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Why do Chinese Representatives at the United Nations General Assembly Deploy Undiplomatic Language in Their Speeches, 1971-2020?

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1. Introduction

'The UN is the accepted forum for the expression of international hatred!' So the Prime Minister, in the BBC sitcom *Yes, Prime Minister*, was rebuked.[1] Even if not wholly true, there is certainly at least a grain of it in the sentiment, for the broader theme of undiplomatic language in profoundly diplomatic settings forms the mainstay of the phenomenon this thesis investigates.

Inspired by recent statements made by Chinese diplomats dubbed 'wolf warrior diplomats' because of their confrontational and combative stance,[2] this thesis looks to examine the use of undiplomatic language in the context of Chinese diplomacy at the United Nations ("UN").

Puzzle

The puzzle is located in the contrast between expectations—lay and academic—of the conduct of diplomacy and the form of diplomatic language and the reality of the existence of strongly worded statements in the diplomatic sphere. The lay expectation is evinced by pointing to the popular connotations of the term 'diplomatic': subtlety, circumlocution, inoffensiveness even if conflict exists, and politeness. To academics and practitioners, the expectation is grounded in the communicative nature of diplomacy.[3] Originating as envoys sent by one state to another, the practice of diplomacy involves communication, negotiation, the gathering of information, and the smoothing of frictions between sending and receiving states.[4] In three of these four activities it is readily apparent that tact and modesty have crucial roles to play. Indeed, when faced with the 'ignorance and foolishness of his home government', Sir Harold Nicolson advises diplomats to temper the

[1] *Yes, Prime Minister*, 'Season 1 Episode 6'.
[2] Shepherd, 'Provocateur'.
[3] Bjola and Kornprobst, *Understanding*, 6.
[4] Bull, *Anarchical Society*, chap. 7.

'vehemence of instructions he receives' to reduce frictions between the two states.[5] The institution of diplomacy serves not only as a functional maintainer but also symbolic affirmation of the English School's ("ES's") 'international society'; diplomatic language can be said to have a crucial part to play in ensuring the performance of these functions. Refusal to maintain the standard of decorum and tact expected in diplomatic encounters can have unfortunate repercussions: disrupting cooperation, destabilising established practices, or even provoking other states into retributive action.[6] Indeed, China's recent spate of 'wolf warrior' diplomacy with Australia,[7] European states,[8] and the United States ("US")[9] has attracted comment precisely for disrupting China's relations with those states and alienating their governments and populations. But it is not a recent phenomenon: presaging the more recent critique, a 2011 commentator called for a cessation of unprofessional and provocative 'party-style diplomatic language'.[10]

Contributions

This thesis represents a new contribution to debates on Chinese behaviour at international institutions and discussions of norm transgressions more broadly that deploys a novel perspective based on a conceptual framework of undiplomatic language, draws on an originally-compiled database of more than eight hundred speeches delivered over fifty years of UN participation, and adopts a mixed-method approach to systematically and comprehensively examine what the timing and explanation for these transgressions can tell us about Chinese statecraft.

[5] Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 35-36.
[6] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 5.
[7] Dupont, 'Afraid'. Called 'chewing gum on China's shoe' for Prime Minister Scott Morrison's demanding an independent inquiry into the origins of the Coronavirus pandemic.
[8] Hinshaw et. al., 'Pushback'.
[9] Westcott and Jiang, 'China'.
[10] Zhang, 'Dianping'.

This thesis contributes to the discipline not only at the intersection of a burgeoning literature that looks to interrogate Chinese behaviour at the UN as well as the conduct of Chinese diplomacy in general (and as a manifestation of foreign policy),[11] but also in respect of broader understandings of diplomatic discourse and the activities of states at international institutions.[12] This is an important question, not least because of the relatively understudied nature of diplomatic activity and language,[13] but more importantly because China is a 'rising power' whose foreign policy and influence in international politics and international institutions deserves to be studied.[14]

This thesis is also pursuing novelty. Diplomatic language is often dismissed as 'cheap talk' in paradigms of international relations that stress structural explanations of international politics.[15] Yet this fails to account not only for the great interest that has been displayed in recent manifestations of 'wolf warrior' diplomacy as cited above, but the increasing attention that is being paid to diplomatic rhetoric and practice in the 'practice turn' of IR.[16] Even within this emerging literature, however, this thesis' treatment of undiplomatic language represents originality. The only extant substantive examination of this sort of undiplomatic language was a 1990 work on isolated statements made by Soviet and American leaders.[17] Rousseau and Baele, writing in 2020 and addressing 'diplomatic insult', hold that their theoretical framework is 'original' and that, while related dynamics

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[11] Recent examples include Foot, *China* and Fung, *China*, which examine Chinese behaviour at the UN; Hartig, *Public*, examining Chinese 'public diplomacy'; Shambaugh, *China*, a wide-ranging examination of Chinese interactions on the world stage. Further back, Rozman, *China's*, demonstrates the field's preoccupation with Chinese foreign policy.
[12] Such as Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*; Koschut, et. al., 'Discourse'.
[13] Constantinou and Sharp, 'Theoretical', 16-19. Though emotions in diplomatic discourse have increasingly been adopted for study, albeit often in the context of underlying emotive content of foreign policy. See Hall and Ross, 'Rethinking'; Crawford, 'Institutionalizing'; Fattah and Fierke, 'Clash'; Lowenheim and Heimann, 'Revenge', among others.
[14] Framed often in the problem of defining China as a 'status quo' or 'revisionist' power, for example in Legro, 'What China will Want'; Christensen, *China Challenge*.
[15] As outlined in an overview of related studies in Trager, 'Diplomacy'.
[16] Such as Wong, 'One-Upmanship'; Jones, 'Contesting'.
[17] Chilton, 'Politeness'. A similar exercise which concerns non-verbal, ritualistic insult is Wong, 'One-Upmanship'.

such as anger, (dis)honour, and humiliation have been the subject of recent investigation, the deployment of undiplomatic language has still been dismissed as 'occasional breaches of diplomatic norms about civility'.[18]

Question

The question, therefore, is "Why do representatives of the People's Republic of China deploy undiplomatic language at the United Nations General Assembly?".

This thesis' treatment is both original in introducing mixed-methods analysis to this subject, and in the perspective it brings to the systematic examination of the material: over eight hundred speeches made by representatives of the People's Republic of China ("PRC"/"China") at plenary sessions of the General Assembly ("UNGA"). This represents all speeches made at that institution from her accession to the UN in 1971 to the end of September 2020, analysed in the original (Chinese) language.

A literature review will firstly situate undiplomatic language in the context of international diplomacy as a transgression of a well-established norm, and operationalise 'undiplomatic language' with reference to sociolinguistic concepts. Drawing on existing international relations literature to provide possible explanations for the deployment of undiplomatic language, ranging from being a revolutionary power to defending perceived core interests, expected observable outcomes from data analysis will be drawn out and highlighted.

Analysis of the data will firstly be quantitative, conducted to discover circumstantial correlates of the use of undiplomatic language by regression analysis on a Diplomatic Score (measuring 'how diplomatic' each speech was) generated by automated sentiment analysis.

[18] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 2. For diplomatic anger, provocation and other emotions see Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*; Hall, 'Provocation'; Koschut, Hall, et. al., 'Discourse'; Crawford, 'Institutionalizing' and Crawford, 'Passion'; Fattah and Fierke, 'Clash'. For stigma see for example Adler-Nissen, 'Stigma'.

A qualitative examination of specific speeches will follow to interpretively interrogate the purpose and value of the use of undiplomatic language.

Finally, discussing the results of the analysis, I will advance the argument that deployment of undiplomatic language reflects China's **complex relationship with socialisation**. Undiplomatic language deployment, especially in the early and more recent stages of China's engagement with the international order, was predominantly characterised by resistance to and revisionism of international norms; however, deployment could nonetheless manifest as support for other norms, even contemporaneously with this resistance. Moreover, undiplomatic language offers a novel potential perspective from which **what matters to states, and how states view themselves with respect to a broader international order**, can be understood.

2. Literature Review

Examining the literature on diplomacy as an institution, I show that 'undiplomatic language' is a transgression of recognized norms. Examining the sociolinguistic literature and previous treatments of similar phenomena, I outline how 'undiplomatic language' is operationalised and how its deployment may be understood as strategic. Finally, the broader IR literature on state behaviour in international institutions and China's diplomatic history is examined for potential explanations for Chinese deployment of undiplomatic language, with their implications for both quantitative and qualitative analysis illustrated.

Undiplomatic Language

Expectations

The use of undiplomatic language must be treated as an intentional act that transgresses prevailing diplomatic norms.

This thesis aligns with the ES's perspective on diplomacy. The principal insight of the ES was both that an international society could be formed from a pre-existing international system, and that the 19th and 20th centuries had seen the expansion of a western-dominated international society: including to China.[1] Recalling that an international society is 'a group of states…[conceiving] themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another and [sharing] in the working of common institutions',[2] it remains for us to note that diplomacy is one of those 'common institutions' that presupposes, and plays a central role in preserving, the international society.[3] The activity examined, speeches made by Chinese representatives at the UN, is explicitly understood as being within the ES's conception of diplomacy as 'execution' (of

[1] See Bull and Watson, *Expansion*, chaps. 8 and 11.
[2] Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 13
[3] Ibid., chap. 7.

communication);[4] it is also with some of the ES's works that we can step off regarding expectations of diplomatic conduct and language. Bull contends that one of the main functions of diplomacy is the minimisation of frictions which invariably arise in the interaction between independent political communities with different 'values, preoccupations, prejudices and sensibilities'.[5] To this end, an 'ideal diplomatist' observes the conventions of the art: seeking 'always to reason or persuade rather than to bully or threaten', emphasising 'rights [flowing] from rules or principles which both states hold in common', and avoiding 'arguments that…give vent to feelings or…satisfy…pride or vanity'.[6] Diplomatic dialogue is, Watson argued, not only civilised but civilising: based on awareness and respect of another's point of view and aimed at finding mutually acceptable solutions to conflicts of interest.[7]

Examples of the strictness of diplomatic language and the ramifications of transgression abound. In the 14th century BC, when sender placed their name before the addressee's only when they were of equal or superior standing,[8] the following exchange can be observed in the Amarna Letters:

> And now, as to the tablet you sent me, why did you put your name over my name? And who now is the one who upsets the good relations between us, and is such conduct the accepted practice[9]

With the addressee quickly taking offence over what might to the layman seem the slightest of breaches. In 1618, questions of precedence between the Spanish and French ambassadors to the Court of St. James's precipitated the recall of the French envoy and

[4] Ibid., 157.
[5] Ibid., 165.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Watson, *Diplomacy*, 7.
[8] Moran, *Armana*, 116.
[9] Ibid., 115. The translation has been tidied.

the issuance of an ultimatum.[10] History highlights this aspect of the diplomatic practice well.

Indeed, the concern with diplomatic language and the assertion that diplomacy possesses conventions is neither contemporary nor exclusively academic. Other treatises on diplomacy note the importance of diplomatic norms, though couched in the form of a concern for the selection of diplomatic personnel. Aeschines' and Demosthenes' orations in the 4th century BC *The False Embassay* (*Peri Parapresbeias*) reveal a lively concern with the proper functions, character, and conduct of a diplomat.[11] De Callières' 1716 *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains* emphasises that the choice of ambassadors ought to rest with level-headed candidates of a 'correct and piercing discernment' who could be relied on to be rational in their expression of the interests of their sovereign, instead of merely conveying fleeting or superficial passions.[12] Manuals and writing on diplomacy focussed on manners and tact until at least the early 20th century: Sir Ernest Satow's 1917 *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice* devotes a large part of the first ten chapters to matters of protocol, address, and counsel for new entrants to the *corps diplomatique*.[13] Latterly, even other practitioners who focus their comment elsewhere mention at least in passing the import of diplomatic language. The British diplomat Sir Harold Nicolson held that 'modesty, charm, and tact must characterize the diplomat';[14] Holbrooke, recounting the negotiations surrounding the Yugoslavian crisis, contends that 'the normal pattern in international diplomacy [is] of outward cordiality masking animosity'.[15] But the 'outward cordiality'

[10] Jönsson and Hall, *Essence*, 54.
[11] Constantinou and Sharp, 'Theoretical', 14.
[12] De Callières, *Manner*, 9.
[13] See Satow, *Guide*.
[14] Nicolson, *Diplomacy*, 126.
[15] Holbrooke, *War*, 116.

mattered: the shock of a sharp threat to leave and a heavy dose of sarcasm rescued a basis for negotiations in a fraught moment with the Bosnian Serb delegation.[16]

Contemporary introductory works on diplomacy continue to stress the importance of diplomatic language: some have gone as far as to call language an institution itself within the broader institution of diplomacy. Bjola and Kornprobst's *Understanding International Diplomacy* refers to the manners and tact of diplomatic culture as an 'autopoietic' institution, 'taken for granted' but which nonetheless constitutes the 'very institution of diplomacy and the diplomat'.[17] The *SAGE Handbook of Diplomacy* devotes an entire chapter to diplomatic language[18] which again stresses its importance as an institution, illustrated with reference to the unfortunate consequences that arose historically when a diplomatic mien was not observed: Bismarck's provocation of Napoleon III by engineering a perception of neglect to extend customary courtesies to the French envoy led to the declaration of war.[19] Diplomats, Oglesby argues, are 'deeply embedded in a social context that privileges careful, controlled and cautious behaviour', of which diplomatic language is a reflection.[20]

The foregoing has established that there are language norms in diplomacy of which the use of undiplomatic language is a transgression. Within specific diplomatic contexts, especially public, multilateral settings where the communicator and communicated are accredited representatives of their home governments, transgressions of these norms are unavoidably construed as intentional or authorised in light of the gravity of the environment, even if it may not be so. The power of language is largely dependent on context of the Bourdieu-ean 'institution': that is, when it is used by an individual situated

[16] Ibid., 151. In doing so, foreshadowing our discussion of the strategic uses to which transgression of the norm of diplomatic conduct may be put.
[17] Bjola and Kornprobst, *Understanding*, 86.
[18] Oglesby, 'Language'.
[19] Ibid., 243; Hall, 'Provocation'.
[20] Ibid.

in the right social context and legitimately empowered.[21] Hence this thesis' focus on the undiplomatic speech of Chinese representatives making official speeches at the UNGA: a diplomatic venue *par excellence*, especially if undiplomatic language is understood with reference to the capacity of speech to threaten face. In comparison to statements which are made in a domestic setting, e.g. at a press conference, or those made in bilateral settings, such as in face-to-face meetings, the international multilateral nature of the setting not only precludes an understanding that statements are purely for domestic consumption, but also amplifies the loss-of-face with the presence of the broadest audience of diplomatic peers possible.

Framework

Notwithstanding all that has been written about it, 'undiplomatic language' remains vague. Endeavouring to base my operationalisation on first principles, I will nonetheless demonstrate continuity with related treatments in the literature. I operationalise undiplomatic language as: firstly, as those speeches that involve the **commissioning of face-threatening acts targeting specific states, the identity of which is either explicit or clearly implicit**; secondly, as those speeches that **do not involve a minimisation of impolite beliefs and the maximisation of polite beliefs**.

Fundamentally, to be diplomatic is to be respectful. Contemplating the oppositional perspective in a negotiation and looking to achieve an intermediary solution that embraces common interests denotes respect for the adversary's interests as equally legitimate as one's own; smoothing frictions displays consideration for whatever harm one might have advertently or inadvertently caused; couching requests or demands tactfully

[21] Bourdieu, *Language*, 74-75.

involves preserving the opportunity for rejection, respecting the interlocutor's freedom of choice. Therefore, to be undiplomatic is to be disrespectful.

What does it mean to be disrespectful? We draw on sociolinguistic theories of pragmatics and politeness to operationalise this concept. The connection is well appreciated on the other side: introducing their 1987 work on politeness, Brown and Levinson call it 'the model' of formal diplomatic protocol.[22] While our topic encompasses slightly more than mere 'protocol', politeness and the concept of 'face' have been at the centre of the international relations literature that provides the within-discipline precedent of my study.[23] Therefore, it is to those concepts that we turn.

Early attempts to discover the essence of politeness manifested in simple lists of acts which were polite and acts which were not, and progressed onto 'maxims', attempts to offer generalised rules of interactions.[24] These approaches were superseded by Goffman's and Brown and Levinson's concepts of 'face' and politeness as 'face work', on which this thesis' definition of undiplomatic language will be based. For Goffman, 'face-work' was at the centre of social interaction,[25] within which 'face', being 'an image of [the] self delineated in terms of approved social attributes', was to be preserved.[26] But it was not only one's own face that was to be preserved: self-respect and consideration for others meant that 'the person tends to conduct himself during an encounter so as to maintain both his own face and the face of other participants'.[27] This 'tacit cooperation' on the 'front stage' of interactions could, indeed, mask enmity on the 'back stage': but the niceties of social interaction nonetheless demanded at least the external concession to the mutual

[22] Brown and Levinson, *Politeness*, 1.
[23] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults'; Wong, 'One-Upmanship'; Chilton, 'Politeness'. See also Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*, deploying similar concepts of face-work and presentation in discussing the 'diplomacy of anger'.
[24] Brown, 'Politeness', 385.
[25] Goffman, *Ritual*, chap.1.
[26] Ibid., 5.
[27] Ibid., 11.

preservation of face for the interaction to continue.[28] Brown and Levinson further developed the concept of face, understanding it to be a mutually known basic want of every member of society.[29] Divided into positive, the 'want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others' (the desire to be ratified, understood, approved of, etc.), and negative, the 'want of every "competent adult member" that his actions be unimpeded by others' (the politeness of non-imposition), face, this set of wants could moreover only be satisfied by the actions of others.[30] To be disrespectful, therefore, is to be inattentive to these face-wants of one's interlocutors.

It is of mutual interest to both sides to maintain each other's face: however, this is stymied by the occasional necessity of commissioning 'face-threatening acts' that threaten either of these faces. Brown and Levinson therefore construct a typology of 'strategies of politeness': ways of avoiding or minimising the threat-to-face the relevant acts would involve.[31] Doing so relies on recognising the potential threat-to-face a contemplated act involves: Goffman's 'diplomatic fiction of the virtual offence, or worst possible reading' that he highlighted as a constant 'orientation' of participants in a social interaction.[32] In addition to the strategies of not commissioning the face-threatening act and going 'off record', rendering intent ambiguous and acts noncommittal, Brown and Levinson outline three others, depending on the extent to which face is threatened. Firstly, to act 'baldly, without redress': that is, to threaten the interlocutor's face. This is usually only contemplated in when the threat-to-face is small, when the situation requires or allows it, or where the speaker is so dominant over the hearer that they will not lose face themselves.[33] If the threat-to-face is greater, positive politeness (giving positive face, i.e. by

[28] Ibid., 29. There is an interesting parallel here to the English School's understanding of institutions (including diplomacy) as contributing to the perpetuation of the International Society.
[29] Brown and Levinson, *Politeness*, Introduction.
[30] Ibid., 61-62; but see chaps. 2-3 for the full argument.
[31] Ibid., 68ff.
[32] Goffman, *Strategic*, 47ff.
[33] Brown and Levinson, *Politeness*, 69.

treating the interlocutor as a member of an in-group, e.g. by the use of tones or phrases of familiarity) is employed; if it is yet greater still, negative politeness (redressing negative face, i.e. by recognising and respecting the interlocutor's freedoms of action, e.g. apology, deference, use of the impersonal passive) is the preferred strategy.[34] Correspondingly, there are strategies of impoliteness: positive impoliteness (to threaten positive face, e.g. by disassociating from, ascribing negative epithets to, stigmatising the target), and negative impoliteness (to threaten negative face, e.g. to frighten, emphasise relative power, explicitly associate the other with negative aspects).[35]

Drawing on these understandings of politeness, there are adequate grounds for defining the undiplomatic language as **the commissioning of face-threatening speech without attempting to temper it through a strategy of either positive or negative politeness, or by going 'off-the-record'**. In a multilateral environment such as the UNGA, language which is impolite and hence undiplomatic must moreover have a target in order to be face-threatening; hence the additional specification of **a target state, whether explicit or implicit**.

This is a definition similar to what works in the literature have adopted when analysing adjacent concepts of 'insult', 'aggression', and other aspects of diplomatic language. Hall's work on the diplomacy of anger highlights Goffman's sociology of face-work and performance.[36] Chilton, examining 'international communication' in the context of Gorbachev and Reagan's statements on the other's foreign policy, deploys Brown and Levinson's framework to understand their mitigation of face-threatening acts.[37] Wong's

[34] Ibid., 68-71. Brown and Levinson further outlined the way the 'weight' of face threat might be calculated and hence when these strategies would be chosen, involving variables such as social distance, relative power, and the culturally-defined weightiness of the imposition. Yet we are dealing with impoliteness and undiplomatic language, not politeness and diplomatic language: further elaboration is therefore unnecessary.
[35] Culpeper, 'Anatomy'.
[36] Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*, 16-18.
[37] Chilton, 'Politeness'.

examination of the 'aggressive' uses of interaction ritual in international diplomacy rests on an understanding of Goffman's 'interaction order' where face can be mutually preserved but also damaged,[38] not to mention Rousseau and Baele, who set out their understanding of 'insults' in the diplomatic arena with reference to the same concepts of Goffman-ian face-threat and performative social interaction.[39]

This two-fold definition, however, is methodologically reliant on a coder's subjective and qualitative understanding of what 'face threatening acts' are, the linking of face-threats to targets, and the qualification of 'without significant recourse to a strategy of politeness': all of which may introduce uncertainty.[40] Hence, I will regress to one of the 'maxims of politeness' in developing an alternative definition that will be more amenable to quantitative analysis. Leech's 'Politeness Principle' stipulates that politeness is the 'maximisation of positive illocutions' and the 'minimisation of negative illocutions'.[41] 'Goods' (praise, benefits) should be minimised to the self but maximised to the interlocutor, while 'bads' (costs, dispraise) should be inversely accrued; sympathy and agreement should also be highlighted.[42] In this minimising-maximising formulation, if we proxy negatively oriented speech in general for 'bads' as well as antipathy and disagreement, and positively oriented speech in general for 'goods' as well as sympathy and agreement, our speeches become more amenable to dictionary-based sentiment analysis. The precise approach will be outlined in the following chapter.

Norms?

What norms are being transgressed by the deployment of undiplomatic language? I follow Jones in asking the question 'what is China being socialised into', and take up the

[38] Wong, 'One-Upmanship', 4-8.
[39] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 4-5.
[40] Attempts to mitigate uncertainty are described in chapter 3.
[41] Leech, *Principles*, 83-84.
[42] Ibid., 132.

distinction between the first-order norms of the *ideas* of an international order and the second-order norms of the *practices* of the same.[43] The norm of diplomatic language, as discussed above, is manifestly a second-order norm.

Evidence suggests China's representatives, at least from the beginning of her participation at the UN and in virtue of the long anticipatory period from the foundation of the PRC in 1949 to its accession in 1971, understood this norm. This can be seen even without referencing the long story of China's entrance into the international society or the shorter story of the diplomatic history of China before the accession in 1971.[44] Empirically, it is evidenced by the proportion of speeches, especially from the 1990s onward,[45] that do not contain undiplomatic language as defined above. But it is also evidenced by the literature emerging from the Chinese academy, which highlight the diplomatic and 'polite' features of Chinese diplomatic speech. Prominently, Hei examines the transition in diplomatic translation activity in China from a prioritisation of politeness to an 'equal weighting of politeness and efficiency' (*limao xiaolü bingzhong*) to match a 'new reality in diplomatic work' (*waijiaogongzuo xinchangtai*), retrospectively highlighting a prevailing commitment to the use of diplomatic language.[46] Others have highlighted the 'vagueness' in historic and contemporary examples of Chinese diplomatic language, including documents as far back as the 1971 Joint Communique, and examined them in light of the pragmatic framework, citing Grice and Brown and Levinson.[47] Still others have surmised that Chinese diplomatists are both well aware of the subtlety inherent in diplomatic speech and regularly deploy turns of phrase and verbal formulations capable of being understood within the framework of politeness when speaking diplomatically.[48]

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[43] Jones, 'Contesting', 111-113.
[44] Bull and Watson, *Expansion*; chaps. 11, 17.
[45] See Appendix F, Figure AF.1.
[46] Hei, 'Waijiaoyuyan'.
[47] Guo and Zheng, 'Waijiaoyuyan'; Xu, 'Pragmatic'; Wei, 'Waijiaoyuyan'.
[48] Guo and Wang, 'Preciseness'; Li, 'Zhongguo'; Chen, 'Waijiaoyuyan'; Zhang, 'Analysis'.

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Diplomatic language is a norm in diplomacy. Therefore, undiplomatic language—defined as face-threat with a specific target without recourse to strategies of politeness—is impactful, and an instrument by which the potential motivations we examine later can manifest on the international stage.

Strategic Uses of Undiplomatic Language

Before examining those alternative explanations, however, we need to understand what purposes undiplomatic language can serve. This is important because these strategic uses confer upon undiplomatic language its instrumental value, in turn allowing its deployment to be part of the strategic pursuit of goals set out by motivations.

What can undiplomatic language do? If we understand the interactional order to be unchanging and static, impoliteness is an aberration. Yet there is another way of understanding impoliteness: as strategic, and oriented towards the attainment of a goal.

This is foreshadowed in some of the terminology used: a 'strategy' of politeness, for example. Aside from 'face', another of Goffman's insights was to conceptualise communication as a social interaction and a form of interpersonal ritual.[49] Within this interaction—and here Goffman's metaphor is theatrical—'actors' engage in 'performances' that manage 'impressions' they gave of themselves to others.[50] This does not mean they are insincere: rather, like actors in a play, interlocutors are situated within a specific context that endows the commission or omission of certain acts, or the saying or non-saying of certain words, with meaning. The knowledge of what this meaning is allows actors to, by their performance, convey specific impressions of themselves—motives, stances, incentives, etc.—to observers: 'impression management' in Goffman's phrase. As Wong

[49] Goffman, *Ritual.*
[50] Goffman, *Strategic*, 13.

notes, 'rules constrain behaviour, but they are also to be "taken into consideration" – hence, active deliberation is expected – "whether as something to follow or to carefully circumvent"'.[51] In other words, motives condition how we interact with the rules of the interactional order. Communication, then, is a *strategic* process—a 'game'—[52] which can be played by 'strategies of impoliteness'.[53]

But it is only against a background of the expectation for politeness—for example in diplomacy and the use of diplomatic language—that transgression—and the use of undiplomatic language—is meaningful. As at the micro-level of interpersonal contact, so at the dizzying heights of international relations: as Jervis argues, one of the 'most important instruments of statecraft' is the 'ability to affect others' images of the state and therefore their beliefs about how it will behave'.[54] Indeed with diplomacy and diplomatic relations, especially at the level of the UN, it is very difficult to imagine scope for (unintended) spontaneous departures from script or displays of a personal, rather than official, perspectives or viewpoints, especially when the speaker in question is an officially accredited representative of a state.[55]

There are at least two, non-mutually exclusive, ways to understand the utility of undiplomatic (impolite) language. The first is to understand undiplomatic language as a 'move' in a strategic 'game' that is important less for the substantive content than the message it represents, of a willingness to tolerate uncooperative outcomes. The second is

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[51] Wong, 'One-Upmanship', partially quoting Goffman, *Stigma*.
[52] Goffman, *Strategic*. Schimmelfennig, 'Goffman', 421ff contains an examination of this duality in Goffman's work.
[53] Culpeper, 'Anatomy'. 'Positive impoliteness' such as ignoring, disassociation, use of taboo words, abuse, use of derogatory nominations; 'negative impoliteness' such as frightening/threatening, condescending, *explicitly* associating the other with a negative aspect.
[54] Jervis, *Logic*, xvi.
[55] This is not the say that the *appearance* of spontaneous departure or being overwhelmed with, for example, emotion, cannot be witnessed on the international stage, only that these, too, can be interpreted as serving a strategic purpose.

to examine the content of undiplomatic language, especially for 'labelling' language that reinforces, breaks, or constructs new identities either of the self or the target.

Signalling and Disruption

Rousseau and Baele's treatment of diplomatic insult as an 'original…encounter between ordinary language philosophy one the one hand…and symbolic interactionism on the other hand' provides one perspective of the strategic utility behind undiplomatic language: that is, as disruptors of interactions.[56] Understanding insults as 'performative' utterances that do not necessarily describe reality, their attention is drawn to their potential to disrupt interactions and generate 'social conflict and disharmony' by sheer audacity, potentially provoking reaction.[57] Combining this with a Goffmanian view of social interaction as occurring within socially produced frames of reference, and that the presentation of self is one way by which an actor can influence another actor's 'definition of the situation', they are led conclude that insults as useful less for the substantive content, or the precise terms in which the insult is couched, and more for its symbolic nature.[58] What does language which disrupts interactions (or even provokes reactions) and/or constitutes a 'presentation' that affects how other actors view the speaker, achieve?

As Rousseau and Baele observe, instrumentally, in line with the 'neo-neo synthesis' which highlights rational choice approaches to decision-making and which often models international interactions as 'iterated rounds of games', impoliteness may enter both into 'power strategies' and 'influence strategies': the former establishing initial payoffs, the latter influencing evolving perceptions of payoffs.[59] In particular, the deployment of undiplomatic language can be used to manipulate the target's perception of a state more

[56] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 4.
[57] Austin, *Words*, 1-2; Culpeper et. al., 'Revisited', 1546.
[58] Schimmelfennig, 'Goffman', 422-423; Culpeper et. al., 'Revisited', 3.
[59] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 6.

generally—one of the 'most important instrument[s] of statecraft'—[60]and, specifically, the likelihood of cooperative outcomes. One way of doing so is highlighted by Hall, who argues that a 'vehement and overt state-level display of anger' can be performed such as to project an image of a particular issue as 'sensitive and volatile', removing it from the realm of normal cost-benefit calculations.[61] Introducing a diplomacy of anger, Hall argues that it involves concerted state-level deployments of 'a rhetoric of outrage and accusation, coupled with calls for the target to rectify a wrong'.[62] This is analogous to undiplomatic language: in terms of positive impoliteness (the outrage, distancing, use of derogatory language, etc.) but also negative impoliteness (requiring targets to alter their behaviour, implying consequences if this is not done, etc.).[63] Hei similarly cites 'threats and provocations' (*weixie ji tiaoxin*) to the 'core interests of the state and people' of China (*guojiaminzu de hexinliyi*) as the reasons for a hardening in diplomatic tone.[64] The goal, in turn, of elevating the perception of cost by making an issue fundamental is to induce either further concessions from the other party in the 'game' or to get them to drop the matter entirely.

Other scholars have highlighted similar dynamics. Chilton observes that 'refusal to address positive face can be a cause of breakdown in cooperation, and can certainly exacerbate the breakdown if the initial cause is elsewhere';[65] the inverse of which is often imputed into the positive Soviet reaction to policies of 'détente' that engaged her and acknowledged her as a member of the international community.[66] Rousseau examines the use of insults, similar to the concept of undiplomatic language, in attempts by Southern African states to derail meetings of the Kimberly Process, such as by addressing Western

[60] Jervis, *Logic*, xvi.
[61] Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*, 40.
[62] Ibid., 50.
[63] See page 16.
[64] Hei, 'Waijiaoyuyan'.
[65] Chilton, 'Politeness', 212.
[66] Chomsky et. al., *Superpowers*, 62ff.

officials as 'neo-colonialists' and NGO experts as 'discredited individuals who failed their careers' during official meetings.[67] Hall traces the origin of the 1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War to perceived provocative behaviour by the Prussians that 'alter[ed] preferences, change[d] attitudes towards risk, and increase[d] impatience and urgency', producing pressure to retaliate.[68] Wolf, paralleling the previous discussion of face and face-wants, argues that this disrespect 'challenges an actor's self-esteem', arousing anger and a 'self-protective urge' to restore a 'rightful position'.[69] This pressure is more keenly felt when the face threat is large: when it comes from an actor of comparable 'standing' (and hence from whom politeness *ought* to be expected), when it is especially egregious or morally outrageous, or when it is publicly commissioned instead of privately expressed.[70] Shared expectations for politeness mean that these 'aggravating circumstances' are well known: to deploy undiplomatic language and commission the face threat, therefore, even when these circumstances are present, amplify the signals being given and the effect of the 'presentation'.

Indications of unfamiliarity and disassociation (positive impoliteness) signal a relational distance that may connote a disinclination to cooperate—more so if the terms used actively signal hostility—while indications of disrespect for autonomy (negative impoliteness) may be signals of a more general status-based disrespect. Whatever the connotations, however, the deployment of undiplomatic language, in stark contravention of diplomatic language norms, clearly signals (recalling our discussion of politeness as the

[67] Rousseau, 'Power'.
[68] Hall, 'Provocation', 5.
[69] Wolf, 'Respect', 106.
[70] Wohlforth, 'Unipolarity'; Lowenheim and Heimann, 'Revenge'; Fattah and Fierke, 'Clash'. This is because disrespect from a peer actor that is not qualified by exigency ('fire, get out!') or minimalism ('come in!') implies on the speaker's part a self-ascribed position of power that, from their perspective, renders politeness unnecessary; face threats that contain content morally outrageous or especially egregious are stronger than minimally impolite content; public commissioning means a larger peer audience observes the loss of face.

'glue' of a social interaction) an unwillingness to continue on with a normal international interaction.

It is as a signaller of generality that enables undiplomatic language use to transcend a singular interaction, however, and which leads us to a wider perspective of its strategic utility. It conveys not only opinions about a certain actor and/or issue at a particular juncture or interaction, but views which are 'on record' and therefore carried over to subsequent interactions. Conveying an impression that the state in question is not to be confronted in general, or over a certain issue, without being ready to make concessions, is a strategic avenue to achieve preferences by altering the cost/benefit calculus of other actors.

But undiplomatic language has wider ramifications. By 'disrupt[ing] the background knowledge upon which calculations of interests and cooperation are grounded' and hence interrupting the 'habitual conduct of international affairs writ large', especially in highly institutionalised or ritualised environments, undiplomatic language destabilises the status quo embodied in dominant practices of the international system.[71] Often considered a paradigmatic example of undiplomatic conduct, Khrushchev banged his shoe on his desk at a UNGA meeting against the background of broader Soviet policy to attract the support of the Non-Aligned Movement ("NAM") and reform the UN.[72] Preventing the 'competent performance of practices'—those 'socially meaningful patterns of action' as identified by Adler and Pouliot—[73] leads to their disruption, desacralisation, and may presage collapse: creating opportunities of remoulding which can be exploited.[74]

[71] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 10; Hopf, 'Logic'. Including plenary meetings of the UNGA.
[72] Iandolo, 'Beyond'.
[73] Adler and Pouliot, 'Practices', 4-5.
[74] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 10.

Of course, the deployment of undiplomatic language is also a strategic move in that it entails certain costs. Aside from the unintended and unpredictable consequences that may attend provocation, which places the onus on the target to react, using undiplomatic language too often may either dispose targets to consider the speaker impotent (and hence only able to rely of language to impose strategic costs on others), or lead them to discount the impression formed.[75] As Wong on anger projection in diplomacy argues, leaders perceived as 'stoic' and not given to such displays have their occasional displays treated more seriously by their interlocutors than those who lash out frequently and are seen as 'hotheads'.[76] While this is something that needs to be accounted for, especially in assessing the impact of undiplomatic language, a thesis that considers the motives for undiplomatic language use need only draw from this the understanding that undiplomatic language is therefore not costless. The deployment of undiplomatic language in spite of these costs must therefore usually accompany some positive motivation.

This approach to undiplomatic language highlights its disruptive properties, with deployment signalling willingness to forego cooperative outcomes in a manner that can transcend individual interactions. Writ large, this disruption can desacralize institutions and practices, paving the way for redefinition and reshaping.

Identity

The pragmatic literature understands impoliteness less in terms of its substantive content than for its role in a broader schema of social interactions. However, what happens when we shift our focus to 'truth claims'?

[75] Ibid., 9.
[76] Wong, 'Hotheads'. Such as international leaders' discounting of Trump's insulting rhetoric and preserving ties with the United States.

Firstly, we can observe dynamics that broadly approximate those outlined above, especially regarding threats that induce the making of amends: after all, to be fully effective they must be believed. For example, the oft-quoted line 'the feelings of the Chinese people have been hurt'[77] is powerful only because the statement is seen as both credible and presaging some consequence for the 'hurt'.

However, consideration of the truth claims that may be seen in other forms of undiplomatic language, such as those that come with positive impoliteness, presents alternative perspectives of the strategic utility of undiplomatic language. What is the difference between calling someone a 'dotard' and an 'imperialist lapdog'? I argue that the relevant conceptualisation here is that of categories: undiplomatic language constructs, reifies, and places actors both self and other into identities.

Language plays a role in constructing a social reality, and one aspect of that reality is the identities of actors that populate the social field.[78] One sort of language act is that of 'naming': where a speaker attributes a name to an individual or a group, assimilating them into a certain category and 'construct[ing] boundaries of belonging…demarcat[ing] who is an insider and who is an outsider'.[79] As 'acts of institution and destitution',[80] naming attributes a certain identity to a certain actor while dispossessesing the actor of other conflicting identities. Indeed, naming is a 'powerful vector of stigma', raising the possibility of categorisation that reduces a complex identity to an attribute considered abnormal and inferior. [81] Categorisation and stigmatisation then provides the justification for differentiated treatment of the now-created outgroup: with norms and socialisation, this can enable sanctions or other forms of coercive activity.[82] 'It takes power to stigmatise',

[77] Anonymous, 'Hurt'.
[78] Bourdieu, *Language*, 105.
[79] Ibid., Part II; Madziva, 'Name', 941.
[80] Bourdieu, *Language*, 105-106.
[81] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 13; Goffman, *Stigma*, 2-3.
[82] Link and Phelan, 'Conceptualizing', 370.

and some scholars argue that stigmatisation truly occurs only when the stigmatisor wields social, economic, or political power over the stigmatised, using an example of patients at a mental institution whose negative stereotypes of clinicians do not produce stigmatisation and attendant negative consequences.[83] Yet this discounts the enormous power of sympathy: outside audiences sympathetic to the patients may take their stereotypes on-board and agitate, producing changes to clinical practice or employment. The patients are indirectly powerful because they possess a sympathetic audience whose sympathy moreover may be premised solely on the fact that they are patients in a mental institution. Rousseau and Baele acknowledge this dynamic in highlighting the contribution even an ordinary individual labelling another a 'parasite' may have to symbolism and perceptions of a 'sympathetic audience', with 'no less dire consequences' in terms of implications of stigma.[84] The relevant power here is less material power and more moral power, which on an international stage with avowed principles of sovereign equality is much more diffuse than material power may be. Inasmuch as undiplomatic language may involve positive impoliteness that attributes undesirable categories to other states, this is an act of naming (and identity construction) writ large: by representatives of one state in seeking to characterise another state's actions, or another state proper.

