and anonymously without any curatorial control'.[122] Furthermore, thanks to the democratisation of printing, these images are not only circulating on-line, but also in the streets, carried by demonstrators or glued on walls. Paradoxically, digital resources may also be particularly fragile: numerous YouTube videos, Facebook groups, or online archives remain now inaccessible. While keeping in mind these material conditions, the intensity of the productions, reproductions, and circulations of images expresses the intensity of the circulation of affects.

The second site of interpretation to investigate the affective impact of these images is to look at their provocative qualities, that is, the manner they represent their subjects. Visual analysis,[123] the translation of discourse analysis to visual resources,[124] consists in analysing images to bring out their connotations.[125] This analysis should take into account the diversity of materials – engravings, photographs, paintings, street art… – and the cultural contexts in which they are anchored. By drawing from cultural history, history of art, and

[121] Bleiker, *Visual Global Politics*, 5. Even before this revolution of communication and transmission of images, we could probably mention the revolution of photographic images, what Peter Burke calls the second revolution of images, after the rise of printed images in the 15th and 16th centuries, see Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (London: Reaktion, 2001), 16.
[122] Boris Groïs, *Art Power* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2013), 83 quoted in Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East*, 12.
[123] Sybille Reinke de Buitrago, 'Grasping the Role of Emotions in IR via Qualitative Content Analysis and Visual Analysis', in *Researching Emotions in International Relations*, by Maéva Clément and Eric Sangar (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 303–324.
[124] On the possibility to translate linguistic theories and methods to images, see Jean Wirth, 'Performativité de l'image', *Problèmes d'histoire des religions* 19 (2009): 125–135.
[125] Roland Barthes, *Image, Music, Text* (London: Fontana, 1977), 16–25.

social psychology,[126] we can make educated guesses regarding the affective reception of these resources.

Eventually, street art and graffiti were a central aspect of spatial occupation during the Arab Spring. Street art was indeed almost inexistent before the revolution, 'as control over visual representation in public space was firmly in the hands of the government'.[127] This form of expression is an open public palimpsest:[128] an image may indeed be recovered, completed, or erased by others. When possible, the analysis of this evolution may thus offer fruitful insights into the revolutionary process.

Audio resources

The aesthetic turn in IR has essentially been a visual turn so far. As Bleiker recognises, 'prevailing scholarly analyses of international relations pay virtually no attention to music'[129] so that works on international relations and music are only a handful.[130] Similarly, in revolution studies, despite the importance of the cultural turn that occurred with the fourth wave, music has largely been neglected.[131] Fortunately, a literature on this question exists, yet scattered in SMT, history, and cultural studies.

[126] Bleiker, *Visual Global Politics*, 10.
[127] Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East*, 153.
[128] Jennifer Pruitt, 'Monumentalizing the Ephemeral in Cairo's Revolutionary Street Art: The Case of Ganzeer', *World Art* 8, no. 2 (2018): 148.
[129] Roland Bleiker, 'Of Things We Hear but Cannot See: Musical Explorations of International Politics', in *Resounding International Relations*, by Marianne Franklin (New York: Springer, 2005), 179.
[130] Marianne Franklin, *Resounding International Relations: On Music, Culture, and Politics*, Softcover reprint, 2005. (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Frédéric Ramel and Cécile Prévost-Thomas, *International Relations, Music and Diplomacy: Sounds and Voices on the International Stage* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
[131] A welcomed exception can be found in Lawson's work, since Lawson affirms that 'music is central to revolutionary repertoires', see Lawson, *Anatomies of Revolution*, 82.

Music is indeed central in social movements and *a fortiori* in revolutions,[132] to the extent that several national anthems are revolutionary songs, the most famous being 'La Marseillaise'. The term 'revolutionary song' may refer either to songs that are sung during a revolution, or to ones that are about a revolution. The former are not necessarily invented during the revolution as it is common for protestors to sing traditional songs to strengthen the sense of collective identity, be they formerly revolutionary in either of this sense or not.[133] Although these two categories sometimes overlap, they may also differ and our investigation is mostly about the former. In this category, one should further distinguish between the songs that are listened during demonstrations, and performed by a singer or on a device, and the ones that are sung by the crowd. Hybrid forms are also common, the crowd singing the chorus or a response to the singer. This invites us to analyse more closely the performance of songs and the affective impact of these performances. Singing together or repeating a slogan may indeed increase the collective identity of the participants and the emotions that are related to this group.[134]

Another specificity of songs is their dual nature[135] as they include a text, which can be investigated through discourse analysis, and a melody. A look at revolutionary songs repertoires shows that new lyrics are often written and sung on traditional melodies. This musical intertextuality makes the diffusion of these songs easier, since melodies are already known, and it contributes in strengthening the sense of collective identity either by referring

132 Ron Eyerman, *Music and Social Movements: Mobilizing Traditions in the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); William F. Danaher, 'Music and Social Movements', *Sociology Compass* 4, no. 9 (2010): 811–823.
133 Eyerman, *Music and Social Movements*, chap. I and II.
134 Randall Collins, *Interaction Ritual Chains* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 33–35; Zoé Carle, 'Les slogans de la révolution égyptienne, épure d'une épopée tue ?', *Communications* 99, no. 1 (2016): 163.
135 One could probably nuance this distinction as the language itself may have a musical dimension.

to a common culture, as it is the case with pop songs, or by situating the social movement in a lineage, by quoting revolutionary songs from the past.[136]

Eventually, to fully understand the affective dimension of revolutions, it is necessary to include in our analysis sounds beyond music and, once again, historians have outdistanced politics and IR scholars.[137] The aesthetic dimension of demonstrations and riots is not limited to songs and slogans. It also includes sounds that vary depending on the historical and spatial contexts in which these episodes occur. Repression, for instance, has its own sounds, from the deflagration of weapons to screams.[138] When it comes to the Springtime of the Peoples, this 'sound landscape', which contributes to the revolutionary atmosphere, must be reconstituted from textual and visual resources, but audio-visual resources, either on social networks or in documentaries, document some episodes of the Arab Spring. Audio-visual resources seem however to have been neglected by EIR scholars. Beyond the testimonies they offer, audio-visual documents also provide us with insights of the aesthetic backgrounds in which revolutionary episodes occur.[139] While they may not always be translated into direct data, these backgrounds may however guide scholars' investigations and nourish them.

[136] David Robb, 'Oppositional Political Identity in the Song Culture of the Vormärz and the 1848 Revolution in Germany', in *Identity, Intertextuality, and Performance in Early Modern Song Culture*, by Dieuwke Van Der Poel, Louis P. Grijp, and Wim van Anrooij (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 240.

[137] See, for instance, Thomas Bouchet, "'Aux armes !", "Bravo ! Bravo !", "Que d'horreurs !!" - Écrire les cris d'insurrection (à propos des 5 et 6 juin 1832)', in *Paris, l'insurrection capitale*, by Jean-Claude Caron (Ceyzérieu: Éditions Champ Vallon, 2015), 113–122; 'La parole insurrectionnelle', in *Paris, l'insurrection capitale*, by Jean-Claude Caron and José-Luis Diaz (Ceyzérieu: Éditions Champ Vallon, 2015), 123–137.

[138] These sounds may also turn into slogans, as the recent example of George Floyd's moan, 'I can't breathe', shows, since it became a rallying cry. I thank Héctor Ruiz Soto for this point.

[139] See for instance Peter Snowdon, *The Uprising* (Rien à Voir production in association with Third Films, 2013).

Conclusion

The first three chapters of this thesis have established a fundamental ontology of popular affects on which this chapter has built a theory to see how circulations of affects nourish revolutionary springs. More precisely, this theory looks at three affective patterns, repressive fear, revolutionary martyrdom and revolutionary fraternity, to see how indignation circulates nationally and transnationally to the point that it overcomes the fear caused by repression and initiates a revolutionary uprising.

This stress on affective patterns allows the theory to tackle the spontaneity of these uprisings. Following Weyland's work, revolutionary springs are indeed defined as fast and spontaneous transnational diffusions of social protests in the absence of any important military or financial collaboration. In a brief presentation of the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring, I have showed why these cases were particularly rich, individually and compared together, and how they correspond to this definition.

Eventually, this research handles multiple methods to approach textual, visual, audio, and audio-visual resources. This diversity of perspectives has two aims: first, to analyse as rigorously as possible affective circulations, despite the inherent challenges faced by the analysis of these objects; second, to seize popular affects where they are expressed in order to avoid an idiosyncratic depiction of revolutionary affects.

The following three chapters investigate the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring in details. In chapter 5, I analyse the emergence of national fraternity, a reciprocal affect that overcomes social divides to create a fraternal group against the regime, and the process of martyrisation that occurred in two episodes, i.e. the Massacre of the Capucines and Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation. In chapter 6, this investigation shifts from the national level to the international one by focusing on transnational fraternity and

transnational circulations of indignation to see how they lead to another understanding of international affairs. Eventually, in chapter 7, I examine the limits of these affective circulations through negative cases.

Chapter 5 – We band of brothers: national diffusion of revolutionary springs

> We few, we happy few, we band of brothers;
>
> For he to-day that sheds his blood with me
>
> Shall be my brother;
>
> William Shakespeare, *Henry V*[1]



Figure 1 – From the blood of the martyrs (***al-shuhada'***) grows the revolution (***thawra***)[2]

[1] William Shakespeare, *Henry V* (London: Penguin Classics, 2015), act IV, scene 3, v. 2295–2297.
[2] Source: Suzee in The City, 'Protest Graffiti in Tahrir – The Mogamaa', *Suzeeinthecity* (blog), 7 August 2011, https://suzeeinthecity.wordpress.com/2011/08/07/protest-graffiti-in-tahrir-the-mogamaa-walls/, last accessed 7th September 2020.

Introduction

A Syrian revolutionary affirms: 'Blood is what moves people. Blood is the force of the revolution'.[3] Blood is at the junction of two affective patterns analysed in this chapter.[4] Revolutionary martyrdom draws its provocative power from shed blood; revolutionary fraternity relies on shared blood, regardless of other social divides. This chapter examines how blood makes the revolutionary multitude emerge at the national level and set it into motion.

Benedict Anderson has showed how fraternity was going hand in hand with nationalism. Fraternal communion is thus a keystone of 'imagined communities' and may be used by the state and its institutions to strengthen the idea of a common sense of belonging. However, fraternity may conversely be experienced and expressed by the people who challenge the state. This revolutionary fraternity, that has received less scholarly attention, is a reciprocal affect that reveals a framing of identification, consequently binding the revolutionary multitude together.

Revolutionary fraternity is entangled with the indignation triggered by revolutionary martyrs. Virtually all revolutions have their martyrs or, to be more precise, produce their martyrs through a process of martyrisation. The term 'martyr', indeed, does not refer to a specific bundle of qualities but to a social production. Revolutionaries spontaneously create 'martyrs' through the production and reproduction of representations of these martyrs.[5] In

[3] Wendy Pearlman, *We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria* (New York: Custom House, 2018), 145.
[4] I thank Cécilia Laurin for this point.
[5] Elizabeth Buckner and Lina Khatib, 'The Martyrs' Revolutions: The Role of Martyrs in the Arab Spring', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 4 (2014), 369. However, I disagree with the authors' claim that this is a new model of martyrdom that would be specific to the Arab Spring. I believe that instead of a new category of martyrs, this is a moment of the process of 'martyrisation'. When these revolutions are successful, the martyrs' representations are controlled and stabilised by the post-revolutionary state, as we saw in Iran as well as in Tunisia and Egypt now.

that sense, as with other social productions, the representations of martyrs – vehiculated through discussions, texts, images, or music – are both a cause and a product of indignation.

I first look at the synergy between revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom at the national level. Starting at the national scale allows us to analyse these affective patterns where they are most obvious before shifting to a transnational perspective. Referring to a 'national level' is however problematic. Some of the countries studied in this chapter are 'composite states'[6] lacking the unity of ideal-type nation-states. This is obviously the case for some European states during the Springtime of the Peoples since this event precisely raised the question of nationalism. While German and Italian nationalisms were heatedly debated during these events, neither Germany nor Italy existed as nation-states. On the contrary, the subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Empire belonged to various ethnic groups diversely recognised both by the regime and by these groups members themselves. For some countries of the Middle East and North Africa involved in the Arab Spring, the question of nationalism is also complex. Libya, for instance, was and still is relying on a complex system of competing tribes. An analysis at the national level, in that sense, comes with a degree of simplification.

The first part of this chapter concerns the fear caused by repression. Rationalist theories conceive of repressive fear as a strategy to increase risks for contentious practices. In that sense, fear would be the emotional translation of a risk calculus. By contrast, I define fear as a disempowering and visceral affect that emerges in an affective atmosphere. Investigating the impact of fear requires to examine micro-interactions in local contexts, but

[6] On this notion, see Daniel H. Nexon, *The Struggle for Power in Early Modern Europe: Religious Conflict, Dynastic Empires, and International Change* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 70–73.

also supposes to consider this affective atmosphere through an investigation of what I call the aesthetic context of revolutions.

Looking at fear as a visceral affect reveals how puzzling revolutionary behaviours, in such contexts, may be. This fear is not dissipated but overwhelmed by other affects triggered by revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom. In a second part, I investigate how a revolutionary fraternal communion makes a revolutionary national multitude emerge despite social divides. National symbols are thus created, retrieved, or alienated by the revolutionary multitude against the regime. Fraternity operates consequently as the foundations of a social structure of affects.

Eventually, I investigate the indignation triggered by revolutionary martyrs through a close-analysis of two episodes: the massacre of the Capucines in Paris and Bouazizi's self-immolation in Sidi Bouzid. In both cases, the process of martyrisation turns local events into martyrdom capable of triggering circulations of indignation intense enough to make people spontaneously take to the streets at the risk of their lives. Examining these two episodes sheds light on other similar cases of revolutionary martyrdom, either notorious, such as Khaled Said in Egypt, or more local. This analysis aims to bring out the processes that occurred in several instantiations during both revolutionary springs beyond these two cases.

I. The visceral and disempowering fear of repression

1. Repressive fear as an affective tactic

To understand how powerful revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary indignation are, it is necessary to comprehend the full affective impact of fear. Fear, indeed, is not just indicative of a risky cost-benefit rational calculation, it is a visceral and disempowering affect. In

revolutionary periods, fear is mostly caused by repression. The process of revolution is thus dependent on the tension between, on the one hand, the fear inflicted vertically by the state, and, on the other, the horizontal circulations of indignation. These affects should not be thought as chronologically ordered (fear first, then indignation) but rather as interacting dynamically over the revolutionary period.

The literature on repression, largely influenced by rational choice theory,[7] most often adopts the point of view of the regimes. Repression consequently appears as an affective tactic for the regime to maintain itself by increasing the cost of certain behaviours: repression intends to frighten demonstrators away. Gadhafi's speech, shortly after the beginning of the uprising, is exemplary:

> [I call] upon the millions, from one end of the deserts to the other, … [to] march in millions, to purify Libya inch by inch, house by house, home by home, street by street, person by person, until the country is clean of the dirt and impurities.[8]

However, the affective impact of repression may not be perceived without paying attention to the micro-level at which repressive action actually occurs. Disjunctions may happen between policies decided in governmental cabinets and acts in the field. In 1848, several massacres – in Paris on February 23rd, in Vienna on March 13th,[9] in Berlin on the 18th of the

[7] Christian Davenport and Molly Inman, 'The State of State Repression Research Since the 1990s', *Terrorism and Political Violence* 24, no. 4 (2012): 621.
[8] SLOBoe, *Muammar Gaddafi Speech translated (2011 Feb 22)*, accessed 26 June 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=69wBG6ULNzQ.
[9] Mike Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 63–64. As Mike Rapport remarks, the Archduke Albert, the commandant of Vienna, had in vain asked the troops to avoid any civilian killing in order not to ignite social conflicts.

same month[10] – have been attributed to moments of panic in the military troops in charge of containing the crowd, while the regimes in place sought to maintain the *status quo*. A regime may attempt to use fear as a political lever, but affective dynamics emerge from concrete situations that sometimes slip from the leaders' hands.

2. Aesthetics of repression

The other pitfall of focusing on the cost increase for certain behaviours is that fear is not the mere emotional translation of a rational calculation. Fear may also be visceral and triggered in situations that do not perfectly fit with the descriptions made by rational choice models. Revolutions are chaotic and usually come with confusion, rumours, and a great level of uncertainty.[11] This does not only make calculations hazardous, it profoundly shatters people, as a Tunisian graduate remembers:

> This was psychologically painful, as people were living in fear. They would hear all kinds of stories, telling them, for example, that a group of people in a particular area had been attacked and now the attackers were moving to another location. This made people live in fear, and they never had the chance to go out and check because there was a curfew during that time.[12]

Fear is stirred up by a variety of visual, sound, and even olfactory stimuli, that compose the aesthetic atmosphere of the revolution. These sceneries vary depending on historical and

[10] Wolfram Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848-49* (New York: Macmillan, 1998), 64; Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 74–75.
[11] Georges Lefebvre, *The Great Fear of 1789: Rural Panic in Revolutionary France* (London: NLB, 1973). For similar situations in 1848, see Ralph C. Canevali, 'The "False French Alarm": Revolutionary Panic in Baden, 1848', *Central European History* 18, no. 2 (1985): 119–142.
[12] Asaad al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring: Personal Stories of the Arab Revolutions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 34.

geographical contexts. Canons and bells rhythmed the 1848 uprisings.[13] An American living in Paris described the Parisian events to his fellow-citizens:

> From one end of the city to the other the cry of *Aux armes* was heard, the tocsin was sounded at several churches. An American, who has only heard bells of a smaller calibre can have no idea of the awful unearthly effect which the sound of these 'storm bells' as the Germans call them, produces. As they are only sounded for fire (which is of very rare occurrence in Paris) and insurrection, you may well imagine that the rarity of the alarm roar adds greatly to its effect. Suppose it mingled with discharges of musketry, the galloping of cavalry, the shouts of the infuriated crowd and the screams of the wounded, and you can form some idea of the 'street music' of Paris on that eventful night.[14]

Leopold von Gerlach, who commanded troops against the riots in Berlin, described a similar revolutionary atmosphere: 'the thunder of cannons resounded in increasingly quick succession … Throughout the city there began this time a frightful sounding of the alarm bells which was kept up through the whole night by armed artisans who had climbed the church towers'.[15] The sounds of the bells were arguably impressive but not immediately threatening. The fact that contemporaries insisted on these elements of the revolutionary

[13] Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 75.
[14] Elizabeth Robins Pennell, *Charles Godfrey Leland, a Biography* (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1906), 188, quoted in Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *La Révolution parisienne de 1848 vue par les Américains* (Paris: Service des Travaux historiques de la Ville de Paris, 1984), 172. I thank Guillaume Lancereau for having found the original passage.
[15] Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 76.

atmosphere brings to light the existing gap between what constituted actual risks – and thus increased the cost of certain behaviours – and what had an affective impact.

These 1848 revolutionary scenes first experienced by demonstrators and bystanders were then relayed beyond these groups. News of the uprisings spread from a city to another and from them to their respective countryside thanks to telegraphs and newspapers with, sometimes, illustrations (figure 2).[16]



Figure 2 – Repression on the Berliner Schoßplatz on Mars 18th[17]

Even though reactions to such illustrations, depicting the revolutionary chaos and the repressive power of the state, are not documented, they may have contributed to circulations of repressive fear beyond the places where repression occurred.

[16] Frédéric Chauvaud and Jean-Jacques Yvorel, 'Les provinces face à février 1848 : Échos et contre-échos (22 février - 16 mars)', in *1848 : Actes du colloque international du cent-cinquantenaire, tenu à l'Assemblée Nationale à Paris, les 23-25 février 1998* (Paris: Société d'histoire de 1848 et des révolutions du XIXème siècle, 2002), 254.
[17] Source: Walter Schmidt, *Illustrierte Geschichte der deutschen Revolution 1848/1849* (Frankfort: Neue Kritik, 1970), 86.

Repression was certainly not less chaotic nor violent during the Arab Spring. Everywhere, gatherings were dispersed by heavy use of tear-gas that 'makes you tear profusely and unable to breathe, coughing uncontrollably, eyeballs bulging'.[18] Rubber balls were progressively replaced with living ammunitions and 'the joyful sounds of the city … by the sounds of gunfire and army tanks with their scary sounds'.[19] The intensity of repression varied at all scales, but almost all the protesters' testimonies evoke 'the continuous echo of gunfire'[20] and the bursts of 'machine guns being fired in the street',[21] echoed by the screaming of people 'running for their lives'[22] or wounded.[23] The yesterday average citizen suddenly faced the risk of death, such as this activist in Tahrir charged by the police who, running away, saw 'a dying protester, his skull cracked open, his brains slowly pouring out'.[24] While repression was hitting, fear became an obsessive reality.[25]

II. The emergence of the revolutionary multitude

1. A fraternal communion

A revolutionary fraternity experienced through revolutionary performances

Social Movement Theory scholars have analysed the importance of collective identities to sustain social movements and, more recently, have integrated emotions into their analyses.[26]

[18] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 58.
[19] al-Saleh, 69.
[20] al-Saleh, 42.
[21] al-Saleh, 66.
[22] al-Saleh, 66.
[23] al-Saleh, 138.
[24] al-Saleh, 55.
[25] 81.9% of the Tunisians reported that they thought their participations in protests could result in injury, see Anita Breuer, Todd Landman, and Dorothea Farquhar, 'Social Media and Protest Mobilization: Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution', *Democratization* 22, no. 4 (2015): 779.
[26] See for instance this recent volume on the question: Aidan McGarry and James Jasper, *The Identity Dilemma: Social Movements and Collective Identity* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2015).

Jasper looked at the role of reciprocal emotions both to maintain the consistency of the movement and to cause 'the pleasures of protest'.[27] Fraternity is one of these reciprocal emotions. The term is indeed commonly used in activist circles to refer to co-members of these organisations,[28] and sometimes even gives its name to these groups, like the Muslim Brotherhood.

During the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring, this fraternal feeling was spontaneously extended to all revolutionaries, despite the fact that most of them did not previously belong to any political organisation. This revolutionary communion experienced by protesters and rioters in the streets and on the barricades was often described as an experience of fraternity.[29] It is thus through contentious collective practices that this revolutionary fraternity of arms developed and spread, making the revolutionary multitude emerge and setting it into motion.

I conceive of these practices as revolutionary performances. The term 'performance' is polysemous but I am less interested here in its use in linguistics than in the way it denotes spectacular acts, be they either extraordinary achievements or artistic shows. In other words, 'revolutionary performances' are not examined as intentional acts of communication but as aesthetic phenomena involving affective consequences.[30] Some of these performances are

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[27] James Jasper, *The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 187.

[28] Jeff Goodwin, James Jasper, and Francesca Polletta, 'Emotional Dimensions of Social Movements', in *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, by David A. Snow, Sarah Anne Soule, and Hanspeter Kriesi (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 420.

[29] In Germany, see Priscilla Smith Robertson, *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 206. In Egypt, see al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 76; in Libya, see al-Saleh, 120, 134; in Syria, see al-Saleh, 208, 209, 217.

[30] In that sense, I understand the term in a slightly different way from Charles Tilly, who sees contentious performances as 'a class of communications that evolve in something like the same way that language evolves: through incremental transformation in use', see Charles Tilly, *Contentious Performances* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 13. The theatrical metaphor used by Tilly (not only in 'performance' but also in his major concept 'repertoire') describes how 'participants in contentious politics commonly dramatize their claims rather than treating them as routine transactions' (Tilly, *Contentious Performances*, 15) and implies an intention to maximise the efficiency of contentious actions. While this theatrical metaphor also informs my use of the term 'performance', I

virtually universal and however somewhat puzzling, like songs and slogans. There is indeed no space for songs and slogans in rational theories or in material accounts of revolutions, as they do not impact risk calculus nor structural factors. The ideological content of songs and slogans is not always quite clear either. Take for instance the most well-known slogan, repeated in virtually all countries of the region during the Arab Spring: 'the people want the end of the regime' (*Ash-sha'b yurīd isqāṭ an-niẓām*). Even though it defends certain ideas, such as popular sovereignty, it is not clearly anchored in any specific ideological system. Songs and slogans do not attempt to be rationally convincing but are involved in affective processes.

A band of singing brothers

Songs and slogans are an important part of contentious 'solidarity rituals'.[31] These rituals, described by Randall Collins, are characterised as shared actions achieved through a physical assembly. Singing songs together as well as repeating slogans contribute to create a group identity.[32] These performances fuelled the fraternal communion experienced by rioters and protesters, as an Egyptian demonstrator recalls:

> The voice of the people was our guide, and I melted in its melody. I have never seen such a scene before: men, women, young men, girls, adolescents, children, and even the elderly were present, some wearing shabby clothes and some the latest designs. We saw people closing their shops to join us while others waved

am less interested in the spectacle (as a constructed product) than in the spectacular (understood as an aesthetic object or situation that has an affective power).

[31] Randall Collins, *Interaction Ritual Chains* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 33–35.

[32] Collins, 36.

> to us from the balconies of their houses. I saw a staggering number of Egyptian flags, along with enough love to fill the entire world.[33]

Through this performance, individuals compose their power together and experience themselves as part of a revolutionary multitude. In Prague, for instance, songs acted as an incentive for rioters on the barricades to embolden themselves while they were fighting the troops.[34]

This fraternal communion did not rely on the sole act of singing or repeating slogans together but also on lyrics and melody. It is common for revolutionary songs to refer to a group identity, exalting fraternity amongst revolutionaries.[35] Moreover, songs and slogans often rely on a common cultural background. In Egypt, the song on the martyrs of the Bahr el-Baqar massacre committed by the Israeli armed forces in 1970 was re-written by Aziz el Shafei and Rami Gamal to give voice to a revolutionary martyr asking revolutionaries to keep on fighting for freedom.[36] Beyond their political content, these songs serve to embody 'a sense of a group identity, rather than supplying information or laying claim to a cause'.[37] The fact that Syrian revolutionary songs tended to follow traditional popular wedding melodies, '*arāḍa*, facilitated their diffusion and contributed to strengthen the revolutionary community.[38]

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[33] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 94.
[34] See Květa Mejdřická, 'Les barricades à Prague en 1848', in *La barricade*, by Alain Corbin and Jean-Marie Mayeur (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1997), 383–393.
[35] James DeFronzo, *Revolutionary Movements in World History: From 1750 to the Present*, vol. 2 (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 2006), 582.
[36] Anastasia Valassopoulos and Dalia Said Mostafa, 'Popular Protest Music and the 2011 Egyptian Revolution', *Popular Music and Society* 37, no. 5 (2014): 651.
[37] John Street, 'Music as Political Communication - Oxford Handbooks', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Communication*, by Kate Kenski and Hall Jamieson Kathleen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 889.
[38] Sadam Issa, 'Ibrahim Qashoush's Revolutionary Popular Songs: Resistance Music in the 2011 Syrian Revolution', *Popular Music and Society* 41, no. 3 (2018): 289-290.

