

Federico Varese

How Mafias Migrate: Transplantation, Functional Diversification, and Separation

ABSTRACT

Many policy makers and some academics believe that mafias move easily between countries and with little difficulty quickly become deeply rooted. The reality is more complicated. Mafiosi often move away from their home territories because they are forced to do so rather than because they relocate for strategic reasons; that kind of transplantation abroad tends to be unsuccessful. Whether transplantation succeeds depends on the presence of mafiosi and local factors, such as whether markets, construction, or illegal drugs are booming and poorly regulated. Under some conditions, transplantation results in wholesale separation between the original organization and the outpost. Mafiosi abroad often neither plan nor hope to achieve the kinds of control of territories, industries, and markets they exercise at home but to buy or sell illegal commodities, thereby engaging in a process of functional diversification.

The movement of Italian mafias from the regions where they are traditionally rooted—Sicily, Calabria, and Campania—to the northern areas of the country and abroad has been widely discussed (see, e.g., Ciconte

Electronically published June 3, 2020

Federico Varese is a professor of criminology at the University of Oxford and a senior research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford. I am grateful to participants in the *Crime and Justice* meeting on organized crime, Bologna (May 16–18, 2019), for their comments, especially to Francesco Calderoni, Paolo Campana, and Maurizio Catino, who provided additional suggestions and pointed me to relevant sources. Zora Hauser, Francesco Niccolò

© 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0192-3234/2020/0049-00XX\$10.00

1998; Sciarrone 1998; Massari 2001; Forgione 2009; Di Antonio 2010; De Filippo and Moretti 2011; Portanova, Rossi, and Stefanoni 2011; Tizian 2011; Pignatone and Prestipino 2012; Gennari 2013; Pignedoli 2016). Similar phenomena affect other countries. For instance, street gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha, Latin Kings, and Barrio 18 are active across the United States and in Central America. Hong Kong triads are said to be moving to Europe and mainland China, while crime groups from the former Soviet Union are reported to be operating in Western Europe. This trend is of immediate policy concern, and yet it also raises general questions related to the role of local factors in organized crime and the effects of globalization in facilitating serious crime across borders. It is now considered one of the main theoretical issues in the study of organized crime. Since the 2000s a number of significant works on the subject—using a variety of methods including community qualitative studies, comparative historical investigations, descriptive quantitative studies, and hypothesis testing on relatively large data sets—have been published. Understanding of the subject, however, continues to suffer from conceptual confusion, data challenges, and knowledge gaps.

Organized crime is best defined on the basis of the activities of groups, rather than on their organizational structure, contrary to a widely held view. I focus here on the mobility of established criminal groups that, in their territories of origin, control market and territories. I refer to this as governance-type organized crime or usually, for reasons of simplicity, as mafias. The first section of this essay introduces the most important concepts needed to understand mafia mobility: transplantation, functional diversification, and separation. Transplantation refers to mafias' ability to reproduce their capacity to govern some markets or territory far from their places of origin and their main operations. This is a more analytically useful concept than others that appear in the literature such as "stable presence," "settlement," "colonization," "entrenchment," and "hard penetration"; they do not make explicit what the group does in the territory in which it is present. A key distinction needs to be made between transplantation and functional diversification. Mafiosi abroad may engage in activities that do not entail attempts to control markets or territories but rather to buy and sell illegal goods. In the latter case, they engage in functional

Moro, and Dennis Rodgers commented helpfully on an earlier version of this essay. Three anonymous referees also gave detailed comments. Michael Tonry and Peter Reuter helped me clarify my arguments and presentation significantly. This essay draws and expands on work I have published elsewhere (Varese 2001, 2004, 2006, 2010, 2011*a*, 2012*b*).

diversification. Under some conditions, the mafia outpost may separate from the “motherland” and become a fully independent new entity.

In Section II, I present two contrasting perspectives on mafia transplantation. According to the Free Movement view, the presence of mafiosi abroad is the product of a rational strategy to colonize new territory, it is a ubiquitous phenomenon, and entrenchment is easy. Such a view tends to suffer from lack of conceptual clarity and of specification of the phenomenon under study and to rely on exaggerated claims. Other scholars have advanced the contrary view, namely, that mafias never move. This I call the No Movement view. While theoretically elegant, this second position cannot explain the limited yet real phenomenon of mafia presence in new places. It assumes that criminal reputations cannot travel across long distances and that the motherland cannot control its agents when they are far away. Criminal reputations do, however, travel across borders, and often the transplanted group is not formed by employees of the motherland. Rather, it is an independent unit using the mafia brand name.

In Section III, I list the main hypotheses that have been advanced to account for mafia transplantation, functional diversification, and separation. Sections IV–VI present the main empirical findings. Concerning transplantation: mafiosi are more likely to find themselves in new territories because of unwanted circumstances rather than because of intentional, rational decisions to colonize new markets and territories. The mere presence of mafiosi as such is not sufficient to predict transplantation. When that presence coincides with particular conditions in the local economy, namely, unregulated expansion in local markets such as construction or drugs, or more generally the inability of the state to provide protection, mafiosi can become entrenched.

Functional diversification is more likely to occur in larger cities and in criminal hubs, and substantial migration from the motherland does not appear to be a necessary precondition. This is in marked contrast to transplantation, which is more likely to succeed in towns and small cities. Several studies report that mafiosi operating abroad were forced out of their places of origin rather than being sent by bosses. Finally, separation is comparatively rare, yet it occurred in at least one significant case, that of the Italian American mafia which emerged from Sicilian roots. Such a separation was possible because the outpost grew significantly in power and wealth vis-à-vis to the motherland, and the brand name was easily recognizable.

Section VII outlines conceptual, methodological, and empirical issues that remain unresolved. I emphasize the importance of use of historical

comparative methods in qualitative studies of the mafia and the need to identify negative cases. I also discuss the relationships between concepts used in indexes in quantitative studies.

Section VIII outlines emerging research areas and policy implications. Alliances are needed among scholars working on Latin America, the United States, and Europe, as is adoption of compatible frameworks. Policy efforts to control and oppose organized crime must be informed by the key distinction between transplantation and functional diversification and by recognition that certain local markets, such as construction, are more at risk of mafia penetration than are other economic sectors such as import and export of goods.

I. Concepts

I focus on a particular type of criminal organization that seeks to govern markets or territories. I refer to these organizations as governance-type organized crime or, for simplicity, mafias. Since the publication of my study of the Russian mafia (Varese 2001), I have been interested in exploring to what extent mafias operate outside of their traditional territories. In this essay, I return to questions I have addressed elsewhere (esp. Varese 2011*b*) and want to shed further light on transplantation, functional diversification, and separation. In this section, I explain what I mean by these concepts and why I do not use others.

What is organized crime? Despite the variety—and often vagueness—of definitions in official documents and the academic literature, definitions are typically of two types: those that focus on the internal structure of organizations and those that focus on the activities of groups. The first type usually includes a reference to minimum membership (“three or more persons”), the presence of a hierarchical structure, and continuity over time. For instance, according to the United Nations, “‘organized criminal group’ shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (UNODC 2004, art. 2a). For this approach, organized crime is crime that is organized, often highly so. Definitions that emphasize the structure evolved over the twentieth century (Varese 2010). Until the 1960s, organized crime was typically defined as a hierarchical, corporate-like entity. Since the 1970s, organized crime organizations have

usually been portrayed as being more flexible, networked, and flat (Catino 2019; Paoli 2020; Reuter and Paoli 2020).

The other type of definition focuses on activities. Several characterizations from the 1960s posit that organized crime groups are illicit enterprises operating in a market producing goods and services, such as gambling, loan-sharking, narcotics, and sexual services (Task Force on Organized Crime 1967, p. 1; Smith 1975, 1978; Edwards and Gill 2002). More recently, Campana and Varese (2018) proposed a framework that distinguishes three sets of illegal activities—production, trade, and governance—each an investment in a different set of resources. In this view, organized crime is not simply crime that is organized, but it is an activity that produces goods and services, including governance (Schelling 1971).¹ The organizational form derives from the activity: for instance, in order to govern, a group must be structured hierarchically with an effective chain of command, invest in violence resources, and have clear membership boundaries. Production of illicit services can, by contrast, be done by small-scale, market-oriented enterprises with minimal organizational structure (Reuter 1983). When law enforcement is weak, such enterprises can grow in size and complexity, just as legitimate counterparts do.

Governance-type organized crime is of particular interest because it undermines the legitimate order. Traditional mafias—Cosa Nostra, the 'Ndrangheta, the Italian American mafia, the Russian mafia, the Japanese yakuza, and the Hong Kong triads—are forms of governance-type organized crime (Varese 2018*b*; Paoli 2020). Historical clans and federations of the Neapolitan camorra also qualify (Campana 2011*b*).² Groups that normally are classified as gangs, such as Mara Salvatrucha, Latin Kings, and Barrio 18, have also shown an ability to govern both inside and outside prisons. They have expanded across the United States and to Central America (Arana 2005; Cruz 2010), making them a good test for theories of transplantation. The ability to govern in the territory of origin is a

¹ Such a perspective excludes some crimes, such as organized theft, sexual harassment, and frauds from the definition of organized crime. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Varese (2010) and Campana and Varese (2018).

² Traditional mafias have developed norms of behavior that are shared across “families.” These mafias have memorable initiation ceremonies, similar hierarchical structures, and internal rules, including rules about sex, family life, and relationships among members and with outsiders. These mafias are, in effect, a collection of fairly independent gangs controlling a territory and subscribing to the same rules of behavior. They might fight with each other, but they belong to the same structure. For a fuller discussion of their organizational features, see Catino (2020).

matter of a degree, and to some extent criminal governance coexists with other governance-type institutions. For instance, a group may be able to regulate and control the unlawful distribution only of a given commodity or service, or it may be able to supply protection across several markets, as in the case of traditional mafias (Varese 2010). A recent study by Gordon (2020) on Medellín, Colombia, points to the dynamics of such coexistence.

One implication of this perspective is that governance-type organized crime shares key features with states. Some hybrids exist, such as insurgencies and paramilitary groups. Paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland, Indonesia, Colombia, and Myanmar controlled territories and dispensed highly imperfect forms of justice, while forcing people to pay taxes and protecting illegal trades (Rueda 2009; Peña 2014; Varese 2018*b*, pp. 182, 260). Insurgent groups can be conceptualized as lying on a continuum between governance-type organized crime and states. Yet they also differ. Mafias differ from insurgencies and states insofar as “the set of collective action mechanisms that constrains institutions of governance and makes them accountable to the people” are different (Varese 2010, p. 20). In other words, they are not run as a democracy in which citizens elect their leaders or as a liberal state in which citizens have rights and can appeal to laws that can force the state to reverse its decisions. Such a perspective opens up fruitful theoretical possibilities to give analytical meaning to the expression “mafia state,” although this essay is not the place to pursue such a conceptual study.

I refer to governance-type organized crime, or mafias. My choice to focus on this particular kind of crime group is motivated by their significance but also by analytical and practical considerations. As we expand the object of study to groups that engage primarily in predatory crime, theft, or just the sale of illegal goods, the models and potential explanations are bound to differ significantly from those that might account for mafias.³

By transplantation, I refer to the ability of a mafia group to supply illegal governance for a substantial period of time to a place outside the territory of origin (Varese 2004, 2006, 2011*b*).⁴ Transplantation implies that the mafia is able to provide private protection even in the new territory and not only in the territory of origin. The concept, introduced in 2004, is now widely adopted in the literature. Similar yet arguably less cogent concepts have also been used. Scholars refer to “stable presence”

³ Yet see below remarks on the possible transition of Mexican drug traffickers from trade to governance and production activities.

⁴ I use the term governance in this essay as equivalent to criminal protection (Gambetta 1993).

(Calderoni et al. 2016, p. 419), “settlement” (Sciarrone and Storti 2014, p. 45), “colonization” (Forgione 2009, p. 26), “entrenchment” (Armao 2003), and “hard penetration” (Galeotti 2000, p. 38). None of these concepts makes explicit what the group does in the territory in which it is present.⁵

Crime groups might also acquire goods, launder money, and operate in the legal economy. Trading in goods, some of which may be illegal, is analytically different from selling the right to operate in a given market or territory.⁶ Campana (2013, p. 318) has suggested that mafias may diversify their activities; in the traditional territory, they govern, while abroad they may buy and sell goods. He calls this “functional diversification,” a term that has entered the literature on mafia mobility. Varese (2004, 2011*a*, 2011*b*) refers to the search for resources and production inputs that are not available in the territory of origin and need to be bought elsewhere.

“Infiltration” is the expression used by Sciarrone and Storti (2014, p. 45) for instances in which “only certain features of the mafia organizations” are present.⁷ Indicators of infiltration include physical presence of individual mafiosi, purely predatory behavior, exploitation of investment opportunities, and more generally engaging in “series of activities, both legal and illegal, that are chiefly economic in nature” (Sciarrone and Storti 2014, p. 54; see also pp. 45, 53). The concept appears to include a range of diverse phenomena, some potentially inconsequential, including the simple presence of a mafioso abroad who might not be engaged in anything at all.⁸

As for involvement in economic activities, it is important to spell out what such involvement entails. Also, it is important to underline that functional diversification differs from the occasional visit abroad. It entails a tangible intention to establish an outpost abroad for the long term, committing resources to such a plan (see Campana 2013, p. 317). Ultimately, the concept of functional diversification expresses that mafia groups might be present abroad with the aim of buying and selling illegal goods and investing in the economy, rather than trying to control markets or territories.

