The Matrix of Honour:

Martial Culture and Military Values in Spanish and English Armies, 1521-1609

Elliot Jordan

New College

University of Oxford

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Trinity 2025

Acknowledgements

My first thanks are due to David Kendall for his excellent prep-school introduction to gunpowder military history, and to Dr Catherine Buchanan for her inspiring early modern teaching and research. My interests and development as a researcher have been energised by the stalwart mentorship of Professor Guy Rowlands. In Oxford, my work has been guided by Professor Peter Wilson, Dr Glyn Redworth, Dr Cathleen Sarti, and Dr Alex Gajda. Like all Hispanists I am in indirect debt to the late Sir John Elliott. In the wider academic world, I have benefitted from the mentorship of Professor Steve Murdoch, and the guidance of Professor Tim Greenwood, Professor John Condren, Professor Paul Hammer, Dr Jack Abernethy, Dr David Lawrence, and Dr Idan Sherer. As a graduate student, I have been enlightened by the intellectual and social company of many colleagues, including Dr Jacob Chatterjee, Archie Batra, Antonio Pattori, Maximilian Diemer, Andrew Biedermann, Michael Collins, Kardo Beck, and, above all, Dr Oscar Patton, a *camarada* through many scholarly campaigns. I have been very grateful for the support of Maya Blackwell. Though it would be churlish to name names, I have been sustained throughout the years by the company and the *joie de vivre* provided by cherished friends outside the academic world. We have heard the chimes at midnight.

The 1578 treatise *Of the Knowledge and Conducte of Warres* advised Captains not merely to train and instruct a soldier but 'to be his friend to visit him, and comfort him, to further his desires and endeavours, to encourage him…for perchance he hath no other friend to cherish, or to have regard unto him'. As the above paragraph shows I have happily not been in quite that position, but I am immeasurably fortunate to have been supervised by two academic *Gran Capitanes* who embody these principles. Professor David Parrott of New College and Professor Steven Gunn of Merton, great historians both, have taught, mentored, guided, and sustained me for the last five years. The existence of this thesis is down ultimately to their intellectual ability and their phenomenal skill, their kindness and their humanity - and any errors remain mine alone.

The completion of this project was made possible by the generous support of Santander Universities and the BritishSpanish Society, while thanks are due to the staff of the Old Bodleian Library and to Dr Christopher Skelton-Foord and his colleagues, as well as those of the Weston and the British Library. Finally, and most importantly, I express my gratitude to the boundless support of every kind provided by my parents, which I shall never come close to repaying.

Acknowledgements ... 1
Short Abstract: ... 4
Long Abstract: ... 5
INTRODUCTION ... 14
PART I: MARTIAL CULTURE IN THE ERA OF THE ITALIAN WARS ... 48
CHAPTER 1: Noble-Martial and Chivalric Culture ... 48
I. *Esfuerzo Belico Heroico*: The Spanish Chivalric Ethos ... 49
i. Palacios Rubios: Chivalric Individualism ... 49
ii. Chivalric Self-Fashioning: Paredes and Guzmán ... 53
II. *As Dutie Bound*: English Noble-Martial Culture ... 62
iii. Nobility and War ... 62
iv. Tudor Chivalry ... 68
CHAPTER 2: Loyalty and Identity ... 77
I. *Nuestra Infanteria*: Spanish Soldier Identity ... 78
i. Collective Infantry Narratives ... 78
ii. Identities: Spaniards, Imperialists, Catholics ... 88
II. *Englysshe Hands, Englysshe Hartes*: Tudor Martial Patriotism ... 98
iii. National-Martial Patriotism ... 98
iv. Patriotic War Narratives ... 102
CHAPTER 3: Professionalism and Military Thought ... 109
I. *Soldados Platicos*: Spanish Military Professionalism ... 111
i. Spanish Military Theory to 1567 ... 111
ii. The Perfect Soldado ... 121
II. *Weakness and Unruliness*: Tudor Military Professionalism ... 136
iii. Elis Gruffudd: Professional Dissatisfaction ... 136
iv. English Military Theory to 1567 ... 147
Conclusion to Part I ... 161
PART II: MARTIAL CULTURE IN THE ERA OF THE DUTCH REVOLT ... 166
CHAPTER 4: Military Public Spheres ... 166
I. *Escuela Militar*: The Spanish Military Public Sphere ... 167
i. Military Literature ... 167
ii. The School of Flanders ... 179
II. *Martiall Industrie*: The English Military Public Sphere ... 192
iii. Military Literature ... 192
iv. The Community of Captains ... 200
CHAPTER 5: Identities and Ideologies ... 215

I. *Epica de Polvora*: Spanish Military Identities 216
i. Class, Honour, and Identity 216
ii. Soldados of the Spanish Monarchy 224
II. *Martial Wights*: English Military Identities 233
iii. Nobility, Honour, Virtue 233
iv. The Spanish Threat 242
CHAPTER 6: The Perfect Captain 252
I. The Philosophy of Command 254
II. The Captain General 265
III. Professionalism and Initiation 272
IV. Officership and Reform 280
CHAPTER 7: The Perfect Soldiery 290
I. The Perfect Army 292
II. The Common Soldiery 302
III. The Submergence of the Individual 311
IV. Discipline and Regulation 321
Conclusion to Part II 337
CONCLUSION 340
APPENDIX 1: PUBLICATION TRENDS IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH MILITARY THEORY 354
APPENDIX 2: SOME 'CREDENTIALS' OF MILITARY THEORISTS REFERENCED 356
BIBLIOGRAPHY 362
Manuscript and Archival Sources 362
Printed Primary Sources 362
Printed Secondary Works 373
Unpublished Theses 388

Short Abstract:

This thesis investigates the martial values and mentalities of sixteenth-century European soldiers, especially how they conceived of military perfection and the ideal commander, warrior, or military community, using two national case studies. The sixteenth century was an age of radical change in military techniques, organisation, and culture, as new weapons and fortification changed the battlefield, the chivalric ethos was challenged and undermined, and new moral and ideological influences emerged to affect the interaction between war, state, and society. The project studies sources from two major powers, Habsburg Spain and Tudor England, with the comparative perspective throwing into sharper relief the differences and contexts, but ultimately the similarities, of these national martial cultures. The structure is split into two halves, the first covering the period of the mid-to-late Italian Wars (1521-1559) and the second the first phase of the Dutch Revolt (1567-1609), focusing on the 'core' military theatres of both states. This thesis concentrates on the long-form writings left by the soldier-writers of both nations, in two main categories: the memoirs and chronicles composed by warriors of the campaigns they witnessed, and the large body of military treatises on the art of war compiled and published by self-appointed military theorists. It is argued that conceptions of military perfection shifted from ideals of chivalric knighthood to a new scientific, reasoned mentality of professional officership and meritocratic promotion. The term 'matrix of honour' is used to evoke how warriors combined different, interlocking themes- from bravery to confessional loyalty, from skilled command to arithmetic- in constructing the perfect man of war, which, it is argued, was strikingly similar between Spanish and English writers by the end of the century, as soldiers shared ideas within and between national communities in their developing 'military public spheres' and complained about the gaps between military theory and reality.

Long Abstract:

This thesis investigates how martial culture, military thought, and conceptions of the perfect man of war changed in sixteenth-century Europe, with reference to two states: Habsburg Spain and Tudor England. The early modern period has long been understood as an age of fundamental military change associated with the spread of gunpowder weapons, new techniques of infantry warfare and fortification, and the development of permanent military institutions. The historiography of these allegedly 'revolutionary' changes has focused mostly on the organisation, funding, and deployment of contemporary armies, but there remains much to learn about how changes in the European art of war affected the cultures, the mental worlds, and the identities and values, of the soldiers and officers who participated in it.

The sixteenth century is particularly fertile for the study of martial culture as it witnessed a startling growth in the quantity and quality of soldier-writing; long-form texts, often very impressive in their scope and stylistic form, produced by the men at the sharp end of Renaissance battle. Such texts ranged from epic poems in praise of 'Great Captains' to highly detailed but often startlingly bitter accounts of battles and campaigns. Especially important for this thesis is the appearance of military manuals, printed theoretical tracts in which professional soldiers fashioned themselves as military experts and set out their opinions on the art of war, and their ideals of martial perfection. Though superficially tempting to dismiss as works of idle 'armchair generalship', the treatises studied in this thesis were deadly serious works of modern tactical and operational thought, often produced by senior and well-regarded members of their national military communities. As such, they are first-hand accounts on how the mental landscapes of war were defined, and changed, over the period. But contemporary war memoirs, too, are valuable texts in their own right for understanding the same themes,

as writers strove to present themselves, their fellows, or their commanders as exemplars of military perfection.

It is striking how far the diverse range of soldier-writers studied in the project tended to broadly agree on what constituted the ideal man of war, but such an ideal was invariably constituted from a subtle and varying mix of ingredients, ranging from political loyalty to personal prowess at arms, from confessional identity to arithmetical skill. This thesis accordingly posits the term 'matrix of honour' to understand how the different strands of Renaissance military identity interlocked and combined to create a general ideal of military perfection. The strands forming this 'matrix' changed over the period, as new generations of self-consciously modern military theorists actively sought to dismiss the old medieval principles of knightly prowess and personal chivalry in favour of new ideas of reason, discipline and 'military science', while the self-fashioning of soldier-writers as loyal servants of crown and country was influenced by new themes of political and religious ideology.

This thesis investigates these changes with reference to two states which over the century sent impressive numbers of their subjects onto the battlefields of Europe: Habsburg Spain and Tudor England. The project is actively comparative, establishing the strikingly numerous precepts of Renaissance military thought on which the soldier-writers of both states consistently agreed, but also identifies and seeks to explain the distinctive, unique themes in their respective martial cultures. Research and analysis has focused mostly on the 'core' European military theatres of each state, the most fruitful areas for the study of military writing and the crucibles of technical, tactical, and psychological reforms in the art of war. The first half of the thesis focuses on the middle and later years of the Italian Wars, from 1521 to 1559, during which many of the key technical and tactical innovations which would ultimately set the tone of military

literature over the rest of the century were catalysed and diffused in the European art of war. This period would see Spain forge a highly effective and quasi-permanent infantry force in the Italian Peninsula while waging war in the Mediterranean against the expanding Ottoman empire. Meanwhile, England as a peripheral participant in the Italian struggles launched three significant invasions of northern France as well as two major military interventions in Scotland. For both states, this period saw radical changes in martial thought and identity, and the first stirrings of their respective national cultures of printed tactical and organisational treatises, reacting to the revolutionary technical changes of the age. The second half of the thesis begins with the arrival of Spain's *tercios* in Flanders in 1567 to suppress the Dutch revolt, turning the region into a crucible of military change. The vast apparatus created by the Spanish state to wage war against the rebels provided a fertile breeding ground for military thought, while England's gradual slide into 'hot war' with Spain drove the publication of strident calls for martial renewal and military reform to face the Catholic threat. By the end of the century, soldier-writers of both states had elucidated in great detail how they conceived of modern martial perfection, and the early modern military treatise had come of age.

Chapter 1 investigates how at the beginning of the period, Spanish and English men of war were still heavily influenced by the pan-European cult of chivalry- the ideal of the personally brave, powerful, and courteous knight, for whom war both imparted and displayed his own noble virtue. Early Spanish soldier-writers still thought in these terms, considering the ideal warrior as a hyper-masculine, individualistic *caballero.* Though English chivalric culture was far more focused on personal loyalty to the monarch, the early Tudor years nonetheless retained an unbroken link between aristocratic status, personal virtue, and martial bloodshed. Already by the 1530s, however, the values of military perfection had begun to change. Soldier-writers shifted

their mental picture of warfare from knightly combats to the manoeuvres of generals, regiments and armies through skirmishes, sieges, and campaigns. As Chapter 2 finds, Spaniards extolled their fellows- both commoner and *hidalgo*, both officer and ranker- as the ideal military community, reflecting the development of the Spanish infantry as a self-consciously elite collective as well as the emergence of royal, national, and confessional identities in martial culture. Meanwhile, the soldier-writers of both states developed an overriding fixation on loyalty to their commanders, whom they increasingly portrayed as the perfect Renaissance captain, combining new ideals of rational, mission-directed command with themes of personal bravery, risk-taking, and close fraternal bonds between a superior and his subordinates. For the soldiers of both nations, too, political and religious considerations were now crucial; Spain's warriors now strove to present themselves as unconditionally loyal to crown, empire, and church, while English 'martial patriotism' had, with the Reformation, expanded outside the traditional military classes to envisage a beleaguered Protestant nation-in-arms. Chapter 3 specifically investigates ideas of martial perfection, both in dedicated military treatises and in narrative texts. By the mid-century, both states had developed nascent cultures of military theory, Spanish veterans of the Italian and Ottoman wars already printing their thoughts on necessary information for aspiring captains, while members of Tudor England's skeletal community of professional soldiers bemoaned the military failings of their countrymen and sketched out plans for tactical reform in ways that prefigured the more numerous, better-known calls for urgent military reform of the Elizabethan era.

The military mental landscapes of both nations would be further transformed with the outbreak of the Dutch Revolt. As Chapter 4 argues, 'military public spheres' of patronage, rivalry and discussion emerged, with the professional officers of Spain's Army of Flanders striving to record the praiseworthy deeds of their fellow infantry

veterans and to elucidate their own thoughts on tactical and moral reform at a time when Spain's military edge was slowly but perceptibly falling away. Spanish soldier-writers revealed the vertical links in their national military public sphere in their appeals to prominent members of the national military leadership, presenting them as perfect commanders, while also revealing the complex horizontal links of the military community in their continued praise for outstanding officers and soldiers. The English military public sphere reveals the same themes, with a similarly vibrant culture of military print and the writing of tactical and organisational theory, while English soldier-writers, albeit in a smaller and more disparate military community, reveal comparable vertical and horizontal links within their self-identified profession. Chapter 5 focuses on the identities and ideologies of Spanish soldier-writers in the period, finding the same culture of collective infantry identity defined by loyalty, national status, and elite service, as in the period of the Italian Wars, but also identifies a conscious turn against the chivalric ethos and the link between noble status and martial excellence, and a surprising willingness at times to criticise the military shortcomings of their countrymen. English soldier-writers, too, turned against the chivalric ethos and the noble-martial link, while justifying the military profession in broad or specific terms of national defence and selfless sacrifice. Ideologically, many English sources presented the war in Flanders as a Protestant crusade and a chance to renew English martial virtues. The latter was especially important as war with Spain and the threat of invasion loomed, with England's military theorists simultaneously portraying Spain's soldiers as demonic foes plotting the brutal extinction of Elizabeth's Protestant kingdom, *and* as a model of martial perfection and military-technical expertise to be emulated- again, with surprising willingness to set national pride aside in favour of elucidating proper military practice.

Chapters 6 and 7 are fully comparative, revealing how by the end of this century of war, military change, and ideological ferment, it is possible to distinguish a new standard of military perfection. Old ideals of knighthood had mostly vanished, with martial exemplars now bifurcating into the 'perfect captain', and the 'perfect soldier'. The matrix of honour of officership, according to Spanish and English military thinkers, was woven not out of noble birth or the chivalric virtues, but out of meritocratic promotion from the ranks by virtue of a man's loyal service and technical ability in the pseudo-science of Renaissance war. To him, warfare was not a chance to show his own *prouesse* in single combats or knightly deeds, but a profession of command to be contemplated, exercised, and put into practice with diligence and skill, and his rank reflected not his own personal connections or aristocratic status but his place within a tightly regulated, all-encompassing military world. The 'perfect soldier', meanwhile, was now expected to be a trained and hardened veteran, well-versed in the practices and daily realities of campaign and siege as well as the prescribed handling of his weapons and duties, but also in some respects an automaton, de-individualised into anonymous infantry formations of pike and shot. Military theorists sought to tightly regulate his military and moral behaviour both on and off the battlefield, 'submerging' the soldier's individual agency and identity in the mental model of soldierly perfection. This was one of the widest gaps between military theory and reality, and between the moral codes of martinet theorists and the values and identities of the community of common soldiers, as the endemic soldierly disorder, indiscipline, and mutiny of the period bore witness.

As well as charting and describing the emergence of these new standards of Renaissance military perfection, this thesis identifies other overarching preoccupations in sixteenth-century martial culture. New themes of political loyalty, contexts of politico-military patronage networks and authorial aspirations, and the religious

atmosphere of the Reformation influenced how soldier-writers envisaged the justifications of violence and the military profession and self-fashioned as loyal servants of the crown and chroniclers of their own commanders' skills of generalship. Despite new themes of scientific command and disciplinary perfection, the traditional, and likely universal, culture of personal bravery and risk-taking remained paramount, with most praiseworthy military service that soldier-writers deemed 'worthy of memory' stemming from this central preoccupation of martial culture. This leads into the theme of masculinity, which the thesis identifies in how soldiers continued to value personal bravery and prowess, but also in how military chroniclers and theorists excluded women of any kind from their narratives and theoretical depictions of military perfection. The profession of arms itself remained inherently prestigious, with soldier-writers invariably glorying in the suffering and hardships as well as the bravery and bloodshed of war, striving to be known among their contemporaries and to earn *fama* for all time, and defining themselves in opposition to a soft, effeminate, un-martial, civilian 'other'. However, the assumption that praiseworthy service in the line of battle or in the cold and hunger of campaigning deserved commensurate material reward in wealth, title, or promotion had survived from the age of chivalry, and inevitable disappointment and bitterness at the lack of sufficient recompense for their suffering and sacrifice likely influenced the pervasive sense of discontent with the current state of the military profession as much as more high-minded considerations of military theory. The drive to record praiseworthy deeds in battle likely stemmed from an understanding that written commemoration was often the only reward those performing such deeds were likely to receive, while the fixation of much military theory on the need for a meritocratic system of officership reflected both the drive to create perfect officers, and the unfairness of promotion practices in reality. On this theme, the disconnect between glorious deeds

performed and witnessed in battle, and the sad paucity of material reward, the masculine cavaliers of the beginning of the period and the prudish military theorists of the end would have agreed.

Statement by the Candidate of Prior Acceptance of Thesis material:

Some aspects of this thesis were developed from my M.Phil. dissertation, 'Spanish Blades: Elizabethan Military Theory, the Spanish Threat and the Military Revolution, c.1558-1604'. The core sources from the M.Phil. dissertation form the core English sources of Part II of the doctoral thesis, and some of the same ideas and broad concepts on military professionalism, hierarchy, and discipline, from Chapter 2 of the dissertation are developed in Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis. Chapter 4, II.iv 'the Community of Captains', is adapted from the second half of Chapter 3 of the dissertation, on the English 'military public sphere'. Chapter 5, II.iv 'the Spanish Threat' of the thesis is adapted from Chapter 1 of the dissertation, covering fear of Spanish invasion, and fear and admiration of Spain's armies in Elizabethan military books.

WORDS: 100,000

Approved extension of 15,000 words used only for original Spanish text in footnotes, the Appendices, and this statement.

"…Three great ones of the city,
In personal suit to make me his lieutenant,
Off-capp'd to him: and, by the faith of man,
I know my price, I am worth no worse a place:
But he; as loving his own pride and purposes,
Evades them, with a bombast circumstance
Horribly stuff'd with epithets of war;
And, in conclusion,
Nonsuits my mediators; for, 'Certes,' says he,
'I have already chose my officer.'
And what was he?
Forsooth, a great arithmetician,
One Michael Cassio, a Florentine…
That never set a squadron in the field,
Nor the division of a battle knows
More than a spinster; unless the bookish theoric,
Wherein the toged consuls can propose
As masterly as he: mere prattle, without practise,
Is all his soldiership. But he, sir, had the election:
And I, of whom his eyes had seen the proof
At Rhodes, at Cyprus and on other grounds
Christian and heathen, must be be-lee'd and calm'd
By debitor and creditor: this counter-caster,
He, in good time, must his lieutenant be…

…'tis the curse of service,
Preferment goes by letter and affection,
And not by old gradation, where each second
Stood heir to the first…"

INTRODUCTION

One night in about 1570, a bitter Ensign was stalking through Venice, giving vent to his professional frustrations. He had expected to be promoted to Lieutenant thanks to his extensive credentials, having risen through the ranks and proven his own martial virtue under the eyes of his General in multiple campaigns- and, to be sure, he had the private entreaties of grandees to further ensure his well-deserved elevation. Yet these emissaries had been turned away with a barrage of military terminology by the General, who instead promoted another man, qualified not by experience, nor by any knowledge of practical battlefield formations, only by his study of military theory and classical warfare- and, again, by personal connections and letters in his favour.[1]

This Ensign existed only on stage, but the preoccupations and language of his speech were eerily redolent of many of the military tracts by real soldiers studied below, and he was in essence engaging with the issue of military *perfection*, the question of what a man of war should do, how he should behave, and what he should *be.* This issue was particularly important because, as Iago knew, the rewards of military service often hinged on such judgements of honour and merit. This thesis investigates how soldiers in the armies of two national case studies, Spain and England, grappled with martial culture and military values as they wrote about the campaigns they had experienced and formulated their thoughts on proper military practice. In doing so, they engaged tacitly or explicitly with questions of what parts made up the 'matrix' of the ideal warrior.

If the seventeenth century was the 'century of the soldier' then the sixteenth century was surely the first century of the soldier-writer.[2] A startlingly broad range of

[1] *Othello*, I.i., was written c.1603 but set in the Ottoman-Venetian war of 1570-73: Jane Hwang Degenhardt, 'Foreign Worlds', in Arthur F. Kinney (ed.), *Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare* (Oxford, 2012), p. 452.
[2] Fulvio Testi, in Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis* (New Haven, 2014), p. 26.

warriors put pen to paper, with their reasons for doing so as diverse as the texts they produced. This thesis studies two key bodies of long-form soldier-writing: firstly, military *memoirs*, primarily in prose, which sought to chronicle the deeds and actions performed or witnessed by the author. Though ostensibly trustworthy, such texts varied considerably in precisely what they considered worthy of record, or how their narratives were filtered through their own identities, preoccupations, and individual contexts as chroniclers, and as such, they reveal much about military mentalities and values. Secondly, and even more importantly for the issue of military values and perfection, self-appointed military theorists also produced a rich body of *treatises* on the art of war, military ethics, and the practice of command. Though more obviously the case in the second source body, *both* source types engaged with the issue of military *perfection*, as (aside from the fact that many warriors wrote their campaign narratives with an expressly didactic purpose, to provide a model for aspiring soldiers) the urge to secure reward or the glory of posterity meant that the ways in which military memoirists depicted themselves and their fellows as paragons of martial virtue reveal almost as much about their value systems as those writers who purposely set out to discuss military perfection. In this specific theme, though the literary genres, the motives for writing, and the specific preoccupations of the author varied, these texts are not in fact so different. Indeed, an apparent drawback of memoirs and treatises alike, their separation from military reality- with the idealised armies depicted in treatises, and the bias and relentless self-promotion of memoirs- thus strengthens the value of the source body for a study of military *values* and *ideals*. Taken together, these source bodies- which, again, *both engage with the crucial issue of military perfection*, albeit from different angles- allow much more detailed reconstruction of contemporary martial

culture and military mentalities, in the words of the warriors themselves, than shorter or administrative-focused documentary evidence.

The project studies a period of intense geopolitical contest and considerable change in the cultures as well as the techniques of European war, and the armies of Habsburg Spain and Tudor England were at the forefront of both. A comparative perspective throws the distinctive aspects and contexts of each national culture of war and of military writing into sharper relief, but the striking number of parallels, similarities, common preoccupations, and even transnational plagiarism of the military writers of both nations means that such an investigation may hint at the profound importance of certain themes in broader sixteenth-century European martial culture and international military thought, and reveal potential angles to be explored in other states. By limiting itself to two nations, the thesis aims to strike a middle ground between existing studies on war and culture in single states on one hand, and pan-European syntheses on the other, and thus to balance breadth and depth of research and analysis.[3]

Spain and England were not the only cultures to participate in intense warfare and the explosion of military writing in the sixteenth century, and many of the themes identified in this thesis could likely be found in the rich memoirs and treatises of (for example) French or German soldier-writers.[4] Yet apart from their plentiful source bodies, Spain and England have distinctive characteristics that justify placing them together for comparison. They had very different military experiences, and forms of

[3] A recent single-state study is Oleg Rusakovskiy, *European Military Books and Intellectual Cultures of War in 17th-Century Russia* (Leiden, 2024).
[4] On French military literature, see Robert J. Knecht, 'Military Autobiographies in Sixteenth-Century France', in J.R. Mulryne and Margaret Shewring (eds.), *War, Literature and the Arts in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (New York, 1989), pp. 3-21; David Parrott, *Richelieu's Army* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 19-83. On German military literature, see Henry J. Cohn, 'Götz von Berlichingen', in Mulryne and Shewring, *War, Literature and the Arts*, pp. 22-42; Peter Wilson, *Iron and Blood* (London, 2022), pp. 82-6; Patrick Brugh, *Gunpowder, Masculinity, and Warfare in German Texts*, *1400-1700* (Rochester, 2019). French military theorists would benefit particularly from serious study to discern how nobility, chivalry, and mounted warfare fitted into their own 'matrix of honour'.

military organisation: a uniquely permanent force of professional infantry units and garrisons in the Spanish case, versus a more *ad hoc*, temporary levy system under a more disparate national military community in the English case. Yet the soldier-writers of both nations participated in a surprisingly similar way in the new culture of printed military theory and agreed on almost all technical and cultural precepts of the new 'perfect science' of warfare, revealing- at least in military thought- the depth and significance of the sixteenth century's technical and cultural 'revolution in military affairs'. Conversely, the soldier-writers of *both* nations served in the period under relatively unified monarchical structures of politico-military and religious authority, in comparison to divided France and fragmented Germany, meaning that the choice of Spain and England offers particularly rich material for exploring the penetration of national identities and religious ideologies into martial culture. Finally, the choice of Spain and England for a comparative project is further justified by the explicit and unabashed admiration of Elizabethan writers for Spanish military practice, which represents an exceptionally strong case of transnational links in contemporary martial culture.

The sources selected are primarily those produced in connection with the 'core' military theatres of these states: Italy and the Central Mediterranean, the Low Countries and central Europe, and England's French and Scottish wars. This is to the exclusion of other, more geographically, mentally, and militarily peripheral theatres of war. Though the Spanish conquest of America and England's own wars of subjugation in Ireland produced important texts and rich martial discourses, these merit and have received dedicated study in their own right, and many of the themes involved- asymmetric warfare, the ethos of conquest, military-colonial settlement, contested questions of royal authority, discussions on the justice and morality of war and atrocity against the

barbarian 'other'- are beyond the scope of this thesis, and of the key works of soldier-writing under consideration here.[5] This focus on the 'core' theatres and their associated texts permits a more manageable scope of investigation, and allows concentration on the most technically intense campaigns of the period in the two great 'schools of war'- first the Habsburg-Valois wars, then the Dutch Revolt- which involved the largest participation and greatest technical military change, and which produced the richest long-form texts on new military practice and evolving ideas of martial perfection. The paradigm of ideal warfare in this new generation of military treatises was 'all quality, pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war', symmetric 'peer' warfare by the highest technological and tactical standards of sixteenth-century Europe, of which first Italy, then the Low Countries, was the theatre *par excellence*.[6]

Part I, the first three chapters, centres on the mid-to-late period of the Italian Wars, the military crucible of early-century Europe.[7] Spain's armies were drawn into the dynastic struggle for the peninsula soon after it was initiated by Charles VIII's invasion in 1494, and by 1503 the reforms of Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba, the legendary *Gran Capitan* (1453-1515) who would remain an archetype of the perfect General for the rest of the century, had laid the foundations of a force of professional

---

[5] On the Spanish conquests, and martial culture and ethics, see Beatriz Pastor Bodmer, *Discursos Narrativos de la Conquista*, 2nd edn. (Hanover, 1998); J.A. Fernández-Santamaria, *The State, War and Peace* (Cambridge, 1977); Andrew W. Devereux, *The Other Side of Empire* (Ithaca, 2020). The dynamic, exciting field on Tudor wars of conquest in Ireland and beyond, and the associated English martial cultures, discourses, ethics, and justifications, includes Neil Murphy, 'Violence, Colonization and Henry VIII's Conquest of France', *Past & Present*, 233 (November 2016), pp. 13-51; Bruce Lenman, *England's Colonial Wars 1550-1688* (Harlow, 2001), pp. 1-143; Nicholas Canny, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland* (Hassocks, 1976); Chapters by Hiram Morgan, Vincent Carey, David Edwards, and Eugene Flanagan, in Hiram Morgan (ed.), *Political Ideology in Ireland, 1541-1641* (Dublin, 1999); Rory Rapple, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture* (Cambridge, 2009), *Idem.*, 'Ideas and Realities in the Elizabethan Experience of Colonizing Ireland and America', *William and Mary Quarterly*, 80/3 (July 2023), pp. 443-52. Conversely, some Elizabethan soldiers in Ireland would also write on the technical art of war: e.g. Rory Rapple, 'Sir Ralph Lane's Approach to Holding Office', *Journal of British Studies*, 62/2 (April 2023), p. 395.

[6] *Othello*, III.iii.

[7] Christine Shaw and Michael Mallett, *The Italian Wars 1494-1559*, 2nd edn. (Abingdon, 2019); John Lynch, *Spain 1516-1598* (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 38-45, 95-137; Henry Kamen, *Spain, 1469-1714*, 4th edn. (Abingdon, 2014), pp. 47-50, 59-70, 115-7.

and highly effective Spanish infantry on the emerging pike-and-shot model.[8] From 1516, Spanish involvement in Italy was part of the pan-European composite monarchy of Charles V, and the burgeoning Spanish infantry, distinguished increasingly by their firearm-dominant tactics and their high veteran proportion as well as their high combat motivation and proud national martial ethos, would spend the next four decades as the military backbone of the Emperor's wars. At the beginning of the period covered by this thesis, Spanish troops along with the German *Landsknechte* would distinguish themselves in the Northern Italian campaigns of 1521-26, at Bicocca (1522) and at the stunning victory of pike-and-shot and especially of Spanish arquebusiers over Francis I at Pavia (1525), under such prominent commanders in Charles' Spanish-Imperial military machine as Fernando d'Avalos, Marques de Pescara (1489-1525) and Antonio de Leiva (1480-1536). The 1530s saw the solidification of the Spanish infantry into '*tercios*', the regimental and organisational combined-arms unit that would become a by-word for the permanent Spanish infantry forces who remained the backbone of Spanish military power and a potent force through such mixed fortunes in the later Italian Wars as the Provence campaign (1536) and the defeat in pitched battle at Ceresole (1544), the latter under Pescara's nephew and successor, Alfonso d'Avalos, Marques del Vasto (1502-1546). Against the Ottomans and their allies in the Mediterranean, the Spanish infantry were likewise the Emperor's key weapon in triumph at Tunis (1535) and disaster at Algiers (1541), along with other significant engagements such as the sieges of Koron (1533-4), Castilnuovo (1539), and, later, Malta (1565). The experience of such religiously-charged 'crusade' warfare helped sharpen the national and religious identity of the proud Spanish infantry community, as

[8] On Córdoba's campaigns, military reforms, and 'school' of war, see José María Sánchez de Toca and Fernando Martínez Laínez, *El Gran Capitan* (Madrid, 2008), pp. 93-234.

did the outstanding role of the *tercios* in the Schmalkaldic War (1546-7) against the Lutheran princes and towns of Germany. The German campaign, producing the model victory at Mühlberg and two particularly interesting military texts, marked the true emergence of perhaps the most significant General of the period, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, 3rd Duke of Alba (1507-1582), who would further bolster his dominance of the Spanish military world with his subsequent command of the Spanish *plaza de armas* in Northern Italy.[9]

As a peripheral participant in the Italian struggles, contemporary English warfare was defined most obviously by Henry VIII's three major French campaigns.[10] The invasion of 1513 saw battlefield victory at Guinegate and the brief conquest of Tournai and Therouanne along with victory over the Scots at Flodden, but the campaign of 1523 was turned back before Paris in an early example of mutiny influencing operational outcomes. The 1530s saw important English efforts against rebels and in Ireland along with considerable mass mobilisation against invasion threats, and the great 1544 campaign in France culminated in the capture of Boulogne, which would join Calais as a hub for the Kingdom's skeletal community of military professionals. One such professional, the Welshman Elis Gruffudd, provides idiosyncratic but vital testimony of his experiences and thoughts of serving in Tudor armies. Major actions against Scotland, meanwhile, included the vast raid of 1544, and the invasion of 1547, under Lord Protector Somerset (1500-1552).[11] The latter resulted in a set-piece victory at Pinkie and an abortive attempt to control Scotland through an ambitious network of permanent garrisons, which again brought the English into direct conflict with the

[9] On Alba's career, campaigns, and political and cultural milieux, see Maurits Ebben, Margriet Lacy-Bruijn, and Rolof van Hövell tot Westerflier (eds.), *Alba* (Rotterdam, 2013).
[10] Steven Gunn, *The English People at War in the Age of Henry VIII* (Oxford, 2018), pp. 1-16.
[11] Gervase Phillips, *The Anglo-Scots Wars, 1513-1550* (Woodbridge, 1999).

French as they bolstered their Scots allies. Significantly, the mid-Tudor years from the mid-1540s would see English warriors experience complex, intense warfare in line with continental practice, and come into increased contact with continental professionals, including Spanish troops in significant numbers for the first time. European 'mercenaries' were deployed to considerable effect in Scotland and against rebels, and an English army served alongside Imperial and Spanish forces in the Habsburg-Valois campaigns of the 1550s, including the victory at San Quentin (1557).[12] However, in contrast to its impressive construction of warships and fortifications, England had by Elizabeth's accession not developed a quasi-permanent or professional infantry force comparable to the Spanish *tercios* and garrisons, especially after the 1558 loss of Calais.

The first half of the thesis analyses the emergence of new military values and cultures in this first great phase of warfare and military change. Chapter 1 examines chivalric and 'noble-martial' cultures, the link between aristocratic birth, military duty, prowess, and honour that defined the martial culture of medieval Europe and remained important in both national case studies. Chapter 2 reveals how new ideologies and loyalties were appearing in military literature by the 1530s, with soldier-writers reflecting national, political, and religious and confessional contexts as well as purely military themes and identities.[13] Chapter 3 examines the emerging ideas of professional military perfection and embryonic national bodies of military theory in both states by the mid-century, as soldier-writers reacted to the changing nature of European warfare. As shall be seen, by the end of the Italian Wars, the military literature of both Spain and England already reflected many of the key early modern military-technological changes

[12] On Anglo-Spanish military interaction before 1572, see Gilbert John Millar, *Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries* (Charlottesville, 1980); Martin A. Sharp Hume (trans.), *Chronicle of King Henry VIII* (London, 1889); Glyn Redworth, 'Where were the English?', in Ana Sáez-Hidalgo and Berta Cano-Echevarría (eds.), *Exile, Diplomacy and Texts* (Leiden, 2021), pp. 15-31.
[13] On religious and confessional war in the period, see D.J.B. Trim, 'Conflict, religion, and ideology', in Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (eds.), *European Warfare* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 278-99.

discussed below, and had developed the key themes in martial culture and professional military identity that would define the texts produced in much greater quantities in the later century.

The second phase of the period covered by this thesis was initiated by the rebellion of the Dutch provinces against Spanish rule, which would replace Northern Italy as the epicentre of the Spanish military world, and the most intense and innovative zone of European warfare.[14] The march of Alba's *tercios* to Flanders in 1567 turned the region into another intense crucible for developing military technology and tactics and a fertile breeding ground for military thought and writing in both nations, while England's gradual slide into 'hot war' with Spain drove the publication of strident calls for military reform, as well as for broader renewals of English martial culture and identity, to meet the Catholic Spanish threat.

The military apparatus installed by Alba was the largest, most complex army of the day, and the *Ejercito de Flandes* would prosecute the grinding war against the rebels to 1609, and ultimately to 1648. Despite his legendary fierceness, outstandingly professional officer corps, and tactical victories, Alba had nonetheless failed to reconquer the rebellious provinces by his recall in 1573. Their strategic problems of distance and natural defensibility in 'the great bog of Europe' were dramatically increased by the regional density of modern fortifications, necessitating endless sieges against determined and often confessionally-inspired opposition. Alba's successor, Luis de Requesens y Zúñiga (1528-1576), would find his Army further hamstrung by the *tercios*' uniquely sophisticated culture of mutiny for pay as the Spanish empire buckled under its strategic and financial burdens, which in 1576 resulted in the infamous sack of

[14] Geoffrey Parker, *The Dutch Revolt* (Rev. edn., London, 2002), and *Idem.*, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven, 1998).

Antwerp. Again, despite tactical victories and even the 1585 recapture of Antwerp by exemplary siegecraft, the Spanish offensive, resumed under Don Juan de Austria (1547-1578) and his nephew and successor, the militarily successful but politically unpopular Alexander Farnese, Prince of Parma (1545-1592), failed to bring an end to the revolt, not least due to the diversion of Parma's *tercios* to intervene in France's religious wars in the 1590s. The end of the first phase of the war saw more mutiny, Spanish defeat by the Anglo-Dutch force at Nieupoort (1600), a rapidly narrowing tactical gap between the Spanish infantry and the Dutch under the innovative Maurice of Nassau (1567-1625), and apparently declining professionalism in the Army of Flanders' officer corps, which may account for the exceptional crop of Spanish reforming military theory in the final two decades of the century. This, however, did not prevent the continued salience of Flanders as Europe's 'School of War' for Catholic and Protestant gentlemen alike.[15]

The involvement of Elizabethan England and its community of gentleman soldiers in the Low Countries wars, frustrated with the relative military inactivity of the early Elizabethan years (after disappointing military interventions at Leith in 1560 and Le Havre/Newhaven in 1562-3), began with the recruitment of English volunteers for the Dutch cause from 1572, creating an embryonic community of English warriors on the continent.[16] Following England's formal entry into the war in 1585, a full-scale expedition in pay of both the English crown and the States General was launched under Robert Dudley, 1st Earl of Leicester (1532/3-1588), and English troops under Leicester and other prominent commanders, notably Sir John Norreys (d.1597) and precocious military theorist Sir Roger Williams (1539/40-1595), would thereafter play an important role in the Dutch war, holding several important garrisons and fighting a pitched battle

[15] Gregory Hanlon, *European Military Rivalry* (Abingdon, 2020), p. 41.
[16] Paul E.J. Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars* (Basingstoke, 2003).

at Zutphen (1586).[17] The late 1580s and 1590s witnessed a growing militarisation of the Elizabethan state and society, with intervention in France, amphibious operations against the Spanish littoral, and mobilisation at home against repeated invasion threats. Nonetheless, despite the confessionally-charged nature of the Spanish war and urging of pro-war partisans in the Elizabethan court- above all Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex (1565-1601), who after the deaths of Leicester and the knightly Philip Sidney (1554-1586), emerged as the centre of England's restless military community, and anti-Spanish, martial Protestant causes- Elizabeth's war efforts remained limited in financial and military ambition, at least in the eyes of England's aggressive 'swordsmen'.[18] English forces remained arguably less institutionalised and permanent than the long-standing *tercios* with their veteran soldiery, while campaigns were marred by desertion, attrition, officer in-fighting, operational disappointments such as the 1587 loss of Sluis, mutiny, and the notorious betrayal of garrison towns.[19] Such events, no less than the devastating Spanish mutinies, proved the general unreliability of contemporary armies, the limits of politico-military power in the period, and the gap between the idealised forces of military textbooks and the disappointing realities- all of which may have further encouraged the pervasive tone of military decline and dissatisfaction in the burgeoning martial literature of the period. However, English troops (notably the Vere brothers) distinguished themselves in Dutch pay, and the English military community in the Low Countries from 1572 through Leicester's expedition to 1604 and beyond proved fertile ground for the cross-pollination of continental military ideas, which were in more demand than ever at home, with a boom in military publishing and the

[17] John S. Nolan, *Sir John Norreys and the Elizabethan Military World* (Exeter, 1997), argues that the varied nature of Norreys' career reflected the evolving forms of military organisation and institutional frameworks in which Elizabethan soldiers served.
[18] For interpretations of Elizabeth's alleged military restraint, see Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars*, p. 1; R. Malcolm Smuts, *Political Culture, the State, and the Problem of Religious War* (Oxford, 2023), pp. 386-7.
[19] Roger B. Manning, *An Apprenticeship in Arms* (Oxford, 2006), pp. 24-40.

constitution from the 1570s of a 'Trained Bands' militia to meet the Spanish threat. Meanwhile, though not the focus of this thesis, nor of the texts under consideration themselves, much of the Elizabethan martial community was linked to or influenced by the wars of pacification and conquest in Ireland, and Irish campaigning remained a crucial and easily-overlooked aspect of the English military experience long before the great English effort in Elizabeth's final decade.[20]

Part II opens with Chapter 4, examining the cultures of military literature and the vertical and horizontal ties between warriors in the 'military public spheres' of both nations, while Chapter 5 explores how their identities and ideologies combined specifically martial preoccupations with national or religious concerns. Chapters 6 and 7 treat the military theory of both Spanish and English soldier-writers as one source body, investigating firstly how these precocious theorists conceived of command and the ideal leader, before exploring how they applied very different standards and concerns in their ideal of the perfect soldiery, again consciously reacting to the perceived demands of the military techniques that emerged in the early century.

The wars of the sixteenth century had been discussed by nineteenth- and twentieth-century historiography with a focus on reconstructing strategy, tactics, and the techniques of war.[21] However, the transition from traditional to 'new military history' in the second half of the twentieth century opened the field to encompass the rest of war, state, and society, examining the economic, political, and social dimensions and contexts of wars, including the study of cultures and mentalities of combatants.[22] In the

[20] Cyril Falls, *Elizabeth's Irish Wars* (London, 1996); John McGurk, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland* (Manchester, 1997).
[21] Sir Charles Oman, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1937).
[22] Joanna Bourke, 'New Military History', in Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott (eds.), *Advances in Modern Military History* (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 258-80; Robert M. Citino, 'Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction', in *The American Historical Review*, 112/4 (2007), pp. 1070-90.

interaction between war and culture, David Parrott identified two decades ago that traditional stresses on technological and organisational innovation driving military change have been replaced by a growing recognition 'that war itself should be understood primarily as a product of cultural assumptions and structures within the surrounding society'. Parrott cited, as prominent contributions on war and culture, John Keegan's argument for war as shaped by societal assumptions and constraints, Victor Davis Hanson's idea of a distinctively western military culture, and John Lynn's cultural history of battle.[23] Likewise, Azar Gat's analyses of the development of military thought stress the crucial influence of wider cultural and intellectual currents on military theory, and as shall be seen, the texts studied in this thesis were often influenced by their political, ideological, intellectual, and even personal contexts as well as purely military-technical considerations and objectives.[24]

Lynn's concept of 'military culture' envisages three key forms: broader 'societal' values, specifically 'military' thought and culture, and 'strategic culture', a combination of the two.[25] Thus, the military textbooks studied in this thesis drew their 'strategic culture' of strict discipline and obedience (as examined in Chapter 7) from grappling with the purely military demands of creating and manoeuvring pike-and-shot infantry formations on the battlefield but were likely also influenced by broader societal currents of moral reformation and intellectual interest in the classical military ethos.

---

[23] David Parrott, 'Cultures of Combat in the *Ancien Régime*', *International History Review*, 27/3 (2005), pp. 518-33.
[24] Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought* (Oxford, 1989), p. ix.
[25] John Lynn, *Battle*, 2nd edn. (New York, 2008), p. xx. Lynn's study skips from 'chivalry and the chevauchée' to Enlightenment linear warfare, neglecting the sixteenth century. Relevant contributions on 'experience' and 'mentalities' have included Yuval N. Harari, *The Ultimate Experience* (Basingstoke, 2008), with a focus on military memoirs, and Erika Kuijpers and Cornelis van der Haven (eds.), *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800* (London, 2016). Though this thesis does not make comparisons outside the period, studies of collective martial culture that have been influential in the project- not least, in both considering chivalric culture and in the latter case, the crucial and easily-overlooked theme of interpersonal connections and contexts of clique and patronage in the 'military public sphere'- are István Deák, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps* (Oxford, 1992) and Andrew Gordon, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (London, 2005).

Also relevant is Lynn's dichotomy of 'the discourse and the reality of war'- with this thesis primarily studying the 'discourse' of 'how war should be' as it was portrayed by the authors of military memoirs and treatises, *not* the realities of military actions or organisation. Discussing the interaction between discourse and reality, Lynn thus posits the idea of 'perfected reality', in which war was forced into 'accepted patterns' and idealised discourses of how combat should work. This idea very neatly fits the sources studied in this project, most obviously the military treatises, but also military memoirs, as soldier-authors strove to present themselves, their fellows, or their commanders as perfect warriors.[26]

Lynn argued that 'by adopting a cultural approach…we better appreciate the variety and change that have typified military institutions, thought and practice over the ages', and this thesis investigates an age long renowned for its 'variety and change' in military affairs.[27] The early modern period, especially from the late fifteenth to the early sixteenth century, saw dramatic and even revolutionary transformations in the techniques, tactics, and institutions of the European art of war, and it is in these contexts that the new genres of military literature studied here should be understood.[28] The most obvious was the coming of age of gunpowder, firstly with the increasing effectiveness of gunpowder artillery by the end of the fifteenth century. This in turn spurred a revolution in fortification, both in the field, and in the new *trace italienne* in artillery-resistant and artillery-equipped defensive architecture, limiting the scope for dramatic, offensive action at both the tactical and the operational level by the mid-sixteenth century and placing a new importance on painstaking, technical, and manpower-

[26] Lynn, *Battle*, pp. 359-69.
[27] Lynn, *Battle*, p. xiv; Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate* (Boulder, 1995); Tallett and Trim, *European Warfare*; Steven Gunn, David Grummitt and Hans Cools, 'War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Widening the Debate', *War in History*, 15/4 (2008), pp. 371-88.
[28] Bert S. Hall, *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe* (Baltimore, 1997).

intensive siegecraft.[29] Even more dramatic was the spread and refinement of handheld firearms, potentially devastating but slow to reload and thus vulnerable in open ground, which though initially best used in conjunction with fixed fortifications, were able to play an increasingly important offensive role in the field when joined in new and often technically demanding combined-arms formations with squares of pike infantry. This anti-cavalry polearm had already proven its value in Swiss hands as an offensive as well as a defensive weapon, but required effective unit coherency, motivation, discipline, and collective aggression. This 'pike-and-shot' model of mutually supporting, co-ordinated infantry arms was already well-developed by 1521, in no small part by the reforms associated with the Spanish *Gran Capitan*, and remained dominant in set-piece infantry tactics over the period covered by this thesis, and far beyond. Such developments encouraged the rise of infantry as the dominant battlefield arm, contributed to the decline of aristocratic heavy cavalry and their knightly ethos of individualistic noble warfare, and were accompanied in the early Italian Wars by the emergence of early professional infantry forces: the Swiss, the Germans, and the Spanish. Firearm-equipped infantry were also suited to the ambushes and detached light-infantry operations in which the Spanish infantry in Italy excelled, while the Spanish innovation of the heavier musket would further increase infantry firepower in siege and on the battlefield.[30]

---

[29] Along with its financial, operational, organisational, and intellectual impact on war-making, fortification- especially in Italy and Flanders, the two key theatres of sixteenth-century Spanish warfare- may itself have driven the contemporary growth of infantry forces: Geoffrey Parker, *The Army of Flanders*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 2004), p. 3.

[30] Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, stresses the long-term evolution of gunpowder technology and its varied effects on warmaking, and the impact of pistols as well as infantry pike-and-shot on the decline of noble heavy cavalry in the sixteenth century. On these early professional infantries, see Dennis E. Showalter, 'The Evolution of Cohesion in European Armies', *Journal of Military History*, 57/3 (July 1993), pp. 407-30; David Parrott, *The Business of War* (Cambridge, 2012), pp. 46-70. On military techniques in this crucial early-century period of technical change, see F.L. Taylor, *The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529* (London, 1993).

Meanwhile, the period saw increasing standards of professionalism, discipline, and training, not least due to the demands of effectively deploying and co-ordinating unwieldy pikes and arquebuses *en masse* in the new combined-arms formations. There was a broader growth in the size, institutionalisation, and permanence of state military establishments, beginning, arguably, with the fifteenth-century *compagnies d'ordonnance* and developing further with the gradual emergence of state-financed field troops and garrisons in the period of the Italian Wars, in which the Spanish again led the way. These organisational and politico-military changes, as well as the purely military-technical contexts of firearms, formation, and fortification, had far-reaching implications for military culture.[31] It is this sense of the sixteenth century as a new era of warfare and of military organisation, and especially of military professionalism, rationality, and discipline, with which most soldier-writers studied in this thesis were particularly concerned.[32] Indeed, these changes in the art of war likely contributed to the sixteenth-century spread of military literature itself, as well as its contents. The connection between military-technical change and the drive to publish didactic military handbooks is self-explanatory, and these gunpowder techniques, infantry tactics, and emerging mentalities of practical command and disciplined obedience formed the essential content of the new treatises, to the neglect of more traditional matters like horsemanship and personal honour. Beyond the simple content of the texts, the new professional culture of knowledge and expertise was clearly encouraged by the sense that gunpowder, fortification, and new infantry techniques had reduced the significance of personal, individual bravery and required a sober, rational, pseudo-scientific

[31] The social, political, and cultural ramifications of military change in the Italian Wars are explored in Idan Sherer, *The Scramble for Italy* (Abingdon, 2021).
[32] As Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, p. 215 argues, the technological flux of the fifteenth century and coalescence of new military techniques in the Italian Wars had largely stabilised by the mid-sixteenth century, which roughly coincides the emergence of the forms of military writing studied in this thesis in Spain and England.

approach to warfare, as well as a solid grounding in specific fields of technical knowledge. The side-lining of the chivalric ethos and individualist knighthood as a literary *topos*, an important trend in the new genres of military narratives and treatises alike, was thus one notable way in which military-technical change would colour the content of military literature: in the effect of gunpowder and fortification on the battlefield in changing the actual nature of war through limiting the scope for knightly individualism, and in the perceived need to deploy regulated infantry formations reducing the significance of individual prowess in mental pictures of the perfect army.

Meanwhile, the growth of armies and military institutions, and emergence of new command networks, ranks, and professional career structures, likely encouraged military writing and publishing, which in both its treatise and memoir forms often sought to further the ambitions of its author. Amelang's study of early modern life writing sees the emergence of soldier memoirs in the sixteenth century as a 'by-product' of military change, specifically of new promotion opportunities in larger armies and a 'revaluation' of the common soldier, in the context of the new importance of infantry.[33] It would often be the aspirations of the soldier-writer, as much as his higher-minded hopes to accurately chronicle military events or design the perfect army, that would influence his decision to write. In this regard, the new genres of war literature may have ultimately been downstream of wider military context, but the influence of immediate, specific biographical and political context on these texts should never be underestimated. The sources studied here would be influenced not only by contemporary military techniques and organisation, but by ideological and political concerns as authors sought to self-fashion as loyal members of their national military community, and to associate their works with the names and public images of

[33] James S. Amelang, *The Flight of Icarus* (Stanford, 1998), pp. 191-2.

prominent commanders, as the lavish, sycophantic prefaces of most printed military works of all types in the period attest.

For the last seven decades, early modern military history has been defined by Michael Roberts' idea that changes in military techniques drove a 'Military Revolution' in both European war-making, and in state formation.[34] The supposedly undisciplined pike-squares and mercenaries of the Renaissance formed the unsophisticated backdrop against which Roberts portrayed the emergence of drilled, professionalised, Dutch and Swedish armies from the late sixteenth century. The specific dating and details of this transformation have come under considerable assault: most importantly, Geoffrey Parker has shifted the period of revolutionary change back to the crucial transformations in firepower and fortification in the early century (to which the sources studied in this thesis reacted), and stressed the significance of Habsburg Spain's forces as catalysts of this military transformation.[35] Some historians have emphasised the importance of military change and moments of 'revolution' in the middle ages, or shifted the revolutionary period post-1660.[36] Other paradigms may replace models of 'revolution' with gradual change and 'punctuated equilibrium', or purely military 'revolutions in military affairs' without concomitant social or political change.[37] However, that the sixteenth century was of immense importance to the development of 'modern war', and,

---

[34] Michael Roberts, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*, pp. 13-35.
[35] Geoffrey Parker, ''The Military Revolution, 1560-1660'- a Myth', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*, pp. 37-54; Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1996). David Eltis, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London, 1995) and Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, focus respectively on tactical and technical changes in the period. A recent contribution to the debate is Mark Charles Fissel (ed.), *The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs* (Berlin, 2023).
[36] Andrew Ayton and J.L. Price (eds.), *The Medieval Military Revolution* (London, 1995), pp. 1-17; Jeremy Black, *A Military Revolution?* (Basingstoke, 1991).
[37] Clifford J. Rogers, 'The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War', in Rogers, *Military Revolution Debate*, pp. 55-93; MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution* (Cambridge, 2001), p. 13, consider 'gunpowder' and 'new fortress architecture' as 'anticipatory' revolutions in military affairs prior to their first 'military revolution', that of Roberts' model in the seventeenth century.

more importantly, is a very rich period for the study of martial culture and military mentalities in the context of these changes, is undeniable. As shall be seen, the richness of sixteenth-century military literature, with its complex, precocious, and consciously 'modern' military treatises, peaked in quantity and sophistication in the final two decades of the century but emerged much earlier and broadly reacted to and depicted warfare based on the aforementioned technical themes of gunpowder, formation, and fortification that were refined and disseminated during the period of the Italian Wars. This would seem to suggest that at least as far as military writing and martial culture is concerned, Parker is correct in arguing that the 'revolutionary' period came before the Dutch reforms stressed by Roberts.[38] It may not be an exaggeration to see early modern military books as themselves one lasting manifestation of the 'revolution in military affairs' in the early sixteenth century.

One theme in martial culture, and in the historiography of late medieval and early modern war, of crucial importance to this project is that of chivalry, the international cult of knighthood that by 1500 had shaped the military behaviour, writing, assumptions, and mentalities of Europe's martial classes for centuries.[39] Especially important for the treatment of chivalry in this study is Richard Kaeuper's understanding of the concept as based ultimately on the exercise of physical, and often inherently ostentatious, violence, that 'knighthood was nourished on aggressive impulses, that it existed to use its shining armour and sharp-edged weaponry in acts of

[38] J.R. Hale, 'Military Education of the Officer Class', in *Idem.*, *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983), p. 236, likewise emphasises that the revolution in professional military theory culture on which much of Hale's work focuses, of which military treatises were such an important part, was visible in military writing 'well before the radical tactical innovations associated with Maurice of Orange'.
[39] Maurice Keen, *Chivalry* (New Haven, 1984); Malcolm Vale, *War and Chivalry* (London, 1981); Richard W. Barber, *The Knight and Chivalry* (rev. edn., Woodbridge, 1995); Richard W. Kaeuper, *Medieval Chivalry* (Cambridge, 2016); Robert W. Jones and Peter R. Coss (eds.), *A Companion to Chivalry* (Woodbridge, 2019).

showy and bloody violence'.[40] It is difficult to overstate the continued significance of chivalry in European politico-military culture and society *throughout* the sixteenth century, with the knightly ethos and aesthetic of the martial elite continuing to permeate art, pageantry, and especially literature.[41] Even the Duke of Alba, who in many ways epitomised the new military techniques and ethos of the sixteenth century, loved his *Amadís de Gaula*, and he was likely joined in his reading of chivalric romance by many of his fellow military reformers.[42] Nonetheless, the sixteenth century is usually seen as the period when chivalry, as a culture of actual, practising warriors, declined and vanished due to changes in military technology, participation, and organisation.[43] To take one example, Malcolm Vale stressed the role of military change in undermining chivalric culture, with its downfall delayed during the period c.1450-1530 when offensive battle retained its importance, before finally declining thereafter.[44]

Together with chivalry, another key theme in sixteenth century martial culture, and in this thesis, is the issue of military *professionalism*, defined by one key contribution as 'the substitution of technical proficiency for personal prowess', and involving 'the creation of objective standards for training and commanding fighting men'.[45] Along with the destructive effects of gunpowder itself, chivalry has often been

---

[40] Richard W. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford, 2001), p. 2.
[41] Early modern chivalric culture is studied by Sydney Anglo (ed.), *Chivalry in the Renaissance* (Woodbridge, 1990). In particular, the diverse field on the rich chivalric culture of Elizabethan England has often stressed its role in art, pageantry, literature, and the political contexts of loyalty, nobility, and royal representation, rather than its direct relevance to 'real' war: Frances A. Yates, 'Elizabethan Chivalry', *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 20/1/2 (1957), pp. 4-25; Arthur B. Ferguson, *The Indian Summer of English Chivalry* (Duke, 1960), *Idem.*, *The Chivalric Tradition in Renaissance England* (Washington, 1986); Richard C. McCoy, *The Rites of Knighthood* (Berkeley, 1989); Blair Worden, *The Sound of Virtue* (New Haven, 1996).
[42] Rosemarie Mulcahy, 'The Third Duke of Alba and the Arts', in Ebben *et al*, *Alba*, p. 167.
[43] Richard W. Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors* (Philadelphia, 2009), pp. 194-224. On the divergence between chivalric romance literature and the technologies of 'real' war, see Michael Murrin, *History and Warfare in Renaissance Epic* (Chicago, 1994).
[44] Vale, *War and Chivalry*, pp. 171-4.
[45] M.D. Feld, 'Middle-Class Society and the Rise of Military Professionalism', *Armed Forces & Society*, 1/4 (1975), p. 419. As David Trim summarises, 'mainstream early-modern historiography generally

seen as undermined or replaced by professionalism, antithetical in military techniques and organisation, and in ethics, to the noble-martial cultures of the past.[46] Thus, describing the end of chivalry and the division of its cultural inheritances, Richard Barber rules that 'the knight at war became the professional soldier', though as medieval armies had also contained common soldiers distinct from social and cultural knighthood, 'professional officer' may be more apposite.[47] As well as technical and institutional military change, the ethos of the headstrong chivalric warrior with his self-affirming honour culture and mutual bonds of loyalty has often been seen as stifled by new military authority and discipline, and unconditional, absolute obedience. However, it should be stressed that far from being inherently incompatible with chivalry, loyalty to the monarch had often been a key feature in medieval chivalric culture.[48] Meanwhile, other contributions have stressed that professionalism, like other aspects of military sophistication or 'revolution', gradually emerged from, or was present in, the later middle ages.[49]

Introducing an important collection, including studies of the nations under investigation here, David Trim considered the questions of chivalry and professionalism and set out to determine whether the latter replaced the former. Trim concluded that 'chivalry and military professionalism are not necessarily dichotomous' and stressed that professionalism was 'frequently promoted by nobles who fully subscribed to the

---

locates the professionalisation in of military society in Europe in the period between c.1470 and c.1620'. D.J.B. Trim (ed.), *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism* (Leiden, 2003), p. 14. Trim, pp. 6-10, offers a seven-point definition of military professionalism, of which the most relevant for this thesis are points five and seven: 'a distinctive expertise and a means of education therein', and 'a distinctive self-conceptualisation'.

[46] Ian Roy, 'The Profession of Arms', in Wilfrid Prest (ed.), *The Professions in Early Modern England* (London, 1987), pp. 181-7.

[47] Barber, *Knight and Chivalry*, p. 337.

[48] Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence*, pp. 89-106. As Mulcahy, 'Alba and the Arts', p. 167 points out, Alba may have identified particularly with the 'loyalty to one's overlord' displayed by Amadís.

[49] e.g. Showalter, 'Evolution of Cohesion'; Adrian R. Bell *et al* (eds.), *The Soldier in Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 2013), pp. 260-8.

cult of chivalry and its values', though he conceded that, ultimately, professionalism had a 'solvent' effect on chivalry.[50] It is with these questions that this thesis is particularly concerned, and Trim's arguments will be revisited in the conclusion. In exploring these themes, the project has been particularly influenced by the contributions of John Hale, and his repeated, eloquent stress on the importance, and the novelty, of Renaissance military professionalism steeped in the rational art of war, practised with 'a new internationalism, no longer that of the knight-to-knight empathy…by a more hard-headed freemasonry of experts', 'a specialised and single-minded profession'.[51] Conversely, though the coming chapters will find much evidence to support Hale's assertions, it should be stressed that the mental and literary world of sixteenth-century military communities, and societies as a whole, continued to be coloured by more traditional martial cultures, and an enduring link between nobility, virtue, prowess, and war. As Sherer rightly emphasises, the story of military history in the Italian Wars, and (from the perspective of this thesis) military culture and identities, is one of continuity as well as change.[52]

Beyond these two poles of chivalry and professionalism, this thesis also engages with the more profound concept of honour. The seminal, and still useful, contribution in this regard is Mervyn James' study of honour in England under the Tudors and early Stuarts. James viewed honour as inherently linked to lineage and class status as the preserve of the noble classes, and as having emerged from the chivalric tradition. James, at least for the beginning of his period, thus prefigured Kaeuper's understanding of chivalry in stressing the paramount role of physical violence in aristocratic honour

[50] Trim, *Chivalric Ethos*, p. 3.
[51] J.R. Hale, *War and Society in Renaissance Europe*, *1450-1620* (New York, 1985), p. 129. The same idea is crucial throughout J.R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983). Another important study of early modern war and society, and particularly of state power and military service, is André Corvisier, *Armies and Societies in Europe*, *1494-1789*, tr. Abigail T. Siddall (Bloomington, 1979).
[52] Sherer, *Scramble for Italy*, pp. 2-3.

culture.[53] However, James argued that a self-affirming, more lineage-based and potentially rebellious honour culture in the early sixteenth century came to be dominated by the state's 'monopoly both of honour and violence', with honour synthesised with humanist wisdom and a new stress on earned rather than inherited virtue, as well as ideas generated by religious change. James is referenced here not for his specific schema for early modern England, which has been seriously challenged by subsequent historiography, but for his value in defining and exploring useful ideas of honour in general, and its interactions with state authority.[54] Accordingly, the conclusion will return to James' theories and test them against the themes identified in the military writing of both national case studies. The issue of honour in the context of this thesis is linked to the importance of identity, and public reputation as well as personal, inner values.[55] James stressed the role of public esteem as an integral component of honour throughout his period and as Brendan Kane argues, honour falls 'between individual feelings of worth and collective notions of propriety and status'.[56] Such preoccupations were never far from the minds of sixteenth century soldiers, and the drive in military writing to advertise a man's virtues as making him worthy of honour, or to elaborate precisely what virtues and identities did so, is one of the key themes in this thesis. Ronald Asch, in his study of early modern European nobilities, thus ruled that the 'principal purpose' in the life of noblemen was 'to prove their claim to honour and superiority' and Rainer Goetz goes as far as to argue that in the Spanish case, the dominant 'quest for honour and glory among the nobility' drove the rise of

---

[53] Mervyn James, 'English politics and the concept of honour, 1485-1642', in *Idem.*, *Society, Politics and Culture* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 308-415. Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence*, pp. 304-7 sees the dissolution of the 'essential linkage of violence with honour', as the state asserted control over violence while non-violent routes to noble status and prestige opened, as key aspects of the unravelling of chivalry.
[54] Brendan Kane, *The Politics and Culture of Honour* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 4-5.
[55] On war and identity, see Bertrand Taithe and Tim Thornton (eds.), *War: Identities in Conflict* (Stroud, 1998).
[56] Kane, *Politics and Culture of Honour*, p. 4.

secular autobiography itself.[57] The following chapters shall question these ideas, such as the assumption that honour culture and 'glory' was limited to the nobility, or that egodocuments had to glorify the author himself, but these themes of honour, glory, identity, and reputation among one's peers remain important throughout.

Lynn suggests masculinity as one example of broader 'societal culture' that impacts on martial culture and military forces, and issues of masculinity, manhood, and gender identity are traditionally under-appreciated but critical aspects of military mentalities, and specifically of early modern martial culture.[58] David Trim's valuable exploration of masculinity and manhood in Elizabethan and early Stuart English martial culture accordingly stresses the need to consider the link between the histories of war and of gender. Trim argues that 'a large part of martial identity…can be understood as masculine identity', and even that ''soldierly' and 'manly' were largely coextensive'.[59] Particularly useful is Trim's idea that masculine and martial identities rested on 'performativity', with war the supreme theatre for 'proving oneself a true man'.[60] Though other preoccupations and themes of martial culture emerge over the following chapters, this idea of war as a stage for showing off outstanding martial deeds was a constant thread in military writing in both national case studies, and more often than not, this involved the physical deeds of courage, risk-taking, and manly suffering of wounds that Trim sees as the basis of reputational masculinity. As such, many or even all aspects of praiseworthy military service or skill- especially, but not limited to,

---

[57] Ronald G. Asch, *Nobilities in Transition 1550-1700* (London, 2003), p. 10; Rainer H. Goetz, *Spanish Golden Age Autobiography in its Context* (New York, 1994), p. 150.
[58] Explicitly gendered studies include Emanuel Buttigieg, *Nobility, Faith and Masculinity: The Hospitaller Knights of Malta* (London, 2011) and Brugh, *Gunpowder, Masculinity, and Warfare*.
[59] D.J.B. Trim, 'Martial Conduct and Masculine Identity in Late Tudor and Early Stuart England', in Matthew Woodcock and Cian O'Mahony, *Early Modern Military Identities*, *1560-1639* (Woodbridge, 2019), pp. 25-55. Keith Thomas, *The Ends of Life* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 44-76 identifies the link between violence, masculinity, and fulfilment as a man in early modern England.
[60] Trim, 'Martial Conduct and Masculine Identity', p. 29.

physical deeds and wounds- may have been seen by contemporaries as inherently gendered. As Katherine Lewis identifies with reference to fifteenth-century sources, 'medieval uses of 'manly' usually signify courage and combat, often with more or less explicit connotations of nobility, and 'manhood' was frequently associated with notions of honour and reputation', and this automatic link between masculinity, honour, war, and even noble status would likely have been equally valid for sixteenth-century soldiers.[61] Though not a primary focus of this thesis- nor, indeed, of the sources themselves, though some touch on gendered ideas of martial identity, and all hint at broader 'manhood' as underpinning martial culture- the conclusion will revisit masculinity as an important component of sixteenth-century military identity, and offer broader thoughts on gender, morality, and military writing in the period.

Turning to the national case studies, considerable historiographical attention has been devoted to Spanish warfare and strategy in the age of Habsburg hegemony in Europe, with major contributions studying Spain's military organisation and placing it at the heart of her grand strategy, fiscal-military system, and the 'military revolution' itself.[62] The *tercios* have long been seen as icons of military proficiency 'on a level with the creation of the Macedonian phalanx or the Roman legion' and as an important step in European military development.[63] René Quatrefages has illuminated the legislative and organisational process by which the *tercios* emerged from their late-fifteenth-

[61] Katherine Lewis, *Kingship and Masculinity in Late Medieval England* (London, 2013), pp. 6-7.
[62] Luis Ribot García, 'Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain', in Philippe Contamine (ed.), *War and Competition between States* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 37-68; Jan Glete, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe* (Abingdon, 2002), pp. 67-139; Parker, *Grand Strategy*; James D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War* (Cambridge, 2002); Fernando González de León, 'Spanish Military Power and the Military Revolution', in Geoff Mortimer (ed.), *Early Modern Military History* (Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 25-42. Studies of Spanish armies include Julio Albi de la Cuesta, *De Pavía a Rocroi*, 7th edn. (Madrid, 2020).
[63] Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World*, tr. Siân Reynolds (2 vols., London, 1972-3), ii.671.

century roots under Ferdinand and Isabella.[64] The seminal study of Habsburg Spanish arms was Parker's examination of the Army of Flanders, which primarily aimed to chart the logistical rise and fall of Spain's efforts against the Dutch rebels but uncovered a wealth of material on life, culture, and mutiny in the army.[65] This was followed by Quatrefages' examination of the 'micro-society', daily life, and junior command echelons of the *tercios* in Flanders, while Idan Sherer has recently studied the Spanish infantry in the Italian Wars with a focus on the experience of the rank-and-file.[66] Within the field of martial culture, Raffaele Puddu examined how Spanish martial culture in the sixteenth century drew on the chivalric ethos and the inherent prestige of arms as well as loyalty to the King and Church, arguing that the heterogenous social makeup of the Spanish infantry allowed non-noble Castilians to participate in the traditionally noble world of martial honour.[67] Quatrefages likewise examined the honour-driven culture and the 'sentiment of religion, nationality, honour, and personal wealth' as well as the close fraternal ethos that defined the culture of Spain's infantry.[68] However, Fernando González de León's study of 'class, culture and command' in the Army of Flanders, an important inspiration for this project, instead stressed the professionalism, meritocracy, and military studiousness of the Duke of Alba's 'school' of officers, though he argued that such values declined sharply in the late sixteenth century.[69]

---

[64] R. Quatrefages, '*L'Organisation Militaire de l'Espagne (1492-1592)*' (Ph.D. thesis, *Université de Lille*, 1989); René Quatrefages, 'La spécificité militaire espagnole', in Jean-Pierre Amalric (ed.), *Pouvoir et Société dans l'Espagne Moderne* (Toulouse, 2019), pp. 39-53; René Quatrefages, 'The Military System of the Spanish Habsburgs', in Rafael Bañón Martinez and Thomas M. Barker, *Armed Forces and Society in Spain* (Boulder, 1988), pp. 1-50.
[65] Parker, *Army of Flanders.*
[66] René Quatrefages, *Los Tercios Españoles (1567-1577)* (Madrid, 1979); Idan Sherer, *Warriors for a Living* (Leiden, 2017). The 'experiential' dimension had previously been studied by Lorraine White, 'The Experience of Spain's Early Modern Soldiers', *War in History*, 9/1 (2002), pp. 1-38.
[67] Raffaele Puddu, *El Soldado Gentilhombre* (Barcelona, 1984).
[68] Quatrefages, 'Military System', pp. 26-7.
[69] Fernando González de León, *The Road to Rocroi* (Leiden, 2009). Four of Alba's officers were recently studied in Raymond Fagel, *Protagonists of War* (Leuven, 2021).

A considerable body of historiography exists on sixteenth-century English wars, armies, military organisation, and 'war, state and society'.[70] Contributors such as Nolan, Phillips, and Fissel have illuminated an active Tudor military culture that discussed, debated, and applied modern developments such as pike-and-shot infantry and new fortification types.[71] Raymond has argued that Henrician England underwent a military revolution and MacMahon for the existence of a form of Henrician military professionalism, while Eltis' study of the pan-European military revolution rested heavily on Elizabethan military theory.[72] C.S.L. Davies' exploration of the 'English People and War' has been developed by Steven Gunn's much more thorough investigation of Henrician war, state, and society.[73] Key contributions on Elizabethan martial culture have included Trim's examination of English volunteers and their religious ideology in the Low Countries, Manning's studies of aristocratic military culture and the importance of continental influences to English military development, and Malcolm Smuts' recent wide-ranging examination of English politico-military themes in the period.[74] Particularly salient is Rory Rapple's bold study of professional gentleman officers in Ireland and their conceptions of authority and military service, which from the perspective of this thesis is significant in underlining the importance of ambition and reward to early modern martial culture.[75] Soldier-writing and the

[70] David R. Lawrence, 'Reappraising the Tudor and Early Stuart Soldier', *History Compass*, 9/1 (2011), pp. 16-33.
[71] John S. Nolan, 'The Militarization of the Elizabethan State', in *Journal of Military History*, 58/3 (1994), pp. 391-420; Phillips, *Anglo-Scots Wars*; Mark Charles Fissel, *English Warfare, 1511-1642* (London, 2001).
[72] James Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution* (London, 2007); Luke MacMahon, 'Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army', in Trim, *Chivalric Ethos*, pp. 183-212; Eltis, *Military Revolution*, *passim.*
[73] C.S.L. Davies, 'The English People and War in the Early Sixteenth Century', in A.C. Duke and C.A. Tamse (eds.), *Britain and the Netherlands* (The Hague, 1977), vi.1-18; Gunn, *English People.*
[74] D. Trim, 'Fighting 'Jacob's Warres': English and Welsh Mercenaries in the European Wars of Religion' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 2003); Roger B. Manning, *Swordsmen* (Oxford, 2003), *Idem.*, *Apprenticeship*; Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*.
[75] Rapple, *Martial Power.*

importance of warfare to Elizabethan literature has received considerable attention, while the importance of sixteenth-century English martial culture and identities was recently affirmed by Woodcock and O'Mahony's essay collection.[76]

The first key source field is that of campaign memoirs, texts on warfare written by its participants, though as shall be seen, the precise structure, authorial style, or use of the first person itself often varied widely. Across Europe, and especially in Spain's armies, an unprecedented number of warriors in the early modern period described in writing, and even in print, the wars in which they had participated. This thesis is interested in these texts not as literary or intellectual subjects, or to relate them to the historiography of autobiography or the 'self', but in what they reveal about martial culture and ideals of military perfection. As Faith Harden summarises, soldier-memoirs of various titles ('life', 'memorial', 'account') were all 'part of a wider textual ecology…that arose as a feature of what Alexandra Shepard has described as early modernity's "pervasive culture of appraisal"', especially in the context of state bureaucracies and military forces.[77] Soldiers, and their commanders, wrote accounts of their campaigns out of 'concrete hopes for material rewards' by relating their praiseworthy merits and services, or to defend themselves against criticism.[78] More often, though, the texts examined here hoped for more intangible glory for themselves and their fellows by consecrating 'into immortality things worthy of remembrance'.[79] As such, the precise ways in which soldier-writers sought to present themselves, their peers, their commanders, and the campaigns in which they fought reveal a wealth of

---

[76] e.g. Geoffrey G. Langsam, *Martial Books and Tudor Verse* (New York, 1951); D.J.B. Trim, 'Martial Poetics', in Mike Pincombe and Cathy Shrank (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Tudor Literature* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 587-605; Woodcock and O'Mahony, *Early Modern Military Identities.*
[77] Faith S. Harden, *Arms and Letters* (Toronto, 2020), p. 13.
[78] Goetz, *Spanish Golden Age Autobiography*, p. 116; Knecht, 'Military Autobiographies in Sixteenth-Century France', p. 10.
[79] Martin du Bellay, referenced in Yuval Noah Harari, *Renaissance Military Memoirs: War, History and Identity* (Woodbridge, 2004), p. 111.

detail about contemporary mentalities of how warriors should act, fight, and think. The key contributor on early modern military memoirs is Yuval Harari, whose detailed thematic study of 34 warrior memoirs c.1450-1600 covered some of the same texts as this thesis, though with a greater focus on the history of ideas and of personal identity than on the history of warfare, and with comparisons to late modern sources to chart long-term development of western military identities.[80] Harari's argument that Renaissance military memoirs were interested simply in chronicling the honourable deeds of noblemen at war can be both supported and challenged with the evidence examined below.

The last two decades have seen considerable interest in early modern Spanish military memoirs. Miguel Martínez' study of Spanish military autobiography has posited a vibrant and often subversive soldierly 'Republic of Letters'.[81] His text has been joined by Harden's recent study of Spanish military memoirs, which as well as examining literary themes, engages with the important concepts of 'petitionary writing' and martial ethics. Both also provide important ideas on some texts studied in this thesis, though, like the broader historiography of Spanish life-writing, Spanish armies, or early modern war, they mostly neglect two very long and enormously valuable texts: the *Tratado* of the arquebusier Martin García Cerezeda, and the *Sucesos* of Sergeant-Major Alonso Vazquez. English military memoirs were far rarer, but as shall be seen, several sources do exist and merit close study, while the prose and poetry of Elizabethan warriors often straddled genres and drew heavily on the author's experiences.

[80] Harari, *Renaissance Military Memoirs*; Yuval Noah Harari, 'Military Memoirs: A Historical Overview of the Genre', *War in History*, 14/3 (2007), pp. 289-309.
[81] Miguel Martínez, *Front Lines* (Philadelphia, 2016).

The second core source body is even more valuable for revealing contemporary ideas of military perfection: military treatises, and especially printed handbooks.[82] Such texts, a 'printed flood' first in Italy, then elsewhere in Europe by the mid-century, of 'books dealing with the conduct and technology of war', are in their very existence treated by Hale as powerful evidence of a new culture of military professionalism and perfection.[83] One innovative study incorporates military treatises into its argument that, driven by technical and tactical changes in war-making as well as classicising intellectual trends, Italian military literature after c.1530 discarded the chivalric ethos in favour of a new culture of 'military humanism'.[84] Geldof, meanwhile, suggests that military-technical instruction books inherently contradicted the medieval, chivalric assumption of war as an exclusively noble duty and right, and of 'prowess as an innate quality of gentle blood'.[85] Valuable contributions on the new age of military theory have included Hale's detailed study of Italian military print culture, Geldof's on Renaissance military print more broadly, and Popper's recent, perceptive interpretation of English 'military humanism' and martial reading, with a focus on how Renaissance military thinkers analysed classical texts and precepts.[86] The latter is an important reminder of the crucial importance of classical, and especially ancient Roman, ideals to sixteenth-century military literature. However, there still lacks comprehensive pan-European research on the spread of military handbooks or evolutions in military theory comparable to the attention given to Vegetius or Machiavelli.[87] Meanwhile, though

[82] Marcello Fantoni (ed.), *Il "Perfetto Capitano"* (Rome, 2001), pp. 491-508.
[83] Hale, *War and Society*, p. 56; Hale, 'Military Education', p. 223.
[84] Frédérique Verrier, *Les Armes de Minerve* (Paris, 1997).
[85] Mark R. Geldof, 'The Pike and the Printing Press', in Matthew McLean and Sara K. Barker (eds.), *International Exchange in the Early Modern Book World* (Leiden, 2016), pp. 160-1.
[86] J.R. Hale, 'Printing and the Military Culture of Renaissance Venice', in *Renaissance War Studies*, pp. 429-70; Nicholas Popper, 'Virtue and Providence: Perceptions of Ancient Warfare in Early Modern England', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 83/3 (October 2020), pp. 519-42.
[87] Sydney Anglo, 'Vegetius's 'De Re Militari'', *Antiquaries Journal*, 82 (2002), pp. 247-67; C.T. Allmand, *The* De Re Militari *of Vegetius* (Cambridge, 2011); Sydney Anglo, *Machiavelli: The First Century*

Renaissance soldiers also wrote important manuscript texts, and taught and debated military practice by word of mouth, the texts of the 'military revolution' in both chronicle and treatise form were produced in the context of another 'revolution', that of printing, which clearly encouraged the transnational ferment of military ideas as in other intellectual fields. Indeed, print likely drove military theory culture even more than military life-writing: as Scannell points out, print was a mass-market medium and 'held a consistent line that was not mutable through its onward transmission'.[88] In this respect, the new phenomenon of printed military manuals emerged alongside a variety of 'handbook' genres in the information-driven culture of practical, didactic publishing.[89]

In the Spanish case, de León has written two crucial articles, respectively on the military reforms and technical precepts of treatises produced by officers in the late sixteenth century, and on the 'social dimension of ethics' in Spanish military theory, including the all-important themes of chivalry and professionalism.[90] Two monographs have studied long-term developments in early modern Spanish military literature, including many of the texts and themes examined in this project.[91] Meanwhile, considerable historiographical attention has been paid to Tudor military theory, with treatises from the 1570s to the late 1590s and onwards to the early Stuart decades

(Oxford, 2005), pp. 477-513. Gat, *Origins of Military Thought*, begins with the Enlightenment and considers sixteenth-century military thought as essentially classical, referencing Machiavelli, though as shall be seen, Beatrice Heuser's work on strategy is more receptive to sixteenth-century sources.
[88] Paul Scannell, *Conflict and Soldiers' Literature* (London, 2014), p. 11.
[89] Donna A. Seger, *The Practical Renaissance* (London, 2022).
[90] Fernando González de León, '"Doctors of the Military Discipline"', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 27/1 (1996), pp. 61-85, and Fernando González de León, '*Soldados Platicos* and *Caballeros*', in Trim, *Chivalric Ethos*, pp. 235-68.
[91] Ricardo González Castrillo, *El Arte Militar en la España del Siglo XVI* (Madrid, 2000); Esther Merino Peral, *El arte militar en la época moderna* (Madrid, 2002)

receiving detailed treatment, as well as being deployed in the broader historiography of Elizabethan martial culture and literature.[92]

Together with the themes and historiographical fields elaborated above, several key terms used in the following chapters require clarification. The first is the concept of the 'matrix of honour'- with 'matrix' meaning 'the elements that make up a particular system, regarded as interconnecting networks', while 'honour' is used here not in the narrowly aristocratic sense envisaged by James, but more broadly as 'great respect, esteem, or reverence received, gained, or enjoyed'.[93] The 'matrix of honour' would be applicable to any field of cultural or intellectual history studying ideal or perfect identity or the judgement of one's peers by preconceived ideals. It is envisaged as the process by which ideals of perfection drew on multiple, interwoven strands of prestige and identity to construct the perfect soldier: thus, Spanish infantry identities combined bravery, suffering, *and* political and religious loyalties, while military theorists increasingly expected their ideal officer to be *both* experienced and well-read, *both* brave and prudent, and *both* fearsome in discipline and magnanimous in command.

Also important is the concept of 'fashioning' or 'self-fashioning' identities, famously used by Stephen Greenblatt- though it is deployed here not to discuss the emergence of the 'self', but to describe how soldiers sought to construct their martial identities.[94] The soldier-writers studied in the following chapters both broadly 'fashioned' the ideal of the perfect soldier or the military-professional identity in their discussions of military theory and practice, and specifically 'self-fashioned' in stressing

---

[92] Henry J. Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science* (Madison, 1965); David R. Lawrence, *The Complete Soldier* (Leiden, 2009); Barbara Donagan, 'Halcyon Days', *Past & Present*, 147 (1995), pp. 65-100; Paul A. Jorgensen, *Shakespeare's Military World* (Berkeley, 1956).
[93] *OED.*
[94] Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning* (Chicago, 2005); Laura Delbrugge (ed.), *Self-Fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia* (Leiden, 2015), pp. 1-17.

their *own* attributes and credentials as veteran soldiers, campaign eyewitnesses, loyal chroniclers, or professional military experts. Richard Cust, appropriately, thus echoes the anthropological definition of honour as 'a nexus between the ideals of society and their reproduction in an individual through his attempts to personify them'.[95]

To evoke the sense of local, national, and pan-European communities of professional warriors, this thesis uses the term 'military public sphere', adapting the influential concept of Jürgen Habermas.[96] As shall be seen, this concept is important as Spanish and English military theorists wrote not in isolation but contributing to a wider body of military literature, and a culture of military thought, discussion, and debate. Moreover, ideas of honour were invariably public-facing and linked to 'renown, fame, reputation, good name' among a fighting man's peers.[97]

Finally, in engaging with emerging concepts of military discipline- in this case, in the specific meaning of regulating and punishing subordinates rather than the more general *disciplina militar*, often used by soldier-writers to mean *all* military technique and practice- this thesis uses the concept of the 'submergence of the individual'. The link between early modern state formation, social discipline, and the formation and disciplining of armies has long been an important historiographical theme. Notably, Gerhardt Oestreich linked state formation, the military adoption of stoic principles, classical discipline, and Dutch military reforms at the end of the sixteenth century.[98]

---

[95] Richard Cust, 'Honour and Politics in Early Stuart England', *Past & Present*, 149 (1995), p. 58.
[96] Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, tr. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, 1989). The concept of a 'military public sphere', and its application to the 'debate of certain military-political issues' among professional officers, has apparently been used once before, by J. Tattenberg, 'The Structural Transformation of the Military Public Sphere: War, Knowledge, and Military Elites in West Germany, 1940-1989' (D.Phil. Thesis, University of Oxford, 2021).
[97] *OED.*
[98] Gerhardt Oestreich, ed. Brigitta Oestreich and H.G. Koenigsberger, tr. David McLintock, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 76-89. Wilson cites Oestreich as well as Norbert Elias' idea of a 'civilising process' and the internalisation of 'self-discipline' as showing the interaction between early modern military history and narratives of social change. Peter Wilson, 'Of 'Master' and

The term ‘submergence of the individual’ was briefly referenced by Roberts as one aspect of ‘the modern art of war’ that, through the ‘military revolution’, had supposedly come into being by 1660.[99] Though it is not the intention of this thesis to discuss broader concerns of state-building, the term is used to evoke how military theory sought to ‘submerge’ the individualism and restrict the agency of the common soldier both on and off the battlefield. This was one important way in which theorists expressed what war *should* be, not what it *was*, which inevitably fell short of the idealised mentalities of military perfection with which this project is concerned.

‘Grand Narratives’ and Their Discontents’, *War & Society*, 42/1 (2023), pp. 90-8. See also Paul Rabinow (ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (New York, 1984), pp. 179-89.

[99] Roberts, ‘Military Revolution’, p. 29.

PART I: MARTIAL CULTURE IN THE ERA OF THE ITALIAN WARS

CHAPTER 1: Noble-Martial and Chivalric Culture

This chapter examines the influence of chivalry and the noble-martial link in Spain and England in the military writing of the early century. In the Spanish case, the *Tratado* of Palacios Rubios depicted a mental landscape of warfare still part of the world of chivalry and even romance, envisaging the ideal warrior as a noble man-at-arms performing praiseworthy deeds with honour and bravery- the ideal of '*esfuerzo*'. This ethos was likewise expressed by two of the first military memoirists of the century, Diego Garcia de Paredes and Alonso Enríquez de Guzmán, who self-fashioned as independent, chivalric *caballeros.*

The second half examines firstly how despite claims of declining military participation and virtue among the traditional martial classes, the nobility and gentry continued to underpin English military efforts, and English thought on war, state, and society continued to see warfare as a noble duty. Meanwhile, the same concept in reverse- that warfare itself was inherently noble and prestigious- remained alive, with chivalry continuing to influence English conceptions of warfare. However, unlike the individualistic, personal, and disorderly mentalities of the Spanish texts, 'Tudor chivalry was turned to the service of the state', and Tudor chivalric writing remained loyal to crown and country.[100]

[100] Steven Gunn, 'Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court', in Anglo, *Chivalry in the Renaissance*, p. 108.

I. *Esfuerzo Belico Heroico*: The Spanish Chivalric Ethos

i. Palacios Rubios: Chivalric Individualism

The individualist nature of Spanish chivalric culture at the beginning of the century is encapsulated by the 'Treatise of Warlike Heroic Spirit' by one of Spain's premier jurists, Juan Lopez de Palacios Rubios (1450-1524). Charged with 'the most important juridical questions of his time' in a period of dramatic military expansion, much of Rubios' work was concerned with questions of 'just war'.[101] However, Rubios' *Tratado*, published at Salamanca shortly after his death, was concerned less with wars than with ideal warriors, announcing its purpose as defining '*esfuerzo*…how it is made and determined, how it works', making the work a valuable discourse on contemporary martial culture.[102]

Rubios' *Tratado* was meditative and philosophical rather than practical in its directions for the aspiring warrior and was exclusively concerned with the spirit and deeds of the individual '*hombre esforzado*'. The first sections were devoted to an extensive dissection of '*fortaleza*' and '*esfuerzo*', ruling that a man must repeatedly perform difficult, dangerous and brave deeds, graded by 'place, time and other qualities', and do so virtuously to be an '*hombre esforzado*'.[103] After extensive discussions on personal virtue and inner strength, Rubios defined 'warlike strength, of heroic war' as 'doing…virtuous acts in war, or battle, of many, or of few, or of one against another', explaining how 'interior' and 'exterior' acts could accord chivalric *esfuerzo*.[104] Though the second half of the text elaborated the deeds expected of an

---

[101] 'López de Vivero, Juan', *Real Academia de la Historia*, *Diccionario Biográfico Español* (50 vols. Madrid, 2009) xxxi.33-5. [*hereafter 'DBE'*]; Devereux, *Other Side of Empire*, pp. 13-14.
[102] Eloy Bullón y Fernández, *El Doctor Palacios Rubios y sus Obras* (Madrid, 1927), p. 280; Juan Lopez de Palacios Rubios, *Tratado del Esfuerzo Belico Heroyco* (Madrid, 1793), p. xv. (*como se fabrica y determina: como se obra*).
[103] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 119. (*como son logar, tiempo, y otros qualidades*)
[104] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 12. (*fortaleza belica o de la guerra heroyca, por la qual se hacen o pueden hacer actos virtuosos en guerra o batalla de muchos, o de pocos, o de uno contro otro*)

aspiring *caballero*, the focus remained overwhelmingly individual. As such, the *Tratado* epitomised the traditional noble-martial value system of masculine chivalry, envisaging the ideal warriors as aristocratic *caballeros* who 'desire burdens and suffering' to 'perpetuate their fame and memory'.[105] Acquiring such fame and memory through displaying personal bravery, prowess, and steadfastness was the essence of Rubios' values, and his characteristics of the ideal knight were explicitly gendered, with *esfuerzo* the antithesis of 'effeminacy'.[106]

In Rubios' value system, it is already possible to discern tensions between this individualistic ethos and emerging concepts of military discipline and loyalty to the crown. Rubios emphasised that a *caballero* must seek 'fame and glory' rather than material reward but conceded 'if a *caballero* who is salaried and summoned by the King does his duty in battle, he can be called *esforzado*'.[107] Yet Rubios' mentality was detached from military discipline; on the morality of fleeing combat, he ruled that in a losing battle, 'the few that remain…are not obliged to stay, but can honestly flee' and remain *esforzado.* Such a judgement was in stark contrast to the absolute discipline extolled in later treatises, or the picture of Spanish loyalty discussed in the following chapter. Rubios restricted martial virtue to the nobility, explaining that 'notable men' can flee a losing battle and remain '*esforzados*' as they are 'very necessary to the republic', lamenting 'the word *to flee* sounds so vicious and nasty, associated with the commons'.[108]

---

[105] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 21. (*desearon los trabajos y peligros, y alegremente se pusieron en ellos y los sufrieron, creyendo, que por ellos se hacían virtuosos y perpetuaban su fama y memoria*)
[106] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 70, 28-9; cf. Lawrence Humphrey, *The Nobles or of Nobilyte* (London, 1563), sig. g.i.v., both using effeminate classical figures as the antithesis of martial manhood.
[107] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, pp. 122-4. (*Ansi que si el caballero salariado y llamado por el rey, hizo lo que debía en la batalla, puedese llamar esforzado*)
[108] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 89. (*los pocos que quedaron, conocida la sobrada ventaja de los adverarios, no son obligados a esperar, mas pueden honestamente huir: y por esto no dexaran de ser dichos y llamados esforzados Especialmente si estos eran hombres notables, famosos, y muy necesarios a la republica… esta palabra suena en vicio y vituperio cerca de los plebyos o populares*)

Occasionally, Rubios offered more practical military wisdom, touching upon several themes that would underpin later military theory. Rubios upheld the importance of reading for men of war, insisting that 'science does not blunt the lance', and followed the principle that men 'trained and exercised' are superior to a larger, inexperienced force, an important *a priori* assumption of Renaissance military theory.[109] Constructing the matrix of honour of the *hombre esforzado*, Rubios included 'reason', 'intellect' and 'discourse' as well as physical and mental strength.[110] He tempered his strident calls for martial bravery with exhortations for moderation, as 'when against reason, [bravery] cannot be called natural virtue, but natural evil and reprehensible foolhardiness'.[111] Rubios warned that 'sometimes a man undergoes greater danger of war than he must', and instead must 'find a middle ground' between caution and daring, and stressed the importance of a skilled commander, 'although he does not fight in person', for military success.[112] In his use of basic rationality in recommending that 'the good captain must have three things: daring against the enemy, benevolence with his subjects, reason with the opportunity of time and place', the jurist almost offered an embryonic contribution to the 'perfect captain' genre.[113] All of these themes would later be foundational to Spanish and English military thought.

