The President Proposes, but Congress Disposes:
The Role of Congress in Foreign Aid as American Foreign Policy

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Abstract

Foreign aid is an American-innovated instrument of foreign policy born of Presidential-Congressional partnership. From its origins in the Marshall Plan, aid has been multipurpose by design and legislators have seen aid as having both "soft" and "hard" foreign policy purposes—what I term "development plus" and "security plus" assistance. For Congress, foreign aid is about far more than electoral politics, it is also an opportunity to shape and influence American foreign policy. For Congress, foreign aid *is* foreign policy. This dissertation unpacks the role Congress plays in foreign policymaking through foreign aid appropriations. It traces the history and evolution of foreign aid as a Presidential-Congressional foreign policy partnership. It details the extent to which the Appropriations Committee (namely through its State and Foreign Operations subcommittee) is integrally involved in decisions about aid funding and allocation. It introduces a new typology that can classify the different foreign policy purposes of American foreign aid and analyzes multiple original datasets collected by the author to reflect the extensive role of Congress in foreign aid and the degree of Presidential-Congressional partnership in any given year. Ultimately, I argue that while Congressional appropriators are willing to partner with most Presidential Administrations to preserve a globally-engaged foreign policy, the dynamics of a divided Congress have substantial ramifications for foreign aid funding and result in cuts to "security plus" assistance.

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Outline of Dissertation

1 Introduction

This chapter engages with the literature on the United States as a foreign aid donor, exploring how the failure to understand the political processes and context of American aid creates distortions in current studies of U.S. foreign assistance. It highlights the need for a clearer understanding of the role that Congress plays in foreign aid and foreign policy. It previews the original data collected by the author to showcase the extensive influence Congress has over foreign aid.

Part 1: The Theory of Foreign Aid as American Foreign Policy

2 Foreign Aid is Foreign Policy for Congress

The underlying assumption of the existing literature on Congress and aid is that legislators are more willing to support the President on the security components of aid, but electoral incentives undermine support for development purposes of aid. I argue instead that foreign aid functions as foreign policy for legislators, with development aid serving "softer" foreign policy purposes and security assistance "harder" foreign policy priorities.

Part 2: The Origins and Evolution of Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy

3 The Marshall Plan as the Foundation of US Foreign Aid Policy

From its beginning in the Marshall Plan, U.S. foreign aid was designed as a multipurpose tool of American foreign policy, forged through robust executive-legislative partnership, undergirded by extensive information sharing (and Congressional travel) and bolstered by building a broad coalition of public support. These were the essential ingredients of continued Congressional support for foreign aid. In the decades after the Marshall Plan, these fundamentals weakened, ultimately jeopardizing foreign aid.

4 The Presidential-Congressional Partnership Falters

Throughout the Cold War, Congress struggled to assert itself as a full and equal partner to the President. Presidents continued to sideline Congress and shield information from legislators, causing the Presidential-Congressional partnership on foreign policy to fracture. Because of the limited information available to them, the ability of legislators to conduct oversight was hampered. This contributed to a reluctance to fund aid at robust levels.

5 "Lurching into a New Era": A Crisis for Foreign Aid

The broad coalition of public support that bolstered aid fragmented after the Fall of Saigon. Foreign aid as a multipurpose tool of foreign policy was the only remaining pillar of the Marshall Plan foundations left by the height of the Cold War. When the Soviet

Union collapsed and obviated containment as the overarching goal of American foreign policy, the crisis around the direction of American foreign policy therefore precipitated an existential crisis for American foreign aid.

6 Rebuilding Support for Foreign Aid

After the Cold War, a broad coalition of advocacy groups effectively rebuilt public and legislative support for foreign aid. The reconstruction of these pillars allowed foreign aid to survive the fundamental shift in American foreign policy—and would underpin significant increases to foreign aid even before the advent of 9/11 and the Global War on Terror. The underlying fundamentals introduced in the post-World War II era reemerged and the appropriations process became *the* key avenue for Congress to influence foreign policy through foreign aid in this era.

Part 3: Understanding the Role of Congress

7 The Foreign Operations Process

Drawing on a series of elite interviews with former members of Congress, legislative staff, and agency personnel, archival materials, and government documents, I create a systematic framework that lays out the individual steps in the U.S. foreign aid process (which I call the "Foreign Operations Process.") This framework reveals that the Appropriations Committee plays a pivotal role in the funding and allocation of American aid.

8 The Foreign Operations Data

This chapter introduces an original typology of aid accounts that can differentiate between the different foreign policy purposes of the aid and original data on U.S. aid appropriations from 1995-2021, built from U.S. government documents. This allows for finer-grained analysis of U.S. aid in future empirical work studying allocation and how the U.S. behaves with regard to specific forms of aid.

Part 4: Analysis

9 Foreign Policy is a Joint Responsibility

I use original data on funding to systematically analyze the Presidential-Congressional partnership over foreign policy annually. I find that Congress is generally willing to work with Administrations of both political parties and that Congressional partnerships are "collaborative" 52% of the time between 2000-2021.

10 Divided Congresses and the Funding of Foreign Policy

I interact these new measures with my typology and original data on foreign policy purposes of U.S. aid. Because "security plus" aid (strategic + security assistance) funds more "hard" foreign policy priorities than "development plus" aid (development + health aid), I demonstrate that a divided Congress, in which a different party controls

each chamber, will cut "security plus" aid but a united Congress (regardless of party) will maintain the budget. I also reveal that Congress (united or divided) almost never cuts "development plus" aid (likely because advocacy groups (dating from the end of the Cold War) have effectively put a floor under this budget).

11 Conclusion

One of the main contributions of this dissertation is to underscore the extent to which Congress, particularly the Appropriations Committee, shapes U.S. foreign policy through aid appropriations. For those on both sides of the aisle who have spent the last thirty years reinstating a meaningful role for Congress in the Presidential-Congressional partnership, aid to Ukraine was a crucial litmus test of that partnership. Divided Congresses severely test the limits of legislators' ability to work together on foreign policy in a polarized era. With slim majorities and strong preferences, it can seem unattainable to balance the priorities of one chamber with those of the other. Yet, despite its political costs, legislators recently passed a "security plus" supplemental through a divided Congress—a testament to the extent to which foreign aid functions as American foreign policy for Congress.

1 Introduction

"The U.S. foreign assistance program is an instrument of the President and the Secretary of State for the conduct of foreign policy."

Department of State, Congressional Budget Justification, 2001, describing Development Assistance

"It is not only the ideas that have made US aid different from that of other major aid-giving countries but also US political institutions…both the executive and legislative branches of government play a role in shaping policies and especially in determining federal expenditures."

Carol Lancaster (2007)
Former Deputy Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development

1.1 Introduction

"America's willingness to underwrite European economic recovery was, without question, one of the most truly generous impulses that has ever motivated any nation anywhere at any time."[1] Reflecting on the Marshall Plan nearly two decades after its completion, its primary administrator, Paul Hoffman insisted that Americans had also "derived enormous benefits" from their own generosity including "a massive increase in exports, the creation of many thousands of new jobs…, the savings of many billions of dollars in arms expenditures, and—most important—the revitalization of a part of the world crucially important to its own national interests."[2] A few years into the project, a member of Congress on the House Foreign Affairs Committee summarized the impulse of the Marshall Plan: "Our belief is that, if we make it better for the other fellow, we will make it better for ourselves…. I think fundamentally this is the American answer."[3] Indeed, this blend of "national interests and national values"[4], noble idealism and sober realpolitik, has been present in American foreign assistance since its inception according to a former senior USAID official. It can be traced to the involvement of Congress in American aid primarily through the appropriations process.

When Russia invaded the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea in February 2014, I was an intern in the Department of State in the office responsible for coordinating aid to Eastern Europe and Eurasia. In the aftermath of the invasion, one of my responsibilities was to track all pledges of support to Ukraine from bilateral donors, multilateral development banks, and U.S. government sources. One evening I watched the White House announce an aid package for Ukraine and arrived at work the next morning ready to log the pledge in our database. That was when I got a lesson in aid appropriations. I was told the President can announce whatever they'd like, but unless Congress gives "new" money or permission to move "existing money", there would be no funding. As insiders quip, "the President proposes, but Congress disposes" (Interview, Wright 2022). This is the

[1] The American Foreign Service Journal. (1967 June). https://afsa.org/foreign-service-journal-june-1967. Accessed 4 March 2024.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Quote from Jacob Javits in 1949; McVety (2012), *Enlightened Aid: Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia*
[4] Lancaster 2007

fundamental reality of the Appropriations Process which governs all U.S. government expenditure, including foreign aid.

Foreign aid is an American-innovated instrument of foreign policy. It emerged in the post-World War II era as a multipurpose tool of American foreign policy created to address the political, economic, and social dimensions of a complex and evolving continental crisis. The Marshall Plan aimed to prevent "hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos", revive "a working economy in the world"[5], preserve peace and arrest the spread of Communism. Compared to any other available foreign policy instrument, the inherent value of foreign aid was its flexibility and multipurpose nature. What began as a systematic but time-limited program of assistance to fifteen other nations[6] evolved into a new American approach toward foreign relations—one which was eventually adopted by numerous other countries.

From the beginning, legislators saw aid as having both "soft" and "hard" foreign policy purposes—what I later term "development plus" and "security plus" assistance. This means that for Congress foreign aid is about more than electoral politics. It is also about an opportunity to participate in the making of American foreign policy. This dissertation unpacks the role of Congress in foreign policy through foreign aid appropriations.

Only a handful of studies analyze aid appropriations; those that do tend to focus on the electoral (dis)incentives for legislators in supporting foreign aid. These studies overlook the nature of American foreign aid and the degree to which it has functioned as an instrument of foreign policy from its inception. To date, there is no work that examines the role of the Appropriations Committee in foreign policy and the evolution of foreign aid as American foreign policy. This dissertation provides a framework for understanding how and why foreign aid functions as foreign policy. It traces the purposes and support for aid through the ups and downs of Presidential-Congressional foreign policy partnership from World War II to present. It details the extent to which the Appropriations Committee (namely through its State and Foreign Operations subcommittee) is integrally involved in decisions about aid funding and allocation. It introduces a new typology that can classify the different foreign policy purposes of American foreign aid and collects multiple original datasets that reflect the extensive role of Congress in foreign aid.

The United States has always been seen as different among foreign aid donors. Many of the distinctive fingerprints that so uniquely identify the U.S. in this regard are due to involvement of Congress in foreign aid. This dissertation clarifies why U.S. foreign aid is different—because of the role of Congress in foreign aid and the extent to which foreign aid functions as foreign policy.

1.2 The Nature of American Foreign Aid

Today more than 29 other countries provide "official development assistance" (ODA)—foreign aid that meets specific conditions laid out by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), namely that it "promotes and specifically targets the economic

[5] The Marshall Foundation. "The Marshall Plan Speech." https://www.marshallfoundation.org/the-marshall-plan/speech/. Accessed 1 June 2024.
[6] Tarnoff, C. (2018, January). The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R45079.

development and welfare of developing countries".[7] An even larger number provide some form of what they consider "foreign aid" (though it fails to meet the OECD criteria)[8]—China prominent among them. Nonetheless, the United States remains the largest single donor of official development assistance, providing more than $50 billion annually.[9] (The next largest donors are Germany at $35 billion and Japan and the United Kingdom, both of which provide about $19 billion—an amount roughly equivalent to what the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) reports spending on health and economic development alone.)[10]

Nevertheless, despite the glow of generosity with which the Marshall Plan is remembered by those who received aid from the program, the United States has an established reputation among other foreign aid donors as a strategic, self-interested donor motivated by foreign policy and national security concerns (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dreher et al. 2008; Harrigan and Wang 2011; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998). The concept of strategic motives comes from a well-established literature on donor behavior.[11] Donors of foreign aid behave differently—in how much aid they give, to whom, and why (to paraphrase the seminal Alesina and Dollar (2000) paper; Dreher et al. 2008; Harrigan and Wang 2011; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998; Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998). Much of this variation in behavior may be attributable to donor motives; however, modeling how donors make these decisions about aid is difficult—in part, because donors are opaque about their processes (Harrigan and Wang 2011; Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015), which often intersect with their own domestic politics (Dietrich 2021).

Donor behavior has been studied extensively in relationship to the U.S., which has been repeatedly characterized as a "strategic" donor. Numerous studies confirm strategic donor behavior by the U.S. during the Cold War (McKinley and Little 1979; Schraeder, Hook, and Taylor 1998, Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998) and into the 1990s (Alesina and Dollar 2000). While scholars identify changes in behavior after the Cold War for both the US and other donors, the reputation of the U.S. as a strategic donor nonetheless persists (Berthélemy and Tichit 2004; Dunning 2004; Claessens, Cassimon, and Van Campenhout 2009; Hoeffler and Outram 2008).

Harrigan and Wang (2011), comparing the U.S. to several other G7 donors, again affirm the label of strategic donor post-Cold War. Clist (2011) traces seven major donors across a quarter-century (1982-2006) and concludes that "only the United States has become less poverty-sensitive

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[7] Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Official Development Assistance (ODA). https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/policy-issues/official-development-assistance-oda.html. Accessed 2 June 2024.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid. U.S. Government. https://www.foreignassistance.gov. Accessed 15 June 2024.
[11] Initially, two competing conceptual frameworks emerged: the "donor interest" and the "recipient need" models (Berthélemy 2006). "Donor interest" models presented donors allocating aid to recipients with political or strategic value. In contrast, "recipient need" models portrayed altruistic donors responding to manifested humanitarian need in allocating aid. In the early stages of the literature, donors were classified as one type, either strategic or altruistic. Later models allowed donors to exhibit both tendencies; Alesina and Dollar (2000) created a "hybrid" model that allowed for both donor interest and recipient need to impact a donor's allocation choices. Hoeffler and Outram (2008) then added the additional element of recipient merit to the model in a working paper. This component allows donors to allocate aid as a reward for change in behavior or reforms. Each of these three motives (strategy, merit, and need) can be measured or proxied by different metrics when undertaking empirical work. Strategic motives are typically linked to foreign policy significance, economic and trade ties, and other strategic interests. Recipient need is often proxied by levels of income per capita, poverty incidence, and health and education indicators. Recipient merit is typically captured by indices of governance or civil freedom. Given the ability to establish proxies for motives, the behavior of major aid donors has been investigated and these donors have been labeled by motivation.

in recent years—this is possibly an effect of the Global War on Terror (GWOT)." Additionally, both Alesina and Weder (2002) and Isopi and Mattesini (2008) report that U.S. aid increases with corruption. Bermeo (2018) argues that donors, including the U.S., adopted a strategy of targeted development in which donors seek to prevent costly spillovers to themselves, such as migration or devastation from natural disasters, through development assistance.

In particular, while the U.S. maintains a global reputation as a strategic donor, Scandinavian countries are considered to be more altruistic donors focused on recipient need (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dreher et al. 2008). According to the empirical evidence, the U.S. appears to purchase support in the UN and reward those aligned with it there (Alesina and Dollar 2000; Dreher et al. 2008). Clist (2011) also indicates that "American aid is often used to reward or reinforce military relationships." The World Bank and other multilateral donors may be unduly subject to its influence, as Winters (2010) chronicles: "a sizeable body of evidence indicates that the World Bank responds to political pressure from the United States and other large donor countries that want to advance their own strategic interests". The U.S. is also marked by its emphasis on democracy and democracy promotion as a part of its foreign assistance strategy (Huber 2015; Carothers 2004). Bush (2015) studies this phenomenon and connects the heavy reliance on American NGOs in the democracy sector to U.S. foreign policy interests—underscoring that U.S. policymakers "pursue a strategy of 'made-in-America' democracy support in countries that are salient for U.S. foreign policy."

In short, the existing literature on aid allocation overwhelmingly identifies the United States as a strategic donor, which awards aid more in accordance with its geostrategic interests than according to humanitarian need. However, most of these analyses overlook the extent to which the U.S. is fundamentally different from other major foreign aid donors because of the context in which aid evolved and its unusual **aid architecture**—the players involved in and processes by which decisions are made about foreign aid.

1.3 The Executive-Legislative Dynamics of U.S. Aid

While donor motive models arose to empirically assess the most salient characteristics for aid allocation, much of this literature ignores the complex aid architecture by which donor budgets come into existence. Analysis frequently assumes donor governments behave like a single decision-maker and scholars tend to treat the processes that generate decisions about aid as a black box. Models assume this single decision-maker allocates an aid budget according to country characteristics—more aid to democracies, less to countries with higher incomes. For most donors, this simplification is both tractable and plausible because an executive sets a budget which a designated aid agency then allocates across a pool of potential recipients. In the U.S. case, this implies that the President empowers the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to determine how, where, when, and why to spend its own budget.

The reality is much more complicated. The United States has what is likely the most complex aid ecosystem of any major foreign aid donor. More than two dozen executive agencies participate in foreign aid[12] and the legislature has an unparalleled level of involvement in aid decisions. As a

[12] Using the U.S. foreign aid database, Explorer, I identify 29 different agencies who have funded aid projects and 30 agencies involved in implementing foreign aid since 2000 (see list below). (This does not include the agencies involved in

result, American foreign aid is characterized by "distinctive executive-Congressional" dynamics (Brown 2020), which shape the nature, process, politics, and purposes of U.S. assistance. Most notably, Congress annually determines the level of funding available for U.S. aid—so much so that the chair of the relevant House Committee reminded the Secretary of State, "*I may not give you everything that you want, but I am the one who gives you everything you get*"[13] (emphasis added). When the Trump Administration wished to cut foreign aid, a Republican Congress prevented them; when the Biden Administration sought to increase support for Ukraine in 2023, Congress stalled for months. Key committee members also influence the allocation of American aid—a power which former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair Robert Menendez (D-NJ) has been implicated for abusing (having been accused of having received cash and gold in exchange for using this influence to increase aid to Egypt).

Foreign aid budgets are a chance for executive-legislative bargaining over the entire foreign policy agenda. The President sets an agenda, signals priorities, and proposes funding levels. Congress shapes the agenda, reacts to the President by endorsing, rejecting, and substituting some of its own priorities, and then passes appropriations that reflect this compromise agenda. Congress disposes and the way in which it does so reveals the disposition of Congress towards the agenda of the President. This is particularly salient when foreign policy and the appropriations process overlap—two dynamics that engender bargaining, compromise, and cooperation between the executive and legislative branches. Aid appropriations, in particular, provide a chance to compete or collaborate over the foreign policy agenda, depending on the state of the working relationship between the President and the Congress.

Figure 1.1 uses original data on U.S. aid appropriations (excluding supplemental funding) to plot the level of funding requested by each President (colored areas) against the level of funding appropriated by Congress (solid black line). (I rely on an original typology of U.S. foreign aid (introduced initially in **Chapter 2** and extensively in **Chapter 8**) to group aid accounts into seven different categories that reflect the primary purposes of the core U.S. foreign aid budget[14]:

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export promotion like the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation or foundations like the National Endowment for Democracy or U.S. Institute for Peace.)

The donor with the next highest number of agencies involved is Germany. To analyze the U.S. and Germany in a comparable way, I rely on DonorTracker's identification of prominent government agencies involved in aid (See **Appendix 1**). By this measure the U.S. has 7 major agencies involved in aid while Germany has 3.


In addition to the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense, this includes the African Development Foundation, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor, Department of the Army, Department of the Treasury, Executive Offices of the President, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Open World Leadership Center, Corps of Civil Engineers, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, Federal Trade Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Peace Corps, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Navy, Environmental Protection Agency, Inter-American Foundation, National Science Foundation, and the Trade and Development Agency.

[13] Sonny Callahan, Chairman of SFOPS, House of Representatives. (2000 April 11). Appropriations Committee. State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee Hearing. https://www.congress.gov/106/chrg/CHRG-106hhrg65471/CHRG-106hhrg65471.pdf.

[14] Again, this will be defined in greater detail in coming chapters. For my purposes, I consider the "core" foreign aid budget to be the aid accounts managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of

democracy, development, health, humanitarian, military, strategic, and security assistance. Within these seven types, I refer to strategic and security assistance together as **"security plus"** and health and development together as **"development plus"** to capture two of the most salient categories of U.S. foreign aid. These two groupings are the largest country-allocated portfolios of aid, managed primarily by the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development, respectively. As **Figure 1.1** suggests, Presidents request budgets, but Congress ultimately decides. Trump failed to enact his desired budget cuts for development and humanitarian assistance from Congress. Obama received less military assistance than he requested; Bush received more health aid than he requested.

Figure 1.1
The President Proposes; Congress Disposes: Requests vs. Appropriated Levels



Though Presidents can indeed request any level of funding, they can only request. Congress decides how much to give, and this decision centers on the recommendations made by the House and Senate Appropriations subcommittee, **State and Foreign Operations (SFOPS).** Existing work ignores the key role that Congress plays in shaping budgets and policy through the committee system. Where the role of Congress in aid has been evaluated, the focus has been primarily on the connection between voting on foreign aid and benefits to members of Congress from aid procurement contracts for their districts or on the role that lobbyists play in pressuring Congress. While important, this overlooks the most powerful Congressional player in determining aid budgets: the Appropriations Committee. When Congress votes on aid, they are voting on bills put forward by the Appropriations Committee.[15] It also overlooks the extent to which foreign aid functions as

State (State), and the Department of Defense (DoD) that fund "bilateral economic assistance" and "international security assistance."

[15] Other relevant committees may also put forward potential legislation related to foreign aid, but, as later chapters in this dissertation will explain, in the current polarized environment, the appropriations process is one of the only reliable

foreign policy for Congress. To date, there is almost no analysis of U.S. foreign aid that takes into account this uniquely complex aid architecture and the executive-legislative dynamics that so distinctively shape it. Failing to account for these political dynamics oversimplifies assessments of donor motivations and introduces bias, confusion, and noise into existing empirical work on U.S. foreign aid funding and allocation. (In **Chapter 7**, I draw on elite interview and archival research to systematically detail the process that generates U.S. aid decisions.)


Indeed, one drawback of existing aid data under analysis is that it obscures the political process by which decisions are made in the U.S. context and submerges the role of Congressional committees in aid funding and allocation. Throughout this dissertation, I draw on original data on U.S. foreign aid appropriations collected and constructed over the course of three years. (More information on data collection for this dissertation is available in **Chapter 8**.) This includes an original panel dataset (2500 country-year observations, 1999-2015) from previously unanalyzed U.S. government documents, which enables comparison before and after direct Congressional involvement in the allocation process. I also use data on the funding levels for aid accounts proposed by the President, recommended by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and ultimately enacted by Congress (400 observations, 1994-2021). (This is the data presented in **Figure 1.1**.) While the collection and analysis of this data will be covered extensively in later chapters, I draw on it throughout this introduction to underscore the extent to which executive-legislative dynamics shape U.S. foreign aid.

1.4 The Appropriations Committee at the Heart of Executive-Legislative Dynamics

The Appropriations Committee in the House and the Senate operates at the crossroads of these executive-legislative interactions. When Congress disposes, it relies heavily on the recommendations of the Appropriations Committee, whose responsibility it is to scrutinize the President's budget on behalf of Congress. **Figure 1.2** tracks the funding levels recommended by the House Appropriations Committee (in green), the Senate Appropriations Committee (in blue), and the level ultimately enacted by Congress (in black). The amount finally enacted by Congress through identical appropriations legislation passed by the House and Senate closely tracks the levels recommended by the House and the Senate **State and Foreign Operations** subcommittee, which has particular responsibility for aid appropriations.

methods to get legislation to the floor of the House and the Senate, giving the Appropriations Committee disproportionate power over what Congress gets to vote on.

Figure 1.2
House and Senate SFOPS Recommendations for Funding Levels



Congress relies on the specialization enabled by the committee system to produce the high-quality knowledge needed to govern well (Curry 2019). This means that legislators on relevant committees disproportionately dominate policymaking within the areas in which they have jurisdiction. Essentially, these legislators propose Congressional policy positions to the membership at large. This is, in part, why David King (1997) argues that "turf" or "*which committees get to decide things*" matters, because it "defines a legislative committee. Jurisdictions are property rights over issues." The "property rights" over foreign aid and foreign policy have become increasingly concentrated in the Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations (**SFOPS**). The former chair of the House committee dedicated to foreign policy[16] has expressed his frustration that "[t]he greatest concentration of foreign policy power in Congress resides now in the appropriations committees".[17]

When a committee produces a bill to be considered by the wider Congress, the contents of that bill have been crafted primarily by the relevant committee. Committee members therefore act in the role of "policy maker" on behalf of Congress. Legislative scholars assess that, while a risk, conferring this power on committee legislators can enhance the quality of information and therefore the quality of policymaking in which Congress can engage (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1987). For this same reason, non-committee legislators tend to defer to committee members as specialists on issues within the committee's jurisdiction (Shepsle and Weingast 1987).

As a result, both formally and informally, bills emerging from committee possess procedural and legislative advantages. As Shepsle (1992) articulates, "committees bring forth bills that have three advantages. First, as the principal motion before a chamber, a committee bill has a privileged position in the order of voting. Second, and related, the legislative approach contained in the committee bill affects the way in which legislative deliberation proceeds. Third, the committee bill is given additional procedural protections."

How Congress votes determines the fate of the proposal, but, as with every piece of legislation that emerges from committee, the committee determines the option set on which members can vote. The same former member of Congress quoted above complained about the position this put Congress in during the late 1960s and early 1970s:

> *"It was difficult for Congress to block funding for the [Vietnam] war effort without holding up all appropriations for defense or denying U.S. combat forces the means to defend themselves. At the time, no amendments were allowed on defense appropriation bills, which were decided by a single yes-no vote. Many of us who had reservations about the war did not want to use the blunt, and politically unpopular, tool of rejecting entire defense appropriations bills.*[18]

Reforms a few years later curbed some of these excesses in committee power, but the Appropriations Committee still fundamentally shapes the levels of foreign aid funding on which the rest of Congress votes. Members can propose amendments, but it is tough to garner the votes

[16] Lee Hamilton (D-IN), former chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (also known for part of this period as the Committee on International Relations)
[17] Hamilton, L., & Tama, J. (2002). *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
[18] Hamilton, L., & Tama, J. (2002). *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

required to overturn the recommendations of the Appropriations Committee, which does not bring a bill to the floor without doing the appropriations "math" to ensure adequate support.[19] Moreover, appropriators are specialists in their issue area—compared to the rest of Congress, they have access to more information about their jurisdiction and have greater time and resources to devote to it. Appropriators know what they want in the bill and they know what they need to get support for their bill on the floor. The Appropriations Committee is as unique as the U.S. foreign aid process itself—neither of which is well-understood or integrated into current explanations of U.S. foreign assistance.

Many existing studies of the U.S. also neglect the historical reality that foreign aid emerged as a tool of foreign policy and this has lasting political ramifications for the way that Congress—and the Appropriations Committee specifically—interacts with foreign aid. Existing data on U.S. aid obscures the depth to which these dynamics shape foreign aid funding and allocation decisions as the data primarily reflects the decisions made *after* Congressional involvement in the process. Everything we think we know about U.S. aid has the fingerprints of Congress all over it—unbeknownst to most scholars. This introduces measurement error into existing analyses of U.S. aid allocation.

1.5 The Presidential-Congressional Politics of Foreign Policy

Foreign aid is fundamentally tied to foreign policy in the United States—which gives relevant Congressional committees particular incentives to shape certain categories of foreign aid in alignment with key national interests. The United States is not unique in using foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy (Morgenthau 1962, Dietrich, Mahmud, and Winters 2018), though it is the originator of the practice. However, the United States is unique in the way it formulates foreign policy, and this has profound implications for its approach to foreign aid.

Foreign affairs in the United States, as structured in the Constitution, creates "tension between the presidency and the Congress when it comes to making foreign policy...[t]he focus is on shared responsibility and an 'invitation to struggle' (Corwin 1948)" (Hermann 2012). Scholars have often assigned, as Corwin does, "the 'lion's share [of these powers] … to the President'" (Hastedt 2012). Yet, as Carter and Scott (2012) note, "[t]his common perspective fails to account for the consequential policy makers in Congress who play important roles and have significant impacts on American foreign policy." Both branches are powerful in foreign policy, but their powers are varied in nature.

Foreign policy can be conceptualized as a toolkit, containing a range of policy instruments such as economic sanctions, international trade policy and treaties, immigration policy, foreign aid, diplomacy, military spending, military deployments, and military intervention, used to advance an agenda.[20] Some instruments (like military deployments) allow Presidents to move more quickly and

[19] Reynolds, M. E., & Hanson, P. C. (2023, August). Just How Unorthodox? Assessing Lawmaking on Omnibus Spending Bills. In *The Forum* (Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 213-238). De Gruyter.

[20] I use the framework put forward by Milner and Tingley (2015) as a starting point, while adding diplomacy and distinguishing between military deployments and interventions here. Senior policymakers frequently refer to "tools of foreign policy" or the "foreign policy toolkit." Both Milner and Tingley (2015) and this dissertation attempt to formalize that notion further.

require less consultation with Congress while others require extensive bargaining with the legislature (like foreign aid funding). The growing imperative for rapid Presidential responses to global events can make foreign policy tools that bypass Congress more attractive—these options typically involve the military, like the Obama Administration's deployment of U.S. military personnel to West Africa to support national governments in containing the Ebola crisis (Rice 2019; Power 2019).

Milner and Tingley (2015) classify seven foreign policy instruments—economic sanctions, international trade policy and treaties, immigration policy, foreign aid (economic and geopolitical), military spending, and military deployments—according to their degree of information asymmetry, ideological divisions, and their potential for distribution in a way that confers electoral benefits. They argue that "[d]ifferent instruments have different politics associated with them" depending on these characteristics. Presidents are in a stronger position vis-à-vis Congress when foreign policy tools have high information asymmetry (the President knows more than Congress), low ideological divisions (the tool is not highly polarized along ideological lines), and low distributional potential (there is little electoral benefit from controlling the instrument). As a result, they perceive Presidents as being in the strongest position on economic sanctions and military deployments (and geopolitical aid) and the weakest position on trade and domestic military spending (and economic aid).

Foreign Aid as a Multipurpose Instrument of Foreign Policy

From its very inception in the Marshall Plan, foreign aid was designed by American policymakers to be multifaceted in nature so it could serve multiple purposes in U.S. foreign policy simultaneously—this complicates decision-making dynamics because it means multiple agencies have high-level involvement in aid in order to deliver on this broad range of goals. As a foreign policy instrument, foreign aid, therefore, represents the widest cross-section of the U.S. foreign policy ecosystem, integrating development, diplomacy, and defense. Furthermore, because foreign aid is an instrument of foreign policy that requires annual funding, it is subject to the appropriations process. This gives foreign aid a particular salience for Congress within the overall foreign policy agenda—because foreign aid contains the whole of the foreign policy establishment in miniature.[21] Ultimately, the multipurpose nature of aid and its regular appropriations give Congress greater leverage to shape the foreign policy agenda compared to other instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

In the case of foreign aid, Milner and Tingley divide assistance into two categories—economic and geopolitical. Economic aid is focused on more traditional development aims, such as health, education, and economic growth while geopolitical aid is more typically military and security assistance. The authors posit that economic aid has high distributional consequences, high ideological divisions (because Democrats are thought to be more supportive of development aid than Republicans), and low information asymmetry. It has the potential to be directed in ways that benefit constituents (since USAID contracts can be awarded to partners and suppliers in members' districts). Lobbyists will therefore supply Congress with high volumes of information about these programs. Geopolitical aid, by contrast, has lower distributional consequences, low ideological divisions, and higher information asymmetry as it mainly involves military and security assistance. Congress is less likely to know the granular details of these programs and there are few other suppliers of information. Geopolitical aid is harder to distribute to supporters. The close association

[21] Meernik, J., Krueger, E. L., & Poe, S. C. (1998). Testing Models of U.S. Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid during and after the Cold War. *The Journal of Politics*, *60*(1), 63–85. https://doi.org/10.2307/2648001

with national security and the information asymmetry between the executive and legislative branches suggest that Presidents have a stronger position with geopolitical aid than with economic aid.

I add an additional component to this framework: the regularity of the foreign policy instrument. Some instruments of foreign policy—such as sanctions, military deployment, and trade agreements—are **"situation-responsive."**[22] They tend to be deployed or recalibrated in response to world events or a big policy push by the President or Congress. Decisions about these aspects of foreign policy tend not to occur routinely or predictably, but are made as officials are "overtaken by events." Meanwhile, other instruments are **"routine"** in that decisions are made at regular intervals that the President and Congress both anticipate. The rules and roles of executive-legislative engagement are well-defined and familiar to both parties. I therefore classify any instrument Congress regularly appropriates as **"routine"** rather than **"situation-responsive."**

Funding for foreign aid and military spending fall into this category, providing key opportunities for committees to influence policy through budget politics. This has become even more prominent as polarization has increased. As Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis (2008) establish, "members of Congress actually vote on foreign policy initiatives with less and less frequency"; instead "the budget is the battleground upon which many of the most significant policy debates are fought." Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski (2013) reiterate,

> *Congress's two most important responsibilities are writing the nation's laws and passing its budgets. Of late, the two responsibilities have melded into one. During the modern era, members have taken to embedding a wide range of policy initiatives into appropriations, which enjoy the advantage of coming before Congress every single year. Policy and budget debates, therefore, are often interchangeable, making annual appropriations a vitally important arena for presidents to pursue their policy initiatives.*

In a 1998 memoir written with his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, President George H.W. Bush described how with rising polarization and the end of the Cold War, "[f]oreign policy and budget politics became mingled".[23]

Appropriations are integral to the financing of foreign policy. With the decline of the authorizing process in Congress with rising polarization,[24] this means that the appropriations of defense and foreign aid are the most reliable and direct ways for Congress to weigh in on and shape the foreign policy agenda of the President. Foreign aid, in particular, is highly salient for Congress because it represents a significant cross-section of the foreign policy agenda space, where the key U.S. foreign policy actors involved in development, diplomacy, and defense interact. Meernik, Krueger, and Poe (1998) have also argued that the "foreign aid budget is…a microcosm of U.S. foreign policy (Hinckley 1994; Riddell 1987). According to Riddell (1987), the foreign aid program *is*

[22] I borrow this term from the Congressional Research Service (particularly, the report IF11515 by Brown 2020)—which categorizes foreign aid accounts as either country-allocated or situation-responsive. I expand the meaning and apply the term more broadly as I think it captures an important characteristic of different tools of U.S. foreign policy—some are more "planned" and predictable while others are more responsive and reactive.

[23] Bush, G., & Scowcroft, B. (1998). *A world transformed* (1st ed.). Knopf.

[24] The decline of the authorizing process will be explained and discussed extensively in Chapter 4.

the U.S. foreign policy budget" (emphasis added). Likewise, a former Appropriations cardinal[25] identified the annual "foreign aid bill as the main way Congress expresses itself on foreign policy" (Interview, Wright 2023).

Like Milner and Tingley (2015), I argue that Congress will treat different forms of aid differently, because of the executive-legislative dynamics that shape U.S. foreign policy. Their differentiation between types of aid reflects the crucial reality that aid has multiple purposes—a feature that matters to Congress and especially to the Appropriations Committee. However, where Milner and Tingley see Congress as deferring to the President on geopolitical aid, I argue that this type of aid is particularly salient to Congress as a chance to shape the foreign policy agenda. In their conception, a main motivation for Congressional deference to Presidents revolves around information asymmetry, the extent to which the President knows more about geopolitical aid than members of Congress. This is presumably because while lobbyists can monitor and inform Congress about development and health aid given the extent to which it is implemented by NGOs, charities, universities, and the private sector, there is no comparable source for Congress to receive information about geopolitical aid.

However, this overlooks the role of Congressional committees and the extent of "information processing between the bureaucracy and the congressional committee system" (Workman 2015). Congressional committees can compel information from the bowels of the bureaucracy to the floor of Congress through hearings and simply by the nature of the power of their office (Interviews, Wright 2022). As one official remarked to me in an interview, when a member of Congress calls, everything stops until the request has been fulfilled or the question answered. If information asymmetry exists between the President and Congress **and** Congress wants information, that asymmetry will collapse. Not least because Workman (2015) argues that Congress encourages overlapping jurisdictions and "compet[ition] to supply information" among the government agencies to which it delegates power as a means of ensuring accountability and control.

If one agency refuses to supply information to a relevant committee, another will. Moreover, the refusal to supply information carries consequences for an agency's future relationship with Congress and jeopardizes its funding. Invoking national security may provide a shield to maintain some pockets of information asymmetry, but there are unlikely to be vast disparities in the information available to both the President and Congress from the executive agencies involved in foreign assistance. (Even when it comes to national security information asymmetry, in the last thirty years, members and Chairs of the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee have frequently been members of the "Gang of Eight" which receive the highest levels of intelligence briefings available to only the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, the Majority and Minority Leader in the Senate, and House and Senate Chair and Ranking Member of the Intelligence Committees.) Interviews with both executive and legislative branch officials revealed that there is constant ongoing communication between the appropriating subcommittee staff and foreign aid agencies. Interviews also confirmed that the subcommittee has tremendous power to reach down into any office under their oversight and request information or induce action (Interviews, Wright 2022).

[25] Cardinals are another name for the chairs of House Appropriations, subcommittees. As Berry and Fowler (2016) explain the House "committee's power over federal spending is considered so great that the chairs of its 12 subcommittees have earned the moniker of 'cardinals.'"

1.6 Conclusion

Since its inception, foreign aid has been at the heart of the executive-legislative struggle to shape the foreign policy agenda. Because foreign aid must be annually funded through appropriations legislation enacted by Congress, this provides Congress a consistent, routine, predictable avenue to weigh in on Presidential foreign policy. This is true of no other instrument of American foreign policy, except for military budgets, both of which follow the appropriations cycle.

Yet considerable tension existed between the President and Congress throughout the Cold War as Congress felt confined to reacting to Presidential decisions, instead of being meaningfully consulted as an important partner in the process. Congress used legislative reforms to gradually reassert its role in American foreign policy, such that by the end of the Cold War, Presidents would increasingly be required to consult with Congress on key foreign policy decisions.[26] This has had tremendous implications for foreign aid, one of the few annually-appropriated instruments of foreign policy and a touchstone of the foreign policy agenda because of its multipurpose, multi-agency nature.

Aid has always been an important component of the foreign policy agenda and annually-appropriated instruments offer the most reliable opportunities for Congress to comment on President foreign policy. However, for much of the post-World War II era, aspects of foreign policy remained fragmented across multiple committees who did not have the leverage of the power of the purse that the Appropriations Committee had. Rising polarization and key reforms in Congress elevated the power of the Appropriations Committee in foreign policy by consolidating the power of the purse with the power to set policy. By the mid-1990s, the Appropriations Committee had gained unprecedented power in American foreign policy because of its leverage in aid appropriations through the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee. One of the core arguments of this dissertation is that the Appropriations Committee has gained tremendous powers in foreign policy in the last thirty years—yet few outside of Congress have noticed—because scholars have overlooked the extent to which foreign aid has been tied to American foreign policy since the Marshall Plan and the power of Congress over this type of foreign policy instrument.

This dissertation aims to explore both the role of Congress in foreign aid and how foreign aid functions as foreign policy for key Congressional decision-makers. I begin in **Chapter 2** by engaging with existing literature which conceptualizes foreign aid as an electoral liability for members of Congress. I argue that foreign aid functions more as foreign policy (than it does as electoral politics) for senior legislators. To further substantiate this claim, I turn to the origins of American aid in **Chapter 3**. I use archival (government) sources to trace the origins of American foreign assistance beginning with the Marshall Plan and document the extent to which aid emerged in the American context as a multipurpose tool of foreign policy and one built from extensive Presidential-Congressional partnership on a broad coalition of public and Congressional support (with the expectation that Congress would have access to extensive information).

Chapter 4 details how these fundamental pillars undergirding aid weakened in the decades after the Marshall Plan as Congress struggled to assert itself as a full and equal partner to the President throughout the Cold War and how this impacted the willingness of legislators to fund aid robustly. **Chapters 5** and **6** explore the crisis in U.S. foreign policy after the collapse of Communism

[26] This trend is discussed extensively in Chapters 3 and 4.

and the revival of support for foreign aid through the role of advocacy groups, reconnecting aid to U.S. engagement in the world. These chapters also detail the rising power of the Appropriations Committee in this period.

In **Chapters 7** and **8**, I draw on elite interviews, archival research, and original data to build a new framework for the American aid process, a new typology of U.S. aid, and original data that reflects the role of Congress. In **Chapter 7**, I clarify the scope and extent of Congressional involvement in U.S. aid, particularly the Appropriations Committee and its subcommittee State and Foreign Operations (SFOPS), which is responsible for the bulk of U.S. foreign assistance. I provide a detailed and systematic understanding of the processes that govern U.S. aid—unpacking the "black box" of American decision-making in the most extensive detail to date.

In **Chapter 8**, I introduce my own novel typology of U.S. foreign assistance, which can classify U.S. foreign aid into different tools of foreign policy. Because I build this typology from Treasury accounts, it also allows direct comparison of the President's proposed budget to Congressional outcomes. (This approach also provides valuable, timely information source about Presidential priorities in U.S. aid for the future—particularly because it can categorize and compare Presidential budgets as soon as they are presented to Congress. Relying on the current U.S. Government databases and the categories and labels applied by officials at the final stages of the project level delays analysis by at least two years.) I also present multiple new datasets on U.S. foreign assistance compiled as part of this dissertation in this chapter. This novel data reflects the appropriations process and the role of Congress in foreign aid, enabling comparison of aid budgets and allocation before and after Congressional involvement in decision-making. Existing data on U.S. aid obscures the depth to which these dynamics shape foreign aid funding and allocation decisions as the data primarily reflects the decisions made *after* Congressional involvement in the process. The new framework, typology, and data introduced are all intended to enable scholars and practitioners the ability to incorporate the role of Congress and the extent of Congressional involvement in aid into empirical analyses moving forward.

In **Chapter 9**, I propose a new model of Presidential-Congressional foreign policy relationships and use original aid budget data to categorize these relationships since 1994. The depth and nature of Presidential-Congressional partnerships has been vital to aid since its inception and this chapter enhances our understanding of how this relationship fluctuates across time and within Administrations. **Chapter 10** analyzes original data on aid appropriations and demonstrates that legislators engage with aid as a multipurpose instrument of foreign policy. While divided Congresses cut "security plus" assistance, they maintain the "development plus" budget. I argue these patterns are tied to the foreign policy purposes of these different forms of aid. **Chapter 11** concludes, drawing on the recent Presidential-Congressional battle over aid to Ukraine as a case study of two of the most important features of American aid: the pivotal role of Congress in the executive-legislative dynamics surrounding aid and aid's relationship to U.S. foreign policy.

Because the process and politics of U.S. aid appropriations are extremely complex, I employ a mixed-methods approach—combining archival research, elite interviews, data collection, and quantitative analysis—to build a nuanced understanding of the U.S. aid environment and decision-

making process. I visited archives in Washington, D.C.[27], Arizona,[28] and Illinois[29] on eight different occasions. I create multiple original datasets on U.S. foreign aid appropriations, compiled from archival work and government documents. I conducted 18 elite interviews with 15 current and former members of Congress, committee staff, and specialists in U.S. aid agencies (supplemented by non-U.S. government interviews for comparison of U.S. practices to those of other major aid donors). (Details about these can be found in **Appendix 2**.)

Elite interviews can provide an unprecedented level of access to information about decision-making and the informal and unwritten processes that govern American foreign aid, but also run the risk of introducing bias into the research process. To counteract these potential dangers, I interview both current and former policymakers and legislators, to compare perspectives and the information provided by both those who are currently involved in American aid policy and those who have left and are able to speak more freely about their past roles. I also use interviews from across government to corroborate what any one branch, agency or office says against what others say. Where possible, I confirm all information provided in external sources. Archival work and data analysis provide opportunities to triangulate key insights, so that, while richly informative, I am not solely reliant on elite interviews for any of the major findings in this research project.

The dissertation unfolds in four parts. The next chapter stands alone as the theory section, providing motivation for why legislators engage with foreign aid as foreign policy. This framing of aid as having both "hard" and "soft" foreign policy purposes—its multipurpose nature—is foundational to American foreign aid. Thus, the second section begins with the story of American foreign aid, its emergence and evolution from 1946 to the present, tracing the role of Congress and the pillars upon which Congressional support has been predicated. This section draws primarily on archival and historical sources. The third part of the dissertation draws on both elite interviews and archival work to carefully detail the extensive role of the Appropriations Committee in U.S. foreign aid. It sets forth a new typology of American aid, based on its foreign policy purposes, and introduces a wealth of new data collected for this dissertation that more fully reflects the role of Congress in aid. The final section analyzes this new data to provide greater insight into Congressional engagement with foreign aid and underscore how the dynamics of foreign aid as foreign policy shape Congressional reactions.

[27] January-May 2022; December 2023, April, June, and September 2024
[28] April 2023; August 2024
[29] June 2022

Part 1

The Theory of Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy

2 Foreign Aid is Foreign Policy for Congress
Aid as Electoral Politics and Aid as Foreign Policy

> *"…those who constantly demagogue foreign aid as being the root of our financial problems, please stop, because you don't know what the hell you're talking about…This account, I believe, is the smartest use of federal dollars of any place within the federal government."*[30]
>
> Lindsey Graham (R-SC),
> Chair of Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations

> *"We should have learned that what happens in far-off places can have very terrible consequences for Americans here at home."*[31]
>
> Patrick Leahy (D-VT),
> Chair of Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on State and Foreign Operations

2.1 Introduction

In the American system, budgets are a negotiation between the President and Congress. Within this system, Presidents put forward a budget (thereby signaling Administration priorities to Congress) and Congress evaluates the budget through the Appropriations Committee in the House and Senate. Appropriators recommend adjustments to proposed funding levels, increasing or decreasing the President's budget for different sectors of government spending for which they are responsible. Congress then votes on appropriations legislation, which, when passed, gives the legal permission for money to be withdrawn from the Treasury and spent on government activities (at the levels specified by Congress in its legislation).

Without appropriations legislation, there is no funding for the government. This is a distinctive feature of the American system. Consequently, in this "bargaining game" between the President and Congress, Congress not only gets the final word on spending but can shut the government down by refusing to appropriate money for its activities. As the House chair of the subcommittee that appropriates foreign aid reminded Secretary of State Colin Powell in May 2001, *"We all know our Constitution gives Presidents exceptional powers in foreign affairs but reserves the power of the purse to Congress. Such a division can, of course, result in a stalemate."*[32]

The underlying assumption of much of the existing literature on Congress and aid is that legislators are more willing to support the President on the security components of aid, but electoral incentives undermine support for development purposes of aid. However, this ignores the reality that Congress maintains tremendous control over the funding of foreign aid, through the Appropriations Committee, and consistently funds the foreign aid budget—often at higher levels than requested by the President. Certain types of foreign aid can be converted into constituent

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[30] Tama, J. (2024). *Bipartisanship and US foreign policy: cooperation in a polarized age*. Oxford University Press.
[31] U.S. Senate. (2002 February 26). Senate Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.
[32] Italics added; James Kolbe, Chair of State and Foreign Operations, House of Representatives. (2001 May 10). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. https://www.congress.gov/107/chrg/CHRG-107hhrg75037/CHRG-107hhrg75037.pdf. Accessed 3 March 2022.

benefits, but there is relatively little money in this compared to other opportunities available to legislators.

Instead, aid appears to carry significant electoral risks for legislators who support it and yet many continue to do so. This puzzle can be explained by recognizing the link between foreign aid and foreign policy for key legislators. For these members, foreign aid functions as foreign policy, with development aid serving "softer" foreign policy purposes and security assistance "harder" foreign policy priorities. Members then use their institutional positions on key committees and in Congressional leadership to leverage wider support for aid.

The power of the purse is exercised primarily through the committee system. Committees are integral to the legislative process in the U.S. Congress (Baumgartner and Jones 2015, Shepsle and Weingast 1987, Wilson 1885) as well as to the appropriations process. For any given issue area in the U.S. Congress, there are two types of committees (and their component subcommittees) that possess jurisdiction: *authorizing* committees and an *appropriating* committee. There may be multiple authorizing committees that overlap in their jurisdiction, but there is only one appropriating committee. Authorizing committees legislate *policy* in bills while the appropriating committee enacts *funding* levels that allow agencies to draw funds from the Treasury for their activities. Without this legislative permission, there is no funding.

Reforms and rule changes in the latter twentieth century have reshaped some of the existing conventions, particularly in the House, such that contemporary subcommittees are a key locus of power in the legislature and appropriating subcommittees have gained power to set policy at the expense of authorizing committees.[33] This combined role of appropriations and *de-facto* authorization significantly concentrates power over foreign aid on the legislative branch side within the relevant appropriating subcommittee, **State and Foreign Operations (SFOPS)** because it consolidates the power of policy with the power of the purse (discussed extensively in **Chapters 5 and 6**).

Because the United States is distinctive in the extent of control that the legislature exerts over foreign aid, scholars have argued this opens up important avenues for electoral politics in foreign aid. I propose such extensive legislative involvement likewise affords opportunities for

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[33] Bill Young, Chair of the full Appropriations Committee from 1999-2005, actually wrote a letter to Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert to complain about the shift of authorizing work onto Appropriations: "I have to say that the existence of a must-pass appropriations bill all too often results in an inappropriate misuse of the authorizing legislative process. This is a problem I don't want or need" (April 7, 1999, Hastert Papers Box 7, Wheaton College). Nonetheless, authorizing language continues to be a part of the appropriations process, leaving significant scope for the appropriating subcommittee and its staff to participate in policymaking. As, Jim Dyer, a former clerk of SFOPS, commented, with the "breakdown of the authorization process. Appropriations are the only bills in town" (Miller Center 2008). In her work on partisan polarization and foreign aid spending, Shannon Carcelli (2024) comments that "using appropriations committees allowed parties to negotiate behind closed doors (Felton 1986), which made compromise more politically palatable despite polarization".

Carcelli, S. P. (2024). Congressional polarization and limitation riders in foreign aid appropriations. In *Polarization and US Foreign Policy: When Politics Crosses the Water's Edge* (pp. 219-258). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland.

Dyer, James. [Oral History.] 2008 January 23. University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/james-dyer-oral-history. Accessed 18 May 2022.

committee-led foreign policymaking in foreign aid and that this is the paradigm through which aid should be analyzed.

2.2 The Appropriations Process Creates Opportunities for Electoral Politics

The role of Congress in determining funding for foreign aid creates scope for electoral politics to operate. This is the most dominant lens through which scholars have studied Congressional involvement in foreign aid. Foreign aid is thought to be unpopular with constituents, who overestimate the amount that the U.S. government spends. Polls reveal that Americans believe 25% of the federal budget goes to foreign aid, while the actual figure is 1% or less (Ingram 2019; CSIS 2019).[34] This is thought to incentivize members of Congress to vote against foreign aid bills. One former SFOPS Chair bragged that in his district "when I say, 'Folks, I voted against increasing foreign aid,' they seem to like that."[35]

Key legislators from the **State and Foreign Operations subcommittee** confirm that it is difficult to communicate to constituents effectively about both the level of spending on and the benefits of foreign aid to the American public. In one interview of forty-five minutes with two former chairs of the SFOPS subcommittee, this topic recurs at least three times, with former Democratic Chair Nita Lowey (D-NY) commenting that "I won't say that we're successful at getting it [this message] out, because the majority of the public still does not support foreign aid, which is unfortunate".[36] Kay Granger (R-TX), also a former Chair of the same subcommittee, highlights that this problem is wider than simply the American public, that members of Congress also grossly overestimate spending on foreign assistance. She recalls,

> *several years ago, there was a large, large group of Republicans elected at one time and a lot of them ran against any foreign assistance and so [Majority Leader] Eric Cantor and I—it was Eric who said "we really need to do some work because they ran against any foreign assistance"—so we had meetings with them and one member said, "we just throw all that money away; it doesn't do anything."*
>
> *So I did my "you know, this is what we do" and he said "all that money, all that money" and I said, "how much money do you think that we do spend on foreign assistance?" He said "30% of our entire budget" and I said, "no, no, it's not 30%." He turned to the member next to him and said, "It is, isn't it?" he said. And you could tell he had no idea. He said, "No, I think it's 20," he said.*

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[34] For comparison, the largest sector of the U.S. federal budget in FY2022 was Social Security at 19%. Defense and Medicare, each at 12%, together constitute approximately what the average American thinks is spent on foreign aid. (U.S. Department of the Treasury. Fiscal Data. "Spending Categories." https://fiscaldata.treasury.gov/americas-finance-guide/federal-spending/#:~:text=Federal%20government%20spending%20pays%20for,primary%20categories%3A%20mandatory%20and%20discretionary. Accessed 5 April 2023.)

[35] Friedman, T. (1999 October 20). "Foreign Affairs; Penny Pinchers." *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/20/opinion/foreign-affairs-penny-pinchers.html?searchResultPosition=10. Accessed 17 March 2024.

[36] Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.

> *"It's 1%. 1% is what we spend for foreign assistance and here's how we decide where that 1% goes and here's what we demand of them" and… he said, "you're wrong." I said, "**I write the bill. I know what I'm talking about.**" So there is, there is really disinformation out there, so I know Mrs. Lowey and I both constantly talk about that and talk about what we really get back, why we do it, not just out of the goodness of the spirit, which is part of it, but here's what we get in exchange—we get countries that we work with that are better, that have more opportunities, but we gain from that also.*[37]

Yet another former Chair generalized that either constituents don't care about aid or think the government is spending way too much. When pressed more closely, he reported that some constituents think up to 30-45% of the federal budget goes to aid—much like the story Granger tells about a freshman representative—and that constituents never put the figure below 10% of the budget (Interview, Wright 2022). He also confirmed that he emphasized the more compelling and concrete humanitarian aspects of aid like mitigating famine and investing in health alongside the economic and security benefits of aid (Interview, Wright 2022). Both Lowey and Granger likewise also periodically reference national security and benefits to Americans alongside education and health—an important focus for both women—in defending foreign assistance.[38] Granger underscored repeatedly that she uses any opportunity available to communicate with constituents about the value of foreign assistance, "So, for instance, when I go on trips, I talk about where I went, what I learned. I write e-newsletters. You know I make sure that everyone knows I'm not going just to have a good time. You don't go to Afghanistan to have a good time."[39]

Yet given the low information environment of the American electorate, such that voters are not aware of the actual budget percentage spent on foreign aid, constituents seem unlikely to track their representative's committee assignments and voting related to foreign aid closely. Powers, Tierney, and Leblang (2010) attempt to quantify this relationship, asking "Could a member's voting record on foreign aid bills really affect their chances of reelection? The data suggest that members of Congress understand their districts quite well and that foreign aid votes do shape their prospects at the ballot box." Why might this be the case if most voters are unaware of what bills their representatives are voting on, much less how they vote on them?