Over time, the mafia group might grow in autonomy and eventually separate from the motherland. Some authors have pointed to this in relation to the separation between the Italian American mafia and the Sicilian

⁵ Correctly in my view, Sciarrone (1998) criticizes the use of medical metaphors, such as virus and contagion, to describe the presence of mafias abroad. See also Spapens (2019).

⁶ Kleemans (2007, p. 176) refers to trading in illegal goods and services as “transit crime.”

⁷ Italian investigators have used the expression “soft presence” (Allum 2014, p. 586).

⁸ This appears to be the case of a man convicted of mafia crimes in Italy in the 1990s, who fled to the United Kingdom and lived some 20 years in London, where he appears not to have been involved in any criminal activity (see BBC News 2015).

Cosa Nostra and to the failed attempt of a Lombardy-based 'Ndrangheta group to separate from the Calabria-based organization (Varese 2011*b*, 2012*b*).⁹ The key empirical indicator of separation is whether entry in one group gives an automatic right to join the other. For instance, in the case of the Sicilian and Italian American mafias, at some time having gone through the admission ritual in Sicily ceased to be enough to gain entry into American families.

Other concepts such as “transnational organized crime,” “power syndicate,” and “enterprise syndicate” are of limited value. As the Soviet Union ended, transnational organized crime replaced the menace of communism in some policy circles, argues Woodiwiss (2003). Regardless of the political agenda that might have motivated the use of this construct in Western policy-making circles, transnational organized crime lacks firm analytical grounding. While it is sensible to assume that the term refers to something (activities or people) that at some point crosses borders, it does not specify the constitutive element that makes a group transnational. More specifically, the term does not distinguish between instances of governance and of trade and, thus, has little analytical power to account for how mafias operate across territories. It is also unclear why transnationality per se should be singled out.

Block (1983, p. 129) introduced the concepts “power syndicate” and “enterprise syndicate” in his study of organized crime in New York City. In his succinct and somewhat elusive wording, the “enterprise syndicate . . . operates exclusively in the area of illicit enterprises such as prostitution, gambling, bootlegging, and narcotics.” As for “power syndicate . . . its forte is extortion not enterprise [and it] operates both in the arena of illicit enterprises and the industrial world specifically in labor-management disputes and relations” (p. 129). The conceptual couple has had some influence in the literature,¹⁰ and it may well capture the cases discussed in Block’s study. On closer inspection, it does not travel as well as other

⁹ Allum (2014, pp. 595–97) has suggested that separation is never complete, and relations between the motherland and the outpost are interdependent: activities in foreign countries often relate to the homeland and vice versa (she calls it functional mobility). Sciarrone and Storti (2014, p. 47) introduce the concept of hybridization: “A criminal group . . . maintains affinities with the original group but cannot be considered as a direct outgrowth, as it gradually distances itself by adopting an independent model of action and organization.” The word hybrid may be misleading, as ultimately the two groups separate and become distinct entities.

¹⁰ This was especially marked in Italy (see, e.g., Catanzaro 1994; Lupo 1996; Balsamo 2006; Asmundo 2011; Sciarrone and Dagnes 2014). For critical discussions of use of the concept, see Santino (2006, pp. 126–28) and Parini (2008).

concepts, such as governance-type organized crime. With “enterprise” it would have been helpful to specify whether the catchall phrase “operates in a market” refers to trading, production activities, or both. Block appears to exclude the possibility that such groups engage in extortion, yet a crime group might well extort illicit businesses. In addition, it has long been established that mafias do not simply engage in extortion but provide forms of governance and criminal protection and are involved in activities well beyond “labor-management disputes and relations” (Varese 2014).

Governance is provided in illegal markets. For instance, US mafia groups ensured that promises between owners of speakeasies and sellers of alcohol were kept in what were known as curb exchanges, places where market actors met and the mafia acted as a governing authority (Critchley 2009, pp. 154–57). To describe this phenomenon, one might say that a “power syndicate” operated in an illegal market but that its forte was protection. Ultimately, the distinction between power and enterprise appears to mirror the distinction between “governance” and “trade,” but the concept pair lacks analytical clarity.

II. Two Views on Transplantation

Does transplantation ever occur? Until recently, two views have been prominent. I call them Free Movement and No Movement.¹¹ The Free Movement view sees mafia presence abroad as easily achieved and ubiquitous, while the No Movement view ignores the limited number of cases in which transplantation has taken place.

A. *Free Movement*

This position suggests that organized crime migrates easily, because of the spread of globalization and population migration, and that criminal multinational corporations are increasingly unattached to a specific territory. This view is mainly associated with the work of Sterling (1990, 1995), Shelley (1999, 2006, 2019), Castells (2000), Williams (2001), and Naim (2010) and has been influential among policy makers (e.g., United Nations 1994; UNODC 2010). “Crime groups on all continents try to globalize their activities for many of the same reasons as their legitimate counterparts. They seek to exploit valuable international markets,” writes

¹¹ I have several times outlined these two views, in particular in Varese (2011*b*, pp. 3, 13–14, 15). I draw on that publication here (see also Varese 2006).

Shelley, director of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime, and Corruption Center at George Mason University (2019, p. 226). Such groups “establish branches around the world to take advantage of attractive labour or raw material markets” (Shelley 2006, p. 43). For Williams, organized crime now “can migrate easily” (2001, p. 71). Castells lists a number of locales where (he posits) well-known mafias have opened outposts, such as Germany for the Sicilian mafia, Galicia for Colombian cartels, and the Netherlands for Chinese triads (2000, p. 201). These and other authors go further to argue that the notions of territorial entrenchment and control are becoming obsolete for a “Global Crime Inc.” that “transcends the sovereignty that organizes the modern state system” (Shelley, Pica-relli, and Corpora 2003, p. 145). Factors often cited to explain the globalization of criminal activities and the geographic expansion of criminal firms include technological innovation in communications and transportation along with disappearing language barriers (Castells 2000, p. 168; Barak 2001; Shelley 2006, 2019).

Police, judicial authorities, and press reports appear to adopt this view when they write that, for example, the Russian mafia is active in at least 26 foreign countries or that the Calabrese ‘Ndrangheta is present in more than 20 (Varese 2011*b*, pp. 13, 34). After six men were killed outside an Italian restaurant in Duisburg, Germany, in 2007, the Italian Parliamentary Antimafia Commission published a report that claimed that the ‘Ndrangheta is a “fluid mafia organization” able to “spread all over the world” following an explicit strategy of criminal colonization (cited in Campana 2011*a*, p. 208). The former chairman of the Italian Parliamentary Antimafia Commission, in a best-selling book aptly titled *Mafia Export*, argued that bosses intentionally colonize key criminal hubs around the world (Forgione 2009, p. 26). Morselli, Turcotte, and Tenti (2011, p. 166) summarize this viewpoint as follows: “Popular and mainstream depictions of organized crime generally perceive participants to be strategic (or intentional) in their actions. More often, such claims are preceded by the premise that mobility is an effortless task for any group or organization.”

B. No Movement

A second view postulates that mafias are closely connected to their territory of origin and rely on a set of network relationships that cannot be reproduced in new settings. Ethnographies of the Sicilian and Italian American mafias published in the 1970s argue that the Cosa Nostra in the

United States emerged because of homegrown conditions, rather than being an Italian export (Ianni 1972; Hess 1973; Blok 1974). In doing so, proponents of this view emphasize the local nature of mafia power. Blok (1974, p. 226) writes that mafiosi's "power domains are locally phrased and it is precisely their control over a distinct locality that enables them to influence higher levels of society as power brokers." When they move to an alien environment, "mafiosi have their wings clipped" (p. 226). Similarly, Ianni writes that "the various *Mafie* in Sicily are engraved on the daily life of the communities in which they live, and they are not for export" (1972, p. 47). The notion that a grand council or central mafia organ sent an advance party to seek new territory across the Atlantic, setting up branch offices in the New World, "is patently absurd" (p. 48).

Writing in the eighties, Peter Reuter underlined the local nature of crime groups. In reference to illegal enterprises specializing in the provision of marijuana and bookmaking services in the United States, Reuter concluded that such groups are "local in scope." In other words, they do "not include branches in more than one metropolitan area" (Reuter 1985, p. 21). Gambetta (1993), in his study of the Sicilian mafia, writes that "not only did the [Sicilian] mafia grow mainly in western Sicily, but, with the exception of Catania, it has remained there to this very day." More generally, the mafia, he adds, "is a difficult industry to export. Not unlike mining, it is heavily dependent on the local environment" (pp. 249, 251).

Similarly, Chu (2000) argues that "Hong Kong triads are localized and they are not international illegal entrepreneurs whose wealth and connections may enable them to migrate to Western countries." Although Hong Kong triads might be involved in international crime, observes Chu, they "are not likely to be the key organisers" (p. 130; see also Finckenauer and Chin 2006, p. 23). Hill reports that the yakuza never "managed to extend their core protective role beyond a native Japanese market" (Hill 2002, p. 53; 2004, p. 112). Weenink and van der Laan (2007) downplay the presence of the Russian mafia in the Netherlands.

Reuter (1985) offered several important theoretical insights into why crime groups, including mafias, routinely fail to expand. Applying key findings from the theory of industrial organization and especially principal-agent models developed in the 1970s in economics (Williamson 1975; Hay and Morris 1979), Reuter noted that distance makes it harder to monitor an employee and ensure that the agent works efficiently and honestly. The agent can misappropriate both tangible and organizational capital from

the enterprise by embezzling it and engage in activities not sanctioned by the principal, thereby attracting police attention and endangering the entire organization. In order to escape punishment, the agent might even inform on the bosses back home (Reuter 1985, pp. 21–22). The collection of reliable information on what people do is a vital part of a mafioso's job, but they are likely to find it hard to come by this information in an unfamiliar territory in which they cannot rely on extensive networks of friends and accomplices.

Furthermore, Reuter argued, agents and bosses need to be in touch frequently, thus increasing communication traffic between the two territories. Since face-to-face meetings would be the exception rather than the rule, the likelihood that the police might intercept such communication increases with distance. Finally, reputation is a crucial asset for mafiosi to carry out their jobs. The greater one's reputation for the ability to wield violence is, the less one needs to use it, since victims comply more readily. Reuter wrote that investments in violence, which yield a reputation for being able to deliver on threats, have a higher return when the criminal has contacts, through a continuous chain of other persons, with at least one witness to the violent act. It is more likely that such a chain is broken with distance (Reuter 1985, pp. 21–22, 33). Along similar lines, Gambetta maintained that a reputation for effective violence depends on long-term relationships, cemented within independent networks of kinship, friendship, and ethnicity. It is impossible to reproduce such networks in a new setting (Gambetta 1993, pp. 249–51).

C. The Two Views Reassessed

Studies that endorse the Free Movement view normally suffer from three related problems. First, they do not clearly define the object of study. In the same sweep, they consider crooked oligarchs engaged in tax evasion, illicit businesses, drug cartels, traditional mafias, and even pirates. Second, they do not offer a precise definition of the dependent variable. In other words, they do not specify what the group is doing in the new territory. Often individuals found abroad are taken as evidence that the group has moved. Third, their sources tend to be superficial, including newspaper stories and official reports, rather than in-depth case studies or large-scale quantitative analyses. In sum, it is hard to evaluate these claims. Yet the perspective they present needs to be taken seriously, as it has greatly influenced policy makers and reflects the broader debate on the nature and

consequences of globalization, and is consistent with the views of writers who emphasize the deterritorialization of economic power (e.g., Albrow 1996; Bauman 1998; Beck 1999).

The No Movement view is empirically clear and theoretically elegant. Yet there are various reasons to doubt it. Some evidence exists that, under certain conditions, governance-type organized crime groups are capable of operating in distant territories. In his memoirs, Catania mafia boss Antonio Calderone reminisced that, during his time, there were two recognized branches of Sicilian mafia families in central and northern Italy. Another family operated for a while in Tunis, its existence having been recorded since at least the 1930s. “At the time,” wrote Calderone, “Tunis was a haven for many mafiosi fleeing Fascism. . . . [There] they had formed a regular family with a representative” (Arlacchi 1993, p. 28; Gambetta 1993, pp. 251, 314).¹² Melchiorre Allegra, a doctor who admitted to belonging to the Sicilian mafia, told authorities in 1937 that the organization had powerful extensions in Tunisia, North America, and Marseilles (Allegra 1962). Sicilian mafiosi operated in the United States, to the point that an organization resembling the Sicilian mafia emerged in some North American cities. Officially sanctioned outposts of the ‘Ndrangheta are present in several regions in Northern Italy, such as Piedmont ($n = 11$), Lombardy ($n = 20$), and Emilia-Romagna, where initiation rituals are performed and a degree of control over crucial markets has been observed (Varese 2006; dalla Chiesa and Panzarasa 2012; Ciccarello 2014; Sciarrone and Dagnes 2014; dalla Chiesa and Cabras 2019).¹³

Italian mafiosi appear to be operating outside the country as well. In 1992, 70 Italian mafiosi were serving time in French prisons, 62 *camorristi* were in prison in Spain in 2009, and in 2017 the German Police identified 17 “predominantly Italian” organized crime groups active in Germany (Bundeskriminalamt 2017). The ‘Ndrangheta has been found to have a stable presence in Germany, Canada, and Australia (Gratteri and Nicaso 2009, pp. 233–51; Sergi 2015; Calderoni et al. 2016).