Undiplomatic language is one linguistic tool which can be deployed to construct identities. Creating and designating a target as an 'out-group' implicitly denies them their positive face-wants—that is, the desire to be included by a speaker—by disassociating the self from the other: manifesting linguistically as positive impoliteness. Equally, explicitly associating them or their actions with negative qualities also denies them their negative face-wants—that is, the freedom of action that comes from plausible deniability—

[83] Ibid., 375.
[84] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 14.

manifesting linguistically as negative impoliteness.[85] This does not mean that all identity-construction is conducted explicitly: the 'sympathetic audience' may be sufficiently aware of the contextual cues as to be able to parse the in-groups and out-groups involved without explication.[86]

Undiplomatic language can both build and reify attributed identities: crucially, however, these identities are not only those of the 'Other', but also of the 'Self'. Naming not only defines another actor or group, but also contributes to the definition of the Self and the in-group by implicit mirroring of the Other.[87] This parallels Goffman's idea of the 'presentation of the self' as constantly occurring on the 'stage' of social interaction,[88] where what one praises or denigrates is carefully selected to project a definition of a person's identity to their audience. Consequently, an identity-construction approach argues that these 'presentations' can have very real effects on underlying identities of both the self and the in-group on whose behalf the self pretends to speak.

There are two approaches to understanding the linkage between language and identity. Language can be mutually constitutive of identity, where discourse reifies and reinforces both positive ingroup and negative outgroup identities—and hence one interpretation positions these constructions as targeted if not more, then at least equivalently at the 'self' in-group—by crystallising and clarifying the divergence between an in-group and an out-group.[89] Donald Trump naming Haiti and African states as 'shithole countries' serves not only to lump all these underdeveloped countries together as 'shitholes', but to establish the contrast of an orderly and well-functioning US: even if this

[85] Culpeper, 'Anatomy', 357-358.
[86] Accounted for methodologically in assessing speeches, where threats to face which have a clear enough implicit target (subjectively interpreted) are coded separately from generalised statements.
[87] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 14.
[88] Goffman, *Self*.
[89] Fearon and Laitin, 'Violence'. For example, labelling the US 'imperialist' assimilates all her international behaviour into the negative connotations of imperialism while positioning the speaker against imperialism and implicitly for liberation.

may not be the case.[90] But language can also be understood as rhetorical instruments that influence the separate construction of identity, by reinforcing and exaggerating existing stereotypes to sympathetic audiences.[91] Sympathetic audiences are needed because this sort of rhetoric depends on pre-existing value systems: naming an opponent as 'impure swine' would be mundane (and not especially creative) when heard by a non-Muslim, but its effect is amplified to a Muslim listener due to the negative status of pigs in Islam.[92] Marking the boundaries between in- and out-groups with specifically chosen rhetoric can, in turn, prompt action including autonomous action in line with the speaker's ideology, or defection from an out- to an in-group.[93]

These concepts translate to international diplomacy. Adler-Nissen in a recent article highlights 'a rise in the use of shaming to promote international norms'; in conceptualising this as 'stigma' she highlights more fully how the clarification and reinforcement of norms and the promotion of conformity is constructed through the 'performative enactment of the normal'.[94] The role of language is also featured in Finnemore and Sikkink's seminal treatment of the dynamics of international norms, where they posit that 'evaluative relationships between states and their state 'peers' is one element of socialisation.[95] As 'naming and shaming', this sort of language is further examined in literature concerning the solicitation of norm compliance: one treatment concerning human rights indicates that 'committed advocates [of human rights] name and shame extensively.'[96] Responses to stigmatisation are equally linked to identity concerns. Adler-Nissen's article on responses to stigma as an instrument of socialisation firstly highlights

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[90] Rousseau and Baele, 'Insults', 15
[91] Ibid., 16. Taking the above example, naming the United States as 'imperialist' reinforces the perception of sympathetic countries (e.g. members of the NAM) that the US is acting imperialistically, and burnishes the speaker's image as sympathetic to those opposed to 'imperialism'.
[92] Ibid.
[93] Ibid.
[94] Adler-Nissen, 'Stigma', 143-144, 150.
[95] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Norm', 903.
[96] Hafner-Burton, 'Sticks', 693. See also Rousseau, 'Power'; Zarakol, 'Made'.

the two Goffmanian reactions: stigma acceptance, where the stigmatised identify with the out-group, accept the sources of stigma and commit to maturation to 'live up' to the standards on which stigma is based; and counter-stigmatisation, where 'in-group alignment' operates and the stigmatized identity becomes virtuous and a source of pride, an alternative system of honour.[97] But she develops a further approach, 'stigma rejection', where while accepting the out-group identity's definitions of normalcy and transgression, the stigmatised rejects the notion that they are different from norm abiders, questioning their competencies to judge and impose stigma and out-group (from the stigmatisors' perspective) status. [98] Undiplomatic language can contribute to these counter-stigmatisation operations by providing the discursive and rhetorical tools to construct alternative systems of honour, or defend against stigmatising efforts by imputing negative attributes to both the stigmatiser or the efforts of stigmatisation.

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Undiplomatic language can serve two strategic purposes: to signal uncooperativeness and disrupt interactions, or define identities of both the 'self' and 'others'. Understanding how undiplomatic language can contribute to a state's foreign policy at international institutions, we now turn to the potential motives that international relations literature presents for its deployment.

Potential Explanations for Undiplomatic Language Deployment

Revolutionism

Undiplomatic language might be deployed because the state in question is a revolutionary state. What underlies disruptive conduct is therefore what Armstrong argues is the paradox of revolutionary states: as states, they are potential members of an

[97] Goffman, *Stigma*, 112-23.
[98] Adler-Nissen, 'Stigma', 154.

international society; as revolutionary movements which seek 'fundamental change in the principles on the basis of which states conduct their relations with each other', they are liable to reject it.[99] The revolutionary tradition of international relations theory sees its thinkers and practitioners identify themselves completely with the 'cosmopolitan' rather than 'internationalist' moral unity of the international society, claim exclusivity in speaking on behalf of it, and see the first aim of their international policies as to give effect to this belief.[100] Revolutionary states are therefore (self-)defined in terms of their opposition to the 'status quo' of the Westphalian international society centred on the principle of state sovereignty: rather, their conceptions are often human, and in the case of Marxism, proletariat-centred.[101] A state with revolutionary goals at an international institution that it opposes fundamentally will seek to disrupt its activities. Indeed the revolutionary tradition has been noted for its hostility to diplomacy, with diplomats frequently perceived as 'defenders and beneficiaries of [status quo] international arrangements'.[102] On the other hand, revolutionary diplomats in service of revolutionary regimes, have been argued to act as subversive forces, both in the actuality of their actions and their presentation of themselves.[103]

Undiplomatic language can serve the purposes of revolutionary states. It not only signals unwillingness to cooperate with the international society—important for a mode of thought which posits that the status quo in international relations is unjust—but can even destabilise and create opportunities for remoulding by desacralizing its institutions. Identity-creating aspects of undiplomatic language can also be deployed to condemn the current order as well as its hegemons, to attract sympathetic audiences into supporting the

[99] Armstrong, *Revolution*, Introduction.
[100] Wight, *Theory*, 8.
[101] Armstrong, *Revolution*, Introduction, chap. 5.
[102] Sharp, *Diplomatic*, 20; but see the remainder of chap. 1; see also Armstrong, *Revolution*, chap. 8.
[103] Ibid., 29ff.

revolutionary cause, or be counted on to '[appeal] to people over the heads of their governments'.[104]

There is support in the literature for viewing Chinese undiplomatic language at the UN from the perspective of a revolutionary motive. Wight positively identifies the Marxist stream of international thought within this tradition: their society being that of the proletariat of the world.[105] Armstrong concurs, explicitly highlighting a new Chinese state's 'revolutionary internationalist stance…that postulated an ongoing global conflict with imperialism as the motive force of history'.[106] Even with the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC merely adjusted their view of imperialism to embrace Soviet 'revisionism' as 'social imperialism'.[107] Just four years before the PRC's accession to the UN, British diplomats in Beijing became 'de facto hostages of their host government' against the background of the Cultural Revolution.[108] The prevailing attitude, less than a decade old by the 1971 accession, was embodied in shrill denunciations of the UN as an 'adjunct of the US State Department…a dirty international political stock exchange in the grip of a few big powers', to be replaced by a 'revolutionary United Nations'.[109] The same authors, however, who stress the PRC's history of revolutionary diplomacy also highlight her transition beginning from the rapprochement with the US from the late 1960s onwards, culminating in the UN accession: the replacement of the imperialist/revolutionary dichotomy with a 'more conventional' understanding of 'superpower hegemony', the eventual settling on 'reform and opening up' and the cessation of revolutionary rhetoric and activity altogether, and efforts to demonstrate socialisation into the norms of international society over the First Gulf War.[110] More generally, it has been noted that revolutionary regimes 'in most cases

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[104] Wight, *Theory*, 205.
[105] Ibid., 12.
[106] Armstrong, *Revolution*, 177.
[107] Ibid., 182.
[108] Mark, 'Hostage'.
[109] Kim, 'People's', 300-301.
[110] Armstrong, *Revolution*, 183-185.

[find] it difficult to conduct formal relations' by means other than conventional diplomacy, especially when the only kind of identity that legitimises their existence in the eyes of others is sovereign statehood entailing membership in the international society.[111] Indeed, the PRC's early grievances included the US' denial of her rightful legitimacy embodied in membership of the UN and the permanent seat on the UN Security Council ("UNSC").[112]

With revolutionary motives, we might expect the following patterns in our analysis of the data. We would expect to see higher levels of undiplomatic language in the beginning of Chinese participation at the UNGA, with a negative correlation with time as the changes to Chinese diplomacy highlighted above take hold. In terms of issue area categorisation, as a revolutionary state's grievance with the international order is general, we might expect undiplomatic language deployment to be almost universal: in short, without much correlation on issue area. However, we might also observe a concentration of undiplomatic speech in UNGA general debate speeches, where states are given an opportunity to speak on any issue they choose instead of being restricted to the relevant agenda items. Qualitatively, we would expect to see the undiplomatic language deployed to explicitly highlight the imperialist/revolutionary dichotomy in international affairs. Language might be deployed to disassociate China with states and actions in the former category and highlight solidarity with the latter category, to construct and reify identities along similar lines, or appeal to the 'people' of a state instead of the government. We might also expect to see the UN as an institution itself condemned.

China as Novice

The discussion of the socialisation of revolutionary states highlights an alternative possibility of a lack of socialisation as motivating the Chinese deployment of undiplomatic

[111] Ibid., 271.
[112] Ibid., 177.

language. Socialisation posits that states (as 'novices') entering into broader (international) institutional environments 'learn' role-appropriate norms, values, and behaviours.[113] Different schools of thought have conceptualised socialisation in different ways: prominently, neo-realism posits a process of competitive selection, while constructivism describes an internalisation of norms which influences behaviour through a 'logic of appropriateness' rather than a 'logic of consequences'. The resulting behaviour, moreover, has variously been ascribed to different microprocesses, including persuasion, mimicking—including eventual 'internalisation by repetition' or rhetorical entrapment—and social influence.[114] However, socialisation does not occur instantly. There therefore exists a possibility that, while a state is a 'novice', it may nonetheless resist the first-order norms of ideas in the international order despite identifying fully with the order and its membership in it.

Undiplomatic language, with its strategic values as highlighted above, may serve as an instrument of this resistance. Prominently, it may be used to signal anger and rejection of alien norms. Identity-based language may also be deployed to justify this unwillingness to be socialised, for example by pointing out the state in question's *sui generis* status, illustrate the injustice of the norm, or highlight the norm-transgressing actions of would-be socialisers. The lattermost would align with Adler-Nissen's concept of 'stigma rejection' above: while 'stigma acceptance' would likely not involve undiplomatic language, 'counter-stigmatisation' would involve denying the overarching identity as a 'normal' member of the international order/society.

[113] Pu, 'Socialisation', 345. See also Johnston, *Social*, chap. 1; for socialisation in sociology see Parsons and Bales, *Family*; Berger and Luckmann, *Social*. See additionally Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Norm', for the seminal treatment on norms in international relations.
[114] Johnston, *Social*, 20-26. For 'rhetorical entrapment' see additionally Schimmelfennig, 'Community'; for social influence see Fung, *China*, and later discussion.

Narratives from the beginning of Chinese participation at the UN reflect both fears and comforts in respect of Chinese socialisation into the international political order, often characterised as 'liberal' or 'rules-based'. As early as 1974, three years after PRC's accession, comforting contrasts were being drawn by the relative normalcy of her behaviour at that institution compared to the shrill rhetoric of the pre-accession era.[115] Predictions that China would exploit the UN to attack other nations on a variety of contentious issues, conduct 'wrecking operations' against agencies and organs dealing with multilateral aid hitherto criticised as an 'imperialist tool of penetration', or overuse the UNSC veto by and large failed to materialise.[116]

What would we expect to see in our data? Firstly, we would expect a negative correlation of undiplomatic language deployment with time as socialisation occurs and China adopts the norms of the international society. Deployment, unlike that motivated by revolutionism, would be focussed on individual issues instead of the international order in general. We would also expect China's resistance to come over norms and issues which are relatively uncontroversial and settled in the international order: as such, deployment would correlate with China being an outlier in non-compliance to the relevant norms, for example in voting results. Qualitatively we would expect, again in contradistinction to revolutionary language, an insistence on identifying as a normal member of the UN and the international society (and not as a revolutionary state) while simultaneously denying the applicability of certain norms, for example by creating *sui generis* sub-identities in the international society in justification of non-compliance, or in attempting to advance counter-arguments.

[115] Kim, 'People's'.
[116] Ibid., 308ff. Kim later characterises China as pursuing the diplomacy of a 'cautious and diligent apprentice', echoing the 'novice' characterisation applied by others to newcomers to socialisation.

Stigmatisation

Recalling the centrality of identity to stigmatisation and the role of stigmatisation in socialisation ('naming and shaming'), another approach would be to contend that China's deployment of undiplomatic language at the UNGA reflects her taking up a position as socialiser of non-conforming states. Finnemore and Sinkkink's 'life cycle of a norm' argues that once a norm has passed a 'tipping point', it becomes the subject of a 'norm cascade'; its adoption backed more by international and transnational norm influences than domestic politics.[117] Praise and ridicule are part of that socialisation process, and their effectiveness is intimately tied to identity: a state's identity is 'as a member of a particular social category, and part of the definition of that category is that all members follow certain norms'.[118] To be uniformly (or nearly uniformly) ridiculed for the same behaviour by different members of the identity group signals to the target that a consensus on the appropriate norms has been reached, and that moderation of behaviour is needed: international 'peer pressure'.

How does undiplomatic language contribute to the process of socialisation? There are differing arguments for the microfoundations of the 'moderation of behaviour' as described above. While some approaches stress the consequences of norm refusal, including a denial of international legitimacy (which can have knock-on effects on domestic legitimacy) or other sanctions (such as those applied to so-called 'rogue states), another approach stresses ideas of conformity and esteem, where the central concept is that states constantly evaluate their relationships with their 'peers'.[119] Conformity is the fulfilment of the 'psychological need to be part of a group', while esteem needs suggest a desire to be 'thought well of' by peers in order to feel good about oneself.[120] Both concepts can be

[117] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Norms', 902.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid., 903.
[120] Axelrod, 'Evolutionary', 1105.

understood in the framework of face-wants and hence of impoliteness: undiplomatic language that involves positive impoliteness distances and disassociates the speaker from the target, while negative impoliteness reveals not only direct criticism, but prescribes avenues of 'improvement'. The environment of international institutions provides the 'social environment' within which socialisation takes place;[121] the UNGA, acting as the 'custodian of seals of international approval and disapproval', is a site where deployment of undiplomatic language produces maximum impact.[122]

What would we expect to find in our data that illustrates a socialising motive? We would not expect temporal correlates, as opportunities to socialise other states are not a function of time but whether another state adopts policies that render them out-of-sync with prevailing international norms. Deployment would also be inclined towards individual issues and specific agenda items, unless the intensity of norm-violating behaviour warranted a mention in a general debate speech. What we would expect, however, in contrast to 'China-as-novice'-motivated deployments above, would be China's positioning with a majority opinion on the norm: illustrated, for example, by being on the winning side where motions are voted on. Qualitatively, we would expect similar highlighting of shared identities, while undiplomatic language deployment would focus on how the target state fails in living up to them.

Rising Power

Gilpin argues that 'as its relative power increases, a rising state attempts to change the rules governing the system'.[123] China's rising power status has played an important role in the narrative of the 'engagement' of China, where, as Schweller argues, the objective of engagement is the '[amelioration] of the non-status quo elements of a rising major power's

[121] Johnston, 'Treating'.
[122] Claude, 'Legitimization', 187.
[123] Gilpin, *War*, 187.

behaviour'[124] by offering legitimating membership and status within international institutions, such as the WTO or the UN(SC).[125] Some scholars argue that the Chinese Communist Party ("CCP") is dissatisfied with the organisation and governance of the international society stemming from a legitimising narrative of a 'century of humiliation'.[126] If threats to international peace and stability arise only when dissatisfaction and power are conjoined,[127] engagement can be understood as part of an effort to pre-empt the dissatisfaction which could result in the seeking of revolutionary, instead of incremental, change.[128] The history of the PRC's 'revolutionary diplomacy' as discussed previously supports this argument, as do scholars who argue that China benefits enough from the current international order to perceive radical transformation as not being in her interest.[129]

However, fast Chinese growth has raised the question of post-unipolar geopolitical struggle[130] and the emergence of a 'China model' which challenges pre-existing norms of the 'liberal international order'.[131] Some have begun to draw comparisons and contrasts between China's rise and the US's rise from the beginning of the 20th century to the end of the Second World War.[132] The important contrast is that China may not be integrated adequately into a pre-existing international order for a non-conflictual rise vis-à-vis the US, with important consequences for the future development of the international society. Even as other scholars have pushed back against a perceived unjustified 'backlash', contending that the China model is not intended for export[133] and that exaggerations of the threat

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124 Schweller, 'Managing', 14-15.
125 Shambaugh, 'Containment', 182-185; Kent, 'China's'.
126 Kaufman, 'Century'.
127 This is a central tenet in theories of hegemonic war, international change, and power transition. See Gilpin, *War*; Organski, *World*; Organski and Kugler, *War*.
128 Gilpin, *War*, chap. 1.
129 Johnston, 'Treating'.
130 See Friedberg, *Contest*; including lines such as '…if current trends continue, we [the USA] are on track to lose our geopolitical contest with China' (6); Schweller and Pu, 'After'.
131 See Chan et. al., 'Rethinking'; Hodzi, 'Delegitmization'. See Cho and Hwang, 'Mainstream' for a succinct summary of 'mainstream' IR theoretical perspectives on China-West relations.
132 Buzan and Cox, 'Comparable'.
133 Chen Weiss, 'World'.

China poses [134] are based in memetic transmission and a misunderstanding and misremembering of the promises of socialisation,[135] it is worth taking these perceptions seriously. Studies have proliferated over the past two decades seeking to examine what rising powers in general and what China in particular may seek within, or indeed beyond, an international order; [136] China's voting record on human rights issues has been analysed,[137] as has the many facets of Chinese activity in the UN in relation to peacekeeping, responsibility to protect, and humanitarian intervention.[138] The effect of Chinese capital flows on the voting inclinations of other countries in the UNGA has been the subject of study,[139] as has the influence of Chinese funding and support of appointees within the UN system.[140]

But the idea of *an* international order to which China may be opposed can be qualified. Johnston argues that the liberal international order is actually a number of separate orders. 'China interacts differently with different orders, supportive of some, unsupportive of others, and partially supportive of still others.'[141] Notwithstanding these qualifications, however, the more recent literature largely concludes that China has been uses her position at the UN to pursue her own agenda.[142]

How do rising powers behave? In outlining their typology of 'spoiler', 'supporter', and 'shirker', Schweller and Pu highlight Chinese attempts to delegitimise US hegemony as part of a move beyond the 'unipolar movement', involving both discourses and practices

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[134] Anonymous, 'West'. E.g.
[135] Breuer and Johnston, 'Memes'; Johnston, 'World of Orders'; Johnston, 'Failures'.
[136] Legro, 'What China will Want'; Pu, 'Socialisation', 356-359. See also Callahan, 'Visions'; Yan, 'International'; Callahan, *Dreams*.
[137] Primiano and Xiang, 'Voting'.
[138] He, *Changing*; Fung, 'Rhetorical'; Fung, *China*; Foot, *China*; Chen and Yin, 'R2P Debates'; as some of the more recent examples.
[139] Raess, et. al., 'Commercially-Oriented'.
[140] Feltman, *Expanding*.
[141] Johnston, 'World of Orders', 12. Support ranges from high (constitutive order of norms that define legitimate actors, sovereignty and territoriality) to low (political development order of liberal democratic norms), see p. 57.
[142] See Morton, 'Global'.

of resistance.[143] In particular, they highlight 'rightful resistance' that temporarily and partially accepts the legitimacy of the hegemon while acting opportunistically and within existing channels to contest particular behaviours of the hegemon: though in the moment the rising power 'does not seek to overthrow the order', grievances exist over 'representation and application of the rules'.[144] This strategy is usefully flexible: it might deepen the legitimacy of the existing order ('support', 'shirk') but also place the challenger in a position to craft her own order ('spoil').[145] However, the dichotomy of further integration into the liberal order (where China becomes a fully-fledged 'supporter') or creation of an alternative order (where China becomes a 'spoiler', such as by advocating international order based on an idea of *Tianxia*)[146] proves false.[147] While China is 'doing far better than everyone else under the current order', there is dissatisfaction: Legro, for example, sees Chinese revisionism in the international order as centring on democratisation of international relations (calling for genuine multilateralism), sovereignty over Taiwan, and resistance of external interference in domestic affairs.[148] Schweller and Pu argue that China is pursuing a 'negotiated order' that supports hedging: by advocating 'peaceful coexistence with differences' where the Chinese and Western worldviews are recognized as different but legitimate, by critiquing the current order on its own terms, by adopting notions of 'Chinese democracy', and by counselling flexibility on economic policymaking.[149] Hodzi traces this more concretely in Chinese delegitimisation of US leadership on the African continent, where Chinese actors have tried to portray the US as an unreliable and irresponsible global power which 'no longer exercises its power based

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[143] Schweller and Pu, 'After', 50ff.
[144] Ibid. 'Specific tactics include (1) denouncing US unilateralism and promoting the concept (if not always the practice) of multilateralism; (2) participating in and creating new international organizations; (3) pursuing a proactive "soft power" diplomacy in the developing world; (4) voting against the US in international institutions; and (5) setting the agenda within international and regional organization.' (53)
[145] Ibid., 51-52.
[146] Callahan, 'Visions'.
[147] Schweller and Pu, 'After', 59-64.
[148] Legro, 'What', 517-518.
[149] Schweller and Pu, 'After', 66-67.

on the norms and rules of the system it created'.[150] Chinese actors have also presented their model of developmental assistance as more beneficial and responsive to recipient needs and desires than Western-led efforts, and sought to delegitimise norms of humanitarian intervention, with their advocacy again focussing on the idea of responsiveness to local agency.[151]

This view of rising power strategy dovetails with Miller's recent work which highlights the 'accommodational' narrative that emerges as a precursor to successful rises to great power status. 'Active' rising powers that 'become, in the near future, a great power', she argues, are characterised not only by the development of material capabilities, but the development of narratives about the rising power's own changing status, national and international priorities.[152] These narratives provide for the promotion of vital external and internal recognition of the state as a great power.[153] Crucially, at least for external recognition, even though 'active powers may eventually become activist powers, that is, what we think of as revisionist powers', rising powers firstly seek to 'take on authority and actively…shape its role in the international system in the fashion of current great powers'.[154] That is, in order to garner authority and legitimacy for their eventual leadership, rising powers first have to 'accept and conform to the current international order before [they] can reject it'.[155] Miller highlights the 1990s in China as the period of inflexion in narratives with the displacement of Cold War anti-hegemonism (*fanba*) in favour of global interdependence (*xianghu yicun*), and a corresponding uptick in participation in and creation

[150] Hodzi, 'Delegitmization', 301-302.
[151] Ibid., 303-306.
[152] Miller, *Nations*, 11. These narratives involve three sets of beliefs: material capabilities of the rising power versus the constraints of the international order, the rising power's acknowledgement of current norms of great power-hood and the seeking of power on those terms (involving relationships with the status quo power(s), and finally the purpose and goals of a rising power's increasing international involvement. (14)
[153] Ibid., 9-10.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.

of international institutions.[156] These actions and the shift in narrative were indicators of China's willingness to operate within the constraints imposed by the international system and the leadership of the US, and to seek great power status within the framework of norms of the exercise of power through multilateralism and global institutions.[157]

Considering the strategic values of undiplomatic language as highlighted above, how can its deployment contribute to these activities of a rising China? The signalling aspect of undiplomatic language can be used to express dissatisfaction and unwillingness to cooperate with existing norms in the international system and induce concessions, especially effective if Chinese cooperation (as a rising power) is essential. Undiplomatic language can conduce the delegitimisation of US leadership in the international order by denigrating US policy or actions—whether implicitly or explicitly—accentuating their negative aspects in the minds of sympathetic actors. Language of 'rightful resistance' might involve burnishing China's credibility within existing identity models by contrasting behaviour that is 'consistent' with that identity with behaviour that is 'hypocritical', and explicitly tie the latter epithet with the US. In building an 'alternative order', language that seeks to build new identities and emphasise Chinese alignment with those identities in contradistinction to the US can be undiplomatic. Within the context of institutions where norms are being remodelled, undiplomatic language can forestall the emergence of new norms or undermine existing norms by direct criticism of their promoters or by implying lack of legitimacy, such as by calling them a 'minority'. Equally, international diplomatic discourse can play an important role as an active instrument of impression management for rising powers in an 'accommodational' mode, such as conciliatory and diplomatic language deployed to build an image as a 'responsible stakeholder' of the international

[156] See ibid., 102-107, for examples.
[157] Ibid., 108-111.

order.[158] On the other hand, this language might be confrontational, directed at other members of the international order who transgress those norms in order to burnish China's credentials for leadership, paralleling deployments motivated by the 'socialisation' of others as examined above.

What would we expect to find in the data if rising power mentality was behind the deployment of undiplomatic language? Firstly, we would expect a positive relationship to time: a growth in undiplomatic language deployment as China 'rises' and becomes more revisionist in ambition. Mindful of Miller's 'accommodation', we might also expect a pronounced absence prior to the uptick. We might not expect issue-area correlates: though China would like to revise international norms that conflict with her interests, delegitimisation of the existing international leadership and attempt to build or reify both self and other identities might equally involve making speeches on agenda items relating to other countries or institutions, or seizing on the opportunity of the General Debate to expound on that state of international affairs. Qualitatively, we would expect to see unfavourable references to be directed towards the US as the existing hegemon. A 'shirk' strategy of a negotiated order would see favourable alignment with a perceived 'true' vision of the liberal international order, identifying with current values and identities while expounding a more 'authentic' interpretation. Under a 'spoil' strategy, Chinese representatives might prepare the foundations of an alternative order by pursuing identity-based cleavages with rhetoric that seeks to align other countries with Chinese outlooks on the international order.

'Core Interests'

It is possible, however, that motivations behind undiplomatic language are much simpler: China has a limited set of core interests which she wishes to defend on the

[158] Ibid., 114-117.

international stage against all comers, regardless of power status or the state of the international order. This was formulated recently by State Councillor Yang Jiechi as 'No country should ever expect China to trade off its core interests or swallow the bitter fruit that undermines its sovereignty, security and development interests.'[159] But this is not new: the earliest mention of the notion seems be to a 2004 reference to territorial interests in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Taiwan.[160] Johnston highlights enduring dissatisfaction over the state of maritime sovereignty in the East and South China Seas and control over Taiwan, arguing that it is 'not new and [cuts] across periods of strong opposition to, and support for, US-supported institutions'.[161] The two aspects of these interests, therefore, seem to be inviolability and endurance.

How can undiplomatic language contribute to the defence of core interests? Here, the strategic value of 'signalling' is paramount: China conveys that any attempt to force China to change her position on a certain issue is futile because it is a 'core interest' that is not up for debate. However, it is also possible that identity-forming language will be used to rally support, especially by characterising actors who promote norms antithetical to China's core interests as illegitimate or malicious.

We would not expect undiplomatic language deployment to exhibit temporal correlations, as these interests would be defended whenever they arise as points of contention. Rather, we would expect correlations with issue-area: the enduring 'core interests' which China looks to defend whenever they come onto the agenda. In particular, these might relate to China's territorial and maritime sovereignty claims, preservation of the Chinese state and CCP governance, and continuation of economic development, variants of which have all been postulated as China's enduring 'core interests'.[162]

[159] Yang, 'Study'.
[160] Zhou, 'Core', 33.
[161] Johnston, 'World of Orders', 29.
[162] Zhou, 'Core', 33.

Qualitatively, the term 'core interest' or other language signalling absolute non-negotiability might be used. We might also expect to see any and all challengers targeted, including relatively minor states, because no challenge is too small for such an important issue.

Status-Seeking

Returning to the international stage, the pursuit of status might serve as another explanation for the deployment of undiplomatic language.

Stigma,[163] identity, and socialisation are intricately linked to status. Fung defines status as 'standing or rank in a status community…"a hierarchy composed of the group of actors that a state perceives itself as being in competition with"'.[164] There are a few important insights: that status is relative; that multiple status hierarchies, referencing different peer groups, may coexist; that status is socially constructed and conferred by consent; and that the pursuit of status can both be instrumental and an end in itself.[165] Crucially, status hierarchies are a two-part process: states firstly seek to become legitimate players by complying with norms that act as 'guides for appropriate behaviour', and then to become a social leader by either outperforming their peers in terms of those norms, or by attempting to redefine the relevant norms entirely.[166] Leadership in the peer group hierarchy, in turn, holds the key to 'respect, deference, and social influence':[167] tying it to legitimacy in the international order. The fundamental question of legitimacy is: 'who has the authority to make the rules of the game and maintain the new world order', Gilpin argues that one of the sources of legitimacy is 'widely accepted ideology'.[168] Acquiring positions of leadership in status hierarchies, and hence wielding social influence that can

[163] See above discussion on the linkage between identity and stigma.
[164] Fung, *China*, 41-42.
[165] Ibid.
[166] Ibid.
[167] Ibid.
[168] Pu, 'Socialisation', 352; Gilpin, *War*, 34.

be used to redefine norms, can herald greater legitimacy and allow states to exercise more transformative influence over the norms and values of the international order. Status-seeking is therefore perhaps better thought of as playing a supporting role, buttressing or laying the foundations for the achievement of other objectives.

Fung argues that China has two major peer groups with regards to humanitarian intervention: a 'great power' peer group, and a 'global south' peer group, and seeks status by endorsing humanitarian intervention when both groups agree.[169] I do not propose to adopt this definition *a priori*, but rather to interrogate how the deployment of undiplomatic language by her diplomatic representatives situates China within peer groups and moreover highlights potential moves to gain status.

Undiplomatic language presents one avenue of acquiring status. Language may be used to burnish credentials of membership (or signal allegiance to new peer groups) by performing affirmation of the norms of group membership by highlighting the differences between members and non-members of the group, as well as critiquing members whose behaviour falls short of standards. These acts may also elevate the speaker's relative status: for example, by voicing a view that is amenable to a sympathetic audience but which is underrepresented because of a fear of repercussion by a strong adversary.[170] Just as the stigmatised have alternatives to stigma acceptance (and out-group alignment),[171] similar options are available in terms of status hierarchies: operationalising these options may involve the deployment of undiplomatic language. Redefining relevant norms by attempting to characterise existing norms (and/or their promoters) as not in keeping with the identity the status group espouses may involve the use of negative characterisations.

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[169] Fung, *China*, 47-51.
[170] Politeness is expected from an inferior to a superior, and impoliteness is more egregious when this power differential exists (see discussion in previous section). Willingness to be impolite in defiance of costliness may serve as a reputation and status-builder.
[171] See page 29.

Speakers may also attempt to create new identities (and new peer groups) to identify with, attempting to activate latent identities in sympathetic actors by choosing new out-groups to denigrate.

What should we expect to find in the data on undiplomatic language deployment to reflect status-seeking behaviour? Firstly, temporal and issue-area correlates may not be present. Status-gaining may be opportunistic and depend on whether the relevant opportunities arise, instead of being correlated with specific time frames or issue areas. While I do not intend to constrict our understanding of China's peer groups to the two Fung names, I will nevertheless pay special attention to the 'great powers' and the 'global South', operationalising China's alignment with them in a way to be outlined in the methodology. However, there may be certain universalist standards of behaviour that pertain to membership of the UN as a whole, hence, undiplomatic language deployment might correlate with alignment with an absolute majority of states: for example, against 'pariah' states. Qualitatively, one approach to status-seeking is related to norms: we might therefore expect undiplomatic language to denigrate others based on abstract principles rather than parochial interest. However, the other approach, identity-building, might also involve undiplomatic language. The deployment of language that associates China and her foreign policy stances with friendliness or allegiance to entire groups might involve denigrating their adversaries; alternatively, Chinese representatives may wish to activate latent cleavages as organising principles for new allegiances within which China may seize the first-mover advantage or be better placed to achieve high status.

Domestic Politics and Bureaucratic Interests

An individual- and bureaucratic agency-centred approach may also explain undiplomatic language deployment. This contends that the deployment of undiplomatic language at the UNGA stems from motives independent of either international or

domestic situations; instead, individual representatives choose (or are instructed by bureaucratic superiors) to deploy undiplomatic language in order to attract the attention of superiors within a bureaucratic hierarchy, garnering opportunities for self-advancement. Consequently, undiplomatic language is less a reflection of state foreign policy than of individual ambition, hindering analysis of the content and intent of undiplomatic language. Inter-agency as well as intra-agency competition exists in the Chinese policymaking and bureaucratic cooperation.[172] Many agencies, not just the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ("MFA"), are involved in different facets of foreign affairs policymaking, and coordination is vertical instead of horizontal.[173] With the MFA having been the recipient of criticism over its perceived passivity,[174] and a professionalization of diplomacy concurrent with a lowering in the ministry's status, there is motivation for inter-agency competition.[175] Equally, intra-agency competition is possible given the career trajectories of recent 'wolf warriors': Zhao Lijian and Hua Chunying were both promoted after high-profile controversial comments.[176] While it is unknown whether these two are merely the most recent beneficiaries of a longer-term trend, or trendsetters who will be emulated by their colleagues, the point stands. Undiplomatic language use can be a function of individual or agency-level incentives to perform.

But individual or agency-level assertiveness is only rewarded when broader state policy inclines towards assertiveness, and individuals and agencies understand this. Even if individuals anticipate the leadership's wishes, they have to be correct to be rewarded. This requires an environment where other inclinations towards assertive policy have already been expressed or sanctioned, though this may be private instead of public. In turn,

[172] Zang, 'Cohesive'; Long, 'Decision'.
[173] Zhao, 'Process'.
[174] Zhou, 'Between', footnote 18.
[175] Zhao, 'Process', 96.
[176] Churchill, 'Chinese'; CGTN, 'Spokeswoman'.

China's top-level leadership exercises profound influence on foreign policymaking and overall policy of the state through both party and state formal and informal institutions, such as the leading small groups, and much depends on the character of the 'paramount leader'.[177] Thus, a top-level inclination towards counter-socialisation can be translated into speeches deploying undiplomatic language that go beyond, but not too far beyond previously delivered instructions. This is doubly so where the stakes are high, such as at institutionalised multilateral international forums including the UNGA, where it is difficult to imagine representatives (and not leaders themselves) making undiplomatic remarks without instructions to do so. What bureaucratic and individual-level incentives look like ultimately depends on a broader political environment.

What can we expect from the data? If we expect top-level leadership changes to have significant impact on the policymaking/governance environment, we might expect temporal correlates with changes in paramount leaders as each leader's 'style' or foreign policy priorities gets transmitted down the bureaucratic hierarchy. Qualitatively, we might also expect references to various leaders' signature policies as a way of signalling allegiance.

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This chapter has established expectations for diplomatic language, explicated a framework for understanding and operationalising 'undiplomatic language', and highlighted ways of understanding its strategic value on the international stage. Having examined potential arguments (and summarized observable consequences) for the deployment of undiplomatic language, we now have a conceptual basis for examining the data.

[177] Zhao, 'Process', 96; Liao, 'Sources'; Lampton, *Following*.

Table L.1: Potential Explanations and Expected Observables

Explanation	Quantitative Observables	Qualitative Observables
Revolutionism	• Declining with time:  • Correlated with Issue Area: General Debate	• Language highlights imperialist/revolutionary dichotomy in international affairs; disassociates China from the former and highlighting solidarity with the latter • Language attempts to construct and reify identities along similar lines, or appeal to the 'people' of a state instead of the government • Condemnation of UN as an institution
China-as-Novice	• Declining with time:  • Correlated with Contestation: China in minority	• Language reflects opposition over individual issues instead of the international order in general • Insistence on identifying as a normal member of the UN and the international society (and not as a revolutionary state) while simultaneously denying the applicability of certain norms
Stigmatisation	• No correlation with time/Issue Area • Correlation with Contestation: China in majority	• Language used reflects acceptance and identification with overarching identities

		• Focus on target's failure to live up to universal principles
Rising Power	• Rising with time, though possibly with pronounced period of lack of undiplomatic language beforehand • No correlation with Issue Area	• Focus on US as target • Shirk: favourable alignment with a perceived 'true' vision of the liberal international order, identifying with current values and identities while expounding a more 'authentic' interpretation • Spoil: pursuing identity-based cleavages with rhetoric that seeks to align other countries with Chinese outlooks on the international order
Core Interests	• No correlation with time • Correlation with Issue Areas related to China's core interests, not correlated with agenda items examining the Situations of Other Countries	• Language includes specific phrases signalling inviolability
Status-Seeking	• No correlation with time/Issue Area • Correlation with alignment with Great Powers and/or the Global South • Correlation with Contestation: China in majority	• Language reflects target's failure to live up to abstract standards (norms) • Language reflects identity-building efforts to acquire status, e.g. alignment by denigrating mutual out-groups, or activating latent cleavages that would be more advantageous for status gain
Domestic Politics/Bureaucratic Interests	• Correlation with change in administration • No correlation with Issue Area	• Employment of language associated with paramount leader in speeches

3. Methodology

This thesis adopts a mixed-methods approach to interrogate an original corpus of every speech made by Chinese representatives at UNGA plenaries in around fifty years, representing an unprecedented systematic examination of undiplomatic language generally and in the context of Chinese foreign policy specifically.

