The Road to '*The Last Crusade*': Anglican Thinkers and European Fascisms, 1922-1945

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Abstract I

This thesis studies a selection of Anglican thinkers and their responses to European fascisms between 1922 and 1945. It explores how Anglican writers perceived, analysed, and critiqued fascist politics. Over this period, the concept of fascism began to dominate Anglican discourse. This research traces the evolution of this discursive continuum. It focuses largely on Anglicans who were the most consistent and vocal critics of European fascism across this twenty-three-year period. It is particularly interested in the books and articles written in response to European fascism, texts that, when balanced with their authors' private papers, demonstrate the negotiation between academic, emotional, and religious responses.

Chapter One, on Italy and Spain, covers the period from 1922 to 1930, and draws particularly on private papers and correspondences. It discusses the initial understanding of fascist politics as having a unique social function in modern society. Chapter Two, on Italy and Germany, considers how Anglicans conceptualised fascism in terms of 'space' and draws on Michel Foucault's 'heterotopia' and Martin Heidegger's concept of *Dasein*. Chapter Three, covering the Abyssinian crisis, explores the response to fascist imperialism. Chapter Four, on the Spanish Civil War, demonstrates how Anglicans did not see fascism monolithically, but existing as a range of broad imaginative configurations. Chapter Five explores Anglican perspectives that fascism was a pagan faith. Chapter Six, exploring the Second World War, concludes the thesis by showing how Anglicans felt comfortable characterising fascism as an eschatological judgement from God, and thus the second part of the Chapter explores Anglican imaginations of 'fascistless' spaces.

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Abstract II

This thesis studies a selection of Anglican thinkers and their responses to European fascisms between 1922 and 1945. It explores how Anglican writers perceived, analysed, and critiqued fascist politics. Over this period, the concept of fascism began to dominate Anglican discourse. This research traces the evolution of this discursive continuum. It focuses largely on Anglicans who were the most consistent and vocal critics of European fascism across this twenty-three-year period. It is particularly interested in the books and articles written in response to European fascism, texts that, when balanced with their authors' private papers, demonstrate the negotiation between academic, emotional, and religious responses.

Nazism has been predominant in the existing scholarship, and it has become somewhat of a conventional wisdom to see it as representative of fascism. There are several compelling reasons for this, but none more so than the confluence of Germany's role as Britain's antagonist in the Second World War and the indelible etching of the Holocaust onto the world's psyche. This narrow approach has been transposed onto religious histories and so the Church of England's consideration of other fascisms has been overlooked and under-researched. This is largely because most histories of the Church of England and European fascism focus on the 1930s.

Overlooking the 1920s means that the formative discussions on fascism are missed. Such an approach obscures larger trends and underappreciates the level of nuance in Anglican thought. As different fascisms emerged, Anglicans were acutely aware of the differences between them; some fascisms were seen as acceptable while others were always inherently evil. Moreover, Anglican thinkers like George Bell, Cyril Garbett, and T. S. Eliot frequently differentiated Nazism from Italian Fascism despite an awareness of the innate ideological continuity between the two. These

perspectives can only be evinced by understanding the internal dynamics of Italian Fascism first. Anglican responses to Nazism remain largely unintelligible without a rigorous understanding of what informed these perspectives.

Part of the issue has been the source material under examination. The Council on Foreign Relations is one of the most important archival collections for any historian of the Church of England's involvement with foreign affairs. But historians have used the collection sporadically, rather than systematically. The Council was an internal committee – chaired by a bishop, A. C. Headlam of Gloucester – and therefore we learn about how the Church tried to orient itself in a changing world through the information it gathered. A dissection of the Council's folders is important not just because it provides evidence of the earliest understandings of European fascism, but it also emphasises the difference between 'government' and 'politics.' While clergymen (for the most part) remained neutral in questions of policy, many felt it was within their authority to moralise on political philosophy. Historiographically then, this thesis speaks to existing discussions about the more diffuse ways the Church of England influenced national life and offers another perspective to the ongoing debate about secularisation in twentieth-century Britain.

New points of religious reference were found in the early twentieth century. One of the more significant changes was in publishing. Clergymen now authored books for the mass market rather than the tracts, hagiographies, and scriptural commentaries that invariably gathered dust on the shelves of theological college libraries. Therefore, these written sources are of significant interest. Alongside their clerical duties, some clergymen were prolific essayists (William Temple) while others enjoyed lucrative weekly columns in culturally significant newspapers (Ralph Inge). Temple and Inge in particular were frequent instructors of Anglican opinion on fascism, however their attitudes toward it are rarely considered as a point of interest in the secondary literature. This thesis

will recover these meditations and present them as part of the wider Anglican discourse on political modernity.

This thesis will make extensive use of private papers, especially private journals, such as those kept by two successive archbishops of Canterbury, Randall Davidson and Cosmo Lang, as well as other senior church figures like Hensley Henson and Inge. It will also consider the personal papers of laypeople like T. S. Eliot. By examining the private perspectives of the most important opinion makers of interwar Anglicanism – both clerical and lay – it will allow for a more well-rounded understanding of what fascism meant to Anglicans. Therefore, the source base is diverse not just in the type of material used but in its authorship as well.

Studying a wide range of sources has two significant benefits. The first is that it allows us to see nuance. Anglican thought was represented by several competing parties – Liberals (Temple and Ernest Barker), Anglo-Catholics (Cosmo Lang and T. S. Eliot), and Modernists (Inge and Charles Raven) amongst others – and the different ways in which they viewed scripture, historical processes, and the role of the divine in the secular world informed the ways in which they perceived, analysed, and responded to fascism. Though remarkably coherent overall, some Anglicans did adopt different positions on different fascisms. It is for this reason I am studying 'fascism' as opposed to Nazism, Italian Fascism, or Francoism.

The other is that a wide variety of sources means we can see the interplay between private thought and public pronouncement. It allows us to see how clerical teaching was shaped in response to an emerging and dynamic political philosophy. But also, this interplay naturally highlights ambivalence and contradiction. Therefore, studying these more abstract responses in Anglican thought shows us more authentic reactions to the complexities of political modernity. The use of one analytical framework means that ambivalence is not anomalous but essential to demonstrating

how Anglican understandings of fascism were challenged and changed in a dynamic discursive continuum.

Moreover, in studying private papers we necessarily encounter emotion and personal dilemma. Studying 'emotions' as opposed to 'ideas' is a relatively new approach to history but one that gives this thesis a greater significance. Understanding the emotional state of Anglican thinkers shows us how their thought was shaped, rather than just presenting this thought; patterns of feeling give us an insight into the cultural feeling toward fascism rather than merely the taxonomic differences they found between fascism and other forms of authoritarian politics.

This thesis follows two principal lines of inquiry. Firstly, it considers the different Anglican understandings of Italian Fascism throughout its lifetime in a more detailed and systematic manner than has been produced hitherto. Secondly, it explores how Anglican thinkers imagined fascism as occupying different types of space. Anglicans believed fascism was the product of an alternative (self-contained) historical process to that of linear civilisational progression and thus it occupied different physical and historical spaces compared to Christian society. Considering these imaginative responses means that this thesis will contribute to an emerging area of historical scholarship.

This thesis thus asks why fascisms apart from Nazism have been overlooked. Chapter One explores the rise of fascistic regimes in Italy and Spain in the 1920s. Specifically, it considers Anglican responses to the suspension of parliamentary democracy, the Italian bombardment of Corfu, and the ratification of the Lateran Treaties in 1929. At first, Anglicans appeared unsure about the ideological rationale of fascism but were acutely aware of the implications of its political doctrine. To their surprise though, fascism survived the decade, and the term became part of common parlance in contemporary politics. This raised a difficult question: what next?

Chapter Two focusses on the years between 1930 and 1935, so it incorporates Nazism into its analytical framework. This chapter considers Anglican perspectives on the conception of community in fascist regimes as well as its theory of the state. It demonstrates how Anglicans became aware of the rampant nationalism in fascism and that it was therefore at odds with the universal aims of post-war Christianity. Drawing on the work of the philosophers Michel Foucault and Martin Heidegger, it explains how Anglicans characterised fascist regimes as a separate 'space' within Christendom as a way of conceptualising and emphasising the 'otherness' of fascism from the normal temporality of politics.

Chapter Three explores the shift in attitudes toward the threat fascism posed – where once it was a rival in a theoretical sense, it now represented a tangible threat to the Christian foundations of the systems of international diplomacy. This will be explored through the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, which sheds light on the interactions between the Church of England and world organisations (such as the League of Nations) in their efforts to combat fascism. Anglicans concluded that because fascist colonialism did not have the evangelistic motivations like the British Empire, it was inimical to the progress of civilisation. Fascist colonialism was adduced as another example of its inherent incompatibility with Christianity.

Chapter Four considers the Church of England's response to the Spanish Civil War. This chapter highlights how Anglicans imagined not one fascism, but rather a range of different fascisms and that Franco represented a perhaps 'better' form of fascism. Importantly though, Spain allowed for some Anglicans to craft a wholly Christian anti-fascism, one based on the civil liberties associated with democracy as being vital for the suffusion of Christian doctrine in modern society.

Some Anglicans held a specific worldview that if democratic regimes affirmed God's presence on earth, then antidemocratic societies necessarily negated this. They ultimately believed that the fascist suppression of God, and the usurpation of His eminence by a temporal leader, was tantamount to the worship of a false idol – it was the behaviour of a pagan society. Chapter Five therefore explores why Anglicans saw fascism as a pagan faith. Its primary focus is the explication of three essays by prominent Anglican intellectuals around the common theme that Christianity must be the basis of a society that wished to combat the tribulations of modernity.

The sixth and final chapter considers the nuances to fascism in the context of the Second World War. Fascism was now largely considered an eschatological phenomenon – a judgement from God on the profanity of modern society. The fundamentally Christian character of the resistance movements in occupied Europe was venerated by Anglican thinkers and informed post-war discussions of reconstruction. This went hand in hand with Anglican criticisms of the Vichy and Francoist regimes in wartime Europe, arguing that confessional fascism was a façade, and that Christianity and fascism were not just incompatible but unable to coexist. The second half of Chapter Six thus considers how the war made Anglicans reimagine the civilisational framework in which they lived and understand that the war was not about the removal of fascism from this space, but the reconceptualisation of civilisation so that fascism could not exist in any space.

The uniting theme of these chapters is that the Church of England observed fascism not merely as a political ideology but as an alternative philosophy of life. Considered this way, it explains the panic that gripped the Church of England's communion in the interwar years. Politics was ephemeral, temporal; political extremism was worrying but nonetheless inconsequential to a Christian's ultimate purpose. But fascism altered this by directly threatening man's ability to access the spiritual world. Ultimately, fascism was seen as an attack on the literal truth of God's word.

Considering fascism as an eschatological phenomenon made Anglican thinkers realise that fascism was as much a product of Western civilisation as it was anathema to it. Many Anglicans therefore felt drastic changes were needed so that fascism may never emerge again. The conclusion of this thesis thus considers the changes within the Church of England that fascism perhaps engendered. Theologically, it moved back to the Incarnationalism of the nineteenth century as well as an embrace of the interwar phenomenon of Personalism. These both directly affected Anglican conceptions of community and shaped the way subsequent generations approached societal problems, such as the racial community upheld by the apartheid regime in South Africa. I will finish by arguing that the totalising nature of fascist spaces necessitated Christian spaces to be equally totalising in post-war Britain, which raises questions about a modern civil society.

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T. S. Eliot is paraphrased as saying 'good writers borrow, great writers steal.' While I do not profess to be a great writer, I have nonetheless accrued several academic debts to many wonderful people, all of whom have shared ideas on which I have drawn throughout this thesis.

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Introduction

In a minute there is time
For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse

- T. S. Eliot, 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock' (1917)

This thesis investigates the Church of England's attitudes and perspectives towards European fascism, examining the cultural feeling and moral alarmism Anglican thinkers expressed about fascism's attempt to reimagine politics. Modernity (be it, cultural, religious, or political) provided a multiplicity of challenges to the interwar Church of England: universal suffrage; secularisation and constitutional crises; communism and now, fascism.

The thesis puts forward two, interconnected, contentions. The first is that fascism was imagined as an eschatological judgement. Anglicans rejected relativist explanations of fascism and instead saw it as an expression of a more fundamental, transtemporal evil which exercised man's primitive, unchristian, instincts. Fascism, constituted thus, was a form of politics unlike that which Anglicans had experienced hitherto. The second contention is that fascism posed a different threat to the usual political crises – including Bolshevism – in the twentieth century.

To show how fascism was imagined, this thesis studies Anglican thinkers from both the clergy and laity, with a principal focus on the essays, books, and articles they wrote to understand fascism in response to a series of political and social experiences. Such works provide ways of thinking about how their broad imaginative configurations of fascism were always inextricably linked to their faith despite its dynamic and ever-changing nature.

Why was there such a distinct panic about fascism? In many respects, it appeared similar to the political authoritarianisms with which the Church of England was familiar. Of these examples, Germany – specifically Prussianism – proved a constant threat. This was especially

pervasive in the First World War (1914-18) and after.[1] The Anglican modernist Hastings Rashdall (1858-1924) and the lay academic Lord Bryce (1838-1922) both presented Kaiser Wilhelm II's state as built on absolute authority.[2] Indeed, such an interpretation continued to be propagated in retrospect. William Temple (1881-1944) used his Scott Holland Memorial Lectures in 1928 to justify Britain's entry into the War on the grounds that it aimed to defeat a nation that undermined the sovereignty of God with its authoritarian conception of the state.[3]

By 1922, the Church of England had also grappled with the political authoritarianism of the left for some time. The establishment of the Soviet Union shocked the Anglican episcopate. Hensley Henson (1863-1947) recorded his distaste for the regime in his private journal on several occasion.[4] Ralph Inge (1860-1954) never shied away from public statements of condemnation; in a 1926 article, he wrote that the Bolshevik ideology was 'flatly and absolutely unchristian.'[5] Even left-leaning clerics like Temple explicitly criticised the religious persecution in the Soviet Union.[6] The Soviet Union was vital context for many Anglican criticisms of fascism.

This raises the question we posited earlier: why did fascism cause such a panic within the Church of England? The purpose of this thesis is to highlight the core tenets of Anglican interpretations of fascism. While authoritarianism had existed as a general ideology, fascism was alarming in that it made authoritarianism a political doctrine. In contrast to communism, which was understood to be about changing the existing structures of society, fascism was about the total implementation of a new moral and civilisational framework. Fascism had an alternative conception of reality. Indeed, whereas the antitheism of communism posed a particular threat,

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[1] For more detail, see Aoife O' Gorman, '*Wissenschaft* at War' (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2016), esp., 211-5.
[2] Hastings Rashdall, 'The Ethics of Conscientious Objection', *Modern Churchman*, 6:2 (1916), 56; James Bryce, *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages* (New York: Macmillan, 1915), 44-5; see also Hensley Henson, *War-time Sermons* (London: Macmillan, 1915), 100 ('Lessons of the Great War', May 1915) and Durham Cathedral Library [hereafter DCL], Bishop Henson Papers [hereafter BHP], HHH/20, 25 April 1916, 652.
[3] William Temple, *Christianity and The State* (London: Macmillan, 1928), 169-74. A similar point was made by Ralph Inge in *The Idea of Progress* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1920), 19.
[4] A persistent theme: DCL, BHP, HHH/28, 26 October 1920, 194; ibid/42, 1 June 1927, 113; ibid/43, 19 October 1927, 146; ibid/56, 11 December 1932, 343; ibid/60, 15 December 1933, 140.
[5] Inge, "Private Vices' and 'Public Benefits", *The Expository Times*, 38:1 (1926), 22.
[6] Temple, 'Editorial Notes', *The Pilgrim*, 3:4 (1923), 366-7.

fascism was a more profound threat in that it directly rivalled Christianity for the control of man's soul.

But fascism also caused a panic within the Church of England because it confirmed that its current moral pedagogy was out of touch with the realities of modernity. If, as Christopher Clark once observed, Britain sleepwalked into world war in 1914, then it was abruptly awakened after the armistice in 1918.[7] Britain awoke to a crisis of faith in society. Specifically, this was a crisis in the faith of progress, seen in the failures of existing political systems, in economic distribution, and in the religious process of progression toward perfection.

This was first observed during the war itself. Frank Russell Barry (1890-1976), who replaced in 1915 his academic gown with a military uniform, swapping the quaint lawns of Oriel College, Oxford, for the muddy fields of France. As a chaplain, he was stationed, amongst other places, at the Somme, where he observed the immense bloodshed in 1916. His extended period around ordinary men (that is to say, not like his fellow boarders at Bradfield College or Oriel) reshaped his understanding of what 'true religion' was; he wrote in 1917 that the 'traditional idea of God' was 'lamentably inadequate' for combatting the problems of modernity.[8] This was not an anxiety found exclusively in trenches across France, but in English cathedrals as well. Henson in particular was damning, writing that 'organised Christianity does not come out well of the world crisis' because if the primary purpose of the Church was to express the Gospel in 'human life', it had failed parlously.[9] Inge expressed the familiar concern that organised Christianity was overlooked as 'a probable saviour of society.'[10]

Whilst the individual examples above constitute only a patchy record of debate within the Church of England, one is left with the impression of a church that emerged from the First World

[7] Christopher Clark, *The Sleepwalkers* (London: Penguin, 2013).
[8] F. R. Barry, 'Faith in the Light of War', in F. B. Macnutt (ed.), *The Church in the Furnace* (London: Macmillan, 1917), 42.
[9] Henson, 'The Church of England After the War', in F. J. Foakes-Jackson (ed.), *The Faith and the War* (London: Macmillan, 1916), 239.
[10] Inge, 'Hope, Temporal and Eternal', ibid, 115.

War aware of its own limitations, of the laity's apathy for institutional moralising, and of the profound novelty of fascism. It is against this background that Anglican responses to fascism must be placed: these responses constituted a concerted effort to understand the causes and effects of fascism and the threat it posed to the Christian Church's moral authority. In being a study of fascism, this thesis is also a study of how the Church engaged with political modernity.

Ideas of fascism

Defining fascism is an open-ended issue. It is by its very nature dynamic and constantly evolving in response to different stimuli. If we take it that fascism necessarily depends on 'othering', as the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek has argued, then what fascist movements define as the 'other' (*i.e.*, those that 'have freely chosen the wrong side') is innate to that movement's geographical, socio-political, and temporal context.[11] According to this framework, then, defining historical fascism is unintelligible without a working knowledge of the social, political, and economic issues of that country in that time. Moreover, studying fascism as an historical force is necessarily complicated by our contemporary understandings of fascism and the banality with which the term 'fascist' is banded around in common parlance. We are only able to use this term loosely, I believe, because of the intricate deconstruction of the word and its meaning(s).

The attempt to systematically define and understand fascism commenced immediately, though it increased in severity during and after the Second World War (1939-45). It was taken up initially by philosophers, which is unsurprising given that fascism was seen as a primarily moral problem. Perhaps the most systematic exposition of fascism's philosophical roots is Max Horkheimer's (1895-1973) and Theodor Adorno's (1903-69) *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1947; English trans., 1974). Horkheimer and Adorno saw fascism as an extension of Positivism, the philosophical school advanced by Auguste Comte (1798-1857) which stipulated that *everything* could be explained logically (*i.e.*, through experience). Enlightenment thought was therefore to

[11] Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (London: Verso, 1989), 166.

blame for fascism because it provided a context for man to be treated as a natural resource. The perspective that humans were uniform (which made it possible to treat them as objects rather than people) had no greater consequence than the Holocaust.[12]

A more common philosophical explanation of fascism is to associate it with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel is more commonly associated with communism because Karl Marx's (1818-83) dialectical materialism depends fundamentally on Hegel's model of history as a dialectical process. Nonetheless, Karl Popper's (1902-94) *The Open Society and its Enemies* (1945) argued that fascism was a natural development of Hegel's 'hysterical historicism', establishing an ethical context for a state that was determined by historical progression toward its destiny.[13] On the other hand, the Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukács (1885-1971) argued that Nazism rejected German Idealism and the concept of progressive liberalism, of which Hegelianism was perceived as its chief philosophical influence.[14]

Lukács argued instead that Nazism was more clearly based on the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), and specifically that Nazi barbarism hinged upon his glorification of violence meted out to subordinate peoples.[15] Nietzsche naturally gets more attention than Hegel, in no small part due to Hitler's cultivation of an image as an intellectual descendent of him. In particular, Nietzsche's theories of the *Übermensch* and of his perfect nihilist have been commonly adduced as central to the Nazi doctrine. Jacob Golomb's and Robert Wistrich's edited volume *Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?* (2003) provides a provocative and insightful explication of the ways in which Nietzsche's philosophy was manipulated to give the fascist doctrine philosophical succour. This collection is especially interesting because it moves away from the dominance of

[12] Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno et al., *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1947; Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 129.
[13] Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, 2 vols. (1945; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020), II, §12; see also, Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (London: Unwin, 1983), 700; Isiah Berlin, *Freedom and its Betrayal* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 103.
[14] Georg Lukács, 'Der Deutsche Faschismus und Hegel' (1943), *Schicksalswende* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1948), 29-49.
[15] Idem, 'Der Deutsche Faschismus und Nietzsche' (1943), ibid, 7-28.

seeing Nietzsche as exclusively applicable to Nazism, with Mario Sznajder's essay demonstrating how Italian Fascism likewise abused Nietzsche's philosophy, specifically his theory of action.[16]

The move toward studying politics as a scientific discipline in the 1950s and 1960s introduced taxonomy to the study of fascism. Of all these studies, perhaps none have been as influential as Hannah Arendt's (1906-75) *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951). Arendt famously separated fascism and totalitarianism where the two had been interchangeable in academic parlance. Arendt defined fascism in simple terms: 'antihumanist, antiliberal, anti-individualist, and anticultural.' She defined totalitarianism even more so: 'a means of dominating and terrorizing human beings from within.'[17] So, to her, fascism could be totalitarian (Nazism), but equally, not all fascist regimes were totalitarian (Italy).[18] Such a sharp and distinct approach to fascist movements leads to revisionism and obscures historical perspectives. More recently, Roger Griffin's influential work *The Nature of Fascism* (1991) has brought much-needed balance. Griffin concedes that negativity is replete in the fascist doctrine but emphasises that more important is the 'palingenetic form of populist ultra-nationalism' – the positive affirmation that the regime will restore a lost greatness through a radical rebirth. Fascist belief, he argues, is built on this positivity.[19] Such a perspective is much more representative of how Anglicans ultimately perceived fascism; they did not define it by what it stood against but as an ideology that offered *something* in a time of morass.

This thesis is not seeking to impose doctrinaire models of fascism, or to view fascism as defined by strict parameters that disqualify judgements of fascism in Anglican thought if these were not met, but rather to reflect critically on how members of the Church of England conceptualised and understood fascism. As such, I am more influenced by what Umberto Eco

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[16] Mario Sznajder, 'Nietzsche, Mussolini, and Italian Fascism' in Jacob Golomb, Robert Wistrich (eds), *Nietzsche, Godfather of Fascism?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 235-62.
[17] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951; New York: Harcourt Brace, 1973), 325-30.
[18] Ibid, 308.
[19] Roger Griffin, *The Nature of Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1993), *passim*, esp. 26-7; see also, 'General Introduction', in idem (ed.), *Fascism* (Oxford: OUP, 1995), 6-8.

(1932-2016), called 'Ur-Fascism', or 'eternal fascism.' For Eco, fascism is not perfect nor linear but 'fuzzy' – it is a *pattern* of various ideologies and philosophies. Eco attempts to define fascism in the same way that Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) defines a game.[20] Games take many forms and what constitutes a game is arbitrary; all games are different and yet they are all nonetheless games.

Consider the following:

1	2	3	4
abc	bcd	cde	def

Groups 1 and 2 are familiar because they have two parts in common (*b* and *c*). Groups 1 and 3 are also familiar, despite having fewer parts in common than 1 and 2 (only *c*). Groups 1 and 4 have no parts in common, and yet the illusory nature of the game's sequence suggests to us they have a family resemblance. Eco shows that fascism is 'fuzzy' because it is a blend of different philosophies and yet despite this fuzziness, one can still identify, what he calls, the 'patterns' of fascism.[21] When we consider the patterns of fascism, we see the different features *of* fascism rather than only seeing fascism when certain features are present.

This being the case, the use of 'fascism' in this thesis stands in contrast to conventional usage. It will refer to the Vichy regime in France (1940-44) as a fascist regime, for example. Essays by several important historians conclude that Vichy France was not a fascist regime. Olivier Wieviorka has argued that Vichy's fascist credentials have been fabricated and imposed onto it by Marxist and Gaullist historians seeking to confirm their own biases.[22] The same issue can be found in defining Francoism in Spain. If one was to question a British citizen in the 1930s as to the

[20] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (1953; Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), §9, 9.
[21] Umberto Eco, 'Ur-Fascism', *New York Review of Books*, 42:11 (June 1995), 14.
[22] Olivier Wieviorka, 'Vichy, a Fascist State?', in Ismael Saz et al., *Reactionary Nationalists, Fascists and Dictatorships in the Twentieth Century* (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 312-3; see also, Stanley Payne, *Fascism* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983), 137.

political disposition of Francisco Franco (1892-1975), the answer would have likely been 'fascist.' And yet Francoism has never been defined as a type of fascism in the secondary literature.[23]

This thesis uses 'fascism' operationally rather than ontologically, and it reflects Anglican usage. Anglicans were not taxonomic because they saw fascism as fluid; ideas of fascism were thus imaginative configurations, broad and transient. The following chapters will demonstrate that it was not the regimes which they defined as fascist that changed, but *what* defined fascism. 'Fascistic' may be used to convey certain affinities people, ideas, and regimes had with fascism while not being fascist; a professed critic of fascism like T. S. Eliot (1888-1965) could in many respects think in fascist ways.

Throughout this thesis, I will show that Anglicans believed fascism controlled all aspects of the social space. To denote this, I tend to avoid the word 'totalitarian': the implications of the total control of the political machinery of the state is not right for me. Instead, I prefer 'totalising.' This still contains echoes of the total control of the social space, without the exclusively political connotations of totalitarianism. Moreover, while 'totalitarian' was used at times, it was not common parlance in Anglican discourse and because that which it describes was widely understood and accepted, the flexibility of 'totalising' allows me to articulate this cultural feeling well. Moreover, totalitarianism is a contested concept, being at once a 'word' and a 'thing', and such ongoing complexities make it an unappealing concept for this thesis.[24]

Historiography

In many ways, the work of a religious historian of twentieth-century Britain is difficult. The demands for justification and qualification of *why* religious histories of a secularising nation are constant. The decline of denominational politics in the twentieth century led many historians to

[23] Cf., H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'The Phenomenon of Fascism', in S. J. Woolf (ed.), *European Fascism* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1968), 28; Raymond Carr, *Spain, 1808-1975* (1982; Oxford: Clarendon, 2001), 165; Paul Preston, *The Politics of Revenge* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 8; Payne, *Fascism in Spain* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1999), 476.
[24] Bruno Bongiovanni, John Rugman (transl.), 'Totalitarianism', *Journal of Modern European History*, 3:1 (2005), 5-17.

suggest that political positions were no longer bound up with religious perspectives. They thus followed a conventional approach, which was to take government policy and consider how the Church interacted with this. But such an approach overlooks the important distinction between government and politics. How members of the Church of England thought about political theory, what the moral and ethical problems associated with these were, and how political opinions were inextricably linked to their faith, must all be considered.

Matthew Grimley, Tom Rodger, and Phillip Williamson have posed and answered some important questions regarding the state of twentieth-century British religious historiography, and how it must change for the future. Grimley's and Williamson's introduction makes a compelling case for why religion, and specifically religious interactions with politics, should be studied in histories of twentieth-century Britain.[25] As they contend, the Church of England remained such a massive institution in British national life that to ignore its interjections in secular discourse would be a glaring omission.

Moreover, they make the important observation that the Church crafted its own political analyses, always informed by its spiritual understanding of morality in the temporal sphere. Fascism, they argue, was always perceived, and critiqued, in a spiritual framework.[26] Thomas Linehan's research into the British Union of Fascists (BUF) demonstrates this well because it shows how Anglican supporters of fascism (few and far between) justified their enthusiasm on spiritual grounds, manipulating scripture to confirm the apparent compatibility of fascism and Christianity.[27] Linehan's research is also important because it shows us what Anglicans specifically did or did not like about the BUF. Due to the nature of Linehan's study, it is a more developed approach than that offered by Edward Norman in *Church and Society in Modern England* (1976), which is an outlier in previous scholarship for identifying specific points of interest. Norman

[25] Matthew Grimley and Philip Williamson, 'Introduction', in Tom Rodger et al (eds), *The Church of England and British Politics Since 1900* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2020), 4-26.
[26] Ibid, 14.
[27] Thomas Linehan, "On the Side of Christ", *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 8:2 (2007), 281-301.

suggests that the Church of England primarily rejected fascism due to its racialist ideology but also that fascism was less popular than socialism on account of a more general left-wing sentiment in the interwar clergy, an unsurprising claim given his outspoken devotion to Thatcherism.[28]

Usually, much larger trends are adduced to explain Anglican responses to fascism, as seen in Adrian Hastings's *History of English Christianity* (1991). Hastings's study is important in that it represents one of the first major studies of the Church of England to systematically include laypeople in the same analytical framework as the clergy. His main contention is that the old denominational politics of the Edwardian era had not disappeared so much as being reimagined as a broader dichotomy between political 'right' and 'left' and that these affiliations guided perspectives on fascism.[29] The suggestion that secular trends and issues informed Anglican perspectives of fascism is, I argue, an inaccurate one. This thesis will show that Anglican perspectives on fascism were distinctly informed and influenced by their faith.

It is now more common in the wider literature to put Anglican sympathy or distaste for fascism down to individual factors. The most consistent suggestion is that where Anglicans did express sympathy, it was out of a more deep-rooted fear of Russian Bolshevism, and that fascism represented a better alternative.[30] The other repeated point is that Anglicans rejected fascism on account of its racism, though this is usually in reference to Nazism.[31] In fact, Anglicans had a complex, multivalent understanding of fascism. As we shall see, Anglicans were fully aware of the ethical issues associated with the internal dynamics of fascist regimes, of which racism was one (albeit major) part. Even when anti-communism was adduced as a reason that fascism could be supported, it was always qualified as a primarily spiritual issue and racism only became a central

[28] Edward Norman, *Church and Society in England, 1770-1970* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1976), 357-60; see also, *Christianity and the World Order* (Oxford: OUP, 1979), 6-10.
[29] Adrian Hastings, *A History of English Christianity, 1920-1990* (London: SCM, 1991), 317.
[30] Cf., Linehan, "On the Side of Christ", 289; Maurice Reckitt, *Maurice to Temple* (London: Faber, 1947), 180; G. C. Webber, *The Ideology of the British Right, 1918-1939* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), 63.
[31] Cf., Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, p.373; Andrew Chandler, *British Christians and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: CUP, 2022), 68-70; Norman, see above.

concern in the mid-to-late 1930s, and even then, it was not as much a cause for concern as the persecution of Protestants in Germany.

The lack of a systematic explication of Anglican responses to the racism of fascism would, at first, appear to be a glaring omission. There are two principal explanations for this. The primary defence is my decision to not focus on Nazism, instead giving much needed attention to fascism in Italy and Spain. Italian Fascists may themselves have been racist, but Italian Fascism was not initially defined by racism nor operated a racist regime – its race laws were not implemented until 1938. For much of the timeframe under examination, Italian Fascism was not racist nor considered to be by Anglican writers. The same must be said for the other regimes which this thesis considers: Francoist Spain and the Austrofascist regime were not defined by their racism and while the Vichy regime was integral to the Holocaust in France, the reality of daily life for younger Jews especially, as explored by Danial Lee (2014), was remarkably more complex, with Jews finding ways to exist and coexist within Vichy's New Order.[32] The second point is that because Nazism is the most studied version of fascism, its racism has been covered well. Andrew Chandler has dealt with Anglican considerations of Nazi racism on both an individual and institutional level while Tom Lawson has presented Anglican understandings of the Holocaust in several detailed studies.[33]

The general racism of fascism, and specific instances like the Holocaust, are inescapable and rightly dominate scholarship. But the decision to always foreground analyses of the Nazi regime in its racism means we rarely ascertain the other ways that Anglicans defined Nazism as a form of fascism. Moreover, this potentially obscures wider understandings of European fascism due to a tendency to elide 'Nazism' with 'fascism.' This is not to say Anglicans engaged consciously in typological discourse throughout the interwar period, but it is true that many understood the

[32] Daniel Lee, *Pétain's Jewish Children* (Oxford: OUP, 2014).
[33] Chandler, *British Christians and the Third Reich*, *passim*; *George Bell, Bishop of Chichester*, (Grand Rapids, MI.: Edermans, 2016), esp., 55-7; Tom Lawson, 'The Anglican Understanding of the Third Reich and its Influence on the History and Memory of the Holocaust' (PhD thesis, University of Southampton, 2001); 'Constructing a Christian History of Nazism', *History and Memory*, 16:1 (2004), 146-76; *The Church of England and the Holocaust* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2006).

differences between the versions of European fascism. The elision of Nazism with fascism is the major limitation of studies such as Norman's and Hastings's, as well as Alan Wilkinson's *Dissent or Conform?* (1986), which remains the most dedicated study of the Church of England and European politics in the first half of the twentieth century. Wilkinson's book is an impressive attempt to collate Anglican perspectives on the politics of dictatorship in the interwar years. But his analyses of 'fascism' are based largely on approaches to Nazism and this oversimplification obscures the reality that Anglicans were aware of the nuances across different fascisms.

Where Wilkinson does critically explore Italy, attitudes are discussed in the context of the international crises surrounding the Abyssinian war rather than any stand-alone perspectives. Additionally, all considerations are foregrounded in the government policy of appeasement, and how responses related to this. As such, Wilkinson suggests almost all senior clergymen were 'appeasers.'[34] Again, we return to the dichotomy of 'government' and 'politics': Anglicans may well have supported the government policy of Appeasement (as they did with almost all government policies, both domestically and internationally) but the suggestion that they were 'appeasers', that they sought to assuage the dictators by bowing to their every demand, is wrong. The emphasis this thesis places on mentalities demonstrates that many Anglicans were vociferous in their condemnation of fascism and were consistently aware that fascism and Christianity were incompatible, which in turn became a perspective that the two could not coexist.

Observing nuance within wider trends is made easier when looking at individual examples. Biographies were often written by other churchmen and originated in the death of their subjects, so there was an unfortunate tendency toward hagiography. Hagiography is used to display the holiness of its subject, which means there is a focus on the actions of the subject in their life rather than on their mentalities or cultural feeling. Therefore, the attitudes of Anglican clerics and

[34] Alan Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform?* (London: SCM, 1986), 165.

significant laypeople have sometimes been omitted. Owen Chadwick's study of Hensley Henson (1983) is an important explication of perhaps the most forthright and consistent Anglican campaign to highlight the wrongness in fascism, though this approach is rare.[35] On the other hand, A. C. Headlam (1862-1947), bishop of Gloucester, has had similar treatment from his biographers for the opposite reason. Considerations of Headlam's Nazi sympathies (except for Matthew Grimley's *ODNB* entry) are largely apologetic, either from his official biographer in the post-Nuremberg years (Ronald Jasper) or from one classical Tory trying to defend another (Edward Norman).[36] Again though, these studies largely explain that he was fond of Nazism, rather than the aspects of Nazism of which he was fond. Overall, individual studies mirror institutional ones in that they do much to prove attitudes toward fascism but do little to explain conceptions of it.[37]

This historiographical gap is emphasised with the knowledge that clerics wrote copiously about fascism and the internal dynamics of fascist societies. To take this further, consider Ralph Inge, 'the Gloomy' Dean' of St Paul's Cathedral. Inge was just as much of a sympathiser of fascism as Headlam, though he has fared better historically perhaps due to a combination of his retirement in 1934 and because (unlike Headlam) he publicly condemned Pastor Martin Niemöller's (1892-1984) imprisonment in Sachsenhausen concentration camp.[38] But the plethora of individual studies of Inge have consistently considered other points of interest in his life.[39] Studying Anglican thinkers like Inge not only makes sense because he was an important instructor of public opinion but also, his frequently evolving views on fascism allow us to see how nuanced views were possible.

Inge is the most glaring omission but there are several other examples. Neither of the two major biographies of Cosmo Gordon Lang (1864-1945), archbishop of Canterbury (1928-42) – by

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35 Owen Chadwick, *Hensley Henson* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), ch.10.
36 Grimley, 'Headlam, Arthur Cayley', *ODNB* (2014); Ronald Jasper, *Arthur Cayley Headlam* (London: Faith Press, 1960), 290-301; Norman, *Church and Society in England*, 360-1.
37 Other biographies where this is the case are, among others: S. C. Carpenter, *Duncan-Jones of Chichester* (London: Mowbray, 1956), ch.6; Jasper, *George Bell* (London: OUP, 1967), *passim*; Andrew Chandler, *George Bell, Bishop of Chichester*, *passim*., N.B., a very passing comment on Bell's understanding of Nazi Germany's internal dynamics is on 104; Sharron Greer Cassavant, *John Middleton Murry* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1982), 30.
38 Inge, *A Rustic Moralist* (London: Putnam, 1937), 46.
39 Cf., Adam Fox, *Dean Inge* (London: John Murray, 1960); Robert M. Helm, *The Gloomy Dean* (Winston-Salem: John F. Blair, 1962); Bernhard Dietz, *Neo-Tories* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).

J. G. Lockhart (1949) and Robert Beaken (2012) – address his well-documented concerns with fascism.[40] William Temple has fared somewhat better. Robert Craig (1963), Alan Suggate (1987), and John Kent (1992) all discuss his critical views of fascism.[41] But Temple is perhaps the most written-about churchman of our period and therefore as a proportion of the oeuvre regarding him (including his official biography by F. A. Iremonger) it does not scratch the surface of what he wrote between 1922 and 1944.[42] All studies focus on other aspects of his journalism in the 1920s, despite it providing a consistent and coherent critical analysis of the fascist ideology.

A more recent approach to studying religious responses to fascism has been to place it amongst the wider threat of 'modernity.' Theo Salemink's (2004) study of Catholic responses to fascism follows such an approach, while Bernhard Dietz (2018) and John Carter Wood (2019) have examined British Christian responses more generally.[43] Carter Wood's study in particular is peculiar in that he refers to the 'crisis of Europe' from 1937 onwards, and yet he makes little reference to Italy and Spain; even in the most recent studies, the elision of Nazism and fascism is present. Moreover, the idea of a homogenous Christian response is accurate, though it does not show the full picture. Christians (by which these writers mean Catholics or Anglicans, with Nonconformist responses inadequately represented in the literature) were largely united in seeing fascism as 'bad' for society, but what made fascism 'bad' differed amongst Catholic and Anglican thinkers.

Catholic responses – individual and institutional – have received significantly more attention than Anglican responses. Such a trend can be explained by fascism largely affecting predominantly Catholic countries as well as Catholic writers offering a much more linear response than the disparate nature of Anglican discourse. Tom Villis (2013) has published an impressive

[40] J. G. Lockhart, *Cosmo Gordon Lang* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1949); Robert Beaken, *Cosmo Lang* (London: I. B. Taurus, 2012).
[41] Robert Craig, *Social Concern in the Thought of William Temple* (New York: Gollancz, 1963); Alan Suggate, *William Temple and Christian Social Ethics Today* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1987); John Kent, *William Temple* (Cambridge: CUP, 1992).
[42] F. A. Iremonger, *William Temple, Archbishop of Canterbury* (London: OUP, 1948).
[43] Theo Salemink, 'Modernity as Neo-Paganism', in Willemien Otten and Salemink (eds), *Religious Identity and the Problem of Historical Foundation* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 240-59; Bernhard Dietz, *Neo-Tories* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018); John Carter Wood, *This is Your Hour* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2019).

and systematic account of how Britain's Catholics thought about, and responded to, European fascism, arguing that British Catholicism was not homogenous in its response to fascism but complex and multifaceted.[44] Important studies by Mary Vincent (1996) and Sarah Shortall (2021) have demonstrated how Catholics in Spain and France dealt with the onset of fascistic politics, complementing the numerous essays in a series of wide-spanning edited collections.[45]

But academic neglect is not a sufficient justification for this thesis. Despite the challenges of studying Anglican responses, it is worth doing so because they show responses which were distinctly 'Anglican', and a comparison of these will be an undercurrent throughout this thesis to highlight the different approaches to political modernity within European Christianity. In understanding how Anglicans contributed to Christian responses generally, I am to an extent posing the same question upon which Carter Wood grounds his interrogation of British Christian views on the crises of post-war Europe: why can we still discern distinctly Anglican perspectives when they claimed 'to speak for a universal Christianity and interested in cross-denominational influences'?[46]

Furthermore, due to the Church of England's role and identity in national life, there was something distinctly 'British' about Anglican responses as well. Therefore, returning to Grimley's and Williamson's suggestion that British responses to contemporary phenomena are largely unintelligible without mention of the Church of England, this study is therefore an important and necessary contribution to our understanding of *British* responses to fascism generally. This is given further incentive by the wider contribution it will make to modern British intellectual history. Joshua Bennett (2021) has suggested that more attention should be given to the propagation and discussion of ideas within religious groups to better understand how different ideas were received

[44] Tom Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2013). Another important study of British Catholics and European fascism is Dietz, *Neo-Tories*.
[45] Mary Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996); Sarah Shortall, *Soldiers of God in a Secular World* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2021), ch.3; see also Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway (eds), *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918-1965* (Oxford: OUP, 1996); Jan Nelis and Anne Morelli, Danny Praet (eds), *Catholicism and Fascism in Europe, 1918-1945* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Velrag, 2015).
[46] Carter Wood, *This is Your Hour*, 5.

in Britain generally.[47] An adherence to both injunctions means that this thesis contributes to significant emerging trends in historical scholarship.

Religious histories of twentieth-century Britain must necessarily encounter the fiery debate around secularisation. The interwar years are often seen as the tinder which set alight the secular turn in the 1960s. Callum Brown, in his definitively titled *The Death of Christian Britain* (2001), consistently points to the 1930s as exhibiting trends of secularism that were foundational for the great secular turn in the 1960s.[48] Clive Field (2022) offers the most recent revaluation – and approval – of Brown's statistical analysis.[49] Other studies have similarly posited that there was no real resurgence of religious practice during the interwar years, but S. J. D. Green (2011) has made the important observation that it 'held up pretty well.'[50] But the wider issue here is that the integration of statistical evidence into secularisation history has created a dissonance between cultural feeling and hard numbers. Numbers only tell us about those on the pews, but not those who listened with great purpose to Cosmo Lang on the wireless or read William Temple's articles in national newspapers. As Green's argument succinctly posits, interwar attendance was weak, but belief was strong.[51]

Where cultural feeling has been considered, it has consistently been suggested that clerical interjections were not wanted. Roger Lloyd (1960) suggested that the calibre of clerical leaders in the interwar clergy – Lang, Temple, Henson – produced a disproportionately underwhelming effect on contemporary debate and opinion.[52] Hastings argues that the clergy were close to 'opting out' of matters of contemporaneous political and social salience.[53] Some historians have perhaps

[47] Joshua Bennett, 'The Cultural History of Ideas' (2021), *Oxford Centre for Intellectual History*, https://intellectualhistory.web.ox.ac.uk/article/cultural-history-ideas#/.
[48] Callum Brown, *The Death of Christian Britain* (London: Routledge, 2009), 151, 166, 187, 215.
[49] C. D. Field, *Counting Religion in Britain, 1970-2020* (Oxford: OUP, 2022), 164.
[50] Ross McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 274; S. J. D. Green, *The Passing of Protestant England* (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 156.
[51] Green, ibid.
[52] Roger Lloyd, *The Church of England, 1900-1965* (London: SCM, 1966), 456.
[53] Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, 293.

exonerated these men somewhat by their reconceptualization of the clergy's contemporary significance. Ross McKibbin makes the important point that clergymen no longer had the clout that their Victorian predecessors enjoyed and so their interjections 'counted for little' in this time.[54] But this thesis follows more recent scholarship, which has challenged this interpretation, with Martin Conway (2006) and Grimley (2007) demanding that a more diffuse and subtle religious influence in national life can and must be recognised.[55]

This diffuse engagement can be easily discerned, as the source base of this thesis reflects. Clergymen left their pulpits and sermonised on the wireless and in the columns of the national press; their books lined the bookshelves of the masses, and their public meetings were attended in their hundreds. In many respects, Cosmo Lang's engagement with the wireless formed a new point of religious reference. In his important study of interwar 'religious belonging', Field argues that more attention should be paid to Anglican radio broadcasts as a way of monitoring alternative points of religious reference.[56] As this thesis will show, the Church of England gave, and was expected to give, a coherent and consistent response to the threat fascism posed to Europe. But it did so in ways that reflected the world in which it now operated.

This engagement with modernity also brings this thesis to contribute to another, interrelated historiographical debate, namely about role of the clergy in twentieth century Britain. The propensity for the clergy to engage in political discourse represented to some a stark change in its remit. Edward Norman (1976) – in one of his wider attacks on what he perceived as the leftist incursion of the Church of England – suggested it was not a reimagination of the clergy's remit but rather its mimicry of the secular intelligentsia.[57] Kenneth Medhurst and George Moyser

[54] McKibbin, *Classes and Cultures*, 330.
[55] Martin Conway, 'The Christian Churches and Politics in Europe, 1914-1939', in Hugh McLeod (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Christianity,* 9 vols. (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), IX, 152; Grimley, 'The Religion of Englishness', *Journal of British Studies*, 46:4 (2007), 903.
[56] Field, 'Gradualist or Revolutionary Secularization?', *Church History and Religious Culture,* 93:1 (2013), 70-1. It is worth noting Temple was also a prolific voice on Britain's airwaves, see Suzan Bray, 'William Temple's BBC Radio Sermons During World War II', in Gilles Teulié and Laurence Lux-Sterritt (eds), *War Sermons* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2009), 207-21.
[57] Norman, *Christianity and the World Order*, 6-10.

(1982) have more convincingly suggested that it was not about reflecting secular trends but a natural stage of clerical evolution. The clergy had started as prince-bishops, who served only to legitimise the thought of the governing elite, but over time had become moral advisors who now felt compelled, when necessary, to question national governments.[58] The major limitation in Norman's thesis is that the clergy did not recycle secular opinions, but rather they thought intensely about issues and blended moral theology with political discourse to continue to moralise the nation in ways that suited the conditions of the interwar years. The case study of fascism vindicates these wider arguments as well as contributing to the more nuanced understanding of secularisation that scholars such as Jane Garnett and her co-authors have done.[59]

Sources

Part of the issue with previous scholarship is the sources under examination. Both Wilkinson and Hastings limited themselves to published material. In response, this thesis makes extensive use of the personal papers and records held at Lambeth Palace Library. In particular, the personal papers of Archbishops Davidson, Lang and Temple will be used to demonstrate the effect fascism had on the individual whilst institutional perspectives have been ascertained from the specific collections of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Council was established in 1934 and, under the guidance of A. C. Headlam as its first chairman, it ascertained information about the social and political happenings around the world. As such, it serves as a vital archive for any analysis of the institutional Church's response to politics, both in Europe and farther afield.

This thesis also makes use of lesser consulted personal papers. Archival trips to York and Cambridge uncovered the private perspectives of Cyril Garbett (1875-1955) and Ralph Inge respectively. Lay sources of this kind were similarly insightful, such as the letters of Geoffrey Dawson (1874-1944), editor of *The Times*, which are held in Oxford's Bodleian Library as well as

[58] Kenneth Medhurst and George Mosyer, 'From Princes to Pastors', *West European Politics*, 5:2 (1982), 172-91.
[59] Jane Garnett et al. (eds), *Redefining Christian Britain* (London: SCM, 2007).

the journal of Lord Halifax (1881-1959) at York University.[60] Though much more limited than other private papers, their diaries are nonetheless significant because they demonstrate an emotional impulse that is rarely associated with public figures due to the decorum expected from moral leaders. Diaries, and the private sanctuary they offer, serve as filters that offer the writers a particular view of the world and help them orientate themselves in it. Indeed, Hensley Henson's diaries demonstrate the emotional response to fascism better than any other. They are an invaluable source for historians of the interwar years, often used effectively to demonstrate his biting and pejorative analyses of the constitutional crises that gripped interwar Britain. But he was as aware of, and engaged with, international politics as much as with British; Chapter One, for instance, makes extensive use of his diary entries where there is a dearth of more general material relating to fascism in the 1920s.

Though Henson's diaries are held in Durham Cathedral Library, they are currently being digitised in a massive project orchestrated by Durham University. The digitising of personal papers is one of the most useful developments to the study of history. It democratises previously secret conversations: digitisation has brought the confidential discussions of the elite Christian group the Moot into the public arena for the first time.[61] Another example is the publication of Alan Campbell Don's diaries. Don (1885-1966) was chaplain to Cosmo Lang and the Speaker of the House of Commons; he was a real establishment insider, so his diaries provide a unique insight into Lang's personality. Another beneficiary of this is T. S. Eliot, whose letters have been published by Faber and Faber (where he was a director for several decades), in incremental volumes from 1898 to (currently) 1941. The volumes are meticulously edited and complement the extraordinary work undertaken by Johns Hopkins University in digitising the *Complete Prose of T. S. Eliot* (2014-2019). Having access to Eliot's letters alongside his published materials allows this thesis to discern better how private thought influenced public interlocution.

[60] N.B., throughout this thesis, Lord Halifax refers to Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, the third Lord Halifax.
[61] Keith Clements (ed.), *The Moot Papers* (London: T & T Clark, 2010).

By studying personal papers, we are necessarily studying emotion. Studying 'emotions' as opposed to 'ideas' or 'intellectual temperaments' is a relatively new approach to history but one that gives this thesis a wider significance.[62] From these records we see how emotion shaped clerical interjections on fascism; patterns of feeling give us an insight into the personal alarm they experienced about fascism rather than merely the taxonomic differences they found between fascism and the normal temporality of politics. As such, this thesis is not just a study of how Anglicans defined fascism but also how these understandings affected Anglican theology, identity, and faith. By ascertaining the emotional impulse of a letter or the cultural feeling of a diary entry we are in some ways performing what Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) considered as the psychoanalysis of the archive. We are not just studying what the archive houses, but what the material itself houses, and what this can reveal about the writer as well as the subject.[63]

Published material is the main supplement to these archival collections. Pamphlets were often written in relation to specific events while books on moral issues of the day invariably turned their attention to fascism. Indeed, some clergymen were prolific essayists. William Temple and Ralph Inge (perhaps the two great clerical thinkers on secular problems) published a massive oeuvre in the 1930s alone. Engaging with a greater breadth of the published sources available thus differentiates this study from previous ones, and even those which took only published material as their source base.

Historical studies on Anglicanism and fascism are few and far between, meaning there is inevitably a crossover of sources between those studies and this one. For example, Alan Wilkinson makes impressive use of the *Cicestrian*, the student-run journal of the Chichester Theological College. The college was a centre of Anglo-Catholic ordination training in the interwar years and its magazine was full of social and political commentary. One article in particular is a brazen

[62] These parameters have been borrowed from Hannah Rose Woods, 'Anxiety and Urban Life in Late Victorian and Early Edwardian Culture, 1800-1914' (PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 2018), 7.
[63] Jacques Derrida, Eric Prenowitz (transl.) 'Archive Fever', *Diacritics*, 25:2 (1995), esp., 16-7.

apologia for the newly established Nazi regime, which Wilkinson compellingly uses to support his claim that the policy of appeasement attracted clergymen that were 'liberal optimists' or 'explicit fascists.'[64] But we can approach previously explored sources from different angles. This article, for instance, can also be used as a source to ascertain the perspectives of (potentially) younger Anglicans toward fascism.

The other major source of published material is Anglican interjections in the media. Newspapers still served as the primary source of information in the public arena and Adrian Bingham notes that events were described in copious detail and speeches and sermons were printed verbatim.[65] Therefore, newspapers in this sense act as a source of information for the historian. This leads us to also consider what some of them chose to publish. Several Anglicans found themselves on editorial boards throughout the interwar years: Temple at *The Pilgrim*, A. C. Headlam at the *Church Quarterly Review*. Perhaps surprisingly, attention will be given to T. S. Eliot's literary review the *Criterion* and John Middleton Murry's (1889-1957) *Adelphi*. Their inclusion is less surprising, however, when one considers Charlie Dawkins's (2015) argument that editors of interwar cultural reviews were aware of the interplay between literary and political modernisms.[66]

But newspapers also serve as an indirect source because as historians we can judge the significance of what Anglicans chose to put into the crucible of public discourse. It should be acknowledged that the presence of a distinctly (Latin) clerical title (*Cantuar, Ebor, Dunelm*, and so on) on the byline of correspondences and articles changed how these public interlocutions were received and interpreted. Even after retirement, Inge continued to use the epithet 'Dean Inge' for his weekly column in the *Evening Standard*. The awareness of the moral weight such interjections had on public discourse speaks to wider issues this thesis will turn to regarding the clergy's changing role in modern society.

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[64] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform?*, 143; see also, Purzelbäumer [pseud.], 'The Nazi State', *Cicestrian*, 8:45 (Advent 1933), 45-9.
[65] Adrian Bingham, *Gender, Modernity, and the Popular Press in Inter-War Britain* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 23.
[66] Charlie Dawkins, 'Modernism in Mainstream Magazines, 1920-1937' (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2015), 53.

The Church of England had its own media. Three newspapers in particular are important for understanding the currents of Anglican discourse: the Anglo-Catholic *Church Times* (which boasted a readership of all other papers combined), the Evangelical *Record*, and the High-Church *Guardian*. Caution must be exercised, however, lest one falls into the trap of referring to the opinions of one dominant newspaper as 'press opinion.'[67] Therefore, I have tempered any temptation to do so by using these sources as supplementary to Anglican thought, rather than being representative of it. Similarly, some church newspapers and parish magazines have not been considered given this thesis is concerned with the currents of national debate and so whilst they offer an important insight into the rhythms of Anglican thought across all strata of the Church, they are only supplementary in this thesis.

Similarly important to note is that in Chapter Six, on the Second World War, this thesis does not take *The Spiritual Issues of the War* as a principal source. Published by the Ministry of Information, *The Spiritual Issues of the War* brought together comments from leaders within all Britain's religious denominations. As Stephen Parker writes, it was an attempt to blur denominational differences and craft a national religion, to appeal to as many people as possible and galvanise public spirit.[68] Hannah Elias shows clearly how Anglican wartime radio broadcasts are evidence of a certain alacrity amongst Anglican thinkers to craft such a national religion.[69] But they nonetheless also continued to promulgate a distinctly Anglican position which, as this thesis argues, was about refining Anglicanism to a certain orthodoxy that would inhibit the growth of movements like fascism in public spaces rather than crafting a 'new' form of public religion. In pursuit of this line of inquiry, *The Spiritual Issues of the War* was thus not an appropriate source for that end.

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[67] On this, see Bingham, 'The Digitization of Newspaper Archives', *Twentieth Century British History*, 21:2 (2010), 229.
[68] Stephen Parker, 'Reinvigorating Christian Britain', in Parker, Lawson (eds), *God and War* (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012), 68-9.
[69] Hannah Elias, 'Radio Religion', in Michael Snape, Bell (eds), *British Christianity and the Second World War* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2023), 46-65.

One benefit of balancing private papers with published material is the opportunity to highlight the interplay between private thought and public interlocution. This allows us to see how clerical pedagogy was shaped in light of fast changing circumstances. The period under examination was a dynamic and volatile one, where the frequent emergence of new groups on the political right made clear understandings difficult. Therefore, this naturally highlights ambivalence and contradiction in the sources. These are not necessarily indicative of political manoeuvring but are in fact representative of the fact that terms of usage changed frequently, and chronologically, throughout the period. One pertinent example in this thesis is Ralph Inge. He can be described as anti-, then pro-, and back to anti-fascist all within a five-year period in the 1930s. For a project like this, which attempts to trace the evolution of intellectual ideas and discussion, these more abstract responses can be useful as they allow us to see when and why perspectives appear to have changed.

Where contradiction becomes problematic is when it is an attempt at personal revisionism. The historian must distinguish genuine changes of opinion from contrived ones induced by changing socio-ethical contexts. A good example of this is A. C. Headlam, bishop of Gloucester. On multiple occasions after Hitler's assumption of power, he wrote effusive articles about Nazism.[70] At the time, he never mentioned the threat Nazism posed to Christianity as many of his peers consistently did. Even throughout the *Kirchenkampf* (German Church struggle) he publicly sided with the Nazis rather than the Confessing Church, eventually being rebuked by Cosmo Lang at the Convocation of Canterbury in 1938.[71] In a 1947 essay though, Headlam distanced himself from Nazism, writing that 'the Germany of National Socialism was built on the more or less explicit repudiation of Christianity.'[72] The sudden effort to reimagine his conception of Nazism in such a dramatic manner is indicative not of a genuine reconsideration of his views but more likely an attempt to align himself with the values of post-Nuremberg Europe. Memoirs offer the same

[70] A. C. Headlam, 'In German Eyes', *The Times*, 24 October 1933 and 'Nazi Germany', ibid, 24 November 1933.
[71] See e.g., idem, 'The German Church', ibid, 14 July 1938; for Lang's response, see 'English Bishops of German Church', ibid, 26 July 1938.
[72] Headlam, 'The Duty of the Christian Church', in James Marchant (ed.), *Has the Church Failed?* (London: Odhams Press, 1947), 16.

refuge of hindsight. So, while they provide an important source base throughout this thesis, consideration has been given to balance revisionist attitudes with the actual opinions they espoused at the time.

I have tried to move away from the ecclesiastical palaces of Lambeth, Bishopthorpe, and Auckland Castle. This metaphor represents my concerted effort to consider laypeople alongside clergymen. But the use of 'lay' sources needs deconstructing. When studying the dominant interlocutors of early twentieth-century Britain, in leaving one corridor of elitism, one must invariably enter another. Socially, interwar Britain was much more similar to the nineteenth century than it is today. It remained a society where class and patronage governed the movement of public life. Those with a voice had one because they came from privilege: for clergy and significant laymen alike, fee-paying boarding school to Oxford was not an uncommon pathway. Even those that broke this mould came from privilege: T. S. Eliot came from a bourgeois New England family and was educated at the highly selective Milton Academy before Harvard, the Sorbonne, and Merton College, Oxford.

Eliot – a prominent publisher – was a dominant force of the Church of England laity in this period, and his lay peers were situated in similarly elite positions: W. H. Moberly (1881-1974) was chairman of the University Grants Committee and the third generation of prominent High-Church, Anglo-Catholic public intellectuals, H. A. Hodges (1905-76) was professor of Philosophy at Reading University, Walter Oakeshott (1903-87) was High Master of St Paul's School. These particular laypeople were what Stefan Collini might call 'public moralists' – educated people in socially elite positions that instructed public opinion.[73] This notion of 'public' also means that women do not feature much because it was *men* in the positions of authority that shaped public opinion. Despite their piety and the impressiveness of their abilities, women in interwar religious

[73] Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), 2-3.

society were marginalised: Kathleen Bliss (1908-89) attended meetings of the Moot as an administrator despite the originality of her religious thought and Maude Royden (1876-1956), a popular lay preacher, was confined to soap boxes because she was excluded from Anglican pulpits.[74]

Tom Buchanan has recently elucidated the realities of female anti-fascist activism by examining Hannah Laurie and Olga Levertoff during the Spanish Civil War. Levertoff contributed significantly to intellectual discussion in this period, contributions which were informed by first-hand knowledge of European religious relations.[75] With interjections like this ignored, it is important to note that 'Anglican' perspectives in the public domain were shaped by a male Anglican elite who favoured a source base formed of Church reports and public journalism as opposed to the diligent and first-hand research of female coreligionists. I hope that in time further research into Levertoff's and others' writings are produced so we might better understand how they fit within the wider corpus of contemporary Anglican responses.

Structure

The other issue pertaining to the current historiography is the narrow timeframe under examination. Judging by the existing historical scholarship, one would be forgiven for assuming that the Church of England did not perceive Benito Mussolini (1883-1945) to be a threat until halfway through the 1930s. Adrian Hastings dedicates a chapter solely to politics in the 1920s and yet despite a discussion about Christian engagement with Germany and the Soviet Union, Italy remains neglected.[76] Alan Wilkinson first introduces Mussolini to his readers in 1935.[77] The paradigms conventionally used by religious historians means there is a tendency to consider Mussolini in conjunction with perspectives on Hitler and, slightly later, Francisco Franco. Such an

[74] On Bliss, and other important women in the Church of England, see Susannah Herzel, *A Voice for Women* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1981), *passim*; On Royden, see Sheila Fletcher, *Maude Royden* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).
[75] Buchanan, *"Spain Mad"* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2024), ch.3.
[76] Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, ch.8
[77] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform?*, 124.

approach means that the formative Anglican discourse surrounding fascism has been left in archival storage. Consequently, this also means that much of the historiography regarding the Church of England and its interactions with Spain, Germany, and other right-wing dictatorships in interwar Europe, is devoid of the context that is a vital premise for any analysis. Therefore, analysing the rise of fascism in sequential phases will provide important context for the rise of Nazism, the Spanish Civil War, and attitudes toward fascism in the Second World War but also of political extremism in the twentieth century more generally.

As such, this thesis commences in 1922. This starting point is taken for numerous reasons. Firstly, and perhaps most basically, it is the natural starting point of European fascism. Secondly, attention to the Anglican response to Italian Fascism has generally been diverted away from the 1920s and so starting here allows for a much deeper focus. Interwar fascism is interesting in that almost all the regimes existed within rigid temporal parameters; even Francoism rid itself of its fascist credentials in the post-Nuremburg years. Mussolini's regime was overthrown in July 1943, and he was executed in April 1945; Hitler's suicide in April 1945 was the definite end to a regime long in disarray. This definite timeframe allows us to effectively trace the evolution of Anglican thought on Italian Fascism as well as how attitudes toward it were affected by the introduction of *other* fascisms within this same timeframe. The nature of this project requires constant comparison and thus engaging with the sources chronologically is the best way to discern the capricious rhythms of Anglican thought.

Moreover, using a linear timeframe like this lends itself to the construction of a single analytical framework. The use of one analytical framework to study Anglican perceptions of (primarily) Italian and Spanish fascism is the most important aspect of this thesis's approach. There has been a tendency for historians to study individual phenomena while it is left to political scientists to consider the analogous nature of interwar European fascism. This is certainly true of religious historians and the consideration of Christian responses to interwar fascism: they are usually about a specific *fascism* rather than of *fascisms*. Returning to the old issue then, rather than

imagining a single, holistic version of fascism, this thesis suggests we might see Anglicans as imagining a range of fascisms, with criticisms specific to each. The comparison of Anglican responses to different fascisms in one timeframe is important because it allows us to detail the considerable spectrum of responses while also making broader judgements through discerning common patterns of anxiety.

As such, 'European fascism' needs qualifying. I am taking Italy, Germany, and Spain as my primary examples of 'European fascism' because these countries had a fascist government. The records of the CFR show that Anglicans were aware of movements across Europe, from Romania to Albania.[78] This thesis acknowledges this fact however where other fascist movements in interwar Europe are mentioned (such as Norway's *Nasjonal Samling*), the reader must be aware that such instances are sporadic and supplementary. Based on the same justifications, this thesis makes no effort to consider Anglican views on the BUF, because, as discussed above, Thomas Linehan has ably done so.[79] Fascism was by no means a solely European phenomenon. Roger Griffin's anthology of fascist publications offers a deep insight into the interwar fascist regimes of South America (notably Chile and Brazil), as well as Japan.[80] But this thesis is a study of European fascism for two principal reasons. The first is that a narrower focus on European fascism allows for a more effective study where conclusions can be drawn accurately and, secondly, Anglicans in interwar Britain were relatively unaware of the political happenings in these countries compared to Europe.

The term 'Anglican' is in need of justification as used in this thesis. This thesis is a study of the most prominent Anglican thinkers – both clergymen and laymen – in the interwar period. Because we are studying 'public moralists' we are studying those interlocutors with the largest public platforms as opposed to the Church of England and all its constituent theological parties. Therefore, this thesis is largely a study of Liberal Anglican, Modernist, and liberal Anglo-Catholic

[78] London, Lambeth Palace Library [hereafter LPL] Council on Foreign Relations Papers [hereafter CFR], CFR DOC 1/101-200, ff.175; ibid, CFR Orthodox Churches [hereafter OC] 79, ff.17.
[79] Alongside the work cited above, see his *East London for Mosley* (London: Frank Cass, 1996) and *British Fascism, 1918-39* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
[80] Griffin, *Fascism*, esp., 231-40.

thinkers and does not consider Anglican thinkers from other theological parties, such as evangelicals, for example, despite its predominance in grassroots organisations as well as having noted clergymen like Christopher Chavasse (1884-1962), bishop of Rochester between 1940 and 1960. Similarly, I have chosen figures who I consider the most consistent analysts of European fascism within the Church of England. Such a rationale explains why T. S. Eliot, who wrote about interwar fascism from its inception until its end, is a subject of this thesis while C. S. Lewis, a similarly fierce force of Anglican thought, is not.

Anglican thinkers perhaps became more 'public' in the interwar years due to new points of reference. Indeed, Anglicans still operated in traditional public spaces like newspapers, and their letters and articles often featured on the front pages. Inge's column in the *Evening Standard* – a newspaper with a circulation of 500,000 – was well known.[81] But a recent flurry of research on religious broadcasting and publishing has elucidated the realities of the newfound reach that some Anglican thinkers had in interwar public spaces. Anglican thinkers became frequent voices on the radio. Lang and Temple often sermonised whilst lay thinkers like Eliot lectured; the BBC commissioned John Middleton Murry, for example, to give a series of lectures in 1940 detailing the perceived collapse of European civilisation.[82] Anglican thinkers also began to be published by outlets other than the Student Christian Movement and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. As Keith Robbins's essay has shown, companies like Penguin were ushering in a 'new era of publishing' based on popular, accessible titles and utilised popular Anglican thinkers for this. Penguin commissioned George Bell and William Temple to write one of its new 'handbooks', the latter's *Christianity and the Social Order* (1942) selling 140,000 copies.[83] This commercial demand is not just an indication of their public reach, but also a reflection of the public reach they were

[81] Martin Weiner, 'Some Leaders of Opinion and Economic Growth in Britain', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 14:2 (1979), 355.
[82] Keith Robbins, Stuart Bell, 'Getting the Message Out', in *Christianity and the Second World War*, 74.
[83] Ibid (69)-71. MacMillan also published a series of Temple's radio broadcasts as *Thoughts in War-Time* (1940).

perceived to have by organisations making decisions on how best to make a profit. Having this public reach is the criteria against which the subjects of this thesis have been chosen.

In critically reflecting on the approaches of previous studies as well as providing an original exploration into the Church of England and Italian Fascism, this thesis thus asks why fascisms apart from Nazism have been overlooked. Chapter One explores the rise of fascistic regimes in Italy and Spain in the 1920s. Specifically, it considers Anglican responses to the suspension of parliamentary democracy, the Italian bombardment of Corfu, and the ratification of the Lateran Treaties in 1929. At first, Anglicans appeared unsure about the ideological rationale behind fascism but were acutely aware of the implications of its political doctrine. To their surprise though, fascism survived the decade, and the term became part of common parlance on contemporary politics. So, this raised a difficult question: what next?

Chapter Two focusses on the years between 1930 and 1935. This chapter considers Anglican perspectives on the conception of community in fascist regimes as well as its theory of the state. As a result, it demonstrates how the centrality of nationalism for the fascist mode of governance made it incongruous with the Church of England's ideas of the post-war world order. Drawing on the work of the philosopher Michel Foucault (1926-84), it explains how Anglicans conceptualised fascist regimes as a separate 'space' within Christendom due to the governing perception that fascism was an interruption to the normal temporality of politics.

Chapter Three explores the shift in attitudes toward the threat fascism posed – where once it was a rival in a theoretical sense, it now represented a tangible rival to the Christian foundations of the systems of international diplomacy. This will be explored through the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935, which sheds light on the interactions between the Church of England and world organisations (such as the League of Nations) in their efforts to combat fascism. Anglicans concluded that because fascist colonialism did not have the evangelistic motivations like the British

Empire, it was necessarily inimical to the progress of civilisation. Fascist colonialism was adduced as another example of its inherent incompatibility with Christianity.

Chapter Four considers the Church of England's response to the Spanish Civil War. This chapter highlights how Anglicans imagined not one fascism, but rather a range of different versions of fascisms and that Franco represented a perhaps 'better' form of fascism. Importantly though, Spain allowed for some Anglicans to craft a wholly Christian anti-fascism which was based on the centrality of democracy to (modern) political theology.

Some Anglicans held a specific worldview that if democratic regimes affirmed God's presence on earth, then antidemocratic societies necessarily negate this. They ultimately believed that the fascist suppression of God, and the usurpation of His eminence by a temporal leader, was tantamount to the worship of a false idol – it was the behaviour of a pagan society. Chapter Five therefore explores why Anglicans saw fascism as a pagan ideology. Its primary focus is three essays by prominent Anglican intellectuals with the common theme that Christianity must have been the basis of a society that wished to combat the tribulations of modernity.

The sixth and final chapter considers the nuances to fascism in the context of the Second World War. In particular, there emerged a conception of fascism that it was an eschatological phenomenon. The fundamental Christianity of the resistance movements in occupied Europe were venerated by Anglican thinkers and informed post-war discussions of reconstruction. This went hand in hand with Anglican criticisms of the Vichy and Francoist regimes in wartime Europe and that confessional fascism was a façade given Christianity and fascism were not just incompatible but unable to coexist. The second half of Chapter Six thus considers how the war made Anglicans reimagine the civilisational framework in which they lived and understand that the war was not about the removal of fascism from this space, but the reconceptualization of civilisation so that fascism could not exist in any space. Such questions are developed further in the conclusion.

Chapter One
New Beginnings, New Politics: Italy and Spain in the 1920s

So many,
I had not thought death had undone so many.

– T. S. Eliot, 'The Waste Land' (1922)

In July 1930, invited members of the global Anglican communion convened at Lambeth Palace, the archbishop of Canterbury's fifteenth-century London residence. The Palace hosted an eponymous conference every ten years to discuss Church policy, ranging from liturgy to foreign affairs. As with all successful Conferences, an encyclical letter was disseminated to the public. The 1930 letter referred to the 'vast political and social experiment which is… rooted in the denial of God's existence' that had emerged in the 1920s.[1]

This was an overt reference to the phenomenon of political authoritarianism. Though previous scholarship emphasises the outwardly atheistic Bolshevism of the Soviet Union as dominating Anglican perspectives on interwar political extremism, Anglicans certainly saw fascism as a central part of this. This chapter traces the development of Anglican thought on fascism and fascistic politics from 1922 up until the 1930 Lambeth Conference. In doing so, it will demonstrate how and why the Conference felt confident in its assertion that fascist regimes were centred around the denial of God and the supremacy of the nation state.

In the 1920s, there was something of an ontological struggle amongst members the Church of England's communion surrounding the ideological rationale behind fascism. Scholars have tended to deconstruct fascist movements to separate its ideology from its social function.[2] But it is important to see these two as not necessarily mutually exclusive in contemporary Anglican

[1] Church Assembly, *The Lambeth Conference, 1930* (London: SPCK, 1930), 18.
[2] General examples include: Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 316-7; Griffin, 'The Palingenetic Core of Generic Fascist Ideology', in Alessandro Campi (ed.), *Che Cos'è il Fascismo? Interpretazioni e Prospecttive di Ricerche* (Rome: Ideazione, 2005), 6-7; an example specific to Italian Fascism is Ruth Ben-Ghiat, *Fascist Modernities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), esp., 17, 203.

discourse, and to recognise that both aspects were important for attempts to contextualise, criticise, and understand fascism. Indeed, T. S. Eliot and others would in fact see the ideological rationale of fascism as innately social, responding to emerging concepts of politics and public spaces in post-war Europe.