Moving beyond Italian groups, at least 30 Taiwanese gangsters lived and worked in Phnom Penh, including the leader of Taiwan Bamboo

¹² The presence of the Sicilian mafia has also been documented in Genoa, Liguria, and Northern Italy (La Spina 2013; see also Scaglione and Sciarrone 2014).

¹³ The exact number of officially recognized outposts in Emilia-Romagna has not yet been established by investigations. Yet, see Pignedoli (2016) and dalla Chiesa and Cabras (2019) concerning Reggio Emilia.

United, a major triad group (Chin 2003, p. 200). According to reports, a triad boss, Lao Da, was “the main organized crime figure in Vladivostok” (Lintner 2004, p. 93). Xiang Du, a Chinese national, led a gang in the Russian city of Khabarovsk for four years (1997–2001; He 2003, pp. 201–3). Latino gangs originating from Los Angeles are firmly established in Central America (Arana 2005; Cruz 2010; Varese 2011*b*, p. 191). While the exact nature of their activities and the extent of their presence need to be scrutinized, it seems clear that we are faced with a phenomenon that cannot be dismissed theoretically, and it requires empirical study.

The No Movement view has also been challenged theoretically (Varese 2011*b*, pp. 25–27). First, the reputation for being a menacing criminal organization can travel, thanks to well-meaning newspaper investigations, popular culture, and the media. Even movies and TV series might help advertise a foreign mafia (Varese 2018*b*, pp. 137–57). Colombian cartels quickly became known in the United States for their ruthless methods (Reuter 1995). Members of Los Angeles Latino gangs were easily recognized by their tattoos in El Salvador and Guatemala (Cruz 2010, p. 386). While it takes a long time for a mafia group to collect reliable information, it is plausible that a number of years suffices to create a network of informants. In addition, the information to be collected need not be about complex transactions or numerous locales. It might well be about a local market in the new territory. To the extent that a mafia can count on migration networks in the new locale, some information will be easier to come by. Significant economic investments in the new territory by associates of the incoming mafia can also be a conduit for data gathering. In sum, the collection of information in the new place is not an insurmountable obstacle to transplantation, only a challenge. Finally, it is plausible that agents abroad are harder to monitor.

Yet the hard-to-monitor argument hinges on the assumption that a mafia group is akin to a standard, fully integrated firm. Each mafia family shares norms of behavior and rituals with other families but otherwise has great autonomy in conducting criminal activities. The motherland can devise a simple mechanism to benefit from the outpost, for instance, by asking for a fixed payment every year. Members abroad are not employees of the original organization but instead operate a franchise and may pay a regular fee or offer some other benefits in return for the seal of approval from the motherland. There is evidence that ‘Ndrangheta outposts offer tokens of appreciation to the motherland. According to Catanzaro Chief Prosecutor Nicola Gratteri, the outpost “makes offers, sends a thought

[meaning a financial payment]” to the coffers of the head of the organization (pers. comm., January 17, 2020).

In sum, there are empirical and theoretical reasons to justify social science studies of mafia transplantation (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). The design of such research projects must imply variation in the dependent variable, which can take three values: the mafia group might be able to transplant itself, it might fail to do so, or it might engage in activities that differ from what it does in its territory of origin (functional diversification). It would be naive and ultimately wrong to assume that transplantation always occurs whenever it is attempted, although some critics seem to think so. The challenge is to pinpoint the conditions under which it is more likely for each of the three scenarios to occur.

III. Mechanisms of Mafia Transplantation, Functional Diversification, and Separation

In this section, I outline the main hypotheses on transplantation, functional diversification, and separation that have advanced, starting with transplantation.¹⁴

A. Transplantation

A number of factors have been identified that facilitate transplantation to new territories. They can be divided into two categories: supply and local conditions that generate a demand for mafia services. These dimensions should be analyzed separately. The circumstances that bring mafiosi (the supply) to a new territory, such as generalized migration and mafia migration, differ from local conditions in which organized criminals operate. Their presence may satisfy a local demand for criminal governance, such as the levels of trust and civic engagement, the presence of local protectors, and the presence or absence of new or expanding markets. Some local structural features, such the size of the new locale, might make transplantation easier.

1. *Supply.* Supply can be generated intentionally or unintentionally. Some mafiosi may decide to leave their home territory following a deliberate strategy. The strategic, intentional reasons leading a mafioso to

¹⁴ For this section, I draw and expand on Varese (2011*b*, pp. 16–27).

move away may include a search for resources. A legal firm may open a branch abroad in order to acquire workforce, knowledge, the ability to produce innovation, or organizational resources (Zaheer and Manrakhan 2001, p. 670). So might a mafia. The resources sought might include workforce, weapons, hiding places, cameras, bugs, fake passports, and bank accounts. Moving may be a safer and less expensive way to obtain these assets.

Alternatively, the mafia group might want to invest the proceeds of their main activities in other countries. Investments by criminal groups are hidden, done informally through fronts, and often in cash. When disputes arise, resorting to the judicial system is not an option. Furthermore, money laundering and investments in the official economy can involve multiple transactions between agents of the criminal group and entrepreneurs in foreign and inhospitable countries. Businesses can fail, but bosses at home have no way to verify why failures occur. This offers a motivation to send representatives abroad. Finally, a mafia may (as implied by the Free Movement view) decide to expand to a new market or territory if it perceives an absence of local competitors and a good chance of recovering the huge costs involved.

Members of governance-type organized crime groups may be abroad unintentionally. People migrate to look for better living conditions. Every population contains a percentage of criminals, so the larger the number of emigrants, the greater the number of criminals who will enter a new territory. Migration from areas where the percentage of members of governance-type organized crime groups is high makes their transplantation more likely. People migrate to escape wars and natural calamities. Criminals, including those belonging to a mafia, may similarly move to a new territory to avoid being killed in local crime feuds or to avoid arrest by the police. Paradoxically, the more effective police repression is in a high-density mafia territory, the greater the numbers of members who are likely to try to run away. The supply abroad of governance-type organized crime members can thus be the product of intentional decisions or of pressures to relocate. Of course, they would choose where to move, a decision often influenced by the well-known phenomenon of chain migration (MacDonald and MacDonald 1964; Varese 2011b, p. 8).

2. *Local Conditions.* Once mafiosi are in a new region, what conditions might allow them to transplant? Robert Putnam, in a ground-breaking study of Italian regional governments, suggested that the level of generalized trust (among people unknown to each other) in the new area could

explain the extent to which mafias become rooted: the lower the level of trust among citizens, the less likely that civil society will be able to organize itself to counter the presence of a mafia group (Putnam 1993). Gambetta (1993) posited that the lower the level of trust among those who break the law, the greater the demand will be for protection services. By guaranteeing pacts and promises, the mafia can facilitate exchanges between criminals who do not trust each other. This implies that mafias are more likely to transplant successfully into places characterized by low levels of trust among both those who respect the law and those who break it.

A demand for criminal governance, the main activity of mafias, may help explain successful transplantation. Such a demand could emerge from sudden development or from rapid expansion of new markets that are not effectively regulated by legitimate authorities. When local authorities cannot define and protect property rights, a need for alternative sources of protection emerges. The less effectively the state can protect its citizens and resolve economic and commercial disputes in legal markets, the greater the search for alternative sources of protection will be. This arises from the state's inability to enforce promises and deals. A second type of demand for protection emerges when legitimate entrepreneurs, dealing in legal commodities, decide to try to sell goods unlawfully, eliminate competition, or organize cartel agreements.

The existence of large illegal markets generates a demand for regulation and protection that cannot be satisfied by official institutions. The mafia can control access to sectors of the economy, offer dispute resolution and protection services, enforce cartel agreements, and reduce competition, thereby penetrating the fabric of the local economy and society. These opportunities are easy to grasp when a supply of individuals trained in the use of violence is present. Such a demand can facilitate both the birth of local groups and the migration of existing ones.

Construction is an economic sector that provides incentives to create cartel agreements: companies compete in a local context, and barriers to entry are relatively low (Reuter 1987; Gambetta and Reuter 1995). Illegal pacts in the construction industry are often formed without mafia involvement when a small number of operators decide to collude and carve up market shares. When the market suddenly expands, however, enforcing cartel agreements and excluding new competitors becomes more difficult without the threat or use of violence.

Companies must, however, compete on the same turf for a gang to exercise effective action. Export-oriented economies, for example, generate

less demand for criminal protection: the mafia cannot help exporters penetrate distant markets by putting pressure on another local entrepreneur who exports to a different part of the world.

Other structural features of a new territory, such as its size, can affect the probability of success of transplantation. All else being equal, the smaller the territory or market, the easier it is to control. It is simpler to govern a construction sector with 30 companies than one with 300. If the mafia tries to infiltrate politics, it will have less difficulty in a small electoral district. More votes are needed to influence the election of a mayor in a big city than in a small town. In places where a criminal group or corrupt government officials already provide protection and are entrenched, mafia members from outside will struggle to supplant them.

Other conditions being equal, large electoral districts, large markets, and export-oriented economies make the provision of mafia protection, and therefore transplantation, more difficult. The absence of local protectors makes transplantation easier. Figure 1 summarizes the hypotheses outlined above. Each is in need of empirical testing and highly unlikely to work in isolation.

B. Functional Diversification

Much less work has been done on factors that might predict functional diversification. For this to occur, a supply of mafiosi in the new territory




FIG. 1.—Hypotheses for mafia transplantation. Supply of mafiosi is generalized migration and mafiosi migration (intentional/nonintentional). DCG = demand for criminal governance.

is again a background condition that could result from either intentional decisions or forced relocations. Mafiosi might be attracted to a locality to buy certain goods. Equally they might be there as part of a migration trend or to escape turf wars or the police.

Intentional decisions to move might be common, but functional diversification depends not on occasional trips but on establishment of a permanent base. Although counterintuitive, unplanned presence may be common. A second structural factor is the size of the locale. Commodities such as drugs are more likely to be traded in hubs, such as ports, and in large cities than in small towns. For functional diversification, the local market structure should not matter. All that matters is that trading can occur in a relatively secure, anonymous setting, and mafiosi can bring cash in and take goods away. A degree of deregulation of financial markets should also facilitate functional diversification. Moro and Villa (2017, p. 49) suggest that markets with low entry barriers and a prevalence of small and medium firms with limited access to credit will offer more money laundering opportunities to mafiosi who have access to capital and liquidity. Figure 2 summarizes the key hypotheses.

C. Separation

Campana (2013, p. 318) suggests that a foreign outpost involved in acquiring goods and services is more dependent on the motherland than are groups that succeed in transplanting themselves. Thus, we should expect that separation is more likely for groups that have successfully transplanted than for those that developed along the lines of functional




FIG. 2.—Hypotheses for mafia functional diversification. Supply of mafiosi is generalized migration and mafiosi migration (intentional/nonintentional).

diversification. Additional hypotheses can be suggested. First, for successful separation, the new brand name must be easily recognizable. It might be the same as the original “firm” or something new that resonates with victims. Second, the breakaway outpost must have accumulated enough wealth and influence that it need not fear retaliation from the motherland. In this case, the breakaway unit need not ask permission to use the original brand name. Separation might also occur when the motherland wants to assert greater control over the outpost than its members want, such as imposing deeply disliked bosses or insisting on actions contrary to the interest of the outpost. Finally, separation may result from expulsion (see fig. 3).

Mafia presence in territories far from where the group originated should be viewed as dynamic. Over time, local conditions may dictate a transition from functional diversification to transplantation (Campana and Varese 2018). Mafiosi away from their home territory might start buying goods and involve themselves in money laundering. Eventually they may be able to exploit opportunities to govern local markets such as construction or drugs. However, the difficulties confronting such a transition should not be underestimated. More is required than the presence of mafiosi and investments in the local economy. The more efficient the criminal justice system, the larger the territory, and the greater the presence of local protectors all make the shift from, say, buying drugs to transplantation more difficult.

IV. Empirical Tests: Transplantation

Efforts have been made to test the mechanisms that account for mafia transplantation. Key findings are that the presence of mafiosi abroad appears invariably to be an unintended consequence of other decisions




FIG. 3.—Hypotheses for mafia separation

rather than the product of rational choices to open distant outposts; that significant migration from the home country at some time is necessary but not sufficient for transplantation; that high levels of trust in the new territory do not prevent transplantation; and that dynamics in the local economy, such as a thriving but badly regulated construction market and a small territory, can be decisive.