Milner and Tingley (2015) summarize the mechanics that drive this behavior, "As classic studies of the connection between Congress and the public have shown, legislators anticipate the reactions of their constituents. It is not because they think the public monitors their votes but rather that in the run-up to the next election, interest groups, challengers in the primary or general election, or the media may make a public issue out of one or more of their roll call votes." The potential for intense public scrutiny in the next election cycle means representatives are hyper-aware of their voting choices and "worry the public may punish them for any deviation from…the party line" (Milner and Tingley 2015). Indeed, following the April 2024 vote to pass more aid for Ukraine, several Republican members of Congress have faced challengers in the primaries, attacking them for their support for Ukraine. Yet even anticipating this, numerous Republican legislators still put their chances of reelection on the line.

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[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid.
[39] Ibid.

The standard line to explain such behavior is that aid also carries constituent benefits. Powers, Leblang, Tierney (2010) explain "[d]espite the 'foreign aid' label, much of this money remains in the United States, flowing to individuals and corporations who contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other government agencies to implement development projects." This creates cross-pressure that may increase legislators' support for foreign aid. As a result, there is a recent and growing body of work investigating how the distributive aspects of foreign aid shape legislators' support for it. Powers, Leblang, Tierney find (2010) that members of Congress are more supportive of aid when it benefits their districts, bolstered by a similar result from Milner and Tingley (2010) concerning economic aid.

Compared to other sources of "pork barrel" spending, however, aid is a small budget well to tap. It represents less than 1% of the federal budget. Moreover, members of Congress and members of the Appropriations Committee have the opportunity to submit requests for sectors of the budget that are far more likely to prove beneficial to their districts. For example, one previous Chair of SFOPS had one of the nation's largest defense contractors in his district. Rather than using his position on SFOPS, he submits requests to the Defense appropriations subcommittee that are clearly linked to businesses in his district. (Even here, though, electoral considerations do not play out as neatly as some of the literature suggests. I examine internal staff memos ranking the requests along with explanations for the priority order. The top priority of this particular Defense contractor is ranked only number 10 by this member of Congress.)[40]

Using the data available from Milner and Tingley (2010) about USAID contracts and voting behavior of the 107th Congress (2001-2002), I find that just 63 of 435 representatives in the House have USAID contracts awarded to a vendor in their district. This is only 14.48% of the House. The percentage of contracts awarded to the districts of members on the State and Foreign Operations Committee members is strikingly similar: only 2 of 13 members have contracts in their districts (15.38% of the committee). Given the contention that legislators need electoral rewards to support aid, this is a shockingly low percentage for the subcommittee. Especially as there is plenty of scope for electoral politics given that, in the House, members of Congress can submit annual requests to the Appropriations Committee which include requests for specific spending items. This means that every member of the House of Representatives can submit requests to fund projects in their districts and all these requests must be reviewed by subcommittee staff. Requests from members of the Appropriations Committee are even more privileged in this review process.

Through archival sources, I find that at least 41 members of the House Appropriations Committee submit 242 requests to the Chair regarding the foreign aid budget in 2005.[41] All but three of these members had one or more of their requests incorporated into the language of the committee report or the bill. (Two of these three members whose requests were denied were from the Chair's own party.) Assuming no dramatic change in prevalence of USAID contracts between 2002 and 2005, this would suggest that members' requests are not primarily targeting USAID contracts for their districts, given their relative paucity in the Milner and Tingley data. Even if there have been dramatic changes in contracts awarded across this period, the fact remains that when these requests are analyzed, 36% focus on health and development aid, but 28% are focused on the

[40] Kolbe, J. James Kolbe Papers. Box 96. Folder 11. University of Arizona Special Collections. Tucson, Arizona. Accessed April 2023 and August 2024.
96.11
[41] Ibid.

strategic and security assistance accounts that fund "harder" U.S. foreign policy priorities (and so are not funded through USAID contracts).

Agriculture and food aid are omitted both from my typology of aid and analysis, because they operate through a different agency (the Department of Agriculture) and are overseen by a different Congressional subcommittee (the Appropriations Subcommittee on Agriculture and Rural Development). This form of aid has been well-documented as one which has benefits for American farmers, a backbone of many Congressional constituencies. I do not attempt to argue that this is not the case, merely, that this relationship does not generalize to all other forms of aid.

Another source of data used to assess whether members of Congress are more supportive of aid when it benefits their districts comes from a 1979-2004 dataset put together by Milner and Tingley focused on "amendments, which sought a general increase or decrease in foreign aid appropriations" (Powers, Tierney, Leblang 2010). The dataset spans the late Cold War to early War on Terror—periods which saw remarkable evolutions and reinventions of foreign aid. This makes these decades challenging to compare to one another. In the post-Cold War period, many of these amendments are about increasing health aid (by re-allocating money from international organizations or export promotion agencies), but, while important, support for amendments is **not** the same as support for aid appropriations bills themselves.

By the time these amendments come up for a vote, funding levels have already been scrutinized and recommended by the Appropriations Committee and SFOPS subcommittee. The majority of the time, funding levels for health have already been increased above the level requested by the President. As a result, amendments examining increases for health are capturing support for an increase to the *already-increased* amount of aid given—a lack of support for these amendments seeking further increases overlooks the fact that in voting for the appropriations bill, legislators have *already* voted for an increase in health. It is not surprisingly therefore that there is little support for additional increases; if they had had sufficient support to begin with, this level of increase would have been incorporated into the initial bill. Lack of support for these amendments is not equivalent to a lack of support for aid.

Between 1994-2024 (the period primarily studied in this dissertation), the U.S. foreign aid budget rebounds from a historic low to the greatest sustained increase in resources since the Marshall Plan in 1948. Electoral benefits alone seem unlikely to generate this upsurge. I propose that foreign aid also functions as foreign policy for the Appropriations Committee.

Indeed, Jordan Tama (2024) identifies it as surprisingly promising arena for bipartisanship, because of

> *its low salience, the support of an ideologically diverse advocacy coalition for diplomatic and development spending, and the absence of concerted interest group opposition to it. Since international affairs spending is rarely the subject of public debate, lawmakers have relatively little incentive to use the issue to gain partisan advantage and considerable leeway to follow their own compass on it. The issue's low salience also means that many new lawmakers join Congress without strongly held preexisting positions on it, creating an opening for internationalist advocacy groups to influence their views.*

Foreign aid offers legislators a quiet, often behind-the-scenes opportunity to make foreign policy. It is a low-salience, high-impact issue arena in which legislators can shape American engagement with international partners and participate in solving pressing global challenges. It has an aura of Presidential glamor and can be a stepping-stone to important high-profile Congressional opportunities and Cabinet-level positions. It is also—as Tama identifies—an issue-area in which new members of Congress tend to be socialized by more senior members (who frequently have more interest in foreign policy) and advocacy groups. Granger's anecdote reveals the impressions with which freshmen members arrive.

One Tea Party Republican illustrates this incisively. He remembers traveling with one of these advocacy groups, the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC) to Ethiopia and Kenya returning as "a supporter of foreign aid": 'I know the attitude, and I've been guilty of it myself: 'Why would you invest over there instead of building bridges, building schools, doing stuff here?' …I'm learning in even more detail that our national defense and our diplomacy our intertwined…If these programs keep raising people's economic situation, their quality of life, their standard of living, it actually results in a direct benefit to us. Because they don't want anything to do with [terrorist organizations like] Al-Shabab.'"[42]

This is not a sentiment unique to contemporary legislators. In 1949, Republican Senator Jacob Javits reflected that "if we make it better for the other fellow, we will make it better for ourselves"[43]; in 1977, Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. insisted "national security is achieved not just by military power-necessary though that regrettably is-but by taking actions which subtract from the number of our potential enemies and add to the number and strength of our friends."[44] For members of Congress, foreign aid functions as a multipurpose tool of foreign policy with both "hard" and "soft" components.

Not all legislators are interested in exercising this power, but a significant cohort in Congress regularly appears willing to risk public blowback over aid for the chance to make foreign policy. This includes more salient cases such as aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan in April 2024 as well as in quieter contexts, as foreign aid appropriations bills are not generally so high-profile when they hit the floor of Congress for a vote. Strikingly, when Republican President Donald Trump attempted to gut the foreign aid budget, it was a Republican House and a Republican Senate that resoundingly rejected these brutal cuts—a veritable miracle if conventional wisdom about aid and Congress is to be believed.

2.3 The Appropriations Process Creates Opportunities for Committee-Led Foreign Policy

Foreign aid is more than just distributive politics and electoral risk and reward; it is also foreign policy for Congress. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), longtime member and former Chair of the

[42] Tama, J. (2024). *Bipartisanship and US foreign policy: cooperation in a polarized age*. Oxford University Press.
[43] Quote from Jacob Javits in 1949; McVety (2012), *Enlightened Aid: Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia*
[44] Cabot Lodge in the Foreword to Wilson, T. (1977). The Marshall Plan 1947-1951. Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series 236. Available from The Marshall Foundation. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The_Marshall_Plan_1941-1951.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2024.

House Committee on Foreign Affairs,[45] reflecting on his tenure in office, directly linked foreign aid (including its appropriation) and foreign policy: "I tried to use my position in the House to help shape a sound American foreign policy that promotes peace, stability, democracy, market, reform, and economic development…I also sought to improve the performance of Congress in foreign policy—for instance, by trying to reform the way it appropriates and oversees foreign aid."[46]

Since its ratification, the Constitution has encouraged a "creative tension" (as Hamilton describes it) between the Congress and the President on matters of foreign policy, "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing foreign policy."[47] For much of its history and in times of war, Congress has deferred to the President on foreign policy.[48] Even so, at the height of the Cold War, Congress became increasingly frustrated by the ways Presidents were conducting foreign policy—from the quagmire of the Vietnam War to discovering the involvement of the CIA in coup attempts across Latin American, Africa, and Asia. Congress began taking steps to re-assert itself in the making of American foreign policy. (I cover this extensively in **Chapter 4**).

Foreign aid had always been an opportunity for engagement with the President on foreign policy (and a flashpoint when executive-legislative tensions were running high over foreign policy). During the Cold War, it remained one of the few means for Congress to exert its foreign policy authority in a meaningful and regular way. Yet Congress still had to take steps to assert itself and wield this power given the dominance of Presidents in making foreign policy in this era. When the Cold War ended, foreign aid like American foreign policy had to be reinvented and recalibrated for a new era. Yet aid remained a pillar of Congressional foreign policy. If anything, this feature of foreign assistance intensified because of the growing powers of the Appropriations Committee. Today, in an environment of heightened polarization, the appropriations process provides one of the only clear avenues for legislation to reach the floor of Congress.

This means that, more than ever, it is vital to understand how the appropriations process works and the role of the Appropriations Committee in U.S. foreign aid and, by extension, U.S. foreign policy. For members of relevant Congressional committees,[49] most notably the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House Foreign Affairs, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, foreign aid functions as foreign policy. Yet the power of the Appropriations Committee has overshadowed that of traditional foreign affairs committees as the authorizing process has broken down in Congress. Hamilton expressed his frustration in 2002 that "[t]he greatest concentration of foreign policy power in Congress resides now in the appropriations committees…important foreign policy issues are now frequently decided in enormous omnibus bills worked out in secret, late-night negotiations among a limited group of Congressional leaders and White House and congressional staffs."

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[45] Hamilton served as Chair when the committee was known as International Relations. For ease and consistency, I refer to the committee as House Foreign Affairs throughout this dissertation so as not to confuse readers.
[46] Hamilton, L., & Tama, J. (2002). *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
[47] Hamilton summarizing and elaborating on Corwin in Hamilton, L., & Tama, J. (2002). *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
[48] Ibid.
[49] Most notably the Appropriations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The Core U.S. Foreign Aid Budget

For appropriators, different types of foreign aid are not equivalent. Each serves specialized purposes in a wider foreign policy strategy, initiated by the President and refined by Congress. For the purposes of this dissertation, I focus on a "core" group of aid accounts that are managed by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense. I rely on archival sources and elite interviews, as well as my own experience in the Department of State and State/USAID's joint Office of Foreign Assistance, to categorize the major Treasury accounts that fund U.S. foreign assistance. (This typology is extensively explained in **Chapter 8**.) (Details of interviews can be found in **Appendix 2**.)

Appropriators have conventions around how different aid accounts are grouped and what their purposes are. Aid, from the Congressional appropriations perspective, can be grouped into four broad categories (from the original seven in my typology): what I term **"development plus"** aid (development + health assistance), international security assistance (strategic + security + military assistance), humanitarian aid (refugee + disaster assistance), and democracy aid.[50] However, because appropriators are likely to distinguish between State Department and Department of Defense-controlled international security assistance accounts and between country-allocated and situation-responsive accounts, I refer to the country-allocated State accounts as **"security plus"** (security + strategic accounts) throughout this dissertation. When military aid is added to this grouping, it is referred to as "international security assistance" (with a reminder of the three categories included) or as **"security ++"** aid.

In this dissertation, I focus primarily on the two largest groupings of U.S. foreign aid which are allocated to individual countries: **"development plus"** and **"security plus".** Humanitarian and some military assistance is situation-responsive, meaning that money is pulled from these accounts throughout the year to respond to ongoing events and crises. Congress designates the level of resources available in these responsive accounts, but it is not linked to specific recipients up-front in the same way that country-allocated accounts are. This engenders different dynamics for Congressional funding. By contrast, when the Appropriations Committee recommends funding levels for country-allocated aid accounts like development, health, strategic and security assistance, it knows exactly where money will be going ahead of time. This can change, subject to events, but requires Congressional notification and approval of key committee members to do so.

These groupings are roughly analogous to what Milner and Tingley (2015) have called "economic" and "geopolitical" aid. They argue that Presidents will have more leverage with Congress with strategic-style assistance than development-style assistance. However, looking at appropriations data, it is clear that Congress frequently increases the amount of **"development plus"** aid given from what the President requested and cuts **"security plus"** assistance from the levels requested by the President. In the current literature, this is utterly counterintuitive. There is no explanation for why Congress would increase spending on health and development but cut strategic, security, and military assistance. The dynamics of foreign aid as foreign policy can illuminate this.

[50] This typology focuses only on 16 core accounts that fund U.S. aid as defined in **Chapter 8**. It excludes agricultural/food aid, export promotion, and funding for international organizations.

2.4 Development Plus as Soft Foreign Policy

"Development plus" aid is thought to be unpopular with members of Congress, but, as Tama (2024) elucidates, a broad coalition of advocates have been bolstering support for aid among members of Congress since the near-collapse of aid budgets at the end of the Cold War. He describes a "strange bedfellows coalition of development and humanitarian aid NGOs, major corporations, retired military officers, and faith-based leaders…working together to build support for diplomatic and foreign aid spending on Capitol Hill…the business, military, and religious members of this coalition have served as powerful external validators of the importance of diplomacy and foreign aid." (The role of these advocacy groups is discussed in much further detail in **Chapters 5 and 6**.)

I argue that while aid may continue to be unpopular with a core of constituents and some members of Congress, such campaigns have influenced the approach of key Congressional decisions-makers toward aid. I anticipate then that this puts a floor under "development plus" aid for appropriators, both Democrat and Republican—so that while it may not be increased every year, it is rarely, if ever, cut. (This is a highly counterintuitive claim given the literature.) Furthermore, I argue that, at times, appropriators will be willing to support increases to "development plus" aid, because of advocacy groups urging them to increase the budget and because of the value development adds to U.S. foreign policy. (It is also a reflection of American values. This seeming cliché is nonetheless a powerful component of the support for such aid.)

Careful reading of public opinion polls of the American people shows them to be broadly supportive of the components of **"development plus"** aid. One study found that the American people "are far more inclined to support economic aid than military aid and are disinclined to provide aid to undemocratic countries" (Doherty et al 2020). Another found high public support for health and food security aid (Hudson et al, APSA 2023). A former SFOPS cardinal affirmed to me that constituents were far more supportive of aid when reminded of specific humanitarian uses like feeding starving children. (This is backed up by public opinion surveys. For example, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs showed "combatting world hunger" to have significant public support, with more than 50% of Americans identifying it as a very important *foreign policy* goal until about 2004.) Even Jesse Helms (R-NC), an infamous opponent of foreign aid who wanted to eliminate USAID altogether, supported key health initiatives like Bush's signature PEPFAR [President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief] program which has saved more than 25 million lives to date (by the State Department's estimate).[51]

Additional evidence comes from Steven Kull (2017), from the University of Maryland, who conducted public opinion surveys regarding American foreign aid and foreign policy interests:

> *Asked, "If you had to choose which countries should get U.S. aid, which of these would you select as the most important?" just 9 percent chose "countries needed as trade partners," 29 percent chose "countries important to U.S. security," while 61 percent chose "countries with the poorest economies."*

[51] Department of State. (2024). The United States President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. https://www.state.gov/pepfar/. Accessed 8 July 2024.

> *Asked to choose between two statements, only 27 percent selected the statement that "we should only send aid to parts of the world where the U.S. has security interests," while 71 percent chose the statement that "when hunger is a major problem in some part of the world, we should send aid whether or not the U.S. has a security interest in that region"—up from 63 percent when asked in the year 2000.*[52]

Kull summarizes the results, "Consistent with public support for an engaged and moral foreign policy, Americans express strong support for humanitarian aid. An overwhelming 81 percent say they favor 'food and medical assistance to people in needy countries' (Republicans 73 percent, Democrats 90 percent)."[53] The most popular aspects of American aid are **"development plus"** and humanitarian aid—which do not have the same straight-line connection to American national security interests as other aspects of the aid budget.[54] "Americans respond favorably to the idea that development assistance is an important strategy for fulfilling humanitarian goals"[55] Kull notes.

The same is true of Congress, which sees **"development plus"** aid as important as a part of overall U.S. foreign policy strategy, because it lays a foundation for the international rules-based order that the United States helped to build out of the ashes of World War II. As former USAID Administrator J. Brian Atwood testified to the appropriating subcommittee in 1994, six months after a humanitarian intervention had deteriorated spectacularly in Somalia:

> *I have talked about how our USAID program contributes to our foreign policy. It contributes to creating stability in a world of chaos. It contributes to preventing crises before they happen. We have seen, I think all too clearly, how difficult those crises are to manage once they get to the point when a nation becomes a failed state.*[56]

Somalia itself provides a case study for why legislators are likely to treat foreign aid as a foreign policy opportunity. "Say 'Somalia' to an American today, and the images most likely to be conjured up are those of a helicopter going down, a courageous crew under fire, and a U.S. soldier's body being dragged through the streets by a mob," former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright writes of the infamous Black Hawk Down incident that shocked and outraged the American public.

A Brigadier General, serving as Chief of the U.S. Army's Office of Military History, would summarize the situation thusly:

> *Americans consider themselves to be a compassionate people, and the United States Army has a long tradition of humanitarian relief operations both within and outside the continental United*

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[52] Kull, S. (2017). American public support for foreign aid in the age of Trump. The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/global-20170731-blum-stevenkull-brief-6.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2024.

[53] Ibid.

[54] For example, using a scale of 0 to 10, respondents were "[a]sked to rate different types of foreign aid, using the same scale, the highest scoring type of aid was "child survival programs, which includes prenatal care, immunizations and nutrition," which elicited a mean score of 7.4." Kull, S. 2017. American public support for foreign aid in the age of Trump. The Brookings Institution. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/global-20170731-blum-stevenkull-brief-6.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2024.

[55] Ibid.

[56] House of Representatives. (1994 March 8). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing with USAID Administrator J. Briand Atwood. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

> *States. Never has this humanitarian impulse proven more dangerous to follow than in 1992 when the United States intervened to arrest famine in the midst of an ongoing civil war in the east African country of Somalia. Ultimately hundreds of thousands were saved from starvation, but unintended involvement in Somali civil strife cost the lives of thirty American soldiers, four marines, and eight Air Force personnel and created the impression of chaos and disaster.*[57]

And yet he would note in the early 2000s, that "[t]hese disturbing events of a decade ago have taken on increasing meaning after the horrific attacks of 11 September 2001."[58] (Indeed, the Congressional Research Service in discussing potential Congressional responses to Somalia in the wake of the Black Hawk Down incident raised concerns that "a strife ridden Somalia could become a breeding ground for terrorism."[59])

Since 1969, Somalia had been ruled by an unpopular military dictator, General Siad Barre. The historical office for the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff describes how "opposition to Barre's rule mounted steadily. A full- scale guerrilla war began in May 1988. Barre's soldiers retaliated by killing tens of thousands of civilians, but repression only made the opposition stronger."[60] The situation continued to deteriorate. On 1 January 1991, NAVCENT "the naval component of U.S. Central Command" "received an alert message indicating that civil war and internal clan conflict in Somalia might endanger U.S. citizens and require a military response. … The following day, Ambassador James K. Bishop in Mogadishu requested military assistance to evacuate Americans from the U.S. embassy there due to the chaotic violence occurring throughout the city."[61] The request came at a precarious moment, as the U.S. Navy was preparing for a vital role in Operation Desert Storm and Desert Shield, the American response to the invasion of Kuwait and seizure of its oil fields by Iraq's Saddam Hussein. Nonetheless, a senior USAID employee, stationed in Somalia since November 1990, herself one of those evacuated, remembered how the "U.S. Marines and Navy Seals, in a dramatic rescue, safely evacuated 241 individuals from the besieged Embassy compound on January 5, 1991"—a mere three days later.[62] Within a year, the country, controlled by rival warlords, faced widespread famine; the "Bush administration airdropped packages of food, which were stolen. Starvation spread and an estimated 350,000 Somalis died."[63]

In August 1992, James Baker, President George H.W. Bush's widely respected Secretary of State, stepped down from his position so he could actively campaign for the President's reelection. In his stead, the only career Foreign Service Officer to ever serve as Secretary of State—Lawrence

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[57] U.S. Army Center of Military History. The United States Army in Somalia 1992-1994. CMH Pub 70-81-1. https://www.history.army.mil/brochures/somalia/somalia.htm. Accessed 5 July 2024.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Prados. A. (1994 October 21). "Somalia: Current Developments, Drawdowns, and Implications." Congressional Research Service. 94-917 F. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 23 April 2024.
[60] Poole, Walter. (2005). The Effort to Save Somalia: August 1992-March 1994. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint History Office. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Somalia.pdf. 5 July 2024.
[61] Ohls, Gary. (2008). Eastern Exit—Rescue "…From the Sea." Naval War College Review 61.4 Autumn. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1984&context=nwc-review. Accessed 6 July 2024.
[62] Westcott, Jan. (1994 November). The Somalia Saga: A Personal Account 1990-1993. Refugee Policy Group: Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues. Accessed from the United States Agency for International Development on 5 July 2024. https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pdabk961.pdf
[63] Albright, M. K., & Woodward, W. (2004). *Madam Secretary : a memoir*. Pan.

Eagleburger—stepped in as Acting Secretary. (Eagleburger eventually received a recess appointment to become Secretary for a little over a month.[64])

His successor, Secretary Madeleine Albright recalls that,

> *Around Thanksgiving 1992, acting Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger told [the UN Secretary General] Boutros-Ghali that the United States was willing to lead a multinational effort to bring relief to Somalia, after which it would hand responsibility back to the UN. The Secretary General accepted but asked that, in the process, the United States disarm warlords such as Aidid [the most prominent of the rivals for power]. Otherwise, he argued, secure conditions would not last. Eagleburger rejected this, saying the United States wanted to get in and out of Somalia as quickly as possible.*[65]

While the U.S. operation dampened the humanitarian crisis, the underlying security situation remained unchanged, though the operation did "succeed dramatically in ending the chaotic violence in the countryside and the massive starvation caused by the consequent breakdown of the economic and social order."[66] Taking office in January as U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Albright was told to fast-track the handover of power from the U.S. military to the UN, but the UN Secretary General demurred, arguing that the UN "was neither staffed nor equipped" to do so at that time. By March, the U.S. began to hand off to a newly recruited "force of 28,000 peacekeepers…[agreeing to] keep roughly 4,000 [U.S.] troops in the area, including a …Quick Reaction Force…as insurance against emergencies." Yet, as "soon as U.S. troop levels went down in Somalia, tensions heated up."[67]

Albright herself visited Somalia in July 1993, remembering that the "roads were so dangerous we took a Black Hawk helicopter from the airport to the UN headquarters. As the helicopter took off, I didn't know whether to be assured or alarmed by the machine guns deployed around the tarmac".[68] On her return, she published an op-ed in the *New York Times*, entitled, "Yes, There is a Reason to Be in Somalia."[69] [70] She enjoined readers, "Success is important not only for the Somalis -- 300,000 people died from war and famine before the United Nations approved intervention -- but also because anarchy may produce refugees, uncontrolled arms peddling and targets of opportunity for terrorists and their state sponsors. But peace cannot be made overnight."

The piece also reflects the understanding—of both the U.S. and the UN at the time—that stopping "renegade warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid" was foundational to the restoration of any stability in Somalia: "humanitarian and political goals cannot be assured unless a secure environment is created." To date, Aidid had "obstructed U.N. efforts to end the violence and rebuild the

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[64] Department of State, Office of the Historian. (2024). Biographies of the Secretaries of State: Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger (1930–2011). https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/eagleburger-lawrence-sidney. Accessed 5 July 2024.
[65] Albright, M. K., & Woodward, W. (2004). *Madam Secretary : a memoir*. Pan.
[66] Epstein. S. (1993 October 18). "Somalia: Humanitarian Assistance Fact Sheet." Congressional Research Service. 93-913 F. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 23 April 2024.
[67] Albright, M. K., & Woodward, W. (2004). *Madam Secretary : a memoir*. Pan.
[68] Ibid.
[69] Albright, M. K. (1993 August 10). "Yes, There Is a Reason to Be in Somalia." *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/10/opinion/yes-there-is-a-reason-to-be-in-somalia.html?searchResultPosition=2. Accessed 5 July 2024.
[70] In hindsight, she admits she was too optimistic.

country"; "On June 5, his henchmen ambushed Pakistani peacekeepers, killing 24. Since then, his forces have killed four journalists, two Italian peacekeepers, at least six Somalis employed by the U.N. and now the four American soldiers" killed on 8 August.[71] The UN Representative in Mogadishu, an American admiral and "former deputy National Security Advisor to President Bush"[72] asked the Pentagon for support to go after Aidid. The request was initially denied, but, in August, the Pentagon "relented and dispatched a 400-man team of Rangers, plus a contingent of Special Forces"[73]. For weeks, Aidid evaded capture.

Changing course, the U.S., the UN, and key African allies agreed that a successful endgame would require a diplomatic, rather than military, solution. Having agreed to this much, it was nevertheless convoluted to discern exactly what that would look like in a failing state and just how to go about it. As a result, on 3 October 1992, the "standing orders to the U.S. Ranger force in Mogadishu remained the same—snatch him." That Sunday afternoon, "U.S. forces stormed a building near Mogadishu's Olympic Hotel. Aidid wasn't there, but the Americans took prisoner more than two dozen of his aides and were preparing to bring them back when a Black Hawk helicopter was shot down."[74]

In the attempted retreat, a second helicopter was shot down. "It was after midnight before a U.S. infantry company, assisted by Malaysian and Pakistani troops, reached the largest group of embattled men…By the time the rescuers arrived, the bodies had been removed."[75] They would be dragged through the streets of Mogadishu—a scene broadcast to anguished Americans watching back home. "Say 'Somalia' to an American today," as Albright says, and many will conjure those images of the "Black Hawk Down" incident. (Perhaps less well-remembered was the appointment of special envoy and diplomat, Robert B. Oakley, the former ambassador to Somalia from 1982-1984. "Ambassador Oakely arrived in Mogadishu on 9 October, determined to obtain the release of U.S. helicopter pilot CW2 Michael Durant, captured at the second crash site by Somali forces loyal to Aideed. After intense negotiations, Aideed agreed to release the wounded Durant and a previously captured Nigerian soldier on 14 October as a 'goodwill gesture.'")[76]

At the time, the *New York Times* commented "the mounting toll, and the images of jeering Somalis celebrating amid the wreckage, have clearly influenced Congressional opinion about the American presence there."[77] This was the Congress which USAID Administrator Atwood had to convince of the importance of U.S. foreign aid. The appropriators were far more sympathetic about the value of **"development plus"** and humanitarian assistance than some authorizers and legislators-at-large. While a year later, Senator Jesse Helms would threaten the existence of the agency itself, forcing Atwood to beg allies across Washington for the agency's survival, House appropriators significantly increased humanitarian assistance, stating, the "Committee believes that

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[71] Albright, M. K., & Woodward, W. (2004). *Madam Secretary : a memoir*. Pan.
[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Holmes, S. (1993 October 8). "THE SOMALIA MISSION: Diplomacy; U.S. Envoy to Somalia is Known for Frank Style." *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/08/world/the-somalia-mission-diplomacy-us-envoy-to-somalia-is-known-for-frank-style.html?searchResultPosition=4. . Accessed 6 July 2024.
[77] Cushman, J. H., Jr. 1993 October 4. "5 G.I.'s Are Killed A Somalis Down 2 U.S. Helicopters." *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/1993/10/04/world/5-gi-s-are-killed-as-somalis-down-2-us-helicopters.html?searchResultPosition=3. Accessed 5 July 2024.

in light of the emergencies occurring in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sudan and the drought in the Horn of Africa an increase in International Disaster Assistance is more than warranted." (This was sanctioned by the same Chair who bragged about cutting foreign aid, no less. Yet it was **"security plus"** assistance that he cut.)[78]

Atwood was not the only senior U.S. government official to describe a "world of chaos" in the early 1990s. Albright titled this chapter of her memoir "New World (Dis)Order": "a civil war was under way in Bosnia, more than twenty thousand U.S. troops were busy saving lives in Somalia, ethnic tensions would explode in the Central African nation of Rwanda, and thousands of desperate migrants were fleeing a cruel and illegitimate regime in Haiti." Appropriators, bolstered by the coalition of advocates described by Tama, believe that "development plus" contributes to U.S. security by greater global stability just as Atwood argued. **"Development plus"** aid can improve health outcomes, invest in education, and create economic opportunities. Lowey (D-NY) explained, "I think it makes much more sense to invest in schools and healthcare rather than bullets and guns …an educated population in my judgment is less likely to turn to guns."[79] (Savun and Tirone (2017) validate that "foreign aid can be used to accomplish foreign policy goals beside economic growth: it can be an effective counterterrorism tool.")[80]

Even so, for appropriators, stability and peace require multi-purpose tools of foreign policy. When Kay Granger (R-TX) and Nita Lowey (D-NY), both former Chairs of House SFOPS, were asked in 2019, "What is your perspective on the importance of foreign aid as a tool in our kit for foreign policy?" Granger responded immediately, "It's extremely important." She then added, underscoring the heterogeneity of aid and its purposes, "Foreign aid, the definitions, the way it works out in different countries is so different…There's all sorts of foreign assistance." Lowey shortly afterward stressed the importance of education and creating economic opportunity through aid. She returned to this point again and again throughout the interview:

> *"One other thing. It can't be just military. It can't be just building schools. We have to deal with their narcotics issues, we have to deal with other countries who are undermining positive leadership, so it's very frustrating and very upsetting to those of us who work so hard to try and bring some stability."*[81]

"Development plus" aid is not solely driven by hard foreign policy concerns, but appropriators are ever cognizant of their responsibility to be accountable with taxpayers' money. This means they need to be able to justify its expenditure to Congress and constituents broadly, which includes key contributions this form of aid makes to U.S. national security. Because this type

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[78] House of Representatives. (1995 June 15). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Report. https://www.congress.gov/104/crpt/hrpt143/CRPT-104hrpt143.pdf. Accessed 6 July 2024.

[79] Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.

[80] Specifically, they argue that "governance and civil society aid dampens terrorism by promoting civil liberties and creating alternative venues for people to express their discontent with the regime and hence reducing the willingness of individuals to join and support terrorist organizations."

[81] Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.

of foreign aid is the most prone to accusations of fraud, wastage, and "pouring money down foreign ratholes", it is harder for appropriators to increase the budget for **"development plus"** than for other forms of aid. This is part of the reason I argue that there will be a "floor" on **"development plus"** aid. Appropriators believe in its value and will not cut the overall budget from the previous year's level. It is harder to justify significant increases for **"development plus"**, however, as it is but one component of several in foreign policy toolkit and other forms of aid are even more concrete in their foreign policy contributions. Where politically possible, however, I argue that appropriators—Democrats and Republicans—are amenable to an increase in **"development plus"** assistance—not because it confers electoral benefits, but because it provides a foreign policy foundation without which other tools of U.S. foreign policy cannot gain traction. (This is perhaps a key lesson learned from Somalia—the emergence of failed states is costly and there are stark limits to the ability of military power to put them back together.)

2.6 Security Plus as Hard Foreign Policy

"Security plus" assistance has tangible real-world foreign policy impact for key Congressional decision-makers. Kay Granger (R-TX) illustrates this well with a vivid story about the use of U.S. aid to build enduring partnerships that contribute to greater global security. Jordan, she reminded her audience, is in a "very difficult place geographically", sharing borders with war-torn Syria, Israel, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. Jordan has been a recipient of **"security plus"** aid since the 1950s.[82] The result for the United States has been "a key U.S. partner in the Middle East", who provides stability in the region, diplomatic channels with its neighbors with whom Jordan maintains good relationships, and an ally in the global fight against terrorism.[83]

Jordan, bolstered by significant U.S. assistance, has hosted hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees who fled from the Assad government's violence (including the use of chemical weapons) against its own people. "On the way to Jordan," Granger remembers on a visit to the region, "we saw a refugee camp that I think was 450,000 people"—she reminds the audience, "this is what we [the United States] do in Jordan, this is what Jordan does for the world."[84] More than this, she recalled being in Iraq during its reconstruction to meet with women and girls, when "it became so dangerous. They blew up the hotel we were going to, they blew up the hotel where we were staying. And the King of Jordan said, 'I will provide the security; meet in Jordan.'" This encapsulates the reminder the Department of State gave to Congress in a 1993 report: "security assistance provides a vital element of continuity and contributes to secure, stable relationships."[85]

"Security plus" represents an opportunity to make foreign policy, which remains a collaborative endeavor between Presidents and Congress. To understand executive-legislative interactions over foreign affairs, most scholars focus on whether government is united or divided,

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[82] Sharp. J. (2024 July). "Jordan: Background and U.S. Relations." Congressional Research Service. RL33546. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33546. Accessed 18 March 2024.
[83] Ibid.
[84] Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.
[85] House of Representatives. (1993). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing: Part 2 Justification of Budget Estimates. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

that is, whether the President and Congress share the same party. I, however, contend that Congress is generally disposed to work with Presidents, of any party, and that what matters more is whether Congress is itself united or divided between parties. This fits with Tama's documentation that "bipartisanship persist[s] in foreign policy during a highly polarized era" and with my elite interviews, suggesting that the party of the President is less salient than scholars may think. Members of Congress understand and embrace the President as the first-mover in foreign policy, but believe "Congress has a responsibility to be both an informed critic and a constructive partner of the President" (Hamilton 2002). At times, this leads Congress to constrain the President, assert themselves more forcefully in foreign policy, and grow frustrated with (potentially even to the point of inhibiting) the President's foreign policy agenda.

I use novel data and measures (developed from elite interviews) on International Affairs budgets to elicit the disposition of Congress toward the President on foreign policy (discussed in detail in **Chapter 9**). My findings corroborate this sense that Congress overwhelmingly prefers to work with Presidents of either party in a collaborative manner on foreign policy (**Figure 2.1**).

Figure 2.1

Foreign Policy Partnerships (2001-2021)		
	International Affairs	**Foreign Operations**
collaborative	52.4%	42.9%
constraining	19.0%	4.8%
assertive	19.0%	38.1%
inhibited	9.5%	14.3%

However, while Congress is more than willing to collaborate with Presidents of either party, it encounters serious difficulties when it is itself divided between parties. In proposing a budget, the President is also proposing a foreign policy agenda, because of the composition of funding across key sectors of development, defense, and diplomacy and different forms of aid. Congress assesses this agenda against its own priorities—and makes a determination about how to respond and align Congressional and Presidential priorities. This dynamic is further complicated by the reality that Congress must frequently bargain with itself as the House and the Senate may have differing foreign policy priorities, particularly when they are controlled by different parties. I therefore anticipate that a divided Congress will interact differently with "security plus" assistance than a Congress united under the same party because it involves harder and more complex foreign policy decisions and trade-offs.

The largest component of **"security plus"** assistance in my framework is the Economic Support Fund, which U.S. government documents identify as "assistance, in part to advance U.S. political and strategic goals in countries of special importance to U.S. foreign policy"[86]; others have described it as "'walking-around-money"'[87] for the Secretary of State. If U.S. aid has always been a blend of "national interests and national values", the **"development plus"** blend leans a little more

[86] Gill, C, and McCabe, E. (2023, May 9). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R40482.
[87] Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

toward "national values" and **"security plus"** more toward "national interests." Both matter to appropriators—as complementary instruments—but appropriators will engage with them differently.

"Security plus" assistance is the most direct opportunity for key Congressional decision-makers to participate in the making of U.S. foreign policy. In many ways, it *is* U.S. foreign policy. It is the form of assistance that is most likely to go to geopolitically strategic U.S. allies, and key Congressional decision-makers can direct where this money flows through the appropriations process. (Jordan, for example, receives significant assistance from the Economic Support Fund account each year and the committee enshrines its allocation level in the actual text of its appropriations bill.) While USAID manages **"development plus"**, the Department of State is responsible for **"security plus"** assistance. As a result, security assistance is tied more closely to diplomacy and defense than development. As Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, with his counterpart from the Department of Defense, testified to House appropriators in 2004, "security assistance is an element of most State Department programs. Economic Support Funds, for example, are used to build democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere, which supports our overall security goals."

Therefore, when appropriators consider **"security plus"** assistance, it is as a more direct tool of U.S. foreign policy—indeed, some of the most significant cornerstones of U.S. foreign policy since World War II have been funded through **"security plus"** assistance. This includes the Biden Administration's top priorities of support for Ukraine and Israel, the Bush Administration's "top foreign policy priority [of] winning the war on terror"[88], the Reagan Administration's aggressive containment of communism, and the longstanding American support of Egypt and Jordan as lynchpins of stability in the Middle East. **"Security plus"** assistance also funds the U.S. counternarcotics strategy and supports democratic partners. These are all critical U.S. foreign policy priorities, which have had global repercussions. It is little wonder then that appropriators use this budget as a means of recalibrating the foreign policy agenda.

Negotiating this foreign policy power of **"security plus"** becomes fraught when the House and Senate diverge in their foreign policy preferences, which is almost inevitable when the Congress is divided. A Congress divided against itself has trouble standing unitedly and convincingly on foreign policy. It struggles to come to an internal agreement on harder and more complex foreign policy priorities. When the House and the Senate diverge from each other, Presidents will, at times, exploit the space opened up between them to make an end-run around Congress (as in the case of the Iran-Contra Affair—discussed in detail in **Chapter 4**). This has clear implications for **"security plus"** assistance. Despite the reputation of Republicans being more supportive of security assistance, I anticipate that all appropriators—Republican and Democrat—see **"security plus"** as an opportunity to make foreign policy. When Congress is united, I hypothesize that appropriators will increase (or at least will not cut) **"security plus"** budgets from the previous year's level. However, when Congress is divided, appropriators will cut **"security plus"** budgets, because they will not be able to reach a consensus on how this foreign policy power should be used.

[88] Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage. House of Representatives. (2004 April 29). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

Again, I underscore that this pattern is driven by a divided Congress rather than a divided government. Every case of a divided Congress is, by definition, a case of divided government, but not every divided government involves a divided Congress. Divided government produced both the Marshall Plan (Republican Congress and Democratic President) and the Iran-Contra affair[89] (Republican Senate, Democratic House, Republican President), in which Reagan defied the directives of Congress to arm a rebel group in Nicaragua. Yet the former—a pinnacle of bipartisanship—occurred under a united Congress and the latter—a nadir of Cold War executive disregard of Congress—under a divided Congress.

A divided Congress matters more than a divided government, because internal division can upend the inter-branch partnership required to forge U.S. foreign policy collaboratively. When both the Congress and the President can articulate foreign policy priorities, however deeply they disagree, they can engage with one another to reach a compromise; however, when Congress cannot produce an internal consensus within itself, there is little hope of being able to engage in productive negotiations with the President over foreign policy.

Remarking on security assistance after a period of divided party control of Congress under the Bush Administration, James Kolbe (R-AZ), chair of the House State and Foreign Operations subcommittee, critiqued how

> *Within the administration, the diffusion of responsibility for establishing, implementing, and funding security assistance programs has led at times to bureaucratic infighting and the loss of central command and control.* ***At worst, it has led to different parts of the U.S. Government pursuing different policies in a country****.*[90]

U.S. foreign policy can become deeply fragmented when its numerous executive and legislative players are not on the same page. I think it no accident that the notorious Iran-Contra affair (1981-1986)—fundamentally a disagreement over **"security plus"** assistance, which a divided Congress refused to appropriate— occurs exclusively during a period with a divided Congress (1981-1986).

2.7 Conclusion

American foreign aid is about more than electoral politics. Congressional legislators have long been interested in the opportunity to participate in the making of foreign policy, especially after the Presidential dominance of foreign policy during much of the Cold War. Through the committee

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[89] "In 1981, President Reagan approved an operation in which the CIA would aid Nicaraguan rebel insurgents—who were fighting the newly established socialist Sandinista government—with the goal of preventing the spread of Communism. The Democrats, led by Speaker of the House Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, were against the operation and in 1984 pushed through Congress the Boland Amendments—two laws banning such aid, whether direct or indirect."

Craig, B. (2017 July 12). The Iran-Contra Affair. University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/issues-policy/foreign-policy/iran-contra-affair. Accessed 21 July 2024.

[90] Emphasis added. James Kolbe, SFOPS Chair. House of Representatives. (2004 April 29). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

system and appropriations process, Congress has the opportunity to shape the policy, funding, allocation, and spending of American aid. It tends to do so through the lens of foreign policy, treating different forms of aid as complementary foreign policy instruments.

From its very beginning, U.S. foreign aid has been a multipurpose tool of foreign policy (as will be illustrated in the next chapter) and Congress interacts with the different purposes of aid in different ways. This has profound implications for understanding the engagement of Congress with the core foreign aid budget, from the Marshall Plan to the present. While appropriators are supportive of both **"development plus"** and **"security plus"** purposes of aid, it is harder to reach an internal Congressional consensus on **"security plus"** whenever Congress is divided. This insight provides a more accurate understanding of the variations in Congressional foreign aid funding than current explanations involving constituency contracts (as will be further substantiated in the analysis in **Chapter 10**).

Part 2

The Origins and Evolution of Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy

3 The Origins of American Aid
How The Marshall Plan Framed the Foundations of American Aid

"If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world -- and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation. Great responsibilities have been placed upon us by the swift movement of events. I am confident that the Congress will face these responsibilities squarely." [91]

President Harry. S Truman, Special Message to Congress, 12 March 1947

"Bi-partisan foreign policy is not the result of political coercion but of non-political conviction."[92]

Arthur Vandenberg, Private Papers, 18 March 1947

"Can you imagine [the plan's] chances of passage in an election year in a Republican congress if it is named for Truman and not Marshall?" [93]

President Harry. S Truman, October 1947

"Each Congress is free to decide these subsequent issues for itself. But they will do so in the presence of the declared attitude and opinion of the Eightieth Congress, as expressed in this act…" [94]

Arthur Vandenberg, Speech on the Marshall Plan before the Senate, 1 March 1948

3.1 Introduction

Foreign aid is an American-made foreign policy instrument. Much like American foreign policy, it has always been an eclectic blend of diplomacy, development, defense, democracy, and commercial interests—a mix of what former senior USAID official Carol Lancaster calls "national interests and national values".[95]

Aid emerged as tool of U.S. foreign policy in an increasingly complex and dynamic global environment. As such, it had to reflect the composite nature of U.S. foreign policy itself. Its core value was its multipurpose nature and its subsequent ability to advance multiple foreign policy goals simultaneously, centered on an integration of diplomacy, development, and defense. Its design ensured that Congress would have an active voice in its use and regular oversight of its effectiveness. The flagship American foreign aid program—the Marshall Plan—was the product of robust executive-legislative partnership between a skeptical Republican Congress and Democratic President

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[91] The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Truman Doctrine (1947). [Transcript of Address to Congress 12 March 1948.] https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/truman-doctrine. Accessed 2 February 2024.
[92] Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Houghton Mifflin.
[93] DeLong, J. B., & Eichengreen, B. (1991). The Marshall Plan: History's most successful structural adjustment program.
[94] The Marshall Foundation. "The Battle for World Peace and Stability." [Speech Delivered by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 80th Congress, 2D Session, March 1, 1948.] https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Senator_Vandenberg_Speech_The_Battle_forWorld_Peace_and_Stability.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2024.
[95] Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

(a case of divided government with a united Congress), built on a broad array of foreign policy purposes, predicated on extensive information sharing, and grounded in a diverse coalition of public support. These proved to be the essential ingredients for continued Congressional support for foreign aid. From the beginning, they have grounded American aid. When they have been weakened or challenged, the future of foreign aid has been in question. This chapter traces the origins of these "fundamentals" before detailing the ways in which they were challenged over the course of the Cold War. Because these fundamentals still frame Congressional support for aid, it is imperative to understand their origins (in this chapter) and their evolution (in the coming chapters).

Most contend that the primary animating principle of foreign aid was the American desire to contain Communism, and this is undoubtedly integral to its history. More fundamentally though, I argue that foreign aid originated in the spirit of a new foreign policy of political economy, focused on peace and "collective security", which defined the early postwar period. Within a few short years, this had distilled into the more concrete goal of anti-Communism that distinguished U.S. foreign policy until the collapse of the Soviet Union and its satellite states. Yet even as containment came to dominate American foreign policy, the original impulse that Congress must safeguard the "restless and precarious peace" forged at the end of the Second World War continued to undergird the approach of Congress to foreign aid for decades to come.[96] The understanding that foreign aid was an investment in peace and stability would re-emerge anew at the end of the Cold War, when the revamping of American foreign policy and the revival of a broad coalition of public support for foreign aid would re-catalyze foreign aid as a tool of foreign policy undergirded by renewed Congressional support.

3.2 A New Foreign Policy for a New World

From Isolationism to Internationalism through Congressional-Executive Partnership

U.S. foreign policy fundamentally changed between the First and Second World Wars. Long marked by isolationism, the United States would emerge as the leader of a new international order by 1946. This radical shift is exemplified by the career of Arthur Vandenberg, Republican Senator from Michigan. Vandenberg entered the Senate in 1928, eight years after the chamber had resoundingly (and repeatedly) rejected President Woodrow Wilson's call for a League of Nations that would offer a peaceful, alternative "forum for resolving international disputes."[97] Wilson unveiled his plan for peace, his famous "Fourteen Points", to Congress in January 1918. Its foundation was the idea of collective security through international organization.[98] Despite widespread public support, having failed to include the Senate as a meaningful partner, Wilson faced defeat when he presented the League to Congress upon his return from the peace conference in Paris. Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican Senator from Massachusetts and chair of the formidable Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was the most public face of opposition to Wilson and has attained an almost mythical status for his role in the League's defeat.[99] Lodge catalyzed the Senate,

[96] Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Houghton Mifflin.
[97] Department of State, Office of the Historian. The League of Nations, 1920. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/99150.htm#. Accessed 31 March 2024.
[98] Ibid.
[99] U.S. Senate. Classic Senate Speeches: Henry Cabot Lodge, Constitution of the League of Nations. (1919 February 28). https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/Speeches_Lodge1919.htm. Accessed 2 April 2024.

but the kindling was simmering resentment toward Wilson for his exclusion of Congress in the making of foreign policy.

The damage to the Presidential-Congressional relationship from this incident was extensive. A President had made a bid to exchange isolationism for internationalism, but had excluded and alienated Congress throughout the process. Because foreign policy is forged through executive-legislative partnership, to fundamentally shift U.S. foreign policy, a U.S. president would need to partner meaningfully with Congress. When World War II broke out in 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt therefore faced a dilemma.

Officially neutral and with no public or Congressional appetite for war, Roosevelt was nonetheless determined that the United States would provide aid and support to the Allies. He had limited legislative space for such endeavors. The Johnson Act (1934) barred him from extending "credit to countries that had not repaid U.S. loans made to them during World War I—which included Great Britain."[100] The Neutrality Act (1939) would have allowed the Allies to purchase "war materiel from the United States, but only on a 'cash and carry' basis."[101] Even the military cautioned Roosevelt against such support; the "Army's Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, anticipated that Britain would surrender following the collapse of France, and thus American supplies sent to the British would fall into German hands. Marshall and others therefore argued that U.S. national security would be better served by reserving military supplies for the defense of the Western Hemisphere."[102] Meanwhile, the American people, though sympathetic to the British, were unwilling to involve themselves in another war so soon after World War I. As the State Department's Office of the Historian encapsulates, the challenge was thus: "President Roosevelt had to develop an initiative that was consistent with the legal prohibition against the granting of credit, satisfactory to military leadership, and acceptable to an American public that generally resisted involving the United States in the European conflict."[103]

With the fall of France in the summer of the 1940, the United Kingdom suddenly stood alone against the advances of Nazi Germany. On June 18, Churchill delivered his "Finest Hour" speech in the House of Commons, remarking that "…the Battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin…The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us."[104] Determined to aid a long-time democratic ally, that September, Roosevelt piloted a program known as "Destroyers for Bases" in which "the United States gave the British more than 50 obsolete destroyers, in exchange for 99-year leases to territory in Newfoundland and the Caribbean, which would be used as U.S. air and naval bases."[105] This was short-lived. Within three months, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that the "moment approaches when we shall no longer be

[100] Department of State, Office of the Historian. (2024). Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease. Accessed 31 March 2024.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Ibid.
[104] Churchill, Winston. Draft of "Finest Hour" Speech in Library of Congress Exhibit. https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/churchill/wc-hour.html#104_2. Accessed 5 April 2024.
[105] Department of State, Office of the Historian. (2024). Lend-Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease. Accessed 31 March 2024.

able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies."[106] Despite the infusion of destroyers from American stores, without the ability to purchase war materiel, broadly defined, Britain was facing likely defeat. In his letter to the American president, Churchill suggested the possibility of placing a "joint order" for the military supplies required.

Roosevelt responded two weeks later, communicating through the Secretary of State to the British embassy in Washington,

> *The President said that it was possible for the United States to take over British orders, and because they are essentially the same kind which we use ourselves we could turn them into American orders and then hand them over upon completion to the British. He explained that we could either lease these materials or sell them subject to a mortgage, on the general theory that it still may prove true that the best defense of Great Britain is the best defense of the United States. What he was trying to do was to eliminate the dollar sign.*[107]

Roosevelt could not legally sell equipment to the British government, nor could the British government afford to purchase the supplies. What Roosevelt *could* do is take over existing British orders for supplies, purchase them on behalf of the United States, and then lend or lease these newly acquired American assets to the United Kingdom. The "Lend-Lease" Program had been born. (It served as a forerunner, an early template, for future U.S. military assistance programs like Foreign Military Financing and Foreign Military Sales, which allow allies to purchase military supplies from U.S. stocks on favorable terms.) Roosevelt justified the action with an analogy of two neighbors:

> *Suppose the house of a neighbor catches fire. If you have a hose and connect it with his hydrant, you may help him to save his house. You don't say to your neighbor that your hose cost $15 and that he must pay $15. After the fire is over, the neighbor might return it with thanks, or if it were smashed, ask how many feet of hose you loaned him. You might say 150 feet, and he would say he would replace it. The President said that if we lend munitions and the like to Great Britain and get them back after the war, if they are intact, it is all right.*[108]

Senator Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) staunchly opposed Roosevelt's maneuverings, fearing that he "was witnessing the suicide of the Republic."[109] When Lend-Lease passed in March 1941, Vandenberg wrote, "We have torn up 150 years of traditional American foreign policy. We have tossed Washington's Farewell Address into the discard. We have thrown ourselves squarely into the power politics and the power wars of Europe, Asia and Africa."[110] Vandenberg described himself as an "'insulationist'", "one who wants to preserve all of the isolation which modern circumstances will permit."[111] He recognized that it "is probably impossible that there should be such a thing as old

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[106] Department of State, Office of the Historian. (1940 December 7). Telegram from the British Prime Minister to the British Ambassador for President of the United States. The British Prime Minister (Churchill) to President Roosevelt. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1940v03/d20. Accessed 31 March 2024.

[107] Department of State, Office of the Historian. (1940 December 19). Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom (Johnson). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1940v03/d22. Accessed 31 March 2024.

[108] Ibid.

[109] Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg.* Houghton Mifflin.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Ibid.

fashioned isolation in this present foreshortened world when one can cross the Atlantic Ocean in 36 hours."[112] He was loathe to involve the United States in distant wars, to pledge extensive American resources to the whims of imperial powers, and to risk the safety of neutrality for the tenuous role of power-broker in a global fight. "I do not believe we are rich enough to underwrite all the wars of the all the world. I fear it means the ultimate end of our own democracy."[113] Yet he had a deep respect for the decisions of Congress. "I fought it from start to finish. I think it was wrong. …I think it will *not* stop short of war. But it is now the law of the land. It is now our fixed foreign policy whether we like it or not."[114]

Vandenberg firmly believed that the U.S. was now on the path to joining the war. His concern became how to broker a foreign policy that could hold the country together. His son explains, "[b]y the spring of 1941, he felt that only a miracle could keep America out of the war, and he was now becoming convinced that unity at home was essential in the face of the world crisis. Therein lay the seeds of what would become the nebulous idea of a bipartisan or nonpartisan foreign policy."[115] On December 7,1941, "a date which will live in infamy",[116] Vandenberg, a member of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, received a phone call informing him "that the Japanese had attacked Pearl Harbor. 'In my own mind,' he wrote later, 'my convictions regarding international cooperation and collective security for peace took firm form on the afternoon of the Pearl Harbor attack. That day ended isolationism for any realist.'"[117]

Vandenberg's conversion from isolationism to internationalism epitomizes the evolution of American foreign policy between the two world wars. Indeed, his conversion cemented the new direction of U.S. foreign policy. As Vandenberg recognized with the passage of Lend-Lease, involvement in global affairs "is now our fixed foreign policy whether we like it or not." Yet in 1947, widely respected and as the new Republican Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with a Republican Congress behind him, Vandenberg could have torpedoed this nascent internationalism. Instead, Vandenberg would partner with Roosevelt's successor, Democratic President Harry S. Truman, to build the new international liberal order. Such a paradigm shift required close executive-legislative partnership. Roosevelt had recognized this—at least, partially. While Roosevelt frequently skirmished with his Democratic Congress on policy—foreign and domestic—he began laying groundwork for his own "League of Nations"—the United Nations—early in the war. This partnership would be taken up even more deftly by Harry Truman, himself a former Senator, who involved Congress as a valued and equal partner in the forging of this new American foreign policy.