British opinion on Mussolini was sharply bifurcated between political Left and Right. Charles Keserich has shown how the Labour-supporting press was decidedly anti-Fascist between the years 1922 and 1925.[3] On the other hand, the Foreign Office felt Italian Fascism was good for a citizenry it deemed volatile and reckless.[4] While Austen Chamberlain (1863-1937) was the Conservative Foreign Secretary (1924-29), it was an open secret that he admired *Il Duce*; what remained secret though were the five times the two met.[5] Through Chamberlain, the British government funded some of Mussolini's anti-communist activities, which amounted to both journalistic and physical assaults.[6] Some early Anglican responses suggest a similar acceptance of fascism as a force for good. Many of these responses seem redolent of John Stuart Mill's (1806-73) justification of a sort of benevolent tyranny: 'despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end.'[7] Mill was, of course, writing about European colonialism in Africa. But the sentiment would remain influential and be applied to European communities too, notably by the Irish-Anglican Whig historian William Lecky (1838-1903), who in turn influenced Anglican moralists like Hensley Henson.[8]

The personal opinions of British statesmen on Spain in the 1920s are harder to come by. As Tom Buchanan has argued, the insular nature of Miguel Primo de Rivera's dictatorship (1923-

[3] Charles Keserich, 'The British Labour Press and Italian Fascism, 1922-25', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 10:4 (1975), 579-90.
[4] Peter Edwards, 'The Foreign Office and Fascism', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 5:2 (1970), 155-6.
[5] See e.g., Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain*, 2 vols. (London: Cassell, 1939-40), II, 295, 394; Edwards, 'The Austen Chamberlain-Mussolini Meetings', *The Historical Journal*, 14:1 (1971), 153-64.
[6] Philip Minehan, *Anti-Leftist Politics in Modern World History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2021), 49.
[7] John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (1859; Cambridge: CUP, 2012), 23.
[8] See e.g., William Lecky, *Democracy and Liberty*, 2 vols. (1896; London: Longman's, 1913), II, 485.

30) meant Britain was relatively unaware of its internal dynamics.[9] Both Ismael Saz and Susana Sueiro Seone have suggested that Chamberlain's eagerness to cooperate with Spain was indicative of the wider strategic importance the British Government believed Primo's dictatorship had rather than any personal affection.[10] Interestingly though, Brian Shelmerdine's study of British travel writing in Primo's Spain highlights a series of effusive pieces united by a shared admiration for his regeneration of Spanish society.[11] A comparison of Italy and Spain thus evinces a common attitude toward fascistic politics in British discourse.

I contend that interwoven throughout the responses of hesitation, ambivalence and, at times, benevolence towards European fascism, is a persistent theme of concern at fascism's absent spirituality. More precisely, in fact, they are interwoven with questions of how fascism would affect the world considering this absence. These questions take the form of four principal lines of inquiry. Firstly, in examining the suspension of parliamentary democracy in Italy and Spain, some Anglicans observed a distinct effort to limit God's presence on earth. This limitation of God's word was later observed in fascist foreign policy, which we shall explore through the Italian bombardment of Corfu in 1923. An investigation of Anglican responses to the ratification of the Lateran Treaties in 1929 will demonstrate how this compounded existing fears about its secularist nature. Finally, attention will be given to its repudiation of the dignity of man's individual conscience. I will conclude by arguing that all tenets of early Anglican thought suggest that fascism was imagined as an alternative philosophy of life rather than a political ideology.

The Emergence of Interwar Antiparliamentarianism

Perhaps the most immediate understanding of European fascism was that it disregarded spirituality for temporal power. Anglicans understood that fascism had an absent spirituality because it was

[9] Buchanan, "A Far Away Country of Which We Know Nothing'?', *Twentieth Century British History*, 4:1 (1993), 3.
[10] Saz, 'Foreign Policy Under the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera', 58-60; Susana Sueiro Seone, Jessica Brown (trasnl.), 'Spanish Colonialism during Primo de Rivera's Dictatorship', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, 13:1-2 (1998), 48-64.
[11] Brian Shelmerdine, 'British Perceptions of Spain During the 1930s, and their use in the Interpretation of the Spanish Civil War' (PhD thesis, University of Central Lancashire, 2003), ch.3.

an ideology that venerated the supremacy of worldly institutions above the moral foundations that religious faith provided. This was apparent in Mussolini's dispensation of centralised and authoritarian state power as a solution to the moralistic problem of Italian social breakdown during the *Biennio Rosso* ('the two red years', 1919-20). Anglicans believed that this gave Fascism an edge because its ability to offer immediate solutions differentiated it from the political Left – and institutional religion, for that matter – which could offer solutions only in the realm of hypothetical utopianism. Therefore, Cyril Garbett, bishop of Southwark, à la J. S. Mill, implied there was a certain moral teleology to the social function of Italian Fascism, because although it used 'unveiled force' it nonetheless meant 'good government has been restored.'[12] This perspective would last a while: a student at Chichester Theological College wrote in its magazine that 'the conduct of Mussolini caused much outcry in the foreign Press at the beginning of his rise to power, and that it took some time for us to see the inestimable benefits which he was bringing to Italy.'[13] However, though noticeable, these stand out because the majority of Anglicans felt fascism's temporal power grew at the expense of Christianity's spiritual power.

Some leading Catholic writers likewise saw the rise of antiparliamentarianism as a symptom of social lethargy. Hilaire Belloc (1870-1953) – a reactionary journalist and leading intellectual light of British Catholicism – wrote that in both Italy and Spain, democracy had been replaced with despotism as a remedy to 'moral anarchy.'[14] Furthermore, due to Leo XIII's (1810-1903) encyclical *Rerum Novarum* (1891), which condemned the rapid transformation of European social life in light of economic and technological advances, many Catholic writers welcomed fascism as a corrective agent to the ills of industrial society and its civil values.[15] Patrick Allitt thus sees the historian and cultural critic Christopher Dawson (1889-1970) as a paradigmatical example of a Catholic thinker

[12] Cyril Garbett, *After the War* (London: SPCK, 1924), 3.
[13] Purzelbäumer, 'The Nazi State', *op. cit.*, 47, 49.
[14] Hilaire Belloc, 'A Pedestrian in Spain', *The Living Age*, 323:4191 (1924), 269-71.
[15] Claudia Carlen (ed.), *The Papal Encyclicals*, 5 vols. (Wilmington: McGrath, 1981), II, 241-61 ('Rerum Novarum', 1891).

drawn to fascism due to the importance it placed on 'organic' principles (such as the family) and the desire to return to the social idyll that existed before the Industrial Revolution.[16]

Indeed, such an interpretation of industrial society proved uniquely unifying amongst some Catholic writers and vehemently anti-Catholic Anglicans like Ralph Inge, dean of St Paul's. Conservative Anglicans like Inge and the prime minister Stanley Baldwin (1867-1947) were influenced by Victorian moralists such as John Ruskin (1819-1900) and Matthew Arnold (1822-88) who condemned 'economism' for reducing society to an economic telos and undermining its moralistic basis.[17] But it is vital to note that where Catholic writers like Belloc and Dawson saw fascism as a corrective agent, Inge and Baldwin emphasised the importance of a strong national church in dispensing spiritual guidance to ensure that British industrial society continued to have a moralistic basis. In fact, the belief that Christian spirituality was the only true corrective to social problems informed Anglican criticisms of fascism.

William Temple, bishop of Manchester (1921-8), used his position as the editor of a small Anglican quarterly, *The Pilgrim*, to bring attention to Mussolini's *coup d'état*. Temple was a remarkable churchman and perhaps the public face of Anglicanism in that period. An outstanding scholar at Balliol and Queen's Colleges, Oxford, Temple initially failed to receive ordination from Francis Paget (1851-1911), due to the then bishop of Oxford's concern that Temple had a radical disposition for eisegesis rather than exegesis. Patronage helped Temple; his father Frederick's (1821-1902) friend and successor as the archbishop of Canterbury, Randall Davidson (1848-1930), saw that he secured ordination in 1908 and he quickly progressed up the ecclesiastical hierarchy, going from Manchester to Canterbury in just over two decades.

Temple's editorial clearly understood the basis of public support for Mussolini's uprising. He suggested that Italians had rejected liberty in favour of despotism as a remedy to the social

[16] Patrick Allitt, *Catholic Converts* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2000), 257.
[17] Martin Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of Industrial Spirit* (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), 100, 113.

morass. However, he was worried that the Fascist regime lacked the 'requisite moral character' to form effective government.[18] To Temple, this was evidenced in its suspension of democracy. W. G. Peck rightly observed that Temple understood democracy as a transcendental ethic.[19] Temple took from Plato that a transcendental ethic is the 'highest good' of the moral order in the material world, which, once achieved, relates man more closely to the spiritual world. His fervent support of democracy hinged upon Plato's emphasis on the reality of ideas: that worldly systems are imperfect, transient copies of the perfect form that an idea constitutes. To Temple, an idea was a worldly transmission of God's will; for example, it was His will for man to live freely. This was served best through democratic systems where voting functions as the primary method of achieving this moral good. Therefore, fascist antiparliamentarianism was not a political issue but a soteriological one because it meant man's life no longer morally prepared him for integration into the spiritual world. Temple's analysis demonstrates the influence of the Idealist Edward Caird (1835-1908), his tutor for Greats at Balliol. It is noticeable further with the allusion to democracy as a vital tool for active citizenship, or the nondoctrinal belief that a Christian must honour his wider responsibilities to the community.

The understanding that Christianity and fascism were competing systems of values meant fascism was defined as an ideology that operated in complete contradiction to Christianity. Because democracy represented liberty, antiparliamentarianism naturally represented subjugation and so fascism was extrapolated to represent a rejection of Christian values. In fact, it suggested to Temple that fascism sought to impose a moral code that undermined the spirituality which drove the progression of civilisation since the Apostolic age. Temple believed that the fascist moral code was erroneous because a solely materialistic society could not have wholly developed man's personality,

[18] Temple, 'Christian Social Principles', *The Pilgrim*, 3:3 (1923), 340.
[19] W. G. Peck, 'William Temple as Social Thinker', in W. R. Matthews (ed.), *William Temple* (London: James Clarke & Co., 1946), 61.

which called on his earlier academic philosophy that he had developed during a course of lectures in Hilary Term, 1910, on 'the nature of personality' while a young fellow at Queen's.[20]

Temple's criticisms of fascist materialism correlated to his concern about materialism in politics more generally. This anxiety had affected his relationship with the Labour Party in Britain (of which he had been a member between 1918 and 1921) because, he argued, the movement narrowed its members' focus to issues exclusive to them which meant they forgot their wider civic duty.[21] The rejection of spiritual for material development was modern political theory's greatest downfall, but he believed fascism was a worrying exacerbation of this. The issue was that whereas the Labour Party's materialism implied a separation, and a coexistence, of the material and spiritual realms, fascism outright destroyed man's connection to the spiritual realm.

Furthermore, Temple believed that the effect political tyranny would have on civic community was antithetical to the Christian communitarianism which he revered. He felt that without a fundamental commitment to individual liberty, 'brotherhood or fellowship' could not flourish.[22] Temple's belief that social fellowship was vital for the development of man's personality demonstrates the relational ontology upon which his theology relied so heavily. In *The Nature of Personality*, his insistence on the social nature of the human personality, which stressed that man can only realise his personality in the widest possible fellowship, is taken directly from the Idealist thinker Thomas Hill Green (1836-82), the Balliol don who introduced Caird to Idealism.[23] This relational ontology meant that because individualism is the 'first Christian social principle', there must necessarily be a mutual interplay of freedom; a person was only free if all people were free.[24] Because democracy had developed from man's awareness of his God-given individual liberty, exercising one's right to vote was integral to the maintenance of the sanctity of individualism in

[20] Temple, *The Nature of Personality* (London: Macmillan, 1911), xxvii.
[21] Idem, *Essays in Christian Politics and Other Kindred Subjects* (London: Longmans, 1927), 80 ('Democracy').
[22] Idem, 'Christian Social Principles', 340.
[23] Cf., Idem, *The Nature of Personality*, *passim*; T. H. Green, David Brink (ed.), *Prolegomena to Ethics* (1883; Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), §216, 250.
[24] Temple, *Essays in Christian Politics*, 12 ('Christian Social Principles' (II)).

society. Temple saw this as another distinct reason why fascism was inimical to the true purpose of Christian fellowship.

Temple developed his *Pilgrim* articles for his *Essays in Christian Politics* (1927). He reiterated his original argument, saying that in Italy 'liberty' was seen as a fair trade for guaranteed 'social order' – 'tyranny is preferred to chaos.'[25] However, he now saw the fascist rejection of democracy as part of its wider rejection of liberalism. Liberalism denoted the philosophical ascent of the individual conscience as the ultimate source of rational judgement. Liberal and modernist thinkers in the Church of England had taken much from German biblical scholarship of the nineteenth century, and especially the idea that the authority to interpret scripture rested solely with the individual. For example, Temple could (and did reluctantly) assent to the doctrines of the virgin birth *ex animo*, but the most compelling evidence of Christianity lay in the individual's historical-critical interpretation of the New Testament. Therefore, liberalism posited that social progression was driven by man's reason, which is the greater engagement with the ideal knowledge of God, and thus allowed man to live as His word. Democracy, constituted such, was the apogee of liberal thought. However, Temple was all too aware that a collective psyche unconvinced with liberal democracy in the wake of an international conflict produced an ethical context in which fascism emerged.[26]

The Idealist gospel of civic duty influenced another of Caird's Balliol alumni, the political scientist Ernest Barker (1874-1960). Caird introduced him to the oeuvre of T. H. Green, with whom he had a much deeper intellectual affinity due to a shared fondness for radical liberal theories of the state and religious nonconformism.[27] In spite of his later Liberal Anglicanism, Barker retained many of the core tenets of his nonconformist upbringing, particularly the form of 'direct democracy' popular in Free Church governance. Barker transposed this ecclesiastical

[25] Ibid.
[26] Idem, 'Democracy', 68; see also, *Christus Veritas* (1924; London: MacMillan, 1954), 196-7.
[27] Julia Stapleton, *Englishness and the Study of Politics* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 30-1; for detail on Green's affinity to nonconformism, see Denys Leighton 'T. H. Green and the Dissidence of Dissent', *Parliamentary History*, 27:1 (2008), 43-56.

procedure onto his analyses of interwar fascism, stressing that democracy ought ideally to be the process of voting directly for policy implementations rather than through the proxy of elected representatives. This held purchase amongst other Liberal Anglicans in this period: Temple, for instance, advocated that religious groups, autonomous from the state, should provide national education.[28]

In a 1929 article for the BBC magazine *The Listener*, Barker pondered the question 'Is Democracy Dying?'[29] While he ultimately believed democracy was not dead, the Fascist state in Italy provided a worrying intimation of its mortality. Barker supposed that Christianity was best represented in democratic systems because it made it possible for people to decide how they 'should', and not how they 'shall', live their lives.[30] Like Temple, he also believed fascism was inimical to the development of man's personality because the lack of liberty in fascist society stifled social fellowship, making 'the community an arid wilderness.'[31] Put another way, Barker believed that democracy was the clearest way for man to express his individual consciousness and therefore transcend the temporal world and relate to the spiritual. Temple and Barker thus had a shared conception that democracy was a transcendental ethic to which fascism was ostensibly uncommitted.

At the other end of the political spectrum, William Ralph Inge provided similar analyses. Upon leaving King's College, Cambridge (where he took a double-first in the Classical Tripos and won a plethora of academic prizes), he had a celebrated academic career, being Lady Margaret's Professor of Divinity at Cambridge between 1907 and 1911. Dean of St Paul's Cathedral between 1911 and 1934, he was a proud but unusual Tory, with idiosyncrasies that ranged from Social Darwinism to devout pacifism. He was known for the pessimistic and controversial opinions which he expressed in a lucrative weekly column for the *Evening Standard*. Democracy, for which

[28] Stapleton, *Englishness and the Study of Politics*, 24, 144.
[29] Ernest Barker, 'Is Democracy Dying?', *The Listener*, 1:16 (1929).
[30] Ibid, 591.
[31] Idem, 'The Growth of Political Liberty', ibid, 4:98 (1930), 879.

he held little regard, and especially the conception that democracy was 'an attribute of God', was a frequent target; rather than seeing this as the apogee of human development (as Temple did), Inge saw it merely as the necessary development of industrial society to limit state control. As such, while he was unconvinced that democracy would last in his lifetime, it was, for the time being, the 'least bad of possible alternatives.'[32]

Like Temple, Inge understood that people supported Mussolini because they felt 'the nation [was]… in danger' and that they were happy for him to save it by destroying democracy given they felt it was 'folly' anyway. Moreover, he was likewise aware of the declining faith in liberalism (what he affectionately called 'the fetish of our grandparents') that drove the fascist revolution, an observation he reiterated in 1930.[33] According to Joshua Bennett, 'liberalism' entered 'widespread theological parlance' as part of the broad discussions that 'religious forms should be open to progressive development in the light of intellectual and ethical advance.'[34] Theological Liberals (Temple) and modernists (Inge) in the Church of England agreed that liberalism showed how the Christian faith was fundamental to modern life, but the greater emphasis on human reason was as much a cause for its celebration as it was for its rejection.

Religious critics of liberalism still largely understood it as that which the Tractarian John Henry Newman (1801-90) denounced in his provocative *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (1864). Though he directly attacked the suffusion of liberalism into the Church of England, Newman was responding to what he had perceived as the more general corruption that liberalism had caused in British society: seen politically in the hegemony of Whig administrations that advocated for a limited monarchy; seen economically in the ascension of *laissez-faire* policies over more moralistic forms of economic activity. In his memoir of the Oxford Movement, Newman defined liberalism as 'the anti-dogmatic principle', by which he meant 'anti-truth' – the negation of the word of God.[35] He

[32] Inge, 'Democracy and the Future', *Atlantic Monthly* (March 1922), 289-98 (291).
[33] Idem, 'Mussolini on Democracy', *The Living Age*, 322:4174 (1924), 15-6; *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1930), 331.
[34] Bennett, *God and Progress* (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 15.
[35] John Henry Newman, *Apologia Pro Vita Sua* (London: Longmans, 1864), 120-1.

felt liberalism had undermined God's sovereignty because it appeared man could now pick and choose what to believe about the Divine.

Inge was not an intellectual disciple of Newman: much to his mother's disappointment, he had rejected his family's Tractarian theology by the time he entered Eton College in 1874.[36] While he revered reason as the motor of civilisational progress, he felt that it alone was too abstract and allowed for too much interpretation of God's word in the temporal sphere. He had a distaste for extreme liberalism, as he scornfully observed in the morally bankrupt economism and irreligious civic life of contemporary America.[37] Therefore, Inge tempered his doubts through an affinity to Christian mysticism. To Inge, mysticism bridged the gaps in man's knowledge of God by giving him individual experiences of direct communication with Him and therefore allowed man to conceive the symbiotic relationship between the material and spiritual worlds.[38] Interestingly, his mysticism relied on Newman's conception of the 'illative sense', which was the license man had to infer from his personal interactions with God what he wished.[39] As such, mysticism paved the way for an association with theological modernism. He differentiated this from the Catholic modernism of the French theologian Alfred Loisy (1857-1940) which he believed was too historicist and too ecclesiastical.[40] Inge's modernism balanced liberalism with orthodoxy because he argued that advances to human society were not the consequence of a blanket providentialism but from reasoned judgement based on an engagement with God's essence in man's spirit.

This emphasis on personal experience over historical processes for the development of man's faith demonstrates his fondness for Neoplatonic mysticism, upon which the success of his celebrated academic career was built.[41] But Platonic theology also served the important function of connecting Temple and Inge around the belief that the spiritual realm was man's highest reality.

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[36] Inge, *Vale* (London: Longmans, 1934), 10.
[37] Idem, 'Mussolini on Democracy', 16.
[38] Idem, *Liberalism in Religion* (London: Longmans, 1924), 6-12.
[39] Newman, *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (1870; London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 276-7.
[40] See e.g., Inge, *Diary of a Dean* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 72, 177 (7 May 1922 and 5 February 1934).
[41] See e.g., his celebrated Gifford Lectures, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (London: Longmans, 1918) and his 1899 Bampton Lectures, *Christian Mysticism* (London: Methuen, 1899).

Ultimately, they saw a greater threat in the total rejection of liberalism than the total advancement of it. Whereas Newman acknowledged that society still believed that God was its creator, Inge and Temple felt fascism went further than this. The fascist rejection of liberalism was more damning because it deconstructed the world into 'material' and 'spiritual' realms: it removed God's presence from the world. Put another way, fascism presented its existence as separate from God's agency.

Paul Crook has suggested that Inge observed a cultural crisis in Europe between 1899 and 1920, engendered primarily by the rejection of a 'supra-temporal idea of spiritual progress' in favour of 'the "secularised idealism" of the myth of progress.'[42] If these were Inge's intellectual parameters of cultural crisis, then we may need to expand Crook's timeframe. For Inge, one feels, fascism manifested this cultural crisis because what he saw in the Italian rejection of liberalism was not that they had necessarily given up on progress, but that they had given up on the idea of spirituality guiding it. It is clear he believed that fascism's suppression of God's Immanence (God's presence in the temporal world while He Himself remains transcendent and incomprehensible) was a clear example of this myth of secular progress. As such, he wrote that Italy 'forgets its God' and had turned to 'adore its institutions.'[43] While Inge was no fan of liberalism, he was even more wary of fascism because it consciously placed total supremacy on human reason over Christian spirituality.

According to Inge's analysis, Italians chose the immediate safety of a worldly leader rather than the refuge of God's eternal salvation because the evidence before them – such as the Great War and the chaos of its aftermath – indicated that the latter was futile in contemporary life. Perhaps some Anglicans were more receptive to this as an explanation in Italy given similar debates were had about the impact of the Great War on British religious life. Matthew Grimley suggests that some Anglicans began to believe that neither God's providence nor a progressive liberalism could have prevented tragedy from impacting Britain.[44] According to Inge and Temple, it was the

[42] Paul Crook, 'W. R. Inge and Cultural Crisis, 1899-1920', *Journal of Religious History*, 16:4 (1991), 411.
[43] Inge, 'Mussolini on Democracy', 15.
[44] Grimley, 'The Religion of Englishness', 903.

declining belief that God could have directly helped people that meant fascism went unchallenged in its deconstruction of the liberal worldview.

In the aftermath of the March on Rome then, Inge was aware of the effective social function that fascism served in giving the civic body a coherent voice, but he remained convinced that this was superficial because it was ultimately an expression of human reason over divine guidance. Observing fascism in such a way, he most likely saw it as part of the general trend in European society where nations (for too long) ignored the Church as a 'probable saviour' of humankind.[45] But fascism was more erroneous than other alternatives to democracy because it was intellectually vacuous. He wrote that its 'political creed does not inspire confidence' and it appears this epistemological void was exclusive to fascism given that, in the same article, he admitted that Lenin's Bolshevism had some ideas behind it, even if they did only appeal to 'madmen.' Given the opportunity, Inge would have preferred 'the ills we know to a fascist dictatorship.'[46]

But Inge appeared sanguine where Temple was distressed. This was because Mussolini's most 'prodigious blunder' was the absence of a positive doctrine and the belief that 'men are guided only by selfish material ends' because this discounted the innate spirituality of man's soul.[47] As he wrote to the Socialist playwright Bernard Shaw (1856-1950), no revolution 'had been permanent' and no revolution ever would be, irrespective of the different ideological rationale behind them, because though 'the actors change their masks' human nature craves for that which only God can provide.[48] Where God provided truth in the reality of His word, politics could only produce vacuous rhetoric.

Significantly, Randall Davidson, archbishop of Canterbury, appeared to think similarly. He was born in Edinburgh to an affluent grain merchant and enthusiastic Church of Scotland Presbyter. Denominational differences notwithstanding, the family was friends with Archibald

[45] Inge, 'Hope, Temporal and Eternal', 115.
[46] Idem, 'Mussolini on Democracy', 16.
[47] Ibid.
[48] London, British Library [hereafter BL], G. B. Shaw Papers, Add MS 50538, ff.158, Inge to G. B. Shaw, 18 December 1931.

Campbell Tait (1811-82), who became in 1868 the first Scottish archbishop of Canterbury. This Anglican influence in Davidson's life intensified with his classical education in England. At Harrow School, its reforming headmaster, Henry Montagu Butler (1833-1918), and masters, like the Christian socialist Brooke Foss Westcott (1825-1901), finalised his conversion so that when he matriculated at Trinity College, Oxford, he was a devout Anglican. His archbishopric (1903-28) is surely defined by the Prayer Book crisis of 1927-8, which he had predicted would be his *nunc dimittis*, though admittedly for reasons far different to those that mean it is.[49] Davidson was not an original thinker in the way that, for instance, Temple was – he was not *a theologian*. But he possessed what few archbishops have. He had the astuteness of a courtier who knew when to exert his authority, how to unite competing bodies within the Church and the state, and ultimately, he sailed the Church of England through some troubled waters.

Davidson kept a diary of his holiday to Italy in 1924. Among the salient entries, he wrote that for a sizeable proportion of the Italian citizenry, Mussolini was someone 'whom they regard as having… saved the country from collapse and anarchy.'[50] It appears that Davidson considered Fascism as an effort to impose a new moral code onto Italian society. Mussolini's messianic image clearly influenced Anglican thought, even if they did not buy into it themselves and Davidson's analyses point to the commonality of this perspective across the Anglican hierarchy. More significantly, it indicates that churchmen were increasingly aware of the threat fascism posed as an alternative philosophy of life.

For instance, Davidson expressed the common concern that public order came at the cost of personal liberty. He privately recorded his despair at Mussolini's installation of a 'tyranny… on the people who oppose him', seen in the assaults on the offices of 'anti-fascisti' newspapers.[51] This was egregious to many Christians in Britain; as one Church of Scotland minister privately joked to

[49] Randall Davidson, *Our Hope and Meaning* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1928), 41. N.B., In 1927, the Church of England Assembly voted in favour of the implementation of a revised Book of Common Prayer, but in 1928 it was rejected for a second time by the House of Commons.
[50] LPL, Davidson Papers 14, 80(A), ff.393, diary for 1924, no specific date.
[51] Ibid, ff.389-90.

Davidson, 'even Baldwin permits communists and class-agitators.'[52] Cosmo Lang once called Davidson 'a "House of Lords man"' and since then historians have reiterated this characterisation, tending to emphasise his strong belief in the importance of democracy for the spiritual wellbeing of a nation as well as his more general activity in secular politics.[53] It appears that he transposed his belief in the importance of democracy to British society onto his analysis of fascism in Europe, which naturally inculcated a concern with the spiritual decay of Italian community and social fellowship.

The same phenomenon had occurred in Spain in 1923, when Miguel Primo de Rivera (1870-1930) led a nationalistic, reactionary, right-wing military coup against the democratically elected government of Manuel García Prieto (1859-1938). I am not attempting to argue that Primo de Riverism was fascist: it was not. But it is accurate to suggest that Anglicans saw it as the same as Italian fascism and therefore considerations of it naturally better our understanding of Anglican interpretations of fascism in the 1920s. Few Anglicans took note of the situation in Spain, but it did not escape the notice of Herbert Hensley Henson, bishop of Durham (1920-39). Henson was raised by his widowed father, a zealous member of the Plymouth Brethren (an Evangelical dissenting sect) and, due to these circumstances, he was largely self-taught. He gained admission to the University of Oxford as a non-collegiate student (a sign of poor finances), which changed with his election to a prestigious All Souls fellowship in 1884.

Historians have continuously emphasised the impressiveness of Henson's public speaking regarding the rise of authoritarian politics in interwar Europe, though this largely reflects his activity in the 1930s.[54] Henson gained this reputation because, as his dean, Cyril Alington (1872-1955), eloquently summarised, he found the injunction to "'keep silence even from good words"

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[52] LPL, Davidson 217, ff.107, Alexander Robertson to Davidson, 8 May 1928. Underlined as per the original.
[53] Lockhart, *Cosmo Gordon Lang*, 232. Cf., George Bell, *Randall Davidson*, 2 vols. (London: OUP, 1935), II, 1059; Hastings, *A History of English Christianity,* 53; Michael Hughes, 'Archbishop Davidson, the "Edwardian Crisis," and the Defence of the National Church', *Journal of Church and State*, 57:2 (2015), 217-42; Tom Rodger, 'The Politics of Church Defence', in *The Church of England and British Politics since 1900*, 36-56.
[54] Cf., Norman, *Church and Society in England*, 330; Chadwick, *Hensley Henson*, *passim*; 238-62, Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 8.

very difficult to obey.'[55] Almost all of Henson's considerations of European fascism in the 1920s were recorded in his private journal, so only the historian has been able to fully appreciate how quick he was in understanding fascism compared to most clergymen, especially his fellow Victorians who appeared distinctly out of touch with the modernity of the twentieth century.

Henson's diaries contain one of the few instances of Anglican analyses of Spain during the Primo de Rivera dictatorship. In one entry, Henson recalls a conversation with John Meade Faulkner (1858-1932), a popular novelist most famous for his adventure story *Moonfleet* (1898). Henson recorded their concern that, from reports in Spain, 'the people are delighted to be rid of Parliamentary government.'[56] The suggestion that it was the Spanish people who welcomed Primo fits into the wider narrative that fascism was a welcomed change to the normal temporality of politics.

Two years later, Henson opined that Italy and Spain governed themselves on a form of 'despotism resting on and justified by a plebiscite.'[57] Henson took this quote directly from William Lecky's essay on the 'moral character of coup d'état.' Lecky argued that despite coups invariably being undertaken by individuals for selfish reasons, they are always ultimately judged by the citizens of whom they assume control.[58] Henson's application of this model to Italy and Spain suggests an understanding that fascistic politics brought a welcomed change – in this instance, it was law and order.

Some years later, Henson turned his attention solely to Italian Fascism. In 1927, he read a series of articles in *The Times* that detailed the internal dynamics of the Fascist regime in Italy.[59] What he ascertained from these articles informed conclusions strikingly similar to Davidson's. He understood that the Fascist regime had 'supress[ed] all personal liberty' – especially criticisms of the regime – and that this was 'disconcerting both for Italy and the world.' He concluded by

[55] Cyril Alington, *A Dean's Apology* (London: Faber, 1954), 40.
[56] DCL, BHP, HHH/36, 2 December 1923, 77.
[57] Ibid/39, 26 July 1925, 149.
[58] William Lecky, *The Map of Life* (London: Longmans, 1899), 183.
[59] 'The Fascist State', *The Times*, 16, 17, 18 August 1927.

indicting the Fascist state of not considering the spiritual needs of their citizens, directing them to worship only materialistic values.[60] Interestingly, he differentiated Fascism from Russian Bolshevism because though the two were similar in their suppression of the individual, an 'allowance' must be made for the 'relative savagery of the Slavs' and the 'political backwardness' innate to eastern Europe.[61] It seems that Henson's concern about the suppression of democratic liberty in Italy was exacerbated by the fact that it was situated within the intellectual and moral framework of Western civilisation. Being situated thus, such a flagrant disregard for the ethical tenets which underpinned this framework pointed not just to a rejection of reason, but to a conscious rejection of God's Immanence.

T. S. Eliot likewise saw a conscious inversion of Christian ethics in fascist society. Indeed, it was a governing theme of his essay 'The Literature of Fascism', which first appeared in his journal, the *Criterion*, in 1928. Born in St. Louis, Missouri, Thomas Stearns Eliot was one of the outstanding poets of the twentieth century. He renounced in 1927 his American citizenship, having fervently embraced English culture and identity to such an extent that Virginia Woolf (1882-1941) quipped that if there were such a thing, Eliot would have worn a 'four-piece suit.'[62] Converting to Anglicanism in the same year after a Unitarian upbringing, Eliot was known for his deep piety.

Scholars have continuously noted his propensity for authoritarianism – both political and ecclesiastical.[63] This being so, the charge of fascism is often levelled against Eliot and his close friendship with Ezra Pound (1885-1972), a fellow poet and cultural aesthete who was, throughout the interwar years, an ardent philo-fascist, has done little to assuage this. The overlaps of Eliot's and Pound's political identities are numerous and far-reaching, ranging from a contemptuousness

[60] DCL, BHP, HHH/43, 18 August 1927, 24.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Clive Bell, *Old Friends, Personal Recollections* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1956), 120 (Woolf to Bell, no date).
[63] Cf., Roger Kojecky, *T. S. Eliot's Social Criticism* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1972), 63; John. D. Marjolis, *T. S. Eliot's Intellectual Development* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 104; Richard Griffiths, 'Another Form of Fascism', in Julie Gottlieb, Thomas Linehan (eds), *The Culture of Fascism* (London: Taurus, 2004), 167; David Bradshaw, 'Politics' in Jason Harding (ed.), *T. S. Eliot in Context* (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 267; Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 93.

for democracy to antisemitism, and they continue to be explored.[64] Crucially though, the two poets had markedly different attitudes toward fascism. Many scholars have correctly pointed out that Eliot was not fascist and instead crafted a political identity that owed a significant amount to Charles Maurras (1868-1952), a leader of the French far-right monarchist organisation *L'Action Française*. This thesis will not consider why Eliot followed Maurras, as has been done before, but why he rejected fascism.

In a typically eloquent summary, Eliot explained that 'there is a general sickness of politics' in contemporary Europe.[65] In fact, Eliot appeared certain, as Cyril Garbett did, that fascism was needed in Italy to overcome the 'chaotic decentralisation' that had governed it hitherto.[66] In one *Criterion* article he explained that Fascism filled the moral vacuum that was left by the collapse of the liberal world view; in another, he stated that it was a revolt against capitalism.[67] It appears that like Inge and Garbett, Eliot saw what we might perhaps call the 'social function' of fascism as providing a sort of benevolent tyranny. My concept of a 'social function' owes a lot to Jürgen Habermas's idea on the social function of the public space:

> a realm of private individuals assembled into a public body who as citizens transmit the needs of bourgeois society to the state, in order, ideally, to transform political into "rational" authority within the medium of this public sphere.[68]

Might some Anglican perspectives on fascism – as a kind of modern, public politics – not be understood in much the same way?

Eliot certainly understood fascism to have unified private citizens into a public voice that asserted the bourgeois rejection of traditional authority.[69] But in conceptualising it as thus, he

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[64] The most detailed study of these overlaps is William Chace, *The Political Identities of Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973); more recently is Katrin Frisch, 'Interdependencies of Right-Wing Ideology and Modernist Writing' (PhD thesis, King's College, London, 2020).
[65] T. S. Eliot, 'The Literature of Fascism', *Criterion*, 8:31 (December 1928), 288.
[66] Ibid, 289.
[67] Idem, 'A Commentary', ibid, 6:5 (November 1927), 387; 'Mr. Barnes and Mr. Rowse', ibid, 8:33 (July 1929), 690.
[68] Jürgen Habermas, 'The Public Sphere', *New German Critique*, 3 (1964; 1974), 53; see also, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962; Cambridge: Polity, 1989), 27.
[69] Eliot's implications that fascism was a bourgeois phenomenon are woven throughout his *Criterion* writings cited above, but he wrote to the Catholic writer, Christopher Dawson, that the expansion of fascism would 'further [the] oppression and exploitation of the lower classes', see Valerie Eliot et al (eds), *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, 9 vols. to date (London: Faber, 2009-), VII, 180 (Eliot to Dawson, 10 May 1934).

necessarily conceptualised it as dualistic because he was aware of the authority it itself imposed onto society. Anglicans could, therefore, possibly accept (sometimes warmly) this social function while rejecting what it saw as a profane ideological rationale. Eliot is an excellent example of this. He was 'suspicious of fascism as a panacea' because he believed that it suffered from 'spiritual anaemia', which is to say that it lacked any spiritual grounding or purpose beyond the material world.[70] So, while he always felt that Fascism was an expedient relief to Italy's troubles, he never believed it was a legitimate ethical context for the state. In his view, Fascism was not a perennial relief because it rejected God as the saviour of mankind.

One of the earliest criticisms of fascistic politics was its absence of a spiritual foundation. Anglicans believed this was most obviously seen in the repudiation of individual liberty through the destruction of democracy, which so many saw as a rejection of the doctrine of reason. There were some competing perspectives, with Temple taking a much more doctrinal approach to his analyses than Davidson, who saw democratic participation more as a Christian's duty in the secular world. But all seemed to coalesce around the perspective that fascist society was inorganic because it was centred around material ambition, rather than fostering spiritual unity.

The Bombardment of Corfu

Anglicans did not have to consider Italian Fascism as a solely domestic phenomenon for long. Given Anglicans believed this absence of spirituality reflected fascism's conscious rejection of reason, this had an added severity in the international sphere. In August 1923, Mussolini sanctioned the naval bombardment of Corfu after Italian diplomats were attacked on Greek territory. Immediately, the League of Nations was brought in, though to little avail. The sustained interest with Corfu from the Church of England's episcopate may have appeared out of touch with British popular opinion given that the incident 'passed by somewhat wearily', as one historian

[70] Eliot, 'Literature of Fascism', 288.

has put it.[71] Anglican interest is perhaps explained because Corfu was a British protectorate between 1815 and 1864, during which an Anglican community was founded and amalgamated into the Diocese in Europe.

The Church of England was a fervent supporter of the League of Nations in the 1920s. Support from Archbishops Davidson, Lang, and Temple meant the League became intrinsic to how the Church perceived, analysed, and crafted foreign policy in the interwar years. The 1920 Lambeth Conference affirmed its commitment to the League's principles, telling the Church of England's communion explicitly that it fully embodied the teaching of the Gospel in its ethos.[72] The core tenet of this was reconciliation. We see this best in Lord Halifax's private journal when he celebrated in 1932 Germany's entry into the League's Disarmament Conference as 'surely great… one of the big moments of the world.'[73]

Understanding the League's covenant as manifesting the teaching of the Gospel was common amongst Anglican clergymen.[74] Of particular importance was Matthew's Gospel and its teaching about the Kingdom of God (a frequent metonym for the Kingdom of Heaven). Liberal ideas that the Kingdom was evidence of 'Christianity's historical progressiveness' resonated strongly with the interwar clergy.[75] Albrecht Ritschl's (1822-89) theological magnum opus, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (1874), was particularly resonant in the interwar period; Ritschl expounded the Idealist view that the Kingdom was not realised out of dogmatism but existed independently of human action and into which human society could only hope for moral integration if it venerated requisite spiritual values.[76] To me, a large proportion of Anglican perceptions of the League's core values – upholding international peace through justice,

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[71] R. B. McCallum, *Public Opinion and the Last Peace* (London: OUP, 1944), 20.
[72] Church Assembly, *Conference of Bishops of the Anglican Communion Holden at Lambeth Palace* (London: SPCK, 1920), 25. Davidson was personally committed to the League, see 'League of Nations' (1922), *Occasions* (London: Mowbray, 1925), 1-2; see also, Bell, *Randall Davidson*, II, 1207; Cosmo Lang, *The Church, the League and the Union* (London: League of Nations Union, 1929), *passim*; Charles Gore, *The League of Nations* (New York: George H. Doran, 1918); Headlam, *Christian Unity* (London: SCM, 1930), 14; F. R. Barry, *The Relevance of Christianity* (London: Nisbet, 1931), 274.
[73] York, Borthwick Institute [hereafter BI], Hickleton Papers, HALIFAX/A7/8/2, ff.56, entry for 23 May 1932.
[74] See e.g., 'The Churches & World Peace', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 May 1925.
[75] For detail, see Bennett, *God and Progress* (29)-35.
[76] Albrecht Ritschl, *The Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation* (1874; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1900), 204-6.

cooperation, and unity – seem redolent of this particular interpretation of the Gospels' teaching about the Kingdom of God.

The strong Anglican influence in the League's formation bolstered general Anglican support for it. One key architect was Lord Robert Cecil (1864-1958). Cecil came from a pious Church of England family and he won in 1937 the Nobel Peace Prize for his work with the League – a contribution described by Cosmo Lang as a 'valiant crusade for peace.'[77] Support was also garnered at a local level, with bishops such as Hubert Burge of Oxford (1862-1925), frequently sermonising on its merits.[78] Moreover, the League of Nations Union (LNU) – a grassroots organisation tasked with garnering civilian support, of which Cecil was president between 1923 and 1945 – had a strong influence at local level, often helped by the fervent support of parochial communions. Helen McCarthy's study of the LNU highlights an important symbiosis between Anglicanism and the League: Anglican support for the LNU was a visible endorsement of the League in general while the League informed Anglican perspectives on interwar foreign policy.[79]

Randall Davidson appeared unconcerned with the bombardment of Corfu. He was contacted by the Greek Orthodox Archbishop in America, Alexander Demoglou (1876-1942), who explained the horrifying consequences of Italy seeking 'to promote imperialistic designs with … arrogant exhibition' against a 'helpless people.' Davidson responded with platitudes of 'anxiety and distress' about the situation but he declined any request for his public support because, as his chaplain, George Bell (1883-1958), wrote, it lay 'rather outside the range of His Grace's direct responsibilities.'[80] Davidson would in time come to think that Mussolini's immediate resolve for violence was worrisome, but Corfu did not seem to trouble the ageing archbishop too much.[81] As the deep investigation of fascist colonialism in Chapter Three will show, Cosmo Lang at

[77] BL, Cecil of Chelwood Papers [hereafter CCP], ff.44, Lang to Robert Cecil, 28 July 1934.
[78] Cf., *The Oxford Diocesan Magazine*, 248 (October 1922), 219 and 256 (June 1923), 119.
[79] Helen McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), ch.3, esp., 88-9.
[80] LPL, Davidson 293, ff.210, Alexander Demoglou to Davidson, 5 September 1923; ff.217, Davidson to Reverend Chrysostomos Papasarantopoulos, 6 September 1923; ff.220, Davidson to Appeal of Greek Clergy, 18 September 1923.
[81] Ibid 213, ff.266, Davidson to Neville Talbot, 10 April 1926.

Canterbury was much more aware of the wider consequences of fascist imperialism not just on relations between the Occident and the Orient, but within the Occident itself.

Lang and Temple offered identical responses to the Corfu incident. According to Lang, Italy resorted immediately to 'what can only… be called an act of war' despite having had time for 'amicable negotiation' with the League. As a result of this flagrant rebuttal of the League's covenant, Italy had attacked the 'Christian principles' that underpinned 'relations with one another' across Europe.[82] Temple was concerned that Italy was 'first resorting at once … [to using] force against a State still not proved guilty of the accusations brought against it.' By 'refusing to recognise the right of the League of Nations to deal with the matter', Italy had, in essence, interrupted the 'progress of civilisation.'[83] For Temple and others, the progress of civilisation had its end in its moral integration into the Kingdom of God and so taking 'the Kingdom of God as the object of our ultimate allegiance', it meant efforts of 'self-aggrandisement at the cost of others' were 'treasonous.'[84] The injustice of Italy's annexation of Corfu – motivated by material advancement and national anger – thus posed a genuine threat to peace and, more profoundly, to Western civilisation's integration into the Kingdom of God. Lang's and Temple's responses both indicate a genuine concern that Fascism was antagonistic to the Anglican plan for civilisational progression following the Paris Peace Conference of 1919.

Henson characterised Mussolini as 'a bull in the diplomatic tea–shop' after learning of the events in Corfu.[85] To Henson, Mussolini's aggressive approach to foreign relations was incongruous with the development of Christian civilisation after the Great War. Henson was initially unconvinced by the League, but by the time of Corfu he had accepted it as a force for good, irrespective of the logistical errors he anticipated.[86] Henson almost certainly had the incident

[82] 'Future of the League of Nations', *The Times*, 17 September 1923.
[83] Temple, 'Editorial Notes', *The Pilgrim*, 4:1 (1923), 4.
[84] Idem, *Christianity and The State*, 159.
[85] DCL, BHP, HHH/35, 1 September 1923, 191.
[86] Henson explained how 'baffled' he was by 'the practical difficulties' in its operation that he did 'not feel free in conscience to "let myself go" in advocacy of it', see DCL, BHP, HHH/23, 4 August 1918, 115. Henson's support can be seen below.

in his mind when he opined that the 'difficulties' posed by Italy were a total affront to the League's central mission of abolishing war, which made fascist foreign policy inimical to 'God's manifested Will' on earth.[87] For Henson, though, these difficulties posed a personal threat to his own faith in the League.

Looking back in 1930, Inge wrote that the Corfu incident severely impaired the authority of the League of Nations.[88] But Henson had come to this position much sooner. He wrote in 1926 that the confluence of the 'brutal cynicism of Mussolini' and the 'pig–headed weakness & obstinacy of Austen Chamberlain', the then Foreign Secretary, damaged the League beyond repair after Corfu.[89] But I am less concerned with Henson's apprehensions about the League of Nations from an operational perspective than I am with what it tells us about his perspective on fascism. To Henson, fascism was inimical to civilisational progression and because progression was bound up with Christian spirituality, the League's inability to solve this problem suggested that a more fundamentally Christian solution must be found to combat fascism.

A year later, the Conference on Politics, Economics, and Citizenship (COPEC) convened at Birmingham. Primarily the fruits of William Temple's intellectual labour, COPEC clearly demonstrated the lasting influence of nineteenth century Christian socialist thought. COPEC was cross-denominational but according to Cyril Garbett's reminiscences, it was an Anglican project which benefited significantly from the Free Churches' contributions.[90] Nevertheless, COPEC's report on 'International Relations' demonstrates a growing unity amongst the Protestant churches in their criticisms of Mussolini's ideology. It concluded that Mussolini's policy in Corfu was a flagrant rebuttal not just of the League's authority but also, more fundamentally, that his actions

[87] DCL, BHP, HHH/35, 30 September 1923, 241.
[88] Inge, *Christian Ethics and Modern Problems*, 321. Like Henson, Inge always mistrusted the League; see e.g., 'The Causes of War', in H. J. Stenning, *The Causes of War* (Pennsylvania: Telegram, 1935), 19.
[89] DCL, BHP, HHH/40, 18 March 1926, 178.
[90] Garbett, *The Church and Social Problems in Peace and War* (London: Church Assembly, 1940), 29.

had stood in contradiction the Christian spirit that was guiding civilisation toward the abolition of war.[91]

The report 'Christianity and War' also scrutinised Mussolini's foreign policy. The report was chaired by the Reverend Alfred Garvie (1861-1945), a Scottish congregationalist minister and leading ecumenist. Throughout the 1930s, Garvie worked closely with leading Anglicans such as George Bell and Cosmo Lang, but two notable Anglican contributors to this specific report were Francis Underhill (1878-1943), then a vicar in Birmingham (later dean of Rochester), and Charles Raven (1885-1964), the pacificist lecturer in Divinity at Emmanuel College, Cambridge.

The report suggested that Mussolini ought to remember the ethos of Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-72), a leading Italian revolutionary in the campaign for Italian unity in the nineteenth century.[92] COPEC adduced Mazzini as a man who used violence for a morally justified campaign, and by implication it suggests that COPEC saw Mussolini's military aggression as selfish and thus unjustifiable. Using military conquest for the advancement of personal ambitions was a total rejection of the principles established at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Anglican thought diverged from COPEC's more general concerns because they emphasised that Fascism contradicted Christian ideas of empire. Anglicans believed that God had gifted Britain with an empire and that it was entrusted with evangelising 'backward' civilisations, and this moralistic basis to colonialism informed Anglican criticisms of Italy's selfish and violent self-aggrandisement.[93] The example of Corfu, despite its brevity, offered Anglicans an opportunity to understand how fascism interacted with Christo-centric international systems. The conclusions drawn from this episode suggested that it was antithetical to the universal mission of Christianity and, as a result, antagonistic to the progression of civilisation.

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[91] Conference on Christian Politics, Economics, and Citizenship [COPEC], *Being the Report Presented to the Conference on Christian Politics, Economics, and Citizenship at Birmingham, April 5-12, 1924*, 12 vols. (London: Longmans, 1924), VII, 92-6.
[92] Ibid, VIII, 39.
[93] See e.g., Henson, *Retrospect of an Unimportant Life*, 3 vols. (London: OUP, 1942-50), I, 44 (Henson to Lord Salisbury, undated, *c.*1893); Headlam, *The Task of the Christian Church* (London: John Murray, 1943), 7.

To an extent, the Idealist emphasis on the reality of ideas largely influenced support for the League of Nations too. The League was the impress of the Gospels' values of justice, universal love, and reconciliation. As such, fascism's conscious inversion of these was presented as a conscious inversion of reason. Reason was the primary function for understanding His will and thus the primary guide for the moral preparation of human society for its integration into the Kingdom of God. Anglicans were concerned that fascism posed a significant problem to the moral unity of Western civilisation which thus hindered its moral integration into the Kingdom. Therefore, a more general concern emerged that fascism was not only a threat to the immediate peace of Europe, but a threat to Christian civilisation.

The Lateran Treaties

The growing sensitivity to the cultural context in which fascism emerged led many Anglicans to question how the Catholic Church could be complicit in this clear abandonment of reason. John Greig (1865-1938), bishop of Gibraltar, was deeply suspicious of the Catholic Church's motivations and thus wrote in March 1923 to Davidson with a rather unusual policy suggestion. Gibraltar sits at the tip of the Iberian Peninsula and though it is connected to mainland Spain it has been an overseas British territory since 1704. It is the centre of the Anglican Diocese in Europe, so its expansive jurisdiction made it a unique and useful source of public and private information.

Bishop Greig thought Britain, and Archbishop Davidson, ought to more closely align themselves with Mussolini. 'Mussolini's position is not stable yet', he explained, 'and he is seeking allies both at home and abroad.' The timing was perfect. He went on to explain that if Britain, and the Church of England, could form a good relationship with Italy, then it would 'reduce the power of the Vatican' in influencing both Italian domestic and foreign policy. 'What a fine opportunity

we are losing.'[94] His obvious statement of intent – to 'reduce the power of the Vatican' – suggests one question: what did Greig, and presumably other Anglicans, perceive as so troubling in the corporate relationship between the Fascist state and the Roman Catholic Church? His impatient tone suggests a second: why was the onset of this corporate relationship so damning? This section is concerned with answering these two questions.

The Lateran Treaties (1926-9) was the Concordat ratified between the Vatican and the Kingdom of Italy. To many Catholics, Mussolini had ended a troublesome period of Church-state relations since the Papal states' forced amalgamation into the Kingdom of Italy in the 1870s.[95] The treaties essentially 'established' the Roman Catholic Church as the national church of Italy: the Vatican was recognised as an independent state under the authority of the Holy See but the Pope was confined to neutrality in matters of Italian domestic and foreign policy. Its influence as the moraliser of Italy was no longer wanted or tolerated.

Greig's tone of suspicion correlates with the general anti-Catholic attitude of the interwar Church of England. The failure of the Malines Conversations – which (unofficially) discussed the potential for a corporate reunion between the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church – encapsulates this feeling well.[96] Pre-existing animosities certainly influenced Anglican perceptions of the Lateran Treaty, with many believing that the Catholic Church was the architect of its own subjugation as it went in search of greater temporal power.

T. S. Eliot wrote in 1923 to the editor of the *Daily Mail* regarding a series of articles it had recently published on Italian Fascism. The *Mail* had commissioned the famed journalist Sir Percival Phillips (1877-1937) to write a series of articles that chronicled Mussolini's ascension. Phillips

[94] LPL, Davidson 338, ff.286, Greig to Davidson, 23 March 1923.
[95] Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism*, 6.
[96] Examples of individual scepticism further this point. E.g., DCL, BHP, HHH/43, 27 October 1927, 160; Oxford, Bodleian Library [hereafter Bod.], Archive of Geoffrey Dawson, MS. Dawson 73, ff.5, Davidson to Dawson, and reply, ff.6, 20 October 1927. A good overview of Malines can be found in Bell, *Randall Davidson*, II, ch.79.

produced fourteen articles in total, a flavour of which can be ascertained from any number of richly evocative phrases, such as explaining that Mussolini was 'weeding out Socialist turncoats' and that he had saved Italy 'when she was in danger.'[97]

In his letter, Eliot wrote that 'these alone constitute a public service of the greatest value.'[98] This has puzzled scholars, with Peter Ackroyd especially unsure on what conclusion to draw from it, but he and Roger Kojecky are right to suggest that Eliot was applauding Mussolini's *coup*.[99] What we can confidently take from this though is that Eliot's conversion in 1927 to Anglicanism changed his interpretation of Fascism, being much more critical than he had been four years before. Jewel Spears Brooker argues that too often scholarship on Eliot's faith is 'retrospective' and does not consider the 'initiating currents of the convert.'[100] Eliot published 'The Literature of Fascism' just one year after his conversion to Anglicanism and it remained his most dedicated meditation on fascism. In it, there is a symbiosis that Spears Brooker rightly suggests is overlooked. Not only does this essay show how politics informed and shaped his early Anglican religiosity but also how his newfound religion shaped his perspectives on fascism.

Even though Eliot's political outlook has received greater scrutiny in recent scholarship, 'The Literature of Fascism' continues to be neglected; the latest consideration of it – in Thomas Hunt's doctorate on Eliot's social criticism (2023) – rather strangely adduces it as evidence of Eliot's suspicions of democracy, not once referencing it during his insightful explorations of Eliot's views on fascism.[101] Anderson Araujo's important exposition of it still fails to properly emphasise Eliot's theological critiques of Italian Fascism.[102] Araujo complements the work of Stefan Collini

[97] Percival Phillips, 'The "Red" Dragon and the Black Shirts', *Daily Mail*, 28 December 1922.
[98] Eliot, 'Right on all Points', ibid, 8 January 1923.
[99] Peter Ackroyd, *T. S. Eliot* (London: Abacus, 1985), 143; Kojecky, *T. S. Eliot's Social Criticism*, 101.
[100] Jewel Spears Brooker, *T. S. Eliot's Dialectical Imagination* (Baltimore: JHUP, 2018), 124-5.
[101] Thomas Hunt, 'The Social Criticism of T. S. Eliot' (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 2023).
[102] Anderson Araujo, 'T. S. Eliot and the Literature of Fascism', *Californian Italian Studies,* 7:2 (2017), 1-19. Important contributions on Eliot's politics are: Kenneth Asher, *T. S. Eliot and Ideology* (Cambridge: CUP, 1995); Grimley, 'Civil Society and the Clerisy', in Jose Harris (ed.), *Civil Society in British History* (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 231-48; David Bradshaw, 'Politics', *T. S. Eliot in Context*, 265-74.

and David Moody, among others, who have sought to defend Eliot from accusations of fascism.[103] But his argument that 'Eliot's disavowal of fascism suggests that he had staked a much more clearly defined political stance at this juncture' underemphasises the importance of theology in bringing Eliot to this juncture.[104] Indeed, the major critiques Eliot makes of fascism were not grounded in political theory but theology.

This is evident in his consideration of the recently signed Lateran Treaties. Eliot was immediately suspicious of the Lateran Treaties, being 'unconvinced of the essential harmony between fascism and Roman Catholicism.'[105] Calling on historical precedent, he hoped it would mimic the Napoleonic Concordat in 1801, where the Catholic Church was recognised as the de facto (not *de jure*) national Church while the state would, for example, appoint bishops. Going beyond this represented the 'danger of Erastian tendencies on the part of a… self-confident government.'[106] Erastianism denotes the political philosophy of Thomas Erastus (1524-83), and specifically his model of government where the state ruled supreme in ecclesiastical affairs. Many in the interwar Church of England were moderate Erastians and while Anglican criticisms of Erastianism were not necessarily new (as the Tractarian movement in the 1830s shows), the realities of Britain's national religiosity which faced the Caroline Divines who crafted the 1662 Book of Common Prayer were starkly different from those facing the Anglicans in the 1920s who tried to reform it. As such, there was a changing dynamic to 'Erastianism.'

Erastianism came to denote a secular, perhaps even atheistic, civic government dictating the liturgical affairs of the Church – as seen in the Prayer Book Crisis – and therefore highlights an ontological shift in Anglican thought.[107] This latter definition certainly influenced Eliot. His responses demonstrate a clear performance of Michel Foucault's discursive formation, where a

[103] Essays which argue Eliot was fascist are, e.g., Rossell Hope Robbins, *The T. S. Eliot Myth* (New York: Henry Schuman, 1951), 38, 49, 184 and Christopher Hitchens, 'How Unpleasant to Meet Mr. Eliot.', *Nation*, 263:5 (1996), 8. For counterarguments, see Stefan Collini, *Public Moralists*, 346 and A. David Moody, *Thomas Stearns Eliot* (Cambridge: CUP, 1994), 322.
[104] Araujo, 'T. S. Eliot', 6.
[105] Eliot, 'The Literature of Fascism', 286.
[106] Ibid.
[107] 'Erastianism', Andrew Louth (ed.), *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 4th edn. (Oxford: OUP, 2022).

particular set of rules defining transformation and exclusion develop the structure and agency of discourse on a particular topic.[108] These rules of exclusion are particularly important for Eliot. In *Thoughts After Lambeth* (1931), he tells us that he is open to various structures of church-state relationships.[109] Therefore, it is not the type of church-state relationship that concerned him, but the precise identity of those involved in its formation; to Eliot, this must be a Christian. As he then wrote in 1933, 'the relation between the natural and the supernatural is not to be settled by a concordat' because secular leaders have no authority in spiritual matters.[110]

Fascism was an even greater threat though. This was apparent to Eliot because it was clear that in Mussolini's doctrine 'political creed usurps the place of religious creed.'[111] This worried Eliot because it was one thing to have secular politicians legislatively restrict the spiritual authority of a church, another to remove it from society altogether – this was, in Eliot's words, a forthright contribution to the current 'experiment of attempting to form a civilized but non-Christian mentality.'[112] Eliot's presentation of Christian spirituality underpinning civilisation calls to mind the overarching argument many Anglicans expounded in this period: that the epistemological void in fascism meant it could not facilitate true progression because its doctrine marginalised the Church and acted according to a separate, unspiritual, moral code. If the Christian church was cloistered away, perhaps to the point of sectarianism, then it would have been unable 'to renew and rebuild civilization and save the World from suicide.'[113]

A clear example of his concerns about moral suppression was that 'what it [the Vatican] has denied in Paris' was not yet denied in Rome.[114] Eliot was making an explicit reference to the French Cardinal Pierre Andrieu's (1849-1935) 1926 injunction that Christians could not associate with *L'Action Française* (France's quasi-fascist antiparliamentary group). Eliot heeded the Cardinal's

[108] Michel Foucault, Alan Sheridan (transl.), *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969; London: Routledge, 2002), 40-1.
[109] Eliot, *Thoughts After Lambeth* (1931), in Ronald Schuchard (eds), *The Complete Prose of T. S. Eliot*, 8 vols. (Baltimore: JHUP, 2014-2019), IV, 236.
[110] Idem, 'Catholicism and International Order', *Christendom*, 3:2 (1933), 172.
[111] Idem, 'The Literature of Fascism', 282.
[112] Idem, *Thoughts After Lambeth*, 240.
[113] Ibid, 241.
[114] Idem, 'The Literature of Fascism', 286.

words despite a personal fondness for Charles Maurras and the movement's monarchism.[115] Andrieu had criticised Maurras's unchristian nationalism, but Eliot believed both Maurras and Mussolini peddled an identically 'pernicious form of nationalism.'[116] It therefore concerned Eliot that the Catholic Church was muzzled from making comments on Italian Fascism where it had called out similar political movements across Europe.

Hensley Henson reacted even more vehemently to the news of the Lateran treaties. Henson had had a tumultuous relationship with English Church-state establishment. He abandoned his erstwhile High Church sympathies before his appointment in 1918 as the bishop of Hereford and moved toward latitudinarianism, supporting the Church of England's establishment because it sanctified it as the representative church of the nation. Henson's appointment to Hereford was met with outrage: Cosmo Lang and Charles Gore were the dominant interlocuters of a group of clergymen who objected to the appointment of a bishop who was (at best) agnostic to the miracles of Jesus and resistant to independent Church governance like synods and assemblies. Henson's understanding of the role of the Church meant he was a vocal critic of the 1919 Enabling Bill (which limited the definition of the laity from being all English citizens to only those that were baptised members of the Church of England), arguing that it undermined the purpose of the Church in national life entirely.[117] Henson blamed an ontological shift toward a 'nakedly irreligious conception of the Church of England as the mere organ of the national mind' as the driving force behind the House of Commons' second rejection of the Revised Book of Common Prayer.[118] Consequently, he championed disestablishment because he felt the state did not venerate Christian values anymore and the Church must be able to moralise free from legislative strictures. This context is a vital premise for any analysis of Henson's outrage at the establishment of the Roman Catholic Church with Mussolini's Fascist state.

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[115] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 501 (Eliot to E. J. Greene, 19 April 1940).
[116] Idem, '*L'Action Francaise*', *Church Times*, 24 February 1928.
[117] See Henson, 'The Enabling Bill', *The Times*, 19 November 1919.
[118] DCL, BHP, HHH/54, 7 February 1932, 253.

Like Eliot, Henson used Napoleon as an historical precedent. He chastised Mussolini for taking 'a leaf out of Napoleon's book.'[119] Henson was referring to the 1802 concordat known as the 'Organic Articles', which drastically revised the 1801 concordat that Eliot cited as a model of good church-state relations; the Organic Articles, for example, gave the state total control of ecclesiastical matters. Drawing a parallel, he continued that because the 'concordat [was] regulating ecclesiastical procedure in Italy', Mussolini's personal control of Italy would have grown considerably.[120] What therefore made Italian establishment worse than English was that the Church of England was bound to the *institution* of the state and not a political party; in Italy, the Roman Catholic Church had 'bound itself rather conspicuously to the cause of anti–democratic reaction' and to a political ideology with atheistic tendencies.[121]

Henson was horrified at the prospect of Mussolini having ecclesiastical control in Italy. He was convinced that the autonomy given to the Roman Catholic Church was a façade that ultimately meant Mussolini's regime controlled both the temporal realm but also access to the spiritual realm through limiting man's access to God's word.[122] Moreover, because the state persecuted outspoken clerics (as one Italian priest told him), there was no moral accountability in the fascist state so Henson, much the same as Eliot, felt society was closer to suicide than salvation.[123] Almost certainly sermonising on the Lateran Treaty, Henson indicted concordats because they allow the state to be not just philosophically 'secular' but actively 'secularist.'[124] 'Secularist' refers to the active and systematic exclusion of a church from the activities of the state. As I have already proposed, the key question around fascism for many Anglicans was one of spirituality. Eliot and Henson demonstrate an interesting unity in their responses to the Lateran Treaties in light of this question:

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[119] Ibid/47, 12 February 1929, 123.
[120] Ibid.
[121] Ibid.
[122] A persistent theme: ibid/47, 10 March 1929, 160, 10 April 1929, 224; ibid/48, 17 April 1929, 87, 8 June 1929, 130; ibid/50, 16 July 1930, 146.
[123] Ibid/45, 22 July 1928, 149.
[124] Henson, *Bishoprick Papers* (Oxford: OUP, 1946), 59 ('The Church in the Modern State'). N.B., no date is given for this Diocesan Charge, but it probably was delivered sometime in early 1931 as the preparation for it took place in December 1930, see DCL, HHH/51, 30 December 1930, 223.

unable to yet explain *why* in more detail, they were for now deeply concerned with the shift of the Roman Catholic Church in Italy was merely a cog in the state machine, unable to dispense moral guidance.

Discussions about the Lateran Treaties evince a common pattern of anxiety regarding the fascist rejection of Christian morality. This correlated with existing concerns about the violently secularist Bolshevik party in the Soviet Union. A key difference Anglicans had in mind was that fascism did not, at this time, systematically persecute the Church as the Bolsheviks had done with the Orthodox Church. But this awareness did not detract from what Anglicans perceived as erroneous in the fascist doctrine. The establishment of the Catholic Church and state in Italy concerned Erastians as much as it did disestablishmentarians for roughly the same reasons. These reasons offer an important insight into early Anglican criticisms of fascism, namely that it venerated a moral code based on materialism and tyranny, rather than Christian spirituality and liberty.

The Divine Presentation of Temporal Power

T. S. Eliot's other central concern with fascism was the false divination of the state. In 'The Literature of Fascism', he wrote that Mussolini had usurped the place of God and demanded the worship reserved only for Him. He argued that 'there is a form of faith which is solely appropriate to a religion; it should not be appropriated by politics.'[125] He held it that there was an innate 'human craving to believe in *something*' (a psychological disposition he deemed 'pathetic') and since Italians had rejected both liberalism and Christianity as drivers of societal progression, they placed their faith in Mussolini, in whom they saw *something* to believe. Indeed, this explained why Italians had transferred their 'religious emotions to political theories.'[126] Eliot's theology was greatly influenced by St Thomas Aquinas (*c.*1225-74). The Thomist injunction that implicit obedience should be

[125] Eliot, 'Literature of Fascism', 282.
[126] Ibid, 282-3.

reserved only for God clearly informed his understanding that Fascism's misappropriation of divine worship must necessarily have come from the corruption of his soul.

Ralph Inge was a committed Erastian who frequently defended the state's right to control the Church. However, he believed that the state cannot interfere with the Church's spiritual authority but only in its activities in the earthly realm. He provided theological succour to this position in his essay 'The State, Visible and Invisible' (1927), which clearly explains the illegitimacy of a worldly leader ('visible') controlling man's spiritual ('invisible') activities.[127] The major consequence of secular interference in man's private instincts is the corruption of his individual personality. In Christian thought, individuality is defined through personhood and a personality derives from one's soul. However, definitions of personhood differ according to theological parties and denominations. For example, Personalism, which drew on the Thomist belief that personhood is a combination of Subjectivity (man's subconscious) and Objectivity (man's knowledge of the exterior world), dominated interwar Catholic thought.[128]

Immanence was central to Anglican theories on personhood. In the interwar years particularly, Platonic ideas on the divine logos (λόγος) in man's soul were recurrent throughout Anglican apologetics and demonstrate well the strong influence of the British Idealists.[129] In particular, the thought of T. H. Green was pervasive: as he concluded one lay sermon at Balliol, 'it is the God in you which strives for communication with God.'[130] Inge was not an Idealist but a thinker who lent on Idealist philosophy to buttress his theological positions. Showing this influence, Inge believed that God's spirit was indwelling in man's soul, and that logos allows Him to be intelligible to man via the knowledge that his will to action is driven by the essence of His spirit.[131] The same Platonism is found in Temple's thought, who posited that logos was 'Immanent

[127] Inge, *Outspoken Essays, Second Series* (New York: Longmans, 1927), 156-7 ('The State, Visible and Invisible').
[128] Personalism is most associated with the French thinker Jacques Maritain (1882-1973) and his *La Personne et le Bien Commun*, 1947.
[129] On this, see Bennett, *God and Progress*, 139; Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 44.
[130] Green, Arnold Toynbee (ed.), *The Witness of God and Faith* (London: Longmans, 1886), 96 ('Faith', 1878).
[131] Bennett, *God and Progress*, 239.

reason', *i.e.,* the knowledge of God's will was innate in man because his will was God's.[132] This is not to say all Anglicans followed this extreme Immanence, but many criticisms of fascism did depend essentially on a version of Immanence similar (if not identical) to these.

The veneration of the individual was sometimes accompanied by an aversion to mass society. 'Mass society' evocatively denoted the behaviour, culture, and social makeup of much of the body politic in Britain. The aversion to mass society is often associated with interwar cultural critics like T. S. Eliot and F. R. Leavis (1895-1978). Leavis in particular is famous for his essay *Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture* (1930), which argued that because only an elite minority (who occupied an 'isolated aesthetic realm') could appreciate true culture (the works of 'Shakespeare, Donne, Baudelaire'), it gave them some special responsibility to make the majority aware of its eminence.[133] As John Carey's controversial *The Intellectuals and the Masses* (1992) argues, the belief that the inhabitants of the aesthetic realm needed to control the mass of civic society provided the context for members of the literary intelligentsia – such as Ezra Pound and Wyndham Lewis (1882-1957) – to outwardly support Mussolini in the 1930s.[134]

A similar belief that a selective elite was needed to control the masses influenced many within the Church of England. Anglicans largely rejected Thomist Natural Law on man's innate knowledge of right and wrong, so they occupied a 'theological realm' where they were the minority able to administer divine wisdom. This wisdom was bestowed in them through to the Apostolic Succession, which holds that the clergy is part of an unbroken and diachronic lineage from St Peter. Concern that the masses would be guided by figures not blessed with this knowledge was commonly held. For example, Hensley Henson, writing in the early 1920s, feared the mass state-education of working-class children in densely populated urban areas because it allowed for the

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[132] Temple, *Christus Veritas*, 59-62; *Nature, Man, and God* (London: Macmillan, 1934), 295 (Lecture Six); see also, Plato, *The Republic* (London: Penguin, 2003), §443 *e*., 153.
[133] F. R. Leavis, *For Continuity* (Cambridge: Minority Press, 1933), 15 ('Mass Civilisation and Minority Culture', 1930). Eliot later also argued the role of the cultural elite was to transmit culture on from one generation to the next, see his *Notes Towards the Definition of Culture* (London: Faber, 1948), 39.
[134] John Carey, *The Intellectuals and the Masses* (London: Faber, 1992), 196-7; see also, Cunningham, *British Writers of the Thirties* (Oxford: OUP, 1988)*,* 277-8.

mass indoctrination of children to consider 'class-consciousness' a legitimate social bond rather than Christianity.[135]

This was complicated by the emphasis on the individual in authoritarian politics. Anglicans soon learnt that fascism's authority rested upon the individual's implicit obedience to the state. Anglican thought on the internal dynamics of the fascist state is the primary concern of Chapter Two, but the major Anglican concern with fascist statism in the 1920s focussed more on the effect of this obligatory sacrifice. The Church of England was all too aware of the inverse correlation between the state's and the Church's control of the citizenry in modern society, but state control predicated on a direct engagement with his soul was totally novel. Fascism posed a threat because the modalities of oppression corrupted man's soul and thus broke his devotional relationship with God.

The major consequence of the fascist state's control of the masses was to treat it as the sum of all individuals rather than the collection of them. Inge's exegesis of Jeremiah was certainly applicable to Italy, as Eliot, Temple, and others demonstrated. In an essay for *The Pilgrim*, Temple wrote that 'the State has no right to exercise control' over man's 'spiritual interest.'[136] He had a much broader definition of the state in civic society than most churchmen, but he drew the line at the state's attempt to control man's private instincts. At the same time, it is perhaps pertinent to point out Temple's argument concerning 'passive obedience' to the state in his Scott Holland Memorial Lectures – *Christianity and the State* – in 1928.[137] Temple argued that when the state takes on an 'ultimate or absolute character', like 'that character [which] alone belongs to God', it cultivates a 'passive obedience' from the body politic unto the state mimetic of the relationship man had with God. The major issue is that such a relationship can only exist because of the breakdown of man's relationship with God. To cause such a breakdown is the act of a tyrannical

[135] Henson, *Unimportant Life*, II, 111.
[136] Temple, 'God and The State', *The Pilgrim*, 5:1 (1924), 95.
[137] Idem, *Christianity and The State*, 27.

regime, which (quoting Aquinas) he defined as a regime that works in the interests of personal gain at the 'people's harm.'[138]

The same anxiety and apprehension are found in Henson's private journals. In one entry, he wrote that the Italian state had taken the 'authority of the individual conscience' away from the individual himself. In another entry, he expressed that the model of control used in Italy would invariably lead to the removal of individual consciousness for the sake of implicit obedience to the state.[139] Henson remembered in 1930 a conversation he had with a retired master from Harrow School who now resided in Tivoli (a small town near Rome) that exclaimed the 'sacrifice of liberty' was 'no excessive price' for the regeneration of Italy.[140] But to Henson and other Anglicans this was an excessive price because it was inimical to the Christian fulfilling his essential purpose.