Unless indicated otherwise, figures are accurate to three decimal places (3 d.p.); translations from Chinese to English are as provided by the UN's official translations.

Pre-Processing

Pre-processing involved acquisition, selection, and extraction, and produced a corpus of 823 speeches.

Speeches were taken from the UN Digital Library, using search terms which selected for speeches delivered at UNGA plenaries, by Chinese representatives, and which had *proces-verbal* (PV) in their document symbols (denoting verbatim minutes). Cross-referencing with the published Indexes to Proceedings of the UNGA,[1] which contain lists of speeches by country, identified further speeches. A cut-off at the end of the 74th session (September 2020) was imposed to avoid an expanding corpus while writing. Each document contained the minutes of one plenary meeting from sitting until rising. The speeches hence selected were downloaded and saved by year.

As this thesis analyses speeches in the original language of delivery (Chinese), speeches which did not have verbatim records in Chinese were excluded from the corpus.[2]

The relevant speeches were then extracted from the documents. Where the PDFs did not contain metadata of the Chinese characters, optical character recognition software

[1] United Nations, *Index*.
[2] These are highlighted in red in the 'Master List' and removed for data manipulation, except for 'Quiescence Score'.

was used with manual correction. Quotation marks ("") were removed as they would interfere with Python scripts. The original downloaded PDFs and extracted speeches linked to in Appendix G.

Dependent Variables

This thesis' question is 'why do representatives of the People's Republic of China deploy undiplomatic language at the United Nations?'. The dependent variable is whether the speech contains undiplomatic language, while the independent variables are those factors which are associated with our potential explanations.

Two approaches, corresponding to the two different operationalisations of 'undiplomatic language', were adopted to code for the dependent variable in this thesis.

Dependent Variable: Hand-Coding

The first was a hand-coding approach, corresponding to the first framework. It involved a two-fold determination: whether face-threatening acts were undertaken without significant redress to a strategy of politeness, and whether these acts had specific targets.[3] This dependent variable had three levels: '0', indicating no undiplomatic language, '1', indicating the presence of undiplomatic language, and '2', indicating tempered undiplomatic language ('implicit' language indicating recourse to a strategy of politeness). The number of speeches hand-coded into each category are as follows:

Table M.1: Number of Speeches in Each Hand-Coded Category

Hand-Coded Category	**Number of Speeches**
0 (No undiplomatic language)	651
1 (***Explicit*** undiplomatic language)	133
2 (***Implicit*** undiplomatic language)	39

[3] See page 15.

A hand-coding approach was required because determining language that fulfils these two criteria requires interpretations not easily conducted automatically. Speeches had to be analysed for face-threatening acts which involve impoliteness: positive (distancing and the attribution of negative epithets), or negative (demands restricting freedom of action or deniability among others).[4] Speeches were analysed for 'attachment', where an impolite belief is *attached* to a specific target, making the face-threat specific instead of a general negative statement that could be a generality, a platitude, or a statement of fact. Finally, speeches were analysed for a lack of recourse to a strategy of politeness. Recall Brown and Levinson's five 'superstrategies' of politeness.[5] An absence of face threat (withholding) in a speech is coded,[6] while the bald-on-the-record 'strategy', involving the commissioning of face-threat, is *prima facie* undiplomatic. Measuring the ratio of positive and negative politeness to impoliteness would compound subjectivity issues by relying on further subjective impression. Therefore, the most reliable, and only remaining, metric of diplomatic intent would be where the target of the face-threat is implicit instead of explicit ('off-the-record'), even if, the audience may be fully aware who the target of the criticism is[7] and where it is obvious that the speaker has a particular target (or targets) in mind.

The following table is an example of handcoding: no undiplomatic language ('0'), negative ideas with no attachment ('0'), negative ideas with only implicit attachment ('2'), and negative ideas with explicit attachment ('1'):

[4] See page 16.
[5] See page 15. From least to most face threat: bald on-the-record, positive politeness, negative politeness, off-record, withholding.
[6] As an absence of face-threat in a speech. However, withholding altogether, not making a speech at all, is not: addressed as a methodological shortcoming below.
[7] Chilton, 'Politeness', 208-209.

Table M.2: Examples of Handcoding

Sentence	Code	Analysis
中国代表团像其他代表团一样，对柯里亚先生再次被任命为联合国贸易和发展会议书长表示祝贺。[8] (The Chinese delegation, like other delegations, would like to express its congratulations to Mr. Corea on his reappointment as Secretary-General of UNCTAD.)	0	Sentence does not contain face-threatening language.
不少国家的经济严重滑坡，政局剧烈动荡；有的地区民族矛盾、宗教纷争和领土争端加剧，冲突不断，战火连绵！[9] (Many countries are plagued by severe economic slumps or by political upheaval. Some regions are torn by ethnic or religious feuds exacerbated by territorial disputes, leading to intermittent conflicts and armed clashes.)	0	Sentence contains negative sentiments ('slumps', 'upheaval', 'feuds', 'disputes' etc.) **but** conveys objective analysis of the world, threatening no face.
但是令人遗憾的是，有的国家仍然无视国际社会的正义要求，拒不执行联大上述决议。[10] (Regrettably, the country concerned, continuing to ignore the just demand of the international community, has failed to implement those resolutions.)	2	Sentence contains face threat of attributing negative aspects to target ('ignore…just demand': implicitly, target is acting unjustly and in defiance of international community), **but** implicit identification ('country concerned'), even as it is clear speaker has a target (*the* country) in mind.
自从苏联领导集团背叛了马克思列宁主义，走上了修正主义的道路以来，它就一直执行着社会帝国主义政策。[11] (Ever since the Soviet leading clique betrayed Marxism-Leninism and embarked on the road of revisionism, it has been pursuing a policy of social-imperialism.)	1	Sentence contains **both** face threat which attributes negative epithets to target ('betrayed', 'imperialism'), and explicitly identifies target ('Soviet leadership', 'it').

The following table contains some further examples of hand-coded and recognized face-threat with explanation:

[8] UNGA, A/34/PV.109.
[9] UNGA, A/48/PV.8.
[10] UNGA, A/58/PV.54.
[11] UNGA, A/PV.2003.

Table M.3: Examples of Face-Threat

Face-Threatening Language	Analysis
苏联政府的所作所为充分表明，它是正如列宁说的“口头上的社会主义实际上的帝国主义”。[12] (The actions of the Soviet government have amply shown that it is ‘socialist in words, imperialist in deeds’, as Lenin said.)	Language accuses Soviet Union of hypocrisy, but also of imperialism, manifesting positive impoliteness as these are negative epithets. Direct attribution also manifests negative impoliteness.
阿拉伯国家和人民反对以色列犹太复国主义的斗争是完全正义的…[13] (The struggle of the Arab countries and people against Israeli Zionism is perfectly just...)	Face-threat manifests in implication that Israel (negative impoliteness) is acting unjustly (positive impoliteness).
对联大将要表决的叙利亚问题决议草案，同不少会员国一样，中方对部分内容存在严重关切，要求提案国充分考虑各方意见。在会员国尚存分歧的情况下强行推动表决，这不利于会员国的团结，也不利于联合国秘书长潘基文和国际社会为解决叙利亚危机所作的斡旋努力。[14] (With regard to draft resolution A/67/L.63 on Syria, on which the General Assembly is about to vote, like many other Member States China has serious concerns with some parts and asks the sponsors to take the opinions of the various sides fully into account. To force a vote amid diverging views is neither in the interest of unity among Member States, nor in keeping with the mediation efforts of the Secretary-General and the international community as a whole on the Syrian crisis.)	Face threat manifests in positive impoliteness in China expressing ‘serious concerns’ over the draft resolution, and by imputation of negative implications in the disunity that will result among member states as well for the Secretary-General’s mediation. Moreover, negative impoliteness is implied: the only actions consistent with the flip-side-of-the-above positive outcomes would be to withdraw the resolution. However, face-threat is **qualified** by implicit identification (‘sponsors’) instead of explicitly naming which sponsors China wishes to criticize.
…美方的谎言和欺骗早已没有市场。如果美方真心抗疫，就应该集中精力保护本国人民生命健康，而不是忙于“甩锅”卸责、转移视线。[15] (…the lies and deception of the US are way past their sell-by date. If the US is genuinely serious about fighting COVID-19, it should get down to business and focus on protecting the lives and health of their own people instead of running to	Language explicitly accuses the US representative of lying, and implies that she has lost the support of the majority of the world (‘past their sell-by date’), positive impoliteness. Further accusations are that the American government is making a disingenuous speech (‘genuinely serious about fighting COVID-19’), and explicitly highlights what China thinks are actions that would fulfil the criterion of non-hypocrisy, negative impoliteness.

[12] UNGA, A/PV.2173.
[13] UNGA, A/33/PV.13.
[14] UNGA, A/67/PV.80.
[15] UNGA, A/74.PV.64.

shift the blame, shirk responsibility and divert attention.)	

Dependent Variable: Sentiment Analysis

Sentiment analysis, the process of 'evaluating whether this expressed opinion about the entity has a positive or a negative orientation',[16] was used to create an alternative dependent variable corresponding to the alternate operationalisation of impoliteness and undiplomatic language: that an undiplomatic (impolite) speech would **minimise** the amount of positive (polite) beliefs and **maximise** the amount of negative (impolite) beliefs.[17] By counting up the positive and negative sentiment-bearing phrases, each speech was assigned a 'Diplomatic Score' corresponding to the ratio between them ranging from 0 (most diplomatic) to positive infinity (the greater the value, the more undiplomatic).

This Diplomatic Score was generated using lexicon-based sentiment analysis, where pre-determined 'semantic orientations of words or phrases' is used to calculate the overall orientation of the document. The alternative was machine learning-based sentiment analysis, where initially labelled instances of texts or sentences are used to build classifiers.[18] A machine learning model is well-suited to studies which focus on large numbers of shorter texts with similar subjects and pre-assigned sentiment orientations (good/bad),[19] because it can use orientation to train to recognize the relevant phrases, and inter-text comparison of shared sentiment-bearing words to fine-tune identifications. However, this approach was ruled out as our corpus' size is too small to train on,[20] initial coding does not exist, and political speeches use a larger array of turns of speech. There is also ample precedent in

[16] Bhonde et. al., 'Sentiment', 51.
[17] See page 17.
[18] Taboada et. al., 'Lexicon-Based', 268.
[19] Taboada, 'Sentiment'.
[20] Sun et. al., 'Predicting'; Neethu and Rajasree, 'Sentiment'; Mullen and Malouf, 'Investigation'.

utilising the comparatively simpler lexicon-based method to analyse political texts in both English and Chinese.[21]

The most important part of lexicon-based sentiment analysis is the lexicon and the method by which it is applied. The framework was provided by the Python package 'cnsenti', a sentiment analysis package incorporating Chinese natural language processing.[22] The package's native[23] dictionary (HowNet) was supplemented by a self-built dictionary created by combining the positive and negative word lists of both the Dalian University of Technology Information Research Laboratory's ('DUTIRL') dictionary of emotional vocabulary[24] and the Augmented National Taiwan University Sentiment Dictionary ('ANTUSD').[25] Combined, these represented three out of five of the main dictionaries available for sentiment analysis in Chinese.[26]

Generating Diplomatic Scores for each speech involving passing them through the 'cnsenti' function called 'sentiment.calculate'. It firstly tokenises, dividing texts into discrete phrases which can be passed onto the sentiment-analysing code.[27] Then, it compares those phrases against the sentiment lexicon. This function natively returns three values: the number of discrete phrases in each speech, and two values denoting the weighted positive and negative sentiment of each speech, which counts the number of positive or negative phrases deployed, accounting for intensity and negation modifiers using a native modifier dictionary. However, this counting function would return higher values for longer speeches which have more opportunity to deploy sentimentally-charged language. Therefore, the code was modified to divide both these values by the number of phrases in

[21] Busch and Pelc, 'Words'; Chen et. al., 'Lexicon'; Zhang et. al., 'Sentiment'.
[22] Hidadeng, 'Cnsenti'.
[23] Contained within the 'cnsenti' package.
[24] Xu et. al., 'Lexicon'.
[25] Ku and Wang, 'ANTUSD'.
[26] Chen et. al., 'Lexicon', 646. The remaining two could not be incorporated because resources were not available.
[27] Sun et. al., 'Predicting', 91.

each speech, and to produce a cumulative score where the two resulting scores were divided, negative by positive.[28] These scores are recorded respectively in the master document as columns headed 'PosScore', 'NegScore', and 'CumScore'. The cumulative score ('CumScore') hence returned is taken to be the Diplomatic Score as outlined above.

The following figure summarises the process:

Figure M.1: Sentiment Analysis Flowchart



Which produces a variable with properties:

Table M.4: Properties of Diplomatic Score

Minimum	1st Quartile	Median	Mean	3rd Quartile	Maximum
0.000	0.106	0.189	0.257	0.344	2.133

This alternative dependent variable has the advantage of being divorced from subjective interpretation. This comes, however, at the cost of greater inaccuracy due to

[28] While speeches lacking entirely in positive phrases were rare, speeches lacking in negative phrases were more common: dividing negative by positive avoids division by zero.

inability of the code to interpret attachment of impolite beliefs to targets and differentiate between implicit/explicit language.

Coherence

However, these two Dependent Variables cohere, showing that they are acceptable alternatives and that my subjective handcoding is indeed operationalising some objectively detectable difference in language deployment.

This is seen in linear regression (see section 3 of the R code ["the code"]),[29] where the null hypothesis is that one form of the dependent variable does not have any significant relationship with the other form of the dependent variable. Regressing of the Diplomatic Score against the three handcoding measures yielded the conclusion that, to a 99% confidence level, significant relationships between the two forms of the dependent variable could be seen:

Table M.5: Regression of Two Forms of Dependent Variable Against Each Other

	Diplomatic Score
	OLS
Handcoded (Implicit)	0.165^{***} (0.030)
Handcoded (Explicit)	0.329^{***} (0.018)
Constant	0.196^{***} (0.007)
Observations	823
R^2	0.307
Adjusted R^2	0.306
Residual Std. Error	0.185 (df = 820)
F Statistic	181.985^{***} (df = 2; 820)
Note:	$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

This linear regression shows that the relationships between variation in the two dependent variables are as expected. The more undiplomatic the speech, the higher the Diplomatic

[29] See Appendix I.

Score; the implicit and explicit variables are associated with statistically significant increases in the Diplomatic Score as against the baseline 'none'—the constant—(an increase of 0.165 and 0.329 respectively); the explicit variable is also related to a larger increase than the implicit variable.

Coding Speeches

Based on the potential explanations presented in the previous chapter, the following parameters and associated variables were coded for during the processing of the speeches. A small section of my master document which contains all the coded parameters for each individual speech is reproduced in Appendix G;[30] a detailed explication of coding rules and practices can be found in Appendix H.

The parameters which were coded were chosen with reference to the potential explanations presented in the previous chapter. The headings in the master document, and the parameters they correspond to, are as follows:

Table M.6: Headers in Master Document and Corresponding Parameters

Heading	Year	Document Symbol	Speech Type	No Chinese Available	
Parameter	*Descriptive*	*Descriptive*	*Descriptive*	*Descriptive*	
Heading	Specific Country Targeted?	Specific Country US?	Specific Country USSR?	Issue Area	Vote won by Chinese side?
Parameter	*Subjective*	*Subjective*	*Subjective*	*Issue Area*	*Contestation*
Heading	Status Group (DEVT) present in vote on Chinese side?	Status Group (G77) present in vote on Chinese side?	Vote Overwhelming?	US Outlier?	China outlier?
Parameter	*Alignment*	*Alignment*	*Overwhelming*	*Overwhelming*	*Overwhelming*

Columns headed 'Comments' were used as overflow for additional information.

[30] The same appendix also contains links to online copies of the relevant documents in full.

Descriptive Parameters

These were attributes of the speech, including the year the speech was given ('Year'), the UN document symbol containing the speech ('Document Symbol'), whether the speech was given in the normal course of events, in proposing a resolution, or in exercise of a right of reply ('Speech Type'), and whether or not a verbatim minute existed in Chinese ('No Chinese Available').

In particular, coding for the exercise of the right of reply is important. Speeches given in right of reply allow delegations, otherwise not on pre-prepared lists of speakers, to 'reply to criticism or abuse',[31] and hence are likely to involve deployment of undiplomatic language.

Subjective Parameters

The subjective parameter records the hand-coded dependent variable and related information, divided into three different variables. The first variable is as the handcoded dependent variable. The second and third variables code for the US and USSR respectively as targets of undiplomatic language, taking '1' if they were the target of undiplomatic language and '0' if they were not.

Issue Area

The 'issue area' parameter consists of an alphabetical code denoting the topic of the speech. Cues were taken from the agenda information, but to provide the best basis from which comparison can be made, i.e. to avoid overly specific issue classifications that would lead to classes with one or only a few speeches each, a broad view of each issue area

[31] Sabel, *Procedure*, 121.

was taken. The Issue Areas were as follows, with an appended column detailing how many speeches were coded in each:

Table M.7: Issue Area Codes

Code	Issue Area	Count
A	Disarmament	12
B	General Debate	33
C	Agenda Items Referencing Other Countries	209
D	Development	126
E	Environment	7
G	General Matters – Relating to the UN Itself	57
H	Health	23
I	Humanitarian Intervention	20
L	International Law	16
M	Migration	7
N	Nonproliferation	41
O	Other	105
P	Peace	38
R	Reform of the Security Council	34
S	Matters Relating to the Seas	41
T	Assistance to Other Countries	33
U	Human Rights	19
V	Virus – COVID-19	2

Where a speech straddled multiple classes, such as a speech on sustainable development that would straddle the 'development' and 'environment' classes, a determination was made as to the main tenor and thrust of the speech by the Chinese representative, and it was coded accordingly. For example, the Chinese representative's first speech in A/50/PV.99 was made under an agenda item relating to human rights issues. However, the substance of the speech was not to address the agenda item but to note inconsistencies between the English and Chinese versions of the report in question.[32] As such, it was coded 'O' for Other.

[32] UNGA, A/50/PV.99.

Contestation

The 'contestation' parameter consists of a single variable, consisting of '0', '1', and '2' such that '0's are where China made a speech and subsequently lost the related vote, '1's are where the related vote was won, and '2's are where no determination of could be made.

This is important because voting in the UNGA is by majority vote;[33] the 'China-as-novice', 'stigmatisation', and 'status-seeking' explanations benefit from having Chinese victory (majority) and defeat (minority) distinguished. However, as speeches at the UNGA are made under agenda items, where these agenda items did not lead to a recorded vote, no determination could be deduced from the minutes as to whether the Chinese position was in the majority or the minority. In some cases, this is because no resolution is proposed as a result of the speech, such as in the general debate (high-level speeches '[presenting a state's] views on the state of the world').[34] In other cases, it is because a resolution was adopted by consensus: more an indication of a 'lack of objection' than a positive agreement.[35] As such, both scenarios were coded '2'. Where China abstained, this was coded as '0' (a loss), as abstention meant that China's position would not be reflected in the final result of the resolution.

Alignment: US and G77

Related to 'contestation' is 'alignment' consisting of two variables coding respectively for whether the US voted on the same side as China did and whether signs of alignment with the Group of 77 could be detected. These two alignments were coded for in response to the potential explanations for undiplomatic language deployment as 'rising

[33] Higgins et. al., *Oppenheim's*, 358.
[34] Ibid., 39.
[35] Ibid., 363.

power' and 'status-seeking' behaviour. Should the former obtain, we would expect deployment to correlate with *opposition* to the existing hegemon, the US.[36] However, should the latter obtain we might see—in line with Fung—deployment correlate with positive alignments in either or both variables as China deploys undiplomatic language against a target which has earned the ire of either or both groups.[37]

In coding for this variable, positive alignments took '1', no alignments took '0'. Alignment with the US was only seen in voting; alignment with the G77 was possible without contestation as Chinese representatives could either reference the G77 in the speech, or be mentioned as supporting the G77 position by speakers speaking on behalf of the G77 and China. No alignment '0' was quite prevalent, as many speeches did not lead to contested votes, and the G77 primarily coalesced on issues of development.

Overwhelming

Also related is 'overwhelming', devised in response to the 'China-as-novice' and 'stigmatisation' potential explanations where we might expect undiplomatic language to be in opposition or aligned with the overwhelming majority respectively. It consists of three variables, coding for whether the contested vote on a resolution was won by an overwhelming (>75%) margin (based on the number of members at the UNGA then present),[38] and (yes '1' and no '0') whether China or the US were outliers, i.e., in the overwhelming minority, in the vote. It was possible for neither to be outliers.

Leadership

This parameter's single variable responds to the 'bureaucratic and individual incentives' explanation. It was coded automatically by year, with slight inaccuracy due to

[36] See page 50.
[37] See page 47.
[38] The relevant calculation is performed in the sheet entitled 'Threshold Overwhelming' in the Master Document, linked in Appendix G and reproduced in Appendix E.

overlap: where this was the case, a year was coded by the leader who was in office for the greater proportion of the year.

The years and number of speeches corresponding to each leader:

Table M.8: Leaders Coded by Year

Years	Leader	Count
1971-1976	'Mao' (Zedong)	36
1977-1978	'Hua' (Guofeng)	8
1979-1988	'Deng' (Xiaoping)	114
1989-2002	'Jiang' (Zemin)	259
2003-2012	'Hu' (Jintao)	225
2013-2020	'Xi' (Jinping)	181

Leaders and their tenure were drawn from the constitution of the CCP, which narrates the transfer of power between paramount leaders,[39] because of the continuing primacy of the party in directing state affairs.[40] An exception is Hua Guofeng, who though is not mentioned in the constitution, is coded for because he succeeded after Mao's death in 1976.

Quantitative Analysis

Regressions were conducted in the statistical programme 'R'[41] to discover correlates between the dependent Diplomatic Score variable and various potential independent variables.[42] Except as stated otherwise, the null hypothesis was that variations in the dependent variable do not display a significant relationship with variations in the independent variable(s).

Linear regressions suppose that the dependent variable can be related to independent variables via an equation of the general form, where E(y) is the expected value

[39] Communist Party of China, 'Constitution', General Program.
[40] Wu, *China's*, 1.
[41] R Core Team, 'R'.
[42] Agresti and Finlay, *Statistical Methods*, chaps. 9-15.

of y, the dependent variable, and x some value of an independent variable, and α and β are numbers:

$$E(y) = \alpha + \beta x$$

An alternative, proposing a quadratic relationship between y and x such that, for example, as x increases y first decreases then increases again, takes the general form:

$$E(y) = \alpha + \beta_1 x^2 + \beta_2 x$$

Increasing the number of explanatory variables included, yielding a multiple regression, produces the equation of the general form:

$$E(y) = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \cdots + \beta_k x_k$$

For every speech associated with particular values of our explanatory variables, $\alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \cdots + \beta_k x_k$ produces an expected Diplomatic Score whose variation as compared to a baseline (where none of the explanatory variables obtain, or where a baseline is chosen) can either be as significant as to, to a certain confidence level, allow the rejection of the null hypothesis, or not.[43]

In all instances, the 'fitting' of the model is by ordinary least squares (OLS) processing using the native function in R, which aims to achieve a minimisation of the difference between the values of the predicted (expected) and actual dependent variables to achieve a line of best fit.[44]

[43] Ibid.
[44] Ibid.

Taking as an example the regression table presented above:[45]

	Diplomatic Score	
	OLS	
Handcoded (Implicit)	0.165^{***} (0.030)	Correlation Coefficients
Handcoded (Explicit)	0.329^{***} (0.018)	
Constant	0.196^{***} (0.007)	
Observations	823	Summary Statistics
R^2	0.307	
Adjusted R^2	0.306	
Residual Std. Error	0.185 (df = 820)	
F Statistic	181.985^{***} (df = 2; 820)	
Note:	$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$	

Independent Variables

The right-hand column is headed by the dependent variable, Diplomatic Score, under which the form of processing (Ordinary Least Squares), correlation coefficients, and summary statistics are produced. The left-hand column records the independent variables. If a speech falls into the 'Handcoded (None)'—baseline—category, its predicted Diplomatic Score is the 'Constant': 0.196. A speech in the 'Handcoded (Implicit)' category, its predicted Diplomatic Score is 0.196 plus 0.165: 0.361. On the other hand, if a speech falls into the 'Handcoded (Explicit)' category, its predicted Diplomatic Score is 0.196 plus 0.329: 0.525. The three asterisks indicate that these coefficients represent a statistically significant (to the 99% confidence level) result in favour of the rejection of the null hypothesis (that there is no actual difference between the means of the baseline and explanatory categories).[46]

The adjusted R-squared value measures 'the proportion of the total variation in [the dependent variable] that is explained by the predictive power of all [explanatory

[45] See page 60.
[46] Two asterisks and one represent a confidence level of 95% and 90% respectively.

variables in the model] in the linear regression model'.[47] In this case, around 30.6% of the variation is explained by the model, and allows us to compare this model with other models.

Outliers

Outliers are observations of the dependent variable which, being one-and-a-half times the interquartile range smaller or greater than the first or third quartiles respectively, can skew the mean and the standard deviation and render regression analysis less accurate.[48] As returned by section 3 of the code, the Diplomatic Scores in the dataset are significantly positively skewed (skewedness score 2.222), i.e., skewed to the right as in the figure below:

Figure M.2: Example of Right-Skewedness[49]



This means that values closer to 0 occur more frequently.

However, outliers in my dataset will be retained. This is because my dataset represents the sum total of the population, with the only missingness due to technical difficulties with the archives and digitisation. More importantly, this skew is expected in

[47] Agresti and Finlay, *Statistical Methods*, 332.
[48] Ibid., 54.
[49] Ibid., 38.

light of an expectation for diplomatic language, as lower Diplomatic Scores denote more diplomatic speeches. Exceptions to this expectation are precisely the subject of this thesis, but only as constituents of the dataset as a whole. Removing these outliers would mean our regressions would fail to capture the correlates with these observations of undiplomatic language.

Qualitative Analysis

Qualitative analysis was from a linguistic rhetorical and discursive perspective, undertaken with a view towards complementing quantitative findings with in-depth understanding of the undiplomatic speeches themselves. Four speeches were chosen, corresponding to four different potential explanations, that were representative of the way undiplomatic language was deployed in service of those explanations.

Analytical focus was three-fold. Firstly, speeches were analysed for their undiplomatic nature, including the sources of face-threat and how they constituted positive and/or negative impoliteness, as well as the use (or absence) of mitigatory strategies. Then, deploying the framework developed in the previous chapter, the potential strategic values of this sort of diplomatic language were explicated. Finally, the speeches were placed in context of the meeting at and issues over which it was delivered as well as broader general knowledge of China's diplomacy to interpret their standing in terms of the potential explanations summarised previously.

A discussion then follows which draws together the quantitative and qualitative findings to arrive at an overall picture of undiplomatic language deployment as well as its academic and political implications.

Methodological Shortcomings

Data

The data comprised speeches given by Chinese representatives, for which there are verbatim records, at plenary meetings of the UNGA, up to and including the 74th session terminating in September 2020. This represents the sum total of Chinese participation at UNGA plenaries up to that point. Nonetheless, some data has been excluded by selecting this thesis' corpus from a broader world of existing data; some data is also missing.

The UNGA was selected as the site of investigation because of its universal multilateral nature and importance. However, minutes from subsidiary organs have been excluded. Because analysis of undiplomatic language requires the original language with which a speech was delivered, not summaries which may not adequately capture the effect of language deployed, only verbatim records are acceptable for this thesis' purposes. Only plenary meetings of the UNGA and meetings of the First Main Committee, which deals with disarmament and international security issues, have chosen to have their meetings recorded verbatim.[50] To prevent biasing issue area analysis in favour of speeches related to international security, only records of UNGA plenaries were analysed.

Additionally, because undiplomatic language is best examined in the original language without the mediation of translation, which in diplomatic settings may be biased in favour of diplomatic language, speeches whose Chinese originals could not be sourced were excluded. Because Chinese was an official language of the UN from its inception,[51] Chinese transcripts of these speeches should exist in principle: hence, they are deemed to be 'missing' if they do not. Missingness per year is summarised in Appendix F, Table AF.2. Though there is a bias towards the earlier years of Chinese participation in missingness,

[50] United Nations, 'Documentation'. The other option is for summary records.
[51] United Nations, 'FAQ'.

this is unavoidable and can only be treated as an objective limitation to this thesis. These missing data points are an opportunity for further research should those documents be found.

Moreover, there is an inherent non-randomness to the data. Not only do Chinese representatives have the ability to choose whether or not to make a speech under each agenda item, but agenda items are not randomly selected: they are subject contestation.[52] As such, it is possible that agenda items to which Chinese representatives are hostile to have already been discarded. The only remedy, in the context of this thesis, is to examine to the furthest extent possible those speeches which have been made in the hope that comprehensiveness would serve to redress non-randomness by representing a best-effort holistic approach, reducing the researcher's liability by not interposing a selection process.

Quiescence

By its nature this thesis cannot examine data points where Chinese representatives made no speeches. But the answer to this thesis' question, 'why do representatives of the People's Republic of China deploy undiplomatic language at the United Nations?' may nonetheless lie in the circumstances in which Chinese diplomats stayed silent. After all, one of the strategies of politeness is not to commission the face-threat at all: 'if you have nothing good to say, say nothing'.[53]

Unfortunately, summation of the opportunities Chinese representatives had to speak but chose to stay silent to the level of detail with which the speeches have been coded, including classification either by issue area or by results of contestation (where a vote was taken but a speech was not delivered) has proved impossible. What has been possible is a general impression of the tendency of Chinese representatives to vocalise at

[52] Higgins et. al., *Oppenheim's*, 37-38.
[53] Brown and Levinson, *Politeness*, 60.

plenaries of the UNGA by time. Knowing that only in around 3.5% of the meetings analysed did Chinese representatives speak more than once, comparing the number of speeches made by Chinese representatives to the number of meetings for a given period (year/UNGA session) provides a reasonable approximation of the propensity of Chinese representatives to 'speak up'. Computing this yields the following graph:[54]

Figure M.3: Number of Speeches Made by Chinese Representatives to Number of UNGA Meetings in a Given Year by Year



showing that, though small, there is a visible rising trend in tendency to vocalise with time which can be seen even if we discount the enormous spike in 2020, possibly influenced by the abnormally low number of total meetings in the year (the denominator in our ratio). This is accounted as a finding; its implications will be discussed.

On the other hand, the import of undiplomatic language in an international setting can only be examined in terms of the actual language used, because only then does the lack

[54] The data on which these calculations are based can be found in Appendix E.

of tact and observation of diplomatic norms that undiplomatic language embodies have the opportunity to manifest its strategic value by eliciting a reaction from international interlocutors. While seething in silence may lead an adversary to conclude that something is 'up', it might equally be interpreted as ambivalence or indifference; equally, strength of feeling or the formation of identities is far better expressed in vocalisation. Silence, though golden, is infinitely less versatile than speech.

Subjectivity in Coding

To address concerns over subjectivity in coding, a second anonymous coder was recruited. Appendix H records instructions given. Their coding results are accessible as outlined in Appendix G. Holsti inter-coder reliability tests report a percentage agreement of 99.3% on the hand-coded dependent variable and 98.9% on the issue area variable. On this basis I have concluded that coder subjectivity did not significantly bias the two subjective variables (hand-coded dependent variable and Issue Area variable), and that both are hence acceptable foundations for further analysis.

4. Quantitative Analysis

Relying on data coded and processed as outlined in the previous chapter, quantitative analysis produces the following results. For all references to 'the code', see Appendix I.

Findings: Summary

Given that our regression analysis yields results consistent with the relevant expected findings (see page 50), the explanations of 'revolutionism', 'China-as-novice', 'rising power', and 'status-seeking', must be considered to be the predominant explanations for undiplomatic language deployment by Chinese representatives at the UNGA.

Table Q.1: Summary of Findings

Parameter	Finding	Relation to Explanations
Time (Year)	U-shaped parabolic curve	**Support:** Revolutionism; China-as-novice; Rising power
Time (Leadership)	Two groups of leaders: Mao, Hua, Deng; Jiang, Hu, Xi	**Qualified Support:** Domestic politics
Speech Type	Replies more undiplomatic	**Support:** Defensiveness*
Issue Area	'Agenda Items Relating to Other Countries' and 'Humanitarian Intervention' more undiplomatic	**Not Supported:** Core interest
Contestation	China losing votes more undiplomatic	**Support:** China-as-novice; Defensiveness* **Qualified Support:** Stigmatisation
Overwhelming	Chinese speeches more undiplomatic where US as outlier	**Support:** Rising power **Qualified Support:** Status-seeking
Alignment	None	**Indeterminate:** Status-seeking

(*): Not a potential explanation with respect to Table L.1.

Yet it would be folly to discount all the other potential explanations on this basis. The expected quantitative observables are premised on the relevant explanation being the sole or dominant explanation for the deployment of undiplomatic language. It is possible that though other explanations have motivated the deployment of undiplomatic language in the past, the reason that they do not show up in statistical analysis is that they are rare.

The next chapter examines qualitatively manifestations of these less predominant explanations.

Findings: Evidence

Time

The deployment of undiplomatic language is significantly correlated with the passage of time, but not in either of the ways as outlined in our expectations. Instead of either decreasing ('revolutionism', 'China-as-novice') or increasing ('rising power') with time, resembling either of the figures on the left, the deployment of undiplomatic language firstly decreases and then increases with time, as with the figure on the right.

Figure Q.1: Trend of Undiplomatic Language Deployment with Time



We hoped that quantitative analysis would adjudicate between our potential explanations as *sole* explanations for Chinese deployment of undiplomatic language at the UNGA. However, the U-shaped relationship instead suggests that all three of these

dynamics have, at different times, been explanations for the Chinese deployment of undiplomatic language. This finding is sustained by multiple regression.

From this perspective, while revolutionism or novice-ship (not differentiable at the level of time-based evidence) explains an initially high level of undiplomatic language deployment, it decreases as expected, i.e., as China is socialised into the international system. A period of fewer deployments of undiplomatic language then obtains, explained by Miller's framework of an 'accommodational' prelude to revisionist rising power behaviour.[1] Then, as a rising China's dissatisfaction with the norms of the international order grows with time, deployment of undiplomatic language increases.

Speech Type

The deployment of undiplomatic language is significantly correlated with the speech type 'reply'. To an extent, this is expected.[2] However, it is still important to note that the deployment of undiplomatic language by Chinese representatives was significantly associated with defensiveness: in rebuttal or a rebuke to another state or its representatives for perceived criticism or offence. This finding is sustained by multiple regression.

There was a relationship to some extent between time and the making of speeches in reply: while before 2000 and after 2009 no more than three years elapsed between speeches given in reply, the entire ten-year period of 2000-2009 saw no speeches made in reply whatsoever. Multiple regression analysis assures us that replies do not account wholly for the relationship between time and Diplomatic Score variation.

[1] See page 39ff.
[2] See page 62.

Figure Q.2: Speech Types by Year



Issue Area

The deployment of undiplomatic language[3] is significantly correlated with certain issue areas: however, they are not the ones highlighted in the expected observations presented in Table L.1.[4] Instead, the results of our analysis, summarised in the table below, show that speeches made in the issue areas of agenda items relating to the situations of other countries and humanitarian intervention, were more undiplomatic to a statistically significant extent in final analysis.

[3] Proxied by Diplomatic Score.
[4] See page 50.

Table Q.2: Issue Areas Correlated with Significant Variations in Diplomatic Score

Issue Area	Initial Analysis Diplomatic Score Change	Multiple Regression Diplomatic Score Change
A (Disarmament)	Increase	Significance Eliminated
C (Other Countries)	Increase	Increase
D (Development)	Decrease	Decrease
G (General)	Decrease	Decrease
I (Humanitarian intervention)	Increase	Increase
N (Non-proliferation)	Decrease	Decrease
P (Peace)	Decrease	Decrease
R (Reform of the UNSC)	Decrease	Significance Eliminated
T (Assistance to Other States)	Decrease	Significance Eliminated
V (Covid-19)	Increase	Significance Eliminated

Two stages of analysis were conducted. Initial analysis, regressing issue areas only against other issue areas, yielded statistically significant relationships as indicated in the middle column above. However, further analysis using multiple regression (controlling for non-Issue Area potential explanatory variables) eliminated the statistical significance of some of these relationships as indicated in the rightmost column. The latter results are preferred because they represent a stricter test on the relationship.

The association of issue area 'C' (agenda items relating to the situations of other countries) with the deployment of undiplomatic language in speeches works against the 'core interest' explanation because they show undiplomatic language is associated with commentary on the situation of other countries, rather than in defence of China and her own interests. The lack of significant correlation between the General Debate issue area and the deployment of undiplomatic language, however, is less injurious to the potential explanation of 'revolutionism'. As noted,[5] the establishment of a correlation between undiplomatic language deployment and General Debate speeches is less necessary.

[5] See page 50. The operative is 'may' instead of 'would' expect.

For the sake of completeness, Figure AF.2 of Appendix F depicts speeches by issue areas by year, showing relatively evenly distribution over time.

Winning and Losing

The deployment of undiplomatic language is significantly correlated with votes being lost by the Chinese side as compared to a baseline of speeches not associated with any vote. In initial regressions only on the contestation parameter, this significant relationship was with votes won *and* lost: multiple regression, however, eliminated the significance of the relationship of the former with variations in Diplomatic Score.