While the U.S. eventually became the de facto power in the international rules-based order that emerged in the 1946 —a sort of "global policeman"—the earliest architecture of this order revolved around the creation of the United Nations and a sharing of the responsibility for preserving peace with the other Allied Powers. Meeting in Moscow and Tehran in late 1943, the Allied leaders

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[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid.
[116] Roosevelt, F. (1941 December 8). "A Date Which Will Live in Infamy" Address to the Congress Asking Thar a State of War Be Declared Between the United States and Japan. Library of Congress. https://www.loc.gov/resource/afc1986022.afc1986022_ms2201/?st=text. Accessed 5 April 2024.
[117] Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Houghton Mifflin.

planned to create a set of new institutions founded on the "principle of collective security";[118] together, the "United States, Great Britain, Soviet Union, and China would enforce peace as 'the four policemen.'"[119] Undisputedly, the United States had a powerful hand in shaping these new international organizations. Three of the pivotal conferences in establishing these new institutions were held in the United States: the Bretton Woods conference in New Hampshire in July 1944[120] to establish the international financial system, followed by a meeting at Dumbarton Oaks (in Washington, D.C.) in fall 1944 to sketch the contours of the United Nations, and the summer 1945 San Francisco Conference which gave birth to the United Nations. In addition to hosting key summits, the U.S. Department of State "in consultation with the U.S. Congress" [121] drafted and redrafted the United Nations Charter in its early stages.

These new institutions included "the Food and Agricultural Organization (May 1943), the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (November 1943), the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (April 1944), the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (July 1944), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (November 1944)."[122] Together these organizations were designed to address global hunger, provide relief for victims of war, [123] "build peace through international cooperation in Education, the Sciences and Culture",[124] support international financial stability and invest in economic growth, and establish "standards and procedures for peaceful global air navigation."[125] Each was meant to be a pillar of peace in a world of conflict and instability. The crowning jewel was to be the United Nations, established in 1945 after the San Francisco conference attended by representatives from fifty different countries.[126] Described by Winston Churchill as aspiring to be a "true temple of peace in which the shields of many nations can some day be hung up", [127] the United Nations would provide a global forum for discussion, deliberation, and diplomacy.

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[118] Department of State, Office of the Historian. The Formation of the United Nations, 1945. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un. Accessed 31 March 2024.
[119] Ibid.; Department of State, Office of the Historian. The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941-October 1945. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/55407.htm# . Accessed 31 March 2024.
[120] Department of State, Office of the Historian. The Bretton Woods Conference, 1944. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwii/98681.htm. Accessed 31 March 2024.; World Bank Group. Archives. Bretton Woods and the Birth of the World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/archive/history/exhibits/Bretton-Woods-and-the-Birth-of-the-World-Bank. Accessed 31 March 2024.
[121] Department of State, Office of the Historian. (2005 October). The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941-October 1945. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/55407.htm# . Accessed 31 March 2024.
[122] Department of State, Office of the Historian. The Formation of the United Nations, 1945. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/un. Accessed 31 March 2024.
[123] Guptil, M. B. (1992). Records of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 1943-1948. *J. Refugee Stud.*, *5*, 29.
[124] UNESCO. History of UNESCO. https://www.unesco.org/en/history. Accessed 1 April 2024.
[125] ICAO. The History of ICAO and the Chicago Convention. https://www.icao.int/about-icao/History/Pages/default.aspx. Accessed 1 April 2024.
[126] Department of State, Office of the Historian. 2005 (October). The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941-October 1945. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/55407.htm# . Accessed 31 March 2024.
[127] Churchill, Winston. The Sinews of Peace ("Iron Curtain Speech"). International Churchill Society. https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/. Accessed 5 April 2024.

Its future looked precarious when Roosevelt died just "days before the scheduled San Francisco Conference" but "Vice President Harry S. Truman took the oath of office and immediately announced that the Conference should go forward as planned."[128] This was "his first policy decision as president."[129] Conscious of Wilson's failure with the Senate, the Roosevelt Administration had been working closely with Congress since 1943 to build support for the United Nations project, even establishing an Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and International Conferences in August 1944 to liaise with Congress.[130] (This position still exists today, as Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs.) Dean Acheson, Roosevelt's first Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations and International Conferences, was instrumental in maintaining the executive-legislative relationships needed to establish the new international institutions. (Acheson would continue to play this role of executive-legislative interlocutor in his new position as Under Secretary of State in the Truman Administration. He would be pivotal in launching the Marshall Plan.)

> *Learning from Woodrow Wilson's failure to gain Congressional support for the League of Nations, the Roosevelt Administration aimed to include a wide range of administration and elected officials in its effort to establish the proposed United Nations. …Consultations between Congress and the Department of State continued into the summer of 1943, and by August, produced a draft United Nations Charter. Congress repeatedly passed resolutions declaring its support for the establishment of an international organization--and for United States membership in that organization.*[131]

The Administration also understood the necessity of garnering public support. The Presidency is commonly seen as the "power to persuade"; Presidents are constrained by public opinion and have limited political capital to spend on changing it. Roosevelt (and Truman after him) would rely on surrogates to carry the message to the public, rather than relying on the "bully pulpit" alone.

> *The Department of State undertook a public relations campaign to build support for the United Nations. As part of that effort, the Department printed over 200,000 copies of the Dumbarton Oaks proposal and an informative, eight-page guide to the draft United Nations Charter. The Department worked in concert with interested groups to inform the public about the United Nations and even dispatched officials around the country to answer questions on the proposed organization. By the end of the effort, the Department of State had coordinated almost 500 such meetings.*[132]

These principles of robust executive-legislative engagement and rigorous public engagement would be deployed again when the Truman Administration needed to build support for another significant foreign policy innovation—aid to war-torn Europe.

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[128] Department of State, Office of the Historian. (2005 October). The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941-October 1945. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/55407.htm# . Accessed 31 March 2024.
[129] Roll, D. L. (2024). *Ascent to Power: How Truman Emerged from Roosevelt's Shadow and Remade the World.* Dutton Caliber.
[130] Department of State, Office of the Historian. Assistant Secretaries of State for Legislative Affairs. https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/principalofficers/assistant-secretary-legislative-affairs. Accessed 5 July 2024.
[131] Department of State, Office of the Historian. 2005 (October). The United States and the Founding of the United Nations, August 1941-October 1945. https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/55407.htm# . Accessed 31 March 2024.
[132] Ibid.

3.3 The Marshall Plan as the Foundation of US Foreign Aid Policy

Presidential-Congressional Partnership as a Cornerstone of a New Foreign Policy

Since the end of the war, the United States had been sending emergency aid to Europe, but the situation was rapidly declining. Civil war erupted in Greece, which was of particular significance to the United Kingdom and the U.S. as the cradle of democracy. Beginning in 1945, the British government had pledged support to the Greek government,[133] but worsening financial strain in early 1947 imperiled British aid to both Greece and Turkey, whose governments were then fighting Communist encroachment. On 24 February 1947, the British ambassador in Washington "handed…two notes of vital importance"[134] to Dean Acheson, now Secretary of State George Marshall's second in command at the State Department. Summarizing their contents in a top-secret memo for Marshall, Acheson reported that Britain would no longer be able to financially support Greece and Turkey:

> *without this aid, the independence of Greece and Turkey will not survive. This of course means that they and the rest of the Middle East will fall under Russian control. …the crisis in Greece is only a few weeks off and … without help, the Government and economy will collapse.*
>
> *… This puts up the most major decision with which we have been faced since the war. I think that War, Navy, Treasury and State should give this immediate study, make recommendations to you, and that a decision in which the leaders in Congress should participate must be made within the week.*[135]

Because foreign policy in the American context is a joint responsibility shared by the President and Congress in which Congress holds the power of the purse, the Truman Administration needed buy-in from the U.S. Congress to provide increased financial assistance to Greece and Turkey. Throughout the war, Roosevelt had been working with a Democratic Congress. Presidents are thought to have an easier time persuading their own party to work with them. By early 1947, Truman faced a much more difficult legislative environment, a Republican House and Senate whose first months in the majority coincided with this rapidly ballooning European crisis. The Truman Administration had already faced challenges "in obtaining necessary appropriations from Congress to back up U.S. world responsibilities."[136] It now needed to convince Congress to appropriate significant funds to support Greece.

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[133] U.K. Parliament. (1947 March 14). Assistance to Greece. Hansard Volume 434. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1947-03-14/debates/94cca10c-f592-495e-b69b-580537b5ca70/AssistanceToGreece#:~:text=Originally%2C%20His%20Majesty's%20Government%20agreed,31st%20March%20of%20this%20year. Accessed 1 April 2024.

[134] Department of State, Office of the Historian. (1947 February 24). Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Acheson) to the Secretary of State. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d31. Accessed 31 March 2024.

[135] Ibid.

[136] Department of State, Office of the Historian. 26 February 1947. Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, February 26, 1947, 10:30 a.m. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d35. Accessed 31 March 2024.

Yet Truman himself was a former Senator and a former appropriator (a committee with a reputation for strong bipartisanship) and had a deep understanding of the value of executive-legislative cooperation. From 1941, he had chaired the "Truman Committee", which "investigate[d] the awarding of government defense contracts, with the objective of ferreting out and publicizing profiteering, mismanagement, and inefficiencies…He and his twelve investigators saved the government billions."[137] He understood the delicate balance of Congressional-Presidential partnership. One of his biographers notes that "Truman was careful to avoid interfering with FDR's conduct of the war" while still managing to create and lead "one of the most successful government agencies of WWII".[138] *Time* featured Truman on its cover in 1943.[139] Auspiciously for Truman, the two most influential members of the formidable Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Chair Arthur Vandenberg (R-MI) and Ranking Member Tom Connally (D-TX), were old friends and colleagues. Connally (D-TX) had been one of the twelve legislator-investigators on the Truman Committee and, up until the recent election, the Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Vandenberg, a Republican Senator from Michigan and now Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had been one of the few to welcome the Missouri freshman (and Democrat) to the Senate and Truman never forgot.[140]

On his first day as President after Roosevelt's death, Truman "left the White House a little after noon for Capitol Hill" to have lunch with "Speaker Rayburn, the House and Senate majority and minority leaders, and twelve more of the president's old friends in the Senate and House from both sides of the aisle." Vandenberg (who counted the Republicans in the room and numbered himself one of three) reported "Truman came back to the Senate this noon for lunch with a few of us. It shattered all tradition. But it was both wise and smart. It means that the days of executive contempt for Congress are ended; that we are returning to a government in which Congress will take its rightful place."[141]

Likewise, both of Truman's choices for Secretary of State understood the role of Congress in American foreign policy. When Roosevelt's Secretary Edward Stettinius resigned, Truman turned to a former Senate colleague, James Byrnes (a Democrat from South Carolina), who had served with him on the Appropriations Committee.[142] Truman later replaced Byrnes with the Army's former Chief of Staff, George Marshall. Shortly before he graduated from the Virginia Military Institute, Marshall traveled to Washington, D.C. with the goal of securing himself a commission as an officer in the U.S. Army, which required passing a rigorous examination. Yet to even be eligible to sit the exam, Marshall needed backing from prominent government officials and official recommendations, so Marshall undertook a trip to the nation's capital to lobby key officials:

> *[a]rmed with letters of recommendation from the superintendent of VMI and a Republican close to the president…he lobbied Attorney General Philander Knox, his father's acquaintance from nearby Brownsville, Pennsylvania, and scored an interview with John A. T. Hull, the chairman of the*

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[137] Roll, D. L. (2024). *Ascent to Power: How Truman Emerged from Roosevelt's Shadow and Remade the World.* Dutton Caliber.
[138] Ibid.
[139] Ibid.
[140] Ibid.
[141] Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg.* Houghton Mifflin.
[142] Byrnes had unsuccessfully sought to be Roosevelt's Vice President in the 1944 election and was the rare politician with experience in the legislative branch, the judicial branch (as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court), and the executive branch (as Director of both Economic Stabilization and War Mobilization). Roll, D. L. (2024). *Ascent to Power: How Truman Emerged from Roosevelt's Shadow and Remade the World.* Dutton Caliber.

> *House Military Affairs Committee. Then, without any appointment, Marshall simply strolled into the White House, joined a procession upstairs, and eventually found himself alone with the president of the United States. "Mr. McKinley in a very nice manner asked me what I wanted," recalled Marshall, "and I stated my case." Several days later, Marshall's name appeared on the secretary of war's list of Pennsylvania candidates selected to sit for a competitive examination that was required in order to receive a commission. Though hard evidence is lacking, Marshall believed his selection "flowed" from his lobbying efforts in Washington.*[143]

Marshall had maintained good relations with Congress throughout his career. "Legendary Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn", a Texas Democrat, "remarked that Marshall had the 'presence of a great man. He doesn't dissemble…He would tell the truth even if it hurt his cause. Congress always respected him. They would give him things they would give to no one else.'"[144] (It was Vandenberg's committee, of course, which had to confirm Marshall in his new post as Secretary of State for a Democratic Administration. As a token of the new "effective bi-partisan foreign policy" Vandenberg championed, he "demonstrated his ability to get quick and decisive action by calling the Foreign Relations Committee to an immediate meeting, securing unanimous approval of Marshall's nomination and then getting Senate approval, again unanimously, on the same day."[145])

Anticipating pushback from the new Republican Congress for increased foreign spending by a Democratic President, to the Administration's surprise, when Marshall's second in command, Dean Acheson, "went to Capitol Hill in late February 1947 to lobby for an emergency appropriation for Greece and Turkey, top congressional leaders warned him that the instability of those countries 'was only part of a much larger problem'"[146] Since the fateful British telegram, a joint committee drawn from the Departments of State, War, and the Navy (known as the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC)) had been meeting to discuss and formulate an American response. Early in the meetings, some officials floated the idea of a more comprehensive, "global" approach than emergency aid to Greece and Turkey.[147] They also recognized the difficulty of gaining Congressional and public support for such an endeavor.[148] In light of the concerns key committee leaders expressed to Acheson that Greece and Turkey represented a wider crisis, the joint SWNCC committee "launched a study of 'situations elsewhere in the world which may require ... financial, technical and military aid on our part.' On April 21, SWNCC warned that six European countries

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143 Roll, D. L. (2019). *George Marshall: Defender of the republic*. Dutton Caliber.
144 Ibid.
145 Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Houghton Mifflin.
146 Wilson, T. (1977). The Marshall Plan 1947-1951. Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series 236. Available from The Marshall Foundation. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The_Marshall_Plan_1941-1951.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2024.
; Department of State, Office of the Historian. 5 March 1947. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson).
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d62. Accessed 31 March 2024.
147 Department of State, Office of the Historian. 24 February 1947. Minutes of the First Meeting of the Special Committee To Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey, February 24, 1947, 3:00 p.m.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d32. Accessed 31 March 2024.; Havlik, Hubert. [Oral History]. (1973 June 20). The U.S. National Archives: The Truman Library and Museum.
https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/oral-histories/havlik. Accessed 31 March 2024.
148 Department of State, Office of the Historian. (1947 February 26). Minutes of a Meeting of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, February 26, 1947, 10:30 a.m.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d35. Accessed 31 March 2024.

would require aid similar to that given to Greece and Turkey 'in the next few months,' and seven other nations probably would require substantial assistance at a later date."[149]

By 27 February (only three days after receiving the memo from the British ambassador), Acheson reported to a colleague that key "Congressional leaders were informed at the White House this morning by Secretary Marshall of the nature of the problem and the urgency of the need for our assistance to these countries and they also approved in principle the general program for aid."[150] (This included, according to Vandenberg's papers, sharing "up-to-the-minute diplomatic papers" with the legislators present.[151]) Those present from Congress wanted help convincing their colleagues, however—key conditions of their support included requesting the President to speak to both Congress and to the American people to make the case for such aid.[152]

A Political Economy of Purposes Undergirds Foreign Aid

The multipurpose nature of aid was a core component of this new foreign policy tool and an innovation which both the Truman Administration stressed in its messaging to Congress and the public. In a special message to Congress on 12 March 1947, Truman tied foreign policy and national security to economic security. He proposed a $400 million aid package to Greece and Turkey. The United States, he explained, was the only nation able to stand in the gap and prevent a collapse of the global order. Only six days earlier in a speech delivered at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, Truman insisted that preservation of a hard-won peace would require a new American foreign policy, one with political economy at its heart:

> *There still are those who seem to believe that we can confine our cooperation with other countries to political relationships; that we need not cooperate where economic questions are involved. This attitude has sometimes led to the assertion that there should be bipartisan support for the foreign policy of the United States, but that there need not be bipartisan support for the foreign economic policy of the United States. …Our foreign relations, political and economic, are indivisible.*[153]

This approach of integrating politics and economics fundamentally reshaped American foreign policy in the post-war era. Indeed, this was how George Kennan, the famed American diplomat and architect of the Cold War "containment" strategy[154], described the Marshall Plan in its formative stages as policymakers debated how to approach the European crisis. The proposed plan was about more than containing the spread of communism and broader than simple transfers of

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[149] Wilson, T. (1977). The Marshall Plan 1947-1951. Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series 236. Available from The Marshall Foundation. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The_Marshall_Plan_1941-1951.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2024.

[150] Department of State, Office of the Historian. 27 February 1947. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State(Acheson) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson). https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d38. Accessed 31 March 2024.

[151] Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg.* Houghton Mifflin.

[152] https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d38; The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration. Truman Doctrine (1947). [Transcript of Address to Congress 12 March 1948.] https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/truman-doctrine. Accessed 2 February 2024.

[153] Truman, Harry. (1947 March 6). Address on Foreign Economic Policy, Delivered at Baylor University. University of California: Santa Barbara. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-foreign-economic-policy-delivered-baylor-university. Accessed 1 April 2024.

[154] Burns, W. J. (William J. (2019). *The back channel: a memoir of American diplomacy and the case for its renewal* (First edition.). Random House.

economic and military resources aimed at combatting Soviet presence; "the extension of American aid" was, Kennan underscored, "essentially a question of political economy in the literal sense of that term"[155] It was about preserving democratic institutions by preventing economic collapse and ensuring the ability of sovereign nations to defend themselves against expansion by neighboring powers.

Acheson's initial impulse to bring together the Departments of State, Treasury, War, and Navy encapsulates this. This political-economic-military trifecta, which still structures American aid, originated as American policymakers were facing the growing stress on democratic institutions arising from the collapsing of European economies. Those who study early U.S. aid programs describe how these programs failed to "clearly delineate between military and economic assistance."[156] These are two important categories used by donor countries today to distinguish between development and non-development purposes of aid. This overlap complicates attempts to translate early U.S. aid programs into the precise language of the modern policymaker, but to fixate on this is to miss the key point: a foreign policy of political economy requires a blend of economic, political, and military purposes. To try and disentangle them is to commit a category error: the blurred lines between the security, economic, and humanitarian purposes of aid was not an oversight, but a fundamental feature of American aid.

This is precisely why aid became the foreign policy tool of choice for this new approach—flexible and multipurpose, it was exactly suited for the complex European crisis facing American officials. The whole of the American foreign policy establishment came together to structure its design, nature, and deployment when economic collapse in Europe threatened to undo the hard-won nascent peace.

Soon it was not just Greece and Turkey on the edge of crisis. Economists DeLong and Eichengreen summarize the economic conditions in Europe at the time:

> *Western Europe's recovery from World War II had ground to a halt by the end of 1947. The first phase of postwar expansion and recovery had come to an end. Reserves of foreign assets had been depleted. Export earnings were insufficient to finance purchases of raw materials and equipment from the only remaining functioning industrial economy, the United States. Bankers in the United States recalled the dismal returns on investments in Europe after World War I. Observing Communist electoral strength, they were unwilling to loan capital to Europe on any terms. Incomes were too low to provide savings needed to finance reconstruction. Taxes were inadequate to balance government budgets. Inflation and financial chaos eroded Western Europe's ability to reconstruct and reorganize its economy. Internal U.S. State Department memoranda spoke of an approaching breakdown of the division of labor between town and country, and between resource extraction, manufacturing, and distribution sectors. Many feared an economic collapse in Europe as soon as U.S. humanitarian aid ceased to prop it up.*[157]

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[155] Kennan, G. 23 May 1947. First Recommendation of Policy Planning Staff. The Marshall Foundation. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/First_Recommendation_Policy_Planning_Staff_Aid_to_Western_Europe_Kennan_to_Acheson_May_23_19.pdf.

[156] E.g., Edwards, D. B., & Meneley, T. L. (1993). The Shaping of the US Security Assistance Program. [Dissertation at the Air Force Institute of Technology.]

[157] DeLong, J. B., & Eichengreen, B. (1991). The Marshall Plan: History's most successful structural adjustment program.

The Truman Administration began formulating a larger-scale, comprehensive plan to address the growing postwar political turbulence induced by economic collapse across Europe, now spreading to the Middle East and Asia. This would become the Marshall Plan. Synonymous with the birth of U.S. foreign aid, it represented the first large-scale, systematic effort in American foreign assistance. More broadly, foreign aid had never before been done by any nation on the scale and scope pioneered by the Marshall Plan, which represented an unprecedented transfer of resources (more than $168 billion in today's terms) from one nation to fifteen others. The notion was hardly popular with either the public or Congress when President Truman and Secretary of State George Marshall first proposed the initiative.

Building a Broad Coalition of Congressional and Public Support

Careful preparations were needed to win the support of both Congress and the American public; Truman knew that to succeed in a Republican Congress the momentum could not come from him. ("Can you imagine [the plan's] chances of passage in an election year in a Republican congress if it is named for Truman and not Marshall?" [158] the Democratic President quipped.) Well-known to the American public given his prominent role in organizing the American military buildup during World War II and named as *Time* magazine's Man of the Year in 1943, soldier-turned-Secretary of State George Catlett Marshall instead became the face of American aid.

Marshall stressed the need for a "cure rather than a palliative" when he previewed the Administration's plans in a speech to recent graduates at Harvard University on 5 June 1947. Truman met with Congressional leaders 17 days later and, as an outcome of this meeting, set up independent committees chaired by the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Chair of the Council of Economic Advisers to investigate the feasibility of his proposal.[159] (The House established its own select committee for a similar purpose.)[160] If any President understood the necessity of demonstrating value-for-money and economic viability of such a project to Congress and the American people, Truman, who had saved the nation billions during World War II, certainly did. As of November, the President had yet to formally present his proposal to Congress, though legislators were well aware it would be coming. Vandenberg (R-MI) observed at the time, that Marshall would "'have a helluva time down here on the Hill. …Politics is heavy in the air.'"[161]

In December 1947, Truman addressed Congress in a special message, unveiling the details of the proposed European Recovery Program (colloquially known as the Marshall Plan) to assist in the recovery of Europe. He also set the ambitious timeline of April 1, 1948, by which legislation and appropriations for the program should be enacted so that aid could commence.[162] The timing

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[158] Ibid.
[159] Tarnoff, C. (2018, January). The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R45079. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45079. Accessed 30 March 2024.
[160] Ibid.
[161] Ibid.
[162] Truman, Harry. (1947 March 6). Address on Foreign Economic Policy, Delivered at Baylor University. University of California: Santa Barbara. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-foreign-economic-policy-delivered-baylor-university. Accessed 1 April 2024.

seemed particularly inauspicious. It was an election year.[163] Getting appropriations for new programs through Congress in any year is a daunting feat. Certainly, Truman, as a former appropriator, would have understood this. Moreover, Truman, who had inherited the job upon FDR's death, now had to win the Presidency "in his own right."[164] (So confident was the Chicago Daily Tribune in his demise that they printed the headline "Dewey Defeats Truman" before the results were finalized. In a famous photograph the following morning, a reelected President Truman holds up the paper proclaiming his opponent's victory.)

Adding to the challenge, the accumulated post-war federal deficits made spending during World War II and the Depression look like a blip on the charts and many Republicans championed a return to fiscal discipline and isolationism.[165] "As a Democratic President facing a Republican-majority Congress with many Members highly skeptical of the need for further foreign assistance, Truman took a two- pronged approach" focused on persuading both Congress and the American people: "he opened his foreign policy initiative to perhaps the most thorough examination prior to launching of any program and, secondly, provided a perhaps equally rare process of close consultation between the executive and Congress. From the first, the Truman Administration made Congress a player in the development of the new foreign aid program, consulting with it throughout the process".[166]

Partnership between the Truman Administration and Arthur Vandenberg, Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was instrumental in achieving Congressional support. Vandenberg occupied a key institutional position as the Chair of the most powerful Congressional foreign policy committee. Moreover, as a Republican and a reluctant internationalist (having been convinced by the events of Pearl Harbor that isolationism was no longer a viable option for the United States), he had credibility with other skeptical Republicans opposed to the President's initiative. The *Washington Post* designated him the "engineer" of the Plan's successful passage through Congress.[167]

Vandenberg and Truman were a rare bipartisan Presidential-Congressional partnership, which remade American foreign policy in fundamental ways in a new era. The Chief of Staff for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reflected in 1984 that Vandenberg "carried the Republicans with him in all these crucial votes. …it's interesting to note that from the United Nations on down through the satellite peace treaties, the treaty with Japan, the NATO treaty, the Greek-Turkish program, the specialized agencies of the United Nations, the Marshall Plan; all of these things

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[163] Tarnoff, C. (2018, January). The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R45079. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45079. Accessed 30 March 2024.
[164] The U.S. National Archives and Records Administration: Truman Library and Museum. The Election of 1948. https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/education/presidential-inquiries/election-1948. Accessed 2 April 2024.
[165] Tarnoff, C. (2018, January). The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R45079. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45079. Accessed 30 March 2024.; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYFSD;
[166] Tarnoff, C. (2018, January). The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R45079. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45079. Accessed 30 March 2024.
[167] Ibid.

brought forth a strong show of support in the Senate, and I think that it was largely due to Arthur Vandenberg's leadership."[168]

On unanimously reporting the bill to the Senate from his committee, Vandenberg urged his colleagues on the Senate floor

> *"[i]n the name of peace, stability, and freedom it deserves prompt passage...the decision which here concerns the Senate is the kind that tries men's souls. I understand and share the anxieties involved. It would be a far happier circumstance if we could close our eyes to reality, comfortably retire within our bastions, and dream of an isolated and prosperous peace. But that which was once our luxury would now become our folly. This is too plain to be persuasively denied in a foreshortened, atomic world. We must take things as they are.*
>
> *The greatest nation on earth either justifies or surrenders its leadership."*[169]

The tension between "national interests and national values" is evident as Vandenberg describes "this heroic adventure, the greatest ever initiated by any one nation for the sake of peaceful humanities" even while underscoring that aid will be terminated if and when it is "no longer consistent with the national interest of the United States."

Annual Appropriations, Travel, and Information-Sharing as Oversight of the Foreign Policy Agenda

Crucially, he devotes several minutes of the speech to identifying the mechanisms by which Congress will maintain oversight of Marshall Plan aid. At the heart of this accountability is the appropriations process. To ensure enough "continuity" for aid to be effective, the Committee lengthened the period for which aid was authorized,

> *But it leaves each annual appropriation, as indeed it must, to the annual decision of the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate and to the annual discretion of the Congress. The net of it is that the recovery program will pass in annual review. It will be tested annually for its promised accomplishments and for the continuity of performance. It will be tested annually for its impact on our economy. Each Congress is free to decide these subsequent issues for itself. But they will do so in the presence of the declared attitude and opinion of the Eightieth Congress, as expressed in this act, that the program, if successful, should carry through to whatever conclusion it proves to deserve.*[170]

This would prove crucial. Indeed, to this day, foreign aid hinges on "the annual decision of the Appropriations Committees" where it is "tested annually for its promised accomplishments". Every subsequent appropriation for foreign aid has indeed been under the auspices of the rationale for foreign aid set forth by the Eightieth Congress: foreign aid remains a multipurpose tool of foreign

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[168] U.S. Senate. (1984 February 10). Oral History with Francis O. Wilcox. https://www.senate.gov/about/oral-history/senators/wilcox-francis-o-on-vandenberg-arthur.htm. Accessed 2 April 2024.
[169] The Marshall Foundation. "The Battle for World Peace and Stability." [Speech Delivered by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 80th Congress, 2D Session, March 1, 1948.] https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Senator_Vandenberg_Speech_The_Battle_forWorld_Peace_and_Stability.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2024.
[170] Ibid.

policy, designed to blend political, economic, social, and security considerations in a way that reflects national values and serves national interests. The considered conclusion of subsequent Congresses seems to have been that foreign aid should remain a significant instrument of U.S. foreign policy, though there were certainly periods when aid looked hopelessly imperiled.

While the multipurpose nature of aid and its relationship to American foreign policy has underpinned and sustained Congressional support for foreign aid since the 1940s, few administrations have pursued executive-legislative partnership with the depth of the Truman Administration. Even fewer administrations have made the efforts that Truman, Marshall, and Vandenberg undertook to convince the U.S. public of the lasting value of American aid to American interests. Throughout the Cold War, Presidents sidelined Congress in the making of foreign policy and, consequently, Congressional support for increases to the aid budget remained tepid throughout this period. All of this culminated in the near disappearance of American foreign aid at the end of the Cold War (discussed more extensively in the next chapter).

One of Vandenberg's innovations which persists to this day was the insistence "on a 'total balance sheet' of all contemplated American aid spending—including Asia and South America."[171] The Executive Branch still submits a version of these balance sheets each year, indicating how much money they plan to spend in particular countries. This ensures that the relevant Congressional committees maintain the ability to perform detailed oversight of foreign aid funding. (These are the allocation tables that will be discussed in **Chapters 7** and **8** and which remain at the heart of the appropriations process to this very day.)

Declassified memos (and the private papers of Senator Vandenberg) also reveal that the State Department closely engaged Congress during this period, conducting informal hearings with key committees and iteratively addressing their concerns about the nature and structure of this new endeavor.[172] Legislators were also invited to see for themselves, rather than simply taking the Administration's word about the dire nature of the situation in Europe: "The Select Committee on Foreign Aid—freshman Representative Richard Nixon among them—journeyed to Europe" with some members visiting "22 countries in six weeks. In addition, the State Department sponsored Congressional tours, so that by the autumn of 1947, over 214 Members of Congress had visited Europe to examine the situation."[173]

Travel remains an important way for members of Congress to observe U.S. foreign policy and U.S. aid in action. "I don't know how you make the right decisions if you really haven't seen it, if you've just read about it, but if you go there…we come away with a much clearer idea of what's

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[171] Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Houghton Mifflin.

[172] Select examples include Department of State, Office of the Historian. 5 March 1947. The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of War (Patterson).
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d62. Accessed 31 March 2024.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d52;
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d55;
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d62;
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d79;
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d96;
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1947v05/d97.

[173] Tarnoff, C. (2018, January). The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R45079. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45079. Accessed 30 March 2024.

really going on," Kay Granger (R-TX), former Chair of SFOPS and of the Full Appropriations Committee explained in an interview.[174] A former subcommittee staffer acknowledged that members often come to the subcommittee because they are attracted to the opportunity for extensive travel—but that they stay because, while traveling, they become interested in the issues (Interview, Wright 2022). A former House SFOPS Chair told me that while he was initially disappointed when his Full Committee Chair assigned him to State and Foreign Operations, he felt he found his calling there, blending an interest in economic growth with the work of the subcommittee on development, aid, and foreign policy (Interview, Wright 2022). From the Marshall Plan to today, travel by members of Congress remains one of the most reliable ways for legislators to obtain information, conduct oversight, and observe the value of American foreign aid for American foreign policy.

Building Public Support and a Broad Coalition

As it was courting Congress, the Truman Administration simultaneously undertook an extensive public campaign to raise support for the Plan, with the understanding that public opinion and Congressional action are correlated:

> *The Truman Administration knew it had to win over the American people if it was to have any chance of winning Congress. But the early signs were not encouraging. Public opinion polls in the early autumn of 1947 showed that half of Americans had heard of the Marshall Plan, and, of those who had, many were opposed. Nonetheless, by December, two-thirds had heard of the Plan and only 17% were opposed. What happened in the interim was a huge public education campaign. The Administration sponsored a major public relations effort in support of the Plan. Government officials, including many Cabinet members, crossed the country giving speeches.*[175]

It required both military and diplomatic muscle to get the project off the ground and persuade the American public, including decorated general and current Secretary of State George Marshall (from whom the Marshall Plan derived its name), a former Secretary of State (and War) Henry Stimson, and current Secretary of War (the precursor to the Department of Defense) Robert Patterson. These soldier-statesmen led the charge in convincing the public:

> *One key to success was the organization of a grassroots Citizens' Committee for the Marshall Plan, chaired by former Secretary of War and State Henry Stimson and former Secretary of War Robert Patterson. Its membership of over 300 prominent Americans delivered speeches, wrote newspaper articles, and lobbied Congress. The committee circulated petitions throughout the country and financed women's groups which, in turn, held meetings and sponsored speeches. Eventually, most of the nation's business, farm, religious, and other interest groups came to support the Marshall Plan, including the National Farmers' Union, the Daughters of the American Revolution, League of Women Voters, the American Bar Association, and the National Education Association.*

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[174] Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.

[175] Tarnoff, C. (2018, January). The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R45079. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45079. Accessed 30 March 2024.

> *Congress was widely viewed as the real target of all this activity, and the Administration went to great lengths to win its support.*[176]

Truman's Secretary of Commerce, Averell Harriman—himself a former ambassador the Soviet Union during World War II and the UK in the early post-war period, chaired a "bipartisan committee…top-heavy with industrialists" "[s]uggested by Vandenberg as a way to soften up Congress…and ease congressional qualms that the Plan was a 'socialist idea.'"[177] Aid had to be defended by respected advocates, often drawn from the business, military, and diplomatic sectors, to have a fighting chance with the American public and their representatives in Congress.

Foreign aid in the U.S. has always required an underlying foundation of public support—something which key legislators and advocacy groups have had to rebuild at crucial junctures.[178] One of these key moments occurred in the 1990s when the collapse of Communism seemed to spell the end of the rationale for foreign assistance. A new coalition of advocacy groups emerged, galvanized by the dramatically falling aid budgets (discussed further in **Chapters 5** and **6**). These included InterAction, which in 1997 "launched its 'Just 1%' campaign to inform the US public on the real amount of US foreign aid" as a share of the federal budget,[179] the new Business Alliance for International Economic Development "was established with an aim of lobbying for increased aid"[180] and the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC) founded in 1995 "with the single goal of advocating for higher overall US international affairs spending."[181] These would be the most extensive public campaign undertaken since the Marshall Plan. These advocacy groups have been instrumental in preserving the U.S. foreign aid budget in the post-Cold War era (discussed further in these later chapters).

Never overwhelmingly popular, the key has always been, as with the Marshall Plan, to lower the percentage of the American public who strongly oppose aid. Though foreign aid might not be tremendously popular with voters, when it is a low salience issue, this creates space for members of Congress to maneuver without the same visibility the President faces on foreign policy. As Jordan Tama (2024) describes in his recent book *Bipartisanship and U.S. Foreign Policy*, "legislators have more political leeway than presidents to place principle over pragmatism when making foreign policy decisions":

> *many legislators regularly adopt foreign policy positions based on their own deeply seated convictions or prior personal experience. Indeed, a personal interest in the substance of foreign policy is a common motivation for legislators to join one of the foreign affairs committees. Yet even among lawmakers with strongly held foreign policy views of their own, legislators' low level of electoral accountability for foreign policy outcomes gives them greater ability than presidents to promote their preferred policies without having to weigh carefully whether these policies will be effective or incur undesirable costs.*

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176 Ibid.

177 Ibid.

178 The crisis in U.S. foreign policy precipitated by the end of the Cold War caused a similar crisis around the purposes of foreign aid. Advocacy groups in the mid to late 1990s revived support for foreign aid, focused on these blend of development, diplomatic, security, democratic, humanitarian and commercial purposes. (See Lancaster 2007; Tama 2023).

179 Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

180 Ibid.

181 Tama, J. (2024). *Bipartisanship and US foreign policy: cooperation in a polarized age*. Oxford University Press.

3.4 Conclusion: The Legacy of Marshall in US Foreign Aid Policy

The legacy of the Marshall Plan was to profoundly link U.S. foreign aid to U.S. foreign policy and to make the multipurpose nature of aid and Presidential-Congressional partnership central pillars in aid's continuation. Since its inception, foreign aid tracks the priorities and direction of U.S. foreign policy. Any crisis over the role of the United States in the world or the level of American global engagement will have repercussions for aid. Likewise, prolonged challenges to the Presidential-Congressional partnership or the multipurpose nature of foreign aid also weaken Congressional and public support for aid. Underlying a robust Presidential-Congressional partnership on aid is the ability of Congress to obtain foreign policy information and contribute to the President's foreign policy agenda. Beginning with Marshall, Congress has used travel, oversight, and annual appropriations to ensure it maintains an active role in aid and foreign policy. Since Marshall, the multipurpose nature of aid has not only proved valuable as an instrument in a new American foreign policy of political economy, but also as a foundation for building the broad coalition of public and Congressional support required to sustain funding for foreign aid.

For many members of Congress, while foreign aid is, without dispute, an investment of domestic resources in foreign countries—and this puts pressure on legislators who are loathe to be seen to be spending taxpayer dollars abroad—it is also foreign policy. As Truman concluded his speech to Congress in December 1947, "In proposing that the Congress enact a program of aid to Europe, I am proposing that this Nation contribute to world peace and to its own security by assisting in the recovery of sixteen countries which, like the United States, are devoted to the preservation of free institutions and enduring peace among nations."[182] Congress supported the investment. By April 1948, Truman had his Marshall Plan. The proposal passed 329 to 74 in the House and 69 to 17 in the Senate.[183]

Just two months later, Vandenberg's labors were nearly undone by the House Appropriations Committee, which has oversight of discretionary government spending. The Appropriations Committee has always been powerful; "its members largely determine how, when, and where the federal government spends money."[184] In his celebrated study of the House Appropriations Committee in the decade following World War II, Richard F. Fenno, Jr. (1962) underscores the fierce pride of committee members in their placement and their conviction "that the Committee on Appropriations, far from being merely one among many units in a complicated legislative-executive system, is *the* most important, most responsible unit in the whole appropriations

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[182] Truman, Harry. (1947 December 19). Special Message to Congress on the Marshall Plan. University of California: Santa Barbara. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congress-the-marshall-plan. Accessed 1 April 2024.

[183] Tarnoff, C. (2018, January). The Marshall Plan: Design, Accomplishments, and Significance. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R45079. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45079. Accessed 30 March 2024.
; The Marshall Foundation. "Foreign Assistance Act of 1948." https://www.marshallfoundation.org/the-marshall-plan/f-a-act-1948/. Accessed 3 April 2024.
; Department of State, Office of the Historian. Marshall Plan, 1948. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/marshall-plan#:~:text=Fanned%20by%20the%20fear%20of,the%20rebuilding%20of%20Western%20Europe. Accessed 31 March 2024.

[184] Berry, Christopher R., & Fowler, Anthony. (2018). Congressional committees, legislative influence, and the hegemony of chairs. Journal of Public Economics, 158, 1-11.

process." In the House, the "committee's power over federal spending is considered so great that the chairs of its 12 subcommittees have earned the moniker of 'cardinals'" (Berry and Fowler 2015).

The Congressional division of legislative labor relies on two broad types of committees: *authorizing* and *appropriating*. The authorizing committee sets Congressional policy and the appropriating committee funds that policy. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee had labored to design a framework for the Marshall Plan that could win sufficient Congressional support, the funding for the endeavor had to be legislated separately through an appropriations bill. After Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act expressing its approval of the Marshall Plan, the House Appropriations Committee threatened to underfund it. The Republican Chair of House Appropriations, John Taber of New York, "ordered" his committee to cut planned funding levels by 26% in their appropriations bill.[185]

This move made Vandenberg "fighting mad."[186] Authorizing and appropriations, by longstanding convention, are separate processes, but Taber's actions to undermine that which both the House and Senate had supported with overwhelming majorities prompted drastic action: "Breaking with tradition, Vandenberg appealed to the Senate Appropriations Committee for an opportunity to appear before it to protest the House action." Happening just days before the Republican National Convention, "[s]ome thought the fight over the cut might precipitate an all-out isolationist versus internationalist fight at the convention…In a tense session of the Senate Appropriations Committee Vandenberg made a scorching assault on what he termed the 'meat-axe approach' of the Taber group. The cut, he testified, 'guts the enterprise' and would 'veto' the will of Congress."[187] The crux of the argument came down to the role of appropriators in American foreign policy; "[w]hile granting the Congressional power of review of appropriations, Vandenberg held that by indirection the House sought to repeal the 'intent and purpose' of the basic legislation and to 'reverse' American foreign policy as established by Congress itself."[188] The role of appropriators, Vandenberg insinuated, was to bolster, not undermine, Congressional foreign policy.

He was blunt in driving this point home before the Senate appropriators. "I do mean to argue that any such cynical reversal would be a major policy decision which should not be made through the back door of an appropriations bill…I respectfully submit that any such action reverses the overwhelming intent of Congress registered two short months ago…"[189] Both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee must reach agreement on appropriations bills. Vandenberg's appeal to the Senate appropriators worked and the Committee forestalled the depth of the cuts proposed by the House. (This is a pattern that persists. The House appropriators are more likely to request deep cuts to foreign aid than the Senate. Today some of this is done strategically to give the House the political cover of requesting significant cuts to funding when it knows the Senate committee will restore funding levels (Interview, Wright 2024).) To this day, some of the most prominent Republican internationalists remaining in Congress (e.g., Mitch McConnell (R-KY) have long served as members and leaders on the Senate's SFOPS committee.

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185 Vandenberg, A. H. (1952). *The private papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Houghton Mifflin.
186 Ibid.
187 Ibid.
188 Ibid.
189 Ibid.

The legacy of the Marshall Plan continues to profoundly shape Congressional approaches to foreign aid. When considering the amount of money to spend in Afghanistan and Iraq, handwritten notes indicate that the House SFOPS chair used the Marshall Plan as a focal point, calculating that it represented 5% of GDP at the time while the proposed $87 billion for Iraq was .08% of GDP. He then compared the costs of World War II ($4.8 trillion in 2003 terms), Korea ($408 billion), Vietnam ($584 billion), and Operation Desert Storm ($82 billion) to the total $193 billion requested for both Iraq and Afghanistan.[190] These kinds of assessments frame aid as investments in peace as compared to the cost of military interventions and underscore the argument that foreign aid functions as foreign policy, not simply a form of constituent benefits. This trend originated in the Marshall Plan and continues to the present.

The Marshall Plan laid the cornerstones of U.S. foreign aid on the foundation of a new American foreign policy; it also constructed the infrastructure of U.S. foreign aid policy that still frames U.S. assistance. It underscored the role of appropriations in American foreign policy through foreign aid. Today more than 125 countries receive aid from the U.S. each year.[191] The features that distinguished this original endeavor remain core pillars of Congressional support for U.S. aid: the multipurpose nature of American assistance, its relationship to U.S. foreign policy, the depth of Presidential-Congressional partnership, the importance of travel, access to information, and the annual appropriations process for Congressional oversight, and the need to engage the public and build a broad coalition of support. These "fundamentals" remain essential to the survival of aid in the American political system, a context in which the President and Congress forge foreign policy together, but they were severely tested over the course of the Cold War and aid nearly disappeared as a tool of American foreign policy.

[190] Kolbe, J. James Kolbe Papers. Box 86. Folder 14. University of Arizona Special Collections. Tucson, Arizona. Accessed 27 August 2024.
[191] This is an annual average, calculated by the author from original data on aid appropriations.

4 The Presidential-Congressional Partnership Falters
The Cold War Struggle over Foreign Policy

> *"There have been so many puzzles here over the conduct of American foreign policy in the last couple of years that the notion is getting around that the President and the Congress can't agree on anything, but this is not precisely true.*
>
> *On at least one thing, they are in total agreement: that the present decision-making 'system,' if that's the right word, is an incoherent mess, excessively irritating to both branches of the Government and dangerous to the national interest.*
>
> *After many years of Presidential domination of foreign policy, marked by excessive secrecy and even unconstitutional military aggression, leading to the defeat in Vietnam and other tragedies, there was a natural and inevitable reaction in the Congress to rope the President in. …Lately the lawmakers have been exerting their own authority… muckraking the past, and concentrating on stopping bad things, but they have no positive policy to replace the policies they destroy…for the time being, almost everybody around here has foreign policy of his own."*
>
> James "Scotty" Reston
> *The New York Times*, 1976[192]

> *"The time has come for rebuilding a truly bipartisan foreign policy in which congressional deference in the execution of policy would be offered in exchange for legitimate consultation and trust in the formulation of policy."*[193]
>
> Senators David Boren (D-OK) and John Danforth (R-MO),
> op-ed, *Washington Post*, 1976

4.1 Introduction

From its beginning in the Marshall Plan, U.S. foreign aid was designed as a multipurpose tool of American foreign policy, forged through robust executive-legislative partnership, undergirded by extensive information sharing (and Congressional travel) and bolstered by building a broad coalition of public support. These were the essential ingredients of continued Congressional support for foreign aid. In the decades after the Marshall Plan, these fundamentals weakened, ultimately jeopardizing foreign aid.

Throughout the Cold War, Congress struggled to assert itself as a full and equal partner to the President. Presidents continued to sideline Congress and shield information from legislators, causing the Presidential-Congressional partnership on foreign policy to fracture. Because of the limited information available to them, the ability of legislators to conduct oversight was hampered. This contributed to a reluctance to fund aid at robust levels. The broad coalition of public support that bolstered aid fragmented after the Fall of Saigon. Foreign aid as a multipurpose tool of foreign policy was therefore the only remaining pillar of the Marshall Plan foundations left by the height of

[192] Reston, J. (1976 February 1). "Foreign Policy Muddle." *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1976/02/01/archives/foreign-policy-muddle.html. Accessed 8 March 2024.
[193] Collier, E (Editor). (1989, March). Congress and Foreign Policy—1987. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

the Cold War. As a result, when the Soviet Union collapsed and obviated containment as the overarching goal of American foreign policy, the crisis around the direction of American foreign policy precipitated an existential crisis for American foreign aid.

4.2 The Presidential-Congressional Partnership Frays

The bipartisan approach to foreign policy Vandenberg worked so hard to build faded with his departure from the Senate after his death in April 1951. While the legislative architecture laid by the Republican Congress and Democratic President preserved aid as a tool of foreign policy for decades to come, over the course of the Cold War, key legislators became reluctant to double down on its use because of the way in which Presidents could use aid to advance their own policy agendas, without meaningful consultation with Congress. Throughout the Vietnam War, Presidents had used foreign aid to augment their military strategies. Johnson, for example, "saw the rapid expansion of [US]AID programs in Vietnam as a crucial complement to military efforts" and "forward-deployed aid workers" as "frontline implementers".[194] The President directed significant resources toward Vietnam, which, at one point during the war, received roughly half of all economic aid.[195]

Vietnam represented a low point in Congressional-Presidential foreign policy consultation and did lasting damage to the image of American foreign aid for the public. Norris (2017) traces how the

> *number of Americans thinking the U.S. spent too much on foreign assistance rocketed from 33 percent in February 1965 to 75 percent around the fall of Saigon in 1975… While we often speak of Vietnam as creating a crisis in the public's view of the U.S. military, it arguably hit assistance programs harder and in a more lasting fashion. There have been some significant improvements in these numbers over the years, but is has been a very slow, and deeply uneven, recovery.*[196]

Outside of military and humanitarian assistance, there were three major funding streams of U.S. aid in this period: "Development Assistance (DA), Security Supporting Assistance (SSA, later renamed the Economic Support Fund or ESF), and food aid (also called PL480)."[197] Food aid originated under the purview of the Department of Agriculture and is appropriated by the subcommittee that handles the Department of Agriculture's budget. It is a well-known component of U.S. assistance, particularly because of its benefits to American farmers, but it falls outside the scope of this dissertation because it follows a different appropriations process from the rest of the U.S. aid budget. The remaining two accounts are the early instantiations of my categories of **"development plus"** and **"security plus"** assistance. Both are country-allocated streams of funding. Varying amounts from each account are directed to individual countries annually. These two accounts are grouped under the broader umbrella of "economic" (i.e. not military) aid.

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[194] Norris, J. (2021). *The enduring struggle: The history of the US Agency for International Development and America's uneasy transformation of the world.* Rowman & Littlefield.
[195] Ibid.
[196] Norris. J. (2017 August 15). Special Feature: A history of American public opinion on foreign aid. Devex. https://www.devex.com/news/special-feature-a-history-of-american-public-opinion-on-foreign-aid-90732. Accessed 19 August 2024.
[197] Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

As Congress grew increasingly frustrated with the conduct of the war, it found it had few opportunities to check the President's foreign policy. Ever since Vandenberg had instituted the balance sheet, Administrations were required to submit an annual budget to Congress about where they planned to spend foreign assistance. Congressional committees could react to this and insist on reallocations, but, once money was appropriated, Presidents were, for the most part, not required to update Congress on where money had actually been spent until six months to a year later. This created opportunities for Presidents to manipulate aid funding without informing Congress or to strategically time notifications so that Congress could not act on them.

In the 1960s, Congress capped the number of countries who could receive aid in attempt to rein in Johnson. Johnson invoked national security prerogatives and notified Congress that he would be "increasing the number of countries eligible for development loans from ten to twenty-nine and for technical assistance and cooperation grants from forty to forty-eight."[198] He did so right before a Congressional recess so that the relevant committees would be unable to meet and review his proposal in the 30 days allotted to them to respond. William Fulbright (D-AR), Democratic Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote a scathing letter to Johnson in reply: "I personally deplore this action and I believe that many members on both sides of the aisle are also seriously concerned."[199] Fulbright pushed Congress to eliminate economic aid to prevent its use in this manner,[200] and though he did not get his wish, appropriations for USAID plummeted in the late 1960s.

In 1967, in the wake of growing frustration with Johnson's use of aid, New York Senator, Jacob Javits (R-NY), serving on the Appropriations Committee and then the Foreign Relations Committee in the late 1960s,[201] [202] successfully introduced an amendment requiring the President to review and reformulate U.S. assistance.[203] (As a freshman representative, Javits had served on the 1947 House Foreign Affairs Committee that scrutinized the Marshall Plan. An initial skeptic worried about the economic burden aid to Europe would have on American prosperity,[204] he was persuaded of the Plan's necessity and viability. The Republican later encapsulated the origins of American aid thusly: "Our belief is that, if we make it better for the other fellow, we will make it better for ourselves…. I think fundamentally this is the American answer."[205]) This culminated in the "New Directions" legislation in 1973, a reform led by the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which, in combination with the War Powers Act (also spearheaded by Javits), would initiate a fundamental rebalancing of foreign policy power between the executive and legislative branch.

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198 Department of State, Office of the Historian. (1967 February 8). 64. Letter From the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) to President Johnson. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v09/d64. Accessed 31 July 2024.

199 Ibid.

200 Norris, J. (2021). *The enduring struggle: The history of the US Agency for International Development and America's uneasy transformation of the world.* Rowman & Littlefield.

201 U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (2000). Committee on Foreign Relations Millennium Edition 1816-2000. https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CDOC-105sdoc281.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2024.

202 Ibid.

203 Department of State, Office of the Historian. (1970 March 5). 128. Memorandum From President Nixon. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v04/d128. Accessed 31 July 2024.

204 Steil, B. (2018). *The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War.* Oxford University Press.

205 Quote from 1949; McVety, A. K. (2015). *Enlightened aid : U.S. development as foreign policy in Ethiopia.* Oxford University Press.

"New Directions" tightened notification requirements for even seemingly small changes to planned spending.[206] It prevented spending on "programs, projects, type of material assistance, countries, or other operations not justified or in excess of the amount justified to the Appropriations Committee . . . unless the Committees on Appropriations of both Houses of Congress are previously notified 15 days in advance."[207] No spending could occur that had not been signed off by the Appropriations Committee in the initial review process and any change to planned amounts in excess of 10% required committees to be notified. (Over time, this has evolved into a powerful Congressional check on foreign policy, known as the "Congressional hold." While the legislation only requires agencies to *notify* Congress before proceeding, today they are reluctant to proceed without receiving Congressional sign-off as it risks their relationship with Congress and future funding.)[208] As a result, "New Directions" gave Congress far more control over foreign aid. Power over funding is fundamental to Congress being able to assert itself in foreign policy through effective use of the power of the purse. This is highly salient in both foreign aid and defense appropriations. Future Chair of House Foreign Affairs, Lee Hamilton (D-IN) recalls of this period:

> *Congress was slow to take dramatic action on Vietnam, in part because it was difficult for Congress to block funding for the war effort without holding up all appropriations for defense or denying U.S. combat forces the means to defend themselves. At the time, no amendments were allowed on defense appropriations bills, which were decided by a single yes-no vote. Many of us who had reservations about the war did not want to use the blunt, and politically unpopular, tool of rejecting entire defense appropriations bills.*
>
> *By 1973, however, Congress changed its rules for considered defense appropriations and, with greater assertiveness, passed legislation that helped end the war and establish a new framework for executive and legislative war-making authority.*[209]

These reforms also bolstered another essential component in preserving a strong role for Congress in foreign affairs—access to information. The Congressional Research Service reports that Congress added "[a]pproximately 30 new reporting requirements relating to foreign affairs…in 1973".[210] This included quarterly notifications for certain types of **"security plus"** funding and military assistance.[211] Another legislative reform enabled Congressional committees to request testimony from foreign affairs officials of any rank; previously, they had been limited to calling only officials appointed by the President whose positions required Senate confirmation.[212]

At the same time, New Directions also sharpened and clarified the purposes for which U.S. aid was given. Members of Congress expressed strong concerns about the drift of American aid

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206 Wright, A. and Higgins, G. (unpublished) (2024 July). Menendez and the Congressional Hold—a National Security Risk?

207 Quoting the amendment from North, W.H. and North, J. F. (2007). Transformations in U.S. Foreign Economic Assistance. In *Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy*. Taylor & Francis Group.

208 Wright, A. and Higgins, G. (unpublished) (2024 July). Menendez and the Congressional Hold—a National Security Risk?

209 Hamilton, L., & Tama, J. (2002). *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

210 Congressional Research Service. (1974, April). Improving the Reporting Requirement System in the Foreign Affairs Field. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 9 September 2024.

211 Ibid.

212 Ibid.

toward primarily military purposes.[213] North and North (2007) emphasize that New Directions placed a "high priority" on aid projects "that directly improve the lives of the poor, and a collaborative style to support the goals chosen by each country receiving aid" and that the impetus for this came from Congress: "(The word "directly" was repeatedly raised when members of Congress and their staffs questioned project proposals put forward by USAID.)" George Ingram, who worked on the for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs from 1973-1995, judged that "New Directions saved the foreign aid budget."[214] It re-established the multipurpose nature of aid, strengthened Congressional access to information, and effectively leveraged the power of the purse—all of which temporarily renewed Congressional support for foreign aid, even in the wake of a fraying Presidential-Congressional foreign policy partnership.