A. D. Lindsay (1879-1952), the master of Balliol College between 1924 and 1949 (with a brief hiatus between 1935 and 1938 when he was Oxford University's Vice-Chancellor), also considered the fascist suppression of individual personality in a series of 1929 lectures. Like Ernest Barker, his conception of democracy was greatly influenced by the confluence of his theological and philosophical upbringing. He was raised a Nonconformist in Scotland; after four years at Glasgow University, he won a scholarship to University College, Oxford, where he came under the influence of Edward Caird. Besides Caird's Hegelianism, Lindsay was also exposed to the oeuvre of John Neville Figgis (1866-1919), from whom he ascertained the benefits of pluralism.[141] Pluralism is the social system where autonomous groups are centred around certain organic interests (trades, for example) and coexisted together and developed individually from the state.[142]

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[138] Ibid, 29; see also, Thomas Aquinas, *The "Summa Theologica" of St Thomas Aquinas*, 22 vols. (London: R. & T. Washbourne, 1912-1925), VIII (II.I, QQ-XC.-CXIV.), 22-3

[139] Henson, *Unimportant Life*, II, 1168 (entry for 8 December 1927) and DCL, BHP, HHH/42, 14 May 1927, 89.

[140] DCL, BHP, HHH/50, 31 August 1930, 262.

[141] Stapleton, 'Academic Political Thought and the Development of Political Studies in Britain' (DPhil thesis, University of Sussex, 1985), 55.

[142] For detail on Figgis and his philosophy, see Paul Avis (ed.), *Neville Figgis* (Leiden: Brill, 2021). David Runciman has mapped the intellectual lineage of pluralism in his expansive but largely politically focussed study *Pluralism and the Personality of the State* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), ch.6. David Nicholls has provided a similarly expansive study, though his work is much more focussed on the contribution of religious writers to this in his *The Pluralist State*, 2nd edn. (New York: St, Martin's Press, 1994). Perhaps a combination of both these approaches can be found in Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, ch.2.

Because of his Oxford education, Lindsay came to hold democracy in the Idealist tradition, believing that it was the worldly impress of God's will.

Lindsay demonstrates this pluralist perspective when he argued that fascism had subsumed Italy because it had destroyed civil society – by which he meant the medieval concept of society where the state connected autonomous organisations (churches and trade guilds, for example) that formed the basis of associational life.[143] Lindsay argued that the Fascist state's omnipotence was an attempt to replace God – and all His influence and infallibility – with the state and that this relied on the suppression of individual conscience and instinct.[144] According to Harry Holloway, Lindsay formulated a dichotomy between a Christian and a 'scientific' individual (closely associated with totalitarianism and no choice). Lindsay believed that democracy represented Christian individualism in civic life, whereas scientific individualism represented the material greed of personal development at the expense of others, encapsulated in the totalitarian concept of the 'economic man.'[145] Democracy was therefore a vital differentiating factor between Christian and fascist nations because rather than just representing a mode of civic governance, it represented the ethical context of the state.

To Lindsay, democracy was not so much about what could be achieved but what could be protected. Interestingly though, his attitude toward democracy appeared markedly different from Temple's and Barker's, with whom he had a longstanding intellectual kinship. For Lindsay, democracy was about the sanctity of man's individual conscience and the dignity of his individual personality. But despite these competing (nondoctrinal) perspectives, all believed that democracy protected the sanctity of individual personality in the face of increased fascist influence across Europe.

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143 A. D. Lindsay, 'Lecture Five', *The Essentials of Democracy*, 2nd edn. (Oxford: OUP, 1935), 80.
144 Ibid, 'Lecture Two', 33.
145 Harry Holloway, 'A. D. Lindsay and the Problems of Mass Democracy', *The Western Political Quarterly*, 16:4 (1963), 799-800.

Fascism: A Decade in Review

This chapter has spanned the 1920s to present the Church of England's immediate responses – at both an institutional and personal level – to the rise of fascistic politics in Europe. Beginning with the fascistic coups of 1922-3, Anglican concerns about the repudiation of democracy translated into more general fears that fascism supressed individual liberty. The fascist repudiation of democracy was tantamount to the limitation of man's inherent freedom. Many Anglicans appeared to have a somewhat Whiggish understanding of democracy: it was by no means a perfect system, but it was the system in which Christian doctrine was best represented. Discussions about the ratification of the Lateran Treaties in 1929 left some Anglicans fearful that the control of the Church limited its ability to influence public morals and spiritual development.

A lack of official information and a preoccupation with the Bolshevik regime as well as constitutional crises at home meant public interlocutions were limited. As we have seen, private thoughts recorded in the journals of Randall Davidson and Hensley Henson are predominant in the source base. Temple's criticisms came in his small quarterly magazine and Eliot's came in his popular but nonetheless marginal literary review. But all the sources demonstrate an ability, and willingness, to keep up with the evolving internal dynamics of Europe's fascist regimes.

Initially, fascism did not concern the Church of England anywhere near as much as Bolshevism had done, and continued to, throughout the 1920s. This was largely due to Bolshevism having a clear ideological rationale where fascism did not. The clarity of its ideological rationale was reiterated to onlookers with its immediate conversion into policy, demonstrated by the systematic persecution of the Orthodox Church and the execution in July 1918 of the Romanovs. At first, Anglicans were only able to define fascism by what it stood *against*. It was perceived as a force that destroyed the existing social space to assuage societal chaos.

But over time this changed. What was once seen as a reactionary, anti-democratic movement soon began to show signs of constituting the basis of a political ideology. Perhaps the moral panic about fascism was caused by this novel development: authoritarianism had existed

before, and reactionary political movements were a dominant feature of nineteenth-century Europe, but these had never formed the basis of an ideology or political doctrine. For the Anglicans we have studied, one feels, fascism was a step further than Bolshevism in the process of achieving ideological utopianism. Bolshevism stood for the total reconstruction of Russian society: the restructuring of the modalities of bourgeois oppression at any (human) cost. Fascism, on the other hand, was about deconstruction: it replaced the ethical framework of society and implemented its own moral code.

Far from being an expression of nihilism, fascism was an alternative philosophy of life. Indeed, Anglicans believed fascism responded to the human instinct to believe in *something*, rather than nothing. Ironically, of all the Anglican thinkers, it was Ralph Inge who was most aware of this. He was aware that fascism – through its secularist programme and reconceptualisation of the state – offered something to people in a time of general apathy. The ability to provide evidence of its doctrine's efficacy was more than could be said for Britain's religious and political groups at the time. Italian citizens had transferred their will from God to Mussolini, and perhaps optimistically (in Inge's case definitely quixotically) Anglicans largely believed that the human instinct for spiritual guidance would bring them back to God.

Anglicans certainly saw some merit in the social function of fascism, not least its socially regenerative qualities. On the surface, the sort of politics that Ralph Inge, Hensley Henson, and T. S. Eliot associated themselves with appeared congruous with many of the social aspects of fascism: centralised authority, the suppression of class-agitation, and the limitation of parliamentary democracy. As we saw in the introduction, writers like Cyril Garbett and Eliot felt that centralised authority was needed across Europe and there appeared no better way to do this than military strength.[146] More radically, Inge felt that Britain needed some of Mussolini's methods to sort out Britain – we 'could do worse', he quipped.[147] This was not a position Inge felt to be

[146] Eliot, 'The Literature of Fascism', 288.
[147] 'Mentally Under 13', *The Daily Telegraph*, 1 June 1927.

hypocritical but congruous with his conservatism, which, he explained in *England* (1926), revolved around a 'love of Order' and of 'strong government.'[148] The fallout of the First World War had brought disruption to European society and perhaps a yearning for the old, traditional, sensibilities of English life – 'the old maids biking to Holy Communion', as George Orwell later captured it – meant some Anglicans felt a forcible push back in that direction was necessary.[149]

But the common denominator in *all* Anglican criticisms of fascism was that its ideological motivations – the implementation of a new moral framework – was antithetical to Christianity. This was engendered when they observed fascism through the lens of their faith, where they saw a misappropriation of the divine obedience reserved exclusively for God redirected toward the material telos of the fascist state. Understanding the moral code which fascism venerated became a central preoccupation of Anglicans in the 1930s. The next chapter thus explores the changes to Anglican discourse now that it was an acknowledged political ideology.

[148] Inge, *England* (London: Ernest Benn, 1926), 243.
[149] George Orwell, 'England Your England' (1941), *The Lion and the Unicorn* (London: Penguin, 1982), 36.

Chapter Two
Fascism's Anniversary: Italy and Germany, 1930-1935

Other echoes
Inhabit the garden. Shall we follow?

– T. S. Eliot, 'Burnt Norton' (1935)

There was a new look to the Church of England in the 1930s. Randall Davidson's retirement saw Cosmo Gordon Lang enthroned as archbishop of Canterbury. Davidson had pushed for his fellow Scotsman to be his successor, which pleased Stanley Baldwin, who had stipulated to Lord Halifax that he did not want an archbishop of Canterbury who had publicly sympathised with the striking workers during the General Strike of 1926.[1] Considering this last point disqualified William Temple, he was instead translated to the archepiscopal see of York as Lang's successor.

Like Davidson, Lang was born in Scotland and raised in a Presbyterian, Church of Scotland family. Lang entered Glasgow University aged just fourteen, and four years later he matriculated at Balliol College, Oxford. After clerical appointments in Leeds, Portsmouth and Stepney, he became archbishop of York in 1908. But unlike Davidson, he attached less significance to his theological roots, being increasingly influenced by Anglo-Catholicism at Oxford; Lang had much more in common with the *Lux Mundi* (1889) essayists than Davidson ever did. Such a change reflected Lang's social trajectory, replacing the slums to which he was once committed with the drawing rooms of England's gentry. As one historian put it, Lang stood firmly in the 'corridors of power, privilege and wit.'[2]

However, Lang does not feature much in this chapter. J. G. Lockhart presents Lang as having cared little for secular foreign relations, while Robert Beaken, in his largely sympathetic biography, suggests a combination of ill health and an infinite list of responsibilities meant he

[1] Beaken, *Cosmo Lang*, 19.
[2] Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, 58; see also David Cannadine, *The Decline and Fall of the English Aristocracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 488.

prioritised his time elsewhere.[3] Lang's position was somewhere in the middle. He was cautious, but certainly not reticent as Lockhart suggests. He spoke only on actual crises, with little interest in academic discussion, and this is probably why Cyril Alington, dean of Durham, wrote that 'Lang could be trusted to say the right thing.'[4] But in the years this chapter will consider, not much 'happened' regarding the tangible impact of fascism on the world.

There was a new look to the political landscape of Europe, too. The rise of Nazism is an inescapable phenomenon for this chapter; the deep-rooted fear that other versions of fascism would have moved ideologically toward Nazism is interesting in that it shows how, contrary to popular belief, Anglicans began to see *fascisms* rather than one fascist phenotype. Importantly though, while it appears Italian Fascism was an esoteric phenomenon with a variety of facets, some acceptable and some not, Nazism was straightforwardly evil. As William Temple privately wrote in 1934 to the sometimes-Nazi apologist A. C. Headlam of Gloucester, without trying to seem 'high and mighty', that his 'antipathy toward the Nazi Movement as a whole is so intense that I do not think I have the necessary bonds of sympathy which can alone make criticisms effective.'[5]

After Hitler's electoral success, Nazism certainly dominated Anglican thought for a multiplicity of reasons: Germany had a significant Protestant population with which the Church of England enjoyed good relations, there were latent animosities with the German political state since the First World War, and it was a greater power than Italy (economically and geographically) so naturally posed a greater threat. But Anglicans were also aware that while German Nazism owed much to Italian Fascism, it was inherently different to it. For instance, T. S. Eliot told his cousin, Henry, that the 'Italian and German versions differ considerably' while George Bell said Nazism was not merely the 'German edition of the Fascist system.'[6]

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[3] Lockhart, *Cosmo Gordon Lang*, 362; Beaken, *Cosmo Lang*, 65.
[4] Alington, *A Dean's Apology*, 40.
[5] LPL, Headlam MS. 2643, Temple to Headlam, 8 March 1934.
[6] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, VII, 515 (Eliot to Henry Scott Eliot, 13 February 1935); Bell, 'Christianity and the Totalitarian State', in Maxwell Leigh (ed.), *Christianity in the Modern State* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1936), 146.

Some Anglicans were quicker to bring Nazism into their discussions of European fascism than others. Eliot was one such figure, whose editorship of the *Criterion* oversaw the publication of numerous critical dissections of Nazism between 1932 and 1934.[7] The same can be said for *The Adelphi*, edited by the Anglican layman and fellow Bloomsbury-grouper John Middleton Murry.[8] In considering *what* individuals chose to publish (and Eliot's letters prove he did choose), it opens up new ways of thinking about political identities; certainly, such an approach undermines William Chace's argument that because Eliot never considered Germany in any of his essays, it was not something with which he was concerned.[9] While there is much more to be said about the place of political discussion in the literary journals of prominent Christian academics, that is beyond the scope of this thesis. For our purposes though, it is worth noting that critics have often adduced the *Criterion* as evidence of Eliot's elitist preoccupations and disregard of politics or, more damningly, his admiration for fascism.[10] Jason Harding makes the important argument that the *Criterion* was a 'nominally literary review' and therefore a reluctance to publish essays of contemporary political analysis was not 'necessarily a sign of complicity.'[11] We may look at this another way though: being a 'nominally literary review', we might emphasise the significance of the essays of contemporary political analysis it did publish.

It is important to consider Nazism in this section because an explication of Anglican discourse on the conception of the state and the national community in the fascist ideology allows for the examination of how they perceived the internal dynamics of the Nazi state – something inexplicably under researched within the vast corpus of research on the Church and Nazism.[12]

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[7] See e.g., cf., Max Rychner, 'German Chronicle', *The Criterion*, 11:45 (1932), 705-10; Eliot, 'A Commentary', 12:49 (1933), 642-47; Stephen Spender, 'Germany After the War', 13:50 (1933), 156-8; Max Rychner, 'German Chronicle', 13:51 (1934), 300-6.

[8] See e.g., cf., John Middleton Murry, 'Prologue to Russia', *The Adelphi*, 2:4 (1931), 350-5; John MacMurray, 'Practical Issues', 7:3 (1933), 201-8; Middleton Murry, 'Politics, Economics, and Freedom', 7:5 (1934), 328-41; Leslie Paul, 'The Decline of the Youth Movement', 7:5 (1934), 317-27.

[9] Chace, *The Political Identities of Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot*, 137; see e.g., *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, VI, 384 (Eliot to Stephen Spender, 27 July 1932).

[10] See e.g., Christopher Ricks, *T. S. Eliot and Prejudice* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 52.

[11] Jason Harding, *The Criterion* (Oxford: OUP, 2002), 155.

[12] A lot of the literature is foregrounded in discussions of antisemitism and the Holocaust, meaning discussions about the Anglican perspectives on the internal dynamics of the Nazi state and its socio-political doctrine are hard to come

Even Andrew Chandler's recent monograph, *British Christians and the Third Reich* (2022), makes the preliminary admission that its attentions are away from the Nazi political state.[13] Though it is tempting to consider Nazism on its own, a comparative analysis reflects better how Anglicans at first responded to the internal dynamics of Nazism.

The emergence of Germany into the discursive continuum surrounding fascism perhaps meant it was taken more seriously as a political philosophy because up until now it was considered (in Eliot's words) 'an Italian regime for Italians, a product of the Italian mind.'[14] Anglicans paid more attention to the political theory of Corporatism, the policy of organising different economic sectors and industries into self-regulating bodies which was as 'definite as the Bolshevist theory of a Communist State.'[15] The *Record* made clear this understanding when it wrote that the new Nazi state in Germany operated, like Italy, on a corporatist model.[16] Interestingly, the Anglo-Catholic *Church Times* appeared fond of the Corporatist state, and praised Mussolini for being both 'courageous and constructive' in his state building.[17] This was seemingly at odds with its usually anti-Catholic disposition because the Corporatist system was aligned with Catholic social teaching.

Such considerations naturally fed into discussions about the impact of the Corporatist state on the national community. We are not so much interested in Anglican conceptions of community (as Matthew Grimley has ably explored) but rather Anglican perspectives on the fascist conception of community. Nevertheless, despite the deep sociological and ontological complexities that existed in interwar thought, a basic consensus of Christian community served to oppose fascist conceptions.[18] Indeed, it is pertinent to establish such a consensus to better contextualise and explain their perspectives and criticisms of fascist community.

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by. Cf., Lawson, 'The Anglican Understanding of Nazism' and *The Church of England and the Holocaust*; Chandler, *British Christians and the Third Reich*; Philip Williamson, 'The British State and Spiritual Mobilization during the Second World War', in Michael Snape and Stuart Bell (eds), *British Christianity and the Second World War* (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2023), 25-45.

[13] Chandler, *British Christians and the Third Reich*, 5.

[14] Eliot, 'A Commentary', *Criterion*, 7:2 (1928), 98

[15] 'Summary', *Church Times*, 10 March 1933.

[16] 'Austrian Corporative State', *Record*, 15 September 1933.

[17] 'Summary', *Church Times*, 10 March 1933.

[18] Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 1-5.

Anglican ideas of the community remained influenced by the intellectual and moral culture of the nineteenth century. The influence of Tractarian communitarianism was largely confined to the 1920s, the spirit of which lived on due to Charles Gore's continued – and at times idiosyncratic – presence in the interwar Church of England. Indeed, his writings on the intended structure of community mirrors Newman's argument in Tract One that presbyters must live *in* their pastorate, *amongst* their flock, because the community *was* the Church.[19] But, like the more moderate interlocuters of the Oxford Movement – John Keble (1792-1866) and Edward Bouverie Pusey (1800-82) – Gore insisted that the Church's responsibility to the state was being the moral guide of the communities which it governed.[20] The eloquent Pusey tempered any attitude toward disestablishment when he wrote that '[the state] has no guide but the Church; and if it rejects that, it must flounder endlessly.'[21] Indeed, they emphasised the *Anglo* in Anglo-Catholic.

However, interwar Anglicanism appears to have had a stronger affinity to broad church ideas about the national community, seeing membership as obtained through the voluntary assumption of a collective morality influenced by Christian doctrine rather than tangible criteria (*i.e.*, being baptised members of the Church).[22] We see specifically the influence of T. H. Green, whose communitarianism – which blended the broach church theology of Thomas Arnold (1795-1842) and Benjamin Jowett (1817-93) with extreme immanentism – remained pervasive at Balliol.[23] Edward Caird delivered unto his Balliol students lay sermons such as 'The Nation as an Ethical Ideal', which goes some way to show how many interwar Anglicans were nurtured to believe communities were formed through collective adherence to certain values.[24] The adherence to a set

[19] Gore, *The Reconstruction of Belief* (New York: Scribner's, 1926), 441; Newman, James Tolhurst (ed.), *Tracts for the Times* (Leominster: Gracewing, 2013), 1-6 ('Thoughts on the Ministerial Commission', 1833).
[20] See e.g., John Keble, *National Apostasy Considered* (Oxford: J. H. Parker, 1833); *Tracts For the Times*, 6 vols. (London: Rivington's, 1833-40), II, 118-26 (Hurrell Froude, 'The Position of the Church of Christ in England', 1835).
[21] S. A. Skinner, *Tractarians and the 'Condition of England'* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004), 92 (Edward Bouverie Pusey to William Gladstone, 24 April 1849). For detail on the Tractarians and moral unity within the state, see 92-3.
[22] As defined by T. H. Green, quoted in Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 44-5.
[23] On Green's Broad-Church upbringing, see Craig Jenks, 'T. H. Green, The Oxford Philosophy of Duty and the English Middle Class', *British Journal of Sociology*, 28:4 (1977), 481-97.
[24] Edward Caird, *Lay Sermons and Address* (Glasgow: James Maclehose, 1907), 97-112 ('The Nation as an Ethical Ideal', 1898).

of values achieved social fellowship because ethical ideals cannot be competed for – they are *shared* – which thus fostered a communitarianism where the achievement of a common good was man's primary aim.[25] Nonetheless, interwar Anglican communitarianism took specific aspects and rejected others: they largely rejected extreme immanentism yet took the metaphysical structure of community.

I will draw on Martin Heidegger's (1889-1976) theory of *Dasein* to explain why fascist community was so unpalatable to Anglican thinkers. Understanding community as *Dasein* helps to explain why they believed the fascist state was separated from the normal temporality of politics and thus from the course of civilisational progression. Anglicans utilised ideas on 'space' to define fascism by bifurcating it with Christian values. Being inside the boundaries of Western civilisation, but only approximate to other Christian nations, meant Anglican observations of the fascist state might be conceived as what Michel Foucault called a 'heterotopia of deviation.' We will therefore finish this chapter with a consideration of 'space' and how psychogeography can help to elucidate certain strands of Anglican discourse.

The Fascist State: Divine Entity or Political Absolute?

Perhaps no interwar Anglican thinker was more interested in the political and social theory of the state than William Temple. Throughout his Balliol days, he was preoccupied with theories on the unity of man, either in his obligatory readings of Plato or from his own readings of contemporary philosophy, such as Bernard Bosanquet's (1848-1923) *Logic* (1885), which he read upon a three-legged chair while volunteering at the Oxford Medical Mission.[26] Balliol was renowned for its culture of social service and active citizenship. Green's communitarianism relied upon the maxim that 'will, not force, is the basis of the state': a Christian should always, where possible, volunteer himself to help the community.[27] This was reiterated by Caird, who used his lay sermons at Balliol

[25] Andrew Vincent and Raymond Plant, *Philosophy, Politics & Citizenship* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), 177-8.
[26] Iremonger, *William Temple*, 43.
[27] Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (London: Longmans, 1895), 121, 157-9.

to prepare his students for the 'service of the community.'[28] It was in this distinctly nondoctrinal culture that Temple became aware of the potential social benefits that a powerful state could have for the community while remaining cautious that this would come at a cost to the individual. Despite constantly battling with these intricacies, by the 1930s he had formulated perhaps his clearest understanding of the state.

While the vicar of St James's, Piccadilly, he published the apologetic *Mens Creatrix* (1917). In it, he asserted that because the state's existence derived from the voluntary associations into which man had organised himself, the state primarily existed *for* man.[29] In 1932, he reiterated that the state existed chiefly to ensure the sovereignty of man's liberty, which he should use to follow Christ's teaching and transcend the material world.[30] The protection of this liberty thus gave the state a divine purpose. By the 1930s then, Temple believed that that state's divine purpose meant it could call on man's allegiance for temporal issues such as war because, ultimately, there was a spiritual basis to it. But the state did not coexist with God; rather, it was subordinate to His authority, with no right to inhibit man's attempts to live as His word.

Finally, in 1935, he argued that man reserved the right to disobey the state's commands because his only implicit allegiance was to God.[31] It is pertinent to mention that these more general meditations came at the same time as the 65th Church Congress at Bournemouth in October 1935. Here, he spoke about the systematic divinising of the state as a fundamental part of the fascist doctrine. He preached that the Italian state was discussed with 'spiritual terminology without any evident incongruity' to describe its apparent transcendental spirituality.[32] This was wrong because the state itself was not divine, meaning it could not have been the highest reality of man's life. According to Temple, the false conception of the state as a divine entity misappropriated the implicit obedience man must reserve for God. Man must *volunteer* to abide by the state's authority,

[28] Caird, 'The Nation as an Ethical Ideal', 121.
[29] Temple, *Mens Creatrix* (London: MacMillan, 1917), 224.
[30] Idem, *The State in its External Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1932), 36.
[31] Idem, *Christ and the Way to Peace* (London: SCM, 1935), 17.
[32] Idem, 'Ye Shall be my Witness', in *Christianity in the Modern State*, 19.

not be subjected to it. This freedom to adhere to God's word is central to the revelation of His Immanence and thus the fascist state was criticised for blocking this.[33]

Ernest Barker offered a similar interpretation. He argued that the Fascist doctrine formulated a 'metaphysical nation.'[34] By this, he meant that the nation was transcendental: it did not exist as a geographical territory, but as the Platonic reality of an idea – the imperfect, worldly image of the perfect idea that the state was the source of man's reality. Because the fascist state existed independent of the will of the body politic, it was given a higher moral value than the dignity of man's individual consciousness, thus meaning it fostered a group philosophy of 'compulsory conformity' to its authority.[35] Moreover, he argued that giving the state a corporate personality allowed for the implementation of a totalising system of governance.[36] The ecumenical thinker J. H. Oldham (1874-1969) likewise argued that the Italian Fascist Party presented the state as 'one of the deepest manifestations of the spirit of man and is, therefore, not only respected but defended and protected.'[37] Therefore, the state enacted restrictive legislation under the aegis of 'national welfare' to extended its control over the individual.

Going further, Temple defined the fascist state as 'the life of a nation.'[38] Here, Temple performed quite a clear analysis of the fascist state that seemed to illustrate Hegel's famous theory of the Absolute state. Hegelianism is typically associated with the British Idealist philosophers.[39] Jose Harris has recast our understanding of this though by arguing that, regarding their social philosophy at least, the influence of Hegel has been overemphasised and that they were more influenced by Plato and Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78).[40] Joshua Bennett has brought some

[33] Ibid, 19-21.
[34] Barker, *The Citizen's Choice* (Cambridge: CUP, 1937), 113-4 ('Philosophy and Politics', 1934).
[35] Ibid, 114.
[36] Ibid.
[37] J. H. Oldham, *Church, Community, and State* (New York: Harper, 1935), 11.
[38] Temple, 'Ye Shall be my Witness', 19.
[39] See e.g., Vincent and Plant, *Philosophy, Politics & Citizenship*, 2.
[40] Harris, 'Political Thought and the Welfare State, 1870-1940', *Past & Present*, 135:1 (1992), 126-7.

balance to this debate because he reaffirms Harris's point about their social ethics but insists that we must continue to see the British Idealists as Hegelian historians.[41]

Specifically, the British Idealists took from Hegel the view that history was a dialectical process in which humanity advanced along a linear narrative toward a specific condition of human freedom – the ultimate end of this was the freedom man achieved in the modern civic state.[42] As such, Hegel's state was absolute, and operated on a 'comprehension of necessity', where man only attained freedom when he accepted the necessity of the organised social system (the 'actual ethical order' of the state) as the only source of freedom.[43] Hegel's social contract meant man's rights derived from his *necessary* membership of the state and obedience to its authority; freedom was only possible *within* the state. Whether or not Temple got this from his Idealist education, I do not propose to argue that he did here. However, his criticisms of the fascist state, though not entirely resembling Hegelian historicism, are not only closer to this than Platonic dialecticism but also aligned closer with the general trend of viewing the fascist state as a Hegelian Absolute within Anglican discourse.

Dialectical thinking was also present in T. S. Eliot's analysis. Eliot's personal and public writings show an increased anxiety regarding European fascism, writing in 1934 to his muse, Emily Hale (1891-1969), 'I have got these beastly fascists on the brain at present.'[44] Ezra Pound's fervent philo-fascism was certainly a primary cause of this. In 1934, Pound had begun an epistolary relationship with Oswald Mosley (1896-1980), the leader of the British Union of Fascists, and soon after he contributed several articles to the BUF publication *British Union Quarterly*.[45] In a letter to the academic Bonamy Dobrée (1891-1974), Eliot said 'Dawson (Chris.)… showing alarming tendency toward fascism' and that 'Ezra … also worritting [*sic*] the life out of me… have more

[41] Bennett, *God and Progress*, 133.
[42] Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 42; see also, G. W. F. Hegel, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Right* (1820; Oxford: OUP, 2008), §260-71, 235-56.
[43] See, ibid, §153, 160. N.B., the concept is originally Benedictus de Spinoza's (1632-77), in his *Ethics* (1677).
[44] John Haffenden (ed.), *The Letters of T. S. Eliot to Emily Hale* [https://tseliot.com/the-eliot-hale-letters] (Eliot to Emily Hale, 27 April 1934).
[45] E. Fuller Torrey, *The Roots of Treason* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1984), 137.

hope of fascist practicies [*sic*] to be made use of by astute quiet people than by cabotins like Mosley.'[46] Eliot was already concerned that fascism represented an epistemological void, but his use of 'cabotin' as a pejorative term for an amateur actor suggests an exacerbation of this, with fascism further removed from the realms of political credibility.

Such was the extent of Eliot's concern that he wrote to Pound, dissuading him from associating further with Mosley, though it does not appear this altered their friendship at all.[47] Indeed, Eliot's hope that 'fascist practicies' might be used by more able politicians calls to mind his earlier separation of fascism between its ideological rationale and its social function. Given Eliot's fondness for the authoritarian social function of fascism, it would appear that he saw an epistemological void in British fascism just as he had done with the Italian version in the 1920s. Therefore, while it is still largely unclear whether Eliot was concerned with Pound's association with Mosley specifically or his more ostensible association with a fascist party generally, given his critical writings about fascism at this time I think it was more likely the latter. Furthermore, he also privately contacted Dawson, doubting 'whether English Communism would be any more spiritually destructive than English fascism.' Eliot seems mild, even irenic, when writing to Dawson, saying 'I should prognosticate the exact contrary' to his idea that communism was the greater threat to society than fascism.[48] Eliot's private manoeuvrings here are significant, not least because they do much to discredit assertions of his fascist sympathies.

The increased fervency of Eliot's personal concerns with his friends' fascism mirrored his increased academic interest with it. We know that Eliot owned a copy of Mussolini's *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism* (1932). Looking at it, we see Eliot's copious annotations and detailed marginalia.[49] The English translation which he owned had been published by his good friends Leonard (1880-1969) and Virginia Woolf at the Hogarth Press in 1933. This shows a significant

[46] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, VII, 127-8 (Eliot to Bonamy Dobreé', 27 March 1934).
[47] Stephen Dorril, *Blackshirt* (London: Penguin, 2007), 287.
[48] Eliot to Dawson, 10 May 1934, *op. cit.*, 179.
[49] Eliot, 'The Blackshirts', 2 February 1934, *Complete Prose*, V, 14, n.4.

level of contemporary interest in fascism and his readings of this edition would inform a large proportion of his public indictments of fascism. Eliot directly referenced it to defend the editor of the *Church Times* in February 1934. Sidney Dark had indicted Oswald Mosley's BUF for propagating an ideology inherently incompatible with Christianity.[50] Eliot provided theological succour to Dark's general assertion by using the example of the Italian state. The Fascist state, he said, had no right to demand man's devotion because his obedience was reserved exclusively for God.[51] A year later, Eliot wrote that Christians must reject fascism because 'it requires a level of devotion to the State which is wholly incompatible with Christianity.'[52]

Eliot was especially interested in how the fascist state and God could be conceived as equal. He believed 'epistemological dualism' was how man conceptualised and perceived the world.[53] This is a paradigmatically Heideggerian dialectic: the silent consensus of innately contrasting parties competing for control the social space.[54] If we recall our consideration of Eliot in Chapter One, he was one of several Anglicans that perceived an epistemological void in fascism and this perhaps explains why he initially seemed unconvinced that fascism was a credible political philosophy. But by the 1930s, he understood an ideological rationale in fascism, even if it amounted to a 'sterilized' idea of government.[55] Therefore, he believed that out of the dialectical process between the spirituality of Christianity and the materialism of fascism, the possibility to conceive the state's power as having parity with God's emerged. In many ways, this is the exact inverse of the problem explored by Jewel Spears Brooker in her book *T. S. Eliot's Dialectical Imagination* (2018): for Spears Brooker, Eliot observed the divinising of the natural world where an epistemological duality was absent.[56]

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[50] 'Summary', *Church Times*, 19 January 1934.
[51] Eliot, 'The Blackshirts', 13.
[52] Idem, 'The Christian in the Modern World' [Unpublished lecture, 31 January 1935], *Complete Prose*, V, 187.
[53] Spears Brooker, *T. S. Eliot's Dialectical Imagination*, 133.
[54] Martin Heidegger, Andrew Mitchell (transl.), *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), 84 ('Basic Principles of Thinking, Lecture One', 1957).
[55] Eliot, 'Mr. Barnes and Mr. Rowse', 683.
[56] Spears Brooker, *T. S. Eliot's Dialectical Imagination*, 133.

Eliot found the answer to the problem of fascism's epistemological dualism in Christian theology. In his letter to the *Church Times*, Eliot draws on a line of argument about man's devotion to created things that can be traced back to the sixteenth-century Spanish mystic St John of the Cross (1542-91). In *The Ascent on Mount Carmel* (*c.*1578-9), St John tells us that man can only have a relationship with God if he has no devotional relationships to created things, such as worldly entities.[57] Eliot observed a troubling development in fascism, where the 'pathetic need to believe in something' was sated by the idolatry of the state: a created thing. 'The love which is not given to God will be given to false gods', he said in 1936.[58] I am not seeking to discredit Spears Brooker's point – in accepting hers I might emphasise my own. Eliot's turn to theology as an intellectual counterresponse to fascism, disregarding the philosophical metaphysics he typically used to conceptualise the material world, goes some way to show us that it occupied a place above the normal temporality of politics. For the time being, Eliot began to conceptualise it as a faith, perhaps on account of the large demands it placed (erroneously) on the human soul. As such, he warned his peers that it was a faith 'to which the Christian cannot possibly adhere.'[59]

The deification of the state meant man's life lost its spiritual direction. In defence of man's liberty, Bishop Henson criticised the Italian, German, and Russian dictatorships for treating man as a 'creature of time' and a 'tool of interest.'[60] But in Henson's thought there was a marked level of difference between fascism and communism. After reading Friedrich Sieburg's (1893-1964) apologia *Germany, my Country* (1933), he privately remarked that Nazism had 'disclosed a mentality which can hardly be called sane, & offers "Germany" as a substitute for reason, morality, and religion.'[61] He clearly understood that fascism did not merely suppress Christianity as Bolshevism did, but outright destroyed it by replacing God with the state. Fascism was the only total in man's life: it was the source of his reality, his guidance, and his purpose.

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[57] St John of the Cross, David Lewis (transl.), *The Ascent of Mount Carmel* (*c.*1578; London: Thomas Barker, 1922), 16.
[58] Eliot, 'Christian Sociology', *The Teaching Church Review*, 6 (1936), *Complete Prose*, V, 347.
[59] Ibid.
[60] Henson, 'Liberty, Religious and Ecclesiastical', *The Listener*, 14:338 (1935), 17.
[61] DCL, BHP, HHH/60, 17 November 1933, 84.

Eliot likewise understood that both fascism and communism operated through a God-state, pointing out that both 'exhibit a diversion, to material ends, of passion which should only be devoted to religious ends.'[62] Given that by the mid-1930s Eliot appears to have seen fascism as a greater threat to civilisation than communism, it would be plausible to suggest much of this was influenced by his concern at the operations of the fascist state. Many will find this a contentious point, probably citing the 1929 *Criterion* article he wrote in which he confessed to a 'preference for fascism in practice', largely because communism would 'destroy' the church.[63] There are a few points to be made. Firstly, this is not Eliot's admission to a fondness for fascism but merely that, at this time, it represented the best of a bad bunch. Secondly, this position drastically changed by 1936, a conclusion this thesis has drawn from a broader look at his interwar corpus, balancing published and epistolary sources.[64] As we shall see, where once Eliot felt fascism was more appealing to a Christian given communism's destruction of the church, he reneged on this position as the fascist misappropriation of Christian devotion became obvious to him. This same phenomenon can be found in the wider current of Anglican thought.[65]

Like Temple, F. R. Barry preached about the effect the fascist deification of the state had on Anglican soteriology and on man's 'eternal destiny.' Barry contrasted the limitless possibility of man's spirit with the temporal barriers of the state, presenting them in a state constant of tension. Man's devotion to the state meant he viewed his present condition as his highest reality and thus did not strive toward fulfilling his potential for transcendence, meaning that his soul remained in the temporal sphere after his death.[66] According to his analysis, this was evident in the fascist citizen because he only worshipped the state. In a 1935 lecture to the Workers' Educational

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62 Eliot, 'In Sincerity and Earnestness', *New Britain*, 3 (July 1934), *Complete Prose*, V, 111.
63 Idem, 'Mr. Barnes and Mr. Rowse', 690.
64 Eliot wrote to Hale 'fascism is as great an enemy, because more insidious, to Christianity as communism [*sic*]', *The Letters of T. S. Eliot to Emily Hale* (Eliot to Hale, 23 November 1936); see also, 'Christian Sociology', *The Teaching Church Review,* 6 (February 1936), *Complete Prose*, V, 347; Eliot to Dawson, 10 May 1934, *op. cit.*, 179.
65 See e.g., cf., Barker, 'Philosophy and Politics', 113; Barry, 'Revolutionary Christianity', in H. Wilson Harris (ed.), *Christianity and Communism* (Boston, MA.: Marshall Jones, 1937), 73; DCL, BHP, HHH/61, 2 July 1934, 207; Inge, *Liberty and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1934), *passim.* (37).
66 Barry, *The Relevance of Christianity*, 309.

Association, he argued that man did not benefit from worshipping the state and this only served to advance an unspiritual society.[67] He argued that this devotional relationship to the fascist state meant man became an 'instrument' of the state's 'necessity' – because the fascist state exhibited a disregard for the dignity of his individual conscience, man's life was thus defined by his utility to the state and constrained by earthly limitations.[68] As we can see, Anglicans were concerned with the deification of the state because this had a tangible impact on the Christian's ability to live a purposeful life.

It is useful here to consider David Nicholls's *Deity and Domination* (1989). Nicholls argues that Christians believe that an authoritarian regime 'collapses the analogical relationship frequently asserted between God and the civil power into an identity.'[69] Nicholls is interpreting Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of religious language. According to Thomist theology, an analogical relationship between God's power and that of an earthly entity exists because, despite their ostensible differences, they are nonetheless both forms of 'power' in a general sense.[70] When this relationship is broken down, it is no longer analogous but 'univocal.' This therefore means the earthly entity assumes the place of God in the eyes of the body politic. When Temple, Eliot, and Barry discussed God's authority being conceived of as paramount to the fascist state's, they all alluded to the state wielding authority that it had attained from the breakdown in this 'analogical relationship.' Instead of fascist citizens living as His word, they lived according to the moral code of the state. From this, Anglicans understood that fascism promulgated the belief that the state was the source of man's social existence.

[67] 'The Aim of Modern Dictators', *Hull Daily Mail*, 31 December 1935.
[68] "Christianity Fighting for its Life", *Daily Telegraph*, 1 January 1936.
[69] David Nicholls, *Deity and Domination* (London: Routledge, 1989), 89.
[70] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I (I.I, QQ.I.-XXVI.), 147-77.

Fascist Ideas of Community

Considerations of the state as the source of reality naturally flowed into a concern that it was also the source of community. In the introduction to this chapter, we touched on the various nineteenth-century influences upon interwar Anglican ideas on community. We see the merit in Jose Harris's argument most strongly here, where the Platonic belief in the reality of ideas – the non-physical, timeless essence of truth – governed Anglican perspectives on community. But to say that Anglican ideas were distinctly Idealist, as opposed to Tractarian, would be misleading. Indeed, it appears to me that neither of these models – incarnational or immanentism – entirely resembles Anglican ideas on community.

We might explain this better by drawing on Martin Heidegger's theory of *Dasein*. According to Heidegger, humans should be considered not purely as biological entities but as *Dasein* ('being there'): a form of being or existence in which the individual's sense of self derived from a realisation of where he is in the world. Anglican writers did not see community as merely the system of social organisation but as *Dasein*: a particular mode of being. In other words, it is '*a way of life* shared by the members of some community.'[71] Being such, we can say Anglicans saw community as that space in which man realises his relation to God, that He is the source of man's reality, and that the lived experience of His word was the source of social fellowship. Fascism was a distinct problem then because where Bolshevism merely restructured the existing modes of organisation, fascism proffered a new *Dasein*, which presented the state was the source of social fellowship.

T. S. Eliot engaged with community as a form of *Dasein*. He certainly held a metaphysical conception that ideas had a reality in the material world, a position he developed at Merton College, Oxford, where he was taught by Harold Joachim (1868-1938), the disciple of F. H. Bradley (1846-1924), on whose metaphysical Idealism Eliot wrote his doctorate. In particular, Eliot took from

[71] John Haugeland, 'Reading Brandom Reading Heidegger', *European Journal of Philosophy*, 13:3 (2005), 423; see also, Heidegger, *Being and Time* (1927; New York: Harper & Row, 1962), §17, 38.

Bradley the idea that community was a 'harmonious and self-included reality', and such a position aligned him with many Anglicans who had likewise been educated as an Idealist at Oxford.[72] His metaphysical interpretation of community's structure operated in conjunction with the sociological understanding of its purpose he took from the Christendom group.[73] The Christendom Group were nineteenth-century Christian socialists in every sense. Theologically motivated (rather than politically), they blended Tractarian ideas of a social gospel with the Idealist belief that social fellowship was attained through adherence to a set of ethical guidelines.[74] They held social fellowship to be essential for the development of society – as Charles Gore wrote in the introduction to the Christendom group's first monograph, 'no stable and healthy… social fabric can be built on the principle of Individualism.'[75]

Eliot's association with the neo-medievalist Christendom group was principally through the writer Maurice Benington Reckitt (1888-1980), who edited its eponymous journal, to which Eliot sometimes contributed. While mostly being made up of Anglo-Catholics, important figures within the group – especially Reckitt and Vigo Auguste Demant (1893-1983) – were also pluralists. But the broad focus on the association of groups allowed for more general support from the Liberal Anglican milieu; William Temple, who, in contrast, felt society was best served by an overarching community, provided an effusive foreword in the first edition of its journal.[76]

We see how Eliot blended Bradley's philosophy and Gore's sociology to criticise fascism. Indeed, his writings on community, and how fascism subverted its structure and purpose, could have been written by Gore. In one *Christendom* article, Eliot argued that the fascist conception of community was heretical because it did not recognise that the central purpose of the community was to uphold 'humanity, brotherhood, equality before God', which therefore meant it did not

[72] F. H. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality* (1893; Oxford: Clarendon, 1930), 329; Eliot, 'Knowledge and Experience in the Philosophy of F. H. Bradley' (PhD thesis, Harvard University, 1916), *Complete Prose*, I, 297.
[73] For detail on the Christendom Group, see John Peart-Binns, *Maurice B. Reckitt* (Basingstoke: Bowerdean and Marshall Pickering, 1988), ch.5.
[74] For detail on the Christian socialists and their influence, see Grimley, ibid, 36-42; for Tractarian influence on Christian socialism, see Skinner, *Tractarians and the 'Condition of England'*, 5-11.
[75] Gore, 'Introduction', *The Return of Christendom* (New York: Macmillan, 1922), xv.
[76] Temple, 'Foreword', *Christendom*, 1:1 (1931).

'recognise the Christian foundations of society.' In other words, it made a social group that was related to the state, not to God.[77]

Eliot's other principal argument was that fascism contradicted Christian ideas on the benefits of communal living for individual personality.[78] Despite being seen by some scholars as the archetypal twentieth-century conservative, his communitarianism largely subverted political affiliations.[79] For him, the only purpose of individualism was its necessity for the mutual interplay of communal freedom. Michael North has argued that Eliot perceived an important symbiosis between the individual and wider community, with both giving value to each other, while Max Saunders suggests that he saw individualism for its own sake as 'a kind of heresy.'[80] North and Saunders come to these conclusions because Eliot understood that community was the manifestation of a joint declaration of voluntary participation in the veneration of shared values: community allowed man to enjoy his God-given liberty as expressed through the individual choice to uphold it for all.

In contrast, he believed that fascist community engendered the 'dehumanisation' of man because it hinged upon man's forced association to the state and its national community.[81] Losing his individual conscience meant man lost his *personal* relationship with God. Multiplied over a whole society, this more clearly represented a rejection of God's Immanence. Ultimately, the fascist rejection of God's Immanence meant man would have strayed from Christianity and sought direction from 'impure motives… aiming at false goods.'[82] The 'false good' Eliot had in mind here was the state, and specifically the erroneous idea that the state was the source of community. Interestingly, this idea of 'false goods' would come to almost exclusively mean 'wrong spiritual

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[77] Eliot, 'Catholicism and International Order', 173-5.
[78] Idem, *Selected Essays* (London: Faber, 1951), 400 ('Religion and Literature', 1935).
[79] See e.g., Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953); Roger Scruton, 'T. S. Eliot as Conservative Mentor', *The Imaginative Conservative* (2020), https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2020/03/ts-eliot-conservative-mentor-roger-scruton-2020-timeless.html.
[80] Michael North, 'Eliot, Lukács, and the Politics of Modernism', in Ronald Bush (ed.), *T. S. Eliot* (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 175; Max Saunders, 'Tradition and the March of Literature', in Giovanni Cianci, Jason Harding (eds), *T. S. Eliot and the Concept of Tradition* (Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 191.
[81] Eliot, 'Literature and the Modern World', *The Teaching Church Review*, 5 (1935), *Complete Prose*, V, 198.
[82] Idem, 'Catholicism and International Order', 183.

values' in Eliot's explanation of how fascism was a form of paganism.[83] This will be explained in detail later but for the meantime it is significant to note how social values were central to Eliot's idea of community and that fascism was a perversion of this.

That social fellowship was the source of community became a more general point used to define, differentiate, and discredit fascist community. Ernest Barker also demonstrates his Balliol education in this regard. He always held the belief that the individual must have priority in the community and that society should never push 'too far our claims on behalf of the group-persons.'[84] He had once been influenced by Neville Figgis, whose insistence that a collective unit (such as a nation) must be constituted of voluntary participants initially resonated with him. Figgis had popularised the work of the German legal scholar Otto von Gierke (1841-1921), whose *Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht* (four vols., 1868-1913), had been translated as *Political Theories in the Middle Ages* (1900) by Figgis's mentor at Cambridge, F. W. Maitland (1850-1906).[85] Maitland's edition was read by a number of Anglicans at university, including Temple, Lindsay, and Barker.[86] Figgis owed a lot to Gierke's *Genossenschaftsrecht* and was particularly inspired by the argument that modern society ought to return to the medieval concept of treating social groups as having rights autonomous from the control of the state.

Barker would himself become a translator of Gierke. He translated the fourth volume of Gierke's *Genossenschaftsrecht* as *Natural Law and the Theory of Society* (1934). In his introduction, Barker appeared distressed at the disregard of utilitarian principles in political modernity, saying that 'economics reigns, having driven out ethics', which provided the context needed for the state to use man as a tool of 'social utility.'[87] This informed his criticisms of fascism, which, he believed, had accelerated the rejection of ethics in the construction of a political unit. Barker observed some

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[83] Idem, 'A Sub-Pagan Society?', *The New English Weekly*, 16 (1939), *Complete Prose*, V, 753.
[84] Barker, *Political Thought in England* (London: OUP, 1915), 157.
[85] N.B., this was a translation of the third volume of Gierke's *Genossenschaftsrecht*, *Die Staats- und Korporationslehre des Alterthums und des Mittelalters und ihre Aufnahme in Deutschland* (1881).
[86] Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 66-7.
[87] Barker, 'Introduction', Otto von Gierke and idem (transl. & ed.), *Natural Law and the Theory of Society* (London: CUP, 1934), xxvi-ii.

worrying consequences of this. He believed that the supremacy of 'the group' in society reflected an altered moral code. Where once 'the supreme moral factor in the world [was] individual personality', group personality was now the dominant force.[88] Fascism complicated this because association with the state was not just a matter of political doctrine, but bound up with ideas that the state was the source of man's reality: it is that 'to which he owes the gift of his life and the debt of his loyalty.'[89]

Perspectives on Germany evince a common pattern of anxiety. Another of Henson's reflections on Sieburg's *Germany* emphasises his understanding that Nazi statism rested upon a comprehension of the necessity of the state for the function and freedom of the national community. Sieburg wrote: 'There are to be no more private Germans: each is to attain significance only by his service to the State, and to find complete self-fulfilment in this service.' In response, Henson wrote '**no more human beings in Germany, but only Germans**.'[90] The mass sacrifice of individuals to the omnicompetent political state allowed for the creation of a group personality: this group personality was significant because it unified all men on the basis that their national identity took precedence over material distinctions like class.[91] To some this highlighted the similarities between fascism and the social philosophy of the French thinker Georges Sorel (1847-1922) and was most likely why Eliot, in a private letter to his cousin, remarked that Sorel was a discernible influence on Mussolini's regime.[92]

Barker's central criticism hinged upon the depersonalisation of the community. Due to the innately anti-Christian nature of this social organisation, he concluded by asserting that fascist regimes had 'abandon[ed] the ancient rock on which we have built – the rock of a belief… that all groups and institutions must adjust themselves to it – and not it itself to them.'[93] Perhaps Barker

[88] Idem, 'Group-Idols and Their Loyalties', *The Listener*, 12:288 (1934), 99.
[89] Idem, 'The Romantic Factor in Modern Politics', *Philosophy*, 11:44 (1936), 397.
[90] DCL, BHP, HHH/60, 12 November 1933, 73. Bold and underlined as per the original.
[91] Barker, 'Group-Idols and Their Loyalties', 98.
[92] Eliot to Henry Scott Eliot, *op. cit*; this comparison was also made by V. A. Demant, *The Religious Prospect* (London: Frederick Muller, 1939), 92.
[93] Barker, 'Group-Idols and Their Loyalties', 99.

was alluding to Matthew 16:18, where Jesus says, 'You are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church.' The 'rock' refers to Peter's confession that Jesus is the son of God and symbolises the truth of God's word, around which the Christian Church – the *community* of Christians – was built. Barker literally plays on this then to emphasise the 'truth' in individual personality being the supreme moral factor in Christian community, which exposed the illegitimacy of fascist community.

William Temple similarly denounced the structure of Italy's community in his sermon at the 1935 Bournemouth conference. He said that 'it presented the true relation of persons to one another not as the free fellowship of friendship or love, but as the interaction of the cells which constitute a physical organism.'[94] Temple's observations that the state was the source of the community thus proved its illegitimacy to him. The state cannot create a community, and especially not through forced homogenisation and the disregard of man's individual personality. This certainly points to the influence of Plato on his social thought, with Temple's sermon a quite clear performance of Plato's idea that society was harmonious because the different natural passions exhibited by different members of society were reconciled in a higher spiritual principle.[95] More troubling to Temple though was the implication of the damage this artificial community had on man's relationship with God. It is pertinent to recall the importance of Green's relational ontology to Temple's theology of the individual personality we discussed in Chapter One. In this ontological framework, man can only realise his individual personality (and thus God's will) in the widest possible fellowship, so the 'organism' of fascist community inhibited this because it was not only the narrowest possible fellowship, but it was an inorganic one because it was crafted according to the state's will for human society rather than His.

This was commonly expressed at Bournemouth, where individualism featured greatly on its agenda. Ralph Inge – just retired from the deanery at St Paul's – was pleased that there was a

[94] Temple, 'Ye Shall Be My Witness', 19.
[95] Idem, *Christus Veritas*, 81-2; see also, Plato, *The Republic*, §369, *d.*, 56-7.

great appetite for his talk on the importance of individualism for man's relationship with God.[96] It indicates that in this five-year period, Anglicans clarified the definition of individualism, and reasserted the importance of man's voluntary association to the state to promote the spiritual benefits of social fellowship as a contrast to the fascist subjugation of man. Temple's understanding of the fascist community was reiterated by George Bell, bishop of Chichester, in his sermon 'Christianity and the Totalitarian State.' Bell made refence to the discernible lack of individuals, saying that it was merely the grouping of 'macadamised souls.'[97] As he later wrote in a quite beautiful phrase: 'collective egoism involves the death of God.'[98] The forced homogenisation of society meant the removal of man's soul, which was seen by many as a conscious rejection of God's Immanence.

Just as Temple and Eliot had done, Bell's central argument was that the absence of an individual personality removed man's connection to the spiritual realm and made him merely a biological entity, rather than a person. It appears these responses all rely essentially on some form of extreme immanentism, though it is unlikely that (Temple notwithstanding) they felt indebted to Green for this. Thinking of the values at the centre of the fascist community, Bell labelled them 'wholly secular' and therefore it was impossible for the community to 'meet the deepest needs of the human soul.'[99] A community which offered nothing for man's spiritual development was meaningless and association with it, voluntarily or not, was not just futile but contradictory to man's purpose to correct his sin and attain salvation.

Some Anglicans believed that man was taken off his spiritual journey to redirect his devotion from God to the material ends of the state. State planning replaced the old system of individual entrepreneurship, and it was an aspect of political modernity to which Victorian

[96] Cambridge, Magdalene College Old Library [hereafter MCOL], W. R. Inge Diaries [hereafter ID] Vol. 34, 9 October 1935.
[97] Bell, 'Christianity and the Totalitarian State', 150.
[98] Idem, *God Above the Nation* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1939), 11.
[99] Idem, 'Christianity and the Totalitarian State', 145.

clergymen had to adapt. The hegemony of Whig and Liberal administrations in the nineteenth century meant most clergymen were used to the political economy of *laissez-faireism*. While most Anglicans in the interwar years continued to see *laissez-faireism* as in tune with their teaching of God's providence and individual liberty, economism remained a source of criticism.[100] Indeed, the criticisms of interwar political economy as engineering society into an economic telos were redolent of Ruskin's *Unto this Last* (1860) or Matthew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* (1869).[101] In particular, Arnold's lamentations about modern society's fondness for 'external goods' rather than 'inward perfection' – something he doubtless ascertained from the numerous sermons he witnessed Newman deliver in the University Church while an undergraduate at Balliol – would appear particularly resonant in some Anglican criticisms of fascist political economy.[102]

A moralistic basis for economics thus permeated and informed Anglican perceptions on the community in Fascist Italy, where the political economy of Corporatism was its most noticeable feature. Corporatism was one of the more accepted aspects of fascist doctrine. T. S. Eliot praised Italian Fascism as a 'well-meaning revolt against "capitalism"', while a student at Chichester Theological College wrote an effusive essay on its communal benefits in the college's magazine.[103] Similarly, William Temple's conception of economic control in society was redolent of a Corporatist state because he believed that economic organisations had a corporate personality that demanded autonomy from the state. Temple inherited from the Christian socialist F. D. Maurice (1805-72) a belief that economics was a central function of social fellowship and enterprise a fundamental expression of man's freedom.[104] Hence, the utilitarian, communal foundations of Temple's corporate economics made it plausible for him to criticise the materialism of fascist Corporatism.

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[100] Skinner, *Tractarians and the 'Condition of England'*, 224.
[101] John Ruskin, *Unto this Last and Other Writings* (*c.*1860; London: Penguin, 1997), 160.
[102] Matthew Arnold, *Culture and Anarchy* (1869; London: Penguin, 2015), 208, 234.
[103] Eliot, 'Mr. Barnes and Mr. Rowse', 690; T. M. F. R., 'Fascist Policy', *Cicestrian*, 9:57 (Advent 1936), 178.
[104] Joseph Fletcher, *William Temple* (New York: Seabury, 1963), 142; Craig, *Social Concern in the Thought of William Temple*, 15.

Barker's criticisms of fascist political economy were multivalent yet always situated within a wider criticism of the structure of the community. He used Arnoldian frameworks, for instance, to criticise fascist community as an economic telos.[105] But he also rejected the insistence that Corporatism brought social liberty, a suggestion perhaps most notably expounded by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical letter *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931).[106] Pius engaged with Corporatism as a form of pluralism, an implicit analogy which Barker both noted and criticised. Though he flirted with pluralism at Oxford, from 1914 onwards Barker was less of a pluralist than he was a writer who could think pluralistically. At the height of his intellectual maturity, he remained committed to the autonomy of groups in society, though he now accepted the *necessary* role the state played in their development.[107]

Such a perspective clearly influenced his criticisms of Corporatism. In an essay written after a trip in 1936 to Rome, he argued that Corporatism could not be a form of Gierkean pluralism because it was another method of state planning, which meant economic bodies were naturally juristic creations and thus they could not have developed organically or governed themselves away from the superstructure of the state. Put another way, the state had artificially created the community. Therefore, Corporatism was not an economic system, but a vital part of the modalities of oppression in the fascist state: it was not about 'group liberty' but group subjugation.[108] The anti-utilitarianism of fascist policy made community thus about the machinery of economic productivity rather than social fellowship.

Retrospectively, Ralph Inge presented a similar interpretation to Barker. Despite being critical overall of the Austrian-American economist Peter Drucker's (1909-2005) book *The End of Economic Man* (1939), Inge agreed that fascism was a superficial revolt against economism. He argued that fascism's alternative moral code meant nationalist discourse about the glory of

[105] Barker, 'Democracy After the War and its Prospects for the Future', *International Affairs*, 13:6 (1934), 761.
[106] *The Papal Encyclicals*, III, §87, 429 ('Quadragesimo Anno', 1931).
[107] See e.g., Barker, 'Democracy After the War', 751-71.
[108] Idem, *The Citizen's Choice*, 98 ('The Corporative State', 1936).

sacrificing oneself for the development of the nation gave the façade of a moralistic basis to economics when it remained solely about output. 'Totalitarian militarism serves the vital purpose of supplying a non-economic basis of society while leaving unchanged the façade of industrial society', he said.[109] Inge loathed the economism of Victorian Britain and this was transposed onto his readings of individual subjugation at the hands of economic corporatism in Fascist Italy. But his observation that nationalism was an integral component in the fascist moral code was central to many Anglicans' perspectives in the 1930s.

Nationalism

In May 1933, Ralph Inge publicly condemned Nazi antisemitism in the *Sunday Times*. This was not due to any moralistic objections, but rather because he believed that it had no scientific basis. Inge was a fervent supporter of biological eugenics and thus he criticised Nazi antisemitism because it was predicated upon a mythological racial group rather than any actual science – allowing emotion to overcome rationalism, he concluded, was 'nationalism run mad.'[110] I mention Inge here because the crux of his argument was that the fascist community was predicated on mistruth. Thus far, we have looked at criticisms of the general structure of fascist community (that it was centred around the wrong spiritual values), but nationalism was the one value of which they were most critical. In sum, fascist community was criticised because it was based on superficial criteria which inorganically separated God's children.

The conception of a nation in interwar Anglican thought was still influenced by the thought of the Victorian Church of England. In particular, the thought of Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) and Thomas Arnold – that the nation was a 'moral unit', where the citizenry was unified around the spiritual values of Christianity – remained pervasive.[111] Therefore, Britain was

[109] Inge, *The End of an Age* (London: Putnam, 1948), 18.
[110] Idem, 'The Folly of Jew-Baiting', *Sunday Times*, 21 May 1933; he had been critical of the 'Nordic' race myth in German nationalism during the First World War, see 'Patriotism', *Quarterly Review*, 224 (1915), 85.
[111] Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 27.

not thought of as a 'nation' (with deeply political connotations) but as a 'national community.' When translated into foreign policy, this notion of a moral unit implied that different nations were morally linked by a shared adherence to Christian values and therefore they had the same spiritual destinies. Lord Halifax provides a clear example of this transnational perspective. In a 1924 letter to *The Times*, he wrote that a true conservative was at once a Christian and British citizen. To be a true British Christian, one must want their nation to contribute to the Christian commonwealth – to advance the 'cause of human thought and progress' – and that favouring one's own nation above another distorted how God intended nations to interact.[112] Inge's belief that the true conservative was anti-internationalist and against cosmopolitanism appears quite in contrast with Halifax's outlook.[113] Inge's position was rare, with other conservative thinkers like Eliot and Stanley Baldwin balancing national pride with the wider responsibility to the international community.[114] Anglicans understood that Britons could be patriotic, but that their wish for Britain's development and success must come as part of a wider contribution to the successful development of Christendom.

Therefore, William Temple spoke for many in his Church when he asserted that nationalism redirected man's allegiance to his own country, rather than to Christendom and the eventual Kingdom of God.[115] Moreover, nationalism was viewed with even more caution after the Great War because nationalistic selfishness was now seen as a principal cause of the conflict.[116] Between 1930 and 1935, nationalism became a defining feature of fascism where it had not been in the 1920s. This was because in explicating fascist states and their communities, it naturally led some Anglicans to conclude that nationalism forcibly bound society together into one unit – it was

[112] Edward F. L. Wood, 'Conservative Beliefs', *The Times*, 14 March 1924.
[113] Inge, *England*, 243.
[114] See e.g., Eliot, 'The Christian in the Modern World', 193; Stanley Baldwin, *This Torch of Freedom* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1935), 88-93 ('The Bible', 1928).
[115] Temple, *Mens Creatrix*, 326.
[116] Cf., idem, *Christianity and War* (London: OUP, 1914), 2; Inge, 'Hope, Temporal and Eternal', 116; Lang, *The Church & the Clergy at This Time of War*, p.11; Henson, *Quo Tendimus?*, 92 and 'The Gift of Historical Thinking', *History*, 10:37 (1925), 6.

how *groups* were formed in fascist society. This is a paradigmatical example of what Hannah Arendt called 'atomisation.'[117]

As discussed in this thesis's Introduction, contra Arendt and others, I intend to consider Anglican responses to different types of fascism together given this reflects contemporary Anglican discourse; I am especially indebted to Emilio Gentile's argument that separating Italy and Germany according to retrospective taxonomical differences is, in many ways, anti-historical.[118] We see the merit in Gentile's argument in Ralph Inge's 1934 Herbert Spencer Lecture because he considered Italian and German fascisms in the same analytical framework. The lectures are named after Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), a social Darwinist who believed that societies developed according to the same principles of natural selection that determined the evolution of animal species. Inge was most interested in Spencer's social evolution outlined in his *Principles of Sociology* (1882) and *The Man Versus the State* (1884).

Spencer argued that the industrial society in which he lived had developed out of the militarist society. He believed that the militarist society (favoured by the Tories) was primitive because the state was required for the basic functions of society; one such function was economic regulation, which necessarily made a state economically protectionist and politically nationalist. Spencer was a classical Liberal who was critical of Tory governance for being too interventionist and so it was unsurprising that he believed industrial society was a higher development of this because society had rid itself of the need for government intervention. Instead, voluntary cooperation amongst citizens meant industry was self-regulated (entrepreneurship) and reduced the need for state intervention.[119]

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[117] Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (231)-6.
[118] Emilio Gentile, 'The Silence of Hannah Arendt', *Revue D'Histoire Moderne & Contemporaine*, 55:3 (2008), 33.
[119] Herbert Spencer, *The Man Versus the State* (London: Williams & Norgate, 1884), 1; see also, idem, *The Principles of Sociology* (1873; London: MacMillan, 1969), 509.

Inge found industrial society uncomfortable: he loathed economism and believed it had diverted England off its true path toward moral perfection, but he accepted that its association with democracy made industrial society a 'reconciling principle' between 'Socialism and Individualism.'[120] In the linear process of history, it was at least on the path of progression. Therefore, fascism thus represented a distinct interruption to this progression because it integrated the primitive elements of the militarist state (*i.e.*, state intervention) and weaved them into the fabric of modern, industrial society. Inge (following Spencer) argued that nationalism was a natural consequence of greater state intervention: fascism exacerbated this because of its innately nationalistic philosophy. Fascist regimes used nationalistic discourse to engender international antagonisms that legitimised the ideological claims that one's nation was the primary end of his allegiance and not to the international Christian community.[121] This informed his overall argument, in which he defined fascism in opposition to communism. Inge argued that a state became fascist when it became 'more militarist' and 'more national' (as Eliot had done in the *Criterion* in 1929).[122] Therefore, the danger of fascism lay in its 'militant nationalism' because it 'no longer corresponds to the actual conditions of civilisation', by which he meant that fascism represented an aberration to the linear historical narrative of civilisational development as coeval with Christian spirituality.[123]

This suggested fascism undermined the God-given, self-evident universal moral framework within which society was ordered. Given that Inge felt fascism was an attempt to venerate an alternative philosophy of life, it is not surprising that he later incorporated nationalism into this. He emphasised the fundamentality he saw nationalism as having to the fascist ideology when he wrote that 'nationalism' was the 'religion' of 'Fascism and Nazism' and that it naturally stood in contradiction to the 'universal religion' of Christianity.[124] As a series of letters sent to *The*

[120] Inge, *Lay Thoughts of a Dean* (London: Putnam, 1926), 359 ('Nationalism and Christianity', 1924); 'Democracy and the Future', 290-1.
[121] Idem, *Liberty and Natural Rights*, 14-5.
[122] Ibid, 37; idem, 'Patriotism', 84, 91; see also, Eliot, 'Mr. Barnes and Mr. Rowse', 689.
[123] Idem, *Liberty and Natural Rights*, 14-5.
[124] Idem, *A Rustic Moralist*, 43.

Times in 1935 demonstrates, several influential Anglicans had a similar interpretation. Church of England teaching at this time emphasised that international cooperation was imperative because *all* were His children.[125] Therefore, the observation that fascist nationalism was not merely a policy but something which constituted a 'religion' that had replaced Christianity was a real cause for concern.

On 3 June, George Bell indicted the Nazi regime of having 'place[d] every kind of restriction on the liberty of the Christian Church', which meant that the regime fostered a 'Neo-Pagan spirit.'[126] This pagan spirit was obvious because German citizens clearly recognised the wrong spiritual values, seeing the national group as the ultimate end of their allegiance. This informed Bell's damning conclusion: 'the resurrection of the Occident is not to be achieved by making the principle of race into a religion and attempting to substitute it for the Christian religion.'[127] The suggestion that Germany was outside of Christendom's ethical framework on account of its antisemitism was common, as shown in Henson's private exclamation that Britain and Germany have 'no common morality.'[128] By 1938 Bell was under no illusions as to the illegitimacy of Nazism's attempt to craft a community, which, he said in the House of Lords, rested upon the 'figment of an Aryan race' and the suggestion that this somehow excluded Jews from being 'counted as Germans' was 'pure fantasy.'[129] To return to Inge, it was 'nationalism run mad.'

The following day, *The Times* published two more letters. One letter, from Temple, simply wished to be publicly associated with the sentiments and statements Bell expounded.[130] Henson sent the other. While Henson was concerned generally about Nazi antisemitism, he appeared even more so that members of the Anglican episcopate – A. C. Headlam of Gloucester and Francis Graham-Browne (1891-1942), the bishop in Jerusalem, in particular – seemed to lack sympathy

[125] See e.g., Church Assembly, *The Lambeth Conference, 1930*, 24.
[126] Bell, 'Herr Hitler and Britain', *The Times*, 3 June 1935.
[127] Ibid.
[128] DCL, BHP, HHH/60, 12 November 1933, 73.
[129] HL Deb., 'Refugee Problems', 27 July 1938, Vol.110, Col.1207.
[130] Temple, 'To The Editor of *The Times*', *The Times*, 4 June 1935.

and, in Headlam's case, felt comfortable in justifying the exclusion of Jews from the German national community.[131] As well as this, he was anxious that Nazi antisemitism suggested basic morality was no longer present in Germany due to the state's control of the Church. Given these letters were sent against the backdrop of the Barmen declaration (the 1934 edict produced by the Confessing Church which criticised the Nazi regime's suggestion, amongst many others, that the revelation can be found in Hitler), this appears in tune with wider patterns of interwar Christian thought.

Like Bell, he criticised the racially inspired nationalism for establishing a 'resuscitated paganism called "German Christianity."'[132] Before this, he had privately noted his concern about the potential effects of the German churches being consumed by the machinery of the state – what he called the 'great tribulation' of his time – and how this meant institutional Christianity was unable to impart true moral guidance concerning the illegitimacy of Germany's race laws.[133] This informed a criticism of the *Kirchenkampf* much like that which he expounded at the Lateran Treaties. Henson argued that the Church in Germany was under similar subjugation to the Roman Catholic Church because no church could be considered free and effective if it must 'subject its catholic character and claim to merely national interests.' But Nazism was different because it created an 'apostate Christianity' and so while the Lateran Treaties limited the influence of God's word, Nazism had elided Hitler's word with His.[134] The importance of universality to the Christian faith continued to be fundamental to Henson's criticisms, condemning in November 1935 Nazi antisemitism on behalf of the 'children of Christendom.'[135] This speech at the Church Assembly received 'loud and continued applause' by all those present, including Lang.[136]

[131] DCL, BHP, HHH/60, 11 October 1933, 7; 14 November 1933, 78.
[132] Henson, 'The New Religion in Germany', *The Times*, 4 June 1935.
[133] DCL, BHP, HHH/60, 29 January 1934, 254.
[134] Henson, 'The New Religion in Germany.'
[135] 'Church Assembly', *The Times*, 21 November 1935.
[136] DCL, BHP, HHH/65, 21 November 1935, 195.

Lang concluded this spree of interjections on 5 June in the Church Assembly. He preached that the 'racial religion' in Germany was evidently a 'form of paganism.'[137] Lang's use of paganism here clearly refers to the systematic recognition of a false idol (in this instance, the national group) as man's primary allegiance rather than God. Therefore, the organisation of German citizens into a pagan society suggested the German people had lost its connection to God. This correlated with Lang's wider concern about modernity, a point he privately communicated to Sir Waldron Smithers MP (1880-1954), saying that the 'suppression of religious liberty' naturally undermines the 'loyalty to the sovereignty of God' and thus allows for obedience to a false idol, namely the state.[138]

Following this, Lang described the German race laws as a 'menace to Christianity', arguing that these measures did not just affect the internal dynamics of German community, but the relationship between Germany and Christendom as well.[139] Like Bell and Henson then, Lang held a transnational interpretation of Nazi antisemitism. Such an approach is exactly what Tom Lawson adduced as the Church of England's 'occidental' view of the Holocaust, which obscured the focus of Jews and homosexuals (amongst others) as the victims of the Holocaust and instead presented it as civilisation generally.[140] This is itself an insightful point about how Church of England perspectives on Nazim were crafted. But we might use Lawson's interpretation another way and show how this shaped ideas on fascist community specifically. For these Anglicans, the exclusion of Jews from German society implied the inclusion of specific Germans into a national community equally as fabricated as the basis of antisemitism. Anglicans thus highlighted the criteria for inclusion to emphasise the illegitimacy of the Nazi community because it contradicted the ethical framework of Western civilisation, according to which the fortunes of individual national groups were subordinate to God's will.

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[137] 'Archbishop's Appeal to Hitler', *Daily Mirror*, 6 June 1935.
[138] LPL, Lang 147, ff.147, Don to Waldron Smithers, 5 November 1936.
[139] 'Archbishop's Appeal to Hitler', *op. cit.*
[140] Lawson, *The Church of England and the Holocaust*, 177.

Such a perspective was not exclusive to Anglican thought. In July 1938, the *Criterion* published 'Christian Politics' by the Reverend Edward Quinn. Little is known about Quinn, but Eliot was under the impression that the Edward Quinn whom he contacted as the Organising Secretary of the Catholic Committee for Refugees from Germany in June 1939 was the same person with whom he spoke in 1938 regarding the publication of this article.[141] Quinn's article was written against the background of *Mit Brennender Sorge*, the 1937 Papal encyclical that condemned Nazism's descent from the terms of the *Reichskonkordat* and a powerful defence of the Old Testament in light of the Nazi attempts to manipulate and, in parts, erase scripture to serve its own ends.[142] Quinn argued that no Christian could support the Nazi racial state because it necessarily contradicted Natural Law and the 'universal aims of Christianity.'[143] Quinn's article is interesting for a number of reasons. It was published in the *Criterion*, amongst the pages of literary and cultural criticism Eliot usually cultivated, but also, perhaps more profoundly, it shows an instance of unique unity between Anglican and Catholic writers in England.

The illegitimacy of Germany's racial community continued to dominate Anglican discussion at the 1935 Bournemouth conference. Here, Anglicans attempted to show how the 'racial religion' they observed earlier was used to legitimise the narrative of the nation's eternal destiny and atomise people into one homogenous group. During his sermon, George Bell noted a multiplicity of similarities between the two fascisms' nationalism and identified the external and internal factors that influenced them respectively. To Bell, fascism inculcated the idea that man's sacrifice to the state was a contribution to the correction of a shared national injustice, something which had affected all members of the country irrespective of pre-existing material differences.[144]

We can immediately trace the evolution of Bell's thought from June to October because he became aware of *how* a 'racial religion' was imposed onto the citizenry: the Nazi state suggested

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[141] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 176 (Eliot to Edward Quinn, 6 June 1939).
[142] *The Papal Encyclicals*, III, 525-35 ('Mit Brennender Sorge', 1937).
[143] Quinn, 'Christian Politics', *Criterion*, 17:69 (July 1938), 626-7.
[144] Bell, 'Christianity and the Totalitarian State', 147-8.

the destiny of the Aryan race was to be superior to those that had wronged it during the Great War. It is what we might call a 'vindictive nationalism.' Bell was not the first to highlight this form of nationalism but in fact William Temple was. After assuming 'some special responsibility' to demand the 'deletion' of the "'War-Guilt clause", he appealed to the moral consciousness of Europe's governing elite to stop seeing Germany as the sole belligerent in the First World War.[145] Treating Germany as such contributed to an international order dominated by vindicative nationalism because non-cooperation was inimical to civilisational progression.