Furthermore, the affective impact of songs and slogans also relies on their aesthetic dimension. This may seem obvious for songs, but less so with regards to slogans. Zoé Carle however affirms that slogans should be conceived of as aesthetic phenomena: although they do not follow any classical metric, they usually have a clearly identified rhythm (figure 3)[39] whose musicality can be analysed.[40]



Figure 3 – The slogan of the Arab Spring: 'The people want the end of the regime'[41]

Beyond their lyrics, songs and slogans have an aesthetic dimension that gives to them their affective power.

'How beautiful is the Tunisian revolution, it unites everyone!', the Tunisian rioters sang.[42] Through the performance of songs and slogans, whose melodies or lyrics often rely on a common culture, revolutionaries experienced and expressed a fraternal communion through which the multitude produced its consistency.

[39] Zoé Carle, 'Les slogans de la révolution égyptienne, épure d'une épopée tue ?', *Communications* 99, no. 1 (2016): 162.
[40] Ahmed Aydoun, 'The Arab Musician and Power - Reflections on a Mixed Relationship', in *Music, Power and Liberty: Sound, Song and Melody as Instruments of Change*, by Craig Robertson and Olivier Urbain (New Jersey: Transaction publishers, 2015), 159–160: 'the first [part] consists of an anacrusis followed by a strongly accented downbeat and by the repetition of this formula that being two binary measures each with a rising eight note and a quarter note at the first beat and a quarter rest … The second consists of … a rising eight note followed by a legato quarter note, two eight notes'.
[41] Aydoun, 'The Arab Musician and Power - Reflections on a Mixed Relationship', 160.
[42] Kerim Bouzouita, 'Music of Dissent and Revolution', *Middle East Critique* 22, no. 3 (2013): 289.

2. An imaginary abolition of social divides

A fraternal communion beyond social divides

This fraternal communion was not unanimously praised. Karl Marx famously accused fraternity of being an 'imaginary abolition of class relations'.[43] Jean-Claude Caron expanded on Marx's suspicion by defining fraternity as 'the anti-class struggle, the anti-generation conflict, and even the anti-sex war'.[44] This fraternal communion that Karl Marx directly witnessed in 1848 is denounced as pacifying social relations by hiding social conflicts.

The fact that fraternity relies on an imaginary representation does not undermine its significance. On the contrary, for Spinoza, imagination plays an essential role in affective dynamics, that is, in the way we interact with the world. After all, nations are as imaginary in their origins as they are real in their effects. The fraternal communion that was experienced during both revolutionary springs was similarly consequential. Robert Darnton describes the fraternity during the 1789 French Revolution in terms that would be adequate for both revolutionary springs too:

> The popular emotion of fraternity … swept through Paris with the force of a hurricane in 1792. We can barely imagine its power, because we inhabit a world organized according to other principles, such as tenure, take-home pay, bottom lines, and who reports to whom. We define ourselves as employers or employees, as teachers or students, as someone located somewhere in a web of intersecting

[43] Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France* (London: The Electric Book Company, 2001), 48.
[44] Jean-Claude Caron, 'La fraternité face à la question sociale dans la France des années 1830', in *Fraternité. Regards croisés*, by Brahami, Frédéric and Odile Roynette (Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2009), 135.

> roles. The Revolution at its most revolutionary tried to wipe out such distinctions.[45]

However, unlike what Marx, Caron, and Darnton seem to suggest, fraternity did not hide social divides. On the contrary, these social divisions were acknowledged and even celebrated while simultaneously minimised in favour of a more fundamental similarity, through experiences and expressions of fraternity. Social differences, be they ethnic, religious, ideological, or social, were not forgotten but explicitly and joyfully ignored. Fraternity, indeed, reveals the identification between revolutionaries and not the existence – or even the affirmation – of a common identity.

The revolutionary multitude has no unity, and no illusion about having one, but it experiences a common affect, fraternity. Unlike in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's work, this multitude does not derive its consistency from a common ideology – i.e. democracy –. On the contrary, diverse ideologies co-exist in the multitude. What maintains this heterogeneous multitude together is thus of affective nature: it is the emotional recognition of some fundamental similarity that these strangers imagine that they share, despite their differences, and to which they refer through the lexicon of fraternity.

Religious communion

Revolutionaries were particularly surprised by and enthusiastic about the end of religious divides, often tied to ethnic ones, especially in countries with large religious minorities. In several German states, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews celebrated the common front they

[45] Robert Darnton, *The Kiss of Lamourette: Reflections in Cultural History* (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 18.

opposed to their respective regimes.[46] In Egypt, Coptic Christians and Muslims protected each other during their prayers.[47] The graffiti below (figure 4), representing the Coptic cross and the Muslim crescent intertwined with the word 'brothers' (*ikhwa*), affirms this fraternal communion of religious communities during the revolution.



Figure 4 – Graffiti of the Crescent-Cross fraternity in Cairo[48]

In Bahrain, the regime tried to stir conflicts up between Sunnis and Shiites to undermine their common involvement in protests. In response, demonstrators wore banners, leaflets, stickers, and flags displaying the slogan 'No Shia, No Sunni, Just Bahraini' and sang 'brothers Sunni and Shia, we won't sell this country'.[49]

[46] Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 123.
[47] On the involvement of Copts and the Coptic Church during the revolution, see Majdī Jirjis, 'The Copts and the Egyptian Revolution: Various Attitudes and Dreams', *Social Research: An International Quarterly* 79, no. 2 (2012): 511–530.
[48] Photograph by Laura Gribbon, in Salem Heba and Kantaro Taira, 'Reclaiming the City: Street Art of the Revolution', in *Translating Egypt's Revolution: The Language of Tahrir*, by Samia Mehrez (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 167.
[49] Adam Hanieh, 'Bahrain', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 80.

Ethnic communion

To what extent an ethnic communion occurred during revolutionary springs is a thornier question. To state the obvious, the Arab Spring is defined through an ethnic belonging. This designation fails to mention the involvement of numerous other ethnic groups, such as Amazighs in Maghreb, Copts in Egypt, or Kurds in the Middle East. The Arab Spring was not *de facto* only Arab. Testimonies, however, refer to Arab brotherhood and to the Arab world,[50] revealing the long-term influence of pan-Arabism. This tension may be explained by the vagueness of the term 'Arab' itself, since it indicates an ethnic identity for some and a linguistic and cultural one for others. In that sense, it is difficult without further context to know whether 'Arab' is used in an exclusive or inclusive manner. That being said, protests strengthened the 'bounds of brotherhood'[51] between ethnic groups, for example between Kurds and Arabs, especially – and in some cases exclusively –[52] in the beginning of the revolutions.

The Springtime of the Peoples also favoured interactions between diverse ethnic groups. Friedrich Sacher's lines describe for instance the German and Czech fraternal celebrations after their victorious protests in Prague:

Jubelt Brüder, lasst den Jubel schallen	Cheer brothers, make the jubilation ring
Hoch erfreut im ganzen Böhmenland	Delighted in all the Bohemian lands
Da nun Tschechen, Deutsche friedlich wallen,	Since Czechs and Germans wave together peacefully
Arm in Arm in beider Vaterland	Hand in hand in their common fatherland.[53]

[50] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 25, 30, 167.
[51] al-Saleh, 233.
[52] See chapter 7.
[53] Heiner Timmermann, *1848 Revolution in Europa* (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1999), 186, my translation.

More radically, French revolutionaries also extended this fraternal communion to Black slaves. Even though slavery was abolished in 1794 on behalf of 'universal fraternity',[54] the Napoleonian regime had indeed promptly restored it in 1802. Already before the Springtime of the Peoples, in 1844, about a thousand Parisian workers sent a petition to the Parliament, which ceremoniously affirmed: 'Obeying to the great principle of Human fraternity, we come here to advocate for our unfortunate brothers, the slaves…'.[55] This request was followed by a second from Lyon in 1847. The February revolution triggered a new enthusiasm for the question, so that the April 2nd Declaration eventually abolished slavery. As they became citizens, former slaves were called to fulfil their national service, a symbol of their 'fraternal assimilation to the motherland'.[56] The reception of the news about the February revolution in Martinique, a French oversea island, provoked insurrections rallied by 'Vive la République!'. On May 23rd, this uprising led to the emancipation of Black slaves, ten days before the messenger sent by the Parliament to declare the abolition of slavery arrived. [57]

Although ethnic communion should not be oversimplified or described too optimistically,[58] experiences and expressions of fraternity reveal an appeasement of ethnic divides during these revolutionary episodes.

An ideological front

Revolutions may appear as highly ideological phenomena, if ever there were ones. However, neither the Springtime of the Peoples nor the Arab Spring displayed a clear ideological front.

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[54] Marcel David, *Le printemps de la fraternité. Genèse et vicissitudes, 1830-1851* (Paris: Aubier, 1992), 30.
[55] David, 211.
[56] *Le Moniteur universel*, May 3rd, f°931, quoted in David, 214.
[57] Édouard Delépine, *Dix semaines qui ébranlèrent la Martinique : 25 mars - 4 juin 1848* (Paris: Servédit Maisonneuve & Larose, 1999).
[58] While the Jews were fully integrated into protests in some places in 1848, they were also persecuted elsewhere during these events, see Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 173.

This is not due to a lack of ideology, but rather to the coexistence of several ideological stands. While the Springtime of the Peoples was spreading in Europe, Catholics and liberals marched together in France and in other European countries – such as in the German states and in Ireland –. After Louis-Philippe's fall, French priests, once ferocious opponents to the French Revolution and its legacy, blessed the planting of trees of liberty, previously regarded as heretic.[59]

Similarly, the documentary *The Square* shows the unlikely alliance between secular and leftist groups and the Muslim Brothers.[60] There is no denying that this alliance was also politically motivated, but this insight into the concrete life in Tahrir Square reveals the importance of tangible and personal interactions. Furthermore, as aforementioned, most protesters had not been involved in political organisations before the event, which should qualify the importance of the tensions between these groups. It follows that testimonies rarely mention tensions between ideological groups.[61]

Diverse ideologies did not only form revolutionary fronts, they also led to what could be coined as ideological syncretism. The figure of the Christ of the Barricades,[62] for instance, combined both Christian and revolutionary symbols. The term 'fraternity' itself was used and praised by Republicans, Jacobins, and Christians alike, which favoured its popular use. Beyond the fact that ideological groups worked together, some symbols or terms bridged their differences to facilitate fraternal communion.

[59] Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 123. On this practice, see the lyrics of the song 'Der Baum der Freiheit' in Ulrich Otto, *Die historisch-politischen Lieder und Karikaturen des Vormärz und der Revolution von 1848/1849* (Köln: Pahl-Rugenstein, 1982), 494–495.
[60] Jehane Noujaim, *The Square* (Noujaim Films Worldview Entertainment, 2013).
[61] Or rather, these tensions occurred later in the revolutionary process, see chapter 7.
[62] Frank Paul Bowman, *Le Christ des barricades : 1789-1848* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1987).

A social class union

The Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring gathered people across classes. This social diversity was noticed by contemporaries. Marie d'Agoult describes the celebrations during the night on February the 23rd, after the success of the riots: 'In the effusion of this common celebration, bourgeois and proletarians were holding hands, frock coats and overalls were familiarly getting closer. A feeling of joyful fraternity was pouring out of all the hearts'.[63] Similarly, a Tunisian demonstrator recalls: 'We – men and women, elders and children, illiterate and educated people, judges, lawyers, doctors, and artists – all stood together; a single body'.[64] This perception of a fraternal communion across classes has since then been supported with evidence by historians.[65]

This social diversity was illustrated in engravings (figure 5).

[63] Daniel Stern [Marie d'Agoult], *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848* (Paris: Balland, 1985), 75, quoted in David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, 183, my translation, but wrongly attributed to Charles de Rémusat (I thank Guillaume Lancereau for pointing that out).
[64] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 22.
[65] In France, see Mark Traugott, 'The Crowd in the French Revolution of February, 1848', *The American Historical Review* 93, no. 3 (1988): 638–652. In Germany, see Wolfram Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848-49* (New York: Macmillan, 1998), 65. Siemann's analyse is based on the 303 people who were killed in March 1848 in Berlin, a source extracted from Ruth Hoppe and Jürgen Kuczynski, 'Eine Berufs- bzw. auch Klassen- und Schichtenanalyse der Märzgefallenen 1848 in Berlin', *Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, no. 4 (1964): 200–276. Unfortunately, I am not aware of similar statistics about the Arab Spring.



Figure 5 – Social communion on the barricades[66]

This picture shows the three typical figures of the revolutionaries, from left to right: a petit bourgeois enrolled in the National Guard, which joined the revolutionaries in February 22nd, a middle-class man, typically a shop-owner or an artisan, and a worker.[67] More broadly, middle-class men, workers, and students, are omnipresent in the representations and the descriptions of both revolutionary springs. However, these representations should not make

[66] Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), 66.
[67] Alain Pauquet, 'Les représentations de la barricade dans l'iconographie de 1830 à 1848', 104.

us forget about other actors who, yet massively involved in the demonstrations, hold more discreet positions: people in rural areas and women.

Urban and rural fraternity

The divide between urban and rural populations was central in all European countries in 1848. Everywhere, urban riots were paralleled by rural revolts, including in countries that were not directly associated with the Springtime of the Peoples, like Croatia-Slavonia.[68] Against scholars like Wolfram Siemann who consider that these revolts were not part of the liberal wave that agitated the continent,[69] Jonathan Sperber affirms on the contrary that 'the peasants … constantly justified their actions by reference to the political issues of the day: they marched into the forest behind the tricolor flags of the revolution; they shouted the political slogans prevalent in the capital cities'.[70] Siemann himself recognises that, from the regimes' point of view at least, these rural revolts were part and parcel of the revolutionary wave hitting Europe.[71]

The rural population played a crucial role in social protests during the Arab Spring too. Unlike the Springtime of the Peoples that originated in Paris, one of the European centres, the Jasmin Revolution began in Sidi Bouzid, the main city of a rural area. Although the involvement of this rural population strongly varied depending on the countries – from

[68] Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 124.
[69] Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848-49*, 59. Siemann argues indeed that the spontaneity and the lack of organisation that characterised these uprisings were modelled on traditional patterns. It is not clear to us, however, how this differs from what happened in cities.
[70] Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 126.
[71] Siemann, *The German Revolution of 1848-49*, 59.

supporting the regime in Morocco[72] to being the centre of the revolution in Syria[73] –, ignoring rural episodes would miss a part of the Arab Spring.

Urban and rural populations did not only revolt at the same time, they also joined their efforts. In Italy, the Lombard peasants came to the rescue of Milanese insurgents who were under siege.[74] In Tunisia, caravans from Sidi Bouzid travelled to Tunis to organise the protests, passing by Regueb, Kairouan and Sousse.[75] Although contemporary representations and descriptions largely ignore the countryside, the fraternal communion embraced rural populations as well.

Brotherhood and sisterhood

Brotherhood and fraternity refer to masculine communities, which raises the question of women's place in this fraternal communion. Were women 'brothers' too? The feminist distinction between productive and reproductive labours seems to adequately describe female involvement in revolutionary springs too: women participated indeed in both the production (the demonstrations and the battles) and reproduction (the care given to revolutionaries) of revolutions.

Although women were not allowed to be members of political clubs before 1848, except in France, they were importantly involved in all countries in all aspects of the

[72] Merouan Mekouar, 'Morocco', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 135–156.
[73] Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto, 'Syria', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 204–242.
[74] Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 88–89.
[75] Choukri Hmed, 'Le peuple veut la chute du régime', *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, no. 1 (2016): 78–81.

Springtime of the Peoples, including its bloodiest episodes[76] as this engraving shows (figure 6).



Figure 6 – A female rioter on a barricade in Prague (on the left)[77] and nuns taking care of revolutionaries in Germany (on the right)[78]

Representations of female revolutionaries oscillate between crude comments on these 'furies' and veneration of heroines who are living revolutionary allegories,[79] a dichotomy that is the revolutionary equivalent of the Madonna-whore complex. These women were then erased from the memories of the revolution and did not obtain the same benefits as men in

[76] Gabriella Hauch, 'Did Women Have a Revolution? Gender Battles in the European Revolution of 1848/49', in *1848—A European Revolution?*, by Axel Körner (New York: Springer, 2000), 73.
[77] Agulhon and Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 24.
[78] Anonymous lithography. Source: Agulhon and Le Men, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 163.
[79] Although Delacroix's *La Liberté guidant le peuple*, painted in 1830, was influential on these representations, it should be noticed that Delacroix's Liberté is a real woman, soiled by the fight, and whose femininity appears through realistic details, such as her armpit hair. On that point, see Marie-Claude Genet-Delacroix, 'La barricade: donner un corps à l'histoire, 1830-1848-1871', in *La Barricade*, by Alain Corbin and Jean-Marie Mayeur (Paris: Éditions de la Sorbonne, 1997), 113-124.

countries in which the revolution was victorious.[80] The fraternal communion of 1848 consequently failed to fully embrace revolutionary sisters.

Arab Spring revolutionaries often referred to both 'brothers and sisters'. [81] Women were involved in all the revolutionary uprisings. In continuity with the distinction made above, women demonstrated, supported the cause online,[82] and were involved in care-giving activities such as providing demonstrators with food and water.[83] Revolutionary martyrs' funerals allowed women to play a prominent role and express their revolutionary indignation while assuming the customary role of the widow or mourning mother.[84]

Although some demonstrators, such as Muslim Brothers, initially refused to walk alongside female protesters,[85] women seem to have been largely and increasingly accepted in demonstrations.[86] Furthermore, female activists reported that the usual harassment in public spaces substantially reduced during this period, showing an improvement of women's situation in public space through the revolutionary process.[87] Police violence, on the other hand, did not spare women. Beyond the tortures and conditions also faced by male activists, specific forms of violence were forced upon women, such as virginity tests.[88] In countries in which the revolution turned into a civil war – Libya, Syria, Yemen –, women were also the

[80] On that point, see Hauch, 'Did Women Have a Revolution?'.
[81] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 25, 27, 29, 30, 76, 134.
[82] Jennifer Pedersen and Monalisa Salib, 'Women of the Arab Spring: A Conversation with Esraa Abdel Fattah and Lina Ben Mhenni', *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 15, no. 2 (2013): 256–66.
[83] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 86.
[84] Emmanuel Fureix, *La France des larmes: deuils politiques à l'âge romantique, 1814-1840* (Ceyzérieu: Champ Vallon, 2009), 447; Mona Abaza, 'Mourning, Narratives and Interactions with the Martyrs through Cairo's Graffiti', *E-International Relations* 7 (2013): 7.
[85] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 192.
[86] Despite these tensions, Islamist women were also involved in the revolutions against regimes that were perceived as persecuting religions, see for instance on Tunisian female Islamists Andrea Khalil, 'Tunisia's Women: Partners in Revolution', *The Journal of North African Studies* 19, no. 2 (2014): 287–289.
[87] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 69.
[88] al-Saleh, 105.

first victims, with an increase of sexual harassment and rapes.[89] Even though the revolutions may have empowered women during the revolutionary period, war dynamics and the militarisation of conflicts have largely pushed women back to their traditional roles – including the one of victim.

3. The organic fraternity against the regime

Shared blood and shed blood

Blood is a dual notion, symbolising simultaneously life and death.[90] This dyad leads to another between shared blood and shed blood. Fraternity metaphorically denotes a community of blood. This community is here analysed at the national level. Embedded in this familial metaphor, the national community is imagined as pre-political and organic. Fraternity consequently calls for another term, in relation to which it is defined: the motherland or fatherland. The fraternal communion is thus justified by a common link to the motherland or fatherland, as formulated in this German song: 'Germany, great fatherland, fraternity embraces you'.[91]

The motherland or fatherland guarantees the community of blood. Conversely, shared blood is the vivid element that animates the political body. Slogans and songs often insist on this organicity that revolutionaries embody.[92] One of the most popular Egyptian slogans claimed that 'Muslims and Christians are one hand' and soon became 'the army and

[89] al-Saleh, 132.
[90] See Jean-Paul Roux, *Le sang : mythes, symboles et réalités* (Paris: Fayard, 1988), 11–14.
[91] 'Deutschland, großes Vaterland, dich umschlingt ein Bruderband', my translation. Extract from 'Deustschland was im März errungen', anonymous, see Otto, *Die historisch-politischen Lieder und Karikaturen des Vormärz und der Revolution von 1848/1849*, 347.
[92] Zoé Carle, 'Les slogans de la révolution égyptienne, épure d'une épopée tue ?', 166.

the people are one hand'.[93] The familial metaphor relies consequently on this fundamental notion of shared blood.

In revolutionary periods, this vivid dimension of blood may however be entangled with its morbid counterpart. The shared blood that invigorates the fraternal communion is the same as the martyrs' shed blood. An Egyptian song claims: 'Egypt, you the mother of your children, the most important [are] the ones that sacrificed their souls and their blood for you'.[94] A Syrian demonstrator, who sought to meet a martyr's family to offer his condolences, experienced the same fundamental ambivalence when he was told: 'My brother, we all are family of the martyr'.[95] In this example, the martyr's shed blood gives its importance to the shared blood and vice versa. Revolutionary fraternity ambivalently relies on both shared and shed blood.

National communion

The fraternal communion that revolutionaries experienced was entangled with national representations and fraternity was exalted through national symbols. In both revolutionary springs, national symbols were displayed by protesters. Tricolours, first adopted by France during the French Revolution and then by its 'sister republics' in the 1790s, spread all over Europe in 1848,[96] under the form of flags or cockades,[97] and became iconic (figures 7 and 8).

[93] Neil Ketchley, '"The army and the people are one hand!" Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution' *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 56, no. 1 (2014): 171.
[94] See Carle, 'Les slogans de la révolution égyptienne, épure d'une épopée tue ?', 166.
[95] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 208.
[96] It was briefly in competition with the red flag in Paris.
[97] In Germany, see Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz: Illustrated with Portraits and Original Drawings* (New York: Doubleday, 1917), chap. 5.



Anonyme, *La barricade slave. Le combat pour la liberté unit toutes les nations* (cat. 103)

Figure 7 – A Slavic barricade in Vienna, May 1848[98]





Figure 8 – Revolutionaries (French on the left; Viennese on the right) wearing cockades[99]

[98] Anonymous work, see Agulhon and Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 24.
[99] Agulhon and Le Men, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 144, 181.

These tricolours were also the subject of revolutionary texts, such as 'Schwarz-Rot-Gold' ('Black-Red-Gold') written by Ferdinand Freiligrath in March 1848 and set to music by Robert Schumann in April:

In Kümmernis und Dunkelheit,	In grievance and darkness,
Da mussten wir sie bergen!	We had to recover the colours!
Nun haben wir sie doch befreit,	Now we have finally released them
Befreit aus ihren Särgen!	Released them from their coffins.
Ha, wie das blitzt und rauscht und rollt!	Alas, this sparkles and whooshes and rolls!
Hurra, du Schwarz, du Rot, du Gold!	Hooray, you Black, you Red, and you Gold!
Pulver ist schwarz, Blut ist rot, Golden flackert die Flamme!	Powder is black, blood is red, and golden flickers the flame![100]

National colours also contributed to revolutionary sceneries in the Arab Spring. Demonstrators painted their faces (figure 9) and carried flags along.[101]



Figure 9 – Demonstrator wearing a Yemeni flag on his face with an inscription 'leave' (*irḥal*, originally a Tunisian slogan)[102]

[100] Ferdinand Freiligrath, *Gedichte* (Stuttgart: Reclam Verlag, 1964), 76, my translation.
[101] Charles Tripp, 'Art of the Uprisings in the Middle East', *The Brown Journal of World Affairs* 19, no. 2 (2013): 190.
[102] 'Paternal and Religious Authority in the Arab World: Yemen's Sons Have Broken the Vow of Silence - Qantara.De', Dialogue with the Islamic World, https://en.qantara.de/content/paternal-

Gigantic parades sometimes offered the performance of national colours:

> Almost all women in Sanaa wear the all-encompassing black ***sharshaf***, which is a modern veil. At one point many thousands lined up, covered in the customary black. Some rows wore white baseball caps on top of their veils. Another group sported red baseball caps. Visually, the effect was to create a white, black, and red Yemeni flag stretching more than a kilometre down a wide road in a show of patriotism.[103]

The display of national symbols did not have the same meaning nor impact in countries in which nationalism was anchored and used by the state – for instance, in France and in most of the MENA countries –, those in which these symbols were well-known but dissident – such as in German and Italian states –, and, eventually, those in which national feelings were only nascent – like in Eastern Europe –. For the latter, indeed, nationalism was a threat to the regime. In these countries, however, nationalism was little more than, in Jonathan Sperber's words: 'the experience of marching behind the tricolor flag, of large-scale collective singing (nationalist songs, naturally), of joining in a large public meeting or a small conspiratorial circle'.[104] The revolutionary process precisely offered an opportunity for large masses to do so. Through the experience of revolutionary fraternal communion, revolutions

and-religious-authority-in-the-arab-world-yemens-sons-have-broken-the-vow-of, last accessed 16th April 2020.

[103] Sheila Carapico, 'Yemen', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 112.

[104] Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 94.

developed and constructed national communities.[105] Even in the MENA countries in which nationalism was well anchored, the public and popular use of national symbols outside of sportive events was uncommon.[106] The display of national colours in revolutionary performances revealed consequently a new sense of pride.[107]

Conflictual nationalism

This use of national symbols is not specific to revolutionary contexts and happens in less politically loaded situations, such as sporting events.[108] The specificity of revolutionary nationalism, however, relies on the fact that this nationalism is conflictual. It is not affirmed against another country, as it happens in wartime, but against its own regime.