A. Generalized Migration

In Varese (2011*b*), I presented a series of systematic comparisons between cases that share some similarities but differ as to whether transplantation occurred: the movement of 'Ndrangheta to two towns in Northern Italy, Bardonecchia and Verona; the movement of members of the Russian mafia to Rome and Budapest; and the movement of Cosa Nostra to New York City and Rosario, Argentina. The cases were selected because members of the same mafias of origin attempted to move to territories that shared some theoretically relevant features (naturally, it is next to impossible to find cases that share all features except one in naturally occurring settings; Varese 2019). Migration by itself did not result in transplantation. Similar levels of migration from high-density mafia areas to New York City and Rosario and to cities in central and northern Italy did not invariably lead to long-term mafia entrenchment. A mafia group can satisfy a demand for criminal protection only when migration is combined with the inability of public institutions to govern economic change. Migration from the south to the central Italian region of Tuscany was also substantial (Sciarrone and Dagnes 2014, p. 60), yet no mafia emerged.

Is migration a necessary condition for transplantation? Italian mafia groups appear to exist in places such as Spain that experienced no significant migration from Southern Italy (Sciarrone and Storti 2014, p. 42). Arguably the Italians in Spain are engaged in a process of functional diversification (Allum 2014). However, Sergi (2015) presents data on migration from Calabria to Australia where the 'Ndrangheta, she argues, was able to transplant. Ingrasci (2015, p. 45) notes that organized groups from the Republic of Georgia have been active in the city of Bari, where the largest Georgian immigrant community in Italy lives (see also Varese 2018*b*, p. 70). Significant migration from the home country at some point appears to be necessary but not sufficient for transplantation but is not a condition for functional diversification.

The “policy of forced resettlement” (*soggiorno obbligato*) may have influenced transplantation in Italy; people convicted of mafia crimes were required to reside outside their home regions. Forced resettlement, started in 1956, was premised on the assumptions that organized crime was a product of backward societies and that mafiosi, far from home and immersed in the culture of the northern regions, respectful of the law and marked by a strong civic sense, would abandon their old habits. However misconceived, *soggiorno obbligato* cannot be held responsible for successful transplantation. The ‘Ndrangheta was able to transplant in Bardonecchia, in the province of Turin, but failed in other provinces of Piedmont that had received comparable or higher numbers of people sentenced to forced resettlement. The presence of incoming mafiosi does not necessarily lead to long-term transplantation (Varese 2011*b*).

Sciarrone and Dagnes (2014, pp. 55–56) evaluated the effects of migration and forced resettlement on mafia presence in Northern Italy. They found a correlation between mafia groups involved in extortion (“power syndicate”) and both migration from the southern mafia regions and forced resettlement in the north. They emphasize, however, that they do not posit mechanical links among migration, forced resettlement, and mafia.

B. Mafiosi’s Presence: Unintentional

Varese (2011*b*) was the first published study to focus explicitly on the mechanisms of mafia mobility. In all the cases discussed, mafia members found themselves “abroad” unintentionally. They needed to move because of a court order, law enforcement pressures, or a mafia war. They were not implementing rational long-term strategies to colonize new markets or obtain new products. Their presence in a faraway territory might appear to be a product of globalization, but the primary explanations are state law enforcement pressures, which export the problems to other countries, and internal feuds within mafia organizations. Unlike what might be expected from the Free Movement perspective, I did not find that mafiosi left their territories and opened outposts abroad in order to obtain resources such as labor, intelligence, and specialized equipment.

Other scholars have also concluded that mafia mobility is unintentional. Ethnographers in the 1970s reported that Sicilian mafiosi ended up in the United States because of forces beyond their control. Hess (1973, p. 156) mentioned that, among Sicilian immigrants to the United States, there were mafia members “flee[ing] from the reach of state organs” or who had defied family orders and were seeking refuge in

the United States (p. 157).¹⁵ Blok (1974, p. 226) observed that “when not forced by circumstances, mafiosi have little reason to move.” Allum (2014) provides an in-depth study of four cases of mobility by members of the Camorra outside of their groups’ heartland in and around Naples. They moved to escape either arrests or internal feuds (pp. 587, 588, 590, table 1). She concluded, “Many *camorristi* did not want to leave Naples but were forced to do so. Our findings are similar to those of Varese [2011*b*, p. 8]” (p. 593). Kleemans and de Boer (2013) describe several instances of Italian mafiosi escaping justice and seeking refuge in the Netherlands.

Arsovska (2014) underscores that hard-core Albanian criminals mentioned in 36 US court cases that she analyzed had not moved of their own volition. Their migration was “not a business choice [but] rather a necessity” (p. 220). Offenders became involved in serious crime after they reached the United States or were “forced to leave their country of origin to escape justice, retaliation, or war. In fact, a number of notorious Albanian organized crime figures were pushed to migrate to escape mafia wars or police repression in their areas of origin” (pp. 220–21). Arsovska (2015), extracting information from court documents, built a database with 254 offenders and 36 variables. She also interviewed 88 ethnic Albanians, 30 of whom had direct knowledge of organized crime. The more direct knowledge of organized crime respondents had, the less they supported the view that Albanian organized crime is exported strategically (p. 166). No respondent who admitted direct contact with Albanian organized crime agreed that organized crime moved strategically to the United States (pp. 166–67, fig. 2).

US Latino gangs known as *maras* provide another transplantation example. In the early 1980s, many Central Americans escaped civil wars by moving to the United States. Thousands came of age in Los Angeles (Cruz 2010, p. 384). Some associated with Latino gangs (Vigil 2010), and police concluded that they were major participants in the 1992 Los Angeles riots (Arana 2005, p. 100). Starting in 1994, California government implemented harsh antigang measures, including stiff prison sentences under the three-strikes law.¹⁶ In 1996, the US Congress authorized

¹⁵ I describe other instances of future Italian American organized crime bosses fleeing from Sicily (Varese 2011*b*, pp. 104–5).

¹⁶ Antigang considerations were not the major reason behind passage of the three-strikes legislation, but it affected gang members (Zimring, Hawkins, and Kamin 2001).

repatriation to their home countries of noncitizens and foreign-born Americans convicted of crimes and sentenced to a year or more in prison. As a result, more than 160,000 people were sent back to Central America and 375,000 more returned voluntarily (Cruz 2010, p. 385). Nearly 50,000 individuals convicted of a variety of crimes were deported to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Rodgers and Baird 2015).¹⁷ Many were members of Mara Salvatrucha (commonly known as MS-13), Barrio 18 (also known as 18th Street gang), and Latin Kings. Their presence in Central America was not the result of a “premeditated and centralised process” but an unintended consequence of US deportation policy (Arana 2005, pp. 100–101; Cruz 2010, p. 388). This parallels the flight of Sicilian mafiosi to the United States to escape Benito Mussolini’s repression of the mafia beginning in 1925 and led by Prefect Mori (Mori 1933, pp. 151–229).

C. *Social Capital/Civiness*

Varese (2011b) challenged Putnam (1993) and Gambetta (1993), who argued that high levels of trust would prevent mafia from establishing a presence in a new place. I found that a high level of generalized trust and social capital in the population is not sufficient to prevent transplantation. The experience of the town of Bardonecchia, Piedmont, shows that high levels of trust are not sufficient to avoid transplantation and that social capital can remain high despite the existence of a mafia cell. Dagnes et al. (2018, p. 8), in a study of mafia penetration of the construction industry in three northern Italian regions, also observed that economic dynamism, high levels of “civiness,” and efficient institutions are not enough to prevent mafia entrenchment. Moro and Villa (2017) tested the effects of interregional variability in civiness on mafia activity in Lombardy, a region with high levels of social capital and wealth. Their findings are consistent with the view that high levels of social capital are not sufficient to prevent mafias’ arrival and entrenchment. They also found that higher levels of civiness reduced the probability of mafia presence (p. 54) but reported that “porous sectors” of the economy, such as construction, had a greater effect.

¹⁷ Some 180,000 Nicaraguan illegal immigrants were allowed to stay in the United States for political reasons (Rocha 2008). As a consequence, the gang problem in Nicaragua is less severe and local gangs (*pandillas*) survived.

D. Size of the Locale

I found that, all else being equal, smaller administrative units (and related markets) make it easier for mafias to influence politics, sell votes, and establish links with politicians, the press, and even the local priest. In Bardonecchia, a handful of votes (500, according to the local boss boasting in a phone call) was sufficient to determine local elections under a proportional representation system with party list and preference voting (Varese 2011*b*).¹⁸ In a case study of a town near Bardonecchia, Ciccarello (2014, pp. 223, 233–36) reached similar conclusions (see also dalla Chiesa and Panzarasa 2012). Dagnes et al. (2018) studied three cases of mafia penetration of the legal economy in small and medium-sized towns and concluded that small size mattered (p. 8). Sciarrone and Dagnes (2014, pp. 55–56) present preliminary evidence for the entire north of Italy that suggests that a significant number of places where mafia groups have been reported to operate are middle-sized towns with between 10,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, lending support to the view that mafias find it hard to control large metropolitan centers.

E. Demand for Criminal Protection in Local Markets

I found (Varese 2004, 2006, 2011*b*) that a demand for protection that is not met by the legitimate authorities is present in all cases of successful transplantation. The availability of mafiosi and the inability of institutions to govern the economy were key factors in successful transplantation by the ‘Ndrangheta in Bardonecchia and by Russian mafias in Hungary.

Not all business sectors are equally attractive to mafiosi. They are more often found in construction, waste disposal, transport, and catering. These sectors have low barriers to entry, are not export oriented, and have low product differentiation. In Bardonecchia, immigrants agreed to work illegally rather than remain unemployed, forgoing union protection and, more generally, state protection. Entrepreneurs employed labor illegally and cheaply and also wanted to restrict competition. A sudden expansion of the construction market to satisfy a boom in demand for holiday homes led to the emergence of a demand for protection against competition. Members of the Mazzaferro ‘Ndrangheta clan who had been court-ordered to reside in Bardonecchia began to offer privileged

¹⁸ I also found (Varese 2011*b*) that no other mafia group (or state apparatus offering illegal protection) was present in the places where transplantation succeeded.

access to this market to some companies and to manage conflicts between workers and employers.

The centrality of construction is well documented. Dalla Chiesa and Panzarasa (2012) studied a town outside Milan where a group from Calabria was heavily involved in construction. Lodetti (2018) showed how construction and waste removal companies connected to the 'Ndrangheta expelled competitors in the province of Mantua in 2002–17. Ciccarello (2014) showed how expansion of the construction sector in the small town of Leinì, Piedmont, was exploited by an 'Ndrangheta group that worked with the town mayor who in turn benefited from their electoral support. Sciarrone and Dagnes (2014) and Dagnes et al. (2018), in two quantitative studies, found a relationship between construction and mafia presence in northern Italy.

More generally, local markets attract organized crime. Calabrese mafiosi governed the fruit and vegetable market in Melbourne, Australia (Minuti and Nicaso 1994; Sergi 2015). In the southern Italian city of Bari, groups belonging to the Georgian mafia have fought over zones of influence, leading to a high-profile murder in 2012. Investigations and case studies found that Georgian businesses (particularly shipping agencies) in the city paid protection money to Georgian groups to ensure safe passage for their goods through Greece and eventually the Caucasus (Georgian groups appoint a national coordinator in Italy; Ingrascì 2015, pp. 44–45; Varese 2018*b*, pp. 69–94, 102–3).

Moro and Villa (2017) estimated mafia activities in the populous, rich region of Lombardy, relying on official measures, and constructed a data set that includes information extracted from court cases. They found that total economic activity does not predict mafia presence. Rather, specific features of local markets are correlated to mafia presence. The size of porous economic sectors, such as construction and hospitality, was tightly linked to the mafia presence. Those sectors have low barriers to entry and low diversification (pp. 47, 53). The low barriers generate incentives to close the market through the use of force, as the cases discussed above illustrate.

In two cases of failed mafia transplantation attempts, the local economies relied on exports (Varese 2011*b*): Verona on furniture exports and Rosario on agricultural exports. There is no benefit from creating cartels in export-oriented sectors of the economy; producers sell in different parts of the world. Producer A and producer B, in competition, might be located at the far ends of the globe. Paradoxically, increased globalization

weakens mafias' ability to offer protection to local businesspeople. Sciarrone and Dagnes (2014, pp. 42, 49–51) found a large negative correlation coefficient, statistically significant at the .01 level, between “power syndicates” in nontraditional mafia territories (and in Italy as a whole) and export-oriented local economies.

Piedmont is not a new market economy like some countries in Eastern Europe, but there is an important parallel with the Russian mafia Solntesvskaya's transplantation in Budapest (Varese 2011*b*). Institutions created in Hungary after the end of the socialist regime were unable to resolve economic conflicts quickly and effectively, thus leaving important sectors of the new market economy without protection, exactly as happened with the immigrant workers of Bardonecchia. People without access to legitimate dispute resolution mechanisms look for nonstate forms of protection. In both Bardonecchia and Budapest, organized crime group members from far away were able to organize and offer services, including dispute resolution and elimination of competitors (Varese 2011*b*).