Nonetheless, Rubios' *Tratado* was an individualistic, noble-martial, chivalric text with no interest in practical military theory. Rubios' 'battles' were usually '*desafios*' (challenges), 'of two or more…for a certain day and time', in the mental

---

[109] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. xvii (*la sciencia no embota la lanza*), xxv. (*los mancebos mas sabios y mas exercitados...en estos actos aunque sean pocos, están muy aparejados para vencer*)
[110] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 8. (*el entendimiento y razon, que son como consejeros*)
[111] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, pp. 11-12. (*quando es contra razon, no se puede llamar virtud natural, mas vicio natural y osadia reprehensible*)
[112] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 16 (*algunas veces acomete el hombre mayor peligro de guerra, que debe*), 13. (*el hombre puesto entre estos dos extremos, escoja un medio entre ellos, por el qual ni del todo tema, ni del todo ose…*), 126. (*aunque por su persona no pelee*)
[113] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 93. (*porque el buen capitan ha de tener tres cosas: Osadía contra los enemigos; Benivolencia con los subditos; Razon cerca la oportunidad de los tiempos y del logar*)

landscape of small-group knightly confrontations.[114] Rubios hinted at the value of training but clearly meant practising personal knightly skills like horsemanship, and in lieu of practical military advice, offered moral precepts on chivalric conduct.[115] As well as its overwhelmingly individualistic focus, the *Tratado* extoled the values and honour system of chivalry, lamenting how 'most fighting' was done by devilish 'trickery' of firearms, 'by which already one cannot know the virtue and *esfuerzo* of knights in battle'.[116] This ostensible outrage at gunpowder socially levelling the battlefield was a *topos* beloved of sixteenth-century chivalric writers such as Ariosto, in drastic contrast to the treatment of gunpowder in other, later, genres of military writing.[117] This is correctly identified by de León as an important part of Rubios' chivalric ethos, as was his insistence that actions must take place 'without fraud and without trickery, because when such things intervene, one cannot say that it was virtue of *esfuerzo*'.[118] Rubios referred exclusively to noble *caballeros*, war's 'proper artificers and ministers', and detached their personal chivalric deeds from any military or hierarchical context, ruling that anything 'done unjustly, even if done for the republic, and a great, difficult, terrible, dangerous thing, cannot be called an act of *esfuerzo*'.[119]

De León is thus entirely correct in viewing Rubios' *Tratado* as reflecting the 'transitional mentality' of the Italian Wars between traditional 'courteous warfare' and emerging ideas of realistic military practicality.[120] Yet if anything, this understates the

---

[114] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 114 (*de dos o de muchos…para cierto día y cierta hora vengan a la batalla*), 88.
[115] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. xxv, 129-30.
[116] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 65. (*ballestas y tiros de polvora, con que se matan los hombres por asechanzas…el diablo invento tan mala cosa, que ya no se puede conocer la virtud y esfuerzo de los caballeros en las batallas; porque lo mas de la pelea se hace con ellas*)
[117] Sherer, *Scramble for Italy*, pp. 119-20; Ludovico Ariosto, *Orlando Furioso*, tr. Guido Waldman (Oxford 2008), p. 109.
[118] Fernando González de León, '*Soldados Platicos*', p. 238; Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. 58. (*sin dolo y sin engaño; porque donde esto interviene, no se puede decir, que hay virtud de fortaleza, ni de esfuerzo*)
[119] Rubios, *Esfuerzo*, p. xv (*que son los proprios artífices y ministros desta materia*), 51. (*Que si la cosa es injusta, o se hace injustamente, aunque le haga en favor de la republica, y sobre cosa grande, dificile, terrible y peligrosa, no se dira acto de esfuerzo, ni el que lo hiciere esfozado*)
[120] de León, '*Soldados Platicos*', p. 238.

traditional character of this chivalric, noble-martial, and impractical text that exemplifies the individualistic, aristocratic matrix of honour of medieval martial culture, in stark contrast to the new martial identities and strands of military thought already emerging in the Spanish infantry in Italy.[121]

ii. Chivalric Self-Fashioning: Paredes and Guzmán

This ethos of chivalric *esfuerzo*, completely opposed to military professionalism and collective soldierly identity, is likewise visible in the individualist, chivalric memoirs of two of Spain's first soldier-writers, both of whom strove to fashion themselves as ideal warriors: Diego de Paredes and Alonso Enríquez de Guzmán. Guzmán's memoir clearly served to construct him as the ideal noble warrior, appealing to posterity as well as to his contemporaries for reward and renown; he apparently distributed manuscript copies to several prominent figures, including Prince Philip.[122] Prior to narrating his deeds as a noble *caballero*, Guzmán began by self-identifying as 'poor of estate, though rich in lineage', following the trope of the impoverished but unimpeachably noble son seeking to assert his nobility and acquire riches by chivalric deeds.[123] Guzmán thus explained that his lifetime's aim was acquiring membership of the Order of Santiago, as 'it is for gentle knights who conquer infidels, and I come well prepared for it, and well qualified by lineage'.[124] Intermixed with his actions as an *hombre esforzado*, Guzmán lavishly described the noble circles and patronage networks

---

[121] On the *Tratado*'s traditionalism, see Robert W. Felkel, 'El *Tratado del Esfuerzo*', *Anales Cervantinos*, 28 (1990), pp. 45-62.
[122] Alonso Enríquez de Guzmán, *Vida y Costumbres*, ed. Hayward Keniston (Madrid, 1960), p. 7, 293; José Luis Gastañaga Ponce de León, *Autobiografia e Invención en el Siglo XVI* (West Lafayette, 2012), p. 5. These recipients included the Duchess of Alba, to whom Diego Nuñez Alba would later dedicate his *Dialogos.*
[123] Guzmán, *Vida*, p. 7. (*pobre de hazienda y rico de linaje*); cf. Blaise de Monluc's similar declaration: David Potter, *Renaissance France at War* (Woodbridge, 2008), p. 89; cf. Lope de Aguirre, in Bodmer, *Discursos Narrativos*, p. 326.
[124] Guzmán, *Vida*, p. 9. (*se hizo para cavalleros generosos e que conquistasen o oviesen conquistado con ynfieles. E yo vengo dello muy aparejado y basteçido, porque de linaje…*)

in which he socialised, jousted, and duelled, while ignoring the common soldiers or military contexts of his time in the army.[125] In his view of the rest of the Spanish military world as well as himself, Guzmán identified martial virtue with noble status, and self-fashioned against the common, 'ill-bred', immoral, civilian or rebel 'other' to present himself as a 'magnificent and noble' member of the Castilian military aristocracy.[126]

The durability of this association between aristocratic status and martial virtue is visible in its survival in the military memoirs narrating war at the 'collective' rather than the individual level, discussed in the following chapter, in which chivalric individualism had otherwise been eclipsed by a new martial culture. Juan de Oznayo included in his praise for one Spanish officer that 'he was a highland *hidalgo*, which he demonstrated well in his nature', and referenced an arquebusier who gloried in shooting French 'Monsieurs' but was himself known as 'Roldan, and well he deserved that name for his *esfuerzo*'- likely a *nom de guerre* from the chivalric Roland/Orlando.[127] Diego Nuñez Alba claimed the decline in class status of recruits lowered the moral tone of the army, while the distinctly common arquebusier Martin García Cerezeda proudly described how he was attracted to war so he could 'try the danger that an infinite number of knights and *hidalgos* and noble soldiers have tried'.[128] Idan Sherer is correct in identifying that Cerezeda's pride at 'having been included among such knights and

[125] Guzmán, *Vida*, pp. 36-9.
[126] e.g. Guzmán, *Vida*, p. 23, 24 (*Magnífico y noble don Alonso Enrríquez de Guzmán*), 67 (*vizcaíno viejo, gordo y mal criado y mal ynclinado*); Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning*, p. 9.
[127] Juan de Oznayo, *Relacion…de la Prison del Rey*, in D. Miguel Salvá and D. Pedro Sainz de Barada (eds.), *Colección de Documentos Ineditos* (Madrid, 1846), ix.430. (*Era hidalgo montañés, lo cual mostraba bien en sus condiciones*), 477. (*un arcabucero español, llamado Roldan, y bien se le podía llamar por su esfuerzo*)
[128] Idan Sherer, 'Diego Núñez Alba's *Diálogos*', *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies*, 19/4 (2018), pp. 393-406; Martin García Cerezeda, *Tratado de las Campañas*, *Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles* (3 vols., Madrid, 1873-6) [*hereafter 'I, II, III'*], I.4. (*probar el peligro que infinito número de caballeros é hijosdalgo y nobles soldados han probado*)

hidalgos and nobles and valiant soldiers' reflected 'fraternity and brotherhood' among soldiers in general, but the arquebusier's choice of specifically noble phrases implies a degree of reflected nobility for having served among men of such status in the traditionally noble domain of war.[129]

Meanwhile, the association between chivalric individualism, martial virtue, and the personal exercise of strenuous violence in some Spanish martial culture in the early decades of the century is further visible in apparently the most popular Spanish military memoir of the period, that of Diego Garcia de Paredes (1468-1533). This text circulated extensively in manuscript and in 1582 was appended to Pulgar's *Cronica del Gran Capitan*, an interesting combination of individualistic knighthood with generalship as two military ideals, both derived from the crucible of Italy. Paredes' name would become a by-word for chivalric bravery, just as that of the *Gran Capitan* would epitomise prudent command.[130]

If Guzmán's *Vida* demonstrates above all how some Spanish warriors in the early century still exclusively associated aristocratic status with military virtue, Paredes' memoir further reveals how such noble warriors saw warfare and military writing as a way of proving their own personal, physical *esfuerzo* as knights.[131] As Goetz argues, Paredes' text 'shows the same desire to flaunt his virtue and military prowess and to cement his honour' as Guzmán's *Vida.*[132] The emphasis of many Spanish military egodocuments in the first decades of the century on the brave and dangerous deeds of their authors is itself an acknowledgement of the chivalric focus on personal martial

---

[129] Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, p. 242; Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.33. (*por haber cabido entre tantos caballeros y fijosdalgo y nobles é valientes soldados*)
[130] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 192; Antonio Sánchez Jiménez, *El Sansón de Extremadura* (Newark, 2006), pp. 9-12.
[131] Diego Garcia de Paredes, *Breve Suma de la Vida y Hechos*, in *Cronica del Gran Capitan Gonçalo Hernandez de Cordova* (Seville, 1582), fo. 3v.
[132] Goetz, *Spanish Golden Age Autobiography*, p. 111.

deeds that underpinned medieval martial culture, and the paramount importance accorded to such accomplishments in traditional martial mentalities and writing.[133]

The continued fascination with violent chivalric prowess, 'the demi-God in the quasi-religion of chivalric honour', explains why Paredes offered very little information on his actual military service, let alone on the course of the Italian Wars.[134] Instead, his text narrated only the author's own deeds of deeply personal, private, and even immoral violence, choosing to describe 'an anarchic succession of combats' such as a fight over a horse and a bloody encounter in a Spanish tavern. Such stories took precedence over more obviously significant events; Paredes thus narrated in lavish detail an arranged combat with a group of French knights before commenting laconically in reference to the defeat of Venice in 1513 'a few days later was the battle of Vicenza, and we won'.[135] Paredes' ultraviolence, absence of overt morality, and lack of interest in broader historical context did not go unnoticed; Faith Harden identifies that though he became an 'authentic chivalric hero' in sixteenth-century Spain, many commentators were uneasy about the 'morally ambiguous' nature of the knight's gory narrative.[136]

Miguel Martínez uses this contrast to enlist Paredes in support of his thesis that a significant proportion of the early modern Spanish military 'republic of letters' was deliberately subversive, in presenting 'bold first-person narratives' that 'openly defied the authority of the state' and questioned 'the thin line between legitimate and illegitimate violence'.[137] Yet given the popularity of Paredes' text, as well as his own insistence (like Rubios, who included the same instruction in his own *Tratado*) that the

---

[133] Jones and Coss, *Companion to Chivalry*, p. 2.
[134] Kaeuper, *Chivalry and Violence*, p. 130.
[135] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 195; Paredes, *Breve Suma*, fo. 2v. (*De alli a pocos dias fue la batalla de vicēcia, y ganamosla*). cf. Guzmán's limited interest in the battle of Valenciennes (1521), despite his own participation. Goetz, *Spanish Golden Age Autobiography*, p. 101.
[136] Harden, *Arms and Letters*, p. 27.
[137] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 8.

text was intended to serve as an example of knightly and Christian behaviour to his son, his memoir can hardly be treated as subversive.[138] A far more straightforward explanation for Paredes' emphasis on personal and private violence was that he was *following*, not subverting, a behavioural code- not that of the disciplined, obedient soldier or loyal servant of the crown, but that of the traditional, chivalric *hombre esforzado.* 'Chivalric deeds not only had to be done, but also had be seen to be done', and Paredes' *Breve Suma* proclaimed his own bravery and martial prowess in the context of noble-martial chivalric culture and romance.[139] Chivalric tales of 'Amadís' or 'Roldan' saturated Spain and its cultures of war and literature, and loomed large in the mental world of noble and non-noble warriors alike.[140] Bernal Díaz' chronicle would thus both reference Amadís, and include in his list of great martial heroes 'that valiant, never-vanquished *caballero* Diego Garcia de Paredes'.[141] It is against this background of chivalric romance that Paredes' career and his memoir of strenuous knighthood should be understood; Harden points out that 'the military and courtly circles' under Charles V in which Paredes moved were deeply imbued with chivalric themes, and in this context, contemporary unease at Paredes' morally questionable narrative chimes with moralist criticisms of chivalric poetry.[142]

Thus, just as chivalric poetry fixated on the bravery of individual knights, emphasising their physical violence and triumphs over vastly superior odds, Paredes

---

[138] Paredes, *Breve Suma*, fo. 3v. (*dexo esta memoria a Sancho de Paredes mi hijo, para que en las cosas que se ofrecieren, en defensa de su persona y honra haga lo que deve como cavallero, poniendo a Dios siempre delãte de sus ojos*)
[139] Jones and Coss, *Companion to Chivalry*, p. 3.
[140] Irving A. Leonard, *Books of the Brave* (Berkeley, 1992); Martínez, *Front Lines*, pp. 66-7. Guzmán, *Vida*, pp. 49-50, narrating dancing, feasting, and courtly love at the Portuguese court, 'and on each day a thousand affairs of this kind occurred', had overtones of chivalric fantasy. (*Y estube çinco dias en Portugal, pasando cada uno dellos mill cosas déstas*)
[141] Bernal Díaz del Castillo, *Historia Verdadera*, ed. Joaquín Ramírez Cabañas (10th ed., Mexico, 1974), p. 159, 515. (*en nuestros tiempos teniamos a Gonzalo Hernandez, por sobrenombre Gran Capitan, y…aquel valiente nunca vencido caballero Diego Garcia de Paredes*)
[142] Harden, *Arms and Letters*, pp. 38-9.

claimed he was set upon by a group of his rivals in Spain but 'I destroyed all of them and went on my way', or after a night attack in Italy, 'I was on my knees surrounded by dead enemies…I killed more than ten men'.[143] Throughout, Paredes' unremitting focus was on relating his deeds in the first-person singular: 'I went forward with the cavalry…I was attacked by the ambush…I had to fight my way through…I returned to our camp, fully armoured, drenched, and wounded, after six miles on foot'.[144]

Like Guzmán, Paredes defined himself against the socially, morally, and physically inferior 'other', narrating graphically how at an inn, he brutally retaliated against a crowd of prostitutes and other lower-class civilians who mocked his armour.[145] Paredes described lavishly his participation in single combats over matters of honour, another icon of chivalric virtue, providing a blow-by-blow description of duelling an allied Colonel who insulted his prowess and claiming that when the *Gran Capitan* was called before Ferdinand over his expenses, Paredes, hearing his commander being dishonoured, issued an open challenge to the entire court 'so loudly that the King heard it'.[146]

Paredes' evident belief that personal, private violence was more important to his status as an accomplished *caballero* than issues of ideology, obedience, or the outcome of military and geopolitical events is equally visible in how he proudly related that when imprisoned by (his own) Papal army for killing a fellow captain, he killed the guard and deserted to the enemy.[147] Such actions seem sacrilegious to the strident

---

[143] Sherer, *Scramble for Italy*, p. 14; Paredes, *Breve Suma*, fo. 1r. (*los descalabre a todos y fuy mi camino*), 3v. (*yo de rodillas en tierre entre algunos de los enemigos muertos…mate, mas de diez*)
[144] Paredes, *Breve Suma*, fo. 2r. (*dexe la infanteria, passe a delante cō los cavallos. Fuy acometido de la emboscada…fuy forçado de pelear, y romper por medio…me bolui a nuestro cāpo, armado de todas armas, a pie, y mojado, y herido, y seys millas de camino*)
[145] Paredes, *Breve Suma*, fo. 2v.
[146] Paredes, *Breve Suma*, fo. 2v. (*respondi alto q[ue] lo oyo el Rey*)
[147] Paredes, *Breve Suma*, fo. 1v.

insistence on loyalty to Prince and commander and the non-negotiability of military discipline that was already emerging in Spanish military organisation and writing by the mid-century. However, such a narrative simply served for Paredes to further display his own prowess, in successfully fighting his way out, and in courageously fighting for his new masters. Such disregard for who, where, or why a hero fought was an important aspect of chivalric romance, especially of the Iberian Christian-Muslim borderlands, and as Devaney has identified, tension between traditional, individualistic chivalric virtue and 'loyalty, religious fervour, and pride in Castilian identity' was already present in fifteenth-century Castilian martial literature.[148]

Like Paredes, Guzmán drew on traditional themes of personal prowess in self-fashioning as a martial nobleman, narrating his personal bravery 'in front of my men' in the first-person singular and challenging to duels not only his fellow Castilian nobles but also 'Barbarossa, a low-born tyrant', 'as is the custom with Christian knights like me'.[149] Guzmán also echoed Paredes in his lack of overt loyalty, claiming that he responded to the Emperor's oath to punish him for duelling with 'Sir, illegitimate oaths are not valid, especially in matters of honour'.[150] This derision for the Emperor's instructions reflects Guzmán's general frustration with Charles and perhaps his own close ties with Prince Philip's own court.[151] Nonetheless, from a military rather than a political perspective, Guzmán's bitter, explicit criticism of 'the cruelty with which the Emperor treated me, in the little rewards he gave me, in spite of all the great services I

[148] William H. Prescott, ed. Albert D. McJoynt, *The Art of War in Spain* (London, 1995), p. 21; Hall, *Weapons and Warfare*, p. 124; Harden, *Arms and Letters*, p. 43; Thomas Devaney, 'Redefining Nobility in Late-Medieval Castile', in Craig M. Nakashian and Daniel P. Franke (eds.), *Prowess, Piety, and Public Order in Late Medieval Society* (Leiden, 2017), p. 125.
[149] Guzmán, *Vida*, p. 29 (*delante de los míos*), 34. (*el desafío que con Barbarroxa pasé, el qual es un tirano que fue honbre de poco…como solemos hacer los cavalleros cristianos, que yo soy*)
[150] Guzmán, *Vida*, p. 63. (*Señor, juramento en purjuizio de parte no es válido, especialmente de onrra y de alma*)
[151] Guzmán, *Vida*, p. 229.

had performed for him' would be unthinkable in later Spanish military writing (as would his support for duelling, in late-century military treatises) and was a vivid illustration of the same belief in reciprocal loyalty in which a knight's services must be rewarded as appeared in the contemporary egodocuments of disappointed *conquistadores.*[152] This conditional loyalty, as well as the overriding focus on a warrior's personal deeds, reflects the 'apparent tension' for the knight errant identified by Keen between 'his loyal service to his masters' and 'the stress laid upon his outstanding individual- and individualistic- achievement'.[153] Spanish military thought by the mid-century was firmly resolving this conflict in favour of unconditional, non-negotiable loyalty, but noblemen like Paredes and Guzmán still conceived of violence and service in the mindset of the individualistic *caballero esforzado.*

Ultimately, the opposition between the chivalric ethos of these early texts and emerging standards of disciplined, reasoned war was amply clear to contemporaries. In his 1566 discourse on 'military honour', Geronimo de Urrea made one of his interlocutors cite Paredes as an example of a 'very valorous' *caballero* who 'deserves much honour for the force of his arm'. To this, Urrea had his more modern speaker- the didactic mouthpiece from whom the reader is intended to learn- remind him of Antonio de Leiva, a respected commander who distinguished himself through leadership rather than pure valour, and 'reached equal glory for conquering without [his own] hands', a vivid evocation of how traditional ideals of the personally valorous knight were being replaced by new concepts of command and officership.[154]

---

[152] Guzmán, *Vida*, p. 123. (*la crueldad quel Emperador usa conmigo, así en las pocas merçedes y hazienda que en mí á hecho y lo mucho que le é servido*); J.H. Elliott, 'The Spanish Conquest and Settlement of America', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *Cambridge History of Latin America* (11 vols., Cambridge, 1984-95), i.191.
[153] Keen, Chivalry, p. 225.
[154] Geronimo de Urrea, *Dialogo de la Verdadera Honrra Militar* (Venice, 1566), fo. 22v. (*por pura fuerça de braço, digno es de mucho honrra…ygual gloria alcanço Antonio de Leyva, por vencer sin manos*)

Even more significant was how Guzmán not merely ignored but actively defined himself in *opposition* to the emerging culture of professional competence and rational tactical thought. He claimed that as he prepared to attack a superior Moorish force, he was approached by a veteran who reminded him that 'the *Gran Capitan* of glorious memory always said that his chief duty was to listen to the soldiers'. The man introduced himself as having 'been in this profession of war for twenty-three years', imploring Guzmán 'according to reason and the rules of war' not to risk attacking, as they were heavily outnumbered, exhausted, under-equipped, and without an appropriate tactical position. As such, this *soldado viejo* represented the emerging voice of Renaissance military theory, and every 'rule of war' he described would soon become a mainstay of Spanish military textbooks. Guzmán, however, dismissed such precepts as simple cowardice, rejecting the soldier's expert advice and instead advancing to glory at the head of his troops.[155] Such an anecdote neatly inverted the universal *topos* in Renaissance military theory that reason and tactical logic must always take precedent over brute force or brave display, and Guzmán's inclusion of it suggests a conscious dichotomy between his chivalric values, and the emerging 'science of war'. The texts described in the first half of this chapter thus reveal how at the beginning of the period, the fundamentally individualist, noble-martial culture of medieval war remained salient for some of Spain's noble warriors, even as a new, radically different military mentality was emerging from the crucible of Italy.

[155] Guzmán, *Vida*, pp. 28-9. (*Señor, el Gran Capitán de gloriosa memoria, la principal cosa que él tenía era escuchar los soldados. Por tanto Vuestra Señoría no deve dexar de hazerlo…yo á veinte y tres años que uso este ofiçio de la guerra…segund razón y ley de guerra…le conosçi tan claremente el miedo*)

II. *As Dutie Bound*: English Noble-Martial Culture

iii. Nobility and War

Contemporary writing would imply that the affinity between the English nobility and war had declined by the early- or mid-Tudor years. As early as the 1470s, William Worcester had lamented the decline of 'disciplines, doctrine, and usage of schole of armes' among young nobles. Worcester's explanation of this as due to the spread of peaceful professions antithetical to martial virtue would later be echoed by a Welsh professional soldier in Tudor service, Elis Gruffudd, railing against English captains as 'feckless boys who were sent to…become auditors rather than soldiers'.[156]

However, these claims of declining noble military participation must not be taken at face value. They owed more to changes over the late medieval period in precisely how and when the English ruling classes served the crown in war- increasingly, as a professional core of dedicated gentleman officers rather than a gentle nation-in-arms- and perhaps still more to the *topos* of nostalgia and decline so beloved of early modern martial literature, than to any actual severance of the link between noble blood and military service, which underpinned English military organisation and culture through the Tudors and far beyond. Throughout the century, discourses on the nature or purpose of nobility invariably gravitated towards the inherent link between nobility and martial culture, in that the nobility were obliged to fight, especially suited for it, or both, as well as in the chivalric ethos examined in the following section.

A typical example was a 1525 dialogue attributed to John Rastell (d.1536) between a merchant, knight, and ploughman disputing who may claim true 'nobility'.[157]

---

[156] William Worcester, *The Boke of Noblesse*, ed. Catherine Nall and Daniel Wakelin, Early English Text Society (Oxford, 2023), pp. 72-3; Elis Gruffudd, 'Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550', ed. M. Bryn Davies, *Fouad I University Bulletin of Faculty of Arts* 12 (1950), p. 27. [*Hereafter 'Gruffudd 1545-50'*]
[157] John Rastell, *Of Gentylnes and Nobylyte* (London, 1525).

Rastell's knight declared proudly that his ancestors had always been 'Dukys & leders of the [w]hole army/And by theire wyttis & warly policy/Study forecast & dilygent trauayle/Have won many a grete fyld & batayle', scorning the merchant, and footsoldiers: 'thyne auncestors that were there/Were never able to bere shyld nor spere/And were never but soldyars & pyoners'.[158] The knight's personal service, 'every tyme of warre…captyn', 'w[ith] hors & harnes spere and sheld' was a vivid illustration of the affinity in English martial culture of the nobility for warfare in general and, particularly, service as a commander or a heavy cavalryman.[159] The latter is surprising in a nation whose late medieval nobility traditionally fought on foot, perhaps reflecting Henry VIII's attempted 'Renaissance in English cavalry warfare' and chivalric culture.[160] Such ideas of warfare as the inherent role of one class, and of the exercise of arms as inherently superior to peaceful occupations, were clearly precursors to the Elizabethan mentality of a 'soldier' as a distinct profession comparable to other trades, but were expressed in the early century as the inextricable and natural link between noble status and military duty, at a time when the King's infatuation with warfare and aggression in France was encouraging at least some cultural remilitarisation of the English ruling classes.[161]

Significantly, the link between nobility and war was also assumed in texts with lukewarm attitudes to war and chivalry, such as the 1560 discourse on 'the true and auncient Image and institucion of Noblesse' of the cleric and academic Laurence Humfrey (d.1589), first written in Latin for a wider European readership.[162] Focused primarily on the aristocracy's religious role, Humphrey devoted far less attention to

[158] Rastell, *Gentylnes*, sig. A2v.
[159] Rastell, *Gentylnes*, sig. A3v.
[160] Phillips, *Anglo-Scots Wars*, p. 85.
[161] Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 4.
[162] Humphrey, *Nobles*, sig. A4r.; 'Humphrey, Laurence', Oxford University Press, *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004). [*hereafter 'DNB'*]

their martial role, perhaps a reflection of the author's own civilian status, a pious distaste for violence, or the text being written at a time of relative peace.[163] Humphrey denied that war, 'farre fitter for bruite beastes than men', was inherently praiseworthy, complaining of men's eagerness to fight over land, rather than religion.[164] In his list of 'filthye and abhominable' characteristics antithetical to the 'honour of Nobilitye', he included 'mightye power', 'vayne vaunts' and 'braverye' along with 'hawkynge, huntynge, hastines', a rejection of the personal exercise of violence as inherently noble.[165]

Yet Humphrey still accepted the inherent military necessity of the nobility as a class, 'who in peace are ornamentes, in warre bulwarkes', though he hoped they would express their martial duty as 'warriors, not warre lovers: wise not willi[n]g Captaines'.[166] In doing so, Humphrey automatically endorsed the idea of the nobility as inherently linked to war, from which 'almost all nobility rose and grewe', just as 'hindes till the grounde, craftesmen cleave to theyr craftes'. In granting permission for noblemen to express their 'warlyke skill and courage' against 'the *Turkes* and other infidels', Humphrey echoed the broader European 'crusade warfare' culture, but also foreshadowed the combination of the noble-martial duty with the chivalric ethos and religious ideology that would later drive Protestant gentleman volunteer 'swordsmen' to the Netherlands.[167] Meanwhile, Humfrey Braham's *Institucion of a Gentleman* (1555), 'a sustained mid-Tudor meditation on the ways that gentility could be achieved by dint of virtue and service to the commonwealth', upheld the importance of martial sacrifice

[163] Humphrey, *Nobles*, sig. B1r.
[164] Humphrey, *Nobles*, sig. C5r, A6r.
[165] Humphrey, *Nobles*, sig. A4v.
[166] Humphrey, *Nobles*, sig. D2v., N4r., C1r.
[167] Humphrey, *Nobles*, sig. N5r.

in raising a man to gentle status, but also deployed contemporary humanist tropes of soldiers as covetous, corrupt, and faithless.[168]

The epitaph of Barnaby Googe (1540-1594) for Edmund Sheffield, 1st Baron Sheffield (1521-1549), whose 'noble blud' was shed by the 'boysterous byll' of 'dunghyll dogs' in Kett's rebellion, is interpreted by Trim as revealing the 'identification of military qualities with aristocratic birth'.[169] The association between class status and proper military morality also remained alive, Hall describing how in 1524 when a group of English adventurers from the Guînes garrison surrendered to the French, the enemy 'Capitain was a gentleman and gently them received', but that after being released, the Englishmen were 'shamefully' killed by 'rybaudes'.[170]

Thus, any rhetoric of martial decline should not obscure the continued noble-martial link in English military culture, and indeed such complaints themselves reveal how war was still seen as an inherently noble pursuit, both in the natural affinity of the nobility for war, and in the honour it imparted. As Manning describes, early modern English writers raised a constant 'clarion call…declaring that noble status and honour had to be revalidated in every generation'.[171] This rested ultimately on the reality that nobles and gentlemen continued to dominate English arms throughout the period.[172] Wooding's dictum that 'no government would have been possible in Tudor England without the nobility and gentry' is equally true of war as of peace, with both groups 'the

---

[168] Humfrey Braham, *The Institucion of a Gentleman* (London, 1555); Rapple, *Martial Power*, pp. 44-5.
[169] Barnaby Googe, *Eglogs Epytaphes, and Sonnettes* (London, 1563), sig. E.i.r.-v.; Trim, 'Martial Poetics', p. 591. Sheffield had earlier fulfilled his noble military duty with his service in France in 1544. 'Sheffield, Edmund, first Baron Sheffield', *DNB.*
[170] Edward Hall, *Chronicle* (London, 1809), p. 675. The Spanish infantry who surrendered at Ceresole staked their lives on a similar assumption: Mallett and Shaw, *Italian Wars*, p. 228.
[171] Manning, *Swordsmen*, p. 16.
[172] Davies, 'English People and War', pp. 10, stresses three important points on Henrician war and class: that military exercises coexisted with new humanist ideas in upper class education, the continued importance of the 'old' nobility in military organisation, and that military service was still a route to ennoblement.

nation's chief line of defence in times of war or civil strife'- and of *offence*, in Henry's great continental campaigns, with almost 75% of the parliamentary peerage serving in 1544.[173] As the 1521 translation of Christine de Pisan's '*Body of Polecye*' reiterated, any state required 'worthy knyghtes/that is to say/good men of armes', 'the champyons that spende their blood…for the honour of the Prynce/and for the common welth'.[174]

Gunn thus argues that the laments of military decline among the upper classes reflected *not* the withdrawal of the English nobility from war, or severance of the noble-martial link in Tudor military culture. Insofar as it reflected military realities, this was the changing nature of upper-class military participation over the preceding centuries, which moved towards a growing 'diversification' and 'specialisation' among the upper classes, producing the lawyers and administrators despised by Gruffudd as well as a core of professional veteran captains.[175]

Throughout the sixteenth century, the martial duty of English noblemen and gentlemen continued to be expressed not only in the personal shedding of blood, but also in the other noble duty cited by Rastell's knight: military organisation and leadership. The absence of a permanent, deployable field force comparable to the Spanish infantry meant that English field armies depended on noble and gentry willingness to recruit, organise, and lead companies and armies, often still drawing on their own 'quasi-feudal' affinities.[176] The historiography of medieval and early modern English military organisation has identified a range of troop generation methods, from

---

[173] Lucy Wooding, *Tudor England* (New Haven, 2022), p. 217; Gunn, *English People*, pp. 53-9.
[174] Christine de Pisan, *The Body of Polycye* (London, 1521), sig. G2v.
[175] Gunn, *English People*, pp. 53-5; Nigel Saul, *For Honour and Fame: Chivalry in England* (London, 2011), pp. 357-8. Anthony J. Pollard, 'English Chivalry and the Decline of Strenuous Knighthood', in Nakashian and Franke, *Prowess, Piety, and Public Order*, p. 147, identifies a similar 'concentration' of actual knightly participation in the fifteenth century. Conversely, as Thomas, *Ends of Life*, pp. 46-9 identifies, even the 'most pacific' members of the nobility continued to reflect the noble-martial link in their family identity, visual culture, and household armouries.
[176] J.J. Goring, 'The Military Obligations of the English People 1511-1558' (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1955), p. 17.

the licensing of household retainers to contracted captains, and from the 'huge indentured retinues' of the later middle ages to the 'military clienteles' of late Elizabethan noble commanders.[177] However, the constant running theme was the reliance on the nobility and gentry and their personal connections in military initiatives at every level.[178] Hence, the disastrous detached operation in France in 1544 related furiously by Gruffudd was commanded by the inexperienced Thomas Hussey as the household treasurer of the army commander, Thomas Howard, 3rd Duke of Norfolk (1473-1554). Yet although he self-fashioned as a 'true soldier' and served in the quasi-professional Calais garrison, Gruffudd himself seems to have campaigned in 1523 as a household servant of Sir Robert Wingfield, revealing the blurred lines between armies and households no less than Hussey's ill-fated experience.[179]

English military organisation continued to rest on noble and gentry initiative and willingness after Henry VIII's death. William Paget (1505/6-1563), a civilian 'new man' writing as an un-chivalric military administrator, advised Lord Protector Somerset to enquire 'what horsemen and footemen' the men of the court could provide to defend the Scottish garrisons, just as four decades before, Henry had opened his preparations for war in 1511 by asking landowners and office-holders to certify the able men they could recruit.[180] The 'small standing army' of *bandes d'ordonnance* briefly constituted under Edward VI was not a directly administered royal force, but a more 'elaborate,

---

[177] Gunn, *English People*, p. 55, 60. Helen Miller, *Henry VIII and the English Nobility* (Oxford, 1986), pp. 131-2, follows Goring's argument that the 'quasi-feudal' system was superseded by 'national', militia-based recruitment over Henry's reign but nonetheless, 'the nobility in the reign of Henry VIII was still a military elite'.
[178] Gunn, *English People*, pp. 59-61; Lawrence Stone, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy* (Oxford, 1965), p. 206; Miller, *Henry VIII and the English Nobility*, pp. 131-2. As Davies, 'English People and War', p. 5 identifies, the two systems, 'quasi-feudal' and levy, reflected the nobility and gentry acting in two different capacities, as landlords versus as royal officers.
[179] Elis Gruffudd, 'The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne', ed. M. Bryn Davies, *Fouad I University Bulletin of Faculty of Arts* 11 (1949), pp. 38-9 [*hereafter 'Gruffudd 1544'*]; 'Gruffudd, Elis', *DNB.*
[180] 'Letters of William, Lord Paget', ed. Barrett L. Beer and Sybil M. Jack, *Camden Miscellany XXV* (London, 1974), pp. 14-5; Miller, *Henry VIII and the English Nobility*, p. 134.

deliberate and…permanent' iteration of licensed household retainers.[181] As Rapple rightly asserts, 'Elizabeth, on her accession, inherited a battle-hardened nobility', with the response to the 1569 rebellion demonstrating how the Queen 'looked to the same aristocratic personnel to lead her forces' as her father. Though Rapple argues that upward mobility for gentry captains had 'atrophied' by the peaceful early Elizabethan years, provoking further lamentation about martial decline by frustrated warriors, England retained a 'semi-martial nobility' for military duties such as fortress captaincies, while the activities of English gentlemen swordsmen in Ireland served as an outlet for upper-class martial urges.[182] In writing on war, state and society and in actual military organisation, the link between nobility and war, 'the natural vocation of peers and gentlemen', continued to underpin English martial culture in the Henrician and mid-Tudor periods, and far beyond.[183]

iv. Tudor Chivalry

Not only did the inherent affinity of the Tudor nobility for war remain alive and well, but martial culture was also defined by the same idea in reverse: the chivalric ethos, that brave personal deeds and suffering in war were inherently praiseworthy and imparted nobility or honour. The vitality of chivalric culture was most obviously visible in the publication of literature such as Malory's *Morte d'Arthur*, which Trim cites along with Berners' Froissart as encouraging a 'revival of heroic, chivalric literature' in England and spurring a genre of warrior poetry that would continue to Sir Philip Sidney's death in 1586.[184] Though he hinted at a broader national pride in King Arthur 'emong us englysshe men', Caxton specifically aimed the text at a noble audience to

[181] M.M. Norris, 'The 2nd Earl of Rutland's Band', *Historical Research*, 68/165 (1995), pp. 100-116
[182] Rapple, *Martial Power*, p. 48; Manning, *Apprenticeship*, p. 16.
[183] Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, pp. 175-7.
[184] Sir Thomas Malory, *Le morte d'arthur* (Westminster: William Caxton, 1485); Trim, 'Martial Poetics', p. 591.

instruct as well as entertain, promising 'feates of armes and chyvalrye, prowesse', 'to the entent that noble men may see and lerne the noble actes of chivalry, the ientyl and vertuous dedes that somme knyghtes used…by whyche they came to honour'.[185] Kaeuper and Pollard stress the patriotic dimensions of the text's noble-martial culture in evoking not merely a chivalric revival but a 'bond between monarchy and chivalry'.[186] However, as in Spain, fascination with such texts throughout military and civil society was reflected in the 'shrill protests of aggrieved moralists'; Roger Ascham later complained that 'when Papistrie…covered and overflowed all England', 'Gods Bible was banished…and *Morte Arthure* received into the Princes Chamber'.[187]

The vibrancy of chivalry and martial nobility in early Tudor martial culture was also expressed in the career and works of John Bourchier, 2nd Baron Berners (d.1533). Berners' ancestors had served at Crécy and he himself in the 1513 campaign, which with its famous 'battle of the Spurs' as well as the French setting, personal presence of the King and victorious outcome lent itself well to chivalric aspirations. Berners' service as Deputy of Calais at the time of writing his translation of Froissart's chivalric *Chroniques,* meanwhile, provided a more tangible connection to England's military past, and its present community of professional warriors.[188] Berners specifically produced his text, which Froissart himself had intended to give examples worthy of emulation to 'the prewe and hardy', for 'the noble gentlemen of England to see, behold

[185] Malory, *morte d'arthur*, fo. 2r-3r.
[186] Pollard, 'Decline of Strenuous Knighthood', p. 143.
[187] Leonard, *Books of the Brave*, pp. 66-74; Peter Burke, 'Chivalry in the New World', in Anglo, *Chivalry in the Renaissance*, p. 253; Roger Ascham, *The Scholemaster* (London, 1570), fo. 27r.-v. On the humanist critiques of chivalric romances and their ethos, see Robert P. Adams, 'Bold Bawdry and Open Manslaughter', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 23/1 (1959), pp. 33-48.
[188] John, Lord Berners, *Chronicles of Froissart*, ed. G.C. Macaulay (London, 1904), pp. xiii-xv; Grummitt, *The Calais Garrison* (Woodbridge, 2008), p. 189.

and read the high enterprise, famous acts and glorious deeds done and achieved by their valiant ancestors'.[189].

Berners' other work was likewise rooted in chivalric and noble-martial culture, his 'Castle of Love' declaring that 'who soever shuld take the ordre of knighthod, he shuld be bound to kepe & defend all women…and who so doth the contrary, breketh the law of noblenes'.[190] Berners also produced an Arthurian romance, 'these auncient noble hystoryes of the chyvalrous feates and martcyall prowesses of the vyctoryous knyghts of tymes paste'.[191] Though the production and reception of chivalric texts may have been affected by religious changes, through the mid-century, English readers of varied backgrounds and proximities to the 'real' martial world continued to participate in the pan-European infatuation with chivalric writers like Ariosto.[192] Elizabethan poetry, art, and professions of loyalty to Queen and country were infused with chivalric motifs, and though- as shall be examined in Part II- the chivalric ethos as applicable to 'real' war was seriously undermined by military thought in the late century, in the final years of her reign, printed romances still offered 'the fortunes and adventures of Knights errant', 'Chivalrie and right knightly perfourmances'.[193] Meanwhile, the blurred line in Tudor martial culture between fictional chivalric romance and narratives of the real medieval military past is hinted at by the reuse in the 1560 edition of *Arthur of Brytayn* of a frontispiece depicting a traditional knight in armour which had previously appeared on the 1509 edition of *Kynge Rycharde cuer de lyon*, a narrative of supposedly non-fictional 'gests…of doughty knyghtes of Englonde'.[194] A eulogy for Henry Fitzalan,

---

[189] John, Lord Berners, *the first volum of sir Iohan Froyssart* (London, 1523), sig. A2r.-v.
[190] John, Lord Berners, *The Castell of Love* (London, 1548), sig. K8v.
[191] John, Lord Berners, *Arthur of Brytayn* (London, 1560), prologue.
[192] Edward Wilson-Lee, 'Romance and resistance', *Renaissance Studies*, 24/4 (2010), p. 482; Susan Brigden, 'Epic Romance', *Review of English Studies*, New Series, 69/291 (September 2019), pp. 632-60; Louis B. Wright, *Middle-class Culture in Elizabethan England* (Chapel Hill, 1935), pp. 375-6.
[193] John, Lord Berners, *Huon de Bordeaux* (London, 1601), sig. Br.
[194] *Kynge Rycharde cuer du lyon* (London, 1509), sig. A1r.

Lord Maltravers (1512-1580) included that as Deputy of Calais in the militarily intense period from 1540 to 1544, he built up the manpower of his strategically crucial garrison but also encouraged jousting and tournaments among the 'spears and men-at-arms', suggesting that at least for heavy cavalry there was not yet a definitive break between chivalric display and practical skills.[195]

Moreover, though Davies argues that Henrician literature had surprisingly little regard for martial feats, there remained opportunities in English military writing for individual gentlemen to show off their personal prowess, and to be honoured as such.[196] A report of the '*Trewe Encounter*' at Flodden shows a similar focus to Paredes or Guzmán on the praiseworthy deeds of named individuals, albeit in the third person, who fought 'like a coragious and an hardy yong lusty gentilman'.[197] This prioritisation of noble deeds of chivalric valour, and lack of interest in English combatants or casualties who were not 'Lord and Knight', evokes an interest in individual deeds of prowess in Henry's wars immediately comparable to Froissart.[198] Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey (1516/17-1547), who as a noble warrior-poet 'assumed the role of guardian of honour and defender of true nobility' and is seen by Trim as 'setting the tone of Tudor martial poetics' with his chivalric verse, structured his military reports from his Captain-Generalcy at the (newly English) garrison town of Boulogne as 'high chivalric adventures'.[199] Surrey thus described a raid on a French baggage train 'like a battle narrative from an earlier century', reporting not tactical actions or achievements, but the praiseworthy deeds of individual gentlemen and how 'all the men at arms from this

---

[195] Grummitt, *Calais Garrison*, pp. 111-2.
[196] Davies, 'English People and War', pp. 15-7.
[197] 'Account of the Battle of Floddon [sic]', ed. David Laing, *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, 7 (1870), p. 148. Deliberately contradictory accounts of Flodden reflected the rivalries and ambitions of England's noble houses. Steven Gunn, David Grummitt and Hans Cools, *War, State, and Society in England and the Netherlands* (Oxford, 2007), pp. 219-20.
[198] 'Battle of Floddon', p. 149.
[199] Trim, 'Martial Poetics', p. 592; 'Howard, Henry, earl of Surrey', *DNB*.

town broke their staves', self-dramatising as a noble chivalric hero in a manner comparable to Paredes or Guzmán.[200]

Even as English military narratives began to shift to the deeds and attributes of English troops as a collective, writers continued to devote attention to the praiseworthy deeds and suffering of individual knights and 'the regard of their honour and fame'. William Patten's chronicle of Somerset's 1547 expedition into Scotland, though dominated by emerging themes of collective patriotism and the Renaissance 'perfect captain', still devoted considerable attention to traditional noble-martial motifs.[201] Patten's climactic description of the battle of Pinkie carefully recorded the personal deeds of named gentlemen 'of right good coorage', 'whose behaviours & wurthynes were at the time notable', such as the prowess of the gentlemen defending the royal standard.[202] This, and his description of how where the men-at-arms of the Gentleman Pensioners and Boulogne contingent had charged the Scottish pikes, 'little Preston was found thear with both hands cut off by the wreasts…Edward Shelley alas that worthy gentleman and valiaunt Captain all piteefully disfigured and mangled amoong them lay', reflected the basic impulse to memorialise displays of strength and martial suffering of the traditional martial classes.[203]

However, there was a crucial distinction between Spanish and English noble-martial culture in the texts examined here: the question of loyalty to the crown. As discussed, the *Tratado* of Palacios Rubios defined chivalric *esfuerzo* as primarily a matter of a man's noble status, inner strength and character, and personal deeds of masculine prowess, with only a tangential relationship to his royal superior. Paredes'

[200] A. Sessions, *Henry Howard* (Oxford, 1999), pp. 314-5.
[201] William Patten, *The Expedicion into Scotland* (London, 1548), sig. G5v.
[202] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. E2v., H8v., H4v.
[203] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. K6r.; Phillips, *Anglo-Scots Wars*, p. 186, 194-5.

memoir mostly ignored royal authority or any other concept of political loyalty, and Guzmán's loyalty was contingent on reward and massively overpowered by his dedication to the chivalric ethos. English noble-martial writing in the early sixteenth century, though equally interested in the personal prowess of individual gentlemen-at-arms, was far less individualistic and was dominated by loyalty to King and country. This is especially visible in the treatment of England's past wars in France. Berners' Froissart was printed by royal command with the royal arms, and ostensibly hoped to 'excite' England's warriors not merely to chivalric deeds, but specifically to 'go in hande with great and harde perils in defence of their countre'.[204]

In other English texts, references to the personal military deeds of gentlemen were usually combined with professions of royal or national loyalty. The epitaph of Charles Blount, 5th Baron Mountjoy (1516-1544), composed by Mountjoy 'being in the wars of France' in the year of his death, reminded posterity not of his valiant deeds but how 'willingly' he gave himself for England 'as dutie bound': 'discharged I am of that I ought to my country by honest wound'.[205] Thomas Challoner's praise for Surrey drew attention to his lineage and warlike actions but also his patriotic service, while Googe's epitaph for Sheffield emphasised that 'thy Kyng and country for to serve/thou dydste not feare to dye'.[206] Googe's epitaph on Edward Shelley's death at Pinkie echoed the Flodden account in claiming that with the English army faltering, the situation was saved by the actions of a single gentleman, but combined noble-martial motifs of personal chivalric deeds with a discourse of national loyalty. Googe thus described how Shelley rode with a 'noble hart', 'with charged staffe on fomyng horse/his spurres with

[204] Berners, *Froyssart*, fo. 322r., sig. A2r.
[205] Gunn, *English People*, p. 53; N.H. Nicolas (ed.), *Testamenta Vetusta*, 2 vols. (London, 1826), ii.721.
[206] Sessions, *Henry Howard*, pp. 291-2; Googe, *Eglogs…*, sig. E.ii.v.

heeles he strykes', but did so 'to do his countrey good'.[207] A ballad on '*the Worthy Service…doen by Maister Strangwige*' (i.e. Strangeways, killed in France in 1562) similarly praised his personal courage and fortitude, but with reference to his loyal service to crown and country, Strangways having 'sought a deadly wound/for Brittaine where he was borne', declaring his aspiration to die 'in my Queene's quarell…'.[208]

Thus, in England the matrix of honour of an individual nobleman or gentleman at war incorporated professions of national and royal loyalty as well as traditional themes of personal prowess, chivalric behaviour, and martial suffering. As Keen argues, the late medieval period witnessed the development of 'national chivalries' in which knightly behaviour was directed to royal service, in no small part because of the 'magnetism' and rewards of serving the crown.[209] In this regard, it is possible that the stark differences between the Spanish and English sources studied in this chapter reflected a difference in their respective national medieval military pasts. Medieval English warfare in France had been defined by the great campaigns of the massed nobility under royal command, while the Lancastrian war of 'steady conquest and standing garrisons' meant that semi-professional gentleman captains were able to demonstrate their martial abilities in contracted royal service.[210] By contrast, prior to the vast centralised effort of the Granada War, much of the *Reconquista* had consisted of small-scale, individualistic border warfare.[211]

---

[207] Googe, *Eglogs*…, sig. E.ii.r-v.
[208] William Birch, *Balade of the worthy service…* (London, 1562). C.H. Firth, 'Ballad History of the Reigns of the Later Tudors', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3 (1909), p. 73.
[209] Keen, *Chivalry*, p. 245. Potter, *Renaissance France at War*, p. 90, likewise argues that the 'highly individualistic view of chivalry' in earlier French writing was superseded by the ethos of royal service and military discipline in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
[210] Gunn, *English People*, p. 54.
[211] Devaney identifies that the greater focus on loyalty in later fifteenth-century Castilian military writing reflected the centralisation of royal authority, the end to noble infighting, and the redirection of noble energies against Granada. Devaney, 'Redefining Nobility', pp. 122-3.

However, the yoking of the chivalric, noble-martial impulse to royal authority in England was also the product of specific policies in royal representation and government. The decline of knightly individualism in English chivalric culture and the notion that for English noblemen, 'manly virtue could serve the needs of King and Kingdom' was already present in the second half of the fifteenth century, with Nigel Saul arguing that a 'grand chivalric renaissance' promoted by Edward IV laid the foundations for a patriotic 'humanist chivalry' under the Tudors.[212] The historiography of Henry VIII's representation as a 'Glorious Knight and Christian King' has identified that in his personal participation in war and tournaments as well as other 'propaganda' methods such as the creation of a bodyguard force of noble cavalry, the King 'revived the chivalric militarism of his Plantagenet forebears', intertwining 'martial skill, chivalric display, noble piety and dedication to the King'.[213] Characteristically, a propagandistic *Ioyfull Medytacyon* on Henry's coronation showed the importance of Henry's own person and the rhetoric of loyalty in English chivalric culture, promising 'all you noble knyghtes so hauntyng chyvalry', that Henry would reciprocate their loyalty by 'encouragynge your hertes that courage chyvalrous/in tyme of batayll for to be vyctoriyous'.[214] This has been interpreted as part of a broader process in which 'the Tudors came to assert a royal monopoly over public and private violence in England', but also as representing the decline of chivalry in England, under the assumption that chivalry was inherently part of a 'decentralised world in which the bonds of knights to each other counted for as much as those binding them to someone above'.[215]

---

[212] Saul, *Chivalry in England*, pp. 345-6.
[213] Wooding, *Tudor England*, pp. 166-7.
[214] Stephen Hawes, *Ioyfull Medytacyon to all Englonde…* (London, 1509), fo. 4r.
[215] Matthew Woodcock, 'The End of Chivalry?', in Jones and Coss, *Companion to Chivalry*, pp. 292-3; Saul, *Chivalry in England*, p. 362.

Yet for English noblemen and gentlemen, the link between nobility and warfare, chivalric aesthetics, and personal prowess in war- and the opportunities it offered for personal advancement- still underpinned martial culture. Thomas Churchyard's famous lament in 1579 that in Henry's time, 'all chevalrie was cherished…he was counted no bodie, that had not been knowen to bee at some valiaunte enterprice' reflected the relative lack of military opportunities in Churchyard's own time of writing, especially in comparison to the great campaigns of the 1540s and continental services of Englishmen in the 1550s, and the natural propensity of sixteenth-century military writers to idealise the past and disdain the present.[216] Yet it also reflected the reality that the basic chivalric principles of the noble-martial link, and the masculine prowess of noblemen in war, albeit with an emphasis on loyalty to the King himself, survived and thrived in Henry's reign. As we shall see, the yoking of English noble-martial culture and chivalric identity to the service of crown, country, and religion would intensify massively under Elizabeth, even as military theorists dismissed much of chivalric culture as irrelevant to modern war. Meanwhile, this culture of *national* chivalry likely contributed to the development from the 1530s of a new pan-English martial patriotism which expanded the rhetoric of service and sacrifice in national defence outside the traditional military classes.

[216] Thomas Churchyard, *A Generall Rehearsall of Warres* (London, 1579), sig. A1r.; Rapple, *Martial Power*, p. 20; Davies, 'English People and War', p. 9.

CHAPTER 2: Loyalty and Identity

In the first half of the sixteenth century, a transformation took place in Spanish military writing. A new generation of soldier-writers in the crucible of Charles V's wars discarded most of the noble-martial or chivalric values of their forebears, narrating and praising not their own military deeds but those of the Spanish infantry collective. Ostensibly neutral memoirs carefully constructed 'our infantry' as a self-conscious elite, an idealised band bound to their *patria*, their commanders, and the ideals of brave, steadfast and obedient soldiering. As well as deploying tropes of bravery, military skill, and suffering, Spanish soldier-writers also revealed the importance of emerging concerns of political and religious loyalty. Broadly similar themes are visible in English military writing, with a new Tudor martial patriotism expanding the rhetoric of military duty outside the traditional martial classes to envisage the entire English nation as an idealised commonwealth-in-arms, while like their Spanish counterparts, English military historiographers carefully praised both the past and present deeds of their countrymen at war. In the mentalities of military perfection in both nations, the individualistic knight had been replaced by the loyal soldiery as an idealised collective, and though ability to perform brave deeds and undergo suffering in war remained important, they were increasingly joined by loyalty to political and religious identities.

I. *Nuestra Infanteria*: Spanish Soldier Identity

i. Collective Infantry Narratives[217]

While the quasi-chivalric memoirs of the self-fashioned *caballeros* Paredes and Guzmán exalted their authors as *hombres esforzados*, a colossal shift was already taking place in Spanish military writing. The memoirs of Juan de Oznayo, Martin García Cerezeda, Luis de Ávila y Zuñiga, and Diego Nuñez Alba narrated *collective* deeds, ignoring the author's own personal actions and instead recounting the deeds and suffering of the Spanish infantry community and its outstanding members. This reflected the emerging *esprit de corps* of the *tercios* as well as the de-individualisation of infantry warfare in practice.

This narrative switch was visible first in the *Relacion* of the Pavia campaign by Juan de Oznayo, the page of the Marques del Vasto, which devoted no attention to the deeds of the author himself. Perhaps due to his connections with Vasto and the noble cavalry, Oznayo's narrative retained streaks of chivalric and noble-martial values. The *Relacion* praised Vasto as 'one of the most elegant knights of our time, most gallant and gentle', narrated with fascination the 'pretty encounters' and 'breaking lances' of the opposing '*Gran Señores*', and praised the Marques de Pescara for his personal valour and courtesy as well as his skill in command.[218]

Oznayo's transitional nature between two martial cultures is further visible in his application of a quasi-chivalric description to the common Spanish infantry who had replaced the noble cavalry as the tip of the imperial military spear. He claimed that the arquebusier 'Roldan' told the captured Francis that he had entered the battle with a gold

[217] This formulation denotes their narration of military events on a collective rather than an individual scale, focused on the collective deeds of the Spanish infantry- not collective/shared authorship.
[218] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 455 (*el Marqués del Vasto, uno de los mas apuestos caballeros que en nuestro tiempo fué visto, y mas galan y gentil hombre*), 463 (*Dierónse hermosos encuentros…el ruido del quebrar de las lanzas, é de las caídas de los caballos é caballeros, era maravilla de ver*), e.g. p. 475.

bullet with which to shoot the King, but now graciously offered it to Francis for his ransom- perhaps an attempt to reconcile chivalric courtesy with the unchivalrous reality of gunpowder warfare. A continuing sense that praiseworthy soldiers must have individual chivalric virtue may also have influenced his recording of masculine deeds in single combats performed by renowned Spanish infantrymen.[219]

However, Oznayo revealed a fundamental narrative shift in relating the skill, bravery, and real military achievements of the common soldiery without need to fall back on chivalrous tropes. He repeatedly singled out outstanding soldiers or junior officers for praiseworthy battlefield deeds, like 'The *alferez* of Juan de Vargas, an Extremaduran, from Medellin' who 'climbed up, with much danger, and placed the flag on the wall', and named men as '*valiente soldado*', '*prudente*', 'such a soldier' (*tal soldado*).[220] Hinting at the role of reputation as well as obedience and the *cursus honorum* in the Spanish infantry, he praised *alferez* Santanilla as:

> [A] man of great renown throughout Italy, who distinguished himself in the battle of Bicocca, being Captain Gonea's Sergeant, he went by order of the Marques de Pescara to reconnoitre a squadron of troops…He was the first in Italy that gained bonus pay, and had great reputation among Lords and soldiers. Hence the expression, '*Juan de Urbina for Captain, and Santanilla for Alferez*'...he was the first to plant a flag inside Melza.[221]

Oznayo consistently emphasised the skill and achievements of Spaniards in action, such as Juan de Urbino, who in a *camisado* 'with only fifty men of his company… attacked the quarters of the French guards, and killing and wounding many,

---

[219] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 477, Martínez, *Front Lines,* pp. 54-5; e.g. Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 430.
[220] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 410, (*El aférez de Juan de Vargas, que es estremeño, natural de Medellin, á escala vista, con mucho peligro, puso la bandera sobre el muro*), 421, 432.
[221] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 429-30. (*Santanilla alferez de capitan Ribera, hombre de gran nombre por toda Italia, el cual fue el que se señaló sobre todos en la batalla de la Bicoca, que siendo sargento del capitan Gonea, fue por mandado del Marqués de Pescara á reconocer un escuadron de gente…este fue el primero que en Italia ganó sueldo aventajado, y tuvo gran reputacion entre Señores y soldados. Decíase por refran: "un capitan Juan de Urbina, y un alferez Santanilla"...fue el primero que puso bandera dentro de Melza*)

took five of their standards, and retreated without loss'.[222] Significantly, the *Relacion* also praised the skilled Spanish infantry as a collective, relating one night attack performed in good order and silence, in which they killed and captured so many Frenchmen that 'the enemy were terrified, thinking that they were the entire [Imperial] army'.[223] Here, Oznayo deployed early examples of skirmishing, raids, and other actions short of full-scale battle in the roll-call of praiseworthy Spanish deeds, and of the recurring trope in the new collective-focused narratives of Spanish soldiers inflicting disproportionate damage against superior numbers. The prominence of such actions in the new generation of Spanish infantry memoirs was clearly encouraged by night operations, raids, and other small-group operations being specialties of the professional Spanish infantry in Italy, all tactics made possible by their compact organisation and mutual loyalty, *esprit de corps*, and high combat motivation. This tactical reality likely helped drive this martial culture and new generation of military writing placing emphasis on skill rather than chivalric virtue, and the collective rather than the individual.[224]

Oznayo's narrative of the battle of Pavia likewise exalted the achievements of the Spanish infantry and of Pescara as their commander against allegedly vastly superior enemy forces.[225] He centred the battle narrative on '*nuestra esquadron*' of Spaniards, combining praise for the bravery and loyalty of individuals with the achievements of the collective, in a way that had not yet fully subsumed warriors into

---

[222] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 408. (*con solo cincuenta hombres de su compañía…dió en un cuartel de las guardias francesas; y matando y hiriendo muchos, les tomó las banderas que eran cinco, y con ellas en el brazo se retiró sin perder ninguno de los suyos*)
[223] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 445. (*concertó bien su escuadron, y con gran silencio arremetió por una parte del bastion…lo cual ponia mayor temor en los enemigos creyendo que era todo el ejército*)
[224] Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, pp. 240-50. Verrier, *Armes de Minerve*, p. 36, 184-223, considers night operations, in particular, to represent a new, more practical, cunning form of warfare 'incompatible with the chivalric ethic'.
[225] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 436, 443-4.

the anonymous ranks of the formation. Hence, he described how 'two good soldiers from Captain Ribera's company, who were said to be Pedro de Araez and Pedro de Medina', requested permission to go ahead of the main Spanish formation in the push of pike, 'because there they would have an opportunity to try themselves'.[226] However, Oznayo's ensuing combat narration was rooted in the realities of de-personalised gunpowder formations, and had no moral criticism for the devastating, and tactically decisive, fire of the Spanish arquebusiers.[227] Again, the absence of chivalrous tropes in Oznayo's positive depiction of the Spanish infantry reflected the unchivalric reality of their tactical specialty of gunpowder infantry warfare.

All these themes would be even more important in the three later texts: the colossal *Tratado* of the veteran arquebusier Martin García Cerezeda, the propagandistic *Comentario* of the Schmalkaldic campaign by Luis de Ávila y Zuñiga, and the campaign narrative-cum-military treatise of another veteran of the German war, Diego Nuñez Alba.[228] All three would follow Oznayo in almost entirely ignoring the author's personal martial deeds, narrating battles, campaigns, and accomplishments of the Spanish infantry collective and using the first person only to underline their own credibility '*como testigo de vista*', or to frame discussions on military practice.[229]

Cerezeda's memoir, though an ostensibly neutral chronicle of Charles' wars, focused on narrating and exalting the praiseworthy deeds of the Spanish infantry and their commanders. The arquebusier recorded engagements diligently but with immense pride in Spanish achievements, tactical skill, and elite status, invariably with the result

---

[226] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 459. (*A esto salieron dos buenos soldados de la compañía del capitan Ribera, que se decía el uno Pedro de Araez, y el otro Pedro de Medina, con picas y coseletes, y llegados al Marqués, le suplicaron les diese licencia para que al tiempo de acometer los escuadrones, ellos dos solos se pudiesen adelantar cuanto tres ó cuatro picas, porque allí tuviesen lugar de esperimentar sus personas*)
[227] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 467.
[228] Cerezeda, *Tratado*; Luis de Ávila y Zuñiga, *Comentario...de la Guerra de Alemaña* (Antwerp, 1550); Diego Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos de la vida del Soldado* (Salamanca, 1552).
[229] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.42.

that 'the French received great damage' and 'the Spaniards always had the victory'.[230] Narrating Pavia, Cerezeda described the 'very good order' of the Spanish infantry formations, and centred his narrative on the arquebusier detachment in which he served, proudly relating 'the great damage that the French received, and that which the infantry did, especially the arquebusiers'.[231] In contrast to texts in the 'noble-chivalric' model, with their relentless individualism and distaste for gunpowder (as Harden points out, Diego Garcia de Paredes never describes himself as using firearms), Cerezeda thus combined realistic depictions of contemporary warfare with praise for the skill and achievements of his fellow *infantes.*[232]

Like Oznayo, Cerezeda trumpeted the achievements of the Spanish gunpowder infantry collective over superior numbers, with any praise for himself expressed only by reflection of the accomplishments of his fellows:

> [the Duke of Alençon] orders his cavalry and squadron of four thousand infantry to retire…But those 300 Spaniards that had captured the artillery were doing great damage among the men at arms with their arquebus fire, and although [the French] made many starts to seek to turn back against them, they could not make themselves return. What those 300 Spaniards did, I can say all of it as an eyewitness, as I was among them.[233]

This tendency to extol the effectiveness of Spanish infantrymen by quoting impressive numbers was likewise visible in official military communications, Francisco Sarmiento reporting from Castilnuovo that 'part of [the Ottoman force] was broken…of

---

[230] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.116 (*los franceses recibieron gran daño*), I.205. (*los españoles siempre ganaban la victoria*); cf. Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 416.
[231] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.120 (*el campo de los españoles comenzo a caminar en sus escuadrones, con muy buena órden*), I.124-5. (*cosa de no creer el gran daño que los franceses rescibieron, pues lo que la infantería hizo, en especial la arcabuceria, quiero callar*)
[232] Harden, *Arms and Letters*, p. 40.
[233] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.124-5. (*manda retirar su caballería y escuadron de los cuatro mil infantes...mas estos trescientos españoles que habian ganado el artillería iban haciendo gran daño en la gente darmas con su arcabucería, y aunque hacian mucho acometimientos de querer volver contra dellos, no les podian volver el ánimo. Lo que los trecientos españoles hicieron, yo lo podia decir, que todo fuí testigo de vista, por me fallar entrellos*)

the soldiers here only one was wounded and none other, nor taken nor killed, Your Excellency may rest assured that here there are very good soldiers'.[234]

Praise for the Spanish infantry collective was expressed in Cerezeda's panegyrics to named individuals of 'great fame' earned through skilled fighting or diligent command.[235] Moreover, his comment that the first Spaniards into La Goleta on the Tunis expedition were 'reputed among the veterans as good soldiers' related outstanding individuals to the Spanish corps as a whole and revealed the importance of personal reputation in the burgeoning military public sphere.[236] Cerezeda further idealised the Spanish infantry by stressing their corporate identity and reciprocal ties of loyalty with their officers, describing how when one Captain was unhorsed, 'his Lieutenant threw himself with determined spirit into the enemies' to save him, 'and as the Spaniards saw those two *caballeros* on foot so close to the enemies, with great haste some came in their aid'.[237]

Luis de Ávila y Zuñiga narrated the grand movements of units on the Schmalkaldic campaign, but with considerable praise for the Spanish infantry, such as when 'they attacked the enemy camp at one or two after midnight, and killing their sentinels, they attacked in their guard corps where they did very great damage to the enemy…and lost only two or three soldiers'.[238] Diego Nuñez Alba's *Dialogos* discussed various negative aspects of the 'life of a soldier' but was also a campaign narrative,

---

[234] Madrid, *Archivo General de Simancas* (AGS), ESTADO Legajo 1372.78 (*y asi fui rroto la una parte dellos...de los soldados solo uno fué herido y otro ninguno fue herido ni preso ni muerto, v ex. crea q[ue] ay aqui muy buenos soldados*). See also e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.50-1.
[235] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.107. (*en esta escaramuza se dió gran fama*)
[236] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.49-50. (*por cierto todos tres soldados eran tenidos entre los soldados viejos por buenos soldados*)
[237] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.107-8. (*Como su teniente le viese caido entre los enemigos, con determinado ánimo se mete entre los enemigos hasta llegar do estaba su capitán, y mata seis de los franceses que lo tenían cercado. Asimesmo le matan le caballo al teniente; y como los españoles viesen á pié aquellos dos caballeros y tan cercados de los enemigos, con gran priesa se van algunos dellos en su favor*)
[238] Ávila, *Comentario*, fo. 18v. (*dieron en el alojamiento de los enemigos ala una o alas dos después de media noche, y degollād̄o sus centineles, dieron en el cuerpo de su guardia donde hizieron muy gran daño a los enemigos…sin perder sino dos o tres soldados*)

centred on the many praiseworthy actions fought by the Spanish infantry in Germany with their 'customary alacrity'.[239] Like Cerezeda, Nuñez Alba singled out individuals by praising them not in isolation but as outstanding members of the Spanish infantry collective doing their duty to their fellows, and with reference to their reputation, like the brave, self-sacrificing soldier who Nuñez Alba commented was reputed as 'the first man that without orders very daringly entered La Calibia' at Tunis.[240] Nuñez Alba's dissatisfaction with many aspects of military life thus did nothing to diminish his proud depiction both of outstanding Spanish soldiers, and of the combat skill and prowess of '*nuestra infanteria*' as a collective.[241]

Thus, these narratives on a collective scale, though presented in the voice of neutral chroniclers, both drove and reflected the formation of a self-conscious Spanish military identity, portraying 'our infantry' as the idealised warrior community. Oznayo claimed that when the Spaniards moved out from a strongpoint, they 'came out with great fury to avoid being among those who had to remain to guard the castle, because Spaniards are very fond of being in the action'.[242] As well as ideally brave and virtuous, the image of the Spanish infantry incorporated technical proficiency and discipline, 'all marching together in great order and silence' or 'all in very secret ambuscade', all four writers portraying their fellows as an elite force without treachery, desertion, incompetence, or cowardice.[243]

Meanwhile, just as Paredes and Guzmán underlined their own status as *hombres esforzados* by their ability to undergo personal suffering and danger, and Guzmán used

---

[239] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. g2v. (*con la codicia acostumbrada a trauar la escaramuça*)
[240] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. g.r. (*fue el primero, q[ue]sin orden muy arriscadamēte entro en la Calibia, quādo la gano la armada del Emperador...*)
[241] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. i2r.
[242] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 427. (*Salian los soldados á gran furia por no ser de los que hobieron de quedar á guardar el castillo, porque los españoles son muy amigos de se hallar en todos los casos de afrenta*)
[243] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.81. (*siendo todos juntos caminando con grande órden y silencio*) (*estando todos en muy secreta emboscada*)

starvation to kindle outrage at his lack of reward, the new 'collective' narrative memoirs used the hardships of war to further exalt their fellows, steadfast and unconditionally loyal though 'shattered and barefoot', 'dead of hunger and tired and broken'.[244] Exposure to danger was likewise used to praise the Spanish infantry as a collective: indeed, the single occasion where Cerezeda described his own personal actions in combat revealed both the importance of stoicism under fire in the Spanish infantry matrix of honour, and how Cerezeda considered the ideal warrior as an obedient soldier doing his duty to his fellows and the disciplined ideals of modern war. Relating how the French attacked an imperial garrison in Piedmont in 1537, Cerezeda described at length the dangers he faced in his exposed guard position but claimed immodestly that he nonetheless remained on duty 'thinking of the great disgrace received by the soldier that absents himself from where he is placed by his officers out of fear' and the risk into which he places his unit.[245]

Injury and death also served to exalt the constancy and sacrifice of the Spanish infantry and other praiseworthy warriors, though inevitably in narratives of bloody actions, 'the French lost more'.[246] Cerezeda's rare uses of explicitly gendered language implied the masculinity of wounds as well as of bravery and prowess, describing how an allied Florentine commander at Ceresole attacked 'very manly' to salvage the battle and was 'wounded with nine wounds, on foot, with another ten of his [men], which won him that day very good and perpetual memory'.[247] When a French-held section of castle wall collapsed during an abortive assault, Cerezeda listed the wounded officers,

---

[244] e.g. Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 444, 420 (*destrozados y descalzos*), 421. (*muertos de hambre y cansados y rotos*); e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.10, III.165.
[245] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.236. (*...mas pensando la gran vergüenza que rescibe el soldado que se aparta por ningun temor de donde es puesto por sus oficiales…*)
[246] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.308 (*aunque la mayor perdida fué de los franceses*), e.g. III.246-7.
[247] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.189 (*muy varonilmente*), III.191 (*herido de neuve heridas, á pié, con otros diez de los suyos, el cual ganó en este dia muy cumplida y perpétua memoria*)

recording how one of them was extricated by 'a good Spanish soldier', exemplifying the relationship of fraternal obligation between the perfect *soldado* and his officers.[248] Cerezeda closely paired injuries with other references to the loyal service of outstanding infantrymen, describing how Captain Santanilla led the charge on a French battery but 'he was shot in the hand in which he carried a pike, and the damage was such, that the bones in his hand were broken, aside from other [shots] that he received'. But as Santanilla faltered, 'Captain Charles and his *alferez* and another, Captain Miguel Navarro, reached the battery…as much as so many people in the world could fight, they fought'.[249] Though he adopted the voice of soldierly dissatisfaction, Nuñez Alba, like others who ostensibly complained of the hardships of war, clearly took perverse pride in how he and his fellows would march through 'the boiling heat of the sun' or 'the snows, winds, and waters of winter', yet remained in formation 'covered with the hot blood of their companions' under bombardment.[250]

This developing Spanish infantry identity was also expressed and exalted through direct comparison with foreigners, Oznayo describing the triumph of the tough Captain Pizano over cowardly Italians in a single combat despite the Italians cheating, and insisting that Francis' downfall at Pavia was entirely due to the Spanish arquebusiers 'with such spirit and unity in shooting'.[251] Placing praise for the Spaniards in the mouths of their enemies was particularly popular, Oznayo claiming that the

---

[248] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.56-7. (*un buen soldado español*)
[249] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.313-4. (*le dan una pedrada al capitan Santanilla en una mano, que como llevaba la pica en la mano le hace daño, y fué tanto, que le rompió los huesos de la mano, sin otras que rescibió en la persona...El capitan Charles y su alférez y otro nombrado, el capitan Miguel Navarro, llegan á la batería, la cual hallaron tan alta y tan embarazada...tanto cuanto personas en el mundo pudieran pelear, asimesmo se peleó*)
[250] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. b8v. (*unas vezes coziendo se con el heruor del Sol en el verano, otras el lodo hasta la rodilla con las nieues, vientos, y aguas del inuierno*), f5v. (*suzios de la caliente sangre de sus compañeros*)
[251] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 417, 412-3, 468. (*por lo cual decía despues el Rey, que no le habian roto sino arcabuceros españoles, que do queria que llegaba los había hallado…salen al encuentro con tanto ánimo é tanto concierto en el tirar*)

celebrated *chevalier* Bayard (d.1524) 'took great solace in dying…at the hands of the greatest nation in the world'.[252] The military theorist Diego Montes proudly quoted the *condotierre* Bartolomeo d'Alviano (d.1515): 'Spaniards did not fight like human men, only like desperate men who do not fear death, and that it was impossible to resist the fury of the Spaniards in battle'.[253]

Spanish troops were also compared favourably with their foreign allies. Montes pointedly quoted Antonio de Leiva's advice that 'I have the Spaniards for my brothers, the Germans for my companions and the Italians for my friends'.[254] Oznayo claimed that at Pavia, while the Germans threatened desertion for lack of pay, the Spaniards 'enrich our names, and the honour of our Spain' by remaining loyal.[255] Cerezeda claimed that wavering Germans at Milan in 1527 took such heart from the example of his own loyal fellows that they declared 'they wanted to die with the Spaniards', and that at Nice in 1536, Charles refused to place his 4,000 Spaniards under Andrea Doria 'because he had in them all the force of his army, and he ordered him to take up to 12,000 Germans'.[256] Such vignettes were clearly intended to show the Spanish infantry as superior, and though this reflected professional rivalry with the *Landsknechte*, this in itself further demonstrated how the development of Spanish corporate identity drew on both national and professional themes; Cerezeda occasionally referred to the Germans respectfully as fellow professionals, and '*compañeros*', but made it clear which *nacion*

---

[252] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 412. (*pero que llevaba gran consuelo en morir por su Rey, y á manos de la mejor nación del mundo*)
[253] Diego Montes, *Instrucion y Regimiento de la Guerra* (Zaragoza, 1537), fo. XVIr. (*Bartolome dalbiano les respondio: que los Españoles no peleauan como hombres humanos, sino como hōbres desesperados: q[ue] no temiā la muerte, y que era imposible poder resistir la furia de los españoles en batalla*)
[254] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. VIIIv. (*El valeroso antonio le respōdio: y dixo: yo tēgo por his hermanos a los españoles: y a los tudescos por mis cōpañeros: y a los ytalianos por mis amigos*)
[255] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 437. (*con ella enriquecemos nuestros nombres, é la honra de nuestra España*)
[256] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.188-9 (*que quería morir con los españoles*), II.147. (*El Emperador no se los concedió, porque tenía en ellos toda la fuerza de su ejército, y le mando tomar hasta doce mil alemanes*)

was the true elite.[257] Meanwhile, Italians were excluded from this professional status, Cerezeda condemning both their military weakness and their disloyalty.[258] Thus, Cerezeda's awkward treatment of a rare imperial defeat, the battle of Ceresole, was steadfastly loyal to the Marques del Vasto but highlighted the cowardice and incompetence of the Italian cavalry and infantry, while arguing that the Spanish infantry achieved their tactical objectives despite great opposition and only surrendered after dogged resistance and inflicting massive damage on the French *gendarmes*.[259] Even military catastrophe could serve to further show the bravery, skill at arms, and steadfast loyalty of Cerezeda's *compañeros* as the ideal military collective.

ii. Identities: Spaniards, Imperialists, Catholics

Meanwhile, Spanish soldier-writing was also coloured by much broader themes of ideology and identity. The culmination of *Reconquista*, followed by the American conquests and European military and dynastic triumphs drove a meteoric rise of Spain's power and self-perception.[260] Typically, the dedicatory poem of Diego Gracian's 1566 compendium of military translations described the achievements of classical and medieval Spaniards before adding 'how many Captains/of our times against the pagans/showed their knowledge, and against/Frenchmen and Germans/their fury they showed with their hands'.[261] Already in 1506, Juan de Narvaez had evoked this world-spanning culture of conquest: 'not only do we dominate/the lands we have conquered/we also sail across/unnavigable seas/we are almost invincible'.[262] This

[257] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.163, III.185.
[258] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.65, III.208. Conversely, Cerezeda's generous praise for Italian commanders in imperial service implied that at some levels, concerns of military or political loyalty outranked those of national origin.
[259] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.179-88. cf. Montes, *Instrucion*, fol. XVr., on Ravenna (1512).
[260] Geoffrey Parker, *Imprudent King* (New Haven, 2014), pp. 95-9; John H. Elliott, 'Spain and its Empire', in *Spain and its World* (New Haven, 1992), pp. 9-11.
[261] Diego Gracian, *De Re Militari* (Barcelona, 1566), sig. ++i.r. (*Y quanto Capitanes/de nuestros tiempos contra los paganos/saber mostraron, y contra Campanos/Franceses y Alemanes/su furria exercitando con su manos*)
[262] Henry Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire* (London, 2003), p. 28.

context of broad national-martial identity and pride in very recent successes of Spanish arms outside the immediate theatre described was mostly unspoken in the European memoirs examined here, which concentrated on the present deeds which the author or his fellows performed or witnessed. Yet that Spanish martial identity was an important background to their own construction of a Spanish infantry identity is visible in its use by Nuñez Alba as part of his performative loyalty to his *patria* and the House of Alba, asking rhetorically 'how much would Spain benefit from valorous men?' if the glorious and inspirational deeds of Spanish warriors in Europe and Africa, as well as in the *Reconquista* and the New World, were properly recorded.[263]

Spanish soldier-writers engaged with and further developed this emerging national martial culture by incorporating into their idealised portrayals of the Spanish infantry the twin themes of monarchical loyalty and Catholic piety. In Paredes and Guzmán, loyalty to King or Emperor was absent or muted, reflecting their unremitting focus on their own personal deeds and, in Guzmán's case, how far knightly loyalty was contingent on reward. However, the switch from 'individual' to 'collective' narrative scope was accompanied by a powerful new focus on loyalty, Cerezeda and Ávila both professing absolute loyalty to Charles and carefully portraying him as a supreme ruler and commander.

This could be relatively straightforward, directly praising Charles as 'this great Caesar, as much in command as in *esfuerzo*'.[264] Ávila's chronicle, a strikingly sophisticated campaign history but also a deliberate piece of imperial 'propaganda' in a period of highly politicised 'official history' and literary representation at Charles'

[263] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. Kiir.-v. (*quāto España es defraudada de su gloria, por auer faltado quiē escruia los grāes hechos de la escalarecida casa de Toledo...Quāto se preciara España de valerosos hōbres, si anduviessen bien escritas las grādes cosas…*)
[264] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.24. (*este gran César, ansí en gobierno como en esfuerzo*)

court, used the triumph over the Schmalkaldic league to demonstrate Charles' virtues as a monarch and a commander, as well as his courtesy and grace.[265] Conversely, Cerezeda carefully omitted certain facts from his otherwise highly detailed and comprehensive narrative to avoid tarnishing Charles' image as a virtuous monarch, and his own political loyalty. Hence, he condemned French alliances with the Ottomans and interventions in Italy, and loyally supported the Imperial cause, while carefully skipping over inconvenient facts such as the infamous murder of French diplomats in 1541, which justified the French renewal of Italian hostilities.[266] Likewise, Cerezeda's portrayal of Charles as a skilled *Gran Capitan* was kept unblemished by his surprisingly brief treatment of the 1541 Algiers expedition, and silence on the reasons for the catastrophe- a topic at least one soldier-writer in Charles' army, Fery de Guyon, was willing to confront.[267]

However, praise for Charles was expressed primarily through positive depiction as an idealised warrior monarch, fighting with 'glory too great for writing'.[268] At Tunis, Cerezeda lavishly described how 'that Great Caesar never failed to be the first into danger', risking his life to save Spanish infantrymen as well as nobles, 'with lance in hand, calling *Santiago*, he charges the Moors with such a determined spirit'.[269] Authors stressed how Charles suffered dangers and discomforts alongside his men, Cerezeda depicting the Emperor with his teeth blackened by powder and thirst in a threatened position at Tunis, and Ávila how with the imperial entourage under accurate

---

[265] Richard L. Kagan, *Clio and the Crown* (Baltimore, 2009), p. 59, 83; Christian Pistor *et al*, 'Translation, Court Networks and the fashioning of an Imperial image', *Bibliotèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 75/2 (2013), pp. 271-90; Nancy F. Marino, 'The "Romance de Carlos V"', *Calíope*, 19/2 (2014), pp. 35-49; Ávila, *Comentario*, fo. 95v.
[266] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.108-10, III.27; Parker, *Emperor*, pp. 278-84.
[267] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.9-11; cf. Parker, *Emperor* (New Haven, 2019), p. 275, cf. Fery de Guyon, *Mémoires,* ed. A.P.L. de Robaulx de Soumoy, *Société de l'Histoire de Belgique* (Brussels, 1858), p. 87.
[268] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.31. (*tanta Gloria cuanta escritores no podrian escrebir*)
[269] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.30-1 (*nunca faltó aquel gran César de ser en los peligros el primero*), II.37 (*con su lanza en la mano, diciendo Santiago, se vara para los moros con tan determinando ánimo*)

bombardment at Ingolstadt, 'many stopped worrying about their own danger for that of the Emperor', an implicit reference to the loyalty of the Spaniards as well as Charles' martial bravery.[270] Likewise, Nuñez Alba followed his gory description of Spanish casualties at Ingolstadt with how when Charles entered a bombarded formation to encourage the men, 'we trembled to see it, considering in how much danger the Camp would be and in how much confusion all of Christianity, if for our sins God permitted that a cannonball took him from among us, of which many were passing very close'.[271]

Such vignettes reveal how fidelity to the Emperor determined not only the soldier-writers' own discourses of authorial loyalty, but also their idealised bond between the dutiful Spanish infantry and their beloved ruler as a *Gran Capitan*. The memoirists emphasised that the love of Charles and his commanders for the Spaniards was fully reciprocated, Cerezeda describing how at Vienna in 1532 the arquebusiers broke ranks to be close to him 'entirely out of their great love', in response to which Charles 'came among them, looking very cheerful, talking to them', declaring '*I remember the many and great services that I have received from them, for which I would trust them with my person and estate*'.[272] Ávila and Nuñez Alba presented the 'very good veteran soldiers' of the *tercios* on the Schmalkaldic campaign as diligently and unconditionally loyal, 'with the blood and life we owe to such a good Emperor'.[273] Nuñez Alba described how Charles 'inspired the soldiers to march, by talking to them, and he rode armoured before the squadron of the Spaniards and he asked if we were

---

[270] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.58; Ávila, *Cometario*, fo. 22r. (*muchos dexauan de mirar su peligro por el del emperador*)
[271] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. f6v. (*temblauamos viendole, considerando, en quanto peligro quedaua el campo, y en quāta cōfusion toda la Christiandad, si por nuestros pecados Dios permitiera, que alguna pelota nos le quitara de por medio: de las quales muchas le passauan muy cerca*)
[272] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.310. (*que con tan entero amor los soldados le iban á conoscer...se viene contra dellos con bulto muy alegre fablándoles...por cierto yo tengo en memoria los muchos y grandes servicios que dellos he rescibido, por lo cual yo pondré por ellos mi persona y estado*)
[273] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. e3r. (*los tres tercios todos soldados viejos muy buenos*); Ávila, *Cometario*, fo. 63r. (*la sangra, y con las vidas, como lo deuemos tan buen Emperador*)

tired', to which they responded in the negative, 'only very ready and eager for his service, certainly a question and a response worthy of each other, as he to such soldiers and such soldiers to such a King'.[274]

As well as the Emperor, soldier-writers focused their own personal loyalty, and that of the Spanish infantry collective, on prominent imperial commanders. Nuñez Alba's portrayal of the Schmalkaldic campaign stressed Alba's skill and diligence, while Oznayo structured his narrative of the Pavia campaign to praise Pescara and claimed that with the imperial coffers running low, the Spaniards told the Marques that 'they treasured his esteem' so greatly that they would fight without pay, a demonstration of 'greatness of spirit' reciprocated by Pescara with 'tears of joy'- again, incorporating loyalty into the identity both of prominent commanders and of the Spanish infantry themselves.[275] Cerezeda, too, would devote much of his chronicle to praising prominent Spanish-Imperial commanders for their virtue, their command skill, and their loyal service with the Spanish infantry collective.[276]

The focus of these discourses of loyalty on individual politico-military figures, and more broadly their drive to record praiseworthy military deeds, often reflected contemporary political concerns and the author's own ambitions. Aside from the obvious performative loyalty in both texts of praising the Emperor as a perfect monarch and *Gran Capitan*, the extremely positive depiction of the Duke of Alba on the Schmalkaldic campaign in both Ávila's *Comentario* and Nuñez Alba's *Dialogos* likely

---

[274] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. e8r. (*acordó animar para el camino los soldados, con hablarles, y a esto se llego a cauallo armado delante el esquadron de los Españoles, y nos pregunto, si veníamos cansados…que no, sino muy enteros y muy alentados para su seruicio. CLI.: Pregunta cierto y respuesta dignas la una de la otra. MIL.: como el de tales soldados, y tales soldados de tal rey*)
[275] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 438 (*Los soldados respondieron que le tenian en mucha merced la estima que de ellos hacia…Oida tal respuesta no se pudo refrenar el Marqués de no mostrar con lágrimas el alegría de ver la grandeza de ánimo de sus soldados*). On the martial, chivalric trope of masculine weeping, see Idan Sherer, 'The *Tratado de las Campañas*', *Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies*, 17/1 (October 2024), p. 126.
[276] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.110.

reflects not merely Alba's genuine importance to the victory but also his immense significance in Imperial-Spanish armies and politics.[277] This was particularly significant for Nuñez Alba, with his explicit purpose in writing and publishing of attracting patronage from the House of Alba, while Ávila was an established client of the Emperor; this may be reflected in subtle narrative differences, with Nuñez Alba apparently putting greater emphasis on the Duke's role in the campaign.[278]

This reveals the development of vertical ties in the national military community, and of the links between military writing and publishing, exemplary warriorhood, commemoration, and patronage, as influences on sixteenth-century martial culture. Sherer has argued persuasively that Cerezeda's *Tratado*, too, attempted to attract attention and patronage from another emerging politico-military figure, the 3rd Duke of Sessa (d.1578), grandson of the *Gran Capitan*, Captain of men-at-arms under Charles, and future Governor and Captain-General of Milan.[279] Further study of the precise links of patronage, family, and command in Spain's burgeoning military community in Northern Italy may help shed further contextual light on precisely why Cerezeda portrayed certain named officers and commanders as ideal martial men. In any case, such focus on prominent commanders in the new military narratives further reveals the growing importance of loyalty in Spanish martial culture. Meanwhile, regardless of the specific reasons *why* authors focused on particular figures as their favoured *Gran Capitan*, the precise *ways* in which the authors presented Charles or his subordinates like Pescara or Alba as battlefield commanders revealed much about emerging ideas of the perfect Captain General, as shall be seen.

---

[277] By the early 1550s Alba had also served as the Emperor's commander in Navarre, and *mayordomo mayor* in Prince Philip's household. Henry Kamen, *The Duke of Alba* (New Haven, 2004), pp. 23-6; Jose Martinez Millan, 'The Duke of Alba in the Court', in Ebben *et al*, *Alba*, pp. 72-89.
[278] Sherer, 'Núñez Alba's *Diálogos*', pp. 395-7; e.g. Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. Ciiii.r.
[279] Sherer, '*Tratado de las Campañas*', p. 127; 'Fernández de Córdoba, Gonzalo', *DBE*.

Meanwhile, Spanish soldier-writers also presented themselves and their fellows as loyal to the faith. Oznayo included in his praise for one Sergeant Pizaño that not only was he reputed for 'doing marvels' in combat and assaults, but 'was such a good Christian that he never took the name of Our Lady except in prayer'.[280] Piety was incorporated into the matrix of honour of individual outstanding Spaniards, and of the Spanish infantry collective.[281] Cerezeda described how at Koron, a fallen *Maestre de Campo* was eulogised before the Spaniards at Mass, and the Chaplain's 'words were such, that they put complete will in all of us to die so glorious a death as him'.[282] He similarly claimed that at the siege of Carignano in 1544, his fellows swore to their wavering commanders that instead of surrendering, they would 'hold Mass, and receive the sacraments, and take the church ornaments and put them somewhere safe' before torching the city and coming out fighting, 'trusting in God'.[283]

The conflation of religious with purely martial virtues in the infantry identity was especially visible in Cerezeda's treatment of another major defeat. The fall of Castilnuovo in 1539 to a massively superior Ottoman force, and the death of its commander, Francisco de Sarmiento, was widely memorialised in Iberian print as a heroic stand against the 'infidel' by Spain's 'glorious heroes'- as one Spanish soldier-poet exalted them.[284] Though Sherer correctly interprets the stalwart defence of the fort as itself showing the determination and motivation of sixteenth-century Spanish

---

[280] Oznayo, *Relacion*, pp. 412. (*Hizo maravillas…fué hombre de grandísimo ánimo, y tan buen cristiano que nunca tomó el nombre de nuestra Señora en su boca sino loarle y encomendarse á él*)
[281] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.86.
[282] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.411. (*y sus palabras fueron tales, que pusieron entera voluntad á todos cuantos en Koron estábamos de morir una tan gloriosa muerte como aquella*)
[283] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.224. (*harémos á los clérigos que nos digan misa y consuman el sacramento…y que tomen los ornamentos que están en las iglesias y se metan en unas caxas y se metan do más seguros…confiando en Dios*)
[284] Tarih Dergisi, 'History is Written by Victorious Battles', *Turkish Journal of History*, 76/1 (2022), p. 90; Gutierre de Cetina, *Obras*, ed. D. Joaquín Hazañas y la Rua (2 vols., Seville, 1895), i.100 (*Hérões glorïosos*).

infantry, close study of its treatment by Cerezeda reveals much about the emerging matrix of honour of Spanish martial culture, amplified by the emotionally resonant context of an acrimonious defeat by non-Christian forces.[285] Cerezeda depicted Castilnuovo as a heroic 'last stand' of Sarmiento himself and the Christian, suicidally brave and loyal soldiery of the Spanish garrison, 'holding great hope in God and his Blessed Mother to defend them', determined 'to die defending the place in service of God and of the Emperor'.[286] The *esprit de corps* of the garrison was conflated with their Spanish identity: when Barbarossa asked an *alferez* to tell Sarmiento to surrender, Cerezeda quoted the officer responding that if the men returned alive to their '*patria*', they would be spurned their families.[287] As Sherer points out, Cerezeda's religiously-charged account of the Ottoman wars may have been intended to 'highlight his own participation' in such ideologically praiseworthy services.