As a consequence of this conflictual dynamic, the national symbols used by revolutionaries to express their national communion may differ from the ones instituted by the regime. Reviving the memory of the French Revolution, the 1848 revolutionaries sang 'La Marseillaise', *de jure* the French national anthem since 1830 but *de facto* replaced by 'La Parisienne'. Similarly, Tunisian revolutionaries privileged dissident versions of the national anthem. The last two lines, added by Abou el-Kacem Chebbi and erased by the regime,

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105 'I would argue that in many areas this was virtually constructed, and certainly greatly altered, during the revolution. Many people "learnt" that they were Czechs or Germans in Bohemia and Moravia, or that they were Magyars and Romanians in Transylvania', see John Breuilly, '1848: Connected or Comparable Revolutions?', in *1848—A European Revolution?*, by Axel Körner (New York: Springer, 2000), 45.

106 Sarah H. Awad and Brady Wagoner, 'Image Politics of the Arab Uprisings', in *The Psychology of Radical Social Change: From Rage to Revolution*, by Brady Wagoner, Fathali M. Moghaddam, and Jaan Valsiner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 201.

107 A survey reveals that 96.1% of the Tunisians involved in the revolution 'agreed strongly or agreed that the events filled them with a sense of pride about being Tunisian', see Breuer, Landman, and Farquhar, 'Social Media and Protest Mobilization', 778.

108 This may not be incidental given the important role that football supporters played in the Arab Spring, especially in Egypt (see Carl Rommel, 'Troublesome Thugs or Respectable Rebels? Class, Martyrdom and Cairo's Revolutionary Ultras', *Middle East-Topics & Arguments* 6 (2016): 33–42), or more recently in the Algerian revolution (the revolutionary song 'La Casa del Mouradia' was sung in stadiums before spreading to the street, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TYzF6y8VntQ, last accessed 26th March 2020).

inspired the slogan 'the people want the end of the regime'.[109] In other countries, demonstrators proudly carried dissident flags. This was of course the case in countries under foreign domination, such as Ireland, Italy, Poland, or Palestine, but dissident flags were also waved in the German states, where the black-red-gold symbolised the desire for a unified Germany.[110] In Libya and Syria, the national flags of the former regimes were preferred over the current ones.[111] In Tunisia, a black version of the national flag circulated online and another crossed by a black band and splattered with blood was carried in demonstrations.[112]

The fraternal communion experienced by revolutionaries is thus embedded in their hate towards a regime perceived as corrupt and murderous. Not so surprisingly, regime leaders were excluded from this communion, as this Egyptian slogan states: 'this is our land, we are united, Hosni Mubarak is not one of us'.[113] Two songs by Ibrahim Qashoush, emblematic singer and martyr of the Syrian revolution, describe the same opposition. The first one is addressed to Bashar al-Assad on behalf of the people:

ويابشار مانك منا خودماهر وارحل عنا	Oh Bashar, you are not one of us, take Mahir [Bashar's brother] and leave us.
وشرعيتك سقطت عنا	Your legitimacy here has ended.
يا بشار ويا كذاب تضرب أنت وهالخطاب	Come on, Bashar, leave us![114]

[109] 'If one day the people want to live, the future is forced to obey. Darkness is forced to dissipate. Chains are forced to break', Kerim Bouzouita, 'Music of Dissent and Revolution', *Middle East Critique* 22, no. 3 (2013): 290.
[110] The black-red-gold is possibly a reference to both the Holy Roman Empire and the Lützow Free Corps, a volunteer unit of the Prussian army fighting the Napoleonian occupation.
[111] Tripp, 'Art of the Uprisings in the Middle East', 190.
[112] Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust, *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 34.
[113] Carle, 'Les slogans de la révolution égyptienne, épure d'une épopée tue ?', 166, my translation.
[114] Issa, 'Ibrahim Qashoush's Revolutionary Popular Songs', 291.

The second song, 'Just Listen to Me' is an exchange between the people, whose verses are sung by demonstrators, and Bashar's supplications sung by Ibrahim Qashoush himself.[115] This fictive dialogue gives a voice to the demonstrators, who express their grieves, while isolating the leader.

As aforementioned, revolutionary fraternity relies as much on shared blood as on shed blood. An Egyptian slogan roared: 'the President, the Prime minister killed our brothers in Tahrir'.[116] The martyrs' blood manifests the fratricide violence orchestrated by the regime. This fratricidal war is also described by Ludwig Flau in his song 'Zum 18. März':

Weh! Volk, vom eignen Blute	Pain! People, from your own blood
Sind deine Hände rot;	Your hands are red;
Der Bruder schlug den Bruder,	The brother hit the brother,
Weil es ein Fürst gebot.	To follow a Prince's order.[117]

Paradoxically, this fratricidal repression simultaneously threatened and strengthened revolutionary fraternity. A Tunisian demonstrator painfully comments: 'The police and the National Guard considered us their targets, as if we were not their brothers and sisters'.[118] In his song, 'Haram aleyh', the Syrian singer Sarout, listing the crimes of Bashar al-Hassad, claims: 'Why does he destroy and exterminate his own people… shame on him / He wounded fraternity, who will heal the country's wound… May God heal it… shame on him'.[119]

[115] Issa, 294.
[116] 'Carle, 'Les slogans de la révolution égyptienne, épure d'une épopée tue ?', 165, my translation.
[117] Ludwig Pfau, *Gedichte* (Stuttgart: Bonz, 1889), 347–348, my translation.
[118] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 27.
[119] Joel D. Parker, 'Song and Rebellion in the Syrian Uprising', *Middle Eastern Studies* 54, no. 6 (2018): 1020.

Fraternal communion was however re-affirmed, including by embracing the agents of repression. Attempts at fraternisation between revolutionaries and police or military forces occurred during and after revolutionary episodes.[120] When victorious, revolutionaries forgave yesterday enemies. In a petition, Prussian workers asked for forgiveness for the troops: 'The grave which has closed above our beloved heroes has for ever buried all hatred and fraternal strife. We demand that a brotherly hand of forgiveness should also be extended to our army'.[121] This fraternal appeal was however unreciprocated, and the funeral organised by the city council on March 21st for revolutionaries and soldiers alike, all 'brothers of the same fatherland',[122] was symbolically refused by the army.[123]

Fraternity is the identification of a fundamental similarity, despite social differences, which generates the emergence of a revolutionary multitude. As we saw, this similarity relies on shared blood as well as shed blood. This ambivalence of blood reveals the fundamental articulation between two affective patterns, revolutionary brotherhood and revolutionary martyrdom. In the last part of this chapter, this articulation is investigated from the perspective of revolutionary martyrdom.

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[120] See for instance in Hungary, Paul Bouteiller, *La Révolution française de 1848 vue par les Hongrois*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949), 75; In Egypt, see Ketchley, '"The army and the people are one hand!" Fraternization and the 25th January Egyptian Revolution'.
[121] Veit Valentin, *1848: Chapters of German History* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940), 215.
[122] Rüdiger Hachtmann, *Berlin 1848. Eine Politik – und Gesellschaftsgeschichte der Revolution* (Bonn: J. H. W. Dietz, 1997), 214, quoted in Hans J. Hahn, *The 1848 Revolutions in German-Speaking Europe* (Harlow: Longman, 2001), 95.
[123] Hahn, 95.

III. Revolutionary martyrdom and indignation

1. The massacre of the Capucines

The fear vertically inflicted by the state through repression is disempowering and visceral for revolutionaries. And still, protests do occur, even in contexts in which risks to be arrested, wounded, or killed are considerable. The revolutionary multitude emerges through fraternal communion but is set into motion by indignation. Rioters and demonstrators, indeed, do not take to the streets because they underestimate the risks, as Weyland assumes. A Syrian protester affirms: 'Don't even imagine that it was easy to go out to a demonstration. No amount of courage allows you to stand and watch someone who has a gun and is about to kill you. We – as a people – were certain that they were going to kill us. Fear didn't go away because we knew that there was death'.[124] Arab Spring protesters are particularly explicit in their recollection of the omnipresence of fear while they were getting involved in the protests, and the bodily impact it had on them (shivers, sleep deprivation, etc).[125] To understand why the multitude spontaneously revolts in such contexts requires an analysis of how indignation spreads and intensifies. To do so, I investigate the circulations of indignation ignited by a second affective pattern: revolutionary martyrdom.

The martyrs of the Capucines

On February 23rd 1848, the riots forced François Guizot, the President of the Council of French Ministers, to relinquish power. A joyful crowd was celebrating this victory in the Parisian streets that night. A large group of rioters decided to go to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Guizot's office, and demanded lights at the windows as a sign of celebration which arose tensions with the troops protecting the Ministry. In order to avoid any incident, the

[124] Pearlman, *We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria*, 88–89.
[125] al-Saleh, 57, 69, 85, 96, 123, 129, 147, 204, 206, 208, 219.

soldiers started retreating but, tragic happenstance, the drummer was unable to pass the gate, blocking the way so that the troop panicked, fired, and killed 35 to 50 people. Immediately after the fusillade, the crowd gathered up its dead, piled up the corpses on carts, and exhibited them in the streets of the capital (figure 10).



Figure 10 – Journey of the funeral convoy on February 23rd[126]

This grim convoy, yearning for revenge, profoundly shocked the Parisians. *Le Siècle*, a constitutional monarchist newspaper, relates the event:

[126] Source: http://paris-atlas-historique.fr/5.html, last accessed 7th September 2020. I added the journey of the funeral car.

> Suddenly, around 10pm, we hear this clamour in the streets: 'To arms! To arms! We are betrayed, they slaughtered our brothers!'. The crowd scatters, some running away from danger, others running into it to know the cause of this great and sudden emotion. A few moments later, carts filled with corpses passed in the streets, escorted by men from the people carrying torches and shouting 'Vengeance!' These corpses laying on the pavement were citizens, women, and children who got shot dead at point-blank range, in front of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs! … The ground was smeared with blood … a brother was looking for his brother, a father for his son: it was a spectacle that would have saddened the most insensitive soul.[127]

This spectacular scenery, spontaneously created by the revolutionary multitude, gave an intensely provocative impact to the event, turning victims into martyrs. In response, rioters built no less than 1,500 barricades overnight, a wooden and stony evidence of the powerful indignation that had spread through the city. 'At that moment', notes a witness to the events, 'the corpse of a woman had more power than the bravest army in the world'.[128] Only a few hours later, the last King of France, Louis-Philippe, hastily fled the city to go into exile in the United Kingdom.

[127] *Le Siècle*, February 24th 1848, 1, my translation.
[128] Daniel Stern [Marie d'Agoult], *Histoire de la Révolution de 1848*, 124-125, quoted in Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 53.

Funerals and indignation

The funeral convoy of the massacre of the Capucines was particularly grim and spectacular.[129] Beyond this episode, revolutionary martyrs' funerals are mobilising events that may spontaneously turn into rallying moments.[130] These processions are thus closely controlled by repressive regimes, and sometimes so violently that repression causes new victims and generates another cycle of funerals.

Indignation relies on imagination, that is on the capacity to represent, and funerals objectify the vivid and embodied reality of repression. In such contexts, Antoine de Baecque argues, 'the corpse becomes the matter of the community and all the fellow citizens need to see the reality of the wounded corpse to prompt emotion, political decision, and then the frightening vengeance'.[131] The revolutionary martyrs' corpses were thus spontaneously exhibited. In Tunisia, friends of the martyr would carry the corpse on their mopeds around the city.[132] As the episode of the massacre of the Capucines illustrates, the display of the martyrs' bodies is a powerful trigger for circulations of indignation.

Direct group identification

The response to the repressive violence on the boulevard des Capucines was spontaneous, intense, and hardly understandable in the terms of rational choice theory. The massacre, indeed, should have increased the cost of contentious behaviours and actions and therefore

[129] As the number of descriptions of the events proves, see for instance the Bonapartist *Le Constitutionnel* February 25th 1848, or Victor Riglet's autobiography, see Victor Riglet, *Journal d'un jeune révolutionnaire - Paris Du 22 février au 22 mai 1848* (Paris: Éditions du Sagittaire, 2017), 65.
[130] Fureix, *La France des larmes*, 321–322. See for instance Pearlman, *We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria*, 65, 109.
[131] Antoine de Baecque, *Le corps de l'histoire: métaphores et politique (1770-1800)* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1993), 353, my translation. Baecque mentions, amongst other things, how necessary this sight (or at least the descriptions of the wounds) is to trigger identification with the martyr.
[132] Amin Allal, 'Avant on tenait le mur, maintenant on tient le quartier !', *Politique Africaine* 1, no. 121 (2011): 58.

undermined the intensity of riots. Scholars have long acknowledged the paradoxical effects of repression: 'popular rebellion, rather than resulting from a decline in the costs of dissent, can be the context in which individuals accept costs that they previously had not accepted'.[133] Some sought to find a solution to this paradox by distinguishing several periods of time: although repression had a negative short-term effect on dissent, it triggered micro-mobilisation processes in the longer run.[134] However, the massacre of the Capucines shows, on the contrary, an immediate and spontaneous reaction to repression. Other scholars argued that only medium levels of repression could escalate collective actions while high levels would decrease them.[135] Here again, this explanation fails to elucidate why this high level of repression was followed by an immediate and strong mobilisation.

Looking at affective circulations opens another path. The indignation ignited by revolutionary martyrs was intense enough to set the multitude into motion despite the risks at stake. The massacre of the Capucines gives an example of direct identification with a group of individuals (figure 11). The Parisian by-standers and revolutionaries (A) identify with the victims of the massacre (B) so that they experience indignation towards the repressive regime (C). As often with group identification, it is favoured by the indefiniteness of the martyrs' representations. The heap of mutilated corpses is indeed anonymous and only described through all-encompassing social categories ('citizens', 'women', 'children').

[133] Wendy Pearlman, 'Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings', *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (2013): 389.
[134] Karen Rasler, 'Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution', *American Sociological Review* 61, no. 1 (1996): 132–152.
[135] Johan L. Olivier, 'State Repression and Collective Action in South Africa, 1970-84', *South African Journal of Sociology* 22, no. 4 (1991): 109–117; Marwan Khawaja, 'Repression and Popular Collective Action: Evidence from the West Bank', *Sociological Forum* 8, no. 1 (1993): 47–71.



Figure 11 – Direct identification

In this episode, revolutionary fraternity preceded martyrdom, facilitating the circulation of indignation. The martyrs were brothers who had been fighting with the insurgents on the barricades the same day. The martyrs were thus only characterised through blood: as brothers, they shared the same blood, as martyrs, the blood was shed. The two affective patterns were thus efficiently articulated, making this episode particularly provocative.

2. Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation

A local martyr

The massacre of the Capucines occurred in Paris, a densely populated city and the centre of the regime, so that the regime fell shortly after circulations of indignation intensified. Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation, on the other hand, first appeared as a local event before becoming a regional and national martyrdom. As such, this event offers more ground to analyse the process that makes indignation circulate.

Bouazizi, a young fruit vendor, is often credited to be the initiator of the Arab Spring. His self-immolation 'resonated broadly',[136] 'catalyzed public anger',[137] and eventually 'spurred riots'[138] in the whole country. The fact that a local event could ignite a national and transnational revolution has however been largely unquestioned. Many, especially abroad, heard about the event through *Al-Jazeera*'s broadcast:

> On December 17, Mohamed Bouazizi, a single man who had supported his widowed mother and siblings since the age of ten, took to the streets with his fresh produce cart to earn a day's wage. 'At around 10 a.m. when he was making his way through the streets the police woman began to harass my son, so he called his uncle to help him,' [said his mother]. 'She left him alone only to return later in order to confiscate his cart. Mohamed said "no." The police woman took the fruit but when she tried to take the scales Mohamed refused. She slapped him and began to insult and cursed his father.' Mohamed, frustrated and ashamed by the public humiliation he endured at the hands of police, set himself on fire outside the local municipality building … 'Not a single person hated him,' [recalled his mother]. 'He did not have a single fault or bad behavior. He had ambitions that he never achieved. He wanted to get married and have some money to take care of his mother and family.'[139]

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136 Eva Bellin, 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring', *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 136.
137 Vincent Durac, 'Social Movements, Protest Movements and Cross-Ideological Coalitions – the Arab Uprisings Re-Appraised', *Democratization* 22, no. 2 (2015): 241.
138 Stephen M. Saideman, 'When Conflict Spreads: Arab Spring and the Limits of Diffusion', *International Interactions* 38, no. 5 (2012): 717.
139 Jeffry R. Halverson, Scott W. Ruston, and Angela Trethewey, 'Mediated Martyrs of the Arab Spring: New Media, Civil Religion, and Narrative in Tunisia and Egypt', *Journal of Communication* 63, no. 2 (2013): 316.

Immediately after Bouazizi's act, a crowd composed of Bouazizi's relatives and fruit vendors spontaneously gathered around the regional government building and threw Bouazizi's remaining fruits on the walls.[140] Though limited to the city of Sidi Bouzid, protests did not wane for five days. On December 22nd, three other men killed themselves in Sidi Bouzid while protests extended to Menzel Bouzaiane, a city sixty kilometres south of Sidi Bouzid. Circulations of indignation started to spread in the whole region, and, in the following weeks, demonstrations occurred in other towns and cities of the region while repression intensified, making its first victims on December 24th.

The first two weeks of protests were restricted both geographically to the Northern regions of the country and socially to the poorest.[141] These upheavals were spontaneous and political organisations prudently kept their distance, with the exception of the local branch of the Union Générale du Travail Tunisienne (UGTT). In line with the dynamics underlying affective imitation, the first demonstrators were the ones who could most relate to Bouazizi, either because of their personal connections or on the basis of social similarities, such as working conditions. This social identification was reflected by early slogans of the protests, mostly about high prices and unemployment. At that time, the hashtags on Twitter associated #Bouazizi with #SidiBouzid.[142] The martyr Bouazizi represented the marginalised class in a poor region.

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[140] Sam Cherribi, *Fridays of Rage: Al Jazeera, the Arab Spring, and Political Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 82.

[141] Habib Ayeb, 'Social and Political Geography of the Tunisian Revolution: The Alfa Grass Revolution', *Review of African Political Economy* 38, no. 129 (2011): 467–479.

[142] Yasmine Ryan, 'How Tunisia's Revolution Began', *Al-Jazeera English*, January 2011, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201112612181598548 3.html, last accessed 7th September 2020.

An embodiment of two worlds

Indignation then reached the whole country and beyond. A first solidarity march was organised in the capital, Tunis, on December 27th, followed by a bigger one two days after. Eventually, on December 31st, protests broke out in most regions of Tunisia.[143] This spreading of social protests was paralleled online: #Bouazizi was coupled not only with #Sidibouzid but also with #Tunisia.[144] Bouazizi, who symbolised the misery of Sidi Bouzid, had become a national martyr. The young fruit vendor was not, however, the first to immolate himself: similar events had already happened in Ghabes, Qasarain, and Sidi Bouzid itself, no more than three months before Bouazizi's self-immolation.[145] Why did Bouazizi trigger such unprecedented circulations of indignation?

Explaining this discrepancy requires to take into consideration a bundle of factors. Merlyna Lim suggests that the exceptional emotional impact was due as much to the framing around the act as to the act itself.[146] She underlines the role of Ali Bouazizi, a distant cousin of the martyr, who recorded videos and took pictures of his tragic act and purposefully shared them on Facebook to fuel popular indignation. While doing that, Ali Bouazizi also framed affective imitation by affirming that his cousin was slapped by Fedia Hamdi, the policewoman who took his scale. This violence inflicted by a woman – be she a policewoman – in public space was perceived as particularly humiliating in the context of Tunisian traditional culture.[147]

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[143] Merlyna Lim, 'Framing Bouazizi: "White Lies", Hybrid Network, and Collective/Connective Action in the 2010–11 Tunisian Uprising', *Journalism* 14, no. 7 (2013): 931.
[144] Ryan, 'How Tunisia's Revolution Began'.
[145] Halim Rane and Sumra Salem, 'Social Media, Social Movements and the Diffusion of Ideas in the Arab Uprisings', *Journal of International Communication* 18, no. 1 (2012): 104; Asef Bayat, 'The Arab Spring and Its Surprises', *Development and Change* 44, no. 3 (2013): 589.
[146] Lim, 'Framing Bouazizi', 926–928.
[147] This affirmation is however still dubious and Hamdi was released from all charges in trial in 2012.

More importantly, Ali Bouazizi presented his cousin, who did not finish high school, as an unemployed university graduate forced to sell fruits to make a living. Ali Bouazizi, indeed, was an activist and intended to rely on the grievances due to the unemployment of the youth to broaden public attention.[148] For the same reason, the local UGTT actively took on this narrative.[149] Even though this fallacy was soon noticed by the media,[150] the rumour was strong and has been lasting to this day.[151] This story made Bouazizi, already a symbol of the Tunisian poorest classes, an iconic figure of the impoverished middle-class. As Eric Selbin remarks, revolutions are made of an entanglement of stories.[152] Bouazizi, presented as a man from both world, was therefore the symbol of this entanglement of stories.

Ali Bouazizi's strategy proved to be successful. As students imagined Bouazizi as someone in a similar situation as theirs, they became enthusiastic demonstrators to the point that the authority closed several schools and university from January 8th to 10th in a desperate and failed attempt to crush the movement. The students' support was crucial to extend the uprisings to other social categories. Soon after, the national leadership of the UGTT officially joined the protestations on January 4th and was then followed by other unions such as l'Ordre national des avocats de Tunisie.

Beyond Bouazizi's case, indignation was sometimes able to circulate across social classes, through indirect imitation thanks to a 'pantheon of martyrs', that is, a group of

148 In 2004, unemployment rate was around 40% for the 15-17 years old, and 30% for the 20-24 years old, see Allal, 'Avant on tenait le mur, maintenant on tient le quartier !', 55.
149 Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad, 'Introduction', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 9.
150 See the correction made in Hao Li, 'The Story of Mohamed Bouazizi, the Man Who Toppled Tunisia', *International Business Times*, 14 January 2011, https://www.ibtimes.com/story-mohamed-bouazizi-man-who-toppled-tunisia-255077, last accessed 7th September 2020.
151 See, for example, Benjamín Tejerina et al., 'From Indignation to Occupation: A New Wave of Global Mobilization', *Current Sociology* 61, no. 4 (2013): 378.
152 On this, see Eric Selbin, Revolution, Rebellion, Resistance: The Power of Story (London: Zed, 2010), chaps 1, 2, and 3.

martyrs that are imagined to share some similarities.[153] In Egypt, four martyrs were often represented together: Gika, Mina Daniel, Emad Effat, and Khaled Said. The four of them came from diverse backgrounds – Gika was a young revolutionary, Mina Daniel a Coptic leader, Emad Effat an Azharite Sheikh, and Khaled Said an ordinary Egyptian – so that multiple groups could identify with them and all Egyptians could be 'united by martyrdom'.[154]

A national martyr

The revolutionary martyr, Bouazizi, became a national revolutionary martyr symbolising the martyrdom of the whole nation. Like fraternity, martyrdom was originally a religious notion, and in both revolutionary springs, representations of revolutionary martyrs display a combination of secular and religious elements.[155] Bouazizi's representations as a national martyr were often combined with national symbols. The Tunisian flag, for instance, enshrouded his coffin during his funeral on January 5th (figure 12).

153 As I explain in chapter 6, pantheons of martyrs rely on indirect identification.
154 Abaza, 'Mourning, Narratives and Interactions with the Martyrs through Cairo's Graffiti', 16.
155 Lucy Riall, 'Martyr Cults in Nineteenth-Century Italy', *The Journal of Modern History* 82, no. 2 (2010): 255–287. See also Alphonse Esquiros, *Histoire des martyrs de la liberté* (Paris: J. Bry Ainé, 1851). During the Arab Spring, it was usual to see a religious and/or national framing for martyrs' pictures. At Tahrir Square, a memorial of the martyrs was set up, with a cubic structure presenting pictures of all the martyrs, drawing parallels to the Kaba around which Muslims circumambulate, see Heba and Taira, 'Reclaiming the City', 160.



Figure 12 – Bouazizi's funeral[156]

Unlike the massacre of the Capucines, Bouazizi's self-immolation preceded and contributed to trigger the revolutionary process. His tragic act initiated a process of martyrisation that turned him into a national and revolutionary martyr.

3. The revolutionary volcano

Indignation and complex affection

Unlike the massacre of the Capucines during which dozens of people died, randomly shot in the middle of a crowd, Bouazizi was a single individual who decided to take his own life. Even though many people could relate to his struggle, how could the affective impact of one single martyrdom be powerful enough to make hundreds of thousands of people spontaneously take to the streets at the risk of their own lives? What turned the multitude into a revolutionary volcano?

[156] Source: https://www.ladepeche.fr/article/2011/01/21/995294-tunisie-famille-martyr-bouazizi-eprouvee-fiere-heros.html, last accessed 7th September 2020.

In a fascinating work, Amin Allal traces how Yosra, a female civil servant who was a former supporter of Ben Ali's regime, decided to join the revolution.[157] Yosra's faith in the regime had already been undermined before the Jasmine Revolution due to personal issues with the local police following a fight between her eldest son and a neighbour. However, the turning point happened when her son showed her pictures of the first victims of the repression in Thala and Kasserine. These pictures were shocking: 'It is my son that is killed. I mean, young men like him who are dead'.[158] The same day, Yosra talked with one of her colleagues:

> My colleague, from Kasserine, she calls me in the same evening, and she tells me that colleagues from the Minister's Office working in this region have kids who are in jail. Some are even dead. They are just normal people, who have never made waves. Everything gets confused in my mind; I dream that it is my son who is dead. The day after, I receive a text: there is a general strike tomorrow and I decide to get more information.[159]

This testimony is not about Bouazizi, but it sheds light on the role of complex affections in revolutionary times. As aforementioned, Spinoza thinks that individuals affected by indignation tend to affect others. The multitude auto-affects itself through bursts of activity and creativity. Affective circulations may thus rely on concatenations of

[157] Amin Allal, 'Trajectoires "révolutionnaires" en Tunisie', *Revue francaise de science politique* Vol. 62, no. 5 (2012): 821–841.
[158] Allal, 830.
[159] Allal, 830, my translation.

affectations.[160] Yosra first encountered pictures that triggered an indirect affective imitation with martyrs through her son. The discussion with her colleague then affected her in the same way a second time, intensifying the affect. This complex affection eventually affected Yosra to the point that, despite her former political opinions, she decided to join demonstrations that she knew would be severely repressed.