4.3 The Collapse of the Authorizing Process

Following the War Powers Act and "New Directions," Congress continued to curb the Presidential use of security and military assistance. In 1974, Congress passed the Nelson Amendment, which gave Congress veto power over arms sales.[215] With the end of the Vietnam War, Congress began to phase out funding for the Military Assistance Program (MAP), though it continued several of the more targeted and clearly defined forms of military assistance, such as education and training and equipment sales to allies.[216] These legislative reforms ensured Presidents understood the need to consult Congress on foreign aid, particularly of the security and military variety.

While the Carter Administration (January 1977-January 1981) was less interested than previous White House administrations in security assistance and more focused on development and human rights, the Reagan Administration, however, was intensely interested in security assistance. "Just two months after being elected, President Reagan sought $6.9 billion for security assistance in FY82, $900 million over former President Carter's request"— a stunning 15% increase.[217] Studying the evolution of U.S. security assistance, two U.S. Air Force Captains describe how "during President Reagan's first term, the administration and Congress worked together to increase accomplish two main objectives, 1) to increase security assistance funding levels, and 2) to balance military assistance with economic aid programs… As a result, budget authority for the Economic Support Fund (ESF) and direct assistance was increased in step with military assistance".[218] The Economic Support Fund was the re-branded Supporting Security Assistance Account so frequently used by Presidents during the Vietnam War. Reagan dramatically expanded its use; "the number of countries receiving ESF went from 28 to 44 under Reagan's administration".[219]

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[213] Nanes, A. (1973, June). Alternatives to Bilateral Economic Aid. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 9 September 2024.
[214] Ingram, George. (2018). Oral History for The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Ingram.George.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2024.
[215] Edwards, D. B., & Meneley, T. L. (1993). The Shaping of the US Security Assistance Program. [Dissertation at the Air Force Institute of Technology.]
[216] International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, Edwards and Meneley, (1993) "The Shaping of U.S. Security Assistance." Air Force Institute of Technology.
[217] Edwards, D. B., & Meneley, T. L. (1993). The Shaping of the US Security Assistance Program. [Dissertation at the Air Force Institute of Technology.]
[218] Ibid.
[219] Ibid.

This looked like a revival of a deeper Presidential-Congressional partnership. What made these funding increases particularly remarkable was the reality of a divided Congress in which Republicans controlled the Senate and Democrats controlled the House. This has become far more common since 2001[220], but, in 1981, it had been *fifty years* since the last occurrence of a divided Congress (in a Great Depression, pre-World War II era.). This introduced the additional challenges in navigating the appropriations process and foreign policy decision-making. Given that the fiscal platform of the new President required budget cuts across government, foreign aid seemed particularly vulnerable.

Even a united Congress in the previous session had been unable to pass foreign aid appropriations and instead relied on continuing resolutions to fund aid.[221] To accomplish a bipartisan consensus to preserve foreign aid funding, the President and Congress, in a return to executive-legislative partnership, increased funding for security assistance while maintaining high levels of development assistance to get the votes needed for the bill:[222] "Former critics of foreign aid called on their colleagues to look past the economic programs with which they disagreed and support the appropriations bill because it contained military assistance that was an important part of the President's foreign policy. Again, Republicans joined Democrats to pass the measure."[223]

This brokered what would be a continuing strategy to build support for foreign aid—security assistance designed to appeal to Republicans paired with development assistance supported by Democrats—reflecting the longstanding tradition of blending aspects of development, diplomacy, and defense since the inception of U.S. aid. In a divided Congress, a broad coalition was required to sustain the foreign aid budget. This seeming bipartisan, executive-legislative triumph turned out to be the coda on a short-lived era of cooperation for foreign aid appropriations. By 1984, a new order had emerged, though vestiges of this bipartisan pairing of development and security assistance would linger in the nineties and reemerge powerfully with the end of the Cold War.

Between 1981 and 1984, the authorizing process had broken down in this new environment of a divided Congress, not just for foreign aid, but for almost every aspect of government except for defense. As with the Marshall Plan, Congress typically passes annual legislation authorizing programs. This is followed up by annual appropriations legislation to fund authorized programs. The Congressional Research Service in a report to the House Foreign Affairs Committee describes

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[220] Between 2001 and 2024 (inclusive), 10 out of 24 years have seen a divided Congress (41.66%). Between 1947 and 2000 (inclusive), 6 out of 54 years had a divided Congress (11.11%).

[221] Collier, E (Editor). (1982, March). Congress and Foreign Policy—1981. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

[222] *"House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki insisted on active administration support in getting the bilateral aid authorization bill through Congress. He said that he would not take the measure to the floor until he had a list of 125 Republicans who would vote in favor of it. In the end, 97 Republicans voted for the foreign aid bill, nearly twice the number that had supported a foreign aid authorization the year before.*

Similarly, Speaker O'Neill said he would get the foreign assistance appropriations bill to the House floor by December 15, but it would be up to President Reagan to garner enough Republican votes to guarantee passage. Democratic supporters in the House also threatened to vote against the appropriations bill if development assistance were reduced substantially more than military assistance." Collier, E (Editor). (1982, March). Congress and Foreign Policy—1981. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

[223] Ibid.

the breakdown of the authorizations process and the new primacy of appropriations subcommittees in great detail—and it traced the origins of this new order to foreign aid.[224]

"Faced with the prospect of seeing its efforts to gain final passage of a foreign aid authorization bill thwarted elsewhere in Congress, the Foreign Affairs Committee sought an alternative-and unusual- strategy to resurrect the apparently-dead foreign assistance legislation"—it attached its authorization to a continuing resolution. The committee had found an appropriations vehicle for its authorizing legislation. While a common procedure in today's polarized Congress, this was unprecedented at the time. Members of the House Appropriations Committee agreed to allow the authorization to be attached to their bill—with some conditions, namely that the Foreign Affairs Committee would not get to formally join the conference meeting to hash out the harmonized version of the bill with the Senate. However, other legislators, primarily Senate Democrats, baulked at this unusual maneuver. Ultimately, the authorizing portion was dropped from the bill, but the appropriations were retained. Having been bypassed, authorizing committees would struggle to recover their footing in making policy ever after.

By 1984, it was clear that continuing resolutions, which extend existing appropriations for an additional period of time, had displaced authorizations and that this change empowered the appropriating subcommittee, enabling "greater control of the [foreign aid] program by the House and Senate Foreign Operations subcommittees (particularly their leaders) where the [appropriations] legislation originates."[225] Up until this point, the power over policy and the power of the purse had remained structurally separate. The collapse of the authorization process ultimately consolidated the power of policy with the power of the purse, but this transformation took time. Initially, the power of policy was simply put on ice as authorizing committees were bypassed. In 1985, the Congressional Research Service still judged that "power of the purse is a potent tool in shaping foreign policy, but Congress encounters difficulties in using it effectively."[226]

Just a year later, the notorious Iran-Contra Affair would test both the limits of the Congressional power of the purse and Presidential-Congressional partnership on foreign policy. In the same way that the legacy of the Marshall Plan still frames foreign aid, the shadow of Iran-Contra still hangs over all subsequent Presidential-Congressional partnerships.

4.4 Iran-Contra: Security Assistance, a Divided Congress, and the Funding of Foreign Policy

The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act enacted in 1985 introduced additional fiscal constraints on the government's budget, which triggered automatic cuts if the budget appropriated by Congress exceeded certain parameters. In addition, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings reconfigured the composition of U.S. aid—because of the cuts required to comply, development

[224] Collier, E (Editor). (1985). Congress and Foreign Policy—1984. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[225] Collier, E (Editor). (1982, March). Congress and Foreign Policy—1981. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[226] Collier, E. (1985 September 4). The Power of the Purse in Foreign Policy—Process and Problems in Congressional Funding. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

assistance grew as a share of the budget remaining while military and security assistance shrank.[227] While Congress managed to pass an authorization bill for foreign aid that year, which froze spending levels, legislators in general were clamoring for deeper cuts even as Reagan was submitting larger budget requests.[228] (This would be "the last year Congress passed a comprehensive reauthorization" for foreign aid.)[229] Appropriators and authorizers were forced to make cuts to foreign aid the next year, but to "help prioritize bilateral funding levels to some countries, the Congress 'earmarked' funds to ensure a certain level and type of assistance to them."[230] This meant that cuts fell deeply on countries not shielded by earmarks; "[b]ecause these reductions were significant and involved so many countries" critics argued that it precipitated "a crisis in U.S. foreign policy."[231]

As the authorizing process was breaking down, Congress continued to reassert its role in foreign policy and constrain the President from pursuing foreign policy priorities which it did not support. On a number of occasions, like his predecessors from both parties, Reagan shielded important foreign policy priorities from the will and input of Congress. The most famous example of this would be the notorious Iran-Contra Affair. Eager to support democracy abroad and combat Communism, Reagan advocated aid for to the Contras in Nicaragua, a group fighting the Cuban-backed Sandinista government of Nicaragua. The U.S. approach to Nicaragua split an already divided Congress into different factions, with the Reagan Administration pushing hard for aid to the Contras. Members of Congress who opposed support to the Contras raised concerns that the group was guilty of human rights violations.[232] Supporters argued that opposition to the Contras was tantamount to support for Communism and stressed human rights violations by the Sandinistas.[233]

Congressional reporting requirements around U.S. foreign assistance had tightened across the Cold War, leaving less and less room for Presidents to maneuver funding without Congressional awareness. This left the Intelligence Community (IC) and Defense appropriations as possible channels through which to funnel assistance to Nicaragua, though both also had reduced maneuverability from just a decade earlier. The House Foreign Affairs Committee (then the House International Relations Committee) had been livid when they learned of the role the CIA played in orchestrating the overthrow of Chilean President Allende—from the *New York Times* no less. One year after a coup removed Allende from office, members of Congress read in their newspapers "that the CIA had directed the infusion of millions of dollars into Chile between 1970 and 1973" and while Nixon's successor, President Gerald Ford, denied the CIA's involvement, "[o]ne key result of these revelations was the focusing of congressional attention once again on the CIA's foreign covert action operations, a subject that had been the source of intermittent controversy for a number of years."[234]

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[227] Collier, E (Editor). (1987). Congress and Foreign Policy—1985-86. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[228] Ibid.
[229] Rennack, D. (2023 January 18). Foreign Assistance Act of 1961: Authorizations and Corresponding Authorities. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R40089. Accessed on 19 May 2024.
[230] Collier, E (Editor). (1987). Congress and Foreign Policy—1985-86. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[231] Ibid.
[232] Collier, E (Editor). (1987). Congress and Foreign Policy—1985-86. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[233] Ibid.
[234] Goodman, M (Editor). (1976). Congress and Foreign Policy—1975. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

The CIA had its access to funding from the foreign aid budget terminated shortly thereafter. ("It was presumed at the time … that this amendment …would enable Congress to maintain better oversight by requiring the CIA to report, through the President, on covert action operations conducted by the Agency overseas."[235] It was not to be.) Congress quickly found that they still lacked authority to stop the flow of funding from the International Affairs budget to "pro-Western forces in Angola" even as members of Congress were again reading new information about the CIA in their copies of the *New York Times* which reported

> *that the CIA, in direct violation of its statutory charter, conducted a "massive, illegal domestic intelligence operation during the Nixon administration against the anti-war movement and other dissident groups in the United States." The Times article also charged that 'intelligence files of at least 10,000 American citizens' had been maintained by the CIA, and that the Agency had engaged in "dozens of other illegal activities" within the United States starting in the 1950s, "including break-ins, wiretapping, and the surreptitious inspection of mail."*[236]

Enough was now enough for members of Congress, with both the House and Senate initiating investigations. While the "Senate select committee focused its public hearing on major controversies that had been the subject of the Rockefeller Commission report …the involvement of the CIA in assassination plots against foreign leaders…and FBI counterintelligence programs within the United States", the House investigation "focused its public hearings on the **budget of the intelligence community**, the performance of the intelligence community in selected crises, and the questions related to risks and control of foreign intelligence programs of the United States" (emphasis added).[237]

The House, with its power of the purse, decided to follow the money. (They would soon initiate reforms to bolster this power of the purse against Presidential encroachment.) Their first obstacle was getting information from executive branch agencies. The difficulty the House select committee had in obtaining information revealed the disparity in foreign policy power between the Executive and Legislative branches at that time. While today, a phone call from a member of Congress has the power to bring an agency to a screeching halt until their questions are answered, in 1975, the House had to bargain with the Department of State *after* it had already *subpoenaed* a memorandum from a senior official, promising "that its action 'shall in no way be considered as a precedent affecting the right of this committee with respect to access to executive branch testimony or documents.'"[238]

Officials from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) were called to testify. It was revealed that they too had no real oversight of the CIA's budget, which was classified: "Comptroller General Elmer B. Staats told the House select Committee in July that the General Accounting Office does not know how much the United States spends on intelligence because of current restrictions on its auditing authority with respect to intelligence agencies." The Director of the CIA also possessed significant budget authority, meaning he could withdraw "large sums of money on his own authority" from the

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[235] Ibid.
[236] Ibid.
[237] Ibid.
[238] Ibid.

Treasury without having to come to Congress or consult OMB. Then, as now, "Congress and the American public's ability to oversee intelligence dollars and understand how they are spent is limited by the secrecy that surrounds the intelligence budget process."[239] Congress needed a way to monitor, direct, and sometimes halt the intelligence community's activities without jeopardizing national security. As a more recent Director of the CIA, George Tenet, has explained:

> *Disclosure of the budget request reasonably could be expected to provide foreign governments with the United States' own assessment of its intelligence capabilities and weaknesses ... [T]he difference between Congressional appropriations from one year to the next provides a measure of Congress's assessment of the nation's intelligence efforts and their satisfaction of stated policy objectives. Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged appropriation reflect a congressional determination that existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the national security needs of the United States, but an actual figure also indicates the degree of change. This knowledge could assist foreign governments or other organizations in redirecting their own resources to frustrate U.S. intelligence collection efforts, with resulting damage to our national security.*[240]

Then CIA Director Colby "urged that the entire budget of the CIA be kept secret by Congress" while a representative from Connecticut, Robert Giaimo, pushed for the full and "public disclosure" of the CIA's budget. The House supported Colby over Giaimo, but also clipped the CIA's wings: "During the House debate on the Defense Department appropriations bill in 1975, Representative George H. Mahon, chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, extended the opportunity to all Members of the House to have access to classified budgetary data on intelligence under proper safeguards which would protect the information from public disclosure."[241]

Therefore, even as security and development assistance grew during the early period of the Reagan Administration, Congress remained wary of the potential for the President to sidestep them on foreign policy by using the Department of Defense and Intelligence Community. Unknown to Congress, during his first year in office, in November 1981, "President Reagan signed National Security Directive 17, authorizing provision of covert support to anti-Sandinista forces" and a few weeks later "Reagan signed a document intending to conceal the November 17 authorization of anti-Sandinista operations."[242] Skeptical of the Administration, the Democratic Chair of the House's Select Committee on Intelligence pushed for legislative guardrails, "that prohibited the CIA, the principal conduit of covert American support for the Contras, from spending funds 'for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua.'"[243] The text of the amendment also prohibited the Department of Defense from using funds or providing equipment, training, and advice for the same purposes.[244] The Reagan Administration decided that as long as its stated purposes were not the

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[239] Devine, M and Plagakis, S. (2024 September 26). Intelligence Community Spending Trends. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44381. Accessed on 14 July 2024.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Goodman, M (Editor). (1976). Congress and Foreign Policy—1975. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[242] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras. https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/9712/appa.htm. Accessed 1 August 2024.
[243] Ibid.
[244] Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. Arthur B. Culvahouse Files. Box: CFOA 1131. Folder: Iran/Arms Transaction: Legal Memoranda - Nicaraguan Contra Aid [Boland Amendment] (4).

overthrow of the Nicaraguan government, they fell within the letter of the law.[245] In 1983, Congress relented and allowed up to the Administration to draw up to $24 million in support of the Contras.[246] To supplement this meager level of funding from Congress, Reagan's new National Security Advisor, Robert McFarlane, "convinced Saudi Arabia to contribute $1 million per month to the Contras through a secret bank account set up by Lt. Col. Oliver North", on staff at the National Security Council.[247]

When Congress discovered that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had directly participated in the mining of Nicaraguan harbors"[248], it halted all aid in 1984, ending what had been "a two-and-a-half year program of covert assistance for the contra military efforts".[249] Congress also issued the "Boland amendment", which prohibited the Department of Defense, CIA, and "any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities" from using funds to "directly or indirectly" support "military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, organization, movement, or individual"[250] "without a prior vote of Congress."[251]

At the same time, Congress agreed to "$14 million in military aid to the contras, available after Feb. 28, 1985, *if both Houses of Congress should approve a presidential request to release it.*"[252] That April the Republican Senate sought to release the $14 million to the President but the Democratic House voted the measure down.[253] Legislators faced heavy pressure from lobbyists that summer on both sides of the issue. As a result, Congress decided to approve $27 million in **humanitarian** assistance for the Contras. While legislators could not agree on the "harder" foreign policy purposes supported by **"security plus"** assistance, they agreed to allow other forms of American aid. The money came with tights restrictions:

> *Congress also again applied what were known as 'Boland Amendment' restrictions on the spending which prevented the administration from using any funds in support of the contras except those*

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https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/digitallibrary/smof/counsel/culvahouse/cfoa1131/40-123-12011812-CFOA1131-049-2018.pdf. Accessed on 2 August 2024.

[245] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras. https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/9712/appa.htm. Accessed 1 August 2024.

[246] Ibid.; Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. Arthur B. Culvahouse Files. Box: CFOA 1131. Folder: Iran/Arms Transaction: Legal Memoranda - Nicaraguan Contra Aid [Boland Amendment] (4). https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/digitallibrary/smof/counsel/culvahouse/cfoa1131/40-123-12011812-CFOA1131-049-2018.pdf. Accessed on 2 August 2024.; National Security Council. 1985 August 23. Declassified Memo. Memorandum for W. Robert Pearson from J.R. Scharfen on The 1984 Boland Amendment. Brown University. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/documents/d-nic-21.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2024.

[247] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Appendix A: Background on United States Funding of the Contras. https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/9712/appa.htm. Accessed 1 August 2024.

[248] Collier, E (Editor). (1987). Congress and Foreign Policy—1985-86. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

[249] Ibid.

[250] Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. Arthur B. Culvahouse Files. Box: CFOA 1131. Folder: Iran/Arms Transaction: Legal Memoranda - Nicaraguan Contra Aid [Boland Amendment] (4). https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/digitallibrary/smof/counsel/culvahouse/cfoa1131/40-123-12011812-CFOA1131-049-2018.pdf. Accessed on 2 August 2024.

[251] Emphasis added; Collier, E (Editor). (1987). Congress and Foreign Policy—1985-86. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

[252] Emphasis added, Ibid.

[253] Ibid.

> *specifically approved by Congress. Congress also prohibited the CIA and Department of Defense (DOD) from playing a role in disbursing the funds, but allowed the CIA to exchange intelligence with the contras and to provide communications equipment and related training.*[254]

Reagan continued to argue for the necessity of military assistance and, in autumn 1986, Congress reluctantly gave the President $100 million "in military and non-lethal aid to the contras, and lifted the prohibition on CIA participation in the contra aid program…Congress retained spending restrictions that would prevent the administration from expanding the contra aid program without Congress' prior consent".[255] [256]

Throughout this period, Reagan and his administration were also quietly negotiating the release of U.S. hostages held by primarily by Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed terrorist group in Lebanon. To do so, the Administration partnered with Iran, who agreed to broker the deal in exchange for arms—an action prohibited by an embargo enacted by Congress. The embargo originated in response to a previous hostage crisis—the Iran Hostage Crisis, when "[i]n the wake of a successful revolution by Islamic fundamentalists against the pro-American Shah of Iran… Iranian students seized the [American] embassy and detained more than 50 Americans, ranging from the Chargé d'Affaires to the most junior members of the staff, as hostages… for 444 days."[257]

Congress continued the embargo as Iran and Iraq went to war with each other, hoping to cool the conflict by freezing arms sales; Congress "also opposed the transfer of arms to Iran because of its involvement in terrorist activities. Following repeated attacks against Americans and U.S. interests in Lebanon, the Secretary of State officially placed Iran on a list of countries supporting terrorism."[258] These attacks included the bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut, an attack on U.S. barracks by a suicide bomber that killed 241 Marines, and the assassination of the president of the American University of Beirut.[259] In 1984, Hezbollah, the terrorist group backed by support from Iran, began seizing U.S. hostages in Lebanon, including the local Bureau Chief of CNN, the local CIA Station Chief, and a Presbyterian pastor who had served more than three decades in Beirut.[260] In 1985, the Director of Catholic Relief Services, the Associated Press' chief Middle East correspondent, and two senior administrators for the American University of Beirut (the director of the hospital and the dean of the Agriculture School) were also taken as hostages.[261] In June, terrorists hijacked a flight and murdered a Navy diver who was aboard.[262]

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254 Ibid.
255 Ibid.
256 Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections. Arthur B. Culvahouse Files. Box: CFOA 1131. Folder: Iran/Arms Transaction: Legal Memoranda - Nicaraguan Contra Aid [Boland Amendment] (4). https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/digitallibrary/smof/counsel/culvahouse/cfoa1131/40-123-12011812-CFOA1131-049-2018.pdf. Accessed on 2 August 2024.
257 Department of State, Office of the Historian. The Iranian-Hostage Crisis. https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/short-history/iraniancrises. Accessed 3 August 2024.; U.S. Congress. (1987). *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair: with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views*. Washington, U.S. Gvt. Printing Office.
258 U.S. Congress. (1987). *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair: with Supplemental, Minority, and Additional Views*. Washington, U.S. Gvt. Printing Office.
259 Ibid.
260 Ibid.
261 Ibid.
262 Ibid.

Given Iran's links to hostage-takers in Lebanon, the Reagan Administration believed they could secretly sell weapons to Iran through Israel in exchange for the release of hostages. The Administration then funneled proceeds from these sales to Nicaragua to provide the military assistance that Congress had prohibited. All this would come to light in November 1986, but members of Congress already had encountered red flags about the President's policy in Nicaragua that October when it was revealed that the Sandinistas had captured a "U.S. citizen flying military supplies to the contras…[which] raised the possibility of significant contacts between those operating the flights and U.S. officials."[263] As further details of Reagan's sale of arms to Iran to gain the release of hostages and support the Contras emerged, Congress launched "the almost unprecedented step of pursuing a joint Senate-House investigation of the affair".[264] Both chambers of Congress banded together to reassert themselves on foreign policy in the face of monumental Presidential overreach. Indeed, a Congressional Research Service report highlights that the

> *investigation of the Iran-Contra affair was notable in the history of the congressional role in foreign policy for bringing the controversy over the legislative and executive roles before the public. …The specially established Senate and House Select Committees concluded that* ***the Iran-Contra affair had posed a serious challenge to constitutional government in the United States****, although a minority of members of both committees disagreed with this interpretation, calling the affair merely a result of mistakes in judgment. The majority emphasized their conclusion that* ***Congress is the partner, not the adversary of the executive branch, in the formulation of policy****, while the minority characterized this interpretation as an aggrandizing theory of Congress' foreign policy powers.*
>
> *The Chairman of the House Committee, Representative Lee Hamilton, said soon after the end of the investigation, "The hearings will have a lasting, long-term impact on the decision-making process, acting as a deterrent to short-cutting the system"…*[265]

Throughout the Iran-Contra Affair, the Reagan Administration had flouted Congress as a partner in foreign policy. (Internal memos from the Reagan Administration from this period assert first and fundamentally that the Boland Amendment is "bad foreign policy" before making a case for the legality of going around Congress.)[266]

This has had longstanding ramifications for the Congressional attitude towards security assistance and its connection to Presidential foreign policy priorities. It revealed serious flaws in the ability of Congress to access information and conduct oversight. It exposed a Presidential disregard for Congressional partnership in foreign policy. It appears to have coincided with (if not itself

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263 Collier, E (Editor). (1987). Congress and Foreign Policy—1985-86. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
264 Collier, E (Editor). (1989, March). Congress and Foreign Policy—1987. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
265 Emphasis added, Ibid.
266 National Security Council. (1985 August 23). Declassified Memo. Memorandum for W. Robert Pearson from J.R. Scharfen on The 1984 Boland Amendment. Brown University. https://www.brown.edu/Research/Understanding_the_Iran_Contra_Affair/documents/d-nic-21.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2024.

precipitated) a downturn in public opinion regarding aid.[267]Iran-Contra damaged almost every "fundamental" pillar of aid instantiated by the Marshall Plan.

Furthermore, the scandal coincided with a period when Congress was already divided within itself and when polarization was rising. It revealed the difficulty of maintaining robust Congressional oversight of Presidential foreign policy when Congress is internally divided with a different party controlling each chamber. It also intensified Congressional distrust of Presidential power over sources of foreign policy funding. The ability to sell weapons and solicit foreign donations for Presidential foreign policy priorities weakens the power of the purse, which remains the ultimate Congressional bargaining chip. Congress appears to have tightened requirements around Congressional notifications in the wake of Iran-Contra, ensuring that Presidents could not re-allocate funds to evade Congressional oversight and strengthening the power of the purse. However, even with increased reporting requirements, subsequent divided Congresses have consistently cut this form of assistance (as will be demonstrated in **Chapter 10**)—likely a lasting implication of Iran-Contra and a consequence of the "hard" foreign policy nature of this form of aid.

4.5 Conclusion

As veteran commentator James Reston reflected (quoted at the head of the chapter), this was a tumultuous period in which the one thing Congress and the President could agree on was that the current system of foreign policy was not working. As the U.S. became increasingly active on the global stage in the new world order which emerged after World War II, this opened up new questions about the role of Congress in American foreign policy. Expansive use of Presidential power, of course, made legislators wary of funding foreign aid. Though Congress continually sought ways to influence foreign policy more actively, the President dominated the making of foreign policy through most of the Cold War.[268] Congress struggled to effectively shape the President's foreign policy agenda. It was confined largely to reacting to salient events and was frequently caught on the backfoot because legislators had been left out of the loop, without relevant information. Sharp executive-legislative skirmishes enabled Congress to constrain the President at key moments, but legislators lacked a means to routinely assess and give input on Presidential foreign policy.

Through the War Powers Act and the "New Directions" aid reform, Congress began to take steps to reassert its role in partnership with the President. Yet Iran-Contra revealed how much the "fundamentals" of foreign aid had weakened in the face of decades of imperial Presidential foreign policy. It provided a serious wake-up call to tighten the guardrails around funding, lest Congress lose one of its few remaining sources of leverage—the power of the purse. Yet Congress would barely have time to consider how to do so before it confronted a monumental challenge to the most fundamental feature of American foreign aid. Predicated upon its relationship to American foreign policy, legislators would wonder if there was any point in continuing aid after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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[267] Norris. J. (2017 August 15). Special Feature: A history of American public opinion on foreign aid. Devex. https://www.devex.com/news/special-feature-a-history-of-american-public-opinion-on-foreign-aid-90732. Accessed 19 August 2024.

[268] Goodman, M (Editor). (1976). Congress and Foreign Policy—1975. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

5 "Lurching into a New Era": A Crisis for Foreign Aid

> *"when you're President, you have to make a lot of tough decisions. You just have to keep lining them up and making them…And they keep coming in quick succession. You can't just say, 'Okay, stop the world. I'm going to just work on this. I'm not going to make these other decisions.' You have to keep going."*[269]
>
> Bill Clinton, 20 July 1993

> *"Immense changes in the world are prompting a basic reassessment of traditional U.S. foreign policy approaches towards international security, economic, and political issues."* [270]
>
> Congressional Research Service, January 1993

5.1 Introduction

Shaken by what the Iran-Contra Affair revealed about the state of the Presidential-Congressional partnership, the collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to be a natural opportunity to reconsider all American aid as it obviated the longstanding "grand goal" of U.S. foreign policy—containment. This precipitated an existential crisis for both foreign aid and the future direction of American foreign policy, which would have to be redefined for a new and still-emerging era.

Given how shaky the Marshall Plan "fundamentals" were at the same time, the future of foreign aid looked perilous. Furthermore, given its historical standing as an instrument of American foreign policy, policymakers faced a conundrum about whether foreign policy had to be reset first to discern whether aid had a role in the new agenda or whether aid could itself contribute to contouring a new foreign policy. Regardless, a new foreign policy paradigm was slow in coming. From 1989 to 1995, as U.S. foreign policy was evolving to align with a changed world, the role of aid as a foreign policy tool seemed diminished. Support for **"development plus"** aid in Congress dissipated. Aid was in danger of disappearing unless it was redefined. Supporters of aid worried that united Republican control of Congress would kill aid, especially as the new State and Foreign Operations cardinal, Sonny Callahan (R-AL), publicly bragged about his opposition to aid.[271]

5.2 Post-War Reforms in Congress

Even during this tumultuous period, the Appropriations Committee retained leverage in foreign policy through the power of the purse. As Baldwin commented in 1967, "the principal legislative concern with foreign policy could now be boiled down to one word: appropriations." [272] Yet appropriators would attain new heights of power, as rising polarization and the post-Cold War

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[269] Clinton, Bill. (1993 July 20). Interview with Larry King. University of California: Santa Barbara. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/interview-with-larry-king-4. Accessed 8 October 2024.

[270] Ahearn, R. and Shuey, R. (1992 January 23). Reassessing U.S. Foreign Policy. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

[271] Friedman, T. (1999 October 20). "Foreign Affairs; Penny Pinchers." *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/20/opinion/foreign-affairs-penny-pinchers.html?searchResultPosition=10. Accessed 17 March 2024.

[272] Baldwin, D. A. (1965). The congressional politics of foreign aid. *Challenge*, *14*(1), 22-25.

crisis in foreign policy enabled the consolidation of the power over policy with the power of the purse. A new generation of House SFOPS leadership would emerge—one that was far more interested in foreign policy than some of its predecessors. In the wake of the demise of the authorizing process, these Chairs would be crucial to sustaining aid into a new era.

For much of the latter twentieth century, the House Appropriations Committee maintained the same attitude to aid that nearly derailed the Marshall Plan. Republican John Taber, architect of the 'meat-axe approach' Vandenberg decried, and Democrat Clarence Cannon of Missouri traded off as Chair of the House Appropriations Committee until 1962 depending on whose party held the majority.[273] Both had similar attitudes toward aid. Fenno, the renowned scholar of the House Appropriations Committee, wrote in 1966 that "both…viewed the program as a place where potentially great savings to the taxpayer could be made and where large budget reductions were possible." Both also chose to serve as chair or ranking member of the foreign aid subcommittee, despite their powerful positions on the full committee itself, to enforce this cost-cutting approach.[274] Cannon even created a "new Committee norm" to prevent a more sympathetic member from chairing the subcommittee. Instead, Cannon hand-selected Otto Passman, "a man who has voted against every foreign aid authorization since the Greek-Turkish loan and who acknowledges that 'in principle I am very much against foreign aid.'"[275]

Fenno further underscores that Cannon as Chair "can and has manipulated subcommittee structure and, hence, subcommittee in assignments in other ways in an effort to promote budget-cutting activity."[276] For example, on the foreign aid subcommittee, "he always maintained a Southern, anti-aid majority on the Democratic side…the most lopsided Democratic majority of all [the appropriations subcommittees]."[277] Cannon's actions offer a prime example of the power of committee chairs in this era—curbing the excesses of this power was the aim of numerous reforms to the committee system from 1946 onwards.

Emerging from World War II, Congress attempted to implement a series of institutional reforms designed to "streamline and simplify congressional committee structure", "eliminate the use of special or select committees", and "clarify committee duties and reduce jurisdictional disputes" (Galloway 2013). The 1946 Act "streamlined the sprawling, complex committee system and the cumbersome appropriations process"—reducing the number of standing committees by more than half, from 48 to 19 in the House.[278] Yet in attempting to simplify the committee system, the 1946 Act exacerbated some aspects of committee power because "[b]y reducing the number of committees and consolidating their jurisdictions, the 1946 act vastly expanded the range of policy areas controlled by many committees. These larger jurisdictions, in turn, magnified the influence of the chairs and made their abuses of power more intolerable" (Kravitz 1990). Consolidated committees became repositories of consolidated power. Consequently, the 1970 Reorganization Act built on and broadened the trajectory of the reforms begun in 1946 by "countering the inordinate

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[273] U.S. Congress. (1962). *Congressional Directory*. 87th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, U.S. Gvt. Printing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDIR-1962-01-10/pdf/CDIR-1962-01-10.pdf. Accessed on 1 August 2024.
[274] Fenno, R. F. (1966). *The power of the purse : appropriations politics in Congress*. Little, Brown and Company.
[275] Ibid.
[276] Ibid.
[277] Ibid.
[278] House of Representatives, Office of the Historian. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. https://history.house.gov/Historical-Highlights/1901-1950/The-Legislative-Reorganization-Act-of-1946/. Accessed on 12 March 2022.

powers of committee chairmen and broadening opportunities for more junior members" (Wolfensberger 2013).

To combat the power of the committee chairs, the new act "limited closed committee meetings...[and] proxy voting in committee", publicized the roll call votes of each committee, "permitted radio and television broadcasting of committee hearings", and committed funds to the minority for committee staffing (Rohde 1974); additionally, the act established committee rules which enabled agenda additions by a committee majority (Wolfensberger 2013). On the heels of these reforms, Rohde (1974) argued that "the real problem ...[with] committee chairmen was not so much who occupied the position, but the fact that in most committees the rules invested the chairman with almost total power."

Committee chairs could determine the number of subcommittees and prescribe their jurisdictions. As Haeberle (1978) elucidates, this power reduced subcommittees to "organs of the full committees. They existed at the discretion of the committee chairman and performed the tasks he assigned them." To this end, some committee chairs adopted the practice of simply "numbering" subcommittees rather than establishing "named" committees with fixed jurisdictions. This intentional jurisdictional morass allowed the chair to "refer bills to any one of the numbered subcommittees because none had a clear claim to a specific type of legislation" (Haeberle 1978). In conjunction with the practice of "stacking" certain subcommittees with aligned members (Rohde 1990), the committee chair could therefore target desired legislative outcomes, essentially acting unilaterally in a gatekeeping capacity, because "[i]n such a situation, the chairman could send a bill to any subcommittee he chose, often determining its fate by that choice" Rohde (1990).

The "Subcommittee Bill of Rights" tackled the disproportionate power of committee chairs in 1973. Under the auspices of the Democratic Caucus, these reforms established a circuit-breaker in the seniority system and parceled out the extensive power of committee chairs. They "passed a number of reforms intended to diminish the power of committee chairs and correspondingly strengthen the role of subcommittees" (Hall and Evans 1990). Under the Bill, "fixed jurisdictions" for subcommittees were introduced (Rohde 1990), staking out policy portfolios for subcommittees rather than condemning them to operate as numbered subordinates at the mercy of a powerful chair. Nor could the chair withhold bills from the subcommittees designated to review them because the reforms also stipulated that "[c]ommittee chairmen were required to report all legislation to the appropriate subcommittee within two weeks after receiving it from the floor, and subcommittee chairmen were given the right to be floor managers of all legislation reported out of their subcommittee" (Haeberle 1978). The Bill of Rights also codified the "powers of subcommittees" and "ratios" of majority and minority members (Rohde 1990), prohibited committee members from chairing more than one subcommittee (Rohde 1990), and "guaranteed their own staff and budgets" to subcommittees (Hall and Evans 1990).


The impact of these reforms on subcommittee power proved significant. Haeberle (1978) speculated that committee desirability would shift as committees "will increasingly be viewed primarily as pathways to subcommittees." He also heralded a new order, "the institutionalization of the subcommittees has produced a new unit in American government. It is a unit capable of reshaping the existing distribution of power within the House of Representatives, and thereby

altering the policy outcomes of the legislative process."[279] In combination with rising polarization and the Republican Revolution in the 1990s, these reforms would disproportionately elevate the already-powerful Appropriations subcommittees.

5.3 Rising Polarization in Congress

By the late 1980s, polarization in a divided Congress had already begun to change the way legislators did business. Over the next decade, these changes would empower party leadership and appropriators, strengthening the power of the purse to shape foreign policy in line with Congressional preferences. Normally, the Appropriations Committee recommends separate appropriations bills for different sectors of government, on which each chamber votes separately. In a world of "sharper, more frequent, more combative—even excessive—partisanship",[280] passing twelve individual appropriations bills increases the risk of individual bills failing to garner enough support and leaving some sectors of the government unfunded. (**Figure 5.1** visualizes the increase in polarization over time, using publicly available data and graphics from VoteView. Higher numbers mean greater polarization between the parties. A black vertical line denotes 1982, when scholars note that polarization began to rise sharply.)

Figure 5.1
Party Polarization in the House and Senate over Time[281]



The red line represents the House and the blue line the Senate.

[279] Hall and Evans (1990) evaluate such claims of "subcommittee government", confirming "disproportionate influence" by subcommittees, but also warning that their power "varies sometimes dramatically issue to issue." Even so, the reforms across the period increased the power and autonomy of the subcommittees and their impact on the legislative agenda.
[280] Oleszek, W. J. (2020). *The "Regular Order"*. Congressional Research Service.
[281] Data and graphic from VoteView, annotated with a line to mark 1982, code and graphics made publicly available at https://voteview.com/articles/party_polarization.

Instead, in the early eighties, during the longest period with a divided Congress to date[282], Congress relied on "continuing resolutions", which extend existing funding levels for temporary periods of time when Congress cannot manage to pass new appropriations. As Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1987 and Congress was no longer divided between the two parties, there was a short-lived return to individual appropriations bills. Even in an era of united Congressional governance, however, polarization continued to climb. Passing individual appropriations bills in this environment risks every individual bill precipitating a floor fight, in which grievances against the other party are aired and compromise cannot be reached on certain aspects of the budget. Again, this intensifies the likelihood that certain sectors of the government would go unfunded.

The introduction of consolidated and omnibus appropriations bill addressed this dilemma by bundling portions of the budget together ("consolidated" appropriations) or putting the entire budget into a single bill ("omnibus"). Aspects of the budget (such as defense) that few members are likely to hold up can then shield other portions of the budget (such as foreign affairs) that might be less likely to survive on their own. This increases the overall likelihood that the legislation will pass and shutdowns will be avoided. This fundamentally changed the legislative process between 1982 and the present and intensified the power of the Appropriations Committee.

In **Table 5.1**, I track the type of appropriations for foreign aid and the International Affairs Budget (State and Foreign Operations appropriations bills). Continuing resolutions became increasingly common with rising polarization—presented in a light gray. Congress passed continuing resolutions on a short-term basis during most of these years to fund the government as it negotiated to build support for appropriations bills. However, in the table below, I only count a year as a "continuing resolution" if no other appropriations bill was ultimately passed. The traditional individual appropriations bills are in unshaded cells. Omnibus and consolidated appropriations are similar instruments in the appropriations process, so both are presented in darker gray.) Between 1983 and 2023, Congress passed individual appropriations for foreign aid for only 10 of 41 years.

[282] 1981-1986 is tied with the period 1883-1889 as the most prolonged period with a divided Congress (for the current two parties).

Table 5.1
The Rise of Consolidated and Omnibus Appropriations

Foreign Aid Appropriations (1983-2023, FY1984-FY2024)			
fiscal year	type of appropriation for foreign aid	fiscal year	type of appropriation for foreign aid
1984	continuing resolution	2004	omnibus
1985	continuing resolution	2005	omnibus
1986	continuing resolution	2006	individual
1987	continuing resolution	2007	continuing resolution
1988	continuing resolution	2008	omnibus
1989	individual	2009	omnibus
1990	individual	2010	omnibus
1991	individual	2011	continuing resolution
1992	continuing resolution	2012	omnibus
1993	individual	2013	continuing resolution
1994	individual	2014	omnibus
1995	individual	2015	omnibus
1996	individual	2016	omnibus
1997	omnibus (consolidated)	2017	omnibus
1998	individual	2018	omnibus
1999	omnibus	2019	consolidated
2000	individual (vetoed); omnibus	2020	consolidated
2001	attached to Kentucky National Forest Land Transfer Act	2021	consolidated
2002	individual	2022	consolidated
2003	omnibus	2023	consolidated
		2024	consolidated

While the Appropriations Committee has always been powerful because of its influence over funding, the role of the committee began to feature even more prominently as Congressional leaders and appropriators took the lead in ensuring the government continued to be funded. The House Appropriations Committee, in particular, had long opposed increases to foreign aid and chairs of the State and Foreign Operations subcommittee had often been selected by committee leadership because of their hostility to aid and commitment to delivering significant cuts to aid.[283]

In the 1980s, two new chairs—Clarence Long (D-MD) and David Obey (D-WI)—replaced Otto Passman, a fierce and unrelenting critic of aid. Both new chairs were tough and insistent that aid must demonstrate its effectiveness, but neither had the same ideological antipathy to the concept that Passman had. As Congress meaningfully reasserted its influence over foreign policy, support for foreign aid appropriations would also increase. As the appropriating process displaced the authorizing process, the chair of State and Foreign Operations and the leadership of the Appropriations Committee would be intimately involved in securing funding for aid in a polarized environment. This would become vital when the collapse of the Soviet Union left legislators asking whether foreign aid had a place in a new American foreign policy.

5.4 Budget Pressure and Earmarks Threaten Aid

Foreign aid budgets had been falling since Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was introduced in 1985. Members of Congress expressed concerns that American aid was no longer reliably serving American interests.[284] For years, the Congressional practice of extensively "earmarking" the aid

[283] Fenno, R. F. (1966). *The power of the purse : appropriations politics in Congress*. Little, Brown and Company.
[284] Collier, E (Editor). (1990, November). Congress and Foreign Policy—1989. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

budget by legislating amounts for specific countries and purposes had frustrated Presidential administrations, who charged that this reduced flexibility and "seriously undermine[d] Presidential conduct of foreign policy."[285] (George H.W. Bush, as Reagan's Vice President, famously complained during this period about the Congressional micromanagement of foreign affairs.) This introduction of heightened earmarks appears to have coincided with periods in which Congress was attempting to reassert its presence and power in foreign policy, but it also fragmented the foreign policy agenda to the point of fundamentally jeopardizing the effectiveness of aid. Congressional strictures strangled the ability of the Executive Branch to conduct foreign policy with the flexibility needed to respond to a rapidly changing world.

Congress took matters of reform in its own hands in 1988, with a House Task Force on Foreign Aid. The group "invited comments of over 200 private individuals and interest groups and received about 50 responses…one pervasive theme was the need to reconsider and reconstruct the foreign aid program from both a legislative and administrative perspective. The Task Force also emphasized the importance of the U.S. foreign assistance program to an effective American foreign policy."[286] Lee Hamilton (D-IN), Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and co-chair of the new Task Force, proposed a sort of "grand bargain" between the legislature and the executive:

> *Hamilton recognized that Members of Congress likely would be reluctant to relax conditions or remove earmarks from foreign aid legislation without receiving something in return from the executive branch. Consequently, in presenting the Task Force findings to the Foreign Affairs Committee on February 1, he argued that Congress and the administration should come to an understanding in which Congress would allow greater Presidential flexibility while the executive branch would provide Congress with more meaningful information and improve Congress' ability to maintain proper accountability of the program. The '[e]xecutive branch will pay attention to the initiatives of the Congress and not ignore them, and the Congress will not try to micromanage.... It's a two-way street.' He stated his belief that Congress should at least give the administration a chance to operate the program with increased flexibility. If the executive branch did not live up to its commitments and ignored important congressional priorities, Congress could return to the more restrictive legislative practices.*[287]

George Ingram, then working for House Foreign Affairs, articulates this even more succinctly, "What we ended up doing at the end of the day is turning our guns on the congress rather than the administration and said, 'you know, we're not sure how to fix whatever is wrong in the administration, but we know what's wrong up here and it's earmarks. It's 33 objectives in the foreign assistance act. It's 75 priorities.'"[288] The Congressional Research Service analyzed the evolution of earmarks from 1946, reporting, "[f]or approximately the first twenty years of U.S. foreign aid there were no earmarks. Beginning in the early 1970s with Israel, Congress began to mandate specific allocations for specific recipients."[289] The reduced earmarks approached was trialed in 1987 (FY1988), but it was short-lived.

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[285] Ibid.
[286] Ibid.
[287] Ibid.
[288] Ingram, George. (2018). Oral History for The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Ingram.George.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2024.
[289] Lowenthal, M. M. (1991). *US Foreign Aid in a Changing World: Options for New Priorities.* Congressional Research Service Report. US Government Printing Office.

Though Congress was initially receptive to the plan, as the new Administration, headed by now-President George H.W. Bush, slow-played a response, Hamilton lost support in Congress to lobbyists who were concerned about what a loss of earmarks would mean for countries they supported. Events overtook the reform with the collapse and fragmentation of Soviet power. No longer simply concerned about earmark reform, "[m]embers of Congress in growing numbers were calling on the President to reassess U.S. foreign policy objectives and to propose appropriate changes in the policy emphasis of the foreign assistance program."[290] Again, the Administration dragged its feet, waiting on the National Security Council (NSC) to complete a systematic review of new foreign policy directions.[291] By 1989, earmarks had returned with a vengeance: "[c]urrent earmark levels are high: for FY 1990, over 90% of ESF and over 80% of FMF were earmarked. In FY 1991 the percentages that were earmarked remained roughly the same, although the number of countries designated decreased."[292]

The level of flexibility Congress has permitted Presidents has waxed and waned with the state of the Presidential-Congressional partnership. Legislators have long understood that foreign policy requires a certain degree of latitude to operate. One former SFOPS chair joked in 2002, "Would not it be best, in your opinion, just to have the Congress not earmark? I may be a secretary of state some day. And I certainly would totally agree with you if I were. [Laughter.] I might be president, and I might need that flexibility in order to determine foreign policy."

On this very point, Secretary of State Colin Powell made a passionate case to the House SFOPS committee that in 2001:

> *every earmark takes away flexibility from the administration. And when you look at earmarks and sanctions and certifications and requirements and all sorts of things that I discovered when I returned to government and took over the Department of State, it is very, very limiting and inhibiting on the ability of the President and the Secretary of State to conduct foreign policy in the most effective manner possible.*
>
> *We are not trying to get out of oversight, but we need much more flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy than we currently enjoy…*[293]

The SFOPS Chair intimated his willingness to work with the Secretary of State, but acknowledged that such a partnership requires trust and cooperation between the branches: "Past breaches of comity between the executive and legislative branches are why our bill and report carry so many restrictions and directives. Each one of them has a little history of its own. Together, over time, we can remove many of these statutory directives if all parties respect each other, and we hope that process is going to start today." (This is one reason I develop annual metrics to gauge the Presidential-Congressional relationship, presented in **Chapter 9**). Both branches agree that flexibility is important, but it also requires a foundation of collaboration—which, in the 1980s, was too

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[290] Collier, E (Editor). (1990, November). Congress and Foreign Policy—1989. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[291] Ibid.
[292] Lowenthal, M. M. (1991). *US Foreign Aid in a Changing World: Options for New Priorities.* Congressional Research Service Report. US Government Printing Office.
[293] House of Representatives. (2000 May 10). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. https://www.congress.gov/107/chrg/CHRG-107hhrg75037/CHRG-107hhrg75037.pdf. Accessed 3 March 2022.

complicated to engineer amidst rising polarization, the presence of a divided Congress for six years, and the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union.

5.5 The Collapse of Containment as American Foreign Policy

For decades, American foreign policy had focused on containing communism. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, this driving purpose deflated. What ultimately reemerged resembled the doctrine of "peace through collective security" that Truman and Roosevelt had architected with Congress. The end of the Cold War reinvigorated discussions around U.S. foreign aid reform and the need for a new rationale in U.S. foreign policy. Because U.S. foreign aid has always been integrally tied to U.S. foreign policy, this return to a philosophy of collective security would eventually ground foreign aid policy more deeply in its older roots of political economy. Yet this approach would not stabilize until after 9/11.

In the meantime, two Presidents (George H. W. Bush and Clinton) took a run at a new foreign policy framework. What opened as a new era of multilateral engagement by the U.S. quickly disintegrated. In many ways, the collapse of the Soviet Union contained echoes of a postwar world. From its vantage point, the United States saw a set of growing and increasingly complex crises, with ramifications for global stability, world peace, and its own domestic tranquility—all while it had the dubious privilege of global leadership in an ecosystem that had more problems than answers. The Congressional Research Service speculated "that future U.S. policy will be more kaleidoscopic than before, that it will not have any overarching, unifying theme. Crafting a U.S. policy-and its supporting programs- to operate successfully in that milieu will be daunting."[294]

Congress continued to press the President to develop a new foreign policy for a new world, but was disappointed in the results: "Representative Obey, Chairman of the House Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittee… asked the President to send Congress a foreign aid package in 1990 that 'reflects the way the world is going to be, not the way the world used to be.'"[295] The committee did not get it and foreign aid funding came under serious fire in 1991 as a distraction from domestic concerns amidst a recession:

> *A strong anti-foreign aid mood materialized in the last month of the congressional session which virtually paralyzed Congress and the President from finalizing the pending foreign aid bills. Congress did approve on the final day of the session-still without White House backing-a bipartisan $500 million package drawn from defense funds to help secure and destroy Soviet nuclear weapons and deliver humanitarian relief supplies. Much of the debate, however, centered on whether such actions should be considered as 'foreign assistance,' or as a fundamental investment in U.S. national security interests in the wake of continuing nuclear threats from the crumbling and highly unstable Soviet Union.* [296]

[294] Lowenthal, M. M. (1991). *US Foreign Aid in a Changing World: Options for New Priorities.* Congressional Research Service Report. US Government Printing Office.
[295] Collier, E (Editor). (1990, November). Congress and Foreign Policy—1989. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[296] Collier, E (Editor). (1992, April). Congress and Foreign Policy—1991. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

This sharp dichotomy between development assistance and investment in national security showcases the fracturing of the integration of "national values and national interests" that had long bolstered American aid. Rather than seeing the value of "development plus and "security plus" as complementary pieces of U.S. foreign policy, the two purposes were pitted against each other as both battled to survive the mood in Congress. Even as Congress and the Administration agreed to a new aid package, the Freedom Support Act, designed to assist countries from the former Soviet Union in their transition to democracy and market economies, this sense of disarray lasted throughout the early 1990s.[297]

The Freedom Support Act was a particularly remarkable accomplishment for a Republican President and a Democratic Congress in an election year—a sort of smaller-scale inverse of the conditions of that birthed the Marshall Plan. Some of the same elements that enabled the political success of the Marshall Plan resurfaced in the engineering of the Freedom Support Act. Members of Congress saw Europe as at a crucial juncture, in which American interests and values could support and bolster robust democracies, strengthen and preserve market economies, and enhance collective security through political and economic development. Key legislators traveled to see the context up-close and recognized the irreducible complexity of the situation, so Congress provided targeted guidance with wide latitude for the executive branch to operate.[298] As Ingram reflected, "The congressional role in foreign aid is a mixed bag. At times it's very constructive. … Congress is very constructive when it provides a flexible authority." Still the overall aid program remain imperiled, with the Congressional Research Service tentatively linking the crisis over new directions for foreign policy to the confusion over a continued rationale for foreign aid: some "observers believe the first step must be the creation and enunciation of new, over-arching goals for U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world, after which decisions about various programs-defense as well as aid--will follow in support of these goals."[299] Such had been the long-standing relationship between foreign aid and foreign policy.

Looking back on the early iterations of post-Cold War foreign policy, one historian summarizes President George H.W. Bush's foreign policy as a "New World Order" predicated on "collective security with multinational cooperation"—another parallel to the foreign policy crafted by Roosevelt and Truman. In this new (or re*new*ed) order, the "United States had to take on a larger role as a world leader to guard against human rights, defend democratic regimes, and lead humanitarian efforts."[300] This included humanitarian relief in Somalia, attempting to broker peace as the formerly Communist Yugoslavia dissolved into warring independence-seeking entities, and leading a multilateral mission to halt Iraq's invasion to plunder Kuwait's oil fields (Operation Desert Shield). Bush and his national security advisor Scowcroft describe their instantiation of their foreign policy as "peaceful, if sometimes awkward, super-power cooperation", titling their joint memoir "A World Transformed."[301]

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[297] Lockwood, D., & Ahearn, R. (1993 February 1.) Key Foreign and Defense Policy Issues in the 103rd Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

[298] Ingram, George. (2018). Oral History for The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Ingram.George.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2024.

[299] Lowenthal, M. M. (1991). *US Foreign Aid in a Changing World: Options for New Priorities.* Congressional Research Service Report. US Government Printing Office.

[300] Knott, S. George H.W. Bush: Foreign Affairs. University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/president/bush/foreign-affairs. Accessed 21 July 2024.

[301] Bush, G., & Scowcroft, B. (1998). *A world transformed* (1st ed.). Knopf.

Crises in Somalia and Yugoslavia continued to worsen as Clinton entered the White House in 1993. The infamous "Black Hawk Down" incident occurred during the early days of Clinton's presidency. Soon after, Rwanda descended into one hundred days of genocide, while the President, haunted by images of U.S. Marines dragged through the streets of Mogadishu after a peacekeeping mission gone sideways, did little to intervene. It took a while for Clinton to develop his own "cohesive foreign policy".[302] Without a clear direction for U.S. foreign policy (or a clear role for Congress), the integrated blend of development, diplomacy, and defense that had undergirded support for the foreign aid budget was fracturing further. By 1994, Foreign Operations cardinal David Obey (D-WI) was perhaps one of the few remaining Congressional leaders still sympathetic to the challenges of formulating foreign policy in this evolving landscape:

> *Mr. Secretary [of State, Warren Christopher], I am often asked, does this administration have a coherent, well-planned and clearly articulated foreign policy. My response to that question has been that if they do, they ought to be locked up. And the reason I say that is because I think the world is changing very rapidly, and virtually all of the old base lines are gone. …the world is lurching into a new era.*[303]

Others were running out of patience. The surprise Republican Revolution, in which Republicans retook the majority in Congress for the first time in forty years, promised a further shake-up, on both the fiscal and the foreign policy front, although one Congressional Research Service report hinted hopefully that these were the same conditions—a Republican Congress and a Democratic President— "which created the Marshall Plan".[304]

Clinton adapted his predecessor's approach, converting the "New World Order" into his own "doctrine of enlargement", which centered on vibrant "market democracies" and "embraced free trade, multilateral peacekeeping efforts and international alliances, and a commitment to intervene in world crisis situations when practical (i.e., with little risk and low cost in U.S. lives) and morally defensible."[305] This blend of democracy, prosperity, and security reflected the same sort of balancing of national values and national interests[306] that first marked the emergence of the international rules-based order in the 1940s:

> *The policy promoted an activist role for America and was designed to extend and protect basic human and civil rights insofar as it was within the power of the United States to successfully achieve*

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[302] Riley, R. Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs. University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign-affairs. Accessed 21 July 2024.
[303] House of Representatives. (1994). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing (Part 2). Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.
[304] Collier, E. (1994 December 20). Key Foreign and Defense Policy Issues in the 104th Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[305] Riley, R. Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs. University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign-affairs. Accessed 21 July 2024.
[306] This underscored by commentary in Congressional Research Service reports from this period. For example, in a 1993 "Reassessing U.S. Foreign Policy" report, Ahearn and Miko write "*Fundamental and unprecedented changes in the world led by the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union are forcing a reassessment of U.S. foreign policy. While the key goals remain the same -- providing for the national security, promoting U.S. welfare, and supporting American national values – the dramatically different international environment has spurred a debate over appropriate strategies and policies."* Ahearn, R. and Miko, F. (1993 September 8). Reassessing U.S. Foreign Policy. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

> *those goals without undermining national security or depleting national resources. In Clinton's mind, the United States must continue its role as the principal leader of the world in promoting human dignity and democracy, with the understanding that it must never act in isolation or overextend its reach.*[307]

This approach involved stepping in to prevent or soften financial crises that would have global ramifications (Mexico 1995, Asia 1997), expanding international trade (through North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)), a commitment to ending ongoing violence through supporting peace negotiations (including the Good Friday Agreement and the Dayton Accords), and expanding NATO membership to include former Soviet states like the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary.[308] Yet the role of aid in this new approach remained largely ambiguous.