This finding fulfils expectations of both the 'China-as-novice' and 'stigmatisation' potential explanations, albeit offering stronger support for the former than for the latter. Where undiplomatic language was deployed and China subsequently lost a vote, it might be concluded that the same 'defensiveness' as highlighted above[6] is being exhibited.

Notably, as the figure below shows, China won and lost votes concurrently:

[6] The correlation between speeches given in right of reply and undiplomatic language.

Figure Q.3: Contestation by Year



In other words, China was in the majority with the international community on some issues but in the minority on other issues at the same point in time. This coheres with Johnston's argument that China's interaction with the 'world of [international] orders' must be examined in terms of different, disaggregated, orders to each of which Chinese foreign policy exhibits differentiated levels of support.[7]

[7] Johnston, 'World of Orders'.

Outliers

Examining the second contestation variable of outliers, deployment of undiplomatic language was significantly correlated with speeches that were associated with votes in which the US was not only outvoted, but outvoted by at least three-quarters of UNGA members at the time. This lends support to hypotheses that undiplomatic language deployment can be explained as stigmatisation. However, because undiplomatic language was deployed in circumstances where the US was in an absolute minority, this deployment can also be understood as a manifestation of status-seeking behaviour related to either revolutionary or rising power aims, because one part of achieving these aims would be to attack hegemonic powers in the international order.[8] This finding is sustained by multiple regression.

Alignment

Deployment of undiplomatic language was not significantly correlated with speeches where Chinese representatives expressed alignment with either the US or the G77. While initial analysis returned a significant relationship between alignment with the G77 and variation in Diplomatic Score, it was with a lower Diplomatic Score; this significance was moreover eliminated by multiple regression.

Leadership

In terms of UNGA speeches made during their tenure, there were broadly two groups of leaders with significant differences between overall Diplomatic Scores of speeches made during their leadership: Mao, Hua, and Deng, and Jiang, Hu, and Xi. With leaders in the latter group as baselines for comparison, the speeches made under the leadership of leaders in the former group all exhibit statistically significant increases in

[8] See page 50.

Diplomatic Score. With the former group as baselines, the latter group exhibit significant decreases. This extends some support for the explanation of domestic politics. However, the fact that speeches made under some leaders' tenure do not differ significantly from those made under other leaders (marked 'N') qualifies this support by raising the possibility that some of these patterns of significant difference can be attributed to broader shifts in foreign policy or grand strategy[9] that transcend individual leaders. Disambiguating this would require qualitative interrogation of speeches, such as by recognising mention of individual leaders' 'signature policies' in the speeches themselves.[10]

Regressions were conducted such that the speeches made under the leadership of every leader was compared to a 'baseline' of every other leader:

Table Q.3: Significant Relationships between Leadership and Diplomatic Score

		Significant Relationship?# (Regression Coefficient)					
		Mao	Hua	Deng	Jiang	Hu	Xi
Baseline Leader	Mao		N (-0.114)	Decrease (-0.156*)	Decrease (-0.352*)	Decrease (-0.367*)	**Decrease** (-0.358*)
	Hua	N (0.114)		N (-0.042)	Decrease (-0.237*)	Decrease (-0.253*)	Decrease (-0.243*)
	Deng	Increase (0.156*)	N (0.042)		Decrease (-0.196*)	Decrease (-0.211*)	Decrease (-0.202*)
	Jiang	Increase (0.352*)	Increase (0.237*)	Increase (0.196*)		N (-0.015)	N (-0.006)
	Hu	Increase (0.367*)	Increase (0.253*)	Increase (0.211*)	N (0.015)		N (0.009)
	Xi	Increase (0.358*)	Increase (0.243*)	Increase (0.202*)	N (0.006)	N (-0.009)	

(#) Increase/Decrease in Diplomatic Score [If Significant Relationship Exists], N [If Not]
(*) Denotes statistically significant regression coefficient, for the purposes of this table all at 99% confidence.

Columns denote the difference in Diplomatic Score of speeches made under the leader whose surname appears at the head of the column as compared to the leader appearing at the leftmost of the row. Hence, for the cell in **bold**, speeches made under the tenure of Xi

[9] See for example Goldstein, 'China's'.
[10] See page 50.

Jinping exhibited a statistically significant overall decrease in Diplomatic Score as compared to speeches made under Mao Zedong's rule.

Notably, regressions on the leadership variable also manifest the uptick at the tail end of the U-shaped curve discovered in regressions on a straightforward time variable (year), albeit to a lesser (non-significant) extent. Compared to speeches made under Hu's tenure, speeches made under Xi display the insignificant correlation coefficient of 0.009. Notwithstanding insignificance, the non-zero result shows a tendency (albeit not at a >90% confidence level required to reject the null hypothesis that the two means are identical) of increase. One possible explanation for this reduction in significance is that, because regressions rely on comparing the mean values of the dependent variable given each value of the explanatory variable, each leader (being in office for multiple years) is associated with too many speeches such that the difference between means does not become statistically significant. As the regression on year has greater specificity—involving a more finely graduated explanatory variable—it is preferred. Hence, the leadership variable was not tested in multiple regression.

Working: Individual

What does undiplomatic language deployment correlate with? Regressing Diplomatic Score on existing coded variables and parameters produces the following results. This is shown in sections 4 and 5 of the code.

Time (Year)

Recall Figure Q.1 above and the need to distinguish between linear and parabolic relationships between time and undiplomatic language deployment. To do so, both linear and quadratic regressions were tested:

Table Q.4: Linear and Quadratic Regressions of Diplomatic Score on Year

	Diplomatic Score	
	OLS	
	Linear (1)	Quadratic (2)
Year	-0.006*** (0.001)	
Year		-2.256*** (0.199)
Year(Squared)		1.719*** (0.199)
Constant	12.726*** (1.147)	0.257*** (0.007)
Observations	823	823
R^2	0.126	0.199
Adjusted R^2	0.125	0.197
Residual Std. Error	0.207 (df = 821)	0.199 (df = 820)
F Statistic	118.253*** (df = 1; 821)	101.862*** (df = 2; 820)
Note:		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Both regressions yield significant relationships. The linear regression fits a slightly decreasing linear relationship. The quadratic regression, yielding a positive coefficient on the 'Year(Squared)' covariate, validates the hypothesis of a U-shaped parabola and indicates that Diplomatic Scores dropped before rising again.

Though R-squared values for both models are low—expected, as more than one speech was made per year—the quadratic model explains more of the variation of the dependent variable (19.7%) than the linear model (12.5%). The quadratic model is hence to be preferred as a more accurate description of the relationship between time and Diplomatic Score.

Speech Type

Speech Type is a three-level variable with levels 'NA', 'ProposeResolution', and 'Reply', with 791, 4, and 28 instances respectively. Regressing Diplomatic Score on Speech Type, the baseline being 'NA':

Table Q.5: Regression on Speech Type

	Diplomatic Score
	OLS
Proposing Resolution	-0.080 (0.106)
Reply	0.361*** (0.041)
Constant	0.246*** (0.008)
Observations	823
R^2	0.088
Adjusted R^2	0.086
Residual Std. Error	0.212 (df = 820)
F Statistic	39.570*** (df = 2; 820)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Compared to the baseline, the fact that Chinese representatives are proposing a resolution is not significantly related to changes in Diplomatic Score. However, the fact that Chinese representatives are exercising a right to reply is, to a 99% confidence level; moreover, the correlation coefficient is positive, indicating that replies are correlated with increases in Diplomatic Score.

Issue Area

A single regression is not appropriate to assess the relationship between different issue areas and Diplomatic Score, as there is no natural 'normal' issue area to use as a baseline to compare all other issue areas against. Equally, setting the intercept to '0', which might seem appropriate given an expectation for absolutely diplomatic language, yields unusable results as in reality there are gaps between expectations for diplomatic language and the 'average' speech by Chinese representatives.[11] This is because sentiment analysis operationalises undiplomatic language with a ratio of *all* instances of negatively-oriented

[11] See Table M.4.

words and phrases to *all* instances of positively-oriented words and phrases, yielding a non-zero Score if so much as one word/phrase appears.[12]

Analysing the relationship between issue areas and Diplomatic Score would require comparison between the mean of the Diplomatic Score of speeches coded for the relevant Issue Area and the mean of Diplomatic Score of every other speech. This is done in section 5.2 of the code, where new datasets were created such that each issue area had its own dataset where every other issue area had been removed and coded as 'Other'. The results are:

[12] See page 59.

Table Q.6a: Regression on Issue Area

	Diplomatic Score																	
	OLS																	
	A (1)	B (2)	C (3)	D (4)	E (5)	G (6)	H (7)	I (8)	L (9)	M (10)	N (11)	O (12)	P (13)	R (14)	S (15)	T (16)	U (17)	V (18)
Disarmament	0.190*** (0.064)																	
General Debate		0.043 (0.039)																
Specific Country Related			0.183*** (0.017)															
Development				-0.125*** (0.021)														
Environment					0.012 (0.084)													
General						-0.108*** (0.030)												
Health							0.001 (0.047)											
Humanitarian Intervention								0.177*** (0.050)										
International Law									-0.026 (0.056)									
Migration										-0.007 (0.084)								
Nonproliferation											-0.130*** (0.035)							
Other												0.005 (0.023)						
Peace													-0.157*** (0.036)					
Reform of the UNSC														-0.090** (0.039)				
Seas															-0.037 (0.036)			
Assistance to Other States																-0.090** (0.039)		
Human Rights																	0.039 (0.051)	
COVID-19																		0.264* (0.157)
Constant	0.255*** (0.008)	0.256*** (0.008)	0.211*** (0.008)	0.277*** (0.008)	0.257*** (0.008)	0.265*** (0.008)	0.257*** (0.008)	0.253*** (0.008)	0.258*** (0.008)	0.258*** (0.008)	0.264*** (0.008)	0.257*** (0.008)	0.265*** (0.008)	0.261*** (0.008)	0.259*** (0.008)	0.261*** (0.008)	0.257*** (0.008)	0.257*** (0.008)
Observations	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823	823
R^2	0.011	0.001	0.130	0.041	0.00002	0.015	0.00000	0.015	0.0003	0.00001	0.016	0.0001	0.022	0.007	0.001	0.006	0.001	0.003
Adjusted R^2	0.009	0.0003	0.128	0.040	-0.001	0.014	-0.001	0.014	-0.001	-0.001	0.015	-0.001	0.021	0.005	0.0001	0.005	-0.001	0.002
Residual Std. Error (df = 821)	0.221	0.222	0.207	0.217	0.222	0.220	0.222	0.220	0.222	0.222	0.220	0.222	0.219	0.221	0.222	0.221	0.222	0.222
F Statistic (df = 1; 821)	8.785***	1.209	122.138***	35.135***	0.019	12.663***	0.0002	12.614***	0.221	0.008	13.663***	0.049	18.441***	5.413**	1.081	5.231**	0.560	2.826*

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Statistically significant relationships are as follows:

Table Q.6b: Significant Relationships Between Issue Area and Diplomatic Score

Issue Area	Significant Relationship? Y/N; If Y (Confidence Level)	Polarity
Disarmament	**Y(99%)**	+
General Debate	N	NA
Agenda Items Referencing Specific Country	**Y(99%)**	+
Development	**Y(99%)**	-
Environment	N	NA
General Matters – Relating to the UN Itself	**Y(99%)**	-
Health	N	NA
Humanitarian Intervention	**Y(99%)**	+
International Law	N	NA
Migration	N	NA
Nonproliferation	**Y(99%)**	-
Other	N	NA
Peace	**Y(99%)**	-
Reform of the Security Council	**Y(95%)**	-
Matters Relating to the Seas	N	NA
Assistance to Other Countries	**Y(95%)**	-
Human Rights	N	NA
COVID-19	**Y(90%)**	+

Of issue areas correlated with statistically significant (to a 90% confidence level or above) variations in the Diplomatic Score, 'Disarmament', 'Agenda Items Referencing Specific Country', 'Humanitarian Intervention', and 'Virus' are related to an increase in Diplomatic Score and hence the deployment of more undiplomatic language in comparison to, in every instance, the remainder of the speeches.

Voting Behaviour and Alignment

Diplomatic Score was regressed on variables related to voting behaviour with respect to an agenda item on which a speech was given. This included variables coding for: vote won or lost by the Chinese side, whether the US voted with China, whether alignment with the G77 could be detected, whether the vote was overwhelming, and, if so, whether the US or China were outliers.

The regression on vote status was conducted such that the baseline was speeches which were made for agenda items which did not involve votes (coded as 'NotVote'):

Table Q.7: Regression on Vote Status

	Diplomatic Score
	OLS
Vote Lost	0.168^{***} (0.029)
Vote Won	0.090^{***} (0.019)
Constant	0.227^{***} (0.009)
Observations	823
R^2	0.057
Adjusted R^2	0.054
Residual Std. Error	0.216 (df = 820)
F Statistic	24.597^{***} (df = 2; 820)
Note:	$^{*}p<0.1$; $^{**}p<0.05$; $^{***}p<0.01$

Both winning and losing votes are significantly correlated, at 99% confidence levels, with increases in Diplomatic Score against the baseline of 'NotVote', which was appropriate as this was a majority (542) of speeches. This is likely the reason for the low R-squared value, as most variation in Diplomatic Score would be contained in the baseline category.

Regression of Diplomatic Score on whether a vote was passed overwhelmingly, including related variables of whether China or the US were outliers (in overwhelming minority) produced the following results:

Table Q.8: Regression on Overwhelming and Related Variables

	Diplomatic Score
	OLS
Vote Overwhelming (>75%)	0.012 (0.033)
US Outlier	0.120*** (0.041)
China Outlier	-0.042 (0.222)
Constant	0.246*** (0.008)
Observations	823
R^2	0.026
Adjusted R^2	0.023
Residual Std. Error	0.219 (df = 819)
F Statistic	7.431*** (df = 3; 819)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Where the US was an outlier, speeches by Chinese representatives were significantly (to a 99% confidence level) more undiplomatic.

Regressing Diplomatic Score on alignment with either the US or the G77 produced the following results, with the baseline (constant) being alignment with neither (most speeches):

Table Q.9: Regression on Alignment

	Diplomatic Score
	OLS
Alignment with the US	0.040 (0.029)
Alignment with G77	-0.068*** (0.024)
Constant	0.262*** (0.009)
Observations	823
R^2	0.013
Adjusted R^2	0.010
Residual Std. Error	0.221 (df = 820)
F Statistic	5.213*** (df = 2; 820)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The only significant relationship (at a 90% confidence level) was between alignment with the G77 and Diplomatic Score, but it was related to a decrease (more diplomatic language).

Leadership

The leadership variable was a function of time. An analysis of means seems to confirm the slight U-shaped parabola found in the regression of Diplomatic Score on year:

Table Q.10: 'Leader' Variables and Mean Diplomatic Scores

Years	**Leader**	**Mean Diplomatic Score**
1971-1976	'Mao' (Zedong)	0.570
1977-1978	'Hua' (Guofeng)	0.456
1979-1988	'Deng' (Xiaoping)	0.414
1989-2002	'Jiang' (Zemin)	0.218
2003-2012	'Hu' (Jintao)	0.203
2013-2020	'Xi' (Jinping)	0.212

However, regression analysis (section 5.6 of the code) presents a contrary picture where some of these relationships are not significant. Where each leader in turn becomes the 'baseline' against which all others are compared, regression analyses produce the following results:

Table Q.11: Regression on Leaders, Alternating Baselines

	Diplomatic Score					
	Baseline Leaders					
	OLS					
	Mao	Hua	Deng	Jiang	Hu	Xi
Mao		0.114	0.156***	0.352***	0.367***	0.358***
		(0.078)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.036)
Hua	-0.114		0.042	0.237***	0.253***	0.243***
	(0.078)		(0.073)	(0.071)	(0.072)	(0.072)
Deng	-0.156***	-0.042		0.196***	0.211***	0.202***
	(0.038)	(0.073)		(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.024)
Jiang	-0.352***	-0.237***	-0.196***		0.015	0.006
	(0.035)	(0.071)	(0.022)		(0.018)	(0.019)
Hu	-0.367***	-0.253***	-0.211***	-0.015		-0.009
	(0.036)	(0.072)	(0.023)	(0.018)		(0.020)
Xi	-0.358***	-0.243***	-0.202***	-0.006	0.009	
	(0.036)	(0.072)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.020)	
Constant	0.570***	0.456***	0.414***	0.218***	0.203***	0.212***
	(0.033)	(0.070)	(0.019)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Observations	823	823	823	823	823	823
R^2	0.199	0.199	0.199	0.199	0.199	0.199
Adjusted R^2	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195	0.195
Residual Std. Error (df = 817)	0.199	0.199	0.199	0.199	0.199	0.199
F Statistic (df = 5; 817)	40.698***	40.698***	40.698***	40.698***	40.698***	40.698***
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

With findings as summarised above.[13]

Working: Multiple

Besides discovering relationships between Diplomatic Score and singular independent variables and explanatory parameters, broader regression models that incorporate multiple independent variables can be constructed.

[13] See page 83.

The assumption of no multicollinearity is important when conducting multiple regression. Fortunately, there is no *a priori* reason why this should be the case with our independent variables.[14] In incorporating issue areas into the multiple regression model, it would prove impractical to conduct the regressions across multiple issue area datasets as previous. To avoid inflating standard error by adding extra variables that add little predictive power,[15] all issue areas identified as not significantly related to changes in Diplomatic Score were re-labelled as 'Other', and used as a baseline 'omitted variable' in regression analysis.

Master Model

Thus far, significant relationships with increases in Diplomatic Score are as follows:

Table Q.12: Significant Relationships between Individual Parameters and Increases in Diplomatic Score

Parameter	**Relationship**
Time(Year)	U-shaped parabolic
Speech Type	Replies more undiplomatic
Issue Area	Agenda items related to 'other countries', 'humanitarian intervention', and 'COVID-19' more undiplomatic
Vote Status	Both won and lost votes more undiplomatic (against baseline of 'NotVote's)
Vote Passed Overwhelmingly	Where US was outlier more undiplomatic
Alignment	None more undiplomatic

Diplomatic Score was regressed on all existing potential explanatory variables that exhibited significance in individual regression (see section 6 of the code).

[14] Independent variables were time (year), speech type, issue area, vote wins/losses, alignment (US and G77), and overwhelming nature of vote (and hence US/China as outliers). Speeches in principle can be made, at any time, on any issue area, with any speech type; these speeches are not necessarily correlated with wins/losses, alignment, or overwhelming nature.
[15] Agresti and Finlay, *Statistical*, 442.

Table Q.13: Regression on All Significant Explanatory Variables

	Diplomatic Score
	Significant Covariates Only
	OLS
Year	-1.872*** (0.190)
Year (Squared)	0.947*** (0.189)
Propose Resolution	-0.037 (0.088)
Reply	0.290*** (0.035)
Vote Lost	0.102*** (0.026)
Vote Won	-0.023 (0.020)
US Outlier	0.075*** (0.028)
Disarmament	0.053 (0.054)
Specific Country Related	0.080*** (0.019)
Development	-0.098*** (0.021)
General	-0.066** (0.026)
Humanitarian Intervention	0.118*** (0.043)
Nonproliferation	-0.122*** (0.030)
Peace	-0.106*** (0.031)
Reform of the UNSC	-0.037 (0.033)
Assistance to Other States	-0.047 (0.033)
COVID-19	0.154 (0.127)
Alignment with G77	0.029 (0.022)
Constant	0.245*** (0.012)
Observations	823
R^2	0.391
Adjusted R^2	0.377
Residual Std. Error	0.175 (df = 804)
F Statistic	28.648*** (df = 18; 804)
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Once controlling for all other explanatory variables with significance in individual parameter analysis, significant relationships are altered as such:

Table Q.14: Alterations in Significant Relationships by Multiple Regression

Parameter	**Relationship Change**
Time	No Change
Speech Type	No Change
Issue Area	"V" no longer undiplomatic
Vote Status	Significance eliminated
Alignment	No change
Outlier	No change

The implications of these regressions for potential explanations are summarised above in the 'Findings: Evidence' sub-section.

Weaknesses of Regression Model

Regressions have weaknesses, especially in application to this dataset. Prerequisites to inference from regression includes the assumptions of proper form (e.g., linear), normal conditional distribution of the dependent variable, no multicollinearity, homoscedasticity, and random sampling.[16] This thesis' data is non-random. We are not sampling randomly from a broader space which is normally distributed or which produces a normal distribution, instead, this thesis' corpus is the entirety of the population; moreover, the phenomenon which this thesis seeks to interrogate is inherently non-random.[17] With respect to the multiple regression conducted in the above section, the possibility of non-necessary but nonetheless existing multicollinearity inflating standard error is non-negligible. 'In practice, the assumptions are never perfectly fulfilled, but the regression model can still be useful.'[18] Consequently, qualitative analysis is also required.

⁂

Quantitative analysis supports as prevailing explanations for the deployment of undiplomatic language that China is firstly a revolutionary/novice power and then a rising power. Qualified support is offered, however, both for a status-seeking, stigmatisation, and domestic political motive.

[16] Agresti and Finlay, *Statistical*, chap. 14.
[17] Due to contestation at the agenda-setting stage. See page 72.
[18] Agresti and Finlay, *Statistical*, 449.

5. Qualitative Analysis

This chapter undertakes qualitative analysis of several representative speeches to understand why they are undiplomatic (referencing impoliteness), what strategic value they could have and how they might be interpreted in context of our knowledge of Chinese diplomacy, including the framework of potential explanations.[1]

Quantitative analysis concluded that the main explanations for deployment are revolutionism/rising power: however, it returns *dominant* explanations only. Therefore, though some of the speeches chosen complement this result (revolutionism [speech 1], rising power [speech 4]), others supplement it by highlighting deployments motivated by other explanations (stigmatisation [speech 2], core interests [speech 3]). Having reviewed every speech in the corpus in detail, these speeches were moreover representative: of the linkage between language and strategic values of signalling and identity-formation; of undiplomatic language deployment in their respective periods in Chinese diplomatic history; and of the phrases associated with their respective explanations.

Speech 1

This General Debate speech,[2] where high-level representatives deliver speeches on the 'state of the world',[3] in 1973 is exemplary of China's early behaviour in the UN. At this time, China still pursued a Maoist revolutionary foreign policy only slightly tempered on joining the UN.[4] As such, the speech reflects the language used by a revolutionary China to critique the international order and especially hegemony of the two superpowers, which is done both generally by reference to revolutionary conflicts around the world, but also a

[1] See page 50.
[2] UNGA, A/PV.2173. Appendix A.
[3] Higgins et. al., *Oppenheim's*, 358.
[4] See page 30.

1973 Treaty between the US and USSR that stipulated the two states would consult mutually whenever a threat of nuclear conflict (not only between them) arose.

Passage 1

> Although no new world war has broken out since the Second World War, local wars resulting from imperialist aggressions have never ceased. The great victory of the heroic Viet-Namese people's war of resistance against US aggression and for national salvation has once again proved that imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers. A small nation can defeat a big one and a weak nation can defeat a strong one, so long as they dare to struggle, are good at struggle and persevere in struggle. It is not the people who fear imperialism; it is imperialism which fears the people. Revolution is the main trend in the world today.

Explicitly naming the US manifests negative impoliteness ("NI");[5] attaching negative ideas of aggression, imperialism, and weakness ('paper tiger') manifests positive impoliteness ("PI"). While 'signalling and disruption' might be an instrumental value of undiplomatic language here—hostility to hegemony and a broader non-cooperative stance with the US—the more profitable implication is identity-building. By lionising the Vietnamese and other 'struggling peoples', the Chinese representative implicitly aligns China with revolutionaries and 'revolution', constructing or reifying an in-group with whom China is sympathetic: encouraging alignment with China by those who self-identify as struggling small nations victimised by imperialism, while emphasising the out-group status of the imperialist US.[6]

Passage 2

> However, we cannot but point out that the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War signed by them on 22 June 1973 goes far beyond the scope of bilateral relations. One may ask, who has given them the right to enter into what they call "urgent consultations" in case of a dispute between either of the parties and other countries and even between any other two countries? The phrase about disputes which "appear to involve the risk of nuclear conflict" is open to any interpretation, and their so-called

[5] See page 16. Positive impoliteness is language of disassociation (usually manifesting as condemnation), while negative impoliteness is language of restriction in freedom of action (usually manifesting as explicit naming or prescription of action).
[6] See page 27. Sympathetic audiences are a prerequisite for successful definition.

"urgent consultations" are bound to be followed by actions dictated by their own interests…

The…agreement…is derived from the so-called principle…that the Soviet Union and the US have "security interests…based on the principle of equality". What is meant by "security interests…based on the principle of equality"? To put it bluntly, it means rivalry for world hegemony—wherever one goes, the other will do the same. What they are doing now is simply to wrap up this content in the form of an agreement…

However, the Soviet leaders have made a great fanfare, lauding that Agreement to the skies, alleging that it ushered in "a new era" in international relations and opened up "historical vistas for strengthening universal security as a whole," and that it was "indeed of historic importance for all mankind". They have their motives for so eulogizing the Agreement. One may recall Khrushchev's famous remarks: "Even a tiny spark can cause a world conflagration" and "We"—that is, the Soviet Union and the US—"are the strongest countries in the world, and if we unite for peace there can be no war. Then if any madman wanted war, we would but have to shake our fingers to warn him off." In this way, if the Soviet Union could be bound together with the US, would not the whole world have to cringe to them?

Preceded by a recital of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,[7] this passage sees the explicit naming (NI) of the USSR as a contender for world hegemony on the backs of weaker nations, with malign motives imputed to the 1972 treaty as merely a façade for the joint suppression of other states ('cringe to them') based on the selfish interests of the superpowers (PI).

Here identity formation is more clear-cut: the language which binds the Americans and the Soviets together sharpens the cleavage between the 'hegemons' and the 'rest of the world' (implicitly threatened by hegemonic domination), reifying the distinction and encouraging the audience to identify with a resistance (*ipso facto* of the rest of the world) of which China is a part. This is aided by revelatory language purporting to explain recent foreign policy moves, and anecdotal evidence of a Khrushchev quote. Importantly, unlike in the above passage, China no longer aligns solely with 'revolutionary' or 'small nations' struggling against larger ones. Instead, the possibility of benefiting from superpower

[7] First formulated in 1954, they are: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

hegemony is foreclosed by the Chinese representative, deploying language to construct a social reality:[8] it is the 'whole world' which will 'cringe' (or kowtow) to the superpowers, and hence the whole world on whose behalf China speaks.

Passage 3

> As to the assertion that the larger the territorial seas and the zones of jurisdiction, the smaller the open sea, the question must be asked, what is the open sea? The so-called "open sea" has, in fact, always been the "private sea" of a few strong naval Powers. The numerous small and medium-sized countries have now stood up; they constitute the majority and demand a change in the so-called law of the sea, which is advantageous only to the imperialists…
>
> Why are the super-Powers so violently opposed to the position of the small and medium-sized countries for enlarging the territorial sea and the zone of jurisdiction? It is not difficult to see the underlying motive if only one takes a look at the contention between the US and the Soviet Union for maritime hegemony in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean and their rivalry in setting up bases and plundering the fishing and sea-bed resources there. When the territorial sea and the zone of jurisdiction are enlarged, their "private sea" over which they act the overlords will contract. How can the super-Powers not desperately oppose this? However, their opposition will eventually prove futile. So long as the numerous small and medium-sized countries are united by seeking common ground on major points, while reserving differences on minor ones, and persevere in tenacious and protracted efforts, their struggle against maritime hegemony is bound to triumph.

Immediately preceding this passage, the Chinese representative raises as an example a Soviet position on the maritime boundary question to evidence what he discusses here. Though not named in the passage, contextually the superpowers clearly refer to the US and the USSR (NI),[9] and again they stand accused of a selfish conspiracy to 'plunder' maritime resources by denying small and medium countries an implicitly rightful pursuit of their interests through the enlargement of territorial waters and zones of jurisdiction (PI).

[8] Bourdieu, *Language*, 105.

[9] The US and USSR are referred to as such in previous passages in the speech, therefore, the use of the impersonal here is shorthand instead of an evasion and qualification of impoliteness (see page 54).

Like previous passages, the discourse and rhetoric is one that juxtaposes the 'superpowers' and the 'small and medium-sized countries', portrayed and defined by the Chinese representative as having fundamentally opposed interests. Once again, further emphasis and definition of China's alignment with and support for other oppressed countries is emphasised: that they are 'bound to triumph' in their quest for an alteration to the law of the sea as long as they are united.

Discussion

The unifying themes of this speech are of opposition to the two superpowers, the US and the USSR, and therefore concomitantly expressions of China's alignment with and support for those who also oppose superpower 'imperialism' and 'hegemony'. Presumably for the benefit of those who as yet remain unconvinced of the threats the two superpowers pose to their interests, the implications thereof are also highlighted. Throughout the passages analysed, the Chinese representative takes pains to define through the use of language a reality where not only are the superpowers selfish, rapacious, hegemonic, and in opposition to the interests of a vast majority of other states, but where alignment with China is natural and beneficial.

The consistent vision of alternatives sets this speech apart from speeches arising from China's novice status: the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are brought up in juxtaposition to the 1972 'power-sharing agreement' as an ideal guide to diplomatic relations between big and small countries;[10] on the question of maritime law the Chinese representative endorses change sought by the manifold small and medium countries which have 'now stood up'. And indeed this theme of advocacy for substantial change is echoed in peroration:

[10] UNGA, A/PV.2173, para. 6.

> We believe that the present conditions in the United Nations should be changed and that the Charter should be revised. How can the United Nations go on working in the same old way it did more than 20 years ago, when the world has already changed? The third world has risen up.[11]

explicitly advocating for the revision of the UN Charter and changing the way the UN operates to better accommodate the Third World.

Hence, this is a speech in the 'revolutionary' vein.[12] Not only has the Chinese representative used a General Debate speech to express the generality of China's grievances with the international order, but the main cleavage that is deployed is of imperialist/revolutionary states:[13] albeit blending into the 'more conventional' critique of superpower hegemony.[14] China is positioned as sympathising with states in the 'revolutionary' category, and the speech is consistent in its attempts to construct and reify the cleavage between 'the superpowers' and 'the rest', especially with references to the selfishness of the superpowers in advancing their own interests at the expense of everyone else's. And though the UN as an institution is not condemned *in principle*, it is subject to a critique that proposes root-and-branch change.

But this speech also embodies a status-seeking motive. Not only does language deployment serve, by deploying an understanding of the world common among China's peer-group composed of the 'rest of the world' more generally or the Third World more specifically, to burnish her credentials of membership, potentially costly condemnation of the superpowers can be understood in terms of a bid for higher status within the peer-group.

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[11] Ibid., para. 48.
[12] See page 33.
[13] UNGA, A/PV.2173, para 13. The rhetoric of the USSR as 'social imperialist' persists in this speech.
[14] Armstrong, *Revolution*, 183-185.

Speech 2

A speech discussing Apartheid (racial segregation) in South Africa (coded as Issue Area 'C') in 1984 is representative of speeches where undiplomatic language is deployed to socialise by stigmatisation.[15] Apartheid was a long-standing issue on the UNGA agenda, and international opposition had already manifested in the suspension of South Africa from the UNGA in 1974. At this point in time, close but still preceding the end of Cold-War 'anti-hegemonism' in Chinese foreign policy narratives,[16] China nonetheless aligned with the international community and exhibited faith in the efficacy of the UN over the South African question.

Passage 1

> For long years the South African racist régime has been pursuing the atrocious policies of apartheid and racial discrimination, cruelly persecuting the black people who make up the overwhelming majority of South Africa's population and depriving them of all their freedom and democratic rights in the political, economic, cultural, educational and all other aspects of social life. At the same time, in defiance of the opposition of the international community, it has for many years kept Namibia under its illegal occupation and incessantly encroached on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbouring countries, destabilizing the front-line African States. South Africa's system of apartheid is a crime against humanity and a serious threat to international peace and security.

This speech explicitly names the target of face-threat, the apartheid government of South Africa (NI), and attaches to its actions negative properties and appellations ('atrocious', 'illegal', 'destabilising'—PI). Notably, terms such as 'crime against humanity', 'serious threat to international peace and security', while certainly constituting positive impoliteness, play a further role in emphasising that China's position is not one of selfish condemnation for self-gain, but one which is based in abstract normative principles.

[15] UNGA, A/39/PV.68. Appendix B.
[16] See page 41.

In doing so, undiplomatic language here contributes, as 'truth claims', to the definition of the Othered South Africa as a deviant among members of the international society, while China is implicitly positioned in opposition: as a supporter of the universal principles of 'freedom and democratic rights' as well as 'sovereignty and territorial integrity'.[17]

Passage 2

A just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little support. The just struggle of the people of South Africa has always received the support and close attention of the international community. Resolution 39/2 adopted by the General Assembly at the current session and resolution 556 (1984) adopted recently by the Security Council both reiterate condemnation of the South African racist regime for its massacre and persecution of the South African people resisting the system of apartheid. The Final Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the Non- Aligned Countries to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly held in New York from 1 to 5 October 1984, and the resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its nineteenth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 6 to 12 June 1983, both express even stronger support for the struggle of the South African people. We believe that all this is undoubtedly a tremendous source of encouragement to the embattled South African people.

The theme continues in this passage, where the international community's stance is further highlighted by example of UN, NAM, and Organization of African Unity resolutions. It is implied that these resolutions endorse the Chinese representative's negative labelling of the South African regime and its actions (NI) ('racist', 'massacre and persecution'—PI).

This language develops a stigmatising narrative and forms the identity of the stigmatised. By highlighting the South African regime's nonconformity with relevant international consensuses, language used deploys nonconformity and a lack of esteem not

[17] Importantly, of course, language may contribute to this definition even if it is not true, see page 28.

only to socialise the South African government into accepting norms of non-racism, but to encourage more action by other states of the UNGA against South Africa.

Passage 3

> In our view, the United Nations should, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, support the just position of the vast number of African countries and take more effective measures, including mandatory sanctions, against the South African authorities. We are convinced that, with the support of all the justice- upholding countries and peoples in the world, the South African people will win final victory for their struggle against apartheid.

Here undiplomatic language is deployed in service of building an identity in support of sanctions. By explicitly defining justice with the 'position of a vast number of African countries' and support for the 'South African people', the implicit negation is not only that the South African regime and their policy of apartheid is unjust, but that all who *do not* support sanctions are similarly obstructing the course of justice. On the other hand, the same phrasing explicitly reifies and assures those who *do* support sanctions that they are on the side of both justice and history ('final victory'): reflecting how identity-forming language defines not only the out-group, but the in-group.

Discussion

The speech's theme is simple: that the South African regime with its apartheid and military involvement in neighbouring states is unjust, and that China joins with others in supporting the South African people's struggle as well as the wider international community's attempts (referenced as the various resolutions of international and regional organisations) to bring an end to both. Indeed, though the speech analysed here does not lead to a vote, a speech given just a year later and under a very similar agenda item does;[18]

[18] UNGA, A/40/PV.81.

the vote is won overwhelmingly (>75% of UNGA plenary membership) by the Chinese side (notably with a US abstention).[19]

It is therefore a speech whose undiplomatic language deployment is socialising by stigmatisation:[20] that is, China is *joining with* the international community/society/order as part of the 'norm cascade'.[21] It is clear that the norms the South African government stands accused of contravening, including racism, enduring colonisation, and disrespect for territorial sovereignty, are well-established even if we consider solely the UN system.[22] By using undiplomatic language that condemns explicitly and defines the situation as one of good versus evil, especially effective given its delivery at one of the 'custodians of seals of international approval and disapproval',[23] the speech is an application of international 'peer pressure': not only on the South African government, but on other states to act by sanctioning.

Speech 3

This speech[24] discusses an attempt to table on the agenda a resolution for the admission of Taiwan to the United Nations (coded as Issue Area 'O'—Other—due to its procedural nature) in 2007. As an example of the PRC defending its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan and attempting to forestall legitimisation of Taiwan's autonomy and *de facto* independence, this speech is representative of the way undiplomatic language is deployed to defend China's core interests.[25]

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[19] UNGA, A/40/PV.115.
[20] See page 37.
[21] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Norm', 902.
[22] UN Charter (territorial integrity), 1960 Declaration on Decolonization, 1964 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (end of Apartheid).
[23] Claude, 'Legitimization', 371-372.
[24] UNGA, A/62/PV.2. Appendix C.
[25] See page 44.

The Chinese delegation firmly opposes the inclusion of item 165 in the agenda of the General Assembly at its sixty-second session…First, there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of China's territory. That is the common position of the United Nations and the overwhelming majority of its Member States…Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 1971 long ago resolved once and for all China's representation in the United Nations politically, legally and in terms of procedure…

However, the Taiwanese authorities, with a view to seeking selfish political gains, have deliberately provoked cross-Straits confrontation, intensified their separatist activities for Taiwan independence, and frenziedly clamoured for the so-called issue of Taiwan's membership of the United Nations. Their purpose is to seek de jure Taiwanese independence. Such adventurous activities of the separatist forces for Taiwanese independence, if not curbed in time, will seriously undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, gravely affect cross-Straits relations and severely threaten peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits. We will never tolerate Taiwanese independence or allow anyone to separate Taiwan from China in any form whatsoever…

Thirdly, respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs is one of the cardinal principles of the Charter of the United Nations. At the instigation of the Taiwanese authorities and in defiance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolution 2758(XXVI), Gambia and a very few other countries have raised the so-called issue of Taiwan's participation in the United Nations at the General Assembly's sessions year after year. This seriously violates China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and gravely interferes in China's internal affairs…China has never done anything to harm the interests of the sponsors, but the sponsors have time and again trampled on internationally acknowledged truth and the one-China principle widely recognized by the international community…We believe that the overwhelming majority of Member States supports the Chinese Government in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity…

Face threat in these extracted passages, again, arises in both positive and negative aspects. Explicit identification (NI) directs criticism (PI) towards the 'Taiwanese authorities' and their supporters 'Gambia and a very few other countries'. These include the contravention of international consensus—the UN Charter and resolution 2758—and norms ('territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs'), separatism, bellicosity ('severely threaten peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits'); moreover, these are for selfish rather than noble interests ('selfish political gains'—presumably domestic electoral ones). In relation to Taiwan's allies who sponsored the resolution, there is a further sense of ingratitude ('China has never done anything to harm the interests of the sponsors') and

definition of illegitimacy born from minority ('Gambia and very few other countries'; 'the overwhelming majority of Member States supports the Chinese Government').