Powerful mafia groups emerged in the United States around 1910 as unintended consequences of police reform and grew thanks to Prohibition (Jacobs 2020). Illegal markets such as prostitution, gambling, and late-night drinking had before then been protected by corrupt politicians and police officers. When the mayor of New York launched initiatives against police corruption, illegal markets such as gambling and prostitution and legal markets such as clothing, garbage collection, and construction needed new protectors. In some legal markets, operators were happy to turn to an organization able to enforce cartel agreements, exactly as happened later on a smaller scale in Bardonecchia. It was from these origins that the Italian American mafia composed of immigrants from southern Italy evolved (Varese 2011*b*, pp. 111–20).

When members of Californian Latino gangs arrived in Central America, they found a fertile environment in which to operate. The destination countries were emerging from bitter civil wars, and populations experienced vast social inequalities and exclusion, in a context of rapid urbanization. The demise of dictatorships and the relative opening up to democracy allowed gangs to grow. By the early 1990s, the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 chapters (*clikas*) in Salvador had absorbed the local gangs, each controlling a specific neighborhood (Cruz 2010, p. 387). Between 2001 and 2006, governments used harsh measures to fight the growing gang problem, violating human rights and arresting and imprisoning many gang members.

The “harsh hand” (*mano dura*) policy exacerbated the gang problem. Members in detention centers were housed according to their gang affiliation. That allowed members to meet, get to know one another, disseminate information, and coordinate activities. Contrary to the predictions of the No Movement view, the prison system allowed reputations to spread and networks to expand. By 2009, the Salvadoran National Civilian Police estimated that 70 percent of extortion committed in the country was carried out by *maras*. A survey conducted in a sample of deprived neighborhoods in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras reported that around 20 percent of small businesses paid “protection taxes” (Cruz 2010, pp. 382–83). Cruz reported that “in Guatemala, 28 percent of residents of poor communities have to pay taxes to gangs; 34 percent in El Salvador; and 31 percent in Honduras” (p. 383).

The *maras* have not been studied using the framework described in this essay, but they appear to be a case of successful transplantation. It remains unclear, however, to what extent the Central America gangs communicate with their US counterparts and seek permission to open branch offices. Scholars suggest that connections are limited and that there is no single chain of command, but it is likely that such connections have changed over time (Rodgers and Baird 2015; Rodgers, pers. comm., July 5, 2019; see also Ward 2013; for a valuable ethnography on the MS-13, see Martinez D’aubuisson [2015]).

A number of key findings emerge from studies conducted using different data sources and methods. First, mafiosi are likely to be in new territories for reasons other than conscious decisions to transplant. Typical motives include evading the reach of the law, escaping internal feuds, and court decisions. The presence of mafiosi is not by itself sufficient to predict transplantation. However, mafiosi can become entrenched when their presence coincides with unregulated expansions in local markets such as construction or drugs and when local governments are unable to provide protection.

V. Empirical Tests: Functional Diversification

Several authors have tested aspects of functional diversification. Campana (2011*a*, 2011*b*) studied operations in Aberdeen and Amsterdam of the Camorra La Torre clan based in Mondragone, near Naples. He disputes the view that “the La Torre strategically planned to expand their activities abroad, and they successfully managed to ‘colonise’ new territories.”

Rather, “the majority of the clan’s affiliates who left Italy were pushed to do so, mainly because of pressure from the law enforcement agencies. However, even if they might not have strategically and rationally decided to leave Italy, it seems that they strategically chose their destination, at least to some extent” (Campana 2011*a*, pp. 213–14). Members of the group knew people in both places and had family members in Scotland. The decision to move was not strategic even in this instance of functional diversification, but the choice of where to go was not random.

The La Torre clan was present in three countries, Italy, Scotland, and the Netherlands, but did not engage in the same activities in each place. It ran a protection racket in Mondragone, Italy, but did other things in Scotland and Amsterdam. “In Aberdeen, they set up legal companies in the food and catering sector (including two restaurants), in the building sector and in real estate. . . . Amsterdam was a hub devoted to the ‘investments’ in the illegal economy, mainly drugs and counterfeiting money. There is no evidence of any protection activity in Aberdeen or Amsterdam” (Campana 2011*a*, p. 213). Kleemans and de Boer (2013) note that Italian mafiosi moved to the Netherlands, where it is relatively easy to hide, in order to avoid arrest. Once there, they became involved in narcotics, rather than in extortion and racketeering.¹⁹ Kleemans and de Boer suggest that Neapolitan camorra members are present in the Netherlands in order to acquire key resources (arms) for the groups back home.

The case of the Russian mafia group Solntesvskaya operating in Rome in the mid-1990s is an instance of functional diversification. They left Russia to avoid an internecine gang war. In Rome they traded in legal and illegal commodities and laundered money arriving from several Russian mafia groups. Investments alone did not result in successful long-term transplantation, as they were unable to identify a demand for protection (Varese 2004, 2011*b*, 2012*a*; see also Ingrasci 2015, pp. 40–43; Mazzenzana 2017, pp. 191–93).

Some ‘Ndrangheta groups operating in Germany engage in money laundering through legal businesses, such as pizzerias, restaurants, hotels, and drug trafficking. This is the pattern of the group considered responsible for the murder of six people in front of a pizzeria in Duisburg, Germany, on August 15, 2007. Rather than try to govern markets in Germany, the clan was functionally diversifying abroad (Campana 2011*a*,

¹⁹ Gratteri and Nicaso (2009) underscore the importance of the port of Rotterdam as a key narcotics hub for the ‘Ndrangheta.

p. 216). Calderoni et al. (2016) showed that some Italian groups have become “entrenched” in Germany, but further work is needed to learn whether they managed successfully to shift from trading to governing.

Allum’s (2014) study of members of the Neapolitan Camorra (*camorristi*) in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain also found that they did not reproduce the control of local markets and territory that characterizes their presence in the Naples area. Rather, “they travelled to buy goods in one country to sell them in another” (p. 589). The *camorristi* were abroad to undertake “strategic business activities that relate back to the territory of origin in Naples” (p. 594). It remains to be seen whether these individuals moved permanently abroad.

Campana (2013) undertook a quantitative study of the activities of Italian mafias in Europe, using data presented in Forgione (2009). He constructed a data set that includes information on crimes committed in 110 different cities in 22 European Union countries. He found that the groups made investments in legal businesses in the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Austria and were involved in illegal trades, mainly drug trafficking, in Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, and Belgium, and in smuggling of counterfeit goods in Eastern Europe. The data are not sufficiently fine-grained to tease out whether Italian groups were exercising a degree of market control in Europe, but references to protection emerged in four cities in Germany (Campana 2013, p. 321). As expected, transplantation is harder to achieve than functional diversification.

Calderoni et al. (2016) extended Campana’s (2013) study by considering Italian mafias’ presence worldwide, using the analytic technique multiple correspondence analysis. They systematically coded annual reports by two Italian antimafia agencies from 1999 to 2012. The analysis identifies all references in the reports to the Italian mafias in foreign countries. Data include the mafia involved, the country, and the criminal market including drugs, money laundering, and “other” illegal activities. They found that Italian mafias were concentrated in nine countries (the top three were Spain, Germany, and the Netherlands). The drug trade was the most important activity; money laundering and investments in the local economy were less relevant (it is harder to collect information on money laundering than on drugs). The study does not differentiate between trading and governing and the official reports are not sufficiently detailed to specify what these mafias were doing, but the authors were able to distinguish “stable” versus “generic” presence. Canada, Australia, and Germany were the countries in which Italian mafias appeared

to be stably present. In these countries, the 'Ndrangheta had created *locali* (officially recognized outposts), equivalent to those in Italy (for qualitative evidence, see Gratteri and Nicaso 2009). The authors concluded that “these cases may fall within the concept of transplantation advanced by Varese [2011*b*, p. 6]” (Calderoni et al. 2016, p. 427).

The key finding of these studies is that substantial migration from the home country does not appear to be a necessary condition for the emergence of functional diversification, which is more likely to occur in larger cities and criminal hubs. This is in marked contrast to transplantation, which is more likely to succeed in towns and small cities. Several studies report that mafiosi operating in foreign markets had been forced out of their home territories, rather than moving to serve as permanent envoys of home country bosses.

VI. Empirical Tests: Separation

Under what conditions can an outpost separate from the motherland? Studies of separation are rare. However, one highly significant example exists: the Italian American mafia. Italian criminal groups with a degree of organization and a leadership structure have existed in New York City since at least 1910: the Morello in East Harlem; the Schiro in Brooklyn; and the D'Aquila, also in Brooklyn. By the late 1920s, two more groups emerged, led by Masseria and Profaci. These groups were the basis for the future “five families” of the Italian American mafia. Between 1910 and 1920, there were three routes into these families. The first was previous membership in a Sicilian *cosca*, a route that remained open as late as 1925. Would-be members carried a letter from Sicily testifying to their position in the *cosca* back home, and any change of family had to be approved by the boss in Sicily. The second was birth in a Sicilian town known to be under the sway of the mafia, where Sicilian mafiosi could vouch for a prospective US member. Third, coming from a well-known mafia family could ease admittance. Dual membership (Sicilian and US) was possible.

By the late 1920s, US families were growing in importance in the eyes of their Sicilian counterparts. For example, when a significant dispute arose between two Palermo mafia factions in 1928 over how to split a payment from a company that had obtained a public contract thanks to the mafia, a US delegation was sent to put an end to the dispute. Around that time, the US groups were becoming autonomous, ending any

dependency on the Sicilian homeland. By the end of the “Castellamarese war” in 1931, dual Sicilian and US mafia membership was forbidden, and membership of a Sicilian family was no longer a sufficient qualification to join a US family. Important mafiosi such as Buscetta and Calderone made it clear in the postwar period that the two mafias were separate organizations. When a Sicilian mafioso wanted to join the Montreal family in 1974, he was put on a 5-year probation (Varese 2011*b*, pp. 120–21; see also Bonanno 1983; Gambetta 1993; Arlacchi 1996; Critchley 2009; Lupo 2015).

A second case worth discussing is the failed attempt of Lombardy-based ‘Ndrangheta outposts to separate. Several investigations have shown that the ‘Ndrangheta families in Lombardy are not a branch of a large enterprise but autonomous entities that share the same brand name and follow certain basic rules, including obtaining permission from Calabria to create new outposts and appoint bosses. There are approximately 20 such groups in Lombardy alone; most are allied to a particular family based in Calabria. Most members were born in Calabria, although some were born in Lombardy.

Conflicts and misunderstandings between outposts and motherland have been documented since the 1990s. Tensions erupted when Carmelo Novella became the head of the Lombardia, the forum that coordinates families in Lombardy. In 2007–8, Novella attempted to separate from the motherland. The plan envisaged minimal forms of coordination, but creation of new families and appointments would be decided exclusively in Lombardy. The plan was initially well received by other Lombardy families, but Novella made a crucial mistake. Rather than just promoting “independence,” he began to interfere in the day-to-day operations and appointments made by local bosses. Their freedom of operation was threatened. All concerned eventually agreed that Novella had to be killed, which happened in July 2008.

The tendency toward the independence of Lombardy did not end with Novella’s death. At a meeting of Lombardy-based families on January 20, 2009, it was agreed that the outposts must remain cohesive and interference from the south must be held in check. The new chairman (who is elected every year, indicating a weak figure) indicated that the representative from Calabria was simply “bringing us news from Reggio rather than impos[ing] his laws here” (Varese 2012*b*, p. xviii). The strict prohibition on interference in the activities of single families was re-emphasized at a subsequent meeting on October 31, 2009 (both meetings

were bugged by police). Ultimately, the 'Ndrangheta retains a federal structure, with coordinating forums. Promotions and creation of new outposts must be approved by the center (Varese 2012*b*).

A third case of separation involved individuals who were expelled from the Sicilian mafia at the time of the second mafia war (1981–83) and formed a breakaway group, known as *Stidda* (Star). At first, some of these individuals were members of a losing faction in the Sicilian mafia; others had been expelled because they married relatives of police officers. The group has been active in southern and eastern Sicily, away from the Sicilian mafia strongholds in the northwestern part of the island. This is not the case of an outpost that lost its official mafia affiliation but suggests that expulsion is another route toward separation. The *stiddari*'s territory does not overlap with that of the Sicilian mafia (Savatteri 2015; Bascietto 2019).

The American Italian mafia experience suggests that sources of income and relative power matter. As income increasingly originates in the new territory, incentives to separate become stronger. They are greater if the new brand name (e.g., "Cosa Nostra") achieves enough of a reputation to be recognized independently of the original brand. The Lombardia case offers some support for the hypothesis. 'Ndrangheta groups there are sufficiently rich and well known to be able to go it alone. Tensions continue to exist, and a delicate balance has to be found if the center wants to retain a degree of control over the outposts. Traditional mafias have not experienced significant instances of separation. This may be due to the flexible nature of relations between outposts and motherland. Outposts pursue their own criminal strategies and interests. Incentives to separate increase only when the motherland interferes with appointments and creation of new families.