Tired of waiting for new direction from the Clinton Administration,[309] both the new Senate Chair of the State and Foreign Operations (appropriations) subcommittee Mitch McConnell (R-KY) and the new Chair of the Senate Foreign Relations (authorizing) Committee Jesse Helms (R-NC) pitched their own foreign aid reforms. At least one of these proposals, however, resembled more of a Faustian bargain than a new Marshall Plan. McConnell had released his plan in mid-December 1994 about a month after the landslide Republican election but before the new Republican majority was sworn into office. His plan focused on "three overarching goals: protecting U.S. security, promoting American economic interests, and preserving political and regional stability." (This tripartite focus was a repackaged variant of the traditional defense, development, and diplomacy motivations for foreign aid with a greater emphasis on U.S. economic interests than economic development.) He wanted to increase aid to former Soviet states like Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia and to the Middle East; he also called for the State Department to absorb USAID.

This had been something the Clinton Administration had already been considering,[310] but the issue gained new life in March 1995 when North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) unveiled a plan to abolish USAID[311] by merging its funding into the State Department.[312] Helms resurrected the power of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee over foreign aid, "an important committee that has drifted close to irrelevance" observers noted.[313] Senior USAID official Carol Lancaster described the "merger debate" as "a near-death experience for USAID, because it found lukewarm

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307 Riley, R. Bill Clinton: Foreign Affairs. University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/president/clinton/foreign-affairs. Accessed 21 July 2024.
308 Ibid.
309 The Administration had submitted a framework, "Peace, Prosperity, and Democracy", but "in the absence of aggressive support by the White House" Congress did not pass the framework. (Collier, E. (1994 December 20). Key Foreign and Defense Policy Issues in the 104th Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.)
310 Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.
311 Collier, E. (1994 December 20). Key Foreign and Defense Policy Issues in the 104th Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
312 Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.
313 The New York Times Opinion. (1994 November 19). "Chairman Helms." *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/19/opinion/chairman-helms.html?searchResultPosition=16. Accessed 17 March 2024.

support for its continuing existence".[314] [315] Congressional support for **"development plus"** had reached new lows. Going forward, USAID would be under pressure to prove its foreign policy value. It survived on life-support from **"security plus"**— Lancaster comments that by

> *late 1995, when Congress was appropriating funds (in "continuing resolutions") adequate to cover only a few weeks of USAID expenditures at a time, the administration urged Congress not to appropriate the entire annual level of aid to Israel (which was usually paid in a cash transfer on the first day of the new fiscal year, beginning in October) for fear that once all the aid money for Israel had been appropriated, Congress would have no more incentive or inclination to appropriate aid for the rest of the year.*[316]

Donor countries in general, in this period, also began to focus more on burgeoning global insecurity. Human security featured prominently. Ngaire Woods reflects that "[s]ecurity concerns were always part of the rethinking of development assistance in the 1990s. Conflicts within countries were devastating the lives of the most vulnerable people, as well as crushing the possibilities for human development" (2005). A focus on security matches what Sarah Bermeo has identified as a strategy of "targeted development" in the wake of the Cold War: an approach in which donors fund development in an effort to prevent costly "spillovers" to themselves, like migration, that could arise from the problems of insecurity. Congressional Research Service reports from the nineties highlight terrorism (international and domestic), international crime and narcotics flows, and financial crises as major global issues for Congress to consider.[317]

Terrorism, illicit trafficking of weapons, people, and narcotics, and transnational organized crime continued to feature prominently in Congressional discussions of aid and foreign policy for at least the next decade. The aid account that funds counternarcotics assistance increased six-fold (in constant terms) between 1994 and 2021. The account funding migration and refugee assistance has more than doubled between 1994 and 2021. At the same time, development budgets have largely kept pace with these increases, having also increased two-fold since 1994. Like the early days of the post-World War II era, the kaleidoscopic foreign policy priorities that emerged after the Cold War would ultimately require multipurpose instruments of foreign policy. Pursuing and funding such foreign policy would likewise require significant public and Congressional buy-in. Prominent

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[314] Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

[315] "The United States Agency for Information (USIA) and the Arms Control Disarmament Agency (ACDA), both created during the Cold War to promote U.S. foreign policy interests, also came under attack and had their existence threatened. In the end, Congress passed a bill which "required the President to abolish all three agencies [USAID, USIA, and ACDA], but permitted him to waive the termination for two of the agencies." (Collier, E. (1994 December 20). Key Foreign and Defense Policy Issues in the 104th Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.) President Clinton vetoed the bill, but only USAID survived in the end after its Administrator J. Brian Atwood campaigned extensively across Washington meeting with members of Congress, journalists, NGOs, and the public in an effort to save the agency. (Greenhouse, S. 1995 February 19. "It's a Hard Job Saving Foreign Aid (but the Job is Still There)." *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/19/world/it-s-a-hard-job-saving-foreign-aid-but-the-job-is-still-there.html?searchResultPosition=5. Accessed 3 August 2024.)

[316] Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

[317] Collier, E. (1994 December 20). Key Foreign and Defense Policy Issues in the 104th Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.; Rennack, D. (1999 January 4). Key Foreign and Defense Policy Issues in the 106th Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

political figures remained divided over whether this new era was a moment for renewed global engagement or time to set back and focus on domestic concerns.[318]

5.6 Conclusion

The "grand goal" of U.S. foreign policy fundamentally shifted with the end of the Cold War. Slowly, the underlying fundamentals introduced in the post-World War II era reemerged. Successive Presidents returned to the concept of peace through collective security—a foreign policy principle for which aid has been specifically designed to serve in a multipurpose manner. However, like the early emergence of American aid, the other "fundamentals" would have to be revived for foreign aid to continue. The growing powers of the Appropriations Committee ensured the capability for robust Congressional oversight and access to information. The increasing use of the appropriations process for legislating likewise assured Congress of a more consultative Presidential-Congressional partnership on foreign policy (even amidst Presidential complaints of Congressional micromanagement). Yet a broad coalition of public and Congressional support was still lacking and the multipurpose nature of aid had blurred into an almost-exclusive security rationale. This presented particular challenges given the Presidential-Congressional history of aid related to security.

Even as donors focused increasing on the relationship between aid and security, Congress remained skeptical of the power of Presidents to use of aid to resolve global instability and insecurity. From Vietnam to Iran-Contra, legislators had reasons to be wary. Carol Lancaster (2007), USAID's former Deputy Administrator, has insisted that security concerns alone have never been enough to ensure aid's survival in the political landscape of Washington. If national security concerns alone drive legislators' support, then aid might as well be funded through the Department of Defense. Security has always been an important component in sustaining foreign aid funding, but it has never been sufficient on its own. For aid to survive the U.S. foreign policy reset, it seemed that support for **"development plus"** and humanitarian assistance would have to be revived.

This looked daunting in an era when foreign aid was an attractive target for deep cuts, with key Republican leaders trying to persuade the American public "that if you are for giving money to Ghana you are for taking it away from Grandma. The foreign operations budget, says [House Republican whip] Mr. DeLay, 'will come straight out of the pockets of American seniors.'"[319] Between 1989 and 1995, under a Democratic Congress, the International Affairs Budget fell by 10%, while the Foreign Operations (foreign aid) budget fell by 20%. There was widespread concern that aid would face even steeper cuts under new Republican leadership.

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[318] Lowenthal, M. M. (1991). *US Foreign Aid in a Changing World: Options for New Priorities.* Congressional Research Service Report. US Government Printing Office.

[319] Friedman, T. (1999 October 20). "Foreign Affairs; Penny Pinchers." *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/20/opinion/foreign-affairs-penny-pinchers.html?searchResultPosition=10. Accessed 17 March 2024.

6 Rebuilding Support for Foreign Aid

> *"the House, the once-ignored lower chamber came to play a key role in foreign policy through its power of the purse…"* [320]
>
> David Baldwin (1967)

> *"various [aid] programs respond to different U.S. and recipient interests. This very diversity has helped maintain some base level of support for the overall foreign aid program by having sufficiently broad appeal to attract multiple, more narrowly focused interests to the larger program. This consensus, however, has eroded significantly over the last several years."*
>
> Congressional Research Service, 1991
> U.S. Foreign Aid in a Changing World: Options for New Priorities

6.1 Introduction

From the beginning, American foreign aid has been about a political economy of purposes operating in a complex environment to deliver peace and security in a way that is consistent with national interests and national values. It has, as Congress is well aware, often fallen short. It has, at times, lost its way—during which Congress and the public have grown deeply disillusioned—but the power to persuade and rebuild a coalition willing to support aid has relied on this vision cast originally in the Marshall Plan. Legislators, when reminded of this vision of aid, grow, perhaps surprisingly, supportive of the humanitarian and development aspects of foreign aid alongside a national security rationale.

In the 1990s, legislators and the American public were powerfully reminded of why the United States gives aid. A new coalition of advocacy groups emerged, galvanized by the dramatically falling aid budgets. These included InterAction, which in 1997 "launched its 'Just 1%' campaign to inform the US public on the real amount of US foreign aid" as a share of the federal budget,[321] the new Business Alliance for International Economic Development "was established with an aim of lobbying for increased aid"[322] and the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition (USGLC) founded in 1995 "with the single goal of advocating for higher overall US international affairs spending."[323] This new advocacy campaign enabled foreign aid to survive the period between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 before a clear new direction for U.S. foreign policy emerged. Drawing on essential components that had long sustained aid, it revived a broad coalition of support.

6.2 Rebuilding Public Support for Aid

The U.S. Global Leadership Coalition is a helpful example of the animating spirit of this broader coalition, formed "with the single goal of advocating for higher overall US international affairs spending."[324] George Ingram, instrumental in the partnership of these organizations, explains,

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[320] Baldwin, D. A. (1965). The congressional politics of foreign aid. *Challenge*, *14*(1), 22-25.
[321] Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.
[322] Ibid.
[323] Tama, J. (2024). *Bipartisanship and US foreign policy: cooperation in a polarized age*. Oxford University Press.
[324] Ibid.

> *When I left the congress on January 1, not Gingrich, but some of his lieutenants were attacking foreign aid. So a handful of us, six or eight of us, over a couple of lunches (no martinis!) in January agreed we would share intelligence and do a little educational work with the congress…It started out to educate the congress on the importance of foreign aid. But we quickly came to the conclusion that foreign aid was not a way to approach Republicans. It was U.S. engagement, the roles of both State and AID. The bigger issue was the International Affairs budget account…*
>
> *At that point we had made three fundamental strategic decisions. One, the issue was funding the entire international affairs budget account, not just foreign aid. Second, it has to be bipartisan. Third, we needed the business community if we're going to talk to Republicans.*[325]

The diversity of surrogates tapped to persuade the public is highly reminiscent of the Marshall era and proved highly effective at shepherding aid through this uncertain and tumultuous period while simultaneously framing and re-establishing the distinctive multipurpose nature of American aid. A former policy director for USGLC John Glenn explained the impetus behind their advocacy work:

> *after the Cold War, everyone was fighting for a slice of the shrinking federal budget on Capitol Hill, and [we thought] that we might be more successful if we worked together on behalf of overall international affairs spending. A diverse set of actors should be able to come together around supporting the overall budget but would likely fracture if the focus was on specific spending priorities…[The goal] was to bring in not just the traditional actors in the foreign assistance community but others who you wouldn't necessarily expect to be advocating for foreign assistance, such as the business community.*[326]

The diverse set of actors involved has been integral to the success of the work. USGLC often "hosts events in lawmakers' states or districts at which locally respected figures" –frequently drawn from the military, business, and faith communities—"explain why diplomacy and development are beneficial."[327] It's a strategy that has proven "very effective with Republicans because it 'highlights the economic and national security benefits of aid'".[328] This wide alliance of business, military, and religious leaders resembles the coalition that built support for the original American aid project, the Marshall Plan. It has been widely successful (as in 1948) at changing the rhetoric and relationship between legislators and foreign aid, framing investments in aid as investments in national security. Republican appropriators (and SFOPS chairs), like Lindsey Graham (R-SC), have described aid as "national security in another form" (Tama 2024), with Graham rebuking "those who constantly demagogue foreign aid as being the root of our financial problems, please stop, because you don't know what the hell you're talking about…This account, I believe, is the smartest use of federal dollars of any place within the federal government."[329] Perhaps the best example of this approach is the extent to which legislators quote the testimony of General James

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[325] Ingram, George. (2018). Oral History for The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Ingram.George.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2024.
[326] Ibid.
[327] Ibid.
[328] Ibid.
[329] Ibid.


Mattis to Congress that "If you don't fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition.")[330]

Nothing had so resembled the public and Congressional campaign to promote the Marshall Plan since 1948. These advocacy groups rebuilt the foundation for Congressional support for foreign aid in a new era while a new foreign policy was still in its nascent stages. Without these efforts, it is unlikely that aid would have survived into the twenty-first century. It proved remarkably effective in increasing Congressional support (Tama 2024).

Nothing causal can be demonstrated here, but public opinion data also appear to grow more positive toward aid around the time of these campaigns (**Figure 6.1**). I use survey data from the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, asking the public about foreign policy goals (many of which relate to key purposes of aid): containing communism, combatting world hunger, supporting the security of U.S. allies, promoting democracy, catalyzing economic growth and improved living standard in developing countries, and standing up for human rights abroad. Public opinion towards all of these goals declines immediately after the Cold War—with drops from the survey in between 1986 and 1990 to 1994. These declines appear to reverse around the time of these public campaigns, with public opinion trending upward between 1994 and 1998. (The solid black line represents the end of the Cold War, the dashed black line 9/11, and the red line the timing of the advocacy campaign.) For most of the foreign policy goals, these gains hold steady or increase after 9/11.


[330] Schrayer, L. (2017). The politics of foreign aid. *The Brookings Institution. July*, *31*.; Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.

Figure 6.1
Public Opinion Around U.S. Foreign Policy and Foreign Aid (1974-2016)



While many date the turnaround in public attitudes toward aid to 9/11, this trend is present well beforehand. Norris (2017) tracks the percentage of Americans who think the U.S. spends too much on foreign aid using Cornell University's Roper Center polling database, iPoll, from 1950 to 2016.[331] He too identifies September 11, 2001 as an inflection point, observing: "The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, brought clear effects on opinion toward aid. With a very pronounced rally-around-the-flag moment and a huge burst in confidence in government, opinions toward assistance — upon which President George W. Bush greatly expanded spending — favorably surged."[332] Yet the percentage in Americans thinking aid spending was too high had been declining dramatically since 1995-1997—the same period in which these advocacy groups were most active with the public after the Cold War. Again, this does not establish a causal relationship, but it is striking that public opinion toward aid grows more positive (across multiple surveys) during this precise period.

Figure 6.2[333]



Used with permission from the author:
Norris. J. 2017 August 15. Special Feature: A history of American public opinion on foreign aid. Devex. https://www.devex.com/news/special-feature-a-history-of-american-public-opinion-on-foreign-aid-90732.

6.3 Rebuilding A Political Economy of Purposes

In its work, the U.S. Global Leadership Coalition has also focused on reinforcing support for three pillars of hard and soft power that motivate aid: national security, development, and humanitarian relief. Each of these is in the foreign policy interests of the United States, because the

[331] Norris. J. (2017 August 15). Special Feature: A history of American public opinion on foreign aid. Devex. https://www.devex.com/news/special-feature-a-history-of-american-public-opinion-on-foreign-aid-90732. Accessed 19 August 2024.
[332] Ibid.
[333] Used with permission from the author, with thanks.

development of other countries is in American interests. At a recent USGLC event in Nebraska, Don Bacon (R-NE) (who faced a primary challenger over his support to Ukraine) emphasized that, "We can't become an isolationist country… When we do that, the world becomes more dangerous, and it eventually comes to our shores… We have got to use all of our instruments of power… diplomatic, information, military, economic… it can't just be military".[334] Alongside him were a retired Air Force Lieutenant General and the merchandising manager from Cargill, the largest private company in the U.S. in 2023 according to Forbes.[335] "One of the things that we firmly believe in is a crisis in one region can impact the entire food system, and our fates are interconnected… When you look at the interconnected nature of our food system, one major incident in a specific region will always significantly have a ripple effect in trade patterns, production consumption, and ultimately, food security," the Cargill representative emphasized.[336]

This dialogue is reminiscent of Bermeo's targeted development argument that it is less costly to donors to invest in development than to bear the costs of spillovers from underdevelopment like migration. Yet it is also "targeted" in a foreign policy sense. Kay Granger, Republican SFOPS Chair from Texas, and Nita Lowey, Democratic SFOPS Chair from New York, reiterate this again and again in a panel interview at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Granger explains to skeptics, "so I know Mrs. Lowey and I both constantly talk about that and talk about what we really get back, why we do it, not just out of the goodness of the spirit, which is part of it, but here's what we get in exchange—we get countries that we work with that are better, that have more opportunities, but we gain from that also."[337]

The success of the campaign with Republicans—another shared characteristic with the Marshall Plan era—was vital. Recent work by Doeun Kim (2024) suggests that "when USGLC lobbies for a foreign aid bill, about 17 more legislators are likely to cosponsor the bill… USGLC's lobbying is highly correlated with the number of republican cosponsors of the bill." Republicans controlled both the House and Senate from January 1995-January 2001. Even as SFOPS cardinal Callahan publicly called for cuts to aid, in his first hearing as chair with the Secretary of State, he candidly explained:

> *The challenge for the subcommittee is daunting. On the one hand, we must respond to the demands of the American people to reduce government spending. In doing so, it will be politically impossible to spare foreign aid from these cuts.*
>
> *On the other hand, these reductions must be wisely and judiciously taken. Our foreign assistance and export financing programs are essential instruments of any President's foreign policy.*

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[334] U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. (2024 August 23). USGLC Convenes U.S. Rep. Don Bacon, Lt. Gen. Richard Newton, Cargill's Ann O'Riley and Other Local and National Leaders for 2024 Heartland Summit. https://www.usglc.org/newsroom/usglc-convenes-u-s-rep-don-bacon-lt-gen-richard-newton-cargills-ann-oriley-and-other-local-and-national-leaders-for-2024-heartland-summit/. Accessed on 7 October 2024.

[335] Murphy, A. (2023 November 14). America's Largest Companies. https://www.forbes.com/lists/largest-private-companies/. Accessed on 7 October 2024.

[336] U.S. Global Leadership Coalition. (2024 August 23). USGLC Convenes U.S. Rep. Don Bacon, Lt. Gen. Richard Newton, Cargill's Ann O'Riley and Other Local and National Leaders for 2024 Heartland Summit. https://www.usglc.org/newsroom/usglc-convenes-u-s-rep-don-bacon-lt-gen-richard-newton-cargills-ann-oriley-and-other-local-and-national-leaders-for-2024-heartland-summit/. Accessed on 7 October 2024.

[337] Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.

> *But in order to be effective, these instruments must enjoy broad bipartisan support here in the Congress, and equally important, reflect the priorities of the people back home that we represent. There is no doubt in my mind that we can achieve both these objectives if we in the Congress can forge a cooperative and constructive working relationship with the President, yourself, and other elements in the executive branch.*[338]

Callahan's first year as chair marked the all-time post-Cold War low in aid appropriations, $11.435 billion in 1995.[339] Surprisingly, Callahan trimmed money from security assistance, but preserved high levels of funding for **"development plus"** assistance. (As will be further demonstrated empirically in **Chapter 10**, this runs counter to existing literature on aid and Congress, but it is consistent with the pattern I predicted in **Chapter 2**: divided Congresses cut **"security plus"** assistance but maintain **"development plus"** aid because of the way in which foreign policy functions as foreign aid for legislators.) The subcommittee instituted a new account, specifically dedicated to child survival and health—singling this out as a priority that must not be jeopardized by budget cuts.[340] (At one point, Callahan even proposed to name the account after himself.)[341] Foreign aid had shifted from being perceived as fiscal drain back to its foreign policy footing.

6.4 The Republican Revolution Elevates the Appropriations Committee

Callahan held unusual power in this position compared to his predecessors because of the ways in which the Republican Revolution reconfigured the legislative rules of the House. When the Republican majority acceded to power in the House of Representatives after four decades in the minority, Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and party leadership simply "did not trust the committee system" which had so long been dominated by the Democratic Party (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). Even so, the leadership had ambitious policy goals, such as their "Contract with America", and legislating policy change required reliance on the committee system, as it is core to way in which Congress operates.

Gingrich decided to consolidate power into key committees—focusing particularly on Rules and Appropriations. He designated the Appropriations Committee as his particular "vehicle for policy change", relying on the Rules Committees to structurally adjust the rules of the House to give him the latitude he needed to operate through Appropriations. Gingrich hand-picked the committee chair, Robert Livingston, bypassing more senior candidates, and "used his enhanced influence over the GOP's committee assignments" to ensure an Appropriations Committee whose members he could trust (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). Livingston had significant experience on the State and Foreign Operations subcommittee, where he served as Ranking Member. Former SFOPS clerk, Jim

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[338] House of Representatives. (1995 February 16). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.
[339] This figure comes from the Foreign Operations budget, not the wider International Affairs budget.
[340] House of Representatives. (1995 June 15). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Report. https://www.congress.gov/104/crpt/hrpt143/CRPT-104hrpt143.pdf. Accessed 6 July 2024.
[341] House of Representatives. (1996 April 24). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023: "*But child survival is serious, it is to be taken seriously, and I am not going to be told by those trying to eradicate polio, like Rotary International, that money is not available when money is available, because this Congress, this committee specifically made it available by creating the Callahan Child Survival Account."*

Dyer, highlighted that "Bob knew more about foreign affairs budgets than anybody. When a foreign affairs issue came up, he was the first person they turned to".[342]

Having then fortified Appropriations as a suitable instrument, the Republican leadership proceeded to work primarily through the Appropriations Committee to accomplish its legislative agenda. This blurred the usual distinction in the House between authorizing and appropriating committees. Instead,

> *the GOP leadership informed the appropriators that they would carry a responsibility that was less consistent with previous practice. The committee would have to handle a substantial legislative agenda that would normally have been handled by the [authorizing] committees with substantive jurisdiction.... authorizing chairmen were instructed to work with the Appropriations cardinals to work out agreements with regard to policy. As [Majority Leader] Armey said to the chairmen, 'You'll get a lot of stuff done, but using the appropriations process' (Maraniss and Weisskopf 1996: 88).*[343]

Normally, the setting of policy through such "legislative language in appropriations bills (termed a 'rider') is a violation of House rules and would be subject to being stricken" (Aldrich and Rohde 2000). Not so now; the Rules Committee enacted special rules that allowed legislative and policy language to appear in Appropriations Bills, allowing authorizing committees to be bypassed—arguably a blow from which they have yet to recover. It was canny strategy as "Appropriations bills are considered 'must-pass,' and Republicans gambled that a Democratic president would not veto those bills just to eliminate the legislative provisions that congressional Republicans inserted into them" (Evans 2007).

This incorporation of policymaking into appropriations bills was a significant change to the appropriations process. While the practice of omnibus or consolidated appropriations had been on the rise since 1982[344], the phenomenon of routinely legislating policy in them was a newer innovation, which has continued under every subsequent Speaker of the House and expanded as the parties have become more polarized.[345] Though not previously a permissible practice, it has now become routine. As a former Appropriations staffer commented, with the "breakdown of the authorization process. Appropriations are the only bills in town".[346] This makes the annual appropriations bills all the more significant and ever more a flashpoint. It remains a "must pass" piece of legislation, to which legislators will be desperate to attach policy that might otherwise fail to reach the floor. Apart from these must-pass appropriations, authorizing committees have no reliable opportunities to bring legislation forward.

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342 (Dyer, James. [Oral History.] (2008 January 23). University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/james-dyer-oral-history. Accessed 18 May 2022.)

343 Aldrich, J. H., & Rohde, D. W. (2000). The consequences of party organization in the House: The role of the majority and minority parties in conditional party government. In *Polarized politics: Congress and the president in a partisan era* (pp. 31-72), emphasis added.

344 Aherne, D. (2024 August 21). Omnibus Appropriations: Overview of Recent Practice. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12324. Accessed on 18 August 2024.

345 Carcelli, S. P. (2024). Congressional polarization and limitation riders in foreign aid appropriations. In *Polarization and US Foreign Policy: When Politics Crosses the Water's Edge* (pp. 219-258). Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland; Duff, J. F., & Rohde, D. W. (2012, January). Rules to Live by: Agenda Control and the Partisan use of Special Rules in the House. In *Congress & the Presidency* (Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 28-50). Taylor & Francis Group.

346 Dyer, James. [Oral History.] (2008 January 23). University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/james-dyer-oral-history. Accessed 18 May 2022.

A member of staff for the House Natural Resources Committee described the difficulty:


> *[T]here really is not a mechanism through an authorizing process to get anything through this committee...and across the finish line. Literally nothing. …So we had to develop this omnibus process…We need a vehicle, right? ...I just need something that's a must pass, right? So there are a short and shrinking list of possible candidates, right? The NDAA, the [National Defense Authorization Act], continues to be arguably the only remaining must pass annual authorizing bill. Then you get these approp[riation]s packages…those are then the vehicles we look at to try and hitch a ride because we can't move individual bills through our normal authorization channels.*[347]

If authorizing committees want to legislate policy, they must find a "vehicle", some other bill that will be brought for a vote, in order to convert their policy agenda from aspiration into law. Moreover, bills that emerge from committee have certain procedural protections which mean that it is challenging for Congress at-large to dismember the policy embedded within them, which, when combined with its "must pass" nature makes appropriations a rare shot at legislating policy in a highly polarized environment. As a result, the work the committee has put into shaping and formulating its policy will survive largely intact. Chairs of authorizing committee still work with appropriators and party leadership behind the scenes to incorporate policy provisions[348] (just as described in the Gingrich era). These tend to have to be measures "that will broaden, rather than narrow, [the] coalition of support."[349] "'You have to do the math' …a former Senate Appropriations staff member explained. …'give members on the fence something to support'".[350]

This changes the calculus of aid appropriations dramatically. While legislating is harder, supportive appropriators have opportunities to leverage greater support for foreign aid budgets through consolidated and omnibus appropriations and through incorporating policy provisions that broaden support. Increases to aid can be shielded by defense appropriations in consolidated and omnibus bills. Moreover, with Congress once more established as an equal partner in the foreign policy making process, previously skeptical appropriators were more willing to fund foreign aid.

[347] Reynolds, M. E., & Hanson, P. C. (2023, August). Just How Unorthodox? Assessing Lawmaking on Omnibus Spending Bills. In *The Forum* (Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 213-238). De Gruyter.
[348] Ibid.
[349] Ibid.
[350] Ibid.

Figure 6.3
Trends in the U.S. Aid Budget with the End of the Cold War
(using the Foreign Operations Budget)



Foreign aid had rebounded to pre-Cold War levels by the end of the 1990s and more than doubled in size between 1990 and 2020 (calculated using current rather than constant amounts). The work of a broad array of advocacy groups provided much-needed political cover and the impetus to do so. Moreover, the work of advocacy groups supporting the International Affairs budget—the largest component of which is foreign aid—has encouraged legislators to reinvent and reimagine the rhetoric they use around aid, particularly on the appropriations side, where the power of policy has been consolidated with the power of the purse. Countless appropriators and legislators have quoted General Mattis.[351]

Numerous current and recent appropriators in the House and Senate point to the security benefits of development assistance as well as the multipurpose nature of U.S. aid. Lindsey Graham (R-SC), former chair of the appropriating subcommittee in the Senate, has stated that "The foreign operations account is national security in another form" (Tama 2024). When Kay Granger (R-TX) and Nita Lowey (D-NY), both former chairs of House SFOPS, were asked, "What is your perspective on the importance of foreign aid as tool in our kit for foreign policy?" Granger responded immediately, "It's extremely important." She then added, underscoring the heterogeneity of aid and its purposes, "Foreign aid, the definitions, the way it works out in different countries is so different…There's all sorts of foreign assistance." Lowey shortly afterward stressed the importance of education and creating economic opportunity through aid. She returned to this point again and again throughout the interview:

[351] Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2013 as quoted in Schrayer, L. (2017). The politics of foreign aid. *The Brookings Institution. July*, *31*.

> *I think it makes much more sense to invest in schools and healthcare rather than bullets and guns and blowing communities up and an educated population, in my judgment, is less likely to turn to guns."*[352]
>
> *One other thing. It can't be just military. It can't be just building schools. We have to deal with their narcotics issues, we have to deal with other countries who are undermining positive leadership, so it's very frustrating and very upsetting to those of us who work so hard to try and bring some stability.*[353]

She closes, turning to Kay Granger and the audience, "we can't give up because we both understand and our generals understand. General Mattis understood and understands that foreign aid is better than bullets, so we have to continue to work to educate and make sure that there's support on both sides of the aisle for foreign aid, **as there is in our committee**. There's Democrat support and Republican support and we work very well together—**on the committee**" (emphasis added).[354] There is significant support for aid on the Appropriations Committee—which recommends funding levels for aid.

To translate this support from the committee to the floor, the ability to point to public advocacy on issues gave key legislators much more maneuverability to support aid, even when it is unpopular with the wider Congress or constituents. It has also turned them into advocates with the public—much like Vandenberg who would answer letters from constituents and non-constituents alike, Granger employs newsletters in an attempt to help the public understand what U.S. aid does for the U.S., its allies, and the world. This phenomenon is not limited to appropriators either. In response to a 2023 constituent email about foreign policy (unrelated to aid), a Republican lawmaker in the Senate, wrote "There is no country like America. The United States is the single largest donor of foreign aid, which is used all over the world to support democracy and economic growth, fight disease and hunger, and assist in recovery following natural disasters. Our support gives opportunities to many across the globe, so even the most vulnerable children can have a chance to succeed."[355]

A USGLC slide deck in the archived papers of a former SFOPS Chair shows that just between 2003-2006, the number of legislators signing letters expressing support for International Affairs spending had risen 70%, from 92 to 156. (This represents 17% of all legislators signing onto support in 2003 and 29% of all legislators by 2006. These numbers are higher, by far, than the number of members with USAID contracts awarded to their districts in this same period.[356])

This bipartisan support among appropriators for security, development, and humanitarian aid became far more visible after 9/11 and the accelerated levels of foreign aid funding that followed, but it was present before this and had already begun to elevate aid spending. This was possible because of the concentrated of power in the hands of a few legislators who had the ability to protect increases to the aid budget, as long as they were willing to defend it publicly and build

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[352] Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.
[353] Ibid.
[354] Ibid.
[355] Email to constituent from Senator Rick Scott, 19 September 2023, shared with the author.
[356] Using data on USAID contracts from Milner and Tingley (2010)

support for it legislatively, and because of the critical work by advocacy groups in the wake of falling aid budgets in the nineties. The groundwork laid by these advocacy groups pre-dated the events of 9/11 and created a foundation of latent support for development, diplomatic, and security purposes of aid that could be quickly built on in a time of crisis.

6.5 Appropriators Make Foreign Policy Now

With aid appropriations as a key Congressional channel for legislating foreign policy, appropriators were empowered to bolster this new bipartisan architecture which undergirded the renewed significance of aid. Lowey and Granger illustrate this reality when they describe the bipartisan consensus that underpins aid appropriations. Lowey tells a story about navigating the political dynamics during a tricky appropriations season in 2019 when Democrats controlled the House and Republicans controlled the Senate—a divided Congress. At this point in time, Lowey and Granger, in addition to their roles on SFOPS, were also Chair and Ranking Member of the full House Appropriations Committee;[357] Shelby (R-AL) and Leahy (D-VT) were Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Committee.

"We, the House, that means both of us," Lowey explained, indicating the tremendous level of power they have to take decisions on behalf of the chamber. "Senator Shelby and I and Pat Leahy and Kay Granger—the four of us—have a very cooperative relationship." Granger added that, despite difficulties with the White House and the dynamics of a divided Congress, "Senator Shelby said, 'we can do this because we're negotiators.' …Authorizers write the bill. We have to find the money, so we negotiate both with departments, on issues, and together with the House and Senate. We negotiate, so we negotiate a bill we can all agree on and the president would sign".[358]

This ability to negotiate, to do the appropriations math, and ultimately to have power over some of the only legislation that reaches the floor empowered appropriators in their control over foreign policy. In combination with a renewed vision for why they should support aid, this catalyzed a greater willing to fund aid budgets than had been seen in decades. The sidelining of the authorizing process effectively transferred the power over policy to the appropriating subcommittee, as money became the *de facto* determiner of policy in the absence of authorizing legislation. The Chair of House Foreign Affairs, the authorizing committee, Ed Royce (R-CA) acknowledged this when welcoming new members at a 2017 organizational meeting. While celebrating the committee's lineage and detailing its productivity,[359] Royce also confronted its frustrating failures to gain authorizations in recent years:

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[357] Lowey was simultaneously serving as Chair of SFOPS; Granger (then Ranking Member for the Full Committee) had previously served as both SFOPS Chair and Ranking Member.

[358] Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.

[359] *"this is the second oldest committee in the House of Representatives...and was first chaired by Benjamin Franklin. Our predecessors have struggled with the questions of war and peace, freedom and tyranny, and diplomacy and development now for more than two centuries... this committee was responsible for 24 pieces of legislation becoming public law. All in all, we held 280 hearings, briefings, and meetings."* Royce, Chair of House Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017 (House of Representatives. (2017 January 24). Committee on Foreign Affairs. Organization Meeting. https://www.congress.gov/115/chrg/CHRG-115hhrg24179/CHRG-115hhrg24179.pdf. Accessed on 1 April 2022.)

> *Of the major initiatives awaiting us, one of the most significant will be to authorize the Department of State, whose accounts have not been authorized for nearly a decade and a half, despite our efforts of authorizing these in the past and sending them to the Senate…I am hopeful that this will be the year that we succeed in fulfilling our budget-authorizing role, one of our most basic and important mandates.*[360]

Lee Hamilton (D-IN), former chair of the same committee, likewise expressed his frustration in 2002 that "The greatest concentration of foreign policy power in Congress resides now in the appropriations committees". [361]

Despite the volume of hearings and committee meetings, without the ability to regularly pass authorizations, the influence of the authorizing committees, with respect to foreign aid, has declined. Tarnoff and Lawson (2011) comment in a Congressional Research Service paper that

> *In the absence of regular enactment of foreign aid authorization bills, appropriation measures considered annually within the State-Foreign Operations spending bill have assumed greater significance for Congress in influencing U.S. foreign aid policy. Not only do appropriations bills set spending levels each year for nearly every foreign assistance account, State-Foreign Operations appropriations also incorporate new policy initiatives that would otherwise be debated and enacted as part of authorizing legislation.*

At the end of the day, money is policy now and U.S. foreign policy falters without funding. This has significant ramifications for American foreign policy. In 2000, House SFOPS chair Callahan (R-AL) complained about President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt pestering him about loan forgiveness and new support for Egypt. His story underscored his growing powers in foreign policy:

> *Mr. Mubarak comes over here. He tells me, I can't understand it. The President of the United States, the Secretary of State, the Speaker of the House, the leader of the Senate, all are in favor of the interest-bearing account and* ***only you, Mr. Callahan, are against it. And why are you doing this to Egypt****?*
>
> *Well, first, I tell him I am not that powerful. And I told him this year, when he was here last week, then why didn't he get all these people to write me a letter and* ***tell me to include it in my bill? And, if they do, I will.***[362]

Just five days later, Callahan further captured this evolving landscape, provocatively reminding the Administrator of USAID, "So maybe the President ought to learn that if he wants authorization, he goes to the international committee; if he wants money, he comes to this committee. **I think his**

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[360] House of Representatives. (2017 January 24). Committee on Foreign Affairs. Organization Meeting. https://www.congress.gov/115/chrg/CHRG-115hhrg24179/CHRG-115hhrg24179.pdf. Accessed on 1 April 2022.
[361] Hamilton, L., & Tama, J. (2002). *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
[362] Emphasis added; House of Representatives. (2000 April 6). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-106hhrg65471/html/CHRG-106hhrg65471.htm. Accessed 12 February 2022.


primary concern in international affairs is money, not policy so much."[363] This was followed by the warning, a favorite quote of his predecessor David Obey, that "*I may not give you everything that you want, but I am the one who gives you everything you get*"[364] (emphasis added).

Callahan's successor as subcommittee chair, James Kolbe (R-AZ) reminded Secretary of State Colin Powell in May 2001, "We all know our Constitution gives Presidents exceptional powers in foreign affairs but reserves the power of the purse to Congress. Such a division can, of course, result in a stalemate."[365] David Price (D-NC), a former Appropriations cardinal[366] for Homeland Security who also served on the State and Foreign Operations subcommittee, identified the annual "foreign aid bill as the main way Congress expresses itself on foreign policy" (Interview, Wright 2023).

A subtle signal of this reality is the number of authorizers who moved from the prestigious House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees to the State and Foreign Operations subcommittee, which has been dismissed by scholars as unimportant and undesirable "because they handle little domestic spending."[367] **Figures 6.4**, **6.5, and 6.6** below depict these shifts. The House Appropriations Committee is exclusive—meaning that members who serve on it must give up all other committee placements. **Figure 6.4** shows the number of State and Foreign Operations subcommittee members who had previously served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC). (The subcommittee averages between 12-13 members, so 6 represents half of a typical subcommittee.)

[363] Emphasis added; House of Representatives. (2000 April 11). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. https://www.congress.gov/106/chrg/CHRG-106hhrg65471/CHRG-106hhrg65471.pdf. Accessed 12 February 2022.
[364] Sonny Callahan, Chairman of SFOPS, Ibid.
[365] James Kolbe, Chair of the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, House of Representatives. (2001 May 10). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. https://www.congress.gov/107/chrg/CHRG-107hhrg75037/CHRG-107hhrg75037.pdf. Accessed 3 March 2022.
[366] subcommittee chair of House Appropriations Committee
[367] Berry, Christopher R., & Fowler, Anthony. (2018). Congressional committees, legislative influence, and the hegemony of chairs. Journal of Public Economics, 158, 1-11.

Figure 6.4
Switching from House Foreign Affairs to State and Foreign Operations



(The subcommittee averages between 12-13 members, so 6 represents half of a typical subcommittee.)


In the 1980s, House SFOPS had two members, on average, who had previously served on the Foreign Affairs authorizing committee. In the 1990s, this average dropped to just a single member. This remained the case until about 2007. When the Democrats regained control of the House, four Democrats transferred from HFAC to SFOPS. (Incidentally, this was under Nancy Pelosi's (D-CA) tenure as Speaker of the House. Pelosi had been Callahan's ranking member from 1997-2000 and had a deep understanding of the committee's functions. In a recent interview she recalled her work on the Intelligence and Appropriations Committees, emphasizing "I loved my work. I was the top Democrat on what we call 'Foreign Ops'").[368]

Later, when the Republicans regained the majority, the number of former HFAC members fell as some of these Democrats were moved off the subcommittee. (Republicans tended to move members to SFOPS from Armed Services, Budget, and Homeland Security instead of HFAC until more recently.) The average number of members with HFAC experience has not, however, fallen below 2 since 2007, while at least twice reaching a high of 6 members (approximately half of the committee). (**Figure 6.6** shows this as a percentage (compared against the trend in the Senate).)

Figure 6.5 visualizes the comparable trend for the Senate, but the measure differs slightly. The Appropriations Committee is not exclusive in the Senate as it is in the House. Members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) who serve on Appropriations can keep membership of both committees. The lighter (top) blue line in **Figure 6.5** tracks the *percentage* of members of Senate SFOPS who have *ever* served on SFRC before serving on SFOPS. The darker blue (lower) line tracks the number of SFOPS members who serve *simultaneously* on both the SFRC and SFOPS committees.

[368] Pelosi, N. (2024 May 5). Interview on Leading [podcast] with Rory Stewart and Alastair Campbell. https://podcasts.apple.com/gm/podcast/nancy-pelosi-from-jfks-inauguration-to-fighting-donald/id1665265193?i=1000654292313. Accessed 10 August 2024.

Figure 6.5
Switching from Senate Foreign Relations to State and Foreign Operations and Simultaneously Serving



(Senate SFOPS ranges from 9 to 17 in members across this period, making percentages a more stable measure in this case.)


There appears to have been **no simultaneous** overlap between the membership of these two committees between 1981 and 2010. However, members began switching from SFRC to SFOPS in 1993, with a large rise seen just after the 1994 Republican Revolution, in 1995-1996. This trend in the Senate was driven primarily by Republicans Mitch McConnell (future chair of SFOPS, R-KY), James Jeffords (R-VT), and Judd Gregg (R-NH) switching from SFRC to join SFOPS. Around 2011, Democrat Dick Durbin (IL) begins to serve simultaneously on both committees. By 2013, two of his Democratic colleagues from SFRC, Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) and Christopher Coons (current chair of SFOPS) (D-DE), also joined SFOPS while keeping their positions on SFRC.

Today, *all but one* of the 7 Democratic members of SFOPS is currently serving on SFRC and he has previously served on SFRC. On the Republican side, 2 of the 6 minority members are currently serving on SFRC and 2 more have previously served on the committee. In total, this means that 84.62% of the committee has served on SFRC and 61.54% are currently serving. Just 2 members of the 13-member committee have no current or previous SFRC experience. Yet a few decades prior, the two committees had zero overlap. On the Senate side, where Appropriations is not exclusive, legislators appear to have compensated for the sidelining of the authorizing process by consolidating the authorizing and appropriating committee. (Of the current SFOPS committee, 61.54% are currently on SFRC.)

I plot these trends in relationship to one another in **Figure 6.6**, using percentages. In the early 1980s, there was very little overlap in membership between the authorizing and appropriating committees for foreign aid, as the two processes operated separately from one another. As the authorizing process collapsed between 1982 to present, increasing percentages of authorizers have

been switching to the appropriating subcommittee that handles aid. I argue that this trend underscores the argument I have been making that the concentration of the power of policy with the power of the purse has elevated the control of the appropriating subcommittee over foreign aid and foreign policy.

Figure 6.6
Authorizers Move to Appropriations in both the House and Senate[369]



The data underlying these figures comes from SFOPS subcommittee rosters I have compiled. While there are some readily available data sets on committee members (e.g. Charles Stewart's MIT database), there is little information on *subcommittee* membership. I use the Congressional Directory, cross-referenced with Congressional hearings and the records of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, to compile annual data on SFOPS, HFAC, and SFRC membership. For any legislator who ever serves on SFOPS in the House or Senate, I then use the Congressional Directory to track their committee placements from the time they enter office to the time they depart. This provides a comprehensive annual snapshot of subcommittee membership between 1981-2024. Subcommittee data is difficult to compile earlier than this as the Congressional Directory only records the subcommittee chair and ranking member (though it can be partially reconstructed from subcommittee hearings).[370]

I offer another visualization from this same data as a further counterargument to scholars who assume that State and Foreign Operations is an undesirable placement on the Appropriations Committee. Typically, committees such as Labor and Health and Human Services, Defense, and Commerce and Justice are seen as highly desirable subcommittee placements, because these


[369] The Congressional Directory is not yet available for 2023, so this data has not been cross-referenced for the House and is therefore currently missing.
[370] Because reconstructing subcommittee membership earlier than 1981 relies on retrieving hearings for the three committees annually from the Law Library at the Library of Congress, I do not trace these trends back earlier in this dissertation, due to time constraints, but plan to go back to 1946 in future research.

subcommittee handle large budgets and provide "pork barrel" opportunities to benefit constituents.[371]

In the figures below, I use data on the seniority of subcommittee chairs to compare State and Foreign Operations to other Appropriations subcommittees. I propose that seniority of the member chairing the subcommittee serves as a reasonable proxy of a subcommittee's desirability, as more senior members have more choice over the subcommittees they chair. (David Price (D-NC), a former appropriations cardinal and academic, agreed that this was a fairly good proxy (Interview, Wright 2023). In **Figure 6.7**, I plot the seniority of the SFOPS cardinal from 1975 to 2022. (I use a measure of majority rank that is analogous to the "rank" feature in ProQuest Congressional. Committee hearings publish an ordered list of committee members from both the majority and minority party. I use these committee lists to number the majority members and then use this ordering as their rank for that session of Congress.) The Full Committee Chair of Appropriations is therefore the most senior member—ranked 1—for any year. (Full Committee Chairs have the choice about whether to chair their own subcommittee or not. When they do choose to chair subcommittees, they have often chosen the Labor and Health and Human Services subcommittee.)

[371] It is commonly thought that members of the House Appropriations Committee use their positions as appropriators to benefit their own districts through "pork barrel" spending. However, when Berry and Fowler (2016) analyzed data on committee membership and district-level spending (federal outlays), they found little evidence of this (except for subcommittee chairs). Hammond and Rosenstiel (2020) reanalyze this relationship with appropriations data for military construction. They report that "[w]hile an analysis of the spending data produces a null result, the same analysis using the appropriations data provides strong evidence that the pork barrel was alive and well during this period." This is because "measures of spending … are downstream measures of the appropriations that originated them" Hammond, B., & Rosenstiel, L. (2020). Measuring the influence of political actors on the federal budget. *American Political Science Review*, *114*(2), 603-608.

Figure 6.7
Seniority of State and Foreign Operations (House Appropriations) Subcommittee Chairs 1975-2022




I can only compile data on SFOPS chairs from 1975, as the set of committee records I have accessed from the Library of Congress only go back that far, but Fenno (1966) records that two Chairs of the Appropriations Committee also chaired State and Foreign Ops during their tenure—as happened in 1994 and 2019-2020 when David Obey and Nita Lowey assumed the position of Full Chair but continued to chair SFOPS. In my figure, this corresponds to a "rank" of 1—the most senior appropriator on the committee.

From 1975 to 2022, the seniority range of SFOPS chairs fluctuates from very senior chairs to less senior chairs (often chairing their first subcommittee). (Subcommittee chairs usually need to be at least 16th in the majority ranking, out of thirty to forty members from the majority, to achieve a position of subcommittee chair. Appropriations as a committee tends to be 70-80 members, with more members from the majority than the minority.) SFOPS has—for half of this period, however—had a cardinal who ranked 6th or higher. This indicates it would have had a chair more senior than at *least half* of the other appropriating subcommittees.

This is perhaps easier to see by comparing recent SFOPS cardinals against chairs of other "desirable" subcommittee in **Figure 6.8**. I plot the seniority of SFOPS' chair against those of Labor and Health and Human Services, Commerce and Justice, and Defense, plus Military Construction. I only have complete data for all Appropriations subcommittees between 1999-2022. For all of these years, SFOPS has a more senior cardinal than Military Construction—which Hammond and Rosenstiel (2020) have demonstrated carries significant benefits for members. Throughout this period, the Defense subcommittee tends to be chaired by highly senior members. Yet for eight years, SFOPS has a more senior chair than Defense.


Figure 6.8
Seniority of Selected Subcommittee Chairs (House Appropriations) 1999-2022



Finally, **Figure 6.9** plots the seniority of all subcommittee chairs for House Appropriations (also known as "cardinals") from 1999-2022. For each year, every subcommittee has a colored tile. The tiles are arranged in the order of the seniority of their chair, with the chair's rank printed in bold within the tile. SFOPS tiles are boxed in bold. (This provides additional confirmation that Defense and Labor are most frequently chaired by the most senior members of House Appropriations—their tiles are consistently in the top two subcommittees slots at the bottom of the figure. For 19 out of 25 years, State and Foreign Operations consistently ranks in the top half of subcommittees by seniority of chair. For 6 years, it ranks in the top three subcommittees by cardinal seniority.)

While observational, this data nonetheless allows for some novel comparisons between subcommittees of the powerful Appropriations Committee. It provides no conclusive proof, but these comparative metrics do not indicate that the State and Foreign Operations subcommittee is at the bottom of the pecking order on Appropriations. Rather, from its inception, some of the most senior members of the full committee have chosen to chair the subcommittee. That trend has continued. I argue this is because the subcommittee offers significant opportunities for chairs to shape the direction and substance of U.S. foreign policy.

Figure 6.9
Seniority of House Appropriations Subcommittee Chairs 1999-2022



6.6 Conclusion

The period between the end of World War II to present has witnessed tremendous changes in the evolution of American foreign policy and American aid. It has seen the reemergence of an assertive Congress in foreign policy after a few decades of struggling on the sidelines during the Cold War. Public and Congressional support for foreign aid have been substantively rebuilt from the ground up by advocacy groups. Reforms to the committee system and budget process, interacted with rising polarization and partisan politics, have uniquely empowered the Appropriations Committee in the arena of foreign policy ensuring the ability to conduct robust oversight and have extensive access to relevant information. The growing power of the purse in foreign policy also all but guarantees Congress a role as a meaningful partner to the President in foreign policy.

Despite the dramatic evolution of foreign policy from 1946 to present, foreign aid remains both a Presidential and Congressional tool of foreign policy. Yet rising polarization creates incentives for Presidents to use foreign policy tools that bypass Congress (Tama 2024) or for which Congressional approval is more easily obtained (Milner and Tingley 2015). In the coming chapters, I explore some of the implications of polarization for foreign policy through the lens of foreign aid. While Presidents propose foreign aid budgets, Congress has the power of the purse and determines the available funding. Foreign aid has been identified by other scholars as an important "microcosm" of the foreign policy budget, if not the foreign policy budget itself (Meernik, Krueger, and Poe 1998; Hinckley 1994; Riddell 1987). In the analytical sections, I demonstrate polarization has not yet sidelined the role of Congress in foreign policy through aid appropriations, though divided Congresses throw up serious challenges to Presidential-Congressional partnerships.

First, however, in the next section, I formalize the claim that appropriators are deeply involved in the making of foreign policy through foreign aid by presenting an original framework that details the Presidential-Congressional funding process for foreign aid, a new typology that classifies the foreign policy purposes of American aid, and original data that reflects the role of Congress in foreign aid.

Part 3

Understanding the Role of Congress in Foreign Aid

7 The Foreign Operations Process
A New Framework Detailing the U.S. Foreign Aid Process

> *"First and foremost, as I said earlier, what we do in the world should be a collaborative process between the administration and the Congress, and so Congress has every right to give us suggestions, ideas. And of course, you have the power of the purse, at the end of the day."*
>
> Secretary of State Colin Powell, 10 May 2001[372]

> *"U.S. foreign assistance... is subject to a high level of congressional input, as mandated under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA, P.L. 87-195) ... Congress works with the relevant executive agencies through a distinctive* ***executive-congressional process*** *to allocate assistance..."*
>
> Brown (2020), Congressional Research Service (emphasis added)

7.1 Introduction

Scholars tend to treat processes that generate decisions about aid as a black box. Modeling these decisions is difficult. Donors are opaque about their processes (Harrigan and Wang 2011; Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter 2015), which often intersect with their own domestic politics (Dietrich 2021). Yet these processes and the politics that attend them shape aid decisions distinctively. Even so, most of these features are glossed over in the existing literature for the sake of analytical ease. As Arel-Bundock, Atkinson, and Potter (2015) comment a "crucial, but oft-ignored determinant of aid allocation patterns: [is] the structure of the aid-giving bureaucracy on the *donor country side*".

Yet the aid bureaucracy inevitably shapes the decisions made. While it is widely acknowledged that donors behave differently, the U.S. stands out in particular. An unusual number of executive agencies are involved in foreign aid (see **Appendix 1** for further details). The United States employs a unique "executive-congressional process to allocate assistance" (Brown 2020), which distinguishes it from other major donors. The Congressional aspect of this process is particularly under-studied. Everything we think we know about U.S. aid has the fingerprints of Congress all over it—unbeknownst to most scholars. As a result, U.S. aid cannot be accurately understood without understanding the role that Congress plays in foreign aid through the Appropriations Committee. In this chapter and the next, I unpack these dimensions of U.S. aid and provide ways to incorporate these features into analyses of U.S. aid, without sacrificing the analytical ease to which scholars and practitioners are accustomed.

[372] House of Representatives. (2001 10 May). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. https://www.congress.gov/107/chrg/CHRG-107hhrg75037/CHRG-107hhrg75037.pdf. Accessed 3 March 2022.

7.2 The Foreign Operations Process

Drawing on a series of elite interviews with former members of Congress, legislative staff, and agency personnel, archival materials, and government documents,[373] I create a systematic framework that lays out the individual steps in the U.S. foreign aid process, which I term the "**Foreign Operations Process**." (The process is named for the portion of the budget that funds foreign aid, from which the appropriating subcommittee also takes its name.) I give careful attention to the role of executive and legislative players and the executive-legislative dynamics that mark the process. The **Foreign Operations Process** governs the approximately 70% of U.S. foreign aid that is appropriated through the State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee. This excludes food aid appropriated through the Department of Agriculture, certain health and humanitarian accounts handled through Defense appropriations, and any "off-book" programming that might be appropriated for the Intelligence Community, but it captures the majority of U.S. foreign assistance funding and details the process for the most prominent U.S. agencies involved in foreign aid—the United States Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

I define the **Foreign Operations Process** as the annual pathway by which core (non-supplemental) funding for U.S. foreign aid is requested, appropriated, allocated, and spent.[374] It comprises twenty-five distinct steps, laid out in **Table 7.1**. (The contents of the table are summarized immediately after it is presented.) The Congressional Research Service has produced a two-page summary describing how the Executive Branch assembles and executes the foreign aid budget—however, it provides scant detail about the role of Congress in this process (primarily because it is designed to inform Congress about the role of the Executive Branch rather than vice versa).[375] This new framework provides greater detail about the actions taken by the Executive Branch as well as systematically tracking actions taken by the Legislative Branch. **Table 7.1** is therefore the most comprehensive, systematic look at the process of U.S. aid available to date. It opens the "black box" of U.S. foreign aid and reveals the integral role that Congress plays in U.S. aid decisions.