Meanwhile, one may trace the early appearance of specifically confessional, Catholic piety in Spanish martial identity. Ávila described Charles hearing Mass under 'most furious' bombardment with the *tercios* in the trenches at Ingolstadt and how after the defeat of the Protestants, 'the joy of victory was general in all' as 'the power of those that professed the new religion had become so great, that it was clearly necessary God made some remedy'.[288] Nuñez Alba described how 'the fortunes of the Lutherans had risen so much' that 'if God willed it, or hadn't stopped it, they would have been planted through the rest of Christendom'.[289] Again, this may have reflected the author's

[285] Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, p. 254.
[286] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.390. (*teniendo esperanza en Dios y en su Bendita Madre de se defender*), II.387. (*de no se rendir, sí morir defendiendo la tierra en servicio de Dios é del Emperador*)
[287] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.388-9. (*nuestros padres é parientes*); Sherer, '*Tratado de las Campañas*', pp. 134-5.
[288] Ávila, *Cometario*, fo. 26r. (*cō grandissima furia*), 91r. (*La alegría de la victoria fue general en todos*), A2r.-v. (*que auia venido a ser tan grande el poder de los que protestauan la nueua religiō: que se via claramente quan necesario era que Dios pusiesse su remedio en ellas*)
[289] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. Av.r. (*Estauā las cosas de los Luteranos tan encūbradas, q[ue]...si Dios por esta, o otra via no lo atajara, facilmente se sembraran por el resto de la Christiandad*)

own ambitions- Sherer points out that Nuñez Alba's support for militant suppression of heresy aligned with that of his would-be patron, Alba- but nonetheless demonstrates the growing confessional dimension of Spanish martial identities.[290]

By switching from individual- to collective-focused narratives Spanish military writers thus formulated a complex ideal of the Spanish infantry as a self-consciously elite community, as idealised soldiers in their military ability, in their willingness to perform great deeds and undergo hardships, and in their idealised loyalty to the Emperor and religion. A representative example is Cerezeda's description of how the imperial army planned to capture Turin in 1543 by smuggling in Spanish troops in hay carts, who would seize the gatehouse for a detachment hiding nearby. This narrative showed the *ingenio* of the handpicked Spaniards but also included an exchange between the imperial commander and the Spanish Captain de Guevara, who epitomised the matrix of honour of Cerezeda's fellows, combining bravery, unconditional loyalty, and piety. Cerezeda thus described how, immensely proud to lead his Spaniards in 'the most dangerous part of the enterprise', Guevara promised, 'if God gives me such good fortune as to get inside', to 'hold the gate, or die trying' to demonstrate his loyalty 'to His Majesty and the Lord Marques del Vasto'.[291]

The inclusion of dozens of such anecdotes of exemplary skill, bravery, suffering and loyalty in Oznayo, Cerezeda, Ávila, and Nuñez Alba's works- usually, unlike the Guevara anecdote, with successful outcomes- vividly demonstrates how, sharpened by an acute awareness of their elite status and distinct identity in the imperial army and in a foreign land as well as their unique martial past and burgeoning national identity,

---

[290] Sherer, 'Núñez Alba's *Diálogos*', p. 397

[291] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.78-9. (*vuestra persona y á cuarenta soldados españoles en el mayor peligro de esta empresa…yo pueda mostrar mi deseo en servicio de su Majestad y del señor Marques del Vasto, y prometo mi fe, que si Dios me da tan buen ventura que éntre dentro de la puerta, de morir ó tenella hasta que vuestra señoría entre con el socorro*)

Charles V's *infantes* developed a distinct *esprit de corps*, public sphere, and matrix of honour.

II. *Englysshe Hands, Englysshe Hartes*: Tudor Martial Patriotism

iii. National-Martial Patriotism

As described in the previous chapter, military participation of the traditional martial classes underpinned both English army organisation and contemporary conceptions of noble identity, and the chivalric ethos continued to flourish, albeit with an overriding emphasis on loyalty to crown and country. However, in broader politico-martial literature it is possible to discern the development of a new, more all-encompassing rhetoric of English martial patriotism that extended beyond specifically noble contexts and classes. This national-martial identity was broadly comparable to the fervent language of patriotic service and national identity in Spanish military writing and prefigured the Elizabethan martial patriotism discussed in Part II.[292]

This new rhetoric of collective martial patriotism emerged despite the absence of a permanent English infantry force like the *tercios*, but appeared under a King who 'made intense efforts to militarise his subjects, mustering them, ordering them to equip themselves, drafting them into ever larger armies' to wage wars and face invasion threats on a scale not seen for generations.[293] As Gunn argues, the language of English military obligation to defend the '*res publica*' was already present by the mid-fifteenth century, and patriotic justifications of war against the Scots in the 1540s reiterated those used in 1513.[294] Fissel argues that 'from the outset, Henry VIII staked his dynasty and physical safety on the armed citizenry of England'.[295] However, it was only after the Henrician Reformation dramatically reorientated England's internal and geopolitical

---

[292] On the sixteenth-century emergence of English and British patriotism and the term 'patriot' itself, see Arthur Williamson, 'The Rise and Decline of the British "Patriot"', *International Review of Scottish Studies*, 36 (2011), pp. 7-32; Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, p. 337.
[293] Gunn, *English People*, p. 115.
[294] Gunn, *English People*, p. 118; *A Declaration…of this present warre with the Scottis* (London, 1542).
[295] Fissel, *English Warfare*, p. 8.

situation that the 'propaganda' of collective national defence and English martial identity would engulf Tudor martial culture.

This was encapsulated by three propagandist calls for national martial defence in Henry's later reign: the *Exhortation* (1539) of Richard Morison (d.1556), 'the best propagandist pen in Henrician England'; the *New Pollecye of Warre* (1542) of clergyman Thomas Becon (1512/13-1567); and finally in 1545, a year of major operations in France and the 'great invasion scare', the *Office and Duety in Fighting for our Countrey* of Edward Walshe.[296] All three were written in a period of dramatic military mobilisation in England, when defence of religion and the realm ('and the two were inextricably linked') rendered such rhetoric necessary, and argued not for the obligations of the upper classes but for 'the bounden duetie of all subjects, of what degree soever they be, to serve theyr contreye'.[297]

Morison thus exhorted 'all englyshe men, both to say and do, al that they judge to be for noble Englandes honour, welthe and safetie', evoking the collective English *res publica* under attack and establishing a pattern that would continue in Tudor martial rhetoric, in calling on Englishmen 'to defende our welth, our countrey, ourselves'.[298] Especially significant in prefiguring later soldier-writing was Morison's picture of an England beset by foreign enemies, requiring urgent martial response to prevent invasion and spoil. Crucially, Morison addressed all Englishmen as 'one realme, so our enemies

---

[296] 'Morison, Sir Richard', *DNB*; Richard Morison, *An Exhortation to styrre all Englyshe men* (London, 1539); on martiality and patriotism in Morison's 'propaganda', see Tracey A. Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England* (Oxford, 2010), pp. 90-107; Thomas Becon, *The new pollecye of warre* (London, 1542); 'Becon, Thomas', *DNB*; Edward Walshe, *The office and duety in fightyng for our countrey* (London, 1545).

[297] Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution*, p. 58; Morison, *Exhortation*, sig. Aiiii.r.; Gunn, *English People*, pp. 118-9 thus stresses the context of military mobilisation and national defence of the '*res publica*' in these texts. See also Kevin Sharpe, *Selling the Tudor Monarchy* (New Haven, 2009), pp. 123-5, 169, on how this new national martial identity reflected religious and political contexts.

[298] Morison, *Exhortation*, sig. Aii.r., Biii.r.

shall fynde us of one hart, one fydelitie, one allegiance', exhorting 'let us fight this one fielde with Englyshe handes, and Englyshe hartes'.[299]

Becon likewise argued for the paramount duty of national defence, as '*dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*' against the enemies of the 'Christian public weal', and like Morison, addressed not the traditional martial classes but the entire population.[300] Three years later, Walshe was driven to proclaim 'oure…mooste bounden deutye and office to oure native countreye' by 'the most godlye quarels of our moost dread sovereigne Lorde Kynge Henrye' and 'other recent writers takynge this sodayne occasion' to advocate martial patriotism.[301]

This all-encompassing national-martial patriotism was linked to the emerging English muster system of mass levies and a populace-in-arms, as demonstrated in the great muster of 1539.[302] Morison reminded the reader of how, since the Pilgrimage of Grace, the commons and gentlemen of England were both furnished, and willing, for war.[303] Becon described how after Kent received muster orders the county responded 'all with one consent', the commons mobilising with 'incredible…alacritie' as the perfect commonwealth-in-arms 'so desyrous to defend theyr countrey…the public weale of Englond' in a way that almost resembled the idealised Spanish infantry collective.[304]

---

[299] Morison, *Exhortation*, sig. Cv.v., Dviii.r..
[300] Becon, *Pollecye*, sig. Aii.r., Biiii.r., Aviii.v.
[301] Walshe, *Office and Duety*, sig. Aiiii.v.-v.r.; Williamson, 'British "Patriot"', p. 10, places Walshe alongside other approximately contemporary texts such as Thomas Smith's *Epistle or exhortacion, to unitie and peace* (1548), as reflecting the concept of an early 'monarchical republic' of patriotic 'citizenship'.
[302] See the patriotic description in Charles Wriothesley, *Chronicle*, ed. William Douglas Hamilton (2 vols., London, 1875-7), i.95-7.
[303] Morison, *Exhortation*, sig. Biiii.v. This rebellion was another important aspect of Morison's 'propagandistic' national discourse: Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform*, pp. 42-53.
[304] Becon, *Pollecye*, sig. Bii.r.-v.

As in the Spanish case, this martial identity had an important confessional dimension. Morison's all-encompassing 'mutuall socyetie of men' was specifically confessional, asking 'whan ever had Englande so good a cause, to fyghte as nowe' with 'Goddes word' against the 'Bishop of Rome'.[305] Becon avowed that the English willingness to serve under arms was 'wrought in them' by 'God's word', while Walshe argued that English subjects should be 'inflamed' to defend 'our liege and naturell Kynge Henrye' as well as 'the very word of God', 'the noble church and congregacion of Englande'.[306]

Meanwhile, all three writers stressed loyalty and sacrifice to the crown. As well as simply praising Henry as a virtuous 'prynce of invincible courage', Morison drew attention to the King's efforts in national defence and fortification, diligently 'devysynge all the wayes, that wytte can invent, for our assurance'.[307] Significantly, he used this to remind the reader of their own reciprocal obligations, as it would be 'our great shame, to suffer his highnes to travaile alone'.[308] Becon likewise linked the obligations of the populace-in-arms with how 'our most puyssaunte and redoubted Kynge' provided England with 'martial armours & all kynd of fortresses', further use of the muster system and the Device Forts as tangible evocations of the commonwealth-in-arms.[309] Accordingly, Becon ruled that just as 'every Prynce…ought with all diligence & pollecy to provyde all thynges' necessary for national defence', 'every subjecte ought…with a glad hart to bestow his very lyfe for the safegard of the same'.[310] This hints at a portrayal of Henry as a martial paragon and even a 'great Captain' bound in mutual obligation to his subordinates comparable to that of Charles in the Spanish

[305] Morison, *Exhortation*, sig. Bii.r., Biii.r., Aviii.v.
[306] Becon, *Pollecye*, sig. Bi.v.; Walshe, *Office and Duety*, sig. Ciii.r., Ciii.v., Bviii.v.
[307] Morison, *Exhortation*, sig. D.ii.v.-iii.v.
[308] Morison, *Exhortation*, sig. D.iiii.r.
[309] Becon, *Pollecye*, sig. Eiii.v.-iiii.r.
[310] Becon, *Pollecye*, sig. Eii.v.-iii.r.

sources- albeit with much less material to work with, given Charles' much greater military participation.

Walshe, too, moved beyond simple calls for mass military loyalty to hint at an idealised martial bond between Englishmen and Henry, 'who…desyreth the welth of his loyall subjectes and paynefully stodyeth for the same', so that readers should support 'the moste godly purpose of our moost drad sovereaygne lorde the kynges majestie, in settynge forth his loyall subjectes against our enemies'.[311] Significantly, Walshe's tract hinted at the movement of such loyal rhetoric and ideas of national defence into the mental landscape of soldiers themselves. Walshe situated the text in the English military public sphere by dedicating it to Sir Anthony St Leger (d.1559), Lord Deputy of the newly-created Kingdom of Ireland, establishing a tradition of Tudor soldier-writers professing the 'fervent affection, which always I have borne to my countrey' to high-profile politico-military figures.[312] No less than Berners' Froissart, Walshe's pamphlet was written from within the English military world, the author emphasising his own military credentials and self-fashioning as a loyal soldier: 'this oracion was pronounced by Edwarde Walshe...unto his felowes militynge at the seige of Boloign[e]'.[313]

iv. Patriotic War Narratives

Meanwhile, Tudor martial patriotism influenced English military historiography, in a manner comparable to the triumphalist and selective Spanish narratives of the Italian and Schmalkaldic campaigns. The 1544 *Expedicion in Scotland* was printed with an expressly 'propagandist' purpose after an inaccurate pamphlet was called in for

[311] Walshe, *Office and Duety*, sig. Aiiii.v., Aii.r.
[312] 'St Leger, Sir Anthony', *DNB.* Walshe was apparently in St Leger's service in Ireland and served with Irish troops in Tudor armies at Boulogne and Calais. Walshe's treatise may have been intended to encourage martial patriotism in Ireland for Henry VIII's wars. 'Walshe, Edward', Royal Irish Academy, *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (9 vols., Cambridge, 2009), ix.773-4; Walshe, *Office and Duety*, sig. Aii.r.
[313] Walshe, *Office and Duety*, sig. Aiii.v.

destruction.[314] This adds additional significance to its rhetoric of martial patriotism, and, like Ávila's 'official' narrative of the Schmalkaldic War, evinces the importance of war news in the public sphere; 1544 would also see Henry's promulgation of an edict suppressing 'slander of his Captains'.[315]

Though the 1544 campaign was essentially an inglorious chevauchée without memorable pitched battles, the text strove to exalt both its purpose and the men serving in it.[316] The anonymous author presented the English soldiery as completely motivated and loyal, 'that it was no nede to haste them forwardes'.[317] The pamphlet praised 'our hackebutters, who in this enterprise dyd very manfully employ themselves', and 'dyvers of the Capytains' who 'the better to comforthe [sic] theyr souldyars assayled the…gate with such corage'.[318] Like the Spanish, the English infantry were presented as both motivated and skilled throughout the campaign in both field engagement and assault, fighting 'courageously and dangerously', 'longynge to see the enemies', 'in good ordre of battayle'.[319] Also like the triumphalist Spanish sources, the *Late Expedicion* pointedly cited favourable casualty statistics while gleefully disparaging the 'giltie cowardnes' of the enemy, and upholding the justness of the war.[320]

This carefully constructed voice of martial patriotism, triumphalist narration of English troops in action, and political loyalty continued with William Patten's account of Somerset's campaign, *Expedicion into Scotland* (1548). Like Ávila's *Comentario*, Patten's very similar text functioned primarily to exalt the expedition's commander,

---

[314] Gunn, *English People*, p. 23.
[315] *Tudor Royal Proclamations*, eds. Paul J. Hughes and James F. Larkin (3 vols., New Haven, 1964-9), i.329.
[316] Phillips, *Anglo-Scots Wars*, p. 161.
[317] *The Late expedicion in Scotland* (London, 1544), sig. Aii.r.
[318] *Late expedicion*, sig. Aiii.v., Bii.r.
[319] *Late expedicion*, sig. Biii.r., Ciii.r.
[320] *Late expedicion*, sig. Dii.r.-iii.r.; cf. 'Battle of Floddon', p. 150, with much greater willingness to acknowledge that 'the Scots fought manly'.

whose ‘speciall invincible vertue and valiaunt polecie’ overcame ‘dooble of oure number and strength in open feld’ and similarly climaxed with a victorious field battle over allegedly superior opposition.[321] Echoing the Spanish portrayals of Charles, Patten made sure to mention that Somerset himself came under fire alongside his troops.[322] Just as the Spanish sources stressed the reciprocal ties of loyalty between the army collective and their idealised commanders, Patten claimed to have heard English combatants declare that ‘they had rather in feld be a mean souldiar under his grace, than under ony other a great Captain’.[323]

However, Patten stressed that Pinkie, ‘our most valiant victorie over our enemies’, was a victory for England, not merely Somerset.[324] Patten named praiseworthy gentlemen and like Oznayo, appreciated the noble-martial aesthetics of knights and retinues, but made it clear that they were fighting for ‘theyr dutie towards their prince, their love toward their country, & to the rulers’, displaying ‘th’auncient English courage and prowes’.[325] Moreover, Patten recorded the good services done by Somerset’s army as a collective, and though he admitted that ‘a few leude souldiours’ ran from combat, refusing to ‘bery the truth’ out of ‘affection towarde countree or kyn’- a greater willingness to acknowledge the failings of his countrymen than the Spanish memoirists- Patten’s portrayal of the English army was overwhelmingly positive, recording proudly how the English prepared ‘diligentley’ for battle before fighting ‘sharply and quikly…so eagerly, and with such fiersnes’.[326]

---

[321] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. +.vii.r. Like the *Comentario,* Patten’s text included innovative ‘birds-eye view’ battle maps.
[322] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. Ciii.v.
[323] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. a.iii.r.
[324] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. +.iiii.v.
[325] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. c.viii.r.-v.
[326] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. Hii.v., Ei.r., Jiii.v.

Just as the Spaniards presented the Imperial armies as unquestioningly and exclusively unified behind the Emperor and his wars, Patten invoked an all-encompassing, albeit hierarchical, perfect military community in recording how 'by the valiaunce and pollecie of my lordes Protectours Grace, by the foreward endeavour of all the nobles and counsell...and by the willing diligence of every Captain, officer and true subiecte else, we most valiauntly and honourably won the victorie over our enemies'.[327] As in the Spanish texts, this loyalty to a national martial identity and relentlessly positive description of his countrymen-in-arms coexisted with realistic depictions of gunpowder warfare.[328] Patten also followed the 1544 *Expedicion* and further paralleled Ávila in vocally supporting England's *casus belli*, in this case of realising union by force with Scotland, 'a steadfast atonement…like countrymen and countrymen'.[329] As well as praising Somerset's military efforts, and, more distantly, Edward VI's kingship, in accomplishing Scottish union, this gave an ideological and political cast to the relentlessly positive depiction of the English military collective.[330] Patten thus portrayed the unified, motivated English force destroying the Scottish army as a 'diligent master' who 'doth beat his Scholar' as 'for love he would have him amend his faults' (i.e. accept English unification), just as the Spanish texts gave an ideological gloss to their heroic *infantes* through their loyal prosecution of Charles' wars.[331] Patten also tied this war objective to a broader national martial patriotism, claiming that civilian public

[327] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. Lii.v.-iii.r.
[328] e.g. Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. G.v.v.
[329] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. b.i.v. Contemporary with publishing his chronicle, Patten praised Edward VI as a 'right Briton' and Somerset and his victory as agents of union. Marcus Merriman, 'British Union and the Scottish Commonwealth', in Roger A. Mason (ed.), *Scotland and England* (Edinburgh, 1987), p. 94. Alan Clarke Shepard, 'William Patten's *Expedition*', *Scottish Literary Journal*, 22/1 (May, 1995), pp. 22-3 sees the text and its 'attempts to aestheticise the violence of conquest' as an early 'English imperial discourse'.
[330] On the significance of Scottish union to Somerset's government and its rhetoric, see Arthur Williamson, 'The Commonwealth Refounded', in Neil McIntyre and Alison Cathcart (eds.), *Scotland and the Wider World* (Woodbridge, 2022), pp. 21-33.
[331] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. Jvii.v. On Patten's narrative in the context of 'war propaganda' of the Tudor conquest of Scotland, see Lorna Hutson, *England's Insular Imagining* (Cambridge, 2023), pp. 44-68.

discourse 'was a matter nought else, but of this expedition and wars in Scotland'.[332] He likewise hinted at confessional contexts and martial identities in portraying Pinkie as a victory over the papist army of the Scottish 'church malignaunt', just as Ávila depicted the *tercios* as the spearhead of Charles' confessional war.[333]

This emerging English martial patriotism and the intersection between war, political loyalty, and military duty for noble and commoner alike was echoed by broader politico-military polemic and historiography.[334] Writers drew on the medieval English past as a source of national martial pride, often with the distinctly English, and non-noble, cult of the longbow. Fabyan, typically, credited Agincourt as a victory over French 'gallants' not to the knightly nobility but to the 'yomen' archers.[335] The *Batayll of Egyngecourte* (1536) described the victory partially in noble-martial terms, praising Henry V as 'a courtyouse knyght', 'mortall myrrour of all chevalry' at the head of the peerage. However, the author also applied a more all-encompassing patriotic rhetoric, emphasising the battle was won by all 'our englysshemen' and especially 'our archers'.[336]

The cult of the longbow was likewise extolled by Morison, encouraging Englishmen to fight for their commonwealth with traditional bow and bill, and would receive more detailed official treatment in the *Toxophilus* (1545) of Roger Ascham (1514/15-1568), a longbow treatise advocating the weapon as 'the defence and wal of

---

[332] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. +.v.r. Williamson, 'British "Patriot"', p. 10, stresses the role of Anglo-Scottish and -Irish interaction, especially the 'Rough Wooing' partially narrated by Patten, in driving new concepts of a patriotic English and British citizenry. Patten may have been motivated by rumours circulating in England of defeat against Scotland, and generally portraying a positive, popular image of the Lord Protector, in depicting an English people unified behind Somerset's campaign: Sharpe, *Selling*, p. 237.
[333] Patten, *Expedicion*, sig. Lii.r., h.i.r.
[334] William Raleigh Trimble, 'Early Tudor Historiography', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 11/1 (1950), p. 35.
[335] Robert Fabyan, *Chronicles*, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 1811), pp. 579-80.
[336] *Ye batayll of Egyncourte* (London, 1536).

our countrie', 'as our enemies can beare recorde'.[337] Ascham's text was rooted in contemporary geopolitical and confessional concerns, evoking English identities of 'Christ, King Henry, the Boke and the Bowe' against 'the Scot, the Frencheman, the Pope, and heresie'.[338] He further evoked an all-encompassing martial patriotism in reminding Henry that on his 'most honourable and victorious journey into Fraunce' in 1544, he was accompanied by 'such a porte of the Nobilitie and yeomanrie of Englande', as well as 'the daylie prayers, good hartes and willes of all and every one your graces subjectes'.[339]

English martial patriotism was thus expressed with reference to a collective military past of both noble and non-noble Englishmen, as well as the exigencies of national defence and loyalty in the present. By the mid-Tudor years, English martial identity and patriotic historiography had already incorporated Henrician victories as showing 'the pollicie and manhode of our captaines and souldiers' into England's collective military memory, just as Spanish soldiers increasingly looked back not only to the *Reconquista* but to the early Italian Wars and the American conquests.[340] Like Morison, Hall emphasised the bonds of loyalty between the King and his army, and described at length how Henry 'never ceased to stody and take payne' for the defence of England, assisted not only by 'lordes, chivalry, horsemen' but also 'archers and commnalitie' against the Pope.[341] Such values reflected the geopolitical and religious threats of the 1530s but also hinted at the broader contemporary ideal of a perfect, mutually loyal relationship between a Great Captain and his loyal subordinates so beloved of Spanish writers- in this case, not a professional infantry force but the English

[337] Morison, *Exhortation*, sig. Bv.r.; Roger Ascham, *Toxophilus* (London, 1545), fo. 8v., 17r.
[338] Ascham, *Toxophilius*, Epigram.
[339] Ascham, *Toxophilus*, sig. Ar.
[340] e.g. Fabyan, *Chronicles*, p. 696; Stow, *Chronicles* (London, 1565), fo. 203r.; Hall, *Chronicle*, p. 681.
[341] Hall, *Chronicle*, p. 828, 626.

commonwealth-in-arms. However, these preoccupations may have been comparable to contemporary Spanish military writing but were by no means shared by all soldiers in Tudor service- as the following chapter shall examine.

CHAPTER 3: Professionalism and Military Thought

By the mid-century, Spanish and English soldier-writers had begun to engage not only with new concepts of duty, ideology, and honour, but with the emerging science of Renaissance war. A diverse pool of Spanish printed texts sought to teach the new '*perfecta sciencia*' to aspirant officers, centred increasingly not on the classical past but on contemporary military practices forged in the Italian Wars. The new practical, professional ethos of warfare was also expressed in how Spanish soldier-writers depicted the ideal commander, creating his matrix of honour not only out of his personal bravery and reciprocal ties with his men, but also his technical skills in successfully leading troops. Spanish soldiers also elaborated the matrix of honour of the common soldiery, focusing on experience and reputation in the tight *corps* of the professional Spanish infantry. However, though new ideas of professionalism and practicality also conditioned Spanish ideals of junior officership and discipline, some Spaniards hinted subversively at the gap between military theory and reality.

The *mentalité* of professional soldiers in Tudor service may be illuminated by the exceptional memoir of the Welshman Elis Gruffudd. Gruffudd shows an increasingly professional, practical idea of warfare, with a similar value system of praiseworthy commanders and soldiers as the Spanish writers. However, Gruffudd did so in the *negative*, presenting the myriad practical and moral military shortcomings he witnessed, and in doing so, prefigured the tone of professional dissatisfaction and need for reform common to later English military writing. English military theorists were soon offering solutions, with a small pool of printed texts joined by the 1560s by a body of manuscript treatises written by military professionals, likely responding to the English experience of intense warfare in France and Scotland in c.1540-60, elucidating

army organisation on continental models, and calling for military reform for national defence.

I. *Soldados Platicos*: Spanish Military Professionalism

i. Spanish Military Theory to 1567

Spanish military theory did not begin in 1500. A classicising 'Book of War' was written in 1420, and Castilian copies of Vegetius proliferated in the fifteenth century.[342] The treatise *Of the Perfection of Military Triumph* (1459, printed c.1490) by the humanist scholar Alfonso Fernandez de Palencia, although at least partially based on Onosander, foreshadowed many themes of future Spanish military theory in its allegorical dialogue between idealised warriors, its Castilian patriotism, its infantry-dominant model and emphasis on the importance of veteran soldiers, and even its Italian setting.[343] Quatrefages refers to the 'clairvoyance of Palencia', seeing this text rather than the *Gran Capitan*'s reforms four decades later as the true origin of the early modern Spanish infantry.[344]

In the 1530s, however, Spanish military thought would undergo a profound shift with the publication of two very different texts, both by members of the Spanish military community. Though 88% of his wordcount was directly translated from Machiavelli, Diego de Salazar's *Tratado de Re Militari* emphasised his own credentials of 'having soldiered prosperously' under the *Gran Capitan*, and 'the times I have spent soldiering have not left me ignorant in military affairs'.[345] Salazar revealed how recent events had filtered into the Spanish military consciousness in changing Machiavelli's interlocutors to the *Gran Capitan*, whom he commended for his 'very great ingenuity

---

[342] Quatrefages, '*L'Organisation Militaire*', p. 71; Allmand, *The* De Re Militari, pp. 175-85.
[343] Alfonso de Palencia, *De la perfección del triunfo militar* (Seville: Compañeros alemanes, c.1490); Rafael Alemany, 'el *Tratado de la perfección del trunfo militar*', *Anales de Literatura Española*, 1 (1982), p. 13; *Aeneas Tacitus, Asclepiodotus, Onosander*, ed. Jeffrey Henderson (London, 1928), p. 358; Quatrefages, 'Spécifité Militaire Espagnole', pp. 17-24.
[344] Quatreges, '*L'Organisation Militaire*', pp. 68-9.
[345] Diego de Salazar, *Tratado de re militari* (Alcalá de Henares, 1536), fo. i.r. (*uno d̄ su sus seruidores, assi por auer militado prosperamēte debaxo d̄ su vādera*), prologue. (*por que no parezca que el tiempo que yo he militadose me ha pasado ignorando las cosas necessarias a la milicia*)

and study' as well as his *esfuerzo*, imparting his military wisdom to another commander, the Duke of Najera.[346] Meanwhile, Salazar's dedication showed how values of class status, deeds performed, and loyalty were being augmented by developing ideas of professional military skill and reputation. He praised the 'catholic and splendid Lord' Diego de Vargas de Carvajal in traditional noble-martial terms, but also for 'having never refused military service in all the events of our time', and for 'being so loving and studious of the military discipline and favoured by those that apply themselves to it'.[347] Salazar proudly displayed Carvajal's arms on his front cover, though as with many such dedications in early modern military books, it is ambiguous whether this implied a real, or a desired, patron-client relationship.

Salazar emphasised that he wrote for the Spanish military community, so that readers who had also served under the *Gran Capitan* could 'refresh their spirits with the memory of his virtue' while others would 'take many useful things…to understand the matters of war'.[348] He adapted Machiavelli's troop types to refer to Spanish pikemen, and arquebusiers, to whom he gave considerably more prominence than Machiavelli.[349] Where the classicising Machiavelli aimed 'to bring military practice back to ancient methods', Salazar ruled that 'it would be impossible to separate present warriors from the common uses', and while Machiavelli wrote 'for the pleasure of those who love ancient deeds', Salazar promised 'to collect from the antique orders part of what I have found written, and from the modern, part of what I have tried…imitating many antique

---

[346] Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. i.r. (*jūto cō el grā esfuerço tuvo grādissimo ingenio, y estudio*). This presumably refers to Antonio Manrique de Lara, Viceroy of Navarre (d.1535).
[347] It is unclear to whom this refers, though Salazar implies Carvajal served on the Tunis expedition. Salazar, *Tratado*, prologue. (*como por ser tan amador y estudioso de la militar disciplina y favorecedor de aquellos q[ue] en ella se exercitā…ansi en las obras de catholico sabio y esplendido señor como en las d[e] su militar habito*)
[348] Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. i.r. (*por q[ue] leyēdo lo sus amigos, y seruidores refresquen en sus animos la memoria de su v[ir]tud: y los otros…deprēder muchas cosas útiles…q[ue] entiēdā las cosas de la guerra*)
[349] Salazar, *Tratado*, fo.xii.v., xvii.r.

and modern authors'.[350] He rejected Machiavelli's ancient weapons and devoted considerable attention to artillery and pike-and-shot formations 'useful for these present times' when 'no infantry should hold itself without order and exercise'.[351] Given the importance of his development of an effective infantry to the *Gran Capitan*'s legacy not merely as a commander but as a military reformer, it is perhaps significant that Salazar placed these new tactics in the mouth of his famous interlocutor. Salazar's transmission of Machiavelli was part of the new professional 'perfect science' of the Spanish military collective, 'the way and order that one must have to lead people chosen, taught, and disciplined to battle'.[352]

This was followed by a native Spanish manual, Diego Montes' *Instrucion y Regimiento* (1537), promising 'subtle advice and secret matters of the military exercise of war'.[353] The author declared himself 'a veteran soldier of his Majesty' and adopted the professional language of warfare as a complex trade to be learnt, to 'take some doctrine for the military exercise' from 'the industries of the past'.[354] This self-promotion as a veteran and an expert can be explained not only by the didactic nature of the text, but as a possible appeal for patronage, being dedicated to another politico-military figurehead, one with local relevance: Beltrán de la Cueva, 3rd Duke of Albuquerque (d.1560).[355]

---

[350] cf. Machiavelli, *Art of War*, tr. Allan H. Gilbert, *Machiavelli* (3 vols., Durham, 1965), ii.567 and Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. 1r.
[351] Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. xxxvii.v. (*utile para en estos tiempos presentes*), xxii.v. (*ninguna suerte de infantes ni condición de armados se deue tener sin ordenar y exercitar*)
[352] Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. xxxvi.r. (*modo, y orden se deue tener para traer la gente escogida, enseñada, y disciplinada hasta traer los a dar la batalla*)
[353] Montes, *Instrucion*, cover. (*sutiles auisos y cosas secretas del exercicio militar de la guerra*)
[354] Montes, *Instrucion*, cover (*soldado viejo de su Magestad*); fo. IIv. (*de sus industrias de los passados tomassen alguna dotrina para el exercisio militar*)
[355] At the time of the *Instrucion*'s publication in Zaragoza, Albuquerque was Viceroy and Captain-General of Aragon. Real Academia de la Historia, 'Historia Hispanica', https://historia-hispanica.rah.es/biografias/12839-beltran-de-la-cueva-y-alvarez-de-toledo, retrieved 18/02/2025.

Though he heeded 'the ancient writers and most wise philosophers', Montes focused exclusively on modern war and referenced recent Italian campaigns.[356] He also revealed that the distinct sixteenth-century idea of warfare as requiring study in books as well as experience had already taken hold in Spain, stressing the importance of reading military history.[357] Montes emphasised the emerging trope of the superiority of cunning and military skill to brute force, warning that 'pitched battle' must be avoided wherever possible, a decisive break with the spirit of *Esfuerzo Belico Heroico.*[358]

Montes was more practical and comprehensive than Salazar-Machiavelli, moving systematically through the selection of a General, army organisation, and the qualifications and duties of different ranks. He surveyed the rational necessities of modern war, from logistics to engineering, and hinted at revolutionary 'artillery fortifications'.[359] Though Montes acknowledged the superior 'dignity' of heavy cavalry, he emphasised that 'there is nothing stronger in the field than a squadron of infantry', the 'strength' and the 'body' of the army, and stressed the dominance of gunpowder and importance of disciplined, 'well-ordered' formations.[360] The growing importance of regulated, disciplined pike-and-shot formation in which all individualism of the soldier is subordinated to his dictated place in the collective unit is visible in Montes' reference to arquebus 'sleeves' (*mangas*) and the importance of tightly maintained formations.[361] Though his views on discipline were not yet the infinitely strict, absolute 'submergence

---

[356] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. IIr. (*antiguos escriptores y sapientissimos Philosophos*), IXr.
[357] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. IIv.
[358] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. XIIIv. (*si el general pudiere romper a sus enemigos sin dar batalla aplaçada, deue lo hazer*)
[359] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. VIv., XVIIv. (*bastiones, y reparos que descrubran la campaña: huviendo abundancia de artilleria*)
[360] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. Vv. (*mayor dignidad*), Xr. (*no hay cosa mas fuerte en campaña: que es un esquadron de infanteria*), fo. XIIIIr. (*cuerpo del exército la infantería y la fortaleza del exército*), Xr.-v. (*Y estando bien ordenado por imposible ternía yo, poder se romper…y escopetas, y arcabuzes: y estas con la artillería es la fortaleza de todo un campo*)
[361] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. Xr., XIIIIr.

of the individual' seen in later-century military theory, the growing importance of loyalty and discipline in constructing the ideal stoic soldier is visible in his insistence that 'their true love to serve their natural King' should render soldiers immune to exhaustion and fear.[362]

Montes cited recent military events both out of national pride and as didactic evidence, expanding the repertoire of praiseworthy Spanish commanders to include Pescara and Ramón de Cardona (1467-1522), Viceroy of Naples, who 'with the Spaniards achieved such a great victory [at Vicenza in 1513] because he knew how to give order in battle, and because he had good troops'.[363] The influence of identity and ideology, meanwhile, is visible in Montes' pride in the 'honourable fame of Spaniards' won in the *Reconquista* and Italian Wars, his hope that his treatise would be used to 'bring the land occupied by the infidels under subjection of the invincible Caesar', and his claim that his military skills were honed not against Christians, but 'the Turks, our enemies'.[364] Like his fellow veterans of Charles' wars, Montes' military *mentalité* combined the emerging science of Renaissance war with distinctively Spanish ideological concerns.

Meanwhile, the 1530s also saw several specialist technical manuals, on fencing, firearms, and fortification, as well as chronicles narrating recent military events.[365]

---

[362] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. XIIv. (*con la gloria de la vitoria no sienten el trabajo de las armas: ni el gran calor, ni la sed que los atormenta, ni otro trabajo ninguno los espanta con el amor verdadero que lleuā de servir a su Rey natural*)

[363] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. XVv. (*Y esta vitoria tan grande alcanço don Ramon de Cardona con los Españoles porque supo dar la orden al tiempo de la batalla: y porque tenia buena gente*). Conversely, Montes did not blame Cardona for defeat at Ravenna, portraying it as a mutual bloodbath demonstrating the needlessness of pitched battle. Montes, *Instrucion*, f. XVr., cf. Mallett and Shaw, *Italian Wars*, pp. 119-21.

[364] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. IXr. (*por esso estaua en tāta honrra subida la fama de los Españoles*), XIXr. (*cōtra los perfidos turcos sarracenos nuestros enemigos…para cōquistar la tierra que los infieles tienen ocupada: y traer la debaxo de subjecion del inuictissimo Cesar*)

[365] Francisco Román, *Tratado de la esgrima* (Seville, 1532); Pablo del Fulcar, *Balestas, Mosquetes y Arcabuces* (Naples, 1535); Juan Cristóbal Calvete de Estrella, tr. Diego Gracian, *La Conquista de la*

Later, these would be joined by military translations, with Spanish editions of relevant classical writers to teach ancient military discipline, though the reader was warned that classical warfare 'does not match nor agree entirely with the military discipline of our time', and Onosander was printed with Martin du Bellay's treatise.[366] In 1547 there appeared a politico-military treatise on the Ottoman Empire, significantly expanded from Paolo Giovio, and both advocating holy war against the Turks and holding up their military superiority as a model to be emulated. This was a specifically military manifestation of the widespread contemporary phenomenon identified by Noel Malcolm as 'shame-praising', and which had already appeared in Salazar's treatise.[367] Praising the Ottoman art of war, Tanco drew on many preoccupations of contemporary military theorists: professional skill, training and self-discipline, military meritocracy, the superiority of reason over 'bestial fury' (*bestial ferocidad*), the importance of military reading, and even the necessity of pike-and-shot formations.[368] Other specialist manuals in the first half of the century reflected the emerging ideal of the professional, experienced soldier. The 1548 *Arte de la Cavalleria* concentrated not on moral and spiritual 'knighthood' but practical skills, the author citing his own military credentials and emphasising that 'the military habit' must be learnt 'like the child reads his ABC'.[369] Another cavalry manual of 1551 likewise deployed the rational language of reason and emphasised the author's expertise.[370]

Ciudad de Africa (Salamanca, 1558). A fortification treatise, Pedro Luis de Scriba, *Apologia…de las Fabricas del Reino de Napoles* was also produced, though de León, *Road to Rocroi*, p. 122, suggests it was 'probably never published in the sixteenth century'.

[366] Thucydides, tr. Diego Gracian, *Historia de Thucydides* (Salamanca, 1564); Xenophon, tr. Diego Gracian, *Las Obras de Xenophon* (Salamanca, 1552), sig. +iii.v. (*esta orden, y manera antigua de guerrear no couiene, ni concuerda del todo con la disciplina militar de nuestro tiempo*); Diego Gracian, *De Re Militari*.

[367] Vasco Diaz Tanco de Fregenal, *Palinoda…de los Turcos* (Orense, 1547); Noel Malcolm, *Useful Enemies* (Oxford, 2019), p. 412; Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. xxxvii.v.

[368] Tanco, *Palinoda*, sig. +iii.r., fo. lv.r.-v., xxxxiiii.v.-xlv.r., xxxx.r., lviii.r.

[369] Juan Quijada de Reayo, *Doctrina del Arte de la cavalleria* (Medina del Campo, 1548), sig. Aii.r.-v. (*el niño que deprende a leer por el a. b. c.*)

[370] Hernán Chácon, *Tractado de la Cauallería*, ed. Noel Fallows (Exeter, 1999), p. 33.

Such themes were all visible in the attempt by another Spanish cavalryman to produce a comprehensive military textbook, *Arte y Suplemento Remilitar* (1541), summarised by de León as 'the most thorough Spanish military treatise' pre-1567 but nonetheless 'mainly a compendium of ancient military knowledge'.[371] Francisco de Pedrosa declared himself as a 'man-at-arms in Italy of the Catholic and Caesarean Majesty' and self-fashioned as a soldier 'resident in the exercise of war', insisting that his critics had never felt 'the fatigue and the sweat' of combat.[372] Though he followed the emerging convention of warfare as something to be studied, Pedrosa deployed another emerging rhetorical trope, the dichotomy between soldiers and scholars, with the former writing less skilfully but more honestly.[373]

Like Salazar and Montes, Pedrosa praised his dedicatee- Joan de Joara, Captain of the Castilnuovo of Naples, where the text was published- in both class status and military identity, as noble and loyal, but also 'a military person, and inclined to all bellicose acts'.[374] Pedrosa resembled Montes or Salazar in his points of technical expertise as well as his generic wisdom on military organisation.[375] Nonetheless, though Pedrosa promised 'ancient and modern' material of 'much utility and doctrine to all soldiers', the text was an omnivorous, cumbersome encyclopaedia of classical, medieval, and contemporary military events.[376] He thus mixed ancient minutiae and fantastical war machines with accurate descriptions of modern warfare, and though Pedrosa distinguished between 'antique' and modern artillery, he followed the chivalric

[371] de León, *Road to Rocroi*, p. 122; Francisco de Pedrosa, *Arte y Suplemento Remilitar* (Naples, 1541).
[372] Pedrosa, *Remilitar*, sig. Ar. (*honbre darmas en la Ytalia de la Catolica y Cesarea Maiestad…estād̄o Rasidēte en el exercicio de la guerra*), fo. 2r. (*no hubiese jamás sido en batalla ni sacado…la fatiga: y el sudor*)
[373] Pedrosa, *Remilitar*, sig. Ar.
[374] Pedrosa, *Remilitar*, sig. Ar. (*p[er]sona militar: y enclinada a todo abto belicoso*)
[375] Marco Federici, 'Teoría y Práctica de la Guerra', *Studia Aurea*, 14 (2020), pp. 395-420.
[376] Pedrosa, *Remilitar*, sig. Ar.-v. (*muchos precetores de melicia antiguos y modernos…de mucha utilidad y doctrina a todo milite*)

trope of casting gunpowder as a 'diabolical' invention.[377] Ultimately, he echoed Machiavelli in idolising the ancient past versus the 'debility and weakness' of modern warfare, while his criticism of a 'new and strange generation of men' may reflect a genuine 'ancient'-'modern' split in Spanish military thought, or the emerging 'rhetoric of decline' so beloved of Renaissance military theorists- or simply invective against the author's perceived detractors.[378] Pedrosa demonstrates that though Spanish military theory was rapidly maturing during the Italian Wars, with unabashed fascination for detailed technical minutiae and a decisive shift away from the introspective, individualistic ideal of the chivalric *caballero esforzado*, it was far from unified in its approach to the 'military revolution'.

Meanwhile, it is possible to sense this emerging culture of rational, technical thought in Spanish military memoirs. Paredes and Guzmán, as individualist, solipsistic narratives, omitted the technical realities of warfare, events taking place outside their own immediate scale, or their own 'experiential wisdom'.[379] Yet the switch to military narratives of the Spanish infantry collective had the concomitant effect of drastically widening the mental horizons of soldier-writers and providing far more technical and operational information on the campaigns described, allowing the author to take on the voice of a military theorist.

Despite his continued chivalric interest, Oznayo constructed a realistic and reasonably detailed campaign narrative, with strategic context, key commanders, and some attention given to troop numbers, locations, and movements. Crucially, this included events where Oznayo, his master Vasto, his hero Pescara, or the Spanish

---

[377] Pedrosa, *Remilitar*, fols. 208-9, 129v.
[378] Pedrosa, *Remilitar*, sig. Ar.-v. (*una nueva y estraña generacion, de honbres*)
[379] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 195.

infantry were absent, demonstrating how memoirs were already beginning to take on a dual function as broader campaign chronicles.[380] Cerezeda's *Tratado* had limitless interest in military, geographical, and historical information and revealed a realistic awareness of the importance of provisioning, marching, and garrisoning as well as technical ingenuity in his narrative, such as bridge-building, mines, infantry manoeuvres, and pike blocks with shot 'sleeves'.[381] Cerezeda likewise described military architecture and treated the construction of fortified siegeworks by pioneers and provision of logistics as of comparable importance to combat operations.[382] Cerezeda drew 'military parables' from his own experiences, describing one tactical disaster in Piedmont in 1542 to explain that 'in some, valour is not accompanied by knowledge of the wisdom of war'.[383] Despite his lowly status, Cerezeda was even willing to engage in strategic speculation, counterfactuals, and tactical paradoxes, with the ostensible rationality and 'reason' of a military theorist.[384] All of these themes would become even more visible in Ávila's account of the Schmalkaldic War, in his technically detailed top-down campaign narrative, and technical appraisal of *reiter* and *stradioti.*[385] This was encapsulated by his use of a very early example of a 'birds-eye view' battle map 'to better understand' the deployment of the infantry squadrons at Ingolstadt and Mühlberg, revealing the literally expanding horizons of early modern soldiers.[386] Other emerging military-technical themes were likewise already visible in Ávila's text, such as the dichotomy between *arte* and *fuerza* in military operations, the superiority of victory without battle to the credit of a perfect Captain, and his strong criticism of Margrave

[380] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 408, 413-4, 425; see also pp. 416-9 on tactics and strategy.
[381] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, e.g. II.416-55; II.150, II.363; III.187.
[382] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.26-7.
[383] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.56-7. (*Mas como en algunos está la valentía desacompaña del saber del astucias y cosas de guerra*)
[384] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.95, I.132, III.46.
[385] Ávila, *Comentario*, fo. 36r., 77v.
[386] Ávila, *Comentario*, fo. 20v. (*y para esto se auian dexado algunos espacios entre los esquadrones de nuestra Infanteria, lo qual porque mejor se entienda, va puesto en esta pintura*)

Albert Alcibiades (1522-1557), whose defeat at Rochlitz he blamed on fighting 'more like a valiant knight, than an astute Captain'- a very significant contrast between chivalry and command.[387]

This movement towards a more rational picture of warfare as a science is thus already visible in how Spanish military writers formed the matrix of honour of the ideal 'Perfect Captain', particularly in the specifically military attributes accorded to Charles and other prominent commanders. In constructing such protagonists, bravery and sharing soldiers' hardships was were insufficient, with the ideal commander increasingly requiring 'experience in military matters, diligence in negotiation, counsel in organisation, speed in execution…authority in command'.[388] Oznayo praised Pescara's skill at earthworks, *camisados*, and motivating his men.[389] In his praise for Charles as a campaigning monarch, Cerezeda made sure to include alongside references to Charles' physical bravery his skills as a field commander eagerly leading reconnaissance patrols, judging terrain, masterminding skirmishes, and organising deployments as 'Captain General, and Sergeant, and soldier'.[390] Ávila's panegyric to Charles likewise portrayed him as mastermind of the defeat of the Schmalkaldic league and as the perfect Captain rather than a chivalric knight, moving and ordering his squadrons, sending out cavalry and skirmish groups to harass the enemy, and acting astutely on intelligence 'with the greatest diligence that he could'.[391]

---

[387] Ávila, *Comentario*, fo. 55v., 57v.-58r., 73r. (*peleado mas como valiente cauallero, que como astuto capitan*)
[388] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 94r. (*deue tener estas cinco [sic] calidades: esperiencia en las cosas militares: diligencia en los negocios: consejo en el proueer: presteza en la execucion: fortaleza en los peligros: auctoridad en el mandar*)
[389] Oznayo, *Relacion*, pp. 433-4, 428.
[390] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.140, II.164, II.25. (*El Emperador fué capitan general y sargento y soldado*)
[391] Ávila, *Comentario*, fo. 21r., 51r., 58v. (*con la mayor diligencia q[ue] pudo*)

As well as the Emperor, Cerezeda praised the technical ability of other imperial commanders, describing de Leiva masterminding imperial strategy as a knowledgeable 'person of such command' and praising Doria for his use of technical stratagems, skills in defensive planning, and 'consultation of knowledgeable persons'.[392] He approvingly described Alba's operational manoeuvres and how Vasto split his forces, guarded key points, used light cavalry for reconnaissance and transmitted complex formation orders via Sergeant-Majors.[393] This picture of rational, 'mission-directed' command is reminiscent of the 'School of Alba' posited by de León, and demonstrates how far ideals of skilled, diligent senior command, and written discourses of practical, professional military science, emerged in the Italian Wars and predated the Duke's march north in 1567.

ii. The Perfect *Soldado*

Spanish military writing also revealed new conceptions and identities of the ideal soldier. Soldier-writers provided considerable evidence on the solidification of the Spanish military public sphere through the role played by personal reputation among *soldados*, and a growing *esprit de corps* in infantry units, the latter identified by Parker, Quatrefages, and Sherer as an important part of Spanish military effectiveness. The insults cited by Geronimo de Urrea's anti-duelling treatise as provoking duels included 'you said that I was absent when my company ensign crossed the [Elbe] river with the Duke of Alba' at Mühlberg, or 'whoever lied that I abandoned the battery at San Quentin'.[394] Given the size and geographic diversity of the Spanish military

---

[392] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.107 (*como persona de tanto gobierno*), I.109, I.323. (*tomó parescer de personas sábias*)
[393] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.181; III.206-7.
[394] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 51r. (*vos haueys dicho que el dia de la batalla del rio Albis, passando este estandarte de mi compañia con los siete que con el passaron el rio con el Duque de Alua, yo me quede destotra parte en mi tienda*), 47v. (*Quien ha dicho de mi que yo desampare la bateria de Sanquintin, ha mentido*). Urrea's text had three editions by 1575 as well as one each in Italian and French.

establishment, Cerezeda's numerous references to individual outstanding officers were surely based in some cases on reputation rather than personal familiarity.[395] Some of his information was sourced from '*Maestres de Campo* and Sergeant-Majors and Captains and others that were there' of 'absolute trustworthiness'.[396] Alongside classical figures and high-profile Spanish commanders, Pedrosa cited obscure junior officers as examples of military expertise, such as 'the good Captain Alvarado', 'known as '*the veteran*' (*dicho el Viejo*).[397] Some soldier-writing also may have hinted at another important aspect of the solidification of the Spanish military community, the '*camarada*' system, which Sherer (echoing François de la Noue) has identified as a possible ingredient in Spanish military effectiveness.[398] The cohesiveness and tactical utility of small groups was a running theme in Cerezeda's *Tratado*, and lodging groups of '*camaradas*' [sic] appeared, albeit very negatively as unsuitable living arrangements for an innocent young *hidalgo*, in Nuñez Alba's *Dialogos*.[399]

It is likewise possible to trace another ingredient of the military effectiveness of Spanish soldiers, and a later pillar of military theory: the importance of soldierly competence and skill, to be developed over time by experience and training. Cerezeda explained how the Spanish 'veteran' (*viejo*) companies remained in garrison from one campaign to the next as the elite, permanent core of the Habsburg military system, and distinguished between *soldados viejos* and fresh replacements as different grades of men within the Spanish establishment.[400] Meanwhile, a developing sense of soldiering as a distinct profession was directly shown by Nuñez Alba's list of the miseries and sins

[395] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.49.
[396] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.33. (*fuy informado de personas de entera fee, como de general, capitan y maeses de campo y sargentos mayores y capitanes y de los demas que en ellas se hallaron*)
[397] Pedrosa, *Remilitar*, 'Tabla', fo. 130r.-131r.
[398] Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, p. 241.
[399] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.44-5 (*toma consigo seis soldados de sus más amigos*); Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. b4r.-b5r.
[400] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.13; e.g. I.250, II.21, II.194.

'belonging to the profession' of the soldier (*propio de mi passado profission*) compared with the other 'trades' (*oficios*).[401]

Veteran status was directly associated with practical skill. Cerezeda defined novice soldiers as ignorant '*bisoños*, or to better say, the newly arrived, although this name of *bisoños* in Italy is better said for those that are not knowledgeable in foreign parts', a vivid evocation of the centrality of Italian service to the development of Spanish infantry culture, expertise and 'micro-society'.[402] Nuñez Alba obviously gloried in the exertions of war and saw veteran status as a matter of pride as well as initiation into the knowledge of war, the worn-out veteran Milicio identifying his naïve nephew as an arrogant young '*bisoño*' by his ostentatious behaviour and clothing, and undertaking to educate him.[403] This association between veteran status and skill, and an understanding of it as crucial in modern warfare was present at the highest levels. Charles himself treated his 'good Spanish soldiers, experienced in war', as strategic assets.[404]

The growing association of experience with skill is encapsulated by the use of 'platico', translatable as 'familiar', 'well-versed', 'discussed' or 'reasoned'. De León has identified the significance in later Spanish military writing of the '*soldado platico*', a 'practical and pragmatic soldier who took pride in his effectiveness', but as with many other themes of Spanish military culture, the concept was already alive long before 1567.[405] 'Platico' or 'platica' could simply mean the noun 'speech', 'talking', but also

---

[401] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. b6r., b8v.
[402] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.250. (*Los españoles bisoños ó por mejor decir, los nuevamente venidos, aunque este nombre de bisoños en Italia es mejor decir para los no pláticos en los extraños reinos*)
[403] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. b.r.
[404] Bernadette Hofinger *et al* (eds.), *Die Korrespondenz Ferdinands I. Bd.5* (Cologne, 2015), p. 291 (*mille bons souldars espaignolz experimentéz en guerre*), 311. (*la bande des vieux souldars espaignolz et deux mille des pietons allemans choisiz des millleurs et plus experimentéz en guerre*). On the strategic role of the permanent *tercios* and garrisons, see Jan Glete, *War and the State*, pp. 78-83.
[405] de León, '*Soldados Platicos*', p. 250, 252; de León, *Road to Rocroi*, p. 129.

'discussion'.[406] 'Platico' was also a personal attribute, however, implying specific skills or knowledge.[407] Crucially, the phrase could be used *without clarification* to describe soldiers as veterans and experts, the ideal '*soldado platico*'. Cerezeda classified individual soldiers as well as entire units as 'very skilled' (*muy platicos*).[408] He also applied the term to the Spanish infantry collective, 'such illustrious men, for the majority of them being soldiers already well-versed (*ya platicos*) in matters of war and in Italy'.[409] It was often used as the antithesis of '*bisoño*', Nuñez Alba's veteran interlocutor reflecting that his swaggering nephew is 'acting so much like a *platico*, I take him for a *bisoño*'.[410] The term entered Spanish military theory, Salazar translating Machiavelli's instructions to 'make your army deal with and learn a new enemy' as '*platicar y conocer*' and Montes referenced 'well-versed veteran soldiers' (*platicos soldados viejos*), explaining that military education depended on following and emulating '*capitanes platicos*'.[411] He thus instructed aspiring field commanders to rely on 'men *sabios y platica*', and implied a professional solidarity in explaining that '*platico* soldiers want to be commanded by persons of their nation who are *platico* in war, because *platicos* understand each other'.[412] Urrea referred to *gente platica* without explanation and distinguished '*Capitanes…visoños*' from 'Captains *platicos* that know how to order troops to win the day'.[413] The inclusion of the concept of 'platico', which as de León identifies implied technical-minded professionals who avoided moral judgements, in Urrea's book (ostensibly interested in moral questions of 'true military

[406] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.416.
[407] e.g. Ávila, *Comentario*, fo. 15r.
[408] e.g. Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.221, II.164.
[409] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.126. (*tan lucida gente, por ser la mayor dellos soldados ya pláticos en las cosas de la guerra y en Italia*)
[410] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig.br. (*haziendo tanto del platico, que yo le juzgo por bisoño*)
[411] cf. Gilbert, *Machiavelli*, ii.719 and Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. lxiiii.r.; Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. IIIv.
[412] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. VIIr. (*los soldados platicos q[uie]re[n] ser gouernados d̄ p[er]sonas q[ue] seā platicas en la guerra y d̄ su nación: porq[ue] platicos cō platicos se entiēdē*)
[413] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 24r., 95r. (*Capitanes platicos, que supieran ordenar la gente, por ventura ganaran la jornada*)

honour') itself demonstrates how far concepts of rational military skill were already part of the matrix of honour of the ideal Spanish soldier. The linguistic nature of 'platico', blurring the lines between 'discussion', 'knowledge', 'experience', 'practical'/'practised', and 'skill'/'skilled', reveals the growing importance of public discussion, debate, and teaching of military thought alongside veteran status and technical skills in the matrix of honour of the ideal *soldado*.

Such concepts were especially important in new ideals of junior officership. The process of military reorganisation traced by Quatrefages included the development of a regulated chain of command from *cabo d'escuadra* to *Maestre de Campo* and these ranks quickly spread through Spanish military theory.[414] Montes revealed the developing sense of meritocratic promotion in formulating the matrix of honour of the ideal junior officer out of skill and loyalty rather than class status or personal connections. He instructed that a Captain should select his Corporals from among the 'most *platicos* and the most experienced', ruling that positions of command should be given to 'men who deserve to have them, who are solicitous and diligent, so in night and day they are sleepless in how to serve their King'.[415] Montes also revealed a continuing appreciation of the noble affinity for war, explaining that the ideal soldiers were noblemen, 'those that always go around very well dressed and garlanded, they carry shining arms, they like doing very notable deeds so they will be known; such as these are called '*Guzmans*' [gentleman rankers] among Spaniards in the army of Italy'.[416] However, he stressed that promotion must be allocated on skill and experience,

[414] e.g. Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. xxxvi.r.; Tanco, *Palinoda*, fo. xii.r.
[415] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. IIIIr.-v. (*tome dellos los mas platicos y mas esperimētados…dar los officios a personas que los merezcan tener: que sean solicitos & diligentes: & tales que de noche y de dia esten desuelados en como podran mejor seruir a Su Rey*)
[416] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. IIIIr.-v. (*Estos tales andā siempre bien adereçados y galanes: trahen muy luziadas armas: huelga se de hazer cosas muy señaladas: porq[ue] sean conoscido. Estos tales son llamados en el cāpo de Ytalia los Guzmanes*). On noblemen in the Spanish infantry in the Italian Wars, including Alonso Enríquez de Guzmán himself, see Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, pp. 21-2.

and that only once a *Guzman* or *hidalgo* has become *platico* did he deserve a Captaincy, nobility or spirit alone being insufficient.[417] Montes ruled that aspirants must spend five years in the ranks, and that only in absence of such veterans should positions be allocated on grounds of *hidalguía*- definitively prioritising meritocracy above class.[418] As with his descriptions of senior officers, Cerezeda revealed contemporary ideas of proactive, technically skilled command at junior echelons, such as a garrison commander who, forewarned of an oncoming attack, responded 'with great vigilance' by repairing his fortifications, carefully placing his artillery, and dispatching reconnaissance patrols.[419]

However, some soldier-writers displayed surprising willingness to give a more realistic or even subversive picture of junior officership, departing from such idealised pictures of military perfection. In a parable of surprising honesty perhaps included to explain to the reader how 'real world' promotion worked, Cerezeda narrated how in 1538, Vasto summoned his officers in Lombardy for *reformacion* (amalgamation and redistribution) of Captaincies. Cerezeda quoted him telling some accredited professionals that '*I give you companies as you deserve them, as much in command as in service*'.[420] However, Vasto allegedly gave one man a company not for his own services or merits but those of his ancestors, and told another '*I give you* [a Company] *not because you have done enough services to deserve it, but for something that counterbalances this*', Cerezeda explaining that 'he was brother-in-law of Cobos, Secretary of the Emperor'. Cobos and his faction dominated Italian policy during the

[417] Montes, *Instrucion*, fols. IIIv.-IIIIv.
[418] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. III.v.
[419] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.95. (*el cual capitán con gran vigilancia manda reparar todas las cosas que le parecían ser flacas en los muros de Cieri…y manda poner el artillería do más convenia estar, y por estar más apercibidos manda que todas las noches…de la gente questaba en las guardias, saliesen tantos arcabuceros*)
[420] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.352. (*os doy las compañías por vuestras personas que, así en gobierno como en el servicio, las meresceis*)

1530s, with the Secretary's 'subtle weave of patronage' linking together such Spanish-Imperial military households as Toledo/Alba, Leiva, d'Avalos, and Doria.[421] Cerezeda also recorded the Marques giving a company to 'Gonzalo Hernandez, for being such a veteran soldier' but also 'for having served as *mayordomo* of the Marques de Pescara, his [Vasto's] uncle'.[422] Such a description of how promotion could be guided by emerging concepts of technical military skill, experience, and services performed, but also by noble status or personal connections, was a more sober, realistic portrayal of promotion than the idealised demands of military theory.

Another ostensibly realistic but much more subversive portrayal of officership would appear a decade later, in Nuñez Alba's *Dialogos.* As part of his stated intention to produce a piece of military quasi-theory with 'no few warnings and benefits' based on his experience, Nuñez Alba engaged with the same ideals of skilled and selfless junior officership but did so in *negative* rather than positive terms, accusing officers of incompetence, corruption, and selfishness, though he retained an idealised picture of the infantry collective in combat, and he stressed that the Emperor behaved faultlessly.[423]

As the text progressed, Nuñez Alba further inverted the emerging convention of describing the 'perfect Captain', holding up three characters who epitomised the shortcomings of Spanish military administration. He described how the *barrachel* became rich by abusing his authority to confiscate illicit plunder, while the *pagador* connived 'with all the Captains of a *tercio*' to defraud the soldiery.[424] Nuñez Alba used

---

[421] Cerezeda, Tratado, II.352. (*no os la doy porque vos hayais hecho tantos servicios que la merezcais; mas miro al contrapeso que está en medio (como éste fuese cuñado de Cobos, secretario del Emperador, hermano de su mujer)…á vos, Don Ramon, no os la doy por habella vos servido; yo os la doy por los muchos servicios que han hecho vuestros antepasados*); Millán, 'Duke of Alba in the Court', pp. 75-6.
[422] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.352. (*Asimesmo dió cargo de capitan á Gonzalo Hernandez, por ser tan antiguo soldado y por haber servido de mayordomo al Marqués de Pescara, su tio*)
[423] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. a.7r. (*sacar dellas no pocos auisos y prouecho*), f.r., e.8v.
[424] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. f4r.-f5r., h.r. (*todos los capitanes de un tercio*)

the honourable, modest, popular and non-corrupt *alferez* to lament how such men deserving of promotion were passed over.[425] Nuñez Alba also equated moral with disciplinary aspects of soldiering, portraying the *alferez* as personally virtuous and thus outraged at murder and robbery in the ranks and corrupt promotion. Like everything else about Nuñez Alba's text, this likely reflected his own career frustrations, and class-based distaste for an increasingly common military *milieu*. Nonetheless, in their treatment of junior officership, Cerezeda and Nuñez Alba both show the same urge as military theorists to display and discuss contemporary military practice and models of officership, including in a more realistic way than the idealised military perfection in military manuals.

Tensions between theory and reality in Spanish military writing, and potentially subversive aspects of martial culture, were more obviously visible in varying attitudes towards perhaps the most important fixation of sixteenth-century theoretical ideals of soldierly identity: discipline. The development of permanent Spanish armed forces in the early century was accompanied by a drive towards greater discipline and regulation as well as tactical and organisational reform. Especially significant were the regulations of the 1530s, which formally created the *tercio* system, and combined strict instructions on unit organisation, junior officership, and weapon types with more overt aspects of military discipline such as punishment for looting.[426] The *tercio* regulations issued in Lombardy in 1538, which Cerezeda considered sufficiently important to transcribe in full, epitomised this drive towards regulated discipline, in mandatory weapon assignments, forbidding fraudulent musters or living off the land, and in the absolute subordination of officers as well as soldiers to the all-powerful chain of command.[427]

---

[425] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. Iiir.-Iiiir.
[426] Quatrefages, 'Spécifité Militaire Espagnole', pp. 48-50.
[427] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.354-60.

Given his depiction of the Emperor as a 'perfect Captain', Cerezeda's detail that Charles had a man hanged for wandering from the march in Provence in 1536 must imply that such draconian punishment was unremarkable or praiseworthy.[428] However, Cerezeda also revealed the developing sense that military discipline must not be summary or arbitrary but enforced according to regulation and reason, describing how, judging Spanish soldiers accused of treason in Italy in 1542, Vasto 'ordered them released, not finding anything against them that warranted punishment'.[429]

Meanwhile, it is also possible to trace Roberts' idea of the 'submergence of the individual' into strictly regulated battlefield formations. Ávila reported proudly how under horrendous bombardment at Ingolstadt, 'with all this unceasing fury, there was not a squadron that moved itself, and not only that, but no soldier shifted from his place nor turned his head to see if any other was safer than where he was'.[430] Of some significance in demonstrating the link between discipline and the rise of rigid infantry formations is the use of the phrase '*desmanda*'/'*desmandada*' to refer both to disobedience to orders and to being physically out of one's rank-and-file place in a company, with or without permission.[431]

Montes shows the developing association between battlefield formations and disciplinary practice, explaining how the Sergeant was responsible for forming troops up and should any man fall out of place then 'the Sergeant may hurt him and if the soldier dies, the Sergeant is blameless, because he exercises his office in service of his

---

[428] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.157.
[429] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.58. (*Pero desde á pocas días los mandó soltar, no hallando contra ellos cosa alguna que meresciese castigo*)
[430] Ávila, *Comentario*, fo. 22v. (*Y con toda esta furia, y esta nunca cessar, no huvo esquadron que se mouiesse, y no solamente esquadron, mas ninguno soldado se meneo de su lugar ni boluio la cabeça a mirar si auia otro mas seguro quel el que tenia*)
[431] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.79, I.297, I.111; Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. f3r.

King and in such a case he must be obeyed as if he is the Captain'.[432] Though he showed an apparent rebelliousness against military authority in his hatred of officers who behaved like 'absolute Lords' instead of loyal executors of royal authority, Nuñez Alba's criticism itself reflected the growing importance of discipline and regulation of officers and soldiers alike, hence his outrage at officers who broke the rules; their refusal to wear armour on duty, which particularly outraged Nuñez Alba, was a point of the 1538 regulations, 'to give an example to the soldiers'.[433]

The extent to which even concepts of personal noble honour had changed in Spanish martial culture is visible by contrasting Palacios Rubios' *Esfuerzo Belico Heroico* with a text produced four decades later for the same purpose of teaching honour, but by a real warrior, and with a very different message: Geronimo de Urrea's *Verdadera Honra Militar.* Urrea was the first Spanish translator of *Orlando Furioso*, first published in 1549 and 'one of the most frequently and successfully reprinted Spanish books of the sixteenth century', revealing the continued importance of other, more traditional martial literary forms.[434] However, in his practical instructions for real-world soldiers, Urrea- an infantry captain with a 'lifelong military career' in Italy and Germany- espoused a very different martial mentality. As such, Urrea's treatment of 'true military honour' was primarily a treatise against the 'inhuman' custom of duelling.[435] In this regard, de León has identified that Spanish concepts of honour had already shifted away from private or individualistic violence by the 1530s, with Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda- like Palacios Rubios, a senior member of the Spanish legal-

---

[432] Montes, *Instrucion*, fo. Vr. (*si alguno saliesse de la orden puede le castigar el sargento…podria le el sargẽto herir: & si de la herida muriesse el tal soldado: no por esso meresce culpa el sargento: porque haze el oficio en seruicio de su rey: y en tal caso ha de ser obedescido como lo es el capitan en el suyo*)
[433] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. cr. (*absolutos señores*); Cerezeda, *Tratado*, II.356. (*por dar enxemplo á los soldados*)
[434] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 62.
[435] Urrea, *Dialogo*, 'a la Infanteria Española'.

intellectual establishment- rejecting single combats in a 1535 treatise on 'the compatibility between *La Milicia* and religion', dedicated to his patron, the Duke of Alba.[436] Urrea wrote for a noble audience, addressing '*caballeros*' rather than common '*soldados privados*'.[437] However, whereas Rubios' *Esfuerzo* was written for a generically noble-martial readership, Urrea dedicated and addressed his *Dialogo* to 'the Spanish infantry', a distinct 'estate of society' ('*estado de gentes*') with 'greater necessity to understand these matters'.[438]

Urrea used the language of nobility and virtue to criticise duelling, along with that of Spanish military pride, reminding the reader that Spanish martial heroes like the *Gran Capitan* and Cortes gained *fama* without duelling and citing the Italian Wars as the apogee of Spanish martial mastery.[439] He also adopted the language of reason and logic beloved of sixteenth-century military theory, claiming that duelling was fit only for barbarians 'outside all policy, law and reason', and referenced Vegetius on the superiority of prudent skill to brute force.[440] However, Urrea primarily based his case on obedience and loyalty, arguing that duelling constituted 'rebellion against divine and human laws'.[441] This is of paramount importance as his primary argument was that 'the good and valiant soldier' should instead show his 'good *esfuerço*, Catholic spirit and desire of true and perpetual glory' by loyal, obedient service to his country.[442] Though he continued to equate nobility with martial, masculine virtue, Urrea expected noble soldiers to be fully subject to military authority, and considered chivalric behaviour without licence as worthy of punishment.[443] He thus sought to redirect *esfuerzo* from

---

[436] de León, '*Soldados Platicos*', p. 239.
[437] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 49r.
[438] Urrea, *Dialogo*, sig. 2 2r. (*tiene mas necessidad de entender estas dos cosas que otro estado de gentes*)
[439] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 11r., 98v.
[440] Urrea, *Dialogo*, 'a la Infanteria Española'. (*fuera de toda policía, ley, y razon*)
[441] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 4v. (*rebelde alas diuinas y humanas leyes*)
[442] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 31r. (*buen esfuerço, un catolico animo y un desseo de verdadera y perpetua gloria*)
[443] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 57r.

Rubios' single combats and individualistic honour into morally, legally, and ideologically acceptable state warfare: 'if you must fight, fight for honest things, like for religion, *patria*, and King'.[444] Though associations between nobility, virtue, and warfare were still important, the implicit tension between personal honour and obedience to monarch, law, and the army hierarchy had clearly been resolved in favour of the latter in Spanish military thought.

Nonetheless, as with the occasional critical descriptions of officers, there remained aspects of tension within Spanish attitudes to military discipline. The absence of discipline in Paredes' chaotic memoir, or *caballero* Guzmán's aversion to disciplinary responsibilities and chagrin at anti-duelling orders were both understandable, but more significant are the occasionally equivocal attitudes of more 'modern' soldier-writers to discipline. Cerezeda even mentioned two Captains reputedly murdered by their own men 'for speaking to them discourteously', passing no comment on such retribution being unacceptable.[445] Nuñez Alba apparently had no problem with fighting in the ranks, only with how duels were often fought unfairly or dishonourably.[446]

Also somewhat subversive was how Cerezeda treated mutiny. As Sherer has demonstrated, the practice notorious in Flanders of 'collective bargaining' through elaborate, quasi-formalised mutiny was already established in the Italian Wars.[447] Significantly, Sherer's evidence hints that such mutinies were not outright rejections of authority, but revealed the blurred lines of national allegiance, discipline, and concepts

---

[444] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 12v. (*mas ya que se tenga de combatir, sea el combate por cosas honestas, como por la Religion, por la Patria, y Rey*)
[445] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.50. (*...desde un motivo por algunas palabras descorteses que ellos dijeron á algunos soldados, que de ellas se dolieron*)
[446] Nuñez Alba, *Dialogos*, sig. b4v.
[447] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, pp. 157-176; Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, pp. 102-43.

of right and wrong. Mutineers in Sicily in 1538-9 thus implored the Viceroy 'to see that we are Spaniards, and we have to do what is suitable for the service of His Majesty', while in Lombardy mutineers were furious at how their own mutiny was presented by their commanders as disloyal to the Emperor.[448] This may reflect genuine patriotism by mutineers, or simply carefully constructed rhetoric by the '*electos*' to present their mutiny in the best possible light by drawing on the developing values of absolute loyalty to Emperor and *patria* as necessary attributes of Spanish soldiers. In either case, the idea that mutiny against the chain of command was not inherently a statement of total disloyalty already belied the strident language of absolute, non-negotiable discipline in early modern army regulations, or military theory. Cerezeda may have been trying to make a point on the loyalty of mutineers in emphasising that the Spanish reinforcements who saved the day in an engagement in 1530 were men who had just been expelled from the army for forming a mutinous *parlemento.*[449]

Though Cerezeda mostly skipped over mutiny, probably to avoid tarnishing his idealised depiction of the Spanish infantry, when he did narrate such events, he echoed the rhetoric of mutineers in giving an equivocal, somewhat subversive depiction of mutiny as acceptable under certain circumstances, and not inherently treasonous. He described how in Sicily in 1534 Spanish troops mutinied for overdue pay without passing judgement on their actions, even when the men fired on a Captain, and tacitly justified their actions in explaining that the officer had threatened a soldier.[450] Cerezeda described how Captain Alonso Carrillo told mutineers to content themselves with a single pay to help the Emperor 'repay the great expenses' of his wars.[451] Carillo's use of

[448] Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, p. 40.
[449] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.259, I.264.
[450] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.465. (*con palabras de mala crianza y amenazas se fué contra un soldado, queriéndole ferir*)
[451] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.447-8. (*que se contentasen con una paga y que mirasen cuánto gasto habia hecho el Emperador...y que era menester que los soldados ayudasen á pagar tan gran gasto*)

Charles' name to dismiss the mutineers' grievances itself demonstrates the growing importance of imperial loyalty in the moral economy of Spanish soldiers. Yet Cerezeda's dry comment 'in truth, little of this help was shared with the Emperor' shows a willingness to reject such rhetoric and criticise corrupt officers. Meanwhile, just as his praise of individual soldiers showed a desire to accord them *fama*, his naming of Carillo presumably aimed to damn his memory.[452]

Montes argued that though military discipline must be enforced, realistically, a *maestre de campo* must try to avoid executing wrongdoers, due to the strategic importance and irreplaceability of Spanish veterans.[453] Even outright disobedience could sometimes be excused; Cerezeda described a group of soldiers pinned down after the failed attack on Turin asking Captain de Guevara '*Sir, what do you want to do here? Do you want us all to get killed for nothing?*'.[454] He did not include Guevara's response but implied another Spanish officer ordered Guevara to pull back, possibly a narrative technique for resolving the situation without implying indiscipline or cowardice on the part of the soldiers- as would have been the case had he reported that they retreated without orders or forced Guevara to acquiesce- but his tacit acceptance of such quasi-democratic insubordination itself further shows the gap between disciplinary theory and reality. This may echo the quasi-'democratic' aspect of the early professional infantries, the Swiss and the *Landsknechte*, in contrast to later, more strictly hierarchical cultures.[455] Conversely, Urrea ruled that soldiers must follow their officer if he pulls them back for tactical advantage, but if he is simply retreating, deemed him 'a coward, and dishonourable…the soldiers must turn their weapons on him as a bad officer and a

[452] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.448. (*Por la verdad, desta ayuda poca parte cupo al Emperador*)
[453] Montes, *Instrucion*, fols. VIIv.-VIIIr.
[454] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.90. (*señor, que quiere hacer aquí? ¿quiere que sin nengun provecho nos maten aquí a todos?*)
[455] Parrott, *Business of War*, p. 62.

traitor to his Prince'.[456] The acceptability of ignoring orders under sufficiently glorious circumstances, anathema to most military theory, was visible in how Oznayo included in his panegyric to Pescara that when the wavering Bourbon ordered retreat at Pavia, Pescara damned his cowardice and disobeyed.[457] Given the battle's outcome, this served to highlight both Pescara's bravery and his acumen in pressing the attack, while further crediting him with the victory, yet Oznayo's anecdote nonetheless shows that in the Spanish matrix of honour, ideas of personal honour and bravery were not yet definitively outranked by discipline and obedience. As this section has shown, along with new ideologies and identities, Spanish military writers engaged with emerging ideas of technical, proficient military perfection and a loyal, obedient soldiery. Yet by the end of the Italian Wars, some Spanish military writing could still acknowledge the limitations of junior officership, and even tacitly approve of disobedience.

[456] Urrea, *Dialogo*, fo. 89r.-v. (*couarde, y deshonrrado Capitan…los soldados deuen boluer las armas contra el como contra mal official, y deseruidor de su Principe*)
[457] Oznayo, *Relacion*, p. 461.

II. *Weakness and Unruliness*: Tudor Military Professionalism

iii. Elis Gruffudd: Professional Dissatisfaction

Elis Gruffudd, an exceptional common soldier-writer in English service of the mid- and late-Henrician years, wrote from a mostly impersonal and entirely unchivalric perspective, mostly omitting his own actions and restricting his use of the first person singular to interjections on technical military detail or confirming trustworthiness.[458] His collective, top-down narrative of the movements of armies and detachments is broadly comparable to the impersonal reconstruction of campaigns in Spanish military chronicles, or the English diary of the siege of Boulogne, and his appreciation of military aesthetics is not that of individual knighthood but of troop movements and technical detail.[459] Indeed, Gruffudd disparaged chivalric values; describing a French operation in Boulogne by 'voluptuous gentlemen…pledged to do gallant deeds for their mistresses' sake', he gleefully reported how the latter were told 'their lovers had failed…and many of the more venturesome returning corpses on carts, which put them into great grief'.[460] This represents an outright rejection of chivalric culture and implicit self-fashioning of the author as a common soldier, to an even greater extent than the Spanish infantry texts which, though they centred on the non-noble culture of the infantry collective, displayed ambivalence (in Cerezeda's case) or positivity (in Nuñez Alba's case) for the moral rectitude of nobility at war. Unlike the Spanish paeans to popular officers or soldiers, however, Gruffudd had almost no interest in describing the outstanding personal actions of individual fellow combatants. His narrative was collective and unchivalric, but without the collective pride, *esprit de corps*, or sense of

[458] e.g. Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 33.
[459] e.g. Gruffudd 1544, p. 52. cf. 'The Siege and Capture of Boulogne', ed. J.H. Leslie, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 1/5 (1922), pp. 188-99.
[460] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 67.

'public sphere' and regard for soldierly reputation that was so important in Spanish military writing.

Unlike Spanish sources with their loyal repetition of Charles' *casus belli*, or English 'propagandistic' texts, Gruffudd did not incorporate the 'patriotic' rhetoric of the English commonwealth-in-arms, anti-French rhetoric, or support for England's wars into his military narrative or his depiction of the Tudor martial collective.[461] Though he occasionally hinted at his own militantly Protestant convictions, Gruffudd also made no effort to portray himself or the Tudor soldiery as religiously loyal- again, in contrast to the Spanish texts. It could be argued that Gruffudd's absence of authorial loyalty or martial ideology, and his disparagement of 'English' warriors, simply reflected his own Welsh identity. He wrote in Welsh and outside the specifically military sections narrating his own martial experiences studied here, Gruffudd's broader chronicle was influenced profoundly by his Welshness.[462] Within the passages under consideration, it is often ambiguous how far he used 'English' to refer specifically to English soldiers distinct from himself, or simply to troops in Tudor service. At points Gruffudd clearly distinguished between Welsh and English soldiers, and he maintained Welsh connections in the army.[463] Davies establishes that his account of the 1523 mutinies differed from Hall, the chronicler blaming both incidents of disobedience on the Welsh while Gruffudd emphasised that it was 'especially the men of Essex and Suffolk' who

[461] e.g. *Pasquyl of Rome*, ed. Joseph Hunter (London, 1851); Gruffudd 1544, p. 81. The phrase 'English' in this section as applied to the crown's army will be used to refer to the English and Welsh troops in Tudor service with whom the Welshman Gruffudd served.
[462] Huw Pryce, *Writing Welsh History* (Oxford, 2022), pp. 121-8. Gruffudd's national identities may have been influenced by contemporary constitutional changes of Wales within the Tudor monarchy: Susan Brigden, *New Worlds, Lost Worlds* (London, 2000), p. 169. On the cultures of Portuguese soldiers in Spanish service after their own country's annexation, see Miguel Dantas da Cruz, 'From Flanders to Pernambuco', *War in History*, 26/3 (July 2019), pp. 316-41. Gruffudd's chronicle remained untranslated until the modern era.
[463] e.g. Gruffudd 1523, p. 39, 37.

mutinied, complaining how the Englishmen 'put the whole blame on the Welshmen although there were twice as many Englishmen eager to turn home'.[464]

Yet Gruffudd's disparagement of 'English' soldiers was expressed not in national but in *military* terms, hence his occasional admission that 'the English soldiers did very gallantly' while at the siege of Montreuil Gruffudd admitted that 'I never saw Welshmen or Englishmen so badhearted and unventuresome', emphasising 'all the discomfort [i.e. cowardice] I saw among the Welshmen'.[465] Such honesty about the failings of his own Welsh countrymen as well as his English fellows, in stark contrast to the exclusively positive image of the Spanish infantry and negative picture of foreign military nations constructed by Cerezeda, reflects the true fulcrum of Gruffudd's identity in the military-focused passages under consideration in this thesis, and the true origin of his complaints- self-identifying not as a Welshman, but as a *soldier*.

Gruffudd's apparent lack of respect for chivalry, crown, or country was an important precondition of a theme with which he *was* preoccupied: critical depictions of English politico-military leadership. Whereas Spanish military writers presented the imperial army as an idealised, harmonious, and loyal martial community, Gruffudd had almost no respect for authority or his superiors. This is most obviously the case in his accusations of corruption against English logisticians. Though Cerezeda included food shortages and other hardships in his narrative, he did so to further praise the Spanish infantry for their steadfastness through suffering, and assiduously avoided blaming Charles' office-holders. Gruffudd, however, described tight rationing and high food prices to castigate his superiors.[466] Though Gruffudd's distaste for administrators like

[464] Gruffudd 1523, p. 33, 41, 35-6.
[465] Gruffudd 1523, p. 34; Gruffudd 1544, p. 71.
[466] Gruffudd 1544, p. 53.

Thomas Hussey or Wolsey likely reflected a soldier-civilian split, his disparagement of profiteering superiors extended to combat officers, of whom 'not one of them took any shame' out of subjecting their men to extortion.[467]

Yet beyond simple corruption, Gruffudd loathed his superiors as unfit for command.[468] In a complete inversion of Spanish military narratives, with their lavish praise for noble commanders and well-regarded *maestres de campo*, Gruffudd called the son of George Brooke, 9th Baron Cobham, Deputy of Calais (d.1558) 'the first to run away from the enemy' while accusing 'the lord [Thomas] Howard second son of the Duke of Norfolk' of 'beating and buffeting the poor soldiers, some of whom were sick and had neither boots nor stockings'.[469] Gruffudd likewise did not shy away from defaming the characters of individual Englishmen in office, like 'Sir John Fogge the Marshal [of Calais] who preferred to spend his time with a whore than with his wife. But he was not the only one who did this in Calais for it was common among most of the controllers of the realm'.[470] In contrast to the Spanish support for the strategies of imperial commanders, Gruffudd criticised England's 'intolerable loss of men and artillery' through incompetence and furiously castigated the operational 'neglect' of the King and Council.[471] This also reflected the expanding mental horizons of Renaissance soldier-writers in their consideration of command decisions and counterfactuals. Meanwhile, unlike Cerezeda or Ávila with their harmonious chains-of-command, Gruffudd acknowledged that 'there was not much love lost' between England's campaigning noblemen.[472]

---

[467] Gruffudd 1544, p. 68.
[468] Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 32-3, 35-6.
[469] Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 35-6.
[470] Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 83-4.
[471] Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 72-3; Gruffudd 1544, pp. 67-9.
[472] Gruffudd 1544, p. 47.

Gruffudd's lack of loyalty, ideological belief, or automatic respect for rank fits with his mockery of chivalric motifs. As such, it may hint at a broader anti-authoritarianism or even the development of a 'common soldier consciousness', such as with his narrative of how after the disaster at St Etienne in 1546, when a soldier defended himself from accusations of cowardice by claiming that his officers had fled first, 'the Earl [of Surrey] caused him to be hung the next morning with two or three of the poor soldiers, more for telling the truth about their Captains than anything they had done against the King'.[473] Gruffudd certainly sympathised with the commons.[474] Yet his subversive attitude to authority was part of his overarching deprecation of Tudor arms and rhetoric of 'martial decline', in which he inverted the ideal military perfection portrayed by his Spanish contemporaries, or the unified commonwealth-in-arms of English propagandists. As such, Gruffudd's lack of martial pride in, and dissatisfaction with, the 'English' military art extended to the moral and military shortcomings of the common soldiery. Whereas Cerezeda presented *nuestra infanteria* as an idealised band of brothers, Gruffudd described how some of his own fellows refused to let their fellows share the warmth of their fire, and blamed the financial misfortunes of English soldiers on their own poor behaviour.[475] As well as Gruffudd's far greater willingness to acknowledge mutiny, while Spanish writers invariably skipped over the depredations of their countrymen, Gruffudd admitted how the 'pitiless' Tudor army destroyed and plundered.[476]

Accordingly, in a complete inversion of Spanish military writing, Gruffudd not merely admitted but *emphasised* Tudor military shortcomings. His narrative was a

---

[473] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 43.
[474] e.g. Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 62-3, 84. For a politics- and class-based interpretation of this source's condemnation of Surrey, see Sessions, *Henry Howard*, pp. 319-29.
[475] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 80; Elis Gruffudd, 'Suffolk's Expedition to Montdider 1523', ed. M.B. Davies, *Fouad I University Bulletin of Faculty of Arts* 7 (1944), p. 40. [*hereafter 'Gruffudd 1523'*]
[476] Gruffudd 1523, p. 41, 79, 83-5.

dismal list of military failures and though Gruffudd occasionally memorialised the actions of individual fellow-soldiers, even this was a framing device for further disparagement of the Tudor army: thus, praising a brave cannoneer outside Montreuil, he wished that 'everyone there had done as much of his share', adding 'in reward for his enterprise, he was sent to prison for leaving the artillery'.[477] Describing the 'English' rout from a disastrous sally at Boulogne, Gruffudd criticised the Tudor troops as both 'ignorant' and 'cowardly' in gunpowder warfare and combined-arms formations.[478] Gruffudd also extensively criticised the incompetence as well as immorality of English soldiers off the battlefield.[479] While Spanish writers described inferior foreign troops to further praise their fellows and put praise for the Spanish infantry in the mouths of foreigners, Gruffudd portrayed foreign troops as superior to the Tudor army, quoting them criticising the 'English' as the antithesis of 'men strong in the art of war'.[480]

Gruffudd's overriding emphasis on the incompetence of Englishmen at war is also visible in his opinions on officership and command, in which he again expressed a comparable values system to Spanish soldier-writers but did so *in the negative*, portraying English officers as epitomising the worst, not the best, of the practical 'military art', as 'giddy and improvident' rather than 'generous, courteous, skilful, sensible'.[481] Like Nuñez Alba, Gruffudd deplored the financial and moral corruption and laziness of his officers, and equated morally poor officership with the suffering of 'the common soldiers', who 'were compelled to lie in the low country' by the selfish Calais officers, inverting the idealised bond of mutual loyalty between officer and soldiers.[482] Not only did Gruffudd admit that English 'people of spirit' deserted to the

[477] Gruffudd 1544, p. 70.
[478] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 41.
[479] Gruffudd 1544, pp. 83-5.
[480] Gruffudd 1544, p. 75, 71; Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 74.
[481] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 44.
[482] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 27.

French, he used it as another rhetorical device for damning the brutal English officers, who 'made them flee'.[483]

As well as immorality and selfishness, Gruffudd's negative matrix of honour of officership incorporated battlefield incompetence. Describing the disastrous resupply mission headed by the treasurer Hussey on the Boulogne campaign, Gruffudd called Hussey 'a man helpless and senseless', ignorant as an officer, and 'too…stubborn to learn from those who knew', quoting an allied imperial officer damning his leadership as 'unfitting a Captain of sense and learned in the ways of war'.[484] In constructing a negative matrix of honour of command, Gruffudd combined Hussey's lack of military-technical skill with his cowardice, describing how Hussey had to be forced into combat by one of his own soldiers.[485]

Gruffudd drew on other strands of the matrix of honour of practical command to criticise the Earl of Surrey not merely as uncaring for his men but as technically incompetent, blaming Surrey's defeat at St Etienne on his poor decisions stemming from his chivalric 'pride' as 'he wanted…glory for himself alone', describing how Surrey ignored advice from an officer to hold a trench and instead attacked with insufficient men 'in the pride of his folly'.[486] Gruffudd thus argued that the debacle was 'chiefly because of the Earl…whose head and heart were swollen with pride, arrogance and empty confidence in his own unreasoning bravery', clearly comparable to Ávila's description of the Margrave Albert.[487] This parable, in its dichotomy between force and reason, is also uncannily redolent- albeit in reverse- of Guzmán's claim that he ignored the same pleas from a more experienced subordinate not to attack a superior force. Just

[483] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 21.
[484] Gruffudd 1544, pp. 60-3, 64.
[485] Gruffudd 1544, p. 63.
[486] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 39, 40-1.
[487] Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 42-3.

as Guzmán described proudly how he triumphed despite the naysaying of his more rational, timid soldier, Gruffudd's rejection of Surrey's irrational chivalric pride demonstrates the deepening gulf between the traditional value system of the individualistic noble knight, and the new culture of practical military 'reason' which reviled excessive bravery almost as much as cowardice.

Gruffudd also hinted more positively at emerging concepts of the ideal officer in English military theory- and further demonstrated that he criticised his superiors on rational grounds of military competence, not Anglophobia or general anti-authoritarianism- in his positive treatment of two English professional officers at Boulogne, Lords Clinton (1512-1585) and Poynings (d.1545).[488] Just as Spanish soldier-writers praised captains willing to share the hardships of their subordinates, Gruffudd recorded how Clinton 'ran into danger', 'played his part like a brave and noble Captain by risking his life among his soldiers', 'courteously thanking and rewarding those soldiers who did any brave deeds…thus he was greatly beloved among all ranks'.[489] He combined this with praise for Clinton's practical military skills, sealing up threatened breaches and organising effective raids.[490] Likewise, Gruffudd portrayed Poynings as 'an experienced man of great purpose and design in the art of war' for having 'proved his craft' through cunning as well as bravery, reputed among England's soldiery as 'the best soldier under the King and the most skilful in accomplishing things'.[491]

Thus, Gruffudd's rejection of both chivalric ideals and the new English martial patriotism was an essential precondition for his highly negative picture of English

---

[488] 'Clinton, Edward Fiennes de, first earl of Lincoln', and 'Poynings, Thomas, first Baron Poynings', *DNB*. For these men's positions in the English military-dynastic establishment in France, see Neil Murphy, *The Tudor Occupation of Boulogne* (Cambridge, 2019), pp. 174-5.
[489] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 69.
[490] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 70.
[491] Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 10-1.

armies, which stemmed ultimately from concerns of strictly military competence. The inherently military aspect of Gruffudd's authorial voice as an expert common soldier was further reflected in his disdain for peaceful men and professions.[492] Gruffudd's criticism of declining military engagement among the gentry resembled Nuñez Alba's perverse glorification of the hardships of military life, complaining how they preferred peaceable, comfortable careers to 'the hardships of wind and rain, heat and cold and frost, to be ready early and late to serve and achieve honour and glory for the King and his realm'- deploying national pride to bolster the inherent superiority of martial over civilian professions.[493] Gruffudd's hatred for Hussey cited his non-military background, and his dismissal of Hussey as 'a fat-bellied lump of a man, big in body and authority, lacking in sense and a coward at heart to lead men of war' hinted at an intersection between the physical body, civilian attributes, military manhood, and inner cowardice that would recur in English military writing throughout the century.[494]

However, though Gruffudd revealed a typical 'soldier-civilian' split in his derision for soft men of peace, he did *not* simply deem anyone under arms a 'soldier'. Gruffudd claimed that during the 1523 mutinies, when the wavering army was told that supplies were coming, 'the news was well-received by the gentlemen of England and those men of the common soldiers who had set their minds on being men of war'. However, he claimed that it was received badly by men 'thinking of their wives and children and husbandry and those cowardly men with base hearts who would rather go home to their mothers and fathers, some to plough and thresh…and live niggardly'. Here, Gruffudd hinted at a much more complex picture of the 'soldier' than simply an armed man, considering warfare a chosen profession for some men, and a conscripted

[492] e.g. Gruffudd 1544, p. 79; Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 75-6.
[493] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 27.
[494] Gruffudd 1544, p. 60; cf. Guzmán, *Vida*, p. 67.

duty for other, lesser individuals, ascribing 'soldier' status only to the first and softness and effeminacy to the latter.[495] He thus derided newly drafted levies sent to Boulogne as civilians-under-arms, 'milk bellies', in contrast to 'valiant soldiers' accustomed to hard living.[496] As well as hardiness, Gruffudd equated veteran status as a 'true' soldier with military skill and diligence; he made it clear that only some of the Boulogne garrison in 1544 were true soldiers, recording how the slaughter of novice English troops by the Dauphin's raid on the poorly-defended lower town could have been prevented had there 'been one man of experience there'.[497] Ultimately, Gruffudd encapsulated this idea that 'soldier' status was not automatically commensurate with bearing arms but was linked to physical traits or to experience in summarising Tudor levies as 'the palest and weakest and the least able to look after themselves that ever came out of England till then under the name of soldiers. They were too wretched in body and too weak in sense to be soldiers'.[498]

Thus, Gruffudd hinted at a matrix of honour by which he qualified true soldiers, clearly comparable to the Spanish *soldado platico* as antithesis of the ignorant, novice *bisoño*, combining professionalism with outer strength, inner fortitude, experience, and the practical skills to survive on campaign. He clearly self-fashioned as a 'soldier' in doing so; Gruffudd stressed his own knowledge of campaign survival techniques and his interminable criticisms clearly implied that he himself was qualified to judge military skill and practice.[499] Gruffudd recounted with rhetorical outrage how 'when a veteran began to talk of the friendship, the comradeship, the good order there was

[495] Gruffudd 1523, pp. 39-40. In a similar association between masculinity and martiality- particularly common in English sources- Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 24 complained of 'unmanly' recruits, and Gruffudd 1544, p. 91, used castration as a metaphor for defeat. cf. e.g. Googe, *Eglogs*…, sig. E.ii.v.
[496] Gruffudd 1544, p. 89.
[497] Gruffudd 1544, p. 90; Murphy, *Boulogne*, p. 60.
[498] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 27.
[499] Gruffudd 1523, p. 40.

among soldiers and men of war' in the early Henrician campaigns, 'then those squires or rascals arrogant, vain reckless, ignorant in their behaviour' would say 'now we must listen to an old man of the King's…so that he can talk of his exploits at Therouanne and Tournai'. Gruffudd clearly implied his own veteran status here, casting himself like Nuñez Alba as the cantankerous, but experienced and expert, old warhorse, and in his nostalgic tone, hinted at the importance of inter-generational differences, as well as the usual *topos* of declining standards in early modern martial culture.[500]

More important in Gruffudd's self-fashioning as a professional, expert soldier, however, was his engagement with military-technical knowledge. Relating Hussey's disastrous operation Gruffudd described the mistakes he made in detail, with Hussey ignoring intelligence reports and relative strengths of his force and the enemy's, impatiently proceeding with his march and moving his column in poor formation, 'everyone out of order', instead of following how it 'should' have been arranged.[501] Gruffudd thus engaged with the emerging matrix of honour of the 'perfect Captain'- patience, effective battlefield formation, and listening to intelligence, reason, and advice- and in doing so, implicitly fashioned himself as a judge of appropriate military practice. In this respect, Grummitt identifies that by the 1540s, commanders of the Calais garrison were judged less by personal prowess-at-arms or 'chivalric reputation', than by their practical and administrative skill, as part of the contemporary 'underlying sense of generalship, of field management of an art form' so clearly visible in Cerezeda or Ávila's texts.[502]

[500] Gruffudd 1545-50, p. 75.
[501] Gruffudd 1544, pp. 60-1.
[502] Grummitt, *Calais Garrison*, p. 111.