Discussion

Here the Chinese representative develops a threefold argument to defend her core interests: that the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan is internationally recognised, that the 'Taiwanese authorities' are acting maliciously and in contravention of international norms, and that Taiwan's supporters at the UNGA are implicated in this malicious activity which is opposed overwhelmingly. How does undiplomatic language deployment contribute?

Firstly, there is a clear signalling and disruption role: the central Chinese position is that 'We will never tolerate Taiwanese independence or allow anyone to separate Taiwan from China in any form whatsoever.' This signals absolute non-negotiability over the Taiwan issue, and draws attention not only for the severity of the language itself, but the undiplomatic nature of statements that surround it. These statements are symbolic disruptors: important less for their substantive content than for their role in signalling that China perceives the Taiwan issue as beyond the 'realm of normal cost-benefit calculations' [26] and/or that she is prepared to risk a breakdown in the normal cooperativeness of that institution in defence of her interests on that issue.

The truth claims contained in those undiplomatic statements also illustrate how this speech serves China's core interests. Attributions of selfishness, bellicosity, and contravention of international consensus and norms dispose other states in favour the Chinese position. But defining via the use of language the social reality of Taiwan and the sponsors of the resolution (Gambia as etc.) as minorities is perhaps more useful. Majority is a natural metric of legitimacy given not only by the system of voting by majority at the

[26] Hall, *Emotional Diplomacy*, 40.

UN, but also because of the 'critical threshold' required to turn a norm from emergence to cascade.[27] The implication, therefore, is that the resolution's sponsors are acting illegitimately: a situation which China wants to continue and emphasises to the relevant parties to deter them from raising the question again.

It can be seen[28] that this speech is one where undiplomatic language deployment can be explained with reference to the Chinese representative's defence of China's core interests at the UNGA.

Speech 4

This speech, delivered in 2020 on the UN 'New Partnership for Africa's Development' (coded Issue Area 'D'—Development) is an example of undiplomatic language deployment explained by China's positioning as a rising power challenging the hegemon tinged with domestic political incentives.[29] In this case, the Chinese representative spoke in opposition to a proposed amendment which would delete the term 'win-win cooperation' from the final resolution.

Passage 1

China wishes to thank the Group of 77 and China's facilitators of resolution 74/301. We commend their work and dedication throughout these negotiations. The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by consensus in 2015, represents the rock-solid commitment of leaders of all countries to multilateralism, to the central status and role of the United Nations and to the promotion of sustainable human development… Pursuing win-win cooperation is a universally accepted and widely popular concept in international cooperation. It is an important consensus and a solemn pledge of all Member States under the 2030 Agenda…

[27] Finnemore and Sikkink, 'Norms', 899.
[28] See page 45.
[29] UNGA, A/74/PV.62. Appendix D.

This passage acts to set up the Chinese representative's argument by establishing the credentials of 'win-win cooperation'. It is associated with positive ideas, such by being presented as 'universally accepted and widely popular concept in international cooperation', and implicitly endorsed by the G77 (containing 134/193, 69% UN Member states).

Passage 2

As we speak, unilateralism, protectionism and bullying have taken a heavy toll on international order and cooperation. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has wreaked havoc on global development. Pursuing win-win cooperation and maintaining solidarity and collaboration is the only right choice for the international community. Certain countries, driven by self-interest, distort and vilify the principle and notion of win-win cooperation, provoke political confrontation and resort to political slander, thus deviating from the spirit of international development and cooperation and historical trends. Such barefaced politicization of development issues seriously undermines the spirit of international solidarity and cooperation, disrupts international efforts to advance the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and compromises the shared goal of countries to achieve better economic recovery and growth.

This passage again manifests both forms of impoliteness in deployment of undiplomatic language.

NI, though not in the form of explicit identification ('certain countries, driven by self-interest…')—the 'tempering' of undiplomatic language—[30] is presented in the form of restrictive prescription that forecloses freedom of action: that 'the only right choice for the international community' is 'pursuing win-win cooperation'. Note, of course, that the states that China is condemning here are not unknown: proposers and supporters of the amendment to the resolution are known because the proposal culminated in a recorded vote.[31]

PI then manifests in the form of condemnation of 'unilateralism, protectionism and bullying', implicitly of the same 'certain countries', who moreover 'distort and vilify'

[30] See page 54.
[31] Six states offered explanations of vote regarding their support for the amendment in opposition to the Chinese position: Germany (on behalf of the EU), Hungary, India, the UK, the US, and Japan.

the high-minded principle of win-win cooperation. Here the appeal is again to the legitimacy of the majority and international consensus but also to the high-mindedness of China, whose only interest, so this speech portrays, is the 'spirit of international development and cooperation'. China and her allies or supporters are contrasted with their opponents, who are in turn labelled as self-interested, malicious ('slander'), on the wrong side of history ('historical trends'), and just plain wrong ('distort and vilify'). If we understand naming as 'acts of institution and destitution',[32] then this language achieves—with the aid of a sympathetic audience—[33]the categorisation of China's opponents and the rejection of their arguments, however well-justified in turn, as façades.

Discussion

One of the intended targets of this speech was the US (which voted in favour of the amendment and—the amendment having failed—in opposition to the final resolution), and the language used manifests facets of the 'rightful resistance' highlighted by Schweller and Pu.[34] This speech explicitly identifies China and her supporters with the international community and perceived legitimate principles of international development support and agreed-on consensuses (the '2030 Agenda'). China is portrayed as in keeping with all these positive identities, whereas the US (and other supporters of the amendment) are implied to be nit-picking over the (misinterpreted) meaning of a single term instead of supporting an overall beneficial resolution and programme of work. Accentuating the negative aspects of US actions, contrasting behaviour that is consistent with identification with the international order/society and that which is inconsistent of it—this is precisely the language of a rising power looking to delegitimise an existing hegemon.[35] Moreover, the deployment of 'win-win cooperation', a Chinese-originated concept (at least in this

[32] Bourdieu, *Language*, 105-106.
[33] See page 27.
[34] Schweller and Pu, 'After', 50ff
[35] See page 39.

formulation) which is presented as a more 'authentic' interpretation of the principles of international development, furthers the impression of a presentation of an 'alternative vision' of international order.

Importantly, however, 'rising power' is not the only explanation supported by qualitative examination of this speech. Indeed, the defence of 'win-win cooperation', one of President Xi Jinping's contributions to foreign relations thought and a core principle of 'foreign affairs with Chinese characteristics',[36] suggests the possibility of the Chinese representative's being motivated by domestic political interests in the form of potential rewards for defending a 'flagship policy'. Moreover, because of its critique of the US and explicit alignment, a 'status seeking' motive can be attributed, the peer group being that as identified by Fung of developing countries (proxied by the G77).[37]

This speech is one where undiplomatic language deployment can be explained primarily with reference to China's foreign policy as a rising power, and secondarily by reference to status-seeking and domestic political incentives.

Discussion

These speeches are snapshots in time of an overall story of Chinese diplomacy at the UN, and, in reflecting a range of motives for the instrumental deployment of undiplomatic language, build a convincing and coherent story of her complex relationship with the international order, international society, processes of socialisation, and international norms that dovetails with the results of quantitative analysis as well as the literature's treatment of her diplomatic history.

The first speech, given in 1974 (three years after accession) shows undiplomatic language deployment reflecting a pre-socialised revolutionary power's opposition to the

[36] Yang, 'Win-Win'.
[37] See page 46.

status quo and the international order as embodied by leadership of hegemonic, 'imperialist', superpowers. In the second speech in 1984, the legitimacy of the UN and the international community begins to be accepted: their norms are supported by a stigmatisation of Apartheid South Africa in service of socialisation. Though China in 2007 is firmly situated in the context of an 'accommodational' rise, the core nature of the interest at stake precipitates the deployment of undiplomatic language with orientation towards forestalling unfavourable normative *change* (of which this resolution could be the metaphorical camel's nose) in potential recognition of an independent Taiwan as legitimate.[38] The final speech, given firmly in the midst of an 'active rise' in 2020, shows China positioning herself as a promoter of the norm of 'win-win cooperation' and a (successful) challenger to status quo or hegemonic (US) understandings of international development.

[38] See page 42.

6. Discussion and Conclusion

Chinese representatives have become increasingly vocal at the UNGA with time.[1] Quantitative analysis concludes that observations best fit the expectations of undiplomatic language deployment explained by revolutionism/China-as-novice, posing challenges as a rising power, and, less substantially, status-seeking. Chinese representatives have consistently been more undiplomatic where the UN has discussed the situations of other countries and humanitarian intervention, and, more abstractly, when on the 'defensive'. Qualitative analysis shows that a common thread that runs through deployment with varying proximate motives is China's complex interaction with the process of socialisation and hence the norms of international order/society.

Overall Discussion

The story that runs as a golden thread throughout these findings is that undiplomatic language deployment by Chinese representatives at the UNGA can, in the final analysis, in the main explained by China's **complex relationship with socialisation** in the international order/society. Additionally, with wider implications, undiplomatic language offers a potential alternative perspective into **what China values, sees as sites of contestation, and self-perception in the context of the broader international order**.

The overarching picture of undiplomatic language deployment is of a U-shaped parabola, which tracks the literature's understanding of China's relationship with the status quo. In the period under review (1971-2020), China firstly sustained a revolutionary objection to, re-oriented herself to play an 'accommodational' role in,[2] and finally begun to challenge as a rising power, the international order. The periods when China has been understood, broadly, to be at greater odds with the status quo and international norms (i.e.,

[1] See page 73.
[2] See Miller, *Nations*, chap. 5.

first/third—beginning/end—periods), have shown greater levels of undiplomatic language deployment.[3] Qualitative analysis reveals that, though other explanations for deployment do exist, the revolutionary/rising power motives definitely do also exist and manifest when we would expect them to.[4] Implicitly, this is an argument about China's relationship with the socialising tendencies of the international order/society: in the first (revolutionary) period, China is resisting it, in the third (rising power) period, China's incentives, broadly, are to revise it, or even supplant it altogether.[5]

China's rising-with-time participatory trend in the UNGA coheres with this picture. As revolutionary rejection gives way to accommodation and China's socialisation, participation should rise as the UNGA becomes a legitimate venue for conducting world affairs. 'Rightful resistance' as a rising power further involves the use of 'existing channels' to contest behaviours of the hegemon, potentially to delegitimise her leadership.[6] The 'defensive' bent to undiplomatic language deployment as detected in quantitative analysis also supports relating undiplomatic language deployment to resistance or delegitimisation. Finally, status-seeking behaviour can certainly be squared with both. With revolutionism, where 'conversion' of other states to the cause of revolution could be considered part of the 'redefinition of norms';[7] with rising power-hood, as part of competition for leadership in a peer group hierarchy which may be a prelude to, or even constitute, competition for hegemonic or great power status.[8]

But China's relationship with socialisation has not simply been resistance, then as a passive 'recipient', then revisionism. Chinese diplomats at the UN have also deployed

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[3] As outlined in Armstrong, *Armstrong*; Johnston, *Social*; Pu, 'Socialisation'; Fung, *China*, and others.
[4] In chapter 5, our 'revolutionary' speech is given in 1973, whereas our 'rising power' speech is given in 2020: the beginning and end of period under review respectively.
[5] See pages 30-43.
[6] Schweller and Pu, 'After', 50ff.
[7] Armstrong, *United Front*, 109ff.
[8] Miller, *Nations*, 8-10. See also page 45.

undiplomatic language to socialise other states in line with norms of the international order/society through the mechanisms of labelling and stigmatisation.[9] Moreover, it has also shown that even in a period of 'accommodation',[10] interests which are sufficiently important may attract undiplomatic language in their defence: manifesting a relationship to socialisation and international norms in the form of forestalling unfavourable normative change. Hence it would be better to characterise the relationship as a complex one, rather than merely support, or resistance. Chinese foreign policy interacts—as perhaps it inevitably does, especially when viewed from the lens of speeches made at large multilateral fora—in a complex manner with international norms and pressures exerted by the international order/society to produce the deployment of undiplomatic language.

Attention to undiplomatic language also offers an alternative perspective into **what China values, sees as sites of contestation, and self-perception in the context of the broader international order**. Qualitative analysis has demonstrated China's forcefulness in defending her position on Taiwanese sovereignty, dovetailing with the literature's understanding of it as a core interest that will not be abandoned. Reflecting Johnston's 'world of orders', while China supports international norms of anti-racism and territorial integrity, quantitative analysis in showing association of undiplomatic language deployment with speeches on humanitarian intervention substantiates the literature's understanding of China's continuing contentious relationship with that subject (including Responsibility to Protect).[11] Quantitative analysis showing undiplomatic language deployment associated with agenda items referencing other countries suggests a proactive status-seeking stance, either by performing or innovating on international norms through commentary on the affairs of other states when the relevant agenda items arise in the UNGA. Finally, attention

[9] See second qualitative speech.
[10] China's 'new assertiveness' is often traced to post-2008 (Goldstein, 'China's')/around 2010 (Johnston, 'New') while the third speech examined qualitatively dates from 2007.
[11] See Fung, *China*; He, *Changing*.

to Chinese use of undiplomatic language at the UN has allowed us to form a picture of the states and groupings with which China has aligned over the years, as well as her self-perceptions in the epithets ascribed both to herself and to others. Of particular interest is the more recent adoption of a strong discourse of rightful resistance and emphasis on the injection of Chinese-originated norms—over the US's objections—into the international developmental dialogue.[12] In the use of language that reflects China's self-identification as a more legitimate defender of international values and consensuses, especially vis-à-vis the US, we see suggestive moves towards revisionism of international leadership.

Implications

This thesis affirms the importance of studying international institutions, practices, and their relation to norms. Demonstrating the utility of Jones' disaggregation of norms in the international order as first-order norms of principles and second-order norms of practices, we arrive at an analogous conclusion: that attention should be paid to China's socialisation into the latter to effectively bargain over the former.[13] By understanding the norm of diplomatic language, Chinese representatives have been able to use their transgression to negotiate China's relationship with the broader international order, especially but not only when Chinese foreign policy is oriented towards resisting or revising those norms. Extending this beyond the Chinese case, transgressions of norms in international relations can be interpreted as another form of engagement with the international order: not only to contest it, but also to support it.

This thesis has also drawn attention to the study of practice-oriented norms and highlighted the possibility of using discursive and rhetorical analysis, both on the micro- and macro-scale, to understand international political trends or positions. Contra 'cheap

[12] See fourth qualitative speech.
[13] Jones, 'Contesting', 128ff.

talk' and those who argue that diplomatic speeches may be 'platitudes, slogans, catchphrases and generalities',[14] this thesis highlights the 'stage' on which international interactions are played out and the parts of the several players thereon. Talk is not cheap—some talk can be very costly indeed—and can be extremely meaningful: not only to the intended audience, but to the scholar searching for traces of foreign policy, especially in states where the policymaking process is often opaque. Generalising on this thesis' approach, I argue that analysis of diplomatic speechmaking can shed light on a state's interests, where it sees contestation in the international society as occurring, and how it sees itself in the context of the broader international order.

For the study of Chinese foreign policy, the recent upward trend in undiplomatic language deployment suggests further clashes with the international order and its first-order norms as China's rise continues. While China's 'new assertiveness' may be a meme, it is undeniably the case that China's representatives abroad have in recent years become more robust in 'telling the China story well'.[15] While, ultimately, speeches are what China *wants* the world to hear, attentiveness may also reward China-watchers by shedding light on what China values, views as potential sites of contestation in the international order, and how she understands herself, especially in alignment with other states.

Conclusion

In answering this thesis' question—that deployment of undiplomatic language by Chinese representatives at the UNGA reflects China's complex relationship with socialisation in the international order/society—we have also highlighted what a practice-oriented study of diplomatic rhetoric and discourse offers to scholars of international relations: an alternative avenue of understanding state foreign policy. Not only what states seek, but

[14] Hameiri and Jones, 'Challenges', 581.
[15] Chan and Song, 'Telling'.

what states see as opportunities to advance their interests, who states perceive as their allies and adversaries, and how they see themselves and their relationship with the international community.

These conclusions have been drawn by examining more than eight hundred individual speeches over a fifty-year period. Of course, our interpretive approach is limited in that it has been based on examining the Chinese deployment of undiplomatic language to deduce motives and trends: where none exists, our method is moot. As such, its utility is as one of many potential perspectives into Chinese statecraft: not as a one-size-fits-all. Nevertheless, there remains ample scope for further research along this thesis' lines, such as by interrogating UNSC speeches by Chinese representatives or by adapting our systematic approach to examine the speeches made by representatives of other states, and will undoubtedly reward researchers who do so with a more holistic understanding of the foreign policy and international relations of the state of choice. Diplomacy is about communication: it behoves us to listen to what is said.

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Reference to material is made according to the 17th edition of the Chicago Manual of Style, save that "British style" quotations (first quotation marks are single quotes, punctuation outside quotation marks) are used.

Material is cited with shortened citations in the body text pursuant Section 14.29 of the same manual; material from the UN Official Documents Service here pursuant Section 14.305 of the same manual.

UN document naming (symbol) conventions are as follows. The prefix 'A' denotes the General Assembly; 'PV' denotes *process-verbal*, i.e., a verbatim minute; before the 31st session beginning 1975, minutes were numbered sequentially per meeting (the first recorded speech in 1971 bears code 'A/PV.1983', the 1983rd plenary meeting of the UNGA); afterwards, the second set of numbers, between two slashes, denotes the session.

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26th Session

A/PV.1983	A/PV.1984	A/PV.1995	A/PV.1996	A/PV.2003	A/PV.2006
A/PV.2016	A/PV.2022	A/PV.2027			

27th Session

A/PV.2035	A/PV.2037	A/PV.2051	A/PV.2069	A/PV.2077	A/PV.2083
A/PV.2093	A/PV.2099	A/PV.2104	A/PV.2105	A/PV.2106	A/PV.2113
A/PV.2116					

28th Session

A/PV.2137	A/PV.2153	A/PV.2154	A/PV.2158	A/PV.2168	A/PV.2175
A/PV.2188	A/PV.2194	A/PV.2199	A/PV.2202	A/PV.2204	A/PV.2205

29th Session

A/PV.2236	A/PV.2252	A/PV.2275	A/PV.2281	A/PV.2288	A/PV.2289
A/PV.2298	A/PV.2301	A/PV.2303	A/PV.2314	A/PV.2315	A/PV.2319
A/PV.2320	A/PV.2322	A/PV.2323	A/PV.2325		

30th Session

A/PV.2354	A/PV.2363	A/PV.2389	A/PV.2394	A/PV.2399	A/PV.2406
A/PV.2409	A/PV.2413	A/PV.2415	A/PV.2419	A/PV.2429	A/PV.2434
A/PV.2435	A/PV.2440				

31st Session

A/31/PV.1	A/31/PV.17	A/31/PV.36	A/31/PV.41	A/31/PV.47
A/31/PV.52	A/31/PV.64	A/31/PV.71	A/31/PV.77	A/31/PV.79
A/31/PV.86	A/31/PV.95	A/31/PV.108		

32nd Session

A/32/PV.2	A/32/PV.5	A/32/PV.13	A/32/PV.45	A/32/PV.48
A/32/PV.54	A/32/PV.56	A/32/PV.57	A/32/PV.61	A/32/PV.64
A/32/PV.70	A/32/PV.82	A/32/PV.85	A/32/PV.91	A/32/PV.105
A/32/PV.106	A/32/PV.107			

33rd Session

A/33/PV.13	A/33/PV.37	A/33/PV.44	A/33/PV.48	A/33/PV.49
A/33/PV.55	A/33/PV.66	A/33/PV.73	A/33/PV.76	A/33/PV.82
A/33/PV.84	A/33/PV.100	A/33/PV.103		

34th Session

A/34/PV.4	A/34/PV.11	A/34/PV.35	A/34/PV.40	A/34/PV.46
A/34/PV.51	A/34/PV.56	A/34/PV.63	A/34/PV.67	A/34/PV.70
A/34/PV.79	A/34/PV.85	A/34/PV.92	A/34/PV.93	A/34/PV.103
A/34/PV.104	A/34/PV.109			

35th Session

A/35/PV.3	A/35/PV.9	A/35/PV.35	A/35/PV.37	A/35/PV.47
A/35/PV.49	A/35/PV.55	A/35/PV.59	A/35/PV.65	A/35/PV.72
A/35/PV.77	A/35/PV.84	A/35/PV.91	A/35/PV.99	A/35/PV.107
A/35/PV.114				

36th Session

A/36/PV.3	A/36/PV.4	A/36/PV.10	A/36/PV.38	A/36/PV.44
A/36/PV.47	A/36/PV.53	A/36/PV.59	A/36/PV.66	A/36/PV.75
A/36/PV.83	A/36/PV.87	A/36/PV.104	A/36/PV.111	

37th Session

A/37/PV.4	A/37/PV.15	A/37/PV.20	A/37/PV.39	A/37/PV.42
A/37/PV.45	A/37/PV.48	A/37/PV.50	A/37/PV.52	A/37/PV.58
A/37/PV.62	A/37/PV.70	A/37/PV.86	A/37/PV.113	A/37/PV.118

38th Session

A/38/PV.8	A/38/PV.28	A/38/PV.34	A/38/PV.38	A/38/PV.46
A/38/PV.49	A/38/PV.55	A/38/PV.56	A/38/PV.57	A/38/PV.61
A/38/PV.64	A/38/PV.65	A/38/PV.74	A/38/PV.80	A/38/PV.98
A/38/PV.104	A/38/PV.106			

39th Session

A/39/PV.8	A/39/PV.32	A/39/PV.41	A/39/PV.45	A/39/PV.49
A/39/PV.54	A/39/PV.59	A/39/PV.62	A/39/PV.64	A/39/PV.68
A/39/PV.79	A/39/PV.83	A/39/PV.89	A/39/PV.96	A/39/PV.102
A/39/PV.105	A/39/PV.108			

40th Session

A/40/PV.14	A/40/PV.37	A/40/PV.52	A/40/PV.63	A/40/PV.65

A/40/PV.67	A/40/PV.68	A/40/PV.70	A/40/PV.71	A/40/PV.73
A/40/PV.77	A/40/PV.81	A/40/PV.87	A/40/PV.91	A/40/PV.93
A/40/PV.97	A/40/PV.100	A/40/PV.116	A/40/PV.126	

41st Session

A/41/PV.8	A/41/PV.9	A/41/PV.36	A/41/PV.43	A/41/PV.45
A/41/PV.46	A/41/PV.49	A/41/PV.56	A/41/PV.62	A/41/PV.66
A/41/PV.69	A/41/PV.73	A/41/PV.78	A/41/PV.81	

42nd Session

A/42/PV.8	A/42/PV.9	A/42/PV.35	A/42/PV.36	A/42/PV.37
A/42/PV.42	A/42/PV.48	A/42/PV.57	A/42/PV.61	A/42/PV.76
A/42/PV.78	A/42/PV.102	A/42/PV.107		

43rd Session

A/43/PV.8	A/43/PV.33	A/43/PV.38	A/43/PV.39	A/43/PV.43
A/43/PV.44	A/43/PV.46	A/43/PV.50	A/43/PV.56	A/43/PV.63
A/43/PV.74	A/43/PV.79	A/43/PV.93		

44th Session

A/44/PV.12	A/44/PV.32	A/44/PV.35	A/44/PV.36	A/44/PV.40
A/44/PV.42	A/44/PV.47	A/44/PV.54	A/44/PV.55	A/44/PV.56
A/44/PV.60	A/44/PV.67	A/44/PV.80	A/44/PV.88	A/44/PV.98

45th Session

A/45/PV.12	A/45/PV.31	A/45/PV.33	A/45/PV.40	A/45/PV.45
A/45/PV.50	A/45/PV.55	A/45/PV.67	A/45/PV.69	A/45/PV.75

46th Session

A/46/PV.8	A/46/PV.33	A/46/PV.38	A/46/PV.39	A/46/PV.43
A/46/PV.52	A/46/PV.60	A/46/PV.75		

47th Session

A/47/PV.8	A/47/PV.34	A/47/PV.37	A/47/PV.40	A/47/PV.43
A/47/PV.44	A/47/PV.54	A/47/PV.63	A/47/PV.68	A/47/PV.76
A/47/PV.83	A/47/PV.84	A/47/PV.92	A/47/PV.93	A/47/PV.102

48th Session

A/48/PV.8	A/48/PV.32	A/48/PV.37	A/48/PV.45	A/48/PV.46
A/48/PV.48	A/48/PV.49	A/48/PV.59	A/48/PV.61	A/48/PV.65
A/48/PV.71	A/48/PV.78	A/48/PV.85	A/48/PV.96	A/48/PV.101

49th Session

A/49/PV.8	A/49/PV.31	A/49/PV.34	A/49/PV.37	A/49/PV.43
A/49/PV.44	A/49/PV.45	A/49/PV.52	A/49/PV.58	A/49/PV.62
A/49/PV.66	A/49/PV.71	A/49/PV.74	A/49/PV.78	A/49/PV.85
A/49/PV.87	A/49/PV.90	A/49/PV.94	A/49/PV.102	A/49/PV.105

50th Session

A/50/PV.8	A/50/PV.33	A/50/PV.43	A/50/PV.46	A/50/PV.47
A/50/PV.48	A/50/PV.59	A/50/PV.64	A/50/PV.71	A/50/PV.72
A/50/PV.74	A/50/PV.79	A/50/PV.81	A/50/PV.84	A/50/PV.86
A/50/PV.95	A/50/PV.99	A/50/PV.108	A/50/PV.113	A/50/PV.121
A/50/PV.123	A/50/PV.125			

51st Session

A/51/PV.32	A/51/PV.35	A/51/PV.37	A/51/PV.41	A/51/PV.43
A/51/PV.45	A/51/PV.50	A/51/PV.57	A/51/PV.62	A/51/PV.65
A/51/PV.68	A/51/PV.76	A/51/PV.77	A/51/PV.82	A/51/PV.84
A/51/PV.88	A/51/PV.91	A/51/PV.99	A/51/PV.103	

52nd Session

A/52/PV.9	A/52/PV.32	A/52/PV.38	A/52/PV.45	A/52/PV.49
A/52/PV.53	A/52/PV.57	A/52/PV.58	A/52/PV.63	A/52/PV.66
A/52/PV.70	A/52/PV.72	A/52/PV.76	A/52/PV.78	A/52/PV.83
A/52/PV.86	A/52/PV.88			

53rd Session

A/53/PV.5	A/53/PV.11	A/53/PV.30	A/53/PV.34	A/53/PV.37
A/53/PV.40	A/53/PV.45	A/53/PV.48	A/53/PV.51	A/53/PV.54
A/53/PV.58	A/53/PV.60	A/53/PV.64	A/53/PV.69	A/53/PV.73
A/53/PV.80	A/53/PV.85	A/53/PV.87	A/53/PV.94	

54th Session

A/54/PV.8	A/54/PV.24	A/54/PV.27	A/54/PV.35	A/54/PV.50
A/54/PV.53	A/54/PV.55	A/54/PV.57	A/54/PV.59	A/54/PV.61
A/54/PV.62	A/54/PV.65	A/54/PV.75	A/54/PV.82	A/54/PV.83
A/54/PV.99	A/54/PV.100			

55th Session

A/55/PV.12	A/55/PV.29	A/55/PV.35	A/55/PV.38	A/55/PV.39
A/55/PV.40	A/55/PV.42	A/55/PV.44	A/55/PV.45	A/55/PV.46
A/55/PV.47	A/55/PV.51	A/55/PV.56	A/55/PV.65	A/55/PV.72

A/55/PV.73	A/55/PV.75	A/55/PV.102	A/55/PV.106

56th Session

A/56/PV.4	A/56/PV.8	A/56/PV.16	A/56/PV.32	A/56/PV.35
A/56/PV.37	A/56/PV.40	A/56/PV.46	A/56/PV.59	A/56/PV.63
A/56/PV.64	A/56/PV.66	A/56/PV.70	A/56/PV.73	A/56/PV.75
A/56/PV.83	A/56/PV.86	A/56/PV.91	A/56/PV.101	

57th Session

A/57/PV.5	A/57/PV.10	A/57/PV.22	A/57/PV.27	A/57/PV.33
A/57/PV.39	A/57/PV.44	A/57/PV.47	A/57/PV.48	A/57/PV.54
A/57/PV.58	A/57/PV.63	A/57/PV.67	A/57/PV.72	A/57/PV.75
A/57/PV.76	A/57/PV.79	A/57/PV.82	A/57/PV.94	

58th Session

A/58/PV.6	A/58/PV.9	A/58/PV.23	A/58/PV.25	A/58/PV.31
A/58/PV.34	A/58/PV.37	A/58/PV.39	A/58/PV.40	A/58/PV.41
A/58/PV.43	A/58/PV.45	A/58/PV.51	A/58/PV.52	A/58/PV.54
A/58/PV.55	A/58/PV.64	A/58/PV.67	A/58/PV.71	A/58/PV.76
A/58/PV.84	A/58/PV.95			

59th Session

A/59/PV.11	A/59/PV.18	A/59/PV.23	A/59/PV.26	A/59/PV.30
A/59/PV.33	A/59/PV.37	A/59/PV.39	A/59/PV.41	A/59/PV.42
A/59/PV.44	A/59/PV.47	A/59/PV.51	A/59/PV.54	A/59/PV.58
A/59/PV.62	A/59/PV.67	A/59/PV.69	A/59/PV.70	A/59/PV.74
A/59/PV.78	A/59/PV.82	A/59/PV.85	A/59/PV.96	A/59/PV.108
A/59/PV.111				

60th Session

A/60/PV.13	A/60/PV.25	A/60/PV.27	A/60/PV.31	A/60/PV.36
A/60/PV.37	A/60/PV.38	A/60/PV.39	A/60/PV.40	A/60/PV.42
A/60/PV.43	A/60/PV.45	A/60/PV.48	A/60/PV.51	A/60/PV.54
A/60/PV.55	A/60/PV.56	A/60/PV.58	A/60/PV.72	A/60/PV.77
A/60/PV.87	A/60/PV.95	A/60/PV.98		

61st Session

A/61/PV.2	A/61/PV.6	A/61/PV.8	A/61/PV.16	A/61/PV.24
A/61/PV.30	A/61/PV.38	A/61/PV.42	A/61/PV.48	A/61/PV.50
A/61/PV.52	A/61/PV.56	A/61/PV.61	A/61/PV.68	A/61/PV.73
A/61/PV.76	A/61/PV.81	A/61/PV.87	A/61/PV.95	A/61/PV.99

62nd Session

A/62/PV.2	A/62/PV.11	A/62/PV.19	A/62/PV.21	A/62/PV.23
A/62/PV.28	A/62/PV.33	A/62/PV.36	A/62/PV.38	A/62/PV.40
A/62/PV.41	A/62/PV.48	A/62/PV.53	A/62/PV.59	A/62/PV.63
A/62/PV.64	A/62/PV.68	A/62/PV.76	A/62/PV.81	A/62/PV.86
A/62/PV.97	A/62/PV.106	A/62/PV.112	A/62/PV.121	

63rd Session

A/63/PV.19	A/63/PV.20	A/63/PV.23	A/63/PV.27	A/63/PV.31
A/63/PV.33	A/63/PV.37	A/63/PV.44	A/63/PV.48	A/63/PV.54
A/63/PV.59	A/63/PV.63	A/63/PV.67	A/63/PV.68	A/63/PV.70
A/63/PV.85	A/63/PV.88	A/63/PV.98		

64th Session

A/64/PV.14	A/64/PV.18	A/64/PV.21	A/64/PV.22	A/64/PV.27
A/64/PV.33	A/64/PV.37	A/64/PV.46	A/64/PV.47	A/64/PV.50
A/64/PV.52	A/64/PV.57	A/64/PV.60	A/64/PV.62	A/64/PV.69
A/64/PV.77	A/64/PV.83	A/64/PV.85	A/64/PV.89	A/64/PV.111
A/64/PV.120				

65th Session

A/65/PV.22	A/65/PV.25	A/65/PV.30	A/65/PV.32	A/65/PV.36
A/65/PV.38	A/65/PV.40	A/65/PV.41	A/65/PV.45	A/65/PV.46
A/65/PV.48	A/65/PV.55	A/65/PV.59	A/65/PV.66	A/65/PV.76
A/65/PV.79	A/65/PV.85	A/65/PV.92	A/65/PV.100	A/65/PV.111
A/65/PV.113				

66th Session

A/66/PV.4	A/66/PV.25	A/66/PV.31	A/66/PV.32	A/66/PV.34
A/66/PV.41	A/66/PV.46	A/66/PV.51	A/66/PV.61	A/66/PV.69
A/66/PV.70	A/66/PV.75	A/66/PV.77	A/66/PV.85	A/66/PV.88
A/66/PV.95	A/66/PV.97	A/66/PV.98	A/66/PV.101	A/66/PV.112
A/66/PV.119	A/66/PV.125	A/66/PV.127	A/66/PV.130	

67th Session

A/67/PV.14	A/67/PV.22	A/67/PV.23	A/67/PV.26	A/67/PV.30
A/67/PV.35	A/67/PV.39	A/67/PV.41	A/67/PV.45	A/67/PV.47
A/67/PV.52	A/67/PV.54	A/67/PV.60	A/67/PV.69	A/67/PV.71
A/67/PV.75	A/67/PV.80			

68th Session

A/68/PV.15	A/68/PV.27	A/68/PV.30	A/68/PV.32	A/68/PV.36
A/68/PV.38	A/68/PV.42	A/68/PV.43	A/68/PV.55	A/68/PV.58
A/68/PV.59	A/68/PV.63	A/68/PV.66	A/68/PV.70	A/68/PV.78
A/68/PV.80	A/68/PV.88	A/68/PV.95	A/68/PV.101	A/68/PV.106
A/68/PV.107				

69th Session

A/69/PV.3	A/69/PV.15	A/69/PV.21	A/69/PV.26	A/69/PV.30
A/69/PV.37	A/69/PV.48	A/69/PV.49	A/69/PV.51	A/69/PV.55
A/69/PV.57	A/69/PV.59	A/69/PV.67	A/69/PV.69	A/69/PV.70
A/69/PV.80	A/69/PV.85	A/69/PV.87	A/69/PV.90	A/69/PV.101
A/69/PV.104				

70th Session

A/70/PV.27	A/70/PV.29	A/70/PV.32	A/70/PV.34	A/70/PV.40
A/70/PV.43	A/70/PV.45	A/70/PV.47	A/70/PV.49	A/70/PV.55
A/70/PV.60	A/70/PV.63	A/70/PV.65	A/70/PV.69	A/70/PV.71
A/70/PV.73	A/70/PV.77	A/70/PV.82	A/70/PV.84	A/70/PV.93
A/70/PV.95	A/70/PV.109	A/70/PV.113	A/70/PV.115	A/70/PV.117

71st Session

A/71/PV.21	A/71/PV.24	A/71/PV.32	A/71/PV.35	A/71/PV.38
A/71/PV.42	A/71/PV.47	A/71/PV.50	A/71/PV.55	A/71/PV.56
A/71/PV.58	A/71/PV.61	A/71/PV.65	A/71/PV.66	A/71/PV.68
A/71/PV.71	A/71/PV.75	A/71/PV.77	A/71/PV.79	A/71/PV.88
A/71/PV.92	A/71/PV.93			

72nd Session

A/72/PV.2	A/72/PV.12	A/72/PV.26	A/72/PV.38	A/72/PV.42
A/72/PV.46	A/72/PV.56	A/72/PV.60	A/72/PV.63	A/72/PV.68
A/72/PV.69	A/72/PV.73	A/72/PV.74	A/72/PV.85	A/72/PV.88
A/72/PV.90	A/72/PV.91	A/72/PV.94	A/72/PV.102	A/72/PV.104
A/72/PV.105	A/72/PV.112	A/72/PV.113		

73rd Session

A/73/PV.3	A/73/PV.5	A/73/PV.12	A/73/PV.17	A/73/PV.24
A/73/PV.27	A/73/PV.29	A/73/PV.34	A/73/PV.35	A/73/PV.36
A/73/PV.42	A/73/PV.46	A/73/PV.49	A/73/PV.53	A/73/PV.56
A/73/PV.60	A/73/PV.61	A/73/PV.62	A/73/PV.64	A/73/PV.74
A/73/PV.77	A/73/PV.78	A/73/PV.81	A/73/PV.84	A/73/PV.85
A/73/PV.88	A/73/PV.92	A/73/PV.94	A/73/PV.95	A/73/PV.102

A/73/PV.104	A/73/PV.105	A/73/PV.107

74th Session

A/74/PV.2	A/74/PV.9	A/74/PV.18	A/74/PV.21	A/74/PV.24
A/74/PV.25	A/74/PV.27	A/74/PV.29	A/74/PV.30	A/74/PV.32
A/74/PV.33	A/74/PV.36	A/74/PV.37	A/74/PV.39	A/74/PV.41
A/74/PV.42	A/74/PV.43	A/74/PV.48	A/74/PV.50	A/74/PV.52
A/74/PV.56	A/74/PV.62	A/74/PV.63	A/74/PV.64	A/74/PV.65

Special and Extraordinary Sessions

A/S-13.PV.3	A/S-13.PV.7	A/S-15.PV.4	A/S-15.PV.22
A/S-16.PV.2	A/S-17.PV.3	A/S-18.PV.3	A/ES-10.PV.2
A/S-19.PV.2	A/S-20.PV.1	A/ES-10.PV.12	A/S-21.PV.1
A/S-21.PV.9	A/S-22.PV.2	A/ES-10.PV.14	A/S-23.PV.1
A/ES-10.PV.15	A/S-25.PV.2	A/S-26.PV.2	A/ES-10.PV.17
A/ES-10.PV.18	A/S-27.PV.2	A/E-10.PV.20	A/E-10.PV.21
A/ES-10.PV.25	A/S-28.PV.2	A/ES-10.PV.29	A/ES-10.PV.34
A/S-30.PV.1	A/ES-10.PV.37		