[373] These documents include reports from the Congressional Research Service (Brown 2020, Morgenstern and Brown 2022), the Government Accountability Office (GAO-19-600), Department of State, and State and Foreign Operations subcommittees. More details on interviews can be found in **Appendix 2**.
[374] This definition and process applies only to the Foreign Operations Accounts, which will be formally defined and discussed later in **Chapter 8**.
[375] Brown. N. (2020). "U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development and Execution." Congressional Research Service. IF11515.

Table 7.1
The Foreign Operations Process

Foreign Operations Process			
Branch	**Stage**	**Summary**	**Steps**
Executive			
	Request	Requests for projects and priorities come in from the field to the agencies.	ER1. Priorities are identified by the 200+ operating units (OUs) in the field.
			ER2. Requests are generated from the 200+ operating units (OUs) in the field.
	Proposal	These requests are coordinated with the president's priorities and the other agencies involved and submitted to Congress as part of the President's Budget Request (**PBR**).	EP1. Requests are reviewed by relevant desk officers and assistant secretaries.
			EP2. Revised requests are combined into agency-wide budget request.
			EP3. Office of Foreign Assistance (**F, State/USAID**) reviews, revises, and submits to Office of Management and Budget (**OMB**).
			EP4. OMB adjusts the budget request to reflect the President's priorities.
			EP5. The proposed budget is returned to the agencies in a "passback."
			EP6. F negotiates with operating units, offices, and OMB.
			EP7. The finalized budget proposal is submitted by OMB to Congress as the President's Budget Request (**PBR**).
			EP8. The Department of State submits a Congressional Budget Justification (**CBJ**) outlining and advocating for the requests.
Legislative	*Outcome:*		*President's Budget Request (PBR) and Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ)*
	Review	The proposal is reviewed by relevant Congressional committees, which recommend funding levels.	LR1. The relevant subcommittee reviews the request and justification and schedules hearings.
			LR2. The subcommittee holds hearings and conducts oversight.
			LR3. Members of the committee and members of Congress submit their budget requests to the subcommittee chair.
			LR4. The subcommittee staff develop allocation tables for the proposed funding levels.
			LR5. The subcommittee chair releases a recommendation (**Chair's Mark**) about funding levels.
			LR6. The subcommittee and then the committee meets for a **markup**, in which members can express support and disagreement.
			LR7. The subcommittee releases a report and drafts an appropriations bill.
			LR8. The committee sends individual appropriations bills or a consolidated bill to the floor.
	Outcome:		*Committee Report and Appropriations Bill*
	Floor Vote	The Congressional disposal (appropriations bill) is considered, amended, and enacted into law by Congress.	LFV1. The chamber considers the appropriations bill.
			LFV2. Members propose amendments to the appropriations bill.
			LFV3. Members vote on the bill and its amendments in each chamber.
			LFV4. Legislation must be reconciled between the House and Senate in conference committee.
Executive-Legislative	*Outcome:*		*Foreign Operations appropriation*
	Budget Execution	The agencies must adjust their plans to the funding levels legislated, subject to Congressional commmittee approval.	ELB1. The President signs the appropriations legislation into law after Congress submits the passed bill to the White House.
			ELB2. Funding levels are legally determined by the appropriations legislation.
			ELB3. Within this, offices and operating units must bargain and negotiate over which projects and regions will receive cuts or increases.
			ELB4. The agencies must submit a 653a report to Congress, detailing its allocation, as an outcome of the previous step.
			ELB5. Subsequent changes initiate a process of Congressional Notifications (CNs), which entails committee-sign off before spending.
	Outcome:		*653a Report and Congressional Notifications (CNs)*

Steps are named and numbered for the branch and stage in which they happen (*e.g., the third step in Proposal is denoted* ***EP3*** *where* ***E*** *identifies it as an executive branch phase and* ***P*** *as occurring within the Proposal stage*). The gray, italicized boxes indicate U.S. Government documents, reports, and legislation that emerge from particular stages.

Request and Proposal

The process originates in the field offices of the Department of State and USAID (termed "operating units"); the staff on the ground identifies "strategic priorities…and the human and financial resources needed to achieve them."[376] These assessments are then reviewed by relevant desk officers in the Department of State and USAID and passed up through the hierarchy to the Assistant Secretary (State) or Deputy Assistant Administrator (USAID) level. All requests will be combined in an agency-wide budget request, managed by the **Office of Foreign Assistance** (**F**) which is jointly staffed by State and USAID.[377] The combined budget request will be considered by **F** and senior officials, weighed, and adjusted to balance the requested resources across the actors and offices involved. It will then be submitted to the **Office of Management and Budget** (**OMB**) (in the Executive Office of the President) and adjusted again to ensure that the President's priorities are adequately reflected in the proposal. It then returns to the agencies in what is known as a "passback." Individual operating units and offices can see which of their priorities and projects have been cut or received increased funding. This initiates a series of negotiations between the field, State and USAID, and OMB—coordinated by the Office of Foreign Assistance— to reconcile priorities. Offices can push to have funding restored. After this, the budget proposal is finalized and submitted by OMB to Congress formally as one part of the wider **President's Budget Request** (**PBR**). The Department of State submits an accompanying **Congressional Budget Justification** (**CBJ**) outlining and advocating for its funding requests. This includes an "annex" which contains "detailed country-level account breakdowns" (Brown 2020).

Review

When the President's Budget Request is submitted to Congress, it is divided across the relevant appropriating subcommittees who have jurisdiction over the particular budget functions.[378]

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[376] Ibid.

[377] The office has only existed since 2006, so this step would have involved a different coordinating body previously.

[378] Readers familiar with the U.S. budget process may notice that steps are condensed for clarity of explanation at this stage. As part of the fiscal cycle, the Budget Committees in the House and the Senate establish a budget resolution "stating how much Congress should spend in each of 19 spending categories (known as budget "functions")". This is then accompanied by a 302(a) allocation—a "table [which] takes the spending totals that are laid out by function in the budget resolution and distributes them by congressional committee instead. …In both the House and Senate, the Appropriations Committee receives a single 302(a) allocation for all of its programs. Each of the Appropriations Committees then decides how to distribute this funding among its 12 subcommittees to create 302(b) sub-allocations."

Center for Budget and Policy Priorities. (2022 October 24). Policy Basics: Introduction to the Federal Budget Process. https://www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-introduction-to-the-federal-budget-process. Accessed on 1 December 2022.

In essence, in the budget resolution, the Budget Committee sets the amount available for each government function. The Appropriations Committee receives a single lump sum, aggregating all of the budget functions for which it is responsible across its twelve subcommittees (302(a) allocation). The Chair of the Committee divides the available funding across the subcommittees (in the 302(b) suballocation) and then, as relevant to their jurisdiction, the subcommittee makes recommendations about which aspects of the President's budget to fund more, less, or as requested. (While the Chair of Appropriations determines the size of each subcommittee's budget, known as a suballocation, Gui and Rothenberg (APSA 2022) posit that higher-ability subcommittee chairs and subcommittees with higher-ability legislators are able to increase their suballocation budget. Indeed, Chairs sometimes change the suballocation as the process unfolds, "parking" money in subcommittees like Legislative Branch and moving it later to increase different subcommittees' budgets (Interview, Wright 2022).)

The **State and Foreign Operations (SFOPS)** subcommittee, which handles foreign aid appropriations, then commences its review of the "International Affairs" budget.[379] This includes the "Foreign Operations" budget, which is the subset of the International Affairs budget containing foreign assistance and the largest component of the wider "International Affairs" budget. "Foreign Operations" represents about 70% of the "International Affairs" budget.

The subcommittee schedules hearings, conducts oversight, and scrutinizes the Executive Branch proposal. It delves into individual Treasury accounts and the composition of priorities and programs underlying the overall request. Members of the SFOPS subcommittee and of the wider Appropriations Committee can submit requests to the SFOPS chair asking for consideration of specific funding priorities, as can members of Congress—though requests from subcommittee appropriators and other members of the Appropriations Committee are more privileged in this review process (Interview, Wright 2022). The subcommittee chair has final say in granting requests.

Beyond recommending funding levels, the subcommittee is also active in shaping the allocation of U.S. aid to individual country recipients—who receives how much foreign aid. When agencies file a **Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ)**, they include a full allocation table for foreign assistance detailing what amounts would be given to specific recipients (e.g., $17.9 million for Angola, $.475 million for Belize, and $22.7 million for Cambodia in the 2000 proposal to Congress). These totals are predicated upon amounts for specific types of aid as well—see **Table 7.2**. (In an upcoming section, I extensively explain how the typology of accounts is created, but, for now, to spare the reader the full technical detail, I simply substitute the "type" of account for the account name.)

Table 7.2

2000	**health**	**development**	**strategic**	**security**	**military**
Angola	$6.41 million	$3.54 million	$5 million	$2.9 million	$.05 million
Belize	*none*	*none*	*none*	*none*	$.475 million
Cambodia	*none*	*none*	$20 million	$2.6 million	$.1 million

The subcommittee reviews this table and generates its own internal table of adjusted allocations which is returned to the agency at the end of the appropriations process (Interview, Wright 2022). Funding for Angola and Belize goes down (to $15.3 million and $.423 million, respectively) while funding for Cambodia goes up (to $26.86 million). Specific instructions can also be provided formally or informally to the agencies about where and how money should be spent.[380]

[379] There are a few components of the International Affairs Budget that fall outside the jurisdiction of SFOPS, but they have oversight of the vast majority of this budget.

[380] For example, the House subcommittee prohibits any aid to Cambodia from going to the central government. The Senate subcommittee expresses similar concerns but directs at least $20 million to be provided from two specific accounts (development and strategic assistance) and implemented through non-governmental and civil society organizations to help with health, education, political reforms (focused on rule of law and democracy), and environmental protection of Cambodia's natural resources.
Examples of Congressional Reports:
https://www.congress.gov/106/crpt/hrpt720/CRPT-106hrpt720.pdf;
https://www.congress.gov/106/crpt/srpt291/CRPT-106srpt291.pdf ;
https://www.congress.gov/106/crpt/hrpt997/CRPT-106hrpt997.pdf;
https://www.congress.gov/106/statute/STATUTE-114/STATUTE-114-Pg1900.pdf

If agencies deviate by more than 10% from the adjusted allocation table (as shared by the relevant committees), this triggers a process of Congressional notifications in which these changes must be run by key legislators who give or withhold approval (Interview, Wright 2022; Interview, Wright 2023; Higgins 2022).

As far as I can tell, this is a truly unprecedented level of legislative involvement in detailed foreign aid decisions compared to other major donors of foreign aid: key legislators can (and do) increase or decrease the amount of aid to particular countries. The SFOPS chair, in particular, has tremendous power over foreign aid. One subcommittee chair reported spending hours with the staff as they finalized tables, recommendations, and legislative language as he wanted to be fully involved in the details of the process (Interview, Wright 2022). Chairs frequently accommodate the requests of their minority counterpart, the Ranking Member of SFOPS, but as one former chair acknowledged: "*it's much better to be Chair than Ranking…It's better to be the Chair, if this is what you're passionate about."*[381] This is why Callahan as Chair could assert, "*I may not give you everything that you want, but I am the one who gives you everything you get."*[382]

After hearings have concluded, the Chair of the subcommittee releases a **Chair's Mark**, which reflects the recommendations they plan to make on behalf of the subcommittee in the form of an appropriations bill. Members of the subcommittee then attend the **markup** and comment on the Chair's Mark. (There is also a Full Committee markup of the bill, which all members of the Appropriations Committee can attend.) Minority members have previously complained that markups serve "*"functionally [as] a messaging bill for the majority".*[383]

David Price (D-NC), himself a former Appropriations subcommittee chair on several different subcommittees describes this process:

> *The starting point for the chairman's mark is the administration's budget request, which has been presented and defended by agency heads in subcommittee hearings. Members are furnished documents showing how the chairman's draft differs from the administration's request on each item. The differences are often substantial, and there is usually little question that the bill has been reviewed item by item and given the subcommittee's own imprint.*
>
> *I have served on seven Appropriations subcommittees; on each, the requests of subcommittee members have been given special consideration and members have been informed, usually through staff channels, of how their items fared shortly before the chairman's mark is unveiled. It is difficult to alter these decisions in any way that requires a major reallocation of funding among items, but marginal changes are sometimes accepted by the chair before or during subcommittee markup. There is also great resistance to 'opening up the bill' in full committee markup…*[384]

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[381] Nita Lowey (D-NY), Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]. (2019). "Smart Women. Smart Power. Panel on Foreign Aid and International Spending." https://www.csis.org/podcasts/smart-women-smart-power-podcast/foreign-aid-and-international-affairs-spending. Accessed 10 September 2023.
[382] Sonny Callahan, Chairman of SFOPS, House of Representatives. (2000 April 11). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. https://www.congress.gov/106/chrg/CHRG-106hhrg65471/CHRG-106hhrg65471.pdf. Accessed 12 February 2022.
[383] Debbie Wasserman-Schultz, House of Representatives. (2023 July 12). Appropriations Committee. State and Foreign Operations Markup FY2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=knBgSTg3NU8.
[384] Price, D. E. (2018). *The congressional experience.* Routledge.

Once the markups are concluded, the subcommittee releases a report which recommends **funding** levels for foreign assistance in a report to Congress at large and translates these recommendations into an appropriations bill, on which members will eventually vote in their respective chambers. This initial recommendation can also provide the chamber that finishes it first additional leverage in its negotiating position with the other chamber (Interview, Wright 2024). As discussed earlier (**Figure 1.2**, in the Introduction and repeated in Chapter 8), the final amounts of aid appropriated track closely with the recommendations made by the House and Senate SFOPS subcommittees.

Floor Vote

Each chamber will then consider the appropriations bill, which is often part of a larger consolidated or omnibus appropriations package. Members of Congress may have the opportunity to propose amendments, which will be voted on by the chamber. Even if the bill passes the chamber, legislation must be enacted identically by both the House and the Senate. This frequently requires a conference committee between the House and Senate to reconcile the text passed by each.

As Shepsle and Weingast (1987) document, most conference committees are populated by members of the original committees with jurisdiction. This means that under conference procedure, the bill returns to a committee very similar to that from which it initially emerged—creating a "kind of forum in which committees get a 'second crack' at a bill." Again, this ensures that it is difficult to challenge the SFOPS subcommittee recommendations.

Budget Execution

Once identically passed, appropriations legislation is then signed by the President into law and funding levels for foreign aid accounts are legally determined. Agency offices and operating units must bargain and negotiate over which projects and regions will receive cuts or increases. However, this happens within tight parameters.

I use the example of Angola in 2000, when State, USAID, and DoD requested a combined total of $17.9 million across multiple accounts (**Table 7.3**).

Table 7.3

Angola (2000)	**request**	**outcome**
health	$6.41 million	$7.29 million
development	$3.54 million	$2.68 million
strategic	$5 million	$2.49 million
security	$2.9 million	$2.84 million
military	$.05 million	no funding

The $15.3 million outcome comes with specific levels for different types of aid. Health aid has been increased, but development and strategic aid have been significantly cut. As a result, negotiating happens inside agencies about which programs will take the brunt of those cuts and which will benefit from the increases. Once finalized, the agencies must submit a "653a report" to

Congress, detailing the final planned allocation by country and by account. Any subsequent changes to this trigger Congressional Notifications (CNs), in which relevant committee members are notified on planned changes and have the power to place a "hold" on spending.

Congressional holds tend to take three formats: an informational hold, an action hold, and a blanket hold. Informational holds typically mean legislators want additional information about a program and can be "cleared" relatively quickly. Actions holds seek to change aspects of planned or ongoing programs. These require extensive consultation across numerous stakeholders to resolve. The "blanket hold" is a nuclear option—it can place a hold across the board on all items for which agencies have notified the key committees. Its typical purpose is to give the member placing it additional leverage on a particular foreign policy issue.[385]

Holds are an informal mechanism; they carry no legal weight, but Presidents and agencies are reluctant to "blow a hold" by ignoring the wishes of Congress as doing so jeopardizes their future funding. The Congressional hold therefore constitutes a powerful Congressional check on Executive Branch action and Presidential foreign policy. Members of Congress in their role as committee legislators can reach down into what scholar Samuel Workman calls the "bowels of the administrative state" to compel information or generate action. Such power can be a double-edged sword—a significant accountability mechanism, but with the potential to slow and disrupt the business of government.[386]

7.3 Conclusion

The **Foreign Operations Process** enables the appropriating subcommittee to exert substantial influence over the funding and allocation of U.S. aid. The power of the SFOPS chair in the House and Senate is tremendous. It is difficult for other members of Congress to challenge these decisions; even SFOPS subcommittee members are constrained in their ability to shape outcomes by the preferences and priorities of the chair. Without a clear and systematic understanding of the role the Appropriations Committee plays in foreign aid, this power has gone largely unnoticed and unstudied in the literature. The documentation of the **Foreign Operations Process** in this chapter clarifies the processes by which U.S. aid decisions are made—a key contribution of this dissertation is unpacking the "black box" of the American aid process. This level of Congressional involvement is neither reflected in current analyses of U.S. aid or in existing data on American aid—an issue I address by introducing a new typology and new data in the next chapter.

[385] This paragraph (lightly adapted) comes from Wright, A. and Higgins, G. (unpublished, 2024 July). Menendez and the Congressional Hold—a National Security Risk? July 2024.
[386] Ibid.

8 The Foreign Operations Data
Novel Data on U.S. Foreign Assistance

> *"I'll never forget the day at one of our staff meetings... about 40 people in the conference room... one morning I said, 'How many of you guys are afraid to go up and talk to Congress directly?' Almost every hand went up. I said, 'That won't work anymore. If you get called by Congress, I expect you to go right away. You will know what I think and what [Deputy Secretary] Rich [Armitage] thinks and what the administration position is. We trust you. You go up there and answer their questions."*[387]
>
> Colin Powell, former Secretary of State
> March 28, 2017

8.1 Introduction

Scholars and practitioners are interested in donor behavior—how donors adjust aid flows based on the characteristics of and conditions in recipient countries. In the U.S. context, because of the appropriations process, spending can lag severely behind allocation decisions, creating measurement error (Hammond and Rosenstiel 2020) when spending data is used to analyze allocation patterns.[388] Even in a year when the funds allocated to a particular country are cut, spending may appear high, because an agency is still spending portions of a previous year's budget.[389] The delay between funding changes and spending implies that analyses of aid allocation are likely subject to measurement error —because of their reliance on current databases such as USAID's Explorer or the OECD's Creditor Reporting System that primarily track spending. (Even measures of aid "commitments" which scholars use to account for this are generated during the "budget execution" stage and are therefore still rather noisy measures of "appropriations.") While existing data may not be suitable for assessing allocation patterns without measurement error, the challenge is how to confront the monumental task of constructing a comprehensive dataset of U.S. foreign assistance that could retroactively track annual allocations at a country level.

Even for prominent government agencies, it is nearly impossible to create a new dataset on U.S. foreign assistance with the same level of detail and specificity at the project-level as USAID's Explorer database. Even the Department of State's own database intended to parallel (and corroborate) Explorer cannot fully accomplish this task (Carcelli 2023, Ingram and Paxton 2018). All available data on U.S. foreign aid was recently consolidated to provide a single platform from which users could download the information: Foreignassistance.gov. This includes the data that comprised USAID's Explorer—the most complete existing U.S. Government database of foreign aid expenditure, which contained over 1,000,000 project-level observations. USAID provides detailed information about how much aid is committed and disbursed, in which country and year the project takes place, from which account the project is funded, the agency funding, the agency implementing,

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[387] Powell, C. [Oral History.] (2017 March 28). University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/colin-l-powell-and-richard-l-armitage-oral-history. Accessed 14 November 2022.
[388] As Hammond and Rosenstiel (2020) demonstrate for Military Construction and Veterans Affairs, "measures of spending conflate competing budgetary influences, [because they] are downstream measures of the appropriations that originated them, and induce measurement error.
[389] This can occur due to delays in Congressional signoff (Foreign Operations Process Step ELB4, see Chapter 7); see Higgins (2022) for a detailed explanation of this process.

the implementing actors, and labels that categorize the type of project. However, despite the wealth of information available, there is no way to distinguish the year in which funds were appropriated from the year in which funds were spent, clouding any analyses of allocation and a clear understanding of the Congressional process influences aid allocation. Moreover, few of these datasets reflect the dynamics of the **Foreign Operations Process** itself.

8.2 Data Collection Process

Foreignassistance.gov now offers another dataset which the Department of State began collecting in 2006, tracking the "President's Requests" as well as aid activities which have been "Appropriated and Planned"—however, these are only available once the Department of State began collecting its own database from the mid 2000s. Rather than using this partial dataset, I independently collect and replicate this appropriations data at the country and account-level for 1998-2015 (with plans to expand from 2016-present). I also format this dataset to directly enable comparison between what Presidents request at the country and account level and what Congress appropriates.

To do so, I collect the Congressional Budget Justifications and their annexes from the State Department Archives and the Library of Congress for 1999-2016. During the **Foreign Operations Process**, the Department of State submits a series of "annexes" as part of the Congressional Budget Justification, which propose an allocation by country across the core Foreign Operations accounts. These consist of printed Excel tables, with columns for each of the core aid accounts. Countries and entities are organized geographically, grouped by the State Department's geographic bureaus. Each country/entity row specifies the amount proposed to be allocated from each core account, as well as a total amount that typically includes food aid. The annexes provide three such tables: one is the request for that fiscal year and details an allocation proposal, one is a table tracking the money so far allocated for the fiscal year in progress, and the last is a finalized table of allocations for the fiscal year just completed. Each table therefore typically consists of 16 account entries for 148 country recipients (approximately 2,368 country-account observations per annual table).

I digitally convert these into Excel spreadsheets. I go through each individual line in each annual table to check for discrepancies in spelling or formatting from the previous year to ensure consistency across time. I then transform these Excel sheets into a database that for each fiscal year matches every country-account-level request by a Presidential Administration to every country-account-level outcome after funding has been appropriated by Congress. As Carcelli documents, "once Congress has translated the executive budget categories into Congress's own, related but different, categories, it is not immediately obvious which of the president's foreign aid requests were granted".[390] This dataset allows for side-by-side comparison of requests to outcomes. At this stage, however, because funding accounts are often technically-named, it remains difficult to interpret what the President requested and what Congress granted.

[390] Carcelli, Shannon P. (2018). *Bureaucracy at the Border: The Fragmentation of Foreign Aid*. University of California, San Diego.

8.3 Disaggregating U.S. Aid using Treasury Accounts

To overcome this, I also develop a systematic typology of the core Treasury accounts that fund U.S. foreign assistance. Treasury accounts are the fundamental building blocks of the U.S. foreign assistance budget; however, like most accounting frameworks, they are not particularly intuitive or user-friendly. I rely on archival sources and elite interviews, as well as my own experience in the Department of State and State/USAID's joint Office of Foreign Assistance, to categorize the Treasury accounts that fund U.S. foreign assistance (what I term **"the Foreign Operations accounts"** in line with Congressional documents). I develop seven major groupings: democracy, development, health, humanitarian, strategic, security, and military assistance. Some accounts are specifically designed to fund projects in other countries (country-allocated accounts); others respond to crises that occur (situation-responsive).[391] I classify accounts based on their primary rationale and purpose. (For example, while the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief [PEPFAR] likely also contributes to political stability and security, its primary rationale relates to health.)

Most analyses treat aid as a homogenous good simply because it is incredibly difficult to distinguish between the purposes for which donors give aid—this is entangled with domestic politics and domestic priorities about which there is often little transparency. This is particularly relevant in the U.S. case where foreign aid was designed to be a multipurpose instrument within U.S. foreign policy—but this matters both in assessing aid's effectiveness and for understanding the domestic politics that shape foreign aid. Radelet (2024) articulates the dilemma incisively and suggests a remedy:

> *The multiple objectives of aid confound research on "aid effectiveness." … Clearer designations of purposes would certainly make research easier. …For example, donors might have one of their aid accounts specified for achieving their own foreign policy or security goals (perhaps managed by their Ministry of Foreign Affairs), another designated to primarily achieve commercial purposes (perhaps administered by the Ministry of Trade), and other accounts reserved for aid for development, humanitarian relief, democracy, and global public goods (administered by a development agency).*

While this is not evident from existing U.S. aid data, this is actually very close to how U.S. foreign assistance operates, particularly for Congress. Congress appropriates aid through a series of Treasury accounts, which have well-defined purposes.

In this dissertation, I focus on 16 core accounts in the U.S. foreign assistance budget—each of which is managed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of State (State), or the Department of Defense (DoD). (I omit all food assistance programs because these are appropriated through a different subcommittee and therefore subject to a different process and different political dynamics. I also set aside funding for independent agencies like the Millennium Challenge Corporation—which I would consider secondary Foreign Operations accounts, given the time constraints of this current dissertation project.)

The three largest agencies involved in U.S. foreign aid reflect the early structure of the Marshall Plan, which drew on economic, political, and security expertise across the U.S.

[391] This framing comes from the Congressional Research Service— Brown. N. (2020). "U.S. Foreign Assistance: Budget Development and Execution." Congressional Research Service. IF11515.

Government. Each of the major U.S. agencies involved in foreign aid has a unique foreign policy specialization. These can be broadly categorized as development, diplomacy, and defense and reflect the multipurpose nature of American aid. The agency to which each account is appropriated sets the policy parameters for its use. This empowers the foreign policy preferences and specializations of whichever agency is functioning as policymaker. As a result, agency control becomes an important feature in distinguishing between accounts. I briefly introduce the three core agencies involved in aid, discuss their role in providing information to Congress, and their institutional relationship to Congress.

8.4 The Core Aid Agencies

The United States Agency for International Development

The United States Agency for International Development (or USAID) was created in 1961 under President John F. Kennedy and through Congressional legislation (the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961). The Agency serves as the nation's premier development agency, responsible for implementing the vast majority of U.S. foreign assistance. USAID is, by its very name, the U.S. government agency most missionally tied to international development.

Yet while USAID may well be "the most prominent development agency in the world", it is also "an organization that, at least in the eyes of the American public, has remained relatively obscure since its founding" (Gabrijelcic 2021).The agency's role in foreign aid has also shifted over the years; "as its footprint and mission grew, and the demands on its workforce expanded, the agency was forced to transition from undertaking projects directly with local communities to managing implementing partners. As recently as 2017, 60% of USAID's assistance worldwide was awarded to just 25 partners."[392] (Currently USAID functions primarily as a procurement agency. This means that while USAID is the largest implementer of U.S. foreign assistance, it implements very little of this assistance directly through its own personnel. Instead, most projects are "contracted out to private companies and organizations."[393]) USAID is primarily responsible for the **"development plus"** (development + health) accounts, as well as some humanitarian (disaster assistance) and democracy aid.

The Department of State

The Department of State is charged with carrying out the President's foreign policy agenda. The Secretary of State acts as the president's primary foreign policy adviser, the conductor of the President's foreign policy, the chief foreign policy spokesperson for the United States, the CEO and COO of the State Department, the defender of the President's foreign affairs budget, the President's principal interlocutor with the Appropriations Committee, and responsible to the President and to Congress.[394] Two Secretaries of State describe the department as "on the front lines" of foreign

[392] Gabrijelcic, G. (2021). "U.S. Foreign Assistance in a Historical Perspective." [Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation Prospectus]. University of Ljubljana.
[393] Ibid.
[394] Nearly all of these titles are drawn directly from State and Foreign Operations subcommittee hearings with the Secretary of State. Some are epithets the Secretary applies to themselves; others are applied by senior members of the subcommittee.

affairs globally, leveraging its resources "smartly and strategically to get the best possible results for the American people".[395] By its very nature, foreign policy lies at the heart of the department's work.

The Department of State is also the agency managing the largest portfolio of U.S. foreign aid resources—despite the prominent public profile of USAID in the U.S. aid space. [396] State manages security and strategic assistance (**"security plus"**) and some humanitarian (refugee) assistance. It is responsible for some **"development plus"** (health) and democracy aid, which it tends to implement through USAID. State also sets the policy for military assistance, which is implemented through the Department of Defense, with whom it works closely. State's portfolio is security, broadly-speaking. The Department's current formulation of its mission reflects this: the Department of State exists "[t]o protect and promote U.S. security, prosperity, and democratic values and shape an international environment in which all Americans can thrive."[397]

The Department of Defense

The Department of Defense did not exist until 1947—a landmark year which saw the creation of the National Security Council and the Department of Defense (alongside the Central Intelligence Agency and the Air Force). Both institutions have dramatically re-shaped the U.S. foreign policy process. If the Department of State is the traditional foreign affairs agency, then the Department of Defense was established as the institutional home for military affairs and national security. Over time, the Department of Defense has increasingly expanded its role in foreign policy.[398] Many scholars have noted the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy (e.g., Milner and Tingley 2015, Toft and Kushi 2023). Milner and Tingley (2015) attribute this to the executive-legislative dynamics that govern U.S. foreign policy: "[p]olicy instruments controlled by the military become the 'go to' instruments for every problem. …For any foreign policy problem then, the president may be tempted to use military instruments of statecraft because doing so may make it easier to persuade Congress to authorize…Domestic politics may bias foreign policy toward a dependence on military instruments of statecraft."

Part of this may also be attributable to the growing role of the National Security Council (NSC). Auger describes how "Presidents…who require rapid responses in the context of a crisis…will turn more frequently to their national security advisor and the NSC staff than to the

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[395] Rice before House of Representatives. (2005 May 12). Appropriations Committee. State, Foreign Operations, and Export Financing Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023; Clinton before House of Representatives. (2010 February 25). Appropriations Committee. State, Foreign Operations, and Export Financing Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

[396] Readers familiar with U.S. aid may be surprised to learn that the Department of State manages the largest percentage of foreign aid resources. Of the 16 core Treasury accounts for foreign aid, the State Department manages 11 of these accounts. Although several of these accounts are primarily implemented by USAID and three are primarily implemented by the Department of Defense, State retains authority over policy and implementation parameters. As a Congressional Research Service report (R40213) summarizes, "The State Department implemented about $7.66 billion in foreign assistance funding in FY2017, though it has policy authority over a much broader range of assistance funds." State can and does contract out significant funding to USAID, but this funding originates from State Department accounts conducted under the agency's policy priorities. USAID does *spend* the largest portion of the U.S. foreign aid budget, but the State Department controls the largest volume of foreign aid *funding*. I show this in the data in Figure 8.1.

[397] Department of State. About. https://www.state.gov/about/. Accessed 29 September 2023


[398] Dombrowski, P. J. (2012). The Department of Defense. In *Routledge Handbook of American Foreign Policy* (pp. 193-202). Routledge.

State Department and other bureaucracies" (2011); the NSC personnel tend to be "activists and 'simplifiers'" who, in turn, turn to the Department of Defense to serve as a rapid conduit for their foreign policy and one which requires fewer hurdles for Congressional signoff. Even so, the Department of Defense itself appears skeptical, or at least cautious, about this approach—both in public reports and Congressional testimony.[399]

Within an Army War College Report (Whittaker et al 2008), the authors comment on the interagency dynamics of the NSC process: "DoD performs a secondary (or support) role to State's lead in foreign policy, but plays an active role at interagency meetings in determining the tools of foreign policy. From DoD's perspective, its three primary concerns are possible uses of military forces, the expenditure of Defense resources, and preventing a situation from deteriorating to the point that it requires military interventions."

Figure 8.1 visualizes the amount of "core" foreign aid funding that each of these three agencies manages. Though USAID is the nation's premier development agency and most prominently associated with American foreign assistance, the Department of State controls the largest portions of the U.S. foreign aid budget. State handles about 70% of U.S. foreign assistance, which is approximately $13.5 billion on average between 1994 and 2020. (This may, in part, explain some of the strategic reputation the United States has a donor if 70% of the budget is more likely to be shaped in alignment with diplomatic objectives.) This underlying structural reality of the U.S. foreign aid budget is only visible in a Treasury accounts approach. (Much like the role of Congress, the role of State in American aid is also underappreciated.)

Figure 8.1
Typology of U.S. Foreign Assistance by Agency Control



[399] Whittaker, A. G., Smith, F. C., & McKune, E. (2008). *The national security policy process: The national security council and interagency system.* U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute; Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz at House of Representatives. 2004 April 29. Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

The Informational Role of USAID, State, and the Department of Defense

Information is the currency of the policymaking process and the bulk of information available to the government is generated and supplied by the agencies. As David Obey (D-WI), the ranking member of the House Appropriations Committee, insisted, *"Congress cannot steer foreign policy from the back seat, even under the best of circumstances. It can't even intelligently comment on that policy if the lines of information from what is happening on the ground to Capitol Hill are not kept open fully by the administration in charge."*[400]

However, as bureaucratic scholar Samuel Workman (2015, emphasis added) explains, different agencies "generate information about policy problems, alerting Congress to important issues as they emerge on the agenda and **leaving their own institutional trace** on this information as it is passed up the ladder of government. Because of this institutional trace, Congress receives signals or clues about the nature and content of the [problem] agenda confronting government." Information is not necessarily neutral—though this does not imply it is misleading or inaccurate, simply that the view from the "front lines"[401] of foreign affairs, may look quite different for diplomatic, development, and military personnel even when operating in the same context.

Diplomatic, development, and military personnel are attuned to different information sources, even in the same country or region, all of which will shape their perception of the context and their perspective on their local partners.[402] The information gathered and received will have internal feedback loops—information collection is shaped by the agency for which personnel work and, in turn, is likely to shape the work of the agency—and external feedback loops in the wider U.S. government information ecosystem—as this variety of information collected from different sources will then be processed and synthesized internally by the individual agencies and packaged for Congress and the President. Thus, as agencies pass information up through their ranks and to Congress, filtering it through their own institutional lens and experience, they are "leaving their own institutional trace on this information" (Workman 2015).

All of these agencies can be an incredibly valuable source of foreign policy information for Congress. For example, because the work of diplomacy involves government-to-government relationships, the State Department has a detailed understanding of the political environments in which foreign aid once received will operate. Foreign aid is known to have impacts on domestic political environments (Cruz, Labonne, and Wright 2024) as well as to interact with regime type—under certain circumstances, foreign aid can prolong the survival of autocrats and be subject to "capture" by elites. A core responsibility of diplomacy is to know foreign governments and the strengths and weaknesses of their institutions. The Department of State's longstanding culture of diplomacy pervades its approach to foreign aid. There is a sense of needing knowledge on the ground to steer funds and projects in the right direction—a hallmark of State's diplomatic culture

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400 David Obey, Ranking Member of House Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives. (2005 September 7). Appropriations Committee. State, Foreign Operations, and Export Financing Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

401 Rice before House of Representatives. (2005 May 12). Appropriations Committee. State, Foreign Operations, and Export Financing Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

402 Broadly, USAID is engaging with civil society and non-governmental actors while State interacts with local governments and political actors and Defense with the military and security establishment.

and what one former State Department official describes as "having to live with the texture and the detail of what's happening."[403] [404]

In an interview, John Negroponte, former Ambassador to the UN, Deputy Secretary of State, and career Foreign Service Officer, described this culture expansively, insisting:

> *there's no substitute for somebody who's been on the scene... for that kind of ambassadorial or diplomatic capability. You've got to have it, and the only way you can have it is to immerse people in these situations...there's just a huge difference between having a remote view of a situation and having to live with the texture and the detail of what's happening, because in the end, these relationships come down to a level of detail that people outside can't always imagine or understand or appreciate...I think the analytic contribution that a diplomat makes, the personal acquaintances and friendships that [s]he makes...can't be replicated by a BlackBerry or a TV set.*[405]

Indeed, scholars from the U.S. Army War College comment that "[a]t interagency meetings, the State Department representatives…bring to the table a wealth of on the ground, in-depth experiences in dealing with foreign governments and cultures from around the globe, which helps frame their recommendations and conclusions" (Whittaker et al. 2008). This distinguishes the U.S. from others in the donor community, who operate using teams traveling in and out of the field, rather than units stationed in the field (or as close as possible given security risks to personnel) (Interview, Wright 2022). The U.S. has an unparalleled on-the-ground global reach through its diplomatic, military, and development personnel (Interview, Wright 2022).[406]

As Obey articulated, the appropriating subcommittee relies on the information gathered by these agencies to comment intelligently on foreign policy. George Ingram, with experience on both the House Foreign Affairs Committee staff and as a Deputy Assistant Administrator in USAID, has further elaborated this:

> *The congress doesn't always want to just hear from the administrator and the AAs (assistant administrators). They particularly want to hear from the field staff. They want to hear from the technicians who know the work. It's not a "gotcha" thing, that's right. And the more information*

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[403] Negroponte, J. [Oral History.] (2012 September 4). University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/john-negroponte-oral-history. Accessed 14 November 2022.

[404] The State Department's very structure reflects the flow of knowledge from the field to the department's principals at Foggy Bottom. State functions as a combination of regional geographic bureaus and policy and issue bureaus, with the six geographic bureaus known as the "baronies" (a reference to the extensive landholdings of aristocrats with the rank of baron) "because of their centrality to the department's functions" (Rosati and DeWitt 2011).

[405] Negroponte, J. [Oral History.] (2012 September 4). University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/john-negroponte-oral-history. Accessed 14 November 2022.

[406] The State Department functions as a combination of regional geographic bureaus and policy and issue bureaus. In addition to its Washington, D.C. location at Foggy Bottom, the Department has "270 diplomatic missions worldwide"—staffed by "13,000 members of the Foreign Service, 11,000 Civil Service employees, and 45,000 locally employed staff" (Department of State, About). This means, as Rosati and DeWitt (2011) elaborate that,

> *"when compared to most contemporary bureaucracies within the U.S. government, the State Department is actually relatively 'small.' At the same time, State is a very 'complex' organization because it facilitates a global bureaucracy... [as a result] the State Department has come to operate as if it were a very large bureaucratic organization both at home and abroad..."*

> *you can give the congress, the better off the agency is. And there will be a few people who want to play "gotcha."*[407]

Patrick Leahy (D-VT), as Chair of Senate SFOPS, reminded incoming USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios to utilize field staff to build relationships with Congress and make the case for American aid:

> *I will give you one bit of advice, and that is to use the expertise that is so abundant on the [US]AID professional staff, because they will provide support for your Agency. Do not keep them hidden, because you know as well as anyone how to build relationships with Members of Congress and those who support foreign aid, as well as those who have not supported it. And so it is not just the Legislative and Public Affairs Office that is the only face we see, no matter how fine a job they do. There is so much expertise there that we should know about.*

Putting the pieces together from each vantage point gives appropriators clues about what is actually happening on the ground and which foreign policy specializations might be most valuable in any given context. This, in turn, shapes funding decisions.

Department Politics and Congressional Pressure

Finally, the institutional structure and history of the three agencies also influences their relationship with Congress. Whereas the Department of Defense is respected by Congress (or at least less subject to scrutiny and funding cuts), historically, Congress has been much more skeptical of the Department of State[408] and attempted to dismantle USAID in the early 1990s. Additionally, USAID does not have the same cabinet-level status that both State and Defense have, which confers greater protection when engaging Congress.

This makes USAID far more susceptible to political pressure from all sides—from other executive agencies and from the legislative branch. Former Deputy Administrator of USAID, Carol Lancaster (2007) described the agency as

> *the principal advocate within the administration for the development use of aid. However, as a subcabinet-level, semiautonomous agency, USAID has been relatively weak in the overall bureaucratic pecking order of the US government, giving it a voice for development in policy circles but not always a significant one…As a result, it has often sought allies for its positions (usually resisting pressures from the Department of State to direct funding for diplomatic purposes) elsewhere in the Executive Branch…*

USAID often faces enhanced scrutiny of its work, including a number of formal and informal processes which "Congress uses to steer the direction of policy and programming at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) after appropriating funds" (Higgins 2022). At the same time, USAID's vulnerability forced the agency to become adept at interacting with Congress, as Ingram reflects:

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[407] Ingram, George. (2018). Oral History for The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Ingram.George.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2024.
[408] Clarke, D. L. (1987). Why state can't lead. *Foreign Policy*, (66), 128-142.

> *In fact, AID was better at dealing with congressional staff and members on a frequent basis than the State Department was. That was largely because AID was totally dependent on the Congress for its budget. The State Department budget was mostly for personnel back then, which was supported mostly pro forma. It didn't have all the assistance programs it has today. So AID had to be better skilled at dealing with the congress.*[409]

Which agency manages foreign aid funds matters greatly to appropriators and the extent to which key committee members can exercise *ex-post* control over funding together governs the funding levels the appropriators will recommend. Like Congress, agencies are important actors in the American aid ecosystem. Scholars ignore the involvement of agencies, their foreign policy specializations, and their relationship to Congress at their peril.

8.5 The Foreign Operations Accounts Typology

A systematic understanding of Treasury accounts and the agencies which manage them are therefore crucial to analysis of U.S. aid; the purpose of each aid account is closely related to the agency that controls it. The 16 core accounts are grouped in **Table 8.1** by **agency control**. This determines the **sector** to which the account belongs: development (USAID), democracy (State and USAID), diplomacy (State), and defense (State and Defense). Each account is then labeled as either "allocated" or "situation-responsive"—this is the **account class**—indicating whether spending is planned in advance or in response to events and crises.

Accounts are also assigned a **type** based on the primary purpose and rationale of the Treasury account (substantiated through quotes from U.S. government documents in the table as well as through interviews and archival sources). There are seven types available to classify accounts: democracy, development, health, humanitarian, military, security, and strategic assistance.

Following **Table 8.1**, I provide a description of each of the individual accounts, introduced and grouped according to their **type**.

[409] Ingram, George. (2018). Oral History for The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. https://adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Ingram.George.pdf. Accessed 10 September 2024.

Table 8.1
The Core Foreign Operations Accounts

The Core Foreign Operations Accounts							
Sector	**Agency**	**Class**	**Type**	**Account**		**Purpose/Goal**	**Source**
development	**USAID**	*allocated*	**health**	GHP-USAID	**Global Health Programs (USAID)**	"focused on combating infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Programs also focus on immunization, oral rehydration, maternal and child health, vulnerable children, and family planning and reproductive health."	1
			development	DA	**Development Assistance**	development assistance, including activities focused on agriculture, economic growth, education, environment, infrastructure, and governance	1
		situation-responsive	**strategic**	CCF	**Complex Crises Fund**	"responses to emerging or unforeseen crises with projects aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict or instability" *("[p]reviously funded through Defense appropriations")*	1
				TI	**Transition Initiatives**	"flexible, short-term assistance" "[f]or international disaster rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance to support transition to democracy and long-term development of countries in crisis."	1, 2
			humanitarian	IDA	**International Disaster Assistance**	"provides relief and rehabilitation to nations struck by natural and manmade disasters and emergencies"	1
democracy	**STATE & USAID**	*allocated*	**strategic**	AEECA	**Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia**	"provides economic assistance" to former Soviet states; focus on "democracy and rule of law"	1, 2
			democracy	DF	**Democracy Fund**	"supports democracy promotion programs"	1
diplomacy	**STATE**	*allocated*	**health**	GHP-STATE	**Global Health Programs (State)**	"the largest source of funding for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)"	1
			strategic	ESF	**Economic Support Fund**	"supports economic assistance, in part to advance U.S. political and strategic goals in countries of special importance to U.S. foreign policy"	1
			security	INCLE	**International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement**	"funds international counternarcotics activities; programs to combat transnational crime and corruption"	1
				NADR	**Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs**	"nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining activities, the clearance of unexploded ordnance, the destruction of small arms, and related activities"	2
		situation-responsive	**humanitarian**	MRA	**Migration and Refugee Assistance**	contributions to international and multilateral organizations and "for activities to meet refugee and migration needs"	2
				ERMA	**Emergeny Refugee and Migration Assistance**	"humanitarian contingency fund for rapid deployment in unanticipated urgent refugee and migrant emergencies"	1
defense	**STATE & DEFENSE**						
		allocated	**military**	FMF	**Foreign Military Financing**	"grants to finance the procurement of defense articles, defense services and design and construction services by friendly foreign countries"	2
				IMET	**International Military Education and Training**	"provides training and education to selected foreign military and civilian personnel on U.S. military practices and standards, including democratic values like civilian control of the military"	1
		situation-responsive		PKO	**Peacekeeping Operations**	"provides voluntary support for multilateral efforts in conflict resolution"; "carried out in furtherance of the national security interests of the United States"	1, 2

1 R40482
2 GAO-19-600

Democracy Accounts

Democracy Fund (DF)

"This account supports democracy promotion programs".[410] The account is managed by the Department of State, though funding may be implemented through both State and USAID.

Development Accounts

Development Assistance (DA)

The country-allocated Development Assistance (DA) account is managed and implemented by the U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Government documents describe its purposes as "targeting" "agriculture and rural development", education, energy, economic development, small and medium enterprises, technical cooperation, "disaster preparedness and reconstruction" and "U.S. citizen-sponsored schools and hospitals overseas."[411]

Health Accounts

Global Health Programs (GHP-USAID; GHP-State)

There are two components to the Global Health Programs account: one managed by USAID (previously known as Child Survival and Health or Child Survival and Disease) and one managed by the Department of State (previously the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative). The USAID account "fund[s] programs focused on combating infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Programs also focus on immunization, oral rehydration, maternal and child health, vulnerable children, and family planning and reproductive health."[412] The State account "is the largest source of funding for the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR)."[413] (Both are country-allocated accounts.)

Humanitarian Accounts

International Disaster Assistance (IDA)

The International Disaster Assistance account is a source of situation-responsive funding managed by USAID, which responds to crises, emergencies, and disasters.[414]

Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)

The Migration and Refugee Assistance account is managed by the State Department and "supports refugee assistance and protection activities worldwide… It funds resettlement of refugees to other countries as well as processing and initial placement of refugees to the United States".[415] (The account is situation-responsive.)

Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance (ERMA)

Also managed by the State Department, "ERMA is a humanitarian contingency fund for rapid deployment in unanticipated urgent refugee and migrant emergencies."[416] (Like MRA, the ERMA account is situation-responsive.)

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410 Gill, C, and Lawson, M. (2018). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R40482.
411 Ibid.
412 Ibid.
413 Ibid.
414 Ibid.
415 Ibid.
416 Ibid.

Strategic Accounts

Economic Support Fund (ESF)

The Economic Support Fund (previously known as Supporting Security Assistance) funds "economic assistance to advance U.S. political and strategic goals in countries of special importance to U.S. foreign policy."[417] It is country-allocated. This is also the most complicated account to categorize. While the State Department manages ESF, USAID implements large portions of this account and considers it to be another source of development assistance. Congress treats this account as part of "international security assistance." Milner and Tingley (2015) identify ESF as an example of "geopolitical aid".

Former Deputy Administrator of USAID, Carol Lancaster (2007) considered that while the account was "[i]nitially intended as balance of payments support to ease the cost of security-related expenses in recipient countries, it eventually came to be used to fund development-oriented projects and programs as well."[418] In 2004, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, with his counterpart from the Department of Defense, testified to House appropriators, that "security assistance is an element of most State Department programs. Economic Support Funds, for example, are used to build democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere, which supports our overall security goals."[419]

To capture this duality, ESF is labeled neither as "development" nor as "security" assistance, but as "strategic". It has been a distinctive pillar of U.S. foreign aid for decades.

Complex Crises Fund (CCF) and Transition Initiatives (TI)

Both the Complex Crises Fund and Transition Initiatives are situation-responsive, USAID-managed accounts. CCF responds to "to emerging or unforeseen crises with projects aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict or instability" and used to be part of Defense appropriations.[420] Transition Initiatives is a hybrid-like account of development and disaster-response to provide "flexible, short-term assistance projects in political transition countries that are moving from war to peace, civil conflict to national reconciliation, or where political instability has not yet erupted into violence and where conflict mitigation might prevent the outbreak of such violence… [it] targets political factors to build peaceful and democratic societies."[421]

Both these accounts are categorized as strategic because of their relationship to U.S. geopolitical and national security interests. However, because, they are situation-responsive, USAID-managed, and sometimes intermittently-funded, I do not include them in my definition of "security plus" assistance.

Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia (AEECA)

AEECA is jointly managed by the Department of State and USAID. It is the "successor" account to funding established through the Freedom Support Act and Support for Eastern European

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417 Ibid.

418 Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

419 House of Representatives. (2004 April 29). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

420 Gill, C, and McCabe, E. (2023, May 9). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R40482.

421 Ibid.

Democracy to support the former Communist bloc in its transition to democracy.[422] All three of these forms of funding sought to assist countries in their economic and political development. That makes this account particularly difficult to categorize. It could arguably be conceived as development, democracy, or strategic assistance.

Because the Department of State primarily manages decisions about this account, though it is implemented through USAID, and State Department documents link this funding to U.S. national security interests— it "reflects the vital U.S. national interest in helping the independent states of the former Soviet Union become stable, pluralistic, and prosperous countries and in continuing to stabilize and transition Southeast Europe"[423]—I categorize AEECA as strategic assistance. At the same time, because of its more hybrid nature with strong economic development and democracy purposes as well as the intermittent way in which this account is funded, I exclude it from my analysis of **"security plus"** assistance in **Chapter 10** until I can conduct additional interviews.

Security Accounts

International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)

The International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account is managed by the State Department and "funds international counternarcotics activities; programs combatting human and wildlife trafficking; and rule of law activities, including support for judicial reform and law enforcement capacity building."[424]

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, and Demining Programs (NADR)

"This account funds a variety of State Department-managed activities aimed at countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (FAA, §581-586), supporting antiterrorism training and related activities (FAA, §571-575), and promoting demining operations in developing nations (FAA, §301)."[425]

Both the INCLE and NADR accounts are part of the State Department's security portfolio of aid and I classify these accounts as (human) security (in contrast to the national security accounts discussed below, which I categorize as military to differentiate them.) Military assistance is implemented by the Department of Defense, but the Department of State manages and has policy control over these accounts (reflecting the tradition of civilian control of the military.)

Military (National Security) Accounts

Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

"The Foreign Military Financing Program supports U.S. overseas arms transfers on a loan and grant basis. Funding generally may be used by recipient countries only to purchase U.S. weapons, equipment and training".[426]

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[422] Ibid.
[423] Department of State. (2009). Congressional Budget Justification. https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/123415.pdf. Accessed 15 October 2022.
[424] Gill, C, and McCabe, E. (2023, May 9). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R40482.
[425] Ibid.
[426] Ibid.

International Military Education and Training (IMET)
"Through IMET, the United States provides training and education to selected foreign military and civilian personnel on U.S. military practices and standards, including democratic values like civilian control of the military."[427]

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
The U.S. has other aid accounts which fund its core contributions to peacekeeping, but this account funds "voluntary support for multilateral efforts in conflict resolution".[428] It is a situation-responsive account and funding is allocated on an ongoing basis in reaction to unfolding events.

To summarize, **democracy** accounts aim to promote democracy globally. These accounts are also country-allocated and are jointly managed by USAID and the Department of State. **Development** and **health** accounts aim at more traditional development and health outcomes. Both types consist entirely of country-allocated accounts. **Humanitarian** accounts respond to crises, emergencies, natural disasters, and emerging events. All humanitarian accounts are situation-responsive accounts. **Security** and **strategic** accounts contribute to U.S. national interests and national security while **military** accounts have similar aims but with focus on military and defense capabilities. These accounts are managed either by the State Department directly or jointly managed by State with the Department of Defense. They are primarily core, country-allocated accounts (with the exception of Peacekeeping Operations, which is a situation-responsive account).

There is one primary **strategic** account, the Economic Support Fund, which functions as an account with a hybrid of development and security elements that focuses on advancing U.S. foreign policy, plus three smaller intermittently-funded or situation-responsive strategic accounts—Complex Crises Fund, Transition Initiatives, and Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia.

I next demonstrate the value of this approach by comparing a Treasury accounts approach to the OECD's DAC (Development Assistance Committee) labels used by all major aid donors. I show that Treasury accounts can provide greater insight precisely, because they rely on an accounting-framework, which can be systematically classified and is therefore much harder to manipulate and less prone to interpretation by individual actors. Because U.S. aid is spread across multiple agencies, there is potential for significant variation in how U.S. aid is labeled by different officials in different agencies and offices. Classifying aid projects is a form of providing of information and may be shaped by political pressure, depending on who is in Congress or the White House, as Shannon Carcelli (2022) explains:

> *reporting requires categorization, an inherently subjective task (Kelley and Simmons 2019) ...In foreign aid, for example, the difference between "economic" and "security" assistance can be subtle...Therefore, bureaucrats may consciously or unconsciously choose to move a policy that they dislike into a different bucket, making it more difficult for political principals to notice it.*

The Development Assistance Committee (DAC)'s Credit Reporting System (CRS) is used by all major donors and provides a common language to compare aid across major donors. However, the categories provided are a reflection of the "Decade of Development" during which most

[427] Ibid.
[428] Ibid.

donors' aid programs emerged. As a result, the OECD's framework does not contain the vocabulary for donors to report aid that is linked to foreign policy or national security purposes. Only development uses of aid are covered by the available codes:

Table 8.2
Existing OECD DAC/CRS Categories for Aid

OECD DAC CRS Categories	
administrative costs	governance
agriculture	health and population
commodity assistance	humanitarian
economic growth	infrastructure
education	other

In **Figure 8.2**, I visualize the U.S. foreign aid budget using existing OECD categories: administrative costs, agriculture, commodity assistance, economic growth, education, governance, health and population, humanitarian, infrastructure, and other. I use "obligations" or aid "commitments" (which is the standard measure in the literature) in current dollar amounts, as reported through Explorer (now available from ForeignAssistance.gov) (but restricted the core accounts introduced in this chapter and the years 1995-2016 for data reliability. Within this framework, governance and health and population are the two largest categories of U.S. foreign aid. (I argue that "governance" aid is frequently a label for "security plus" assistance—though this is not obvious from the OECD labeling conventions—but can be seen if governance aid is disaggregated into sector codes as well as in my original data on appropriations.[429]) From this "OECD snapshot", American aid overwhelmingly looks like governance and health.

[429] The majority of obligations in Governance are "Conflict, Peace, and Security" which are implemented by the Department of Defense—a typical feature of security assistance.





Figure 8.2
"OECD" Snapshot of American Aid




Yet this is not the best representation of how key legislators "see" aid. Congressional appropriators use the language of aid accounts to categorize aid. This typology introduced in this chapter therefore provides analysts a new lens that better captures what aid looks like from a Congressional perspective. It reveals a very different "snapshot."