VII. Research Challenges

In this section, I address selected conceptual, research design, and data challenges to the study of mafia movements. Functional diversification raised a conceptual challenge. Examples include a diverse range of activities including money laundering in financial centers such as London, creation of shell companies in tax havens such as Panama, and purchase of illegal commodities such as drugs in transportation hubs like Amsterdam and Rotterdam. Functional diversification can also refer to the production of goods and services far from the motherland. These

activities are quite different. Factors that might predict one will not necessarily predict others. A way forward is to specify whether the activity undertaken is production or trading and, within trading, to distinguish money laundering from other trading activities.

Qualitative studies of transplantation tend to focus on single successful cases, thus selecting on the dependent variable. This is understandable and not uncommon in political science and traditional ethnography (Varese 2020). Single case studies allow scholars to go beyond judicial data (a common source of evidence in mafia studies) and conduct field interviews and, ideally, extensive field work of the kind undertaken by Whyte in his classic *Street Corner Society* ([1943]1993). Case study methodology can explore dynamics in depth, identify relevant social mechanisms, and inform the collection of quantitative data (Vaughan 2011). Abell (2009) has argued that narrative case studies can provide paths of causal links, without the need to compare or to generalize. The increasingly popular method of process tracing aims to achieve causality through analytical, temporal description (Bennett and Checkel 2014).

However, case study narratives and process tracing have limitations. First, even atheoretical case studies must describe events, and any description necessarily involves collection and selection of evidence. Valid descriptions need to make selection processes clear. A description can be accurate and valid but uninteresting and ultimately useless.²⁰ To be useful, it must be oriented toward answering a theoretical question. Explicit theoretical frameworks are necessary to identify an instance as a case of a class of events. Finally, it is doubtful that temporal narratives can achieve causal explanations. The cause of an outcome may not be an immediately preceding event. If so, standard methods must be used to establish causality. In my view, case studies must make selection criteria explicit, including why the particular case was selected, and should be oriented toward testing or building a theory (Panebianco 1991, p. 144; Varese 2019). Choosing cases that appear to deviate from what established theories predict can be extremely valuable to confirm or challenge established results (Eckstein 1975; Thomas 2011).

Efforts to understand why an outcome occurs must consider similar cases in which the outcome of interest did not occur (alternatively, cases

²⁰ Friedman famously observed that it would be descriptively accurate to mention wheat traders' eye colors in a model of the wheat market but irrelevant for predicting price fluctuations (1953, p. 32). Sen (1980) emphasized that description involves selection of evidence and is informed by theory, even if often the theory is hidden.

that appear to differ in many respects but shared the same outcome can be compared). Comparative qualitative historical methodology has been used extensively in sociology and political science (Mahoney 2004) but is nearly absent in the study of mafias.²¹

However, the path to the development of causal statements cannot entirely be solved by adopting this research design. Although controlled experiments in a laboratory allow experimenters to manipulate variables directly, that is impossible and ethically unacceptable in many social studies.

How can we then be sure that outcomes do not depend on factors that are not explicitly accounted for? The best practical solution is to choose cases that are as similar as possible concerning all variables of interest except one but with different outcomes. For instance, among a set of cases transplantation was sometimes successful, but in one it was not. A second challenge relates to negative cases in which the outcome did not occur. How to select such cases? In my work, I follow the possibility principle proposed by Mahoney and Goertz (2004). I regard cases in which the outcome of interest was sought but not realized as “negative.” Scholars who adopt this approach can draw on evidence of mafia attempts to transplant in court files, newspaper reports, and the memories of observers and participants.

Quantitative studies also face conceptual and data challenges. One concerns relations between concepts and indexes. The simpler and analytically clearer a concept is, and the less cluttered the index, the easier interpretation of results is likely to be. Sciarrone and Dagnes (2014), for example, created indexes for “enterprise syndicates” and “power syndicates” that are meant to capture mafia presence in different regions in Italy. The first index is meant to capture illicit trades (p. 42), but the indicators include robberies. Robberies are predatory crimes, and it is hard to see why they should be considered “enterprises.”²²

The power syndicate index includes officially recorded mafia-association crimes, asset seizures, and town councils disbanded because of mafia presence.²³ Asset confiscation is a fundamentally ambivalent indicator.

²¹ Exceptions include Paoli (2000), Varese (2011*b*), and Catino (2019).

²² In addition, a robbery committed by a mafia group may be an act of intimidation against a reluctant extortion victim rather than a simple crime. Qualitative knowledge is necessary.

²³ Official data contain built-in biases: the judiciary may be more active in confiscating assets and disbanding city administrations in places where the mafia is less powerful, giving

Confiscation can refer to both functional diversification and transplantation. Investments in movable and immovable assets can occur both in places where transplantation has occurred and in places in which only functional diversification is observed.²⁴ That makes data on confiscated assets difficult to interpret. They should be used with caution and be accompanied by analyses of the types of activity of mafia organizations in each individual territory. More generally, the more indicators included in the index, the harder it is to interpret the results. Good methodological advice is to use indexes sparingly (Apaza 2009).

A special problem arises in studies of mafia movements in Italy that use official data on individuals required by courts to move outside their home territory. These data should include the resettled individuals' province of origin. Individuals required to move may have resided in nontraditional mafia territories. Crucially, not all people forced to resettle were found guilty of mafia-related crimes. For instance, only four of 16 individuals forced to resettle in Verona in February 1974 had been found guilty of mafia-related crimes in the south (Varese 2011b, p. 55; see, e.g., *L'Arena di Verona*, February 23, 1974). The data would need to be cleaned qualitatively. It is also not clear to what extent individuals had a degree of choice about their final destinations. If defendants were invited to suggest suitable destinations, forced resettlement would not be an instrumental variable.

Finally, scholars should reflect on the extent to which variables are related to each other. For instance, migration from southern Italy to Germany could be related to crime opportunities in Germany. If so, the key assumption of regression is violated. Multivariate models need to include both migration and economic variables to evaluate the effects of both.

VIII. Emerging Research Agenda and Policy Implications

Mafia transplantation has been more intensively investigated in the past decade than ever before, but much more needs to be done. Some information can improve governments' efforts to control organized crime in

the impression that the mafia is more active there than elsewhere (see, e.g., Calderoni 2011, p. 58).

²⁴ Calderoni (2011) found that asset confiscations vary significantly with mafia murders, implying that mafias buy assets in their traditional territories.

their territories, but greater attention needs to be paid to unintended consequences.

A. Emerging Research Agenda

A great deal of research has been conducted on mafia movements in Europe. It would be a significant leap forward if scholars working on Asian, Latin American, and American mafias joined forces with European colleagues and adopted comparable frameworks. That could shed light on underexplored subjects such as transitions from trading to governance, interplays between local and incoming crime groups, the significance of a locale's size, and links between social exclusion, weak and corrupt states, and emergence of extralegal governance.

US-based Latino gangs and Mexican cartels offer important targets of research opportunity. What are the links, if any, between *maras* in the United States and Central America? Some research has been conducted, but more is needed. Investigative reports suggest that Mexican cartels have expanded to the United States. The US Justice Department reported that Mexican cartels operate in at least 230 American cities, mainly in California, the Pacific Northwest, and the Eastern US (National Public Radio 2009). Data for 2011 from the National Drug Intelligence Center appear to show a significant reach of Mexican cartels, especially the Sinaloa, in the United States (*Guardian* 2014). These organizations are suppliers and are said to “have a near-monopoly on the distribution of wholesale quantities of drugs in most of the country now” (National Public Radio 2009). These statements need to be substantiated by academic research, but they suggest a possible transition from trading to governance in limited illegal markets. Dulin and Patiño (2020), who have studied the determinants of Mexican cartels' battles over territories within Mexico, found that expansion occurs toward municipalities that are “relatively small in both size and production, with few recorded narcotics offenses” (p. 332). That suggests that Mexican cartels may have become governance-oriented organized crime groups (see also Locks 2014).

A development in Colombia may shed light on neglected dynamics of mafia movements motivated by searches for resources and input goods. Newspaper reports indicate that Mexican cartels are directly engaged in the production and shipping of drugs in Colombia and no longer wait for coca to arrive in Mexico. The son of “El Chapo” Guzman, head of the Sinaloa cartel, was in Medellín for some months in 2016. According to *El Tiempo* (Croda 2018), he opened laboratories for processing coca in the

Medellín area that are capable of producing up to 100 kilos a week. Sinaloa cartel operatives have reportedly bought large plots of land in the Colombian Nariño region in which a quarter of illegal production is concentrated.²⁵ The Jalisco cartel appears to be operating in Cali, and the Mexican cartel Zetas appears to be present in the Cauca region and in the cities of Suárez and Buenos Aires (Colombia). Since 2016, more than a hundred Mexicans involved in drug trafficking have been arrested in Colombia. According to Fabián Laurence Cárdenas, Director of the Federal Police Antinarcotics Unit in Colombia, “the Mexicans are no longer operating through intermediaries, but want to control production themselves. At a certain point they became concerned that quality was no longer what it used to be, and they lost faith” (Croda 2018).

The dismantling of Pablo Escobar’s organization and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army’s (FARC) capitulation to the government appear to have enabled outside forces with the necessary resources and infrastructure to become involved in narcotics production in Colombia. Mexicans appear to have brokered a nonaggression agreement, the so-called Rifle Pact, between clans in Medellín. This implies that Mexicans could become regulators of organized crime in Colombia (Varese 2018*a*). It is too early to know. More complex dynamics than exist in Europe may result from combinations of production of illegal goods, incentives to search cross-nationally for input resources, and the limited regulatory capacities of weak states.

B. Policy Implications

Scholars should be cautious in proposing policy implications of their work. Some tentative suggestions emerge. First, the distinction between transplantation and functional diversification is important. One may lead to the other; different strategies are required to fight them.²⁶

Migration appears to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for transplantation. However, a large workforce operating outside the rule of law framework provides opportunities for extralegal forms of governance. Workers who cannot turn to state-sponsored forms of dispute

²⁵ On June 16, 2018, 16 Mexicans and one Ecuadorian, linked to El Chapo’s organization, were arrested in the Nariño region with 1,300 kilos of cocaine destined for Mexico (Croda 2018).

²⁶ This section draws on Varese (2011*a*, pp. 230–31).

settlement might welcome such services, even if they are supplied by criminals. This should not be allowed to happen. If undocumented migrants are present in considerable numbers, authorities should legalize their status, thereby bringing them within the fold of state-provided forms of protection and dispute settlement. Authorities might consider adopting don't ask, don't tell policies concerning the immigration status of workers, in order to lessen their need for illegal forms of governance. An effective justice system will reduce demand for illegal forms of dispute resolution.

Some markets are easier to control than others. Firms that want to enter a new sector of the economy must be able to do so without risking retaliation from incumbents. Violence is an effective way for incumbents to reduce competition in sectors such as construction, waste disposal, and garbage collection that have relatively low barriers to entry. Authorities should ensure easy entry into markets, thereby increasing competition. Simple registration norms, easy resort to legal dispute resolution, and an effective civil law system facilitate easy entry into markets and their smooth functioning. If a sector is already organized as a cartel backed by mafia violence, authorities should consider establishing their own companies to break into the market (see, e.g., Jacobs 1999, pp. 194–96). Such companies would not be easily scared away by incumbents, since they have direct access to police power. Construction especially plays a particular role in the success of mafia transplantation and should be tightly regulated and closely monitored.

The size of a territory matters. All else being equal, it is easier for incoming criminals to control small towns than large cities. How can mafia infiltration in smaller municipalities be prevented? Larger electoral constituencies make it harder to control votes than smaller ones. A party-list proportional representation system with preference voting, to the contrary, makes it easier for mafias to gain influence and control than a first-past-the-post system does. Authorities must recognize the risk of capture of smaller municipalities and be prepared to disband local councils if they become corrupted. Because local authorities often have regulatory power over key elements of the local economy, especially construction, and officials oversee the granting of licenses, their exercises of power must be closely scrutinized. Systems of checks and balances must ensure that permitting and oversight comply with applicable laws. Outside experts should be consulted when key permits are granted. Public offices might be rotated, so that individuals do not serve in a given position for

a long period. Routine rotation makes it harder for incumbents to forge long-term ties to individuals who want to influence them.²⁷

Finally, American policies in the 1990s were instrumental to transplantation of Los Angeles *maras* to Central America. Mass expulsion of gang members had disastrous consequences: powerful gangs continued to operate in California; emerged in Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras; and eventually built cross-national albeit loose links. Attempting to get rid of gangs in one place may simply move the problem elsewhere.