This was part of Gruffudd's broader interest in technical military practice, discussing artillery emplacement, sappers, light guns, and mines as well as the movement of troops in the field.[503] Like his Spanish counterparts, Gruffudd revealed the expanding horizons of military writing and self-fashioned as an expert soldier in his consideration of military counterfactuals, elaborating with reference to a French attack on Calais the different tactical ploys that could have averted disaster, 'if the English Captains had been prudent and sensible'.[504] Gruffudd's shockingly negative picture of the Tudor army was the authorial voice not of a Welshman or a disgruntled commoner but what his Spanish counterparts called a *soldado platico viejo.* Though the uniqueness of the text prevents using it to construct a general paradigm of Henrician soldiers, it is striking how far Gruffudd's disdain for knightly bravery, his sense of professional military identity based on experience of war rather than noble status, and his practical concepts of tactics and command parallel the Spanish texts studied above. Moreover, though Gruffudd's main interest was criticising perceived failings, by the middle decades of the century, some of his fellow 'English' professional soldiers had begun prescribing solutions.

iv. English Military Theory to 1567

In the opening years of the century, English warriors already had access to some basic military literature. The fifteenth century saw considerable interest in military writing, including manuscript translations of Vegetius, with some basic adaptations for contemporary politico-military contexts.[505] Traditional military texts, like the *Faits d'Armes* of Pisan printed at Henry VII's command, had already appeared

[503] Gruffudd 1544, p. 58, 71-2, 63.
[504] Gruffudd 1545-50, pp. 31-2.
[505] Phillips, *Anglo-Scots Wars*, p. 88; Catherine Nall, *Reading and War in Fifteenth-Century England* (Cambridge, 2012), p. 2; Allmand, *The* De Re Militari, pp. 185-193.

in print by 1500, offering the potential of reaching a much wider audience than the 'leading landowners' who commissioned military manuscripts.[506] Early links between military professionalism and military literature are visible in the sphere of gunnery with the production of standardised training manuscripts by the 'Servitor Gunners', part of the gunnery community interpreted by Raymond as proof of the Henrician 'process of professionalisation and modernisation'.[507]

In his 1539 translation of Frontinus' 'stratagems, sleights and policies of war', Richard Morison claimed that 'the noble capitaynes of England, have oft declared, that they lytell nede any instructions, any bokes, to teach them to towse their enemies'.[508] Gunn rules this 'humanist exaggeration', and though this is undoubtedly correct, such exaggeration would nonetheless have required plausibility in its description of English military culture as largely uninvolved in military literature.[509] However, the middle decades of the century would see the small but steady growth of English military print culture. Morison's Frontinus was joined by translations of Jacopo di Portia and Giovio's commentary on the Turks- including 'the araye and discipline of the Turkysh warfare'- as well as Whitehorne's Onosander, expressly to propagate the 'science' of warfare 'for the common utilitie of my countrymen, who delyte in warlike skilfulnes'.[510] Peter Betham's advice that warriors, like 'phisitians and astronymers', should 'come to theyr knowleadge' by reading, together with 'helpe of them, that have bene in warres' also

[506] Nall, *Reading and War*, pp. 161-2; Christine de Pisan, *The boke of the fayt of armes* (Westminster: William Caxton, 1489), explicit.
[507] Phillips, *Anglo-Scots Wars*, p. 89; Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution*, p. 179.
[508] Frontinus, tr. Richard Morison, *The Strategemes, sleyghtes and policies of warre* (London, 1539), sig. a.v.r. This text further showed Morison's propagandistic martial patriotism under threat of invasion: Sowerby, *Renaissance and Reform*, pp. 107-9. On the specific military and geopolitical contexts and influences of this and other classical military translations, see Fred Schurink, 'War, what is it good for?', in S.K. Barber and Brenda M. Hosington (eds.), *Renaissance Cultural Crossroads* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 121-38.
[509] Gunn, *English People*, p. 63.
[510] Peter Betham, *The precepts of warre* (London, 1544); Peter Ashton, *A Shorte Treatise upon the Turkes Chronicles* (London, 1546), cover; Onosander, tr. Peter Whitehorne, *Onosandro Platonico, of the Generall Captaine* (London, 1563), fo. 41r., Aiii.v.

reflected an embryonic sense of the value of military study, and in comparing war to other learned vocations, professionalised it.[511] Morison's Frontinus*,* meanwhile, already exemplified the basic *raison d'être* of Renaissance military theory, the link between intellect and warfare, reminding the reader that 'many mor[e] fieldes have ben lost for lacke of polycie, than for wante of strength', and arguing for the need 'both warely to invente new polycies, and wysely to use the olde'.[512] Morison also initiated the idea of military theory as itself a form of national service, claiming that as 'present occasion requireth martiall feates to be knowen', he produced his treatise 'to serve my countreye'.[513]

In 1562, this small field was augmented by the appearance, three decades after its Spanish counterpart, of Peter Whitehorne's translation of Machiavelli's *Art of War.*[514] Whitehorne made no effort to update or adapt the text for the English context, but appended his own pamphlet on 'orderyng of Souldiers in battelray'. This contained ample detail on mathematically regulated infantry formations, hinted at the interoperability of arquebus and melee infantry, touched upon the Sergeant as a dedicated rank for deployment of formations, and hinted at formation training.[515] Along with infantry formations, Whitehorne- who had served with Habsburg forces in North Africa, and apparently studied Ottoman military practice in Constantinople- discussed other key motifs of Renaissance military theory: the revolutionary *trace italienne,* 'the most perfect fations [sic] that any strong fortresse is possible to bee made', artillery, and explosives.[516] Unlike some of his Elizabethan successors, however, Whitehorne rejected

[511] Betham, *Precepts*, sig. a.vii.v.
[512] Morison, *Strategemes*, sig. iiii.v.-v.r.
[513] Morison, *Stratagemes*, sig. a.iii.r., a.iiii.v.
[514] Machiavelli, tr. Peter Whitehorne, *The Arte of Warre* (London, 1562), published with appendix, *Certain waies for the orderyng of Souldiers in battelray*.
[515] Whitehorne, *Orderyng of Souldiers*, e.g. fo. 4v., e.g. 2v., e.g. 12v.
[516] Whitehorne, *Orderyng of Souldiers*, fo. 20v. 33-4*,* 21-7; 'Whitehorne [Whithorne], Peter', *DNB.*

the notion that artillery would have prevented the Romans from achieving their 'mightie conquestes' and argued that despite the coming of firearms, men could still 'shew their strenghth and vertue, as they might in olde time'.[517] His conclusion, that 'artillerie is profitable in an armie, when the aunciente vertue is mingled therewith', displayed an awareness of emerging technologies but a continued focus on the classical past that would subtly change with the more consciously and explicitly modern, innovative mentalities of later English soldier-writers.[518]

Meanwhile, the most significant aspects of English military theory that anticipate post-1567 developments were most clearly visible in the mid-century not in print, but in three overlapping but distinct manuscript treatises. The first was authored by Thomas Audley in the final year of Henry's reign to instruct the young Prince in 'orders of men for the warres' and updated in the first year of Mary's reign.[519] The second, attributed in different surviving copies either to Audley or one Robert Hare, is dated by Raymond to the late Henrician period.[520] Finally, a treatise survives from 1562 by Henry Barrett, which focused on the same basic themes as the previous texts and has been placed by Hale in the context of the mid-century drive for militia reform, as well as the constitution of an army in 1562 to aid the Huguenots.[521] Given the significant overlaps and recurring preoccupations of this small but important manuscript body, Cruickshank posits that together they represent surviving versions of a 'great Tudor military book', and Hale suggests that these theorists were 'picking and choosing from

[517] Whitehorne, *Orderyng of Souldiers*, fo. 32v.
[518] Whitehorne, *Orderyng of Souldiers*, fo. 41v.
[519] Version cited here is 'A treatise on the Art of War', ed. W.St.P. Bunbury, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 6/24 (1927), pp. 65-78, contd. 6/25 (1927), pp. 129-33. [*hereafter 'Audley'*]. The updated version is in Oxford, Bodleian MS Tanner, 103.
[520] Version cited here is Oxford, Bodleian MS Rawlinson, D.363, 'A Treatise of Military Discipline', [*hereafter 'Text B'*] after Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution*, p. 10. This thesis will not engage with questions of authorship.
[521] J.R. Hale, 'On a Tudor Parade Ground', in *Renaissance War Studies*, pp. 247-84. [*hereafter 'Barrett'*]

and adding to a body of manuscript material' from the broader military public sphere.[522] Audley himself consciously engaged with a broader culture of military discussion and debate, modestly saying that there were 'other men of more experience & knowledge' and recommending his royal reader seek 'diverse mens opinions, as well strangers as Englishmen'.[523]

The importance of Audley's text is greatly magnified by his own status in the Tudor military public sphere. Audley had an extensive military career and enjoyed considerable reputation among England's professional captains, being praised by the highly-esteemed gentleman 'military professional' and fellow member of the Calais garrison during the intense 1540s, Sir John Wallop (d.1551), for his uniquely 'good understanding and knowledge' of war, especially as he 'can very well set a nombre of men in order from one thousand unto ten and upward hardly to be amendyd'.[524] Gruffudd considered Audley a rare 'soldier of renown'.[525] An annotation on the version of 'Text B' credited to Audley gave him an even more ringing collective endorsement, claiming that all of 'our best soldiors of that time termed him their father, and father of the English soldiorie'.[526]

Crucially, a poem praising Audley, attributed to the mid-Elizabethan soldier-writer Thomas Churchyard, eulogised Audley for his wisdom as well as his bravery, and praised him as a 'mastere' of soldiers, 'a tutour to thignorant, a fathere to them all,/He tought them how how to lede there men as cheyfe and principall'- an important incorporation of skill in *teaching* military theory, as well as command skill in general,

---

[522] Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution*, pp. 11-12; Hale, 'Tudor Parade Ground', p. 264.
[523] Audley, p. 65.
[524] Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution*, p. 9; Sir John Wallop to Council, 16th Aug. 1542, TNA, SP 1/172, fo. 109. Grummitt, *Calais Garrison*, pp. 108-9, 113, identifies both Audley and Wallop as members of a new mid-Tudor class of professional Captains whose value lay not in individual prowess but multifaceted command ability.
[525] Gruffudd, 1545-50, p. 73.
[526] Text B, fo. 1v.

into the matrix of honour of an outstanding officer.[527] Henry Barrett belonged to the Yeomen of the Guard, part of England's skeletal network of professional soldiers, which Hale believes was a 'crack corps' modelling military drills.[528] Both men were thus, like the Elizabethan military writers who would succeed them, members of England's burgeoning community of professional soldiers.

Though Audley and 'Text B' predated the English translation of *Arte della Guerra*, all three texts paralleled Machiavelli in their systematic picture of military organisation, fascination with well-laid-out army camps as epitomes of military perfection, and classical references. This could be interpreted as signalling the texts as unrealistic or purely contemplative, an impression encouraged by their ambitious battlefield tactics and unrealistically-sized formations.[529] However, their systematic picture of command, logistics, and discipline, as well as the absence of individual agency or chivalric honour of soldiers, signals them as rational, practical texts. The authors emphasised their use of contemporary military practices, Audley formulating his tactics from 'the latter ende of the last warre' (i.e. the capture and defence of Boulogne) and Barrett warning that 'the practises of the warres doth daylie alter and chaunge to the greate perill of the ignorante'.[530] This conscious attention to military modernity included modern fieldwork and fortification, not 'according to the thopinion of olde', but 'as we use now' with bastions and artillery.[531] The authors themselves expected their texts to be taken seriously as an 'A.B.C. to warre' based on 'my doings

[527] Matthew Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard* (Oxford, 2016), pp. 52-5.
[528] MacMahon, 'Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army', pp. 192-3; Hale, 'Tudor Parade Ground', p. 264. Anita Hewerdine, *The Yeomen of the Guard* (London, 2012), p. 79 points out Barrett's own declaration of benefitting from experience in foreign armies, and similarly believes that Guard membership may have reflected combat skill.
[529] Text B, fo. 32r.; Barrett, p. 271.
[530] Audley, p. 70; Barrett, p. 271.
[531] Audley, p. 74.

and knowledge'.[532] Just as Spanish military theory evolved in the crucible of Italy, Audley was clearly heavily influenced by the complex and technically innovative campaigns of the 1540s in writing his treatise; as Wallop would comment to Henry VIII in 1543, there had never been 'such a war where there was so much for the youth to learn'.[533]

In their treatment of infantry 'bands', the treatises show the same overriding 'drive to regulate' as their plans for army organisation, Audley arguing that 'all good captains' must have a Lieutenant, an Ensign, a 'sergeant of the band', four vinteners with 25 men each and musicians, 'the mouth of the captain'.[534] Beyond general points of logistics and organisation, all three manuscripts drew attention to the urgent and very practical issues of infantry *formation*, as 'division [of] weapons and placing of them is the chief strength of all Battailes both on horseback and on foot'. Audley accordingly promised infantry and cavalry formations 'for a soldier to begynne with' and provided detailed instructions on setting regulated formations of mixed infantry types, reducing men into rigid, formalised shapes without freedom to choose their own place or weapon.[535] Barrett's text, meanwhile, is viewed by Hale as a 'uniquely practical answer to the needs of the time' in its willingness to 'stick to the local parade ground', and not veer off into army-level manoeuvres, morality or antiquity, or even esoteric or unrealistic infantry formations.[536]

Significantly, the 'Tudor military book' understood by the mid-century the revolutionary importance of combined-arms formations, though Audley even warned

---

[532] Bodleian Tanner MS 103; Audley, p. 65.
[533] Sessions, *Henry Howard*, p. 293. Phillips, *Anglo-Scots Wars*, pp. 256-7 likewise stresses the exposure of English troops to the techniques of the 'military revolution' in the late 1540s.
[534] Audley, p. 72. This early focus on formalised unit hierarchy may have been encouraged by the hierarchical structure of the Calais garrison: Grummitt, *Calais Garrison*, p. 113.
[535] Audley, pp. 66-8.
[536] Hale, 'Tudor Parade Ground', p. 255.

'many times it hath been seen that battle hath been gotten by shott onlie'.[537] Audley specifically envisaged the 'square and sleeve' model of pike-and-shot, 'for the covering of the weak flankes two sleves…as many rankes of them as be in the flankes of the Bodie of the Battell'. He stressed the interoperability of pike-and-shot detachments, and hinted at differing professional opinions and an awareness of evolving continental tactics in adding that some commanders 'set within the first Rank of Pykes one Ranke of harkebusses…also some useth to place the shot, that shall assaile there enymes like two sleves streight out at ii. corners of the Battell'.[538] In this regard, it is significant that Wallop focused his praise on Audley's skill in 'setting' men, further reflecting the importance of regulated infantry formations in the military transformations of the mid-century and the matrix of honour of officership.

Text B likewise envisaged standardised pike-and-shot formations in 'quadrant proporcion' and 'winges sleves and lynes' set by the 'Great Sergeant', with tightly controlled shot 'sleeve' detachments able to 'lerne to showt, skyrmysh and retier' in mutual support.[539] Barrett argued for the importance of shot integrated into the band for organisation but detachable for skirmish in 'wings', taught to 'marshe, invaide towardes thennymyes…retyer in pollitike manner, still their faces towardes the incounter'- with this sense of regulating which way the soldiers were physically pointing prefiguring important aspects of bodily discipline in post-1567 texts.[540]

Moreover, these texts hinted at collective training under supervision of professionalised, skilled, and dutiful officers. Audley expected Captains to train their

[537] Audley, pp. 66-8.
[538] Audley, p. 130. The former option may echo a technique used at Ceresole. Massimo Predonzani and Simon Miller, *The Battle of Ceresole* (Warwick, 2022), p. 98.
[539] Text B, fo. 8r.-v., 28r., 30r.-31v.
[540] Barrett, p. 284.

men in formation deployment.[541] Text B stressed the role of group musters for training as well as discipline and included in the matrix of honour of the ideal captain the duty of training men in formation manoeuvres and weapon handling. Arquebus officers were expected to 'teach them to charge and dyscharge, to march and retyer in good dystaunc[e]' and 'ymbattell them', while officers of pikes should 'teach the souldiers sometymes to push, traile & order the same…to muster, march, retyer and ymbattell'- significantly, the first three orders referred to individual postures, but the latter four to group formation drills.[542] Sergeants and Lieutenants were expected to practise 'by musters, embattling, marching and retiring until they be perfect', and teach the company 'the soundes of the drommes and fyffes, which warneth as the mouthes of men…to marshe, muster, convey…'.[543]

As well as the expectation that professional officers should 'marshe, train and instruct' their men, Audley's ideal of officership echoed Gruffudd in conflating low morals and corruption among officers with low military skill.[544] In choosing who should receive charge, Audley hinted at emerging ideas of meritocratic promotion as well as simple class status in instructing that Captains should give junior officer positions to 'some young gentlemen' *or* 'some worthie souldiers', just as he instructed in his regulations for setting the night watch in camp that the watch-word should be provided to the 'hedde officers' but *also* to 'all Earles Barons & such other like', implying noble and professional military qualifications, and chains of command, in parallel.[545]

However, he echoed the same anxieties about meritocratic promotion common to professional soldiers throughout the century in stressing that men granted double pay-

[541] Audley, p. 69.
[542] Text B, fo. 3r., 4r.
[543] Text B, fo. 5r.; Barrett, p. 282.
[544] Barrett, p. 278; Audley, p. 69.
[545] Audley, p. 72, 75.

a contemporary technique for rewarding, and retaining, good infantrymen, paralleled by the Spanish *ventajo*- must have 'strength and experience, and not to choose them as captaynes be chosen in England by favor and not by worthynes' as otherwise 'we shall never be strong in the felde'.[546] In all this, the manuscripts prefigured Elizabethan military theory, as did Audley's instructions that officers have a duty to look after their men's victual, medical, and spiritual needs as well as study the 'good Order and Knowledge' of war.[547] Audley stressed the importance of accruing proper military skill before aspiring to command, and modestly wrote 'not because I think myself worthie to be a Captaine nor yet a souldier for…knowledge be not in me yet it is in some other', a *topos* of stressing the high volume of skill required to be a 'true' professional warrior which would become very common after 1567.[548] Text B offered a comprehensive matrix of honour and duties for each rank, expecting Captains both to train their men and diligently look after them, and requiring Ensigns to combine self-sacrifice and zeal 'unto his prince and countrye' with being an 'able personage' to govern soldiers.[549] Significantly, Text B also included in the matrix of honour of officership the requirement to be a technically proficient professional, qualified to put their company into 'broad' or 'square' battle, 'devyse…in tymes of nede' other formations, but also to heed 'any souldier speakinge of experience & discreet pollecy, regarding and advauncing them'.[550] Barrett, likewise, constructed his ideal Captain combining loyalty to Prince, willingness to both look after and instruct soldiers, listening to 'counsaile of the experte soldiers' and above all, 'sapiente goverment' in the art of war.[551]

[546] Audley, p. 69; on double pay, see Parrott, *Business of War*, p. 50.
[547] Audley, pp. 69-72.
[548] Audley, p. 69.
[549] Text B, fo. 2v., 4v.
[550] Text B, fo. 10v., 12r.
[551] Barrett, pp. 272-3.

Meanwhile, the manuscript authors offered a very different picture of the rank-and-file, revealing a widening gulf between the components of the ideal officer, and those of the common soldier 'submerged' into tight discipline in and out of battlefield formation. Like Gruffudd they implied that status as a 'soldier' was not automatic, and men must 'by the sapiente government, diligent trayninge and instructinge of captaines be converted and brought to the order and worthie name of soldiers'. Barrett thus outlined the practical and moral qualifications of a soldier (six passive points: silence, obedience, 'secrett', sobriety, hardiness, and truth) and ruled that 'any offendinge to the contrary ys not worthie that noble name'.[552] However, though they included considerable duties for the common soldier, Tudor military theorists ultimately expected him to be a de-individualised subordinate. In contrast to the extensive skills and duties required of officers, Text B simply wanted soldiers to have the passive attributes of 'silence', 'obedyence' and 'trewthe'.[553] None of the manuscripts devoted any attention to the bravery or personal ability of individual soldiers, and though they expected knowledge and military expertise, their overriding preoccupation was that soldiers 'be obedient' and follow martial law.[554] At the simplest level this was expressed in their extensive disciplinary regulations; as Barrett summarised, to discipline and punish as well as reward the soldiery was an important part of an officer's duties, to be 'bothe loved and feared'.[555] The manuscripts echoed Gruffudd's anxieties about the low moral character of common soldiers, Text B expecting officers to ensure the men 'live an honest syvell catholike and Chrystian life' without blasphemy or 'excesseve drinking'.[556]

[552] Barrett, p. 273, 280-1.
[553] Text B, fols. 6v.-7r.
[554] Text B, fo. 12r.-v., 2v.
[555] Barrett, p. 272.
[556] Text B, fo. 12r.-v.

Disciplinary regulations also extended to more practical aspects of military life, the camp envisaged as a tightly controlled, perfect military world with day-to-day life regulated by provosts and written licences.[557] Crucially, this 'drive to regulate' reflected not only anxieties of licentious soldiery, but the reduction of the soldier to an anonymous fighting unit in a tightly regulated formation. Barrett ordered soldiers be punished not only for untidy living or pillaging, but also for failing to learn their signals and manoeuvres or not maintaining their weapons.[558] The manuscripts even argued for the regulation of the physical posture of weapon handling.[559] Barrett envisaged that each weapon posture should be modelled by the Sergeant, 'the company standinge still geveth silence, and accordinge to every signe by him framed doo the lyke'.[560] Whitehorne, similarly, envisaged that as part of his infantry formation drill, soldiers will 'all…turne with their faces that waie' when signalled by their officer.[561] Mid-century theorists also hinted at another key preoccupation of their Elizabethan successors in their use of continental models, Audley basing his instructions on German and Spanish troops 'expert in the warres' and Barrett and Whitehorne both emphasising their experience of continental military practice.[562]

Finally, as well as calls for army reform, expert officers, and trained pike-and-shot forces, the preoccupations of post-1567 English military theory were also foreshadowed by the early appearance of another key strand of Tudor military thought: the urgent need for military reform in the specific context of English national defence and invasion threats. The rhetoric of the Protestant commonwealth-in-arms as well as

[557] Text B, fo. 15-6; Barrett, p. 278.
[558] Barrett, pp. 282-3.
[559] Text B, fols. 3r.-4r.
[560] Barrett, p. 274, 277.
[561] Whitehorne, *Orderyng of Souldiers*, fo. 13r.
[562] Audley, p. 133; Barrett, p. 252; Whitehorne, *Arte of Warre*, fo. Aiii.r.-v.; Audley, p. 133 referred to the beginning of Charles' reign 'when…the Spanyardes were not so expert in the warres as they be now'.

the very real need to combat potential invasion led to calls for a moral renewal of English martial virtue, but also very practical military reform. Audley justified his opinions through fear of invasion, and in 1537 Cromwell had proposed a standing force 'ever yn a redynes for the defence of this realme' with daily pay 'yn the tyme of peace as of warre' for training.[563] The Edwardian years saw a proposal for a trained militia force by an apparent circle of military-intellectual discussion including Sir Thomas Wyatt the younger (d.1554) and Leonard Digges, while in the Marian period 'articles devised for the manner of musteringe' proposed the appointment of a dedicated, expert 'muster mayster'.[564]

Especially revealing of the state of English military thought by the mid-century, and foreshadowing developments post-1567, was a proposal for militia reform very early in Elizabeth's reign, for 'the maintenance, exercise and training of a convenient numb[er] of English men….for the ready defence of this realm'.[565] The text warned of England's military vulnerability, and of the necessity of 'the maintenance and increase of good soldiers' as a strategic resource, not least to underline the dire importance of its own reforming precepts.[566] Though the treatise also called for a cavalry force of re-militarised gentry, it primarily envisaged a standing infantry force trained and equipped to continental standards. As well as the usual 'drive to regulate', the text emphasised the importance 'especially' of arquebusiers and 'the armed pike' 'well trained and exercised'.[567] The text further echoed contemporary English military theory in the conflation of veteran status and skill in the matrix of honour of officers, 'praise-

[563] Audley, p. 69; Lawrence Stone, 'The Political Programme of Thomas Cromwell', in *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 24/69 (1951), pp. 1-18.
[564] Stone, *Crisis of the Aristocracy*, pp. 206-7; Charles Cruickshank, *Army Royal* (Oxford, 1969), pp. 193-4; Hale, 'Tudor Parade Ground', p. 248. Wyatt commanded troops with distinction in France in the 1540s, and Digges visited wartime Calais. 'Wyatt, Sir Thomas', and 'Digges, Leonard', *DNB.*
[565] London, British Library, MS Lansdowne 1225/3, 'A Brief Discourse'.
[566] Lansdowne 1225/3, fo. 42r.-v., 49r.
[567] Lansdowne 1225/3, fo. 49r., 46r.-47v., 42v.

shaming' how English officers were 'young and raw', 'whereby the blind must leade the blinde', while veterans were 'regarded and approved' in other states.[568] The idea that soldierly status must be earned was also present, with armed men undeserving of 'the name…EXCERCITUS unless it be of exercised soldiers'.[569] The military-technical model envisaged was 'as behoveth soldiers these 40 years' (i.e. since c.1520), and the author thus rejected the longbow as 'the forces of all princes, consisteth in horse, pike and harquebusiers'.[570] Reform was especially necessary due to the gulf between English and continental practice in the distinctive 'revolutionary' technologies of gunpowder infantry warfare, as English troops had 'not experienced the join of the pike against the foreign nations…and of our arquebusiers there has been no tryall butt of late at Lyeth…[where] there were almost as many of yo[ur] soldiers hurte and killed by their own unskilfulness…as were slaine by the Enemy', quoting the claim of the German military theorist Lazarus von Schwendi (1522-1583) that 'we never use any warlike discipline'.[571] This 'capability gap' was combined with appeals to Tudor 'martial patriotism', the author hoping that every 'true Englishman' would happily sustain a trained militia, so 'our nation…may nott now be inferior unto others, and loose oure old Renowne for Valiantness'.[572] All of these themes- the drive for technical reform on the continental model of pike-and-shot infantry and professionalism, perhaps influenced by England's intense mid-century campaigns, linked with concerns of national defence and the drive to create a trained English military community- would come to define English military print culture in the coming decades, but had already emerged in the tactical, technical, political, and ideological contexts of the Henrician and mid-Tudor period.

---

[568] Lansdowne 1225/3, fols. 44v.-45v.
[569] Lansdowne 1225/3, fo. 43r.
[570] Lansdowne 1225/3, fo. 42v., 49r., 50v.
[571] Lansdowne 1225/3, fo. 44v., 45r. On the English debacle at Leith, see Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars*, p. 61; Beatrice Heuser, *Strategy before Clausewitz* (London, 2017), pp. 141-9.
[572] Lansdowne 1225/3, fo. 47r., 49r.

Conclusion to Part I

The development of Spanish and English martial culture over the first half of the century can be further illuminated with reference to two case studies, constructions of military perfection in panegyrics to individual middle-ranked commanders, both of which reveal how a 'matrix' could be constructed of multiple themes of martial identity. Describing the death of *Maestre de Campo* Francisco de Pedreras in Piedmont in 1542, Cerezeda drew on recognisable images of physical strength and loyalty through suffering to memorialise and exalt him as an outstanding member of the Spanish infantry collective. The officer is bravely and prudently leading a reconnaissance operation when he is shot 'and fell to the ground. But as a person of such spirit he soon rose'. Yet Cerezeda also depicted him as the ideal officer in his close ties to both his subordinates and superiors, and in continuing his duties, showing developing ideas of formalised rank as well as effective command:

> Seeing that the artillery had not arrived…he ordered the Sergeant-Major that he recall the troops and return to Chieri, the troops bearing such inconsolable sadness in bringing with them the *Maestre de Campo* so badly wounded…he ordered that Captain Miguel have charge of the men and all else that fell to a *Maestre de Campo*, until the Marques del Vasto filled the position at his will.

Displaying the characteristic language of piety that coloured the moral and martial identities of Spanish soldiers, Cerezeda described solemnly how 'in death he showed himself to be God-fearing', atoning for his sins before 'he was buried with great triumph'.[573] This mixture of physical bravery, diligent command, personal piety, and

[573] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, III.70. (*del cual golpe cayó en tierra. Mas como persona de tanto ánimo se leventa prestamente…viese que no habia llegado el artillería…manda al sargento mayor que recogiese la gente y se tornasen á Chieri, la cual gente traia consigo tanta tristeza que no se podian consolar en traer á su Maese de campo tan mal ferido…tomando su parecer manda que el capitan Miguel tuviese el cargo de la gente y lo demas que tocaba al Maese de campo, hasta que el Marqués del Vasto proveyese á su voluntad del cargo del Maese de campo… Por cierto, en la muerte mostró ser temeroso de Dios…con gran triunfo fué sepultado*)

reputation within the *tercio* micro-society was typical of how Cerezeda's text sought to idealise the officers and men with whom he served.

An unusually detailed English evocation of the emerging 'matrix of honour' of command is found in the 'commentary of the services and charges' of William Grey, 13th Baron Grey de Wilton (1508/9-1562), by his son Arthur (1536-1593), lavishly recording Grey's military experiences in France and Scotland.[574] Especially important is how the text emphasised not only Grey's physical deeds, but his skill and experience as a commander, and the particular commands he held over his career as a quasi-professional Captain in England's mid-century wars. In this respect, Davies defines Grey as a member, 'though of a higher social class than most', of the distinct 'professional cadre' that emerged in the intense wars of the 1540s and continued to define the 'professional Captain' image in the Elizabethan years.[575] The description of Grey's services at Pinkie thus emphasised his skilled judgement and advice to Somerset on Scottish movements and the English deployment, as well as his personal bravery, as both a 'devysor' and an 'enterpryzor' of victory. The stress on Grey's valiant mounted charge with the Pensioners into 'the whole ennemies battayle' and graphic description of his injuries, as well as Arthur's explicit credit of the victory to his skill and initiative, is clearly comparable to Oznayo's construction of Pescara's bravery, grievous wounds suffered with the infantry, and tactical acumen at Pavia, though with Grey as the leader of a mounted, noble force, not a common infantry collective.[576]

The narrative of Grey's lieutenancy at Guînes, culminating in the French capture of the castle in 1558, likewise emphasised his skill in setting out and leading the

---

[574] Arthur Lord Grey of Wilton, *Commentary of the Services and Charges of William Lord Grey of Wilton,* ed. Sir Philip de Malpas Grey Egerton, Camden Soc. (London, 1847). This was apparently composed pre-1577, due to its incorporation into Holinshed. *Commentary*, p. vi.
[575] Davies, 'English People and War', p. 9.
[576] Grey, *Commentary*, pp. 14-5.

defence and shoring up the fortifications as well as his bravery, along with the trope of the ideal commander encouraging and looking after his men and looking to their needs ('…sawe the breateche repayred, enquyred of theyr lackes…').[577] Arthur also stressed that his father ultimately only surrendered when forced to by the 'unwoonted fayntnes of mynde' of his mutinous soldiers- a much greater willingness to acknowledge the miserable failings of one's countrymen, and specifically of the common soldiery, than in the Spanish texts, with their idealised portrayal of the *infantes*.[578] Moreover, it is significant that as well as describing his previous praiseworthy actions as an officer and his wounds suffered ('shott thowroghe the left shullder', 'a greate wownde in the mouthe with a pyke') the text also trumpeted the specific military commands and appointments Grey had previously held at Guînes, Boulogne, the Scottish campaign, and San Quentin.[579] This careerist 'credentialism' within the national military world as a 'right famous captayne in his dayes', as well as praiseworthy deeds, wounds suffered, and skilfull command, is another evocation of military professionalism, and supports the interpretation of military narratives as *curricula vitae* for professional warriors living or dead.[580]

As Chapter 1 has identified with reference to three important texts, at the beginning of the period, noble-martial and chivalric identities, arguably reminiscent of contemporary chivalric romance culture, retained considerable influence over at least some of Spain's warriors. In Henrician and mid-Tudor England, the basic association of nobility and war continued to flourish, in birth imparting military duty and in the chivalric ideal of warfare imparting noble honour, but Tudor noble-martial culture was

[577] Grey, *Commentary*, p. 28.
[578] Grey, *Commentary*, p. 32, 35-6.
[579] Grey, *Commentary*, p. 1, 15.
[580] Gunn, *English People*, p. 54.

much more focused on crown and country. The second chapter has examined how such individualistic cultures of soldier-writing, and the restriction of military identity to the traditional martial classes, changed with new influences of loyalty and identity. In the Spanish case, there was a revolutionary transformation in military writing, with the four soldier-writers almost entirely removing themselves from the account and expanding their narratives to cover entire campaign theatres, while centring the story and their own authorial voice and identity on the deeds and loyalty of the idealised Spanish infantry. Meanwhile, English 'propagandists' and military chroniclers, influenced by seismic political and religious changes, began to envisage an Protestant nation-in-arms, forging new and lasting links between military identity and national defence.

Chapter 3 has investigated how writers of both nations constructed their emerging pictures of military perfection. By the 1560s, Spanish soldier-writers had already produced a heterogenous but significant body of military theory, revealing an emerging sense of military practicality, study, and 'science'. Spanish military memoirists, meanwhile, hinted in their presentations of imperial commanders at an emerging idea of the perfect Captain as distinguished in command skill and organisation as well as physical bravery and personal glory. The culture of the *soldado platico* also revealed a new sense of the ideal soldier or junior officer as a man inducted into the technical, practical arts of war through experience and reputation, with discipline and obedience both important but not yet dominant in constructing the ideal infantrymen.

The exceptional chronicle of the Welshman Elis Gruffudd engaged with ideas of military perfection in the negative rather than the positive, portraying most of his commanders, and Tudor arms in general, as the antithesis of proper military practice, but sharing many of his values with the Spanish texts. Together with an embryonic military print culture, a few English military writers produced manuscript treatises

explaining professionalised, skilled, practical infantry warfare in explicitly didactic form, together with a stress on trained and disciplined pike-and-shot formations that reflected conscious awareness of a 'capability gap' between English and continental practice. Regarding chronology of technical and cultural military change, the development of these embryonic cultures of professional, ostensibly rational and technically-minded gunpowder military literature by the mid-century, with their stress on pike-and-shot tactics and associated discipline and training, would further support the importance of the military changes of firepower and formation, in the era of the Habsburg-Valois conflict. As shall be seen, the texts published in both nations after 1567 would be more impressive in quantity and content, but many of the themes with which they were preoccupied, in constructing the matrix of honour of the ideal warrior out of increasingly professional, rational, distinctly un-chivalric components rooted in the specific technical contexts of 'revolutionary' gunpowder warfare- firepower, formation, fortification- had clearly emerged already in military literature produced pre-1559.

PART II: MARTIAL CULTURE IN THE ERA OF THE DUTCH REVOLT

CHAPTER 4: Military Public Spheres

The period from 1567 to 1609, with the Dutch Revolt and concomitant Anglo-Spanish war, witnessed a qualitative and quantitative revolution in Spanish and English military writing, enabling much more detailed reconstruction of ideals of military perfection. This chapter examines how these texts fitted into their national military communities or 'public spheres', and firstly charts for both nations the chronology and context of the key publications. It argues that neither Spanish nor English military theorists were idle 'armchair Generals', nor were their works unrealistic or classicising diversions, but like the early works of military theory produced pre-1559, these were serious and unambiguously practical instructions on modern military practice, written in most cases by qualified and often prominent members of their respective national military professions. The chapter then examines for both nations how these texts were not written in isolation, but with both vertical and horizontal ties with the rest of the military world. Soldier-writers engaged with the patronage and the public image of prominent military figures and strove to present these commanders as the 'perfect Captain', hinting at the crucial importance of personal ambition and political context in military writing- but in doing so, revealed what components made up this image of perfection. Meanwhile, soldier-writers also engaged with their fellow combatants, using their texts to bolster or defend the reputations of themselves and their peers- again, revealing much about their ideas of military perfection.

I. *Escuela Militar*: The Spanish Military Public Sphere

i. Military Literature

Spain's Dutch wars generated several important memoirs. The *Commentaries* of the noble officer and diplomat Bernardino de Mendoza ran from 1567 to 1577, and was significant in its realism, in its impersonal, detailed depiction of operations under Alba, Requesens, and Don Juan, and in Mendoza's willingness to confront the shortcomings of Spanish troops.[581] The *Commentary of the Frisian War* of Francisco Verdugo, completed before his death in 1595 but not published in Spanish until 1610, was at once a detailed campaign chronicle in the tradition of Mendoza and Ávila, and Verdugo's attempt to exculpate himself from the catastrophes that occurred under his command.[582] The most interesting soldier memoir from the period would remain in manuscript until the nineteenth century. The colossal *Events of Flanders and France* of Sergeant-Major Alonso Vazquez narrated its chosen period in exacting detail and is comparable in scope and value to Martin García Cerezeda's *Tratado*, and has suffered from a similar lack of scholarly notice.[583]

Meanwhile, there was a proliferation in 'gunpowder epics', narrating not fantastic deeds of chivalry, but real actions of the loyal Spanish infantry collective in contemporary battles and campaigns. The key text is typically identified as the *Araucana* (1569) of Alonso de Ercilla, which was clearly popular in Spanish military circles in Europe.[584] However, the 1560s had already witnessed similarly 'professionalised', realistic and non-chivalric gunpowder epics describing the Italian

---

[581] Bernardino de Mendoza, *Comentarios…de lo sucedido en las Guerras de los Payses baxos…* (Madrid, 1592); 'Mendoza, Bernardino de', *DBE*.
[582] Published in Naples, in Spanish in 1610 and in Italian in 1605. References are from Henri Lonchay (ed.), *Commentario del Coronel Francisco Verdugo...* (Brussels, 1899).
[583] Alonso Vazquez, *Los Sucesos de Flandes y Francia del Tiempo de Alejandro Farnese*, ed. D. José Sancho Rayon and D. Francisco de Zabalburu, *Coleccion de Documentos Inéditos Para la Historia de España,* lxxii-lxxiv (Madrid, 1879-80). [*Hereafter referenced as 'I, II and III'*]
[584] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 159.

Wars, the amphibious campaigns of Álvaro de Bazán, 1st Marques de Santa Cruz (1526-1588), and the Schmalkaldic War, later to be joined by epics of the siege of Malta and Don Juan's campaigns.[585]

Soldier-writers in Flanders soon joined in, with Baltasar de Vargas producing a poetic *Relacion* of the epic march north in 1567, which served as a paean to Alba as well as the Spanish officer corps and infantry collective.[586] With the Duke installed in Flanders, Diego Ximenez Ayllon published a collection of sonnets, each praising one of Alba's prominent subordinates, and drawing on emerging pre-occupations of skill at command, loyalty, reputation, and classical comparisons as well as bravery and lineage.[587] Miguel Giner wrote an epic *Siege and Fall of Antwerp* after the city's painstaking recapture in 1585, which, despite making unusually extensive use of classical references and poetic devices, remained grounded in Giner's own memories, the realities of gunpowder siegecraft, and the deeds of outstanding peers.[588] At least two other epics remained in manuscript: the lost *Civil Wars of Flanders* of Pedro Alfonso Pimentel, and the *Restless Flanders* of Cristobal Rodriguez Alba.[589] The latter boasted that his poem was 'watered with the blood of my veins, and written among the arms and furor of death', proudly narrating Spanish triumphs not against 'barbarian arms', like Ercilla, but in Flanders.[590] Finally, the Portuguese Emanuel Antunes published an epic on the recent *Descent of the Spaniards from France into Normandy* (1593) to memorialise the praiseworthy deeds of his *tercio* during the intervention in France's

---

[585] Martínez, *Front Lines*, pp. 67-85. On the Marques' commands, see 'Bazán y Guzmán', Álvaro de', *DBE*.
[586] Published Antwerp, 1568. References are from Baltasar de Vargas, *Breve Relacion de la Jornada…* ed. Duque de Alba (Madrid, 1952).
[587] Published Antwerp, 1569. References are from Diego Ximenez Ayllon, *Sonetos a Ilustres Varones Deste Felicissimo y Catholico Exercito y Corte* (Valencia, 1959).
[588] Miguel Giner, *El Sitio, y Toma de Anvers* (Milan, 1587).
[589] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 241; Cristobal Rodriguez Alba, *'La Inquieta Flandes'*, Madrid, *Biblioteca Nacional de España* MSS.22,648.
[590] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 31; Rodriguez Alba, *Inquieta Flandes*, fo. 10r.-v. (*barbaras Armas*)

religious wars, and echoed the concerns of unfair promotion so prominent in contemporary military literature.[591]

Of even greater significance to this thesis was the startling proliferation of Spanish military treatises on modern martial perfection, a qualitative as well as a quantitative revolution on the tentative efforts of the later Italian Wars- military publishing apparently comprised 1% of all Iberian printing from 1580 to 1600- though expanding on much the same themes, and ultimately responding to the same military techniques and cultures as developed in the early century.[592] The authors of these treatises saw themselves as presenting general handbooks of modern military organisation and timeless martial wisdom, and usually avoided engaging with specific Spanish geopolitical or strategic questions. Nonetheless, it is very likely that the late-century boom in Spanish military writing and publishing reflected the military context of Philip II's empire. The expansion in military writing first in prose and verse narratives, and later in treatises (as shown in Appendix 1, Table 1) reflected the beginning and intensification of the Flanders war, likely encouraged particularly by Spain's uniquely permanent, stable, structured, and professionalised officer corps, which surely provided rich ground for the fermentation of military ideas. As shown in Table 2, the geographic distribution of Spanish military theory reflects the triple centres of the 'Spanish Road' system- Spain, Italy, Flanders- and supports the *Ejercito de Flandes* as a centre of military thought, while several 'gunpowder epics' and other martial texts would also be printed in Flanders.

The nature of the Dutch war, emphasising artillery and engineering, positional warfare and sieges, and gunpowder-dominant tactics, may also have encouraged and

[591] Emanuel Antunes, *Primera Parte de la Baxada de los Españoles…* (Rouen, 1593).
[592] Alexander S. Wilkinson (ed.), *Iberian Books* (Leiden, 2010), p. xx.

coloured the strictly rational, technical Spanish military theory, as well as influencing the new, realistic 'gunpowder epics'. The ongoing failure to win the war against increasingly effective Dutch opposition may have encouraged the rich production of military theory in the final two decades of the century, while de León has suggested that declining officer professionalism and mutiny drove the publication of reforming treatises, and their obsession with meritocratic promotion, declining standards, and strict discipline.[593] In this respect, these texts could be seen as manifestations of the pervasive sense of decline and critical frustration in late-century Spain, and specifically of *arbitrismo* culture, as Spanish writers from the late sixteenth century sought to explain and reverse the strategic as well as the economic *declinación* of their world-spanning monarchy.[594] Finally, specific politico-military and individual context also continued to influence the content, authorial voices, and dedications of Spanish military texts, through the author's discourses of loyalty, his personal convictions, and his real or hoped-for patron-client relations within the military public sphere.

Already in 1569, there appeared Luis Gutiérrez de la Vega's *New Treatise and Compendium of Military Matters.* This veteran soldier and officer claimed that he wrote his treatise due to unspecified popular demand, and that although 'some have written very relevantly' of war, 'the times in which they wrote were very different from what they are today'- though the captain may also have been motivated by the geopolitical upheavals of the late 1560s, with the traumatic Granada war in particular having inspired Spanish attempts at national military reform.[595] Meanwhile, one of Alba's

[593] de León, *Road to Rocroi*, pp. 107-143.
[594] J.H. Elliott, 'Self-Perception and Decline', *Past & Present*, 74 (February, 1977), pp. 41-61; Sina Rauschenbach and Christian Windler (eds.), *Reforming Early Modern Monarchies* (Wiesbaden, 2016), pp. 9-15.
[595] Published Medina del Campo, 1569. References are from Luis Gutiérrez de la Vega, *Nuevo Tratado y Compendio de Re Militari*, ed. Mirian Galante Becerril (Madrid, 2005), p. 73. (*aunque en esta materia algunos hayan escrito muy acertadamente, por ser los tiempos en que ellos escribieron muy diferentes de*

leading officers was composing his own treatise, though it would not be printed until 1587. *Maestre de Campo* Sancho de Londoño's *Discourse* was primarily concerned with discipline and obedience and called for a more strictly regimented army, ostensibly on the Roman model, but Londoño was expressly modern in his awareness of the needs of the contemporary Army of Flanders, then two years into the Dutch war.[596] At least eight editions had been printed in Spain and Brussels by 1600, including two joint editions with the *Mirror and Military Discourse* of one of Londoño's long-standing professional colleagues in the Mediterranean, Italian, and Flanders theatres, Francisco de Valdes.[597] Valdes' text was composed in 1571 and had at run to least nine Spanish and one Italian editions by 1600.[598] As such, these likely represent the most popular Spanish military treatises of the period, which may reflect that Loñdono and Valdes were the two most prominent officers to publish military theory. *Maestre de Campo* Valdes structured his dialogue between a supplicant soldier 'Vargas' (apparently Don Alonso de Vargas, 'a true professional soldier' who would rise from the ranks to become Cavalry General of the Army of Flanders) and the expert, Londoño himself.[599] Valdes centred on the crucial modern rank of Sergeant-Major and explained three key themes that underpinned all contemporary military theory: marching, encampment, and tactics.

Bernardino de Escalante's *Dialogues of the Military Art* (1583), of which four of five editions were printed in the Spanish Netherlands, built on these texts and discussed

---

los que ahora son…), 18; I.A.A. Thompson, *War and Government in Habsburg Spain* (London, 1976), pp. 18-21.

[596] The Army had already experienced one serious disciplinary breakdown in 1568, a sign of things to come, which may have encouraged Londoño's disciplinary focus: Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 187.

[597] Sancho de Londoño, *Discurso sobre la forma de reducir la Disciplina Militar à mejor y antiguo estado* (Madrid, 1593); *Iberian Books*, p. 450.

[598] *Iberian Books*, p. 736; Antonio Palau y Dulcet, *Manual del Librero Hispano-Americano* (28 vols., Barcelona, 1948-77), xxv.8-9.

[599] Francisco de Valdes, *Espeio, y Disciplina Militar* (Brussels, 1596), p. 7; I.A.A. Thompson, 'The Spanish council of war', in *Idem.*, *Crown and Cortes* (Aldershot, 1993), p. 716.

'everything specifically relevant to military officers, from the soldier to the Captain General, and the necessary order' in organisation, discipline, and combat.[600] In the same year, the *Military Dialogues* of a civilian jurist appeared in Mexico City, promising 'information of persons, instruments and necessary things for the good use of war'. Despite the far-flung origin, Palacio's content was explicitly European, and the headings of its four parts neatly summarised the key preoccupations of contemporary military theory, in line with the primary technical and institutional themes of the sixteenth-century 'military revolution' as developed in the Italian Wars and gradually absorbed by European military thought: Qualities for a Captain and a Soldier, gunpowder weapons, 'good and dextrous formations of squadrons', and 'institutions and laws' of war.[601]

The 1590s, 'perhaps the most creative [decade] in the history of Spanish military thought', witnessed further publication of military theory, perhaps in response to an increasingly perceptible replacement of professionalism with *hidalguía* and favour as criteria for appointments, or more broadly an ominous strategic outlook in the Dutch and Anglo-Spanish Wars.[602] The *Milicia, Discourse, and Military Rule* of the veteran officer Martin de Eguiluz had at least three editions, including a joint volume with Londoño.[603] Advertised by the printing licence as covering 'each matter necessary for practice in *la milicia* so that one may exercise it well', Eguiluz provided a comprehensive guide to the duties and qualifications of each rank from private soldier

---

[600] Bernardino de Escalante, *Dialogos, del Arte Militar* (Brussels, 1595), dedication. (*que les tocan en particular a los oficiales de la guerra, desde el Soldado hasta el Capitan general, y la orden que se deue tener*). Outside his treatise, Escalante also advised Philip on strategic, foreign, and maritime matters. Jose Luis Casado Soto (ed.), *Discursos de Bernardino de Escalante* (Laredo, 1995).
[601] Diego Garcia de Palacio, *Dialogos Militares…* (Mexico, 1583), inside cover. (*las Calidades, requisites, y substācia que han de tener un Capitan y Soldado…la naturalza, y composition de la Poluora y buen uso de los Arcabuzes, y Artilleria…de la buena y diestra formacion de los Esquadrones....auisos, Instituciones, y Leyes…de la guerra*).
[602] de León, 'Doctors', p. 70; de León, *Road to Rocroi*, p. 72.
[603] *Iberian Books*, p. 257.

to Captain General, with detailed sections dedicated to formation and fortification design, and strident advocacy for military discipline.[604] Two years later appeared the treatise of Flanders Captain and four-decades 'spirited soldier' Marcos de Isaba, a startling evocation of the rhetoric of military decline and insufficiency so beloved of Renaissance soldier-writers, using the trope of bodily illness commonly deployed by contemporary *arbitristas*: *The Sick Body of the Spanish Milicia…and How it Can be Cured*.[605]

Addressing the future Philip III, Bernardino de Mendoza's *Theory and Practice of War* (1596) took an unusually broad strategic view and likewise sought to reform Spain's beleaguered military position, perhaps inspired by the author's close correspondence with his brother Alonso, a profound critic of Philip II's misrule.[606] However, Mendoza's embryonic thoughts on grand strategy and prudent warmaking were invariably in generic terms, and the text was also a more conventional treatise on military perfection.[607] Though Mendoza neglected to break down the duties of each rank, his treatise otherwise reflected 'the major themes of the 1590s'- 'juxtaposition of theory and practice', 'demand for qualified officers' and 'a cursus honorum based on merit'- along with modern formations, fortification, and firepower, from 'what I have read and experienced in thirty-something years'.[608] In 1603 appeared the *Discourse of the Maestre de Campo General* of Sergeant-Major Cristobal Lechuga, an exceptionally well-regarded infantry officer and artilleryman who claimed to have carried the draft

---

[604] Martin de Eguiluz, *Milicia, Discurso, y Regla Militar* (Antwerp, 1595), *aprovacion*, back cover. (*cada cosa…que se conuiene praticar en la Milicia, para que se exercite bien*)
[605] Marcos de Isaba, *Cuerpo Enfermo de la Milicia Española…* (Madrid, 1594); Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.403 (*soldado animoso*); Elliott, 'Self-Perception and Decline', p. 49.
[606] Richard L. Kagan, *Lucrecia's Dreams* (Berkeley, 1996), pp. 101-8.
[607] Beatrice Heuser, *The Strategy Makers* (Santa Barbara, 2010), pp. 87-9.
[608] de León, 'Doctors', p. 75; Bernardino de Mendoza, *Theorica y Practica de Guerra* (Antwerp, 1596), p. 3. (*lo que he leydo y experimentado en treynta y tantos años*)

manuscript on campaign 'to show it to those with more experience in matters of war'.[609] Though primarily concerned with the titular rank, the senior infantry officer of the Army of Flanders (which perhaps he hoped to secure by writing his tract), Lechuga echoed his antecedent military theorists in his emphasis on 'meritocratic' promotion, the pseudo-science of infantry formations, and his extensive disciplinary instructions.

Thus, by the Twelve Years Truce, Spanish military theorists had produced an impressive body of published expertise, with several recurring preoccupations. This was bolstered by specialist manuals on military law and ethics, cavalry warfare, fortification, and New World fighting.[610] There also appeared detailed treatises on artillery, which themselves included extensive teaching on general military skills and attributes and contributed to 'the perfect officer genre'.[611]

Meanwhile, the 'seriousness' of Spanish military theory was most obviously visible in the qualifications of the authors themselves. Frontmatter often stressed this: 'you have been a Captain and soldier for many years in Africa, Italy and other parts in our service, and as a man of experience you have written a book…very useful and necessary'.[612] The theorists themselves self-fashioned as experts 'brought up over so many years' in the profession, but held genuine military credentials, as shown in Appendix 2.[613] Eguiluz' prologue declared that 'I have been bred and raised up [*criado*

---

[609] Cristobal Lechuga, *Discurso…en que trata del cargo de Maestro de Campo General…* (Milan, 1603), p. 30. (*mostrarle a los que hallaua tener mas experiencia en las cosas de guerra*)- [*hereafter 'Discurso'*]; de León, 'Doctors', pp. 77-80.
[610] Balthazar Ayala, *De Iure et Officiis Bellicis* (Antwerp, 1597); e.g. Pedro Fernandez de Andrada, *Libro de la Gineta* (Seville, 1599); e.g. Cristobal de Rojas, *Teorica y practica de fortificacion* (Madrid, 1598); Bernardo de Vargas Machuca, *Milicia y Descripcion de las Indias* (Madrid, 1599).
[611] de León, 'Doctors', pp. 70-2; Diego de Álava y Viamont, *El Perfeto Capitan…y nueva ciencia de la Artilleria* (Madrid, 1590); Luis Collado, *Platica Manual de Artilleria* (Milan, 1592); Cristobal Lechuga, *Discurso…en que se trata de la artilleria…* (Milan, 1611).
[612] Vega, *Tratado*, *provision real.* (*vos habías sido capitán y soldado muchos años en África, Italia y otros partes en servicio nuestro, y como hombre de experiencia habías escrito un libro…muy útil y necesario*)
[613] e.g. Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 103r. (*yo he dicho por lo que he visto en el tiempo que me he criado en la guerra tantos años*), 132v.

y cursado] twenty-four years in *la milicia…*in many occasions and campaigns, in diverse provinces and in garrisons, as a soldier, Sergeant, *Alferez* and other charges', a vivid evocation of the Spanish professional *cursus honorum*.[614] The few civilians theorising on war felt the need to justify 'putting my sickle in someone else's harvest' by writing outside their own 'profession'.[615]

Spanish military theorists were very clear on audience and purpose, writing 'matters of my profession, for the utility and use of those that follow it', so that '*soldados bisoños*, by reading, will become *platicos*'.[616] Vega stressed that 'my only intention is to write for those that are very interested in matters of war', hoping modestly that '*maestros*' in the art would correct his mistakes, but still learn from his writing.[617] Moreover, treatises were unambiguously clear on their purpose: Vega set the tone of the next four decades of military theory in producing his book not as a 'pastime', but 'only for those who are novices and not instructed in the art…so they have in this compendium some enlightenment and knowledge of what they have to do'.[618]

The usefulness of military theory was also stressed by their printing licences and commendatory *aprovaciones*. The didactic treatise on the 1583 Azores campaign by Auditor General Cristobal Mosquera de Figueroa was officially sanctioned as 'important for those who profess war' and the licence of Lechuga's text noted his

---

[614] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, sig. Ar. (*tengo noble exercisio de la Milica en que me he criado y cursado veintiquatro años ha…en muchas ocasiones y jornadas de exercitos, en diuersas Prouincias, y en Presidios, de soldado, Sargento, Alferez, y en otros cargos*)
[615] Palacio, *Dialogos Militares*, dedication (*por ajeno, de la professiō en que siruo à su Magestad…meter mi hoz en miesse agena*); Viamont, *Perfeto Capitan,* preface, sig. ++6r.
[616] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 6. (*escriuir cosas de mi profession, para alguna utilidad y prouecho de los que la siguen*); Escalante, *Dialogos*, dedication. (*para que los soldados visoños, leyéndolos, se hagan platicos*)
[617] Vega, *Tratado*, p. 73. (*mi intento sólo es escribir a los que muy aficionados a cosas de guerra*)
[618] Vega, *Tratado*, p. 96. (*passatiempo*), 73 (*sino para aquellos que nuevos y no instruidos en el arte del ordenar tengan en este compendio alguna luz y noticia lo que deben hacer*)

military credentials and approved it as covering 'everything relevant to an army'.[619] Spanish soldier-writers were also endorsed by their peers. The *soldado viejo* Luis de Barrientos provided reviews for the treatises of Eguiluz ('useful and appropriate') and Londoño ('very useful') but also endorsed the authors based on his personal connections, having known Londoño 'very well as a soldier, Captain, and *Maestre de Campo*, and we were *camaradas* [sic]' and pointedly saying of Eguiluz that 'I knew the author from when he began to serve your Majesty, and he deserves the rewards he asks…for his services and knowledge'.[620] Valdes' text secured the written approval of Alonso de Vargas, one of the characters in the dialogue itself, and Lechuga's treatise was advertised by Francisco Verdugo as 'something from which all that profess *la milicia* could take great utility'.[621]

There is ample evidence that Spanish officers read such texts, and at least used printed formation tables.[622] In 1586 Don Francisco de Bobadilla (1537-1610), veteran of Italy, Flanders, Portugal, and commander of the Terceira campaign in 1583, endorsed Bernardino de Escalante to run Parma's new military hospital because 'he understands the military profession so well that he has written a very good book on *la milicia*'.[623] Later, Bobadilla would provide a preface for Mendoza's *Theorica*, which reportedly sold 660 copies in 18 months, praising it for its practical utility to aspiring commanders based not only on Bobadilla's own 32 years of military experience but also 'having read

---

[619] Cristobal Mosquera de Figueroa, *Comentario en breve compendio de disciplina militar* (Madrid, 1596), 'El Rey' (*de importancia para los que professauan la guerra*); Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 3. (*todo de lo que tocaua en el exercito*)
[620] Londoño, *Discurso*, '*aprovacion'*, inside cover (*es muy util…yo conosci muy particularmente al Autor, de soldado, Capitā, y Maestro de Campo, y fuymos camaradas*); Eguiluz, *Milicia, 'aprovacion'*, back cover. (*es util y provecho…y conozco al Autor desde que começo a seruir a su Magestad, y merece que se le haga la merced que suplica a V. A. por sus seruicios, y entendimiento*)
[621] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 87; Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 11. (*cosa de que se puede sacar grande utilidad, y prouecho para todos los que professaren la milicia*)
[622] e.g. Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 22r.
[623] Bernardino de Escalante, *Diálogos del Arte Militar*, eds. Geoffrey Parker and José Luis Casado Soto (Laredo, 1992), p. 16.

diligently all I have been able to collect of what is written, antique and modern, in this profession'; Verdugo similarly praised Lechuga's text referencing his own prior military reading.[624] Listing his praiseworthy contemporaries in the Army of Flanders, Vazquez included in his entries for several officers that they had written military treatises.[625] This reflects the growing intellectualisation of the military profession and the sense that an officer's reputation could incorporate matters of thought and word as well as action, but on a simpler level demonstrates awareness of military literature. Having described a rare rebuke given to the exhausted Francisco de Valdes by Parma for slacking off from the trenches at Maastricht in 1579, Vazquez commented that:

> Valdes knew [his duty] very well, having been taught by the great experience that he had in matters of war; he had become *platico* in the duties of a good soldier and gone through ('*cursado*') the office of Sergeant-Major so well, as say his writings, which today teach many [who are] not very *platicos* the mode and manner that they must have in their offices, in particular that of the Sergeant-Major.[626]

Vazquez was writing in the early seventeenth century and may refer to the use of the book by his fellow militia Sergeant-Majors, so this may not describe the use of a sixteenth-century manual *in the sixteenth century*, or on 'active duty'. Nonetheless, Spanish military treatises were neither intended, nor received, as idle amusements nor purely intellectual exercises. Valdes himself wrote his treatise 'knowing how important

---

[624] Mendoza, *Theorica*, frontmatter. (*auer leydo todo quanto con diligencia he podido recoger de lo que esta escrito, antiguo, y moderno en esta profession*); Dirk Imhof, 'Las Ediciones Españoles de la Officina Plantiniana', in Werner Thomas and Eddy Stols (eds.), *Un Mundo Sobre Papel* (Louvain, 2009), p. 65; Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 11.
[625] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.361-443.
[626] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.195-6. (*Entendia esto muy bien Francisco de Valdés, enseñado de la gran experiencia que tenia de las cosas de la guerra, habiendo platicado en ella lo que debe hacer un buen soldado y cursado el oficio de Sargento mayor, tan bien, como lo dicen sus escritos que hoy enseñan á muchos poco pláticos el modo y manera que deben tener en sus oficios, en particular el de Sargento mayor*)

it is that those who are chosen to this office are not ignorant of the many things one must exercise in such an important role'.[627]

Moreover, Spanish soldier-writers were conscious of contributing to a national public sphere of military thought, discussion, and debate. Authors interacted with, plagiarised, and endorsed each other's opinions.[628] Spanish theorists also drew on modern and classical foreign-language works 'very well known to all'; writing in 1596, Mosquera cited Greek, Latin, Italian, and Spanish authorities 'that have written on this science'.[629] Spanish soldier-writers also hinted at a broader military-intellectual culture of sharing and debating professional opinions among 'the greatest soldiers of age, and experience, authority, and worth listening to'.[630] Martin de Eguiluz referenced 'soldiers' opinions' on such matters as the *Cabo d'Escuadra*'s disciplinary powers, Neapolitan versus Spanish pike drills, and a three-decades 'long-standing debate' on whether musketeers should do guard duty.[631] Eguiluz thus hoped his 'opinion' on such debates would 'not offend anyone'.[632] Mendoza addressed in detail the debate between *soldados de opinion* over lances versus guns for cavalry and the 'very disputed matter' of the placement of field artillery relative to infantry formations.[633] Discussion on military practice could also take more negative forms, Isaba stating of the contentious issue of

---

[627] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 5. (*conociendo la mucha necesidad que auia, de que no ignoren muchos que a este officio son elegidos, lo que tanto es necesario entiendan para bien exercitar cargo de tanta importancia*)
[628] cf. e.g. Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 50r. and Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 64; Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 22r., 82r., 37v.
[629] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 128r. (*libros de esquadrones y ordenanças, y esto en muchas lenguas, siendo a todos muy notorio*); Mosquera, *Comentario*, fo. 4v.-5v. (*que han escrito desta ciencia y arte militar*); Lechuga, *Discurso*, endmatter.
[630] Lechuga, *Discurso*, pp. 15-6. (*los mayores soldados en hedad, y experiencia, authoridad, y opinion que vuiese en la guerra*)
[631] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 6r. (*ay opiniones de algunos solados*), fo. 28r., 31v. (*larga question*)
[632] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 31v. (*sin les hacer agrauio alguno*)
[633] Mendoza, *Theorica*, pp. 60-1, 116. (*materia muy disputada*)

corruption that the severity of the problem 'moved me to say in writing what is discussed every day between myself and many people of good understanding'.[634]

ii. The School of Flanders

The interplay in military culture between command, patronage, careerism, and the emerging science of war is visible firstly in interactions between military writers and Spain's politico-military leadership. As de León has argued, the Duke of Alba presided over a network of military patronage and promotion guided by merit and experience rather than birth or personal connection, producing a generation of hyper-competent professional officers who had cut their teeth in the period of the Italian Wars and reached the apex of their careers in Alba's *Ejercito de Flandes*, including such professionals as Londoño, Valdes, Sancho Dávila (1523-1583), Cristobal de Mondragon (1514-1596), and arguably Julian Romero (1518-1577). Alba's officers were apparently often from lower *hidalgo* or even common backgrounds, but between them had hundreds of years of experience of high-intensity gunpowder infantry warfare. Alba himself was thus able to boast of how 'the veterans of this army' had all 'learned military art in my school', reportedly insisting on his deathbed that he had never promoted anyone for personal connections over competence.[635] Describing his own deployment of troops at the victory at Mookerhyde (1574), Mendoza, another of the Duke's devotees, related proudly how he 'had many times listened to the *platica* of the Duke of Alba' and emulated his command style.[636]

Alba's generalship reflected other emerging principles of early modern military science. The Duke trained '*bisoños*' in garrisons before deploying them in the field,

---

[634] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 24v. (*me ha mouido a dezir por escrito lo que entre mi y muchos de buen entendimiento platicamos cada dia*)
[635] de León, *Road to Rocroi*, pp. 53-63.
[636] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fo. 240r.-v. (*por auer oydo platicar...muchas vezes al Duque de Alua*)

promulgated strict military discipline under a professional, regulated hierarchy, and introduced muskets.[637] Alba's operational art was itself a 'new and disturbing vision of contemporary war', with his seminal Schmalkaldic command avoiding conventional battle and making careful use of earthworks, reconnaissance, raids, and *camisados* before delivering the crushing victory at Mühlberg, and de León identifies the same 'austere', objective-driven tactics in Flanders.[638] Though themselves inheritances of the middle and later Italian Wars, seemingly all of Alba's organisational and operational policies were mainstays of both Spanish and English military theory for the rest of the century, and many explicitly referenced 'the school of our most excellent Captain General', just as Gonzalo de Córdoba, the '*Gran Capitan*', had earlier become embedded into Spanish military culture and writing as the archetypal great commander and military reformer.[639]

Alba also interacted more directly with the new culture of written military theory. Cerezeda claimed that the Duke had memorised Vegetius by the age of thirteen- which even if untrue, is revealing in incorporating an intellectual component to the ideal of Generalship.[640] Alba himself authored a manuscript treatise, the *Discourse on the Reform of the Milicia*, supporting the promotion of experienced officers, arguing for a minimum of ten years' service prior to elevation to a captaincy, and prescribing infantry training in weapon handling.[641] Cristobal Lechuga would later hint that he and Infantry General Chiappino Vitelli (1519-1575) consulted Alba's treatise.[642] Alba also encouraged military writing among his proud '*hechuras*', based on 'what each has

[637] de León, *Road to Rocroi*, pp. 49-51.
[638] William S. Maltby, *Alba* (Berkeley, 1983), p. 55; de León, '*Soldados Platicos*', pp. 240-1.
[639] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 34v. (*la escuela del excelentissimo Capitan General nuestro*); Ebben *et al*, *Alba*, pp. 9-10.
[640] de León, *Road to Rocroi*, p. 49.
[641] de León, *Road to Rocroi*, p. 55.
[642] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 31, 195.

learnt in such an excellent school'.[643] Alba was not alone among senior Spanish officers in participating directly in military theory culture. As well as commending other books, Francisco de Bobadilla, whom Alonso Vazquez called with approval a '*hechura*' of Alba, reportedly wrote his own text 'on the *Maestre de Campo General*', and commissioned a fortification treatise.[644]

Though de León has argued convincingly that the Prince of Parma's tenure undermined Spanish dominance in the Army of Flanders' hierarchy and reinstated aristocratic ethics in promotion and military morals, at least one of Parma's officers- albeit with twenty years' nostalgia- presented the Prince's corps as another 'school' of hyper-competent Spanish professionals.[645] Alonso Vazquez included among Parma's attributes as a model Captain-General that he promoted and rewarded his *criados*, and Vazquez' chronicle doubled as an enormous compendium of the names, services, and praiseworthy attributes of Parma's officers who later held senior ranks across the Spanish military world. Significantly, Vazquez claimed that like Alba, Parma *taught* military skill to his *criados*, 'created them and conserved them in such good order and military discipline' in his '*escuela militar*', with this another of Parma's services to the crown.[646]

The link between Spain's politico-military leaders and the burgeoning culture of soldier-writing was also expressed in how writers, like their predecessors in the Italian Wars, strove to self-fashion as loyal servants and chroniclers of their commanders, and

---

[643] Londoño, *Discurso*, dedication (unpag.). (*a mi, y es de creer que a los demas sus hechuras ha V. Señoria mandado poner en escrito nuestros pareceres…lo que cada uno en tan excelente escuela ha deprendido*)
[644] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.368; Mosquera, *Comentario*, fo. 10r.; Rojas, *Teorica,* prologue (unpag.).
[645] de León, *Road to Rocroi*, pp. 98-100; de León, '*Soldados Platicos*', pp. 253-6.
[646] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.353-5. (*Era gran amigo de sus amigos, gran señor de sus criados...los crió y conservó en buen órden y disciplina militar...como Generales de provincias y de la artillería, caballería, Comisarios genereles y de víveres, Maestres de campo generales, Coroneles, Maestres de campo, Sargentos mayores*)

attach themselves to past martial heroes and present sources of military patronage. Diego Ximenez Ayllon's sonnet collection praised the virtues making up the matrix of honour of each individual member of Alba's court and headquarters, naturally reserving the most generous praise for the Duke himself and exalting his strength, loyalty, prudence, justice, and military achievements.[647] Other prominent military figures in Alba's entourage were likewise extolled as models of Renaissance martial virtue, such as his son and subordinate commander, Don Hernando de Toledo (d.1591), whom Ayllon praised as balancing between the dichotomous virtues of *valor* and *prudencia* as a 'clear mirror of *la milicia*'.[648]

Baltasar de Vargas dedicated his epic to Alba, and the text served primarily to exalt 'the great service that your Excellency did for God and his Majesty in coming to those States of Flanders, that were so lost in faith and loyalty'.[649] Vargas harked back to the Duke's participation in the previous period of Spanish warfare in Europe, praising Alba's Italian service and how he conquered 'all the Lutheran camp', as well as his inspired leadership on the Spanish Road, to portray his General as a '*Gran Capitan*' superior to his classical and medieval predecessors.[650] Vargas himself identified as a '*criado* of your Excellency' and, like Diego Nuñez Alba before him, insisted on the 'sincere and pure affection/that I have to serve the greatness/of Alba'.[651]

Londoño dedicated his *Discurso* to his patron and praised Alba for his personal bravery and skilful command, while assuring the Duke of his own fitness as an officer,

---

[647] Ayllon, *Sonetos*, sig. A5r.
[648] Ayllon, *Sonetos*, sig. A6r. (*de milicia es claro espejo*); Santiago Fernandez Conti, 'El prior Don Hernando de Toledo', in Fantoni, *Perfetto Capitano*, pp. 87-134.
[649] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, p. 21. (*el gran servicio que a dios y a su magestad a hecho V. E. con su venida a estos Estados de Flandes que tan perdidos en la fee y lealtad estavan*)
[650] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Canto 57, 53, 55. (*todo el campo Luterano*)
[651] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, p. 23 (*criado de V.E.*), p. 29. (*el aficion sincera y pura/que tengo de servir a la grandeza/del dAlva*)

'*hechura*', and military theorist 'having soldiered so many years under the command of your Lordship in the hardest and highest enterprises'.[652] Valdes likewise self-identified as Alba's '*hechura*' and '*criado*' and dedicated his treatise to Alba's son and heir, Infantry General Don Fadrique (1537-1585), as Fadrique's 'true servant'.[653] The original 1573 preface of Mendoza's chronicle reminded Philip II that some victories were given to him by God, but others 'by the hands of the Duke' and his 'great valour and prudence'.[654] That year saw Alba's ignominious return from the rebellious Netherlands, and the loyal Mendoza may have intended his text to shore up both his master's court position, and his pro-war policy.[655]

Although many later soldier-writers dedicated their works and their authorial discourses of loyalty to Philip II or III, some continued to attach themselves and their works to their more immediate superiors. Miguel Giner dedicated his epic to Ranuccio Farnese (1569-1622) and stressed his own 'perfect love' and loyalty to Alejandro Farnese and his victories, quoting Mondragon, in an idealised scene between *Gran Capitan* and subordinate, assuring the Prince that it was 'only…heaven and your greatness' that 'won these states/to great Philip's obedience'.[656] Antunes and Rodriguez Alba both dedicated their poems to their *Maestre de Campo*, Alonso de Idiaquez (1565-1618), and the latter, 'inclined to the service and the house of your lordship', secured a prefatory sonnet from (among several officers) Idiaquez himself, praising his

---

[652] Londoño, *Discurso*, dedication (unpag.). (*Aviendo yo militando tantos años so el Imperio de vuestra Señoria en las mas arduas, y altas empressas que en el mundo se han ofrecido…no se deue pensar…hiziesse eleccion de persona inmerita*)
[653] Fagel, *Protagonists*, p. 294; Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 5. (*verdadero seruidor*)
[654] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, 'Al Rey Nuestro Señor' (unpag.). (*algunas por manos del Duque…con su mucho valor y prudencia*)
[655] Maltby, *Alba*, pp. 263-70; on factionalism, Alba, and militant policy, see James Boyden, *The Courtier and the King* (Berkeley, 1995), pp. 130-131; Fernando Gonzalez de León and Geoffrey Parker, 'The Grand Strategy of Philip II', in Graham Darby (ed.), *Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt* (London, 2001), p. 113.
[656] Giner, *Sitio*, fo. 2r.-v. (*el perfetto amor de sus famosissimos hechos*), 8v., 15r. (*Respondele Señor, esta vitoria/solo viene el cielo y su grandeza,/y el permitira que tanta gloria/gane en estos estados vuestra Alteza/que sea el gran Felipe obedecido*)

subordinate's pen for saving Spanish deeds from oblivion 'and fixing them in immortal life'.[657] As ever, their choice of dedicatee was likely influenced by his status, connections, and position in Spain's politico-military institutions; apart from his career as a field commander, Idiaquez was the only son of a royal secretary and was already on the *Consejo de Guerra.*[658] Antunes' dedication thus likewise stressed his desire to 'serve your Grace', to write 'your great command, your glories,/your haughty deeds and victories' as the perfect officer, reminding Idiaquez that they had served together in the ranks, so 'I can affirm, that you won/in exchange for the blood you shed/the charges that you have'.[659]

Like Antunes, Spanish soldier-writers structured their narratives to present their superiors as the ideal Captain, again, following and enlarging a distinctive *topos* of military writing from earlier wars, and tacitly revealing the perceived ingredients of military perfection as much as dedicated military textbooks. As well as Alba's loyalty and constancy, Alonso de Vargas incorporated military skill and 'art' into his portrait of the *Gran Duque Hispano*, praising how 'the prudent General provided…for the lack of artillery' with musketeers and based his orders on 'his experience of war', and providing a 'wealth of detail' on the campaign's logistics.[660] Mendoza, perhaps emulating Ávila, centred his comprehensive campaign narrative on Alba's 'many, and very special services' and, like Vargas, incorporated professional and technical skills in

[657] Rodriguez Alba, *Inquieta Flandes*, fo. 1r. (*tan afiçionado al seruiçio y cassa, de V S.*), 2v. (*en ymmortal vída estampando*)
[658] 'Idiaquez y Butrón-Múgica, Alonso de', *DBE*.
[659] Antunes, *Baxada,* dedication (unpag.) (*el deseo que de seruir à V. M. tengo*), p. 3. (*vuestro grande gouierno, vuestras glorias,/vuestras hazañas altas, y victorias…pues que puedo afirmar, que aueis ganado/en cambio de la sangre de dexastes,/los cargos que teneis*)
[660] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Canto 171, 107 (*El general prudente prevenia/aquesto y a la falta de artilleros/mandando hacer seiscientos mosqueteros*), 138 (*la experiencia que tenia/de guerra*); Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 27.

portraying the Duke as a model 'good soldier, and prudent Captain'.[661] Miguel Giner portrayed Parma as an '*esforzado*, excellent Caesar' and an icon of perfect command, leading by example and sharing dangers at Dendermonde in 1584, clearly reminiscent of Cerezeda's depiction of Charles at Tunis, or Ávila's of Alba at Mühlberg.[662]

However, as in Italy, the Spanish military public sphere was defined by horizontal as well as vertical ties, with authors also extolling the reputations of their peers. This was most obviously because of the implications of professional reputation for promotion and reward in Spain's world-spanning military institutions; Londoño's treatise stressed that candidates for promotion must be 'known to him that chooses them, or by sufficient information from trustworthy persons of the same profession'.[663] Yet reputation was also important in broader notions of *fama*, bestowing upon soldiers living or dead the deserving memory earned by their praiseworthy deeds, and often their only reward. As Antunes summarised with reference to his own fellows, 'it seems to me unjust…for deeds so honourable and worthy of such *fama* as the Spaniards that were distinguished in that *tercio* did in Normandy, to be forgotten'.[664]

Ayllon lauded the reputations of infantry officers with reference to their knowledge and skill as well as their valour and 'virility'.[665] Baltasar de Vargas used his epic to name and praise a considerable number of the Duke's outstanding officers, such as Julian Romero ('no better soldier in the land') and Gonzalo de Bracamonte ('very

---

[661] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fo. 22r. (*muchos, y muy particulares seruicios…tan gran soldado, y prudente Capitan*)
[662] Giner, *Sitio*, fo. 8v. (*Y el esforçado Cesar excelente*)
[663] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 1v. (*conocidos por el que los eligiere, o por informacion bastante de personas fidedignas de la misma profession*)
[664] Antunes, *Baxada*, dedication (unpag.) (*Paresciendo me cosa iniusta que por negligencia…se metan en el oluido las cosas tan honrrosas, y dignas de tanta fama, que en Normandia hizieron los Españoles que de esse tertio fueron señalodos*)
[665] Ayllon, *Sonetos*, sig. B8r.; e.g. Ayllon, *Sonetos*, sig. C4r.

principal for war') and cited their services and professional qualities.[666] Miguel Giner's account was saturated with the names of 'valorous Captains' as well as more obscure soldiers, such as 'Perera and Padilla' ('very desirous to serve their King') and 'Xacon' ('leader of a valorous squadron/so well proven in other occasions/that their fame would remain very great').[667] A decade later, Antunes likewise used his own epic to extol named companions, and make a snide but revealing comment on the imbalance between service and reward:

> The famous Sabala, whom I declare
> Was a valorous Captain and a good warrior,
> An eyewitness of all I write,
> And with his troops he was never in the rear…
> …Warlike Gomez de Parada
> A fellow of much *esfuerzo* and daring…
> …Pedro Navarro,
> Being the troops' own alferez,
> A very valiant and *bizarro* soldier
> If any Spaniard ever was valiant:
> And in speaking of him I do not exaggerate one thing
> As shown by most evident testament
> Of his wounds, his years as a soldier,
> His great merit, and his poverty.[668]

Alonso Vazquez followed his predecessors in according well-earned fame to scores of named Spanish soldiers and officers 'well-known in Flanders for his attributes', from prominent officers to a '*soldado mulatto*, one of the veterans of the

---

[666] e.g. Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Canto 111, 122. (*mejor soldado que no ay en la tierra…muy principal para la guerra*)

[667] Giner, *Sitio*, fols. 25r.-26r. (*Perea y Padilla alli muriern* [sic]*/Por seruir a su Rey muy codiciosos …Alli murio Xacon brauo soldado/cabeça de la squadra valerosa/en otras ocasiones tan prouado/que del quedar a fama muy gloriosa*). Paolo Pintacuda, 'Sobre los dos Versiones del *Sitio y Toma*…', in *Idem.* (ed.), *Le Vie dell'epica Ispanica* (Lecce, 2014), pp. 107-9, counts 75 named soldiers in Giner's 1587 edition, expanded to 146, with 71 further allusions to soldiers, in the expanded 1588 edition, the change likely made based on feedback from Giner's fellows on which names the author had missed.

[668] Antunes, *Baxada*, pp. 14-5. (*…El famoso Sabala de quien digo/valiente capitan, y buen guerrero,/de todo quanto scriuo fue testigo, y con su gente nunca fue el postrero…belicoso Gomez de parada,/varon de mucho esfuerço, y osadia…Pedro Nauarro,/siendo Alferez el proprio de la gente,/soldado muy valiente y muy bizarro/si algun Español ay que sea valiente:/y un punto en el hablar no me desgarro,/pues testimonio dan muy euidente/sus heridas, sus años de soldado,/su mucho merescer, su poco estado*). Martínez, *Front Lines*, pp. 49-50 understands *Bizarria* as a 'mix of dash, proud daring, arrogant gallantry and military discipline', the identity of the masculine and proud but technically proficient and obedient soldier that had replaced chivalric *caballeria* among Spanish infantrymen.

Duke of Alba', nicknamed '*Sanguino*, and well-known throughout the Spanish army'- though admittedly, most were *alfereces* or higher, and those rankers he did name were mostly either *entretenidos* (officers without portfolio) or noble *particulares*.[669] A typical example was Vazquez' description of the brave reconnaissance carried out by '*alferez* Alonso de Ribera Zambrana, native of Ubeda, named many times already in these writings as a valiant soldier…and also *alferez* Miron, no less gallant than Ribera, and *alferez* Alonso Mercado, native of Valladolid, as *bizarro* and animated as the other two, accompanied by Martin Lopez de Aybar…one of the most valiant and experienced soldiers'.[670]

Vazquez recorded his fellows' names as a reward for their outstanding services, 'so that these soldiers be better known, who undertook something worthy of eternal memory, and had they done it in sight of Alexander [Farnese] or any other General, he would at least have granted each one a company'.[671] Meanwhile, Vazquez echoed Cerezeda in mentioning his own actions only to portray himself as a dutiful soldier, not a glorious *caballero*, describing himself in passing in the third person, using the first person only to emphasise trustworthiness, and never prioritising his own deeds.[672] Elaborating on his descriptions of individual warriors and their deeds, Vazquez

---

[669] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.526 (*bien conocido en Flandes por sus partes*), III.81, II.418. (*un soldado mulato, de los viejos, del duque de Alba…por otro nombre Sanguino, bien conocido de todo el ejército español*)
[670] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.518. (*alférez Alonso de Ribera Zambrana, natural de Ubeda, ya otras veces nombrado en estos escritos por valiente soldado…también al alférez Miron, no ménos gallardo que Ribera, y con estos dos el alférez Alonso Mercado, natural de Valladolid, tan bizarro y animoso como los otros dos, y estos tres, acompañados con Martin Lopez de Aybar…uno de los más valientes y experimentados soldados*)
[671] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.137. (*He escrito sus nombres y naturaleza para que sean más bien conocidos soldados que emprendieron una cosa digna de eterna memoria, y si la hicieran á vista de Alexandro ó de otro cualquier General, era poco darles á cada uno una compañía*)
[672] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.137. Pintacuda, 'los dos versiones', p. 108 identifies that another change in Giner's 1588 edition was of his narrative voice from first person plural to the third person, which may have reflected a backlash from Giner's peers for misrepresenting his own participation in events.

frequently hinted at the reputational culture and hidden interpersonal links that ran through the *tercio* community:

> He inherited this [bravery and risk-taking] from this father, Captain Alonso del Castillo, who was killed at Maastricht, well known for his fame and valorous deeds; he has a brother no less valorous and animated, Captain Don Alonso del Castillo, now in the pay of the Viceroy of Aragon…when I was a Captain in Brittany, he was my Sergeant and *Alferez*…[673]

Vazquez also hinted at the importance of the professional *cursus honorum* in painstakingly recording not only the deeds and ranks of dozens of individual Spaniards in Flanders, but their later careers, implying the existence of a very active public sphere of Flanders 'alumni'. Like Cerezeda before him, Vazquez consulted fellow veterans for narrative details and even advocated the promotion of named contemporaries, such as:

> Captain Francisdo [sic] de Escames, native of Mojacar, today Castellan of the Castle of San Francisco de la Roca in the Canary Islands; in Flanders he was the Sergeant and the *Alferez* of Don Sancho Martinez de Leiva, outstanding as a most valiant soldier, and esteemed as such by Alexander, and who in action fought and stood out as rare as anyone: he is a veteran soldier and very daring and experienced, and deserves to occupy more pre-eminent and honoured positions than that which he has now.[674]

This concern for the reputation of his contemporaries and fellow professionals not simply in the afterlife of *fama* but in the living, present public sphere could be expressed in more negative terms. Describing a brutal reprisal by Spaniards against civilians, he commented darkly that 'although I know their names, I do not say them, because some of them still live and occupy most pre-eminent charges'.[675]

---

[673] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.415-16. (*el cual heredó del capitan Alonso del Castillo, su padre, que mataron sobre Mastriq, bien conocido por su fama y valerosos hechos; tiene un hermano no ménos valiente y animoso, que es el capitan D. ALONSO DEL CASTILLO, hoy entretenido cerca la persona del virey de Aragon…y siendo yo Capitan en Bretaña fue Sargento y Alférez de mi compañía*)

[674] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.9; III.388. (*El capitan FRANCISDO DE ESCAMES, natural de Mojaca, hoy Castellano del castillo de San Francisco de la Roca, en las islas de Canaria; fue en Flandes Sargento y Alférez de D. Sancho Martinez de Leiva, escogido por valentísimo soldado, y estimado por tal de Alexandro, y que en las ocasiones de la guerra peleó y se señaló tan bizarramente como el que más; es soldado antiguo y muy arriscado y de experiencia, y que merece ocupar más preeminentes y honrados puestos del que hoy tiene*). See also e.g. II.65.

[675] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.394. (*aunque sé sus nombres no los digo porque algunos dellos viven y ocupan cargos muy preeminentes*)

Indeed, though Vazquez broadly echoed proud Spanish infantrymen like Vargas or Cerezeda in presenting the Army of Flanders as an idealised, generally harmonious military collective, his chronicle repeatedly touched on the interplay between reputation and rivalry. As Parma's 'passionate defender' Vazquez carefully justified the Prince's actions against the accusations of incompetence, corruption, and disobedience that surrounded Parma's Captain-Generalcy by his death in 1592.[676] Vazquez thus justified Parma's operational decisions by appealing tacitly to the professional authority of the reader's military expertise and denigrating that of Parma's critics: 'although some judged this retreat of Alexander…to have been neither good nor appropriate, they did not look at it like soldiers…those who spoke of it without passion [i.e. bias] and like prudent soldiers, judged it fortunate and good'.[677] As with Cerezeda's wily treatment of defeats like Ceresole and Algiers, we can thus observe the careful massaging of military failure to rebut criticism of a *Gran Capitan.*

As de León identifies, Parma's tenure witnessed considerable fracture within the Army's senior officer corps. Vazquez' acknowledgement of, and engagement with, military rivalry, gossip, and dissension extended below Parma's own mixed reputation to defend or censure controversial mid-ranking figures, such as his old *Maestre de Campo*, Sancho Martinez de Leiva (d.1601), whom Vazquez carefully defended from blame for the mutiny and infamous disbandment of the *Tercio Viejo* of Lombardy in 1589.[678] No less than Cerezeda's chronicle, Vazquez' treatment of named contemporaries would merit dedicated close study in archival context, to reconstruct the

---

[676] Castrillo, *El Arte Militar*, p. 57; e.g. Vazquez, *Sucesos,* III.63, III.68. On Parma's poor reputation, especially among Spanish politico-military officers, see Parker, *Dutch Revolt*, pp. 228-30; Juan Carlos Losada, *Los Generales de Flandes* (Madrid, 2007), pp. 228-32.
[677] Vazquez, *Suceso*, III.291. (*y aunque algunos juzgaron desta retirada de Alexandro de los cuarteles de Caudebeque que no había sido buena ni á propósito, no lo miraban como soldados…los que sin pasion y como prudentes soldados hablaban en este caso, lo juzgaban por felice y dichoso*)
[678] e.g. Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.433-5; Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 188.

institutional and interpersonal links of patronage, reputation, and rivalry in the key Spanish *plaza de armas* of the day. However, the best evidence of the importance of rivalry in the Spanish military public sphere, and of military writing in defending the names and memories of prominent officers, was the exculpatory *Commentary* of Colonel Francisco Verdugo. Verdugo served as military governor of Frisia from 1581 and suffered a string of defeats culminating in the fall of Groningen in 1594, and wrote his commentaries after being recalled.[679] As Fagel identifies, Verdugo's text defended him by blaming his failures on the court and high command, including Parma himself, to which he added insufficient support from his own subordinates, insufficient funds, local hostility, desertion, and disciplinary breakdown. Meanwhile, Verdugo highlighted his own praiseworthy services, claimed he could have beaten Maurice in Frisia were it not for the influence of his 'secret enemies' at court, and wrote to preserve his reputation from those at the court of Flanders who unfairly 'obscure my services out of their passions or personal interests'.[680]

As well as deflecting blame, Verdugo hastened to take credit for his successes and to depict himself as a skilled commander, such as at Noordhorn (1581), where 'as I knew the position…I advised our people not to attack without my order…I detached 200 arquebusiers from my regiment on the right…'. His narrative thus stressed his own responsibility for 'the movement of squadrons in which consisted, after the will of God, the victory that resulted'.[681] Of one tactical failure he similarly claimed that 'I wanted to fight, being able to do it with…commodity, security and reason of war', and blamed the

[679] Raymond Fagel, 'Alejandro Farnesio y Francisco Verdugo', *Tiempos Modernos*, 35 (2017), pp. 14-29.
[680] Verdugo, *Commentario*, pp. 1-2. (*siendo advertido de la corte destos estados de los malos officios que en ella algunos me hazen contra razon procurando por sus passiones ó particulares intercesses escurecer mis servicios…secretos emulos*)
[681] Verdugo, *Commentario*, pp. 15-6. (*Conociendo yo el sitio…fui avisando á los nuestros que no se moviessen sin que yo les diesse la orden…puse…saque de nuestro cuerno derecho hasta doscientos arcabuzeros de mi regimiento…mover sus esquadrones en que consistia, despues de la voluntad de Dios, la Victoria como succedió*)

'hypocrisy and artifice' of his subordinate officers in disagreeing, resulting in the enemy being able to fortify while Verdugo's pleas for orders from above went unanswered.[682] As such, his *Commentary* is unusually good evidence of how Spanish military writers produced their works and elaborated ideas of military perfection with a constant preoccupation with their own present and future reputation, and that of their peers, as well as more high-minded discussions of technical proficiency, in the military public sphere.