Two of these OECD categories—health and humanitarian—remain in my new classification, because there are specific Treasury accounts dedicated to these purposes. In contrast to OECD, my approach bundles together several groups of development aid that are separate in the OECD classification—agriculture, economic growth, and education—into a single category in my typology. (This is because the Treasury accounts used to appropriate aid are not fine-grained enough to disaggregate separate purposes of development assistance. For example, there is no distinctive account for education, though Congress may direct specific amounts to be directed toward education from the development assistance account.) Crucially, however, my approach can identify and distinguish between military and security assistance, as well as a category I call strategic assistance (which is focused on advancing U.S. foreign policy goals). Finally, I have a separate category for democracy assistance.

In visualizing the budget with this new typology, I re-classify the data on U.S. aid obligations (**Figure 8.3**, color-coded to match **Figure 8.2** where possible). This approach reveals (as expected) that military assistance is a sizeable portion of the U.S aid budget (about $5 billion annually on average). **Figure 8.4** also conveys the size of what I term **"security plus"** assistance—security and strategic assistance—which constitutes about $5.5 billion annually on average. "Security plus" is a larger component of the budget than military assistance. **Figure 8.4** regroups the aid budget using the five broadest categories of my typology "development plus", "security plus", humanitarian,

military, and democracy assistance to validate to readers that "development plus" and "security plus" are the largest components of the U.S. foreign aid budget.

Figure 8.3 and 8.4
"Congressional" Snapshots of American Aid






In **Figure 8.5**, I compare the OECD categories directly to my proposed typology. Health and humanitarian assistance align very closely between my categories and the CRS labels. The primary issue with OECD labels is the extent to which strategic (and security) assistance pervades almost every OECD category, but this is largely invisible to scholars and practitioners when using the OECD framework. (Strategic assistance (in pink) is present in every OECD category in **Figure**

8.5, to varying degrees, and it cannot be detected and distinguished as such without using an accounts-based approach.) Focused on these core accounts, governance aid is almost entirely military, security, and strategic assistance. Infrastructure and economic growth are primarily funded from strategic accounts.

Figure 8.5
Comparing DAC/CRS Labels to Treasury Accounts Typology



A clearer understanding of the purposes behind different types of aid is essential to evaluating the effectiveness of aid, as well as the domestic politics that shape U.S. foreign aid budgets. These framings matter because they reveal two very different angles on U.S. aid. OECD labels are used by aid scholars and practitioners. **Figure 8.2** is what the public, agency personnel, and international organizations see when they consider U.S. aid: a budget dominated by health, humanitarian, and governance aid. **Figures 8.3** and **8.4** represents what members of the Appropriations Committee "see" when they look at U.S. aid.

8.6 New Data

I draw on three original datasets on aid appropriations for this dissertation. I begin with the simplest and build up to the most complex. All datasets are built to reflect the Presidential-Congressional dynamic of request and outcome. To extensively cover the Foreign Operations Process, I collect data on overall budgets, account-level funding requests and outcomes, and country-level allocation.

The International Affairs and Foreign Operations Budget Data

I use Congressional Budget Justifications to record the amount requested each fiscal year for the overall International Affairs Budget and the Foreign Operations Budget. I then match this to the amount enacted for each budget, which is recorded in Congressional Budget Justifications two fiscal

years later. This is straightforward budget data, but this dataset enables comparisons between the request and outcome for each of these budgets, which has previously been elusive.

Data	Description
The International Affairs and Foreign Operations Budgets *Requests 1997-2021* *Outcomes 1995-2021* 98 observations, 5 variables	**From the Department of State's archives of Congressional Budget Justifications, I compile a dataset that details the budget requests and outcomes for the overall International Affairs and Foreign Operations budgets.** *Key variables include:* • the total amount requested by budget for each fiscal year • the total amount enacted by budget for each fiscal year

The Foreign Operations Accounts

I next collect data for the 16 core Foreign Operations accounts that reflects both Presidential proposals and what Congress disposed (including House and Senate recommended funding levels as well as the ultimate account-level appropriation). I again draw on Congressional Budget Justifications, with information cross-referenced with appropriating committee reports and appropriations legislation.

For each of the core Foreign Operations Accounts, I look up what was requested in the Congressional Budget Justification. I then confirm this figure in individual House and Senate SFOPS subcommittee reports for that year. From these reports, I also extract the funding level recommended by the House or Senate subcommittee. (Senate reports provide additional corroboration of the House figure, which is typically included alongside the Senate recommendation). I then pull the appropriations legislation for that fiscal year and record the amount enacted for each account. This final outcome is cross-referenced against Congressional Budget Justifications submitted after the close of the fiscal year, which report account-level allocations. This method allows for all account figures to be cross-validated across both branches of government (or across the two chambers of Congress for House and Senate recommendations).

These account-level figures exclude supplemental funding and focus on the amounts finally appropriated whenever legislation passes (rather than continuing resolutions which temporarily extend existing funding levels). This represents a novel data set on U.S. foreign assistance funding, which consists of 514 observations for 16+ accounts across 22 years (1999-2021). (This dataset includes some secondary accounts, such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Export-Import Bank, and the Peace Corps.)

Data	Description
The Foreign Operations Appropriations *Requests 2001-2021* *Outcomes 1999-2021* 514 observations, 8+ variables	**From the Congressional legislation, Congressional committee reports, and the Department of State's archives of Congressional Budget Justifications, I compile a dataset that details funding of U.S. aid through core Foreign Operations accounts.** *Key variables include:* • the amount requested for core Foreign Operations accounts each fiscal year • the amount enacted for core Foreign Operations accounts each fiscal year • the amount recommended for each Foreign Operations account by the House and Senate for each fiscal year • indicators classifying aid accounts by type

This is the data that underlies **Figures 1.1** and **1.2** (repeated) in the introduction of this dissertation—comparing Presidential requests to Congressional enactments across aid types as well as tracking House and Senate SFOPS subcommittee recommendations in comparison to final outcomes.

Figure 1.1
Presidential Requests and Congressional Enactments for Foreign Aid





Figure 1.2
House and Senate SFOPS Subcommittee Recommendations compared to Outcomes



The Foreign Operations Annexes

Initial details about the collection of this dataset were given earlier in this chapter when describing the collection of the Congressional Budget Justifications and their annexes from the State Department Archives for 1998-2015. I construct a novel database that mirrors the unfolding of the Foreign Operations Process, by reporting both *proposed* allocation requested by the executive branch and the *disposed* allocation after the involvement of the legislative branch of every core Foreign Operations account. This represents a novel data set on U.S. foreign assistance allocation, which consists of 2,982 observations for 190 countries for 16 accounts across 16 years. This data is also interfaced with the typology presented in this chapter to provide convenient summaries of the type of aid requested and allocated to each individual country each year (similar to tables provided in the previous chapter for Angola, Belize, and Cambodia).


This dataset expands on the initial one available from the Department of State, as well as correcting some errors in State's data (e.g., the USAID health account is coded as a State Department account, all FSA/SEED (Freedom Support Act/Support for Eastern European Democracies) is coded as AEECA funding). It allows for comparison before and after direct Congressional involvement in the process. It therefore reflects the Foreign Operations process which is the "data-generating process" for U.S. foreign assistance. It captures allocation rather than spending, which reduces concerns about measure error. Finally, the added typology element allows users to quickly understand and compare requests and outcomes across different types of aid without needing an extensive knowledge of Treasury accounts themselves.

Data	Description
The Foreign Operations Annexes *Requests 2000-2015* *Outcomes 1998-2015* 2,982 observations, 27 variables	**From the Department of State's archives of Congressional Budget Justifications, I compile a dataset that details allocation of U.S. from core Foreign Operations accounts.** *Key variables include:* • the total amount requested by country for each fiscal year by account • the total amount allocated by country for each fiscal year by account • the total amount requested by country by type (Wright) for each fiscal year • the total amount allocated by country by type (Wright) for each fiscal year

I provide two sets of visualizations related to this data, comparing "development plus" (health + development) aid and security plus (strategic + security assistance)[430]. **Figures 8.6** and **8.7** show the number of years between 1998-2015 countries received "development plus" and "security plus" assistance. More countries are recipients of "security plus" aid than "development plus" aid, with more than 150 countries having received "security plus" assistance during this period, while 100 have received "development plus". At the same time, both are used as complementary tools in 45 countries annually on average.


[430] Restricted to ESF + INCLE + NADR (excluding Transition Initiatives, Complex Crises, AEECA as well as military assistance)

Figure 8.6
Number of Years Receiving "Development Plus"



Map: Ashley Wright • Source: (original data) • Created with Datawrapper

Figure 8.7
Number of Years Receiving "Security Plus"



Map: Ashley Wright • Source: (original data) • Created with Datawrapper

The amounts for "security plus" are much larger as well (**Figure 8.9**). The largest recipient (Nigeria) of "development plus" receives a total of $6.3 billion across 18 years, while the largest amount of "security plus" received (by Afghanistan) in that period is nearly three times larger at $17.21 billion. (The next largest recipients of "security plus" are Egypt, Pakistan, Jordan, and Colombia receiving more than $7 billion each. My definition excludes military assistance, so this type of aid does not drive these results.)

Figure 8.9
Total "Development Plus" Received (1998-2015)





Figure 8.10
Total "Security Plus" Received (1998-2015)



8.7 Conclusion

This chapter introduces a novel typology which uses Treasury accounts to differentiate between the foreign policy purposes of American aid and provides analysts an intuitive vocabulary for engaging with this technical aspect of U.S. aid budgets. The original data discussed helps reduce measurement error by using measures that capture "appropriations" rather than "spending." This data is also an innovation in that it reflects the nature of the **Foreign Operations Process** itself and enables comparisons between Presidential proposals and Congressional disposals. Together, this framework, typology, and new data more accurately reflect the ecosystem that governs American aid.

In the coming chapter, I build a framework for analyzing annual Presidential-Congressional interactions over the foreign aid budget to gauge the state of foreign policy partnership between the two branches. I draw on three new measures (developed from interviews revealing how Congressional appropriators interact with Presidential budget requests) and suggest four potential dispositions of Congress towards the President's foreign policy agenda: collaborative, constraining, assertive, and inhibited. For 1999-2021, I use these new measures and original data on the International Affairs and Foreign Operations budgets to categorize the foreign policy relationship for each of these twenty-two years. Similar to recent work by Jordan Tama (2024) on the surprising prevalence of bipartisanship in Congressional foreign policy, I find that 52.4% of the time Congress engages collaboratively with the President's foreign policy agenda. This partnership can be traced to the Appropriations Committee and its most relevant subcommittee, State and Foreign Operations. Both are crucial but overlooked foreign policy actors in this new system, operating at the crossroads of these foreign policy decisions for Congress.

Part 4

Analysis

9 Foreign Policy is a Joint Responsibility
Understanding the Presidential-Congressional Partnership Through Aid Appropriations

> *"Foreign assistance legislation, although frequently unpopular and difficult to enact, traditionally has been one of the primary vehicles through which Congress reacts to executive branch proposals or offers its own initiatives to reshape the foreign aid program, or foreign policy more generally."* [431]
>
> Congressional Research Service, 1991

9.1 Introduction

As Canes-Wrone, Howell, and Lewis (2008) establish, "members of Congress actually vote on foreign policy initiatives with less and less frequency"; instead "the budget is the battleground upon which many of the most significant policy debates are fought." Howell, Jackman, and Rogowski (2013) reiterate,

> *Congress's two most important responsibilities are writing the nation's laws and passing its budgets. Of late, the two responsibilities have melded into one. During the modern era, members have taken to embedding a wide range of policy initiatives into appropriations, which enjoy the advantage of coming before Congress every single year. Policy and budget debates, therefore, are often interchangeable, making annual appropriations a vitally important arena for presidents to pursue their policy initiatives.*

Meernik, Kruger, and Poe (1998) have also argued that the "foreign aid budget is…a microcosm of U.S. foreign policy (Hinckley 1994; Riddell 1987). According to Riddell (1987), the foreign aid program *is* the U.S. foreign policy budget" (emphasis added). Likewise, a former Appropriations cardinal[432] identified the annual "foreign aid bill as the main way Congress expresses itself on foreign policy" (Interview, Wright 2023). Crucially, the regularity of the appropriations process and its necessity to the functioning of government (e.g., appropriations bills are considered "must pass") creates a reliable way for Congress to influence policy and foreign aid serves as an influential "microcosm" through which to exert such influence over U.S. foreign policy. The process offers Congress a regular opportunity to influence this microcosm and amplify the presence of Congressional preferences in the foreign policy agenda. Consequently, foreign aid is foreign policy for Congress and foreign aid appropriations are Congress's chance to respond and shape the President's foreign policy agenda.

Former Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which should have a significant role in foreign policy within the House of Representatives, Lee Hamilton (D-IN) expressed his frustration that "The greatest concentration of foreign policy power in Congress resides now in the appropriations committees…important foreign policy issues are now frequently decided in enormous omnibus bills worked out in secret, late-night negotiations among a limited group of

[431] Collier, E (Editor). (1992, April). Congress and Foreign Policy—1991. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[432] subcommittee chair of House Appropriations

Congressional leaders and White House and congressional staffs."[433] In a 1998 memoir written with his National Security Advisor, Brent Scowcroft, President George H.W. Bush described how with rising polarization and the end of the Cold War, "[f]oreign policy and budget politics became mingled".[434] In the last thirty years then, the foreign aid budget has become an important proxy for U.S. foreign policy and perhaps the most reliable indicator of the state of the Presidential-Congressional partnership in foreign policy.

Foreign policy is, constitutionally, a joint responsibility between the President and Congress. While, at times, Congress has struggled to assert itself as an equal partner to the President, the end of the Cold War has seen a "'resurgent Congress with unprecedented resources and a will to be involved more directly in foreign policy'"[435] This is reflected in what Congress appropriates. As CIA Director George Tenet explained of the Intelligence Community budget,

> *[T]he difference between Congressional appropriations from one year to the next provides a measure of Congress's assessment of the nation's intelligence efforts and their satisfaction of stated policy objectives. Not only does an increased, decreased, or unchanged appropriation reflect a congressional determination that existing intelligence programs are less than adequate, more than adequate, or just adequate, respectively, to meet the national security needs of the United States, but an actual figure also indicates the degree of change.*[436]

Unlike Intelligence budgets, the International Affairs budget is public. The same logic applies to the International Affairs Budget and the Foreign Operations Budget: the difference between Congressional appropriations from one year to the next provides a measure of Congress's assessment of the President's foreign policy agenda and their satisfaction with stated policy priorities. Analysis of this budget therefore provides insight not only into the scope and direction of American foreign policy but into the Presidential-Congressional partnership on foreign policy—one of the "fundamentals" that undergirds aid.

9.2 The International Affairs Budget

The President Sets the Agenda

The annual Presidential Budget Request represents the clearest signal to Congress about what a given President's policy priorities are, even if these are strategically adjusted in anticipation of the Congressional response (Howell et al 2013). The budget covers the whole of the U.S. government. Every agency involved

> *must submit detailed reports to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Working at the behest of the president, OMB then clears each of these reports to ensure that they reflect the chief executive's policy priorities. When they reveal discrepancies, officials at the OMB either return the*

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433 Hamilton, L., & Tama, J. (2002). *A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

434 Bush, G., & Scowcroft, B. (1998). *A world transformed* (1st ed.). Knopf.

435 Ornstein (1985), as quoted in Grimmett, R. (1999 June 1). Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. RL30193. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

436 Devine, M and Plagakis, S. (2024 September 26). Intelligence Community Spending Trends. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44381. Accessed on 14 July 2024.

> *reports to the agencies for subsequent amendment or simply edit the documents themselves. The end product, then, is a proposed budget that closely adheres to the president's policy agenda.*[437]

The International Affairs budget, also known as Function 150, is the relevant budget for U.S. foreign policy—foreign aid represents the vast majority of this budget, about 70% of the total requested (in a budget subfunction known as "Foreign Operations"). Members of Congress and policymakers frequently refer to these budgets interchangeably. Foreign aid budgets spend months at OMB, where they are carefully vetted to ensure that they reflect key Presidential priorities (Interview, Wright 2024). As a result, by the time budgets get to Congress, they provide a strong signal of where the President's priorities lie, even if these priorities are wrapped in some strategic noise to assist the President's bargaining position with Congress.

Congress Shapes the Agenda

Congress assesses and responds to this agenda by choosing how much of the President's agenda to finance through the appropriations process and through the relevant appropriating subcommittee. Appropriating subcommittees, in particular, are adept at interpreting these budgetary signals and extracting Administration priorities from them, even when accompanied by some strategic noise. (In addition, Congressional committees also have numerous backchannels that can help differentiate between noise and signal from the Administration (Interview, Wright 2022; Interview, Wright 2024.) Where Congress, primarily through the appropriators, chooses to endorse and even increase funding reveals where Congressional priorities lie (Interview, Wright 2024).

This occurs on two levels—the first of which is this topline level of funding available for International Affairs; the second is the composition of funding across specific foreign aid accounts. I argue the topline funding level for International Affairs reflects Congress's attitude toward the President's foreign policy, while the composition of foreign aid funding is also a function of internal political dynamics in Congress (as discussed in the next chapter).

In general, Presidents ask for more money than Congress awards them (Howell et al 2013). The job of the Appropriations Committee is to adjudicate these requests and determine which of the President's priorities to fund at the levels requested, where to cut requested funding, and where, on occasion, to increase funding from the levels requested. As Milner and Tingley (2015) summarize:

> *In order to realize his objectives in foreign policy, the president must convince Congress to go along with his policy program…at the end of the day, Congress controls budgets and the financing of all government policies in addition to enacting laws regarding all policies. The executive can thus be checked by the legislature in his pursuit of any goal if he requires funds or laws to do it.*

In examining Presidential requests and Congressional responses for agencies and programs between 1933-2006, Howell et al. (2013) report that "in the vast majority of cases Congress appropriates less than the president requests. Forty-eight out of seventy-seven agencies received less money from Congress per year than the president requested."

From its perspective, Congress largely does approve of the President's budgets (Hamilton 2004); legislative staff estimate that Presidents get 90% of what they request for foreign aid budgets

[437] Howell, W. G., Jackman, S. P., & Rogowski, J. C. (2013). *The wartime president : executive influence and the nationalizing politics of threat*. The University of Chicago Press.

(Interview, Wright 2022). Yet for the agencies who receive the budget back from Congress, they rarely feel that they have gotten what they requested (Interview, Wright 2024; Interview, Wright 2024). Congressional appropriators adjust funding levels up and down, re-allocate funding across countries, regions, and sectors, issue directives about the use of funds, and stipulate reporting requirements to keep Congress informed. As a result, Congress feels Presidents get what they want, but the Executive Branch generally feels hamstrung by Congressional directives. (Using original data on the International Affairs budget, I find that, typically Congress keeps budgets within ±7% of the previous year and within ±13% of the President's request. This accords with the estimates of the legislative staff. At the same time, appropriators can cut particular accounts within this budget by 50% while keeping the overall budget within 3% of last year and 1% of the President's request—as appropriators did in 2000). This, of course, creates serious headaches for the Executive Branch who can no longer simply reprogram aid to overwrite dramatic Congressional changes.

This tension encapsulates the unique legislative-executive dynamics that pervade foreign policymaking in the American context. The final foreign policy agenda is a joint endeavor with accommodations and compromises made by both branches. As a Congressional Research Service report in 1999 highlighted,

> *U.S. foreign policy is not created in a vacuum as some sort of indivisible whole with a single grand design. Rather, making foreign policy is a prolonged process involving many actors and comprising dozens of individual policies toward different countries, regions, and functional problems.… Throughout American history there have been ebbs and flows of Presidential and congressional dominance in making foreign policy.*[438]

With the end of the Cold War and innovations in the appropriations process, Congress regained its footing as an equal, rather than a junior, partner in U.S. foreign policy. This trend began, as discussed in previous chapters, around the end of the Vietnam War, when, coupled with key reforms of the committee system, Congress began to reassert its foreign policy power. This timing is confirmed by Congressional documents which acknowledge that "[i]n the period after the Vietnam War, Congress reasserted its role in foreign policy. It on occasion initiated new policies and exerted decisive influence on policies initiated by the executive branch."[439] These same documents likewise identify a changing landscape between 1981-1992—coincident with breakdown of the authorizing process as described earlier—explaining that "[d]uring the Reagan and Bush Administrations the pendulum swung back toward Presidential dominance, reaching its height in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm against Iraq. In the post-Persian Gulf war era, both President and the Congress are confronted with issues in foreign policy that may well define which branch of government will play the dominant role during the first decade of the twenty-first century."[440] Dynamics of the relationship continued to change across time and across Administrations.

Simultaneously, the slow accretion and interaction of budget reforms, rising polarization, and legislation constraining the President's foreign policy powers all combined to empower the Appropriations Committee in this new era. These changes, interacted with a changing world and a longstanding Congressional desire for greater involvement in foreign policy, introduced a sea-change

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[438] Grimmett, R. (1999 June 1). Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. RL30193. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.
[439] Ibid.
[440] Ibid.

as the twentieth century transitioned to the twenty-first. Suddenly, a "'resurgent Congress with unprecedented resources and a will to be involved more directly in foreign policy"'[441] meant that Congress and the President were functioning again as relatively equal partners with a joint responsibility for foreign policy. The President cannot pursue a foreign policy agenda without funding from Congress; Congress would be hard-pressed to pursue a foreign policy agenda without the executive branch. As David Obey (R-WI), former SFOPS cardinal and Chair of the Full Appropriations Committee, succinctly articulated,

> *Congress cannot steer foreign policy from the back seat, even under the best of circumstances. It can't even intelligently comment on that policy if the lines of information from what is happening on the ground to Capitol Hill are not kept open fully by the administration in charge.*[442]

Foreign policy is therefore always the product of Congressional-executive interaction, especially in this new era when an assertive Congress has consolidated the power over policy with the power of the purse. In Obey's metaphor, while Congress cannot drive foreign policy from the back seat, the President requires funding to fuel the car to drive in the first place. This primes appropriations to be a significant opportunity for bargaining over the foreign policy agenda. In proposing a budget, the President is proposing an agenda. Whereas appropriations and authorization used to run through two different Congressional committees and were developed more independently, funding telegraphs policy now because appropriations bills are the only game in town these days.[443] While the President's Budget Request may be opaque to outsiders, appropriators can relatively quickly discern which foreign policy tools are funding priorities for the Administration and extract and extrapolate the President's wider agenda from these budget line items. Through the appropriating subcommittee, Congress will evaluate the President's agenda and propose amendments and adjustments. Under these conditions, the interaction of the two branches over the budget become a fairly reliable signal of the state of the foreign policy partnership.

9.3 Budgets as a Proxy of the Presidential-Congressional Foreign Policy Partnership

I first focus on the top-line International Affairs budget interactions and what these dynamics reveal about the relationship between the President and Congress in this new appropriations environment. (This framework may still be applicable to earlier periods, but it should applied and interpreted more cautiously—given that this paradigm is built to reflect the politics of aid appropriations from about 1994 onwards.)

By paying careful attention to appropriations norms, the attitude of Congress towards the President's foreign policy can be extracted from these budget interactions. To do so, I propose three

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[441] Ornstein as quoted in Grimmett, R. (1999 June 1). Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. RL30193. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 22 April 2024.

[442] David Obey, Ranking Member of House Appropriations Committee, House of Representatives. (2005 September 7). Appropriations Committee. State, Foreign Operations, and Export Financing Subcommittee Hearing: Security Assistance. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

[443] Dyer, James. [Oral History.] (2008 January 23). University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/james-dyer-oral-history. Accessed 18 May 2022.

new measures, which, when taken together, can map International Affairs budget interactions to four different executive-legislative foreign policy partnerships. The level at which Congress funds the International Affairs budget jointly signals where foreign policy ranks as a Congressional priority in a given year and its attitude toward the President's foreign policy; however, this requires measuring the budget in ways that align with institutional budgeting norms in Congress (Interview, Wright 2024; Interview Wright, 2024).

Existing Measures of Presidential "Budget Success"

Scholars have developed different metrics to measure the "budget success" of Presidents. These approaches focus on the difference between what Presidents ask for (Presidential requests) and what Congress approves (Congressional outcomes); however, they do not (and cannot) distinguish whether Congress gives Presidents more or less than they requested. Typically, any deviation from the President's proposal is treated as a budget "failure", regardless of whether the "failure" includes more money or less money than last year. For example, Howell et al (2013) propose the natural log of the absolute value of difference between the President's proposal and the Congressional appropriation

$$(\ln(|Proposal - Appropriation|)$$

while Canes-Wrone et al (2008) take the negative absolute value of the difference between the increase in the President's request from last year and the increase in Congress's enactment compared to the previous year:

$$-|\%\ change\ in\ President's\ request\ from\ last\ year - \%\ change\ in\ Congressional\ appropriation\ from\ last\ year|.$$


Both of these measures are meant to capture the distance between the President's position and Congress's position. (By construction, the absolute value strips the direction of the divergence between the request and the outcome by making all the distances between the President and the Congress positive). Thus, in both specifications, *any* distance from the President's position is treated as undesirable, because it is presumed that Presidents ask for the amount they want in particular budget areas and deviations from this by Congress, whether up or down, have ripple effects across the entire Presidential budget (e.g., if Congress gives the President more money in International Affairs, it may be taking the money from the President's domestic policy priorities.)

However, I argue that the *direction* of change matters for the foreign policy budget and for understanding executive-legislative dynamics in this arena—it reveals something about the disposition of Congress towards the President's foreign policy agenda. Under the existing metrics of budget success, cases which are very different are treated similarly because these common measures of budget success have the ability to pick up unusual cases but cannot differentiate between when Presidents get more or less (**Figure 9.1**).

In **Figure 9.1**, I use the measure of "budget success" developed by Canes-Wrone et al (2008), which was later adopted by Milner and Tingley (2015) to assess the success Presidents have with their foreign aid budget. This particular measure picks up the distance between what Presidents ask for this year compared to last year and the difference between what Congress gives this year compared to last year. Everything is treated as a negative absolute value, so smaller numbers represent higher Presidential success for the International Affairs budget. I use original data

compiled on the International Affairs budget for 1999-2020, compiled from the State Department's annual Congressional Budget Justifications which report annual requests and appropriated levels of the International Affairs and Foreign Operations budgets. (I do not include supplemental funding—which means increases in funding are not driven by President's requests for supplemental funding for foreign policy emergencies in particular years.) Rather I use the baseline budget as I am interested in the standing relationship between the President and Congress over foreign policy for these years. In line with authors who use measures of Presidential budget success, I drop the first budget of any new President. Incoming Presidents rarely have time to comprehensively overhaul their first budget and, as a result, these initial budgets can be a composite of the outgoing administration melded with priorities of the incoming administration.)

Figure 9.1
Presidential Budget Success with International Affairs
(using Canes-Wrone et al 2008 measure)



Using only a budget success measure in this context obscures salient differences between how Congress interacted with different Presidents. For example, under these measures, Obama experiences almost identical levels of budget success in 2011, 2012, and 2014. Yet in two of these years, he receives a larger International Affairs Budget than requested (from a divided Congress with a Republican House and a Democratic Senate.)

These measures are designed with the reality that for most sectors Congress cuts the budgets the President proposes. Under these conditions, "distance" rather than "direction" measures perform well. In examining Presidential requests and Congressional responses for agencies and programs between 1933-2006, Howell et al. (2013) report that "in the vast majority of cases Congress appropriates less than the president requests. Forty-eight out of seventy-seven agencies received less money from Congress per year than the president requested." This means that each year 62% of agencies receive cuts from what the President requested. Such measures of budget success then broadly makes sense as most budgets proposed by Presidents are *cut*. They enable comparison about how deep the cuts faced by the President were across different sectors of government. However, the International Affairs budget does not fit this pattern. Rather, for this

period, I find that 68% of the time, Congress enacted a larger budget than the President requested for International Affairs (**Figure 9.1**).

New Measures of Presidential and Congressional Budget Interactions

I therefore propose an additional set of metrics that can identify these differences between cases and are better suited to the International Affairs context. Rather than simply looking at how much Presidents request, appropriators measure the budget against the previous year (Interview, Wright 2024). Appropriators assess whether the President asking for more money than last year's budget and by how much. Then they determine whether they are willing to give more money than last year and, if so, by how much.


As a result, I suggest three budget measure that together indicate the state of the executive-legislative relationship over foreign policy. **Presidential amplification** compares the President's request to last year's budget and measures the percentage change. A positive measure indicates that the President asks for more than the previous year's budget and indicates how much more the President is requesting. **Congressional amplification** compares Congress's appropriation to last year's budget and measures the percentage change. Finally, **Presidential-Congressional divergence** captures the gap between the amount the President requested and the amount Congress appropriated (*with no reference to previous years*). (In addition to comparisons against existing budgets, this is, of course, highly salient to agencies and the President because it measures the margins by which Congress adjusted the proposed budget up or down.) All measures can take on both positive and negative values—to ensure that they capture the direction of change.

For example, in 2002, President George W. Bush asked Congress to cut the International Affairs budget by 6.39% compared to the budget Congress enacted in 2001. (This would be a **Presidential amplification** of -6.39%, negative because the President wants a cut.) Congress refused to cut the budget (compared to last year) and instead enacted a budget 14.91% larger than the budget it gave in 2001. (This would be a **Congressional amplification** of 14.91%.) At the end of the day, Congress gave the President a budget 22% larger than he requested. (This is the **divergence** measure—the gap between the request and the budget given for this year only, measured with no reference to prior years.) Taken in combination, for 2002, these measures suggest some tension between the two branches—after all, it is rare for Presidents to ask for cuts and while Congress typically cuts budgets in general, it did not accommodate the President's request. Instead, it enacted the largest single increase in the budget in recent years. Yet according to the Canes-Wrone (2008) et al measure, the President had relatively high budget success in 2002. (In contrast, 2008 is considered a highly unsuccessful year for Bush, when he asked for an 8.5% increase from last year's budget and Congress appropriated a 44.5% budget increase from the previous year's budget.) Again, like Tenet's interpretation of the intelligence budget, funding signals Congressional support and priorities. The direction of the Congressional response to Presidential requests therefore matters greatly in foreign affairs.

I treat Presidents requesting an increase from last year's budget (**positive Presidential amplification**) as pushing forward, or amplifying, the foreign policy agenda and Congress increasing the budget from last year (**positive Congressional amplification**) as pushing forward, or amplifying, the agenda and signaling a willingness to work with the President. Drawing back, or dampening, (**negative Presidential** or **Congressional amplification**) corresponds to requesting or giving less than the previous year's budget. From Congress, negative amplifications can convey

reservations about the President's foreign policy agenda. The size, scale, and scope of the foreign policy agenda are directly affected by the levels of funding that Congress appropriates. Budget interactions can therefore be mapped to the four executive-legislative foreign policy partnerships (**Figures 9.2**). Budget interactions can be calculated annually from publicly available data using the new measures laid out. As a result, this approach provides an alternative to anecdotal evidence for gauging the state of the Presidential-Congressional foreign policy partnership that allows for stable comparisons across time.

Figure 9.2
Categories of Foreign Policy Presidential-Congressional Partnership based on Budget Dynamics



At times, the President and Congress may want to push forward foreign affairs and ensure that the U.S. is present and active on the world stage while at others they may seeking to pull back and focus on domestic affairs. (This is roughly analogous to a more internationalist and more isolationist disposition by each actor.) Simultaneously, Congress may be more or less willing to support the agenda of the President in foreign policy. Depending on the interaction of these dynamics, I argue that there are four categories of relationship that can emerge. When both the President and Congress want to push the agenda forward and be present and visible abroad, they can forge a **collaborative** relationship.

I argue that this type of relationship is the most common between the President and Congress, even when they are of different parties and may disagree about the nature of American foreign policy. (In this new appropriations environment, a resurgent Congress has greater foreign policy powers to check but not to displace the President. Therefore, if both parties are invested in a robust American foreign policy, they will have to work together.) A collaborative relationship signals that both parties see foreign relations and global engagement as fundamental to American interests. (Collaboration is not equivalent to rubber-stamping the President's agenda; Congress will always seek to amend and align the President's agenda with their own.) Where disagreements exist,

Congress will shape and adjust the President's agenda through the composition of funding available, rather than by refusing to fund and work with the President or gutting the President's budget. (Appropriators have the ability to "support" the President's agenda by providing a larger budget than requested while also determining exactly where additional funding will flow—as it will be legally tied to particular Foreign Operations accounts.)

When the President is pushing forward global engagement, but Congress is pulling back, they will have a **constrained** relationship in which Congress tries to rein in the President. This type of partnership can also emerge when Congress supports the President's agenda, but cannot or will not do so with the level of resources requested, perhaps due to fiscal constraints. When the President seeks to pull back from international affairs, but Congress wants to remain engaged, Congress will become **assertive** and sustain an engaged foreign policy agenda. In both of these cases, Congress will change the composition of funding for different tools of foreign policy to constrain the President, reduce costs, or to ensure American presence abroad.

When both branches want to pull back, the relationship often ends up being an **inhibited** one, in which the partnership has largely broken down. Either the President or Congress has grown frustrated with the other or there are domestic political and fiscal constraints binding both in the international arena. This sort of relationship is likely to be a final resort—the collapsed end-state of a rocky relationship or the necessary product of a storm of domestic and fiscal circumstances that neither can successfully navigate.

In mapping relationships to budget dynamics (**Figure 9.2**), pushing foreign policy forward or foreign policy engagement is equivalent to positive amplification from the actor as they are seeking expanded budgets to enact new priorities or double down on existing priorities. Drawing back on foreign policy or dampening engagement is equivalent to negative Presidential or Congressional amplification. This corresponds to shrinking the previous year's budget, necessarily limiting the number of priorities that can be pursued and the scope of the foreign policy agenda. Using my new measures to map budget interactions to foreign policy relationships, I categorize 2002 as a year in which Congress was assertive on foreign policy. (The President tried to cut the budget and Congress refused.) (In my framework, 2008 would be a collaborative relationship—the President asks for an increase to the budget and Congress approves.)

9.4 Analyzing Presidential-Congressional Foreign Policy Relationships

I anticipate that, when this framework is applied to the existing budget data from 1999-2021, collaborative partnerships will be the most common and inhibited the least common. Both parties are better off in a collaborative working relationship, because Congress cannot sustainably drive foreign policy from the halls of Congress and the President relies on Congress for funding and political backing to credibly advance a foreign policy agenda abroad. Because foreign policy is a joint endeavor, either party can derail the other. Yet, as Lee Hamilton, former Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, summarized, "American foreign policy always has more force and punch to it when the president and Congress speak with one voice."[444] I anticipate that this collaboration is the

[444] Hamilton, L. H. (2004). *How Congress works and why you should care*. Indiana University Press.

natural default state between the President and Congress. This fits with recent work by Jordan Tama (2024) documenting that foreign policy still exhibits more bipartisanship than expected, given rising polarization in Congress. In particular, he notes that the "data also reveal that bipartisan voting has occurred more often on foreign policy spending legislation than on any other foreign policy legislation."

While Congress prefers a collaborative partnership, given the essential nature of foreign aid as a tool of Congressional foreign policy, I anticipate that Congress is more likely to adopt an assertive posture when it comes to the foreign aid budget (Foreign Operations) than International Affairs as a whole. These claims can be distilled into three hypotheses.

- **Hypothesis 1: Collaborative partnerships will be the most common generally (in International Affairs).**

- **Hypothesis 2: Collaborative partnerships will be the most common in foreign aid budgets (Foreign Operations).**

- **Hypothesis 3: Assertive partnerships will be more common for the Foreign Operations budget than for the International Affairs budget.**

I compile an original data set on the International Affairs Budget and the Foreign Operations Budge to test this theory and apply my new measures of Presidential and Congressional amplification to categorize budget interactions from 2001-2021. (These years are slightly restricted from the original data for International Affairs, as some early years of data are missing for Foreign Operations. I restrict the whole dataset to the years available for both budgets to enable comparability.) I find that collaborative partnerships are the most common for both budgets. The relationship between the President and Congress is collaborative 52.4% of the time for the International Affairs budget and 42.9% of the time for the Foreign Operations budget. (This means that Presidents are requesting increased budgets from the previous year and Congress responds by increasing the budget from the previous year.) For the International Affairs budget, assertive and constraining partnerships are equally common—both occurring just less than 20% of the time. As expected, inhibited relationships are the rarest for International Affairs, occurring less than 10% of the time. With the Foreign Operations budget, as hypothesized, Congress much more likely to be assertive—the occurrence of an assertive partnership is twice as likely for Foreign Operations (38.1%) as compared to International Affairs (19%). A constraining partnership is the least common for Foreign Operations (5%) while an inhibited relationship (14%) is slightly more likely than for International Affairs (10%).

Figure 9.3
Foreign Policy Partnerships 2001-2021


Foreign Policy Partnerships (2001-2021)		
	International Affairs	**Foreign Operations**
collaborative	52.4%	42.9%
constraining	19.0%	4.8%
assertive	19.0%	38.1%
inhibited	9.5%	14.3%

In **Figure 9.3**, I use the budget dynamics of Presidential amplification, Congressional amplification, and divergence to categorize individual years between 1999-2021 according to this framework. The labels generated frequently fit with more anecdotal evidence about the Presidential-Congressional foreign policy partnership in a given year. For example, immediately following the 2008 Financial Crisis and the Budget Control Act, the relationship switches from collaborative to constraining as the internationalist Obama Administration seeks to maintain a global presence and Congress faces budget constraints. Interestingly, the foreign aid budget (in the second column) is only constrained for the one year following the 2011 Budget Control Act; though Congress is constraining the President's wider foreign policy agenda in the aftermath of the Financial Crisis, Congress continues to prioritize the foreign aid budget. As expected, given wide differences on foreign policy between the President and the Congress under the Trump Administration, Congress becomes assertive on foreign policy, appropriating levels of funding consistent with or higher than previous years. Tensions emerge and dissipate between the President and Congress throughout the Bush Administration, consistent with evolving responses after 9/11. The assertive and inhibited partnerships at the end of the Clinton Administration fit with reflections from senior officials about that period:[445] "a lot of us disagreed with President Clinton and Madeleine Albright and her predecessor on some international endeavors", Callahan would explain to the new Secretary of State Colin Powell in 2001.

Figure 9.4 presents information about both the International Affairs and the Foreign Operations budgets. (Foreign Operations represents about 70% of the International Affairs budget, so there is high overlap between the two. Yet the Foreign Operations budget captures the segment of the budget that is predominantly foreign aid, while International Affairs includes operating and administrative expenses for foreign aid agencies.)

[445] The State Department is unique in having two Deputy Secretaries: the **Deputy Secretary of State (D)** who serves as the Secretary's second-in-command (or 'alter ego')[445] given the frequent travel undertaken by modern Secretaries of State and the **Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources (D-MR)**. The latter position traces its origins to an executive-legislative dispute. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell explained in an interview with the Miller Center (2011) that "The Congress in all its wisdom created a second Deputy position. It was because of their unhappiness with the [William J.] Clinton administration—Frankly, they were not happy with Madeleine [Albright], so they authorized—insisted on a second Deputy for management." (Powell, C. [Oral History.] (2011 December 16). University of Virginia Miller Center. https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/colin-powell-oral-history. Accessed 11 November 2022.)

Figure 9.4
Foreign Policy Partnerships 1999-2021



Foreign Policy Partnerships between the President and Congress							
year	President	International Affairs	Foreign Operations	government	House	Senate	President
1999	Clinton Administration	assertive		divided			
2000		inhibited					
2001	Bush Administration	collaborative	collaborative				
2002		assertive	assertive				
2003		inhibited	inhibited	united			
2004		collaborative	collaborative				
2005		inhibited	inhibited				
2006		collaborative	assertive				
2007			collaborative	divided			
2008							
2009	Obama Administration	constraining	collaborative	united			
2010			assertive				
2011		collaborative	collaborative	divided			
2012		constraining	constraining				
2013			collaborative				
2014		collaborative	assertive				
2015			collaborative				
2016			assertive				
2017	Trump Administration	collaborative	inhibited	united			
2018		assertive	assertive				
2019				divided			
2020							
2021	Biden Administration	collaborative	collaborative	united			

Figure 9.4 also includes information about party control and whether there was a divided government. This is meant to help visually demonstrate the collaborative partnerships do not only or primarily occur when the President and the Congress share the same party. **Figure 9.6** breaks down the percentages presented in **Figure 9.5** by periods of united and divided government. Divided government occurs 57% of the time between 2001-2021 (and united government 43% of the time). Out of the 11 collaborative cases, 7 of them occur under divided government (63.6%). Perhaps the most surprising insight from **Figure 9.5** is that inhibited partnerships only occur when the President and Congress share the same party!

Figure 9.5
Foreign Policy Relations and Divided Government

Foreign Policy Partnerships (2001-2021)		
partnership type	**International Affairs**	
	divided government	**united government**
collaborative	33.3%	19.0%
constraining	9.5%	9.5%
assertive	14.3%	4.8%
inhibited	0.0%	14.3%

However, most of the collaborative partnerships under divided government are driven by cases of a united Congress (**Figure 9.6**). The difference between a divided Congress and divided government is crucial to my argument about how Congress interacts with aid. Congress is willing to work with Presidents of either party collaboratively on foreign policy, but this relationship founders when Congress is itself divided between the two parties. When the same party controls the House and Senate, the partnership with the President is collaborative 30.4% of the time; when each party controls one chamber, the relationship is collaborative only 13% of the time. During a divided Congress, Congress is equally likely to be assertive as it is to be collaborative (and is assertive about 5% more than when it is united).

Figure 9.6
Foreign Policy Relations and Divided Congresses

Foreign Policy Relationships (2001-2021)		
budget disposition	**International Affairs**	
	divided Congress	**united Congress**
collaborative	13.0%	30.4%
constraining	8.7%	8.7%
assertive	13.0%	8.7%
inhibited	0.0%	13.0%

9.5 Conclusion

Most Presidential-Congressional partnerships start out collaboratively as can be seen in **Figure 9.4**. The partnership then evolves from there as Congress watches how the President engages with and responds to legislators. Even as Congress is willing to collaborate with Presidents on foreign policy, it will also take decisive steps to instantiate Congressional priorities and will gauge the willingness of the President to partner with Congress.

For example, autumn 1999 witnessed a standoff between Democratic President Bill Clinton and the Republican Congress over the foreign aid budget that culminated in a Presidential veto of the Foreign Operations bill (H.R. 2606). My budget dynamics analysis would categorize this year as one in which Congress was assertive. Commenting on the dispute, the *New York Times* reported,

> *Aides said the two sides were still about $600 million apart on pay for three of Mr. Clinton's proposals: debt relief for poor nations that owe money to international financial institutions, measures aimed at reducing the threat of unsecured nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union and peace operations in Kosovo. The aides said Congress was willing to offer less than $370 million for these programs, and the White House wanted $950 million.*[446]

On October 19, 1999, one day after Clinton's veto, Sonny Callahan (R-AL), then the appropriating subcommittee chair and sponsor of the bill, transmitted an article to the Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert from his local newspaper, titled "Callahan should take a hard line on foreign aid". Along with a copy of the article, Callahan included a note urging the Speaker that "My local newspaper, in my view, is fairly reflective of national sentiment on issues like foreign aid. Its reaction to the president's veto and House Republicans' position clearly shows we are on the right track."[447]

In the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the Republican Revolution in the 1994 midterms, Republicans were determined to rein in government spending. By the end of the 1990s, foreign aid was an attractive target for deep cuts, with key Republican leaders trying to persuade the American public "that if you are for giving money to Ghana you are for taking it away from Grandma. The foreign operations budget, says [House Republican whip] Mr. DeLay, 'will come straight out of the pockets of American seniors.'"[448] This would naturally lead to an expectation of a constraining or inhibiting partnership as Congress exerted its authority to curb aid budgets.

Yet an analysis of the International Affairs budget in 1999 reveals that while Clinton requested a 9% budget cut compared to the previous year, Congress ultimately enacted a .44% increase compared to the previous year—essentially maintaining the budget and giving the President more resources than requested—thus the assertive nature of the Presidential-Congressional

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[446] Stevenson, R. (1999 November 4). "Clinton Vetoes Budget Cut, but Seeks Accord on Foreign Aid Bill." *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/04/us/clinton-vetoes-budget-cut-but-seeks-accord-on-foreign-aid-bill.html. Accessed 11 March 2024.
[447] Hastert Papers. Box 5. Wheaton College. Wheaton, IL. Accessed 16 June 2022.
[448] Friedman, T. (1999 October 20). "Foreign Affairs; Penny Pinchers." *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/1999/10/20/opinion/foreign-affairs-penny-pinchers.html?searchResultPosition=10. Accessed 17 March 2024.

partnership for that year. The problem, for Clinton, was that the *composition* of the budget omitted three of his key priorities.

The composition of the aid budget is the focus of the next chapter. Because foreign aid represents different foreign policy instruments and purposes, the internal political divisions of Congress shape the levels at which different forms of foreign aid are funded. I test my theory about how Congressional appropriators interact with different types of aid under united and divided party control of Congress. Congress was united—with a Republican House and Senate in 1999. As a result, **Chapter 2** would predict that both "security plus" "development plus" funding would be maintained or increased. Despite the rhetoric (and a House chair who bragged to his constituents about cutting foreign aid), this is exactly what happened in 1999. Congress increased the **"development plus"** budget by 3.5% from the previous year and the **"security plus"** budget by 1.45%.[449] The final analytical chapter unpacks this phenomenon.

[449] These are measured in current terms to conform to appropriations norms, in which changes to the budget are benchmarked against the prior year—as explained earlier.

10 Divided Congresses and the Funding of Foreign Policy
The Implications of Congressional Party Divisions for Security Plus Assistance

"I was on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and participated in legislative action on the Marshall Plan from its inception in 1947. Having returned to the Senate from wartime Army service in Africa and Europe, I was well aware of Europe's predicament and our vital interest in lending a hand…

True national security is achieved not just by military power-necessary though that regrettably is-but by taking actions which subtract from the number of our potential enemies and add to the number and strength of our friends."[450]

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
1977

"As I have often said, U.S. foreign assistance is not an entitlement and our aid must support U.S. economic, political and security goals."[451]

Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY), 2001
Chair of Senate State and Foreign Operations Committee

"While you make a convincing case for more funding for foreign assistance, the budget request itself falls far, far short. The $7.3 billion you request for USAID's programs from the Foreign Ops Subcommittee represents only a modest increase over the fiscal year 2002 level. It is actually a decrease from last year if you factor in emergency spending. This budget appears to reduce funding for programs to protect child and maternal health, combat infectious diseases like TB and malaria, and assist vulnerable children. That is not a budget worthy of a great Nation."[452]

Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT), 2002
Chair of Senate State and Foreign Operations Committee

10.1 Introduction

Examining how Congress funds the composition of the foreign aid budget provides one of the best test cases for my theory that foreign aid functions as foreign policy for key Congressional legislators. As a multipurpose instrument of American foreign policy, both **"security plus"** and **"development plus"** aspects of the budget should have sustained support in Congress. While narratives focused on electoral incentives for legislators predicted dampened support for development aid and consistent support for security assistance, I anticipate the reverse: **"development plus"** as a soft foreign policy instrument should be consistently funded (at relatively

[450] Cabot Lodge in the Foreword to Wilson, T. (1977). The Marshall Plan 1947-1951. Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series 236. Available from The Marshall Foundation. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The_Marshall_Plan_1941-1951.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2024.
[451] U.S. Senate. (2001 May 8). Senate Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.
[452] U.S. Senate. (2002 February 26). Senate Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

stable levels) by Congress, but **"security plus"** assistance as a harder foreign policy instrument should be cut whenever Congress is divided. These cuts to "security plus" should almost exclusively occur during divided Congresses if foreign aid is foreign policy, because divided Congresses cannot reach an internal consensus on how this foreign policy power should be used and are reluctant to empower Presidents with "harder" foreign policy powers when their ability to conduct oversight is hampered by internal political divisions. Both forms of aid should be maintained or increased, however, when Congress is united, because they are complementary instruments of American foreign policy to key legislators.

10.2 The Presidential Politics of Foreign Aid Funding

As in the previous chapter, eliciting behavior from budget data requires careful interpretation. Comparing Presidential requests to Congressional outcomes can provide initial insights about Presidential and Congressional preferences over the aid budget; at the same time, the composition of Presidential requests often involve strategic adjustment based on what they anticipate Congress is willing to fund. Howell et al (2013) articulate this succinctly:

> *"[t]he most nettlesome problem associated with this kind of analysis is the possibility—indeed, the probability—that presidential proposals do not represent the president's actual preferences…Just as a seasoned negotiator will open any negotiation with a low-ball offer, presidents, in anticipation of Congress's next move, may request higher (or lower) levels of appropriations in an attempt to ultimately secure their ideal outcome."*


In the context of foreign aid and foreign affairs budgets, this is especially relevant to the composition of the budget. The ultimate levels that Congress appropriates, however, can be interpreted as representing Congressional preferences and priorities, because Congress must legislatively enshrine funding levels and cannot cloak these in the same strategic noise that the President can.

If, as I have argued in **Chapter 2**, **"security plus"** aid represents "harder" foreign policy while "development plus" aid is "softer" foreign policy in the eyes of the President and Congress, then I expect that Presidents will consistently ask for increases to "security plus" assistance from the previous year's budget—**positive Presidential amplification** (as introduced in the previous chapter). "Security plus" forms of foreign aid—as evidenced throughout the Cold War (but particularly through Vietnam and Iran-Contra) are easier forms of aid for Presidents to convert into foreign policy "capital" and resources to advance their agenda. (This is the same reason divided Congress are likely to be especially wary of this form of assistance.)

The Presidential politics of foreign aid are likely to center on the features of aid as different hard and soft tools of foreign policy. For this reason, I examine Presidential budget requests through the framework proposed by Milner and Tingley (2015), which identifies two main tools of Presidential foreign policy: geopolitical aid and economic aid. I map their framework to my typology, using the descriptions in their book. (For example, they identify ESF as a form of geopolitical aid even if they cannot isolate it in the budgets because they did not have access to data built from Treasury accounts. They also consider military assistance to be a form of geopolitical aid.) Geopolitical aid is therefore essentially analogous to my "security ++" category—it includes strategic, security, and military aid. Economic aid combines development and health—and is

equivalent to my existing "development plus" category. (Situation-responsive, humanitarian, and democracy accounts are omitted from this analysis, because of their unique characteristics.)


Figure 10.1
Presidential Amplification for Different Forms of Foreign Aid



Examining Presidential amplification for these different categories of aid, it is clear that Presidents overwhelmingly request increased budgets for geopolitical aid ("security ++") in contrast to economic aid ("development plus"). Presidential amplification is consistently positive for geopolitical aid. Just 2 out of the 28 years analyzed see (small) negative amplification for this form of aid—Presidents only request a cut from the previous year's budget 7.14% of the time. Meanwhile, Presidential amplification for economic aid is negative 35.71% of the time and positive 64.29% of the time.

Excluding military aid from the analysis dramatically alters this pattern however. If I examine **"security plus"** assistance instead of "security ++", then there is not such a pronounced Presidential pattern to requests. (**"Security plus"** combines strategic (ESF only) and security aid.) Instead, **"security plus"** looks much like development plus—in that Presidential amplification is negative 35.71% of the time and positive 64.29% of the time (albeit for different years than for **"development plus"**).

Figure 10.2
Presidential Amplification for "Security Plus"




While an important metric, Presidential patterns are difficult to trace solely through Presidential amplification given the strategic nature of requests. Presidential requests are *always* obscured by strategic noise, as Presidents take cues from Congress and incorporate these into their strategic calculus, adjusting the budget to try and achieve Presidential priorities while also accounting for the disposition of Congress.

It is also helpful then to look at the difference between Presidential proposals and Congressional enactments. **Figure 10.3** visualizes Presidential requests (the colored areas) and Congressional appropriations (the solid black lines). Presidents almost always request more strategic assistance than Congress is willing to grant, while Congress almost always grants more health assistance than Presidents request. Presidents take their cues from Congress—when Congress trims the strategic aid budget in 2011, Obama follows its trend and begins requesting smaller amounts of strategic assistance. At the same time, the levels the Obama Administration requested continue to exceed what Congress is willing to enact.

I therefore focus on how Congress adjusts the **"development plus"** and **"security plus"** budget from one year to the next. This essentially sets aside, for now, what Presidents ask for and simply assesses what Congress gives, benchmarked against what Congress last gave. The general trend in all categories of aid is upward, but there can be wild fluctuations on the way.

Figure 10.3
Presidential Requests and Congressional Enactments (1995-2021)



10.3 The Congressional Politics of Aid Funding

My predictions are that **"development plus"** assistance is unaffected by party control of Congress and whether Congress is united or divided, but that **"security plus"** assistance is cut from the previous year's level whenever Congress is divided. This would suggest, for example, that the long period of divided Congress from 2011-2014 would see a downward trend in **"security plus"** assistance, but that **"development plus"** budgets should hold steady or increase. (I contend that divided government can explain these dynamics only insofar as there is overlap between a divided Congress and divided government. In this period, government is divided more than 73% of the time. I anticipate this has no effects on aid budgets. What matters are the cases of a divided Congress, which only occur 33.33% of the time in this period.)

I argue that the dynamics of a divided Congress therefore have substantial ramifications for the funding of foreign aid. While Congress is more than willing to collaborate with Presidents of either party, it encounters serious difficulties when it is itself divided between parties. Increasing foreign aid budgets requires "two-factor authentication" from Congress: first, the House and Senate appropriating subcommittee must reach an internal consensus about an increase, which they will recommend to the wider Congress; second, they must then ensure that they have enough Congressional support to pass their increases. Negotiating this foreign policy power therefore becomes fraught when the House and Senate diverge in their foreign policy preferences, which is highly likely when the Congress is divided.

A Congress divided against itself has trouble standing unitedly and convincingly on foreign policy. It struggles to come to an internal agreement on harder and more complex foreign policy

priorities. This has clear implications for **"security plus"** assistance. Despite the reputation of Republicans being more supportive of security assistance, I anticipate that all appropriators—Republican and Democrat—see **"security plus"** as an opportunity to make foreign policy. When Congress is united, I hypothesize that appropriators will maintain or increase **"security plus"** budgets from the previous year's level. However, when Congress is divided, appropriators will cut "security plus" budgets, because they will not be able to reach a consensus on how this foreign policy power should be used.