Bell claimed that while Italy felt itself deprived of the 'fruits of victory' from the Great War, Germany blamed its disgrace on its Jewish population.[146] Bell believed fascist regimes fabricated national injustices as a way of justifying its total transformation of the social space so that the nation may recover a lost glory. Class society, political corruption, and cultural decadence were replaced with the fundamental values of their national identity, fulfilled in the ascension of the leader.[147] Nazism's 'racial religion' was therefore central to this social regeneration and provided a context to exclude Jews and other apparent undesirables from the new national community.

In light of this, Cyril Garbett, now bishop of Winchester, and the Conference's president, went as far to say that fascist nationalism was wholly incompatible with Christian teaching. If we recall, Garbett initially praised the social function of fascism because it restored 'good government' despite its heavy-handed approach; in 1935, he continued to extol the 'order' and 'discipline' the regime had brought into effect in Italy.[148] He tempered any enthusiasm though by explaining the ideological rationale behind such social tranquillity. He argued that unity was achieved at the expense of Christian spirituality and social values. In direct contradiction to the Christian doctrine of universal love, he argued that fascism taught national selfishness, which was engendered by the same vindictiveness that Bell had highlighted. In the context of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia,

[145] BL, CCP, Add MS 51154 A, ff.135, Temple to Cecil, 5 January 1932; see also, 'The War-Guilt Clause', *The Daily Telegraph*, 1 February 1932.
[146] Bell, 'Christianity and the Totalitarian State', 147.
[147] Ibid, 148.
[148] Garbett, 'The Presidential Address', 48.

Garbett highlighted how fascist nationalism translated to an innate disregard for the ambitions of other nations to only further its own.[149] As well as this, he immediately defined the Nazi state as 'racial', explaining that those 'not of Aryan race' are treated as an internal enemy.[150] This feeds into the idea that a reality was given to the fascist community because it applied the ideas of superiority into discernible and tangible requirements for the membership of community.

Ernest Barker strongly condemned Germany's national community, which was a 'racial unit resting upon a physical basis.'[151] This physical basis was a community of ethnically homogenous citizens. Barker adduced the Race Laws as the reality of the Nazi community, suggesting that they were used to sanctify 'pure culture and true progress', which, in other words, meant controlling the demographic and destiny of the fascist community.[152] These Race Laws were the biggest indicator of the artificiality of Nazi community though, because creating an ethnically homogenous group necessarily depended on the state to create it. Furthermore, he suggested that the shared experience of injustice was an irrefutable binding agent and through its correction, the fascist leader was able to establish a common goal all had to sacrifice themselves to: a leader in whom the true destiny of the nation was revealed.[153] 'Every centre has its incarnation in a hero: each mystical party has its Duce, or Führer.'[154] Barker's overall point here is that in the fascist doctrine, the state was the source of reality and this was revealed to the body politic through the leader, whose sole purpose was to guide the nation toward its eternal destiny.

It is pertinent here to reference the Lutheran theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer's (1906-45) treatise *The Cost of Discipleship* (1937), which argued that '*The Church is one man; it is the body of Christ. But it is also many, a fellowship of members.*'[155] I am not suggesting that Bonhoeffer was a direct influence upon Anglican theology at this time; in fact, Bonhoeffer was a relatively unknown figure compared

[149] Ibid, 49.
[150] Ibid, 50.
[151] Barker, *Reflections on Government* (Oxford: OUP, 1942), 2 ('Democratic Government and its Internal Difficulties', 1933).
[152] Idem, 'Philosophy and Politics', 114.
[153] Idem, 'Group-Idols and Their Loyalties', 98-9.
[154] Idem, *The Citizen's Choice*, 81 ('The Social Background of Recent Political Changes', 1936).
[155] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *The Cost of Discipleship* (1937; London: SCM, 1959), 218. Italics as per the original.

to someone like Karl Barth (1886-1968), for example, with a notable exception being George Bell, with whom he corresponded frequently in the early 1930s.[156] I instead use Bonhoeffer here because it is an eloquent summary of how Anglicans similarly felt the community was the reality of an idea. For Christians, the Incarnation was the clearest example of the reality of the idea of God's existence. For Anglicans like Barker, the identical nature of both systems suggested that the fascist structure of community must be a misappropriation of its Christian counterpart.

In his private journal, Henson wrote that Nazism was 'something analogous to a new religion, in which Hitler is in place of the Deity, or at least of the Deity-inspired Prophet?' Following this, he described the German people as exhibiting the 'unarguing fanaticism of a race of Dervishes.'[157] The implication that Hitler had the unwavering and implicit obedience of his citizenry places much greater emphasis on the leader than we have seen hitherto. Allusions to the fascist misappropriation of the Incarnation became a common form of criticism, and of Mussolini especially, of whom Inge wrote 'the apotheosis of the dictator is almost absolute.'[158] T. S. Eliot also had an insight on this phenomenon. He initially argued that fascism overemphasised the threat of 'anarchy', or of communist internationalism, to 'exalt one particular group of men', *i.e.,* the national community.[159] Interestingly though, Eliot said that the supremacy of this national group over others was given tangible evidence in the existence of Mussolini, which legitimised the ethical context of the dictatorial state. Eliot contrasted monarchy to dictatorship, arguing that while the king incarnates the nation, the dictator incarnates the spirit of the national community. Hence, 'in the *success* of a man like Mussolini (a man of "the people"), a whole nation may feel a kind of self-flattery', because his existence is the worldly impress of the metaphysical values of the nation.[160]

[156] For the correspondence, see Geoffrey Kelly and F. Burton Nelson (eds), *A Testament to Freedom* (San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1995), 394-403.
[157] DCL, BHP, HHH/61, 11 April 1934, 18.
[158] Inge, 'Nationalism and National Character', *The Quarterly Review*, 277 (1941), 136.
[159] Eliot, 'Mr. Barnes and Mr. Rowse', 689-9.
[160] Ibid, 690.

In Eliot's analysis, fascist community was both metaphysical and real, just as Bonhoeffer's model of Christian community was.

Anglicans perceived fascist regimes as using nationalist rhetoric to provide a moral basis to the inorganic community. This was used by fascist ideologues to legitimise the fabricated eternal destiny of the nation that replaced the object of man's life from attaining salvation from God. This shared investment in the nation's regeneration thus gave it both a metaphysical existence as well as a reality.

Fascism and Other Spaces

This chapter has provided a deeper look at Anglican discussions on the internal dynamics of fascist regimes, principally through the role of the state and the structure of its community. Where Chapter One demonstrated that Anglicans believed fascism venerated an alternative moral code, this chapter has shown what Anglicans believed the impact of heeding this moral code was; perspectives thus shifted from seeing fascism as a rejection of Christian society, to now being actively incompatible with it. Anglicans understood the fascist doctrine provided a context for the state which meant it transcend its usual remit *within* the community to being the *source* of it. Therefore, it required a level of devotion that Anglicans believed Christians could only offer to God, making the formation of a devotional relationship between man and the state illegitimate. Similarly, this affected the structure of community. Community was no longer about social fellowship, the veneration of Christian morality, nor one's civic duty. In the fascist ideology, the community was structured around a leader that transcended the realm of temporal politics meaning there was no place for God's presence. With no personal connection to God, man no longer had an individual personality and thus the body politic was a mass collection of dehumanised people. Fellowship in the fascist society was inorganic because it was created artificially by the state, and the national community was presented as exclusive from other national groups within Christian

civilisation. In fascist regimes, the state was the source of community and Anglicans vociferously rejected this.

In 1986, the French philosopher Michel Foucault constructed his model of *un hétérotopie* (a heterotopia).[161] Unlike a utopia (an imagined 'perfect' space) or a dystopia (an imagined 'imperfect' space) a heterotopia is an 'different' space. Foucault details a multitude of heterotopias, but we are most interested in the 'heterotopia of deviation.'[162] This is defined as being an approximate space to utopia and is created to harbour social deviants and thus ensure the possibility of utopia – a prison, for example. The differences between accepted standards in utopia and heterotopia are slight but significant, with Foucault using the lexical subtleties of 'leisure' being accepted in the utopia of free society whereas this is condemned as 'idleness' in the heterotopia of a prison.[163]

It is on this point primarily that I think Anglicans conceived the fascist state as a heterotopia of deviation. While Anglicans believed that man only realised his individual personality through realising his relationship with God, for fascist citizens this only came through a comprehension of the state's necessity in his life. When distilled to its purist form, fascism had artificially created its community because it was ordered around the worship of temporal power rather than around a spiritual power. This difference may appear slight, but it is a significant disparity and meant Italy and Germany were observed as approximate to England, outside of the temporal barriers dictated by the course of civilisational progression. Interestingly, Foucault tells us that a heterotopia 'exposes every real space' and this is certainly true where Anglican criticisms of fascism appear to buttress the existence of a spiritual utopia in Christendom.[164] This occupied a significant place in some Anglican imaginations, expressed beautifully by T. S. Eliot during the

[161] Foucault, Jay Miskowiec (transl.), 'Of Other Spaces', *Diacritics*, 16:1 (1986), 22-7.
[162] Ibid, 25.
[163] Ibid.
[164] Ibid, 27.

Second World War: 'So, while the light fails / On a winter's afternoon, in a secluded chapel / History is now and England.'[165]

Conceptualised in this way, 'space' perhaps had a dual purpose in Anglican imaginations, being at once both a physical space and a temporal space. The physical space of the 'fascist state' had set parameters (as discussed throughout this chapter) but it also occupied a temporal space in the Christian conception of history and its existence problematised the historical narrative that Christianity drove linear civilisational progression. The latter conception has most recently been explicated by Joshua Bennett while William Whyte has produced several studies on the importance of 'space' in British religious history.[166] Through my theologically informed study of space, I hope my work has contributed to an emerging area of interest, not just in religious history but in modern British history as well.

Being a heterotopia, it is *one* space: the state and society unified through fascist ideology. As such, Foucault helps us to see how the social function of fascism was no longer able to be separated from its moral code. It was an ideology which provided the ethical context of the state: not a dictatorship (which still suggested appropriate temporary governance) but effective and sustained government. The existence of these states as heterotopias also reflects a very real moment in Anglican thought where many started to think something was inherently wrong with fascism, way before the horrors of the Holocaust began to be evinced. Fascism was distinctly modern, and yet it was saturated with pre-existing philosophies. Fascism was totalising, nationalistic, and, as the mid-1930s approached, it was warmongering. They had dealt with states like this before: Germany, for example, in the First World War. And yet, fascism remained inexplicable. It is telling of the uncertainty in their early responses that they turned to previous philosophies: Coleridge's moral unit, Green's communitarianism, Arnold's critiques of political

[165] Eliot, *The Complete Poems and Plays of T. S. Eliot* (London: Faber, 1969), 197 ('Little Gidding', 1942).
[166] Bennett, *God and Progress*, esp. ch.5; William Whyte, *Unlocking the Church* (Oxford: OUP, 2017) and 'Building Corpus Christi', in Mordechai Feingold, John Watts (eds), *Renaissance College* (Oxford: OUP, 2019), 160-82.

economy. That fascism presented a distinctly modern iteration of old anxieties did not leave Anglican discourse, especially with the onset of international conflict in the 1930s.

Chapter Three
Abyssinia: Fascism Without Borders

The last act is the greatest treason
To do the right deed for the wrong reason

– T. S. Eliot, *Murder in the Cathedral* (1935)

Hensley Henson paralleled the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 with the Old Testament story of Naboth's Vineyard (1 Kings: 21:1-16). 'In the eyes of the Italian dictator', he wrote, 'the country was as Naboth's vineyard in those of the Hebrew despot.'[1] In the story, Naboth refused to sell his vineyard to King Ahab so his wife, Jezebel, told Naboth's peers that he had transgressed, so he was stoned to death. Having sinfully taken control of the vineyard, God prophesised that Ahab's son's dynasty would collapse as punishment. The meaning of Naboth's story is often understood to represent a double transgression, with the motivation behind the actual wrongdoing being exacerbated by the way it was committed. But it also interrogates the character of those who stoned Naboth to death without proper investigation of his supposed transgression. Fittingly, Henson's invocation of a double transgression sets the parameters of this chapter's exploration of Anglican responses to fascist colonialism.

Mussolini gave a new impetus to Italian colonial interests in East Africa that long predated the Fascist regime. Following Italy's failed attempt to colonise Abyssinia in 1896, Mussolini vowed to bring it into its African empire when he came to power. After a campaign of ruthless brutality and chemical warfare, Abyssinia was recognised as the final piece of the Italian Province of East Africa in 1937.[2] The emergence of a colonial dimension to fascist politics demonstrated once again that fascism was innately antithetical to the moral code Christianity upheld in Western civilisation.

[1] Henson, *Abyssinia* (London: Hugh Rees, 1936), 10.
[2] This was also formed of Italian Somaliland and present-day Eritrea.

Like Corfu in 1923, Anglicans took a sustained interest in Abyssinia because of its significant Christian population. Christianity in Abyssinia long predates that which was imported during European colonialism. Randall Davidson upheld its ancient Church as a symbol of Christian history and tradition when he welcomed Haile Selassie (1892-1975), emperor of Abyssinia (1930-74), to Lambeth Palace in 1924.[3] Furthermore, Abyssinia had been a member of the League of Nations since 1923, despite strong opposition from Britain.[4] Though British complaints centred around Abyssinia's thriving slave trade, a number of influential Anglicans saw in Haile Selassie a paladin of Christianity who had civilised his country by dismantling the structures of its slave trade and produced its first written constitution.[5]

The League responded to the Abyssinian crisis by imposing economic and military sanctions against Italy. The policy divided opinion: moral voices wanted a more draconian punishment while the majority of Stanley Baldwin's cabinet pushed for a policy of *realpolitik*, fearing that aggravating Mussolini would only push him closer into Hitler's arms.[6] The League abandoned the policy after seven months. The sanctions were never strong enough to be effective and so there was little support from the Church of England. As William Temple eloquently summarised in a private letter to Lord Robert Cecil: 'it appeared to me that many people, who might have been expected to take a strongly ethical line, did none the less regard it as almost inconceivable that any nation should so act as to damage its own immediate interests for the sake of maintaining the Covenant.'[7]

Lord Halifax understood Britain to have assumed a 'great moral leadership' in the resolution of the Abyssinian crisis.[8] However, Britain's formal involvement led to disgrace.

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[3] See 'Prince Tafari', *The Times*, 12 July 1924. On Christianity in Abyssinia, see Diarmaid MacCulloch, *A History of Christianity* (London: Penguin, 2010), 890.
[4] F. P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (Oxford: OUP, 1960), 258.
[5] See e.g., cf., 'Prince Tafari', above; Henson, *Abyssinia*, 8; Council on Foreign Relations Ancient and Oriental Churches [hereafter CFR AOC] 67/1, ff.3-5, Don to Edoardo Bassi, 13 January 1936.
[6] Anthony Eden, *Facing the Dictators* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962), 274, 292. On the government position see, Robert Mallett, *Mussolini in Ethiopia* (Cambridge: CUP, 2015), *passim*, 154-167; Keith Middlemas and John Barnes, *Baldwin* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969), 830.
[7] BL, CCP, Add MS 51154 B, ff.1, Temple to Cecil, 19 January 1937.
[8] Halifax, *Speeches on Foreign Policy* (London: OUP, 1940), 26 ('Italy and Abyssinia', 19 December 1935).

Britain's Foreign Secretary, Samuel Hoare (1880-1959), orchestrated the Hoare-Laval pact (1935) with France, which proposed the partition of Abyssinia and giving control of the majority of the country to Italy. The pact was met with such hostility that it was abandoned, and Hoare forced to resign. Halifax was profoundly upset by the dismissal of his friend, though he nonetheless accepted Neville Chamberlain's offer to replace him as Foreign Secretary in February 1938, exerting, in his words, a more spiritual influence in the negotiations.[9] Writing privately, Henson joked 'Sir Samuel Hoare is reported to have broken his nose: had he broken his neck, it had been more politically convenient!'[10]

Abyssinia was a pressing issue amongst Britain's general population, especially in 1935 when much of the population took to the polls in the November general election. As two political historians have argued, Abyssinia was hugely significant in the minds of the electorate.[11] Nick Crowson's detailed analysis of Conservative party campaigns in 1935 estimated that around forty-one percent of all Tory candidates referred to the Abyssinian conflict, with only two percent mentioning Adolf Hitler's Germany.[12] In light of this, the fact that the episcopate offered a sustained (albeit incoherent) response to Abyssinia challenges Adrian Hastings's assertion that the Church was 'close to opting out' from matters of contemporary significance.[13]

Surprisingly for an event with such a profound impact on the Church in its own time, Anglican responses to the Abyssinian conflict have never been satisfactorily explored or emphasised. Furthermore, what research there is too often oversimplifies the response of the Church of England, invariably being presented as a monolith of unwavering support for the League of Nations.[14] In fact, it appears many Anglicans – both clergymen and laypeople –

[9] Ibid; see also letters of consolation to Hoare from Halifax and Cosmo Lang; Cambridge, University Library [hereafter UL], Templewood Papers [hereafter TP], VIII/file 5a/47 and 48, 22 December 1935.
[10] DCL, BHP, HHH/65, 14 December 1935, 239. Underlined as per the original.
[11] Martin Pugh, *The Making of Modern British Politics*, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1983), 239; Nick Crowson, *Facing Fascism* (London: Routledge, 1997), 55.
[12] Crowson, *Facing Fascism*, 58, tab.2.1.
[13] Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, 293.
[14] Peter Kent, 'Between Rome and London', *The International History Review*, 11:2 (1989), 252; Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform?*, 166-7.

reconsidered their stance of support for the League. This chapter's analysis of the League thus contributes to more recent scholarship that has sought to emphasise the heterogeneity of Anglican opinions on the League in the interwar years.[15] By producing a much-needed assessment of Anglican responses to Abyssinia, as well as integrating it into the history of the Church of England's perspectives on fascism in the 1930s, it will recast our understanding of Anglican anxieties regarding modern warfare, as well as the formative attitudes toward the culture of appeasement.[16]

To return Henson and his analogy of Ahab's double transgression and Italy's Imperialism, the first transgression Anglicans observed was the motivation behind fascist colonial policy. At its core, Anglicans held colonialism as an evangelising process. This model of empire would prove central to Anglican criticisms of the fascist ideology as detached from Christian reason. In contrast to the British Empire, which was inspired by Christian doctrine and morality, Anglicans believed fascist colonialism was driven by nationalistic greed and material selfishness. The second transgression was the methods by which Italy annexed Abyssinia. The campaign of military force employed by Mussolini, especially the use of illicit chemical weapons, outraged Anglicans who saw the spectre of the First World War looming. Both demonstrated how fascism was totally detached from Western civilisation as per my consideration of fascism as Foucault's heterotopia of deviation in the previous chapter. By the mid-1930s then, fascism was seen less as a political issue and instead a moral one, which meant that it demanded a response directly from the Church and not through the spiritual proxy of the League of Nations.

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[15] See e.g., McCarthy, *The British People and the League of Nations*, ch.3; Markku Ruotsila, 'The League of Nations Controversy among British Protestants', *Journal of Ecclesiastical History*, 65:2 (2014), 327-46.

[16] For studies of these anxieties; Stephen Lammers, 'William Temple and the Bombing of Germany', *The Journal of Religious Ethics*, 19:1 (1991), 75; Chandler, 'The Church of England and the Obliteration Bombing of Germany in the Second World War', *The English Historical Review*, 108:429 (1993), 925-6.

Competing Conceptions of Colonialism

Following its attack on Corfu in 1923, some Anglicans saw fascism as embodying the conscious inversion of the world order imagined at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. Catherine Ann Cline argues that the Church of England conceptualised a world order based on ecumenism, and the idea that a united – perhaps truly *catholic* – Christianity was the only way to overcome the immorality of the modern world. She insists that a fundamental commitment to this drove William Temple's persistent campaign for revision to the Treaty of Versailles despite the 'changing moral context' of European relations with Germany that Nazism induced.[17] It was commonly argued that Christian values needed to be venerated in society so that it was prepared for moral integration into the Kingdom of God.[18] Many Anglicans believed that Britain's role in this was largely performed by the British Empire, and that its evangelising of the uncivilised world constituted an important foundation of the Kingdom.

The Anglican conception of empire in the 1930s was practically identical to its conception in the 1830s. Edward White Benson (1829-96), archbishop of Canterbury (1883-96), described the Empire as one of the 'seven gifts of the Holy Spirit', a theological perspective that pervaded interwar thought on empire and the preparation of those countries for self-government was Britain's providential mission for the world.[19] Anglican writers did not think Britain had created its empire but had taken up the mantle of God's empire (the Kingdom) on earth; Italy, on the other hand, had subverted God's manifest will by establishing its own empire. Moreover, the

[17] Catherine Ann Cline, 'Ecumenism and Appeasement', *The Journal of Modern History*, 61:4 (1989), 683-(703).
[18] Examples discussing the spiritual basis of empire generally are: Lang, 'The Lambeth Conference', *The Listener*, 4:78 (1930), 47; Lord Halifax's journal, Borthwick Institute, Hickleton Papers, Halifax/A7/8/2 ff.35, 10 May 1932; 'Philosophy of Empire', *Record*, 18 August 1933. For examples specifically regarding the Empire and the Kingdom of God, see Randall Davidson's sermon (1910) in Bell, *Randall Davidson*, I, 611; Headlam, *The Task of the Christian Church*, 7. For historical considerations of the latter, see Grimley, 'The State', 128; Jeffrey Cox, 'The Dialectics of Empire', in *The Oxford History of Anglicanism*, V, 25.
[19] Edward White Benson, *The Seven Gifts* (London: MacMillan, 1885), esp., 211-5 ('Missions'); Grimley, 'The State, Nationalism, and Anglican Identities', in Jeremy Morris (ed.), *The Oxford History of Anglicanism*, 5 vols. (Oxford: OUP, 2017), IV, 128.

Christian *modus operandi* was to convert not conquer, though this has been hotly disputed by anti-colonial writers.[20]

This providential notion of empire was also upheld in the 1930s largely because it went hand-in-hand with contemporary ideas about trusteeship and the mandate system imposed by the League of Nations. Trusteeship was based on the notion that colonialism was, ultimately, about the preparation of uncivilized nations for self-government. Many Anglican thinkers in this period believed its role was to spearhead the moral and spiritual education of these countries because, as we saw in Chapter One, having strong moral character was a requisite for effective government. Therefore, conceptions of the British Empire like this served to rebut any accusations of hypocrisy toward Britain being critical of Italy's imperial policy.

Indeed, the Church of England's defence of Britain's empire and outrage over Italy's behaviour can be explained as a form of 'ethical relativity', a term taken from Morris Ginsberg's theory of the 'diversity of morals.' Ginsberg describes this phenomenon as the same act being performed by two separate groups yet treated differently.[21] Fascist expansionism was criticised because it was the antithesis of the Christian model of colonialism. Anglicans held that the British Empire had a certain moral teleology to it. In other words, the erroneous execution of imperial processes in some countries was overshadowed by the achievement of civilisational progression in a backward country. On the other hand, Fascist imperialism cared only for the material self-aggrandisement of the nation; Benson condemned the materialistic motivations of colonialism as 'disastrous' for Christianity because it negated the true vocation of colonialism.[22] Interwar Anglicans appeared to think similarly to Benson and criticised Fascist colonialism as a negation of its true Christian purpose.

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[20] Most famously, see e.g., Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963; London: Penguin, 2001), 32.
[21] Morris Ginsberg, 'On the Diversity of Morals', *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland*, 83:2 (1953), 117-35, esp., 118.
[22] Benson, 'Missions', 209-10, 215.

William Temple provides an illuminative example of this moral teleology. He had commented on the exploitation of natives in British Egypt and Kenya around the same time that COPEC produced a scathing report on the economic exploitation and cultural alienation of indigenous peoples in British colonies.[23] For Temple, colonialism was an historical process.[24] Indeed, if there was any truth in Temple's theory of historical processes, we might discern this much:

> The historical order together with the climax which is a transition to something more and other than history is, on this view, one of those unities where the principle of unity is in the whole, so that even what precedes is fully intelligible only when what follows has completely developed the ground of the necessity of every part.[25]

To Temple, 'human History is nothing other than ourselves; and we make its meaning by living out its process.'[26] Colonialism was an historical process because it was the direct attempt to expose uncivilised nations to Christian spirituality and create a moral whole ready for moral integration into the Kingdom of God. Therefore, while errors in practice did occur, they were insignificant and did not derail the overall mission of progress toward the Kingdom of God.

But throughout the conflict, some influential Anglicans felt the hypocrisy of criticising Fascist Italy's colonial ambitions while actively participating in the advancement of the British Empire was inescapable. These Anglicans argued that Britain's actions only served to strengthen the ties between Mussolini and Hitler. Ralph Inge was unusual amongst Britain's interwar Tories on account of his staunch pacifism. His pacifism superseded his patriotism, and he was critical of Britain's relentless suspicion of Italy. It is pertinent to note that Inge, more than most, understood colonialism as having an important economic impetus to it rather than solely being rooted in providentialism.[27] Perhaps he perceived Britain's and Italy's motivations as aligned rather than

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[23] Temple, 'Editorial Notes', *The Pilgrim*, 5:2 (1925), 124 and ibid, 5:4 (1925), 364; COPEC., *Being the Report Presented to the Conference*, VII, 42. Henson was also outraged about Kenya, see DCL, BHP, HHH/39, 18 October 1925, 285.
[24] Idem, 'The Christian Conception of History', ibid, 6:1 (1925), 90-1 and 'Christianity and The Empire', ibid, 6:4 (1926), esp., 452.
[25] Idem, *Nature, Man, and God*, 450-1.
[26] Ibid, 451.
[27] Grimley, 'The Religion of Englishness', 898.

contra to one another, which made the tensions baseless and futile. Inge initially believed that Britain had provoked Mussolini, and that it was disingenuous in its calls for international peace. How, he asked, could Italy think anything else when Britain was vocal in its suspicion of Italy's supposed threat of military intervention in Africa? This process of suspicion and denial only escalated the tensions between Italy, Abyssinia, and the League.[28] In a cruel twist of irony, Italy invaded Abyssinia the day after Inge's article was published.

Even during the conflict, Inge believed the violence would be short-lived. A letter from his son, Edward, in January 1936, explained that a correspondent of his in Abyssinia assured him that the morale of Italian soldiers was rock bottom and that Mussolini's regime would not be able to withstand this failure.[29] It must be said that he repeatedly condemned the immorality of Italy's campaign as the truth about its use of chemical weapons became public knowledge.[30] However, a fervent desire to see peace maintained at all costs meant he became deeply troubled by the possibility that the conflict could have become international and was bemused by Britain's involvement. He understood that Italy felt aggrieved by Britain because they were 'dragged… as criminals before the bar of public opinion.'[31] In his mind, the tensions at the end of the 1930s could be explained by Britain's rash need to be the policeman of the world, as his recollections of the period show.[32]

Cyril Alington, dean of Durham, also highlighted Britain's apparent hypocrisy. Like Temple, he reiterated that British colonialism prepared human society for integration into the Kingdom of God by raising up its subjects. But unlike Temple, he believed that it was not Britain's place to highlight and indict paradoxes in colonial policy. Alington argued that sin was consistent across the spectrum of humanity – just as God judged ordinary citizens, so too did he judge the

[28] Inge, 'The Dangers of Being Human', *The Listener*, 14:351 (1935), 548.
[29] MCOL, ID, Vol. 35, 22-25 January 1936.
[30] Inge, *Our Present Discontents* (London: Putnam, 1938), 24; *A Rustic Moralist*, 45.
[31] Ibid, 63.
[32] Idem, *A Pacifist in Trouble* (London: Putnam, 1939), 154.

actions of the dictators; it was not Britain's place to cast judgement but God's.[33] As a result, in his explanation of how the 1930s culminated in *The Last Crusade* (1940), Alington made the unfashionable claim that 'if we had shown less interest in her fate, that unfortunate country would, in fact, have received better treatment.'[34] The implication that Britain was culpable for the suffering of Abyssinian civilians was a unique take in the context of Anglican responses to the conflict and one imagines that this did not go down well with a clergy that felt not enough had been done to prevent Italian aggression.

Inge and Alington were certainly outliers in the Church of England. The *realpolitik* approach to Abyssinia was anathema to Henson. He blamed Britain and France directly for the rising tensions in Africa and was puzzled by the lack of action taken toward Italy after it had destroyed the 'olive branch' extended to it.[35] Henson made this point clear in a front-page letter in *The Times* entitled 'Justice Before Peace' – a title which clearly alludes to the pattern of Anglican thought that insisted peace was unachievable in a social space devoid of Christian values. The letter was largely in response to a letter written by the diplomat Lord Hardinge (1858-1944), which argued that Britain had no moral obligation to Abyssinia because it had no commercial interest in the region.[36] Hardinge's letter also received public condemnation from Lord Robert Cecil, asserting that the idea that moral outrage was inextricably linked to commercial interests was an 'unpardonable breach of faith' – a sentiment Henson shared in his private diary, writing that Hardinge's letter clearly rejects the presence of God in the temporal sphere if he believed that God would watch wickedness occur so long as a profit was turned.[37] Concluding his preliminary

[33] For Alington and the British Empire, see 'Nazi Doctrine of Enslavement', *Daily Telegraph*, 2 December 1939; 'Evil is There – To be Conquered', *The Daily Telegraph*, 28 October 1939.
[34] Idem, *The Last Crusade* (Oxford: OUP, 1940), 11.
[35] DCL, BHP, HHH/64, 24 August 1935, 234; a similar point would be made later by Ernest Barker, see 'Anglo-Italian Agreement', *The Times*, 27 April 1938.
[36] Lord Hardinge, 'Italo-Abyssinian Dispute', ibid, 27 August 1935; see also, Henson, 'Justice Before Peace', ibid, 30 August 1935.
[37] Lord Cecil, 'Italo-Abyssinian Dispute', ibid, 28 August 1935; DCL, BHP, HHH/64, 27 August 1935, 240.

thoughts, Henson wrote laconically: 'it is hard to see what will happen; easy to see what ought to happen.'[38]

Inge's and Alington's *realpolitik* show that nuanced perspectives on fascism were possible and that not every tenet of the fascist doctrine was perceived as innately sinful. More than this though, it highlights the fulcrum of Anglican criticisms of fascist colonialism. Criticisms came from the very existence of competing systems of colonialism because this destabilised the international order predicated upon cooperation. Reason dictated that international cooperation was in line with God's manifest will for all his children to coexist irrespective of material differences. Therefore, only Christian conceptions of colonialism could be justified because such a conception was the only true manifestation of God's will. While the Church of England believed it contributed to this through the expansion of Christianity across the globe, fascism was seen as antithetical to it because its system of colonialism was not only different to Christian conceptions, but actively undermined them.

The Motivations of Fascist Imperialism

Lang was convinced that fascism's colonial motivations lay in its nationalistic ideology. His belief that Italy consciously subverted the values of cooperation and universal love for its policy of self-aggrandisement fits into the wider conception of fascist nationalism explored in Chapter Two. Though firm in his convictions, he took a while to reach this point. Anthony Eden (1897-1977), the Minister for League of Nations Affairs, remembered the palpable apprehension in the cabinet in August 1935 at the relocation of 300,000 Italian soldiers to Italian-controlled Eritrea.[39] Lang, on the other hand, characterised the inexorably rising tensions as a 'dispute' between Abyssinia and Italy and though the neutrality here implies reticence, it was more indicative of his caution in foreign relations.[40]

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[38] DCL, ibid, 30 August 1935, 256.
[39] Eden, *Facing the Dictators*, 228-9.
[40] 'Abyssinia and Italy', *The Times*, 7 August 1935.

Lang's approach certainly differed from Davidson's response to Italy's bombardment of Corfu in 1923, as he clearly thought it in his remit to learn about, and speak on, the Abyssinian crisis. There are numerous examples of Lang directly contacting the Foreign Office and other official bodies to ascertain the correct information about the conflict.[41] In one pertinent instance, Lang received a letter from Major General Polson Newman, then stationed in Addis Ababa. Newman was somewhat of a freelance diplomat and journalist, whose books *Ethiopian Realities* (1936) and *The New Abyssinia* (1938) provided intellectual and ethical succour to Mussolini's claim to be leading a civilising mission. He wrote personally to Lang to propagate this narrative, hoping to explain 'the truth' about the massacres of Abyssinian civilians by the Italian military in 1937.[42] Unsure about its legitimacy, Alan Campbell Don, Lang's chaplain, met with Sir Lancelot Oliphant (1881-1965) at the Foreign Office to ask about Newman, to which Oliphant replied that Newman was 'a known propagandist' of Mussolini's regime and that 'the Archbishop would be well advised not to see the man' due to his report being 'most certainly biased.'[43] What we will see is that the information Lang proactively gathered formed much of his public pronouncements on Abyssinia and suggests that he was not avoiding the controversy of contemporary discourse, but rather waiting to make an informed and influential contribution to it.

Lang was genuinely distressed about the situation in Abyssinia and Lockhart portrays his emotional state at this time well.[44] Moreover, the candid prose in Don's private diary offers a unique insight into Lang's personal commitment to the Abyssinian crisis. Lang frequently welcomed the exiled Emperor Haile Selassie to Lambeth Palace and the Emperor even stored his more treasured belongings in Lambeth's safe (much to Don's dismay); Lang also forwarded numerous appeals to the Foreign Office on the Emperor's behalf.[45] But Lang was also painfully

[41] See e.g., LPL, CFR AOC 67/1 ff.50-2, Anthony Eden to Lang, 25 August 1936 and ff.63, Lang to the Abyssinia Association, 6 March 1937.
[42] Ibid, Lang 153 ff.130-1, Polson Newman to Lang, 15 May 1937.
[43] Ibid, ff.136-7, A. C. Don Memorandum, 1 June 1937.
[44] Lockhart, *Cosmo Gordon Lang*, 382.
[45] Don, Beaken (ed.), *Faithful Witness* (London: SPCK, 2020), 238, 242 (16 and 29 July 1937).

aware that his interventions regarding Abyssinia would bring him criticism.[46] The picture that emerges is of a conflicted Lang: a Primate looking to reconcile his public and private thoughts, his faith and his friends.

Italy's invasion of Abyssinia on 3 October 1935 provided Lang with irrefutable evidence that fascist colonialism was nationalistic and had no interest in international cooperation. Five days after the invasion, the Church of England convened at Bournemouth for the 65th Annual Church Congress. On the opening day, Lang scathingly asserted 'if there was ever an act of unprovoked aggression surely it is this.'[47] It is vital to notice the semantic shift in Lang's interjections, who had first considered this a 'dispute', a mutual disagreement, to now 'unprovoked aggression' against a 'backward state.'[48] He responded to Abyssinia in much the same way he did to Corfu in 1923: he did not see a foundational binary of Italy against Abyssinia but of fascism against Christian civilisation.[49] Following my previous discussion of Anglican conceptions of fascism and space at the end of Chapter Two, if Italy was a heterotopia of deviation within Christian civilisation then Abyssinia had been firmly repositioned within the jurisdiction of Christian civilisation.

Therefore, Lang crafted an occidental view of the crisis, just as he did with the German Church Struggle in this same period.[50] Lang was clearly responding to the new conception of international relations established at the Paris Peace Conference, based more than ever on mutual trust and universal love. This point is furthered when we acknowledge that Lang considered Abyssinia as part of the Occident and Italy outside of it. He clearly breaks down the once sharp distinctions between 'Occident' and 'Orient' as defined by the philological, social, and aesthetic differences common in contemporary colonial discourse.[51] Instead, he had broadened the scope of the Occident's defining features in accordance with this new world, not caring for the material

[46] See e.g., BL, CCP, Add MS 51154 A, ff.66, Lang to Cecil, 30 November 1936.
[47] Lang, 'The Present Crisis', in *Christianity in the Modern State*, 69.
[48] Ibid.
[49] 'Maintenance of Peace', *The Times*, 22 October 1935.
[50] On this, see Chapter Two of this thesis.
[51] Edward Said, *Orientalism* (London: Routledge, 1978), 12.

differences between cultures so long as those cultures were oriented toward God. The association of developed and non-developed nations as equally fundamental to the same civilisational framework goes some way to show the foundational binary that fascism was forcing Christendom to establish.

Through the example of colonial systems, Lang was able to extrapolate that fascism was anathema to Christian civilisation because of Italy's refusal to see colonialism as about the opportunity for the expansion of Western (Christian) morality and instead about personal, material development. This Occidental approach governed his sermon at the Church Congress in Bournemouth. Lang explained that peace itself was not something that society could establish but that it is the product of a social space where Christian values such as justice and cooperation are supreme. Because fascism had a flagrant disregard for these values in its colonial systems – seen principally in its nationalistic intentions – peace could not have been attained.[52] As with Corfu, Lang once again turned to the providential mission of the League of Nations as the solution, although he now believed military force was a legitimate option, justifying it through an assertion of the innately 'spiritual force' behind the League's operation.[53]

Temple's indictment of the situation was similarly structured around an absence of reason. Reason was central to the Christian conception of empire because justification for it rested upon the ultimate ideal of the Kingdom of God, which could only be realised where God's word was acted upon – colonial missions must act in accordance with His manifest will. This perspective was certainly in keeping with Temple's ideas on fascist nationalism from the early 1930s. Italy's conscious rejection of its obligations to Abyssinia coincided with previous ideas about fascism's selfish nationalism. Interestingly though, in the context of Abyssinia, Temple began to see fascism as directly attacking the Christian faith while Lang continued to observe a consequential relationship between fascism's repudiation of reason and its marginalisation of Christianity.[54]

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[52] Lang, 'The Present Crisis', 70.
[53] Ibid, 74.
[54] Temple, 'The Christian and the World Situation', *The Listener*, 14:347 (1935), 466-7.

Temple's commitment to a world order based on a unity around Christian principles engendered a rapid development in his approach to maintaining this system. In August 1935, he stated clearly his belief that it was a 'moral obligation' to defend the earthly impresses of these values with the full operation of the 'machinery of the League.'[55] Temple followed Lang in presenting the League as possessing an irrefutable spiritual justification for physically intervening in Abyssinia. He argued that the League's central responsibility in Abyssinia was to uphold the values of the Christian doctrine in the international sphere and if it did not do this 'it cannot function effectively in any great crisis.'[56]

Both Lang's and Temple's early response to the threat of fascist colonialism demonstrate an effort to formulate an ethical justification for the use of force if necessary. This context hinged on the need to protect the supremacy of transcendental ethics in the world. We have noted already how Benson pervaded interwar thought, and other Victorian writings appeared similarly instructive. Frederick Temple, William's father, had an interpretation of empire to which eschatological judgement was integral: on the Day of the Lord, God will ask 'have you done more than others as the gifts bestowed on you were greater than those given to the rest of the nations?'[57] Benson and Temple were responding to the problems of nineteenth century colonialism, which was primarily about the treatment of indigenous people – but what apologetics like these stressed is the transtemporality of the true vocation of colonial expansion. Such an understanding allowed interwar Anglicans to establish a relativist understanding of colonialism which justified the use of military force to maintain an international order conducive for this vocation.

The other significant episcopal comment on Abyssinia at Bournemouth came from the Conference's President, Cyril Garbett, bishop of Winchester. Garbett called directly for the Church of England to engage in greater 'social witness.' Garbett meant that the Church needed to

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[55] Idem, 'The Abyssinian Dispute', *The Times*, 20 August 1935.
[56] Idem, 'The Christian and the World Situation', 412; see also, 'Pacifism and "Heresy"', *The Times*, 29 October 1935.
[57] Frederick Temple, *Five of the Latest Utterances of Frederick Temple* (London: MacMillan, 1903), 44-5 ('Sermon on Foreign Missions', 1902).

stop crafting responses to the tribulations of modernity through secular or worldly frameworks and start engaging with approaches more in line with ideas of divine judgement, hope, and salvation. Though this is a general point, he adduced the specific policy of 'snatch and grab' (redolent of the nineteenth century 'scramble for Africa', *c.*1885-1914) that Italy was performing in Abyssinia to emphasise the need for witness.[58] Garbett's colloquialism is actually an eloquent summary of the thought of Anglicans like himself, Lang, and Temple. Garbett's call to witness was a damning indictment of the conscious rejection of God's manifest will in the earthly realm and the forcible expansion of the fascist moral code.

T. S. Eliot saw world peace as unattainable given the clear repudiation of justice in fascist foreign policy. In January 1936, Eliot wrote a commentary in the *Criterion* which clearly shows that he had no truck with Mussolini's claim of leading a 'civilising' mission in Abyssinia. This narrative was notably expounded in Britain by Evelyn Waugh (1903-62). Although Waugh is probably best known today for his novels, at this time he was the *Daily Mail*'s correspondent in Abyssinia, a devout Roman Catholic, and a vocal apologist of Mussolini's regime. Waugh wrote that Mussolini's campaign brought 'order and decency, education and medicine, in a disgraceful place.'[59] This might simply reflect the attitude of a 'classic colonialist' as imperialism emerged into the discursive continuum surrounding fascism (as Tom Villis suggests), but it might also be ascribed to a pro-Fascist propaganda campaign.[60] Whether he was aware of it or not (and one suspects he was), Waugh wielded influence as part of a literary coterie (which included G. K. Chesterton (1874-1936) and Hilaire Belloc), that crafted and informed Catholic opinion in Britain. Responding to such claims, Eliot insisted that 'higher' nations should help to develop 'lower' ones, maintaining that Italy's claim to have done this was 'flimsy' at best.[61]

Eliot's essay continued thus:

[58] Garbett, 'The Presidential Address', 66.
[59] Evelyn Waugh, *Waugh in Abyssinia* (London: Longmans, 1936), 249-50.
[60] Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism*, 160.
[61] Eliot, 'A Commentary', *Criterion,* 15:59 (January 1936), 268.

> There will probably always remain a real inequality of races… But the fundamental identity in *humanity* must always be asserted; as must the equal sanctity of moral obligation to people of every race. All men are equal before God; if they cannot all be equal in this world, yet our moral obligation towards inferiors is exactly the same as that towards our equals.[62]

One might argue that Eliot's theological writings were too specifically Anglican to have any meaningful Christian influence but compared to his most famous early attempts – 'Lancelot Andrewes' (1928) or *Thoughts After Lambeth* (1931), for example – this commentary is always orientated to the Christian. Jason Harding has argued that the *Criterion* had a 'weak grasp of political realities', while Peter White reiterates this, suggesting its journalism was 'out of touch', and both are certainly applicable to Eliot's Abyssinian essay.[63] I happen to think that this is applicable to this essay, but I will stress that the most significant aspect of Eliot's essay is that it demonstrates a common understanding amongst Anglicans that Mussolini's colonial policy was dislocated from Christian morality and transcendental ethics like justice. If the moral duty to evangelise areas of the world was removed from a colonial campaign, it was devoid of any legitimate justification.

This shows that some Anglicans saw fascist imperialism as a genuine threat to the advancement of civilisation because what was being allowed to happen to Abyssinia undermined the principles that were fundamental to civilisational progression. The milieu of 'Neo-Tories', in which Bernhard Dietz includes Eliot as a central member, largely sought to justify and praise Mussolini's campaign, either as a civilising mission or as an aggrandisement of the Catholic faith's jurisdiction.[64] Significantly though, Eliot proved to be an outlier amongst his ideological peers as he condemned the invasion of Abyssinia, once again suggesting how Anglican objections to fascism and its imperialism superseded traditional political affiliations. He instead showed a unity with Anglicans who considered it occidentally – as an attack on civilisation.

Arnold J. Toynbee similarly indicted fascist colonialism on account of its discernible contrast to the British Empire. Toynbee was concerned by the absence of morality in the world

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[62] Ibid.
[63] Harding, *The Criterion*, 183; Peter White, 'Literary Journalism', *T. S. Eliot in Context*, 103.
[64] Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 124.

generally, which was most noticeable in the fascist and communist regimes. According to one biographer, the intensity of this challenge had increased by 1936 to the extent that it pushed him back toward the religiosity which he had abandoned as a young man.[65] Though he was certainly more religious in the 1930s, he observed a latitudinarian Christianity in the interwar years before eventually moving closer to Roman Catholicism, a position which, at this time, he felt was untenable.[66]

Christianity for Toynbee was more about a system of morality than ecclesiastical practice. Indeed, we might characterise Toynbee as viewing religion as a form of practical reason like Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In Kantian philosophy, one had a 'moral necessity to assume the existence of God' owing to his duty to reach the 'highest good.' For Kant, as for Toynbee, God must exist because virtuous behaviour must have a purpose: it must be vindicated by the 'highest original good.'[67] This religiosity was present in Toynbee's criticisms of Fascist policy about Abyssinia. Toynbee argued that national and ethnic distinctions were irrelevant to the discussion, emphasising a universal Christian ethic: 'The nationalized human being of A.D. 1935 could not be a Frenchman or an Englishman… without first being just a man.'[68]

Toynbee understood the conflict as a microcosm of a wider struggle bifurcated along the lines of 'dictators' and 'democracies'; on the question of Abyssinia, 'morality' was on the side of the democracies.[69] Britain's outcry over Abyssinia was underpinned by morality because prejudices did not stop them from defending Abyssinia, as was its Christian, moral, duty. According to Toynbee, the root cause of conflicts like the Abyssinian war was the fascist rejection of Christian ethics regarding right or wrong because it followed its own moral code. Alternative moral codes, he argued, emerged in the moral vacuum caused by the 'dissolution' of a common morality present

[65] William McNeill, *Arnold J. Toynbee* (Oxford: OUP, 1989), 70. For further comment on Toynbee's loose but nonetheless present religiosity, see R. J. Overy, *The Morbid Age* (London: Allen Lane, 2009), 44.
[66] McNeill, ibid, 156.
[67] Immanuel Kant, Mary Gregor (ed. & trans.), *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788; Cambridge: CUP, 1997), §5:125-6, 104-5.
[68] Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1935,* II (London: OUP, 1936), 99.
[69] Idem, 'The Issues in British Foreign Policy', *International Affairs*, 17:3 (1938), 329-30.

in 'medieval Christendom', in which individual nations 'had had no doubt of what the moral system was and… believed that these applied to international affairs.'[70] W. H. Moberly, a lay Anglican academic, agreed, saying that 'part of our trouble today was that the dictator countries were morally unified in a way which we were not. We had got to get back to our own unified standards.'[71] Both Toynbee and Moberly supported the League of Nations because it was an expression of collective morality; for Toynbee this meant it was one of the 'principal landmarks in our progress' toward the 'path of salvation' while for Moberly, 'collective security, though not the highest Christian Ideal, was perhaps the best immediate ideal.'[72] Despite differing levels of doctrinal orthodoxy, a common pattern in Anglican thought emerged regarding the need for moral unity as a counterresponse to the distinct lack of morality in fascism.

But perhaps more than anyone else in the Church of England, Bishop Henson of Durham was the most vociferous and dominant critic of Italy's campaign. Henson did not speak at the Bournemouth conference, but his interjections would have been well known amongst those present. Attendees also likely remembered Henson's previous campaigns to highlight the injustices of modern colonial endeavours, such as the British involvement with the rubber boom in Putumayo, Peru, in the 1900s.[73] He had a history of inflammatory and controversial language. His appointment as the bishop of Hereford in 1917 was met with outcry (notably from Charles Gore and Cosmo Lang, both of whom refused to attend his consecration) due to his comments surrounding the clergy's right to express doubts over the virgin birth. Though his doctrinal soundness was soon reaffirmed, his disposition for unequivocal language was never tempered. Despite Alan Don claiming he was 'typically eloquent' in this episode, Henson's voice was

[70] Bod., Archive of Arnold Joseph Toynbee [hereafter AAJT], MS. 13967/63/2, Minutes of 'The Relevance of Ethics to International Affairs', 7 November 1938, 1.
[71] Ibid, 8.
[72] Ibid/43, 'The Fourth Talk, 1 December 1930', *World Order or Downfall* (London: BBC, 1930), 27; W. H. Moberly, see above.
[73] Chadwick, *Hensley Henson*, 101-5.

considered vituperative by most, and large swathes of the Church of England chided him 'for unchristian bellicosity.'[74]

Like most within the Church of England, Henson condemned the nationalism of Italian colonialism. Henson drew on the familiar understanding that there was an epistemological void in fascism. To him, Mussolini's invasion sought 'adventure which would divert popular attention from domestic ills' because instead of providing genuine, progressive social regeneration, fascism relied on man's base instinct for national superiority, which clouded his enlightened, rational judgement.[75] Moreover, to further this point he invoked classically 'evil' statesmen to denounce Italy's military campaign: he described it as 'the principles of [Niccolò] Machiavelli (1469-1527) and the practice of Cesar Borgia [*sic*] (1475-1507) combined with the resources of modern science.'[76] It is not difficult to infer that Henson purposefully used Machiavelli to indict the nationalistic attitude of the fascist doctrine, a man who encouraged the callous use of violence and deceit to fulfil one's ambitions. Such was the appeal of this base instinct that it even gripped supposedly enlightened figures, including Pope Pius XI, whose Italian nationality meant he was stuck in 'the teeth of arrogant nationalism.'[77]

Henson was critical of the Catholic position. He was distressed that the *Church Times* (an Anglo-Catholic paper) was currying favour with the Mussolini regime to, in turn, win favour with Pope Pius XI, whose comments on Abyssinia he derided as 'nebulous and noncommittal.'[78] In public, Henson wrote of Pius:

> In the face of treaties broken, oppression flagrant, barbarous cruelties inflicted, the Pope kept silence, or prayed helplessly of peace to men who were sharpening their weapons for war. Jeremiah's verdict on the religious leader of ancient Israel suggests itself as not undeserved by their representatives in modern Christendom: "They have healed also the hurt of my people lightly, saying, Peace, peace; when there is no peace."[79]

[74] Don, *Faithful Witness*, 263 (18 May 1938); Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, 328; see also criticism of Henson in 'Summary', *Church Times*, 29 April 1938.
[75] Henson, *Abyssinia*, 10.
[76] Ibid, 13.
[77] Ibid, 19.
[78] DCL, BHP, HHH/65, 6 September 1935, 8.
[79] Henson, *Abyssinia*, 19-20.

Directly referencing Jeremiah 6:14, Henson was comparing Mussolini to the Neo-Babylonians that besieged Jerusalem in its destruction of Judah. Henson's comparison was centred around the narrative of a false prophet who brought violence to a God-fearing people that had refused to acknowledge the alien authority imposed onto them. In this instance, through scriptural exegesis and Patristic history, Henson crafted a pervasive image of Christian martyrdom with which all his references to Abyssinia were inflected and thus consistently exposed Mussolini's colonialism as the direct inverse of the evangelism associated with the British Empire.

In light of this, the pamphlet should perhaps be read as a polemic against Pius XI. As the crisis unfolded, Henson's prophecy of an impotent Pope bound by the strictures of the Lateran Treaties was vindicated. Henson felt peace could have been achieved by direct action; by which, he meant the proactive effort to cultivate certain Christian values within a social space. Henson believed the Church was the primary source of social moralising, and so Pius's neutrality was indicted as complicity. As he wrote in a letter to his friend, the classicist E. H. Blakeney (1869-1955), '<u>there is a time to be silent</u>' but this was not one, and he called on 'men with the BBC at their service' to stop shirking their moral responsibilities. Though talking generally, Henson was almost certainly targeting Lang and other Christian leaders, such as Cardinal Arthur Hinsley (1865-1943), the Roman Catholic archbishop of Westminster, as well Cabinet ministers of whom he was suspicious, notably Anthony Eden.[80]

Henson was known for his dyspeptic attitude toward Lang. But in August 1935 it stemmed from Lang's seeming ambivalence toward what was, for him, a straightforward case of right and wrong. As usual, Lang closely adhered to the official Government line of showing fairness to both Mussolini and Haile Selassie. In response, Henson wrote 'ye know nothing at all, nor do ye take account that it is expedient that one man should die for the people', the phrase uttered by Caiaphas during the Sanhedrin trial of Jesus.[81] Henson had found a neat analogy, and one which associated

[80] BL, Blakeney Collection [hereafter BC], Add MS 63089, ff.11, Henson to E. H. Blakeney, 30 December 1936; criticism of Eden is in ibid., ff.7, Henson to Blakeney, 25 July 1936. Underlined as per the original.
[81] Henson, 'Justice Before Peace', *op. cit.*

the Abyssinian's cause with Jesus's martyrdom. He pointed out that the Government line – that it was expedient for world peace to appease Italy – negated the Christian conception of peace because it could not be achieved without justice; as he later wrote of those toeing this line, 'peace divorced from righteousness is the sorriest cant that can pollute Christian lips.'[82]

More than this though, Henson argued that Abyssinia was one of a number of instances where the 'shadow of moral obtuseness clings to the papacy' – from the *Te Deum* Gregory XIII (1502-85) ordered for the St Bartholomew's Day Massacre of French Huguenots in 1572 to its support of the French Government during the Dreyfus Affair (*c.*1894-1906), 'Abyssinia does but sum up and emphasise the witness of Christian history.'[83] Here, Henson offers a similar interpretation to Garbett at Bournemouth however he is specifically talking about the witness of the Church and not the faith. In this instance, he was directly condemning the Papacy not for witness but direct involvement. Henson diverged from the episcopate then not on account of sentiment, but rather in the location of his anger: it was not the faith that was inept for modernity, but those tasked with representing it. Such ideas on the social witness of the Church became conventional in Christian thought. In his unfinished magnum opus, *Ethics* (*c.*1943), Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrote that the Christian church should be ashamed of having witnessed the lawless application of brutal force 'under the cover of the name of Christ' in that period.[84]

Alan Wilkinson has argued that Henson took 'satisfaction' from seeing his 'pessimistic view of modern civilisation' unfold in Abyssinia.[85] The suggestion that Henson was gratified by having his prescience ratified by the suffering of Abyssinian civilians is tenuous. Owen Chadwick's assessment that Henson was 'stirred with martial spirit' to end the suffering in Abyssinia is much more compelling.[86] He toured Rotary clubs in the 1930s, subverting their strict code of apoliticism

[82] Idem, *Abyssinia*, 16.
[83] Ibid, 18.
[84] Bonhoeffer, Clifford Green (ed.), *Ethics* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2009), 138.
[85] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform?*, 166.
[86] Chadwick, *Hensley Henson*, 247.

to raise awareness of the conflict.[87] Henson felt profound emotional distress at the plight of Abyssinia – again writing to Blakeney about the conflict, Henson concluded '1936 was an evil year.'[88] Indeed, studying Henson's letters and diaries elucidates a response of genuine concern at the dislocation of the world from Christian values and that this had led to the current instability – an instability which showed no signs of settling. We also ascertain the palpable anger he felt toward the moral leaders of the Anglican and Catholic churches who were supine in their responses.

Though critical of Lang's apparent moral ambivalence in August and September 1935, as well as his sustained commitment to peddling the Government line of neutrality, Henson's analyses converged with Lang's. The Church of England justified the British Empire on the basis that it was preparing human society for its integration into the Kingdom of God. Given that reason was the ultimate knowledge of God's word, the Church of England's conception of the system of international cooperation after the Great War was distinctly informed by reason. Fascism's incompatibility with this world order – seen principally in its colonial policy – was blamed on its behaviour being consciously detached from rational consideration. Fascist colonialism was nationalist and acted with no regard for its obligations to primitive states. If the new world order was utilising cooperation as the driver of civilisational progression, then fascism was evidently inimical to this.

Illegal Weapons and Civilisational Destruction

The violence that accompanied fascist colonialism was the other primary reason why Anglicans believed fascism was dislocated from Christian morality. Unsurprisingly, the fear of annihilation became a common anxiety in the years succeeding the First World War, but there remained a hope that civilisational progression would lessen the need for weapons of mass destruction. Archbishop

[87] See e.g., 'Dr. Henson on Italy's War Policy', *The Daily Telegraph*, 31 December 1935; *Unimportant Life*, II, 412 (entry for 16 June 1938); on Rotary Club conduct, see McCarthy, 'Parties, Voluntary Associations, and Democratic Politics in Interwar Britain', *The Historical Journal*, 50:4 (2007), 897.
[88] BL, BC, Add MS 63089, ff.11, Henson to Blakeney, 30 December 1936.

Davidson certainly had this in mind when he called for God to protect civilisation from the 'perils of war' and to make the world 'safe' for human habitation immediately after the Armistice.[89] If Ford Maddox Ford's and Virginia Woolf's accounts of daily life in interwar England have any truth in them, then the aeroplane in particular was as much as an indicator of modernity as it was a source of fear.[90]

Anglican writings seemingly fitted this cultural and aesthetic trend. The lay Anglican historian and socialist campaigner R. H. Tawney (1880-1962) wrote that 'scientific' warfare was a perversion of the natural order and that the modalities of modern warfare (which he experienced on the Western Front in the Great War) 'kills [the]... souls' of those who participated in it.[91] Furthermore, the pacifist Canon Professor Charles Raven characterised modern warfare as 'the manifestation of a sub-human instrument of destruction, an onslaught of blind mechanical forces.'[92] Hensley Henson lamented that 'fighting now resolves itself into butchery at long range' while the literary critic John Middleton Murry, a noted pacifist in this period, wrote during the Nazi bombing of Guernica in the Spanish Civil War that the bomber pilot 'sits remote and apart. What are human beings to him?'[93] The close association of fascism and the invisible operation of mechanised annihilation emphasised the total absence of reason in fascist imperialism.

Tempting as it is to surmise that this was due to a strong pacifist influence in the Church of England, it should be noted that pacifism's appeal was disproportionately limited compared to the fame of its exponents. It had leading exemplars amongst the clergy in Dick Sheppard (1880-1937), sometime dean of Canterbury, Ralph Inge, and Charles Raven as well as influential laypeople like Middleton Murry and the feminist preacher Maude Royden, however it never became more than a fringe movement. More likely, Anglican anxieties about the immorality of Mussolini's

89 'Thanksgiving Day', *The Times*, 15 November 1918.
90 Ford Maddox Ford, *Parade's End* (1924; London: Penguin, 1989), 691; Virginia Woolf, *Mrs. Dalloway* (1926; Oxford: OUP, 2008), 16-7.
91 R. H. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1920), 45.
92 Charles Raven, *War and the Christian* (London: SCM, 1938), 42.
93 DCL, BHP, HHH/65, 6 October 1935, 70; Middleton Murry, 'Democracy and the Democrat', *Peace News*, 47 (8 May 1937), 7.

campaign were exacerbated by Article XXXVII of the Thirty-Nine Articles (the doctrines and practices of the Church of England written in 1563), which accepted 'just war' principles as well as a belief that Christians could undertake active military service.[94]

Anglican theology on the justification of war was largely influenced by Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas theorises these principles explicitly, demanding a righteous cause, such as the defence of one's nation at the behest of the ruler.[95] Though differences between Thomist-influenced just war principles and Anglican ones are limited, Michael Snape has argued that the wording of Article XXXVII provided scope for the interpretation that fighting was part of the Anglicans' duty and pacifism tantamount to heresy. As Snape explains, this particular idea held purchase with thinkers such as the nineteenth-century Christian socialist F. D. Maurice right through to William Temple.[96] With the Church of England recommitted to an accepted standard of war, it served to support the suggestion that Italy's military campaign further demonstrated that its colonialism was detached from reason.

Like the Christian pacificists above, Lang purposely removed human agency from the images of the Abyssinian war which he evoked. Speaking in Kent, he declared that Abyssinia was suffering at the hands of a 'great and carefully prepared machine of slaughter.'[97] A few days later at the Bournemouth Conference, he reiterated this sentiment. He asked why modern society had 'invented [weapons] for the destruction of human life?' considering this was inimical to civilisational progression.[98] As a consequence of its embrace of this, Italy was reduced to nothing more than a 'vast and pitiless machine of war.' It is significant that in Lang's analysis Abyssinia remained a 'state' (albeit a 'backward' one), but Italy did not which is a position formed through a direct synthesis of his reimagined understanding of the Occident and his more longstanding belief

[94] Michael Snape, 'War and Peace', in *The Oxford History of Anglicanism*, IV, 216.
[95] Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, IX (II.II, QQ.I.-XLVI.), 500-16.
[96] Snape, *A Church Militant* (Oxford: OUP, 2022), 7.
[97] 'The Primate on Italy', *The Times*, 7 October 1935.
[98] Lang, 'The Present Crisis', 69.

that nations constitute moral units.[99] Moreover, it is indicative of Daniel Pick's argument that 'the machine' came to be emblematic of modern states that used military force with no rational consideration. In *War Machine* (1993), Pick argues that the 'rationalisation of slaughter' in fact made the operation of modern warfare distinctly irrational; despite Pick's book being concerned with secular intellectuals between *c.*1830 and 1914, we nonetheless see how these thoughts pervaded religious discussions in the 1930s.[100]

Many have seen President Franklin D. Roosevelt's (1882-1945) speech in 1939 on the wrongfulness of weapons of mass destruction as the keynote interjection on the modalities of modern warfare.[101] But, as we have seen, religious responses were expounded much earlier than this, and Cosmo Lang was at the forefront of this. As such, there was a real moment, I think, when he transcended denominational, religious, and geographical boundaries to speak for humanity on the direction of civilisation louder than anyone else. As such, his outbursts did not escape the notice of Mussolini's acolytes either. A 1936 article entitled 'Public Ignorance Exploited' in the pro-Mussolini *British-Italian Bulletin* claimed that Lang manipulated uninformed emotions amongst the laity with lies about Italy's campaign.[102] Similarly, Alan Don, again dining with Sir Lancelot Oliphant at the Foreign Office, was told that the Italian press had accused Lang of being a major shareholder in an Abyssinian slave trading company and thus did not want Italy's civilising mission to succeed.[103] Furthermore, Consuelo Vanderbilt-Balsan (1877-1964) wrote to her cousin-in-law Winston Churchill (1874-1965) that Lang's behaviour regarding Abyssinia had done nothing but tighten the relationship between Germany and Italy.[104]

Some have suggested that discussions around modern warfare coincided with the onset of the Second World War in 1939. Andrew Chandler implies that discussion of these issues only

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[99] Ibid.
[100] Daniel Pick, *War Machine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), esp., 238, 265.
[101] 'Text of Appeal by Roosevelt on Bombing', *Daily Telegraph*, 2 September 1939.
[102] Claudia Baldoli, *Exporting Fascism* (Oxford: Berg, 2003), 108-9.
[103] Don, *Faithful Witness,* 178 (14 February 1936).
[104] Cambridge, Churchill College Archive [hereafter CCA], CHAR 2/327/111, Consuelo Vanderbilt-Balsan to Winston Churchill, 12 October 1935; see also, Douglas Jerrold, 'The League and the Rule of Law', *The English Review*, 64:2 (1937), 157.

featured amongst fringe groups in interwar religious society.[105] As I have shown, the discussion of aggressive militarism and the ethics of modern warfare were formative debates in what constituted the Anglican understanding of, and response to, fascism in the 1930s. Furthermore, Stephen Lammers argues that the episcopate generally accepted aerial warfare as ethical during the Second World War, which illuminates the seismic shift in attitudes between 1935 and 1940.[106] The following chapters of this thesis will demonstrate how the increased threat of fascist regimes in Europe forced the episcopate to adapt its ethical stance.

For a generation of Anglicans familiar with the horrors of the Great War, the use of poison gas in Abyssinia was resonant. Moreover, some Anglicans believed peace was only attainable through venerating justice, love, and cooperation; only the worldly implementation of Christian doctrine could have removed the need for armaments. Indeed, fascism's use of military force for its own (material) development at the expense of another country was further evidence to some Anglicans that fascism's impact on the temporal world was inimical to the progress of civilisation. Anglicans found no teleological justifications in the fascist colonial process, unlike the British Empire, because its motivations were not spiritual but material.

The use of poison gas was immediately condemned, with Toynbee publicly declaring it a 'devilish weapon.'[107] There had been some efforts of cross-denominational solidarity with the Vatican through Cardinal Hinsley around humanitarian campaigns in Abyssinia. But they were not seen as enough, especially as the truth of Italy's military campaign was elucidated. In 1935, Arthur Duncan-Jones, dean of Chichester, wrote to Lang requesting that he distance himself from Hinsley, and thus the Roman Catholic Church more generally, because the Papacy was not doing enough to condemn the use of poison gas.[108] Yet even for those clergymen with a memory of

[105] Chandler, 'The Obliteration Bombing.'
[106] Lammers, 'William Temple', 72.
[107] Toynbee, 'The Abyssinians' Fate', *The Times*, 22 April 1936.
[108] Kent, 'Between Rome and London', 268.

poison gas in the First World War, the use of it against defenceless Abyssinians seemed to set a new precedent of trauma. Speaking directly to ideas about fascism as a civilisational aberration, Henry Wilson (1876-1961), bishop of Chelmsford (1929-50), wrote in his Diocesan leaflet that 'it would be impossible to find in past history such cruel and shameless treatment as the Italians have meted out by their poison gas and bombs to the women and children of Abyssinia.'[109]

The gassing of Abyssinia was also a damning indictment of Mussolini's claims to be civilising Abyssinia. Kenneth Ingram (1882-1965), a lay Anglican writer and social activist, sarcastically concluded that 'Fascist Italy has brought civilisation to Abyssinia by drenching it in poison gas.'[110] Ingram's quip was, however, indicative of genuine Anglican anxiety regarding the fascist propensity to use weapons of mass destruction without considering the consequences this would have on the world. Numerous Anglicans noted that most Abyssinian people were still 'backward' and that they deserved help from civilised nations to lift them up (as the British Empire was purportedly doing elsewhere) rather than exploiting their weakness for material gain.[111] If empires were a gift from God, then they demanded behaviour in accordance with His manifest will. The use of violence, exacerbated in the context of a powerful nation against a backward one, thus supported ideas about fascism's rejection of moral reason.

In the thought of the two archbishops though, the consequence was perhaps even more profound than this. This thesis has already proposed that by the mid-1930s, Anglicans observed fascist regimes as an example of a 'heterotopia of deviation' as per Foucault's theory – an imagined 'other' space centred upon an alternative moral code within the framework of Christian civilisation. Some Anglicans soon suggested that the failure to stem the expansion of fascism was not about inactivity but inability; how could the civilisational and moral frameworks that allowed fascism to emerge in the first place combat its growth? Not too long after Bournemouth, Lang and Temple

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109 "'Shocking Beyond Words'", *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 22 May 1936.
110 Kenneth Ingram, *Christianity – Right or Left?* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1937), 84.
111 Cf., Don, *Faithful Witness*, 156 (3 October 1935); Garbett, 'The Presidential Address', 66; Henry Wilson, 'Bishop and Bombing', *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 24 July 1938.

delivered a joint New Year's Day message which offered a damning analysis of the impact of chemical weapons: 'it is plain also that that we call civilisation is not enough.'[112] The sermon called for a supranatural intervention, bringing to mind Garbett's call for a more fundamental Christian witness, to make man more aware of the need for 'brotherhood amongst men' as essential to the realisation of the Kingdom of God.[113] It is therefore plausible to suggest this went hand in hand with a reconsideration of Social Gospel theology.

Coined by the Christian socialist Brooke Foss Westcott, the 'social gospel' now refers to a theological party within the Church of England which taught that Christ was the source of ethics in society and that they ought to be applied to seemingly secular phenomena.[114] Moreover, these Anglicans held a high view of human potential, which was inextricably linked to a progressive coming of the Kingdom of God. Temple, who owed so much to the Christian socialists, clearly demonstrated the influence of this thought in his criticism of fascist colonialism. Writing in his *Diocesan Leaflet*, he said 'what has happened in Abyssinia… is a dishonour to Christendom and a most dire injury to the progress of evangelisation in Africa.' He argued that 'the aggression of Italy and the supineness of the League have gone far to persuade Africans that Christianity does not cause Europeans to treat them fairly and the Gospel does not work.'[115] Temple alluded to a waning faith in the idea of strong human potential for betterment because Italy – the hallmark of advanced civilisation – showed no regard for the transcendental ethics that drove civilisational progression. Fascism was thus seen as inimical to civilisational progression, and specifically the development of the Kingdom of God, because it operated on a different, unchristian, code of ethics. Worryingly for Temple, it appeared to irreparably damage the reputation of the Social Gospel.

In 1936, Lang presided over the annual meeting of the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts, an organisation founded in 1701 to evangelise non-Christian subjects of

[112] 'The Way of Peace', *The Times*, 30 December 1935.
[113] Ibid.
[114] N.B., Westcott used the term in his sermon marking the consecration of J. B. Lightfoot (1828-1898) as bishop of Durham; *From Strength to Strength* (London: MacMillan, 1890), 8 ('From Strength to Strength', 1879).
[115] 'Menace of Racialism', *The Times*, 28 May 1936.

the British crown. It is of considerable importance that it was here, at this organisation, that Lang offered a similarly damning indictment. 'What is so trying is the impotence of Christian Europe', he said. 'I ask you to think and pray so that in the future, the united powers of Europe and the civilised world may have strengthened the League of Nations that such things may become impossible in the future of this world.'[116] If we trace the timeline of Lang's response and reaction, the move away from the providential foundations of the League's mission to a reconsideration of the spiritual justifications for the use of force, goes some way in demonstrating how he more generally recapitulated his understanding of fascism as a civilisational aberration.

Again, Lang and Henson appear to provide similar interpretations. In 1936, Henson delivered the Gifford Lectures at the University of St Andrews, choosing the pertinent title *Christian Morality, Natural, Developing, Final*. In the lectures, Henson argued that Christian morality was the basis of Western civilisation and therefore all previous developments had been, and all forthcoming ones must be, affected by Christian doctrine.[117] When he discussed the 'non-Christian world' of the Roman Empire (that is to say, the period before Constantine and the official conversion to Christianity), Henson saw an opportunity to compare the moral code of the pre-Constantinian Roman Empire with Mussolini's Italy.

He suggested that not even 'the brutal aggression of ancient Rome insulted justice more grossly than the new-born imperialism of Mussolini's Italy.' He went on to say that he would have listened to arguments to the contrary, but he would have quickly reminded people that Mussolini operated under the universal moral framework Christianity had imposed on the world.[118] This draws on a previous statement he had made at the West Hartlepool Rotary Clubs, where he rhetorically asked whether the 'civilised people of Europe' wanted a return to 'barbarism', which was currently manifested in Italy's actions.[119] Henson had a sustained interest in the analogous

[116] 'Peace Brought by Bomb', *Daily Telegraph*, 30 April 1936.
[117] Henson, *Christian Morality, Natural, Developing, Final* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1936).
[118] Ibid, 126.
[119] 'Dr. Henson on Italy's War Policy', *op. cit.*

nature of fascism and paganism at this time. A more detailed explication of this is to come in Chapter Five, but the key thing to note now is that, for Henson, modernity was a cultural anathema because mature civilisations were now saturated with ancient, pagan, instincts.

Like Henson, Cyril Garbett saw the damage that the Fascist model of empire had the potential to inflict on the temporal world if it was allowed to go unchecked. If it continued to follow the path it was on, the Abyssinian conflict would 'destroy mutual trust' and 'throw open the way for another and more ghastly world war which may wreck our civilisation.'[120] In this specific instance, Garbett alluded to the anxiety of returning to the international political atmosphere out of which the First World War emerged. Henson's and Garbett's vocalisations reflected a wider sentiment in the Church of England, which was that fascism represented a selfish, nationalistic ideology. Moreover, though less doctrinal than Temple's thought, there is nonetheless an important overlap here in demonstrating that fascism was no longer seen as an approximation to Christendom, but as actively trying to destroy it.