[682] Verdugo, *Commentario*, p. 28. (*quise pelear pudiendo hazerlo con mas commodidad, seguridad y razon de guerra*)

II. *Martiall Industrie*: The English Military Public Sphere

iii. Military Literature

To an even greater extent than their Spanish counterparts, participants in the vibrant world of Elizabethan soldier-writing were influenced by their realm's military, geopolitical, and political contexts in assembling and publishing their texts. The relative lack of military opportunities in the comparatively peaceful 1570s encouraged martial nostalgia and defences of the military profession's values and necessity in the present among English soldier-writers, while treatment of the Dutch war as a worthy Protestant cause or a lesson in military unpreparedness further drove some authors to advocate a renewal of English martial virtues.

By 1585, England had already developed a respectable body of military theory, and as in the Spanish case, English theorists generally depicted idealised armies largely divorced from geopolitical contexts, or national realities. Nonetheless, as Table 3 in Appendix 1 shows, the formal outbreak of war with Spain, expansion of crown military efforts and concomitant increase in military opportunities for professional soldiers, and a broader 'militarisation of the Elizabethan state' and society for the strategic offensive and defensive alike, clearly drove a wave of English military theory from the late 1580s onwards.[683] In production and content, this may have been further encouraged by specific aspects of English military organisation: the absence of a professional, permanent force comparable to the Spanish infantry system and Army of Flanders, and conversely the expansion in crown forces and the creation of a trained militia under

[683] Nolan, 'Militarization of the Elizabethan State', pp. 391-420. Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, p. 228, sees military treatises as one response to the 'challenges and opportunities presented by threats to the Kingdom's security', coloured by English 'cultural values variously rooted in the chivalric code, Protestantism, and humanistic concepts of service to the commonwealth'. *Idem.*, 'Organized Violence in the Elizabethan Martial Republic', *History*, 99/336 (July 2014), p. 424, likewise saw these texts as another manifestation of 'military voluntarism' by England's political nation.

threat of invasion, respectively may have contributed to English calls for officer professionalisation in military treatises, and may have helped create a demand for these treatises themselves. The geographic distribution of English military publishing in Table 4 suggests that Flanders never became a centre for martial print culture, unlike in the Spanish case.

The lack of a permanent, self-conscious English infantry force was also reflected in the absence of any kind of memoir culture among junior soldiers comparable to the Spanish 'gunpowder epics'. Finally, as in the Spanish case, ties with senior politico-military figures or the ambitions of soldier-writers could influence both their decisions to produce their texts, and their content, in their discourses of loyalty and in authors aligning with the martial ethos and ideologically and geopolitically militant policies advanced by such figureheads.

The most obvious interactions between the pike and the pen in Elizabethan England were the works of three prominent authors who served in England's wars and wrote at length about their own experiences, those of their countrymen, and the military profession itself. The poet and Low Countries volunteer George Gascoigne identified '*tam marti quam mercutio*', and his 'Fruites of Warre' was a complex but valuable window into the preoccupations of frustrated English warriors in the 1570s.[684] The highly prolific poet and pamphleteer Thomas Churchyard had a long military career stretching from 1543 to 1587.[685] Of particular interest to this thesis are Churchyard's two military chronicles, *Wofull Warres in Flanders* (1578), and his longer *General Rehearsal of Warres* (1579), both holding up for emulation the military deeds of

[684] George Gascoigne, 'The fruites of Warre, written upon this Theame, Dulce Bellum inexpertis', in *The Posies of George Gascoigne Esquire* (London, 1575).
[685] Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard*, p. 226.

English gentlemen on the continent over the last quarter-century.[686] Churchyard was joined in his 'martial backlash' against England's pre-1585 military stagnation and lack of regard or opportunity for soldiers by Barnaby Rich, 'the most prolific military author in England during Elizabethan and early Jacobean times', who wrote a string of treatises from 1574 to 1604.[687] Accordingly, Elizabeth Heale identifies Gascoigne, Churchyard, and Rich as a new generation of soldier-writers and a new genre, voicing their thoughts of, and disappointments in the military profession in the decade before open war with Spain.[688]

Later, in somewhat happier times for professional soldiers with the expansion of English forces post-1585, two prominent English commanders would compose valuable memoirs. Sir Roger Williams' truncated narrative of the early Dutch wars was not published until 1618, but paralleled Mendoza's *Comentarios*, if not in length, then in the military sophistication of the narratives and in the prominence of the authors in their respective national military communities.[689] Sir Francis Vere, an equally eminent contemporary, also composed a series of self-aggrandising 'Commentaries' narrating his own commands against the Spanish.[690] Williams' and Vere's texts resemble the Spanish sources discussed above in their 'collective', wide-angle narrative of troop movements and engagements along with their realistic depiction of gunpowder positional warfare and appreciation of skilled command, but did not show the same drive to praise named outstanding warriors, nor the infantry collective.

---

[686] Thomas Churchyard, *A Lamentable, and pitifull Description, of the wofull warres in Flaunders…* (London, 1578); Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*.
[687] Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science*, p. 27; Rapple, *Martial Power*, p. 55.
[688] Elizabeth Heale, 'The voice of the soldier in Gascoigne, Rich and Churchyard', *Early Modern Literary Studies*, 14.1/18 (2008), pp. 1-39.
[689] Sir Roger Williams, *The Actions of the Low Countries* (London, 1618).
[690] Sir Francis Vere, *Commentaries…being diverse pieces of service…* (Cambridge, 1657).

Meanwhile, English soldier-writers produced a very impressive body of military treatises, distinguished by specific military teaching and broad advocacy for English martial renewal, as well as influence from the contexts of national defence of the Protestant nation against the Spanish threat, and- initially, before the outbreak of war- the volunteer movement to the Low Countries. Barnaby Rich's *Mercury and an English Soldier* (1574) used a fantastical dialogue to discuss the virtues and vices of military service.[691] Rich's *Alarm to England* (1578) 'recapitulated' the earlier text, including the 'vindication of the martial profession', the complaints about England's lack of regard for soldiers- a theme rapidly emerging to define Elizabethan martial culture- and warned ominously about military unpreparedness.[692] In the same year, Thomas Proctor's *Knowledge and Conduct of Warres* defended arms and 'the martial value of history', again reflecting the perceived military stagnation of England in the 1570s, before discussing tactics, operations, and soldierly qualities.[693]

In 1579, the Low Countries volunteer Geoffrey Gates similarly warned of the dire consequences of military ineffectiveness, constructing an extensive, wide-ranging defence of arms as well as a more specific call to zealous militarism in a text that reflected the author's own military experience, religious convictions, and personal connections with 'notable Protestant warriors' of the day.[694] The *Castle, or Picture of Policy* (1581) of Gates' friend William Blandy served both as another discourse on military honour and command, again in the religiously charged context of the Dutch revolt, and a lavish panegyric to recent English actions in the Low Countries.[695] David Lawrence thus places Blandy's text alongside those of Churchyard, and Gates (who

[691] Barnaby Rich, *A…Dialogue betwene Mercury and an English Souldier* (London, 1574).
[692] Barnaby Rich, *Allarme to England…* (London, 1578); Rapple, *Martial Power*, p. 69.
[693] Thomas Proctor, *Of the Knowledge and Conducte of Warres* (London, 1578); Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science*, p. 5.
[694] Geoffrey Gates, *The Defence of Militarie Profession…* (London, 1579); 'Gates, Geoffrey', *DNB.*
[695] William Blandy, *The Castle, or picture of policy* (London, 1581).

appears as an interlocutor in Blandy's dialogue), all three authors raising a 'call to arms' for English gentleman swordsmen in absence of formal English involvement in the Netherlands.[696] Meanwhile, the father-and-son duo Lawrence and Thomas Digges published *Stratioticos* (1579), a detailed work of instruction in military mathematics including a book of officer duties, and in 1590 Digges, having since served in the Low Countries, would produce both an expanded and revised version of *Stratioticos*, and a short, separate treatise on military corruption appended to his narrative of the Sluis campaign.[697] In 1581 appeared Thomas Styward's *Pathway to Martial Discipline*, a comprehensive study of military organisation including officer duties, weapons, and deployment, but using the same rhetoric of national defence and military reform that coloured all contemporary English military theory.[698]

The later, more sophisticated generation of military handbooks clearly responded to the outbreak and intensification of war from 1585, and was again opened by Barnaby Rich, with the 1587 publication of his most detailed treatise, *Path-Way to Military Practice*.[699] In 1590, three editions were published of Roger Williams' *Briefe Discourse of War*, advocating military permanence, professionalism, and meritocratic promotion, on the model of the Army of Flanders- in which Williams himself had served, and which he had fought against.[700] The same year, Williams' rival Sir John Smythe published his *Certain Discourses*, renowned for advocating continued longbow use, though this argument was only part of Smythe's (otherwise more typical) vision of

[696] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, pp. 23-7.
[697] Leonard and Thomas Digges, *An Arithmeticall Militare treatise, named Stratioticos* (London, 1579, 2nd ed. 1590); Thomas Digges, 'Another Addition concerning certain chiefe officers', in *A Breife and true report of...the reliefe of the Towne of Sluce* (London, 1590).
[698] Thomas Styward, *The Pathwaie to Martiall Discipline…* (London, 1581).
[699] Barnaby Rich, *A Path-Way to Military Practice…* (London, 1587).
[700] Sir Roger Williams, *A Briefe Discourse of Warre* (London, 1590). Williams' treatise, Styward's *Pathwaie*, and Whitehorne's Machiavelli, each had three editions, possibly making them the most popular English military works.

military perfection, and it was likely his criticism of England's officer corps in the Low Countries that proved most controversial.[701] The longbow-gun debate also provoked Humfrey Barwick's 1592 defence of 'manuall weapons of fire', and an anonymous pro-longbow treatise in 1596.[702]

Meanwhile, in 1591 appeared Gyles Clayton's handbook of 'the approved order of martial discipline', and a long *Arte of Warre* by William Garrard, formerly of the Army of Flanders.[703] John Smythe's hitherto-suppressed second printed treatise, *Instructions, Observations, and Orders Military*, appeared in 1594, and 1595 saw the anonymous but pithy *Myrrour for English Souldiers.*[704] Robert Barret's *Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres* was published in 1598, a detailed dialogue on contemporary infantry tactics and command, with extensive plagiarism from Bernardino de Escalante.[705] The final years of the war saw further martial treatises by Rich in dialogue between a naïve militia officer and a continental veteran, and the posthumous publication of two further short treatises by Thomas Digges.[706] There had also developed a body of specialist textbooks on gunnery, fortification, and military law, including an important work on military law and ethics by Matthew Sutcliffe, and both

---

[701] Sir John Smythe, *Certain Discourses Written…* (London, 1590); J.R. Hale (ed.), introduction to *Certain Discourses Military* (Ithaca, 1964), pp. lvi-lxiii.
[702] Humfrey Barwick, *Breefe Discourse* (London, 1592); 'R.S.', *A Briefe Treatise…of Archerie* (London, 1596). On this debate, see Jonathan Davies, 'The Decline of the Longbow', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 80.321 (Spring 2002), pp. 16-31.
[703] Gyles Clayton, *The Approoved Order of Martial Discipline…* (Middelburgh, 1591); William Garrard, ed. Robert Hichcocke, *The Arte of Warre…* (London, 1591).
[704] Sir John Smythe, *Certen Instructions, Obseruations and orders Mylitarie…* (London, 1594); *A Myrrour for English Souldiers…* (London, 1595).
[705] Robert Barret, *The Theorike and Practike* (London, 1598); cf. e.g. Barret, *Theorike,* p. 92 and Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 43v.
[706] Barnaby Rich, *A Martial Conference…* (London, 1598); Thomas and Dudley Digges, *Foure Paradoxes, or politique Discourses* (London, 1604).

classical and modern translations of relevant military texts including at least three Spanish authors (Vega, Valdes, and Mendoza, possibly joined by Londoño).[707]

English theorists were no more 'armchair Generals' than their Spanish counterparts- as Appendix 2 shows- and their texts were similarly intended as serious guides to the modern art of war. Most English soldier-writers emphasised their qualifications and expertise from 'the tyme of service which I my selfe have seene and marked', and drew on 'what I have either practiced by experience, seene by example, or gathered by Historie concerning Martiality', stressing especially their service on the continent.[708] As in Spain, the professionalism of military writing is also seen in the disdain directed at civilian contributors 'which had ne'er seen the field'.[709]

English soldier-writers also wrote expressly for a military audience and declared the practical intentions of their works, 'according to my profession…for the camp, and not for the carpet'.[710] Barret stressed that his *Theorike and Practike* was 'not to instruct the experimented souldier; but to shew unto the unskilled and willing minded Gentlemen, the most points used…in these our moderne warres' under threat of invasion. He further followed Escalante in modestly offering it to the national military community, especially 'martiall men better experimented than myselfe'.[711] Garrard

---

[707] William Bourne, *The Arte of Shooting in great Ordnaunce* (London, 1587); Paul Ive, *The Practice of Fortification* (London, 1589); Matthew Sutcliffe, *The Practice, Proceedings and Lawes of Armes* (London, 1593); Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science*, p. 6; e.g. François de la Noue, tr. Edward Aggas, *Politicke and Militarie Discourses* (London, 1587); Luis Gutiérrez de la Vega, *Compendious Treatise,* tr. Nicholas Lichefield (London, 1582), Francisco de Valdes, *The Sergeant Maiour…*, tr. John Thorius (London, 1590), Bernardino de Mendoza, tr. Sir Edward Hoby, *Theorique and Practise of Warre*, (London, 1597); *Transcript of the Company of Stationers of London*, ed. Edward Arber (privately printed, London, 5 vols., 1875-94), ii.251b.

[708] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. A.ii.r.; Rich, *Path-way*, unpag.; e.g. Clayton, *Martiall Discipline*, sig. A3r.; Smythe, *Instructions*, sig. A4r. See also Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, cover, and Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 29, stressing the authors' experience in Spanish armies.

[709] Sutcliffe, *Practice, Proceedings*, sig. A4v.; George Whetstone, *The Honourable Reputation of a Souldier* (London, 1585), sig. Aii.r.-v.

[710] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, sig. A.ii.v.-A.iii.r.

[711] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 233. cf. Escalante, *Dialogos*, sig. A.2.v.

promised ‘exercises the Sergeants and Officers are daily & duely to instruct generally and privately each souldier’, and like Sancho de Londoño hoped that ‘they may ever read [them] as a lecture to their soldiers’.[712]

As in the Spanish case, there is some evidence that English officers owned, read, and used these texts; Barret and Barnaby Rich both criticised officers who relied too much on written formation instructions, the former imagining one bookish captain tying his troops up in theoretical parade-ground manoeuvres until reduced to crying ‘hola Maister, stand still until I have looked in my Booke!’.[713] Sir John Smythe claimed in his appeal against the censorship of *Certain Discourses* that it sold 1200 copies in eight days.[714] A 1595 bookseller’s catalogue included several English military treatises, with translated military texts, alongside works of medicine and scientific instruction, instead of ‘matters of Delight and Pleasure’.[715]

Finally, as in the Spanish case, there is a sense that English soldier-writers wrote not in isolation, but as contributors to a growing national ‘large fielde of…authors that have written on the arte of warre’ and a burgeoning culture of military discussion.[716] English writers, like the Spaniards, referenced each other's works.[717] There were also hints at deeper cultures of verbal discussion and debate. Barwick mentioned having ‘at sundry times had conference with divers persons’ debating the theories of Smythe and Williams and expected his readership of ‘all skilfull Captains and soldiers’ to be accustomed ‘to heare such arguments and so many reasons and devices’ on weapon

---

[712] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 21-2; cf. Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 43r.-v.
[713] Barret, *Theorike*, pp. 5-6; Rich, *Martial Conference*, sig. E3r.
[714] Smythe to Lord Burghley, MS Lansdowne 65/62.
[715] Andrew Maunsell, *Catalogue of English Printed Books* (London, 1595).
[716] Sir Henry Knyvette, ‘A Briefe Treatise’, MS Lansdowne 1225/1, fo. 3r.; cf. Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, sig. ¶5r., complaining of the lack of English military theory in 1578.
[717] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 35-60, 81; Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 23; Barwick, *Weapons of fire*, sig. A2r-3r.; Sir John Smythe, ‘Aunswer to Contrarie Opinions’, London, British Library, MS Harley 135, fo. 2r., 6r.; Rich’s 1598 military satire may have parodied Smythe specifically: cf. Rich, *Martial Conference*, sig. H.v. and Smythe, *Discourses*, sig. A.v.-A2r.

use.[718] Like their Spanish contemporaries, English military thinkers existed in a public sphere of discussion and debate, and expected their precepts to be read, considered, and even put into practice by their fellow professional soldiers.

iv. The Community of Captains

Meanwhile, as England's war effort intensified and coalesced under prominent aristocratic commanders, it is possible to discern similar interaction between military writing, command, patronage, and the military public sphere. This is most clearly the case in how some key figureheads of the martial community actively participated in military theory culture. As Hammer and Adams both point out, Elizabeth's limited commitment to centralised military organisation encouraged its devolution, arguably even more than was typical for the period, on 'aristocratic military patrons'. Such figures were thus perhaps even more important than in the Spanish case as focal points of patronage and careerism, connections between military professionals, and military theory discussion culture.[719] Specifically on the last point, Lawrence argues, with reference to the interpersonal 'circles' of patronage that underpinned English military organisation from the early 1580s, that 'the military circle was more than just a haven for soldiers, it also served as a forum for discussion of military and political affairs, and it is in these circles that we find evidence for the use of military books in knowledge transactions'.[720] Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester, as royal favourite and commander in the Low Countries from 1585 as well as warlord of preparations against the 1588 Armada, held a 'near monopoly of military patronage' until his death that year and

[718] Barwick, *Weapons of fire*, sig. A2r.-B3r.
[719] Simon Adams, 'The English Military Clientele 1542-1618', in Roger Mettam and Charles Giry-Deloison (eds.), *Patronages et Clientélismes* (Lille, 1995), pp. 216-7; Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars*, p. 242.
[720] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 51.

enthusiastically encouraged both traditional and new military values and activity.[721] Leicester was himself tutored by amateur militarist John Dee, who advocated arithmetic as one of a soldier's 'chief counsaylors' and whose library included an extensive collection of modern military theory.[722] Dee's circle brought Leicester into contact with Lawrence and Thomas Digges, and the Earl appointed the devoted latter his Muster-Master-General in the Low Countries.[723] Leicester also patronised and supported Matthew Sutcliffe and Roger Williams, describing the latter as 'worth his weight in gold, for he is noe more valiant than he is wise'.[724] Leicester's prominence as a politico-military figurehead and his political and confessional preoccupations with the national and international 'Protestant Cause' also likely influenced the content of English military literature, with its calls for English martial renewal to support the confessional struggle in the Netherlands.[725]

Other notable members of Leicester's circle likewise engaged with military theory. Gabriel Harvey, associate of prominent politico-military figures including Leicester, Sidney, and the soldier and writer Sir Humphrey Gilbert (1537-1583), annotated his copy of Machiavelli's *Arte of Warre* with a list of texts he himself would take to war, singling out English as well as classical and Italian works, especially 'the Spanish discipline under the Duke of Alba, and the Prince of Parma, the best discipline

---

[721] Adams, 'English Military Clientele', p. 224. On Leicester's patronage networks, their confessional dimensions, and their role in his military endeavours, see Simon Adams, *Leicester and the Court* (Manchester, 2002).
[722] Trim, 'Martial Poetics', pp. 589-90; Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, pp. 51-2.
[723] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 52.
[724] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 64. John Bruce (ed.), *Correspondence of Robert Dudley* (London, 1844), p. 430.
[725] e.g. George Gascoigne may have been motivated by his own ambitions in aligning his polemic against Philip's soldiers with anti-Spanish interests at court: C. Buchanan, 'The Massacre of St Bartholomew's and the Sack of Antwerp: Print and Political Responses' (Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics, 2011), p. 198, 233. On Leicester's martial ideologies, see S. Adams, 'The Protestant Cause: religious alliance with the West European Calvinist communities as a political issue in England, 1585-1630' (D.Phil thesis, University of Oxford, 1973).

now in use, newly discovered by Sir Roger Williams'.[726] In this, Harvey concurred with his former master, Leicester having described the *tercios* as 'the best soldiers of this day in Christendom'.[727]

After Leicester's death, his stepson Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex became the figurehead and focus of loyalty and patronage in England's burgeoning military public sphere, as well as of aspirations for English, and broader Protestant, martial endeavours.[728] Essex's public status was inseparable from his military activities and 'ardent expectations of martial honour' and as Adams identifies, Essex's following among men of war was even greater than Leicester's, as years of campaigning had increased the size of England's community of aspirant officers, whom Essex made a more 'aggressive' effort to cultivate.[729] Essex was 'trained up to the knowledge both of Armes and Letters' and like Leicester, his patronage circles reflected not merely his military service and identity, but specifically his strong interest in military thought and the techniques and ethics of the 'profession'- as he himself called it.[730] Most significantly, Essex served with and had a close relationship with Roger Williams, and as Hammer points out, Essex closely followed Williams' precepts in his public image, his efforts at military reform, his command style, and his advocacy for the interests of professional officers.[731] Among other texts, Essex sponsored Matthew Sutcliffe's treatise on military law and ethics, which, naturally, supported his views on urgent

---

[726] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, pp. 55-61; Lisa Jardine and Anthony Grafton, '"Studied for Action"', *Past & Present*, 129 (1990), p. 39, 74; 'Gilbert, Sir Humphrey', *DNB*.
[727] Colin Martin and Geoffrey Parker, *Armada* (New Haven, 2022), p. 57.
[728] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, pp. 63-7.
[729] Alexandra Gajda, *The Earl of Essex and Late Elizabethan Political Culture* (Oxford, 2012), p. 5; Adams, 'English Military Clientele', p. 225; Paul E.J. Hammer, *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics* (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 147-8, 269-315.
[730] Gervase Markham, *Honour in his Perfection* (London, 1624), p. 27; Mervyn James, 'At a Crossroads of the Political Culture', in *Society, Politics and Culture*, p. 416; Earl of Essex to Lord Burghley, 2nd Sept. 1590, TNA SP 12/233, fo. 104.
[731] Hammer, *Polarisation*, pp. 147-8, 237-9. Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, sig. A2r.-v. was dedicated to Essex, and Williams also intended to dedicate his military memoir to the Earl.

national military mobilisation to prosecute the Spanish war.[732] The Earl authored his own project for the creation of trained veteran infantry regiments, backed technological and institutional innovation, and generally supported the 'modern, professional approach to war' of military theory on the Spanish model, as much as more traditional martial cultures.[733] English military writers, displaying their loyalty to Essex as their 'great patron of the warrs' and the champion of their 'wild enthusiasm for vigilant militarism', were clearly influenced by his political and ideological agenda of an intensified 'crusade' against Spain, against rival, less warlike voices in the late Elizabethan polity. They followed the Earl in glorying in martial deeds and technical military improvement, and were committed to an intensification of English military activity and proficiency to meet the Spanish threat.[734] Military treatises were thus an important aspect of how the Earl's politico-military career, martial aspirations, and role as a figurehead in late 1590s political factionalism, impacted English print and intellectual culture.[735]

Essex's subordinate on the 1597 Azores expedition and successor as Lord Deputy in Ireland, Charles Blount, 8th Baron Mountjoy (1563-1606), was renowned as 'a good peece of a Scholler' who had 'grown by reading…to the theory of a souldier', using both books and command experience in the Low Countries 'to acquaintance of the

[732] Heuser, *Strategy before Clausewitz*, pp. 91-116. Essex also patronised Alberico Gentili, 'the most important theorist of international politics in Europe in the late sixteenth century'; English editions of Gentili's writings on the laws of war were dedicated to Essex and quoted in his *Apologie*. Gentili's writings reflected specific military contexts of the Spanish war: first supporting defence against invasion, later advocating a 'more aggressive pan-European strategy': Gajda, *Earl of Essex*, pp. 75-6.
[733] L.W. Henry, 'The Earl of Essex as Strategist and Military Organiser', *English Historical Review*, 68/268 (1953), p. 370; Hammer, *Polarisation*, p. 241.
[734] Hammer, *Polarisation*, p. 269; e.g. Barret, *Theorike*, pp. 1-2, with the expert Captain insisting to the sceptical Gentleman in 1598 that the continued Spanish threat and war in Ireland means that English gentlemen still need martial motivation and technical military competence; Gajda, *Earl of Essex*, p. 74. On Essex's political, strategic, and ideological agendas, see Hammer, *Polarisation*, pp. 393-404; Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, pp. 337-87; Earl of Essex, *Apologie* (London, 1600).
[735] Alzada Tipton, 'Dedications of Printed Works to the Earl of Essex', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, LII/1 (2021), pp. 111-32.

practique of the War'.[736] After preventing him from returning to war in France, Elizabeth allegedly told Mountjoy to 'follow books, read and discourse of warre'- demonstrating Mountjoy's reputation as a martial scholar, and an understanding that senior commanders could read and discuss military theory.[737] Mountjoy's operational art in Ireland included modern fortifications as well as traditional counterinsurgency methods, perhaps inspired by his reading as well as his experience in the Low Countries.[738] Peregrine Bertie, 13th Baron Willoughby (1555-1601), another senior member of the Essex clique and commander of the 1589 Normandy expedition, reported foreign military developments back to Essex, supported the Earl's efforts to become Master of the Ordnance by writing treatises on munitions reform, and was known as 'a great M[aste]r of the Art Militarie'.[739] Two other members of Essex's circle and confidantes in his Rising, Henry Wriothesley, 3rd Earl of Southampton (1573-1624) and Sir Charles Danvers, amassed an extensive collection of continental military literature including recently published Spanish manuals.[740] Sir Francis Vere owned many foreign military books, interacted with military classicism, and also appears to have participated in military theory culture more directly, later claiming that he dictated to Essex a treatise for novice officers on the Cadiz expedition, based on 'my industrie and experience', which 'took so good effect that no question arose'.[741] Again, the real significance here is the incorporation of military theory and thought into the matrix of the ideal commander, as Vere unquestionably presented himself.

---

[736] Robert Naunton, *Fragmenta Regalia* (London, 1641), pp. 37-8; Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, pp. 67-8; Cyril Falls, *Mountjoy* (London, 1955).
[737] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 68.
[738] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 71; John McGurk, 'Terrain and Conquest', in Padraig Linihan (ed.), *War in Seventeenth-Century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001), p. 100; Manning, *Apprenticeship*, p. 20.
[739] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 66; Hammer, *Polarisation*, p. 236; Naunton, *Fragmenta*, p. 22 ; 'Bertie, Peregrine, thirteenth Baron Willoughby', *DNB*.
[740] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 46.
[741] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, pp. 97-100; Vere, *Commentaries*, pp. 26-7; Clement Edmondes, *Observations…of Caesars Commentaries* (London, 1600), sig. *ii.r.

Like their Spanish contemporaries, English soldier-writers thus used their works to construct discourses of loyalty to senior military figures, by praising them as ideal men of war. Barnaby Rich dedicated his 1574 treatise to his fellow veteran of Newhaven, Ambrose Dudley, 3rd Earl of Warwick (d.1590), 'a father to souldiers', as his 'valiaunt acts' and having 'passed so many brunts' in war qualified Warwick to 'thoroughly deeme of such labours'.[742] Digges' dedication of *Stratioticos* to Warwick's brother and fellow veteran of the San Quentin campaign, Leicester, likewise argued that the dedicatee's experience of 'having…borne honourable Office in the field' qualified him to 'discerne the Veritie and Valour of this worke'.[743] The posthumous publication of Garrard's treatise stressed the martial character of its dedicatee, Essex, 'whose race assured him a souldier' from birth and who had since been distinguished by his 'valour'.[744]

Military narratives, however, functioned as vehicles for English soldier-writers to praise their superiors as paragons of Generalship in much more complex and sophisticated ways than simply declaring the dedicatee's affinity for war. William Blandy, in his summary of praiseworthy officers in the Low Countries, held up John Norreys, 'now Generall of the Armye of the States in Frieseland' as a model commander, 'for where the desire of true honour, & glory is in the Generall imprinted, there the Captaynes, officers, and souldiars…are much more set on fire and enkindeled'.[745] Thomas Digges' *Briefe Reporte* of Leicester's operations in the Low Countries was, likely due to the mixed results of the campaign in reality, an exclusively positive narrative, prefiguring Spanish depictions of Parma in portraying the Earl as a

[742] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. A.ii.r.-v.; Thomas M. Cranfill and Dorothy Hart Bruce, *Barnaby Rich* (Austin, 1953), pp. 15-6. Warwick had commanded the 1562 English expedition to Le Havre/Newhaven. 'Dudley, Ambrose, earl of Warwick', *DNB*.
[743] Digges, *Stratioticos*, sig. A.ii.r.-v.
[744] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, sig. 4.r.-v.
[745] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 25r.

perfect Captain, a 'personage of nobilitie, valure and wisdome'.[746] Like Miguel Giner, Digges stressed how his master shared the dangers, hardships, and labour of his soldiers, 'himselfe in person within arcabuze shot'.[747] Digges likewise stressed Leicester's diligence and skill as a General, 'in the field giving order from the beginning' at Zutphen, listening to the advice of his subordinates (one of Vazquez' key preoccupations) and generally portraying the Earl as a technically proficient, diligent, perfect Captain.[748]

English soldier-writers also aggrandised the reputation of other, less exalted, named members of the national military community, albeit officers and gentlemen only, and in smaller numbers than Vazquez' titanic *Sucesos* or the 'gunpowder epics'. Woodcock stresses how 'the recording of the names of both victorious and fallen fighting men, and the preservation of their deeds', was an important motive for English soldier-writers, citing Churchyard, Blandy, Gates, and Digges.[749] Thomas Churchyard was especially significant; his interest in the lives and memories of outstanding soldiers was reflected in his epitaphs for prominent warriors and the inclusion of a contents page of soldiers' names in his 1599 translation of *Historica Belgica* as well as the two chronicles under examination here.[750] Churchyard recorded such names and deeds 'worthie to be spoken of' lest they 'escape the praise of the world', and, also like the Spaniards, took care to accurately apportion credit for specific deeds.[751] Typically for an English soldier-writer, Churchyard recorded such matter not only to apportion 'due

[746] Thomas Digges, *A Briefe Report of the Militarie Service…by the Erle of Leicester* (London, 1587), fo. 1v.
[747] Digges, *Militarie Service*, sig. C2v.
[748] Digges, *Militarie Service*, sig. D1v.-2r.
[749] Matthew Woodcock, 'Introduction', in Woodcock and O'Mahony, *Early Modern Military Identities*, p. 9.
[750] Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard*, p. 210.
[751] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. G.iii.v.-iv.r., G.i.v.; Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard*, p. 210 highlights the biographical role of the text and estimates c.230 names are mentioned.

renowne' for each man's 'painfull labours', but to 'animate and enourage others' to emulate such praiseworthy warriors'.[752]

This drive to praise named contemporaries is firstly visible in how earlier Elizabethan military writers looked back to the wars of the mid-century, on which they focused much of their militant nostalgia for when 'he was thought happie and more valiaunt, that sought credite by the exercise of Armes'.[753] Rich's *Mercury and the English Soldier* named the English Captains encountered at the heavenly 'court of Mars', the author reserving his most generous praise for 'the noble Captaine Audley, whose prowess and valiaunce…hath made him famous to every inferiour person'.[754] Churchyard likewise trumpeted the names of prominent participants in the mid-century wars, as 'those gentlemen did suche service in those days, as thei deserve to be honoured for the same in their owne Countrie whiles the world lasteth'.[755] His narration of the 1550s campaigns focused on the deeds and fortunes of individual named Englishmen, with obvious 'manly', individualist, and chivalric overtones: 'Willyam Spenser…cried *a charge, a charge…*and fought with such courage and manhoode'.[756] Lines such as 'no one of the garrison retourned to the toune, without his launces broken' obviously echoed the chivalric, noble-martial mentalities of Henry Howard, Earl of Surrey, whom Churchyard himself had served as a page.[757]

Yet Churchyard's 'commendation of others' also aggrandised the reputation of living, active members of the military community.[758] He expended considerable text praising 'Captain Reade (now in the garrison of Berwick) a man so worthy of memory,

---

[752] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. G.iv.r.
[753] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. A.i.r.
[754] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. Br.-v.
[755] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. A.iv.v.
[756] Churchyard, *Wofull Warres*, p. 48, 10-11; Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. B.i.v.
[757] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, f. B.i.v.; Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard*, pp. 19-20.
[758] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. **.iv.v.

and garnished with knowledge and courage, that he not only merits to be spoken of, but likewise deserveth to be honoured in martial causes, and exercises of war'.[759] Significantly, Churchyard endorsed Reade not only for his masculine bravery but for his professional qualities as a modern officer, stressing his 'knowledge' as well as his 'courage', especially in his ability to order his soldiers into mutually supporting formations, in a way that, like Digges' construction of Leicester as the ideal General, could easily have come from a military textbook.[760] Retelling knightly cavalcades and single combats may have sufficed for much of Churchyard's narrative of the 1550s and early 1560s actions, but when aggrandising the reputation of an active officer, Churchyard paralleled Vazquez in constructing his image out of the matrix of honour of a skilled professional Captain. Churchyard also hinted more directly at the importance of connections and reputation in the English military public sphere, claiming that everyone with personal experience of Reade's skilled officership 'giveth good reporte thereof and speaketh muche to the advauncement of his good name'.[761]

Moreover, Churchyard's praise for named members of the English military community extended to very recent events in the Low Countries, and showed a similar focus on practical officership rather than performative bravery. In this regard, Lawrence places Churchyard alongside Gates and Blandy in his justification of English participation in the war and drive to 'herald the success' of English volunteers under Morgan and Gilbert.[762] *General Rehearsal* included 'some speciall services in Flaunders of late', narrating the recent battle of Rijmenam (1578) focusing on the 'divers lustie fellowes' of the English regiment and recording names and praiseworthy services in a

[759] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, fo. G.i.v.
[760] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, fo. G.ii.v.
[761] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, f. H.i.r.
[762] Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 24.

manner immediately comparable to Vazquez.[763] In this regard, it is significant that while Churchyard's narrative of the 1550s wars tended to stress traditional themes of personal, mounted bravery, his narrative of recent Dutch engagements was more sophisticated in describing unit-level tactical movements and skilled command decisions, though with the same drive to 'name names'.[764]

Churchyard likewise praised Colonel Morgan for his 'rear-echelon' officership: 'though he were not in the feelde, yet did he very worthie service within the Campe, in givyng order for us to be supplied'.[765] As such, Woodcock's stress on the 'individualistic conception of soldiery' as defining Churchyard's writing, with heavy emphasis on 'revenge and the preservation of personal honour' as well as the importance of 'fate or fortune' in battle narratives- echoing Mervyn James on traditional honour culture- works well for Churchyard's descriptions of the mid-century wars (with the important exception of his panegyric to Captain Reade) but is much less accurate for Churchyard's narratives of post-1567 events.[766] Like Vazquez, Churchyard's praise for named contemporaries revealed the importance of personal reputation in the military public sphere, but also how such reputations were increasingly coloured by ideals of professional officership as well as personal, masculine bravery.

In 1584 the *True Relation* of John Lingham, the clerk of Captain William Martin, was published expressly to 'spred the praise' of the 'exceeding courage' of English combatants.[767] Lingham's text served purely to list the names and aggrandise the reputations of England's living and dead officers who had recently served in Flanders, and hinted at the importance of an officer's reputation in referring to those 'in

[763] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. T.i.r.-v.
[764] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. S.ii.v.-iii.r.
[765] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. T.i.r.
[766] Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard*, pp. 210-1. cf. James, 'Concept of Honour', pp. 311-5.
[767] John Lingham, *True Relation of all suche Englishe Captaines…* (London, 1584), sig. A2v.

good credit and estimation'.[768] However, Lingham invariably deployed traditional themes of masculine bravery and 'manhood': 'a right stout and bould champion', 'a hardy man of courage', 'like a Lyon fighting among the thickest of them'.[769] Despite his subjects being officers, Lingham made virtually no reference to their command decisions or abilities, instead simply praising and exaggerating the personal prowess of Captains who 'hath with sworde and shield cut in peeces so many thousand Spanyards'.[770]

Other themes of professional officership, however, had been deployed three years earlier in Blandy's *Castle*, which as well as formulating the 'perfect and absolute Souldiar' and urging English martial renewal, contained 'the names of many worthy and famous gentlemen' who fought and died as Low Countries volunteers.[771] Blandy expressed the same ideas as Churchyard on personal reputation and honour as the deserved rewards of war, and likewise hoped that by giving praiseworthy men 'a moyety of theyr desert', he would inspire other Englishmen to 'ennoble theyr names with the like exploytes'.[772] Yet there was also the obvious drive to publish the professional *bona fides* of officers who may have benefitted from such public endorsement: 'I finde Captayne Gaynstord foreward in the field, prudent, liberall and full of pollicye…'.[773]

Like the Spanish sources, Blandy incorporated ideological themes into his praise for one Captain Corne, quoting him calling on 'my naturall and deare Countrymen, let us now stand fast, and give yonder cursed company a canvassado [sic] for the honor of

[768] Lingham, *True Relation*, sig. A4v.
[769] Lingham, *True Relation*, sig. A6v.
[770] Lingham, *True Relation*, sig. A3v.
[771] Blandy, *Castle*, cover.
[772] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 24v.
[773] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 26v.

our Prince and Countrye'.[774] Blandy, like Churchyard, also sometimes recorded the present military appointment of his subjects, such as 'Captain Carelell, now Serjeant Major', a man inferior to Corne in physical stature but his equal in prowess and in 'pollicy, attayned by learning and study, his superior farre'.[775] While Lingham praised John Norreys as 'right hardye & valiaunt' and exaggeratedly claimed that he so terrified the Spaniards that they would drown themselves to escape him, Blandy praised Norreys for his 'policy' and his tactical skill.[776] Blandy similarly incorporated new ideas of professional officership into the matrix of honour of other outstanding officers with 'wisdome, and deepe advice…bold of courage, provident in direction, industrious in labour and quick in execution'.[777]

Meanwhile, the importance of military publishing to defend the reputations of past and present officers can be seen in two sources published in 1590. Like Parma, Leicester's tenure in the Netherlands would be surrounded by political controversy, and factionalism and rivalry within the officer corps, as well as military disappointments.[778] Particularly humiliating was the fall of Sluis in 1587, with Roger Williams' garrison surrendering after the failure of multiple relief efforts by Leicester and his Dutch allies. The inevitable criticisms of the Earl were sufficiently strong for Thomas Digges to publish another defence of his (now dead) commander and patron.[779] Digges' writings are particularly good evidence for how personal connections often motivated positive textual depictions of commanders; Manning claims that only the devoted Digges 'ever described [Leicester] as anything other than incompetent'.[780] The Muster-Master-

[774] Blandy, *Castle*, fols. 22v.-23r.
[775] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 24v.
[776] Lingham, *True Relation*, sig. A3r.; Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 25r., 22v.
[777] Blandy, *Castle*, fols. 26v.-27r.
[778] Manning, *Apprenticeship*, pp. 33-6, Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, pp. 271-336.
[779] Digges, *Towne of Sluce*, cover.
[780] Manning, *Apprenticeship*, p. 35.

General had already defended Leicester's embattled reputation as a 'great Captain' in his 1587 pamphlet, emphasising his achievements and excusing his operational failures.[781] Digges blamed the Dutch for the loss of Sluis and attributed criticism of Leicester to malice in the military community. More importantly, he deployed recognisable tropes of praiseworthy generalship in offering a fairly detailed description of Leicester's military reasonings and the tactical factors that offset his failure, while again echoing Spanish writers in portraying his hero risking his own life under fire and claiming Leicester could have won the war had he been given operational freedom.[782]

Unlike Digges' pamphlet, the narrative of the Sluis debacle by the English commander, Roger Williams, strove to protect the reputations of officers still active.[783] Williams appended his justificatory account against 'envie and malice' to his treatise *Briefe Discourse*, a reminder of the multipurpose nature of early modern military books, and began with an innocently didactic point on the impossibility of holding fortresses indefinitely without relief.[784] However, Williams soon admitted that this was really 'for the wrongs done unto my selfe & companions' over the Sluis failure.[785] Williams based his honesty on his own military identity 'by the faith of a Souldier' and like Vazquez, appealed to the reader's professional judgement, insisting (presumably in response to he and his men having been cashiered by their Dutch paymasters for surrendering too quickly) that a relatively short siege did not mean an easy surrender: 'experimented Captaines will confesse, the furie of all breaches are tried in a few houres'.[786] As well as the scale of the Spanish bombardment and assaults, and the dogged English resistance,

[781] Digges, *Militarie Service*, fols. 14r.-15v.
[782] Digges, *Towne of Sluce*, sig. A3r., p. 7, 10, 3.
[783] Digges, *Towne of Sluce*, sig. A2r.
[784] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 58.
[785] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 54.
[786] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 56; Manning, *Apprenticeship*, p. 32.

Williams deployed the trope of ascribing praise for his fellows to the enemy.[787] Though less critical of others than Digges or Verdugo, Williams' account was equally focused on justifying and defending himself and the other officers, naming those gentlemen who 'shewed themselves most valiantlie'.[788]

Ultimately, the importance of personal reputation and self-aggrandisement in military writing, and of the emerging matrix of honour of the perfect officer in constructing it, was powerfully demonstrated by the last English text under consideration in this thesis, the *Commentaries* of Francis Vere. Though unpublished by Vere's death, the text was obviously intended for 'a circle of admiring veterans…with half an eye on a wider public', and Trim identifies with considerable understatement that there was 'clearly a self-congratulatory aspect to Vere's writings'.[789] Vere's narrative was in a relentless first person and his self-presentation included references to personal bravery and wounds comparable to other narratives of praiseworthy military service over the last century, and specifically the enduring *topos* of risking one's life, which increasingly meant an officer sharing dangers with his men: 'I came presently to the push of pike with them…receiving a hurt in my leg, and divers thrusts with pikes…'.[790]

However, Vere's self-presentation also drew on much more sophisticated themes of officership. Just as Nolan sees Vere's forces by the end of the century as displaying 'a level of modern professionalism roughly equivalent to their continental competitors' after three decades of the Elizabethan military evolution, the tactical complexity of Vere's battle narratives represents the culmination of the tendency in both

[787] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 57, 58-9.
[788] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 62, 58.
[789] 'Vere [de Vere], Sir Francis', *DNB*.
[790] Vere, *Commentaries*, p. 7.

Spanish and English military chronicles towards more sophisticated, impersonal battle accounts, away from the praiseworthy deeds of individuals (Vere himself excluded).[791] In this context of tactical sophistication, Vere described his own intelligent tactical decisions and underlined his own acumen as a 'great captain': 'when [the enemy] marched, I followed, when they stood, I stayed, and standing or marching I kept within reach…so as I slew and galled many of them'.[792] Vere put particular emphasis on favourably comparing his own tactical advice to that of his Dutch counterparts in Maurice's retinue and stressing his own responsibility for many of the Count's victories, including Nieupoort- which Vere claimed he could have won quicker had he been reinforced.[793] Vere explicitly presented himself as a model 'Captain and a soldier', combining seemingly every aspect of the perfect infantry officer in contemporary textbooks in acting 'as is usuall and necessary in the execution and performance of the office of a Captain'.[794] Vere's first-person voice at times seemed to echo even that of Diego de Paredes: 'I took the boldness and assurance to follow them with these two hundred musketeers…giving in the meantime the Count Maurice advice…'.[795] Yet this served to narrate his command decisions, crediting himself with tactical skill as well as bravery. Such material vividly demonstrates how military memoirs still had the same fixation on martial reputation, but now served to fashion their heroes not as the perfect knight, but as the perfect Captain.

[791] Nolan, *John Norreys*, p. 244.
[792] Vere, *Commentaries*, p. 76
[793] Vere, *Commentaries*, p. 105.
[794] Vere, *Commentaries*, pp. 101-2, 96.
[795] Vere, *Commentaries*, p. 76.

CHAPTER 5: Identities and Ideologies

This chapter examines how justifications of the military profession, the noble-martial ethos, and ideological contexts coloured the identities of soldier-writers in the later century. Spanish authors engaged with the idea of war as inherently virtuous, but generally did so in the language of service and national defence, along with loyal suffering and the traditional virtue of bravery. However, they moved against the noble-martial link, dismissing both the notion that noblemen were inherently fit for command, and the chivalric ethos. As in the Italian Wars, Spanish soldier-writers had considerable pride in the collective as well as the individual achievements of their fellows and the royal and religious ideology of empire. Nonetheless, there is evidence that some Spanish writers were now able to say explicitly when the Spanish infantry fell short of ideal military standards. English theorists continued to associate the nobility and gentry with military service and virtue but envisaged the same system of meritocratic promotion as their Spanish counterparts, and their writings did not engage with chivalric culture. English defences of the military profession were increasingly based on ostensibly selfless, ideological or philosophical grounds of national health, defence, and virtue, rather than individual glory. Meanwhile, English arguments for martial engagement and technical military reform were also expressed in very specific terms of national defence against the Spanish threat. Yet simultaneously, they unambiguously held up Spain's soldiers as exemplars of military perfection to be emulated by England's warriors- again, revealing how concerns of military reform and perfection could outrank ideological preoccupations.

I. *Epica de Polvora*: Spanish Military Identities

i. Class, Honour, and Identity

Spanish authors in the Flanders wars invariably considered the military profession inherently prestigious and disdained 'base' civilian life.[796] However, explicit arguments for the honour of the profession typically rested on loyalty and sacrifice rather than individualistic knightly honour. Sancho de Londoño argued that it was specifically the willingness of soldiers 'to suffer, and shed blood, and die for their homeland, their law and their King', that earned them rewards.[797] Alonso Vazquez advocated a renewal of the 'ancient and true nobility' of Spanish martial virtues, but argued that the military profession was honourable not with reference to simple bravery, noble status, or personal virtue, but because its members were under the authority of their prince's officers and thus must perform deeds 'so honourable that one becomes worthy of his superiors appreciating him, as a person that is humble, and a vassal of the military habit and order'.[798] Bernardino de Escalante advised that 'the soldier who aspires to glory' must 'build his valorous determination on the defence of the Christian religion, and on the honour of his Monarch, and on the health of his *patria*', interpreted by Luna Nájera as reconciling the Roman custom of glorifying military success with a Christian distaste for excessive worldly ambition.[799] Such conflation of martial prestige with loyalty and obedience reflected the overriding urge of late-century military theorists to harness martiality to strict disciplinary standards, but also showed the growing interdependence of military identity and ideological loyalty. Spanish writers

---

[796] e.g. Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 84v.-85r. (*sacado de officios y padres baxos*); Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 34v.
[797] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 20v. (*a trabajar, y derramar sangre, y morir por su patria, por su ley, y por su Rey*)
[798] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.8 (*antigua y verdadera nobleza*), I.442. (*obligándole á hacer cosas tan honradas que se dignan los superiors á premiarle y á favorecerle como á persona que se humilla y avasalla al hábito y órden militar*)
[799] Luna Nájera, 'The Deployment of the Classics in Early Modern Spanish Military Manuals', *Sixteenth Century Journal*, 46/3, (2015), p. 624.

engaged with contemporary ideological justifications of the military profession for defence of the *patria*, arguing for the superiority of arms over letters as soldiers are responsible for the 'defence of the holy Faith, the authority and reputation of princes, the punishment of heretics, Turks, and rebels'.[800]

Despite more complex concerns of ideology or discipline, Spanish writing from the Flanders wars still deeply appreciated personal bravery. Along with recording hundreds of individuals risking their lives or meeting praiseworthy deaths, soldier-writers hinted how a man's personal honour could still rest on his own *esfuerzo*. Vazquez narrated Parma's earlier service as an 'adventurer knight', leaving the reader in no doubt as to the Prince's personal bravery before moving into Parma's more refined operations, logistics, siegework, and discipline as a *Gran Capitan.*[801] Vazquez implied how reputation could still be based on one's honour and bravery as well as obedience in describing how one Spanish officer was charged with a near-impossible operation outside Antwerp in 1584, 'but the rigorous order that Alexander had given and the stain of the infamy that would have fallen on such honourable soldiers had he not observed it pressured Captain Juan de Rivas to overcome this, putting fear aside for the honourable shame that comes with Spanish virtue and valour'.[802] As well as bravery, Spaniards in Flanders followed their predecessors in Italy in their fascination with military suffering, 'the hardships of body and spirit' suffered by their fellows, as inherently praiseworthy.[803] Again, this was expressed in collective as well as individual martial

---

[800] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 40v.-41r. (*defensa, amparo de la santa Fe, autoridad y reputacion de Principes: castigo y temor de hereges*, *Turcos y rebeldes*)
[801] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.66 (*caballero aventurero*), I.93.
[802] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.505-6. (*pero la memoria del riguroso órden que Alexandro habia dado y la mancha de la infamia que de no observarla cayera en tan honrados soldados, hizo al Capitan Juan de Rivas apresurar su determinacion y vencer estas y otras mayores dificultades, posponiendo el temor por la honrosa vergüenza que es acompañada con la virtud y valor español*)
[803] e.g. Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.166. (*los trabajos que con el cuerpo y espíritu pasó D. Diego e Ibarra en todas estas guerras*)

pride, Vazquez trumpeting how the Army underwent 'hardships, hunger, cold, nakedness' at Antwerp, 'with water, mud and snow up to their belts', 'particularly the Spanish nation'.[804]

However, though Spanish conceptions of martial honour combined personal, masculine traits and more refined ideological identities, there was an ambiguous treatment of 'noble-martial' cultures, and, crucially, a strong movement in the texts studied here against the notion of the nobility as inherently suited for command. On one hand, Spanish writers still understood, and occasionally reinforced, the notion of war as a noble duty. Escalante argued that Spanish nobles should emulate the Roman nobility in bringing up their sons in arms and letters to serve the Republic, combining the traditional sense of the martial duty of the noble estate with the emerging preoccupation with national service in a way that would be massively echoed in Elizabethan texts. His was an especially eloquent but not unusual Spanish example of rhetoric arguing for a resumption of martial virtues based on a supposed decline of military participation among the Spanish upper classes, who 'nowadays do not pretend to honour, nor are they interested in such hard work; they content themselves with mediocrity'.[805]

Conversely, the fact that the Spanish writers examined here made fewer overt arguments for increased noble participation in war than their English contemporaries may have reflected the healthy numbers of nobles who continued to serve in Flanders and elsewhere. It is possible that the specific context of Escalante's text- an allegorical dialogue about protecting the homeland from corsairs, written in Spain by a theorist no longer on 'active', overseas military service but concerned in his advisory role to Philip

[804] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.89-90. (*muchos y grandes trabajos, hambres, fríos, desnudeces…particularmente la nacion española…con el agua, lodos y nieves hasta la cinta*)
[805] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fols. 1v.-2r. (*como no ay guerras en España…no pretenden agora los Caualleros honrras, ni intereses con tanto trauajo, contentandose con una mediania en sus casas*)

II with questions of national military mobilisation- may have encouraged his complaints about declining noble military engagement and participation, given the central role of the nobility in defence and military organisation within the peninsula.[806]

Yet in the tracts and the mentalities of what Martínez calls 'the professional militia of the *platico* soldiers', for whom 'the loyalties generated by the military corporation…seem to have outweighed other forms of social association and allegiance' there was an overwhelming rejection of the idea that noble blood imparted military fitness.[807] As de León identifies, the superiority of 'talent' over 'birth' in Spanish professional military culture was the basis of the 'School of Alba' and its successors, as later encapsulated by the dedicatory sonnet of Captain Cristobal de Virues to Cristobal Lechuga's 1603 officer treatise. The poem accurately summarised the ensuing text in warning 'the noble soldier' that though he could 'distinguish yourself highly and gloriously' with 'natural valour innocent of art', 'to reach, as Lechuga reaches, the almost incomprehensible duties comprised in military greatness, is impossible…unless you, like him, add science to your valour, aspirations, and nobility'.[808] All military theory was based on meritocracy, which by definition precluded promotion or appointment by birthright. Although the civilian Palacio called for the recruitment of noble officers 'because the valour of their ancestors…incites them to love their King and homeland more', he acknowledged that low-born Captains fight harder to distinguish themselves and discussed the idea of earned rather than inherited honour.[809] More importantly, Palacio followed his more qualified contemporaries in prioritising practical skills as the 'principal parts of the military art', without which 'one may not be

[806] Thompson, *War and Government*, pp. 151-55.
[807] Martínez, *Front Lines*, p. 79.
[808] de León, 'Doctors', pp. 80-1.
[809] Palacio, *Dialogos Militares*, fo. 37v. (*porque el valor de sus padres, le obliga è incita mas á amar à su Rey y patria*)

called an excellent Captain'.[810] Escalante similarly ruled firmly that positions of authority should be given not to certified *hidalgos* but 'Captains and *soldados viejos* that have served well'.[811] He likewise hinted at a modern transition away from command by birthright in commenting that the *Maestre de Campo General*, candidates for which rank must be 'very *platico* in all offices of *la milicia*' with extensive qualifications and skills, had replaced the medieval Constable, which used to be given to according to 'lineage', as well as military ability.[812]

The same rejection of class status in favour of meritocratic promotion according to new military precepts in the matrix of honour of the perfect captain is visible in close study of two Spanish officers' texts, more receptive than most to the ethos that blood made a man inherently fit for war, but still unequivocally part of the new culture of meritocratic officership: Vazquez' *Sucesos* and Isaba's *Cuerpo Enfermo.* Vazquez praised some companies as having unusually high numbers of 'titled' *particulares*, and clearly considered such units superior.[813] The greater prominence of noblemen throughout Vazquez' narrative than Mendoza's, or indeed Cerezeda's, may support de Léon's idea that from Parma's tenure onwards, the Flanders officer corps was becoming more aristocratic not only in demographics but in ethos. Hence, such men may have appeared 'different' to Vazquez, rather than simply members of the Spanish infantry collective which, as Puddu argued, was defined in the days of the *Gran Capitan* or Pescara, Leiva or Alba, by the social heterogeneity but homogenous identity of its rank and file.

---

[810] Palacio, *Dialogos Militares*, fo. 39r.-v. (*muy principales miembros del Arte militar…no se puede llamar uno experto Capitan, sin la sciencia*)
[811] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 4v. (*se diessen a los Capitanes, y soldados viejos, que han seruido bien*)
[812] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 70r. (*muy platicos en todos los officos de la milicia…personas con la calidad y authoridad de estados y linage*)
[813] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.77-8. (*títulos españoles*)

Yet though Vazquez sometimes mentioned class status or family in listing the positive attributes of his protagonists, he always did so as an afterthought to their practical military skills or professional reputation.[814] Vazquez explicitly rejected the noble-martial ethos in favour of practical military considerations in criticising one captain's foolish tactical decision, who 'though he was a very honoured and gallant *caballero*, he had no experience as a soldier', and emphasised ruefully that the captain had been warned by his sergeant, 'a soldier of valour and experience'- another inversion of Guzmán's anecdote about ignoring expert tactical advice.[815]

Marcos de Isaba revealed the continued allure of noble warfare in evoking the ideal of the 'valerous *caballero*', motivated by 'Christian zeal, desirous of honor and fame' to leave his homeland 'and go to seek enemies of the holy faith'.[816] Isaba included in his argument for the superiority of military pursuits over civilian that 'no noble or *hidalgo* in all the world confesses his antiquity or purity to come from…vile trades, only from an old branch that began their lineage in *la milicia*', and complained of declining martial virtue among Spain's nobility at a time of holy war.[817] Yet Isaba moderated such rhetoric with the common argument that military service *itself* imparted *hidalguía* to commoners.[818] Much more importantly, Isaba definitively ruled noble status alone as insufficient qualification for command, instructing *señores* aspiring to fulfil their military duty to find a '*soldado viejo* of good fame' who has served in 'Italy, or Germany, Flanders, or Barbary', 'of humble lineage and great ingenuity', and ask

---

[814] e.g. Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.511.
[815] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.395. (*aunque el capitan D. Cristóbal Masco era muy honrado y gallardo caballero, no tenia experiencia de soldado…soldado de valor y de experiencia*)
[816] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 141v. (*con zelo de Christianos, desseosos de honra y fama…yuan buscar los enemigos de la santa fè…alcançaron fama y nombre inmortal de valerosos caualleros*)
[817] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 41r. (*no ay noble o hidalgo en todo el mundo que confiesse su antigüedad o limpieza venir de…officios viles, sino de un troco o ramo antiguo, que en la milicia dio principio a su linage*), 142v.-3r.
[818] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 84v.

him about foreign military practice and 'how a squadron is made, how artillery is planted, advice and parts of skirmishes', 'geometry, procure to understand from them the fortification of a position…the technique of mines, the form of digging a trench…'- the matrix of honour of professional officership, derived from the emerging techniques of gunpowder warfare.[819]

Meanwhile, dismissal of the noble-martial ethos is visible in the strident rejection of chivalric tropes by Spanish soldier-writers. Vazquez and Mendoza both presented realistic, comprehensive modern campaign narratives devoid of chivalric tropes or actions, while chivalric poetry (though still unquestionably popular among soldiers and 'civilians' alike) was drowned out by the explicitly realistic, earthy panegyrics to the common Spanish infantryman in the new gunpowder epics in active opposition to chivalric motifs, most obviously in their gleeful disparagement of chivalric love.[820] Just as Ercilla opened *La Araucana* by explicitly disavowing chivalric romance in favour of real praiseworthy military events, a year earlier, Baltasar de Vargas' *Breve Relacion* had promised that 'I do not give you fabulous battles/nor vain enchantments, which is madness/nor the sorrowful passions of love', but 'the long march that you made/serving God and King well'.[821]

---

[819] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 143v.-4r. (*de Italia, ò Alemania Flandes, ò Berueria…soldado viejo de buena fama…los humildes linages è ingenios gruessos…como se haze un esquadrō, como se planta el artillería, auisos y partes descaramuças…geometria procure entender dellos una fortificaciō en una tierra…platica d̄ una mina, la forma de abrir una trichera*)

[820] de Léon, *Road to Rocroi*, p. 187, thus contrasts Mendoza's 'sober and business-like campaign narrative', a product (like military theory) of the professional Flanders officer corps, with 'adulatory' texts from a 're-aristocratised', neo-chivalric corps post-1621.

[821] Alonso de Ercilla, *La Araucana*, tr. and ed. Cyrus Moore (New York, 2022), p. 7; Vargas, *Breve Relacion,* Canto 4. (*No os presento batallas fabulosas/ni encantamentos vanos que es locura/ni de amor las pasiones congoxosas/con que se suele hacer larga escritura/parte de vuestras obras valerosas/es Señor lo que ofrezco y verdad pura/deste largo camino que hezistes/y en el quan bien a Dios y al Rey servistes*). See also Antunes, *Baxada*, p. 73; Rodriguez Alba, *Inquieta Flandes*, fo. 10r.-v. cf. the classic romantic opening of Ariosto, tr. Geronimo de Urrea, *Orlando Furioso* (Salamanca, 1578), Canto 1: '*Damas, Armas, Amor, empresas canto: cavalleros, esfuerço, y cortesia…*'

'Gunpowder epics' were rooted in Flanders mud, depicting the bravery not of knights but of raiding detachments and outstanding junior officers, and not duels and charges but the grinding sieges and artillery duels of late-century war. Miguel Giner's epic climaxed not with chivalric combat but with the gradual encirclement and technical innovation of the siege of Antwerp: 'turrets/began to fire with a great voice/we positioned the gabions ready/first we attacked the battery…'- surely strong evidence that transformations in warfare, above all 'the harsh light of gunpowder culture', contributed to a new, unchivalric idea of war narratives and praiseworthy military service.[822] Though this example may have been influenced by the exceptionally complex siege which Giner narrated, Antunes' epic of the 1591 campaign in Normandy recounted 'not incredible fictions…but invincible hearts, most dignified deeds', praised for 'industry and art' as well as *esfuerzo*, and drew a realistic picture of modern warfare 'with arquebus and pike' rooted in the 'warlike tricks…opinion and design' of the military revolution.[823] This realistic depiction of gunpowder warfare invariably involved much suffering, which served to further praise the stoicism, bravery, and sacrifice of the Spanish collective under fire.[824]

Vazquez likewise consciously rejected chivalric motifs: describing how he and his fellow officers dined at a French noble household which was attacked by enemy raiders, he admitted bashfully that the ensuing fight 'was like a book of chivalry, for it was in sight of a castle, and ladies, next to a forest, and in France, where there have

[822] Giner, *Sitio*, fo. 9v. (*torreones/comiençan disparar con bozeria/nuestros puesto a punto los cestones/principio dimos a la batería*); Sheila J. Nayer, 'Arms *or* the Man I', in *Studies in Philology*, 114/3 (Summer 2017), p. 519.
[823] Antunes, *Baxada*, sig. Br. (*No contare fictiones increybles…pero dire de pechos inuencibles/digmissimas hazañas*), p. 57 (*industria, y arte*), 44 (*Alli vierais formar luego squadrones...con arcabuz, con pica, y con coraça*), 55 (*abriendo mil trincheras:/allí van los soldados estudiando/belicosas astucias, y maneras,/qual da su parescer, qual da su traça/para poder ganar la fuerte plaça*)
[824] Antunes, *Baxada*, p. 59.

been so many adventures'.[825] Though Vazquez praised his Spanish companions winning an 'incredible' victory, he admitted that the enemy retreated not because of their suicidal bravery but for fear of an ambush.[826] Vazquez concluded primly that though impressive, 'as it was a service done for ladies, and not the King our Lord, nor with order of his officers', he and his fellows 'certainly deserved great punishment' for being 'away from their banners without licence'.[827] Vazquez thus subordinated romance to discipline, again neatly inverted Enríquez de Guzmán's chivalric self-fashioning, and as such, firmly defined himself not as a *caballero* but a *soldado platico* and a sober military expert.

ii. *Soldados* of the Spanish Monarchy

Meanwhile, Vazquez and his peers were also affected by more specific ideological influences of their distinctive Spanish identity. Philip II's soldier-writers continued to see themselves as members and chroniclers of 'the Spanish Marses', an idealised elite defined firstly by their exceptional skill-at-arms, 'the high deeds/that our Spaniards did/against the Belgians'.[828] Significantly, this was *not* incompatible with the growing rhetoric of dissatisfaction and decline among military theorists. The harshest critic of institutional failings in the *tercios*, Marcos de Isaba, stressed that the Spanish infantry were a truly great military force, 'valorous and invincible' with great deeds in their future as well as their past, whose 'dexterity, ability, spirit, strength' was held back, not negated, by incompetent officership or disciplinary failings.[829]

---

[825] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.137. (*parece de libro de caballerías, por ser á la vista de un castillo delate de damas, junto á una floresta y en el reino de Francia, donde tantas aventuras hubo*)
[826] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.138. (*cosa incredible*)
[827] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.137. (*como fue servicio hecho á las damas, y no al Rey, nuestro señor, ni con orden de sus Oficiales…eran dignos de muy gran castigo ó reprension por haber emprendido una cosa semejante sin orden de sus superiores y haber desamparado sus banderas sin licencia*)
[828] Dedicatory sonnets to Rodriguez Alba, *Inquieta Flandes*, fo. 8r. (*A luz sacaís/Españoles Martes*), 9r. (*Los çelebres y altos hechos/que contra los belgicanos/hizieron nuestros hispanos*)
[829] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 12r. (*valerosa é inuēcible Infāteria*), 19r. (*destreza auilidad, animo, fortaleza*), 72r.

As in the earlier period, Spanish soldier-writers thus praised not only their commanders or outstanding officers, but also 'the innumerable and heroic deeds of the invincible and feared Spaniards' as a collective. Vargas' narrative of the 1567 campaign portrayed the 'ten thousand Spanish *soldados viejos*/such as cannot be found among Christians' as the ideal military collective, serving skilfully, loyally, piously, and joyfully.[830] Mendoza's more sober chronicle proudly related that the Spaniards at Mookerhyde were such a perfect army that 'if I wanted to say what each man did in particular, it would be necessary to write a great history'.[831] The overwhelmingly positive depiction of the deeds and suffering of the Spanish infantry collective by Cerezeda was more than matched by Vazquez, typically narrating how in one engagement, the Spaniards '[did] so great a service to the King our Lord', forming up into squadron, praying the *Ave Maria*, and 'in less than half an hour the rebel army, which numbered ten thousand men, was undone'.[832]

The sense of the Spaniards as an elite in Italy had clearly been encouraged by their status as a distinct *nacion* in composite armies, and this only hardened in the formally multinational Army of Flanders. Isaba proudly, and accurately, described the Spaniards as the 'sinew and force' of allied armies, a popular metaphor in commentary on the Army of Flanders.[833] Spanish soldier-writers were aware of the unique institutional permanence of the *tercios* and the 'Spanish Road' system. Isaba declared that it was their permanent service that made Spanish units superior to other *naciones*, and Martin de Eguiluz argued that Spaniards should be held to higher disciplinary

---

[830] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Canto 69 (*diez mil soldados viejos son ispanos/que tales no los hay entre christianos*), 123. See also Giner, *Sitio*, fo. 10r., 16v.
[831] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fols. 244v.-5r. (*à dezir lo q̄ cada uno hizo en particular, serio necesario escriuir una grande historia*)
[832] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.73-4. (*tan gran servicio al Rey, nuestro señor…en ménos de media hora fué deshecho y desbaratado el ejército rebelde*)
[833] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 17r.-v. (*neruio y fuerça*); Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 27.

standards than others as they were kept in pay, not disbanded after each campaign.[834] This awareness of the Spanish *tercios* as a unique quasi-standing army would also be reflected in Elizabethan military theory, most famously in Roger Williams' panegyric to the Army of Flanders as 'a university continually in exercises'.

Also carried over from the Italian campaigns was the urge to draw unfavourable comparisons with foreign troops, though criticism of allied *naciones* had become more subtle and Walloons or Germans had replaced Italians as objects of derision. Like Cerezeda or Oznayo, Vazquez constructed his narrative to belittle allied *naciones* and exalt the Spanish infantry, claiming that when the *tercios* were temporarily withdrawn from Flanders in 1579, a Walloon declared that a recent victory showed that the loyalists could win without Spanish help, at which another officer reminded him that the battle had in fact been won by Spanish volunteers.[835] Such an anecdote, like Oznayo's insistence that it was in fact a Spanish detachment in Frundsberg's formation at Pavia, not the Germans themselves, that were responsible for Francis' downfall, is important less for its veracity, and more for what it reveals about the entrenched, chauvinistic Spanish infantry identity. Vazquez echoed the earlier soldier-writers in his pride in the reputation of the Spanish infantry among foreign *naciones*, though in a more polite and professional tone: he proudly included in his eulogy for the 'experienced and prudent Captain' François de la Noue (1531-1591) that he was 'well known by the Spaniards and he greatly wished to serve with them', and that Noue's book, 'deserving to be read by *gran capitanes* and *soldados*', 'greatly praised the Spanish obedience and their way of war'.[836]

---

[834] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 71v.-72r.; Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 24v.
[835] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.277. See also e.g. II.223.
[836] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.87 (*experimentado y prudente Capitan*), III.109. (*Era bien conocido de españoles y deseó mucho militar con ellos…digno de ser leído de grandes Capitanes y soldados. Celebró mucho la obediencia española y su modo de proceder y de pelear*)

Spanish chroniclers and theorists incorporated Italy and, increasingly, Flanders to their national military past, evoking a martial heritage from the *Gran Capitan* through Ravenna, Pavia, and Ceresole, via Koron, Mühlberg, and Gravelines (1558), to the 'valour and constancy of that valorous and invincible infantry' since 1567 to prove both the superiority of daring and discipline over numerical strength, and of the Spanish nation over classical martialists.[837] This was encouraged by institutional permanence connecting one generation of loyal *infantes* with the next: Vargas' praise for the four *tercios* marching to Flanders drew attention to the past victories of these specific units.[838] Vazquez' highly emotive description of the acrimonious disbandment of the legendary *Tercio Viejo* of Lombardy revealed the depth of the Spanish infantry heritage, how it was coloured by professional skills, and how it interlinked with the reputation of legendary named officers of the 'schools' of Italy and Flanders; Vazquez' praised the unit's 'so many victories in so many places' but also how it 'brought up such, and so many, valorous Captains and soldiers with good order and discipline'.[839]

As before 1559, Spanish soldier-writers strove to present themselves as loyal to the crown and religion (which were essentially conflated), so vocally supported Spain's wars. Typically, Vargas reminded the reader of the 'insolence' and 'damaging Lutheran intentions' of the 'heretics' that prompted the 1567 expedition by Spaniards marching from fighting the 'great pagan Turk' at Malta in 1565.[840] Mendoza's chronicle accused the Dutch of 'heresies and false doctrines' and followed Vargas in claiming that Dutch attempts to remove Spanish garrisons were a conspiracy to further religious

---

[837] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 11v.-12r. (*inmortal fama y nō̄bre…escaramuças, asaltos, batallas, ingenios, sitios…valor y constancia desta valerosa é inuēcible Infātēria*). See also Collado, *Platica Manual*, dedication; Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Cantos 129-33; Escalante, *Dialogos*, fols. 5v.-8v.
[838] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Canto 25.
[839] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.451-5. (*tantas victorias en tantas y diversas partes…por haber criado tantos y tan valerosos Capitanes y soldados con su buen órden y disciplina como han tenido…*)
[840] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, dedication, Canto 26 (*gran Turci pagano*), 27 (*sus dañadas intenciones/y sigue luteranas intenciones*). See also Antunes, *Baxada*, p. 2.

reformation.[841] Like their English counterparts, who similarly linked patriotism, national military readiness, and their own efforts at military reform, Spanish military theorists stressed their patriotic motivations for writing, as the 'security' of the Spanish monarchy 'depends on the valour and fortune of our Spanish soldiers'.[842] The texts of Mendoza and Lechuga were both advertised as in themselves a form of service to the crown, while Isaba incorporated confessional identity to his voice of loyalty, hoping Spanish troops reformed on his disciplinary model would be a 'bloody punishment' to Protestants, and reminding Philip that he needed competent armies as the 'defender of Catholicism'.[843]

As in the Italian Wars, the Spanish infantry were depicted by soldier-writers as an impeccably patriotic, loyal collective, 'great scourges of heresy' 'who help strengthen the Kingdoms and States of Don Philip our Lord'- likely in no small part to bolster the authors' own voices of loyalty by supporting the King's confessionalised foreign policies.[844] Eguiluz's dedication told Philip that just as the ancients raised great monuments to those they wished to honour, '*la milicia* is a pyramid to your Majesty, an altar for sacrifice to God and the King, and a triumphal statue to display an excellent, heroic Captain'- including his own humble treatise.[845] Vazquez concluded his description of the 'Miracle of Empel', when a timely change in the weather permitted the withdrawal of the encircled *Tercio Viejo* of Lombardy, with the declaration that as

---

[841] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fols. 10r.-11r. (*heregias y falsas doctrinas*); cf. Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Canto 9.
[842] Escalante, *Dialogos*, sig. A2r. (*la seguridad de tantos Reynos y estados consiste en el valor y felicidad de nuestros soldados Españoles*)
[843] Mendoza, *Theorica*, 'censura'; Lechuga, *Discurso*, pp. 6-7; Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 80v. (*castigo sanguinoso*), fo. 123v. (*como defensor Catholico*)
[844] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Canto 9 (*soldados/de España, gran cuchillo de eregia*); Escalante, *Dialogo*, sig. A2v. (*los muy illustres señores la infantería Española, que asiste de presidio en los Reynos y estados del Rey Don Phelippe nuestro Señor*)
[845] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, sig. *1r. (*la milicia es por su alteza, una piramide, por el sacrificarse en ella a Dios, y a su Rey un altar, y por enseñar a formar un excelente, y heroico capitan, una triumfal estatua*)

the event 'remains perpetual as a holy devotion of the Spanish infantry', he planned to found a confraternity to celebrate it in his own militia district.[846]

Spanish military writers thus continued to idealise their fellows as the ideal military community both in their combat proficiency and in their political and confessional loyalty. Much more significant in comparison to the texts studied in Part I, however, was where such identities and ideologies had their limits- the circumstances under which they were willing to *criticise* the Spanish infantry. In this regard, the early example of Nuñez Alba's furious critique of Spanish officership, which was reprinted in 1589, was followed by the military treatises of the 1580s and 90s, which though they did not question the fighting quality of the Spanish rank-and-file, were increasingly critical of their disciplinary failings as well as the corrupt or unfair promotion of incompetent officers. The latter point is especially important as whereas Nuñez Alba almost certainly spoke out of career frustration, many military theorists in the later century had successful careers, yet still contrasted the 'sick body' of Spain's armies with their own emerging concepts of military perfection.

Spanish military theorists in the period studied here do not appear to have identified anything revolutionary about Dutch military reforms under Maurice of Nassau. Alonso Vazquez' memoir included an intriguing passage on the 'good order by which the Flemish exercise arms' and hinted tantalisingly at Dutch military improvement somehow linked to training methods, 'military exercises' by which 'they have come to be such good soldiers and so dextrous in arms'.[847] Yet Vazquez clearly referred to their longstanding town militia guilds, *not* Maurice's innovative field army;

---

[846] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.118. (*quede perpetua una tan santa devocion entre la infantería española*). On the 'Miracle', see Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 188.
[847] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.6 (*modo y buen órden de ejercitar las armas los flamencos, y las que usan para conserver sus Estados*), I.38-9. (*Destos ejecicios militares que de tantos años atras acostumbran los flamencos, les viene el ser tan grandes soldados y tan diestros en las armas*)

he thus described Dutch urban 'confraternities' and how their training exercises were conducted at militia gardens with weapon handling competitions and feasts.[848] Vazquez himself was writing while serving as an expert training officer for 'the new militia that the King our lord has established now in Castile' at a time when Spanish authorities were striving to reform the peninsula's defensive forces.[849] Though it may reflect some garbled awareness of Maurice's reforms, it was apparently in this context, of comparing *militia* forces (i.e. actual part-time soldiers, not the Spanish '*milicia*' to mean any army or military discipline) that Vazquez held up Dutch practice as 'worthy of imitation'.[850] Meanwhile, Vazquez' contemporaries remained apparently innocent of Dutch military reforms, many Spanish writers continuing to use the Ottoman Janissaries as 'an *espejo* and a model' of discipline and meritocratic promotion, 'although it is taken from barbarians', to shame Spanish failings.[851] Though Elizabethan military writers usually had more relevant foreign military models in mind, they too would continue holding up the Janissary model to illustrate their own preoccupations with diligence, discipline, promotion, and training.[852]

However, a clear change from the relentlessly one-sided battle narratives of the Italian Wars, in which even defeats like Castilnuovo or Ceresole served simply to further glorify the Spanish *soldado*, is visible in the quiet, but important, willingness of Spanish military writers to name specific engagements in which the Spanish infantry collective fell short of military perfection. Describing the humiliating 'rout' at Heiligerlee in 1568, Bernardino de Mendoza defended the command decisions of the

---

[848] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.6 (*Compañías de milicias fundadas sobre confradias*), I.36-8.
[849] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.36. (*la nueva milicia que el Rey, nuestro señor, ha establecido ahora en sus reinos de Castilla*); Thompson, *War and Government*, pp. 128-43.
[850] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.36. (*costumbre digna de imitarla*). Vazquez' description of Maurice himself is positive but does not imply revolutionary military reforms: Vazquez, *Sucesos,* I.503.
[851] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 70v.-71v. (*espejo para los Christianos y dechado…aunque de Barbaros se tomasse*)
[852] e.g. Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 29-30.

fallen loyalist commander, Count van Aremberg, as in accordance with 'reason of war', and explicitly blamed the debacle on the Spanish infantry, attacking 'inconsiderately' out of formation and 'blind' to the difficult terrain.[853] Mendoza blamed this on 'the disorder with which our troops wanted to fight' and 'the contempt and little estimation in which they held the enemy', illustrating not Spanish valour, but the dangers of indiscipline and overconfidence.[854]

In context, it could be argued that as a prominent diplomat and courtier, Mendoza had to defend Aremberg to avoid inflaming the political sensibilities of Spain's loyalist allies, while he himself was a blue-blooded commander, not a common or lower *hidalgo* member of the Spanish infantry collective, so would be less likely to resent criticism of the *tercios*. Yet the same cannot be said of Vazquez, who despite being a proud member of the Spanish infantry community and repeatedly deriding Spain's allies, was even more willing to identify on didactic grounds the gap between his Spanish fellows and emerging standards of military perfection: 'as careless actions in war have no excuse, I diligently write what happened…so that one may know how important it is not to lose a single point of military order and custom'.[855] Describing one action, Vazquez explained how again, the Spaniards attacked out of formation order and were met by 'a great formed squadron of the rebel army', 'in as good order as one could want', whose disciplined counterattack 'forced [the Spaniards] to turn their backs in an ugly manner'.[856] Vazquez used the defeat as an explicit tactical lesson, teaching 'the

---

[853] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fo. 48v. (*razon de la guerra*), 49r. (*ciegos…incōsideramente*). See L.L. Doedens, 'The Battle of Heiligerlee', in Marco van der Hoeven (ed.), *Exercise of Arms* (Leiden, 1997), pp. 57-67.
[854] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fo. 50r. (*la desorden con que los nuestros quisieron pelear, que es de juzgar auer procedido del menosprecio, y poca estima en que tenian à los enemigos*)
[855] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.202. (*como los descuidos de la guerra no tienen disculpa, con escribir yo puntualmente lo que esta dia pasó se conocerá lo mucho que importa no perder un solo punto el órden y costumbre militar*)
[856] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.161. (*un gran escuadron formado del ejército rebelde con todas sus banderas, y en tan buen órden como se podia desear…volvieron las espaldas feamente*)

importance in combat of good order and military discipline, and how necessary it is to avoid fighting an action without cavalry, or without having first well ordered the soldiers into strong squadrons…although the valour of the Spanish nation is so well known, they cannot have victory with it alone', which rests in the 'order of soldiers placed in squadron'.[857] Despite the strength of patriotic feeling and real pride in the Spanish infantry collective, Spanish officers in the Flanders wars could still set identity and ideology aside and soberly assess how their countrymen fell short of emerging ideals of 'good use and military order'.[858] In this regard, they would be massively reciprocated by their English enemies.

[857] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.160. (*aunque el valor de la nacion española es tan conocido, no se pueden con él alcanzar las victorias…estas están en el órden de los soldados puestos en escuadron*), II.167. (*lo que importa en las ocasiones del pelear el buen órden y disciplina militar y lo mucho que conviene no hacer ninguna faccion sin caballeria, ni sin tener primero bien ordenados y en fuertes escuadrones á los soldados*). See also III.55, on incompetent Spanish siegeworks and assaults.
[858] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.55. (*contra todo buen uso y orden militar*)

II. *Martial Wights*: English Military Identities

iii. Nobility, Honour, Virtue

English soldier-writers typically did not engage at length with questions of nobility and war, but nonetheless regularly hinted at an enduring idea of the upper classes as duty bound, or inherently suited, to military participation and leadership. Thomas Proctor reminded the reader that 'the knowledge, and practyse of…armes, principallie and properly are of the profession of noble menne, and gentlemen of greate revenues', and like Isaba, argued that military leadership and national defence was the nobility's *raison d'être*.[859] Gates appealed to the nobility as 'if the nourishment and practise of Armes' depended on the 'common multitude', 'Martiall profession should lye in the streete', as war is 'not a matter that doth properly appertain to base and servile minds, but doth belong to the noble and ambitious courages'- a clear equation of actual class status as well as spiritual nobility with the business of war.[860] As ever, this often rested on a perceived decline of noble military engagement; Barnaby Rich expressed this with particularly gendered language, lamenting how should the need arise, England would find itself without officers, 'for Gentlemen that are descended of honourable families, in these dayes, give themselves rather to be *Battalus* knightes, than Martiall wights'- the margin explaining '*Battalus an effeminate man*'. Rich, inevitably, linked upper-class martial decline to the refrain that England insufficiently rewarded its soldiers, making the gentry instead become 'Courtiers, Lawyers, or Lovers'.[861]

English military theorists throughout the period thus often addressed their precepts to a noble or gentle audience, either the upper classes in general or specifically 'such Noblemen or Gentlemen as wyll applye themselves to that honourable

[859] Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, sig. ¶iv.r.
[860] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, pp. 56-7.
[861] Rich, *Allarme*, sig. G.iiii.v.-Hv.

profession', 'the Arte and Profession onely or chiefly convenient for the nobility or gentlemen of this land'.[862] Woodcock has identified how Robert Barret's dedication of his military treatise to young William Herbert (1580-1630), son of the Earl of Pembroke, 'assumes a natural, inexorable connection between nobility and military identity' in Barret's assumption, given Herbert's illustrious bloodline, of his martial potential.[863] English narratives of warfare tended to stress the 'Gentlemen and Officers' participating while entirely or almost entirely ignoring the common soldiery.[864]

In general, the greater English association between noble status and martial duty, or virtue, may reflect the kingdom's lack of a permanent, structured officer corps, and, as in Henry's day, the continued importance of the motivation and personal connections of the nobility and gentry in military recruitment and organisation.[865] Moreover, the sense in much Elizabethan literature of shared duty and voluntarist mobilisation of England's 'monarchical republic' to defend the Protestant nation may also account for the continued idea of war as an inherent duty for the ruling classes as a whole.[866] In particular, this may explain the emphasis in some English martial texts that one of the nobility's specific military roles was to inspire martial engagement in the 'meaner sorte'.[867]

English theorists thus generally did not explicitly reject noble status as making a man fit for command. Nonetheless, all agreed with the principle of meritocratic promotion, so by definition, even if tacitly, relegated class status behind military ability

---

[862] Digges, *Stratioticos*, sig. a.ii.r., p. 70. See also Smythe, *Discourses*, sig. *2r., cf. Smythe, *Instructions*, sig. A3r.,
[863] Barret, *Theorike*, sig. ¶2-3; Woodcock, 'Introduction', pp. 1-2.
[864] e.g. Williams, *Actions*, p. 83; e.g. Churchyard, *Wofull Warres*, p. 15.
[865] Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, pp. 187-9.
[866] Patrick Collinson, 'The Monarchical Republic of Elizabeth I', in *Idem.*, *Elizabethan Essays* (London, 1994), pp. 31-58; Smuts, 'Organized Violence', p. 418.
[867] Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, sig. ¶iv.r.

in the matrix of honour of the perfect Captain. William Garrard instructed soldiers not to 'disdain to be governed and commanded of a Captaine…of no ancient house', as it is only 'valour and virtue' that makes a man 'noble', citing the Spaniards Julian Romero and Cristobal de Mondragon as well as classical figures.[868] A rare explicit argument of the superiority of military knowledge to birth appeared in volunteer Walter Morgan's manuscript account of the early Low Countries wars. Morgan explained the defeat of a relief force at Haarlem in 1573 as its commander's 'honor by byrthe was greter then his skille or experience', proving 'that hit ys not mans byrthe entitulyd wythe seremonis of honor that ys to stande an armie in effecte…but his industrius spiritte of knowledge and value in judgement…thoughe hee weare of de[s]cent never so bace, vertue and knowledge ys of auctoritie sufficient too beare ruule'.[869]

Meanwhile, some other English writers argued that praiseworthy military service *imparted* nobility. George Whetstone praised how 'valour, by government' 'is able to raise a man from the Carte, to be a Sovereign Captaine', while in the Roman army, 'the noble and the innoble soldier, by birth was regarded alike'.[870] Rapple points out that Whetstone was from a younger generation than Rich and Churchyard and 'attempted to effect a greater accommodation between the martial profession and civil republican discourse', so that instead of 'chivalric franchise', Whetstone invoked 'humanist meritocracy' and 'civic glory'.[871] Geoffrey Gates, likely encouraged by his particularly strong link between the reformed faith and the martial ethos, echoed Richard Morison in extending his appeal for national martial revival outside the traditional martial classes to encompass the Protestant nation-in-arms, for the 'gentle or

[868] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 34-5.
[869] Walter Morgan, ed. Duncan Caldecott-Baird, *The Expedition in Holland* (London, 1976), p. 119.
[870] Whetstone, *Honourable Reputation*, sig. B.v.-II.v. See also Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 26r.-v.
[871] Rapple, *Martial Power*, p. 78.

ungentle, noble or unnoble, riche or poore, that meaneth to proove himself a good Christian, a faithful Englishman' to 'honour, nourish and exercise Armes, and learne…the skill and prudence that doe necessarily accompany the same'.[872]

A more important change in military identities among English soldier-writers, however, is visible in their much greater emphasis on professional identity. On one hand, chivalry remained a critical component of martiality, politics, and culture in Elizabethan England. The military treatises studied here coexisted with much more traditionally chivalric or straightforwardly noble-martial treatments of war in English martial literature.[873] Chivalry continued to saturate English art, pageantry, and royal representation, and in the context of a female monarch and national defence against the Catholic threat, in an increasingly militarised political nation 'chivalric tropes of honour and prowess fused with militant Protestantism and incipient nationalism'.[874]

More importantly from the perspective of military culture, much of England's warrior classes, in their identities, discourses, and behaviour, saw no inherent contradiction between chivalry and newer ideas of military professionalism and technical expertise, and recent historiography has accordingly revised the idea that Elizabethan or Jacobean chivalry or neo-medievalism was pointlessly Quixotic or divorced from military reality.[875] Thus, politico-military leaders like Leicester and Essex presented themselves both as skilled commanders and chivalric knights, and participated in the immensely rich chivalric culture of Gloriana's court society as well

---

[872] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 51.
[873] Alex Davies, *Chivalry and Romance in the English Renaissance* (Woodbridge, 2003); e.g. William Segar, *Honor Military, and Civill* (London, 1602), covering 'Justice, and Iurisdiction Military' but also 'Combats for life, and Triumph'.
[874] Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, pp. 174; On chivalry in Elizabethan political culture, noble ideology, and discourses of loyalty, see e.g. Roy Strong, 'Fair England's Knights', in *Idem.*, *The Cult of Elizabeth* (London, 1999), pp. 129-63; Sharpe, *Selling*, pp. 425-9.
[875] Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, pp. 173-7.

as new military theory culture.[876] The modernising, professionalising Roger Williams jousted and arranged single combats, while the outstanding chivalric paragon and martyred knight Philip Sidney criticised firearms in his poetry yet 'embraced gunpowder weaponry' in his actual military service, studied under von Schwendi, and advised technical military study, including reading, mathematics, and modern formations, 'as it were the trade of our lives'.[877]

Nonetheless, though the evidence for chivalric culture in Elizabethan England's political nation and for explicit treatment of chivalric and knightly themes in contemporary literature is vast, the Elizabethan military-technical treatises studied here cannot be counted amongst it. Though one might have expected chivalric themes of knighthood, prowess, *franchise*, or courtesy to play some significant role in the English military literature studied in this thesis, 'the facts do not quite bear out that interpretation', with English soldiers in these texts writing in an overwhelmingly technical rather than knightly mindset, not as 'exemplars of the martial tradition, but as professionals engaged in a career that was coming to have less and less to do specifically with that tradition'.[878] As such, English military textbooks, like their Spanish counterparts, were firmly un-chivalric. As ever, this likely reflected the military contexts and perceived tactical demands of the time; the themes of infantry formation tactics, army-level manoeuvre, fortification, officership, and discipline, with which English military theorists were usually preoccupied, hardly leant themselves well to

[876] McCoy, *Rites of Knighthood*, pp. 28-78, 79-102.
[877] 'Williams, Sir Roger', *DNB*; Lawrence, *Complete Soldier*, p. 59; Philip Sidney, *Astrophel and Stella* (London, 1591), p. 9; James M. Osborne, *Young Philip Sidney* (New Haven, 1972), p. 539. As Trim, 'Martial Poetics', pp. 603-4 points out, Sidney commanded a pike-and-shot regiment as well as a knightly horse company. Williams was buried at Sidney's feet and both knights' funerals were redolent with noble-martial themes: Hammer, *Polarisation*, p. 148; Elizabeth Goldring, 'The Funeral of Sir Philip Sidney', in Elizabeth Goldring and J.R. Mulryne (eds.), *Court Festivals of the European Renaissance* (London, 2017), p. 202.
[878] Ferguson, *Chivalric Tradition*, pp. 101-6.

chivalric themes of individualistic knighthood, while the absence of chivalric themes was perhaps further encouraged by the relatively small attention given by English, or indeed Spanish, military theory to cavalry warfare.

English soldiers did not develop a culture of anti-chivalric 'gunpowder epics' comparable to that of the *tercios*, likely reflecting their lack of any equivalent institutional basis for a strong rank-and-file *esprit de corps* and proud infantry culture; the Elizabethan common soldier, in military literature, is invariably voiceless. However, some English military literature did echo many themes in the Spanish 'gunpowder epic' in a similarly un-chivalric manner; George Gascoigne in his poem *Fruites of Warre* (subtitled '*Dulce Bellum Inexpertis*') adopted the voice of an experienced but embittered warrior, criticising those 'haughty hearts' who fight for glory as much as greedy men who fight for profit. Gascoigne's realistic depiction of contemporary warfare and the failures of English soldiers at Goes arguably paralleled Spanish gunpowder epic in focusing on the reality of war, though of course without the triumphalist, proud infantry culture of the Spaniards, and the poet self-fashioned as a seasoned professional soldier correcting naïve readers on the inglorious realities of gunpowder campaigning.[879]

Gascoigne identified as 'Esquire by birth, and Souldiour by profession', and other Elizabethan soldier-writers likewise consistently presented themselves and their fellow warriors as members by choice of a distinct profession.[880] English theorists were particularly fond of contrasting 'soldiers' and 'scholars' to self-fashion as gruff but authentic martialists.[881] Indeed, a Spanish example of this *topos* appeared two and a half

[879] e.g. Gascoigne, *Posies*, p. cxxiii.
[880] Gascoigne, *Posies*, sig. ¶¶ii.r.
[881] Barwick, *Weapons of fire*, sig. Br.; Rapple, *Martial Power*, p. 76.

decades earlier in Vega's treatise, which declared that 'our task is more to give order in how one has to use arms and order infantry, than to write elegantly'.[882] Meanwhile, English military writers compared the profession of a soldier with other specialised professions as a way of aggrandising the superior honour of the warrior's masculine occupation compared to soft, peace-loving civilians, frequently based on the inherent praiseworthiness of bravery and suffering.[883] The emerging idea of warfare as a specialist 'trade' with its own skills to be learned by study and experience, as discussed in the following chapter, further reinforced the notion of warfare as a 'profession', not a class obligation.