Again, I underscore that this pattern is driven by a **divided Congress** rather than a divided government. Every case of a divided Congress is, by definition, a case of divided government, but not every divided government involves a divided Congress. I argue that a divided Congress matters more than a divided government, because internal division can upend the inter-branch partnership required to forge U.S. foreign policy collaboratively. When both the Congress and the President can articulate foreign policy priorities, however deeply they disagree, they can engage with one another to reach a compromise; however, when Congress cannot produce an internal consensus within itself, there is little hope of being able to engage in productive negotiations with the President over foreign policy. For security plus, this "two-factor authentication" is thus all but impossible in a divided Congress where the House and Senate subcommittee will struggle to align their priorities and each may produce a budget that reflects "majority messaging" about partisan foreign policy priorities.[453]

The largest component of **"security plus"** assistance in my framework is an account called the Economic Support Fund, which U.S. government documents identify as "assistance, in part to advance U.S. political and strategic goals in countries of special importance to U.S. foreign policy"[454]; others have described it as "'walking-around-money'"[455] for the Secretary of State. While USAID primarily manages **"development plus,"** the Department of State is responsible for "security plus" assistance. As a result, security assistance is tied more closely to diplomacy and defense than development. As Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, with his counterpart from the Department of Defense, testified to House appropriators in 2004, "security assistance is an element of most State Department programs. Economic Support Funds, for example, are used to build democracy in the Middle East and elsewhere, which supports our overall security goals."[456]

"Security plus" assistance also funds the U.S. counternarcotics strategy and supports democratic partners. These are all critical U.S. foreign policy priorities, which have had global repercussions. It is highly likely then that Presidents will see this form of the budget as crucial to the financing of their foreign policy and that appropriators would see this budget as a means of recalibrating the foreign policy agenda, especially as appropriators have significant control over both the overall funding level and the allocation of funding to individual countries. It is the form of assistance that is most likely to go to geopolitically strategic U.S. allies and key Congressional decision-makers can direct where this money flows through the appropriations process. Many of these priorities are likely to become bogged down in partisan differences as **"security plus"** assistance is a prime opportunity to shape the President's foreign policy agenda. This is

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[453] House of Representatives. (2023 July 12). Appropriations Committee. State and Foreign Operations Markup FY2024. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=knBgSTg3NU8.

[454] Gill, C, and Lawson, M. (2018). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations: A Guide to Component Accounts. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. R40482.

[455] Lancaster, C. (2007). *Foreign aid : diplomacy, development, domestic politics*. University of Chicago Press.

[456] House of Representatives. (1994 April 29). Appropriations Committee. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Subcommittee Hearing. Accessed through ProQuest (Library of Congress) on 20 December 2023.

compounded by the reality that, in addition to recommending total funding levels, the appropriating subcommittee has the ability to shape where funding goes because they also have significant control over the allocation of aid.

I argue that the dynamics of a divided Congress therefore have substantial ramifications for the funding of foreign aid. While Congress is more than willing to collaborate with Presidents of either party, it encounters serious difficulties when it is itself divided between parties. Increasing foreign aid budgets requires "two-factor authentication" from Congress: first, the House and Senate appropriating subcommittee must reach an internal consensus about an increase, which they will recommend to the wider Congress; second, they must then ensure that they have enough Congressional support to pass their increases. Negotiating this foreign policy power therefore becomes fraught when the House and Senate diverge in their foreign policy preferences, which is highly likely when the Congress is divided.

A Congress divided against itself has trouble standing unitedly and convincingly on foreign policy. It struggles to come to an internal agreement on harder and more complex foreign policy priorities. This has clear implications for "security plus" assistance. Despite the reputation of Republicans being more supportive of security assistance, I anticipate that all appropriators—Republican and Democrat—see **"security plus"** as an opportunity to make foreign policy. When Congress is united, I hypothesize that appropriators will maintain or increase **"security plus"** budgets from the previous year's level. However, when Congress is divided, appropriators will cut "security plus" budgets, because they will not be able to reach a consensus on how this foreign policy power should be used.

"Development plus" aid, which combines health and development accounts, is thought to be unpopular with members of Congress and the public but, careful reading of public opinion polls reveals the American people to be broadly supportive of the components of **"development plus"** aid (as discussed in earlier chapters). (Summarizing his work on aid and public opinion, Kull affirms that "Americans respond favorably to the idea that development assistance is an important strategy for fulfilling humanitarian goals"[457].) The underlying assumption of the existing literature on Congress and aid is that legislators are more willing to support the President on the security components of aid, but electoral incentives undermine support for development purposes of aid. Yet such aid has also had longstanding support from legislators like Jacob Javits and Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. in earlier era of American aid, because of its relationship to American interests: "national security is achieved not just by military power-necessary though that regrettably is-but by taking actions which subtract from the number of our potential enemies and add to the number and strength of our friends."[458]

"Development plus" also has the support of numerous advocacy groups (as discussed in **Chapter 6**). I anticipate then that this puts a floor under "development plus" aid for appropriators, both Democrat and Republican. I therefore expect that between 1994-2021, the "development plus" budget will never be cut below the previous year's budget level. Furthermore, I argue that, at times, appropriators will be willing to support increases to **"development plus"** aid, because of advocacy

[457] Ibid.

[458] Cabot Lodge in the Foreword to Wilson, T. (1977). The Marshall Plan 1947-1951. Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series 236. Available from The Marshall Foundation. https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/The_Marshall_Plan_1941-1951.pdf. Accessed 2 April 2024.

groups urging them to increase the budget and because of the value development adds to U.S. foreign policy.

This enables appropriators to overcome the "two-factor authentication" problem that normally derails security assistance in a divided Congress. Appropriators perceive **"development plus"** aid as contributing to foreign policy, but it is more of "soft" foreign policy in the sense that development contributes to global stability and security. This makes it less polarizing than security plus assistance, when it comes to shaping the foreign policy agenda. Pressure from advocacy groups on each chamber gives the subcommittee a focal point (of increasing budgets) even during a divided Congress and this same external pressure helps persuade legislators in a divided Congress to vote for **"development plus"** aid. This pressure helps at both stages of the "two-factor authentication"—to coordinate appropriators around maintaining, if not increasing budgets, and to garner support for these funding levels from wider Congress.

I anticipate that the pressure from these coalitions has effectively put a floor under **"development plus"** aid for appropriators, both Democrat and Republican, since the advent of post-Cold War advocacy campaigns. At a minimum, they will avoid cutting the budget from previous year's levels—creating a *de facto* lower bound below which committee members would be unwilling to cut **"development plus"** aid.

I therefore expect that between 1994-2021, the **"development plus"** budget will never be cut below the previous year's budget level. This is a highly counterintuitive claim given the literature.

In summary, this argument leads to the following expectations:

- **Hypothesis 1: The "security plus" aid budget will be cut by a divided Congress (from the previous year's level). A united Congress will maintain or increase the "security plus" aid budget, regardless of which party is in power.**

- **Hypothesis 2: The "development plus" aid budget will not be cut by Congress (from the previous year's level), regardless of which party is in power.**

10.4 Results


I contend that divided government can explain these dynamics only insofar as there is overlap between a divided Congress and divided government. In this period, government is divided more than 73% of the time (**Table 10.1**). I anticipate this has no effects on aid budgets. What matters are the cases of a divided Congress, which only occur 33.33% of the time in this period (**Table 10.1**).

Table 10.1
Divided Congress vs. Divided Government

Congress (1995-2024)		
	years	**percentage**
united Congress	20	66.67%
divided Congress	10	33.33%
united government	8	26.67%
divided government	22	73.33%


I begin with "security plus" assistance. **Figure 10.4** uses the measure of Congressional amplification developed in the previous chapter—the percentage change in the budget compared to the previous year. Positive Congressional amplification represents an increase from last year's budget—this will be anything above the horizontal black line (which represents no change from the previous year's budget). Negative Congressional amplification will be anything below the line, which represents a cut from the previous budget. (All percentages are calculated using current figures and so are not adjusted for inflation—this has obvious drawbacks. Maintaining the budget exactly from one year to the next will technically be a cut anytime there is any positive amount of inflation. Yet this is the convention appropriators use in gauging budgets one year to the next—and since this is a paper focused on how appropriators view and interact with aid from a Congressional perspective, I follow this convention.)

Figure 10.4
Congressional Amplification for Security Plus Assistance (1995-2021)



Congressional amplification for security assistance exhibits high variation, ranging from -43.8% to 77.6%. In **Figure 10.5**, I split the data into three panels: one for each party's control of a united Congress (Democratic control of Congress, Republican control of Congress) and one for divided Congresses (in which each party controls one chamber.)

Figure 10.5
Divided Congress: Congressional Amplification for Security Plus Assistance (1995-2021)



A striking pattern emerges. For united Congresses—both Democratic and Republican—Congressional amplification for security assistance is overwhelmingly positive. There are two occasions when a Republican Congress cuts the "security plus" budget by 4-5% and one occasion when a Democratic Congress does. (This means out of the years when there is a united Congress, 82% of the time, it maintains or increases the "security plus" budget. Just 18% of the time will a united Congress make a small cut to the "security plus" budget.) By contrast, a divided Congress cuts "security plus" assistance 70% of the time—and by far larger margins than a united Congress does. I also include **Figures 10.6** and **10.7**, where I confirm that the same pattern does not exist when simply looking at "divided government." The middle panel plots Congressional amplification under divided government and it exhibits huge fluctuations from a more than 40% cut to a nearly 50% increase. Individual years are then color-coded (in **Figure 10.7**) to show whether the case of "divided government" is also a case with a "divided Congress". Every case of a divided Congress is, by definition, a case of divided government, but not every divided government involves a divided Congress.) Cuts under divided government overwhelmingly come from divided Congresses.[459]

[459] I also confirm that results are not driven by a particular pair of House and Senate SFOPS chairs emerging in divided Congresses. (Results for divided Congresses hold across three different pairs of House-Senate SFOPS chairs.)

Figure 10.6
Divided Government: Congressional Amplification for Security Plus Assistance (1995-2021)





Figure 10.7
Divided Government: Congressional Amplification for Security Plus Assistance (1995-2021)



The expectations around "development plus" are counterintuitive, but more straightforward. I anticipate that, regardless of whether Congress is divided and regardless of which party is in power, Congress will not cut "development plus" assistance. The work of advocacy groups has essentially put a floor under the budget.

Figure 10.8 plots Congressional amplification for "development plus." There is a significant cut (-24.1%) in 2010 and a minor cut (-1.21%) in 2013. Beyond this, the budget never falls below the previous year's level and often increases. For this period, therefore, "development plus" is cut 7.4% of the time, but maintained or increased 92.6% of the time. This pattern holds regardless of party control or divisions in Congress (**Figure 10.9**).

Figure 10.8
Congressional Amplification for Development Plus (1995-2021)





Figure 10.9
Divided Congress: Congressional Amplification for Development Plus Assistance (1995-2021)



Congress only very rarely cuts **"development plus"** aid from the previous year's level. This is highly counterintuitive, given the existing literature on how unpopular foreign aid is with members of Congress. This suggests both that role of advocacy groups has been vital in sustaining existing levels of support for this form of aid and that, for many appropriators, who have the power to push through increases to the budget, this form of aid has important foreign policy purposes and is not solely driven by electoral interests.

10.5 Conclusion

As anticipated, united Congresses consistently maintain and increase both **"security plus" "development plus"** assistance as complementary tools of American foreign policy. Divided Congresses, however, are wary of **"security plus"** and this form of funding is cut whenever Congress is split.

Polarization has been on the rise in Congress since 1982. As a result, divided government has become increasingly common, but a divided Congress has not. Between 1982-2024, government has been divided for 32 out of 42 years (76.19%), but Congress has only been divided for 16 out of 42 years (38.1%). These results suggests that when it comes to foreign policy and foreign aid, in particular, a divided Congress matters more than divided government. Congress is generally willing to forge a constructive foreign policy relationship with Presidents of either party, but this dynamic can break down when Congress itself is divided on its own foreign policy priorities. This has ramifications for **"security plus"** assistance, which funds more the "hard" foreign policy priorities in the American context than **"development plus"** assistance.

Foreign aid, with all its purposes, remains a key tool of American foreign policy. The President and Congress must work together to forge foreign policy amidst rising polarization. This chapter identifies some of the ramifications those realities have for the U.S. foreign aid budget. In general, **"security plus"** assistance—a crucial component of U.S. foreign policy—is likely to be cut whenever Congress is divided. By contrast, **"development plus"** assistance tends to be maintained or increased, regardless of party control or divisions of Congress. The results of this chapter bolster the argument that legislators engage with foreign aid as foreign policy and, that regardless of internal divisions in Congress, legislators perceive **"development plus"** as an important foreign policy tool to maintain.

11 Conclusion

"For months, the national security priorities of the American people have been obstructed…A bipartisan coalition of Democrats and Republicans has risen up to work together and ensure that we are getting the national security legislation important to the American people over the finish line. House Democrats have risen to the occasion. President Joe Biden has risen to the occasion. Traditional conservatives, led by Speaker Mike Johnson, have risen to the occasion. We have a responsibility not as Democrats or Republicans but as Americans to do what is necessary to defend democracy, wherever it is at risk, and the best interests of the free world. That is what this legislation represents."[460]

Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY), House Minority Leader
House vote on Ukraine aid, 20 April 2024

"Ronald Reagan said, 'Democracy is worth dying for because it's the most deeply honorable form of government ever devised by man.' Madam Chair, that's but one reason I rise today in support of [this legislation]…At this moment, the world is looking to America for leadership and asking, do we still stand behind our belief in democracy and are we the world power that we acclaim?"[461]

Chuck Edwards (R-NC), member of House SFOPS
House vote on Ukraine aid, 20 April 2024

"The greatest nation on earth either justifies or surrenders its leadership."[462]

Arthur Vandenberg,
Chair of Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Speech before the Senate on the Marshall Plan

From its inception, American foreign aid has been intertwined with the direction of American foreign policy, serving as a multipurpose tool to advance American interests and values in a complex, interconnected world. Congressional involvement in aid began with the Marshall Plan, brought to fruition through a partnership between Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Democratic President Harry Truman, which invited members of Congress to engage with relevant officials, to travel and see, and to maintain robust oversight of the programs. The Plan drew on the expertise of the whole of the American foreign policy establishment and relied on advocates from the military, business, diplomacy, and civic and religious life to catalyze public support.

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460 CSPAN. (2024 April 20). U.S. House of Representatives House Session. https://www.c-span.org/video/?535072-1/house-session. Accessed 25 April 2024.
461 Ibid.
462 The Marshall Foundation. "The Battle for World Peace and Stability." [Speech Delivered by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 80th Congress, 2D Session, March 1, 1948.] https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Senator_Vandenberg_Speech_The_Battle_forWorld_Peace_and_Stability.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2024.

While officials, at the time and since, have acknowledged the ways in which the Marshall Plan benefitted the American people, it was also fundamentally part of a new political economy of foreign policy. This has made American aid multipurpose—and different—from the beginning. This variety of economic, political, and security purposes has underpinned broad Congressional support for foreign aid since 1946. While Congress frequently criticized the Presidential use of foreign aid during the Cold War period, this variety of purposes endured—though, at times, this pushback turned so vehement that Congress contemplated eliminating certain purposes of aid altogether so as to take them off the table as tools of Presidential foreign policy. Instead, Congress reasserted its control over foreign policy and foreign aid through reforms like the War Powers Act and "New Directions." In the decade that followed, the new House appropriating subcommittee leadership softened toward aid. Rising polarization would increasingly empower appropriators by consolidating their power of the purse with the power to shape policy.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new foreign policy was required for a new world. It was unclear whether foreign aid would survive as a tool of foreign policy or if its utility had been limited to Cold War containment. As complex global problems with economic, political, and security dimensions continued to face American policymakers, a coalition of advocacy groups undertook a public and Congressional campaign to remind legislators and voters of aid's value. Combined with Congress's renewed powers in foreign policy which ensured a more equal partnership with the President, this recreated some of the key conditions of the Marshall Plan. Funding for International Affairs, after a precipitous decline, rose 40% between 1995 and 1998. These renewed fundamentals from the Marshall Plan would hold foreign aid together through the crisis of American foreign policy between the end of the Cold War and 9/11.

This period also coincided with increasingly "collaborative" partnerships between the Republican Congress and the Democratic Clinton Administration, which then soured towards the end of Clinton's term as the appropriating subcommittee grew more frustrated with some of the President's foreign policy priorities, like debt relief. (This is picked up in my data on Presidential-Congressional partnerships, which shift from "assertive" and "inhibited" at the end of the 1990s.) As rising polarization recontoured the way in which Congress itself functioned, regardless of whether government was united or divided, united Congresses proved far more willing to work "collaboratively" with Presidents of both parties than divided ones. This has had profound ramifications for the funding of different aspects of the American foreign aid budget. As demonstrated in the last chapter, divided Congresses struggle to forge a consensus around the use of **"security plus"** assistance—a likely artifact of the Iran-Contra Affair.

The recent fight over aid to Ukraine in a divided Congress is a prime example of this. It is also a stunning exclamation point on the salience of foreign aid as foreign policy instead of simple electoral politics—culminating in the saving of a Republican Speaker by House Democrats. Divided Congresses severely test the limits of legislators' ability to work together on foreign policy in a polarized era. With slim majorities and strong preferences, it can seem unattainable to balance the priorities of one chamber with those of the other. Only one supplemental for Ukraine has passed a divided Congress during the Biden Administration—which waited nearly a year into the tenure of the new Congress to submit any funding requests. It then required another grueling nine months to enact the legislation. Yet when it came time to vote, House leaders and appropriators emphasized not the frustrating delays, but the enduring bipartisanship that would make the almost-impossible possible.

The recent supplemental request for additional funding for Ukraine consisted primarily of **"security plus",** humanitarian, and military accounts. (Because of their salience, supplemental appropriations carry slightly different foreign policy implications than annual appropriations and are therefore subject to similar but slightly differing domestic politics. However, they provide examples of the dynamics of foreign aid as foreign policy writ large enough to observe more clearly than annual appropriations do.)

Increases to security assistance *can* get through a divided Congress—as this one eventually did when paired with enough other priorities to ensure adequate votes—but it is a floor fight to the finish and requires expending vast amounts of political capital to do so. When the Republican-controlled House voted on sending additional aid to Ukraine, appropriator after appropriator had to stand on the floor of the House and defend the aid as an investment in the liberal international order,[463] in U.S. national security,[464] in democracy,[465] in U.S. leadership,[466] and in freedom[467] to get it across the finish line.

Aid to Ukraine has been one of the top foreign policy priorities of the Biden Administration, but Congress has the power to withhold the financial backing for all major foreign policy endeavors. When Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the Biden Administration had already been warning allies in Europe of the likelihood of such an attempt since November 2021.[468] (Even prior to onboarding European allies, Congress had worked with the Administration as early as August 2021 to increase aid to Ukraine.[469])

As quickly as March 2, barely a week later, while the world was still reeling and newspaper headlines daily questioned how long Kyiv could withstand Russian aggression, the Administration had pulled together a request for a $10 billion emergency supplemental from Congress for Ukraine.[470] (For comparison, the formulation of the President's Budget Request for the regular appropriations cycle is a year-long process.) The letter, as is tradition, was addressed to the Speaker of the House, then Nancy Pelosi (D-CA), with the chair and ranking member of both the House and Senate Appropriations Committee and the Senate Majority Leader receiving identical copies. The emergency supplemental is a special, urgent form of appropriations. Though the timeline is typically compressed, it follows the same dynamic as "regular" appropriations: the President requests; Congress responds. Congress retains both the prerogative and the power not to fund

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463 De Lauro (D-CT)) in CSPAN. (2024 April 20). U.S. House of Representatives House Session. https://www.c-span.org/video/?535072-1/house-session. Accessed 25 April 2024.
464 Diaz-Balart (R-FL) echoed by Chair of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Turner (R-OH) and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY)
465 Edwards (R-NC), echoed by former House Speaker Pelosi (D-CA)
466 Lee (D-CA)
467 De Lauro (D-CT)
468 Landler, M., Erlanger, S., and Sanger, D. (2022 January 28). "In Standoff with Putin, Biden Makes Sure European Allies Are With Him" *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/28/world/europe/biden-putin-ukraine-europe.html?searchResultPosition=3. Accessed 21 March 2024.
469 Department of State. (2024 September 27). U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine. Fact Sheet. https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine/#. Accessed 30 September 2024; Arabia, C., Bowen, A., and Welt, C. (2024 May 22). U.S. Security Assistance to Ukraine. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12040. Accessed on 24 May 2024.
470 McCabe, E. (2024 April 26). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: In Brief. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47275. Accessed on 24 May 2024.

Presidential priorities which it does not support. In a show of support, by March 15, not even a full two weeks later, Congress gave the White House $13.6 billion for Ukraine—*more* than had been requested.[471] Congress had responded, demonstrating broad support for the President's agenda.

On 28 April 2022, the Administration went back to Congress with another request, this time for $33 billion to support "Ukraine and the region" and received $40.1 billion by 21 May.[472] More funding was requested and approved in September and November. In total, Congress approved $113.3 billion for Ukraine in 2022, with the broad pattern being that Congress gave the President more money than he requested. While Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) was Speaker of the House and Democrats held the majority, —a united government and a united Congress—President Biden went to Congress four times in 2022 for funding to support Ukraine. Each time Congress signed off on additional financing for the President with broad support from Republicans and Democrats.

With the 2022 midterm elections, Republicans took control of the House.[473] (At that time, the party appeared divided between continued support for Ukrainian democracy and a rules-based international order by Republican internationalists and an admiration of the strongman tactics of Russia's President Putin by others.[474]) This meant Congress switched from being united to being divided with a Republican House and a Democratic Senate—a perilous environment within which to request increased security assistance. As demonstrated in the last chapter, divided Congresses cut **"security plus"** assistance 70% of the time—and by larger margins. After a final November 15 supplemental, the White House requested no further funding for Ukraine until August 10, 2023.[475]

Sensing the change of mood in Congress, the White House held off on asking for any additional funding for Ukraine until August 2023 when its request got caught up in the ousting of Kevin McCarthy as Speaker of the House by his own party. Fragile from the outset, McCarthy's turbulent tenure finally faltered on the issue of appropriations. The government's fiscal year starts in October, which means that appropriations must be in place by October 1, or agencies begin to experience a "funding gap" that requires them to curtail operations and services. Depending on the duration of this gap, this can trigger a shutdown—when the government cannot meet its financial obligations and is forced to cease operating.[476] This was the situation facing McCarthy as Speaker on Friday, 29 September 2023, with Goldman Sachs estimating the likelihood of a government shutdown at 90%.[477] As the *Financial Times* reported,

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[471] Ibid.
[472] Ibid.
[473] House of Representatives, History, Art, & Archives. Party Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present. https://history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/. Accessed on 12 April 2024.
[474] Weisman, J. 2(022 January 2026). Republican Rift on Ukraine Could Undercut U.S. Appeals to Allies. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/26/us/politics/republicans-ukraine.html?searchResultPosition=4. Accessed 18 March 2024.
[475] McCabe, E. (2024 April 26). Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) Supplemental Funding for Ukraine: In Brief. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47275. Accessed on 24 May 2024.
[476] Brass, C., Brudnick, I., Keegan, N., McMillion, B., Rollins, J., and Yeh, B. (2018 December 10). Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34680. Accessed on 22 March 2024.
[477] Wigglesworth, R. (2023 September 29). What the US shutdown means. *Financial Times*. https://www.ft.com/content/85c8bd76-9521-4c02-a22a-2502de676c5f. Accessed 18 March 2024.

> *Parts of the US government are expected to shut down from Sunday after Republican dissidents in the House of Representatives defeated the party's own stop-gap funding bill in a severe blow to Speaker Kevin McCarthy. …The likely shutdown on Sunday will trigger the furlough of hundreds of thousands of federal workers, leave troops without pay, and shutter a broad swath of government services.*[478]

Several members of the House Freedom Caucus declared themselves unwilling to vote for a continuing resolution under any circumstances.[479] "The path forward for the House of Representatives is to either bring you into total, immediate compliance or remove you", Representative Matt Gaetz (R-FL), a member of the House Freedom Caucus, threatened; "'If Kevin McCarthy puts a continuing resolution on the floor, it is going to be shot, chaser, continuing resolution, motion to vacate,' Mr. Gaetz said, referring to the procedural move to oust a speaker." [480]

In late September, with about five days to a shutdown, House Republicans were working on four consolidated appropriations bills. No serious observers expected the fractured chamber to be able to push these through in time for the Saturday deadline, especially when

> *[s]talemated on any real action to keep the government open, House Republicans instead spent Wednesday working to appease the hard right by adding a litany of arch-conservative amendments to four individual spending bills they are trying to push through. The amendments include a proposal that would reduce the salary of Defense Secretary Lloyd J. Austin III, the first Black man to hold the post, to $1. The additions are likely to make passing those bills — which are doomed in the Senate anyway — even more difficult.*[481]

Instead, that Friday, McCarthy proposed a continuing resolution that "would slash spending and impose severe immigration restrictions" and temporarily fund the government at existing levels.[482] It was a non-starter with House Democrats and the Senate, designed to appeal to the very small cadre of Republicans who ultimately tanked the bill.[483] Despite their demands for sweeping reductions in government spending and a return to tougher policies at the southern border,[484]

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[478] Politi, J. (2023 September 29). US on brink of shutdown as Republicans defeat last-minute funding bill. *Financial Times*. https://www.ft.com/content/0cc78adc-3f62-4ddd-a7a7-4ab86b45dbe9. Accessed 18 March 2024.
[479] Jimison, R. and Edmondson, C. (2023 September 27). The Republicans Driving Congress Toward a Shutdown. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/27/us/politics/republicans-congress-shutdown.html?searchResultPosition=7. Accessed 18 March 2024.
[480] Hulse, C., Broadwater, L., and Karni, A. (2023 September 12). McCarthy, Facing an Ouster and a Shutdown, Orders an Impeachment Inquiry. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/12/us/politics/mccarthy-biden-impeachment-inquiry.html?searchResultPosition=1. Accessed 20 March 2024.
[481] Jimison, R. and Edmondson, C. (2023 September 27). The Republicans Driving Congress Toward a Shutdown. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/27/us/politics/republicans-congress-shutdown.html?searchResultPosition=7. Accessed 18 March 2024.
[482] Edmondson, C., Guo, K., and Hulse, C. (2023 September 29). Ring Wing Tanks Stopgap Bill in House, Pushing Government Toward a Shutdown. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/12/us/politics/mccarthy-biden-impeachment-inquiry.html?searchResultPosition=1. Accessed 20 March 2024.
[483] New York Times. (2023 September 29). Government Shutdown. Right Wing Pushes Government Toward a Shutdown. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/09/29/us/government-shutdown?searchResultPosition=8#heres-why-hard-right-republicans-oppose-a-temporary-spending-measure-to-keep-the-government-open. Accessed 20 March 2024.
[484] Edmondson, C., Guo, K., and Hulse, C. (2023 September 29). Right Wing Tanks Stopgap Bill in House, Pushing Government Toward a Shutdown. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/12/us/politics/mccarthy-biden-impeachment-inquiry.html?searchResultPosition=1. Accessed 20 March 2024;

members of the House Freedom Caucus voted with House Democrats, who opposed the deep spending cuts and immigration restrictions, to kill McCarthy's initial appropriations bill.[485] The experience prompted McCarthy to comment that some in his party "just want to burn the whole place down."[486]

Instead, in a stunning eleventh-hour weekend deal, McCarthy turned to House Democrats to pass a continuing resolution on Saturday morning—legislation that would extend existing appropriations for an additional 45 days. However, the measure still had to pass the Senate before Saturday midnight. Just four days earlier, the Senate, with its thin Democratic majority, had passed a similar bill in hopes of avoiding a shutdown and to put pressure on the House to get its fiscal act together. The sticking point was that their version included significant aid for Ukraine.

To keep the government running, the legislation would have to be passed—in identical format—by both the House and the Senate. Insistent on the crucial importance of assistance to Ukraine but unwilling to withhold funding for key government services (including the very politically salient pressure to pay the troops)[487] to get it, the Senate convened that Saturday evening to pass the text of the House's bill, which "President Joe Biden signed … before a midnight deadline", buying Congress an additional 45 days to try and pass appropriations before confronting the threat of another shutdown.[488]

True to his word—after McCarthy passed a continuing resolution on Saturday, 30 September to avoid a government shutdown—that Monday Gaetz filed a motion to vacate, triggering a snap vote on McCarthy's leadership within the next forty-eight hours.[489] In filing the motion, Gaetz called McCarthy chaos and declared, "I think that not passing single-subject spending bills is chaos. I think the fact that we have been governed in this country since the mid -'90s by continuing resolution and omnibus is chaos."[490]

Edmondson, C., Hulse, C., and Demirjian, K. (2023 September 28). Border Takes Center Stage as McCarthy Seeks to Shift Shutdown Blame. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/28/us/politics/shutdown-mccarthy-immigration-border.html?searchResultPosition=3. Accessed 20 March 2024.

[485] Yourish, K. and Gamio, L. (2023 October 3). How the Shutdown Holdouts Have Antagonized McCarthy Before. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/09/29/us/politics/gop-mccarthy-shutdown-holdouts.html?searchResultPosition=6. Accessed 20 March 2024.

[486] Greeve, J. (2023 September 21). McCarthy says hard-right Republicans 'want to burn whole place down'. *The Guardian.* https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/sep/21/government-shutdown-latest-spending-vote-mccarthy-republicans. Accessed 20 March 2024.

[487] "'If the House fails to fulfill its most basic function, it fails to fund government by tomorrow, it will have failed all our troops,' Mr. Biden said. 'Our service members will keep upholding their oath, showing up for work, standing sentinel around the world, keeping our country secure, but they won't get paid.'
'It's a disgrace,' he added." New York Times. (2023 September 29). Government Shutdown. Right Wing Pushes Government Toward a Shutdown. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/live/2023/09/29/us/government-shutdown?searchResultPosition=8#heres-why-hard-right-republicans-oppose-a-temporary-spending-measure-to-keep-the-government-open. Accessed 20 March 2024.

[488] Fedor, L., Smith, C., and Politi, J. (2023 October 1). US lawmakers pass short-term deal to avoid government shutdown. *Financial Times.* https://www.ft.com/content/1723e6e8-495d-4e0c-bf18-6c91e106e71a. Accessed 18 March 2024.

[489] Demirjian, K. (2023 October 1). McCarthy Faces Test as Gaetz Moves to Oust Him for Working with Democrats. *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/01/us/politics/mccarthy-speaker-gaetz.html?searchResultPosition=9. Accessed 20 March 2024.

[490] New York Times. The Daily [podcast]. (2023 October 4). The Ouster of House Speaker Kevin McCarthy. [Hosted by Michael Barbaro.] *The New York Times.* https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/04/podcasts/the-daily/mccarthy-ouster.html?showTranscript=1. Accessed 20 March 2024.

Eight Republicans sided with Democrats and voted against McCarthy in a moment that made history as the first time a party voted to dethrone its *own* leader over appropriations politics.[491] It was perhaps the most stunning challenge to a Speaker of the House to date. The last thirty years has seen a series of unprecedented take-downs of Speakers, including Republican John Boehner's forced retirement by Freedom Caucus and Republican Newt Gingrich's coup in ousting Democratic Speaker Jim Wright, in which the outgoing leader "urged both parties to 'bring this period of mindless cannibalism to an end!'"[492] Gingrich himself would later complain of his own party: "'I'm willing to lead but I'm not willing to preside over people who are cannibals.'"[493]

Its first request having gone unanswered, the Biden Administration addressed a request for additional aid to Ukraine to the interim Speaker Patrick McHenry on 20 October (available online in a pdf labeled "letter regarding critical national security needs for FY 2024", clearly underscoring the urgency with which the White House viewed the request).[494] For months, no funding for Ukraine was forthcoming from Congress. Despite bipartisan support in both chambers, McCarthy's replacement Speaker Mike Johnson seemed well aware that allowing a vote on the issue on the floor would alienate the same contingent of his party that removed his predecessor. After watching McCarthy's fate, one commentator described Johnson as "living in fear of this motion to vacate"[495] Support for aid remained strong in the Senate, which was also working on a bipartisan border and immigration reform, spearheaded by Republican James Lankford (R-OK), Independent Kyrsten Sinema (I-AZ), and Democrat Chris Murphy (D-CT).[496]

Initially, the Senate combined aid for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan together with this new immigration legislation to build a broad coalition to pass this series of national security priorities.[497] With immigration as a key issue in the upcoming election, as Lankford describes, "…it [immigration] became immediately the major focus in the election… and everything collapsed at that point. If that bill would have gone in December, I think it would have passed."[498] Five months later, in February 2024, the White House was still waiting and the Administration growing increasingly desperate. Asked by a reporter at a White House press briefing on 12 February 2024 about the Ukraine

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[491] Hulse, C. (2023 October 3). McCarthy's Extraordinary Downfall Reflects an Ungovernable G.O.P. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/03/us/kevin-mccarthy-house-speaker.html?searchResultPosition=6. Accessed 20 March 2024.

[492] Zelizer, J. E. (2020). *Burning down the house : Newt Gingrich, the fall of a speaker, and the rise of the new Republican Party*. Penguin Press.

[493] Ibid.

[494] Executive Office of the President. (2023 October 20). Letter regarding critical national security funding needs. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Letter-regarding-critical-national-security-funding-needs-for-FY-2024.pdf. Accessed 20 March 2024.

[495] Brooks, D. and Capehart, J. (2024 March 2022). PBS. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w2W5Rr8ZBsA. Accessed 22 March 2024.

[496] Lankford, J. The Interview [New York Times podcast]. (2024 August 10). The Man Who Tried to Solve Immigration for the G.O.P. *The New York Times*. [Senator James Lankford interviewed by Garcia-Navarro, L.] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/10/magazine/james-lankford-senator-interview.html. Accessed 25 August 2024.

[497] With thanks to Chris Bertram from American University's Program on Legislative Negotiation for his helpful notes on the bundling and unbundling of the various bill in the Senate and House during this period. In an interview with the New York Times, Senator Lankford describes both his and Senator Murphy's position that the current immigration crisis is a national security crisis too.

[498] Lankford, J. The Interview [New York Times podcast]. (2024 August 10). The Man Who Tried to Solve Immigration for the G.O.P. *The New York Times*. [Senator James Lankford interviewed by Garcia-Navarro, L.] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/10/magazine/james-lankford-senator-interview.html. Accessed 25 August 2024.

"funding fight" and whether the President had a "plan B" if Congress failed to get its act together, the National Security Communications Advisor John Kirby replied:

> *It's really important that the House now take this up…It's critical. This, as we've said before, we said it when we submitted the supplemental, back in October, there is no magical pot of money from which to draw to try and support these allies and these partners. ...Congress needs to act. They need to be the ones to move forward.*[499]

Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates lamented just a day after the State of the Union:

> *So the Ukrainians are really in a spot. And, you know, there are some dribs and drabs that can come out of the Pentagon—as a friend of mine puts it, the Pentagon finds a lot of money between the cushions in the sofa—but not enough to provide the kind of support that Ukraine really needs.*[500]

Key Congressional leaders and Administration officials, including CIA Director William Burns, worked to convince Johnson of the importance of aid to Ukraine.[501] Yet Johnson insisted the House would not be voting on the aid package and House Republicans contemplated using a "discharge petition" to go around the Speaker and force a vote.[502] In a stunning offer in late February, House Democratic Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY) signaled he and other Democrats would "vote to save the Republican speaker if his party sought to oust him over allowing a vote on" aid to Ukraine.[503] Initially, Johnson made no move to allow such a vote. (A former member of the House Freedom Caucus Marjorie Taylor Greene promised to bring a motion to vacate if he were do so.[504]) Instead on 13 March, concerned about rising Chinese influence through the platform, the House passed legislation "requiring divestment in TikTok by a vote of 352-65 under suspension of the [usual] rules."[505] The Senate was reluctant to take up the legislation, worried about alienating young voters.[506]

On 20 March, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited Kyiv to offer support to Ukrainian President Zelensky. While there, Sullivan again urged the House of Representatives to get

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[499] White House Press Briefing. (2024 February 13). PBS. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rd6oGcfBfqY. Accessed on 13 February 2024.
[500] Gates, R. (2024 February 8). Interview with *Foreign Affairs*. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/anyone-still-afraid-united-states-robert-gates. Accessed 20 March 2024.
[501] Edmondson, C. (2024 April 21). How Mike Johnson Got to 'Yes' on Aid to Ukraine. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/21/us/politics/mike-johnson-house-foreign-aid.html?searchResultPosition=2. Accessed 22 June 2024.
[502] Guo, K. (2024 February 13). How Congress Could Bypass Republican Opposition to Funding Ukraine. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/13/us/politics/congress-discharge-petition-ukraine.html. Accessed 20 March 2024.
[503] Edmondson, C. (2024 February 28). Jeffries Suggests Democrats Would Save Johnson from Removal over Ukraine Aid. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/us/politics/hakeem-jeffries-mike-johnson.html?searchResultPosition=1. Accessed 22 June 2024.
[504] Ibid; Marjorie Taylor Greene was she was reportedly evicted in June 2023 for verbally attacking Caucus member Lauren Boebert. Metzger, B. (2023 July 25). Marjorie Taylor Greene reportedly found out she was booted from the House Freedom Caucus after seeing her own name trending on Twitter. *Business Insider*. https://www.businessinsider.com/marjorie-taylor-greene-twitter-house-freedom-caucus-ouster-2023-7. Accessed 20 March 2024.
[505]With thanks to Chris Bertram from American University's Program on Legislative Negotiation for his helpful notes on the bundling and unbundling of the various bill in the Senate and House during this period.
[506] Ibid.

its act together. A spokeswoman for the National Security Council told the press that Sullivan "'stressed the urgent need for the U.S. House of Representatives to pass the national security supplemental to meet Ukraine's critical battlefield needs.' The covert trip showed the rising sense of urgency in the White House to pressure Congress to pass billions of dollars of aid for Ukraine."[507]

"Security plus" assistance is inevitably tied to U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities. The salience of aid to Ukraine heightened the electoral costs for legislators, but it also deepened the commitment to foreign aid as foreign policy for many in Congress. House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries "predicted the foreign aid bill would receive 'north of 300 votes from both sides of the aisle' if Mr. Johnson allowed it to come to the floor, calling it "an urgent issue for America's national security."[508] This was more support than either Johnson or McCarthy had as Speaker—numbers observers thought Johnson might be forced to rely on to save his Speakership.

Indeed, by Friday, 22 March 2024, Johnson stood in political peril like his predecessor. Having just passed a consolidated appropriations bill to avoid a government shutdown, he had done so drawing on the support of his conference but also relying on House Democrats to get the legislation across the finish line. Of the 286 votes to pass the package only 101 came from Republicans in the end.[509] Immediately afterwards, Marjorie Taylor Greene filed a motion to vacate, speaking of it to reporters on the steps of Congress as a "warning and a pink slip" for Johnson. "We were promised regular order." [510] (As one commentator explained to the public that Friday, "this resolution is not privileged, which, in plain English, means that the House doesn't have to vote on it until Marjorie Taylor Greene says so."[511]) This appeared to link the future of Mike Johnson, who had a history of voting against aid to Ukraine,[512] as Speaker to the fate of continued aid to Ukraine, itself entangled in the fight over the future direction of U.S. foreign policy.

All eyes were on the House again in the month that followed. In the runup between February and April, Johnson appeared to be slowly softening on aid. The campaign to convince Johnson finally seemed to be gaining ground, when the Speaker "found himself badly out of step with the three other congressional leaders," including Republican Mitch McConnell (former SFOPS Chair) and Democratic Chuck Schumer: "That was evident at the White House meeting in February, which Senator Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New York and the majority leader, described as an 'intense' pile-on. 'Everyone in that room was telling Speaker Johnson how vital' sending aid was, he

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[507] Kanno-Youngs, Z. (2024 March 20). National Security Adviser Makes Covert Trip to Kyiv. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/20/us/politics/jake-sullivan-ukraine.html?searchResultPosition=1. Accessed 22 June 2024.

[508] Edmondson, C. (2024 February 28). Jeffries Suggests Democrats Would Save Johnson from Removal over Ukraine Aid. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/28/us/politics/hakeem-jeffries-mike-johnson.html?searchResultPosition=1. Accessed 22 June 2024.

[509] Edmondson, C. (2024 March 22). Congress Passes Spending Bill in the Wee Hours to Fend Off Shutdown. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/us/politics/congress-spending-bill-government-shutdown.html?searchResultPosition=2. Accessed 22 June 2024.

[510] Ibid.; Jimison, R. and Edmondson, C. (2024 March 22). Enraged Over Spending Bill, Greene Threatens to Ousts Johnson. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/22/us/politics/greene-oust-johnson-spending-bill.html. Accessed 22 June 2024.

[511] Brooks, D. and Capehart, J. (2024 March 2022). PBS. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w2W5Rr8ZBsA. Accessed 22 March 2024.

[512] Edmondson, C. (2024 April 21). How Mike Johnson Got to 'Yes' on Aid to Ukraine. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/21/us/politics/mike-johnson-house-foreign-aid.html?searchResultPosition=2. Accessed 22 June 2024.

said then."[513] This was when Johnson began to signal that he would look for a path forward to voting on Ukraine and when the Democrats signaled that they would be willing to save if him, if the action proved costly with his own party.

In April 2024, the House took up the Senate bill through a special rule that allowed the House to unbundle the three aid bills so that members could vote individually on aid to Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan, alongside divestment in TikTok.[514] These "four freestanding bills" were introduced in the House on 17 April.[515] On 19 April, the House (through a 316-94 vote) passed a Rule which would allow "the four bills to be considered individually on the House floor". Speaking in favor of the Rule, Chair of the Appropriations Committee Tom Cole (R-OK) stated that the bills "collectively represent the commitment to move much-needed security assistance funding for America's friends and partners" and "central to our own national security".[516] He commended the Rule and urged all members to vote in favor of it as well as the aid packages: "importantly, this Rule allows every member to vote his or her conscience on every issue".[517] When passed, each would be "incorporated (substituted) into the Senate-passed aid bill" and, after the vote, would automatically be taken up by the Senate. Doing the "appropriations math", the expectation was that each of the 4 bills would pass, but each would draw on different sources of support. The combined bill would never face a vote in the House (and would not have passed if it had to do so), but the innovation of unbundling the Senate bill to vote on it and re-bundling it to return it to the Senate for a final vote finally allowed Ukraine aid to run the gauntlet of a divided Congress.

Appropriator after appropriator stood on the floor of the House and defended the aid as an investment in the liberal international order,[518] in U.S. national security,[519] in democracy,[520] in U.S. leadership,[521] and in freedom.[522] They staunchly defended the inclusion of "economic" (mainly "security plus" and humanitarian) aid alongside military aid.[523] As incoming Chair of Appropriations, Cole had described Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan as "on the front lines of the struggle to preserve democracy and freedom around the world."[524]

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513 Ibid.
514 With thanks to Chris Bertram from American University's Program on Legislative Negotiation for his helpful notes on the bundling and unbundling of the various bill in the Senate and House during this period.
515 Ibid.
516 Cole, T. 19 April 2024. 'Full and Fair Process': Tom Cole Commends Work by Lawmakers on Aid Packages to Ukraine and Israel. *Forbes*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nrSMrWYQxiY. Accessed 22 June 2024.
517 Ibid.
518 De Lauro (D-CT)), CSPAN. 20 April 2024. U.S. House of Representatives House Session. https://www.c-span.org/video/?535072-1/house-session. Accessed 25 April 2024.
519 Diaz-Balart (R-FL) echoed by Chair of the House Intelligence Committee Mike Turner (R-OH) and House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries (D-NY)
520 Edwards (R-NC), echoed by former House Speaker Pelosi (D-CA)
521 Lee (D-CA)
522 De Lauro (D-CT)
523 The package included what I call "security plus" and military assistance, rather than any "development plus" aid. Both "development plus" and "security plus" fall under the broad umbrella category of "economic" aid, as opposed to "military" aid (for the purposes of reporting Official Development Assistance to the OECD). Officials refer to my categories of "development plus", "security plus", humanitarian, and democracy assistance under the umbrella term "economic aid" to distinguish them from military aid.
524 Cole, T. (2024 April 19). 'Full and Fair Process': Tom Cole Commends Work by Lawmakers on Aid Packages to Ukraine and Israel. *Forbes*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nrSMrWYQxiY. Accessed 22 June 2024.

Amendments seeking to strip military, **"security plus"**, and humanitarian components of the package were voted down—these challenges again were primarily fended off by House leadership and key appropriators who insisted on the necessity of an aid package that reflected aid's multipurpose nature. In the end, aid to Ukraine passed 311-112. (Rumor has it that when some Republicans saw the bill had enough support to pass, they declined to vote for it on the floor to protect themselves politically from primary challengers in the upcoming election cycle.) Aid to Israel passed 365-58, and aid to Taiwan passed 385-34. The Senate then passed the aid package on April 23, by a larger margin than in February, 79-18 compared to 70-29.[525]

A week later, having opposed the aid bills and particularly aid to Ukraine as a "disgusting" use of taxpayer dollars, Marjorie Taylor Greene insisted the House would soon vote on her motion to vacate: "I think every member of Congress needs to take that vote and let the chips fall where they may".[526] On Wednesday, 8 May, about two weeks later, the House voted. Unlike McCarthy's ouster, in which Democrats declined to save the Republican Speaker, "Democrats flocked to Mr. Johnson's rescue, with all but 39 of them voting with Republicans to block the effort to oust him."[527] This was a move with no historical precedent. It is strange party politics in a highly-polarized era for one party to save the leader of the other—and one with whom they have profound disagreements.

Neither is aid to Ukraine a particularly electorally popular issue. The Pew Research Center reports that "[i]n March 2022, shortly after the invasion, about four-in-ten Americans said the U.S. was not providing enough support to Ukraine (42%). This share has declined by nearly 20 percentage points. Meanwhile, the share of those saying that the U.S. is providing *too much* support to Ukraine has grown from 7% in March 2022 to 31% in April 2024."[528] Electoral concerns motivate members of Congress, but they are far less salient in this domain than is often thought. The primary lens through which many legislators view foreign aid is its relationship to American foreign policy—and, in cases like Ukraine, this galvanizes substantial numbers to take potentially politically costly decisions.

Rather than electoral calculation, what this episode seems to be instead is bipartisan foreign policy determined to preserve the role of Congress as an equal partner to the President and insistent on engaged American leadership on the international stage. This is foreign aid as foreign policy in action. (It proved costly to Republicans who supported the measure on the floor and did indeed face primary challengers; it was costly for Democrats who drew criticism for "saving" the Republican majority from its own dysfunction.) In recent years, even as particular Presidents sought to withdraw from global engagement, Congress maintained an "assertive" role in the Presidential-Congressional

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[525] With thanks to Chris Bertram from American University's Program on Legislative Negotiation for his helpful notes on the bundling and unbundling of the various bill in the Senate and House during this period.
[526] Jimison, R. (2024 May 1). Greene Says She Will Demand Vote Next Week on Removing Jonhson. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/01/us/politics/marjorie-taylor-greene-mike-johnson-speaker.html?searchResultPosition=2;%20https://live.house.gov. Accessed 22 June 2024.
[527] Edmondson, C., Hulse, C., and Guo, K. (2024 May 8). Johnson Survives Greene's Ouster Attempt as Democrats Join G.O.P. to Kill It. *The New York Times*. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/08/us/politics/greene-johnson-vacate.html?searchResultPosition=3. Accessed 22 June 2024.
[528] Pew Research Center. (2024 May 8). Growing Partisan Divisions Over NATO and Ukraine. https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2024/05/08/views-of-ukraine-and-u-s-involvement-with-the-russia-ukraine-war/. Accessed 9 October 2024.

partnership. Since the late-1990s, Congress has overwhelmingly sought an engaged American foreign policy—pursuing a "collaborative" or "assertive" partnership 72% of the time. Appropriators have been committed to "soft" as well as "hard" power—maintaining or increasing the **"development plus"** budget 92% of the time.

One of the main contributions of this dissertation is to underscore the extent to which Congress, particularly the Appropriations Committee, shapes U.S. foreign policy through aid appropriations. For those on both sides of the aisle who have spent the last thirty years reinstating a meaningful role for Congress in the Presidential-Congressional partnership, aid to Ukraine was a crucial litmus test of that partnership. If Congress failed to come through as a partner and failed to maintain engaged leadership, the future of American foreign policy (both for Congress and in the eyes of the world) hung in the balance. The impassioned pleas of House appropriators and leadership echoed the rhetoric of Arthur Vandenberg on the Senate floor in 1948: *"The greatest nation on earth either justifies or surrenders its leadership."*[529]

This dissertation reminds scholars that the President and the Congress set foreign policy *together* and funding for foreign aid is integral to shaping U.S. foreign policy—as recent events illustrate starkly. It also aims to equip scholars and practitioners with a deeper understanding of the process and purposes behind U.S. aid by providing a clear framework that details the decision-making process and a new typology that can classify the foreign policy purposes of American aid.

I trace the specific process by which U.S. foreign assistance is allocated, identifying 25 different steps. I divide these into Presidential and Congressional phases, according to the actor at each stage and step. I show that key Congressional committees are far more involved in funding and allocation decisions for American foreign aid than has been previously realized. To complement this enriched understanding of the U.S. aid process, I also compile original data that compares country-level allocation of aid *before* and *after* Congressional committee involvement (1999-2016; 2,649 observations). This allows for finer-grained analysis of U.S. aid in future empirical work studying allocation and how the U.S. behaves with regard to specific forms of aid.

Appropriators are integrally involved in foreign aid and in preserving the use of aid as an instrument of American foreign policy. The President is the face of the United States to the world and has tremendous powers in foreign affairs, but the President cannot make, let alone fund, foreign policy on their own. As Kirby told the press—"there is no magical pot of money". For now, foreign policy remains "*a joint responsibility between the United States Congress and the Administration"*, and foreign aid remains fundamental to discharging that responsibility. It remains unclear whether American foreign policy is at another inflection point, like the end of the Cold War, but, if so, for foreign aid to survive as a multipurpose instrument of American foreign policy the fundamentals of deep Presidential-Congressional partnership, information-sharing and oversight through appropriations, and a broad coalition of public and Congressional support will be required to preserve it in the decade to come. Congressional leaders fought hard throughout the Cold War to empower Congress as a crucial partner on foreign policy. Rising polarization and changing partisan attitudes to foreign policy may yet fundamentally erode this dynamic, but, for now, beneath the surface of simmering

[529] The Marshall Foundation. "The Battle for World Peace and Stability." [Speech Delivered by Senator Arthur Vandenberg, 80th Congress, 2D Session, March 1, 1948.] https://www.marshallfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Senator_Vandenberg_Speech_The_Battle_forWorld_Peace_and_Stability.pdf. Accessed 1 April 2024.

tensions and party politics, there still appears to be a reservoir of legislators willing to quietly and consistently collaborate with Presidents—because, for them, foreign aid is American foreign policy.

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Appendices

Appendix 1
The Executive Branch Actors: Agencies by the Dozen

From the U.S. foreign aid database, Explorer, I identify 29 different agencies who have funded aid projects and 30 agencies involved in implementing foreign aid since 2000.[530] Not included in these figures are the funding to the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, classified by Congress as foreign aid, and foundations like the National Endowment for Democracy or U.S. Institute for Peace. Their inclusion raises the overall figure of agencies involved in U.S. aid to levels unprecedented in comparison to other G7 donors. This remains true even when figures are revised to include only prominent aid agencies of G7 and Nordic donors (**Table 1**). I use DonorTracker's identification of main actors in the donor country's government to classify prominent aid agencies for each G7 donor[531]; in this classification, I exclude finance and export promotion agencies. Only Germany demonstrates similar complexity in aid architecture (Nunnenkamp and Ohler 2011).

Prominent Aid Agencies by (G7 + Nordics) Donor Country
(excluding development finance)

Donor	Number	Agencies
United States	7	USAID (U.S. Agency for International Development) State (Department of State) DoD (Defense) HHS (Department of Health and Human Services) Treasury (Department of the Treasury) Agriculture (Department of Agriculture) MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation)
Canada	1	GAC (Global Affairs Canada)
France	2	AFD (*Agence française de développement)* (Development Agency) MAE (*Ministère de l'Europe et des Affaires étrangères*) (Foreign Affairs)
Germany	3	BMZ (*Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung)* (Economic Cooperation & Development) GIZ *(Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit)* (Development) AA (*Auswärtiges Amt)* (Foreign Affairs)
Italy	2	MAECI (*Ministero degli affari esteri e della cooperazione internazionale*) (Foreign Affairs) AICS *(Agenzia Italiana per la Cooperazione allo Sviluppo)* (Development)
Japan	2	JICA (Development) MOFA (Foreign Affairs)
United Kingdom	1 *(formerly 2)*	FCDO (Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office) *formerly* DFID (Department for International Development) FCO (Foreign and Commonwealth Office)
Norway	2	NORAD (Development)

[530] In addition to the U.S. Agency for International Development, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense, this includes the African Development Foundation, Department of Commerce, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Labor, Department of the Army, Department of the Treasury, Executive Offices of the President, Millennium Challenge Corporation, Open World Leadership Center, Corps of Civil Engineers, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Department of the Interior, Department of Transportation, Federal Trade Commission, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Peace Corps, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Department of Agriculture, Department of Energy, Department of Justice, Department of the Air Force, Department of the Navy, Environmental Protection Agency, Inter-American Foundation, National Science Foundation, and the Trade and Development Agency.

[531] Example for Germany: https://donortracker.org/country/germany

		MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Sweden	2	SIDA (Development) MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Appendix 2
Interviews

Because of the sensitive nature of Presidential-Congressional relationship, individuals interviewed for this dissertation are not identified (with the exception of a few former members of Congress who were happy to be named). I conducted 18 interviews with at least 15 individuals; some interviews involved 2-3 conversations throughout the course of this dissertation. Some officials interviewed held positions on both the executive and legislative side at different stages in their career.

Current or former positions of interviewees include:

- Chair of State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee (House Appropriations)
- Chair of Appropriations Committee (House)
- Chair of Homeland Security Subcommittee (Appropriations)
- Staff of State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee
- USAID budget specialist
- White House budget specialist
- Mid-level personnel in Department of State, USAID
- Mid-to-senior-level personnel in the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (to provide comparison to the U.S.)

Spring 2022 Interviews
Official # 1. Interviewed on 10 May 2022.
Official #2. Interviewed on 13 May 2022.
Official #3. Interviewed on 17 May 2022.
Official #4. Interviewed on 18 May 2022.
Official #5. Interviewed on 19 May 2022.

Autumn 2022 Interviews
Official #6. Interviewed on 10 August 2022.
Official #7. Interviewed on 16 August 2022.
Official #8. Interviewed on 11 November 2022.

Spring 2023 Interviews
Official #9. Interviewed on 2 March 2023.

Autumn 2023 Interviews
Official #1. Interviewed on 9 September 2023.
Official #10. Interviewed on 13 September 2023.

Spring and Summer 2024 Interviews
Official #11. Interviewed on 21 February 2024
Official #1. Interviewed on 11 March 2024.
Official #12. Interviewed on 12 April 2024.
Official #11. Interviewed on 15 April 2024.
Official #13. Interviewed on 28 May2024.

Official #14. Interviewed on 28 June 2024.
Official #15. Interviewed on 3 July 2024.

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Soli deo Gloria.

[532] The abridged version.