Timur Kuran explained the sudden nature of revolutions *via* the concept of 'preference falsification':[161] in authoritarian states, people have incentive to dissimulate their true preferences in public space so that their actual preferences remain largely unknown until they are suddenly revealed by a revolution. Without denying the relevance of preference falsification, Yosra's testimony exhibits a different situation: intense affective circulations, causing and caused by complex affections, may shape new preferences in a short period of time. Due to this emotional intensity, the political context may evolve quickly and radically in the revolutionary process.

Martyrs as empty signifiers

Yosra's interview provides insight into the process through which martyrs crystallise diverse angers towards the regime. Her personal frustrations with the local police are mentioned

[160] While looking at social networks, Zachary Steinert-Threlkeld affirms that central actors (activists, members of the media, civil society organisations) have a marginal impact on mobilisation in comparison with the impact of the mass of peripheral actors, see Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld, 'Spontaneous Collective Action: Peripheral Mobilization During the Arab Spring', *American Political Science Review*, 111, no. 2 (2017): 379–403. Merlyna Lim also looks at crucial 'peripheral' actors, beyond social networks, such as taxi drivers and fruit vendors, see Merlyna Lim, 'Clicks, Cabs, and Coffee Houses: Social Media and Oppositional Movements in Egypt, 2004–2011', *Journal of Communication* 62, no. 2 (2012): 242–244.

[161] Timur Kuran et al., 'The Inevitability of Future Revolutionary Surprises--Comment/Reply', *The American Journal of Sociology* 100, no. 6 (1995): 1528–1551; for an application of this theory to the Arab Spring, see Jeff Goodwin, 'Why We Were Surprised (Again) by the Arab Spring', *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 452–456.

altogether with the martyrs. Paolo Gerbaudo argues that martyrs' representations functioned as 'empty signifiers', a concept drawn from Ernesto Laclau's work.[162] Martyrs are filled with an affective power that may be detached from any identifiable ideology. This emptiness makes martyrs' representations more likely to become viral[163] and to agglomerate diverse angers. As empty signifiers, martyrs do not embody a single demand or struggle but rather represent and express the 'fullness of the community'.[164] This shared indignation favours broad cross-class coalitions.[165]

Fraternal communion is expressed through national symbols. The national revolutionary martyr is one of them. The martyr's shed blood is linked to the brothers' shared blood. The revolutionary martyr is thus a conflictual national symbol. In the Islamic tradition, the trope of the 'crown of martyrdom' brings into opposition the rightful martyr on his throne in heaven and the illegitimate ruler.[166] Bouazizi's representations spread online and in the streets (figure 13), whereas Ben Ali's pictures, that used to represent the power of the autocrat in public space, were vandalised or caricatured.[167] Exemplifying this opposition, some demonstrators glued Bouazizi's face on Ben Ali's official presidential pictures (figure 14).

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[162] Ernesto Laclau, *Ernesto Laclau: Post-Marxism, Populism and Critique*, ed. David R. Howarth (London: Routledge, 2015), chap. 3: 'Why do empty signifiers matter to politics? (1994)'.
[163] Paolo Gerbaudo, 'Protest Avatars as Memetic Signifiers: Political Profile Pictures and the Construction of Collective Identity on Social Media in the 2011 Protest Wave', *Information, Communication & Society* 18, no. 8 (2015): 1–14.
[164] Laclau, *Ernesto Laclau*, 71.
[165] On the role of anger in the creation of these coalitions, see Jack A. Goldstone, 'Cross-class Coalitions and the Making of the Arab Revolts of 2011', *Swiss Political Science Review* 17, no. 4 (2011): 462; Jean-Pierre Filiu, *The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 39.
[166] Halverson, Ruston, and Trethewey, 'Mediated Martyrs of the Arab Spring', 317.
[167] Souheil Fakhfah and Rachida Tlili, 'La Caricature à l'épreuve du "Printemps Arabe"', *Sociétés & Représentations* 2 (2013): 143–165. The practice of caricature is noticeable in virtually all countries in which social unrest occurred, see for instance in Egypt Lina Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East: The Role of the Visual in Political Struggle* (London: IBTauris, 2012), 146–148; or in Germany W. A. Coupe, 'The German Cartoon and the Revolution of 1848', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9, no. 2 (1967): 137–167.



Figure 13 – Picture of Bouazizi carried in a demonstration in Tunisia[168]



Figure 14 – Bouazizi's face on Ben Ali's presidential official picture[169]

[168]Source: https://www.24heures.ch/monde/afrique/pays-printemps-arabe-tourmente/story/16514258, last accessed 7th September 2020.
[169] Source: https://www.alamy.com/stock-photo-portrait-of-mohamed-bouazizi-the-tunisian-street-vendor-whose-desperate-34999411.html, last accessed 7th September 2020.

In the same way demonstrators and rioters subverted the national symbols used by the regime, the images produced by the regime were challenged and disrupted by the popular productions and reproductions of martyrs' representations.[170]

Conclusion

Revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom are combined at the national level, prompting the revolutionary multitude to emerge and setting it into motion against the regime. This does not underestimate the powerful affective impact of fear. By contrast with the way rational theories approach the notion, I do not conceive of fear as a risk evaluation but rather as a disempowering and visceral affect caused by the revolutionary atmosphere. This affect may consequently demobilise rioters and demonstrators.

And yet, revolutions do happen. In both revolutionary springs, affective circulations were triggered by revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom. Fraternity is indeed a reciprocal affect that bounds revolutionaries together. This fraternal communion is experienced by revolutionaries through the performance of revolutionary acts despite social divides. This fraternal communion is entangled with nationalism: the motherland or fatherland guarantees that citizens share a community of blood. National symbols, including dissident ones, express this fraternal communion opposing a regime orchestrating fratricide.

If fraternity gives consistency to the revolutionary multitude, indignation sets it into motion. A close analysis of two revolutionary episodes, the massacre of the Capucines and Bouazizi's self-immolation, illuminates how local events are turned into revolutionary martyrdom. Due to this affective pattern, indignation is triggered, circulates, and intensifies, turning the multitude into a revolutionary volcano.

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[170] Awad and Wagoner, 'Image Politics of the Arab Uprisings', 198.

Both affective patterns, revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom, have been analysed in this chapter at the national level. This investigation has revealed in particular how the fraternal communion experienced and expressed by revolutionaries was tied to national symbols. In the next chapter, I examine how these two affective patterns interplay at an international level.

Chapter 6 – 'The whole land, free!': transnational fraternity and martyrdom

> Seizing the royal seat, the Parisian rioters wrote on it: 'The People of Paris to All Europe: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' before burning it.
>
> Mike Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*[1]

> 'Some journalists, who were chitchatting in front of me earlier, said that we are going to emancipate Poland and Italy! No more kings! Do you get it? The whole land, free! The whole land, free!' …
>
> [Frédéric] was voluptuously inhaling the stormy air, still filled with powder fragrances; and yet, he was shivering under the scents of an immense love, a supreme and universal tenderness, as if the heart of the whole humanity was beating in his chest.
>
> Gustave Flaubert, *L'Éducation sentimentale*[2]

Introduction

The Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring spread across borders and impacted their respective regions. This chapter shifts the analysis of two affective patterns, revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom, at the international level to look at transnational circulations of indignation.

[1] Mike Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 56.
[2] Gustave Flaubert, *Oeuvres*, vol. 2 (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1952), 323, my translation.

Fraternity, be it institutionally established by the state or spontaneously experienced and expressed by revolutionaries, is usually thought at the national level. The notion is indeed embedded in a familial metaphor that structures the representation of national imagined communities. Fraternity would thus be the emotional translation of nationalism. Fraternity, however, the notion pre-existed nationalism and has been used in other historical contexts to refer to diverse forms of communities.

Shifting from the national to the international level enriches consequently the understanding of revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom. Revolutionary springs are radical international phenomena, by which I mean that they invite us to reconceive the articulation between the 'national' and the 'international' through the revolutionaries' perspective.

I first examine how national and transnational fraternities coexisted. Instead of bringing into opposition nationalism and internationalism, revolutionaries rather conceived a union of peoples which were involved in similar struggles. This does not underestimate the importance of the national symbols that expressed fraternal communion at the national level, but it underlines their fluidity. These symbols circulated and were also displayed by foreign revolutionaries outside of their countries of origins. A plurality of social structures of affects at different levels coexisted.

Although the notion of martyr is not directly linked to a national context, I showed in the previous chapter how revolutionary martyrs are framed in nationalistic terms. This national framing may appear as an obstacle to foreigners' identification and thus, to transnational circulations of indignation. However, I show in the second part that revolutionary martyrs sparked transnational indignation following the same affective dynamics as at the national level, that is, direct individual and group identifications. Furthermore, the martyrs' national dimension may also be circumvented by indirect

identification based on 'pantheons of martyrs'. The martyrs' blood ignites powerful transnational affective circulations as well.

Eventually, revolutionary springs shaped the way revolutionaries experienced the international. Demonstrators and rioters did not only fight for local causes but also demanded a change for 'martyr peoples', such as the Polish or the Palestinians. Transnational fraternity stirs up the emergence of a transnational multitude that alters the distinction between self and other, between domestic and international. The revolutionaries' perspective on international affairs, expressed in popular songs as well as in testimonies, refuses the classical rivalry between states and describes an opposition between a transnational multitude which embraces diverse national multitudes, on the one hand, and a bloc of counter-revolutionary regimes, on the other.

I. Transnational fraternity

1. **Expressions of transnational fraternity**

The Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring caused a national communion experienced as and expressed through fraternity. Simultaneously, though, fraternal feelings embraced foreign revolutionaries across borders. Immediately after the February Revolution, a workers' newspaper from Frankfurt, *Die Allgemeine Arbeiter Zeitung*, praised the French as a 'great and noble people of brothers'.[3] While the news spread in Europe, enthusiastic political clubs or groups, pre-existing the revolution or emerging from its echo, exchanged fraternal letters with the French provisory government:

[3] Axel Körner, 'The European Dimension in the Ideas of 1848 and the Nationalization of its Memories', in *1848—A European Revolution?*, by Axel Körner (New York: Springer, 2000), 14.

> Brothers! Coimbra students could not stay silent while witnessing your achievements … your love for freedom and your devotion to the cause of the peoples. You have unchained France, you have prepared for the Italian and German unities, emancipated Austria, helped to the Polish revolution, accelerated the fall of absolutism in Europe … and we, from afar, we wish for the triumph of the holy cause that you defended, which is ours too, the cause of the Peninsula, of the nations, of the whole humanity … The Holy Alliance is dead and in our hearts the love for freedom grows stronger everyday … Vive the Peninsula! Vive the freedom of all peoples! Vivent our brothers in Paris, Italy, Berlin, and Vienna![4]

Immigrants in Paris organised spontaneous delegations to congratulate the provisory government, such as the Hungarian who marched proudly wearing Hungarian traditional *atilla* and singing the 'Szozat' and the 'Marseillaise' with the Parisians.[5]

Demonstrators involved in the Arab Spring protests also extended fraternal feelings to the rest of the Arab world.[6] Fraternity was indeed often expressed in terms reminiscent of pan-Arabism. This cultural and political movement emerged after the First World War as an endeavour to establish a unique Arab state. The movement has largely declined after Egypt's peace treaty with Israel (1978) and the Gulf War (1990-1991) though, so that 'pan-Arabism as a dream, a romantic idea, an obligatory rhetoric is alive and well; but experience and reality

[4] Published on April 18th 1848, see Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, 'Le Portugal et La Révolution de 1848', in *1848 : Actes du colloque international du cent-cinquantenaire, tenu à l'Assemblée Nationale à Paris, les 23-25 février 1998*, by Jean-Luc Mayaud (Ivry-sur-Seine: Créaphis, 1998), 531, my translation.
[5] Paul Bouteiller, *La Révolution française de 1848 vue par les Hongrois* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949), 120–125.
[6] I estimate that a third of the occurrences of the term 'brother' in *Voices of the Arab Spring* edited by al-Saleh refers to Arab brotherhood.

are different'.[7] Nowhere in the MENA did the demonstrators ask for a pan-Arab state, proving the lack of popular support for the pan-Arabist project, but the numerous allusions to Arab fraternity reveal the importance of these imaginary representations in the region.

Beyond what Weyland affirms, revolutionaries did not receive foreign revolutions only – if at all – as pieces of information about their own chances to overthrow their regimes. On the contrary, these news affected foreigners who felt no strangers to these events. Experiences and expressions of fraternity across borders reveal the existence of transnational reciprocal affects.

2. Internationalism and communion of nations

An international socialist fraternity

The affirmation of experiences of national and transnational fraternities at the same time might appear puzzling, not to say contradictory. Transnational fraternity, however, was little expressed as a rejection of nationalism during the events of the Springtime of the Peoples and not at all during those of the Arab Spring. Certainly, the slowly emerging socialist movement looked at the state with suspicion. One of its main thinkers, Henri de Saint-Simon, believed that a fraternal and peaceful unification of all peoples and nations would progressively arise from the process of civilization.[8] Saint-Simon's works were influential and French popular songs, *goguettes*, relayed his anti-militarist ideas to larger audiences. Victor Rabineau's song, 'La gloire militaire' ('Military glory'), displays such an antimilitarist internationalism:

L'amour de la patrie	The love for the fatherland

[7] Tawfic Farah, *Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalism: The Continuing Debate* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), xii.
[8] Körner, 'The European Dimension in the Ideas of 1848 and the Nationalization of its Memories', 93.

Sera bientôt un amour trop étroit.	Will soon become too narrow.
Fraternité, ton drapeau salutaire,	Fraternity, your salutary flag,
Des vieux drapeaux doit fondre les couleurs.	Must melt the colours of the old flags.
N'encensons plus la gloire militaire,	Military glory should not be praised anymore,
Tous les lauriers sont arrosés de pleurs.	All the laurels are tear-soaked.[9]

Saint-Simon's project of international fraternity was of course poorly received in conservative circles, but did not win the socialists' unanimous support either. Two young German intellectuals, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, gave a speech in London in November 1847 in which they denounced the fact that 'the brotherhood of nations' was too often 'the brotherhood of the oppressors'.[10] While rejecting nationalism, Engels also discarded this international bourgeoisie and affirmed that 'because the condition of the workers of all countries is the same, because their interests are the same, their enemies the same, they must also fight together, they must oppose the brotherhood of the bourgeoisie of all nations with a brotherhood of the workers of all nations'.[11] The international fraternity of workers was a response to both threats: national fraternity, which would pacify social conflicts,[12] on the one hand, and the international bourgeoisie, on the other. Mikhail Bakunin

[9] *La voix du peuple, ou, Les républicaines de 1848: Recueil des chants populaires, démocratiques et sociaux publiés depuis la révolution de février* (Paris: Librairie chansonnière de Durand, 1848), 110, quoted in Marcel David, *Le printemps de la fraternité. Genèse et vicissitudes, 1830-1851* (Paris: Aubier, 1992), 301, my translation.

[10] Karl Marx, Frederick Engels 'On Poland: Speeches at the International Meeting held in London on November 29, 1847 to mark the 17th Anniversary of the Polish Uprising of 1830' in *Karl Marx, Frederick Engels: Collected Works* (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1975), vol. VI, 388.

[11] 'On Poland: Speeches at the International Meeting held in London on November 29, 1847 to mark the 17th Anniversary of the Polish Uprising of 1830', 388.

[12] Karl Marx, *The Class Struggles in France* (London: The Electric Book Company, 2001), 48.

similarly recognised that fraternity is one of these 'big words' that is 'often used nowadays in verbiage, but that was, at the time, sincerely and deeply experienced',[13] hence his use of the notion to depict both a pre-political situation and a post-national aim.[14] Without denying the differences amongst socialist thinkers and the evolution of their respective thoughts on this question, it appears that international fraternity was an opportunity for them to challenge nationalism.

A communion of nations

Socialist ideas, which spread during the Springtime of the Peoples, were however in minority. Instead of a rejection of nationalism on behalf of international fraternity, demonstrators and rioters seem to have experienced international fraternity as a communion of nations. Although the content of contentious performances varied, all nations displayed formally similar repertoires. The revolutionary performances, yet marching under different colours, were therefore unified aesthetically, which facilitated the experience and the expression of fraternal feelings towards both fellow-citizens and foreigners. Nationalism and internationalism were not perceived as contradictory.[15] This communion of nations was also illustrated in pictures (figure 1):

[13] Michail A. Bakunin, *Gosudarstvennost'i Anarchija* (Zürich, 1873), 25, quoted in Arnaud Macé, 'Bakounine et la fraternité. Le fondement affectif du politique', in *Fraternité : Regards croisés*, by Frédéric Brahami and Odile Roynette (Besançon: Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2009), 159.
[14] On Bakunin's use of the notion, see Macé, 'Bakounine et la fraternité. Le fondement affectif du politique'.
[15] Körner, 'The European Dimension in the Ideas of 1848 and the Nationalization of Its Memories', 5.



Figure 1 – Union of the peoples[16]

[16] Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. l'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), 63.

This picture represents a group of nations (Hungary, Germany, Italy, the United States, Switzerland, Poland, France) on an equal footing carrying their respective national flags. These standard-bearers wear the typical revolutionary clothes with some national variations.

This 'brotherhood of nations',[17] to use Giuseppe Mazzini's terms,[18] was not only acknowledged by revolutionaries, but also performed. During the summer of 1848, Viennese students exchanged flags with French, Hungarian, Polish, Croat, Slovene, and Serb students.[19] The Arab Spring demonstrators also displayed foreign national colours, as this picture of painted hands shows (figure 2).



Figure 2 – Hands painted with the Libyan, Yemeni, and Syrian flags (from left to right)[20]

[17] Giuseppe Mazzini, *A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini's Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 92.
[18] For an analysis of Mazzini's thought, see Martin Wight, *Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory: Machiavelli, Grotius, Kant, and Mazzini* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); for a historical perspective, see Eric J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1962), chap. 7.
[19] Priscilla Smith Robertson, *Revolutions of 1848: A Social History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), 221–222.
[20] Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/sunday-review/the-arab-intellectuals-who-didnt-roar.html, last accessed 4th April 2020. The article was published in October 2011, but the picture itself is not dated.

Furthermore, some national symbols travelled and were adopted beyond their countries. With the Springtime of the Peoples, the Phrygian caps and the trees of liberty, already known from the 1789 French Revolution, gained popularity in France as well as everywhere in Europe.[21] The "Marseillaise", first brought to Germany by the Napoleonian occupation,[22] became properly European.[23] Carl Schurz, a student in Cologne at the time, remembers how: 'in the taverns and on the streets resounded the 'Marseillaise', which at time passed as the "hymn of liberty"'.[24]

Tunisian and then Egyptian national symbols also circulated in other MENA countries.[25] A Yemeni revolutionary reports how, after the fall of Ben Ali's regime, she immediately went with a friend to the Tunisian embassy, in front of which she stood 'just looking proudly at the Tunisian flag'.[26] This national symbol got filled with an affective power which exceeded its national dimension. The crowd then started chanting Abul-Qasim al-Shabbi's lines, 'If the people want, one day, to live [in freedom], then fate will answer their call', which were the final lines of the Tunisian national anthem and the inspiration of the slogan 'the people want the end of the regime'. Thanks to the common use of Arabic in most countries in the region, which provided a linguistic and cultural common ground, the slogan

[21] Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 80.
[22] David Robb, 'Oppositional Political Identity in the Song Culture of the Vormärz and the 1848 Revolution in Germany', in *Identity, Intertextuality, and Performance in Early Modern Song Culture*, by Dieuwke Van Der Poel, Louis P. Grijp, and Wim van Anrooij (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 259.
[23] Michel Vovelle goes as far as affirming that 'the French anthem [by contrast with 'England's God Save the King, whose export market outside the Commonwealth was nil'] is often considered to be one of the few songs that belong to all mankind.', see Michel Vovelle, 'La Marseillaise: War or Peace', *Realms of Memory: The Construction of the French Past*, vol. 3, by Pierre Nora and Lawrence Kritzman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998): 29.
[24] Carl Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1917), chap. 5, np.
[25] Mona El-Ghobashy, 'The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution', *Middle East Report*, no. 258 (2011): 5; Kerim Bouzouita, 'Music of Dissent and Revolution', *Middle East Critique* 22, no. 3 (2013): 291.
[26] Asaad al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring: Personal Stories of the Arab Revolutions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 168. For similar testimonies of Syrian demonstrations in front of Egyptian and Libyan embassies, see Wendy Pearlman, *We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria* (New York: Custom House, 2018), 55.

was then transnationally diffused and adapted to national and local contexts. While Egyptians chanted 'the people want you and your corrupt mafia to leave',[27] a more careful phrasing was privileged in Jordan 'the people want to reform the regime,[28] contrasting with the radical Syrian version, 'the people want to execute the president'.[29]

Even though the revolutionary springs triggered national fraternal communions, 'exclusive, xenophobic, and aggressive nationalism, which considered the loyalty to the nation-state as the highest value … did not exist in 1848'[30] nor during the Arab Spring. International fraternity, consequently, was little opposed to its national counterpart, but rather experienced and expressed through a communion of nations. Foreign national symbols were indeed displayed by rioters and demonstrators and sometimes even fully adopted. The fraternal communion experienced and expressed at the national level was thus not an obstacle to transnational forms of fraternity. A plurality of social structures of affects, either emergent or well-settled, could thus coexist.

II. Transnational circulations of indignation

1. An affective transfer between regimes

Analysing revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom at the national scale sheds light on how circulations of indignation were triggered, spread, and intensified. These

[27] Lewis Sanders IV, 'Signs and Signifiers: Visual Translations of Revolt', in *Translating Egypt's Revolution: The Language of Tahrir*, by Samia Mehrez (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2012), 117.
[28] Jean-Pierre Filiu, *The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 146.
[29] Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto, 'Syria', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 218.
[30] Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, '1848 en Allemagne : Une perspective comparative', in *1848 : Actes du colloque international du cent-cinquantenaire, tenu à l'Assemblée Nationale à Paris, les 23-25 février 1998*, by Jean-Luc Mayaud (Ivry-sur-Seine: Créaphis, 1998), 471–472. I qualify this statement in chapter 7.

affective dynamics are not specific to the domestic level and revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom may ignite transnational circulations of indignation. However, to cause social unrest across borders, this indignation requires an affective transfer between the regimes (figure 3) so that revolutionaries imagine that the regime abroad, that caused indignation, and theirs share some similarities.



Figure 3 – Affective transfer of indignation

Illustrations of European state leaders circulating in 1848 show that they were in the same boat (figure 4). This was especially true for the countries that used to be part of the Holy Alliance, namely Austria, Prussia, Russia, and France, to which one may add the United Kingdom.[31] Despite its official dissolution in 1825, the memory of the Holy Alliance was still vivid in popular representations[32] and was the main target of transnational progressive European forces.[33]

[31] Although the United Kingdom was not a member of the Holy Alliance, it actively supported it.
[32] For the representation of the Holy Alliance in popular French songs, see Axel Körner, 'The European Dimension in the Ideas of 1848 and the Nationalization of Its Memories', 88.
[33] Laurent Nagy, 'La Sainte-Alliance des peuples face à une résistance nationale. Circulation et diffusion d'idées fraternelles et cosmopolites durant le Trienio Liberal', *Historia Constitucional*, no. 17 (2016): 103.



Figure 4 – The European Monarchs are all imagined to be in the same boat[34]

The similarity imagined between these governments had an impact on how events were read. It was common for newspapers to evoke foreign episodes of repression in relation with national events, which sometimes led them to ignore or misread foreign episodes.[35]

The Holy Alliance does not have any equivalent in the MENA. Authoritarian leaders of the Arab world, yet less institutionally organised than the Holy Alliance, were however imagined forming a bloc. In February 2011, a graffiti in Tripoli affirmed: 'Arab rulers are the catastrophe of peoples' (*al-ḥukām al-ʿarab muṣībat al-shuʿūb*).[36] In the following passage of

[34] Agulhon and Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848: L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 69.
[35] René Pillorget, 'Berlin en Mars 1848, vu par la presse parisienne', in *Paris et Berlin dans la révolution de 1848*, by Ilja Mieck, Horst Möller, and Jürgen Voss (Stuttgart: Thorbecke Jan Verlag, 1995), 269–275.
[36] Nabiha Jerad, 'The Tunisian Revolution: From Universal Slogans for Democracy to the Power of Language', *Middle East Journal of Culture and Communication* 6, no. 2 (2013): 244.

'Oh my dear' by Qashoush, the friendship between Bashar al-Assad and the Arab leaders condemns him to the same fate:

طارو كلن رفقاتك..يصيح عما كله الشعب.	The Syrian people are screaming [Mubarak and Ben Ali] your friends flew away
حاله شايف والسوري ياروحي ياعيني	Oh my dear; the Syrians are full of pride
زيح يلا دربنا وعن..الفصيح بالعربي افهما لك.	Understand clearly: get away from us and leave us
انشالو علي مبارك..يصيح عما كله الشعب.	The Syrian people are screaming Mubarak and Ali were all forced to step down.[37]

In a more expeditious manner, this banner shows the execution of the Arab leaders (figure 5), all portrayed as convicted.



Figure 5 – Hanging the Arab leaders (from left to right: Bashar al-Assad, Muammar Gaddafi, 'Ali Saleh, unrecognised picture, Hosni Mubarak)[38]

[37] Sadam Issa, 'Ibrahim Qashoush's Revolutionary Popular Songs: Resistance Music in the 2011 Syrian Revolution', *Popular Music and Society* 41, no. 3 (2018): 296.
[38] 'Literature and the Arab Spring: An Uprising of Words, Qantara.de - Dialog mit der islamischen Welt, https://en.qantara.de/content/literature-and-the-arab-spring-an-uprising-of-words, last accessed 8th April 2020.

In both revolutionary springs, regimes were perceived as related to each other. This relation between the regimes permitted an affective transfer and thus, the propagation of social unrest across borders.