Functional diversification should be contrasted with greater attention to financial flows and credit markets. Access to credit is difficult and creates temptations to use illegal sources. Mafias lend money at high interest rates and sometimes use violence to collect. To reduce the spread of illegal lending, authorities should promote medium and small enterprises' access to credit. Offshore areas within Europe should be abolished, and economic sectors in which untraceable transactions are common should be monitored closely, since risks of money laundering are high (Campana 2011a; Shaxson 2012; Calderoni et al. 2016; Bullough 2018). Suspicious business practices, such as opening and closing many companies in a short period, should also be closely scrutinized. Monitoring and controls on unexplained wealth are crucial. The fight against functional diversification by mafias within the European Union would be well served by strengthening mechanisms of international cooperation, including the European Arrest Warrant and EuroJust.²⁸

Some authors (e.g., Allum 2012) and the European Parliament have recently advocated the introduction throughout Europe of laws criminalizing mafia-type association such as exist in Italy. Such laws authorize stiff sentences for being a member of a mafia group. Laws creating such offenses should be enacted in places in which mafias have been able to transplant. New provisions in a criminal code are, however, only as effective as the criminal justice system is effective, transparent, and fair. In places where corruption or political inference in judicial decision is rife, enactment of new laws can offer no panaceas and be counterproductive.

²⁷ Max Weber famously suggested rotation of office to limit abuses of power. See Gerth and Wright Mills (1970, p. 289).

²⁸ The European Arrest Warrant laws stipulates that extradition can occur swiftly even if the two countries do not have identical provisions in their criminal laws. On the potential security implication of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, see Carrera et al. (2018).

Mafia movements across territories is a main theoretical and empirical subject in organized crime research (von Lampe 2012, 2016; Kleemans 2014). Conceptual clarity is improving only slowly. Three phenomena—transplantation, functional diversification, and separation—are central. Mafia transplantation is relatively rare, but it has occurred. Functional diversification encompasses a wide variety of criminal activities—money laundering, offshore creation of firms, buying and selling illegal goods such as drugs and arms, and the production of illegal goods—conducted by mafias outside their traditional territories. This is the area in greatest need of empirically sound and conceptually clear research.

REFERENCES

- Abell, Peter. 2009. "A Case for Cases: Comparative Narratives in Sociological Explanation." *Sociological Methods and Research* 38(1):38–70.
- Albrow, Martin. 1996. *The Global Age: State and Society beyond Modernity*. London: Polity.
- Allegra, Melchiorre. 1962. "Come io, medico, diventai mafioso." *L'Orsa*, January 12, 22–23.
- Allum, Felia. 2012. "Italian Organised Crime in the UK." *Policing* 6(4):354–59.
- . 2014. "Understanding Criminal Mobility: The Case of the Neapolitan Camorra." *Journal of Modern Italian Studies* 19(5):583–602.
- Apaza, Carmen R. 2009. "Measuring Governance and Corruption through the Worldwide Governance Indicators: Critiques, Responses, and Ongoing Scholarly Discussion." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 42(1):139–43.
- Arana, Ana. 2005. "How the Street Gangs Took Central America." *Foreign Affairs* 8(3):98–110.
- Arlacchi, Pino. 1993. *Men of Dishonor: Inside the Sicilian Mafia; An Account of Antonino Calderone*. New York: Morrow.
- . 1996. *Addio Cosa Nostra: I segreti della mafia nella confessione di Tommaso Buscetta*. Milan: Rizzoli.
- Armao, Fabio. 2003. "Why Is Organized Crime So Successful?" In *Organized Crime and the Challenge to Democracy*, edited by Felia Allum and R. Siebert. London: Routledge.
- Arsovska, Jana. 2014. "The 'Glocal' Dimension of Albanian Organized Crime: Mafias, Strategic Migration and State Repression." *European Journal on Criminal Policy Research* 20:205–23.
- . 2015. "Strategic Mobsters or Deprived Migrants? Testing the Transplantation and Deprivation Models of Organized Crime in an Effort to Understand Criminal Mobility and Diversity in the United States." *International Migration* 54(2):160–75.

- Asmundo, Adam. 2011. "Indicatori e costi della criminalità mafiosa." In *Alleanze nell'ombra*, edited by Rocco Sciarrone. Rome: Donzelli.
- Balsamo, Antonio. 2006. "Organised Crime Today: The Evolution of the Sicilian Mafia." *Journal of Money Laundering Control* 9(4):373–78.
- Barak, Gregg. 2001. "Crime and Crime Control in an Age of Globalization: A Theoretical Dissection." *Critical Criminology* 10:57–72.
- Bascietto, Giuseppe. 2019. *Stidda: L'altra mafia raccontata dal capoclan Claudio Cerbonaro*. Reggio Emilia: Aliberti.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 1998. *Globalization: The Human Consequences*. London: Polity.
- BBC News. 2015. "Mafia Boss Domenico Rancadore's Sentence 'expired.'" April 1. <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-32144720>.
- Beck, Ulrich. 1999. *What Is Globalization?* London: Polity.
- Bennett, Andrew, and Jeffrey T. Checkel, eds. 2014. *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Block, Alan. 1983. *East Side, West Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930–1950*. London: Transaction.
- Blok, Anton. 1974. *The Mafia of a Sicilian Village, 1860–1960*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Bonanno, Joseph. 1983. *A Man of Honour: The Autobiography of Joseph Bonanno*. With Sergio Lalli. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Bullough, Oliver. 2018. *Money Land: Why Thieves and Crooks Now Rule the World and How to Take It Back*. London: Profile.
- Bundeskriminalamt. 2017. *Organisierte Kriminalität*. Bundeslagebild. <https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Publikationen/JahresberichteUndLagebilder/OrganisierteKriminalitaet/organisierteKriminalitaetBundeslagebild2017.html>.
- Calderoni, Francesco. 2011. "Where Is the Mafia in Italy? Measuring the Presence of the Mafia across Italian Provinces." *Global Crime* 12(1):41–69.
- Calderoni, Francesco, Giulia Berlusconi, Lorella Garofalo, Luca Giommoni, and Federica Sarno. 2016. "The Italian Mafias in the World: A Systematic Assessment of the Mobility of Criminal Groups." *European Journal of Criminology* 13(4):413–33.
- Campana, Paolo. 2011a. "Assessing the Movement of Criminal Groups: Some Analytical Remarks." *Global Crime* 12(3):207–17.
- . 2011b. "Eavesdropping on the Mob: The Functional Diversification of Mafia Activities across Territories." *European Journal of Criminology* 8(3):213–28.
- . 2013. "Understanding Then Responding to Italian Organized Crime Operations across Territories." *Policing* 7(3):316–25.
- Campana, Paolo, and Federico Varese. 2018. "Organized Crime in the United Kingdom: Illegal Governance of Markets and Communities." *British Journal of Criminology* 58(6):1381–400.
- Carrera, Sergio, Valsamis Mitsilegas, Marco Stefan, and Fabio Giuffrida. 2018. "Criminal Justice and Police Cooperation between the EU and the UK after Brexit: Towards a Principled and Trust-Based Partnership." CEPS Task Force Reports. https://www.ceps.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/TFR_EU-UK_Cooperation_Brexit_0.pdf.

- Castells, Manuel. 2000. *End of Millennium: The Information Age; Economy, Society and Culture*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Catanzaro, Raimondo. 1994. "Violent Social Regulation: Organized Crime in the Italian South." *Social and Legal Studies* 3(2):267–79.
- Catino, Maurizio. 2019. *Mafia Organizations: The Visible Hand of Criminal Enterprise*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2020. "Italian Organized Crime since 1950." In *Organizing Crime: Mafias, Markets, and Networks*, edited by Michael Tonry and Peter Reuter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Chin, Ko-lin. 2003. *Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan*. Armonk, NY: Sharpe.
- Chu, Yiu Kong. 2000. *The Triads as Business*. London: Routledge.
- Ciccarello, Elena. 2014. "Politica e 'ndrangheta nel Nord Italia: Il caso di Leini." *Meridiana* 79:221–41.
- Cicone, Enzo. 1998. *Mafia, Camorra e 'Ndrangheta in Emilia-Romagna*. Rimini: Panozzo Editore.
- Critchley, David. 2009. *The Origins of Organized Crime in America: The New York City Mafia, 1891–1931*. London: Routledge.
- Croda, Rafael. 2018. "Los narcos mexicanos imponen su ley en Colombia." *El Tiempo*, October 25. <https://www.eltiempo.com/justicia/conflicto-y-narcotrafico/presencia-de-carteles-mexicanos-en-colombia-es-un-problema-de-seguridad-nacional-284974>.
- Cruz, José Miguel. 2010. "Central American Maras: From Youth Street Gangs to Transnational Protection Rackets." *Global Crime* 11(4):379–98.
- Dagnes, Joselle, Davide Donatiello, Valentina Moiso, Davide Pellegrino, Rocco Sciarrone, and Luca Storti. 2018. "Mafia Infiltration, Public Administration and Local Institutions: A Comparative Study in Northern Italy." *European Journal of Criminology* <https://doi.org/10.1177%2F1477370818803050>.
- Dalla Chiesa, Nando, and Federica Cabras. 2019. *Rosso mafia: La 'ndrangheta a Reggio Emilia*. Milan: Bompiani.
- Dalla Chiesa, Nando, and Martina Panzarasa. 2012. *Buccinasco: La 'ndrangheta al Nord*. Turin: Einaudi.
- De Filippo, Francesco, and Paolo Moretti. 2011. *Mafia padana: Le infiltrazioni criminali in Nord Italia*. Rome: Editori Internazionali Riuniti.
- Di Antonio, Sara. 2010. *Mafia: Le mani sul Nord*. Rome: Aliberti.
- Dulin, Adam L., and Jairo Patiño. 2020. "Mexican Cartel Expansion: A Quantitative Examination of Factors Associated with Territorial Claims." *Journal of Crime, Law, and Social Change* 73:315–36.
- Eckstein, Harry. 1975. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In *The Handbook of Political Science: Strategies of Inquiry*, edited by F. Greenstein and N. Polsby. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Edwards, Adam, and Peter Gill. 2002. "Crime as Enterprise? The Case of 'Transnational Organised Crime.'" *Crime, Law, and Social Change* 37(3):203–23.
- Finckenauer, James O., and Ko-lin Chin. 2006. "Asian Transnational Organized Crime and Its Impact on the United States: Developing a Transnational Crime Agenda." New York: US National Institute of Justice.

- Forgione, Francesco. 2009. *Mafia Export: Come 'ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra e Camorra hanno colonizzato il mondo*. Milan: Baldini-Castoldi-Dalai.
- Friedman, Milton. 1953. *Essays in Positive Economics*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Galeotti, Mark. 2000. "The Russian Mafia: Economic Penetration at Home and Abroad." In *Economic Crime in Russia*, edited by Alena Ledeneva and Marina Kurkchyan. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Gambetta, Diego. 1993. *The Sicilian Mafia*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gambetta, Diego, and Peter Reuter. 1995. "Conspiracy among the Many: The Mafia in Legitimate Industries." In *The Economics of Organised Crime*, edited by Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gennari, Giuseppe. 2013. *Le fondamenta sulla città*. Milan: Mondadori.
- Gerth, Hans, and Charles Wright Mills, eds. 1970. *From Max Weber*. London: Routledge.
- Gordon, Jon. 2020. "The Legitimation of Extrajudicial Violence in an Urban Community." *Social Forces* 98(3):1174–95.
- Gratteri, Nicola, and Antonio Nicaso. 2009. *Fratelli di sangue*. Milan: Mondadori.
- Guardian. 2014. "Mexican Drug Trafficking in the United States: The Sinaloa Cartel's Vast Empire." February 28. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2014/feb/28/mexican-drug-trafficking-sinaloa-cartel>.
- Hay, Donald, and Derek Morris. 1979. *Industrial Economics: Theory and Evidence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- He, Bingsong, ed. 2003. *Deciphering Mafia-Related Crimes*. [In Chinese.] Beijing: China Procuratorial.
- Hess, Henner. 1973. *Mafia and Mafiosi: The Structure of Power*. Lexington, MA: Lexington.
- Hill, Peter B. E. 2002. "Tokyo: La rete della yakuza." *Lettera Internazionale* 71:53–55.
- . 2004. "The Changing Face of the Yakuza." *Global Crime* 6(1):97–116.
- Ianni, Francis A. J. 1972. *A Family Business: Kinship and Social Control in Organized Crime*. With E. Reuss-Ianni. New York: Russell Sage.
- Ingrascì, Ombretta. 2015. "La mafia russa in Italia: Lavori in corso." *Rivista di Studi e Ricerche sulla criminalità organizzata* 1(1):37–55.
- Jacobs, James B. 1999. *Gotham Unbound: How New York City Was Liberated from the Grip of Organized Crime*. With Coleen Friel and Robert Raddick. New York: New York University Press.
- . 2020. "US Organized Crime since 1950." In *Organizing Crime: Mafias, Markets, and Networks*, edited by Michael Tonry and Peter Reuter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kleemans, Edward R. 2007. "Organized Crime, Transit Crime, and Racketeering." In *Crime and Justice in the Netherlands*, edited by Michael Tonry and Catrien Bijleveld. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- . 2014. "Theoretical Perspectives on Organized Crime." In *The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime*, edited by Letizia Paoli. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kleemans, Edward R., and Marcel de Boer. 2013. "Italian Mafia in the Netherlands." *Sicurezza e Scienze Sociali* 1(3):15–29.
- La Spina, Antonio, ed. 2013. *I costi dell'illegalità: Una ricerca sul Sestiere della Maddalena a Genova*. Bologna: Mulino.
- Lintner, Bertil. 2004. "Chinese Organised Crime." *Global Crime* 6(1):84–96.
- Locks, Benjamin. 2014. "Extortion in Mexico: Why Mexico's Pain Won't End with the War on Drugs." *Yale Journal of International Affairs* 10:67–83.
- Lodetti, Patrizio. 2018. "'Ndrangheta e impresa mafiosa a Mantova: Le conseguenze sull'economia locale." *Rivista di studi e ricerche sulla criminalità organizzata* 4(1):53–98.
- Lupo, Salvatore. 1996. *Storia della mafia: Dalle origini ai giorni nostri*. Rome: Donzelli.
- . 2015. *The Two Mafias: A Transatlantic History, 1888–2008*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- MacDonald, John S., and Leatrice D. MacDonald. 1964. "Chain Migration Ethnic Neighborhood Formation and Social Networks." *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 42(1):82–97.
- Mahoney, James. 2004. "Comparative-Historical Methodology." *Annual Review of Sociology* 30:81–101.
- Mahoney, James, and Gary Goertz. 2004. "The Possibility Principle: Choosing Negative Cases in Comparative Research." *American Political Science Review* 98(4):653–69.
- Martinez D'auhuissou, Juan José. 2015. *Ver, oír y callar: Un año con la Mara Salvatrucha 13*. La Rioja: Pepitas de Calabaza.
- Massari, Monica. 2001. "La criminalità mafiosa nell'Italia centro-settentrionale." In *Mafie nostre, mafie loro: Criminalità organizzata italiana e straniera nel Centro-Nord*, edited by S. Becucci and M. Massari. Turin: Edizioni di Comunità.
- Mazzenzana, Sarah. 2017. "La criminalità russa: Nota storica sulle origini contemporanee." In *Mafia globale: Le organizzazioni criminali nel mondo*, edited by Nando dalla Chiesa. Milan: Laurana.
- Minuti, Diego, and Antonio Nicaso. 1994. *'Ndraghete: Le filiali della mafia calabrese*. Vibo Valentia: Monteleone.
- Mori, Cesare. 1933. *The Last Struggle with the Mafia*, translated by Orlo Williams. London: Putman. (Originally published as *Con la mafia ai ferri corti*, 1932.)
- Moro, Francesco N., and Matteo Villa. 2017. "The New Geography of Mafia Activity: The Case of a Northern Italian Region." *European Sociological Review* 33:46–58.
- Morselli Carlo, Matilde Turcotte, and Valentina Tenti. 2011. "The Mobility of Criminal Groups." *Global Crime* 12(3):165–88.
- Naim, Moises. 2010. *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy*. New York: Random House.
- National Public Radio. 2009. "Cartels Fueling Violence in Mexico Take Root in US." March 25. <https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=102322570&t=1562222624471&t=1562234517653>.