The Church and the League of Nations: A Fractured Time

Shifting perspectives called for fresh responses. R. J. Overy has suggested that the Church of England's approach to interwar foreign relations was problematic 'because senior church leaders did not want to be seen to be challenging government policy or undermining the League of Nations.'[121] Overy is correct in his statement regarding government policy but Anglican support for the League toward the end of the 1930s was more complex than this. As we have seen, support for the League rested upon a perceived convergence of the moral intentions between the Church of England and the League in the development of the post-war world. Criticisms of the League from 1937 onwards, however, provide ways of thinking about how fascism was seen to transcend the normal temporality of politics. Anglicans did not lose their moral support for the League but

[120] Garbett, 'The Presidential Address', 66.
[121] Overy, *The Morbid Age*, 241.

began to overlook it due to a growing belief that the Church itself must lead the counterresponse to fascism.

In 1937, the Universal Christian Council for Life and Work held a conference in Oxford under the title 'Church, Community, and State.'[122] The Universal Christian Council was an ecumenical body that organised cross-denominational commissions that attempted to establish unified Christian teaching on contemporary issues. The conference was largely the work of the Scottish ecumenical theologian J. H. Oldham. The Church of England's presence was dominant not only because it was the largest single church at the conference, but also its senior figures were involved in its organisation, seen in Cosmo Lang's active recruitment of conference members.

As early as May 1936, Lang asked Lord Robert Cecil to join the Conference, describing it as a more general exposition of 'the various perils to the human spirit and to liberty with which the Totalitarian State, in its different forms, challenges us.'[123] To give a flavour of the intellectual context of Oxford, consider the preliminary notes Garbett produced for the 65th Church Congress at Bournemouth in 1935: 'at what point and how should the Church resist the claims of the totalitarian state?'[124] Lang's summary to Cecil is important because though the title implied a multitude of aspects related to modernity with which the Church had to contend, in the context of the Abyssinian and Spanish wars, fascism must have been the central preoccupation of the Council.

Other significant lay Anglicans were involved in the Conference, such as Arnold Toynbee as well as T. S. Eliot. Eliot's involvement would prove formative for his later discussions of a Christian world order. Oldham would ask Eliot to contribute to his journal, the *Christian News-Letter*, born out of the discussions of the Moot, to which Eliot was also invited. The Moot was an exclusive discussion group formed by members of Britain's religious intelligentsia and Roger

[122] For an overview of the 1937 Oxford Conference, see Edwin Aubrey, 'The Oxford Conference, 1937', *The Journal of Religion*, 17:4 (1937), 379-396 and Graeme Smith, *Oxford 1937* (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2004).
[123] BL, CCP, Add MS 51154 A, ff.56, Lang to Cecil, 27 May 1936.
[124] Garbett, 'The State and Christianity', *Sunday Times*, 23 June 1935.

Kojecky contends that it was created in direct response to the Oxford Conference in 1937.[125] The Moot will be discussed further in Chapters Five and Six but in the meantime, it is interesting to consider this as one part of the wider scramble for a new, religious response to modernity as providentialism and Social Gospel theology were seemingly marginalised.

Eliot had lost what little faith he had had in the League of Nations by 1936, writing to his confidant Emily Hale that 'the Italians seem to have got what they want in Abyssinia. Does anyone now believe in the League of Nations? I am not sorry for what I said about the League in my essay.'[126] The essay in question appeared in the sixpenny weekly magazine *Time and Tide*, a mouthpiece of Britain's leading left-wing and feminist writers. In it, Eliot expounded the then controversial opinion that seeing the League as based on 'Christian foundations' was indicative of severe 'theological muddleheadedness [*sic*].'[127] His *Time and Tide* piece had a certain vindication in it, with emerging criticisms of the League's ability as a secular institution to moralise the world correlating to his belief that it must be based on 'prudential' and never 'Christian ethics', which he had warned about in a 1933 *Christendom* article.[128] Eliot's criticisms here never became conventional, with most Anglicans continuing to support the League because of its perceived moral and ethical overlaps with the Church of England. Where the majority of Anglicans agreed with him was that despite being spiritually well-intentioned, the League was a secular institution, so there was a limit to its performance of these spiritual intentions.

At Oxford, the Church of England, alongside the other churches in attendance, officially reiterated its support for the League and its mission. But there was an important caveat to this. As the Conference report shows, support for the League was now explicitly support for its *ethos*, rather than its practice. Efforts were made to highlight that criticisms of its failure should not be made against the League itself, but against the governments that constituted it. The League was not a

[125] Kojecky, *T. S. Eliot's Social Criticism*, 158.
[126] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot to Emily Hale* (Eliot to Hale, 4 April 1936).
[127] Eliot, 'Notes on the Way [I]', *Time and Tide*, 16 (1935), *Complete Prose*, V, 155.
[128] Idem, 'Catholicism and International Order', 176.

church and thus did not have the same moral accountability, so criticisms of this nature were misdirected.[129] The report implored Christian churches to re-exert their moral authority rather than continuing to merely offer support to a well-intentioned but nevertheless ineffective institution.[130] John Kent has argued that this turn toward ecumenism at the expense of ecclesiastical solidarity with the League was a defensive move by the Church of England, repositioning itself at the forefront of combatting the present crisis of, amongst other things, authoritarianism.[131] This certainly rings true with wider discussions about the need for the Church to spearhead the spiritual response to fascism.

In a private letter, Temple told Lang that the Church of England must disseminate its own edicts on the sin associated with fascist militarism. Directly referencing Italian massacres in Abyssinia, he told Lang in pellucid language that its current response meant the Church was running 'the risk of becoming indifferent to horrors.'[132] In the context of his crisis of faith regarding the Social Gospel amongst unchristian people, Temple's suggestion that the Church ought to have pronounced its own comments on international crises, rather than appending signatures to statements issued by secular institutions like the League, implies his scepticism about its ability to match the growing intensity of the fascist challenge.

In a series of letters to Lord Robert Cecil (the president of the LNU), Lang privately communicated his concern about the League's ability to uphold peace in the world because its members could not have been relied upon. This was an expression of his earlier concern that fascism destabilised the new world order because it operated on a separate moral code to Christianity. For Lang, the League was unworkable because it was a network of nations bound only by political obligations rather than a common morality; it allowed nations to exist as heterotopias of deviation within Christendom. In 1937, Lang wrote much more decisively to Cecil,

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[129] Oldham (ed.), *The Churches Survey their Task* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1937), 175-6.
[130] Ibid, 177-8.
[131] Kent, *William Temple*, 99.
[132] LPL, CFR AOC 67/1, ff.64, Temple to Lang, 8 March 1937.

insisting that he no longer asked him to sign letters that endorsed the League because 'unfortunately in point of fact apart from Germany being out of the League, Italy though a member treats it with contempt, and as recent experience has shown France can certainly not be relied upon to fulfil obligations.'[133] His private manoeuvrings here demonstrate Overy's conundrum well – Cosmo Lang personally believed the League to be unworkable, but *Cosmo Cantuar* could not be seen as publicly dissenting.

Hensley Henson's writings about the League at this time were marred by a concern that his comments from August 1918 had been vindicated.[134] He wrote damningly in his diary. 'It is difficult to see what can be done to rescue the League of Nations from a defeat so humiliating as practically to destroy it as an effective instrument for maintaining peace'; again, in 1938, he opined that the League had successfully disarmed Britain yet allowed Italy to increase its already troubling military strength.[135] So damning was the betrayal of Abyssinia that Henson described Lord Halifax's speech in Geneva (which declared Britain's formal abandonment of Abyssinia) as the eulogy at 'the funeral of the League of Nations.'[136] Likewise discussing these terms, Toynbee concluded, with an allusion to the betrayal of Abyssinia, and of international morality more generally, that this was the end of serious support for the League, following the 'ill-success of this eighteen-years' trial.'[137] It is little surprise then that historians have often pointed to this moment as the death of the League.[138]

But perhaps the most zealous convert was Arthur Duncan-Jones. In 1938, Duncan-Jones preached a sermon entitled 'The Day of the Lord' in St Peter's Cathedral, Geneva, with League officials presumably in attendance. Duncan-Jones's sermon distilled the anxieties at the heart of Anglican scepticism of the League more powerfully than anyone else had done. 'It has often been

[133] BL, CCP, Add MS 51154 A, ff.66, Lang to Cecil, 30 November 1936 and ff.76, Lang to Cecil, 20 April 1937.
[134] See, DCL, BHP, HHH/23, 4 August 1918, 115.
[135] Ibid/64, 21 August 1935, 223; Henson, *Unimportant Life*, II, 409 (entry for 13 May 1938).
[136] HL Deb., 'Foreign Policy', 18 May 1938, Vol.109, Col.138.
[137] Toynbee, 'The Issues in British Foreign Policy', 313.
[138] Cf., A. J. P. Taylor, *The Origins of the Second World War* (New York: Atheneum, 1962), 96; Susan Pedersen, *The Guardians* (Oxford: OUP, 2018), 356.

said that the League of Nations was the one really good thing that came out of the Great War', he said, but 'like many such generalizations it is an exaggeration.'[139] As the sermon's title implies, Duncan-Jones offered an eschatological interpretation of the Book of Zephaniah:

> The Lord hath prepared a sacrifice, says the prophet with bitter irony, He has got his guests ready. The sacrifice was the People of God. The guests were the barbarous and savage hordes from the North and East. The aggressor was advancing swiftly. The day of the Lord was at hand. Neither their silver nor their gold would be able to deliver them in the day of the Lord's wrath. Their softness, their slackness, their cowardice made them an easy prey.[140]

His analysis of Abyssinia and the League followed:

> Again it is said that the League has tended to strengthen the sanctions Article at the expense of the provisions devised for the pacific settlement of disputes… Could anything be in more flat contradiction to the facts? Look at them… In Abyssinia a half- or a quarter-hearted attempt was made to use coercive measures, which were nullified from the start by the declaration that they would never be pushed beyond a point to which the aggressor might reply in violence. Thus the aggressor and not the League was made the master of the situation – with the consequence that war is still going on in Abyssinia.[141]

The similarities between the theological interpretation and the political analysis were far from coincidental. Duncan-Jones's interpretation about the Lord's judgement in Zeph. 1:8-13 used the language of an aggressor against a defenceless people. His analysis of the League's impotence regarding the suffering of innocent Abyssinians was mimetic of this. In this period, Anglicans largely believed Jesus was an apocalyptic prophet, and that the Kingdom of God would reveal itself after the Day of the Lord. Zeph. 1:17 talks of God's judgement of those who strayed from Him and in this context, straying from God should be taken as having allowed the injustice of Abyssinia to occur. Like Garbett's call for witness, Duncan-Jones hoped his sermon would force Christian society to prepare its citizens for its integration into the Kingdom of God.

In many ways, Duncan-Jones's sermon was a confluence of Temple's doubtfulness about the Social Gospel and Garbett's concern that the Church of England had lost sight of the apocalyptic element of God's judgement and the Kingdom of God. But where Temple was

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139 Carpenter, *Duncan-Jones of Chichester*, 109 (quoting 'The Day of The Lord', 1938).
140 Ibid, 107.
141 Ibid, 113.

dubious about the Social Gospel in the 1930s, Duncan-Jones was much closer to rejecting it outright. One of the more influential rejections of the Social Gospel at this time was the theory of Original Sin and Christian Realism, most closely associated with the American Calvinist theologian Reinhold Niebuhr (1892-1971), though it had a European exponent in the Swiss Calvinist Karl Barth. Niebuhr's primary argument was that the Kingdom of God could not be realised on earth because man's inherent sin was reflected in the social space he inhabited – no divine presence could exist there.[142]

Niebuhr's work is an interpretation of Augustine of Hippo's (AD 354-430) *De Civitate Dei* (c.410 A.D.; *On the City of God*), and specifically the conflict between the 'city of God' (*secundum Deum*) and the 'City of Earth' (*secundum hominem*). The 'City of Earth', Augustine argued, was dominated by perpetual conflict and a need for physical supremacy over other groups within the city.[143] Duncan-Jones's sermonising on the current state of the world – and how the Kingdom of God cannot be realised there – was comparable if not identical. Indeed, fascism's tendency to act without moral consideration, and Western civilisation's complicity in allowing it to act without consequence, was the evidence Duncan-Jones needed that a fundamental re-exertion of Christian morality was vital.

Niebuhr was a Christian Realist, who, like Ritschl before him, believed that the Kingdom of God could not be realised on earth because man is not capable of divine action; man could, however, create an approximation of the Kingdom as an ethical framework on earth in which he could live as His word. As such, M. T. Edwards has argued that Christian Realist theology influenced those within the Church of England (especially Eliot and the Moot) who crafted a form of 'Christian Totalitarianism', an ecumenical movement that would strictly impose Christian doctrine on the social space much like the fascist regimes they rejected.[144] As Jonas Kurlberg has

[142] Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (1932; New York: Scriber's, 1960), 79-82.
[143] St Augustine, John Healey (transl.), *De Civitate Dei*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: John Grant, 1909), II, 57.
[144] M. T. Edwards, *The Right of the Christian Left* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 9, 48.

shown, Edward's argument in unconvicting.[145] While the Moot did feel there was a need for a reconceptualisation of Western civilisation, it was not as totalitarian nor as unique as he implies; Temple, Lang, and Duncan-Jones all alluded to a similarly strict evangelism. Duncan-Jones may not have been close to Niebuhr and Christian Realism, but it is worth highlighting how Anglicans appeared to move toward more radical strands of Christian theology in search of a more effective response to fascism. For these Anglicans, fascism was not seen as occupying merely a different space in Christendom (as Chapter Two argued) but a rival one.

Henry Wilson, who signed the same 1935 letter as Temple that expounded the congruence between the Gospels and the League's ethos, also concluded that the League was doomed to failure due to its reliance on 'the written and pledged word of a nation… [being] regarded as reliable.'[146] Cyril Garbett went from one extreme to the other. He now felt that active 'national rearmament' was necessary because an 'unarmed democracy', such as the League, was 'powerless when confronted with Totalitarian States armed to the teeth.'[147] Ultimately, Garbett concluded his 1937 New Year's sermon at Westminster Abbey with a candid expression of his beliefs regarding the preceding year: 'we had learned that the League of Nations was powerless to prevent aggression.'[148] Some Anglicans wanted to give the League a chance through reform, but these figures were in a small minority at this time.[149] It thus becomes clear that, for a growing number of Anglicans, preventing fascist aggression was only possible through reemphasising the moral foundations of Western civilisation – some Anglicans saw this as only possible through Christian unity and, thanks to the justification of the just war tradition, through the use of force if necessary.

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[145] Jonas Kurlberg, 'Resisting Totalitarianism', *Religion Compass*, 7:12 (2013), esp., 527.
[146] '"Shocking Beyond Words"' *op. cit.*
[147] 'Christian Attitude to Rearmament', *The Times*, 30 September 1936.
[148] 'Westminster Abbey', *The Times*, 4 January 1937.
[149] See e.g., E. G. Selwyn, 'Reform of the League', *The Times*, 10 September 1936; Don, *Faithful Witness*, 182-3 (2 May 1936).

When we look at these responses more generally, criticisms of the League indicate one important factor about the Anglican perceptive of fascism. The increased observation that the League – a secular, political institution – was unable to stem the tide of fascist colonialism suggested to some Anglicans that they had underestimated the need for a greater spiritual rebuttal to fascism. We ought still to see fascism as existing as a heterotopia of deviation in Anglican imaginations but acknowledge that the degree of separation between it and Christendom blurred somewhat when they took a macroscopic look at the world. Colonialism suggested to some Anglicans that it was not merely a separate space, but a rival space. Anglicans had no doubt about the object of this rivalry: control of the social space. And the consequence? The creation of a world where the Kingdom of God could not be realised.

The desire to reclaim the spiritual and ethical response in the face of this aggression from the League is indicative of how fascism transcended the normal temporality of politics. Indeed, for all communism's misgivings, it never threatened the course of civilisational progression as fascism was doing. But none of the Anglicans above suggested how a response might look in lieu of the League's intervention. Charles Raven made this criticism of the Oxford Conference: 'mere debate upon the question is at the present stage futile' because 'the issues are too serious and too difficult to be settled by impassioned rhetoric.'[150] This was a common criticism of the Church of England at this time. Bonhoeffer wrote to George Bell in 1934 that the German perception of Anglican clergymen was that 'the thing they are afraid of is not discussion but action.'[151] Bell was on the receiving end again in 1940 when Barth responded 'I think you are too much of a British gentleman and thus unable to understand the phenomenon of Hitler' to his idea for a negotiated peace.[152] What becomes glaringly obvious is that Anglicans in this period could define what they were against – selfish imperialism, for instance – but were unable to provide any blueprint for how

[150] Raven, *War and the Christian*, 106.
[151] Kelly and Nelson, *A Testament to Freedom*, 403 (Bonhoeffer to George Bell, 15 May 1934).
[152] Chandler, 'The Church and Humanity', *The Church and Humanity* (London: Routledge, 2016), 12 (Barth to Bell, 28 January 1940).

this would be stopped. For all the valid criticisms that the Church placed on the League in the context of Abyssinia, it must be said that at least it had some plan to challenge the fascist threat. This is more than can be said for the majority of Anglicans.

This being said, highlighting that there was a consensus that *something* needed to be done is important for the current state of historical scholarship on the Church of England and international relations in the 1930s. Alan Wilkinson argued that 'when we examine the attitudes of English churchmen to the main international crises of the 1930s it is evident that virtually all were appeasers.'[153] Appeasement has come to denote the clumsy attempt of the British Government to maintain peace in Europe in the latter part of the 1930s. Because of the dominance of these connotations of this term, appeasement as a concept is now rather out of fashion with historians now because it implies a fundamental binary of 'pro' or 'anti' appeasement that did not exist in contemporary discourse.[154] Therefore, Wilkinson's use of 'appeasers' appears charged. Anglican clergymen supported Government foreign policy within the framework of 'appeasement' as was expected. But the wider connotations of 'appeasers' – that clergymen sought to promote peace at *any* cost – cannot be attributed to a great many Anglican clergymen or laypeople in the mid-1930s. Criticisms of Mussolini's Abyssinian campaign and the fascist doctrine more generally in this period demonstrate an instance of unique unity within the Church of England where action was demanded to stem the increased threat fascism posed to the world. Abyssinia highlights an important limitation in this approach to appeasement and it is hoped that thesis prompts further research into individual clergymen and laypeople to evince the complexities of appeasement.

Occidentalism and Orthodoxy

Colonialism presented Anglicans with ways of thinking about the macroscopic impact of fascism. The maintenance of an empire for material development, rather than as a tool to evangelise

153 Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform?*, 165.

154 I would like to thank Professors Martin Conway and Marc Mulholland for their useful comments on the first draft of this chapter and helping me to understand the historical problems associated with appeasement today.

uncivilised people – disregarding its obligations to civilisational development – was seen by Anglicans as a more general threat to the Kingdom of God. The methodology of fascist colonialism – using illicit weapons of mass destruction – underlined its indifference to human life and thus buttressed Anglican perceptions of the fascist doctrine as antithetical to Christianity, which was a doctrine of love and protection for every individual life.

Fascism's direct contradiction of Christianity meant some Anglicans saw its very existence as inimical to the spiritual development of the world. Such an interpretation of fascism forced Anglicans to reconsider its approach to the challenges of modernity. Chapter Two argued that Anglicans rediscovered older, more nondoctrinal forms of theological reaction as they familiarised themselves with a distinctly modern phenomenon. The shifting perspective of fascism, however, brought a more orthodox response. There were certainly doubts about the efficacy and place of Social Gospel theology. Temple, more than most, was painfully aware of how different stimuli altered its efficacy; it was one thing preaching a Social Gospel about economism, another about the use of poison gas. The intellectual movements toward a more fundamental, orthodox pedagogy goes some way in demonstrating how fascism came to be considered more of a spiritual, rather than secular, threat.

The suggestion that fascism was a spiritual phenomenon not only allowed for a nuanced position on fascism, but arguably encouraged it. In the next chapter, I will demonstrate that fascism became multivalent where once it was seen as monolithic. Indeed, in the context of the Spanish Civil War, fascism was separated into broad imaginative configurations, with some imagining a 'better' form of fascism based on Christian spirituality.

Chapter Four
Spain: The Emergence of Spiritual Fascism

Men tighten the knot of confusion into perfect misunderstanding.

– T. S. Eliot, *The Family Reunion* (1939)

In 1937, Spencer Carpenter (1877-1959), dean of Exeter, passed Lang in the corridors of the Church Assembly Hall in Westminster. He stopped to talk to his Primate, but, leaving in a hurry, a beleaguered Archbishop muttered 'You Deans! You give me a great deal of trouble.'[1] This anecdote neatly encapsulates the governing theme of this chapter, as it seeks to understand why Lang's clergy troubled him so much during the Spanish Civil War.

The Second Spanish Republic (1931-39) was born out of the breakdown of Miguel Primo de Rivera's military dictatorship and the subsequent collapse of support for the monarchy which had supported him, bringing in intractable factionalism, political extremism, and civil unrest. Between 1933 and 1936, the political right was represented by the CEDA (*Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas*; the Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right), while Spain's left-wing parties formed a Popular Front (much like what had happened in France's Third Republic) to defeat the CEDA. The *Frente Popular* managed to unite the eclectic Left-wing organisations into one cohesive unit, with the levels of cross-partisan support surprising even the leader of the CEDA, José María Gil Robles (1898-1980).[2] Gil Robles's memoirs of this period are aptly titled *No Fue Possible La Paz* (1968; *Peace was Not Possible*) and two important studies by Paul Preston, taking Spain as a whole, and Mary Vincent, looking specifically at the city of Salamanca, both attest to Gil Robles's choice.[3]

[1] Carpenter, *Duncan-Jones of Chichester*, 103.
[2] José María Gil Robles, *No Fue Possible la Paz* (Barcelona: Editorial Ariel, 1968), 469.
[3] Paul Preston, *The Coming of the Spanish Civil War* (London: Macmillan, 1978); Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*.

In July 1936, a military junta launched a coup against the Republican government. The Republican government had won on a manifesto that promised vast reforms in Spain, continuing what they had started in 1931. The reforms affected public liturgy and marriage (undermining the Church) as well as the ownership of private property (angering the petit bourgeoisie). To those in the *junta*, the 'new Spain' was too redolent of the Soviet Union and thus they wanted a return to the 'old Spain.' The *junta* stood for the principles of ultranationalism, monarchism, and orthodox Catholicism: it was a rejection of modernity. As Bernhard Dietz importantly notes, it was this attack on modernity that proved uniquely unifying in garnering the cross-denominational support of Christians in Britain.[4]

The British government responded with the organisation of the Non-Intervention Pact which Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany signed. Under the terms of the Pact, European nations would not intervene to contain the war within Spain's geographical borders.[5] It soon transpired, however, that both Italy and Germany had flouted this and had aided Franco's 'crusade' against the Republic. In the face of another overt example of Italy's and Germany's disregard for its commitments to European peace, the Republic was condemned to defeat. The Church of England supported the Government's policy. Lang was a close friend of Neville Chamberlain, a chief architect of non-intervention and, from 1937, Britain's prime minister.[6] But personalities aside, this policy fitted well with Lang's approach to foreign policy. It suggested caution, cooperation, and, at least in intention, fairness to both sides. The same cannot be said for his clergy. The conflict in Spain opened new discussions about European fascism within the Church of England, specifically on the idea that there existed a multiplicity of distinct types of fascism.

This is a crucial point, and it is the governing theme of this chapter. Though there is much thematic and temporal overlap between the discussions of fascism in the context of the Abyssinian

[4] Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 172.
[5] For detail, see Jill Edwards, *The British Government and the Spanish Civil War* (London: Macmillan, 1979); Scott Ramsay, 'Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality', *The International History Review*, 41:3 (2019), 604-23.
[6] Lockhart, *Cosmo Gordon Lang*, 426.

crisis and the Spanish Civil War, Spain demands individual scrutiny because of the effect that Francoist fascism had on existing Anglican perspectives and discursive operation. Typology entered the Anglican discursive continuum surrounding fascism due largely to the efforts of Ralph Inge, whose blend of philosophical relativism and theological Thomism attempted to distinguish different types of fascism according to differences in their moral intentions. Inge was perhaps Franco's most vocal and influential supporter in Britain's Protestant sphere, though his sustained campaign of support for Franco has inexplicably been overlooked. While he made clear he had 'no sympathy with fascism', his very acceptance that Franco propagated fascism in Spain – not to mention his vocal support of this – allows us to discern the evolution of Inge's thought on fascism.[7] Crucially, though, Inge did not lend his support to fascism generally, but to a particular *type*: that which was rooted in Christian spirituality and organic social principles. In imagining a different, Christian, fascism Inge perhaps imagined a 'better' fascism.

Most Anglicans were against typological discourse to the same extent as Inge and continued to see all fascisms as inherently antagonistic to Christianity. This is not to say that they saw one fascist phenotype: they did not. These Anglicans, whom we may term 'anti-Franco', engaged with Francoist fascism, like Inge did, as a broad imaginative configuration, as distinctly Spanish as Nazism was German. Their criticisms of Francoist fascism hinged upon comparisons with Italian and German fascisms; their criticisms depended heavily on what Umberto Eco called the 'patterns of fascism' – it was what they had in common more than what was different about them. But they did construct one holistic 'enemy' out of these broad imaginative configurations on account of these patterns, thereby crafting a wholly Christian anti-fascism. They did this by deconstructing the material issues that were at stake in the war and the distillation of these earthly systems to the spiritual values that underpinned them allowed Anglicans to present the war as a microcosm of the wider frontier in Europe of Christianity against fascism.

[7] Inge, speech in *The Case for Nationalist Spain* (London: FNS, 1938), 4.

Scholarly interest usually favours the more linear response of British Catholics.[8] Nonetheless, recent research has shown that Anglicans were perhaps just as engaged as their Catholic coreligionists. Tom Buchanan's *Britain and the Spanish Civil War* (1997) argues that an innate anti-Catholicism meant a significant proportion of Anglican responses were critical of the Catholic Church's response to the conflict more than it was concerned with an exposition of the conflict itself.[9] More recently, Ben Edwards's research has built on Buchanan's work, also evincing a vociferous anti-Catholicism.[10] Both works are important studies that highlight how religious groups interacted with secular ones and how this influenced their responses to the conflict. Emily Mason has taken a different approach, showing how many Christians formed their support for the Republic through a confluence of their faith and their politics.[11]

This chapter similarly focusses on the spiritual factors that were at the forefront of Anglican discourse. It explicates these (sometimes nondoctrinal) spiritual factors and demonstrates how the Church of England held a unique view of the conflict amongst religious bodies in Europe. Indeed, I also see Spain as a way of tracing the evolution of the cultural feeling within the Church of England to fascism. It is this chapter's contention that the Church of England engaged with fascism as a multivalent phenomenon – no longer seeing European fascism as monolithic but existing in a multiplicity of forms, a perspective out of which debates around the possibility of nuanced support for fascism emerged.

Anglican Pro-Francoism and Thomist Ethics

Some Anglicans appeared unconcerned with the outbreak of civil war in July 1936. Indeed, Lang was reticent about commenting on Spain at all. As we know, he was a cautious archbishop and

[8] Cf., James Flint, "Must God Go Fascist?"", *Church History*, 56:3 (1987), 364-74; Buchanan, *The Spanish Civil War and the British Labour Movement* (Cambridge, CUP, 1991), esp. ch.5; Lewis Mates, *The Spanish Civil War and the British Left* (London: Taurus, 2007), esp. ch.3; Ben Edwards, *With God on Our Side* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2013).
[9] Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), 169-76.
[10] Edwards, *With God on Our Side*, 132-3; see also, Buchanan, *Spanish Civil War*, 175.
[11] Emily Mason, *Democracy, Deeds, and Dilemmas* (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2017), 129.

perhaps the lack of clarity on what had caused the conflict in Spain prompted his restraint. The pre-existing colonial paradigms that infantilised 'backward' peoples as in need of protection meant more Anglicans were decidedly on the side of the Abyssinian people, just as they were with the Chinese victims of Japanese aggression in Manchuria at this time.[12] Without the dynamic of an inferior and superior social group, as well as being an inherently political conflict, Spain was much less appealing to weigh in on. For instance, after penning his emotionally charged 'Epitaph on Abyssinians' in *The Times*, Arnold J. Toynbee did not comment on Spain as he did not 'believe any of us know enough about the facts.'[13] To an extent, Toynbee was correct in his general assertion.

Spain remained a relatively unknown entity to interwar Anglicans. Buchanan has tried to dispel the suggestion that Spain was a 'far away country of which we know nothing', pointing to an awareness of anarcho-syndicalism amongst sections of the British left as evidence of an awareness of the internal dynamics of interwar Spain.[14] Generally speaking, however, British conceptions of Spain were still predicated on stereotypes of social and political chaos. Buchanan argues that these stereotypes played into the Government's attempts at neutrality, as it could present the Civil War as typical of Spanish political instability and, therefore, of limited significance for the rest of Europe.[15] This stereotype of political chaos allowed religious groups to likewise cast specific readings of the conflict onto the public imagination.

Lang's restraint was born out of anxiety as much as caution. He was acutely aware that his public pronouncements on Spain were not wanted by either the Republican government (a secular institution) or Franco (a man 'so much in the hands of the Roman Catholics').[16] Writing in his *Diocesan Gazette*, he immediately dispelled any attempts to bifurcate Spain along political or religious lines. 'There are no clear issues of established Government against rebels', he asserted irenically,

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[12] Buchanan, *East Wind* (Oxford: OUP, 2012), 65.
[13] Toynbee, 'The Abyssinians' Fate', *op. cit.*; Bod., AAJT, MS. 13967/79/1, Toynbee to Dom Columba Cary-Elwes, 27 July 1938.
[14] Buchanan, "A Far Away Country of Which We Know Nothing", 1-24.
[15] Ibid, 24.
[16] LPL, Council on Foreign Relations Roman Catholic Church [hereafter cited CFR RC] 211/3, ff.21, Lang to Harold Buxton, 9 March 1937.

'or of democracy against Fascism, or of religion against irreligion.'[17] From this, as well as a lack of private correspondence, it is not quite clear what Lang thought had happened in Spain. What Lang was certain of, however, was that no material solution would be able to bring the conflict to a halt.[18]

It would be inaccurate to suggest Lang saw the rejection of reason in fascism as specific to political extremism. Rather, he saw fascism as an example of an ideology possible only in a world where there was a total abandonment of Christian morality. We should thus see Spain as one of the many crises that engendered his belief that a 'National Recall to Religion' was needed. It was during the coronation of George VI (1895-1952) in May 1937 (which followed the constitutional crisis of Edward VIII's abdication) that he gave this evangelistic sermon. 'There must be a renewal in our midst of definite and deliberate allegiance to Christ – to His standards of life, to the principles of His Kingdom.'[19] That the language used in his few interjections on Spain mirrored his contemporaneous 'Recall' is significant, which suggests he began to see political extremism as a direct threat to the fabric of Christian society.

Temple's position was more complex than this. Publicly, he condemned the *junta* immediately, arguing that 'there was a constitutional Government in Spain, rather weak and ineffective, but legally established' and that 'the military chiefs initiated an armed rebellion.'[20] But in private, he seemed eager to recognise the *Junta*'s authority. The 'rebels' (Nationalists) had established its rival government in the city of Burgos in northern Spain. Temple asked Viscount Cranborne (1893-1972), an Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office, whether it would have been most practical to have recognised the Burgos government as the legitimate government of Spain forthwith.[21] Temple offered little justification other than the strength of the *junta* and the known weakness of the Republican military.

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[17] Ibid 211/1, ff.13, *Canterbury Diocesan Gazette*, 44:9, September 1936.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Transcript of Lang's Sermon, *Church Times*, 18 December 1936.
[20] 'Vigilant and Strong', *The Times*, 1 October 1936.
[21] LPL, CFR RC 211/1, ff.54, Temple to Lang [Temple to Viscount Cranborne enclosed], 30 October 1936.

Knowing the traumatic persecution that many people (especially in northern Spain) went through during the Franco dictatorship, Temple's private manoeuvrings make for deeply uncomfortable reading. But we should temper any such indictments with the use of Scott Ramsay's fresh model of appeasement. Ramsay compellingly argues that Britain's non-intervention in Spain should be seen as part of its wider appeasement policy to the fascist dictators across Europe and that, in its early stages, this was about establishing a better position for itself from which it could forge good relations with potential victors.[22] I think it most accurate to see Temple's initial position as conforming to this, especially when observed within the wider context of his civil war.

The engagement with Francoism as a 'good' form of fascism occurred away from the episcopate. E. Allison Peers (1891-1952) was a Hispanist at University College, Liverpool and regularly contributed articles about Spain to the popular press. He was arguably the most well-informed Anglican regarding Spain's internal dynamics. Peers's wider interaction with European fascism is hard to gauge due to a significant lack of public pronouncements on it. He was socially and politically conservative and thus a pronounced critic of the Spanish Socialist parties. Interestingly though, this mistrust of the left did not make Peers a fan of right-wing authoritarianism either, for he was critical of the Primo de Rivera dictatorship, both contemporaneously and retrospectively.[23] His writings on the Spanish Civil War demonstrate a continuing anti-leftist yet pious tone. As a result, like many conservative Anglicans, his fear of atheistic Communism informed his support for Spanish fascism.

Christian fears about international Communism centred on the pervasive influence of the Comintern.[24] In Britain, this reached its peak with the publication of the Zinoviev Letter during the October 1924 general election. The *Daily Mail* published a counterfeit letter supposedly written

[22] Ramsay, 'Ensuring Benevolent Neutrality.'
[23] E. Allison Peers, 'Learning from Despotism', *Times Literary Supplement*, 1527 (1931), 354; *The Spanish Dilemma* (London: Methuen, 1940), 4-7.
[24] The Comintern was the Communist International, a body organised by the Soviet Union to advance the cause of international Communism.

by the head of the Comintern, Grigory Zinoviev (1883-1936), encouraging the Communist Party of Great Britain to cooperate with Ramsay MacDonald's (1866-1937) Labour Party and facilitate a Bolshevik revolution in Britain.[25] According to one historian, the publication of the letter essentially handed Stanley Baldwin's Conservative Party a parliamentary majority.[26] A fear of the Comintern fuelled support for Franco across Europe. Franco's officials justified his uprising by adducing the existence of four 'secret documents' that detailed how the Comintern intended to orchestrate a social revolution in Spain.[27] The British Christian pro-Franco group, the Friends of National Spain, produced facsimiles of these documents in an available-to-buy pamphlet.[28] Though it is doubtful that they ever existed, for Anglicans already fearful of the threat of Communism they seemed to be another credible piece of evidence that proved the Comintern's plot for a pan-European revolution.

But the most pervasive fear was the threat of irreparable secularist policies associated with communist governments. Anglicans had for some time expressed a concern about the treatment of Christians in the Soviet Union. In the Hispanic world, the Mexican revolution (1910-24) and the election in 1934 of the socialist Lázaro Cárdenas (1895-1970) manifested these fears. Julio de la Cueva has argued that the socialist secularism in Mexico had a profound impact in 1930s Spain.[29] Influential supporters of Franco in Britain's Christian milieu directly and intimately engaged with the Mexican revolution and its influence on Spain.[30] Ideological uniformity across the right-wing, religious milieus of Europe, especially in Britain and Spain, meant this became a common anxiety in this period.

This lent itself to Franco's characterisation of his campaign as a crusade: a holy war against the irreligious and laicising Republic on behalf of Christianity. Frances Lannon argues that this

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[25] 'Civil War Plot by Socialists' Masters', *The Daily Mail*, 25 October 1924.
[26] Taylor, 'Confusion on the Left', in John Raymond (ed.), *The Baldwin Age* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1960), 71.
[27] Herbert Southworth, *Conspiracy and the Spanish Civil War* (London: Routledge, 2002), 2-4; Preston, *Franco* (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 297-300.
[28] Friends of National Spain, *Exposure of the Secret Plan to Establish a Soviet in Spain* (London, FNS, 1938).
[29] Julio de la Cueva, 'El Asalto de los Cielos', *Ayer*, 88 (2012), 64-66, 74. See also, Vincent, *Second Spanish Republic*, 16.
[30] See e.g., Arnold Lunn, *Spanish Rehearsal* (London: Hutchinson, 1937), 210; Page Croft's speech in *The Case for Nationalist Spain*, 17.

narrative was firmly entrenched into European discourse with the publication of Cardinal Isidro Gomá y Tomás's (1869-1940) letter, which sharply bifurcated Franco's war effort as 'Christ against the anti-Christ.'[31] It certainly had an impact on Catholics across Europe. The Irishman Seumas MacKee admitted that he volunteered for Franco's forces in Spain after being convinced by the crusade narrative.[32] Francoist-sympathising Anglicans reiterated Gomá y Tomás's characterisation of the Republican Government being inherently profane. Bishop Hensley Henson concluded that it had 'deliberately repudiated Christianity', which made it a pan-Christian concern, rather than a solely Spanish one.[33] Similarly, Allison Peers referred to the Republican government as the 'enemies of Religion' while Inge, in typically theatrical style, described the election of the Republicans in February 1936 as the 'invasion of the anti-Christ'.[34]

At the very heart of this narrative was the political theology of St Thomas Aquinas. Thomist theories on the justification of war suggested that a government perceived to be tyrannical could only be deposed through acts of violence if it was on behalf of a 'public authority' and not on the 'private presumption of a few.'[35] Thomism was the key to presenting Francoist fascism as rooted in a spiritual basis and thus the justification for Christian support. Therefore, pro-Franco Anglicans presented a multiplicity of reasons which met the requisite for a Thomist justification of war: not only was it fought on behalf of Catholics in a majority-Catholic country, but they also pushed the narrative that the 1936 elections were corrupt, and that in fact *most* people voted for the CEDA, whose interests were best represented by the *junta*.

Peers's *The Spanish Tragedy* (1936) neatly presented the alignment between Thomist political theology and Francoist fascism. His main criticism of the Spanish Government was that it violently secularised Spain and that government officials – in particular Manuel Azaña (1880-1940), the

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[31] Frances Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy* (Oxford: Clarendon 1987), 203. For detail on the letter, see Hilari Raguer, *La Pólvora y el Incienso* (Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 2001), ch.6.
[32] Seumas MacKee, *I Was a Franco Soldier* (London: United Editorial, 1938), 5, 14.
[33] Henson, *Bishoprick Papers*, 63 ('Reflections on the Coronation of King George VI', 1937).
[34] E. Allison Peers, *The Spanish Tragedy, 1930-1936* (New York: OUP, 1936), 70; Inge, speech in *The Case for Nationalist Spain*, 6.
[35] Thomas Aquinas, *De Regimine Principum* (*c.*1265; New York: Sheed, 1938), 58-9.

prime minister – purposely tried to extirpate the Christian faith in Spain, encouraged by the Comintern.[36] Peers had never trusted Azaña, whom he referred to as an 'implacable anti-clerical', and believed that he wilfully ignored the efforts of Spaniards who intended to 'make Spain the Russia of the West!'[37] The Republic's secularism had been apparent to Peers in the years preceding the Civil War, but it attained a new significance during the conflict when the *junta* claimed to be defending the Christian faith from Bolshevism.

Peers noted that fascism was the driving force behind the rebel army. This ideological unity was centred on fascism's innate commitment to organic principles in society. In this thesis, 'organic principle' is taken to mean a social concept which defines the roles and rights of people in their broadest possible terms as supreme over individual identity. One such principle was of national religion, and so these military men saw it as their national duty to defend Catholic Spain from atheistic Bolshevism.[38] Peers presented this as having met the requisite Thomist justifications because Francoist fascism had clearly acted on behalf of a people devoted to Catholicism. 'Attempt after attempt is made by the enemies of religion to attack it or to expel it from the minds of the people, and again and again the people themselves instinctively defend it and secure its victory', he said.[39]

The presentation of Spain as an historically Catholic country, with Catholicism a defining feature of Spanish tradition, culture, and identity allowed for the successful elision of fascist nationalism and Franco's 'crusade' narrative. Inge frequently defined Spain as the country of 'St Teresa of Avila and St John of the Cross' in his general characterisations of Spain.[40] It is both interesting and unsurprising that these two Spanish mystics were frequently adduced as significant exponents of Spanish Christianity. Both Inge and Peers had published academic studies of mysticism and Peers was awarded Papal Imprimaturs to translate and publish the *Complete Works*

[36] Peers, *Spanish Tragedy*, 71.
[37] Idem, 'The Religious Situation in Spain', *Studies*, 22:87 (1933), 364, 368.
[38] Idem, *Spanish Tragedy*, 218.
[39] Ibid, 70.
[40] Inge, speech in *The Case for Nationalist Spain*, 6 and 'Religion in Spain', *The Times*, 23 May 1938.

of Saint John of the Cross (three vols., 1934-5) and Teresa of Avila (five vols., 1946-51).[41] These Saints were presented as transtemporal and transnational, emphasising the fundamentality of *Spanish* Christianity for the faith itself. This particular version of Spanish national history situated Spain as interconnected with all other Christian nations in Europe which reconceptualised this domestic conflict as a civilisational one. Indeed, such was the fervour with which Inge and Peers associated Franco's campaign with some kind of providence that it presented Franco as a divine gift to earth.

This transcendence of time and space helped to emphasise how religion was an organic principle on which civilisation was built. In his 1934 Herbert Spencer Lecture, Inge had argued that fascism was an ideology born out of, and ultimately committed to, the veneration of organic social concepts.[42] Fascism had destroyed the political and cultural spaces where these organic principles had supposedly been suppressed – in Italy it was the political chaos of the *Biennio Rosso*, in Germany the cultural decadence of the Weimar Republic. In recent times, Inge conceded that Italian Fascism and Nazism had drifted from these roots, but Franco's commitment to them made it a 'better', perhaps the 'true', form of fascism.[43] The presentation of Franco as defending the organic social concept of Christianity evolved into the more profound suggestion that his fascism was protecting civilisation, rather than solely Spanish religion, from communism.

Understanding fascism as a physical reaction to Communism was not uncommon amongst conservative members of the Church of England. It can be seen, for example, in Bishop Headlam of Gloucester's thought as well as the prime minster Stanley Baldwin's.[44] But it was especially present in Inge's writings. The fear of Communism had tormented him since the Bolshevik revolution in October 1917, but it assumed new levels of intensity during the Spanish Civil War.[45] It also informed his support for Francoist fascism which, like Peers, was motivated by

[41] See e.g., Inge, *Christian Mysticism*; Peers, *Spanish Mysticism* (London: Methuen, 1924).
[42] Inge, *Liberty and Natural Rights*, 14.
[43] See, idem, *A Rustic Moralist*, 44-5; *Our Present Discontents*, 61, 248.
[44] Headlam, 'Nazi Germany', *op. cit.*; Philip Williamson, *Stanley Baldwin* (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 316.
[45] See e.g., Inge, 'Christian Cooperation', *The Times*, 4 September 1920, and CCA, CHAR 2/125/12, Press Cutting of Inge, 'War and Population', *The Evening Standard*, 5 October 1922.

an attempt to show how it was ostensibly Thomistic in its ideology and practice. To justify this, Inge retrospectively analysed the rise of fascism in Europe throughout the Civil War period to suggest that anti-Communism was the fundamental reason for its existence. In both *A Rustic Moralist* (1937) and *Our Present Discontents* (1938), Inge explained that fascism was a functional response to the societal fear of international Communism.[46] The messianic imagery used to describe Mussolini and Hitler perfectly coincided with that which he invoked in his characterisation of Franco.

His earliest diary entries on Spain (between 18 and 31 July 1936) tells us that he agreed with Peter Amigo (1864-1949), the Catholic bishop of Southwark, that a 'Communist uprising in France' was likely if the war spilled over the border: he was glad that Amigo agreed it was a 'European crisis' rather than an exclusively Spanish one.[47] Amigo was an interesting character. As a Catholic bishop born in Gibraltar, he felt a profound resonance with the Spanish clergy who were persecuted at the inception of the conflict. His efforts to venerate Franco's campaign in Britain have received important scrutiny but his largely overlooked association with Inge – known for his pronounced anti-Catholicism – is telling of how support for Franco's campaign was unusually cross-denominational.[48]

In November 1936, Inge's diary demonstrates more fervent support for Francoist fascism. 'The news from Spain is exciting though inconclusive. The anti-reds are masters of the whole country except Madrid… Catalonia… [and] Malaga.'[49] Inge's use of 'anti-reds' (meaning the Nationalists) so early epitomises his view of the conflict as innately about the suppression of a Communist revolution. Moreover, his excitement at the Republic's defeat is explained by the moral teleology he saw in Franco's defence of Christianity from atheistic, Bolshevik tyranny.

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[46] Idem, *A Rustic Moralist*, 41, 44; *Our Present Discontents*, 25.
[47] MCOL, ID Vol. 35, 28-31 July 1936.
[48] See e.g., Frederick Hale, 'Fighting Over the Fight in Spain', *The Catholic Historical Review*, 91:3 (2005), 462-83; Michael Clifton, *Amigo* (Herefordshire: Fowler Wright, 1987), 142-9.
[49] MCOL, ID Vol. 35, 8 November 1936.

But this had not featured in any of Inge's analyses before 1935 and certainly not at all in the 1920s. In fact, after dining with the German biblical scholar and Nazi apologist Gustav Adolf Deissmann (1866-1937) he remarked, 'rather to my surprise he thinks that Hitler has saved Germany from a Bolshevik revolution. I do not believe it.'[50] It could either suggest that anti-Communism was not a core tenet of Inge's general understanding of fascism but rather specific to Francoist fascism or, more likely, that it *became* part of Inge's repertoire to support Francoist fascism. Either way, it provided a context for Inge to conceptualise Francoist fascism's anti-communism as aligned with its more general divine purpose, and thus separate it from existing fascisms. This appears the same for Peers. His association of fascism's anti-Communism with patriotism for a Romanticised conception of Spain suggests anti-Communism was innate in Francoist fascism's nationalistic doctrine. Republican-sympathising Anglicans came to challenge this narrative. Arthur Duncan-Jones argued 'if Communism is the enemy of Christianity, it does not follow that Fascism is its friend.'[51] But in the meantime, the nationalistic recrafting of history that implied fascism was dependent upon communism for its existence gained traction amongst the pro-Franco Anglicans.

These pro-Franco Anglicans also presented the falsified narrative that the CEDA had won an overall electoral majority, which implied most people in Spain had a closer affinity to the politics of Franco than the Popular Front. This provided another example of how Franco had acted on behalf of the majority – a vital requisite for Thomist justification. The main systematic exponents of this in the Anglican milieu were two ideological networks of cross-denominational Christians with a strong Anglican influence: the Friends of National Spain (FNS) and the United Christian Front (UCF).

[50] Inge, *Diary of a Dean*, 171 (23 May 1933).
[51] Arthur Duncan-Jones, 'Christianity and Communism', *The Times*, 7 January 1938.

Organised in late 1937, the FNS's ideological rationale was self-evident. In the words of one prominent Anglican executive, Sir Henry Page Croft (1881-1947), it was 'whole-heartedly opposed to the Socialist-Anarchist-Syndicalist combination' that apparently controlled the Republican Government in Valencia.[52] Page Croft, MP for Bournemouth (1910-40), was on the ideological right of the Conservative party, and his Christian piety, pro-Imperialism, and flirtations with extreme politics in the early interwar period contextualise well his fervent support for Franco's campaign as a nationalistic defence of Christo-Spanish values.[53] Operationally, the FNS claimed to have been correcting the mistruths about Franco's campaign in Spain and tackling the 'red' propaganda that manipulated uninformed emotion.

It is hard to gauge how popular the FNS was in Britain. Inge's claim that 'hundreds were turned away' from an FNS event at which he spoke is most likely exaggerated but we do know that there were *ad hoc* local branches, such as in Chelmsford, which suggests its message was resonant and influential.[54] Inge was perhaps the FNS's most prominent Anglican affiliate and it used the clout he had from his notoriety in the popular press to its advantage: his speech at the infamous Queen's Hall meeting in March 1938 was published as *Dean Inge Indicts the Red Government of Spain*. Historical interest has grown in the FNS. Bàrbara Molas's important study 'Transnational Francoism' (2021) convincingly argues that the FNS managed to elide 'Franco's right to rebel' with the defence of Christianity generally and thus suggested that the threat was not exclusive to Spain but to Britain as well.[55]

The United Christian Front was much more explicitly Christian. Like the FNS, it saw itself as instilling a balance in a media which it perceived to be biased against Franco.[56] Henry Lunn (1859-1939), the Methodist-raised Catholic-convert founder of the UCF, wrote that his

[52] CCA, CHAR 2/328/10, Page-Croft to Churchill, 5 January 1938.
[53] For a survey of Page Croft's interwar activities see, Larry Witherell, *Rebel on the Right* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1997), 15-9.
[54] MCOL, ID Vol. 36, 23 March 1938. Evidence of the FNS's Chelmsford branch can be found in Anonymous, 'Editorial', *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 16 September 1938 and F. B. Hitchcock, ibid.
[55] Bàrbara Molas, 'Transnational Francoism', *Contemporary British History*, 35:2 (2021), 168. Other studies of note are Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 178-84; Pugh, *The Making of Modern British Politics*, 231-2; Edwards, *With God On Our Side*, 67-71.
[56] Henry Lunn, 'Introduction', in idem (ed.), *United Christian Front* (Cambridge: W. Heffer, 1938), 1-13.

organisation hoped to unite 'all Christians in the war against the anti-Christ'.[57] It initially had support from Anglicans like A. D. Lindsay and William Temple, though these two, and others, resigned their support in protest at Lunn's language, arguing that they did not see Spain as a war between the religious and irreligious.[58] After this exodus, Anglican committee members left included Inge and Cyril Alington, dean of Durham.

Allison Peers produced the first notable statement on this 'rigged election' narrative. In a *New Statesman* article, he asserted that, numerically speaking, the Popular Front did not win a majority in the elections. He would go on to suggest outright that the Republic's electoral success was illegal just as the UCF had done.[59] Peers presented Franco as the leader of this majority on purpose to irrefutably meet the Thomist justification of his crusade. Not only was it empirically in defence of a majority, but the suppression of those who objected to the cultural aesthetic of the 'new Spain' felt this qualified the government as tyrannical, which both supported the 'crusade' narrative further.

In 1938, the FNS produced a manifesto in which its support for Franco's crusade was foregrounded in this 'rigged election' narrative. It presented the overt injustice of the elections and how this had opened the door to legislative atheism.[60] Page Croft wrote to *The Times* in October 1936 and asserted that the CEDA had won the most votes in Spain, not the Popular Front. Moreover, in the House of Commons he argued that the illegality of the Popular Front's election was manifold: not only did they not receive a majority but that during the campaign itself they had neglected their civic duties and allowed 'terrorism [to go] unchecked.'[61]

Bernhard Dietz argues that this attack on democracy was a cynical guise through which a more general attack on modernity was possible. 'Modernity' was dog-whistle for the ways in which

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[57] Idem, 'Civil Strife in Spain', *The Times*, 23 July 1937.
[58] 'United Christian Front', ibid, 29 November 1937.
[59] Peers, 'The Spanish Civil War', *The New Statesman and Nation*, 12:295 (1936), 584; 'Catalonia and the Spanish Civil War', *Studies*, 26:101 (1937), 5; Lunn, 'Introduction', in *United Christian Front*, 3.
[60] Friends of National Spain, *The Friends of National Spain* (London: FNS, 1938), 2.
[61] Page Croft, 'To The Editor of The Times', *The Times*, 12 October 1936; idem, *My Life of Strife* (London: Hutchinson, 1948)
272 (speech of 25 June 1937).

contemporary society had apparently deviated from the political and social traditionalism and elitism of pre-industrial European society – to many on the ideological right, this political modernity was embodied in communism. Dietz categorises those involved as 'Neo-Tories': public figures who organized themselves, ideologically, on the political right of the Conservative party. He argues that many 'Neo-Tories' in this period (such as Inge and the other executive members of the FNS) pounced with alacrity on the Spanish conflict to reroute European civilisation back to the social idyll conceptualised in their particular version of the past.[62]

My research does suggest Dietz's argument is plausible. Inge and others certainly wanted a return to the idyll of social elitism and limited electoral power in the 1920s and had seen a possibility for this in the social function of fascism. But, while one could argue that the FNS or UCF used Francoism for a more general purpose, the same cannot be said for Inge. For Inge, Francoist fascism invoked optimism rather than opportunism. It was a political doctrine that spoke to his outlook: rustic, organic, authoritarian, but not profane. It was deeply – and innately – Christian.

Inge never used the term 'crusade', but he engaged directly and intimately with the crusade narrative. Inge so often criticised Catholic social teaching, but, in this case, he appeared to be the greatest Anglophone exponent of Thomist theology. He was part of an intellectual movement in Britain that used Thomism to suggest that Franco's coup was not despotic or autocratic, but as deeply committed to the Spanish people. Foregrounding his presentation of Francoist fascism in this naturally gave it a divine purpose or justification, maybe even both. In the context of Inge's other writings on fascism, his ruminations on Francoism could have been about a totally separate ideology. But crucially, it was not: it was a conscious interaction with fascism, and a particular version at that. This is exactly what Umberto Eco meant when he talked of the patterns of fascism.

[62] Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 10, 172.

On the other hand, some Anglicans saw Francoism as cut from the same cloth as Fascism and Nazism. But the emergence of multiple fascist regimes forced Anglicans to distil their understanding of fascism's ideological rationale and craft a wholly Christian anti-fascism.

Anglican Anti-Francoism and the Defence of Democracy

Not all in Dietz's reactionary, ultra-conservative milieu accepted Franco's crusade narrative. In an essay of January 1937 in the *Criterion*, Eliot rejected the Francoist claims of saving Christianity. 'The victory of the Right will be the victory of a secular Right, not of a spiritual Right, which is a very different thing', he said.[63] To Eliot, Franco may well have been saving *Christians*, but he was ultimately advancing the cause of an ideology that stifled the expression of *Christianity*. A year later, he followed this point up with the important caveat that the Catholic was permitted to see Franco's campaign as 'just' because of the subjectivity of what is just, but 'just' could not be elided with 'holy' as Franco was currently doing.[64] Eliot gave the impression of neutrality in public, and gave it well; responding to a public questionnaire targeted at Britain's cultural elite, he wrote that that 'men of letters should remain isolated' from the political discourse of the public sphere.[65] In private, however, Eliot confirmed that he felt that fascism was a greater threat to Christianity than the Socialist government in Spain because it was 'more insidious' towards it and therefore he was 'on the whole, against the Rebels.'[66] Nonetheless, it shows how limited the appeal of the 'crusade' narrative was amongst even those Anglicans suspicious of the cultural, political, and aesthetic modernity.

This is not to present Eliot as a pro-Republican thinker: he was not. But his position is evidence of the possibility of being critical of both the government and Franco. Being anti-Franco (or, more accurately in Eliot's case, at least not pro-Franco) did not make someone pro-

[63] Eliot, 'A Commentary', *Criterion*, 16:63 (January 1937), 290. N.B., the commentary was written in November 1936.
[64] Ibid, 18:70 (October 1938), 58.
[65] Cunningham (ed.), *Spanish Front*, 56 ('Authors Take Sides on the Spanish War', 1937).
[66] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot to Emily Hale* (Eliot to Hale, 23 November 1936).

Republican. This mentality is indicative of much of the Anglican clergy. Claims of pro-Republicanism are tempered with the knowledge that Anglicans showed little regard for the Government itself rather than what it represented. As such, many saw the conflict about two competing systems of values rather than specific institutions. Instead of government against rebels, some Anglicans presented it as democracy against tyranny which was a microcosm of the wider competition between Christianity and fascism; anti-Francoism implies a real sense of anti-fascism. Therefore, I am less concerned with Anglican favourability towards the Spanish Second Republic than I am with criticisms of Francoist fascism.

As noted in the chapter's introduction, even for those who abstained from critical analyses of the conflict, it was widely accepted that Franco's coup was not spiritually justified. This general conclusion was reached even by competing theological parties. For example, interwar Christian socialists demonstrated a commitment to their nineteenth-century theological heritage by demanding that social fellowship be predicated on moralistic ties. *Christendom* published an article by the Russian Orthodox thinker Nicolas Berdyaev (1874-1948), which rejected Franco's crusade because it clearly intended to establish a society rooted in a political, rather than a spiritual, Christianity.[67]

Most Anglican critiques of Francoist fascism, however, came from more mainstream perspectives. Two of the most important instructors of anti-Franco opinion in the Church of England were Cyril Garbett and Henry Wilson, bishop of Chelmsford, both of whom were convinced there was nothing mitigating or divine about Franco's fascism. They argued Franco's 'crusade' was not underpinned by Thomist spirituality and that his propagation of a nationalist doctrine undermined any claims to be a Christian leader. William Temple was so often a dominant

[67] Nicolas Berdyaev, 'The Tragedy of Spain', *Christendom*, 9:34 (1939), *passim*, 122-32; see also, H. A. T. Bennett, 'Bernanos on Spain', ibid, 8:32 (1938), 299.

voice of moral guidance but about Spain he was quieter than usual. Nonetheless, it was clear that he felt similarly to Garbett and Wilson.

By this time, Temple had certainly forgotten any ideas about recognising the Burgos government and appeared more in line with the sentiments of his initial public statement on Spain, in which he quipped that the claims of Christianity being under threat in Spain due to the election of the Republican government were 'ridiculous.'[68] His association (much to Lang's anger) with the aid campaigns of the German Marxist playwright Ernst Toller (1893-1939) certainly hints to his political sympathies in the conflict.[69] Some suggest that the bombing of Guernica (April 1937) pushed him to the side of anti-Francoism, and while this may have helped, there is evidence to suggest it came earlier.[70] Temple's major work at the time of Spain (*Christian Democracy*, 1937) contributed to a wider intellectual development amongst some Anglicans regarding European fascism.

It is important to note a development from Chapter One, where democracy was a way of contextualising, understanding, and defining fascism in response to its antiparliamentarianism, to now being the ethical foundation of a form of anti-fascism. Democracy was not upheld as a political system *per se*, but as a set of values. This was part of the Church of England's wider ruminations on the construction of a space in which fascism could never have existed, a space in which values born out of His word were supreme and worldly values held no quasi-spiritual place. Such a perspective leads us to consider that Anglican perspectives on fascism were much less about political systems as they were about the misappropriation of divine status for worldly values.

In her study of Christian support for the Spanish Republic, Emily Mason adduced the Anglican cleric St John Groser (1890-1966) as an example of how some Christians formulated an anti-fascism based on defending the 'intellectual and civil liberties' associated with democracy as

[68] 'Vigilant and Strong', *op. cit.*
[69] See e.g., LPL, Lang 166, ff.46, Don to Temple, 3 January 1939 and reply, ff.47, 5 January 1939.
[70] See e.g., Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, 170.

more broadly defending Christian values.[71] Groser was a Christian Socialist already active in 'secular' antifascism by the time of Spain, having joined the resistance against the BUF at Cable Street in his East End parish of Stepney.[72] But as we shall see, it was not just committed left-wing clerics that considered democracy as an ethical foundation from which to build an anti-fascism, but across the political spectrum, and at every stratum of the ecclesiastical hierarchy. Lord Robert Cecil, for example, was so convinced by this that he pleaded with Cosmo Lang to support the cause of 'democratic liberty' against fascist tyranny in Spain.[73]

Temple's *Christian Democracy* was an ethical treatise that gave theological succour to that particular view of the conflict. The letters between Temple and the layman who edited his manuscripts, Henry Brinton (1901-77), show that large sections of it were written in light of the events in Spain, where Brinton had visited in 1937.[74] The central argument of *Christian Democracy* is that reason pointed to democracy as the only viable mode of civic governance. This was because democracy demanded the moral responsibility of individuals toward the collective more than any other form of governance and so spoke directly to the individual conscience.[75] Losing this divine contact meant an inability to heed reason, which ultimately contributed to the 'whole rake's progress' of civilization.[76] As has been argued in this thesis, some Anglicans felt fascism represented a distinct interruption to civilisational progression. To Temple, the efforts and effects of Franco were too similar to be coincidental.

After reading the first manuscript of Temple's monograph, Brinton pushed Temple to present the use of violence in politics as a consequence of a rejection of reason, as demonstrated in Spain.[77] Temple listened and in the final manuscript he summarised thus: 'so outrage breeds outrage, oppression breeds assassination.'[78] When a society turned from heeding reason, which

[71] Mason, *Democracy, Deeds, and Dilemmas*, 122-4.
[72] Kenneth Leech, 'Groser, St John Beverley', *ODNB* (2013).
[73] BL, CCP, ff.74, Cecil to Lang, 19 January 1937.
[74] BI, Bishopthorpe Palace Papers [hereafter cited BPP], Bp C&P XIII/6, esp., Brinton to Temple, 8 March 1937.
[75] Temple, *Christian Democracy* (London: SCM, 1937), 29.
[76] Ibid, 36.
[77] BI, BPP, Bp C&P XIII/6, Brinton to Temple, 8 March 1937.
[78] Temple, *Christian Democracy*, 36.

demanded cooperation and consideration of others, and instead chose intolerance, the result was always tension and, subsequently, violence. Temple believed that fascist nationalism was a clear example of the rejection of reason, because the egoistic impulse that 'I am to serve… My country' is a direct contradiction to the 'universalising tendency' of Christianity and was used by Franco to justify the use of violence on private citizens outside of this idealised national community.[79] Readers will remember that the main conclusion put forward in Chapter One was that Anglicans saw fascism as the manifestation of a conscious rejection of reason. It is important to note that this is not just a recapitulation of that point some ten years later, but that this point developed and intensified in severity as more Anglicans held an Occidental view of fascism.

Henry Wilson likewise challenged the pro-Franco narrative of a Thomist-sanctioned crusade. In a 1938 pamphlet, he sought to dismantle the pro-Franco arguments the UCF expounded. He refuted the UCF's claims that the Republican government was in the hands of Moscow.[80] He defended the Republican government as legitimately elected and argued that this was a clear manifestation of the expression of liberty – like Temple, then, he concluded democracy was most conducive to the Christian way of life.[81] Having attacked the process of democracy, Franco had attacked the sanctity of the God-given liberty in the world.

Wilson's main preoccupation though was his attempt to dispel Franco's 'crusade' narrative. His principal argument was that Franco had enlisted the support of 'Mahommedans' (meaning the Islamic Moorish fighters Franco commanded) as well as the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany.[82] To Wilson, Islam, Fascism, and Nazism shared a disregard for the Christian faith and so he was astounded that Franco had employed the enemies of Christianity as its principal defenders. Eliot made an identical point privately to Emily Hale, despairing Franco's use of 'black or brown or yellow mercenaries against one's fellow-countrymen.'[83] Hence, Wilson joked with some venom

[79] Ibid, 15-6.
[80] Wilson, *Religion & Spain* (Bristol: Parliamentary Committee for Spain, 1938), 11.
[81] Idem, 'Bishop on Spain', *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 9 September 1938.
[82] Ibid.
[83] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot to Emily Hale* (Eliot to Hale, 23 November 1936)

that Franco's 'crusade' was nothing more than a 'crusade of the comic opera variety.'[84] Wilson came to this conclusion because he believed the religion which Franco was defending was not Christianity but the 'new religion of Nationalism' that was inextricably linked with the fascist dictatorships in Europe.[85] Temple and Wilson presented a clear case against Franco: a campaign to save Christianity cannot be propagated on an ideology that directly undermines Christian doctrine.

Separately, Charles Raven characterised Spain through sharp bifurcation: it was a 'struggle between democracy and dictatorship.'[86] To Anglican pacifists who held democracy as central to Christian society, Spain provided a profound moral dilemma. Raven could not escape the thought that if the Christian ought to be committed to pacifism, at what personal cost should the defence of democracy, and thus the Christian conception of society more generally, have had?[87] While through Raven we can see how pacifist opinion was undoubtedly shaken, John Middleton Murry demonstrated an unapologetic conversion from pacifism to supporting military action.

'My personal destiny fits absolutely with the abominable horrors of the Fascist counter-revolution in Spain, sanctified by the Catholic Church – the mass-murder at Badajoz. The two together convince me, as I have never been convinced before… that one must fight.'[88] Middleton Murry's answer to Raven's conundrum then was that violence was justified in defending democracy from fascism. A year later, in the pacifist *Peace News*, he wrote in even more existential language, saying that the battle of democracy against fascism was essentially a fight between life and death.[89] In his analysis, 'life' symbolised the liberty of man's individual conscience, which was expressed in democratic systems, whereas 'death' represented to him a society predicated on the

[84] Wilson, *Religion & Spain,* 9.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Raven, *War and the Christian*, 23.
[87] Ibid, 115.
[88] F. A. Lea, *The Life of John Middleton Murry* (London: Methuen, 1959), 232 (entry for 20 August 1936).
[89] Middleton Murry, 'Democracy and the Democrat', *Peace News*, 47, 8 May 1937, 7.

destruction of individual personality. For Middleton Murry, because the conflict was distilled to this, Spain was a microcosm of the more general struggle of Christianity against fascism.

A potentially more effective way of looking at Middleton Murry's conversion would be to use Martin Ceadel's terminology and suggest it was a conversion from pacifism to pacificism. Pacificism is the justification that force can be used to prevent war.[90] In Middleton Murry's case, he was pacificistic because he saw that the forcible defeat of Franco would elevate Christian values to their rightful primacy in Spain and, by extension, Europe. This became a central theme of Middleton Murry's thought as the war in Spain ensued. Indeed, his analysis on Spain constitutes a large portion of his aptly titled book *The Defence of Democracy* (1939).

Middleton Murry rejected the Thomist justifications for Franco's crusade and the spirituality of his fascism, arguing that it misappropriated Christian paternalism, which was typical of the fascist doctrine. It would be useful to consider Slavoj Žižek's argument that fascism relies on a 'perceived' enemy to legitimise its authoritarian power.[91] Applying Žižek's model to Spain, Franco and his *junta* declared that communism was its 'enemy' so it could assert its authoritarian control over the country under the guise of protecting it. Middleton Murry was alluding to the fascist conception of the corporate personality of the state, just as Ernest Barker had argued in his conception of the fascist state in the early 1930s. Conceiving Spain as a (higher) spiritual entity, Franco was able to present his campaign as a defence of the will of the people rather than the offense for control of the geographical space. This was done so that the Spanish people would 'accept the responsibility of authoritarian government in a spirit of Christian paternalism', just as Žižek's model suggests.[92] This was ultimately a 'betrayal of the principles of morality and humanity, which we professed to hold sacred.'[93]

[90] Martin Ceadel, *Pacifism in Britain, 1914-1945* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 5.
[91] Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, 166.
[92] Middleton Murry, *The Defence of Democracy* (London: Cape, 1939), 27.
[93] Ibid, 247.

The crusade narrative was central to a lot of debate, and it is little wonder why Ben Edwards's research into Christian responses is centred around it.[94] But when we look specifically at Anglican responses, a different picture emerges. The crusade narrative was not *the* defining feature, but part of a wider debate which framed the Spanish Civil War as democracy (Christian spirituality) against fascism (worldly materialism). In contrast to the suggestion that Francoist fascism presented the possibility of different fascisms, many within the Church of England perceived a holism to European fascism. To these Anglicans, Franco's inculcation of a different type of fascism – of a *spiritual* fascism – was superficial and, in fact, many felt he was a greater threat to Christianity than the government to which he was in open resistance.

Anticlerical Violence

The Spring of 1938 was perhaps one of Lang's busier periods of the decade. Growing anxieties about Nazi Germany's expansion across eastern Europe claimed most of his attention and caused much personal stress to the now 73-year-old Primate. For those more concerned with the conflict in Spain, however, spring 1938 saw the erstwhile debate between Anglicans descend into vituperative and intractable disagreements. Indeed, Anglicans now used the atrocities undertaken by both sides to inform their understandings of fascism: Thomist justifications of Francoist fascism were bolstered by frenzied anticlericalism while anti-Franco Anglicans redoubled their criticisms of it after the bombing of Guernica.

The discussion of anticlericalism brought criticism to the Church of England. On more than one occasion, senior figures in Britain's establishment complained to Lang he and Temple had not shown enough public outrage over the killings.[95] Perhaps after the coverage of the Church of England's protestations over the persecution of Christians in Africa and Germany, cross-

[94] Edwards, *With God On Our Side*.
[95] LPL, CFR RC 211/1, ff.34-5, Baron Rankeillour to Lang, 5 October 1936 [criticism of Temple] and ff.43, Marquis de Moral to Lang, 22 October 1936 [criticism of Lang]. See also the diary entry from Conservative MP Arnold Wilson, July 1936, *Thoughts and Talks* (London, Longmans, 1938), 175.

denominational support was expected in Spain. Anglican discussions certainly remained focussed on Abyssinia rather than Spain, but the atrocities in Spain informed Anglican perspectives on fascism just as much as those in Abyssinia did. Given that Francoist fascism's claim to spirituality hinged upon on the defence of Christianity, the mass murder of clergymen in 1936 bolstered these claims.

It is unsurprising that the Civil War's anticlericalism caught the attention of most Anglicans given this was the 'greatest anticlerical bloodletting' in European history nor an isolated incident in twentieth century Spain.[96] Moreover, outbursts of anticlerical violence were not uncommon in twentieth-century Spain: the violence in 1936 succeeded waves of violence in 1931. Responding in 1931 to that year's violence, Temple said to Lord Robert Cecil: 'anti-clericalism is not mainly anti-religious. It is the revolt of the citizen from an organisation exercising inevitably large political and social power which is independent from and bears no allegiance to the State.'[97] Spain was a predominantly Roman Catholic country, and the Church had maintained a fractious relationship with the state for some time.[98] The suggestion that the Catholic Church was persecuted in Spain because it was considered central to the modalities of oppression was a common fallback of many Anglicans across the ecclesiastical hierarchy.[99]

Anticlerical violence was coterminous with the conflict's opening months, with estimates suggesting that around half of all the killings took place before September 1936.[100] The international impact of this was profound. The Vatican mourned these atrocities as an attack on its authority and existence. Diarmaid MacCulloch compellingly argues that the violence had such an impact on the Vatican's already negative view of the Republican government that it seemingly

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96 Vincent, 'The Keys to the Kingdom', in Chris Ealham, Michael Richards (eds), *The Splintering of Spain* (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), 68.
97 BL, CCP Add MS 51154 A, ff.131, Temple to Cecil, undated August 1931.
98 For a fuller account, see Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*; see also, Carr, *Spain*, 45-8; Vincent, *Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic*, *passim*.
99 Cf., LPL, CFR RC, 211/1, ff.13, Article by Lang in the *Canterbury Diocesan Gazette*, *op. cit.*; Barry, 'Revolutionary Christianity', 70; Henson, 'Fourth Quadrennial Charge' (1936), *Ad Clerum* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1937), 34.
100 de la Cueva, 'Religious Persecution, Anticlerical Tradition and Revolution', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 33:3 (1998), 357; José María Margenat Peralta, 'Manuel de Irujo', *Cuadernos de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea*, 4 (1983), 176.

ignored Nationalist atrocities inflicted upon civilians in Republican-controlled zones of Spain after 1936.[101]

In England, the same can be said of Ralph Inge, who publicly ignored Nationalist atrocities – he claimed the bombing of Guernica was misrepresented and that the Nationalist massacre of civilians at Badajoz was 'fictitious.'[102] Interestingly though, after years of denouncing the anticlerical violence and emphasising the religious tolerance of Franco's regime, Inge wrote in his diary that 'the nationalists have not always behaved well, e.g., after the capture of Malaga.'[103] Perhaps he omitted Nationalist atrocities from his public pronouncements because he hoped there would be little public attention given to incidents that would undermine the Thomist justifications behind Franco. For Inge and the other pro-Franco Anglicans, anticlericalism legitimised their presentation of the conflict as synonymous with the defence of Christianity and the idea that Francoist fascism was a spiritual type of fascism.

Inge explored anticlericalism in quite some detail in his writings about Spain. This was a common ploy by those on the British political right, with Thomas Linehan's work showing how Anglican clerics associated with the BUF propagated this anti-communist, pro-fascist narrative.[104] Inge was aware of the weight these indictments would give his Thomist justification for Franco's crusade. This perhaps explains his propensity to disseminate overwhelmingly falsified information. For instance, he opined that by February 1937 around 16,750 clergymen had been murdered in Spain and that 20,000 churches had been burned.[105] In retrospect, of course, this cannot be taken seriously: nowhere near 16,000 clergymen were killed and iconoclasm was never on this industrial scale.