2. Transnational affective imitation

Direct identifications

Indignation relies on imagining similarities between the self and the other. Imagination is not constrained by national borders and the same dynamics that ignited national circulations of indignation may trigger transnational ones as well. Bouazizi's self-immolation, which sparked the revolution in Tunisia, also shocked abroad with immediate consequences in the Arab world. Reemy Mojahed, a young Yemeni protester, recalls how she identified with the young Tunisian martyr:

> I can remember listening to the radio while preparing breakfast when I heard about Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation. This news thrust me into a new life and perspective. Like Bouazizi, I also was a college graduate without a job. Belonging to the middle class and studying sociology made me relate to him even more. At that point, I felt a mixture of nerve-wracking humiliation and pain. For a moment, I imagined that we were just millions of humiliated people spread on a map of the Arab world. This was the last day that I would feel humiliated.[39]

[39] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 167–168.

This transnational circulation of indignation from Tunisia to Yemen relies on direct identification. Mojahed first identified with Bouazizi on the basis of specific social characteristics (being a 'college graduate without a job'). Then, she imagined a community of 'millions of humiliated people spread on a map of the Arab world'. These people are not defined through ideology or national belongings, but through Arab identity and a shared affect.[40] This imagined community matches exactly Spinoza's definition of the multitude: a group that experiences a common affect. This common affect is not directed towards the Tunisian government and it leads Mojahed to get involved in the social protests of her own country, despite the lack of any causal link between the death of a foreigner in Sidi Bouzid and her own situation.

These transnational circulations of indignation explain why Bouazizi's act was immediately emulated outside of Tunisia: in the following month, a case of self-immolation occurred in Mauritania,[41] four in Algeria,[42] and more than a dozen in Egypt.[43] This imitation of Bouazizi's martyrdom abroad shows the transnational dimension of his martyrdom.[44] All these martyrs, who acted like Bouazizi, triggered and intensified transnational and local circulations of indignation, fuelling the affective revolutionary atmosphere.

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[40] One may notice that Mojahed mentions humiliation and not indignation. Humiliation has a long and complex history in the MENA. As Khaled Fattah and Karin Fierke affirm, 'the object of humiliation in the Middle East is not a state but rather categories of people, i.e. Arabs and Muslims, who have often, throughout history, been constituted by the "West" as "Orientals", assumed to possess not only feminine qualities of irrationality and emotionalism (Said, 1978), but a propensity to evil and violence', see Khaled Fattah and Karin M. Fierke, 'A Clash of Emotions: The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East', *European Journal of International Relations* 15, no. 1 (2009): 76.

[41] 'Man Sets Himself on Fire in Cairo', 17 January 2011, *BBC* sec. Middle East, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12204999, last accessed 7th September 2020.

[42] Mona El-Naggar, 'Self-Immolation Protests Spread Across North Africa', *The New York Times*, 17 January 2011, sec. Africa, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/world/africa/18egypt.html, last accessed 7th September 2020.

[43] 'More Cases of Self-Immolation in Egypt after Tunisia', *Reuters*, 21 January 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-tunisia-egypt-immolation-idUSTRE70K5X220110121, last accessed 7th September 2020.

[44] Johanna Sumiala and Lilly Korpiola, 'Mediated Muslim Martyrdom: Rethinking Digital Solidarity in the "Arab Spring"', *New Media & Society* 19, no. 1 (2017): 53.

Individual direct identifications seem less frequent during the Springtime of the Peoples. As Axel Körner notices, representations of martyrs 'remained impersonal and abstract',[45] even though prominent figures like Lajos Kossuth or Robert Blum received considerable national and international attention. Unlike individual identification, which relies on specific similarities, group identification is favoured by vagueness since it allows the projection of similarities. This may have favoured the provocative impact of images about foreign events. Despite the national and even local nature of their production, images were indeed quite homogeneous in style and topics throughout Europe. National or local characterisations were usually left vague, most often limited to flags or symbolical buildings.[46] This homogeneity may partly be explained by the influence of French and English illustrators who pioneered the genre and were imitated everywhere in Europe.[47] Plagiarism was also frequent, newspapers copying engravings published elsewhere to spare themselves time and money. The same illustration could be used successively by diverse newspapers to represent different events,[48] which may have helped to create a sense of similarity between revolutionary episodes. This undetermined aspect of revolutionary representations produced a common European revolutionary aesthetics, contributing to the provocative dimension of images representing foreign episodes.

The massacre of the Capucines profoundly shocked Parisians and was intensely relayed by newspapers. Representations of this episode and of its gloomy funeral spread

[45] Körner, 'The European Dimension in the Ideas of 1848 and the Nationalization of Its Memories', 87.
[46] Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 23.
[47] W. A. Coupe, 'The German Cartoon and the Revolution of 1848', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9, no. 2 (1967): 137.
[48] The same engraving was, for example, used by *L'Illustration* to illustrate the February events in Paris, then by the *Leipziger Illustrirte Zeitung* to refer to the same events, and eventually by another editor in Frankfurt to illustrate the Märzrevolution, see Agulhon and Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 26–27.

internationally. European and American newspapers rivalled to offer their own descriptions of the event.[49] The Hungarian newspaper *Eletképek* published this anonymous depiction of the macabre convoy:

> The lights were turned off … The city suddenly turned from the brightest illumination to complete darkness. The dead, their wounds exposed, were carried on top of carts. They were thus driven through the city, escorted by the people who were carrying torches and singing *Le Chant des Girondins* 'to die for your homeland'.[50]

Foreign descriptions are remarkably similar to the ones that French newspapers published. This passage is both indicative and provocative: it showed, and by doing so probably ignited, intense emotions. The dramatic tension between torches and darkness was an opportunity for monochromatic images. Thanks to the international development of major newspapers,

[49] For American testimonies, see Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *La Révolution parisienne de 1848 vue par les Américains* (Paris: Service des Travaux historiques de la Ville de Paris, 1984), 148, 157, 162–163, 171–172, 177, 180.
[50] Paul Bouteiller, *La Révolution Française de 1848 vue par les Hongrois* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949), 100–101, my translation.

this image (figure 6), made by Raunheim, a German artist who lived in Paris, was first printed in the French capital, and almost immediately reproduced in London by Gambart & Cie.



Figure 6 – Boulevard des Capucines by Hermann Raunheim[51]

While some elements are typical, such as the torches and the smoke, this image unusually focuses on the emotional impulse that led to the procession.

Even though popular demand for those newspapers and for illustrations increased, affective reactions to these specific images and descriptions are not documented. The affective impact that the massacre of the Capucines had abroad is thus unknown. A similar event happened in Berlin on March 18th. After casualties caused by confrontations between

[51] Source: http://parismuseescollections.paris.fr/fr/musee-carnavalet/oeuvres/revolution-francaise-1848, last accessed 7th September 2020.

rioters and the royal military forces, the victorious rebels piled up their martyrs on carts and brought them to the palace (figure 7), threatening the King in case he would not pay homage to them – which he eventually did –.[52] Such a spectacular performance, evoking the massacre of the Capucines, was all the more surprising and noticeable in a time when funerals were individualised and corpses usually hidden from sight.[53] In the absence of any documentation, it is impossible to know whether this procession was at all influenced by its Parisian precedent. The absence of explicit correlation is however not sufficient to invalidate the hypothesis of an influence. While it is known that German cafés and political clubs were modelled after the French, revolutionaries were reluctant to acknowledge this influence.[54] The similarities between the massacre of the Capucines and this event in Berlin show, at least, a common aestheticism of martyrdom so that representations of the massacre of the Capucines may have shocked foreigners too, and vice versa.

[52] Schurz, *The Reminiscences of Carl Schurz,* chap. 5, np. The event is also recalled in Ludwig Pfau's song 'Zum 18. März', see Ludwig Pfau, *Gedichte* (Stuttgart: Bonz, 1889).
[53] On funeral practices during the first half of the 19th century, see Emmanuel Fureix, *La France des larmes: deuils politiques à l'âge romantique, 1814-1840* (Ceyzérieu: Champ Vallon, 2009), 48–51.
[54] Geerten Waling, 'Organizing in a Moment of Madness: Political Meetings and Clubs in 1848', in *Organizing Democracy*, by Henk te Velde and Maartje Janse (New York: Springer, 2017), 115. Waling argues that this reluctance to acknowledge the influence of France over Germany may be due to the Germans' mixed feelings towards France, which occupied German states during the First Empire.



Figure 7 – The Prussian King paying homage to the revolutionary martyrs[55]

Indirect identifications

Affective transfer opens the possibility of indirect identification (figure 8). These identifications are coined indirect as they require an intermediary link (B) between A and B. For Yosra (A), the Tunisian demonstrator, this intermediary link (B') was her son, tying the martyr (B) to the intimate sphere. This intermediary link may also be another martyr. Representations of martyrs, as Khatib remarks, are meta-representations that refer to other

[55] Source: Walter Schmidt, *Illustrierte Geschichte der deutschen Revolution 1848/49* (Frankfort: Neue Kritik, 1970), 92.

images,[56] including images of other martyrs. Revolutionary martyrs are indeed often included in 'pantheons of martyrs'.[57]



Figure 8 – Indirect identification

Some of these pantheons were transnational. In 1848, Lucien Bessières's book consisted in an exhaustive presentation of the martyrs who fought for European freedoms.[58] Less exhaustively, the Egyptian Facebook group 'Kulena Khaled Said' regularly drew parallels between martyrs. This banner juxtaposed for instance the pictures of three martyrs, Khaled Said, Hamza al-Khatib, and Mohamed Bouazizi, with their respective national flags (figure 9).[59]

[56] Lina Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East: The Role of the Visual in Political Struggle* (London: IBTauris, 2012), 12.
[57] I draw this expression from Lucien Bessières's book, see Lucien Bessières, *Panthéon des martyrs de la liberté, ou Histoire des révolutions politiques et des personnages qui se sont dévoués pour le bien et la liberté des nations* (Paris: Penaud frères, 1848).
[58] Bessières.
[59] Khatib, *Image Politics in the Middle East*, 160.



Figure 9 – Pictures of Khaled Said, Hamza al-Khatib, and Mohamed Bouazizi (from left to right)[60]

Signs were also carried by demonstrators in front of the Egyptian Ministry of the Interior to underline the similarities between Bouazizi and Said, both victims of the police (figure 10).



Figure 10 – Pictures of Khaled Said and Mohamed Bouazizi carried in front of the Minister of Interior, Egypt[61]

[60] Source: Khatib, 160.
[61] Source: 'Where the Arab Spring Will End Is Anyone's Guess', *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/17/arab-spring-end-anyone-guess, last accessed 5th November 2019. Unfortunately, *the Guardian* did not mention when this picture was taken.

Indirect identification between Bouazizi and Said went both ways. The affective transfer between the two martyrs may have facilitated for Egyptians the identification with the Tunisian martyr but it conversely gave a second wind to indignation about Said's murder. Said was indeed beaten to death by two policemen on June 6th 2010, a few months before Bouazizi's immolation. This murder, in public space, triggered indignation. 'Kulena Khaled Said' shared pictures of the defigurated corpse and organised several demonstrations in June. A close analysis of the Facebook group reveals that its online activity steadily declined after its creation, in terms of comments, likes, new users, posts and unique active users. However, Bouazizi's self-immolation and Tunisian unrest nourished a new burst of activity from December 2010 onwards that peaked in February.[62] Distinguishing between the impact of Bouazizi's self-immolation and the Tunisian events more broadly would be thorny. However, these Tunisian demonstations did not only lead to similar Egyptian marches: the Tunisian events sparked a new interest online – and, one imagines, in the streets – in Said's martyrdom. Bouazizi's martyrdom did not cause the Arab Spring alone, but the transnational circulations of indignation ignited by Bouazizi's blood through direct and indirect identifications intensified and nourished circulations of indignation abroad.

[62] See the exhaustive analysis offered in Bernhard Rieder et al., 'Data Critique and Analytical Opportunities for Very Large Facebook Pages: Lessons Learned from Exploring "We Are All Khaled Said"', *Big Data & Society* 2, no. 2 (2015): 14–15.

III. 'The Peoples are our brothers'

1. Martyr peoples

The Polish martyrdom

The impact of revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom at the international level changed popular perspective on the international. Revolutionary springs gave a momentum to the question of 'martyr peoples'. The term 'martyr peoples' refers to peoples perceived as the martyrs of the international order. In that sense, unlike most of the martyrs at whom we have so far looked, this martyrdom preceded the events of revolutionary springs. In 1848, these martyr peoples included Ireland, occupied by the United Kingdom, the Italian states, Lombardy and Venetia annexed to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and most of all, Poland, divided between the Holy Alliance, Prussia, Russia, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. During the Arab Spring, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict crystallised the tensions and frustrations of the region.

Even though affects towards these martyr peoples preceded the revolutionary springs, these events intensified the transnational fraternity towards these peoples and the indignation against regimes that were perceived as directly responsible or complicit. The revolution in Paris raised the hope of the Polish. Polish emigrates, scattered everywhere in Europe, were particularly influential in the French capital that had been the main destination for the Polish elite, tying a unique cultural relationship between the two countries.[63] Poets, such as Alfred de Vigny or Victor Hugo, as well as popular singers, had evoked the Polish tragedy and demanded a French expedition.[64] During the Springtime of the Peoples, songs

[63] Lydia Scher-Zembitska, *L'aigle et le phénix. Un siècle de relations franco-polonaises, 1732-1832* (Paris: CNRS, 2001).
[64] Frédérique Tabaki-Iona, 'Chants de liberté et de solidarité, pour la Grèce et la Pologne', *Mots. Les langages du politique* n 70, no. 3 (2002): 51–56.

exalting fraternal feelings towards Poland multiplied, such as 'Le Citoyen Mayeux en 1848' by Louvet:

Frères lointains	Brothers, so far away,
Vos destins	Your fate
Seront prompts et certains	Will be prompt and assured
Quand maint trône chancelle	When so many thrones fall
Serrez vos rangs.	Close ranks.
Peuples grands	Great peoples,
Renversez les tyrans.	Overthrow the tyrants.[65]

Despite the moderation of French foreign policy, the 'Sister Poland', as it was often called,[66] was not forgotten. An anonymous poster on a Parisian wall in March warns: 'Don't forget Poland! It is not just a nationality, it is a principle, the principle of fraternity, of national independence, that you just proclaimed and that you have to defend now'.[67] Beyond the Polish situation, the song 'Appel à tous les peuples' ('Call to All the Peoples') asked for a fraternal union of peoples – led by the French – to free martyr peoples:

Hongrois, Saxons, Italiens, aux armes	Hungarians, Saxons, Italians, to arms!
Peuples marchons sous la même bannière,	Peoples, let's march under the same banner,
Ralliez-vous aux Français, vos aînés	Join the French, your elder [brothers]
Belle Pologne à nos cœurs toujours chère.	Beautiful Poland, forever dear to our hearts.[68]

[65] Tabaki-Iona, 58, my translation.
[66] Tabaki-Iona, 61.
[67] Tabaki-Iona, 61, my translation.
[68] Tabaki-Iona, 61, my translation. Interestingly enough, the horizontal fraternity is here presented in a more vertical manner through the representation of the French as elder brothers opening the path.

Despite the specificity of the French-Polish relationship, Polish fate also moved other European revolutionaries. As part of Italy was subjugated by the Austro-Hungarian empire too, Italians were sensitive to the similarities between their situation and the Polish one, as it appears in 'Fratelli d'Italia' ('Brothers of Italy'), written in 1847, that became later the national anthem:

Già l'Aquila d'Austria le penne ha perdute.	The Eagle of Austria has already lost its plumes.
Il sangue d'Italia, il sangue Polacco	The Italian blood, the Polish blood
Bevé, col cosacco, ma il cor le bruciò	It drank with the Cossack, but it burned its heart.

The song stresses the power of the martyr peoples' blood: the Italian and Polish shed blood shared indeed a similar fate, drank by the Cossack until it eventually turned into a lethal poison.

Even in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Springtime of the Peoples caused popular sympathy for Poland. The Polish delegation, invited to speak with Ferdinand, was welcomed with enthusiasm by the Viennese population.[69] In Berlin, the Polish nationalist Ludwik Mieroslawski was released from jail and greeted by a crowd cheering Poland with fervour.[70]

The Palestinian martyrdom

The Arab Spring also intensified transnational fraternity towards a martyr people, the Palestinians. The *Nakba* (Arabic for catastrophe), that is, the displacement of the Palestinians, has since 1948 pervaded the Arab world. The colonisation of Palestinian territories as well

[69] Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 137.
[70] Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851*, 123.

as the conflicts it provoked caused the emigration of a large portion of the Palestinian population to neighbouring countries. Toufic Haddad distinguishes in the Palestinian question a dual dimension: 'it is at once the goal of the national movement of the Palestinian people and a cause that had embodied and shape-shifted the collective Arab aspiration for self-determination'.[71] Palestine is not only a foreign country, it also symbolises a broader regional and ethnic identity. While the Arab Spring gave substance to Arab fraternity, the indignation ignited by Palestinian martyrdom intensified.

In Sidi Bouzid, where the revolutionary spring originated, pro-Palestine chants already rhythmed the demonstrations.[72] In Egypt, in which the question was particularly salient due to the common frontier and the war, the Palestinian flag was omnipresent in demonstrations. In Tahrir Square, a rally of three million persons 'witnessed the roaring chant "to Jerusalem, we are going, martyrs by the millions"'.[73] On March 15th, anniversary of the *Nakba*, Palestinians fraternised with Syrians: thousands of Palestinians, singing 'the people want the liberation of Palestine', approached the fences on the Syrian-Israel occupied Golan Heights border at risk of triggering the mines and dismantled the barriers. Once they crossed the border, 'the demonstrators were warmly welcomed by the local Syrian population on the other side, who embraced and kissed them, with the sound of women ululating in the background'.[74]

Although fraternity towards martyr peoples did not appear overnight, revolutionary springs intensified these experiences. Expressions of fraternity did not serve the purposes of domestic revolutions nor individual interests. They revealed genuine reciprocal and shared

[71] Toufic Haddad, 'Palestine', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 288.
[72] Haddad, 296.
[73] Haddad, 296.
[74] Haddad, 283.

affects: these transnational affective circulations led to the emergence of a transnational multitude.

2. A disappointing absence of military involvement

Revolutionary states' moderate foreign policies

The martyr peoples caused popular frustration vis-à-vis the international system and, once revolutionary states were established, vis-à-vis the absence of revolutionary foreign policies. Revolutionary states, such as France in 1848 or Tunisia and Egypt in 2011, abstained from any attempt to export their revolutions and to collaborate militarily or financially with foreign revolutionaries.

At first sight, this situation may seem at odd with revolutionary energy. However, as Fred Halliday notices, new-born revolutionary states often adopt moderate foreign policies to maintain the *status quo* and focus on controlling the domestic struggles first[75] in order not to wage two wars at the same time, one within the country, the other against foreign enemies, as it happened with the French Revolution after 1792. What is surprising, therefore, is not that these new revolutionary states abstained from revolutionising their foreign policies, but rather that the revolutions spontaneously spread before they could do so. I have shown what this revolutionary enthusiasm abroad owed to transnational feelings of fraternity and to circulations of indignation. These affects informed popular perspectives on international affairs.

[75] Fred Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Sixth Great Power* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 135.

The foreign policies adopted by revolutionary states were equivocal. The *Manifesto to Europe*, published in March 1848 by Alphonse de Lamartine, an influential figure of the provisory government, summarised this ambiguity quite well. This manifesto was addressed simultaneously to European courts and peoples. In 1792, Lamartine affirmed, the middle-class took the power for itself. To distract the people, the Girondins, who represented the middle-class, waged war on European countries. With the February Revolution, France is not divided anymore since 'fraternity, that we proclaimed and that the national assembly will organise, is going to unify everyone'.[76] Fraternity at the domestic level would thus establish fraternity at the international level and the February revolution would provide with 'fraternity and peace'.[77]

It was however unclear to whom these fraternal feelings were addressed: the conservative European monarchies or their peoples. Lamartine asserted indeed that 'nations, like individuals, have different ages',[78] and therefore, that 'a people would lose itself by forestalling the hour of its maturity as it would dishonour itself by letting this hour pass without seizing it'.[79] In this single ambiguous sentence, Lamartine recognises altogether the legitimacy of both non-Republican regimes and of revolutionary attempts to overthrow them.

Egyptian diplomacy, after Mubarak's fall, developed along similar lines. Under Mubarak's regime, Egyptian foreign policy was seeking a balance between, on the one hand, maintaining positive relations with the United States and, through them, with Israel, and, on the other, affirming its Arab leadership including by supporting the Palestinian cause. Even though the provisory government – the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) –

[76] Alphonse de Lamartine, *Manifeste à l'Europe* (Paris: Pagnerre, 1848), 6, my translation.
[77] Lamartine, 5, my translation.
[78] Lamartine, 4, my translation.
[79] Lamartine, 5, my translation.

officially ruled until Mohamed Morsi's victory at the presidential election in June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood was *de facto* carefully consulted, and Morsi's presidency was largely in continuity with the SCAF's official positions.[80]

Despite starting with strong official positions, since Morsi openly backed Hamas and accused Israel of being an illegal occupier,[81] the situation soon normalised and Egypt showed signs of benevolence to Israeli foreign office, by controlling more severely its tunnels to Gaza to limit the import of weapons. Despite the close connection between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, the setback in Egypt-Israel relationship, yet real, was not substantial.

Popular frustration towards the international order

In 1848, this diplomatic moderation was diversely welcomed by foreign revolutionaries, from disappointment to relief. Although this meant the absence of any foreign support to achieve revolutionary plans, it also avoided a foreign invasion à la Napoléon. In France itself, foreign policy caused immediate dissatisfaction, especially with regards to the situation of martyr peoples. With the fall of the monarchy, progressive forces thought that the long-expected French expedition to Poland was about to happen. Upset by Lamartine's pacifist position, popular mobilisation obtained that the provisory government would discuss the Polish situation on May 15th. The same day, a crowd entered the assembly and stormed the building.

The denunciation of the Palestinian question in MENA countries was at the heart of the criticisms towards authoritarian regimes deemed as inactive or complicit. Ibrahim Qashoush's song, 'Just Listen to Me', opens with this dialogue between Bashar and the revolutionaries:

[80] Nael Shama, *Egyptian Foreign Policy From Mubarak to Morsi: Against the National Interest* (London: Routledge, 2013), 224.
[81] Mohamed Morsi, 'Statement before the 67th Session of the general Assembly of the United Nations', United Nations Assembly, New York (September 26, 2012).

بس اسمعوني	Just listen to me
والله لحرر فلسطين	I will liberate Palestine
بس اسمعوني	Liar![82]

In a similar way, Egyptian protestors accused Mubarak of being engaged in double-dealing: 'Hosni, Bey! Hosni, Bey, tell me: why do you siege Gaza?'.[83]

Popular hopes that the election of the Muslim Brotherhood would change this situation were soon disappointed by the new government's moderate responses to the Palestinian question. In that light, it is revelatory that the news of Morsi's resignation in July 2013, forced by mass uprisings and the army to relinquish power, was received with concerns in Israel and with careful blessings from the Hamas and Mahmoud Abbas, the President of the Palestinian Authority.[84] The intensity of transnational affective circulations thus informed and nourished popular dissatisfaction with the international order supported or suspiciously accepted by regimes.

3. 'Fraternise and chase all the kings'

A transnational multitude

Ignoring the transnational fraternal communion to analyse revolutionary springs as successions or collections of isolated national revolutions would thus miss a fundamental

[82] Issa, 'Ibrahim Qashoush's Revolutionary Popular Songs', 294.
[83] Belqes Al-Sowaidi, Felix Banda, and Arwa Mansour, 'Doing Politics in the Recent Arab Uprisings: Towards a Political Discourse Analysis of the Arab Spring Slogans', *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 52, no. 5 (2017): 628.
[84] Jonathan Eyal, 'Egypt Crisis: Cautious Reactions from Middle Eastern Governments', July 2013, *The Straits Times*, https://web.archive.org/web/20131231000800/http://www.straitstimes.com/the-big-story/asia-report/politicsdiplomacy/story/egypt-crisis-cautious-reactions-middle-eastern-gov, last accessed 7th September 2020.

aspect of these phenomena. Revolutionaries indeed did not perceive their struggles as separated. Some, witnessing the revolution abroad, wished for its diffusion. This Syrian demonstrators remembers how 'The Egyptian revolution was only eighteen days, but some guys stopped sleeping at night. They followed the news nonstop, all day long: Egypt, Egypt, Egypt'.[85] Conversely, successful revolutionaries also paid a close attention to the diffusion of the revolution: French political clubs meticulously pinned down the places where the revolution had spread.[86] National and transnational fraternities co-existed, and the national revolutionary multitude was embraced in a transnational multitude.

Without denying the importance of foreign events in terms of strategic or tactical reasonings, news from abroad were nevertheless received with sincere enthusiasm, as these two testimonies show:

> I also still remember the day (February 11, 2011) when Hosni Mubarak stepped down and the Egyptian people celebrated in Tahrir Square. That moment I cried, and my mother saw my tears of joy … I was mesmerized in front of the television and laptop following news feeds with all the updates from television, Facebook, and Twitter. It felt like the whole world was celebrating with our Egyptian brothers.[87]
>
> *
>
> Each time I saw a footage of crowds of Tunisians sweeping down the streets while carrying signs and chanting – but also being killed – my whole body shivered, and I cried … The Tunisian revolution made us find the essence of our lives. Millions of young Arab people like me probably screamed with joy

[85] Pearlman, *We Crossed a Bridge and It Trembled: Voices from Syria*, 53.
[86] Maurice Agulhon, *Les Quarante-Huitards* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2013), 96–97.
[87] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 226.

> when Leila Sheikhly from Al Jazeera announced that Ben Ali had fled. We found the meaning of our lives on that day when the earth held millions of dignified, victorious, dreamers and turned them around the sun, showed them to the galaxy and the universe, and expressed pride for those who had a dream.[88]

Even though the reality of struggles was local, the revolutionary springs were experienced by revolutionaries as a common effort across borders. This Egyptian activist remembers that: 'After the Tunisians toppled their president, I called my family and friends to offer congratulations on the Tunisian revolution as if it were our own'.[89] The distinction between self and other or domestic and foreign blurred. Affects were circulating beyond national communities in a form of transnational revolutionary multitude.