- Panebianco, A. 1991. "Comparazione e spiegazione." In *La comparazione nelle scienze sociali*, edited by G. Sartori and L. Morlino. Bologna: Mulino.
- Paoli, Letizia. 2000. *Fratelli di mafia: Cosa Nostra e 'ndrangheta*. Bologna: Mulino.
- . 2020. "What Do the Five Iconic Mafias Have in Common?" In *Organizing Crime: Mafias, Markets, and Networks*, edited by Michael Tonry and Peter Reuter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Parini, Ercole Giap. 2008. "Myths, Legends, and Affiliation Practices in the Italian Mafioso Imagery: The Local Dimension of Power of a Global Phenomenon." PhD dissertation, University of Calabria.
- Peña, Mario Aguilera. 2014. "Las guerrillas marxistas y la pena de muerte a combatientes: Un examen de los delitos capitales y del 'juicio revolucionario.'" *Anuario Colombiano de Historia Social y de la Cultura* 41(1):201–36.
- Pignatone, Giuseppe, and Michele Prestipino. 2012. *Il contagio: Come la 'ndrangheta ha infettato l'Italia*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Pignedoli, Sabrina. 2016. *Operazione Aemilia*. Reggio Emilia: Imprimatur.
- Portanova, Maria, Giampiero Rossi, and Franco Stefanoni. 2011. *Mafia a Milano*. Milan: Melampo.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Italy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Reuter, Peter. 1983. *Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Invisible Hand*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- . 1985. *The Organization of Illegal Markets: An Economic Analysis*. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice.
- . 1987. *Racketeering in Legitimate Industries: A Study in the Economics of Intimidation*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.
- . 1995. "The Decline of the American Mafia." *Public Interest* 120:89–99.
- Reuter, Peter, and Letizia Paoli. 2020. "How Similar Are Modern Criminal Organizations to Traditional Mafias?" In *Organizing Crime: Mafias, Markets, and Networks*, edited by Michael Tonry and Peter Reuter. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Rocha, José Luis. 2008. "La Mara 19 tras las huellas de las pandillas políticas." *Envío* 321:26–31.
- Rodgers, Dennis, and Adam Baird. 2015. "Understanding Gangs in Contemporary Latin America." In *Handbook of Gangs and Gang Responses*, edited by S. H. Decker and David C. Pyrooz. New York: Wiley.
- Rueda, Zenaida. 2009. *Confesiones de una guerrillera*. Bogotá: Editorial Planeta Colombia.
- Santino, Umberto. 2006. *Dalla mafia alle mafie: Scienze sociali e crimine organizzato*. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore.
- Savatteri, Gaetano. 2015. "La Stidda: Mafia nelle terre di zolfo." In *Atlante delle mafie: Storia, economia, società, cultura*, vol. 3, edited by Enzo Ciconte, Francesco Forgione, and Isaia Sales. Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino.
- Scaglione, Attilio, and Rocco Sciarbone. 2014. "Il radicamento in una zona di confine: Gruppi mafiosi nel ponente ligure." In *Mafie del Nord: Strategie criminali e contesti locali*, edited by R. Sciarbone. Rome: Donzelli.

- Schelling, Thomas C. 1971. "What Is the Business of Organized Crime." *Journal of Public Law* 20:71–84.
- Sciarrone, Rocco. 1998. *Mafie vecchie, mafie nuove*. Rome: Donzelli.
- Sciarrone, Rocco, and Joselle Dagnes. 2014. "Geografia degli insediamenti mafiosi: Fattori di contesto, startegie criminali, e azione antimafia." In *Mafie del Nord: Strategie criminali e contesti locali*, edited by R. Sciarrone. Rome: Donzelli.
- Sciarrone, Rocco, and Luca Storti. 2014. "The Territorial Expansion of Mafia-Type Organized Crime: The Case of the Italian Mafia in Germany." *Crime, Law and Social Change* 61(1):37–60.
- Sen, Amartya. 1980. "Description as Choice." *Oxford Economic Papers* 32(3):353–69.
- Sergi, Anna. 2015. "The Evolution of the Australian 'Ndrangheta: An Historical Perspective." *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Criminology* 48(2):155–74.
- Shaxson, Nick. 2012. *Treasure Islands: Tax Havens and the Men Who Stole the World*. London: Vintage.
- Shelley, Louise. 1999. "Identifying, Counting, and Categorizing Transnational Criminal Organizations." *Transnational Organized Crime* 5(1):1–18.
- . 2006. "The Globalization of Crime and Terrorism." *e-Journal USA*, February.
- . 2019. "The Globalization of Crime." In *International and Transnational Crime and Justice*, edited by M. Natarajan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shelley, Louise, John Picarelli, and Chris Corpora. 2003. "Global Crime Inc." In *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda*, edited by Maryann Cusimano Love. Boston: Thomson Wadsworth.
- Smith, Dwight C. 1975. *The Mafia Mystique*. New York: Basic.
- . 1978. "Organized Crime and Entrepreneurship." *International Journal of Criminology and Penology* 6(2):161–77.
- Spapens, Toine. 2019. "Cerca Trova: The Italian Mafia on Dutch Territory." In *Constructing and Organising Crime in Europe*, edited by Petrus C. van Duyne, Alexey Serdyuk, Georgios A. Antonopoulos, Jackie H. Harvey, and Klaus Von Lampe. Chicago: Eleven International.
- Sterling, Claire. 1990. *Octopus: The Long Reach of the International Sicilian Mafia*. London: Norton.
- . 1995. *Crimes without Frontiers: The Worldwide Expansion of Organised Crime and the Pax Mafiosa*. London: Little, Brown.
- Task Force on Organized Crime. 1967. *Organized Crime: President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice*. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
- Thomas, Gary. 2011. "A Typology for the Case Study in Social Science Following a Review of Definition, Discourse, and Structure." *Qualitative Inquiry* 17(6):511–21.
- Tizian, Giovanni. 2011. *Gotica: 'Ndrangheta, mafia e camorra oltrepassano la linea*. Rome: Round Robin.
- United Nations. 1994. "Report of the World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime." Conference held in Naples, Italy, November 21–

- 23, 1994, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 48/103 of December 20, 1993. Vienna: United Nations. <https://www.imolin.org/imolin/naples.html?print=yes>.
- UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime). 2004. *United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto*. Vienna: UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/documents/middleeastandnorthafrica/organised-crime/UNITED_NATIONS_CONVENTION_AGAINST_TRANSNATIONAL_ORGANIZED_CRIME_AND_THE_PROTOCOLS_THERE_TO.pdf.
- . 2010. *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*. Vienna: UNODC. https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/the-globalization-of-crime-a-transnational-organized-crime-threat-assessment_html/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf.
- Varese, Federico. 2001. *The Russian Mafia: Private Protection in a New Market Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2004. "Mafia Transplantation." In *Creating Social Trust in Post-socialist Transition*, edited by J. Kornai, B. Rothstein, and S. Rose-Ackerman. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- . 2006. "How Mafias Migrate: The Case of the 'Ndrangheta in Northern Italy." *Law and Society Review* 40(2):411–44.
- . 2010. "What Is Organized Crime?" In *Organized Crime: Critical Concepts in Criminology*, edited by Federico Varese. New York: Routledge.
- . 2011a. "Mafia Movements: A Framework for Understanding the Mobility of Mafia Groups." *Global Crime* 12(3):218–31.
- . 2011b. *Mafias on the Move: How Organized Crime Conquers New Territories*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- . 2012a. "How Mafias Take Advantage of Globalization: The Russian Mafia in Italy." *British Journal of Criminology* 52(2):235–53.
- . 2012b. "Introduzione all'edizione italiana." In *Mafie in Movimento: Come il crimine organizzato conquista nuovi territori*, edited by Federico Varese. Turin: Einaudi.
- . 2014. "Protection and Extortion." In *The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime*, edited by Letizia Paoli. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2018a. "Colombia, dimenticare Escobar: I reportage di Repubblica." *Repubblica*, December 28.
- . 2018b. *Mafia Life: Love, Death and Money at the Heart of Organized Crime*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- . 2019. "Comparazione e spiegazione: Lo studio delle mafie." In *Lo studio della politica*, edited by R. Mule and S. Ventura. Bologna: Mulino.
- . 2020. "Ethnographies of Organized Crime." In *Oxford Handbook of Ethnographies of Crime and Criminal Justice*, edited by Sandra Bucerius, Kevin Haggerty, and Luca Berardi. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vaughan, Diane. 2011. "Analytic Ethnography." In *The Oxford Handbook of Analytical Sociology*, edited by Peter Bearman and Peter Hedström. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Vigil, James Diego. 2010. *Barrio Gangs: Street Life and Identity in Southern California*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- von Lampe, Klaus. 2012. "Transnational Organized Crime Challenges for Future Research." *Crime, Law, and Social Change* 58(2):179–94.
- . 2016. *Organized Crime: Analysing Illegal Activities, Criminal Structures and Extra-legal Governance*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- Ward, Thomas W. 2013. *Gangsters without Borders: An Ethnography of a Salvadoran Street Gang*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Weenink, Anton, and Franca van der Laan. 2007. "The Search for the Russian Mafia: Central and Eastern European Criminals in the Netherlands, 1989–2005." *Trends in Organized Crime* 10(4):57–76.
- Whyte, William Foote. 1993. *Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Originally published 1943.)
- Williams, Phil. 2001. "Transnational Criminal Networks." In *Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy*, edited by Arquilla J. and D. F. Ronfeldt. Washington, DC: Rand.
- Williamson, Oliver. 1975. *Markets and Hierarchies*. New York: Free Press.
- Woodiwiss, Michael. 2003. "Transnational Organized Crime: The Strange Career of an American Concept." In *Critical Reflections on Transnational Organized Crime, Money Laundering and Corruption*, edited by Margaret E. Beare. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
- Zaheer, Srilata, and Shalini Manrakhan. 2001. "Concentration and Dispersion in Global Industries: Remote Electronic Access and the Location of Economic Activities." *Journal of International Business Studies* 32(4):667–86.
- Zimring, Franklin E., Gordon Hawkins, and Sam Kamin. 2001. *Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California*. New York: Oxford University Press.