Elizabethan military literature also revealed changing martial cultures in how soldier-writers justified the military profession as praiseworthy or necessary. Perhaps even more than their Spanish counterparts, they retained healthy respect for individual acts of strenuous bravery or honourable sacrifice, from which they continued to derive their identity and their entitlement to status and reward. Even the professionalising Roger Williams ruled that 'the fewer [killed] the better conduct, but the more dyes, the more honour to the fight', an open acknowledgement of the dichotomy between bloody but honourable warfare, and the duller, safer 'conduct' in textbooks.[884] The example *par excellence* of conceptualising and justifying war through traditional masculine virtue was Thomas Churchyard, who argued that anyone who 'gallopes after glorie', whether in national or foreign service, 'should either bee rewarded, or at least reap some suche credite' purely for the inherent glory and prestige of dangerous military pursuits, not for any higher philosophical or ideological justification.[885] Churchyard openly ruled 'desire

[882] Vega, *Tratado*, p. 96. (*nuestro oficio es más dado a dar orden cómo se ha de obrar con las armas y ordenar infantería, que no al elegante escribir de la pluma*)
[883] e.g. Barret, *Theorike*, p. 167.
[884] Williams, *Actions*, p. 80.
[885] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. Miii.r.

of worldely fame and glorie' 'the only sturrer up of stoutness in a Soldiours stomacke, and the principal poincte that a manne of warre careth for, and holdeth in reputation'.[886]

This was an increasingly politically incorrect but probably accurate identification of the true reason sixteenth-century gentlemen went to war. Yet by the time Churchyard wrote those words, many of his fellow soldier-writers were already beginning ostensibly to justify the military profession in very different ways. In this regard, they were clearly responding to prevailing moral conditions: as Rapple has identified, humanist criticism of war and its practitioners, and the generally un-martial nature of the English state and society prior to 1585, necessitated English advocates for the martial community to adjust their rhetoric accordingly. As such, Barnaby Rich in 1574 addressed moral criticisms of warfare in having his 'soldier' interlocutor repulsed by war's human consequences, and resolve to 'leave the exercise of so vyle a profession…so filthy and hatefull a service'. In response, 'Mercury' agrees but reminds him of the inevitability of war and the dire consequences of military unpreparedness- the recurring refrain of all Elizabethan military treatises- and therefore that soldiers are necessary. Rich's soldier thus concludes 'the soldier is worthy to be maintayned yf it be but to withstand the malignitye of others'.[887]

Geoffrey Gates similarly justified the necessity of the profession but not the inherent glory of violence, defending 'the Militarie profession, for the repressing and restraining of the tyrannies and noyfull [sic] malice of the wicked'.[888] Gates's 'defence and praise of warlike prowess, against all contemners of the same' was thus made 'for the benefite and encouragement of my countrie & countrimen', and combined the

[886] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. Tiii.r.
[887] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. B3r.-B7r.
[888] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 6.

language of royal authority, public good, military discipline, and personal virtue.[889] Gates was also an outstanding but by no means unique example of emerging confessional identities and the 'Protestant Cause' influencing English military writing and justifications of soldiering, stressing the importance of 'militarie industrie' in defending 'Christes Kingdom' in reformed Europe 'against the most famous, arrogant, & implacable enemies of the gospel'.[890] As Trim has shown, Gates' text was a religious as well as a military polemic, and many of his fellow volunteers were similarly driven by personal Protestant conviction and understood the war in Flanders in specifically confessionalised terms, even before the threat of Spanish invasion would further strengthen the link in English martial culture between national defence, military reform, patriotic duty and Protestantism.[891] However, unlike Spanish soldier-writers, English military writers generally did *not* incorporate piety into their descriptions of praiseworthy fellow warriors.

Politico-religious and ostensibly selfless justifications of the military profession would continue to subsume traditional identities of manhood, honour, and personal, self-serving virtue in later military theory. William Blandy claimed that 'the two limmes that chiefly…strengthen the body of Princely Majestie, is the justiciar and souldiar', both owing their promotion and honour to their loyalty to the crown.[892] Though Blandy inevitably ruled that soldiers were superior due to the greater hardships they faced, he stressed that soldiers should be motivated by 'fidelity to his Prince, love to his countrey, honor of his upright minde', and that the entire military profession 'is honourable, which resteth in the maintenaunce to death of a good and rightfull cause'.[893] Setting out

[889] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 6, 45.
[890] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 6, 23.
[891] David Trim, 'Calvinist Internationalism and the English Officer Corps', in *History Compass*, 4/6 (2006), pp. 1024-48.
[892] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 15r.
[893] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 15v., 18v.

to argue another 'defence of martial practice' in 1587, Rich moved straight to 'for he that taketh away the knowledge of feates of armes, worketh the overthrow of his own countrey and commonwealth' and echoed Lawrence Humphrey in hoping that England's defenders would be 'expert warriours, although I doo not meane, that they should bee warre lovers'.[894] Such rhetoric, that 'the Art and discipline militarie, is the maintainer of peace, and ground of securitie', was clearly a way for England's burgeoning community of professional soldiers to advocate for their own social prestige and material interests according to wider social and intellectual *mores*, but nonetheless, reveals a real shift in martial identity away from individual martial prowess and towards a new, higher-minded argument for the necessity and reward of arms.[895]

iv. The Spanish Threat

As well as justifying the military profession in general terms, however, English soldier-writers also revealed much more specific influences of geopolitical context and contemporary ideology in advocating for martial renewal and military reform to face a specific danger: Catholic Spain. This reflected both ideological and confessional aversion to Philip II's monarchy and, increasingly, the practical military menace posed by Spain as England moved closer to 'hot' war. Long before 1585 or even 1567, the fear of Spain and specifically of Spain's armies had appeared in printed polemic in the context of Mary's Spanish marriage.[896] Fear of Spain became acute with the suppression of the Dutch Revolt and arrival of the Army of Flanders, and horror of Spanish troops was easily conflated with confessional hatred, revulsion at the inquisition, and Spanish atrocities in the New World; tellingly, proposals for reforming the English militia

[894] Rich, *Path-way*, sig. A4v.-A5r.
[895] Smythe, *Instructions*, sig. A3r. See also *Myrrour*, sig. Br.-v.
[896] John Bradford, *Nature of the Spaniardes* (Wesel, 1556), fo. 46r., 39r.

system likewise appeared soon after Alba's arrival.[897] Religious conflict in the 1570s, particularly the Sack of Antwerp as well as the Saint Bartholomew's Day Massacre, created a wave of 'militant Anglo-Protestant nationalism' and printed 'alarum texts', polemics warning of the threat posed to England's commonwealth or the wider Protestant cause by Catholicism and its rapacious armies. George Gascoigne produced an infamous account of the 'pitteous spectakle' at Antwerp, where Spain's Catholic 'butchers' 'slew great numbers of yong children'- one of many examples of how it was often Spain's soldiers in particular on which anti-Spanish literature centred.[898] Gascoigne saw the sack as simply the latest of Spain's 'barbarous' cruelties and referred to the revolt as 'the burning houses of [our] so near neighbours' while a ballad warned Londoners to 'keep sure thy trench, prepare thy shot', 'for Antwerp's plague approacheth near'.[899] Fear and loathing of Spanish troops, and identification of the Army of Flanders as an urgent threat requiring moral and military response, intensified after 1585 with the outbreak of war, threat of imminent invasion, and concomitant domestic military mobilisation. Far from receding with the defeat of the 1588 Armada, the Spanish threat in English martial writing continued throughout the intense offensive and defensive military efforts of the 1590s, and despite calls for peace, to the final years of the war.[900]

---

[897] William S. Maltby, *The Black Legend in England* (Durham, 1971); Buchanan, 'Print and Political Responses'; Hammer, *Elizabeth's Wars*, pp. 97-8; Lindsay Boynton, *The Elizabethan Militia* (London, 1967), p. 59.
[898] George Gascoigne, *The Spoyle of Antwerpe* (London, 1576), sig. A5. Buchanan, 'Print and Political Responses', pp. 151-4; see also Anonymous, *A Briefe Discoverie* (London, 1588), on fear of Spanish soldiers.
[899] Gascoigne, *Spoyle of Antwerpe*, sig. A3r.; Ralph Norris, *A Warning to London* (London, 1577).
[900] Anonymous, *Newes from Rome* (London, 1590); Charles Gibbon, *Watch-vvorde for Warre* (Cambridge, 1596); Anonymous, *A Larum for London* (London, 1602); Claire Jackson, *Devil-Land* (London, 2002), p. 53; Alexandra Gajda, 'Debating War and Peace in Late Elizabethan England', *Historical Journal*, 52/4 (December 2009), pp. 851-78.

As such, English military writers incorporated the Spanish threat into their own texts and used it to legitimise their own martial precepts and the military profession itself. Geoffrey Gates, reflecting his military identity as well as his confessional and ideological alignments, justified his strident call to 'give most honourable place' to the military profession by evoking familiar images of Spanish sacks, 'streetes and fieldes lying covered with the deade carkeises of them that contemned prowess, and had Armes in derision'.[901] Rich centred his evocation of the Spanish threat and call for English military renewal on the parable of Antwerp, an indolent, hubristic city whose sack demonstrated that 'where Mars is had in no accompt, no state may long endure'.[902]

The context of confessional war and national defence against the Spanish enemy influenced authorial voices of loyalty. Just as Spanish soldier-writers hastened to justify Philip's war against heretic rebels, George Whetstone praised Elizabeth's intervention in the Netherlands and reassured 'worthy Gentlemen' in royal service that 'your quarrel is grounded upon compassion & justice, and polliticke judgement, for the safetie of your own countrey'.[903] Like their Spanish counterparts, English soldier-writers stressed their patriotic motivations, writing 'for countries cause' and 'true Religion, the faithful service of her excellent Majestie', citing their books as examples of their service to the crown.[904] Criticisms of incorrect military practices were couched 'not upon any hate' of rivals, 'onlie for the great love that I beare to my Prince, Countrie and Nation'.[905]

As well as calling for patriotic solidarity in service between military professionals, English military writers also revealed a degree of pride in the past and

[901] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 11, 47.
[902] Rich, *Allarme*, sig. **4r.
[903] Whetstone, *Honourable Reputation*, sig. F2r.
[904] Rich, *Allarme*, sig. **2v.; Digges, *Stratioticos*, sig. A2v.; Barret, *Theorike*, fo. 3v.; Smythe to Burghley, MS Lansdowne 65/62.
[905] Smythe, *Discourses*, sig. **3v.; Rich, *Martial Conference*, sig. H2v.

present martial deeds of their countrymen.[906] Many extended England's medieval military heritage to Henry VIII's wars, and Churchyard's chivalric nostalgia for Henry's reign and careful recording of English martial deeds from the 1550s to the early 1570s reads like an attempt to create a recent tradition of 'fame and honour of my countreymen', comparable to the *tercio* heritage in the Spanish texts.[907] William Blandy depicted the English volunteers under Norreys as an ideal and ideologically sound martial collective, whose 'vertue doubleth the worthynes of other nations', 'even the rude multitude', as fighting 'to winne their prince and countrye honour, [they] feare no force, dread no daunger', proudly declaring that Englishmen were 'to be preferred before the straunger in true value, hardynes, courage, prowes and magnanimitye'.[908]

Thus, as well as general rhetoric justifying the importance of arms, English military writers were influenced by much more specific identities and ideologies, viewing themselves and their fellows as defenders of Protestant England or even participants in an international Protestant cause against the Spanish threat, and framing their advocacy of the military profession and their own personal voices of loyalty accordingly. Yet such themes coexisted in English martial culture with a far more surprising influence: *admiration* for Spanish military practice. Robert Naunton, looking back in 1641 on the Elizabethan politico-military world, was in no doubt that for England's soldiers, continental warfare 'was a *Militia* wherein they were daily in acquaintance with the discipline of the Spaniards'.[909] Open admiration for the prowess and skill of Spain's troops could coexist in English texts with revulsion at their atrocities, and even the most hysterically hispanophobic texts admired Spain's hated

[906] e.g. Barrett, *Theorike*, fo. 3r.; Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 57.
[907] Woodcock, *Thomas Churchyard*, p. 204.
[908] Blandy, *Castle*, sig. Hi.v.-Hii.v.
[909] Naunton, *Fragmenta*, p. 19.

soldiery as having 'never…attempted any thynge, but that they have thereby gotten both honour and prayse'.[910] The Spanish empire, like the Roman, was cited by Elizabethan writers to prove the link between civilisational success and martial culture. Gates cited Spanish victories to prove how 'when the Lord meaneth to advance a nation and to make any people famous and honourable upon earth, he stirreth them up to high courage, and maketh their minds and bodies apt to the warres', by which Charles V 'advanced the honour and state of Spayne to the full summe: by virtue of military industrie and martial prudence'.[911] Barnaby Rich portrayed the *tercios* as a unique 'troupe of Mars' while the Dutch honoured Bacchus and Venus.[912]

However, English soldier-writers admired Spanish soldiers in much more specific, professional ways. English use of the Spanish military model was most obviously visible in the direct publication of Spanish military literature. Along with at least three Spanish manuals in translation and Barret's plagiarism, this included the reproduction and explicit citation of Sancho de Londoño's military regulations in Thomas Digges' 1590 edition of *Stratioticos* and Matthew Sutcliffe's *Lawes of Armes*.[913] The Spanish technical vocabulary of professional infantry warfare ('*ambuscado*', '*camisado*', '*alferez*', '*camerado*') formed the backbone of the English lexicon of continental war.[914] The 1591 English-Spanish dictionary was dedicated to Essex, ostensibly to assist him in future military endeavours, and Robert Barret's

[910] Buchanan, 'Print and Political Responses', pp. 151-4.
[911] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 21, 41.
[912] Rich, *Allarme*, sig. **iii.v.
[913] Thomas Digges, *Stratioticos* (London, 1590), p. 297; John M. Collins, *Martial Law and English Laws* (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 93-4.
[914] e.g. *Myrrour*, sig. D2r.; e.g. Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 12; e.g. Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 338; e.g. Smythe, *Instructions*, p. 20.

technical glossary (as 'most of our termes now used in warres are derived from straungers') included 36 Spanish words, and only two Dutch.[915]

Even more surprisingly, explicit use of Spanish models permeated Elizabethan 'native' military literature. The promise made by the translator of Valdes' treatise of 'unarming this Spanysh Sergeant and doffing his Castilian and hostile armour…to the end that our men may use him to theyr pleasure, and he finding himselfe metamorphosed, learn how to serve English men' could have applied to much of English military theory.[916] English soldier-writers consistently described Spain's infantry forces as exemplars of professionalised military skill. The best-known case is that of Sir Roger Williams, whose manual (described by Williams himself as 'my little discourse of the Spanish discipline', published only two years after the defeat of the Armada) was emphatically based on his service in the Army of Flanders as 'no Armie that ever I saw, passes that of the Duke de Parma for discipline & good order: the which & it pleased others to follow, it were not amiss'.[917] Williams both demonstrated the depth of his admiration for Spain's soldiery, and revealed a growing understanding of military permanence, experience, and institutional competence, in famously describing the Army of Flanders as 'a Universitie continually in exercises' and recognising how the 'Spanish Road' system 'traines his *besinos*, and furnisheth this Armie with trained souldiers'.[918]

But detailed praise for the *tercios* was a constant refrain of Elizabethan military theory, Barnaby Rich idolising them as 'expert and trained souldiers', 'great and notable

---

[915] Richard Percyvall, *Bibliotheca Hispanica* (London, 1591), sig. A2r.; Barret, *Theorike,* end table. On Barret's glossary, reflective of the sixteenth-century English focus on continental military models, see Alicia Rodriguez-Alvarez, 'Robert Barret's Glossary', *International Journal of Lexicography*, 37 (2024), pp. 95-116.
[916] Valdes, *Sergeant Maior*, sig. A2r.-v.
[917] Williams, *Actions*, p. 102; Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, pp. 10-11.
[918] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, pp. 28-9, 12.

Captaines and commanders…for all purposes, the best experimented that Christendom could afford' and Barret as 'old Regiments, where their souldiers be experimented, trustie & carefull'.[919] Just as Spanish soldier-writers trumpeted recent *tercio* victories, English writers cited Spanish military endeavours to prove the Spaniards' martial prowess. Garrard, himself a veteran of fourteen years in Spanish service, referenced the 'famous and glorious' river crossing at Mühlberg and the skill and 'valiant courage' of the Spaniards under Don Juan over the Dutch rebels at Gembloux in 1578, which he himself witnessed.[920] Digges, Smythe, Williams and others even singled out the hated Alba, 'though otherwise cruel, yet a man skilful in matter of warre', for praise.[921]

Beyond general admiration for Spain's 'worthy' soldiers and 'special Captains and gentlemen', English military writers cited the Spanish model in support of specific aspects of military reform.[922] Infantry-dominant tactics and innovations like the adoption of muskets, reconnaissance operations, or '*camisados*', all evocative of the military context of gunpowder infantry warfare and growing professionalism from which military theory took its cues, were regularly and explicitly identified as Spanish practices to be emulated. Smythe modelled his costume and equipment recommendations on Spanish examples and Williams even praised Spanish discipline in mutiny.[923] Even the uniquely English longbow-gun discussion was expressed through the Spanish threat and model. Spanish infantry were used to exemplify firearm supremacy, and Humfrey Barwick sarcastically wished that 'the Spanish shot were archers' but warned that as they were not, England must practise with 'the musket, the harquebuze and the pistol: the which without exercise cannot bee commodious…to be

[919] Rich, *Martial Conference*, sig. G2v.; Barret, *Theorike*, p. 17.
[920] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 20-1, 124-5.
[921] e.g. Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 146-7, Smythe, *Discourses*, fo. 14v., Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 6; Collins, *Martial Law*, pp. 93-4.
[922] Gates, *Militarie Discipline*, p. 33.
[923] Smythe, *Instructions*, p. 185, 18; Williams, *Actions*, p. 92.

answerable against the usurping enemies the Spaniards, who are wholly and fully practiced therewith'.[924] English theorists do not seem to have explicitly advocated creating a similar, permanent infantry force, reflecting their general silence on direct, specific prescriptions for English military organisation.[925] However, the *tercios* were used as exemplars of training, long-term service, meritocracy, and service in the ranks before aspiring to command, all crucial aspects of their vision of military professionalism, while one of Burghley's military advisors suggested in particular that the English emulate the Spanish '*camerades* of five or six p[er]sons', for 'any occasion of employment of smale nombers in fight watche…or other service'.[926] In short, almost every theme incorporated by military theorists into the emerging picture of military perfection according to sixteenth-century military techniques was found by Elizabethan military theorists to be exemplified by their hated enemies. This was the case throughout the period; English military writers were apparently blissfully unaware of the crippling financial and disciplinary problems in the Spanish system by the 1590s or the declining professionalism identified by de Léon, and though Rich hinted in 1598 at improvements in Dutch military practice, only well into the Stuart years would English military theory dismiss the Spanish model in favour of the 'revolutionary' innovations credited to Maurice of Nassau.[927]

Elizabethan military theorists hastened to stress that Spanish prowess was based not on any innate national masculinity or superiority, only on their 'good order' and technical practices. This reflected the very real tactical innovations of the *tercios* as an

---

[924] e.g. Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 19; Barwick, *Weapons of fire*, sig. B2v., fo. 19v.
[925] Essex's military-institutional proposals for an elite infantry force and permanent Council of War likely both followed Spanish models but apparently neither was intended to outlast the Spanish war: Henry, 'Essex as Strategist', p. 390; Hammer, *Polarisation*, p. 241; *Apologie*, sig. D3v.
[926] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 12; MS Lansdowne 24/30, Ralph Lane, 'Discours Uppon Martiall Affayres'; Lord Burghley to Thomas Wilkes, 11th Feb. 1591, and Thomas Wilkes to Lord Burghley, 12th Feb. 1591, TNA, SP 12/241, fo. 76 and 77.
[927] Rich, *Martial Conference*, sig. G2v.; Manning, *Apprenticeship*, pp. 138-9.

institutionalised, enduring force of gunpowder infantry, and the obvious achievements of Spanish arms over the last century.[928] As Lynn points out, Spanish arms in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century were the 'paradigm force' of the day, the national exemplar of military organisation that 'defined the core characteristics for a stage of military evolution' for European observers. In this case, the *tercios* epitomised the institutionalisation of gunpowder- and infantry-dominant tactics, and the centralised authority and embryonic professionalism of the men that deployed them, that had developed in the era of the Italian Wars.[929] Indeed, Elizabethan use of the Spanish monarchy as an intellectual model extended outside the military sphere; Elliott pointed out that despite contexts of religious and military conflict, Spain's geopolitical hegemony provoked admiration as well as hostility and exerted a 'hypnotic fascination' over the Elizabethan and early Stuart polity, including in such realms as fashion and theatre along with colonial aspirations and literary forms.[930] Barbara Fuchs includes military translation in the English 'piracy' of Spanish literary models, which coloured late Elizabethan letters even during 'the greatest rivalry between the two nations', again reflecting Spain's geopolitical dominance as well as its literary achievements.[931]

Conversely, the English fixation on the Spanish military model reflected their own specific political contexts and other preoccupations: admiration for Spanish military practice was clearly symbiotic with criticisms of England's lack of martial spirit or perceived military backwardness. To a far greater extent than their Spanish counterparts- but motivated by the same drive for military perfection, which outranked patriotic feeling- English military writers were willing to criticise the tactical, technical,

[928] e.g. Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 8.
[929] John A. Lynn, 'The Evolution of Army Style', *International History Review*, 18/3, (August 1996), p. 510, 514.
[930] J.H. Elliott, 'Learning from the Enemy', in *Idem.*, *Spain, Europe and the Wider World* (New Haven, 2009), pp. 25-51.
[931] Barbara Fuchs, *The Poetics of Piracy* (Philadelphia, 2013), p. 1.

and moral failings of their own nation at war, albeit in strictly general terms while preserving their own authorial voices of national loyalty, and this was obviously an important mental background to praising the hated enemy as a military model. Indeed, given how important both the English need for military reform and the superiority of the Spanish infantry were as twin pillars of Elizabethan military theory, the latter was on one level likely a uniquely powerful example of 'praise-shaming', dwarfing explicit use of the Ottoman model in contemporary military writing. Yet advocacy of military reform on the Spanish model, even at the height of the Spanish threat, must be seen ultimately as showing the willingness of military theorists- who, after all, ostensibly based their prescriptions on 'reason'- to put concerns and contexts of identity and ideology aside, and concentrate on their emerging ideas of military perfection.

CHAPTER 6: The Perfect Captain

In their decision to write, and in the content of their works, Spanish and English soldier-writers, including theorists of the art of war, were thus influenced by the political, geopolitical, and military contexts in which they wrote, by their own personal ties or hopes for patronage from leading politico-military figures, and by the martial identities and ideologies of their respective nations and periods. Nonetheless, military theorists almost invariably wrote their treatises not merely for specific individuals nor explicitly for particular or nationally-specific military or geopolitical challenges. Rather, they strove to present timeless military wisdom combined with an organisational, technical, and tactical vision of the perfect 'modern' army: not how armies *were*, but how they *should be.* This accounts for the striking similarities examined below in the content and preoccupations of Spanish and English military theory, despite their very different contexts of culture, national identity, and 'real-world' military organisation.

As such, considering both national bodies of military handbooks together, the following two chapters will seek to synthesise how soldier-writers conceived of martial perfection. This chapter will firstly examine the philosophies underpinning ideals of command and the overriding stress on reason, control, and practical, objective-driven warfare that underpinned all more concrete principles in tactical and organisational theory. It will then examine the constituent elements that made up the ideal Captain General, which, lip service to piety or inner qualities aside, was focused on the same practical view of warfare, with significant distaste for messy and risky pitched battle. Moving further down the chain of command to unit commanders and junior officers, the chapter will then examine how military theorists envisaged a form of 'initiation' by both study and experience to become an approved member of the professional officer community. The gap between theory and reality in this regard provoked lamentations of

unfair or improper allocation of ranks, the most common and the most significant form of dissatisfaction with real-world military practice encountered in the martial tracts of both nations, and concomitant calls for meritocratic promotion standards. Finally, it examines how military theorists combined specific inner characteristics and professional skills in making up the ideal infantry officer.

I. The Philosophy of Command

Perhaps the most fundamental intellectual basis of military theory was the principle, both explicit and implicit, of 'reason'- the practical imperative to military victory that underpinned all more specific precepts of tactics and techniques, and *ab initio* justified the 'meritocratic' principles of officership discussed later in this chapter. Bernardino de Mendoza expected officers to act in quotidian duties, as well as on the battlefield, 'in reason, like experienced men' and the *Myrrour for English Soldiers* ruled that 'as the General himselfe is the directer of the whole army, so must reason joyned wyth learning bee the guide of his life'.[932] 'Reason of war', especially in Spanish texts, could be used to imply a generally accepted body of opinion about correct practice; thus, chronicles assessed the actions of Generals with reference to 'good reason of war' 'in obligation to the profession', and theorists justified their precepts as 'truth justified in all military reason'.[933] Bernardino de Escalante neatly summarised the dichotomy between performative bravery and practical, rational wisdom, and the overriding focus on the latter, in having his *alcaide* interlocutor insist that his predecessor, when besieged, would always launch sallies, 'and if I don't, I will be seen as a coward', to which Escalante's expert 'Captain' responds that 'the *caballero* who follows military honour does not have to govern by bad custom, only by true reason, which was given as a judge in all such matters'.[934]

Together with the logical 'reason' of practical warfare, military theorists also started *ab initio* from the principle that it was proper military practice, not numerical

---

[932] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 85. (*de razon como gente experimentada*); *Myrrour*, sig. B3v.
[933] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.168. (*en buen razon de guerra*); Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fo. 48v. (*razon de la guerra*), 49r. (*obligar à ello la profesión de la guerra*); Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 92. (*verdad fundada en toda razon militar*); see also Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 12v.-13r.
[934] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 3r. (*los Alcaydes mis predecessors salian à estos rebatos, y dexando lo yo de hazer, tener me yan por pusilanimo, y couarde. CAP. El cauallero que sigue la honrra military no se ha de gouernar por la mala costumbre, sino por la verdadera razon, que le fue dada por juez de todas sus causas*)

strength or fortune, which decided the outcome of battles and campaigns, and as such, tacitly justified their own treatises. Especially frequent was the refrain that skill trumped numbers; typically, Lechuga assumed that 'one knows that the victories of armies result not from the numbers of the many, but from the virtue and sagacity of the few, and principally of the chiefs', which Lechuga saw as primarily embodied in his own titular rank, the *Maestre de Campo General.*[935] Williams explained the superiority of military perfection over numerical strength with both ancient and modern examples:

> The Warres consists altogether in good chiefs, & experimented soldiers, & ever did…What caused Alexander to overthrow Darius with few men, considering his number?...also Charles the fifth with a few experimented souldiers considering the number of the Germans.[936]

Similarly, military skill was seen as more important than fortune. Bernardino de Escalante quoted Greek and Roman sources as wanting four qualities in a commander- 'very practised in the military art, valorous, and a man of authority, and very lucky'- but ruled that luck arose from 'science, strength, and authority'.[937] Referring to the same classical attributes, Francisco de Valdes rejected luck and even innate authority of a man's person as independent virtues of command, ruling that luck and authority automatically accompany martial knowledge and virtue.[938] Even the pious Geoffrey Gates rejected divine assistance as sufficient for war, arguing that a 'righteous hearte' must be joined with 'skill, courage, industrie and agilitie'.[939]

Following on from these principles came another, equally important basis of all military theory, the importance of wisdom or 'prudence' as the guiding ethic of military

---

[935] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 19. (*se sabe que las victorias de los exercitos, no se tienen por el numero de los muchos, si no por la virtud y sagacidad de pocos, y principalmente de las cabeças*)
[936] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 4.
[937] Escalante, *Dialogos*, 76r. (*quatro cosas, que fuessen muy praticos en el arte militar, y valerosos, y hombres de authoridad y bien afortunados*), fo. 81r. (*la felicidad nace de la sciencia, y de la fortaleza, y de la authoridad*)
[938] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 12.
[939] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 50.

operations, 'the most important component in leadership', and the crucial attribute for warriors.[940] Spanish writers were particularly fond of combining prudent command with brave comportment as the two basic attributes of the ideal officer, with this bipartite *topos* of 'valour firm and constant…with singular prudence accompanied' being the simplest, and most common, matrix of honour of officership- usually expressed explicitly in the Spanish sources, and tacitly in the English.[941] A sonnet of Juan Venegas Quizada, Lieutenant General of Artillery, praised the Marques de Santa Cruz for his '*esfuerço*', '*prudencia*' and '*valentia*'.[942] Spanish writers thus praised their senior commanders and more junior heroes for their '*valor y prudencia*', and combined these with other basic military attributes and their personal service record, expanding the matrix of honour with 'valour, prudence, industry and courage' and 'zealous service' and 'notable dangers' undergone.[943]

The same combination was visible in military theory; Bernardino de Escalante's ideal fortress commander had '*esfuerzo*, wisdom and good sense, and loyalty, which must be esteemed more than lineage, however illustrious it is', while Mendoza wanted garrison commanders to be '*esforzado*, prudent, and a soldier of experience'.[944] English military writing was based on the same drive for wise and 'prudent' command, and occasionally used a similar formulation of the 'wisdom-bravery' combination; Churchyard described his Captain Reade as 'a manne so worthie of memorie, and

---

[940] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 39. (*prudencia para saber bien mandar y combatir, que es la parte de mas importancia en el gouernar*)
[941] Ayllon, *Sonetos*, sig. B7r. (*valor firme y constante…de singular prudencia acompañado*)
[942] Mosquera, *Comentario*, fo. 176r.-v.
[943] Verdugo, *Commentario*, p. 135; Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.128. (*su valor, prudencia, industria y valentía...el celo con que le servia, de otros muchos y tan notables peligros*); see also Ayllon, *Sonetos*, sig. Br.
[944] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 10v. (*esfuerço, sabiduría, y cordura, y con lealtad, que se ha de estimar en mas, que el linaje por muy Illustre que sea*); Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 125. (*esforçado, prudẽte, y soldado de esperiencia*)

garnished with knowledge and courage'.[945] The *Myrrour* thus ruled that 'true governed valiancie, is the groundworke of compleate perfection'.[946]

The ostensibly 'rational' mentalities of military theorists, and their drive for skilled, wise command, were also reflected in the concomitant principle that bravery or valour themselves were insufficient or even negative: 'force may not serve, nor a proud spirit/if the art of fighting is lacking in the warrior'.[947] English theorists particularly stressed that 'policie is of more force to subdue, than valour', warning that if a commander 'bee voyde of wisdome and learning…marshall discipline wanteth her greatest stay, courage is but rashnesse…therefore hee may bee onely accounted valiant…without vaine fooole-hardinesse'.[948] Barnaby Rich likewise warned that 'courage without skill is not true valiance, but rather may be sayde to be rash and foolish hardinesse', condemning 'courage…for vain glorie and greedie desire'.[949]

This condemnation of immoderate bravery, and the exaltation of wisdom over valour, was also manifested in an emerging distaste among theorists for seeking battle itself. Mendoza explained that victories without loss were 'of greatest esteem for a Captain': 'nothing can be held greater in *disciplina militar*, than undoing the forces and enterprises of the enemy with prudence, and industry, guiding one's affairs by mature counsel, without risking his soldiers (except when forced by necessity) in the dangers of battle'.[950] Londoño, typically, explained the risks of battle before concluding that 'for this, one must try all possible means before putting victory to the test of battle', and

---

[945] Churchyard, *Generall Rehearsall*, sig. G.i.v.; See also Lingham, *True Relation*, sig. A3v.
[946] *Myrrour*, sig. A2r.
[947] Palacio, *Dialogos Militares*, sig. Av. (*no prestan fuerças, ni animo fiero,/si el arte del lidiar falta al guerrero*)
[948] *Myrrour*, sig. B2r.-v.
[949] Rich, *Martial Conference*, sig. C4r., D.r.
[950] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fo. 102r.-v. (*lo que es mas de estimar para un Capitan…ninguna cosa la pueden tener mayor en la disciplina militar, que del deshazer las fuerças y ympresas de los enemigos con prudencia, e industria, guiando las cosas con maduro consejo, sin ofrezer sus soldados (no forçandoles la necesidad*) *al peligro de las batallas*); See also Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 78v.

stressed the long list of tactical factors that a General must consider if brought to fight by absolute necessity.[951]

English military theorists, though equally practical in their conception of warfare and with the same theoretical focus on 'knowledge', 'wisdom', and 'prudence' as superior to brute force, did not place the same emphasis on avoiding battle. At least one, Sir John Smythe, even still stressed the 'greatest importance' of field engagements.[952] This transnational difference may reflect the Spaniards' experience in the positional warfare and sieges of Flanders, where large field battles were rare. Conversely, it may reflect Smythe's lack of recent experience or his generally 'traditional' tone and ostensible dislike for military innovations. Other English military theorists stressed the rarity of battle in 'the conduction of our warres nowadays'; the Flanders veteran William Garrard limited his discussion of field engagements 'for that foughten fields chance seldome in our time'.[953] This did not stop Spanish nor especially English theorists devoting considerable attention to battlefield infantry formations.

Beyond the nature of warfare in Flanders, it is tempting to suggest that the Spanish focus on avoiding battle owed something to Alba's distinctive command style, who even on manoeuvre-intensive campaigns practised the Fabian strategy of avoiding battle and wearing the enemy down. Baltasar de Vargas, perhaps making the best of a campaign somewhat lacking in glorious martial feats, incorporated Alba's avoidance of field engagements into his praise for the Duke's command in 1567, arguing that 'victory without bloodshed is much more glorious' and only a civilian 'who knows nothing of

[951] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 27v. (*por esto se deuen tentar todos los medios que puede auer antes de poner en discrimen de batalla la vitoria*)
[952] Smythe, *Instructions*, sig. A4r.
[953] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 94; Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 156.

war' could think otherwise.[954] Isaba cited Hattin and Mohacs on the dangers of field engagements, and the Schmalkaldic campaign as a model victory without battle:

> Although [Charles' army] was smaller…he availed himself of the dilation of Fabius Maximus, delaying pitched battle, taking positions and posts, whence by his great discretion and understanding, he undid and defeated them…this form of fighting is the highest, and most intelligent, and the most honourable victory, that a Captain General may seek.[955]

Given Isaba's willingness to criticise severely the bias and incompetence in Spanish promotion networks and other failures of the 'sick body' of the Spanish infantry, this praise should be interpreted less in political or ideological terms as reflecting the author's patriotic pride in Charles' and Alba's deeds, and more as a genuine expression of military thought. On the early Flanders campaigns, Mendoza similarly described Alba's 'waging war with patience', 'not fighting except with great positional advantage to make up for the inferior strength of his army, nor fighting such skirmishes as would force him to come to battle', explaining the Duke's interdiction of rebel movement and supply as worthy of professional consideration.[956] From the rebel side, Williams likewise praised the dilatory strategies of the 'great Captaine' Alba in outmanoeuvring Orange's army, commenting that 'the wisest and of best judgement' of the military fraternity would agree with Alba's determination not to risk battle.[957] As much as their more obvious references to 'wisdom' and 'prudence', such deeper analysis by military theorists of the operational art came back to the same overriding idea of war as a problem to be met with strictly rational, practical skills rather than

---

[954] Vargas, *Breve Relacion*, Canto 179. (*ni de hechos de guerra sabe cosa…porque no entiende quinto es mas gloriosa/victoria la sin sangre ciertamente*); cf. Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.291.
[955] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 14v.-15r. (*bien que el suyo fuesse menor de numero, aunque mayor de animo, destreça, y fortaleça, toda via aprouechandose de la dilación de Fabio Máximo, dilató el venir a jornada señalada con ellos, tomādoles sitios y puestos, donde por su grā discreción y entendimiento los deshizo y desbarato…esta forma de pelear es la mas alta, la mas bien entendida, y la victoria mas honrosa que un Capitā general puede buscar*)
[956] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fols. 100v.-101r. (*guerreando con mucho sufrimiento...no combatiendo, sino con gran ventaja de sitio, que supliesse lo que con la inferiodidad de numero de su exercito se auenturaua, ni atacando escaramuças tales, que le forçassen venir à la batalla*)
[957] Williams, *Actions*, p. 2, 28.

glorious but ostentatious shows of masculine spirit, and it was on these basic mentalities that all other ideas of proper command and military practice rested.

Finally, in studying the key philosophies and ethics of command that underpinned military theory, it is important to address briefly how these manuals treated the military past and present, and the crucial theme of modernity. It is not within the scope of this thesis to analyse the use and discussion of ancient history or classical military themes in sixteenth-century military writing, which merits dedicated textual study, to examine precisely how, why, when, and to what end, soldier-writers drew on the antique past. However, the importance of classical influences on the military thought of both national communities is undeniable, writing as they did in a cultural and intellectual world that was immersed in classical study and paid particularly close attention to military matters in the classics.[958] Among military thinkers, Vegetius had been in use for centuries and would remain a very important influence over the sixteenth century, to be joined by other classical writers such as Frontinus, while many military memoirs of the era likely owed much to Caesar's *Commentaries.*[959] The soldier-writers examined here tended to assume on some level, whether with detailed explanation or tacit assumption, that at least as regarded martial culture and soldierly ethics, the classical world was an age of military excellence from which modernity had fallen away, and that 'the campe in those dayes was a schoole of honour, justice, obedience, dutie, and loyaltie, but now a den of deceit, trecherie, theeverie…'.[960] In their analysis of the classics for martial lessons, Spanish and English sixteenth-century theorists

[958] Webb, *Elizabethan Military Science*, pp. 3-16. Schurink, 'War, what is it good for?', and Popper, 'Virtue and Providence', both provide nuanced and subtle treatments of the depth and range of analysis with which English scholars and soldiers examined and used the military classics. On Spanish military classics, see Nájera, 'The Deployment of the Classics'.
[959] On Caesar's influence, see Harari, *Renaissance Military Memoirs*, pp. 190-5; Thomas F. Mayer and D.R. Woolf, *The Rhetorics of Life-Writing in Early Modern Europe* (Ann Arbor, 1995), p. 16.
[960] Rich, *Martial Conference*, sig. E.v.

echoed better-known contributors like Machiavelli and Justus Lipsius, albeit with a more narrow, purely military focus, and set the tone for later generations of classicising military texts in the seventeenth century.[961]

Within the military treatises discussed here, the classical past was usually deployed in two main ways: firstly, the use of didactic examples from classical military history to prove (usually rather basic) points about tactics, strategy, command behaviour, or common sense, albeit often in combination with medieval or modern examples- something frequently omitted in the historiography of Renaissance military literature.[962] As Bernardino de Mendoza claimed, 'arms, ingenuities and instruments' of war had changed, but 'the reason of attack and defence' has varied little since the creation of the world.[963] Secondly, and more importantly, the Roman world was held up as a 'golden age' of proper military practice. Specifically, an idealised Vegetian (or Machiavellian) version of the Republican Roman army functioned as a model of motivation and discipline, usually resting on the principle that the rise and fall of Rome could be explained by the rise and fall of its martial ability.[964] This clearly overlapped with the contemporary 'rhetoric of decline' and dissatisfaction with military practice, while some military theorists- Smythe and Thomas Digges in the English case, Londoño and Isaba in the Spanish- were particularly explicit in self-fashioning as traditionalists against recent decay in military culture and practice, albeit with reference to moral standards rather than military technique.

Yet it is crucial to recognise that, just as national pride and religious zeal coexisted with very rational, sober precepts on the technical art of war, a healthy

---

[961] Popper, 'Virtue and Providence', p. 526, 529.
[962] e.g. Parker, *Military Revolution*, p. 6.
[963] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 5. (*la razon del ofender, y defender…fuesse desde la creacion del mundo, variando solo en la diferencia de armas, ingenios y instrumentos*)
[964] e.g. Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 5r.

appreciation for the classics coexisted in *all* military theory studied here with an explicit modernity, and an overriding drive to teach practical, useful material for contemporary military reality. As such, though the influence of the classics on sixteenth-century military culture was immense, multifaceted, and undeniable, the soldier theorists examined here were not limited to ancient wisdom, but built on and moved far beyond classical study in their formulations of military perfection.[965] All texts depicted 'newe pollicies and practises of the greatest souldiours in Christendome, in these our present dayes', and though the Roman soldier may be held up as a generic (and often vague) icon of disciplinary perfection, all weapons, ranks, and forms of military organisation taught by sixteenth-century military theorists were contemporary to their own period, and increasingly, adapting to the realities of late-century positional warfare.[966] Indeed, far from exclusively viewing modernity as an age fallen from proper military practice, many writers considered innovation an important trait for officers. Escalante ruled that a Captain General 'must be very industrious in inventing new opportunities of war', citing the Schmalkaldic campaign as an example, and Garrard that Sergeant-Majors should be 'so studious in theorik reading, practise and invention, that through his industrie he may invent new artificiall formes of battels…for no man without invention, can be accounted excellent in his art and profession'.[967]

Explicit focus on modern military practice usually rested on early modern changes in the technical art of war, as 'the fight these days' is 'clean contrary to…times past'.[968] Marcos de Isaba reflected sadly that since the dawn of man, war had always changed, with the invention of 'the true profession', new weapons, 'squadrons, sleeves,

[965] Popper, 'Virtue and Providence', p. 529, argues that the emergence of 'independent military science' was itself facilitated by emerging cultures of 'compiling historical military particulars'.
[966] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, sig. 4r.
[967] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 77v. (*El Capitan general ha de ser muy industrioso en inuētar nuevas occasiones de guerra*); Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 174-5. See also Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 58.
[968] Clayton, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 64-5.

fosses, modern trenches': 'the ingenuity of man is so great, and he always goes inventing new inventions for his own destruction'.[969] Chivalric lamentations of how gunpowder had removed bravery from warfare were often dismissed or inverted, and were joined by more sober appreciations of how firearms and fortification had changed the art of war.[970] Mendoza warned that modern battles were now decided 'quickly, by the shock and speed of cavalry, the liveliness of the arquebusiers, aided by the violence of the artillery' and Martin de Eguiluz that he could have written on classical commanders, but decided not to 'because in this era war is made very differently…with stronger arms and industries, and each hour are discovered more subtleties of ingenuity'.[971] Roger Williams thus warned, again reminding how military theory's tone was hugely influenced by classicism but was ultimately based on technical military context: 'although the ground of auncient discipline is the most worthiest and the most famous: notwithstanding, by reason of Fortification, Strategems, ingins, arming, with munition, the discipline is greatlie altered; the which we must follow and be directed as it is now'.[972]

As such, military theorists did *not* discard the classics, and, as with chivalry and professionalism, it is wrong to assume complete, airtight separation between differing martial cultures, in this case classicism and modernity. Nonetheless, the texts studied here were well aware of the limitations of the classical past for modern soldiers, and that for all the lessons in the Roman past for the common sense of Generalship, the

---

[969] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 1v.-2r. (*la verdadera profession…esquadrones, māgas, fossos, ni tricheras modernos…el ingenio del hombre sea tan alto, y de ordinario ande inuentando nueuas inuenciones para su daño*)
[970] e.g. Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 5r.
[971] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 114. (*en breue tiēpo el impetus y presteza de la caualleria, biueza de la arcabuzeria, ayudada con la violencia de la artilleria*); Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 81r. (*en esta Era la Guerra se haze muy diferēte…con mas fuertes armas y industrias, y cada hora se descubren mas sotilezas de ingenio*)
[972] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, p. 37.

importance of infantry discipline, or for the link between collective martial prowess and national health, 'then was then, and now is now'- as Robert Barret's model Captain firmly ruled, and none of the authors examined in this chapter would have disagreed.[973] The classicising, ostensibly reactionary Thomas Digges complained of 'many with whom I have conferred' talking 'as all those Romane Orders were mere toyes', but in his actual technical content, ruled unequivocally that current military reality 'is clean contrarie to that of the Antiquitie, and Romane Praecedents therein can nothing pleasure us'.[974] Londoño cited classical writers including Vegetius and Frontinus, 'but most wrote so confusedly, and so far outside what is necessary today'- hence the necessity of Londoño's text, combining classical study with 'experience and practice'.[975] This explicit awareness that war had changed, and that reverence for the classical past *coexisted* with very practical, modern attention to the contemporary art of war in the context of the new techniques of firepower, fortification, formation, and their associated demands of institutional discipline and professionalism, was another iteration of the 'rational' nature of military theory.

[973] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 2.
[974] Digges, *Stratioticos*, sig. Aiv.r., p. 117, 177.
[975] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 43r.-v. (*los mas tan cō̄fusamente, y tan fuera de lo que oy es necessario, que de sus recuerdos, y de la experiencia y uso…*); See also Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, sig. ¶v.r.

II. The Captain General

Moving from the intellectual foundations of military books to their detailed prescriptions for military perfection, the first and most common preoccupation was usually the attributes and behaviours required of the most important man in the army: the General, or 'Captain General', though unclarified references to 'Captain' frequently also implied an army rather than a company commander. In this rank, many theorists ostensibly prioritised piety or other aspects of inner honour. As Popper points out, some English military theorists, in their classical reading, focused on matters of virtue for the ideal General or army, rather than 'material factors' that explained Roman victories.[976] The English *Myrrour* listed 'eight conditions that a good Generall ought to have', most of them moral or quasi-chivalric ('to succour innocents', 'to observe fayth with enemies'), though also hinted at slightly more practical 'mentall virtues'.[977] Vazquez' lavish eulogy to Parma, a uniquely detailed glimpse of the 'perfect Captain General', concluded 'he was, in the end, Captain of God', and especially in English texts, zeal in a General was equated with piety in the rest of the perfect army.[978] Bravery, too, was still valued in senior commanders, especially in Spanish texts. Mendoza ruled that a commander needed 'daring' along with 'readiness, affability, suffering hardships' and other moral qualities, though he stressed that they were not merely moral, but 'very necessary for the use of war', and could be learned through 'wisdom and prudence'.[979] Escalante insisted that like Hernan Cortes, a Captain General must be 'very constant in dangers…he cannot be an *esforzado* and excellent General if he does not count all

[976] Popper, 'Virtue and Providence', p. 538.
[977] *Myrrour*, sig. B2r.-v.
[978] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.359. (*era, en fin, Capitan de Dios, y Dios estuvo siempre con él y él con Dios*); e.g. Smythe, *Discourses*, sig. (a)r.
[979] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 40. (*la osadia, y presteza, afabilidad, sufrimiēto de trabajos, y otras calidades que tienen afinidad con las virtudes morales, si bien no lo son, y necessarias en el exercicio de la guerra*)

danger for naught, to conserve his honour'.[980] This could coexist with Escalante's stress on Fabian strategy and avoidance of battle.[981]

Yet particularly in Spanish texts, inner moral characteristics were invariably combined with, and often drowned out by, much more ostensibly 'rational' themes of intelligent, objective-driven command. Viamont formulated the matrix of honour of a '*Capitan perfeto*' from both inner characteristics and knowledge, ruling he needed 'strength of spirit, prudence in negotiations, severity in command, adventure in deeds, and science in *la milicia* to be called, with reason, perfect'.[982] The *Myrrour* appended to its knightly qualities for Generals the 'liberall artes', including 'arithmetike to place his armie', while Thomas Digges advised that 'briefely, he must be religious, temperate, sober, wise, valiaunte, liberal, curtous, eloquent, of good fame and reputation, learned in histories, and in those sciences and arts that may enable him…readily to conceyve and judge of militaire actions'.[983] Just as they used the perfect Sergeant-Major to epitomise the modern art of infantry discipline and formation, theorists used the Captain General to express their all-encompassing, comprehensive picture of military perfection. A typically ambitious requirement was Escalante's hope that along with the classical qualities, a modern Captain General should base his decisions on detailed knowledge of the enemy and local geography, knowing how to lodge a camp, reading military history, commissioning maps, and must display industry and knowledge of all subordinate rank duties as well as personal bravery, daring, and clemency.[984] Eguiluz offered a particularly eloquent version of the *topos* of both experiencing and studying war for the

[980] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 79v. (*muy constante en los peligros…no puede ser esforçado, y excellente General, el que no menosprecia todo gran peligro por conseruar su honrra*)
[981] e.g. Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 78v.
[982] Viamont, *Perfeto Capitan*, fo. 4r. (*Fortaleza de animo: prudencia en los negocios: seueridad para mandar: ventura en sus obras: y ciencia en la milicia. Las quales concurriendo en el, podra con razón ser llamado perfeto*)
[983] *Myrrour*, sig. B.v.; Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 138.
[984] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fols. 76r.-81r.

ideal Captain General, who must 'embrace letters with arms like cavalry with infantry…the experience (*curso*) of war joined with letters makes a man perfect'.[985] Londoño saw the army commander as the pinnacle of the professional chain of command, stating that Captains General needed 'great experience, and greater understanding of the military art than the inferior officers'.[986]

The exceptionally lavish eulogy bestowed by Vazquez on his beloved Parma serves as an excellent case study to show how a range of attributes were brought together in the matrix of honour of the *'gran capitan*' of sixteenth-century professional military mentalities. Vazquez near-worshipped Parma, and explicitly instructed that 'he who would appraise himself a soldier must imitate this famous Captain and generous Prince that honoured our military habit so much, and always seek to follow in his footsteps in military affairs'.[987] As with many of the decisions by sixteenth-century military writers to laud particular figures as ideal commanders, this clearly reflected the context of the author's personal connections with his superior; in his concluding roll-call of praiseworthy Flanders officers, and their charges and attributes, Vazquez included in his own entry that his successful career had been initiated by Parma promoting him to Sergeant and acting company commander, making him a proud *hechura* of the Prince.[988] Yet as ever, the *way* in which the soldier-writer constructed his protagonist's matrix of honour was highly revealing of conceptions of military perfection. Vazquez had thus devoted much of his chronicle to eternalising Parma's

---

[985] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 81r.-v. (*Muchos valerosos Emperadores, Reyes, y Capitanes generales han sido letrados, y así se abraçan las letras con las armas, como la caualleria con la infantería…El curso de la guerra jūtando las letras, haze perfeto al hombre*)
[986] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 1v. (*en los Capitanes generales se requiere gran esperiencia, y entender el arte militar mejor que los demas ministros a el inferiores*)
[987] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.220. (*debe el que se preciara de soldado imitar á este famoso Capitan y generoso Príncipe que tanto honró nuestro hábito militar, procurando siempre seguir sus pasos en las ocasiones de guerra*)
[988] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.xii.

'valorous deeds', first as a gentleman volunteer and then as Captain General in Flanders and France.[989] However, Vazquez' ekphrasis also lavishly described Parma's personal attributes, beginning with his inner mental and spiritual qualities as a noble warrior: 'affable, true, benign, devoted, most valiant and of invincible spirit, generous, secret, solicitous, splendid, just and merciful'.[990] Vazquez also depicted Parma as a paragon of Catholic piety and loyalty to the crown against 'the enemies of the church', while his martial praise included Parma's risking his own life as well as (more personally relevant for Vazquez and his fellow officers) his generosity as a military patron and role model.[991] Yet such qualities were combined with a vivid evocation of Parma's professional skills and technical knowledge:

> patient and long-suffering in the businesses of war, most vigilant in the tricks and stratagems of it; and in the observations of military customs he was a rigorous and perfect Captain in knowing how to govern the many armies he had in his charge, and in besieging a position, however inexpugnable, he was so diligent and such a great master, that until today one knows none greater….he made such proof of his ingenuity and bravery, making so many extraordinary machines…never seen nor imagined in war…[992]

Interestingly, Vazquez did not include Parma's princely status, connections, lineage, or the deeds of Parma's forebears or relatives, instead praising the '*hechuras*' and disciples he left behind him in the professional officer corps. However, military treatises usually assumed that Captains General should, or in any case would, be high noblemen, a concession to reality not countenanced for any other rank, apart from the General of Cavalry.[993] Yet this was generally expressed not with any idea that

---

[989] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.352. (*al fin le quitó la vida, mas no su gloriosa fama, porque será inmortal como el nombre eterno de sus valerosos hechos*)
[990] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.353. (*afable, verdadero, benigno, devoto, valentísimo y de ánimo invencible, generoso, secreto, solícito, espléndido, justiciero y misericordioso*)
[991] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.358. (*enemigos de la Iglesia*)
[992] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.353-4. (*paciente y tan sufrido en los negocios de la guerra; y en la observancia de las costumbres militares fue riguroso y perfecto Capitan en saber gobernar los muchos ejércitos que tuvo á cargo, y en sitiar una plaza por inxpugnable que fuera, tan diligente y tan gran maestro, que hasta hoy no se sabe de otro mayor…tanta prueba hizo de su ingenio y valor, fabricando tantas y extraordinarias máquinas de ingenios y otros pertrechos nunca vistos ni imaginados en la guerra*)
[993] e.g. Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 68v.

aristocratic blood made a man inherently suited for command, more the practical consideration that only a suitably noble candidate was ever likely to be considered for such a position, and that he would need considerable authority of blood to command other nobles- and in any case, he still needed the appropriate 'minde, bodie, vertue, and experience'.[994] Escalante's noble interlocutor asks whether 'the Captain General's authority comes from his title and illustrious blood', to which the expert *Capitan* admits that 'it is very important that he is [noble], in order to be respected and followed by knights and noblemen', but nonetheless insists that 'however lordly the Captain General is, he has more obligation to avail himself of the qualities [of Generalship] to which I referred'.[995]

Bernardino de Mendoza emphasised that though Princes and Generals commanding armies may realistically not be qualified in military science, many have triumphed by 'entrusting their armies to those that were soldiers' and following the advice of professionals.[996] Mendoza placed this duty on the *Maestre de Campo General,* who 'has to be soldierly' with 'many years of experience', his own professionalism lending 'voice, life, and spirit' to the noble General's amateurism.[997] Mendoza thus hoped that by following the expert advice of his professional subordinate, the amateur General would 'come to be considered a soldier, although really he is not', and explicitly contrasted command by birthright with professional qualification: 'men can

[994] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 1.
[995] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 80v. (*DON MA. Yo entendia, que la authoridad en el Capitan general era ser señor, y de sangre muy illustre. CAP. Mucho importa que lo sea para ser respectado, y seguido de los caualleros, y gente noble, que professan la milicia, porque poruentura no le acudirian ni obedecerian con tanta subjecion, sino le fuesse, pero quanto mas señor fuere el Capitan general, tiene mas obligacion de repararse con las calidades que he referido*)
[996] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 41. (*encomendarlas, y sus exercitos a los que eran soldados*)
[997] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 39. (*ha de tener soldadesca…de muchas años y experiencia, siendo boz biua y alma el General*)

be born *Generales*, and not *Maestre de Campo Generales*'.[998] This was an especially eloquent manifestation of the expectation that the professional chain of command sustained an army as much, if not more, than the General's own qualities or actions, and more broadly, of the importance of military 'counsel'.

Londoño ruled that Generals must rely on 'Captains and *soldados platicos*, who can often point out the key to victory'.[999] Smythe was even more explicit, arguing that the third duty of a General, after piety and 'know[ing] how to command and govern', was 'often to consult with his counsell' to learn how 'with valour to resolve and perform'.[1000] Alonso Vazquez repeated that 'it is of such great importance that a Captain General collect opinions from valiant and prudent' subordinates, portraying Don Juan as another exemplary commander 'so similar to his father the Emperor…as he never thought meanly of receiving the advice of the lowliest soldier in all his actions', criticising commanders who 'think they lose their authority if they ask for advice…and when the time comes, they lack valour, prudence and counsel'.[1001] Naturally, Vazquez incorporated this into Parma's matrix of honour, depicting him consulting officers '*viejo*, and *de opinion*' 'to work out what he had to do'.[1002] Vazquez' constant reminders of how Generals must consult their expert subordinates smack of professional advocacy, insisting on the indispensability of veteran professionals like himself and other *soldados platicos viejos* from Flanders. This is especially visible in Vazquez'

---

[998] Mendoza, *Theorica*, pp. 39-40. (*de manera que se viene a tener por soldado, si bien realmente no lo sea…los hombres pueden nacer Generales, y no Maestres de Campo Generales*)
[999] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 28r. (*Pueden ser los Generalissimos muy ayudados de los ministros inferiores, y personajes que à sus consejeros se admiten…capitanes y soldados platicos, que muchas vezes pueden aduertir de cosas en que consista la vitoria*)
[1000] Smythe, *Discourses*, sig. (a)r.
[1001] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.173-4 (*es de tan gran importancia cobrar un Capitan general opinion de prudente y valeroso*), I.88-9. (*tan parecido á su padre el emperador Cárlos V, de gloriosa memoria, pues jamás se despreció de recibir parecer en todas sus acciones del menor soldado de su ejército…les parece pierdan su autoridad si preguntan ó se aconsejan…al tiempo de la ocasion le falta el valor, la prudencia y consejo*)
[1002] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.121. (*para llegar prevenido de lo que habia de hacer en aquella empresa, mandó llamar á D. Alonso de Leiva y á todos los Capitanes más viejos y de opinion*)

strident insistence on the necessity of '*entretenido*' Captains, officers without portfolio retained on the payroll as a reward for their services or qualities, arguing that 'men of such experience' will be able to provide counsel to their Captain General.[1003] More subtle insistence in military treatises that Generals must rely on the advice of expert, professional officers likewise probably owed much to the promotion of the author's own professional fraternity, as well as high-minded ideas of military perfection.

[1003] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, I.87-8. (*hombres tan experimentados*); Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 94 counts 668 *entretenidos* of the Captain General in 1588 under Parma, 'probably the record', distinct from the company-level *ventaja* bonuses.

III. Professionalism and Initiation

This sense of officership as a professional fraternity into which a man was inducted by knowledge learnt through experience, study, and command, as well as his innate qualities as a warrior or a leader, went to the heart not only of the identity of soldier-writers, but their ideas of the perfect officer: a man who must not merely *be* something, but also must *know* things. The semantic field of 'knowledge' versus 'ignorance' was universal in military theory, treatises advertising themselves as 'such a myrrour to looke in, that every unlearned souldiour, beholding the same with eyes of judgement, shall at the first sight behold his owne ignoraunce, and become a leader of the ignoraunt multitude'.[1004]

This was invariably linked with professional identity as a soldier or officer. Robert Barret reminded his readers that 'all practises of mechanicall artes do follow the same order and course to come to the cunning of their craft' and Viamont that 'just as one may not be called a good architect who knows not the art of architecture, neither could he who does not know what is necessary for the military art deserve the name of a good soldier'.[1005] This trope of comparing warfare with other learned professions, with a distinct, esoteric, and, by implication, communally agreed-upon body of necessary knowledge, 'the general rules of that art' to be 'applied to particular cases', was very common in military textbooks.[1006] Comparison with doctors (whether medical or academic) was particularly popular in Spanish treatises, Valdes saying that 'just as a doctor, or a lawyer, or a theologian would not be permitted to publicly practise their

---

[1004] Hichcock, introduction to Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, sig. 4r.
[1005] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 13; Viamont, *Perfeto Capitan*, fo. 3v. (*como no se puede llamar buen Arquitecto el que no sabe el arte de la Arquitectura, tampoco podra merecer nombre de buen soldado, el que no supiere lo que toca à la arte militar*)
[1006] Palacio, *Dialogos Militares*, fo. 23r. (*habilidad y entendimiento para saber las reglas generales de aquella arte...los casos particulares...ha de tener buena estimaua para aplicar los canones generales à las enfermedades singulares*)

profession if they had not studied such faculties and become doctored in them, it would be just as bad for a man to command and govern in war who has not doctored in the military discipline'.[1007] This was accompanied by a quiet but determined advocacy of qualified officers as a professional body, Lechuga advertising that as 'the military art consists in opinions…so one must follow the most experienced opinion', 'just as how in matters of conscience we go to find the best Doctors we know of at University, and follow what they think about that case'.[1008]

This link between military-professional identity and the *topos* of expert 'knowledge', and similar self-aggrandisement, is visible in the way that military authors tended to stress the complexity of their subject.[1009] Meanwhile, those without the requisite professional knowledge were excluded from the fraternity of experts, Valdes warning that 'few soldiers are doctored in *la milicia*'.[1010] Exclusive definitions of military-professional status were sometimes carried to extremes that clearly had more in common with the 'perfect Captain' trope than with reality: the self-effacing Gyles Clayton claimed that despite serving sixteen years in Ireland and the Low Countries, 'yet I dare not account myselfe a souldiour. For the name of a soldiour is most honourable, and those that bear the name and title thereof, shoulde be men of understanding and knowledge, and well experienced in warre, & martiall discipline'.[1011]

[1007] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 11. (*como no se permite usar en publico del exercicio de medico, ni letrado, ni Theologo al que no a estudiado en dichas facultades, y sea docto en ellas, tā poco sera bien, q̄ mande y gouierne en la guerrra, el que no fuere docto en la disciplina militar*). Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 21v. advocated 'viva voce' exams for Sergeant-Majors.
[1008] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 24. (*aduierto a todos que el arte militar consiste en opiniones…seguirlas de los mas experimentados…de la misma manera que hazemos quando se offrece un caso de conciencia que vamos a buscar los mayores doctores que sabemos ay en una universidad, y seguimos la que tienen en aquel caso*)
[1009] e.g. Hichcock, introduction to Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, sig. 4r.; cf. Lechuga, *Discurso*, pp. 17-8.
[1010] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 11. (*ay pocos soldados que seā doctos en la milicia*)
[1011] Clayton, *Martiall Discipline*, sig. A4v.

This idea of war as a distinct body of knowledge in which an aspirant officer must become properly qualified, and as an intellectualised, pseudo-scientific discipline, was most obviously visible in the discrete fields of military engineering, siegecraft, and mathematics. Military engineering was often seen as a parallel profession to that of military command, but perhaps due to the gradual absorption by military literature of the revolutionary spread of new fortification techniques since the early century, or specifically due to the experience of earthworks and trench networks in Flanders positional warfare, the perfect officer was increasingly expected to be proficient in these specialist disciplines.[1012] Isaba called on Spanish nobles to learn marching, encamping, and squadron deployment, but also 'how to fortify a place, artillery positioning, the *plaza de armas* and the mode of the trenches and gabions', and promised to write another, more technically-focused manual to outline comprehensively the body of 'understanding in matters of war, not only of squadrons, but batteries, trenches and *camisadas*'.[1013]

Mathematics, too, was increasingly required in the matrix of military perfection. Digges' *Stratioticos* stressed the practicality of its extensive mathematical instructions 'servisable for the state in causes militare'.[1014] Viamont's textbook advocated a 'general curriculum' for the perfect Captain including mathematics, geography, topography, cryptography, and formation deployment as well as philosophy, medicine, rhetoric, and history.[1015] Sir Humphrey Gilbert, meanwhile, had suggested in 1570 that an academy for young gentlemen to serve the English state should include instruction in mathematics, fortification, artillery, cartography, and navigation, as well as heraldry,

[1012] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 283; Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 79v.
[1013] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 145v. (*tener noticia de fortificar una plaça, ansi mesmo el lugar y puesto de artilleria, su plaça de armas, el modo de las trincheras, y cestones*), fo. 148r. (*a entender en cosas de Guerra, no solo de los esquadrones, pero baterias, trincheras, y en camistadas*)
[1014] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 70.
[1015] Viamont, *Perfeto Capitan*, sig. +++3r.; de León, 'Doctors', pp. 70-1.

oration, and weapon use, a reminder of the coexistence of 'modern knowledge with medieval warrior ideals' among the English martial elite. Hale cites this as an early example of early modern proposals for institutionalised military education for the upper classes, stressing how Gilbert's proposal reflected military-technical contexts as well as a broader Renaissance, humanist ideal of gentle education.[1016] Francisco de Valdes had his interlocutor Londoño append to the four qualities desired by the Greeks and Romans in a commander the knowledge of arithmetic, 'because it is very necessary for forming squadrons'.[1017] Valdes argued that instead of relying on printed formation tables, the perfect officer should have 'dexterity in counting, accompanied by the habit of making in one's memory different squadrons…to work them out before necessity requires', and should exercise his *tercio* 'to see with experience and *platica*, what theory teaches'.[1018]

Beyond these specialist disciplines, the art of war *itself* was increasingly viewed as a discrete body of knowledge. Isaba based his construction of useless Captains promoted by court connections on their ignorance: 'never seen a squadron, trench, nor mine, nor governed soldiers…in a way that he neither has *platica*, nor judgement, nor understanding: clearly, one may expect nothing from such as this, except a thousand disgraces'.[1019] This specialist knowledge field was expressed in increasingly intellectualised terms as something to be gained by study and intelligent contemplation as well as by experience, Escalante's dedication informing the Spanish infantry that they needed '*sciencia y experiecia*'.[1020] Some authors juxtaposed 'science' and

[1016] Smuts, *Problem of Religious War*, p. 179; Hale, 'Military Education', pp. 227-8.
[1017] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 13. (*porque le es muy necessaria para hazer los esquadrones*)
[1018] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 29. (*la destreza en el cōtar, acompañando la cō el cōtino habito de hazer en su memoria differēcia descquadrones, los quales deue procurar poner en platica antes que la necessidad lo constriña a ello...exercitar su gente, y ver con la experiētia y platica, lo que la Theorica le enseña*)
[1019] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 69v. (*nunca ha visto esquadron, trinchera, ni mina, ni escaramuça, ni gouernado soldados…de manera que ni tiene platica, ni juyzio, ni entendimiento: cosa clara es esta que deste no se puede esperar sino mil desgracias*)
[1020] Escalante, *Dialogos*, sig. A2v.

'barbarity' to explain proper military practice, with 'barbarous order' as the antithesis of military perfection.[1021]

Even more important to ideas of the perfect officer were the ways in which an aspirant was expected to acquire this knowledge- in short, the twin initiations of study and experience. The intellectualisation of the military art included stressing the importance of reading and study; in this regard, it is important to understand that the common *topos* of 'arms versus letters' (with the soldier-writer invariably finding arms superior), or of refined literature by civilian scholars versus the simple style of an 'unlettered soldier' served to help solidify the distinct identity of the military profession, but did not conflict with the belief that reading was important, and even necessary, to the art of war.[1022] This in turn further supported the attempt to curb excessive bravery, and the 'rational' idea of warfare as a combination of cold prudence and hot valour: 'a valiaunt minde unless it bee governed by wisdome, commeth into manie inconsiderate actions, which oft proove the ruine of a whole legion'.[1023] Indeed, many military theorists explicitly defended the importance of reading about war, against unspecified (but likely numerous) sceptics. Digges argued that 'most barbarous is the opinion of such as suppose Letters and Armes cannot wel stande togither' while Valdes blamed derision on ignorance, as soldiers gamble instead of reading, then 'to cover their enormous fault, they vainly mock those who have studied the military art'.[1024]

The precise reasons why military theorists wanted aspirant warriors to read is also important. The idea that reading about heroic deeds would inspire warriors to

---

[1021] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 197; see also Smythe, *Discourses*, fo. 48r.
[1022] On 'arms versus letters', see e.g. Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 40v.-41r.; On the dichotomy between learned civilian and unlearned soldier writing, see e.g. Barwick, *Weapons of fire*, fo. Br.
[1023] *Myrrour*, sig. B2r.
[1024] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 138; Valdes, *Espejo*, pp. 11-2. (*pocos soldados que seā doctos en la milicia…la mayor parte los soldados pierdan su tiēpo en juegos…(por encubrir su enorme falta) suelen vanamente burlarse del arte militar estudiada*)

emulate such knightly virtue 'to the purchasing of honourable victories, fame, and renowne' was nothing new, and was still occasionally used.[1025] But crucially, there was a growing understanding of the value of military history, especially the classics, for more practical, didactic purposes 'the better to consider of such stratagems as heretofore by other noble souldiers hath bene used'.[1026] Rich also advised 'to peruse in bookes the manner of any warres, which hath ben these many hundred yeres, & by what meanes many noble victories have ben obteyned, and what pollicies hath bene used by suche as were famous Captaynes'.[1027] As such, some military chronicles had an explicitly didactic purpose. The printing licence of Mendoza's *Commentaries* noted approvingly that they 'may also show to illustrate, and demonstrate, a good soldier, a valiant Captain, and a prudent and experimented General', 'for which one may say that it is jointly theory, and *platica* of the true *milicia*'.[1028] Mendoza himself wrote to be useful 'to those that must follow war, and be soldiers'.[1029] Escalante powerfully summarised this new emphasis on the importance of martial teaching, reading, and mental contemplation of 'the art', advising that military literature can teach battlefield formation, artillery deployment, tactical geography, logistics, 'and what is appropriate to each officer in particular from the *cabo d'escuadra* to the Captain General so that he knows better from the root the art he professes'.[1030]

[1025] e.g. Ghillebert de Lannoy in the early fifteenth century advised reading of chivalric deeds as a form of knightly training. Keen, *Chivalry*, pp. 15-6; Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. D.i.r.
[1026] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 11.
[1027] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. D.i.r.-v.
[1028] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, censura. (*Pueden tambien seruir estos Comentarios de dechado, y muestra de un buē soldado, de un valiente Capitan, y de un prudente, y experimentado General…a cuya causa se puede decir, q̄ es juntamente theorica, y platica de la verdadera milicia*)
[1029] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, sig. §§3v. (*no tāto por hacer memoria de las ganancias y perdidas de las vitorias, quanto…del fuese de algún prouecho à los que hā de seguir la guerra, y ser soldados…alcançar en alguna manera conocimiēto de las ocasiones y sitios*), e.g. fo. 22r.
[1030] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 29r. (*el arte, que en el arte militar se usan, y lo que toca a cada Official en particular, dende el Cabo de esquadra, hasta el Capitan general, para que sepa muy de rays el arte que professa*)

Yet as Barret stressed, 'there be many points in a souldier, and more in a Captaine, which cannot be attayned by reading, but by practise and experience…*de veras*, as the Spaniard sayth, in earnest, and not *de Burla*, in jest'.[1031] As such, military theorists invariably stressed the paramount importance of practical experience on campaign, and though Viamont claimed brazenly that 'a year of reading, together with good *ingenio* and observations, makes a man more exercised than 50 years as a *soldado viejo*' this simply underlined the author's civilian status.[1032] Barnaby Rich thus had his soldier interlocutor ask 'Mercury' if a man can 'learne to be a perfect souldiour' by reading alone, having 'heard this reason many times before'.[1033] In response, Rich's god supports reading, but ultimately stresses the importance of practical experience, to 'gain more experience then…by readyng of all these bookes'.[1034]

It was thus through both reading and experience, with greater stress on the latter, that men could be 'initiated' into the professional fraternity of expert officers and approach the image of perfection evoked in military textbooks. Francisco de Valdes ruled that as 'all the arts have their theory and their practice, likewise does *la milicia*', calling on aspirant warriors to 'together with [practice] mix the theory'.[1035] Lechuga argued that only experience could make a man knowledgeable in war, but officers must also learn as much information as possible to gain 'science or wisdom', including by consulting books.[1036] As such, Lechuga advertised his own texts as based on twenty-five years' continuous experience, the verbal and written advice of renowned experts, and

[1031] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 6.
[1032] Viamont, *Perfeto Capitan*, preface (unpag.) (*en un año de licion, junto con buen ingenio y obseruaciones, haze un hombre mas exercitado que cincuenta de sodado viejo*)
[1033] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. C8r.
[1034] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. Di.v.
[1035] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 12. (*todas las artes tienē su theorica, y su practica, y assi las tiene la milicia…la practica…cō esta mezclare la theorica*)
[1036] Lechuga, *Discurso*, pp. 13, 192. (*ciencia, o sabiduria*)

his own observations of infantry in action.[1037] It was, increasingly, the *combination* of long experience with book-learned military science that made a man a '*perfecto maestro*'.[1038]

[1037] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 5, 31, 152.
[1038] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 98.

IV. Officership and Reform

Thus, both Spanish and English authors envisaged military aspirants as undergoing a form of 'initiation' into their fraternity of professional officers, in which by both reading and experience they came to learn a generally accepted (if somewhat vague) field of knowledge, which included the 'science' of modern warfare itself as well as ancillary technical disciplines. In many respects, that this was one of the ways in which military theory was divorced from reality, but the authors were aware of the shortcomings of existing promotion systems. In their dissatisfaction with current practice, above all in the allocation of rank and promotion, military theorists of both nations further engaged with the idea of military perfection, and revealed the qualities they sought in the ideal officer.

As with so many other points of contemporary military theory, dissatisfaction with the realities of unfair promotion was incorporated into the *Sucesos* of Alonso Vazquez, echoing Martin García Cerezeda with his realistic description of mixed promotion policies and the disappointing realities of professional advancement. Vazquez claimed that a Sergeant-Major once pointed out tactlessly to Parma that a recently departed failure of a Captain had been appointed by the Prince himself, to which Vazquez quoted Parma responding that some officers are '*chosen by grace, and some by justice*'. The author explained that some officers were chosen 'for their many services done in war, and their shed blood', while others arrived in Flanders expecting 'to be given company commands without having been soldiers', 'charged with letters and favours…from personages whose respect must be maintained'.[1039] This anxiety,

[1039] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.266-7. (*unos son de gracia y otros de justicia…los elegía por sus muchos servicios hechos en la guerra y sangre derramada…mas tambien que por gracia elegía otros habiendo llegado á Flandes cargados de cartas y favores llevados de España, de personas á quien no podia perder el respeto, para que les diese compañías sin haber sido soldados*)

that ‘favour and affection commonly carieth all’, was an omnipresent theme in military theory, often with much more explicit criticism of current practice than Vazquez’ anecdote.[1040]

Though obsession with unfair promotion obviously reflected the aspirations and frustrations of soldier-writers themselves, it was typically couched in the language of military efficiency, in which the promotion of undeserving novices over qualified professionals corroded not only motivation and reward among the officer corps, but also the quality of *la milicia* as a whole. Barret, typically, equated favoured promotion with a lack of true merit: ‘the little discipline used among those so chosen…by favour, friendship, or affection, little respecting their experience, virtues, or vices’.[1041] Martin de Eguiluz lamented how candidates for Sergeant-Major should be examined for their ‘sufficiency and dexterity’, ‘but this is considered for nothing’, with promotion instead given to ‘such persons that know little and do not know their ABC, nor have they seen a campaign of account to accredit or honour them’.[1042] Military theorists thus included in their picture of the idealised fighting force the principle of promotion by experience or ‘meritocracy’. Mendoza argued that armies should be like universities, where a man cannot graduate ‘by nobility of blood, favour of kinsmen, riches’, or even ‘display of ability’ without completing ‘the necessary courses’.[1043] Again, this smacks of the career frustrations or advocacy for the interests in the military profession of the authors themselves, and as usual (particularly in Spanish sources), this went hand-in-hand with

[1040] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 240.
[1041] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 7.
[1042] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fols. 21v.-22r. (*suficientes, y diestros officiales deste ministerio…personas, que tenian poco que oluidar, y que no sabian el A. b. c., ni visto jornada de cuenta, por les acrecentar, y honrar*)
[1043] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 41 (*por mas nobleza de sangre, fauor de deudos, riquezas, o muestra de habilidad que tenga el que quiere seguir en una universidad la profession de alguna sciencia, no son parte ninguna destas cosas apuntadas de por si, ni todas juntas, al graduarse, apresurando los cursos que son necessaries par ello, sino los tiene*)

lamentation of current promotion practice. Mendoza complained that 'every day in the soldiery and militias of your Highness, many, by favour and intercession of *deudos*, occupy charges that they do not deserve for their experience…making those who find themselves left behind despair for their own advancement', sapping morale and undermining 'all military discipline'.[1044] That both Eguiluz and Mendoza's texts appeared in the 1590s supports de León's idea of declining professionalism at the end of the century motivating military *arbitristas.*

'Meritocratic' promotion was a less strident, but equally important part of English military theory. Williams emphasised that 'it is an error to think men without triall worthie to bee compared unto the others tried', including in his praise for the Army of Flanders how 'none comes to be high officers, unless they be known to be expert and tried souldiers of action, of long continuance', while merit outranked class for promotion and noblemen were willing to serve in the ranks under common officers.[1045] This idea of having been commanded as a necessary pre-requisite for command was a particularly important *topos*, Garrard arguing that a man must 'be a perfect private soldier, before he be drawne to the desire of bearing office, which were to set the cart before the horses'.[1046] Given how far Elizabethan forces were constituted and officered through affinity, patronage links, and interpersonal connections with senior commanders, the English hope for purely meritocratic office-holding is another possible example of the contents of military theory being influenced by specific military

[1044] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 42. (*cada dia en la soldadesca y milicias que tiene V. A. ocupād̄o muchos por fauor y intercession de deudos cargos que no merecian por su experiēcia en aquel exercicio y seruicios hechos, desesperandose los que los tienen de verlos adelantados, y ellos atras…descōpone del todo la disciplina militar*)
[1045] Williams, *Briefe Discourse*, sig. A3v., pp. 10-11. It is possible that Williams had quietly in mind a contrast with the English forces he witnessed in Flanders in the 1580s; as Manning, *Apprenticeship*, p. 35 reiterates, Leicester's officer corps were 'an extension of his patronage network rather than members of a disciplined and orderly military hierarchy'.
[1046] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 18.

contexts- or, perhaps, a particularly strong example of military theory being divorced from reality.

The focus on serving in the ranks before expecting promotion was, in turn, part of the formalised, institutionalised chain of command, envisaged both as a system for transmitting orders and as a professional *cursus honorum.* Mendoza advised his royal reader to 'order that none may be *cabo d'escuadra* who has not served some years under the banner, and more for Sergeant, and through *Alferez* and Captain, coming from that grade to *Maestre de Campo*, *Alcaide* or Castellan, with specified time served'.[1047] As de León identifies, this concern for promotion free of social bias and 'emphasis on the military *cursus honorum*' is particularly striking coming from Mendoza as he himself, as a prominent nobleman, would not have had to 'depend on his technical expertise' for promotion.[1048] Escalante ruled that no *alferez* could be appointed 'who had not been a Sergeant, nor a Sergeant [appointed] that has not been a Corporal, and this must be guarded inviolably'.[1049] Though he adapted his requirements to the realistic detail that many Captaincies were given out not 'in-theatre' but in Spain to men who would then recruit their company, Escalante stressed that these commissions must be allocated on professional recommendations from senior officers 'of the *alferezes* who are most experienced and *platico* in the *milicia*'.[1050] Again, this was closely paired with dissatisfaction at current practice, Escalante complaining that such commissions were usually given to 'relations and familiars', through which the service of the crown had suffered for 'passing over many valorous soldiers of use in war' and promoting '*bisoños*

[1047] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 42. (*ordenar V. A. no pueda ser cabo de esquadra quien no hubiere seruido debaxo de vandera algunos años, y mas para Sargento, y por el consiguiente de Alferez y Capitan, viniendo deste grado a Maestre de Campo, Alcayde o Castellano, con tiempo señalado*)
[1048] de León, 'Doctors', p. 76.
[1049] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 37v. (*que no aya sido Sargento, ni sargento, que no ouiere sido Caporal, y que esto se guarde y compla por todos inuiolablemēte*)
[1050] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, pp. 29-30; Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 37v. (*de los Alferez mas antiguos, y platicos en la milicia*)

without *platica*, nor experience, only favour...by which the *milicia* has fallen so far and has such bad need of reformation'.[1051]

With the occasional exception- such as William Bourne's technical treatise, which countenanced appointing Captains who had only ever served in the General's retinue as they 'know how for to provide and set forth an armie'- English treatises similarly envisaged meritocratic or at least experience-based promotion up a progressive chain of command:[1052]

> A Captain of Infantrie…should have in him all the parts (before rehearsed) of a perfect souldier, having worthilie passed through all the aforesa[i]d degrees of service: as first to have been a Carporall, from a Carporal to a Sergeant, from a Sergeant to an Ensigne, from an Ensigne-bearer to a Lieutenant, and from a Lieutenant to this office…to the end he may the better know how to command.[1053]

The promotion criterion of experience under arms, or in a particular rank, was self-explanatory. However, as with their image of the perfect Captains General, military theorists offered detailed formulations of precisely which personal attributes were required for promotion, and again, combined inner qualities with exogenous knowledge. One basic but important point was that officers were selected not for their fighting ability, but 'to commaunde, rule, and controlle': 'not in the force of hys personne, which is but one singuler man, but in hys policie and skyll, in leadynge and orderynge'.[1054] This returned to the 'prudence'-'valour' formulation: Vazquez thus constructed the matrix of honour of one officer who commanded 'with his spirit and prudence, commanding with very great care and solicitude…as one finds governance

---

[1051] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 37r. (*allegados y familiares…bisoños sin niguna platica, ni experiencia, por solo fauor les preceden...que es causa de que la milicia vaya muy de cayda, y de que tenga harta necessidad de ser reformada*)
[1052] William Bourne, *Inventions or Devises Very Necessary* (London, 1578), sig. *r.-**2r.
[1053] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 26.
[1054] Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, fo. 2r.; Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 1v.

and valiance together in few Captains. He combined these two traits with prudence'.[1055] Though usually addressed only in brief or taken for granted, and invariably subordinated to more refined ideas of officership, personal bravery unquestionably still mattered. The Walter Morgan manuscript recorded that Humphrey Gilbert understood an attack on Goes in 1572 would fail but 'too avoyde susspecte that hyt was not cowardlyness that causyd hym to gaynesaye thys enterprise hee was the foremost man on the ladders'. Such behaviour flew in the face of contemporary theories on the dangers of immoderate or pointless bravery, an important reminder that military theorists did not always speak for the wider military community.[1056]

Together with bravery, wisdom, and ability in leadership, a surprisingly common but frequently overlooked trope was that of the hard-working officer.[1057] 'Diligence', 'the mother of all good success', was a very common term of praising others or oneself as a proper professional officer.[1058] Thomas Digges applied the 'diligence' trope as well as technically skilled generalship to his construction of Leicester as the ideal Captain General: 'he most diligently and dangerously attended alwaies in person both early and late, and put his owne hand almost to every particular service…nothing for offence, or defence, omitted on every side, that militarie skill in like case could execute or invent'.[1059]

Spanish writers in particular explicitly incorporated hard work into the matrix of honour of officership. Eguiluz described how 'the work of the Sergeant-Major is at its greatest when he marches with the *tercio*, or the army, so he cannot rest or sleep',

---

[1055] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.223. (*con su ánimo y prudencia, gobernando con grandísimo cuidado y solicitud…que en pocas Capitanes se halla gobierno y valentía. Estas dos cosas mostró con prudencia*)
[1056] Morgan, *Expedition*, pp. 93-4.
[1057] e,g, Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 74r.
[1058] Verdugo, *Commentario*, p. 50 (*la diligencia cierto es madre de todo buen suceso*), 191. (*aventurando mi vida…con muy gran costa, trabajo y peligro de mi persona*)
[1059] Digges, *Briefe Report*, sig. D2r.

relishing how the officer should be so exhausted with diligent service that 'when marching on horseback, he nods off…and risks falling off', 'for this it is necessary that he be robust, and a sufferer of hardships'.[1060] Digges introduced his chapter on a Lieutenant's qualifications and duties with the warning that though 'of credit and reputation, so [this rank] is also an office of greate toyle and payne, the which he oughte willingly to suffer, as well to discharge hys Captaine of toyle, as for hys owne reputation'.[1061] This almost masochistic idea of officership was clearly linked to the fixation on well-earned promotion for praiseworthy service and patient merit. Sancho de Londoño included honourable ambition in the matrix of honour of the ideal officer as they should expect to 'be promoted and receive merit for their hard work and good services'.[1062] Isaba believed that military leadership should consist of 'sweat and hard work', the officer trusting the King to reward his 'time, hardships and services' with honourable promotion, 'as did the antique and discreet Romans'.[1063] The trope of painstaking officership can be placed alongside that of the soldiery patiently suffering the dangers of the enemy as well as the hardships of the campaign (with a similar perverse sense of physical suffering as itself inherently praiseworthy and deserving of reward), while the idea that officership should be hard work chimes with the general 'sterilisation' of war in military treatises and memoirs as an un-chivalric, diligent process of patience. As de León identifies, the qualities required by Isaba for the perfect

[1060] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 35v. (*El trabajo mas crecido que el Sargento mayor tiene…es, quando camina con el tercio, o con exercito que no reposa, ni duerme…que yendo caminando a cauallo se va durmiendo cabeceando en su quartago, ando vaybenes con peligro de caer…por esta ocasion es necessario sea robusto, y sufridor de trabajos*)
[1061] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 90.
[1062] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 1v.-2r. (*tener esperança de ser honrados, mejorados en cargos, y de recebir merced por sus trabajos y buenos seruicios*)
[1063] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 67r. (*sudor y trabaxo…su tiempo trabaxos y seruicios…como hazian los antiguos y discretos Romanos*)

Captain (fortitude, temperance, loyalty, patience, humility, and constancy) were more stoic than chivalric.[1064]

Meanwhile, personal virtue and innate traits were combined with learned skills and 'knowledge': Valdes wanted officers to be 'virtuous' and 'men of authority' as well as 'doctored in the military art'.[1065] Isaba expected his Captains (i.e. company commanders, the rank he apparently took most seriously) to be both 'a good Christian, and a *soldado platico*'; listing nine points for Captains to follow, Isaba included personal honour, piety, and loyalty to the crown, but also 'discourse and understanding' and being '*platico* in *la milicia*'.[1066] Isaba thus wanted the Council of War to scrutinise candidates for 'valour, virtue, ability, dexterity, and experience', both innate and 'augmented in *la milicia*', and Eguiluz wanted Captains to be 'dextrous, spirited, agile' and hard-working, but also to have 'served some years as a soldier' and be as *platico* as possible.[1067] Again, such themes were expressed less stridently but with the same importance in English military textbooks. Thomas Proctor wanted Captains to have 'magnanimitie or valiaunt courage, justice, prudence, & tender affection, diligent care or regarde over his souldiers and armie' as well as 'knowledge, & judgement in martial affaires'.[1068] Thomas Styward, likewise, wanted:

> such Captains as be circumspect, skilful, & expert…also hardie, & valiant of courage, painfull and ingenious: liberall in rewarding: just in service to their powers…[consult] the skilfull and expert souldiers whose opinion they will diligentlie observe and learne, gratifieng and rewarding…choosing of soldiers to the officers of their bands, placing ancient, travailed & and skillful men to charge, according to their experience.[1069]

[1064] de León, 'Doctors', p. 70.
[1065] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 11. (*que fuessen virtuosos, que fuessen hombres de autoridad*)
[1066] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 22v. (*buen Christiano, y soldado platico*), fols. 61r.-62v. (*El Capitan ha de ser platico en la milicia…tenga discurso y entendimiento*)
[1067] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 88r. (*sino valor, virtud, auilidad, destreça, y espiriencia q̄ tienen, y han aumentado en la milicia*), Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 15r. (*huviesse sido soldado algunos años…ser diestro, animoso, y agil*)
[1068] Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, fo. 3v.
[1069] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 34.

Finally, beyond general references to leadership, many writers (to take one example, Bernardino de Escalante) provided specific requirements for each rank, and these usually increased further up the command chain. Thus, the only requirements specified by Escalante for a *cabo d'escuadra* were that he must be older and 'superior in valour, in experience, and diligence' to the soldiers of his squadron.[1070] Thomas Digges likewise expected the corporal, 'as he is a degree in dignity above the private soldier, so ought he also in wit, discretion and diligence to surmount his inferiors'.[1071]

Escalante's Sergeant, however, had also to be 'very *platico* and valorous…and very experienced in all actions of war' as well as 'of great spirit, and diligent'. The importance of this specific rank, which together with the Sergeant-Major, was a 'new' rank indelibly associated with new standards of discipline and formation, was shown by Escalante's warning that the Sergeant was the most important rank in the company, and that even if the other officers were *bisoños*, the Sergeant must be a proper *soldado viejo.*[1072] Yet as referenced above, Escalante's requirements for a Captain were more ambitious still, while he wanted a *Maestre de Campo* of 'much *platica* and experience' to have similarly risen through the ranks and learnt how to 'rule with prudence and valour' and exercise independent operational command in manoeuvre, raid, battle, and siege.[1073] Finally, Escalante- like the other Spanish theorists- saw the *Maestre de Campo General* as the pinnacle of the military art and of the professional soldier's career, 'very *platico* in all the offices of the *milicia*', chosen for his 'prudence and industry'.[1074] As shall be seen, these increasingly ambitious requirements for officership

[1070] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 29v. (*superior en valor, virtud, experiencia y diligēcia*)
[1071] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 84.
[1072] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 30v. (*muy platico, y valeroso soldado, y muy experimentado en todas las factions de guerra…de grande spiritu y diligencia*)
[1073] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 56r.
[1074] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 70r. (*gran prudencia e industria…muy platico en todos los officios de la milicia*)

were accompanied by increasingly detailed ideas of precisely what duties applied to each level and position in the perfect *milicia.* Nonetheless, they also serve to further demonstrate how theorists engaged with their ideal infantry leader: a man selected for command and organisational ability, not simply personal bravery, with both inner qualities and professional knowledge. The specific motif of climbing all the way through the ranks was a particularly distinctive preoccupation of Spanish treatises, while their fixation with unfair promotion was, if anything, even more prominent than in English manuals. Nonetheless, it is striking how far both national bodies agreed on what characteristics, skills, and 'initiation' made a man a perfect officer, further demonstrating how they ultimately responded to the perceived demands of the pan-European 'revolution in military affairs'.

CHAPTER 7: The Perfect Soldiery

The qualifications and expectations of officers were the most prominent, and clearly the most emotive, theme in the military theory of both nations. Yet the perfect officer was envisaged by theorists not as existing in isolation, but in an idealised and heavily regulated military ecosystem of the perfect army. At the base of this ecosystem were the common soldiers, and as shall be seen, the expectations, requirements, and duties of these men were very different to those of the 'perfect Captain'. This chapter will firstly examine ideas of 'order', hierarchy, and regulation in the ideal army, expressed in general terms, in the specified duties of the chain of command, especially outside combat, and in the idea of the regulated, controlled camp as the perfect military micro-society. It will then examine how the common soldiery fitted into this picture, with a brief caveat that there also still existed an 'uncommon' soldiery, the gentlemen rankers and *entretenido* officers, before finding that, in contrast to the detailed and ambitious expectations for the perfect officer, military theorists simply expected common soldiers to be unquestioningly obedient. This, it is argued, was a result of the specific tactical context of the drive to create regulated infantry formations, in which any independence on the part of individual warriors was 'submerged' into anonymous files of pike and shot. This established, the chapter then examines broader disciplinary standards, identifying this 'submergence of the individual' and drive for a perfect but anonymous, collective soldiery in a wider drive to regulate every aspect of a soldier's physical behaviour and moral life. Finally, the crucial new rank of Sergeant-Major, with his duties of regulating soldierly behaviour both on and off the battlefield, responding to both specific tactical changes and the broader preoccupations of military discipline and institutionalisation, is examined as the epitome of the themes discussed above.

Again, the sense throughout is of military theorists writing detached from their individual, personal, or national contexts, depicting how their *ideal* army would function. Hence, with their lack of explicit geopolitical or military contextualisation or application of their theories to specific real-world or national military challenges, these theorists invariably skipped over many of the real problems or even the quotidian tasks faced in reality by their contemporaries in the military profession. An Elizabethan officer in Ireland looking for practical or moral instruction on counterinsurgency and conquest, or how to straighten out his company finances, or a Spanish officer trying to halt desertion or quell mutineers in Flanders, would have found little to help them in these treatises which, in their depictions of armies and soldiers as much as their yearnings for meritocratic officership, were fundamentally expressions of a transnationally shared dream of military *perfection*.

I. The Perfect Army

Just as the language of 'reason' reflected the new stress on practical and ostensibly rational command, the semantic field of 'order' and 'discipline' (the latter meaning both military techniques and the enforcement of regulations) revealed how military theorists envisaged the perfect army as a strictly regulated, quasi-totalitarian world. Thomas Styward's justification of the Sergeant-Major's duties 'inasmuch as good order is necessarie in all humane actions' could easily have applied to all precepts in all military textbooks in the period, as 'without order and conduct, [a] force is not woorthye the name of warre, but it is a tumulte, route or assemblie'.[1075] Martin de Eguiluz thus identified a lack of restraint and self-control, with these positive traits both antithetical to, and superior to, savage *furia* as hampering the effectiveness of Spanish troops: 'in our nation we have a great carelessness…overcome by great fiery anger, fighting against the enemy, we scatter ourselves…all good outcomes depend on good discipline, and obedience, and order'.[1076]

Eguiluz referred primarily to 'order' as physical position in a formation of infantry, but as this chapter will show, this aspect was merely one important component of the all-encompassing system of military 'order' that governed the perfect army. The drive towards order and regulation was equally visible in the regulated officer hierarchies and duties prescribed by treatises. Just as military theorists outlined the qualifications required in an aspirant officer, they carefully listed the different roles and duties they were expected to perform, tailored to the specific rank they held. As with the qualifications discussed above, precise precepts varied from one text to another, but

[1075] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 19; Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, sig. Ai.v.
[1076] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 85r. (*En nuestra nacion tenemos un peligroso descucuydo…que vencidos de la mucha colera fogossa peleando contra el enemigo, nos esparzimos…todo buē successo consiste en la buena disciplina, y obediencia, y orden*); See also Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 4v.

with three universal preoccupations: firstly, the wide range of duties officers were expected to perform, which were as ambitious as the qualities they were expected to display. Indeed, the former justified the latter: listing the sheer number of 'offices and charges', Isaba ruled that 'it is most just that they be given to sufficient and diligent persons of much experience'.[1077] The second universal theme was that, as with the qualifications for promotion, requirements and duties expected of officers increased as the theorist's chapters ascended the chain of command. Finally, just as the treatises invariably privileged prudence and skill over bravery in their promotion criteria, the duties they listed for officers had a preponderance of non-combat over combat roles, with the multitudinous duties of the perfect officer involving the discipline, maintenance, and increasingly the training of their unit off the battlefield, as well as skilfully handling them *on* the battlefield.