A revolutionary spring model of international relations

Governments generally accuse revolutionaries of being foreign agitators and 'anti-national'.[90] Revolutionaries usually respond by blaming their governments for compromising with the international system or for colluding with foreign governments against their own people.[91] In revolutionary contexts, the international is suspiciously regarded. Revolutionary springs, specifically, create a paradoxical situation: the international dimension is polarised both negatively and positively. Transnational fraternity is praised and yet, foreign states are suspiciously looked at.

[88] al-Saleh, 168. Several testimonies, from diverse countries, recall the emotions experienced when Ben Ali or Mubarak fell, see also Lina Khatib and Ellen Lust, *Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 83.
[89] al-Saleh, *Voices of the Arab Spring*, 59.
[90] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, 62.
[91] Halliday, 60.

This apparent contradiction vanishes as soon as one gets rid of the traditional perspective on international affairs to adopt the revolutionary spring model presented in chapter 2. As aforementioned, the classical model, illustrated by Hobbes, depicts states in 'posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another'.[92] States are thus typically in a agonistical situation. Drawing the conflictual line between states was only possible for Hobbes at the cost of neglecting the conflicts between the Sovereign and the multitude, the latter being deemed as fundamentally a-political (figure 11).



Figure 11 – Representation of international affairs for classical IR theory

For the revolutionary spring model as for Marxism, the conflictual line runs within each state (figure 12).[93] For Marx, indeed, the opposition was between the bourgeoisie who owns the means of production and the proletariat since, as he famously argued, 'the working men have no country' and the 'national differences and antagonism between peoples are daily

[92] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 90.
[93] Halliday, *Revolution and World Politics*, 88.

more and more vanishing'.[94] Unlike Marx's understanding of international relations, the revolutionary spring model, which brings into opposition a union of multitudes, on the one hand, and a bloc of counter-revolutionary regimes, on the other, is not about material interests but about affects and imagination. It follows that this perspective on international affairs that stood Hobbes on his head was momentary and remained as long as transnational fraternity was sustained.



Figure 12 – Representation of international affairs during revolutionary springs

Analysing revolutionary springs through this lens resolves the apparent contradiction between the suspicion towards states, on the one hand, and transnational fraternity, on the other. The Egyptian slogan 'Mubarak, Mubarak, Saudi Arabia is waiting for you',[95] implicitly referring to Ben Ali's departure to Saudi Arabia, is indeed less a xenophobic remark than a critic of the Saudi regime that supported and symbolised the counter-revolutionary forces. Revolutionary springs are not ideologically homogeneous, and diverse projects co-existed, from peaceful collaborations between states after the revolutions to those which wished the

[94] Karl Marx, *The Communist Manifesto* (Oxford: University Press, 1992), 55.
[95] Zoé Carle, 'Les slogans de la révolution égyptienne, épure d'une épopée tue ?', *Communications* 99, no. 1 (2016): 167.

establishment of larger states[96] – not to mention the abolition of states altogether. However, across ideological differences, there is a general agreement in bringing into opposition a brotherhood of multitudes and a bloc of counter-revolutionary regimes. Songs and slogans do not often a fully developed political theory. They are however fertile resources to study the perspective on politics.[97] The Republican singer Pierre Dupont gave voice to this feeling in 'Le chant des soldats' ('The Soldiers' Song'):

Aux armes ! Courons aux frontières !	To arms! Let's run to the borders!
Qu'on mette au bout de nos fusils	So that we can hold at gunpoint
Les oppresseurs de tous pays,	The oppressors from every country,
Les poitrines des Radetzkis !	The Radetzkies' chests!
Les peuples sont pour nous des frères,	The peoples are our brothers,
Et les tyrans des ennemis.	And the tyrants our enemies.[98]

The chorus subverts nationalistic themes: usually a symbol of national defence, the borders represent here the support to foreign struggles. War is not waged on other peoples, but on tyrants only. In that sense, the Viennese marshal Joseph Radetzky, who served during the

[96] Although I do not have any trace of a pan-Arab project during the Arab Spring, the Muslim brotherhood, which was massively involved, especially in Egypt, was first created in order to achieve a pan-Islamic state. It does not seem that representatives from the party explicitly expressed this project during the revolution though. As far as the Springtime of the Peoples is concerned, it gave momentum to the idea of a federation of European states. Long advocated by philosophers like William Penn, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, or Immanuel Kant, the United States of Europe became a political question that Victor Hugo famously addressed on August 21rst 1849; on that point, see Angelo Metzidakis, 'Victor Hugo and the Idea of the United States of Europe', *Nineteenth-Century French Studies* 23, no. 1 (1994): 72–84.

[97] On the importance of 'mediocrities' for International Intellectual History, see Edward Keene, 'International Intellectual History and IR: Contexts, Canons and Mediocrities', *International Relations* 31 (2017): 341–356.

[98] See Pierre Dupont, *Chants et Chansons*, vol. 1 (Paris: Lécrivain et Toubon, Libraires, 1851), my translation. Dupont also wrote a song on the 'Jeunesse des écoles' ('Student youth'): 'Hurrah! Student youth! / In Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, / Everywhere lanterns and farandoles / Would burst all the country, / Tyrants and old abuses, step back!' ('Hurrah ! jeunesse des écoles ! / A Vienne, à Berlin, à Paris, / Partout lampions et farandoles / Feraient sauter tout le pays ! / Tyrans et vieux abus, arrière !'), see Pierre Dupont, *Chants et Chansons*, np, my translation.

Napoleonian wars and led the Viennese counter-revolution during the Springtime of the Peoples, embodied the conservative forces of what used to be the Holy Alliance. Dupont was not the only one to extoll the brotherhood of nations, and another singer, Chalory, wrote a new 'Marseillaise, 'La Marseillaise européenne et universelle' which softened the martial tone of the original:

Plus de soldats, plus de frontières,	No more soldiers, no more borders,
Peuple, plus de sanglants combats ;	People, no more bloody battles;
Plus de sanglots dans nos chaumières,	No more cries in our cottages,
Non, plus de rois, plus d'états, (bis)	No, no more kings, no more states, (bis)
Dans le champ que ton bras féconde,	In the field that your arm fertilises,
Peuple, où le sang a coulé,	People, in which blood was poured,
Dis qu'il peut être encor foulé	Say it can still be treaded upon,
Pour cimenter la paix du monde.	To cement world peace
Peuple des nations, marchons, fondons nos droits ;	People of nations, let's walk, found our rights,
Buvons, buvons, fraternisons,	Drink, drink, fraternise,
Et chassons tous les rois.	And chase all the kings.[99]

Due to its popularity, it was common to use the tune of the 'Marseillaise' for political songs.[100] The original lyrics are however implicitly subverted by Chalory. While the 'Marseillaise' is a war song, Chalory's version advocated for the abolition of war, borders, and states. Blood,

[99] Chalory, 'La Marseillaise européenne et universelle (air de la Marseillaise)', 1848, B.N., cote 7185 (262), quoted in Tabaki-Iona, 'Chants de liberté et de solidarité, pour la Grèce et la Pologne', 222, my translation. This theme was quite popular, and other songs, such as the 'New Carmagnole' by Hippolyte Demanet, also advocate for the abolition of the state.

[100] Eugène Pottier intended 'the Internationale' (1864) to be sung to the tune of the 'Marseillaise', for instance.

shed in the field in both versions and formerly a national call to arms was suddenly dreamt as the cement of fraternal world peace.

These songs were not idealistic wishes: transnational fraternity was intense enough to prompt the masses to take action against warfare. In reaction to the Austro-Hungarian Emperor's declaration of war on the Kingdom of Hungary on October 3rd, a crowd of Viennese workers, students, and National Guards rioted, occupied the War Ministry, captured and lynched Theodor Franz von Latour, the Imperial Minister of War, and invaded the arsenal to seize weapons. This insurrection forced the troops to delay the expedition and to retreat out of the city. Once the occupation of Vienna secured, revolutionaries immediately reversed the declaration of war and appointed a new and popular government.[101] Transnational fraternity was powerful and was able to drive the multitude into action.

Conclusion

Revolutionary springs are not domestic phenomena but international processes. The important display of national symbols and discourses should not lead us to examine domestic revolutions as isolated events, but rather encourages us to reconsider how the 'national' and the 'international' are articulated by and for revolutionaries.

An analysis of revolutionary fraternity at the international level reveals indeed that there was no opposition between national and international. While few rejected nationalism itself, revolutionaries imagined a union of nations, underlining the similarities between respective revolutionary episodes and performances. Furthermore, national symbols were quite fluid: despite their strong national connotations, they circulated across borders, were

[101] Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 280–283.

displayed by foreign revolutionaries, and sometimes even adopted abroad. Consequently, national fraternity was not an obstacle to the emergence of transnational fraternity and several structures of affects could coexist.

In a context of transnational fraternal communion, revolutionary martyrs could trigger transnational circulations of indignation. Yet thornier to trace than their national counterpart, these transnational affective circulations relied on similar affective dynamics. Beyond direct individual and group identifications, transnational affects were sparked by indirect identification based on pantheons of martyrs. These dynamics go both ways and foreign martyrs also revived the indignation about a local martyr. The martyrs' shed blood thus ignited transnational indignation, nourishing social protests across countries.

Revolutionary springs are radical transnational phenomena that impact the way the international is perceived and experienced. In both the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring, demonstrators and rioters demanded justice for martyr peoples and blamed their regimes – and then, the revolutionary regimes that were established – for compromising about an unjust international order. At first sight, revolutionary springs are paradoxical: on the one hand, they stir up transnational fraternity; on the other, they raise suspicion towards the international. This paradox vanishes as soon as one conceives of international relations not as a rivalry or a conflict between states, but rather as the struggle between a transnational multitude and a bloc of counter-revolutionary regimes.

Examining social phenomena as complex as revolutionary springs through three affective patterns comes with some simplification. While keeping an affective lens, the following chapter investigates negative cases to add layers of complexity to our understanding of the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring.

Chapter 7 – Limits of revolutionary affective patterns and analysis of counter-revolutionary affective patterns

Introduction

Revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom ignite intense circulations of indignation that spread at both national and international levels, sparking spontaneous protests across countries. Revolutionary springs are however spatially and temporally limited. Despite their intensity and their transnational diffusions, revolutionary springs do not affect every country nor are they indefinitely sustained unless these structures of affects are maintained by political institutions such as the state. This chapter investigates how revolutionary springs are spatially and temporally circumscribed by examining the limits of revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom.

While the previous chapters focused on the beginning of revolutionary processes in countries affected by revolutionary springs, this chapter broadens the reflection by looking at further moments of these processes as well as negative cases. In order to avoid unnecessary complexity, the negative cases explored, i.e. countries to which the revolutionary springs did not spread, are selected among cases in which a different outcome seemed possible or likely.[1] Furthermore, although I tackle these negative cases through the three affective patterns studied so far, I do not pretend that all negative cases could be explained solely thanks to these affective dynamics, or affects in general.

In the first part, I examine the limits of revolutionary fraternity. In both revolutionary springs, revolutionaries experienced and expressed revolutionary fraternity despite their

[1] James Mahoney and Gary Goertz, 'The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research', *American Political Science Review* 98, no. 4 (2004): 653–669.

social and national differences. Fraternity appeared as a loose and particularly fluid reciprocal affect. An analysis of two negative cases, however, namely the United Kingdom and Israel, shows that this transnational fraternity did not reach all foreign communities. Beyond spatial limitation, fraternity is also limited temporally. Affects, unless they are institutionalised, are fluid and thus changeable and fraternity is no exception. While fraternity progressively vanishes, the revolutionary multitude falls apart. A close-analysis of the June days reveals, however, that the bloody conflicts that arose were less an evidence of a lack of fraternity than a fratricide that caused confused affects.

I then look at the limits of indignation. First, fear, either caused by repression or by a traumatic experience before the revolution, may be more intense than indignation, limiting consequently the importance of social unrest and making the impact of revolutionary springs less visible. Second, transnational circulations of indignation may be intense but, in the absence of affective transfer between regimes, they do not cause any social unrest across countries. Third, indignation is not necessarily a revolutionary indignation. Mirroring revolutionary martyrdom, I analyse the role of counter-revolutionary martyrs who ignite national and transnational circulations of counter-revolutionary indignation that weaken or counter-balance the revolutionary affects.

I. The limits of fraternity

1. The absence of fraternity

Fraternal communion embraced large groups of people, nationally and transnationally, but was not universal. At the national level, the revolutionary springs led to episodes of violence towards diverse minorities. For instance, some Jewish communities were assaulted in France

and Germany by 1848 revolutionaries.[2] At the international scale, transnational fraternity sometimes went unheeded, as in the United Kingdom in 1848 and in Israel in 2010-2011. In both cases, revolutionary springs did not spread to these two countries because there was no affective transfer to their own regimes and, most importantly, because transnational fraternity was not massively experienced by British and Israel populations despite their geographical proximity to the events. This lack of transnational fraternity is to be linked to the fact that both countries identified foreign revolutionaries with their domestic minorities. As a result, the revolutionary springs, which remained foreign, were perceived as threats.

The United Kingdom

In 1848, the United Kingdom was enjoying a rather peculiar position on the European scene. Despite its support to counter-revolutionary powers, the country presented itself as liberal and as such, as having already long enjoyed what the Springtime of the Peoples sought to achieve.[3] Hence this analysis published in the *Times* in March 1848: 'If we ask why this country has scarcely felt the shock under which all Europe now reels, it is not from a selfish security or a premature pride … this nation is already reaping the fruits of a harvest which continental Europe is only beginning to sow'.[4] Pushing this argument even further, the *Bristol Mirror and General Advertiser* affirmed that German states, contrary to appearances, did not want to follow the French model, since 'English liberty [was] their model for imitation'.[5] In fact, it was accurate that Englishmen enjoyed rights and freedoms inaccessible to the peoples

[2] Jonathan Sperber, *The European Revolutions, 1848-1851* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 130.
[3] Leslie Mitchell, 'Britain's Reaction to the Revolutions', in *The Revolutions in Europe 1848–1849: From Reform to Reaction*, by R. J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 88.
[4] Mitchell, 88.
[5] *Bristol Mirror and General Advertiser*, March 25th 1848, 5, quoted in Owen Jackson, 'Receiving Revolution: The Newspaper Press, Revolutionary Ideology and Politics in Britain, 1789-1848' (PhD diss., The University of Bristol, 2000), 91.

living in German and Italian states, especially in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The argument was however less convincing regarding the French Monarchy of July, which was also a parliamentary and rather liberal regime in comparison with other European regimes. It is possible, nevertheless, that this British sense of superiority undermined an affective transfer to British monarchy.

It would be exaggerated to affirm that the February Revolution in France did not have any impact at all on the British. Revolutionary events were indeed immediately commented and debated by newspapers (figure 1).



Figure 1 – Importance of France in the publications of *The Illustrated London News* during the first semester of the year 1847 (on the left) compared to year 1848 (on the right)[6]

Thomas Frost, a young Chartist printer at the time, described in his memoires the fraternal celebrations in London after the reception of the news from Paris:

> Suddenly the news of the events in Paris was brought in. The effect was electrical. Frenchmen, Germans, Poles, Magyars, sprang to their feet, embraced, shouted, and gesticulated in the wildest enthusiasm … Then … the whole

[6] Fabrice Bensimon, *Les Britanniques face à la révolution française de 1848* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000), 346–348.

> assemblage descended to the street, and, with linked arms and colours flying marched to the meeting-place of the Westminster Chartists in Dean Street, Soho. There another enthusiastic fraternization took place, and great was the clinking of glasses that night in and around Soho and Leicester Square.[7]

These spontaneous festivities were mostly due to foreigners living in urban centres and to members of the Chartist movement. Chartist newspapers, such as *The Republican* or the *Northern Star*, praised the example of French revolutionaries who freed themselves from despotism and showed the way to all, including the British.[8]

The Chartists, animated by a new energy, organised meetings and even riots in March and April in the cities in which the movement was strongest: Bradford, York, London, Manchester, Oldham, and Liverpool.[9] Like in continental Europe, rioters were galvanised by the 'Marseillaise' and the 'Chant des Girondins', whose new translations circulated.[10] Riots reached their climax with the organisation of a demonstration in London on April 10th. Although the protest gathered no less than 100,000 demonstrators, it was considered a failure by both the Chartists and their opponents.[11] This fiasco was a turning point and, despite a few riots during the summer, it was then clear that social protests would not be followed beyond foreign and Chartist circles.

There is a general agreement amongst historians on the role that Irish played with regards to the British reaction to the Springtime of the Peoples.[12] Both in Ireland and in the communities living in Great Britain, the Irish responded enthusiastically to the February

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[7] Thomas Frost, *Forty Years' Recollections: Literary and Political* (London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, 1880), 128–129.
[8] Bensimon, *Les Britanniques face à la révolution française de 1848*, 99.
[9] Bensimon, 102–103.
[10] Bensimon, 106.
[11] Bensimon, 109–116.
[12] Bensimon, 134–140; Leslie Mitchell, 'Britain's Reaction to the Revolutions', 94.

Revolution and the events that followed. As Fabrice Bensimon argues, 'for the British, the *other* par excellence is the Irish',[13] and the British did not miss the parallels that the Young Ireland movement was drawing between the French events and their own situation.[14] The relationship between the French and the Irish contributed to isolating the British from the revolutionary spring.

Peter Burke remarks that 'the word "stereotype" (originally a plate from which an image could be printed), like the word cliché (originally the French term for the same plate), is a vivid reminder of the link between visual and mental images.'[15] Illustrations in British newspapers blatantly revealed the prejudices hold against both the Irish and the French. The Irish community, largely belonging to the working class, was deemed as passionate, violent, and inclined to inebriation. Dehumanised representations of the Irish as apes (figure 2) were frequent over the period,[16] not so differently from representations of Black people in other periods.



Figure 2 – Caricature of an Irish man as a monkey[17]

[13] Bensimon, *Les Britanniques face à la révolution française de 1848*, 345, my translation.
[14] Bensimon, 134–140.
[15] Peter Burke, *Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence* (London: Reaktion, 2001), 125.
[16] Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), 195; Burke, *Eyewitnessing*, 135.
[17] *Punch*, April 1st 1848, presented in Agulhon and Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 195.

Although such dehumanisation of the French was not as frequent, the representations of revolutionaries were hardly complimentary.[18] Following typical clichés – which are close to the perspective that I coined as political elitism –, French rioters were represented as passionate and inebriated (figure 3).



Figure 3 – Scenes in the Courtyard of the Tuileries[19]

Revolutionary fraternity was also bitterly mocked by the *Bristol Mirror and General Advertiser*:

> We hope our workmen will take good notice of the practical character of French republican principles. *Fraternity* with our dear English neighbours is their profession, but they have turned off, at an hour's notice, all the British workmen,

[18] The descriptions of the French were however more nuanced in 1848 than in 1789, see Jackson, 'Receiving Revolution', 45.
[19] *The Illustrated London News*, March 4th 1848, presented in Maurice Agulhon and Ségolène Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 1 Une république nouvelle (Paris: Assemblée nationale, 1998), 88.

> and their wives and children, that have been employed on the French railways and other undertakings! Yet these are the men with whom the Chartists are so eager to shake hands that they crossed to France to 'fraternize' with them.[20]

Representations of Irishmen and Frenchmen were not only negative, they were also intertwined and mirrored, as this passage from *The Economist* published on April 29th eloquently summarises:

> Thank God, we are Saxons! … Flanked by the savage Celt on one side, and the flighty Gaul on the other – the one a slave of the passions, the other a victim to the theories of the hour – we feel deeply grateful from our inmost hearts that we belong to [the British race] … While there is observable and marked similarity, there is, also traceable, a definable distinction in the general character and the present proceedings of the Irishman and the Frenchman … The Frenchman is a civilised Celt. The Irishman is a barbaric Gaul. Both are deplorably excitable and when aroused furiously wild … But the Frenchman requires idea, pungency, and nerve, in the eloquence to which he succumbs: the Irishman is satisfied by mere violence and rant.[21]

The inversion of the terms Celt and Gaul underlines the similarity between the two peoples as well as it opposes them to typical representations of the British as phlegmatic Saxons.

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[20] *Bristol Mirror and General Advertiser*, March 11th 1848, 5, quoted in Jackson, 'Receiving Revolution', 64.
[21] *The Economist*, vol. VI, n°244, April 19th 1848, 477, quoted in Bensimon, *Les Britanniques face à la révolution française de 1848*, 345.

Fraternity reached the United Kingdom but only embraced the Irish community. British representations framed the Irish and the French as the others *par excellence*. Identification with foreign revolutionaries was thus unlikely, preventing circulations of indignation from occurring. Ironically, while fraternity was making the French and the Irish feel closer to each other, it conversely isolated the British from the revolutionary spring.

Israel

The fact that Israel did not join the Arab Spring was little surprising. Israel was indeed far more democratic than the authoritarian regimes overthrown or threatened in the Arab world. Furthermore, the country was and still is at the heart of the geopolitical tensions so that any regional instability was potentially a threat. The attention given to the Palestinian question during the Arab Spring was also incomparably higher than to Ireland in 1848. For all these reasons, this negative case is not puzzling. However, it gives a second insight into the affective dynamics brought out by the British situation.

If Israeli newspapers did not pay much attention to the Tunisian Revolution that happened relatively far away in a country judged minor for the geopolitics of the region, the fall of Mubarak was a shock. The coverage, Yusri Hazran remarks, was 'mournful and perturbed'.[22] The diplomatic relationship between Israel and Mubarak had indeed been relatively stable, and the involvement of the Muslim Brotherhood, a parent organisation of the Hamas, raised concerns. Public opinion polls reflect this pessimism: 44% of Israelis believed that Israel's status had deteriorated and been damaged due to the fall of the Arab

[22] Yusri Hazran, 'An Israeli Perspective on the Popular Uprisings in the Arab Middle East', in *The World Community and the Arab Spring*, by Cenap Çakmak and Ali Onur Özçelik (New York: Springer, 2019), 305.

regimes in May 2011, and 68% reported that Israel's security was threatened by the ongoing uprisings in November of the same year.[23]

Despite this general scepticism, some welcomed the Arab Spring positively. A few Israeli intellectuals and artists expressed 'a sense of solidarity with the Tunisians, Libyans and Egyptians fighting in the streets and risking their lives for opportunities and bread'.[24] The Arab Spring also caused social unrest under the form of 'tent protests', starting in Tel Aviv in July 2011 and spreading from there to other major cities. Although these protests did not ask for a change of regime like their foreign equivalents, and limited their demands to more social justice, they mobilised over 400,000 people, a considerable number for an overall population of 7,7 million.[25]

The movement started from complaints about the cost of living, especially due to housing, before moving from urban centres to their peripheries and widening demands into a largely encompassing claim for social justice. Like the Arab Spring protests, the movement was popular and did not follow any political party or professional politicians.[26] This similarity was not coincidental, since, according to some of the leaders of the movement, it was indeed the Arab Spring upheavals that inspired this movement,[27] hence its slogan: 'the people want social justice'.[28] Even in Israel one could witness the circulations of indignation triggered by the Arab Spring.

Despite the proximity between these protests and leftist groups and even though it included the economic concerns of Israel's Arab minority, the movement paid little attention

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[23] Hazran, 308.
[24] Naomi Ragen, 'Can the Arab Spring Change Israel's Climate?', *Moment* 36, no. 4 (2011): 16.
[25] Alan Craig, 'The Israel Tent Protests', in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization*, by Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2014), 538.
[26] Craig, 539.
[27] Haim Bresheeth, 'The Arab Spring: A View from Israel', *Middle East Journal Of Culture And Communication* 5, no. 1 (2012): 48.
[28] Craig, 'The Israel Tent Protests', 539.

to the Palestinians of the occupied territories.[29] As a result, as Bresheeth argues, 'the lack of fraternity toward the Tahrir Square victory over tyranny, or of a call during the recent "tent protest" to end the occupation of Palestine, is the clearest evidence that such emotional and intellectual *salto mortale* by Israeli "liberals" is sheer nonsense'.[30]

Similar affective dynamics happened in the United Kingdom and Israel: while foreign revolutionaries fraternised with martyr peoples, including the Irish and the Palestinians, it was harder for their colonisers to identify with these revolutionary movements.

2. A fading fraternity

A fading national fraternity

For Spinoza, affects change overtime, making human interactions inconstant.[31] Fraternity is no exception and may lose its intensity over time. The fraternal communion that held diverse groups together against the regime at the domestic level, or against the regimes at the international, vanished, and the fluid identification made way to identities. Divisions and sometimes even bloody conflicts arose between those who called each other brothers not so long ago.