[101] MacCulloch, *A History of Christianity*, 940.
[102] Inge, *Our Present Discontents*, 18.
[103] MCOL, ID Vol. 36, 4 April 1939.
[104] Linehan, "On the Side of Christ", 289-90; see also his *East London for Mosley*, 83.
[105] Inge, *Our Present Discontents*, 17.

Inge's repertoire was not limited to the murder of clergymen, but also focused on the apparent sexual abuse of female Catholics. This was a common war-time trope with which Inge was familiar. During the First World War, stories circulated that some German soldiers had raped civilians in Belgium. The Church of England's clergymen were appalled: Hensley Henson, while bishop of Hereford, preached about these 'vile deeds' while a collection of Oxford dons condemned Germany's 'Asiatic barbarism' which had undermined the 'supremest [*sic*] interests of Christian civilisation.'[106] Like many, Inge got his information from Lord Bryce's official report.[107] He had full confidence in its findings and paraphrased them in his 1920 Romanes Lecture *The Idea of Progress*: 'no such cruelties had been committed for three hundred years as those which the Germans practiced in Belgium and France.' Interestingly, Inge made the surprise confession that he accepted the possibility that 'some atrocities were magnified with the amiable object of rousing a good-natured people to violent hatred.'[108] Ironically, his writings on Spanish anticlericalism appear to demonstrate the value he understood in such exaggerations.

Inge repeatedly invoked images of sexual violence. In a speech at an FNS event, Inge quoted a conveniently anonymous source who supposedly had the misfortune of having 'witnessed outrages on Spanish girls'; in another, he explained how tortured Catholics were forced to watch their 'wives and daughters being… violated.'[109] Moreover, Inge asserted that it was the 'protégés' of Bishop Wilson (meaning members of the anarchist gangs accused of these crimes) that revelled in the ceremony of kidnapping nuns, forcing them to strip 'naked' before they subsequently 'violate them.'[110] Such an accusation acts as an illustrative example of the levels of public vitriol present in Anglican discourse on Spain.

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[106] Henson, *War-time Sermons*, 48 ('Salt and Light', 1915); Various, *To The Christian Scholars of Europe and America* (London: OUP, 1914), 10, 15.
[107] Lord Bryce, *Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages*.
[108] Inge, *The Idea of Progress*, 23.
[109] Idem, speech in *The Case for Nationalist Spain*, 5; quoted in H. G. Wells, *The Common Sense of War and Peace* (London, 1940), 42-3.
[110] Inge, 'Religion in Spain', *op. cit.*

Inge frequently appealed to the sensibilities of English society. For example, he asked his readers to imagine the villagers of a quaint English town suddenly dragging the local vicars from their beds, 'beating them to death with clubs, tearing out their eyes, mutilating them… outraging their wives and daughters.'[111] Conversations about the realities of sexual violence in the Spanish Civil War are ongoing yet remain hampered by a lack of *official* evidence. Mary Vincent and Paul Preston have both argued that there is little to no evidence of systematic rape during the Civil War's anticlerical violence, and that the evidence of sexual violence in fact shows that it was infrequent, spontaneous, and overwhelmingly reserved for laywomen.[112] Whatever the statistical truth, Maud Joly makes the important argument that the 'fear' of rape was as much an instrument of wartime behaviour as the act of rape itself.[113] Inge's writings are replete with examples of this trope and he perpetually espoused stories of this ilk rather than emphasising the very real murders of priests. It seems likely that he reiterated them as the heinousness associated with this particular crime in recent popular consciousness helped to corroborate the claims that international Marxism and lawlessness were two inherently interlinked phenomena. The impact of this was evident.

But Inge's exaggerations should not obscure the accurate observation that he saw anticlericalism as part of the cultural crisis that rejected reason as the driving force of human society.[114] Inge believed that only in a society where reason was unintelligible could the human instinct for 'blood-lust [be] excited in young men' and where men were indifferent to the industrialised slaughter of civilians as a means to achieve the end of progression.[115] This conception of the bloodlettings played into Inge's distinct characterisation of Francoism because where the Spanish Republic, Italian Fascism, and German Nazism propagated the idealised myth of secular progress on account of a common epistemological void, Francoist fascism appeared an evolved

[111] Idem, *Our Present Discontents*, 20.
[112] Vincent, 'The Keys to the Kingdom', 86; Preston, *The Spanish Holocaust* (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012), xix.
[113] Maud Joly, Helen McPhail (trans.), 'The Practices of War, Terror and Imagination', in Raphaëlle Branche, Fabrice Virgili (eds), *Rape in Wartime* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2012), 103-14.
[114] Crook, 'W. R. Inge and Cultural Crisis', 425.
[115] Inge, *The Idea of Progress*, 23.

form of fascism. Franco's efforts to protect man's personhood proved that Francoist fascism was aware of the true meaning of progression – the effort of man to transcendent the temporal and reach the spiritual world – and thus a spiritual form of fascism.

Anti-Francoists like Bishop Wilson of Chelmsford refuted the conception that Francoist fascism was defending the world from atheistic terror. There was no love lost between Wilson and Inge after they had crossed swords in the columns of the national press. Wilson remembered Inge telling him personally that defending the Republic from these accusations was a 'very horrid thing' to have done.[116] Wilson publicly refuted Inge's claims. In *The Times*, he accused Inge of having purposely inflated the figures to stoke the flames of hatred in Britain toward the Republican government.[117] He rejected Inge's statistics and instead asserted that only 6,000 clerics had been murdered. In the same article, he argued that anticlericalism was a minor phenomenon under the government elected in 1936 and only became prominent when Franco's uprising forced the government to funnel all its resources into defending itself.[118] Inge, as one might have guessed, was unconvinced by timings as a legitimate mitigating factor, having previously said that anticlericalism – irrespective of when it started – justified Franco's crusade 'ten times.'[119]

Wilson perceived Inge's eschatological language as appealing to the uninformed, yet understandable sympathy Anglicans had for their Catholic coreligionists killed in Spain in order to give credence to his claims of Christo-Spanish extermination. Wilson was prescient to see this at play; as Valentine Cunningham has argued, the strong 'mythic atmosphere' surrounding the war in Spain in Anglophone writings was 'engendered… by the current sense of the apocalypse.'[120] In direct response to Wilson's article, Inge claimed that the number of clergy killed should have been included in the wider figure of 200,000 Catholics (clergymen and laypeople) who had apparently

[116] Wilson, *Reflections of a Back-Bench Bishop* (London: Latimer House, 1948), 12.
[117] Idem, 'Religion in Spain', *The Times*, 20 May 1938; see also, *Religion & Spain*, 10.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Ibid; Inge, speech in *The Case for Nationalist Spain*, 5.
[120] Cunningham, *British Writers of the Thirties*, 421.

been victims of the campaign to 'extirpate the Christian faith' from Spain.[121] The strength of Cunningham's argument is self-evident in Inge's eschatological tone and Thomist justifications of Franco, which certainly overemphasised the threat of Christo-Spanish extinction.

The Wilson-Inge debate was a microcosm of a much wider struggle within the Church of England's communion. It was certainly an *Anglican* phenomenon too, as most Catholics and Catholic publications (except for outliers like the *Catholic Herald* and the *Sower*) subscribed to the narratives emanating from Francoist Spain and the Vatican.[122] Graphic accounts of mutilation featured prominently in indictments of anti-Franco Anglicans. Charles Petrie (1895-1977), a 'Neo-Tory' affiliate of the FNS, wrote in the Catholic *English Review* that William Temple was indifferent to stories such as the 'young wife in Madrid [who] missed her husband for a day or two, until his head was delivered at her door in a basket.'[123] The horror associated with graphic images in the public's mind always put Anglicans attempting to criticise Franco on the backfoot, seemingly unable to disprove claims that Francoist fascism was charged with the spiritual mission of saving Christianity.

Wilson's interjection had little to no impact in steering anti-Republican thought away from explicit pro-Francoism. It was clear that the *physical* defence of Christians in Spain legitimised support for Francoist fascism. Pronounced anti-Franco Anglicans tried to downplay the threat of Christo-Spanish extermination by presenting anticlericalism in Spain as an attack on the socio-political institution of the Catholic Church (anti-clericalism) rather than the Christian faith (anti-theism). This was done to undermine the legitimacy of Francoist fascism's crusade narrative but also, it associated Francoist fascism with values antithetical to Christian doctrine, such as the repudiation of justice as a requisite for peace. There was already a current of Anglican thought that separated these two issues. In an article on Spain, Ernest Barker wrote that 'there is a terror of

[121] Inge, 'Religion in Spain', *op. cit.*
[122] See, Clifton, *Amigo*, 143; Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism*, 206-7.
[123] Petrie, 'Foreign Affairs', *The English Review*, 63:5 (1936), 481.

Russian anti-theism, aided by a similar terror of Spanish anti-clericalism.'[124] Despite seeing these as two inherently linked phenomena, there was still an awareness of the difference between them. This difference is at the centre of two reports by pro-Republic clergymen who visited Spain in January and April 1937.

Efforts to demonstrate why some Spaniards violently attacked the Catholic clergy were undertaken by two deans. Arthur Duncan-Jones, dean of Chichester, took a delegation to Spain in January 1937, sanctioned by the British and Spanish Governments, and blessed by the Church of England. Hewlett Johnson (1874-1966), the Marxist 'Red Dean' of Canterbury, had a different experience, with Anthony Eden in the Foreign Office practically begging him to not go to Spain in April 1937.[125] Buchanan rightfully points out that the reports were unified by a belief that the Spanish people sought revenge on the clergy after years of oppression.[126] I echo Buchanan's argument, but for my purpose I am more interested in how these documents can demonstrate the Anglican conceit of the war as a battle of democracy versus fascism.

Duncan-Jones saw the Church's role as the application of a social gospel, evidenced in his involvement with Spain through various humanitarian organisations. While his expertise and activities had hitherto been focused on the persecution of Protestants in Nazi Germany, he was employed to advise the Parliamentary Committee for Spain. However, he soon concluded that the Government's position of impartial non-intervention was a pretence, employed 'as an excuse for the avoidance of duty.'[127] Ben Edwards does well to highlight the multiplicity of reasons why Duncan-Jones's report angered so many Francoists in Britain's Christian milieu.[128] However, Edwards treats this document as a catalyst for the formation of the UCF and FNS, whereas I will instead show how it can provide an insight into the quasi-institutional response of the Church of England to the Francoist narrative that had widely suffused British discourse.

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[124] Barker, 'Conflict of Ideologies', 347.
[125] John Butler, *The Red Dean of Canterbury* (London: Scala, 2011), 69.
[126] Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, 173.
[127] Quoted in Carpenter, *Duncan-Jones of Chichester*, 113-4.
[128] Edwards, *With God On Our Side*, 56-9.

Duncan-Jones's delegation arrived in Republican Spain in January 1937, going to investigate 'the events which led up to the destruction of the Churches and the killing of clergy.'[129] They were hosted by Government officials in Barcelona and Valencia, and the principal conclusion put forward was that politics was the primary motivation of anticlericalism in the Civil War and it was not motivated by the 'anti-God' sentiment that pro-Franco Anglicans claimed.[130] The report was warmly accepted by the Church of England hierarchy: Alan Don privately joked to Duncan-Jones 'that the only result of your expedition which has so far come to my notice is the withdrawal by an outraged military man of an annual subscription of £200 to the Church owing to certain remarks of your colleague the dean of Rochester [Francis Underhill] reported on the wireless on February 15th!'[131]

Such a conclusion undermined the Thomist justifications of Francoist fascism which pro-Franco Anglicans promulgated. Duncan-Jones's argument, instead, fed into the narrative that Spain was a struggle between democracy and fascism. One of the more illuminating examples of this comes from his suggestion that the Catholic Church would do well to steer clear of politics if it wanted tolerance in the future.[132] Once again, we see the suggestion that the Catholic Church deserved the treatment it received for years of apparent injustice. Moreover, Duncan-Jones was not referring to 'politics' in general but almost certainly to the politics of the Right. Indeed, it comes across that he readily accepted the notion that priests were killed as they were seen as class enemies and inextricably linked with (Francoist) fascism.

The expression of latent anger through iconoclasm and murder is plausible in some cases. Frances Lannon argues that priests were perceived to have abandoned their pastoral duties and instead assisted the Spanish bourgeoisie in oppressing the masses of society.[133] Such an assessment

[129] Warwick University Digital Archives, 292/946/18b/70, Duncan-Jones, *Report of a Group of Anglican and Free Churchmen Who Visited Spain* (London: Henry Brinton, 1937), 1.
[130] Ibid.
[131] LPL, CFR RC 211/3, ff. 12, Don to Duncan-Jones, 18 February 1937. For another positive reception of Duncan-Jones's report, see 'Summary', *Church Times*, 19 February 1937.
[132] Duncan-Jones, *Report of a Group*, 3.
[133] Lannon, *Privilege, Persecution, and Prophecy*, 202

has since been reiterated by Mary Vincent, who demands that we understand the 'social function' that violence served. In certain *pueblos*, the social function of violence was to protect local communities from the clerics who were perceived as the active agents of rebellion against the Government.[134]

Historians should rightly be sceptical about aspects of Duncan-Jones's report. Anti-Catholicism was an undercurrent throughout his report, for he was at this time publicly expounding the belief that Pope Pius XI and his senior prelates were men of 'pronounced Fascist sympathies.'[135] Moreover, the report itself does not offer the plurality of perspectives required for rigorous analysis and certainly not for the more general conclusions he made. For example, it made no effort to elucidate information about the violence that occurred in smaller *pueblos*, where numerous anecdotal sources convey the wider realities.[136] He also downplayed the realities of the repression of Christianity in Spain. This is unsurprising considering Duncan-Jones visited Spain in 1937, after much of the anticlerical violence had stopped, which perhaps confirmed his presupposition that anticlericalism had been overemphasised by his pro-Franco peers.

Duncan-Jones hoped his report would, under the auspices of neutrality, exert a significant influence and balance the weight of public opinion in Britain's religious milieu. He was incandescent with rage at Henry Brinton then for jeopardising this impartiality by having the report published in his name. 'Your association with the report has already greatly interfered with the influence which it might rightly have exercised' and therefore even if permission was sought 'I should have objected in the strongest way', he said.[137] Duncan-Jones was aware of his own shortcomings too. Writing to another delegate, Philip Usher (1899-1941), chaplain to A. C. Headlam, the director of the CFR, he lamented his use of the term 'no evidence' of anti-Christianity when he meant 'little evidence', which he believed to be accurate.[138]

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[134] Vincent, 'Keys to the Kingdom', 70.
[135] Duncan-Jones, *The Struggle for Religious Freedom* (London: Gollancz, 1938), 158.
[136] Vincent, 'Keys to the Kingdom', 72.
[137] LPL, CFR RC 211/2, ff.56, Duncan-Jones to Brinton, 27 March 1937.
[138] Ibid, ff.22, idem to Philip Usher, 22 February 1937.

Nonetheless, the report remains an important document for this thesis. It shows the nondoctrinal sanctity that Anglicans placed onto the civil liberties associated with democracy and how this was utilised as the ethical context of a wholly Christian anti-fascism. With anti-Francoism based on this, it reiterates the point made by Temple and Wilson that fascism's rejection of democracy naturally correlated with a rejection of Christian spirituality in the civic space. Duncan-Jones's reconceptualisation of the violence as performative, being more about the political authoritarianism which the clergy symbolised than about their Christian faith, further distilled the war as about liberty against tyranny. Instead of Christianity being under attack from the Republic, Duncan-Jones played right into the suggestion that it was under a greater threat from fascism. Such emphases on the political nature of the violence appealed to the longstanding fear in the Church of England that the Roman Catholic Church perpetually exhibited an ostensible affinity with political authoritarianism.[139]

The delegation that went to Spain four months later was led by the communist-sympathising dean of Canterbury. Hewlett Johnson never officially joined the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), however his unrepentant Marxism illuminated his many extracurricular activities, such as visiting (and extolling the virtues of) the Soviet Union alongside being Chairman of the Board for the CPGB's newspaper *The Daily Worker*.[140] He championed a brand of theology best described by Buchanan as a 'combination of extreme materialism with spiritual utopianism.'[141] Johnson's dedication to Marxism – something one of his detractors would call a 'perverse obsession' – made him an isolated figure toward the top of the ecclesiastical hierarchy.[142]

While Duncan-Jones's delegation was exclusively Anglican, Johnson's was exclusively Marxist; one delegate was the Anglican vicar E. O. Iredell, who was known to end each service in

[139] The concerns about Spanish fascism and the Vatican were common in the Anglican media; see e.g., 'Summary', *Church Times*, 21 August 1936 and 9 October 1936.
[140] Natalie Watson, 'Johnson, Hewlett', *ODNB* (2004); see e.g., Hewlett Johnson, *Socialist Sixth of the World* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1939).
[141] Buchanan, *Spanish Civil War*, 172.
[142] Norman, *Church and Society in England*, 350.

the working-class London borough of Islington with the clenched-fist salute of left-wing activists common during the Popular Front era as well as organising 'collections… to help the People's Front government… get machine guns.'[143] But it also included other interwar Christian Marxists, such as the nonconformist minister D. R. Davies (1889-1958). Johnson's delegation was already considered suspect due to its political radicalism and the presence of nonconformists probably added to this; it is perhaps why the report was dismissed as being fuelled by anti-Catholicism. Unlike Duncan-Jones, with whom Don could joke, Johnson became the centre of an ecclesiastical scandal. Following a 'stupid sermon' he preached in Canterbury Cathedral about his trip to Spain, Don wrote in his diary that Lang was 'much annoyed at his vagaries' while he himself described Johnson as 'an incorrigible sentimentalist [who] delights to flirt with Bolshies.'[144]

Like the January delegation, Johnson visited Barcelona and Valencia, but he also managed to explore Madrid as well as the Basque country's de facto capital, Bilbao. Notwithstanding the wider variety of places visited, Johnson also misleadingly presented the greater religious freedom he may have found in certain cities as evidence that Republican Spain was tolerant of the Catholic Church. The most ostensible example of this is when Johnson failed to differentiate the vast social and structural disparities between the Basque Church and its Castilian counterpart. José Peralta has since asserted the fundamental differences between the regions in this period and argues that the Basque church experienced near normality while churches were sacked, and priests murdered, in Castilian Spain.[145]

In Johnson's report, there was a more concerted effort to underplay the violent iconoclasm than in Duncan-Jones's; Johnson's group more readily accepted Government statements on religious toleration, while Duncan-Jones was acutely aware that these statements must be treated with caution.[146] But the primary argument put forward by Johnson's report mirrored Duncan-

[143] D. R. Davies, *In Search of Myself* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1961), 164; Buchanan, *Britain and the Spanish Civil War*, 173.
[144] Don, *Faithful Witness*, 219 (19 April 1937).
[145] Peralta, 'Manuel de Irujo', 179.
[146] See e.g., LPL, CFR RC 211/2, ff. 22, Duncan-Jones to Usher, 22 February 1937.

Jones's and correlated with the wider effort to present the Spanish Civil War as the defence of democracy from fascism. Johnson asserted that the violence was 'political' and not 'anti-religious', with the report seemingly trying to exonerate the Government. The report asserted there was 'no revolutionary upheaval' in Republican zones, which they hoped would dispel ideas of anticlericalism being a violent preamble to the formation of a Soviet in Spain, as pro-Franco Anglicans like Inge suggested.[147]

Johnson used the example of a priest he met in the Basque seaside town of Santander to support his claims that the anticlericalism in the Civil War was political. He explained that the priest had not worn his clerical vestments since the violence had commenced and, as a result, he was 'moving about freely' and respected ubiquitously.[148] Upon evaluation, this anecdote – which implies violence was only directed toward those who were ostentatious symbols of clerical authority – has no supporting sources to verify it, and, given what we know, it is likely apocryphal. After all, we know religious and political differences were minimal in the Basque country, with there being a closer social bond between the clergy and the laity due to the uniquely unifying desire for Basque independence.

It is from perspectives like this that Buchanan probably concluded most pro-Republican responses were influenced by a latent anti-Catholicism within the Church of England. But it is important to highlight that these reports (and the wider discourse to which they contributed) do not represent traditional forms of Anglican anti-Popery but rather it was a specific anti-Catholicism that was influenced by the Roman Catholic Church's sustained association with fascistic politics in interwar Spain. As such, this discovery provides a new way of interpreting 'anti-Catholicism' in the interwar period and hopefully complements Buchanan's research. Therefore, we should remain wary of seeing anti-Catholicism as driving Anglican perspectives on anti-Francoism more than a genuine belief that democracy was integral for the evangelising of civic life. Such a process of re-

[147] Johnson, *Report of a Recent Religious Delegation to Spain* (London: Gollancz, 1937), 8, 14.
[148] Ibid, 14.

Christianisation was considered necessary in the imagination of a society able to combat the issues of modernity, of which fascism was a perennial threat.

We cannot, of course, argue that these documents represent a coherent or official perspective on fascism. But even so, it is valuable to see the significant problems within them. Both reports demonstrate a concerted effort to reframe the debate around Spain and the justifications of the conflict's inception. Put another way, these reports highlight Anglican mentalities and how the cultural feeling toward fascism in Spain largely contrasted with the sentiments Lang expounded to garner support for non-intervention. The second consequence of this is that we see the intellectual counterresponse to the 'crusade' narrative. The reports attempted to undermine the Thomist justifications of Franco's campaign through highlighting the inaccuracy of the apocalyptic tone of Christo-Spanish extermination by presenting it as anti-clerical, not anti-theist. To an extent, Johnson and Duncan-Jones had responded to Spain not as an individual issue, but an episode in the more general fascist revolution of Europe.

Nationalist Atrocities

While the anticlerical killings provided even greater credence to the Thomist justifications of Francoist fascism, the use of aerial bombardment reiterated to Anglican anti-Francoists that fascism was ultimately antithetical to Christianity because it rejected the core tenets of its doctrine. Returning to Eliot's criticisms of Francoist fascism, it may have defended Christians, but the modalities of this defence represented a stark rejection of the Christian faith. As was the case in Abyssinia, aerial bombardment in Spain reflected a civilisation that had consciously rejected reason and was therefore inconducive for the realisation of the Kingdom of God.

Guernica is in the heart of the Basque country. Basque nationalism is complex and far beyond the scope of this thesis, but in its simplest terms, Basques believe they are a separate ethnic group to Castilian Spaniards and speak a different language (*Euskara*). The Second Spanish

Republic had granted the Basque country greater autonomy than it had previously had. 26 April 1937 looked to be another ordinary day as its famed market bustled. Without warning, the Nazi *Luftwaffe* dropped incendiary bombs and used machine guns to attack the people of the town. Where anticlericalism appeared an esoteric phenomenon, Guernica was not.

The day after the bombing, Lang remained cautious in the face of journalistic advances for his comment.[149] Once again, he waited to ascertain the facts and, once he had done so, he appended his signature to an appeal for the immediate cessation of aerial bombardment of civilian targets in Spain.[150] Temple, in contrast, had immediately released a statement in *The Times*, in which he asked Christians to 'unite in condemnation of such methods of warfare as those employed in the destruction of Guernica.'[151] What Temple saw in Guernica, as he made clear in his writings, was that the fascist propensity for wholesale violence was destroying civilisation.

Often in histories of interwar Church of England, wherever Temple is discussed, Cyril Garbett is not far behind. Perhaps the two most important pastoral figures of the interwar Church, Temple and Garbett invariably offered similar analyses of the social and political landscape of the interwar years. Though in the case of Guernica, they were separated by contrasting levels of public outrage. On 29 April 1937, Garbett exploded in the House of Lords. He declared that Guernica was an 'appalling outrage against all the laws of civilisation' and spoke with incredulity about the British government's refusal to take suitable action to curtail the integral role Germany was having in Franco's war effort.[152] Three days later, he remained incandescent with rage. He explained to his congregation that Guernica was a 'cruel, deliberate, cold-blooded act against the laws of God and against every law of civilisation and of man.'[153]

The impact that the bombing of Guernica had on civilisational progression was a salient concern for Garbett. In both statements, it is clear he hoped that this crime would be banished

[149] LPL, CFR RC 211/3, ff.26, Francis Williams to Lang, 27 April 1937, and reply, ff.28, 29 April 1937.
[150] Ibid/4, ff.8, Don to Walter Layton, 2 February 1938.
[151] Temple, 'Massacre from the Air', *The Times*, 30 April 1937.
[152] HL Deb., 'The Adjournment: Civil War in Spain', 29 April 1937, Vol.105, Col.92.
[153] Charles Smyth, *Cyril Forster Garbett* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1959), 233 (Garbett sermon, 2 May 1937).

from the repertoire of modern warfare due to the threat it posed to the destruction of civilisation. The normality of this type of warfare in campaigns of fascist conflict suggested to Garbett, like many others, that fascism fundamentally rejected reason and, on the evidence before him, Francoist fascism was no different. With Guernica in mind, Henry Wilson wrote in his *Diocesan Chronicle* that the declining influence of Christian ethics in the world meant that 'civilisation and progress' were stunted.[154] A year later he concluded that a civilisation that allowed the 'rape of Abyssinia and the murder of women and children in Barcelona' was a 'civilization not worth preserving.'[155]

But the aerial bombardment of Guernica was not an isolated incident in Spain. Hewlett Johnson's delegation witnessed numerous air raids. In a rather derisory tone, Alan Don recalled Johnson installing 'steel girders' to protect the roof of Canterbury Cathedral at the start of the Second World War so it did not collapse under the effects of 'aerial bombardment [like he saw] … at Barcelona and Guernica.'[156] They also witnessed the German and Italian shelling of Eibar, a small municipality in the Basque country. 'It was a hopeless ruin, reduced to dust and rubble by heavy German and Italian artillery', Davies remembered, 'I felt numb, physically and morally exhausted.'[157] By Davies's own admission, the group's worst experience came in Durango, yet another Basque town that was flattened: 'it was at that moment that my belief in progress collapsed', he admitted.[158] Despite converting to Anglicanism in 1941 (receiving ordination from Temple), Davies's experiences with fascism pushed him to embrace the theology of Original Sin, at this time most famously promulgated by radical Calvinists such as Reinhold Niebuhr and Karl Barth. Charles Raven famously criticised this position, chastising their 'pathological' response to

[154] 'Bishop and War Horrors', *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 23 April 1937.
[155] 'A Bishop's Protest', *The Times*, 22 March 1938. See also, 'Summary', *Church Times*, 25 March 1938.
[156] Don, *Faithful Witness*, 308-9 (16 September 1939).
[157] Davies, *In Search of Myself*, 177.
[158] Ibid, 176.

the political morass of the 1930s.[159] This may be slightly unfair; though more radical in its foundational theology, Davies's prescription of evangelism was no different from Lang's.

Either way, the belief that fascism inhibited the progress of civilisation was increasingly common. Anglican discussions on the industrialised violence in Spain were identical to those had about Abyssinia and once again reiterated that these were unchristian acts. This violence significantly undermined Anglican pro-Francoist claims of an establishment of a spiritual version of fascism. More than this though, these discussions complemented Lang's move toward a more fundamental application of the bible to society in this period. In fact, Anglican responses to Spain generally suggest a similar reading of fascism to Lang's reading of modernity. The emergence of evangelism in Anglican discussions about fascism suggests that by the mid-1930s it was seen as a spiritual problem rather than one driven by worldly factors. Despite Inge's efforts, a sizeable proportion of the Church of England's clergy still perceived Franco's campaign of violence in Spain as identical to Mussolini's campaign in Abyssinia: nationalistic and a conscious rejection of reason.

Fascisms in the Anglican Imagination

The Spanish Civil War was a complex issue for any group involved. It split political parties, trade unions, and church communions. The Church of England was not immune from this. The various responses to this complexity demonstrate how Anglican thought on fascism evolved and became disparate. Hitherto, we have presented Anglicans as understanding fascism monolithically. But Anglicans did not continue to perceive one fascist phenotype. Instead, we see a number of different fascisms as existing in the Anglican imagination simultaneously.

A theme that runs consistently through the writings of Inge, Peers, and the ideological networks that supported Franco is the possibility of imagining a Christian, perhaps 'better', fascism. Inge never denied Francoism was fascist; he did not merely sympathise with Francoist

[159] Raven, *Good News of God* (New York: Harper, 1943), 6.

fascism, but fervently supported it. But Inge's support of Francoist fascism should not be understood as a turn toward support of all fascist regimes so much as a total a reshaping of how he conceptualised fascism. Inge's ability to separate different fascisms speaks volumes about how more dynamic and broad scoping the concept of fascism was by the mid-1930s. Though this appears a nuanced position – in the ability to support one fascism but reject another – it was in fact a binary one for Inge. Therefore, it suggests fascism could exist in a multiplicity of forms, some profane and some not. But what separated them? For Inge, it rested upon the defence of organic principles.

This was clear to Inge from two separate examples: Francoist fascism defended class society and religion from Bolshevism. Bolshevism wanted to destroy these organic principles to facilitate the transformation of society into its economic and social utopia. His 1934 Spencer Lectures showed an awareness that all fascisms were born out of the defence of these principles, but Francoist fascism was a true form of fascism because it remained committed to them. On the question of religion – where Franco was fighting *against* an ideology associated with the murder of priests – the above statements could not be refuted. In many ways, Francoist fascism was a Catholic fascism, based largely on the political theology of St Thomas Aquinas. Inge's fervent support of it stands in contradiction to his deep-rooted suspicion of Catholicism – theologically and culturally – and as such, we might argue that Inge's conceptualisation of Francoist fascism as a Christian fascism superseded existing denominational issues.

This suggestion of a spectrum of profanity amongst fascisms did not convince all within the Church of England, mainly because there were too many ideological continuities between Francoist fascism and other – 'condemned' – fascisms. When distilled to its purest form, Anglican support for the Republic was actually support for democracy against fascism and the compatibility of liberal social values and Christian teaching. In other words, it was about spiritual liberty or political tyranny. This was not reflective of a new form of fascism, but a new regime that operated within the same ideological network as Italy and Germany. Additionally, Francoist fascism

apparently peddled a form of nationalism that was both exclusive to those in Spain (being aimed at those who wanted the 'old Spain' back) as well as uncooperative to the appeals of international organisations, which proved the falseness in Franco's claims to be a paladin of world Christianity. These Anglicans discarded Franco's claims of saving Christianity, once again reaffirming that all fascisms were incompatible with Christianity.

Tom Villis has argued that Spain distinctly problematised the efforts to conceptualise a Catholic anti-fascism in Britain. Catholics who rejected Franco's crusade as a campaign of fascist aggrandisement, he argues, felt compelled to engage with secular modes of criticism and this hindered its cause as it was an inferior challenge to the seeming spiritual strength of Francoist fascism.[160] But this was not the case for Anglicans in interwar Britain. The successful elision of democracy and the Christian doctrine of liberty by some Anglicans more generally in this period was easily transferred to their anti-fascism in the Spanish Civil War. At its very core, Anglican anti-fascism relied upon the attempt to reinstate and venerate the supremacy of values that were the earthly impress of God's word. The understanding that Christian ethics could combat fascism thus led to a wider reconceptualisation of its nature so the following chapter will explore the wider implications of this.

[160] Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism*, 214.

Chapter Five
A New Challenge of an Old Variety: Fascism as Paganism

The wounded surgeon plies the steel
That questions the distempered part;
Beneath the bleeding hands we feel
The sharp compassion of the healer's art
Resolving the enigma of the fever chart.

– T. S. Eliot, 'East Coker' (1940)

'It may be questioned whether "pagan" is the right designation for societies that have once known, and have consciously rejected, the Christian faith. But for our own present purpose the term may pass.'[1] So wrote J. H. Oldham in his review of T. S. Eliot's *The Idea of a Christian Society* (1939) in *The Christian News-Letter*, the magazine of which he was the editor. Eliot's usage left others similarly confused. His friend Maurice Reckitt wrote to him privately that 'pagan' was too closely bound up with the idea of a 'pre-Christian society' rather than a society 'consciously hostile to a long-established faith.'[2] Oldham and Reckitt certainly held a view of paganism more in line with patristic theologians such as Justin Martyr (*c.*AD 100-65) and Augustine of Hippo, who held it as the veneration of false philosophies and conscious rejection of the truth fulfilled in Christ.

From this original definition, paganism is thus largely associated with false idolatry. Consider the eighteenth-century Anglican divine Richard Bentley (1662-1742) and his attack on Deism. In one sermon ('Of Revelation and the Messias'), he criticised Deism as a form of paganism because it believed that God was merely *a* Creator, with no further influence in the temporal world, and this actively undermined the central fact that Jesus was the Messiah. Deist theology broke man's individual relationship with God, which in turn gave man the possibility of finding personal salvation in other, false, deities – Deism paved the way for the 'worship of strange gods.'[3] 'Pagan'

[1] Oldham, 'The Idea of a Christian Society', *The Christian News-Letter*, 18, 24 February 1940. N.B., page numbers were never given.
[2] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 399-400, n.2 (Reckitt to Eliot, 18 January 1940).
[3] Richard Bentley, Alexander Dyce (ed.), *The Works of Richard Bentley*, 3 vols. (London: Francis Macpherson, 1836-8), III, 222 ('Of Revelation and the Messias', 1696); see also, 19-20 ('The Folly of Atheism', 1692).

was certainly not a synonym for 'secular' then. In this period, Anglican thinkers used 'secular' to refer to atheistic practises driven, fundamentally, by unbelief. We might explain this better by quoting John Henry Newman, who described a pagan mind as receptive to (misguided) spirituality whereas a secular mind is found in someone who is 'not liking to retain God in their knowledge.'[4]

Modern interpretations were slightly more diffuse about what constituted pagan actions. By the twentieth century, the definition of paganism had shifted in common parlance to mean any form of unchristian behaviour. Therefore, Oldham's and Reckitt's comments stand out because they appear fastidious in a time where most in the Church of England's communion engaged with a general understanding of paganism. In the mid-1930s, Cosmo Lang and Arthur Winnington-Ingram (1858-1946), bishop of London, endorsed campaigns to build more churches in areas of rapid population growth for a fear that without these (in Lang's words) 'this new England is to be pagan.'[5] Similarly, Eliot wrote in 1931 to John Middleton Murry that his poem 'Corolian' (unpublished) had in mind 'the general state of paganism in this country.'[6]

But what in modernity caused this pagan revival? The answer perhaps lies in the process of self-actualisation. Self-actualisation is the motive for man to realise his full purpose and potential in the material world. Colin Campbell, in *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirt of Modern Consumerism* (1987), argues that self-actualisation was redefined in the nineteenth century, with the potential for human fulfilment no longer tied to traditional forms of Western esotericism but instead in the acquisition of commodities.[7] Such a process, he argues, drove the development of capitalist society. Might not this focus on the immanent world, and the search for meaning within it, also have affected modern politics? As the previous chapters have shown, Anglicans saw the process of fascist self-actualisation as the sacrifice of individual liberty for the social whole. This presented

[4] Newman, *Parochial and Plain Sermons,* 8 vols. (Oxford: Rivington's, 1880), II, 19 ('Faith Without Sight').
[5] 'Primate and the New England', *Daily Telegraph*, 31 October 1936; 'Church Assembly', *The Times*, 5 February 1936.
[6] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, V, 697 (Eliot to Middleton Murry, 20 October 1931).
[7] Colin Campbell, *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 45.

fascism as an exacerbation of other modern political philosophies because, by offering a route to transcendence, it was motivated by faith and not ideology.

The confusion of politics as a quasi-religion has been studied extensively by Michael Burleigh. Like Griffin before him, he emphasises the importance of 'rebirth' for the 'totalitarian political religions.' He wrote that Mussolini created a

> quasi-religious conception of politics, in which a dedicated elite would help regenerate mankind from the social and spiritual ills that were commonly held to debilitate it in the closing decades of the nineteenth century.[8]

He wrote similarly of Hitler, claiming that Nazi liturgy and rituals crafted a sacred narrative that Nazism had rescued Germany from a brief but disastrous democratic interlude.[9] From its very inception, Anglicans has seen fascism as a rejection of Western political, cultural, and aesthetic decadence. This rejection was expressed through the total moral and material reconstruction of the social space, dismissing Christian ethics and replacing them with fascist ethics. In this respect then, Anglicans certainly engaged with fascism as a 'political religion.'

Nevertheless, the emphasis on self-actualisation and transcendence cannot be understated. More than anything else, Anglican thinkers believed fascism was a form of paganism specifically because this quasi-religious political ideology was presented as offering a route to transcendence – it was not just religious in the way it crafted sacred narratives to garner devotion as Burleigh's idea of a political religion suggests.[10] Burleigh's total omission of soteriology, in contrast to the predominance it held in Anglican analyses, plays a vital role in my decision to focus more on what Wouter Hanegraaf called a 'New Age religion':

> All New Age religion is characterised by the fact that it expresses its criticism of modern Western culture by presenting alternatives derived from a secularised esotericism… New Age religion cannot be characterised as a return to pre-Enlightenment worldviews, but it is to be seen as a qualitatively new syncretism of esoteric and secular elements.[11]

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[8] Michael Burleigh, *Sacred Causes* (London: HarperPress, 2006), 55.
[9] Ibid, 110, 217.
[10] Ibid, 58, 103-4, 210-13.
[11] Wouter Hanegraaff, *New Age Religion and Western Culture* (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 520-1.

From its very inception, fascism was seen as a rejection of Western political, cultural, and aesthetic decadence. This rejection was expressed through the total moral and material reconstruction of the social space, dismissing Christian ethics. We see this most clearly in the fascist insistence on individual sacrifice as the route to self-actualisation. For the eminent sociologist of religion Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), pagan societies held a negative view of duty because of its emphasis on individual duty (as seen in the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome), which contrasted to the positive view of duty based on a common responsibility that Christianity promoted.[12] Therefore, Anglicans observed in fascism this traditional tenet of paganism, blended with modern esotericism, such that the individual's realisation of spiritual greatness was found in being part of a wider whole of the nation. In other words, the secular ideal of nationalism was presented as a transcendental ethic. As per Hanegraaff's characterisation then, Anglicans observed fascism as a form of neo-paganism because it elevated secular, post-Enlightenment, ideas to spiritual values which gave the individual the potential for transcendence.

Though interpretations of fascism as a form of paganism were frequent in the latter part of the 1930s, there were sporadic references to fascism's contribution to the general paganism of political modernity before 1930.[13] These earlier responses are much more in line with the general trends of interwar Catholic thought. Theo Salemink has ably demonstrated how Catholic writers perceived fascism and communism as representative of the pagan outlook of an unbelieving society.[14] What this implies is that Catholic thinkers, much like Lang and Winnington-Ingram, perceived a general paganism (that is to say, a general anti-God sentiment) in modernity to which modern political philosophies contributed. Interestingly, Karl Barth, in the first volume of his *Church Dogmatics* (1938), argued that fascism was pagan because it worshipped a false God which, he claimed, had been created to satisfy the needs of a citizenry lost in the morass of the interwar

[12] Robert Alun Jones, 'Religion and Realism', *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions*, 35:69 (1990), 76-7.
[13] See e.g., Inge, 'The Destiny of Man', *The Times of India*, 23 July 1929; Henson, The Church and the Nation' (1933), *Bishoprick Papers*, 50-1.
[14] Salemink, 'Modernity as Neo-Paganism', 240.

years.[15] Barth's (Protestant) view is much more reflective of the rhythms of Anglican thought in the 1930s that considered fascism a distinct form of paganism. Such an interpretation of fascism not only differentiated it from communism – the existence of which Anglicans blamed on the more general pagan culture of Europe – but from Catholic responses too.

Such an interpretation is clear in T. S. Eliot's thought. In 1932, Eliot gave a series of radio broadcasts for the BBC with the general title 'The Modern Dilemma.' His third talk – 'The Search For Moral Sanction' – was greatly edited by the time it went to air, but the original manuscript shows that while he believed that communism contributed generally to the 'Pagan world', it was nevertheless not a pagan philosophy because 'communism means atheism for anyone who can think straight.'[16] Though 'pagan' was now a conventional synonym for unchristian, it still did not mean secular; as he confessed to the editor of the *New English Weekly*, though he felt uncomfortable with 'pagan' as a descriptor of 'non-Christian', he judged it more appropriate, in the context, than 'secular.'[17] The official proceedings of the 1937 Oxford Conference likewise made this interesting distinction, stressing that the 'essential theme' of the Conference was the 'life and death struggle between the Christian faith and the secular *and* pagan tendencies of our time.'[18] Consider the implications of 'and' in between 'pagan' and 'secular': the distinction tell us that in Anglican configurations, communism could not have been pagan itself because it was inherently secular but fascism was itself pagan because of this (misdirected) spirituality.

It may also be argued that man's realisation that his true purpose was in the world rather than in the spiritual realm explains why Thomas Hobbes's 'Leviathan' replaced Hegel's theory of the Absolute as the ethical context of the fascist state in Anglican imaginations. Therefore, this chapter will explore Anglican usage of Leviathan to explain the fascist state, and how this created a context for its paganism. I will trace the various strands of thought on this with a principal

[15] Karl Barth et al., *Church Dogmatics*, 13 vols. (1938; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956-75), I.II, 315.
[16] Eliot, 'The Search for Moral Sanction' [unpublished MS., 1932], *The Listener*, 7:168, *Complete Prose*, IV, 446.
[17] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 399 (Eliot to the Editor of the *New English Weekly*, 24 January 1940).
[18] Oldham, *The Churches Survey their Task*, 10. My italics.

interest in three essays that considered fascism a form of paganism: Arnold J. Toynbee's 'Post-War Paganism Versus Christianity' (1937), Eliot's *The Idea of a Christian Society* (1939), and R. G. Collingwood's 'Fascism and Nazism' (1940). The textual appraisal of all three studies will be augmented by the scrutiny of smaller contributions from Anglican clergymen and laypeople.

The Hobbesian Context of Fascism

The theory of the omnicompetent state was not conceptualised by the fascist ideologues of interwar Europe but repurposed and reconceptualised into a modern phenomenon. Anglican thinkers in this period were acutely aware of this and invariably turned to the theory of the state outlined in Thomas Hobbes's *Leviathan* as its natural starting point. Hobbes (1588-1679) was an English philosopher who primarily focussed on the function of the state in an era where monarchy was hegemonic across Europe (though now overthrown in Britain). Despite producing an extensive corpus of political theory, including *De Cive* (1647) and *De Corpore* (1655), he is perhaps remembered best for *Leviathan*.

Written in the immediate aftermath of the English Civil War (*c.*1642-51) – a conflict which reflected contemporary struggles in civic governance and religious toleration – *Leviathan* is Hobbes's treatise on effective government. Hobbes argues that man had a multitude of 'natural passions' (instincts) that could fracture society if unmitigated. For instance, Hobbes tells us that 'war… is necessarily consequent to the natural passions of men, when there is no visible power to keep them in awe.'[19] This notion of a 'visible power' – that is, physical authority – is central to Hobbes's *Leviathan*. The decade of conflict in England which Hobbes experienced proved to him that man could not have tamed his natural passions. The ruler maintained peace on the basis that private citizens were obedient to his authority, which created a unison that ensured there was no tension within the state, or between states. Hobbes therefore believed that his state was in line

[19] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (*c.*1642; Oxford: OUP, 1996), XVII, §85, 111.

with God's manifest will because the sole purpose of the state was aligned to the First Law of Nature: 'to seek Peace, and follow it.'[20]

The existence of Hobbes's state, and the authority of the sovereign, is a product of the will put into it by the body politic; it only exists because the citizenry has willingly sacrificed their rights in return for protection from the ruler. Hegel likewise felt it was only possible for man to be a social being if his natural state was suppressed by imposed authority. In contrast however, Hegel's authority existed independent from the will of the body politic, so man's necessary membership of the state meant he had to subjugate his will to the authority of the state. Therefore, the self-actualisation Anglicans observed in fascist citizens made Hobbes's state much more comparable to the fascist state than Hegel's.

These differences notwithstanding, Anglicans criticised both theories on account of a more general belief that man did not need outside intervention to subdue his instincts. For those Anglicans who had been taught by Edward Caird for Greats at Oxford, the philosophy of Plato had a lasting influence. In Chapter One, I made clear that Temple followed Plato in understanding that man's personality is made up of three spirits, and that θυμός (*thumos*, anger) may be controlled through obedience to λόγος (*logos*, reason). However, he rejected Thomist Natural Law that stipulated man innately knew how to control θυμός through λόγος.[21] Though he accepted John Locke's (1632-1704) theory that man's will to action was one of his innate faculties, he insisted that this was subordinate to his personality – man could therefore not spontaneously choose to overpower θυμός with λόγος but only do so through disciplined training, hence why he felt guidance from ordained ministers was needed.[22] But the central issue was liberty. Hobbes's Leviathan impinged on man's God-given, self-evident liberty in the temporal world to coerce him

[20] Ibid, XIV, §4, 87.
[21] Temple, 'Theology To-day', *Theology*, 123:4 (1939; 2020), 258; see also, Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, IV (I.I, QQ.LXXV.-CII.), 120-1.
[22] Idem, *Christus Veritas*, 60; 'Theology To-day', ibid.

into meeting the state's demands whereas Temple believed that doing this undermined the purpose of that God-given liberty.

Moreover, Hobbes was not an atheist, nor was he considered as such by Anglican writers. However, Hobbes viewed the world as a material plenum, which meant spiritual forces like God's presence (which was on earth through divine miracle like the Incarnation), could not have existed in it and therefore his commonwealth rejected Christian doctrine that emphasised spiritual authority in the temporal sphere. Attacking the fundamentals of the Church of England's ecclesiology, Hobbes argued that 'spiritual government' in the 'temporal' world caused man to 'see double, and mistake their *lawful sovereign*', which was a primary cause of political and social breakdown.[23] Instead, Hobbes believed that only the sovereign should have had man's obedience in the earthly realm. But fascism represented an exacerbation of previous authoritarianisms based on this model because the sovereign's power derived from pious devotion not fearful obedience.

The radical Anglo-Catholic priest and Pluralist thinker John Neville Figgis first introduced the term 'Leviathan' into modern politico-religious parlance to denote the abuse of state power in Edwardian Britain. Figgis was writing in a period known as the "Edwardian Crisis", where a 'radical growth in political sentiment' swept over Britain and affected the state's relationship with the Church of England.[24] In response, Figgis believed that the Church of England should disestablish itself from the state and that it should stand alone to defend itself from the accelerated materialism of the secularising world.

Figgis described Leviathan as 'all-devouring' and said that it was 'more dangerous if its form be democratic' because though this was the apparent zenith of individual liberty, it nonetheless negated the doctrine of the word of God.[25] He developed this in his most famous book, *Churches in the Modern State* (1914), which described Leviathan as the 'unlimited and illimitable

[23] Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XXXIX, 248, 311.
[24] Hughes, 'Archbishop Davidson', 217.
[25] John Neville Figgis, *Antichrist and Other Sermons* (London: Longmans, 1913), 266 ('Church and State', 1912).

power of the law-giver in the state.'[26] Figgis's pluralism rejected the Idealist conception of the impersonal state – which did not recognise groups in society, but society as a group – most associated in Britain with Bernard Bosanquet, perhaps the greatest votary of Hegel amongst the British Idealists, and his major work *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899).[27] Though T. H. Green (Bosanquet's tutor) had discounted the Hegelian idea that freedom was found within the state, Figgis nonetheless targeted his omnipresence in twentieth-century religious culture, reminding his congregation in 1916 that 'the problems of faith are now fought out in fields more tragic than college bowling greens.'[28] Though many rejected Figgis's pluralism, they shared his prescience in observing the ineffectiveness of metaphysics for the amelioration of modern society's problems; to many, only a radical reconceptualization of Anglican pedagogy would help.

Cyril Garbett drew on Figgis in his early responses to the threat of the fascist state. In his preliminary notes for the 1935 Bournemouth Conference, he wrote that Christianity and authoritarian societies represented the two most dominant conceptions of the state, which, more generally, represented a conflict between the '*communitas communitatum*' and the 'great Leviathan.'[29] The mediaeval *communitas communitatum* (the community of communities) was central to Figgis's theory of the state. The *communitas communitatum* was the coexistence of a multiplicity of communities centred on specific ties (religion, or trades, for example) rather than one monolith.[30] As detailed in Chapter Two, interwar Anglicans were probably somewhere in between these two conceptions of civic governance, but Garbett's use of the *communitas communitatum* as the alternative option to fascism appears to be a recognition of the extreme threat to Christendom some Anglicans observed in fascism. It suggests that the expansion of the omnicompetent state in fascist

[26] Idem, *Churches in the Modern State* (London: Longmans, 1914), 79.
[27] Bernard Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899; London: MacMillan, 1925), esp. 176-8, a section aptly titled 'Distinction between Individual and Society irrelevant to question of Social Means and End.'
[28] Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 64 (Figgis, *The Love of God*, 1916).
[29] Garbett, 'The State and Christianity', *op. cit.*
[30] Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*, 8.

countries, and its effect on the individual, was ever pushing Christian society to consider a more radically separate relationship with the state.

At the Conference itself, F. R. Barry discussed the concept of Leviathan in the modern world during his sermon 'Christian Sanctions For, and Limits to, State Authority.' Barry argued that modern society could choose to be governed either one of two ways: 'the Great Leviathan or something more like a Christian Commonwealth', perhaps a *communitas communitatum*.[31] The deciding factor was ultimately the 'vitality of religion.' To Barry, religious vitality most probably referred to the degree of fervency in a society's commitment to Christianity, and could be seen in democratic societies, for instance, because democracy was the expression of man's God-given liberty. Leviathan, on the other hand, would emerge in a society which embraced the modern 'mechanised world of mass production [and] a régime of increasing State control', which was a society where the external authority of the state controlled every aspect of man's life.[32] This broad approach provides important context to Barry's specific consideration of the fascist state as a version of Leviathan one year later.

Barry published in 1936 *The Relevance of the Church*, the natural sequel to his 1931 ethical treatise *The Relevance of Christianity*. Speaking on the threat of authoritarian politics more generally, Barry wrote:

> What fills the whole contemporary horizon is the rise of the totalitarian state… persecuting rival religions because it is itself a religion. Hobbes and Machiavelli have returned, and the Church now finds itself confronted with a modern form of the worship of the Great Beast. *The Great Leviathan* is a far worse menace to the whole Christian conception of life than were ever the claims of romantic *Eros*. In many parts of the world the stage is set for the old conflict between Christ and Cæsar; and it looks as though the Church would be vindicated not so much by the vigour of its leadership as by the courage of its martyrdom.[33]

Barry suggested that *Eros* (the love man receives from another man) was a threat to the Christian conception of life for it posited that the source of man's love derived from created things rather

[31] Barry, 'Christian Sanctions For, and Limits to, State Authority', *Christianity in the Modern State*, 165.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Idem, *The Relevance of the Church* (London: Nisbet, 1936), 40.

than from God. But what made Leviathan a greater threat than *Eros* was that whereas *Eros* is human error on account of man's primitive instincts, Leviathan existed through the purposeful manipulation of man's base state. Barry's allusion to 'Cæsarism' is telling given that he often used it to describe European fascism holistically.[34] Though not explicitly stated, it seems plausible that Barry saw fascism as the most pertinent authoritarian ideology for a comparison with Leviathan. Ultimately, the theory and practice of Hobbes's Leviathan were perceived in the fascist state due to the redirection of devotion from God (creator) toward the authority of the temporal state (created).

Barry again used Hobbes when he attempted to answer the question *What Has Christianity to Say?* to the social and political chaos of the 1930s, again insisting that Europe's authoritarian states represented the modern development of Hobbes's Leviathan. 'As the nations have ceased to be directed by any secure spiritual conviction, the Great Leviathan has been re-enthroned.'[35] According to him, the despiritualised state (such as Hobbes's model) was a consequence of the conscious rejection of God's Immanence in the temporal sphere – Barry therefore saw the Nazi state as a paradigmatical example of this because it was 'the Incarnation of the organic expression of the *Volk* – the giver of rights and the determiner of destiny.'[36] If the state was the manifestation of the spirit put into it, then it must be that the culture of fascist society recognised worldly values over Christian ones in a more systematic manner than had been considered hitherto. Barry's interpretation of fascism's rejection of Christian thought plays into Hanegraaff's idea that 'New Age religions' rejected Western traditions by replacing them with post-Enlightenment ideas driven by the supremacy of human reason. Fascism, to Barry, was a clear expression of this neo-paganism.

Ralph Inge also considered the issue of misdirected love in the modern Leviathan. Inge may not have been fond of the practicalities of the Hobbesian *Leviathan*, but as a committed Erastian he accepted its legitimacy. However, he made clear that while 'we may submit to it… we

[34] See e.g., ibid, 51 and idem, 'Christian Sanctions', 164.
[35] Barry, *What Has Christianity to Say?* (London: SCM, 1937), 36.
[36] Ibid, 23.

cannot possibly love it.'[37] Fascism represented an exacerbation of Hobbes's model because where obedience is material, love is spiritual; love denotes devotion and man cannot be devoted to a created thing. And yet, in fascism, he was. It suggested a systematic level of spiritual misguidance, religious almost. It was pagan. Inge went on to suggest that this misdirection of man's love from God to the Leviathan was a consequence of modern nationalism. The fascist citizen was manipulated to believe that the sacrifice of his rights and liberty to the state was a contribution to the fulfilment of its providential glory.[38] Like Barry then, it appears that Inge observed in the fascist doctrine a conscious misdirection of spiritual values, and that the fascist state was not obeyed but worshipped. However, to Inge, the fascist state had not merely repurposed Leviathan, but made it practical to the modern world, hinting at a new form of paganism.

Given that Inge differentiated fascism from communism on account of its fervent nationalism, he naturally came to see Leviathan as the ethical context of the fascist state rather than the communist. In 1938 he wrote that in Italy and Germany, 'what Hobbes called "Leviathan", the God-state, has ousted for the time all other objects of worship.'[39] The Anglican perspective on the worship of the state we discussed in Chapter Two informed this current perception of the fascist state as a Leviathan, but a notable difference is that whereas Anglicans once saw a competition between God and the state, the fascist state had now *replaced* God as an object of worship. Much like Leviathan, the fascist state's existence removed the possibility of God's Immanence.

At a meeting of the Moot, W. H. Moberly criticised fascism on account of its dependence upon Hobbesian moral philosophy, alluding to the fact that it made no objective distinction between good or bad morality.[40] The fascist state was akin to Leviathan because it demanded implicit obedience to a moral code based on the arbitrary teaching of a worldly leader. Moberly

[37] Inge, *A Rustic Moralist*, 36.
[38] Ibid, 36-7.
[39] Idem, *Our Present Discontents*, 61.
[40] *The Moot Papers*, 329 (Minutes for the Ninth Meeting, July 12-15, 1940); see Hobbes, *Leviathan*, XIII, §13, 85.

believed that in such a culture of moral ambivalence, man became susceptible to misguidance: fascism garnered its support because it offered moral guidance through the false representation of worldly values as leading to transcendence. Moberly's criticisms essentially relied on the assumption that man perceived the world according to John Locke's principles of human understanding. Locke was an empiricist thinker who argued that experience was central to what man knew and understood about the world, including the divine. Moberly believed that Lockean human understanding had an innately spiritual purpose because it suggested man discerned right and wrong through personal experience of living in accordance with the Natural Laws.[41] Moberly's presentation of Lockean human understanding as innately moralistic provided intellectual weight to his simultaneous criticism of fascism because this suggested it operated according to a different moral framework to Christianity.

Many Anglicans drew comparisons between Leviathan and the fascist states because they both operated on moral codes different to Christianity. Specifically, they worked according to different allegiances: Christians to God, fascist citizens to the leader. Hobbes's state was the practical implementation of the self-actualisation of man as a worldly being rather than a spiritual one. It thus provided the context for the fascist state because it operated on man's sacrifice toward a providential glory promised to him in nationalistic rhetoric. Man's devotion to the leader was, to many, the actions of a pagan society.

Idolatry

At the time of the Reformation, 'paganism' became largely synonymous with the worship of a false idol. Given most Anglicans initially believed that fascism subsumed countries where citizens were desperate to believe in *something* in the moral vacuum left by the Great War, the consideration of fascist idolatry appeared a natural intellectual turn. If we recall Barth's central argument about fascist paganism, we will rightly suggest that this was a common feature of Protestant discourse

[41] Ibid; see, John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689; Oxford: OUP, 2008), IV.XIX, §4, 451.

generally. However, many Anglicans had rather distinct understandings about the idolatry of fascism.

The first systematic explication of fascism as a form of paganism was produced by Arnold Toynbee in 1937. While Toynbee was certainly moving toward the Catholicism of his wife Rosamond at this time (and thus further away from his ancestral Anglicanism), his essay shows a strong affinity to Anglican, rather than Catholic, perspectives on fascism. He wrote 'Post-War Paganism Versus Christianity' for the BBC magazine *The Listener*, the contents of which were suggested to him by W. H. Moberly, who had himself written a piece in the magazine a week earlier.[42] As the title of Toynbee's article implies, he observed a powerful conflict in the world between Christianity and paganism (by which he meant the false religions of extreme political movements) as representative of the incompatibility of the two faiths most followed by humankind. Interestingly, the foundational binary that Toynbee conceptualised here was frequently referenced in a discussion of the first meeting of the Moot one year later in which Moberly was heavily involved.[43] Clearly, Moberly was not just receptive to Toynbee's argument, but directly influenced by it.

This was not the first time that Toynbee had highlighted the paganism of modernity. In a 1930 *Listener* essay, he engaged directly and intimately with the themes and ideas of paganism when discussing the 'Idolatry of Nationalism' in modern Europe. Toynbee's analysis of nationalistic idolatry was perhaps inevitable given he saw nationalism as a form of religion, which was a common frame of analysis in the interwar years. This was most famously expounded by the American historian Carlton Hayes (1882-1964), who argued nationalism and religious belief were alike because 'the imagination builds an unseen world around the eternal past and the everlasting future of one's nationality.'[44]

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[42] Moberly, 'Church, Community, and State', *The Listener*, 17:418 (1937).
[43] *The Moot Papers*, esp., 39-52 (Minutes to the First Meeting, 1-4 April 1938).
[44] Carlton Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism* (New York: Macmillan, 1926), 105 ('Nationalism as a Religion').

To Toynbee, nationalism was a pagan faith because it was a 'bad religion', characterised as such because it demanded that man acted according to the will of the state, which was the ultimate good in his life, rather than according to his conscience.[45] Given that Toynbee saw Christianity as a form of Kantian practical reason, the human conscience was the greatest indicator of God's will because, by consciously following the divine command, one acts as His word. He perhaps felt paganism was characterised by its distinctly negative morality, which he saw most prominently in the neo-pagan obsession with national supremacy rather than the positive morality associated with international cooperation. Such a line of argument appears common in Anglican discourse.

In 1937, Inge defined Fascism and Nazism both as 'substitutes for religion' ('national religions' specifically) and that each was a natural 'danger' to 'peace.'[46] He argued that the danger lay in the lived experience of national religion because this moral code naturally created a perpetual state of tension with other nations; when two nationalist groups met, war was always the result. This did not happen between Christian countries because they had a shared morality. We see this further when, in his diary, Henson lamented Nazi nationalism because it meant 'we have no common morality', which suggested that he believed fascism's existence was wrapped up with ideas about rival system of ethics in the world.[47] This was a significant development from earlier in the decade (as explored in Chapter Two) where nationalism was a policy to bind the inorganic national community to now being perceived as the foundation of a pagan faith.

To Toynbee, the most obvious indicator that fascism was a form of paganism was its idolatry. In his 1937 article, he identified the national community ('tribe') as just one of several 'idols' that political modernity worshipped. It is important to note that like his 1930 essay, Toynbee was speaking generally about political modernity, and he considered Communism as much of a 'Post-War Paganism' as fascism.[48] Of equal importance though is that the examples Toynbee

[45] Toynbee, 'The Idolatry of Nationalism', *The Listener*, 4:98 (1930), 874.
[46] Inge, *A Rustic Moralist*, 43.
[47] DCL, BHP, HHH/60, 12 November 1933, 73.
[48] Idem, 'Post-War Paganism versus Christianity', *The Listener*, 17:419 (1937), 123.

carefully examines are all fascist regimes. This not only hints at a sort of hierarchy of authoritarian regimes in Toynbee's mind, but also that fascism itself was a distinct and unique form of paganism.

Fascism demonstrated an 'idolatrous worship of organised human power' in lieu of God.[49] The specific examples of this organisational power differed according to each fascism. In Italy, it was 'the leader' (*Duce*), bound up with the existence of the state, and in Germany it was 'the tribe' (*Volk*).[50] This was not a new observation about Germany. During the First World War, Ralph Inge wrote that German patriotism was immoral because it did not stand for anything 'great and valuable' but only for the 'wolf-pack.'[51] The suggestion of intellectual vacuousness recalls the argument that the epistemological void many observed in fascism could now be explained as a consequence of its paganism, and in this instance it was seen clearly in its tendency to worship worldly entities like the tribe with spiritual devotion. We see the merit in Hanegraaff's characterisation of modern paganisms well here because Nazism, for instance, was a syncretism of ancient blood worship with a new metaphysic in the Aryan race.

A similar theme runs through Robin George Collingwood's (1889-1943) analysis. Before he had even finished his final university examinations, he was elected to a fellowship at Pembroke College, Oxford, where he remained until he accepted in 1935 the esteemed Waynflete Professorship of Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen. His desire to be active in the resistance against tyranny was longstanding: he was enraged by his rejection for a military commission in the First World War, instead being placed in Admiralty Intelligence. His writings in response to fascism demonstrates this same fervour for action. This may not have always translated into effective action though, with Stefan Collini writing that his essay 'Fascism and Nazism' was too philosophical and that he had assumed society cared for the interjections of Oxford dons more than was the case.[52] Collingwood's neo-Idealist approach certainly drew on the work of T. H.

[49] Ibid, 124.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Inge, 'Patriotism', 79.
[52] Collini, *Absent Minds* (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 336-40.

Green, which perhaps explains why the two men also shared a fundamental misunderstanding about the place of metaphysics in combating social and political chaos, as Figgis and Collini suggested about each respectively. A series of debilitating strokes led to his death in 1943.

Collingwood's 'Fascism and Nazism' first appeared in *Philosophy* in response to the 'Appeal to Philosophers' by the English philosopher C. E. M. Joad (1891-1953). Joad had requested that Britain's philosophes meditate on the greatest contemporaneous threat to humanity – to Collingwood, this was the onset of fascism.[53] The article has garnered significant interest from intellectual historians. Collini is perhaps its harshest critic, writing that it 'lacks historical evidence.'[54] James Gilman makes a similar point, arguing that Collingwood appeared oblivious to the 'ecclesiastical alliances' which ensured 'for the Third Reich the active support of the churches.'[55] But for our current purposes, we may see Collini as correct in observing that this essay provides a clear insight into his fervent belief that Christian spirituality was central to the development of European civilisation and how fascism stood in contradiction to this.[56]

According to Collingwood, civilisations are centred around an 'absolute presupposition', otherwise known as a 'metaphysical belief.'[57] In other words, an absolute presupposition is a foundational belief that must be accepted for any further investigation of a particular subject in that civilisation to happen. For Collingwood, phenomenology is inextricably linked to the specific absolute presupposition at the core of a civilisation. An absolute presupposition is therefore not susceptible to proof because to scrutinise it will necessarily undermine the process which allows that line of inquiry in the first place.[58] Collingwood explains that the absolute presupposition at the core of Western civilisation is that there is one God, and He is the source of reality. Such a statement cannot be questioned because to do so must rely upon the freedom of individual thought

[53] C. E. M. Joad, 'Appeal to Philosophers', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 40 (1939-1940), 27-48.
[54] Collini, *Absent Minds*, 345.
[55] James Gilman, 'R. G. Collingwood and the Religious Sources of Nazism', *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 54:1 (1986), 126.
[56] Collini, *Absent Minds*, 345.
[57] Paul Trainor, 'History and Reality', *Ultimate Reality and Meaning*, 4:270 (1984), 272.
[58] Collingwood, *An Essay on Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1940), 29-30.

which only He has given to man. According to Collingwood, the social attitudes toward such an absolute presupposition can be bifurcated as either 'rational' or 'irrational.' Rational behaviour is concerned with the fervent defence of this absolute presupposition through finding irrefutable truths to support it while irrational behaviour is the pious veneration of it. Christianity, for example, demonstrates a balance between the rational belief in God and irrational devotion to Him.

Rational and Irrational civilisations, on the other hand, exhibit an imbalance. The Rational civilisation, focussed only on truth, discounts the irrational tendencies which stimulates veneration. Conversely, the Irrational civilisation is so overwhelmed by emotion that its rational judgement is clouded and thus it misunderstands what constitutes a rational metaphysic. Collingwood provides historical analogies for his claims, leveraging the knowledge from his academic and archaeological expertise of Roman Britain. He argued that the 'Greco-Roman civilisation' had 'died' because it had abandoned the emotional impulses which drove the veneration of its religious belief while ancient pagan cultures died because of a 'failure to keep alive its own fundamental convictions', or the metaphysic it held at its core.[59]

For Collingwood, the philosophy of liberalism demonstrated this civilisational balance. He upheld writers like John Locke, and his idea that man's mind was a *tabula rasa* onto which knowledge is imposed through experience, to support these arguments. Locke believed that progress was a consequence of man's increased awareness of his condition as one of God's created things, intended to live according to His will.[60] In contrast, later Enlightenment thinkers sought to rationalise the world further, reducing knowledge to being only that which man has consciously experienced and therefore likeliness was no longer an accepted argument in phenomenological debate. The existence of God was an immediate casualty. Because Christianity was unable to provide any adequate proof above the reasonable doubt Locke and others like Joseph Butler (1692-

[59] Idem, 'Fascism and Nazism', *Philosophy*, 15:58 (1940), 168; *An Essay on Metaphysics,* 225.
[60] Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, IV.III, §21, 353.

1752) proffered, it was stripped of its superstitious and devotional elements (its dogma) leaving only a system of morality as the only thing which could be logically inferred.[61]

Collingwood's central argument is that the collapse of liberalism allowed pagan philosophies like fascism to emerge. The rationalisation of religion during the Enlightenment – most famously undertaken by Kant in *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) – severed society's emotional attachment to the key institutions of Christian-liberal society, which allowed fascism to subsume democracy.[62] It is pertinent to recall that Temple and Inge had been quick to blame the emergence of fascism on the collapse of the liberal world order in the 1920s. Collingwood clearly felt similarly, though he connected this collapse more closely to attacks on the religious foundations of these worldly structures more than most Anglican writers in the early 1920s, perhaps benefitting from the rich discourse which had followed that decade and out of which many Anglicans (Temple and Inge included) had decided fascism was a deeply spiritual phenomenon.

Fascism was able to garner support in this spiritual vacuum because it provided the stability which Christian society and its liberal institutions had not been able to do. Indeed, fascism operated upon the same rational-irrational balance Christian society did. To Collingwood, fascism was not merely an irrational political phenomenon but an irrational faith, making it a form of paganism. Being perceived in this way, Collingwood's understanding of neo-paganism is thus a paradigmatic example of Hanegraaff's model of 'New Age Religions.' Its likeness to paganism was seen principally through its idolatry. Collingwood argued that fascism was 'conjuring up a social order based on the superstitious adoration of individual leaders who, being human, are neither infallible nor immortal.'[63] Idolatry demonstrated irrationalism because man must be wholly overcome with emotional desires if his rational judgement had been clouded to the extent that he could not discern the difference between a divine and worldly entity. In *The New Leviathan* (1942),

[61] David Boucher, *The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood* (Cambridge: CUP, 1989), 236.
[62] Collingwood, 'Fascism and Nazism', 171-2.
[63] Ibid, 173.

he emphasised that the 'Greco-Roman quest for a superman-ruler' was a demonstrably 'pagan outlook', perhaps to align fascism and paganism more obviously than he did in 'Fascism and Nazism.'[64]

However, the ease with which this devotion overwhelmed entire nations led Collingwood to concede that the phenomenology of fascism was not to be found solely in the collapse of liberalism but in deep-rooted cultural issues too. According to Collingwood, fascism had subsumed Italy and Germany because it was given somewhat of a head start due to their affinities to paganism. He wrote that 'Germany was the last European country to adopt Christianity' so, as a result, 'the pagan survivals have always been extremely vigorous… it is no wonder, then, that… Nazism should actively promote them.'[65] In other words, Germany's Christianity was weak because it was still culturally attached to paganism in some form or other. Germany was once again imbalanced then because Nazism leveraged the emotional impulse which remained and stimulated the worship of the irrational metaphysic, that of the Aryan race fulfilled in the worldly leader.

Collingwood was not at all surprised that Italy was now organised around the worship of the fascist leader given he deemed Catholic ritual 'Caesaro-Papism, which combined the principles of Christianity with the principles of three-centuries-old Emperor-worship.'[66] 'Caesaro-Papsim' plays on the term 'Caesarism', which, in contemporary parlance, was a synonym for autocratic and tyrannical rule, usually denoting a leader going beyond his remit. Therefore, the social organisation around an idol with misappropriated divine qualities evident in both fascism and Catholic society were too similar to be coincidental. This clear attempt to elide Catholic ritual with idolatry draws on general concerns about the authoritarian ecclesiology of the Roman Catholic Church.

For Philip Mitchell, Collingwood's explanation of modern paganism aligned him closer with cultural critics of fascism like the Roman Catholic Christopher Dawson than more conventional theological writers. Mitchell argued that Collingwood and Dawson explained the rise

[64] Idem, *The New Leviathan* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1942), §26.3, 194.
[65] Idem, 'Fascism and Nazism', 175.
[66] Ibid, 174-5.

of paganism in fascist countries on account of their 'syncretistic Christianity' – a Christianity blended with 'pagan survivals' such as mystical ritual – and such a profane and barbarous ideology could not have existed in a space where genuine Christian doctrine and morality existed.[67] Though they agreed on the problem of Germany's infantile Christianity, as one might expect they had different views on Italy. Whereas Collingwood blamed this syncretistic Christianity on the Catholic Church's primitivism, Dawson, an ontological realist (*i.e.,* one who believes that certain truths exist in a transcendent reality independent of man's consciousness) believed it was more to do with the tendency of Italian society to disregard eternal truths due to its deep-rooted attachment to pagan culture.[68] Given that Collingwood was a known critic of relativism, the suggestion that he believed fascism pervaded modern European nations through syncretism with the Catholic faith is plausible.[69] However, such a position reiterates his exclusively *Anglican* perspective because it hinges upon a traditional anti-Catholicism which was much more in line with the attitudes of other Anglican writers.

F. R. Barry likewise denounced fascist idolatry. Barry is most remembered as the bishop of Southwell, Nottinghamshire (1941-64), though for most of our timeframe he was a canon of Westminster Abbey and sometime vicar of the University Church in Oxford (1927-33). Like John Henry Newman, Barry had been a fellow at Oriel College, Oxford. He claimed to be haunted by 'the ghost of Newman' as he 'inherit[ed] his pulpit' at the University Church, and though the two traversed different theological pathways they perhaps shared an understanding about the spiritual threat which paganism posed to Christianity.[70] Barry described the contemporary epoch as a conflict between 'Christianity and Paganism', which is redolent of, though much more precise than, Valentine Cunningham's assessment of how Eliot, at around the time of Spain, bifurcated

[67] Philip Mitchell, 'Civilizational Sickness and the Suspended Middle', *Logos*, 21:3 (2018), 105-7.
[68] Ibid, 107.
[69] Boucher, *The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood*, 214.
[70] Barry, *Period of My Life* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1970), 90.

the interwar *kulturkampf* 'between secularism and anti-secularism.'[71] It is interesting that studying shorter, more intense, timeframes allows us to see how fast perspectives changed.