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Appendix A: A/PV.2173

Chinese Original

自从第二十七届联大以来，国际上先后发生了一些引人注目的事情。首先，是越南和老挝的停战。其次，是美苏两个超级大国的会谈及其所签订的协定。再其次，是欧洲安全和合作会议的召开·与此同时，第三世界进一步觉醒和壮大，非洲、拉丁美洲和不结盟国家举行了一系列重要国际会议。当前世界形势的特点究竟是什么？国际局势是不是真正在走向普遍缓和？这是人们关心的问题。对于这个问题和本届联大所面临的其它一些问题，中华人民共和国代表团愿意谈一谈自己的看法。第一，当前世界形势的特点是什么？长时期以来，中国政府就认为，我们这个也界是处于大动荡、大分化、大改组的过程中。世界上各种基本矛盾，特别是帝国主义、殖民主义同被压迫民族、被压迫人民之间的矛盾，和帝国主义国家之间、尤其是超级大国之间的矛盾，都在激化。第二次世界大战以来，新的世界大战虽然没有爆发，但由于帝国主义侵略而引起的局部战争，却从来没有断过。英雄的越南人民抗美救国战争的伟大胜利又一次证明了帝国主义和一切反动派都是纸老虎。只要敢于斗争，善于斗争，坚持斗争，小国就能够打败大国，弱国就能够打败强国。不是人民害怕帝国主义，而是帝国主义害怕人民。当前世界的主要倾向是革命。现在，越南战争停止了。能不能认为天下就从此太平了呢？显然不能。1953 年，当朝鲜战争停止的时候，曾经有人认为，从此世界上就不再会有枪声了。但是，过不了许久就爆发了苏伊士战争，接着就开始了越南战争。更何况现在印支战争还没有完全停止，柬埔寨还在打。中东的紧张局势一点也没有缓和。殖民主义和种族主义武装镇压非洲人民和非洲人民对抗他们的武装斗争止在发展．超级大国对非洲、亚洲、拉丁美洲国家的侵略、颠覆、控制和干涉层出不穷。最近一个事例是智利的军事政变，阿连德总统以身殉职，我们深切念他的英勇牺牲，同时认为也不应当忘记另一个超级大国所提倡的所谓(和平过渡(的荒谬理论对亚非拉人民的反帝革命斗争具有多大的危害性。武装肢解主杖国家和把一个国家的分裂合法化、永久化，也成为大国企图用统治世界的一种趋势。在经济上，发达的富国和发展中的穷国之间的差距日益扩大，就是在发达的国家中间也是矛盾重重，远谈不上什么缓和。最近在阿尔及尔召开的第四届不结盟国家和政府首脑会议强烈谴责种族主义、犹太复国主义、殖民主义、帝国主义、霸仅主义，强烈要求改变这个世界的现状，体现了亚非拉人民的新觉醒。总而言之，我们认为，当前形势的特点是天下大乱，而不是天下太平。国家要独立，民族要解放，人民要革命，则是这一大乱中的主流。第二，当前世界不得安宁的根源在哪里？我们历来主张，全世界大、小国家一律平等，所有国家，不管它们的社会制度如何，都应当根据互相尊重领土完整和主权、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处五项原则，建立正常的国家关系，并且，在这些原则的基础和平解决国际争端，而不诉诸武力和武力威胁。大国和大国之间的关系应当如此．大国和小国之间的关系也应当如此，强国和弱国、富国和穷国之间的关系更应当如此·中国就是根据这些原则同美国开始改进关系的，同日本建交的。1972 年 2 月 27 日中美在上海联合公报中还共同声明，不应当在亚洲和太平洋地区谋求霸权，也反对任何国家或国家集团建立这种霸权的努力。中日在 1972 年 9 月 30

日的建交声明中也重申了这一主张。我们认为，上述这些原则是国际关系一律平等的最起码的准则，也是缓和国际紧张局势的正确途径。美国和苏联作为两个主权国家，完个有权采取他们认为适当的措施，改进和发展他们的双边关系。但是，我们不能不指出，美苏于 1973 年 6 月 22 日签订的防止核战争协定远远超出了双边关系的范围。请问，谁赋予他们以这样的权利，可以在他们之中任何一方同其他国家发生纠纷的时候，甚至在其他任何两国之间发生纠纷的时候，进行所谓「紧急磋商」呢？所谓纠纷「显得牵涉到核冲突的危险」，是一句完全可任意加以解释的话，而所谓「紧急磋商」，则只能是根据他们两国的利益行事。这岂不是凭着他们手中拥有大量核武器，就可以任意干涉世界上所有国家之间的事吗？中国绝不乞求任何国家的核保护，也绝不害怕任何国家的核威胁。但这是牵涉到全世界各国人民的事，我们有责任讲出我们自己的观点。苏美签订这样一个协定，不是偶然的。这是根据 1972 年苏美协议的所谓苏美具有「平等基础上的安全利益」原则发展而来的。什么是「平等安全利益」？说穿了，就是争夺世界霸权，你到哪里，我也可以到哪里。现在不过是用一个协定的形式把这个内容包起来就是了。其实，这个协定只不过是一纸空文，它既没有规定不使用核武器的明确义务，更没有提出全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器的前景。美国政府比较坦率地表示，这个办定不涉及任何一方必须采取的任何具体行动，而只是一个一般的政策声明，同时还指出，协定并不是始终得到维护的，这个文件也不会是自己实行的。但是，苏联领导人却对这个协定大吹大擂，把它说得天花乱坠。说什么这个协定开创了国际关系的「新纪元」，打开了「加强世界普遍安全的历史境界」，「对整个人类确实具有历史意义」。苏联领导人如此吹捧这个协定是有其用心的。大家记得赫鲁晓夫的名言「一个小小的火星也能够引起世界大战」，「我们」苏美两国「都是世界上最强大的国家，如果我们为和平而联合起來，那么就不会有战争。那时，如果有某个疯子想挑起战争，我们只要用手指吓唬他一下，就足以使他安静下来」。这样，只要苏联能够同美国绑在一起，整个界不就跪倒在他们的脚下了吗？但是，我们看，事情未必刘此。苏联想同美国绑在一起是不那么容易办到的。协定签订不久，苏联加紧进行地下核试验，加速发展多弹头导弹。美国也不示弱。为什么？这还不是拼命争取核优势，拼命争夺世界霸权。目前，苏联同美国的争夺遍及全世界。最近在亚洲和南美两个政府被颠覆的事例，生动地说明了这一点。他们之间的你争我夺愈演愈烈。这就是当前世界不得安宁的根源。那里谈得到什么和平共处呢？和平共处是外衣，争夺共处是实质。当然，将来能不能这样共处下去，那又是另外一个问题。苏联领导人大肆宣扬，苏联作为一个(社会主义(国家，是发展中国家(天然的和最可靠的同盟者(。过去我们中国也有人相信过这样的话，因为苏联是伟大列宁的故乡，中国革命是十月革命的继续，作为一个社会主义国家，它怎么能够不对发展中的国家给予全心全意的国际主义的援助呢？在赫鲁晓夫上台后，由于长期的切身体会，例如要求在中国海建立联合舰队、撤退专家、撕毁合同、侵犯边界、进行颠覆等等，才发现事情并非如此，它推行的不是什么国际主义，而是大国沙文主义、民族利己主义、领土扩张主义。因此，我们对于某些由于缺乏经验还没有认清这一点的朋友们是不会见怪的。一个社会主义者怎么能够变成帝国主义者呢？其实，

只要稍微了解一下国际共产主义运动的历史，也就毫不奇怪了。考茨基不曾经是一个有点名气的马克思主义者吗？但是，后来他背叛了马克思主义，投降了帝国主义。正是列宁写了那本有名的《无产阶级革命和叛徒考茨基》的小册子，对考茨基作了历史的定论。人是会变的，国家也是会变的。他变了，你有什么办法？列宁指出过，(判断一个人，不是根据他自己的表白或对自己的看法，而是根据他的行动(。对于一个国家也是如此。这些年来，苏联政府对其他国家究竟干了些什么呢？广大的捷克斯洛伐克人民知道，埃及人民知道，巴基斯坦人民知道，正在浴血奋战的柬埔寨人民知道，受到它侵略、颠覆、控制、干涉和欺负的各国人民都知道·苏联政府的所作所为充分表明，它是正如列宁说的(口头上的社会主义实际上的帝国主义(。苏美防止核战争协定骗不了多少人，也吓不倒世界各国人民，而只能引起人们的愤怒、疑虑和寒心。一个反对超级大国权主义和强权政治的浪潮正在兴起。第三，究竟谁反对缓和？越南停战后不久，美国政府就宣布今年是(欧洲年(。接着，苏联政府多年鼓吹的欧洲安全和合作会议举行了第一阶段会议。这表明美苏两个超级大国争夺的重点是在欧洲：所谓欧安会，不过是一种争夺的形式。欧安会的进程表明，这个会议大大越过了两个超级大国控制的范围。许多国家在这个会上一针见血地指出，谈安全不能只听空话，要看行动：欧洲的安全必须建立在保卫国家独立和主权的基础上，不能因为开了欧安会就解除思想武装，丧失警惕；要保障欧洲的安全就必须解散军事集团，拆除外国军事基地，撤退外国军队，使欧洲各国的相互关系建立在互相尊重独立和主权、完全平等、互不干涉内政等原则的基础上。有的国家还指出，地中海的安全和欧洲的安全是分不开的，当地中海还处于两个超级大国的武力威胁和争夺之下，欧洲也不可能有什么安全。所有这一切，对于那些企图利用这个会议巩固第二次世界大战及其后所形成的许多欧洲国家被占领的状态，并进而企图瓦解西欧、称霸欧洲的人，不啻是当头一棒。欧安会还在继续往下开，但是，从欧安会第一阶段会议的进程看来，这个会议将会进一步暴露超级大国企图分化瓦解西欧的野心。正在加紧扩军备战，加紧在全世界同美国争夺势力范围的苏联，却宣扬要把所谓(缓和的范围扩大到全世界(。这样，他们在最近期间又重新拣起了早已无人过问的所谓(亚洲集体安全体系(的破烂货。这真是妙不可言。这使我们想起 1954 年第一次日内瓦会议结束印支战争后，有一个美国人，名叫杜勒斯，匆忙拼凑了一个矛头针对中国的所谓东南亚条约组织，而参加这个条约组织的多数国家却不在东南亚。苏联是一个欧洲国家，是华沙条约的盟主，为什么如此热衷于关心亚洲国家的(集体安全(呢？是不是杜勒斯的幽灵跑到克里姆林宫去了呢？其实，不要这么转弯抹角，把华沙条约扩大到亚洲不是更加直截了当吗？苏联领导人最近给我们中国加了一顶帽子，叫做反对缓和。这是张冠李戴。你们说，你们那么想缓和世界局势，你们为什么不做一两件事情，比如从捷克斯洛伐克或者蒙古撤退军队，归还日本北方四岛，来证明你们的诚意呢？我们认为，帝国主义就是战争。存在着帝国主义，就存在着战争的危险。在世界各种基本矛盾国益激化的今天，新的世界大战的危险依然存在，各日人民必须有所准备，而不被暂时的、表面的和缓假象所迷惑。只有这样，我们才能更好地争取世界的光明前途。归根结缔，决定人类命运的，是坚持斗争、坚持团结的亿万人民，而不是一两个超级

大国。第四，柬埔寨问题。中国政府坚决谴责美国政府现在仍然以各种方式向金边傀儡政权提供支持，对柬埔寨横加干涉。目前盘踞在金边的朗诺卖国集团，是美帝国主义及其盟友强加给高棉人民的，从一开始就是非法的。由国家元首诺罗敦·西哈努克亲王领导的柬埔寨王国民族团结政府是柬埔寨唯一合法的政府。它所领导的柬埔寨民族解放人民武装力量已经解放了 90%以上的国土和 80%以上的人民。柬埔寨王国民族团结政府得到了近五十个国家的承认。9 月份在阿尔及尔召开的不结盟国家会议与会者声明，柬埔寨的唯一合法政府是由诺罗敦．西哈努克亲王领导的王国民族团结政府，并且，恳切要求一切爱好和平与正义的国家正式承认这一政府（参看 A/9330 号文件，第 12 页）。这是正义的呼声。中国政府认为，朗诺卖国集团到现在还窃踞着联合国的席位，这是对所有主持正义的国家的蔑视，是对第四届不结盟国家会议的蔑视，也是对联合国本身的蔑视。中国政府坚决主张，本届联大作出决定，立即把朗诺卖国集团的代表从联合国赶出去，恢复国家元首诺罗敦。西哈努克亲王领导的柬埔寨王国民族团结政府在联合国的合法席位。第五，朝鲜问题。现在，关于朝鲜问题，摆在联合国大会面前的有两个决义草案。一个是由美、英、日等国提出的决议草案，一个是由阿尔及利亚、中国等国提出的决议草案。中国政府认为，美、英、日等国的决议草案尽管包含有解散所谓(联合国韩国统一复兴委员会'的积极因素，他的关于在南朝鲜保持联合国军司令部、保留美国军队和朝鲜南北双方同时加入联合国的主张，是不合理的，是违反 1972 年 7 月 4 日朝鲜南北联合声明的。从朝鲜撤退一切外国军队及和平解决朝鲜问题，是早就应该解决的了。按照 1953 年 7 月 27 日朝鲜停战协定的规定，解决这一问题的高一级政治会议应该在停战协定生效后的三个月内举行。仅仅由于当时美国方面的阻挠，这个会议未能举行。后来，到了 1954 年在日内瓦举行的朝鲜政治会议，又重新讨论了这个问题。当时的美国国务卿杜勒斯先生蛮横地拒绝一切合理建议，从而又一次使从朝鲜撤退一切外国军队及和平解决朝鲜问题得不到解决。当时美国根本不想从南朝鲜撤军。那有什么办法呢？好罢，你们不撤，我们撤。1958 年，中国人民志愿军单方面无条件地撤出了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国。这样，在朝鲜的一方就没有任何外国军队，而在朝鲜的另一方却驻扎着大量的外国军队，主要是美国军队。这种极端不合理的状态势形成朝鲜自主和平统一的障碍。难道南朝鲜就一点民族自尊心都没有，非依靠外国军队来支持不可吗？这显然是南朝鲜人民所不能容忍的。这样，到了 1972 年 7 月 4 日，在朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金日成主席的倡导下，就产生了南北双方关于自主和平统一的联合声明，开始了南北双方的对话。这是向着从朝鲜撤出一切外国军队，由朝鲜人自己和平解决朝鲜统一问题的方向大大前进了一步。自从有了这个声明，十九年前签订的朝鲜停战协定，在很大程度上已经失去了它当时曾经产生过的作用。既然南北两方的朝鲜人自己商定，不进行无论规模大小的武装挑衅，并采取积极措施以防止突然陆的军事冲突事件，难道这不是对保持停战状态的最好保证吗？说什么取消了联合国军司令部，并撤出了外国军队，就将使 1953 年的厚战协定失效，这是一种吹毛求疵的说法。应当知道，签订朝鲜厚战办定的双方，一方是朝鲜人民军和中国人民志愿军，另一方是联合国军。按照这种逻辑，中国人民志愿军的撤出不早就意味着朝鲜停战协定已经失效了吗？既然中

国人民志愿军可以从朝鲜撤出，为什么打着联合国军招牌的在南朝鲜的外国军队不能撤出呢？所谓联合国军司令部和外国军队在南朝鲜的继续存在，是不符合 1972 年 7 月 4 日朝鲜双方协议的关于统一应当在不依靠外来势力和没有外来势力干涉的情况下自主地加以实现的原则的。事实上，正是由于这种外来势力的存在，南朝鲜当局才敢于拒绝朝鲜民主主义人民共和国方面所提出的一系列合理建议，使南北对话处于停滞不前的状态。前不久发生的金大中事件表明南朝鲜当局依靠外来势力到了何等卑劣的程度。为了给促进朝鲜的自主和平统一创造条件，联合国军司令部应当同意解散，驻在南朝鲜的一切外国军队应当同意撤走。至于谈到朝鲜南北双方同时加入联合国的问题，这分明是要使朝鲜被分裂的状态合法化、永久化，是同朝鲜南北双方一致协议的(应当超越思想、信念和制度的不同，首先作为一个民族，促成民族大团结(的原则背道而驰的。朝鲜民主主义人民共和国金日成主席今年 6 月 23 日提出的五点主张中指出，朝鲜南北双方不能各自加入联合国；在朝鲜统一前要加入联合国，至少也应该在实现联邦制以后。以高丽联邦共和国的国号，作为一个国家参加。这个主张是完全合情合理的，应该得到一切主持正义的国家的同情和支持。第六，孟加拉问题。1971 年二十六届联大期间，苏联支持印度以武装肢解巴基斯坦。联合国大会和安理会先后以压倒多数通过了印巴停火、撤军和遣俘的决议大会第月和 9 月份补编 S/3079 号文件，附录 A·2793(XXVI)号决议和安全理事会第 307（1971）号决议。1972 年，二十七届联大又通过了遣返巴基斯坦战俘和希望接纳孟加拉国进入联合国的两个相互依存的决议（第 2938 和 2937(XXVII)号决议〉。直到今年 8 月 28 日，印巴才在新德里达成了遣返战俘和平民的协议。这个办义来得太迟了，但是，终于达成了这个办议，还是值得欢迎的。协议是纸上的东西，把纸上的东西变成现实，还需要一个过程，还可能出现曲折。中国政府认为，一旦联合国大会和安理会关于这个问题的有关决议得到毫无保留的实施，就可以考虑接纳孟加拉国加入联合国的问题。但这只能在联合国决议得到彻底实施之后，而决不能在此之前。第七，中东问题。尽管两个超级大国都在鼓吹世界总的趋势在走向缓和，笼罩着中东地区的仍然是紧张的不战不和的僵持形势。前年苏联肢解巴基斯坦，没有任何人说过有什么爆发核战争的危险。现在美国干涉柬埔寨，也没有任何人说过有什么爆发核战争的危险。唯独在中东这个地区，只要有人谈起阿拉伯国家要击退以色列的侵略，收复失地，什么两个超级大国要爆发核战争之类的话就满天飞了。究竟是什么道理呢？这是因为两个超级大国制造和保持的不战不和的局面最方便于它们在中东地区争夺势力范围、石油资源和战略要地。形式上是两个超级大国各自支持对立两方中的一方，实际上它们象两个泥人捏在一起，又分成两个，你中有我，我中有你。就拿以色列这个侵略者来说吧，光有美国输送枪炮，没有苏联输送人力，能够这样肆无忌惮地横行霸道吗？我们认为，什么爆发核战争的危险，是故意制造出来吓唬人的。指望超级大国来解决中东问题是没有希望的。联合国通过什么决议也改变不了局势。出路只有独立自主、自力更生。中国一向不同以色列犹太复国主义者发生任何关系。中国坚决支持巴勒斯坦人民和阿拉伯各国人民反对以色列犹太复国主义的正义斗争。我们相信，巴勒斯坦人民和阿拉伯各国人民只要坚持团结，坚持斗争，在全世界人民支持下，就一定能够克服前进

道路上的重重困难，收复自己的神圣领土，恢复自己的民族权利。第八，反对殖民主义问题。非洲形势一片大好。一年来，非洲人民争取和维护民族独立，反对种族主义、新老殖民主义、帝国主义和霸仅主义的斗争，取得了一系列新的胜利。非洲各国人民从斗争中越来越认识到武装斗争的必要性，相互支援的必要性。今年 5 月在亚的斯亚贝巴召开的非洲统一组织第十届国家和政府首脑会发出了(根除非洲大陆上的一切形式的殖民主义(的响亮号召。会议文件充分体现了非洲国家团结合作、共同对敌的精神，也表达了未独立地区的非洲人民要进一步开展武装斗争，以争取民族解放的决心。非洲种族主义政权和殖民主义当局在帝国主义和超级大国的支持和纵容下，采取更加阴险和残酷的手段，进行垂死挣扎，妄图维持他们摇摇欲坠的统治。它们对联合国通过的反映非洲人民正义要求的各项决议，长期抵制，拒不执行。特别值得注意的是，老殖民主义者正在走向衰亡，而形形色色的新殖民主义者又企图用种种狡猾和欺骗的手段取代老殖民主义；超级大国在非洲国家之间进行挑拨离间，以便混水摸鱼。非洲人民仍然面临着长期的、复杂的、曲折的斗争任务。非洲是属于伟大非洲人民的·中国人民坚决同非洲人民站在一起。我们坚决支持莫桑比克、安哥拉、阿扎尼亚、纳米比亚、津巴布韦、几内亚（比绍）、西属撒哈拉等地区人民争取民族解放的正义斗争。我们热烈祝贺并承认刚刚诞生的几内亚（比绍）共和国。我们坚决支持一切非洲国家反对新老殖民主义的侵略、颠覆和挑拨，为捍卫国家主权和维护非洲团结而进行的正义斗争。我们相信，日益觉醒的非洲人民一定能够在今后的斗争中不断取得新的胜利。第九，反对海洋霸权问题。拉美国家带头兴起的坚持二百海里海洋权的斗争，日益得到广大中小国家的支持。今年非洲统一组织首脑会议和第四次不结盟国家首脑会议明确宣告，沿海国家有权建立最大限度为二百海里的专属经济区或国家管辖区。就是内陆国家，也应该有权分享海底资源和渔业。围绕海洋权问题，广大中小国家正在开展一场声势浩大的反对超级大国海洋霸权的斗争。超级大国为了争霸海洋，妄图维护旧的海洋法制度，竭力对各国领海和管辖范围加以限制。他们说，规定领海为三海里或十二海里的制度是神圣不可侵犯的，你们把领海和管辖区扩大了，不就是把公海缩小了吗？这是唬人。什么神圣不可侵犯？三海里领海是人规定的,十二海里领海也是人规定的，这反映了当时殖民主义和帝国主义控制海洋的现实，有什么神圣不可侵犯呢？说什么领海和管辖区大了，公海就小了，什么是公海？所谓公海,实际上从来就是拥有强大海军力量的少数国家的(私海(。现在广大中小国家站起来了，他们是多数，他们要求改变这种只是有利于帝国主义的所谓海洋法制度，有什么不可以呢？一九七二年六月二日，苏联及其盟友在向联合国工业发展理事会提出的一项提案中指出，(发展中国家对自然资源的主权，很大程度上取决于其工业对这些资源利用的能力·一(1973 年 8 月 22 苏联的一位代表在日内瓦召开的底委员会会议上说什么，发展中国家即使有二海里的区域，由于缺乏技术、捕捞能力等等，也不可能增加渔获量。所有这些话意味着，谁有多大实力，就有多大权力。这是赤裸裸的帝国主义逻辑。超级大国为什么如此强烈地反对中小国家扩大领海和管辖区的主张呢？只要看看美苏两家在地中海、波斯湾、印度洋、加勒比海、太平洋、大西洋争夺海上霸权，竞相建立基地，掠夺渔业和海底资源，就不难明白其中的奥妙了。领海和

管辖区扩大了，他们横行霸道的(私海(就缩小了，他们怎么能够不拼命反对呢？但是，超级大国的反对终将是徒劳的·只要广大中小国家求大同，存小异，团结起来，坚持坚韧不屈的长期努力，反对海洋霸权的斗争是一定会胜利的。反对海洋霸权的斗争，是亚非拉广大发展中国家维护本国资源、发展民族经济的斗争的一个重要方面，也是当前反霸斗争的一个新的焦点。在其它经济领域内，发展中国家在反对帝国主义和大国霸权主义的剥削、掠夺、倾销和垄断的斗争中，也进一步协调了行动，加强了团结。他们之间的双边和地区性经济合作日益增进，各种原料输出国组织不断扩大。越来越多的发展中国家认识到，要巩固自己的政治独立，就必须取得经济独立；要发展民族经济，就必须自力更并加强发展中国家的相互支援和合作。殖民主义和帝国义是靠对亚非拉人民的掠夺和剥削起家的，亚非拉人民完全有权利要求他们偿还这笔旧债。但是，根据我们中国的切身经验，他们是决不会还债的，而且还要给维护民族独立、发展民族经济的国家制造更多的困难，对于他们寄予不切实际的幻想是要落空的。我们一定要坚持反帝、反殖、反霸，我们一定要衣靠自己，依靠人民，艰苦奋斗，长期努力。这样，我们相信，发展中的国家是一定能够兴旺起来的。第十，裁军问题。中国政府是历来主张裁军的。但是，我们主张的是真裁军，不是假裁军，更不是口头上空谈裁军，实际上天天扩军。目前，我们面临着的严酷的现实是，超级大国，特别是苏联这个超级大国最起劲地叫喊裁军。它几乎每年都要在联合国大会上提出这样或者那样的裁军建议。去年，它鼓吹同美国达成的所谓限制战略核武器协议的意义是如何重大。今年，它更加鼓吹苏美防止核战争协定具有多么了不起的划时代的意义。同时，它还煞有介事地建议安理会五个常任理事国各裁减军费百分之十，并以节省下来的一部分钱用于援助发展中国家（第 2124 次会议)0 这是赫鲁晓夫的旧货色，吹了十几年了，骗不了多少人。军费怎么算？单凭这一点就得成立一个委员会研究好多年。军费减得下来吗？反正谁都没有看到过。我们认为，这些空话以赶快收起来为好。如果真正是发展中中国家的(天然的和最可靠的同盟者(，那么就应当走到这个讲坛上来，公开宣布对一切发展中国家用于抵抗外来侵略的军事援助都是无偿的，根本不要钱，不做军火商；即使过去要了钱，也不要去逼人家还债付息，特别是不要去逼那些战斗中的阿拉伯国家还债：痛快一点，当众宣布所有军事债务，不要还，那不是更实际一些吗？什么普遍裁军？事实是，在今天的世界上，进行无法控制的扩军竞赛的是两个超级大国。它们的目的是争取核优势，实现控制世界的核霸权。说句老实话，要裁军首先应当裁减这两个超级大国的军。试问能做到么？在这点上，美国政府比苏联政府要坦率些，它承认在两霸争夺中，军费不能削减。至于广大中小国家所面临的现实问题，决不是什么裁军，而是加强自己必要的、独立的防御力量。西欧的防御力量尚且不足，更何况亚非拉广大的中小国家呢？他们有什么军可裁？在这种情况下，谈什么普遍裁军，那简直是废话。如果真正按照他们的主张做了，那就是要全世界在两个超级大国面前彻底解除武装，任人摆布。中国政府是赞成召开真正的世界裁军会议的。但这个会议必须有必要的先决条件和明确的目标。那就是：所有核国家，特别是两个超级核大国，苏联和美国，必须首先承担明确的义务，保证在任何时候、任何情况下，都不首先使用核武器，特别是不对无核国家和无核区

使用核武器，例如，苏联就应当对拉美无核区承担义务。必须撤回在国外的一切武装部队包括火箭核武器部队，拆除设置在别国领土上的一切军事基地包括核基地。只有这样，才能使全世界所有国家，不分大小，一律平等，在没有任何武力威胁的情况下，心平气和地讨论并解决全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器等问题。有人指责我们中国对裁军问题的立场是(要么全部，要么全不(。这是歪曲。请问，作为核裁军的第一步，有核国家首先承担义务，保证在任何时候、任何情况下，都不首先使用核武器，特别是不对无核国家或无核区使用核武器，这有什么困难呢？这不是走向全面禁止和彻底销毁核武器的真正有效的第一步吗？但这些鼓吹裁军的(圣人(却连这一点起码的义务都不肯承担，难道这还不正足以证明他们实际上是坚持扩军侵略、威胁世界人民、妄图称霸世界的帝国主义吗？中华人民共和国参加联合国的活动已经三年了。我们要坦率地说，我们在联合国的经历使我们感到担心。联合国发言盈庭，决议如山，却过问不了它应该过问的问题（例如防止核战争问题），对世界上许多重大问题（例知中东问题）的解决，无能为力。长此以往，联合国还有什么前途呢？但是，我们并不沮丧。我们认为，联合国的现状应当改变，联合国的宪章应当修改。世界已经变了，联合国还按照二十几年前的老样子工作下去，这怎么能行呢？第三世界已经兴起。联合国如果要成为名副其实的联合国的话，那它就必须能够反映广大中小国家的愿望，真正实现大小国家一律平等的原则，而不再被超级大国及其少数追随者所控制。中国愿意同一切爱好和平、主持正义的国家一起，为实现这个崇高的目标而共同努力。

English Translation

Since the twenty-seventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, some notable events have successively taken place on the international arena. First, there was the cessation of the war in Viet-Nam and Laos. Secondly, there were the talks held and the agreements concluded between the two super-Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union. Thirdly, there was the convening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In. the meantime, the third world has further awakened and grown in strength, and the African, Latin American and non-aligned countries held a series of important international conferences. What is the characteristic of the present world situation? Is the international situation really moving towards a general détente? This is a question in which people are interested. The delegation of the People's Republic of China would like to state its views on this question and a number of other questions with which the current session of the General Assembly is confronted.

3. First, what is the characteristic of the present world situation?

4. The Chinese Government has long held that our world is now going through a process of great turbulence, great division and great realignment. The basic contradictions in the world are all sharpening, in particular the contradictions between imperialism and colonialism on the one hand and the oppressed nations and peoples on the other and the contradictions among the imperialist countries, especially those between the two super-Powers. Although no new world war has broken out since the Second World War, local wars resulting from imperialist aggressions have never ceased. The great victory of the heroic Viet-Namese people's war of resistance against United States aggression and for national salvation has once again proved that imperialism and all reactionaries are paper

tigers. A small nation can defeat a big one and a weak nation can defeat a strong one, so long as they dare to struggle, are good at struggle and persevere in struggle. It is not the people who fear imperialism; it is imperialism which fears the people. Revolution is the main trend in the world today, Now that the war in Viet-Nam has ended, can it be assumed that the world will henceforth be tranquil? Obviously not. When the Korean war was ended in 1953, some people thought that no more gunshots would be heard in the world. Not long afterwards, however, the Suez war broke out and then the Viet-Nam war started. And even today, the war in Indo-China has not stopped completely, for there is still fighting in Cambodia. Tension in the Middle East has not relaxed in the least. The colonialists and racists are carrying out armed suppression against the African people and the African people are developing armed resistance against them. The aggression against, subversion and control of and interference in countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America by the super-Powers are continuing without end. A recent case in point is the military coup d'état in Chile. President Salvador Allende died a martyr at his post. We express profound condolences on his heroic death. At the same time, we hold one should not forget how harmful the absurd theory of so-called "peaceful transition" is to the anti-imperialism revolutionary struggles of the Asian, African and Latin American people, a theory which has been advocated by another super-Power. The dismember-ment of a sovereign country by armed force and the legaliza-tion and perpetuation of that division have also become a tendency on the part of the big Powers in their attempt to dominate the world. In the economic field, the gap is widening between the rich and developed countries and the poor and developing countries, and even among the developed countries there exist many contradictions, and hence détente among them is far from being the case. The recent Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Govern-ment of Non-aligned Countries, held at Algiers, strongly condemned racism, zionism, colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism and strongly demanded a change in the present state of affairs in the world, demonstrating a further awakening of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples. In a word, we consider that the characteristic of the present situation is one of great disorder throughout the world and not tranquillity. And the main trend amidst this great disorder is that countries want independence, nations want liberation, and the people want revolution.

5. Second, why is there no tranquillity in the world today?

6. We have always held that all countries in the world, big or small, should be equal; that all countries, irrespective of their social systems, should establish normal State relations on the five principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence; and that inter-national disputes should be settled peacefully on the basis of these principles without resorting to the use or threat of force. This should apply to relations between big Powers, to relations between a big Power and a small country, and all the more so to relations between a strong and a weak, or between a rich and a poor country. It was on these principles that China started to improve its relations with the United States and established diplomatic relations with Japan. In their joint communiqué issued in Shanghai on 27 February 1972, China and the United States further declared that they should not seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and were opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony. The same principle was in the Sino-Japanese statement of 30 September 1972 on the establishment of mutual diplomatic relations. In our view, the above-mentioned principles

are the minimum criteria for the equality of all countries in international relations and indicate the correct way to achieve a relaxation of international tension.

7. As sovereign States, the United States and the Soviet Union are fully entitled to take' the measures they deem appropriate to improve and develop their bilateral relations. However, we cannot but point out that the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War signed by them on 22 June 1973 goes far beyond the scope of bilateral relations. One may ask, Who has given them the right to enter into what they call "urgent consultations" in case of a dispute between either of the parties and other countries and even between any other two countries? The phrase about disputes which "appear to involve the risk of nuclear conflict" is open to any interpretation, and their So-called "urgent consultations" are bound to be followed by actions dictated by their own interests. Does not this mean that they may interfere at will in the relations among all countries on the strength of the huge numbers of nuclear weapons in their possession? China absolutely will not go begging for nuclear protection from any country, nor is she afraid of nuclear threat from any country. But we feel in duty bound to state our views on this matter since it concerns all the people of the world.

8. The signing of such an agreement by the Soviet Union and the United States is by no means accidental, but is derived from the so-called principle which they agreed upon in 1972 that the Soviet Union and the United States have "security interests ... based on the principle of equality". What is meant by "security interests ... based on the principle of equality"? To put it bluntly, it means rivalry for world hegemony—wherever one goes, the other will do the same. What they are doing now is simply to wrap up this content in the form of an agreement.

9. In fact, this Agreement is a mere scrap of paper. It contains no explicit undertaking on the non-use of nuclear weapons; still less does it envisage the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The United States Government was more frank when it stated that the Agreement is only a general statement of policy which does not involve any particular positive actions that either side has to take, and pointed out that agreements are not always maintained and there is nothing self-enforcing about this document.

10. However, the Soviet leaders have made a great fanfare, lauding that Agreement to the skies, alleging that it ushered in ' 'a new era" in international relations and opened up "historical vistas for strengthening universal security as a whole," and that it was "indeed of historic importance for all mankind". They have their motives for so eulogizing the Agreement. One may recall Khrushchev's famous remarks: "Even a tiny spark can cause a world conflagration" and "We"—that is, the Soviet Union and the United States—"are the strongest countries in the world, and if we unite for peace there can be no war. Then if any madman wanted war, we would but have to shake our fingers to warn him off." In this way, if the Soviet Union could be bound together with the United States, would not the whole world have to cringe to them? However, in our view, things may not necessarily turn out that way.

11. It is not so easy for the Soviet Union to bind itself to the United States. Shortly after the signing of the Agreement, the Soviet Union pressed forward with its under-ground nuclear tests and hastened the development of missiles with multiple warheads. The United States will not take this lying down. Why? Because the desperate struggle for nuclear

superiority and world hegemony still goes on. The contention between the Soviet Union and the United States now extends all over the world. A vivid proof can be found in the recent subversion of a government in Asia and another in South America. Their scramble is becoming increasingly fierce. That is the reason why there is no tranquillity in the world today. So, what peaceful co-existence is there to speak of? There is only a travesty of peaceful coexistence; the substance is coexistence in rivalry. But whether such coexistence can last is, of course, another question.

12. The Soviet leaders noisily proclaim that as a "socialist" State the Soviet Union is the "natural and surest ally" of the developing countries. In the past, some people in China also believed this, because they saw the Soviet Union as the homeland of the great Lenin and the Chinese revolution. a continuation of the October Revolution. Therefore, how could the Soviet Union, as a socialist State, fail to give the developing countries whole-hearted internationalist assistance? But since Khrushchev rose to power, we came to realize, thanks to the long and direct experience we had gained as a result of the Soviet Union's demand for the establishment of a joint fleet in the China Sea, its withdrawal of experts, its tearing up of contracts, border intrusions, subversions, and so on, that this was not the case, and that what the Soviet Union practised was not internationalism but great-Power chauvinism, national egoism and territorial expansionism. Therefore we will not blame those friends who have so far failed to see this for lack of experience. How can a socialist turn into an imperialist? There is in fact nothing strange about it if one goes a little into the history of the international Communist movement. Was not Karl Kautsky once a somewhat well-known Marxist? But he later betrayed Marxism and capitulated to imperialism. It was Lenin who passed the final historical verdict on Kautsky in his well-known pamphlet The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky. People can change.; so can a State. It has changed, and what can one do about it?

13. Lenin pointed out on one occasion: "We judge a person not by what he says or thinks of himself but by his actions." That applies to a State as well. What has the Soviet Government done to other countries in these years? This is clear to the broad masses of the people of Czechoslovakia, Egypt and Pakistan, to the peoples of Cambodia who are fighting dauntlessly, and to other peoples who have been subjected to its aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying. The actions of the Soviet Government have amply shown that it is "socialist in words, imperialist in deeds", as Lenin said.

14. The Soviet-United States Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War cannot hoodwink many people or intimidate the peoples of the world, but can only arouse indignation, misgivings and disillusionment. The tide is mounting against the hegemonism and power politics practised by the super-Powers.

15. Third, who is really against détente?

16. Shortly after the war in Viet-Nam came to an end, the United States Government pronounced 1973 to be "the year of Europe". That was followed by the first stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe—a conference advocated by the Soviet Government for many years. All this indicates that Europe is the focus of contention between the two super-Powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—and that the so-called European Security Conference is nothing but one of the forms of contention. Its proceedings showed, however, that it went far beyond the scope to which the two super-Powers wished to confine it. At that Conference many countries stated

pointedly that deeds and not empty promises are called for in the matter of security; that European security must be based on the safeguarding of national independence and sovereignty; that one must not become mentally disarmed and off guard simply because the European Security Conference has taken place; and that in order to guarantee European security, military blocs must be disbanded, foreign military bases dismantled, and foreign troops withdrawn, so that the relations between European countries may be established on the principles of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty, complete equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

17. Moreover, some countries pointed out that the security of the Mediterranean and the security of Europe were inseparable and that there could be no security for Europe when the Mediterranean is under the armed threat of, and contention by, the two super-Powers. All this is tantamount to a direct blow at those who seek by means of this Conference to consolidate the occupation of many European countries which resulted from the Second World War or the events thereafter, and to proceed further to disintegrate Western Europe and dominate the whole of Europe. The European Security Conference is still going on; but, judging from the proceedings of its first stage, it will' further expose the ambitions of that super-Power Which seeks to divide and disintegrate Western Europe.