This phenomenon appeared at both domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, ideological, religious, social, and gender identities eventually got the upper hand over fraternal communion. The split between liberals and Catholics occurred everywhere in Europe. In the German states, 'Pius Associations', named after the pope, had appeared and multiplied since March 1848 so that in October there were four hundred societies with one hundred thousand members to oppose liberal forces.[32] In December, the

[29] Craig, 540.
[30] Bresheeth, 'The Arab Spring', 56.
[31] *Ethics* IV, prop. 32-34.
[32] Mike Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 268.

pope excommunicated all the people who voted for the election of the Roman constituent assembly, giving up the ambiguous position he had maintained so far in order to resolutely support conservative forces.[33] The peasantry who enthusiastically joined the insurrection against Austrian forces in Lombardy were by July largely opposed to a war that, they thought, only benefited to the landlords and some were even heard cheering 'Vive Radetzky!'.[34]

Despite the prominent role they played in revolutionary springs, women were then marginalised again. In countries in which the revolution was successful, women did not secure as many benefits as men. In France, universal suffrage excluded women despite the mobilisation of female political clubs. In Tunisia, the outcomes were contrasted: although women represented 24% of the Constituent Assembly seats, these figures 'eclipsed the reality of a "state of feminism" that neglected real women, poor women and women outside the power circle of Tunis and the RCD'.[35] Furthermore, 'there were only three female appointments at the ministerial level in the transitional governments and two were quick to resign.'[36]

Syria, in which the revolution turned into civil war, was perhaps the most striking example of this atomisation of revolutionary fraternity. In comparison with their neighbours, Syrian demonstrators were particularly prone to religious Sunni slogans. Political slogans for freedom were often combined with chanting of 'God is great' and 'there is no god but God'. At first, this religious dimension was inclusive enough for Alawis and Christian minorities, but 'it gradually became more and more invested with clear Sunni meanings, deepening the tension between inclusive and sectarian understandings of religious nationalism'.[37] In this

[33] Rapport, 350.
[34] Rapport, 278.
[35] Andrea Khalil, 'Tunisia's Women: Partners in Revolution', *The Journal of North African Studies* 19, no. 2 (2014): 193.
[36] Khalil, 193.
[37] Paulo Gabriel Hilu Pinto, 'Syria', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 222.

context, the chanting of anti-Iranian and anti-Hezbollah slogans during the protests in Der'a, which supposedly targeted Bashar al-Assad's international allies, was perceived as anti-Shia Sunni sectarianism.[38] In his study on the revolutionary process in Syria through music, Joel Parker notices that, in the beginning of the period, when fraternity was exalted, music reflected the diversity of the revolutionaries themselves.[39] However, with the growing militarisation of the conflict, new and classical jihadi anthems appeared to inspire the fighters.[40] The divisions were not only religious and ethnic, but also between urban populations and the countryside. The population of Aleppo, because of a 'mixture of class prejudice and urban snobbery'[41] looked down at the rebellious rural crowds. In April 2010, a banner displayed at a demonstration in Baniyas asked 'Where are you, Aleppo?'. In October, this impatience turned into anger as other banners claimed 'Shame on the people of Aleppo' and 'Aleppo the grey, Aleppo the coward' while asking for a boycott of goods from the city.[42] All these divisions led to an atomisation of a Syrian society caught in local, national, and transnational conflicts.

A fading transnational fraternity

Transnational fraternity also crumbled. Anecdotally, Egyptian supporters attacked the Tunisian players of Club Africain in Cairo on April 2nd 2011, forcing the Egyptian Prime Minister to publicly apologise to Tunisians.[43] International divisions were however much deeper in 1848-1849 and the Springtime of the Peoples ended in bloody conflicts. Both a

[38] Hilu Pinto, 222.
[39] Joel D. Parker, 'Song and Rebellion in the Syrian Uprising', *Middle Eastern Studies* 54, no. 6 (2018): 1018.
[40] Parker, 1026.
[41] Hilu Pinto, 'Syria', 230.
[42] Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad, *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East* (University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 230.
[43] Jean-Pierre Filiu, *The Arab Revolution: Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 140.

civil and an international war, the conflict between the Kingdom of Hungary and Vienna turned to be particularly bloody. As Vienna was occupied by revolutionaries and the Magyars were progressing to support them, the Emperor led a particularly brutal attack against the city. While moderate members of the Austrian parliament, such as Baron Pillersdorf, tried to appease the marshal Windischgrätz in charge of the assault, the latter refused to let the revolutionaries surrender.[44] The Magyars finally arrived and attacked the Austrian troops but were defeated by the Habsburg artillery.[45] Once his capital was taken back, the Emperor sent his troops to Hungary, supported by other national minorities such as the Croatians. They crushed the Magyars on their way, leading to an estimated 40,000 deaths.[46] Arguably, transnational fraternity did not so much disappear than it got brutally crushed by counter-revolutionary forces.

A more ambiguous case is the French expedition to Rome in July 1849. The pope having left the city, the liberals voted a new Roman constituent assembly on December 26th 1848. By fear of excommunication, moderate liberals largely abstained so that the assembly meeting in February 1849 was radical. Rome was however threatened by Italian states, such as the Monarchy of Piedmont and the Kingdom of Naples, as well as by European conservative forces, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire which had defeated the Milanese troops in March 1849. Rome's survival was dependent on an alliance with other Italian liberal forces, like the Tuscan republics, and European liberal powers. The French republic naturally appeared as a potential ally. While Catholic regimes, namely Naples, Spain, and Austria, were planning the invasion of Rome to restore the pope, France's position was uncertain. Eventually, newly elected President Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte decided to please the conservative opinion and to invade Rome. Beyond the consolidation of Catholic support,

[44] Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 285.
[45] Rapport, 287.
[46] Rapport, 309.

national pride was also at stake. Adolphe Thiers, member of the French constituent assembly, affirmed that 'to know that the Austrian flag was flying on the Castle of Saint Angelo is a humiliation under which no Frenchmen could bear to exist',[47] a position with which the moderate Alexis de Tocqueville also agreed.[48] The decision to invade Rome was however not unanimous. Some Frenchmen, accusing this expedition to be 'fratricidal', spontaneously volunteered and defended Rome against the French forces.[49]

Despite the Romans' ardour, the French troops, twice more numerous, eventually took the city in June 1849. As a last gesture of resistance, while the French were taking the buildings around the parliament, the Roman deputies ratified the constitution of the Roman republic which stated: 'the Republic declares all nations as sisters: it respects every nationality; it supports the Italian'.[50] Ironically, this episode showed the opposite: the brotherhood of the peoples, celebrated during the revolutionary spring, had largely disappeared in favour of the classical logic of states. Despite the revolutionary springs, international systems proved their stability, at least in the decade that followed both revolutionary springs.[51]

Fraternity and fratricide

National and transnational fraternities, which were at the heart of both revolutionary springs, were short lasting. When fraternity was not simply crushed by counter-revolutionary forces, it disappeared. Beyond the emergences of new and old conflicts, there is the more discreet vanishing of popular expressions and experiences of fraternity. Circulations of indignation

47 Rapport, 358.
48 Rapport, 358.
49 See Anne-Claire Ignace, 'French Volunteers in Italy, 1848–49: A Collective Incarnation of the Fraternity of the Peoples and of the Tradition of French Military Engagement in Italy and Europe', *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 14, no. 4 (2009): 450.
50 Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 360.
51 On that point see Robert J. W. Evans, 'Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Coming of the Revolutions', in *The Revolutions in Europe 1848–1849: From Reform to Reaction*, by Robert J. W. Evans and Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 23.

had turned the multitudes against states. Later in time, defeated or victorious, the multitude's affects were once again channelled by the state. Spring ended.

This disappearing of fraternity may cast doubt upon the notion itself. If fraternity had vanished, it might be because it was never there to start with. Some scholars have indeed analysed the revolutionary fronts as coalitions based on common interests that disappeared once regimes fell.[52] After what Crane Brinton called 'the honeymoon' of the revolution,[53] conflicts would thus arise between revolutionaries. Acknowledging the role of interests in revolutions, and the internal conflicts that they may ignite, does not contradict, however, the importance of affects in the revolutionary process.

Paradoxically, fraternity was still expressed during and after bloody conflicts, as the 1848 June riots in Paris illustrate.[54] A few months after the February Revolution, the question of national workshops, established after the revolution to support the unemployed, had divided moderate and radical liberals. In reaction to Falloux's decision to put an end to workshops on June 21st, the Parisian proletariat took to the streets. From the 23rd to the 26th, rioters faced on the barricades the troops led by Cavaignac. Repression was particularly brutal.[55] As Maurice Agulhon summarises, the June riots were 'socially the men from the people against the bourgeois … geographically, Eastern Paris against Western Paris; materially and militarily, the barricade against the cannon'.[56] The Parisian proletariat was also isolated from the rural world, which massively supported Cavaignac. The National Guard units from fifty-three departments enthusiastically decided to join the battle to crush the

[52] See for instance Habib Ayeb, 'Social and Political Geography of the Tunisian Revolution: The Alfa Grass Revolution', *Review of African Political Economy* 38, no. 129 (2011): 477.
[53] Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1952), 90.
[54] For a detailed study on the June Revolution, especially with regards to the identity of the insurgents, see Charles Tilly and Lynn Lees, 'Le peuple de Juin 1848', *Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales* 29, no. 5 (1974): 1061–1091.
[55] *En passant*, this violence of the so-called moderate Republicans severely qualifies Brinton's model following which the periods of revolutionary terror are imposed by the radicals on the moderate.
[56] Maurice Agulhon, *Les Quarante-Huitards* (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2013), 167, my translation.

insurgents.[57] During the June days, 4,000 insurgents were killed and 4,000 others deported to Algeria.

Parisian newspapers also largely supported Cavaignac. *Le Constitutionnel*, a moderate liberal Parisian newspapers, described the insurgents in these terms:

> This time, they had a red flag, and the rioters fought shouting 'Vive the Social Republic!'. As a comment on this rallying cry, they wrote on flags: looting and rape … Amongst the insurgents killed on the barricades or captured, we find, as we expected, the leprosy: convicts and ex-convicts.
>
> Forced to leave the barricade, rebels committed an atrocious and barbarian act. Instead of letting their prisoners go, they abjectly murdered them by cutting their heads off … A cross-dressing man wearing a sharpened sabre was the executioner … You could see men forcing ten or twelve years old kids to drink before sending them to barricades with riffles …
>
> They cut heads off like Hurons and Iroquois and made some hideous trophies out of them. They insulted the corpses. Certainly, they have not eaten them yet; but be patient, this will eventually happen if they keep listening [to socialists]![58]

The 19th century Parisian bourgeoisie projected onto the insurgents the shadows of the social outcasts of the time. Beyond usual clichés about drunk and violent rioters, insurgents were described as savages challenging gender norms, perverting children, and emulating foreign barbarity; in sum, threatening society itself. The dehumanisation of rioters may have

[57] Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 276.
[58] Agulhon, *Les Quarante-Huitards*, 168, my translation.

contributed to undermine the identification of the rest of the population with them while they were brutally repressed.[59]

The savagery of this fratricidal repression shocked, even the moderates who did not support the rioters' cause.[60] In the *Revue des deux mondes*, a liberal newspaper, Victor de Mars confesses: 'We are writing weighed down by sadness, not disheartened, not sorry, but as if our mind had been stroked by an awful dream, and our hearts are mourning, because this dream is real'.[61] The passage reveals a conflict between two affects, what Spinoza coins as the 'wavering of the mind':[62] the June days were experienced as a fratricidal conflict. A fratricide, yet bloody, only occurs between brothers. Despite the conflict of class-interests and the dehumanisation that newspapers framed, something remained of yesterday's fraternal feelings.

Agulhon has showed how literary works written after the events are marked by this wavering of the mind. In Gustave Flaubert's *L'Éducation sentimentale*, Dussardier, a fervent Republican who fought the rioters, expresses the same doubt:

> On Saturday, on the top of a barricade in the rue Lafayette, a kid wrapped in a tricoloured flag screamed at the National Guards: 'Are you going to shoot your brothers?'. As they advanced, Dussardier threw down his gun, pushed away the others, leaped over the barricade, and kicked the insurgent down while pulling his flag off.
>
> …

[59] On the impact of dehumanisation on empathy, see Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, 'Rehumanizing the Other: Empathy and Reconciliation', *Human Rights Quarterly* 26, no. 3 (2004): 561–583.
[60] Emmanuel Fureix, 'Mots de guerre civile. Juin 1848 à l'épreuve de la représentation', *Revue d'Histoire du XIXe siècle - 1848* 15, no. 2 (1997): 22.
[61] Fureix, 22, my translation.
[62] *Ethics* III, prop. 17, schol.

> [Two weeks later] he even confessed to Frédéric how confused his conscience was … They [the rioters] were wrong, of course – not quite, however; and the good lad was tormented by the thought that he might have fought against justice.[63]

Free indirect speech, quite common in Flaubert's works, discloses the movements of the wavering of the mind that affects Dussardier.

Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables* gives voice to a similar ambiguity:

> It sometime happens that … that great and despairing body, the rabble, protests against, and that the populace wages battle against, the people.
>
> Beggars attack the common right; the ochlocracy rises against demos.
>
> These are melancholy days; for there is always a certain amount of night even in this madness, there is suicide in this duel, and those words which are intended to be insults – beggars, canaille, ochlocracy, populace – exhibit, alas! rather the fault of those who reign than the fault of those who suffer, rather the fault of the privileged than the fault of the disinherited …
>
> June, 1848, let us hasten to say, was an exceptional fact, and almost impossible of classification, in the philosophy of history … But what was June, 1848, at bottom? A revolt of the people against itself.[64]

In this passage, Hugo progressively shifts from describing the rioters as the rabble

[63] Gustave Flaubert, *Oeuvres*, vol. 2 (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1952), 367, my translation. Partly quoted in Agulhon, *Les Quarante-Huitards*, 174. On the role of Dussardier in the June riots, see Tony Williams, 'Dussardier sur les barricades : naissance d'un "héros de juin"', *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France* Vol. 101, no. 1 (2001): 81–104.

[64] Victor Hugo, *Les Misérables* (Minneapolis: Lerner Publishing Group, 2015), 1064–1065.

attacking the people, a distinction that reminds the one Hobbes made between the multitude and the people, to affirming that the June days was a collective suicide.

The same wavering of the mind was expressed in popular songs. Loynel hoped that the 'holy union of the noble fraternity' could be renewed through the common mourning once again:[65]

Pourquoi ces pleurs dans tous les yeux…	Why these tears in every eye?
Frères, c'est un convoi qui passe.	Brothers, a convoy is passing.
Saluons ces nobles débris,	Let's greet these noble remains,
Vainqueurs ou vaincus, votre frère	Victors or defeated, your brother,
Doit être aujourd'hui l'espérance.	Today, must be hope.[66]

The song addresses to insurgents and counter-revolutionaries, both referred as brothers, a message of hope. Loynel was not the only one to advocate for an appeased and renewed fraternity. In his song 'Les journées de juin' ('June Days'), Dupont lamented French loss:

La France est pâle comme un lis,	France is pale like a lily
Le front ceint de grises verveines	A crown of grey verbena around her forehead
Dans le massacre de ses fils,	In the massacre of her sons,
Son sang a coulé de ses veines, …	Her blood has flown out of her veins, …
Offrons à Dieu le sang des morts	Let's offer to God the blood of the dead
De cette terrible hécatombe	From this awful slaughter
Et que la haine et les discords	And hatred and dissension

[65] Marcel David, *Le printemps de la fraternité. Genèse et vicissitudes, 1830-1851* (Paris: Aubier, 1992), 301, my translation.
[66] David, 301, my translation.

Soient scellés dans leur tombe	Shall be sealed in their graves.[67]

Dupont presents France as a mourning mother. Insurgents and the agents of repression are once again hold together by the familial metaphor and never presented as perpetrators of each other's murders. Elsewhere in the song, Dupont described the battle: 'Guns and the brutal canon / Abundantly vomited on the city / A furnace of metal / Ignited by Civil War'.[68] Strictly speaking, the conflict was therefore not fratricidal as it did not oppose brothers but, metonymically, impersonal weapons. The martyrs are turned into scapegoats and the massacre into a sacrifice of the brothers' shared and shed blood to God in order to achieve social peace and renew fraternal communion. Another singer, Festeau, also uses a metonymy to avoid the personification of the fratricide: 'Fire, iron, while riddling the walls / Break the fraternal network in our hearts'.[69] To renew fraternity, the fratricide is pudically kept quiet.

Other singers, however, took a stand and openly defended the position of the insurgents. Charles Gille predicted that the June massacre would give birth to another revolution:

Dans les cachots où nos frères languissent	In the gaols where our brothers languish
Le « saint espoir » vient réchauffer leurs cœurs	The 'holy hope' warms their hearts
Ils ont laissé bien des fils qui grandissent	They left many sons who are growing up
Et les martyrs engendrent des vengeurs.	And martyrs generate avengers.[70]

Although the two affective patterns that trigger revolutionary indignation are evoked, this revolution is delayed: it is not for brothers to avenge their martyred brothers, but for the

[67] Pierre Dupont, *Chants et chansons*, vol. 1 (Paris: Lécrivain et Toubon, Libraires, 1851), np, my translation.
[68] Dupont, *Chants et chansons*, np, my translation.
[69] David, *Le printemps de la fraternité*, 300, my translation.
[70] David, 302, my translation.

latter's sons.

The socialist singer Gustave Leroy bitterly celebrated the rioters by reminding that, after their victory in February, they 'Forgave their brothers [the troops] / Who followed their oath and their duties. / That's because they thought about their mothers.'[71] Their fraternal magnanimity contrasted with the brutality of the June victors who shot the insurgents down. Leroy was thus suspicious towards the renewal of the national fraternity:

Leur grand mot de fraternité	Their great word 'Fraternity'
Cache des lois agraires	Hides agrarian laws
Comme ils ont la vanité	As they are conceited enough
De nous chérir en frères	To cherish us like brothers
Jamais bourgeois n'aimera	The bourgeois will never love
Qui le nourrira.	The ones who feed him.[72]

After the fraternal communion experienced and expressed in February, June days were sobering up. However, fraternity did not disappear altogether. While some were swearing never to fraternise with the bourgeois again, others advocated for a renewal of national fraternity, or were just confused about the events. Even though there is a disagreement on what to do with fraternity – should it be accused of being an illusion or renewed? –, there is an implicit accord about the fact that the February fraternal communion was intensely experienced indeed. In that sense, the June days were not revealing the vacuity of this past fraternity, it rather showed that, while fraternity was slowly losing its intensity, the fraternal communion could turn into a fratricidal bloodshed.

[71] David, 302–303, my translation.
[72] David, 303, my translation.

II. The limits of indignation

1. An overwhelming fear

An overwhelming repressive fear

Mass uprisings occur when revolutionary indignation overcomes repressive fear. These are not chronologically ordered – first fear and then indignation – but interplay over time. Ultimately, fear paves the way for the success of counter-revolutionary strategies, even after a long revolutionary period.

It follows that indignation may spread without igniting social unrest because of a high level of fear. Analysing fear accounts for some of the negative cases. This affective dynamic may contribute to explain the Russian exception in 1848. Although Russia was poorer, more authoritarian, and less politically organised than most European countries, the Springtime of the Peoples did 'not directly affect[t]'[73] the Russian Empire. This situation may be explained by the violent repression that the Tsar imposed on his subjects. The Third Section, the notoriously brutal Russian secret police, was particularly active during the period. Despite Tsar Nicholas I's attempt at establishing a *cordon sanitaire* by forbidding all Russians to leave the empire and all foreigners to come in, news from the revolution were nevertheless circulating. The regime consequently reinforced its censorship in April 1848 and several intellectuals and political leaders, amongst whom Fyodor Dostoyevsky, were arrested.[74] In the absence of further indication, it is difficult to know whether the Russian population was affected by circulations of indignation, as the tsarist repression may have kept the population still. Beyond the violence of repression, its temporality may also have played a role: unlike

[73] The same expression is used to describe the Russian situation in 1848 by Körner and Rapport, see Axel Körner, 'The European Dimension in the Ideas of 1848 and the Nationalization of Its Memories', in *1848—A European Revolution?* by Axel Körner (New York: Springer, 2000), 11; Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, XI.
[74] Mike Rapport, *1848, Year of Revolution*, 100–104.

other European conservative powers, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire which first compromised with the revolutionaries, the Russian repression immediately crushed the revolutionary movement.

A similar situation occurred in Saudi Arabia in 2010-2011. The kingdom appeared as the most powerful and determined conservative force in the region. It officially disapproved the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, and eventually came to action when the revolutionary spring reached its vassal state, the small kingdom of Bahrain.[75] Saudi Arabia proved its fierce resolution to defeat the revolution by sending a military expedition to Manama, Bahrain's capital, in order to scatter the demonstrators.[76] This sign was addressed to revolutionaries abroad, especially in Bahrain, but also to its own population. Demonstrations were not frequent in Saudi Arabia, and yet, as Toby C. Jones remarks, the country 'did possess tremendous coercive power. Riyadh had spent billions of dollars on the best Western weapons and military training that oil revenues could buy'.[77] When, following the examples of neighbouring revolutionaries, the Saudis organised a 'Day of Rage', repression was immediately very high, especially on the Shiites living in the Eastern provinces.[78] Conjointly, King Abdullah promised $130 billion to support the poor through unemployment aid, housing support, loan guarantees, and so on.[79] Through this carrot and stick approach, the kingdom prevented mass uprisings from happening in the country.

[75] Toby C. Jones, 'Saudi Arabia', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 89.
[76] Jones, 89.
[77] Jones, 92.
[78] Jones, 93.
[79] Jones, 93.

Fear as an affective disposition

These two cases, Russia and Saudi Arabia, display the most blatant examples of overwhelming levels of repressive fear. These cases do not, however, exhaust the diversity of situations in which fear prevented upheavals.[80] Although fear may be caused by repression, it may also be profoundly anchored in a population before the revolutionary spring itself. Algerians paid a careful attention to the revolution in Tunisia, as they had lived under Abdelaziz Bouteflika's authoritarian regime since 1999. Although labour unions, human rights, feminist, and student associations, organised a demonstration in February 2011, under the umbrella of the National Coordination for Change and Democracy,[81] they did not manage to spark a popular movement comparable to the spontaneous uprisings in other MENA countries.

Scholars have explained the Algerians' reluctance to join the Arab Spring as a consequence of the civil war trauma.[82] The memory of the Algerian civil war (1991-2002), that claimed between 150,000 and 200,000 lives was indeed still vivid.[83] 1848 Spain, which had been plagued by several civil wars, including the First Carlist War from 1833 to 1840s, may have been in a similar position. Affects mark and shape bodies – and thus, minds –, so that individuals or communities may have specific affective dispositions,[84] what Spinoza

[80] It would be consistent with the theory as well as with common sense that the repression used in one country could trigger fear in other countries as well – as long as they imagine that the regime abroad and theirs share some similarities, creating an affective transfer – so that foreign nations are less likely to revolt. However, there is no evidence of this transnational circulations of fear in our data – which certainly does not mean it did not occur, nor, if it did not, that it could not occur in other revolutionary contexts –. I thank Jessica Gliserman for her remark on this point.

[81] Susan Slyomovics, 'Algeria', in *Dispatches from the Arab Spring: Understanding the New Middle East*, by Paul Amar and Vijay Prashad (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), 123.

[82] Wendy Pearlman, 'Emotions and the Microfoundations of the Arab Uprisings', *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 2 (2013): 387–409; Shamil Jeppie, 'Revolutions in North Africa: A View from the South of the Continent', in *Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring* by Larbi Sadiki (London: Routledge, 2014), 551.

[83] Slyomovics, 'Algeria', 123.

[84] On affective disposition, see Lucile Eznack, 'Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies' Relationships', *Security Studies* 20, no. 2 (2011): 238–265; Lucile Eznack, 'The Mood Was Grave: Affective Dispositions and States' Anger-Related Behaviour', *Contemporary Security*

termed 'complexion' (*ingenium*). A collective affective disposition makes a community particularly sensitive to certain affectations: the traumatic experience of the civil war may have increased the level of fear at the detriment of circulations of indignation.

2. An absence of affective transfer

US indignation

To fuel social unrest across borders, transnational circulations of indignation require an affective transfer between regimes. Even intense circulations of indignation may not spread the revolutionary spring if regimes are not imagined to share similarities. The lack of affective transfer explains the situation of the United States in 1848. The news of the revolution in Paris were received with utter thrill in New York and Washington as the *Pennsylvania Inquirer* remarked: 'I often saw the excitement of New Yorkers, but never have they been as frenetic and enthusiastic as yesterday … the city looked like a boiling kettle.'[85] Like in Europe, 'The Marseillaise' and the 'Chant des Girondins', whose lyrics were published by the *New York Herald*, were enthusiastically sung in the streets.[86] There too, Phrygian caps as well as Hungarian fur hats and boots appeared to symbolically support the revolutions.[87] Towns were even named after Kossuth in Indiana, Mississippi, and Ohio.[88]

Funeral ceremonies were organised for the revolutionary martyrs for several days and money sent to the widows and orphans.[89] The *North American and United States Gazette*

Policy 34, no. 3 (2013): 1–29; Lucile Eznack, 'Let's Stay Friends! Relational Repair in Friendly Interstate Relations', *The Polish Quarterly of International Affairs* 22, no. 4 (2013): 55–76; Todd Hall and Andrew G. Ross, 'Affective Politics after 9/11', *International Organization*, no. 69 (2015): 855.

[85] Guillaume de Bertier de Sauvigny, *La Révolution parisienne de 1848 vue par les Américains* (Paris: Service des Travaux historiques de la Ville de Paris, 1984), 19, my translation.

[86] de Sauvigny, 31–32.

[87] Tim Roberts and Daniel W. Howe, 'The United States and the Revolutions of 1848', in *The Revolutions in Europe, 1848-1849: From Reform to Reaction* by Hartmut Pogge von Strandmann and Robert Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 166.

[88] Roberts and Howe, 166.

[89] de Sauvigny, *La Révolution parisienne de 1848 vue par les Américains*, 110.

described how 'people came to give a solemn homage to the brothers who fought for their countries, their independence, and their freedom'.[90] The ceremonies were followed by popular marches displaying the US, French, Italian, Polish, and Swiss flags. Later, mass assemblies in Pennsylvania and New York expressed their sympathy to German revolutionaries. An 'Address of German Brothers in the free United States of America to the German People', signed in April 1848 by four hundred and ninety four persons, was sent to Bremen with a donation of three thousand five hundred dollars and the German and US flags.[91]

An absence of social protest

Circulations of indignation that fuelled the revolutionary spring in Europe were experienced and expressed in similar ways as in Europe. And yet, demonstrations and marches did not threat the US regime nor cause any social unrest. Due to its Republican system, the US regime was imagined radically different from the European monarchies so that 'most Americans did not believe that their own country needed the kind of revolution Continental Europe was having, about which they read in their newspapers.'[92] On the contrary, France, Americans thought, was following the American path and would then be its *avant-garde* in Europe[93] – the establishment of the Second Empire would soon deceive this hope –. In Washington, the march in support of the revolution symbolically passed in front of the President and the Vice-President apartments.[94] Since there was no affective transfer, the intense indignation experienced by US citizens was entirely directed to European monarchies. However, due to the absence of affective transfer between regimes, this multitude was not revolutionary.

[90] *North American and United States Gazette*, April 5th 1848, quoted in de Sauvigny, 45, my translation.
[91] Veit Valentin, *1848: Chapters of German History* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1940), 441.
[92] Roberts and Howe, 'The United States and the Revolutions of 1848', 157.
[93] de Sauvigny, *La Révolution parisienne de 1848 vue par les Américains*, 47.
[94] de Sauvigny, 88.