Barry held the much more precise definition that fascist idolatry was the worship of a 'god like Moloch.'[72] This is significant because Moloch was specifically depicted in the Hebrew Bible as a deity that demanded human sacrifice. Much of the Anglican anxiety regarding fascism's paganism was because they believed the fascist citizen's self-actualisation came from his sacrificial subjugation to the state, encouraged by nationalistic rhetoric inflected with allusions to providential military glory. Indeed, the stress on the irrational violence of Moloch seemed common in Anglican analyses. Toynbee wrote in the *Manchester Guardian* that the 'cult-state' in fascist society means man 'loses sight of God as He is revealed in Christianity' which 'will inevitably relapse into the worship of Juggernaut and Moloch.'[73] In an unpublished manuscript evocatively titled 'Man Goes Mad' (1936) Collingwood follows suit: 'The militarist must value his children and his property, or the Moloch to whom he sacrifices them would not be appeased.'[74]

Mussolini had always been perceived by Anglicans as a soldier more than a politician. Owing largely to his devout pacifism, Ralph Inge explained his disapproval of the fascist propensity for 'sabre-rattling' and during the Second World War he defined fascism as the 'organized worship of Moloch, based on a perverted romanticism.'[75] John Middleton Murry referred to Mussolini as a 'gunman… on the international scale' while Ernest Barker characterised him as a 'strong man armed [and] impatient.'[76] Similarly, this was a growing anxiety about General Franco. William Temple stressed to Cosmo Lang the importance of guaranteeing a religious and political amnesty from Francoist forces as his victory was nascent – Lang agreed and put the matter

[71] Idem, *What Has Christianity to Say?*, 20; Cunningham, *British Writers of the Thirties*, 367.
[72] Ibid, 78.
[73] Toynbee, 'The Causes of War', *The Manchester Guardian*, 10 April 1935.
[74] Boucher et al., *The Philosophy of Enchantment* (Oxford: Clarendon, 2005), §8, 311 (Collingwood, 'Man Goes Mad', unpublished MS., 1936).
[75] Inge, *A Rustic Moralist*, 46; 'The Philosophy of the Wolf State', *Philosophy*, 18:69 (1943), 13.
[76] Middleton Murry, *The Defence of Democracy*, 39; Barker, *National Character and the Factors in its Formation* (London: Methuen, 1939), 275.

directly to Lord Halifax in the Foreign Office.[77] In the context of destructive fascist military campaigns in Africa and Spain, the use of Moloch was resonant.

Barry suggested that Moloch is the god of those people who value 'armaments and the interest of the stronger' instead of 'Justice and Brotherhood', which shows clearly how Anglicans saw Leviathan as a natural and inevitable precursor to paganism.[78] If we recall Barry's earlier arguments about Leviathan, he claimed that it was a threat because the worship of the state reflected the mass veneration of unspiritual values. Because the existence of Leviathan suppresses God's Immanence and replaces Him with a false prophet as the end of man's allegiance, a new moral code thus governed the social space. In this specific instance, the moral code Moloch imposes is one which venerates hate over love. The spiritual devotion toward such an unchristian system of values was thus reflective of the more fundamental 'error' of paganism.

The Ancient Error of Paganism

Unlike Catholic writers, Anglicans saw the 'error of judgement' in fascist regimes just as much as idolatry; in fact, the two were symbiotic. Pagan peoples were not unbelievers *per se*, but they believed in the wrong things due to a misguidance of their spiritual urges. The 'error' in fascism was that it presented the veneration of worldly values as the key to transcendence. In Anglican discourse, nationalism was frequently adduced as the most troublesome error in fascism because it reflected a false spirituality which had damning consequences for civilisation.

Interestingly, the consideration of error allowed communism to be brought into this analytical framework where studies of idolatry usually excluded it. In a 1933 sermon to the University of Cambridge, Hensley Henson talked about the 'doctrine of the Omnicompetent state'

[77] LPL, CFR RC 211/5, ff.6, Temple to Lang, 23 February 1939 and ff.9, Don to Halifax, 28 February 1939. For public concern, see 'Spain', *Guardian*, 14 January 1938.
[78] Barry, *What Has Christianity to Say?*, 78.

which had 'local variations in Russia, Italy, and Germany.'[79] To Henson, it appears that the development of the omnicompetent state was not a political phenomenon, but an eschatological one.

> The ancient pagan state is reappearing in new circumstances which add greatly to its menace. Intellectual and economic forces are co-operating with political in the attack on individual liberty, of which the ultimate citadel is Christ's Religion. Industrialism is quite plainly breaking down, and in its fall, it is carrying away the social system which it generated and sustained. Christianity has been so closely bound into the fabric of industrial society that its fortunes cannot easily be disentangled, nor its essential independence vindicated without effort. The intellectual movement of the modern age has acted as a corrosive acid on the moral and spiritual tradition of Christendom with such effect, that the masses of the people are everywhere falling easy victims to the sophistries of pseudo-science and the glittering baits of revolution.[80]

In contrast to Anglican preachers of the Social Gospel, Henson did not think modern economic industrialism was bad. In his 1935-6 Gifford Lectures, *Christian Morality*, he explained that Christianity naturally brought good to the economic systems with which it associated itself because its transcendental standard of morality must naturally integrate into those systems. Therefore, the prosperity of British industrialism was, in part, due to its moralistic guidance.[81] By 'intellectual forces', Henson meant the reconceptualisation of economic enterprise into a science that standardised work to increase profit. This naturally brought the collapse of industrial society because it had lost its moral and spiritual justifications.[82] Such a moral vacuum in man's life meant it became dictated by material values. Therefore, it was in this vacuum that the authoritarian state emerged and revealed its paganism because it made man believe in 'sophistries of pseudo-science and glittering baits of revolution.'

Henson came to see fascism as a version of paganism itself. In *Christian Morality*, we see Henson directly criticise the erroneous nature of fascist devotion. He said that 'we have an example of the power of national distress to generate a fierce national spirit in Germany at the present time.'[83] After reading a 1934 article by Arnold Toynbee in *The Times*, Henson despaired in his

[79] Henson, 'The Church and the Nation', 50.
[80] Ibid, 51.
[81] Idem, *Christian Morality*, 272; see also, 'Religion and Economics', *The Edinburgh Review*, 244:498 (1926), 209-27.
[82] Ibid, 282.
[83] Ibid, 101.

private journal at the 'intellectual proletariat' (with echoes of his 1933 sermon) that spearheaded the revolution in Germany: 'The natural thirst for some spiritual ideal was so intense that human beings would eagerly welcome the coarsest & crudest ideal that could be offered to them.'[84] Henson is thus playing on the idea that fascism was pagan because it claimed transcendence was possible through venerating its (worldly) values.

The story of Hitler's extrajudicial purge of the *Sturmabteilung* (the Nazi Party's paramilitary wing) in July 1934 was 'blood-curdling' to Henson.

> It is evident that the German Revolution is true to type… But no moral reformation can be affected by terrifying examples. "It cost more to redeem their souls." Where Savonarola failed, Hitler cannot hope to succeed. The facility with which the Nazis have recourse to suicide when they are "in a tight place" is very suggestive … Suicide [is] the familiar marks of paganism, new and old.[85]

The reference to Girolamo Savonarola (1452-98) is an evocative one. Savonarola was a Dominican friar famed for his apocalyptic preaching who was in 1497 excommunicated from the Catholic Church for heresy. It appears to me that Henson is suggesting that fascism was a form of paganism because its idea of progress was misunderstood: progress could not come through base emotions like fear (hence the propensity for 'suicide') but only through transcendence, which comes from living as His word. This was a common concern amongst Anglicans in the latter part of the decade.

Toynbee, likewise, believed that fascism could not offer transcendence despite its claims. He wrote that 'the true home of man' was the *Civitas Dei* (the City of God).[86] *Civitas Dei* was only accessible through transcendence, which came from venerated transcendental ethics like justice in the temporal space and later vindicated by God. Though Toynbee held a largely philosophical view of religion, he shared with his more orthodox brethren the belief that transcendence was judged on the behaviour of man according to set morals. Because fascism venerated a moral code which presented its transcendental ethics as worldly values, man could never enter *Civitas Dei*. This was confirmed to him because Christianity could provide material evidence of spiritual preparedness

[84] DCL, BHP, HHH/60, 20 February 1934, 297.
[85] Ibid/61, 2 July 1934, 207. Underlined as per the original.
[86] Toynbee, 'Post-War Paganism Versus Christianity', 124.

leading to transcendence, the most compelling of which was sainthood. Sainthood confirms the possibility for transcendence because those who most fervently embraced God's word become closer to Him while, at the same time, remain accessible to human comprehension. In contrast, the 'ancient error' of paganism to venerate its own presuppositions as evidence of its destiny was noticeable in its post-war variety.[87] The epistemological void that many continuously identified in fascism was now explicable. In fact, this epistemological void was evidence in itself: it reiterated the strength of Christian spirituality in light of its historical successes over paganism. This illuminates an optimistic tone in Toynbee's writing; by positioning fascism within the long history of pagan challenges to Christianity, it reassured him that orthodox Christianity would inevitably defeat it.

It is integral to note that Toynbee's perspective here is distinctly *Catholic*. The Church of England has no mechanism for Canonisation and thus it has no saints. But of equal importance to note is that this perspective is much more in keeping with Anglican writers who searched for material evidence of Christianity's defeat over paganism. Take Henson and Inge, for example, both of whom sought reassurance from the Pauline epistles as material evidence for the success of strict ecclesiology in defeating paganism.[88] Indeed, it was a typical feature of Anglican apologetics at this time to proffer material evidence of Christianity more generally – not the noetic impetus to infer with reason God's existence *in* the material, but the tangible evidence of God's word. Temple wrote in *Christian Democracy*, for example, that the Incarnation proves that Christianity is 'the most materialistic of the great religions', and it is only from this material evidence that reasoned judgement of His existence is possible.[89]

It was common to believe that the fascist man could only possibly exist in the temporal world. Barry believed that fascism's inability to provide a route to transcendence was a primary indicator of its paganism. To Barry, this was because transcendence was impossible outside of

[87] Ibid, 123.
[88] DCL, HHH/51, 30 December 1930, 223; Inge, *A Rustic Moralist*, 132.
[89] Temple, *Christian Democracy*, 22.

Christianity's ethical framework – a framework situated within a wider, linear narrative where man was aware that the spiritual world (beyond his earthly comprehension) was his highest reality. Paganism established a different, almost contradictory, civilisational framework, one which viewed 'man as the last word in the universe and history as a self-contained process.'[90] Fascism, in Barry's mind, was identical. Speaking of the regimes of 'a Hitler, a Mustapha Kemal', he claimed that because they controlled the 'mind and soul of modern man' it makes him 'wholly of this world.'[91] In similarly holding man's worldly condition as his highest reality, the fascist man clearly exhibited a negative view of human potential as paganism did. Considering earlier and longstanding Anglican perspectives that the fascist doctrine held that the state was the source of man's reality, it is plausible to argue that Toynbee, Barry, and others now connected this ideological rationale to its innate paganism. From Henson's comment on paganism's propensity for suicide to F. R. Barry's claim that its most prodigious blunder was the 'narrow reading of human life, circumscribed by temporal horizons', it was recurrent in Anglican discourse.[92]

For those Anglicans who observed the fascist state as developed within a self-contained historical process, it suggested to them that transcendence was not a future process, but one that had already taken place. From this perspective, they likened fascism to paganism on account of it holding the present as an 'ontology of a historical reality.'[93] An ontology is a way of understanding something, rather than what that something is. In this sense, then, ontology interacts with phenomenology (the appearance of things in our conscious minds) and man thus interprets what he wants from his immediate reality; it represents something closer to Francis Bacon's (1561-1626) bias knowledge than the post-modern, Heideggerian model of ontology as a purely introspective process (*Dasein*).[94]

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[90] Barry, *What has Christianity to Say?*, 20.
[91] 'The Aim of Modern Dictators', *op. cit.* N.B., Mustapha Kemal Atatürk (*c.*1881-1938), nationalist dictator of the Republic of Turkey, 1923-38.
[92] Idem, *The Relevance of Christianity*, 57; see also e.g., Inge, "The Destiny of Man', *The Times of India*, 23 July 1929.
[93] Rik Peters, 'Actes de Présence', *History and Theory*, 45:3 (2006), 362-74.
[94] Francis Bacon, Brian Vickers (ed.), *The Major Works* (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 283 ('The Advancement of Learning', II, 1605); Heidegger, *Being and Times*, §32, 190.

Piecing this together then, Anglican thinkers felt fascism presented reality *as* history: man's present condition was the product of a historical process which the state had constructed. If this *is* his highest reality, then it must be that he had transcended, and he has done so because of his self-actualisation as a member of the state. In their most immediate discussions, such a perspective helped Anglicans to explain fascism's negative view of soteriology, which confirmed Barry's, Toynbee's, and Henson's concerns that these regimes were destined for suicide. Thinking more generally, it helped Anglicans explain why Mussolini administered material solutions to moral problems and why fascist ideologues dictated that self-actualisation was achieved through sacrificing one's rights to the state.

Collingwood – a philosopher of history – similarly identified the connection between fascism and paganism through its erroneous concept of history. For Collingwood, history was the process of ascertaining knowledge through experience; for him, like Locke, history was a process of inquiry. But he also owed a lot to Hegel because he saw history as a process of progression toward the Absolute, which was the state of man's ultimate awareness of his reality. If we recall, an absolute presupposition is an unquestionable truth at the core of a civilisation. For Collingwood, an absolute presupposition may also be defined as a 'metaphysical belief' and therefore to study metaphysics was to study the processes of inquiry – as Paul Trainor sees it, it is simply the study of how such beliefs are justified.[95]

This is not quite the same apologetic approach Butler pursues in the *Analogy* (1736). Where he argued that the laws of nature reflected the doctrine of Christianity as suggestive of the truth of God's existence was beyond reasonable doubt, Collingwood insisted that ideas about God's existence reflect objective knowledge.[96] Therefore, the very fact that fascism's process of inquiry (its historical processes) could be scrutinised implied that there was not an absolute presupposition

[95] Trainor, 'History and Reality', 272.
[96] Butler uses the example of emotional maturity reflecting moral development for his ascension to heaven: man learns from previous mistakes and gains a better understanding of right and wrong; see e.g., Joseph Butler, William Gladstone (ed.), *The Works of Joseph Butler*, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1897), I.I §15-22, 96-9 (*The Analogy of Religion*, 1736).

as its foundation, but a subjective one. Furthermore, Collingwood's exploration of fascist metaphysics thus allowed him to demonstrate that it was an irrational civilisation because it managed to garner emotional energy to venerate its subjective disposition.

In 'Fascism and Nazism', Collingwood highlighted that fascist regimes were organised around a subjective presupposition – a point helped by the fact that each version of fascism had a different metaphysical belief: Nazism, for example, was different to Italian Fascism because it upheld 'blood' (racial grouping) as the core tenet of its national community.[97] Irrespective of what the specific metaphysic was, the point remained that the processes of inquiry that its metaphysical framework established could be scrutinised and undermined. This proved to him that fascist civilisation was not centred around an absolute presupposition – which cannot be questioned – but a subjective one.

Collingwood also took from Hegel the theory that history was a dialectical process in which knowledge is exchanged through ideas. Indeed, ideas represent the purest form of historical knowledge and thus they are central to Collingwood's philosophy of history. To Collingwood, if 'metaphysical beliefs are justified by the historical situation of the believers', then the ideas expounded in an historical situation tell us *how* they justified their belief.[98] Ideas mean that 'history is possible because the past is not 'dead' but can 'live' in the present.'[99] Collingwood uses the example of Patristic writers and the establishment of the Catholic faith to overcome paganism in the Apostolic period: the Council of Nicaea (325 AD) articulated the idea of the Holy Trinity to understand and articulate the absolute presupposition that there is one God and we know they did this because the idea they expounded *then* is still expounded *now*.

Collingwood's understanding of historicism thus seems a little confused. He saw historicism as the process of inquiry through studying ideas that are inextricably linked to a specific

[97] Collingwood, 'Fascism and Nazism', 172. N.B., Collingwood deals with Spain as a fascist state in this essay, though he does not produce detailed explanations of it like he does with Italy and Germany.
[98] Trainor, 'History and Reality', 272; see also, Collingwood, *The Idea of History The Idea of History* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946), 220.
[99] Ibid, 281.

absolute presupposition. However, as David Boucher has tried (and, to his own admittance, failed) to explain, Collingwood somehow came to this position while being a thinker who rejected philosophical relativism.[100] Nevertheless, we may broadly define his understanding of historicism as about the search for eternal truth in the past, and so to be anti-historicist was to view history a self-contained process.

Collingwood called fascism an 'anti-historicist doctrine' in an unpublished manuscript ('Notes Toward a Metaphysic II').[101] Following Lockean processes of human understanding, Collingwood would argue that it was reasonable that a German citizen should believe that the supremacy of the Aryan race was an absolute presupposition because in their immediate reality it was demonstrably true.[102] But this was because it was the *only* idea available to him because the Nazi regime's history began with its establishment in 1933 – it was disconnected form the normal processes of historical dialecticism. The fact Collingwood could highlight this error proved to him fascism worshipped a subjective presupposition wrongly venerated as absolute. In fact, it is this process that explained his claim that the ancient pagan civilisations lost sight of their fundamental convictions – because the presupposition at the centre of its civilisation was something to which it could no longer justify its devotion.

T. S. Eliot provided the other major contribution to this discussion. *The Idea of a Christian Society* started as 'three lectures on Church and State' given to Corpus Christi College, Cambridge in February 1939.[103] It was most probably born out of the discussions Eliot had with The Moot, where conversations about building a Christian society in Britain were frequent. He had for some time been concerned with the increased rejection of organised religion in the 1930s. The marginalia on one draft script of his pageant play *The Rock* (1934) details his concern about the 'discounting

[100] Boucher, *The Social and Political Thought of R. G. Collingwood*, 214-5.
[101] Rik Peters 'Croce, Gentile and Collingwood on the Relationship between History and Philosophy', in Boucher et al (eds), *Philosophy, History and Civilisation* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995), 152-67.
[102] Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, 220.
[103] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 49 (Eliot to Henry Eliot, 7 February 1939).

of religion in modern thought' and how he hoped his play would have highlighted the inadequacies of a secular Britain.[104] *The Idea of a Christian Society* is a blueprint for the development of a wholly Christian society which would be governed by a Christian elite – a concept which was informed by his close reading of Jacques Maritain's *L'Humanisme Intégral* (1936), in which he lays out the role of the '*cives praeclari*' (elite citizens).[105] One influence often overlooked however is the Moot occasional John Middleton Murry – of whom Eliot was nearly always critical, calling him a 'genuine heretic' – but his lectures *The Price of Leadership* (1939) so compellingly explained the need for a ruling elite to educate the masses in Christian doctrine that Eliot similarly concluded education was *the* way to evangelise Europe.[106]

As the introductory vignette shows, there was a great deal of discussion about Eliot's use of the term 'pagan.' Eliot's clearest definition of 'paganism' came in response to Reckitt's query in the *New English Weekly*. Eliot was responding to societies where 'the wrong spiritual values are recognised' and, given the emphasis of 'spiritual' in Eliot's thinking, 'pagan' was more appropriate than secular.[107] It is interesting to note that Eliot's definition of paganism in *The Idea of a Christian Society* shows a distinct intellectual link to some of his earliest definitions of fascism. If we recall, in 1933 he wrote in *Christendom* that fascism led people to 'impure motives… aiming at false goods.'[108] A few years later, he reiterated this point, saying that fascism had disregarded God in a concerted effort to manipulate 'mass-civilisation' towards 'many wrong ambitions and wrong desires.'[109] While Eliot took both fascism and communism as accelerated forms of pagan society, it was fascism with which he appears most concerned. Given the above, this is hardly surprising.

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[104] Bod., The Works of T. S. Eliot, MS. Don. D. 44, 'A Provisional Scheme for Spectacle of London Church Building, in a Theatre' (undated May 1934).
[105] Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 208; see also, Jacques Maritain, *L'Humanisme Intégral* (Paris: Aubier, 1936), 273-8. Eliot told E. J. Green that he had read *L'Humanisme* 'three or four times', *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 485 (6 April 1940).
[106] Andrew Hawthorne, 'T. S. Eliot's Social Criticism and Absolute Idealism' (PhD thesis, King's College, London, 2005), 315-21; Eliot, 'Why Mr. Russell Is a Christian', *Criterion*, 6:2 (1927), 179.
[107] Eliot, 'A Sub-Pagan Society?', 753; idem, 'Christian Society', *The New English Weekly*, 16 (1940), *Complete Prose*, VI, 7.
[108] Idem, 'Catholicism and International Order', 183.
[109] Idem, 'The Church's Message to the World', *The Listener*, 17:423 (1937), 294.

According to Eliot, there were only two types of society: Christian and pagan. Society was defined by its doctrine (the values that established its ethical framework) and its culture (its lived experience). A Christian society is wholly positive and a pagan society wholly negative. Britain was neutral because while it had a negative culture, it held a positive doctrine.[110] Eliot was aware of a general Christianity that existed in British society, but its lived experience was increasingly negative. This was because Britain was predicated on a pagan theory of the state while its society was not pagan (yet). Eliot imagined a distinction between the two, one that Oldham and Reckitt perhaps missed in their readings.

British democracy was a pagan theory of the state as much as European tyranny was because it negated the Christian doctrine which it was built upon: it demanded unchristian acts of their Christian citizens, which therefore made its culture distinctly unchristian.[111] Remembering that Eliot defined paganism as the recognition of the 'wrong spiritual values', this is most pronounced in his criticisms of Britain's pagan culture with his Ruskinesque indictment that Britain was a 'mass society organised for profit.'[112] Hence, Eliot wrote, 'it is not enthusiasm, but dogma, that differentiates a Christian from a pagan society.'[113]

He argued that fascist regimes were pagan societies. Its doctrine of state supremacy meant it was the source of moral prerogative in society, so the culture of fascist society was wholly materialistic, for instance. Interestingly, he believed fascism was an accelerated version of paganism because its pagan theory of the state that 'asserts the absolute authority of the state, or the infallibility of a ruler' meant that the state subsumes society, so its culture immediately becomes a product of the will of the state.[114] He did concede that it was possible to have a pagan theory of the state and a non-pagan society; for example, contra Collingwood who said Catholic primitivism facilitated pagan advances in Italy, Eliot suggested it exhibited a pagan theory of the state but that

[110] Idem, *The Idea of a Christian Society* (London: Faber, 1939), 9.
[111] Ibid, 63.
[112] Ibid, 39.
[113] Ibid, 59.
[114] Ibid, 70.

its society was not wholly pagan because areas of rural Italy had not been modernised so its culture remained committed to the mysticism of Christian ritual and not the materialism of the Fascist state.[115]

But just as it was increasingly difficult for Britain to remain neutral in a time of increased state intervention, it was even harder for Italian culture to remain positive within the contained system of the fascist state where a negative doctrine was the source of man's reality. Germany was already a wholly pagan society, for instance, because it was much more industrialised (*i.e.*, where society was connected more closely to the state) and so fewer traditional communities which governed themselves by Christianity's ethical framework remained.[116] In other words, both Germany's culture and doctrine was pagan, or negative. Where Eliot's thought differed from Oldham's then is that he believed a society may not have chosen to be pagan, but that its society naturally evolved due to the totalising nature of the fascist state. Thus Britain, perfectly balanced, had a choice: a nation with a wholly negative culture and doctrine, or a positive one.

The structure of Eliot's Christian society caused some suspicion. It was not democratic (for the reasons outlined above) but rather governed by an Oxbridge-educated, Christian elite; the Church was legally established by the state but joined ecumenically with other nations' churches. He pushed this very point in a letter to the writer and political thinker Leonard Woolf. Woolf was concerned that the Christian society which Eliot laid out in his book repudiated democracy – and the social values associated with it, such as liberty and tolerance – to the extent that it was closer to fascism. Eliot rebutted his old friend, saying that the implicit obedience to God would naturally bring liberty and tolerance into the world where fascism could not have done so because it was the worship of 'Human Infallibility incarnated in a Ruler', which rested on man's sacrifice of such values.[117] It appears that Eliot believed it was legitimate to offer obedience to a state that was built upon the correct spiritual values because these demands helped man live as God's word. The state

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115 Ibid, 21.
116 Ibid, 50.
117 *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 387 (Eliot to Leonard Woolf, 13 January 1940).

would not be a regulatory body but rather the collection of individuals all united by common spiritual bonds. Rather than the practical modalities of fascist government, Eliot instead rejected its innately pagan doctrine.

Culture was thus central to Christian society. If culture was people's lived religion, then an understanding of the moral code which underpinned Christianity was necessary to live their lives in accordance with God's word. We might see Eliot's ideal Christian society rather similar to Matthew Arnold's idea of a Christian *Bildungsstaat* as laid out in *Culture and Anarchy*. He believed that paganism had re-emerged in Europe because of the Church's failure to properly tackle the inexorable problem of unbelief in modernity. In a private letter to the German literary critic Ise Gropius (1897-1983), he recounted Adolph Lowe's (1893-1995) argument that the German churches had abandoned the 'German nation in such a way to facilitate the acceptance of the Nazi faith… It is probable that the churches in England could learn a good deal from what he says.'[118] Lowe – a German Jewish academic who had fled Germany in 1933 – was an occasional member of the Moot, and other conversations which the group had point to a common pattern of anxiety. J. H. Oldham, the group's *de facto* organiser, made this point in his review of Eliot's book.[119] Eliot told the Moot's first meeting that a strict Christian education was needed else the masses of the British population would clamour for 'totalitarian conditions.' Moreover, at the next meeting, his preoccupation with the citizenry's need for strict Christianisation continued when he said 'society was not now more fitted to be Christian, but it was more essential than ever that it should be Christian.'[120]

For Eliot, it appears paganism was a cultural problem perpetuated by individual sin. It is interesting then that what he prescribed to resolve this demonstrates his Anglo-Catholic orthodoxy as well as his debt to Lancelot Andrewes (1555-1626), the seventeenth-century Anglican divine. In fact, it appears he was particularly influenced by the sermon which he took 'almost at random' to

[118] Ibid, 425 (Idem to Ise Gropius, 12 February 1940).
[119] Oldham, 'The Idea of a Christian Society.'
[120] *The Moot Papers*, 55, 82 (First Meeting and Second Meeting, September 23-26, 1938).

adduce the mastery of Andrewes's prose in an essay of 1928. In the sermon, Andrewes explains salvation not in terms of hypothetical utopianism, but as a very real state of being in the temporal world – as such, it necessarily prevents material sin (*i.e.*, idolatry) from emerging.[121] The sermon itself continues that 'we have not the feeling of our sins that we have of our sickness' so 'three offices did God… erect to save His people by' one of which being 'Priests.'[122] Given Andrewes remains perhaps the most eloquent and influential proponent of Apostolic succession and authority in the Church of England (John Keble notwithstanding), it is not at all surprising that this sermon resonated so strongly with Eliot, for whom Christianity 'implies orthodox faith and apostolic succession'.[123] This maxim – of orthodoxy and Apostolic authority – is an undercurrent throughout his interjections with the Moot and woven deeply throughout the *Idea of a Christian Society*. To Eliot, one feels, fascism was merely just one of several possible consequences of a society which had turned from God.

Therefore, the achievement of a Christian society would not have been a consequence of the removal of fascism but rather a wholesale overhaul of the existing order. As such, Eliot's book was less concerned with politics and more about wider cultural rumination. Fascism, for Eliot, could only ever have existed in pagan society; fascism is a negative doctrine and therefore would not have garnered support in a space where a positive doctrine is undercurrent in every aspect of civic life. In many ways, Eliot was essentially suggesting a spiritual authoritarianism as its replacement. As a result, Adrian Hastings observed that had it not been for its paganism, Eliot would have considered fascism to 'not be at all bad', but I do not think that the difference is a facetious one.[124] Paganism was not a tenet of fascism: fascism was a pagan faith and therefore it could not be considered acceptable on any aspect.

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[121] Eliot, *For Lancelot Andrewes* (London: Faber, 1928), 25-7 ('Lancelot Andrewes').
[122] Lancelot Andrewes, *The Liturgical Sermons of Lancelot Andrewes* (Durham: Pentland, 1992), I, 26-7 (Nativity Sermon V, 1610).
[123] Eliot, 'Christianity and Communism' [unpublished MS., 1932], *Complete Prose*, IV, 428.
[124] Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, 321.

Thinking about Eliot's comments to the Moot and his private lamentations to Ise Gropius, it is worth considering Anglican understandings of *how* paganism, in the form of fascism, re-emerged in modernity. Barry argued that contemporary religion was weak because of the 'bankruptcy of secular leadership' in allowing social spaces to be uprooted from their spiritual foundations.[125] Going further, Cyril Garbett said that 'when religion is weak' pagan theories of human organisation emerge and 'takes the place once occupied by God.'[126] But to a great many others, it was the placidness of spiritual leadership that had allowed for this descent, and the indictment of Anglican pedagogy in light of this appeared common.

Unsurprisingly, Henson had several things to say about the state of moral leadership in Britain. In many ways, though he understood the complexities of political modernity much more than his Victorian peers, he still operated as a Victorian gentleman, and expected others to do so. In particular, he still expected Christian morality and decency to be foundational in political practice, even if politicians were not practising Christians themselves. Writing privately in June 1935, Henson explained that

> nothing brings home to me more vividly and painfully the decay of Christian feeling than the letters which are now appearing in the *Times* from prominent men e.g. Sir John Marriott and Mr John Murray, pleading for patience towards Germany and deprecating any expressions of sympathy for the victims of Nazi brutality and paganism. We are asked to sit back, and study the interesting spectacle of Germany's evolution from medievalism to modern democracy, while our fellow Christians are incidentally sent to Concentration Camps, and the most shocking perversions of Christianity are officially encouraged![127]

For Henson and others, fascism was not an 'interesting spectacle' but an eschatological phenomenon. He was aghast that people could watch the persecution of Christianity in Germany and observe the rise of a new form of paganism, and not connect the two, either out of ignorance or naivety. For Christians, it must have been the former. Stronger moral leadership was thus required to ameliorate this present condition. Some Anglican writers tended to recover the

[125] Barry, *The Relevance of the Church*, xviii.
[126] Garbett, 'The President's Address', 47.
[127] DCL, BHP, HHH/64, 12 June 1935, 57.

catholicity of their Reformed faith, perhaps engendered by this occidental view of fascism and its impact on the world. Henson was critical therefore of Barry's *Relevance of the Church*, and in particular his introductory remarks that 'if Anglicanism fails in the world right now, it is not some other form of Christianity which will win its allegiance, but paganism.'[128] In direct response, Henson asked rhetorically

> what is this precious and indispensable "Anglicanism" which alone stands between the world & paganism? In the welter of incoherent verbiage, which forms the staple of this pretentious book, there is never a scintilla of definition.[129]

The Church of England was not a sect, but one church amongst many, and it must consider paganism not as a threat to a specific nation or to Anglicanism, but to Christian civilisation.

L. John Collins (1905-82), while chaplain of Oriel College (1938-40), felt palpable anger at the Church's blatant disregard of the moral decay of the world, something he saw as 'a denial of the Gospel.'[130] This caused such a monumental shift in Collins's life that he founded in 1946 the social pressure group Christian Action and was integral to the founding in 1958 of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament – both addressing issues which he felt the Church should have been, but was not, moralising on. Robert Helm has argued that Ralph Inge saw a woeful inadequacy in Church moralising in the 1930s.[131] Writing privately to Inge in the wake of Lang's 'Recall to Religion', Henson reciprocated the Gloomy Dean's concern, commenting on the archbishop's vacuous 'pontifical moralising', 'arrogant egotism', and the sermon's 'lack of generous feeling.'[132] To these churchmen then, it was clear the Church seemed lost when faced with new ways of believing.

To many influential Anglicans, this was an obvious symptom of the collapse of Christendom. Therefore, this could perhaps be considered an example of the 'Christendom in

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[128] Barry, *Relevance of the Church*, xviii.
[129] DCL, BHP, HHH/64, 13 June 1935, 60. Underlined as per the original.
[130] L. John Collins, *Faith Under Fire* (London: Leslie Frewin, 1966), 63.
[131] Helm, *The Gloomy Dean*, 45-6.
[132] Evelyn Braley (ed.), *Letters of Herbert Hensley Henson* (London: SPCK, 1950), 99 (Henson to Inge, 25 December 1936).

crisis' thesis. Historians use the term 'Christendom in crisis' to describe the radical existentialism of theologians such as J. H. Oldham, Kathleen Bliss, and, unbeknown to them, Dietrich Bonhoeffer in his cell at Tegel Prison. Though each writer had their own idea of this 'crisis', we may succinctly define it as the concern with the rejection of God *en masse* in contemporary society and the emergence of a wholly secular one. While Sam Brewitt-Taylor and Tom Rodger have both pinpointed the late 1940s as the zenith of this theological existentialism, arguing that this was engendered, in part, by the rise of political totalitarianism, Brewitt-Taylor specifically argues that many of the important interlocuters of this believed a significant proportion of the blame lay with the Church of England's episcopate.[133] We can certainly see traces of this thought in the discussions about fascism as a form of paganism throughout the 1930s.

Fascism: Ancient, and Modern

This was not the first time that Anglican thinkers turned to previous philosophies to grapple with the ontological and epistemological complexities of fascism. As we have seen, Matthew Arnold's economic moralism and T. H. Green's active citizenship were frequent references. But these were largely nondoctrinal, and often a way for Anglican voices to remain audible in a time of industrial and social change. In Anglican imaginations, fascism was no longer a political phenomenon, but the worldly iteration a transtemporal idea of profanity. Therefore, as this chapter has shown, by the end of the 1930s, Anglicans engaged much more intimately with orthodox theology to conceptualise fascism. This chapter provides important context for the following chapter, which argues that fascism was considered as an eschatological phenomenon.

Though it was certainly common amongst Christian writers to see fascism and paganism as analogous, it was a distinctly Anglican conception to see fascism as a form of paganism itself. Theo Salemink contends that Catholic writers saw fascism as contributing to the more general

[133] Sam Brewitt-Taylor, 'The Invention of a 'Secular Society', *Twentieth Century British History*, 24:3 (2013), 335-6; Rodger, 'Spiritual Authority in a 'Secular Age', *The Church of England and British Politics Since 1900*, 227.

paganism of political modernity through idolatry, or what Gillman called 'autocrat worship' (idolatry of the leader) and 'ancestor worship' (idolatry of the national community).[134] This provides an insightful example of why Anglican responses differed from Catholic ones. Salemink argues that Catholics were most concerned with Nazi 'tribe worship' due to a corresponding concern with the Holocaust, and seeing this as the result of paganism allowed the Holocaust to be presented as an aberration from Christian civilisation.[135] Anglicans, on the other hand, saw the 'autocrat worship' in fascism as more concerning. The argument that Anglican suspicions of Papal infallibility and the continuities between Catholicism and fascism (as Matthew Grimley has compellingly put forward) should not be overlooked.[136] Nevertheless, an equally compelling argument can be made that Anglicans saw this as an example of the 'error' in paganism rather than as a separate tenet as Catholic writers did. The 'tribe worship' Salemink identified in Catholic responses to Nazism did concern Anglicans, but it formed part of a much wider awareness of fascist society as one which venerated worldly values as spiritual.

Communism posed a different threat with its future-orientated utopianism, concerned with what *could* be achieved. Fascism was perceived as focussed on what *had* been and what *should* be achieved once again. Ironically though, in observing fascist-paganism through an historical lens, Anglicans found in it something distinctly modern. Fascism represented a modern version of paganism for two principal reasons. The first was noted by Hensley Henson, who observed that fascism practised the idolatrous worship of the symbols of modern materialism in lieu of God. In time, this would be reiterated by a handful of Anglicans across the political and theological spectrum.[137]

But fascism's paganism was also a distinctly modern phenomenon due to the unprecedented enthusiasm and devotion it garnered. On this, Ralph Inge described fascism as a

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[134] Gilman, 'R. G. Collingwood and the Religious Sources of Nazism', 122.
[135] Salemink, 'Modernity as Neo-Paganism', 241-8.
[136] Grimley, 'Religion of Englishness', 891.
[137] Henson, 'The Church and the Nation', 51. Other later examples include: Eliot, *The Idea of a Christian Society*, 39; Middleton Murry, 'Europe in Travail', *The Listener*, 22:570 (1939), 1170; Raven, *War and the Christian*, 41.

'curious medley of antiquated ideas and very modern methods.'[138] Toynbee wrote in more detail, arguing that neo-pagan philosophies had misappropriated the levels of devotion and enthusiasm Christians reserved for God only. This gave paganism a 'driving force' it had never had.[139] Some Anglicans observed the importance of military victory in garnering this emotional support. According to Walter Benjamin's theory on the aestheticisation of politics, nothing garnered a unified emotional response like war.[140] The sentiment of Benjamin's essay can be seen throughout Anglican perspectives, but perhaps expressed most eloquently by John Middleton Murry, who wrote that 'the warlike nation… is the only idea of society as a whole which as yet has reality in the heart and mind of modern man. He has lost his universal religion.'[141] The manipulation of uninformed emotion to worship the personification of military strength was both ancient (Moloch), and modern (the state).

Matthew Grimley has asserted that Anglican writers in the interwar years presented the inherent 'Englishness' of Christian values as a response to the potential suffusion of paganism in English society. One of Grimley's primary examples was the effort to buttress a belief that the establishment of the Church of England was interconnected with the 'sovereignty of God' and that its presence in society necessarily ensured His word was supreme.[142] Similar interpretations have since been published by Philip Williamson and Michael Snape.[143] My own research on how Anglicans conceptualised fascism as a spiritual problem contextualises the above research on the theological justification for the war against fascism in 1939.

The association of 'Englishness' with certain Anglican values – as identified by Grimley, Williamson, and Snape – served as an important contradistinction between Britain and the fascist regimes as they initially locked horns in September 1939. A defence of the supremacy of Christian

[138] Inge, *Our Present Discontents*, 65.
[139] Toynbee, 'Post-War Paganism', 123-4.
[140] Walter Benjamin et al, *Illuminations* (New York: Schocken, 1969), 241 ('The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction', 1935).
[141] Middleton Murry, 'Europe in Travail', *The Listener*, 23:573 (1940), 27.
[142] Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 183-4; 'The Religion of Englishness', 889.
[143] Philip Williamson, 'Christian Conservatives and the Totalitarian Challenge, 1933-40', *The English Historical Review*, 115:462 (2000), 607-42; Snape, 'War and Peace', 227.

principles in international relations was how the Church of England justified Britain's entry into the Second World War. The perpetual allusion to the need for fervent spiritual leadership as a rebuttal to fascism thus supports Grimley's wider argument about the Anglican perspective on the British state and the importance of its established Church at the end of the 1930s.

Moreover, turning to the theology of paganism also gave the Church of England an historical precedent from which it could learn – Patristic writers wrote that a fervent religiosity organised by structured ecclesiology defeated paganism. Once again, the Christian churches had to fight for the supremacy of these spiritual values over the worldly authority of false alternatives, and it was believed it could learn a lot from its own history. This informed Cosmo Lang's justification for the war to Robert Cecil, because, as he insisted, Britain was not fighting to impose democracy on other nations but rather to uphold 'the principles which are essential to any civilised order among nations', an order upon which a democratic society could be built.[144] The following chapter will thus deconstruct Anglican ruminations on the possibility of a space in which fascism could not exist.

[144] BL, CCP, Add MS 51154 A, ff.102, Lang to Cecil, 7 September 1939.

Chapter Six
The Last Crusade: War, 1939-1945

So, while the light fails
On a winter's afternoon, in a secluded chapel
History is now and England.

\- T. S. Eliot, 'Little Gidding' (1942)

Hensley Henson retired from the episcopate in February 1939 at the age of seventy-five. He made a brief return to public ministry in 1940, accepting Winston Churchill's offer to be a canon of Westminster Abbey, though he resigned a year later, due in no small part to his failing eyesight. Henson spent the war in Hintlesham, Suffolk, retired, but no less involved in discussions on the present war. In 1943, he wrote to his longstanding correspondent E. H. Blakeney that 'the outlook for the war has considerably brightened, while the outlook for the peace has, perhaps, considerably darkened.'[1] To Henson, it was clear that a *British* victory and a *Christian* peace represented two very different things. Reassuring himself and Blakeney, he quoted Psalms 99:1-3: 'The Lord is king, be the people never so impatient; he sitteth between the cherubims, be the earth never so unquiet.'[2] Henson's allusion to God's judgement was his way of emphasising that Britain's war aims needed to be brought back in line with Christian values.

According to Henson's private diary, whereas a British victory meant the total military defeat of Germany, a Christian victory was the establishment of a fair and equitable peace in Europe.[3] While there appeared to be a unanimous assent to this conception, questions about what constituted a moral way to achieve this proved more divisive. Cosmo Lang's conception of the war was inextricably linked to the ideas of national sovereignty which had governed his approach to interwar foreign relations. To him, the military defeat of Germany was a Christian victory because it brought the defeat of a worldly 'evil' which had subsumed Germany. Therefore, he had

[1] BL., BC., Add MS 63089, ff.63, Henson to Blakeney, 28 September 1943. Underlined as per the original.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Henson, *Unimportant Life*, III, 142 (entry for 29 August 1940).

no qualms about asking the Church of England to pray for a 'complete British victory.'[4] Henson agreed, arguing that the Church must moralise the military victory to bring about such a peace. Hence, 'it is a crusade', he wrote, 'for the rescue of the ultimate factors of Christian civilisation, and we need the faith and fervour of crusaders if we are to achieve victory.'[5]

Cyril Garbett was a principal exponent of the 'war as crusade' theme. In his *Diocesan Leaflet*, he wrote that the campaign against European fascism was self-evidently a 'crusade' because it was fighting to stave off an 'earthly hell.'[6] Cyril Alington, dean of Durham, justified his use of the term because Britain's campaign was against a 'tyranny which increasingly denies God', which it demonstrated in its suppression of 'those rights of men which come from Him alone'; 'to fight for justice', he concluded, 'is to fight for the cause of God.'[7] Given the reluctance of many Anglicans to consider Franco's campaign against the Republic a crusade, the forthright acceptance that the campaign against fascism was one is telling of the irrefutable evil they saw in fascism.

George Bell took exception to the term 'crusade' in several articles in the *Fortnightly Review*, arguing that it was impossible to 'fight with earthly weapons [for]… the Cross.'[8] A real crusade was a 'crusade of conversion', and the allusion to the Apostolic Church and its Christianising of the pagan world was what Bell believed the present war must be.[9] Hence, he urged people to realise that the defeat of fascism would come from 'nothing less than a crusade, by all the churches working together, for the conversion, the re-Christianising, of Europe.'[10] Similarly, William Temple privately despaired to Garbett about Lang's injunction to 'pray for a complete victory' because it was made on behalf of *Cantuar* and *Ebor*, despite his belief that 'the maintenance of the spiritual fellowship of all Christians is for the Church a concern that takes precedence even over the military

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[4] Beaken, *Cosmo Lang*, 274; on Lang's use of 'evil', see e.g., cf., quote in ibid, 189; 'Satanic and Evil', *Daily Mail*, 31 October 1939; LPL, Lang 272, ff.134-5, 'Broadcast to USA', 1 September 1940; 'Primate's Plea on War Aims', *Daily Telegraph*, 12 May 1941.
[5] Henson, 'The Issues at Stake', *The Times*, 15 September 1939.
[6] York Minster Library [hereafter YML], Cyril Garbett Papers [hereafter CGP], Acc No. COLL 1973/1/O, *York Diocesan Leaflet*, 175, January 1943.
[7] Alington, *The Last Crusade*, 20-4.
[8] Bell, *The Church and Humanity*, 28 ('The Church's Function in Wartime', *Fortnightly Review*, November 1939).
[9] Ibid, 122 ('The Church and the Future of Europe', ibid, March 1943).
[10] Idem, 'A Visit to Sweden', *The Christian News-Letter*, 139, 24 June 1942.

defeat of Nazism.'[11] Garbett provided a telling rebuttal: 'I am afraid I have often told people not to hesitate to pray for victory, and I regularly pray for it myself.'[12]

The Anglican clergy's responses to the war have been studied in most detail by A. J. Hoover in *God, Britain, and Hitler in World War II* (1999). Hoover makes the compelling argument that, for Anglicans, the war was less about fighting fascism (the definition of which did not concern Anglican thinkers, he argues) but more about demonstrating to God the capacity to recognize and resist sin in the material world. Such a providential context, he argues, allowed thinkers like Temple and others to present the war as a more general defense of civilization.[13] Alan Jacobs argues similarly, writing that for Anglican thinkers like C. S. Lewis and the poet W. H. Auden (1907-73), Christianity became central to ideas on resistance to Nazism in the present war.[14] This chapter builds upon this argument and shows in greater detail how this narrative was crafted but that, contra Hoover, Anglican thinkers only came to this position because of previous and current meditations on the exact nature of fascism.

The focus of religious historians has more recently been the view from occupied countries, the framework which Andrew Chandler chose, and that which Jan Bank and Lieve Gevers came to as a consequence of studying the responses of the most predominant strands of European Christianity (Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Lutheranism, and Calvinism).[15] Both studies do well to dissect the intricacies of each country's predicaments to present a wider picture: Christian churches under Nazi occupation faced profound moral dilemmas which forced them to decide between survival through *Realpolitik* or extinction through martyrdom. This chapter therefore adds a new dimension to existing scholarship, not only because it will show how another

[11] YML, CGP, Acc No Coll 1973/1/H/25, Temple to Garbett, 23 February 1944.
[12] Iremonger, *William Temple*, 556 (Garbett to Temple, no date given, *c.* February 1944).
[13] A. J. Hoover, *God, Britain, and Hitler in World War II* (Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), esp., 136.
[14] Alan Jacobs, *The Year of Our Lord, 1943* (New York: OUP, 2018), 8-12.
[15] Chandler, 'Catholicism and Protestantism in the Second World War in Europe', in *Cambridge History of Christianity*, IX, 262-84; Jan Bank and Lieve Gevers, Brian Doyle (transl.), *Church and Religion in the Second World War* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016).

Christian denomination viewed the ensuing conflict but also because it will demonstrate how non-occupation shaped perspectives on occupied Christianity. Moreover, none of these accounts of the war considers attitudes toward General Franco's Spain, and yet his maneuverings in the war were fundamental to how Anglican thinkers defined European fascism during the conflict.

This chapter will show that wartime Anglican writings demonstrate a strong evangelistic and transnationalist approach, both of which suggest a shift in Anglican theology and pedagogy. Such a change suggests alarm, and perhaps even despair. In his eschatological reading of John's Gospel, Søren Kierkegaard (1813-55) held that 'despair' was a type of spiritual death – it is 'the sickness unto death.' Despair comes from man losing his sense of self, which is necessarily found in his relation to God.[16] Kierkegaard's idea of eschatology (the theology of 'last things') is not so much the *end* itself, but how man responds to the *ending*. To not be in a state of despair, and to welcome judgement, one must have reconciled the 'infinite and the finite', or his soul with God.[17] I intend to use this idea of a disconnectedness from God – of a deviation from God's will – to explain the sudden eschatological alarm in Anglican discourse.

In this chapter, I contend that Anglicans formed an eschatological perspective on fascism. Anglicans acknowledged that fascism was as much a product of Western civilisation as it was anathema to it. It therefore meant that civilisation had, at some point, strayed too far from God's will and that it needed to be reconciled with God as judgement came. Anglican writers developed a pedagogy which responded to this idea of apocalyptic judgement and shaped a narrative that the war was fundamentally about ensuring civilisation returned to reflect God's will. This was largely done by presenting fascism and Christianity as unable to coexist in the same space, and the tension between the two had brought war: Lord Halifax often spoke in this tone, bifurcating the present war simply as 'Christ versus the anti-Christ.'[18]

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[16] Søren Kierkegaard, Walter Lowrie (ed.), *The Sickness unto Death* (1849; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 146.
[17] Ibid, 262.
[18] Quoted in 'Summary', *Church Times*, 26 July 1940.

This chapter explores Anglican imaginations of 'fascistless' spaces during the Second World War along two principal lines of inquiry. It will explore Anglican perspectives on the resistance movements against Nazism in occupied Europe to demonstrate how conspicuously Anglicans bound themselves to the theology of evangelism, specifically in the need to re-Christianise Europe through the establishment of a new social space more fervently entrenched in Christian doctrine. Linked to this, it will explore how Anglicans deconstructed the claims of Vichy France and Francoist Spain as confessional forms of fascism to vindicate the conception that fascism could never truly exist in a Christian world. In many ways, it was a war not *against* fascism, but *for* a world where fascism could not exist.

The Occupation of Protestant Europe

Christianity in northern Europe (except for Catholic Belgium) is largely Protestant. In the Netherlands, the Dutch Reformed Church is the largest Protestant (Calvinist) body, and until the end of the 1930s it was the largest church. The Scandinavian countries of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are predominantly Lutheran. Where the Church of Sweden holds dogma as central to its faith, in the Churches of Denmark and Norway there is a greater emphasis on ecclesiology. Norway and Sweden (at that time) had state churches like the Church of England, whereas Denmark and the Netherlands did not.[19]

The turn toward ecumenism in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries meant relationships between Protestant churches across Europe strengthened. The archdiocese of Uppsala in the Church of Sweden provided an important touchstone of world Christianity, out of which successive archbishops Nathan Söderblom (1866-1931) and Erling Eidem (1880-1972) orchestrated important ecumenical advances. George Bell, the Church of England's leading ecumenist, corresponded frequently with Swedish clerics and even visited during the Great War.[20]

[19] The *Svenska kyrkan* (Church of Sweden) was disestablished in 2000.
[20] Jasper paints a good picture of Bell's interactions with the Church of Sweden, see his *George Bell*, 48, 243-5, 266-9.

The Dutch ecumenist Willem Visser 't Hooft (1900-85) had been a consistent correspondent with many in the Church of England during the interwar years and continued to play an important role during the war while Eivind Berggrav (1884-1959), bishop of Oslo, Norway, was venerated as the light of Christianity in the darkness of Nazi-occupied Europe.

In May 1940, German forces entered the Netherlands, and, after just five days, the Dutch forces surrendered. The *Church Times* and the *Record* both sought to emphasise the Germanic influence in the country (the popularity of Nazism, for instance), arguing that this had suppressed the Netherlands' true national spirit, which was innately Christian and directly traceable to William the Silent (1533-84), the defender of Dutch Protestantism from Spanish Catholicism in the sixteenth century.[21] This had a dual purpose: it separated the *realpolitik* of the Government from the true commitment of the Christian citizenry to defeat the pagan Nazism but it also aligned the national values of the Netherlands with Britain. This distinction allowed two versions of the Netherlands to exist simultaneously, and thus the 'real' version was presented as existing in the consciousness of those Dutch people who remained committed to Christian values despite Nazi occupation. The ideological creation of a 'real' Netherlands, as defined by Christian identity, was useful in the Anglican effort to justify Britain's involvement in the war, enriching a wider narrative that Britain had a responsibility to fight for those countries where God was recognised as supreme and to create a new, more connected Christian community. Perhaps this is what Henson meant when (quoting Joseph Butler) he argued that Britain was 'on the side of divine administration.'[22]

This transnational approach was taken up by many within the Church of England. Cosmo Lang, preaching in Canterbury Cathedral, exclaimed that the occupation of northern Europe represented a genuine 'challenge to the peace and freedom of the whole world' and therefore begged the question how one could 'doubt that it is in accordance with that Divine Will that these

[21] 'Summary', *Church Times*, 17 and 31 May 1940; 'For All We Have and Are', *Record*, 17 May 1940.
[22] Henson, 'The Issues at Stake', *op. cit.*; see also, Butler, *The Analogy of Religion*, I.I §22, 67.

forces of evil should be resisted and overcome?'[23] Mirroring Henson's public invocation of Butler, Lang's rhetoric clearly demonstrated his commitment to Christian civilisation's struggle against fascism, as fought through Britain's military campaign against Germany. This can be seen further in his engagement (through Bell) with Cardinal Hinsley's 'The Sword of the Spirit', an evangelistic campaign much like his own 'Recall to Religion.' Though committee positions were exclusive to Roman Catholics, he nonetheless spoke in 1941 at one of its meetings about the need of evangelism to rid civilisation of fascism.[24]

Transnationalism even gripped those who had, at one stage or another, been suspicious of ecumenism. Temple wrote privately of the need to engage more willingly with the Vatican, which is indicative of what Edward Loane identified as a more general ecumenical turn in Temple's theology toward the end of the 1930s.[25] Even T. S. Eliot, who, in many ways, thought *anti*-ecumenically, believed that pan-denominational cooperation was essential when Christianity faced oppression.[26] The Church of England's special position as the coordinator of Christian unity and resistance (now inextricably linked) across occupied Europe was acknowledged by several important ecumenists, but especially by Willem Visser 't Hooft. In November 1944, J. A. Douglas (1868-1956), chairman of the CFR, wrote to his confidant Basil Batty (1873-1952), bishop of Fulham, that Visser 't Hooft had spoken to him about the possibility of an 'Anglican Dutch Circle' much like 'our little Scandinavian Circle.'[27] The 'Circles' in question were fellowships (such as the Anglo-Swedish Society, at which Eliot and others spoke): ideological networks which, during the war, were vital channels of information and sources of unity amongst Christian countries fighting for the possibility of a Christian peace.[28]

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[23] 'Archbishop says 'Hour Has Come'', *Daily Mail*, 13 May 1940.
[24] On this, see Beaken, *Cosmo Lang*, 285-7; for the speech, see 'Primate's Plea on War Aims', *The Daily Telegraph*, 12 May 1941.
[25] F. S. Temple (ed.), *Some Lambeth Letters* (London: OUP, 1963), 40 (Temple to unknown recipient, 20 November 1942); Edward Loane, *William Temple and Church Unity* (London: Palgrave, 2016), 189.
[26] Eliot, 'The Church as an Ecumenical Society' [unpublished address given to the World Conference of Churches in Oxford, 16 July 1937], *Complete Prose*, V, 498.
[27] LPL, CFR LRC 99, ff.5, J. A. Douglas to Basil Batty, 22 November 1944.
[28] See e.g., Eliot, *Friendship, Progress, Civilisation* (London: Anglo-Swedish Society, 1944), 15-20 ('The Nature of Cultural Relations', 1943).

This particularly appealed to Douglas because 'if only for the sake of the Oecumenical movement, an Anglican Dutch Circle would provide opportunity for contacts between Hollenders [*sic*] and Anglicans of all categories, e.g., Anglo-Catholics and others who do not mix easily in Anglo-Fellowships.'[29] The fostering of unity within the Church of England was certainly part of a wider process of aligning Britain with the universal terms of Christian morality against fascist apostasy. Indeed, in light of the emerging consensus that fascism was a judgement of God, Christian unity was seen as central to rediscovering, and realigning themselves with, God's will for humanity and therefore it was sought more zealously than before, both at home and abroad.

This transnational approach relied upon the shared adherence to Christian doctrine and morality. Therefore, some Anglicans used their platforms to show how the occupied countries of Europe resisted moral occupation and continued to venerate Christian principles to encourage the uptake of their struggle in Britain's religious circles. One principal issue was antisemitism. Jan van Dorp (1888-1948), a pastor in the Dutch Reformed Church in London, forwarded to Douglas a translation of the Dutch bishops' condemnation of the 'suppression of the Jews in the Netherlands.'[30] One imagines documents like this were not merely read by CFR members, but directly shaped the committee's discussions. Indeed, resisting the Holocaust became the central image of resisting moral occupation. For instance, George Bell explained in the Lords Spiritual that the Netherlands's treatment of Jews did not reflect its Christian morality but the policy of *realpolitik* the Government was forced into through Nazi deceit.[31] But it was also done by venerating the Dutch Reformed Church. J. H. Oldham explained that the Dutch Reformed Church was leading the resistance to the Nazi occupation through cultivating a spirit of national religiosity, built principally on a recommitment to the principles of justice and love through its outspoken

[29] Douglas to Basil Batty, 22 November 1944.
[30] Ibid, ff.1, Jan van Dorp to Douglas, 13 March 1941.
[31] HL Deb., 'Internment of Aliens', 6 August 1940, Vol.117, Col.126.

condemnation of Nazi antisemitism.[32] As time went on, Oldham in particular wrote effusively about the Dutch Reformed Church and its efforts to combat Nazism.

The elision of national history with Christian identity functioned as part of the *Christian News-Letter*'s narrative on the Christian challenge of the war. Oldham wrote that Dutch Christians were aware 'that spiritual independence was part of the historical Christian heritage of Holland' and that they must 'vindicate it in spite of being outwardly compelled to submit to alien rule.' But Oldham made the important addition that Dutch Christians fully understood that they were a small part of a wider, supranational Christian front, united by 'the common danger and the common needs.'[33] This was not sophism, but a perspective ascertained from requests of intercessory prayer. In 1944, the Dutch prime minister-in-exile Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy (1885-1961) telegrammed Temple saying 'in all the Churches of Holland our people will undoubtedly implore the aid and the mercy of the almighty. Many millions of Dutchmen will be greatly comforted by the knowledge that others elsewhere are joining them in prayer.'[34] It is not difficult to infer why Gerbrandy became so central to Anglican representations of the Dutch resistance.

Oldham was especially positive about Gerbrandy, in whom he felt the Netherlands had a committed Christian leader. In an article published by the *Christian News-Letter*, Gerbrandy argued Western civilisation had relegated God beneath temporal phenomena like politics and economics and that this drastic suppression of His word had caused the total instability of the twentieth century, exhibited in fascism.[35] His chief solution was the formation of a lay order, whose purpose was the effective suffusion of God's word throughout civic life. Oldham's intellectual affinity to this was evident. He emphasised the importance of laypeople to Sweden's foremost religious resistance movement, the evocatively named 'Movement of Preparation for Spiritual Defence',

[32] Oldham, 'Conditions in Holland', *The Christian News-Letter*, 81, 14 May 1941 and 'The Will to Freedom in Holland', ibid, 83, 28 May 1941.
[33] Idem, 'Holland and Scandinavia', ibid, 72, 12 March 1941.
[34] LPL, W. Temple 26, ff.206, Pieter Sjoerds Gerbrandy to Temple, 11 October 1944. N.B., Temple's response was 'Prayers for Holland', *Daily Telegraph*, 14 October 1944.
[35] Gerbrandy, 'Christianity and Politics', *The Christian News-Letter*, 170, 27 January 1943.

writing that it 'attempts to reach Christian laymen…and form them into groups which will prepare themselves to meet the spiritual crisis and to combat anti-Christian tendencies in thought and action.'[36] This eagerness for lay activity across occupied Europe was perhaps caused by the introspection of Oldham and others who felt that Britain's laity had become complacent toward fascism.

Indeed, for several influential Anglican thinkers, Britain's non-*occupation* in a time of mass continental *occupation* perhaps created a mentality of complacency within its citizenry: not for nothing was Bishop Wilson of Chelmsford's book on this topic titled *It Can Happen Here!* (1942). In 1940, Oldham condemned the characterisation of the present war as a crusade, maintaining that whilst Britain was fighting evil in fascism, it was not fighting for anything particularly 'good' either given that Britain represented something closer to an apostate nation than a spiritual utopia.[37] The Moot (sometimes called the Oldham Group) was largely in agreement.[38] Eliot wrote in the *News-Letter* that Lord Halifax was the only statesman in Britain with a genuine grasp of the moral issues of the war, which explained why he was ignored by his citizens and fellow politicians alike.[39] From this, we understand that some Anglicans saw orthodox Christian pedagogy as effective not just in resistance to occupation, but integral to the maintenance of a free society.

George Bell was similarly inspired by the increased Christian religiosity of occupied Europe. The son of an Anglican vicar, Bell won competitive scholarships to Westminster School and Christ Church, Oxford, after which he entered the clergy. Bell is best known as the bishop of Chichester (1929-58), but he began his ministerial career as chaplain to Archbishop Randall Davidson (1914-24) and, from 1925 to 1929, he was the dean of Canterbury. As a churchman, Bell was integral to the European ecumenical movement, in illuminating the tribulations of the German

[36] Oldham, 'Holland and Scandinavia', *op. cit.*
[37] Idem, 'Editorial', ibid, 26, 24 April 1940; see also idem, 'This England', ibid, 83, 28 May 1941.
[38] *The Moot Papers*, 55 (First Meeting), 82 (Second Meeting).
[39] Eliot, 'The Conditions of Statesmanship, *The Christian News-Letter*, 42, 14 August 1940. For further evidence of Eliot's belief in this complacency, see 'Christian Education in Britain', ibid, 97, 3 September 1941; see also, *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 425 (Eliot to Ise Gropius, 12 February 1940).

Churches under Nazism, and campaigning on behalf of the victims of the Holocaust.[40] Bell's transnational approach here reflected his more general belief in the catholicity of the Christian Church and the importance of cooperation for the development of the Kingdom of God.

Bell believed that the Church of England's rediscovery of its catholicity was central to its function in wartime. In a letter to *The Times* in September 1939, he said that the Church's primary function was to foster a national spirit influenced by the 'Gospel of Redemption' because this will facilitate 'what the Church is divinely commissioned to offer human beings', namely 'the worship of the family of God.'[41] In other words, the Church offered human society a unique possibility for unity, and his association with the Federal Union (a pressure group aiming to create a federal Europe) from 1939 meant he rejected any attempt at international governance that was predicated on national sovereignty.[42] In essence, Bell felt the Church of England had a vital role in crafting a theology of redemption that would contribute to the establishment of a 'community founded on love.'[43] Other Anglicans similarly held redemption as integral to the Church's wartime theology. Temple believed that redemption was an immanent expression of divine will, revealed so man can deepen his knowledge of God and save himself.[44] Crucially though, moves toward a theology of redemption not only emphasise the eschatological interpretation of fascism, but also that some within the Church of England felt ecumenism was closer to God's will and that it was therefore the Church's duty to assume the struggles of other nations' churches.

This was done primarily through the public veneration of the activities of Eivind Berggrav, the Preses (leader) of the Church of Norway. Norway was occupied in April 1940 and a political coup saw Vidkun Quisling (1887-1945), leader of the fascist *Nasjonal Samling*, assume control of a Nazi puppet regime. Bell ascertained information about the Norwegian Church through direct

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[40] Andrew Chandler has produced a vast corpus of research on the life and work of Bell. Cf., *Brethren in Adversity*; 'The Church, the Writer and the Artist in the Face of Dictatorship', *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, 20:2 (2007), 298-315; *The Church and Humanity*.
[41] Bell, 'The Church's Function', *op. cit.*
[42] Philip Coupland, 'Bishop George Bell', *Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte*, 21:2 (2008), 305-6.
[43] Bell, 'The Church's Function', *op. cit.*
[44] Temple, 'Preface' (1937), in *Doctrine in the Church of England* (New York: Macmillan, 1938), 16-7. N.B., Temple's writing here is noticeably prewar, but he believed war was nascent (17).

correspondence with Swedish coreligionists as well as from officials in the exiled Norwegian government of Johan Nygaardsvold (1879-1952) in London.[45] Nils Hjelmtveit (1892-1985), the Minister for Education and Church Affairs, frequently provided Bell with documents pertaining to the Norwegian Church struggle – he even sent a poem written by Berggrav, something which the sometime winner of the Newdigate Prize for English Verse at Oxford cherished deeply.[46] Another figure was Johannes 'Johnny' Ursin (1895-1989), a pastor in the *Sjømmanskirken* (Norwegian Church Abroad) based at the Church of St Olav's in south-east London. Ursin frequently translated and disseminated important books such as *The Fight of the Norwegian Churches against Nazism* (1943) by Bjarne Høye (1893-1971) to churchmen like Bell.[47]

The Church of England was aware immediately of the Church of Norway's commitment to the struggle against European fascism, and it especially applauded its refusal to embark on a policy of *realpolitik* like many of Europe's secular leaders. This perspective was formed in no small part due to the Manifesto of the Norwegian Churches, which came to the CFR through Bell. The manifesto presented the Norwegian churches as committed to the 'spiritual' war – 'fighting in order that the existing Church can accomplish its task, which is to serve the congregations with the Word and the sacraments.'[48] In February 1942, the resignation of Berggrav and his six fellow bishops in the Church of Norway in protest at the Quisling government's interference with the Church's autonomy vindicated Anglican faith in this manifesto.

Oldham expressed his solidarity with Berggrav in the *Christian News-Letter* while Temple, speaking as archbishop of Canterbury, broadcasted on the BBC's Norwegian service the message that 'we honour you who in our own day are showing that the spirit which upheld the martyrs is still alive and strong in the Church of Christ.'[49] The direct reference to martyrdom is significant

[45] See e.g., LPL, Bell 87, ff.263, Erling Eidem to Bell, 12 February 1943.
[46] Ibid 89, ff.140-2, Nils Hjelmtveit to Bell, 25 September 1944.
[47] Ibid, ff.293, Johannes Ursin to Bell, 20 May 1943.
[48] Ibid, Bell 89, ff.116, Manifesto of the Norwegian Churches, 1 July 1942.
[49] Oldham, 'The Church in Norway', *The Christian News-Letter*, 124, 11 March 1942; 'Archbishop on Norway Stand', *Daily Telegraph*, 27 April 1942.

because it shows how Temple emphasised the Church of Norway's commitment to the essential vocation of the Christian faith, which was, by extension, a commitment to the Church of England. It is clear that, in Temple's thought, the barriers of denominationalism collapsed during the war, and he rediscovered the catholicity of the Christian church, which allowed for the seamless creation of a transnational interpretation of the conflict.

In Easter 1942, Berggrav was placed under house arrest. In response, Bell enlisted the help of Herbert Montague Waddams (1911-72), Canon of Canterbury Cathedral, to edit a collection of Berggrav's essays and letters published under the title *With God in the Darkness* (1943). Bell's introductory remarks read as a hagiography of the Norwegian Preses, deeming him 'the life and soul of the struggle… against Nazi violence and Godlessness.'[50] The titular essay of the collection emphasised Berggrav's position on collaboration with the Quisling government, writing that 'peace must be prepared; peace must cost courage… only the peace with a price is God's peace.'[51] His allusion to martyrdom was most certainly selected by Bell to lead the pamphlet to demonstrate the clear intellectual and theological affinity between British and Norwegian interpretations of the conflict. To further this end, Waddams wrote to Bell during the initial stages of production to suggest putting Berggrav's title – Bishop of Oslo – as a suffix to his name on the cover to present the Apostolic heritage of the English and Norwegian clergies, emphasising that the Christianity fundamental to Berggrav's resistance was the Christianity of the Church of England.[52]

Bell visited unoccupied Sweden to further this ecumenical mission. Temple was positive about the potential benefits of Bell in particular embarking in unifying missions because, as he explained to Erling Eidem, 'he has done more than any other among us to foster the relationships between the Church of England and the Churches of the continent.'[53] Bell's trip was a resounding success. Yngve Brilioth (1891-1959), bishop of Växjö, handwrote a letter of thanks to Bell for the

[50] Bell, 'Preface' and 'Eivind Berggrav', Eivind Berggrav, Bell and H. M. Waddams (eds), *With God in the Darkness* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1943), v, 1.
[51] Berggrav, 'With God in the Darkness' (1940), ibid, 17-8.
[52] LPL, Bell 89, ff.287, Waddams to Bell, 16 May 1943.
[53] Ibid 87, ff.9, Temple to Eidem, 29 April 1942.

sermon he delivered on the importance of Christian unity and Britain assuming Scandinavia's struggle as its own.[54] Back in England, Bell agreed to a request from Carl Söderberg (1873-1951), a Swedish pastor in London, to publish this sermon in the *Anglo-Swedish Review*.[55] Bell was similarly positive, suggesting to Eidem that more Anglican clergy should be welcomed in Sweden, and offering the services of Richard Parsons (1882-1948), bishop of Hereford.[56]

As we have seen, the ecumenical mission of the present war hinged as much on cross-denominational unity as it did transnational. It was typical of Church of England ecumenists to embrace this, and just as Oldham had emphasised this model of cross-denominationalism in the Dutch resistance, so too did Bell emphasise it in solidarity with Sweden. Writing for the *Christian News-Letter*, Bell remarked that he was 'able to make contacts with the different Churches in Sweden in a remarkable way.' From these meetings, he ascertained an unprecedented level of cooperation between the Protestant, Catholic, and Free Churches (though this was invariably credited to the work of the Protestant Church of Sweden minister Erling Eidem).[57] Based on observations of Scandinavian Christianity, Anglican thinkers started to believe that a country could only contribute to international Christian unity if its national Christianity was united, if not possibly uniform.

Upon his return, Bell presented the special responsibility Britain and Sweden had to the occupied nations of Europe. He gave a press conference at the headquarters of the Ministry of Information on 15 June, in which he emphasised the commitment of the Swedish people to the ecumenical necessity of this war, seeing 'public evidence of the enthusiasm the Swedes hold for their Norwegian kinsmen.'[58] Indeed, he characterised Sweden as 'war-conscious', a phrase which implies the Swedish assumption of Norway's, and Europe's, struggle as its own.[59] More than

[54] Ibid 86, ff.191-2, Yngve Brilioth to Bell, 12 July 1941.
[55] Ibid 87, ff.203, Carl Söderberg to Bell, 7 August 1941 and reply, ff.203.
[56] Ibid, ff.252, Bell to Eidem, 17 December 1942.
[57] Bell, 'A Visit to Sweden.'
[58] LPL, Bell 87, ff.83, 85, Transcript of Bell's Press Conference, 15 June 1942.
[59] Ibid, ff.90.

anything though, Bell stressed that Swedish solidarity was driven by a view of the war as a possibility for a Christian society. He said that they were 'exceedingly keen to know of the plans of actions in connection with social reconstruction', a statement which brought Britain and Sweden closer together in their conception of the war as the possibility of a totally new space.[60]

It is unsurprising that Bell emphasised the theology of redemption, so fundamental to Sweden's national religiosity, given that he believed it should also be the foundation of British religiosity. Swedish Lutheranism is strongly dogmatic: we see this in Bell's conversations with Söderberg, from which he understood that Sweden had an unwavering belief that through God's grace alone can man achieve forgiveness – grace thus meant accepting and forgiving the sins of Europe entirely, not just those of Germany and Italy.[61] Therefore, it is even less surprising Bell pushed this to his British audience when we consider how similar his interpretation of Swedish redemption was to his idea that it was integral to the establishment of a 'community founded on love.'[62] In his press conference, he explained that 'they have many of them a very strong European sense, a belief that only if Europe is viewed as a complete entity, can the real welfare – political and economic – of Europe be established.'[63] Moreover, he used his *Christian News-Letter* article to further this end. He wrote that Sweden was not thinking of military defeat as a solution to Nazism, reiterating that they were too concerned with a future-oriented vision of a federal Europe, and that Britain should start to think the same.[64] Therefore, it seems that Bell's trip to Sweden was as much about ecumenical advances as it was about highlighting the absence of a theory of redemption in wartime Britain's political consciousness.

This last point was perhaps motivated by personal biases. We know that Bell was keen for a federal Europe of some description at this time and that his conception of transnationalism was less about international conformity as much as it was about unity. Irrespective of this, Bell's public

[60] Ibid, ff.84.
[61] Ibid, ff.40, Bell Interview with Söderberg, 4 May 1942.
[62] 'The Church's Function', *op. cit.*
[63] Ibid, ff.87, Transcript of Bell's Press Conference.
[64] Bell, 'A Visit to Sweden.'

discussions about Sweden's role in European resistance were undoubtedly done to encourage the greater uptake of Europe's struggle within Britain. Where there was not a need for direct resistance – as in Britain and Sweden – there was a need for indirect resistance because the stresses on the mutual interplay of freedom increased greatly. This occidental view of Christendom was integral to the Church of England's engagement with the French resistance, where the organisation of Christian resistance against Nazism's moral occupation was much more complex.

The French Resistance

One of the more interesting features of Anglican wartime writings was the broad imaginative configuration of European nations as separated into 'real' and 'superficial' spaces according to a demonstrable commitment to Christian spirituality. 'Real' countries now largely existed in the consciousness of a citizenry still committed to Christian values despite being governed by a ruling elite that abandoned ethics and spirituality to pursue policies of *realpolitik* with the fascist conquerors. Anglican engagement with the French Resistance throughout the 1940s demonstrates a much more systematic attempt at crafting such a narrative. This sheds light on the newfound conception that fascism was an eschatological phenomenon, because it was believed that countries which were subsumed by fascism had abandoned their commitment to God's will and thus faced His judgement. As Henry Wilson wrote regarding denunciations of God on account of His willingness to let France fall to the Nazis, 'the intervention of God to prevent by force nations from sinning would mean the destruction of human free will.'[65] This emphasis on the French government's *realpolitik* led Anglicans to craft an image of Christian spirituality as underpinning the French Resistance so that, in time, it was recognised as the legitimate French Government.