18. While stepping up its arms expansion and war preparations and its world-wide contention with the United States for spheres of influence, the Soviet Union is clamouring for "spreading the zone of relaxation to the whole world" Accordingly, it has lately picked up once again the long-ignored trash known as the Asian Collective Security System. This is most amusing. It reminds us of the American by the name of John Foster Dulles, who, after the war in Indo-China was brought to an end by the first Geneva Conference in 1954, hastily rigged up the so-called South-East Asia Treaty Organization, which was directed against China and whose members were mostly non-South-East Asian countries. The Soviet Union is a European country and the chief of the alliance deriving from the Warsaw Treaty. Why should it be so eagerly concerned about the "collective security" of Asian countries? Has the ghost of John Foster Dulles gone to the Kremlin? Actually, would it not be less devious and more direct simply to extend the Warsaw Treaty to Asia?

19. Lately, the Soviet leaders have tried to pin an additional label on China, namely "opponent of détente". As the Chinese saying goes, this is putting Mr. Chang's hat on Mr. Li's head. Since you say you are so anxious to relax world tension, why do you not show your good faith by doing a thing or two—for instance, by withdrawing your armed forces from Czechoslovakia or the Mongolian People's Republic and by returning the four northern islands to Japan?

20. We hold that imperialism means war. There is a danger of war so long as imperialism exists. Today, when the various types of basic contradictions in the world are sharpening, the danger of a new world war still exists, and the people of all countries must be prepared, and must not let themselves be misled by a temporary and superficial facade of détente. Only thus can we better strive for a bright future for the world. In the final analysis, the destiny of mankind is decided by the people in their hundreds of millions who persevere in struggle and unity, and not by the one or two super-Powers.

21. Fourth, there is the Cambodian question.

22. The Chinese Government resolutely denounces the United States Government for continuing to support in various ways the puppet régime in Phnom Penh and wantonly to

interfere in the affairs of Cambodia. The régime of the traitorous Lon Nol clique, which is now installed in Phnom Penh, was imposed on the Khmer people by the United States imperialists and their allies and has been illegal from its very inception. The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia under the leadership of the head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, is the sole legal government of Cambodia. The People's Armed Forces of National Liberation of Cambodia under its leadership have liberated over 90 per cent of Cambodia's territory, with over 80 per cent of the population. The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia has been recognized by nearly 50 countries. The participants at the recent Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, which met in September at Algiers, have declared that the Royal Government of National Union under the leadership of Prince Norodom Sihanouk is the only legal government of Cambodia and earnestly requested all countries which love peace and justice to give it formal recognition. This is a voice of justice. The Chinese Government holds that the continued usurpation by the traitorous Lon Nol clique of the seat in the United Nations is a contempt for all countries that uphold justice, for the Fourth Conference and for the United Nations itself. The Chinese Government firmly maintains that the present session of the General Assembly should take a decision immediately to expel the repre-sentatives of the traitorous Lon Nol clique from the United Nations and restore to the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia under the leadership of the head of State, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, its rightful seat in the United Nations.

23. Fifth, I turn now to the Korean question.

24. There are now before the General Assembly two draft resolutions on the Korean question—one sponsored by the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and other countries [A/C.1/L.645], the other sponsored by Algeria, China and other countries [A/C.1/L.644 and Com.l]. Regarding the former draft resolution, the Chinese Govern-ment considers that the position for retaining the United Nations Command and the United States forces in South Korea and for the entry of both North and South Korea into the United Nations is unreasonable and contrary to the joint communiqué of North and South Korea issued on 4 July 1972,4 although it contains the positive element of dissolving the so-called "United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea".

25. The withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question are long overdue. According to the provisions of the Korean Armistice Agreement of 27 July 1953, a high-level political conference for the settlement of the Korean question ought to have met within three months after the Armistice Agreement became effective. The conference was not held only because of the obstructions put up by the United States side at the time. Subsequently, the question was again discussed at the 1954 Korean Political Con-ference in Geneva. The then United States Secretary of State, Mr. John Foster Dulles, peremptorily rejected all reasonable proposals, thereby blocking once again a solu-tion to the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. The United States was then absolutely unwilling to withdraw its forces from South Korea.

26. What could be done about it? Well, if you would not withdraw, we would.

27. In 1958 the Chinese People's Volunteers unilaterally and unconditionally withdrew from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Consequently, there are no foreign

forces on one side in Korea, while large numbers of foreign forces, mainly United States forces, are stationed on the other side. This most unreasonable state of affairs cannot but constitute an obstacle to the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

28. Is South Korea so lacking in national self-respect that it must rely on the support of foreign forces? Obviously, such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated by the people in South Korea. Subsequently, thanks to the initiative of President Kim II Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, a joint communiqué of North and South Korea on the independent and peaceful reunification of the country was issued on 4 July 1972, leading to the start of a dialogue between the North and the South. This was a big step towards the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the problem of the reunification of Korea by the Koreans themselves. With the issuance of this communiqué, the Korean Armistice Agree-ment, signed 19 years ago, to a great extent ceased to play the role it once had. The Koreans in the North and the South have themselves agreed upon refraining from com-mitting armed provocations, big or small, and upon taking active measures for preventing incidents of unexpected rilitary conflicts. Is this not the best guarantee for the maintenance of the armistice?

29. It is captious to say that the dissolution of the United Nations Command and the withdrawal of foreign forces would nullify the 1953 Armistice Agreement. It should be recalled that the Korean Armistice Agreement was signed between the Korean People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers on the one hand and the United Nations Command on the other. According to that kind of reasoning, would not the withdrawal of the Chinese People's Volunteers mean that the Korean Armistice Agreement had long been nullified? Since the Chinese People's Volunteers could withdraw from Korea, why cånnot the foreign forces in South Korea under the signboard of the United Nations Command do the same?

30. The continued presence of the so-called United Nations Command and of foreign forces in South Korea is at variance with the principles agreed on by the two sides in Korea on 4 July 1972 that "unification shall be achieved through independent Korean efforts without being subject to external imposition or interference". In point of fact, it is the very presence of this outside force that has emboldened the South Korean authorities to reject a number of reasonable proposals put forward by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, thus causing the dialogue between the North and the South to bog down. The Kim Dae Jung incident which occurred not long ago has shown how abjectly the South Korean authorities depend upon foreign forces. In order that conditions may be created to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea, the United Nations Command should agree to disband, and all foreign forces stationed in South Korea should agree to withdraw.

31. As for the entry of both North and South Korea into the United Nations, this is plainly an attempt to legalize and perpetuate the division of Korea, which runs counter to the principle agreed upon between the North and the South that a homogenous people, a great national unity shall be sought, above all as one nation, transcending differences in ideas, ideologies and systems". In his five propositions put forward on 23 June of this year [see A/9027, pra. 19], President Kim II Sung of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has pointed out that the North and the South should not enter the United Nations separately and that if they want to enter the United Nations before the reunification of the country is achieved, they should enter it as one State, at least, under the name of the

Confederal Republic of Koryo after the Confederation is enforced. This proposition is entirely reasonable and merits the sympathy and support of all countries that uphold justice.

32. Sixth, there is the question of Bangladesh.

33. At the time of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly in 1971, the Soviet Union supported India in dismembering Pakistan by armed force. The General Assembly and then the Security Council adopted resolutions by overwhelming majorities calling for cease-fire, troop withdrawal and the repatriation of the prisoners of war by India and Pakistan [General Assembly resolution 2793 (XXVI) and Security Council resolution 307 (1971 At its twenty-seventh session, in 1972, the General Assembly further adopted two interdependent resolutions calling for the repatriation of Pakistan prisoners of war and expressing the desire for the admission of Bangladesh into the United Nations [resolutions 2938 and 2937 (xxvll)l.

34. It was not until 28 August of this year that an agreement on the repatriation of prisoners of war and civilians was reached between India and Pakistan at New Delhi. This agreement has come much too late, but its ultimate conclusion is to be welcomed. The agreement reached is on paper, and there will have to be a process before it can be turned into reality. Complications may yet arise. The Chinese Government holds that the question of admitting Bangladesh to the United Nations can be considered once the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council are implemented without qualification. But this can be done only after the thorough implementation of the United Nations resolutions, and definitely not before.

35. Seventh, there is the Middle East question.

36. Although the two super-Powers are both trumpeting about a general world trend towards détente, a tense stalemate of "no war, no peace" still prevails in the Middle East. When the Soviet Union dismembered Pakistan in 1971, no one said there was the risk of a nuclear war. Neither has anyone made a similar warning in connexion with the current United States intervention in Cambodia. It is only in the Middle East that, at the mention of an attempt by Arab countries to repulse Israeli aggression and recover their lost territories, the air is filled with cries about a risk of nuclear war between the two super-Powers. Why is this so? Because the situation of "no wars no peace" created and maintained by the two super-Powers serves them best in their scramble for spheres of influence, oil resources and strategic positions in the Middle East. In appearance the two super-Powers are each supporting one of the antagonistic sides, but in essence they are like two clay figurines which have been kneaded together and then remoulded, so that there is something of each in the other. Take the case of the aggressor Israel. Could Israel be so unbridled in its truculence if it received only supplies of American weapons but none of Soviet manpower? In our opinion, the so-called risk of a nuclear war has been deliberately fabricated to scare people. It is futile to count on the super-Powers to bring about a settlement of the Middle East question. Nor will the situation be changed by any resolution adopted by the United Nations. The only way out is to act independently and rely on one's own efforts. China has never had anything to do with the Israeli Zionists. China firmly supports the Palestinian and other Arab peoples in their just struggle against Israeli zionism. We believe that so long as they uphold unity and persevere in struggle, the Palestinian and other Arab peoples, with the support of the people of the whole world,

will certainly surmount all the difficulties on their road of advance, recover their sacred territories and regain their national rights.

37. Eighth, there is the question of opposing colonialism.

38. An excellent situation prevails in Africa. In the past year, the African people have achieved a series of new victories in their struggle to win and safeguard their national independence and to oppose racism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and hegemonism. Through their struggle they have come to realize more and more the necessity of armed struggle and mutual support. The Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity [OAU], at its tenth ordinary session held last May in Addis Ababa, issued the resounding call to "eliminate all forms of colonialism on the African continent". The conference documents fully manifested the unity and co-operation of the African countries and their militancy against the common enemies, as well as the determination of the African people in the territories which have not yet become independent to expand their armed struggle for national liberation. With imperialist and super. Power support and connivance, the racist régimes and colonialist authorities in Africa are resorting to more insidious and brutal means in their desperate struggle to buttress their tottering rule. They have long refused to implement the United Nations resolutions which reflect the just demands of the African people. What deserves special attention is that while the old-line colonialists are on the decline, neo-colonialists of different shades are trying to take their place by means of cunning and deceptive manoeuvres. The super-Powers are sowing dissension among the African countries so as to fish in troubled waters. The African people are still faced with the task of a protracted, complicated and tortuous struggle. Africa belongs to the great African people. The Chinese people stand firmly by the African people. We resolutely support the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Azania, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Guinea-Bissau, Spanish Sahara and other regions in their just struggle for national liberation. We warmly hail and give recognition to the new-born Republic of Guinea-Bissau. We resolutely support the just struggles of all African countries against aggression, subversion and the sowing of discord by colonialism and neo-colonialism and in defence of State sovereignty and African unity. We are confident that the awakening African people will continue to win new victories in the course of their coming struggle.

39. Ninth, there is the question of opposing maritime hegemony.

40. The determined struggle for the recognition of maritime rights in a zone of 200 nautical miles initiated by Latin American countries has won increasing support among the numerous small and medium-sized countries. Both the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU and the Fourth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held earlier this year, expressly declared that a coastal State is entitled to establish an exclusive economic zone or a zone of national jurisdiction with the maximum limit of 200 nautical miles. And land-locked States are also entitled to share sea-bed and fishery resources. On this problem of maritime rights, the numerous small and medium-sized countries are waging a gigantic and vigorous struggle against the maritime hegemony of the super-Powers. With a view to seeking hegemony on the seas and oceans, the super-Powers are trying in vain to preserve the outdated law of the sea and are doing their utmost to restrict the territorial sea and scope of jurisdiction of all countries. They that the three-nautical-mile or 12.nautical-mile rule for the territorial sea is sacred and inviolable, arguing that the expansion of the territorial sea and the zone

of jurisdiction will narrow down the open sea. This is a bluff. What sacredness and inviolability! The three nautical-mile rule was a man-made stipulation, and so was the 12-nautical rule. Both rules reflect the reality of the time when the seas and oceans were controlled by colonialism and imperialism. What is there that is so sacred and inviolable? As to the assertion that the larger the territorial seas and the zones of jurisdiction, the smaller the open sea, the question must be asked, What is the open sea? The so-called "open sea" has, in fact, always been the "private sea" of a few strong naval Powers. The numerous small and medium-sized countries have now stood up; they constitute the majority and demand a change in the so-called law of the sea, which is advantageous only to the imperialists. What fault can-one find with this? In a proposal submitted by the Soviet Union and its allies to the United Nations Industrial Development Board on 2 June 1972, they said that "the sovereignty over the natural resources is depending to a great extent upon the capability of utilizing these resources by the industry of the developing countries

41. At the 101st meeting of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction held in Geneva on 22 August 1973, a Soviet representative said that the developing countries could not increase their catch even if they had a 200-nautical-mile zone, because they lacked the technical know-how, fishing capacity, and so forth. These statements simply mean that the greater the might, the greater the right. This is the logic of imperialism, pure and simple. Why are the super-Powers so violently opposed to the position of the small and medium-sized countries for enlarging the territorial sea and the zone of jurisdiction? It is not difficult to see the underlying motive if only one takes a look at the contention between the United States and the Soviet Union for maritime hegemony in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean, the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean and their rivalry in setting up bases and plundering the fishing and sea-bed resources there. When the territorial sea and the zone of jurisdiction are enlarged, their "private sea" over which they act the overlords will contract. How can the super-Powers not desperately oppose this? However, their opposition will eventually prove futile. So long as the numerous small and medium-sized countries are united by seeking common ground on major points, while reserving differences on minor ones, and persevere in tenacious and protracted efforts, their struggle against maritime hegemony is bound to triumph.

42. The struggle against maritime hegemony is an important aspect of the struggle waged by the numerous developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to protect national resources and develop the national economy. It is also a new focus in the current struggle against hegemonism. In other economic spheres, the developing countries are also more closely co-ordinating their actions and strengthening their unity in the struggle against exploitation, plunder, dumping and monopoly by imperialism and big-Power hegemonism. The bilateral and regional economic co-operation of the developing countries is growing, and the various organizations of raw-material-exporting countries are expanding. More and more developing countries have come to realize that, in order to consolidate political independence, it is imperative to attain economic independence, and that in order to develop the national economy, it is imperative to rely on their own efforts and strengthen their mutual support and co-operation. It was by plundering and exploiting the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America that colonialism and imperialism accumulated their fortunes. Therefore, the people of these continents are fully entitled to demand repayment of this debt. However, in the light of China's own experience, colonialism and imperialism will never repay the debt and, what is more, they will create more difficulties

for those countries which are defending their national independence and developing their national economy. It is futile to harbour any unrealistic notions about them. We must persist in opposing imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism. We must rely on ourselves, rely on the people, wage an arduous struggle and exert sustained efforts. We believe that, by so doing, the developing countries will certainly become prosperous.

43. Tenth, there is the question of disarmament.

44. The Chinese Government has always stood for disarm-ament. But what we stand for is genuine disarmament, not phoney disarmament; still less empty talk about disarmament coupled with actual arms expansion every day. At present, we face the harsh fact that the super-Powers are hawking disarmament, and the Soviet Union in particular is most energetic about it. Nearly every year it comes up with some sort of proposal on disarmament at the General Assembly. Last year, it boasted of the great significance of its agreement with the United States on the so-called limitation of strategic nuclear weapons. And this year, it is even more vehement in lauding the so-called epoch-making significance of the Soviet-United States Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. Meanwhile, it has sanctimoniously proposed a 10 per cent reduction of the military budgets of the five permanent members of the Security Council and the utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries [2124th meeting]. This is Khrushchev's old war [ed. scan unclear] peddled for more than a dozen years [ed. scan unclear, possibly 'and has'] not deceived many people. How are military budgets to be assessed? To study this problem alone, a committee will have to be set up and work for many years. Can military budgets really be reduced? Anyway, nobody has ever seen this happen. We think it is better to stop this kind of empty talk, and stop it quickly. If you are really the "natural and surest ally" of the developing countries you should come up to this rostrum and declare openly that your military aid to all developing countries which is used to resist foreign aggression is gratis and free of charge, that you will not be a merchant of death, and that, although you have charged previously, you will not press for the payment of debt and interest, especially in the case of the struggling Arab countries. Be forthright and simple. Declare publicly that you will cancel all the loans, that there is no need for repayment and that you will let them be gone with the wind. Would not that be more practical?

45. What general disarmament? Actually, in the world today, it is the two super-Powers that are engaged in an uncontrollable arms race. Their aim is nuclear superiority and the nuclear hegemony with which to dominate the world. To put it bluntly, any disarmament must first of all be the disarming of these two super-Powers. But can this be realized? On this point, the United States Government is somewhat more candid than is the Soviet Government. It admits that military expenditures cannot be reduced in the context of rivalry between the two hegemonic Powers. As to the numerous small and medium-sized countries, the real problem they face is definitely not disarmament, but the strengthening of their necessary and independent defence capabilities. Even Western Europe is inadequate in defence capabilities. How much more so are the large number of small and medium-sized countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America? What have these countries got to disarm? To talk about general disarmament in these circumstances is gibberish. If such proposals were really accepted, it would mean to ask the whole world completely to disarm itself in front of the two super-Powers and allow itself to be ordered about.

46. The Chinese Government is in favour of convening a world conference on genuine disarmament. But there must be the necessary pre-conditions and clear aims for the

conference. That is, all nuclear countries, and particularly the two nuclear super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, must first of all undertake the unequivocal obligation that at no time and in no circumstances will they be the first to use nuclear weapons, particularly against non-nuclear countries and in nuclear-weapon-free zones. For example, the Soviet Union should undertake obligations in respect of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, and they must withdraw from abroad all their armed forces, including nuclear missile forces, and dis-mantle all their military bases, including nuclear bases, on the territories of other countries. Only thus will it be possible for all countries big and small to discuss on an equal footing and with equanimity and to solve the questions of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and other questions free from any threat of force.

47. Some people charge that China's position on the disarmament question is "either all or nothing". This is a distortion. One may ask, what difficulties are there for nuclear countries first of all to undertake the obligation, as the first step towards nuclear disarmament, that at time and in no circumstances will they be the first to use nuclear weapons, particularly against non-nuclear countries or in nuclear-weapon-free zones? Is this not a truly effective first step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons? But these disarmament-advocating "saints" would not even agree to undertake this minimum obligation. Does this not suffice to show that they are actually imperialists who persist in arms expansion and aggression, menacing the people of the world and aspiring to world hegemony?

48. The People's Republic of China is taking part in the activities of the United Nations for the third year. We wish to say frankly that what we have experienced in the United Nations has caused us to become worried. Speeches are multiplying and resolutions are piling up in the United Nations, yet the Organization has not been able to look into matters which it ought to—for instance, the question of the prevention of nuclear war—and it is impotent in the solution of many major world issues—for instance, the Middle East question. If things continue this way, what future is there for the United Nations? However, we are not disheartened. We believe that the present conditions in the United Nations should be changed and that the Charter should be revised. How can the United Nations go on working in the same old way it did more than 20 years ago, when the world has already changed? The third world has risen up. The United Nations must be able to give expression to the desires of the numerous small and medium-sized countries, truly to give effect to the principle of the equality of all countries big or small and to cease to be controlled by the super-Powers and their small number of followers if it is to be worthy of its name. China is ready to work together with all countries which love peace and uphold justice for the achievement of this noble aim.

Appendix B: A/39/PV.68

Chinese Original

主席先生，正当南非人民掀起新的反对种族隔离的高潮，同南非当局的残酷镇压进行英勇斗争的时刻，本届联大再次审议南非种族隔离政策问题具有特别重要的意义。长期以来，南非种族主义政权一直野蛮地推行种族隔离和种族歧视政策，从政治、经济、文化、教育以及社会生活的各个方面残酷迫害占人口绝大多数的黑人，把他们的一切自由和民主权利剥夺殆尽。同时，它又不顾国际社会的反对，长期非法占领纳米比亚，并不断侵犯邻国的主权和土完整，破坏非洲前线国家的稳定。南非的种族隔离制度是对人类的犯罪，是对国际和平与安全的严重威胁。主席先生，近年来，为了维护和加强种肤主义统治，欺骗界舆论，南非当局更加紧玩弄它惯用的政治欺骗和军事镇压的手段。它竭力宣扬愿意通过宪法改革实现种族关系的改善。它的所谓先法改革的实质是把要的权利牢牢掌握在少数白人种族主义者手里，用混血种人和亚洲裔人作为陪衬，从而便种族隔离制度永久化和合法化。今年八月和九月，南非当局不顾广大南非人民的强烈反对，导演了一场所谓议会和总统选举的闹剧。这物大骗局一出笼，不仅遭到了广大黑人群众的强烈抗议，也遭到混血种人、亚裔人和有正义的白人群众的广泛反对。数万金矿工人举行罢工，几十万学生罢课，南非各族人民和各界人士在反对所谓宪法改革的斗争中，不仅建立了基础广泛的群众组织，而且这些组织的规模正日益扩大。面对人民群众声势浩大的反抗，南非当局竟然出动大批军警，动用军用直升飞机，疯狂镇压手无寸铁的示威群。数百人被打死打伤，不少群众组织的领导人和数千名无辜群众遭到逮捕。南非当局以为靠刺刀和监狱可以扑灭人民斗争的烈火，但是，事实正好相反。哪里有压迫，哪里就有反抗。压迫愈甚，反抗愈强，南非广大人民反对种族隔离制度的斗争为在更广泛和深入地发展，这是任何力量也镇压不住的。主席先生，得道多助，失道寡助。南非人民的正义斗争一直得到国际社会的支持和重视。本届联合国大会 9 月 28 日通过的决议以及不久前安理会通过的第 566（1984）号决议都谴责南非种族主义政权屠杀和迫害反抗种族隔离制度的南非人民。出席第三十九届联大的不结盟国家部长和代表团团长会议所发表的《最后公报》以及最近在亚的斯亚贝巴召开的非洲统一组织首脑会议所通过的决议更加力地支持南非人民的斗争。我们相信，这一切对于斗争中的南非人民无疑巨大的鼓舞。主席先生，中国政府和人民一贯同俏和支持南非人民反对种族隔离和种族歧视的正义斗争。找们强烈谴责南非当局对人民的残酷镇压，要求它立即释放纳尔逊。曼德拉和其他所有因反对种族隔离制度而受到拘禁的群众组织领导人和无辜群众。我们认为，联合国应该很据《宪章》的有关规定，支持广大非洲国家的正义主张，对南非当局采取更加有效的措施，包括强制性制裁行动。我们坚信，在全世界一切主持正义的国家和人民的支持下，南非人民反对种族隔离的斗争必将取得最后的胜利。谢谢主席先生。

English Translation

At a time when the people of South Africa have brought about a new upsurge in their struggle against apartheid and are fighting heroically against savage suppression by the South African authorities, it is of particular importance for the current session of the General Assembly to consider once again the policies of apartheid of South Africa.

149. For long years the South African racist régime has been pursuing the atrocious policies of apartheid and racial discrimination, cruelly persecuting the black people who make up the overwhelming majority of South Africa's population and depriving them of all their freedom and democratic rights in the political, economic, cultural, educational and all other aspects of social life. At the same time, in defiance of the opposition of the international community, it has for many years kept Namibia under its illegal occupation and incessantly encroached on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its neighbouring countries, destabilizing the front-line African States. South Africa's system of apartheid is a crime against humanity and a serious threat to international peace and security.

150. In recent years the South African authorities have intensified their customary manoeuvres of political deception and military suppression, in order to sustain and strengthen their racist rule and hoodwink world opinion. They have energetically played up their willingness to improve racial relations through constitutional reforms. Their so-called constitutional reforms are, in essence, aimed at placing all the important powers in the firm grip of a handful of white racists, with a few Coloured and Asians thrown in to keep up appearances, so as to perpetuate and legitimize the system of apartheid.

151. Last August and September the South African authorities staged the farce of so-called parliamentary and presidential elections, despite the strong opposition of the people of South Africa. As soon as this election fraud became known, it met with strong protest from the black masses and widespread opposition from the Coloured, Asians and white people with a sense of justice. Tens of thousands of gold miners and hundreds of thousands of students went on strike. In the struggle against the so-called constitutional reforms, people of all ethnic groups and mass organizations, which are expanding daily in scale.

152. In the face of the tremendous resistance of the South African people, the South African authorities went so far as to dispatch massive troops and police and resort to military helicopters to suppress the defenceless demonstrators frenziedly. Hundreds of people were killed or wounded and many leaders of mass organizations and thousands of innocent people were arrested, The South African authorities thought that they could extinguish the flames of the people's struggle by bayonets and imprisonment but facts prove the contrary. Where there is oppression there is resistance, and the greater the oppression the tougher the resistance. The struggle of the South African people against the system of apartheid is deepening and broadening, and no force on earth can put it down.

153. A just cause enjoys abundant support while an unjust cause finds little support. The just struggle of the people of South Africa has always received the support and close attention of the international community. Resolution 39/2 adopted by the General Assembly at the current session and resolution 556 (1984) adopted recently by the Security Council both reiterate condemnation of the South African racist regime for its massacre

and persecution of the South African people resisting the system of apartheid. The Final Communiqué of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the Non- Aligned Countries to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly held in New York from 1 to 5 October 1984 [A/39/560, annex], and the resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its nineteenth ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 6 to 12 June 1983, both express even stronger support for the struggle of the South African people. We believe that all this is undoubtedly a tremendous source of encouragement to the embattled South African people.

154. The Chinese Government and people have all along sympathized with and supported the people of South Africa in their just struggle against apartheid and racial discrimination. We strongly condemn the South African authorities for their brutal repression of the people, and demand the prompt release of Nelson Mandela and all the other leaders of mass organizations and innocent people who are arbitrarily imprisoned on account of their opposition to the system of apartheid.

155. In our view, the United Nations should, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, support the just position of the vast number of African countries and take more effective measures, including mandatory sanctions, against the South African authorities. We are convinced that, with the support of all the justice- upholding countries and peoples in the world, the South African people will win final victory for their struggle against apartheid.

Appendix C: A/62/PV.2

Chinese Original

主席先生，在这个问题上我有很多话要说。但是，为了响应你的呼吁，我将作一个简短的发言。我也希望其他的发言人也能响应你的呼吁。中国代表团坚决反对将项目 165 列入第 62 届联大议程，坚决支持总务委员会报告所提的建议。因为它符合《联合国宪章》的宗旨、原则和联大第 2758（XXVI）号决议，符合绝大多数会员国的共同意愿。我谨强调以下三点：第一，世界上只有一个中国，台湾是中国领土的一部分。这是联合国和绝大多数会员国的普遍立场。尽管中国暂未统一，但大陆与台湾同属一个中国的事实从未改变。这是任何人都无法否认的客观事实。1971 年联大第 2758（XXVI）号决议早已从政治上、法律上和程序上彻底解决了中国在联合国的代表权问题。该决议的政治和法律含义是完整的、明确的。联合国成立以来，中国的领土范围从未改变，中国在联合国的代表权当然包括台湾在内。台湾当局和极少数国家抹杀史实、断章取义，企图歪曲甚至推翻第 2758（XXVI）号决议是徒劳的。联合国是只有主权国家才能参加的政府间国际组织。台湾是中国的一个地区，没有资格以任何名义加入联合国。世界上任何主权国家，包括提案国在内，都不会同意本国的一个地区加入联合国。第二，两岸同胞同根、同宗、同文，命运相连，休戚与共。2300 万台湾同胞是 13 亿中国人民的一部分，台湾是全中国人的台湾。世界上没有任何人比中国人更关心台湾的前途和利益。中国政府始终坚持和平统一、一国两制的基本方针，一直以最大诚意、尽最大努力为两岸同胞谋福祉，争取和平统一的前景。我们真诚希望，两岸互相尊重、互利互惠，共谋和平、稳定、发展、繁荣的美好明天。但是，台湾当局出于自身政治私利，蓄意挑起两岸对立，变本加厉搞台独分裂活动，疯狂鼓噪入联问题，其目的就是谋求法理台独。台独分裂势力的冒险活动，如不及时制止，将严重损害中国的主权和领土完整，严重冲击两岸关系，严重威胁台海地区的和平稳定。我们绝不容忍台独，决不容许任何人以任何方式将台湾从中国分裂出去。第三，尊重国家主权、领土完整和不干涉内政，是《联合国宪章》的重要原则之一。冈比亚等极少数国家在台湾当局的唆使下，无视《联合国宪章》的宗旨、原则和联大第 2758（XXVI）号决议，年复一年地在联大鼓噪所谓台湾参与联合国问题。他们的行径严重侵犯了中国的主权和领土完整，粗暴干涉了中国的内政，还浪费了联合国的大量资源与时间，严重干扰联大的正常工作。中国政府和人民对此表示强烈谴责和坚决反对。中国从未做过伤害提案国利益的事，但提案国却一再践踏国际公理和国际社会普遍承认的一个中国原则。有的国家甚至在其加入联合国后就不遗余力地参与分裂中国的活动。我们强烈敦促提案国改弦更张，遵守《联合国宪章》的宗旨、原则及联大第 2758（XXVI）号决议，珍惜自己的国际形象和尊严，不要为一时之利，为台当局搞台独分裂活动所利用。中国政府赞赏联合国和广大会员国坚持一个中国原则的正义立场。相信绝大多数成员支持中国政府维护主权和领土完整，支持通过总务委员会的建议，反对将所谓涉台提案列入第六十二届联大议程。

English Translation

I have a great deal to say on this subject. However, in response to your appeal, Sir, I will make only a few, brief remarks. I also hope that other speakers will also heed your appeal.

The Chinese delegation firmly opposes the inclusion of item 165 in the agenda of the General Assembly at its sixty-second session, and firmly supports the recommendation made by the General Committee in its report. The recommendation conforms to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolution 2758(XXVI), and reflects the common will of the overwhelming majority of Member States. I now wish to underscore the following three points.

First, there is only one China in the world and Taiwan is a part of China's territory. That is the common position of the United Nations and the overwhelming majority of its Member States. China is yet to be reunited, but the fact that both the mainland and Taiwan belong to one and the same China has never been changed. That is an objective reality that nobody can deny.

Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of 1971 long ago resolved once and for all China's representation in the United Nations politically, legally and in terms of procedure. The political and legal meanings of the resolution are integrated and clear-cut. The scope of China's territory has never changed since the founding of the United Nations. China's representation in the United Nations certainly includes Taiwan. It is futile for the Taiwanese authorities and a very few countries to deny historical facts, take things out of context and attempt to distort and even deny resolution 2758 (XXVI).

The United Nations is an intergovernmental organization composed only of sovereign States. As a region of China, Taiwan is not entitled to United Nations membership under any name whatsoever. No sovereign State in the world, including the sponsors, would allow one of its regions to become a Member of the United Nations.

Secondly, compatriots on the two sides of the Taiwan Straits have the same origin and ancestors and speak the same language. They share a common destiny and ride on the same boat. The 23 million Taiwanese compatriots are part of the 1.3-billionstrong Chinese people and Taiwan belongs to the entire Chinese people. No one cares more about the prospects and interests of Taiwan than the Chinese people. In consistent adherence to the fundamental principle of peaceful reunification and one country, two systems, the Chinese Government has always made every effort and worked with the utmost sincerity to deliver benefits to the compatriots on both sides of the Taiwan Straits and to strive for the prospect of peaceful reunification. We sincerely hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Straits will render mutual respect, cooperate for mutual benefit, and work together for a beautiful future of peace, stability, development and prosperity.

However, the Taiwanese authorities, with a view to seeking selfish political gains, have deliberately provoked cross-Straits confrontation, intensified their separatist activities for Taiwan independence, and frenziedly clamoured for the so-called issue of Taiwan's membership of the United Nations. Their purpose is to seek de jure Taiwanese independence. Such adventurous activities of the separatist forces for Taiwanese independence, if not curbed in time, will seriously undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, gravely affect cross-Straits relations and severely threaten peace and

stability across the Taiwan Straits. We will never tolerate Taiwanese independence or allow anyone to separate Taiwan from China in any form whatsoever.

Thirdly, respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs is one of the cardinal principles of the Charter of the United Nations. At the instigation of the Taiwanese authorities and in defiance of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolution 2758(XXVI), Gambia and a very few other countries have raised the so-called issue of Taiwan's participation in the United Nations at the General Assembly's sessions year after year. This seriously violates China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and gravely interferes in China's internal affairs. It is also a waste of the precious resources and time of the United Nations and a serious interruption of the normal work of the General Assembly. The Chinese Government and people strongly condemn and firmly oppose such an act.

China has never done anything to harm the interests of the sponsors, but the sponsors have time and again trampled on internationally acknowledged truth and the one-China principle widely recognized by the international community. Some countries even started to take an active part in activities aimed at splitting China as soon as they obtained their United Nations membership. We strongly urge the sponsors to change their positions and comply with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and resolution 2758(XXVI). We urge them to cherish their international image and dignity, and refrain from seeking to serve transient interests while being used by the Taiwanese authorities for separatist activities aimed at Taiwanese independence.

We believe that the overwhelming majority of Member States supports the Chinese Government in safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the adoption of the General Committee's recommendation, and opposes the inclusion of the so-called Taiwan-related proposal into the agenda of the sixty-second session of the General Assembly.

Appendix D: A/74/PV.62

Chinese Original

中方感谢决议草案 77 国集团和中国以及大组协调员的不懈努力。他们在决议磋商中的工作令人尊敬。2015 年全体会员国协商一致通过的《2030 年可持续发展议程》体现了各国领导人共同支持多边主义、支持联合国核心地位和作用、推进人类可持续发展事业的坚定承诺。《2030 年议程》明确指出，各方应共同坚持合作共赢，让发展成果惠及所有国家和全世界。坚持合作共赢，是国际社会普遍接受和广受欢迎的合作理念，是全体会员国在《2030 年议程》中达成的重要共识和作出的庄严宣誓，也是推动国际社会致力于消除发展鸿沟，帮助发展中国家特别是非洲国家和特殊处境国家落实可持续发展目标、实现共同发展和繁荣的重要基石和基本原则。当前，单边主义、保护主义和霸凌行径严重冲击国际合作秩序。新冠肺炎疫情给全球发展事业造成了严重的负面影响。坚持合作共赢、保持团结协作，是国际社会唯一的正确选择。个别国家从一己私利出发，歪曲、污蔑合作共赢理念和原则，甚至挑动政治对抗，采取政治污蔑，背离了国际发展合作精神和历史发展潮流，是赤裸裸的把发展问题政治化，严重损害国际社会的团结合作精神，严重损害国际社会推进落实《2030 年议程》的努力，严重损害各国致力于实现更好经济复苏和增长的共同目标。中方坚定支持非洲发展新伙伴关系，支持联大以协商一致方式通过决议，对一些国家提出表决深感遗憾。中方将继续坚定支持非洲国家同各方发展新伙伴关系，始终秉持真实亲诚理念和正确义利观，同非洲国家团结一心，谋求共同发展。中方将继续坚定支持非洲国家走符合自身国情、自己选择的发展道路，实现自主发展。面对新冠肺炎疫情，中国同非洲国家相互声援，并肩战斗，友好互信更加巩固。习近平主席在今年 6 月召开的中非团结抗疫特别峰会上强调，中非要坚定不移携手抗击疫情，坚定不移推进中非合作，坚定不移践行多边主义，坚定不移推进中非友好，共同打造中非卫生健康共同体和更加紧密的中非命运共同体。中方将继续全力支持非洲抗疫行动，向非洲国家提供物资援助，派遣医疗专家组协助非方来华采购抗疫物资。中国的疫苗研发完成并投入使用后，将率先惠及非洲国家。中方将在中非合作论坛框架下，免除有关非洲国家截至 2020 年底到期对华的无息贷款债务，积极落实 20 国集团的减债倡议，推动进一步延长对包括非洲国家在内的相关国家缓债期限。中方将坚定不移采取实际行动，为中非合作共赢、实现共同发展和繁荣不断注入新动力，共同推动构建人类命运共同体。

English Translation

China wishes to thank the Group of 77 and China's facilitators of resolution 74/301. We commend their work and dedication throughout these negotiations.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by consensus in 2015, represents the rock-solid commitment of leaders of all countries to multilateralism, to the central status and role of the United Nations and to the promotion of sustainable human development. The 2030 Agenda clearly states that all parties should work together for win-win cooperation so that development gains benefit all countries and the world at large. Pursuing win-win cooperation is a universally accepted and widely popular concept in international cooperation. It is an important consensus and a solemn pledge of all Member States under the 2030 Agenda. It is also a major cornerstone and a cardinal principle guiding international efforts towards bridging the development divide and helping developing countries, especially African countries and countries in special situations, to implement the Sustainable Development Goals and achieve shared development and prosperity.

As we speak, unilateralism, protectionism and bullying have taken a heavy toll on international order and cooperation. The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has wreaked havoc on global development. Pursuing win-win cooperation and maintaining solidarity and collaboration is the only right choice for the international community. Certain countries, driven by self-interest, distort and vilify the principle and notion of win-win cooperation, provoke political confrontation and resort to political slander, thus deviating from the spirit of international development and cooperation and historical trends. Such barefaced politicization of development issues seriously undermines the spirit of international solidarity and cooperation, disrupts international efforts to advance the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and compromises the shared goal of countries to achieve better economic recovery and growth.

China firmly supports the New Partnership for Africa's Development, as well as the adoption of resolutions by consensus in the General Assembly. However, China deeply regrets the request, from some countries, to put draft resolutions to a vote. We will continue to firmly support African countries developing new partnerships with all parties, guided by the principles of sincerity, practical results, affinity and good faith, and upholding the values of friendship, justice and shared interests. China stands in solidarity with African countries in pursuit of common development. We remain committed to supporting African countries following the path of development tailored to their specific national circumstances and their choices in order to achieve nationally owned development. In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, China and African countries have offered mutual support and fought shoulder to shoulder with one another in enjoyment of stronger friendship and mutual trust.