No country displayed such a sharp contrast between an expression of intense indignation and an absence of social protest during the Arab Spring. In France, former coloniser of Tunisia and home to a large community of Tunisian immigrants, specific attention was paid to the Jasmine Revolution.[95] Two days after Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation, France 24 was the first Western media to report on the event.[96] In January, several demonstrations were organised in France 'to show solidarity to our Tunisian brothers'[97] in Paris, but also in Toulouse,[98] Lyon,[99] Marseille, Nice,[100] et caetera. On February 8th, a Parisian square was named after the young Tunisian vendor. Like in the US, indignation towards Ben Ali's regime did not result in more social unrest in France.

3. Counter-revolutionary indignation

Revolutionary martyrdom ignites indignation. Violence is rarely one-sided in revolutions. Revolutionaries may also commit brutal acts and counter-revolutionaries have their own martyrs.[101] As aforementioned, Spinoza does not conceive of indignation as being uniquely a revolutionary affect. Indignation also strengthens the state, its institutions, and its order.

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[95] On the reception of the Tunisian Revolution in France, see Guillaume Mazeau, 'La ronde des révolutions', *La Vie des idées* 16 (2013).

[96] Merlyna Lim, 'Framing Bouazizi: "White Lies", Hybrid Network, and Collective/Connective Action in the 2010–11 Tunisian Uprising', *Journalism* 14, no. 7 (2013): 930.

[97] 'Manifestation de soutien aux Tunisiens à Paris : "Il fallait que la rage sorte"', *Le Monde.fr*, 7 January 2011, https://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2011/01/07/manifestation-de-soutien-aux-tunisiens-a-paris_1462109_3224.html, last accessed 7th September 2020, my translation.

[98] 'Manifestation de soutien au peuple tunisien à Toulouse', *Toulouse7.com l Actualités Toulouse Informations* (blog), 15 January 2011, https://www.toulouse7.com/2011/01/15/manifestation-de-soutien-au-peuple-tunisien-a-toulouse/, last accessed 7th September 2020.

[99] 'À Lyon, manifestation de soutien aux luttes des peuples Tunisien et Algérien', https://rebellyon.info/A-Lyon-manifestation-de-soutien, last accessed 7th September 2020.

[100] 'En France, des milliers de manifestants célèbrent la chute du dictateur', *Le Monde.fr*, 15 January 2011, https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2011/01/15/en-france-des-milliers-de-manifestants-celebrent-la-chute-du-dictateur_1466204_3212.html, last accessed 7th September 2020.

[101] These martyrs are most often referred to as 'revolutionary martyrs', see for instance Ivan Gobry, *Dictionnaire des martyrs de la Révolution* (Paris: Dualpha, 2002). For reasons of clarity, I call them 'counter-revolutionary martyrs' in the same way as I refer to 'counter-revolutionary indignation'.

Revolutionary springs, as Lucy Riall showed in the Italian context,[102] brought into opposition diverse pantheons of martyrs. Counter-revolutionary martyrs also sparked circulations of indignation towards revolutionaries and in favour of the regimes. Counter-revolutionary indignation may have weakened or counter-balanced waves of revolutionary indignation at the national and international levels.

Counter-revolutionary indignation seems to have been uncommon during the Arab Spring, perhaps because demonstrations were most often peaceful.[103] Even the brutal murder of Muammar Gaddafi on October 20th 2011, filmed while he was beaten up, sodomised with a bayonet by a rebel fighter, and shot,[104] did not spark popular indignation in Libya nor abroad. In the intricate Syrian situation, Assad attempted to use the indignation triggered by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant to gain international support for his regime.

The death of the Parisian Archbishop Denis-Auguste Affre during the 1848 June riots is the most striking example of counter-revolutionary martyrdom. The Catholic Church, though not favourable towards revolutions in general, acknowledged – for some of its members, quite enthusiastically so – the fall of Louis-Philippe's monarchy.[105] On February 24th, Denis-Auguste Affre himself made a speech to pay homage to the Parisian people and their generous and selfless feelings, and asked the priests to pray for the victims. Even though anti-ecclesiastic riots occurred, mostly in Lyon and its countryside, there was overall an

[102] Lucy Riall, 'Martyr Cults in Nineteenth-Century Italy', *The Journal of Modern History* 82, no. 2 (2010): 255–287.
[103] Giedrė Šabasevičiūtė, 'Intellectuals and the People: Portrayals of the Rebel in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising', *Middle East-Topics & Arguments* 6 (2016): 27.
[104] Martin Chulov, 'Gaddafi's Last Moments: "I Saw the Hand Holding the Gun and I Saw It Fire"', *The Guardian*, 20 October 2012, sec. World news, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/20/muammar-gaddafi-killing-witnesses, last accessed 7th September 2020.
[105] Mary-Patricia Dougherty, 'The Parisian Catholic Press and the February 1848 Revolution', *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 100, no. 1 (2005): 83–123.

agreement between the Church and the revolutionaries, symbolised by the public benediction of the Freedom trees.[106]

The June days put an end to this period. To avoid a brutal repression, Affre convinced Cavaignac, who led the troops, to let him talk to the rioters. He then went onto the barricade at the entrance of the Faubourg Saint-Antoine, bearing a green branch as a sign of peace. In the middle of his speech, however, insurgents heard shots and, as they thought they had been betrayed, opened fire upon the National Guard who immediately riposted. In the middle of the battle, Affre was struck by a stray bullet and died shortly after. Due to Affre's ecclesiastic position and the circumstances of his death, this event had a huge impact. Affre's funeral procession was followed by 200,000 persons. His martyrdom was iconic and became the subject of numerous articles, engravings, paintings, and rumours that spread nationally and internationally to the point that Emmanuel Fureix estimates that this event was the subject of a third of the engravings and a fifth of the booklets produced on the June riots.[107]

This illustration made in 1848 by F. Franke, a German artist from Dresden, reproduces the organisation of French engravings (figure 4).

[106] Paul Christophe, *L'Église de France dans la révolution de 1848* (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1998).
[107] Emmanuel Fureix, 'De "l'autel de l'anarchie" au Golgotha: la barricade de juin 1848 en représentation', in *La Barricade* by Alain Corbin and Jean-Marie Mayeur (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1997), 221–233.



Figure 4 – Denis-Auguste Affre's martyrdom by F. Franke[108]

In this representation, the Archbishop is shot on the top of the barricade, which subverts the topos of the 'Christ of the barricades'. Representations of the Christ of the barricades were often linked to the Sermon on the Mount – which was also a pun with Robespierre's political club *La Montagne* –,[109] but with Affre the barricade became a new Golgotha.[110] While the barricade used to be deemed as an 'altar of anarchism'[111] by counter-revolutionaries, it became a symbol of counter-revolutionary martyrdom.

[108] Source: https://www.dhm.de/datenbank/dhm.php?seite=5&fld_0=GR000618, last accessed 27th September 2019.
[109] Agulhon and Le Men, *Les révolutions de 1848. L'Europe des images*, t. 2 Le printemps des peuples, 140.
[110] Fureix, 'De "l'autel de l'anarchie" au Golgotha', 196.
[111] *The Lampion*, August 20th 1848, quoted in Fureix, 198, my translation.

The term 'counter-revolutionary martyr' does not imply that martyrs were counter-revolutionary themselves but that the process of martyrisation that turned the individual into a martyr was sparked by and ignited counter-revolutionary indignation. Affre was not a hard-line counter-revolutionary figure. However, the indignation that the prelate's death triggered isolated rioters from public support and divided them. The February revolution benefited from its image of a fraternal communion at the national and international levels. Affre's martyrdom, on the contrary, was a grim reminder to the European public of the bloody struggles between French revolutionaries and Catholics.

These circulations of counter-revolutionary indignation weakened or counter-balanced the circulations of revolutionary indignation, especially in Catholic circles. In Ireland, a country as Catholic as revolutionary, the news of the Archbishop's martyrdom 'shocked public opinion'[112] and 'was a grim warning to the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland of a possible outcome of a republican insurrection'.[113] After this event and the pope's exile, the Irish Church consequently withdrew its support to the revolutionary spring.

Even though indignation may be a revolutionary affect, it is not intrinsically so. Looking at counter-revolutionary martyrdom and indignation brings out a more complex take on affective dynamics in revolutionary processes.

Conclusion

Affective dynamics do not necessarily favour revolutionary movements; they may also weaken or limit them. The same affective patterns that ignited revolutionary indignation may also shed light on the spatial and temporal limitations imposed on revolutionary springs. In

[112] Christine Kinealy, *Repeal and Revolution: 1848 in Ireland* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009), 178.
[113] Kinealy, 146.

this chapter, I have examined the limits suffered by either revolutionary fraternity or revolutionary martyrdom in order to account for several negative cases and for further episodes of the revolutionary process.

Revolutionary fraternity is limited both spatially and temporally. Some national communities may not experience the transnational fraternal communion that emerged with revolutionary springs because they do not identify with foreign revolutionaries – or rather, they identify these revolutionaries with another community with which they have a conflictual relationship –. Furthermore, fraternity may fade away over time so that divisions arise nationally or internationally. These conflicts, however bloody they may be, do not necessarily prove the vacuity of fraternity. On the contrary, the example of the June days shows how these episodes of violence were viewed as fratricidal. The fratricide that occurred between Parisian workers who rioted and the repression led by Cavaignac caused confused feelings, a wavering of the mind.

Revolutionary indignation, triggered by revolutionary martyrdom, is also limited in several ways. Fear, either caused by repression or by a traumatic historical event, may overwhelm circulations of indignation. In such situations, popular indignation was less visible, if not completely invisible, as there were no mass uprisings comparable to what was happening in neighbouring countries. Moreover, intense circulations of indignation do not necessarily translate into social protests if there is no affective transfer between regimes. The Springtime of the Peoples martyrs moved the US opinion but the European monarchies were not imagined as anything like the US Republican regime. Eventually, revolutionary indignation may be weakened or counter-balanced by counter-revolutionary indignation. Counter-revolutionary martyrs may ignite affective circulations against revolutionaries and in favour of the regime.

Integrating these perspectives on the limits of revolutionary fraternity and

revolutionary martyrdom do not restrain the importance of affective dynamics. It gives a more complex account of how affects shape, fuel, weaken, or limit revolutionary processes, favouring or undermining the diffusion of revolutionary springs.

Conclusion

Politics is embedded in stories and imagination. In his famous work, Thomas Hobbes has offered to modernity a terrifying image that has since then haunted our political imagination: the Leviathan. 'The fleeing serpent … that twisted serpent'[1] became the symbol of the powerful Sovereign established by the social contract. Like the biblical monster, the Leviathan has no counterpart – except, of course, other Leviathans.

This thesis has attempted to tell another story about politics. Something exceeds, indeed, the Leviathan in disproportion and power: the Ocean. It is from this primordial Ocean that the Leviathan once emerged and any of its acts supposes and requires the Ocean. It is precisely to the Ocean that Hobbes, following an old and reccurent cliché, referred to talk about the multitude.[2] The passionate and seditious multitude resembles the incessant movements of the flows. Beyond the Ocean, the revolutionary multitude has been portrayed as outbursts of primitive forces, storms, earthquakes, wildfires, volcanoes…

Such descriptions are not fortuitous and, for thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, they echo their general view on the multitude, deemed as irrational and passionate. Describing revolutions as cataclysms is part and parcel of the exclusion of the multitude and its passions from the political sphere. This metaphor also tells something different though, something that Spinoza theorised and that this thesis has attempted to underline: the immense power of the multitude that exceeds the institutions of the Leviathan. This thesis told a story about multitudes that turned into revolutionary volcanos.

[1] *Isaiah*, 27:1.
[2] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 55.

To approach revolutions, and especially revolutionary springs, I have offered another perspective on the multitude, which first required to conceptualise popular affects on different ontological grounds. Spinoza's philosophy appears as uniquely capable of providing such theoretical foundations. By contrast with Descartes's dualism, Spinoza's theory of affects, which influenced both Gilles Deleuze and António Damásio, refuses the now controversial distinction between bodies and minds, and thus, between affects and rationality. More radically, Spinoza rejects Cartesian individualism in favour of a transindividualist view that defines individuals as constantly shaping, marking, interacting and composing with each other. Because of this theoretical stand, Spinoza conceives of collective emotions as circulations of affects relying on a fluid identification with others. Affective circulations consequently pass through individuals, shaping them, and disempowering or empowering them, including by prompting them to compose with each other.

The way individuals compose together through the effect of affective circulations is analysed by Spinoza in what I called a theory of the multitude. Unlike his contemporary, Thomas Hobbes, who displays a form of political elitism, tying together the passions and the multitude and rejecting them altogether from politics, Spinoza puts the multitude, defined as a group of people moved by a common affect, and its affects at the centre of politics. The state and its institutions, initially produced by the multitude's affects, are constantly sustained by these affects. The action of the state and its institutions produces and reproduces a common group identity, which makes the multitude particularly conductive to affective circulations. This is the effect of what I call the social structures of affects. Circulations of indignation may thus quickly spread within the multitude, favoured and intensified by complex affections, and set the multitude into motion. Through the emergence of this revolutionary multitude, individuals, empowered by affective circulations, interact and

compose their powers to challenge or overthrow the state. Even though these affective dynamics are facilitated in national communities because of their imagined identities – in the way Benedict Anderson understands this notion –, multitudes also emerge transnationally since affective imitation is not bounded by national borders.

Antonio Negri's early work on Spinoza's political philosophy has hugely contributed to the understanding of the concept of multitude. However, his more recent pieces of work, written with Michael Hardt, display a conceptualisation of the multitude which is distinct from the one used in this piece of research – and, I believe, from Spinoza's –. The consistency of their multitude relies ultimately on its ideological commitment to democracy whereas I argue that the multitude emerges through and is set into motion by common affects. As soon as these affects fade, the multitude crumbles. The multitude is not defined substantially but affectively.

Spinoza's philosophy offers ontological foundations to build a theory of affective patterns in revolutionary springs. I have, in particular, insisted on three affective patterns: repressive fear, revolutionary fraternity, and revolutionary martyrdom. While repressive fear disempowers the multitude and dissuades it from protesting, revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom, on the contrary, may prompt the emergence of the multitude and set it into motion. These two affective patterns shed light on the spontaneous revolutionary movements that occur and cross borders. They are therefore adequate to analyse revolutionary springs, precisely defined as fast and spontaneous transnational diffusions of social protests without any financial or military collaboration. Through a first presentation of the Springtime of the Peoples and the Arab Spring, I show how this definition accounts for these two historical events, despite their differences. Studying affective patterns faces a

few challenges and requires an innovative methodology, which handles diverse resources, such as textual, visual, audio-visual, and sound ones.

Affective patterns have first been studied at the national level. Blood, a dual notion as it may be shared or shed, ignited both revolutionary springs. Revolutionary fraternity, experienced and expressed as a fraternal communion beyond social divides, exalted the shared blood, inherited from the motherland. Through the display of dissident national symbols, the revolutionary multitude opposed the regime, which was imagined to be orchestrating fratricides. Revolutionary martyrdom also displays an interplay between the two dimensions of blood. The massacre of the Capucines and Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation reveal how the complementarity between shared and shed blood triggered circulations of indignation that turned victims into national revolutionary martyrs and the multitude into a revolutionary volcano.

Even though revolutionary springs have been largely reconstructed through a national(ist) perspective in official discourses as well as in the scholarly literature, they are however radical international phenomena. Revolutionaries experienced and expressed transnational fraternity across borders, through a communion of the peoples. Foreign martyrs also ignited circulations of indignation abroad, either directly or indirectly through pantheons of martyrs. International affairs were also important contentious subjects during both revolutions, especially with regards to martyr peoples, such as the Polish or the Palestinians. Transnational fraternity and martyrdom informed revolutionaries' perspective on international relations. Instead of an international system conceived of as a rivalry between independent states, international affairs were imagined as bringing into opposition a transnational multitude and a bloc of counter-revolutionary regimes. Both revolutionary

springs were not only involving international matters, they also questioned the nature of the international system itself.

Eventually, affective patterns and affective dynamics shed light on how revolutionary springs are sparked, but they also illuminate their temporal and spatial limits. The limitations of revolutionary fraternity and revolutionary martyrdom consequently account for several negative cases as well as further stages of the revolutionary process. Even though political elitism contrasts the rationality of the Sovereign with seditious passions, for Spinoza, affects are not inherently revolutionary. Studying affective patterns in a revolutionary context may thus explain how protests intensify and spread as well as how they fade away and fail.

*

This thesis has opened several paths that can now be trodden upon. First, Spinoza's theory of affects and of the multitude may offer rich ontological ground for social scientists, including EIR scholars. His philosophy does not suffer from Cartesian dualism and individualism which made the conceptualisation of collective emotions thorny, not to say impossible. Moreover, unlike other perspectives on affects, such as Deleuze's, Spinoza's immediately and essentially ties affects to the question of popular and political affects – the multitude's affects –. His analysis of the relationships between affects and imagination or power is thus immediately relevant to think about our social world. Spinoza's philosophy is an opportunity to anchor diverse already known concepts or perspectives, as well as less studied Spinozist notions into a complex and coherent system. Spinoza's theory of affects is not a perspective on affects, but on the world – including the political world – through affects.

Second, the notions of 'affective pattern' and 'structures of affects' may shed light on other social phenomena, including contentious practices such as protests, riots, or revolutions. Revolution theory, specifically, may benefit from the studies of emotions and affects that emerged in Social Movement Theory (SMT) and in social sciences in general. Even though they are now mentioned and accounted for, emotions and affects have rarely been integrated into the study of revolutionary processes. A rigorous analysis of affects, however, illuminates aspects that are not tackled by structural or ideological approaches. More specifically, the three affective patterns studied in this piece of research, repressive fear, revolutionary fraternity, and revolutionary martyrdom, may be applied to a wide array of cases. As aforementioned, repressive fear is now under scrutiny in the literature on repression, thanks notably to Lauren Young's work, amongst others. Even though revolutionary martyrdom has not received similar attention, George Floyd's tragic murder and the riots it triggered may increase scholars' interest in this affective pattern. To the best of my knowledge, revolutionary fraternity – and fraternity in general – has not been studied outside of the historical field and, to a lesser extent, of political philosophy. The familial metaphor that this term expresses has however been used in nationalist or socialist spheres in diverse contexts, from wars to revolutions or decolonisation. Other affective patterns, relying on other affects such as hope or humiliation, would most certainly open other theoretical and empirical paths.

Eventually, the concept of 'revolutionary spring' may be extended to other empirical cases, such as the decolonisation of the Americas over the first half of the 19th century, the 1830 revolutions in Europe, or the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe. More broadly, the definition of revolutionary spring used in this piece of research could be thought about in relation to 'riot springs', for instance the youth social protests in the 1960s, or more recently, the protests in Latin America (Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Colombia) in 2019, or

the on-going wave of Black Lives Matter protests. Turning the term 'spring' into a concept initiates a debate on the specificity of these phenomena. Unlike what Weyland affirms, these springs seem to have increased over the recent decades, in a context of rising transnational communications and growing political tensions. While seismic tremors are intensifying, this study offers a Spinozist approach to affective patterns in revolutionary springs in order to contribute to the understanding of revolutionary volcanoes.

Appendix



Figure 1- Map of Europe in 1848 (Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Europe_1848_map_en.png, last accessed 17/09/2020)

		FRANCE	PRUSSIA AND 'THIRD GERMANY'	AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN EMPIRE	OTHER ITALIAN STATES	OTHER COUNTRIES
1848	January			**2-4**: Uprisings in Milan.	**2-27**: Riots in Palermo. **29**: Ferdinando II, King of Naples promises a Constitution.	
	February	**21**: The Symposium of the 12th arrondissement is forbidden. **22**: Uprisings in Paris. **23**: Guizot relinquishes power; Massacre of the Capucines. Barricades are set up in Paris.	**27**: Uprisings in Mannheim, Heidelberg, Cologne…			**12**: Marx and Engel publish the *Communist Manifesto* in the United Kingdom.

		24: Louis-Philippe abdicates. The Republic is proclaimed, a provisory government is established. **28**: Creation of the national workshops				
	March	**2**: Universal suffrage (limited to men). **4**: Abolition of slavery. Lamartine publishes the *Manifeste à l'Europe*.	**18**: Riots in Berlin. **20**: Ludwig I in Bavaria abdicates. **22**: Friedrich Wilhelm IV promises the establishment of a constitution.	**11**: Uprisings in Prague. **13**: Riots in Vienna. The Emperor Ferdinand I promises reforms. Metternich leaves Vienna. **18**: Beginning of the uprising in Milan.	**24**: Charles Albert wages war on the Austro-Hungarian Empire.	

				22: Riots in Venice and Milan. The Republic of Venice is proclaimed. **23**: An independent Hungarian government is established.		
	April	**23**: Election of the Constituent Assembly. Failure of the Left.	**12**: Republican riots in the Grand Duchy of Baden.	**8**: Prague adopts a Chart. **11**: The Emperor accepts the Hungarian constitution **25**: The Emperor establishes a constitution, poorly received by the opinion.		**10**: Failure of the Chartist demonstration in London.

	May	**15**: Demonstrations in Paris demanding a Polish expedition. **26**: First decisions against the national workshops.	**1**: Elections of the German Confederation Parliament. **22**: Opening of the Prussian Assembly.	**11**: Creation of a committee in Prague to claim national rights. **13-15**: Riots in Vienna, the Emperor leaves the city.	**15**: Counter-revolution in Naples.	
	June	**4**: Complementary elections. Louis-Napoléon and Victor Hugo are elected. **21**: Abolition of the national workshops. **23-26**: Riots in Paris.	**14-17**: First democratic congress in Frankfurt. **14-15**: Riots in Berlin	**2**: In Prague, creation of the pan-Slavic Congress that demands the independence. **10**: The revolutionary government in Vienna recognises the independence of Hungary.		

		24: The executive Commission gives full powers to Cavaignac.		**17**: Prague is occupied by the Austrian army. **28**: End of the pan-Slavic Congress.		
	July	**28**: Law limiting the activity of political clubs.	**24-27**: Uprisings in Frankfurt. Creation of a German government in the German Confederation.		**3**: Venice decides to join Charles-Albert. **25**: Charles-Albert is defeated by Austrians.	Irish and Chartists riots end in the United Kingdom.
	August		**23**: Workers' associations Congress in Berlin and creation of the Fraternity.	**23**: Workers' riot in Vienna.		

	September		**17**: The Leftists Members of the Parliament in Frankfort send their sympathies to the Republican insurgents in Vienna. **18**: Republican riot in Frankfort.	War between the Croats (supported by the Empire) and the Hungarians. **29**: Victory of the Hungarians.	Ferdinando II takes Sicily back.	
	October		**26**: 2nd Democratic Congress in Berlin. **27**: Vote for the first constitutional articles in Frankfort.	**6**: Republican Revolution in Vienna. Defeated by the imperial troops.	Democratic government in Florence.	

			31: Marches in support of the Revolution in Vienna.			
	November		**9**: Counter-revolution in Berlin. **12**: Berlin is under siege.	9: Counter-Revolution in Vienna. Robert Blum is executed. Hungary is attacked by the Empire.	**15-16**: Republican Revolution in Roma. Pius IX is forced to leave the city.	
	December	**20**: Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte is elected President.	**5**: The German Confederation is dissolved. The Constitution is offered by the King.	**2**: Ferdinand I abdicates in favour of Franz Joseph.		
1849	January					
	February					

	March			Franz Joseph offers a Constitution. The Russians invade Hungary.	**23**: Charles-Albert is defeated by the Austrian troops.	
	April					
	May					
	June		28: The Frankfort Parliament is dissolved.			
	July				**3**: The French occupies Rome.	
	August				26: Venice is occupied by the Austrians.	



Figure 2- Map of the MENA countries (source: https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Map-of-the-MENA-region-including-the-countries-that-are-covered-in-this-review-MENA_fig1_259825975)

		TUNISIA	EGYPT	LIBYA	YEMEN	SYRIA	OTHER COUNTRIES
	June		**6**: Khaled Said's murder by policemen.				
	July						
	August						
	September						
	October						
	November						
	December	**17**: Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire.					
2011	January	**11**: Protests in Tunis**.**	**25**: Beginning of 18 days of protests.		**27**: Protests in Sana'a.	**26**: After an incident of police brutality against	**Algeria, 3-12**: Protests against the government.

		14: Ben Ali flees to Saudi Arabia.				children, protests against the regime.	**Algeria, 14-30**: 9 self-immolation (including 2 to death).
	February		**11**: President Hosni Mubarak resigned, his powers are transferred to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces	**15**: Uprisings against Muammar Gaddafi. **18**: The opposition holds control of Benghazi (3rd city in the country). **20**: Protests occur in Tripoli but are violently repressed.	**3**: Important protests during a 'Day of Rage'.		**Bahrain, 14**: Protests against the regime, violent repression. **Bahrain, 20**: Massive demonstration at the Pearl Roundabout. Bahraini military

							kills 20 protestors and injures many. **Morocco, 20**: Protests against the regime.
	March	**7**: Provisional government.		**17**: The UK, the US, and France start supporting the rebel forces.		**15**: Damascus is under siege by anti-government rebel forces. 3,000 civilians are arrested by the government.	
	April						
	May						
	June				**3**: President Ali Abdullah Saleh is	**13**: Protests in Aleppo.	

					injured in a failed assassination attempt and flees to Saudi Arabia.		
	July				**16**: The opposition creates a Presidential Council.		**Morocco, 3**: Protests against the regime.
	August			**20-28**: Battle of Tripoli. Rebel forces capture the capital city, overthrowing Muammar Gaddafi.	**16**: Saleh announces his return to Yemen.		
	September						

	October		**9-10**: Coptic Christians protest against the destruction of a church. The army send tanks, killing many.				
	November						
	December						
2012	January						
	February				**27**: President of Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh resigns and transfers his powers		

					to his Vice President, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi.		
	March						**Bahrain, 9**: 3,000 people are arrested by the government.
	April						
	May						
	June		**16-17**: Mohammed Morsi elected President.				
	July						
	August						
	September						

	October						
	November		**22**: Protests erupt when President Morsi is sworn into power.				

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