Returning to the case study examined above, Bernardino de Escalante covered not only the qualifications expected but also the duties required of every company rank from *cabo d'escuadra* to Captain, before covering the regimental ranks of Sergeant-Major and *Maestre de Campo* before ascending to the General and other army-level officers. Thus, Escalante's *cabo* was primarily a barrack-room rather than a battlefield officer, assisting the Sergeant in his duties, ensuring the men were properly equipped, and setting and inspecting the company's guards and lodgings, while he was also expected to 'teach the *bisoños*', serve as a father figure to the troops, and 'persuade' them to live well without recourse to punishment.[1078] Escalante expected the *alferez* to be a paragon of bravery and diligence and die in defence of the banner- echoing the other manuals, who usually stressed the bravery expected of this particular officer- but

[1077] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 60v. (*es justissimo se procuren…en personas suficientes, diligetes, y de mucha espiriencia*)
[1078] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fols. 29v.-30r. (*enseñādo à los bisoños…persuadir*)

also expected the *alferez* to mediate in disputes between soldiers, ensure they were properly equipped, review the troops and maintain discipline, supervise the lodgings and guards, and fill in for the Captain or the all-important Sergeant as necessary.[1079] Just as the qualifications for senior officers were even more ambitious than for the junior ranks, Escalante likewise expanded their powers and duties, but made it clear that they still existed within a carefully regulated hierarchy. His *Maestre de Campo* had to be able to discipline as well as command the entire tercio with corporal and capital punishment, oversee victualling and supplies, and exercise independent command when necessary but otherwise diligently obey the Captain General. Escalante proved his point by referencing Don Alvaro de Sande in North Africa and Sancho de Londoño in Flanders, 'marvellous examples of *Maestres de Campo* who distinguished themselves in such enterprises'.[1080]

Though much less likely to cite their own countrymen as examples, English military authors similarly explained the escalating duties, as well as the qualifications of officers, as they moved up the chain of command. To examine one example, the rank breakdown in the book of 'offices, lawes, strategemes &c' in Digges' *Stratioticos* ruled that the corporal must 'keepe continually companye with his little troupe' and provide for their lodgings and wants while supervising their equipment and behaviour, and reporting problems up the strictly regulated chain of command.[1081] Digges, typically, echoed the Spanish texts in requiring a Sergeant to have first been a soldier and corporal, and stressed his role in supervising, administering, and controlling the rank and file both on and off the battlefield.[1082] Like most English texts, Digges distinguished

[1079] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 31v.
[1080] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 56r. (*de que tenemos exēplos marauillosos de muchos Maestres de cāpo, que se señalarō en semejātes empresas*); 'Sande, Alvaro de', *DBE*.
[1081] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 84-5.
[1082] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 86-7.

between Ensign and Lieutenant, usually combined in the Spanish *alferez*. He thus adjusted their duties accordingly, focusing his description of the Ensign's role on looking after the company standard, leading by example and being 'first and foremost' into the assault, while the Lieutenant covered the other '*alferez*' duties of supervision, administration, and leadership of a company-level second-in-command.[1083] Digges required the Captain to carefully choose and instruct his subordinate officers and organise the baggage, lodgings and guards, as well as actually leading and arranging his soldiers on the battlefield.[1084] Finally, Digges' 'coronel' paralleled the *Maestre de Campo* with his extensive regimental duties and wide-ranging but carefully defined powers, stressing his obligations of obedience to those above him in the command chain, and to the lower command chain in carefully appointing properly qualified officers and specifying the weapon types of his subordinate companies.[1085] No English texts over the next three decades would depart significantly from this model.

The nature and scope of officer duties in the perfectly regulated, standardised, army hierarchy thus stretched well outside battlefield responsibilities, reflecting a drive to regulate and institutionalise military life into an all-encompassing micro-society, while the stress was placed not on an officer's own personal initiative or bravery, but how he fitted into the military ecosystem. A particularly vivid but typical evocation of the latter point was Digges' inclusion in the duties of the Lieutenant that he should act as the Captain's eyes, ears, mouthpiece, and counsellor, while supervising 'the Sergeants, and Corporals, that they doe their duetie' and passing their requests back up to the Captain.[1086] Eguiluz argued that some officers 'are very good for everything

[1083] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 88-9, 90-91.
[1084] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 92-4.
[1085] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 95-7.
[1086] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 90-1.

(those who are perfect), some fight very spiritedly…others command prudently', but that the most valuable was 'those who are fit to be commanded, which is often the cause of good outcomes of campaigns'.[1087]

Also significant in this drive to control and regulate officership, and the unremitting focus on the regulated institutional hierarchy rather than the individual, is the tacit or explicit idea that the rank itself, not the man- whether through his personality or his personal connections with superiors and subordinates- carried the authority to command. In his list of points for a perfect soldier, Eguiluz included the rule that no soldier may permit an officer to be insulted in his presence even if the officer personally deserves it, as 'he must be honoured and respected for being an officer of his King'.[1088] He further ruled that even though an officer is 'no more than a man, like him', a soldier must never respond to provocation from an officer with violence, even in self-defence against an officer chasing him with a sword, as 'in that office, [the officer] represents, and commands with, royal authority'.[1089] Though Eguiluz ruled that in private matters of honour over women and gambling, the soldier and officer may fight man-to-man, this was unique among military theorists.[1090] Valdes echoed much more simply the stress on the rank, not the man himself or his personal connections with subordinates as carrying authority, in repeating the common principle that soldiers were bound to obey *all* officers in the army, not only their own company or regimental commanders.[1091] Likewise, officers in the perfect military hierarchy could

[1087] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 29r. (*unos dellos son buenos para todo (que estos son perfetos) otros para pelear muy animosos...otros son para gouernar prudentes...otros buenos para ser gouernados: y estos tales por sus personas, suelen muchas vezes ser causa del buen successo de las jornadas*)
[1088] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 5r. (*le ha de honrrar, y respetar, aunque el en si sea de poco, por ser ministro de su Rey*)
[1089] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 5v. (*no es mas de un hombre solo como el, es mucho, que representa, en aquel officio, y mando, el autoridad Real*)
[1090] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 5v.
[1091] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 84.

stand in for absent superiors and take on the specific authority and responsibilities of their rank.[1092]

Conversely, the subordination of individual officers to a strictly regulated command chain was visible in how many theorists sought to limit the authority of officers to specified roles and duties. Digges stressed that the role of the Lieutenant was 'not to vendicate to himselfe any authoritie, but thoroughly to understande and reporte to his Captayne…and from him to take his commission and direction'.[1093] Londoño's *alferez* was to 'represent the Captain' as necessary but with limited powers: 'they may not receive soldiers, nor give licence, nor punish them, nor give or take away quarters, nor bestow or take away *ventajas*', bonus wages accorded either for particular weapon types or, more importantly, for loyal or praiseworthy service.[1094] In a point of realistic practicality, Londoño specifically denied these powers as the primary duty of the *alfereces*, protection of the standard in combat, relied on the goodwill of the soldiers to protect him, so their first duty was to ensure that 'the soldiers love them, so they follow them with greater willingness'.[1095] Especially significant in the regulation of the military hierarchy is how, despite their draconian laws, many writers explicitly limited the disciplinary powers of junior officers. Londoño specified a Captain's duties in managing the soldiers 'but [Captains] should not dismiss them without legitimate cause, nor should they hurt or maltreat them except in cases where they are unable to capture them and it is necessary to punish them *in flagrante delicto*, in which case they should

[1092] e.g. Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 71.
[1093] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 90.
[1094] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 5r. (*han de gouernar como los mesmos Capitanes: pero en su presencia ni han de recibir soldados, ni darles licencia, ni castigarlos, ni darles, ni quitarles posadas, ni señalar, o quitar ventajas*); Quatrefages, *Los Tercios*, pp. 179-83.
[1095] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 5r. (*los soldados los amen, para que con mas voluntad los sigan*)

do it with the sword in a manner that does not kill or maim', though not on humanitarian grounds, but to ensure they could still bear arms.[1096]

Digges ordered that if a Corporal discovers an infraction, 'his part is not violently to punish the souldioures himselfe, but to make it known to his Captaine who muste not neither, as some rashly do, revenge it himself, but communicate the same with the Marshall or his provost', who alone have 'authoritie to punish'- and again, this is justified as to avoid 'ill will…to the Captain or officers'.[1097] Though particularly severe in his disciplinary precepts, Thomas Styward stressed that punishment must be carried out according to the published articles of war, not arbitrarily, and through formal army channels, not summary punishment. Thus, though a soldier drawing his weapon in anger outside combat would be punished with death, 'the like law is against the officer…if he strike anie souldier, without such occasion as is permitted him in the articles to doe'.[1098] Moreover, theorists stressed that officers as well as soldiers must expect to be punished as examples for dereliction of duty.[1099] As Styward put it, discipline, like promotion, must be orderly, rational, and conducted regardless of 'what calling or degree soever [the accused] be', 'to judge the rich as the poore: not regarding friendship, kindred, or anie other corrupting cause'.[1100]

As well as a regulated and ordered chain of command, military theorists also elaborated a broader military ecosystem of dedicated ranks and positions for specialised aspects of military life, each with their own qualifications and duties. At the company level, both Spanish and English texts envisaged the junior officers as accompanied by

---

[1096] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 5r. (*no les han de despedir sin causa legitima, ni les han de herir, ni maltratar, sino en casos que no huuiesse lugar de prenderlos, y conuiniesse castigarlos en la fragancia del delito, lo qual han de hazer con la espada, de manera q̄ no maten, ni manquen de los miembros necessarios*)
[1097] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 85.
[1098] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 52.
[1099] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 2r. (*si fueren remissos, y exercitaren mal sus oficios*)
[1100] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 30-1.

musicians, clerks, surgeons, and often quartermasters and priests. At the regimental level, Londoño wanted the *Maestre de Campo* to have an auditor, *furrier major*, *barrachel*, doctor, surgeon, and drum major.[1101] These specialist positions were particularly numerous in army-level organisation; Digges specified the duties and qualifications of 'the Generall or Lieutenant of Horsemen', 'Mayster of the Ordinance', 'Lord high Marshall', and 'High Treasourer', each overseeing a dedicated service branch, as well as a Master of Victuals and Captain of Pioneers.[1102] Perhaps based on his experience in the Low Countries with Leicester since his first edition, Digges' expanded 1590 edition added instructions for the carriage-, trench-, quarter- and scout-masters, the Muster-Master-General, and the Colonel General of the Foot, the latter presumably based on the Spanish *Maestre de Campo General*.[1103]

Theorists stressed the disciplinary role of junior officers, albeit with such men usually expected to encourage and lead by example rather than punish. Spaniards usually centred low- to mid-level disciplinary issues on the *Maestre de Campo*: as Eguiluz instructed, this officer must be 'ordinary justice and governor' as well as '*caudillo*' and 'guide' of his *tercio*.[1104] English texts increasingly shifted disciplinary roles among other responsibilities onto the new regimental-level authority, with John Smythe stressing how the 'sufficiencie of Coronells' consisted in governing their regiment 'with all care, valour, affection and diligence', but specifying that 'they do make their Regiments…to observe all orders militarie in lodging, dislodging, in marching, in fighting', 'as also that they doo live in great order, without stragling, spoiling, or any waies injuring'.[1105] However, those theorists who covered army

[1101] Londoño, *Discurso*, fols. 12r.-18r.
[1102] Digges, *Stratioticos*, sig. a.iii.v.
[1103] Thomas Digges, *Stratioticos*, (2nd ed., London, 1590).
[1104] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 62r. (*caudillo, guya, justicia ordinaria, y gouierno*)
[1105] Smythe, *Discourses*, sig. (a)r.

organisation also envisaged a strictly regulated chain of dedicated 'ministers of justice' such as provosts, reflecting the unbreakable links between army institutionalisation, perfect 'order' and disciplinary enforcement, and the paramount importance of punishing malefactors, 'because an army without justice is like a forest of bandits'.[1106]

As well as the chain of command and army organisation, this idea of the perfect army as harmonious and strictly regulated was also visible in the common fixation on camps as representations of military perfection. Thomas Styward thus associated camp placement with professional officership, instructing that in choosing the location of the camp, a commander:

> must use especiallie…the wise advice of his companie, as namely of the Maister of the Campe, the Sergeant-Major, and other experienced heads of his armie…whether it be commodious for the victualling of the Campe, he must learn of the chief Purveier: and whether it be fit to fight in, he maie take the counsale of other beaten soldiers: so that all having the election of the place both by the benefit of the Theorike and the helpe of practise…[1107]

As such, the physical camp of the army (which many theorists designed in detail, complete with idealised illustrations) could be a synecdoche for the army itself and represent professional military order and 'discipline' as a whole. William Garrard clearly blurred the lines between 'camp', 'army', and military life itself in praising how the Romans, 'the very maisters of the arte of war', knew how to lay out camps, 'and to avoid those idle, or rather dissolute effrenate [sic] pastimes, that our Christian Campes are bewitched withal, to the utter ruine of all good military discipline, and confusion of our armies'.[1108] In designing the layout of the camp, theorists further engaged with military 'order' and hierarchy in specifying the location of the tents of particular units and commanders. Londoño typically justified his camp design with reference to Roman

[1106] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 54. (*un exercito sin justicia, es como un bosque de ladrones*)
[1107] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 125.
[1108] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 349.

models, all overseen by 'very intelligent, diligent, and experienced' officers, while Digges' camp layout allotted space to each regiment and service branch, all ringed with a perfect bastioned artillery fieldwork.[1109]

Likewise, the self-contained military world of the camp reflected the drive to create a military micro-society sealed off from the civilian world, and to regulate the physical positions of soldiers. All theorists stressed the need to keep soldiers inside the camp, or when on the march their unit, except with their officer's license, with no deviation from the prescribed orders by either officers or soldiers 'left without punishment'.[1110] Camp layout, in turn, was simply one of the multitude of ways in which military treatises displayed their drive to regulate everything about military life.[1111] Clayton's list of 'penall statutes, to be executed by the Marshall' reflected the drive to control duties of specific officers in every aspect of army life: 'all men shall be lodged by the quarter maister, and…be contented with the same…no Captain send forth any Company about anie enterprise…without the licence of the Lord Lieutenant…no man goe a foraging, further than they be appointed by the forage master, which is garded by the Marshall's appointment…'.[1112]

[1109] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 29v. (*grandissima inteligencia, diligencia, experiencia*); Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 171-5, unpag. illustration.
[1110] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 51. (*ningun yerro o descuido ha de q̄dar sin reprehension*)
[1111] e.g. Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 17r.
[1112] Clayton, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 34-5.

II. The Common Soldiery

Within this regulated military world of hyper-competent 'perfect captains', institutional organisation and officership catering to the army's needs both on and off the battlefield, and the literal and metaphorical idea of the perfect camp, the obvious question to ask is how military theorists imagined the men who would actually fill the ranks and perform the fighting. Indeed, there is a sense throughout sixteenth-century military culture of a widening gulf between officers and soldiers, visible in the de-individualisation of combat narratives as well as in the drive to organise, regulate, and discipline in the treatises: as Valdes summarised, 'military recruitment extends to two types of men: those who command and govern, and those who are commanded and governed'.[1113]

However, one important factor to understand before examining these points is that between officers and soldiers, most military theorists still included an intermediate, more traditional category: the 'gentleman ranker', a socially or militarily superior warrior with a degree of independence and distinction from ordinary soldiers, but without a command. The Spanish army had a strong culture of *particulares*, which as expressed in Vazquez' chronicle could mean a *capitan entretenido*, a veteran professional without a company command, but also a volunteer 'Don'. Sancho de Londoño stressed the importance of restricting horse ownership in infantry companies but argued that horses should be made available for nobles serving as infantrymen, with the tactical justification that they could act as a mounted detachment, but also that if they were expected to march on foot, such noblemen, 'the sinew of the Spanish

[1113] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 10. (*la election militar se estiende à dos generos de hombres: los unos para mandar y gouernar, y los otros para ser mandados y gouernados*)

infantry', would not want to serve at all.[1114] The continued stress on gentleman rankers was an important exception both to the drive to divide the ideal army into a hierarchical chain of command and an anonymised, obedient soldiery, and to the increasing minimisation in military theory of the noble affinity for war. Noblemen infantrymen were a distinctively Spanish phenomenon, and understood as such by contemporaries; Alba himself considered them 'the men who win victory in the actions' but also those 'with whom the General establishes the requisite discipline among the troops'.[1115] This hinted at a practical role, as well as a class status, distinct from that of the common soldiers, with the 'gentlemen rankers' having more in common with the officers above them than with the rank and file. Escalante ruled that *particulares* could be exempted from his ban on recruiting foreign soldiers, and instructed that when a new company is raised, a dedicated *escuadra particular* be formed 'all of *caballeros*', more prestigious than the rest of the company.[1116]

Though Escalante apparently also envisaged this *escuadra* including particularly valued soldiers with *ventajas*, the English equivalent of the 'gentleman volunteer' clearly had more straightforward class implications. William Blandy's rank list thus included 'gentleman in a company or of the rounde' above 'private or common souldiars'.[1117] However, there was the same drive to regulate and fit these men into the all-encompassing military hierarchy. Digges instructed Captains and Colonels to appoint 'two or three of the expertest Gentlemen of his band' as 'Lieutenants extraordinarie' (though this also had a qualification of military skill and knowledge) to

[1114] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 16v. (*nerbio de la Infantaria Española*)
[1115] Parker, *Army of Flanders*, p. 74.
[1116] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 38r. (*todo cauallero*)
[1117] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 18v. On English 'Gentlemen Volunteers', see C. G. Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1966), p. 25.

attend on the officer, execute his commands, and take over junior officer roles.[1118] William Garrard expanded this and echoed Escalante in envisaging a force in each company of 'cavalliers' or 'the Gentlemen of a Band' to be organised as 'cavallerie of St George's Squadron'. This group would be a 'speciall seat' for 'the flower of warlike souldiers', recruited from high-quality officers wanting to continue in service (equivalent of the Spanish *entretenidos*, with whom Garrard, a veteran of the Army of Flanders, would have been familiar) but also noble youths. Garrard's 'squadron' would take a 'solemn oath' and display special insignia, would be selected for military skill and knowledge of 'martial affairs', and would be given a special stipend to act as an elite detachment.[1119] In creating an elite soldiery out of both veteran experts and gentleman volunteers, such ideas reflect the continued association of nobility with war and the realities of high noble participation in armies, as well as the importance of professional, skilled officers, and an understanding that both groups would expect to be distinguished in appearance, duties, and treatment from the mass of common soldiers even when not holding a command.

However, there were very different expectations for genuinely common soldiers of the rank-and-file. In contrast to the classical requirements for Generals, Valdes claimed that the ancients simply wanted 'the communal gregarious soldiers' to be 'robust, dextrous in arms, obedient, and know how to swim'.[1120] Escalante added an ideological basis in ruling that those who aspire to be soldiers should found their

[1118] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 92.
[1119] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 73-81, 140-1.
[1120] Valdes, *Espejo*, pp. 10-11. (*los soldados communes gregarios…saber que fuessen robustos, diestros en las armas, obedientes y nadadores*)

aspirations 'on valorous determination in the defence of the Christian religion, and the health of their *patria*, thence to understand the art that they wish to profess'.[1121]

English texts were particularly specific on the characteristics required in potential soldiers, specifying both the physical condition and the social and moral character of recruits.[1122] Typically, Barnaby Rich complained how recruitment of dishonest and criminal elements meant that 'the Prince's service is abused, the maners and discipline of the aunsient orders corrupted, and the name and estimation of the noble souldier utterly despysed' and explained that soldiers must be chosen first for their 'manners and condicions', then for their physical and mental 'sufficiency'.[1123] This anxiety about criminal recruits was a constant refrain in English military theory, and one iteration of the *topos* of England's martial decline or lack of military skill was how the national recruiting systems believed that 'the worst sort of men…are fit for the warres: and accordingly doe call out the refuse'.[1124] Cruickshank suggests that the question of whom to recruit was one of the 'two great military controversies of the age' in English treatises, but debating whether certain civilian professions were more or less apt for war was less important than the universal belief that 'the ruffion…is most unfitte to make a souldior'.[1125] This stress in English texts on the attributes and character of recruits reflected the very real phenomenon of criminals or vagabonds being swept into troop levies.[1126] Meanwhile, contemporary criticisms in England of warriors in general as brutal and dishonest likely encouraged English theorists, as part of their defence of

---

[1121] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 22r. (*funde su valerosa determinacion en la defensa de la Religion Christiana, y del honor de su Principe, y salud de la patria, y que desde luego entienda el arte que quiere professor*)
[1122] Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, fo. 3v.; Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 1.
[1123] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. Gvii.r.-viii.r.
[1124] Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 18.
[1125] Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, p. 26; Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 81.
[1126] Cruickshank, *Elizabeth's Army*, pp. 26-8; Neil Younger, *War and Politics in the Elizabethan Counties* (Manchester, 2012), p. 173.

the military profession, to anxiously emphasise the importance of keeping it free of disorderly elements, while aversion to criminal recruits clearly tied into the broader anxiety of soldierly depredations and lawlessness shared by English and Spanish writers.

More important for the construction of the perfect soldiery, however, was that neither Spanish nor English treatises saw the character of recruits as the only or even the primary determining factor in their military value. Thus, even Rich, perhaps the most vocal critic of the recruitment of poor-quality men, identified that the selection of a Captain required greater care than the soldiery, 'considering that it onely resteth in his dilygence, to trayne and make hys souldiers perfect and redy at such time as neede shall require'.[1127] Instead, just as aspirant officers were judged not primarily for their innate characteristics but for their experience and study, the soldiery as a collective were envisaged as being brought towards proper military efficiency through experience, and, increasingly, through active training: 'no man is borne a souldiour, but by exercise and trayning it is attained, and by discontinuance againe it is lost, as all other Artes and Sciences be'.[1128] Military writers increasingly engaged with ideas of veteran status, whether explicitly in formulating the perfect soldiery, or tacitly in judging bodies of men as 'new men, not well exercised' or '*soldados viejos* of experience'.[1129] Given the tradition of high veteran numbers in the *tercios*, most Spanish texts tacitly assumed the superiority of bodies of experienced *soldados platicos* to inexperienced *bisoños.* Vazquez judged companies and entire *tercios* based on the veteran proportion in their ranks and attributed their victories to high veteran status, while, like Cerezeda before

[1127] Rich, *Dialogue*, sig. G.vi.r.
[1128] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 349.
[1129]Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 77r. (*gente nueua, y no bien exercitada, ò…soldados viejos, y de experiencia*), e.g. Clayton, *Martiall Discipline*, sig. A4r.-v.

him, automatically associating *viejo* status with being *platico* in the practical skills of war.[1130]

As with officership, there was again a sense that a man must be 'initiated' into the profession by experience and learning, with the concomitant (and often overly ambitious) restriction of the title of '*soldado*' as unobtainable 'by anie other way, but by a continuall delight, exercise, and observation', to attain the necessary 'experience and knowledge' 'whereof if he be ignorant, although he have bene twentie yeares in the warres, he is not too be esteemed a souldier'.[1131] Slightly more realistically, Isaba ruled that a man of five years' service, having 'learnt to manage his arms, mount guard, respect officers, obey orders, keep the bans', is a qualified soldier eligible for promotion to *cabo d'escuadra.*[1132]

Moreover, just as experience was joined with study for the perfect officer, there was a growing stress on organised, formal training in transforming raw recruits into proper soldiers. Though some texts envisaged this taking place through osmosis from their fellows, most explicitly included in their instructions for officers the duty 'to muster, march, and traine, exercise, and instruct' their company.[1133] Thus, Sancho de Londoño typically held up the Roman model as showing how all soldiers but especially the *bisoños* must be 'exercised in all the types of exercises necessary', and ruled it easier to train novices in good discipline than reform men already in service.[1134] Instructing recruits often formed an important part of the duties of lower officer ranks, with the *cabo d'escuadra*/corporal and especially the Sergeants expected to teach the

[1130] e.g. Vazquez, *Sucesos*, II.146-7, I.465. cf. Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fo. 312r.-v.
[1131] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 21; see also Digges, *Stratioticos*, sig. a.r.
[1132] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 78r. (*aprenda a tratar sus armas, hazer sus guardias, respectar sus officiales, obedecer las ordenes, cō̄seruar los vandos*)
[1133] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 45-6.
[1134] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 18r. (*todos los generos de exercicios necessarios*), 42r.

troops, in explicit instruction as well as leading by example.[1135] Training could be seen in terms of the moral and spiritual regulation of the soldiery, especially in English manuals, Digges stressing the value of training to 'bryng the souldyours to a singular readinesse' but also to keep them from 'dicing and carding'.[1136] Physical fitness training was especially popular in this regard, Smythe advocating it both for practical ends and as the antithesis of 'sloth and idlenesse, two mortal enemies of the commonwealth'.[1137]

However, a very practical manifestation of this drive to create a regulated, ordered collective soldiery was the focus on weapon handling training, to 'accustome himselfe to beare a peece or a pyke'.[1138] Londoño cited the Romans as proving the general importance of weapon training, but later theorists updated and refined this principle, with Digges including in the duties of a corporal to 'instruct them howe to handle and use the weapon they carry' and Eguiluz expecting the *cabo d'escuadra* to demonstrate the arquebus and pike to the men.[1139] Meanwhile, as shall be examined, weapon training was seen not only as an end in itself but as the foundation of even more advanced training requirements.

Though the quotidian roles of the soldiers themselves in military theory invariably included a full-time life of guard duties, forage parties, digging, and various forms of training as well as actual military operations, the basic duty of the perfect soldiery could be summarised in one word, 'the true profession of *la milicia*': 'obedience'.[1140] Thus, just as the perfect Captain General was expected to prioritise retreating and regrouping over direct battle, and the perfect Captain was expected to

[1135] e.g. Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 10r.
[1136] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 103-4.
[1137] Smythe, *Instructions*, sig. A3v.
[1138] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 3.
[1139] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 18v.; Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 84; Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 7r.
[1140] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 10v. (*la verdadera profession de la milicia, que es la obediencia*)

spend most of his time studying or administering his company rather than fighting, Escalante ruled that for the perfect soldier, bravery without obedience was insufficient 'even if he has performed more feats than El Cid'.[1141] To return to the requirements of the 'perfect good soldier' of William Garrard, the specific lessons to be imparted by experience, apart from physical training, were entirely focused on passive obedience:

> ...to be well able to use the weapon he serveth withall, but also sodainly to understand all commandments…whether it be by voice or sound of drum or otherwise, and to know how to maintein himselfe in order without breaking array, not onely marching, but also turning in a troupe or retyring. For that souldier which knoweth his dutie how to behave himselfe in the campe, in watch, scout, &c. and likewise in marching, turning, retyring, and fighting or skirmishing to observe the order prescribed by his Captaine, may be called a trained and old souldier…in these exercises the sergeants and officers are daily & duely to instruct generally and privately each soldier…[1142]

Especially significant is the combination of physical obedience on the battlefield with good order in the camp, but on a simpler level, such passages demonstrate how it was always obedience, not bravery or prowess, that defined the soldier's duties in military theory. Typically, Styward summarised the passive attributes required of the perfect soldier by listing 'sixe principall points belonging to the souldiers of all estates': silence, obedience, smartness, sobriety, hardiness, and truth, while Garrard added loyalty to country and God.[1143]

Escalante, likewise, ruled that soldiers must consider *la milicia* 'no less than a form of true religion', and so love their officers and 'keep justice, faith, constancy, silence, and above all obedience'.[1144] Conspicuous by its absence in the components of the good soldier or the prescribed disciplinary regulations, meanwhile, was personal bravery. As Smythe summarised, in contrast to his detailed command duties and skill

---

[1141] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 25v. (*aunque…aya hecho mas hazañas que el Cid*)
[1142] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 21.
[1143] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 46-7; Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 30-1.
[1144] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 25v. (*no es otra cosa que una semejança de verdadera religión…guardar justicia, fee, constancia, paciencia, y silencio, y sobre todos obediencia*)

requirements for Colonels and Captains, ‘the dutie and sufficiencie of soldiers, doth first and principallie consist, to be obedient to their Captaines, and all other their superiour officers’, followed by knowing how to handle their weapons ‘and to knowe and observe all orders militarie’, and ‘the third is, to be sober, patient, and be able to endure labours and travells’.[1145] Likewise, Styward’s three forms of training hinted implicitly at the passive obedience and malleability of the soldiers’ bodies and minds: ‘the one to harden the bodie to make it apt to paines, the other to teach them to handle their wepons, the third to learne them to keepe their orders in marching, as wel in the armie as in fighting or in camping’.[1146]

[1145] Smythe, *Discourses*, sig. (a)r.-v.
[1146] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 148-9.

III. The Submergence of the Individual

This focus on obedience, though also manifested in a much more diverse range of disciplinary precepts, ultimately stemmed from a single tactical imperative and real-world technical military context: the drive to create disciplined infantry formations, which 'well-made in proportion, is the victory of a campaign, and if badly made, the contrary'.[1147] The dominance of infantry formations on the contemporary battlefield was a constant refrain in those treatises that discussed tactical precepts, and was explicitly or tacitly linked with ideas of order and discipline. As Mendoza argued, in a fascinating hint at how intellectual contexts of logic and 'reason' as well as purely military-technical contexts may have influenced military theory, 'the infantry are truly the strength of the army', not simply because of changes in battle technique but also as infantry were more controllable: 'as they move by reason, while cavalry move by spurs, held back with the bridle, and the one cannot be equal to the other'.[1148]

The central principle of infantry formations, and the technique most often explained in military theory, was the pike squadron, 'the strength of the field'.[1149] Valdes expected Captain Generals to understand 'how important is good order and perfection of the squadron, in which consists all the force of the army', and applied to formation discipline the usual *topos* that good order trumps superior numbers.[1150] Meanwhile, though some theorists included unrealistic but aesthetically pleasing pike formations, most theorists of both nations argued against such impractical techniques,

---

[1147] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 22r. (*Un buen esquadron, bien hecho en su proporcion, es la victoria de una buena jornada: y si es mal hecho, por el contrario*)
[1148] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 60. (*infanteria, que realmente es la firmeza de los campos…a causa que ellos se mueuē por la razon, y los cauallos por las espuelas, reteniendo los el freno : y lo uno y lo otro no puede ser en todos con igualdad*)
[1149] Smythe, *Discourses*, fo. 4v.
[1150] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 14 (*entendiendo de quanta importācia era la buena orden y perfection del squadron, en el qual consiste toda la fuerça del exercito*), 16.

resolving 'to put…all the easiest rules for making those [formations] that are used now in war'.[1151] English sources were particularly vocal on the impracticality of hypothetical squadrons; Rich again expressed this in the language of conscious modernity, warning that classical commanders 'framed many proportions which were both requisite and beneficial to the service then required, but as time hath nowe altered the manner of fight, would serve to no purpose at all'.[1152]

Meanwhile, the drive to create simple but tightly disciplined, perfect pike squadrons was linked with a growing stress on infantry firepower, which was also treated in terms of explicit modernity, and increasingly seen as the dominant infantry arm.[1153] As Robert Barret warned, 'as the armed pike is the strength of the battell, so…is the shot is the furie of the field', with 'shot and pikes of necessitie to be coupled'.[1154] Formation instructions thus evolved beyond the simple pike squadron to envisage combined-arms formations of various type and complexity: 'pikes in proper order, lined with arquebusiers and fortified by sleeves of arquebuses'.[1155] Typically, Vega instructed how to form a pike-and-shot squadron of various sizes, with a regulated manoeuvre for arquebusiers to leave the square and form up into sleeves and rearguard.[1156] Though he cited the German model, Vega added that he disliked *Landsknecht* practice for forming square as it relied on the order followed by the first few ranks of the squadron, whereas he preferred to rely on the officers, and all other

---

[1151] Vega, *Tratado*, p. 81; Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 97. (*me he resuelto a poner en este discurso todas las reglas mas faciles para hazer los que agora se usan en la guerra*)
[1152] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 104; Rich, *Path-way*, sig. K1r.
[1153] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 116. (*ser la furia de la poluora el dia de oy tanta, ayudada con el instrumento de la artilleria, mosquetes y arcabuzes, que no solo viene a quebrantar…pero rompe y abre los esquadrones…y assi la mayor parte de vitorias que se ganan en estos tiempos es…sin auer visto ya afrontarse sino raras vezes los esquadrones de picas*)
[1154] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 69.
[1155] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 33. (*picas en conueniente ordē, estuviere guarnecido del arcabuzeria, y fortalecido de las māgas de arcabuzeros*)
[1156] Vega, *Tratado*, pp. 80-91.

theorists likewise envisaged formations as top-down creations of the company or regimental officers, in which *all* soldiers were reduced to simple components.[1157]

As such, group training in the ideal infantry force was extended beyond instructions in personal weapon handling to encompass 'parade ground' drill manoeuvres, which was included by military theorists in their officer duties: 'resort wholie together to some ground' and instruct them 'by words and deedes, as by signes from the officers framed'.[1158] As with physical fitness, weapon drill, or military discipline as a whole, this could be supported with the Vegetian model. Valdes stressed the importance of emulating the Romans specifically in formation training for '*tirones*, which we now call *soldados bisoños*, not only to be dextrous in weapon use, but to be taught in the order that they had to keep, and the proper place they had to be in', so that 'in a very great army there is not a soldier who does not know his place in the squadron'.[1159] Thomas Proctor likewise envisaged infantry training as going beyond 'exercyse to handle hys bow, peece, pyke, or other weapon' to 'be perfecte in keapynge the arrayes, rankes, and orders of warre'.[1160] Marcos de Isaba envisaged the Captain placing his men in formation then 'watching them closely, showing them where they have to advance, where they have to retire, how they have to charge, where they have to make front', with the shot drilling 'in a way that all he does and shows them, keeps the order of *la milicia*, for when the time comes for real they will know how to secure the victory'.[1161] With the infantry companies trained to this exacting standard, the *Maestre*

[1157] Vega, *Tratado*, p. 82.
[1158] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 45-6.
[1159] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 14. (*que en un muy grande exercito no auia soldado alguno que no supiesse su lugar en lesquadrō…Tirones que agora llamamos soldaods bisoños, no solo a ser diestros de todas armas, pero erā doctrinados de la orden q̄ auian de guardar, y del lugar proprio q̄ auiā de tener*)
[1160] Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, fols. 22v.-23r.
[1161] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 90v.-91r. (*saldrá el dicho capitan de ordinario con su compañía…y la pōdra en esquadron o batalla…muy vigilante sobre ellos, mostrandoles donde han de cerrar: donde se han de retirar: como han de cargar: y donde hā de hacer frente…de manera que todo lo que se hiziere y se les*

de Campo should engage the *tercio* in formation skirmishes, 'turning, readying the pikes, all the acts they have to do when facing the enemy, and whatever he understands to be insufficient, he reproves them and undoes it, and praises and raises and remembers the good and virtuous'.[1162]

Thus, as in fitness or weapon handling training, the soldiery was seen as malleable and passive, to be shaped by diligent and strict officers into perfection. This hierarchical picture of strictly regulated squadron deployment extended to standardised commands. Smythe included in his second treatise the specific words of command the perfect officer should use, based on his discussions with European officers, including Chiappino Vitelli.[1163] Londoño ruled that fifes and drums 'are necessary instruments as apart from raising the spirits of the men, with them orders are given which would not be heard nor understood by mouth', 'therefore, the drummers should know everything necessary, like *form up, march, to arms, open fire, call, respond, forward, about face…*'.[1164] Barret summarised the soldier's duties as to 'perfectly learne his march; knowe the severall sounds of the drumme, to keepe his place and array in good order; when to march; when and how to charge; when to retire; when to stand…'.[1165]

Finally, many treatises also provided directions for the duties and the tactical evolutions of shot wings, sleeves, or detachments to be practiced in training sessions, some of which, especially in the Spanish texts, with their embryonic volley fire systems,

---

mostrare, sea guardando la orden y profession de la milicia, para quando de veras se offreciere, sepan salir con la victoria)

[1162] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 125v. (*juegos militares…bueluan calen las picas, y todos los actos y exercios q̄ han de hacer estando cerca los enemigos, y lo que entendiere no ser suficiente, lo reprueue y deshaga, y loe y leuante, y tenga en mucha memoria lo bueno y virtuoso*)

[1163] Smythe, *Instructions*, pp. 9-10.

[1164] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 6r. (*son instrumentos necessaries, porq̄ demas de leuātar los animos de la gente, con ellos se les dan las ordines, q̄ no se oyrian, ni entenderiā a boca. Por esso conuiene, q̄ los Atābores sepā tocar todo lo necessario, como recoger, caminar, dar arma, bateria, llamar, respōder, adelantar, boluer las caras…*)

[1165] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 6.

were strikingly sophisticated for the period. Regarding volley fire, an important historical background was the successful use of a form of continuous volley fire-by-rank by the Spanish infantry against the Swiss at Bicocca in 1522, as reported by Giovio's biography of an earlier Spanish-Imperial commander and hero of Spanish soldier-writers, the Marques de Pescara.[1166]

Mendoza envisaged small formations of shot under 'Captains of experience', carrying out a form of multiple-rank fire: 'the first files put their knees on the ground to fire, revealing the target for those who stand behind, and in making a good aim, they fire the rounds (*ruziadas*) at one time', though rather than a continuous-fire manoeuvre like that narrated by Giovio, this may imply a simultaneous multi-rank salvo.[1167] Especially significant in prefiguring developments in infantry firepower associated with the 'military revolution' is the passage in Martin de Eguiluz' text in which he describes a form of countermarch to maintain continuous fire:

> …he takes out three files each of five soldiers, 15 paces in length one to the other, not with fury, but with dextrous repose, and as the first file comes to fire, without turning away they give place to the other, who comes to fire, passing them (*contrapassando*) on the left side, turning their sides to the enemy…and return to fire with the proper order.

This is clearly intended to maintain a steady stream of fire, and Eguiluz added that these three files would fire 'four rounds each and no more', then would be marched back into the main firearm force, and another three would march out.[1168] Apart from the

---

[1166] See Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, p. 190. Giovio's *Pescara* was available in Spanish from 1555, and was advertised to aspiring warriors: Pedro Vallés, *Historia del Fortissimo, y Prudentissimo Capitan…con los hechos memorables de otros siete exceletisimos Capitanes* (Antwerp, 1570), frontmatter. The volley-fire anecdote appears fo. 69r.-v.

[1167] Mendoza, *Theorica*, p. 117. (*Capitanes de experiencia…los primeras hilaras pongan las rodillas en tierra al tirar, descubriendo blanco con esto a los que quedan atras, en que hazer buena punteria, disparando a un tiempo las ruziadas*)

[1168] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 69r. (*comience con la bendicion de Dios y de la primera andada saque tres fileras de a cinco soldados cada una, largas la una de la otra quinze passos, y no con furia, sino con reposo diestramente : y en acabando de disparar la primera filera, sin boluer el rostro, hagan lugar a la otra, que viene a tirar, contrapassando al lado izquierda, dando los costados el enemigo…y boluer a tirar con la propia orden…estas tres fileras tira cada una quatro tiros y no mas*)

obvious sophistication of such a manoeuvre, this passage vividly depicts how infantry formations and evolutions in the perfect army left no room for any kind of individualism on the part of the anonymous soldiery. Historiography has rightly identified this as prefiguring the allegedly revolutionary 'countermarch' drill supposedly invented by Maurice of Nassau, in a text that predated Maurice's first letter on infantry firearm drill by two years.[1169] Yet over two decades earlier, Vega had hinted at a basic form of continuous-fire manoeuvre, though in this case at the level of detached shot groups, rather than volley fire or fire-by-rank, envisaging the reloading and retreat of one arquebus sleeve to be covered by the fire of another, 'so that all the time that one is firing the other is retiring, and so they…never cease fire until ordered otherwise, all with good order'.[1170] Thomas Digges envisaged a stream of fire 'without intermission' either by some form of alternating fire at the detachment level, like Vega's, in which one corporal's squadron 'presentlie discharging, retire themselves, and in place of them, another Corporall with his companie presents himselfe', or with a circular ring march of constantly loading and firing arquebusiers.[1171] Given the links between military mathematics, infantry formations, and professionalism and discipline in general, it is unsurprising that the most mathematically-focused English military treatise would thus also be the most sophisticated in its firearm infantry deployment.

Thus, along with being inducted into soldierly status by learning basic campaigning skills and weapon handling, soldiers were expected to be trained by their Captains, Sergeant-Majors, and regimental commanders to become components of

[1169] de León, 'Doctors', p. 73. Parker has identified forms of volley fire in Digges and Eguiluz, predating Maurice's countermarch, though stresses the theoretical nature of the exercises. Geoffrey Parker, 'The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs', *Journal of Military History*, 71/2 (2007), pp. 337-8.
[1170] Vega, *Tratado*, p. 90. (*De manera que entre tanto que la una tira se ha de retirar la otra, y así se mantendrán nunca dejando de tirar, haste que les sea mandado otra cosa, todo con buen orden*)
[1171] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 105.

'perfect' formations. This complex and skilled but passive, anonymous and de-individualised idea of the fighting man was vividly summarised by Garrard:

> To keepe ranke in each kind of motion…in marching slowlie, softlie & fast & to learne all the sounds, all the signes and all the blasts, voices and cries, wherewith the officers commaund in a battell: and that everyone know perfectly the significance thereof…in which souldiours must be readie and diligent to obey incontinently & aptly to the stroke & battery of the drums, whether it be to march forward, to stay, or to recoile, or to turn their faces and their weapons towards any place…[1172]

A useful concept in this regard is that of the 'submergence of the individual', referenced by Michael Roberts as one of the attributes of the 'modern art of war' he saw as having come into being by 1660. The drive to regulate soldierly behaviour, meanwhile, chimes with Gerhard Oestreich's argument for the importance of classical and neostoic ideals, and the writings of Justus Lipsius, in military discipline around the turn of the century, initially in the Dutch army. Indeed, Bernardino de Mendoza produced his own translation of Lipsius, albeit some years after his military treatise, and is cited by Oestreich as demonstrating that 'the most important military writers of all the European armies show the effects of the new spirit' of neostoic 'action, constancy, self-control and obedience'.[1173] Detailed textual study of contemporary military handbooks would likely reveal considerable tacit engagement with the texts and principles examined by Oestreich, and though the soldier-writers discussed here did not explicitly address neostoic principles nor Dutch military reforms, Olaf van Nimwegen's summary of Lipsius' ideals of soldiering as 'a sense of duty…moral education, regular drill, and bodily labour' is an equally accurate summary of attitudes to the common soldiery in both national bodies of military theory under consideration.[1174]

[1172] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 204.
[1173] Oestreich, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, pp. 76-89; Justus Lipsius, tr. Bernardino de Mendoza, *Los seys libros de las politicas...* (Madrid, 1604).
[1174] Olaf van Nimwegen, 'The transformation of army organisation', in Tallett and Trim, *European Warfare*, p. 161.

The notion of the private soldier as being 'submerged' into anonymous ranks and having lost his freedom and individual initiative both on and off the battlefield fits perfectly the constant drive to regulate behaviour, actions, movement and even posture in the military treatises studied here. However, it is important not to over-emphasise the extent to which this fitted into a wider philosophical movement, and to stress that military theorists probably did not see themselves as moving *towards* disciplined armies as much as *away* from soldierly disorder and anarchy- whether the pillage of civilians or individualistic glory-hunting on the battlefield- and were generally guided less by philosophical principles than by perceived demands of operational realities. Hence, the twin and clearly interlinked obsessions with discipline and with perfect infantry formations; though anxieties of general soldierly disorder were clearly important and equally practical reasons to restrict their freedom, the tactical wellspring of this 'submergence' was the perceived need to deploy perfect formations in the context of contemporary pike-and-shot infantry techniques as developed initially in the first half of the Italian Wars and subsequently refined and institutionalised more widely, which would not work with 'everie one of his owne head'.[1175]

It was in this military context above all that obedience was 'the greatest virtue that may be in souldiers' while military theorists increasingly discouraged personal bravery as well as cowardice.[1176] Hence, Londoño issued the typical rule that any officer or soldier going out to skirmish with the enemy without permission should suffer the death penalty, while Thomas Styward ordered violence, and if necessary summary execution, to keep men in their prescribed place in the formation and Lechuga advised *Maestre de Campo Generales* to 'punish rigorously anyone found *ahead* [emphasis

[1175] Smythe, *Instructions*, p. 140.
[1176] Rich, *Allarme*, sig. L.ii.r.

added] of the vanguard and outside the position that they were ordered'.[1177] Even on the march, most theorists specified the same strict formation discipline.[1178]

More prosaically, warriors were no longer given autonomy over their own weapons, with the duties of a Captain including specifying weapon enrolment, while Sergeants were expected to 'have care that each soldier serves with the weapons that the Captain has ordered, without lacking any piece'.[1179] Some theorists even argued for standardised weapon design, enforced- like weapon cleanliness, a much more common refrain- by draconian discipline.[1180] Others sought to regulate how soldiers carried their weapons; Eguiluz provided detailed instructions on weapon carriage and use, to be taught by officers, while Garrard argued for regulation of weapon carriage not only for practical reasons in formation assembly but as it 'also doth make a gallant shew, and a generall forme of good proportion', a fairly typical appreciation of the visual aesthetics of discipline, drill, and formation.[1181] Even the physical posture of soldiers was regulated: Londoño wanted to reintroduce the standardised 'military pace' from the Roman model and specified how close, and with what hand and arm postures, men should stand at the push of pike.[1182] Garrard regulated distances between men in formation, while Isaba included in his training instructions for officers to 'order them to march with concerted paces, keeping order, readying their pikes, turning their faces with much speed and concert'.[1183]

[1177] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 38r.; Styward, *Martiall Disicpline*, p. 50; Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 38. (*castiguen rigurosamente los que hallaren mas delante de la vanguardia, y fuera del puesto que les huviere señalado*)
[1178] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 14. See also e.g. Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 59.
[1179] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 5v. (*han de tener cuydado, q̄ cada soldado sirua con las armas que el Capitan le huviere señalado, sin faltarle pieça alguna*)
[1180] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 48.
[1181] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 9v., 15v., 26v.-27v.; Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 8.
[1182] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 18r.-v., 7v.
[1183] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, pp. 217-9; Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 90v. (*mandarles a marchar con passos concertados, guardando la ordē, calar las picas, boluer las caras con mucha presteza y concierto*)

Likewise, theorists did not allow soldiers to choose their own place in the squadron. Valdes emphasised that the Sergeant-Major must strictly prohibit men from pushing their way forward to show off their own bravery, as the best thing that 'a good and valorous soldier can do, is to obey, and this is the principal virtue that he must have as his objective from the day he first picks up a pike in war, and if he lacks it, then he has nothing of value, because obedience is the basis and foundation of all good discipline'. Though Valdes argued that men could still show off their bravery without disobeying orders on the battlefield, he added in the margin 'many with vain pretence try to win credit as valorous men'.[1184] Though English treatises generally did not have the same expectation that the soldiers would want to show off their bravery (with this idea of rank-and-file soldiers accruing 'credit' and reputation a distinctly Spanish phenomenon) there was the same focus on obedience over bravery and on unit over individual, as summarised by Garrard's instructions that soldiers are put in their place in the formation by an officer, with 'vaine glorious' jostling for the most dignified position strictly forbidden.[1185]

[1184] Valdes, *Espejo*, pp. 31-2. (*pero en ninguna cosa tanto puede acertar el bueno y valeroso soldado, como en obedecer, y esta es la virtud principal, que ha de tener por objeto el día que uno toma la pica en la guerra, si y esta le falta, ninguna tiene que valga, pues la obediencia es el vassis y fundamēto de toda buena disciplina…muchos cō vanas aparētias pretētē guanar credito de valientes*)
[1185] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 57.

IV. Discipline and Regulation

Regulating the physical posture, movements, and positions of the soldier within the formation, however, was simply the most important part of the multitudinous, varied, and draconian- but not unregulated- disciplinary system that all military theorists saw as underpinning the perfect army. Disciplinary preoccupations were often expressed with the principle that all men under salary, regardless of rank or status, whether or not they had taken an oath of obedience on enlistment, were automatically subject to the army-wide disciplinary standards and complete loss of autonomy: 'he is not now his own man, but the Prince's, who doth give him pay'.[1186] As Valdes explained, soldiers are obliged 'from the day they enter into this profession of *la milicia* to be most obedient to their Captains and officers, doing everything with their licence, no less than friars [obey] their priors', 'especially' *but not exclusively* when 'standing in squadron, or marching in order, or standing on guard'.[1187]

A particularly revealing statement on discipline, salary, and the perfect soldiery is found in the disciplinary regulations of Marcos de Isaba. Complaining both of disobedience and of an excessive number of soldiers pleading for *ventajas* as a reward for praiseworthy service, Isaba ruled that praiseworthy acts such as shooting an enemy, helping dig trenches, and even serving in a forlorn hope should 'come under the ordinary salary' and should be considered duties expected of every soldier, not exceptional behaviour meriting special reward.[1188] Meanwhile, Isaba limited the freedom of action of the soldiery, asking those begging for reward to consider whether

[1186] Barret, *Theorike*, p. 11; see also Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 2r.
[1187] Valdes, *Espejo*, pp. 83-4. (*el día que entran en esta profesión de la milicia, de ser muy obediente à sus Capitanes, y oficiales, haziendo todos sus cosas con licencia de los tales, que los muy recogidos frayeles de serlo à sus priores o guardianes…mayormente estando en esquadron, o caminando en la orden, o estando en la guardia*)
[1188] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 34r. (*basta su sueldo ordinario*)

what they did was under orders or on their own initiative, with the latter deserving punishment, not reward.[1189] Isaba ruled challenging an enemy, attacking an enemy position, or launching a reconnaissance without license (even if successful) as all worthy of punishment. Isaba thus considered personal acts of bravery, as much as cowardice or disorder, as selfishly endangering one's Prince's interests, further proof of the 'submergence of the individual' under an all-encompassing, all-regulating system of discipline and punishment with little place for individual warrior initiative or spirit.[1190]

Also common in expressions of discipline was the sense of dissatisfaction with current practice or of decline and a need for renewal. Londoño's book aimed to *Reduce Military Discipline to a Better and Older State* almost entirely through stricter regulation of the soldiery, as 'if they knew how to obey, to guard order and place, they would know enough to be invincible'.[1191] Though Isaba primarily diagnosed bad promotion and leadership as afflicting the 'sick body of the Spanish infantry', he also discoursed extensively on the lack of 'obedience and discipline'.[1192] Along with poor officership, insufficient discipline was a recurring refrain in dissatisfied military theory, together with a universal distaste for the licentiousness of soldiers and expectation of soldiery depredations unless control was sufficiently enforced, from the assumption that soldiers would smash up their lodgings unless closely supervised to Geoffrey Gates' typical lamentation of soldierly 'wickedness' and spoil, though he saw it as tainting the sacred military profession no more than wicked preachers tainted religious truths.[1193] Valdes famously warned that 'the day a man picks up a pike he renounces his

[1189] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 33v. (*al dia de oy se gratificā y se reciben por seruicio sīēdo dignas de castigo*)
[1190] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fols. 34r.-5r.
[1191] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 42v. (*en sabiendo obedecer, guardar orden y lugar, sabran quanto es necesario para ser inuēcibles*)
[1192] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 39v. (*la obediēncia y diciplina*)
[1193] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 8v.; Gates, *Militarie Profession*, p. 44.

Christianity', but stressed that moral reform, as well as physical regulation of behaviour, was achievable through proper discipline.[1194] Military theorists of both nations thus professedly saw depredation, spoil, and immorality not as sad and inevitable realities of war and the sordid martial life, like the peaceable humanists of the early century, but as fixable problems separable from the positive aspects of the military profession, that could, and should, be addressed in forming the perfect soldiery.[1195]

Though some put more or less emphasis on different perceived problems with the modern undisciplined soldiery, all military theorists engaged with questions of discipline and regulation, all placed enormous weight on the importance of a very tightly disciplined army, and most provided specific model regulations. The most influential regulations in printed military theory were those of Londoño's *Discurso*, listing 70 rules of which 22 carried either automatic or optional execution, while most others were punished at the discretion of the officers.[1196] To take an English example, which likely copied part of Londoño's rules, Thomas Styward's 'Articles, which all soldiers must swear to maintain at all times' included 83 separate statutes (some with multiple individual rules) of which 59 were capital.[1197] Distinctions between the expected characteristics and behaviour of a soldier, and actual disciplinary regulations, were often blurred. Eguiluz dedicated several pages to prescribing the expected actions of a 'perfect' infantryman, almost all of which focused on obedience and regulation, some obviously practical. However, Eguiluz also regulated purely moral concerns such as looting and drinking, as well as proscribing personal behaviour: the *soldado* must

---

[1194] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 84. (*el día q̄ uno toma la pica para ser soldado, ese día, renuncia el ser Christiano*)
[1195] On this humanist distaste for war and chivalric violence, likely significant as an intellectual context for these attempts at moral military reformation, see Rapple, *Martial Power*, p. 29; Kaeuper, *Holy Warriors*, pp. 195-8.
[1196] Londoño, *Discurso*, fols. 32r.-38v.
[1197] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 46-64. cf. Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 36r. and Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 53, Item 21.

never be lazy and should spend his time exercising weapons and doing physical training, he must never be verbally or physically insubordinate with officers or quarrelsome in the ranks, while Eguiluz added that he must be convinced that if he serves properly, with 'good spirit, diligence, and good service', he may aspire to promotion.[1198]

Theorists sought to control the soldiers' behaviour (with the usual prescriptions against striking an officer, looting, or attacking civilians) but also their physical location, always, both in and out of formation or combat conditions. Regulations were particularly strict for dereliction of duty by pickets and sentinels, but leaving the camp without permission was taken almost as seriously. Regulations on a soldier's presence in the camp or with his unit further revealed the focus on the hierarchical chain of command, loss of autonomy, and drive to regulate, in the emphasis placed on written 'licences'. Londoño, typically, ordered soldiers needing to be absent overnight to get written permission specifying destination, reason, and duration of absence.[1199] Spanish theorists extended the *licencia* system to all aspects of military life, Eguiluz ruling that once enrolled in royal salary and having sworn the oath of obedience, a Spanish soldier must never leave his banner at any time nor refuse any order for any reason without written licence from his superior.[1200] English manuals copied this stress on written permission for regulating physical location and behaviour; Styward ruled that a written licence was required for a soldier to go more than two hundred paces from his quarters at any time, on penalty of death.[1201]

[1198] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fols. 2v.-9r., 3v. (*buen animo, diligencia y bien seruir*)
[1199] Londoño, *Discurso*, fols. 33v.-34r.
[1200] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 2r.
[1201] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 57-8.

Similar unspoken anxieties about desertion, as well as corruption in disbursement of salaries, together with the general urge to discipline and regulate, underpinned another restriction on the soldier's freedom: regulating his membership of a unit. Among other tacit anti-corruption measures, Londoño ordered that soldiers required license not only to leave the army but to transfer from one company or *tercio* to another.[1202] English treatises apparently did not care about such regulations, which likely reflected the greater number of companies and Captains to serve in the larger and more permanent Spanish military establishment. Indeed, some English treatises sought to foster *esprit de corps* among the soldiery, such as recommending ceremonies for bestowing and handling the company ensign- and capital punishment for failing to save it or an officer from the enemy.[1203]

As well as limiting freedom to leave the army or change units, Spanish treatises also regulated soldiers' freedom of association in other ways. Interestingly, the *camarada* had now gained quasi-official status in military theory. Londoño included in his regulations the importance of *camaradas* as a 'major part of good soldiering', but echoed Nuñez Alba's anxiety that 'vicious men' would steal from or corrupt their comrades.[1204] Eguiluz saw *camaradas* as a way of keeping the soldier with 'honourable *camaradas* that are *platicos* soldiers, from whom he can learn, and who are of good fame and customs'.[1205] However, Londoño sought to curtail other horizontal ties between soldiers, warning of disorderly 'gangs' and prescribing death for any man who joined one in an army or garrison.[1206] Londoño's ban on 'secret councils or public

---

[1202] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 5r.
[1203] Digges, *Stratioticos*, p. 88; Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 38-9.
[1204] Londoño, *Discurso*, fols. 32v.-33r. (*gran parte de la soldadesca buena consiste en que los soldados tengan camaradas...hōbre vicioso*)
[1205] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 4r. (*camaradas honradas que sean platicos soldados, de quien pueda aprender, y que sean de buena fama y costumbres*)
[1206] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 36v. (*quadrillas*)

groups', a prohibition to which Styward added capital punishment, hinted at the (invariably unspoken) danger of mutiny.[1207]

As well as unofficial association, Spanish treatises were also particularly vocal in suppressing unofficial conflict resolution. Londoño warned of both one-to-one challenges and mob disorder and ruled that the violent settling of 'old grudges', or starting new ones, should be punished by death.[1208] Escalante likewise advised a General enforce a truce on 'all quarrels, disputes, challenges, and injuries' in his army, again on pain of death.[1209] Styward again echoed Londoño's regulations in banning duelling over old or new disputes among soldiers, while the *Myrrour* may have referred to private quarrels, or to broader, more significant disputes or even religious differences, in instructing that 'one man's particular revenge' must not hinder 'the common good': 'therfore for thy countries cause all domesticall factions must be laid aside'.[1210] Eguiluiz complained how grudges 'rule *la milicia*' due to gambling and envy, which must be settled 'without regard to that false, ill-intentioned procedure of duelling'.[1211] Citing his own experiences with Spanish garrisons, he recommended that readers disregard pro-duelling opinions they had read or heard (another important hint that military theorists did not in fact speak for all men of war) and heed the 'good and accurate *contraduelo* of Geronimo de Urrea'.[1212] Eguiluz stressed that any army was 'the territory and preserve of the King', removing the ability to privately settle grudges, and fell back on the chain

[1207] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 35v. (*jūtas secretas ni corrillos publicos*); Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 51.
[1208] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 36v. (*pendencia vieja*)
[1209] Escalante, *Dialogos*, fo. 71r. (*todas las pendencias, questiones, desafios, e injurias*)
[1210] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 58; *Myrrour*, sig. D4r.
[1211] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 81v. (*que en la milicia reyna*), fo. 82r. (*no mirando aquel falso processo mal intencionado del duello*)
[1212] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fols. 82r. (*bueno, acertado cōtraduello hecho por don Geronimo de Urrea*)

of command in resolving disputes, instructing officers to bring the parties together and 'make them make friends'.[1213]

Eguiluz cautioned that officers should punish any soldier who tries to stir the dispute back up by saying that such official settlements were dishonourable, as 'a tongue offends a man more than a blow'.[1214] This was one of several subtle ways in which military treatises of both nations sought to curtail the speech as well as the actions of soldiers. As referenced above, some theorists specified 'silence' as an attribute for the perfect soldier, especially when in formation, both to hear orders and to avoid giving away a unit's position.[1215] Londoño ruled that 'no soldier may speak nor shout in order and squadron' on penalty of being 'shamefully' removed as a 'violator of modesty', and though he wanted his soldiers to be furious in combat, even this was strictly regulated, with the soldiery expected to remain silent and 'execute their just rage with deeds, when, and as, their superiors order them'.[1216]

However, Londoño also sought to regulate very different forms of soldierly speech in ordering 'death without a hearing' for anyone 'saying scandalous words' or fixing posters inciting mutiny and advising all officers to collect handwriting samples from their recruits to prosecute mutinous writing.[1217] Londoño's oath for recruits specified that as well as obeying all officers, they must do so 'without reply, or any contradiction', and Isaba advised Captains to make the soldiers understand that their duties 'must be carried out without demand nor response'- and that as the Captain 'is

---

[1213] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 82r. (*al Rey que todos los dichos lugares sō vedados, y cotos suyos*), 83r. (*donde los ha de hazer amigos*)
[1214] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 84r.-v. (*la lengua ofende un hombre a otro mas que con bofeton*)
[1215] Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, pp. 59-60.
[1216] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 38v. (*ningun soldado grite ni hable en la ordē y esquadron...so pena de ser sacado de la hilera vergonçamente…por violador de la modestia*), 40r. (*executar sus justas iras con obras, donde, y como los superiores les ordenaren*)
[1217] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 35v. (*hiziere o fixare carteles, o dixere palabras escandalosas...muera por ello sin ser oydo*)

supreme over them, and all the officers are his creatures', when given orders 'they must not talk back nor show evil face'.[1218] Though they invariably remained silent on the specific Spanish issue of endemic, quasi-institutionalised mutiny, these strong Spanish concerns of soldierly obedience are, like the more explicit English anxieties about low-quality recruits, an example of visions of military perfection being coloured by national military context.

As well as regulating the physical location and behaviour of soldiers, military theorists of both nations devoted lesser but still considerable attention to their moral behaviour. Rich's oath for soldiers that 'I will not doo anythinge unworthy the sacred and holy wars…I will not make my countrey to be in worse case than it is' reflected the particularly English anxiety of soldierly licentiousness as well a subtle but universal drive to regulate the moral and spiritual lives of soldiers.[1219] Thus, Thomas Proctor argued against recruiting someone 'idle, unrulie, blasphemous, or licentious', 'a ryotous dyceplayer… more meete for an alehouse then an army' while Smythe's criticisms of English officers in the Low Countries associated their alleged incompetence and corruption, and the militarily dissatisfactory nature of the wars themselves, with 'quaffings and carowsings…offending of God in the highest degree'.[1220] Spanish theorists envisaged their ideal army as morally and spiritually as well as militarily perfect, Eguiluz expecting officers to prevent adultery or dice playing 'so they seem a congregation of honourable men'.[1221]

[1218] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 2r. (*sin replica, ni contradicion alguna*); Isaba, *Cuerpo,* fo. 89v. (*las guardias, escoltas, centinelas, y seruicios y trabajos que son ellos los que los hā de hacer, y executar, sin demandas ni respuestas. Entenderan del Capitan como supremo de ellos, q̄ todos los oficiales son su hechura…no se les ha de replicar ni mostrar mala cara*)
[1219] Rich, *Path-way*, sig. G3r.-v.
[1220] Proctor, *Knowledge and Conducte*, fo. 18v.; Smythe, *Discourses*, sig. A2r.-v.
[1221] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 125r. (*parezca una congregacion y ayuntamiento de muchos hombres honrados*)

Most superficially moral regulations also had practical purposes for military operations or organisation; hence, robbing provisioners or despoiling the civilian population would make supply more difficult or turn civilian populations against an army, while, as many theorists explained, gambling debts and grudges could destroy unit coherence. However, some moral or spiritual regulation was taken very seriously in its own right. Cristobal Lechuga advised that a *Maestre de Campo General* should 'demonstrate his authority' by punishing 'severe' malefactors in the ranks, meaning 'the renegades and blasphemers…and those that cheat in gambling' as well as 'those who disobey the authority of a superior officer'.[1222] Some regulations of soldierly behaviour against damaging religious property or harming women, the old, or clergy, clearly drew on chivalric traditions of pure Christian warriors protecting the 'weak and afflicted'.[1223] As with the Captain General's requirements, many theorists headed their regulations and requirements for soldiers with moral and religious precepts, Rich instructing that 'the first thinge…that is to be respected in a souldiour is the honesty of his minde' and 'religion'.[1224] Londoño and Styward both featured blasphemy as their second regulation (after prescribing oaths of obedience), the latter mandating the death penalty, while Londoño threatened galley service.[1225] This is arguably a particularly extreme example of military theory being divorced from reality.

Moral and spiritual, as well as practical concerns, likewise influenced another occasional theme in military regulations, consensual relationships with women. Spanish sources displayed the same moral distaste for female relations (as well as a practical anxiety of fights in the ranks over women) as for blasphemy and gambling but

---

[1222] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 51. (*a demonstrar su autoridad…seueros…ha de ser en los renegadores y blasfemos…y en los que hizieren engaño en el juego…inobedientes, usando de acto contra auctoridad de official mayor*)
[1223] e.g. Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 33r. (*amparar los flacos y afligidos*)
[1224] Rich, *Allarme*, sig. L.ii.r.; Rich, *Path-way*, sig. G3r.-v.
[1225] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 32r.; Styward, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 48.

occasionally noted the impossibility of a celibate soldiery. Lechuga ruled that the *Maestre de Campo General* must 'have the same care with public adulterers' as with other severe rule-breakers and 'reduce', i.e. not completely ban 'the superfluity of public women' and echoed the English dichotomy between masculine and feminine devotions in warning that if 'public women' are not reduced, 'he will see his soldiers fighting more with Venus than with Mars'.[1226] Three-and-a-half decades earlier, Sancho de Londoño had recommended reluctantly that there be eight prostitutes per 100-man company, who must be inspected for venereal disease. Significantly, Londoño felt the need to justify this requirement as necessary 'among free, robust men who in towns would offend the inhabitants, taking their wives, daughters, and sisters, and in the field it would be more dangerous not to have them'.[1227] Martin de Eguiluz followed this theme but also insisted that such women be referred to euphemistically as 'washerwomen' and be strictly common, and that adultery would be otherwise banned, as 'the soldiers must have some liberty, but without scandal'.[1228] English sources did not countenance legitimate prostitution, mandating blanket bans on all adulterous female contact, 'upone pain to be punished as a vile person, or a vagabond, and never to be accounted a souldiour in any service'.[1229] This contrast may reflect different national religious contexts in a period of moral as well as religious reformation and counter-reformation, or, more prosaically, the greater permanence of Spanish infantry units requiring such arrangements.

[1226] Lechuga, *Discurso*, p. 51. (*Teniendo el mismo cuydado en los amancebados públicos, quitando la superfluidad de mujeres publicas, porque al que no lo tuviere en esto aseguro vendrà a ver sus soldados pelear cō Venus, tanto y mas que con Marte*)
[1227] Londoño, *Discurso*, fols. 16v.-17r. (*entre hombres libres rubustos, que en los pueblos ofenderian a los moradoes, procurando sus mugeres, hijas, y hermanas, y en campaña seria mas peligroso no tenerlas*)
[1228] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 16r. (*que sean generales, lauanderas…esfuerça tengan los soldados alguna libertad, pero sea sin escandalo*)
[1229] Clayton, *Martiall Discipline*, p. 35.

It is important to stress that though military theorists overwhelmingly regarded the perfect common soldiery as an anonymous, de-individualised and tightly controlled mass both on and off the battlefield, they envisaged not the unilateral brutalisation and control of the soldiers, but mutual obedience and respect between soldiers and officers in an idealised military community. Valdes stressed that outside combat, 'the officers have no less obligation to be humble, and good servants of the soldiers (*servatis servantis*) than the soldiers have to be with them', and 'love and treat all the soldiers under their protection and governance like their sons'.[1230] As referenced above, disciplinary regulations in the treatises, though draconian, strictly limited the authority and power of junior officers, and expected them to exercise positive as well as negative control of soldierly behaviour: 'intreat thy souldiers with all kindnes, except some necessarie cause provoke thee to severitie'.[1231]

Eguiluz instructed that Sergeants should beware disobedience or dereliction and be 'feared and respected' but also loved, as a soldier will love his officers for looking after him as a '*buen compañero*', teaching him military skills and speaking to him respectfully.[1232] Apart from the usually tacit but repeatedly hinted fear of mutiny in Spanish military theory, the Spanish focus on speaking respectfully to soldiers may, like the ban on duels and private grudges, reflect a far stronger culture of honour and self-appraisal among the *tercio* common soldiery. As Londoño put it, with mixed approval, 'Spaniards love honour more than life, and fear death less than infamy', clearly not a concern in the conscripted Elizabethan bands, whose faceless rank-and-file exist in English military writing only as recidivists to be punished, impressionable souls to be

[1230] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 84. (*no menos obligaciō tienen los officiales a ser humildes, y biē criados cō los soldados (seruatis seruādis*) *que los soldados de serlo con ellos*)
[1231] *Myrrour*, sig. C2.
[1232] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 10r. (*temer y respetar, y q̄ los soldados le amē, y aūque parece que ay grā cōtrariedad*)

kept from vice, or anonymous weapons to be trained, drilled, and controlled.[1233] Such concerns to avoid inflaming the honour of soldiers may also have motivated Isaba to warn that if a Captain cannot promote a *cabo* to the vacant position of Sergeant as the man lacks the necessary 'solicitude and understanding', the Captain must first meet with him in private and explain respectfully to him that 'on that occasion, he cannot be promoted' before telling the rest of the company that he had not been promoted due to illness or another 'honourable defect'.[1234] No such concern appears in English treatises.

The importance of proper reward for praiseworthy military service, never far from the minds of sixteenth-century military writers, was extended to the rank and file and was an important component of the 'perfect soldiery'. The model of Roman martial perfection was invoked to this end, as much as higher-minded principles of discipline and training.[1235] However, like punishment, rewarding soldiers was seen as another means of controlling their behaviour. William Garrard wanted soldiers to memorise their disciplinary regulations to understand 'what they ought to shun for feare of punishment, and what to imbrace to increase credite'.[1236] Spanish sources were particularly vocal on the importance of material or immaterial reward. Londoño instructed that 'they must also hope to be advantaged in pay and honour, and those that serve well should be placed in charge…and likewise must expect to be severely punished for any disorder'.[1237] Requirements and regulations for the perfect soldier thus focused on obedience and loyalty and shunned personal, individual bravery: 'known as

[1233] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 42v. (*Son Españoles que aman mas la honra que la vida, y temen menos la muerte que la infamia*)
[1234] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 79r.-v. (*solicitud y entendimiento, o otro defecto…no poder en aquella ocasion subirle en aquel grado…defecto honroso*)
[1235] e.g. Rich, *Allarme*, sig. B.iii.r.
[1236] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, p. 22.
[1237] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 2r. (*deuen tener también esperança de ser auentajados en sueldo, honrados y puestos en cargos los que bien siruieren…y assi mismo certeza de ser seueramente castigados por cualquier desorden*)

obedient', 'does nothing without licence from his officers', 'takes good care of his weapons', 'very diligent in the service of his King', 'serves in his company for a long time and does not switch without a very good reason, and licence', 'goes to the place he was told armed with the weapons with which he serves' and 'begs his officers to choose him for opportunities of service'.[1238]

Ultimately, the relationship between the soldiery and the officer hierarchy in the ideal army, as well as the ethics of professionalism and command, was aptly summarised by how theorists envisaged the crucial new rank of Sergeant-Major, the 'principal minister and officer of war'.[1239] As Valdes summarised, the Sergeant-Major was 'Minister General of an entire *tercio*', transmitting and enacting the *maestre de campo'*s orders via his Sergeants for 'marching, lodging and fighting', though not for the other pillar of military organisation, the logistical 'apparatus of war'.[1240] Valdes saw the rank as epitomising the officer hierarchy, citing 'men of good judgement and *platicos* in this profession' in claiming 'that he who perfectly understands that charge and office can easily come to understand what is needed for the rest'.[1241] As such, requirements to be sought in candidates for the rank were a particularly ambitious evocation of the matrix of professional officership. Typically, Londoño combined experience with mental acuity, wanting men of 'greatest diligence, intelligence, and experience, account and reason', to which Eguiluz added being '*cursado*' through the

---

[1238] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, fo. 94r.-v. (*conocido por obediēte…no ha hecho cosa sin licencia de sus oficiales…tener gran cuidado de sus armas…hōbre curioso en el seruicio de su Rey…sirue en una compañía mucho tiempo: y que no haze mudança sin muy justa ocasion y licencia…va en el lugar y puesto que le han señalado armado con las armas que sirue…trabajos y casos que se ofrecen…ruega y suplica a sus oficiales le empleen en ellos*)
[1239] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 11. (*principal ministro y Official de guerra*)
[1240] Valdes, *Espejo*, pp. 9-10. (*ministro general de todo un tercio...en el marchar, alojar y pelear*), 17 (*el apparato de guerra*)
[1241] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 8. (*hōbres de buenos juycios, y en esta profession platicos...que el que perfectamente entiendere este cargo y officio, que facilmēte vendra en conocimento de lo que se requiere para los demas officios*)

lower officer ranks, well-reputed, and promoted by merit.[1242] Thomas Digges, the most vocal English commentor on the Sergeant-Major, likewise wanted him to be an outstanding 'man of great courage, and well experienced', of 'lively spirit and quicke invention', able to provide expert tactical advice to his superiors in battle.[1243]

The primary purpose of the rank's paramount significance was the all-important setting of perfect infantry formations of 'disciplined and *platico* soldiers', 'good order and perfection of the squadrons, in which consists all the force of the army'.[1244] Characteristically, and with a clear mental picture of soldiers as anonymous units rather than individual warriors, Digges summarised that he must receive orders from the senior officers then 'presently sort everie kinde of weapon…then draw them foorthe in hearses or sleeves', forming a pike square with 'wings of shotte on eyther side', like 'the flanckers in fortification'- a revealing, and typical, combination of one aspect of early-century technical change, the bastion fort, with another, gunpowder infantry tactics- with even Captains appointed to their place by the Sergeant-Major's judgement. Significantly, Digges emphasised that the Sergeant-Major should form a regiment into one large formation 'if the soldiers be rawe and untrayned' but use multiple, mutually supporting formations 'if the souldiers be trained'. Transforming the soldiery from the former state to the latter through drill was another key responsibility of the new rank. Again, Digges' own summary of the Sergeant-Major's training duties 'in time of rest' powerfully evoked the submergence of the individual into disciplined formations:

> …put them in sundrie sortes of standing and marching battels…to march forwarde swiftly or slowly according to the stroke of the drumme, to stay and retire in perfite measure…when they can perfectly doe this, then cause them suddaynely to make any flanke a front, or turn entirely togither, as it wer one

[1242] Londoño, *Discurso*, fo. 13v. (*deuen ser hombres de gran diligencia, inteligēcia y esperiencia, cuenta y razon*); Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 21r.-v.
[1243] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 101-2.
[1244] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 14. (*buena orden y perfection del squadron, en el qual consiste toda la fuerça del exercito…soldados tambien disciplinados y platicos*)

> body, without breaking their array. And when they can do this, albeit they never saw the enemie in the face, yet may they be tearmed Trained Souldiers.[1245]

As Eltis summarises, the Sergeant-Major was the 'coping-stone' of the new hierarchy of specialist professional officers from Corporal to Colonel, expressly novel even in the most classicising military texts, and owed his existence to 'the fresh tactical world of the sixteenth century', regulated pike-and-shot infantry formations.[1246] But less prominent, 'non-combat' aspects of the duties of the ideal Sergeant-Major also evoked the new stress on discipline and regulation of every aspect of the life of the soldiers. Valdes envisaged him strictly regulating daily life in the camp as well as the layout and the setting of guards, preventing gambling and quarrelling, and carrying a baton to 'break over the heads of disobedient soldiers'.[1247] However, Valdes stressed that the Sergeant-Major should not rule exclusively by such means, but should also be 'the universal procurer of good of the soldiers', ensuring they have equipment and medical care, and asking the senior ranks on their behalf for their overdue pay – something from which the soldiers in Valdes' own *tercio* who, three years later, mutinied and threatened him at gunpoint would likely have taken small comfort.[1248] Yet almost as much as in the strict enforcement of disciplinary regulations or the assembling of de-individualised soldiers into anonymous columns and sleeves, there is the overriding sense of the perfect soldiery as without agency or independence. Valdes saw the perfect Sergeant-Major as a 'father to all the soldiers of his *tercio*', but he would also strictly punish blasphemy and swearing as well as adulterers and thieves, 'persecuting and banishing all public sin': 'the Sergeant-Major's office is not only to be master of all good military discipline, and universal procurer of all the bodily necessities of the soldiers, but he has

[1245] Digges, *Stratioticos*, pp. 102-3.
[1246] Eltis, *Military Revolution*, pp. 54-8.
[1247] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 51, 77, 63-4. (*rōperla en la cabeça del soldado inobediente*)
[1248] Valdes, *Espejo*, p. 59. (*universal procurador del bien de los soldados*); Fagel, *Protagonists*, pp. 320-8.

no less obligation to the good of their souls'.[1249] Twenty years later, Martin de Eguiluz extended this even to their emotional and alimentary state: describing the duties of a Sergeant-Major in garrison, he declared that the soldiers should hold him in such great 'fear and respect' that 'on a day when they see him looking somewhat cheerful, they will be so happy that their food will taste better'.[1250] At least in this respect, it would be difficult to imagine a picture of the ideal warrior culture further removed from the proud, headstrong knights of the chivalric past.

[1249] Valdes, *Espejo*, pp. 84-5. (*padre general de todos los soldados de su tercio...al Sargento mayor no solo le toca, y es su officio, ser general Maestro de todas las necessidades corporales de los soldados, pero que no menos obligacion tiene, serlo del biē de sus animas, persiguiēdo y desterrādo todo peccado publico*)
[1250] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 23v. (*la tendran tanto respeto y temor los soldados, que el dia que le vieren algo alegre el rostro, estaran muy contentos y les sabra bien la comida*)

Conclusion to Part II

By the end of the century, a considerable number of Spanish and English officers had elaborated in great detail their ideal of military perfection- tacitly, in their campaign narratives and panegyrics to outstanding commanders, and explicitly, in their two rich national bodies of original military theory. As Chapter 4 has shown, the authors of these treatises were most often professional soldiers writing serious treatises on the modern art of war, in active engagement with their national military public spheres. Soldier-writers also revealed vertical links of patronage and public status in their dedications and personal links with key figureheads in their national military cultures, who themselves participated actively in military reform culture, and horizontal martial links with their concerns for reputation, and praising outstanding contemporaries with new as well as traditional martial values. Only in the Spanish case would this be extended to the soldiery with their 'gunpowder epic' culture; the rank-and-file of the Elizabethan bands are invariably voiceless and faceless, which speaks volumes about the differences in culture and mentality as well as organisation between England's pressed 'bands' and Spain's *tercios.*

Chapter 5 has shown that though personal bravery and martial attributes still dominated warrior identities, religious and national ideologies were also important in how soldier-writers fashioned themselves and others. Confessional themes were important but muted compared to other preoccupations; though English writers were more vocally confessional- with their powerful link between patriotism, confessional identity, military reform, and defence of the country or the broader Protestant cause- it was Spanish writers who occasionally incorporated piety into their warrior matrix of honour. Meanwhile, both national groups were aware of, but increasingly discounted the 'noble-martial link', while ignoring or rejecting the chivalric ethos. Both Spaniards

and Englishmen were also willing to soberly identify occasions and ways in which their countrymen fell short of proper military standards.

Exploring precisely what constituted this military perfection was the focus of Chapters 6 and 7. Both nations were strikingly homogeneous in their idea of practical, objective-driven warfare based on 'reason', expressed in the growing distaste for ostentatious bravery or seeking battle itself, and in the new culture of joining 'prudence' with 'valour' for the ideal officer. This practicality also underlay the surprising willingness of both national bodies to put their undeniable respect for ancient military wisdom aside and emphasise military modernity. Their understanding of the perfect Captain General, though still including personal piety and moral themes, increasingly stressed professional skill and technical knowledge. For junior officers, military theorists were even more focused on exogenous knowledge rather than inner warrior characteristics, with the ideal officer 'initiated' through study and experience. Both nations lamented the actual mechanisms of promotion, so different to their meritocratic picture of the perfect officer corps, which like other complaints of real-life incompetence, and their dedications and discourses of loyalty, reflected the authors' own career aspirations and frustrations.

Just as military theorists formulated their precise qualifications and requirements for each rank, they also explained the specific duties and expectations of different officers and specialists, envisaging the perfect army as a harmonious military ecosystem with 'camp' life wholly supervised and regulated. Both nations continued to acknowledge the existence of 'uncommon' soldiers who had no command but, by class status or praiseworthy service, were distinct in treatment and independence from the rank-and-file, though theorists still sought to formalise their role. Otherwise, the perfect soldiery were homogeneous and anonymous, whose primary trait was not bravery but

obedience, and who were reduced- though it is important to stress again that this was in *theory*, not reality- to unthinking pikes or arquebuses in the ranks of formation diagrams. This was accompanied by a growing drive to control their behaviour both on and off the battlefield through draconian disciplinary precepts, perhaps influenced by contemporary preoccupations of moral reformation but stemming ultimately from military contexts, the perceived need to deploy perfect pike-and-shot formations, as well as a broader practical anxiety of soldierly disorder. This underlines how a cultural revolution in martial culture, the new fixation on discipline, was downstream ultimately of a technical revolution, the infantry techniques developed and refined in the period of the Italian Wars. The perfect officer and the perfect soldier were thus two distinct archetypes on which all military theorists studied here would have agreed; one defined by professional skill and meritocratic promotion, the other by unthinking obedience and strictly controlled violence, though both were influenced by the same ideals of loyalty and steadfast service, both were coloured by the rejection of individualistic knightly bravery, and both stemmed ultimately from the new culture of rational, practical 'reason' of war.

CONCLUSION

In 1598, two self-styled Captains met on the road to London, each on his way to the wars. ‘Captain Skill’ introduced himself as a veteran professional soldier, having served and commanded in France and the Low Countries. His new companion, ‘Captain Pill’, proudly introduced himself too as a professor of arms, which Pill saw in no way diminished by the fact that the closest he had ever come to a real campaign was commanding militiamen on Finsbury Fields.

The differences continued: Pill thought that his lack of experience meant little since he had learnt the art of war from military books and from table talk in London, and in any case, that experience in the disorderly, undisciplined wars of the present was largely useless and that war itself had hardly changed since antiquity. Skill, however, understood that war, like any science, required both study and practical experience, and like all arts, required constant innovation with new techniques, tactics, and weapons-above all, gunpowder, the importance of which Pill dismissed. Pill was riding to London only to seek a Captaincy, while Skill wanted simply to serve his Prince, and warned Pill that a soldier must gain experience in the ranks before seeking command. Pill believed that a company command was an opportunity to make money, and that a Captain was distinguished by his flashy clothing and his eagerness to stab anyone who insulted his touchy honour; Skill abhorred such corruption, disregarded such ostentation, and considered aggressive valour, whether on or off the battlefield, as dangerous and requiring moderation with reason, skill at command, and loyalty to one’s Crown and country. Six years later, the two men met up again, and the abashed Captain Pill explained that having since acquired real military experience, he now understood

his former ignorance, though the two men- albeit in a much more polite tone- soon launched into another discussion of war and of military perfection.[1251]

These men were fictional, but were creations of a real soldier, Captain Barnaby Rich, who, like a surprising number of his contemporary warriors, put pen to paper to elaborate his thoughts on the art of war. Rich's 'Pill' and 'Skill' were unusually clear-cut and explicit, but in fact quite typical portrayals of military perfection. With the contrast between these two soldiers, Rich assembled the matrix of honour of the perfect captain, with 'Skill' combining modesty in his own bravery and his ambitions with an understanding of reason and policy, believing that commands must be earned and carried out with rational military expertise, gained by both study and experience. Together with these new professional attributes, expressed in the language of skill, reason, and discipline, there was a new focus on ideological loyalty and identity, with Rich's ideal captain stressing that he fought only for royal, national, and religious loyalty. Finally, both in his portrayal of the characters, and in his writing of his books in the first place, the author reflected another important theme of sixteenth-century martial culture: the drive to discuss, debate, and instruct in military practice.

The comparative structure of this project has allowed the distinct national characteristics and contexts of, and, more importantly, the many similarities between, Spanish and English martial values to be identified more clearly. The texts studied in Chapter 1 revealed the continued vibrancy of the noble-martial link at the beginning of the century, both in viewing war as an inherently noble pursuit, and in that war imparted nobility or honour- the chivalric ethos. It is striking how far the English had a greater focus on loyalty to the crown, while Spanish texts were much more focused on showing

[1251] Rich, *Martial Conference*, and *Idem.*, *The Fruites of Long Experience* (London, 1604).

off personal prowess in a way that, ironically, fits Trim's model of ostentatious masculinity and manhood particularly well. The chivalric nature of the Spanish texts became particularly clear when the two warrior memoirs from Chapter 1 were compared to the texts in Chapter 2, revealing a revolution in martial culture with the removal of the author himself from the narrative and the new collective, idealised identity of the Spanish military community, extending to common soldiers. Also significant was the new stress on national, imperial, and even confessional identities. The scarcity of English sources for the first half of the period mostly precludes study of the same themes- which in any case, were likely products of the uniquely Spanish experience of a quasi-permanent, socially heterogeneous, and unquestionably elite infantry force. However, some Henrician writing hinted at new military cultures and identities in extending martial patriotism outside the traditional martial classes. As Chapter 3 has found, the emerging stress on military skill, rational command, and professional or veteran status and reputation, is visible both in Spanish and 'English' texts, with the exceptional Welsh soldier-writer in Tudor service, Elis Gruffudd, hinting at many of the same preoccupations as his Spanish counterparts. The two embryonic national cultures of dedicated military theory broadly agreed on how armies and commanders should function, albeit with greater English stress on correct infantry formation and basic discipline, again reflecting their lack of an institutional infantry culture as well as perceived gaps between English and continental practice. These themes would be reinforced and multiplied in the later century, but emerged in, and fundamentally responded to, the technological crucible of the pre-1559 period.

After 1567, as Chapter 4 has shown, it is possible to identify the solidification and growth of both national 'military public spheres', most obviously in their startlingly vibrant cultures of military printing, which in both cases, albeit especially the Spanish,

included some very well-regarded members of their national military communities. Both nations also developed professional communities of patronage and loyalty between officers and their great commanders, and between and among fellow soldiers (in the Spanish case) and officers (in both). Though this is less visible in the English case, reflecting the smaller, more disparate nature of the English military community and shortage of English military memoirs, the same vertical and horizontal ties of loyalty, commemoration, and professional community were equally important to the Elizabethan soldier-writers examined.

As studied in Chapter 5, soldier-writers of both nations engaged with the idea of warfare and military service as inherently virtuous and honourable but did so increasingly in terms of selfless sacrifice to crown, confession, and country, especially in the English case, reflecting the growing imperatives of national defence and perceived decline in English military engagement in the 1570s. Meanwhile, though the noble-martial link remained present, and was likely a tacit assumption for all warriors in the period, Spanish soldier-writers were particularly vocal in dismissing knightly motifs and the chivalric ethos, while both nations rejected birth as an automatic qualification for command. This, and the surprising willingness of soldier-writers to criticise the military shortcomings of their countrymen, reflected ultimately their growing focus on military perfection.

As the final two chapters have demonstrated, it is striking both how vocally military theorists of both nations elaborated their ideals of military perfection, and how far they agreed. This underlines the point that as much as national identities and ideologies coloured military writing, or individual writers were influenced by their personal preoccupations and politico-military aspirations, sixteenth-century military theory shared a dream of military perfection, ultimately stemming from the

revolutionary technical changes in gunpowder-, infantry-, and fortification-dominant warfare. The matrix of honour of the ideal officer was founded on rational, mission-directed warfare, and combined the strands of study and experience of war with innovation, policy and skill, and religious and national loyalty. Theorists envisaged such men as being part of the perfect army, a regulated, strictly hierarchical micro-society, in which the values of the ideal common soldier disregarded individual warrior spirit and even bravery itself, instead basing soldierly perfection on absolute obedience and moral and disciplinary purity. To both Spanish and English writers, warfare had- in theory, as a form of 'perfected reality'- truly become a 'science'.

With these conclusions in mind, it is worth returning to some of the historiographical ideas touched upon in the introduction. On the question of martial culture and identity, the evidence clearly supports Hale's idea of a professional 'freemasonry' of experts. In answer to Trim's question as to the dichotomous nature of chivalry and professionalism, the sources examined did indeed see the knight and the professional soldier as separate categories. Personal bravery and prowess unquestionably still mattered in the martial matrix of honour, and some aspects of the traditional knightly ethos survived in the moral prescriptions for Christian warriors. However, the assault on the links between birth, command, and military honour; the drive to subordinate personal bravery and to de-individualise warriors; and the stratification of the ideal army by new, purely military ranks rather than personal or hereditary status all undermined the deepest foundations of knightly culture. Accordingly, we may also conclude that Mervyn James' classic picture of shifting honour culture, from individualist, aristocratic, masculine prowess to a focus on state authority and humanist education is broadly appropriate for understanding the soldier-writers of the sixteenth century. This is the case in their new culture of study and

learning about war, as well as more obviously in the new stress on patriotism, authority, discipline, and hierarchy as crucial martial values, while their ideas of what made a military man worthy of an honourable reputation expanded beyond, though did not discard, personal prowess.

Though changing ideas of military perfection, the new scientific stress on technically proficient command, and the submergence of the individual have been the primary foci of this thesis, it has also found several other key overarching themes in the martial culture of sixteenth-century warriors, which merit brief treatment. Perhaps the most obvious, but nonetheless worth reiterating, is that of physical bravery. Though it is a central contention of this project that in the matrix of honour of the ideal warrior, bravery was often sidelined by new ideas of command perfection, discipline, and loyalty- and as examined in Chapters 6 and 7, a considerable body of military treatises were surprisingly lukewarm about bravery- it is very important not to overstate the declining significance of courage in military identities. The ideal soldier or officer was first and foremost a brave warrior, and this is most obviously visible in how brave deeds, albeit with varying emphasis and focus, remained the foundational substance of military memoirs and chronicles. Harari's argument that military memoirists wrote primarily to commemorate 'worthy and chivalric events' considered '*digna memoria*' in the warrior mentalities of the period requires the crucial alteration that those things considered to merit commemoration *expanded* over the century. They transcended traditional, personal bravery to encompass skilled officership, model generalship, accurate depictions of campaigns and battles, and the collective loyalty, as well as the individual deeds, of one's countrymen. Harari's automatic equation between noble and military identity also requires revision. Nonetheless, he is correct that Renaissance military memoirs should be understood primarily through their desire to record

outstanding actions of individual warriors, according to the value system of the time- and, despite all the new themes and values described above, personal bravery remained crucial in determining an anecdote worthy of inclusion.

Spanish and English memoirs in both parts of the thesis recorded hundreds of examples of outstanding bravery, which in the rich Spanish sources extended to common soldiers as well as noble volunteers, officers, and *Gran Capitanes.* Harari makes the identification that the 'particular obsession with names' in recording soldierly deeds is distinctive to *non-noble* writers, citing Díaz, and he could equally have named Cerezeda. Even in describing the deeds of great commanders, there was a clear requirement to combine references to skilled generalship or knowledge in the art of war with reminders that men like Alba and Leicester risked their own lives in battle. Thus, Alba has been treated here as a 'modern', progressive commander, but in his reputation among Spanish soldiers, his military reforms and Fabian strategy coexisted with his renown for going without armour 'like a very foolhardy soldier, and not a General', or wearing a distinctive blue outfit to stand out in battle.[1252] Likewise, Roger Williams, examined here for his stress on skilled professional officership and meritocratic promotion, was known to run up and down under fire with a conspicuous plumed helmet, and was heard to say before a cavalry attack that 'it is far more honourable' to charge than retreat; the latter anecdote is cited by Trim to show the importance of bravery, and specifically of gratuitous recklessness, in the masculine identities of Elizabethan gentleman warriors.[1253] Criticisms of bravery in military theory were massively important in that they sought to replace such ostentatious recklessness with a safer, more scientific form of warfare, and as such represent a genuine paradigm shift in

[1252] Mendoza, *Comentarios*, fo. 154r. (*soldados muy arriscados, que no Generales*); Eguiluz, *Milicia*, fo. 68r.
[1253] Trim, 'Martial Conduct and Masculine Identity', pp. 47-8.

ideas of military perfection, but they clearly still took personal bravery for granted in constructing the ideal officer. In this period, as perhaps in any period, the matrix of honour of the ideal warrior was constructed first on personal bravery, and all more complex or refined ideas of skill, knowledge, command, and professional status were woven around this core of martial culture.