At the extraordinary China-Africa Summit on Solidarity against COVID-19, held in June, President Xi stressed that China and Africa should stay committed to fighting COVID-19 together, enhancing China-Africa cooperation, upholding multilateralism and taking the China-Africa friendship forward — building together a stronger China-Africa community of shared health and a shared future.

China will continue to fully support Africa's response to COVID-19, help African countries through the provision of supplies, send expert teams and facilitate Africa's procurement of medical supplies from China. Once the deployment of the COVID-19 vaccine is completed in China, African countries will be among the first to benefit. Under the forum of the China-Africa cooperation framework, China will cancel the debt of relevant African countries in the form of interest-free Government loans that mature by the end of 2020. China will diligently implement the Group of 20 debt-service suspension initiative and, on that basis, push to further extend debt-service suspension for the countries concerned, including those in Africa. As always, China will take concrete actions to inject new impetus into China-Africa cooperation, as well as their common development and prosperity, in a concerted effort to build a community with a shared future for humankind.

Appendix E: Methodological Supplement

The following data was used to arrive at thresholds for 'overwhelming' votes.

Table AE.1: Thresholds for 'Overwhelming' Votes

After	Number of UNGA Members	Corresponding 3/4 value	Rounded
1971	132	99	99
1973	135	101.25	101
1974	138	103.5	103
1975	144	108	108
1976	147	110.25	110
1977	149	111.75	111
1978	151	113.25	113
1979	152	114	114
1980	154	115.5	115
1981	157	117.75	117
1983	158	118.5	118
1984	159	119.25	119
1990	159	119.25	119
1991	166	124.5	124
1992	179	134.25	134
1993	184	138	138
1994	185	138.75	138
1999	188	141	141
2000	189	141.75	141
2001	189	141.75	141
2002	191	143.25	143
2006	192	144	144
2011	193	144.75	144

Table AE.2: Quiescence Data

Year	Session	Number of Speeches that Year	No. of Meetings	Ratio
1971	26	10	97	0.103
1972	27	14	84	0.167
1973	28	12	89	0.135
1974	29	16	93	0.172
1975	30	17	94	0.181
1976	31	12	107	0.112
1977	32	18	113	0.159
1978	33	11	99	0.111
1979	34	21	136	0.154
1980	35	15	99	0.152
1981	36	15	119	0.126
1982	37	16	121	0.132

1983	38	16	111	0.144
1984	39	17	107	0.159
1985	40	19	127	0.150
1986	41	15	114	0.132
1987	42	11	100	0.110
1988	43	14	102	0.137
1989	44	15	97	0.155
1990	45	11	89	0.124
1991	46	9	89	0.101
1992	47	15	107	0.140
1993	48	16	105	0.152
1994	49	21	114	0.184
1995	50	20	113	0.177
1996	51	22	117	0.188
1997	52	22	97	0.227
1998	53	21	106	0.198
1999	54	17	102	0.167
2000	55	19	101	0.188
2001	56	20	115	0.174
2002	57	18	99	0.182
2003	58	24	94	0.255
2004	59	22	92	0.239
2005	60	25	111	0.225
2006	61	22	116	0.190
2007	62	21	104	0.202
2008	63	22	117	0.188
2009	64	17	99	0.172
2010	65	21	127	0.165
2011	66	22	138	0.159
2012	67	23	100	0.230
2013	68	18	109	0.165
2014	69	22	114	0.193
2015	70	26	110	0.236
2016	71	23	104	0.221
2017	72	20	106	0.189
2018	73	29	106	0.274
2019	74	35	95	0.368
2020		6	14	0.429

Appendix F: Supplementary Tables and Figures

Figure AF.1: Number of Speeches in Each Category of Undiplomatic Language by Year



Figure AF.2: Number of Speeches in Each Issue Area by Year



Table AF.1: Issue Area Codes

Alphabetical Code	Issue Area
A	Disarmament
B	General Debate
C	Agenda Items Referencing Other Countries
D	Development
E	Environment
G	General Matters – Relating to the UN Itself
H	Health
I	Humanitarian Intervention
L	International Law
M	Migration
N	Nonproliferation
O	Other
P	Peace
R	Reform of the Security Council

S	Matters Relating to the Seas
T	Assistance to Other Countries
U	Human Rights
V	Virus – COVID-19

Table AF.2: Missing Speeches by Year

Year	Number of Speeches Missing/Total
1972	9/14*
1973	11/12*
1974	14/16*
1975	4/17
1976	7/12*
1977	17/18*
1978	4/11
1979	1/21
1980	5/15
1981	12/15*
1982	12/16*
1983	16/17*
1985	1/19
1988	2/16
1989	2/16
2000	1/21
Total Missing/Total	118/941

(*) Where the number of missing speeches was greater than half the total.

Appendix G: Data

A snippet of the 'Master List' on which every relevant speech was coded can be seen below, broken up for readability:

Table AG.1: Snippet of Master List

File Home Insert Page Layout Formulas Data Review View ACROBAT Tell me what you want to do...

E936 | 0

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H
1		Document Symbol	Speech Type	EN?	Specific Country Targeted? (1/0/2-implied)	Specific Country US? (0/1/2 - Implied)	Specific Country USSR? (0/1/2-implied)	Comments
147	1980	A/35.PV.99		0	0	0	0	
148	1981	A/35.PV.107		0	1	2	2	South Africa
149	1981	A/35.PV.114		0	2	2	0	
150	1981	A/36.PV.3		1				

Master List Updated - Excel

I	J	K	L
Issue Area (Hum"I"nt, "C"ountry, "S"ea, "W"eapons, Co"V"ID, "O"ther, "D"evelopment, "G"eneral - presentation of reports, "P"eace, "R"eform of the SC, "N"onproliferation, Int"L"aw, Dis"A"rmament, "M"igration, Assis"T"ance, "H"ealth, "E"nvironment, H"U"man Rights, Genera De"B"ate)	Comments	(Final - resolution) vote won by Chinese side? (0, 1, 2 - not an explanation of vote/not contested vote) "0" where China abstained	Status Group (DEVT) present in vote on Chinese side? (US)
D		2	0
C	Namibia	1	0
D		2	0

M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T
Status Group (G77) present in vote on Chinese side (whether statements made by G77+China)	Vote Overwhelming?	US Outlier?	China outlier?	Comments on Vote	NegScore(Neg/All)	PosScore(Pos/All)	CumScore (Neg/Pos)
1	0	0	0		1.10625	4.53125	0.2441379
0	1	1	0		2.136602452	3.732924694	0.5723669
0	0	0	0		0.5581571	3.939577039	0.1416794

A reminder as to what the headings mean:

Table AG.2: Headers in Master Document and Corresponding Parameters

Heading	Year	Document Symbol	Speech Type	No Chinese Available	
Parameter	*Descriptive*	*Descriptive*	*Descriptive*	*Descriptive*	
Heading	Specific Country Targeted?	Specific Country US?	Specific Country USSR?	Issue Area	Vote won by Chinese side?
Parameter	*Subjective*	*Subjective*	*Subjective*	*Issue Area*	*Contestation*
Heading	Status Group (DEVT) present in vote on Chinese side?	Status Group (G77) present in vote on Chinese side?	Vote Overwhelming?	US Outlier?	China outlier?
Parameter	*Alignment*	*Alignment*	*Overwhelming*	*Overwhelming*	*Overwhelming*
Heading	NegScore	PosScore	CumScore		
Parameter	*Quantitative*	*Quantitative*	*Quantitative*		

The full Master List, and other data for reproduction, can be found at this link: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1lIBUwaskQY8dgH0N2DBnIfTSJaSI0ITP?usp=sharing.

Table AG.3: Structure of File 'Primary Sources'

Primary Sources	Explanatory Note
• Indexes to Proceedings	Containing indexes to proceedings prepared by the UN. Used as outlined in the thesis.
• Raw Minutes PDFs and Extracted Speeches by Year	Contains sub-folders titled by year in turn containing PDFs of minutes downloaded from the UN's Official Document System as well as the speeches by Chinese representatives made in that year, extracted from the PDFs, in a word document.
• Speeches By Year	Contains word documents of all speeches made by Chinese representatives at plenaries of the UNGA, divided and labelled by year.
• Text Files for Python Processing	Contains, with a few exceptions, the word documents as above translated into .txt files for insertion into Python code for sentiment analysis. The exceptions were for logistical reasons.
• Data For R.csv	A .csv file used for import of data into statistics program 'R'. A copy of the sheet 'GA EnglishOnly Removed' within the 'Master List Updated' file.
• Master List.xlsx	An excel spreadsheet containing all parameters of each speech.
○ GA - Raw	All speeches made by Chinese representatives at the UNGA.
○ GA English Only Removed Updated	All speeches as above except those with no Chinese original file available.

○ Summary of Amount of Data	Summary of number of speeches delivered/analysed by year.
○ Threshold Overwhelming	Threshold used to derive 'Overwhelming' data, calculated from public data.
• Quiescence Data.xlsx	Data used and computations for the 'Quiescence Score'.
• Second Coder.xlsx	Merged data from second subjective coder used to check subjective coding, incorporating calculations for Holsti inter-rater reliability.

Raw machine codes used for processing of the data can be found at this link: https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1hSslI7U-Zdwi6e4b1_OPfK5H4IGEu3As?usp=sharing.

Table AG.4: Structure of File 'Data Manipulation'

Data Manipulation	Explanatory Note
• Dictionary Compilation	Contains raw (.rar) and processed (.xlsx) dictionaries used in compiling the Sentiment Dictionary.
• Actual.py	Python script used in sentiment analysis.
• Sentiment.py	Python script incorporating my modifications to the same file originally supplied with the 'cnsenti' package on Python.
• negwords.txt	Negative words from Sentiment Dictionary for import to Python functions.
• poswords.txt	Positive words from Sentiment Dictionary for import to Python functions.
• R Script.R	R script used for quantitative analysis.
• Data For R.csv	A .csv file used for import of data into statistics program 'R'. A copy of the sheet 'GA EnglishOnly Removed' within the 'Master List Updated' file.

Some of this data is reproduced in other appendices for completeness.

**All of the above is made available for the purposes of marking and checking only, no reproduction or further circulation is allowed without the author's explicit permission. All possible measures to anonymize the shared data have been taken.

Appendix H: Coding Rules

Objective

Many academic and professional writers on diplomacy have emphasised the almost tautological 'diplomatic' nature of the profession, especially in terms of language. Diplomatic language is highlighted as an expectation, or even as an 'autopoietic norm', in the world of international diplomacy. Yet there are ready examples of undiplomatic language being deployed by diplomats: prominently, Chinese diplomats have attracted much recent comment for 'wolf warrior' diplomacy.

This thesis looks to examine why undiplomatic language is deployed, by examining correlates between deployment of undiplomatic language by representatives of the People's Republic of China ('China') at the United Nations General Assembly ('UNGA'). In order to do so, two parameters need to be coded for subjectively: whether a speech contains undiplomatic language, and to what issue area the speech belongs.

You will be required to code individual speeches, given at the UNGA by Chinese representatives, for two different parameters: whether the speech contains undiplomatic language (and if so, what kind), and the issue area that the speech relates to. The level of coding is for the entire speech.

Requirements

This coding exercise requires a native or near-native understanding of the Chinese language in general and reading comprehension of simplified characters in particular. You will be required to parse implicature, context, and sentiment of the language deployed by serious speakers speaking on an international diplomatic level and representing their country at the United Nations.

Preliminaries

A note on UN document naming (symbol) conventions: The prefix 'A' denotes the general assembly; 'PV' denotes *process-verbal*, i.e., a verbatim minute; before the 31st session beginning 1975, minutes were numbered sequentially (hence the first recorded speech in 1971 bears code 'A/PV.1983'); afterwards, the second set of numbers, between two slashes, denotes the session (hence 'A/74/PV.65' is the verbatim minutes of the 65th plenary meeting of the 74th UNGA session).

Coding Guide: Undiplomatic Language

There are three values the undiplomatic language code for a speech can take. '0' where there is no undiplomatic language in the speech, '1' where there is undiplomatic language with a ***specific*** target, and '2' where there is undiplomatic language with an ***implicit*** target.

Fundamentally, this thesis defines undiplomatic language as the demonstration of disrespect. This is operationalised via two frameworks drawn from the sociological literature on politeness; however, you as the coder need only be concerned with one of them.

Undiplomatic language is defined in this thesis as the presence of either positive or negative impoliteness. These two forms of impoliteness correspond to Brown and Levinson's two forms of face (positive and negative), defined as follows:

- Positive face: the 'want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others' (the desire to be ratified, understood, approved of, etc.)
    - Positive politeness: treating the interlocutor as a member of an in-group (i.e., the politeness of *association*)
- Negative face: the 'want of every "competent adult member" that his actions be unimpeded by others'
    - Negative politeness: by recognising and respecting the interlocutor's freedoms of action, e.g. apology, deference, use of the impersonal passive

Impoliteness is the threatening of these two forms of face, via face-threatening acts. Manifestations of these two forms of impoliteness may include the following acts, drawn from Culpeper (1996).

- Positive impoliteness (threatening positive face): disassociation, denigration of the target
    - Ignore, snub the other - fail to acknowledge the other's presence.
    - Exclude the other from an activity
    - Disassociate from the other - for example, deny association or common ground with the other; avoid sitting together.
    - Be disinterested, unconcerned, unsympathetic
    - Use inappropriate identity markers - for example, use title and surname when a close relationship pertains, or a nickname when a distant relationship pertains.
    - Use obscure or secretive language - for example, mystify the other with jargon, or use a code known to others in the group, but not the target.
    - Seek disagreement - select a sensitive topic.
    - Make the other feel uncomfortable - for example, do not avoid silence, joke, or use small talk.
    - Use taboo words - swear, or use abusive or profane language.
    - Call the other names - use derogatory nominations.
- Negative impoliteness (threatening negative face):
    - Frighten - instill a belief that action detrimental to the other will occur.
    - Condescend, scorn or ridicule - emphasize your relative power. Be contemptuous.
    - Do not treat the other seriously. Belittle the other (e.g. use diminutives).
    - Invade the other's space - literally (e.g. position yourself closer to the other than the relationship permits) or metaphorically (e.g. ask for or speak about information which is too intimate given the relationship).
    - Explicitly associate the other with a negative aspect - personalize, use the pronouns 'I' and 'you'.
    - Put the other's indebtedness on record.

These examples are not exhaustive: impoliteness is fundamentally the denial of the two forms of face as defined above; as such, you are asked to use your judgement in determining whether a threat to face exists. Place yourself in the context of the speaker or their target: do you intend to threaten the target's face/would you feel your face threatened if someone spoke to you in that manner?

This thesis, moreover, is concerned only with undiplomatic language deployed to threaten the face of other states or their representatives, not of the wider world in general. You are therefore requested to **exclude** from consideration general statements about the state of the world, generic platitudes, and other such language that does not have a clear state target.

Importantly, however, this thesis recognizes an additional level of undiplomatic language: where the existence of a specific target of undiplomatic language is clear, but where the target is nonetheless not named. This corresponds to one of Brown and Levinson's 'strategies of politeness', 'off-the-record', and represents a deployment of undiplomatic language that is reduced in intensity, i.e., tempered. This may be recognised by formulations such as '某些', '有一个', '有一些'.

Please code according to the flowchart below.

Figure AH.1: Flowchart for Undiplomatic Language Coding



Coding Guide: Issue Area

I have identified a set of issue areas into which the speeches Chinese representatives have made might fall into, and which represent a workable number of issue areas that distinguish sufficiently dissimilar speeches while not being overly specific and rendering statistical comparison unwieldy or meaningless. In particular, in order to provide the best basis from which comparison can be made, i.e. to avoid overly specific issue classifications that would lead to classes with one or only a few speeches each, please take a broad view of each issue area. These are presented below. However, if you do not agree that a speech falls into any of these categories, please flag them for my attention and create your own category.

Table AH.1: Issue Area Codes

Alphabetical Code	Issue Area
A	Disarmament
B	General Debate
C	Agenda Items Referencing Other Countries
D	Development
E	Environment

G	General Matters – Relating to the UN Itself
H	Health
I	Humanitarian Intervention
L	International Law
M	Migration
N	Nonproliferation
O	Other
P	Peace
R	Reform of the Security Council
S	Matters Relating to the Seas
T	Assistance to Other Countries
U	Human Rights
V	Virus – COVID-19

In coding for the 'issue area' parameter, which consists of a single variable, insert the alphabetical code denoting the field to which the speech is related. Where a speech straddles multiple classes, such as a speech on sustainable development that would straddle the 'development' and 'environment' classes, please make a determination as to the main tenor and thrust of the speech by the Chinese representative, and code it accordingly. For example, the Chinese representative's first speech in A/50/PV.99 was made under an agenda item relating to human rights issues: specifically, discussion of the report of the UNGA's Third Main Committee. However, the substance of the speech was not to address the agenda item but to note inaccuracies and inconsistencies between the English and Chinese versions of the report in question. As such, it was coded 'O' for Other, with comment inserted that the speech was procedural in nature.

Notes:

- "B": The General Debate is a specific event at the UN General Assembly, and can usually be discerned by the length of the speech, or status as one of the earlier speeches in a session.
- "O": Please consider whether a speech would fit into any of the other categories before labelling it 'Other', as I consider this an overflow issue area.
    - Speeches relating to procedural matters are contained in this category.

<u>How to Code</u>

Open the excel worksheet that has been included in this folder. The leftmost columns give the year and document symbol of the speech you are coding for; each row is therefore specific to one speech. Then:

- Look to the right. Under the merged header 'Coder 2', you will find columns headed 'undiplomatic language code' and 'issue area'.
- In the folder called 'Speeches by Year', every speech made in a certain year has been collated into a word document bearing the prefix 'A' and then titled with the relevant year. Open the relevant document.
- Locating the relevant speech, read it.
- Insert your code for undiplomatic language and issue area in the relevant cells in accordance with guidance above.

Concluding Remarks

Please get in touch if you would like more information or assistance, especially if anything in this document is unclear.

Appendix I: R Code

```
######
#Preliminaries
##Please set own working directory.
data <- read.csv("Data for R.csv", header=T, na.strings = c("", " ", "NA"))
summary(data)
NAdata <- data[rowSums(is.na(data)) > 0, ]

#install.packages(ggplot2)
library(ggplot2)
#install.packages("coefplot")
library(coefplot)
#install.packages("stargazer")
library(stargazer)
#install.packages("aod")
library(aod)
#install.packages("tidyverse")
library(tidyverse)
require(nnet)
library(dplyr)
#install.packages("PerformanceAnalytics")
library(PerformanceAnalytics)
#install.packages("tidycomm")
library(tidycomm)

######
#1. Adjusting Data
data$Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted <- NA
data$Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted[data$Specific.Country.Targeted. == 0] <-0
data$Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted[data$Specific.Country.Targeted. == 1] <-2
data$Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted[data$Specific.Country.Targeted. == 2] <-1
```

```
data$Specific.Country.Targeted. <- as.factor(data$Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted)

data$WonFact <- NA
data$WonFact[data$VoteWon == 2] <- "NotVote"
data$WonFact[data$VoteWon == 1] <- "Won"
data$WonFact[data$VoteWon == 0] <- "Lost"
data$WonFact <- as.factor(data$WonFact)
data$WonFact <- relevel(data$WonFact, ref = "NotVote") #changing reference baseline
to variable 'NotVote'

data$SpeechTypeFact <- NA
data$SpeechTypeFact[is.na(data$Speech.Type)] <- "Normal"
data$SpeechTypeFact[data$Speech.Type == "Reply"] <- "Reply"
data$SpeechTypeFact[data$Speech.Type == "Propose Resolution"] <- "Propose"
data$SpeechTypeFact <- as.factor (data$SpeechTypeFact)
data$SpeechTypeFact <- relevel(data$SpeechTypeFact, ref = "Normal")

#Generating 'Leaders' data according to timeline presented in Chapter 2.
data$Leaders <- factor(NA,levels = c("Mao", "Hua", "Deng", "Jiang", "Hu", "Xi"))
data$Leaders[data$Year <=1976] <- "Mao"
data$Leaders[data$Year == 1977|data$Year == 1978] <- "Hua"
data$Leaders[data$Year >=1979] <- "Deng"
data$Leaders[data$Year >=1989] <- "Jiang"
data$Leaders[data$Year >=2003] <- "Hu"
data$Leaders[data$Year >=2013] <- "Xi"

#adding additional factor level 'Other' to facilitate later analysis
levels(data$Leaders) <- c(levels(data$Leaders), "Other")
levels(data$IssueArea) <- c(levels(data$IssueArea), "Other")

######
```

```
#2. Subsetting Data

hcudlangset <- NA

hcudlangset <- rbind(data[data$Specific.Country.Targeted. == 2, ], data[data$Specific.Country.Targeted. == 1, ])

summary(hcudlangset)


Contestation <- NA

Contestation <- rbind(data[data$VoteWon == 1,], data[data$VoteWon == 0,])

Contestation <- droplevels(Contestation)


IssueAreaOther <- data[data$IssueArea=="O",]

IssueAreaOther <- droplevels(IssueAreaOther, na.rm=TRUE)


IssueAreaGeneral <- data[data$IssueArea=="G",]

IssueAreaGeneral <- droplevels(IssueAreaGeneral, na.rm=TRUE)



attach(data)


######

#3. Understanding the DV

boxplot(CumScore, horizontal = TRUE)

summary(CumScore)

skewness(CumScore) #shows that the raw DV has High Skew


#Given that we have chosen to retain outliers, these operations and datasets are superfluous

#CumScore_Q <- quantile(CumScore, probs=c(.25, .75))

#CumScore_IQR <- IQR(CumScore)

#up <-  CumScore_Q[2]+1.5*CumScore_IQR # Upper Range

#low<- CumScore_Q[1]-1.5*CumScore_IQR # Lower Range
```

```
#dataOUTRM<- subset(data, CumScore > low & CumScore < up) #data with outliers removed

#dataOUT<- subset(data, xor(CumScore < low, CumScore > up)) #the outliers

#skewness(dataOUTRM$CumScore) #much better!

#boxplot(dataOUTRM$CumScore)


HandCodingCat <- lm(CumScore ~ Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted)

summary(HandCodingCat)


###Relatively accurate, indeed, the handcoding is a better metric as the negative beliefs can be expressed generally, or about the state of the world, rather than as Undiplomatic Language


summary(CumScore)


MeanCumScoreByHandCoding <- c(mean(CumScore[Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted == 0]), mean(CumScore[Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted == 1]), mean(CumScore[Specific.Country.Targeted.Adjusted == 2]))

plot(c(0,1,2), MeanCumScoreByHandCoding)

meancumscore <- matrix(MeanCumScoreByHandCoding, nrow = 1)

colnames(meancumscore) <- c("None", "Implied", "Explicit")

rownames(meancumscore) <- "Mean Diplomatic Score"

meancumscore <- as.table(meancumscore)

meancumscore


stargazer(HandCodingCat, type="html",

	dep.var.caption = c("Diplomatic Score"),single.row = TRUE, model.names = TRUE, dep.var.labels.include = FALSE,

	covariate.labels=c("Handcoded (Implicit)","Handcoded (Explicit)"), out="DVLMOnly.htm")


######

#4.First Two Models: Year and Quadratic Year
```

```
#Regress Metrics on Year
YModel <- lm(CumScore ~ Year)
summary(YModel)

QYModel <- lm(CumScore ~ poly(Year,2))
summary(QYModel)

stargazer(YModel, QYModel, type="html",
        dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", column.labels = c("Linear", "Quadratic"), model.names = TRUE, single.row = TRUE,
        dep.var.labels.include = FALSE, covariate.labels=c("Year", "Year", "Year(Squared)"), out="Year.htm")

#Conclusion: Quadratic Model is Better, but only by a bit.

#Test: Cubic Polynominal
CYModel <- lm(CumScore ~ poly(Year,3))
summary(CYModel)
#Conclusion: Cubic term is not statistically significant; adjusted R-squared is also lower than quadratic model

######
#5. Regression Analysis By Individual Parameter
###5.1 Regression by Speech Type
STModel <- lm(CumScore ~ SpeechTypeFact, data=data)
summary(STModel)

stargazer(STModel, title="Table Q4: Regression on Speech Type", type="html",
        dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", dep.var.labels.include = FALSE,
        model.names = TRUE, single.row = TRUE, covariate.labels = c("Proposing Resolution", "Reply"), out="STModels.htm")
```

```
#########
#5.2 Regression by Issue Area
tapply(CumScore, IssueArea,mean)

#For each issue area, a dataset was created that was identical to the main 'data' in all respects except that every other speech's issue area was coded as 'Other'.
#A regression model was then created where the diplomatic scores of the relevant issue area was regressed against every other issue area.

#####
#5.2.1 Creating Issue Area-specific datasets
IA.Arm <- NA
IA.Arm <- data
IA.Arm$IssueArea[IA.Arm$IssueArea != "A"] <- "Other"
IA.Arm$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Arm$IssueArea)
IA.Arm$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Arm$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Bate <- NA
IA.Bate <- data
IA.Bate$IssueArea[IA.Bate$IssueArea != "B"] <- "Other"
IA.Bate$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Bate$IssueArea)
IA.Bate$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Bate$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Country <- NA
IA.Country <- data
IA.Country$IssueArea[IA.Country$IssueArea != "C"] <- "Other"
IA.Country$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Country$IssueArea)
IA.Country$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Country$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Devt <- NA
IA.Devt <- data
```

```
IA.Devt$IssueArea[IA.Devt$IssueArea != "D"] <- "Other"
IA.Devt$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Devt$IssueArea)
IA.Devt$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Devt$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Env <- NA
IA.Env <- data
IA.Env$IssueArea[IA.Env$IssueArea != "E"] <- "Other"
IA.Env$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Env$IssueArea)
IA.Env$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Env$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Gen <- NA
IA.Gen <- data
IA.Gen$IssueArea[IA.Gen$IssueArea != "G"] <- "Other"
IA.Gen$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Gen$IssueArea)
IA.Gen$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Gen$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Health <- NA
IA.Health <- data
IA.Health$IssueArea[IA.Health$IssueArea != "H"] <- "Other"
IA.Health$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Health$IssueArea)
IA.Health$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Health$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Int <- NA
IA.Int <- data
IA.Int$IssueArea[IA.Int$IssueArea != "I"] <- "Other"
IA.Int$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Int$IssueArea)
IA.Int$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Int$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Law <- NA
IA.Law <- data
IA.Law$IssueArea[IA.Law$IssueArea != "L"] <- "Other"
```

```
IA.Law$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Law$IssueArea)
IA.Law$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Law$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Mig <- NA
IA.Mig <- data
IA.Mig$IssueArea[IA.Mig$IssueArea != "M"] <- "Other"
IA.Mig$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Mig$IssueArea)
IA.Mig$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Mig$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.NonProlif <- NA
IA.NonProlif <- data
IA.NonProlif$IssueArea[IA.NonProlif$IssueArea != "N"] <- "Other"
IA.NonProlif$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.NonProlif$IssueArea)
IA.NonProlif$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.NonProlif$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Other <- NA
IA.Other <- data
IA.Other$IssueArea[IA.Other$IssueArea != "O"] <- "Other"
IA.Other$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Other$IssueArea)
IA.Other$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Other$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Peace <- NA
IA.Peace <- data
IA.Peace$IssueArea[IA.Peace$IssueArea != "P"] <- "Other"
IA.Peace$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Peace$IssueArea)
IA.Peace$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Peace$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Reform <- NA
IA.Reform <- data
IA.Reform$IssueArea[IA.Reform$IssueArea != "R"] <- "Other"
IA.Reform$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Reform$IssueArea)
```

```
IA.Reform$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Reform$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Seas <- NA
IA.Seas <- data
IA.Seas$IssueArea[IA.Seas$IssueArea != "S"] <- "Other"
IA.Seas$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Seas$IssueArea)
IA.Seas$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Seas$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Tance <- NA
IA.Tance <- data
IA.Tance$IssueArea[IA.Tance$IssueArea != "T"] <- "Other"
IA.Tance$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Tance$IssueArea)
IA.Tance$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Tance$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Uman <- NA
IA.Uman <- data
IA.Uman$IssueArea[IA.Uman$IssueArea != "U"] <- "Other"
IA.Uman$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Uman$IssueArea)
IA.Uman$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Uman$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

IA.Virus <- NA
IA.Virus <- data
IA.Virus$IssueArea[IA.Virus$IssueArea != "V"] <- "Other"
IA.Virus$IssueArea <- droplevels(IA.Virus$IssueArea)
IA.Virus$IssueArea <- relevel(IA.Virus$IssueArea, ref = "Other")

#####
#5.2.2 Running Regressions

IModelA <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Arm)
```

```
IModelB <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Bate)

IModelC <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Country)

IModelD <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Devt)

IModelE <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Env)

IModelG <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Gen)

IModelH <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Health)

IModelI <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Int)

IModelL <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Law)

IModelM <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Mig)

IModelN <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.NonProlif)

IModelO <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Other)

IModelP <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Peace)

IModelR <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Reform)

IModelS <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Seas)

IModelT <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Tance)

IModelU <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Uman)
```

```
IModelV <- lm(CumScore~IssueArea, data=IA.Virus)


stargazer(IModelA, IModelB, IModelC, IModelD, IModelE, IModelG, IModelH, IModelI, IModelL, IModelM,

	IModelN, IModelO, IModelP, IModelR, IModelS, IModelT, IModelU, IModelV,type="html",

	dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", dep.var.labels.include = FALSE, column.labels = c("A","B","C","D","E","G","H","I","L","M","N","O","P","R","S","T","U","V"),

	model.names = TRUE, single.row = TRUE, covariate.labels = c("Disarmament", "General Debate","Specific Country Related",

"Development", "Environment","General", "Health",

"Humanitarian Intervention", "International Law",

"Migration","Nonproliferation","Other","Peace","Reform of the UNSC",

"Seas","Assistance to Other States","Human Rights","COVID-19"),

	out="IssueModeIndivSR.htm")


#####

###5.3 Regression by WonFact

data$WonFact <- relevel(data$WonFact, ref = "NotVote") #changing reference baseline to variable "NotVote"

attach(data)

WModel <- lm(CumScore ~ WonFact, data=data)

summary(WModel)


stargazer(WModel, type="html",

	dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", dep.var.labels.include = FALSE,

	model.names = TRUE, single.row = TRUE, covariate.labels = c("Vote Lost", "Vote Won"),

	out="WModelsAlt.htm")
```

```
###5.4 Regression by Alignment
AModel <- lm(CumScore ~ Status.Group..DEVT. + Status.Group..G77.)
summary(AModel)

stargazer(AModel, type="html",
	dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", dep.var.labels.include = FALSE,
	model.names = TRUE, single.row = TRUE, covariate.labels = c("Alignment with the US", "Alignment with G77"),
	out="AModels.htm")

###5.5 Regression by Overwhelming
OModel <- lm(CumScore ~ Vote.Overwhelming. + US.Outlier. + China.outlier.)
OModelOverwhelmOnly <- lm(CumScore~Vote.Overwhelming., data=data)
OModelOutlierOnly <- lm(CumScore ~ US.Outlier. + China.outlier.)
summary(OModel)
summary(OModelOverwhelmOnly)
summary(OModelOutlierOnly)

stargazer(OModel, type="html",
	dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", dep.var.labels.include = FALSE,
	model.names = TRUE, single.row = TRUE, covariate.labels = c("Vote Overwhelming (>75%)", "US Outlier", "China Outlier"),
	out="OverwhelmingModels.htm")

######
#5.6 Regression by Leadership
data$Leaders <- relevel(data$Leaders, ref = "Mao")
LModel.Mao <- lm(CumScore ~ Leaders, data=data)
summary(LModel.Mao)

data$Leaders <- relevel(data$Leaders, ref = "Hua")
```

```
LModel.Hua <- lm(CumScore ~ Leaders, data=data)
summary(LModel.Hua)

data$Leaders <- relevel(data$Leaders, ref = "Deng")
LModel.Deng <- lm(CumScore ~ Leaders, data=data)
summary(LModel.Deng)

data$Leaders <- relevel(data$Leaders, ref = "Jiang")
LModel.Jiang <- lm(CumScore ~ Leaders, data=data)
summary(LModel.Jiang)

data$Leaders <- relevel(data$Leaders, ref = "Hu")
LModel.Hu <- lm(CumScore ~ Leaders, data=data)
summary(LModel.Hu)

data$Leaders <- relevel(data$Leaders, ref = "Xi")
LModel.Xi <- lm(CumScore ~ Leaders, data=data)
summary(LModel.Xi)

stargazer(LModel.Mao,LModel.Hua,LModel.Deng,LModel.Jiang,LModel.Hu,LModel.Xi,
type="html",
	dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", dep.var.labels.include = TRUE,
	column.labels = c("Mao", "Hua", "Deng", "Jiang", "Hu", "Xi"),
	model.names = TRUE, single.row = FALSE, covariate.labels = c("Mao", "Hua",
"Deng", "Jiang", "Hu", "Xi"), order = c(2, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6), model.numbers = FALSE,
	dep.var.labels="Baseline Leaders", out="LModels.htm")

#Testing for Each Leader Individually
Leaders.Mao <- NA
Leaders.Mao <- data
Leaders.Mao$Leaders[Leaders.Mao$Leaders != "Mao"] <- "Other"
Leaders.Mao$Leaders <- droplevels(Leaders.Mao$Leaders)
```

```
Leaders.Mao$Leaders <- relevel(Leaders.Mao$Leaders, ref = "Other")

Leaders.Hua <- NA
Leaders.Hua <- data
Leaders.Hua$Leaders[Leaders.Hua$Leaders != "Hua"] <- "Other"
Leaders.Hua$Leaders <- droplevels(Leaders.Hua$Leaders)
Leaders.Hua$Leaders <- relevel(Leaders.Hua$Leaders, ref = "Other")

Leaders.Deng <- NA
Leaders.Deng <- data
Leaders.Deng$Leaders[Leaders.Deng$Leaders != "Deng"] <- "Other"
Leaders.Deng$Leaders <- droplevels(Leaders.Deng$Leaders)
Leaders.Deng$Leaders <- relevel(Leaders.Deng$Leaders, ref = "Other")

Leaders.Jiang <- NA
Leaders.Jiang <- data
Leaders.Jiang$Leaders[Leaders.Jiang$Leaders != "Jiang"] <- "Other"
Leaders.Jiang$Leaders <- droplevels(Leaders.Jiang$Leaders)
Leaders.Jiang$Leaders <- relevel(Leaders.Jiang$Leaders, ref = "Other")

Leaders.Hu <- NA
Leaders.Hu <- data
Leaders.Hu$Leaders[Leaders.Hu$Leaders != "Hu"] <- "Other"
Leaders.Hu$Leaders <- droplevels(Leaders.Hu$Leaders)
Leaders.Hu$Leaders <- relevel(Leaders.Hu$Leaders, ref = "Other")

Leaders.Xi <- NA
Leaders.Xi <- data
Leaders.Xi$Leaders[Leaders.Xi$Leaders != "Xi"] <- "Other"
Leaders.Xi$Leaders <- droplevels(Leaders.Xi$Leaders)
Leaders.Xi$Leaders <- relevel(Leaders.Xi$Leaders, ref = "Other")
```

```
LModelExclude.Mao <- lm(CumScore~Leaders, data=Leaders.Mao)
summary(LModelExclude.Mao)

LModelExclude.Hua <- lm(CumScore~Leaders, data=Leaders.Hua)
summary(LModelExclude.Hua)

LModelExclude.Deng <- lm(CumScore~Leaders, data=Leaders.Deng)
summary(LModelExclude.Deng)

LModelExclude.Jiang <- lm(CumScore~Leaders, data=Leaders.Jiang)
summary(LModelExclude.Jiang)

LModelExclude.Hu <- lm(CumScore~Leaders, data=Leaders.Hu)
summary(LModelExclude.Hu)

LModelExclude.Xi <- lm(CumScore~Leaders, data=Leaders.Xi)
summary(LModelExclude.Xi)

stargazer(LModelExclude.Mao,LModelExclude.Hua,LModelExclude.Deng,
LModelExclude.Jiang,LModelExclude.Hu, LModelExclude.Xi, type="html",
        dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", dep.var.labels.include = FALSE,
        column.labels = NULL,
        model.names = TRUE, single.row = FALSE, covariate.labels = c("Mao", "Hua",
"Deng", "Jiang", "Hu", "Xi"),
        out="LModelsExclude.htm")

#####
#6. Multiple Regression
data$IA.OnlySig <- NA #Creating new variable with Issue Areas previously identified as
significant remaining independent only.
data$IA.OnlySig <- data$IssueArea
```

```
data$IA.OnlySig[data$IA.OnlySig != "A" &data$IA.OnlySig != "C" &data$IA.OnlySig!= "D"&data$IA.OnlySig!= "G"&data$IA.OnlySig!= "I"&
        data$IA.OnlySig!= "N"&data$IA.OnlySig!= "P"&data$IA.OnlySig!= "R" &data$IA.OnlySig!= "T"&
        data$IA.OnlySig!= "V"] <- "Other"
data$IA.OnlySig <- droplevels(data$IA.OnlySig)
data$IA.OnlySig <- relevel(data$IA.OnlySig, ref = "Other")


MasterModel.OnlySig_IA.OnlySig <- lm(CumScore ~ poly(Year,2) + SpeechTypeFact + WonFact + US.Outlier. + IA.OnlySig+ Status.Group..G77., data=data)
summary(MasterModel.OnlySig_IA.OnlySig) #Including Issue Area covariates previously analysed as significant with other significant covariates


stargazer(MasterModel.OnlySig_IA.OnlySig,
    type="html", dep.var.caption = "Diplomatic Score", dep.var.labels.include = TRUE,
    dep.var.labels = c("Significant Covariates Only"),
    model.names = TRUE, single.row = TRUE,
    covariate.labels = c("Year", "Year (Squared)","Propose Resolution", "Reply", "Vote Lost", "Vote Won","US Outlier", "Disarmament", "Specific Country Related",
        "Development", "General", "Humanitarian Intervention", "Nonproliferation","Peace","Reform of the UNSC",
        "Assistance to Other States", "COVID-19", "Alignment with G77"), out="QYMasterModelsSigSigOnly.htm")


############
#Clearing Cache
detach(data)
detach(data)
detach(data)
```