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Withering minds – towards a unified embodied mind theory of personal identity for understanding dementia

Abstract:

A prominent view on personal identity over time, Jeff McMahan’s ‘Embodied Mind Account’ (2002) holds that we cease to exist only once our brains can no longer sustain the basic capacity to uphold consciousness. One of the many implications of this view on identity persistence is that we continue to exist throughout even the most severe cases of dementia, until our consciousness irreversibly shuts down. In, this paper I argue that, while the most convincing of prominent accounts of personal id...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.1136/medethics-2021-107381

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MSD
Sub department:
Psychiatry
Role:
Author
Publisher:
BMJ Publishing Group Publisher's website
Journal:
Journal of Medical Ethics Journal website
Publication date:
2021-09-11
Acceptance date:
2021-08-19
DOI:
EISSN:
1473-4257
ISSN:
0306-6800
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1191660
Local pid:
pubs:1191660
Deposit date:
2021-08-19

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