Together and in connection with bravery and courage, the themes of manhood and masculinity remained important, though usually tacitly so, in martial culture over the period. Most sources examined did not explicitly engage with masculine identity, references to 'manly' deeds notwithstanding, and even this was far less common in Spanish texts. However, the significance of masculine identity is demonstrated by the direct engagement with, and discussion of, gender and military identity in many Elizabethan texts on war and martial honour, especially among the generation of soldier-writers of the 1570s who advocated greater martial participation, and regard for war as honourable, among Englishmen. This was reflected in their explicit elision between masculine strength and military identity, and in their condemnation of unwarlike life as a soft, feminine 'other'.

Yet beyond explicit discussions of gender identity and manhood, all soldier-writers, with their constant drive to record praiseworthy military behaviour, provide rich material to support Trim's argument that 'physical actions' in war represented 'the conceptualisation and personification of masculinity'. Trim's summary of the types of behaviour by which men at war were impelled to prove their manhood- '*élan*, skill at arms, courage and *sang froid*'- describes most of the outstanding deeds at arms recorded in sixteenth-century soldier egodocuments. Indeed, it fits the anecdotes recorded in Spanish soldier-memoirs especially well. This, in turn, chimes with how Elizabethan authors were less sure of their own martial identity or of the acceptability of violence, so

felt the need to discuss and defend the masculine profession of arms in explicit terms. In contrast, Spanish soldier-writers, who throughout this thesis have appeared much surer of their own military identities and honour, simply took the manliness and prestige of war for granted and focused on recording instances where their peers lived up to the ideals of the Spanish *soldado.*

Meanwhile, the continued importance of masculine deeds of bravery, and the interaction between physical combat, danger, and strenuous prowess likely underpinned the sense throughout the sources that war itself was inherently superior to any other occupation- 'O, sole noble state worthy of man!', as Captain Francisco de Aldana, another soldier-poet of the Army of Flanders, trumpeted at the end of his sonnet describing a gory push of pike.[1254] Indeed, though bravery was increasingly coexisting with or even being replaced by a new focus on proper, scientific military practice, new ideas of disciplined, reasoned martial perfection in Spanish and English treatises may themselves have owed something to conceptions of manhood and gender roles. Alexandra Shepard's description of how early modern English conduct literature defined manhood 'in broadly patriarchal terms of discretion, reason, moderation, self-sufficiency, strength, self-control, and honest respectability' has much in common with how military theorists of both nations envisaged the ideal disciplined soldiery and the perfect army.[1255]

Moreover, if the sources are viewed through the lens of gender history more broadly, more interesting than soldiers caring about appearing 'manly' is the startling *absence* of women. Even though 'women were clearly present and played valuable roles

[1254] Quoted in Arthur Terry, 'War and Literature in Sixteenth-Century Spain', in Mulryne and Shewring, *War, Literature and the Arts*, pp. 112-3.
[1255] Alexandra Shepard, *Meanings of Manhood in Early Modern England* (Oxford, 2003), p. 9.

in the campaign community', women are almost completely excluded from the memoirs examined above.[1256] The absence of women is perhaps connected with another startling absence in the memoirs studied, that of plunder and the sack. Hence, though brutal sacks of Italian towns were an important part of the Spanish infantry experience, Cerezeda's *Tratado* almost completely ignores hostile contact with Italian civilians, and barely mentions a single woman.[1257] Most egregiously, Cerezeda's description of the sack of Rome related the Spanish infantry's bravery in capturing the walls, listed the names of clergymen captured, and admitted the sack of churches, but finished 'I do not wish to give other details lest I be accused of prolixity'.[1258] As with the drive to record physical bravery, it is likely that the exclusion of women from military memoirs again reflected the desire to record only things 'worthy of memory'. Yet it is also likely that the exclusion of women of any kind from military memoirs was more than a lack of interest- it was about preserving the positive, even idealised or sanitised depiction of soldier-writers' peers as morally pure as well as militarily perfect. In this context, Cerezeda's exclusion of female contact or plundered towns fits with his sidelining of mutiny, his biased battle narratives, and his omission of Spanish military failures, as necessary corollaries to his construction of the Spanish infantry as paragons of martial virtue, morally pure and politically loyal as well as militarily perfect.

In this crucial issue of military perfection, the exclusion of women from military writing becomes especially clear when treatises and handbooks, as well as memoirs, are considered. Despite purporting to offer detailed military curricula, and discussing some logistical matters, military theorists almost entirely ignored the presence of women as camp followers, peripheral participants, or victims of war. Exceptions to this were the

---

[1256] John A. Lynn, *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2008), p. 230.
[1257] Sherer, *Warriors for a Living*, pp. 144-74.
[1258] Cerezeda, *Tratado*, I.179. (*no quiero decir otros particularidades por no ser acusado de prolijidad*)

occasional, obviously reluctant Spanish comments on prostitution, which were never shared by English treatises, or the traditional prohibitions on harming women or other 'weak' groups in disciplinary codes. Women, families, or civilians otherwise did not intrude on the mental picture of military perfection envisaged by the theorists of both nations, further proof that these texts represented the 'perfected reality' of war rather than true reflections of reality, or even truly honest attempts to comprehensively confront the military problems of the day.

More profoundly, the almost total absence of women from, and general 'sanitisation' of military theory may reflect the deeper phenomenon of 'social disciplining' and moral reformation. As Wilson has reiterated, developments in early modern military organisation and state power were accompanied by the post-Reformation drive by church and state to 'turn people into diligent, obedient, and pious subjects'. In the context of women at war, Wilson identifies that the regulation of soldiers' behaviour included limitation of female contact, and women in armies were transformed from 'a recognised part of the military establishment' in the professional mercenary forces of the late fifteenth century to simple civilians excluded from 'respectable' views of military and civil society.[1259] Given the determination of military theorists to control soldiers' behaviour and morality, the exclusion of women from sixteenth-century military theory would seem to fit this model of state army formation, social discipline, and the specifically gendered decline of women as an accepted part of war. Indeed, a useful comparison is the early sixteenth century artworks of Swiss and *Landsknecht* troops, which were startlingly willing to portray realistically women as participants in, and victims of, soldierly violence.[1260] Such depictions were the

[1259] Peter. H. Wilson, 'German Women and War', *War in History*, 3/2 (1996), p. 128
[1260] J.R. Hale, 'Women and War in the Visual Arts of the Renaissance', in Mulryne and Shewring, *War, Literature and the Arts*, pp. 43-62.

antithesis of the sanitised ideal envisaged in military theory, just as the mercenary troops of the early century were very different to the forces envisaged by military theorists by c.1600.

Returning to the overarching themes and values of sixteenth century martial culture, personal bravery was often joined by physical injuries and suffering as things 'deserving of memory'. Again, there is a clear link between physical deeds and suffering, and masculine identity; Trim stresses the specific role of wounds, as well as risk-taking, as part of the 'honour economy' of Elizabethan military writing, and it is easy to find similar references in the Spanish memoirs to an outstanding warrior's wounds, as well as his bravery, proving his status as a praiseworthy member of the warrior community.[1261] However, suffering as a *topos* of military identity extended beyond battle wounds to include frequent evocations of hunger, cold, disease, and other campaign hardships, with the perverse sense that these, too, were part of the proud identity of soldiers. The inherent prestige and superiority of martial activity drew heavily on the contrast between idle, peaceable luxury and the 'honourable sweat' of campaigning- in which Francisco de Aldea, again, gloried.[1262] This, once again, reminds us of the link between war and masculinity, and between ideal manhood and military perfection. As Katherine Lewis points out, 'medieval manliness was defined not so much in opposition to women but more usually in relation to other men', and the contrast between hard living at war and soft civilian life encouraged military writers to treat civilian men, and women, with equal disdain.[1263] In this context, martial suffering in any form was almost as much something to be proud of as bravery.

[1261] Trim, 'Martial Conduct and Masculine Identity', pp. 52-4.
[1262] Quoted in Terry, 'War and Literature', pp. 114.
[1263] Lewis, *Kingship and Masculinity*, p. 7.

Both bravery and suffering underpinned the drive to commemorate praiseworthy deeds, which, in turn, hints at perhaps the most profound issue of sixteenth century martial culture: *reward.* The constant urge to record outstanding deeds was likely motivated by an understanding that this was the only reward most men were ever likely to receive. Wars 'make ambition virtue' and in principle offered social and financial mobility as well as personal prestige; indeed, the development of basic chains of command and the crystallisation of the military profession meant that such rewards could be manifested in promotion, as well as traditional bounty of plunder or ennoblement.[1264] The fact that in reality, there was an inevitable disconnect between the volume of praiseworthy deeds performed and the proportion that were properly rewarded encouraged the occasional diatribe of soldierly disillusionment with the disappointing reality of war, most notably in Diego Nuñez Alba's dialogue. A more famous soldier-writer, Garcilaso de la Vega, made the typical association between the hard work of campaigning and the sad oblivion of most praiseworthy martial deeds: 'what does one get out of this? Some glory? Some rewards or gratitude?...our labours, to which our purpose is directed, will be scattered like dust in the wind'.[1265]

Even more importantly for this thesis, disappointment at the disconnect between glorious martial deeds and the lack of material reward also likely motivated the dissatisfied tone of military theorists, and specifically their lamentations of unfair promotion practices, as much as higher-minded ideals of scientific, meritocratic officership. The fact that successful professional soldiers like Londoño and Williams engaged with the new culture of professional officership and skilled command, and of military theory in general, should caution against drawing a direct link between

[1264] *Othello*, III.iii.
[1265] Quoted in Terry, 'War and Literature', p. 106.

disappointment at a lack of promotion, and the writing of military treatises. Nonetheless, a hypothetical conversation between the soldier-writers studied would have seen them agree on the need to memorialise all praiseworthy military service, and the sad paucity of more tangible rewards for themselves and their peers, before the discussion turned to more complex dissection of technical theory. This crucial theme of military reward, and the interactions between commemoration, reward, and how warriors judge each other by shifting 'matrices' of military perfection, offer rich scope for study in all periods of the history of war, culture, and identity. Historians are familiar with the recruit in *Don Quixote*, declaring that only poverty drives him to war.[1266] But perhaps a better image for early modern martial culture would be another fictional military archetype, Diego Nuñez Alba's 'Milicio', making his way home penniless and bitter, proud of the services in which he participated, but angry at his bad treatment and lack of promotion in armies that always failed to live up to the martial ideal- and, like a surprising number of his real-world counterparts, seeking to educate his fellows on the correct values and cultures of war.

[1266] Miguel de Cervantes, tr. John Rutherford, *Don Quixote* (London, 2003), p. 651

APPENDIX 1: PUBLICATION TRENDS IN SPANISH AND ENGLISH MILITARY THEORY

Table 1: Known publication dates of Spanish military theory to 1609[1267]

Period	**New titles**	*All editions*
Pre-1530	**1**	*2*
1530-39	**2**	*2*
1540-49	**1**	*1*
1550-59	**1**	*1*
1560-69	**1**	*1*
1570-79	**1**	*1*
1580-84	**4**	*5*
1585-89	**3**	*9*
1590-94	**2**	*13*
1595-99	**6**	*19*
1600-04	**2**	*7*
1605-09	**1**	*4*
Total:	**25**	*65*

Table 2: Known publication locations of Spanish military theory to 1609

Location	*Editions*
Madrid	*16*
Seville	*3*
Other Spain	*8*
Spain total:	**27**
Milan	*5*
Venice	*4*
Naples	*1*
Italy total:	**10**
Antwerp	*4*
Brussels	*17*
Middelburg	*1*
Low Countries total:	**22**
London	*2*
Lisbon	*1*
Mexico City	*1*
Other total:	**4**

[1267] Note the appearance of early texts in the Italian Wars, relative inactivity during the tenures of Alba, Requesens, and Don Juan (respectively Captains General of Flanders 1567-73, 1573-6, 1576-8), then increased activity during the tenures of Parma and Archduke Albert from 1578, and more broadly, amid the intensification and frustrations of Spain's war efforts in the later century.

Table 3: Known publication dates of English military theory to 1609[1268]

Period	**New titles**	*All editions*
Pre-1530	-	**-**
1530-39	**-**	-
1540-49	-	-
1550-59	**-**	-
1560-69	**1**	*1*
1570-79	**6**	*8*
1580-84	**2**	*4*
1585-89	**5**	*7*
1590-94	**9**	*13*
1595-99	**6**	*8*
1600-04	**4**	*8*
1605-09	-	*3*
Total:	**33**	*52*

Table 4: Known publication locations of English military theory to 1609

Location	*Editions*
London	49
Middelburg	1[1269]
Leiden	1

[1268] Note the absence of native military theory publishing in the period of the Italian Wars, the early burst of activity in the 1570s in the context of the 'Protestant crusade' to the Netherlands and England's relative military unpreparedness, then the wave of works in the militarised, wartime state post-1585, before tailing off in peacetime.
[1269] Plus the 1597 English translation of Mendoza's *Teorica y Practica.*

APPENDIX 2: SOME 'CREDENTIALS' OF MILITARY THEORISTS REFERENCED

Spanish

Writer	Military Experience
EGUILUZ, Martin de	Served 24 years in multiple campaigns, wars, and garrisons by 1586 Served 27 years by 1591 'in Italy, Malta, Flanders, and Portugal' Served as a soldier, Sergeant, *Alferez*, 'and other charges of command'[1270]
ESCALANTE, Bernardino de	Followed his father (a Captain) in Flanders in 1555, possibly at San Quentin Present with father at Calais in 1558 'Soldier in his youth in Flanders' with Philip II[1271]
ISABA, Marcos de	Company commander in Flanders under Don Lope de Figueroa in 1579 Held rank of Captain, Castellan of Capua in 1593 Apparently served in Italy, North Africa, and Flanders with 'almost 40 years' of military experience[1272]
LECHUGA, Cristobal	Enlisted at 16-18 in the *Tercio de Flandes* under Sancho Dávila Passed from *Cabo d'Escuadra* to Sergeant to *Alferez* 1579-85. Captain of Spanish horse in Milan Acting General of Artillery Served in Flanders as a Sergeant-Major and Lieutenant of the Captain General of Artillery Served as an artilleryman at the sieges of Maastricht, Tournai, and Antwerp Organised a school of artillery in Antwerp, 1604[1273]

[1270] Eguiluz, *Milicia*, prologue, frontmatter.
[1271] Parker and Casado Soto, *Diálogos*, pp. 14-6.
[1272] Isaba, *Cuerpo*, frontmatter, fo. 50r. (*he andado casi quarenta años entre contadores y pagadores*); Castrillo, *Arte Militar*, p. 55
[1273] Vazquez, *Sucesos*, III.400-1; 'Lechuga, Cristóbal', *DBE*.

LONDOÑO, Sancho de	Pikeman under Alba in 1542 Served under Charles V in Northern Europe 1544 with various units Served in the Schmalkaldic campaign *Mayordomo Mayor* of Alba in 1548 Lieutenant of a company of light horse Served in the siege of Metz 1552 Travelled to Flanders with Alba in 1552 Captain of infantry of the *Tercio de Milan* *Maestre de Campo* of the *Tercio de Lombardia* in 1558 Served in Northern Italy 1559 Commanded the *Tercio de Lombardia* on the Malta campaign 1565 Commanded the *Tercio de Lombardia* on the Flanders campaign, 1566-7 Commander of Alba's guard[1274]
MENDOZA, Bernardino de	Served in the Oran campaign in 1563 and La Gomera campaign in 1564 Served with noble volunteers under Don Juan in the Malta campaign in 1565 Company commander under Alba in the Flanders campaign, 1567 Commanded a cavalry company in Flanders 1567-77 Important role at battle of Mook, 1574 Politico-military role in the French Catholic League 'Thirty-something years' of military and ambassadorial service by 1594[1275]
MONTES, Diego	'*Soldado Viejo* of his Majesty'[1276]
MOSQURA DE FIGUEROA, Cristobal	Auditor-General of the Fleet and Army on the Azores expedition, 1583[1277]
NUÑEZ ALBA, Diego	Served as soldier since his 'youth'[1278]

[1274] 'Londoño, Sancho de', *DBE.*
[1275] 'Mendoza', *DBE*; Mendoza, *Theorica*, prologue. (*treinta y tantos años*)
[1276] Montes, *Instrucion*, cover.
[1277] Mosquera, *Comentario*, cover.
[1278] Sherer, 'Núñez Alba's *Diálogos*', pp. 394-5.

PEDROSA, Francisco de	Man-at-Arms in Italy, served under the *Gran Capitan*[1279]
SALAZAR, Diego de	Served under the *Gran Capitan* Describes himself as a Captain[1280]
VALDES, Francisco de	Captain of infantry, *Comisario General* of Men-at-Arms and Light cavalry in Siena Part of the *Tercio de Lombardia* from 1558 Captain under Sancho de Londoño 1566 Sergeant-Major of the *Tercio de Lombardia* under Londoño Commanded at siege of Leiden 1573-4 *Maestre de Campo General* of troops in Flanders at Alba's departure, 1573 Commander of the *Tercio de Italia* 1574 *Maestre de Campo* in 1575 Commanded at sieges of Buren and Oudewater 1575 38 years of service, 32 continuous, by 1575 Left Low Countries in 1577, returned to serve Don Juan *Maestre de Campo* of the *Tercio de Sicilia* under Parma Serves at Maastricht 1579[1281]
VEGA, Luis Gutiérrez de	Served as a Captain and soldier in Italy, Africa, and elsewhere[1282]
VIAMONT, Diego de Álava y	*None*

[1279] Pedrosa, *Remilitar*, prologue,
[1280] Salazar, *Tratado*, fo. 10r.
[1281] 'Valdés, Francisco de', *DBE*; Fagel, *Protagonists*, pp. 271-334.
[1282] Vega, *Tratado*, frontmatter, pp. 39-40.

English

Writer	Military Experience
AUDLEY, Thomas	Possibly served as Captain of foot in the 1513 campaign Captain of Guînes castle in 1544, then Provost Marshal Served at Berwick and in Scotland 1544-5 Served in France as fortress commander after the fall of Boulogne[1283]
BARRET, Robert	'Spent most part of my time in the profession of Armes, and that among forraine nations, as the French, the Dutch, the Italian, and Spaniard' Possibly implies having served on amphibious expeditions[1284]
BARRETT, Henry	Yeoman of the Guard[1285]
BARWICK, Humfrey	Began career aged 18 in 1548 Highest English salary was 14s./day Served the King of France Served in Leith campaign (1560) and in Berwick garrison at some point 1564-68 Unclear Spanish service; promised pension from Charles V for service at San Quentin Implied service in Ireland 1567/8[1286]
BLANDY, William	Served as a Low Countries volunteer pre-1581[1287]
CLAYTON, Gyles	16 years service in Ireland and the Low Countries by 1591 Possible role in Cambridgeshire militia[1288]
DIGGES, Thomas	

[1283] Raymond, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution*, p. 9.
[1284] Barret, *Theorike*, sig. ¶2r., p. 123.
[1285] Hale, 'Tudor Parade Ground', p. 252.
[1286] Barwick, *Weapons of fire*, sig. Br.-v., fols. 3v.-5v.
[1287] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 4r.
[1288] Clayton, *Martiall Discipline*, sig. A3r., title to second part.

	Tours the Low Countries to observe fortifications and troops in 1578 Trench-Master and Muster-Master in Flanders under Leicester and afterwards (discharged 1588)[1289]
GARRARD, William	Fourteen years serving the King of Spain Served in Burgundian regiment of 'Colonell the Baron of Cherau' [Chevreax] including at the battle of Gembloux, 1578[1290]
GATES, Geoffrey	Described as a soldier 'even from [his] greene and tender yeares', volunteer in Low Countries pre-1581[1291]
PROCTOR, Thomas	*Unknown*
RICH, Barnaby	Served in France and Low Countries during Marian/early Elizabethan period Served on the Walter Devereux expedition to Ireland, 1573 Promoted to Captain 1574 Served under Essex in Ireland, 1599 '40 yeares training in the warres' by 1604[1292]
SMYTHE, Sir John	Volunteer in France and the Low Countries in the 1550s Served in Hungary against the Ottomans, 1566 Fought against Turks with Protestant volunteers in the Mediterranean Supervisor and training Colonel of the Essex Militia 1587-9 Training the Essex militia 1596 Served 'in two sondrie rebellions against Rebells'[1293]

[1289] 'Digges, Thomas', *DNB*.
[1290] Garrard, *Arte of Warre*, cover, pp. 124-5; Parker, 'Military Revolution', p. 51.
[1291] Blandy, *Castle*, fo. 18v.
[1292] 'Rich, Barnaby', *DNB*; Rich, *Fruites*, sig. A3r.
[1293] 'Smythe [Smith], Sir John', *DNB*.

STYWARD, Thomas	*Unknown*
WILLIAMS, Sir Roger	May have served on the continent in 1557 or in the French Wars of Religion to 1570 Served in Flanders with Morgan and Norreys in the 1570s Served in the Army of Flanders: 22 months under Romero, 18 months under Mondragon, 8 months with Don Juan Lieutenant-Colonel under Norreys from 1578 to the early 1580s May have been a gentleman volunteer under Henri of Navarre Knighted at Zutphen in 1586, governor of Sluis during siege in 1587 Appointed to Middlesex's defences in 1587, Essex's second-in-command of cavalry in 1588 Regimental commander in the Counter-Armada of 1589 Served under Willoughby in France 1589-90 Colonel under Norreys, Marshal under Essex in Brittany 1591 English commander in Brittany to 1593[1294]

[1294] 'Williams, Sir Roger', *DNB*.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Manuscript and Archival Sources

London, British Library, MS Harley 135, Sir John Smythe, 'Aunswer to Contrarie Opinions'

London, British Library, MS Lansdowne 4/30, Ralph Lane, 'Discours uppon Martial Affayres'

London, British Library, MS Lansdowne 65/62, Sir John Smythe to Lord Burghley

London, British Library, MS Lansdowne 1225/1, Sir Henry Knyvette, 'A Brief Treatise'

London, British Library, MS Lansdowne 1225/3, 'A Brief Discourse'

London, TNA, SP 1/172, fo. 50: Sir John Wallop to Council, 16th Aug. 1542

London, TNA, SP 12/233, fo.104: The Earl of Essex to Lord Burghley, 2nd Sept. 1590

London, TNA, SP 12/241, fo. 76, Lord Burghley to Thomas Wilkes, 11th Feb. 1591, and fo. 77, Thomas Wilkes to Lord Burghley, 12th Feb. 1591

Madrid, *Biblioteca Nacional de España*, MSS.22,648, 'La Inquieta Flandes. Poemia heroica de Christoual Rodriguez Alua natural de la çiudad de Merida…'

Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Rawlinson, D.363, 'A Treatise of Military Discipline'

Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Tanner, 103

Simancas, *Archivo General de Simancas* (AGS) ESTADO Legajo 1372.78, Francisco Sarmiento to the Viceroy of Sicily

Printed Primary Sources

Military Memoirs

'A Contemporary Account of the Battle of Floddon, 9th September 1513', ed. David Laing, *Proceedings of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland*, 7 (1870), pp. 141-52

Ávila y Zuñiga, Luis de, *Comentario….de la Guerra de Alemaña, hecho de Carlo V. Maximo, Emperador Romano, Rey de España…* (Antwerp, 1550)

Díaz del Castillo, Bernal, *Historia Verdadera de la Conquista de la Nueva España*, ed. Joaquín Ramírez Cabañas (10th edn., Mexico City, 1974)

Cerezeda, Martin García, *Tratado de las Campañas y Otros Acontecimientos de los Ejércitos del Emperador Cárlos V en Italia, Francia, Austria, Berbería y Grecia, Desde 1521 hasta 1545, Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles* (3 vols, Madrid, 1873-6)

Gruffudd, Elis, 'Suffolk's Expedition to Montdidier 1523', ed. M. B. Davies, *Fouad I University Bulletin of Faculty of Arts* 7 (1944), pp. 33-43

Gruffudd, Elis, 'The 'Enterprises' of Paris and Boulogne (A Contemporary Narrative)', ed. M. Bryn Davies, *Fouad I University Bulletin of Faculty of Arts* 11 (1949), pp. 37-95

Gruffudd, Elis, 'Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550', ed. M. Bryn Davies, *Fouad I University Bulletin of Faculty of Arts* 12 (1950), pp. 1-90

Guyon, Fery de, *Mémoires…avec un Commentaire historique…*ed. A.P.L. de Robaulx de Soumoy, *Société de l'Histoire de Belgique* (Brussels, 1858)

Guzmán, Alonso Enríquez de, *Vida y Costumbres*, ed. Hayward Keniston (Madrid, 1960)

Mendoza, Bernardino de, *Comentarios de Don Bernardino de Mendoça, de lo sucedido en las Guerras de los Payses baxos, desde el Año de. 1567 hasta el de. 1577* (Madrid, 1592)

Morgan, Walter, ed. Duncan Caldecott-Baird, *The Expedition in Holland 1572-1574: the revolt of the Netherlands: the early struggle for independence* (London, 1976)

Oznayo, Juan de, 'Relacion sacada de la que escribió Fray Juan de Oznayo…de la prision del Rey de Francia', ed. D. Miguel Salvá and D. Pedro Sainz de Barada, *Coleccion de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España* (Madrid, 1846), ix, pp. 406-81

Paredes, Diego Garcia de, *Breve Suma de la Vida y Hechos de Diego Garcia de Paredes La qual el mismo escivio…* in *Cronica del Gran Capitan Gonçalo Hernandez de Cordova y Aguilar…con la vida del famoso cavallero Diego Garcia de Paredes. Neuvamente añadida a esta Historia* (Seville, 1582), fols. 163r.-5v.

Patten, William, *The Expedicion into Scotlād̄e of the most woorthely fortunate prince Edward, Duke of Soomerset…* (London, 1548)

'The Siege and Capture of Boulogne- 1544', ed. J.H. Leslie, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 1/5 (1922), pp. 188-99

Vere, Sir Francis, *The Commentaries of Sr. Francis Vere being diverse pieces of service, wherein he had command, written by himself in war of a commentary* (Cambridge, 1657)

Williams, Sir Roger, *The Actions of the Lowe Countries* (London, 1618)

Military Treatises[1295]

A Myrrour for English Souldiers: Or, An Anotomy of an accomplished man at Armes… (London, 1595)

'A Treatise on the Art of War', ed. W.St.P. Bunbury, *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 6/24 (1927), pp. 65-78, contd. 6/25 (1927), pp. 129-33

Barret, Robert, *The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres, Discoursed in Dialogue wise, wherein is declared…* (London, 1598)

[1295] Original works on military theory including artillery and fortification, excluding narrative texts and works on personal honour, just war, heraldry, personal weapons, or riding. For the purposes of the tables in Appendix 1, Diego Nuñez Alba's *Dialogos* is considered to be a work of military theory.

Barwick, Humfrey, *A Breefe Discourse, Concerning the force and effect of all manuall weapons of fire, and the disability of the Long Bowe or Archery…* (London, 1592)

Blandy, William, *The Castle, or picture of policy shewing forth most liuely, the face, body and partes of a commonwealth, the duety, quality, profession of a perfect and absolute Souldiar…* (London, 1581)

Bourne, William, *Inventions or Devises Very necessary for all Generalles and Captaines, or Leaders of men, as wel by Sea as by Land* (London, 1578)

Bourne, William, *The Arte of shooting in great Ordnance. Contayning very necessary matters for all sortes of Seruitoures eyther by Sea or by Lande* (London, 1587)

Cespedes, Andrews Garcia de, *Libro de Instrumentos Nuevos de Geometria muy necessarios para medir distancias, y alturas, sin que intervengan números, como se demuestra en pa practicia…* (Madrid, 1606)

Crompton, Richard, *The Mansion of Magnanimitie, Wherein is shewed…* (London, 1599)

Clayton, Gyles, *A Briefe discourse of Martial Discipline contayning the office and dueties of every officer and private soldiours* (Middelburg, 1587)

Clayton, Gyles, *The Approoved order of Martiall discipline, with every particular Offycer his offyce and dutie: with many other stratagemes adioyning to the same…* (London, 1591)

Collado, Luis, *Platica Manual de Artilleria, en la qual de tracta de la excellencia de el arte militar, y origen de ella, y de las maquinas…* (Milan, 1592)

Digges, Leonard and Thomas, *An Arithmeticall Militare Treatise, named Stratioticos: Compendiously teaching the Science of Nūbers…Together with the Moderne Militare Discipline* (London, 1579, 2nd edn. 1590)

Digges, Thomas and Dudley, *Foure Paradoxes, or politique Discourses. Concerning Militarie Discipline, written long since by Thomas Digges Esquire. Of the worthinesse of warre and warriors…* (London, 1604)

Edmondes, Clement, *Observations upon the five first books of Caesars commentaries…with such instructions as may be drawn from their proceedings, for the better direction of our modern warres* (London, 1600)

Eguiluz, Martin de, *Milicia, Discurso, y Regla Militar, del Capitan Martin de Eguiluz, Bizcayno. Diuidida en dos libros…* (Antwerp, 1595)

Escalante, Bernardino de, *Dialogos, del Arte Militar de Bernardino de Escalante…* (Brussels, 1595)

Escalante, Bernardino de, *Diálogos del Arte Militar*, ed. Geoffrey Parker and José Luis Casado Soto (Laredo, 1992)

Funes, Juan de, *Libro Intitulado Arte Militar, En el qual se declara que sea el oficio de Sargento mayor: y que sea orden quadrada: y…* (Pamplona, 1582)

Garrard, William, ed. Robert Hichcock, *The Arte of Warre. Beeing the onely rare booke of Myllitarie profession: drawne out of all our late and forraine seruices…* with Hichcock, Robert, '*A generall proportion and order of provision…'* (London, 1591)

Gates, Geoffrey, *The Defence of Militarie Profession. Wherein is eloquently shewed the due commendation of Martiall prowesse, and plainly prooued how necessary the exercise of Armes is for this our Age* (London, 1579)

Gonzalez de Medina Barba, Diego, *Examen de Fortificacion* (Madrid, 1599)

Isaba, Marcos de, *Cuerpo Enfermo de la Milicia Española, con discursos y auisos, para que pueda ser curado, utiles y de prouecho* (Madrid, 1594)

Isla, Lazaro de, *Breve Tratado del Arte de Artilleria, Geometria, y artificios de fuego.* (Madrid, 1595)

Ive, Paul, *The Practise of Fortification: Wherein is shewed the manner of fortifying in all sortes of Scituations…* (London, 1589)

Lechuga, Cristobal, *Discurso del Capitan Cristoual Lechuga, en que trada del cargo de Maestre de Campo General, y de todo lo que derecho le toca en el Exercito* (Milan, 1603)

Lechuga, Cristobal, *Discurso del Capitan Cristoual Lechuga, en que trata de la Artilleria, y de todo lo necessario à ella, con un tratado de fortificatcion, y otros aduertimientos* (Milan, 1611)

Londoño, Sancho de, *Discurso sobre la Forma de Reduzir la Disciplina Militar à major, y antiguo estado* (Madrid, 1593)

Machiavelli, Niccolò, tr. Peter Whitehorne, *The Arte of warre, written first in Italiā by Nicholas Machiavell…with an addiciō of oother like Marcialle feates and experimentes, as in a Table in the ende of the Booke maie apppere*, with appended section *Certain waies for the ordering of Souldiers in battelray…* (London, 1562)

Mendoza, Bernardino de, *Theorica y Practica de Guerra, Escrita Al Principe Don Felipe Nuestro Señor* (Antwerp, 1596)

Montes, Diego, *Esta obra llamada Instrucion y regimiento de guerra…en la qual trata sutiles avisos y cosas secretas del exercicio militar de la guerra* (Zaragoza, 1537)

Mosquera de Figueroa, Cristobal, *Comentario en Breve Compendio de Disciplina Militar, en que se escriue la jornada de las Islas de los Açores* (Madrid, 1596)

Nuñez Alba, Diego, *Dialogos…de la vida del Soldado, en que se quenta la conjuracion, y pacificacion de Alemaña con todas las batallas, recuentros, y escaramuças que en ellos acontecieron…* (Salamanca, 1552)

Palacio, Diego Garcia de, *Dialogos Militares, de la formacion, è informacion de Personas, Instrumentos, y cosas necessarias para el buen uso de la Guerra* (Mexico, 1583)

Palencia, Alfonso de, *De la perfección del triunfo militar* (Seville, Compañeros alemanes, c.1490)

Pedrosa, Francisco de, *Arte y Suplemento Remilitar* (Naples, 1541)

Proctor, Thomas, *Of the knowledge and conducte of warres, two bookes, latlye wrytten and sett foorth, profitable for suche as delight in Hystoryes, or martyall affayres, and necessarye for this present tyme* (London, 1578)

Rich, Barnaby, *A Right Exelent and pleasaunt Dialogue, betwene Mercury and an English Souldier: Contayning his Supplication to Mars…* (London, 1574)

Rich, Barnaby, *Allarme to England, foreshewing what perilles are procured, where the people live without regarde of Martiall lawe…* (London, 1578)

Rich, Barnaby, *A Path-way to Military Practise. Containinge Offices, Lawes, Disciplines and orders to be obserued in an Army, with sundry Stratagems very beneficiall…* (London, 1587)

Rich, Barnaby, *A Martial Conference, Pleasantly discoursed betweene two Souldiers, the one Captaine Skil, trained up in the French and Low country services, the other Captaine Pill…* (London, 1598)

Rich, Barnaby, *The Fruites of Long Experience. A pleasing view for Peace, a Looking-Glasse for Warre. Or, Call it what you list. Discoursed betweene two Captaines* (London, 1604)

Rich, Barnaby, *A souldiers VVishe to Britons welfare: or a Discourse, fit to be read of all Gentlemen and Souldiers* (London, 1604)

Rojas, Cristobal de, *Theorica y Practica y fortificacion, conforme las medidas y defensas destos tiempos, repartida en tres partes* (Madrid, 1598)

'R. S.', *A Briefe Treatise, To prooue the necessitie and excellence of the use of Archerie. Abstracted out of Ancient and Moderne Writers* (London, 1596)

Salazar, Diego de, *Tratado de re militari. Tratado de Cavalleria hecho a manera de dialogo…* (Alcalá de Henares, 1536)

Smith, Thomas, *The Art of Gunnery. Wherein is set forth a number of serviceable secrets, and practicall conclusions, belonging to the Art of Gunnerie…* (London, 1599) ustc

Smythe, Sir John, *Certain Discourses, Written by Sir John Smythe, Knight: Concerning the formes and effects of diuers sorts of weapons, and other verie important matters Militarie…* (London, 1590)

Smythe, Sir John, *Instructions, Observations and orders Militarie, requisit for all Chieftaines, Captaines, and higher and lower men of charge, and Officers, to understand, knowe and obserue* (London, 1594)

Smythe, Sir John, *Certain Discourses Military*, ed. J.R. Hale (Ithaca, 1964)

Styward, Thomas, *The Pathwaie to Martiall Discipline, deuided into two Bookes, verie necessary for young Souldiers, or for all such as loueth the profession of Armes…* (London, 1581)

Sutcliffe, Matthew, *The Practice, Proceedings, and Lawes of armes, described out of the doings of most valiant and expert Captaines, and confirmed both by ancient, and moderne examples, and praecedents* (London, 1593)

Tartaglia, Niccolo, tr. Cyprian Lucar, *Three bookes of colloquies concerning the arte of shooting…also the said Cyprian Lucar hath annexed unto the same three books…a treatise named Lucar Appendix* (London, 1588)

Valdes, Francisco de, *Espeio, y Disciplina Militar…en el qual se tratta del officio del Sargento Mayor* (Brussels, 1596)

Vargas Machuca, Bernardo, *Milicia, y Descripcion de las Indias* (Madrid, 1599)

Vega, Luis Gutiérrez de la, *Nuevo Tratado y Compendio de Re Militari* (Madrid, 2005)

Viamont, Diego de Álava y, *El Perfeto Capitan, Instruido en la disciplina Militar, y nueua ciencia de la Artilleria* (Madrid, 1590)

Whetstone, George, *The Honorable Reputation of a Souldier: with a Morall Report, of the Vertues, Offices, and (by abuse) the Disgrace of his profession* (London, 1585)

Williams, Sir Roger, *A Briefe Discourse of Warre. Written by Sir Roger Williams Knight; With his opinion concerning some parts of the Martiall Discipline* (London, 1590)

Other Printed Primary Sources

A Declaration, conteynyng the just causes and consyderations, of this present warre with the Scottis, wherin also appereth the trewe & right title, that the kinges most royall maiesty hath to the soverayntie of Scotland (London, 1542)

A Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers of London between 1554-1640 A.D., ed. Edward Arber (privately printed, 5 vols., London, 1875-94)

Aeneas Tacitus, Asclepiodotus, Onosander, ed. Jeffrey Henderson (London, 1928)

Andrada, Pedro Fernandez de, *Libro de la Gineta de España…* (Seville, 1599)

Anonymous, *A Briefe Discoverie of Doctor Allens seditious drifts, contrived in a Pamphlet…* (London, 1588)

Anonymous, *Newes from Rome, Spaine, Palermo, Genuae and France…* (London, 1590)

Anonymous, *A Larum for London, or The Siedge of Answerpe* (London, 1602)

Antunes, Emanuel, *Primera Parte de la Baxada de los Españoles de Francia en Normandia* (Rouen, 1593)

Ariosto, Ludovico, *Orlando Furioso*, tr. Guido Waldman (Oxford, 2008)

Ariosto, Ludovico, tr. Geronimo de Urrea, *Orlando Furioso de M. Ludovico Ariosto, traduzido de lenguage Italiana, en romance Castellano* (Salamanca, 1578)

Ascham, Roger, *Toxophilus the schole of shootinge contayned in two books…* (London, 1545)

Ascham, Roger, *The Scholemaster or plaine and perfite way of teaching…* (London, 1570)

Ashton, Peter, *A shorte treatise upon the Turkes Chronicles, compyled by Paulus Iovius byshop of Nucerne, and dedicated to Charles the V. Emperour* (London, 1546)

Ayala, Balthazar, *De Iure & Officiis bellicis, & disciplina militari, Libri III* (Antwerp, 1597)

Ayllon, Diego Ximinez, *Sonetos a illustres varones deste felicissimo y catholico exercito y Corte de su Excelencia* (Valencia, 1959)

Becon, Thomas, *The new pollecy of warre, wherin is declared not only how ȳ mooste cruell Tyraunt the great Turke may be over come, but also all other enemies of the Christen publique weale…* (London, 1542)

Betham, Peter, *The preceptes of warre, set forth by James the erle of Purlilia, and trāslated into englyshe* (London, 1544)

Birch, William, *A new balade of the worthy service of late doen by Maister Strangwige in Fraunce, and of his death* (London, 1562)

Bradford, John, *The copye of a letter, sent by Iohn Bradforth…declaring the nature of the Spaniardes…* (Wesel, 1556)

Braham, Humfrey, *The Institucion of a Gentleman* (London, 1555)

Bruce, John (ed.), *Correspondence of Robert Dudley, Earl of Leycester: during his Government of the Low Countries, in the years 1585 and 1586* (London, 1844)

Calvete de Estrella, Juan Cristóbal, *La Conquista de la Ciudad de Africa*, tr. Diego Gracian (Salamanca, 1558)

Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de, tr. John Rutherford, *Don Quixote* (London, 2003)

Cetina, Gutierre de, *Obras de Gutierre de Cetina con introducción y notas*, ed. D. Joaquín Hazañas y la Rua (2 vols, Seville, 1895)

Chácon, Hernán, *Tractado de la Cauallería de la Gineta*, ed. Noel Fallows (Exeter, 1999)

Churchyard, Thomas, *A Lamentable, and pitifull Description, of the wofull warres in Flaunders, since the foure last yeares of the Emperor Charles the fifth his raign…* (London, 1578)

Churchyard, Thomas, *A generall rehearsall of warres, wherein is five hundred severall services of land and sea: as sieges, battailles, skirmiches, and encounters…* (London, 1579)

Devereux, Robert, 2nd Earl of Essex, *To Maister Anthonie Bacon. An Apologie of the Earle of Essex, against those which falsly and maliciously taxe him to be the onely hinderer of the peace, and quiet of his country.* (London, 1600)

Digges, Thomas, *A Briefe Report of the Militarie Services done in the Low Countries, by the Erle of Leicester: written by one that serued in a good place there in a letter to a friend of his* (London, 1587)

Digges, Thomas, *A Breife and true report of the Proceedings of the Earle of Leycester for the reliefe of the Towne of Sluce…Whereby it shall plainlie appeare his Excellencie was not in anie fault…* with '*Another Addition concerning certain chiefe Officers*' (London, 1590)

Ercilla, Alonso de, *La Araucana: A New Translation with Annotations & Introduction*, tr. and ed. Cyrus Moore (New York, 2022)

Fabyan, Robert, *The New Chronicles of England and France, In Two Parts, by Robert Fabyan, named by himself the Concordance of Histories…*, ed. Henry Ellis (London, 1811)

Frontinus, tr. Richard Morison, *The Strategemes, sleyghtes, and policies of warre, gathered together, by S. Juluis Frontinus, and translated into Englyshe* (London, 1539)

Gascoigne, George, *The Posies of George Gascoigne Esquire. Corrected, perfected, and augmented by the Authour* (London, 1575)

Gascoigne, George, *The Spoyle of Antwerpe. Faithfully reported, by a true Englishman, who was present at the same* (London, 1576)

Gibbon, Charles, *A Watch-vvorde for Warre. Not so new as necessary, published by reason of the disperced rumors amongst us, and the suspected coming of the Spanyard against us* (Cambridge, 1596)

Giner, Miguel, *El Sitio, y Toma de Anvers, de Miguel Giner* (Milan, 1587)

Googe, Barnaby, *Eglogs Epytaphes, and Sonettes* (London, 1563)

Gracian, Diego, *De Re Militari. Primero Volumen. Onosandro Platonico…Segundo Volumen. Cesar Renovado...Tercero, Quarto, y Quinto Volumen. Disciplina Militar y Instruction, de los hechos y cosas de guerra de Langeay…* (Barcelona, 1566)

Hall, Edward, *Hall's Chronicle; Containing the History of England…* (London, 1809)

Hawes, Stephen, *A ioyfull medytacyon to all Englonde of the coronacyon of our moost natural souerayne lorde kynge Henry the eyght* (London, 1509)

Here after foloweth ȳ batayll of Egyncourte & the great sege of Rone by kynge Henry of Monmouthe… (London, 1536)

Hofinger, Bernadette, Kufner, Harald, Laferl, Cristopher F., Moser-Kroiss, Judith, and Tschugmell, Nichola, *Die Korrespondenz Ferdinands I. Familienkorrespondenz Bd. 1535 und 1536* (Cologne, 2015)

Hume, Martin A.S., ed. and tr., *Chronicle of King Henry VIII. Of England, bring a contemporary record of some of the principal events of the reigns of Henry VIII. And Edward VI.* (London, 1889)

Humphrey, Lawrence, *The nobles or of nobilitye. The original nature, dutyes, right, and Christian institucion thereof three books…* (London, 1563)

Kynge Rycharde cuer du lyon (London, 1509)

Lipsius, Justus, tr. Bernardino de Mendoza, *Los seys libros de las politicas o doctrina Ciuil de Iusto Lipsio, que siruen para el gouierno del Reyno, o Principado* (Madrid, 1604)

Lingham, John, *A True Relation of all suche Englishe Captaines and Lieutenants, as have beene slaine in the lowe Countries of Flaunders, together with those now living…* (London, 1584)

Lord Berners, John, *Here begynneth the first volum of sir Iohan Froyssart…translated out of frenche into our maternall englyshe toonge…* (London, 1523)

Lord Berners, John, *The castell of love, translated out of Spanishe into Englyshe, by Johan Bowrchier…* (London, 1548)

Lord Berners, John, *Arthur of Brytayn. The hystory of the moost noble and valyaunt knight…translated out of frensshe into englishe…* (London, 1560)

Lord Berners, John, *The Ancient, Honorable, Famous, and delightfull Historie of Huon of Bourdeaux, one of the Peeres of Fraunce…* (London, 1601)

Lord Berners, John, *The Chronicles of Froissart, translated by John Bourchier, Lord Berners*, ed. G. C. Macaulay (London, 1904)

Machiavelli, Niccolò, tr. Allan H. Gilbert, *Machiavelli: The Chief Works, and others* (3 vols., Durham, 1965)

Malory, Sir Thomas, *Le morte d'arthur* (Westminster: William Caxton, 1485)

Markham, Gervase, *Honour in his Perfection or, a treatise in commenation of the Vertues and Renowned Vertuous undertakings of the Illustrious and Heroyicall Princes…* (London, 1624)

Maunsell, Andrew, *The First Part of the Catalogue of English printed Bookes…* (London, 1595)

Mendoza, Bernardino de, tr. Sir Edward Hoby, *Theorique and Practise of Warre. Written to Don Philip Prince of Castil…* (London, 1597)

Morison, Richard, *An Exhortation to styrre all Englyshe men to the defence of theyr countreye, made by Richarde Morysine* (London, 1539)

Naunton, Robert, *Fragmenta Regalia, or Observations on the Late Queen Elizabeth, Her Times and Favorits* (London, 1641)

Norris, Ralph, *A Warning to London by the fall of Antwerp* (London, 1577)

Noue, François de la, tr. Edward Aggas, *The Polliticke and Militarie Discourses of the Lord de la Noue. Whereunto are adioyned certaine obseruations of the same Author…* (London, 1587)

Onosander, tr. Peter Whitehorne, *Onosandro Platonico, of the generall captaine, and of his office* (London, 1563)

Pablo del Fulcar, *Balestas, Mosquetes y Arcabuces* (Naples, 1535)

Palacios Rubios, Juan Lopez de, *Tratado del Esfuerzo Belico Heroyco* (Madrid, 1793)

Pasquyl of Rome, ed. Joseph Hunter (London, 1851)

Percyvall, Richard, *Bibliotheca Hispanica containing a grammar with a dictionarie in Spanish, English and Latine* (London, 1591)

Pisan, Christine de, *Here begynneth the table of the rubryshes of the boke of the fayt of armes and of chyualtye whiche sayd boke is departyd in to foure partyes…* (Westminster: William Caxton, 1489)

Pisan, Christine de, *Here begynneth the booke which is called the body of Polycye. And it speketh of vertues and of good maners…* (London, 1521)

Quijada de Reayo, Juan, *Doctrina del arte de la cavalleria…* (Medina del Campo, 1548)

Rastell, John, *Of gentylnes and nobylyte. A dialogue betwen the marchaut the knight and the plowman dysputyng who is a verey gentylman et who is a noble man and how men shuld come to auctoryte…* (London, 1525)

Román, Francisco, *Tratado de la esgrima, con figuras por natural de Carmona* (Seville, 1532)

Segar, William, *Honor Military, and Civill, contained in foure Bookes…* (London, 1602)

Shakespeare, William, eds. Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen, *The RSC Shakespeare: The Complete Works* (London, 2008)

Sidney, Philip, *Sir P. S. His Astrophel and Stella. Wherein the excellence of sweete Poesie is concluded* (London, 1591)

Stow, John, *A summarie of Englyshe chronicles conteynyng the true accompt of yeres, wherein every king of this realme of England began theyr reign…* (London, 1565)

Tanco de Fregenal, Vasco Diaz, *Libro intitulado Palinoda, de la nephanda y fiera nacíon de los Turcos, y de su engañoso arte y cruel modo de guerrear…* (Orense, 1547)

The late expedicion in Scotlande, made by the Kynges hyghnys armye, under the conduit of the right honorable the Erle of Hertforde, the yere of oure Lorde God 1544 (London, 1544)

'The Letters of William, Lord Paget of Beaudesert, 1547-1563', ed. Barrett L. Beer and Sybil M. Jack, *Camden Miscellany XXV* (London, 1974), pp. 1-141

Thucydides, tr. Diego Gracian, *Historia de Thucydides. Que trata de las guerras entre los Peloponeses y Athenie͞ses…* (Salamanca, 1564)

Tudor Royal Proclamations, eds. Paul L. Hughes and James F. Larkin (3 vols., New Haven, 1964-9)

Urrea, Geronimo de, *Dialogo de la Verdadera Honrra Militar, que tracta como se ha de conformar la honrra con la consciencia…* (Venice, 1566)

Valdes, Francisco de, tr. John Thorius, *The Sergeant Maior. A Dialogue of the Office of a Sergeant Maior. Written in Spanishe by the Maister of the Campe Francisco de Valdes* (London, 1590)

Vallés, Pedro, *Historia del Fortissimo, y Prudentissimo Capitan Don Hernando de Avalos Marques de Pescara, con los hechos memorables de otros siege exceletissimos Capitanes del Emperador Don Carlos.V. …* (Antwerp, 1570)

Vargas, Baltasar de, *Breve Relacion en Octava Rima de la Jornada que ha hecho el Duque de Alba desde España hasta Flandes*, ed. Duque de Alba (Madrid, 1952)

Vazquez, Alonso, *Los Sucesos de Flandes y Francia del Tiempo de Alejandro Farnese por El Capitan Alonso Vazquez, Sargento Mayor de la Milicia de Jaen y su Distrito, Escrito en Diez y Seis Libros. Biblioteca Nacional, sala de MS. I. 132*, eds. D. José Sancho Rayon and D. Francisco de Zabalburu, *Coleccion de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de España* (3 vols., Madrid, 1879-80), lxxii-lxxiv

Vega, Luis Gutiérrez de la, tr. Nicholas Lichefield, *A Compendious Treatise entituled, De Re Militari, containing principall orders to be obserued in Martiall affaires* (London, 1582)

Verdugo, Francisco, ed. Henri Lonchay, *Commentario del Coronel Francisco Verdugo de la Guerra de Frisia en XIIII Años que fue Governador y Capitan General de Aquel Estado y Exercito por el Rey D. Phelippe II, Nuestro Senor* (Brussels, 1899)

Walshe, Edward, *The office and duety in fightyng for our country. Set forth with dyverse stronge arguments…* (London, 1545)

Wilton, Arthur Lord Grey of, *A Commentary of the Services and Charges of William Lord Grey of Wilton, K. G.*, ed. Sir Philip de Malpas Grey Egerton, Camden Soc. (London, 1847)

Worcester, William, *The Boke of Noblesse*, ed. Catherine Nall and Daniel Wakelin, Early English Text Society (Oxford, 2023)

Wriothesley, Charles, *A Chronicle of England during the Reigns of the Tudors from A. D. 1485 to 1559*, ed. William Douglas Hamilton (2 vols., London, 1875-7), pp. 247-84

Xenophon, tr. Diego Gracian, *Las Obras de Xenophon Transladas de Griego en Castellano…* (Salamanca, 1552)

Printed Secondary Works

Adams, Robert P., 'Bold Bawdry and Open Manslaughter: The English New Humanist Attack on Medieval Romance', *The Huntington Library Quarterly*, 23/1 (1959), pp. 33-48

Adams, Simon, 'The English Military Clientele 1542-1618', in Roger Mettam and Charles Deloison-Giry (eds.), *Patronages et Clientélismes, 1550-1750 (France, Angleterre, Espagne, Italie)* (Lille, 1995), pp. 217-27

Adams, Simon, *Leicester and the Court: Essays on Elizabethan Politics* (Manchester, 2002)

Alemany, Rafael, 'Dimensión Humanística de un Obra Menor de Alfonso de Palencia: El *Tratado de la Perfección del Triunfo Militar* (1459)', *Anales de Literatura Española* 1 (1982), pp. 7-20

Allmand, C.T., *The De Re Militari of Vegetius: The Reception, Transmission and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 2011)

Amelang, James S., *The Flight of Icarus: Artisan Autobiography in Early Modern Europe* (Stanford, 1998)

Anglo, Sydney, *Chivalry in the Renaissance* (Woodbridge, 1990)

Anglo, Sydney, 'Vegetius's 'De Re Militari': The Triumph of Mediocrity', *Antiquaries Journal*, 82 (2002), pp. 247-67

Anglo, Sydney, *Machiavelli: The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility and Irrelevance* (Oxford, 2005)

Asch, Ronald G., *Nobilities in Transition 1550-1700: Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe* (London, 2003)

Ayton, Andrew, and Price, J.L. (eds.), *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (London, 1995)

Barber, Richard W., *The Knight and Chivalry* (rev. edn., Woodbridge, 1995)

Bell, Adrian R., Curry, Anne, King, Andy, and Simpkin, David (eds.), *The Soldier in Later Medieval England* (Oxford, 2013)

Black, Jeremy, *A Military Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550-1800* (Basingstoke, 1991)

Bourke, Joanna, 'New Military History', in Matthew Hughes and William J. Philpott (eds.), *Palgrave Advances in Modern Military History* (Basingstoke, 2006), pp. 258-80

Boyden, James M., *The Courtier and the King: Ruy Gómez de Silva, Philip II, and the Court of Spain* (Berkeley, 1995)

Braudel, Fernand, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, tr. Siân Reynolds (2 vols., London, 1972-3)

Brigden, Susan, *New Worlds, Lost Worlds: The Rule of the Tudors, 1485-1603* (London, 2000)

Brigden, Susan, 'Epic Romance: How the Duchess of Richmond Read her Ariosto', *The Review of English Studies*, New Series, 69/291 (June 2018), pp. 632-60.

Brugh, Patrick, *Gunpowder, Masculinity, and Warfare in German Texts, 1400-1700* (Rochester, 2019)

Boynton, Lindsay, *The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638* (London, 1967)

Bullón y Fernández, Eloy, *Un Colaborador de los Reyes Catolicos: el Doctor Palacios Rubios y sus Obras* (Madrid, 1927)

Burke, Peter, 'Chivalry in the New World', in Sydney Anglo (ed.), *Chivalry in the Renaissance* (Woodbridge, 1990), pp. 253-62

Buttigeig, Emanuel, *Nobility, Faith and Masculinity: the Hospitaller Knights of Malta, c.1580-c.1700* (London, 2011)

Canny, Nicholas, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland: A Pattern Established, 1565-76* (Hassocks, 1976)

Carlos Losada, Juan, *Los Generales de Flandes: Alejandro Farnesio y Ambrosio de Spínola, dos militares al servicio del imperio español* (Madrid, 2007)

Casado Soto, José Luis, *Discursos de Bernardino de Escalante al rey y sus ministros (1585-1603)* (Laredo, 1995)

Castrillo, Ricardo González, *El Arte Militar en la España del Siglo XVI* (Madrid, 2000)

Citino, Robert M., 'Military Histories Old and New: A Reintroduction', *The American Historical Review*, 112/4 (2007), pp. 1070-90

Cohn, Henry J., 'Götz von Berlichingen and the Art of Military Autobiography', in J.R. Mulryne and Margaret Shewring (eds.), *War, Literature and the Arts in Sixteenth Century Europe* (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 3-21

Collins, John M., *Martial Law and English Laws, c.1500-c.1700* (Cambridge, 2016)

Collinson, Patrick, 'The Monarchical Republic of Elizabeth I', in Patrick Collinson, *Elizabethan Essays* (London, 1994), pp. 31-58

Corvisier, André, *Armies and Societies in Europe, 1494-1789*, tr. Abigail T. Siddall (Bloomington, 1979)

Cranfill, Thomas M., and Bruce, Dorothy Hart, *Barnaby Rich: A Short Biography* (Austin, 1953)

Cruickshank, Charles, *Elizabeth's Army*, 2nd edn. (Oxford, 1966)

Cruickshank, Charles, *Army Royal: Henry VIII's Invasion of France, 1513* (Oxford, 1969)

de la Cuesta, Julio Albi, *De Pavía a Rocroi: Los Tercios Españoles*, 7th edn. (Madrid, 2020)

Cust, Richard, 'Honour and Politics in Early Stuart England: The Case of Beaumont v. Hastings', *Past & Present* 149 (1995), pp. 57-94

Dantas da Cruz, Miguel, 'From Flanders to Pernambuco: Battleground Perceptions in the Portuguese Early Modern Atlantic World', *War in History*, 26/3 (2019), pp. 316-41

Davies, C.S.L., 'The English People at War in the Early Sixteenth Century', in A.C. Duke and C.A.Tamse (eds.), *Britain and the Netherlands* (The Hague, 1977), vi.1-18

Davies, Alex, *Chivalry and Romance in the English Renaissance* (Woodbridge, 2003)

Davies, Jonathan, ''A Combersome Tying Weapon in a Throng of Men': The Decline of the Longbow in Elizabethan England', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 80/321 (April 2002), pp. 16-31

Deák, István, *Beyond Nationalism: A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps 1848-1918* (New York, 1992)

Delbrugge, Laura (ed.), *Self-Fashioning and Assumptions of Identity in Medieval and Early Modern Iberia* (Leiden, 2015)

Devaney, Thomas, 'Loyalty, Autonomy, and Virtue: Redefining Nobility in Late-Medieval Castile', in Craig M. Nakashian and Daniel P. Franke (eds.), *Prowess, Piety, and Public Order in Medieval Society: Studies in Honor of Richard W. Kaeuper* (Leiden, 2017), pp. 120-39

Devereux, Andrew W., *The Other Side of Empire: Just War in the Mediterranean and the Rise of Early Modern Spain* (Ithaca, 2020)

Dergisi, Tarih, 'History is Written by Victorious Battles: Glorious Lepanto (1571) and Forgotten Preveza (1538)', *Turkish Journal of History*, 76/1 (2022), pp. 63-94

Doedens, L.L., '"The Day the Nation was Born." The Battle of Heiligerlee, 1568', in van der Hoeven, Marco, *Exercise of Arms: Warfare in the Netherlands, 1568-1648* (Leiden, 1997), pp. 57-67

Donagan, Barbara, 'Halcyon days and the literature of war: England's military education before 1642', *Past & Present* 147 (1995), pp. 65-100

Ebben, Maurits, Lacy-Bruijn, Margriet, and van Hövell tot Westerflier, Rolof (eds.), *Alba: General and Servant to the Crown* (Rotterdam, 2013)

Elliott, J.H., 'Self-Perception and Decline in Early Seventeenth-Century Spain', *Past & Present* 74/1 (February 1977), pp. 41-61

Elliott, J.H., 'The Spanish Conquest and settlement of America', in Leslie Bethell (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Latin America* (11 vols., 1984-95), i.147-206

Elliott, J.H., 'Spain and its Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', in J.H. Elliott, *Spain and its World 1500-1700* (New Haven, 1989), pp. 7-26

Elliott, J.H., 'Learning from the Enemy: Early Modern Britain and Spain', in J.H. Elliott, *Spain, Europe and the Wider World 1500-1800* (New Haven, 2009), pp. 25-51

Eltis, David, *The Military Revolution in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London, 1995)

Fagel, Raymond, 'Alejandro Farnesio y Francisco Verdugo: La Guerra en el Noreste', *Tiempos Modernos* 35 (2017), pp. 14-29

Fagel, Raymond, *Protagonists of War: Spanish Army Commanders and the Revolt in the Low Countries* (Leuven, 2021)

Falls, Cyril, *Mountjoy: Elizabethan General* (London, 1995)

Falls, Cyril, *Elizabeth's Irish Wars* (London, 1996)

Fantoni, Marcello (ed.), *Il "Perfetto Capitano": Immagini e Realta? (secoli XV-XVII)* (Rome, 2001)

Federici, Marco, 'Teoría y práctica de la guerra: Francisco de Pedrosa y un episodio sobre la toma de África', *Studia Aurea* 14 (2020), pp. 395-420

Feld, M.D., 'Middle-Class Society and the Rise of Military Professionalism: The Dutch Army 1589-1609', *Armed Forces and Society*, 1/4 (1975), pp. 419-42

Felkel, Robert W., 'El *Tratado del Esfuerzo Bélico Heroico* de Juan López Palacios Rubios: ¿Una Fuente del *Quijote*?', *Anales Cervantinos*, 28 (1990), pp. 45-62

Ferguson, Arthur B., *The Indian Summer of English Chivalry: Studies in the Decline and Transformation of Chivalric Idealism* (Durham, 1960)

Ferguson, Arthur B., *The Chivalric Tradition in Renaissance England* (Washington, 1986)

Fernández Conti, Santiago, 'El Prior Don Hernando de Toledo, capitan de Felipe II y de sus consejos de estado y guerra', in Marcello Fantoni (ed.), *Il "Perfetto Capitano": Immagini e Realta? (secoli XV-XVII)* (Rome, 2001)

Fernández-Santamaria, J.A., *The State, War and Peace: Spanish political thought in the Renaissance, 1516-1559* (Cambridge, 1997)

Firth, C.H., 'A Ballad History of the Reigns of the Later Tudors', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3 (1909), pp. 51-124.

Fissel, Mark Charles, *English Warfare, 1511-1642* (London, 2001)

Fissel, Mark Charles (ed.), *The Military Revolution and Revolutions in Military Affairs* (Berlin, 2023)

Fuchs, Barbara, *The Poetics of Piracy: Emulating Spain in English Literature* (Philadelphia, 2013)

Gajda, Alexandra, 'Debating War and Peace in Late Elizabethan England', *The Historical Journal*, 52/4 (December 2009), pp. 851-78

Gajda, Alexandra, *The Earl of Essex and Late Elizabethan Political Culture* (Oxford, 2012)

Gastañaga Ponce de León, José Luis, *Caballero Noble Desbaratado: Autobiografía e Invención en el siglo XVI* (West Lafayette, 2012)

Gat, Azar, *The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz* (Oxford, 1989)

Geldof, Mark R., 'The Pike and the Printing Press: Military Handbooks and the Gentrification of the Early Modern Military Revolution', in Matthew McLean and Sara Barker (eds.), *International Exchange in the Early Modern Book World* (Leiden, 2016), pp. 147-68

Glete, Jan, *War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States* (Abingdon, 2002)

Goetz, Rainer H., *Spanish Golden Age Autobiography in its Context* (New York, 1994)

Goldring, Elizabeth, 'The Funeral of Sir Philip Sidney and the Politics of Elizabethan Festival', in Mulryne, J.R. and Goldring, Elizabeth (eds.), *Court Festivals of the European Renaissance: Art, Politics and Performance* (London, 2017), pp. 199-224

Gordon, Andrew, *The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (London, 2005)

Greenblatt, Stephen, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: from More to Shakespeare* (Chicago, 2005)

Grummitt, David, *The Calais Garrison: War and Military Service in England, 1436-1558* (Woodbridge, 2008)

Gunn, Steven, 'Chivalry and the Politics of the Early Tudor Court', in Sydney Anglo (ed.), *Chivalry in the Renaissance* (Woodbridge, 1990), pp. 107-28

Gunn, Steven, Grummitt, David, and Cools, Hans, *War, State, and Society in England and the Netherlands 1477-1559* (Oxford, 2007)

Gunn, Steven, Grummitt, David, and Cools, Hans, 'War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Widening the Debate', *War in History*, 15/4 (2008), pp. 371-88

Gunn, Steven, *The English People at War in the Age of Henry VIII* (Oxford, 2018)

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, tr. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, 1989)

Hale, J.R., *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983)

Hale, J.R., 'On a Tudor Parade Ground: The Captain's Handbook of Henry Barrett 1562', in J.R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983), pp. 247-84

Hale, J.R., 'The Military Education of the Officer Class in Early Modern Europe', in J.R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983), 225-46

Hale, J.R., ‘Printing and the Military Culture of Renaissance Venice’, in J.R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983), pp. 429-70

Hale, J.R., *War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620* (New York, 1985), pp. 247-84

Hale, J.R, ‘Women and War in the Visual Arts of the Renaissance’, in J.R. Mulryne and Margaret Shewring (eds.), *War, Literature and the Arts in Sixteenth Century Europe* (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 43-62

Hall, Bert S., *Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology and Tactics* (Baltimore, 1997)

Hammer, Paul E.J., *The Polarisation of Elizabethan Politics: the political career of Robert Devereux, 2nd Earl of Essex, 1585-1597* (Cambridge, 1999)

Hammer, Paul E.J., *Elizabeth’s Wars: War, Government and Society in Tudor England 1544-1604* (Basingstoke, 2003)

Hanlon, Gregory, *European Military Rivalry, 1500-1750: Fierce Pageant* (Abingdon, 2020)

Harari, Yuval Noah, *Renaissance Military Memoirs: War, History and Identity, 1450-1600* (Woodbridge, 2004)

Harari, Yuval Noah, ‘Military Memoirs: A Historical Overview of the Genre from the Middle Ages to the Late Modern Era’, *War in History*, 14/3 (2007)

Harari, Yuval N., *The Ultimate Experience: Battlefield Revelations and the Making of Modern War Culture, 1450-2000* (Basingstoke, 2008)

Harden, Faith S., *Arms and Letters: Military Life Writing in Early Modern Spain* (Toronto, 2020)

Heale, Elizabeth, ‘The fruits of war: The voice of the soldier in Gascoigne, Rich, and Churchyard’, *Early Modern Literary Studies*, 14/1/18 (2008), pp. 1-39

Henry, L.W., ‘The Earl of Essex as Strategist and Military Organizer (1596-7)’, *The English Historical Review*, 68/268 (1953), pp. 363-93

Heuser, Beatrice, *The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz* (Santa Barbara, 2010)

Heuser, Beatrice, *Strategy Before Clausewitz: Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400-1830* (London, 2017)

Hewerdine, Anita, *The Yeomen of the Guard and the Early Tudors: the formation of a royal bodyguard* (London, 2012)

Hutson, Lorna, *England’s Insular Imagining: The Elizabethan Erasure of Scotland* (Cambridge, 2023)

Hwang Degenhardt, Jane, ‘Foreign Worlds‘, in Arthur F. Kinney (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Shakespeare* (Oxford, 2012), pp. 433-57

Imhof, Dirk, ‘Las Ediciones Españoles de la Officina Plantiniana’, in Werner Thomas and Eddy Stols (eds.), *Un Mundo Sobre Papel: Libros y Grabados Flamencos en el Imperio Hispanoportugués (Siglos XVI-XVIII)* (Louvain, 2009), pp. 63-82

Jackson, Clare, *Devil-Land: England under Siege, 1588-1688* (London, 2021)

James, Mervyn, ‘English politics and the concept of honour, 1485-1642’, in Mervyn James, *Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 308-415

James, Mervyn, ‘At a crossroads of the political culture: the Essex revolt, 1601’, in Mervyn James, *Society, Politics and Culture: Studies in Early Modern England* (Cambridge, 1986), pp. 416-66

Jardine, Lisa, and Grafton, Anthony, ‘“Studied for Action”: How Gabriel Harvey read his Livy’, *Past & Present*, 129 (1990), pp. 30-78

Jones, Robert W. and Coss, Peter R. (eds.), *A Companion to Chivalry* (Woodbridge, 2019)

Jorgensen, Paul A., *Shakespeare’s Military World* (Berkeley, 1956)

Kaeuper, Richard W., *Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe* (Oxford, 2001)

Kaeuper, Richard W., *Medieval Chivalry* (Cambridge, 2016)

Kagan, Richard L., *Lucrecia’s Dreams: Politics and Prophecy in Sixteenth-Century Spain* (Berkeley, 1995)

Kagan, Richard L., *Clio and the Crown: The Politics of History in Medieval and Early Modern Spain* (Baltimore, 2009)

Kamen, Henry, *Spain’s Road to Empire: the Making of a World Power 1492-1763* (London, 2003)

Kamen, Henry, *The Duke of Alba* (New Haven, 2004)

Kamen, Henry, *Spain, 1469-1714: A Society of Conflict*, 4th edn. (Abingdon, 2014)

Kaeuper, Richard W., *Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry* (Philadelphia, 2009)

Kane, Brendan, *The Politics and Culture of Honour in Britain and Ireland, 1541-1641* (Cambridge, 2010)

Keen, Maurice, *Chivalry* (New Haven, 1984)

Knecht, Robert J., ‘Military Autobiographies in Sixteenth-Century France’, in J.R. Mulryne and Margaret Shewring (eds.), *War, Literature and the Arts in Sixteenth Century Europe* (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 3-21

Knox, MacGregor and Murray, Williamson (eds.) *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050* (Cambridge, 2001)

Kuijpers, Erika, and van der Haven, Cornelis (eds.), *Battlefield Emotions 1500-1800: Practices, Experience, Imagination* (London, 2016)

Langsam, Geoffrey G., *Martial Books and Tudor Verse* (New York, 1951)

Lawrence, David R., *The Complete Soldier: Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603-1645* (Leiden, 2009)

Lawrence, David R., 'Reappraising the Elizabethan and Early Stuart Soldier: Recent Historiography on Early Modern English Military Culture', *History Compass*, 9/1 (2011), pp. 16-33

Lenman, Bruce, *England's Colonial Wars 1550-1688* (Harlow, 2001)

de León, Fernando González, '"Doctors of the Military Discipline": Technical Expertise and the Paradigm of the Spanish Soldier in the Early Modern Period', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 27/1 (1996), pp. 61-85

de León, Fernando González, and Parker, Geoffrey, 'The grand strategy of Philip II and revolt of the Netherlands', in Darby, Graham (ed.), *The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt* (Abingdon, 2001), pp. 107-132.

de León, Fernando González, '*Soldados Platicos* and *Caballeros*: The Social Dimension of Ethics in the Early Modern Spanish Army', in D.J.B. Trim (ed.), *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism* (Leiden, 2003), pp. 235-68

de León, Fernando González, 'Spanish Military Power and the Military Revolution', in Geoff Mortimer (ed.), *Early Modern Military History, 1450-1815* (Basingstoke, 2004), pp. 25-42

de León, Fernando González, *The Road to Rocroi: Class, Culture and Command in the Spanish Army of Flanders, 1567-1659* (Leiden, 2009)

Leonard, Irving A., *Books of the Brave: being an account of books and of men in the Spanish Conquest and settlement of the sixteenth-century New World* (Berkeley, 1992)

Lewis, Katherine, *Kingship and Masculinity in Late Medieval England* (London, 2013)

Lynch, John, *Spain, 1516-1598: From Nation State to World Empire* (Cambridge, 1992)

Lynn, John, 'The Evolution of Army Style in the Modern West, 800-2000', *The International History Review*, 18/3 (August 1996), pp. 505-45

Lynn, John, *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture*, 2nd edn. (New York, 2008)

Lynn, John A., *Women, Armies, and Warfare in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2008)

MacMahon, Luke, 'Chivalry, Military Professionalism and the Early Tudor Army in Renaissance Europe: A Reassessment', in D.J.B. Trim (ed.), *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism* (Leiden, 2003), pp. 183-212

Malcolm, Noel, *Useful Enemies: Islam and the Ottoman Empire in Western Political Thought, 1450-1750* (Oxford, 2019)

Maltby, William S., *The Black Legend in England: The Development of anti-Spanish Sentiment, 1558-1660* (Durham, 1971)

Maltby, William S., *Alba: A Biography of Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, Third Duke of Alba 1507-1582* (Berkeley, 1983)

Manning, Roger B., *Swordsmen: The Martial Ethos in the Three Kingdoms* (Oxford, 2003)

Manning, Roger B., *An Apprenticeship in Arms: The Origins of the British Army 1585-1702* (Oxford, 2006)

Marino, Nancy F., 'The "Romance de Carlos V" and the Emperor's Imperial Propaganda Machine', *Calíope*, 19/2 (2014), pp. 35-49

Martin, Colin, and Parker, Geoffrey, *Armada: The Spanish Enterprise and England's Deliverance in 1588* (New Haven, 2022)

Martínez, Miguel, *Front Lines: Soldiers' Writing in the Early Modern Hispanic World* (Philadelphia, 2016)

Mayer, Thomas F., and Woolf, D.R., *The Rhetorics of Life-Writing in Early Modern Europe: Forms of Biography from Cassandra Fedele to Louis XIV* (Ann Arbor, 1995)

McCoy, Richard C., *The Rites of Knighthood: the Literature and Politics of Elizabethan Chivalry* (Berkeley, 1989)

McGurk, John, *The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland* (Manchester, 1997)

McGurk, John, 'Terrain and Conquest 1600-1603', in Padraig Lenihan (ed.), *Conquest and Resistance: War in Seventeenth-Century Ireland* (Leiden, 2001)

Merino Peral, Ester, *El arte militar en la época moderna: los tratados "de re militari" en el Renacimiento, 1536-1671: aspetos de un arte español* (Madrid, 2002)

Merriman, Marcus, 'James Henrison and 'Great Britain': British Union and the Scottish Commonwealth', in Mason, Roger A. (ed.), *Scotland and England 1286-1815* (Edinburgh, 1987), pp. 85-102

Millán, José Martinez, 'The Duke of Alba in the Court of Charles V and Philip II', in Ebben, Maurits, Lacy-Bruijn, Margriet, and van Hövell tot Westerflier, Rolof (eds.), *Alba: General and Servant to the Crown* (Rotterdam, 2013), pp. 72-89

Millar, Gilbert John, *Tudor Mercenaries and Auxiliaries, 1485-1547* (Charlottesville, 1980)

Miller, Helen, *Henry VIII and the English Nobility* (Oxford, 1986)

Morgan, Hiram (ed.), *Political Ideology in Ireland, 1541-1641* (Dublin, 1999)

Mulcahy, Rosemarie, 'The Manifestation of his Magnificence: The Third Duke of Alba and the Arts', in Ebben, Maurits, Lacy-Bruijn, Margriet, and van Hövell tot Westerflier, Rolof (eds.), *Alba: General and Servant to the Crown* (Rotterdam, 2013), pp. 136-67

Murphy, Neil, 'Violence, Colonization, and Henry VIII's Conquest of France, 1544-1546', *Past & Present*, 233 (November, 2016), pp. 13-51.

Murphy, Neil, *The Tudor Occupation of Boulogne: Conquest, Colonisation and Imperial Monarchy* (Cambridge, 2019)

Murrin, Michael, *History and Warfare in Renaissance Epic* (Chicago, 1994)

Nájera, Luna, 'The Deployment of the Classics in Early Modern Spanish Military Manuals', *The Sixteenth Century Journal*, 46/3 (2015), pp. 607-27

Nall, Catherine, *Reading and War in Fifteenth-Century England: From Lydgate to Malory* (Cambridge, 2012)

Nayer, Sheila J., 'Arms *or* the Man I: Gunpowder Technology and the Early Modern Romance', *Studies in Philology*, 114/3 (Summer 2017), pp. 517-60

Nicolas, N. H., *Testamenta Vetusta: Bring Illustrations from Wills of Manners, Customs, &c…* (2 vols., London, 1826)

Nimwegen, Olaf van, 'The transformation of army organisation in early-modern western Europe, c.1500-1789', in Frank Tallett and D.J.B. Trim (eds.), *European Warfare, 1350-1750* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 159-80

Nolan, John S., 'The Militarization of the Elizabethan State', *The Journal of Military History*, 58/3 (1994), pp. 391-420

Nolan, John S., *Sir John Norreys and the Elizabethan Military World* (Exeter, 1997)

Norris, M. M., 'The 2nd Earl of Rutland's Band of Men-at-Arms, 1551-2', *Historical Research*, 68/165 (1995), pp. 100-16

Oestreich, Gerhard, ed. Brigitta Oestreich and H. G. Koenigsberger, tr. David McLintock, *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State* (Cambridge, 1982)

Oman, Sir Charles, *A History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1937)

Osborne, James M., *Young Philip Sidney, 1572-1577* (New Haven, 1072)

Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2004)

Palau y Dulcet, Antonio, *Manual del Librero Hispano-Americano. Bibliografía General Española e Hispano-Americana desde la invención de la imprenta hasta nuestros tiempos con el valor comercial de los impresos descritos*, 2nd edn. (28 vols., Barcelona, 1948-77)

Parker, Geoffrey, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660- A Myth?', in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder, 1995), pp. 37-54

Parker, Geoffrey, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 1996)

Parker, Geoffrey, *The Grand Strategy of Philip II* (New Haven, 1998)

Parker, Geoffrey, *The Dutch Revolt* (Rev. edn., London, 2002)

Parker, Geoffrey, *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries' Wars*, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, 2004)

Parker, Geoffrey, 'The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy', *The Journal of Military History*, 71/2 (2007), pp. 331-72

Parker, Geoffrey, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change & Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century* (New Haven, 2014)

Parker, Geoffrey, *Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II* (New Haven, 2014)

Parker, Geoffrey, *Emperor: A New Life of Charles V* (New Haven, 2019)

Parrott, David, *Richelieu's Army: War, Government, and Society in France, 1624-1642* (Cambridge, 2001)

Parrott, David, 'Cultures of Combat in the *Ancien Régime*: Linear Warfare, Noble Values, and Entrepreneurship', *The International History Review*, 27/3 (2005), pp. 518-33

Parrott, David, *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 2012)

Pastor Bodmer, Beatriz, *Discursos Narrativos de la Conquista: Mitificación y Emergencia*, 2nd edn. (Hanover, 1988)

Phillips, Gervase, *The Anglo-Scots Wars 1513-1550: A Military History* (Woodbridge, 1999)

Pintacuda, Paolo, 'Sobre los dos versions del *Sitio y toma de Amberes* de Miguel Giner', in Paolo Pintacuda (ed.), *Le Vie dell'epica Ispanica* (Lecce, 2014), pp. 95-122

Pistor, Christian, Behiels, Lieve, and Thomas, Werner, 'Translation, Court Networks, and the fashioning of an Imperial image: Charles V and the work of Luis de Ávila y Zúñiga', *Bibliothèque d'Humanisme et Renaissance*, 75/2 (2013), pp. 271-90

Pollard, Anthony J., 'English Chivalry and the Decline of Strenuous Knighthood in the Later Fifteenth Century', in in Craig M. Nakashian and Daniel P. Franke, *Prowess, Piety, and Public Order in Medieval Society: Studies in Honor of Richard W. Kaeuper* (Leiden, 2017), pp. 140-58

Popper, Nicholas, 'Virtue and Providence: Perceptions of Ancient Roman Warfare in Early Modern England', *The Huntington Library Quarterly*, 83/3 (October 2020), pp. 519-42

Potter, David, *Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c.1480-1560* (Woodbridge, 2008)

Predonzani, Massimo, and Miller, Simon, *The Battle of Ceresole 1544- The Crushing Defeat of the Imperial Army (The Italian Wars Vol.4)* (Warwick, 2022)

Prescott, William H., ed. Albert D. McJoynt, *The Art of War in Spain: The Conquest of Granada 1481-1492* (London, 1995)

Pryce, Huw, *Writing Welsh History: From the Early Middle Ages to the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford, 2022)

Puddu, Raffaele, *El Soldado Gentilhombre* (Barcelona, 1984)

Quatrefages, René, *Los Tercios Españoles (1567-1577)* (Madrid, 1979)

Quatrefages, René, 'The Military System of the Spanish Habsburgs', in Rafael Bañón Martínez and Thomas Mack Barker (eds.), *Armed Forces and Society in Spain Past and Present* (Boulder, 1988), pp. 1-50

Quatrefages, René, 'La Spécificité Militaire Espagnole', in Jean-Pierre Amalric (ed.), *Pouvoir et Société dans l'Espagne Moderne* (Toulouse, 2019), pp. 39-53

Rabinow, Paul (ed.), *The Foucault Reader* (New York, 1984)

Rapple, Rory, *Martial Power and Elizabethan Political Culture: Military Men in England and Ireland, 1558-1594* (Cambridge, 2009)

Rapple, Rory, 'Brazen as Falstaff, Devious as Iago: Sir Ralph Lane's Approach to Holding Office in Ireland and Virginia', *The Journal of British Studies*, 62/2 (April 2023), pp. 390-417

Rapple, Rory, 'Ideas and Realities in the Elizabethan Experience of Colonizing Ireland and America', *The William and Mary Quarterly*, 80/3 (July 2023), pp. 443-52

Rauschenbach, Sina, and Windler, Christian (eds.), *Reforming Early Modern Monarchies: The Castilian* Arbitristas *in Comparative Perspective* (Weisbaden, 2016)

Raymond, James, *Henry VIII's Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-century Britain and Europe* (London, 2007)

Real Academia de la Historia, *Diccionario Biográfico Español* (50 vols., Madrid, 2009)

Real Academia de la Historia, *Historia Hispánica*, 'Beltrán de la Cueva de Álvarez y Toledo', https://historia-hispanica.rah.es/biografias/12839-beltran-de-la-cueva-y-alvarez-de-toledo, retrieved 18/02/2025

Redworth, Glyn, 'Where Were the English? Antoon Van Den Wijngaerde, the Evidence of Visual Clture, and the 1557 Siege of Saint-Quentin', in Sáez-Hidalgo, Ana, and Cano-Echevarría, Berta (eds.) *Exile, Diplomacy and Texts: Exchanges between Iberia and the British Isles, 1500-1767* (Leiden, 2021), pp. 15-31

Ribot García, Luis, 'Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain', in Philippe Contamine (ed.), *War and Competition between States* (Oxford, 2000), pp. 37-68

Roberts, Michael, 'The Military Revolution, 1560-1660', in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder, 1995), pp. 13-35

Rodriguez-Alvarez, Alicia, ''Most of our termes now used in warre are derived from straungers': Robert Barret's Glossary of Military Terms in *The Theorike and Practike of Moderne Warres* (1598)', *International Journal of Lexicography*, 37 (2024), pp. 95-116

Rogers, Clifford J. (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder, 1995)

Rogers, Clifford J., 'The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years War', in Clifford J. Rogers (ed.), *The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe* (Boulder, 1995), pp. 55-93

Roy, Ian, 'The Profession of Arms', in Wilfrid Prest (ed.), *The Professions in Early Modern England* (London, 1987), pp. 181-219

Royal Irish Academy, *Dictionary of Irish Biography* (9 vols., Cambridge, 2009)

Rusakovskiy, Oleg, *European Military Books and Intellectual Cultures of War in 17th-Century Russia: From Translation to Adaptation* (Leiden, 2024)

Sánchez Jiménez, Antonio, *El Sansón de Extremadura: Diego García de Paredes en la literature española del siglo xvi* (Newark, 2006)

Sánchez de Toca, José María, and Martínez Laínez, Fernando, *El Gran Capitan* (Madrid, 2008)

Saul, Nigel, *For Honour and Fame: Chivalry in England, 1066-1500* (London, 2011)

Scannell, Paul, *Conflict and Soldiers' Literature in Early Modern Europe: The Reality of War* (London, 2015)

Schurink, Fred, 'War, What is it Good For? Sixteenth-Century English Translations of Ancient Texts on Warfare', in Sara K. Barker and Brenda M. Hosington (eds.), *Renaissance Cultural Crossroads: Translation, Print and Culture in Britain, 1473-1640* (Leiden, 2013), pp. 121-38

Seger, Donna A., *The Practical Renaissance: Information Culture and the Quest for Knowledge in Early Modern England* (London, 2022)

Sessions, W. A., *Henry Howard the Poet Earl of Surrey: A Life* (Oxford, 1999)

Sharpe, Kevin, *Selling the Tudor Monarchy: Authority and Image in Sixteenth-Century England* (New Haven, 2009)

Shaw, Christine, and Mallett, Michael, *The Italian Wars 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe*, 2nd edn. (Abingdon, 2019)

Shepard, Alan Clarke, 'William Patten's *Expedition of Somerset into Scotland* (1547) as English Imperial Discourse', *Scottish Literary Journal* 22/1 (May, 1995), pp. 22-34.

Shepard, Alexandra, *Meanings of Manhood in Early Modern England* (Oxford, 2003)

Sherer, Idan, *Warriors for a Living: The Experience of the Spanish Infantry in the Italian Wars, 1494-1559* (Leiden, 2017)

Sherer, Idan, '"¿Qué te parece Cliterio? ¿Quieres todavía ser soldado?": Diego Núñez Alba's *Diálogos de la vida del soldado* (1552) and soldiering in early modern Spain', *Journal of Spanish Cultural Studies*, 19/4 (2018), pp. 393-406

Sherer, Idan, *The Scramble for Italy: Continuity and Change in the Italian Wars, 1494-1559* (Abingdon, 2021)

Sherer, Idan, 'The *Tratado de las Campañas* of Martin García Cerezeda: military life writing and self-advancement in the memoirs of a sixteenth-century Spanish veteran', *Journal of Medieval Iberian Studies*, 17/1 (October 2024), pp. 117-38

Showalter, Dennis E., 'Caste, Skill, and Training: The evolution of cohesion in European armies from the Middle Ages to the Sixteenth Century', *The Journal of Military History*, 57/3 (1993), pp. 407-30

Smuts, Malcolm, 'Organized Violence in the Elizabethan Martial Republic', *History*, 99/336 (July 2014), pp. 418-43

Smuts, R. Malcolm, *Political Culture, the State, and the Problem of Religious War in Britain and Ireland, 1578-1625* (Oxford, 2023)

Sowerby, Tracey A., *Renaissance and Reform in Tudor England: The Careers of Sir Richard Morison* (Oxford, 2010)

Stone, Lawrence, 'The political programme of Thomas Cromwell', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research*, 24/69 (1951), pp. 1-18

Stone, Lawrence, *The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558-1641* (Oxford, 1965)

Strong, Roy, 'Fair England's Knights: The Accession Day Tournaments', in Roy Strong, *The Cult of Elizabeth: Elizabethan Portraiture and Pageantry* (London, 1999), pp. 129-63.

Taithe, Bertrand, and Thornton, Tim, *War: Identities in Conflict, 1300-2000* (Stroud, 1998)

Tallett, Frank and Trim, D.J.B., *European Warfare, 1350-1750* (Cambridge, 2010)

Taylor, F.L., *The Art of War in Italy, 1494-1529* (London, 1993)

Terry, Arthur, 'War and Literature in Sixteenth-Century Spain', in J.R. Mulryne and Margaret Shewring (eds.), *War, Literature and the Arts in Sixteenth Century Europe* (Basingstoke, 1989), pp. 101-18

Thomas, Keith, *The Ends of Life: Roads to Fulfilment in Early Modern England* (Oxford, 2009)

Thompson, I.A.A., *War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620* (London, 1976)

Thompson, I.A.A., ‘The Armada and administrative reform: The Spanish council of war in the reign of Philip II’, in I.A.A. Thompson, *Crown and Cortes: Government, Institutions and Representation in Early-Modern Castile* (Aldershot, 1993)

Tipton, Alzada, ‘“All mens eyes are fixed vpon you”: Dedications of Printed Works to the Earl of Essex and the Creation of Essex’s Public Persona’, *Sixteenth Century Journal*, LII/1 (2021), pp. 111-32

Tracy, James D., *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance, and Domestic Politics* (Cambridge, 2002)

Trim, D.J.B., *The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism* (Leiden, 2003)

Trim, David, ‘Calvinist Internationalism and the English Officer Corps, 1562-1642’. *History Compass*, 4/6 (2006), pp. 1024-48

Trim, D.J.B., ‘The Art of War: Martial Poetics from Henry Howard to Philip Sidney’, in Mike Pincombe and Cathy Shrank (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Tudor Literature: 1485-1603* (Oxford, 2009), pp. 587-605

Trim, D.J.B., ‘Conflict, religion, and ideology’, in Tallett, Frank and Trim, D.J.B., *European Warfare, 1350-1750* (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 278-99.

Trim, D.J.B., ‘‘Warlike prowess and manly courage’: Martial Conduct and Masculine Identity in Late Tudor and Early Stuart England, in Matthew Woodcock and Cian O’Mahony (eds.), *Early Modern Military Identities* (Woodbridge, 2019), pp. 25-55

Trimble, William Raleigh, ‘Early Tudor Historiography, 1485-1548’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 11/1 (1950), pp. 30-41

Vale, Malcolm, *War and Chivalry: Warfare and Aristocratic Culture in England, France and Burgundy at the End of the Middle Ages* (London, 1981)

Verrier, Frédérique, *Les Armes de Minerve: l’Humanisme Militaire dans l’Italie du XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1997)

Webb, Henry J., *Elizabethan Military Science: The Books and the Practice* (Madison, 1965)

White, Lorraine, ‘The Experience of Spain’s Early Modern Soldiers: Combat, Welfare and Violence’, *War in History*, 9/1 (2002), pp. 1-38

Wilkinson, Alexander S. (ed.), *Iberian Books: Books published in Spanish or Portuguese or on the Iberian Peninsula before 1601* (Leiden, 2010)

Williamson, Arthur, ‘The Rise and Decline of the British “Patriot”: Civic Britain, c.1545-1605’, *The International Review of Scottish Studies*, 36 (2011), pp. 7-32

Williamson, Arthur, ‘The Commonwealth Refounded: the British Vision in its Edwardian Moment, 1547-50’, in Neil McIntyre and Alison Cathcart (eds.), *Scotland and the Wider World: Essays in Honour of Allan I. Macinnes* (Woodbridge, 2022), pp. 21-33

Wilson, Peter H., ‘German Women and War, 1500-1800’, *War in History*, 3/2 (1996), pp. 127-60

Wilson, Peter H., ‘Of ‘Master’ and ‘Grand Narratives’ and Their Discontents: Early Modern European Military History’, *War & Society*, 42/1 (2023), pp. 90-8

Wilson, Peter H., *Iron and Blood: A Military History of the German-Speaking Peoples Since 1500* (London, 2022)

Wilson-Lee, Edward, ‘Romance and resistance: narratives of chivalry in mid-Tudor England’, *Renaissance Studies*, 24/4 (2010), pp. 482-95

Woodcock, Matthew, *Thomas Churchyard: Pen, Sword, and Ego* (Oxford, 2016)

Woodcock, Matthew, and O’Mahony, Cian (eds.), *Early Modern Military Identities* (Woodbridge, 2019)

Woodcock, Matthew, ‘Introduction’, in Matthew Woodcock and Cian O’Mahony (eds.), *Early Modern Military Identities* (Woodbridge, 2019), pp. 1-22

Woodcock, Matthew, ‘The End of Chivalry? Survivals and Revivals of the Tudor Age’, in Robert W. Jones and Peter R. Coss (eds.), *A Companion to Chivalry* (Woodbridge, 2019), pp. 281-300

Wooding, Lucy, *Tudor England: A History* (New Haven, 2022)

Worden, Blair, *The Sound of Virtue: Philip Sidney’s Arcadia and Elizabethan Politics* (New Haven, 1996)

Wright, Louis B., *Middle-Class Culture in Elizabethan England* (Chapel Hill, 1935)

Yates, Frances A., ‘Elizabethan Chivalry: The Romance of the Accession Day Tilts’, *Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes*, 20/1/2 (1957), pp. 4-25

Younger, Neil, *War and Politics in the Elizabethan Counties* (Manchester, 2012)

Unpublished Theses

Adams, S., ‘The Protestant Cause: Religious Alliance with the West European Calvinist Communities as a Political Issue in England, 1585-1630’ (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1973)

Buchanan. C., ‘The Massacre of St. Bartholemew’s (24-27 August 1572) and the Sack of Antwerp (4-7 November 1576): Print and Political Responses in Elizabethan England’ (Ph.D. thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011)

Goring, J.J., ‘The Military Obligations of the English People 1511-1558’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1955)

Quatrefages, R., ‘*L’organisation militaire de l’Espagne* (1492-1592)’ (Ph.D. thesis, *Université de Lille*, 1989)

Tattenberg, J., ‘The Structural Transformation of the Military Public Sphere: War, Knowledge, and Military Elites in West Germany, 1940-1989’ (D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2021)

Trim, D., ‘Fighting ‘Jacob’s Warres’: English and Welsh mercenaries in the European wars of religion: France and the Netherlands’ (Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 2003)