[65] Wilson, 'The Fall of France', *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 26 July 1940.

At the start of the war, France was seen as Britain's military and spiritual ally.[66] During the Battle of France (May - June 1940), Cosmo Lang made it clear to Geoffrey Dawson, editor of *The Times*, that the British people were well aware that 'in defending their country they are most truly defending ours.'[67] In two speeches a month apart, Lord Halifax stressed the unprecedented closeness of the two countries, and that the uniqueness of this alliance was engendered by their shared responsibility for defending Christendom.[68] As such, Halifax's comments – representative of the most common Anglican perspective – explain why France's abandonment of its responsibilities to Britain was extrapolated to represent an abandonment of its spiritual responsibilities to civilisation.[69]

Anglican writers crafted analyses of France within the framework of 'defeatism.' This was the belief that France had surrendered without any effective military resistance because fighting against Germany was considered futile given the inevitability of its failure. This perspective transcended religious circles, being easily identifiable across British discourse. Henry 'Chips' Channon (1897-1958), the Conservative MP for Southend and occasional Catholic, wrote in his diary that he 'lay in bed brooding about the grim future. The news from France is despairing … there is talk of a total French collapse. Then we are done.' The next day he wrote laconically 'defeatism is about.'[70] Sleeplessness was a common symptom of distress about France: both Stanley Baldwin (now retired from the Commons) and Alan Campbell Don (still Lang's chaplain) admitted to this between 23 and 24 July 1940.[71] Don appears to have embraced the defeatist narrative more

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[66] See e.g., YML, CGP, Acc No COLL 1982/5/B, War Diaries: Vol. 1, 3 September 1939; Henson, 'The Issues at Stake', *The Times*, 15 September 1939; Kenneth Kirk, *The Oxford Diocesan Magazine*, 452 (October 1939), p.233; Henson, 'The Issues at Stake', *op. cit.* and *Unimportant Life*, III, 52, 56 (entry for 17 September 1939).
[67] LPL, Lang 176, ff.137-8, Lang to Dawson, 11 June 1940.
[68] Halifax, *Speeches on Foreign Policy*, 353 ('The Progress of the War', 20 January 1940), 360 ('The Challenge to Liberty', 27 February 1940). Halifax was central to the military alliance between Britain and France, see Harindar Aulach, 'Britain and the Sudeten Issue, 1938', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 18:2 (1983), 235.
[69] Cf., Henson, *Unimportant Life*, III, 119 (entry for 25 June 1940); 'Summary', *Church Times*, 5 July 1940; Lang, 'The King Calls a Day of National Prayer', *Record*, 16 August 1940; Wilson, 'Prospects of Victory', *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 11 October 1940 and 'Bishop and War Lessons', *Chelmsford Chronicle*, 18 October 1940; Bell, *Christianity and World Order* (London: Penguin, 1940), 88; Temple, 'Inspiration For War Struggle', *The Times*, 24 March 1941.
[70] Henry Channon, Simon Heffer (ed.), *Henry 'Chips' Channon*, 3 vols. (London: Hutchinson Heinemann, 2021-2022), II, 318-9 (15-16 May 1940).
[71] Halifax, *Fullness of Days* (New York: Dodd, 1957), 230 (Baldwin to Halifax, 23 July 1940); Don, *Faithful Witness*, 338 (24 May 1940).

than most. 'It appears that the collapse of France has been due in part to the President, [Albert] Lebrun, who threw in his hand. [Philippe] Pétain, in his dotage, was used as a screen by a number of defeatist politicians.' On 4 July 1940, he wrote sombrely that 'the collapse of France is complete, and the spirit of her leaders broken.'[72]

Defeatism both concerned and infuriated Anglicans. In his private diary, Garbett wrote that Britain is 'to go on alone' in its campaign to ensure that 'Justice will be vindicated', but he was aware that 'the nation which has championed it may go under in the struggle.'[73] R. H. Tawney explained that 'we prefer dying on our feet to living on our knees' while Don wrote proudly in his journal that 'most of us would rather die than submit to Hitler.'[74] In many respects, the defeatist narrative was a natural contrast to the image of martyrdom evoked by the other occupied countries and certainly exacerbated in Anglican imaginations by the eschatological understanding that this war was a judgement on the presence of fascism in Christendom.

In a sermon preached in Chichester Cathedral in September 1941, Bell drew his congregation's attention to comments made by Denis Saurat (1890-1958), Professor of French at King's College, London, and an integral member of the Resistance in London. Saurat published *French War Aims* in 1940, an ethical treatise which argued that war was now a reality due to Western civilisation's abandonment of 'values superior to the values of human life.'[75] Bell turned Saurat's statement back on itself when he suggested that too many Frenchmen were not willing to sacrifice themselves for ethical ideals and were too fixated on material issues: a damning indictment of Saurat's countrymen.[76]

A month later Bell reiterated the importance of communal values transcending national interests. Preaching to students at Cambridge University, he explained that 'France fell last year,

[72] Don, ibid, 344 (4 July 1940).
[73] YML, CGP, Acc No COLL 1982/5/B, War Diaries: Vol. 1, 13 and 18 June 1940; see also, Wilson, *It Can Happen Here!*, 30.
[74] Tawney, *The Attack, and Other Papers* (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 337 ('Why Britain Fights', 1940); Don, *Faithful Witness*, 337 (18 May 1940).
[75] Denis Saurat, *French War Aims* (London: Methuen, 1940), 49.
[76] Bell, *The Church and Humanity*, 216-7 ('A War of Ideals', 7 September 1941).

not just because its politics were corrupt, its army ill-furnished and ill-led, but because at the back of these things it lacked faith.'[77] Bell's tone mirrored that of Father Cassian (Sergei Sergeevich Bezobrazov, 1892-1965), the Professor of New Testament studies at St Sergius Theological Institute in Paris. Cassian had written to Bell in February regarding the 'hopelessness' at the present situation in France; however, Cassian nonetheless encouraged Bell to 'believe that the day will come, when the Christian conscience of the world will say its word and this word will be heard.'[78] Letters like this certainly informed Bell's perspective that fascism was a judgement of God and that a fresh fundamentalism was central to the cessation of hostilities.

Cosmo Lang spearheaded the veneration of the French resistance in Britain, responding in part to its ostensible need for spirituality. In October 1940, Etienne Boegner (1908-85), the son of Pastor Marc Boegner (1881-1970), a leading figure in the Protestant Reformed Church of France and the European ecumenical movement, visited Lambeth. Don recorded that Lang was impressed by Boegner's suggestion that '[Charles] de Gaulle's organisation here should be strengthened by the addition of a few Frenchmen of Christian character and vision who could speak for the real France which is at present muzzled and inarticulate.'[79] In contrast to Gavin White's argument, Lang was convinced that France had fallen to the Nazis due to a weak spirituality. White is unconvincing when he argues that Lang merely agreed with the Czechoslovakian diplomat Štefan Osuský (1889-1973) that France's defeat represented a 'betrayal of spirit.'[80] After meeting Osuský, Lang produced a memorandum for the CFR in which he stated that 'the capitulation of France was the failure of national spirit in all classes, not least among the politicians.'[81] In his private journal he wrote 'who would have thought that… France … would have thus <u>miserably</u> collapsed. I fear it will be difficult… to persuade our <u>people</u> … [to] wage the

[77] Ibid, 222, ('The Basis of Christian Co-operation', 26 October 1941)
[78] LPL, Bell 84, ff.192, Father Cassian to Bell, 25 February 1941.
[79] Don, *Faithful Witness*, 354 (11 October 1940).
[80] Gavin White, 'The Fall of France', *Studies in Church History*, 20 (1983), p.437; LPL, Lang 176, ff.143, Osuský to Lang, 18 October 1940 and reply, ff.146, 24 October 1940.
[81] Ibid, ff.147, Lang Memorandum, 'The Surrender of France', no date.

battles there which she had refused to wage.'[82] It appears Lang did more than merely accept the suggestion of France's spiritual collapse.

Lang also got from Boegner the conception that the 'real' France existed outside of its geographical territory. The separation of France in the Anglican imagination was not just a conceptualisation of the realities of the French occupation (where the country was split into Occupied Zone and a 'free' zone (*Zone Libre*), which was a rump government headquartered at Vichy), but an attempt to legitimise de Gaulle's (1890-1970) resistance. In between occupied France and Vichy existed a third, more liminal France: 'Free France.' Free France was the France upheld by the French Resistance, headquartered in London. De Gaulle was a Roman Catholic, but he nonetheless foregrounded his edicts on the war in general Christian morality. He spoke of the 'moral element, which binds together oppressed peoples' as the 'common will to assure the victory of a civilisation founded on liberty, and the dignity and security of mankind, against a system whose main principle is the abolition of the rights of the individual.'[83] Senior Anglicans pounced with alacrity on the French Resistance as an opportunity to revive the spiritual foundations of France, seen, for instance, in Lang's private letter to Halifax saying that he would be happy to help ascertain who might be appropriate to provide the moral guidance Boegner prescribed.[84]

Moreover, the perpetuation of the two Frances was bolstered by efforts 'to differentiate between the French nation and the various groups of politicians who have ruled France', making a clear distinction between spirituality and temporality in Anglican imaginations of wartime Europe.[85] This was part of the wider attempt to reconceptualise the present war as about competing systems of values. For instance, some Anglicans were aware of the need to make the moral distinction between *fascism* and *fascist citizens*; or, as W. H. Moberly told the Moot, the

[82] Ibid, ff.258-9. Underlined as per the original.
[83] 'General de Gaulle on Moral Resistance', *The Spiritual Issues of the War*, 101, 9 October 1941.
[84] LPL, Lang 175, ff.132, Lang to Halifax, 11 October 1940.
[85] 'The Week', *Guardian*, 28 June 1940; see also ibid, 18 July and 1, 15, 28 August 1941.

distinction 'between the German people and the "gang" that leads them'.[86] This had precedence in Anglican discussions of fascism. Responding in the *Criterion* to the group of Oxford dons that boycotted an invitational visit to Göttingen University in 1937, Eliot noted the difference between the actions of the fascist state and the actions of institutions coerced into complying with the fascist state's will.[87] But the need for a transnational Christianity after the fallout of France's collapse was even more vital because it allowed Anglicans to distinguish between Vichy and France, so that the latter was presented as aligned with the Christian resistance in Europe.

The partition of France in this way therefore meant the French Resistance became the real France in Anglican imaginations. William Temple invited in 1943 André Philip (1902-70), de Gaulle's Interior Minister, to speak at the Nikæan Club. Founded by Randall Davidson in 1926 to support the Church of England's ecumenical ministry, it was therefore named after the site of the Christian councils at Nicaea. Philip was a Christian socialist who had worked with the *Front des Chrétiens Révolutionnaires* (*Christian Revolutionary Front*), a trade union movement underpinned by a sophisticated confluence of Christian and Socialist doctrine.

In a meeting disclosed as 'private and confidential', Temple lauded Philip as

> a Christian and a statesman who believes that Christian faith should be the inspiration of statesmanship. We honour him for his courage and in him we greet the spirit of *the* France that will, as we believe, take her place – and her foremost historic place – among the United Nations both in the winning of victory and in the ordering of a better world.[88]

Temple's statement is telling of how pervasive the 'two Frances' narrative was throughout the war years. Temple's distinction that Philip's Christian statesmanship was representative of the 'France' Britain was fighting alongside emphasised the spirituality of the French Resistance and legitimised its claims to be the 'real' France. In response, Philip told those present that his movement's purpose was the veneration of 'the supreme value of the individual soul' and that it hoped to

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[86] *The Moot Papers*, 226 (Fifth meeting); see also, Alington, *The Last Crusade*, 23-4; BL, CCP, Add MS 51154 A, ff.102, Lang to Cecil, *op. cit.*; Temple, 'Peace Aims and War Aims', *Daily Telegraph*, 4 December 1939, in *Thoughts in War-Time* (London: Macmillan, 1940), 79; Matthews, *Our War for Freedom* (London: Nisbet, 1939).
[87] Eliot, 'Correspondence', *The Criterion*, 17:66 (1937), 123-4.
[88] LPL, CFR, Council on Foreign Relations Documents, 1/201-310, ff.258, Minutes of Nikæan Club Meeting, 21 January 1943. My italics.

sanctify God's will for man to live freely as 'higher than the will of the State.'[89] This point elegantly restated the aims of the French resistance in terms that would have more likely appealed to an Anglican of Temple's Platonic bent, not least because he was likewise propagating this to the British public in 1941.[90]

Philip's stock grew considerably amongst Anglican thinkers in this period. *The Christian News-Letter* overlooked de Gaulle (an exclusively military figure) and praised Philip as *the* thinker and leader of Free France, emphasising the importance of his belief that France needed a 'common spiritual front against Nazism.'[91] Figures like Philip were important because they allowed Anglicans to throw their weight behind the Resistance despite the ostensible communist influence within the movement. This was not just Anglican opportunism or propaganda, but a response to Philip's efforts to cultivate this image in Britain. In particular, his article in *The Listener*, 'Malgré Vichy, la France Continue' (1942; 'Despite Vichy, France continues'), emphasised the widespread suffusion of the dual France model in European Christian discourse. In the article, Philip explained that the primary aim of the French Resistance was the 'spiritual reconstruction' of France, built upon the core values of 'justice', 'freedom', and 'truth.'[92] Therefore, much like the lay-oriented visions of a future Christian society inculcated by T. S. Eliot and Gerbrandy, Philip's efforts to present the French resistance as the possibility for a new France – with Christianity more firmly entrenched in civic life – reflected the emerging eschatological focus of Anglican discussions of fascism and the need for an evangelistic reconstruction of civilisation as a response to this.

Vichy France

Vichy initially occupied a liminal position in Anglican thought: not fascist but certainly not an ally. Bishop Garbett characterised the negotiations for a 'fascist France' as 'an unwelcomed calm before

[89] Ibid.
[90] LPL, W. Temple 67, ff.126, Temple, 'The Freedom for Which We Fight' (1941). N.B., Temple at least wanted to propagate this narrative, though this article cited remained unpublished.
[91] Oldham, 'The Resistance of French Christians to Nazism', *The Christian News-Letter*, 151, 16 September 1942.
[92] André Philip, 'Malgré Vichy, la France Continue', *The Listener*, 28:712 (1942), 291.

an awful storm' while Cosmo Lang, in much firmer language, wrote that Pétain was 'going too far with Hitler.'[93] But from early 1941 onwards, the Church of England press was painfully aware of Vichy's fascism.[94] By April of that year, the *Record* was drawing comparisons with the Nazi state for its readers and in June it put Vichy's leaders alongside Mussolini and Hitler: 'the most contemptible of European leaders.' Ultimately, Vichy became a 'prison-house framed on the Nazi model.'[95]

After Vichy's establishment, Anglicans reiterated the regime's separateness from France, the real iteration of which now existed by proxy in London. The defining parameters of Vichy's separateness from France were neatly encapsulated in the *Christian News-Letter* when, on the question of fascist antisemitism, it declared that 'Vichy France' was in conflict with the 'Christian and liberal sentiment in [occupied] France.'[96] The *Record* referred to the territory as 'Pétainia' because it was not recognisably French anymore; its leading administrators were not French but 'of French birth.'[97] The existence of France in a multiplicity of forms, but always separate from Vichy, represented the eternal truth of the Christian religion and, in contrast, the transiency of the fascist ideology. As such, it vindicated the support Anglicans gave to the spiritual resistance de Gaulle proffered through military resistance.

The emergence of Christian resistance movements across occupied Europe vindicated the Anglican separation of moral and military occupations and showed that the latter did not necessitate the former. As already proposed in this chapter, Anglicans saw in these resistance movements the fostering of a spirit of national Christianity as a counterresponse to the forced adoption of fascist moral codes. Therefore, the distillation of competing values allowed Anglicans to present Vichy as not just in contrast with Britain, but definitely on the side of the fascist states.

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[93] YML, CGP, Acc No COLL 1982/5/B, War Diaries: Vol. 1, 20 and 30 June 1940 and 20 July 1940; LPL, Lang 176, ff.147 'The Surrender of France'; see also, Henson, *Unimportant Life*, III, 122 (entry for 6 July 1940).
[94] 'The Week', *Record*, 3 January 1941; 'The Week', *Guardian*, 23 May 1941; 'Summary', *Church Times*, 5 September 1941, and 2 April 1942.
[95] 'The Week', *Record*, 4 April 1941 and 13 June 1941; ibid, 15 August 1941.
[96] Oldham, 'Christians and Jews', *The Christian News-Letter*, 158, 4 November 1942.
[97] 'The Week', *Record*, 12 July 1940.

Henson perpetually characterised the democracies of Britain and France as the proponents of transcendental ethics such as justice and liberty, so it is unsurprising that he considered Vichy's abandonment of 'democracy' and 'liberty' as reflective of its 'monstrous apostasy.'[98] Similarly, the *Church Times* made clear its understanding of Vichy's ideological position, quoting the words of a professed 'Free Frenchman', it said that Vichy's embrace of Nazism 'emphasises the immense responsibility that has fallen to English Christians at this time. It is made clearer by the fact that all the anti-Christian forces in the world are allied against both Christianity and democracy.'[99] In deconstructing Vichy's claims of operating a confessional state, Anglicans were able to articulate better how a Christian civil space should look.

T. S. Eliot saw Vichy as far removed from France and its true Christian identity. He immediately condemned Vichy's increasingly antisemitic legislation, which formed the basis of his wider criticism of Vichy's religious policy.[100] If we remember his 1936 *Criterion* commentary on Abyssinia, he demanded that justice be seen as a central and defining value of Christian civilisation.[101] As such, he stipulated that if the 'Protestant bodies in France' did not 'rise to protest' at the injustice of Vichy's antisemitism then he had 'serious doubts about the way in which the revival of Christian France, advertised from Vichy, is to be carried out.'[102] Eliot managed to highlight the perceived falseness of Vichy's Christianity through exposing the dissonance between its values and true Christian ones. Moreover, such an argument naturally juxtaposed Vichy to the Christian churches of Europe which Anglicans praised for resisting the antisemitism fascism sought to impose.

Due to the publication of his *Idea of a Christian Society* in 1939, Eliot had by this time a more clearly defined parameter of what a Christian society should look like and thus he was unconvinced

[98] Henson, *Unimportant Life*, III, 52, 116 (entries for 3 September 1939 and 17 June 1940); 9 July 1940, ibid.
[99] 'Summary', *Church Times*, 10 January 1941.
[100] Eliot, 'The Christian Education of France', *The Christian News-letter*, 97, *op. cit.*
[101] Idem, 'A Commentary', *Criterion*, 15:59, *op. cit.*
[102] Idem, 'The Christian Education of France.'

that Vichy's programme of national regeneration would be effective because its Christianity was not authentic. This draws on longstanding concerns that fascism could not effect genuine progress because it had no spiritual foundations. Fascist movements which claimed a Christian basis invariably lacked actual spirituality because fascism operated according to a totally separate moral code. Eliot highlighted the clericalism of the Vichy regime as evidence of its inauthentic Christianity. As highlighted in Chapter Four, 'clericalism' is significant as it alludes to the authority associated with religious bodies, rather than the dispensation of moralistic guidance to correct man's sin. One of his main sources on the Vichy regime was the article 'A "New Order" For France', published in *The Times* in August 1941.[103]

The Times's correspondent wrote that

> Pétain declares that the new regime, in sacrificing the semblance of liberty, saved its substance … Thus liberty is now interpreted as the concrete, legitimate rights inherent in membership of a community or corporation, while abstract liberty, as embodied in the "Rights of Man", is declared to vain and illusionary.[104]

In direct response, Eliot wrote

> the device *Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité* is only the memorial of the time of revolution: *Famille, Travail, Patrie* has more permanent value. But to substitute the second for the first is to go further than merely to call attention to equal, or even to higher values: it is by implication the denial and repudiation of the first.[105]

Eliot was aware that Vichy's programme of social regeneration was based on a return to certain organic principles which underpinned the *Ancien Régime*: family, work, patriotism. These values had a certain truth at their core and provided moral foundations from which social fellowship flourished. But the above shows that Eliot believed that an exclusive reimplementation of these values was theologically untenable.

Vichy's forcible implementation of Christianity was the biggest indicator of its clericalism and thus the falseness of its faith. As committed as Eliot was to the development of a truly

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[103] 'A "New Order" For France', *The Times*, 14 August 1941.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Eliot, 'The Christian Education of France', *op. cit.*

Christian society, the implementation of this was erroneous: conversion was the mission of the Church. For example, he rebutted the American writer Archibald MacLeish's (1892-1982) suggestion that all education systems in Nazi Germany be replaced with Western ones, saying that it is the responsibility of Christian societies to *show* that these alternatives are better, not take others away.[106] As Temple wrote at the same time, 'Christianity exists only where it is freely accepted; the use of force on behalf of it is therefore a betrayal of it.'[107] Vichy had created spirituality in just the same way as the French Revolutionary Government had created equality: forced adherence to imposed social values.

Eliot's interjections in the *Christian News-Letter* formed part of the magazine's wider response to the Vichy regime. Another central feature was its publication of Karl Barth's famous series of 'Letters to French Protestants', in which the Swiss theologian condemned Vichy's collaboration with Hitler.[108] Barth was known for his outspoken attitude toward Nazism throughout the 1930s (for which he was expelled from his academic post at Bonn University) and thus grew in popularity amongst Britain's Christian intellectuals. Despite his radical Protestantism being distinctly at odds with Eliot's increasingly orthodox Anglo-Catholicism, he appeared frequently in the *Criterion*, which, as Anthony Domestico contends, became a 'clearinghouse for conservative politics and religious orthodoxy' (notably neo-Thomism) in the late-1930s.[109] Interestingly, Eliot claimed that Barth had as much of an impact on contemporary English theology as Søren Kierkegaard, which not only shows his powerful estimation of Barth but also a sensitivity to the eschatology now omnipresent in Anglican discourse.[110]

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[106] Idem, 'Books for the Freed World', *The Times*, 8 May 1944.
[107] Temple, 'Introduction', *op cit.*, 8-9.
[108] Barth, 'A Question and Request to French Protestants', *The Christian News-Letter*, 66, 29 January 1941.
[109] Anthony Domestico, 'Editing Modernism, Editing Theology', *The Journal of Modern Periodical Studies*, 3:1 (2012), 20-1.
[110] Eliot, 'Types of English Verse' (1940) [unpublished lecture], *Complete Prose*, VI, 59. I do think it is interesting that Eliot should cite Barth (his contemporary European eminence notwithstanding) and Kierkegaard, two deeply eschatological theologians, as being a governing influence in English wartime theology given what we have seen specific to the discursive continuum surrounding fascism.

In Barth's most salient letter, he made it 'perfectly clear' that a military armistice may be 'provisional', but that French Christians could not adhere to a spiritual armistice of any kind.[111] The conscious alignment of the *News-Letter*'s interpretation of Europe's moral occupation with the perspectives of other European denominations suggests the magazine was not just positive about thinkers like Barth but influenced by their thinking. The need to uphold a spiritual defence against fascism drove the emerging perspective that fascism was an eschatological judgement, and that the current civilisational collapse was caused by an abandonment of Christianity across Europe.

The *News-Letter*'s permanent editor, J. H. Oldham, was just as suspicious of Vichy's spirituality because it had 'adopted from the beginning a policy of extreme and frantic "clericalism".'[112] This came after he had already expressed a concern that the Roman Catholic Church in France would be eager to collaborate with the new fascist powers in France.[113] It was an oft-repeated anxiety. Cosmo Lang likewise feared the formation of a 'Latin-Catholic block of France, Italy, and Spain.'[114] Bishop Wilson of Chelmsford said that 'the Roman Church has never found democracy a tolerant bed fellow. It is an authoritarian form of religion.'[115] The Roman Catholic Church's immediate resolve to join forces with the advancing Nazi army meant the rest of the population was 'deprived of its spiritual armour in the hour of her gravest peril.' Wilson appeared somewhat quixotic though, especially in contrast to Oldham and Lang. Alluding to Matt. 13:33, he wrote: 'France will rise again. Yes, but there will be no rising until the yeast of faith re-leavens the whole nation.'[116] This direct application of scripture to the situation in France puts it beyond doubt that Wilson understood fascism subsumed countries with a weak national religiosity.

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111 Barth, 'A Question and Request to French Protestants.'
112 Oldham, 'The Church in France', *The Christian News-Letter*, 188, 11 April 1943.
113 Idem, 'Conditions in France', ibid, 85, 11 June 1941.
114 LPL, Lang 176, Lang memorandum, *op. cit.*
115 Wilson, *It Can Happen Here!* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1942), 33-4.
116 Ibid, 34, 36. Matthew 13:33: 'Another parable He spoke to them: "The kingdom of heaven is like leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal till it was all leavened".'

Fascism in Iberia: Francoist Spain and *Estado Novo* Portugal

Franco's entry into Madrid in April 1939 commenced his thirty-six-year dictatorship. But the changing nature of Franco's ideological rationale shed new light on the realities of his supposedly spiritual fascism. The personal difficulties it posed to erstwhile supporters is encapsulated neatly in Ralph Inge's and E. Allison Peers's wartime writings. They were aware more than other Anglican observers of Francoist fascism's changing dynamics. The growing ideological affinity between Francoist fascism and Nazism was a distressing development for Anglicans, irrespective of their previous attitudes toward Franco. As we shall see, Francoist fascism, like Vichy, was exposed as resting upon a superficial confessionalism.

Ralph Inge was remarkably quiet during the war. The death of his son, Richard, an Anglican priest, during his Royal Air Force training in 1941 affected him profoundly. But also, his silence was probably reflective of the personal turmoil the conflict caused in someone who, as a devout pacifist, had supported appeasement with Hitler and only later accepted a pacificistic position.[117] He continued to insist on the legitimacy of Franco's coup, but, by the 1940s, he was aware of the regime's ideological drift towards Nazism and that this made it as unacceptable as the fascisms he had condemned earlier in the interwar period.[118] In Chapter Four, we explored in detail the broad imaginative configurations of fascism in Inge's thought, however Francoist fascism's drift toward Nazism removed the possibility of ideological nuance. It appears that when Francoist fascism was isolated from the dichotomy the Spanish conflict brought, and scrutinised on its own merits, the reality of its profanity was exposed.

For Inge, Francoism's move toward Nazism did not just truncate his belief that it was a 'better' form of fascism, but more generally prompted him to question whether fascism can ever

[117] Inge was monitored by MI5 for suspected pro-Nazi sympathies due to his association with the Anglo-German Friendship (sometimes Brotherhood) and the British Council for Christian Settlement in Europe; see Dietz, *Neo-Tories*, 472 n.540; see also, Linehan, "On the Side of Christ", 289; Pugh, *The Making of Modern British Politics*, 232.
[118] See e.g., Inge, *A Pacifist in Trouble*, 9-10 and 'National Socialism', *The Cambridge Review*, 63 (1942), 151.

be nuanced, thus forcing a complete reimagining of the configurations which had governed his understanding of European fascism hitherto. He was most troubled by Franco's implementation of a moral code that stimulated false idolatry. 'Several observers have noted the appearance, in Germany, Italy, Russia, of a new type of young man, unsparing of himself but ruthlessly cruel and fanatical', he said. 'It is young men of this type who keep the dictatorships in being and execute the crimes which perpetuate the reign of terror.'[119] The suggestion that Spain was now a tyrannical society demonstrates how he felt Spain had abandoned that which had differentiated it from other fascisms in the mid-1930s.

'The emergence of a permanent new type in human nature would be almost unexampled', he said, 'and for this reason I have hopes that the scourge of Nazism may not survive its present Duces, Fuehrers and Caudillos.'[120] Though he observed it in political authoritarianism generally (*including* the Soviet Union), the fact that he only adduced fascist leaders is telling of how he perceived the threat of the fascist efforts to regenerate the moral code of social life. Inge was not alone in such wartime meditations. R. G. Collingwood spoke pejoratively of the new man emerging in the regimes of Spain, Italy, and Germany.[121] Similarly, Cyril Garbett saw a distinctly 'fascist' new man in modernity. As opposed to the Soviet Union, where the new man was amalgamated into the community, making one *collective* man (with perhaps purposeful Hobbesian undertones), fascist society created a man who venerated his base instincts for barbarity as the guide to fulfil his highest potential as a member of the state, rather than subduing these to attain salvation.[122]

Inge's connection of Spain to other European fascisms is interesting, though it does not undermine his previous conception that fascism was distinctly multivalent. Bàrbara Molas argues that many erstwhile FNS affiliates reconsidered its stance on democracy, no longer seeing it as an 'error' of modern society but as a legitimate vehicle through which neo-conservative opinions

[119] Idem, *Possible Recovery?* (London: Individualist Bookshop, 1941), 23-4.
[120] Ibid, 24.
[121] Collingwood, 'Fascism and Nazism', 171.
[122] Garbett, *What is Man?* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1940), 25-6.

could influence post-fascist discourse on behalf of a political Right in fear of the natural resurgence of the political Left.[123] Whether Inge can be considered part of this conversion will always remain to be seen, and his wartime writings leave much doubt as to his position in this regard. But given he initially favoured democracy over fascism on account of the former's ability to limit the state in industrial society, it would be plausible to suggest he was. Either way, Inge's criticisms of Franco during the war give weight to the argument I made in Chapter Four, that Anglicans always engaged with the patterns of fascism. Such a change of perspective was not an abandonment of his previous typology of fascism but it in fact depended wholly upon such a conception. Francoist fascism, like all forms, was not innately profane, but it had become so because it incorporated into its doctrine an aspect of fascism which was rooted in the denial of God and one which was shared by Fascism and Nazism.

Samuel Hoare did much to shape Anglican perspectives on the Spanish clergy's condemnation of Franco's drift toward Nazism, which not only separated religious spirituality from temporal politics but also aligned Spanish Catholicism with European Protestantism in the wider battle between Christianity and fascist apostasy. After his disgraced exit as the Foreign Secretary during the Abyssinian crisis, Hoare became the British Ambassador to Spain in 1940. He fared much better in Madrid than Westminster: Cyril Garbett privately noted that his appointment had been a 'success', a sentiment shared by Lambeth's man in Spain, Harold Buxton, bishop of Gibraltar.[124] The CFR had a limited knowledge of Spain in this period, so Hoare's letters make up a large proportion of the contemporary information from which Anglican criticisms of Francoist Spain were made.

One of his earliest letters to Lang is particularly telling. He wrote privately that 'the Germans have dug themselves in so deeply here that my job is an exceptionally difficult one.'[125]

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[123] Molas, 'Transnational Francoism', 173.
[124] YML, CGP, Acc No COLL 1982/5/B, War Diaries: Volume 1, 24 July 1940; LPL, W. Temple 37, ff.241, Buxton 'Diocese of Gibraltar and R. C. Church', November 1942.
[125] UL, TP, XIII/file 2/4, Hoare to Lang, 6 June 1940.

He reiterated this point in his inaugural address as Viscount Templewood of Chelsea in the House of Lords. Speaking in December 1944, he asserted that 'for those early years of the war Spain was morally occupied.'[126] Interestingly, the presentation of Spain's moral occupation in the absence of any military occupation emphasised the choice Franco had made to shift his ideological focus. To assuage concerns about this moral occupation, Hoare reassured Lang that leading Spanish clerics were fully aware that 'the war is a war between Christianity and paganism.'[127] A central theme of Hoare's wartime letters was thus the presentation of the Spanish Church's growing separation from the state and its renewed commitment to Christendom, not fascism.

He wrote to Lang on another occasion to inform him that many members of the Spanish Catholic Church would abandon their support of Francoist fascism if it was to 'start upon Nazi lines.'[128] In May 1942, Hoare wrote privately to Temple that the Catholic clergy in Spain were 'obsessed with the necessity of combatting Nazism' because of its racialism, which was 'the direct antithesis not only of Catholicism but of all family life.'[129] Little is known about what Hoare thought about Francoism in the 1930s, but it was clear that he was concerned by its ideological alignment with Nazism in the 1940s. What we can also infer with certainty is that just as Temple had deconstructed Vichy's claims of spirituality by emphasising the spirituality of the French Resistance, Hoare, in much the same way, aligned the motivations of the Roman Catholic Church with the spiritual aims of Britain's war rather than Franco's quasi-neutrality, which thus emphasised the significance of its willingness for ecumenical cooperation.

Moreover, Hoare explained to Lang that he had been trying to get Anglican chaplains from Gibraltar to go to Madrid to revive the Protestant Church in Spain.[130] This also interested Temple during his time at Canterbury, who tried to convince Anthony Eden, now Leader of the House of Commons, that commissioning more Anglican chaplains in Spain was certainly within Britain's

[126] HL Deb., 'Unifying Forces of Europe', 19 December 1944, Vol.134, Col.374-5.
[127] UL, TP, XIII/file 2/4, Hoare to Lang, 6 June 1940.
[128] Ibid/57, Hoare to Lang, 30 December 1940.
[129] LPL, W. Temple 37, ff.220, Hoare to Temple, 29 May 1942.
[130] UL, TP, XIII/file 2/57, Hoare to Lang, 30 December 1940.

wider war interests.[131] Hoare evidently believed that the spiritual soundness of the Spanish state could present its conversion to Nazism, ensuring that it did not slip from one bad form of fascism to one even worse. This suggests a common belief that only a truly spiritual society could stop the growth of fascism, and this mirrored not just their earlier pronouncements on the necessity of religious vitality as a counter to fascist paganism but also their immediate understandings of France's collapse in this same period. It tells that Hoare believed that the Catholic Church was providing the only real resistance to Franco's move toward Nazism. This fed into the wider pattern of Anglican discourse at this time, which was developing quickly into a belief that only a social space committed to Christianity could be inimical to the development of fascism.

Alongside Hoare, the Hispanist E. Allison Peers continued to be a major Anglican source of contemporary information on Spain. Peers and Inge were ideological companions in their fervent support of Franco's campaign in the Spanish Civil War and this unity continued into the early stages of the Franco regime. Peers wrote a series of books in the early 1940s that detailed the formation, and predicted the future of, the Franco regime. Interestingly though, his previous tone of optimism for Franco's mission was now replaced with one of deep concern. Like other Anglican writers, Peers separated the secular actions of the government with the Christian sentiments of the citizenry.[132] The greatest source of Peers's anxiety regarding Spain's future was the Falange's ideological drift toward Nazism and its overtly 'pro-Nazi' policy during the war itself.[133] This was clear to Peers from Franco's unwillingness to recognise the blatant paganism of Nazism, and no example was more damning than Franco's unwillingness to criticise the cruelty Hitler had meted out in Catholic Poland.[134]

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[131] See e.g., LPL, W. Temple 37, ff.228, Roland Cragg to Ian White-Thomson, 13 October 1942 and ff.247, Buxton to Temple, 9 March 1943. N.B., White-Thomson (1904-97) was Temple's chaplain at Canterbury.
[132] Peers, 'Spain, Russia, and the War', *The Spectator*, 167:5901 (1941), 102.
[133] Idem, *The Spanish Dilemma*, 44; *Spain in Eclipse* (London: Methuen, 1943), 232. Peers uses 'Phalange' as an alternative spelling to *Falange*, the major Spanish fascist movement.
[134] Idem, *The Spanish Dilemma*, 72; 'Spain, Russia, and the War', 102.

Throughout the war, Peers believed Britain's involvement was justified by its staunch defence of Christian values and the possibility of a world order predicated on these. Like Hoare's insistence to Lang that the Spanish clergy were anti-Nazi, Peers publicly reassured people in Britain that the Catholic Church in Spain, and the majority of Spanish Catholics, were aware that the Allies were fighting 'to ensure respect for engagements and to vindicate the Christian spirit of morality.'[135] This commitment to spirituality went hand in hand with the perceived falseness of Francoist fascism's spirituality due to its move toward Nazism: 'it is his alliance of sentiment with Hitler that they will not forgive.'[136] 'Alliance of sentiment' is a really telling phrase because it is the same as Hoare's observation of a 'moral occupation' and, in direct contrast to the widespread veneration of the Scandinavian churches for their continued Christian spirituality, it reiterated the spiritual threat fascism posed and how only *true* spirituality could counter it.

Peers adduced three recent developments in Francoist fascism that proved its Nazism. The first was that suddenly 'the most exaggerated epithets were heaped on him [Franco] and the terms in which he was addressed were at times almost suggestive of apotheosis.'[137] The reference to Franco's 'apotheosis' is important because it demonstrates a continuity with the national rebirth upon which fascist groups predicated its fabricated national destiny and divinising of the temporal leader. This contributed to the plethora of reasons why fascism was innately profane in Anglican thought; in fact, it was a central and defining feature of fascism. Peers also noted how Spain had an increased desire for territorial expansion, of which he was critical because of its mimicry of the romanticised nationalism that defined Italian colonial policy in this period.[138] To emphasise his point, Peers directly contrasted this to Britain, stressing that its war aims were to uphold justice and freedom by limiting fascist territorial and material advancements.[139]

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[135] Ibid, 158.
[136] Ibid, 230.
[137] Ibid, 168.
[138] Idem, 'Spain's Dream of Empire', *The Spectator*, 165:5853 (1940), 216.
[139] Idem, *The Spanish Dilemma*, 158; see also, 'Post-War Language', *The Spectator*, 168:5947 (1942), 576.

It is interesting that wartime Anglican perspectives on Francoism were united by a concern about an ideological move toward Nazism. This was not without precedent. Attention was mostly given to Dollfuß's Austrofascist regime (1932-34) in the context of a growing fear that Nazism was the 'worst' kind of fascism, and so the prospect of two Nazi states was deeply concerning – a concern which became intensified after Dollfuß's assassination at the hands of Austrian Nazis in July 1934.[140] This should not be taken as an elision of 'Nazism' and 'fascism' which I highlighted as erroneous in the introduction. As this thesis has shown, a multiplicity of 'fascisms' existed in interwar Anglican thought. But it is accurate to suggest that a sort of hierarchy emerged where Nazism was the 'worst' and that other, often emerging, fascisms were perceived in relation to it.[141] In this hierarchy, they were not separated by kind but rather by degree. Regarding Spain then, when Anglicans expressed concern that it would move toward Nazism, this meant that they were concerned it would become a version of fascism more profane than its original iteration; that is to say an ideology based on spiritual repression, false idolatry, and a community that was inorganically structured on a fabricated destiny.

But the greatest indicator of Franco's 'faithless Christianity' was the emergence of António de Oliveira Salazar (1889-1970) as the darling of the European extreme political Right. Salazar came to power in 1926 after a nationalist military coup toppled the First Portuguese Republic (1910-26). He had been a lecturer in political economy at Coimbra University before moving into politics. His academic aptitude was mirrored by a deep piety; like Franco, he based all policies on the social teaching of the Papal Encyclicals but, in contrast, he never presented his regime as holding an Apostolic succession.[142] In 1933, Salazar officially installed the *Estado Novo* (New State),

[140] See e.g., cf., 'Austria', *Guardian*, 1 September 1933 and 16 February 1934; 'Summary', *Church Times*, 27 July 1934; 'Austrian Corporative State', *Record*, 15 September 1933, 'The Attack on Dr Dollfuss', ibid, 6 October 1933, 'What of the Future?', ibid, 3 August 1934; Henson, *Unimportant Life,* II, 337 (entry for 26 July 1934).
[141] See e.g., cf., Inge, *The Fall of the Idols* (London: Putnam, 1940), 116; Tawney, 'Why Britain Fights', 78; Don, *Faithful Witness*, 356-7 (14 November 1940); 'Summary', *Church Times*, 14 June and 27 December 1940.
[142] A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *History of Portugal*, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), II, 193; for a good overview of the Salazar regime, see Tom Gallagher, 'Portugal', in *Political Catholicism in Europe*, 129-155.

which, like Mussolini's Italy, was politically and socially authoritarian and economically corporatist. Though it was in power for some time, British enthusiasm for Salazar largely coincided with the *Estado Novo*, and, as A. H. de Oliveira Marques importantly notes, the total social, economic, and political redevelopment of Portugal garnered significant interest.[143]

Salazar was an important figure on the European political Right, not least because of his veneration of Christianity. He was a pronounced critic of fascism, describing it as 'pagan Caesarism.'[144] Both Mary Vincent and Tom Villis have noted that Portugal served as the model for a successful confessional state amongst large swathes of the interwar European Catholic political Right.[145] Praise was given to Salazar's confessional state for not being clerical. Anglicans had criticised Dollfuß's confessional state in Austria for being a clerical regime, typified in the richly evocative letter J. A. Douglas sent to Basil Batty in which he stated that 'the Catholic Church [in Austria] has been for some time a definitely political party – monarchist and reactionary.'[146] As Chapter Four of this thesis showed, the same sentiments underpinned Anglican anti-Francoism in the 1930s. Praise of Salazar's confessionalism could be found throughout British political discourse: a leader in *The Times* considered one of Salazar's principal achievements to be the establishment of a regime on the 'philosophical basis of Christianity' while Lord Harlech (William Ormsby-Gore, 1885-1964) deemed him 'Gladstonian' in his confessionalism.[147]

Moreover, Adrian Hastings has argued that English Catholics found both Salazar and Franco particularly congenial.[148] Hilaire Belloc wrote effusively in the Catholic *G. K.'s Weekly*, lauding Salazar's 'imperturbability' and 'high organising power.'[149] Chips Channon wrote simply 'I wish that we had a Salazar at home.'[150] Michael Derrick (1915-61) was a leading Catholic journalist

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143 Marques, ibid, 202.
144 Hugh Kay, *Salazar and Modern Portugal* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1970), 68; see also, Filipe Ribeiro de Meneses, *Salazar* (New York: Enigma, 2009), 162-71.
145 Vincent, *Second Spanish Republic*, 223; Villis, *British Catholics and Fascism*, 190-1; see also contemporaneous praise of this in, 'The Rights of Man', *Guardian*, 3 November 1944.
146 Ibid, Lang 49, ff.217, Douglas to Batty, 8 September 1934.
147 '800 Years of Portugal', *The Times*, 3 June 1940; Lord Harlech, 'Salazar', *The Listener*, 23:595 (1940), 1081-99.
148 Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*, 324.
149 Belloc, 'Portugal', *G. K.'s Weekly*, 645:25, 22 July 1937, 329.
150 *Henry 'Chips' Channon*, III, 487 (22 August 1948).

at *The Tablet*, and his book *The Portugal of Salazar* (1939), was a unique source of contemporary information. Derrick wrote before many others in Britain that Salazar should not be seen as a fascist, nor his ideology fascistic.[151] But the same cannot be argued in the Church of England because whereas Franco was condemned, Salazar was praised. In fact, the emergence of Salazar helped to unify Anglican criticisms of Franco.

Salazar's doctrine suffused British intellectual and political culture in no small part due to T. S. Eliot. At this point in his career, he was a director at the publishing house Faber and Faber, and was the driving influence in the publication of two important books on the Salazar regime.[152] In 1939, Faber published both António Ferro's (1895-1956) *Salazar*, an overview of the dictatorship by the regime's most notable propagandist, as well as the English translation of Salazar's *Doctrine and Action*, a collection of essays outlining the regime's domestic and foreign policies. Salazar's ideological rationale is self-evident from his introduction: he was unequivocally critical of fascism for what he interpreted as a Hegelian conception of the state and a preoccupation with national prestige at the expense of the spiritual wellbeing of its citizens.[153] With these two books serving as the main sources of Eliot's understanding of the Salazar regime, it was little wonder that he was so impressed by Portugal's dictatorial prime minister.

Where Salazar was unique in Anglican thought then was that he showed it possible to construct a truly confessional state that was socially and politically authoritarian while acknowledging that man's rights were God given and that the state could not impinge upon them. Eliot's earliest comment on Salazar is brief but important in understanding this perceived uniqueness. In a 1936 letter to the poet Stephen Spender (1909-95), who was currently holidaying in Portugal, he affectionately asked after 'our Salazar', a man whom he considered gentle, especially

[151] Michael Derrick, *The Portugal of Salazar* (New York: Campion, 1939), 69.
[152] See e.g., *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, VIII, 164, 640 (Eliot to Antonio de Mendonça 17 April 1936 and 27 July 1937), 884 (Eliot to António Ferro, 27 May 1938).
[153] António Salazar, Robert Edgar Broughton (transl.), *Doctrine and Action* (London: Faber, 1939), 34-5.

in contrast to the twin-brutes Mussolini and Hitler.[154] A year later, Eliot met Salazar while visiting Portugal in May 1938 'at the expense of the government' which 'doubtless comes from António Ferro, the head of the Portuguese Propaganda Department.'[155] After the meeting, he wrote to Ferro expressing his 'respect and admiration' for Salazar.[156] Salazar's leadership qualities constituted the large part of Anglican analyses of him: the *Guardian* called him a 'modest, patriotic leader' and praised his impressive statesmanship for ignoring Nazi propaganda, just as the *Record* had regarding Dollfuß.[157]

Eliot's comments on the Portuguese dictatorship contrasted significantly to the fascist leaders he had consistently condemned throughout the interwar years. In the *Christian News-Letter* he wrote that Salazar

> has never encouraged the adoption of the "Leader Principle," and no leader has ever won his position with less personal ambition, or less appeal to mass emotion. Nor did he rise to power through a "party". He simply happens to be the ablest statesman in Portugal… His interest and importance for us is that without being in any dubious political sense pro-clerical he is a Christian at the head of a Christian country.[158]

As we have seen, Eliot's preliminary objection to Italian Fascism was that it used temporal solutions to fix moral problems. Salazar, on the other hand, made no such 'appeal to mass emotion' but rather rose to power because he offered the best solution to the political and social crises of 1920s Portugal. Eliot's use of 'Leader Principle' alluded to the language of paganism that dominated Anglican discourse in the years preceding, and during, the Second World War. His consideration of Salazar as a leader who had no interest in divinising himself, or the ideology he was an exponent of, but merely being a man who saw the need to re-exert Christian principles in

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[154] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, VIII, 79 (Eliot to Stephen Spender, 21 November 1936); Eliot, 'A Retrospective Review of The Lion and the Fox', *Twentieth Century Verse*, 6:7 (1937), *Complete Prose*, V, 574.
[155] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot to Emily Hale* (Eliot to Hale, 15 March 1938)
[156] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, VIII, 885 (Eliot to António Ferro, 27 May 1938); see also, *The Letters of T. S. Eliot to Emily Hale* (Eliot to Hale, 20 May 1938).
[157] 'A Christian Dictator', *Guardian*, 14 June 1940 and 'The Peninsula, ibid, 15 January 1943; see also, 'The T. U. C. and Herr Hitler', *Record*, 8 September 1933 and 'Austrian Corporative State', ibid, 15 September 1933.
[158] Eliot, 'Portugal', *The Christian News-Letter*, 42, 14 August 1940.

Portuguese society, was used as a contrast to other contemporary figures on Europe's political Right.

Importantly, he noted that Salazar cared only for the veneration of Christian values. Salazar's position of not being 'pro-clerical' did not make him 'anti-clerical' in Eliot's mind but rather indicated that he was aware that a confessional state could not be formed on clerical authority, but only on the authority of Christian doctrine. Vichy, for example, had rejected religious doctrine as the basis of society as evidenced by the imposition of political tyranny. The government could be 'civic' while still promoting a fervent adherence to Christianity and therefore the ideological similarities between Salazar's actual state and Eliot's hypothetical one as per *The Idea of a Christian Society* suggest an important reason behind his interest in the Portuguese dictator. Moreover, the reference to clericalism here is significant because it provides an instance of direct unity between analyses of Spain and Vichy. If we recall Oldham's criticism of Vichy's religious policy ('extreme and frantic clericalism'), this was remarkably similar to what some Anglicans (such as Arthur Duncan-Jones and Hewlett Johnson) had indicted Franco for during the Spanish Civil War. Salazar's commitment to Christian doctrine and social values showed how a Christian could never be fascist, and vice versa. While it was believed that Franco had subverted this, it soon became clear this was never possible. Perhaps this explains Peers's and Inge's sudden condemnation of a once gallant Christian gentleman.

Resistance to Reconstruction

During the war years, Anglicans perceived fascism as an eschatological phenomenon. If war was the product of a tension between God and the world, and if the present war was about the competition of the systems of values attached to Christianity and fascism, then fascism was necessarily a judgement from God. Hensley Henson privately responded to a request from the *Methodist Recorder* for an article entitled "Why did God allow the War?", opining that 'the dark

mantle of agnosticism is ever encroaching on the area of dogmatism.'[159] Many within the Church of England must have felt similarly because throughout the war Anglicans crafted a response that centred on a fervent and orthodox Christianity. Central to this was the alignment of nations that acted in accordance with God's manifest will for mankind. As a result, a form of Christian transnationalism (not ecumenism, with implications of corporate unions) was an undercurrent in all Anglican interjections.

This was most clearly seen in the Anglican solidarity with the resistance movements across occupied Europe. Regarding Scandinavia and the Netherlands especially, Anglicans publicly venerated the efforts of the Christian churches which cultivated a revitalised national religiosity. The efficacy of national religiosity for ensuring that moral occupation did not accompany military proved the strength and truth in the word of God and vindicated the wider spiritual campaign of the present war. Moreover, where national religiosity was not cultivated by the national church or by the government, such as in France, Anglicans emphasised the spiritual foundations of the clandestine French Resistance and engaged with it as the legitimate government of France.

Interestingly though, this eschatological perspective of fascism engendered a powerful bout of introspection. In understanding fascism as such, Anglicans were made aware that where once it was considered approximate to this framework – an interruption to the normal temporality of politics – the war proved it was a product of Christian civilisation. Retrospective analysis of the preceding years by clerics such as William Temple and Cyril Alington concluded that the conflicts in Abyssinia, Spain, and Czechoslovakia were about fundamental issues which were now at stake in the present war: the failure to defend these values *then* haunted them *now*.[160] This shifted fascism from being perceived as incompatible with Christianity to being unable to coexist with it. Interestingly, such a perspective means what Michel Foucault called a 'heterotopia of deviation' is

[159] Henson, *Unimportant Life*, III, 59 (entry for 22 October June 1939).
[160] Cf., Temple, *A Conditional Justification of War* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1940), 20; Alington, *The Last Crusade*, 9; D. M. MacKinnon, 'Revelation and Social Justice', *Malvern, 1941* (London: Longmans, 1941), 98.

no longer an applicable framework to explain Anglican interpretations of fascist regimes; they cannot be heterotopias because they cannot coexist in one space.

Therefore, the Church of England's aims in the present war were not about military supremacy but spiritual. It was a war for the possibility of a space where Christian values were supreme, and fascism could not have existed. In many ways, the hope that Europe would emerge from the ashes as an interconnected, perhaps even omnipotent, Christian community makes Anglican thought close to what Foucault, in the same article, called a 'utopia': an 'unreal' space in which society can exist in its 'perfected form.'[161] Given the preceding two decades of Anglican anxiety culminated in an eschatological interpretation of fascism, one presumes this 'perfected form' was its readiness for moral integration into the Kingdom of God. I hope this chapter has shown how post-war Anglican discussions on European reconstruction – ably explored by Jonas Kurlberg and Matthew Grimley – were stimulated by those had during the war itself.[162] It seems that the fervent, lay-oriented Christianity on which the resistance movements in occupied Europe were based was transposed onto Anglican ideas about reconstruction.

The possibility of a new space was the governing theme of William Temple's Malvern Conference in 1941. The intellectual culture of the conference was a nod back to Victorian Christian social teaching of the Incarnationalist thinkers F. D. Maurice and Brooke Foss Westcott. The conference's primary concern was economic reconstruction, so the strong presence of Anglo-Catholic Christian socialists meant Victorian economic moralism akin to Newman and Arnold was pervasive. T. S. Eliot and other members of the Moot were also present, which is perhaps unsurprising given the group had been preoccupied by the same concerns that Malvern sought to address. For example, Gilbert Shaw (1886-1967), an Anglican clergyman and intellectual, explained

[161] Foucault, 'Of Other Spaces', 24.
[162] Jonas Kurlberg, 'Resisting Totalitarianism', 517-31; Grimley, 'Anglicans and the New Jerusalem', *International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church*, 21:1 (2021), 3-18.

that 'we might be bolstering up what had to die… but what we had to do was to hold to fundamentals.'[163]

At the conference, Maurice Reckitt explained that previous efforts for peace had failed because people had failed to instil the requisite spirituality within the worldly structures and institutions tasked with establishing peace in the temporal world. For Reckitt, this explained the collapse in the support for the League of Nations, for instance.[164] D. M. MacKinnon (1913-94), a Kantian-Idealist Philosophy fellow at Keble College, Oxford, made a similar suggestion about the achievement of peace. He used Ludwig Wittgenstein's theory of 'ostensive language', which posits that the everyday function of language means words become associated with pictures of words rather than what those words actually mean: for instance, 'slab' automatically invokes an image of a piece of stone.[165] For MacKinnon, this affected ethics in the same way; people associated 'peace' with 'no war', rather than with the spiritual values that society must venerate to establish peace.[166]

After the conference, Temple wrote that 'we are fighting to keep open the possibility of a still more truly Christian civilisation in the future.'[167] How this civilisation would look was less certain. But Anglicans were certain of the values which must be foundational to this space. Perhaps we might invert the predominant perspective which has been highlighted throughout this thesis for a moment. Rather than Anglicans observing fascism as antithetical to Christianity, we might instead suggest that Anglicans imagined this new civilisation as antithetical to fascism. Having had to distil the core tenets of their faith for the justification of war, Anglicans developed an awareness of what would make a space inimical to the rise of fascism. What the Church of England did learn from fascism though was that despite the transtemporality and cultural universality of these values, it had to adapt its pedagogy and application of these to tackle better the problems of modernity.

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163 *The Moot Papers*, 361 (Minutes to the Tenth Meeting, 10-13 January 1941).
164 Maurice Reckitt, 'War', *Malvern, 1941*, 39-53.
165 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, §6, 7. N.B., given this theory was (posthumously) published in 1953, MacKinnon must have ascertained this from Wittgenstein's *Blue and Brown Books* (1933-5), a collation of notes made by his students from his classes at Trinity College, Cambridge, available only to a handful of philosophers.
166 MacKinnon, 'Revelation and Social Justice', *Malvern, 1941*, 115.
167 Temple, 'Introduction', *op. cit.*, 8-9.

In many ways, this is a neat culmination of all the thoughts regarding how and why fascism emerged and existed between 1922 and 1945.

Conclusion

'You will have to live with those memories and make them into something new.
Only by acceptance of the past will you alter its meaning.'

\- T. S. Eliot, *The Cocktail Party* (1949)

'Yesterday Mussolini fell – never did such a well merited nemesis overtake a man of ὕβρις [hubris] in a superlative degree. His record is a warning to all would-be dictators… There is no redeeming feature in his twenty years of dictatorship. I… pray that Italy may yet recover its soul.'[1] This is what Alan Don remarked about Mussolini's arrest in 1943. Mussolini's military campaign in the Second World War was so dismal that discontent grew to the extent that no resistance to his arrest was offered. Two years later he was executed, by people whom Don glorified as 'patriots.'[2] Cyril Garbett wrote laconically 'Mussolini killed… so one of these evil men has gone.'[3]

The Anglican response to the collapse of the Fascist regime in Italy focussed almost exclusively on Mussolini's arrest in 1943; neither the *Church Times* nor the *Guardian* commented on his death in 1945 to any noticeable extent. The *Guardian* contrasted Mussolini – a toxic confluence of the '*étatism* [statism] of Machiavelli and the "blood and iron" doctrine of Bismarck' – with the 'great Christian people' that deposed him.[4] The *Church Times* presented Mussolini's place in the annals of European history as 'niche' due to this impressive albeit profane ability to utilise 'the cruelty and irrationalism of the Orient at its worst' within the paradigms of 'the modern and civilised West.'[5] It is striking that both newspapers reflected on the fascist regime as one of civilisational aberration – a form of politics unlike any which they had encountered hitherto. And yet, given the panic about fascism which newspapers like this stirred up, there appears a sort of

[1] Don, *Faithful Witness*, 413 (26 July 1943). Bold as per the original.
[2] Ibid, 1 May 1945, 441.
[3] YML, CGP, Acc No COLL 1982/5/B, War Diaries: Volume 6, 1 May 1945.
[4] 'The Week', *Guardian*, 30 July 1943. N.B., Otto von Bismarck (1815-98) was a Prussian and, later, German statesman, known for his authoritarian rule.
[5] 'The Week', *Church Times*, 30 July 1943.

complacent banality in these two pieces. This is hardly surprising given the strongly triumphalist tone in British culture generally in the post-war period.

Following the war, Spain reimagined itself and thus Anglican perceptions of it changed, again. A combination of Francoism's ideological realignment away from fascism and the emerging Cold War framework in international relations meant Anglicans knew the importance of balancing criticisms of its government with a need for cordiality to limit the spread of Bolshevism.[6] Such a willingness for international, anti-Soviet cooperation is replete in post-war Anglican examinations of Spain. 'Spain under Franco has an absolutist régime which is both stupid and harsh, but can hardly be described as totalitarian', Garbett believed.[7] To Eliot, Spain may have been 'despotic and probably cruel', and he may have wanted the restoration of the Alfonsist monarchy, but he saw no reason why this would preclude cooperation with Britain going forward.[8] In Anglican minds at least, Spain's dictatorship was acceptable though unfortunate.

As the fascist regimes of Italy and Germany faded from reality to memory, distance furthered this apparent banality. 'Fascism' entered common parlance as a touchstone of barbarity. F. R. Barry said the world had been split along the 'pre-Hitler, pre-Hiroshima' events.[9] Moving forward, Ralph Inge frequently referred to the excesses of the Stalinist regime back to fascism, indeed calling it a form of Nazism itself.[10] With a rather fascinating reference to F. A. Hayek's 1944 work *The Road to Serfdom*, Inge also used the term when writing about Clement Attlee's (1883-1967) newly elected Labour government: 'in conquering fascism we have had partially to fascise ourselves. "Planning", we are warned, may be a euphemism for the road to serfdom.'[11] Going

[6] On this, see Florentine Portero, 'Spain, Britain, and the Cold War', in Sebastian Balfour, Preston (eds), *Spain and the Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge, 1999), 232-51.
[7] Garbett, *In an Age of Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 157.
[8] *The Letters of T. S. Eliot to Emily Hale* (Eliot to Hale, 15 December 1946); *The Letters of T. S. Eliot*, IX, 998 (Eliot to Sencourt, 26 December 1941).
[9] Barry, *Period of My Life*, 90.
[10] Inge, *Ultimate Values* (London: The Society of Individuals and National League for Freedom, 1946), 3.
[11] Idem, 'Bernard Shaw', *The Listener*, 36:926 (1946), 472; see also, F. A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (London: Routledge, 1945).

further, he wrote that the 'ultimate values' Britain had fought for during the war had still not been realised because of this alacrity for state authority.[12]

In spite of this, banality might be an unfair suggestion, no matter how credible it is in these sources. It could be that after the war, fascism was already canonised, and the time for explication over. It instead suggests a revitalised (perhaps even newfound) confidence in the power of God's influence in the temporal world which the First World War had shattered. This is not to say providentialism had a dramatic resurgence, but rather that the Church of England's pedagogy in response to fascism had more success than its earlier attempts to moralise on secular politics. In many ways, Anglicans perhaps became comfortable with directly applying the Christian faith to suit the conditions of modern (secular) society: it reemphasised the mission of the Apostolic ministry but did not compromise its status as a Reformation church.

From a scholarly perspective, it is important to not let this ambivalence distort the fact that fascism caused many Anglicans much anxiety. To Anglicans, fascism was a unique representation of an eschatological phenomenon and therefore seen as a judgement of God on the state of modern society. We can offset this obscurity through a three-staged approach, presenting the empirical, historiographical, and theoretical findings of this thesis.

To tackle the first is to recapitulate the overall argument of this thesis. To point out that fascism caused alarmism in the interwar Church of England is no great claim, but the particular sources of this panic had rarely been considered. As this thesis has argued, Anglican attitudes toward fascism were dynamic and changed in response to external stimuli. Chapters One and Two considered fascism as an extreme variation on previous attempts at social organisation and the control of the masses. Chapter Two in particular focussed on Anglican ideas about the fascist state, imagining fascism as occupying a particular physical and temporal space in European civilisation.

[12] Idem, *Ultimate Values*, 9-10.

Moving into the 1930s, Chapters Three and Four examined the international crises of the Abyssinian conflict and the Spanish Civil War to explain how Anglicans saw fascism as a direct rejection of Christian spirituality and argued that it was, therefore, incompatible with Christian society. Chapters Five and Six demonstrated why Anglicans felt fascism and Christianity could not coexist. In many ways, the final two chapters emphasised the conception of fascism that had been woven throughout Anglican responses from 1922 onwards, namely that fascism was an eschatological phenomenon – a judgement from God.

This conception of an eschatological judgement – an innately theological interpretation – is surely significant. It represents, at the very least, a shift in Anglican abilities to handle the complexities of cultural, social, and political modernities. At the domestic level, the 'calamitous' response of Church of England bishops to the 1926 General Strike demonstrated how ineffective, and unwanted, secular interjections from clergymen were.[13] Bolshevism, too, was difficult to criticise holistically given the variety of attitudes clergymen expressed, some of whom believed its egalitarian utopianism aligned with the Social Gospel while others felt it anathema to religious conviction. But Bolshevism (largely) remained a secular issue, with interjections being of a religious nature imposed onto worldly problems. Anglican representations of, and responses to, fascism should not be seen like this, but rather as a response to what they saw as a totally separate and unique political, social, and cultural phenomenon. Anglican responses to fascism were innately religious given they perceived it as a spiritual, not a temporal, problem.

Each chapter of this thesis has in turn addressed specific issues and absences in existing scholarship. But thinking critically, it has produced three important, larger, interjections. The first is that this thesis has produced an original study of British religious responses to the internal dynamics of fascist regimes. Studies have largely been about responses to specific events, as Alan Wilkinson's and Adrian Hastings's work shows; even Tom Lawson's consideration of Anglican

[13] Bod., Dawson 72, ff.121, Henson to Dawson, 3 August 1926.

understandings of Nazism is situated within the wider framework of responses to the Holocaust.[14] As this thesis has shown, Anglicans were concerned with everyday life in fascist regimes as much as the major international crises which they caused.

The second issue that this thesis has reconsidered is the Church's relationship with Appeasement. A novel aspect of this thesis was its emphasis on emotions, cultural feeling, and mentalities. Such an approach has allowed me to make the important distinction between Appeasers and adherents of Appeasement and the value of this approach should be seen in the ability to confidently challenge Wilkinson's claim that all the clergy were 'appeasers.'[15] We cannot take claims of the clergy being appeasers seriously given what we have seen – from 1937 onwards, the clergy directly combatted the false prophets that were responsible for the destruction of Europe.

This naturally speaks to questions about secularisation, and the Church's role in the modern world. At an empirical level, the space given to Anglican pronouncements on fascism in published books and articles, invitations to speak at events, and public moralising on the radio, goes some way to suggest that contra Ross McKibbin, the Church of England's opinions counted for a lot. This is not even mentioning that senior clerics like Lang and Temple were vehemently criticised in the fascist-sympathising press, a fact of no small significance. What the above list also shows is that the Church of England was able to remain relevant and prominent in public life. The Church of England's response to fascism engaged with modernity in ways that it had not done before and suggests a sage awareness not of an unbelieving society, but a society with different ways of believing. This line of argument thus adds important historical support to Kenneth Medhurst's and George Moyser's argument (in response to Edward Norman) that the clergy's remit naturally evolved to represent modern society. Ironically, the Church of England's clergy managed to stay relevant by finding more diffuse ways of engagement.

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[14] Wilkinson, *Dissent or Conform?*; Hastings, *A History of English Christianity*; Lawson, 'The Anglican Understanding of Nazism.'
[15] Wilkinson, ibid, 165.

I have argued throughout this thesis that Anglicans observed a range of distinct versions of fascism in Europe, and the value in this is wholly dependent on the acknowledgement that it is one piece of a still fragmented history. More detailed studies on the regimes of Austria and Norway (only cursory in this thesis) are needed. The nature of studying established regimes means attention is always diverted away from less successful but no less ideologically driven parties and movements, in Europe and beyond. The merit and importance of such studies cannot be understated and is significantly disproportionate to its current exclusion from the historiography. Moreover, we have only studied a twenty-three-year period, and one wonders what could be made out of how Anglicans remembered fascism, especially as new waves of fascism emerged, particularly in 1980s Britain. Further investigations like this are important because they speak to more than just fascism, or political extremism, but to modernity generally.

There are, of course, other clergymen and laypeople to whom we could have turned for a different perspective, however, I remain unsure what to make of Bishop K. E. Kirk of Oxford's (1886-1954) assessment of Mussolini.

> [He] had something great in him – not spiritually or intellectually, but he had his roots in the earth. He was primitive, near the soil.[16]

Interesting this may be, but one fears that the ecocriticism of interwar European fascism (despite the best efforts of Greg Garrard and Jeremy Diaper) is unlikely to gain any serious traction.[17]

This lends itself to the theoretical point of this thesis. We have seen that fascist politics was perceived as totalising and that Anglicans perceived fascism as unable to coexist with Christianity in the same social space. In response, the Church of England felt compelled to practise a totalising religion, which broke down the traditional spheres of influence between church and state and thus engaged with new ways of moralising and believing. This totalised conception of

[16] YML, CGP, War Diaries: Vol. 6, 13 April 1945.
[17] Greg Garrard, 'Heidegger Nazism Ecocriticism', *Interdisciplinary Studies in Literature and Environment*, 17:2 (2010), 251-71; Jeremy Diaper, *T. S. Eliot & Organicism* (Clemson, S.C.: Clemson University Press, 2021), 175.

the community could be interpreted as a new form of anti-statism, away from traditional disestablishmentarianism. It was not that clergymen now saw the moral scrutiny of politics as their right, but that it was their duty. F. R. Barry thus spoke for many of his generation when he wrote that 'a church that is only concerned with saving "souls" out of the world has no message for the world… The Church must be involved in the world, as Jesus himself was, without reserve, because the secular world is God's world.'[18] Put another way, many within the Church felt that in modernising their remit, they actually recovered the true vocation of the ministry; they had a better grasp of what the Act of Apostles meant when it demanded that minsters had to 'serve tables' as well as 'the word of God' (Acts. 6:2-3).[19]

The patterns of theological thought changed in the Church of England, and among the salient changes was the new emphasis on the Incarnation. It was prominent in wartime sermons; Hensley Henson and Cyril Alington followed Brooke Foss Westcott's more conventional teaching that the Incarnation showed that Christ lived as God's word, and thus how Britons should do in this time of war.[20] This interpretation of the Incarnation became common in post-war Anglican thought as a way of ensuring that God's presence was more firmly entrenched on earth and His word suffused every aspect of civic life. As Geoffrey Fisher (1887-1972), archbishop of Canterbury since 1944, and Cyril Garbett both suggested, a relationship with the Incarnate God was essential for the smooth redevelopment of the post-fascist world.[21]

Personalism also became a crucial part of the Church of England's post-war worldview. Unlike the anti-liberal Catholic Personalism of Jacques Maritain, Anglican Personalism stressed the relational ontology of mankind. That is to say, the dignity of man's individual personality is

[18] Barry, *Christian Ethics and Secular Society* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1966), 277; see also, Alington, *Sense and Nonsense* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1949), 77; Garbett, 'The Church's Future', *The Times*, 5 February 1955 and *Church and State in England* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1950), 295.
[19] See e.g., Kirk, 'The Apostolic Ministry', *The Apostolic Ministry* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1947), 11.
[20] Cf., Henson, *Last Words in Westminster Abbey* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1941); Alington, *The Kingdom of God* (London: Centenary Press, 1940), 139; see also, Brooke Foss Westcott, *Epistle to the Hebrews* (Grand Rapids, MI.: Edermans, 1965), 48.
[21] Geoffrey Fisher, 'A Crisis of Faith' (1952), *The Archbishop Speaks* (London: Evans Brothers, 1958), 192; Garbett, *The Christian Churches and International Peace* (London: SCM, 1945), 46.

sacred and therefore all individual personality must be considered as such. This came through most prominently in Anglican anti-racist discourse. T. S. Eliot criticised the racially segregationist societies of America and South Africa because they did not allow all members of the community to have the same access to education, which, as we have seen, was central to Eliot's idea of moral unity.[22] South Africa's apartheid regime in particular garnered a distinctly Personalist response. T. N. W. Bush, Rector of Beaconsfield, said that the 'Church exists to pursue one objective… to establish a brotherhood between all men under the paternal care and guidance of God'; Geoffrey Fisher and Geoffrey Clayton (1884-1957), archbishop of Cape Town, both spoke in Personalist tones of 'common justice' for ending racial segregation.[23]

Taken together, the changes that fascism prompted suggests two things. The first is that community was perhaps the most criticised aspect of fascism. Anglican thinkers understood that fascism emerged in what Bonhoeffer called 'broken communities' – that is to say, communities where man had lost his connection to God, and thus to each other.[24] Though fascism was an extreme development of this because it replaced God with the state, it was nonetheless recognised as a problem of modernity. The second then is that the Church of England began to imagine itself as the architects of a social space that responded to both modernity and God's will. In many ways, the critical reflections above suggest that Matthew Grimley is right to see the Church of England emerging from the interwar period as a 'civil religion.'[25] This being said, how did its idea of a civil society look?

It was not in the functional sense which Jean-Jacques Rousseau meant when he coined the phrase nor in the mediaeval sense that J. N. Figgis had envisaged, but a civil society where there was one community – the national community – and the state was reintroduced into the confines

[22] Eliot, 'Lambeth and Education', *Guardian*, 1 July 1949.
[23] T. N. W. Bush, 'Anglicans and Apartheid', *Africa South in Exile*, 5:4 (1961), (28)-36; Rob Skinner, 'The Moral Foundations of British Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1946-1960', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 35:2 (2009), 408-9.
[24] Bonhoeffer, *The Communion of Saints* (1930; New York: Harper and Row, 1963), §4.
[25] Grimley, *Citizenship, Community, and the Church of England*, 225.

of this community, as a tool of divine administration.[26] With the Christian faith supreme, God would be recognised as the source of reality and His word the source of ethics. With a greater awareness of society being built on its true, Christian roots, it would mean the Church was reinstated as the only saviour of mankind.

Over time, this naturally changed to reflect a new Britain and perhaps became closer to Andrew Shanks' idea of civil society. For Shanks, civil society is the space in which man's dual allegiance to his faith and the state flourished and the ability for each to critique the other was an integral part of the general effort to stabilise and reconstruct religious belief and social order. This space is governed by parameters of opportunity remarkably like Habermas's ideal speech situation, in which fair and honest dialogue is central to the development of social fellowship.[27] Robert Runcie (1921-2000), archbishop of Canterbury between 1980 and 1991, truly embodied this, with Daniel Loss showing that he and others understood the importance of *religion*, not necessarily Christianity, for keeping British community alive.[28] If previous studies have shown how the Church of England redefined itself in this way, then this study has attempted to show at least one reason why it did.

[26] Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, I.VIII, 166-7, Susan Dunn (ed.), *The Social Contract and The First and Second Discourses* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Figgis, *Churches in the Modern State*, 87-8
[27] Andrew Shanks, *Civil Society, Civil Religion* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 69; Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols. (Boston, MA.: Beacon, 1984-7), I, 25, 304-7.
[28] Daniel Loss, 'The Church of England, Minority Religions and the Making of Communal Pluralism', in *The Church of England and British Politics since 1900*, 298-315, esp., 300.

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Notes

All Bible verses are quoted from the King James Version (KJV).

Abbreviations

CUP: Cambridge University Press
FNS: Friends of National Spain
JHUP: Johns Hopkins University Press
ODNB: *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*
OUP: Oxford University Press
SCM: Student Christian Movement
SPCK: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge

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